The Two Great QUESTIONS CONSIDERED.  

I. What the French King will Do, with Respect to the Spanish Monarchy.  
II. What Measures the English ought to Take.   
LONDON, Printed by R. T. for A. Baldwin, at the Oxford-Armes, in Warwick-lane. 1700.   

THE PREFACE.  
SInce the Following Sheets were in the Press, some Letters from France advise, that the King of France has saluted his Grandson the Duke D'Anjou, as King of Spain.  
Some People who are of the most Intelligent Part of Mankind, think He has done so by way of Politics, to see how the rest of Europe will resent it; as He once did in a like Case, to the Prince of Conti as King of Poland; whose Pretensions He did not think fit to pursue.  
The Author therefore thinks the following Sheets are as much to the purpose as they were before; and without any farther recommendation refers the Reader to the perusal.   

THE Two Great Questions CONSIDERED.  
WE are told, That the Deceased King of Spain has by his last Will, bestowed his Kingdoms on the Duke D'Anjou, Grandson to the Present King of France.  
Amongst the many weak Actions of that Effeminate Prince, who hardly ever did a Wise One, This is the most Ridiculous; if it be proper to give such an Epithet to the Actions of Sovereign Princes.  

1. To imagine the Most Christian King would give any Regard to, or put any Value upon such a Bequest, any farther than consisted with his other Measures, or at least with his Interest; must be a Folly none could be guilty of, but such as know very little of the King of France, or of the Affairs of Europe.  
2. To think that the Rest of the Princes of Christendom, would suffer the Spanish Monarchy to be bequeathed by Will to a French Man, without any Title or other Right than the Deed of Gift of the late King, and without any Regard to the Right of the Lawful Pretenders, is also most Egregious Nonsense.   
To make way therefore, to the Case in hand, and come at the Questions before us with more Clearness; 'tis necessary to Examine the Nature, and probable Consequences of this Last Will and Testament of the King of Spain.  
1. As to the Nature of the Thing, it seems to be a Tacit Invitation to all the Competitors to a Dangerous and a Bloody War; as if the King of Spain should have said to his Privy Council, I'll be revenged on them all for attempting to divide our Dominions; for I'll give it to One that has no Title, let the Rest fight for it, and the longest Sword take all.  
As to the Duke D'Anjou, he has no Manner of Title, but what is presumptive on the Death of his Father and Elder Brother without Issue; if they should have Children the Emperor of Morocco has as good, and perhaps a better Title to the Crown of Spain than Herald  
The Dauphin of France has an Unquestioned Title to the Crown of Spain, if it be True, that the Renunciation made by his Father and Mother at the Pyrenaean Treaty; cannot bind the Children so as to deprive them of their Right, which is the great Argument now used to defend their Title: Now if their Right be good the Crown is the Dauphin's, and after him the Duke of Burgundy's and his Heirs; and Dr. Davenant may spare himself the Labour of Writing a long Discourse to defend the Dauphin's Title, for we will grant he has an Undoubted Right of Succession.  
But I should be glad to have it answered, how the Duke D'Anjou can have a Title while the other are alive? It cannot be in the Power of the Dauphin to say, I will give my Right to my Second Son, for I do not think it worth my while to accept of it for myself or my Eldest. Because,  
2. The Consequence of that will in all Probability be this, that the Duke of Burgundy's Son when he has One will say again, My Grandfather had no Power to give away my Right, I am the Undoubted Heir to the Spanish Monarchy, and so no Question he will be if the present Dauphin has a Right; and if Power be in his Hands to subdue it, he will have it, tho' the Possession be his Uncle's; for Crowns know no Uncles, Brothers, or any Relations; when Power of Possession joined with Right is before them.  
So that the King of France cannot but see, that to take the Crown of Spain from the Will and Testament of the late King, is Disclaiming the Right of his own Son and Involving his Grandsons in Bloody Wars; the Issue of which a Wiser Head than His cannot foresee. This leads me to Consider  

The First Question. What Measures the King of France will take, with respect to the Succession of the Spanish Monarchy?  
By saying what Measures he will take, I mean, what He will in all Probability take, or what his Interest will lead him to take; for I suppose, no Man will imagine I am of his Privy Council.  
To debate this Matter, 'tis necessary to consider the King of France, with respect to the Terms He stands in with the rest of Europe.  
