REFLECTIONS ON A LETTER Writ by a NAMELESS AUTHOR TO THE Reverend Clergy of both Universities ' And on his BOLD REFLECTIONS ON THE TRINITY, etc.  
By Richard Frankland.  
LONDON: Printed for A. & J. Churchill, and sold by F. Bently Bookseller in Halifax, 1697.   

A PREFACE TO THE READER.  
EVER since the Divine Oracle sounded the Alarm of War between the Seed of the Woman and Serpent's Brood, Gen. 3. 18. the Devil and his Agents have spit their Poison against our blessed Lord Jesus, the Captain of our Salvation. For some Thousands of Years the World was invelop'd in the Mist of Ignorance: Heathenism, Barbarism, Scythism, and Hellenism overspread the Face of the Earth: And when the Gospel-Sun appeared in our Horizon, the Heathen raged, Kings and Rulers raised all the Militia of Earth and Hell: And by the joint Conspiracy of Jews and Gentiles, this Son of God was abused, rejected, crucified: And since his Resurrection, by the Power of his Godhead, and glorious Ascension to the right Hand of the Majesty on high, What a Number of Heretics have attempted to pull him down from the Throne of his Glory, and degrade him of his Deity, the most orient Pearl in his Crown? Strange were the Figments of Gnostics and Valentinians of old, the Followers of Simon Magus, who overturned Gospel Revelations by their Aeones, Combinations, Conjugations, Genealogies, and unintelligible Imaginations. Cerinthus and Ebion in the first Century, affirmed that Christ was only a Man, begotten between Joseph and Mary: Cerdon and Martion in the second Century, denied the Verity of Christ's Humane Nature and Sufferings: In the third Century, Theodosian also denied Christ's Divinity: Artemon said Christ was not existent before he took Flesh of the Virgin: The Sabellians denied the Three Persons in the God head: Yes, they affirmed that the Father clothed himself with our Nature, died, called therefore Patripassians: Samosetanus also denied Christ's Divinity: The Manichees held the same heretical Opinions, which did at last centre in Arius, and spread through the World. A. D. 324. condemned by the Council of Nice: Nestorius contradicted the Personal Union of the Divine and Humane Natures in Christ: Eutichus confounded these two Natures, saying, The Humane was swallowed up by the Immensity of the Divine: The Agnoitae denied the Perfection of Knowledge in the Divine Nature of Christ: Others called Christ only the adoptive Son of God: all these had their Followers: Yet God raised up learned Men to oppose and suppress these Heretics in all Ages: Some of them came to astonishing Ends, by the just Judgement of God, and some by the Sentence of Men, as Servetus at Geneva, A. D. 1652. Gorgius Blandrata, Petrus Statorius vented pernicious Errors in Poland, but the later dissembled, and was found in his Bed with his Neck broken: But the Errors settled in Faustus Socinus, A. D. 1565. born at Sens: A witty Scholar got his Uncle Laelius Socinus' Books, comes into Poland, writes a Book, De Jesus Christo Servatore, at Cracovia, whereof he boasted, and was answered by several, in a Disputation: The Orthodox confounded the Anti-trinitarians from plain Scripture-Texts, and ancient Writers; so that Religion mightily prevailed: But some falling off to Tritheism, Anabaptism, etc. they regarded not what Principles they owned, so they were but Enemies to the Doctrine of the Trinity.  
One thing is observable; several in that confused Company denying Religious Worship to Christ, Socinus contended with them, but was silenced and baffled by his own Principles, who held that Christ was mere Man, therefore by consequence it would be Idolatry to worship him: There were also several Errors broached by Socinus, that the Condition of the first Man was Mortal, that there's no original Sin, that Christ was not an Highpriest on Earth, that he made no Satisfaction for Sin, that we are not justified by his Righteousness, but our own, that the wicked shall be utterly annihilated at the last Day: These he contended for in their Synods, and prevailed so by the Help of Smalcius and other Artifices, that in 24 Years he got his Opinions enthroned in Poland, which are not rooted out to this Day.  
Whosoever desires to read more of this History of Socinianism, may find much more in Dr. Owen's Answer to Mr. Biddle, and his Preface to it.  
Surely 'tis a thousand Pities that in England, a Goshen, a Land of Light, where the Gospel-Sun hath shined in its Meridian Splendour, such black Fogs should rise out of the bottomless Pit as to darken our Horizon: Trinitas, saith one, est verae Theologiae Fundamentum, quae consesequentes omnes fere Doctrinas quasi animat: Who so denies the Trinity, denies his Baptism; for we are baptised in, or into the Name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. It's true, the Racovian Catechism asserts Three, and pronounces them to be no Christians who do not believe it; but deny that there are three Persons or Subsistences in the Godhead. But our Divines prove it by the Essential Name, Jehovah, essential Properties, Operations: But see more of this in the ensuing Treatise.  
The other dangerous and damnable Doctrine is that of denying the Lord that bought us, 2 Pet. 2. 1. revived out of the Rubbish of ancient Heresies. Who could imagine that Jews and Turks should be bred in England? Denying Christ's Divinity doth cut the very Sinews of our Hopes of Redemption and Consolation: Neither Angels nor Men could have pacified God's Wrath, or satisfied Justice, or brought in everlasting Righteousness: Such Doctrines undermine and pluck up the Pillars of our Christian Religion; and yet in these licentious Days such Heresies are publicly broached by more learned Scholars, and some confident Ignoramus's. I have read that Quakers say, we deny the Person of him whom you call Christ, and affirm that they that expect to be saved by that Christ without them, will be damned in that Faith. O horrid Sacrilege, unheard of Impiety!  
Methinks the Question of our blessed Lord, that nonplussed the Pharisees, Mat. 22 45. should puzzle these Antichristian Spirits that deny Christ's Divinity. [If David then call him Lord, how is he his Son?] Is the Son greater than the Father? Surely the Godhead of the Messiah advanceth him above King David. It's true, the Plumb-line of Reason is too short to fathom this Mystery; but where Reason cannot wade Faith must swim, having so good a Card and Guide as the Holy Ghost: The Trinity of Persons, and Hypostatical Union of Godhead and Manhood in Christ, being so fully revealed in Scripture, let us hold them fast, and contend for them as our .  
