Arcana Aulica: OR WALSINGHAM'S MANUAL; OF Prudential Maxims, FOR THE statesman And the COURTIER. LONDON: Printed for James Young, and are to be sold by John Williams, at the Sign of the Crown in St. Paul's Church yard. 1652. THE PRINTER TO THE Discreet and Understanding READER. HEre is a child of Chance, that like another Moses in a Wicker Basket, was lately put to Sea; and by the Hand of Providence guided unto this shore, as unto Pharaoh's Daughter; by the taking of a small Irish pirate, in which it was found; and appearing a Babe both promising, and very beautiful, was recommended unto me to Nurse. Of what Birth it is, I can give no certain account; all that I can assure you of, is this, That having perused it through, some very knowing persons have affirmed, That our Language is yet enriched with nothing upon this Subject equal unto it. The Clothes that it was wrapped in, say little towards the discovery of its Parents; for it was directed as a present unto Ormond, the Titular viceroy of Ireland, from one Walsingham; who though he professes to have given it this English Habit it now wears, yet he is able to name no Father for it: Whether it be some other nameless Author, as he affirms, that first gave it light, I must of necessity leave that as doubtful as I found it: And it is a needless curiosity to inquire further, since no man is injured in that concealment, but the Author; who it seems is well content to lose the glory of it. What value this Walsingham sets upon it, you may read in a part of his Letter unto Ormond, which I here insert. YOur Excellency will herewith receive a piece, that if not too much lessened in passing through, and from the hand that sends it, truly not unworthy the acceptance of so great a Person. It is some years since I first met with it in a Manuscript, and in a foreign Language, when I took so great a fancy to it, That it hath ever since been an inseparable Companion, a daily Manual unto me: I have since that time found it published in Latin, but still as nameless as at our first acquaintance. The divulging of it, seriously, I did much lament, and that for a twofold Reason; One was, to see it come abroad so lamely, and so much injured; another was, to find it divulged at all: For surely, it is a Tract not intended for the unskilful palate of the vulgar; and indeed, only meant, and fit for the wisest souls, and the maturest, and best tempered Judgements. And the most part of men are either by nature so depraved, that they cannot forbear the practice of those evils, that they find discoursed upon, only for their instruction; or else so sand-blind and ignorant, that they must needs be scandalised with, and stumble at those precepts which are here recommended unto no man's practice, but laid by the Authors skiful hand, as necessary Sea-marks upon the shelves of danger and deceit; of which, the Ocean of a public life, God knows, is full. And a little after he adds, In this small Volume, you will find (my Lord) enchaced skilfully together as precious jewels, the choicest Precepts that Story and Experience both together, have produced for the instruction of those that move within the sphere of Business, and the Court: It is a curious landscape, wherein that great Territory, with all the blemishes and beauties of it, is all contracted to an easy view: It is a perfect Compass fitted to those Seas, with Points adapted to every wind that blows there: It is an exact Card, describing all the Coast; and as there is not a road, a Creek, or harbour, overpast in all that Channel; so is there not a Rock, a Flat, or quicksand that is omitted. But surely it is done to keep us from, and not to lead us to those dangers, &c. This, and more delivers he in commendations of it; and what he says, cannot but be of some Authority in the case: Since upon enquiry I do find, That he is one, who though very young, in a little time grew up under the Wings and favour of the Lord Digby, to such credit with the late King, That he came to be admitted to the greatest Trusts; and was prevented only by the fall of the Court itself, from climbing there unto an eminenter height. This much Reader I thought fit to say for thy satisfaction, and by way of civility to him; contrary to whose design I have published this Treatise, and until another Father can be found for it, have prefixed his name unto it, under the Title of his Manual. Farewell. THE CONTENTS. CHAP. 1. THe several ends of Courtiers, and the means to maintain them. Fol. 1. CHAP. 2. The ways to obtain the Prince's favour. Fol. 4. CHAP. 3. The ways to become known to the Prince. Fol. 3. CHAP. 4. The humour and Inclinations of the Prince, and his Familiars are to be known. Fol. 7. CHAP. 5. The Prince's affections, whether, and how to be complied with. Fol. 11. CHAP. 6. The scarcity and Condition of honest men, in corrupt and vicious Courts; The swarms of ill men, and their arts of ingratiating themselves. Fol. 15. CHAP. 7. Whom, when, and how we ought to flatter; the nature of a free and tolerable flattery, and the necessity of it in Court. Fol. 19 CHAP. 8. How to manage the Counsels of a Prince. Fol. 21. CHAP. 9 The sudden resolutions of Princes, how to be moderated. Fol. 26. CHAP. 10. The several natures, and tempers of Princes, how to be handled; with the art of Courtiers in introducing their Companions. Fol. 31. CHAP. 11. That Age, Business, Custom, and Sickness, alter the temper of the Bodies and Constitution of the minds of Princes. Fol. 39 CHAP. 12. How much Impostors are able to do by flattering Princes; and how a Prince is to beware of them. Fol. 43. CHAP. 13. Of the Familiars and Servants of the Prince, and the ways to win them. Fol. 46. CHAP. 14. Four kinds of Noble Courtiers; how to be handled, and made use of; how warily we ought to deal with inconstant Princes. CHAP. 15. The three other kinds of Noble Courtiers; how they are to be dealt with. Fol. 54. CHAP. 16. The meaner sort of Courtiers, how they are to be handled; as also such as are enemies to us, for the sake of others, to whom we relate. Fol. 58. CHAP. 17. How we are to treat with those Enemies that hate us for our own sakes; also concerning threats and injuries. Fol. 61. CHAP. 18. The injuries of the more and less powerful, how to be avoided, and handled; the several artifices of reconciliation. Fol. 65. CHAP. 19 Of Envy, how it is to be overcome. Fol. 69. CHAP. 20. Of Emulation, the Sister of Envy, and the remedies of it. Fol. 73. CHAP. 21. How to avoid a threatening ruin; and when it is upon us, how to make the best use of it: Examples of the fall of great men. Fol. 76. CHAP. 22. Boasting, Presumption, Arrogance, too much Familiarity, Pride, and Perfidy, noted with examples. Fol. 88 CHAP. 23. How we must, not only take care to preserve the Prince's favour, but also that of those in Power about him. Fol. 91. CHAP. 24. Pride even in the meanest persons at Court, noted with examples; as also Treachery in betraying the Princes secrets. Fol. 94. CHAP. 25. The causes, kinds, and examples of Conspiracies with the Prince's Enemies. Fol. 97. CHAP. 26. That our Courtier must not be the Author of Hazardous Counsels, the variety of Errors, whereby the Prince's favour is lost. Fol. 98. CHAP. 27. Of the A●ts whereby Courtiers are supplanted by others; and first, under pretence of specious employments abroad, or of calling them from their Commands, to attend upon the King's Person. Fol. 101. CHAP. 28. How Calumnies are used to make men suspected, or hated by the Prince. Fol. 105. CHAP. 29. Examples of other treacheries in suborned witnesses, and forged Letters. Fol. 114. CHAP. 30. Confirmation of slanders under the colour of a feigned friendship; and the inclinations of the Prince to the accuser. Fol. 117. CHAP. 31. The chief arts and ways of slanderers. Fol. 120. CHAP. 32. The deceits and danger of Courtpraises, and masked Courtiers. Lastly, The third way of oppressing our Courtier by force. Fol. 121. CHAP. 33. Sometimes the Princes own ill and cruel Nature, envying the deserts of his Servants, is cause of the Courtiers fall; and this, how it is to be handled. Fol. 127. CHAP. 34. How to preserve our favour and Office, with the succeeding Prince. Fol. 130. CHAP. 35. Ostentation of the Prince's favour, to be avoided: Something also concerning our Friends and followers. Fol. 134. CHAP. 36. How to manage and dispense the Prince's favour, advices, and comforts in adversity, with other rules. Fol. 136. CHAP. 37. How to make a judgemeut of the constancy, or change of the Prince's affection to us. Fol. 140. CHAP. 38. The Prince's favour to Women: Instructions for the Prince's Mistresses; benefits conferred on Princes, often make those persons hated by them, with other documents. Fol. 141. CHAP. 39 Sundry precepts concerning the Pleasures, and Inclinations of the Prince, &c. Fol. 145. CHAP. 40. Concluding with many choice, and necessary Admonitions. Fol. 149. ARCANA AULICA, OR Walsingham's Manual; Of Prudential Maxims, for the Statesman and the Courtier. CHAP. 1. The several ends of Courtiers, and the means to maintain them. IT is necessary that all men, who desire with prudence and order, to govern their Affairs; do in the first place, propose unto themselves, an end whereunto all their actions must tend? Those that look towards the Court, do not all fix upon the same ends; some the hope of gain, and others the desire of honour; leads; the Ambition of Rule; draws not a few; and very many steer that Course, merely out of a busy inclination, to the Engrossing, Crossing, or Interposing in other men's affairs; whilst the number of those is very small, who Princitively intend the honour, Safety, and Advantage of the Prince. But though their ends be diverse, yet the way to attain, to whatever end any man there hath pitched upon, is but one, and Common to all that move in that Sphere, to wit, the favour of the Prince; in obtaining which the industry, and labour of all Courtiers is employed. In order whereunto it is in the first place necessary, that you be known unto your Prince; and then either by your behaviour, your parts, your actions, or some other laudable means, that you make yourself Grateful in his eye; yet there are those for whom the splendour of their Family, the authority of their Office, or convenience of their employment (whether it be high, or low, come unto them by inheritance, or got with money) hath prepared an access unto the Prince's person; so that they being hereby exempted, from the toil of seeking how to become known unto the Prince, find half their work performed unto their hands; whilst those to whom these introductions are denied, find their greatest difficulties in their first beginnings: But when they are once known unto the Prince, as he judges them fit for his Service; they are often preferred and trusted before others; by reason that being lifted up from a low Condition, or a mean Fortune; they are more addicted and subject to the Princes will, whom they submissively reverence, as the only Author of their advancement. It is otherwise with Courtiers that are born Great, for upon those the Dignity either of their employment, or their Family, imposes a necessity of having a regard unto their own honour, and of referring sometimes their own to the Prince's opinion; who besides is more oft unwilling to promote these through a certain emulation, or fear, lest their swelling greatness should insult at last against him that is the Author of it; and he not able to repress them without danger to himself and his Kingdom; whilst on the other side, the oppression of him that riseth from a mean Condition, is far more easy; only let the Prince turn his back upon him, or abandon him to the great ones (who for the most part look with envy upon such) and he is lost. I intend here only those wise Princes that have known, how to limit within due bounds, the Power of those they love, and advance; not conferring all the authority and trust of his Kingdom upon one of these men, in subjecting even the Peers unto him; which having been done by some Princes, did seldom or almost never succeed well. CHAP. 2. The ways to obtain the Prince's favour. THe ways whereby Courtiers get into authority and favour with the Prince are two, above all other most usual and frequented. The one is of those that seek after public Offices and Dignities, Climbing up the stairs of honour till they come within a stage of the favourite himself; The other is of those that follow the Court, sedulously seeking all occasions of being employed in the secret affairs of the Prince, and made use in business of the greatest trust. The last of which ways, is without doubt the shortest, and traced with their steps, who have lived in the greatest favour with their Princes; as Maecenas was to Augustus, and Sallust both to him, and his Successor Tiberius, of whom Tacitus, Annal. 3. Sallust, although the ways of honour were easy unto him, imitating Maecenas, without the senatorial Dignity, outwent in Power many that had been honoured, both with triumphs and the consulship, & varying from the custom of the Ancients through his delicacy, and neatness, seemed prone to nothing but the Plenty and abundance of luxary; although he had indeed a vigorous mind, capable of the weightiest business; by so much the more sharp and active by how much the more he made sh●w of dulness and sloth. Like to him was Mella, of whom speaks the same Tacitus, Annal. 12. Mella born of the same Parents, that Gallio and Seneca were; through a Preposterous ambition laid aside all pretence to public honours; to the end, that being only Roman Knight, he might equal in power those that had been Consuls; Besides, he believed it the shortest way to the getting of money, to be employed in Agencies, and soliciting the Prince's business. CHAP. 3. The ways to become known to the Prince. THe ways of becoming known and grateful to the Prince are various, according to the diversity of the Courtiers, and the times; there are some that make themselves known by their actions signally, either profitable, or glorious; or else by a more than Common virtue, and honesty. The Commendation of others gives to many, both access to, and interest in the Prince, which is indeed the most usual way of all. For Princes live in such a degree of eminence above others, and are ●o hedged in with the number of Peers, and train of Veterane Courtiers that a stranger can hardly thrust in amongst the throng that stand in his way, unless either there be some one to take him by the hand, and make his passage, or else that himself by some extraordinary enterprise do attract the eyes of all men upon him, and amongst others, those of the Prince. And here the fact of the Architect Dimacrates, or as some call him Stasicrates, is very memorable. He desiring to become known unto the Great Alexander, when all the Courtiers had refused to bring him to the King, bethinks of a way of presenting himself all naked, anointed with oil, a poplar Crown on his head, upon his left shoulder a lion's Skin, and holding a great Club in his Right hand: And thus Accoutred he comes into Alexander's presence, as he was sitting in his Throne. The novelty of the thing drew the Eyes of all upon him, and moved Alexander himself so far, as he caused the man to be brought unto him; And though he approved not of what he propounded, yet he commanded he should be enroled amongst his Family. I do not bring this example to persuade anybody with the like foolery, to insinuate himself into the Prince's favour, but to the end I may demonstrate, That those who are strangers and unknown, unless they be holpen by some one in great authority, can hardly screw themselves into so great a train, as do surround the Prince, except either by some memorable action as we have said before or, by some unusual accident, they deserve as the Poet says. With fingers to be pointed out, For some strange thing amongst the rout. CHAP. 4. The humour and inclinations of the Prince, and his familiars are to be known. OUr young Courtier, who desires to be known and loved by the Prince, must observe well the manners and conditions, not only of the Prince himself, but also of such of his followers, as he most trusts, and relies upon; together with the Peers, and all those others who may either afford him any help, or countenance; or else on the contrary stirred up either with emulation, fear, envy, hate, their own, or their Friends concernments, work him any prejudice. It is chiefly necessary that he make a full discovery of the inclinations and customs of the Prince, that for the most part follow the temperature of his body; which though by wary Princes, they be much concealed, and smothered, yet it seldom happens but that sometimes they break out, and as it were laying aside disguises, show themselves. Since all their actions are so exposed to the eyes of men, it cannot be, but some one or other, must observe whereunto their inclinations tend. Sometimes they are so oppressed and vexed with the weight of business, that forgetting their Artifices, they betray their dispositions; Tiberius himself although a most skilful Master in dissembling, could not set so good a face upon it, but that time would by little and little, bring all his Arts to light. But since those of other men are so many, the propensions of Princes must needs be diverse, and almost infinite; yet they may be reduced to two heads. The one of which, includes all that tends to the greatness of his State, The other his personal pleasures; His greatness consists either in his Fame and Authority, or in Riches; the duty of his Subjects; or lastly, in the strength and faithfulness of his Armies. In these things he ought to accommodate his endeavours to the nature, and disposition of the Prince's affairs; which he that shall with Dexterity and Skill perform, provided he be neither suspected nor hated for other Reasons, cannot fail of becoming acceptable unto the Prince. Make the same judgement of the pleasures, and vicious affections of the Prince. If he be diffident and of a fearful disposition, believe that a bold informer will be grateful unto him, who sticks not at the displeasure of the great ones, and is ready to execute the Prince's commands, whatsoever they be; as Tacitus ascribes Sejanus. He had a body (says he, Annals 4.) patient of toil, a bold mind; he was a close concealer of himself, and a rash accuser of others: Composed he was of a mixture of flattery, and pride, with an exterior face of modesty; and yet inwardly fraught with an excess of ambition. If the Prince delight in Drunkenness, he will all also take pleasure in men addicted to the same vice; for which cause Tiberius loved Pomponius, and Lucius Piso, of whom Suetonius, Cap. 24. de Tiberio. After this, the Prince to the corruption of public manners, spent two whole days and nights, eating and drinking with Pomponius Flaccus, and Piso; to one of which, he gave immediately the Province of Syria, and to the other the Government of the City, calling them in his Letters, his most pleasant and familiar Friends. The same Tiberius, as Suetonius relates, preferred a most ignoble Fellow to the Questorship, before many Noble pretenders, because at a Banquet, where himself was drinking, he drunk of Nine Gallons of Wine. Their society in their lust, did endear Tigellinus to Nero. Tigellinus was more powerful (saith Tacitus, Annal. 14) in the bosom of the Prince, as being admitted to his most private lusts. So Petronius, that Master of elegance (for those are the Historians words, Annal. 16.) was taken in, amongst few, to the familiarity of Nero; who thought nothing pleasant or sweet, but what Petronius approved of. And according to this example, did Commodus and Heliogabalus, confer all the dignities of the Empire upon men for lust and licentiousness, most like unto themselves. Mutianus was not beloved by Vespasian so much for his fidelity, duty, and the merit of his passed services; as that, because he was more dexterous than others, in feeding his avarice. To Isacius Angelus, who after the death of Theodorus, got the Empire; the same avarice endeared a certain Boy, who though he scarce knew how to write, kept the Accounts of his Exohequer, out of hope only of sharing in the Bribes, which were given him largely, from all those that used his assistance. Manuel Comnenus, also Emperor, seeking some rough exactor and crafty raiser of his Tributes, that might supply his prodigality with money, chose John Pucius, a rude unsufferable man, difficult of access, and intolerable harsh. Whose language, and his looks did well His nature and his office tell. And not content with this, lifted him up to that Authority, that he did not only excel all others in dignity, but also would dare to violate the Edicts of the Prince, and Orders of the Senate; abrogating, under pretence of increasing the Treasury, some of the greatest and most necessary Offices of the Empire: Such as was the Commander of the galleys, the chief strength and defence of that Imperial Monarchy. CHAP. 5. The Prince's affections whether, and how to be complied with. BUt that they, who desire to become acceptable to the Prince, aught to soothe him in all his inclinations, is not only a thing publicly granted, but also too authorized by the daily practice of Courtiers. An honest man will wonder at it, and think that by this rule that teaches us to humour all the dispositions of the Prince, he is shut out from Court; since that Princes often run courses, much astray from the paths of Reason and Justice. Truly, he that desires to lead a life altogether innocent, and remote from the conversation of men addicted to vice, and to their own corrupt inclinations; shall in my opinion, do very well to absent himself from that great courtesan, the Court (if I may so call it) that sometimes corrupts men of the greatest integrity and innocence. Let us see an example or two of this corruption. Festinus the Friend of Maximinus▪ during Valentinians Reign, governed Asia with a wonderful repute of Gentleness and Modesty; being a sharp reprover of the violence and cruelties of Maximinus, and of the calumnies and frauds, wherewith he circumvented many: But at last observing that his Companion by these means had gotten the command of the Praetorian Bands, next in dignity to the Emperor himself, he changed his manner of life, and imitating Maximinus, did many unjust and cruel things. John Pucius (whom I mentioned but a little before) administered for a time the Affairs and Treasures of the Emperor Manuel with great integrity; which caused, that the Emperor's pride and inhumanity was in some sort tolerable to those that were well disposed amongst the Subjects: But at last (as N●cetas witnesseth) giving himself over to the desire of wealth, he was in covetousness inferior to none, that ever had born those offices before him; exhorting his very friends and servants, to imitate his example, as many of them did; and the rest, though better, and incorrupted themselves, yet were fain silently to suffer others to be depraved, for fear of the danger that hung over those that should oppose him. Aristides the first, both in name and nature, being by the Athenians made Treasurer; In the first place, according to his own disposition, and the duty of an honest man, went about to hinder all those that were under his charge, from robbing the Treasury; whereupon they presently accused him of cheating, and bribery, as one of the corruptest persons that ever bore that office; insomuch, that he had like to have been condemned: But being at last quit, and his office still continued, he determined to imitate his Predecessors, and wink at the thefts of his Companions; by which means, he presently reobtained the name of a good man, in the opinion of all. Such things often fall out in the Courts of Princes, either through the malice of those that are in most authority, who can endure no man more virtuous than themselves; or else through the folly and imprudenee of the Prince. The preservation of our integrity in Court, I confess, is therefore very difficult; yet if any, either through the necessity of his Fortune, the eminence of his Birth, the dignity of his office, or the desire of serving, either his Friends or Country, is lead unto it, or called thereunto by the Prince, shall undergo this kind of life; and as occasion shall require, seek to do thereby good unto himself, and serve his Friends; in my judgement he may persist therein, without prejudice to his upright heart, at least-ways for a time. I speak of the Courts of the worst Princes; for to live in the Court of a wise Prince, that loves honest and virtuous men, the difficulty is not so great. In times past, good men did not always undergo public employments with a desire of doing service to their Country, so much as merely to keep wicked and corrupt men out of those charges: And for the same reasons, ought they to seek access unto Tyrannical, and voluptuous Princes; to the end, That if they durst not directly, at least obliquely, and as much as in them lay, they might impede the evil, and pernicious Counsels of the Prince; either by framing delays, and contriving difficulties in his way, or by offering unto him more mild and plausible resolutions. Burrhus and Seneca, who according to the rate of those times, were accounted not only good Courtiers, but virtuous men also; when being made Governors of Nero's youth, they observed the humour of this Prince apt and prone to lust and pleasure; lest he should break out to the rapes of the Noblest Women, they permitted him a Mistress, whereby for a time they kept him in order: Who took into his familiarity Annaeus Serenus for a cloak unto his lust, Who feigning to be in love with this freed Woman, did openly own those gifts to be his (saith Tacitus Annal 13.) which the Prince in private bestowed upon her. This must a good man do, who not being able to master the luxury, liberty, and perverseness of the Prince, must at least divert them, and bend them other ways, whence there is least danger like to arise, either to the public, or the Prince's honour. CHAP. 6. The scarcity and Condition of honest men, in corrupt and vicious Courts; The swarms of ill men, and their Arts of ingratiating themselves. PErhaps some one will say, that it seldom falls out, that a Tyrant or a dissolute Prince, will take into his favour an honest man; I do not deny but it is very rare, but yet I must affirm there are few Prince's Courts in which there are not some good me● found; if not called thither by the Prince▪ at lest drawn thither by their own desire of doing good to others, and infringing the power of evil men: Who stand their ground there to that end, through the assistance o● the best disposed Courtiers, and through the friendship and patronage of some Great man, observing carefully there, that wholesome rule of Lepidus, whom Tacitus (Annal. 