DE CAUSA DEI: OR, A VINDICATION Of the Common Doctrine of Protestant DIVINES, Concerning Predetermination: (i. e. The Interest of God as the first Cause, in all the Actions, as such, of all Rational Creatures:)  
From the invidious Consequences with which it is burdened by Mr. JOHN HOWE., In a late Letter and Postscript, of GOD'S PRESCIENCE.  
By T. D.  
LONDON, Printed for R. Roberts, and are to be sold by Walter Davis at his House in Amen-Corner, 1678.   

To the Reverend Mr. JOHN HOWE., Author of the late Letter and Postscript of God's Prescience.  
SIR,  
WHen I had read the Title-page of your late Letter to the Honourable Mr. boil, and thereby understood its design, and withal observed the smallness of the Bulk, I promised myself that it would be Pagella, hoc solo nomine redarguenda, quod sit tota Gemmea. For else I thought it would not be worthy of so great a Moecenae, a Master of all sort of Learning; and [so] whose nobility is not only in Parchment, (as Charron speaks): nor of the Author, (for I was ware of him, though he had concealed his name) whose parts I well knew (and have always had the candour upon all fit occasions to acknowledge) were not of the lower size: nor yet of so excellent a subject, and so needful in these dregs of time, which verge so much toward Socinianism. And in the perusal of the Letter itself, for some time I pleased myself with an apprehension that I had not imposed upon myself; nor had my affection to the Author seduced my judgement. Fancy and Reason were in so happy a conjunction, that I hoped they would never be parted throughout the whole Discourse. But alas! too soon I found my hopes shamefully baffled. For (beside a corrupt gloss upon Act. 4.28. pag. 28. which I could not digest, and divers passages in the process of your after-Discourse not unexceptionable) from pag. 32, to 50, to speak my sense freely, I found pro thesauro carbones, i.e. Coals instead of Treasure, shining indeed, but black and smutty; politeness of stile, I mean, continued, but the series of well-digested thoughts broken and dissevered; jejune Answers to Arguments full of sense; old Popish Arguments dressed up A-la-mode, and many of which militate as much against your assertions as ours; and a great deal of good eloquence put to a very ill use, and a far worse than it would be to play at Duck and Drake with broad pieces in the Thames; and sometimes degenerate eloquence, which (like painted glass) though it was an ornament, yet impeded the transmission of the light: and (which is worst of all) the whole design of those Pages I found to be an averment of the old Popish Calumny, that by the Protestant Doctrine God is made the Author of sin; which I must needs profess was a strange surprisal to me; and so much the more, because I could not conceive what should induce you a● Protestant Divine, to make affidavit of a Pontificial accusation, nor why in this Discourse. For if the end you assigned yourself in doing it was the vindication of the blessed God from the imputation of being the cause of moral evil, you have certainly lurcht the Reader of his expectation, by offering nothing toward it but what he can easily see through, (viz.) that God is not the cause [universally] of natural good; or at least as remote as the Grandfather is of the Grandchild. [See your own words, Let. p. 36.] Two causes which might seem probable of your doing it in this Discourse, yourself has removed out of your Readers way. It was not the request of the Honourable Person to whom your Letter is directed, but (for aught I can collect) as the defending God's Predeterminative concourse unto sinful actions was an unenjoined task, Let. p. 150. So was the overthrowing it too. Nor was it the connexion between Prescience and Predetermination (as it lies in the Divine Decree, and is the only true ground of the certainty of Divine Prescience) for that was not your design to demonstrate God's Prescience of all whatsoever futurities, and consequently of the sins of men; but supposing it to show its reconcileableness with what it seemed not so well to agree, (as you since tell us) Postsc. p. 4. which I did easily apprehend before. For all the mediums you use for the eviction of this reconcileableness, borrow no strength from the denial of Predetermination. Sometime after your Letter succeeded a Postscript, in the view of which I was more astonished than before: obstupui steteruntque comae. For whereas I might have hoped that your second thoughts would be better, they proved a great deal worse. I had such an opinion of your modesty, that at least you would recall the hard words you gave the Arguments urged for Predetermination to sinful actions, Thin Sophistry, Collusive ambiguity, Let. p. 41. Vain attempts, 38. Dismal conclusions, 36. the effects of a Sophistical wit against sense, and more against the sense of our souls, and most of all against the entire sum and substance of all Morality and Religion at once, p. 39, 40. and overturning and mingling heaven and earth, p. 50. And that reflection you make upon those who have used the distinction of voluntas signi & Beneplaciti, that they have only rather concealed a good meaning, than expresed by it a bad one, p. 106. For take all together, and I see not that they amount to a less guilt, than of trampling upon that venerable dust, which was sometimes animated by truly Heroic Souls, and bore the names of Zuinglius, Calvin, B●za, Perkins, Pemble, Davenant, Twisse, Ames, etc. than which no cause hath had, nor needs greater Patrons. But instead of recalling, you have avowed them, by the addition of others of the same sort, a contagion, a deadly thing, Postsc. p. 15. An ill coloured opinion, Postsc. p. 51. Fearful consequences of that rejected opinion; vanity of the subterfuges whereby its assertors think to hid the malignity of it, p. 50. Nor was this enough, but as if you were Animal gloriae, (as was said of the Philosophers) an animal that lived by the air of vain glory and applause, and thought yourself another Goliath, you cry out, I defy the armies of Israel this day; give me a man that we may fight together. What other interpretation are these words capable of? Now I perceive that some persons, who had formerly entertained that strange opinion of God's Predeterminative concurrence to the wickedest actions, and not purged their minds of it, have been offended with that Letter, for not expressing more respect unto it; and yet offered nothing themselves (which to me seems exceeding strange) for the solving of that great difficulty and encumbrance, which it infers upon our Religion, Postsc. p. 7. Or these, If I find myself obliged any way further to intermeddle in this matter, I reckon the time I have to spend in this world can never be spent to better purpose, than in discovering, etc. the inefficacy of the Arguments brought for it, p. 50. but most immodest is your threatening those that assert the contradictory to your Proposition, with your preparations for the defence of it, and plain intimation of the value you put upon them, as sufficient to silence all opposers, p. 51, 52. And for aught I can judge to the contrary, if contempt of your Antagonists will dash them out of countenance, and so silence them, you are likely enough to obtain the victory you assure yourself beforehand. An instance whereof you have given us in your ill treatment of Mr. Gale, a most pious, modest, and learned man, and our common friend, and one who like a friend touched your sore so gently, that one would have thought you should hardly have cried Oh! much less have cried out of Vindictive Hostility, p. 16. and that he was the man that might be instanced in, that had managed a public contest with that candour and fairness, as not at all to entrench upon friendship, which you did well know was possible to be done, (as you express yourself, ibid.) And yet how many holes do you pick in his coat? one while you insinuate that he is of those men's humours who take an unaccountable pleasure, in depraving what is done by others, p. 12. whereas I who have known him about 25 years, and was of the same Academical Society with you both, have never observed any such misbehaviour of his. Another while, that he had a concealed end of his own glory, viz. [in attacking you], (as if the good man had coveted that inscription upon his Tombstone,— Magnis tamen excidit ausis). And again, assert that he had a mighty strong and irresistible inclination to squabble a little with your Letter, p. 13. And that this inclination cannot but owe itself to some peculiar aspect and reference he had to the Author, p. 14. (whereas I dare be his voucher, that all the harm he wishes you is but an increase of humility). And this guilt you make account is fastened upon him, because he hath not attempted sundry others of former and latter days, which have said much to the purpose which your Letter does but touch on the by, p. 13. which is a strange accusation, and will appear such to those who shall upon perusal find, that he hath run the hazard of his safety in meddling with those Giants you point at, Postsc. p. 14. But if he had not, I think he might apologise for himself, that your tract being concise, and adorned with good language, might invite more buyers and readers. Ratsbane capt in fine sugar, may well be judged likely to entice some liquorish appetite to taste of it, to their own hurt. But the greatest provocation not to let you [whoever be let] pass, is that intolerable reflection upon the Asserters of Predetermination; upon their Arguments, and the natural consequences of them, all at once in these words. But the effects of a Sophistical wit against sense, and more against the sense of our souls, and most of all against the entire sum and substance of all Morality and Religion at once, are but like the attempt to batter a wall of brass with straws and feathers, Let. p. 39, 40. This passage alone were enough to raise indignation, sufficient to make a disputant (at least if that passion be as effectual to that purpose as the old shred,— facit indignatio versum, intimates it is to make a Poet). And this was it that made me inquisitive after an answer to your Letter, and Postscript, as to which, when after many rumours of Answers preparing, I found my hopes frustrated, I resolved (though almost too late) to attempt one myself, for my resolution was his in Terence, a quoquam alio quam a me, a me autem potius quam a nemine; that I had rather your answer should come from any one than me, but from me rather than no body. I met with many discouragements in the last clause of my resolution, in general from a consciousness of my own disabilities, and particularly from the hard measure your other Antagonist Mr. Gale hath met with, as in the instances , so in some other. The one, your carping at words, that you make so severe Ani●nadversion upon him for an innocent Pleonasm, The Divine Independent will of God, which meant you no harm, nor was more guilty of any design to rob your Essay of any part of its eloquence, than that was to pilfer from him any part of his collections, Postsc. p. 13. And I was not without some apprehensions that I might fall under your lash myself, who am not curious in the choice of words, or composure of periods. But against this fear I was somewhat relieved, as against the sorrow I had conceived for Mr. Gales affront, (as if it had fell out for that end, and also to justify the old saw, aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus) by an happy accident that I have taken you tardy twice in that kind yourself: For what else but a Pleonasm is that Phrase, The rectitude of God's holy nature, Let. p. 42. and the rectitude of Gods own most holy will and way, p 59 in the excess of your caution, lest any should think the holy nature, the most holy will and way of God were void of rectitude, Postsc. p. 22. And elsewhere actions malignantly wicked, p. 32. i. e. wickedly wicked. But these are childish criminations, unfit to be bandied from hand to hand by sober persons. The other discouragement was the difficult investigation of your sense, which I take to be a far harder task than to confute it; of which, that I may not be thought to complain without cause, I have collected some instances of repugnant and self-contradicting Propositions, in your Discourses.  

1. Mediate concurrence.  
1. It sufficiently salves the rights of the first cause, to assert that no action can be done, but by a power derived from it, which in reference to forbidden actions, intelligent creatures may use or not use as they please, Let. p. 36.  
2. All actions good to Mr. Gales Quest. Is there any action so sinful that hath not some natural good as the substrate matter thereof? you Answ. True, Postsc. p. 36.  
3. Predetermination denied as to some actions, (viz.) evil. 
This is the design of all your Letter, from p. 32. to 50. and of the Postscript.    

2. Immediate concurrence.  
1. I do really believe Gods immediate concourse to all the actions of his creatures, Post. p. 28.  
2. Some actions in themselves evil. 
Some actions of the creatures are in themselves most malignantly wicked, Le. p. 32. and intrinsically evil, p. 46.   
3. Predetermination to all actions granted. 
The active providence of God about all the actions of men consists not merely in giving them natural powers, whereby they can work of themselves, but in a real influence upon those powers, Postsc. p. 39 n. 5.    
By which last clause, a real influence upon those powers, if you mean (as I cannot divine what else you can) a reducing those powers into act, (as your phrase is, Ib. n. 6.) you come over to our Camp, and we will give good entertainment to so serviceable a Deserter.  

4. Predetermination forces the will. 
Nothing is more apparently a simple and most strictly natural impossibility than not to do an action whereto the Agent is determined by an infinite power, Let. p. 33.    

4. Predetermination forces not the Will. 
It is unreasonable to imagine that God cannot in any case determine the will of a rational creature, in a way agreeable enough to its nature, Let. p. 141.  
Men are enabled by an internal infusion of power and vital influence to do much good, to which they are not impelled by it, p. 145.    
non est ingenii mei hosce nodos dissolvere, i.e. I have not wit enough to untie these knots. The consideration of these repugnancies, fills me with wonder at your exclamation against Mr. Gale, for finding no fault with your Pamphlet but what he makes, Postsc. p. 11. and particularly for suggesting that your opinion falls in with the sentiments of Durandus, which many think not well of, Postsc. p. 9 For I must needs profess, that as far as I can judge, he hath but slandered you with a word of truth. For in your Letter, by which Mr. Gale did, and only could take his measures of your sense, there's not the most implicit intimation of any other intendment, than to close with Durandus. And though you do explicitly disown it in your Postsc. yet you instruct not you Reader, how the Grammatical construction of these words above cited, p. 36. of your Let. will yield any other meaning, than what Mr. Gale pitches upon. And the foresight of the probability of being cried out upon for want of candour, in the same respects, did not a little deter me from the undertakement.  
A third, the necessity of making a Parallel between your and the Papists Arguments against Predetermination, which I foresaw would give you occasion to fault me, (as you do Mr. Gale), for parallelling your conceptions with theirs, the reason whereof must needs be because I take a Papist for an ill-favoured name, Postsc. p. 27. yet here they are.  

1. Some actions are intrinsically evil, and in themselves wicked, Let. p. 33, 32.  
2. God hath as much influence and concurrence to the worst actions, as the best, Post. p. 25. viz. by the Doctrine of Predetermination of sinful actions.]  
3. For God to determine men to the worst of actions, can mean no less thing than to impel them to do them, Let. p. 37. which impelling you call an ineluctable fate, p. 33. [and so intent compelling.]  
4. God hath more influence and concurrence to the worst actions than the sinner or tempter, Post. pag. 25. and in more words, Let. pag. 32. viz. by our Doctrine.]   

1. There are many actions so intrinsically and in themselves evil, that they always are repugnant to the eternal Law, and Right Reason. Bell. de Am. c. 18.  
2. Calvin was blasphemous against God in affirming, That God works evil works in us, so as he works good, Alvarez de Aux. Gr. l. 4.  
3. God, according to our Adversaries opinion [viz. the Protestants] impells men, and so compels them to sin, Bell. c. 5.  
4. God according to the opinion of Calvin and Beza is the primary Author of all sins. Bell. c. 4. de Amiss. Gr.   
But pass upon this parallel what judgement you please, I am at a point. I have proposed to myself a good end in the exhibition of it, viz. to mind my Readers that the point under debate between you and me is a stated controversy between the Papists and Protestants, and therefore the affirmative not lightly to be receded from; and in drawing it up I gave myself a little pleasure mixed with disdain; that because there was no Smith found throughout all the land of Israel, you were said to go down to the Philistines to sharpen your axe and your mattock, 1 Sam. 13.19, 20. And I admired that you could not excogitate one new Argument, but present us with all old, and strangely unfortunate, which have been baffled as often as urged. I have entitled my Answer De Causa Dei, rather than De causa Deo; which latter might be proper enough for the subject, a Defence of God's interest as the first cause in all the actions of his Creatures. But herein I have imitated Bradwardine's Piety, who would signify thereby that it was the Cause of God he designed to secure from the impetuous assaults of its Adversaries, among whom I am hearty sorry you should be numbered, as to this instance. I know you will not own the charge, but pretend that you are on God's side, but if so, you have neglected an opportunity of showing yourself, by not reconciling Gods preventive methods of sin with immediate concourse, which is at least as hard as with Predeterminative concourse: and to be sure, any one may see it was very idle and ludicrous trifling, to offer at reconciling those methods with God's Prescience, and to wave that (manifestly) greater difficulty of reconciling them with his immediate concourse, if you think there is such a thing, (to use your own words with but the variation that a disserent instance requires) Postsc. pag. 3, 4. I have been as brief as I could in my Answer, without prejudice to our cause; and have come (as Caesar Borgia said of the French in their Expedition into Italy) rather with Chalk in my hands to mark out the Inns, than with Arms to break through and take possession. It will be time enough to arm when your Preparations shall rise out of that dust and silence in which they are buried, Post. p. 51. In the mean time I have but pointed out the Fontes solutionum, the general grounds upon which our Answers depend, to all Arguments that can be produced. To conclude, I could hearty wish you would serionsly reflect upon your Letter and Postscript, and consider how many passages you are obliged to repent of and retract. Shall I ●ind you of that notable saying of Austin, Illius scripta summa authoritate dignissima, etc. i.e. his writings deserve to be of the greatest authority, who hath let slip never a word, not that he would, but that he ought to recall. He that hath not attained so much wisdom as to be able to say nothing not to be repent of, may yet attain so much modesty as to repent of what he knows he has said amiss, Aug. Ep. 17. And for your encouragement, it may not be unseasonable to mind you, of what you cannot but know, that Austin who gave this good counsel, did take it himself, and left upon record retractation of his Errors, wherein he was a singular instance of humility, and was rewarded by God with a greater esteem in the Church than any one man since his time. Which is all, besides that I am  
Octob. 31. 1677. Your true Friend and Brother T. D.   


De Causa Dei.  
