SOME OPINIONS OF M R HOBBS  
Considered in a Second DIALOGUE BETWEEN Phylautus and Timothy.  
By the same Author.  
LONDON,  
Printed by J. Macock for Walter Kettilby, at the Sign of the Bishops-head in St Paul's Churchyard. 1673.   

TO THE Most Reverend Father in God, GILBERT By Divine Providence Lord Archbishop OF CANTERBURY, Primate of all ENGLAND and Metropolitan: and one of His Majesty's most Honourable Privy-Council, etc.  
May it please your Grace,  
SEeing your Grace has already withstood the displeasure of such a threatening Philosopher and Politician as Mr. Hobbs, and not publicly disowned, or renounced the protection of my former Dialogue; I have ventured to anger our Adversary once more, by pr●…suming to offer this second to your Grace's acceptance and pardon. Which presumption, although the continuance of your Grace's favours towards me might almost excuse, yet it is the great insolence and great extravagance of Mr. Hobbs' attempts, that makes me still seek out for protection from so gre●…t and eminent a Patron; who by his unaffected affability to all men, and his studious encouragement of the best, by his unwearied care for promoting true Religion, as well as securing the just Authority of his Prince, is alone able to live down many Leviathans. And if there be any way to bring that haughty-conceited-Philosopher to a tolerable good nature, and to tie him up to moderate profaneness, it must be done by such as your Grace, defending and approving those that write against him: for as 'tis well known to your Grace, that he'll allow no man to speak truth but himself; so will he scarce ad●…it of any man to be truly great, unless he is of his mind and opinions: and that makes him so angry with your Grace, because you are such an unanswerable Argument against all that he hath writ. And nothing does so nearly concern him, and almost convert him; as to see the name of a person, so conspicuous for Religion and Power, stand before a Book that doth oppose his Doctrine. And for this reason I have once more taken the boldness to make this second Address to your Grace.  
If upon this review of Mr. Hobbs, I had found that he had given his Readers sense and argument answerable to the mischi●…f and wickedness of his opinions; I should then have endeavoured to have now appeared to your Grace in another Style and Dress. For I am not so utterly given over to toying, nor so conceited of this way of writing, nor so indifferent about a good life and Religion, nor so careless of offending sober men, nor so bend and resolved always to presume upon your Grace after this kind, but that I think it possible, that upon a just account and a good subject, for a need, I could make two or three grave Period●…, as well as Mr. Hobbs has made thousands▪ about those things which are eithe●… impudently false, 〈◊〉 notoriously f●…ivolous  
But I must confess, that of all Triflers 'tis the set, the grave, the Philosophical, and Mathematical Trifler, to which I have the greatest averseness: whom when I meet very gravely making out all men to be Rational beasts both in Nature and Conversation; and every man when he pleases a Rational Rebel: and upon any fright or pinch, a Rational Atheist and Antichristian; and all this performed with all demureness, solemnity, quotation of Scripture, appeals to Conscience and Church-History; I must humbly beg your Grace's pardon, if then I have endeavoured to smile a little, and to get as much out of his road, and wa●… of writing as possible.  
I might offer to your Grace's consideration several things, in Apology for myself. If what I have done be at all pardonable, I am sure your Grace need not be reminded of what I might plead or pretend: but if otherwise, for me to argue the Case with your Grace, would but heighten the presumption of,  
My Lord, Your Graces in all Duty and Service most devoted J. E. May 20. 1673.   

THE BOOKSELLER TO THE READER.  
Dear Reader,  
THE Author wanting wit, confidence, and friends to commend himself and this following Dialogue to the World, at that ●…ast and prodigious rate, after which Mr. Hobbs (and such as he hired) is sufficiently known to have extolled himself and all his Writings; rather than such a man, and such endeavours, should utterly perish for want of a few good words, I was resolved to say somewhat, not only for my own gain, but also for my own profit. It is to be confessed, that there has been already so very much said (in Prefaces) of the bottomless deserts and inestimable Writings of our Author's Adversary, that it will be a very difficult Talk for me, who am no ways concerned, no ways corrupted nor prepared, no Chaplain, no Butler, 〈◊〉 ●…d, no Nephew, no R●…, no Friend nor Acquaintance of the Author, ever to overtake those extravagant praises that Mr. Hobbs has showered down upon himself. But however, Reader, I prithee, do so much as hold my Hat and Gloves; and thou shalt see, what such an unprejudiced and unconcerned person can do for a poor, modest, shiftless, friendless, despairing, dying Author.  
There was, thou know'●…t, a great Greek man, who was thrice asked what was most necessary to make an Orator: and 'tis known well enough, what his threefold answer was. Even so shouldst thou ask me three thousand times over what is the most-best Book that ever was, or will be printed, buy this, and thou hast fully answered thyself and my design. The Book, it is to be acknowledged, is but a Book; and that's the least and worst thing that can be said of it. But why do I call it a Book: what am I mad? for in reality 'tis all Books: for it does not only faithfully relate what has been already done, but it foretells all that shall be done. Dost thou want, Reader, a just, true, and impartial History of the whole World; from the very beginning, to the very minute that thou buyest this Book? trouble not thyself, here ' 'tis. It begins ten thousand years before the oldest Praeadamite, and holds good and firm ten thousand years after the World shall end. Dost thou want a true, ●…ound, substantial, Orthodox Body of Divinity? hold it still fast; for thou hast got it. This very Book was at the first four General Councils, and in all the Persecutions. Hast thou a mind to a complete body of the Law, Civil Law, Canon Law, Common Law, & c? The twelve Tables were stolen out of this Book last week, when 'twas printing: I met with the Rogue at Pie▪ Corner, but he outran me: and so were Lycurgus' Laws, and Justinian's Institutes: as for Littleton, Cook, etc. 'tis plain they had all hence: and as London-Bridge stands upon several Woolpacks; so Westminster-Hall itself, and all its proceedings, stand upon four of these Books. Dost thou want Galen, Hypocrates, Paracelsus, Helmont, & c? want them still; for in effect thou hast them all. For here's that which cures all diseases; and teaches a most certain way how to make a complete Gentleman, at one baking. Dost thou want a Book to measure the height of Stars, survey Ground, make a Dial, & c? Look pag. 79. lin. 12. it tells thee exactly what's a Clock either by day or by night; next line thou hast full Moon and new, high Tide at London Bridge, and all the Bridges in the World. Turn down the fourth leaf of this Book when thou goest to bed; and 'twill go off just at that hour, and waken you as well as any Alarm. Immediately after which follows a complete and most wonderful Table of Consequences; which, if read one way, tells you all the Fairs and Markets; t'other way all the Battles that ever have been, or shall be fought; with the number of the slain, etc. And besides, it doubles Cubes and Squares, Circles (better than Mr. Hobbs) only with an Oyster shell and a pair of Tobacco Tongues. And now, Reader, tell me, art thou so void of conscience, reason, and all sense of thy own benefit, as not to carry home this Book?  
Besides, read but five pages of it Spring and Fall, and for that year thou art certainly secured from all Fevers, Agues, Coughs, Catarrhs, etc. Chomp three or four lines of it in a morning; it scours and clarifies the Teeth; it settles and confirms the Jaws; and brings a brisk and florid colour into the Cheeks. The very sight of the Book does so scar all Cramps, Bone-aches, running Gouts, and the like, that they won't come within a stones cast of your house.  
Art thou, Reader, a single man? be no longer so, but alter thy condition, and take this Book along with thee. Hast thou a Wife and Children, and are they dear to thee? here's a Book for that dear Wife, and for those dear Children. For it does not only sing, dance, play on the Lute, speak French, ride the great Horse, etc. but it performs all Family duties. It runs for a Midwife, it rocks the Cradle, combs the Child's head, sweeps the House, milks the Cows, turns the Hogs out of the Corn, whets Knives, lays the Cloth, grinds Corn, beats Hemp, winds up the Jack, brews, bakes, washes, and pays off Servants their Wages exactly at Quarter day; and all this it does at the same time, and yet is never out of breath. Besides, if thou hast a mind to borrow eight or ten thousand pounds; never look c●…t for a surety, but take this Book along with thee; it will go further and for more than half the Bankers.  
It were endless, Reader, to tell thee all the uses and excellencies of this Treatise: which though it be a full Answer to all ill-natured, seditious, heretioal, blasphemous Books that ever were written; yet, after a most peculiar manner, it does so horridly rout some silly-phantastical opinions of Mr. Hobbs, that he'll be ashamed ever so much as to own any one opinion again. Mr. Hobbs happened into a fancy that every thought was necessary: i. e. not one thought, Reader, that thou ever hadst since thou camest into the World, that thou couldst any more have avoided thinking, than that thy hair is black, or the Sky blue. Now, to that says my Author most wonderfully and judiciously; that if such a thing should ever come to pass, that is to say, that if ever any man at any time should chance to have but one thought crowded upon him, he would presently have a most huge Oak grow out of his Neck, and his left Leg would be turned into a Phoenix▪ This he proves at large. Again says Mr. Hobbs, that every action that a man does is perfectly unavoidable: to that says our Author, very candidly and ingenuously: that if any one man should be forced willingly, to do any one action; the Moon would presently tumble into that man's mouth. In the next place, says Mr. Hobbs, there's nothing in the World but matter. Ay, says our Author, nothing but matter! then has not any man, in his life, ever tasted of a Pudding. This, Reader, is plain demonstration. Then for Philosophical Language, Mathematics, and Divinity; he brings him to such absurdities, as you never heard of, nor are to be imagined. Only thus far I'll tell you, that if Mr. Hobbs has squared the Circle, than both Mars and Venus, and the seven Stars will be every one of them most certainly in the Counter, the next Friday after you buy this Book.  
Never was any Book more magnified beyond the Seas, than this has been. Go into France, Spain, Italy, or any other part of Europe, no other discourse but of the Dutch War, and this second Dialogue. If the French King and Brandenburg have agreed, without doubt, 'twas done by this second Dialogue: and if he ever beat the Dutch, 'twill be just after the same manner, as Tim has slain the Leviathan. For 'tis already translated into Latin, Greek, French, Spanish, and the Universal Language. Al●…uding to this Dialogue, says Tully; Omnes ex omni aetate libri, si unum in locum conferuntur cum Servio Sulpitio Timotheo non sunt conferendi. And says Pindar (doubtless of this Book) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 'Tis needless to tell you what Zenophon, Josephus, Varro, and the Talmud say of it. I know, Reader, 'tis a little uncivil and unbecoming for one of my Profession to seem so learned. But how could I help it? for I did only carry the first sheet of this second Dialogue to the Press, and when I returned, my Wife and Family could not understand one word I said.  
What if Mr. Hobbs were familiar with Gassendus, Mersennus, and Monsieur Sorbier; whenas our Author went to School with Archimedes, and Julius Caesar was his Bed-fellow? And what if Mr. Hobbs initiated his present Majesty in the Mathematics; this Author, at the same time, disciplined six young Kings, four Emperors: and the first Pope that ever was infallible was then his Usher?  
But now, Reader, I take leave; but only I am to let you know, (not to deceiv●… you) that I am very doubtful, whether the Book be worth reading. But if you understand me aright, 'tis the more valuable for that. For such is the virtue of this Book, that the mere buying of it will do all those feats abovementioned. And therefore lay down your money: and so farewell.   

THE AUTHOR TO THE READER.  
Reader,  
IT is not the design of this following Dialogue, neither was it of the former, to make sport for idle people: (though if I have written all those Books, that I am appointed to own, thou mayst justly suspect that I never did, nor do intend any other thing;) but to preserve thee from being laughed at, by all who can distingnish sense from words. For though I cannot think how I should any ways be useful or serviceable to the Public; yet (I thank God) I have not spent my time so very ill, as only to collect a few Tales and Proverbs to make others merry. Nor was it my design either to please the Churchmen, whose Office, Power, and Bible Mr. Hobbs cunningly hath disposed of; nor to oblige the Lords and Commons; who may all stay at home, if the Prince take his advice: but it was, if possible, to cure a Company of easy, giddy, smallpated Gentlemen; who swagger that Mr. Hobbs hath said more for a bad life, and against any other life after this, than ever was pleaded by Philosopher or Divine to the contrary. Now to effect this Cure, (at least amongst some of them) is ten times more difficult than to answer all Mr. Hobbs' Works.  
For in the first place, there be a sort of people who were sturdy, resolved Practicants in Hobbianism; and would most certainly have been so, had there never been any such man as Mr. Hobbs in the World. But when they heard that ill Nature, Debauchery, and Irreligion was Mathematics and Demonstration: and that he who reported this, was a very grave, studious, contemplative, and observing Gentleman; and yet writ as viciously and profanely, as their own vanity and lusts could tempt them to practise: then had these Gentlemen found out a Philosopher exactly sor their purpose, and the Philosopher had sound out as right Gentlemen for his. And these are the sure, the firm, and constant Pit-friends; that clap, shout, and swear all that comes from Malmesbury. And to speak so plainly, as I might be understood, the Devil and the Philosopher have got these people so fast, that I have little hopes of retrieving them.  
The next shoal that came into Mr. Hobbs, are a sort of small, soft, little, pretty, fine Gentlemen: who having some little wit, some little modesty, some little remain of Conscience and Country Religion, could not tear and Hector it, as the former; but quickly learned to chirp and giggle, when t'other clapped and shouted: and those were Mr. Hobbs' Gallery-friends; who at first were coy and squeamish, and for a while stood aloof off, and made some little doubt, whether a tailor's Bill was truly and legally satisfied, when he or his Bailiffs were sufficiently beaten; but by degrees they came in, and in their kind proved very serviceable. And such as these Mr. Hobbs catched by his fame of being a Mathematician, by filling his Books with Schemes, by frequent using the word Demonstration, and calling all kind of vice and irreligion, humane Nature, and obedience to the Civil Magistrate; and the like.  
There be o'er sort still behind: and they are the solemn, the judi●…ious, Don-admirers, and ●…ox▪ friends of Mr. Hobbs: who being men of gravity and reputation, don't only d●…fie the name of Sot ●…r Villain, but are unwilling to venture upon the more ingenious one of Hobbist: and will scarce simper in favour or allowance of the Philosopher; but can make shift to nod and nod again; and think that no man but Mr. Hobbs has gone to the Fundamentals of Government or humane Nature.  
Now, Reader, what I shall do or say to these men, I know not. As for the great Shouters and Clappers, who are resolved upon their course of life, you'll easily judge, that I can expect to do but little upon them: they being so resolved, not for Mr. Hobbs' sake, but only out of true and unfeigned love, to debauchery and wickedness. But yet one thing I would beg of them, that if they be thus determined and fixed; that they would even stick to the old true new English name of Knave and Ungodly; rather than (●…or the renown of being of a Philosophical Sect) to the new one of an Hobbist. For upon my word there is not the least credit and ingenuity in it, more than tother: but if they be for variety, and that dull, blunt profaneness won't down with them, but they must have it a little so modelled and new phrased, that upon occasion they may plead for't, and justify it; let them not go to Mr. Hobbs for devices (but, when they have occasion, devise some of their own:) for his are so weak, so notoriously idle, that they are more scandalous and disparaging, than right down Roguery without any pretence or artifice.  
But as for the Gallery-Gentlemen, most of whom, I suppose, infected by general fame, I have for their sakes, (because I thought them not much at leisure) read over most of Mr. Hobbs' Writings. And what I learned thou shalt hear. By his Logic I profited wonderfully: for it was there (and I must ever acknowledge it) that I first was instructed, to call Logic Computation: and there I learned how to add and subtract Logically: also how to make use of Triangles, Circles, Parabola's, and other Mathematical instances; instead of homo, lapis or canis: and that's, upon my word, all that I found there. Then I went to his natural Philosophy; and there I found the word Phantasm, as thick as ever it could stand; and that space, time, and every thing else was a Phantasm, but not any one thing tolerably explained, but what was taken out of Cartes, though he denies it. But indeed in those very things, wherein he says he differs from him, he most exactly agrees with him; (as the corp. Ch. 29.) and knows it not. There is, I must confess, a good lusty heap of Mathematics, about the middle of his natural ●…hilosophy: but Dr. W. has taken such care about them, that I believe they'll do thee but little good.  
I might tell thee also, Reader, of his Humane Nature; which carries a very good Title, and is called the Fundamental Elements of Policy: which Title has nothing at all to do with the Book, nor the Book scarce with any thing at all else: his Liberty and Necessity is a little, very feat Book: but there's nothing but a new Definition of Liberty to make it agree with Necessity; and he might even as well have made one Definition for Fire and Water. Of his Books de Cive and Leviathan, I need say nothing: because most of this, and the former Dialogues concerns them. And lastly, as to his Mathematics, I leave them to be judged by others. But only, Reader, let me tell thee thus much, that if in that Science thou preferrest one doting, conceited Fellow, not only before all the Mathematicians of our own Nation; but also all in Europe (which thou must do, if thou admirest his Mathematics▪) than I do look upon thee to have arrived to the height of the Hobbian Spirit; and thou mayst even continue in it. So that what is in it, Reader, thou hast left now to admire in thy Master. 'Tis a most plain Case, that he's neither Logician, nor Philosopher, nor Moralist, nor Politician: and upon the credit of others, I'll presume him no Mathematician. Yes, I'll tell thee what he's good for, and truly that's just all viz without doubt, he is a very good English Grammarian; (and those that are skilled in Latin, say he must not pretend higher:) and knowing exactly the difference between do and doth, which and who, would have made a most absolute, unlimited, irresistible Sovereign of a Country-School; and upon Play days▪ we'll allow him t●… translate: he has done Thucidydes well.  
As to the last sort of Gentlemen, the grave and s●…ill Admirers: who think no man's Style, Method▪ and Politics, like Mr. Hobbs': I shall only desire them to su●…er me to tell them where those Politics lie, viz. he went and read, and considered the Laws and Sta●…utes of our Realm: and then went on, and suppos●…d that in every place (if there be any Prince at all) he must be absolute and unlimited: whom he mounted so high at last, as that he should not be only sufficiently above all men; but above God himself, and all Religion: (and having given him such a full brimmer of Power and Authority; to be sure he had raised him above our Form of Government:) and this his Prince you take for a rare Prince, and these his Politics for rare Politics. Whereas it is plain, in his Commonwealth, there is nothing at all new; but only saucy impudent reflections upon the Laws, Constitutions, and Government of our Realm. And don't mistake yourselves, he's every whit as much against the Civil Power, as Ecclesiastical. And suppose that you are willing to excuse him; yet His Majesty likes such money, as is given him by the Parliament; and such Laws as they advise him to make; and thinks himself Prince enough, and is contented with his place; though, according to the strict Rules of Sovereignty, and Mr. Hobbs' definition of a Monarch, he can't make Bibles, nor turn God out of the World. As for the rest of his Politics, they are such as are known to every Dragoon: and when he writ them, as he pretended, for the immortal Peace of his Country; he might even as well have put out a Regular System to tea●…h people how to charge a Gun, or cleanse the Streets.  
It is possible, Reader, that thou mayst now expect I should give thee some account of the following Dialogue: but I have no mind to't, only whereas some in a Book against Mr. Hobbs might look for close and serious arguing; thou art to understand that I was always ready for it, but never could find an opportunity. For when I had pulled a▪ pieces Mr. Hobbs' Phrases, and changed his affected words into such as were familiar; I always found, that to confute him throughly, was only to understand him aright. And if, by the instances I have given, others are convinced thereof, I have my design.   

A SECOND Dialogue BETWEEN Phylautus and Timothy.  Phi. 
HOW, Tim, not hanged yourself yet?  Tim. 
In my opinion, Bristol is a very pr●…tty Town.  Phi. 
Surely thou wert at cross purposes last night: what has Bristol to do with hanging?  Tim. 
The most that can be, Sir. And I wonder, of all men, that you should no●… perceive it. 'Tis a train, Sir; and as plain beaten road, as from St. Albans ●…o Barnet, or from St. Andrew to Tumult.  Phi. 
Wh●…, is there such a Town, any where upon the road, as Tumult?  Tim. 
A very ●…amous one, in the fourth Chapter of your Humane Nature: and according to the account you ●…here give of it, 'tis nothing near an hours riding from St. Andrew thither. For, the mind being mounted at St. Andrew, starts thence and runs to St. Peter, because in the same Gospel, their names are read together. Having got to St. Peter, it makes forthwith for stone, for the same reason; from stone it goes to foundation, because they are seen together; and then from foundation it switches away presently to Church, and from Church to people, and from people to Tumult.  Phi. 
All this is very natural and Coherent, the passage being smooth and easy: but how shall we get from Hanging to Bristol? I doubt that is a kind of a cross road, Tim; is it not?  Tim. 
I must confess, there's one place a little hard to hit: but from Bristol to Hanging, 'tis impossible to miss. For, the mind getting up at Bristol, away presently it rides for Flintshire, from Flintshire it goes to Hamshire, and so to Hempshire, Ropeshire, Pippin.  Phi. 
Pippin? whereabouts are we now? what have we to do with Pippin?  Tim. 
This Pippin, Sir, was he, to whom Alderman Cooper the great Turkey Merchant was so nearly related.  Phi. 
How dost mean? what, did this Cooper marry one of Pippins Daughters?  Tim. 
No, Sir: he was of the whole blood upon my word: for he was only Son of Mr. Hooper, who came from a Greekish kind of Man, one Hoper, and he from Dioper, and he again from Diaper; and than it runs alone, to Pippin. Alas! Thought is very swift, and set but the mind once agog, and how it whews it away.  Phi. 
I shall not come to you to learn how swi●…t Thoughts are: nor yet how that they are all necessary.  Tim. 
No: if you do, you'll lose your journey, for I know no such thing.  Phi. 
What don't you know? done't you know, that there is a necessary coherence and order, a fatal and irresistible occasion, a drift, a clue and Chain of all thoughts?  Tim. 
Not, in the least; not I  Phi. 
Then thou knowest nothing belonging to the Brain; nor didst thou ever take into consideration my principle of motion.  Tim. 
I have tasted, Sir, of a Calves head and Bacon; and I was in the great wind: and yet I humbly conceive, that though a Man's legs be tied never so fast; and his mouth stitched up never so close, he may, notwithstanding that, pay it away with thinking, if he be but in the right queu. When the Purse is empty, and the Pha●…sie low, then indeed the mind usually is very modest and governable; and goes only to leapfrog, and skips perhaps from Cooper to Pippin, or ●…rom St. Andrew to Tumult. But let the man's belly and pockets be but once refreshed, and then presently he is Cock-a-hoop, than he takes Hedge and Ditch, Church and Steeple; and struts and straddles like the great Colossus at Rhodes. Now, methinks, I am just in the very middle of Smyrna: Now I am at As in praesenti: Now I am for a Dish of Cucumbers and Mustard: and, after all this, nothing will satisfy me but Adam and Eve, and the North Wind. hay day! how I can range sometimes, and make the whole World to spring, and flutter before me.  Phi. 
This now, I perceive, is intended for frolic, and fancy: but, that thou mayst see, Tim, that thou hast no hopes of ever having the credit of being distracted; I shall show thee, that in this great flight that thou hast made, and these great jumps, that thou hast taken, there's nothing else but mere train and drift: and thou hast as absolutely crept on from hint to hint, and motive to motive, as ever Child did, that leaned upon its Mother's Apron-strings. And in the first place as for Smyrna, I take it for granted that it was an unavoidable thought.  Tim. 
Do you so? then you must take it all alone: for you are not likely to have my Company.  Phi. 
Why, has not the word Smyrna by some means or other been formerly impulsed upon you? Surely you will not say that you just now made it.  Tim. 
No truly, I did not make it: but, if you have occasion for them, I can make you a thousand words presently, that neither you, nor I ever heard of before.  Phi. 
What, neither in part nor whole? I hope you'll make them of some syllables you have heard of, or at least of some Letters.  Tim. 
Ps●…aw! pshaw! that's a mere fancy o●… yours: we'll make them of a Turkey Tammy, or a Calamanco. Make words of Letters! they are dull and old fashioned words that ar●… made so. Give me a word, that has neither beginning nor ending, Vowel, nor Consonant, that is neither to be spoken, heard, nor understood.  Phi. 
Come, come: for all your fooling, you had some one considerable reason or other why you named Smyrna.  Tim. 
Some one, Sir! I had a dozen at least.  Phi. 
Then no man can say but you had reasons enough.  Tim. 
But I had as many, Sir, full out for Aleppo.  Phi. 
Perhaps so, but then they wer●… not altogether so big.  Tim. 
Yes but they were, and bigger too. There was the tenth reason, that was as big as the great Turnip King James gave the Scotchman. O Aleppo! how infinitely am I taken with Aleppo!  Phi. 
That's true, you may be much taken with the place now, but you cared little for it before.  Tim. 
O Sir, for many years together I have been so horribly inflamed with the thoughts of it, that if you do not a little divert me, and let me know how I got from Smyrna to As in praesenti, I shall immediately swoon.  Phi. 
Although thy ignorance show thy education to have been but very small: yet I suppose thou mightst travel so far into the Grammar, as to be acquainted with As in praesenti.  Tim. 
Yes, Sir, I know As in praesenti very well: but I don't remember that ever I met As in praesenti riding behind Smyrna to Market.  Phi. 
That may be, simpleton! but you met, in the beginning of Propria quae maribus, with the Island called Cyprus: and every body knows that Cyprus is no such huge way from Smyrna.  Tim. 
'Tis very right I profess— ceu Creta Britannia Cyprus. O, what a happiness it is, to have had the opportunity of prying into the little intrigues, and starting holes of the mind! and to be well acquainted with all the little Lanes and by-paths of thinking! But I pray, Sir, how came Cucumbers and Mustard into such an intimacy with As in praesenti?  Phi. 
'Lack a day! they are old Comrades. For the very last side but one in Quae Genus, (which you know is next to As in praesenti) there you learned Scelerata sinapis, and cucumis cucumber.  Tim. 
I durst swear upon Lily, 'tis just so. And that this same thought of Mustard and Cucumbers came only from the sediments and relics of an old twang I got at School. But how, Sir, came the Cucumbers to outrun the Mustard; for they are otherwise placed in the Grammar?  Phi. 
That is because some time or other you have seen Mutton and Cucumbers to be succeeded by Beef and Mustard.  Tim. 
Yes, Sir, that I have once, or so: but I don't remember that ever I saw Adam and Eve and the Northwind succeeded after any such manner. How shall we train in these, Sir?  Phi. 
O most easily. For Adam and Eve were the occasion of all thoughts: for from them were descended all thinking Creatures. But besides, 'tis possible that at some time or other (for no man can remem●…er every thing that has happened in his whole life) you might meet a Woman crying Cucumbers; and thereupon looking up, you spied the sig●… of Adam and Eve.  Tim. 
But 'tis five to one, Sir, whether the Northwind was written upon the sign.  Phi. 
That's true: but 'tis not so many to one, but that the Wind might then be in the North, Tim. And if so, there's sufficient ●…son for them to lig together in the Brain, and afterwards to spring forth. Alas! Tim, the●…e is not one of a thousand that is able to discern how strangely things are chained together. It being a plain cas●… that people generally spend their time in gazing and staring at the whole lump of second causes; and never mind the delicate wreathe and twist of motion.  Tim. 
Indeed, Sir, I am afraid that people are somewhat careless: in my mind they ought to be chidden.  Phi. 
Chidden? they aught to be kicked out of the World for duncery. I tell thee, Tim, I was, I remember, one day (in the late troublesome times) at a place where we sell into discourse of the Civil War. In the midst of which up starts one (as seemingly attentive as any of the rest) and asks, what was the value of a Roman penny. The old fops and boys, that crowded close to see and admire me, and to get some reputation from being in my Company; thought the man utterly distracted, or (as Theolog●…es use to say upon such occasions) inspired. But to me, who knew how to drive a thought to the spring head, the coherence and train of the question was as manifest as could be. For the thought of the War introducing the thought of the Scots selling the King, and the thought of that, the thought of Judas betraying of Christ; and he being sold for thirty pence, I need not say any more.  Tim. 
Not a word, Sir, and 'twas well for the poor Gentleman, Phylautus, that you were so nigh at hand; or else, by chance, he might have gone to Bedlam, for want of a Trainer. But suppose, Sir, instead of the Roman penny, he had asked what was the reason that Ginger is spelt with a G, and Jeopardy with an J. Must he needs have gone for't: could not you have dropped down a little solder, and relief upon such an unfortunate extravagancy?  Phi. 
What's that to you Goodman-two-shoes: am I bound to acquaint you with all that I can do?  Tim. 
Nay, I hope no offence, Sir: for I am confident you that have such excellent skill at putting a thought off the squat, could have easily done't: for the phantasm of War introducing the phantasm of powder, this powder presently breaks forth into bullets: again those bullet's pig and bring forth hail shot: and in the twincling of an eye, hail▪ shot begets Pepper: and that Pepper that can't beget Ginger, aught to be flung into the streets.  Phi. 
But hold Tim; who▪ shall help us to the phantasm of Jeopardy? dost keep a Journeyman to do that for thee? I prithee why not Ginger and Justice, or Ginger and Jeremiah, as well as Ginger and Jeopardy?  Tim. 
Nay softly there, Phylautus; you would fain draw me into a Land-story. The business of Ginger and Jeopardy is as famous as the ▪ three blue beans in ●… blue bladder.  Phi. 
Then you may keep your story to yourself: I am sure it can't any ways weaken my opinion, let it be what it will: for as I said before, so say I again, that 'tis perfectly impossible for any man in the World, either to devise a new thought, or so much as to choose the order of any old one.  Tim. 
I have now in my mind, Phylautus, a spick and span new thought, so fine and so pretty—  Phi. 
What, that no body ever thought of before? I pr●…thee let's hear it.  Tim. 
No, but you shan't: for you can't hear it, unless I speak; and if I speak, I shall go nigh to open my mouth: and than you'll presently say, that some body have opened their mouths just so before now; either in whole, or in part; and so I shall be choosed out of the novelty of my thought. No, no, Sir: I must beg your pardon as to that: but if you have any other kind of reason to bestow upon me, why a man may not think over his old thoughts in what order he pleases, besides such as King Pippin, Tumult and the Roman penny, I shall count myself very much beholding to you.  Phi. 
What an impertinent thing is this to look about for reason, in a case that need not at all to be reasoned? does not what men practise and daily experience teach thee, how naturally the mind flies from one thing to another: even as a Hawk flies after a Partridge? and have not I in the thirty third page of my Humane nature plainly shown thee, that when the thought of honourable is by some occasion or other sprung in a man, how the mind presently takes Wing, and flies to the thought of being wise, which is the next means thereunto: and from thence to the thought of study, which is the next means to wisdom: and have not I besides there told thee, that the necessity of this order depends upon this great truth, that he that has a conception of an end and has an appetite thereunto; the next conception he has, is a conception of the next means to that end.  Tim. 
A most vast and stately truth indeed! and therefore certainly that Gentleman's brains lay very oddly, who, being sent for to a dying friend, bad his man to saddle him presently the Chessboard, and give the Warming-pan half a peck of Oats.  Phi. 
This is a mere flame of your own devising: there never was any man in the World in his Wits, who thought after this extravagant rate.  Tim. 
This way you'll be too hard for me indeed. For if I take a little pains to make a new thought, you presently cry out aware A●…phabet! and when I appeal to History and matter of Record, than my men prove all mad.  Phi. 
I say you and your men are every one of you mad; if you look upon this way of thinking to be common or natural.  Tim. 
I know, as well as you, that 'tis not altogether modish: and therefore if at any time the thought of hunger stirs within me, and struggles so hard as to pull in Victuals; I don't call for a Flail or the Snuffers to cut my meat; but for t' other instrument: and if I have occasion to be trimmed, I seldom send for the Bricklayer, because I have more frequently observed the fall of beards to succeed the performances of another sort of Operators.  Phi. 
And therefore you plainly see that people eat, live, talk, and do all merely by train of thoughts. And as the water followeth a man's finger upon a dry and level Table: so every conception is guided and necessarily drawn in, by something that went before.  Tim. 
I grant you, Phylautus, that Victuals draws out the knife out of the sheath, as naturally as the finger, etc. but it will not fetch in the flail out of the Barn altogether so well▪  Phi. 
