The Debate or Arguments for Dissolving this present Parliament, and the calling frequent and new Parliaments.  
As they were delivered in the House of Lords, November the 20th. 1675.  
THat it is according to the Constitution of the Government, the ancient Laws and Statutes of this Realm, that there should be frequent and new Parliaments, and the practise of all Ages, till this last, hath been accordingly: Parliaments, both long before and after the Conquest, were held three times a year, viz. Easter, whitsuntide, and Christmas, during the space of Eight Days for each time, and so continued with some variations, as to the times of Calling, and length of Holding; but always very short until the Reign of Ed. 3. in the fourth year of whose Reign there was a Law made, That Parliaments should be holden every year once, or more often, and how this Law is to be understood, whether of a New Parliament every Year, or calling the Old, is most manifest, by the practise, not onely of all the Ages before, but of some Hundred of Years since that Law: Prorogations or Long Adjournments, being a thing never heard of until latter Years.  
And it is most unreasonable, that any particular number of Men should for many Years engross so great a Trust of the People, as to be their Representatives in the House of Commons; And that all other the Gentry; and the Members of Corporations of the same Degree and Quality with them, should be so long excluded. Neither is it agreeable with the nature of Representatives to be continued for so long a time; and those that choose them, not to be allowed frequent opportunity of changing the hands, in which they are obliged to put so great a trust. The mutual correspondence and Interests of those who choose and are chosen, admitting of great variations in length of time. How many in this present House of Commons are there, whose business and acquaintance has not given them the occasion of the correspondence of one Letter,( for these many Years) with any Person of those places for whom they serve? How many may there be in future Parliaments, if continued as long as This, that may be Protestants when they are chosen, and yet may come in so many Years justly to be suspected to have changed their Religion? Nay, How many in this present Parliament are there, who were chosen by the People when they were of the same adequate Interest with them, and in length of time, by the Favour and Goodness of the Prince, and their own great Merits, are become Officers in the Court, and about the Revenue? This is not spoken to reflect on them, for many of them have behaved themselves very worthy, of those places: but yet themselves cannot say, that they are equally as free to act for those that choose them, as they were before: Nor are they of the same Interest; as when they were chosen; for now they gain, and have the advantage by the Peoples payments: And if they should say, They are the same Men they were, We may call their Fellow Members that have sate with them to Witness, whether the Proverb be not true, that Honores mutant mores, whether they have the same Opinion, and the same Freedom they had before. Nay, may it not be said without offence, that even in this House of Commons, there are not a few, who, when they were chosen, were looked upon as Men of Estates; and are either since grown or discovered to be of that indigent condition, that they are much fitter to receive the public maintenance, then give the public money; and it may be charitably supposed, that those Gentlemen are so modest, as to be willing to lay down, if they could, the public Trust. But 'tis most certain, that those places they serve for, would not be willing to continue them in it. There is no question, but 'tis the Kings undisputed Prerogative to call and end Parliaments when he please, and no man, nor number of men can limit him a time; but the greatest Prince cannot avoid the being limited by the nature of things; Representatives of the People are necessary to the making Laws, and there is a time when it is morally demonstrable; that men cease to be Representatives, there being Circumstances and Proprieties that distinguish every thing, as well as Person in the World: So that to conclude this head, We Owe the Prince the observance of his time and place both for calling and duration of Parliaments, and the Prince owes us, not onely the frequencies of Parliaments, but that our Representations should be preserved to us in them.  