IT has been always judged very needful in polemics to state the Question, and explain the terms, when they labour under any ambiguity, or however fall not under the apprehension of those who are to be instructed, for want of skill in that art or science to which they belong, or language from which they are borrowed. In neither of these respects will it be needless in the Controversy now to be agitated; not as to the first, because Mr. How gives us his sense in various terms, and such as seem repugnant to each other: one while that which he denies is, a Predeterminative concurrence to all actions of the Creatures, Let. p. 32. and Postsc. p. 3. and Predeterminative concourse, Post. p. 19 another while 'tis Predetermining Influence, Post. p. 19 and a Determinative influence, Let. p. 36. and Efficacious influence, Post. p. 52. As for the two former phrases (which are of the same import) they are in effect contradictio in adjecto in their conjunction. I appeal to Strangius, Mr. H.'s friend, but my Adversary in the main Question under consideration, Hujusmodi Predeterminationem nonnulli confundunt cum concursu Dei generali quem concursum praevium appellant, etc. i.e. Some confound this kind of Predetermination with the general concourse of God. But they speak very improperly who call Predetermination a previous [or Predeterminative] concourse, or say that God does by concourse determine second causes: and he quotes Twisse with approbation, saying, Concurrere cum agente aliquo modo, etc. i.e. To concur with an agent some way to the production of an effect, is not to determine that agent. For the Creature also concurs with God to the production of an effect, and yet it does not determine God: therefore nor does God concurring with the Creature determine it to act. Strang. de Vol. Dei, Lib. 2. Cap. 4. p. 161. Strangius does not call the terms a contradiction, I confess, but the reason out of Twisse gave him as just ground (as it does me) so to call them. As for the latter phrase, influence, which he makes equipollent with the former concourse, in these words, I here affect not the curiosity to distinguish these two terms as some do, Post. p. 29. I had rather he should hear Strangius again, than me blaming his not affecting that curiosity of distinction: Caeterum nobis operaepretium videtur distinguere inter ista duo vocabula concursum & influxum, etc. i.e. But it seems worth our labour to distinguish between those two words Concourse and Influence, which in this matter are often conjoined and confounded. For first, Influence is of a larger extent than Concourse. For the causality of every Cause, especially the Efficient, is called Influence. And therefore in many instances there may be observed an Influence of God, when yet there is no concourse, as when he acts, not making use of any second cause. Again, although in the concourse of two Causes each of them are considered as having their Influence, yet the word Influence is absolute, and noting a respect to another cause; but the word Concourse is relative to another cause. Strang. de Vol. Deil. 1. c. 11. p. 59 As for the term Efficacious, it suits us well enough, if Mr. H. intends by it an Infallibility of the event, or the certain production of those actions which God hath an Influence upon. The ambiguity of Mr. H. phrases removed, and the sense of them brought to a certainty, I assert the contradictory to his Proposition, That God doth not by an Efficacious influence universally move and determine men to all their actions, even those that are most wicked, Post. p. 52. Which if we might be allowed the liberty of our own terms, we would thus lay down, That God does determine, or predetermine, or move all Creatures to all and each of their actions. Strangius fairly enough citys our Thesis, lib. 2. cap. 4. pag. 155. The Question then to be discussed is, Whether God does determine or predetermine all Creatures to all and each of their actions? So Strang. fairly, l. 2 c. 4. p. 155. Unless it may seem meet to add that reduplicative particle, as such, because of Mr. Howe's addition, even those that are most wicked, Post. p. 52. As to which it is to be noted, that we who assert Predetermination of all actions of the Creatures, do limit it to the actions considered abstractly from the moral good or evil adhering to them: as for instance, we hold God's Predetermination of the natural act whereby David begat a child in Adultery, as well as of those whereby he begat children in lawful Matrimony; and of the use of his tongue in telling a lie to Abimelech the Priest, as well as in praising God. Whereas Mr. How limits God's Predetermination only to morally [or spiritually] good actions as such, Posts. p. 39 n. 6. Which Predeter nation special, we grant; but withal assert a general, which extends to evil actions. In which we consider,  
1. The subject; and as to this we say that sin is in that which is good, the nature of man and his faculties and actions, and these God excites and guides efficaciously. And this subject is called the materiale or substrate matter of sin.  
2. The end; and thus though not the nature, yet the existence of sin is good, or it is good that sin should be, because God draws good out of it; and hence God predetermines to the natural actions, though he knows sin will adhere to them. The grand term then to be explained is Predetermination, or (as some Divines and Metaphysicians sometimes call it) Praecurse and Praemotion, of which terms the former which signifies a fore appointment, is either from eternity, or in time. The latter two, only in time. The former (viz.) Predetermination, is either from eternity, and so is an immanent act of Gods, that is, of his will to produce in time all the actions of his Creatures; or in time, which is the actual production of all those actions which he had decreed to produce. And of this latter only is the Question to be discussed understood; and this act of Gods is called Predetermination, because it limits the creature to this action rather than to that; and 'tis called a Precourse, or Premotion, i.e. a running before, or fore motion, (as I may so speak), because in order of nature it is before the action of the creature. Again, Predetermination [or Precourse, or Premotion], is distinguished into Physical or Moral. The latter, I grant may be ascribed to God with reference to good actions as such, but not with respect to evil actions, unless the proposing objects and occasions of sin may (as some learned men judge) be reduced to the actions of a moral cause. But whether the moral acts of God in commanding, threatening, promising, etc. may be justly denominated Predetermination, will remain dubitable till another doubt be resolved, (viz.) Whether the will do always follow the last practical dictate of the understanding. Against the affirmative of which Question (to note that obiter) the most acute and learned Wallis seems to oppose an irrefragable Argument, viz. that the Will then is not disabled by the fall more than the will of the confirmed Angels and Saints in Heaven. Wallis Truth tried against the Lord Brook, p. 55. But let Predetermination Moral fall or stand, our Question is not of that, but of Physical Predetermination, as appears in that we make it common to all creatures, some whereof are not capable of a Moral Predetermination, (supposing that to be) which yet is not intended to be agitated at present, but only that which is exercised about free agents, that is, rational creatures. Which that it may be done with more clearness, and may in part obviate some of our learned Antagonist's objections, we shall endeavour, with as much accuracy as is needful to a discourse that will fall into other than learned men's hands, to consider Predetermination as contradistinguished, or opposed rather to two things, which are acknowledged by him as God's Acts respecting the actions of free agents, (not excluding natural), (viz.) Conservation and immediate Concourse, or Concurrence; the concession of the former of which two, will not be sound sufficient to entitle God to the honour of the first cause of his creatures actions; and of the latter will (unless we take our measures amiss) enforce him to grant that Predetermination which now he denies. First as to Conservation, we must observe, that as Creation stands opposed to nothing; so Conservatition to Annihilation, i. e. making that cease to be something which was so; and it differs from Creation only in this, that it notes a continuation of that being, and its powers and faculties, which were given by creation, as being a continuation of that action by which it was produced; and therefore is commonly styled continua creatio, and not unfitly termed by the Schoolmen manutenentia Dei, i. e. God's hand-hold, because by it God holds up all things, as it were, with an hand from falling into nothing; by the withdrawing of which, Divines generally think the world would be annihilated.  
Secondly, As to concourse or concurrence, it may be thus defined; It is an extrinsickaction of God, by which he does with second causes, [or the creatures] immediately produce all their natural actions and effects. 1. It is an action of God to distinguish it from the power communicated and conserved to second causes, (by which they perform their several operations) by creation and conservation. 2. Extrinsic to distinguish it from his Decree of this action called concourse, which decree is an intrinsic action. 3. With second causes, or the creatures, because it is such an action as joins with the creature; as when the Writing-Master and the Scholar shape the same letter by the Masters guiding the Scholar's hand. 4. I add, all their actions, and what is produced by action or the effects, as when the Master and Scholar write, not only is the action the same, but the effect; the letters are the same which are done by both together. 5. Natural actions and effects, to exclude what by accident adheres to the actions and effects; which seeing they are defects, cannot be produced by a proper efficiency, and so nor God concur to the production of them by such efficiency. 6. Immediately produce, to note the intimacy of the conjunction of God with the creature in the production of natural actions; which is such, that one and the same action is the action of God and of the creature.  
3. As to Predetermination, it is thus defined. It is a transient action of God which excites every creature to act. It is called a transient action of God, in opposition to Immanent, or the Will and Decree of God that the creature should act. That is distinguished from Concourse or Concurrence thus. 1. The very difference of the particles, Prae and Con, i. e. Before and with, notes that the former is in order of nature (though not of time), before the creatures action, the latter with it. 2. That the former notes the reduction of the creatures powers into act: the latter notes Gods acting with the creature. 3. The former is to be conceived of per modum principii, under the notion of a principle, or cause of the creatures acting: the latter only, per modum actionis, i. e. as importing Gods acting with the creature. 4. The Terminus or object of that action of Gods, which we call Predetermination, is the second cause itself, the reasonable creature: but the Terminus or object of that action of Gods, called concourse or concurrence, is the action of the second cause, and effect produced by that action. So that the Question in plain words is, Whether God does move men to all their natural actions, and so to one rather than another. The Protestants generally maintain the affirmative, and how forcibly Mr. How opposes it, remains now to be considered.  
The terms explained, we shall endeavour a defence of our Arguments, which Mr. How hath thought meet to single out.  
The first of the two Arguments of ours; which seeming most importunate and enforcing, he hath attempted to enervate, is.  
Arg. 1. That it necessarily belongs to the Original and Fountain-Being to be the first Causc of whatsoever Being; and consequently, that what there is of positive Being in any the most wicked action, must principally owe itself to the determinative productive influence of this first and Sovereign Cause: Otherwise, it would seem that there were some Being that were neither primum, nor a primo, [i. e. neither the first Being, nor from the first Being], Let. p. 35.  
Answ. To which he Answers, It may well be thought sufficiently to salve the rights and privileges of the first Cause, to assert that no action can be done, but by a power derived from it; which in reference to forbidden actions, intelligent Creatures may use or not use as they please, without over-asserting, that they must be irresistibly determined also, even to the worst of actions done by them, Let. p. 36.  
Reply. For the better understanding of our Argument, and the proof thereto annexed; together with Mr Howes Answer thereunto, it will not be unneedful to reduce them to Syllogisms: the Argument thus,  
All positive Being are effects of the first Cause. All sinful actions, as actions, [for that is our limitation], are positive Being's. Ergo, All sinful actions [as actions] are effects of the first Cause, [viz. God].  
The Major [or first proposition] is proved by an Hypothetical Syllogism, thus: If all positive Being's are not effects of the first Cause, than there is some positive Being which is neither primum [ens] nor a primo, [i. e.] neither the first Being, nor from the first Being, [or which is neither God nor a Creature]. But there is no positive Being which is neither the first Being, nor from the first Being. Ergo, All positive Being's are effects of the first Cause. To the Argument itself Mr. whither replies nothing, nor yet to the proof, in form (as by the Laws of Argumentation he was obliged). But seems to distinguish in the Major between a double dependence, which positive Being's have upon God as the first Cause; one, that they have no power but from God; the other, that the exercise or use of that power is from God. The former he grants; the latter he denies, but with a limitation as to forbidden actions.  
To which we Reply,  
1. That this Answer is fatal to his own Concession of God's immediate concurrence to all the actions of his Creatures, Postsc. p. 28. For it amounts to as much, as if in terminis, he had asserted a mediate concurrence only to some actions, (viz. forbidden actions; and this was the passage I presume that gave Mr. Gale occasion to charge Mr. How with Durandus his Opinion, which was, That God concurs remotely and mediately with second Causes, (viz.) no otherwise than as he confers and conserveses their Essence and Power of action, by which they themselves act nextly and immediately. And for aught I can yet understand a very just occasion; for though Mr. How in the place above-cited acknowledges immediate concurrence; yet in the Letter itself, by which Mr. Gale was to make an estimate of his judgement, there was ne gru quidem, not a Syllable of any such thing.  
2. It is hard to conceive the reason of Mr. Howe's limitation; why forbidden actions should be only by power derived from God; and good actions or indifferent, require also an irresistible determination; when the material of the actions morally diversified is often the very same. For instance, In the motion of my hand to kill another out of spleen and private revenge, or to kill my enemy in a lawful self-defence, or to strike my friend in merriment. I am ware that he attempts to wipe off the aspersion of symbolising with Durandus, because he denies immediate concourse universally, whereas himself denies only determinative concourse to wicked actions, Postsc. p. 28, 29. And be it so, that his attempt hath been successful, yet I must give Durandus the precedence of Mr. How for sagacity in this point; and do judge that he spoke more consonantly to himself, and the truth, when he affirmed that the indetermination of the power given to the creature, was so universal, as to extend equally to evil actions and to good. For it seems evident enough that all natural actions, as such, [the Subjects of moral good and evil] must either have, or want immediate concurrence.  
3. This Answer runs counter to Mr. Howe's assertion elsewhere, That in reference to sinful actions by this influence [determinative] God doth not only sustain men who do them, and continue to them their natural faculties and powers whereby they are done, [which is all Mr. How hath granted us hitherto in his Answer to our Argument, from the dependence of the second Cause upon the first]; but also as the first mover, so far excite and actuate those powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous action, etc. Postsc. p. 41. For if by exciting and actuating the powers, he means that God reduces them to act, he hath taken a large jump from Durandus to Twisse: for the latter (nor we who follow him) neither says nor means any more by Predetermination. And we cannot tell what other meaning to affix to his words, without upbraiding him with strange inadvertency in his choice of them. For else he consounds Concurrence either with Conservation; which latter keeps the powers apt and habile [as they are made] or with Predetermination, whereas this goes before, that goes along with the Creatures act.  
But now I attend to the proof of his strange Assertion, for a proof I understand it to be) though he introduces it with a Besides; (a particle which commonly is a sign of an additional Argument) which thus presents itself.  
Ans. It seems infinitely to detract from the perfection of the ever blessed God, to affirm he was not able to make a creature of such a nature as being continually sustained by him, and supplied with power every moment suitable to its nature, should be capable of acting, unless whatsoever he thus enables, he determine [th●● is, for it can mean no less thing, impel] it to do it also. Let. p. 36, 37.  
Rep. 1. If we should take liberty of judging things by their appearance at first sight, without giving ourselves the trouble of a strict disquisition, we might easily be seduced into an imagination, that it does no less infinitely detract from the Divine Perfection, to affirm. That God was not able to make a Creature of such a nature, as that it might continually sustain itself, without a supply of power every moment from God; for that opinion seems to tie God to a shorter tedder, than an ingenuous Artificer, who can raise an Edifice that shall last many years, without any need of his help for reparations.  
And this I the rather take notice of, because I find it the sentiment of the most acute Suarez, That they who deny Gods immediate Operation in every action of the Creature, [which Mr. H. seems to do in his Answer now under discussion] will doubtless be compelled to deny that the Creature does depend immediately upon the actual influence of God. For (which is his reason) that which depends not upon God in acting, nor does it depend upon him in its being. Met. Disp. 20.  
2. This confirmation of Mr. H. Assertion is guilty of two unpardonable faults in a man of Learning and Ingenuity, (viz.) a too early anticipation, and immodest begging of the main Question. An anticipation, in alleging the impelling, i. e. compelling (for that is his sense of the term, as will appear e'er long) men to act, as the import of Predetermining; whereas there is no necessity of hooking in such an import of it: for suppose it no way to abridge the liberty of the Will, yet by Mr. H's Argumentation, it is eo nomine to be rejected, because the sustaining the Creature and supplying it with power every moment suitable to its nature, [that is, in Durandus stile, mediate concurrence] is to be judged sufficient to enable the Creature to act, without determining it to action; upon no less peril to them that shall dare to judge it insufficient, than to be reputed detractors from the Perfection of the ever-blessed God. And a begging of the Question 'tis, which I may well call immodest, because he knows we neither can nor will grant it, without ruining our Hypothesis; nor need we do it, because he elsewhere owns it unreasonable to imagine that God cannot in any case determine the will of a rational Creature, in a way agreeable enough to its nature. Let. p. 141.  
I confess he gives us here but an inch, but we will venture to take an ell; I mean, to extend his concession of some cases to every case, and particularly to our case of sinful actions. For let our sentiment be burdened with what other load Mr. H. shall please (as the truth is he is not over merciful to the Predeterminants') I think he hath discharged it of forcing the will, till he hath evinced a specialty in our case, which will be somewhat an uneasy task, though we should grant him his own option, that God predetermines to sinful actions in concreto, i.e. to the actions and sinfulness of them too; for upon that supposition there is less necessity to imagine that God cannot determine the will in a way agreeable enough to man's [corrupt] nature; because he does but determine it to what it hath an innate propension to of itself; and so God's determination is but as the wind in a man's back, which puts him on a little faster in the way he was going before.  
3. We are at a great loss as to Mr. H's meaning, whether it be that it is a detraction from God's perfection, to affirm, God was not able to make a Creature that could not act universally without determination, or particularly as to forbidden actions; the generality of the terms calls for the former sense, the conclusion he was to prove, for the latter.  
