ENGLAND'S MONARCH, OR A CONVICTION AND refutation by the Common law, of those false Principles and insinuating flatteries of Albericus, delivered by way of Disputation, and after published, and dedicated to our dread Sovereign King JAMES, in which he laboureth to prove by the Civil Law, our Prince to be an absolute Monarch; and to have a free and Arbitrary power over the lives and Estates of his people.  
TOGETHER WITH A General confutation (and that grounded upon certain Principles taken by some of their own profession) of all absolute Monarchy.  
LONDON, Printed by Thomas Pain, Anno Dom. 1644.   

To the Reader.  
THis work (after so much labour and expense of time by others in the like subject) may now be thought vain and superstitious, scarce deserving the vacant hours of a man's time; much less those oppertunities, which necessary occasions and employments call for. But Reader let not this make you vilipend or undervalue his endeavour; who doth here present you, with such a piece of Sophistry that happily you never read, nor heard off; and that is Albericus, published in latin, the great propugnor of our King to be an absolute Monarch; which he would maintain too by the Civil Law; and who but our good King JAMES must be made the Patron of these absurd Principles. Give me but your patience, I will not acomagere, tread in others steps, the Author hath lead me into a large field of novelty; where if you please to solace yourself but a while; you shall find it more apt to inform your judgement, then confirm your memory; which if made good unto you, let him have your favourable censure, who ever was, and will be a faithful servant to his Country.   

ENGLAND'S MONARCH.  
HAving by accident met with a Book full of the fallacies of these times, and yet dedicated to our late Sovereign King james; and for aught I can be informed passed over in silence without the least reproof. I thought it my duty out of that faith and loyalty that I own to my King and Country to publish its principles to the world, and by the way as I go to give a particular answer to every one of them.  
The Author's name is Albericus; what Country man I know not, but his name as also his principles seem to speak him a stranger by birth, and a Civilian by his profession.  
His Book is entitled, Three Regal disputations. 
Regales Disputationes tres.  And the first is; Of the absolute power of the King. 
Depotestate Regis absolutae  And this is the task that I have at this time imposed upon myself, to debate and refute the absurdity of this principle; being a Tenet utterly repugnant and absolutely destructive to the Laws of England, and the Liberties of the Subject.  
I am not ignorant that the greatest part of the unhappy heretical principles of this Book, are at this day defended by force of Arms, by such as would be called Royalists, or if you will the King's friends; while in the mean time they sell their Birthright and inheritance for a poor mess of Pottage; and become Actors in this sad Tragedy of the ruin of their King and Country. But to begin with the Author, who in the very first position of his Book, were it Orthodox in this Kingdom, would quite confound all our Laws and Liberties.  
That which pleaseth the Prince (saith he) hath the force of a Law. 
Quod Principi placvit Legis habet vigorem pag. 5.  I this is that which your Prelatical flatterers & Parasitical Courtiers persuade his Majesty; and this piece of poison they have sucked out of such unworthy underminers of their own Liberty, as my Author is.  
And this he says, to be 
Page 5.  a regal Law brought in by his Empire, for that the people have conferred upon him all their rule and power. That is, the people have given power to their Prince to be a Tyrant, and tread them under feet at liberty, a principle so void of reason, that it carries not the least colour or probabality with it; but of this hereafter.  
But this position Quod Principi placuit, etc. That which pleaseth the Prince hath the force of a Law. He saith, is to to be understood of the Roman Emperor, 
Page 5, 6, 7.  for his excellency above others; as also for other reasons that he renders. If this be so Albericus, what have we that are English Subjects & live under a Municipal Law to do with that? or why didst thou dedicate this unsound and unwarrantable piece of flattery to our King? couldst thou imagine so learned and so wise a Prince would be wrought upon to subvert the Laws, and enslave his Subjects: who can make as good a Title by the Law to their liberty as the King to his Crown? But Albericus well knew that the best Princes might be corrupted; and that ambition may captivate the Crown, as well as the Peasant. I even in those days, our Liberties were invaded by the infusion of such false Maxims as these are; And to this hour we groan under that heavy burden; my little finger shall be heavier than my Father's Loins.  