This is the Attempt and Design of the ensuing Treatise, which was put into my Hands by a very reverend and dear Brother, whose Praise is in the Gospel, who is better known to the World by the successful Fruits of his indefatigable Labours, sounding viva voce, than by legible Characters in Scripture, having spent much Time and Strength in his peculiar Province, with much Advantage to the Church of God: His Learning and Capacity elevates him above his Fellows, so that he needs no Epistle of Commendation from me or any other Person; his own Works praise him in the Gate, and in the Consciences of many▪ thousand: nor doth any (pruritus scripturiendi) Itch of appearing in Print, prompt him to this Undertaking, but purely a Zeal for God, his Cause, Truth, and Glory, and the preventing of young Students being poisoned with Soul-destructive Errors, that have edged his upright Soul, and moved his able Hand to this uncouth Undertaking: It's true, the Manner of handling this Subject is something abstruse and intricate; for the Subject is high and profound, and above the Reach of ordinary Capacities; but I hope it may give some Satisfaction to the learned and ingenuous Reader, and that this and all other Helps Polemical and Practical, may be of Use to the Church, is the Prayer of  
March 11. 1697. Thy Soul-Friend, O. H.   

REFLECTIONS ON A LETTER Writ by a Nameless Author TO THE Reverend Clergy of both Universities, And on his Bold Reflections on the Trinity, etc.  
IN the beginning of the Introduction, p. 3. § 1, 2. the 
On Ch. 1.  Author would make the World believe that his design in this Letter is to get the best Light and Information he can to promote his Eternal Happiness; and to engage the Learned Persons to whom he Writes, to comply with his desires in taking opportunity to satisfy him, and a great number of Pious Men who are affected with the same doubts, occasioned by Divisions amongst the Clergy about the Doctrine of the Trinity.  
Answ. Had the Author acted with like Modesty in other parts of his Letter as he does here, there might have been some ground to hope, that he had truly desired for to get his doubts satisfied; but when he dares be so bold as to Assert frequently, that the Doctrine of the Trinity is no better than a bundle of flat Contradictions, Who can believe that he had any other design in Writing, than to vent his blasphemous Invectives against the Ever-blessed God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost?  
His Discourse §. 3. is idle vain Discourse; for where will he find any Persons who pretend to believe they know not what, (i. e.) empty sounds, or words that have no Ideas fixed to them? If he have met with any such Asses, he should tell us who they are, and not cast false Reflections upon all those Learned Writers who have writ upon, and by undeniable Proofs from Holy Scripture defended the Churches received Doctrine about the Trinity.  
His Discourse p. 4. § 4, 5. is to the like purpose, and such wherein he shows himself a false Calumniator; for whereas he would persuade, that new and wrong Trinities are daily increasing, Authors having such different Ideas of them, that there are almost as many Trinities as Writers; and so would make it be believed, that they do but ridicule the Christian Religion and render it most absurd and irrational, in obliging People to put their trust in Three they know not what, and to pay Divine Worship to each of them, when the mere Light of Nature obligeth Man not to Adore for God any thing but what he believes to be an Omniscient and an Omnipotent Being, able to Know and Relieve his Wants; and that to pay Worship to any thing else, is Idolatry.  
Ans. 1 It's a gross and abominable untruth, that there are almost as many Trinities as Writers about them; I could easily show that Learned and Orthodox Divines generally do sweetly accord in their Judgements about the Trinity; and what if some few be found who differ from these, must therefore the Orthodox Doctrine be rejected? Where will he find that Christian Doctrine which hath not been depraved and corrupted by some or others?  
Ans. 2 But Secondly, Where will he find such Writers about the Trinity, who would oblige People to put their Trust in Three they know not what; and to Adore any for God but an Omnipotent Omniscient Being? As I do believe he cannot find one Writer about the Trinity who doth this, therefore must it not be gross Calumny to Charge all with this?  
What follows in p. 4. N. 6, 7. viz.) That the Trinitarians only agree in the same words, that scarce three of these venture to explain themselves being of the same Mind, and they that have published what they supposed the Three are, have fallen into gross Contradictions, plain Polytheism, or Sabellianism, that they destroy one another's Hypotheses, but raise none; needs no other Answer than to tell the Author, all such Assertions are mere Falsehoods, and such as the greatest part of his Book is stuffed with, as will hereafter be more fully evidenced.  
We proceed then to Chapter II. and the Author's Reasonings 
On Ch. ●.  upon the Athanasian Creed. And here we must tell the Author, that if there be any Jangling amongst late Writers about the meaning of the word (Person) it is to be lamented; yet is this no great Argument that they do not believe the Athanasian Creed, Which saith, We are compelled by the Christian Verity to acknowledge every Person to be by himself God; because doubtless all the said Writers whatever else they may differ in, yet do acknowledge the same Christian Verity; yea, we do humbly conceive that there is not any Writer about the Holy Trinity worthy to be taken notice of, but he does acknowledge a Divine Person to be an Uncreate, Eternal, Incomprehensible, Almighty Being, yea God Blessed for ever: And that it would be Idolatry to Worship him if he were not such; but the Author in ask, Is it not a Demonstration, that those that pay the highest Adoration to a Person, have no different Ideas of God and a Divine Person? speaks not so right and accurately; because although these by Adoring a Divine Person do acknowledge him to be God, yet they do not say that he is God, as absolutely considered, but as limited by a Relative Property, and so the Ideas may differ: Therefore his following Discourse, that we cannot have an higher Idea of God than that he is such a Person, and to frame any other, it must be one that is lower, and consequently Blasphemy against God; is but vain, and idle Discourse; for neither the one nor the other of these Ideas is either higher or lower, but equal; the one being of God as absolutely considered, the other of him as limited by a Personal Property; and this he must be either forced to confess, or deny that Scripture Phil. 2. 6. who being in the form of God thought it no robbery to be equal with God; for Ideas of Equals must be Equal.  
Obj. As to what he adds— If a Person be God there can be no real difference between them; for which he quotes Heb. 1. 3. Col. 1. 15.  
Answ. That Phrase (Real difference) is Homonymous; for if by real difference be meant such, as that which is Rei a Re, we grant there is no real difference, because God and a Divine Person, or first and second Person, are not different Things or Being's; but if by real difference he mean no more than a true modal distinction, in opposition to feigned and imaginary, than we do assert such a difference or distinction; and the Scriptures by him quoted are so far from opposing this, that they do clearly evince it, as we shall see afterwards.  
What is contained in § 9 is as idle and impertinent; for granting that if a Man be an Animal, all that is contained in the Idea of Animal, must be contained in that of Man; what is this to the purpose? But as if he would correct his own Impertinency, he pretends afterwards to speak properly, truly, naturally, (viz.) Man is a Rational Animal, and a Rational Animal is a Man; They are only different words to express the same Being; so (saith he) a Divine Person and God are convertible Terms; how absurd this Discourse is will easily appear, if the Dissimilitude of the things compared, be considered; Man is defined by Rational Animal; Man is the thing defined, Rational Animal the Definition; therefore these must needs be convertible Terms: But it is not so here, for neither is God the Thing defined, and Divine Person the Definition, nor is Divine Person the Thing defined, and God the Definition; So that its clear they are not in like manner convertible as Man and Rational Animal. Surely the Author for all his pretending to Reason, might have been more Logical: But he tells us that  
Obj. Nothing is contained in the Idea of God, but what is contained in the Idea of a Divine Person; and so on the contrary: And therefore the Terms are convertible.  