1. If the former sense be that he will own, I seem to myself fairly allowed to infer, that then man in his primitive state had not, nor have the good. Angels at present, any Divine determination to good actions, because to both unnecessary; and unnecessary it must be presumed, because it is a detraction from God's Perfection to conceive he could not make them of such a nature, as that they should not need it, and because they had no disinclination to be overcome by an efficaciously determinative influence, (which is the reason Mr. H. gives of the necessity of Predetermination to holy actions in the lapsed state. Post. p. 35. Which if it be of any force makes it unnecessary to a state of Integrity.) And if this inference be natural, I wonder not that Man fell, but that he fell not as soon as he was set upon his legs; nor that some of the good Angels turned Rebels so soon to their Sovereign Lord, but how the rest persevere in their Loyalty. I have hitherto swom with the stream of Protestant Divines, (not because it was easy, but in my apprehension safe) who have conceived the good Angel's security an effect of a greater degree of determinative influence, (to borrow Mr. H's Phrase) or corroborating grace, that is, in the terms of the Question now agitated, Predetermination, than was afforded to the [now] bad Angel's; or to speak more strictly of the continuance of that Predetermination to the one, which was suspended as to the other: which conception of Divines (to note that in passage) may be easily freed from the imputation of reflecting either upon God's Holiness, Justice, or Truth; upon the first, because God by the suspension of Predetermination was no more the Efficient of the Angel's sin, than the Sun of the darkness that overspreads the air, when it hath withdrawn its rays; upon the second, for it is a ruled case in the Schools, Non datur justitia proprie dicta inter Deum & Creaturas; i. e. God cannot be properly said to be a debtor to his Creatures; no not when he hath passed a promise to them, for even then, (if we will speak strictly) he is a debtor to himself, namely to his own truth and fidelity, not to them; and if he should (to suppose an impossibility for illustration-sake) break his word, he would be but Mendax, non injurius, a Liar, not unjust. Not upon his Truth, for he was not under the bond of a promise, (as he is to the part of repaired Mankind, whom we denominate Saints) to preserve the Angels from Apostasy. As for those who take this Doctrine for a blemish upon God's goodness, I turn them over to God himself, for a reconciliation of these two seemingly contradictory Propositions, contained in his Word, and within the verge of our own experience, that God is good, and [yet] that he hath permitted a passage for sin, which he could have impeded.— If the latter sense be avowed, as a genuine interpretation of Mr. H's mind; I know not how it will be able to save its credit, if I should charge it with being guilty of this gross absurdity, viz. a supposal that God made Man with an ability to do sinful actions in concreto, i. e. the natural actions, and sin that adheres to them. 'Tis true, God made Man mutable, and how could he do otherwise? (unless he should have made him a God) which very terms involve an insufferable contradiction) and so in a remote capacity of sinning. But Mr. H's words import a next or immediate capacity of acting, which the Creature is capable of, as soon as it starts out of nothing into something, without the intervenient aid of Predetermination. I am very averse from thinking this to be Mr. H's meaning; and I would offer him a friendly hand (if he would accept of it) to help him out of the pit he is fallen into, by minding him of our distinction between the materiale and formale of sin, the natural action that is the subject, and the sin that is the [inseparable] adjunct, in our temporary estate: which distinction supposed, in conjunction with Mr. H's Hypothesis, Mr. H's meaning will be freed from the encumbrance now inferred upon it; and it will amount to no more than that the power of acting God gave to man, suffices to the natural actions, since sin adhered to them, as well as before, without the help of Predetermination. But then this friendly hand will prove unfriendly in the issue; for though it may clear him of one, yet it will entangle him in many absurdities, or (at least self-contradictions: For then,  
1. How shall he quit himself from the blame of being a Favourer of Durandus Hypothesis? for the sense is the same, and the words not much different. And yet why should he once attempt it, seeing that Hypothesis serves his professed design of quitting God of the blame of being the Author of Sin, with much officiousness: and that he may accept this suggestion the more kindly, a most Learned hand shall tender it to him: Some are of opinion that God hath no immediate influence, but mediate only, in respect of voluntary agents. And according to this opinion it is easy to clear God from the imputation of being the Author of Sin, and yet to acknowledge his concurrence with second Causes, in producing their defective effects. If the will of the Creature, saith Scotus, C. 2. Dist. 37. Q. 1. were the total and immediate cause of her action, and that God had no immediate efficiency, but mediate only in respect thereof, as some think: It were easy according to that opinion to show how God may be freed from the imputation of being the Author of Sin, and yet to acknowledge his concurrence with second Causes, for the producing of their effects: for whether we speak of that which is material or formal in sin, the will only should be the total cause of it, and God should no way be a cause of it but mediately, in that he caused and produced such a will, that might at her pleasure do what she would. Durandus seemeth to incline to this opinion, supposing that second Causes do bring forth their actions and operations by and of themselves, and that God no otherwise concurreth actually to the production of the same, but in that he preserveth the second Causes in that being and power of working, which first he gave them. Thus far the most Learned Dr. Field, of the Church, B. 3. Ch. 23. pag. 121, 122. And yet he adds his dislike of Durandus opinion in these words: But they that are of sounder judgement resolve, that as the light enlighteneth the air, and with the air all other inferior things: so God not only giveth being and power of working to the second Causes, and preserveth them in the same, but together with them hath an immediate influence into the things that are to be effected by them, etc. Ibid. p. 122.  
3. What account can be given of his exploding our distinction between the material and formal part of sin? [approved of above by Dr. Field]. Most of his way, (viz. Mr. Gales) mince the business, and say, the concurrence is only to the action, which is sinful; not as sinful, so Mr. Howe's Postsc. p. 33.  
Answ. Except it were affirmed, that it implied a contradiction for God to make such a creature, there is no imaginable pretence, why it should not be admitted he hath done it, Let. p. 37. and subjoins soon after, I must confess a greater disposition to wonder that ever such a thing should be disputed, than dispute so plain a case, p. 38.  
Reply. That it is affirmed, Mr. How cannot surely be ignorant; nay, he frees himself from that blame. I am not altogether ignorant what attempts have been made to prove it impossible, p. 38. but in the interim he incurs another of contradicting himself.  
This Argument, ab absurdo, from the implication of Gods making a creature independent upon himself, is urged against those that deny immediate concurrence (and so by just consequence conservation) and Predetermination.  
1. As to mediate concurrence, 'tis urged for it by Durandus, That there is no repugnuncy nor contradiction for God to make a creature that should be able to act without his help [otherwise, that is, than by conserving its being and powers]. To this is Answered, Involvere repugnantiam quod creaturae sit potens, etc. That it involves a repugnancy and contradiction, that the creature should be able to act independently upon the Creator, as well in respect of the created cause itself, which hath necessarily a power of acting commensurate and proportionable to its own being, as in respect of the action or effect flowing from it; for seeing they are Being's by participation, they essentially depend upon the first Being. Wherefore, as the Divine power cannot produce a Being independent upon him in its Being, so nor produce an Agent independent upon him in acting. Suarez. Met. T. 1. D. 22. n. 16. One egg is not more like another, than Durandus Argument to Mr. Howe's; nor can a more solid Answer be given thereto, no, though Mr. How should acknowledge immediate concurrence, (as in his Postsc. he does) of which, in his whole Letter there is altum silentium, and deny only Predetermination: for this Answer is a  that will fit either foot (as will appear in its place).  
2. As to conservation, the no necessity of God's continual influx to that end seems colourably affirmed upon this ground too, That it is not repugnant to Omnipotency to produce such creatures, as when once made, may continue their Being; though the operation of the Agent cease, by which they were produced. To this Argument Suarez also fits a rational reply; Ad amplitudinem divinae potentiae spectat, etc. It belongs to the amplitude of the Divine Power, that nothing is, nor can be a moment after its production without its influence; and also that it have full dominion over all his creatures, and an intrinsic power of annihilating them, by the suspension or withholding of his influence, Suarez. Met. T. 1. D. 21. n. 2, 17.  
3. Which is directly to our case upon Mr. Howe's explication of his mind, that he does really believe Gods immediate concourse to all actions of his creatures, both immediatione virtutis & suppositi, yet not determinative to wicked actions, Postsc. p. 28. we shall adventure a demonstration, that it implies a contradiction for God to make a creature that can act without Predetermination, i. e. applying it to action, and to one rather than another action; and 'tis this, that such a creature would be but ens secundarium, a second being; not causa secunda, a second cause, or (which is all one) God should be but ens primum, not causa prima, the first Being, not the first Cause; which I prove thus.  
Arg. 1. If God does concur only by simultaneous concourse, and not by Predetermination, or previous motion, than God cannot be the cause of the actions of the creatures as they proceed from them. But the consequent is absurd; and Mr. How, I presume, will not own it. Therefore so is the Antecedent. The Consequence is proved thus: God is not by concourse the cause of the actions of the creatures, as those actions proceed from them, because then concourse must be before the action of the creature (for every Physical cause is before the effect), but the very name concourse, imports a joining together in the same action, as the Master and Scholar, whose hand is guided in shaping the same letter. And all consent, in concourse, neither does God act before the creature, nor the creature before God, but both together, and at once.  
Arg. 2. To make good the English Proverb, He is twice killed, that is killed with his own weapon. I shall retort, Mr. Howe's too concessions upon him.  
1. If there be an immediate concourse, than there is a Predetermination, or putting the creature upon action before it acts; or else the creature is the first mover of itself to action. The consequence is plausible enough, as depending on this ground, that by concourse alone we have no account given us how God and the creature join in one individual action rather than another. As for instance, in the state of innocency, when man was encircled with a variety of trees of the Garden, all good and fit for food, whence was it that he willed to eat of one rather than another. The concourse of God with Adam's will in the election of one (suppose that in the midst of the Garden, before the prohibition passed upon it) could not determine it to that rather than to any of the rest, as is plain in external actions. Two men launching a wherry-boat concur to the same effect; but the one does not determine the other, by lending common assistance to that act. There must be therefore a Predetermination in order of nature, though not of time, to that act of Adam's will [supposed] of eating that tree instanced in, to which God concurred. This may be illustrated by the example of a Writing-Master and his Scholar, wherein there is a concurrence to the action of writing, and its effect the letter written; and also a Predetermination, a putting the Scholar upon the action of writing, (not morally, for that influence is discerned in commanding a Scholar to write by himself; but Physically, by putting his hand on the Scholars to write, and to write one letter rather than another. An account how the particular action of any rational creatures will, comes to be determined upon the exclusion of Predetermination, I know none can be given. Not by chance, upon the occasional sudden presentation of an object; because the action is Gods (who is not liable to any such impressions) as well as the creatures; not by the creatures self-determining power, for that, as such, is indeterminate as to the acts to which we conceive it must be some way or other determined. And these two Propositions are so evident, that concurrence immediate does not determine the will, and that yet it must be determined, that Baronius himself, who is an Antipredeterminant, does acknowledge both, Met. 7, 8. Disp. 3. n. 66. and he does suggest a reason against any necessity laid upon a thing by Divine Prescience, which we will accept of for a necessity of Divine Predetermination to the acts of the will. Illud solum imponit necessitatem alicui rei, quod est prima ratio cur illa res non potuit non evenire, i. e. That alone imposes necessity upon any thing which is the first reason or cause why that thing could not but fall out. Baron. Met. 7, 12. D. 2. n. 59 [which necessity, that it excludes not the liberty of man's will, shall be cleared in due time].  
2. Again, from the necessity conceded by Mr. How, of immediate concourse and Predetermination to the production of good actions, we shall infer the necessity of both to all actions: This necessity must take its rise either from something common to all actions, or peculiar to good actions. The removing the latter, will be the fixing the former in its due place. In order hereunto, we must consider that grace is an habit seated in the natural faculties, and fitting them for good actions; which as it was concreated with them in innocency; so in the lapsed estate it is re-created, or created again by infusion: which infusion is not Predetermination: for this latter still presupposes the former. There must be grace in habit before it can be acted. Now than the Query is, whether the terminus of Predetermination be the habit or the faculties; not the habit, for that is a Quality that meliorates the faculties, and so the actions, in genere morali, and cannot be put upon action, or one rather than another, but mediante potentia, by the intervention of the power or faculty in which the gracious habit resides. It must then be the faculties; the will for instance (for of that is the grand inquiry), for otherwise (supposing what has been owned, that holy habits fit the will for holy volitions and nolitions) in what degree the habits are confirmed, in that the will may act without Predetermination, and produce sincerely good actions as it please, as long as these good actions are done by a power derived originally from it, [which is Mr. Howe's Hypothesis, and judged by him sufficient to salve the rights and privilege of the first cause, with reference to forbidden actions, Let. p. 36. [and I see not, why not as well with reference to commanded actions]. The result of this ratiocination will be, that if it be the indetermination of the powers to individual actions that makes an excitation of them to one rather than another necessary; and the possibility of action contained in the powers, that makes the reducing of that possibility to action no less necessary to good actions, than the consequence seems immovable, that Predetermination in its two Branches is alike necessary to all actions, even when they flow from a will tainted with vicious habits and inclinations. Quod erat demonstrandum And to me this Argument seems to carry along with it triumphant evidence, (to borrow one of Mr. Howe's lofty Epithets, Let. p. 62.) my fancy labours under so despicable poverty as to be unable to supply me with any evasion.  
As for Mr. Howe's phrase of impelling, by which he intends compelling, we shall refer the word and thing to the Head, where it will most properly fall under examination. In the interim, let us attend to what he subjoins.  
Answ. I confess a disposition to wonder that a matter whereupon all moral Government depends, both humane and divine, should not have been determined at the first sight, Let. p. 38.  
Reply. These words imply, that all moral Government, etc. is rendered ludicrous, and a mere Pageantry by the Doctrine of Predetermination; but upon what Mr. How, magisterially enough, takes for granted, but does not once make an offer of proving, that the will is hindered by Gods own irresistible counter-action, p. 37. from yielding obedience to such Government: But if I live till that be proved, my age will certainly exceed Methuselahs.  
Answ. But Mr. How adds, The notion of the goodness and righteousness of God, methinks should stick so close to our minds, and create such a sense in our souls, as should be infinitely dearer to us than all our senses and powers. And that we should rather choose to have our sight, hearing, and motive power, and what not besides disputed, or even torn from us, than ever suffer ourselves to be disputed into a belief, that the Holy and Good God should irresistibly determine the wills of men to, and punish the same thing, Let. p. 19  
Reply. The sum of the Argument, though accompanied with a long train of fine words, is, that Predetermination to sinful actions crosses the natural notions of mankind concerning God's Goodness and Holiness. To which we return.  
1. That there is not the least colour for any such consequence from our Doctrine, but upon supposition of two things; which Mr. How would fasten upon us, but we disown.  
1. That God predetermines to sinful actions, in concreto, i e. to the natural action, and the sinfulness of it: which we constantly deny: for though we own it a h●rd province to answer all objections that may be started against this partition made between the one and the other, as to God's influence, which we affirm as to the former, the action, and deny, as to the latter, the sinfulness of it: yet ' we doubt not (in its season) to evince these two things, that God is the Author, and consequently the Predeterminer of all the actions of rational creatures, (for as to irrational, though we include them, yet the Question not being of them, we shall not intermeddle with them); and that God is not the Author of the sinfulness, and so not the Predeterminer thereof. And then as to the modus, or manner of God's influence, so as to separate these that are so nearly conjoined in sinful creatures, we shall be less solicitous, at least with respect to Mr. Howe's satisfaction, who has professed that he can more easily be satisfied, to be ignorant of the modus, [i. e. manner], or medium, [i. e. the mean] of God's knowledge, whilst he is sure of the thing; and he knows not why any sober minded man might not be so too, while we must all be content to be ignorant of the manner, yea, of the nature too of a thousand things besides, when, that such things there are, we have no doubt. And when there are few things about which we can with less disadvantage suffer our being ignorant, or with less disreputation profess to be so, Let. p. 49, 50. And if this Argumentation be true, in reference to Divine acts in general (as there is no reason why it should be limited to God's knowledge only, and himself extends it beyond that); I conceive Mr. How has against his will given us the cause; for that God is not the Author of sin (our last proposition) he every where affirms as well as we. That God is the Author of all the actions of rational creatures, he grants too; or else his words are unintelligible, and we have cause to quarrel with him, (as he did with Persius, a crabbed Poet), si non vult intelligi, cur vult legi, i. e. If he would not be understood, why would he be read, (an end that every man is presumed to intent that writes), these words, I mean, This active providence of God about all the actions of men, consists not merely in giving them the natural powers, whereby they can work of themselves, but in a real influence upon those powers, Postsc. p. 39 By which last clause, if he intends reducing them to act (as his phrase is, ibid.) we are perfectly agreed so far; and the remaining disagreement will be but about the modus or manner, how God affords a real influence upon the powers defiled with sin, and yet none upon the sin itself. And of ●his he and I being both (I hope) sober minded men, may well be content to be ignorant, as long as we are sure of the thing. But I fear I reckon without my Host, and so must reckon again; I mean, that Mr. How will not stand to my compromise of the difference between us, though I see not why he should not, if he will be but a man of his word, stand, that is, to his own Assertions.  
2. Our Doctrine cannot be accused of a confederacy, to raze out the impressions of God's Holiness upon humane nature; but upon this supposition also, That God does irresistibly determine the wills of men to that which he punishes men for, viz. to sin, which is a brat we are not bound to father. For we neither own irresistible nor resistible determination of man's will to sin, as such; nor do we acknowledge any determination of the will at all to be irresistible, if he takes that term for equivalent to compulsory; which if he do not, it will be neither a friend to him, nor foe to us.  
We might also observe upon his Rhetorical amplifications of his Argument, that he seems to be no ill-willer to Transubstantiation. For if the natural notions of God's goodness should be infinitely dearer to us than our senses, I see not why the notion of God's sincerity, that he means as he speaks, should not challenge a share in our endearments; and so why, Hoc est corpus meum, should not assure us, that the bread is transubstantiated, though our senses, sight, taste, feeling, join in a common testimony, that it remains bread after consecration, as well as before: not that I charge him with that Popish ridicule, but I would have him take notice how dangerous sometimes an affectation of embellishments of speech may prove, by leaving him that is guilty of it, at the mercy of his Antagonist, in deducing such inferences from them, as can neither be safely admitted, nor creditably turned off.  
Answ. Mr. How complains of the feebleness and impotency of our defence against the forenamed charge, that God makes a Law, and necessitates the violation of it; when it is no more than, That man is under the Law, and God above it, Let. p. 40, 41. and he affirms, that a tender spirit, etc. will not be relieved or eased by the thin Sophistry of only a collusive ambiguity in the word Law, etc. ibid.  
Reply. If Mr. Howe's candour did but bear any tolerable proportion to his Eloquence, he would never have thus represented our Answer. For the truth is, this Answer is not given by the Predeterminants' to that objection to which he applies it (as is plain enough, because we always esteem ourselves unconcerned in the charge of representing God as necessitating the violation of his own Law), but to another, (viz.) that God sins when he produces that action with man, which to man is sin, (which Mr. How, who in words at least owns immediate concurrence to all actions as well we, is therefore equally concerned to answer). For the proof of this, I shall allege Bellarmine, who (after he had told us, it was only Zuinglius' Answer to the same Objection that Mr. H. fits it to; adds with the peril of his reputation), Sententiam tamen aliorum quorundam, etc. i. e. That it was the opinion of others also, who though they agreed not with Zuinglius, in teaching that God impels men to sin, yet they use no other medium to evince how God does not sin, when he produces that action with man, which to man is sin, than that God is bound by no Law, and nothing is sin but a transgression of a Law, Bell de Amiss. Gr. l. 2. c. 18. Yet withal I deny not, but 'tis also applied to that Objection, that God sins, if he does determine to that action, to which sin inseparably cleaves. But yet the necessitation of the violation of the Law, is no way concerned in the objection.  
