AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS Drawn from Scripture and Reason, In Dr. SHERLOCK's CASE OF ALLEGIANCE, And his Vindication of it.  
LONDON, Printed in the Year M DC XCI.   

An EXAMINATION of Dr. SHERLOCK's Case of Allegiance.  
IT is the design of this Treatise to examine all the Arguments in Dr. Sherlock's Case of Allegiance, that are drawn from Scripture and Reason; and that the state of the Controversy may be clearly understood, I begin with  

SECT. 1. The Case plainly and briefly stated.  
HEre he complains, first of the perploxing this Controversy by intermixing the dispute of Right with the Duty of Obedience; but is it not as much perplexed by Separating them? Is not this the great Controversy between us, whether Allegiance be due to those who have no legal Right to it? And thus the Controversy is perplexed because it is a Controversy.  
Then he tells us, it seems unfit to dispute the Right of Princes, a thing which no Government can permit to be a Question; but it seems to me unfit that Religious Oaths should be broken, and if Allegiance be due only to those who have a Right, the dispute of Right is unavoidable; and if no Government can permit it, that is no Obligation upon me to be Perjured.  
But such disputes will carry Men into the dark Labyrinths of Law and History; and therefore the Doctor leads them into the inextricable Labyrinths of Providence. Now I think that Law and History are not such dark, unintelligible, and uncertain Riddles as he makes them; they were not designed to maze and blunder our Understandings, but to rectify and inform us about Fact and Right. If History cannot enlighten us in Matters of Fact, than the Ages that are passed are buried in Darkness and Oblivion, and all History, Sacred and Profane, is no better than Romance. If Law be a clear and safe Rule of Conscience only to a very few, why is it published, and enjoined, and enforced by Penalties upon the many? It is a contradiction to the very nature of Law, to say it cannot be a clear and safe Rule of Obedience; and if Law and History are clear in any thing, it is very probable they are clear in things Fundamental, and in Matters of greatest Importance and most universal Concernment. I know there are great and intricate disputes about our Constitution, and so there are about the most evident conclusions of Faith, Sense, and Reason; but Doubts and Errors do not overthrow Truth and Certainty; and if some Men shut their Eyes at Noonday, it is no good Consequence that there is no Sun in the Firmament, or that Light is Darkness.  
He gives a summary Account 
Pag. 2.  of the Difficulties, which they who refuse the Oaths do labour under. They think, that a rightful Prince only has a Right to our Allegiance; that though he be dispossessed of his Throne, he has Right still, and therefore our Duty is still owing to him, and to no other, and our Oaths of Allegiance to him still bind us; and that no other Prince who ascends the Throne without a legal Right, has Right to our Allegiance; and that to swear Allegiance to him while we are under Obligation of a former Oath to our rightful Prince, is Perjury. This is indeed the Principle we proceed on, though it is not the sum of all that can be said in this Cause; our Principles, I think, may be more clearly and fully expressed, and ● propose them thus:  
We maintain that a lawful Sovereign cannot lawfully be Resisted on any pretence whatsoever; and therefore cannot lawfully be Deposed, nor consequently be lawfully▪ Dispossessed; that such unlawful Acts are null in themselves, and can effect nothing; that a rightful Prince does not cease to be so, because he is wrongfully Deposed, that his Right does remain after he is Deposed, unless he renounce it by Resignation, or lose it by Dereliction; that when this ancient Right is extinguished, the Usurper of the Throne becomes a lawful Sovereign, and has a Right to Allegiance and not before; that the Dispossessed Prince, as long as his Right to the Government continues, has a Right to Allegiance; that Allegiance includes all those Duties, which are contained in the relation of a Subject, not only Submission and Obedience in things lawful, but most especially actual Defence and Assistance against all his Enemies: That therefore Allegiance cannot be Sworn to an Usurper, because it is an Obligation to assist him against the true and rightful Sovereign, that such assistance is manifest Injustice, and in them that are bound by Oath to assist the rightful Sovereign inexcusable Perjury: And lastly, That God's Authority is Delegated only to rightful Princes, and that Usurpers, while they continue such, have no better Title to it than even Pirates and Robbers; and these I take to be the Principles of them who refuse the Oath.  
But the Propositions which the Doctor opposes to their Principles, are fairly reconcileable with them; for▪ 1. We may acknowledge that Allegiance is due not for the sake of legal Right, but Government; and, 2. That it is due not to bare legal Right, but to the Authority of God. We may admit that Allegiance is due to God's Authority, and for the sake of Government, and yet a legal Right to Government may be still an evident Proof both of the Authority of God, and of a Right to Allegiance.  
3. We may allow also, That God, when he sees fit, sets up Kings without any regard to legal Right, or humane Laws: He may do it by express Revelation, and he may do it by his Providence extinguishing the legal Right, and so making the Possessor a rightful Prince, though his Right be grounded on no humane positive Law, but upon the Law of Nature. And, 4. It may be granted that a Prince so established, Is invested with God's Authority, which must be obeyed not only for Wrath, but also for Conscience sake; and thus admitting these Principles to be true in some Sense, it will neither follow, That our old Allegiance nor our old Oaths are at an end, nor that Allegiance is always due to the Powers in possession.  
But, here in short, lies the Controversy between us, whether an Usurper who has wrongfully Dispossessed a rightful Prince, whose legal Right to the Throne does still continue in force, has nevertheless the Authority of God on his side, and by consequence a divine Right to our Allegiance. The Doctor is for the affirmative, and his Adversaries against it.  
But first he endeavours to bias the Reader to his Opinion by obsering, 
Pag. 3.  How much it makes for the ease and safety of Subjects in all Revolutions; and therefore, they have reason, he says, to wish it to be true, and to be glad to see it well proved. Whether this Principle be in reality for the ease and safety of Subjects may be debated hereafter; suffice it here to observe, That ease and safety are usually strong Arguments, but only to Flesh and Blood; Trouble and Danger do generally pursue Truth and Virtue; and if Principles may be prejudged by this Criterion, the Epicurean and the Atheist have much the better on't, and are wiser, in their Generation at least, than the Religionary and the▪ Christian. Salus Populi has been ever the Argument for Rebellion and Regicide; we know it is Milton's Fundamental Principle; and in all Revolutions, it is as much for the ease and safety of Subjects certainly to execute the Deposed Prince, as it is to abjure him. The same renowned Author wrote a Book for the Lawfulness of Divorces, in the case of a troublesome and unsociable Marriage; and the great Reason that runs through his Book, is this, because the Remedy of Divorce is much for the ease and happiness of Mankind, and the making the Bond indissoluble is, says he, the Changing the Blessing of Matrimony into a familiar and coinhabiting Mischief, at least into a drooping and disconsolate Houshold-captivity, without Refuge or Redemption.  
Mr. Hobbs hath taught his Followers, that Subjects when commanded by their Sovereign to deny Christ, may lawfully obey him; they have the Licence, says he, that Naaman had, and need not put themselves into danger for it: A Principle much, no doubt, for our Worldly ease and safety; and upon the same account he advanced another Principle, the same, for aught that I can see, which is maintained by the Doctor, That the Obligation of the Subject to the 
Leu. pag. 124.  Sovereign does last no longer than the Power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. In short, the Temptation (for it is nothing else) with which the Doctor would corrupt his Reader, may equally serve as a persuasive to the denial of Christ, the Existence of Spirits, Hell Torments, and to divers other Articles of the Hobbian ●elief; and to a Discourse concerning them, no fitter Introduction could be devised than this, That those Principles are so much for the ●ase and safety of Mankind, that they have reason to wish them to be true, and to be glad to see them well proved. But I think it a much fairer way of procedure which the Cas●●st● have hitherto prescribed: First to consider Lawfulness, and then Expediency, to examine what is just and righteous, before we inquire what is safe and easy; and if a bias must needs be clapped upon our Reason before we enter into Argument, I am sure it is much safer for a Christian to incline the Balance on the other side, and to suffer Ease and Safety to weigh against Duty and Conscience.  
And now we come to Argument, and the Doctor undertakes to prove his Opinion from Scripture and Reason, and from the Principles of the Church of England: He begins with the last, but that comes not within the compass of my undertaking, and therefore I proceed to consider   

SECT. 3. The Testimony of Sripture and Reason in this Matter.  
HEre the Doctor does premise, 
Case of Alleg. p. 10.  That the Proofs from Scripture and Reason, must necessarily be intermixed and interwoven with each other. But why was this necessary? Was it impossible for the Doctor to separate his own Reasons from God's Revelations? Are not Arguments from Scripture and Reason easily distinguished? And to what purpose is this Confusion of Discourse, but to blunder and confound the Reader's Understanding; nevertheless he pretends to set th●● matter in a clear Light, and first he presents us with some plain Propositions, as he calls them.  
The 1. and 2. Propositions, (That Civil Power and Authority is from God, and that he gives this Power and Authority to so●●▪ particular Persons,) are beyond all Controversy with the Refusers of the Oath, and for this very Reason they refuse them, because they are sure the Dispossessed Prince had Authority from God to govern them, and they cannot be sure that God hath deprived him of it.  
But the 3d. Proposition is that on which the whole Controversy turns, and the sum of it is this, That every one who is in Possession of Sovereign Power, has the Authority of God. If this can be proved, the dispute is at an end, and so it is likewise, if it cannot be proved. It will be evident▪ to any one that throughly considers the Doctor's Book, and all the Reasons and Arguments in it, that most of them must stand and fall together with this Proposition. The Doctor has not only asserted it, but has endeavoured also to establish and deduce it by a train of Consequences; here he has laid the Foundation of his Discourse, and therefore no doubt it has all the Strength, and Stability that so wise a Builder could give it: This is his Fundamental Proposition, and let us impartially examine the Deduction he has made to prove it.  
There are but Three ways, says 
Pag. 11.  he, whereby God gives this Power and Authority to any Persons, either▪ by Nature, or express Nomination, or by the Disposals of Providence. Now these Three ways are really no more than One, for the ways of Nature and express Nomination are only some of those various ways, whereby the Providence of God has disposed of Authority, and they are not therefore contradistinct to Providence, but comprehended ●n it; the World has been ever governed by Providence, and therefore there never▪ was, no● can be, any Power or Authority, which was not derived from it. But the various Methods by which Providence has conveyed Authority, may indeed be reduced to some general Heads, and then, according to the Doctor's Scheme of Principles, there will be Three ways of conveying Authority, by Nature, by Nomination, and by giving Power and Possession; but we think that a legal Right is one of the ways of Providence also; we are sure that whosoever has it, it is a Gift of Providence; and since a Right to a Sovereign Power implies a Right to the Possession of it, we cannot possibly conceive how one Prince can have a legal Right to Possession by virtue of God's Donation, and another, at the same time, have a divine Right to be the Possessor by God's Donation also. But let us follow the Doctor through his own ways of Providence.  
1. By Nature; Parents, says 
Ibid.  he, have a Natural Superiority over their Children, and are their Lords and Governors too; this was the first Government in the World, and is the only Natural Authority; for in Propriety of speaking there is no Natural Prince but a Father. Thus he plainly acknowledges that a Parent is a Natural Prince, and that in the beginning of the World the Fathers of Families had Civil Power and Authority over their Children. And now for Argument sake, let us revive the Patriarchal Government, and suppose a Paternal Prince, as Noah for instance, invested with Civil Authority over his Children; suppose again, that one of his Natural Sons, let it be Cham for example, does by force depose Noah, and usurp his Power, and acquire plenary Possession of it; and suppose once more, that the Unnatural Usurper requires an Oath of Sem and Japh●t, and all the rest of the Family, wherein they must Swear, That they will live in Obedience to Cham, and support his usurped Power, and contribute their Prayers, Purses, and Arms, to oppose their Father Noah, and to kill him if he endeavours to recover his Paternal Power; what should Sem and Japh●t do in this Case? Do, says the Doctor, they must Swear, and Pray, and Fight for the Usurper, against their Natural Father, for though Noah has a natural Right, Cham has a divine Right, he Reigns by God's Authority, and that may certainly be defended against all Persons whatsoever. Thus this Principle in its Consequences, is much worse than the Corban, for it teaches Children not only to deny Maintenance, but actually to murder their natural King and Father, and it glosses away the Precept of Honouring Parents into a Licence to destroy them; but, I think, that God did never authorise either Parricide or Usurpation.  
On the contrary, If in the Case supposed it can never be lawful for Children to forswear, oppose, and to destroy their Parents, when they seek only to recover their Rights of which they are wrongfully Dispossessed; if natural Fathers can never cease to be such, and their Authority is Inalienable without their own Consent, and if the mere Possession of it by an Usurper does not entitle him to the full Allegiance of the Children; what reason can then be given why Civil Authority in a legal Father, which is the same with that of a Natural, should not be equally Perpetual and Inalienable also? Why should Dispossession extinguish this Authority in one Father, when it does not in the other? If Providence does superinduce a divine Right over a legal Right, upon the same Grounds it will destroy a natural Right, and if it be lawful for Subjects to bind themselves by Oath to act for an Usurper against their political Father, than may Children in the same Case oppose their natural Father in the Prosecution of his natural Rights: But I appeal to the Sense and Reason of Mankind, whether such an opposition would not be highly Wicked and Unreasonable, and yet the Doctor's Principle will serve to justify it.  
2. His next way is, By particular Nomination, and thus God made Kings in Jewry. But this nominated King I leave in better Hands, with all the Arguments and Evasions that belong to him.  
3. He proceeds to tell us, That 
Ibid.  God ruled in all the other Kingdoms of the World as well as in Jewry, and all other Kings ruled by God's Authority, as well as the Kings of Judah and Israel, who were advanced by his Command; and if any one doubts this, it is evident out of Daniel, That the most High ruleth in the Kingdoms of Men, that he removeth Kings and setteth up Kings, and that he gav● to Nabuchadnezzar a Kingdom, Power and Strength, and Glory, (yet he afterwards owns that Nabuchadnezzar was made King over the Jews by God's express Command) and if all this be not evidence enough, The Prophecy of the Four Monarchies is a Demonstration of it. I have considered this Prophecy as it is Recorded in Daniel, and any one else, that considers it, will find that it contains only a Prediction of great Revolutions in the Governments of the World; but, I hope, the bare Prediction is no Demonstration, That the Accomplishers of it had the Authority of God to legitimate the unjust Invasion and Possession of the Rights of others. There are great Writers who affirm the Kingdom of Antichrist is foretold in that Prophecy, and it is undeniably foretold (if the great Beast be Antichrist) in the Revelations; Is Antichrist therefore to reign by the Authority of God? Indeed the Doctor's Arguments do prove it, but that is a plain Demonstration that they are Fallacious. Was the Crucifixion of our Saviour by God's Authority? And yet that was Prophesied also▪ May not Usurpation against God's Authority be as well Foretold, as the Delegation of it? If the Introducers of the Four Monarchies were Usurpers, the Prediction of them is no Proof of a divine Commission, and if the Doctor can demonstrate such a Commission out of Daniel's Vision, I will undertake to demonstrate it in the behalf of Antichrist also. In the mean time, we deny not that God governs in all the Kingdoms of the World, and that he removeth and setteth up Kings as he pleaseth; we maintain that all rightful Kings do rule by God's Authority, as much as if they were expressly Nominated, and we believe farther, that God cannot be the Author of Wickedness, and that he gives not his Authority to Usurpation and Injustice.  
But now, saith the Doctor, 
Pag. 12.  God governs the rest of the World, removeth Kings, and setteth up Kings▪ only by his Providence. This Proposition he explains thus; Then God sets up a King, when by his Providence he advances him to the Throne, and puts the Sovereign Authority ●●ito his Hands; then he removes a King, when by his Providence he thrusts him from the Throne, and takes the Government out of his Hands. The Proposition then, according to the Author's Sense, is to be understood in its utmost latitude, That whosoever is by Providence advanced to the Possession of Sovereign Power, is made a King by God, and whosoever is deprived of it by Providence, is deposed by God. But this is ambiguously proposed, and is true in one Sense, false in another; and this ambiguity will be evidently exposed by this parallel Proposition; That God does then give a Man an Estate, when his Providence puts him in Possession of it, and he deprives a Man of an Estate, when by Providence he is Dispossessed of it: It is certain that God governs every thing in the World, as well as Kingdoms by his Providence, and if all Events, then certainly the Dispossession and Possession of an Estate must be ascribed to it. And therefore the Proposition is true in this sense, that as far as God's Providence is concerned in the disposal of an Estate, he may be said to take away or give it. But it is manifestly false in this sense; that whosoever has by Providence the Possession of an Estate, has a divine Right to it by God's Donation. A Thief has by God's Providence Possession of honest men's Properties, and in some sense it is God that gives it him, but it was never yet thought that he had a jus Divinum to them. The Sabaeans drove away Job's Oxen, and yet he acknowledged that the Lord had taken them away; but it would be a strange Commentary upon the Passage to say, That the Sabaeans had God's Authority to keep them.  
And by Analogy to this parallel Case, the ambiguity of the former Proposition may be easily unfolded. It is true that God removes and sets up Kings in the same sense as his Providence does advance or dethrone them; but it is false, that whosoever is in any sense advanced to a Throne by Providence, is set up by God, so as that he has God's Authority to keep it: For it is undeniably evident that Providential Possession is no Argument of divine Authority; and therefore though it be granted, That God now governs the World, and setteth up Kings only by his Providence; yet it will by no means follow, that every one who is set up in any sense by Providence, has Authority from God; for than it would follow, that Pirates and Robbers have his Authority also.  
But here the Doctor leads me into a Digression about Providence, and because the whole Controversy depends upon the right understanding of God's Providential Concurrence in all Events and Actions; it is necessary to attend him through it.  
Providence he defines to be, God's Government of the World 
Case of Alleg. p. 12.  by an invisible Power, whereby he directs, determines, overrules all Events to the accomplishment of his own Will and Counsels; and to avoid Cavil we admit the Definition. There is a known Distinction between the permissive and the effective ordering and authorising Providence of God, and there is evident Reason and Necessity for it; for otherwise we must foolishly charge God with being the efficient Cause and positive Author of all the Wickedness in the World. But the Doctor will not allow the Distinction in the Case before us, and his Reason is, Because it does not relate to 
Ibid.  the Events of Things, but to the wickedness of Men, and though God cannot be the Author of any Wickedness, yet he is the Author of all Events which happen to private Persons or Societies; and the Consequence which he draws from this Doctrine is, That the Usurpations of Government are not only permitted, but are effected and authorized by it. To lay open the falsehood of this Doctrine, it is necessary to observe how the divine Providence is conversant about Wickedness.  
Before it is accomplished, Providence is concerned only in prohibiting and hindering the Commission of it; this is to be understood only of moral Impediments, such as are consistent with our natural Liberty, and are not irresistible. And here a Distinction is made between the internal and external acts of Sin, between an act of Wickedness as it lies in the Mind, and the outward Execution of it; the former is never hindered by irresistible Power, for that would destroy the very nature of the Will; but Providence does often lay such effectual Restraints upon the execution of Sin, that it is impossible to effect it, and when God does not by the interposition of his Power hinder a wicked event, or the external act of Wickedness, than his Providence does give it a negative Permission, because it does not positively prevent it.  
The acts of Providence which are conversant about Sin, in the very act of Commission, are the conservation of our Being and Powers, whereby we are capable of committing it; The direction and overruling of it to the accomplishment of his own Will and Counsel; and the determining or restraining of it within certain bounds and limits; and lastly, after the Wickedness is committed, the acts of Providence about it are the Punishment or Forgiveness of it. These are the acts of the divine Providence in relation to Sin, and from this account it is manifest, that the Providence of God which prohibits, hinders, overrules, restrains and punishes Sin, does neither effect nor authorise it.  
But though God be not the Author of Sin, yet the Doctor asserts him to be the Author of all Events; then say I, it unavoidably follows, that he is the Author of all the Wickedness that ever was, or can be committed in the World; for it is evident that all wicked Actions, when accomplished, are Events; and if God be the positive doer of all Events, he is infallibly the doer of all wicked Actions. Was not Absalom's Incest an Event, as well as his Usurpation? Was not Cromwell's Murder of King Charles an Event, as well as the Possession of his Power? Are not all Murders, Incests, Robberies, and all other Villainies that have been ever acted under the Sun Events? And that we may be convinced of the lawfulness of Swearing, must we now blasphemously conclude, that God is the Author of them? Two Evasions may be made use of to elude this Consequence.  
1. The old Distinction between an Action in itself, and the Obliquity and Vitiosity of it. But it is evident that in these actions, which are evil in themselves, as Blasphemy, Adultery, Oppression, and Usurpation, the act and the obliquity, though they may be considered separately, are yet really, and in the nature of the thing inseparable; (for who can commit Adultery, and be free from all Wickedness in it;) and therefore seeing they are inseparably united, he who causes the act is the cause of the obliquity, as he that kindles a fire is the cause of burning.  
2. It may be replied, That by Events the Doctor understands the direction, or the success of Designs and Actions, as it makes for the good or evil or private Men, or public Societies. He acknowledges, That God cannot be the 
Ibid.  Author of any Wickedness, and therefore we say he only permits it; but then when it comes to action he overrules it, and he either disappoints men's wicked Designs, or gives success to them, when he can serve the Ends of his Providence. But still the same Consequence will return upon him; for if God does not only permit, (for a Permissive giving of Success will here signify nothing,) but does positively give Success to Wickedness, than he is unavoidably the Author of the wicked Event, or Action; for the success of a wicked Design, is nothing else but the actual accomplishment of it, and if God be the positive accomplisher of all Wickedness that is actually committed, he is evidently the positive Author of the actual Commission of it: As for instance, whoever accomplishes, or gives success to a Plot of Murder or Adultery, is undeniably guilty of the actual Commission of them. It is true, that God's Providence overrules all the Designs and Successes of wicked Men to good ends and purposes, to the good and evil of private Persons and Societies; Punishments and Blessings do proceed from his Will, and there cannot be an Evil in the City, and the Lord hath not done it; he hath done it, by not hindering wicked Men from accomplishing their Designs, and he hath done it, by directing their Wickedness to the punishment of the wicked.  
But if this be all the Doctor's Meaning, that Providence does only direct the wickedness of some Men to the good or evil of others, than it will follow, 1. That this cannot be sufficient to make God the Author of all Events, and consequently that can be no Argument to authorise an Usurpation: And, 2. It is evident that the providential Direction of any wicked Event to the good or evil of Mankind, can be no proof of the conveyance of God's Authority. The using of an evil Instrument to a good End, and a divine Commission, are things easily distinguished, and it is easy to show the inconclusiveness of this arguing by many Instances. God makes use of Persecutors to chastise his People, Have they therefore God's Commission to do the Work of the Devil? Even the Devil is his Instrument to good Ends and Purposes, and God orders and overrules his Wickedness to accomplish them, Has he therefore God's Authority to govern us, and when God gives him Power, are we bound to pay Obedience? The Doctor argues, That all Events are ordered by God to the good or evil of private Persons, as well as Societies. Thus the Events of Robbery and Murder are often directed by Providence to the good and evil of private Men, and sometimes of Societies, but is this a Proof that Murderers and Robbers have God's Authority? The Incest and Usurpation of Absalon were equally from God's permissive Providence, and were alike ordered by God as a punishment to David, had he therefore a divine Commission to lie with his Father's Wives, and to usurp his Throne? For the one undoubtedly as much as the other, and much the same as have all other rebellious Sons and unnatural Usurpers. The sum is this; if God be the Author of all Events, than he is the Author of all wicked Actions; and if he is not, the overruling them to good Ends is no Commission of Government; and therefore the Doctor's Argument thus far does either border upon Blasphemy, or is nothing to the purpose.  
However the Doctor thus pursties it, If there were any such distinction as this, that some Events God only 
Ibid.  permits, and some he orders and appoints, we ought in reason to asscribe the Advancement of Kings to God's Decree and Counsel, because it is the principal Act of Providence which has so great an Influence upon the Government of the World; and if he decree and order any Events, certainly he peculiarly orders such Events as will do most good, or most hurt to the World; he must with his own hand immediately direct the Motions of the great Wheels of Providence, and not permit them to move as they please themselves. The Doctrine here delivered is this: That all great Events, such as have an Influence upon the Government of the World, are God's Order and Appointment, his Decree, his Counsel, and his Positive Doing. Strange and prodigious Doctrine from a Divine of the Church of England! for are not all the great Villainies of the World great Events? Are not all Insurrections and Rebellions, the Murdering of Kings, the Desolation of Kingdoms, the Destruction of Millions of innocent Persons, and the infinite Barbarities that are committed in unjust and impious Wars, are not all these Events, and such Events as do most hurt to the World, and have a great Influence upon the Government of it? And must it not then be said, that lesser Wickednesses are fit to be acted by miserable Men, but the great and flagrant Villainies are the peculiar Works of the Almighty. How the Hand of God does direct the great Wheels of Providence, is to us incomprehensible, but this we can easily comprehend, that God is no more the Author of greater than of lesser Villainies; he did not move Absalon to usurp upon David, nor Athaliah upon Joash, he directed neither the Hearts nor Hands of Jaques Clemens and Ravillia● to assassinate the two Henry's, nor did he order and appoint our English Regicides to execute the Royal Martyr upon a Scaffold.  
It is a false Notion of Providence to think it is more concerned about greater than about lesser Affairs: Providence has as much to do with Beggars as with Princes, with Families as with Kingdoms; and it numbers up all the Hairs of our Head, as well as the Destiny of Empires. All Nations are before God as the small Dust of the Balance, and are counted less than nothing; neither is there any difference of great and little, as to Omnipotency and Immensity. Events therefore are not peculiarly to be ascribed to God, because they appear great to us; and the Reason why some Events are said to be permitted, and others to be caused by God, is not because they are great or little, but because they are morally good or evil. If Usurpation of another's Right be a thing evil in itself, God must be equally discharged from being the Author of it, in the case of a Cottage and a Kingdom, God may permit, and may decree the Deposition of a King, as a just Punishment from him, who is righteous in all his Judgements, and he knows how to effect it without wicked Instruments but if he makes use of such Instruments for the execution of his Judgements, if he punisheth a lawful King by the Rebellion of his Subjects, or the Usurpation of his Throne, Have the wicked Instruments therefore the Decree and Appointment of God to authorise them? Or, is the Usurpation any more from God than the Rebellion?  
Nay farther, he may decree to advance a private Person to the Throne, as he decreed to advance David and Jeroboam, and God can certainly effect such a Decree by lawful ways, as by the Extinction of all former Titles; but if the Person whose Advancement is decreed expects not till Providence opens a lawful way to the Ascension of the Throne, but ascends it himself by the way of Usurpation, can the secret Decree of God either justify his Usurpation, or give him Authority to continue it? Shall we say that God moved him to this Wickedness? or not rather, that his Wickedness and his Advancement are only from himself? God decreed to make David King, yet after the Decree was revealed to him, he accounted Saul as God's King, and he patiently waited till God made him a lawful Sovereign, by the Extinction of the former Title. But Jeroboam anticipated God's Covenant, and advanced himself to the Throne by Rebellion and Usurpation; and therefore he is generally branded as an Usurper, and of him among others, it is thought that God himself hath said by the Prophet, They have set up Kings, but not by me. God 
Hos. 8. 4.  decreed to raise Joseph to great Dignity in Egypt; but if Joseph had wickedly usurped that Power or Wealth which was the Right of another, Could it then be said, that God's Decree did give him Authority to keep it, any more than it did to his Brethren to sell him to the Midi●nites? Thus would it be, if the Decrees of God were made known to Men; and much more is it so, when his Decrees are secret and unsearchable, and cannot possibly be known before they are accomplished. A Distinction there must be, between God's decreeing the Possession of a Throne to a Person, and giving him Authority to possess it while it is the Right of another; for otherwise the Decree of God must give Authority to Injustice. However nothing is effected by the Providence of God, but as it was decreed by him; and therefore when any wicked Event does happen, since it happens only by the permissive Providence of God, the antecedent Decree about it must be permissive also. We can never know whether God's Decrees be permissive or authoritative, but from the nature of the Events decreed; we are certain he only permits Wickedness, and he decrees only to permit it; and therefore if the Possession of a Power which is the Right of another be Wickedness, we are sure that God's Decree and Providence about it are merely permissive, and are consequently far from being Arguments of Divine Authority. But to return to the Doctor:  
He endeavours to support his Argument by Providence, by remembering, 
pag. 13.  That Kings are God's Ministers and Lieutenants, and are invested with his Authority; now to give Authority to any Person, does not signify to permit him to take it, and we cannot but think that God will exercise a particular Providence in appointing his great Ministers. Under the word Kings he comprehends Usurpers; and here the Doctor would conjure us into a Circle. He undertook to prove that all Usurpers do rule by God's Authority, because they are advanced by his Providence, and now he remembers that they are invested with his Authority, and from thence he argues that they are advanced by his Providence. But the Doctor remembers what he has not proved, that all Kings (comprehending Usurpers) are invested with God's Authority. This we positively deny, as being here precariously asserted, and therefore the Assumptions and Inferences that follow aught to pass for nothing. But behold his 
Ibid.  Subtlety! No Man can have God's Authority but he to whom it is given; and if the advancement to a Throne invests a Prince with God's Authority, than God gives him the Throne, and does not merely permit him to take it. If the Supposition were well proved, the Consequence would be never doubted; but the Reason on which he grounds it, is either not true, or not pertinent, For no Man can take God's Authority, but it must be given by him. The gift of God does generally imply a conveyance of Right by divine Donation, and in this sense his Assertion is manifestly false; for all Authority is God's, and whenever Men do assume Power and Authority, which they have no Right to exercise, (as for instance all Usurpers, Rebels, Pirates, Robbers, and Schismatical Preachers,) it is evident they usurp that Power and Authority which God never gave them. But sometimes God is said to give a thing, when Providence so order it, that Men have Power to take it. Thus ●●d God give David's Wives to Absalon, as the Prophet had denounced; but this Permissive gift did by no means authorise and legitimate his Inoest with them; and in this sense it is true, That no Man can take God's Authority, but it must be given; that is, no Man can usurp it without God's Permission. But in this sense his Proposition here is insignificant; for a Permissive gift is as good a Charter for Thiefs and Cutthroats, as it is for Tyrants and Usurpers.  
Nay, says the Doctor, Since 
Ibid.  God makes Kings now▪ not by an express Nomination, but only by the Events of Providence, we must not allow that God at any time permits Men to make themselves Kings, whom he does not make Kings; for than we can never distinguish between Kings by the Permission, and by the Appointment of God, between God's Kings and Kings of their own making. Then in other words he repeats the same Assertion, and concludes, That there is no direction how to distinguish them, and the Events of Providence in placing them in the Throne, are the same in both. Here the Doctor will not distinguish against his own Hypothesis; but why may not the Permission and Appointment of God be as easily distinguished in the advancement of Kings, as in the success of Pirates and Robbers, or in any other Event whatever? Since the only way whereby God does now give Riches and Estates, is the disposal of Providence, can we therefore never distinguish between the Possessing them by the Permission and by the Appointment of God? Does the forge● of a Will hold his Estate by divine Appointment, or the Thief the purchase of Robbery? If we cannot distinguish in such Cases between God's Permission and Appointment, Justice must leave the Earth again, and a divine Right may be pleaded for all the Injustice in the World. But if that distinction be allowed in private Property, why should it not be admitted in the right of Sovereignty also; the Reason is the same in both, for God can never be the Author of any Wickedness, and as long as the Possession of any thing is unjust or wicked, we may be sure that Providence only permits it.  
But, saith the Doctor, There is no direction how to distinguish between Kings by Permission and by divine Appointment, and the Events of Providence are the same in both. If he means direction in Scripture, he knows we are directed there to render every Man his due; and not only Scripture, but the Laws of Nature and Nations do direct it also. But though Scripture is no Code of Political Laws and Rights, yet we want not sufficient direction to determine us in paying every one his due. Political Laws and Constitutions are the Rule of Civil Rights, and they direct us how to distinguish between unjust and just Possessors, and the light of Reason and Scripture does assure us, That an unjust Possession is only permitted by God, and not appointed and authorized by him. We have as plain a direction how to distinguish about the Possession of Sovereignty as of private Property, or as we have to distinguish between the Usurpers of God's vindictive Justice, ●nd the lawful Administrators of it. Vengeance is God's, and his Vicegerents, but it is often usurped by Murderers and Rebels, they invade it by God's Permission only; but the Laws of Nations teach us how to distinguish them from God's Vicegerents; and if we have directions to distinguish when one branch of Sovereignty is permitted to be Invaded, when the whole is Invaded will not the same directions serve? Or is it easy to distinguish in lesser Usurpations, impossible in greater.  