And though we live under a Municipal Law, which utterly denies and condemns these flattering positions of the Civilians; as absolutely destructive to that freedom we were borne under; yet my Author doth affirm that all interpeters (that is of the Civil Law) without any difficulty do attribute this power to all supreme Princes. 
Page 7.   
Now hence he raises a question who those supreme Princes are? 
Page 7, 8, 9  And the some of his definition of the supreme Princes may be reduced shortly to this; They are supreme Princes, who neither have, nor acknowledge any one above them but God, and to him only are bound to render an account; who are free from all Law, whose willis a sufficien treason; & whose reason is as an absolute law. And he says this is no barbarous Law, but the Roman Law. If so Albericus, why do such Sycophants vent their poison here in England. Sir, God be thanked we have a Law of our own, whose fundamentals cry down this definition as paradoxical to sense and reason; whose light is so great, that it need not borrow of others to add to its perfection.  
But here we may see that the same Doctrine is preached to our King at this day; that was to his predecessor; what else meant the long discountinance of Parliaments, the only assurance we have of the continuance of our Laws and Liberties? I and what means the taking up of Arms too against them? But yet to come nearer to this definition of the Civilians of an absolute Prince, what means that frequent expression of His Majesty in His Declarations, that he is responsible to God alone for his actions? I am certain this is Lex Romana, the Roman Law.  
But when he had shown what is not this supreme power, and who are not these supreme Princes, (he saith,) 
Page 10.  That our King is amongst the other Kings, that is, the supreme Princes, who are free from the Law, which is (saith he) of an absolute power and this is not subject either to the rules of necessity, or public Law. Then he says that there is potestas extraordinaria & libera, an extraordinary and free power, which he says, in England we do signify by the name Regiae Praerogativae, of the Royal Prerogative. And further he says, That the interpreters of their Law do commonly write that there is a double power in a Prince; the one ordinary bound by the Law; the other extraordinary, free from the Law; and he says, that they define that to be the absolute power by which he may take away another man's right, though it be great, and that without a cause too.  
Is this that extraordinary power which we by the Law of England call the Royal Prerogative? I wonder at the madness and the ignorance of the Author, that should publish a thing so absolutely contrary to the known Laws of the Realm: but I will refute him by our Law, and not by railing, though he deserves no better.  
First, that our King (according to their own definition) is not one of these supreme Princes, or absolute Monarches, nothing more pregnant or plainly demonstrable in our Law: For he is under the Law, and so says Bracton and Fleta, two of our ancientest Law Books in several places commonly known; so that I need not to cite them. But Bracton goes further, 
Bracton de acquirendo rerum Domino. fol. 34.  that not only habet legem superiorem; the Law is above him, but also curiam suam viz. Comites, Barones, &c. (which can be understood of no other than the Parliament,) that that likewise is above him: why then if both Law & Parliament be above him, he can be no absolute Monarch according to themselves. But further by the Laws and constitutions of this Kingdom, the Legislative power doth not reside in the King alone (for he cannot create a Law, or destroy, or disannul any Law, by his Patent or Proclamation) but in the three estates jointly together assembled in one body in Parliament; and therefore to maintain our Prince to be an obsolute Monarch is utterly to oppose and overthrow the fundamentals of our Law. But how sat this is laboured at this day, I leave it to the consciences of all honest men to judge; for if the King might have power to discontinue Parliaments as long as he pleaseth; or being called, to have a negative Voice to all their reasonable demands, will not this be a compendious way to bring all the Legislative power into his own hands? But then he says, that by this extraordinary or absolute power, (which he would have our Prince to have) He may take away any man's right, be it never so great. For he says, 
Page 13.  That the Prince by his Empire possesses all things, that he hath an imperial and universal dominion, though the particular and private be in the proprietor. Which in plainer English, is to tell you, that the King hath an interest and power over every man's particular property, which is as absolutely false, as can be imagined; and stands as much in opposition to our Law, as one contrary can to another, for what then would become of our Petition of Right? Or how could we say that we had right to any thing, when the King at his own pleasure, might dispossess us of all? this were a ready way to enslave us, and to make us hold by that base tenure of Villeinage. I do not deny, but that the Common wealth hath an interest paramount the property of every private man; but this is not left to the sole disposition of our Prince, but the Parliament, who may dispose of the general interest, for the good of the Common wealth, and in such case we ourselves are the free dispensers of our own; for 'tis not more their power, than our own consents that binds us. But thanks be to God, that every man by our Law, (let Court Parasites say what they will) hath as absolute a right in that he enjoys, as his Prince claims in his Crown, nay I may be bold to affirm (without prejudice to the royal interest) that he hath a greater: for that the King is seized or possessed in the right of his Crown only; the people in their own right. What one principle more aumenticke in our law then this; that the King cannot take away any man's property without his own consent; and how is this consent to be purchased? why not otherwise then by Act of Parliament, with whom the general property (which is above every man's particular interest) is entrusted. And therefore those that will have the King to be an absolute Monarch over his people, must instruct him how to repeal Magna charta, and all the other Laws made in confirmation of it, and the Subjects liberty, before they can court them into slavery.  