What now is become of Mr. Howe's charge of thin Sophistry, and collusive ambiguity, when we deny God to be under a Law, in the same signification of the word, wherein we affirm it of man, (viz. as Mr. How expresses it), For the declared pleasure of a Ruler to a Subject, p. 41. This charge disproved, we yet grant what Mr. How objects; that the term Law, as noting an habitual principle, and rule of acting after one steady tenor, in which sense the perfect rectitude of God's nature is an eternal Law to him, etc. Let. p. 41, 42, is yet an Argument against our opinion upon Mr. Howe's Hypothesis, that thereby the creature is necessitated to sin: but that he hath neither attempted, nor ever will be able to prove. If proof could be made that the consequence were natural, we should not know how to decline the force of Bellarmine's grave Argumentation upon Mr. Howe's ground, Licet deo non sit posita Lex ab aliquo superiore Legislatore, tamen sua sapientia est ipsi Lex, etc. i. e. Though God be not under a Law given him by a superior Legislatour, yet his own wisdom is a Law to him; and as Zuinglius himself teaches us, That what a Law is to us, that is Gods own nature to him. God is therefore no less bound, not to act repugnantly to his own wisdom and nature, than men are bound not to act repugnantly to the Law of God. Wherefore, if God should impel [Mr. Howe's phrase], men to these things, which are contrary to the Eternal Law, and to his own nature and wisdom, as to Adultery, his will were evil, because repugnant to the right rule of divine wisdom, and God should deny himself, which cannot be (as the Apostle says). Thus far Bellarmine, ubi supra.  
Answ. Mr. How concludes, What relief is there in that dream, [of the supposed possibility of Gods making a reasonable creature with an innocent aversion to himself]. For what can be supposed more repugnant? or what more impertinent? If innocent, how were it punishable? A Law already made in the case, how can it be innocent? Let. p. 42.  
Reply. Mr. How leaves us wholly at a loss, who it is, that with this dream hath attempted to relieve a pious and sober mind, closely urged with the horror of so black a conception of God, that he does first irresistibly determine men's will to, and then punish them for the hatred of his blessed self, (as he tragically, but falsely represents our opinion), p. 40. I say falsely, for God does not punish that natural passion we call hatred, which himself, as first Cause, applies the second to the production of; nor does God determine the will to that natural passion, its elicit act, irresistibly, in his sense forcibly. But as Austin long ago, of God's influence upon good actions; [so say we of bad] God acts Omnipotenter pro te, suaviter pro me, Omnipotently according to his own nature, but sweetly according to ours, (as shall be fully cleared in its place). If any particular person of our judgement in the main, shall propose an argument liable to exception, I see not that we are obliged to defend it. But as Mr. How introduces it, it seems to be represented as a common extravagancy of the Predeterminants', which I am sure it is not; nor does Mr. How labour under a surguedry of candour, in a bare presentation of this supposition, without its application to the Question. Both which, because Mr. How hath neglected, I think not myself obliged to give the Reader an account of, but shall dismiss it without any ado.  
Arg. 2. The second pressing and importunate Argument of ours which Mr. H. repeats, That God does predetermine sinful actions as actions, otherwise it were impossible for God to foreknow the sinful actions of men (many whereof he hath foretold) if their futurition were a mere contingency, and depended on the uncertain will of the subordinate agent, not determined by the supreme agent [God.] Let. p. 35, 36.  
Ans. To which Argument, this is the sum of his Answer, That this supposed indetermination of the Will in reference to wick●d actions, is far from being capable of inferring any thing more than that we are left ignorant of the way how he foreknows them, which is a small inconvenience, and manifest absurdity not to acknowledge the like in many cases, seeing God does many things, whereof the manner how he does them we can neither explicate nor understand. Let. p. 47, 48.  
Rep. 1. To which I reply, That the way how God foreknows future contingencies, is in his own Decree, at least as to such which he hath decreed. For I cannot divine what can be opposed to this Proposition, That what God hath decreed he foreknows in his own Decree, (though it should be granted that he foreknows them also antecedently to his own Decree in some manner, which we can neither explicate nor understand.) Taking that then for granted till it be denied, I think Mr. H. hath much overshot himself in denying universally our knowledge of the way how God foreknows future contingencies. For either he must exclude the good actions, which he grants God predetermines men to, Postsc. p. 39 yea, and all actions of free agents to which he acknowledges God affords immediate concourse, p. 28. from being Contingencies; (which himself as well as we, suppose in the whole controversy now agitated) Or deny that they fall under God's Decree; (which is too absurd, because there's nothing more evident than that what God does in time, he decreed to do from Eternity) Or if he grants both, than it roundly follows, that God foreknew those acts of the Creatures which in time he did either predetermine to, or concur with; and such are all the actions of men disjunctively.  
Rep. 2. We shall prove that God foreknows all future contingencies in his own Decree, and consequently the sinful actions of men.  
1. By Scripture, Isa. 46.9, 10, I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, my counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure. Upon which Scripture the Incomparable Calvin, (so I call him in compliance with the very Learned Andrews, (sometime Bishop of Winchester's admonition), that he was a man never to be named without the addition of some title of Honour) thus glosses, Neque solum ejus praescientiam hic commendat, etc. i.e. Neither does God only here commend his own Prescience, but he affirms that he had testified by the Prophets what he had decreed. For there were no certainty, nor firmness in the Predictions, or Prophecies, unless the same God who foretells this or that thing would come to pass, had the event of things in his own hand. As to which words we may further observe:  
1. The form of the expression: two Attributes are here applied by God to himself, Wisdom and Sovereignty or liberty of Will, and a common adjunct of both, Immutability, [or we may call it a common effect, the certainty of the event] that what God does wisely and freely determine or decree within himself, shall certainly come to pass.  
2. The extent of it, that it refers to all those things which it was Gods peculiar certainly to foreknow, viz. all that should certainly come to pass. For as Judicious Calvin observes upon vers. 11. Posteaquam Propheta, etc. After that the Prophet had spoken of the Prescience of God, he accommodates the general expression he had used to his present purpose, to comfort the Jews in hopes of the return of their Captivity by Cyrus, etc.  
3. The argument which is couched in them, to evince the certainty of God's foreknowledge of what he did predict, viz. because the events predicted were the result of his Wisdom and Pleasure, or of his own wise Decrees.  
And now to draw down this General to the particular in question, Whether God foreknows sinful actions in his own Decree. And for the proof of the affirmative I shall quote but that place, Act. 4.28, compared with Chap. 2.23, For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done. So the former place, Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken and by wicked hands have crucified and slain. So the latter; both speaking of the most wicked action that ever was done in the world, the putting the Lord of Life to death. To the former place the Learned Calvin says, They who acknowledge only the Prescience of God, but do not confess that all things are managed by God's will, are easily convinced by these words, that God hath foreordained that to be done which is done. To the latter place the Learned Dr. Manton (now newly deceased, to the great grief of Pious & Learned Men) affords a notable gloss, (which I especially recommend to Mr H. for the friendship sake between the Doctor and him, in his Comment on Jam. 1.13. p. 101. Many who grant Prescience, deny Preordination, [viz. the Decree, whereof Predetermination is the execution; So I understand him] jest they should make God the Author of Sin: but these fear where no fear is. The Scripture speaketh roundly, ascribing both to God, Act. 2.23. [N. B.] Peter saith not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by the foreknowledge; but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, determinate counsel; which implieth a positive Decree. So far he: and for aught I know consonantly to the constant sense of Protestantism, till now of late that it grows weary of itself, if we may judge of its present humour by Mr H. and Mr. B.) And by these sound Interpretations we may easily judge, whether Mr. H.'s gloss upon Act. 4.28. doth not corrupt the Text. Let us hear it, if our patience can bear such an exercise. That is, God foreseeing wicked hands would be prompt and read for this tragic enterprise, his Sovereign power and wise counsel concurred with his foreknowledge, so only, and not with less latitude, to define or determine the bounds and limits of that malignity, than to let it proceed unto this execution, Let. p. 29. And soon after, Which purpose (viz.) of Christ's to give himself to be a propitiation for the sins of men by dying, it was determined [by God] not to hinder prepared hands to execute in this way, p. 30. These words plainly imply a denial of God's foreknowledge of the Death of Christ, as consequent to his Decree of that event, (which is sufficiently confirmed by the Scriptures now quoted against that denial) and they imply an affirmation of a foreknowledge of Christ's Death antecedent to God's Decree; and so make a confusion (where a distinction ought to be kept) between God's foreknowledge of possibles and future's; or of what may, and of what shall come to pass; and run Mr. H. into this absurdity, to deny that any Decree passed upon the Death of Christ at all. For to what end should he pass a Decree, if he foreknew it would come to pass without it? I cannot conceive how Mr. H. can rid his hands of this absurdity, unless he shall affirm, the passion, but not the action, the death of Christ, but not their agency who put him to death was the object of God's Decree. But then Austin will correct him by his gloss upon that Text, 1 Pet. 3.17, For it is better, if the will of God be so, that ye suffer for well-doing than for evil doing. Sancti affliguntur secundum Dei voluntatem, etc. i.e. The Saints are afflicted according to the will of God, but they cannot suffer unless wicked men act. He that wills the passion, wills the action. Aug. in Enchir. c. 100 And the Philosopher will fall foul upon him with his naxim, Actio & Passio sunt idem motus. i.e. Action and Passion are one and the same motion. And differ but as the way from London to York, and from York to London; and but as the ascent and descent of the same Hill. And so it cannot be pretended with any colour, that the Decree of God includes the Passion of Christ, and excludes the Jews and Gentiles action about it. I will dismiss Mr. H. as to this Text without further exagitation, when I have but minded him of a passage of the acute Twisse, (who I presume, is one of those pious and learned men, to whom his reverence is not extinguished, notwithstanding the badness of their opinion about Predetermination, Post. p. 49.) Dictata ista Jesuitica, etc. Those Jesuitical dictates of the foreseen determination of the humane will before God's Decree, are not the dictates disserentium Theologorum, sed somniantium. i.e. Of Divines disputing, but dreaming. Twiss. Vind. Gr. L. 2. p. 1. Digr. 2. c. 1. p. 31. And so I have cried you quittance, one dream for another. [Let. p. 42.]  
2. By reason we shall demonstrate, that God's foreknowledge of all future contingencies depend upon his Decree. And I shall choose to borrow (because I have none of my own better) that of Dr. Twisse, which hath been esteemed irrefragable, says the Learned Strangius, who yet opposes it, but not with strength enough to overthrow it; and hath done us the favour to reduce the whole process of the Argumentation into form. De Vol. Dei, etc. l. 3. c. 9 p. 626.  
Arg. 1. What is future only by the Decree of God, that God necessarily foreknew by his Decree. But every future contingent is future only by the Decree of God. Ergo, every future contingent did God necessarily foreknow by his Decree.  
2. The Minor proved. That which is future from Eternity, that is not future but by God's Decree. But every future contingent is future from Eternity. Ergo, every future contingent is future only by the Decree of God.  
3. The Major of the last Syllogism proved. That which from Eternity passed out of the condition of a thing possible, into the condition of a thing future, that is not future but by God's Decree. But that which is future from Eternity did pass from Eternity out of the condition of a thing possible into the condition of a thing future. Ergo, That which is future from Eternity is not future but by God's Decree.  
4. The Major of the last Syllogism proved. That which from Eternity passed out of the condition of a thing possible into the condition of a thing future, had for the cause of that passage the Decree of God, or no cause at all. But it cannot be said it had no cause at all. Ergo, only the Decree of God was the cause of that passage out of the condition of a thing possible into the condition of a thing future.  
5. The Minor of the last Syllogism proved. Future contingents are either future in their own nature, or not future but by some cause determining their indifferent nature. But future contingents are not future in their own nature; else it would follow, that they should be always future, and never become present. For what agrees to any thing of its own nature, agrees to it inseparably. Ergo, future contingents must needs be future from some cause.  
6. The Major of the same fourth Syllogism proved. If there be any cause why any thing passeth from Eternity out of the condition of a possible thing into the condition of a future, that cause must be either something without God, or in God; and if in God, either that cause shall be the essence of God, or the knowledge of God, or the will and decree of God. But the cause of any thing becoming of possible future, is neither any thing without God, nor the essence or the knowledge of God. Ergo, it is only the will or decree of God.  
7. The Minor of the last Syllogism proved by parts. For first, nothing out of God could be the cause, because that passage (which they call futurition) was made from eternity, and therefore the cause thereof must be from eternity. But nothing is eternal besides God. Nor can the knowledge of God be the cause; for that severed from his will, doth rather suppose, than make things future. Moreover, if the Essence of God were the cause of this passage of things from possibility to futurity, it must either be said to be the cause as acting necessarily or freely. Not the former, for then all future things would fall out necessarily, and none would fall out contingently and freely. But God in things to be created, or created, hath done, nor doth any thing by necessity of nature, but freely. If the Essence of God be said to be the cause of the passage of things from possibility into futurity, as acting freely, this is to grant, that the will of God and the determination thereof is the cause why any contingent from eternity passeth out of the condition of an indifferent thing to be or not to be, into the condition of a thing future, or to determine the futurition of it. It remains therefore that the Decree of God, or the Decreeing will of God, be alone the cause of futurition (if you will admit the phrase) and of its effect. Thus far Dr. Twisse.  
I desire the Reader to take notice, That though I have a great reverence for Dr. Twisse, and do judge the process of the above-cited Argument invincible as to the main; yet I am not clear in my apprehension, that the third Syllogism is in sense different from the second, (as Strangius objects against it with some probability.) Nor yet do I wholly dislike Strangius his alteration of the terms of both the Majors of the second and third Syllogism, thus: That which from eternity was possible so, as that it also had the condition of a thing future, its futurition is from the Decree of God. But every future contingent was from eternity possible so, as that it also had the condition of a thing future. Ergo, the futurition of every future contingent is from the Decree of God. And then the fourth Syllogism will be the proof of the Major of the second, (leaving out the third) and the words must be the same; and so the argument runs on without any further rub, unless perhaps the reason given in the fifth Syllogism, Why contingent things are not future in their own nature, because than it would follow, that they should be always future, and never become present.  
For I confess ingenuously, that I cannot answer Strangius contrary consequent from that antecedent; That if future contingents were necessarily future, whether in their own nature, or in respect of any other cause, as the 〈◊〉 of God, they must necessarily be present some time or other. For to be future is nothing else than that a thing should sometime be present. Strang. p. 630.  
And these alterations (though I will not positively assert to be needful, as not having had time to examine Strangius throughly since he came to my hands, (which was long after Mr. H's Letter and Postscript came out,) yet I am the more willing to admit, that I may in part wipe off the aspersion Mr. H. casts upon many of us, who hold Predetermination, That whatsoever strength there may be in arguments and replies to and fro in this matter, that which hath too apparently had greatest actual efficacy with many, hath been the authority and name of this and that man of reputation. Let. p. 42.  
As to all the rest of the Doctor's Arguments, (if I be not a partial judge of my own abilities, an infirmity of lapsed humane nature, which I cannot challenge an exemption from,) I seem to myself able to answer Strangius' subtle evasions, and should willingly have done it, but that I doubt not but I shall meet with them in Mr. H's threatened Rejoinder, in which I expect Mr. H. should answer distinctly, by denial or distinction, to some Proposition in these Syllogisms; and then let him rhetoricate as he pleases in the amplification.  
We have now dispatched the two Arguments in the Letter, there remain three in the Postscript cited out of Mr. Gale's Animadversions upon the Letter; which, though modestly proposed by way of Question, will constringe our Learned Adversary.  
Arg. 3. Whether there be any action of man on earth so good, which hath not some mixture of sin in it? And if God concur to the substrate matter of it as good, must he not necessarily concur to the substrate matter as sinful? for is not the substrate matter of the act, both as good and sinful the same? Postscr. p. 32.  
Mr. H's Answ. 1. It seems then that God doth concur to the matter of an action as sinful; which is honestly acknowledged, since by his principles it cannot be denied: though most of his way mince the business, and say, the concurrence is only to the action which is sinful, not as sinful. Ibid. & pag. 33. So Mr. H.  
Reply. Mr. H. misrepresents Mr. Gale's meaning: for it is not, that God concurs to the sinfulness of the action, but to the action; which though physically one individual action, yet is morally diversified in respect of its conformity and difformity to the Law of God: so that considering the natural action in concreto, with the good or evil adhering to it, it is no less true, that God concurs to the action that hath evil adhering to it, than that he concurs to the action that hath good adhering to it. This premised, to the fault he finds with the distinction, I answer, that I doubt he must recur to it himself, when he is pressed, to know how God's concurrence immediate to actions sinful will free him from the imputation of being the Author of Sin: yea, worse than so, I cannot imagine, but that as to those actions, which he calls in themselves sinful, he must own what he would fasten upon Mr. Gale, that God doth immediately concur to the matter of an action as sinful; for 'tis impossible to separate the malignity thereof from an intrinsically evil action, (as he tells us) Let. p. 33. [of which hereafter.)  
Mr. H's Answ. 2. This I am to consider as an argument for God's Predeterminative concurrence to wicked actions. And thus it must be conceived, that if God concur by determinative influence to the imperfectly good actions of faith, love, etc. therefore to the acts of enmity against himself, cursing, idolatry, etc. To which (besides an unseemly scoff, is it not a mighty consequence?) Mr. H. answers divers things, as reasons for the denial of the consequence.  
1. That it is infirm, because the actions in the antecedent are good, quoad substantiam, but these in the consequent are in the substance of them evil. Post. p. 33.  
Reply 1. Mr. Gale doth not limit wicked actions to those that are in the substance of them evil, but ampliates the term to all whatsoever so that supposing the consequence were not good to such actions as Mr. H. instanceth in; yet it may be good to those actions that are evil, quoad finem & circumstantias, as to the end and circumstances. For instance, to be hospitable, or charitable out of vainglory, to be reading the Scriptures at home, when we should attend upon public worship, etc. and Mr. H. seems to yield it.  