Yes, if there be a Pudding upon the Table.  Tim. 
But it shan't be Pudding-day: we'll have nothing but a Haunch of Venison. I durst not say Beef. For that would have taken fire presently; and ran like a great Gun backward. Flail, Corn, Pudding, Beef.  Phi. 
Why, Venison is flesh as well as Beef.  Tim. 
There you are cunning to some purpose: for if I had only said, that we had a small device, or a thingam for Dinner; you would easily have brought in your Flail. For all substances are Cousin-germans.  Phi. 
So they are: for the whole World is only a vast, vast Family: and though by reason of the multitude of relations, we don't presently perceive how the Kindred comes in: Yet there always is and must be some necessary alliance.  Tim. 
That same must be I like mainly well: because 'twill indifferently serve for any elevation of the Pole. For, suppose a Gentleman comes into his Inn, and finding his stomach mawkish, desires only a boiled Cushion and Apple-sawce for his Supper; and my Landlord calls for ●…ippin or Tumult to speak in the Globe; and neither of them will answer: 'tis no matter for that, for if they won't somebody else must: every thought coming from imagination, and imagination from sense, and sense from motion, and therefore it must be so, so or so.  Phi. 
It seems by this, Tim, as if 'twere thy opinion that all thoughts were merely casual or indifferent.  Tim. 
You must guess again, Sir: for though I believe no thought to be necessary; yet 'tis plain that there is not one of a hundred of which, for the most part, there is not some occasion offered. For Children at School are very well aware of your train of thoughts; (only they don't know the phrase) counting it not modest nor civil to tell a Passenger a story of eo and queo, when he gives them occasion to tell him the hour of the day.  Phi. 
I prithee, Tim, don't trouble me with a●…y of thy children's stories: but if thou hast a mind to understand wherein the whole cheat of this same freedom of thinking consists, 'tis in short thus. There are, thou knowest, several senses belonging to a man; which senses seldom lie long fallow; but are constantly busied and knocked upon by this outward World: so that these knockings saved all together, and treasured up in the brain, in twenty years' time, suppose, will amount to a vast bank of motion: hence now it comes about, that a man may easily be deceived, and ofttimes seem to think Volunteer, when as he only filtches out of the common stock.  Tim. 
This same seeming only to think freely does not at all please me: for a man, notwithstanding that, is still as very a Jimcrack as a Farthing-whistle; only he's a little more copious. And an ability to think of ten thousand thousand several things, if stinted to a certain order, is nothing else but a wilder kind of necessity. And thereupon it was that the late Philosopher who took great pains in making Bruits to be mere Engines; was never so idle or mad, as to make man to be such a kind of tool.  Phi. 
He might even have gone on with the work, for any thing I see to the contrary.  Tim. 
No, Sir: he knew how to spend his time better. For he perceived that though an engine might possibly be contrived not only to walk up and down, but also to pronounce several words very distinctly, and to call knave if touched in one place, and in another to be your humble servant: nay, suppose you bestow upon it such breeding, as it becomes able at last to recite word for word every Verse in Virgil: yet take this same engine and stroke it, and coke's it, and promise it a Violet▪ Comfit, tell it the Emperor is to dine with you that day, and therefore it must needs do some extraordinary feat; for all this you can't get this sullen thing to say so much; as Patulae tu Tityre.  Phi. 
Perhaps so: but what's the reason, Tim?  Tim. 
I know none but only this; that make what you will of mere matter; and put in never so many Wheels and Pulleys: and instruct it in all the Language●… of Europe, and ▪ 'twill still be but a chip of the old block, and 'twill go but just the rounds, and never take forth of its own accord, nor skip up your lap, and kiss you, when you had tuned it to say the first Ode of Horace.  Phi. 
I grant you that Man has very much the advantage of all other Creatures; because he alone is capable of speech, and thereby of comparing and reasoning.  Tim. 
Now, don't I believe one word of all this.  Phi. 
What, Tim, dost deny by whole sale?  Tim. 
In the first place I do say that 'tis not speech, or the uttering of words that does at all make a man; but the understanding those words he utters, and the applying the same aptly. For suppose you go to your Cage, and ask your Pie, how do you do this Morning? and the Pie answers, how do YOU do this Morning? now if you can but teach the Pie to lay the accent strong enough upon that same YOU which she pronounces, 'tis then plain reparty, and the Pie shall presently put in for a place at Court. And as speech alone will never amount to reasoning; so by your good leave, Phylautus, there may be reasoning without speech: that is, there may be demonstrative inferring or concluding without the use of words. For I don't imagine reasoning to consist in gaping or hollowing, but in perceiving the necessity of the effect from its causes; which deaf and dumb people by many instances certainly do, as well as the loudest disputant in the Schools. But of these things, Phylautus, you and I may have further occasion to discourse, before we part. And therefore if you have ever another Roman penny about you, I pray let's have it.  Phi. 
No, Tim, I know what to do with my money and notions better, than to fling them away upon such an ungrateful wretch as thou art. This same train or necessity of all humane thoughts is a great secret, and too deep, I perceive, for thy apprehension. Perhaps thou mayst have better luck at understanding the necessity of all humane actions: and therefore if thou hast a mind to it; we'll have a small brush about freewill: for my part I have not much to say: being most of it comprised in that little despicable piece of mine, called Liberty and Necessity. 'Tis a very small thing, Tim, and one of thy confidence and prowess may eat it up at a mouth-ful.  Tim. 
Yes, Sir, 'tis very small: but somebody has put such a dreadful Preface to't, as would go nigh to give a Giant his Breakfast. Reader, says that same somebody, take this little Book of Liberty and Necessity: pull off thy glove, and take it I say into thy right hand, and let not the smallness thereof, make it seem contemptible to thee, for 'tis every bit Diamond and Oaks heart, for (besides a new passage into the East-Indies, and the bowels of the number of the Apocalyptical Beast) there's work enough for many thousand Sermons and Exercises: and there's that which is much better than the Catechisms and Confessions of a thousand Assemblies: and that which will cast an eternal blemish upon all the cornered Caps of the Priests and Jesuits, and upon all the black and white Caps of the Ministers. I know not, Reader, what profession, persuasion, opinion, or Church thou art of: but be of what thou wilt, if thou intendest to be saved, buy and study this little Book. In comparison of which, all the Sermons, Teachings, Preachings, Meetings, Disputations, Conferences and Printed Books are good for nothing, but only to divert the duller sort of Citizens. Perhaps, thou mayst have a mind to be prying into the great mysteries of Predestination, Election, Freewill, Grace, Merits, Reprobation, etc. if so, take my advice for once, and never go to any Black-Court again; for generally they are a Company of ignorant Tinkers, that pretend to mending and sodering of men's Consciences, and for the most part they make more holes than they find: but go thou me to this little, little Book of Liberty and Necessity; (not written by a dull Tinkering Theologue, but by a severe student of the Mathematics) and there thou shalt find more evidence and conviction, and more means of humane salvation, than in all the Volumes and Libraries, and all the Controversial Labours, and Polemical Treatises that were ever Printed. Now, Sir, is not this very thundering and dismaying? Do you think any body will venture, when you scare people thus.  Phi. 
Who scare people? You can't say that I writ that Preface, can you?  Tim. 
No: But when I find therein that same rattling story (which was before in your Preface de Cive) of Ixion's clasping a Cloud instead of Juno, and of the Centaurs and Hermaphrodite opinions that were produced by that unnatural coition; and compare therewith your being so notoriously given to print over and over such elegant flourishes: and when I consider besides, how chargeable 'twould be to procure one to ●…eign such commendations, as you, upon all occasions, so easily and naturally trundle in upon yourself, I cannot but say, that I am somewhat afraid, that—  Phi. 
Afraid? of what I prithee? thou knowest well enough there was a Metaphysical Bishop that ventured to meddle; and I don't question but thou art as foolhardy as any Bishop, Primate, or Metropolitan of them all.  Tim. 
But you remember, Sir, what a woeful example you made of the poor Bishop; (as you tell us in the last page of your Animadversions) and of all fish that fly, there's none I hate like an Example. In my opinion, Phylautus, you did him a little too hard, considering he was a Bishop.  Phi. 
How could I help it, Tim? dost think I can endure to be eternally tormented with nothing but Tohu's and Bohu's and Jargons'? The Bishop and I meet at Paris: we discourse very calmly concerning freewill: upon this he writes a very angry Book, viz. Vindication of true Liberty, etc. and upon that (as he desired) I writ that perilous little thing, Liberty and Necessity. But withal (now mark how tender I was of his credit) in no less than four several places, I requested, that it might by no means be Printed, that the World might never see what a pitiful weak Creature they had for a Church Governor. But afterwards this little Book being infinitely desired, and by stealth made public; notwithstanding all these cautions, and this my great regard to his reputation, he was so inconsiderate as to go and make a reply. In which, Tim, (to be short and plain) he has discovered so little of breeding, reasoning, or elocution, that I am oft times forced to let him know that his Lordship writes like a Beast, nay worse than a Beast, nay both as to sense and cleanliness: and for his language that 'tis Jargon, Tohu, Bohu, the very same with that of the Kingdom of darkness.  Tim. 
'Twas a most unhappy thing, that so great a Churchman should run himself into such danger: and at once offend such a formidable Monster of Wit, and Philosophy.  Phi. 
Offend? I tell thee, Tim, I am of as gentle and sparing a nature (let people talk but tolerable nonsense) as any man alive: but to be perpetually snarled at and cursed— One he falls to scribbling against me with his Ghebrical gibberish, called symbols, Gambols, or Antichrist in short hand; and in his Elenchus would make people believe that he has confuted me, by writing so as no body understands him. Then comes another little Dog called Vindex Academiarum, and without being set on, he barks and exclaims against me as an Enemy to the Universities; and knows no more than a Puppy, either what an Enemy is, or what an University is. Then comes the railing and wondering Bishop with his Tohu, Bohu and Jargon; and he calls me Rebel, Atheist and Blasphemer, because I will not comply with him in his fopperies of Accidents of Cheese in Bread, freewill, Free-subject, and the like. Upon this, Tim, perceiving that folly and spite were both like to be endless: and that of all men that baited me, the Clergy were the great Ringleaders and disturbers, what did me I, (for my future ease and quiet) but picked out this same provoking Bishop, as a good lusty Sacrifice of their own flock: and so made of him an example for all the rest: which, if I be not much mistaken, I have done to some purpose.  Tim. 
To tell the Bishop (as you do) that his distinction of compounded sense and divided sense was nonsense, was a very proper and pinching reflection: there being no sort of sense so very scandalous as nonsense: but to let go the very same instruments of revenge upon every slight cavil, and frivolous occasion; and in times too, when Liberty of will, as well as Episcopacy and Loyalty were equally persecuted; was not done like a man that pretends to such variety of wit, and had the honour to initiate his present Majesty in the Mathematics.  Phi. 
Thou talkest, Tim, as if the Bishop had left thee a Legacy to defend his fooleries. I wonder, what kind of things thou countest slight and frivolous. If a man should tell me ●… long story of a round quadrangle, or of a Kingdom standing upon two heads, and I desire him out of all love to speak softly; for my part, I believe thy wit to be such, that thou wouldst look upon this to be mere carping and cavilling.  Tim. 
No; by no means, Sir: you talk now of businesses indeed. But suppose, Phylautus, the Bishop in his Epistle to the Reader, taking notice of your Principles being destructive both to Religion and Government, concludes all with, God bless us. May not a Bishop (because the supreme Rascals had got away his estate) reserve so much of his sacred function, as to say, God bless us, without being accused of buffoonly abusing the name of God to calumny?  Phi. 
But he brings it in, Tim, as if he intended it as a spell, or a charm against my doctrine.  Tim. 
Perhaps so: for there are a great many think it pernicious, besides the Bishop.  Phi. 
It may be some few particular men.  Tim. 
Do you know what you have said? what a barbarous expression is this, for one that has done so well upon Thucydides, and the Peak! is t●…is you that pretend to such exactness of Language and have so little as to come in with your particular men? Is this you that have confounded thousands of Catechisms and thousands of Confessions, and routed white Caps, black Caps, corner'd Caps, Priests, Jesuits, and Ministers, and talk of your particular men? is this you—  Phi. 
For shame, Tim, rave no more, for thou lookest black in the mouth already. I prithee what fault canst thou fi●…d with particular men, Tim. Wherein does the iniquity of that expression lie?  Tim. 
I know no more hurt in't than you did, when you made use of it in the last page but one of your Animadversions: (as you may do a hundred times more for aught I know) but the poor Bishop did but speak of some particular men that slighted all ancient Authors: and 'twas as very Jargon, as if he had taken his Text out of St. Paul to the Deuteronomians; particular men! this word particular men (say you) is put in here, in my opinion with little Judgement: especially by a man that pretendeth to be learned. That now is a very girding aggravation. Does the Bishop think that he himself is, or that there is any Universal man? that's vexation driven. It may be he means a private man. Does he then think there is any man not private besides him that is endued with Sovereign Power? rarely fetched up again! there is not one man of a thousand that's fit to be trusted with an absurdity: that knows how to give the rising blow, and to urge and press to the quick. I wonder for my part that Episcopacy was not ashamed of coming into Ireland again, so long as there was a particular man to be found there. But that which pleases me much better than all this, Phylautus, is; that the Bishop a while after happening to make use of the word General, the Tables presently turn, and he's even as very Ja●…gon for that, as he was before for particular. General! 'tis Jargon, say you: for every thing that is, is singular and individual, and there's nothing in the whole World that is general, but the signification of words and other signs. So that, Phylautus, if you resolve to deal with us at this severe rate, and neither let us have particular men as a constant going stock, nor an Universal man for a Breeder, we must even fling up at quarter day; and there's an end of the World.  Phi. 
What an idle stir thou makest about two or three rotten words! what's all this, I prithee, to the Matter in hand.  Tim. 
Matter in hand! what, do you look upon Freewill to be a matter in hand, when as Liberty is immaterial: or a discourse of Freewill (which consist only of words) to be a matter in hand? O, that I were but at leisure to take my full swing at this same luscious bit of nonsense; this same matter in hand!  Phi. 
Whereabouts are we got now, trow we?  Tim. 
We are now just got to the 288th. page of your Animadversions. Where the Bishop did but speak of a perfect definition being made of the essential causes, viz. matter and form (which is as common as Logica est ars) and you hooted at him, for as very an example, as if he had gone nine miles to suck a Bull. What (say you) would the Bishop have matter come into a definition, that is made only of words: and into a definition of Liberty too, that is immaterial? We had best c●…ll for a skillet for his Lordship, that he may set on his definition, and boil it. Is it not a strange thing that a dignifyed Churchman should be so ignorant, as not to know that Matter is body, and that Body is corporeal substance, and subject to dimension, such as are the Elements, and things compounded of the Elements? this is, Phylautus, damnable and upbraiding Rhetoric: for though Matter, Body, corporeal substance, dimension, elements and things made of elements, seem to be the same sort of torment, yet it grates all the way like a saw upon a man's leg.  Phi. 
I know it does; and I intended it should. For to illustrate nonsense, after this easy and familiar manner, is sometimes the most stinging improvement that can be made of it.  Tim. 
I pray, Sir, when the Bishop says that a man has the determination of himself, and dominion over his own actions: how do you manage that absurdity?  Phi. 
It need not be managed at all Tim; for without any help the man makes an absolute fool of himself; and at one dash flings away all his Freewill, as utterly as ever rotten egg was ●…lung against the Wall: for over wh●…tsoever things there's dominion, those things are not free.  Tim. 
This is a plain case, that he lost his parts and Bishopric together: for Free dominion is as much as to say free imprisonment, free subjection, or free sl●…very: and therefore I very much wondered at your Moderation, when (in the beginning of your Animadversions) you said that Arminianism was only in part the cause of the late troubles. Whereas 'tis very plain, that the War never had been begun, had it not been for the Freewillers. For a subject being nothing else but a person who has given up his will to the will of his Prince: he that presumes to call in his own will again, and to challenge a dominion and command over his actions (as all Freewillers do) what does he do but in eff●…ct, renounce all allegiance; and like a Rebel, sets up his own will against that of the supreme. Nay farther, whereas some people (not understanding words) do imagine that the Doctrine of Necessity makes the Government of God Tyrannical; these are so very silly as not to perceive that they which maintain the contrary give way to the same absurdity in a much higher degree. For he that holds that man has a power and dominion over his own actions, makes every man to be a King: from whence it plainly follows (King and Tyrant being all one) that according to him, God is more a Tyrant, being King of Kings. I profess, I did not think there had been any thing nigh so much treason and blasphemy in maintaining this same Liberty of Will as now I perceive there is.  Phi. 
Thou perceive! thou perceivest nothing at all: not so much as the first grounds of the dispute between us. For if thou didst, thou wouldst know, that no man in the World is more for true Liberty, and for man's being a free Agent than I am. Nay (which possibly such a Fool as thou art may stare at) I hold true Liberty more than the very Bishop himself, who seemeth so eagerly to scramble and fight for't. For (as I have it p. 77.) whereas the Bishop either craftily, or (be it spoken with all due respect) ignorantly pu●… things so together as to scandalise me and make people believe I am altogether against Liberty, because I hold necessity: let him and his ecclesiastics know, that I hold as much that there is true Liberty as he doth and more: for I hold it, as from Necessity; and that there must of Necessity be Liberty: but he (like a beast) holds it not from Necessity, and so makes it possible there may be none. And that's the reason why I called my Book, Liberty and Necessity. For I am so far from denying Liberty, that I hold Necessity besides.  Tim. 
He does so: never minding that sober advice of the Poet, about severities clog, upon the three Children that were drowned; untie 'em and you undo 'em. Now say I, Phylautus, give me again my Actus primus, and Actus se●…undus, my terminus à quo, and terminus ad quem, my quidditas, quodditas, entitas, and all the r●…st of my little, barbarous, Metaphysical implements; rather than such childish, ridiculous, nonsensical quirks and subtleties, dressed up ●…nto eloquent stile, with soft a●…d Roman expressions. You had best now complain to his M●…jesty that the boys laugh at you, when you chastise them for their particul●…r men, their free dominion, and their boiled definitions: and that they grow saucy and headstrong, and won't believe but that plain right-down, untrimed Liberty, without any Necessity at all, is near upon as good, as your kind of Liberty laced with a vengeance.  Phi. 
Nay, if you be good at that, Tim, for a need, I can rail, 〈◊〉 well as you  Tim 
I pray, Sir, hold your hand: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 last page of your six Lesson●… you have given the ●…gregious Prof●…ssours (as ●…ou call them) such a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as would go nigh to 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 itself. Go your ways, say you, you uncivil 〈◊〉, inhu●… ane Divines, Dedoctors of morality, unasinous Colleagues, egregious pair of Issachar, most wretched Vindices and Indices Academiarum.  Phi. 
I said all that; 〈◊〉 they deserved it. And I am heartily sorry, Tim, that I have it not about me, for thee too. For, thou art a most rude and ungentile scribbler, a most unmannerly, and scurrilous libeler, a most ignorant, pragmatical, and malicious despiser of age, gravity, observation, and every thing else that is becoming and venerable: a very Boy, Toy, flie-flap, shuttlecock, nutcrack, that ought not to speak to one that has read a good Book, or seen a wise man: the very sediment, fag-end, stump, and snuff of mankind; that snears and blinks at stars of reason: a●…d that shirked only into humane race, to vex old men, and stum sober company: and ●…herefore ●… do defy thee, and abhor thee, and spit on thy face, and say, that that Liberty of humane actions, which I do allow of, is true Liberty.  Tim. 
And spit, and rail till you be hoarse again, I do say that, according to your principles, a Mustard-quern, or Wheel-barrow, has every whit as much liberty, choice, etc. as the most uncontrollable Governor now upon earth.  Phi. 
Why so? done't I frequently say that man is a free Agent, that he deliberates, chooses, consents, etc.  Tim. 
Yes, that you do forty times over.  Phi. 
How much freedom than wouldst thou have? I grant that he ●…ay do, whatever he will; and I ●…hink that's Forest big enough for ●…ny one Creature to range in.  Tim. 
But I pray, Sir, how far is that same will that he has, in his own power?  Phi. 
That now is as absurdly and ignorantly spoken, as ever was any thing either b●… the Bishop or St. Austin: for, they both talk of having the will in their own power, not at all considering, that the will is the very power itself.  Tim 
That was very carelessly d●…ne of them i●…deed: for, as you say, the will being the power, to talk of having power over the will, is all one as to have power over power: whence will follow penetration of powers: and so we shall have two Kings of Brenford currant at the same time. And therefore being convinced, Phylautus, that I was in the wrong, I 〈◊〉 only to know what is it, that a man has the power to will?  Phi. 
Because that ●…ow is tol●…rable well, (if it be rightly taken) ●… do tell thee, that he has power to will whatever he pleases, fancies, or has a mind to: and I know not what thou canst desire more, unless thou wouldst have the Calf with the white face.  Tim. 
But I pray, Sir, how comes he by that mind? does that mind come always upon him necessarily; so that it was impossible for him not to have had that mind: or does he himself choose that mind?  Phil. 
Choose that mind! what strange words you put together again: what, would you have a man to choose his own choice, and to will his own will? 'tis worse by half than lying with his own mother.  Tim. 
A great deal worse, Sir, for man is an excellent Creature; for man has a liberty to do: and besides that, he has liberty to do whatever he will: (O brave man!) and he can will whatever he has a mind to: but all on a sudden he plomps, for he has a mind to nothing. And so, you know, it happened, Philantus, in that famous case of the House that Jack built. For though it was always granted that there was a man that killed the Cat, that eat the Mouse, that lived in the House— yet, at the upshot of the business, Jack always steps in, and swops away all the credit.  Phi. 
All this ridiculous prattle is, because thou never hadst a just and true notion of Liberty. For, Liberty, say I, is absence of all the impediments to action that are not—  Tim. 
This now is specially good, and one of your old tricks. For you take a man and stake him down upon the middle of New-market heath, and then give him a definition of Liberty, and tell him that he may now run away faster, than if he were loose; for now he runs upon necessity, but if he were loose, he could only run away upon his Legs.  Phi. 
'Tis impossible ever to stop a Fool's mouth, that won't hear out a definition.  Tim. 
I am resolved not to hear it, make your complaint where you will. For put you a man into a Dungeon, as deep as you can th●…ust him; and let me 〈◊〉 ●…ut the ordering of a few words, and if I done't presently defi●…e him steeple height, I'll undertake to supply his place. And therefore, still say I, give me my Wheel-barrow for a free Agent. For this can do whatever it will: and it can will whatever it has a mind to; and it has a mind to whatever the man that crowds behind has a mind to, who has a mind to whatever the Heavens and Elements crowd upon him. So that, let the necessity be a thousand removes of, yet for all that, certainly at last we fetch about to the House that Jack built. And so we must do. For, as was said before concerning thoughts; that the greatest variety imaginable can never arise to freedom of thinking; so neither can the justling and crowding back of the immediate necessary causes ever amount to Liberty of doing. For, let the plot lie as deep as the Centre of the earth, and let there be never so many turnings, and whirlings, and windings; yet the case is ●…xactly the same, as if all had been laid but just at threshold-door. And therefore, why should we play the Children any longer, and talk of willing, and choosing, and I know not what, and mean nothing thereby?  Phi. 
I tell thee, Tim, there is a kind of great business which I do mean by that Liberty, which I count consistent with Necessity: but if thou resolvest not to like it, then, say I, thou must even be content, to take up with necessity all alone. Perhaps thou hast got a new set of Vertuosoarguments, and some double-bottomobjections against me; if thou hast, produce, Child; and thou shalt see how I'll slice thee down.  Tim. 
What I have, Sir, I shall keep to myself: unless in your answers to common reasons and experience, formerly alleged by others, you had discovered somewhat besides quirks, quibbles, and ignorance.  Phi. 
Now to see the Coxcombness of such a pragmatical fellow! for, though all that I have written, have been performed wi●…h strange kind of force and p●…cuity; yet never was any thing so clearly laid down, nor so solidly defended, as I h●…ve done the necessity of all events. For in the first place (as a 〈◊〉 foundation) I do assert, that th●… 〈◊〉 such thing or cause of any thi●…g, as luck, ●…nce, or fortune: but that they are all mere words, more or less made use of, according to the degrees of men's ignorance or understanding. Now, Tim, away to thy detecting office; and show me where the querk or quibble of this notion lies.  Tim. 
There's none at all in't, Sir: 'tis a huge, stout, well-grown truth: and whereas you crowd it almost into every Book you have written, as if 'twere a discovery of your own; 'twas so anciently and currently believed, that one of the very Poets could tell us above a thousand years ago— Nos facimus fortuna deam, etc. and besides 'tis nothing at all to the purpose: for though (making use of a common phrase) I may say such a friend may chance to come to my House to morrow; yet my being ignorant which of the two will come to pass, does not at all hinder his own choosing, whether he'll come or stay at home.  Phi. 
But that, Tim, namely, whether of himself he can choose to come or stay at home, is the very controversy betwixt us; and against it I have two familiar Cases to propound; one concerning the weather, t'other concerning dice: each of which will most effectually prove (if ever I proved any thing at all) the necessity of all kind of events whatever, humane or not humane. And therefore the first thing I would know of thee is this: whether 'tis necessary that to morrow it shall rain, or not rain: what thinkest thou?  Tim. 
I believe 'tis.  Phi. 
'Tis! 'tis what?  Tim. 
'Tis most absolutely and undoubtedly necessary that to morrow it shall rain, or not rain.  Phi. 
But that's not my meaning, Tim: but, it being necessary that to morrow it shall rain or not rain, that, which I would know, is whether this very one, or that very one is absolutely necessary.  Tim. 
I care not much if (for a little while) I believe that also. For I always love to believe, as much as ever my skin will hold.  Phi. 
Then farewell all contingencies and Freewill.  Tim. 
As for contingencies, let the Poet and the Bees look to them: but as for my Freewill, I won't take ten groats for't yet. For the instance you give is no trial at all of Freewill. For I believe 'twill necessarily rain, or necessarily not rain to morrow (as that the sun will rise or not rise) because the weather is not within a man's power; but falls out necessarily according to the course of the World: not for your silly reason, because 'tis a true disjunctive proposition: and therefore the whole being necessarily true, the parts or one of them should be so too: for do but try it, Phylautus, in any other proposition, where the necessity of events may not be concerned (that there may be no skulking advantage in the word necessity) and you shall see 'tis so querkishly and ignorantly said, that a very freshman but of a months standing, would have been ashamed to have been guilty of such a gross error. For jnstance; Every number is odd or even, is a proposition so very good and laudable, that the Pope himself has not a better in all his budget: that is, if you serve it up all whole together: but take the same, and chop it into two Messes, viz. Every number is odd, ev●…ry number is even: and it makes two such deadly rappers as would choke old Nick himself. So again, to say that every man in the world is in London, or out of London, has no hurt at all in't. But pull this in pieces, and it may so fall out, that there may be most deadly crowding for the Wall.  Phi. 
But these cases, that you have put Tim, being general; you only mean that some numbers are odd, and some even: and some men are in Town, and some are out.  Tim. 
And if you suppose in particular that to morrow my Lord Mayor goes abroad or stays at home: you only mean that sometimes he is pleased to go abroad and sometime he's pleased to stay at home. For though that same Omnis be a person of wonderful dispatch and presence, yet 'twould make the greatest individual Magistrates head in the world, to gig again, to have so much business upon his hand, as to be forced all the day long to be abroad at home.  Phi. 
I know he can be but in one place: but wherever that be, 'tis upon necessity.  Tim. 
Why so?  Phi. 
Because every proposition is true or false.  Tim. 
That's right: if therefore every proposition in the world were true, or every proposition were false (which, Phylautus, is your way of Computation) than I grant you, that he must needs go, that the Devil drives. But because there's Field-room enough, and that some propositions are true, and some false; therefore I am resolved to enjoy my humour, and neither to go, nor drive, unless I have a mind to't. For in short, Phylautus, that same old famous story of Socrates' necessarily disputing to morrow, or not, because every proposition is now true or false, has no more in't but just this; that 'tis true to day, that one of the two shall be true or come to pass to morrow; or 'tis true or false to day, that this or that particularly shall be true or come to pass to morrow: and sweat and shuffle as long as you will, you can never advance that querk any higher. And therefore to make an end of this same story of Socrates and the weather; seeing, Phylautus, these same English men are most of them a Company of clownish and disingenuous dunces; the ecclesiastics having no breeding, the Philosophers having not tasted of motion, and the Mathematicians being much o'errun with the scab of ignorance, pride, and symbols; the best way will be to draw up your opinion concerning a disjunctive proposition (you may do it in half a sheet) and send it beyond Sea: where (as you very friendlily inform yourself in your late lux Mathematica, etc.) you are much read, understood, and admired: and if amongst all your acquaintance, you can get so much but as one subscription to your Paper, by any body that knows what belongs to Logic (to which you appeal in this very Case) then shall it rain or not rain; and Socrates shall dispute or not dispute, whenever Phylautus pleases.  Phi. 
What dost tell me of Logic? dost think that I that began to reason, the very first day I went into breeches, will be bound up to your paltry, pimping, pedantic rules of Logic? done't I know that Logic is the Mother of all Lies, and the Nurse of your damned, confounded Metaphysical jargons?  Tim. 
Now do I shortly expect a Book contra Fastum Dialecticorum: now am I confident that Logic will be the Devil and all, as Mathematics was, after the Doctor had baffled, and confuted you.  Phi. 
I baffled, I confuted? I never was, nor will be, as long as I live.  Tim. 
No, no, Sir: you shan't be confuted: it does not at all become one of your age to be confuted: 'tis uncivil, Sir, 'tis not done at all like a Gentleman to confute you: You shall have a protection from his Majesty not to be confuted.  Phi. 
You lie in your very throat. I never went about any such thing.  Tim. 
Perhaps so: but however having now done with the business of the weather; let's now if you please, Sir, have one throw at Liberty and Necessity; that we may see, whether the Dice will run on my side, or yours.  Phi. 
Done: I would know then, suppose, I take a die, and throwing it upon the Table, there comes up such or such a cast: whether there was not an absolute necessity of that particular cast.  Tim. 
Most absolute.  Phi. 
Then have you perfectly gamed away your Freewill.  Tim. 
Yes: just as much as 'twas reigned away before. For supposing (as you do) that a die have (as they call them) so many chances, and such a chance to lie uppermost when 'tis thrown, and to be thrown with such or such a force, and upon a table of such or such a smoothness, then say I there will as necessarily come forth such or such a cast, as if there had been never another cast upon the die but that which came forth.  Phi. 
Then there's necessity enough.  Tim. 
Enough: but nothing to your purpose.  Phi. 
That's strange.  Tim. 
Not at all: because all the several circumstances required to such a cast, notwithstanding all that you have supposed, are wholly still in my own power; that is, I may choose which side I'll lay foremost, upon what I'll make the throw, and if need be I can have a spring with so many notches, that shall let go the die, and give it as many turns, as I please.  Phi. 
You choose! you please! 'tis a very hard matter, I see, to beat people out of the common tract of nonsense. And therefore though there's nothing more seemingly casual, or more proper to be insisted on, than the weather and dice; yet, because to give particular instances would be endless, I shall rather choose to put all out of doubt, and settle the whole business by one general argument.  Tim. 
That will be well indeed. For I love at my very heart those same general arguments; because they pretend to kill the old one in the Nest. How is it I pray, Sir?  Phi. 
'Tis thus: there is, say I, a necessity or necessary cause of all events; because every event has a sufficient cause. For an event is that which is come to pass: and nothing can come to pass unless somewhat produce it: and produced it cannot be, but by that which is able or sufficient to produce it: that is to say, but by the meeting together of all that's necessary to produce it.  Tim. 
And what then?  Phi. 
Then every thing that is produced, is necessarily produced.  Tim. 
Why so?  Phi. 
Because all is met together that was necessary.  Tim. 
Therefore they necessarily met together: did they? O your Servant, Sir! because Fire, Water, and Oatmeal are requisite (that's all the meaning of necessary here) for the making of Water-gruel: therefore I must of necessity fall upon the operation at four of the Clock; and 'tis impossible for me to forbear, or employ myself otherwise at that time.  Phi. 