But when a legal Prince and an Usurper are advanced to a Throne, The Event is the same in both. The Events considered, as Natural actions, may be the same, but as Moral, they may be as easily distinguished as any Moral good and evil. Adultery and Conjugal Copulation, just and unjust Possessions, the executions of Magistrates and Cutthroats, the Beheading of Charles the First, and the Beheading of Monmouth, in all these actions the Event, considered Physically, is the same; but, I hope, it is easy to distinguish in these Cases between Lawful and Unlawful, Permission and Appointment. So it is in the advancement to Sovereignty, when King Charles and Cromwell were advanced, the Event, to wit, the Possession of the Sovereignty was the same; but every Church of England Man, in those Days, could easily distinguish between God's Sovereign and the Devil's. In short, we can never distinguish Permission and Appointment by bare Events, but only by the moral Circumstances which denominate them good or evil.  
Consequently since Providence itself must be distinguished by the rules of good and evil, it necessarily follows that Providence of itself can never be a rule to us. The only rule of our Actions is Law, either Positive, Divine, Natural, or Humane; but it is impossible that Providence, abstracted from the Consideration of the moral Nature of Events, should be a Law to us, because it declares not the preceptive Will, or that Will of God which must be a rule to our Actions: Whatever Providence works, or is the Will of his good Pleasure, we must follow that Will which God has signified to us, either in written or unwritten Laws. God has never prescribed the Dispensations of Providence as a rule to us; they are often Unsearchable and above our Comprehension, but in no Case can we understand what God permits, and what he effects and authorizeth, but by the Moral nature of Events. Providence itself must be measured by the rules of good and evil, and therefore those must be the ultimate rules of our Practice. To conclude, Though Success (which is but another word for providential Events) be a good Argument of God's Approbation and Authority among the Disciples of the Alcoran, I think, it can be none among the Disciples of Christ; I am sure it cannot be found in the Volumes of his Religion.  
Thus I have considered what the Doctor has advanced about Providence; now, says he, The necessary Consequence is this; that by what means soever any Prince ascends the Throne, he is placed there by God, and receives Authority from him. And let the Reader judge, whether the Premises to this Consequence be sufficiently proved or confuted. The sum of his Proof is this, That God now governs the World only by his Providence, (which is false if it exclude his Government by Laws, and however is no Proof that every Usurper does Reign by God's Authority,) that all Events are from God, and especially great Events, (which is to charge God with all the Wickedness in the World,) that no one can usurp God's Authority, unless God does give it him, (which is confuted by all Murders and Rebellions;) and, lastly, that we cannot distinguish between Kings by Permission and Appointment, unless all Possessors of Sovereignty have God's Authority, (which may as well be said of all other Possessors; and contains no difficulty at all, it being as easy to distinguish Permission and Appointment, as lawful Princes and unlawful.) This is the sum of his Discourse upon the third Proposition, and let the Reader judge how well he has demonstrated it. I need not here reflect on his several ways of conveying God's Authority to Princes, Election, Succession, and Conquest or Usurpation. These will be considered hereafter; suffice it here to observe that there are in general but two ways whereby Princes are advanced by God, Permission and Appointment, this the way of Rightful Princes, and that of Usurpers.  
We are come now to his 4th Proposition, viz. That all Kings 
pag. 14.  are equally rightful, with respect to God; which is just as true as this Proposition, That all Men are equally righteous with respect to God, or that with God there is no difference between good and evil; or, that with respect to God, the Thief and the lawful Proprietor are equally rightful Possessors. But let us consider how he proves it: It is impossible there should be a wrong King, unless a Man could make himself King whether God will or no. The same Assertion with that which is confuted already, That no one can take God's Authority, but it must be given him: And may it not be said with equal Reason, that all Men must be made wicked by God, unless Men can make themselves wicked whether God will or no? Or is it impossible there should be a wrong Possessor of any thing, unless a Man could make himself a Possessor whether God will or no. He proceeds thus, The whole Authority of Government is Gods, and whoever has God's Authority is a true and rightful King, for he has the true and rightful Authority of a King. But is not every Branch of Sovereign Authority God's, if the whole Authority of Government is his? Does not every Murderer usurp the Power of the Sword, the principal Branch of that Authority? And is the Exercise of that Power rightful with respect to God, or is the Murder committed by God's Authority? Having God's Authority is an equivocal Expression; it may be had by Commission, as rightful Princes have it, and it may be had by Permission, as Assassins, Rebels, and Usurpers have it; and such a manner of having will never make the Possession rightful, either before God or Men. To speak properly, the Usurper has not God's Authority, he has Power or Force, and so has the Murderer, but that is not Authority; and yet because they exercise a Power which it is not lawful to exercise without God's Commission, abusively and improperly they may be said to have his Authority.  
Prop. 5. The Distinction then 
Ibid.  between a King de Jure, and a King de Facto relates only to humane Laws which bind Subjects, but are not the necessary Rules and Measures of the Divine Providence. This Distinction relates to humane Laws, just as does the Distinction in all other Cases between Right and Wrong. Humane Laws do declare and determine what is right, and the Law of God does establish and confirm the Law of man about it. Thus he who has a Right to an Estate by the Law of the Land, has a Right to it by the Law of God, and is the rightful Proprietor, with respect both to God and Man. If it were not so, the Invasion of another's Property could be no Sin; it could not make a man guilty before God, nor obnoxious to his Vengeance, if it were no Transgression of his Laws. In private Dominion therefore the Distinction of a Possessor de Jure and de Facto, relates to divine as well as humane Law; and why should it not then in the ease of politic Dominion and the Possessors of Sovereignty? Shall private Injury be a Breach of Divine and Humane Laws, and an Injury to God's Vicegerents be an Offence only against the Laws of Men? Does not the Sanction of God establish the Rights of Sovereigns? Or does his Law take care of Oxen, and not of Men, of private Men, and not of Princes? What can be the Reason of this Prerogative of private Rights above the Rights of Princes? Is it because Humane Laws are not the necess●●y Rules and Measures of Providence? Does not Providence dispose of them? And is it bound to humane Laws in respect to Property, and free in respect to Sovereignty? Humane Laws are not the adequate Rule of Providence, for many things come to pass in God's Government of the World, which cannot be regulated by them; and yet God's Providence does govern political Societies by political Laws, sometimes it makes a Law void by extinguishing the matter of it, but it never directly abrogates it; for as long as humane Laws are Laws, they do continue to bind Subjects, they are the necessary Rules and Measures of their Actions, and have the Sanction of divine Authority to enforce them.  
Let us consider how the Doctor illustrates and confirms his Proposition: In hereditary Kingdoms, says he, a 
Ibid.  rightful King is he who has by Succession a legal Right to the Crown, and he who has Possession of it without a legal right, is a King de Facto, a King, but not by Law: That is, he is an unlawful King, or an Usurper. Now if this Law which creates a Right to the Crown be truly and properly a Law, than it is certain the Authority of God confirms it; and consequently the King de Jure, having his Right established by the Law of God, the Usurper cannot claim by virtue of it; if the legal and divine Right be in another, it is manifest he has neither, and must be a wrongful Possessor with respect to God and Man; but if the Law of Succession be no Law, the talk of a King de Jure is Banter, and there is no such thing as Right or Law in the World.  
The Dr. acknowledges, that 
Ibid.  Subjects are so tied up by the Constitutions of the Kingdom, that they must not pull down or set up Kings contrary to the Laws of the Land; but (he adds) God is not bound by humane Laws, but can make whom he pleases King, without Regard to legal Rights. This is liable to many Reflections.  
1. He grants that Subjects must not see up illegal Kings, therefore they must not set them up, by giving their Consent to the Advancement of them; and yet he affirms afterwards, that Kings de Facto are not set up by God till they are settled, and that they are not settled till they have the Consent of the Subjects. Thus the Result is, That God can never set up Kings against Law, for Subjects must not set them up by their Consent, and there is no other way to do it.  
2. If Subjects must not, is it lawful for others to advance them? May Foreigners lawfully set up Kings over others? Who made them Judges or King-makers in other Kingdoms? Or how can they prove any Commission from God to do it? Thus it can be lawful for no sort of Men to be Instruments in setting up illegal Kings, and therefore they must be set up by God's Permission only; for when wicked Actions are done by wicked Instruments, it is certain he only permits them.  
3. If neither Subjects nor Foreigners can lawfully set up Kings against Law, how shall Providence do it? God must either set them up without Instruments, which he never did nor will do, or he must always set them up by wicked Instruments, and then it must be said, that God can lawfully set up Kings, but never by lawful means; and whether this be not derogatory to the Goodness and Justice of his Government, let every one consider.  
4. Whereas he affirms, that God can make Kings without regard to legal Rights, why may it not be as well said, that he can make Marriages, or legitimate Bastards, or create Judges, Constables, and Freeholders against Law? No doubt he can do all this by an express Revelation of his Will, and so he can make Kings against Law, by express Nomination. But providential Events are by no means equivalent to it; the unjust Possessor of another's Freehold, is in some sense a Freeholder by Providence; but that can be no bar to an Ejectment by Law; and so it is in the unlawful Possession of Sovereignty; God's Providence does not Abrogate the legal Right, nor make an Ejectment unlawful. As I said before, the Matter of humane Laws is often Substracted by Providence, and so is the Matter of divine and natural Laws; but Providence does no more act against those than these. The bond of Law is the Authority of God, and God is the Author of Political Society, and the establisher of Law, which is the Soul and Cement of it; and therefore to say he destroys it by his Providence, is to represent his Providence as Subverting his Authority, and to make him not the God of Order, but the God of Confusion.  
Prop. 6. The sum of it is 
Ibid.  this, We can have but one King at a time, and therefore our Allegiance can be due only to one King. By King he means the Possessor of the Throne; so that this Proposition is a very wonderful Discovery, that two opposite Kings cannot at the same time possess the same Throne, which is as clear as that they can't be in the same place together, or that two M●● cannot be one Man; this the little Writers can easily comprehend; and if it were as clear that Allegiance is always due to the Possessor, the Controversy would be at an end between us.  
Prop. 7. He is our King who is 
Ibid.  settled in the actual Administration of Sovereign Power; this we deny to be true, in our sense of King, and his sense of Settlement. But King, he says, is the Name of Power and Authority not of mere Right. Then the sense of the Proposition is this, He has Power and Authority over us, who has the Administration of Power and Authority over us; but if the Doctor will assume an Authority over Words, it is not for me to contradict it. We know the World did generally give the name of King to Charles I. and II. when they had only a legal Right to the Crown, but did not Possess it, and so they do to such a Prince, who ought by the Laws of the Land to be King, but is not, as the Doctor understands the name of King. But since he is resolved that King shall signify Possession of Power only, let him have his Humour, but let him draw no Arguments from his Arbitrary interpretation of Names. His King can have no Title to God's Authority against legal Right, which always carries God's Authority with it.  
Here the Doctor proposes an Objection, That it is Hobbisin that Dominion is naturally annexed to Power; and in Answer to it, he makes show of a distinction between Hobbs' Opinion and his own. Hobbs makes Power and nothing else to give Right to Dominion, and asserts that God himself is the natural Governor of the World, not because he made it, but because he is Omnipotent: But I say that Government is founded in Right, and that God is the natural Lord of the World, because he made it, and that no Creature has any Right to govern, but as he receives Authority from God. He might as well have Answered, That Hobbs makes Civil Laws the Rules of good and evil, and denies the existence of Spirits; but I do not. Is there any dispute here about the Grounds of God's Dominion? Is it not wholly about humane Government? And was Hobbism ever laid to his charge, for asserting that God's Dominion is founded only in his Omnipotency? The Question is whether Mr. Hobbs, and the Doctor teach not the same Doctrine about the legal Right and Possession of Sovereignty, and the transferring of Allegiance to Usurpers? And whether he can clear himself from Hobbism in the Points we are now debating? And this charge is so evident, that he had no other way but to decline it, by answering what was never objected.  
Does not the Doctor teach, that our Allegiance is extinguished when the King has not the Administration of Government in his Hands, and that Allegiance and actual Government are essential Relatives. Mr. Hobbs had taught the same before him, That the Obligation of Subjects to 
Leu. p. 114.  their Sovereign, is understood to last no longer, than the Power lasts to protect them. The Doctor maintains, That when a lawful King is wrongfully deposed, he has still a legal Right to the Crown, but the Subjects are absolved from their Allegiance to him; the Doctrine of the Leviathan is just the same, The 
Ibid. p. 174.  Right of the Sovereign is not extinguished, yet the Obligation of the Members is. The Doctor binds the Subjects to an actual assistance and defence of the Usurper; so doe● 
Ibid.  Mr. Hobbs, The Subject is obliged (so strictly obliged, that no pretence of having submitted himself out of fear can absolve him) to protect and assist the Usurper as long as he is able. Thus it appears that they are Fratres Fraterrimi, and it is not within the Power of Metaphysics to distinguish them. But what saith the Doctor, That Power does not give Right and Authority to govern; but is a certain sign to us, that where God hath placed the Power, he has given the Authority. And is not this a manifest Confession of Hobbism, That Dominion is naturally annexed to Power? Mr. Hobbs does often call his Sovereign God's Lieutenant, and his Vicegerent, and Sovereign under God; he affirms that he governs in God's stead, and that from him, and under him he hath Authority to govern. He agrees with the Doctor then, that the Right of Government does flow from God's Authority; so that still it seems impossible to distinguish their Opinions.  
Prop. 8. Is this: Allegiance 
Case of Alleg. p. 15.  is due only to the King, and the Reason this, For Allegiance signifie● all that Duty which Subjects owe to their King, and therefore can be due to none but the King. He had told us before, That by King he understands the actual Possessor, and therefore it is his sense of the Proposition, that Allegiance is due only to the Possessor, a precarious Assertion repeated often and never proved. But here he pretends to give a very plain Reason for it, the suram of it is this, That Allegiance is 
Ibid.  due only to God's Authority, and no one has it but the actual King. And if this be not a very plain Reason, let every one be judge, that can distinguish Reasoning from Affirming. But Propositionmaking was by this time grown cumbersome to the Doctor; he was forced to make up a round number by Tautologies and Repetitions, and now having exhausted his stock of Postulates, he endeavours next to fortify them against two Objections, which he imagined might be raised against them.  
Obj. But if this ●e so, What 
Ibid.  does a legal Right signify, if it do not command the Allegiance of Subjects? Why according to the Doctor, certainly it signifies nothing; for the legal Right of the Dispossessed Prince can give him no Right to the Crown, against the Right of divine Authority; the divine Right to all intents and purposes must null the legal; therefore if this continue still to be a Right, it is a Right to nothing. But a great Writer is worth nothing, that cannot defend Absurdities and Contradictions, and thus the Doctor endeavours it.  
1. He answers, that eel legal Right bari all other humane Claims, no other Prince can challenge the Throne of Right. The plain meaning of this is, That if the legal Right can be in one Prince, it is not in another; which ●● an admirable Proof, that the legal Right does signify something. When Oliver usurped, Charles II. had a legal Right to the Throne, but no Allegiance was due to his bare legal Title without God's Authority, and yet this legal Right did signify something; for if Charles had a legal Right to the Throne, than neither the French King, nor the Grand Signior, nor the Great Mogul, could have a legal Title to it; and though Oliver being settled in the actual Administration of Sovereign Power had a divine Right, yet the legal Right did signify something to King Charles, though it was nulled by the Divine; and though it made him not a King, (for that is the name of Power,) and left him no Subjects, (because no Allegiance was due to him.) Thus the legal Right of a Dispossessed Prince is only a Feather in his Cap, it constitutes him only an Utopian King, yet without so much as imaginary Subjects. But he tells us.  
2. That Subjects are bound to maintain the Rights of such a Prince, as far as they can, that is, against all Mankind, but not against God's disposal of Crowns. But who is this such a Prince? Is he a Prince dethroned and dispossessed of his legal Right? Of such a Prince the Doctor is Discoursing, and if such a one he means, How can the Subjects he bound to maintain his Right as far as they can, when they are bound as far as they are able to oppose it; their whole Allegiance being due to the Possessor? And thus the Obligation to maintain the dispossessed Prince must be expounded as a Duty to destroy him. But if his legal Prince be such an one as is not dispossessed, but has either a Right to the Throne upon the Demise of the Predecessor, or is actually in Possession; then I say he speaks not to the Objection; for the Objection relates to the Case of a legal Prince, excluded from his Right, by the Intrusion of another, the Case which he proposes in the preceding Paragraph, When he who has the legal Right is not our King. (i. e. has not Possession,) and he who has not i●. And he asserts upon it, That all our Allegiance is due to him who is our King, and not to him who is not, though it be his Right to be so; and upon this Case does the Objection proceed, If this be so, What does the legal Right signify? So that if here he speaks of a Prince Possessing the Throne, or Claming it when it was Vacant, Amphoram instituit, urceu● exit; he puts one Prince in the Objection, and another in the Solution, and in short he does not Answer, but Evade and Prevaricate.  
Well! but suppose a Prince with a legal Title to a vacant Throne, How can the Subjects he bound to maintain his Right, since they are not his Subjects, and owe him no Allegiance? For, according to the Doctor, Subjection and Allegiance are due only to Possessors, and not to a bare legal Title without it. Maintenance therefore. In such a Case, can be only a Debt of Justice, because it is due by Law and Equity, and the same Debt will continue, when the rightful Prince is wrongfully Dispossessed; for the legal Right is the same, and the same Law and Equity for restoring a due, as giving it at first. But farther, suppose that he means a rightful Prince in actual Possession; such a one hath both legal Right and God's Authority; and, yet the Doctor denies afterwards, that Subjects in some Cases are bound to maintain them; and thus as a legal Right does signify nothing with him here, so neither does God's Authority hereafter. He eludes and trims, and distinguishes them away as often as he has occasion; he grants Allegiance to Power without Right, and denies it to lawful Right and God's Authority together.  
The other Objection he propounds is this, If we have Sworn 
Ib. p. 16.  Allegiance to a lawful Prince, and his Heirs and lawful Successors, How can we pay Allegiance to any Prince, while He, or any of his Heirs and legal Successors are living, and claim our Allegiance, without violating our Oaths? And the sum of his Answer is, That an Oath of Allegiance made to any King, can oblige no longer than he continues to be King, (i. e. in Possession;) for if it did, it would oblige us against our Duty, and so become a● unlawful Oath. I acknowledge this Answer would be good, if he had sufficiently proved, that Allegiance is always, and only due to the Possessor; and whether that be done, let every one judge as he sees Reason. Were it here pertinent, it would be easy to prove, That our Oaths were intended to bind us to the lawful King and his Heirs, even in the Case of Dispossession; so all honest Men did understand them in the Age of Usurpations, and till of late they were never otherwise Interpreted, but by a few wretched Slaves of the Usurpers. All the faithful Members of the Church of England thought them Obligatory, when their Princes were Dispossessed; they thought it no breach of Duty to stick so a righteous Cause, when it proved Improsperous; and as long as the Man was in bring, they never looked upon the King as gone. The truth is, they were not wise in their Generation, and they understood not that Jesuitical 
Lessius de Jure & Justitia. p. 79.  Evasion, which would have been worth more than the whole World unto them, That when the King is deposed, tum definit esse Princeps; which, if it be true Doctrine, the Consequence of Lessius the Jesuit is unavoidable, quod quidquam licet in eum attentare, he becomes a private Person, and may be lawfully murdered.  
In the next Paragraph he observes, that we do not swear to keep the King and his Heirs in the Throne, which may be impossible for us to do against a prosperous Rebellion. And who was ever so senseless as to imagine that we swore to keep them in the Throne, when 'tis impossible to keep them; but I presume we swore, that in case our King should be thrown out by a prosperous Rebellion, we would not bind ourselves to oppose his Restitution, by transferring our Allegiance to his Rebel; yet he argues that we did not, because such an Oath would be unlawful, as contrary to that Duty we owe so the divine Providence, which conveys God's Authority to the Usurper. Thus the same precarious Assertions are everlastingly inculcated, but a Million of Repetitions will never amount to one Argument for them. And now having routed the Objections, he concludes thus:  
These seem to be very plain Propositions, and to carry their own Evidence with them. Very plain and self-evident Propositions! And why then could not the Doctor discover them before the publishing of Bishop Overall, and the Battle on the Boyne? Is it possible so great, so quicksighted a Writer could be above a year in finding out self-evident Propositions? Alas! poor, miserable Swearers and Non-swearers, that cannot see that which is as clear as the Noonday, and carries its own Evidence with it? How unhappy are they that have not the Doctor's Spectacles, by which he is able to see clearly through Mountains, and to discern things dark and invisible to others! But after all, 'tis well these bright Propositions do carry their own Evidence and are known by Intuition; for it seems to me that the Doctor hath given them no additional Lustre, he has hitherto proposed them without Proof, and if they are not innate Ideas, they seem to be altogether as indemonstrable.  
But if these Propositions are true, they are a very plain Direction to Subjects, 
Ibid.  in all Revolutions of Government. And the Direction in short is this: They must have no hand in the Revolution, and oppose it as far as they can, and not be hasly in complying; but when such a Revolution is made, they must pay Allegiance to the new Prince, as invested with God's Authority. Now his Direction is every whit as plain as his Propositions; in the days of the Unlawfulness of Resistance the contrary Direction was then very plain and evident with him, but it is the singular Prerogative of great Writers to alter the nature of Things with the Alteration of their Judgements, and in all their Changes to carry Evidence, Perspicuity, and Demonstration with them. But yet the Direction is not so very plain neither; for even the Doctor himself was sensible there remained still a very considerable Difficulty, which he labours next to remove, and to give us more plain Directions about it.  
The Difficulty is to know when a Revolution is so perfectly completed, or when a new Prince is so fully invested with God's Authority, as to have a Right to our Allegiance; but the Doctor, according to his way, does very easily resolve it: Obedience is due to God's Authority, and when we can reasonably conclude, that God's Providence has settled the new King in the Throne, we must pay our Obedience to him. But how comes Settlement here to be the only Indication of God's Conveyance of Authority? Does not all his Reasoning conclude as strongly for all Possession of Sovereign Power, without respect to Establishment? God removeth and setteth up Kings only by his Providence, and he sets up a King when by his Providence be puts Sovereign Authority in his hands; every advancement to a Throne, whether settled or unsettled, is an Event, and therefore ordered by God's Will and Appointment, and peculiarly ordered by him, at having so great an Influence upon the Government of the World; and this will be farther confirmed, when we remember that Kings are God's Ministers, and are invested with his Authority; all Authority is God's, and no Man can have God's Authority, but he to whom it is given; and yet 'tis very plain, that Princes that are not fully settled, are in Authority. We must not allow that God at any time permits Men to make themselves Kings, whom he does not make Kings; for than we can never distinguish between God's Kings, and Kings of their own making; and it is impossible there should be a wrong King, unless a Man could make himself King whether God will or no: And therefore a King whose Possession is not firmly established, cannot be a wrong King, because he is a King of God's making; he has the Authority of Government in his hands, and whoever has God's Authority is a true and rightful King, and therefore our only King; for we cannot have two opposite Kings at once, and consequently our Allegiance is due only to him.  
In short, there is not an Argument in his Book which is not equally applicable to all Possession whatsoever; either they prove Allegiance to all Possessors, or to none at all; but if they infer Absurdities, rejected even by the Doctor, they must needs be false and fallacious; and if we cannot reasonable conclude when a Prince has the Administration of Sovereign Power, that God ha● made him King, unless he be throughly settled, we cannot possible conclude from any of the Doctor's Arguments, that a settled Usurper is made a King by God. Let him show the difference, if he can, let him demonstrate to us the Reason, why a Prince when he is first advanced has no Right to Allegiance, and has when he is settled, though the same Providence does advance and settle him; why the same actual Administration of Government is a Sign of God's Authority when it is secure, and none when it is in danger; and let him resolve us whether an unsettled Possessor be not a Power in being, and advanced by God, and therefore invested with his Authority; whether God's Advancement and Authority do argue a Right to Allegiance; and whether the public Good, the Preservation of ourselves, and of political Society, are but frivoldu● Arguments when an Usurpation is doubtful, and demonstrative when established. If he can unriddle these Mysteries, and show all his Arguments to be conclusive for a settled, and not for an unsettled Possessor, I will acknowledge him then to be the greatest Writer under Heaven: But it is too much for any one to write precarious Propositions, and apply them by arbitrary Distinctions, and to argue as if all Mankind were Idiots, and as if there were no Logic nor Reason in the World.  
But as the Doctor distinguishes between settled and unsettled, so also between Settlement and Settlement. In new Governments, he says, there must 
Pag. 17.  necessarily be different degrees of Settlement, which seem to require, or at least to justify different degrees of Submission, till it increases to such 〈…〉 full, and plenary, and settled Possession, as requires our Allegiance. Thus our Submission is ever to keep pace with Settlement, and to bear a due proportion to it. Now Settlement consists not in a Mathematical Point, he acknowledges there are various degrees of it; and I say they are indefinite and innumerable, for in the Acquisition of new Sovereignty, Power and Stability do increase like Time and Bodies, by innumerable steps and progressions; and as the degrees of Settlement ●re innumerable, so must the degrees of Submission, which is commensurate to it. But the● this is not a very plain Direction for Revolutions, that our Submission must grow in proportion to the Settlement; for it will be impossible to find out degrees of Submission answerable to degrees of Settlement. For instance, King Steven, Henry IU. and VI Edward IV. Richard III. Henry VII. and Cade and Ket, the Rump and Oliver, and his Son Richard, had not two of them the same degrees of Power and Stability; and is the Doctor able to find out so many several degrees of Submission for them? Though neither Mathematical proportion nor Mathematical certainty is here expected from him, yet he should have directed us in the gradual increase of Submission by some rules and distinctions, and have showed us in gross, at least, what Submission is due to an upstart Power that is like to be of short continuance, what to a Power of weak or doubtful Establishment, what to a Power supported only by force, or by the consent of a great Party, as well as what is due to a Power that is throughly settled by the full consent of the People.  
But the Doctor speaks only to two degrees of Setlement; the First 
Ibid.  is, When the generality of a Nation submit to a Prince, and place him in the Throne, and put the whole Power of the Kingdom into his Hands, and yet the dispossessed Prince has such a formidable Power as makes the Event very doubtful. This we may call a doubtful Setlement; but p. 9 where the Doctor is discoursing on the Convocation Book, he affirms that this is a through Setlement; the general Submission of People, the Possession of the whole Power of the Nation, and the whole Administration of Government, are the Notes and Characteristics of it; but here they are owned to be insufficient to prove i● through Setlement, and notwithstanding a general Submission, and a Possession of the whole Power of the Kingdom, It ●ay be thought that God's Providence has not 〈◊〉 the Usurper, and that Allegiance ●s not due to him; and yet again in his Vindication, p. 37. by Setlement he understands the Setlement of a Government within itself, and there he thinks it may be throughly settled before it has a peaceable possession and Settlement. Thus the Doctor makes as much, or as little go to a through ●et●●ment as he pleases; and when he pretends that the thing is notoriously evident and sensible, he writes ambiguously, incoherently and contradictorily about it.  
Now let us consider his Directions about Submission to a Government doubtfully ●●tled.  
1. They who live under such a 
Ibid.  Government are bound (he says) to live quietly and peaceably, and to promise or swear, or give any other security to do so, if it be demanded. But neither is this a very plain Direction, For to live quietly and peaceably is a very doubtful Expression; and if he intends by it an Obligation never to contribute our Assistance to restore the rightful Sovereign, than it is a promising or swearing away our Allegiance; and I would fain know what Obligation there can be to renounce our Allegiance, for a Government that has no Title to it. But if he means the not attempting any thing against this Government while we are under its Power, and are certain to be crushed in the attempt, and the exerting our Allegiance cannot be effectually serviceable to restore our Sovereign; a Subject indeed may lawfully promise thus to live peaceably, and he might lawfully swear it, but that it seems to be taking God's Name in vain; for it would be a vain and trifling Oath, such as would give no Security to the Imposers, and should be imposed upon none but Madmen.  
He add●, It is reasonable we 
Ibid.  should live peaceably, if we think it reasonable to live under the protection of the Government. But there is no more reason that we should renounce our Allegiance for the Protection of Usurpers, than that we should renounce Political Society for the Protection of Banditi; it is reasonable to live where we have right to live, and if unreasonable Men will not permit us to enjoy our Right, without a sinful Compliance, we must live where God's Providence shall dispose us, and if we cannot live Innocently, it is reasonable to die so. But this all Men do, saith the Doctor, in an Enemy's Quarters, and no Man blames them for it. No Man blames them for living peaceably, when to live otherwise would be unserviceable to the Prince, and to them inevitable Destruction. No doubt they may do so, as long as they are in the Enemy's Power, but as soon as that Power or Force is removed, and the Subjects are in a capacity of exerting their Allegiance, than the reason of living peaceably ceases, and the paying actual Allegiance to their lawful Sovereign is an indispensible Duty; and I believe no one ever denied, that it was lawful thus to live peaceably under all Usurpers.  
2. We must pay Taxes to them; 
Ibid.  for these are due to the Administration of Government, as St. Paul observes; for this Cause pay ye Tribute also, for they are the Ministers of God attending continually on this very thing. The Powers to whom Tribute is to be paid, are there expressly said to be the Ministers of God, and to be ordained by him; they are therefore such Powers as have a right to Allegiance, and the Doctor in the next Section does argue upon that supposition. And yet here he argues from this Text, That Tribute is due to such Powers as have no right to Allegiance, and therefore are not God's Ministers, nor Ordained by him. If Allegiance be always, and only due to God's Authority, (as he affirms in his self evievident Propositions,) and if they who have not God's Authority are not his Ministers, nor his Ordinance, and Tribute is due only to God's Ministers, because it is enjoined to be paid for that Reason only, than the Consequence is, That such Powers as are not thoroughly Settled have no right to Tribute, because they have no right to Allegiance. The Apostle requires Taxes to be paid to God's Ministers; and if they who administer the Government are not God's Ministers, they cannot claim them from the Apostle. Taxes are due to the Ministers of God, as attending continually on the Administration of Government; but if they are hindered from attending it, by the Rebellion or Revolt of their Subjects, Are the Subjects then discharged from paying them, because they have wickedly Rebelled or Revolted from him? In a time of Rebellion, Is nothing due to the Sovereign, because he can't administer the Government? And if a Sovereign forfeits all his Rights, when it is impossible for him to administer it, May it not equally be argued from the Apostle, that he forfeits his Crown, if he is not a t●●●or to evil Works, but to the good? But if the Doctor still thinks that to be an unreasonable Inference, he must allow the other to be unreasonable also.  
To the Text of the Apostle he adds this Reason, If we owe the secure 
Ibid.  Possession of our Estates to the Protection of the Government, let the Government be what it will, we ought to pay for it. No doubt we may pay Taxes to an Usurper, as we may deliver our Purses to a Robber; in both Cases it is lawful to give that which we cannot keep: But to pay Taxes voluntarily when we can avoid it, is no more our Duty than to present a Robber with our Purses, when we can easily save them. If it is our Duty, it must be either on the score of Gratitude or Justice; but since the payment of Taxes must necessarily strengthen the Usurper, and enable him to resist and to destroy the rightful Sovereign, it must necessarily be Injustice to pay them, because it is unjust to support Injustice, and to contribute voluntarily to the overthrow of a just and righteous Cause. And if the Contribution be unjust, it cannot be a Debt of Gratitude, for that does never oblige us to Injustice; and consequently though the Usurpers Protection be a Benefit, (as receiving Quarter from the Banditi is a Benefit,) yet this cannot oblige me to support him in his Usurpations, nor pay such Taxes as are raised to establish the unjust Power, and resist the Rightful: I ought not to receive his Protection on that condition, nor purchase a Benefit to myself by Perjury and Injustice. If it be a Duty to pay Taxes to support an Usurper that is not throughly settled, Why should it not be a Duty to pay Allegiance to him? If we assist him with Money, we may assist him with Counsel, Prayers, and Arms; we may fight for him with our Persons as well as with our Purses; and if we do all this, we pay him plenary Allegiance. But since the Doctor does not require Allegiance to an Usurper doubtfully settled, the Subjects cannot be obliged to contribute their Assistance to support him; for that is the principal Duty of Allegiance, nor consequently to pay him Taxes for that purpose, for that is the principal and most powerful Assistance.  