4.) brings for an example of a good and wise Courtier, who neither with an unseasonable Contumacy did exasperate the Prince, nor with a sordid flattery soothe him in his vices. The same Tacitus for these reasons commends Capito and Labeo. That age (saith he) had at once two Ornaments of peace; But Labeo was of a more incorrupted liberty, and therefore more esteemed, whilst Capito's pleasing humour was more acceptable to the great ones. I do not deny, but a courtier's life will be far more dificult to an honest man then to another; But withal I must affirm, that the advantage of Glory and content of mind that will arise from thence, will much recompense the trouble of it. Since that, if he carry himself wisely and accommodate himself to those things that he sees, he cannot change nor overcome; I dare say, he will at last become acceptable to the worst of Princes, and dearer than others that are of a worse repute; who seldom manage the Prince's business with a due fidelity and care; or at least not equal to that he might easily promise to himself from the hands of a virtuous and honest man. And hither tends the Counsel of Sallust and Mecaen●s, whereby the first recommended to Julius Caesar, and the latter to Augustus, the choice and friendship of Good men. Because conscience and care of their reputation restrains these more powerfully from dishonest things, than the fear of punishment, or the want of power doth others. But as I have said, the vicious are always in Court in greater thrungs; who chiefly by two ways do ingratiate themselves with the Prince first by flattering and fulfilling whatever he shall please to command; and that by so much the more servilely, by how much the more their hopes of gain are greater. Next for that, Princes are pleased to have those about them in comparison of whom, themselves, though bad God knows, seem to be good. Some there are that think also their lives more secure in the company of those that are most like unto themselves. Dionysius the Tyrant, being requested to expel out of his Court one, who for his villainy was hated by all men, answered, No, he would keep him, lest otherwise he himself should become the most hateful person in the Court. It is natural to those who find themselves obnoxious to any vice, by comparing themselves to those that are worse, to seek to purchase to themselves some show of probity; And it hath been an old trick of Princes, on purpose to choose unlikely Successors to the end, their own acts and virtues migh● appear better and more illustrious: Fo●Tacitus is of opinion, that for no other reason did Augustus adopt Tiberius, whose arrogance and cruelty he knew full well; no●Tiberius choose Caligula. It is principally necessary, that a good man be very sober and circumspect in hi● discourse; for Princes seldom or never love an unwary and careless liberty in any kind of men, how virtuous soever they be. Neither did Plato's freedom with Dionysius succeed well, for therefore was he delivered up to a needy mariner, and sent to be sold in the I'll of Crect; whence being redeemed by certain Philosophers, he was admonished either to abstain wholly from the conversation of Princes, or to speak plausible things: With the like advices did Aristotle furnish his cousin Callisthenes, then going to attend upon Alexander, to wit, That he should very seldom speak, and then never but pleasing things, to him upon whose Tongues-end lay the dsposall of his life. CHAP. 7. Whom, when, and how we ought to flatter; the nature of a free and tolerable flattery, and the necessity of it in Court. THough it be inconsistent with the strictest rules of Morality and virtue, yet of necessity, if you live in Court, you must sometimes so flatter the Prince as may gain him unto you. But all manner of flattery is not tolerable, a base and servile one was displeasing even to Tiberius himself, of whom it is written by Tacitus, Annal. 3. that going out of the Senate he was once heard to say of those flattering Senators in Greek; O men born to slavery. There are circumstances wherein flattery used, is as prejudicial, as when it is wholly omitted; For it happens often, that he whom we flatter too grossly, suspects deceit. It is requisite still that flattery have something of truth, and some show of liberty mixed with it, (it is the opinion of Aeschines and Plutarch) whereby we may persuade not only the Prince, that we speak heartily, and as we think, but others also, and so preserve our Credit. Croesus, who whilst he was a King himself, had learned well the humour of Kings, and what would either please or displease them: When upon a time Cambyses, King of the Persians, demanded of those that were about him, What they thought of him in Comparison of his Father Cyrus: They all affirmed, That he was greater than Cyrus, as who unto his father's Kingdoms had added Egypt, and the dominion of the Sea. When Croesus (Than a Captive) came to speak, he affirmed, That he was much inferior to his Father, by reason that he had as yet begotten none equal to himself. This answer had some taste of freedom, and therefore was more pleasing to Cambyses' vanity, than all the rest had said. That flattery is very notable of Valerius Messala, recorded by Tacitus Annal. 1. Messala Valerius added, That it was convenient the Oath of Allegiance should every year be renewed in Tiberius name; who being demanded by Tiberius, whether he had any commandment from him to give that advice, he answered, That he spoke it of his own accord; and that in what concerned the commonwealth, he would use no man's advice but his own, whatever the offence or danger were: Which was a wonderful unpractised kind of flattery. Like unto this, is that which the same Author relates of Ateius Capito, Annal. 3. Lucius Ennius, a Gentleman of Rome, was accused of Treason for melting the Image of the Prince, and making it into Plate; Caesar commanded he should not be prosecuted for it: Ateius Capito, openly complained with a seeming liberty, that the power of determining in such a case ought not to be taken from the Senate, nor so great a Crime pass unpunished; and that he was slow in resenting his own, lest he should also punish an injury done to the commonwealth. It were easy to bring more examples of this kind, but these are sufficient to instruct those upon whom there is imposed a necessity of flattering, that they may take heed, lest their flattery bring upon themselves, or others, any Private or public damage; it is sufficient that it be such as may sometimes satisfy thy Prince's vanity. CHAP. 8. How to manage the Counsels of a Prince. OUr Courtier ought to beware how he engages himself (though called) in the Counsel of a Proud and Violent Prince; for such as those do ask Counsel in no other sort, then as Xerxes did when he went to invade Greece: He called together the Princes of Asia, as it were to deliberate with them about the Conduct of the War; b●● they being come before him, he said, Le● I should seem without your advice to a● all things according to my own will; 〈◊〉 have called you my Lords to Counsel: ye● I would have you know, that I expect here from you obedient minds, and not troublesome debates. Cambyses, the Predecessor o●Xerxes, being about to Marry his Sister, demanded of his Counsellors, whether any Law of the Persians prohibited such a Marriage; They perceiving the King did no● ask this question, so much to resolve himsel● of any doubt, as to sound the dispositions o● the Nobles, answered, That truly there wa● no love that warranted expressly this tha● the King was about to do, but there wa● one that affirmed, that whatever the King thought fit to do, was lawful. Thus out of the humour of the Prince, and the Nature of the affair, we must first make a judgement, whether it be fit, or safe, when he asks ou● Counsel, to deliver freely our opinions; o● to humour him in his inclinations. You have royal examples of this already, I will now bring you one of a man, who though he were not a King, yet bore the Office of a King; not above an Age ago in Spain: Ferdinand being dead, the Pope and Maximilian the Emperor, exhorted, Charles of Austria then in Flanders to take upon him the title of King of Spain; although his Mother Jone, Ferdinand's daughter were still living, but wholly unfit for Government, by reason of her want of health. The States were hereupon assembled, and before them Cardinal Ximenes, to excuse the novelty of the thing, discoursed excellently of the reasons of what was done. The Grandees more observant of ancient customs, and the Queen, then was fit against a King that was shortly to succeed of Course; Protested very obstinately against it. Ximenes being angry, rises up and tells them, the thing that was treated of, was not to be called in question; neither was there any need of their ndvice in the case: That Kings being to enter upon their Kingdoms, are not to expect the consent of their Subjects; that they who were assembled, were not called out of any necessity, but that they might have ●ccasion by the Promptitude of their suffrages to endear their Prince unto them. But since they interpreted that as a due, which was only a favour, they should see that without their approbation he would proclaim King Charles at Madrid; which example all the rest of the Cities quickly followed. Such a manner of proceeding, not only in these cases, but in all others in a manner do Princes use; scarce asking any man's advice, but either to the end they may Countenance their own resolutions with the consent of many, or else to discover the disposition of the person they advise withal, as Tacitus witnesseth that Tiberius oft did. The Courtier must therefore solicitously sift into the Prince's Mind, lest otherwise he should chance to give offensive Counsel. If the Prince's inclination in the thing debated be doubtful unto him, let him seem to discuss the matter, and so laying down arguments both for the one, and the other side, let him leave the Prince to his own election: Who (if the thing advised of, be not unalterably resolved upon already) having heard the reasons that may be brought against it, if he be discreet, will change his mind. Neither in this case will there be any ground for that bashfulness (of blushing, to seem so much inferior to anybody, as to follow their Counsel) which though it be very hurtful and unbecoming unto them, is very familiar amongst great men; for having said what you can, you leave the freedom of determining all to the Prince's prudence, whereby you will also avoid the danger that many times Counsellors are obnoxious unto, if their advices succeed ill. And if the Prince following his first resolutions meet not with success, he will by so much the more acknowledge and esteem the prudence of that Courtier, who foresaw the approaching misfortune, when it was yet avoidable. If you be pressed to deliver your opinion in ●n unlawful matter, either seek some pre●ence of delay, or else entreat that some third person may be called for the better discussing of the business; whereby the case being more maturely weighed, it may appear what is most for the dignity and safety of the Prince. By this means Burrhus defeated Nero's first attempt against his mother's life; Promising that himself would kill her if she were found guilty; But since it was afforded unto every other person, a trial could not be denied unto his Mother. whilst the examinations are taking, Nero's fury assuages, and his fears grow less, so that his determination, though it was not quite altered, yet it was laid aside to another time. But this manner of proceeding takes not place upon all occasions, being proper only in desperate and ambiguous cases. Moreover, before we adventure upon it, we ought to know, whether the nature of the Prince is compatible with delays: for there are some so headlong and impatient, that there is no means more certain of incurring their displeasure, then by using delays. CHAP. 9 The sudden resolutions of Princes, ho● to be moderated. WHen as it often falls out, our advi●● is not asked in the resolution, bu● for the manner of execution of what is resolved upon already; if the business do seem 〈◊〉 consistent with reason and honesty, we mu●● propose the remotest means we can think 〈◊〉 for the effecting of it; and countenance th●● our advice with the pretences of facility equity, and security; showing withal, tha● sudden undertakings, are full of hazard and difficulty. When we have to do wi●● those impatient kind of Princes, we ough● to be ready, and have always our Wits about us for these sudden occasions, an● then if they be not unsufferably rash and wilful, no doubt but they will follow the course which we shall demonstrate to b● most safe and easy: Yet if their madness be such, that they will not hear mild and gentle Counsels, his adviser may yet excuse th●● his wary prudence with a Care and Affection to the Prince; desiring rather, that things should be done slowly with security, the● rashly with the ruin of his Master. Now if so be, that in that headlong course that the Prince hath wilfully chosen, difficulties or straits do occur, he will much more reflect upon the prudence of him that would have dissuaded him in time, and perhaps for the future, be willing to harken to him, propounding milder ways. Besides this gaining of time doth frequently afford subject of moderating the Prince's passion, and of bridling his desires, or else of letting him see, that what he is about is either wholly impossible, or else cannot be effected without great absurdity. For it after happens, that the ways which Princes propose unto themselves, are accompanied with such circumstances of difficulty, as are not to be overcome; and to these kind of straits, as I would not have you exhort him, so I would not have you too much dissuade him from them, (rather suffer him with a respective silence to take his own course, lest you dissuading out of these difficult ways, he seek out some more easy one of compassing his will;) which otherwise having toiled himself out of breath amongst the Obstacles that he met with, he would voluntarily give the business over. But sometimes it falls out that Princes commit the execution of some Wickedness or Injustice to an honest man: In which case truly (though all good men ought to suffer any violence or misfortune rather than consent to be made the Minister of villainy) I fear the number of these is very few that are so generously resolved, as by a passive disobedience to expose themselves to the sacrifice for another; especially if the occasion offered, and the nature of the Prince admits of no denial, or excuse, nor affords any way of casting that displeasing employment upon some third person. Which later course Burrhus took, Nero resolving the second time upon his mother's murder, full of so much the more care and eagerness, by how much the danger of her contrived shipwreck in the Tyher had produced no other effect, then that the Woman always before malicious and greedy of revenge, was after so great an injury become more enraged then ever. Burrhus and Seneca, being called to Counsel, stood long ambiguous and doubtful what to say, as Tacitus reports Annal. 14. saying: They were both of them a long time silent, fearing lest they dissuade in vain; At last Seneca hitherto the forwarder man, cast his eye upon Burrhus, as if he would have asked, whether the execution of that murder should not be left to the Soldiers; Burrhus prevented him with an answer, and says that the Praetorian Bands were all devoted to Caesar's house, and so mindful of Germanicus, that they would act nothing of cruelty against his Progeny; and therefore that Anicecetus should perform his promise. So he freed both himself and his soldiers, from the execution of that ugly act. I confess, he is not beholding unto you, whom, to save yourself innocent, you shall entangle in such an employment: But should such an occasion happen, I think it fitter that some such man as Anicetus was, should undergo the infamy of such an act, than any virtuous or honest man. Yet the safest way of all is in time to foresee, and in their birth to prevent, and occur to the unjust desires, and the unlawful designs of the Prince; and before they either take Root, or appear above Ground, to suppress and pull them up. There are many, who with seasonable and gentle admonitions, and silken words, as Parisates calls them, have done much good, and had wonderful success in these cases; yet it is necessary, that whosoever would use such remedies as these be of great authority with the Prince, who, must hear as much out of reverence as love: And nevertheless, when all is done, though it may succeed well in this or that case, it will hardly do so in all. I am much pleased with the way of those men, who are of a conceited and pleasant humour, and for that faculty, acceptable with the Prince; who as it were, intending something else, with a fit similitude, or a well chosen story, will represent unto the Prince the danger, and foulness of those Counsels, wherewith he seems to be carried headlong away. But to do this, there is a great nimbleness of wit, and pleasantness of discourse required; besides, they must take heed the Prince smell not out, that himself is the argument of the jest. As Tiberius, who in the Tragedy of Atreus, composed by Scaurus, believed he was reproached of his brother's murder; and Domitian, in that which Helvidius had writ of Paris and Cenon, thought himself upbraided with his divorces: Wherefore it is necessary, that these kind of stories be skilfully interwoven amongst other things, not squaring or appliable to the Prince; and it is very pertinent to this purpose, That they take care not to inculcate too plainly, that matter which makes most to the purpose; though, lest it should quite escape the Prince's observation, it may be, as it were, by a casual repetition i●erated. The conceit and continuance of the story, by how much the greater, and more cheerful it is, by so much the more it will imprint those things that are said; and because they seem to come by chance, not of purpose, or design, they will not distaste the ticklish ear of the Prince. For this kind of moderation, whereby you may neither contribute to the Prince's vices, nor in vain resist them; there are many critical times, and means, which those that attend upon the persons, and are Employed in the affairs of Princes, cannot but meet with. If so be that the case be such, that you must needs contradict the disposition and inclination of the Prince, you must seek out some other passion or humour in him, whereunto he is equally inclined, and so beget a strife and contention in the Prince's mind; but we must carefully pretend still, that what we say, comes from the duty and reverence that we bear him. By this means did Mutianus keep Domitian in orde, and hinder him from joining with Cerealis, as (out of what hopes, I know not) he was about to do, says Tacitus, Hist. 4. CHAP. 10. The several natures, and tempers of Princes, how to be handled; with the art of Courtiers in introducing their Companions. YEt to do these things successfully, it doth much conduce, that we know the inclinations of our Princes, which depend upon the natural temperature of their Bodies. The difference and variety of which is common to them with other men; except, that as they are more powerful than others, so they are less masters of their affections and inclinations; which are for the most part, more violent and more unreasonable in them, then in meaner persons. He, in whom Choler rules, is, Hasty, Proud, and prone to Anger; a lover of Ceremony, and Respect; a sore enemy to those that are but in the least sort refractory; impatient in execution, and rash in resolution; a contemner of all men's opinions, that differ from his own; very apt to commit injuries, yet soon friends with those he hath wronged, if they renew not the memory of passed enmities; but a hater of those that rip up old offences, and to the end, he may prevent such as he is afraid of, watching all occasions of doing them a greater mischief. Whoever hath to do with such a Prince, must always have his eyes and ears open, that he may readily understand and obey the first beck, without making any reply or delay, lest by contradiction the Prince come to suspect him of arrogance, as one that would seem to think himself wiser than he; let him not stick to submit himself to the lowest kind of employments, if need be, though they suit not with his condition. He must be patient of injuries, and no ways mindful of them; but after a wrong, so much the more officious: He must not brag of his merits, lest he should seem to reproach the Prince with them; but rather heap services upon services, lest the memory of those that are past should wear out, and to the end, the pleasure and gratefulness of fresh ones, may revive the remembrance of the old. When the Prince is angry, let him not come near him, for all things displease him then; nèither are those that are dearest unto him, grateful in any thing they can devise, to say or do. Familiarity with such humours as these, turns into contempt; which for that reason, although the Prince invite us to it, is to be avoided: Let all things rather tend to modesty and respect. For these lions, though sometimes