So 'tis impossible.  Tim. 
To do what: to stab and kill a man, and then to unstab and unkill him again? that's all, Phylautus: for seeing in our Country there's no halfing or quartering of effects: therefore (say you) all effects are necessary: that is, you suppose the thing done, or (which is all one) to be in such circumstances, that 'tis impossible but that it should be done; and than you conclude 'twas necessary that it should be done. Whereas the question is not whether when ●…ny thing is produced, such and such things are necessarily required to its production; but whether it be now necessary, that all those necessaries or requisites shall certainly club together at such a time to produce it.  Phi. 
I say they must, and that upon the account of sufficient causes.  Tim. 
And, I say, they need not, and that upon the account of the West-wind: and I am sure tha●… my account is as good as yours: for I am for sufficient causes as much as you.  Phi. 
What, and hold freewill?  Tim. 
O most easily, Sir: for ofttimes the will alone is the sufficient cause.  Phi. 
Of what! of the will!  Tim 
No, that's Jargon: but of the action.  Phi. 
But, I inquire, what's the cause of the will.  Tim. 
So you may, but in many instances I can tell none.  Phi. 
I prithee, let me hear one of those instances; and thou shalt see, if I done't presently Ferret out a sufficient cause.  Tim. 
Suppose then there be laid before you, three Apples: I would know, whether you can pick one of them.  Phi. 
Yes surely: what hinders?  Tim. 
You can as soon pick a Star out of the Firmament: for these Apples shall be exactly of the same size, the same complexion, and the same distance from the eye; and thereupon they shall strike and tempt all alike: so that, unless you'll allow the will itself to cast in the last feather, and to determine the scales, you can only platonically admire, for there's no falling to, as the case stands.  Phi. 
But you don't consider, Tim, how the World being in a constant toss and hurry; there's chopping and changing every moment: so that one or other of your sufficient causes over-topping the rest, will strike you as dead—  Tim. 
Theresore I'll have my three equally sufficient apples to be nailed fast down; and there shall be a very stout supporter for the chin, that the head may no ways wag; and the eyes shall be so spoken to, that they shall not dare to roll in the least.  Phi. 
But may there not be for all this, that which they call, I know not what, which getting in at a corner of the eye, may give a private stab, and so determine the choice?  Tim. 
There may so: sor perhaps one of the Apples may have some pretty mole or dimple, or some such wounding feature or other. And therefore I think we had best take three pease, or three grains of Mustard seed. Surely there can't be any great difference of Cupids in such a case. Or if we bened yet armour-proof; what think you, Philautu●…, of even or odd? there is, you know, just as many of t'one as tother: and as for the words themselves they seem to smirk and flame and charm much at one. And yet 'tis very evident from History, that there has been many a shilling won and lost at that game: which, according to you, is utterly impossible; and as mere a tale as Religion.  Phi. 
How so?  Tim. 
Because no body could ever play at it. For if the mind never determines itself, but is always (as you would have it) necessarily overborne by hopes and fears: the hopes and fears of even and odd being for ever equal, if at any time even (suppose) puts in for a man's will, presently in steps odd, and looks you full o'the face, with its why not I as well? so that the alternate appetite (as you call it) being perpetual, a man's mind can never possibly be seized on, but must go titter totter, swing swang, to the World's end.  Phi. 
Don't you trouble yourself about that, Tim: for 'tis very plain that a man may choose one number before another; but, still say I, the reason is not merely because he will choose it (for that's nonsense) but because by choosing it, he hopes—  Tim. 
Hopes! to do what?  Phi. 
To win.  Tim. 
I tell you, he shan't hope any such thing.  Phi. 
Why, Tim, must a man ask you leave to hope?  Tim. 
I don't stand much upon't, Sir: but you won't let him hope: for, in the ninth Chapter of your Humane nature, you put in this imbargo upon hope: viz. that it does then only take place, when the causes that make us expect the thing hoped for, are greater than those that make us expect the contrary. Now he that, in the business of even or odd, can spy out such bouncing causes on one side, more than tother, shall presently quit the Channel, and be permitted to hope.  Phi. 
But may there not be many other sufficient causes besides hope, fe●…r, and such like passions, that may possibly move and determine the will?  Tim. 
Questionless there may be several: for suppose, the gamester chaps at even: one sufficient cause of that choice may be, that, by so doing, it is an even case but that he wins: and certainly he's a very foul Gamester that desires any more than to win. In the next place, 'tis to be considered, that possibly the Gentlem●…n that so chooses, may be of a smooth and even temper: and what influence bodily temper (for there is no other) has upon all humane affairs, whether by Sea or by La●…d, I need not explain. Besides, it must not be omitted, that the choice which is propounded is not odd or even, but even or odd: so that even getting the start of odd, claps in physically upon the fancy, before odd can possibly get up. To all which (if need were) may be further added, that perhaps the Gentleman Elector by some means or other may have been prejudiced against odd: either by having an odd Father, an odd Mother, or an odd kind of Wife; and many such an odd thing may have happened, that may have quite disoblidged him, and indisposed him to odd. And as there may be many other sufficient causes that may thus jog and incline the will to even: so without doubt one that married but a small relation of Tully's, for a very little fee, could do as much for odd.  Phi. 
But why do we spend so much time about such trifles and inconsiderable things as these: whereas, we are enquiring what it is that directs a man in the grand affairs of his life.  Tim. 
As much trifles and inconsiderable as they seem to be, give me leave to tell you, Phylautus, that these same trifles and inconsiderables do utterly destroy not only all your Doctrine of Necessity, but all that nothing that you have said against immaterial substances. For, if any one man since the world began, has but lifted up his finger merely because he would do so: that is to say, when all outward causes and considerations did equally solicit him to move it downwards, (were there no other) 'tis a demonstration to me, that there is somewhat in the world besides matter; and that man is of that kind.  Phi. 
I prithee don't tear me a pieces now, with those contradictions of immaterial substances: but let me advise thee not to be cheated with such phrases, as thou didst just now mention. viz. because he would do so, forsooth: for we ofttimes hear people say, they will do such a thing; I, that they will: as if the will were the only determining cause: whereas there's abominable Pride, Vainglory, and perverseness in that expression. For example, you tell a man, suppose, that he shan't fling his Hat into the fire; no that he shan't. Say you so, says he? I'll see you hanged, before I'll be nosed by such a scoundrel, and with that slap goes the Hat into the middle of the fire.  Tim. 
And truly he's right enough served, that gives a Gentleman such saucy language. But what shall we think of him, Phylautus, who, without any such provocation at all, upon the twenty third of April takes his silk-doublet, and cutting it into thirty nine pieces, steeps it in Rhenish Wine till the first of September; and then seals it up in a Tamarisk-box, with this superscription; Ego & tu sumus in tuto: and lays it under his pillow the night before Full Moon.  Phi. 
For my part, I keep to my old opinion: that every thing has a beginning: and that nothing can come to pass alone.  Tim. 
Most certainly nothing can: and therefore, doubtless the sufficient cause of this whole business lie couched in the Rule of three. For, as the twenty third of April is to a silk Doublet cut into thirty nine pieces: so are those thirty nine pieces steeped in Rhenish Wine till the first of September, to the Tamarisk Box, with the foresaid superscription, laid under the pillow the night before Full Moon.  Phi. 
I must confess, that the necessary and sufficient cause of some actions, (especially of those which are called indifferent) lie ofttimes very deep: but of all actions, I am from hence sure, there's always one at the bottom; because in all common actions, and concerns of life, it lies so very plain.  Tim. 
I grant you that the probability of many events lies very plain: but not the necessity of any one, that I know of. That is to say in other words, that man being a rational Creature, for the most part is pleased (not constrained) to do that which is most reasonable: so if a Merchant, suppose, is promised an old debt of five thousand pounds, for crossing the street: 'tis highly probable, that such news as this, will make the spirits to sally a little towards the Legs. But what if he stays at home only to suck his middle finger?  Phi. 
The cunning of that may be, Tim, to make such Fools as thee believe, that man has dominion over his actions. But there's no such thing at all: for he stays at home only to cross and contradict those that deny Freewill. That is in short, he loves and prefers his opinion (than which nothing you know is dearer) before five thousand pounds.  Tim. 
But how came he, Sir, to dote so much upon his middle finger: does the Doctrine of Freewill make the middle finger grow fatter than all the rest?  Phi. 
That need not be: for, in itself you know, it is the longest and most sufficient.  Tim. 
And so, in good truth, must the little one have been; if he had spent his Meditations upon that. Again, Phylautus, suppose a man be catched in a good lusty rain: there is such probability of some events, that I count it more than two to one, that he will choose to borrow a Cloak, rather than a Currycomb or shooing-horn.  Phi. 
If he does ask for any such thing; a very sufficient cause of that may be, to make people laugh.  Tim. 
Indeed he can't help it, if they do laugh: but he may do it, merely because he will do it.  Phi. 
But I have told you over and over that that is utterly impossible.  Tim. 
And I can say it as often, that 'tis not. Seeing, by many instances above given, 'tis plain that a man may and doth often determine himself, where all imaginable grounds of necessity are equally poised: I count that I may safely conclude that, whenever he pleases, he may make use of the same power in all other cases whatever. For the same principle which empowers a man for to do any one thing upon no extrinsical account at all; empowers him to sorbear the doing of any other thing whatever, though he has a thousand reasons to do it. Against all which, you have no other sense, but only to pop in that lamentable engine of your sufficient cause. The sum of which is only this, that whatever is already done, can't be undone: and whatever is not yet done, is not done as yet.  Phi. 
That great notion of a sufficient cause (whereby I absolutely demonstrate the necessity of all events) which you so saucily disdain, has stun'd all the great Divines and Philosophers of Europe. Whereas all those inconveniencies and absurdities which they charge upon my Doctrine, of themselves vanish in a moment; they being chiefly grounded (as most errors are) upon nothing else but want of understanding of the true signification of words. It would be very tedious, Tim, to repeat many of their objections, they are so intolerably silly: and therefore I shall only give you a very short specimen of their folly. In the first place they'll tell you, that if there be a necessity of all humane actions, to what purpose do we praise and commend one action; and blame and discommend another. Ignorant Souls! that should not understand, that to praise or commend a thing, is only to say a thing is good: good I say for me, or for some body else, or for the State and Commonwealth. And in like manner to blame and discommend a thing, is no more than to say that 'tis bad and inconvenient. For instance, what more common, Tim, than for people, in cold weather, to say there's a very good fire: an excellent good fire: a special good fire: a most stately Princely fire (words big enough for the greatest exploits of the mightiest Hero) and yet, I suppose, very few think that the fire burns out of choice and discretion: and that it lies listening and gaping for commendations, and burns accordingly. On the contrary, what is it we mean when we express our dislike and disgust? Be true now, and tell me, Tim; is there any thing more frequent than to say, that such an Horse is blind or foundered: that he starts, halts, or stumbles: that he's a very Jade: a rotten, molten, confounded Jade; (words that do most passionately express blame and displeasure) and yet again we don't suppose that the Horse ever requested the Blacksmith to drive a nail up to the hilts into his foot: or desired the Groom to thrust out one of his Eyes with the Pitch-fork, or to ride him so hard, as to melt or founder him? and therefore, in the forty first page of my Animadversions, I tell thee (hadst thou the wit to observe it) that, whereas people make such a great bustle about their sins; and are ofttimes vexed and can't sleep in their beds for their sins; sin is nothing else but halting or stumbling in the ways of God's Commandments.  Tim. 
And do you think that this is all that is meant by people's breaking Gods Commandments; that one is stabbed with the Pitchfork of stupidity and ignorance; and another pricked and lamed by the Blacksmith of sensuality and drunkenness: so that there must needs be great halting and stumbling among them?  Phi. 
What, Tim, do you make sport and a mock of such a serious thing as sin?  Tim. 
'Tis you and such as you, Phylautus (whose very opinions make a mock of sin) that are the sport-makers: not those, who out of a sincere design to undeceive the World, are forced sometimes to condescend to very mean, and almost unpardonable expressions.  Phi. 
I don't cheat or deceive any body: for 'tis plain from common Custom, and the consent of the best Authors, that praise and dispraise do equally belong to those things, that are never so far from all pretences of Freewill, as well as to men.  Tim. 
But then, Phylautus, I would have people a little careful how, and upon what, they bestow their commendations and reproofs. For though sometimes indeed they turn to very good account; yet at other times they have their inconveniencies. He therefore that overnight commended a diamond at such a rate, that by Morning it was grown from a Cherry-stone to a Pippin, (besides a little young diamond it had fole, running by its side) must be granted to have spent his breath, and praises with very good discretion and profit. Neither was the famous Miller of little Hingham much out of the way: who, when the wind did not blow to his mind, would so frown, and chide, and rattle over his Mill, that one would wonder to see, how pouring the meal came down, upon the reproof. But, for all that, I shall always pity poor Sir Frederick.  Phi. 
For what I prithee?  Tim. 
Why, Sir, he having in Christmas time (as most Gentlemen use to have) one of those same stately and Princely fires beforementioned: the neighbours that sat about it, fell into such lavish praises, and extravagant admiration of the fire, that it grew so conceited, as to burn down the House. Therefore, if it must be so, that to praise or dispraise a thing is only to say that 'tis good or bad: yet however let people hence learn, that good words, as well as bad, are to be used with discretion. But truly, Phylautus, (to deal plainly with you) as plausible as the conceit seems to be, for my part, I much suspect whether it be true. For though we may praise a stone, tree or Horse, a man's foot or forehead, with the very same words and phrases, and in as good a stile as the best of humane actions: yet I can't but think that those commendations which are usually bestowed upon that account, which we call desert, to be not only much larger, but quite of another kind from those which we give upon all other occasions whatever. And though I done't at all doubt, but that such an one as Pliny, could have done very much upon the considerable legs and renowned codpiece of Henry the Eighth; yet I am confident, he would have done much better upon the peaceable and pious reign of Q. Elizabeth. But to make an end of this, Phylautus, we do often indeed commend the sun for shining, and the Heavens for affording rain, and the like: but, at our end of the Town, (what you do I know not) we think hereby we praise God himself; who not out of his necessary, but free pleasure at first created, and still disposes of all these things: and has made man like himself. So that still nothing is praised merely because 'tis good or beneficial, but because it was contrived and brought about by that which need not have done it.  Phi. 
But don't you hear people very ordinarily blame and find fault with bad winds and bad weather, as well as commend good: and complain of many things that could not be helped?  Tim. 
Yes: and I don't much wonder at it: for, such Fools as those, shall curse and bid the Devil take them ten thousand times over, for such things, as they could have helped: and that's their gentile way of repentance. And therefore let us have no more concerning praise and dispraise; but let us see if they have any thing else to say against you.  Phi. 
They have nothing at all to say: but they think they have got somewhat by the end; when they tell you, that if there be a necessity of all humane actions; then many laws would be unjust, because the breach of them could not be avoided.  Tim. 
This sounds, Phylautus, as if it had somewhat in't.  Phi. 
That it does: and that's all. For whereas they talk of an unjust law, they had as good talk of a piece of iron burning cold. For, every Law is either divine or humane. As for divine Laws, the irresistible power of God alone justifies all them.  Tim. 
Truly such a famous Broker for power (as you are known to be) may easily make that out. For, having in your Animadversions, turned all the Attributes of God (as you use to do all things else) into power; making divine goodness, divine mercy, and divine justice to be nothing but power: you might securely say that divine power alone justifies all actions. That is, divine power alone together with all the rest, especially divine justice, justifies all actions. And now, I pray, a little concerning humane Laws.  Phi. 
Concerning them I do say also, that 'tis impossible that any one of them should be unjust. For, a humane Law is that which every subject has given his consent to: namely, by giving up his will to the will of the supreme: and no man can be unjust to himself. And therefore a Prince can't put upon his subjects any unjust Law.  Tim. 
Suppose, he should put out a Law, that all that are born blind, shall have their fingers and toes cut off. There's abundance of power in this same Law: but, in my mind, very little justice.  Phi. 
Why, all the fingers and toes of the Nation are the supremes. And you have given up your consent as well to his pleasure, as his power.  Tim. 
Never in my life to such pleasure as this.  Phi. 
You have given your consent to all things, that he should do, be they what they will.  Tim. 
No but I han't. For if he has a mind to go a finger▪ hawking, or so; I desire to stay at home, and keep the Hogs out of the Pease. Because, long before I had bargained with him, I had preingaged myself to the Law of nature and reason (to which he, for all his greatness, is as much a subject as ●…) never to use, or give my consent to such inhuman recreations. But, if I mistake not, Phylautus, you and I had some little talk about these matters, when we met last at the Isle of Pines. And therefore be pleased to consider a little those same punishments that are inflicted upon men, for what they could not avoid. It seems a little severe, Phylautus, to hang a man for stealing, suppose; when as he could not possibly help it: and to damn him for not repenting, when he could, as little help that also.  Phi. 
As for damnation (if you mean your eternal damnation) I shall tell you a fine story about that by and by—  Tim. 
A fine one indeed!  Phi. 
But, as for people's being punished for what they could not avoid; the case, in short, stands thus: viz. When we say that such a one could not avoid the breaking of such a Law, we mean no more by it, but that he had a necessary will to break it. Now this same nec●…ssary will contains two parts, Necessi●…y and Will: (be sure that you attend well, for it clears all) now therefore say I, when any man is punished for willing or doing of that which he could not avoid, he is not punished for the necessity, or because he could not avoid it—  Tim. 
I hope not: (for if he were, all the Dogs of the Town ought to be set upon the Executioner.)  Phi. 
But he's punished for doing it, or willing it.  Tim. 
What's that, because he could avoid it?  Phi. 
No, no: but because he consented, and had a mind to▪ t.  Tim. 
He consented! he had a mind to't! he scorns your words, Phila●…tus; for he, nor any man else (according to you) had ever of themselves a mind to any thing in this whole World. But those same necessary second causes ofttimes flock about me, suppose, and have a mind to me: and when they take me only by the elbow, and clownishly drag me to the Jail, then am I said (because Liberty the same time pulls homeward) to go against my mind, and against my consent: but, when they take me gently by the brain and spirits (which have always the whole body at their beck) and slily push me on to steal, or the like, then, forsooth, a●…●… s●…id to co●…sent. Whereas I can as lit●… avoid ●…his consenting, as going to 〈◊〉 ●…ail. Only, here's all the differenc●…, th●…t ●…e considerations of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…ecessarily affect the brain, b●…ing ●…ot ●…uch visible and big things a●… the Constables with their staves: therefore they say that I consented, and 'twas of my doing.  Phi. 
So 'twas of your doing. For in stealing, don't you put forth your hand, and take somewhat against Law?  Tim. 
That's a good one indeed! I walk suppose to the Window; and there lies a Gold-watch: and this gives me a deadly flap o'er the face. I being of a sanguine complexion, and not used to pass by such affronts; I give it as good as it sent, and flap that o'er the face again: but at last it does so dazzle me, and puts me so out of all countenance; that I can't endure it in my sight any longer: and so, according to the laws of motion, it goes mechanically into my Pocket. And then poor Pill-Garlick must go to Pot; for having eyes, hands, and a pocket: whereas I'll be sworn, I no more conspired, nor consented 〈◊〉 this, than a Mousetrap does to the catching of a Mouse. For, though I look and leer, as if I intended somewhat, and as if I took aim: but they are those same pernicious second causes that do all: they charge, and propound; and tickle and pull down the little Cartesian tricker, and then bounce go I off at the Watch.  Phi. 
As apt an instance, Tim, as thou thinkest this to be for thy purpose; thou couldst not have given one more for my advantage. For killing of Mice and such like Vermin is good for the Commonwealth: but, as for stealing, 'tis a thing that does hurt: 'tis noxious, Tim; as I have at large taught in my Liberty and Necessity. And therefore though every action of a man's life be equally unavoidable; yet those only are punishable that are found to be noxious.  Tim. 
Only those, Sir: and therefore, though a Knife cuts and slashes a stick, or a piece of meat never so sorely; yet the Knife is not blamed and chastised for this; because 'tis not noxious. But if it chances to get never so little way into a Child's finger, 'tis then presently chidden and condemned; and sometimes flung away with such displeasure, that for a week after 'tis ready to turn tail, at sight of a Pint of Butter; and you can scarce get it to come within a yard of a Pudding.  Phi. 
But this is only to cheat Children, and make them leave crying.  Tim. 
And to hang a man that has been past crying forty years, is every whit as great a cheat: for he could not avoid stealing, any more than the Knife could avoid cutting.  Phi. 
I know that. But the end of punishment is to fright and deter: and to frame, and make the will to justice.  Tim. 
I believe that if I be once hanged for stealing, my mind will be strangely framed, and made against stealing any more.  Phi. 
But though your●… can't; yet other men's minds may receive advantage and instruction hereby.  Tim. 
I thank you for that indeed. I shall be hanged for nothing at all, only to do my Neig●…bour a kindness. I done't at all like (without any fault of my own) to be made a mere memorandum for the County, and a framer of other men's minds.  Phi. 
But you can't but say, that the punishment of on●… man is a very proper means to keep others in awe.  Tim. 
Who was ever so silly as to say otherwise? But here's the case: which is most reasonable, to punish a man for doing of that which is noxious, and which he could have avoided, that hereby others may be affrighted: or to hang him up as a Crow upon a Pear Tree, for no other reason at all but only to affright others.  Phi. 
I take them to be much alike.  Tim. 
Hugely alike indeed! for if the first be true, every man's sin and ruin lies at his own door: but if the last, I see no ways to avoid it—  Phi. 
To avoid what?  Tim. 
But that God must be the Author o●… all sin.  Phi. 
The Author of all sin! whoever that Divine be (for this is an old Black-Coat objection) that talks of God being the Author of sin is not fit to go Chaplain to a Mackerel-Boat. For the word Author, Tim, is a latin word; and to be the Author of any thing is to give it authority and credit: that is, to command it, warrant it, and own it: now I suppose, Tim, that you can't find any where in Scripture, that God did ever command sin, or issued out any Warrants or Certificates for sin to be committed.  Tim. 
'Twere strange if one should. But yet if your opinion of necessity be true, one may find out that which is full out as strange, if not stranger.  Phi. 
What's that I prithee?  Tim. 
Whereas God has given plain Commandments against sin, and manifested his great displeasure at it: notwithstanding this he has so far authorised or owned it as (according to you) to be the contriver, and finisher too, of all the sins that ever were committed in the World.  Phi. 
I do grant, and don't look upon't to be any blasphem●… to say, that God has so ordered the World that sin may necessarily be committed.  Tim. 
Then I pray is not sin of his ordering?  Phi. 
Not at all: ●…or to order sin is to put out an order to have sin committed.  Tim. 
And what is it to order the World so, that sin may necessarily be committed.  Phi. 
'Tis to put things of this World so and so together, that people will necessarily fall into such and such sins▪  Tim. 
Now I count these to be much the same. For, suppose, I give order to my man, first by word of mouth, and afterwards under hand and seal, to charge the Musket, and to shoot such a Neighbour as he goes to morrow to Market. Every body, I know, will grant, that I have taken very sufficient order about this man's Death. But, suppose I do not dispatch him thus exactly, according to the Roman use o●… the word: but, I knowing that this day twelvemonth's, he'll certainly ride to such a friends House, and certainly go through such a G●…te; and I put things so ●…nd so together, that he shall choose to go so much out of ●…he road, as to fall into a Pit and b●…eak his neck: for my part, I should reckon, that in so doing, I did as it were order his tumbling into the pit; and that I was a kind of an Author of his destruction, notwithstanding Author is a Latin word, and t●…at he himself choose to go out o' the way, seeing that I had laid a trap for that choice.  Phi. 
I suppose you are not so much a Heathen, Tim, as to imagine God should go about to decoy men into sin, and to set snares for their destruction.  Tim. 
I am so far from that, that I had much rather believe that there's no God at all, and no sin at all; but those of your opinion must believe so: for, if God makes man of such or such a consti●…ution, and puts him into such and such circumstances, that every action he does (be it good or bad) it was as impossible for him to have avoided it; as it is for fire to avoid burning: I know in what sense it is that he has made fire to burn; and I dread to think that in the same he should make any man to ●…in.  Phi. 
What a havock's here about a little sin? when you have it so plainly in your Divinity Book, how that God hated Esau, and hardened Pharaohs heart: how that he commanded Abraham to murder his only Son Isaac, and gave Commission to the Israelites to cheat and rob the Egyptians: and how besides all this God himself says by the Prophet Amos, non est malum in Civitate quod ego non feci?  Tim. 
'Twas well done indeed to put the last in Latin. For some body or other perhaps might be so silly as to think that malum did signify sin: whereas, in that place, it means nothing at all, but only those great judgements and afflictions, which God denounces against the people of Israel, for their oppression, Idolatry, and such like impieties. And you might as well have produced Gods raining Fire and Brimstone upon wicked Sodom and Gomorrah, to have lessened the impiety of your opinion of sin, as that place of the Prophet.  Phi. 
Say you so? What think you then of the Israelites robbing the Egyptians, according to Gods own direction and warrant? was that, Tim, a mere affliction too?  Tim. 
Truly I take it to be so; seeing that God himself tells Moses, that the last Plague that he intended to bring upon the Egyptians for their oppressing his people, should be to spoil them of their Jewels. And, as for Gods making use of the Israelites in this affair, that was all one, as if he had given Commission to a Whirlwind, Fire, or Angels to have done the same, and to have been Executioners of his just displeasure.  Phi. 
Surely we shall have all the Bible turned into Judgements and Afflictions. Must Gods hardening of Pharaohs heart come of thus also?  Tim. 
Just thus, Sir. For 'tis plain that God did not harden Pharaoh's heart, till he had hardened his own heart six times after so many judgements: and then God is said to have hardened his heart; that is, he choose rather to raise him up, or keep him alive, and to inflict upon him that punishment of hardness of heart, whereby the divine power by miracles might still be more manifested, than to destroy him by the Pestilence.  Phi. 
But before ever Pharaoh hardened his own heart, so much as once; God was resolved to do it; and said (Exod. 4. 21.) I will harden his heart, that he shall not l●…t the people go.  Tim. 
And you may as well remember, that in the Chapter before (Exod. 3. 19) the same God said also, he was sure that he would not let them go: that is, that he would harden his own heart.  Phi. 
But I would know, what it was that God did to Pharaoh's heart, when he hardened it. That expression, methinks, sounds as if it had something of positivity in't (as the Jargonists speak) and seems to make God every whit as much concerned in sin, as my opinion of necessity.  Tim. 
What did he do, say you? he did the same that the Scripture tells you he did to the Jews: who, when they had several miracles do●…e amongst them, and would not see, and would not understand: God inflicted this just Judgement upon them that they should not see and should not understand. In my opinion, 'tis very reasonable; and there's nothing at all i●…'t tending towards the Author of sin.  Phi. 
But 'tis strange if this way of judgements and aff●…ictions does for Esau too: for, before he was born, he was hated of God.  Tim 
And so were all the Women in the World hated, in respect of the Virgin Mary; she being the only blessed among Women, and preferred to be the Mother of our Lord Jesus. For as 'twas impossible that Christ should be born bu●… of one Woman: so likewise was it as impossible that he should be descended but of one Man. And though God promised to bless Abraham and his seed after a most special manner, yet he never promised to do the like to the elder House or line.  Phi. 
But what say you to Gods commanding Abraham to kill his own Son? you can't surely call that, merely not preferring.  Tim. 
You know well enough that it was the contrary that he commanded: for he said▪ lay not thine h●…nd upon the lad. 'Tis said indeed that Abraham w●…s tempted and tried by God: and that accordingly he obeyed, and made all things ready to do it.  Phi. 
But the Author to the Hebrews tells you, that he did offer him up: for doubtless Abraham did believe, that God did really intend that he should kill him; and that it was not at all unjust.  Tim. 
And well he might: not doubting, I suppose, but that God might as well choose by Sacrifice, or what other means he pleased, to take away any innocent man's life, as by a Fever or any other sickness. So that we hear nothing as yet of the Author of sin, nor any thing toward Gods being at all concerned in sin, after any such manner, as most inevitably follows from your opinion.  Phi. 
Therefore I have saved the great business for the last: viz. the eternal decrees and prescience of God Almighty. I suppose it will take you some time to explain them, and to reconcile them to your Freewill.  Tim. 
They are done the easiest of any thing you have yet mentioned.  Phi. 
How so, I prithee?  Tim. 
How so? I don't believe any such thing at all: that's my way, Sir.—  Phi. 
What, no decrees? no prescience? a most solid Divine without doubt!  Tim. 
Nay hold, Sir: 'tis only when I meet with one that has such a God as yours: for I believe always according to my Company: and when I meet with one that has nothing else for his God but omnipotent thin matter, 'tis very idle in my opinion, to talk about his foreknowing or determining beforehand what shall come to pass in this World. For the World may as well foreknow what God shall do, as God can what shall be done in the World: they both running into one another and so proving to be exactly the same.  Phi. 
But to say that God is the World is a most horrid opinion: and therefore in my Leviathan I utterly reject it, as very unworthy to be spoken of God.  Tim. 
Then you must reject your omnipotent matter also. For if God be nothing else but matter; and this matter be in every particle of the World or Universe, that is (to speak according to yourself) of all that is; either we have no God at all, or they are all one which you please.  Phi. 
But the thinness, Tim! and the omnipotency.  Tim. 
Never talk to me of thinness, for thinness takes up as much room, as thickness. And Omnipotency itself can never take away that incurable nuisance that belongs to matter, viz. of one justling out another.  Phi. 
But you make nothing to jumble man's body and soul together, and never think then of any such clashing or enterfeiring.  Tim. 
Therefore 'tis you that have helped us to answer that difficulty: for the body of man being only flesh and bones, and the soul blood and spirits; their quarters (setting aside some few stragglers) are even as different as the Oat-tub is from the Hay-Chamber.  Phi. 
But stay a little, Tim; you are, I perceive, very severe in demanding how that if God be merely matter, the World and God should both stand together: now suppose I should grant the soul of man to be quite different from his body (which is a thing much too ridiculous to be so much as supposed) I pray, can't I, (seeing you are so very curious in your enquiring) inquire also, how contradictions can dwell together: that is, how matter and no matter can be joined, and move one another? do you think it would not take much more time to remove and conquer such an absurdity as this, than any thing that is to be inferred from my opinion?  Tim. 
Nothing nigh so much, Sir: for though we cannot punctually tell you, by what Chains and Fetters, matter and no matter (or spirit) are fastened together; yet by our senses we are so exactly acquainted with the lodgings, haunts, and all the powers of the former, and do so very well know that the most subtle and most refined of all must be subject to the common encumbrances, as evidently to perceive, that matter alone can never do the business.  Phi. 
Why so?  Tim. 
Because we don't only find several things very difficult to explain, should there be nothing else; but somethings there be (especially two) which ever to explain is utterly impossible. And from the utter impossibility of their ever being explained, we have abundance of reason to believe that there is somewhat else: the name of which we agree upon to be a spirit.  Phi. 
And I prithee, Tim, may not I know what those two things be, which thou dost prophesy will never be explained?  Tim. 
I have told you them already, Phylautus. The one is, that God and the World are the very same; of which I desire no more may be now said. The other is, that a man can't choose of himself to stroke his beard, when it would oblige the Company every whit as much, if he cocked his Hat.  Phi. 
What a mighty business is that? to stroke a man's beard!  Tim. 
'Tis such a trick, Phylautus, which neither Prince Rupert's famous Dog, that eat up the Parliaments Ammunition, nor Bank's ingenious Horse could ever arrive to; as was before briefly hinted, in what was said about train of thoughts. And though it be not needful now to inquire how far further; yet most certainly in this Man differs from all other Creatures whatever.  Phi. 
In this! in what I prithee?  Tim. 
In Freewill, Sir.  Phi. 
I see not the least difference for my part. For, don't Horses, Dogs, and other bruit Beasts demur ofttimes upon the way they are to take, the Horse retiring from some strange figure that he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And what is it I pray more that a man does when he deliberates: but one while he proceeds toward action, another while retires from it, as the hope of greater good draws him, or the fear of greater evil drives him away. This I take to be the utmost that man can do.  Tim. 