2. I am not yet convinced that there are any actions evil, quoad substantiam. And it is a wonder to me, that our Learned Antagonist should exact of us an implicit faith of that Position. It ill becomes his generosity so basely to beg the question. Let him prove that, and I will be his Proselyte as to antipredetermination of such actions. But because he neglecteth the duty he owes to his Hypothesis, I will perform mine to my own anon.  
2. Mr. H. denies the consequence by an argument a pari; That we ourselves can in a remoter kind concur to the actions of others, yet it doth not follow, that because we may assord our leading concurrence to actions imperfectly good, that therefore we may afford it to those that are down right evil; because to prayer, therefore to cursing and swearing, and then ruin men for the actions we have induced them unto. I●●d. & p. 34.  
Repl. 1. In general 'tis unsafe arguing a pari, from the creature to God; that what the former may not do, neither may the latter. The creature is bound to hinder all the sin that he can; but if God were under such an obligation, there would not only have been so much sin as the world affords, but indeed none at all. And you yourself discourse at large of the incongruity of an universal determinative influence to good actions; which yet would have made an admirable Metamorphosis of all the Sinners in the world into Saints; (at least if in those expressions you include, infusion of grace, which divine Predetermination of good actions presupposes, as I have proved before.)  
2. If your arguing be forcible as to this instance, I see not, but you reflect as highly upon God by the immediate concurrence you grant to all actions of the Creatures, Post. p. 28. For will it not follow, that God affords men a leading concurrence to actions downright evil, and then ruins them for those actions, which were as much his as theirs? I am too dull to imagine how you can extricate yourself, but by eating your words, and distinguishing of concurrence, as you do of Predetermination; that God concurs to actions that are imperfectly good, but not to those that are downright evil.  
3. Mr. H's answer touches not the intendment of Mr. Gale's argument, which is to evince upon Mr. H's own assertion, that as God predetermines to actions imperfectly good; so by the like reason he may predetermine to actions that are perfectly evil. And the ground of the consequence is this, that if in actions imperfectly good, the evil and the good of the actions are so divided between the creature and God, that only the former is the Creatures, and the latter Gods; whilst yet the natural actions themselves are common to both, to God as the first, to the Creature as the second cause; why may not we infer that in actions perfectly evil, the action is common to God and the Creature, but the evil of it, the Creatures peculiar, and no more chargeable upon God, than in the other instance. And this I take for an irrefragable Argument, ad hominem, which if Mr. H. can satisfy, I am silenced.  
4. It is an unaccountable inadvertency, (for to salve his honour, so I will call it, rather than a slip of Judgement) to produce cursing and swearing for instances of actions downright, or for the substance of them evil. I thought that David's frequent cursing of wicked men in the Psalms, and Paul's swearing, Before God I lie not, Gal. 1.20. had not passed under so bad a character; but did rest assured, that (as the actions in themselves are capable, so in them) they were hallowed by their manner and end.  
5. To what end Mr. How closes with this clause, And then ruin men for the actions we have induced them to, is not hard to conjecture (viz.) to insinuate, that our Doctrine represents God under the same character with the Devil, who induces men to sin, and then torments them for it. But what is said untruly (as well as Profanely) of the Devil, is verified of our Doctrine, That it is not so black as it is painted. Mr. How indeed tells Mr. Gale, you'll say God may rather, and adds as his own sense, But sure he can do so much less than you, p. 34. This suggestion deserves a severer animadversion than I shall make upon it. In general, I say 'tis an odious slander. For we in no sense assert that God induces men to wicked actions, not morally, for we constantly affirm, that his commands, threats, are all against it; not Physically, for so he determines men to actions, not to the wickedness of them, nor does he ruin men for what he contributes by Predetermination, or immediate concurrence to the Production of (viz.) the natural actions he moves to and joins in.  
Answ. 3. Mr. How denies the consequence from the evidence of two Scriptures compared, Luk. 6.9. Hos. 13.6. p. 35. but (which is strange) hath not directed us how he infers from them the denial of Mr. Gale's consequence, or how they show a difference between the warrantableness of Gods concurring to the substrate matter of an action as good, which tends to man's salvation and blessedness, and to the substrate matter of all their evil actions [which tend to their ruin and misery]; we must therefore guests at it as well as we can.  
Reply. The former Scripture hath these words, Is it lawful on the sabbath days to do good or to do evil, to save life or to destroy? The latter these, O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself, but in me is thine help: From the former Scripture, I presume, thus he argues: If it be unlawful to man to destroy life, than it is unlawful to God. But the antecedent is true, therefore the consequent. And he proves the consequence by the latter Scripture, by this Enthymeme; God's word is to help man. Ergo, it is unlawful for him to destroy. And this, viz. that man destroys himself. Ergo, 'tis unlawful for God to destroy him. To which, I return,  
1. That the antecedent or minor of the first Syllogism, is not true universally, for for it is not unlawful for man to destroy life, se defendendo, i.e. in self-defence; but it must be limited to Homicide or murder, which notes not barely the act of destroying life, but involves with it a vitiosity, or that act done in cases prohibited by the divine Law.  
2. Suppose it were, yet I deny the consequence, and you cannot be any whit-ased or relieved by the thin Sophistry, of only a collusive ambiguity in the word [Lawful,] which you must have recourse to. For suppose you take it in the antecedent strictly, and in the consequent analogically, in the former, for the declared pleasure of a ruler to his Subject; in the latter, for an habitual fixed principle and rule of acting after one steady tenor, (which are both your own distinctions and explications of the word Law), Let. p. 41. yet the consequence is utterly false, because depending upon this false ground; that whatever man may not do in regard of God's Law, God himself may not do, because of his own nature, or habitual fixed Principle and Rule of acting after one steady nature, (as you something oddly describe it). In this sense the subtle Twisse rejects Zuinglius maxim, Quod nobis est Lex, Deo est ingenium & is God's nature to himself. Though in another sense he admits it, That such obligation, as the divine Law lays upon us to do nothing repugnant to it, that God's nature lays upon him to do nothing repugnant to it. Now then, though it be unlawful to man to kill in such cases as the Law exempts, yet it is not contrary to God's nature to kill, and so not unlawful to him.  
3. To the Enthymeme, we deny the connexion, that because in [or from] God is man's help, that therefore it is unlawful for him to destroy, for how then does God own himself the author of all evils of suffering, Amos 3.6, Shall there be evil in a City, and the Lord hath not done it? And besides, we see not, such is the dimness of our sight, how the consequence would be proved thereby, were the connexion granted.  
The proofs subjoined hang together so loosely, that I cannot make sense of them, and therefore will dismiss them.  
Your general drift I am ware of, that you deny Predestination to evil actions, though you concede it to good, because it seems more congruous to the divine goodness to concur (a term that you will still use, though improper enough, to signify that divine action, we call Predetermination, as hath been shown once and again) to actions that have good in them, rather than to these that have evil in them, because the one tends to the salvation, the other to the destruction of man. To which I answer: This Argument, if it hath any weight will bear as hard upon immediate concurrence, which you grant to all actions, and so to sinful, as upon Predetermination; and whatever answer will relieve you, will with the same hand ease us. I will pause a little with the Readers leave, and try my skill what answer I can excogitate for Mr. How, which will not be a common friend to us both, (as we have been hitherto one to another, and I hope shall remain notwithstanding this public contest): I have thought out my thoughts, and they afford me but three Answers.  
1. That immediate concurrence, as to sinful actions, divides between the action and the sinfulness; so that 'tis only the action as such, which is Gods and man's at once: the sinfulness of it is to be attributed to man only. And this distinction is an open friend to us, and to which therefore upon all fit occasions we pay our respects.  
2. That if it be granted divine concurrence is as immediate to evil, as to good actions, (so as hath been explained); yet that does not necessitate or compel the will to any elicit act, [i. e. inward acts of willing or nilling]: neither does Predetermination judge itself guilty, as to any such crime; for that does but put the creature upon that action, which is produced by God's immediate concurrence with it. And but that it waits a fit time to speak out her mind, she could say, That she conceives not how she can compel the will to any act, without compelling God himself: seeing one and the same act thereof, is as truly Gods as the creatures.  
3. If immediate concurrence thinks herself disobliged to satisfy an inquisitive curiosity, as to the modus or manner how she joins with the creature in an action, to which sin does necessarily adhere, seeing the thing itself is plain, that so strict is the dependence of the creature upon the Creator, that it cannot act without God's immediate concurrence: Predetermination claims the same privilege upon the like ground, that the creature cannot exert its natural powers, till they be applied to action, nor determine itself to action, till it be determined; which determination cannot include a compulsion of the will, (which is the main, if not the only controversy), for if the will act spontaneously, and from precedent deliberation, how is it forced? if it do not, how is it a will, i. e. a rational appetite?   

Arg. 4. (which is Mr. Gale's second), is, There is no action so sinful, that it hath not some natural good as the substrate of it, Postsc. p. 36.  
Answ. 1. To which Argument, proposed by way of Question, Mr. How answers, True.  
Reply. But then, if that be true, your former position, that some actions are evil in the substance of them, p. 33. must needs be false. Let us but formalize the Opposition thus: some actions are so sinful that they have no natural good, as the substrate matter of them; [which is the sense of the words just now quoted] no actions are so sinful that they have not some natural good, as the substrate matter of them; and it will appear, that they are propositions contradictory, and consequently, that they cannot both be true. They are two known Rules in Logic, contradictio est oppositio inter universalem & particularem Enunciationem [aut propositionem] And, Harum alterutra semper vera, & altera semper falsa.  
Answ. 2. Mr. How presently flinches, and Sophister-like, puts more into the conclusion, than was in the premises. And what must be inferred (says he) viz. from his own concession, That therefore God must by a determinative influence produce every such action [ reason there be against it].  
Reply. Those words included in the semiquadrates are injuriously foisted in. For Mr. Gale's Argument entirely is thus, If there be no action so sinful, that it hath not some natural good as the substrate of it, than God is the cause, (viz. by Predetermination) of that natural good that is in every action, sed verum prius; Ergo & Posterius. And indeed the Argument itself excludes any such addition. For there can be no reason against God's production of what is good in any action, unless it be (what Mr. How objects) the accidental adherence of evil thereunto; which, if it be of any moment, militates as much against immediate concurrence, (as hath been shown but now). That passage of Augustine's, opportunely offers its service to us, as to the force of Mr. Gale's Argument, Deus boni tantummodo causa est, etc. i. e. God is only the cause of good, therefore he is not the author of evil; because he is the Author of all things that are, which are so far good as they are. 'Tis indeed Mr. Gale's Argument in other terms.  
Answ. 3. Mr. How pretends, Mr. Gale might better argue from his premises, The necessity of his producing every hour a new world; in which, there would be a great deal more of positive entity and natural goodness, Postsc. p. 36.  
Reply. This is too great a scorn to be cast upon so learned a man, as Mr. Gale is well known to be. For there is no medium that can, with the least probability, be judged likely to be able to tack Mr. Gales Antecedent, and Mr. Howes consequent together. To be sure, not that which he suggests; for that is false and unworthy of a Philosopher, at least if these maxims be true, substantia non recipit magis & minus; ens & bonum convertibile; though 'tis easy to conceive there would be more positive Being's in number, upon Mr. Howe's supposition, yet 'tis hard to conceive there would be a great deal more of positive entity, and so of natural goodness in the new world, than is already in the old one.  
Answ. 4. The natural goodness that is in the Entity of an action, is no such invitation to the Holy God, by determinative influence to produce it, as that he should offer violence to his own nature, and slain the justice and honour of his government, by making it to be done, and then punish it, being done, p. 36.  
Reply. 1. The natural goodness of an action, hath invitation enough in it to induce God to produce it, both because it is good, and because it cannot be done without him.  
2. By Mr. Howe's own concession, something or other does induce God to produce it, by giving and conserving the powers, and immediate concurrence to the act of those powers.  
3. It remains upon Mr. How to prove, that the producing of an action by determinative influence, is more liable to those absurdities he names, than the producing it any other way, (except what Durandus pitches upon; which if he will also own, than I know what I have to rejoin). In the interim, I am ashamed he should clog his Reader with, cram bis cocta, coleworts twice sod; I mean, an odious consequence imposed upon predeterminative influence, that it offers violence to God's nature, and stains the justice and honour of his Government; which we shall deny, till he hath proved, that by it God makes an action to be done, i. e. in his sense necessitates it to be done, and then punishes it being done; which last clause is very absurd in its connexion, for it supposes a contradiction, viz. that the action is naturally good, and yet, that God punishes the natural goodness in it.  
Arg. 5. (which is Mr. Gale's third and last). The denial of Predetermination, even of sinful actions as such, cuts off the most illustrious part of divine providence in governing the lower world, Postsc. p. 33.  
Answ. I am ashamed to answer it. Name any act of providence, I hereby deny, if you can, ibid. So Mr. How.  
Reply. 1. This act of providence thereby you deny, which in words you own, to limit and moderate sinful actions, Postsc. p. 45. This will appear by considering what influence your mediate or immediate concurrence (for you do so fluctuate, that I know not which of the two you will abide by), can have upon this effect. The mediate can have none, for that is nothing else but a conservation of the being, with its powers and faculties, and so but abusively called concurrence or concourse; and so does but keep the powers indeterminate, not determine, nor limit their acts: nor yet can immediate limit any action, because as such, it is neither before nor after the creatures action, but with it. The withdrawing of concourse immediate, may hinder, I grant, the creatures action: but whether God does ever withdraw it or no, Strangius. L. 1. c. 11. p. 65. doubts, and so may you, perhaps, upon his ground. Let us, for the exemplification of this limitation, consider it, with respect to those things which it is conversant about.  
1. As to the objects of its acts; as, that Absaloms' Adultery with David's wives, rather than any other women. This is plain, by comparing 2 Sam. 12.11. with Chap. 16.22. In the former place, the words are, Thus saith the Lord, Behold, I will raise up evil against thee out of thine own house: and I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbour; and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of the Sun. In the latter place the event answers the threat. And Absalon went in unto his Father's Concubines in the sight of all Israel.  
2. As to the time, when, or how long the sinful acts shall be exercised about their objects. When, Gen. 45.5, God did send me before you to preserve life, says Joseph to his Brethren; whereas, they might not have sold him, till the famine came. How long; That is intimated in Psal. 125.3, The rod of the wicked shall not rest upon the lot of the Righteous.  
3. As to the event, or issue of the actions. That an oppressor shall impoverish, not utterly undo him he does oppress: that he who strikes his neighbour with an intent to kill him, shall yet but wound him.  
4. As to the decree of the act, Psal. 76.10, Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee; the remainder of wrath thou shalt restrain, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, cinges, ligabis; which I understand of binding up the faculty, that it put not forth its utmost force in the act issuing from it: as when a man is but in a pet, as we say, not outrageously angry. Thus God makes as great a difference between the same man and himself, as a Rider does when he uses a straight rain, or lays the bridle on his Horse's neck.  
2. The overruling and disposing of a sinful action to good, against the design and inclination of the sinful Agent, Postsc. p. 45. n. 10. is an act of Providence, which Mr How denies, in the denial of Predetermination. For immediate concurrence is all that Mr. How allows of; which, being but God's action with the creature, and not existent before nor after it, cannot therefore direct the action to any end. And particularly in punishing one sin with another. As in the instance of Absalon; his Adultery with his Father's Concubines, was a punishment of David's Adultery with Vriah's Wife. In this and such like instances, God is the Author, ordinis in malo, though not mali, as the most learned Dr. Field, Dean of of Gloucester, expresses it, of the Church, p. 131, 132). i e. God is the Author of the order of consequence, that one evil shall follow another, and have the reason of a punishment thereof; which how he can be, is no way explicable, but by the Doctrine of Predetermination which, importing an application of the creature to action, and to one rather than another, and at one time rather than another, etc. (as hath been shown) gives an easy account, how God may dispose of sinful actions to good ends, and particularly to this, to be punishments of preceding sins.  
And now, it is high time that we take a view of Mr. Howe's Arguments, for the negative of the Question hitherto discussed, for which we must return to his Letter again, where he states the Thesis he opposes, as importing an irresistble predeterminative concurrence to all actions of the creature, even to those that are in themselves most malignantly wicked, Let. p. 32.  
Reply. Here are divers ambiguities in the terms (besides that of predeterminative concurrence, which hath been faulted already, as not very proper).  
1. The term irresistible; which may either import, a necessity of infallibility, as to the event, or a necessity of coaction or compulsion. If he takes it in the former sense, 'tis altogether improperly. For irresistible, imports a relation of the action of the agent, to some resistance or counteraction of the patiented; as when the water endeavours to put out the fire, which would lick it up; or in free agents, when a man with all his strength resists him that by force would carry him away Prisoner. If he understands the term in the latter and proper sense, I understand not why he imposes the term upon our Thesis; for we do not assert any compulsion in Predetermination of the will, nor can we conceive it possible in any case; not if we should suppose per impossibile, a rational creature made under no Law at all; for then as it would have a power, and also an inclination to use it, so there would be no need of any force to reduce it to act; not supposing it (as it is) under a Law, would there be any need of compulsion, not as to good actions, because there are gracious habits to dispose the will to actions congenerous; not as to evil actions, (no not if God did predetermine to them as such) for the will in regard of sinful habits is of itself inclined enough to any evil actions.  
2. The term, in themselves most malignantly wicked. To which I say, that it may be understood in a double sense, either with respect, to the different kind of Laws that prohibit actions, thus; Those actions are said to be in themselves evil which are a breach of the Law of nature, and so are opposed to those which are evil only by a positive law; or else with reference to the degrees of rectitude in one and the same Law; thus some actions are said to be in themselves evil, when they are evil in regard of their object, as that is opposed to the end and circumstances. Thus the hatred of God, and Adultery, are in themselves evil, because no end or circumstance can make them good; but giving Alms out of vain glory is not in itself evil, because changing the end, the action is good, that before was bad.  