If the King of France were Absolute Master of his own Measures, and had no Leagues or Neighbours to regard; there is no Question to be made, but that rejecting all Conditions, he would immediately enter upon the Dominions of Spain as his own undoubted Inheritance, or at least his Sons; annex the same to the Crown of France and make it one Entire Empire, and any Man else would do the like.  
But as He has Measures to take with Powerful Neighbours, who as Potent as He is, are able to give him Diversion enough; and if He should embroil himself with them, may make it a Hazard whether he should obtain it or no; He is too Wise a Prince not to see that his Interest will Oblige him to act in Concert with his Neighbours. as far as conveniently He can.  
The Truth of this Argument is abundantly confirmed in the Measures He took, and the Alliances He made before the Death of the King of Spain.  
They who think the King of France so Magnipotent that He values none of his Neighbours, and talk so big of him, that like His Medal-makers they place him among the Invincibles; must have forgot the Siege of Namure, and the Vain Effort of the Power of France to relieve it; they must pass over his Deserting the Late, and Acknowledging the Present King of England at the Peace of Reswick; they must overlook the low Steps he was obliged to make, to draw the Duke of Savoy from the Confederacy, how he was unable to save casal, which cost him so much Money; how he delivered the Impregnable Town of pignerol, which his Father called the Right Hand of France, and which cost him 100 Millions to fortify; how he married the Fortune of France to a Daughter of Savoy without a Portion, and bought the Duke of Savoy at the Price of his Grandson's Dishonour; how he surrendered the large Dominions of Lorraine and Luxemburgh, and above 100 Fortified Towns to the Confederates, which though he were always Master of the Field, would cost him Seven Years to recover by the Ordinary Course of Sieges and Attacks.  
These are plain Demonstrations, that he found himself overmatched by the Confederacy; and he is not a Man of so little Sense, as not to know it.  
Why else in the League now made for the Partition of the Spanish Monarchy, should he content himself with the Dominion the Spaniards had in Italy, and quit the Delicious Morsel of America to the House of Austria.  
What Reason can any one assign for it, but that finding the English and Dutch never to be brought to consent, to his being so very powerful at Sea, as that Addition would make him; he was willing to accept so large a Portion as the Italian Part assign d to him upon Easy Terms, rather than venture like the Dog in the Fable, to lose all by coveting too much.  
Upon these Terms therefore, in Consent with the English and Dutch, his Most Christian Majesty has agreed, that on the Decease of the King of Spain the Spainsh Monarchy should be thus divided.  
All the Dominions which the Spaniards possess in Italy to be given to the French, Milan excepted, which is to be given to the Duke of Lorraine in Consideration of the Dutchies of Lorraine and Barr, which are to be yielded to the French, and all the rest some few Towns on the Frontiers of Navarr excepted, to be given to the Archduke of Austria, with other Particulars needless to repeat.  
This League being Concluded, the King of Spain (as if he had lingered out his Days only till it was thus fixed) dies according to our Account on the 22. October last.  
The Spaniard on pretence, that they would not have their Monarchy divided, and taking no Notice at all of the Right of any Prince to succeed; has made a Legacy of his Kingdoms, and given them all away to the Duke D'Anjou, a Prince who has no more Right to it, or Pretence of Right, except as before, than the Prince of Wales or the Czar of Muscovy.  
Now 'tis a Mighty Disputed Point among our Politicians, what the King of France will do in this New Juncture of Affairs, whether He will stand by the Partition agreed on, or accept of the late King of Spain's Bounty, and take the Kingdom as a Gift to his Grandson.  
What He will do, as is before noted, cannot positively be asserted; but what Reason the State and Nature of the Thing, and his own Undoubted Interest will dictate, to be done by any Prince in his Circumstances, any one may judge.  
If He be the same King of France that He has always been, who has very rarely took false Measures, or balked his own Interest, if He be guided by the same well-mannaged Council as he used to be, He will certainly adhere to the Posculata of his Alliance, and quietly accept the Partition of the Spanish Monarchy, as it is agreed in the beforementioned League. For,  
By this Acquisition of Italy He secures to Himself the whole Absolute Dominion of the Mediterranean Sea; He entirely excludes the House of Austria from any farther Concern in Italy, He has the Church so absolutely in his Clutches, that He may make himself Pope if He thinks fit; and whenever He is pleased to be displeased with the Petty Princes of Tuscany, Parma, Modena, Mantua, etc. He can blow them away with the Breath of his Mouth, they shall lay down their Principalities at his Invincible Feet, and count it more an Honour to be called Princes of the Blood or Peers of France, than to be Absolute Lords of their own Dominions. So He shall whenever He thinks fit, re-establish the Old Kingdom of the Lombard's, and annex it to the Title of France and Navarr.  