This is nothing, Sir: for a Dog can do much more than this: for you may instruct him at the naming of the word States, to bark and rouse as if (without the King of France) he would pull 'em all down: and at the word King, to cringe and be as submissive as a Dutchman in the days of Queen Elizabeth. But now comes the trick, Sir: I would have this same Dog two or three times in a week (not out of any Pique to Monarchy, or favour to Commonwealths, but only out of pure innocent mirth and fancy) be a little cross and humoursom; and swagger when he should sneak, and sneak when he should swagger. This is the Dog that I would have put into Doublet and Breeches too: and to be kept in the Tower for a precedent of Freewill. But, O the sufficient cause!  Phi. 
That's out of pure madness now: because you know well enough, that it utterly routs all that you can say either for Freewill, or immaterial substances. And therefore, seeing you make such a noise with your absurdities (or as you call them impossibilities) that you draw upon my opinion; the best way, Tim, will be to go to the poll: and then you shall see that, whereas you can find but two things impossible to be explained, should there be nothing in the World besides matter: I have no less than four or five impossibilities (and all swingers too) to stake down against there being any thing else.  Tim. 
Yes, I do, in part, remember what kind of impossibilities they are. In a sunshine day, you get into the Balcone in Queen-street, and there you cry Matter, Matter, nothing but Matter. And, when the people come to see what's to do, you have nothing to tell them, but only, Truly Gentlemen you look like persons of parts: and 'tis great pity that such as you are should be abused and spoiled for want of the knowledge of motion. Therefore might I advise you I would have you well acquainted with what I have written concerning motion (of which no body has done any thing but myself,) and w●…th the nature and properties of matter: for there's no such thing at all as an immaterial substance: never stand to consider of it, for I am sure there is not: verily there is not: Faith and troth there's no such thing: upon the word of a Gentleman, a Mathematician, and a Traveller, there's no more immaterial substance either in England, France, or any other Country whatever, than there is to be seen upon the back of my hand. 'Tis all a mere cheat, and a forgery of Sextons to raise the price and credit of Graves.  Phi. 
And dost thou think, Tim, that I have fetched o'er such brave men to my side, with nothing but so it is: verily so it is: Faith and troth, Gentlemen, 'tis just so. Do you think Gentlemen that stand so much upon their honour and reputation, won't demand better satisfaction than this?  Tim. 
They may demand what they will, but they'll find no better than what I tell you.  Phi. 
Why, Tim, don't ay, in the first place, plainly show, that an immaterial substance is a mere dream and phantasm; an image or a thing behind the Looking-glass; a fairy and an old Wife's tale; a small Creature of the brain, and a device of the Kingdom of darkness?  Tim. 
No truly; I never found that you did show any such thing at all, any further than merely by saying so.  Phi. 
Why, man, to say so, as the case stands, is all one as show it to be so. For an immaterial substance can't be shown.  Tim. 
But, by your bragging, I thought it might have been shown, that there was no such thing.  Phi. 
You done't at all take it, Tim. For upon that very account, that an immaterial substance can't be shown, 'tis my second demonstration that there's no such thing.  Tim. 
Now, Sir, I think I have got it. Because an invisible thing is somewhat wild, and can't endure to be stared on long together (besides a great defluxion of rheum that it occasions in the Spectators eyes); therefore there is no such thing.  Phi. 
I don't say so: but I say thus: whatever is (or rather we know to be) must some ways or other strike and affect our senses. For to know is to perceive by imagination; and to imagine is to perceiv●… by sense.  Tim. 
Delicate! delicate! the question is whether we have reason to believe that there's any substance in the World, differing from such as do affect our senses. No, no: says Phylautus, it can't be: it can't possibly be: for there's no reason to believe there's any thing in the World different from what does affect our senses. And so score up two demonstrations against immaterial substances. The basket will be full, by and by.  Phi. 
And well it may, for the bigest are all still behind. And therefore in the next place, Tim, let me know of thee which of all words dost thou think to be the most proper to signify the whole World?  Tim. 
Universe, as I take it, is counted the best.  Phi. 
Yes: 'tis so: and that word alone clearly cuts out all your immaterial substances. For, what is the Universe, but the whole sum or aggregate, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of all the matter that is in the World?  Tim. 
Very right, Sir: and therefore whatever pretends to be (or, which is all one, to be in the Universe) must cease being a dream and phantasm, and list itself under the notion and protection of matter. For the word Universe being made up of unum and versum: and unum being taken adverbially for only; and versum by a kind of a figure, signifying matter (which, upon such an occasion it may be persuaded to do) whoever talks of immaterial substances being in the World or Universe, does most absolutely confute himself: for thereby he confesses there's only matter in the World. And upon this I suppose, Phylautus, rather than God Almighty should prove to be only a thing behind the Looking-glass, you have been pleased to admit him also into your great pound of matter.  Phi. 
He must come in there, or else not be at all. But yet, because some giddy-headed ecclesiastics had prated against my Leviathan, therefore, in my Appendix to't, I have shown both from the best Authors, and Scripture itself, that God is so far from being immaterial, that he is much more material than any thing else.  Tim. 
I marry, Sir, this does it indeed!  Phi. 
So it does, Tim, (to the shame of all your spiritual men) for 'tis plain that never any of your Roman Authors did speak considerately of God▪ but they always styled him Maximus, as well as Optimus.  Tim. 
They do so: and if he be Maximus, to be sure he's Magnus, (and a great deal to spare) and every body knows of the alliance between magnitude and matter. Deus optimus Maximus. Most specially good! now if the Scripture proves but as well—.  Phi. 
'Tis no other than that famous place of the Apostle; for in him we live and move and have our being. Upon which, I do thus reason: if all men be in God, and live in God, and move in God (which the Apostle plainly affirms) and that to every man there belongs so much bulk or quantity: he ought to be sent to the Hospital, that denies God to have quantity, for he has got within himself all the quantity that men have, and his own quantity besides.  Tim. 
So, so: Very well. Very well. Because the Apostle tells us, that God created all men, and gave them life and power to move; and by his daily providence continues these blessings to them: therefore we feed upon God, and swim and fly in God: just as wild fowl do, in St. James' Park. I wish with all my heart that the basket was full.  Phi. 
You need not wish for that, Tim: for I have one demonstration more against immaterial substances so very big, that 'tis enough to fill a basket alone. It lies in the very words themselves. Don't you see't, Tim?  Tim. 
Not in the least.  Phi. 
That's strange. You'll grant, I suppose, that an incorporeal body is a good rousing contradiction. Won't you?  Tim. 
Yes, Sir: 'tis one of the first head.  Phi. 
And, so is immaterial substance: for immaterial and incorporeal every man grants to be the same: and I'll undertake for body and substance being the same.  Tim. 
You don't prove it, Sir: do you?  Phi. 
No, no: it need not, it need not; for I'll swear they are the same.  Tim. 
Faith and troth would have come in excellently well there: for, by chance, all the controversy is, whether they be the same or not. (i. e. whether there be a substance distinct from body) but that's nothing: for, it need not, it need not, no, no: it need not. For, Phylautus is the man that has farmed all the custom for the signification of words: and suffers none to go out of his office, but such as are sealed: and because your Apothecaries give out of the same pot, Mercury or quicksilver, which the customer pleases to call for: therefore Philau●…us, in his great shop of words, has a box superscribed substance or body. And that's all his reason they are the same. And therefore, say I, if any Gentlemen be so overkind and complimental, as to gobble down such things as these (and these are the very best that I can find) for demonstrations against immaterial substances, by all means, let Phylautus take such Gentlemen, and Tim will be content with their Estates.  Phi. 
I'll take no Gentlemen on my side, but such as are convinced by solid reasons: and by your leave, Tim, I can tell you of several of my opinion, that scorn to be convinced with any thing less: and that are very ready to affirm, that what Phylautus has said, against incorporeal substances, has not been without some reason.  Tim. 
Yes, I remember one, Sir: who, in a late Preface to a Play, tells us just so: viz. 'tis not, says he, without some reason, that Phylautus thinks incorporeal substances to imply a contradiction.  Phi. 
What (and be hanged) would you not have a Gentleman speak truth?  Tim. 
O by all means, Sir: especially such a Gentleman as this: for he is so hearty a friend to your opinion, that he has added much strength to't.  Phi. 
Matter! but I done't like that at all, that any man should be so conceited, as to think himself able to add any thing to what I have written.  Tim. 
Nay, I beseech you, Sir, be not offended: for 'tis so very little that he has said, that you may easily lay it aside. The great business is the novelty of the Argument.  Phi. 
Don't tell me, Tim, of any novelties: for I can't think of any thing against immaterial substances that I have omitted.  Tim. 
No? I pray of what profession are they that have been your great adversaries in this point? Are they not Divines?  Phi. 
What then?  Tim. 
There's a business now, that you never thought of. For 'tis impossible for a Divine to write, or so much as to think of a spirit, or immaterial substance. 'Tis utterly impossible: it implies a contradiction: 'tis Jargon, 'tis Tohu, and Bohu: the Kingdom of darkness, and all that.  Phi. 
Implies a contradiction? what a Fool art thou, and all that, to talk t●…us? may not a Divine do, as well as other men, if they would but read and believe my Books; and such, as I got my learning out off?  Tim. 
ay, I: you may think so: but you are much mistaken for all your cunning. For there is not one Divine of all the whole Tribe, be he Deacon, or Priest, or Bishop, or Archbishop; but is most abominably phlegmatic. And 'tis a Poet alone, I say again, that 'tis the Poet who has briskness, fancy, elevate and all that, that can discourse of such a subtle and gliding subject, as a spirit or imm●…terial substance.  Phi. 
Divines all Phlegmatic! I have been as much affronted by Divines as any body: but they never affronted me into such an odd remark as this.  Tim. 
Therefore you never minded the History of it, Phylautus, as this Gentleman Poet has done. For let a man be of never such a frank and florid constitution: let him be all flame, all sky, all glory; yet no sooner does the Bishop lay upon his head his heavy and stupefying hand, but his fancy runs out at his heels, and the blood presently all turns. The benediction of a Deacon, indeed, is only Rheum and slaver: but, when he comes to be made Priest, it curdles all into utter snot and phlegm.  Phi. 
I prithee, Tim, don't torment me with such abominable nauseous stuff as this. What have I to do with what other people say?  Tim. 
But this Gentleman is your friend, Sir: and you must not disregard what a friend offers in your behalf: as yet you only have heard how Divines come to be so phlegmatic: you must needs also understand, how that, being so, they can't possibly discourse of an immaterial substance, or a spirit.  Phi. 
I care not for hearing it: for I am sure there can't be any sense in't.  Tim. 
O Sir very much: as much as any thing that you yourself have said against immaterial substances. For the argument is taken out of the great art of Chemistry. Where, you know, nothing is at such variance with a spirit as phlegm. And there can happen no such scandal to a spirit, as to have any phlegm upon its skirts. And therefore your wary Druggist's will scarce suffer a Clergyman to come into their Shops, for fear they should bind and phlegmatize their spirits. And you can't, I suppose, have altogether forgot, how an whole brewing of strong waters, had like to have been quite spoiled, only by a Clergy-man's Gown sleeve, that, in passing by, dangled into the door: and therefore 'tis not for a Clergyman (whose heavy gown damps the apprehension of a spirit, as much as great toped stockings does the sound of a Theorbo) I say 'tis not for a Phlegmatic Clergyman (who can only cough to an Organ, and thrum upon Thomas Aquinas) to think to raise himself to such a tall imagination, as that of immaterial substanc●…s: for they are of a very thin and airy composure; of a flooting and fluttering consideration: and when a man of gravity, sense, and judgement, goes dully about to invoke them, and to poor into their notion and condition, they presently all bush, and are as still as birds in an Eclipse or great thunderclap. But let the trim, the gay, the sharp and piercing Poet get about him but half a score Violins, an huge Plume of Feathers on his Hat, and only thrip his fingers, and briskly say, Come my Daphne, and if there be an immaterial substance within a mile, it presently stoops to the Poetical Lure. But besides, Phylautus.—  Phi. 
I prithee, Tim, let's have no besides: for I am already almost quite killed with this damnable Poet.  Tim. 
But you must not be tired, Sir: I profess 'tis uncivil: for, if you part with this Gentleman, I don't know where you'll get another to commend your reasons against immaterial substances. And withal I would have you consider, Phylautus, that 'tis a very unsafe thing to slight such a man's approbation: for, he may chance to have you into the next Prologue he makes; and a Poet, you know, is as ill as a whole Nest of Hornets: nine of which, they say, will sting an Horse to death. And therefore 'tis your interest, Phylautus, to be kind and respectful: for, he has also done so much credit to your opinion, as to tell us that you have got some of the Fathers, on your side. And you know, Phylautus, 'tis a great honour and security to have the Fathers on one's side.  Phi. 
A very kind Poet indeed! I know not how many years agone, I found by several Places, that Tertullian was of my opinion—  Tim. 
And you might have found as good ones in Caesar's Commentaries.  Phi. 
And now, this Gentleman having in some of my Books either read so, or met with somebody that told him so, he sends me word of it again.  Tim. 
I profess, Phylautus, I am perfectly of your mind: for I look upon't to be very indiscreet and dangerous for a Poet, who renounces all judgement and sense, and betakes himself wholly to the wing of fancy and imagination, to meddle with such dull and melancholy stuff as Fathers. For your Fathers doubtless (though they were counted pretty honest people) yet they were all very Phlegmatic. And some think that Levi himself was a kind of a blue, green, yellow man. So that there has been a constant succession of Phlegm and dullness in the Church from the very beginning. And therefore, I say, I don't think that this Poet of ours durst ever venture to meddle with any Father, except such as Father Horace, Father Juvenal, and the like: for alas, Sir, one page of a right true Phlegmatic Father would so fetter, and jade his fancy, that 'twould scarce get into a good Heroic rhyming condition in a month's time. But besides, Sir—  Phi. 
What have we more besides still? is there no way, Tim, to persuade thee to hang thyself?  Tim. 
Yes, Yes, Sir: I had done it long ago: only you sent no particular directions; and so I deferred the business a little, lest I should not have performed it according to your Philosophical mind. I pray, Sir, what do you mean by the word hanging?  Phi. 
Why, Tim, must thou needs have a definition of it, before thou goest about it?  Tim. 
O by all means, Sir, for, such a nice matter as that, if it be not done with all the consideration and curiosity imaginable, a man may chance to do himself a mischief, before he be aware of it. And I am sure, Phylautus, you can't but call to mind; that most of those tumults, and rebellions, deluges, and Earthquakes that have happened in former ages, were chiefly because they were ages of great equivocation: not being sufficiently mindful to signify their meaning in settled words, which by the learned is called defining. And therefore I wonder, Sir, that a man so exact as you are, of all things, should omit to give us a definition of hanging; it being a thing of so great moment: and besides in the 18th page of your Leviathan you have laid so good a foundation sored. For seeing politics (as you there have it) are only the addition of pactions to find out men's duties: and Law is only the addition of Laws and facts, etc. what else can hangging be, but only the concluding or summing up of a man from the premises: from whence we learn the exact difference between condemning and hanging: viz. to be condemned is only to be cast: but to be hanged is to be summed or cast up. And though breaking a Leg or Arm be not altogether of such great concern, as t'other thing we have been speaking of; yet, upon this account questionless it was, that the Author of the Medicinal definitions (lest a man in distress should be equivocated, and send for the Joiner instead of the Bone setter) like a most safe and careful Artist, brands Chirurgery after an everlasting manner: Chirurgery (says he) is the quick motion of an intrepid hand joined with experience: or an artificial action used by the hand in physic for some convenient intent.  Phi. 
What thou drivest at, Tim, I know not: unless it be, that thou wouldst have hanging to be as much a Science as Chirurgery. For, I grant thee, that most of those mistakes, fooleries and absurd opinions that have crept into men's minds and their writings have been, because they have ventured to reckon without setting ●…own their first Items right: i. e. without agreeing upon sound and substantial definitions: but I would not have thee therefore think, that, before I call for my Horse, I must needs examine the Osler how he is furnished as to the genus and specifical difference of saddle and bridle.  Tim. 
Truly, I thought that might have been your meaning. For you must now give me leave to tell you, Phylautus, and that a little more plainly and largely too, than I could do last time we met (being in haste) that there is scarce any thing so mean and trivial, but you make it your business to puff it up either with some lofty and magnificent description, or else to fix upon't some smart or curious character: and this is your constant practice from one end of your writings to the other.  Phi. 
Never was any thing more improperly and unseasonably applied: it being my humour to meddle with nothing but rarities, and things of fundamental moment: and whereas thou talkest, Tim, of my puffing definitions, and of my contriving curious characters; and, that I do this from one end to the other: I am confident that (had I patience to pose thee) thou dost not so much as understand either what 'tis to begin or end, or what is curiosity, or what 'tis to define: and yet this is Tim that accuses me of defining trifles.  Tim. 
I beseech you, Sir, cast away one small bit of those thousand years, you have still to live (for, you know, 'tis not good to be stinted) and hear me say. As for the bounds and measures of beginning and end, I must step a little back, and consider there be two sorts of parts, middle and extreme: which being granted I do then proceed to set them out after this manner. That part which is between two other parts is called the middle: and that which is not between two other parts, is called an extreme. Now, of the extremes, that which is first reckoned (I say of the extremes that there may be no mistake) that that very extreme so first reckoned, in strictness of speech, is always to be looked upon as the true beginning; and that which is last reckoned to be the true ending. As for example, take me the number three: which is bounded on each side with an Unite: (for no number is actually infinite) now that Unite which stands before the middle Unite, (provided it be first reckoned) is to be looked upon to be the beginning or first Unite of the number three: and that which stands after the middle Unite, the end or last unite of the number three. And now, Phylautus, I am confident, that were you not wholly taken up with commending yourself, as severe a Judge as you are, you yourself would be ready to confess this first task to be very accurately performed▪  Phi. 
Confess, Tim! I don't use to make Fools and Children my Confessors, but only those that have the supreme Authority.  Tim. 
I thought I should be thus put of. For let a man be never so wary, and take never such care about his Items; and settle things with never so much exactness, yet one had as good grope for Guineas in an Oyster pit, as expect any approbation from Phylautus.  Phi. 
Go on, Tim: thou shalt have, it upon my word by and by: 'twill come pouring down; approbation, or somewhat else.  Tim. 
I thank you, Sir; for one minutes commendations from a person that has kept a constant register of Consequences is worth an age-ful from any body else. And therefore I proceed to the great mystery of curiosity: concerning which (in short) I thus give out. Namely, that 'tis a desire to know why, and how. And I am sure there's no body can be so harsh and churlish, but must look upon this same why and how, as a most distinguishing and Philosophical Ear-mark. And therefore, if approbation be not just approaching, I don't expect ever to deserve again.  Phi. 
Yes, Tim, 'tis just at hand, and therefore I do bless thee after this manner: reckoning thee, looking upon thee, and approving of thee—  Tim. 
I am glad to hear these words. They are every one of them words tending to renown. O, what a blessing it is to be allowed of by the ancient! and to have an Item set upon a young man by an intrepid hand joined with experience.  Phi. 
O 'tis a most inestimable blessing! and therefore, Tim, I do say once again, that I do set thee down, and account thee, and allow of thee for the greatest pilferer, shirk, and notion-stealer, that ever thieved out of a Book. For all these great truths, which thou hast now pretended to knock out of thy own noddle, are nothing else but my very own contemplations irreverently slavered out of thy mouth. And if I should try thee in forty things more: I believe I should find it just so: i. e. thou wouldst either talk right down non sense, or steal from me. And therefore, seeing thou pretendest to judge what things are needful to be defined; do so much as tell me now what a definition is.  Tim. 
I remember some of them tell us, that a definition is that which explains a thing—  Phi. 
A definition that which explains a thing! that now is most horribly obscure, ridiculous, and absurd. A Definition, say you or they (for I think you are all alike) is that— is that? what that? that same, or t'other same? how shall any man in the World understand which of the that's you mean? again, you talk of your definition explaining a thing. After what manner, I prithee, Tim? what, as the Tablecloth is explained upon the Table: or as butter is explained upon bread? thou surely wouldst have a man to be spread into Animal and Rationale. Therefore take it me altogether thus. Definitio est propositio cujus praedicatum est subjecti resolutivum ubi fieri potest, ubi non potest exemplicativum. Instead of which you come in with your blind ids and quods, and I know not what's.  Tim. 
I pray, Sir, be not so angry with me; for 'twas not I that put in id est, instead of propositio; or that said, that the nature of man was to be unfolded like a Napkin; whereas I perceive 'tis to be unroped and unbound like a load of Faggots.  Phi. 
But you are always prating as if you favoured such nonsense.  Tim. 
Truly, Sir, I must confess, that I never did much admire the temper of that wary Gentleman, who being requested to help to make an Inventory for his neighbour, would by no means be persuaded to engage in the business, till they had first agreed upon principles, and set down quid est fire shovel, quid tongs, and quid bellows. And very little better opinion have I of those, who observing the Mathematicians to choose their own terms, and to give them what signification they pleased, shall vainly do the like in all kind of discourses: defining things, that by custom have been long determined; or that have been sufficiently defined before. For my part, I always thought, that a man might have a very nigh guessing, when he was in the Jail, and when not: till I looked into the 164th. page of your Leviathan, and then I found, that 'twas almost as hard for a man to understand what a Prison was, as to get out of it. For, imprisonment (to define it fully and exactly) is all restraint of motion, caused by an enternal obstacle, be it a House, which is called by the general name of a Prison, or an Island. Thus Du Val and such others, have (upon occasion) been restrained by the external obstacle of Newgate for some convenient intent. And, you know, Jack Lambert is at this time obstacled up at the Isle of—  Phi. 
Well: and what then?  Tim. 
Even what you please, Sir.  Phi. 
Then I tell you, that though others may have observed, that a House may come under the notion of a Prison, yet, that an Island may do so likewise, was a great observation of my own.  Tim. 
I do a little question it, Phylautus: for now I think on't, in an old merry song, there's a very notable hint towards an Island being a Prison; and more than that too, there's direction given how, if need be, to break Prison. For the Poet does not only say, that the Land is a large Prison enclosed with Sea: but adds further, that if we would but set lustily to't, and drink up the obstacle (i. e. the Ocean) we may set ourselves ●…ree. But for all that, I don't absolutely say, that you stole your notion from the song.  Phi. 
I steal from songs: I that have a thousand things that never were in any Book whatever?  Tim. 
Ay, and a thousand too. I'd fain see any body show me, either in Book, or Manuscript any thing like what you have in that Chapter of yours, called the nutrition and procreation of a Commonwealth.  Phi. 
Why, what have I there?  Tim. 
What have you there? why, Sir, you have there, not only a most exact division of all commodities into Native and Foreign: but (lest people should lose their time a Nutmegging, or Cloving in Enfield, or Epping Forest) you are pleased to acquaint us besides with the very essence, and nature of each commodity. A Native Commodity (say you, very gravely) is that which is to be had within the territory of the Commonwealth. That sounds bravely. Within the territory of a Commonwealth. 'Twill almost furnish a shop alone. And a Foreign Commodity is that which is imported from without.  Phi. 
And is not this very true, and useful besides?  Tim. 
'Tis so very true, that I much question whether it be useful at all. For there's scarce an Apprentice, that has but had the improvement of twice wiping his Master's shoes, but would look upon't to be a most abominable affront, to be informed with such Ceremony, in such a trivial matter. And more than that, Phylautus, I am very confident, that should any man go about solemnly (as you do) to advise and caution one of these same Youngsters, in what immediately follows; and deliver but his message in the common Town language, he would count himself so horribly abused, as presently to cry huzza, and break all the Windows of such an Instructor.  Phi. 
Why, what is it I prithee?  Tim. 
The very bottom of the notion is only this, Sir: viz. that if we have, suppose, here in our Country, more Pudding than Plums, and other people have got more Plums than Pudding; the best way will be for the Pudding and the Plums to hold a correspondence. But now, Sir, from the consideration of Native and Foreign Commodities, to biggen this spare and lean notion into a Sir John: 'tis thus. And because (it begins as statelily, as a Preface to an Act of Parliament) there is no Territory under the Dominion of one Common wealth, except it be of very vast extent (that's to prevent objections) that produceth all things needful for the maintenance and motion of the whole body; and few that produce not something more than necessary; (here's the groundwork; now we build) the superfluous commodities to be had within become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home by importation of that which may be had abroad, either by exchange, or by just War, or by labour. For a man's labour also, is a commodity exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing. Yes, yes: without doubt ' 'tis. That is, if a man has a great superfluity of those native commodities of Legs and Arms, but as great a scarcity of those Foreign ones, called clothes and Victuals; nothing more frequent than for such an one, to betake himself presently to his flail, or spade, and to exchange benefits: full well knowing, that Labour is a very good commodity, and as likely a way to fetch in money, as most things that have been invented. And this politic remark of yours puts me in mind of a most admirable Receipt, that I have somewhere met with, to awake a man that is asleep.  Phi. 
I suppose, Tim, if he bened deaf, and be but called loud enough; we need not go to the Queen's Closet, nor Triggs secrets, to awake a man.  Tim. 
Called! but how shall he be called? that's the mystery, Phylautus; what method, what means, what instruments are the most natural, and proper for this purpose?  Phi. 
I prithee, has not the man a name: and can't you call him by that?  Tim. 
Call him by his name! what a deadly black, dull, phlegmatic story is that? call him by his name! (Dick, Jack, Robin, or any of the rest know, and can do that:) no, no, Phylautus: you are quite out. The way is this. Seeing that humane Creatures as well as some others are not altogether free from the thraldom of sleep: and that it may be for the interest of some private person, or for the good of the Commonwealth, to loosen and redeem one so bound and captivated: and seeing besides that there be several noises and sounds, that by different motion, do differently invade the Territories of the ear: from most diligent observation it has been at last concluded, that, of all noises or sounds, there is not any so fit and proper to awaken a humane Creature, as a humane voice: especially, if the proper name belonging to the humane Creature, be plainly pronounced by the humane voice. Roger: I come, Sir, cries he presently.  Phi. 
And I prithee, Tim, how differs this from what I said before?  Tim. 
Just as much, and no more, Sir, than as a thousand things, that you magnificently and flaringly dress up, differ from what Dick, Jack, or t'other says. Only, as I hinted just now, out of Mathematical apishness, you fall to your drawing, and deducing, and gathering a Company of trifles, which are not worth the while to pick up in the streets.  Phi. 
Timothy, Timothy, I shall make thee repent of this, Boy. For it plainly shows, that thou dost in no ways understand the greatest instance of sagacity, and a mature judgement: and that the highest advancement, and very top of reasoning, is to make discreet, and holding inferences.  Tim. 
O, Sir, that is a most admirable perfection indeed! and how far you transcend all others in it, one may plainly see, in the tenth page of your Leviathan. Where (having in the Chapter before carefully laid down, that much memory, or memory of many things is called experience;) you thence firk out this for a great certainty: namely, that by how much one man has more experience of things past than another, by so much also he is more prudent, and his expectations the seldomer fail him. As suppose, Sir, a Tailor makes a Gentleman a Suit of clothes; but sees not a farthing of money, but only a very sweet promising countenance. And, upon the same terms, he proceeds to a second, a third, and a fourth. Most certainly this sweet promising countenance will take much better with a fresh Tailor, than with the old beaten Dog of much memory: for he has four very bad consequences, already upon the file. And therefore, (as you have it in the same page) as long as we live, we must note this; that, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he ghesses at, is certainly the best ghesser. And that, because he hath most signs to go by. From whence it follows, that though no sign is absolutely certain; yet (we may take this for certain) that the oftener the Consequences have been observed, the less uncertain is the sign. As suppose, the Dun-Cow turns up her tail, and frisking about the Close immediately upon that we have a shower of rain: this being the first consequence, 'tis possible that the Farmer may venture his Corn abroad, for all the Dun-Cow. But suppose her fancy continues; (for I can't think, that the mere motion of her tail can physically pull down the Clouds) and that the same consequence is strictly observed for a whole year together; Will. Lily may send his Almanacs to Market, and so forth; but, upon my word, the Dun-Cow will send them home again with rattle. Men may talk of finding out this, and finding out that: but there is not one of a▪ thousand that knows how to make the best of a notion. That is, how to nurse it, and brood it, and improve it.  Phi. 
'Tis true enough, Tim. For a mere Fool may by chance, stumble upon a vast truth. But the great emolument thereof lies wholly in the inferences.  Tim. 
Yes, yes: there lies all the skill. For, though a man of less sagacity than yourself, might possibly have blundered upon what you say (Le. p. 36.) viz. Of all discourse, governed by desire of knowledge, there is at last an end either by attaining or giving over. Yet there is no body but Phylautus (who can make notions breed, long after Geese have done laying) could ever have thence disclosed, that which follows: viz. that in the chain of discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an end for that time. I profess, Phylautus, 'twas very well for you, that you did not make these politi●…k inferences, in Hopkins' days. For upon my word, (as great an unbeliever, as you are in his profession) he'd have had you into his inquisition, and tried whether you would have swum, or sunk. You talk of deducing and inferring! whereas in the 3d. Chapter of your Book de Cive, you make such a notable remark, abou●… putting things to arbitration, that to me is right down witchery and divination.  Phi. 
Why, Tim, is it not highly reasonable and convenient, that if two parties disagree about matter of right, it should be referred to some third indifferent person, called an Arbiter.  Tim. 
Very reasonable and convenient, Sir. And accordingly you write it down for your fifteenth law of nature. But the divination lies in hatching out of this fifteenth, a sixteenth law of nature. viz. that no man must be judge in his own cause. Which sixteenth law comes into the World, after this manner. Seeing that when two parties disagree about a matter of right, it is a law of nature that they should leave it to the determination of a third: we gather (say you) what? that this third must not be one of the two. No, no: that would be most horrible foul play indeed: that when two disagreeing parties had taken pains to choose a third, and had bespoken a very good Dinner: no sooner does this third get into the Chair, but whip goes he into one of the two; and there's all the fat in the fire.  Phi. 
This now is so abominably ridiculous, that 'tis ten times worse than positive nonsense.  Tim. 
But hold a little, Phylautus; you should have asked first, whose it was. For, in good truth, this same of the third being none of the two, is one of your own Mathematical gatherings. And because (I know) you love your own words, better than any bodies else; you shall have them exactly as they stand, p. 49. upon condition you'll trust me another time. But from this ground (say you) that an Arbiter or Judge is chosen by the differing parties to determine the Controversy, we gather (in Latin 'tis colligitur) that the Arbiter must not be one of the parties. Do you see Phylautus? 'tis plainly your opinion, that the third person that is chosen by the two differing parties, must not be one of the two that chose. For it takes two and one more, to make a third. And besides, 'twould be a very inconvenient thing; as you proceed to demonstrate it, in the same Article. For, say you, every man is presumed to seek what is good for himself naturally, and what is just only for peace sake and accidentally; and therefore cannot observe the same equality commanded by the law of nature, so exactly as a third man would do. No, no: he can't observe it: nothing near so exactly. For supposing the third should be one of the two, to be sure he, after a few Compliments, would so utterly forget that he was a third, that he would even deal as archly for ●…imself, as if he were merely one of the two. So that having throughly weighed, not only the great absurdity of three being two, but also the great mischief that might thence arise in a Commonwealth; we safely gather, that the third neither can, nor aught to be one of the two.  Phi. 
I shall maintain, Tim, against thee, and all such bold faces, that to choose an Arbiter is a fundamental law of nature: and that it was the Philosopher of Malmsbury that first found it out; because no body before him had gathered it according to art.  Tim. 
ay, I; there lies the skill, Phylautus; to nick a notion, and to gather it according to art: to take it at the critical minute, and register it upon the right file. As (in the 68 p. of your Leviathan) I remember you do the business of covenanting with Bruits.  Phi. 
Why, Tim, can any Covenant, or bargain be made between a Man and a Beast? is it not demonstrable, both from the nature of a Covenant, and the nature of a Beast, that there can't possibly be any such thing?  Tim. 