they be meek and gentle, are at other times enraged against those they love best, and who are in most authority with them. They that are of a Sanguine Constitution, are for the most part of a pleasant humour, lovers of mirth, and recreation; flying sadness, the seriousness of business, and trouble of debates, lovers of peace, leaving the administration of their affairs to others, in whom they suffer nothing more unwillingly, than complaints. They are courteous, gentle, and free, if not from all, at least, from any grievous injuries; more mindful of benefits received from others, then done by themselves▪ complacent, willing to help, and for the most part liberal. He that lives with such as these, must omit no circumstances of veneration and respect, but very seldom must they treat of business, or serious affairs. Those that are employed in the greatest, and most important Offices, and concernments of the Kingdom, ought not to come near these Princes, before they be either called, or certain that the Prince is not engaged in any recreation; lest otherwise, they should interrupt him in his greatest delights, and make him blush to be surprised by those, who, he may apprehend, are secretly angry, to see him no better entertained. For so when Philip of Macedon, was once at play, it was told him, That Antipater was at the door, who presently troubled, and conscious of his transgression, hid his dice under his Pillow; blushing, that Antipater should catch him at that sport. Therefore with such a Prince, as those that manage the greatest affairs of the Kingdom, in serious and weighty trusts do exceed others; so also are they outgone by others, in a familiar and free access to the Prince's person; who naturally avoids these kind of serious men, as much as may be. Those men that are of a jovial and well tempered disposition, and capable as well of pleasure, as of business, are chie●ly acceptable to these kind of Princes. Provided, That whilst they are out of the Prince's sight, they do not with too much facility and complacence, lose their authority with others; but they must preserve the honour of their rank entire, for without that (as the Proverh says) Familiarity breeds contempt, and contempt gives encouragement to quarrels, upon the first appearance of an injury: Which the Prince being an enemy to trouble and strife, to free himself of, will endeavour to remove him that shall appear most faulty. A melancholy Prince is slow in his Counsels, anxious, thoughtful, diffident, jealous, witty, and for the most part peevish; given to silence, and when he speaks, involving himself in ambiguous words, a dissembler, apt rather to sound other men's opinions, then deliver his own; an enemy of jests, and freedom; a lover of solitude, difficult of access, a friend to few, and to those but coldly; prone to hatred, out of diffi●ence, an inseparable companion unto him; covetous and fearful, even to absurdity; one that hates equally those that he hath offended, with those that have offended him; implacably greedy of revenge, and whom, though reconciled unto you, you ought to be jealous of. With these kind of dispositions, we cannot deal with too much wariness and circumspection; principally we must take care of our Tongues, and call, as it were, a counsel upon every thing we say; to the end, we may speak nothing strange or offensive, nor indeed, scarce at all, unless we be called upon: In our respect, we must rather exceed, then fall short, and altogether abstain from contradiction, without pressing him, when he demurs in his Counsels, lest his melancholy once kindled in choler, never quench till it convert to hatred. In our demands, we must not be importunate, when we see him deny us readily; for it is not convenient to accustom the Prince, to give us repulses, especially such a Prince, who being by his nature prone to ill suspicions, will think that man his enemy, that he hath given a refusal unto; neither will you easily afterward, by any skill, take this apprehension out of him; for with such, the memory of an in●ury endures long; and measuring others by themselves, they believe all men as malicious, and as obstinate in their hatred, as they. In short, these kind of men are the worst, and most difficult of all others; and whose temper, by reason of the variety of cloudy thoughts, that hover in their dark imaginations, is most unequal; which makes their conversation exceeding troublesome. The phlegmatic Prince participates of the heaviness and slowness of the melancholy; but as in understanding, so in peevishness and disturst, is inferior to him; for his heart is, as it were, congealed with cold; and hence it comes to pass, that he is diffident of none so much, as of himself; fearing to undertake great matters, because he despairs of the success, and knows not how to go about it. He is doubtful in his Counsels, fearful in Execution, not of a quick capacity; and as his hate is not great, so his love is not vehement. To supply the heaviness of these Princes, an active and ready Minister is necessary. When the Prince hath once found him capable to effect those things, that himself thought desperate, discovering the weakness of his own wit; he loves, admires, and cherishes this man, as necessary unto him. And that kind of favour, which leans upon the opinion of such a necessity, is of all others most durable. Which our Courtier once observing, let him make it his business to bring to a prosperous issue, those businesses that seemed most difficult, and from which, the Prince expected little or no success; as it was the constant practice of that great Minister of France, Cardinal Richeleiu, who always kept the King entangled in such dangerous undertakings, That if he would, he knew not how to be without him. Let our Courtier also, if it can be so contrived, compass these things, and execute the most material part of his business himself alone, taking heed, however he do, that he take not to his assistance, a helper or companion, more habile and dexterous, than himself: Withal, let him beware he be not too long absent from Court, lest he chance to lose the Prince, who if he shall once find one more able or useful than him, he will be either less valued, or at least be held less necessary; and so being laid aside once or twice, in employments that shall succeed in other hands, will at last fall into contempt. Wherefore it is an old art of Courtiers, not to take unto themselves any Companions, but such as in virtue and Prudence they shall much excel, to the end, that in comparison of these, their own lustre may so much the more appear, and that the Prince being surrounded with such as these, may not easily know where to find one, whom he may either prefer or oppose unto the introducer of these. Moreover, these grosser souls, as often as he hath need of them, to whom they do now their present, and may owe their juture advancement, are easy and obnoxious to be debau●hed by him, and ready for corruption, which he cannot easily expect from one that is his equal in condition, or in parts, and who stands upon his own legs. These are the several kinds of human inclinations, whereunto Princes are no less subject than other men, inclining now to this, and then to that side, according to the prevalence of this or that temperature in them. CHAP. 11. That Age, Business, Custom, and Sickness, alter the temper of the Bodies, and Constitution of the minds of Princes. NOtwithstanding that for the most part hangs are thus, yet these rules are not infallible and without exception; for Age, Custom, and Business, altars the temper of the Bodies, yea, and the Inclinations and Actions of Princes. In the time of war, the Prince cherishes Military men, but peace being returned into his Kingdom, the Authority and Interest of these men doth soon wax old; and then, if the Prince inclines to pleasure, or any other affection, he will be apt to save those that can serve or further him in it. See what Tacitus writes of Tiberius, Annal. 6. He changed his manners strangely with the times, whilst he was a private man, and under Augustus his Government, both his life and manners were of good repute; as long as Germanicus and Drusus lived, he was close and crafty in counterfeiting virtue; as long as his Mother was alive, he kept a mean betwixt virtue and Vice: For cruelty he was infamous, but for his Lusts as long as he either loved or feared Sejanus, secret. But in the end, he burst out into all wickedne●s and dishonesty, and casting away both fear and shame, he suffered himself to be carried wholly by his vicious Inclinations. Of Caligula, this judgement of Passienus is very notable; There was never a better Servant, nor a worse Master. It is almost incredible, what variety of dispositions were found in Marius and Sylla; so that Plutarch doubts, whether Fortune wrought this change in their Natures, or only brought to light what before of wickedness lay concealed in them. In which case, if I should speak my opinion, I would declare, I thought they did not change their Natures; but only pull of those Masks, that fear and a narrow Fortune had muffled them withal. Just as Leontius said of Zeno, That a Serpent frozen with cold, hurts not; but warmed by the fire, thrusts forth his sting. Tryphon, as Josephus witnesses, whilst he led a private life, to win upon the people, did personate a good man; but being made a King, he threw of his disguises, and quickly let them see, that all that virtue which appeared in him, was forced and counterfeit: And that of Agamemnon is not much unlike, if what Euripedes writes of him be true; he was modest, affable, and easy of access, before he was chosen Generalissimo of the Greeks. But after that election, he became an enemy to his friends, and inaccessible to all, in keeping himself shut up, whereby he became so distasteful, that the Precept the Poet gives upon this occasion, is worth recording. These men are wise, that great advancement gain, And still their ancient modesty retain. An excellent sentence, but observed by few. Pollio truly seemed to follow it, if we may believe Seneca. Afterwards (saith he) being promoted to the highest degrees of honour, he, never corrupted by any occasion, deviated a whit, from his former modesty, temperance, and civility: He was never puffed up with prosperity, nor with the variety of business was he so disordered, as that any one could surprise him in a humour, derogating from the reputation he had gained before. For truly, the defects and blemishes of Princes and Courtiers, proceed for the most part out of Pride, the inseparable handmaid of greatness. This is that makes them despise other men's counsels, being vainly persuaded, that they do excel other men, as much in Prudence, as they do in Power. And some are so carried away with this stream, that they think it below them to keep within the limits of Law or Reason; believing they cannot be Princes, to whom all things are not lawful, they have a mind unto, according to that of the Poet. Virtue, Truth, Faith, such private things as these, Are not for Kings, they must do what they please. But if these kind of opinions did only corrupt the weakest, and worst of Princes, I should wonder the less; but I see the minds of the best men to be blinded also with the witchcraft of Power and Rule. No man ever yet exceeded the Seven Sages of Greece, in giving Precepts of modesty; nor ever were there worse Tyrants, than such of them as came to Government. Appianus being to speak of Aristo, reckoned up not a few that bore the name of Philosophers, that had played the Tyrants at Athens; naming also some of the very Pythagoreans, who being called to Government in Italy, did exceedingly abuse their power; which makes me doubt much, whether most of those Philosophers, who so proudly contemn honours and dignity, do it in good earnest, or not rather for a cloak and cover to their small deserts, their poverty and idleness. Surely, if we will believe Aristophanes, they did not live so frugally and nearly, so much out of virtue, as necessity; and would not refuse to feast plentifully, when ever they were invited. CHAP. 12. How much Impostors are able to do by flattering Princes; and how a Prince is to beware of them. THere are oftentimes Impostors, who with flatteries, and hidden sly suggestions, creep into the Prince's bosom, and corrupt their nature; To these kind of men, doth Tacitus impute the pride and cruelty of Vitellius. Vespasian, who was of a gentle nature, learned from these people to oppress his subjects with heavy Tributes, as the same Tacitus affirms: In short, it is certain, that many who have used the service of these kind of men, have sadly degenerated. These Impostors seek favour unto themselves, by showing the Prince ways to Greatness, Power, and Profit; who by so much the more willingly doth harken to them, by how much the less he understands himself. He poor man, not reflecting, nor observing that these men praise and soothe him; to the end, they may at last betray him to contempt, and expose him to the hatred of his people. And truly, to humour and comply with the Cruelty, Covetousness, and Lust of a Prince, is of all others, the securest way to betray him, for he cannot condemn the traitor, without discovering his own guilt and vices. The Franconians, by the help of Aegidius, at that time governing in Gaul for the Romans, had expelled Clodius Comatus out of his Kingdom, whom one of his friends desiring to see restored, goes over to Aegidius, and fostered upon all occasions, as much as in him lay, the Avarice, and Cruelty of the man, which was but too notorious before; whence the injuries of this Roman growing insufferable, the Franconians begin to wish for their King again, and at last recall him to his Kingdom. Thus this honest Franconian made good use of his flattery, and by feeding him in his own vices, betrayed his Master's enemies. Sejanus, who gaped after the Roman Empire, see what arts he used: After he saw that Tiberius, who by his instinct had imprisoned Agrippina, and her children, grew weary of the City; spurred that inclination on, hoping, that when the Prince was once retired, the Trust and Government of the Empire should be cast upon him, as indeed it came to pass; so that for a time, Tiberius was only Lord of a little Island, and Sejanus Emperor. Perrennius also thirsting after the Empire, first circumvented and made away all those that stood in his light, under pretence of a conspiracy, that Lucilla had contrived against Commodus; and then entices the Emperor to pleasures, whereby he himself might come to the managing of all things, and at last attain unto the Empire. The same way took Bardas', Uncle to Michael, Emperor of Constantinople, who having taken away Theoctistus, his Associate and Tutor to the young Prince, contrived also his mother's banishment; persuading Michael to take the Government into his own hands; whose young years incapable of rule, he soon diverted to delights, and pleasure; so as he gave himself wholly to these entertainments, and intended nothing e●●e: Bardas', in the mean time, fishes eagerly after the love of the people, and to that end, converses with good and learned men, restored learning in the City, and made many good Laws; by which means, he would doubtless, have slept at last into the Imperial Throne, if another had not prevented him. I do not bring these examples, that I may teach how Princes are to be circum●ented, but that I would have Princes themselves learn hence, what Prudence and Caution is necessary for them to discern, and distinguish the Counsels of their Ministers; and chiefly, that they may beware of those who are apt to soothe them in, and applaud their Lusts and Vices; and learn to think well of such, as will sometimes modestly adventure to express their dislikes of their excesses. CHAP. 13. Of the Familiars and Servants of the Prince, and the ways to win them. HAving considered all things, that our Courtiers was to observe in the Prince himself, let us come to his Servants, who by reason of the Offices they bear, are continually about his person, and may be useful to those that pretend at Court, either by procuring them extraordinary accesses, or by making seasonable mention of them, or by instructing them of the ways, times, and occasions of doing their business. There are many Princes, who being private, put on a quite other face, then that they bear in public; and who more willingly do trust and disclose their thoughts, to such of their Servants, as they think faithful to them, esteeming the lowness of their condition incapable of treachery, or wicked practices: Who does not know, that Claudius was governed by his Freedmen, one of which, called Pallas, he had so enriched, That upon a time complaining of Poverty to some body, he was advised to get Pallas adopt him for his Heir. By this man's persuasion, Claudius married Agrippina, after by the help of Narcissus (a freedman also) he had destroyed Messalina? Who can be ignorant, that during the continuance of the Eastern Empire, the eunuchs many times governed all? if that had not been so, it had been impossible for Arbetio, the chief Ruler of the Empire, to have escaped with life, when Verissimus accused him. Borilus and Germanus, two slaves, by the absolute authority they had with Botoniates, one of the Emperors, made him an enemy to Isacius, and Alexius Comnenis. Yet let us suppose, That the Prince does not impart his Counsels to these men, they are more easily pried into by these, than any others: For it cannot be, that Princes always wear their Masks in private, oftentimes the throng, and a public life, makes him suppress and hide those affections, which when he is at liberty, and in private, do break out. Wherefore, I conclude, it is very necessary in Courts, To think all kind of men, even the meanest, useful unto you. And we must believe for certain, That together with their Authority and Fortune, their prudence and discretion, will grow up; which Arrian demonstrates to Epictetus in Epaphroditus, and his two slaves; The one of which coming to wait upon the Emperor at his Stool, and the other to have the charge of his Shoes; Epaphroditus himself, who had sold them not long before as unuseful, sought now their favour, and praised their Prudence. Fortune hath never scarce been so favourable to any one in Court, as not to afford him as many enemies as friends; neither hath it ever yet cast any man so low there, as that he was neither able to hurt, nor help another: Whence it was, that in the time of Tiberius, as Tacitus says, It was a great honour to be known to Sejanus his doorkeepers. It will therefore be a wiseman's part, by all becoming ways, to endear the Servants of the Prince, whatever their condition be. CHAP. 14. Four kinds of Noble Courtiers; how to be handled, and made use of; how warily we ought to deal with inconstant Princes. FRom the Prince's Servants, we come to the Nobles of the Court, which are of sundry kinds: There are some illustrious for their birth, but destitute of the Prince's favour; others in favour with the Prince, but not laden with honours; a third sort, that have honours and offices, far exceeding their Interest and favour; and lastly, Those who flourish both in favour, and great employments. The friendship of the first of these, will perhaps avail our Courtier very little, who are nevertheless to be honoured and respected, according to their quality; lest, though they cannot hurt you themselves, by their friends and followers, they should do it: For in such Trains of defendancies and followers, great Families are often very powerful, either by reason of old benefits, or reverence to their greatness; or lastly, (since princes' minds are mutable) out of respect to the Fortune and Favor these great men may yet chance to come into; with this, or the succeeding Prince. Archelaus, King of Cappadocia, to his great disadvantage, did neglect to honour and Court Tiberius, when he came to Rhodes; for Tiberius afterwards meditating revenge, but pretending another cause, called him to Rome, where he perished miserably: Which respect nevertheless the Historian says, He omitted not out of pride, but for that he was warned by some of Augustus his favourites, That whilst Cajus Caesar flourished, and was sent into the East, the Friendship of Tiberius seemed unsafe. We must look therefore upon these great men of Fortune, though not able to deserve well of us, yet powerful enough to hurt us: And though they be unacceptable and suspected by the Prince, we must yet reverence them, to avoid the blame of others, and their enmity. If it chance, that the Prince will oppose you to one of these great ones, as it is usual with Princes to do; as you must not refuse the task, so you must with great art, dexterity, and choice of occasions, undertake it; taking care, that you may both satisfy the Prince, and justify your endeavours to other men: It is an enterprise full of danger, but if at the Prince's instance, it be taken in hand, it is the way to rise. Yet after you are once engaged in one of these Brigues, there are the choice of two ways to be taken, according to the nature of the Prince you act for, the persons you have to do with, and the times you are in: Some men act all these things in their own name so boldly, and with so high a hand, That all kind of men, except those that are great indeed, strike easily sail unto them, for fear of offending the Prince; who approves (as they believe) all these men say or do. There are others yet, that take another course more safe and sweet, by continually waiting upon the Prince, their interest, in whom they will make no show of, but upon the best opportunities; neither will they take any occasion for these contentions, but such as with great choice they have selected, as both likely to succeed; and having took effect, to redound much to the advantage of the Prince and public. For you must take great heed you undertake nothing you cannot go through with; for besides that, the common people judge of all things by the event, believing still, that Justice and Prudence, are on the side that Fortune is; by ill successes, you will soon diminish the esteem and favour, you have with the Prince. For he to take away the disgrace received, and by reason, That he fears either to be despised of his Subjects, or contemned by his Enemies, whom he hath opposed in vain, will be compelled to remove his favour from, and abandon you. Beware, that when I speak of your contention with these great persons, that you understand not, that I wish you to intermeddle, when you see it cannot be done without tumult, or that you should provoke them with contumelies and reproaches, for that becomes only a base soul, whose judgement is corrupted by Fortune: The end of which kind of men is seldom happy; as is to be observed in Piso, whom Tiberius sent into Syria, to cross the hopes and designs of Germanicus; against whom, he carried himself so insolent●y, that when Prince Germanicus was dead, Caesar was compelled to sacrifice and abandon Piso to the public hate. When I advise you to oppose these great men, it is in cases only, wherein they are to do something that is unjust, or against the public good, or Religion, or that is prejudicial to the Government of the Army, or the Treasures of the Kingdom: In which occasions, you must so comport yourself with Prudence and Modesty, that all others that are concerned, and all honest men may perceive, that what you do proceeds not out of any private enmity, but only from your zeal to the public good. If you demand an example to imitate, behold Cardinal Ximenes, chosen by Isabelia, Queen of Castille, on purpose to tug with those Grandees, that were not so subject to the King's pleasure, as they are now: Of a Franciscan friar, he was first made the Queen's Confessor, afterwards by the advice of Cardinal Mendoza, Archbishop of Toledo, and Inquisitor General of Spain; which Offices he bore with great authority, being there during the whole Reign of Isabel, and Ferdinand, and was even to the time of Charles the