3. We must give the Title of King 
Ibid.  to such a Prince, and this he requires for two Reasons; 1. Because it is a piece of good Manners. 2. Because he is indeed King while he administers the Regal Power, though we may not think him so well settled, as to all Intents and Purposes to own him for our King. What Title we are obliged to give him in good Manners. I leave to the Heralds and the Master of the Ceremonies to determine; but till I am better informed, if the Title does not belong to him, I cannot think it good Manners to call him that which he is not. But if he be King indeed, than a very little Sense, without Skill in Heraldry, or Casuistical Divinity, will serve to inform us that we must give him the Title of King; and this is one of the plainest Directions in his Book, that if he be King indeed, he has a Right to be called so. But he is indeed King while he administers the Regal Power; and this is evident from what he affirms in Prop. 7. That King is the Name of Power: But Prop. 8. This King is one to whom Allegiance is due, and yet here he is indeed King to whom Allegiance is not due, as being not well settled in his Government, and who is not to all Intents and Purposes to be owned for our King. Thus we must give him the Title of King, because he is a King, or at least half a King, and yet in reality no King, because he has no Right to Allegiance. But the Doctor may trifle and shuffle with Names as he pleases, he may give the Title of King, if he will, to every Rebel and Usurper, to Oliver and Richard and Massaniello, for they administered the Regal Power for a time: But I hope he will not be offended if others follow not his Humour, if they call a Spade a Spade, and say that he has no Right to the Title of King, who has no Right to the Office, and no Right to Allegiance.  
4. We must pray for him under 
Ibid.  the Title and Name of King; for we are bound to pray for all who are in Authority; and that a Prince is, who has the whole Government in his hands, and has power to do a great deal of hurt, or a great deal of good. All this was true of Oliver, he was visibly in Authority, had the whole Government in his hands, and had power to do a great deal of Hurt or Good, were the Clergy therefore bound to pray for their Sovereign Lord King Oliver? In those days the Sons of the Church were of another Mind, they esteemed it infamous and wicked to thrust their lawful Sovereign out of their Prayers, to make room for the Usurper; and to style him their Sovereign Lord, their King, or their Protector; and yet pray for all in Authority was then a Text in the Bible. What does the Apostle mean by all in Authority? Not certainly all that have the Administration of it, for then Pirates, Robbers and Rebels will be comprehended in that Expression: But the Motive or Reason annexed is a clear Limitation of it, we must pray for them, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable Life; which shows we must here understand such Authority as is for the Quiet and Peace of of Society, and such are all lawful Powers, even the most Tyrannical; but such are not the Usurpers of that Authority that belongs to others, whether Rebels, Robbers, or titular Tyrants; for these are the great Enemies of Society, their Usurpation of their Authority tends to its Subversion, and considering its natural and ordinary Effects, it can never be expected that a quiet and peaceable Life should be attained under them. But the Doctor understands by the Expression, such as have the whole Government in their Hands, though they are not perfectly settled. And whose Authority have they? Certainly God's Authority, for according to him, the whole Authority of Government is God's; but if they have God's Authority, his Propositions give them a Right to Allegiance; and to what purpose then is his Distinction of a through Settlement? And if they have not his Authority, how impertinent is the alleging that Text for a Right to our Prayers? We are bound to pray for all Men, for private and public Enemies, for Thiefs and Murderers, and Usurpers; but we are principally obliged to this out of Charity to their Souls, and therefore we must pray chiefly for their Repentance and Conversion, and to pray thus for Usurpers, (that God would bless them thus with the chiefest of his Blessings,) is (as says the Doctor) so far from being a Fault, that it is a Duty, while we do it in such terms as not to pray against the Dispossessed. But if in the late Usurpations a Doctor had ejected Charles, and inserted Cromwell, and had prayed in these Terms, Bless we beseech thee our Sovereign Lord King Oliver, I presume, the Master of the Temple would have been as forward as any Man to charge Hypocrisy, base Compliance, and breach of Allegiance upon him. And Reason would have made good the Charge; for to pray for Oliver, as our Sovereign Lord, is to acknowledge before God and Man that he is so; and to teach the People to acknowledge him, and to pay him that Subjection and Allegiance that is due to a Sovereign. Is not Prayer for a King one of the principal Expressions of Allegiance? And when we pray for the Usurper in the room of the lawful Sovereign, does not the very nature of the thing require this Interpretation, that we do not own him for our King, whom we thrust out of our Prayers, and that we have transferred our Allegiance, where we pay the most benefical Expression of it? this is the general Sense of the People concerning it, and he that can satisfy his Conscience to own an Usurper for his King and Sovereign Lord in the most Solemn Manner that can be, though he owns no Allegiance to be due to him, when the Reason for which he does it, the Nature of the Thing, and the Construction of the People do imply an acknowledgement of Allegiance, may I think be satisfied in any thing, and need not scruple any Compliance whatsoever.  
Thus far the Directions about Submission to a Government not throughly settled, to which Allegiance is not required; but though he requires it not here, in the Sequel of his Discourse he infers it as a necessary and indispensible Duty: for when he 
Case of Alleg. p 38.  comes to confute Bp. Sandersons measures of Submission, his Reasons there do prove (if they prove any thing) that Allegiance is due to such a Government. The Doctor here directs us to pay some lower degrees of Submission, but not Allegiance to his unsettled Usurper; and so does Bp. Sanderson, but his Arguments against the Bishop's do equally conclude against his own Directions; and thus I argue after him. 
Pag. 39  If under an Usurper unsettled, the Safety and Tranquillity of Human Societies, requires any thing of us, it requires and justifies a great deal more; for, 1. As he states the matter, this destroys Civil Government, and a governed Society; for seeing Allegiance is not due to such a Prince, it follows he has not God's Authority, so that to speak properly, here is neither King nor Subject, and I suppose no Man that considers it well, will ca● this a Civil Government, to which God's Authority and Allegiance is essential. 2. I would ask whether Self-Preservation, public Good, and Gratitude for Protection do oblige me to obey and submit to the Prince who governs, and to wish and pray for, and do my utmost to endeavour his Prosperity? if it does I see no difference between this and Allegiance; if it does not, than I am at liberty to disturb the Government, nay am under an Obligation by my former Allegiance to do it, when I can; and how does this contribute to the Safety of Societies? 3. Suppose such a Prince should require an Oath of Allegiance, and the Subjects according to their Duty should refuse it, and the Prince had Power to compel them, what must be the effect of this, but the utter Destruction of the Nation? But there is no need of transcribing the rest of his Discourse, it will be obvious to every one that considers it, that it is applicable throughout to his own Directions for Submission without Allegiance. Thus the Doctor does engage the Doctor, his Arguments do overthrow his Directions, or his Directions his Arguments. His Propositions prove that Allegiance is due to every Usurper, his Directions deny it, and his Arguments against the Bishop do again infer it; let him choose the one or the other, either Allegiance is due to all Usurpers, and then he loses Bp. Overal's Convocation-Book, several Pages of his own Book, and innumerable passages about a through Settlement: Or it is due only to Usurpers that are settled, and then his Propositions and all his Arguments from Scripture, and almost all from Reason are irrecoverably gone. The World knows he can prove which he pleases, but I think he is not so great a Writer, as to be able to prove Contradictions.  
We come next to this summary account of a Government throughly settled, and these are his Notes and Characters of it. When besides the Possession of the 
Pag. 18.  Throne, the Power of the dispossessed Prince is broken, and no visible prospect of recovering his Throne again; nay, if it be visible that he can never recover his Throne again, but by making a new Conquest if the Nation by Foreigners, who will be our Masters if they conquer, and no very gentle ones, we may then (he concludes) look upon the new Prince as settled by God in his Throne, and therefore such a King as we ●●e entire Allegiance to. Here then his Characters of a through Settlement acquired to Possession are these two; absolute Conquest over the dispossessed Prince, so that he has no visible prospect of recovering his Throne; and no prespect of recovering it, but by Conquest of the Nation by Foreigners who will be no gentle Masters. How is it possible to hang these Characters together? P. 9 he makes plenary Possession and Submission to be the only Test of a through Settlement; but 
Pag. 17.  upon second thought, he owns that to be insufficient; and here again he sets it first upon the dispossessed Prince having no visible prospect of a Restoration; then one would conclude that if there is such a prospect, than there is no Settlement: Not so neither; for though there be a prospect of recovering one way, there is nevertheless a Settlement, and we must conclude that God has settled the Usurper, because there is but one way open to a Restoration: This is just as reasonable as if it should be affirmed, That a Man who is subject only to Convulsions is well settled in his Health; that an enclosure is well fenced when there is but one gap; that a Fort is perfectly secure when there is but one breach for the Enemy to enter at; or that the wrongful Possessor of an Estate has got a good Settlement, because there is but one way to eject him. If a little Writer had made such a Settlement, How unmercifully would the great Judges have treated him, he had certainly lost all his Credit in conveyancing for ever; and doubtless nothing can be more absurd, than to pretend that a Deed of Conveyance is a good Settlement, when there is one way to defeat it; or that a Government is throughly settled, when there is visibly one way to overthrow it. Why should not a visible prospect of Restoration by Foreigners spoil a Settlement, as well as a prospect of effecting it by Subjects; is it because Foreigners will be no gentle Masters? We remember well when the Government of rebellious Subjects was the most cruel Tyranny that ever the Nation felt. But be they hard or gentle Masters, what is that to a Settlement? The point is not whether the Government of the restored Prince will be gentle, but whether there be a prospect of Restoring him, for if there is, it is a plain Demonstration that there is no through Settlement. This reflection then upon Foreigners, was in the bottom only an Amusement; it was intended for nothing but to throw Dust in our Eyes, and to create a weak Prejudice, to supply the want of Argument.  
We return then to that which is the only colourable Proof of a through Settlement; When the Power of the dispossessed Prince is broken, and there is no visible prospect of a Restoration. Nothing is more arbitrary and various, than the prospect which Men have of future Revolutions; almost every Man has a peculiar Prospective through which he looks, and every one looks through his own Organs and his own Prejudices. Men of Sanguine Complexion, whose Spirits are brisk and volatile, as they happen to be prepossessed, will judge a Prince's Condition to be hopeful, or desperate upon every little turn of Providence; the Melancholic and Timorous, on both sides, will be always anxious and aboding the worst, either despair of a Restitution or eternally fear it, and never think the new Government to be settled enough: Even Men of a well balanced Temper, of sedate and prudent Judgement, will yet have a different prospect of Things; some will think a Prince irrecoverably lost, and others who have as a good foresight, will think his recovery probale. Not the diversity only of Temper and Judgement, but also the intricacy and obscurity of the Matter and Object, and the constant vicissitude of humane Affairs, must necessarily occasion difference of Opinions; even the most able and skilful Politicians are often deceived in balancing of Governments, and passing judgement on their Strength and Stability; and if hereunto we add, that the Decrees of God, who governs Governments, are unsearchable; that his Providence is an unfathomable Abyss; that he often lifteth up the Poor out of the Dust, and levels proud Usurpers with it; that in History there are innumerable Examples of Princes and Governments Re-established and Exalted from the very bottom of Despair; and in fine, that we are assured by Experience, that the most improbable and unexpected Events do happen almost as often as those that are most probable and most certainly expected. When all this, and much more is considered as it ought, it must needs be acknowledged, That the Judgements concerning the final Depression of a dispossessed Prince, and the secure Establishment of an Usurper, must be exceeding difficult, various and uncertain; and then the result is, that seeing it is hardly possible to be assured of a through Settlement, as the Doctor understands it, and seeing Men of the best Judgements are often mistaken, and are never unanimous about it, and a very small part of Mankind can be thought capable of judging it, the Consequence is, that a through Settlement is no sufficient direction for Allegiance.  
The Doctor gives this description of a through Settlement, to determine the present Controversy about Allegiance; but whether the dispossessed Prince is so broken, that there is no visible prospect of his Restoration, we may be determined by the visible Hopes and Fears of the opposite Parties. 'Tis plain his Power is not totally broken, and 'tis a palpable absurdity to say that a Prince, who is still carrying on a War, is absolutely Conquered. Let not him that girdeth on his Armour boast himself, as he that putteth it off; the Event of War is always doubtful, and when the War is finished, it will be time enough to triumph, and to talk of a through Settlement. If the Doctor thinks it may commence sooner, his Opinion is contradicted by Experience and common Sense, for no Man that has any Title to it, will believe that the purchase of War is secure before the War is over; or that an Usurper is throughly settled in his Throne, when the deposed Prince is pursuing his Right to it by War: That Restoration for which we have an annual thanksgiving, was once esteemed morally impossible without a Conquest by Foreigners, and the Destruction of the Nation, but with God it was not impossible, and that which has been may be. The Doctor has formerly told the World, That though 
Case of Resist. p. 132.  God for wise Reasons may sometimes permit such Usurpations, yet while his Providence scours the Persons of the deposed and banished Princes from Violence, he secures their Title too; as it was in Nebuchadnezzar' s Vision, the Tree is cut down, but the stump of the Roots is left in the Earth. The Kingdom shall be sure to them after they shall know that the heavens do rule, Dan. 4. 26.  
In those times the Right and Title of the natural Prince were of such importance, that there could be no Settlement of the Usurper, as long as a stump of the Tree remained; but Times and Principles are altered, and now says the Doctor, We must not take the 
Case of Alleg. p. 18.  consideration of Right into the Settlement of Government; for a Prince may be settled without legal Right, and when he is so, God has made him our King, and requires our Obedience. The Doctor, no doubt, may consider Settlement without Right, and then declare that a Prince may be settled without it: But any one else may consider it with relation to Right if he pleases; for a legal Settlement is, I hope, a Settlement; and 'tis as certain that the extinction of all legal Claims and Competitors, will contribute much to a through Settlement.  
We may consider Settlement in a natural, and in a legal, or moral Sense, in relation to Possession, and in relation to Right. He that dwells in a House, and keeps out the right Owner may be said to be settled in it, because he keeps Possession, but inquire in Westminister-hall whether this be good Settlement, and the query will be easily resolved. Oliver was settled in some sense at Whitehall, so he was in the Government; but that Settlement was thought to be of no validity in Law and Conscience, nor did it give him a divine Right to the Palace and the Throne. Settlement is a Word of manifold and ambiguous Meaning, and must be always interpreted according to the nature of the Matter to which it is applied; when civil Property is the subject Matter, the very nature of the Thing requires it to be understood in the civil or legal Signification of it, and then (as it has been well observed) it denotes two Things, peaceable Possession and legal Right. This is undeniable in relation to private Rights, And why does it not require that Interpretation in respect to politic Dominion? Is that the sense of all Lawyers when they speak of private Estates? And is there any Lawyer that ever applied that Term to a Government usurped and possessed without Right? Is there any other good Author that called such a Possession a through Settlement? The Lawyers have always considered Right as necessary to the firm Establishment of any Possession, and it would be a contradiction to their Profession to consider otherwise; for if Right be not requisite to the Settlement of Possessions, there is an end of all Law, and there is no need nor use of it in the World.  
When a Man is Possessor malae fidei (and such are all Usurpers) the Lawyers do not account him to be throughly settled in his Possession; for as he is bound in Conscience to Restitution, so he may be ejected by Law; and they never look upon him as settled till he becomes a lawful Possessor and has acquired a legal Right by Prescription of a 100 Years, or time immemorial, in which they presume a Dereliction of the true Proprietor. Their Doctrine is the same concerning the Possession of the Rights of Sovereignty; they never supposed it to be established without Right; they affirm the Usurper (as long as he is such) is bound to 
* Navarre. 26. Tom. 3. p. 228. Arnisaeus de Rep. l. 2. c. 3. s. 27.  Restitution; that the rightful Prince may lawfully eject him by 
† Grot. de ju. belli. l. 2. c. 1.  War; that the presumption of Law is always for the lawful Prince; that the Usurper cannot prescribe a Right, 
* Covar. pars. 2. Rel. c. Possess. Malaef. dereg. s. 2. n. 13. p. 449.  (nisi accesserit praescriptioni scientia patientiaque ipsius Principis,) without the knowledge and permission of the Prince, and lastly, that these are never to be presumed, but in case of perpetual and undisturbed Possession 
† Ibid. p. 451.  for a 100 Years, or a time exceeding the memory of Man. Tyrants (says 
* De Rep. l. 26. o. 7.  Petrus Gregorius) after they have Dethroned th● true and rightful Princes, are yet desirous of their Titles, and they make use of Parliaments or Assemblies of the People to acquire them; yet they are Tyrants still, and are comprehended in the Laws that relate to Tyrants, unless (as some think) they abdicate their Power, and submit to their Judgement who can confer lawful Sovereignty upon them; or unless after their Usurpation, they with their Posterity, prescribe a Right to the Sovereignty by the Possession of a 100 Years or more. Thus the Civil Lawyers: And, if we may believe Grotius, their Doctrine is confirmed by the Law of Nations:  
He says 
a De ju. belli, l. 2. c. 4. s. 9  it is probable that this Law was introduced by the consent of Nations, that immemorial Possession peaceably enjoyed without Interruption, Omnino dominium transferret, should to all intents transfer Dominion; he shows by many instances that this was often pleaded by Nations; those out of Isocrates 
Ibid. s. 2.  are apposite to our Purpose; in his Archidamus, he argues the Right of the Lacedæmonians to Messana, from their Possession of it for some hundreds of Years, and he lays down this Rule as most certain and confessed by all; That Possessions, both private and public, become proper and patrimonial, if they have been held for a long time; and in his Oration to Philip, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; When length of time had made the Possession firm and settled. These and other Instances that might be produced, do show it has been the Sense of Mankind, that Prescription is requisite to establish Possessions without an original Right, and that there could be no Settlement till a new Right were introduced; for if Dominion might have been transfered without Right, the introduction of the Right of Prescription, by the Law of Nations, would have been superstuous.  
But the Law of England is yet more rigid in requiring legal Right, it differs from the Civil Law in Matter of Prescription; (
b Finch's Disc. of Law, p. 132.  for by the Common Law Prescription maketh no Right in Land,) but the difference is in favour of Right against Possession, which cannot in any tract of time advance to a legal Settlement, when an antecedent legal Right can be made out against it. And can we think that the Law is more careful of private Property than of Sovereignty, of Lands and Tenements than of the Royal Crown and Dignity? That it has provided that the Rights of the Subjects be Sacred, Inviolable, and Eternal, and hath left the Crown to every one that can catch it, though all the Estates in the Realm are held in Fee of the Crown, and are derived Originally from it? On the contrary, the Favour and Presumption of the Law is always for the King; no time is allowed to prescribe against his Rights; it is the first 
c Case of the Postnatis, p. 36.  Principle of the Law that his Crown is Hereditary, it is entailed on his Posterity for ever. 
d Ibid. 68  Descent is declared to be a Title stronger than all others, it being an undoubted Title made by Law, it cannot be defeated by any other Title. 
e Cook in Calvin's Case.  Allegiance is not due to the Crown, but to the natural Person of the King, which is ever accompanied with the Politic Capacity; 
f Judge Jenkin's Works, p. 22.  it is due to the natural Body by Nature, God's Law and Man's Law, cannot be forfeited nor renounced by any Means, it is inseparable from the Person; and it has been said to be due to him, 
g Postnatis, 104.  even when he is driven out of his Kingdom. And lastly, we have the Resolution of all the Lords and Commons in the Case of the Claim of the Duke of York against Henry the Sixth, that an illegal Settlement of the Crown by Acts of Parliament, and the Settlement of 60 Years Possession without interruption, were not sufficient to defeat the legal Title, nor to settle the Usurper's against it.  
Further it appears from the whole S●…ies of our History, from the constant practice of Usurpers, and from the Acts and Recognitions of their Parliaments, that no Possession whatsoever without a legal Right was ever esteemed a through Settlement by the Parliaments, the People, or by the Usurpers themselves; they have always pretended to a Legal Right, and got themselves to be declared Kings dejure, by their Parliaments, for the satisfaction of the People: to what purpose, but that they knew it was the surest Foundation of their Power, that the People could never be brought to a plenary Submission, nor their Government be throughly settled without a general Persuasion of it. These Recognitions of Parliaments were as illegal as the Usurpations, they could not alter the nature of things, lawful Parliaments did always declare them to be invalid and null, the whole Body of the Nation have rejected and made no account of them, and they never yet were effectual to establish Usurpation: But they who had no Right thought the Pretente and Opinion of it necessary to a Settlement, they knew that Parliaments were the best Instruments to delude the People, and therefore they made them to recognize Force and Usurpation to be Right and Inheritance; and this constant practice of Usurpers is an evident Proof that it has been the Universal Sense o●● the Nation, that without a Legal Right there could be no hopes of Settlement.  
Lastly, I appeal to the Sense and Reason of Mankind, whether according to the natural course of things there can be a through Settlement of an Usurped Power, while the rightful Prince is actually prosecuting his Right. Mankind are not so degenerate nor so much in love with Oppression and Injustice as to have no regard to Right, nothing is more natural than to commiserate and assist the Oppressed, and that may well be expected in the case of a Rightful Sovereign, to whom the Subjects have sworn Assistance, and whom they know to be wrongfully deposed. The generality of Men will never so far shake off the bands of Reason and Equity, as to think they are loosed from the Obligations of rendering every Man his due, and doing as we would be done by. Brave and Generous Spirits will never be wanting, who will dare even to die for a Righteous Cause, and will scorn to abandon a Prince because he is unfortunate. Men may be cuneated and deluded for a while with the plausible Pretences of Religion and 〈◊〉 Public Safety, but time does always discover the Imposture, and when once the Fig-Leaves are removed, the Usurpation and Injustice will be exposed naked to their view, and their Abhorrence will be heightened by the Briars and Thorns, the Sweat and Labour and Misery they have produced▪ and then they will strive who shall be the first in bringing back their King, all this is natural to imagine, what has often happened, and what may be reasonably expected. Usurpers are always in the state of Robbers, they may be well armed and strongly fortified, but they can never be secure, Usurpation will never want Enemies, not Right its Friends and Defenders. Nature and Religion and the Common Interest of Mankind do conspire for Right and Justice, against Injury and Oppression; and 'tis not likely they should be established in spite of so powerful a Combination. Lastly, it was never yet known in this Nation, that a Legal Right to the Crown, when prosecuted, was totally deserted, or a through Settlement acquired without it, and therefore I conclude that Reason and Experience do assure us, that Right is necessary to a through Settlement.  
The Result is this, that seeing the Civil Law, the Law of Nations, the Law of England, the Practice of Usurpers, the constant Sense of the People, and even Reason itself do unanimously agree in proving the necessity of Right to Settlement; it is very unreasonable to consider Settlement without it, or when we meet with it in any Author, to give it such an Interpretation as is warranted by no good Writer, and is contradictory to Law and Practice, Reason and Experience; and when on the contrary it may fairly be interpreted in a sense agreeable to them.  
The Doctor concludes this Section with repeating his former Prejudice, and insinuating a new one, That his Principles 
Pag. 18.  are so very useful in all Revolutions, that Subjects have reason to wish them true, and to examine over again those strict Principles of Loyalty, which if pursued to their just consequences, must unavoidably in some junctures sacrifice whole Kingdoms, at least all Subjects who pretend to this degree of Loyalty and Conscience to the ill Fortune of their Princes. Now this is nothing but Wheedling and Prevaricating; if his Principles be false, it is certain they are not useful to the Good of Mankind, and 'tis as impious to wish them true, as to wish that Vice were Virtue, as absurd as to wish that an Ox were an Elephant. His Principles are useful enough to them who think sleeping in a whole Skin should be preferred to all Obligations; and such is that Principle which was once vouched by the Devil, Skin for Skin, and all that a Man hath, etc. But the strict Principles of Loyalty are such as may sacrifice Kingdoms to the ill Fortune of a Prince; so may the Principle of Passive Obedience to the Cruelty of a Prince; so may the Doctrine of the Cross to the Fury of a persecuting Prince; so it is possible that Obedience to any Law of God o● Nature may in some junctures be the destruction of a Kingdom; must the Laws of God and Nature be therefore canceled? Must the Doctrine of the Cross and of Non-resistence be therefore rejected, as destructive to Society? Must the Principles of Honour, Loyalty, and Fidelity, be sacrificed to ill Fortune? Is our Allegiance due to Fortune? And if a righteous Cause be unsuccessful, is it our Duty to abandon, and bind ourselves by Oaths to oppose it? We may thus briefly answer his Objection: We will discharge our Duty, and leave the Event to God.  
But as for the Doctor's Principles, they are exactly the same with Mr. Ascham's, and because he professes greatly to reverence the profund Judgement of Bishop Sanderson, I will conclude this Section with his 
* Reprinted in the 2d Pt. of the Hist. of Passive Obedience.  Censure of them in these words, That they evidently ●●nd, 1. To the taking away of all Christian Fortitude and Suffering in a righteous Cause: 2. To the encouraging of daring and ambitious Spirits to attempt continual Innovations▪ with this Confidence, that if they can possess themselves of the supreme Power, they ought to be submitted to. 3. To the obstructing unto the oppressed Party all possible means without a Miracle of recovering his just Right▪ of which he shall have been unjustly dispossessed. And, 4. To the bringing in of Atheism, with the Contempt of God and all Religion, whilst every man by making his own Persuasion the measure of all his Duties and Actions, maketh himself thereby his own Idol.   

Examination of SECT. 4.  
IN the former Section the Doctor has laid down Propositions which he asserts to be plam, and to carry their own Evidence with them; but if that be true, the rest of his Pamphlet is Supererogation: for what need of lighting Candles to the Sun, of adding more Evidence to the greatest Evidence that can be, and of confirming self-evident Truths by such Mediums as are not self-evident. Indeed the Doctor was conscious that they were not evident, but that there was need of urging more Arguments to confirm them, and of answering material Objections against them. He begins first with Arguments from Scripture; and here  
He observes, That the▪ Scripture has given us no directions in this Case, but to pay all Obedience to the present Powers, and that it makes no distinction between rightful Kings and Usurpers; but the general Rule is, Let every Soul be Subject to the higher Powers, for all Power is of God, the Powers that be are ordained of God; whosoever therefore resisteth the Power, resisteth the Ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves Damnation, Rom. 13. 1, 2. To say that the Apostle here speaks of lawful Powers is gratis dictum, for there is no Evidence of it. Thus ou● Author.  
This Passage of the Apostle has ever since the days of Cromwell been made use of by all the Advocates of Usurpers, it is the 〈…〉 cipal Fort and Bulwark of their Cause, and if we can wrest it from them, they have no Shelter nor Defence for their Opinion in Scripture. Before the late Revolution there is not one Writer of the Church of England, that expounds this passage as requiring Allegiance to Usurpers; the whole Church in the late age of Usurpations, thought the higher Powers in the Apostle to be the rightful Powers, who were then dispossessed, and they acted accordingly in defiance of Consiscations, Prisons, and Gibbets. But the Revolution has turned men's Heads round, and together with new Lords and Laws, we have new Reasons and new Resolutions of Cases, and to support a new Government, new Interpretations of Scripture. The Doctor himself has expounded otherwise in his Case of Resistance, and in those Days his Exposition was authentic, and the current Doctrine of the Church. But now Cases are changed, The Case of Allegiance confounds the Case of Resistance, and Usurpers whom he once excluded out of the Text, do in their turn exclude the rightful Powers, and which is more, that which was then thought manifestly false, is taken now for little less than Demonstration. We will try however to rescue this Text to the rightful Powers attain, and it will be the more easy to do if, because we may have the Doctor's Assistance.  
It is observed before, that the Doctor's new Exposition does take in all Powers whatsoever, as well settled as throughly settled; and his Reasons are applicable to both alike. The Scripture has made no distinction between settled and unsettled Powers, but the general Rule is, that all Power is the Ordinance of God, unsettled Powers are certainly Powers in being, and to say the Apostle here speaks of settled Powers ●s gratis dictum, for there is no evidence of i●: There may be Kings and Rulers who exercise suprime Authority without through Settlement, yet St. Paul has made no exceptions against them, and the distinction being unknown in Scripture; if he had intended i●● he ought to have said it in express Words, or else no body could have understood him only of Powers that are throughly settled: For then in order to the fulfilling of this precept, it would be necessary for Subjects to be well 〈…〉 lled in Politics, and to know exactly how much goes to a through Settlement, that they may know to whom they ought to pay Allegiance; And let any Man judge in what Perplexities this would involve the Consciences of Men? Besides this, the reason the Apostle gives for Submission to higher Powers, is not a through Settlement, but the Authority of God; and to this I add that this distinction, that only settled Powers are of God, had made the Apostle's direction signify nothing, for the great Question would still have been undetermined, what Powers are of God, and what Powers they must obey, if some Powers are of God, and some not. Thus the Doctor's Arguing does hold for all Usurpers, or for none; but if notwithstanding all these Reasons, the Rule must be restrained to Powers throughly settled, than it is certain those Reasons are Fallacious, for they equally conclude against all Restrictions, and a Reason that proves too much, does prove nothing at all.  
But it is absolutely necessary that the Rule be understood with some Restriction. These Propositions, There is no Power but of God, and the Powers that be are ordained of God, if they be understood as simply universal, will comprehend the Power of Robbers, Pirates and Rebels, the Papal Power, the Power of Anti-christ, and the Power of the Devil. It is universally true, that there is no Power but it is of God, and St. Austin, nay the 
August. in Ps. 32. Conc. 2.  Scripture itself, declares it to be true even of the Power of the Devil; And is this a good Reason for being subject to the Devil? Does it bind us to be subject to the Pope, or Anti-christ? Or does it enforce Subjection unto Thiefs and Rebels? The whole scope of the Apostle, the manner of his Expression, and right Reason, do require that these Powers be excepted out of the Rule; and let us see now whether there be not▪ the same necessity for excepting of other Usurpers.  
1. The design of the Apostle, and his manner of Expression do require it. His design was to enforce Submission as due to the Roman Emperor, the Power then in being over the Romans: Thus the Doctor himself in his Case of Resistance, 
P. 107.  At the time of writing this Epistle the supreme Power was in the Roman Emperors, and therefore when St. Paul commands the Roman Christians to be subject to the higher Powers, the plain meaning is that they should be subject to the Roman Emperor: And again, 
P. 121.  According to the Apostle's Doctrine those Princes who where then in being, that is, the Roman Emperors, were advanced by God; the Powers that be, i. e. the Princes and Emperors who now govern the World are now ordained and appointed by God. Now if the Roman Emperors were lawful Powers, it is plain the Apostle required Subjection unto lawful Powers, and not unto Usurpers; and the former general Proposition, There is no Power but of God, must be restrained by the later, The Powers that be are ordained of God. The later Proposition shows what Power he speaks of in the former, and restrains it to this Sense, There is no lawful Power but of God: This Interpretation is natural and agreeable to the common Rules of Interpreting, and to the common Sense and Reason of Manking; if the Apostle had lived in the Reign of Charles I. and required the English Christians to be subject to the King then in being as ordained by God, Would this have been a good Argument for Subjection to the Rump and Cromwell as the Ordinance of God? Could the precept which required Allegiance to a lawful King be of any advantage to an Usurper? And would not such an Interpretation have appeared unreasonable and unnatural? The Doctor excepts unsettled Powers out of the Rule, but he can give no other Reason for it, but that the Powers then in being were throughly settled; he must allow then that the same Reason will hold good for the exception of Usurpers, if the same Powers were lawful.  