But here it will be objected, that the laws of this Realm do avow and maintain our King to be an absolute Monarch; very just, and with this difference we shall allow him to be so; that is, as to all foreign power, authority, or jurisdiction what soever, he is an obsolute Emperor within these his dominions: in plainer language he is no dependent or tributary Prince: but is (as he is acknowledged to be by the statute of 24. H. 8. ca 12,) Furnished with plenary, whole, and entire power, preeminence, authority, prerogative and jurisdistion, etc. So that no foreign Prince or Potentate whatsoever, can challenge or excercise the least authority in these Kingdoms; but this doth no way conclude our Prince to be an absolute Monarch in the excercise of his jurisdiction over his people. 'tis true that my Lord Coke says our King is an absolute King: but how? not over his people: and that is cleared by the case that he puts, which is this. Artold King of Man sued to King H. 3. to come into England, etc. upon which my Lord Coke observes, 
Lib. 7. fo. 21.  that seeing that Artold King of Man, sued for a licence in this case to our King, it proveth him an absolute King, which is evident, as to any foreign power or authority whatsoever, but not to his own Subjects. For as to them, he hath but a qualified, limited power, confined to the rules of law, & the customs of his Kingdom. These things pondered on, I stand amazed at thy brazen, confidence Albericus, that durst affirm our King to be an absolute Monarch, and canst prove it no better, then by the daubing principles of the Civil Law: what else is this but to argue a case at Common Law, upon the notions and grounds of the Civil; which were an absurdity next to madness. But I stand most astonished, when I consider that our Prince must be made the Patron of such dangerous absurd principles. This is that that hath so much advanced Prerogative, and depressed Liberty. And these times are become the sad effect and consequence of such flattering falsities.  
But now having clearly evidenced it that our King is no absolute Monarch and so hath no power over the lives, liberties, or estates of his Subjects, more than the law alloweth. You shall now hear several reasons given in my Author totally to oppose this opinion of absolute Monarchy, which with the favour of the courteous Reader, are no way answered by the contra-disputant, and for my part, I think that absolute Monarchy is much like Sir Tho. Mores Eutopiae, no where to be found.  
And first you shall hear how one of their own inveighes against this opinion. Says he, Those things that are done by this clause of supreme power, not by way of justice; but because it so pleased the Prince, and no man could say to him Cur it a facis? why do you so? It is no other than violence; which (says he) by a more honest title is called the supreme power. 
Pag. 15.   