Fift, the sole Arbiter and Moderator of all Affairs; ever contending with the great ones, but so discreetly, That he always held both the Prince and people fast unto him. It is reported that he was poisoned, and he himself suspected it, but the fact could never be proved. Wherefore it is better to attribute so late a death as his (for he was very old) to age and nature; and not without reason, since he preserved his fortune and authority (both which he owed principally to his own industry) entire unto his end. Chico Simoneta had not so good success, who whilst Francis Sfortia ruled in Milan, was called to the helm of business, and afterwards chosen by young Galeacius Mother, by reason of his known fidelity, and experience in public Affairs, to contend with his Master's Brethren. He to preserve the Dukedom for Galeacius, banished Galeacius Brothers, and Robert de St. Severin out of Milan, with how much envy you may imagine: Yet see how wickedly he was afterwards deserted, for the Widow, Galeacius his Mother, reconciling herself with her adversaries, sacrificed Simoneta to their new friendship; by whom being cast into prison, and there flayed alive, he died miserably. Learn hence, how warily we must trust Princes, of whose steadiness we are not assured; for often upon a light occasion, they are wont to prostitute their Servants to the will of their Enemies. CHAP. 15. The three other kinds of Noble Courtiers; how they are to be dealt with. THere are a second kind of Noble▪ courtiers (as I said before) who are in favour with the Prince, and yet not very eminent in any dignity or employment. These though they can contribute nothing else unto us, may make our way unto the King, seasonable and easy, besides they may be useful in calling to mind our deserts, or if occasion require, in excusing our errors; protecting us also from the calumny and detractions of our Enemies; by which means, if they be really our Friends, they may serve us highly; as on the contrary side, if they be our foes, they may prejudice us exceedingly: Wherefore we must seek the friendship of these men, by all means, that are not unworthy our condition; and we must consider, that they seldom stay any long time about a Prince, unexalted to honour: Nay, suppose that for some reason or other, they be not advanced, yet by their help and commendations, they do advance their friends, and lift them up above others, though either equal or superior to them in desert. The third sort of Nobles, are those who are in great Offices of Authority, and have a great share in public business, and yet have little interest in the Prince's favour. And these kind of men are chiefly found about such Princes, who live quietly, attending to their pleasures, mindless of public business, which they commit wholly to one or two of their tried Servants, abhorring the trouble that is attending it themselves. In such a Court as this, we must rather seek the Faver of these Ministers, than of the Prince himself; who since he trusts them with the administration of his Affairs, leaves also the choice of his Officers to these men, being himself unfit to choose men for duties, which he knows nothing what belongs unto. There are other Princes more jealous of their Majesty, and sparing in their Power; who though they intrust one or two with their Affairs, do seldom or never admit those men to their Presence or Conversation, but when they are to treat of weighty business; and do not leave the disposal of places to them, for fear that by the multitude of Creatures and Dependants, their power should swell to that height, that it cannot be abated, if they transgress. Wary Princes are wont to keep their Ministers in awe, and make them believe, That they can in a moment cast them from all their Authority, and divest them of all that power, that with the services and labours of many years, they have been acquiring towards such persons as these; whose power is thus circumscribed, you will have a hard task, how to demean yourself. Their friendship can avail you little, nay perhaps if the Prince observe it, it will do you hurt. Again, if they stand in your light, you will hardly come to the management of Affairs, and yet you must of necessity run the hazard of clashing oftentimes with them. Wherefore, a most circumspect gentleness of Nature will here be needful, for you must render them all the duties of respect, and as occasion presents itself (yet warily) express the inward devotion of your mind unto them: But in the mean while, without openly seeking to, or relying upon the Patronage of any other, you must yourself, work out your way unto the Prince's person, and his favour. There remains now unspoken of only the last kind of Noblemen, who are in short, The favourites, as being both highly in the Prince's favour, and great in the administration of Affairs: Which kind of men, are to be honoured with a respect almost equal to the Prince himself. Their wills and inclinations are to be pried into, as being more necessary to be known and executed, than the Princes own. Here you see, what you may expect, or hope for, from the Authority and Patronage of the Peers, and Grandees of the Court; and how you may use each of them in his several degree and kind. Truly we must carefully take heed, that we ask nothing of either the Prince, or any of all these that is impossible, or cannot be effected without great absurdity; For nothing is more troublesome to human nature, than not to be able to fulfil the requests of those we love; and surely, the friendliest and gentlest dispositions that are, will be offended with an uncivil and unreasonable suit. Know moreover, that he from whom you have received such a repulse, is not pleased with seeing you again, for fear lest with the impudence of a like request, you should make him ashamed; and also, lest he should seem to want Authority or means to perform what you desire. But you must note by the way, that access unto the great ones, is not suddenly obtained, we must by degrees also gain that; and to this end, all that have any interest in them, whether they be Strangers or domestics, and the Dependants of these (according to their usefulness) are to be won unto you. CHAP. 16. The meaner sort of Courtiers, how they are to be handled; as also such as are enemies to us, for the sake of others, to whom we relate. THere are yet in Courts below these great ones, others of a lower stage; some of which are our betters, others our equals, and some perhaps our inferiors; all which, since we are to make use of, we will divide into two kinds: The first, of those that may help and advantage us; the second, of those that are likely, or able to hurt us. The interest and power of both of them, is diligently to be weighed, to the end, we may gather what help or impediment we are to expect from them. We must consider also, their friendships and alliances, to the end, that if necessity press us to seek their votes for the promotion of our designs, if they themselves are through envy or any such respect, backward or averse unto us, we may work upon them by their friends and dependants: But we must be sure to take heed, that we do not then begin to seek their friendship, when we have apparent need of them, or their assistance; we ought to have it prepared long before, and assured unto us by the pledges of a long professed kindness, and good will. Let this suffice for the first sort, (to wit, of those that may help us) for every man's industry will prompt him, How to insinuate with such, as he finds may be useful unto him. Of the second sort (to wit) those that may hurt us, there are three kinds; either those that are our enemies, or those that envy us, or lastly, those that are our competitors. Those I call enemies that hate us for our own, or our friend's sake; but this latter kind of hatred, is not for the most part so inveterate and sharp as the first; and it may be mitigated much by our civilities and professing, That we can love our friends, notwithstanding our relations to their enemies: Yet the friendships of the Court are for the most part factious and cruel; compelling us to break off all friendship and familiarities that may bring us into suspicion: For which reason, many publicly pretending a friendship to one, have notwithstanding complied underhand, and kept fair quarter with the adverse party; not out of design to betray their friend, but to the end, if he should chance to fall, they may find a refuge and support. And truly, this care of our preservation may be sometimes blameless, but all kind of treachery is unworthy an honest man. This kind of Prudence hath not only been practised in the Brigues of the Court, but in kingdoms also, and that very fortunately. Syenneses, President of Tharsus, when the War broke out between Cyrus and Artaxerxes, fearing to resist Cyrus, took his part in person, and sent his son to Artaxerxes, to the end, that if Cyrus were vanquished he might be a refuge to his Father. Bar●us Durus escaping out of the hands of the Saracens, where he was prisoner; seeing Phocas created Emperor against Basilius, applied himself to gain the friendship of Phocas, hitherto his enemy, and followed him; but caused his son, wi●h a contrived flight, to take part with Basilius, to the end, that if Phocas were vanquished, he might intercede for his Father, as it afterwards fell out. Solon made a law, That in case of a civil discord in the Commonwealth, none should be permitted to stand neuter; not intending, I believe, that friends taking several sides, should break off their private friendships, but rather hoping that friends being severally engaged, could not but labour for the public peace, by so much the more eagerly, and with more su●cess. After this manner in Court, a man though of a different faction, may yet discreetly, and without prejudice to integrity, retain his friendship with a man of another party; to the end, That he may both have a retreat in the change of Fortune, and that if their animosities should begin to assuage, he may be a fit instrument of reconciliation between the factions: Which is the safest and most commendable way amongst the strifes and discords of great men; and the means of gaining at last the favour of both the contending parties. CHAP. 17. How we are to treat with those Enemies that hate us for our own sakes; also concerning threats and injuries. THose who hate us for our own sakes, do so either, because we have offended them, or else (as it is frequent from great men towards their inferiors) because they have injured us; and the Italian Proverb says, He that offends, never forgives. It is a custom amongst minds, puffed up with a prosperous Fortune, to hate those themselves have wronged. The injuries that these kind of men do us, are best remedied in our seeming not to understand them: But if it chance, that the greatness of the wrong, do wrest out of us some testimony of our sense of the injury received, we must quickly after our grief is over, seem to have lost the memory of all; otherwise, if they see us still impatiently suffer it, fearing our revenge, they will seek to prevent us with a greater mischief. Chiefly we must beware of threats, if that we not ready, and sure to execute them; for threats do both warn our adversary to beware, and provoke his hatred to double our injuries; affording us nothing but shame, in seeming to breathe revenge, but to be destitute of power. I know this kind of moderation will not be approved by all kind of men, especially such as are greedy after vengeance; who think no injury is to be passed over without resentment, not only by reason of the sweetness that is found in revenge; but also, because they say by suffering one injury, you invite another; wherefore we must persecute those that offend us with an immortal hate: But these men whilst they desire to render themselves formidable, do effect nothing else but make all men fly their Company. For since we mortals are Creatures prone to falls, and slips, and are carried away sometimes with affection, and at other times with passion; and in consideration, every one for fear of offending, will fly from these kind of malignant, rash, and revengeful persons; and as wild beasts, leave them to their own solitude. Since, if any one offends one of them, he must expect all that rage and malice can afford at his hands; Lastly, if any one provoke one of the malicious hotspurs, he expecting a severe resentment, and fearing a home revenge, will strive to be aforehand with him. For this Reason therefore, for the avoiding all these evils, I think the contrary way is to be chosen, and gentleness to be preferred; which truly, in the greatest injuries is not hard to be personated, when we consider the reasons and consequences of a passionate resentment, and the condition of the persons from whom we receive them. In lighter injuries, that we see arise rather out of passion, than malice or design, we ought to be so little offended with them, that it may not be perceived we are sensible of them. If the injury is great and foul, we must not show ourselves wholly careless of our esteem and reputation; yet without seeming too implacable towards them that provoked us, as they may have reason to think there is no hope of a reconcilement, or place for pardon upon any reasonable satisfaction left them. And therefore it will be pertinent in this case to complain unto his friends that hath injured us, of our wrongs, and to make them judge of our difference. Injuries that are offered in a petulant insulting humour, I think aught to be presently vindicated, not so much out of a desire of revenge, as for the chastisement of him that did them; and to teach him how to demean himself more modestly hereafter, as well towards others, as our selves. But these injuries also are not to be prosecuted with an inveterate hatred, nay, we ought to declare, that the necessity of complaint, and seeking revenge is put upon us, and that we are ready to be friends after a satisfaction given us, that is any way compa●ible with the injury we received. And if so be they give any secret testimonies of ●egret, or seek in the least manner unto us, we must return into favour with them, and by way of amends, let this suffice instead of a submission, That they profess they cannot want your friendship. CHAP. 18. The injuries of the more and less powerful, how to be avoided, and handled; the several artifices of reconciliation. BEcause these kinds of injuries are done, for the most part, by those that are much more powerful than our selves, and who have some way or other, great advantage of us: The first way to avoid them, is to treat these kind of men respectively, and to avoid all freedoms as much as may be with them: Or if they be very cross and unruly, to fly their conversation altogether. This saying of Martial is in this case very notable. Wouldst thou avoid what may displease? Or seek'st thou for content and ease? With no man be thou over free; As joys, so griefs will fewer be. The second way will be, as I said more than once before, to seem unsensible of the wrong; for it is neither safe nor prudent for us, to strive too much with one that is too powerful for us; and the inequality of our forces, will be a just pretence to excuse our dissimulation. I know there are some that are persuaded, That if we can but fright our adversaries, they would soon seek unto us, and desire to be reconciled; and I do not deny, that there are some sly dispositions that will descend to do so; but believe me, it is always a dangerous, unsound, and faint reconciliation: And these will seldom or never omit (if an occasion of injury present itself) to give way to their disposition; which is by so much the more revengeful, by how much their dissembling was the tamer; besides, a private enemy is harder to be taken heed of, than one that is publicly so. It is better to have such as these, our professed enemies, than out of fear, our reconciled friends; yet I mean, those who are not greater than our selves, nor whose friendship being lost, can hurt us notably. For if we have to do with one that is much superior to us, and whose enmities will stand in our light, it is better to have a feigned friendship, then open enmity with him; though he offer us the wrong, yet we must endeavour by the mediation of friends to appease him, as if we had done the injury. To discern who is most able and likely to prejudice us, we must consider not only their power, but also the nature of their malice towards us; for some have a desire of revenge, like a handmaid, always waiting upon their hate; others a fear, lest that having got what we aspire unto, we should be more able to hurt them. Though the sting of this revenge is very sharp, yet the fear I mentioned, is the most violent and frequent cause of our Court oppressions, and far the most unavoidable. The first may be mitigated with the satisfaction of a continued duty and respect; but you shall hardly ever persuade fear, to put on the confidence of friendship, and good will again; yet we must seek by all means possible to effect it: and occasion will better instruct us how to do it, than any rule can. Agesilaus desiring to become friends with those that he had offended, did put them into great offices and employments, which whilst they ill administered, bringing euvy (as is usual) upon them; being accused, they were compelled to have recourse unto the Prince; who delivering them from the danger and infamy, won them by the benefit, to be afterwards sincerely and heartily his friends. It is an ordinary thing in Courts to supplant one secretly, to the end, that being supported by your favour, he may become your Creature. It is no less frequent as Eutrapelus craftily practised in Horace, to lend those men money for to feed their lusts and vanities, whom we desire to ruin. So it proves, that for the most part, they who applaud us in our pleasures, our humours, and expenses, and exhort us to undertake things that are unreasonable, and above our strength, do seek our destruction. But let us now return unto the ways of renewing our friendships with our Enemies. Amongst all which, it is none of the worst to help both with your Counsel and Assistance, the desires and endeavours of your Enemy, in such things as you see by succeeding will nothing hinder, nor prejudice you; to the end, he may seem to owe you his love, for your benefits. In this manner Cardinal Ascanius Sforza observing, That in vain he opposed himself to the practices of Julian the Cardinal, who laboured to advance John, the Nephew of Alexander the Sixt, to that dignity; did so eagerly move in the business for John, that it succeeding, he got the start of Julian in his friendship. If the stubbornness of our Enemy be such, as that all our endeavours for a reconciliation are fruitless; we must at last look out, if there be anybody else that he ha●es or fears more than he doth us, and let us fain this man (if the circumstances will bear it) to be a competitor to us, and him; to the end, That his hate towards the other prevailing, may induce him either to favour, or less oppose us in our designs. An a●tifice not much unlike to this, was that which Gerla●hus Archbishop and Elector of Mentz used, when he intended to create Adolphus of Nassau, his Kinsman, Emperor: He knew that those Princes that stood for the Empire, (for which a Governor was now a choosing) were divided amongst themselves; which discords and factions, he to make use of, dealt thus with the Electors severally apart. He tells Wenceslaus King of Bohemia, That the Votes of the Electors, for the most part, would favour Albert, Duke of Austria, Wenceslaus his Enemy: But if he were certain of Wenceslaus his concurrence, he was ready to hinder it. Having thus won Wenceslaus, he sets upon the Duke of Saxony, and tells him, That his Enemy Brunswick was like to carry it; and then assures the Palatine, That Wenceslaus (at that time hated by him) unless prevented, was like to defeat them all. So promising to oppose every man's Enemies, he circumven●ed them all; making by that means, his Kinsman Emperor, who if he had been first propounded, had without doubt been rejected by the common consent of all. CHAP. 19 Of Envy, how it is to be overcome. NOw I must say something of Envy, which is so great an evil, that we have need of a strange felicity, and fortitude to overcome it; which is not to be satiated with any thing, but the participation of that which it envies in another; for every one eager after its own advantage, desires to toil in nothing but that, whence if nor, the whole, at least a great share of the honour, and emolument will redound unto himself. Yet although, I confess, it be very hard, yet this envy is nevertheless with industry and prudence, to be mastered; and that not only by this means alone, of sharing with them, that very thing we seek for: For sometimes it will suffice to persuade them that envy us, That the thing they desire, if it chance to light upon us, will turn much to their honour and profit. To which end, we must court them with friendship and familiarity; and though their envy to us be very palpable, yet must we express on our parts great Inclinations and Affections towards them; professing, That we wish nothing more, then that their desires should succeed, and that we desire this very thing that we now pursue, for no other end so much, as that we may become capable to serve our friends, and principally themselves. In short, we must act our part so, as from the augmentation of our fortune, they may conceive hope of advancement to their own. By those that desire to be free from envy, all pride, over-sumptuous manner of living, unseasonable feasts, and boasting, is sedulously to be avoided; especially, by those who have risen from a mean condition; unless the pleasure of the Prince, or the dignity of their Office, require it otherwise; for then a becoming magnificence, will not be unfit, provided, That in these expenses, he lets the world see, he doth rather comply with the pleasure of the Prince, then follow his own inclination. With this kind of modesty and prudence, the beginnings of Cardinal Ximenes were very fortunate, and notable; for he was born of so mean a parentage, that it was doubtful, whether he were a Gentleman, or no; although his prosperous fortune found those afterwards, that would undertake to prove his Nobility. This Ximenes whilst the world went hard with him, became in his youth a friar, whence soon after for his singular endowments, he was by the commendation of Cardinal Mendoza, made confessor to Isabel, Queen of Castille, and not long after Archbishop of Toledo, (as I said once before) which archbishopric upon Medoza's death, Queen Isabel having obtained of the Pope for Ximenes; he finding himself too weak for the envy it would draw upon him, refused to accept it; and was so stiff in his refusal, That he scarce suffered himself to be won to the acceptance of it, by all the Nobles of the Court, who one by one, at the Queen's direction, pressed him to embrace it: And having accepted of it, he was fain to be so entreated over again, before he could be persuaded to live in a condition and splendour equal to his dignity; nay, after that, he was personally so observant of his former manner of life, in this great fortune, that no way else, but by the Pope's express command, could he be induced to change it. This modesty succeeded so well with him, that hereby he appeased and avoided that great envy, which must otherwise of necessity have oppressed him, being the possessor of a dignity gaped after, by all the Grandees of Spain, and of Revenue, scarce inferior to those of the Crown. But yet as this manner of proceeding is in the East of our fortunes, an antidote against envy, so it little avails those who have once already carried themselves insolently and proudly; for the moderation of these men, is still looked upon as counterfeit: Of which thing, the Constantinopolitan History affords us an example in a Metropolitan, called Constantine; who being banished from the