Answ. The Author is bold and forward in Asserting, but as slow in Proving what he does assert: Where will he find one who asserts the Trinity but he will tell him, That the Essence of God as absolutely considered is communicable to three Persons; but the Divine Essence as limited by a personal Property is Incommunicable; and is there then no difference in the Ideas of these? He may as well tell us that Communicability and Incommunicability are the same, which sure is a downright contradiction. He might do well to give over such bold Assertions, till he can make better proof of them; or free them from most gross absurdity.  
Obj. But the Author would persuade, That Person being a Term which we give to all Intelligent Being's, either Man, Angel, or God, as we have no different Ideas of Man, and a humane Person, or of Angel, and Angelical Person, so we have the same Idea of God, and a Divine Person.  
Answ. This will not at all follow, except he could make it out, that Personality does flow from the Divine Essence after the same manner as it doth from the Angelical or Humane Essence, which he can never do; for it flows from Angelical or Humane Essence, as Finite and Terminated in itself, but so it cannot flow from the Divine Essence, it being Infinite and Unterminated: Therefore though Essence or Fundamental Subsistence in an Angel or Man, being Finite and Terminated in itself, can propagate only one modal Subsistence or Personality, yet it will not follow by any Rational Consequence, That the Divine Essence or Fundamental Subsistence which is Infinite and Unterminated, must do the like. Thus you see this high pretended Rationalist, how weak and vain his Reasoning is. But you will see more of the Poison of this Doctrine in that which follows, (viz.) God (saith he) is in holy Writ described as a Person; and as the Father, who is a Person, is God, so God (as appears by a great number of Texis) is a Person, viz. the Father: So that it is evident there is nothing more in the Idea of one, than of the other, and are convertible Terms, and only different words which signify the self same All. perfect Being. Compare this passage with what we find p 32. in his close of the 9th Chapter, viz. That it is evident, that in Scripture God the Father is as much distinguished from the Son, as two Men or Angels can be: So you see its clear, the Author's mischievous design in denying the Blessed Trinity, is to overthrow and destroy (so far as in him lies) The Divinity of Christ and of the Blessed Spirit: for in making the Person of the Father and God convertible Terms, he excludes the Son and blessed Spirit from being God, yea he makes God and the Son to differ as really, as two Men or Angels. So that you see his Work is to revive again the long since confu●ed and condemned Heresies and Blasphemies wherewith Arius did so much infest the ancient Church, raising a dreadful Storm in it. One would think that those many Scripture Texts, which, with greatest Plainness, do hold forth the Divinity of Christ and of the Holy Ghost, such as Isa. 9 6. Joh 1. 1, 2, 3, 10. Joh. 17. 5. Heb. 1. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. Psal. 139. 7. Act. 5. 3, 4. I Cor. 2. 10, 11. with abundance more, should have kept him from so daring an Attempt as to vent himself in downright Opposition to so many sacred Testimonies.  
As to what follows, p. 6. §. 10. he tells us (1.) That he hath, according to his weak Ability, vindicated the Honour of a Divine Person, and cleared the Athanasian Creed from speaking so contemptibly of him.  
Answ. The Author's running into gross Mistakes about God and Divine Person, argues indeed but weak Ability; but it were well if Weakness were the worst; surely his excluding the Son, as well as Spirit, from being God or Divine Person, is so far from vindicating the Honour of Divine Person, that it casts the vilest Aspersions, not only on the ever-blessed God, but also on holy Scripture, which testifies, that Father, Word, and Holy Ghost, are one, 1 Joh. 5. 7. But when he tells us, he hath cleared the Athanasian Creed from speaking so contemptibly of him, (viz. Divine Person) It's strange if he can believe himself, when a little after he tells us, that this good charitable Creed only damns all those that cannot believe a Divine Person is and is not the same with God: And that it makes it Damnation not to believe a Difference.  
Is it not evident here, that his Design, in Reference to this Creed, is only to ridicule it, and so set it off, as made up of Contradictions (when yet the Contradictions are not found in the Creed, but only floating in his own Brain) yea, and to make the Compiler of it (the worthy Athanasius) fall under the Fate of Damnation, if he believe his own Creed, as Sect. 1? And what is this but to damn all the Christian World from the Time that the Arian Heresy was exploded in it, till such time as it was revived again by Socinus; yea, and to rob God of a Church during those many hundred Years?  
But how comes this great Master of Reason to be so highly conceited of himself, as to account all the ancient Fathers, in and since the Time of Athanasius, all the learned Schoolmen and reformed Divines, to be a Pack of such silly Fools, as to contradict themselves, to say a thing and unsay it again, which is saying nothing at all, and to teach the People like Parrots, Propositions without apprehending them, and such as are wholly unintelligible, and the last of which is a Negation of the first? See N. 11. How comes, I say, this Man to have this Confidence, or rather, bold Impudence? Is it from the Strength of his Reason, or rather, of his Folly? I would willingly reduce his Reasonings (if they will bear it) to some Heads, and then severally consider the Strength of each of them, for they are but a few, the far greatest Part of his Book being made up of mere Tautologies.  
His first Reasoning P. 6. §. 10. is grounded on his own grand Mistake, viz. That God (absolutely considered) and Person, are convertible Terms, so that there must be as many Gods as Persons. How false this is, hath been before declared and evidenced, so that I shall not trouble my Reader with it again.  
Object. His second Reasoning immediately follows in the same Page, and it seems to be to this purpose; If there are Three, each of whom is God, or each of whom is Infinite, Almighty, Incomprehensible, then there are three Gods, three Almighty's, three Infinites, etc. His Consequence is most absurd and false, because all the three Persons have but one and the same singular or numerical Godhead, Infinity, Omnipotency, etc. for neither is the divine Essence, or any Essential Attribute of God multiplied as Personality is. But the Author asks, How do you prove that there are three Almighty's, three Incomprehensible Persons?  
Answ. We affirm no such thing, let such prove it as do asfirm it; for though three may be affirmed of Persons, because multiplicable, yet not of infinite or eternal, which cannot be multiplied; so that his Argument is a mere Sophism (viz.) such as ariseth e Conjunctione eorum quae dividenda sunt, and may be answered thus, God is three Persons, but not three Infinites or Eternals; neither will he ever be able, if he had more Skill than he hath, from a Trinity of Persons in God, if rightly understood, to infer Polytheism, or a Plurality of Gods.  