I must acknowledge it ever was, and shall be my opinion, that though Princes are styled Gods here on earth, yet their power is so qualified, that they ought not to live according to their own will, but the rule of reason and religion; and if they pass these, let flatterers qualify their actions as they can, more sound and honest judgements will say, that they are but violence & tyranny. Again says the same Author, 
Pag. 16.  Your great Governors & Counsellors lay snares every where in the way (that is to catch and entrap their Prince) Your Divines they err (and make their Prince do the like) And your Lawyers they faun and flatter; and all persuade their Prince that all things are lawful for him, and that be hath free and absolute power to do what he list. And is not this the very dialect of these times? Hath not Bristol, Digby and Cottington and such like perfidious Counsellors, seduced his Majesty from his Parliament, and persuaded him that it is lawful for him to take up Arms against them, and to state himself (if possibly he may) in an absolute Monarchy? Do not your Divines preach prerogative, in stead of Divinity, and by consequence detrude the Subjects liberty? And now I could wish that our great Lawyers could puill their necks out of the halter, the collar I should say. But it is sad news, that the Shipmoney is again revived. The King must be sole Judge, (I and that in his own case too) when the Kingdom is endangered, and so by this slight, might dive into his Subjects purses, when, and as often as he himself pleased. Now pray what doth the negative voice in Parliament (so stiffly defended by our Lawyers of Oxford) differ from this, if the King shall be sole Judge of the necessity or conveniency of any Laws presented unto him by his people? do but support this ground of the Kings being Judge in his own case, down goes all the fundamentals of our Law presently. No way more exact or absolute to bring in Quod Principi placet, etc. and to obtrude the liberty of the Subject. But that you may see how fare this absolute power is laboured for at this day; they have derived this very principle, from this unreasonable Law of liberty, as I shall make it appear hereafter. But now let us reason the point, and hear what is objected against this absolute power of Princes.  
Sais one all Dominion or Sovereignty is for the public profit of the Citisent or Subjects, not of those that reign or rule. 
Pag. 16.  To this Albericus says, that it is a false foundation in those principalities or dominions that are got by force; and not totally true in those who are induced or brought in by the people; For he says, that due honour was given to the virtues of those Princes that were chosen.  
For my part I never read or heard Albericus, 
Pag. 16.  that a Prince who hath gained a Kingdom by Conquest, is disobliged from the rule of Reason; and Religion. The Scripture doth no where warrant (that I know of) any Prince whatsoever to be a Tyrant, which I am sure he must needs be, that seeks his own, not his people's good. This is but just, that due honour should be given to the virtues of those Princes that are elected; but such as reverence them, so far, as to attribute an absoluteness of power unto them, and give them liberty to do what they list; do dishonour God, in ascribing that power that was never given; & debase their Prince, by making him to degenerate from true Sovereignty into Tyranny.  
Though Aristotle by way of Derision faith, 
Pag. 16.  that we make our Princes like Physicians, whose rule or power is for the sake of those only, who are their Patients. My opinion is, that Princes cannot be more properly compared or assimulated, then unto Physicians; the one is the Physician for the body natural, the other for the body politic. A Prince ought to purge out all ill humours; that is, ill members out of the Common wealth; he ought to tender the lives and happiness of his people, as much as a Physician the life and good of his Patient. Nay, as a Physician ought to have an eye more to the good and safety of his Patient, than his own benefit, so ought this great Physician of the Common wealth. The Prince's happiness is involved in the good of his people, & therefore they do but teach him how to ruin himself, that instruct him to undo his people  
But Albericus reasons further, by way of admittance, what says he if all Dominion or Power were ordained for the only benefit of Subjects? Ergo plenitudo potestatis non est, is there not therefore a plenitude of power? Sir, we do not deny but that Princes have full power and authority to govern their people; but we do, and shall ever deny, that they have an absolute power to Tyrannize over them.  
But he says further, that it is for the benefit and profit of Subjects ' that a Prince should have this power. I marry Sir, witness the great utility, 
Pag. 16.  that accrues to the Subject at this day, by the exercise of the like power. That their lives and estates should be at the sole will, beck, and command of their Sovereign; this is for the benefit of the Subject. Pray give me leave to put you a plain case in Law. A. gives land to B. in trust, and for the only use of C. B. breaks the trust, and disposes of the Land at his own pleasure; resolve me this question; is not this for the benefit of C? Such, and only such benefit accrues to the Subject, by giving of an absolute power to the Prince. But so much for this argument.  