Courts, both of Isacius Angelius, and Alexius, the Emperors, returned afterwards with the Empress Euphrosyne; pretending a great aversion from business, and a courtier's life; to the end, he might be the more credited, and sought unto the more eagerly, he took orders upon him: In short, he carried his business so craftily, That the Emperor himself causing him to be absolved from the oath of Priesthood, called him to Court; and trusted him with the management of his greatest affairs: Who presently, not content with his own advancement, introduced his two Brothers to wait upon the Emperor; and as it were, to stand sentinels for him, if at any time his business called him away: But because his former prosperity had discovered the insolence of his nature, everybody feared him still, although he now made show of great temper and moderation, which was the cause that he was again supplanted and removed from Court, without ever being restored more. CHAP. 20. Of Emulation, the Sister of Envy, and the remedies of it. THe same remedies that are good against Envy, prevail also against Emulation, which hath less malignity in it truly, than Envy hath; but more of Ambition, and the treachery of self-concernments. But these Competitors of ours, are to be stroked with a a certain specious respect, and ceremonious veneration, which will powerfully divert these kind of humours; especially, if we feed their hopes with higher thigns than those we aim at, and seem to contribute our Votes and assistance to them; on the other side, vilifying that which we seek for, as below them to stoop unto, and fitter for ourselves; whose merits as they are less, so our pretences ought not to be so high. If we fear that they will smell our drift, we are to hol● them in suspense, and seem to discourse the case with Arguments on both sides; yet giving the greatest weight to those, which we intend should divert their ambitions. But the surest and best course of all, is to conceal, if it be possible, what we aim after, till it be out o● the power of our Enemies, or Competitors 〈◊〉 hinder us. A too great eagerness in our pretences, i● sometime odious, even to those that would if it were more modest, contribute thei● assistance to us; pulling with it besides, othe● greater inconveniencies upon us, as if we succeed, more envy, and if we fail, a great●● disgrace: It is much more safe, as I said eve● now, to hide our designs, and as Rowers do● turn our backs upon the place we are goin● unto. Those that look after the greate●●Commands, have taken this way; nothin● hath been more usual unto them, then afte● the example Agamemnon in Euripides, to express a greater desire of rest and retirement, then of honour or employment. And many have found this a singular remedy, to divert the wiles of those that would oppose them, and to escape the disgrace which attends those fierce pretenders; nay, they have had hereby the glory, to have it often thought, That this honour or employment was cast upon them, merely for their merits, and not obtained by begging or buying of voices, as it too often falls out. Last of all, in our pretences we must take heed, that we clash with no rival, that is greater or more powerful in Friends and Dependants, than our selves. In this case we must imitate Marcus Lepidus', a man in Tacitus his opinion, of great wisdom; who being drawn, as it were, into the Senate by Tiberius, to stand with Junius Blaesus, Sejanus his Uncle, whether of them should be chosen Pr●consul of afric, pretended presently against himself, want of health, the tender years of most of his Children, and the marriage of a Daughter, that he was to take care of; fearing doubtlessly to make Sejanus his Enemy, if he carried away the Province from Blaesus. Neither must we obstinately contend with him, whom some great man is about to advance, although the Law favour us against him; for without doubt, favour weighs down the Law, as Tacitus instances in Germanicus and Drusus, creating Haterius Agrippa Praetor, notwithstanding the express contradiction of a Law; But let the Historian speak himself. There arose a dispute of substituting a Praetor in the place of Vipsanius Gallus lately dead; Germanicus and Drusus favoured Haterius Agrippa, Germanicus his Kinsman; others on the contrary side, did contend, That the number of Children should carry it, according to the Law. Tiberius was glad to see his Sons, and the Laws of the Senate, clash together; without doubt the Law was overcome, but yet not easily, nor by many voices: By which means, when they were in their greatest vigour, they were wont to be overborne. CHAP. 21. How to avoid a threatening ruin, and when it is upon us; how to make the best use of it: Examples of the fall of great men. HItherto we have observed the principal precepts that are to be observed by our Courtier; if any want, every rational man's (for such only we intend to instruct) Prudence and Dexterity will supply it. Now because these kind of Rules are no less necessary, for the preserving our Greatness and Fortune in the Court, then for the gaining of it; it will not be impertinent to have by us, the examples of some of those that have fallen from their power and greatness, to the end, we may grow wise by other men's mischances; and learn, if not to avoid a ruin, at least to arm and prepare ourselves for it: For this latter is almost as necessary as the first, since the endeavours of those that seek to escape their approaching misfortunes, are for the most part vain; whilst he that prepares himself for it long before, makes that fall, which few or none of them can avoid; that fortune hath lifted up on high, to be much more gentle and easy, then otherwise it would. These falls happen unto us, either through our own faults, through the arts and contrivance of our Enemies, or through the perverseness of the Prince's nature, or perhaps his death. Since the lives of all men are obnoxious to faults, and full of errors, and failings, it is so especially with those that are on high, who by reason of their greatness, are out of the lists of reprehension; all that are about them, being compelled to approve of whatever they do, be it well or ill. Amongst all which faults, the foulest they are incident unto, is, A treacherous turning against their Prince, who is the Author of their Dignity, and Power: A crime marked out with the blackest note of an ungrateful and faithless Soul; and a most just subject of the Prince's hate and indignation. All men that are in Authority ought to fly the very shadow of this crime, and to the end of taking all ground of suspicion from the Prince, to decline those honours and places, that are opportune for such attempts. Paterculus esteems Sejanus to have been one of the wisest Courtiers that ever was; and truly it is likely, That he that flourished so long in the favour of a Prince, so subtle, and diffident, as Tiberius was, did comport himself with great modesty and wariness. He was (saith our Author) in appearance given to ease, assuming nothing to himself, and by that means obtaining all things; Crouching still willingly beneath the opinion of other men, and striving to come behind them in repute; His countenance and his life, was calm and quiet, although his mind was restless, and ever a wake; yet ambition at last transported this provident and wary man so far, as to aspire to the Empire. To which end, Drusus being dead, he married Livia his Widow, that so being linked into the House of the Caesars, he might more easily compass his desire: And although he perceived out of Tiberius his tergiversations, when he demanded his consent in the case, that it had drawn a suspicion upon him; yet did he not change his mind; but what he had failed of this way, he sought to compass another. He knew that Tiberius was grown weary of the City, whereupon he presently spurs him on, and persuades him to retire to Caprea; read Tacitus, Annal. 4. who says, That lest he should either infringe his Power, or weaken his Authority, by debarring the multitude from the Court, or minister matter of slander, and suspicion by entertaining them, he took this course: He persuaded Tiberius to go live in some pleasant place, far from Rome; foreseeing many conveniencies in it. First, There could be no access to the Prince, but through him; then, That the disposal of all Letters would be in his hands, since the Soldiers, by whom they were to be conveyed, would be at his devotion; and lastly, That Caesar now growing old, and waxing effeminate with the privacy of the place, would easily transfer the burden of Affairs, and Government upon him. And truly, his hopes deceived him not, for in a short time, under pretence of easing Tiberius his age, he drew all the power of the Empire into his own hands. Yet at last, the event showed, That this way of Sejanus, was both perilous and tedious; to mention which more accurately, seems worth my labour here, to the end, That both Courtiers may be more wary in governing their Fortune, and Princes more cautious in exalting their Mini●ns. Tiberius did either love or suffer patiently Sejanus, as long as he found his help useful to the oppression of Agrippina, and her Children, Nero, and Drusus; to which kind of employments, Sejanus showed himself very ready, knowing, That thereby he should not only win the favour of the Prince, but also establish his own power and hopes; there being none left of Caesar's house now but two youths, whose tender age, if they should come to the Government, must needs leave the Authority, and ordering of Affairs, to him; until he saw his opportunity of usurping the Empire itself. But mark how rash and blind ambition makes us; He did not see, that the nearer he came to the top, the more he became suspected of this jealous Prince; who now sought all means of lessening, rather than advancing him; that strove as much on the other side to climb still on; For though he wanted nothing, but the name of Emperor (which some did not stick to give him) and the Tribunes power (which the Emperors never entrusted to any) yet was he not content, but daily endeavoured to augment his Authority. By which course, as he rendered himself venerable to all others, so he made himself formidable to Tiberius; For when he saw that Sejanus had not only won the Praetorian Guards, but also very many of the Senators, and principal Families of Rome, by either benefits, or hopes, or fears, unto himself; and likewise, That his secrecies were by his own servants told unto Sejanus, and not Sejanus his to him again; he determined his destruction, as one that was become his rival: But before he went about it, he thought fit to sound the inclinations of those about him, to the end, That he might know how to choose out some that would like of his design. Lest that Sejanus should smell out any change in Caesar's affection towards him, he makes him Consul, and calls him both present and absent in his Letters to the Senate, and the People, His friend and companion of his labours. Lastly, he faigns himself sick, to discover thereby, the affections both of Sejanus, and several others. Sometimes he writes to the Senate of his recovering condition, and that he would shortly come to Town; sometimes praising, sometimes blaming Sejanus; sometimes receiving those that came recommended by him, and at other times refusing others; that thus he might keep him ●suspended between hope and fear, who, whether trusting to his favour with the Prince, or for fear of losing of his hopes, resolved to attempt nothing by force; hoping, that the disgusts of the Prince, if there were any, would wear out with time. In this interim, others who had hitherto fawned upon Sejanus his fortune, not upon himself, seeing Tiberius stagger, began to carry themselves more warily, and the devotion of many towards Sejanus, grew cold. Tiberius having discovered long ago the pride and insolency of Sejanus, and fearing withal, lest provoked by contempt, he should run some desperate course, caused it to be given out, That he intended to confer the Tribunical Power upon Sejanus; and presently after, Commands him to be laid in prison, writing Letters, to that end to the Senate, which were carried by Macro, Captain of the Guards: Who coming to Rome, first communicated the Prince's pleasure to Memmius Regulus, than Consul (for the other Consul was more addicted to Sejanus) and then to Graecinus Laco, Captain of the Watch, it being not yet break of day. Thence going to the Senate-house, he met Sejanus, who startled to see him, demanded if he had brought him any Letters from Tiberius, he whispered in his ear, That he should anon be saluted Tribune; whereupon, he entering the Senate-house, not without an inward joy, Macro commanded the Praetorian Guards to go home, showing them to that end, a Warrant from the Emperor, in which also, he promised them a largesse. The Praetorian Soldiers being departed, and Laco's Company placed there in their room, Macro enters the Senate, and delivers his Letters; immediately going forth, without expecting the reading of them, to bid Laco stand well upon his Guard, lest Sejanus raising a tumult in 〈◊〉 Senate, should break away; and went thence himself to the Praetorian Guards to hinder them, lest they should attempt any thing. The Letters that were then a reading, were spun out into a great length, to the end, That Macro might have time enough to order his business; and truly they were interwoven with a wonderful contrivance. In the beginning there was no mention of business, nor any thing concerning Sejanus; a little after he was touched upon, as they say, with a gentle hand; then some other things interlaced, there followed a more open, but that also a slight accusation against him: At last, after sundry excursions about the Affairs of the Commonwealth, two of Sejanus his favourites were named, and the Senate commanded to proceed against them; and withal, that Sejanus himself should be secured. All mention of his death being purposely left out, to the end, That hope might be left to the accused, of clearing himself of those crimes, and those but light ones, that were there objected against him. The Letters being read, many that had waited upon him into the Senate, seeing things of another nature in hand, then making Sejanus Tribune, rose up and compassed him in, lest he should escape; which it is believed, that he would at least have attempted to do, if in the beginning, the Emperor's Letters had thundered any thing sharply against him. But he then despising those slight touches, sat still in his place; and being called upon, either two or three times, by the Consul Memmius to rise up, with much ado he obeyed at last, as being accustomed to give, and not receive commands. When he was risen, Laco followed him close at the heels, and after him came Regulus, accompanied with other Senators, who led him from the Senate to the prison; and thence, soon after, to execution at the Scalae Gemoniae, where he was put to death. Behold here the ruin of a great Courtier, and a favourite, who for craft and power had scarce ever his equal. The contrivance of whose fall, though it may seem due to Tiberius his Prudence, yet it is rather to be attributed to his own greatness and prosperity, which ruined itself with its own weight, so evidently, That all those sleights and stratagems of Tiberius, were not very needful; as may be gathered out of the example of Perennius, who aspiring to the same height that Sejanus did, and by the same arts, was subverted by Commodus, a Prince of a judgement far inferior to Tiberius. It may well be, that many will not be moved with these examples, because they will seem to be wiser than others, and to know something more than these did, whose misfortunes are here recounted. I will not move them to passion, with telling them what I think; although truly, I will not deny, but in those latter ages, there have been some, whose projects succeeded less unhappily, as Boylas, whose story we read in the History of Constantinople; who being caught in a conspiracy against Constantinus Monomachus, than Emperor, did not undergo so heavy a punishment; as for such crimes, are wont to be in●licted, the reason being, because he had the luck to transgress against a mild and gentle Prince. It will not be amiss to recite the story briefly here, to the end, you may see how the secretest Counsels, and undiscoverably by the eyes of man, are oftentimes discovered by the divine Providence, after an unlooked for manner; not being able to escape punishment, by whatsoever Caution they are managed. No mortal man would have believed, that this Boylas should have any inclination to, or could have any ground for, so great a villainy. The greatness of the favours, which were heaped upon him, had possessed the good Prince with a great hope and opinion of his singular fidelity, who seemed also by nature unapt for great undertakings: He was not only of very mean birth, but also stammered so much, as he could hardly be understood; which stuttering, since he saw it pleasing to the Emperor, he did afterwards affect on purpose: With this assentation and flattery, he so insinuated himself into the Prince's familiarity, That the bedchamber and Cabinet of Constantine, were always opened unto him: At last being enriched by the Prince, he was chosen into the number of the Senators, and begins to cast his thoughts higher; wherein he went so far, that he determined by the murder of the Prince, to make his own way to the sceptre. This design he first opened to those he knew surely hated the Emperor, promising mountains to such as approved it, and offered him their assistance; and praising greatly those that disliked it, and refused it out of their affection and loyalty towards the Prince; as whose spy, he would seem to propound such things, to discover the inclinations of his subjects. By which means he was undescried by all, but such, whose fellowship in the Treason, make him secure of them; and had at last, effected that abominable act, if at the very time, when he had the Weapon in his hand, which he had prepared for the Emperor's Throat; one of the Conspirators, touched with a sudden remorse of Conscience, had not seasonably disclosed, and discreetly prevented it. The Emperor took the injury so patiently, That having condemned some of the Conspirators to die, he was satisfied in inflicting banishment only, on the Author of the Treason. It were too long to recount all those here, who having undertaken such Treasons, were caught in them, or else, though innocent, were falsely believed to be guilty of some such design, and made shipwreck in Court. But contenting ourselves with what we have already said, this only is to be added, That all Pride, whether through Ambition, Bragging, Reproaches, Detraction, Ostentation, or other pompous manner of living, it displease the Prince, is the high road to ruin. CHAP. 22. Boasting, Presumption, Arrogance, too much Familiarity, Pride, and Perf●dy, noted with examples. THis Boasting and recounting of services past, destroyed Philotas and Clytas in the Court of the Great Alexander; and Craterus himself had like to have been overborne with those winds: Certainly, he had been much more acceptable to the Prince, if he had contained himself within the bounds of a generous modesty; so Cajus Silius with Tiberius; Antonius Primus with Vespasian; and Silla's with King Agrippa; by boasting of their services, deprived themselves of all the fruit of them: As Tacitus witnesses of the two first, Annal. 4. and Hist. 4. And Josephus▪ of the last. Princes do believe their Fortunes and favours lost, and cast away upon these Braggadoshaws; for they will have their subjects seem to owe all they have to them, and their bounty; not to their own virtue, and merits. The liberty of reprehending the actions of Princes, or inveighing against others in their presence, is to be carefully avoided, as bordering upon Arrogance, and Presumption. Eumenes complaining before Alexander, something petulantly, That Hephaestion should assign the Soldiers Quarters to Musicians, Comedians, and such kind of people, incurred the displeasure of the King. To treat with the Prince over familiarly, or to seem to make one self the sole Arbiter of his principal cares, savours of Pride, although it may proceed only out of Vanity and Covetousness; as it appeareth in the example of Zotirus, once the favourite of Heliogabalus; and also of Turinus, who scarce worse than Zotirus, yet more unhappy, was commanded to be stifled to death with smoke, by Alexander the son of Mammea; the Executioner crying out, Let him perish with smoke, who sold smoke. He was wont to brag, That the Prince was governed by his advices; and so by intruding upon the Prince's retirements, and with impertinent senseless whispers in public, pretending to favour, was sought unto by very many; and gathered together great riches, through the bribes, and presents of those, to whom all his interest in the Prince, could not avail a straw. The Arrogance of Plancianus is also worthy of memory, which being accompanied with great vanity, broke out at last into open perfidy: His arrogance was such, That he did not stick to contend with Bassianus, the Emperor's Son; who was Author both of his Dignity, and Fortune; and he was withal so vain, that as he passed through the City, he would not only interdict all access unto him, but also would not suffer them to behold him; his Ushers going before still to clear the streets, of all that they could see. Becoming a traitor at last against his Prince, and convicted of his Treason, he was Beheaded. In France, during the time of Philip le Bell, Enguerrandus Marigny, daring to contest personally with Charles de Valoy, what misery he did pull upon himself, and his friends, may be observed in the French Histories. Above all things, we must take heed, That we give not ourselves in Court, to sowing of strife between Princes, and great men; for they becoming friends, do for the most part sacrifice such unto their friendship; of which, though the stories of all Nations are full, yet the Bavarian History furnishes us with one example very memorable, of Otho Crondoferus, who flourishing with Rodulphus the Palatine in singular favour, was the Author of great enmities between this Prince and his Mother, for a time; but the Mother afterwards reconciling herself unto her son, Crondoferus had his Eyes and Tongue pulled out. CHAP. 23. How we must, not only take care to preserve the Prince's favour, but also that of those in Power about him. IT is not enough, that the Princes themselves be not averse unto us, but we must also keep ourselves aright with those that are in favour with them. Germanicus at his death, gave that advice to Agrippina his Wife, of which Tacitus, Annal. 