'Tis very demonstrable, Sir. For suppose a man proffers his Dog Jowler a good large piece of bread; upon condition that he skips cleaverly over his stick. Here seems indeed a tacit kind of promise, that the Dog should have the piece of bread for his pains; (a Dog's labour being a Commodity exchangeable for benefit as well as a man's:) but, by reason the Master only held forth the piece of bread, and did not orally say to the Dog; here, Jowler, skip over this stick, and thou shalt certainly have this piece of bread; or if he had said so, yet Jowler being not able to take him at his word, and to say done Master; (by which the right of the bread might be transferred upon performance of Covenants:) thereupon it is that, if the Master either eats the bread himself, or gives it to any other Dog (though never so little deserving) Jowler can never recover of his Master this piece of bread, or any other thing to the value of it, either at Common-Law, or Chancery. And why? because (as you very learnedly gather it, in the forementioned place) seeing that bruits understand not our speech, they understand not: (all understanding being nothing but knowledge of words:) and if they don't unde●…stand, they can neither accept of any translation of right from us, nor can translate any right to us; and without mutual acceptation there's no Covenant. There now lies the point of law: without mutual acceptation there's no Covenant. This place most certainly deserves a cut; 'tis so mathematically managed. And therefore, in the next edition, I'd have Jowler pictured, jumping at the overture of his Master.  Phi. 
'Twould be a better sight by half, Tim, to see Jowler and you hanged up together for a couple of Curs. For what more easy, than out of the best Book that ever was printed, to pick three or four places; and, by forgery and malice, to represent them as trivial, and contemptible?  Tim. 
'Tis not three or four places, or three or four hundred that I should have much minded: and whereas you talk of representing, etc. there is so little need of any such thing, that this kind of gullery and affectation discovers itself in every page almost of your Writings. What forgery or malice, I pray, is required, to make what you say, Leu. p. 29. most notoriously idle, and frivolous?  Phi. 
Why, what do I there say?  Tim. 
As in your Humane nature, you invite down the Jocqueys (which I formerly told you of) to see your race of the passions: so here you call together the Schoolmasters; and, much to their astonishment, show them the great harmony that is between the passions, and the several Moods of a Verb. First, say you, generally all passions may be expressed indicatively; as I love, I fear, I joy, I deliberate, I will, I command: upon my word, the Indicative Mood has a fine run on't: 'tis in at all. But some of them have particular expressions by themselves; for instance, deliberation is expressed subjunctively; which is a speech proper to signify suppositions with their consequences. What a brave definition is there of the Subjunctive Mood! the Subjunctive Mood is a speech proper to signify suppositions with their consequences. The language of desire and aversion is imperative: as, fall on, bear back: the language of Vainglory, etc. is Optative; as Utinam, or would to God, I had a piece of Bread and Butter round about the Loaf: but of the desire to know there is a peculiar expression, called Interrogative. A very peculiar one indeed! ('tis great pity there is no Interrogative Mood:) and therefore, if a man be either in haste to know, or eager to know, the best way will be to make use of that same peculiar expression, called enquiring or ask: for it will take some considerable time for another man to guess, what I have a mind to know. Again, Sir, when you advise such as have the supreme Authority to affix punishments to the breach of their laws, you do very well: but when you advise them further (Civ. p. 207.) to put those laws sometimes into execution; and withal so heartily prove the convenience thereof, I can't see, but that a man without either forgery or malice, may make shift to smile. The fear, say you, whereby men are deterred from doing evil, ariseth not from hence, namely, because penalties are set, but because they are executed; (and that's the reason that people are not so much afraid of Paper and Ink, as Rope, Ladder, and the consequences thereof:) because, as you proceed, we esteem the future by what is past; seldom expecting what seldom happens. And therefore, man being of a collecting nature, he certainly aught to be hanged for a Coward, who fears to be added to the law for stealing, if no body upon that account, had ever been added before him; because he reckons badly, and expects that which never, as yet, came to pass. But I shall not at present, Phylautus, trouble myself any further to set forth how laboriously you argue, when 'tis to no purpose. Only I can't forbear showing some little respect to one thing more, because you so accurately discuss it.  Phi. 
All that I ever writ, has been very accurate.  Tim▪ 
Yes, Sir: but this is not only very accurate, but of extraordinary concernment. For it removes a very considerable objection against Government. viz. if it be so necessary for the Peace of Mankind, that men should confer all their power and strength upon one man, or one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will; how comes it about then that Bees (and such like Creatures) live so quietly and contentedly, without either choosing one supreme unlimited buzzer, or one Assembly of Bees, that by plurality of buzzes may be brought to consent in one buzz? Of this there be no less than six very remarkable reasons: (no body but Phylautus could have found out half so many:) In the first place, 'tis to be considered, that amongst Bees there's no contestation of honour and preferment: if one Bee has a mind to be made Burgess or Knight of the Shire; march on, say the rest: Honey is a very good thing. Now it is not honour or preferment, but the contestation that does all the mischief in a Commonwealth. It being that alone which begets envy and hatred, and these beget sedition and quarrelling, and quarrelling begets War, and War in time spoils Peace. We may possibly, now and then, have observed a couple of Bees wrestling two or three falls or so; where sometimes one would be above, and sometimes another: but we are to know, that in strictness of speech, this being above is not to be called preferment, nor this endeavouring to be above contestation of preferment: because preferment (to say no more of it now) is a kind of a notable business. In the next place, we are to consider, that, that which makes men to quarrel unless awed by some supreme power, is their esteeming of those things only which have somewhat of eminence in the enjoyment. But 'tis not so with Bees: for suppose one of them grows fatter, or proves taller by the head and shoulders than all the rest; notwithstanding this, there's no need o●… choosing a Hive-holder, to keep them from mutinying: they having no such as custom to register their Statures upon the Wainscot, or Mantletree; as man does, who is a comparing Creature, and relishes nothing but Phoenixes and eminencies. In the third place, that which secures Bees from waging War is, that they don't keep any Scales in the House, to weigh how much Honey every Bee administers towards the Winterstock: or if they did, they having not so much the use of reason, as men, are not able to weigh it. For to weigh is only to ponderate, or compare reasons. But, in the Section before, it was proved that man alone was a comparing Creature. Therefore to bed Bees, for fight is a vanity. Fourthly, though Bees have some use of voice to signify their mutual affections, and to buzz and hum out one another to public duty; yet, they having never read either Seton or Keckerman, want the art of disposing these buzzes and hums into propositions; and also of managing those propositions into eloquent and crafty orations. So that, suppose some factious, aspiring, innovating Bee should go about to disturb the Peace, and make an uproar; yet because this Bee has not a true humane tongue (which is as very a Trumpet of War and Sedition, as a Warming-pan is of Peace and settlement, to a swarm of those Creatures) though it be as big as an Elephant it can never like Pericles, by its elegant speeches so thunder and lighten as to confound the Hive. And therefore sleep on Bees. Fifthly, give but Bees their belly full, and set them out of the wind; and libel them, and lampoon them as long as you will, all this breeds no ill blood: and the reason is, because as yet they never read Philautus' Politics; and so can't distinguish between injury and harm. Hive and Honey! What times should we have, if these Stingers should once but find out the difference between injury and harm? Sixthly, and lastly (I am sorry for this lastly: what would I give for six such more) seeing that neither the present Bees, nor their Predecessors, did ever take either the O●…th of Allegiance, or the Solemn League and Covenant, or the Engagement, or the Oath upon Triplow-heath (where they say there grows many a sweet bit) what need is there, or can there be, for these Creatures to choose any supreme Magistrate to keep them in awe; when as they did never either swear, or covenant or engage to keep any thing at all? and therefore finally, good night Bees; for the Moon is in the Flock-bed.  Phi. 
All this is most abominable forgery.  Tim. 
If you had not said so, 'tis like some of your friends might. And therefore let's have pure Phylautus, word for word, as he discusses the business in the 77th. p. de Cive.  Phi. 
And won't you put in none of your own wild, nonsensical Jim-cracks, to interrupt the drift, and contexture of my reasons?  Tim. 
No no, Sir: I am so far from any such thing that, to give your reasons all possible advantage, I'll take in Preface and all. The point to be debated in the Margin stands thus, viz. why the government of some bruit Creatures stands firm in concord alone, and not so of men. To decide which we make this preparation. Aristotle reckons among those animals, which he calls politic, not man only, but divers others; as the Ant, the Bee, etc. which though they be destitute of reason, by which they may contract, and submit to government, notwithstanding by consenting, (that is to say) ensuing or eschewing the same things, they so direct their actions to a common end, that their meetings are not obnoxious unto any seditions. Yet is not their gathering together a civil Government, and therefore those animals not to be termed political, because their Government is only a consent, or many wills concurring in one object, not (as is necessary in civil Government) one will. It is very true, that in those Creatures, living only by sense and appetite, their consent of minds is so durable, as there is no need of any thing more to secure it, and (by consequence) to preserve peace among them, than barely their n●…tural inclination. But among men the case is otherwise. Now begin the six reasons. For first among them there is a contestation of honour and preferment; among Beasts there is none: whence hatred and envy, out of which arise Sedition and War, is among men, among Beasts no such matter. Next, the natural appetite of Bees, and the like Creatures, is conformable, and they desire the common good which among them differs not from their private; but man scarce esteems any thing good which hath not somewhat of eminence in the enjoyment, more than that which others do possess. Thirdly, those Creatures which are void of reason, see no defect, or think they see none, in the administration of their commonweals; but in a multitude of men there are many who supposing themselves wiser than others, endeavour to innovate, and divers Innovators innovate divers ways, which is a mere distraction, and civil War. Fourthly, these Brute Creatures, howsoever they may have the use of their voice to signify their affections to each other, yet w●…nt they that same art of words which is necessarily required to those motions in the mind, whereby good is represented to it as being better, and evil as worse than in truth it is; But the tongue of man is a Trumpet of War, and Sedition; and it is reported of Pericles, that he sometimes by his elegant speeches thundered, and lightened, and confounded whole Greece itself. Fifthly, they cannot distinguish between injury and harm; Thence it happens that as long as it is well with them, they blame not their fellows: But those men are of most trouble to the republic, who have most leisure to be idle; for they use not to contend for public places before they have gotten the Victory over hunger, and cold. Last of all, the consent of those brutal Creatures is natural, that of men by compact only (that is to say) artificial; it is therefore no matter of wonder if somewhat more be needful for men to the end they may live in peace. Now am I as much taken with these six reasons, as the Gentleman was with his good piece of road. I profess, I have a great mind to ride 'em all over again: they are so incomparably close, so smooth, and so pleasant.  Phi. 
Yes, yes, without doubt, Tim, set but such a one as thou art on Horseback, and there will be riding. Thou talkest of close reasoning! thou never saidst in thy whole life one line of such deep sense, as that which just now thou didst repeat.  Tim. 
But you have said many things as deep, Sir; as one may plainly see by your Leviathan, p. 86. where you thought the mooting this point of the Bees to be so very necessary for the understanding the causes, the Generation and the definition of a Commonwealth that; with great delight to yourself, we have all the forementioned reasons over again. And seeing you are so very much delighted, I am as conformable as any Bee; and am resolved to be delighted too. Thus then: It is true, that certain living Creatures; as Bees, and Ants, live sociably one with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle numbered amongst Political Creatures;) and yet have no other direction, than their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signify to another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why mankind cannot do the same. (I don't believe any man in the World had ever such an odd appetite, unless he had the green sickness:) To which I answer,  
First, That men are continually in competition for honour and dignity, which these Creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, envy and hatred, and finally War; but amongst these not so.  
Secondly, That amongst these Creatures, the common good differeth not from the private; and being by nature inclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose joy consisteth in comparing hims●…lf with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.  
Thirdly, That these Creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason, do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their common business: whereas amongst men, there are very many, that think themselves wiser, and abler to govern the public, better than the rest; and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into distraction and civil War.  
Fourthly, That these Creatures, though they have some use of voice, in making known to one another their desires, and other affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that which is good, in the likeness of evil; and evil, in the likeness of good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatness of good and evil; discontenting men, and troubling their peace at their pleasure.  
Fifthly, Irrational Creatures cannot distinguish between injury, and damage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellows: whereas man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease: for than it is that he loves to show his wisdom, and contro●…l the actions of them that govern the Commonwealth.  
Lastly, The agreement of these Creatures is natural; that of men, is by Covenant only, which is artificial: and therefore 'tis no wonder if there be somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their agreement constant and lasting; which is a common power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit. I wish, with all my heart, I could tell where to happen of these six reasons, but once more: for I am as fresh, methinks, as when I first set out. Never in my life did I meet with such a Company of good words, so artificially put together, to no purpose. And yet, now I think of it Camoraldo, the great Spanish Politician gave a friend of his six very good directions for Travelling. If (says he to his friend) you be not sufficiently content with such knowledge of Foreign Countries, as Maps and Historians do afford you; but that you have a mind to peruse the Country's themselves (or at least some of them) with your very own eyes; in the first place, I do advise that into such Countries, as you have a mind to peruse after the supposed manner, you send not your man, but go yourself. In the next place, when you be once fixed and determined to go; it will be very requisite then to think of going: and that either by the motion of your own feet, or by the motion of the feet of one Horse, or of more Horses (as by Tumbril, Cart, Wagon, Coach,) or by no Horse; as by the motion of Boat, Ship, or by some other means and instruments of motion. For, Native and Foreign being altogether opposite, there's no possible passing from one extreme to another without motion. Thirdly, When you be once come (according to the directions laid down in the foregoing Article) to that Town or City that you have most mind to see and remember; be sure you stay longest there: for the longer you stay, the more you may look; and the more you look, the more you'll see; and the more you see, the more you'll remember: as was said before, he that has most signs to guess by, is certainly the best ghesser. Fourthly, such notices and informations of things as you intent to take in at the eye, choose rather to do it in the day time, than in the night. For though the eye and object be full out as big, after as before the Sun is down; yet by reason of the many mists, vapours, Hobgoblins and Witches that trade in the night, the sky becomes much thickened; and thereupon observations are rendered much more weak and uncertain. Fifthly, If after particular observations of Houses, Churches, Cathedrals, etc. (made at the time above prescribed) you should have a mind, (the day, suppose, before you go out of Town) to sum up all, and at one view to take the dimensions of your whole improvements; don't you go to Bed, and draw the Curtains Close about you: for they'll refract and scare the light; nor into the bottom of a well; (as some by equivocation have done, because Stars are thence best seen:) but climb you me some Steeple, Tower, or other high place: for though it must be granted that the higher you go, the further you'll be from the earth; yet the further you are from the earth (so you be not too far) the more you'll see, in all probability, of those things that are built upon the earth. Sixthly, and Lastly, Suppose you don't travel by a proxy, but go yourself in person, and perform all according to the laws of motion, and set a work those laws of motion more or less according as 'tis worth the while to stay, and that you don't make your observations at midnight, nor out of the Cellar; then, quoth Camoraldo to his friend, as a Crown to all, I do advise, that you take a Table-book in your pocket, or some other little portable instrument to register consequences: for though it be said of Julius Caesar (who for a need could thunder and lighten as well as Pericles) that he never forgot any thing but injuries; yet it does not, you know, fall to one man's share of forty to be so great an Emperor, as Julius Caesar: and though Paper, Parchment, and Velam be all subject to the teeth of time, envy, and rats; yet by no means is the memory wholly to be trusted, being ofttimes as treacherous, as a sieve or scummer.  Phi. 
The teeth of time! 'tis very good really: and so is a treacherous sieve or scummer. But for the memory to keep Garrison is much better; especially, if it be but like ●… sieve, or scummer: because the enemy may pass and repass at the little Portholes. Doubtless this Cam●…raldo was a most excellent Statesman. I wonder, Tim, where thou pickest up such abominable, metaphorical-simili●…udinarian-Rascals. (that similitudinarian is not a just word, but I han't patience to make a better now:)  Tim. 
Why, Sir, you know ●…hat a little slice or so of a trope, or figure, gives a fine relish and hogoo. 'Tis as good, Sir, as an anchovy or shalot.  Phi. 
A relish and a hogoo! to what I prithee? to a Treatise of Philosophy or Dominion: or to directions for travelling, by which Gentlemen may come to understand the Generatio●… of a Commonwealth, and afterwards become helpful in Government? I'll give leave to a Juggler, or Barber to put into their common tittle tattle, their relishes and hogoos, their anchovie●… and shalots: but when Divine●… shall tell you (Leu. p. 17.) of in-powred virtue, and in-blown virtue (as if virtue were turned into a man's mind, just as new drink is into the Vessel) and of this and that man being extraordinary assisted and inspired: as if it were not more credit for a man to speak wisely from the principles of nature and his own meditation, than to be thought to speak like a Bagpipe by inspiration: I say, when such things as these creep into serious reckonings, and Philosophical Bills; then, then's the mischief. ●… perceive, Tim, that thou never didst read the 5th Chapter of my Leviathan: for if thou hadst, thou wouldst have there found, that amongst the many causes of the absurd opinion●… that have been in Philosophy, there has not been any greater, than the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetorical figures, instead of words proper. For (as I there go on) though it be lawful to say, (for example) in common speech the way goeth or leadeth hither, or thither, the Proverb says this or that (whereas ways cannot go, nor Proverbs speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted.  Tim. 
What, neither back-stroak, nor fore-stroak? I know, Phylautus, that you have spent much time in this sort of reckonings; and therefore you must needs be a notable accountant in Philosophy: but when I find (as ●… do in your Treatise, called Computation) that a Proposition is the first step i●… the progress of Philosophy, that a Syllogism is a complete pace, trot, or gallop in Philosophy; being made by the addition of steps: and that method is the highway that leads to Philosophy: (where note, though 'tis not proper, in reckoning, to say that the way either goes or leads; yet I perceive that Propositions and Syllogisms may both walk and gallop, provided it be in the way to Philosophy:) again, Sir, when I read (Levi. p. 108.) that a Commonwealth is an artificial man, ('tis as like him, as ever it can look: 't has got just de Father's nose, and the pouting lip) or an aggregate of Puginelloes made for the attaining of peace; and that the civil laws are only artificial Chains; (so the Dutch broke the civil Law that went cross the River at Chatham) which men, by mutual Covenants, have fastened at one end, to the lips of t●…e man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Sovereign power; and at the other end to their own ears. (I'd scarce have the place to be so fastened:)  Phi. 
What if I do say this: is this like the teeth of time, and your sieves and scummers?  Tim. 
Moreover, Sir, when you instruct us (Leu. p. 115.) in all the several sorts of Systemes of people (this Systeme I look upon to be a kind of Bastard anchovy, or wild shalot) that belong to a Commonwealth; and how that these systemes resemble the similar parts of a body natural: and if they be lawful systemes, they are as the muscles of the body: but if unl●…wful, they are Wens, Biles, and Apostems engendered by the unnatural conflux of evil humours: and how that a conflux of people to Market, or a Bull-baiting, though it be a lawful system, yet 'tis an irregular system, by reason 'tis not ordered by law which Dog shall play first; or which man shall sell the first roll of Ginger bread: and that the Corporation of Beggars, Thiefs, etc. though they may be regular systemes (having a representative) yet they are not to be looked upon as lawful Systemes, being not as yet allowed of by public authority: the brick shall be, out of hand, burnt for the Halls, against the Parliament meet next.  Phi. 
What of all this?  Tim. 
Nay, I pray, Sir, don't interrupt me: let me make an end of my sentence: and that as the several systemes of people are the similar parts of a Commonwealth, so the public Ministers are the organical part of a Commonwealth, resembling the Nerve●… and tendons that move the several limb●… of a body natural: and that public persons appointed by the Sovereign, (this is all Mathematick●…) to instruct, or judge the people, are such memb●… of a Commonwealth, as may be fi●…ly compared to the Organs of voice in th●… body natural: and that the service of Sheriffs, Justices of the peace, etc. is answerable to the hands in the body natural. And that if a man be sent into another Country secretly to explore th●… counsels and strength; (i●… he com●… only to see, he may do well enough; but if he comes to explore, and b●… catched; he may chance ●…o be hanged:) he is to be looked upon as a Minister o●… the Common wealth, though but private; and may be compared to an ey●… in the body natural: (and very well, for a blind man makes a very bad Scout:) but those public Ministers that are appointed to receive the Petitions, or other informations of the peo▪ i'll, are, as it were, the public ear of the Commonwealth: (I profess, this artificial man thrives bravely; I hope the cheeks, and the chin of the Commonwealth will come on by and by:) besides, Sir, when I look—  Phi. 
What, han't you done your sentence yet?  Tim. 
Alas, Sir, I have but just begun: my hand is but just in: I say, when I look into the 24th. Chapter (above-cited) of the nutrition and procreation of a Commonwealth; and observe, how that the commodities of sea and land are the nourishment of the Commonwealth; and t●…at propriety or the constitution of meum a●…d tuum is the distribution of the materials of this nourishment; and that buying, selling, etc. is the concoction of the commodities of a Common wealth; which concoction is, as it were, the sanguification of the Commonwealth, being performed by money, which is the very blood of a Commonwealth: (for as natural blood is made of the fruits of the earth, and circulating, nourishes, by the way, every member of the body natural: so money is made out of the fruits of men's labours, and running up to Town, and then down again into the Country, nourishes those politic members, that live upon the road:)  Phi. 
Surely now you have done.  Tim. 
And when I observe further; how that the Collectors, Receivers, and Treasurers are the Conduits and Vessels by which this blood (of money) is conveyed to public use: and that the public Treasury is as the heart of the Commonwealth; (so that, as the veins receiving the blood from the several parts of the body, carry it to the heart; where being made vital, the heart by the arteries sends it out again to enliven and enable for motion all the members of the same: so the Collectors, etc. receiving the venose money, out of the several parts of the Country, carry it to the heart politic; where being vitalized, it does strange things when it comes again into the Country:) and that if a Commonwealth bened strictly dieted, but highly fed, how that it spawns and brings forth little Commonwealths, or Children of a Commonwealth: (thus the artificial man of Spain laid about him, and begot (the Child)▪ Hispaniola; and if Hispaniola should afterwards grow up to have a little one, than would Spain be a Grandfather.)  Phi. 
Certainly this sentence will have an end at some time or other.  Tim. 
Pray, Sir, don't speak to me; for I am in great haste, and have a great way still to go: once again, I say, when I look also into the 29th Chapter of your Leviathan; and there read of the several infirmities and diseases that this artificial man, the Commonwealth, is subject to: (for, we must know, that an artificial man, as well as other men, is very much out of sorts sometimes:) and how that some proceed from defectuous procreation; (as when an old pocky, gouty, crazy Commonwealth begets another, by reason of the mala stamina, or vicious Conception, the Child Commonwealth either comes to an untimely death, or by purging out the ill quality, breaks out into Biles and Scabs:) some from seditious doctrines; such as killing a Tyrant is lawful; which venom, say you, I will not doubt to compare to the biting of a mad dog; (no man in the World would ever have doubted of it:) which is a Disease Physicians call Hydrophobia or fear of water: for as he that is so bitten, has a continual torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and is in such an estate as if the poison endeavoured to convert him into a dog; (in a still night, you may hear one, so converted▪ bark almost from Dover to Calis:) so when a Monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those democratical Writers (and the teeth of time) that continually snarl at the estate; it wanteth nothing more than a strong Monarch, which nevertheless out of a certain Tyrannophobia, or fear of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhor: such likewise is the opinion of those that hold there may be two Authorities in the same Commonwealth, Temporal, and Spiritual; which disease, say you, not unfitly may be compared (it sits to a Cow's thumb) to the Epilepsy, or falling sickness (which the Jews took to be one kind of possession by spirits) in the body natural. For as in this Disease, there is an unnatural Spirit, ●…r wind in the head that obstructeth the roots of the nerves, and moving them violently, taketh away the motion which naturally they should have from the power of the Soul in the brain, and thereby causeth violent and irregular motions (which men call Convulsions) in the parts; insomuch that he that is seized therewith, 〈◊〉 down sometimes into the water, a●…d sometimes into the fire, as a man deprived of ●…is senses; (a very good lecture upon the Epilepsy:) so also in the body Politic, when the spiritual and windy power, moveth the members of a Commonwealth, by the terror of punishments, and hope of rewards (which are the nerves of it,) otherwise than by the civil power (which is the soul of the Commonwealth) they ought to be moved; (this still is pure Mathematics) and by strange, and hard words suffocates their understanding, it must needs thereby distract the people, and either overwhelm the Commonwealth with oppression, or cast it into the fire of a civil war.  Phi. 
What no end yet?  Tim. 
Such again, say you, is the opinion of those that are for mixed government: making the power of levying money, which is the nutritive faculty of a Commonwealth (that is supposing blood nourishes; for if it don't money is clearly cut out:) run one way: the power of conduct and command, which is the motive faculty (that's well enough, because conduct and command is performed by the motion of legs and lips:) run another way: and the power of making laws, which is the rational faculty (that's well enough also; because of law and reason:) a third way: which irregularity of a Commonwealth to what Disease, say you, in the natural body of man, I may exactly compare it, I know not: this is the first time that Phylautus has been at a loss; but so ho! I have seen a man, that had another man growing out of his side, with an head, arms, breast, and stomach of his own: if, say you, he had had another growing o●…t of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact: (if I meet with the man, I'll speak to him, to hire another man to grow out of t'other side; and if that be once done, good-night Parliament for this October, and for ever after:)  Phi. 
Nor yet?  Tim. 
When I also read that want of money, especially in the approach of War, may very aptly be compared to an Ague; (now for as long a Lecture upon an Ague, as we had before upon the Falling-Sickness:) wherein the fleshy parts being congealed, or by venomous matter obstructed; the veins which by their natural course empty themselves into the heart, are not (as they ought to be) supplied from the arteries, whereby there succeedeth first a cold contraction and trembling of the limbs; (a very pretty Hypothesis for an Ague:) and afterwards a hot and strong endeavour of the heart, to force a passage for the blood; and before it can do that, contenteth itself with the small refreshments of such thi●…gs as cool for a time; (a Julap from a Banker:) till (if nature be strong enough) it break at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed ('tis a little obscure, but the Devil they say is in an Ague:) and dissipate●… the venom into sweat; (through ●…he sieve, or scummer of the skin:) 〈◊〉 (if nature be too weak) the patient dyeth. Ting, tongue: ting, tongue:  Phi. 
Then never.  Tim. 
And that Monopolies and ab●…ses of Publicans are the Pleurisy of the Commonwealth. For as the blood, say you, in a Pleurisy, getting into the membrane of the breast, breedet●… there an inflammation, accompanied with a Fever and painful stitches: so say I and you together, money t●… blood of the body politic, getting in too much abundance into the membranaceous Purses, and Coffers of Publicans, and Farmers of public revenue; by inflammation, doth distend the Purse-strings, and make the sides of the Coffers to sob and groan: and that the popularity of a potent subject is like Witchcraft: (though, with Phylautus, there be no such thing, yet for a need that will serve for a Disease too:) and that too great a number of corporations; which are as it were many lesser Commonwealths in the bowels of a greater; (that now is a notion) are like worms in the entrails of a natural man: but that disputers against absolute power, are not like those belly worms in general; but like those little worms which Physicians call Ascarides.  Phi. 
I thought nothing had been infinite:  Tim. 
And when I meditate—  Phi. 
What, more mumping still?  Tim. 
I say when I meditate, upon those four accounts (de Cive, p. 123.) for which, the spaces between the times of the subjects meeting, under a Temporary Monarch, elected by the people, may be fitly compared to those times, wherein an absolute Monarch, who hath no Heir Apparent, sleeps; with the introduction thereunto, viz. to dissolve the Convent, so as it cannot meet again, is the death of the people; just as sleeping, so as he can never wake more, is the death of a man▪ (yes indeed I believe it may prove his death, if he don't use some speedy means:) as therefore, say you, a King, who hath no Heir, going to 〈◊〉 rest, so as never to rise again (i. ●…) dying (a very pretty notion of death: 'tis a going to rest, so as never to rise again) if he commit the exercise of 〈◊〉 regal authority to any one till he 〈◊〉, does by consequence give him the succession. So the people electing a Temporary Monarch, and not reserving ●… power to convene delivers up to him t●… whole dominion of the Country. Furthermore, as a King going to sleep f●…r some season, entrusts the administration of his Kingdom to some other (he can't surely govern much, when he'●… asleep) and waking takes it again; (that is, if no body has broken up the doors, and stole away the Kingdom; for if so, he may take another nap:) So the people, etc. and as a King who hath committed the execution of his Authority to another, himself in the mean while waking can recall this Commission again when he pleaseth: (or else he has given out a very large one:) so the people, etc. Lastly, As the King who commits his authority to another while himself sleeps, not being able to wake again, till he whom he entrusted give consent; (such a temptation as this would make some trusties to walk as light as a Chambermaid) loses at once both his power and his life; so the people, etc. and when I consider—  Phi. 
And when I consider, that this sentence may last till to morrow this time, I shall take my leave—  Tim. 
By no means, Sir; for I say, when I consider those fourteen elegant comparisons, between the Papacy, or Kingdom of darkness, and the Kingdom of Fairies; (with which you conclude your Leviathan) viz. the Kingdom of Fairies sprung from old Wives Fables, concerning Ghosts and Spirits, that play seats in the night: and what is the Hierarchy of Rome, but the Ghost of the deceas●…d Roman Empire, starting up from the ruins of that Heathen Power. There's Ghost for Ghost already: A second Ghostliness they agree in is, that t●… Papists use in their devotions the Latin language: and what, I pray, is Latin but the Ghost of the old Roman language, walking up and down Calepine, Cooper, Goldman, and such like enchanted places? Thirdly, The Fairies have got but one Universal King, called King Oberon: the ecclesiastics have got a King Pope, that shall play, in the night, at push-pin with their King Oberon. Fourthly, The Fairies are Spirits and Ghosts: ecclesiastics outdo 'em there; for they are spiritual men and Ghostly Fathers. Fifthly, Fairies and Ghosts inhabit darkness, solitudes, and graves: Nay, if you be good at that, we can be as private as you: for, ecclesiastics walk in obscurity of doctrine, in Monasteries, Churches, Church-Yards, and dark coloured clothes. Sixthly, The Fairies have their enchanted Castles and certain Gigantine Ghosts, that domineer over the Regions round about them: say you so? we can fit you there too: clap but a Gigantic Pontificial Clergyman upon the top of his Cathedral; and he looks over all the little Parochials, just as the Devil looked over Lincoln: Seventhly, The Fairies can never be arrested or sued, though they steal Garters, Shoestrings, Pin-Cushions, etc. and, if the ecclesiastics be not as sly I am much mistaken: for no sooner do you call 'em to appear before the visible Tribunal of civil justice, but they presently vanish into their Ghostly Courts: Eightly, The Fairies are said to take young Children out of their Cradles, and to change them into natural Fools or Elves; the ecclesiastics are old Dogs at that; for they take young men out of the Cradle of reason, and lay them upon the hurdle of hard words, Metaphysics, and Miracles. Ninthly, The Shop or Operatory of the Fairies is not as yet determined: there we get ground; for the operatories of the Clergy are well enough known to be the Universities: Tenthly, When the Fairies are displeased with any body, they are said to send their Elves to pin●…h them; the ecclesiastics (I'll warrant you) won't be cast out at pinching; for no sooner does any state displease them, but they enchant the elvish superstitious subjects to pinch their Princes: and sometimes enchant one Prince to pinch another. Eleventhly, Fairies marry not; there you get nothing; neither do Priests. Twelfthly, It is said of Fairies that they enter into the Dairies, and Feast upon the Cream which they skim from the milk. The ecclesiastics are very good at skiming: for what are the Church lands but the very Cream of Nations skimed from the Estates of ignorant, flotten, Gentlemen? Thirteenthly, What kind of money is currant in the Kingdom of Fairi●…s is not recorded in the story; but with the ecclesiastics, all is Fish that comes to the Net. Lastly, As there is no such thing at all as Fairies, but only in the fancies of silly idle people; so, though it be strongly reported, yet there's no such man at all as the Pope; but he's as mere a Phantasm, as Beelzebub the Prince of Phantasms:  Phi. 
And what of all this? here's no conclusion yet.  Tim. 
No, Sir: but now I conclude, and say, that when I find such things as these, and a thousand more such, not in your Peak or Ulysses, (for a Poet has his privileges as well as a Juggler or Barber;) but in your grave and Philosophical reckonings—  Phi. 