The next position that is discussed, 
Page 17.  is, that absoluteness of power is only in God, and is not communicable to any other.  
To this Albericus answers that this doth not make the Prince equal to God; 
Page 17.  for nevertheless he is under God, and is bound by the Laws of God: God (says he) is simply absolute not bound to any Law; but the Prince only absolute to some respects: for though he be above the Civil Law, yet he is under the Law of God, of Nature, and of Nations.  
We will allow this absolute power that you speak of, if you canevince us out of holy Writ (to which Princes as well as people, own subjection) that ever such power was communicated to any just Prince that he might dispose of the lives, and estates, of his Subjects at his own will and pleasure; what is this but Tyranny? and if God (who only hath absolute power over his people) did sometimes in his wrath for the sins of his people, put a Tyrannical King over them, yet this is no warrant for others to be so. God who is the only proprietor and free dispenser of all things; and giveth what he pleaseth, and to whom and when he pleaseth what he out of his bounty doth bestow upon his meanest servant; he doth invest him in as pure and absolute a right, as he doth the greatest Prince in his Monarchy, and therefore it lies not in the power of his Prince to dispossess him of it.  
We have a most exact, and perfect description of a Tyrant in the word. of God. 1 Sam. 8. where, when the people of Israel, not contented with that Government, that God had appointed over them, asked a King of Samuel; God in his anger, and as a judgement upon the people for their sin, gave them a King to rule over them, but such a one, who (according to the description of Samuel) would make his will his Law; for says Samuel to the people, This will be the manner of the King that shall reign over you, he will take your sons and appoint them for himself, for his Charets, etc. And he will appoint him Captains over thousands, etc. And he will take your daughters to be confectioners, etc. And he will take your fields and your vineyards and give them to his servants. And he will take your servants and cattle and put them to work, etc. Here you have a complete delineation of a Tyrant. For mark, Samuel tells the people what he will do, not what he ought to do; thus, and thus he will do saith he; and he will render no better reason for what he doth, stat pro ratione voluntas, his will is reason sufficient to deprive you of your substance, and to enslave you and your postetity for ever. This was the judgement of God, and therefore not to be drawn in example, or made a precedent for others. And therefore let every unjust Prince take heed that (whilst he is made the Rod and scourge of God for his people's sins) he himself be not at the last thrown into the fire.  
But now you shall hear the duty of a good Prince set forth in Deut. 17 He shall not multiply horses to himself, etc. Neither shall he multiply wives, nor silver and gold. He shall write him a copy of this Law in a Book, etc. And it shall be with him, and he shall read therein all the days of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this Law, and these statutes to do them. Now mark what follows all, That his heart be not lifted up above his brethren, etc. For my part I do not find here that the Kings will is a Law, or that he hath power to open, & shut the purses of his Subjects at his pleasure. A just Prince must not multiply silver & gold; why then doubtless he must not do it upon the ruins of his Subjects. He must keep this law; and I am sure this Law doth not make him lawless, or justify Tyranny. And lastly his heart must not be lifted up above his brethren, that is, he must not so exalt his own power, as to depress and destroy his people.  
Another Argument is this, that the people did transfer this power to the King, that by it they might be more commodiously governed, 
Page 24.  but this is not that supreme power, sic volo, sic jubeo, but an ordinary power directed by law.  
To this Albericus answers, with his distinction before taken, that there is an ordinary and an extraordinary power in the Prince; and he says, that the people sometimes by this extraordinary power (which is the supreme and absolute power) may be governed more commodiously, for he says, That people of indomitable and rigid spirits are better governed by this extraordinary, than an ordinary power, and those Subjects are to be governed by an Iron Rod, that will not yield to the ferula.  
Certainly Albericus when he wrote this book, thought he had been tutoring of children. I confess that I have often read and heard that the government by Monarchy, is much to be preferred and set before Oligarchy, Democracy, or Aristocracy; but I never heard that tyranny might be more apt & commodious than a just and lawful government; neither did I ever read of any people of so savedge and barbarous a nature, who would not rather stoop to a just and legal than an unjust and tyrannical dominion. No question it is most commodious both for King and people, that the one should have a certain positive rule by which he might govern; and the other by which he might obey. And that Prince who governs his people by the rule of justice, shall find more faithful and loyal Subjects, than he that sways them by the Sceptre of an extraordinary and tyrannical power.  