And further, if you consider the constitution of our Government, where the King as Head( from whom all the vital and animal Spirits are diffused through the Body) has the care of all, whose Interest is to seek the welfare of the whole; all being his, the strength of the Nation being his strength, the riches his riches, the glory and honour, his glory and honour, and so on the contrary; But least passion mistake flattery, or the ill designs of those about the Prince, should make him grow across to his Real, and follow a destructive imaginary Interest: There is an Estate of Hereditary Nobility, who are by Birth-right the Councellors of the Kingdom, and whose Interest and Business it is, to keep the balance of the Government steady, that the Favourites and great Officers, exceed not their bounds, and oppress the People, that Justice be duly administered, and that all parts of the Government be preserved entire; Yet even. These may grow insolent( a Disease Greatness is liable to) or may by Offlees, Dependencies, hopes of Preferment, and other accidents, become, as to the mayor part of them, rather the obsequious flatterers of the Court, then true supporters of the publck and English Interest, and therefore the Excellence of our Government, affords us another Estate of Men, which are the Representatives of the Free-holders, Cities, principal Burroughs, and Corporations of England, who by the Old Law, were to be new chosen once a year, if not oftener, so that they perfectly gave the sense of those that choose them, and were the same thing as if those were present that choose, they so newly coming from them, and so quickly returning to give an account of their. Fidelity, under the penalty of shane, and no further Trust.  
Thus you have in our English Government, the House of Commons affording the sense, the Mind, the Information, the Complaints, the Grievances, and the desires of all those People for whom they serve, throughout the whole Nation. The People are thus secure, no Laws can be made, nor Money given, but what themselves, though at home, fully consent and agree to. The Second Estate in this Government, is the Lords, who are the council, the Wisdom, and judgement of the Nation, to which their Birth, Education, and constant employment, being the same in every Parliament, prepares and fits them. The last, and supreme of all, is the King, One who gives Life and Vigour to the proceedings of the other Two; The Will and Desires of the People, though approved by the Wisdom and judgement of the Lords, are Abortive, unless he bids them be an Act.  
human reason can hardly contrive a more excellent Government; But if you will alter this Government, in any of the Three Parts of it, the disorders and inconveniencies incident to the nature of such alteration, must necessary follow; As for instance, the long continuance of any such as are entrusted for others, especially of such as have so great a power over the Purse of the Nation, must necessary produce cabals, and Parties, and the carrying on of private Interests and Court-Factions, rather then the public good, or the true Interest either of the King or Kingdom. How vastly is the privilege of a Parliament man increased since the middle of the Reign of H. 8.? Before, it was seve●all times agreed by all the Judges, and observed as the Law, That a Member and his Servants, were exempted onely from Arrests and Outwlaries, but might be impleaded, sued, and Attached by his Land and Goods; yet now they must not be sued in any Case, nor dispossessed of any thing during the time of privilege; nay, these two last Sessions the privilege must extend to exempt them even from the Judicature of Parliament itself: As also before the same King's Reign the House of Commons never thought of Judicature, as being in the nature of their Constitution uncapable of it; But since they are not only become Judges of their own privileges, condemning and imprisoning their fellow-Subjects at pleasure, and without an Oath, and also Judges of all Elections, by which very often they, and not the places, choose their fellow-members: But now 'tis come to that, that the House of Commons pass sentence on the Lords proceedings, make new crimes, and add Preinstruments to them by their own Authority; If you will ask the reason of this change, 'tis plain that Parliaments began in Hen. 8's time to be longer than they ought, That Prince knowing that long Parliaments were fitted to make great Changes, they have been too frequent since, but never of that length as this; Besides all this, the long continuance of Representatives renders them liable to be corrupted and won off from the Publique-Interest; it gives them time to settle their Cabals and Interest at Court, and takes away the great Security the Nation has; that if it be possible to happen that the Spiritual Lords because of their great dependence on the Crown, the Popish Lords being under the pressure of so severe Laws, together with the Court Lords and great Officers should in any future Age make up a greater