Object. His third way of Reasoning (if we may call it such) is P. 7. §. 13. The former Part of the Section is a mere Repetition of what went before, and hath been fully answered. But in the latter Part of it, he tells us, That God and Man (he means according to the Trinitarian Doctrine) be Vniversals, and so predicated of more Persons than one, and each Divine Person is as much of himself God (he means a distinct God) as each Human Person is Man (i. e. distinct Man.)  
Answ. Never any Trinitarian yet did assume God to be an Universal, or to be predicated of Father, Son, and Spirit, per Modum Generis seu Vniversalis. We say, as in the Creed, The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God; that is, the Father is Eternal God, as with the Personal Property of Father, the Son is the same Eternal God, but with a distinct Personal Property (viz.) that of Son, the like we say of the Holy Spirit: Therefore his Inference, That Divine Persons must be as much distinct as Humane Persons, is idle and vain; and it stands firm (for all he hath said) that there are not three Gods, but one God.  
As to what he adds, §. 15. That Father, and Son, being Relatives, cannot subsist in the same Subject, I must tell him, that, had he learned his Logic better, he would have found they may, provided they be not predicated de eodem respectu ejusdem, which these are not.  
Object. His fourth way of arguing is, §. 16. If the Son is the same God, as he is that begat a Son, he must beget a Son too, except the same God did and did not beget a Son.  
Answ. Although the Son be the same as he is that begot, yet he does not beget, because God, as begetting, is God, as clothed with the Relative Property of Father; now the Son not being clothed with that Property, doth not beget.  
His fifth way of Reasoning, §. 18. is as foolish and absurd viz. That if God be three Persons, and each Person God, there must be nine Persons, because each single Person must be three Persons. Had the Author but known and weighed the Description given of a Divine Person, viz. that he is— essentia Dei prout est cum Proprietate Hypostatica, he would not have troubled us with such a trifling Argument. For although God absolutely considered, and not limited by a Personal Property, may, by Addition of those Properties, be Three Persons; yet a Divine Person, being God limited by Personal Property, cannot be Three Persons.  
His sixth way of arguing is §. 20. Those things, according to the common Sense of Mankind, are the same with themselves that are the same with a third, and all Knowledge but Intuitive, depends upon the Truth of it. We grant him all this: But what is it he would infer? It's this, that if three Persons and one Person, first, second, and third, are the same with God, they are the same with one another: Is this his Demonstration? I must tell him, that through Abuse of a good Rule, there's nothing but Confusion and Deceit in it. For 1. He confounds three Persons and one, as if they were the very same. 2. He would make us believe, that they do both alike agree in a third, which is absurd and false, because that Notion we have of the three Persons jointly considered, is adequate to the Notion we have of God, because the Divine Essence is not communicable to more than three Persons: But the Notion we have of a single Person is not adequate to the Notion we have of God, who is communicable to more than a single Person. Do these then agree entirely in a third, when this third hath itself, after a different manner, with respect to them? It cannot be: So that the Argument may be retorted upon himself, and the quite contrary Conclusion inferred from the foresaid Rule. Thus, if one Person and three Persons do not agree in a third, than they do not agree between themselves, but they do not agree in a third (as hath been shown) therefore not between themselves.  
His seventh way of arguing, § 21. is to as little purpose; If the Persons (saith he) are really distinct, and each is God, must not each be God distinct from the other? For nothing can be distinctly predicated of three distinct Persons, if it do not distinctly belong to each. As to the phrase of real Distinction, we refer the Reader to what hath been said upon §. 8. But as to what follows, we say, That although God be predicated of three distinct Persons, yet not distinctly, or after a distinct manner, but one and the same God is after one and the same manner equally predicated of three, therefore it follows (quite contrary to what he would infer) that there's but one ever blessed God, though three distinct Persons. His 22d. Section hath been answered over and over.  
All that which he adds, §. 23, 24, 27, 28. is wholly founded upon his own gross Mistakes, as if it must needs follow from a Multiplication of Persons that there must be a Multiplication of Infinities and All-sufficiencies in God; for suppose he may find some Assertors of the Trinity to allow such a manner of speaking, as to call the three Persons, three Infinite Persons, or three All-sufficient Persons, yet he knows well enough, in his own Conscience, that they mean no more than three Persons, with one and the same Numerical Infinity and All-sufficiency; or which is the same, tres personas habentes eandem singularem infinitatem & omni-sufficientiam: And that they do account it the vilest Heresy, yea, even Blasphemy, to assert a Plurality of Infinities and All-sufficiencies in God; and does it not argue then the Author to be guilty of the vilest Sophism and Deceit; yea, such as is more suitable for the Devil, the Father of Lies, than for any fair Disputant, from an Homonymous Phrase that may be taken in different, yea, contrary Senses, to infer, from such a Sense or Interpretation as he puts on the Phrase, Heretical and Blasphemous Conclusions, as the Conclusions of such Authors, as he knows do take and interpret the same Phrase in a quite contrary Sense? Let him but take the Phrase in the Sense of these Authors, and all his monstrous Conclusions will vanish. He can neither infer, that there are three Infinites, or Infinities, or three Infinite Spaces, or three Gods, or that the Trinitarians must be Idolaters, either in worshipping something as God which is not God, or in setting up a Plurality of Gods, as he would persuade §. 30. These will be found to be Brats of his own luxuriant Brain, not to be laid at the Trinitarians Door. As to what he adds, §. 31. That whatever Name we give the three, yea, though we only say three, yet so long as we pay Divine Worship to each, we own three Gods, because the three are three Objects of Divine Worship, and whilst the one is worshipped, the other is not worshipped, etc. We shall answer this hereafter, viz. P. 24. when we come to confute this false and frivolous Charge more largely elsewhere insisted on by the Author: Because we do not love, with him, to multiply Tautologies.  
Object. There's only one thing more I would take into Consideration before I leave this Chapter, that I may leave this Author the more inexcusable in his perverse Reasoning such as he makes use of, Section 25, 26. His Words are these (viz.) There cannot be supposed in God more Persons than one, without supposing an infinite Number; for what Reason soever moved the first Person to beget two Persons equal to himself, the same Reason (because their Nature is the same) must move the other to beget their Equals, and so on to Infinity; for (saith he) if the first Person produced two equal to himself, it was no doubt an essential Perfection of his Nature, otherwise he might have chosen whether he would have produced them, and they, when produced, would have had but a precarious dependent Being, since they must depend on his Pleasure for their Continuance in Being, as well as for their Being. And he does further infer, that if no more Persons can now be produced, than an Essential Property is lost.  