He saw himself that this Consequence was unavoidable, and therefore to prevent the Force of it, he denies the Roman 
Case of Alleg. P. 20.  Emperors to have been lawful Powers; affirms that for many Ages together the Titles of the Roman Emperors were all of them either stark nought, or the very best of them very doubtful, and I believe he is the first that ever affirmed it. What, were their Titles nought, and were they all Usurpers for many Ages together? What Historian, Lawyer, or good Author, what Demonstration or even probable Argument can be produce for so incredible an Assertion? But what have we to do here with the Emperors of many Ages? he knows that either Claudius or Nero were the higher Powers to whom Subjection is required by the Apostle, and it was plainly his business to speak to their Titles, if he intended to speak to the purpose; but he declines this, (for it was impossible to prove them Usurpers;) he says only in general, (and without proof he says it,) that the Emperor's Titles were either stark nought or very doubtful. And is there no difference between no Title and a doubtful Title? the Laws of Nature and Nations, and I believe the Municipal Laws of all Societies do allow Possession to be a good and lawful Right where the Title is doubtful, and the antecedent Right cannot be sufficiently proved; if the Titles therefore of the Emperors were doubtful they were lawful Emperors, and if Allegiance be due to such, it is no good Consequence that Allegiance is due to Usurpers.  
He should have proved that the Emperors were manifest Usurpers of that Sovereignty which was the Right of others, and he should have proved this particularly of Claudius and Nero: But the Title of these Emperors was unquestionable; for, 1. They had no Competitors who claimed a Right to the Empire, and therefore either there was no better Right, or it was extinguished by Dereliction. 2. Neither the Senate nor the Roman People had a good Right against them, for they had not that which they had parted with; that Right which they had, by their own Acts and Deeds they conveyed upon the Emperors. The Lex Regia which is mentioned in Dion Cassius and Justinian's Code, and some Remains whereof are published in Gruter's Inscriptions, is an authentic evidence of this Translation of their Right. It is very probable that this Law was renewed at the advancement of every Emperor, and it appears plainly from the Remains of it, that Augustius, Tiberius, Caius, Claudius, and Vespasian, had the Imperial Power conferred on them by a written Law, and therefore they were lawful Emperors. It is certain they had all of them the concurrent agreement of the Roman Senate and People; Claudius was first set up by the Soldiers, but the Senate soon consented to his Advancement, and swore Fidelity to him, and the Roman People, and all the Provinces received him as their Emperor; and the same universal concurrence there was to the Advancement of Nero, without any Opposition. Thus the Senate and People by express Law, or by their Submission and Oaths of Fidelity (which were as evident Declarations of their Will, as any Law could be) had transferred their Right upon the Emperors, and therefore had not that which they transferred, and there is no pretence of Right for any others; and than it is evident those Emperors were Rightful Princes, because they had a Lawful Right, and because no other Right could be made good against them.  
The Doctor insinuates this Prejudice against their Right, that the consent 
Pag. 23.  of the Senate was extorted by ●ear, or Flattery, or other Acts. But their Consent however was voluntary and therefore valid against themselves: Consent extorted by Fear or Flattery is as obligatory a● that which proceeds from Love, or avarice, or Ambition, or any other violent Passion; and if all Contracts in which Fear or other Passions have a share are ●ill, there is an end of all Justice and Faith among Manking. But the Consent of the Senate and the People of Rome to the advancement of the Emperors, may be justified by Reason, and Necessity, and the public Good; there was no other way to prevent Civil War and the Dissolution of the Empire. We find in History that this Reason prevailed upon the wisest of the Romans; and since there are rational Grounds for their Consent, why should it be ascribed to Fear and Folly, rather than to Reason or Wisdom. In the consent of a Multitude there may be as many Reasons as Men; and therefore we must have regard only to their Act of consenting, and not to their Reasons; otherwise no consent of a Multitude will be valid, for the Reasons of many of them will be always invalid, and such as may be resolved into some Passion or other. The Doctor adds, that it is plain 
Ibid.  the Romans themselves were great Usurpers, and had no other Right to the greatest part of their Empire, but Conquest and Usurpation. The Romans always pretended Justice in their Wars, and if their pretence was true, and the Right of Conquest in a just War be a good one, they had a just Right to their Acquisitions; they obtained a just Right to many of their Provinces by the dedition of the former Sovereigns and by express Compacts with them, and by the extinction of all Competitors. But in short, it may suffice to answer, that when St. Paul wrote this Epistle to the Romans, they had a Right to their Provinces by Prescription, and the Law of Nations declares that to be a good one.  
This is all that the Doctor hath objected to the Title of the Roman Emperors, and for any thing he hath objected, their Title was just and lawful. He says, if we 
Ibid.  must obey such Powers as the Roman Power was, I know very few Powers that we may not obey; and he had said it to some purpose, if he had proved that Power to be Usurpation. But I know no Powers that are more lawful, and if we are required to obey such Powers only, we are under no Obligation to be the Subjects of Usurpers; if the Powers intended by the Apostle were lawful, than he required Subjection only to lawful Powers, and to say that he speaks of such Powers is not gratis dictum. for there is evidence of it; if I were the Doctor, I should say there is little less than Demonstration for it.  
2. That the Rule of the Apostle must be restrained to lawful Powers does seem evident, as from the Powers then in being, so also from the Nature of the Duty, and the Apostle's manner of expressing it. Subjection or Nonresistance is the Duty required; but Scripture itself and the Law of Nations do allow Resistance of Usurpers; and therefore this Rule of Scripture ought not so to be interpreted as to prohibit that which is allowed by Scripture and by the Consent of Nations, especially when it may be interpreted in a Sense agreeable to them: Who can doubt but that the Recuperative Wars of the Israelites against the Nations that usurped upon them, recorded in the Book of Judges, that the Resistance of Absalon by Joab, and other Loyal Subjects, and the Deposition of Athaliah after a Settlement of six Years Possession, are approved in Scripture? Does Christianity any where forbid such Recuperative Wars? Have not all Nations ever allowed and practised them? And are not they allowed by all Divines and Christians, excepting Quakers, Anabaptists and Socinians? But if such Wars for the recovery of usurped Dominion are lawful; it evidently follows, that Usurpers may be lawfully resisted, and therefore they are not such Powers as are declared by the Apostle to be God's Ordinance, and unresistible. Nothing can be objected to this Argument, but that a Recuperative War may be lawful to the dispossessed Sovereign, and yet unlawful to the Subjects; and this indeed is 
Case of Alleg. P. 26.  asserted by the Doctor. But here it shall suffice to reply in short, that if an Usurper be God's Ordinance and Minister, he has a Divine Right to the Throne, and therefore a Recuperative War against him is a War against God; it cannot be lawful to dispossess any one of a Power for which he has God's Authority, no Truth and Principle can be more evident than this, and so the Result must be, either that the Usurper is not God's Ordinance, or that a War to dispossess him is absolutely unlawful; if the Doctor choose the former, he overthrows his Book, if he choose the latter, he contradicts Scripture, the Law, and Practice of all Nations, the Judgement of all Lawyers, and almost all Divines, and asserts a Proposition of which the L. 
* Considerations touching a War with Spain  Bacon hath said, That no Man is so poor of Judgement as to affirm it.  
3. It should be considered that an Usurper is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, one that resists, opposes, and fights against Authority; he is so, much more than a Rebel; for his Opposition is greater, and his Usurpation is only prosperous Resistance; all the Iniquity of Resistance does lie in the Usurpation of that Power which by divine Ordinance is invested in another; for when Resisters have a lawful Right to the Power of the Sword, there is no Iniquity in their Resistance, and they are not within the Apostles Prohibition; that which makes them liable to Damnation is the usurping the Power of the Sword, and using it against those who have a divine Commission for the Exercise of it: There can be no Resistance without Usurpation, and therefore Usurpers must be condemned by the Apostle as well as the Resisters, and if the Resister in the Apostle does comprehend the Usurper, it is impossible he should be God's Ordinance, and have a Right to Subjection by virtue of his Authority.  
To this it will be objected, that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is he who resisteth a Sovereign in Possession, that such a Resister usurps the Power of the Sword, and is liable to Damnation; but if by a prosperous Resistance he gets Possession of Sovereign Power, he ceaseth to be an Usurper, and has God's Authority; and the former Power is no longer the Ordinance of God, but is deposed by him. The force of this Objection consists in these two Propositions: 1. That Subjection is due to all Possessors of Sovereignty. 2. That a lawful Sovereign ceases to be God's Ordinance, when he is dispossessed. But neither of these Propositions are affirmed by the Apostle; he says not that every Sovereign in Possession is God's Ordinance, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, there is now no Power over us, but of God, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Powers now in being are ordained of God. It is very obvious that these Propositions are limited to the Powers then in being, and the former Propositions included in the Objection are universal, and every one that has but natural Logic, does know that Universals are not comprehended in particulars. As to the 2d Preposition, the Apostle has given us no intimation how a Sovereign that is God's Ordinance can cease to b● so, ●or has he taught us, that when he is wickedly deposed by damned Resisters, he is deposed by God's Authority also. This Doctrine is neither taught by the Apostle, nor by any of the inspired Writers. The whole Scripture is a perfect Stranger to these two Propositions, and the great Writers for Usurpation cannot produce any Text of Scripture, which contains them either expressly, or virtually. To except the Usurpers of Sovereignty out of the number of Resisters, is therefore a precarious Exception, that has no Foundation in the 13th of the Romans, nor in any Chapter of the Bible.  
4. Let us then suppose that Reason is the sole Judge of this Controversy, Whether a Sovereign dispossessed is no longer God's Ordinance? And whether a prosperous Resister, who has usurped the Sovereignty, is ordained by God, and has his Authority to govern? These are not Propositions that carry their own Evidence, and from what Topics shall we deduce them? From the politic Good and the Preservation of humane Society? But this Proof will be as doubtful at least as the Propositions to be proved; not only because it is a great Question, whether the public Good can set up Kings and depose them; but also because it will seem evident to many, that the Encouragement of Resistance and Usurpation by conveying divine Authority upon every prosperous Resister, and the unavoidable consequence of frequent Wars, the greatest Evil to Society, which will often end in Anarchy, and the Dissolution of Society, are the things which are most destructive to the public Good, and the Preservation of Society.  
Are those Propositions then to be deduced from the Topick of Providence? We all acknowledge that the World is governed by Providence; but this can be no Proof, that whoever gains any thing by any concurrence of Providence has God's Authority to keep it: If it were, these two Consequences would be inevitable, 1. That God does authorise all the Injustice, and all the Wickedness in the World, for no Man can commit Wickedness without some concurrence of God's Providence, and if that be a proof of his Authority, than it necessarily follows, that God does authorise it. 2. That there is no such thing as the Obligation of Justice; for i● there be, no doubt it binds us to render to every Man his due; but if it is impossible to get the Possession of any thing without God's Providence, and that is always a Conveyance of his Authority; then he who has the Possession of another's Property, has acquired a Divine Right to it, and there can be no Obligation upon him to restore it. And in short, nothing can be due to a Man, which he has not in his Possession; and therefore since suum ouiqu● cribuere is the only Office of Justice, and that Office is impracticable, it follows, that Justice is only an empty Word, that has no significancy in it. These are the desperate consequences of that Doctrine which overturn at once the very Foundations of all Religion, civil Society, and Morality; and therefore we are as sure that it is false, as that God is holy, that Justice is a Duty, or that Wrong is not Right, nor Vice Virtue.  
Providential concurrence thereof to the gaining of any Possession, is in its self no Proof of the conveyance of divine Authority, it neither deprives the former Possessor of his Right, nor transfers it to the new one; this is undeniable in the Case of private Property, and there is equal Reason to allow it in the Case of Sovereignty. Private Property and Sovereignty are different Things indeed, but the notion of Right applied to both is the same, and the concurrence of Providence to the acquiring of both the same; and therefore if Providence extinguishes not the Right to one, neither does it so to the other; if it gives not a divine Right to Robbers, neither does it to Usurpers: Since the influence and co-operation of Providence is the same in bringing any one to the unjust Possession of a Purse, a House, a City, and a Kingdom; and it is impossible for Reason to observe any difference as to the conveyance of Power, (though there be a difference in the extension of Power proportionably to the Usurpation,) it necessarily follows, that from the precise Consideration of Providence, Reason cannot possibly distinguish between God's Ordinance and Permission, his conveying Authority upon an Usurper and not upon a Robber, his establishing the Possession of a Throne by divine Donation, when he gives no Establishment to the Possession of a Robber.  
But on the contrary, Reason seems to assure us, That God's Providence does never give Authority to Injustice; that Robbery is not God's Ordinance; that great Robbers are no more authorized by him than little Robbers; that as Stealing of itself introduces no Right, so neither does Rebelling no● Usurping; that Prosperity in Wickedness is no Proof of a divine Commission; lastly, that if resisting God's Ordinance be unlawful, it is unlawful to carry on and continue that Resistance, it is unlawful to resist a King so far as to depose him, and to usurp his Throne; and if it be unlawful to resist and to usurp, it is unlawful to continue the Usurpation by keeping Possession against the rightful Sovereign; for that is only a continuation of his Injustices which increases his Crime; and if it be unlawful to resist a lawful Prince, to depose him, to usurp his Throne, and to continue the Usurpation; it seems evident beyond all Contradiction, that an Usurper while he is such, is never established by God's Authority; for that is never granted to unlawful Acts or Possessions. In short, If it be unjust to usurp, the Usurper is bound to Repentance and Restitution; he who has unjustly invaded fewer Right, is bound in Justice to restore it: And if the Usurper is bound to restore the Power he has usurped, he cannot have a divine Right to that which he is bound to restore to another, and consequently cannot have the Establishment of divine Authority. This to me is the voice of Reason; and if Reason is so far from proving that an Usurper is God's Ordinance, that it proves the contrary; if that Proposition is not to be found in the 13th of the Rom. nor in any part of the Bible; if an Usurper be properly a Resister of God's Ordinance; if the Examples in Scripture, and the Law of Nations do prove it lawful to resist him; and finally, if the Powers to whom the Apostle requires Subjection were lawful Powers, than it is evident that the Rule of the Apostle must be understood of lawful Powers, and that there is as much evidence for excepting of Usurpers, as there is for excepting Thiefs or Rebels. Thus there is Reason to except Usurpers out of the Rule; and this will appear more reasonable when we have examined the Doctor's Arguments against it.  
1. He objects that the Criticism 
Pag. 19  between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 will not do, because they signify the same thing in scripture either Force and Powers or Authority. But he has produced no Instance to show that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when it denotes Civil Authority, does signify Possession of Power without Right; he knows the Word is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, licet, and therefore properly it must signify only 
* Phavorinus thus explains the Word, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. It is a Legal Commission, a Power invested with Authority by a grant from God.  Lawful Power: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is far from being spoken concerning Civil Authority, and when the same Apostle declares that our Saviour was exalted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not only in this World, but also in that which is to come; I hope he spoke not of Usurped Powers, unless there are such also among the Angels in Heaven. Every one knows that Force and Authority are two different things; and if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be applied to signify Force, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Authority, the Propriety of the Words will bear it▪ but we depend not upon that Distinction to exclude Usurpers; though it is manifest that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Scripture must be sometimes necessarily understood to signify only Lawful Power, as Matth. 21. 23. and I have shown there is a necessity of understanding it to in the 13th of the Romans.  
2. But the Doctor observes, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, those who exercise Authority, and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Rulers, ve●. 3● the Ministers of God which bear the Suerd, ver. 4. in St. Peter, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the King and Governors; and thence he infers that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does evidently relate to the exercise of Civil Authority, not to a legal Right. I think it relates to the rightful exercise of Authority; God gives Authority and Power that it may be exercised, but if wicked Men obstruct the exercise of it, the Gift is not forfeited, though the End is accidentally defeated. In a Rebellion, which is the Parent of Anarchy, the Sovereign cannot exercise his Authority; But does he then cease to be th' 〈…〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is God's Ordinance? Or ar●● the Rebels then Licenced to resist him? The same is the case of Usurpation; the Usurper obstructs the exercise of God's Authority, and his own Wickedness can give him no Right to continue it. The exercise of God's Authority is often hindered by the Wickedness of Men; as for instance, his Authority in a Father when his Children are Rebellious, in a Husband when his Wife, in a Master when his Servants are Disobedient, and in a Bishop, or Pastor, in the Cases of Schism, Usurpation, and Persecution; and yet still the one remains a Father, the other a Husband, the other a Master, and the other a Bishop, though those are names which relate to the exercise of Authority, as well as Rulers, Kings, and Governors.  
3. He insists much upon the 
Ibid.  silence of Scripture, as to the distinction between rightful Kings and Usurpers; he affirms there is no such distinction to be found any where in Scripture, and thence he argues, That if St. Paul had intended any such distinction, he ought to have said it in express Words, or else no body could have reasonably understood him to intend this precept of Subjection only to legal Powers. To this Objection the Doctor himself hath given a sufficient Answer. What he has observed of our Saulour in his Case of Resistance, is as true of his Apostle; We have no 
Case of Resist. p. 43, 44.  Reason to suspect that Christ would alter the Rights of Sovereignty— This was no part of his Commission to change the external Forms and Polities of Civil Governments.— He who would not undertake to divide an Inheritance between two contending Brethren; Luke 12. 13, 14. Can we think he would attempt any thing of that vast Consequence, as the alterations of Civil Power, which would have unsettled the Foundamental Constitutions of all the Governments of the World? Again, What Rights 
Ibid. p. 55, 56.  he found Sovereign Princes possessed of, he leaves them in the quiet Possession of; for had he intended to make any change in this Matter, he would not have given such a general Rule, to render to Caesar the Things which are Caesar' s, without specifying what those Things are. And therefore he leaves them to the known Laws of the Empire to determine what is Caesar' s Right; whatever is essential to the notion of Sovereign Power, whatever the Laws and Customs of Nations determine to be Caesar' s Right, that they must render to him, for he would make no alteration in this Matter. Now, say I, if our Saviour, or his Apostles, had enjoined Subjects to adhere to Usurpers against their legal Sovereigns, They had altered the Rights of Soveverignty, and unsettled the Fundamental Constitutions of all Governments: But on the contrary, they leave all Princes in the Possession of their Rights, they have given 〈…〉 this general Rule, that we should render them their deuce; and what those are, they have left to the Laws of Nations to determine, and whatever the Laws and Customs of Nations determine to be a Prince's Right, that the Subjects must render to him, for the Gospel has made no alteration in this Matter. And if this be good Reasoning, than the point is, whether Allegiance were due to Usurpers before the Gospel, for if it were not, the Gospel has made no alteration in this Matter; nor made that to be a due, which before was none: But the Examples of Scripture, the Law and Consent of Nations, which have always allowed the Resistance of Usurpers, do put that out of Question; and therefore supposing the Gospel has given us no distinction between rightful Princes and Usurpers, that silence can be no Argument against it; for the Gospel has left the Rights of Princes as it found them, it requires Subjects to render them those Rights, and if by the Laws of Nations Allegiance is the right of lawful Princes, it is their Right also by the Gospel.  
Where may we find in Scripture any Distinction between a true and a false Father, a lawful Husband or Master, and such as usurp those Characters? Yet Subjection is required to Fathers, Husbands, and Masters, as well as to Sovereign Princes: but there was no need that the Scriptures should declare, that it was due only to real Fathers, and to lawful Husbands and Masters; or that it should give Rules to distinguish them from the Usurpers of those Authorities; common sense is sufficient to inform us, that such a Distinction is necessary to be made, and in ordinary cases it is easy to distinguish them. The Scripture requires Obedience to Parents, but tells us not who they are, nor distinguishes real Parents from pretended, and yet no one thinks that final Obedience is due to the Usurpers of that Authority. Suppose it to be in the Case of Subjection to Civil Powers, the Scripture requires it, but distinguishes not between lawful Powers and Usurpers, Must we therefore conclude, that it requires Subjection to Usurpers? And why may we not conclude alike for the Usurpers of paternal Authority? Is it because Sense and Reason do agree that Usurpers must be distinguished in the one Case, but not in the other? But Reason tells me plainly, that Obedience is not due to the Usurpers of Civil Power; for he who has no Right to Power, has no Right to Obedience. The Foundations of Paternal and Civil Authority may be different, but in both the Duty of Obedience must be founded on a Right to Obedience: nothing can be due to him who has no Right; as an Usurper of paternal Power has no Right, so neither has the Usurper of Civil Power; he has neither a legal nor natural Right; and as for the Right of Providence, both the Usurpers may lay an equal Claim to it, for they are both advanced by the same way of Providence. There is no more Reason therefore to pay Obedience to a Civil Usurper, than to the Usurpers of the Power of Fathers, Husbands, or Masters, and where there is a plain necessity of making a distinction, the silence of Scripture is no Argument against it.  
There is no express Distinction in Scripture between the legal and illegal Possessor of an Estate, there are only general prohibitions of Injury and Injustice, and general Precepts of rendering every Man his Due, but what Estates or Properties are due to every Man, is left to the Civil Laws of Nations to determine; and yet the Silence of Scripture in these points, is no Argument against the Distinction of Right in private Possessions, and how can it hold good against the same Distinction in respect of Sovereignty? There is the like Reason and Necessity for admitting it in the one case, as there is in the other; if there be any difference, it is on the side of Sovereignty, which is the preserver of private Property, and of much greater Importance; and therefore in reason ought to be better secured, and the right to it be more inviolable; however if there be no distinction in Scripture about the Rights of Sovereignty, so neither about the Rights of Property; and therefore the Silence of Scripture is of itself no Argument against it.  
Let us suppose the Throne to be vacant, and two Competitors claiming it, and claiming a Right to our Allegiance, how shall the Conscience of the Subject be directed in this Dispute? Here the Scripture is perfectly silent, and gives him no particular Directions; but the Laws of the Land, and the Oath of Allegiance will direct him to pay his Allegiance to the true and lawful Heir, if he knows him; and the Doctor acknowledges, 
Case of Alleg. p. 52.  that the Laws of the Land are the Rule of Conscience, when they do not contradict the Laws of God. And he acknowledges also, that in such a Case we are bound to oppose the illegal, and to assist the lawful Title; thus far the Laws of the Land are the Rule of Conscience, though the Scripture makes no distinction between a lawful and unlawful Heir. But suppose farther, that the false pretender does actually usurp the Throne, and the lawful Heir does still demand our Allegiance: Here again we suppose the Scripture to be silent, and that there is no distinction in it between rightful Princes and Usurpers, and then it is evident, we can have no other direction but the Law of the Land, and if the Law determines our Allegiance to the rightful Heir, we are certainly bound to obey the Law, because it contradicts not the Laws of God.  
But the Doctor will not allow, that the Scripture is perfectly silent in this matther; for he objects, That the Apostle generally affirms, that all 
Vindicat. p. 57  Power is of God; and therefore if he had not intended that we should understand this as universally as he expresses it, he should have limited it to legal and rightful Powers. This I have answered already; there is no necessity of understanding the Apostle's words universally, of all the Powers that ever were, are, or shall be in the World; it is very probable he spoke only of the Powers then in being, viz. the Roman Emperors; the Words will fairly allow that Construction, and it is impossible to confute it: And therefore since there is no necessity of understanding the words so universally, as to take in all Usurpers, it is evident, That Text is no sufficient Rule to direct us in that Difficulty; and if there is no plainer Direction in the Bible, we are left only to politic Laws; and if these direct us to pay Allegiance to the lawful Prince, they are a Rule to us, and we must regulate our Actions by them.  
In short, the Scripture directs us to render to Sovereign Powers their due, and not to resist them, as it directs us to pay Obedience to Parents, Masters, and all that have Authority over us: But which are the higher Powers, and who are our Parents or Masters, or are invested with any Authority over us, the Scripture does not determine; but when there i● any Competition, we are left to Moral Evidence, to Political Laws, and to the Laws of Nature and Nations to direct us; and it is no imperfection in Scripture, if it does not determine such Controversies, if it supposes us rational Creatures, and embodied in Civil Societies, and under the Direction of Laws sufficient to determine them.  
4. The Doctor urges, That if the Apostle had intended 
Case of Alleg. p. 19  such a Distinction between rightful Princes and Vsupers, to the fulfilling of his Precept, it would be necessary for Subjects to examine the Titles of Princes, and to that end to be well skilled in the History and Laws of Nations, and to be able to judge between a pretended and real Right, and to know exactly what gives a real Right: But th●se are great Disputes among learned Men, and how should unlearned Men understand them? And I cannot think that the Resolutions of Conscience in such Matters at all Mankind are concerned in, should depend on such Niceties as learned Men cannot agree in.  
The Force of this Objection, as far as I can apprehend it, is this: That learned Men who are skilled in Law and History do often differ in their Opinions of a legal Right, and it cannot then be supposed that unlearned Men, who are the greatest part of Mankind, should be able to judge of it; and therefore it cannot be a Rule to them. But is not this Objection as strong against the Law of God, as against the Laws of Nations? If nothing can be a sufficient Rule to the unlearned, which the unlearned cannot agree in, Does it not plainly follow, that the Scripture cannot be a Rule of Faith to the unlearned, (who are the greatest part of Mankind,) because the most learned do differ in interpreting it? Is not this to say, (they are his own words,) that nothing can be clear in Scripture which is matter of 
Vindicat. p. 48.  Controversy, and thus we m●st be either Sceptics in Religion, or seek an insallible Interpreter? Thus Heretics oppose the Ar●●●●es of Faith; thus Papists Dispute against the Scripture's being the Rule of Faith▪ and yet I think it would be unjust and uncharitable to insinuate, (as he does against his Adversary,) that the Doctor has an Inclination to Rome, because his Argument looks kindly towards it.  
But the Doctor easily eludes this Consequence, I grant indeed that the Resolution 
Ibid. 49.  of Conscience ought not to depend on such Niceties of Law and History as learned Men cannot agree about, and that is a Reason why legal Rights should not be the Rule of our Obedience to Princes; but is this a Reason to reject the Directions of Scripture too, because some Men will dispute the plainest Texts? Well, but are not Law and History in many things as plain as the plainest Texts in Scripture? And if those can be no Rule of Conscience because learned men do raise Disputes about them, does it not follow, that the plainest Texts of Scripture can be no Rule of Faith, if the learned raise a Controversy about them; if nothing can be a sufficient Rule which has been disputed by the learned, neither Law, nor History, nor Scripture, nor even Sense or Reason are sufficient Rules: for inextricable Difficulties have been raised about them by perverse Disputers. He will say, that legal Right depends on the Niceties of Law and History, but Articles of Faith upon plain and evident Texts of Scripture; and yet even those evident Texts are many of them perplexed by the Niceties of Criticism, and the subtle Interpretations of Heretics. The Scripture evidently teaches the Divinity of Christ; but the Doctor knows, (and no Man better) that the Socinians who deny it, do elude the plainest Texts, and by their Skill in Criticism do wrangle them into Niceties. A Rule then may be plain and sufficient, though learned men do pretend it is difficult and obscure, and say it depends on Niceties, and the Question than is, Whether humane Laws may be a plain Rule to determine the Rights and Titles of Princes; for it is certain the Rule may be plain in its self, though learned Men may make a Nicety of it.  
But nothing can be a more palpable Absurdity, than to say that Law cannot be a plain Rule of Right, for that is to say, that the Law giver cannot plainly declare his Will, and that no Controversy about Right can be determined by Laws; and if the Law may be a plain Rule to determine the Rights of Subjects, may it not be a● plain about the Rights of Princes? Have not our Laws plainly declared the King to be irresistible? Do they not plainly invest him with the whole Power of the Militia? I know that learned Men do not agree in these Points, but I think the Doctor will grant that the Law is clear about them. And in the nature of the Thing there is no Reason, but it may be as clear about the Right and Title to the Crown; for may it not be plainly declared by Law, that the Crown shall descend by Hereditary Succession, and that he who invades the Crown without this Right is an Usurper, and has no Legal Right to Allegiance? this we believe to be our Law, and we believe it to be a plain and sufficient Rule to the Subjects: But when we say that the Law is plain, we do not deny but learned Men may have another Opinion of it, we intent that the Law is plain in itself, and may be made plain to Men of common Understanding, who will take the pains to inform their Judgement, and judge without Byas● and Interest. The very design of Law is, that it should be a plain Rule of Right and Practice, and it is a Rule to the common People as well as to the Lawyers; it is presumed they may understand it, if they will, and the ignorance of Law is always presumed to be affected, and to be culpable as well as the Transgression of it. To say therefore, that the Law cannot be a plain Rule to the unlearned who are bound to obey it, is a plain Contradiction to the very nature and end of the Law, and is to charge it downright with Folly and Barbarity.  
There are many Difficulties in Law, as there are in Religion, and in both the unlearned must consult the learned, the Lawyers and Divines; but they must judge also for themselves, and judge rightly at their peril; if a Lawyer, or a Judge, advise a Man to commit Treason, and tell him it is lawful, the Law will nevertheless condemn him as a Traitor. The Law no doubt requires our Allegiance to the legal King; but he who should pay his Allegiance to another King, though he should think him to be the legal King, his Mistake would be no good Plea in Law against an Indictment for Treason; the reason is, because the Law is supposed to be sufficiently promulged to all, and therefore the ignorance of it is inexcusable. In short I demand, was not the Law of the Land sufficient to inform all Men, that K. James the First had a legal Right to the Crown, and that Charles the First and the Second, had it successively after him; was there any honest understanding Man in England who ever doubted of their Right, and that when the two last were actually excluded from the Possession of it? Nay, was the Right of K. James the Second, either unknown, or uncertain to any of that Character? I think the Doctor will confess that the legal Right of these Princes was among all honest Men certain and unquestionable; and thence it evidently follows, that the Law of the Land may be a clear Rule of the Prince's Right and the Subjects Obedience, and if the Law may sufficiently direct us how to distinguish between Rightful Princes and Usurpers, there is no need of any other Direction.  
But though the Law be in itself a sufficient Rule as far as the intention of it reaches, yet Controversies may also arise, a● in other things, so in the Right to the Crown, of which there could be no foresight, and therefore no Provision about them; and further, it sometimes happens, that when the Law is clear, the due application of it is doubtful and difficult, the matter of Fact being disputed, when the Rule of Right is uncontested. Thus in those Kingdoms where there is a known and uncontroverted Rule of Succession, yet there are sometimes Controversies about the matters of Fact which are necessary to the application of it; as for instance in Hereditary Kingdoms, who is the right Heir; in Elective, who is duly elected. When such 〈…〉 asses' happen as are beyond the Provision of Law, and for which there could b 〈…〉 o Provision, as in the Disputes of Fact, if there be no Legislative Authority to determine them, (
* Puffendorf de Ju. Nat. & Gen. lib. 7. c. 7. s. 15.  as it is thought there can be none in the Disputes about the right to Succession,) there is no other way but for every Man to judge for himself, to examine the Competitors Evidence for their Claim and Title, to judge impartially, and to act accordingly. But it follows not hence, that Law is an insufficient Rule, because it prevents not, or decides not all Controversies about Right; for neither can Scripture, which we acknowledge to be a sufficient Rule in Religion, decide all Controversies that relate unto it; for instance, it requires Christians to obey them that have the Rule over them, not every one surely that intrudes himself into the Office of a Ruler, but only those that are lawfully called to it; but who those are the Scripture does not determine, that is a dispute concerning matter of Fact, and must be decided by such Evidence as can be had concerning it.  
But when the matter of Right and matter of Fact is clear, (as ordinarily they are in the Rights of Sovereigns to their Crowns) then there is a plain Direction for the Allegiance of Subjects: But in cases extraordinary, when Right and Fact are doubtful, and there is no such Evidence concerning them as may direct honest and understanding Men to the right Object of their Allegiance, in such Cases it is agreed, That if either of the Competitors be in Possession, the Subjects must pay their Allegiance to the Possessor, for the Laws of Nature and Nations, declare Possession to be a just Right when there is not a better, and Allegiance certainly is due where there is a just and lawful Right to it. And thus the unavoidable Defects of Political Constitutions are supplied by such Rules, as are founded on the Law of Nature and the Consent of Nations; and therefore if the Scripture has only required Obedience to the higher Powers in general, and has left us to the direction of other Laws, to determine which those Powers are to whom our Obedience is due; we are not left to Niceties and Uncertainties, but have as clear and plain direction as the nature of the Thing will admit, and reasonable Men will expect no more.  