But Mr. H. understands the term in another sense, and overlooks the genuine signification of it; viz. thus, that wickedness is of the essence of some actions. This I collect from that clause, Nothing is more apparently a simple and most strictly natural impossibility, than to separate the malignity thereof from an intrinsically evil action, Let. p. 33. Now 'tis plain enough, if we take the hatred of God, which is Mr. H's instance of an action in itself evil, that the evil of that action is separable from it, for the same passion, if the Devil be the object of it, is good. And the evil of this action is as separable from it, as in actions that are evil, as to their circumstances. As to read the Scriptures, when it is our present duty to hearken to the Sermon. The reason is the same in both, the action of hatred is evil only in regard of the undue object, and the action of reading the Scriptures only in regard of the undue circumstance of time. And if Mr. H. understands actions in themselves evil, of actions essentially evil, let him enjoy his own satisfaction, but let him not impose it upon us, who look upon it as one of the greatest absurdities a learned man can be guilty of believing. To state the Question therefore aright (though we have done it before) we say, that we reject the term irresistible, as not being in the Question, but being a begging of the Question, because it supposes some force on God's part the Agent, which the Creature as far as it can resists. And we disown the distinction of actions, which Mr. H. introduces into the Question, for we know of none that are in themselves malignantly wicked; that is (in his sense) essentially evil. But that which we assert is, That God does predetermine the Creature as well to the actions that are evil, as to those that are good. Let us now hear his Arguments against our Assertion.  
Arg. 1. If there be an irresistible determinative concurrence to all, and so to wicked actions of the Creature, than the matter of all God's Laws in reference to all wicked actions was a simple and most strictly natural impossibility. But the Antecedent is, Therefore we must own the consequent, Let. p. 32.  
Ans. 1. In general, If we take his words simply as they found, we see not but we may grant the whole, with as little inconvenience to our assertion as to his. For the consequence will be the same, if some of his assertions be placed for an Antecedent in the room of ours. If God does certainly foreknow all, and so all wicked actions of the Creature, then for the Creature not to do those wicked actions, was a simple and most strictly natural impossibility. For 'tis as truly impossible that ev●●ts should not be such as God fore●●ows they will be; as that men should yield obedience to the Laws of God, when God hinders them thorough his own irresistible counteraction, Mr. H's phrase p. 37. Again, we may argue thus, If there be an irresistible determinative concurrence to all good actions of the Creature, than the matter of all God's Laws in reference to all good actions was a simple and most strictly natural impossibility; i.e. it is simply impossible, that good men should not do those good actions, exacted of them by the Law. As to this last, I cannot apprehend any reason why Predeterminative concurrence to evil actions should make the avoiding of them impossible; and the like concurrence to good actions should leave the neglect of them possible.  
2. But because Mr. H. intends more by Impossibility than the Predeterminants' can allow him, we shall borrow a little learning from the Schools for the explication of it. It is a Question in Metaphysics, An possibile & contingens a parte rei aequipolleant; i.e. Whether for a thing to be possible and contingent, 〈◊〉 of the same signification or import? To which it is answered affirmatively, Si possibile accipiatur pro eo quod sese habet indifferenter ut sit; i. e. If for a thing to be possible be taken for an indifferency to be or not to be. And by the like reason impossible and necessary must be terms equipollent, if impossible be taken for that which is not indifferent to be, and not to be; or, which as it is not, so nor can it be. 'Tis true indeed, that Impossible is contrary to Necessary; as Necessary is taken generally for that which cannot but be, and Impossible for that which cannot be: yet these two are equipollent, if the one be affirmed, the other denied; for that which is necessary to be, is impossible not to be; and that which is necessary not to be, is impossible to be; and on the other hand, That which is impossible to be, is necessary not to be; and that which is impossible not to be, is necessary to be. We must therefore make a little enquiry into the kinds of necessity, which as to things is either simple, or compound. The latter (for the former is irrelative to our business) agrees to things in their cohesion or connexion each with other; this is divided into a necessity of the consequent, and of consequence, or absolute, and respective. The former is a connexion of those things which cannot be severed without a contradiction; i.e. destroying the nature of their subject. So justice to God, reason to man, agree so necessarily to their subjects, that if you deny either, you do in effect deny them to be what they are, The latter, a necessity whereby those things that are not in their own nature conjoined, are yet upon supposition of something antecedent conjoined for this or that time. Whence Baronius calls the former, a necessity of nature; the latter, an accidental necessity. Of this latter sort is this example, If Islanders will export Goods out of their own Country, they must make use of Ships. And from these modes of necessity it is easy to collect the modes of Impossibility, That something is, said to be impossible, either absolutely, which involves a contradiction, as for a stone to be a man; or respectively, as if a man will fly that he should have wings. And here we may stop a while and observe how Mr. H. hath gratified his own unscholastick humour, in neglecting the strictness of Scholastic terms, to the overthrow of his own assertion. For I am much mistaken if it is not plain enough that Mr. H. confounds the distinction of necessity or impossibility, into absolute and respective; and makes the matter of God's Laws, etc. upon supposition of God's irresistible determination to wicked actions, to be an impossibility of both kinds, and so of neither. For if it be an impossibility only upon Hypothesis of Determinative influence, how is it a simple and strictly natural impossibility? If it be a simple, etc. impossibility, how is it an impossibility only upon an Hypothesis? [viz. that now mentioned.]  
Way being thus made by explication of the Terms, to the antecedent or minor, I answer by denial, That the Determinative Influence to all wicked actions we assert, does infer any coaction on the Will.  
Arg. If Determination of the Will imports Coaction, or is inconsistent with the freedom of the Will; than it is either from some general reason agreeing to all Determination, or from some special reason agreeing only to this Determination, viz. to sinful actions; but neither of these: Ergo, it does not import any such thing at all; no Determination of the Will in general does import Coaction, or destroy its liberty.  
1. Upon Mr. H's own concession of a Predetermination of good actions, Post. p. 39 which I presume he will not affirm to be compulsory; yet because I cannot see a reason why he should not, (as well as of evil actions) I will suppose him to acknowledge it. And then I would demand whether God compels men to the natural actions as such, or to them as morally good. Not to the natural actions as such, but to them there is no need of it, for the powers that produce them, are apt and habile for any congenerous action, by Mr. H's confession, Post. p. 45. Not to the actions as good, for the powers being renewed by Grace, (so far as they are such) need but an excitation, not a compulsion.  
2. It appears from the general principle of Divines, Libertas a coactione est essentialis voluntatis proprietas; i. e. That liberty from force and compulsion is an essential property of the will. Which may be thus evinced. 1. By the nature of the wills liberty, that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, spontaneum intellectuale; i.e. spontaneum praeeunte intellectus lumine vel judicio, as Strang. acknowledges, De Vol. Dei, p. 686. That is, an Intellectual spontaneity. A spontaneity in opposition to the acting of necessary agents, such as the Sun in shining; and Intellectual, to distinguish it from that spontaneity which agrees to brutes, or to mankind, who are acted by fancy, without previous judgement, as Infants, Fools, Madmen, who whilst they remain such, are brutes in the shape of men and women.  
2. It appears by the repugnancy of the terms in conjunction. For the Will to be forced is but invita aliquid velle, i. e. to will any thing unwillingly; which were to will and not will the same object at the same time, which is an implicit contradiction.  
2. 'Tis not from any peculiar reason agreeing to sinful actions. If there be any, Mr. H. would befriend the world to bring it to light. Which will appear,  
1. Upon Mr. H's grounds, if Coaction be inseparable from compulsion, upon any special reason agreeing to one sort of actions, rather than another, it must be with respect to good actions, not to evil. For God determines the Will by irresistible grace, to such actions as by nature since the fall it is averse unto; and remains so in a degree after the blessed change it hath undergone: whereas the Will having a natural Bias to evil, [as it is not, so nor] does it need to be predetermined, i.e. forced, [if Mr. How be a faithful interpreter of the word.]  
2. There are manifest indications of liberty in sinful actions, pregnant proofs that man hath not only potentiam in se liberam, but liberum usum potentiae; i.e. a power in itself free, but as to them a free use of his power. An instance of his own, hatred of God, will serve our turn. This act must be spontaneous, or 'tis not the act of an humane will, which is an [intellectual] appetite; no, nor of a sensitive appetite, for to this last spontaneity is essential, and intellectual too: and so it is, for it proceeds from, and is guided by a precedent [though mistaken] judgement of the understanding, which represents God to him as a Tyrant, that abuses his authority by needless restraints upon man's natural inclinations. Suppose to unchastity with any woman whose skin and features attract his liking. Joseph's brethren's hatred of him, was determined by God to the selling, rather than killing of him; yet as they acted spontaneously, so upon precedent consideration. Two Reasons determined their choice of the milder course of the two they had in view, He is our Brother, and our Flesh, and what profit is it if we slay him, and conceal his blood? Gen. 37.26.  
3. If there be any reason to infer Coaction from Predetermination, it must be the inconsistency of necessity on God's part, and contingency on man's: Which if it be universally affirmed,  
1. Then I know not how Mr. How will salve the objection against immediate concurrence, [which he seems to grant,] that thereby the liberty of the will seems to be lost, both as to the exercise and specification of the act. Unless as Burgesdicius does, (whose solution offers it service, he being the first Metaphysic Author that ever I read,) That the concourse of God takes not away the contingency of voluntary actions, because it does not precede the action of the second cause. Burg. Met. l. 2. c. 11. n. 9 But then that reason (if assented to) will give a mortal wound to the Predestination (which certainly precedes them) of good actions, which Mr. H. acknowledges: or if he will lose the knot artificially, he must say that the concourse of God is so accommodated to the nature and manner of the creatures acting, that notwithstanding it, natural causes act necessarily, and voluntary causes contingently, or freely; and then the same answer will fit Predetermination of free agents to all their actions.  
2. The denial of the consistency between liberty and necessity in general, will bear as hard upon (what we grant, and Mr. H. cannot deny) actions in themselves good, as Amor Dei, the love of God; as it can do upon (what we deny, and you assert) actions in themselves evil, as odium Dei, the hatred of God. And harder, for the Will is but in part free to good actions, when as 'tis wholly free, I mean disposed and inclined to evil actions. We are now the better prepared by way thus made, to answer Mr. H's proofs of his consequence. Which are,  
1. Not to do an action whereto the agent is determined by an infinite power is impossible, Let. p. 33. Ergo, not to do wicked actions, [for that's the sum of his consequent, in his Hyp. Syll. whereof this Enthymeme is a proof] to which the creature is determined is impossible.  
Rep. 1. In general, that [supposing his Antecedent true, as 'tis in the sense before given] yet the impossibility he speaks of is not a simple and most strictly natural impossibility, which he before asserted; but an impossibility respective, to the determination of an infinite power, (as hath been proved.)  
R. 2. That if he intends a respective or conditional impossibility, I grant his Enthymeme, for it hurts our Hypothesis no more than his, viz. of determination to good actions. For all determination does infer a necessity, that the thing determined should be, as it is determined to be; or an impossibility, that the thing determined should not be, as it is determined to be.  
Rep. 3. If we must supply from the Hypoth. major, the term irresistibly to modify the determination he opposes, and we must understand by it compulsion or force, we again concede the whole without any disadvantage to us. And so we may rid our hands of it, as an ignoble begging of the Question, for that was incumbent on him to prove, not to take for granted, that our Predetermination imports a Coaction.  
Mr. H's second Enthymeme is this, To separate the malignity of an action intrinsically evil is impossible, p. 33. Ergo, not to do such wicked actions to which the creature is determined, is impossible.  
Rep. 1. Granting his Antecedent for Arguments sake, I cannot imagine how he will defend the immediate concurrence of God to all the actions of his creatures; and so to sinful actions, and so to those (if there be any such) as are in themselves evil, against the charge of involving God in the production of sinful actions, as such, seeing by Divine immediate concurrence the intrinsically evil action is as much Gods as man's action. Baronius and Strangius (who are as Heterodox as Mr. H.) do both confess, that it is very hard to show how God may be freed from that charge, when-as he cooperates with the creature to every sinful action. Bar. Met. 98. D. 3. n. 72. Strang. de Vol. Dei. p. 344, 372. Though Mr. H. would lay the great difficulty and encumbrance inferred upon our Religion, only upon Predeterminative concourse to wicked actions. Yet, the Learned Amesius, a Predeterminant, tells us not without reason, Deformitas moralis magis annexa videtur actui in exercito, quam in applicatione ad agendum. Cont. Greu. p. 189. i.e. Moral deformity seems more closely joined to action, than to application unto action. For an object may be innocently presented to the eye, which may put a man upon action, viz. unchaste desires.  
Rep. 2. We will grant the Antecedent, ex animo, because it does implicate, that there should be any such action. 'Tis a received maxim, Malum est in bono, tanquam in subjecto, i.e. Evil is in good, as in its subject. And Augustine's saying is well known, and as well approved, Ipsum quantulum-cunque esse bonum est, quia summum esse bonum est. De vera Rel. c. 34. i.e. Being itself how inconsiderable soever is good, because the chiefest Being is good.  
R. 3. We deny that there cannot be a separation of an action, from the evil of it. Of this separation there are many instances: supposing Usury lawful, (which I will not now dispute) I may lawfully take up money at use at Ten pounds per Cent. (if my necessity require it) when the Interest allowed by Law (which to break in matters of public benefit is sinful) is but 6 l. A Christian Prince may urge the great Turk to swear to Articles of Peace, though the former knows the latter will swear by his Mahomet. These are instances of our concurrence to the actions of others in a remoter kind, [than God does concur to the actions of his creature] as Mr. H. speaks in another case, Post. p. 33. And by the like reason may God Predeterminatively concur (as Mr. H. delights to speak, though not accurately) to an action that is evil, and yet not to the evil of it; which the Learned Twisse illustrates by divers pretty similitudes. An Horseman that puts on a lame horse to go, is the cause of his motion, not of his halting, that proceeds from some hurt in his leg, the instrument of motion. The Sun by his warmth makes the dunghill stink, of which stink that that warmth is not the cause appears, in that the very same influence draws forth a fragrant savour from a bed of Roses. That the dunghill smells is from the Suns drawing forth the vapour●, but that it smells ill is from the condition of the matter. The upper-wheel of a Clock, though by its motion it draws along with it an under-wheel, that is irregular in its motion, yet it is not the cause of that irregularity. When a dexterous Penman writes upon sinking paper he makes [pothooks, as we say of children that begin to learn the art of writing] blots rather than letters, which yet is not his fault, but the Papers. Twisse Vind. Gr. l. 2. p. 1 a. p. 26.  
Reply. 4. There must needs be a separation [and therefore 'tis possible to be] between actions, and the evil of them upon Mr. Howe's own Hypothesis (viz.) That God does predetermine to all good actions, which in the present state are but imperfectly good. Here he must distinguish between the efficiency of God and man, as to the same action, and ascribe the action and grace of it to God, and the evil that adheres to that action to man, unless he will ascribe all to God. Absit blasphemia verbo! If Mr. How can extricate himself, and not us with the same Answer; or rather, if he can excogitate any other Answer, than by this exsibilated distinction— erit mihi magnus Apollo, and without an Irony, sapientum octavus.  
Reply. 2. To the connexion. I Answer, That it infolds a twofold contradiction.  
1. For it supposes some actions to be intrinsically evil, and yet (by our Hypothesis), to be determined, i. e. compelled, (if Mr. How may be admitted our Interpreter); whereas, that is not sin which is not spontaneous, neither is that spontaneous which is necessary, i. e. violent [or compelled]. For violence is a Physical action upon the Patient; in which sort of actions virtue or vice hath no place: for the will is the principle of moral actions. So the learned Camero de Scanned. p. 98. [where note, that I presume Camero denies not original sin imputed, to be suo modo, i. e. in its kind voluntary, [and so truly sin], according to St. Augustine's sentiments, nos omnes eramus ille unus homo, i.e. we were all that one man, [Adam], and so sinned in him. This to prevent any misapprehension].  
2. It supposes sin to have an efficient cause, whereas 'tis a known Rule in Divinity, Peccatum qua tale & essentialiter est effectus moralis, & non habet causam Physicam, i. e. Sin as such, and essentially is a moral effect, and hath no Physical cause.  
Reply 3. Having given an Answer to Mr. how's Antecedent, and Connexion, we shall now proceed to raze the foundation of his Hypothesis, by proving, that there are no actions of free agents evil in themselves; or that no moral evil is positive, but only privative, (which latter are the common terms of Philosophers and Divines, in enquiring into the nature of moral evil). And I shall borrow one Argument, which will be instead of all, from the most learned Dr. Barlow, the now Renowned Bishop of Lincoln.  
Arg. Every real and positive Being is from God the author and first cause of all Being. But moral evil [formally] taken, is not from God the author and first cause of all Being. Ergo, moral evil [formally taken] is not a real and positive Being.  
The Minor is evident, and acknowledged by the very Heathens, in the appellation of Optimus, the Best, which they apply to their Jupiter, together with Maximus the Greatest: [And will no doubt be owned by Mr. How; who, eo nomine, for that very reason, rejects Predestination of evil actions, because, in his apprehension, it makes God the author of moral evil].  
The Major, let us hear the learned Bishop prove, [and the rather, because it will much confirm our first Argument for Predetermination of all actions as such].  
Proof. Because it is impossible that there should be any finite and created Being, which does not depend, and hath its Being from an infinite and uncreated Being, [viz. God]; for it must needs be, if there be any Being not caused by God, that that Being be independent upon God as the first cause; and consequently, God shall not be the first cause in respect of that Being, whence follow many absurdities, etc. [whereof I shall only take the sum, as himself hath given it us, with an application to moral evil]. If moral evil, [i.e. any sin or breach of Divine Law], be a real Being; then, 1. God shall not be the cause of that Being; for of so deformed a birth, divine goodness cannot be the Parent. 2. This granted, it will follow, 1. That there is a secondary Being, and a Being by participation, [such as every finite Being is supposed to be]; which does not partake of [or receive its] being from the first Being. 2. That there is a finite Being independent upon God, both as to production and conservation. All which things we know, and believe are contrary, not only to Philosophy, but Divinity. Thus far the most acute Philosopher and Divine, Exercit. metaph. 2 a. de natura mali, ad calcem Scheib. met. p. 32, 33.  