And all this without the Expense of Treasure or Hazard of his Armies, without fitting out a Fleet, or fight at Sea or on Shore; the English and Dutch being assistant to put him into the Possession of it.  
If the Emperor should be so weak to oppose Him, He must stand upon his own Legs, and in the present Circumstance, his Power does not seem formidable enough to make the Matter doubtful.  
And now we are come to mention the Emperor, let us say a Word or Two to those Gentlemen, who in his behalf speak big and say, he is able to baffle all these Measures.  
First, They tell you, how powerful the Empire now is by the Acquisition of the Kingdom of Hungary, and the most advantageous Peace with the Turk.  
They tell you his Imperial Majesty has an Army of 120 Thousand Men, besides the Troops of the Circles which are 80 Thousand more; that of these 50 Thousand lie ready on the Confines of Italy, and all the rest of his Forces are drawing down to the Rhine, that the Duke of Brandenburg on Condition of being made King of Prussia will join him with all his Forces; that the Duke of Lunenburgh on account of the Ninth Electorate, will maintain 30 Thousand Men at his own Charge, and thus all the Princes of Italy are on his side.  
By these they tell you, the Emperor will immediately on the one side secure Italy, and on the other side make such a Vigorous Diversion on the Rhine, that the King of France shall have Work enough to secure his own Dominions, while in the mean time the Archduke Charles shall be sent into Spain, where the Spaniards who naturally hate the French, will immediately proclaim him King.  
Those are great Things indeed, and if the Emperor be so strong, he may cut out a great deal of Work for the Confederates, and I'll suppose, the Emperor should be so blind to his own Interest as to attempt it, yet it seems not at all probable, that his Imperial Majesty who has hardly been able to support himself this War, in Conjunction with the whole Confederacy of Europe, should imagine himself capable of putting a Check to the Power of France, in Conjunction with England and Holland; for whatever he might do in Italy and on the Rhine, he would never be able to defend Spain and Flanders if he really had them in Possession.  
First, Flanders which has always been maintained by the Conjunction of the Dutch, would immediately be entered by the Dutch on one side, and the French on the other; and must fall into their hands with little difficulty.  
Secondly, Spain could never hold out against the French by Land, assisted with the Naval Forces of the English and Dutch by Sea, the Islands of the Mediterranean must submit to the Masters of the Sea, and America would lie like the Golden Garland to the Wrestlers, to be given to the Conquerors.  
No Man can imagine, but the Emperor, to whose Son so Considerable a Dominion is allotted, will accept of the Partition for his Part, especially when he sees how impossible it will be to make better Conditions by force.  
What the English and Dutch are to do, if he should; remains to be debated under another Head.  
I'll now suppose that which to me seems very unlikely, That the King of France should accept of this Legacy, and claim the Crown of Spain for his Grandson the Duke D'Anjou, and attempt to set up that Ridiculous Title of a Last Will and Testament, as the Foundation of his Pretention.  
Let us Calmly consider the Consequences.  
1. He inevitably renews the War with the whole Confederacy, that Peace which cost Him so much to procure is immediately broken, upon the first Invasion He makes on the Territories of Spain, who are a Branch of the Confederacy.  
2. He renews the War under insuperable Disadvantages, such as are infinitely greater than He lay under before, and such as loudly tell the World, He never will venture to fight the whole Confederacy again. Viz. The Multitude of strong Towns and Cities which he surrendered to the Confederates, which are a sufficient Guarantee of the Peace, and the Different Case of the Emperor, who is more than ' twice what he was the last War, by his Peace with the Turks.  
3. If He should make the Duke D'Anjou King, France would really get nothing by the Bargain for in One Age the Race would be all Spaniards again; Nay, in a few Years Property would prevail, and he would no more let his Brother the Duke of Burgundy when King of France encroach upon him, than the late King of Spain would the present King of France; We do not want Instances in the World, that Interest banishes all the Ties of Nation and Kindred, when the Duke D'Anjou had been King of Spain some time, he would look upon Spain to be his Own, his Native, his Peculiar, and be as far from subjecting himself to France, because he was born there; as if he had never seen it: Possibly he might be willing to join Interest with France, and it may be join Forces upon Occasion; but it must be where the Interest of the two Nations did not clash then, and that is almost no where, but if ever France encroach upon him, she would find him King of Spain not Duke D'Anjou.  