5. Farther it is objected, That 
Case of Alleg. p. 20.  the Reason the Apostle gives for Submission to the higher Powers is not a legal Right, but the Authority of God; that all Power (or every one who exercises the supreme Power) is of God, and the Ordinance of God, which seems plainly intended to wave the Dispute about the legality of the Powers. But, 1. This Objection does conclude as strongly against his own Principle as against his Adversaries; he requires Allegience not to every one who exercises the supreme Power, so did Oliver; but to a Possessor throughly settled by the general Consent of the People: But the Reason the Apostle gives for Subjection to the higher Powers, is not a through Settlement or the Consent of the People, but the Authority of God; that every one who exercises supreme Power is the Ordinance of God, which seems plainly to wave all Disputes about Settlement and Consent. He can make no reply which will not serve his Adversaries; if he says that Settlement and Consent are not the formal Reason of Allegiance, but only the Signs of God's Authority to which it is immediately due; we say the same for our Principle; we confess that the Duty of Allegiance must be ultimately resolved into God's Authority; we only affirm that a lawful Right is a Sign of that Authority; we maintain that Allegiance is due to God's Authority, and thus far we are agreed; But how shall we know when a Prince is invested with this Authority? When he is settled, saith the Doctor; when he has a lawful Right, say others; and here lies the difference between us: If the Apostle had required Subjection to all Possessors for the sake of Possession, there could have been no Dispute about the legality of Powers; but since the Apostle's Reason of Subjection is not Possession, but the Ordinance of God, and he does not say that every one who is in Possession is ordained by God, (for every one who exercises the supreme Power is the Doctor's saying, and not the Apostles,) it remains a Question what Powers in the meaning of the Apostle are ordained by God, whether lawful only, or also unlawful Powers; and if he means lawful only, the Dispute about Legality is unavoidable.  
The Doctor in the Vindication 
Vind. p. 56.  of his Arguments from Rom. 13. demands, How God does invest any Prince with his Authority, whom he does not immediately nominate? To this he Answers himself, and confutes himself, but my Answer is, That God annexes his Authority to those Princes who have a lawful Right to govern, or to execute the Regal Office. And what says the Doctor? If God's Authority be annexed to the Regal Office, a Prince must be in the actual Administration of the Regal Office, before he can have God's Authority; as a Man must be actually Married before he can have the Authority which the Divine Laws give to a Husband. By Regal Office either he means the Duty in the Abstract, and whoever said that God's Authority was annexed to the Duty; or he must mean a Right to execute it, or the actual Execution of it; if he means the former, he asserts a manifest Absurdity, That he who has a Right to an Office must be in the actual Administration of it; if the later, he only asserts. That a Prince who actually administers the Regal Power must be in the actual Administration of it; and thus this show of Argument is nothing but an Amusement, and so is the similitude of an Husband; for the Relation of a Husband is subsequent to Marriage, and no Man can have the Authority of a Husband before he is a Husband: But the Relation of a King is not founded upon Possession, but upon a Right to govern, which implies a Right to Obedience, and we acknowledge that a King must actually have that Right, before he can have God's Authority; but this very instance of a Husband is a convincing Proof, that God's Authority may be given to those that cannot exercise it, for that is the condition of many Husbands.  
He urges farther, That to call 
Ibid.  a Right to the Crown the Authority of Government, is contrary to the Sense of Mankind, when they speak of Sovereign Princes: For he has actual Authority, who actually administers the Government, and it is actual Authority which is God's Authority, not Authority in Fancy and Idea, for God does not give Authority to govern without the Power of Government, which is a very fruitless and insignificant Authority. The Reply is very obvious; a Right to the Crown is a Right to govern, and that implies Authority to govern; and a Prince may have actually this Authority, and yet not actually administer it: And this is so far from being contrary to the Sense of Mankind, that nothing is more consonant to it; for all Men know that there may be Power without Authority, and Authority without Power, and there is no Man in his Wits but can easily distinguish them; and this is not an Authority which subsists only in Fancy, for it has a moral Efficacy and obliges to Obedience, and it might as well be said that all Duty, Law and Right, are nothing but Fancy and Idea; but to say that God never gives Authority to govern without the Power of Government, is an Assertion manifestly false; Have not Parents, Masters, and Husbands, Authority from God to govern, when they cannot govern those that are ungovernable? Had not David God's Authority to govern when Absalon forced him to be Abdicated? Had not Charles I. Authority to govern the Parliament, and the Regicides? And have not all Princes the same Authority over their Rebellious Subjects? But God's Authority without Power is fruitless and insignificant; that, I think, is no fault of God, or his Authority; the Grace of God is fruitless, much more than his Authority, and his Authority in Parents, Husbands, and Church Governors, is too often as insignificant as his Authority in Princes; but woe to them who render God's Authority insignificant, For their Damnation slumbereth not. And this may suffice to his Objection about God's Authority. But he endeavours farther to support it by observing,  
6. That the Pharisees made this Objection against Submission 
Case of Al. p. 20.  to the Roman Powers, that they were bound by the Law of God not to submit to them, as being unjust Usurpations upon the Privileges and Liberties of God's People; and therefore the Apostle tells them, that all Powers are of God, and the Powers that be are ordained of God. Let it be granted now that some such Objection was made by the Pharisees; How does it appear that the Apostle intended to oppose or answer it? Was that Opinion maintained by any of that Sect after they were converted to Christianity, or by any of the Roman Converts, or by any of the Christians at all? That the Doctor will not affirm, and if he does it, it is impossible to prove it. And why should we then imagine that the Apostle designed to confute an Error, which appears not to have been maintained by any that he wrote to, which he never mentions in his Writings, and of which he has not given any intimation.  
However the Doctor doubts not but St. Paul knew that the 
Vind. p. 57  Pharisees made this Objection, and for that very Reason he affirms that all Power is of God, and that they must be subject to the higher Powers without any distinction; which he would not have done, if any distinction ought to have been made, when he knew the Dispute was about the Romans, whom they looked upon as Usurpers over them. Well, but if St. Paul had that Objection in his view, Can we imagine he would not have expressed it, nor have given the least hint of it? If that was the Reason, for which he affirmed that there is no Power but of God, one would wonder why he should not express it, and why he did not directly determine that Controversy, by condemning the Distinction. And besides his Words can never be proved to affirm any more, than that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Powers at that time in being, were ordained by God, and this was sufficient to confute those Pharisees who taught the contrary; and therefore allowing that the Apostle intended to confute them, there is no reason to extend his Words beyond their scope and intention, which we suppose was to condemn the pharisees, who pretended the Roman Powers were Usurpers, and in opposition to them it was enough to affirm that they were God's Ordinance, and therefore Subjection was due to them.  
But after all, This Reasoning from the Apostle's design to condemn the Pharisees hath no certainty in it. That the Apostle had that Aim is affirmed by no ancient Writer or Expositor. St. chrysostom affirms that the Apostle's Design was not to show that Christianity did not tend to overthrow civil Polity, but rather to establish it better; Theophylact, that the Gospel did not teach Men Disobedience and Rebellion, but Quietness and Obedience; and this is the common Sense of modern Expositors, that the Apostle here intended to vindicate Christianity from the Imputation of Disloyalty and Rebellion with which it was reproached by the Jews and Gentiles. Calvin observes, that there are always tumultuous Spirits in the Church, who think the Kingdom of Christ cannot be advanced, unless all earthly Powers be abolished; but the Jews above all others thought it an Indignity that the Seed of Abraham, who were a flourishing Kingdom before the coming of their Redeemer, should after his Manifestation continue still in Servitude: And not the Jews only, but also the Gentiles thought it absurd to ackgowledge those for their lawful Governors who did cruelly persecute them, and endeavour to destroy the Kingdom of Christ: This last Objection is mentioned by Origen as aimed at by the Apostle; and for these Causes, says Calvin, it is probable he was induced to give so strict a Charge of Subjection to Governors. Thus it appears that Expositors have Foundations, Designs, and Occasions for this Precept of Subjection: But as for the pretended Objection of the Pharisees, it is at best but guessing, and no Argument can be deduced from it.  
7. Farther he urges, that 
Cas● of A●. p. 20  There is no Reason to confine the Words of the Apostle unto legal Powers, unless it were evidently the Doctrine of Scripture, that usurped Powers are not of God, which is so far from being true, that the contrary is evident, that the most High ruleth in the Kingdom of Men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, Dan. 4. 17. He cites also to this Purpose Dan. 2. 21, 37. It is he that changeth Times, that removeth Kings, and setteth up Kings; therefore all usurped Powers are of God, that is the conclusion; and in some sense I grant it to be true, and to be rightly inferred from those Testimonies of Scripture. We acknowledge that God sets up Usurpers, and gives them a Kingdom, Power, and Strength, and Glory; but he gives and sets them up as he sets up Robbers, Murderers, and Rebels, by granting them Power and Strength, and permitting, or not hindering them from the Abuse or wicked Exercise of it. In short, when Providence sets up Usurpers, it is not by the conveyance of Authority, but only by giving them power and liberty to abuse it; the Power whereby they are enabled to subdue their Opposers is from God, but the Abuse of it, to remove a rightful Prince, and to usurp his Throne, is merely from themselves, and is no otherwise from God than are all other Acts of Usurpation and Injustice. There are two ways then whereby God removes and sets up Kings, and gives the Kingdom of Men to whomsoever he pleases; by the Permission of Power, and the Conveyance of Authority; he permits a Prince the Possession of a Throne, when it is unjust and unlawful for him to possess and keep it, and he conveys Authority when his Providence opens a way to the lawful Possession of it; and if the Passages insisted on may be understood in this sense, they are far enough from proving that Usurpers have God's Authority.  
And that it is reasonable to understand them in this sense, will appear by comparing, them with other Passages of Scripture which assert the divine Providence in the Government of the World: The Lord maketh rich, he bringeth low and lifteth up; he raiseth the poor out of the Dust, and lifteth up the Beggar from the Dunghill, to see them among Princes, and to make them inherit a Crown of Glory, 1 Sam. 2. 7, 8. Thine is the Kingdom, O Lord, both Riches and Honour come of thee, and thou reignest over all, and in thine Hand it is to make Great, and to give Strength unto all, 1 Chr. 29. 4, 12. The Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away, Job 1. 21. and Ps. 75. 6, 7. Promotion cometh neither from the East, nor from the West, nor from the South, but God is the Judge; he putteth down one and setteth up another. It would be endless to produce all those passages, which affirm that Riches and Possessions, Honour and Promotion, do proceed from God; but these may may suffice, for they undeniably evince, that the Wealth and Advancement of private Persons is as much directed by Providence, as the Advancement of the greatest Monarches; that God giveth Riches as well as Kingdoms to whomsoever he will; and that when private Persons are Enriched and Promoted by the Ruin of others, it is God that putteth down one and setteth up another. But now it follows not hence, that every one who is in the Possession of Riches and Preferments, does enjoy them by such a Gift of God, as conveys Right and Authority to possess them; for then there could be no unjust Possession of any Thing, seeing every Man would have a divine Right to what he actually Possesses; and therefore there is a necessity of Expounding those Passages so, as to discharge God from being the Author of Injustice, to reconcile his Providence with the Rules of Right and Wrong, and to distinguish it according to the moral Nature of the Possession to which it concurs. When Riches are taken away from the rightful Owner, we may say as Job did, that the Lord hath taken them away, and that he hath given them to the wrongful Possessor; but this must be interpreted only of his permissive Providence, unless we will say that all Robbers have God's Authority and Commission. But when God's Providence, together with the Possession of Riches, conveys a Right to possess them, we are sure this Providence is more than Permissive, and that Riches so acquired are properly, and strictly the Gift of God. Undoubtedly it may be said of Riches, that God giveth them to whomsoever he will; but it would be plainly inconsequent to conclude from such Expressions, that every one who possesses Riches does hold them by a Divine Right, and by God's Authority.  
And this is a manifest Proof, that when God is said to give Kingdoms, to remove Kings and set up Kings, it does not necessarily follow from those Expressions, that all Possessors of Kingdoms have God's Authority to keep them; for if the mere force of the Words could advance it, since the very same may be applied to Riches, and the same thing is actually affirmed concerning them, in Words equally express and forcible; it would follow that all who have Riches, have a divine Right to them; but this Proposition is inconsequent from those Words, and therefore so is the other, that all Usurpers have a divine Right to their Kingdoms.  
There is no material difference in the Expression; there may be difference in the subject Matter, or nature of the Things, to which it is applied, and the same Expression may require different Interpretations according to the diversity of the Matter. Thus it may be objected, that when God is said to give Riches, and to give Kingdoms, the nature of the thing does require, that when Riches are given without a lawful Right to them, we should look upon it only as a permissive Gift; but when God gives Kingdoms, it is reasonable to understand, that he confers a Right to possess, and Authority to govern them. Now if the necessity of this Interpretation could be demonstrated from Reason and the Nature of the Thing, I acknowledge we should be bound to embrace it as the genuine Sense of Scripture: But I have shown that it is impossible to prove that Doctrine from Reason, and to find any difference in the nature of the Thing, between the Concurrence of God's Providence to the unjust Possession of Riches, and to the Usurpation of a Kingdom.  
But since the Expression of God's giving a Thing, does not always imply a conveyance of Right and Authority to possess it, and in the Case of a Kingdom, there is no way to prove that it does but by an appeal to Reason; it is plain that the Objection from those passages of the Prophet, which pretends to be drawn from Scripture Testimony, must at last be resolved into Reason: It is no where declared in Scripture, that God's giving of Kingdoms is to be understood otherwise than his giving of Riches; and if nothing but Reason can show, that giving of Kingdoms must always signify a conveyance of Authority, than it is Reason (and not those Prophetic passages) which proves, that all Usurpers have God's Authority; and therefore those passages ought not to be urged as Proofs from Scripture, nor be brought to prove that it is the Doctrine of Scripture that God does give Authority to Usurpers; for the result of that Proof must at least be this, that Scripture teaches it, because Reason teaches it.  
Those passages do assert no more, than that God's Providence does rule the World, and particularly Kingdoms, and that they are not governed either by Fate or Fortune, or merely by the Conduct, Power, and Policy of Princes. Nabuchadnezzar ascribed his Greatness to himself, as the building of Great Babylon, so his Empire and his Kingdom to the Might of his Power, to his own Strength and Policy; he gave not Glory to God, nor had any regard to his Providence and Dominion; and therefore God admonishes him by Dreams and Visions, sends a Prophet to convert him, and when he still persisted in his Atheism, he punishes him with the loss of his Reason and his Kingdom; and the end of all this Discipline, was to convince him, that the most high ruleth in the Kingdom of Men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will: Of which Words the best Explication is, that which Nabuchadnezzar himself did make after his Conviction; that God's Dominion is an everlasting Dominion, and that he doth according to his Will in the Army of Heaven, and among the Inhabitants of the Earth, Dan. 4. 34, 35. Now what can be inferred from these passages, but only that God governs the World, and that his Government, or his Will is irresistible? But are we therefore forbidden to distinguish between his positive and permissive Will? Far be it from us to deny God's Sovereign Dominion, let him be Anathema that does it; we maintain only that God is not the Author of Wickedness, that his Providence is unsearchable to us, and that Law is the only Rule of our Actions.  
But let us consider what the Doctor offers in the Vindication of these passages. To what he urges concerning 
Vind. p. 50, 51.  God's removing and setting up Kings; I reply, that those general Expressions do prove only that God's Providence is always concerned in the Advancement and Depression of Kings; but sometimes his Providence is only permissive, and that extinguishes no Right, nor conveys any Authority: He should therefore have proved, that God does always remove and set up Kings by his positive and authoritative Will, and that the Text does say so; for if the Text does neither say it expressly, nor virtually, it is impertinent to produce it.  
But this is evidently the Prophet's 
Ibid. p. 51.  meaning to attribute all the Changes and Revolutions of Government to the divine Providence. I grant it, for it is certain no King can be removed or set up whether God will or no: But when God is said to give Kingdoms to whomsoever he will, Does whomsoever 
Ibid.  signify those only who have a legal Right? Does giving suppose an antecedent Right in him to whom it is given? Does giving to whomsoever he will signify giving it only to those to whom the Law gives it? Do we use to say a Man may give his Estate to whom he will, when his Estate is entailed, and he cannot alienate it from the right Heir? We should think this a very absurd way of speaking among Men; and he insinuates 'tis absurd, To expound God's giving a Kingdom to whomsoever he will, to signify his giving the Kingdom to the right Heir. It may suffice to answer, That a legal Right to a Kingdom is a Gift of Providence, and God invests it in whomsoever he will; what is it which brings any particular Person to legal Right, but Providence? God that conferred it upon Charles the First, might have given it to Cromwell, or to any other Man in the World; and therefore when it is asserted that God never gives a Kingdom without a lawful Right to it, this is very well consistent with that Assertion of the Prophet, though it be understood of God's Authoritative Gift, and in the utmost comprehension of the Words; for though God's Authority be annexed to Right, yet he gives that Right to whomsoever he will.  
But farther, he instances in the giving of an Estate, and that instance will lead us to a Resolution of his Questions. God giveth Estates to whomsoever he will; this Proposition is contained in Scripture, and is undeniably true: it is nevertheless certain that no one can have a Divine Right to an Estate, when the legal Right is fewer; and than though God's Providence gives Possession of an Estate, that Gift is no conveyance of Right or Authority to keep it. But then the Doctor bri●kly demands, does whomsoever signify those only who have a legal Right to an Estate? does giving it suppose an antecedent Right? does giving an Estate to whomsoever be will, signify giving it only to those to whom the Law gives it. The Answer is obvious, God gives Estates by his permissive, and by his positive Will; by the latter to those only who have a legal Right, by the former to every one that gets Possession; in respect to this Gift whomsoever may be taken universally, but must be limited to a lawful Right in respect to the other.  
Thus in the disposal of Kingdoms, every one who has Possession, has a permissive Gift, but not a positive or authoritative Gift, which always attends upon Right; in relation to the former, God does give Kingdoms absolutely to whomsoever he will, without regard to Right; in relation to the latter, God does give Kingdoms to whomsoever he gives Right to possess them. In short, he gives them to whomsoever he will, but God's Will is either positive or permissive; and it is impossible to distinguish by which of them he gives any Possession, but by considering the Right to possess them. When an Estate is entailed, the Possessor cannot give it to whomsoever he will, for he has no Right to alienate it from the Heir, neither does Providence properly give it to those who have no Right to it: But nevertheless God can give Estates to whomsoever he will, by permitting Power, or conveying a legal Right to possess it: God can do both, when it is not in the Power of a Man to do either; and therefore there is a great Disparity in this Case, between God's giving and Man's giving.  
And now what Absurdity is there in saying that God giveth a Kingdom to whomsoever he will permit the Possession of it, and conveys his Authority on whomsoever he will confer a Right to possess it? does the Absurdity lie in distinguishing between his permissive and authoritative Will? that is a Distinction generally received, and hitherto I see no Reason why it is not applicable to the disposal of Kingdoms. Is it absurd to say that God gives a thing when he only suffers the taking it? that is the Language of Scripture, thus saith God himself unto David, I will give thy Wives unto thy Neighbour, and he shall lie with them; I will do this thing before all Israel, and before the Sun. But surely no Right was hereby given unto Absalem to his Father's Wives. The Actions of seducing, deceiving, and moving unto Wickedness, of blinding and hardening Men in it, are expressly attributed to God in Scripture, and if such Expressions may be reasonably expounded only of God's Permission, or his being the accidental cause of such Effects; there can be certainly no Absurdity in expounding God's giving a Kingdom without Right, by granting Power to Usurpers, and permitting them to abuse it. Lastly, Does the Absurdity lie in restraining whomsoever he will unto rightful Princes, when we speak of God's giving Authority? But if God gives a legal Right to whomsoever he will, than there is no Restriction, because none are excepted. God gives Riches to whomsoever he will, but he always gives a legal Right when he gives Authority to keep them; and in fine, it is no Absurdity to restrain the general Expressions of Scripture when the matter does require it. Thou hast wrought all our Works in us, saith the Prophet; if we understand this of God's positive Operations, wicked Works must be excepted: He hardeneth whom (or whomsoever) he will, saith the Apostle; and I think the Doctor will not think it absurd to restrain the Words, to those who make themselves obnoxious to the Divine Vengeance, by their obstinate Incredulity: and if this Expression may be restrained in one place, so it may in another, if there be equal Reason for it. In short, it is no Absurdity to restrain such general Words, when it is absurd to understand them without Restriction.  
But the Doctor argues, that 
Case of Alleg. p. 20.  these Passages relate to the Four Monarchies, which were all as manifest Usurpations a● ever were in the World, and yet set up by the Decree and Counsel of God, and foretold by a Prophetic Spirit. Here he affirms that the most manifest Usurpers that ever were in the World, were set up by God; conseqently they had God's Authority to govern, and therefore a Right to Allegiance; otherwise Usurpers are never the better for being set up by God, and those Passages are produced superfluously to prove it. But if the most manifest Usurpers in the World are God's Ordinance, what shall become of his distinction between Usurpers settled and unsettled, such as Cromwell was, and such as those that are enthroned by a full Convention, such as have and such as have not the consent of the People: If all Usurpers have God's Authority, these distinctions are perfect Banter; but if all have it not, certainly the most manifest Usurpers that ever were in the World were without it: But let this pass for an Hyperbole. I answer,  
1. It appears not, that those Monarchies were Usurpations: I grant they were such in sieri, those, I mean, who set them up, were Usurpers in doing it, and for some time, it may be, after their Advancement: but they soon became rightful Sovereigns, by the extinction of the former Right; and if at first they were Usurpers, and afterwards rightful Sovereigns, How knows the Doctor that those Passages in the Prophet, relate to the four Monarchies, as Usurpations, and not as rightful Governments? He affirms, that the 
Vind. p. 51.  Prophet tells us with respect to the very Revolutions, which were nothing else but Force and Usurpation, that God changeth Times, and removeth and setteth up Kings. Then it follows, that even the unjust and violent Changes of Governments are acted and authorised by God; for if in respect to them it is said, that God changeth Times and sets up Kings, and setting up is the act of God, and conveyance of Authority, than it is certain that God does act and authorise Changes; then those very Usurpers, whose Government is founded only upon Force, without the consent of the People, have God's Authority; and then rebellious Subjects, and ambitious Princes, who overturn a lawful Government by Force, have God's Authority for it; for in respect to that Force and Violence he affirms, that Governments are destroyed and set up by God. Thus in the transport of his Anger, the Doctor forgets his own Principles, and the Convocation's.  
2. Suppose those Passages do relate to Usurpers, and to the very Force and Violence by which Empires are overturned; How does it appear that God's setting up Kings, and giving of Kingdoms must be expounded of God's positive, and not of his permissive Will, of his giving of Authority, and not of his concession of Power, whereby Rebels and Usurping Princes are enabled to accomplish their wicked Erterprises: If those Passages relate to the very Revolutions of Governments, and the wicked Force and Violence by which Usurpers are advanced, then certainly they must be understood of God's permissive Providence, unless we will make God the Author and Abettor of the highest Wickedness and Injustice. The Doctor will not affirm that those Passages do prove that Usurpers are set up by God, when they are making their way to the Throne, nor when they actually place themselves in it; for till they are settled in it by consent, he himself does allow that they have not God's Authority; and yet they will prove this, if they prove any thing for Usurpers; for they limit not God's setting up, to Consent and Settlement, they make no difference between Kings in sieri, and in facto esse, between their ascending to the Throne, their fitting and their settlement in it; they intimate that all the Gradations and Steps of such Revolutions are alike from God, that he bringeth about the whole Change, and that the Invasions and Rebellions by which Kings are removed, are as much from him as the Advancement of a new King to the Throne, and his Establishment in it: And therefore if they prove that Usurpers have God's Authority, they prove it for Rebels and Invaders also.  
But perhaps the four Monarchies which we suppose to be Usurpations were set up by God's Authority, because they were set up by the Decree and Counsel of God, and foretold by a prophetic Spirit. I have observed before, that some of God's Decrees are permissive, and such are his Decrees about wicked Events, among which I reckon unjust Violence and Usurpations: But they were foretold by a prophetic Spirit; And what then? Have Usurpers therefore God's Authority, because God, who is omniscient, and sees future things as present, does behold them committing Wickedness, and foretells it by a Prophet; or is God's Prescience a Conveyance of his Authority?  
Among other Changes and Revolutions foretold by Daniel, in the Judgement of very learned Men, the setting up of Antichrist is predicted, and that under the name of a King, Dan. 11. 36, 37, 38, 39 and I see no Reason why the setting up of this King may not as well be ascribed to God's Decree and Counsel, as any other King in Daniel. However it is said expressly of the Beast in the 13th of Revelations, which is supposed to be the Antichrist, that Power was given him over all Kindred's, Tongues, and Nations: Here we have his Commission for an universal Empire. And Power was given him to continue forty two Months: Here is a Settlement for a long Tract of Time. And all that dwell upon the Earth shall worship him: Here is the Consent and Submission of the People to establish him; and if this King has not God's Authority upon the Doctour's Principles, and by virtue of as express words of Scripture, as any he produces for Usurpers, I wonder who can have it? Let us know whether this Power of Antichrist was not given him of God, and whether he could have it without his Will and Appointment? A Power over all Nations must certainly be given him by God; and yet I think this giving of Power is no Conveyance of Authority upon this Usurper, nor does it infer any Obligation to Obedience: and this Instance overthrows all his Arguments from God's giving Power and Kingdoms, for here is a Power and Kingdom which is given by God, to which we cannot be Subjects without Apostasy from him.  
The Doctor observes, That under the fourth Monarchy the 
Case of Al. p. 22.  Kingdom of Christ was to be set up, and Antichrist was to appear, and the Increase and Destruction of the Kingdom of Antichrist is to be accomplished by great Changes and Revolutions in humane Governments. Hence he infers, That since God has declared, that he will change Times and Seasons, remove Kings, and set up Kings, to accomplish his own wise Counsels, it justifies our Compliances with such Revolutions; he should have added, for otherwise Antichrist could neither be advanced nor destroyed. Thus it was once argued for Resistance, That God's hiding 
J. Goodwin in his Anticavalierism.  the lawfulness of it from the primitive Christians was necessary to help Antichrist to his Throne: and now Compliance with Usurpers is urged to be lawful, as necessary to set up and pull down Antichrist, that so God's Counsels may be accomplished; and may it not as reasonably be inferred, that since God has declared he will make Revolutions, remove and set up Kings, that therefore Rebellions and unjust Invasions are lawful, because they are the ordinary ways of effecting Revolutions? No, says he, we must not, contrary to our Duty promote such Revolutions upon a pretence of fulfilling Prophecies, but when they are made and settled, we ought to submit to them: What! Can it be contrary to our Duty to promote Revolutions which God decrees, promotes, and effects? Is it lawful for no one to promote them? And how then shall they be accomplished? But why is it lawful to submit to them when they are made and settled? Why, because God has decreed them, that must be a Reason for it, or his Decrees and Counsels are here impertinently urged. But we are sure that God has decreed the Kingdom of Antichrist, and when his Kingdom is settled, must all Kindred's, Tongues, and Nations, pay Subjection to him? If God's Decree be a a Reason for Submission, we have no more to do, but to fall down and worship, when we see his Decree accomplished in the Advancement of Antichrist. And if this be not Enthusiasm, there is no such thing in the World.  
How vain is it to distinguish between promoting and submitting in respect to the fulfilling of Decrees and Prophecies? Does not he that submits promote? And what Ground is there for that Distinction in Scripture? It was God's Decree that Cromwell should have the Administration of Sovereign Power, and he might have foretold it by Prophecy; but it was impossible it should have been accomplished without a general Submission: Was that therefore a general Duty, and was the Nation bound to it, to fulfil Decrees and Councils? What have we to do with God's unsearchable Decrees? Our Rule is Law, the Laws of God and Nature for religious and moral Actions, the Laws of Kingdoms and Commonweals for those that relate to Civil Society. As for God's Decrees, they are unknown to us, till they are fulfilled, and when they are, we can never know whether they are positive or permissive, whether they require our Submission or Resistance, but by the nature of the Events. Usurpations are decreed by God, and so are Robberies, so is Antichrist; and if there be no difference between these Decrees, as there may be none, and there can be none gathered out of Daniel, or out of any other part of Scripture, it follows necessarily, that God's Decreeing of Usurpers infers not any Obligation of Subjection to them. Thus I have done with his Argument from Dreams, Decrees, and Prophecies; and I hope it appears, that the Doctour's Commentary upon Daniel does by no means make good his Commentary upon the Apostle.  
8. He argues farther, That this Distinction, that only legal 
Case of Al. p 21.  not usurped Powers are of God, had made the Apostle's Direction signify nothing; for the great Question had still been undetermined, what Powers are of God, and what they must obey, if some Powers be of God, and some not. The Apostle directed the Roman Christians to be subject to the Roman Powers then in being; and if there was any Dispute whether they were lawful Powers or Usurpers, he plainly determines it, by declaring they were God's Ordinance, and that Subjection was therefore due to them; he tells them the Powers then in being were ordained by God, and that was enough to silence all Disputes about them. The Doctor confesses, That had the Apostle confined himself to the then present Powers, it would have directed them at that time; but, says he, it would have been no general Direction to Christians in other Ages to obey the present Powers; it would have been very convenient for some Men, if the Apostle had given such a Direction; but what if he hath not? Why, then we have no Direction in Scripture, what to do in such disputed Cases unless by a Parity of Reason. Well, suppose that we have not; the Direction is sufficient, if we will be content with what may be reasonably expected: St. Paul required the Christians to pay Subjection to the Roman Emperors who were lawful Powers; and the Reason upon which he enjoins it, extends the Obligation to Subjects in all Ages and Nations who are under the government of such lawful Powers. But the Apostle has not directed us to distinguish what Powers are lawful; neither have we any Directions to find out true Parents, lawful Husbands, Masters, and Pastors; and yet, I think, the Scripture is not to be charged with Imperfection: The Scripture prescribes the Duties of these several Relations, but gives no Rules to distinguish the Relatives, the True and Lawful from the False and Counterfeit, that depends upon the infinite variety of Fact, of Customs, and of Laws, and therefore cannot be comprehended in general Rules; so does the Distinction between lawful Powers and unlawful, it depends upon the various Constitutions of Civil Politics, and often upon Matters of Fact; and therefore that Distinction could not be bounded and defined within Rules, nor consequently be determined in Scripture. In short, it may be inferred, by parity of Reason from the Apostle, that the supreme Powers in every civil Government are God's Ordinance and irresillible; But which are the supreme Powers he hath left to be determined by the Laws of every Government? The Doctor himself hath told the World, That whatever 
Case of Resist. p. 111.  Power in any Nation, according to the Fundamental Laws of its Government, cannot and ought not to be resisted; that is, the supreme Power of that Nation, the higher Powers to which the Apostle requires us to be subject; And is there any Nation in the World, which hath made an Usurper irresistible by a Fundamental Law? The Doctor may recant this, but he will pardon me if I am still of his Opinion.  
But the Doctor is sure the only 
Case of Al. p. 21.  Direction in Scripture, is to submit to those who are in the actual Administration of Government. And I am sure there is no such Direction there; and which is more, the Doctor himself is sure of it, for he is sure that Usurpers who have the actual Administration of Government, without the consent of the People, have no Title to Subjection. He seems to lay stress upon those Words of the Apostle, At God's Ministers attending continually upon this very Thing; the Emperors were then actually Administering the Government, and that was their Business, as God's Ministers: But does the Apostle say, that Sovereign Powers are not God's Ministers, when they are hindered from their Business, though they are still attending upon it, and endeavour to remove the Impediment? Do they cease to be God's Ministers, because their Subjects are Rebels? Obedience is required to Spiritual Rulers, because they watch over Souls, Heb. 13. 11. Are the People then discharged from their Duty, if they will not suffer their Pastors to watch over them, but separate from them? And are the Pastors no longer God's Ministers, because they can't exercise their Function?  
But there is not the least notice 
Ibid.  given us of any kind of Duty, to a Prince removed from the Administration of Government, whatever his Right may be. Neither, say I, is there any the least notice of paying any Duty to Usurpers; no more is there of paying Obedience to a Father, or a Master, removed from the Government of their Families, or to a Bishop removed from his Church by Persecution; there is no more than this, that the Scripture requires Obedience to them, and neither Scripture nor Reason does teach us that when they are violently removed from the actual Administration of their respective Governments, the Relation ceases and the Duty with it. And thus much may be said for Sovereign Princes; Subjection is required to them, but neither Scripture nor Reason do inform us, that the Relation is extinguished when they are violently deposed: On the contrary, we are expressly required to give Princes their deuce, and what those are we must learn from the Laws of Nature and Nations, for the Scripture has not taught us.  