Answ. The whole of his Discourse does clearly evince, that the Author had blind and gross Conceptions about the Eternal Generation of the Son, and Mission or Emission of the Blessed Spirit, and therefore it's no wonder to find his whole Discourse made up of those two grand Ingredients, Impudence and Ignorance. For,  
1. How shamefully does he contradict himself, when he tells us, that if the first Person produced two equal to himself. it was no doubt an Essential Perfection of his Nature, and yet (as §. 25.) that it was for some Reason that moved him to it: How can both these hold? If the Act was an Essential Perfection, than it was no arbitrary Act; but if it was an Act, to which the Agent was moved by some Reason, than it was arbitrary and not essential: If his Adversaries spoke Contradictions at such a rate as this, he might then have had Ground to have charged these on them.  
2. What a begetting Act must that be, which may, or rather must (according to him) be multiplied into infinite begetting Acts? But had he framed no other Ideas of Eternal Generation, and Eternal Mission, but such as might have suited with the Nature of the most perfect eternal Spirit, he would then have seen, that that most sublime and scriptural Revelation of three Persons in the Godhead, is not only sweetly consistent with the highest Reason, but likewise, that it's impossible that there should be more than three Persons in the Godhead.  
Had the Author but perused, and seriously weighed what is said as to this, by the learned and accurate Doctor Ames, in his Medulla Theologiae, ch. 5 §. 16. (and which is agreeable to what hath been said before by ancient Fathers, Schoolmen, and modern Divines) sure he would not have talked at such a rate as he doth; the Doctor here speaking of a Trinity of Persons in God. hath these Words, viz. potest tamen (aliqua ex parte) similitudine adumbrari; Pater nempe est quasi Deus intelligens; Filius Imago Patris expressa, est quasi Deus intellectus; Spiritus sanctus emanans, a Patre per Filium & spiratus est quasi Deus dilectus; Filius producitur quasi per actum intelligendi ex intellectu vel memoriâ faecundâ Patris; Spiritus sanctus producitur per actum amandi vel spirandi ex voluntate faecunda Patris & Filii. What I pray will the Author say to such a Discourse as this? (1.) Will he say that God doth not know himself by a reflex Act of eternal Intellection terminated on himself? Surely this he neither can nor dare do. 2. Will he say, that God doth not, after a like manner, terminate an eternal Act of Dilection on himself? He cannot say this. (3.) Can he assure us that Personalities in God cannot flow from such reflex Acts? I am sure he cannot. (4.) Are there any moreinternal and eternal reflex Acts in God, besides the two before mentioned, from which Personalities can flow, and can there any more than three Personalities flow from these in manner aforesaid, supposing these to emane from the Divine Essence, by Mediation of the said Acts? I shall freely confess here, we could not at all have gone thus far by the dim Light of our own Reason, nor could so much as have thought no, much less, have asserted a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of Divine Essence; but when we have the great and ever-blessed God going before us in the infallible Revelation of sacred Scripture, and assuring us, that there be Three that bear Witness in Heaven, and that these Three are One; that himself as Father, did, before the World was, and from Eternity, beget the Son, in the Form of God, and equal to himself; that the Holy Ghost, in like manner, is God, proceeding and sent from the Father and Son; we can now safely follow God, and improve sanctified Reason to the getting of true and right Notions about this sublime Mystery, and for Defence and Vindication of it, and dispelling the Mists of those vile Aspersions and feigned Contradictions, black-mouthed Heretics would fasten on it; and we can as truly tell the Author, that however this Mystery be a very high Mystery, yet it is not (as he would persuade) wholly unintelligible, but that we may have true Ideas of the Father begetting, and of the Son's being begotten, and of the Holy Ghost's proceeding from Eternity; and that this was not after some gross manner as the Author seems to suppose, but in such a way, as might agree to the most pure and simple Spirit; yea, we may tell him, that from one and the same numerical eternal Essence acting upon its self by its internal Acts, and likewise terminating those Acts, and so laying the Foundations of relative Properties, Three relative personal Properties, with the Three blessed eternal Persons, do necessarily emane, without the least Appearance of a Contradiction; the divine Essence so acting or reflecting on its self by eternal Intellection with the relative Property of Generation, as flowing from it, being God the Father: The divine Essence as reflected on by, and terminating the said Intellection with its relative Property (of being begotten) being God the Son, the Splendour of the Father's Glory, the eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or the express Image of the Father's Person, making a full and entire Representation thereof: (And how agreeable is this to many Scripture Phrases, relating to the the Person of the Son?) And the same divine Essence, as reflected on or terminated by that other Act of the same Essence, and which may be styled the Love or Dilection of the Father and Son, with its relative Property of being sent or proceeding, being the third Person, or Holy Ghost, the amiable Springhead and Fountain of all that good which God communicates to his Creatures, the all-searching, quickening Spirit, Deus spiratus missus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
And give me leave to ask the Author, our high pretended Rationalist (who dares, with his dark and glimmering Light, so boldly contradict divine Revelation; telling us, that for the Father to beget, the Son to be begotten, the Holy Ghost to proceed; and that these Three should be One, and the Son to be equal to God the Father; that such Language is nothing but mere Contradictions, though the express Language of the written Word.) Let me ask him, I say; according to the preceding Interpretation of the Words, what Show or least Appearance of a Contradiction can he find in them? For the Divine Essence, by an eternal reflex Act to know its self; and so, by a like act, to love itself, and for the same Essence to terminate each act, is that which he neither can nor dare deny; because that these are essential divine Perfections falling under our distinct inadequate Notions of the same glorious Being, and which can no more cease to be, than God can cease to be God; where then comes in his Contradiction?  
Object. Will he say, that according to these our Notions of a Trinity, it follows that there are but three Persons, and yet nine Persons? That they cannot be multiplied beyond three, and yet may be multiplied in infinitum?  
Answ. The quite contrary follows: For, according to these our Notions of the divine Essence so acting upon itself, as aforesaid, and so terminating the said two internal essential acts, (viz.) of Intellect and Will; it's impossible the Persons in the divine Essence, as flowing from them, should either fall short or exceed the Number Three; because, according to these. these, we have (to come up to his own Terms) distinct Ideas of so many, and neither fewer nor more, (viz.) of a Person acting or begetting, of a Person conceived or begotten, and of a Person beloved or proceeding. But will he say (as he doth expressly) §. 26. That,  
Obj. If it be not essential to the Nature of the Son and Spirit, so to produce more Persons equal to themselves, their Nature is not the same with the Father's, and they want Perfections which he hath?  