So that all the King of France could get by accepting the Crown of Spain, would be a little present Satisfaction, to see a Son of the House of Bourbon on the Spanish Throne, but as King of France he would not be One Farthing the better for it.  
But this would not be all as is before noted, but whenever the present Duke of Burgundy comes to Enjoy the Crown of France, it will in all Probability be an Eternal Cause of Contention between them: For if the Family of France has any Title to Spain 'tis in the Eldest Son of the Family, and there can be no Colour of a Title in the Second Son while the Eldest is alive, but what is founded either in the Gift of the One King or the Other.  
As to the Gift of the Dauphin to his Second Son the first being alive, it cannot be valid; for he has no Power to give away what is his Son's by Inheritance, nor can no more give the Crown of Spain from him than the Crown of France; if Gift could be pleaded, the Grandfather gave it away from them all before they were born: Nay, If the Duke of Burgundy should consent to it, His Children if ever he has any, will declare, he had nothing to do to give away their Right, any more than the present King of France had Power to give away the Right of the Dauphin; for since the Deficiency of that Action in its own Nature is the whole Ground of the Dauphin's Title now, it will directly destroy the Title of the Duke D'Anjou, for what is a good Argument for him cannot be a bad One against him.  
As to the Gift of the Defunct King of Spain, I see nothing in it to build a Pretence of Right on; If He had bequeathed it to the Right Heir, I presume, he would not have thought his Title one jot the better for it. And if he had bequeathed it to the Grand Signior, the King of France would not have thought his Title the worse for it: So that it signifies just nothing at all.   

We come now to the grand Question proposed.  
Quest. 2. What Measures the English ought to take in this Juncture.  
The Answer must be in Two Parts.  

1. Supposing the French King adheres to the Partition agreed upon by the League beforementioned.  
2. Supposing the French King for Reasons which we know not should think fit to quit the Treaty, and push for the whole on the Pretence of a Will made by the King of Spain.   
'Tis confessed England, since her Troops are broke, and her People more divided in Temper than 'twas hoped they would have been under so mild and gentle a Government, makes but a very mean Figure abroad; and were any King at the Head of her Councils as well as Forces, but King William, hardly any Nation would trouble their Heads to confederate with her.  
But all the World does not yet see our weak Side, and the Reputation of the King makes us more formidable a great deal than we really are.  
But we are to act according to the Knowledge we have of what our Circumstances really are not what other Nations may believe them, lest we let them know our Weakness at the Price of our Destruction.  
However I'll for the present suppose what all good Men wish: That we were in the same good Posture as the War left us, united in Council, and ready for Action, and willing to preserve the Character we had then in the World.  
And First, Supposing the King of France adheres to the Partition of the Spanish Monarchy.  
If so, without Question England ought to put herself into such a posture as to be able, in Conjunction with the Dutch, to force the Emperor and Princes of Italy to comply with the Conditions.  
At the same time so to maintain the Balance in the Partition, as to oblige the King of France to accept of, and rest contented with the Particulars stipulated in their respective Leagues, without farther Encroachment, and to make themselves trusties for the rest, in Behalf of the Heir.  
It is already started as a Query, what if the King of France does accept of the Partition, and the Emperor should continue to stand out, the King of France is then at Liberty to take the whole if he can get it.  
No such Matter, I do not pretend to have been privy to the Debates, or of the Council, in the contriving this League, nor to be acquainted with what Provision is made, in case the Emperor refuses to come in, but in order to give a Judgement as near as can be done without Doors as we call it. I shall briefly state the Reasons, which in my Opinion should move the English and Dutch to form this League: And the great Reason, which, as I conceive, gave Birth to the first Project of this League, setting aside private Reasons of State, was the maintaining the Balance of Power in Europe.  
This has been the Foundation of all the Wars in our Age against the French, and in the last Ages against the Spaniard and the Emperor.  