2. speaks thus. Then turning to his Wife, he entreated her by his memory, and for their Children sake, which were common to them both, That she would pull down her stomach, and submit her great heart to the rage of Fortune; lest returning to the City, she should with emulation of her greatness, stir up against her, persons more powerful than herself; Agrippina's neglect of this document, ruined her and her children. I told you before, how much Eumenes his favour was diminished with Alexander; after that, railing against Hephaestion, he carried himself irreverently towards the Prince; and discovered his spleen and envy, to him that he accused. Wherefore, when we see any one in the Prince's favour, we must carefully weigh his Authority, and compare it, as it were, in a balance against our own; that we may know certainly which weighs down the other: And in the trial of this, we are not so much to observe outward appearances, as the circumstances of inward causes. Craterus and Hephaestion, for a time did flourish both of them, in great and equal favour with Alexander; until Alexander himself determined the business, in calling one of them, The King's friend, and the other, Alexander's friend. Out of which decision, Craterus might have made this judgement, That since Princes, for the most part, are more in love with their own wills, than their Authority; they also are held more dear unto them, who rather adore and worship Alexander, that is their Person, than their Fortune and Kingly Dignity: And though that afterward upon a strife that arose between him and Hephaestion, when all the Court was divided into factions, Alexander seemed to incline to neither side; but chiding them both heavily, threatened punishment, if ever they should harp upon that string again; yet his manner of dealing with them, showed rather his singular Prudence, to be imitated by all Princes, than his equal affection to them both. He apprehended, that this discord might produce great tumults, and mischief; For he knew both Craterus his great interest in the Macedonians, and how much Hephaestion was envied for his favour to him. Therefore to diminish Hephaestion's envy, he reprehended him publicly; and to avoid giving offence to the Macedonians, he reproved Craterus in private. Amongst those that in this trial and examen of the Prince's favour, between themselves and others, were out of negligence and discretion, most grossly mistaken: Antonius Primus ought to have the first place, who daring to contend with Mutianus, learned at last, That he had better have contested with Vespasian himself. And in this manner, you will find it is a thing witnessed by the examples of all Courts, To vindicate more sharply an injury against the favourites, then against the Prince himself. Dio tells us the reason of it, when he had recounted how the same thing happened to Sejanus, thus, As those whom virtue and consciousness of their own deserts, hath lifted up to dignities, do not much stick upon the vain Ceremonies, and outward Circumstances of honour: So on the contrary side, those who seek to ●limb by Ambition, Pride, and Vice, thereby to hide their unworthiness, and meanness, do presently take ill, and understand as a contempt, the least neglect of Ceremony, and respect towards them. Insomuch, that it is harder to preserve the friendship of these men, then of the Prince himself, for he thinks it a glorious and Princely act to forgive injuries: When these, lest they should seem to remit that which they cannot revenge, even to ostentation, do use their borrowed power, in persecuting those that have offended them. CHAP. 24. Pride even in the meanest persons at Court, noted with examples; as also Treachery in betraying the Princes secrets. NEither truly hath it been destruction to great ones only, to have carried themselves insolently and amiss, but also to men of the lower stage. John King of Arragon, loved Alvarez de Luna so much, that he trusted him with all his Affairs, and even his Kingly power itself, notwithstanding the repining of all his Nobles. But when he by reason of his prosperous Fortune, fell into that pride and presumption, That he caused a Nobleman, who in the King's name admonished him of his duty, to be precipitated and murdered; he was by the Kings command beheaded. It is also an ordinary cause of shipwreck in Court, when any one hath rendered, either himself, or the Prince, hateful to the Peers, or People; For, either the Prince is fain of his own accord, to cast such a one off, to rid himself of envy, or else others never leave, till they have overthrown him. During the Reign of Commodus, Cleander once armed the Praetorian Guards against the Roman people; which was a ground of so great tumults in Rome, that unless the Emperor had sacrificed Cleander to the people's fury, he himself could not have been secure. The same Commodus, had rendered himself odious to all men, by his affection to one Anterus; from which envy, that they might free their Master, some of Commodus his servants being very desirous, slew this Anterus as he was coming from Court. Eutropius who had been long dear to Arcadius, the Emperor; since, he was believed to be the Author of the Sedition raised by Tribigildus, was given up as a price of the Peace, by the Prince, to the Enemies. Amongst the evils that subvert Courtiers, there are two remaining yet, as very dangerous, so very frequent; A betraying of the Prince's secrets, and Conspiracy with his Enemies. Crimes, for the most part, arising out of perfidy, but many times also out of levity, and indiscretion only. And forasmuch as concerns the secrets of Princes, I think they do very well, who pry not into them; and who, if their office exact it not at their hands, avoid the bare knowledge of them: For if you be the only person, to whom they are imparted, and Fame (which often makes witty conjectures) chance to scatter any thing like unto them, you cannot avoid the suspicion, that the secret came out by you: And although the Prince perhaps hath imparted it to some one else, yet it may fall out so, that he hath forgot; or else, that he is more confident of the other man's silence, and so the foil remain upon you still. Not without cause, did Philippides the comic Poet, when he was asked by King Lysimachus (to whom he was very dear) of what things he did chiefly desire to be made partaker by his Prince, answer, That he would refuse nothing that came from the Prince, his secrets only excepted; from which he desired to be excused. Let us from the example of this man, as much as we can, and esteem it safer to be ignorant of secrets, so difficult and dangerous to be kept, then to know them. Hiero, Tyrant of Syracuse, was wont to say, That those who discover Princes secrets, do wrong both to themselves, and to those they impart them unto, by exposing them also together with themselves, to the hatred of the Prince. CHAP. 25. The causes, kinds, and examples of Conspiracies with the Prince's Enemies. YEt their condition is, of all other, most hazardous and ticklish, who led either by avarice, ambition, or desire of providing for their own security, do conspire with the Prince's enemies; whether they be either Strangers, or domestics. Cardinal Balaeus, a tailor's son, being by Lewis the Eleventh, made his Treasurer, and afterward a Bishop, at last also by the King's intercession, and the Pope's willingness, to oblige one that had been so sharp an adversary unto him, was promoted to the dignity of Cardinal: But afterwards being convicted of a Conspiracy with the King's Enemies, he was sent to the Tower of L●ches, where he dwelled twelve years, until Sixtus Quintus by great entreaties, and much ado, procured his release. For the like crime, the Cardinal of Prata underwent the like punishment, in the Reign of Francis the Fift; and had never, perhaps, got his liberty, had he not deceived his physicians with an opinion of the Strangury, by drinking his urine: When the King fearing the anger of the Pope, if consumed with that disease, a Cardinal should die in prison, dismissed him. Petrus de Vineis, a chief Counsellor of the Emperor, Frederick the Second, being suspected of intelligence with Pope Alexander the Third, the Emperor's Enemy, lost his eyes. Not only designs of usurping the Empire of the E●st, but also private intercourse betwixt him and Alaricus, King of the Goths, are believed to have caused Stilico's death: Which that shameful Peace he made with the same Alaricus, against the will of the Senate, seems to confirm; Lampadius (who always disclaimed it) calling it not a Peace, but a Contract of slavery; whereby the Emperor was obliged to pay Tribute to Barbarians. CHAP. 26. That our Courtier must not be the Author of Hazardous Counsels; the variety of Errors, whereby the Prince's favour is lost. THe Courtier that we are all this while a forming, must chiefly beware, That he never be the Author of Hazardous Counsels; for the ill success of these, is always wont to be imputed to the unfortunate adviser, and the good unto the Fortune of the Prince; not only by the vulgar, who judge all things by the event, but also by the Prince himself; who is always glad to have some one, upon whom to derive the envy of an unlucky undertaking, and scarce ever willing that any one should share with him in the glory of a prosperous action. A good while before and after Stilico's death, the Argument of the public Complaint, was, his unseemly Peace with the Goths; until at last, Olympius who had procured his ruin, seeking fame from contrary courses, broke the Truce, Alaricus in vain, pleading the injustice of the deed; But afterwards having made War for some time, still with ill success, this very man was, in the opinion of the people, esteemed, The Author of all their evils; And at last, being accused by the eunuchs, who were in great favour with the Emperor, he was fain to leave the Court, and fly into Dalmatia. When either the beginning of a War, or breaking of a Peace, is treated of; the part of a wise Counsellor is to bring Arguments for both sides, and leave the Prince at liberty to make choice, of what likes him best. And if he be pressed to deliver his opinion, it will be the safer course to incline to peace; unless invincible necessity, or an apparent advantage, persuade the contrary: Which course was prudently taken by Jovius, the Successor of that Olympius, we lately mentioned. He, though he was more inclined to War, that so himself might be more necessary to the Emperor; yet after the manner of some statesmen, seemed to prefer a love to Peace, having met with Alaricus at Ariminum, whither he was sent to confer with him; he sends the Conditions that Alaricus propounded to Honorius; persuading him in other Letters apart, That he should offer the command of his Armies to Alaricus, to make him more reasonable in other things. The Emperor denying, That it was not safe for him to commit the strength of his Empire to a stranger, that had been hitherto his Enemy, answered, That he had rather consent to pay him Tribute. When Jovius had read these Letters to Alaricus, he angry to see himself, and his friendship rejected by Honorius, broke off the Treaty of Peace, and Jovius returns to Honorius; who being much offended with the insolence of his enemy, swore, He would never have any peace with Alaricus; and gave the same Oath to all his Courtiers and Commanders. Thus Jovius by the same art, removed from himself, the envy of the broken truce, and endearing himself to Alaricus, by the testimony of his goodwill, in adadvising Caesar to give him the Command of his Armies, engaged Honorius in a War; whereby the power and authority of Jovius was wonderfully established. There is in story so great variety of those errors, by the means of which Courtiers have fallen from their Prince's favour, That no man's diligence can reckon them all up so; but when he hath recounted many, he shall find still more behind. Wherefore having here culled out some of the principal, we leave the rest to the industry and discretion of every observing Reader. CHAP. 27. Of the Arts whereby Courtiers are supplanted by others; and first, under pretence of specious employments abroad, or of calling them from their Commands, to attend upon the King's Person. WE have seen already, How by his own fault, a Courtier may lose the Prince's favour; let us now show the means, whereby his Enemies are wont to supplant him; which are of three sorts. Either they will endeavour to remove him from the Court, under an honourable pretence; or else they will render him suspected, and hateful to the Prince; or lastly, will by open force compel the Prince to remove him. Of the first kind of these three; as there are divers ways, so the ends are divers. For some are with shows of honour, or with the desire of living amongst their friends, willingly persuaded to depart the Court. Which course, during the Reign of Manuel Comnenus, Styppiota craftily used, to remove out of his way Hagiotheodorita that stood in his light: For there arising a controversy between Michael Paedagogus, and Joseph Balsamon, Styppiota persuaded the Emperor, That if Hagiotheodorita were made Governor of Peloponnesus, it would put an end to the contention of these great ones. Hagiotheodorita out of desire of assisting his Kinsman, undertakes the employment; not dreaming that Styppiota having got his rival out of the way, would by this means come to the sole management of Affairs, as indeed it fell out. Some men also tired out with the brawls and strifes of their Enemies in Court, to provide for their own quiet, do easily embrace any plausible employment for a pretence of their departure, As Agrippa did, who, Velleius testifies, went into Asia, under the colour of a great employment, only to withdraw himself from Court, where he had private grudges and heartburnings against Marcellus, as the report goes. Tiberius, whilst Cajus Caesar lived, retired to Rhodes, upon pretence of following his studies, and by his mother's means (they are Sue●onius his words) to hide the disgrace of it, obtained to be sent, as it were, Ambassador from Augustus. If there want a pretext, whereby he whom you desire to remove, may voluntarily seek leave to go, and esteem it for a benefit; the Prince must be persuaded to give him some charge, by reason it can be executed by none, so well as he: So also, if there be any man great and powerful in any of the Provinces abroad, and have emulators that seek to eclipse him; they must labour to call him thence to Court, as necessary to the Prince's person; that so being crowded up amongst the Courtiers, his lustre may be ●bscured. This art used Apelles in Polybius, when he stripped Taurion of the Government of Peloponnesus. So Darius by the advice of Megabyzus, recalled Hyesteus out of Jonia; not, that he had any need of his presence, as he pretended, but to weaken his Authority. If these Courtiers would rest contented with removing others out of their way, for their own advancement, and proceed no further, in comparison of many worse, these arts and practices would be something tolerable; but the most of them rest not here: In the Reign of Constantius, Sylvanus, General of the Foot (as Ammianus Marcellinus tells us) by Arbetio his procurement, was sent into France, to chastise the Barbarians for the injuries they offered to the Gauls; whether he being once come, and growing into favour with the Nation, and also rich; the envy of Arbetio wrought at last his utter destruction with the Emperor. Almost the same fortune under this very Emperor had Vrsicinus, the General of the Horse: Eusebius, the Eunuch, had together with some other Courtiers, conspired his ruin; and by these men's means, to the end he might be far enough from Court, he was sent upon some expedition to the Confines of Persia; where having stayed ten years, Sabinianus was sent to succeed him, neither in judgement nor experience, equal to the charge: Whereupon, presently a rumor being spread, That the Persians were preparing for a War, he was commanded to stay there still, though the power was already given to another. Eusebius contriving it so on purpose, to the end, That whatsoever good success happened against the Persians, might be attributed to Sabinianus; and what ever fell out amiss, might be imputed to Vrsicinus, as the event witnessed; for Vrsicinus cast down for another man's faults, retired and past the rest of his life in private. The Reign of this Emperor doth furnish us yet with another example; For Ruffinus, the Uncle of Gallus, Captain of the Guard, was sent to appease a mutiny of the Soldiers, out of no other intention, but that he might perish in the rage of the tumult: As Clitus did complain, That he was sent by Alexander against the Sogdians, to no other end. CHAP. 28. How Calumnies are used to make men suspected, or hated by the Prince. THus much for the first way, whereby Courtiers are by their Enemies supplanted, and stripped of the Prince's favour. Now let us come to the second, which are, The Calumnies that are used to render us hated and suspected by the Prince: In calumny, two things are to be observed; the first is, Whether it be sufficient to deprive him of the Prince's favour? the second is, Whether it be probable? Of the first, We must make our judgement out of the present state of things, out of the humour and inclination of the Prince, and out of the nature of the Calumny intended. No kind of slander doth subvert more great men, then that which accuses us of conspiracy against the Prince's person, or his Empire, or else of contempt or disdaining to obey; with detraction, and derision towards the Prince. These Calumnies are rendered likely to be true, not only by the words and actions of those that are accused, and of their servants, friends, and kindred, but also by contrived Letters, and the disposition of the Prince; too apt to believe the Calumny, or too prone to think ill of the person accused; especially, if he were ever suspected before. These things which are by Calumny converted into a Crime, he that is traduced, either did, or said of his own accord, or else was ticed into them, by the sleights of his Enemies, and Competitors: The knowledge and practice of which Malice, whets the wits of those who will curiously watch their occasions; and know dexterously ●ow to use them. There are some men that will put Projects into our heads, to the end, That if we embrace them, they may make these very things, a subject of Calumny against us, and accuse us to the Prince of some wicked intention. There was a certain Magician, called Santabarinus very much beloved by Basilius, Emperor of Constantinople, but as much hated by Leo, the Emperor's Son; who this Magician desiring to overthrow, did so besiege him with counterfeited duties, and feigned respects, that at last winning upon him, he grew into credit with the young Prince: Then having got an authority and interest in him, he takes his time, and warns Leo, with great art and solicitude, That whensoever he went a Hunting with his Father, he should carry a Poignard under his Garments, to defend himself withal: He obeying this advice, the Magician goes to his Father, informing him, That his Son intended to murder him, and for a testimony, told him, That he always carried a Dagger hidden about him, waiting for an occasion of performing it. In short, the business came to that pass, the young Prince was searched, and the Poignard found, whereupon he was cast into prison; and though he were protected by the joint intercession of all the Court, yet he hardly escaped with his life. Whilst Valentinian was Emperor, Aetius accused Earl Boniface, who was very dear unto Valentinian, and Governor of Africa, unto Placidia, the Emperor's Mother, of Treachery towards the Prince, and of a design he had of subjecting afric to himself; persuading her withal, That he should be recalled quickly. At the same time he warns Boniface by his Letters, That he was accused at Court, and for that reason recalled; wherefore he should take heed how he returned, if he loved his own safety. Boniface giving credit unto him, obeyed him so far, That (resolving to oppose those that would come to reduce him) he called in Gontarus, King of Valladolid, and Gensericus his Son, then reigning in Spain, unto his aid; who upon this occasion, possessed themselves of Mauritania. The deceit being afterwards found out, to the end the truth might appear more plainly, they were permitted the trial of a combat, wherein Aetius being vanquished, was banished the Court. Not unlike unto this was the craft of Samona, beloved by Leo, Son to the Emperor Basilius (by reason of his detection of the Treason of Basilius, Kinsman to the Empress Zoa) who resolving to ruin Andronicus, that was General against the Saracens, caused him to be warned by a friend, that he should take heed of Hymerius, who came to deprive him of his eyes; which was in those days a punishment usual towards great persons, whose power was overgrown, and become formidable: Andronicus believing this to be true, which was feigned by Samona, withdraws himself from Hymerius, unto a place of strength, which he seized upon. This fact of his, Samona did not omit to exaggerate unto the Emperor, insomuch, that by his procurement, an Army was sent against him, which forced Andronicus, driven to despair, to quit the limits of the Empire, and fly unto the Saracens. A little before, we mentioned Arbetio, and it will be worth observing, how he added deceit upon deceit: When he observed the Emperor angry with Sylvanus, and feared, that he should come to Rome to clear himself of the objected crimes; he gives the Emperor his Letters, wherein he called Sylvanus to his presence, to an instrument of his own, called Apodenius; who arriving in France, suppressed the Letters as he was directed, and tells Sylvanus, That nothing but destruction hung over him; whereby Sylvanus running into Rebellion, as the only means of his preservation, made good Arbetio his calumnies. But we have too long been silent concerning Sejanus (to whom being expert in all these tricks) this artifice we now treat of was very usual. That he might render Agrippina suspected to Tiberius, He inveigled her friends to puff up her haughty spirit; and her own kindred were enticed to feed the swelling hopes of Agrippina, with crooked and perverse discourses; whilst in the interim, he causes Claudia Pulchra, Agrippina's x German, to be accused by Domitius Afer; which injury, this fierce and passionate Woman, complaining of heavily to Tiberius, did thereby exceedingly increase the suspicions of this jealous Emperor. Yet Sejanus not content with this, but seeking the utter ruin of this unwary, and sorrowful Lady, sent those unto her, who under a show of friendship, should warn her, That Tiberius meant to poison her, and that she should beware of his Feasts; whereupon she over credulous, refused to take an Apple out of Tiberius his hand at Table, which grievously incensed Caesar against her. By the same Sejanus now, when Soldiers were set to watch over Agrippina and her Children, were men suborned to advise her, to fly to the German Army, or to run to the Image of Augustus for sanctuary; and there to invoke the help of the Senate and the people. With the same ugly arts, whereby he endeavoured to supplant this Lady, by making her suspected of Tiberius, he utterly overthrew her friend Titius Sabinus; which thing, as it is described by Tacitus, you may read here in his own words, because the circumstances are very notable, Annal. 