Answ. It's essential to the Nature of Son and Spirit, as well as of the Father, absolutely considered to be productive of more equal Persons, though it be not essential to the Nature of the Son and Spirit as limited by personal Property; because, by these, it's rendered incommunicable, and cannot be so productive. Therefore it's very idle what he would infer, that the Nature of the Son and Spirit, is not the same with the Father's, because they want Perfections which he has, because the Nature still, whether of Father, Son, or Spirit, absolutely considered as such, hath the very same essential Perfections, though, as this is limited by personal Properties, importing three Persons actually to exist in it from Eternity, it cannot be said to produce them de novo, and to be still productive of them; so that we may justly say here, that whosoever shall affirm, that Essence, as common to Father, Son, and Spirit, is not productive of Three Persons, let him be Anathema; and whoever shall affirm, that Essence, as limited to Father, Son and Spirit, by personal Properties, is still productive of Three Persons de novo, let him be Anathema; for Essence so limited, the Three Persons exist as actually produced, and therefore cannot remain to be produced.  
Again, will the Author say, that the Father now producing no Persons equal to himself, has lost a Perfection that's essential to his Nature, and consequently ceaseth to be all perfect, as §. 26? How vain and idle is all this? When the act of begetting, or producing in God, is essential to the divine Nature, and so can no more cease to be, than the Nature itself, it being an eternal act identified with the Nature, and an eternal Foundation of such Relation as that of Son to Father, which must there. therefore be continued for ever, the Foundation being continued otherwise than in the Creatures.  
Having premised thus much for Explication of a Mystery, which the Author most blasphemously pretends to be a Mystery of Antichrist, wholly inexplicabable and unintelligible; and having showed that however it be a most sublime Mystery, much transcending Reason and the Light of Nature, yet being once fully revealed in the Word, that it's so far from standing in flat Contradiction, to Reason and natural Light, that it's found to have a sweet Consistency with Reason and Light of Nature.  
Having, I say, permised thus much, I proceed now to his 
〈…〉 3.  third Chapter of the Nominal Trinitarians, as the Author thinks meet (though without just Ground) to style these Assertors of the Trinity, whom he doth distinguish from such as he doth after call Real Trinitarians  
Here, before I pass on, give me leave to observe, that however most orthodox Divines tell us (see Polan. Syntag. p. 226.) That the Distinction of the divine Persons ought to be the least Distinction: Therefore Counsels and Fathers generally say, that its Relation only that makes Distinction and Number in God; yet, however, they all agree in Opposition to Sabellius, that this is not mere nominal, but a true Distinction; which will hereafter be further evidenced.  
Obj. And, now to come to the Chapter itself; where, first, I shall take notice of that Passage of the Author, §. 35. because that being answered, the Solution of his other Objections will be very Facile, or rather, the Objections will vanish of themselves: His Words are these; It contradicts our clearest Ideas, to suppose the same numerical Substance that is in one Person, to be at the same time in another; and we can as little apprehend what we mean when we say the same numerical Substance constitutes three infinite Persons, as when we say, the same Substance constitutes three finite Persons. Is not the reason the same between an infinite Person and an infinite Substance, and between a finite Person and a finite Substance?  
Answ. As to that Homonymous Phrase (three infinite Persons) I have shown before in what Sense it may be allowed, and and in what Sense it may not, and therefore shall not here trouble myself or the Reader with it again; but as to the Remainder of his Discourse, I must tell him, that although it contradicts our clearest Ideas, to suppose the same numerical finite Substance that is in one finite Person, to be at the same time in another; yet it no way contradicts our clearest Ideas, that the same numerical infinite Substance that is in one Person, with one Mode of Subsistence, should be at the same time in another Person, with a different Mode of Subsistence. Neither is the reason the same between an infinite Person and infinite Substance, and between a finite Person and a finite Substance. And his Mistake about this is the Foundation of all his other Mistakes, and Soul-ruining Errors. That the Reason is not the same between infinite Substance and infinite Person, as it is between finite Substance and finite Person, is evident; because finite Substance does propagate modal Subsistence (which in rational Nature we call Personality) as it's finite and terminated; yea, and where it hath its Terms; but infinite Substance, not being so terminated, but infinitely excluding all Terms and Bounds, cannot therefore propagate Personality in like manner as the finite doth; for that would be to make it imperfect; and if it doth not propagate this after the same manner, than it follows undeniably, that the Reason is not the same betwixt infinite Substance and infinite Person or Personality, as between finite Substance and finite Person or Personality: So that this Author's self-evident Propositions will be found to be self-evident Untruths; and his Reasoning is no better when he would infer, that because the same numerical finite Substance is but in one Person, therefore infinite must be so too.  
Obj. But he would persuade, that if, by reason of the Difference between finite and infinite, there is a Difference between the Number of Persons, that the Substance is in; it would follow, that the Difference of Number is infinite, because the infinite Distance betwixt these would suppose this.  
Answ. This Reasoning of his is vain and false as the former, for as Scripture is express in it, that there's Three, and no greater Number of Persons in God, than three, viz. Father, Son, and Spirit; so we have shown how sanctified Reason sweetly complies with with divine Revelation in giving us clear Ideas of it, how Three and no more than Three personal Properties may emane or flow from divine Essence, as terminating itself by essential internal Acts upon itself.  
Obj. But suppose the Author should here object, if three relative Properties or Personalities flow from divine Essence by means of reflex acts of Essence; how comes it to pass that these do not in like manner flow from angelical or humane Essence, reflecting on itself after a like manner by the like Acts?  
Answ. There's not the like Reason for it. 1. Because these internal reflex Acts of Intellection and Dilection in the angelical and humane Nature, are but accidental acts, and most frequently intermitted, and therefore cannot propagate Personalities; but in the Divine Nature these are essential eternal acts, and therefore may (I had almost said must) propagate something (viz.) in that Nature whence they emane, and whereon they terminate. 2. These reflex acts in the Creatures, at least in ourselves, are very imperfect, and cannot produce an express Image of that which reflects, on the Nature as reflected on, and consequently not a Person: But in God these are most perfect, and therefore produce that express Image which is a Person, and so the Son is styled, Heb. 1. 3. The express Image of the Father's Person. 3. We have showed before, that angelical or humane Essence being finite, and having Terms, must therefore, wherever it terminates, or where the utmost Bounds of its Extension are, propagate Modal Subsistence or Personality for to terminate such Essence; but the divine Essence, infinitely exceeding all such Bounds and Limits, cannot in this way (suited only to a finite Creature) propagate the same; but doth it after an higher way, suited to infinite immense Being. And here I would demand of the Author, either to show us the way wherein infinite essence doth this, seeing its undeniable that it must be different from this of finite Being's; or else give us some pregnant Reasons, why it may not do it by terminating itself upon itself, with the aforesaid reflex acts, or else ingenuously confess, that a Trinity of Persons, or which is the same, Father, Son, and Spirit in one and the same singular divine Essence is not only clearly revealed in the written Word, but is likewise very fully consistent with true Reason and the Light of Nature, as elevated and improved by divine Revelation; and that he hath greatest Cause to be humbled, for his bold blasphemous Oppositions to so great and clear a Truth.  