Let us take notice of the instances of those sins, which are supposed to be evil in themselves, [or positive].  
Obj. 1. Sins of commission which are evil, ex genere & objecto; (whereof two are specially insisted on: adam's eating of the forbidden fruit, and [by Mr. whither] the hatred of God) are in themselves evil.  
Answ. 1. In general. If all sins subsist in some actual motion of the soul, body, or both, and this motion abstractively considered, be the material part of every actual sin, and hath God for the prime cause, in whom we live, and move, and have our being; then no sin can be assigned, wherein this material part may not be found. So the Learned Davevant, sometime Bishop of Sarisbury, Animadv. on Hoard, p. 174, 175.  
Answ. 2. As to the instances. The first, in eating the forbidden fruit, the material part of the sin, in regard of the Soul was the appetition thereof; in regard of the body, the mastication [chewing] and manducation [eating], and other bodily acts. Separate these from the formal part, which is modus appetendi, the manner of desiring, and containeth a repugnancy to God's command, and God was the prime author thereof. The act of desiring and eating must of necessity be reduced to God, without whom there neither is nor can be any motion of body or soul: but the disorderly manner of desiring and eating contrary to the Law of God, this is reducible (as being a defect) only to the defective will of man, Davenant. ibid. p. 175. As to the second instance, hatred of God; That the act terminated upon that object, in complexo, is evil, and cannot be otherwise, we deny not; but then, that is true of acts and undue ends, as Hospitality out of vainglory; of acts and undue circumstances, as walking in the Fields, when we should be at Church; as of acts and undue objects, whereof this is an instance. And so all sinful actions are evil, as to their substance, which Mr. How hath not affirmed. That hatred of God is not evil in itself, because the act invaried, the object but changed, that act which was evil, is become morally good. So our Learned Bishop of Lincoln, again, Exerc. met. p. 41. which he illustrates and proves by the instance of Adultery, where the act being the same for the substance, is altered in its moral respect, by making the woman, with whom I committed Adultery, my wife, Id. ibid. Which instance of our Learned Bishop is plain, in the case of David and Bathsheba, whose society together was unlawful before, but lawful after their marriage. They that desire further satisfaction in this point, may do well to have recourse to a learned Discourse in our native Language, of Mr. H. Hickman, of the positivity of sin.  
Obj. 2. One sin is the cause of another, as original sin inherent [as that stands opposed to original sin imputed] is the cause of actual sins; therefore sin is not merely privative.  
Sol. The privation which is in the natural propension of the will to sin, [in which natural propension original sin consist], is not the real efficient of evil actions; but the will, in regard of that propension, is the real and true cause of evil actions. So Baron. wet. §. 5. n. 30. & 33.  
Obj. 3. Our Divines do make a positive part in original sin.  
Sol. Yet they hold sin to be only Privative. But than it will be demanded how their assertions will agree together.  
I Answer, In inherent sin there is said to be a positive and a negative Quality. This latter Divines call a want of original righteousness, or not to be able to do good. The former, they call a pravity of nature, or to be able to do evil only, which is called Positive Legice, because 'tis expressed affirmatively; whereas the latter is expressed negatively: so Maccov. op. Post. p. 83. r. fuse de hac re disserentem Gisb. Voet. Disp. Theol. p. 1. p. 1084  
Arg. 2. If God hath a prede erminative concurrence to the most wicked actions, it is then no way explicable how the influence and concurrence the holy God hath to the worst of actions, is to be distinguished from that which he affords to the best; wherein such inherently evil actions are less to be imputed to him who forbids them, than to the malicious Tempter, who prompts to them, or to the actor that doth them, or wherein not a great deal more? Let. p. 32, 33. which Argument Mr. How gives us more concisely afterward, That God hath as much influence and concurrence to the worst actions, as to the best; as much or more than the sinner or the Tempter, Postsc. p. 25. viz. according to our Doctrine].  
Answ. 1. If our learned Adversary understands the antecedent, as we do whom he opposes, of the materiale of wicked actions, we grant his consequence: for we cannot yet see the inconvenience of owning, that there is an universal or indifferent influence upon the actions of free Agents, as such, abstracted from their morality. The actions of the understanding and will Physically considered, are neither holy nor sinful; those denominations being taken from the relation of the actions to the Law prescribed, as a compliance with, or deviation from it: and therefore, in linea Physica, God's influence and concurrence is the same, when they are the substrate matter of moral evil, and moral good.  
2. If he intends the formale, or rather, the most wicked actions, in concreto, we disown the antecedent as none of ours, and complain of his disingenuity in pinning such an assertion upon our sleeve.  
3. Yet however, for his satisfaction, I shall let him know, That (besides the influence upon good and bad actions in what degree soever, which we acknowledge common to both) there are divers differences of the influence we own for distinguishing of good actions from bad.  
1. That as to good actions God does, in genere physico, re create those internal habits, which he did concreate in the state of innocency, with the several faculties, in which they were respectively seated, (as knowledge in the understanding; a rectitude of the will, consisting in a compliance with the last dictates of the practical understanding); that they might be [actus primi, or] principles of [the actus secundi, or] operations of the faculties, [in virtue of those habits], which [faculties] he influences to reduce them to act, by that influence which we call Predetermination. But as to evil actions, God insuses no evil, neither indeed can he (besides the repugnancy such an action would carry to his holiness); because, though sin be sometimes conceived by us, per modum habitus positivi, under the notion of a positive habit, yet it is not properly so, and so is not capable of production by that immediate efficiency, (which we call infusion), as hath been, in part, demonstrated before.  
2. As to good actions God does in the Predetermination to them, so excite to the action, as that withal he adds new strength to the habits given, whence those acts immediately proceed; which he does not neither as to evil actions.  
3. We have a third difference from Mr. H's own concession: The ordinary appointed way for the communication of this determinative influence is by our intervening consideration of the inducements which God represents to us in his Word, viz. The Precepts, Promises, and Comminations, which are th'. moral instruments of his Government. Postsc p. 40. The meaning of which words, is, that God is not only a Physical, but also a moral cause of good actions: whereas 'tis our sentiment, that God is only a Physical cause of the actions to which sin inheres, but not a moral cause of the sin adhering to them. And (if I do not too much trust my own judgement) this observation is not contemptible for the evincing of it; that the indifferency of the will to choose or refuse the Object proposed by the understanding, is not so natural to the will, but that it may be inclined by an inherent quality to choose or refuse one object rather than another.  
As for the comparison which he makes between God, the sinner and the Tempter, (upon our grounds), and gives God the precedency of them both in his influence upon wicked actions, 'tis an odious and horrible calumny, not backed with any proof; as he intends it of such actions in the concrete, i. e. as including with the action the sinfulness of it too.  
Reply. To it I reply, That a short Horse is soon curried. This slight objection is easily answered.  
1. Either Mr. How means as much physical influence, or moral: If the former, we say God and the sinner have both a physical influence, upon the action that is evil, but the Tempter none at all; and that, as to the evil of it, their physical influence is alike, i. e. they have none at all; for sin not being a physical effect, cannot have a physical cause. If the latter, (besides that that influence is not in the Question), the Sinner and the Tempter have influence and concurrence to wicked actions, and God not at all: for neither by Commands, Counsels, Threats, nor Promises, does he induce men to sin.  
2. Were it so; yet the immediate concurrence, which he acknowledges to all actions, and so to sinful actions; in conjunction with the notion he entertains with self-applause, of the inseparableness of the evil of some actions from the actions themselves, makes himself obnoxious to the same charge of making God's concurrence with sinful actions, to be as much or more than the Sinners, or the Tempter's.  
Arg. 3. Lastly, he charges the Predetermination of sinful actions with irreconcilableness with God's wisdom and sincerity, etc. Postsc. p. 25. by which, etc. I presume he intends, in his Counsels, Exhortations, and  means he uses to prevent them, (which are the expressions he uses in the Title-Page of his Letter, in reference to Prescience).  
Reply. As to both of these perfections of God, I am not ware of any thing well said by Mr. How, for the reconcileableness of God's Prescience with them, which may not by a just proportion be applied to God's Predetermination. For the evincing whereof, we will cast his Discourse into Paragraphs.  
1. To speak particularly of God's wisdom.  
1. That there should be a direct and explicit contradiction between foreknowing and dehorting, we may at first sight perceive the terms cannot admit, Let. p. 51.  
Reply. The same may be said of Predetermining, and dehorting, though not simply as to the terms, yet as to the things signified by them; for the elicit acts of the will, being the Object of Predetermination, [contested for], we may at first sight perceive it cannot be compelled; and so as to the event, infers but a necessity of infallibility, as to the sinners doing what he is dehorted from, (which also Prescience does).  
2. Mr. How goes on, Let it be supposed only, that the blessed God hath belonging to his nature universal Prescience, we will surely, upon that supposition, acknowledge it to belong to him as a perfection. And were it reasonable to affirm that by a perfection he is disabled for Government? or were it a good consequence, he foreknows all things, he is therefore unfit to govern the world? Let. p. 54.  
Reply. And why may not we as well argue thus, Let it be but supposed only, that universal Predetermination belongs to God's nature, we will upon that supposition acknowledge it a perfection. And were it reasonable to affirm, that by a perfection [that he not only conserveses the powers of his creatures, but reduces them to act] he is disabled for government; or were it a good consequence, He is the first cause, [not only of all beings], but of all actions as such, therefore he is unfit to govern the world? And I will add; nay surely, but the more fit in the present state of mankind, [not to intermeddle now with Angels], because all the actions of men, being either in whole or in part sinful, he would have nothing to govern, if he had not the government of all their actions; and govern them he could not, nor limit them, nor turn them to good, if he did not Predetermine them, (as hath been, I trust, clearly evinced).  
3. Would the supposition of such foreknowledge in God make that cease to be man's duty, which had otherwise been so? Let. p. 54. for what influence can foreknowledge have to alter or affect any way, either the nature of the thing foreknown, or the Temper of the person that shall do it, any more than the present knowledge of the same thing now in doing? p. 55.  
Reply. And can Predetermination make that cease to be man's duty, which otherwise had been so? seeing that it altars not the nature of the thing: [the will of man], nor the Temper of the person [Predetermined]; but as it finds the will free, so it leaves it; and as it finds the person disposed by habitual inclinations, so works upon him; which is confirmed, by that grave observation of his, which we embrace as our cordial friend, and confederate. It were very unreasonable to imagine, that God cannot in any case, extraordinarily oversway the inclinations, and determine the will of such a creature, as over whom Gods general course of Government is by moral instruments, [viz. Man], in a way agreeable enough to its nature, Let. p. 141. Only we extend it further, That supposing, (what hath been before proved), that Predetermination includes a Perfection, God can in all cases determine the will, without forcing it to actions to which it hath a renitency; for that were to alter the nature of the will, and the temper of the person whose will it is. And I add, what influence can fore-determining have to alter the nature of the thing, or person fore-determined, more than immediate concurrence to the same action, of the same person, now in doing?  
4. But if what was otherwise man's duty, be still his duty, what can make it unfit, that it be made known and declared to him to be so? and how is that otherwise to be done, than by these disputed means? yea, (for this is the case), what can make it less fit, than that God should quit the right of his Government to his revolted creatures, upon no other reason, than only that he foresees they have a mind to invade it? Let. p. 56.  
Reply. All this Argumentation fits our Predetermination as well as Prescience, (wherein Mr. whither and we agree): what can make it unfit that God should acquaint man with his duty, by proper means, seeing Predetermination supposes such a foreknowledge (as Mr. How supposes, antecedent to God's decree) of the creatures having a mind to invade Gods right of Government, if put under such and such circumstances; or rather, (because we understand not any foreknowledge, but of Possibilium, things possible, not Futurorum, of things future, antecedent to God's decree) seeing Gods determination of the Creatures will to invade his right, without which he could not will so to do, leaves the Creatures will as truly free from Co-action, as if it exerted all its elicit acts, only by a power derived from God, and preserved apt and habile for action.  
4. But it may now be said, All this reasoning, (says Mr. whither), tends but to establish this assertion; that notwithstanding God did foreknow man's sin, it is however necessary he forewarn him of it: but it answers not the objected difficulty, (viz.) How reasonably any such means are used for an unattainable end: as it manifests the end, man's obedience cannot be attained, when it is foreknown he will not obey, Let. p. 57  
To this difficulty Mr. How answers, That there is this noble and important end, which Gods Edicts aim at, (viz.) the Dignity and Decorum of his Government itself. And that he may be found in every thing to have done as became him, and most worthy of himself. And what could be more so, than to testify his aversion to whatsoever is unholy, his love of righteousness, and complacency to be imitated herein, together with his propension to make them happy, who do imitate him, p. 61. [I take here but the sum of Mr. Howe's words, because they contain nothing controversal].  
Reply. Whether this Discourse affords us any new consideration or no, yet we can claim the benefit of it in the fullest extent of it to Prescience, as to Predetermination also.  
2. As to God's sincerity, the difficulty may still urge, how it can stand with sincerity; whereas that end also which fails, [viz. man's obedient compliance with God's Declarations of his will, p. 60.] seems to have been most directly intended, etc. p. 65. To which Mr. How answers.  
1. That the public Declarations of the Divine will do attain that very end in great part, and as to many, and are the successful means of obtaining it, p. 66.  
Reply. And so they do upon our Hypothesis, who acknowledge God first infuses gracious habits into some, and then determines the powers in which these habits reside, to congenerous actions; which yet excludes not the use of God's Edicts, as means of educing those actions: which because they are vital and free passing from the Will, upon a comparison made in the Understanding between the Goodness of the Objects proposed to it, do require a moral cause, whereby the Agent may both understand the Object, and by Arguments be induced to embrace it, (as the Learned Parker observes, Thes. de Trad. Pecc. ad vitam Th. 27.)  
2. Nor was it necessary that those who would obey should be severed from the rest, and be dealt withal apart, etc. p. 67.  
Rep. This we also assent hearty unto.  
3. Nor was it necessary, that effectual care should be taken that they should actually reach all, and be applied to every individual person, p. 67.  
Rep. Here is a strange loss we are put to for an Antecedent to the Relative, They. The only one that I can meet with is, public declarations of the Divine will touching man's duty, p. 66. and Divine Edicts, p. 67. and I cannot fathom the reason of the denial of their necessity to their two ends by himself assigned, Man's Obedience, and the Decorum of the Divine Government; at least if he means by them the Gospel, (as I gather from his after-discourse.) If he intends by his Relative They, determinative influences to holy actions, to which the nature of man is now viciously inclined, (as he elsewhere speaks, Post. p. 40, & 35, compared) I cannot find that Antecedent in his whole Discourse foregoing: yet the following passages might give a suspicious person some ground to pitch upon this latter for Mr. H's meaning. And thus [by messengers running from Nation to Nation, some to communicate, others to inquire after the tidings of the Gospel] how easily, and even naturally would the Gospel soon have spread itself through the world? Let. p. 69. I confess that term naturally will not down with me: for I have always seen cause to own Dr. Sibs' weighty observation, in his Soul's Conflict, That though there are seeds of the Law, yet there are none of the Gospel in man by nature. But upon second thoughts to do Mr. H. all the right I can, out of love to his person, and the truth, I find, That the They refers to the Divine Edicts of the Gospel, which he supposes not needful to be immediately by the Ministry; but the transmission of it from those that have heard it published by them, may suffice to others. But to what end he expatiates upon this I do not know; though I do what ill use Mr. John Goodwin in his Pagans debt and dowry, makes of this very notion. Sed meliora spero.  
4. Nor was it incongruous that God should provide by some extraordinary means that his gracious tenders might not finally be rejected by all. Let. p. 74.  
Rep. Yet it seems not of such absolute necessity (as I always conceived it to be) if by the dispensations of God towards the whole community of mankind, [whereof he reckons instances, and adds] they might understand God to have favourable propensions towards them, and that though they have offended him, he is not their implacable enemy; and might by his goodness be led to repentance. Let. p. 75, 77, compared. For thus Mr. John Goodwin argues against the absolute necessity of the Gospel strictly taken. And in Phrases so near, that my fancy is ready to abuse me with a mistake, that not J. H. but J. G. is now discoursing. Rom. 2.4, The long-suffering of God and goodness of God are said to lead men to Repentance, because they testify according to a rational and clear interpretation, a willingness and readiness in God to receive all such into grace and favour with himself, who shall unfeignedly repent of their sins. So Mr. Goodwin, Pagans debt and dowry, pag. 13. And he adds, There is no other consideration but this, (at lest none without this) in respect whereof the patience and bountifulness of God can be said to lead, i.e. to persuade or invite to repentance. There is no motive or persuasive, whereof sinners are capable unto repentance, without hope of pardon upon repentance. Id. Ib. And concludes you see it clear from the Scripture, that even Heathen men, and those that want the History of the Gospel have yet a sufficiency of means whereby to believe, and so to prevent the wrath and indignation which is to come. Mr. Goodwin, Ib. p. 14. I must profess I am none of Mr. J. G's Proselytes, who ever be; nor was Mr. Obadiah How, a most worthy person, and kinsman of our Learned Antagonist, who hath learnedly and largely confuted him, in a Tract entitled significantly, The Pagan Preacher silenced, out of whom I shall transcribe his Answer to Mr. J. G's Explication of Rom. 2.4. of Heathens. This second Chapter relates to the Jews, whom he reprehends because by their Law they would condemn the Gentiles as sinners, when they committed the same things. But that the patience [and goodness of God] afforded to the Jews was without the word, I think Mr. G. will not affirm, which is the cause why the Apostle concludes the Jews under a great inexcusability, because the ministry of the word superadded to the light of nature, became not efficacious to restrain them from sin; and from this very Argument he argues against the Jews, v. 17, 18. still supposing that these persons enjoying the patience of God, v. 4. had the letter of the Gospel. So far Mr. Ob. How, p. 52.  