But hear what Albericus doth determine to be tyranny. That says he 
Pag. 25.  is tyrannous, which in a tyrant is wont and ordinary; in aiust Prince extraordinary and casual. To take away famous and excellent men, to expel or drive away those that are wise, to exterminate studies, to have and countenance such about him as are envious, private calumniators and accusers of others, to follow & delight in bloody wars, these & others of that kind, he says to be tyrannous. How Albericus are these tyrannous? I thought the supreme power had been unlimited, why so it is: for he says, that even these very actions, which immediately before he styles tyrannous, Possunt aliquandoetiam esse justa, may sometimes be just.  
May tyrannous actions be just? what a diametrical contradiction is this? he may as well call darkness, light, or light darkness, good, evil, or evil, good. In vain doth he labour to make this good, by strange and tyrannous actions, (as he would have them) which are done by Princes for the good of the common wealth, neither is this malum necessariun, a necessary evil, as he calls it, for whatsoever is simply tyrannous, cannot be said to be just, and whatsoever is done (and in truth is so) for the common good cannot bear the infamous scandal of tyrannous. But this saying of Albericus savours more of Machavilians Politics, then of just and legal government, 
Pag. 27.  That this absolute power of which he treats, and which be confesses to be at will; must be taken ta the will of a good man. A very good distinction; why then belike a prince that is an unjust and corrupt man, cannot use this supreme and arbitrary power. O yes; for immediately after he doth affirm, the Prince to be this good man; As if it were an absolute and uncontrollable consequence, that every Prince must be a good man, Whereas the Scripture holds out clear testimony of the wickedness & corruption of Princes. Ezek. 45.9. Job 34.30. Amos 4.1. And such was the tyranny of the Princes of Jerusalem, that in Zeph. 3.3. they are called roaring Lions. Observe but his way of reasoning, Every Prince that is a good man hath this arbytrary power: But every Prince is a good man Therefore every Prince hath this arbitrary power. The falsest syllogism, and the most pure implicit contradiction that ever was. For the Major proposition, clearly implies that every Prince is not good, the Minor concludes every one to be good. But here you may see the senseless daubing Sophistry of these men; who are resolved to put a good gloss, upon the foulest actions; and rather than their Prince shall not be, what they would have him, they will most boldly affirm to be that which he is not. But woe be to you that call good evil, or evil good. I shall say no more but this. Happy England were greatness and goodness, inseparable concomitants.  
But he steps a little neater to us, and says Though the Prince hath a plenitude of power, 
Pag.  yet the aught to use this justly; otherwise it will be a plenitude of storms and tempests. And he further sates: That this clause of the fullness of power, is under stood of a good and laudable power & not a power to ill or injury.  
What strange and unparallelled contradictions are these? How can this stand with the former positions? that the King may do what he list, that his will is a sufficient reason, and his reason a positive law, if the King may be said to do that, which is unjust, ill or injurious. The doing of ill or injury, are not things compatible to absolute Monarchy, give me leave a little to reason the case out of Albericus himself. Those that have not power to do what they list, have no absolute power. But Kings cannot do what they list: Therefore Kings have no absolute power. But here the Minor preposition will be denied, that Kings may do what they list. To this I answer with Albericus, that Kings cannot do wrong or injury, therefore Kings cannot do what they list. And hence the consequence is very evident, that Kings have no absolute power.  
But he doth yet approach nearer to us, in denying the opinion of some of their own formerly delivered; for he says, 
Pag. 27.  That the Prince by this plenitude or absoluteness of power, cannot deprive his Subjects of their dominions or properties, sine causa iusta, without just cause tendered.  