A just Balance of Power is the Life of Peace. I question whether it be in the Humane Nature to set Bounds to its own Ambition, and whether the best Man on Earth would not be King over all the rest if he could. Every King in the World would be the Universal Monarch if he might, and nothing restrains but the Power of Neighbours; and if one Neighbour is not strong enough for another, he gets another Neighbour to join with him, and all the little ones will join to keep the great one from suppressing them. Hence comes Leagues and Confederacies; thus the Germane Protestants called in the Assistance of Gustavus Adolphus to match the Power of the Emperor Ferdinand the 2. and founded the famous League called the Conclusions of Leipsick, which brought the Imperial Power to the due Balance which it now stands at on the Foot of the Treaty of Westphalia; so the French and the English assisted the Dutch to bring the Spanish Power to a Balance in the time of Philip the II. when the Spanish Greatness began to be terrible to Europe, which Balance was established in the Peace of Aix la Chappel.  
So the Power of France was brought to a Balance, but not so equal as it might have been, had King Charles II. stood to his own Proposals at the Treaty of Nimeguen, the Defects of which Peace were in a great Measure the Occasion of this late War, which has been the longest, most chargeable, and most bloody that ever the French Nation has been engaged in since the Days of Francis the I. their own civil Wars excepted.  
This War has brought the power of France to a Balance, she had fortified her Frontiers with a continued Rampart, a Line of strong Cities from Hunninghen on the Confines of the Swiss, down the Rhine, the mosel, and the Maes, to the very Seaside, the greatest whereof she has been obliged to part with, to enable her Enemies to be their own Guarantees; by which in some places she is left so naked, that she is fain to build new Cities, or fortify old ones to supply the Vacancy, as at Brisack, and in other she lies wholly open as at pignerol; she has stooped to such a peace, as has made her far less formidable than before.  
Now the precarious Life of the King of Spain gave the King of England just Umbrage, that this Balance in which our Safety so much consists, should receive a Shock, to the prejudice of the Protestant Interest, by the Addition of the Spanish Dominion to that of France.  
And here I place the Original of the Project, as a probable Conjecture, at least drawn from the Nature of things according to rational Conclusions from probable premises, when better Grounds are made public, I shall own myself mistaken.  
When the pretenders to the Spanish Succession are considered, they are found to be the Emperor and the King of France, the Prince of Bavaria being dead before.  
To let the Emperor possess the Spanish Dominions, would be the overthrowing the Balance made at the Westphalia Treaty, by which the House of Austria already strengthened by the Conquest of Hungaria, and the peace with the Turks would be too potent for the princes of Germany, nor would the French like well that the Emperor the Eternal Competitor of France upon the Rhine should be strengthened with such an addition, by which he would ha' been Lord of almost half the World.  
To let the French possess the Spanish Dominions, would overthrow the Balance Purchased in this War with so much Blood and Treasure, and render fruitless the Treaty of Reswick. Twoved especially ha' been Fatal to the English and Dutch, by the increase of Wealth from the Mass of Money returning Yearly from the Empires of Mexico, and Peru, which the French would be better Husbands of than the Spaniards; by their increase of Shipping which would make them too strong for all the World at Sea, and by their ruining the Spanish Trade which is the greatest and most profitable in Europe; 'twould immediately unhinge all the Settlement of our Merchants and Factories, and turn the whole Channel of Trade; for the ports of Spain being free to the French as Subjects, all our Negoce that way would be destroyed, than their Neighbourhood in Flanders, and in the West-Indies, would be intolerable and insupportable.  
O 'twould fill a Volume to set down the Inconveniencies which England and Holland must expect to feel, in Case the French were Masters of the Spanish Monarchy, the Straights-mouth would be like the Sound, and all our Ships should pay Toll at Gibraltar, as they do at Elseneur, your Fishing Trade from New-England, and Newfoundland would perish, for the French from the Banks of Newfoundland should go free, and you Pay 23 per Cent. etc. We must erect an Admiralty in the West-Indies, or mantain a Fleet there, or our Plantations would be always at his Mercy; our Colonies of Virginia, and New-England, would easily be destroyed while the French would lie on their backs quite through their Country from Canada to the City of Mexico.  
These are some of the lesser Inconveniencies, which as I presume, were the first Motives to the Treaty.  
The Confederates therefore not being willing the French should have Spain, and the French being resolved the Emperor should not have it, a Medium is proposed that since it was not convenient for Europe, that either of them should have it all, and both of them had a Title to it, it should therefore be divided between them in Manner and Form, as aforesaid.  