But we have no Example in 
Ibid.  Scripture, that any People were ever blamed for submitting to Usurpers. In the 2d. of Samuel we have the People of the Jews submitting to Absalon; in the 13th. of Revel. the People of all Nations to Anti-christ, but in neither do we find that they are blamed for it. But I wonder when he was heaping up these negative Arguments, that he did not remember, that if they are good for any thing, they overthrew his own Hypothesis; he maintains that Allegiance is not due to all Usurpers (though all his Arguments from Providence and Scripture do prove it) but only to those that are settled by a general consent; and yet there is no Rule, no Example, not an jota for this Distinction in Scripture. But this was not convenient to be remembered, for than he had lost these pretty Arguments. But in Scripture we have Examples 
Ibid.  of Subjects being condemned for refusing to submit to Usurpers. This indeed is to the purpose: But where are these Examples to be found? in the Prophecies of Jeremiah, and the Discourses of our Saviour with the Scribes and Pharisees, about paying Tribute to Caesar. Let us now examine these Examples.  
Our Saviour's Argument relies wholly on the Possession of Power, whose Image and Superscription hath it? and if this be a good Reason, it is good in all other Cases, that we must submit to all Princes who are possessed of Sovereign Power. I refer the Reader to our Saviour's Discourse, and let him satisfy himself, whether this Proposition is in it, That Allegiance is due to all Princes in Possession of Sovereignty, or this other, which is contradictory it to, That it is due only to these Possessors that are settled by the consent of the People; that I think cannot he inferred from the Image and Superscription, for Usurpers may coin Money before they are settled; neither is it any Proof that a Prince is in Possession, because his Coin is current; if it is, Allegiance is due to King JAMES, or at least all the Money that has his Image and Superinscription. Is the Doctor sure that the Coin presented to our Saviour had the Image of Tiberius? Others say it had the Image of Augustus, and then our Saviour's Argument could not rely upon Possession, for the Coin of a Prince deceased could suggest no Argument that Allegiance was due to the Possessor.  
Dr. Hammond I take to be the better Expositor; thus he upon those Words: Whose is this Image and Superscription? The Inscription on the Coin is Caesar Agustus, such a Year after the taking of Judaea; this being a Record of the Conquest of the Romans ●ver this Nation, and the Right by them acquired, by the dedition of Hyrcanus, and an expression of the Years since that taking, about 90 Years, (for so long ago did Pompey subdue and take Jerusalem,) show that now it is unlawful to seek change, after so long continuance of that Power, so fairly and legally settled. So the excellent Dr. Hammond; and in his Annotations he evinces historically, the Legality of the Roman Government over Judaea. Dr. Sherlock on the contrary, supposes that Caesar was an Usurper, and that our Saviour reproved the Pharisees for not submitting to an Usurper; but he was pleased only to suppose it; and I presume to affirm, that it is impossible to prove it: For an Usurper must have some Competitor who claims a right to the Sovereignty, and let him name us that Person, if he can, that was Caesar's Competitor; if he cannot, he may suppose, but he can never prove him an Usurper.  
His other Instance is out of the Prophet Jeremiah; and here he acknowledges that his Argument for Submission is Prophecy, or an express Command from God to submit to the King of Babylon: And was Nabuchadnezzar then an Usurper, if Allegiance was required to him by God's revealed Will? Was he not King over the Jews by particular Nomination? Did not the Sin of the Jews consist in their Disobedience to God's express Command? And how can he prove that the Prophet would have condemned them, if they had refused to submit without express Revelation, or that he himself would have advised them to submit without it.  
Before the first Conquest of Judaea under Jehoiakim, the Jews could be under no Obligation to submit to Nabuchadnezzar; but when their Kings had made a voluntary dedition to him, and confirmed it by an Oath, than their Obedience was due to him as their lawful Sovereign: Their Revolt is afterwards styled Rebellion, and the Violation of that Oath was punished with final Captivity and Destruction, Ezek. 17. The Doctor pretends there was a necessity of an express Command to submit, because they could not without it subject themselves to any other Prince, while any of David's Family were living, because God himself had entailed the Kingdom upon his Posterity. But this is a groundless Fancy, and contradicted by himself; for in his Vindication he maintains, That whether there be a Divine Entail or no, it is always lawful to submit to Force, and then sure there was no need of a Revelation. But where is that Reason to be found in Scripture? Does the Prophet Jeremy mention it? Had the Jews any Scruple then about a Divine Entail? The Prophet declares from God, that if Zedekiah would submit to the King of Babylon, he should live in Safety, chap. 38. and after his Captivity, and the Destruction of Jerusalem, he assures the remaining Jews, that if they would still abide in the Land, God would deliver them from the King of Babylon, chap. 42. The only Motive which he urges to the King and People is an assurance of Safety by Submission: But it appears from the Prophet Ezekiel, that they were bound to it by Oath and Covenant, and they are therefore branded by both the Prophets with Rebellion, because they revolted from their lawful Sovereign.  
But the Doctor argues hence, That where the Entail of the 
Ib. p. 22.  Crown is only by Humane Laws, there is no need of Prophecy to direct the People to submit to any new Prince whom God sets over them. Well, suppose there was need of Prophecy in case of a Divine Entail; how does it follow there is no need of Prophecy when an Entail is by Human Laws; perhaps it may follow from something else, but I am not subtle enough to discern how it follows from his Premises: It will follow as well, that because a King by a Divine Entail cannot be deposed without Prophecy, there is no need of Prophecy to depose a King of Human Entail; or because Abraham could not lawfully Sacrifice his Son without an express Command, therefore▪ other Parents may murder a Son without it. When God sets up a Prince by his positive Will, there is no need of a Prophet to prescribe Submission, but there is need of a new Revelation to inform us, when it is his Will to convey Authority to an Usurper, for the Event▪ is no Indication of it.  
But since the Prophet's Motive for Submission to the Jews was Safety, may we not for the same Reason submit to any King in Possession? I answer the Case may be different; for, 1. The Jews were bound to submit to the King of Babylon; for they were his rightful Subjects by Dedition, and by God's express Appointment; and though Safety is a good Argument to enforce Duty, it is none against it. 2. The case of absolute Conquest, when the Lawful Prince is a Captive, the Government dissolved, and no possibility of restoring it, is manifestly different from the case of a People deposing their lawful Prince, advancing an Usurper, supporting him by their Power, opposing their Rightful Sovereign, and still in a capacity of restoring him; their Safety in this case is no Argument for persisting in Rebellion; and if they are under any Necessity, it is of their own making and continuing. 3. Submission is not Allegiance, and though the former is lawful, when it is to no purpose to resist, yet it is no more lawful to assist an Usurper to the destruction of a Rightful Prince, merely for my own Safety, than it is to assist a High-way-Man to save my own Purse, or to compound for my own Life, by assisting an Assassin to destroy my Neighbour's,  
Thus I have considered all the Doctor's Arguments from Scripture, but there is one Text more to be considered, which the Doctor propounds as an Objection against his Principle; the place is Hosea 8. 4. where God himself does thus complain of the Israelites, They have set up Kings but not by me, they have made Princes and I knew it not. Here we are assured, that all Kings have not been set up by God, and this is as plainly and expressly declared as Words can do it, and how then is this reconcileable with the Apostle's universal Proposition, there is no Power but of God? I have intimated that this Proposition is restrained by the following Words unto the Powers then in being, which were lawful Powers: And thus the Texts are easily reconciled, and there is no Contradiction between them, if we understand the latter of lawful Powers, the former of Usurpers; or if we distinguish between Kings set up by God's Ordinance and Authority, and Kings set up by his Permission, and the general Concourse of his Providence. But what saith the Doctor?  
1. Those Words in Hosea 
Case of Alleg. p. 35.  are not true of all the Kings of Israel, after their Separation from the Tribe of Judah; for Jeroboam and Jehu were set up by God's own Appointment. This is contrary to the general-Sense of Expositors, 
Calvin, Rivet. Mercer. Piscator. Tarnovius, cited by Dr. Pocock: To which add Zanchius, Junius, Pareus, Diodate, Geneva Interpr. Annotations of Divines.  who apply this Speech to to Jeroboam especially: But did not God declare by the Prophet Abiah, that he would give him the Kingdom over Israel? It is answered, though Jeroboam had a Prediction of his Advancement, yet he did not tarry for God's farther direction about it, as David did; he possessed himself of the Kingdom, not by God's Appointment▪ but by the Gift of the People, who had no Command nor Direction from God to depose Rehoboam; and whereas another Prophet declared, that the Thing was from God, this may denote, that God permitted and ordered the Rebellion and Usurpation for the punishment of Solomon and his Son, and such a permitting and overruling Providence could be no Conveyance of Authority, for thus the Cursing of Shimei, and the Usurpation of Absalon, were also from God.  
2. One of these Kings was Baasha, who made himself King without God's express Nomination; and ye● God tells him, I exalted thee out of the Dust, and made thee Prince over my People Israel. This might have been said of Cromwell, who yet had no Title to God's Authority; and it may be understood of the general Concurrence of God's Providence, and the concession of Power to usurp the Throne. But as for these Kings, if God did actually deprive the Family of David of their Right to the Kingdom of Israel, than they were lawful Kings, because Possession was a Right when there was no other; if he did not, (which seems very doubtful,) they were certainly Usurpers upon a Divine Right; and therefore though they were exalted by God's Providence, yet they could not be invested with his Authority.  
3. The true Answer is this: Israel was a Theocracy, and therefore they ought to have received their Kings from God's Nomination; but instead of that, they submitted to any who could set up themselves over them; and this, he says, was a great Crime, it being in effect a renouncing their Prerogative of having Kings set up by God's Nomination, and putting themselves into the common condition of the World, where Kings are set up only by his Providence. This contains the force of his Answer, and at most 'tis only conjecture, and such as has little show of Probability. No doubt it was a Crime not to consult God, when they might have consulted him; but upon the Doctour's Principle it could be no fault to submit to any who could set themselves over them; for he says himself concerning those Princes, that they were set up by God, and surely it could be no fault to submit to his Ordinace. He affirms expressly, That in Judah and Israel God did sometimes set up Kings only by his Providence, and these providential Kings had all the Rights of other Sovereign Princes of Judah or Israel; consequently they had a Right to Submission, and therefore it was no fault to pay it; and if it was a fault to submit to those Kings of Providence, then certainly they were not invested with God's Authority; and then the meaning of the Words in debate is this; they have set up Kings by the Concurrence of my Providence, but not by me, but without the conveyance of my Authority. As for the Prerogative of receiving Kings by express Nomination, I understand not upon the Doctor's Principles, how that could be any Prerogative; I am sure it could be no advantage; for if Kings of Providence have divine Authority as much as Kings by Nomination, where is the difference? Cannot good Kings be made by Providence, as well as by a Prophet? Is not the one God's Act and will as much as the other? There can be no Privilege or Advantage in a singular way of making Kings, if all are made by God and enjoy his Authority: and therefore in the nature of the thing itself, it could be no Crime to forego it. I hope it appears now, that his Scripture-Proofs are as ill grounded as his Propositions; I might well spare the Labour of examining his other Reasons, but if they be not answered, they may be thought unanswerable, and therefore I will briefly consider them.  
2. The Doctor observes, That his Hypothesis gives the 
Oase of Al. p. 23.  easiest and intelligible Account of the Original of humane Government; that all Power is from God, who is the Sovereign Lord of the World. Having observed this, he recites the various Opinions about the Origine of Monarchy, and confutes them severally, and concludes at last, That he cannot see where to fix the Foundation of 
Page 24.  Government, but in the Providence of God, who by the choice of the major or stronger part of the People, or by Conquest, or Submission, or the long successive Continuance of Power, or by humane Laws, gives a Prince and his Family Possession of the Throne, which is a good Title against all humane Claims, and requires the Obedience of Subjects, as long as God is pleased to continue Him and his Family in the Throne; but it is no Title against God, if he please to advance another Prince. To set this Matter in a clear Light, I observe,  
1. That our Dispute with the Doctor is not about the Origine, or first Beginning of Government, whether it began in Paternal Authority, or by Original Contracts; but about the Resolution of Government and Obedience, whether they must be resolved into Right or Possession.  
2. The Dispute is not whether the Power of Government is derived from God, or whether it is founded upon this Providence. We acknowledge that the Authority of Government is derived only from God, and from him no otherwise but by a Providential Conveyance of his Authority upon particular Persons; and thus far we are agreed: But then the Question is, Whether God's Providence does invest a Prince with his Authority by the conveyance of Right, or by the conveyance of Possession without it? In short, whether every Prince in Possession is invested with God's Authority: We affirm that Government is founded in God's Authority, but we deny that God conveys it upon every Prince in Possession.  
3. When we say God's Authority is annexed to Right, we do not confine this to a Right by political Laws of particular Governments; the adequate Rule of Right is Law, and whatsoever is Law may create a Right, and consequently Right may result not only from political Laws of this or that Government, but also from the Laws of God, of Nature, and Nations; the Will of God revealed is a Law to us, and therefore when God nominates a King by express Revelation, he has a Right to the Possession of Sovereignty and the Obedience of Subjects: In a state ●f Nature, as they call it, wherein Men are under no Government nor Obligation of Subjection, they may choose a Sovereign, and when they have chosen him, he has a Right to Sovereignty by the Law of Nature: By the Law of Nations it is generally said, how truly I dispute not, that Conquest in a just War does create a lawful Right. And lastly, when political Societies are Constituted, and a Rule of Succession Established, either at the first, by an Original Agreement, or afterwards by Prescription or positive Laws; that Law of Succession does create a Right to the Sovereignty, which is confirmed by the Laws of God, and Nature, and Nations; but if this Law be violated, and an Usurpation is made against it, the Usurpers may acquire a Right by Prescription, which implies an undisturbed Possession, and a Dereliction of the former Right; and this new Right (which commences from the extinction of the former) is such by the Law of Nature, which is Equity, and of Nations, which is the Consent of civilised Societies.  
Lastly, Where there is no Rule of Succession, or no Right in any Person to the Sovereignty, as when a Royal Family is extinguished, in 
Dr. Sherlock's Case of Res. p. 129.  such Cases The Possession of Sovereign Power is Title enough, when there is no better Title to oppose it; for than we may presume that God gives him the irresistible Authority of a King, to whom he gives an irresistible Power. When there is no other Right, Possession is a Right by the Law of Nature and Nations; but Possession of another's Right has been always pronounced invalid, by the voice of Equity and the suffrage of all Nations. These Two last Rights may perhaps be reduced to the Second, the Consent of a free People; for they suppose them to be discharged from all former Obligations; and Possession of Sovereignty supposes Submission of the People, and that is nothing else but a Consent to be governed, which in a free People, I have observed, does create a Right to Sovereignty by the Law of Nature. And now let us consider what the Doctor does object against these Titles to Sovereignty.  
Against the Choice and Consent of the People he objects, That then no Man is a Subject, but he who Consents to be so, for the major Vote, says he, cannot include my Consent unless I please; that is, the effect of Law and Compact, or Force, not of Nature. I answer, when a free People choose a Sovereign, if they consent to choose, it is presumed (unless it be otherwise provided) that they consent the major Vote shall determine the Choice; this presumption is grounded upon manifest Equity: But if any one refuses to be determined by a Majority, he refuses to enter into the Society, and may remove out of it; but if he will live within the Government of the new Sovereign, he accepts him for his Sovereign, and is bound to Obedience. He urges farther, That if Subjects give their Prince Authority, they may take it away again if they please. Bp. Sanderson propounds this very 
Sand. de Oblige. Conse. Prael. 7. sect. 21.  Inference, and his Answer is this, Contra stat ratio, & omnia jura, omnia for a reclamant, scilicet legitima pacta non esse rescindenda. It is the Voice of Reason and of all Laws, and of all places of Commerce, that lawful Compacts are not to be rescinded at pleasure. But another Answer is also 
Ibid. sect. 20.  given. The Subjects are only instrumental Agents, God is the principal Agent in the making of a King, the People design the Person, and God conveys the Authority. It is God that makes Kings, the People are his Instruments, but he has given them no Power to depose them. The Doctor himself 
Vind. p. 16.  affirms, That the Consent of the People are the means by which Princes gain a Right to their Thrones; and I affirm no more; the People may be a means of conveying Right, though it be God alone that confers the Authority, and if God alone does▪ make Kings, he alone can depose them. But farther, Upon this Principle there can be no Hereditary Monarchy, one Generation can choose only for themselves, their Posterity having as much Right to choose as they had. True; if there could be no Right to Sovereignty without the constant Election of the Subjects; but that is no Principle of mine, and I am not bound to answer for it; but this I will answer for, that a Law made a Thousand Years ago may be Obligatory now, and that it may create a Right to a Person now living, and that it may be a Sin to deprive him of it, tho' it be done by the help of Providence.  
His Objection against the Right of Conquest, supposes it to be effected by unjust and violent Force, and I easily acknowledge that unjust Conquest gives no Right.  
Submission, he says, is only a forced and after Consent not to make a King, but to own him who has made himself King; and what Right can that give more than Force? He shall Answer this himself, The Consent and Submission of 
Ibid.  the People turn that, which was Originally no more but Force into a civil and legal Authority, by giving themselves up to the Government of the Prince; by this means Princes gain a Right to those Thrones, to which they had no antecedont Right; this is certainly true where the People are under no antecedent Obligation.  
The continuance of an Usurpation can never give a Right, unless that which is Wrong grow Right by Continuance: That Maxim of the Law, to which he refers, has this Exception, Unless a new Cause intervene, which of 
Gr. de Ju. bell. l. 2. c. 4. s. 11.  itself can create a Right. Now that which makes way for a new Right, is the Extinction of the former Right: The continuance of an Usurpation of itself may never give a Right, but if the Usurpers enjoy quiet Possession of a 
Ibid. s. 6, 7.  100 Years together, it is a presumption in Law and Equity, that the former Right is relinquished. But it is also affirmed by Lawyers, That quiet and immemorial 
Ibid. s. 9  Possession is a Right by the positive Law of Nations; and if that be true, than a wrongful Possession may become rightful by Continuance. But though the former Right be extinguished, Though no body else has any Right to the▪ Crown, How does this make him a rightful King who has no Right? I answer in his own Words, Possession is Title enough, 
Case of Res. p. 129.  when there is no better Title to oppose it; it is a Right by the Law of Nations, and it may be founded also on the Consent of the People, for they are free to Consent, when the former Right is relinquished, and they actually consent by submitting to his Government.  
This Right of Prescription the Doctor will not understand: He demands, 
Vind. p. 7.  will an uninterrupted Possession of an hundred Years make the Usurper a Rightful King, without the Death or Session of the whole Royal Family? I answer a Session is presumed by the Consent of Nations, and by Equity itself; because it is reasonable to believe that he has relinquished his Right, who suffers another to enjoy it without interruption; and because it is 
Grot. ibid. sect. 8.  the Interest of Societies, that the Controversies about Dominion should at length be ended. How then, says the Doctor, does the Royal Family come to lose their Right by an usurped Possession? And if an Usurpation will destroy their Right, why not a short one as well as a long one? Their Right is lost by Session, not by Usurpation; and the Session is not presumed by the Law of Nations when the Usurpation is of short continuance; short possession of an Estate is no right in any civilised Society, but a long Possession is a right almost all the World over: So it is in Kingdoms; and this consent of Nations will justify this Distinction, though the Doctor will not understand it. He demands farther, How the People shall be justified in consenting that the Usurper should reign while their rightful King is living? If they cannot hinder him from reigning, they need not justifying; if they can and will not, and therefore cannot be justified, who can help it? And what is that to the matter of Prescription? But how long must the Usurper reign before the People consent to it? Till they can reasonably be persuaded that the former Right is extinguished. Lastly, he asks again, Whether an hundred Years Possession be a good right against a better claim, or how this better claim comes to expire after an hundred Years Usurpation? And I answer again, that Prescription supposes the former Right to be extinguished, which is so far from being a better, that it ceases to be any Right; the extinction of it may be grounded upon Equity, or the positive Law of Nations; as to the time of its expiring, an hundred Years is not always necessary; if the Session can be proved, that will suffice without respect to time, but without other Proof, by the consent of Nations, undisturbed Possession for a hundred Years does entinguish the former Title.  
We come next to Hereditary Right, and thus he argues against it, it 
Case of A●● pag. 24.  is either a continued Usurpation which can give no Right, or a Right by Law. How Usurpation may produce a Right is considered already, and what says he against a Right by Law? why, that is by the consent of the People to entail the Crown on such a Family, which (he has observed before) cannot be done; for what Right had my Ancestors three or four hundred Years ago to choose a King for me? Here a Question is made, whether an Act or Law made by our Ancestors may oblige their Posterity? He gives no Reasons to prove the Negative, but supposes it Self-evident. But the Reason and Practice of Mankind suppose the quite contrary; if Children cannot be bound by the Acts of their Parents, the Authority of Parents does signify nothing; but we need not this Authority to enforce the Obligation of Laws: every Human Law does oblige the whole Community, or Political Society, to which it is a Law, and therefore the Society being still the same it was four hundred Years ago, the Obligation reaches to every Member of it. Thus Mr. Hooker, to be commanded we do consent, 
Eccles. Pol. 1st Book, p. 88  when that Society, whereof we are a part, hath at any time before consented, without revoking the same after by the like universal Agreement: Wherefore as any Man's Deed past is good as long as he himself continueth; so the Act of a public Society done five hundred Years sithence, standeth as theirs who presently are of the same Societies, because Corporations are immortal: We were then alive in our Predecessors, and they in their Successors do live still. Even the public Good and Interest of Societies is a sufficient Foundation for the extending the Obligation of Laws to Posterity. If the Acts of Predecessors cannot bind their Successors, standing Leagues between Nations are impracticable, a King in being cannot be obliged by the Acts and Grants of former Kings, the public Faith of a Society is a public Cheat, for the Society can never be bound by it for a▪ Week together; and lastly, where the explicit Consent of the People is required to a Law, it is plain that all Laws must expire as soon as born; for the People are in a continual Flux, and they are not the same to Day as Yesterday; so that absolute Necessity seems to have introduced an universal Agreement in all Societies 〈◊〉 that the Obligation of Laws should be extended to Posterity. This is the undeniable practice of all Nations; every Act of Parliament is intended to oblige the future as well as present Generation, till it is repealed. In the Recognition of James the First, the Lords and Commons do submit and oblige themselves, their Heirs and Posterity for ever, until the last drop of their B●oods be spent, to his Majesty King James, and his Royal Progeny, and Posterity for ever.  
Here it is plain, this Parliament thought they had a right to make Acts and Vows for their Posterity; and we have not a Parliament only, but also the Reason and Practice of all Nations against a single Doctor; and I think he is the first Doctor that ever undertook to prove that Hereditary Right is no Right, and that there is no Right to Sovereignty but Possession. But I think also that the Doctor does contradict the Doctor, for he allows that in an Hereditary Kingdom the lawful Heir has a legal Right to the Crown before he is in Possession, and even after he is dispossessed, and when the Crown is vacant he acknowledges the Subjects are bound to maintain the Succession, and to set up the lawful Heir: And if this be true, than it is evident, that an Hereditary Right without Possession may lay an Obligation upon the People, and consequently the People may be obliged by this Right, though they did not personally consent to it.  
He urges farther, that this Hereditary Right must be ultimately 
Case of Al. p. 25.  resolved into the Authority of the People to make Kings, which it is unjust for God himself to overrule and alter, for a legal Entail is nothing more than the Authority of the People, and if the People have Authority to make Kings, they will challenge as much Authority to unmake them. A Legal Entail may be founded on the express consent of the People, or upon 
* Bp. Bramhall's Works, p. 527.  a long continued Prescription, which implies a full Consent, and derives a good Title of Inheritance both before God and Man; but though the Right be founded on Consent, yet the Authority of Government is only from God. The People have Power to consent, and when they have consented, Reason and Equity do dictate that they are bound to observe their own Pacts and Covenants. But to speak properly, this Obligation does 
Vide Seld. de Jur. Gen. l. 1. c. 7, 8. p. 93, 105.  not arise from Consent and Reason, but from the Authority of God; for Obligation is the effect of Law, and nothing can be Law without the Sanction of superior Authority, which in the Laws of Nature (such as that is, which requires that the People stand to their Pacts, and to those Forms of Government which they have entered into) can be God alone. And thus as the Authority of Government proceeds from God; so the Obligation of the People, to adhere to that Entail which their Consent has made, does proceed only from God's Sanction of that natural Law, which makes their Consent irrevocable; and for that Reason though they have some Power in making Kings, they have none to unmake them.  
But then if Consent be necessary to Right, and God's Authority is not conveyed without Right, Is not this to 
Case of Alleg. p. 25.  say, that the Right of Government is not derived from God without the Consent of the People? For if God cannot make a King without the People, or against their Consent declared by their Laws, the Authority must be derived from the People, not from God; or at least if it be God's Authority, yet God cannot give it himself without the People, nor otherwise than as they have directed him by their Laws. And this, says the Doctor, is very absurd, and what those Persons abhor the Thoughts of, who insist so much upon a legal Right. But where is this horrible Absurdity? Is it that God cannot make a King without the People? That indeed is an Absurdity, but asserted by no one; the Question is what God wills or does, and not what he can do. He can make a King out of Stones, he can make him without the People, without any Instruments, and without any antecedent Right; but this he never does, and what he can do is nothing to the purpose. But does it not then follow, that the Authority must be derived from the People, not from God; derived from the People only as Instruments; but then God cannot give it himself without the People, which indeed is a self-evident Consequence; for if God cannot make a King without the People, it follows plainly, that God cannot give Authority without the People: He adds, nor otherwise than as they have directed him by their Laws. He should have said, as God himself has directed, for the Direction or Obligation of Laws proceeds from God alone. But where are we? Is it not his own Doctrine, that God does never make Kings without the Consent of the People? No matter whether this Consent be Law or no, it obliges the People, and Providence never sets up a King without it; and how then can he acquit himself of these imaginary Absurdities? If he says the Consent of the People is the effect of God's Choice, is his Instrument, or the Sign of his Conveyance of Authority, the same say I for a legal Entail, and his own Distinctions will answer his own Arguments.  
3. To justify the Doctrine of Allegiance to Usurpers, he urges this Argument, That it is founded 
Case of Alleg. p. 36.  on the same Principle as the Doctrine of Nonresistence, and therefore both must be true and false; for it is founded on this Principle, that God makes Kings, and invests them with his Authority; which equally proves, That all Kings who have received a Sovereign Authority from God, and are actually in the Administration of it, (which is the only Evidence we have that they have received it from God,) must not be resisted. This Reason depends upon his former Proofs, and falls together with them▪ it is finally resolved into this Assertion, that they who are in the actual Administration of Sovereign Power have received Authority from God: An Assertion which makes all Usurpers the Ordinance of God; which divests Charles I. and II. of God's Authority, and assigns it to the Rump and Cromwell; which gives the Sanction of divine Right to the greatest Wickedness and Injustice, which is contradicted by almost all Divines and Lawyers, by the Voice of Nations, and by the Doctor himself; for he acknowledges that God's Authority is not always annexed to the actual Administration of Sovereign Power: Here he asserts, that it is the only Evidence we have of the receiving Authority from God; yet when he comes to account for Cromwell, he confesses it is no Evidence, and makes the Consent of the People to be the only evidence of it. We grant that Non-resistence is founded on God's Authority communicated to Sovereigns; but we say, that it is always communicated with Right, that all just Rights are established by God's Authority, that actual Administration is only matter of Fact, which is different from Right, and that Usurpers may have it by God's permissive Will, which is no Conveyance of Authority. But Non-resistence it seems is Nonsense, unless it be founded on this new Principle; if it must be so, who can help it? We must acknowledge, that Dudley Diggs', Dr. Fern's, Dr. Hammond's, Bishop Sanderson's Archbishop Bramhall's Defences of Non-resistence, are Nonsense, for they defend it upon another Principle; which is more, that all the Church of England Writers, for at least ●0 years together, even Bishop Stillingfleet, Doctor Sherlock, and the other Worthies of the Age, have erred in the Foundation of Nonresistance, and have preached nonsensically, and writ nonsensically for it; and which is more yet, that no one Writer of the Church of England, before the late Revolution, has defended the Doctrine of the Church upon that Principle, which by a new Light is discovered to be the true Foundation of it; I cannot believe this without Demonstration; but for that I am sent to the Clouds, and to the unsearchable Abyss of Providence.  
What the Doctor urges about receiving Authority from 
Ibid. p. 37.  the People, is answered already; the 13th of the Roman● is also considered, and Bishop Overall's Convocation-Book is fully vindicated from his Glosses, and I am not now at Leisure for Repetition.  
4. To say that when the Divine Providence has removed one King, and 
Ibid.  set up another, we must not pay the Duty of Subjects to him, if he have no legal Right, is to deny God's Authority to remove Kings, or set up Kings against humane Laws. This he propounds as a 4th Reason, but 'tis only a repeating of what he had said in his 5th Proposition, and there it is answered. Here it will suffice to answer that removing and setting up Kings are equivocal Expressions, which signify either God's suffering or doing, his Permission of Power, or his Conveyance of Authority: An Usurper is set up by permissive Providence, and to deny him Allegiance is no Opposition to God's Authority. But God cannot make a King, if he cannot oblige us to obey him; nor remove a King, if he cannot discharge us from our Allegiance to him. He can make and remove Kings by his permissive Will, without transferring our Allegiance; if the Doctor can prove that he makes Usurpers otherwise, we are ready to shift sides with Providence. But those are bold Men, who will venture to say in plain contradiction to holy Scripture, that God cannot remove or set up Kings. As for me, I am none of those bold Bayards; I believe that God governs the World, and that he removes and sets up Kings; he removes Kings out of the World, and out of their Thrones, he sets up lawful Kings, and he sets up Usurpers. Henry the Great he removed by Ravilliack, and Charles I. by a High Court of Justice; he set up Charles H. and King James, and he set up Cromwell and Massianello: All this is true; but it follows not hence, that he does all this by his positive Will and Conveyance of Authority.  
Our Church has taught us otherwise in the Office for King Charles' Martyrdom, his Death is there always ascribed to God's permissive Will. Albeit thou didst suffer them to proceed to such a height of Violence, as to kill him, and to take possession of his Throne, yet didst thou in great Mercy preserve his Son, whose Right it was, and at length by a wonderful Providence bring him back, and set him thereon. The Removal of King Charles, and the setting up the Usurpers, are both attributed to God's permissive Providence; but the setting up of him, whose Right it was, to his positive and active Will: He suffered the Usurpers to take Possession of the Throne, but he set the rightful Heir thereon.  
But here again the Question is not, what God can do, but what he does; he can give a Man's House, and his Wife, his Ox and his Ass, and any thing that is his, to another who has no Right to them, and so he can give his Crown and Kingdom: But the Question is whether God does give them by the bare Events of Providence? Whether he who has Possession of another's House, or Wife, or Kingdom, has a divine Right to them? I will be bold ●o say that he has not; and yet I pretend not to confine God's Providence, he governs the World as he pleases, but he obliges us to be governed by Laws; he can transfer any Man's House, or Wife, or Kingdom to another, by his permissive Will, as when they are usurped; by his positive, when he conveys a Title to them. The Doctor affirms, that God never sets up Kings without the Consent of the People; others add, without their lawful Consent, or against a lawful Right; if Consent be no Confinement of Providence, neither is Right and lawful Consent; and if this Opinion be a contradiction to the Scripture, so is the former. But,  
5. This limits the Providence of God in governing Kings, and protecting 
Ibid.  injured Subjects: We say the punishment of Sovereign Princes is peculiar to God, and that if they abuse their Power, God will punish them for it; but it seems God has no way to do this, but to take them out of the World, for he cannot remove them from the Throne. The Doctor is very careful that bad Princes may be punished, and their Punishment in another World does not satisfy him: He pretends to make them accountable to God only, but that is a Compliment; he elsewhere makes them accountable to their Subjects; for if Princes govern not according to their liking, they may withdraw their sworn Allegiance from them, suffer them to be deposed, and then abjure them. But has not God ways enough to punish Princes without licensing their Subjects to abjure them? Cannot he punish them as he did David, by raising Evil against them out of their own House and Bowels; as he did Jeroboam with the loss of his Son, Vzziah with Lepro●ie, Nabuchadnezzar with Frenzy, and Herod with a most loathsome and tormenting Disease? Is not God's Power of punishing confined by not resisting as well as not abjuring? Or is it any Argument against Non-resistence, that then God cannot licence Subjects to rebel against their Sovereign? Is it a Confinement of God's Power to punish lewd Husbands, because it is not lawful for their Wives to commit Adultery; or prodigal and tyrannical Parents, because their Children cannot hang them, or in respect of both, because Obedience is due to Husbands and Parents as long as they are living? In all the Succession of the Roman Emperors, which were as wicked and tyrannical as any Succession in the World, not one of them was punished by the Translation of the Empire, while they were living, and against their own Consents, and yet God's Judgements were never more remarkable upon any Succession of Monarches. God has ways enough to punish Princes without taking his Measures from the Doctor, he ●an punish them without the Wickedness of Men, and he can punish them by it: though he never makes it lawful for Subjects to rebel and depose their Princes; yet he can punish them by Rebellion and Deposition, by withdrawing his Protection, and giving Success to Rebels and Usurpers; he can punish them likewise by hardening them in their Wickedness, by suffering Subjects to abjure the King they have deposed, to raise Taxes and Armies to oppose, and even at length to murder him▪ and can any Man wish for more ways of Punishments? Are not these enough for God to execute his Vengeance? Or is his Providence cramped or limited, because it is not lawful for men to do evil?  