Why now Albericus secundumte, according to your own argument: if Kings cannot take away their Subjects properties, but are bound to regulate their actions according to the rule of justice; How can Kings be said to have an absolute power? Why yes, you shall hear how, for he doth afterwards, (if what he says would hold) make good whatsoever he hath delivered: or indeed can deliver in the defence of this tyrannical, absolute Monarchy. For he says, That of the justness of this cause, this absolute Prince is the sole Judge and Arbitor. Now you know upon what foundation that principle of the Shipmoney was built; that the King only ought to be Judge of the imminent danger then pretended. This is that which was taught by evil Councillors, one whereof (with whom the dominion of Ireland was entrusted) was wont to say, that he had the law locked up in scrinio pectoris, in the closet of his own breast: which expressed in plainer language speaks clearly this, that his will was a law. But he that then thought to have advanced his Sovereign, (& by consequence himself) above law, hath sense undergone his just demerit; and the law still lives in spite of its enemies. But who would have thought that our grave fathers and sage determiners, the lex loquens, or walking Libraries of our law; should have been so perfidious to their own principles, as to borrow grounds of the Civil law, to make up a judgement so destructive to the Common. And that that was so, give me leave to reason the case a little, I will make it evident. For first they themselves say that to be the only discrimen or true difference betwixtabsolute (if any such thing there be) and qualified or limited Monarchy. For say they, the first doth judge de causis, of causes; and the latter ex legibus, by the laws. So that give but the King leave to be judge in his own case, you presently mount him into absolute monarchy: if this were law, the King might take away any man's estate upon just cause; I and whether it were just or no, he would do it, for he himself should be judge of the cause and then it would not be difficult to determine on whose side the judgement should be given. 'tis an undoubted Maxim that no man can be acompetent judge in his own case, and it is all one to give the King libetty to take away his Subject's rights unjustly; as to say he cannot do it, but upon just ground, and yet to leave that to his sole sudgement, and determination. Might not the King in that case, as often as he himself pleased, have exhausted his Subject's treasure upon pretence of an imminent danger? and if he be sole Judge of the necessity, who could oppose it? But you see the absurdity and ill consequence of this principle, and therefore so I shall leave it.  
But then speaking how fare the law should be obligatory to the Prince, 
Page 2.8.  he takes these distinctions: says he, There is Lex honestatis, the law of honesty; and Lex necessitatis, the law of necessity. The law of honesty that binds the King; that is, the King in point of honesty may if he will observe the law, if he will not he may make his will his law. The law of necessity, that binds the Subject, so that will he, nill he, he must submit and give obedience to it.  
Others he says, say That there is the law of honesty, and the law of the precept; and he says the one doth not less oblige, than the other, yet there is this difference, that the law of honesty depends only upon the will of the prince: what an absurdity is this, to say that the one doth as strongly bind as the other, and yet that the one must observe the law and the other is at his liberty, whether he will or no.  
Others he says, say That there is necessitas rei, the necessity of the thing & necessitas personae, the necessity of the person, so that though the thing may be of necessity to be done, (as for the purpose the settling of the Militia) yet that doth not necessitare the person of an absolute Prince to do it.  
What pure contradictions are these, first that Princes have Supreme and absolute power to do what they list, and yet that they ought to do nothing, but what is just and right. That they are above the Law, and yet by the law of honesty they are bound to observe and keep it. I think it is almost impossible to reconcile these differences, or to make Albericus agree with himself. For my part, I shall not stick to defend that Princes by the law of necessity, are bound to submit to the Law, as well as their people; For I am sure that the divine precept doth as strongly oblige the greatest Monarch, as the meanest beggar; and that requires that justice be done to all men, and that every man (which exempts not Princes) should do that, which he commands others to do. Now it is but consonant to the rule of justice and good government, that Princes should be necessitated to observe the Law as well as their people; for if the King shall have power to make his will his law, what justice or settled government can be expected. Then this being an act of justice to observe the Law, by that general precept of the word of God, that justice be done to all men; Princes are as strongly obliged to it as the people. Again, if the Divine rule requireth that every man do that which he commandeth to be done by another; why then no Prince can excuse himself of the necessity of subjection to that Law; which he requireth should be kept and observed by his Subjects. I am certain it is the very letter of the Word and a principal part of justice, that every man should do, as he would be done by; and I am confident no Prince if he would state himself in the place of his Subject, could hold it just or equali, that it should lie in the breast of his Sovereign to vassalize him at pleasure. Now a man ought not to do that, or to conceive it just to be done to another, which he would condemn as unjust, being done to himself. I never complied with that distinction of some Divines, who say the Prince to be subject to the directive, but not to the coactive or compulsive power of the law; for though they may be exempt from the penal, yet not from the coercive power; and without controversy, whatsoever God requires, of that man may exact the just and due performance. And as I have said, the word of God doth rather bind over Princes by the law of necessity, to the observance of the Law, than any way give them freedom from it, or power against it.  