What then? I hope we are not beginning the sentence again:  Tim. 
Then, say I, that though Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetorical figures be the cause of very absurd conclusions; and therefore must not by any means; no, not by any means, be admitted in reckoning and seeking of truth; and though again (as you have it Leu. p. 21.) the light of humane minds is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed and purged from ambiguity; Reason is the pace; Increase of Science, the way; and the benefit of mankind the end. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like ignes fatui; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition or contempt; Yet Phylautus himself (as great a reckoner, and stickler for truth as he would seem to be;) when 'tis for his tooth, can smack his lips at an Anchovy, as loud as a Coach-whip. And now I have done.  Phi. 
In good time indeed! and what, Tim, is there no difference to be made between the Rhetoric which is all flash and froth; and such as drives at notion, and carries that which is weighty and considerable at the bottom?  Tim. 
O, Sir, a very great difference: because you have found out a very peculiar way of making yourself and your Writings considerable, which no body else ever thought of.  Phi. 
I am considerable for the sake of my works; and my works are considerable for their own sakes, and mine together. I know no other way of being considerable.  Tim. 
This way, Sir, is very troublesome: a man must write well, and meditate much to become thus considerable: there's a much easier way, than this, Sir.  Phi. 
How so prithee?  Tim. 
Get some body to write against some Book of yours; and let the title of it be Phylautus considered; and before the ink be dry, you'll become as considerable, as the House of Austria.  Phi. 
Thou art a most arch wag, Tim: here take a Plum. Phylautus considered, and therefore Phylautus is considerable! or an account of Phylautus, therefore Phylautus is of account. May not Tom Thumb, or Tom of Odcomb be made considerable after this manner?  Tim. 
Yes, Sir; and so may Tom of Malmesbury too; having in the 51. page of his Letter to Dr. Wallis tried the experiment upon himself. Where, the Doctor looking upon you as one to be pitied or contemned rather than meddled withal; Pish, say you; the egregious Professor is a Fool for that: for if Mr. Hobbs be not a considerable person, how came he to entitle the beginning of his Book, Mr. Hobbs considered? now whether this be Wit, or Mathematics I know not: but one of them I am sure ' 'tis. For Phylautus is a man that plays at nothing less; despising all the middle regions of knowledge.  Phi. 
Well done, Tim: specially well done: for it is not above six or seven years agone, or thereabouts, since I wrote a Book called, contra fastum professorum Geometriae: wherein I have plainly shown, that there is full out is great uncertainty, and as many cheats, errors and falsehoods in the writings of Mathematicians, as in the writings of other kind of ordinary Philosophers.  Tim. 
This Dr. Wallis is a most wicked and pernicious Creature; a man of the most rural language, and absurd reasoning that ever spoke or writ.  Phi 
I know that well enough: but what makes you say so?  Tim. 
Because, till he took you to talk for your Geometry, and showed you to be no Mathematician; Mathematics (as 'tis said in another case) was the very smile of nature, the gloss of the World, the varnish of the Creation, a bright paraphrase upon bodies; whether it discovered itself in the morning blush of computation in general, called Logic; or opened its fair and virgin eyelids in the dawning of the computation of men's duties, called Ethics; or whether it darted forth it's more vigorous and sprightful beams in the noon day of motion called Physics. However 'twas the first born of corporeal beings, the Lady and Queen of sensitive beauties, the clarifier and refiner of the Chaos, etc. but, immediately after the Doctor put forth his Elenchus Hobbianae Geometriae; one would wonder to see how the price of Olives fell. Alas! before that scurvy Book came forth, Phylautus sometimes could not get above three or four lines into an Epistle dedicatory, but he must be slabbering over his dear Miss, his sweet and honey Mathematics: (but poor Aurelia is now grown old:) Hum: nat: my most honoured Lord, from the most principal parts of nature, reason, and passion, have proceeded two kinds of learning, Mathematical, and dogmatical: as for Mathematical, 'tis free from controversy and dispute, etc. but in the other there is nothing undisputable. Sometimes Phylautus dissembles his love, and goes a little further into the Epistle, before he falls aboard. Ep. Ded. de Cive. Were the nature of humane actions as distinctly known, as the nature of quantity in Geometrical figures, the strength of avarice and ambition, which is sustained by the erroneous opinions of the vulgar, as touching the nature of right and wrong, would presently faint, and languish; and mankind should enjoy such an immortal peace, that (unless it were for habitation, on supposition that the earth should grow too narrow for her inhabitants) there would hardly be left any pretence for War. There would be brave Mathematical days! such an immortal Peace, that there would be neither War, nor pretence for War. And all because of Mathematics. For, say you, in another place (Leu. p. 50.) the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed by the Pen and Sword: whereas the doctrine of lines and figures is not so.  Phi. 
Why is it?  Tim. 
Not much till you pretended to the Mathematics. But yet they are never the more free from dispute for your reason, viz. because men care not in that subject, what be truth, as a thing that crosses no man's ambition, profit, or lust: (ah! woe's me; woe's me: for Phylautus, upon my word, has cared very much ever since his Mathematical Girl gave him a clap from Oxford:) for I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any man's right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, that the three Angles of a Triangle should be equal to two Angles of a Square; that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all Books of Geometry, suppressed as far as he whom it concerned was able.  Phi. 
Why, don't you think, Tim, if the sorementioned property of a Triangle should prove injurious to a Commonwealth, but that those who have the supreme Authority would call a meeting, and take some speedy care about it.  Tim. 
Care about it, Sir? they'd have a Session purposely, not only to turn out all Triangles out of Office, and places of trust and strength; but to banish them forthwith five miles from any Corporation.  Phi. 
I say again (as I said, in the 2d. page of the Epistle Dedicatory to my Humane nature;) that the reason why Mathematics, or that part of learning which consist in comparing of motion and figure, is free from controversy and dispute; is because there's nothing in that Science against a man's interest: i. e. there's nothing that crosses a man's ambition, profit, or lust.  Tim. 
Fie, fie! done't say it o'er again, Phylautus: you had better say you were at that time a little too much in love with the Mathematics: and, you know, in that condition, a man may be somewhat abated as for speaking reason. And therefore if I were you I'd choose to have it go for a sudden pang, rapture, or any thing else rather than sense: for you can't but have read, Phylautus, what a World of Pens have been drawn and blunted in the great quarrels and Wars that have been about blazing Stars, solid Orbs, the motion of the Earth, and such like points: and yet I don't remember that Copernicus or his Doctrine did ever whisk away any man's Titles of honour, or ran away with his Estate into another Country, or choosed him of his Mistress. And therefore don't let us talk any more of this, Phylautus: for without doubt, when you writ those two places, you had had a sad night on't, and been in a most strong fit of the Mathematics.  Phi. 
So, so: this is well: it seems then to thee, Tim, that my Book contra Geometras, or contra fastum, etc. does contradict what I formerly said of the Mathematics, and Geometry. Therefore, prithee, do so much as answer me one question. What's the difference between Geometria and Geometra? they both end in a; and therefore have a care of being out.  Tim. 
The first, Sir, I take for the Science itself; the latter for him that is, or pretends to be a Master of it.  Phi. 
Now, Tim, do but consider my first four lines contra fastum, etc. viz. Contra Geometras (amice Lector) non contra Geometriam haec scribo. Artem ipsam, artium navigandi, aedificandi, pingendi, computandi, & denique (scientiae omnium nobilissimae) Physicae matrem, aequè ac qui maximè, laudibus extollendam censeo. Do you see, Tim, how horribly you are mistaken? 'tis not against the Science of Geometry, or Geometry itself that I write: for without doubt Geometry itself is an absolute Science, and being a Science—  Tim. 
Yes: and being a Science, 'tis certainly a Science: but what then do you write against?  Phi. 
What do I write against? I write against the Authors; the silly, negligent, slothful Authors; that are as full of errors, as a Beggar is of louse: the proud, haughty, supercilious Authors; who if they can but raise, or let fall a perpendicular, think there's no certain knowledge without rule and compasses: I say, I write against these; who always were, and are, and (if I live) shall be as much cheated, and gulled and fopt, as any men in the World.  Tim. 
But have you not, Phylautus, several Seats and Pews to place these Authors in? methinks, those same malicious Rascals, that answer Books, and won't let Circles be squared, aught to be set in the Belfry: for they are much more scabby, and lousy than the rest.  Phi. 
I deny not but there may be some mean Ecclesiastical wretches, that may pretend to Mathematics: but my design, Tim, is not to take down the Crest of this or that small, pedantic Geometer; but I fly at the whole Covey: Geometrarum totam invado nationem; as I have it in my Dedication: and again p. 5. ipsa aggredior principia, & interdum etiam demonstrationes. Pro Geom●…tris autem omnibus oppugnabo Euclidem, qui omnium Geometrarum magister existimatur, & interpretem ejus omnium optimum Clavium. Because they make such boasting of him, I set upon their great Flag-man, Euclid himself; and his Vice-Admiral Clavius.  Tim. 
For my life, I can't get it out of my mind, but that the price of Olives is certainly fallen. For, till about the year 56. Phylautus did not only think that Geometry, or the Lady herself was the beauty and Cream of the Creation; but that the very men, the two-legged men that studied and admired her, were the most careful, the wisest, and most happy people that ever opened Book. And, I am confident, that had not Phylautus himself been a little disappointed in some of his Writings, by this time (had he believed any such things) they'd have proved all Angels.  Phi. 
Never did I intend any such thing at all: for whatever I have written to the honour and commendation of Geometry; 'twas (as I said before) Geometry itself that I always meant, not those fantastical, conceited people that ignorantly profess it.  Tim. 
If this, Phylautus, was always your opinion, in my mind you have a very crafty stile. For suppose one should take up your Book de Cive—  Phi. 
Then, do I say, that he has taken up one of the best Books that ever was written in the whole World: for, though I say it myself (as I do in the 7th page of my Letter to Dr. W.) never was any Book more magnified beyond the Seas; and therefore, as I myself say again (six Less. p. 56.) in French it carries the Title of Ethics demonstrated:  Tim. 
Very modest: 'tis pity any body should say so, but ones self: now, Sir, if you please to let this same honest Gentleman read the seventh page of your Epistle Dedicatory, he'll find these words. And truly the Geometricians have very admirably performed their part. (do you see, Sir, they are the two legged Geometricians that have done the feat:) for whatsoever assistance doth accrue to the life of man, whether from the observation of the Heavens, or from the description of the Earth, from the notation of times, or from the remotest experiments of navigation; finally, whatsoever they are in which this present age doth differ from the rude simpleness of antiquity, we must acknowledge to be a debt which we owe merely to Geometry.  Phi. 
Now, Tim, let me ask thee one thing: whether is a man's mind best to be guessed at from the beginning of a sentence or end of it? done't I conclude and say, that all those fine things are owing to Geometry itself, and (to keep out the pragmatical Geometricians) done't I say besides, merely to Geometry?  Tim. 
Merely may do excellent service now, to hedge out the Geometricians; but when you writ that Book, you designed no such thing.  Phi. 
How can you tell what I designed?  Tim. 
Very well: because you tell us yourself, in the words immediately following this great encomium of Geometry. viz. if, say you, the moral Philosophers had as happily discharged their duty, etc. As what? as Geometry itself? Geometry itself was never upon duty; and knows no more how to discharge any duty, than to discharge a Musket. No, no, I am confident, Phylautus, it must be the huffing and pragmatical Geometricians, that you then meant. But however you need not be at all concerned about it; for neither Geometry, nor the Geometricians can ever sue you, for those commendations; because you have in print revoked the whole sentence. And in law, you know, the last Will always voids the former.  Phi. 
I revoke in print? I have made many of my Adversaries to pull in their Horns, and hang their Ears: but never said any thing so hastily myself, as to recant, or repent of it.  Tim. 
How it came about, I know not: (perhaps Poetry might send you a Basket of Chickens;) but all that same observation of the Heavens, the description of the Earth, and the rest of that rich treasure, and furniture which about 47. you gave to Geometry, in the year 50. you bequeathed it all to Poetry; just as it stood, silk Curtains and all.  Phi. 
To Poetry? that's very like Geometry indeed!  Tim. 
Yes to Poetry: you shall hear it Sir: 'tis an excellent sentence, and may do afterwards for Grammar; upon condition 'twill be towardly, and promise to be guided by the Precepts of true Philosophy. Whatsoever commodity men receive from the observation of the Heavens, from the description of the Earth, from the account of time, from walking on the Seas; and whatsoever distinguisheth the civility of Europe from the barbarity of the American Savages, is the Workmanship of fancy but guided by the Precepts of true Philosophy.  Phi. 
But where's Poetry all this while?  Tim. 
Here's fancy; and that's as well, Sir.  Phi. 
But how do you know, that by fancy I must needs mean the fancy of a Poet; and not that of a Geometrician? and again how do you know but that by Philosophy, I meant particularly Geometry.  Tim. 
I'll tell you, Sir, how I came to discover these two great secrets. The sentence I just now mentioned is in the 132. page of your Answer to Sir William Davenant's Preface before Gondibert: which answer is so richly fraight with the History, nature and laws of Poetry, that I am more than pretty well assured, that by fancy you could not easily mean that of a Geometrician. And that by Philosophy likewise you meant not particularly Geometry, but Philosophy in general, I am as well assured; because in the very next words you advise Poets, to be well skilled in the true doctrine of moral virtue; (that in their Heroic Poems they may exhibit a venerable and amiable image of Heroic virtue) and (a little after) to consult the possibility of nature; and not to talk of their impenetrable armours, enchanted Castles, invulnerable bodies, iron men, flying Horses, and a thousand other such things which (as you say) are easily feigned by them that dare. But, now I think on't, why am I so mad as to trouble myself about this? 'tis better by half for me to let all pass for Geometry; for then have I two most tearing sentences in praise of the Geometricians: for, as for Geometry itself giving any precepts for the guidance of the fancy, she is so modest and mealy-mouthed, that I'll trust her for doing any such thing; unless she make use of the pen, or mouth of some Cuckoldy Geometrician.  Phi. 
You may catch, and carp, and wrest Tim, as long as you will: but you'll never be able to find any one place, wherein I do absolutely and positively affirm, that the Writings of Geometricians do any ways transcend the Writings of other men.  Tim. 
Absolutely and positively affirm! that truly may be somewhat difficult. That is, you'd have me, I suppose, show you some such place as this, viz. Whereas I Thomas, the great Mathematician and Philosopher of Malmesbury; having, for ten years together, taken all occasions to magnify the labours, and admire the success of the Geometricians in their several undertake above all other Writers: do now publicly declare to all the World, that by Geometricians, I meant Geometricians. In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal in the presence of etc. Such a place as this I done't know, on a sudden, where to find: but setting aside the solemnity of such an acknowledgement, I don't know any thing that ever was more plainly expressed, than what you have in many places said to the vast credit of Geometricians themselves. But now they are all Cannibals and Cuckolds. Let but any body read the 15. page of your Leviathan.  Phi. 
So he may, if he will: 'twill do him good at the heart; that or any other page.  Tim. 
For all that you'd give money to buy it out of your Book.  Phi. 
I won't part with any one line of any Book that I ever writ, in my whole life, for all the money you can offer.  Tim. 
You shall keep it then, Sir: the only way, say you, to become truly wise, and to avoid false and senseless tenets, is to order words aright: that is, to determine what every word shall signify, and how it is to be placed: which no body has done but the Geometricians.  Phi. 
Now, I am sure, I have catched thee, Tim: for the word Geometrician is not in that whole page.  Tim. 
But there's that which is as like it, as the Philosopher of Malmsbury is like Mr. Hobbs. I think I can say it just as you do. Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly, or else he will find himself entangled in words, as a Bird in Lime-twigs, the more he struggles, the more belimed. And thereforè in Geometry (which is the only Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow upon mankind) men begin at the settling the signification of their words; which settling of significations they call definitions, and place them in the beginning of their reckonings. Do you mind it, Sir? they are those same men, that begin at the settling of the signification of their words; and they call such settling of significations definitions; and (by the blessing of God upon their extraordinary care and endeavours) the doctrine of lines and figures is so accurately performed by them, that that alone as yet deserves the name of Science.  Phi. 
I am not bound, Tim, to remember every word that I have ●…poken, or writ.  Phi. 
No, Sir; that would be a most unreasonable burden: and therefore I suppose when you writ your contra fastum, etc. You might have forgot also what you said Leu. p. 20. viz. that of all Creatures none is subject to absurdity but men: and none so much as those that profess Philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero saith of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the Books of Philosophers. And why? because all, but Geometricians, are Sots, Lubbers, and Loggerheads.  Phi. 
I am sure these last are none of my words.  Tim 
Right: but these that follow are (which are as good) and the reason, say you, is manifest. For there is not one of them (and now there's ten thousand since you failed in Geometry:) that begins his ratiocination from the definitions, or explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in Geometry; whose conclusions have therefore been made indisputable. Do you mind it again, Phylautus; 'tis not an idle tale of ambition, profit, or lust; (such as you talked of before) that makes the conclusions in Geometry to be indisputable; but 'tis the admireable method, etc. which Geometricians alone make use of?  Phi. 
I don't speak one word of the method which Geometricians use; but only of that which is used in the Science of Geometry.  Tim. 
By whom: by Sowgelder's or Rat-Catchers? I beseech you, Phylautus, don't try at that any more: for you know well enough that Geometry herself can't wipe her own nose according to art; unless she borrows a quadrant of some neighbour. And besides, I find that you right down affirm, that the Mathematicians are the only men, that reason methodically; and in a discourse too, where one could not easily expect any such thing; (viz. in your Animadversions upon Bishop Bramhall's Vindication of true Liberty, etc. p. 46.) but only I consider, Phylautus, 'twas in the days of ●…our Amours; when you took all possible occasion to hook in that venerable esteem you had of those kind of Writers. Reason teacheth, say you, and the example of those who only reason methodically, say you, which are the Mathematicians, say you, that a man when he will demonstrate the truth of what he is to say, must in the first place determine what he will have to be understood by his words; which determination is called definition; whereby the significations of his words are so clearly set down, that there can creep in no ambiguity. Thus 'twas, Phylautus, for many years together: write about Humane Nature, Ethics, Politics, Liberty and Necessity, or any thing else, still Mathematics was the word, and the Mathematicians were the only white boys. I know that that part of Philosophy wherein are considered lines and figures, has been delivered to us notably improved by the ancients. I confess indeed that that part of Philosophy by which magnitudes and figures are computed is highly improved: the like advancement I have not observed in the other parts of it, etc. Because the Elements of Geometry having been improved by the best wits of all ages, has afforded greater plenty of matter than can well be thrust together within the narrow limits of this discourse; I thought fit to admonish the Reader, that before he proceeds further, he takes into his hands the works of Euclid, Archimedes, Apollonius and other as well ancient as modern Writers. For to what end is it to do over again that which is already done? the little therefore that I shall say concerning Geometry, shall be such only as is new and conducing to Natural Philosophy.  Phi. 
But what's all this for? and whence hadst it, Tim?  Tim. 
All this, Sir, I had out of the Translator of your Book de Corpore. The first place I mentioned is in your Epistle Dedicatory: the second in the beginning of your Logic: and the last in the 149. page of your Philosophy.  Phi. 
What is any mechanical Translator to me? this Translator, for aught I know, is some twopenny Almanac-maker: or some giddy-headed, conceited Mathematician; who had a mind to foist into my Works some commendations of himself, and his own trade.  Tim. 
I don't think, Sir, that the Translator has wronged you much; because (in his Epistle to the Reader, he says) what he did was viewed, corrected and ordered according to your own mind and pleasure. But perhaps the noise of your own Latin may be more delightful to you. Scio Philosophiae partem illam, quae versatur circa lineas & figuras traditam nobis esse bene cultam à veteribus. Bene cultam! I promise you, that's pretty well for such old Fornicators. Fateor quidem partem Philosophiae eam, in quâ magnitudinum figurarumque rationes supputantur, egregiè cultam esse. Say you so: Egregiè cultam esse? I think they deserve a largess: for by the following words they have wrought very hard. In reliquis partibus Philosophiae similem operam positam non vidi, etc.  Phi. 
And by the words following those; (viz. consilium ineo, quoad potero, Philosophiae Universae, etc.) others intent to work as hard, and in time to deserve as well.  Tim. 
Who do you mean, Phylautus, you noun dear self?  Phi. 
Yes, Tim, 'tis I: I my own self that have advanced all parts of Philosophy to indisputable and Mathematical certainty. 'Tis I that set forth the first Book that ever was truly written about civil Philosophy (Epis. ded. de corp.) in respect of whom (I mean myself) Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle and the rest were mere Chimney-sweepers, black pieces of superficial gravity, Phantasms and Ghosts of Philosophy, and served only to be derided by Lucian. 'Tis I that first show the way (Leu. p. 87.) how to generate a Commonwealth the great Leviathan; or rather (to speak more reverently) that mortal God, to which we owe under the immortal God our Peace and defence: and that have sent word to (Leu. p. 391.) such as govern Kingdoms, that if either they intended to preserve themselves in authority, or to have their Clergy and Gentry preserved from the venom of Heathen Politicians, and from the incantation of deceiving Spirits, they should appoint that Book of mine publicly to be taught in the Universities. 'Tis I again that first banished the Hobgoblin School-distinctions; (Epis. Ded. de corp.) and i●…stead thereof have brought pure light into natural Philosophy: (non pugnando, sed diem inferendo, as I there have it) having first discovered such a principle in the World as motion; and having out of my many good wishes for the improvement of Philosophy, revealed this great secret to the lazy backs at Gresham. Who (as I tell them Ep. Ded. de nat. aeris; and in my Letter to Dr. W. p. 55.) may do very well, if they would not set their minds wholly upon every new gin, and janty device that is brought from beyond Sea. Nam conveniant, studia conferant, experimenta faciant quantum volunt, nisi & principiis utantur meis, nihil proficient. They may meet at Gresham College, and the Precedent (which my dear friend and Translator Sorbiere wittily observed) may knock the table with the wooden hammer, and the fellows may lay all their experimental noddles together, and they may build Furnaces, and buy Coals, and grind Spectacles, and shoot Stars, and kill Cats and Pigeons; but they'll never be able to make so much as the tail of a Mouse, unless they apply themselves to the doctrine of my motion, and send for me, who will be very ready to help them so long as they use me civilly: for I am at a composition with nature; and she has promised to do nothing but by me and my motion. 'Tis I that have heard that Hugenius and Eustachio Divini were to be tried by their Glasses who was most skilful in Optics of the two; but, for my part, (Letter to Dr. W. p. 54.) before I set forth my Book de Homine, I never saw any thing written of that subject intelligibly. Lastly, 'tis I alone (Ep. Ded. contra fast. etc.) that have throughly examined and mended the principles of Geometry itself, and in spite of all my Adversaries have truly squared the Circle.  Tim. 
What an excellent thing 'tis for a man to keep a common place-Book of his own deserts: especially if it be made out of his own works, and that the quotations be ready? there comes, suppose, a good honest fellow to Phylautus; who having looked upon his Picture before his Latin Works; and finding there, en quam Modicè habitat Philosophia; tells him that those words, as they may be taken, sit about him excellently well. Say you so, quoth Phylautus? if any man takes those words in a bad sense, let him be who he will that very man do I take for a Fool. Because I am not only the best Logician, the best Moralist, and the best Natural Philosopher, but the greatest Mathematician in all Europe. As at large I grant it, and acknowledge to myself, in several places of my several Books, such Pages, such Articles, and such Editions. Neither is there any thing of Vainglory or self-conceit in all this; because (quoth Phylautus) there is not; as I myself have proved it in several places of my Writings. For (to define it strictly) Vain glory or self-conceit is a certain idle and wanton form of speech; by which a man, either in the shade or in the open Sun, admires himself, being not justly called thereunto. And that man has very little skill in Morality, and the common actions of humane life, that cannot see the justice of commending a man's self, as well as of any thing else, in his own defence. And to speak not only prettily well, but extraordinary well of a man's self if vilified and provoked, is a great instance of Heroic virtue: (as I have at large proved it, both in my six Lessons, p. 56. and in my Letter to Dr. W. p. 57) and he that neglects that piece of justice towards himself is a most pusillanimous sneaker; and (for aught I know) neglects a duty as great, as any of those that belong to the clergymen's two Tables. And thus it happened when I first put out my Book de Cive: some snarled at this, some looked askew upon that, and some found fault with the whole. But I being well acquainted with the value of myself; (keeping always by me a Register of my own deserts:) and being well skilled in the greatest actions of humane life, presently did myself justice, and straightened all. For (as was said before) I printed a Book a little after, wherein I told myself, and the Earl of Devonshire, that my Book de Cive was not merely the best, but the only Book that ever was written of that subject. And then, I pray, what became of my absurd and rural detractors? So again, there was a small pragmatical Cypherer (he was one of the resemblance of Divines:) went and reported that I had committed some great mistakes in the very principles of Geometry. That fellow, say I, shall presently be made a Fool of; and forthwith I call to my principal moral virtue self justice, to rally together all the famous things that have been spoken concer●…ing me; (now, there's no self conceit in this, it being other people's conceit of me, not my conceit of myself:) I know a passage (Letter to Dr. W. p. 52.) in an Epistle written by a learned French man to an eminent person in France; wherein I am reckoned amongst the Galilaeo's the Des Carteses, the Bacons and the Gassendi's: and 'tis generally believed that some of these were no inconsiderable Mathematicians (especially Des Cartes) and I am sure in the Epistle my name stands immediately after his. But if any body should question the truth of this testimony, it being foreign, I am sure it cannot be denied (though my name is not to the Book) but that I give this following testimony of myself (Lux Mathem. p. 36, 37.) viz. Hobbesius extrà legitur, intelligitur, laudatur: Hobbesii inventa tum in Geometriâ tum in Physicâ multa, nova, excelsa, clara, utilia sunt: imo talia, ut nec aetas prior majora vidit, nec (quantum conjicio) futura confutabit aut extinguet. O brave Arthur of Bradley! now they are mere Asses that think any of this ostentation; it being only to vex and confound my Backbiters. Oh how the Rascals do pine and fret, when I let go the great consciousness of my own worth upon myself! In short, they may talk and write what they will; but if I don't commend myself much faster, than they can possibly ever discommend me, then will I give in, and patiently submit to their scurrilous, and clownish contumelies. But notwithstanding all this that you have now said for yourself, or I for you; I have a very great suspicion of one thing—  Phi. 
What's that, Tim?  Tim. 
That though to praise a man's self, in order to the vexatio●… of his Enemies be a very pretty divertisement; and most undoubtedly a moral virtue; yet this will not fully reconcile you to yourself in the case of the Mathematics.  Phi. 
Why not?  Tim. 
You must hear the last place which I promised to repeat to you, concerning your former opinion of the Mathematicians; and you will then perhaps perceive somewhat. Quoniam autem (de Corp. p. 106.) pars ista Philosophiae (Geometriae) ab excellentissimis omnium temporum ingeniis exculta (we had benè culta, and egregiè before; now 'tis got to exculta:) uberiorem tulit segetem, q●…am ut in angustias propositi operis nostri contrudi possit; Lectorem ad hunc locum accedentem admonendum esse censui, ('twas then very good advice, and so 'tis still for all your contra fastum, etc.) ut Euclidis, Archimedis, Apollonii, aliorumque tum antiquorum tum recentiorum scripta in manus sumat. Quorsum enim actum agere? ego vero de rebus Geometricis pauca tantum & nova & ea praesertim quae Physicae inserviunt proximis aliquot capitibus dicturus sum.  Phi. 
Now what do you make of all this?  Tim. 
Oh Sir! of that same excellentissimis omnium temporum ingeniis exculta, etc. I make very much: viz. that when you writ that same Book de corpore, you were so fully satisfied with what the man Euclid, the man Archimedes and the man Apollonius had done; (who were not three Sciences, but tres substantes viri in Geometry) that you did then think that there was nothing to be said against them; nor, as far as they had gone, any thing to be altered. Quorsum enim actum agere? ay quorsum indeed: ego tantum nova & pauca, etc. but now, Phylautus, they are all Scoundrels, Hedgehogs, and Caterpillars; not knowing so much as what a point is, or what a line is, or what superficies is, or what an angle is nor any thing else: nay you done't certainly know (non videtur Propositio illa universaliter vera, say you, sed dubitans nil pronuncio) but the famous 47th Proposition itself may be false? so that I am afraid that the Gods must restore to Pythagoras all the Bullocks they have received for that Proposition. Now, I'll tell you, Phylautus, how all this came about.— 'twas just so: really ' 'twas.  Phi. 
Really 'twas, Tim? thou art really an Owl. 'Twas just so? how so was it?  Tim. 
You know, Phylautus, you have written a Poem upon the Peak: and upon Ulysses.  Phi. 
Well.  Tim. 
Now I am very confident, that were those verses, as capable of being confuted, as your Mathematics are, and have been; if need were (as was said before about Logic) we should presently have a Book out contra Fastum Pecci, & Ulissis: wherein it should be proved that there never was any such place as the Peak; nor any such man as Ulysses; but that the one was a standing Phantasm in Derbyshire; another's was a Phantasm that travelled.  Phi. 
And how do you apply this to Mathematics.  Tim. 
I'll tell you two sayings of your own; and than you may apply yourself. The one is Leu. p. 21. viz. who is so stupid as both to mistake in Geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him? the other is Ep. Ded. Hum. nat. viz. as oft as reason is against a man, so oft will a man be against reason.  Phi. 
I meant that, Tim, only of other people: for I myself never forsook reason in my whole life; and therefore, suppose, I should grant that in former times I might speak a little too warmly in praise of the Geometricians: am I, Tim, obliged to be always of the same mind; when I had so many good reasons to alter it?  Tim. 
Now, Phylautus, you say somewhat indeed: if you had had any reasons to do so. But you never had any, nor are ever likely to have any. But only according as you have been bitten by the Doctor, and the teeth of time; so your distemper has constantly increased; and thereupon you invent new exceptions, and seek out new places of refuge. For it is very evident, that when you were first taken ill; 'twas a mere plain Wallisiophobia: but the Doctor getting deeper and deeper into you; 'tis heightened now into a most absolute Euclidophobia: which is a Disease almost as ill as that same Tyrannophobia you spoke of before. And I am very much afraid if the rest of your Writings were as strictly examined, as your Mathematics have been; that at last it may come to a perfect Philosophophobia; which is the most dreadful howling Disease that can possibly befall a man: ten thousand Sceptics done't make half such a noise, as one man that has got the Philosophophobia. Therefore I pray, Sir, have a care of it: for really I look upon you to be a going that way. And I perceive you yourself are not without some apprehensions of danger; by what you say in your Epistle Dedicatory to your contra Fastum, etc. For a certain, say you, either I am stark mad, or all the Geometricians are so: for I differ from them all. Remember that, Sir; and, as I said, be careful of yourself: for I believe, as for their parts, they all hold pretty sound as yet.  Phi. 
Sound? Yes, so is a Tub with twenty great holes at the bottom. Their principles are all false; their demonstrations are many of them false; (and therefore you are likely to have a good reckoning:) as I have evidently made it out by most solid reasons.  Tim. 