This is the short History of this League, which really has more of Policy than Right in it, for strictly Considered, the Right of Succession can devolve but upon one Person, let that one be who it will, is not the present Business. But public good, the Peace of Kingdoms, the General quiet of Europe, prevails to set aside the Point of nice Justice, and determine in favour of the Public Tranquillity.  
And I crave leave to make Two Observations here:  
First, Our jacobites-protestant-brethrens, whose Understandings are so blind, that they cannot see the Interest of their Native Country, have here fairly represented to them the Condition England had now been in, and Europe in General, if a Papist and Confederate with France had been on the English Throne; if England had not had a King who could so far Influence the Ambition of the powerful Prince, as to prevent his seizing that Monarchy of Spain, which none but England could hinder him from.  
Secondly, Our Non-jurants who hold the right Lines of Princes such Sacred things, may also see that even among Hereditary Princes themselves, the Rights of Succession are oftentimes infringed, and the private Interest of Princes and Families set aside when the public Interest of Nations, the Preservation of Peace, and the keeping a General Balance of Power among Princes, comes to be the Question, and the Histories of all Ages and Nations give Instances to Prove it as well as this.  
Having thus run through the Reasons of this League of Partition, the Question is answered of course, that if the Emperor should refuse to come into the Partition and push for the whole, than the King of France is not thereby at Liberty to possess the whole, if he can, for that would overthro ' all the Measures upon which the League of Partition is built.  
The Emperor is not so weak a Prince to refuse the Kingdom of Spain with all its & c's in the Ocean, Flanders, and America, but upon some Expectation to get more; the Confederates therefore are to preserve that part which is Designed him free, and then effectually to put it out of his power to obtain the rest, and with all not to admit him into the part Reserved for him, till he agrees to accept it on the Terms proposed; if he should absolutely refuse it, which is a ridiculous Supposition, there are other Heirs of that Line to have recourse too, there's no doubt the Crown of Spain, need not go a begging for an Heir.  
It may be answered, if it be thus, it is the Emperor's best Course to lay his Measures for the whole, and if he cannot carry it, he may accept of the Partition at last.  
That's more than the Objector may be able prove how far the Confederates may think fit to bestow the remainder, if the Emperor after a War should be reduced to accept of it, is more than any one can Answer, and more than the Emperor will try, if he be not infatuated worse than ever a certain King was, who if he had not might ha' been a King still.  
The Second Branch of the Answer is supposing the King of France should so far forget himself as to quit the League of Partition, and claim the Crown of Spain for his Grandson l'Duk d' Anjou, by Virtue of the Will of the King Defunct.  
It must certainly then be the Interest of England and Holland, first to put themselves in such a Posture as may prevent the French King seizing of Spain itself, and Flanders in Particular.  
And upon the First Invasion of the Territories of Spain by the French King, to Declare War against him in the Name of the whole Confederacy as an Infringer of the Grand Peace at Reswick.  
And then by appearing on the Frontiers in such a formidable manner as shall give him diversion enough, that he not be able to enter Spain with any considerable Forces.  
The First of these things is to be done immediately by fitting out a good Fleet, which should so Scour the Mediterranean that the French would not be able to do much on the side of Catalonia, for Experience has told us a Fleet at Sea will make their War in Catalonia very uneasy to them, and by landing a small Force of about Eight or Ten Thousand Men at Fonterabia, which should be sufficient to Defend that side of the Country from the Invasions of the French.  
But this Pamphlet is not wrote to direct Methods, but to Argue the general Point.  
The Conclusion of the Argument must come to that sort of People, who have appeared Champions for our English Liberty, as to Damn all kind of force, as useless, burdensome to the Kingdom and Badges of slavery, and all Arguments to be only pretences for supporting Arbitrary Designs.  
If the French should attack Spain, I am far from saying I am glad they will be convinced; but I must say I am sorry the people of England have been deluded by their specious pretences.  
For if the French carry the Spanish Monarchy for want of our being in a Condition to prevent it; I am bold to tell those Gentlemen God Almighty must be put to the trouble of working another Miracle to save us, or we are reduced to a very dangerous Condition.  
But say they, we have a great Fleet, and in that we are safe; it is true, Gentlemen, so we are from Invasion, I believe we need not fear all the World; but what is England without its Trade, without its Plantation Trade, Turkey Trade, and Spanish Trade, and where will that be when a French Garrison is planted at Cadiz, and the French Fleet brings home the Plate from Havana.  