Obj. And thus, having discovered the Falsehood of his grand Conclusion, §. 35. I proceed to take notice of some few things more in this Chapter, especially in §. 33. where we find him thus reasoning.— If a Person be a Substance, there must be three Substances, because Substance is contained in the Idea of Person, and consequently, as many Substances as Persons; all that we apprehend of a divine Substance is, that he is a Subject, in which all the divine Attributes exist; that Person is the very same, and these are only different Words to express the divine Being by, whence he would infer (most blasphemously) §. 34. That a Trinity of Persons in one Substance, is nothing less than a Trinity of Contradictions.  
Answ. But I must tell the Author, that the whole of this his Discourse and Reasoning, is full of Confusion, Deceit, and Error, and might, at least, in Part, have been rectified by himself, had he been well versed in sound Philosophy, and if he had but assented to some common Maxims granted by learned Men; for, 1. He confounds Substance and substantial Nature or Essence, as when he makes it to be the proper Subject of essential Attributes: So p. 28. of his Book, §. 85. he tells us, If the Father communicated his Essence to the Son, he communicated himself, who is no way distinct from the Essence; but Philosophers tell him (see Glisson de Nat. Subst. p. 6.) that Substance is made up of two Principles, which they call Rudimenta Substantialia (viz.) substantial Essence, and modal Subsistence, which, in Rational Nature, is called Personality, and so would have taught, that he ought not to confound these, viz. the Part with the Whole, or Principium cum Principiato, which none but a Novice in Philosophy would have done. 2. Having (as before) confounded or identified complete Substance or substantial Essence, he confounds again this his Substance and substantial Essence, with Person or Personality, contrary to the Rules of all Philosophy, yea, even of such as relate to created Substances (about which he takes his Ideas to be most clear, and boasts of them as common Ideas of all Mankind,) for might he not have found Philosophers not concerned about the Trinity, from mere Dictates of Reason and natural Light, telling him (viz.) that essentia substantialis est singularis substantia continens integram individui entitatem. Or, abstracto sumptam, seu totum id quod abstrahiturè supposito: And that Modal Subsistence, Suppositality,, or (which in Rational Nature is the same) Personality, is Modus ab essentia substantiali resultans, eamque quod ammodo terminans; and that it is, To●um id post abstractionem minutilum in supposito residuum, quod essentiae additum eam concertioni restituit. All which is so clear, that if he dare yet venture to deny any Part of it, I hope he may, by one familiar Instance, be forced to confess the Truth, and correct his Error, or else expose himself to the general Scorn of Manking: We say that Homo habet Humanitatem, or which is the same, essentiam humanam substantialem: It is the common Language of Men, that Man is that Person, who hath substantial humane Essence: But should the Author say, that Homo habet hominem, that Man hath Man, or that humane Person, which is himself, would he not render himself too apertly ridiculous to all Manking? And doth not this undeniably evince, that there is more in the Person of a Man as being the totum cotinens, than there is in substantial humane Essence, which is but pars contenta; for substantial humane Essence can be nothing but Essence; but Man besides that Essence hath Personality, and is made up of both, as constituent Principles; and this is still further evinced, both by the the vulgar Definition that is given of a Person, viz. that he is, substantia intellectualis naturae singularis incommunicabilis, and also by that which Writers in Theology generally give of a divine Person, viz. that he is, essentia Dei prout est cum proprietate hypostatica, or to that purpose; and these I was more willing to lay down here, not only for fuller Explication of the matter in hand, but also because the Author seems to call for them, in the Conclusion of his Letter, §. 36. telling us, that according to these Ideas we have of Substance, or (as he means) substantial Essence and Person, it is a flat Contradiction to say there are three of the one, and but one of the other; and that if we have no Ideas, we talk like Parrots, when we affirm or deny any thing concerning any thing we have no Ideas of: Therefore, 1. I would, by these Definitions, let the Author see (though he cannot here pretend Ignorance, because they are the vulgar Definitions) that we have Ideas of Substance and Person; yea, clear Ideas, though not such as his.  
2. Whereas he saith, according to those Ideas we have of Substance and Person; ●e should have said from those gross Ideas▪ which myself and the Anti-trinitarian Faction have of Substance and Person, such a Conclusion as that before (so blasphemous that I tremble to write it) may be inferred; no wonder, when these say that the Idea of substantial Essence, Substance and Person, is entirely one and the same, and confound one of these with another, contrary to common Sense and Reason, as we have shown; but for him to say, that according to those Ideas which we have of Substance, Person, etc. If he mean the vulgar Ideas of the best and most accurate Divines and Philosophers, as he seems to do; then I must tell him, 1. That it is but one of his cunning false Tricks, by ranking himself in the Number of these, to insinuate into his incautious Reader, that his Idea of Substance and Person are the same with the vulgar Ideas of the best Divines and Philosophers; when it's evident, from the aforesaid Definitions, they are not the same; for his Idea of Person is no way distinct from that of substantial Essence, as he doth expressly acknowledge, when he tells us, p. 23. §. 85. That God the Father is no ways distinct from his Essence; but now the Idea of Philosophers as well as Divines, according to the said vulgar Definitions, is distinct, because their Idea of substantial Essence, being but one (though the chief) Rudiment of a Person, doth exclude the Idea of Modal Subsistence or Personality; the other Rudiment, as hath been shown, when yet the Idea of Person (as is granted) does include both. And I pray then, how are these the same? 2. Having thus declared what our true Ideas are of substantial Essence, Substance, Person, and differenced them from his false Ideas; I would now know of him, what flat Contradiction there is in our affirming Three Persons, and yet but one substantial Essence or Substance in God; and we shall see how he makes this out, §. 37. He reasons thus. If the Persons are the same Substance, or (which is the same in his Sense) substantial Essence, than the same Substance or substantial Essence, is begotten and unbegotten, and yet neither of these, but proceeding, self-existent, and not self-existent, incarnate and not incarnate; is this his flat Contradiction? A very Smatterer in Logic would soon tell him, that however it be a Contradiction to say that such opposite predicates ' possunt attribui eidem, secundum idem, ad idem, eodem modo, & tempore, yet to say, they may be attributed to the same Subject, provided it be not secundum idem, or ad idem, eodem modo, is no Contradiction at all, as is granted by all, and as may be evinced by thousands of Instances; why then may not the divine Essence, as it is with the personal Property of Father, be said to be unbegotten, as it is with the personal Property of Son, be said to be begotten, or conceived (and if he mean no more by his self-existent and not self-existent, than the Case is alike: But if he take them in a different Sense, they will not be found to be the distinct Predicates of the divine Persons) and so, why may not the same divine Essence, under a different Mode or personal Property, or as beloved with a Love of infinite Delight and Complacency, be still the same Essence, but neither as unbegotten, nor as begotten, but as proceeding? And so in like manner, may not the divine Essence, as it is with the personal Property of the Son, be incarnate, yet the same divine Essence, as it is with the personal Property of Father and Holy Ghost be not incarnate? Is there any thing of Contradiction in all this? No Man that knows what a Contradiction is, unless a deceitful Sophister, who would impose on others his own Sophisms, would assert it; when these contrary Predicates are predicated of the same Subject; not in one and the same respect, but under such different Respects as that Subject hath to different Persons. Are not these very Predicates, viz. to be begotten, and not begotten; to beget, and not to beget (to use a familiar Instance) in like manner, truly attributed to the Nature of Isaac? Do we not truly say, that as it related to Abraham, it was begotten, but did not beget, and as it related to Jacob, that it did beget, but was not begotten.