I wish, Sir, you'd tell me where those same solid reasons lie. For I can find nothing but only some Grammatical, Metaphysical smallshot: such as you formerly discharged at the Doctor, when you and Mathematics first fell out. Tother day, Phylautus, I looked upon a Book of yours, called Examinatio & emendatio Mathematicae hodiernae; a very good Title: surely, think I, we shall have some notable Reformation. But reading on I found qualis explicatur in Libris Johannis Wallisii. Whenever I saw that same qualis etc. in the Title, I presently, from that Symptom, concluded that there would be very much of the forementioned distemper in the Book itself. And so it proved: there being very little besides Grammatical nibbling, and tearing rants at Algebra. Quantumvis, says the Doctor, non sim ●…go prorsus nescius, etc. Out, out, out! says Phylautus; abominably out! Quantumvis Wallisius Doctus sit Mathematicus, non est certè Latinae linguae peritissimus. Quantumvis, prorsus; what both in the same sentence? the like was never known. For quantumvis is a mark of uncertainty; but prorsus puts all out of doubt. Etsi might have done well enough; but quantumvis can never do. Then immediately after this, say you, follows sigillatim for singulis, instituat for institueret, laboret for laboraret, proffer for efferre, and those barbarous Scholastical Phrases, viz. Pro formâ, idem erit ac si, and the like: as also this: cum quae in publicum prodeant, pro more scilicet (eoque satis inveterato) nonnullis inscripta soleant prodire; in which small piece of a sentence, you find out no less than three huge Geometrical miscarriages. First, say you, cum quae etc. should be cum Libri qui etc. for we don't hear of Houses or Churches going to the Press; but only of Books: therefore doubtless the Doctor had not his Compasses about him, when he said cum quae etc. (cum quae etc. an ille ipse, say you, quoties in publicum prodit, inscriptus (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) prodit?) in the second place, say you, the Doctor again is out in prodeant, which should be prodeunt: and in the third place, as for his nonnullis inscripta, I can't devise, say you, what possibly to make of it. For the word nonnullis (solitariè posita) standing melancholy without any substantive, and Rebus being always civil, and ready to be understood; presently cries out; next Oars, next Oars! so that the Doctor's Mathematics are certainly most extraordinary Mathematics, for he scorns to dedicate them to men, but to Rebusses themselves.  Phi. 
And did not the Doctor, Tim, first nibble at my Writings and my Latin?  Tim. 
If he did, Phylautus, you have clearly got the day; for no man ever carried on that humour like you. And thus, say you, it happens in all the Books that he has written. For whatever he says, either non placet, or 'tis inept, or childish, or vicious, or unintelligible, or wonderful, or lastly malicious and ghebrical. For example: he has put out a Book de motu, say you; which (at the latter end of my Rosetum) I briefly censure and confute after this manner. The Book (suppose) is sent to me: and I having read it, am asked what I think of it. In the first place, I say, non placet: and there's for his Book in general. Then I go on, say you, and read, viz. Mechanica est Geometria de motu: that's inept; because he lets Mechanica stand alone without arse in the singular number. Impedimentum est id quod motui obstat, vel eum impedit: to put impedit into the definition of impedimentum is horribly childish, say you: and to put resistere into the definition of resistentia is not childish, but vicious. Celeritas est affectio motûs etc. is unintelligible; for affection only belongs to living Creatures: and no man ever saw motion to hug, kiss, or feed celerity. Continuum quodvis (secundum Cavallerii Geometriam indivisibilium) intelligitur etc. for Cavallerius to come into a definition would be very wonderful to any Logician. Lastly, to make use of Symbols, and to say cujuscunque rationis index is most maliciously and ghebrically done. And if Euclid, say you, or Archimedes should ever come this way, and but see those abominable Antichristian scrawles, which the Egregious Geometer makes, and the word Index, they'd be so horribly scared, that we should never have their Company again. And therefore now you are in, Phylautus, I pray let's hear you rail a little at Algebra and Symbols.  Phi. 
You are a very scoundrel, Tim, and somewhat besides, for supposing me to rail: for my language is always clean, gentile, and elegant.  Tim. 
This is only modesty: for you 〈◊〉 do't as well as any man alive. Come, Sir, let me give you the Key. Gheber. Now away with it: id dictum Ghebricè, hoc dictum ghebricè, gibbericè▪ gabbericè, scabicè, scrubbicè, symbolicè, gambolicè, etc.  Phi. 
What are you doing, Tim?  Tim. 
Don't you see, Sir? I am confuting and confounding the Whore- Algebra: that barbarous, Irish, Welsh Whore- Algebra: that nasty, scabby, pestilential, abomination-Whore- Algebra: that scratching, scrawling, brachygriphal, stigmatical, symbolical Whore- Algebra. (Exam. & emend. p. 10. p. 100) abominans praetereo etc. pro peste Geometriae habenda est, etc.  Phi. 
I hope you don't call this confuting, & c.?  Tim. 
Yes but I do; and so do you: for when you would seem mild, and pretend to reason the case, you talk ten times worse. Algebra? it takes its name, say you, from one Gheber: who perhaps might be some Comb-Maker, dextrous Corn-Cutter, Operator for Teeth or some such Engineer. Symbols? what a silly thing is it to talk of symbols (Exam. p. 9) words are the most ancient and currant of all symbols, etc.  Phi. 
And do you really think, Tim, that Algebra is good for any thing?  Tim. 
I durst not think any thing of it at all, Sir; for fear Gheber should get me: but I have heard that Vieta, Oughtred, Cartes, de-Wit, and half a dozen more have, for reasons I shall not now mention, spoke well concerning it: whose judgements put all together, I shall for once, Phylautus, beg leave to prefer before yours.  Phi. 
Vie●…a I grant (the corp. p. 156.) by reason of his great skill in Geometry, was a good considerable person. But as for the rest of those ghebrical scrawlers, you mentioned; I don't know any one thing they ever found out.  Tim. 
And truly, Phylautus, as you order the business, I don't see how they▪ or any body else ever should. For first of all, you seize upon all motion as yours; and neither man, nor nature can do any thing, unless you lend them a little of your motion. Again all reasoning is plainly yours; you being the first that ever called Logic Computation. And most of the Mathematics is also yours; you being the first that demonstrated (the corp. p. 63.) the whole to be bigger than any one part. And I don't much question but that the Sun and the Moon also (you may do somewhat or other to 'em) in time, may become yours. But no more of the Whore- Algebra. Now look to yourself Euclid, Clavius and the rest of you: for Phylautus is coming, and upon my word wherever he comes, he makes most dreadful work. You may think (and so did he once) that you were the only people upon whose endeavours the blessing of God had fallen. But he has sent back the blessing of God; and you have made such small progress in your profession of Geometry, that there is no one of you (besides himself) that knows so much as the definition of it. Geometry (says a famous man among you) is an art of measuring well. Neatly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for a Timber-Merchant, or Dial maker! but there's very nigh as many absurdities as words in the definition. For first of all Geometry is not an Art, but a Science; and if that bened sufficiently absurd, I know not what is. Secondly, 'Tis an Art of measuring well, says he: measuring well? measuring what well? Geometry well? is Geometry than an art of measuring Geometry well? Lastly, says he, 'tis an art of measuring well: but how does that art measure, and by what? by Sunbeams, or Rain-bows? all which abominable absurdities I avoid (Lesle. p. 1. cont. fast. p. 7.) by saying, that 'tis the Science of determining the quantity of any thing not measured, by comparing it with some other quantity or quantities measured. Again say you, suppose we go and search for an exact account of a figure; which is a thing of such vast concernment, that the whole business almost of Geometry is to consider nothing else but several figures: and yet, for all that, one had even as good turn to Rider's Dictionary as Euclid's Elements for any such thing. Figura, says Euclid, est quae sub aliquibus, etc. How lubberly and Porter-like was that said? figura est quae? where's here any antecedent for the Relative quae? (cont. fast. p. 17.) if there be any, it must be either est, or figura. As for est, surely no body will take that for an antecedent: and figura is even as bad a Bedfellow. For than it must be figura est figura quae, etc. which sounds a little oddly out of a Geometricians mouth. I told the Euclidists of this (for as I said before, 'tis of infinite concernment) in my six Lessons (p. 1.) and again in my Examinatio (p. 44.) and now again in my contra fastum, etc. and yet I believe they are so stupid, that in some Copies one may still find figura est quae, etc. If Phylautus had not come, and comforted poor quae, by saying, figura est magnitudo quae etc. doubtless by this time, she had pined away herself to skin and bones, for want of an Antecedent. And thus again, say you, they do in the business of proportion. Which, says Euclid, est mutua quaedam habitudo, etc. that is in plain English (Lesle. p. 7.) proportion is a what-shall-I-call-it isness, or soness; or, say you, (Lesle. p. 16.) a whatshicalt habitude of two quantities. I wonder where the modesty of these Euclidists lies, that they should not perceive the bawdiness of this quaedam: all which they might have easily avoided, if with me they had said proportio est relatio etc. and truly 'twas worth the writing a Book on purpose to leave out quaedam, and put in relatio instead of habitudo.  Phi. 
But when do I speak, Tim?  Tim. 
Speak, Sir, you speak all this while.  Phi. 
But you pick the worst and least of my exceptions against the Geometricians: for I rout them about a point, a line and every thing else of concernment.  Tim. 
How so?  Phi. 
I hold, Tim, that a point and a line are both really bodies; though in Mathematical consideration they are not.  Tim. 
What need we then trouble ourselves about such an old Metaphysical nicety, as indivisibile and divisibile in infinitum, & c.? seeing (suppose they be bodies) we are not, say you, to take notice of that in Mathematical demonstration.  Phi. 
But, Tim, there's a vast deal, a very vast deal depends upon a point having bigness, and a line breadth.  Tim. 
A vast deal indeed! if you have but the carving it out. For seeing that your squaring the circle, &c. don't well agree with the principles of Geometry; you'll shew'em a trick, and make the principles of Geometry, to comply with your squaring the circle: and then huff comes out contra fastum, etc.  Phi. 
Did you ever know me to wrest, or force any thing to comply, & c.? were you, Tim, at my elbow, when I squared the circle?  Tim. 
No: nor any body else, that I can hear of; for though you have done it twelve times over, yet several people say, 'tis still all to do.  Phi. 
I say, I have done it; and have demonstrated it too (cont. fast. p. 43.) as manifestly as any proposition in Euclid. And therefore why may not I be believed as well as other people, and why should I be said to wrest, & c.?  Tim. 
As for your being believed, Phylautus, I did never care for relying much upon any man's judgement, that looked upon self-conceit to be a moral virtue: but as for another's thing, I had it in part from yourself.  Phi. 
From myself; how so?  Tim. 
In the 41. and 43. pages of your contra fastum, etc. you tell us that had the business of punctum, linea, and some such principles of Geometry, been sooner examined and corrected; we had had squaring of circles and many other admirable things long before this time. Now I have a fancy that this sentence ought to be thus turned: viz. seeing that squaring the circle is a most admirable thing, if it would but agree with the principles of Geometry; 'tis high time now even to make 'em agree. But, which is worse than all, Phylautus, your dear friend tells you, that they won't agree yet. And whereas you have taken such vast pains to prove a point to have bigness, and a line to have breadth; he's of the mind (Heaut. p. 112.) that Cheapside is much too narrow to do the business. Therefore in my opinion, Phylautus, you had much better have suffered quae, quaedam, punctum, linea, and the rest of them to have continued, as we had them from Euclid; unless the alterations you made had been more to your profit; and the grounds you went upon more considerable. A point, say you, is a body: and why? because (de corp. p. 59) the whole earth is a point, in respect of the Heavens; Ergo. Again, a point is a body, for 'tis a mark; and the nature of a mark is to be visible: and if visible, then, say you, (Lux Mathematica p. 11.) it must be divisible: and if divisible; then say I, it must be indivisible: for we'll never stand out for one syllable. And then for a line having latitude, and being a body; that's so very plain that if it bened granted nothing, say you, (Lux Math. p. 12. 32.) can be demonstrated in Mathematics. For there's no demonstrating without Diagrams: and no Diagrams can be made without drawing of lines, and no lines can be drawn but they will have breadth. And by such niceties and whimsies as these, (of which I could give you many more instances) have you vainly endeavoured to preserve your credit, and make people believe you had great skill in the Mathematics. And the very same shifts you have made use of, to secure your Carcase, in all that you have said about Government, and Religion: being all plainly founded upon your three Cardinal virtues, Self-conceit, bad nature, and most irreligious cowardice.  Phi. 
No man ever writ two such Treatises of humane politics, and Christian politics, as I have done—  Tim. 
Those Phrases are perfectly new:  Phi. 
In both which I have given the Prince such due Authority, and such a vast power as will be a foundation of perpetual Peace, and happiness in his Kingdom.  Tim. 
'Tis a vast power indeed, Phylautus, that you have bestowed upon him; and he is very much beholding to you: for, at one stroke, it utterly destroys both himself and his Government.  Phi. 
How is that?  Tim. 
You allow him, you remember, to be the maker of all good and evil.  Phi. 
What then?  Tim. 
I would only know which way you conferred that power upon him: did you send it him in a Basket, as a token of your pure love to absolute Sovereignty: or how was it?  Phi. 
That power was originally divided amongst all his Subjects; but they all joined together, and turned over all their power of making good and evil to him.  Tim. 
Don't you believe that, Phylautus: that any man, that ever thought he had the power of making good and evil, would so part with it, as not to reserve a little for private use; or at least to keep the Receipt. And therefore you may make a noise about absolute Monarchy, and unlimited Sovereignty; and that if the Prince bened able to raise money at his pleasure, he'll catch an Ague, as certainly as if he went into the hundreds: and if he takes any advice about making of Laws, he'll have a man grow out of his side; and very tender you may seem to be of the Sovereign's health (with reflections bad enough upon our Government) but you are even with him for all your kindness: for you give him indeed a little money; but withal every subject leave to take away his throne, and life also.  Phi. 
But a subject, Tim, is one that has given up all his power, etc. and a Prince can't be removed without power.  Tim. 
But, by your principles, he can call for't again, when he thinks it for his advantage.  Phi. 
But he has promised he won't; and every man is bound to keep his promise.  Tim. 
How (according to you) is he bound? has he promised to keep his promise: or has he sworn to keep his promise; or how has he so fastened himself, but that your principles will untie him?  Phi. 
But for a man to break his promise is absurd.  Tim. 
'Tis very right: 'tis absurd; I remember it very well, in your 3d. Chapter de Cive. He that contracts, say you, in that he doth contract, denies that action to be in vain: and if he thinks himself not bound to keep it, in thinking so, he affirms the contract to be made in vain: now for a thing to be done in vain, and not in vain is a contradiction: which is absurd. Whence, say you, it follows that an injury (which is breaking of a bargain) is a kind of absurdity in conversation, as an absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation. And therefore when Oliver cut of the King's head, etc. he was guilty of an absurdity, and that's all.  Phi. 
I hated Oliver, and his practices as much as you.  Tim. 
That you might do in your heart, Phylautus: as you love Christ, when you renounce him. But your Writings favour his actions so very much, that there is not one thing that he, and his Rogues did, but upon your Principles may be easily defended: nay, and demonstrated too; and trained from Article to Article. And were not your Books much too ridiculous for people to be guided by (any further than of themselves they are debauched, and villainously bend) those two opinions alone of yours, viz. that interest is the measure of good and evil in this life; and in the next life that Heaven is only a little better than Spring-Garden; and Hell not so ill as the Counter, are at any time sufficient to set up such another pack of Rebels. And yet you are the man that have set up Princes, and established them in their Thrones: and have shown such a Generation of a Commonwealth, that (give it its due) is to be called a mortal God.  Phi. 
Methinks, Tim, you begin to be somewhat hot: but be as hot as you will, I stand to this, that no man before me had ever justly stated the rights of Princes, nor given them such power as become them.  Tim. 
You are a very liberal Gentleman indeed, Phylautus: and have granted to Princes, power in a great measure: but by chance so ridiculously blasphemous, that you'll get ne'er a Prince in the World to accept of it.  Phi. 
Can you confute—  Tim. 
Confute? what should I confute: all the madness of Bedlam crowded into one man? for once I'll try two or three instances of your bounty; and let standers by judge what kind of confutation it deserves. The first Compliment you pass upon your Prince is, that it would please his Sovereignty to umpire the business of the Creation: (a very pretty point indeed for the civil Magistrate to decide with his Sword:) i. e. whether the World was eternal, or whether it was created by God. Here's honour now for a Prince! The King of Sweden or so, if requested, may give his opinion concerning Flanders, or concerning Liberty of fishing: but Philautus' Prince is to have the arbitration of Heaven and Earth: his Prince is to determine whose the whole World is; and to whom it belongs; whether to God Almighty, or to its own self.  Phi. 
Who says that God does not govern the World?  Tim. 
I don't know indeed; but I say if the World made itself, it may even as well make shift to look after itself.  Phi. 
But I am not, Tim, against the Providence of God: but thus much I say; (the Corp. p. 204.) seeing that all knowledge comes from Phantasms; and no man can have a Phantasm of that which is infinite: and seeing that it is very laborious, and would tyre the best Philosopher to proceed from cause to cause, till he comes to the first and truly eternal cause: I say, upon these and such like accounts, I think it reasonable, that this of the Creation of the World, and all such knotty points should be left to the determination of that Authority, which has right to determine all things.  Tim. 
I think, Phylautus, I understand you: seeing that there's no man now living upon Earth, that was really and actually present at the Creation of the World; nor that did bonâ fide see, or speak face to face with any man that was: and seeing that the tallest subject, or Philosopher that any Prince has, can't stand upon his threshold, and from thence look to the furthest end of the World, unless he cuts down the great Pear-tree; nor can stand so long upon one leg, hopping from cause to cause, but that if he hops long enough he may be tired; therefore we Prince, by the Authority aforesaid, do declare and determine that the World had no beginning, but was eternal. Given at our Court— dasho.  Phi. 
I don't say 'tis so to be determined: but that he that has the supreme Authority (seeing the case is very doubtful, and too difficult to be determined by natural reasons;) may determine it so, if he please.  Tim. 
Yes doubtless: and that by right and virtue of the first-fruits.  Phi. 
The first-fruits! what first-fruits?  Tim. 
Don't you remember, Sir, that the dispute concerning the Creation of the World is the first-fruits of all disputable questions: and upon that account the decision of that controversy as first-fruits belong to him, that has the supreme power?  Phi. 
I done't easily call to mind the meaning of these first-fruits.  Tim. 
Look, Sir, but the above-quoted place de Corp. and you'll soon perceive it. For say you there; as Almighty God when he had brought his people into Judaea, allowed the Priests the first-fruits reserved to himself; so when he had delivered up the World to the disputations of men, it was his pleasure that all opinions concerning the nature of infinite and eternal (as the Creation of the World and the like) known only to himself should (as the first fruits of wisdom) be judged by those to whom he had given the supreme Authority. I wonder, Sir, you should forget such an admirable reflection as this: Judaea being so very like the many disputations that are in the World; and that concerning the Creation so very like first-fruits. But if you please, Phylautus, we'll go on to the next Compliment you bestow upon your Prince. And truly if there ever was a Compliment to purpose, this is one: 'tis down, and down, and down again to the ground.  Phi. 
What is it, Tim?  Tim. 
'Tis such a swinger, I can scarce get it out: 'tis only, Sir, whether there be a God or not?  Phi. 
Whether there be a God or not? what shall the Civil Magistrate (whom I never granted to be more than God's Lieutenant, Leu. p. 361.) determine whether there be a God or not?  Tim. 
Shall he? why not? for all knowledge comes from Phantasms, etc. and no body whom we can trust, has lately seen or discoursed with God Almighty: and 'tis plainly a first-fruits-disputation; i. e. concerning infinite and eternal: and all first-fruits disputations belong to the Magistrate.  Phi. 
Whom do you mean: the Hangman? (Lett. to Dr. W. p. 36.)  Tim. 
That's a very good hit: I perceive Phylautus begins to be a little angry; and when so, than a Magistrate, forsooth, in strictness of speech, signifies only some Officer of the Sovereigns, not the Sovereign himself. But you may go on, Phylautus; and, if I had occasion for any Latin, I'd put in quae and quaedam too: for I love to cross a man, that is made wholly up of such starched curiosities. And therefore, I say, you have so far honoured your Prince or Magistrate, that if he please indeed there shall be a God; but if he be out of humour, there shall be none at all.  Phi. 
What, can he pluck God Almighty out of his Throne: and banish him out of the World?  Tim. 
That, Phylautus, is a little more than he can do; but (by your great bounty to him) he can banish him out of his Kingdom; or if he can't do it alone, he's to call in the assistance of all his subjects.  Phi 
I guess how you mean, Tim; the Prince, I warrant you, is one day or other, to put out a Proclamation against the existence o●… a God: and this is to be posted up at every Corner of the streets. Can't I, in passing by, pull off my Hat very low, and cry Vous avez Mr. Prince: and for all that walk religiously home; believing and trusting in God every step that I set; and praising him for all the good Victuals that I have eaten, and all the great victories that I have obtained, over such as out of envy have endeavoured to answer my Books?  Tim. 
But suppose, Phylautus, he sends Poker for you, with an Halberd or a Musket.  Phi. 
He need not trouble himself so far: for I am passed those vanities, and had much rather go to him privately, than in such pomp.  Tim. 
And when you come there, he tells you that he has been that Morning running o'er the World, and the affairs thereof; and, upon the whole, he can't find that there is any God besides himself. What would you then say, Phylautus?  Phi. 
I should beg his pardon as to that, as great as he is; and tell him plainly that I know what belongs to a God better than he; and I know that he is no more than God's Lieutenant; and that I am more obliged to God (being more powerful) for the several kindnesses that I have received from him, and the great mischief that he may do me, than I ever was or can be to him.  Tim. 
But if upon that, Phylautus, the Lieutenant cocks his Hat, stamps, looks stern and big; and says that he is sure, he is very sure that there is nothing (either in Heaven or Earth) better or greater than himself; and that you shall be sure of it too, before he and you part. What shall we do now, Phylautus?  Phi. 
Ha! how is't? cocks, stamps, stern, big?  Tim. 
Yes; 'tis just so: come I'll tell you what you'd say, Sir:— truly says Phylautus, Majesty is not to be put out of humour for every small matter: 'tis pity the Prince should spoil his Hat with cocking it; or his shoes with stamping, or his countenance with frowning: meekness becomes a subject; and therefore I'll be silent. But being silent, Phylautus, won't serve your turn: for you must pronounce with a clear and loud voice that he, before whom you now stand, is not God's Lieutenant, but God himself: and not only so, but that he is the Almighty, Omnipotent and Eternal God; who, when you were asleep Created you, and all things else; but especially his own great Grandfather; you must say, pronounce, and subscribe all this; or else— You need not go on, says Phylautus, I am yours, I am yours, Sir: for what is a true Prince but one, to whom all the right and power of the whole Kingdom is transferred: and if he comes to his Sovereignty by right of succession I have (Leu. p. 99) proved such Sovereignty to be a kind of eternity. So that he understands nothing at all of the Generation of a Commonwealth that sticks in the least to grant every absolute Monarch to be Almighty, Omnipotent and Eternal. But you have not done yet, Phylautus, for after all this you must engage to worship the Prince with the very same words, and same postures, as you use to do God Almighty: praying unto him for health, long life, rain, fair-weather and the like: and this you must do so loud, that all your Neighbours may hear you; and besides, that they may think you to be in good earnest; you must take all public occasions to curse and blaspheme God, in the most affronting and defying words that can be invented.— That's a little odd, says Phylautus, that a Prince, let him be as absolute as he can, should be able to make it rain or hold up. But, now I think of it, by right of subjection I have made over my whole body, and every limb of it to his service: and therefore, if the Prince will send my tongue upon such an errand, it must not refuse to go, no more than my legs, if they were spoken to. And then, says Phylautus, as for cursing, blaspheming, etc. God knows my mind well enough as to that: i. e. how I worship him in my heart; and what honour and service I have done to his Church, to himself and the whole Trinity by my several writings. But still, Phylautus, the Prince is not so absolutely secure of you, but you may give him a bob at last. For you know there is a very strong report in this part of the World, that many years agone there was one, that called himself the Christ, that appeared upon earth: and he taught that it was better to listen to him, than to the commands of Princes; and he said that he came from God, and that he was the true and only Son of God; and, by many things that he said and did, made several to believe the same. Now, if this be so, Phylautus, this will be a notable check and rebuff to the unlimited Authority of your Prince. And therefore, if you intent to be a Subject quite through, you must needs also renounce Christ: ('tis a small matter, for Christ, you know, is no more God the Son, than Moses was God the Father.) and believe there never was any such person; but that he was a mere Impostor, or a cheat of the Kingdom of darkness— to that, replies Phylautus; I must confess, most unlimited and irresistible Sir, that of all things now visible upon ea●…th, you are to me the greatest and most obliging; and your opini●…n upon all accounts I am bound to adore: for it is by your great interest in your own Dominions as well as elsewhere, that I continue in fame and health, and am protected from the barbarous insolences of my Adversaries. But whereas 'tis your Princely pleasure to command me not to believe in Christ; (with humble submission to your irresistibility) I think you are, as it were, mistaken: for whatever you appoint 〈◊〉 to do in affront to Christ; I can therein deceive you, believing on him in my heart: and should your almighty inclinations proceed further, and force me to deny and forswear such beli●…f (with all imaginable dread again be it spoken) 'tis not my heart but my tongue alone that denies or forswears, etc.  Phi. 
But how do you know, Tim, that I'll say or do any of these things? did you ever see me tried?  Tim. 
No: but above twenty years ago you promised to do them all in several places of your Leviathan. And I know you'll be as good as your word; because you desire Mr. Godolphin (in your Ep. Ded. to him) to tell all people that are offended at that Book, that you love your own opinions. If, say you, (Leu. p. 360.) I want rain, fair weather or any thing else that God alone can bestow on me; and out of my own humour, wantonness, or opinion, I make solemn Prayer for such things to him who has the supreme Authority; by doing so, I am certainly a very wicked man, and an absolute Idolater; because out of my own heart I give unto the civil Magistrate that worship which is alone due unto God: but if I be compelled to this by the terror of death, or any other corporal punishment, I may then do it very safely; without any offence to God Almighty, or scandal to my Neighbour. Well done Carcase! and thus have we turned off Moses, or God the Father: now let's see how we can get rid of Christ, or God the Son: if, say you, (Leu. p. 27.) a King, Senate, or other Sovereign person forbid me to believe in Christ (if he does not hear me) I'll say he talks nonsense; because belief and unbelief are not subject to men's commands. For faith is a gift of God (that comes well out of Philautus' mouth) which men can neither give nor take away by promise of rewards, or menaces of torture. But if the lawful Prince (being aware of such subtlety) urges further, that I should say with my tongue I believe not in Christ; I can he too cunning for him there also; for I still do but say so: and therefore rather than I'll displease my lawful Prince (O Heavens! how do I love and honour myself, and a lawful Prince!) it shall be done, and aught to be done. For profession with the tongue is but an external thing, and no more than any other gesture whereby we signify our obedience. Rarely come off Carcase again!  Phi. 
I must confess that to this purpose I do speak: and very nigh in the same words: and let Theologers object what they can, I can most easily prove myself to be a true subject of the Christian City; that is, a Son of Christ's Church, and an Heir of that Salvation which he has bargained for.  Tim. 
Prove, Sir? never in my life did I meet with your fellow for proving: especially considering what inferior tools you work withal. For you shall talk less morality than a Turk, and less Christianity than a Jew; (for you shall not only swear that Christ is not as yet come, but that he shall never come:) and yet give you but a little Country motion, and ordinary Grammar, and you shall presently be at perch with the Primitive Christians. I deny Christ, suppose, and when that's done I swear that I do it from the very bottom of my Soul: What of all this, says Phylautus? denying and swearing too are both mere forms of speech: and speech is but words: and words are but motion: and therefore that Divine that talks of Blasphemy or Heresy coming out of a man's mouth, whose heart is truly firm; he may as well gape for Blasphemy or Heresy at thè spout of a pair of Bellows. Besides, says Phylautus, people may prate against my professing with my tongue and so forth; but (to go to the bottom of the business) he that knows but the very first Elements of Government, knows that I have no Tongue at all: for 'tis one of the Prince's Tongues that I wear in my mouth: and what's that to me, or any body else what the Prince does with his own tongue? and then, says Phylautus again: what wondering is here at my speaking two or three words? is speaking any thing more than a mere gesture of the tongue? and did Naaman, I pray (when he was allowed to go into the House of Rimmon) leave his tongue at home? did not his tongue also bow together with his head? and did it not, as it were, nod and give consent to what his head and shoulders did? and then in the last place, says Phylautus; as for the several places of Scripture which the ecclesiastics bring against me: such as those of our Saviour; whosoever denyeth me before men, I will deny him before my Father which is in Heaven: and ye shall be brought before Governors and Kings for my sake, etc. and fear not them that kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul, etc. 'tis plain, that they done't at all understand the History of that Gospel, by which they live: for though our Saviour, at the first planting of Christianity, commanded his Disciples and Apostles that they should not be daunted, nor give in; but rather suffer any thing, than not stand to the Faith: yet, thanks be to God, says Phylautus, such advice is now needless: for Christian Religion is very well spread and settled now; and has got great footing in the World; and a man may either profess or renounce it (according as it lies for his hand) with a great deal less danger, and inconvenience than formerly: and therefore if two or three subjects in a Kingdom should utterly forsake Christ, there's still enough: and if two or three Kingdoms should do the like; there's still more Kingdoms: and if (the Turk prevailing) Europe, Asia and the rest of the whole World should also do the same; yet Christ is still Christ: and he has had a fine time of it. And there will be a joyful meeting, and great doings about Jerusalem, at the general resurrection: and I hope to be as merry then, as the best of 'em. There be, continueth Phylautus, I know those who understanding neither Grammar, nor the History of the Gospel shall tell you that, let what will come, they'll not part with Christ; no not for a thousand Worlds. They'll die, yea and that a thousand Deaths. Die on, says Phylautus; for this is mere Vainglory, and affected Apostleship; and all for want of a good Dictionary. For Martyr (Leu. p. 272.) is a Greek word; (which they, poor Creatures! suffer themselves to be knocked off the head, and never think of;) and signifies a witness, an eye-witness; and especially such an one as saw Christ be●…ore, and after his Resurrection: which few, I suppose, now alive will pretend to have done: or so much as to have seen those that did see Christ: and if there be any such as these latter, they are but Martyrs at the second hand; that is, Martyrs of Christ's Martyrs. And therefore if any man has a mind to put himself upon any inconvenience, or run himself into any danger upon the account of Christian Religion, I wish him a good Journey; but I pity him no more than one that should skip off a Steeple, for fear he should stumble in coming down the stairs. Here's a Christian Politician for you, or a true Member not of Christ's Church, (for that's vulgar) but of the Christian City!  Phi. 
I say, Tim, that Martyr does signify a witness.  Tim. 
And so does amo signify to love.  Phi. 
That's false; for in strictness of speech it signifies I love.  Tim. 
How quick and nimble Phylautus is? well, suppose then that Martyr does signify a witness: are you willing to be such an one for our Saviour?  Phi. 
That is, will I who was born within these hundred years, be willing to be born above sixteen hundred years ago? well guessed Tim!  Tim. 
You shall then, Phylautus, be a Martyr of a Martyr. I'd fain have you into some employment.  Phi. 
How can I be any such thing? I never met in my Travels with any of the Apostles or Disciples, that were sent into the World to be Witnesses of the Resurrection: and no man can glory in being a Martyr unless he be sent; and he must be sent to Infidels too: for what need (Leu. p. 273.) a witness of Christ be sent to those, that have had sufficient witnesses already?  Tim. 
If that be all, Phylautus, we'll speed the Commission, and you shall be sent, etc.  Phi. 
But, I tell you, I had rather stay at home, than be cut o' the Crown like a Goose, to be a Martyr, of a Martyr, of a Martyr, of I know not whom, or what.  Tim. 
I see this Martyrdom (or Greek affliction) won't down with you, Phylautus; will you, if need be, for Christ's sake suffer a little in plain English? we'll engage you shan't be abused, and called Martyr: nor have any such improper, and unfashionable word written upon your Tomb.  Phi. 
How much would you have me suffer: what, dye?  Tim. 
Suppose such a thing should be, Phylautus: according to Christian Politics, you'll clearly be a saver by't; when you meet Christ at Jerusalem. For when he comes to reign here upon Earth, he has promised, you know, to make very much of those (you may chance to be Chief Secretary of State) who are faithful to the end. And his Kingdom, you know, is a dainty fine Kingdom: and worth two or three of the Kingdoms of England.  Phi. 
But 'tis a great way, Tim, to go for preferment to Jerusalem: and it may be a great while, before Christ will come to have his Court there.  Tim. 