4. Junius Silanus and Silius Nerva, being Consuls, the year had a foul beginning; for Titius Sabinus an honourable Gentleman or Rome, was cast into prison only for his friendship to Germanicus, which was such, That he never omitted any occasion of honouring or serving his Wife and Children; Of all Germanicus his followers, being the only man which visited them at their house, and accompanied them abroad; wherefore as he was much praised by the good, so was he much maliced by the bad: Against him, Latinius Latiani, Porcius Cato, Petilius Rufus, and Marcus Opsius, who had sometime been Consuls, bent their spite, through a desire of the Consulship, which they could not obtain, but by Sejanus his means, and Sejanus his liberty could not be purchased, but by some notable piece of villainy. Wherefore they plotted amongst them, That Latiani, who was somewhat a kin to Sabinus, should lay the snare, and that the rest being privately witnesses to what past, they might begin their accusation. Hereupon Latiani began at first to cast speeches out at random, and to extol Sabinus his constancy, that he did not as others did, fawn in prosperity, and shrink from a house in adversity; with other honourable mention of Germani●us bewailing Agrippina's estate. And seeing Sabinus (as men's minds are soft and tender in calamity) to pour down tears, and complaints; Latiani began more boldly to touch Sejanu's Cruelty, Pride, and Ambition, not forbearing to reproach Tiberius; These seeming dangerous speeches, and such as durst not be avouched, made a strict friendship in show between them: So far that Sabinus often frequented Latianie's house, and as unto his faithful friend uttered his griefs unto him. Those I mentioned before, now began to devise with Latiani how these speeches might be heard by them all: For the place of meeting must be in appearance private, and if they should stand behind the door they did apprehend some noise, or other accident of suspicion might discover them; wherefore between the ceiling and the Roof the three Senators (in a place no less unseemly than the Treachery was detestable) hid themselves, laying their ears close to the holes and chinks, to listen what was said. In the mean time Latiani having found Sabinus in the Market place (as if he had some new matter to tell him, enticeth him home into his chamber, beginning there to rip up things past and present in a great abundance; and to load him with new fears. Sabinus was not behind hand with him, the nature of griefs being such, that when once we enter into them, we can hardly make an end. This done, they began immediately their accusation, and writ unto Caesar the whole contrivance of their own lewd and shameful act. The city was never in greater perplexity, and fear then at that time, every man estranging himself from his nearest kindred, and acquaintance; avoiding all meetings and conferences as well with their friends, as Strangers; yea they grew jealous of mute, and senseless things, Prying into the Roofs and Walls of their houses. But Tiberius requesting in his Letters that the Solemnities of the new year might be Celebrated on the Calends of January, falls at last upon Sabinus, charging him that he had corrupted some of his freedmen to attempt something against his person, and therefore boldly demandeth a revenge, which without delay was granted. Sabinus being condemned, was drawn and haled away with his Garments over his head, so that he being almost throttled was heard to cry out: Is this the beginnings of the new year? be these the sacrifices slain in Sejanus his honour? Which way soever he did cast his Eyes they all fled that he directed his speech unto; the places of Assembly and the Streets were empty, some come running back and showed themselves again afraid for that they were seen to be afraid. And what days think you now were exempt from executions, if amongst the sacrifices, and the vows, when the custom was to abstain from profane speeches, Fetters and Manacles were mentioned. It is believed Tiberius could not be ignorant of the envy he should incur for doing so, but that he did it on purpose, to the end the new Magistrates might open the prisons, when they set open their Temples and their Altars. For after that he sent Letters of thanks, for that they had punished an enemy to the State. CHAP. 29. Examples of other treacheries in suborned witnesses, and forged Letters. I Cannot avoid bringing here another example out of the same Historian. Firmius Cato, a Senator, and one of Liboes inward friends induced this simple young man, easily led to vanities, to give credit to the Chaldeans promises, the magician's ceremony, and the interpretation of Dreams, vainly putting him in mind that Pompey was his Great Grandfather, Scribonia who had been Augustus his Wife, his Aunt; The Caesars his cousin Germanes; and that his house was full of the Statues and Monuments of his Ancestors: He enticed him to Licentiousness, to borrow money, making himself a Companion of his Lusts, and Familiarities, the better to entangle him and convince with many evidences. That there might be witnesses enough, he also debauched such of his Servants as knew any thing of the matter. Then he desires access to the Prince, and by means of Flaccus Vescularius, a Gentleman of Rome, one of Tiberius his Familiars, he discovered both the matter and the man. How after this Liho was treated by Tiberius and made much of, until accusations were brought against him in such abundance, that he was forced to kill himself; Tacitus Annal. 2. will tell you at large, to whom I had rather refer you, then exceed the bounds I had proposed to myself in this Treatise. Styppiota, whose deceit in supplanting Hagiotheodorita, I told you of before, could not avoid being circumvented himself, as Sabinus the Roman was; the contriver of that plot was Camaterus Logotheta, who being an enemy to Styppiota, accused him before the Emperor as an impostor, and one that intended to betray Sicily. And to the end he might give some face of truth to his Calumny, he hides the Emperor in his Chamber, and in his hearing begins on purpose to discourse of the affairs of Sicily. At which time many things fell from the heedless Styppiota that were very displeasing unto Caesar; not content with this, Camaterus causes counterfeit Letters to be mingled amongst Styppiota's Papers, which being searched by the Emperor's order, were the cause of Styppiota's condemnation, and the loss of his eyes. This Story leads me to speak of another means of rendering slanders probable, to wit, by Counterfeiting Letters; A deceit indeed that for the most part breaks out at last to the prejudice of him that uses it, but nevertheless is of great power to make deep impressions of suspicion in the Prince's mind, and to alienate his favour: Which being once observed by the accused, will either induce him to withdraw himself willingly from business, and the Court, lest something worse should follow; or else cast him upon such attempts and practices, as will Confirm the slander. Which appears by that example of Sylvanus I mentioned before. The perfidy of false witnesses is no slender confirmation of slanders, and this is chiefly necessary against such as are accused of Treason, and Capital crimes; And truly domestic Servants as most proper, so oftenest are made use of in this nature. In the reign of Arcadius, Eu●ropius seeking the destruction of Timasius, a great Captain, and a man of much authority; corrupts his friend or rather his inseparable com Bargus to accuse him of affecting the Empire. The friendship between Bargus and Timasius gave credit to the accuser, all men believing that he would not, unless the crime was most certain, accuse him; To this Counterfeit Letters were added, to prove the Treason, by which means the innocent man and his son were sent into Banishment, to the Isle of Oasis, from whence neither of them ever returned. Caius Petronius was for his skill in pleasures preferred before Tigellinus by Nero, whereupon the other out of envy accused his Rival of Scaevinus his friendship, (who was convicted of a Conspiracy against Nero) and brought to witness it a Servant of Petronius his corrupted by him. CHAP. 30. Confirmation of slanders under the colour of a feigned friendship; and the inclinations of the Prince to the accuser. I said before that to confirm Calumnies, the affection of the Prince to the slanderer did much conduce, and for this reason did Sejanus endeavouring to make the E●ip. ess Livia jealous of Agrippina, Germanicus his Widow, choose Julius Posthumus to do it; who, as Tacitus affirms, by reason of his Adu●●eries with Mutilia Prisca, the Empresses favourite, was very gracious with Livia. But calumnies never succeed so easily, as when they are used against one already suspected by the Prince: For it is very probable, That then the accuser shall not only ruin the other, but also exalt himself. The familiars of Vitellius durst not 〈◊〉 upon Junius Blaesus, till they-observed him to grow less in Vitellius his favour, and they compassed their desires much sooner, because Lucius Vitellius, the Emperor's Brother, lent them his assistance. Gracchus, a freed man of Caesar's, and one as Tacitus saith, Annal. 13. All his life bred up in, and by a long experience, well practised in the Prince's house, thought it the best way to preserve himself in the favour of the Prince, to accuse Cornelius Sylla, whom Nero he knew was jealous of already. The same art did●ige●linus use against this Sylla, and Plautus afterwards, of which Tacitus, Annal. 14. writes thus. But Tigellinus credit increased daily, who thinking that his lewd practices, wherein he was a great pr●ficient, should be more acceptable, if he could engage 〈◊〉 Prince into the communion of his villainies, began diligently to pry into all his fears, and perceiving that Plautus and Sylla were above others suspected: Plautus being banished into Asia, and Sylla into France, he entreth into discourse of their Nobility, and how one was too near the Army of the East, and the other to that of Germany: That Sylla was poor and needy, only counterfeiting a laziness; and Plautus abounding in wealth, did not so much as pretend a desire of a quiet life. I told you above of Vrsicinus accused by Eusebius the Eunu●h, to the Emperor C●nstantius, who was already s●ie towards him, by reason of his kindred to G●●●us; but I did not set down the success of the cause, which was thus. The accusation faltering, because the Arguments whereby the crime was to be proved, wer● slend●r; the Eunuch intending a new mi●chief, causes the accused to be enlarged: And things standing in this posture undecided, he doth strive to endear Vrsicinus to himself, whom he would seem to have deli●ered from the danger of a trial; but withal, removes him from the Court (where all his thoughts were placed) notwithsta●ding this face of friendship he put on, persuading the Emperor under hand against him. CHAP. 31. The chief arts and ways of slanderers. WHen any one is accused to have spoke ill of the Prince, how much the nearer these reproaches come to truth, by so much the easilier is the accusation credited; as appears in the example of Granius Marcellus, of whom Tacitus, Annal. 1. Whom Caepio Crispinus accused to have reviled Tiberius, which was an inevitable accusation, for he having chosen out the greatest blemishes of Tiberius his life, did impose them the accused; which because they were true, were believed to have been spoken. This example have many slanderers followed, reproaching many Princes of their vices, under pretence of informing them of other men's detractions; which one would think should be a sufficient reason to persuade them from giving ear to these Calumniators. And Tiberius truly, who though he was a lover of informations, yet he hated his own reproaches; and therefore lest he should hear them in the Senate, where they were occasionally brought in by way of accusing others, retired to Caprea, Believing (as Tacitus avers) that he ought to avoid the Assemblies of the Senate, lest he should be compelled to hear reproachful, but yet true, uttered of himself in his own hearing. This way also do some take only to reprove Princes for their vices; as they that would reprove Nero for his mother's murder, did use to inveigh against others for the like acts in his hearing; yet more with a design to correct the fault in Caesar, then to ruin those that they accuse. These are the choicest ways that slander takes, but who will undertake to trace her in all her turnings? For calumny is a monster that hath a thousand shapes, and a thousand sleights to do mischief with. CHAP. 32. The deceits and danger of Courtpraises, and masked Courtiers. Lastly, The third way of oppressing our Courtier by force. FRom Slanders, let us come to Praises, of which also as we have hinted before, there is great use in undermining others; for many men do by this means, Palliate secret Hate, Envy, and Emulation, to the end, they may deceive more easily. So Fabius Valens with secret criminations, defamed Martius Valens that suspected no such thing from him; who to betray him more securely, did always speak well of him in public, Tacitus Hist. 1. So Arbetio with the blandishments of a great kindness, did assault Vrsicinus, and frequently call him in public, A valiant gallant person, thereby craftily to entangle in more deadly snares, that harmless, and well-meaning man. Ammianus Marcellinus, Lib. 15. Alphonsus, King of Arragon, as one was praising another man unreasonably in his presence, beyond his wont, turning about to a friend said, Without doubt this fellow seeks the destruction of him he praises: Neither was the King deceived in his opinion, for six months after, this intemperate praiser, accused before the seat of Justice, him that he had so highly extolled; and had undone him, had not the King interposed for his preservation. Mucianus having in the Senate heaped many praises upon Antonius Primus, whom he could not openly oppress; loads him also with secret promises, and points him out the further Spain, left void for him by the decease of Cluvius Rufus, giving to his friends and followers, several commands in the Army. And afterward, when he had filled him with ambition, and desire, he suddenly undermines his power by taking from him the Seventh Legion, which was exceedingly devoted to Anthony. Neither is this way traced by Courtiers only, but also by Princes themselves, when they desire to abate or take down anybody. For Tiberius did thus confer the Praetorship upon, and invite to his Table, Libo, (whom he secretly suspected and hated) without change of countenance or showing anger in his words, till he saw his time (he had so concealed his indignation) as Tacitus tells you, Annal. 2. By the same artifice, you saw he overthrew Sejanus: Domitian was never more to be feared, than when he smiled; the praises of Andronicus were the beginning of injuries. Nicetas called his liberality, An earnest of the confiscation of that man's goods, and his lenity a forerunner of a certain death. Yet there are some that seek by their applauses only, to stir up the Pri●ces envy towards them they praise, for so Tacitus tells, Julius Agricola was ruined with Domitian. The cause of his destruction was no Crime nor Complaint against him, but the Prince's envy to the virtues and glory of the man, stirred up by the worst kind of enemies, unseasonable and treacherous praisers. There is extant, a saying of the Emperor Julian, That there are no more dangerous Enemies in the world, then Masked Courtiers; whom Mammertinus describes in a panegyric, saying, That with a crafty artifice they did in all company, slander men by way of Praises, and under the titles of friendship. But we see that some have used these praises towards one, with an intention of reproaching another, whom they desired to affront with the dis●●militude of his merit: Plutarch accuses Herodotus with this spiteful kind of dealing in his commendations of the Athenians, for the brave repulse they gave the Persians, which saith he, was not intended so much for the Athenians honour, as the shame and disgrace of the other Greeks. Seneca attests, that Kings are wont to praise their dead servants, to make those blush that are alive: So did Augustus extol the faithful services of Maecenas, and Agrippa, when his daughter's lusts being discovered; he seeking thereby to reprove his familiars and servan●●, as negligent and careless of the honour and service of their Prince. The same was Augustus his end in praising and dispraising of Tiberius, of whom Tacitus writes thus; Augustus when a few years before he demanded the Tribunicial power in the Senate for Tiberius, although he did in his speech touch upon many things of his behaviour, his habit, and manner of living; which, as it were, by way of excuse he did reproach him with, &c. Therefore these things ought to warn us to look as well into the intention of those that praise us, as of those that caluminate us. These two first ways of undermining our Courtier, to wit, Of removing him out of the way, under some fair pretence; or, of making him hated, or suspected by the Prince; being sufficiently discoursed of, there remains only untouched, the third and last way of all, Open violence; which principally takes place, when either the people or the soldiery offended with the dignity, or manner of the favourite, run into a public sedition. The tumults of the Parisians, when the people raged at the captivity of their King John, with the English, are sufficiently known; as also the fortune of those, upon that sedition, who bore the principal offices under his Son, then supplying his father's place in the Government. But few years since, the janissaries, more than once, have by sedition deprived the Turkish Emperors of their Ministers of greatest trust and authority: Out of more ancient stories, the time of Arcadius will furnish us with some examples; Ruffinus was amongst others, principally beloved by this Emperor, with whom Stilico being offended, and determining his destruction, sent Gainas with his forces, as it were, to assist the Emperor, but indeed to deprive him of Ruffinus, as it came to pass: For Ruffinus going to the Army, the Soldiers of Gainas upon the signal given, ran together, and compassing Ruffinus in, tore him in pieces. Eutropius being then put in Ruffinus his place; when the chief Courtiers likewise grew discontented with him, by the contrivance of the same Gainas, Tribigildus raises a Rebellion, overrunning and spoiling all Asia, and denies to accept any conditions of a peace, till Eutropius were removed out of the way; which by the persuasion of Gainas, the Emperor consented at last unto: Neither was this enough, for Gainas being afterward openly joined with Tribigildus, to the end he might suffer himself to be reconciled to Arcadius the Emperor, demanded, That Aurelius Saturnius, and John Chrysostom, than the chief Moderators of the Emperor's Affairs, should be given up to him; which being done, he sent them into banishment, contenting himself with giving them (before their departure out of his presence) the Edge of his Sword for to handle, that they might feel how sharp it was. CHAP. 33. Sometimes the Princes own ill and cruel Nature, envying the deserts of his Servants, is cause of the Courtiers fall▪ and this, how it is to be handled. OFtentimes, although our Courtiers underprop themselves with all other supports, yet the nature of the Prince, as being either over light, vain, jealous, envious, covetous, cruel, or timorous, makes their ruin inevitable. These diseases as being incorporated into them, do for the most part elude, and overgrow the circumspection of the prudentest men. Seneca, whose authority had with Nero far more of liberty, than flattery; in the beginning, being wise and skilful in the arts of Court, was fain to yield at last, as quite overcome by the malice of the Prince's nature: First, he was envied by him for his eloquen●e, then for his riches, and lastly, being oppressed with malicious slanders, he lost both the Prince's favour, and his life. The jealousy and envy of Princes, hath been so formidable to some, that they had rather be lessened to their loss, then incur their envy by doing their business prosper●●sly and well. Publius Ventidius fearing the envy of Mark Anthony, under whom he served, contented himself to have beaten the Parthians by three Victories into Media, and would not prosecute his good fortune any farther. Agathias tells us, that during the Reign of Justinian, the same was done by Bellisarius; lest the greatness of his Victories, and the acclamations of the people, should stir up the hate of the Peers, and envy of the Prince against him. Truly such as these do not mind their own honour, and the profit of the Prince, as they ought to do; but the fault is not so much in them, as in the Prince himself; And therefore it was, that Maecenas persuaded Augustus, not to impute his ill successes to his Ministers, nor envy their prosperous actions. For (saith he) many of them that manage public affairs, have done it very negligently, for fear of envy, choosing rather to hazard their glory, than their safety. Yet I do much more approve their way, who to avoid envy, whatever great and fortunate actions they did, would needs ascribe the glory of it to the Prince, though absent. Agrippa, Augustus his Son in Law, persuades us to undertake great adventures; but having performed them to attribute the glory of it to the Prince, as he himself was always wont to do. So Joab besiedging Rabatham, though he could, refused to take it in, before David himself came thither. Craterus when the business of Artacena was to be determined, waits for Alexander's coming; Julius Agricola (as Tacitus writes) never did boastingly apply his acts to his own glory, but cast all upon Fortune, as the author and guide of all he did, who was but her servant. This envy and emulation, though they are diseases incident to the generousest Princes (such as Philip and Alexander were) yet they are more predominant and malignant in some, than others. Theodosius, the second Emperor of that name, committed the charge of building a Wall at Constantinople from Sea to Sea unto Cyrus, which work he effecting in threescore days; This great dispatch was so grateful to the people, that they cried out in the streets, That Constantine built the City, and Cyrus had restored it; which being heard by the Emperor, brought so great an envy upon Cyrus, that he could not expiate it any other way, but by putting on a Religious habit. He that hath to do with such Princes, is to consider, That he walks upon ashes, under which fire lies concealed; and therefore must he still examine their inclinations with great diligence, to the end, he may either defend himself against them; or, if it fall out that he cannot, that he may have this satisfaction of mind at least, That he hath done his duty, and all that in Prudence he ought. CHAP. 34. How to preserve our favour and Office, with the succeeding Prince. HE is deservedly to be remembered amongst the Darlings of Fortune, whose Authority and Interest being great with one Prince, continues so with his Successor. It is truly a thing very rare in Courts, because he that is to succeed, is for the most part suspected by the present Prince; and therefore, they who manage his affairs, are necessitated to be adverse unto the Heir apparent; from whence, commonly deadly enmities arise. Besides this also, the succeeding Prince hath for the most part Servants known, and endeared unto him, by a long fidelity, and many services; for whose advancement to dignity that he may make way, he will ordinarily, either of his own accord, or by the persuasion of those that desire to succeed, lay aside the Servants of the deceased Prince. Yet there are some, whom either the state of affairs, for which they are more able, and apt than others; or some other dexterous quality, and taking humour, doth so insinuat● them into the succeeding Prince, That one Prince dying, they lose nothing thereby, but his person. Macro, that he might obtain Caligula his favour, sets his own wife Ennia upon him, to inveigle him with love, and bind him in a marriage. The same man commanded Tiberius to be smothered with clothes, as he was sick and dying, as Tacitus affirms. Julian the Emperor retained Arbetio still, because he thought him useful, although he hated him for his pride, and turbulent disposition. And Valentinian after him, called the same man unto him to oppose against Procopius. We have hitherto handled only such things as our Courtier, who will enjoy the Prince's favour, aught to avoid; But the sum of all Counsels that can here be given to him, is, A modesty towards the Prince, such as becomes a man, more mindful of his duty, then of his swelling fortune; let him never boast, nor do any thing irreverently; and as much as possibly he can, let him avoid envy; which hath been so dreadful to many, and those great men, That some of them with pretending a love of ease, others embracing a retirement to study, have showed themselves averse to public affairs. Examples in both which cases, the Historians give us in Domitian and Galba. He must take heed, he pass not over carelessly, either those treacherous kind of praises we spoke of before, nor the slanders that are cast upon him: They that Calumniate us, do say, That either we are wanting in some thing that is necessary to serve the Prince well; or else, That we have said, or done something, either really, or intentionally, to the prejudice of him, or his service. As to the defects imputed unto us, we must either modestly excuse, and justify ourselves, or else amend them; or lastly, endeavour with some other virtues to recompense those wants. Our words and actions ought to be so moderated▪ and weighed, That they may not be obnoxious to ill interpretations; we