Besides, you shall hear how some of their own argue; frustra sint Leges positae nostro principi, nisi sit, qui ipsum in leges cogat; that is, it is in vain to tie our Prince to the Laws, except there should be somebody to compel him to the observation of them. And says another, why are not the laws also abrogated, with which the Prince is said to be bound, if it can never be, that he may be compelled to keep and observe them? Every Law carries with it a coactive necessity of observance; and as good no Law, as no power to exact the performance of the Law: But hear what a third of their own says; The Laws are the conventions or covenants betwixt the Prince and his people, & it is the nature of obligations to enforce the unwilling, & the bond and obligation being mutual, 'tis but just and equal that Kings should be necessitated to observe the law as well as their people. To conclude this, give but King's freedom from the coercive power of the Law; you make the Law as vain and idle, as their covenants and obligations.  
The last argument that I shall touch, is this; that if the people were bound by their own Laws, so should the Prince, if the people confer their power upon him.  
To this it is said, that this power collated by the people to the Prince, is interpreted of the people, of Magistrates, and of the Laws themselves; that is, he hath power over all these, than it is said, can he who hath the Laws in his power, be in the power of the laws? or can he that hath the power of the Laws, be detained by the power of the Laws?  
For my part Albericus I count it a flat absurdity for any man to maintain that the people conferred a grater power or exemption upon their Prince, than they themselves had, or exercised, for though they did transfer all the Legislative power to the Prince, yet it must be clogged with the same qualifications and conditions that they themselves had it. Neither can it be imagined by sounder judgements, that people who had such experience of an ample liberty, would give an absolute power to their Prince, and thereby subject themselves to the bond of slavery. That the people did grant to their Prince a power of making Laws; doth not allow him an exemption or freedom from them. Besides as the alterations of Government in any state are dangerous, and therefore not to be attempted without mature consideration, so it hath been always the care and vigelancy of all States whatsoever upon their innovation or alteration of Government, to reduce themselves to a better, not a worse condition; and can we then conceive that the Nations upon the first election of Princes, could be so stuped as to submit themselves to absolute Monarchy, & live under the lawless power of Tyranny? and so avoiding one extreme to fall into another much worse than the former. For myself, I must needs acknowledge that it is a thing so opposite and disconsonant to the rule of reason, and that freedom that all men naturally covet, that I shall as soon renounce the fundamentals of my faith, as believe it. But the long continuance of the Monarchical government (which indeed is the most absolute of all others, if it do not exceed the sweet mixtute of legal moderation) the corruption of Princes, and the fawning principles of Court Parasites; these are they which by degrees have insinuated these absurd and false positions, and adulterated the original constitution of so pure and happy a Dominion. Thus much against absolute Monarchy in general.  
And now after all, let us who are English Subjects, & live under the golden mean of mixed & qualified Monarchy (the most blessed dominion in the world if not corrupted through the ambition of Princes or the base seducement of evil Counsellors) bless God for his goodness who hath not only dispensed and bestowed an equal portion of his bounty upon us, but hath also made us absolute proprietors of what we enjoy, so that our lives, liberties and estates, do not depend upon, not are subject to the sole breath or arbitrary will of our Sovereign. And I shall conclude all with a small variation of that old verse  
Non est Lex, Regi, sed Rex, obnoxia, Legi.  
The law's's not subject to the greatest King,  
But doth his will into subjection bring.  
FINIS.