But if Subjects can't translate their Allegiance, when an evil Prince is removed from the Throne, than his removal is no deliverance to 
Ibid. p. 38.  them, They are never the better for it, for they must not own another Prince, though he would be never so kind to them. Well, and what if they are never the better for the deposing of their Prince? This is often the course of God's Providence to give and to take away a King in his Wrath. When the Romans thought to make themselves happy by deposing Tyrants, they were usually plagued with greater; Saevior & intestabilior semper est exortus. When God deposes a rightful Prince, and leaves him a right to the Throne, he has a right to Allegiance; and therefore his Subjects cannot transfer it to another Prince, though he be the sweetest, kindest Prince under Heaven, for kindness and good Nature are no Right to Allegiance.  
Yet this seems very hard, that when God has actually 
Ibid.  delivered us, we must refuse our Deliverance, that we will not allow God to deliver us, unless he do it by Law. This is pretty and passionate, but, to use his own Eloquence, is a very nothing. It is often a Duty to refuse Deliverance when God does deliver us; we are sometimes bound to suffer Martyrdom not accepting Deliverance. A Master of a Family does cruelly treat his Wife, his Children, and Servants; God delivers them, by suffering a Robber to drive him out of his Possessions, he offers to govern them gently, if they will swear to resist the former Possessor, and accept of him as a Husband, Father, and Master. A Prince oppresses his Subjects, many of them rebel and bring Deliverance to the rest with this Condition, that they will swear to join in the Rebellion; In these Cases is it lawful for the oppressed to accept Deliverance? When a Deliverance is offered, which cannot be enjoyed without Sin, it is God's Providence that offers it, not for our Compliance but our Trial; and to accept of such a Deliverance will make us liable to his Vengeance. The Question than is, whether it be a Sin to abjure our lawful Sovereign, and to assist an Usurper against him, we believe that it is a Sin against humane Laws, and against the Laws of God and Nature, and if it be a Sin, than interests of Flesh and Blood cannot make it lawful; and therefore to talk of God's Deliverance, when the only Question is about the lawfulness of abjuring a lawful Sovereign, is in plain English only Cant and Banter.  
His 6th Argument, wherein he undertakes to confute Bishop Sanderson, has fallen into better Hands, and there I shall leave it; the sum of it is this, That we must renounce our Allegiance to the dispossessed Prince, for the sake of the public Good, the Necessity and Ends of Government; and I shall only observe that here he Argues upon the Fundamental Principle of the Jesuits, Republicans, and Fanatics, who have written for Resistance, and if the Doctor expects it, I will make good this Charge against him.  
His 7th Argument is this, These Principles answer all the 
Ibid. p. 43.  Ends of Government, both for the security of the Prince and Subjects, and that is a good Argument to believe them true. These Principles, What are they? Nonresistance, Non-assistance, and Allegiance to Usurpers: A Prince who is in Possession, is secured in Possession by them (as far as any Principles can secure him) against all attempts of his Subjects, who must submit to him without Resistance, though they are ill used. On the contrary, here is no Security for even the best of Princes; his Subjects are indeed forbidden to resist him, but if any attempt be made against him by Subjects or Foreigners, he may be left to duel them all, and to sight his Battles by himself against all his Enemies. He will say that a good Prince must be defended by his Subjects, and so say the Republicans that he must never be resisted and deposed: But it is the unavoidable Mischief of their Principle, that the Subjects are made the Judges of their Sovereign, and they will often judge the best of Kings to be Tyrants. And is not the Doctor's Principle liable to the same Mischief? If Subjects have a 
Page 27.  very bad King who notoriously violates their Rights, they are not bound to defend him; and are they not plainly then the Judges of his Crown? They may judge the best of Kings to be a very bad one, and then David look to thyself, for Absalon, or Sheba, any Rebellious Son or Subject may destroy thee at their Pleasure; there is but little difference between Resistance and Non-Assistance, as to the Security of Kings, the one exposes them defenceless to be murdered by the other, this brings them to the Scaffold, and that chaps off their Heads; and 'tis the same thing to Princes whether they are betrayed or resisted, abandoned or deposed, assaulted by Assassins', or exposed naked to them. But,  
The Doctor's Principles will not serve the Revolutions of Government, 
Pag. 43.  to remove one King and set up another, and why so? the Revolutions of Government are not the Subjects Duty but God's Prerogative; that is, God may make Revolutions, but the Subjects must not promote them, and if God can change Governments without the Subjects Assistance, why may he not do it without their Compliance; But yet Subjects must comply and transfer their Allegiance, and then the new King is secure, till he disobliges his Subjects, for than they who have Power from God, will think they have a Call to execute his Prerogative, and the rest will say in their Hearts, let him go if he cannot defend himself; and if 
Pag 27.  sighting by himself he chances to ●e beaten, than God removes him, we must ●dore the rising Sun, and Allegiance must ●e always a Lackey to Success. These ●re Principles sure that Princes have reason ●o be jealous of, for whatever Service they may do them at one time, they may do them as great disservice at another; they advance Usurpers to the Throne, and then tumble them headlong from it.  
But when any Prince is settled in the Throne, these Principles put 
Pag. 43.  an end to all Disputes of Right and Title, and bind his Subjects to him by Duty and Conscience. I may answer in his own way, it is evident that these Principles were either unknown to the 
Pag. 44.  World, (and that is an Argument against them) or else, that they cannot put an end to Disputes of Right and Title; for there have been such Disputes in all Ages, and I believe will be to the end of the World: If this be trifling; let the Doctor answer for it. But admit his Principles were generally received, it is evident they can never put an end to Disputes of Right, nor bind the Subjects by Duty and Conscience to an Usurper; for he expressly acknowledges, that the Providence 
Pag. 26.  of God removes and sets up Kings▪ but altars no legal Rights, nor forbids those who are dispossessed to recover their Rights. The dispossessed Prince has still a legal Right and Claim, which he may lawfully prosecute by War; And is not here an admirable end the Controversy about Right? Oh! but this Controversy is between the Princes only, upon these Principles it can be none among the Subjects, for they are bound by Duty and Conscience to the Prince in Possession. And what are they bound to? Nonresistance and Submission? Is that any Security to the Sovereign when he is invaded by the lawful▪ Prince? Are they bound to Allegiance, or to an actual defence of the Usurper against him? That they cannot be, for it would be a bond of Iniquity; if the dispossessed Prince has a just cause of War, and this is evident to the Subjects, Is it lawful for them to support an unjust Cause against a just Cause? It is generally agreed, that a War cannot be just on both sides; Grotius gives this Reason, because in the nature 
Lib. 2. c▪ 23. sect. 13.  of the thing there cannot be a moral Faculty unto contrary Actions, a right in one side to invade, in the other to defend; and Vasquez 
Tom. 1. Dis. 6●. c. 3.  this, because that a War be just on one side, it is requisite there be injustice on the other, for herein consists the reason of War, that he who deserves it should be punished by vindictive Justice: If the War of the legal Prince be therefore just, and the War of the Usurper unjust, these Consequences must inevitably follow. 1. That the Usurper is bound to restore the Crown he has usurped, for if it be unjust to defend it, it must be unjust to keep it. 2. If he is bound to restore it, he has no right to it by God's Donation. 3. He is responsible for all the Blood that is shed in an unjust War, his Soul must answer for all the Persons that are killed, as for so many Murders. And, 4. The Subjects cannot lawfully assist him in murdering Innocent Persons, and much less in executing a Sentence of Death, (for such in effect is War) upon their innocent Sovereign to whom they had sworn Allegiance, and who seeks for nothing, but what is justly his own.  
And now upon the whole, is not this Scheme of Principles an incomparable Security for Princes? Subjects must not depose their Princes, but they may stand by and see them deposed and murdered; if the best of Princes be unfortunate, they may lawfully abjure them, and swear Allegiance to the Usurper, and then contribute their Purses, Prayers, and Arms to destroy their lawful Sovereign. But let the Usurper be sure to be fortunate still, and not to invade our Properties and Religion, let him look to it, or most Men will say, let him go if he cannot defend himself; that he is placed in the 
Pag. 26.  Throne at present, does not prove that it is God's will it should always be so. The dispossessed Prince has a lawful War against him, and if he gets a Battle, he is God's Ordinance again, and our Allegiance is due to his Victory.  
On the contrary, if Principles are to be judged by their being for the Security of the Prince and Subject, an immovable Allegiance to our lawful Prince, will appear to be the truest, for it is the best Principle to prevent all Revolutions of Government; and all the Mischiefs of Civil War and Anarchy which usually attend them, and therefore is most for the Peace and Security of Human Societies. But to this the Doctor has several Objections.  
1. If this Principle would prevent all Revolutions, it is a demonstration 
Pag. 44.  against it, that it is a bad Principle, because it is contrary to God's Prerogative of reproving and setting up Kings. This Objection concludes as strongly against Justice and Christianity itself; for it is certain, that if the Principles of Justice and of Christian Religion were universally preached, there would be no Usurpations nor Revolutions; and that is a Demonstration with the Doctor, that they are bad Principles, mere Human Inventions, which cannot come from God.  
2. It is evident, that this Principle was either unknown to the 
Ibid.  World, or that it cannot prevent the Revolutions of Government. But still it may be the best Principle to prevent them, and no Man ever affirmed that it would always actually prevent them. Mankind are not generally governed by Principles, but by Lusts and Passions: Christianity is the best Religion to prevent Revolutions, and to preserve the Peace of Societies, but we see, de facto, it fails of preventing them no less than our Principle of Allegiance.  
3. Such Principles as must dissolve Human Societies when such 
Ibid.  Revolutions happen, and expose the most conscientious Men to the greatest Sufferings, without serving any good end by them, cannot be true. I answer, there is no Principle of Morality and Religion but may occasion the dissolution of Human Societies, but then the wickedness of Men is the proper Cause of it, and not the Principle. The Doctor has answered this Objection himself, the Divine Providence 
Pag. 34.  takes care of all such extraordinary cases, and there we must leave them. And even his own Principle is liable to the same Objection; for till the new Prince is settled, no Allegiance is due to him, and therefore in that Interval which may last for an Age or more, since no Allegiance is due there can be no Sovereign, nor Subject, and consequently no Society. As for the Sufferings of conscientious Men, that is their Portion here, but great is their Reward in Heaven; and whereas he says those Sufferings can serve to no good end; the keeping of their Consceinces void of Offence, is one good end, and the promoting the public good of Human Society in general, is another. But does not this Principle tend to dissolve Societies? No otherwise than as Christianity tends to set Men at variance in the same Household, not naturally, but contingently, not in its own Nature, but in the Event of Things, and by the Wickedness of Men.  
4. Is the Right of any Prince so sacred, as to stand in competition 
pag. 45.  with the very Being of Humane Societies? I answer, That the Sovereign is comprehended in the Society, and ought not to be opposed to it; that we must not do Evil that Good may come of it; and that Perjury and Injustice, Revolutions, Civil Wars and Anarchy, are against the Interests of Society. Must we defend the Prince's Right with the destruction of the Nation, and the Ruin of his Subjects? This perhaps may be a Case in the New Atlantis or Utopia: But I ask another Question, may we abjure and sacrifice a lawful Prince for the safety of his Rebels and Enemies? Which is most necessary, that the Nation should be governed, or that such a Prince should govern it? And if he be driven out of his Kingdom and cannot govern, must we th●n have no Government? Or how shall the Nation be governed, if the Subjects are bound to pay Allegiance to no other Prince? Let us remember the Rump and Cromwell, and all these Questions are answered. The Loyal Members of the Church of England in those days thought it necessary that the Nation should be governed by the lawful Prince, they reserved their Allegiance for him when he was driven out of his Kingdom, and could not govern, and they refused to pay Allegiance to Usurpers. In short, it is better to be without Government, than to do Evil for the sake of those who will not be governed by their lawful Governors. But this is to make all Mankind the Slaves and Properties of Princes; as if all Men were made for Princes, not Princes for the Government of Men. To this I oppose some other Sayings of the former Dr. Sherlock, in his Case of Resistance: If the King be God's Minister; he is upon that Account as much greater than all as God is. pag. 104. The whole Nation is as much Subject to the higher Powers a● any single Man. pag. 107. Sovereign Power is inseparable from the Person of a Sovereign Prince. p. 200. We must not deny Duty to be Duty, because we may suffer by it. p. 215. And we must patiently submit to a Prince, though he persecute and oppress us. p. 220. The Doctor may reproach us if he will, for preaching the Doctrine of the Bowstring, and making all Mankind the Slaves and Property of Princes: But then he should renounce his Nonresistence and his King together; for that Doctrine is equally loaded with those Reproaches, and our Principle will be as easily discharged from them.  
I have now done with the Doctor's Arguments; there are some others which are scattered in his Book, but they are reducible to these I have examined. I have answered them fairly, and to my own Reason satisfactorily, and all ingenuous Men I hope will be satisfied, that if I am in an Error, I have some show of Reason for it, though I pretend not to Demonstrations, and self-evident Propositions.  
But I must not give it over thus; for the Doctor has endeavoured to vindicate his Arguments: the greater part of his Vindication relates to Bishop Overall's Convocation-Book, the Case of Athaliah, and the Case of Obedience to the late Usurpers; and these Disputes will be managed better by others: It is my business to answer his Arguments from Scripture and Reason; what he offers in his Vindication from Scripture is considered before, and now we must examine what he offers farther from Reason. Our Dispute, as far as Reason is concerned, depends upon this single Question, Whether it can be proved by any Arguments drawn from Principles of Reason, that every Usurper who is settled, is invested with God's Authority? But the Doctor pretends not in his Vindication to produce new Reasons for the Affirmative, he only repeats his former Arguments, and fortifies them with new Evasions.  
His fundamental Argument from Reason is contained in his 3d Proposition, and the sum of it is this, That God governs the World, and sets up Kings, when by his Providence he advances them to the Throne, that he never does this by his permissive Will, because all Events, and especially such as will do most good or hurt to the World, must be ascribed to his positive Will, his Order, and Appointment; and hence he concludes, that all Usurper's being advanced by God's Providence, are invested with his Authority. I have endeavoured to confute this Argument, and in his Vindication I meet with a long Discourse 
Vind. p. 58. to 62.  about Providence where he endeavoured to defend it.  
He demands, How God does 
Pag. 58.  make Kings in England? he sends no Prophets to anoint them; therefore he makes them no other way but by the Events of Providence, and how does God make Kings by his Providence? Truly this can be done no other way but by placing them in the Throne, and settling them there with the general consent of the People. And hence he infers, that when God makes a King by this Providential Settlement, he invests him with his Authority, and makes it the Duty of Subjects to obey him. I reply to all this, that God makes Kings in England only by his Providence, is true; but there are two ways of making Kings by Providence, by Permission and Appointment; by the conveyance of Right and Authority, or of bare Power and Possession: an Usurper is made the wrong Way by God's Concession of Power, and Permission of his Wickedness. But thus the Doctor argues against the Advancement of Usurpers by God's permissive Providence, A Prince, says he, may ascend the Throne, 
pag. 59  and govern a Kingdom for many Years, (it may be 100 Years) without God's Authority, and then it should seem that God does not rule in these Kingdoms, which he does not dispose of by his own Will and Counsel, but suffers Usurpers to take the Government of them. Now if this be an absurd or impious Consequence, the Doctor himself is bound to answer for it: he maintains that a Prince dispossessed is divested of God's Authority, and an Usurper is not invested with it, till he is throughly settled; but this Interregnum may continue 100 years, or more; he acknowledges himself, that in England there was no Settlement for near 20 years together, in the times of the late successive Usurpations; and it should seem then that God did 
Ibid.  not rule in this Kingdom, when he only suffered Usurpers to take the Government of it, and that God did not govern it, when it was not governed by his Authority or Minister. How the Doctor will answer this I know not; but this I know, that God's Providence does govern in times of Usurpation, of Civil War, of Anarchy, and in those Countries where there is no Civil Government at all; and one may safely affirm, that God governed this Kingdom in the time of Cromwell, when yet it was not governed by God's Minister, or by his Authority. But does Providence and Government signify only his Permission? 
Ibid.  No man says it; does God look on, and see Men snatch at Crowns, and take them, and keep them, and exercise an Authority which he never gave them? And does God then inspire and authorise usurping Princes to snatch at Crowns, and possess them? Does he only look on and see infinite Villainies and Impieties every day committed? Does he suffer Schismatics, Rebels, Pirates, and Murderers, to exercise an Usurped Authority which he never gave them? But to resolve Providence into a bare Permission, especially 
Ibid.  in matters of such vast consequence is to deny God's Government of the World. But we resolve not Providence into a bare Permission; 'tis our Faith, and our exceeding Comfort, that Providence overrules Men's Wickedness, and brings Good out of Evil; but we believe also that God is not the Author of Sin, be i● great or little, and that all wicked Actions, though of never so vast a consequence, are only permitted by him for wi●e Ends and Purposes: in short, we maintain God's Government of the World, but not in Derogation to his Justice and Holiness.  
But the Doctor endeavours to answer this Objection against his Principle, That to say that prosperous 
Ibid.  Usurpers, when they are settled in the Throne, are placed there by God and have his Authority, is to make God a party to their Wickedness. The force of the Objection consists in this; that since according to the Doctor's Scheme of Principles, it is Wickedness in an Usurper to ascend the Throne, and it must be Wickedness also to keep it, because the legal Right of the former Prince remains, which to detain from him is Injustice; hence it follows evidently, That if God authorises the Usurper to possess and keep the Throne, he gives him Authority to commit a Sin, which he will punish with Damnation, and is therefore the principal Author of the Wickedness.  
And how is this Objection Answered? First we are told, It is an Argument against God's Government of 
Ibid.  the World, and this is the Reason, for if God cannot direct and overrule the Wickedness of Men to accomplish his own Counsels, without being the Author of those Sins, whereby such Events are brought to pass, there is an end of God's Providence and Holiness; for the most glorious Designs of Providence have been accomplished by very wicked Means, even the Crucifixion of our Saviour himself. Now this is a great Truth, but nothing to the purpose; God can certainly overrule Wickedness without being the Author of it; But what then? Does God's overruling Providence convey Authority to persist in Wickedness? Or does it alter the nature of Good and Evil, and make the unjust Detention of another's Right to be no Injustice? We have no dispute about God's bringing Good out of Evil; We maintain that it is unlawful to detain another's Right, and that God cannot give Authority to do that which is unlawful, because it is contrary to his Goodness and Holiness: And to say that God authorises no Man to be wicked, I am sure, is no denial of his Providence, nor any Argument against it.  
But the Doctor speaks particularly to the Case of transferring Kingdoms; he supposes, No Man will 
Pag. 60.  deny, but that God as the supreme Lord of the World may give the Kingdoms of the World to whom he pleases, without doing Injustice to any Prince, who can have no Right, but by his Gift. This I grant is his unquestionable Prerogative. Then, says he, the only dispute can be, about God's bringing such Events to pass by the wickedness of Men. I Answer, we have no dispute about it; no doubt it is God's Prerogative to give Kingdoms and Riches to whomsoever he pleases; but the Question is, whether God does properly give them when they are unjustly Possessed, and when it is a Sin to keep them; if he does, we think the Consequence is, that he authorises Wickedness, and to this the Doctor Answers nothing; but he laboriously proves what is nothing to the purpose, that it is Just for God to bring Good out of Evil. God permits Robberies for good Ends, but this proves not that Robbers have a divine Right to their Booty, it is a Sin to keep it, and as long as it is so, we are sure they have not God's Authority for it.  
He supposes farther, that God may permit ambitious Princes to depopulate Countries, to depose Princes, and subdue their Kingdoms; and then he asks, Which most becomes the divine 
Pag. 61.  Wisdom to suffer such Men, when they please, to overturn Kingdoms only to gratify their own Lusts; or to give prosperous Success to them when he sees fit to new model the World, to pull down such a Prince or to chastise such a Nation? And thus he Answers his own Question, I am sure this much more becomes the divine Wisdom, than a bare Permission of such Violence without any further Design, which does not become it. Thus he still disputes against his own Imaginations; for no one else does imagine, that God permits the deposition of Princes without any other Design, than to gratify the Lusts of Usurpers; there are many good Ends for which he may permit it, the Chastisement or the Punishment of the Princes themselves, and of their Subjects, the Disciplining of them by Afflictions, the Trial of their Faith and Patience, the Illustration of his own Glory, and many other Ends that are worthy of the divine Providence. When Charles I. was deposed and murdered, that execrable Violence was permitted for wise Ends; but this was no Proof that God had authoritatively transferred his Kingdoms to his Deposers and Murderers: And this is a plain Demonstration, that it may become the divine Wisdom to suffer Princes to be deposed, and Kingdoms to be subdued, without any Design of transferring them to Usurpers.  
But why may not God give them those Kingdoms which he has overturned by them? Undoubtedly he may; he may give them by the Conveyance of a lawful Right, or by express Revelation; but the dispute is not, what God may do, but what he does, and whether he does properly give Kingdoms to Usurpers. But the Doctor supposes again, That it is as agreeable to the Sovereignty, Wisdom, 
Ibid.  and Justice of God, to give a Kingdom to an Usurper, as to suffer a wicked Tyrannical Prince to ascend the Throne with a legal Title. This he supposes but without Proof, and against Reason; God by Virtue of his absolute Sovereignty may give a Kingdom to any one, as he can give any Man's Estate, or Wife, to any Man by the same Sovereign Dominion: But First, The Possession of an Estate, Wise, or Kingdom, is no Evidence of God's Donation: And Secondly, When God does really give a Kingdom, all former Rights are extinguished by a divine Right, and it is no Injustice in him to whom it is given to possess and keep it. But according to the Doctor's Principle, the Right of the former Prince is still valid, and he may prosecute it by a lawful War, and therefore it must be unjust in the new Prince to detain it from him; and this does make a great difference between the Doctor's Usurper, and a Tyrannical Prince with a legal Title; the later has lawful Authoririty from God which he can keep and exercise without Sin, the Tyrannical abuse of it is yet wholly from himself, and is only permitted by God for Ends agreeable to his Wisdom and Justice. But the Doctor's Usurper has Authority given him by God, and yet the Possession and Defence of it against the lawful Prince is unjust and unlawful; now this is a plain contradiction in the nature of the Thing, and to God's Wisdom and Justice also, for hereby God is made to authorise that which is formally unjust, which is contradictory to his Justice; and to give a Prince a Kingdom, and yet oblige him to restore it, which is disagreeable to his Wisdom. But in short, let the Doctor prove if he can, that it is no Sin in an Usurper to possess himself of the Throne, and that he is not bound to restore it, and there shall be an end of this Controversy; I will acknowledge that he has God's Authority, and that his Principle does not charge God as being the Author of Wickedness; but if that be impossible to be proved, he may wash and varnish, and lay on Colours till he is weary, the Aethiopian will still retain his Skin, and the Leopard his spots.  
The next Objection he labours to remove is this, That his Principle justifies an unreasonable and wicked 
Ibid.  Doctrine, by making the Acts or Permissions of Providence a Rule for practice against Right and Justice. The sum of his Answer is this; He acknowledges that it is impious to justify Actions from Success▪ or to conclude that is God's Cause, which Providence prospers, because it confounds the difference of Good and Evil, and destroys all the standing Rules of Right and Justice: But yet it is a necessary Duty to discharge those Duties which the Providence of God lays upon us according to the Nature and Intention of the Providence; and thus God's Providence may in some Sense be a Rule of Practice, and may make or extinguish a Duty by changing our relations or condition of Life; as in the present Case he must transfer my Allegiance when he changes my King. In another place he states it 
Vin. p. 44.  thus, The Laws of God are the Rules of Good and Evil to us, not his Providence; but Providence lays new Obligations upon us by creating new Relations: The Laws of God prescribe the Duty of Subjects to their Prince, but the Providence of God makes him. I Answer,  
1. That impious Doctrine which teaches, that the Cause, which Providence prospers, is God's, does seem the unavoidable Consequence of the Doctor's Principle; for he teaches that all Events are God's doing, and that he positively decrees, appoints, accomplishes all Usurpations: But if all Events are God's doing, he is certainly the Author of that which he does; and in such Events which are necessarily and inseparably accompanied with Iniquity, he must be the Author of the Iniquity too: And as to the Event of Usurpation, if he decrees, assists, and accomplishes it, if he does all this for Usurpers, we must needs conclude, that their Cause is Gods ', for it is impossible for God to do more than this for any Cause whatsoever.  
2. If the Laws of God, and not his Providence, are the Rules of Good and Evil to us, than it follows undeniably, that Providence of itself can never direct us how to distinguish between Good and Evil; and therefore when the Question is, whether an Action be lawful or not, we must have recourse to Laws, and not to Providence, to determine it: Thus when we dispute about Allegiance to Usurpers, the Question must be, whether there be any Law that requires it; and if there be no such Law, it is certain there is no such Duty. It is true that the divine Providence does change our Condition and Relations, and by introducing new Relations, does oblige us to new Duties: But it is also certain that all Changes which befall, ourselves, or the Persons to whom we are related, do not extinguish our Relations and Obligations to them, and therefore we must have some other Rule besides Providence to instruct us when they are extinguished. When I am in Prison, or my Father i● in Prison, here is a providential Change, but no Cessation of Relation or Duty. When the Course of civil Government is interrupted by Rebellion, and the Prince cannot actually administer; here is a providential Change which affects my Sovereign, but is no discharge of my Allegiance.  
And how then shall I know when the Events of Providence do extinguish my Duty? My Duty does not cease upon every Change in the condition of my Sovereign that is made by Providence, and it is impossible that the Events of Providence should direct me, when it is extinguished by any Event of Providence: And therefore I must be directed by some other Rule, which may inform me, when any Duty is extinguished by a Change of Providence, and that Rule can be nothing else but Law, either divine or humane Law. Thus it appears that though a Change is made sometimes in our Duties, by the Events of Providence, yet our only Direction is Law, and thither we must appeal at last in all our Controversies about the Change of Duty; and the result is, that if there be no Law that requires Allegiance to Usurpers, the Events of Providence cannot make it to be a Duty. Providence, 'tis true, does make Kings, and God transfers my Allegiance when he changes my King: But the Question is, whether Providence does not make Kings by Permission, and whether when my lawful Prince is dispossessed, my Relation to him is extinguished; and the only way to determine those Doubts, is by appealing not to Providence, but to Law and Reason.  
The Doctor tells us, That we must conform ourselves in the discharge of those Duties that Providence lays upon us, according to the nature and intention of the Providence. But how shall I know that it is the intention of Providence, when an Usurper is advanced, that I should pay Allegiance to him? I know that God disapproves Usurpations and strictly forbids them, and declares that he will punish them; and I know also, if Usurpation be so great a Wickedness, that God's Providence does not assist or authorise it, though he does not interpose his irresistible Power to hinder it, this I am taught by natural and revealed Religion, and I find no Precept in either to assist any Man in his Wickedness; in the whole Progress of the Usurpation I find nothing but Injustice, in the Rebellion or Invasion, in setting the Usurper on the Throne, and in supporting him on it; and therefore I have reason to conclude, that since my Assistance is unlawful, neither the Nature nor the Intention of the Providence does require it.  
There remain some other Objections and Evasions in the Vindication which relate to Providence, and I will consider them as they occur.  
He objects against our Principle, that it opposes Providence to Providence; the force of the Objection is this; God does settle the Crown on any 
Vind. p. 43, 45.  Family no otherwise but by his Providence, and when an Usurper is settled in the Throne, he is advanced by Providence too; and therefore to oppose an Hereditary Right which is made by the overruling Influence of Providence, against God's setting up an Usurper by other Acts of his Providence, is to oppose Providence against Providence, his former Providence against his later Providence. Now there is no absurdity at all in opposing Providence to Providence: A Divine Entail is nothing but an Act of Providence, and yet the Doctor thinks that the Providential Advancement of an Usurper is of no validity against it, and thus himself does oppose Providence to Providence. God's Providence may make Kings by Nomination, by the conveyance of a legal Right, and by granting Possession without Settlement, and Possession with it: And if it be no Absurdity to oppose and prefer the first to all the others, and the fourth to the third, why is it absurd to prefer the second to the third and fourth: It would be absurd indeed if the latter Providence were as clear a Declaration of God's positive Will as the former, but that is the great Controversy between us: All Men are agreed, that when a lawful King is on the Throne he has God's Authority; but not that an Usurper settled or unsettled is invested with it. I am sure there is a Providence that is only permissive, which conveys no Authority, which we cannot possibly distinguish, but by the moral nature of Events; and I think it is no absurdity to distinguish Providence, nor to oppose Wrong to Right, a permissive Providence to a legal Right, which is established by God's Authoritative Providence. And this single Observation, that▪ for all that yet appears, an Usurper is advanced only by permissive Providence, is a sufficient Answer to all the Reflections which he makes upon our opposing Providence to Providence.  
He observes, that this is to shackle and confine Providence, 
Pag. 45.  and that we will not allow God's Providence to change and alter. We only maintain that God's permissive Providence is no discharge of our Allegiance, and that we may not abjure and resist our lawful Sovereign, because God has suffered others to rebel, or to depose him: We confine not God's Providence, but we confine ourselves to that which is just and lawful, and we hope it is no shackling of God, to say he is not the Author of Iniquity.  
He observes that when lawful Kings and Usurpers are advanced, 
Ibid.  it is all but Providence still; and he desires to know, why the Providence of an Entail is more Sacred and Obligatory than any other act of Providence, which gives a settled Possession of the Throne? And is not an unsettled Possession an effect of Providence too? Is a Divine Entail any thing more than an Act of Providence? It is all but Providence still. But the Answer is obvious; it is God's Authority, and not Providence, which is Obligatory; we are sure that Lawful Kings have his Authority, but not that Usurpers have it, they are advanced by God, but by his permissive Providence only.  
Lastly, He raises a great Dust about opposing Humane 
Pag. 43.  Rights and Laws to God's Authority. I will not dispute with him about the Obligation of Humane Laws; it is enough to answer, that he supposes what he has not proved, that Usurpers have God's Authority, because they are advanced by his Providence; and if this is not true, all his Harangues about Humane Laws and Providence do signify nothing. I have often urged the Case of Robbery, and the unjust possession of private Estates and Properties, to show the unconclusiveness of all his Arguments from Providence, and to prove that Possession by Providence is no Evidence of Divine Right or Authority. But the Doctor has found out Distinctions and Evasions to take off the Force of these Instances, and now I am at leisure to consider them.  
The Substance of his First Answer is, That the Dispute is 
Case of Al. p. 34.  not about legal Right but about Authority; no Man pretends that Thiefs and Pirates have God's Authority; they have Force and Violence which every Man may submit to when he cannot help it: but Sovereign Power is God's Authority, though Princes may be advanced to it by no honester means than Theft or Burglary. I answer, 1. That no difference is here assigned between the Usurpations of Sovereignty and private Property, but only this, that Sovereign power is God's Authority: I have answered all his Arguments whereby he would make good his Proposition, and if this Proposition be unproved, the Evasion that is founded on it must needs be insufficient.  