ought always to endeavour to search into other men's opinions, and inclinations, before we discover our own; And if either by chance or negligence, any thing slip from us, which may po●sibly offend, we must when we reflect upon it, by some respective means, or by some kind of occasi●nal interpretation, amongst other discourse, let them see, what we spoke was not with an intention of offending anybody. If we shall once discover, that we are calumniated by any one, we ought as little as may be, be absent● from the Prince, to whom we are slandered; for besides that, love abates towards those that are absent, detraction also in time takes root, if it be not seasonably contradicted with truth; for a jealousy being once put into the Prince's head, in time through the many suggestions of the accuser, there being nobody to gainsay; takes such footing at last, That oftentimes the Prince hates the person accused, before he examines the crime. He therefore that will provide for his safety, must make himself at Court, one friend or more, to defend him in his absence against the dangerous assaults of Calumny: But withal, he must take care they be persons of Condition and honour, or at least, men of Interest, and such as have access to the Prince's ear, as readily as our Enemies. I confess, the store of such Friends in Court, is but very small, where it is the usual custom, almost amongst all, if not to persecute their companions themselves, at least to suffer them to be oppressed by others. But yet it happens sometimes, That there is one that either out of gratitude for benefits received, or with a desire of obliging us, or else out of hatred, towards our accusers, will perform that office. CHAP. 35. Ostentation of the Prince's favour, to be avoided: Something also concerning our Friends and followers. LEt our Courtier avoid all ostentation of the Prince's favour, not only to eschew the envy of the rest of his Companions, but also of the Prince himself: For lately, when the Grandees of Spain went about to supplant Cardinal Spin●sa, under Philip the Second, see with what a wile they circumvented him: They all struck sail to him, they all seemed to acknowledge, that their fortunes depended upon his favour; the very domestic servants of the King, showed themselves very obedient, and ready at his beck: Which when the Prince observed, he was removed from Court, and all that power and greatness which he had acquired, in less than two years fell to nothing. Let therefore our Courtier learn to be contented with a modest ●rain of attendants, and with a ra●e of living rather beneath the dignity wherewith he is honoured by the Prince, then above it; which he must be sure never to exceed. It is unseasonable to lessen your attendants, when your fortune is declining. It availed Seneca nothing, after he had lost Nero's favour, to hide himself in his private house, and betake himself to his studies, nor to shut out visitants with his pretence of want of health. Neither did it advantage Agricola a whit, to have entered the City by night, and with a slender company of followers: Wherefore it is necessary, That we put on a face of modesty betimes, and hold on so. Yet although I would not have our Courtier be besieged with too great a thr●ng of Friends and Servants, I would not have him neglect to make many Creatures and Followers; not to serve him in his pomp, but to support and comfort him, if any adversity should happen: For although an adverse Fortune finds few of these prove friends, yet there are for the most part, some among them who will endeavour to shelter and assist you; if not out of friendship, yet out of respect to their own advantage, which they may well expect from the restauration of your Fortune. CHAP. 36. How to manage and dispense the Prince's favour, advices, and comforts in adversity, with other rules. BUt as it is a great content and help in adversity, to have communicated your prosperity freely and generously to many, in using the favour of the Prince, to their assistance and advantage; so our Courtier is to be warned, That he warily and industriously dispense these benefits; for it is certain, That whatsoever the Prince shall at our entreaty do for any man, a great part of it is by him imputed, as done to us. Wherefore, unless the Prince's favour towards us, be very large, we must not be too prodigal of sharing it amongst others: And very seldom must we introduce or commend any unto the Prince, who are not in some measure known unto him, as well as to ourselves, whose deserts we ought first carefully to look into, observing that saying of Horace. Till thou art certain what his virtues be, In no man's praises be thou overfree; lest he transgress, and purchase shame to thee. Moreover, let those favours also, which you demand for anybody from the Prince, be fit for the person, and suitable with the times, consistant also with the dignity, and emolument of the Prince; and lastly, such as you know have been formerly obtained by others. If the Prince grants it, we must let him see we take it as a great favour done unto ourselves; if he refuse, we must take heed that he do not perceive we are offended. That is also to be observed here, which we have touched upon before, That we must never vainly make show of the Prince's favour, nor give it out, That he is governed by us; for we have told you before, how ill that succeeded with some. Princes whatsoever they do, desire to be thought to do it of themselves, without the help and authority of any others, especially their Subjects. If the Prince shall lay any weighty command upon us, we endeavour to have it in writing, and as clearly interpreted unto us, as is possible: We must not omit to represent unto him, such difficulties before we undertake the business, as we apprehend will occur unto us in the execution. If it be a thing committed to us in secrecy, and unfit to be written, we are to repeat the Commands over and over (yet without absurdity) in the Prince's presence, to the end we may better understand the intention of him that gives them, and also that he may not forget what orders he gave us. We must also show ourselves ready for the meanest employments the Prince will cast upon us; for many times a small matter is the occasion of a great fortune; and Princes would have their commands to be weighed not by the importance of the affair, but by the greatness and dignity of him the giver; being no less incensed at our refusal of slight enterpises, than our declining of great and hazardous undertakings, when imposed by him upon us. When we are attending upon the Prince, we ought to watch diligently, that we be not surprised nor overwhelmed with sudden commands; And to that end, always as much as may be, we ought to ruminate before hand all things then afoot, and to prepare our mind and understanding for whatever may come in agitation. We must likewise take heed, that we importune not the Prince with unseasonable nor impertinent discourses, but only with what we both know to be certain, and judge to be fit for him to hear. When the Prince speaks, we must appear attentive, not as if we thought of something else; not sad, not musing, lest we should seem either to slight, or dislike what he says. If any one disgusted, or injured by the Prince, shall come and make his complaint to us, we must let him see we are sorry for his misfortune; persuading him to patience, and silence, and encouraging him to hope well; lessening the injury, and excusing the Prince. But with such as these, we must deal warily, for there are those that counterfeit wrongs and discontents, to see if they can draw any testimony of an ill will to the Prince out of us, that thence they may take an occasion to undo us: Others are injured indeed, but yet are weak and imprudent, not being able to conceal what is out of friendship communicated to them in secret. If our condition be such, that we keep a train of servants, we are to take great care that none of them speak licentiously, either of the Prince, or his favourites; for many times the servants fault is cast upon the Master, from whom his words and actions are often thought to proceed. Amongst the principal rules of a courtier's Prudence, this is one, To discover and smell out betimes, the change and diminution of the Prince's affection towards us, to the end, that the knot of love between you, may rather be gently untied, then cut in sunder. For so many times the cause of our distaste being removed, or worn away, there is sometimes an easy return for us unto our former favour, especially, if we seem, either not to remember, or not to have understood the injury. CHAP. 37. How to make a judgement of the constancy, or change of the Prince's affection to us. TO the end our Courtier may judge of the constancy of the Prince's favour towards him, It is not enough that he know the Prince's humour, with the authority and power, both of his friends and enemies in Court; but, he must principally weigh the original cause of the Prince's love towards him: For, if that once cease, or be found more prevalent in another, without doubt, the affection of the Prince will either wholly cool, or at least be much diminished. Yet sometimes it is hard to divine what is the reason, that you are so beloved; and truly, it is sometimes only a fortunate felicity, for which no reason can be given, though ordinarily the Prince's love arises, either out of similitude of disposition, out of the pleasingness of your humour and manners, out of your services done him, or from your virtue; or lastly, from your obsequious plyableness to his will. That love which comes from the similitude, or takingness of your manners, although it seem very great for a time, yet it wears out soonest of all; both, because as we have said before the nature of man changes daily with age, or with variety of business; and also, because it is hard to find two dispositions so sympathising together, as that they differ in nothing; and many times that wherein they differ, is of more power to divide them, than all the rest to unite them together. Yet I know not what Star doth so tune and temper some men still to the Princes liking, and disposition, that they can hardly, if they would, do any dissonant or displeasing thing to him: And I do confess, That these men may make the best harvest, with a Prince of all others; especially, if they know skilfully how to choose and use their times, and how to take in their sails seasonably before a storm. CHAP. 38. The Prince's favour to Women: Instructions for the Prince's Mistresses; benefits conferred on Princes, often makes those persons hated by them, with other documents. PRinces do sometimes also bestow this favour on Women, according as they are more or less prone to venereal pleasures; but they also do frequently fall from favour, if not by their own faults, yet out of the Princes●atiety, or finding out a fairer Mistress. Wherefore, such Women as are crafty, are wont to divert Princes, as much as may be, from all commerce with other Women, especially such as may be likely to entangle the Prince's mind; some also, by counterfeiting disdain, and keeping state, have preserved their lover; and lastly, some more audacious and bold, when they saw the Prince once truly love them, have kept him still drunk in lust, and drowned in pleasure. Which arts Poppaea practised upon Nero, For when she saw that he was enamoured of her, becoming proud, if she entertained him a night or two, it was all she could afford him; saying, She was a married wife, and could not abandon her Husband Otho, who for his parts and behaviour exceeded Nero: That in using a bondslave, acts for his Concubine, had learned nothing from that servile familiarity, but baseness and niggardise: Thus Tacitus reports her discourses, Annal. 13. And soon after, Annal. 14. the same Poppaea despairing now of marrying Nero, or of seeing him divorced from Octavia, as long as Agrippina lived: Sometimes tauntingly, and sometimes merrily, began to reproach the Prince, calling him a Ward, and subject to others controlment; and said, he was so far from the Government of the Empire, that he wanted his own liberty. Some Prince's Mistresses have by this means held their affections faster, then by the dallyings and blandishments of pleasure; yet, as I said before, there is no constancy in this kind of affection to be relied upon long. Truly one would think that love, which you have gained by your services, should be stable and more firm, than what comes from flattery or pleasure, as arising out of an honest cause; and which being cherished in you, is apt to stir up others to merit as well by virtuous undertakings. Yet experience often teaches us, that very great services have in Courts been the ruin of those that have performed them; by reason, that Princes are wont to hate, whom they cannot requite. They will not be indebted to a subject, and therefore do fly the sight of those that have exceeding well deserved of them, as if they did with their looks reproach them of ingratitude; which is the reason, why the condition of such men in Courts, is much to be pitied; for when they have obliged the Prince by any service, they are ashamed by and by, to ask a reward, lest they should seem not to have giyen, but sold the benefit they did him; who in the mean time, as Princes are often regardless of the service received, and slow to reward, draws out, day after day, till the memory of the benefit wears out in the minds of those that were privy to it; whose silent reproaches he feared before. Which some men observing, have judged it fit, to strike the Iron whilst it was hot; and when they were designed for any business, to look to their reward, before they undertook the employment; knowing well, that with Princes the hope of future services, is more prevalent to induce reward, than the memory of those that are past; and that it is better to be obliged to Princes, then to have them obliged to us; because they believe, whoever they have obliged, to wish well to them, whilst he that they are indebted unto, because he is believed not to love the Prince that hath denied him, what he pretended unto; is recompensed only with hate. This Commines tells us, was Lewis the Eleventh his opinion. The love of Princes towards the Ministers of their pleasure, would seem to be stable; and truly, it is of some continuance, as long as the inclinations of the Prince to pleasure continue; but those changing, the affections to those that fed them, change also. Sometimes likewise, the Prince inclining to the love of virtue, doth reject and abominate those that are instruments of his pleasures. But as some of the inclinations of Princes are more durable than others, so also is their favour (as I said) of a proportioned continuance, towards the Servants of those veral inclinations. CHAP. 39 Sundry precepts concerning the Pleasures, and Inclinations of the Prince, &c. I Will not touch here upon all pleasures, whereunto the nature of the Prince is prone, because all of them are not fit, or apt to have the greatness of any man's fortune built upon them. Those passions that are of any greatest sway in Princes minds, and familiar unto them, are three, to wit, Wanton love, Cruelty, and Avarice: The first, as it is more vehement than all the rest, so it is more incertain, and inconstant; for though the vice still remains as to the Subject, yet it keeps not fixed still upon the same object: Nevertheless, many have used this as a foundation, whereupon to build their fortunes, not sticking to prostitute their Wives, so they might gain the favour of the Prince; as we read in Tacitus, that Otho did, although it ●ell not out well with him; for Nero removed him from Court, lest he should have a rival there. Others that they might bind their Princes unto them, made themselves Witnesses and Companions of their wickedness and lusts, by the example of Tigellinus. These men do not think that Princes have a trick to free themselves of public blame and envy, to sacrifice oftentimes such kind of men unto it: And all those servants of their lusts are to expect the same fortune as happened to Remirus de Orco, the Minister of Caesar Borgia his cruelties; whom at last, Borgia caused to be murdered, as guilty of all the ill that he had done. And from the example of this Remirus, we may also read their destiny, who serve the Prince in his cruelties; for the Prince's affection seldom endures towards them, both because he doth, as it were, daily read his wickedness in seeing them, and also is afrai● of them, whom he knows so apt to villan● Nero although hardened in vice, and of ●cruel nature, yet after his mother's death hated Anicetus, as one whose face daily reproached him with his mother's murder. The affections of Avarice are least of all changeable; the diversity of the object doth not vary in these, as in those of love; it is not diminished, but increases with age; and although it is as hateful to the people; as cruelty, yet it is longer endured, because it covers and cloaks all exactions, under the pretence of public necessity, Parsimony, and the Common good. Therefore, those that upon this score serve Princes, may long preserve themselves in their favour, whilst (which is rare in these kind of men) they do not become froward and peevish, nor too much intend enriching themselves. Frowardness, which for the most part is likewise contumelious, begets hatred both to the Prince, and to itself; The author of which, the Prince will at last cast away, to remove the envy of it from himself. Riches are also obnoxious to envy, not of the people only, but sometimes of the Prince himself; who if he be truly avaricious, will hardly be content, till he have squeezed the full Sponge, as we read that Vespasian was wont to do; but will rather imitate the Country Clowns, who when they have fattened their Hogs, do kill and devour them. Truly, France hath seen many such, who being proud and peevish, and who making too much haste to be rich, have thereby, and by their insolence, from a great height of fortune, fallen to nothing. In the time of Philip le Belle, Peter Berchius, High Chamberlain, and Treasurer of France, was strangled at Paris; Lewis, Philip's Son, afterward coming to the Crown, Enguerrandus Marigny met with the same misfortune: Under Charles the Seventh, Gyacensis, in dignity equal to B●rchias, was brought to the Bar, and afterwards sowed in a Sack, and drowned; his Successor Camus Beaulieu was killed at Poytiers; and the same end had come under Philip the First, to Peter Essart, if with an Hundred thousand florins he had not redeemed his life. I could recount more nearer us, but that I am willing to spare their memory: In the mean time these examples are sufficient to instruct, That as the too great easiness of these Ministers brings too great a detriment upon the Prince's profit; so their insolent griping, and frowardness, draws hate and destruction upon themselves: And that as we ought not to refuse a just occasion of enriching ourselves, so we must not show ourselves too greedy after riches, nor amass so much together, as may expose us to the public Envy. CHAP. 40. Concluding with many choice, and necessary Admonitions. THere remains only now unhandled the last cause, why Courtiers are beloved by their Princes; to wit, An aptness, and singular ability to dispatch, and manage their Affairs: For which reason, When we see that we are become acceptable to the Prince, we must consider, Whether he love this aptness for business, because of the usefulness and necessity of it; or else, because the Prince desires to acquire from us that aptitude to himself. If it be grateful, because it is necessary, his favour to us will endure as long as the necessity remains; but his love, will rather be a forced, then voluntary love. If we see the Prince aspire to the glory of this aptitude for business, there is no doubt, but when he sees; that he cannot either equal, or excel us, we shall become an eyesore, and unacceptable to him; for there is in Prince; an innate desire, as well as in all other men, of excelling all persons in those arts they addict themselves unto; and therefore no man, almost, is pleased to be excelled in them by his own servant. As●●ius Pollio, some exhorting him to make a reply to those Verses Augustus Caesar had made against him, answered, That he would not by contending to seem the better Scribe, draw his envy upon him, that had power to proscribe him. There arising a dispute once between Favorinus the Philosopher, and the Emperor Adrian, about some word, wherein the philosopher at last seemed to yield; his Friends wondering at it, he said, I am not ashamed to be overcome in knowledge by him, that commands Thirty Legions. To this purpose, that saying of Solomon is very notorious, Do not seem wise before the King. It is necessary therefore, That whosoever desires to purchase a Prince's favour, must se● aside the desire of his own glory; and not only in verbal disputes, but in every thing else, yield him the day: And to that end, it will not be amiss, on purpose to commit some errors and oversights; so that they be not too gross, nor like to take too much from our repute. Out of our discourse hitherto, it is evident▪ how little certainty is in all the greatness and favour at Court; Wherefore, the best counsel that can be given to all Courtiers, is, To prepare themselves for their fall; for although it is thought a more generous thing to fight, then to fly, when you are once entered these lists; yet if you are to do it with greater hazard of danger, then hope of success, it is not indiscreet to sound a retreat betimes, and in imitation of the Parthians, to fight flying. As it is also a more glorious thing to descend gently by steps, and as it were, to go out at the door, then to be cast headlong out at the Window; so it is less shameful, under colour of some specious and contrived pretences, to bid adieu to your honours and Offices, then to expect to be stripped disgracefully of them: And hereunto may fitly be applied the saying of an ancient Roman. Why dost thou weary tired Fortune so? Depart the Court, before thou art forced to go. Seneca says, it is happiness to die in the midst of your felicity; but I on the other side think That Courtier happy, who in the midst of his prosperous race makes a retreat. Perhaps he that shall do so, shall not be applauded by all, but by some that look upon the outsides of things, be judged unworthy of the Fortune that he hath so abandoned. Yet he that is wise, not regarding such idle discourses, will provide for his own safety, and remember, that in all games, it is better to give over a winner, than a looser; as also, that no prudent man will exchange or adventure certain things, for things so very uncertain. Though our ascent to these heights of Fortune and Dignities, is, as it were, by steps in order; yet our descents, if not timely foreseen, are for the most part headlong, and sudden: So that those that are flourishing in favour and Authority, if they chance once to slip, or stumble, their falls are lightly desperate and fatal. Behold here the Compendium of all, that I desired to say, for our courtier's instruction: Whether these pre●epts be pertinent, and select or no, I will not determine, but leave that to the judgement and experience of my Friends. For my own part, I confess, I have at present no great use of them, and am so far from being transported with sadness, at my private and retired condition, that I do heartily say with Seneca; Let him that pleases, stand upon The slippery Battlements of Court: I am well content to live alone, Obscure, and free from all resort. A sweet reti●ement I desire, To all things that are Great unknown: Where I to virtue may aspire; Therewith my latter days to Crown. That so when Time hath stolen away My health, and scarcely left me breath, Without disturbance, find I may A quiet, and a happy death. And that may cheerfully embrace, As being terrible to none But those, who known in every place, Die only to themselves unknown. FINIS.