What will the Virginia Colony be worth when the French come to be strong in the Lakes of, and have a free Commerce from Quebeck to Mexico behind ye, what will our Northern Trade be worth in a War, when the the ports of Ostend and Neuport are as full of pirates as Dunkirk and St. Malo.  
A wise Man cannot patiently reflect upon the formidable power of France, with the Addition of the Spanish Dominion, and should he at last annex it to the Crown of France, who can consider without Horror that all the ports from Sluice in Flanders, to the Faro Messina in Sicily, should be in the Hands of the French, which is a Coast of near 3000 Miles, Portugal, Genova and Leghorn excepted; and how long they will hold out, is easy to imagine.  
I know God can prevent Humane Contrivances, and I believe he has placed King William on the English Throne, on purpose to disappoint this Invincible Monarch in these vast Designs, but no Thanks to our Gentlemen that have so weakened both his Hands and his Interest at home, as to make him less able to perform for us what is our own Advantange than His Majesty would be, and than the Case required.  
As to Ways and Means I meddle not with them, I leave them to the wise Heads of the Nation, but with Submission to their Judgement, this I am positive in, let our Measures be what they will, if we do not keep the Enemy, the French, I mean out of Spain, we are undone.  
In all the Histories of Times and Wars, I never read of a General who would not choose to be Master of the Field, and able to fight his Enemy, rather than to be cooped up, and bound to defend the Walls of a Town.  
If the French get the Spanish Crown, we are beaten out of the Field as to Trade, and are besieged in our own Island, and never let us flatter ourselves with our Safety consisting so much in our Fleet; for this I presume to lay down as a fundamental Axiom, at least as the Wars go of late, 'tis not the longest Sword, but the longest Purse that conquers. If the French get Spain, they get the greatest Trade in the World in their Hands; they that have the most Trade, will have the most Money, and they that have the most Money, will have the most Ships, the best Fleet, and the best Armies; and if once the French master us at Sea, where are we then? And though I would not lessen our Fleet, which I believe is now the best in the World, yet he that looks back to the French Fleet before their Misfortune, will tell you that all our English was not able to look them in the Face if we had no Dutch on our side, and hardly with the Dutch and us together.  
I am Answered by some, that if the French should have Spain, we shall Trade thither still, they cannot do without our Manufactures.  
To this, I Answer, time was France could not Trade without our Manufactures. Now they are fallen into them to such a Degree, that they only want Wool, and they have Hands enough to supply all the World with Manufactures, and they are so supplied with that from one Place or another, that they Buy none of our Goods now, or but a trifle; and if the Ports of Spain come to be filled with French, they will fill every Place with their Goods, as well as People.  
Besides, the Laws of Trade when Masters of the Ports will bring all Nations to Trade underfoot with them, and with gaeat disadvantages and hardships which will in the end ruin all that Trade that does not run through their own Hands.  
The Present King of France, like a wise Governor, puts his People upon all manner of Improvements; tho' the Spaniards are a flothful Nation, if the French Diligence comes once to thrive in Spain, he knows little of Spain that does not know they are capable of Improvements, several ways to the disadvantage of the English Trade.  
I'll give but one Instance, Spain is a very hot Country, and yet such is the Constancy of the Spaniard to the Old ridiculous Custom, that they wear their Cloaks of course black English Bays, should the French King when he is Master of Spain, forbidden the Spaniards the wearing of Bays, and introduce some antic French Druget, or other thin Stuff, such as they make in Normandy, it would at once destroy our Trade of Bays, which is the noblest Manufacture in many respects that we have in England, and send Forty Thousand People who depend on that Trade to beg their Bread, or seek other Work, which other Work must of Consequence lessen the Employment of other Poor Families which it maintained before.  
I could give many Instances of the like Nature, as for one more should they Prohibit the Exportation of Spanish Wool and Manufacture it among themselves, or into France; let the West-Country Clothiers speak for themselves, and say what strange work it would make among them, or our Hambrough Merchants give an Account what their Trade would come to, where they are outdone already in course Cloth and would ha' no fine over to send to Market.  
I know not but I may present the World with a short Account by itself, of all the Sensible Losses our Trade will come under, if the Kingdom of Spain should fall into the Hands of the French, tho' methinks it should be needless to run through it, the meanest Understanding being capable to know that the greatest Part of the Wealth of this Nation has been and is still raised by the Gainful Trade we have with the Spaniards.   
FINIS.