I believe indeed it may; after that childish, ridiculous, gross, profane manner that you describe. Are you not ashamed, Phylautus, to pretend to Wit, Philosophy, Mathematics, etc. and to go about to face, and huff down God Almighty, and our Saviour, with such intolerable fooleries as first-fruits, Martyr, etc. Was ever old fop so utterly benumb ', and besotted, as to turn Providence out of the World, to prevent tumults and uproars; and to think to compliment his Prince, by offering such saucy and witless affronts to God himself? I'll undertake, Phylautus, give but a very smallwit sufficient impudence, profaneness, and a Glass of Wine, he shall abuse the Scriptures, scoff at Heaven, and talk better and more reasonable Atheism ex tempore, than you have laboured into all your grave Periods.  Phi. 
hay day! how huffing and swaggering is this Tim, because he has got a few of those same Churchmen on his side? who are for a spiritual Commonwealth; not minding what I learn them (Leu. p. 317.) that there are no men on earth whose bodies are spiritual; and therefore there can be no spiritual Commonwealth amongst men that are yet in the flesh. I say, Tim, some such as these, that talk of a spiritual-body-politick you may have on your side; but I am sure all the great Wits, and the men of depth, and business go all my way.  Tim. 
And my Lord Bacon is your way too.  Phi. 
If he were now alive, 'tis likely he would.  Tim. 
Yes very likely: for, says he, in his Essays, it is true, that a little Philosophy inclineth man's mind to Atheism, but depth in Philosophy bringeth men's minds about to Religion.  Phi. 
This now is very scurrilous, and most uncharitably said: and if the Bishop of Durham were now alive—  Tim. 
What should he do?  Phi. 
He should testify, Tim, to the confusion of all my slanderers, (Ep. Ded. to his Majesty) how godlily I behaved myself, when I was ready to die: and what a sound and clear Conscience I had.  Tim. 
Conscience? that's good indeed! Conscience, you know, is only when one looks over your shoulder, or in at the Keyhole. For, you remember, there must be two at least, to make up a true Grammatical Conscience; (because of cum and scio:) and as for any other Conscience (Leu. p. 31.) i. e. knowledge of ones own secret facts or thoughts, that's only a Metaphorical or Rhetorical Conscience. But I pray, Phylautus, after what manner did you confess to the Bishop? did you confess with your tongue, or how?  Phi. 
With my tongue? what, Tim, wouldst thou have men confess with their Legs, or Shoulders?  Tim. 
Truly, Phylautus, you are such a movable, slippery, and Philosophical kind of Christian, that I think the Church ought to appoint a peculiar sort of confession for you. For if, after you were recovered, you had but met with any body that had a little scared you, you should have unconfessed all again; and have sworn, and cursed, that you did but droll with the Bishop.  Phi. 
Under favour, Tim, that's a lie. For I only say that if my Lawsul Prince or the supreme Magistrate require any such thing, for Peace sake, and to preserve my life I am bound to obey.  Tim. 
And I say, that if the lawsul Ostler, or supreme Magistrate of the Stables, should take you into his office, and show you but a switch (for that may Gangrene) I understand the Principles of your fidelity, and Christian courage so well, that, were he so wicked as to demand it, you should not only renounce all belief in Christ, but all allegiance to your lawsul Prince too: for a breathing time, you know, is very desirable, and whilst he has you in his power, he's to you as good a Lieutenant of God, as any Prince upon earth. And Naaman the Syrian (Leu. p. 271.) shall do for all; for the Ostler, as well as for the Prince himself.  Phi. 
For my part, Tim, I can't see (when compelled) why I may not allow myself as much liberty, as the Prophet did to him.  Tim. 
But how are you sure, Phylautus, that the Prophet allowed him any at all? for there be some, and those learned too, who question whether go in peace signify Naaman's waiting still upon his Master, etc. or whether he should forthwith leave his service. But suppose it does; do you think, Phylautus, that what Naaman did (which may several ways be imagined to be far enough from Idolatry) will countervail, or void all those several plain places of Scripture, that are most absolutely against your whimsycal, and profane opinion? but Philautus' Divinity is like the Gentleman's, who (a little before he was to suffer for padding) being asked by his Confessor how he came to follow that employment: told him, that he took it up from Gods advising the Israelites to spoil the Egyptians; which to him, he said, was a plain place for robbing at any time, and any where: whereas thou shalt not steal, and the like, were all typical and metaphorical; and only true upon some occasions. But 'tis wonderfully strange to me that his Majesty should suffer it—  Phi. 
Suffer what, suffer me—  Tim. 
No, Sir: suffer his spiteful, ambitious Priests to preach in his Chapel against you.  Phi. 
So 'tis, Tim: and I make bold to tell his Majesty to that purpose, in an Epistle Dedicatory to him.  Tim. 
And you did very well so to do, Sir: for Naaman will do against the whole Bible; and a line or two out of Tertullian (nothing to the purpose) against all the Fathers. And seeing you are so firmly fixed in the Catholic Faith, and are so condescending and dutiful to all lawful Princes, certainly they ought to be very careful to check and rebuke the adversaries of such a dear and devout Subject. And therefore let's see if we can't find never another Compliment for the Prince. If I bened mistaken (Leu. p. 205.) there is a pretty obliging one: viz. that if the Civil Magistrate please, he may take away the word of God (for we have had it even long enough) and instead thereof, give us Gusman, your Leviathan, or whatever else he thinks most convenient for his Commonwealth. For in the first place 'tis plain say you, that the Book which is now called the word of God is not really and grammatically the word of God: i. e. 'tis neither the Noun of God, nor the Verb of God, nor any other part of Speech of God. But, be it what it will, it obliges no further than the Civil Magistrate pleaseth: who by making it law, made it first to oblige; and by repealing that Law can make it not to oblige. The Old Testament indeed was a Law, but to the Jews only, never to us. The New Testament never was a Law to any body at all, till 'twas made so by Princes and Emperors. For Christ was no Lawgiver: neither (if he had made any Laws) had he any Kingdom to practise in: neither did he by his civil Authority command any thing; but only advised and counselled, etc. and sent out the Apostles to do the like; who were to fish and allure; (Leu. p. 270.) not like Nimrods' by coercition and punishing to hunt men into Christianity.  Phi. 
Most of this is true, Tim: but first of all I must chastise thee, for thy great saw●…yness in comparing my Leviathan to such a Raskallionscoundrel-Book as Gusman: and in the next place, for supposing me to be ambitious of having the Bibles turned out of Churches, and my Leviathan made Canonical.  Tim. 
As for Gusman, Phylautus, I am not, I must confess, much skilled in that Author; (and if I were, it would take up a little too long time to debate the business throughly between you two) but if that Book bened ten times worse than any I ever saw yet, I don't question but it will furnish out a much honester Gentleman, a more faithful subject, and a truer Christian than yours shall do. And then as for your Leviathan being made Canon; you know well enough, Phylautus, 'twas a thing you yourself were not without some hopes of.  Phi. 
What, Tim, did I ever hope, wish, or desire that my Leviathan might be appointed by Act of Parliament to be publicly read in all Churches, instead of the Bible?  Tim. 
You shall hear, Sir: Seeing, say you, (Leu. p. 293.) that neither Plato nor any other Philosopher hitherto, hath put into order and sufficiently proved all the Theorems of moral doctrine, that men may learn thereby how to govern, and how to obey; I recover some hopes, say you, that one time or other, this writing of mine may fall into the hands of a Sovereign, who will consider it himself (for 'tis short, and I think clear) without the help of any interessed, or envious interpreter; and by the exercise of entire Sovereignty, in protecting the public teaching of it, convert this truth of speculation, into the utility of practice. 'Tis worth any Sovereign's pains indeed, to take a progress of a year or two to settle and protect in his Kingdom a Company of such speculations, which, if practised, would (for all your kindness to him) certainly ruin him.  Phi. 
But here's not a word, Tim, of my ever hoping that the Bible should give way to my Leviathan. What made you say that I had any such expectation or ambition?  Tim. 
Don't you remember, Phylautus, what a huffing challenge you once sent to a Doctor of Divinity: how that you and your Leviathan should preach with him and his Bible? and that without any such ceremonious foolery as ordination; only the Sovereign should lend you one of his Lifeguard to see you into the Pulpit, and to bang those that would not believe you. If, say you (as I take it 'tis in your Stigmai) the Sovereign power give me command (though without the ceremony of imposition of hands) to teach the doctrine of my Leviathan in the Pulpit, why am not I, if my doctrine and life be as good as yours, a Minister as well as you. Right; why are you not? for 'tis plain that you have the word of command, as well as the Doctor; and a Minister has nothing more. And as for Authority, you are well enough with him; for if he swaggers, and produces the Bishop's Orders; then can you bid your Lifeguard man swagger too, and cock his Pistols: and then as to the Book that is preached out of, there's no difference at all between you. For you preaching out of your Leviathan preach out of a Bible, as well as he. For a Bible (in Greek) is only a Book: and most certainly your Leviathan is a Book: and a most rare one too. But I pray, Phylautus, how came it into your mind that the word of God does not oblige as much, (if not a little more) than the word of a Prince? I must confess indeed that in the beginning of the 36th Chapter of your Leviathan, you have a very notable observation concerning the word of God (as was just now hinted) which, I don't remember, I ever met with in any Author: but I don't see, but that it may oblige for all that, without the supreme Magistrate's drawing his sword. When there is mention, say you, of the word of God, it doth not signify a part of speech such as Grammarians call a Noun or a Verb, or any simple voice, without a contexture of other words to make it significative; but a perfect speech or discourse, whereby the speaker affirmeth, denieth, commandeth, promiseth, wisheth, or interrogateth: (I profess Phylautus would have been a thundering Preacher: how he pours it out! affirmeth, denieth, commandeth, etc.) in which sense 'tis not vocabulum, that signifies a word (I pray, Gentlemen, remember that, and turn down a proof;) 'tis not vocabulum but sermo (in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) that is, some speech, discourse or saying. Without doubt, if the Sovereign had sent out Phylautus, this same had been the beginning of his first holding forth. 'Tis a most admirable introduction to a body of Divinity. But to proceed, Phylautus, suppose the word of God (as you have most painfully and learnedly made it out) is neither Noun, Pronoun, Verb, Participle, nor any of the rest, but only the speech or discourse of God: I pray do so much as let me know (I desire it once more) some of your best reasons why this same speech, or discourse of God (seeing you'll so have it) does not oblige us to believe it and practise it, unless it be authorised by Kettledrums, and Trumpets.  Phi. 
Best reasons? what an impudent trick is this of Tim, to call for my best reasons? any surely are good enough for such a fellow as thou art: in the first place, if thou canst, thou art to understand that whatever was laid down by Christ himself, or his Apostles after him, as it was laid down by him or them, never did, neither does it now at all oblige.  Tim. 
I am such a fool, Phylautus, that methinks I had much rather mind, and observe what our Saviour said, than any thing that can be commanded by the General of an Army.  Phi. 
You may mind and observe what you will; but (take that from me) you'll have little thanks for your labour. For it does not at all oblige, (Leu. p. 284, 285.) as propounded by him.  Tim. 
Why so?  Phi. 
Because 'tis not Canonical.  Tim. 
Canonical? did not Christ and they that followed him give Articles of Faith, and rules of an holy life?  Phi. 
Yes: but neither he nor any of his Successors did ever lay down one obligatory Canon. For such a Canon is a Rule authorised and enjoined by the Commonwealth, etc. and that only is truly said to be Canonical, which is allowed of, and made Canonical by the Sovereign: that is to say which is made Law in any Kingdom: for a Law is the commandment of that man, or assembly to whom we have given—  Tim. 
Really, Phylautus, if you don't leave that trick, I'll get a new man to talk withal.  Phi. 
What trick?  Tim. 
You can't come near the word Law, but presently you spring forth— for a Law is the commandment of that man or assembly, etc. and when 'tis every whit to as little purpose, as 'tis here.  Phi. 
To as little purpose? by the definition alone of a Law, namely, that a Law is the commandment of that man, or—  Tim. 
What, shall we have it again?  Phi. 
I say, by that definition of a Law it is very evident that not any one Rule or precept in the whole New-Testament was an obligatory Canon: i. e. did really oblige any man living till the New-Testament was made Law. And I am sure it never was made Law till—  Tim. 
Till when? till 'twas made Law. That's all that Phylautus will engage for: for he's a very wary Gamester, and he's as sure as can be that the Gospel was never publicly owned, nor appointed by any Prince to be read in any Kingdom or Commonwealth; till that very day, hour, and minute that it was so owned, and appointed, etc. Phylautus, I say, is very sure of this; and thus much he will certainly undertake for, and no more.  Phi. 
'Tis false: for I undertake further to show, that whatever our Saviour propounded to be done in order to Salvation (till obedience thereunto was commanded by the Soveraign-Ruler) was so far from obliging, that every man, without the least injustice, might refuse to observe—  Tim. 
For injustice, (should you have said) is a breach of the commandment of that man, or assembly—  Phi. 
Should have said? what, Tim, dost thou undertake to teach me what I should have said: done't I know when to break of, and when to go on?  Tim. 
Indeed, Sir, I think that in all right the definition of injustice ought to have come in there: for then the business had been plainly demonstrated.  Phi. 
'Tis plainly demonstrable, Tim, that any man might refuse to obey whatever our Saviour said (till 'twas made Law) without being unjust at all.  Tim. 
Without being unjust? to whom do you mean, Phylautus?  Phi. 
To whom can a man be unjust but to his lawful Sovereign; and to those with whom he contracts according to the Laws of his Country.  Tim. 
Yes, yes: so I thought: I knew as well as could be, that the demonstration would be thereabouts.  Phi. 
What did you know, Tim?  Tim. 
I know this, Phylautus; that a man may neglect to obey the precepts of Christ, and yet not be at all guilty of transporting of Leather, or Wool.  Phi. 
How do you mean, Tim?  Tim. 
I mean this, Phylautus; suppose I (being a subject of a Kingdom wherein there were no positive Laws against swearing or private Revenge, but plain and severe ones against transportation of Leather, and Wool) had been present at our Saviour's Sermon; and believed him and his doctrine: but notwithstanding had still continued a great swearer, and a most revengeful wretch; thus far I durst venture to say (and truly you may safely go along with me) that swearing, to define it strictly, is not transportation of Leather, neither is revenge transportation of Wool.  Phi. 
Nor are they a direct breach of any other particular Law of the Kingdom.  Tim. 
How can they possibly be? what are you mad, Phylautus? would you have those things to be a breach of the Laws of that Kingdom, which we have supposed not to have taken notice of any such things? never certainly did Catchpole, Pettifogger, Forger of Wills, more entangle, shuffle, wrest, scrape, and patch, etc. to bring about their villainous designs: than you have racked and tortured those two poor words of Law and Justice to make yourself singular in Irreligion. And as in your Morals, you have thereby endeavoured to debauch humane nature, and to taint the very foundations of practical reason: so here you use the same silly artifice to frustrate the intentions of Christ's coming into the World, and to void the obligation of those Precepts that he left behind him.  Phi. 
You much mistake me, Tim, if you think me to be against Christ, or his Precepts: for Faith in him, and obedience to Laws is all that I count necessary to Salvati●…n. But thus much I say further, that nothing which either our Saviour or his Apostles propounded was truly Law, or did oblige; for neither he, nor they had any Kingdom. And though there were many Kingdoms in the World; over which Christ, if he had pleased, might have challenged to himself the Sovereign Power; yet 'tis plain, that he utterly disowned all such public and Regal authority, by saying, my Kingdom is not of this World. Now, say I, (Leu. p. 286.) they that have no Kingdom, can make no Laws.  Tim. 
Well rhymed, Phylautus! Kingdom and Law.  Phi. 
Why, can any man, Tim, make a Law, that is, give out some rule to be observed in a Nation, who has no Nation to give it to? must not a man have Sovereign right to do it, and strength and authority to make it take effect?  Tim. 
Truly, Phylautus, I cannot forbear to say, that if a private Country-Gentleman, in a rainy day, should contrive a set of Laws; and send them, by the packet Boats into Foreign Countries, to look for a Nation, and people to observe them; but that some of his Laws may chance to come home again unobserved.  Phi. 
No question, Tim, but that they would: and the reason is because all Nations are ready stocked; and there's never a void Nation for the Gentleman to vent his Laws in: and a Law is no Law, but where it is, or aught to be obeyed.  Tim. 
But, I suppose, you don't look upon our Saviour (who was immediately sent from God, and whom we believe, not minding what you do, to be the Son of God) to be only a private person. Surely, Phylautus, if you believe any God at all, you must also believe that he can both make and protect Laws without dispossessing of Princes, and keeping his standing Armies. You may remember that Christ could violently have been rescued by twelve Legions of Angels: and could have sent for as many to have enforced his Doctrine: which if he had done, then possibly it might have agreed with your great curiosity to have admitted his Precepts to have had the force of Laws: but, why do I talk to Phylautus of such vain-Philosophy as twelve Legions of Angels; which to him are only twelve Legions of Phantasms; all to be discomfited with the brandishing of Horn-knives, and the blast of Elder-Guns?  Phi. 
I done't at all regard, Tim, any of all this: being most fully assured that I never read that Christ was chosen supreme Magistrate of any place.  Tim. 
Neither did you, I warrant you, ever read that he was so much as chosen Overseer, or Churchwarden of any Parish.  Phi. 
You are profane, Tim.  Tim. 
I bless God, that I believe Christ to be his Son; and that I am more obliged to observe his Precepts (without your indulgent favouring them to be termed Laws) than the most immediate and direct commands of all the Princes in the World: and he that believes otherwise, I suppose, is the man that justly deserves the title of profane.  Phi. 
You may believe what you will, Tim: but 'tis plain that Christ never took upon himself the Government of any Nation; neither would he accept of any place of authority or public employment.  Tim. 
And I pray, Phylautus, what do you think might be the reason of it? done't you think it was for fear people should not only believe his doctrine, but count themselves obliged to practise it? was not that, Phylautus, think you the business? was it not to prevent some such great absurdity and inconvenience that might have happened in the World? whereas now every one enjoys a most reasonable and blessed Liberty: and if the Gospel stands with a man's convenience, and be the fashionable Book at Court, it may then be read and practised not without some delight, and benefit: but when it either crosses my own particular interest, or the irresistible humour of my most dreadful Prince, thanks be to God, there be other judicious and practical Authors, in which a retired and studious Gentleman may make shift to spend his time, without any ways disobliging Gods second representative, Jesus Christ. This, Phylautus, is such a kind of devout meditation as, I suppose, you take bedward. And from hence any one, that is not utterly blind, may plainly perceive, what it is that you count obligation: that is, when a man is so chained, roped or chorded down to his bargain that he can't possibly avoid submitting to't; such a man and none else will you allow to be truly obliged. Neither must he be fastened with such Chains and Chords as the joys and terrors of another life; for they are at a great distance, and with Phylautus, very metaphorical: but he is for visible Grammatical Hemp, and Iron, such as grow upon, and is digged out of the Earth. Where these things be, there's reason, law, justice, and obligation; but where they are missing, a man is as free as any fish in the Ocean. Thus if a man, suppose, has an hundred pound weight of shackles about him, and be under good store of locks; I believe Phylautus will grant such an one to be very properly and strictly obliged not to ride an Hunting: and if a man has half a dozen Pikes tickling him at the tail, 'tis likely that he also may be looked upon a sobliged to march on: but if I privately without either witness or writings borrow a hundred pounds of a friend—  Phi. 
If you do, you ought to pay it him again, upon demand.  Tim. 
I ought? why so; how am I obliged? where's the shackles, where's the Pikes, & c?  Phi. 
But you know well enough, Tim, that you did really and truly borrow of him so much money.  Tim. 
Yes, Sir, that I do very well: but do you think, Phylautus, that when a Gentleman has entrusted me with such a great secret as an hundred pounds, that I am such a great Booby, as to blab out this in open Court?  Phi. 
But you forget Conscience all this while, Tim.  Tim. 
No more than you have forgotten it in all your writings. Can't I say to Conscience, Couchée Conscience: down Conscience: close and be still Conscience. That man certainly is a very passionate fool, that has so little command of his mouth, as not to be able to keep it shut, when 'tis so much to his disadvantage to open it. And se●…ing we are fallen upon Conscience, Phylautus, let us put one case more: suppose you find a Neighbour of yours in a Ditch, just ready to perish: whose life, by wetting the end of your Cane, you might easily preserve—  Phi. 
O, help him out, help him out, by all means. What a Man, a Neighbour, and a Christian and not help him out!  Tim. 
To what purpose? do you owe him a helping out, or do you lay in one aforehand? you don't consider, Phylautus, that the end of your Cane being wetted may catch cold; and this cold (by motion) may creep up to your hand; and seizing your hand, by degrees it may get into the whole mass of blood: and so bring you into some dangerous distemper; a distemper that may cost you another confession: and if the Bishop be out of the way; you must then send for the Lord Lieutenant of the County: for he'll do as well as t'other being commissioned by the Prince: and, of the two, is the best and safest Conf●…ssour: for he is one of the immediate Lieutenants, under God's Lieutenant; and, if need be, can raise all his Militia, to defend such a confession as he and you shall agree upon. I say, Phylautus, seeing your helping him out may occasion you so much trouble, if I were you, I'd even let our Neighbour pass on in the business, he has begun. For if you done't, there is still one much greater mischief that you don't think of.  Phi. 
What's that?  Tim. 
If, Phylautus, you help him out of the Ditch now: you must needs so contrive it, that he may help you out another time.  Phi. 
To what end, I prithee, Tim, should I wet and endanger myself when I need not?  Tim. 
There is a most absolute necessity of it. For if you omit to do't; this Neighbour of yours will be your utter Enemy, despise you, hate you, and as certainly contrive your death, as you helped him out of the Ditch.  Phi. 
If I thought so, Tim, he should even have gone on, for all Phylautus, till he came to the bottom. What, shall I be thus rewarded for my great pains, and clemency? shall he conspire to take away my life, because I endangered mine own, to save his? this truly is very fine ingenuity, and morality!  Tim. 
'Tis just such ingenuous morality as you teach your Disciples, and would have them to practise. To have received, (say you, Leu. p. 481.) from one, to whom we think ourselves equal, greater benefits than there is hope to requite, disposeth to counterfeit love; (mere cou●…terfeit love: he may come, Phylautus, to your Bedside Morning and Evening, and there ask you blessing, and pretend to adore and worship you; but all this is only to spy out some cunning place to lay a Barrel of Gunpowder, and to blow you up: for, as you go on very morally) such benefits do really produce secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate Debtor, that in declining the sight of his Creditor, tacitly wishes him there, where he might never see him more. (That would be just your case, Phylautus; for the ingenuous Neighbour, whom you have so much obliged, may, as was said, pretend to come to see you, but at his heart he wishes ten thousand Devils would fetch you away, so that he might never see you again) for, as you further go on, benefits oblige; and obligation is thraldom; and unrequitable obligation, perpetual thraldom, which is to ones equal hateful.  Phi. 
What a wondering you make, Tim, at this sentence? whereas, I am confident, I could prove the truth of it from Histories of all Ages.  Tim. 
I done't at all question, but that in all Ages you may find Rogues and Rascals, somewhere or other: and 'tis plain that that's the very method you took, to make up your moral Philosophy. And whereas other Writers upon that subject were so civil to humane nature, and studious of the good of Mankind as to draw their observations from the most brave, the most virtuous, an●… most generous of Men and Princes: Phylautus (as may have formerly been hinted) that he might be si●…gular, and sufficiently scandalise his own kind, appeals to nothing else but to the very dregs, and sink; to the most vile and most unreasonable practi●…es for his Authority. Obligation is thraldom! and unrequitable obligation perpetual thraldom and hateful!  Phi. 
What, han't you done wondering yet, Tim?  Tim. 
No, Sir: and I say fu●…her he that thinks so, and behaves himself accordingly: thinks nonsense, and behaves himself like a Beast.  Phi. 
How do you know, Tim, but that Kings may have done so?  Tim. 
And how can I help it, if Kings won't live and act like men? why, Phylautus, for all your bountiful condescensions and mighty cringes to him that has the supreme Authority; I believe that such an one, if he don't observe the laws of nature (which are known well enough without his interpretation) may as plainly and easily be proved a Tyrant, in the Court of reason; as an ordinary Subject that refuseth to obey his Laws, may be proved a Rebel in Westminster-Hall. But we are not at leisure, Phylautus, for that dispute now.  Phi. 
If you be, I am ready for you: but if you bened then let me tell you; that it is thought by some that Sir William Stanley fared ne'er the better for his overmuch-obligation that he laid upon King Henry the 7th. in Bosworth-field.  Tim. 
If, upon that very account, he fared the worse, I say—  Phi. 
What do you say? What, Tim, prate against Kings?  Tim. 
No, Sir; but I say that his present Majesty (God bless him) is a reasonable and great man, as well as a great King: who, when highly obliged by a late subject, could never be persuaded, by your sort of puny, and ill-natured Politicians, to think it tedious or reproachful so to be.  Phi. 
That was because he was his superior, and able to requite him; but the obligation which I observe to be hateful is unrequitable obligation, such as is, for the most part, only amongst equals.  Tim. 
Come, come Phylautus; for a need you can hate without standing upon the curiosity of equals: for if the obligation be but unrequitable, let it be where it will, 'tis hateful to you. And upon this account, I suppose, it may be that seeing our blessed Saviour has laid, by his Death, an infinite and unrequitable obligation upon all Mankind; therefore to revenge this kindness, you renounce both him and his Gospel.  Phi. 
This is only railing, Tim, to which I have been so long accustomed; that I am pretty well seasoned against it. For still I keep to this that nothing can be a Law, that is, a Precept that obliges, unless he that lays it down has both authority to do it, and coercive secular-power to make it good.  Tim. 
And would any man in the World, but such a mad one as Phylautus, think that a Commission, such as our Saviour had from the great God of Heaven and Earth should be of less authority than a ticket from Jack of Austria, or any tiny-earthly Potentate: or that those eternal rewards and punishments which our Saviour plainly promises and threatens should be less obliging than running the Gantelet, or an hours setting in the stocks? but I know very well what it is that Phylautus drives at: viz. if our Saviour had either determined the breadth of Stuffs, or the weight of bread: or had set a certain mulct or fine presently to be levied upon every iniquity, then possibly he might have passed for a Lawgiver; and his word might have been taken without a Canonical Certificate from two Justices of the Peace. But to say that he that lives and dies in sin shall be eternally damned, was only a figurative expression, and a mere frolic which Christ began, and spoke to his Apostles and Disciples to put about.  Phi. 
I am sure that the Gospel would find but very little entertainment, were it not for the Sword of Justice.  Tim. 
Why what, I pray, does the Sword of Justice towards the making the Gospel oblige? does the Magistrate thrust down the Gospel into his Subjects bellies, with his Sword of Justice? if he did, 'twould do them but very little good. For 'tis plain, Phylautus, to any one that knows what belongs to Religion; that this same Sword of Justice which is to make the Scriptures Canonical has so very little of any obliging virtue in it, that he that does not count himself obliged to obey the Precepts of Christ, only because Christ gave them (i. e. without your Sword of Justice) is as far from salvation, as one that never heard of Christ at all.  Phi. 
I suppose you don't imagine, Tim, the command of a lawful Prince to blast the obligation of the Gospel.  Tim. 
No: but, I suppose, he that obeys the Gospel only out of complaisance to his Prince, will obey any other Book out of the same ●…omplaisance; having no other God, nor Religion, but Power and the Sword.  Phi. 
'Tis a very strange thing to me that the commands of Princes should have such little virtue in them; whereas the chief thing that our Saviour ordered his Disciples to Preach, was obedience to Magistrates. And therefore St. Paul bids Children to obey their Parents in all things; and servants in all things to obey their Masters: now, if it was Christ's mind that such little Potentates, as Fathers and Masters of Families, should be obeyed in all things; what shall we say to Fathers and Masters of Kingdoms?  Tim. 
What shall we say? we must say that they must be obeyed in more than all things.  Phi. 
In more than all things? that's nonsense, Tim, and impossible. But it was certainly our Saviour's intention that they should be obeyed as far as was possible, i. e. in all things.  Tim. 
Without doubt, Sir: and therefore when our Saviour Preached up obedience to Magistrates, and said that he came not to destroy but fulfil the Law, his meaning certainly, Phylautus, must be this: viz. Whereas I, who am the true Son of God, am come into the World to give Salvation, and the true means leading thereunto; which are meekness, sobriety, fidelity, charity, etc. yet, not to deceive you, you are to know that at present, I am only in a private capacity; and this is no command, but only my private opinion, judgement and advice: and therefore if the supreme Magistrate calls upon you to cheat, lie, swear, whore, sink, damn; and to despise and renounce me and my doctrine; never boggle or stand to consider of it; but do't, do't: mind not at all what I said: for I called in now, only by the by: and this is a time only of friendly counsel and invitation. My time of commanding is not as yet come. But I shall have a time of it afterwards; and that a very great one, when I come to be seated at Jerusalem; and then I shall have great strength and a long Retinue: but in the mean while— obey in all things, whatever I say to the contrary. This is the very truth and bottom, Phylautus, of all your Christianity.  Phi. 
I am sure of this, that neither Christ nor his Apostles did any thing more than counsel and invite; never did he, or they impose, or command.  Tim. 
That is, when Christ sent out his Disciples to preach the Gospel, he did not bid them fire a Musket at every sentence: and when St. Paul exhorted the Corinthians to stand fast in the Faith; he did not bid them do't, in the King's name.  Phi. 
No; nor in any other name of secular Authority.  Tim. 
No; for according to you, they only went up and down the World crying the Gospel: for a Preacher (as you observe) in Latin is Praeco; that is, a Crier or Proclamation-maker and as the Prophet Esay (Leu. p. 286.) invites and calls: ho, every man that thirsteth, etc. so they that were sent out to preach the Gospel did nothing more, but knock at men's doors, and cried ho, will you have any Gospel within? or else got upon a stool in the Market, and made Proclamation of the Gospel there; which, according to Phylautus, (without any sin) need not be any more minded than the singing of a Ballad: for Christ has no Kingdom as yet; and where no Kingdom, there's no command, and consequently no obligation. That a Philosopher and Poet should write this for sense or wit; or that any body else should take it for such in the reading! for, as for Religion, that's not to be regarded.  Phi. 
I am sure I have had many a serious thought about Religion: and have been very careful to keep a Conscience void of offence towards God, and towards my lawful Prince: for my lawful Prince is to be minded.  Tim. 
Yes, Sir, your Prince must be minded: and truly you have complemented up a fine one. But let me tell you he's not absolute and perfect, till you have removed one objection.  Phi. 
What's that?  Tim. 
You must needs take away Heaven and Hell: but especially Hell.  Phi. 
I don't take away Hell.  Tim. 
No; not quite; but you make such a little, pretty, easy, reasonable, convenient Hell for Villains, Traitors, Tyrants, and Atheists, as never was invented. Let me see, say you (Leu. p. 238.) I have promised my lawful Prince (or the Ostler) to blaspheme God, renounce Christ and burn my Bible: and for Peace and Government have advised others to do the like: but there be some squeamish, Clergyfied, disloyal Simpletons that will be afraid of Hell. Therefore I must needs make a little, pretty, tiny Hell. For otherwise my Eternal Almighty Prince may chance to be disobeyed, and the Peace disturbed. I shall only give you most of your own words, and so take leave. Seeing, say you, that the maintenance of civil society dependeth on justice, and justice on the power of life and 〈◊〉, and other less reward●… and punishments residing in them that have the Sovereignty of the Commonwealth; and seeing that 'tis impossible that a Commonwealth should stand, where any other than the Sovereign hath a power of giving greater rewards than life; and of inflicting greater punishments than death: and seeing further that it is reported by Poets and some Bagpipe Divines, that Eternal life is a greater reward than the lise present, and Eternal torment a greater punishment, than the death of nature; therefore, say you, let us make a pretty good Heaven, to invite people to obedience to Magistrates: but a very little Hell (about the bigness of a Quartan-Ague) for fear people should obey God more than Men. And accordingly you do't.  Phi. 
My Hell is a very reasonable Hell.  Tim. 
I remember so much of it that all the men that ever were in the World are to live upon earth at the same time; and 〈◊〉, they'll eat up one another in a day and a night or thereabouts, for want of pasture. Cast it up and you'll find it so: you are a Mathematician: and so farewell.  Phi. 
What won't you talk a little about the Trinity, & c?  Tim. 
I know what Persona signifies in the Dictionary, and therein lies all your Divinity. And therefore, I say again, Farewell.  
THE END.