5. As to those with whom God's Methods succeed not well, it is to be considered, that he doth not apply himself to every (or to any person) immediately, and severally, after some such tenor of speech as this; I know thee to be a profligate, hopeless wretch, and that thou wilt finally disregard whatsoever I say to thee, and consequently perish, and become miserable. But however (though I foresee most certainly thou wilt not, yet I entreat thee to hear and obey, and live. Let. p. 79. And afterwards, What is endeavoured for the reducement of such— is by substituted Ministers, that know no more of the event than they do themselves, p. 81.  
Rep. Nor doth God apply himself to sinners in such a tenor of speech with reference to Predetermination of those natural actions; which because such need a cause acting efficiently for the production of them: though he knows (without special grace which to them he affords not) a moral obliquity will adhere to them. And it is as true, that what God does for the reducement of them is by Ministers, who know as little who are Predetermined to good, and who to sinful actions, as the Saints or Sinners so Predetermined.  
Having discoursed thus more laxely, Mr. H. proceeds to a more strict disquisition of two things.  
1. What may be alleged out of God's word in reference to them that finally perish in their wickedness, which can be thought not consistent with sincerity to have inserted, upon the supposed foresight of so dismal an issue? Let. p. 82. And he instances in Gods professing to will the salvation of all, 1 Tim. 2.4, Not to desire the death of him that dieth, Ezek. 18.32; Yea, and professeth himself grieved that any perish, Psalm 81.12, 13. Ib.  
In answer to which Scripture in general (besides many things said well): he says, That which Gods declarations do amount unto is, etc. That if they neglect to attend to these external discoveries of the word, etc. they are not to expect he should overpower them by a strong hand, and save them against the continual disinclination of their own wills. p. 89, 90.  
Reply. I am not able to make sense of the last words: For I understand not what overcoming by a strong hand (in a sinner's case) God can make use of, that leaves the will under disinclination to salvation; And they seem to be repugnant to another Clause referring to the same persons: that they cannot promise themselves such power shall be used with them, as shall finally overcome their averse disaffected hearts. p. 90.  
2. Mr. H. adds, Whatsoever extraordinary Acts, God may do upon some to make them willing. p. 90.  
Reply. I am not well satisfied (because I am not ignorant of the Arminians apprehension about Paul's Conversion) that Mr. H. calls those Acts by which God makes some men willing, extraordinary: for though they are supernatural, yet they are ordinary to all that are willing. It seems to imply, that some are made willing by ordinary acts, and others by extraordinary: And so it is an ill-sounding word.  
3. Mr. H. at last gives us the import of the above-cited Scripture, That they really signify the obedience and blessedness of those his Creatures that are capable thereof, to be more pleasing and agreeable to his nature and will, than that they should disobey and perish, which is the utmost can be meant [particularly] by those words, God will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. p. 93, 94.  
Reply. As these words sound they do not gratify my ear: For I cannot understand, that the Connexion of Disobedience and Destruction, should not be as agreeable to Gods Will and Nature, as the Connexion of Obedience and Salvation. I take the import of 2 Cor. 2.15, We [Apostles] are unto God a sweet savour of Christ, in them that are saved, and in them that perish: that God takes pleasure in the perishing of unbelievers, as well as in the saving of believers.  
2. Yet in sano sensu, I admit them as the most learned and pious Davenant, sometime Bishop of Salisbury, explains the matter: When God commandeth any thing which is good, he unfeignedly liketh and loveth such actions, and can do no other; his own natural goodness, and holiness terminating, Voluntatem divinae complacentiae [i. e. the will of divine Complacence] unto all holy actions by whomsoever performed, Animadv. on Hoard, p. 350. And God's meaning when he offereth any grace to men, is, that they should perform such actions whereunto such grace conduceth; and his meaning when he promiseth glory to any man if he believeth and perseveres, is truly to perform it if he do so. Id. pag. 353. And not to sever the learned Bishop's sentiments: To Mr. Hoards notion [the same with Mr. Howes], that mercy is more natural and pleasing to God than Vindicative Justice, which is his strange work; He doth not willingly afflict, etc. [for which are quoted, Mich. 7.18. Isa. 28.21. Lam. 3.33]. The Bishop replies, That is said to be natural and pleasing to God, which comes originally from himself, and is not an act depending upon the misdeserts of the Creature. p. 206. As for Vindicative Justice it may be called a strange work, because it is opus occasionatum [i. e. a work occasioned] by man's transgression. p. 287.  
And once more to cite this eminent Divine; The absolute liberty and supreme dominion, which God hath in the preparing, or not preparing of effectual grace, wherein the absolute decrees of Election and nonelection do show themselves, is a thing as natural and pleasing to God as his mercy. p. 287.  
4. Mr. H. asserts, That God doth so far really will the salvation of all, as not to omit the doing that which may effect it, if they be not neglectful of themselves, but not so as to effect it by that extraordinary exertion of power, which he thinks fit to employ upon some others. Let. p. 105.  
Reply. This must be mixed with a grain of salt: If this omission of Gods refer only to the use of means for effecting men's salvation, we grant, that in genere mediorum, God is not wanting to them that live under the Gospel-dispensations. And in this sense God representing himself under the similitude of an Husbandman, truly says of Israel, What could have been done more to my Vineyard, that I have not done in it? Isa. 5.4. But if Mr. H. intends (as the words seem to sound) that salvation may be obtained by the use of means, without that exertion of power (which he calls extraordinary) whereby that end is obtained in some, I cannot take such an assertion upon his bare word. I have been taught from my Childhood (and see no cause to suspect the credulity of that age abused to draw me into a misbelief) that such an exertion of power, as whereby God raised Christ from the dead, is universally necessary to make the means of salvation effectual to their end.  
5. Mr. H. professes his dislike of the common distinction of Voluntas beneplaciti & signi, in this present case [viz. to explain how God wills the salvation of all, and yet only of some] under which such as coined, and those that have much used it, have only rather I doubt not, concealed a good meaning than expressed by it a bad one. p. 106.  
Reply. And whoever coined it (which I take it was Hugo de S. Victore) few of our Divines but have used it, that have dealt in any Controversy which gave an occasion for it. And why should Mr. H. charge them with a concealment of a good meaning, which they have so often discovered? If Mr. H. only dislkes the terms, I should not contend with him, for I can give him their sense in others from the learned Davenant; The will of God termed voluntas simplicis complacentiae, i. e. the will of simple complacency [which is the same with vol. signi] and that which is termed voluntas absoluta or essicax i. e. an absolute or efficacious will [which is the same with vol. beneplaciti] may well stand together. God wills that all men believe and be saved with the will of complacence; God wills and decrees to permit that some continue in unbelief, and be not saved but perish, with the Absolute will. The former will in effect is but a conditional will; As if the Apostle had said, God will have all men to be saved, if all men shall believe in Christ; and to believe in Christ is an act so well pleasing and so agreeable unto God's will, that wheresoever it is found it shall be rewarded. But notwithstanding the extent of this will unto all men, there is in God an absolute will of permitting some to continue in their unbelief, and so perish, Dau. ag. Hoard, p. 220.  
But it must be observed, that whereas the most learned Bishop seems to attribute a Conditional will to God above; he afterwards explains himself, Mere or purely conditional Decrees agree not with the perfection of the Divine Nature. The speeches therefore cited out of Scripture [He that believes shall be saved, etc.] do not imply a Conditional Will in God suspended for any moment of time, and then post purificatam conditionem, i. e. after the Condition performed] becoming an absolute and effectual will, etc. But these conditional Decrees are grounded on some absolute revealed Decree of God, to the Performance whereof he hath tied himself. For example, it is an absolute Decree of the Divine Will published in the Gospel, that whosoever believeth, etc. shall be saved. From hence is derived that mixed conditional Decree; If Cain, Judas, or any other believe, they shall be saved. Now such mixed conditional Decrees carry no contradiction to the absolute, etc. who seethe not these Propositions may well stand together? I will that if Judas repent and believe, he shall have remission and salvation. I will not to give to Judas the gift of repentance, of faith and of eternal life, Id. p. 225, 226, 227. I have said enough to obviate M. H's exagitation of the terms Vol. signi & beneplaciti, which are not worth the trouble of transcribing.  
6. But M. H. adds, And of these faults the application of the distinction of God's secret and revealed Will unto this case, though it be useful in many, is as guilty. Let. p. 108.  
Rep. 1. As to this I say (as the aforesaid Bishop Davenant of M. Hoard); Mr. H. should first have rightly set it down, and then have tried his strength in confuting it, and I shall add his explication of it: We say that there is in God a true will revealed in the Gospel of saving all men that shall believe; and a true will liking, embracing, rewarding faith, holiness, perseverance in all men whomsoever without distinction of persons: And this is the Will called Voluntas simplicis complacentiae [or signi] which neither decreeth nor determineth any thing infallibly concerning the being or not being of such good acts in this or that singular person. This Will we know, and therefore we call it his revealed will. There is also in God a secret will of bringing some men to faith, perseverance, and the Kingdom of heaven, and of not bringing others to any of these: this Will we know not, and therefore we call it, the secret Will, Dau. ag. Hoard, p. 221: only 'tis to be noted, that when the Reverend Bishop says, This secret will of God we know not; it must be understood, with reference to the particular persons whom God intends to work faith, etc. in; for we know in general, that there are some persons whom God will be thus good unto. I add this to prevent a Cavil, which may seem very acute to them that use it: If God's will of good pleasure [or absolute will] be secret, how come we to know it? or if it be revealed, how is it secret? And then the members of the distinction are confounded (as Mr. H. objects, p. 107.) who should have done well to have told us, in what cases it is useful (though not in the present case). For I dare offer myself to disprove the use of it in any case, upon the same grounds that Mr. H. can the use of it in this.  
Rep. 2. And yet when Mr. H. hath so solemnly declared his dislike of our distinction, he owns it himself, but in other words, which are the explication of our terms: And whereas it may be thought to follow hence, that hereby we ascribe to God a liableness to frustration and disappointment, that is without pretence: The resolve of the Divine will in this matter [viz. the holiness and salvation of all men] being not concerning the event what man shall do, but concerning his duty what he should, and concerning the connexion between his duty and his happiness, Let. p. 112.  
Now to leave Mr. H. inexcusable for the impertinency of his exception against our Distinction; let us see how Dr Twisse (a man that much used this distinction, and therefore blamed by Mr. H.) explains it. There is no contradiction, says he, between these two wills Divine: For Voluntas signi is improperly called a Will, for it signifies only man's duty, or what he should do, as what will be pleasing to God if it be done. But Voluntas beneplaciti is properly and simply a will, (viz. whereby is decreed whatsoever shall come to pass, by Gods either efficiency, or permission) Twisse Vind. Gr. l. 1. p. 1. §. 12. p. 140. It is evident to any intelligent Collator, that M H's and Dr. Twisse's sense is the same, and so Mr H. hath blamed himself in blaming Twisse.  
7. And if it should be insisted, that in asserting God to will what by his Laws he hath made become man's duty, even where it is not done, we shall herein ascribe to him, at least an ineffectual and imperfect will, as that which doth not bring to pass the thing willed: It is answered, that Imperfection were with no pretence imputable to the Divine will, merely for not effecting every thing whereto it may have a real propension, Let. p. 115, 116.  
Reply. We had need tread warily here, for our way is strewed with Daggers, I mean, with terms repugnant to each other.  
1. If God be understood but to will man's duty, not the event [his obedience to it] there's no colour for the Objection, that the will of God is ineffectual; for it is effectual (when declared) to make man's duty what it pleases.  
2. If by willing man's duty, he means the event [the performance of it], then is there an Objection indeed, but without solution, and not capable of any.  
3. Take it how you will, there's no answer to the Objection. For this is, That Gods will is ineffectual if that come not to pass which is willed: and that is, That God hath no will at all of that which comes not to pass [which yet the Objection supposes] for what else is the meaning of a real Propension, which differs as much from willing as an habit from an act, or as the power of seeing when my eyes are shut, from my actual seeing when they are open?  
8. Nor could any course have been taken that was fit in himself, and more agreeable to sincerity [viz. than counsels, and exhortations, and whatsoever means God uses to prevent men's sins]. There are only two ways to be thought on besides, either that God should wholly have forborn to make overtures to man in common, or that he should efficaciously have overpowr'd all into a compliance with them. And there is little doubt, but upon sober consideration both of these will be judged altogether unfit, Let. p. 121.  
Reply. As to the former of these two ways, I have nothing to oppose; As to the Latter, there is a great deal of doubt; and Mr. H. implies so much when he says, it is loss obvious.  
9 Mr. How proceeds to show the unfitness of God's efficacious overpowering all men into a compliance with his Overtures to them, because of two congruities in the course taken for the Government of the World.  
1. That it be steady and uniform; not interrupted by frequent, extraordinary and anomalous actions.  
2. That he use a royal Liberty, of stepping out of his usual course sometimes, as he sees meet, p. 131, 132; and adds, If we apply them to the affairs of Grace, there is something correspondent. That ordinarily [grace] be sought and expected, in the use of ordinary means. And that sometimes its Sovereignty show itself in preventive exertions; and in working so Heroically, as none have beforehand, in the neglect of its ordinary methods, any reason to expect, p. 138.  
Repl. 1. This Answer is not fitted to the Question. The Question is, Whether it be fitting for God efficaciously to overpower all men into a compliance with the overtures he makes to them in common? The Answer is, It is not fit for God to overpower m●n, without making any overtures to them at all: or to alter the terms and keep the sense, the Question is, Whether it be fitting, that God should give all men special grace, in the use of means? And the Answer is, It is not fitting, that God should give all men special grace, without the use of means. An admirable incogitancy in a man of parts. If the Question had been about the fitness of Gods converting all men (whom he thinks meet to convert) as he did Saul, by a voice from Heaven; the Answer had been akin to the Question: (though even Saul was not converted without means, but without ordinary means).  
2. I am at a loss for a Reason, why it should be unfit for God efficaciously to overpower all men into a compliance with the means (supposing what I hope Mr. H. will not deny, I am sure will never be able to disprove; that no man will ever comply with the means, that is not overpowr'd thereunto) unless it be this, that it is unfit for God to bestow grace, and salvation upon all men (which would be a very hard saying).  
Reply. 2. As to his second Thesis, if it be (as 'tis pretended) an Answer to the Question proposed. I Answer, That though it be fitting enough for God to use a Royal liberty in giving grace to some, and not to others; yet I understand not that the suspension of his Liberty, and binding up himself to give grace to all, had been any way unfit. We poor Mortals, I am certain, are very unfit to judge what is fit or unfit for God to do. We may rest satisfied that God does nothing but what becomes him: but we shall intermeddle in things too high for us, if we pass sentence, that for God to do otherwise in many instances than he hath done, would unbecome him. God hath permitted the whole race of mankind to turn Rebels to his Sovereign Majesty, and but some part of the Angelical nature. This became him to do, because he hath done it. But suppose he had prevented the Rebellion of all his rational Creatures; or man's, and not the Angels; or the Angels, and not man's; or permitted the Rebellion of all the Angels, (as he hath of all mankind); or restored the Angels, and left man in his own ruins: would Mr. How adventure to say, that upon sober consideration any of these ways would have been judged altogether unfit for God to have taken?  
10. Mr. How proceeds, and acquaints us, that it were incongruous that a whole order of Intelligent creatures should be moved only by inward impulses:— And that the faculties, whereby men are capable of moral Government, should be rendered to this purpose [viz. the Improvement of means] useless and vain. And that they should be tempted to expect to be constantly managed as mere Machine's, that know not their own use, Let. pag. 142, 143.  
Reply. Either this Harangue is impertinent, or it borders as near upon Arminianism as Scotland does upon England. If Mr. H's meaning be, that it is incongruous for God to overpower men, that neglect the means [as his words p. 142, imply] whereas the Question he undertook to Answer is, Whether it be congruous for God to overpower all (as he does some) that use the means, than his Discourse is besides the business; or if he would insinuate, that the course which God takes with some [though not with all] in overpowering them, is to manage them as Machine's, and render their natural faculties vain and useless; This is Arminius' Charge upon the Protestant Doctrines of the irresistible operation of special grace.  
To draw now to a close, after too long a Discourse, (that I may not tyre my Reader) I shall only request him, that he would duly consider, that of Mr. H's Principles there are these desperate consequences, (which I have so much charity as to believe he does not see, and (so) nor own,) That God is justled out of his proper place; I mean, of being the first cause of all the Creatures actions, and the Creature put in his stead, as being represented able to use its powers, as it pleases. That one great Perfection of the Divine Nature, viz. Foreknowledge of future Contingencies, is separated from it, by denying the only true ground of such Foreknowledge, the Divine Decrees. And hence, the Providence of God in governing the actions of his Creatures is left in great danger of falling, because a Superstructure raised without a foundation. For how can God govern those actions which depend not immediately upon him in their production; nor are foreknown in his Eternal Decree, wherein lies the model of all he intends to exercise his Government upon, in time?  
In sum, his Doctrine opens a wide door for Atheism, and deserves as sharp a censure as one gave of Epicurus' denial of Providence, Verbis Deum posuit, re su●tulit; i.e. He acknowledged God in words, but denied him in deed. For as all Arguments proving any of the Divine Attributes, do prove a God, because those terms are essentially convertible: so those Arguments which deny any Divine Attributes, do also deny a God upon the same ground.  
I shall give the Reader no further trouble but what (if he be conscientious) he will willingly give himself of examining what he hath read, and judging according to the evidence of Truth; for which in this momentous Controversy, and not for victory I have entered into this public contest with my ancient and learned Friend, Mr. How, which I take to be sufficiently warranted by that passage of holy Writ: But when Peter was come to Antioch I withstood him to the face, because he was to be blamed, Gal. 2.11. Whence it may be duly collected, that the reverence or estimation of any man's person ought not to hinder a public reproof, when he is guilty of a public scandal.    
FINIS.  

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