number of the House of Lords, and should pass things very prejudicial to the public, yet all should prove ineffectual, and the Nation remain safe in an House of Commons lately chosen that have not had time to learn new Sentiments, or to put off their old Principles at a good Market. How great has been the modesty of this present House of Commons, that having had the Purse of the Nation thus long in their hands, as being those that first begun the Grants of Subsidies and Aids to the King, and so by consequence have all the Addresses made to them, when ever the wants of the Crown( which in this active Age are very often) require it, that they have not made use of it to the prejudice of the public, or to their own advantage; It was a very high Temptation, and might easily have rendered them in their own Opinion more than Lords, and they are rather to be commended that they insisted on no higher Terms with the Lords House, than wondered at for what they did; Considering the matter, ground, and the circumstances wherein they stood, and yet they were certainly mistaken, and not a little forgot themselves, when they would not allow the Lords House a power of lessening the sums in any Bill of subsidy or Aid that they had once set; which was not only directly contrary to the Interest of the People that choose them, but against the ancient and express Rule and Custom of Parliament, whereby it is clear if the Commons grant five Subsidies, and the Lords agree but to four, that Bill of subsidy need not be sent down to the Commons for their consent to such an alteration. And they certainly were grown very high in their own Opinion, and had a very low esteem for the Lords, when they neglected the safety of their best Friends in that House, and did almost with scorn refuse the passing of the Bill for the more fair and equal trial of Peers, which in several Sessions was sent down to them. How great were the apprehensions of all sober and wise Men at every meeting of this present Parliament during these late years, and how much is to be ascribed to the goodness of our Prince, and to the virtue of the Members of this present House of Commons, that Honours, Offices, Pensions, Money, employments and Gifts had not been bestowed and accepted, and the Government, as in France, Denmark and other Countries, made absolute and at the will of the Prince? How easy this may be done in future Ages under such Princes, and such an House of Commons as may happen, if long and continued Parliaments be allowed for Law, may be made some measure of by this, where though the Prince had no design, and the Members of the House of Commons have shewed so great candour and Self-denial, yet the best Observers are apt to think that we owe it to the strong and opposite Factions at Court, that many things of great Alterations have not passed.  
And moreover, it cannot be passed over with silence, nor considered without great thoughts of heart, to what a price a Member of the House of Commons place is come; In former times when Parliaments were short and frequent, The Members constantly received their wages both of their Counties and Burroughs; many of the poorer Burroughs petitioned to be excused from sending Members, as not being able to bear their charge; and were so: Laws were made in favour of the Gentry, that Corporations should compel none but their Freemen of their own Town to serve for them; Nay you shall find in all the ancient Returns of Writs for Knights of the Shires, their Sureties for their appearance returned with them: But now the case is altered, 1500 l. and 2000 l. and lately 7000 l. is a price Men pay to be entrusted: 'Tis to be hoped the Charity of those worthy Persons, and their Zeal for the public Interest has induced them to be at this expense; But it were better to be otherwise, and there is a scurvy English Proverb, That Men that buy dear, cannot live by selling cheap. And besides all these, the very privilege of the Members, and of those they protect in a Parliament of so long duration, is a pressure that the Nation cannot well support itself under; So many thousand Suits of Law stopped, so vast a Sum of Money withheld from the right owners, so great a quantity of Land unjustly possessed, and in many Cases the length of time securing the possession, and creating a Title; And 'tis an Observation not unworthy the making, that all this extent of privilege beyond its due bounds has first risen from the Members of the House of Commons; That House to this day pretends to forty days privilege before and after Parliament, the House of Lords but twenty, and yet the privilege of Parliament is the same to both: and if the House of Commons obtain their forty days to become Law and Custom, the Lords will certainly enjoy the same privilege; But the cure of this Evil is very easy in frequent and short Parliaments, The Members will affect no larger privileges than are necessary and useful to them, for such as oppress and injure others cannot expect a second choice, and the present time is but short.  