2. This Evasion is at last a begging of the Question; the Fundamental Dispute is, Whether God's Authority is always annexed unto Sovereign Power? His Fundamental Argument from Reason, is that all Providential Events are God's Appointment; it is objected that Piracy and Robbery are Providential Events, as well as Usurpation; and the sum of his Answer is this, That Sovereign Power is God's Authority, which is nothing but arguing in a Circle, and is plainly petitio principii.  
3. Thiefs and Pirates have often Sovereign Power; they exercise the Power of the Sword, they make Laws, decide Controversies, and assume all the Properties and Badges of Sovereign Authority; and to make them absolutely God's Ordinance according to the Doctor's Principle, the Sovereign Thiefs and Pirates are settled in their Administration by the voluntary Consent and Submission of their Subjects; such there have been in the World, and such there may be, and whenever they shall be, they will have as good a Title to God's Authority as any Usurper, for Sovereign Power is God's Authority, and when once the Subject Thieyes have consented to their Sovereignty, upon pain of Damnation they must pay▪ Allegiance to them.  
4. It has been answered, that Thiefs and Pirates have God's Providence as well as Usurpers, though they have not God's Authority. A Thief cannot take a Purse whether God will or no, and he must have the Concurrence of God's Providence to take it, and if these are Arguments of God's Will and Appointment▪ if Providence give a Divine Right, it is certain that the Thief has it, as well as the Usurper, for they have both the same evidence for it.  
To this the Doctor replies, That there is a great difference 
Vind. pag. 54, 55.  between these Cases, which is this, that to the settlement of an Estate, nothing more is required but a mere legal Humane Right, and though the Providence of God allots Men's private Fortunes, yet he gives no Man a Right to an Estate which he has got by Fraud, Injustice, and Violence; but leaves all such legal Rights to the care of public Government. But on the contrary, it is God's Authority which makes a King, and not a mere Humane Right, and God's Authority is not inseparably annexed to Humane Entails, for he can make a King without a Humane Right; if mere Law made a King, as it makes an Heir to an Estate, it were very unjust to own any but a legal King; but if God can remove a legal King and set up an Usurper, than it is no Injustice when God does so, to transfer our Allegiance. This contains the force of his Reply, and in Answer to it I observe,  
1. That this is no Reply to the Objection, which is only levelled against his Arguments from Providence, the sum of it is this; that the Usurpation of a Crown and an Estate are effected alike by Providence, and that 'tis impossible to find any difference in the Concurrence of it, and therefore if Providence proves a Right, the Usurper of an Estate has a divine Right to it. The Doctor replies, that a legal Right is sufficient for an Estate, but to make a King he must have God's Authority. Admit this to be true, what does it signify to the Dispute about Providence? How does it show that there is not the same concurrence of Providence to the Usurping of an Estate and the Usurping of a Kingdom? As God can give Kingdoms, so he can give Estates to whomsoever he will, and if the mere providential Advancement to a Kingdom, is a proof that it is God's Will to give it, why is not the same providential Advancement to an Estate, a proof of the divine Donation also? If God may give the Possession of an Estate without a Right to keep it, so he may give Kingdoms; and if God's Providence does not overrule and cancel the Obligation of Laws in the one Case, how shall it appear that it cancels them in the other? he acknowledges that Providence gives no Right to the unjust Possession of an Estate, and yet the unjust Possession is certainly an Event; and therefore he must quit his fundamental Argument, which is drawn from the Events of Providence; for he must either confess that all Events are not God's Doing, or that his Doing, his Giving Possession of any thing is no Evidence of any Right or Authority to possess it. In short, his Reply is a Confession that his general Arguments from Providence are unconclusive. God's Providence is nothing when it conveys the unjust Possession of an Estate; but when it conveys a Crown to an unjust Usurper, it is an uncontrollable Evidence of his positive Will and Authority; this Distinction cannot be deduced from Providence itself, for in both Cases the Concurrence is the same, he must go to something else to prove it, either Reason or Scripture, and all his Arguments from both I have examined already.  
2. The same difference that is assigned in the Reply between a Crown and an Estate, may be applied to other Cases; I will instance in a Bishop's Right to his Temporalty, and to spiritual Jurisdiction; to the former nothing is required besides a mere humane Right, but to enjoy the later, he must have God's Authority; suppose now that both are usurped by an illegal and schismatical Intruder, who is certainly in some sense Episcopus divina Providentia: The Dr. will confess, that Providence has given him no Right to the Temporalties; the Question than is, whether ●● has a Right to the Spiritual Jurisdiction, which is God's Authority? It may be urged, that there is indeed an ordinary lawful way, whereby Bishops are invested with that Authority; but God's Authority is not inseparably annexed to that ordinary Vocation, he can make a Bishop without it, and when he does so, a mere lawful Vocation is not a sufficient Reason to adhere to a Bishop deposed by God, nor can the want of it justify the disowning of a Bishop whom God has advanced. The plain Resolution of such a Case is this: God can make a Bishop without an ordinary Vocation, but this he never does, and he that pretends to an extraordinary Call, is bound to prove it by indubitable Evidence; if he cannot, we must reject the extraordinary, and adhere to the ordinary Bishop, and they that do otherwise are schismatical Dividers of Catholic Communion. And thus it is in the Case of Kingdoms; God can depose a lawful King, and set up an Usurper without antecedent Right; but before we can transfer our Allegiance, we must be sure that God has done this: The pretender to an extraordinary Commission must produce extraordinary Evidence, but the ordinary Events of Providence are not sufficient to prove it; for the Thief and the schismatical Bishop are in Possession by Providence, as well as the Usurper; and many things do happen under the Direction of Providence, which God himself does condemn and punish, which Men are bound by God to resist to the utmost of their Power.  
3. There is no such great Disparity, as is pretended, between Right to a Crown and Right to an Estate. Right in general is a moral Quality, whereby we may possess or do any thing justly, it extends to Government of Persons, as well as possession of Things, and when it is applied to the former it is called Authority: the Rule and measure of Right is Law, and the Obligation of all Law does proceed only from the Authority of God. A Right to an Estate is a moral Power of possessing and enjoying it justly; a Right to the Government of a Family or Kingdom, is a moral Power to command those Societies; and where there is no Right to command, there can be no Obligation to obey; these Rights may be acquired by the positive Laws of God, the Laws of Nature, and the Laws of Civil Societies, which are only so many several ways of God's revealing his Will to Mankind; and therefore all Right either to Government or Estates, must be ultimately resolved into the Authority of God, the only Lawgiver; concerning the Right to govern there is no Question; and as to Estates and other private Possessions, it seems evident, that no humane Law, considered as merely humane, can create any Right to any thing: for humane Law is nothing but the Will of Men, and the Act of one Man conveying a Possession to another, cannot oblige a third Person to abstain from it, and therefore cannot appropriate it as the Right of the other; the Obligation must proceed from some Authority superior to both, which does bind the one by the Act of the other, and that can be no other but God's Authority. In short, Right is the Effect of Law, and Law hath its Obligation from God; and hence it follows, that as God's Authority is necessary to make a King, so is it necessary likewise to create a Right to an Estate; and therefore in this respect there is no difference between the one Right and the other; for both are ultimately founded on God's Authority. God by his Sovereign Dominion can dispose of Estates as well as Crowns against Law, but humane Laws cannot dispose of either without God's Authority, but the Power of God to do a thing is no Proof that he does it, and Providential Possession is still as good Evidence of God's Authority to an Estate, as of his Authority to govern.  
There remains yet another Reply to the Objection, which must also be considered, it is this: That all private Injuries are reserved by God 
Vind. p. 46.  himself to the redress of Civil Government and Courts of Judicature, and therefore his Providence has no effect at all on such personal Rights: But the nature of the Thing proves, that when such Disputes arise which are too big for humane Judicature, which God hath reserved to his own Judgement, as the Correction of Sovereign Princes, and the transferring of Kingdoms; here the final Determinations of Providence in settling Princes on their Thrones, does draw the Allegiance of Subjects after it. This contains the force of his Evasion, and the first Answer to the former may sustice to this; that though this difference be admitted between private Robbery, and the Usurpation of a Crown, yet there is no difference between them as to the concurrence of Providence; for Robbery is a providential Event, and if every Event is God's Will and Appointment, the Robbery is confirmed by God's Will, and if the Civil Magistrate does redress it, he fights against God, by contradicting his Order and Appointment. But,  
2. There is often no such Difference between Robbery and Usurpation; there is none when the Banditi are so strong and powerful, that the Civil Powers are not able to subdue them, for then their Injuries are too big for legal Redress; there is none in a state of Nature when there is no Civil Government; there is none when Anarchy is introduced by Civil War, and the Administration of Justice is obstructed by Rebellion; and lastly there is none, when the injurious Possession of an Estate cannot possibly be cleared by legal Evidence: In all these Cases it is impossible that Oppressions, Thefts, and Robberies, should be redressed by humane Judicature; it is God alone that can redress them, and therefore according to the Doctour's way of arguing, the final Determination of Providence does in such Cases create a Right, and the unjust Possessor is not bound to Restitution.  
But, faith the Doctor, to make the Cases parallel, he who 
Pag. 47.  unjustly seizes another Man's Estate, must be throughly settled in it; but that no private Man can be who is under the Government of Laws, and has not ligal Possession, and when he has, whether Right or Wrong, he must not be violently dispossessed again. But, 1. If we may suppose a state of Nature, we may suppose a private Man, who is not under the Government of civil Laws, to be throughly settled in an Estate, which is by Right another's, and then the Case is parallel; the unjust Possessor has a Providential Right, and being under no Government, his claim by Providence is the same as the Doctor makes for Usurpers, and it proves a divine Right to the purchase of Injustice. 2. When an Estate is unjustly possessed, and yet the just Right cannot possibly be proved by legal Evidence, here is a through legal Settlement of the unjust Possession, for which there is no legal redress, and therefore this Case is parallel in that respect to the Usurpation of a Kingdom; the Question upon it is, Whether the Intruder has a divine Right by Providence, and may therefore lawfully keep what God has given him? 'Tis true the injured Person cannot restore himself by Force, because he has no Authority to use if, but 'tis certain the unjust Selzor is bound to Restitution, though the Law cannot compel him, and therefore has acquired no Right by his providential Possession: And so is the Usurper of a Crown obliged in Conscience to restore it, and that is a plain Demonstration that he has no Right to it; but if he will not restore it, the dispossessed Prince has Authority to compel him, he may make a lawful War upon him, he has still the Power of the Sword, and that is a Demonstration that he has God's Authority: And thus much concerning the Objection about Thiefs and Pirates. But there remain somethings more to be considered.  
The Doctor observes in his Vindication, That his Adversary 
Vind. p. 11.  is blundered for want of clear and distinct Notions concerning legal Powers, and he pretends to clear all the Difficulties by stating the Terms. Now, says he, We may understand legal, either with respect to the Laws of Nature, the Law of Nations, or the Law of a particular Kingdom; and in this last Sense legal is understood by all Men, who understand themselves in this Controversy of legal Powers. Well, if I understand not myself, I cannot help it, for I understand as well as I am able, and by legal Powers I have always understood such Powers as are according to Law, either the Law of God, of Nature, of Nations, or of political Societies. In the present Controversy the great Question is, to what Powers our Allegiance is due, we think it is due to legal Powers, and if it would be clearly proved, that an Usurper is a legal Power according to any Law whatsoever, this Controversy would be ended.  
He grants however, That legal Powers may be understood 
Pag. 12.  in a larger Notion, as that may be said to be legal, which is agreeable to the Laws of Nature and Nations; and he adds, In this Sense Submission may make a legal King of him, who by the Laws of the Land can be only King de Facto. Now this, as he says, is worth considering, and a very little consideration will show the Inconsistency of this Doctrine. For according to the Doctor's Hypothesis, the King de Facto has a legal Right by the Laws of Nature and Nations, and the dispossessed Prince has still a legal Right by the Laws of the Kingdom: And hence it follows undeniably, that at the same time two opposite Kings may have a legal Right to the same Throne, the one by the Law of Nature and Nations, and the other by the Law of the Kingdom. But it is easy to show, that this does imply a manifest Repugnancy, and I will exemplify it in the instances of Charles and Oliver. Charles is the legal King by the Law of England, and Oliver (who is in Possession with the Submission of the People) by the Laws of Nature and Nations; and hence it follows that Charles has a Right to be King, and Oliver has a Right to be King; but Charles has no Right because it is in Oliver, and Oliver has no Right because it is in Charles. But though Charles has a Right to the Crown, yet he has no Right to possess it, for Oliver is a rightful Possessor of it, and yet he has no Right to keep it, because Charles has a Right to take it from him. There cannot possibly be a greater absurdity either in Law or Nature, than to say that the Possessor and the Dispossessed, the Plaintiff and Defendant, have at the same instant a true and real Right to the same thing in Question. When two opposite Rights are pleaded, the one is undoubtedly none, if the Possessor has a good Right by the Law of Nature, the Right of the Dispossessed must needs be extinguished, for he cannot have a Right to possess that which is another's by the Law of Nature, and if he has no Right to possess, he has no Right to recover, and his legal Right at last is only a Right to nothing. If the Doctor therefore can prove that his Usurper has a Right by the Law of Nature and Nations, I will acknowledge that Allegiance is due to him, and there is an end of the Controversy; but in all his Harangues about the state of Nature, the state of Force, and the Submission of the People, there is no Argument that proves it. In a state of Nature, when Men are free from any Government, a free Consent, or a forced Submission, are enough to make rightful Princes by the Law of Nature: But the Case is different, when rightful Princes are established, and Subjects are sworn to pay Allegiance to them; for then the Subjects are not sui juris, they have no Right to consent, and therefore their Consent is nothing.  
But a state of Force the Doctor thinks is parallel to a 
Vind. p. 13.  state of Nature, and when a Nation is Conquered, or private Subjects are under the Power of an Usurper, than he thinks that force will justify Submission; and so do I too, and his own instance does sufficiently prove it, for he tells us, When we happen to fall into the 
Pag. 14.  Hands of Robbers, where the Government cannot protect us, we may very innocently for our own Preservation, promise and swear to them such Things, as are against the Laws of the Land, and which i● would be unlawful for us to do in other Circumstances. It is lawful no doubt to submit to Robbers, and in some Cases it may be lawful to dispense with a humane Law for our own Preservation, because it wa● not the intention of the Law given to oblige in cases of Extremity. But hence he infers, as he thinks, with greater Reason. That if the Government can't protect it▪ Subjects from a greater Force, they are all liberty to submit to the greater Power. Where the greater Reason lies I know not the force of an Usurper is no greater than the force of a Robber is to those who are under it, and if Force does justify Submission, there is the same Reason for Submitting to both: But what is all this to Allegiance, which is a great deal more than Submission? Force will justify Submission to Robbers, but will it justify the assisting of Robbers, or the joining in Robbery with them? Or will it justify the assisting of an Usurper against a rightful Sovereign?  
But our Obligations to Hitmane Government are reasonably 
Page 14.  supposed to except the Case of greater Force. What, in all Cases whatsoever? The Casuists teach us, that there are many Cases in which Humane Laws do oblige even unto certain Death, as 
* Bp. Taylor Due. Dub. 448. Suarez d● Leg. lib. 3. c. 3. n. 5.  particularly when to undergo the danger of Death is the express Obligation of the Law, and such is the Obligation of legal Allegiance, as appears from the ancient Oath of Ligeance, wherein the Subject is sworn, to bear true Faith to the King of Life, and Member, and terreite Honour, that is, (as the Lord Coke expounds it) until the letting out of the last drop of 
Calvin's Case.  our dearest Heart Blood. 2. When it is notorious that the Tyrant Power threatens 
Taylor, ibid. 4●9. Suare●▪ ibid. n. 7.  Death to Subjects, to tempt them to transgress the Law, and to bid defiance to the Authority of their Superior, they are then obliged to obey and die, the Law does then require our Fortitude and Patience, and the Lawgiver cannot be presumed to allow the renouncing of his own Authority, or to make an Exception that Subjects may become Enemies to it.  
But the dissolution of the Government, or the Power of 
Vind. p. 14.  the Prince to protect himself, or his Subjects in his Government, puts an end to the Obligation of Oaths. This Assertion depends on his Fundamental Principle, that a dispossessed Prince has no Right to Allegiance, & with that Principle it stands or falls: I shall only observe that it follows thence; that our Oaths are cancelled by every Rebellion, for that (as far as it goes) is a dissolution of the Government; and it follows also that when a Subject falls under the Power of Robbers, who require him upon pain of Death to renounce his Sovereign, he is then at liberty to renounce him, and to swear Allegiance to the Robber; for the Prince has no Power to protect his Subject in his Government, and that puts an end to the Obligation of his Oath.  
He asserts that every private 
Pag. 18.  Man, or any City, or Garrison, when they are overpowered, may submit to the Conqueror, and become his Subjects, which implies that they may lawfully transfer their Allegiance to him. But pag. 40. he affirms, that while the Prince is in the actual Administration of the Government, though the Subject be violently torn from him, yet this relation of a Subject may still continue, because he has a Prince to whom he is related▪ and thence it necessarily follows, that he owes the Duty of a Subject to his lawful Prince, and therefore cannot tranfer it to the Conqueror. How shall we reconcile these Repugnanc●es? But if his Arguments from Force are valid, they will justify the Translation of Allegiance wherever there is Force enough to exact it; as he saith himself, it is no matter from what quarter the Force comes, if a Man 
Pag. 1●▪  is under a Power which he cannot resist, which will undo● and ruin him if he transfer not his Allegiance; it is alone to him as if his King and Country were absolutely conquered, and these are invincible Arguments for Allegiance not only to a Ket, a Cromwell, or a Mussianello, but also to a Captain of the Banditi, or the Rapparees, when he gets a Subject in his Power.  
But we have nothing to do with the Cases of irrisistible Force and Conquest; suppose a Nation in America under a King acknowledged by all to be lawful, and the Subjects bound to him by the strictest Ties and Oaths of Allegiance; notwithstanding which they call in a Foreign Prince to invade him, actually rebel against him, & force him to leave his Kingdom for the Safety of his Life; afterwards a Convention of the Estates assembles, which solemnly depose their Sovereign, and place his Enemy in the Throne, and proclaim him over the Nation, and enjoin all that have Offices and Preferments, upon pain of forfelting them to swear Allegiance to him, and this they voluntarily do without any force upon them: In such a Case as this, to talk of Force and Conquest is only Banter; the Subjects voluntarily rebel, depose, and abjure their Sovereign; and if all this be Perjury and the highest Injustice, i● can be no Warrant or Excuse to particular Persons, that if they had not complied, they had lost their Preferments, or that they follow a Multitude to do Evil.  
The Doctor lays the whole stress of the Controversy upon the Consent and Submission of the People, he annexes and limits God's Authority to it, it is his great Criterion of a Settlement, and he makes it a Legal Right by the Law of Nature and Nations. But what he means, or whether he means the same thing by Submission and Consent, we are left to conjecture; we know that Oliver had the entire Submission of the Nation, the Doctor acknowledges that it was lawful to submit, and since they actually submitted, it follows from his Principle that Oliver 
See Vind. pag. 15.  had a Legal Right by the Laws of Nature and Nations. A National Submission, as he says, 
Pag. 69.  must be declared by one means or other: I confess Submission to Oliver was not declared by a Recognition of a Free legal Parliament; but it was declared by the quiet and peaceable living of all the Estates, and of the whole Nation under his Government, by their paying him Taxes to support it, by their taking Commissions, and receiving Justice and Protection from it, and if all this be no declaration of Submission, there can be no such thing in the World; no Recognitions nor Oaths of Allegiance can be equivalent, for those we see are taken and made in many Senses, they are often obtained by Menaces and Promises, by Cabal and Faction, and it is clear from History that the Nation never thought themselves obliged by them to adhere to Usurpers; and yet the quiet and peaceable Submission of a whole Nation to a Government in the Case of Cromwell, is of no validity with the Doctor to entitle him to a legal Right, and God's Authority.  
There is another Difficulty about Consent and Submission, which the Doctor may resolve when he pleases, whether the Consent of the whole, or the major part of a Society, be required to the translation of Allegiance, or whether a lesser Part, a County, a Hundred, a Village, or a City, may submit for its self, and make a King by itself, and pay their Allegiance to him▪ If a single Town should make a little King for itself, according to the Doctor's Notion, there would be, a Settlement of the Government within itself, so he says, Alexander's Authority was settled at 
Pag. 73.  Jerusalem, before Darius was finally conquered, and yet Jerusalem was no more to the Persian Empire than a Village is to England; and thus upon the late Abdication, as we are taught to call it, there might have been a new Heptarchy of Governments, nay as many as there are Counties, Towns, or Villages in the Kingdom, every Government would have been throughly 〈…〉 in itself, even without a peaceable Possessim and Settlement. Thus when Monmouth was at Taunton, and the People generally submitted to him as their King, his Government was settled in that Town; and private particular Men, being under the Power of the new King, might have lawfully paid Allegiance to him.  
The Doctor thinks it very absurd to found the Right of Government upon Humane Laws, or the Legal Consent of the People, but if they consent against Law, their Consent does make a Lawful King by the Law of Nature and Nations; he accounts it a monstrous Absurdity to say, that God cannot give his Authority 
Case of Al. pag. 25.  himself without the People, nor otherwise than as they have directed him by their Laws; if Princes receive their Authority from Humane Laws, he cannot imagine that their Power is any more than a Trust, 
Pag. 36.  for which they are accountable; he thinks it a bold Contradiction 
Pag. 37.  to say, that God cannot remove or set up King's against Law: This is shackling of his Providence; and in fine, whoever will confine the Power of God in setting up 
Pag. 20.  Kings, to Humane Laws, ought not to be disputed with. But now instead of Humane Laws, insert the Consent of the People against Law, and all these Absurdities and Contradictions are easily reconciled to Reason and Religion, and he that will not shackle God's Authority and Providence to Submission and Consent, shall not be thought fit to be disputed with.  
I grant that the Laws of Nature and Nations do make him a lawful King, who has the Consent of a Free People who are under no antecedent Obligation; But when they are, they have no Power to Consent, and then their Consent is a Nullity by the Law of Nature itself; for it is a Rule in that Law, That Actions which are forbidden by it for defect of 
Bp. Taylor Duc. Dub. 197.  Power are not only unlawful, but also void; this is true in Contracts and Acts of Donation, in Vows and Dedition, and all rely upon the same Reason. He that cannot give, 〈…〉 he that cannot be given, cannot contract, or be contracted with. Therefore in what Cases soever, the People have no Power to consent to the advancement of a new Sovereign, their consent is nothing in Law, and therefore cannot make a rightful King, according to the Laws of Nature and Nations.  
No 〈…〉 suppose as before, that a Rebellious People by the assistance of Foreign Power drive their King out of his Kingdom, refuse to restore him, or so much as to treat with him, and then set up an Usurper over them; here the Question is, whether their Advancement of the Usurper was lawful, and whether they had Power to consent to it; if the Doctor can prove the People have Power to rebel, depose, and set up Usurpers, let us see him prove it; but if he cannot prove it, he will never prove that such a People had Power to consent, or that a consent which is nothing can effect any thing, can create ●a lawful Right by the Law of Nature or Nations; their consent is void and unlawful, it is a breach of their Allegiance, and that cannot absolve them from it; it is Perjury, and that is no release from▪ their Oaths, and in short it binds them only to Repentance and Restitution.  
He allows that the lawful Prince, who is dispossessed has 
Case of Al. p. 26.  a lawful Right to make War for the recovery of his Kingdom: I demand, Is not this lawful by the Laws of Nature and Nations? It h● lawful by those Laws, or by none; for it is no proper Matter for political Laws, and they prescribe nothing about it. But the Doctor will grant that, and if he will not, it is easy to prove it by a cloud of Witnesses, and by the practice of Nations: But now if the dispossessed Prince by the Law of Nature, and Nations, has a Right to recover his Kingdom, he has certainly a Right by the same Laws to possess it; and consequently the Usurper has no Right to it by those Laws, unless they are contradictory to themselves by giving two incompatible Rights to the same Possession. And this is a plain Demonstration (whatever becomes of the Usurper in the Vindication) that the Usurper in the Case of Allegiance is not a rightful Prince, according to the Laws of Nature and Nations.  
One thing more may seem necessary to be considered, because it looks like Argument from Reason, and that is the Discourse concerning 
Vin. p. 37, 38, 39  the Relation between a King and a Subject; but I have the Doctor's Warrant to let it pass as a logical Banter; the result of it is this, that the Fundamentum Relation●s is God's Authority, and that, says he, is always annexed to the settled Possession of the Throne; but this again is the Fundamental Proposition in Dispute between us; I have endeavoured to answer all the Arguments that are drawn from Scripture and Reason to prov● it, and the Reader is left to judge whether they are sufficiently Answered.    

ADVERTISEMENT.  
THe Reader may please to take Notice, That the following Postscript doth not relate to this Book, nor yet to the Author; but it was an Addition to the Answer to Dr. Sherlock, in Defence of the Case of Allegiance to the King in Possession, and written to the same Friend; but the Impression of it being then prevented, it was thought convenient to annex it to this.   

POSTSCRIPT.  
IT will, Sir, be no small Surprise to you to tell you, after all, that the Case of Allegiane● to a King in Possession, with all the Mistakes, Nonsense, and Trifling which the Doctor now discovers in it, had notwithstanding the Doctour's Imprimatur before it saw the Light, as you may fully assure yourself from the following Testimony of a Person of very good Credit, who some time since gave me this following Account.  The Case of Allegiance to a King in Possession in M. S. was recommended to Dr. Sherlock, who read it over, and mightily approved it, and wished it were then actually printed, especially for the sake of Dr.— who had written a Letter to him (which he also then read) wherein he endeavoured to persuade him that Allegiance was due to the Regnant Power. He urged to have it printed as soon as might be, and that Care might be taken that Dr.— should have a Copy; which shows a strange Temper in the Master, to treat a Book and an Author at such a rate, which a little before he did so approve and commend. 
The Author ought to take this for a very great Honour done him by the Doctor, as great as if the Book had been Licenced under his hand; and it will be some Comfort to him, to hear that once he stood so fair in the Doctor's Opinion, notwithstanding his customary Compliments of Nonsense and Trifling. But it is more material to observe, that the Doctor seems by this Account to have been more busy against the Oaths while he refused them, than he is willing to acknowledge. He disclaims being ever engaged in any Faction against taking the Oaths, or making it his business 
Pref. p. 2.  to dissuade Men from it, or seeking out Men to make Proselytes, but confesses only that he declared his Thoughts against them when he was asked. But it seems to be a little more; for a Man to be a Party to the Printing of a Book tending to dissuade Men from taking the Oaths, and to make Proselytes against it, for him to wish it were actually printed, to urge the printing it as soon as possible, and to direct whither a Copy should be sent. If this be more than what the Reverend Doctor would seem to own, he may have forgot that he was so far engaged in one Overt-Act for the making Proselytes against the Oaths; and it would be more charitable for him to distrust his own Memory, than to cast a Slander upon the Inventions of his Neighbours.  
I would beg your leave to add one thing more, with regard to the Doctor's Raillery against the Notion of Presumptive Consent. He says, it is a very pretty Notion, 
p. 58.  and serves a great many good turns; i● makes Laws, makes Treason, and gives Authority to the inauthoritative Acts of a King de facto. It serves a great many good turns; so that the Dr. looks upon it as a Notion fit for no purpose but to serve a turn; and one would think then, that he above all Men should not ever have made use of it to serve his turn upon occasion. And yet if we look back into his former Writings, we shall find that no other Author has served himself of this Notion in a more peculiar manner than the Reverend Dr. In his 
Ed. 1682.  Vindication of his Defence of Dr. Stillingfleet, he asserts the Validity of the Ordinations by me●r Presbyters in the foreign Reformed Churches, which have no Bishops. And upon what does he ground the validity of their Orders? Why truly, upon the Force and Authority which the Presumptive Allowance of the Church has in Cases of 
pag. 345.  Necessity. He takes some pains to prove that the Church's Consent may be presumed to these Ordinations, from the Reasonableness of the Thing, and from the Practice of the Church in parallel Cases; but makes no Difficulty in the least to conclude, that the Church's presumed Consent has sufficient Force and Authority to make these Ordinations by mere Presbyters, and the Administration of the Sacraments by Persons ordained by them, valid and effectual. His word● are, If the Church may be presumed in Cases of Necessity to allow Persons to perform such religious Offices and Minist●ries, as otherwise 〈…〉 are not qualified to perform; then this very Allowance supplies the Incapacity of the Person● and does virtually confer. that Authority upon him, which in other Cases he had not. And 〈…〉 consider his farther prosecution of this Argument▪ it will appear that the Doctor would make as little difficulty to assert, that the Administration of the Sacraments by mere laymen, in a Church where they have no Bishops or Presbyters to administer them, is mad 〈…〉 valid and effectual by 〈…〉 of the same Presumptive Allowance of the Church.  
No 〈…〉 will the Dr. be pleased to look back upon his way of arguing in that Treatise, and see ho 〈…〉 all his present R●●ll●●y ●● directly leveled against it? The Presumptive Allowance o● the Church is a very pretty Notion, and serves a great many good turns; it makes 〈…〉, and it makes Prie●●●▪ it makes Orders conferred by simple Presbyters true Orders, and it makes the Sacraments administered by Persons who have not Episcopal Ordination (nay even by mere Laymen) true Sacraments, and it makes a Church without Bishops, nay without Bishops or Presbyters, a true Church; it gives Authority to the inauthoritative Acts of Ordaining in mere Presbyters, and to the inauthoritative Acts of Administering the Sacraments in Persons ordained by Presbyters, nay eve● in Laymen, where they have no Bishops or Presbyters. Does now the Dr. take this Raillery for a sufficient Confutation of his own pretty Notion of the Church's Presumptive Allowance? If he does not, why must we take it for an Argument against Bp. Sanderson's Notion of the Presumed Consent of the King de Ju●e? Can the Church's Presumed Consent do all this, and must the King's Presumed Consent do nothing? And whence is it that the Dr. asscribes so great Force and Authority to the Church's Presumed Consent?  
He grounds it upon the Church's Power to dispense with positive Institutions in case 
● Ibid.  of Necessity, and by her own Approbation and Authority to supply the Defects and Irregularities of such Administrations. But why must the Church have such a Power? Why? Because otherwise the Power of the Church is more defective than of any other Society of Men. Then other Societies of Men, i. e▪ Civil Societies, have such a Power, by the same reason as the Church has it; and if this Power in the Church implies so great Force and Authority in the Church's Presumed Allowance, than the same Power in the State implies as great Force and Authority in the Civil Magistrate's presumed Consent.  
I do not look upon it as so very strange, that the learned Dr. should contradict himself thus at the distance of 7 Years, because in that time a man may become another Person, and his very Principle of Unity, i. e. his Self-consciousness, may be changed: But it looks ●ery oddly, that others should be lashed with the Dr's Raillery, and run down with his Confidence, for no other Reason but that the Dr. is not at leisure to review his Writings 7 Years backward, and so forgets and contradict● his old Notions. He is very free to say, he hath renounced no Principle bu● one that ever he taught; but 
Pref. 〈…〉.  ever is a very long time, and within a little more than 7 Years we find the learned Dr. tripping, and renouncing one more pretty Notion besides that Principle. He declares now, that for his part he lays no stress upon a Presumed 
pag. ●1.  Consent; but then he was pleased to lay the greatest stress upon it, to make it the ground of the Validity of the Orders and Sacraments in the foreign Reformed Churches, which have no Bishops, and consequently the ground of the very Being of those Churches. Now he is pleased to expose the Notion which then did him such 〈…〉 Service, as a Notion good for nothing but to serve a turn: And is not this very pretty 〈…〉 after all the Dr. himself seems to be the only P●rson who hath made use of this Notion, to serve a turn? for he ●aid the greatest stress upon it once, when it was for 〈…〉, but declares he lays no stress upon it, nay thinks sit to ridioule and explode it, ●ow that it is not for his turn.  
FINIS.