To all this there are two Objections that make a great sound, but have really nothing of weight in them; The first Objection is, That the Crown is in danger if you call a new Parliament. If those men be in earnest that urge this, it were to be wished they would consider well what are the Men are likely to be chosen, and they are not difficult to be guest at through the whole Kingdom, Men of Quality, of Estates, and of the best Understanding; Such will never affect change, or disturb the Kings Government: A New Parliament will be the Nation, and that will never stick at small matters to render themselves acceptable to their Prince. Would the King have acquaintance with his People? This is his way. Would he have yet more the love of his People? Thus he is sure to have it. Would the King have a considerable sum of Money to pay his Debts and put him at ease? Thus he cannot fail of it, nay he shall have it as a pledge of endearment between him and his people, they give it themselves, and they know the King receives it as from them. The English Nation are a generous people, and have at all times expressed themselves ready to supply even the Humours, and Excesses of their Princes, and some of the best beloved Princes we have had were such as by war, or otherwise put us to most expense: Witness Edward the 1st, Edward the 3d, and Henry the 5th; but then always they were satisfied that the Honour of the Nation was preserved, and what ever private or personal Excesses the Prince had, yet the Nation was secure, there was no design upon them, neither should their money or their strength be used against them; All this is the happiness of our present state under our most gracious King. But how shall the People know and be secure it is so? but by those they annually sand up to Parliament from amongst themselves; Whereas if the King should have a great Sum of Money given by this Parliament, it would be looked upon as theirs, not as the Peoples gift, and the best of Men with their Circumstances cannot avoid the suspicion, when they give much to have received some; and men will not so cheerfully undergo the burden of a Tax, and their own Wants in the time of this general Poverty, when they apprehended others have the Thanks, and perhaps the Reward of their Sufferings.  
The second Objection is with great apprehensions and passion urged by the Bishops; That the Church and this Parliament fall together. Which Objection how vain it is you will easily confess, if( as was said before) the persons that are like to be chosen be considered; The dissenting Protestants may very probably find more favour and ease, but the Church can never suffer, either in her Lands or Dignities she now enjoys, by an House of Commons consisting of Men of the best Quality and Estates in England, as the next certainly will do: But, on the other side, what do the Bishops mean by this Assertion? most certainly it is not their intent to make the Interest of the Church and the Nation direct opposite and inconsistent one with the other; and yet in saying this they confess, that this House of Commons are not the true Representatives of those they serve for; that the People and they are of different minds; that if they were to choose again, they would choose other men of other sentiments; And it must be confessed that what ever is not natural is by force, and must be maintained by force. A standing Parliament and a standing Army are like those Twins that have their lower parts united, and are divided only above the Navel; they were born together, and cannot long outlive each other. Certainly that man is no friend to the Church that wishes it a third incorporated with those two.  
To conclude this Debate, the continuance of this present Parliament any longer is unpracticable; the breach this House of Commons has made upon the Lords is as unlikely to be repaired with these present Men, as it is to be renewed by another House of Commons of a new Election; If you consider the Power, the Courtship, and the Addresses that these Men have for so many years enjoyed and received, they may almost be forgiven if they think themselves greater Men than the Lords in the higher House; besides it is very well known that many of the ablest and most worthy Patriots amongst them have carried this Difference to the greatest height with this only design, that by this means they might deliver the Nation from the danger and pressure of a long continued Parliament: Whereas a new chosen House of Commons, especially if it were fixed, and known that it could not remain long, could not be apprehended to have any affectation to exceed their just bounds, nor to renew a Contest, where the Interest of the People is manifestly on the Lords side; for besides the undoubted Right and constant practise that the Lords enjoy in the Case of Appeals from Courts of Equity, all other Expedients when well considered, give the Crown, the Favourites and Ministers the power over every mans Estate in England.  
Thus you see 'tis the Interest of all sorts of men to have a New Parliament; This will give the King constant and never-failing Supplies with the hearts and good-will of his People: This will not only preserve the Church in the Honours, Dignities and Revenues she now enjoys, and make her the Protectrix and Asylum of all the Protestants through Europe, but will also increase the Maintenance of the Ministry in Corporations and great Towns, which is now much wanting, and of great concern to the Church. This will procure the dissenting Protestants Ease, Liberty, and Protection: The Papists may justly expect by this to be delivered from that grievous pressure of penal Laws they lye under, if they can be contented with being deprived of access to Court, bearing Offices or Arms: The great Officers and Ministers may under this enjoy their places undisturbed and in quiet, and be secure with a moderate Conduct, and reasonable condescensions to attain that in a new Parliament which they have by experience found is impossible in the old. In a word, there is not to be imagined an Interest against this, unless there be an inveterate party still remaining in our World, who to compass their Revenge, and repair their broken Fortunes, would hope to see the Act of Oblivion set aside, and this happy Monarchy turned into an absolute, Arbitrary, Military Government; But Charity bids us hope there are no such Men.  
FINIS.