— As to what he adds, that there could not any Attributes or Modes, or anything that inheres in a Substance be begot, because they cannot subsist by themselves: How false this is, and contrary to all sound Reason, may appear, even from physical Generations, which are no other than several progressive Motions from one essential Mode to another; for the Matter itself is not generated, but only the essential Mode or Form, which being educed out of the Power of the Matter, does not subsist of itself, but inheres in the Matter, by Virtue whereof the Compound itself is said to be generated, as being specificated by it. His Discourse in the last §. of this Chapter, viz. 38. is as vain as the former, yea, it is such as is grounded on a mere Sophism, viz. that there's no Distinction of Persons in God, because every Person is the divine Substance, which is three different ways the same, that is, three different ways one; whereas if he would have reasoned fairly, he should have said, that every Person is the divine Substance, as it three different ways the same or one; but then this Conclusion, as hath been shown, being false, which should be the Foundation of all that follows, the whole Superstructure built on it, as his Multiplication without Addition, and his Substraction without Diminution, must fall with it, and so the Falsehood and Sophistry of his other Reasoning would clearly have been detected as now it is, there being a vast Difference betwixt those two ways and Modes of speaking, viz. every Person is that divine Substance which is three different ways the same (which imports no more, than that it is that divine Substance which subsists in three Persons, and which is common to three) which is a manifest Truth; and that every Person is the divine Substance Substance, as it is three different ways the same (which imports that every Person being the same with the divine Substance, as subsisting in one way, as for example, with that Mode of Subsistance which is peculiar to the Son, is the same with that divine Substance, as subsisting in another way, as for example, with that Mode of Subsistence which is peculiar to the Father) which is a manifest Untruth: And so to father Contradictions on us, he'll speak them himself, and then make us speak them whether we will or no.  
Obj. Thus, having done with his third Chapter, we proceed to his Reflections on the Adimadverter's Hypothesis, chap. 4. p. 12. where I shall briefly take notice of his trifling Discourse, without taking on me to defend the Animadverter's Hypothesis, which I have not seen, save only so far as to vindicate it, as here represented by the Author, from some unjust Aspersions which he seeks to cast upon it; and whereas, §. 39 he tells us, the common Opinion of the Trinitarians, even from the Beginning (if we may believe the Animadverter) has been, that the three Persons are not three Substances, Attributes, Properties, or any real but incomplete Being's, viz. three Modes, and if the Persons are no more than three Modes, than the Difference is but a trifling Difference.  
Answ. But doth not this Author shamefully wrong the Animadverter, in making him say, that the three Persons are no more than three Modes? Did ever any Trinicarian or Man of common Sense talk at that rate? But as if he were afraid of being called to account for such false Aspersions, he tells us afterward in the same Section, viz. But it's said, a Person is not a mere Mode, but the divine Substance with a peculiar Mode. It's well he's brought at last to make a true Representation of the Trinitarians Doctrine, and thereby to confute his own Calumny: And what hath he now to say against this, that a Person is not a mere Mode, but the divine Substance, with a peculiar Mode? He saith, that if each Person is the divine Substance, he must have in him all the Modes; an admirable Inference, If Person be divine Substance with one Mode, then he's divine Substance, as with all Modes. If this be not to speak Contradictions, I know not what is; but he would back his absurd Inference with a Reason, That Person must have all the Modes, because he is the divine Substance in which the Modes subsist; this Reason is just like the former, as if Person, who is the divine Substance, as limited with one Mode or relative Property, is the divine Substance, not as limited with one, but three relative Modes or Properties: A downright Contradiction. One should think this Man, who is so ready to charge others with flat Contradictions, should better have sensed himself against venting Contradictions at this rate; but before I pass on, I would take notice of another Passage of his in this Section, not much short of the former for Absurdity, wherein, speaking of these relative Modes, he saith, two of which may be absent without the least Alteration in the divine Substance or Properties: He might as well have said, that where there is the Foundation of Sonship, yet the relative Property of Son doth not result or flow from it; which, according to the Sense of all Mankind, is impossible.  
Obj. What the Author saith, §. 40. I shall take up when I come to the following Chapter, and so shall next consider what he saith, §. 41. where he reasons thus. If there be any Thought, Word, or any of those Actions that are proper to intelligent Being's, that belongs to the one and not to the other, it shows that they are more than distinct Modes, they are distinct intelligent substantial Being's; and are not the Father and Son in Scripture frequently opposed to one another, as intelligent Being's? The Father's knowing and loving the Son, is not the Son's knowing and loving the Father; but each has a numerical distinct Knowledge, and consequently, distinct Essence.  
Answ. The whole of this his reasoning is idle and perverse like the former, and is grounded on either a grossly ignorant, or a wilful Mistake of the Trinitarians Doctrine: The divine Acts or Operations, according to these, are either ad intra or ad extra; the Author's Discourse, in the Beginning of the following Chapter, relates to those ad extra, where we shall consider them; but his Discourse here, to those ad intra, as the Father's knowing and loving the Son, the Son's knowing and loving the Father: Now these are acts of the divine Nature or Essence as reflecting on itself, and lay the Foundations of relative Properties never to be altered, because from these acts and their terms the personal Properties result, as hath been shown before; therefore, according to his Doctrine, these internal acts, are in Nature before the personal Properties, or Personality: And yet (according to Scripture Phrase) they are attributed to each Person with respect to another, in as much as each Person hath the divine Essence, with its Acts and Operations, under a relative Mode appropriated to him; and so the Father is said to love the Son, and the Son to love the Father: How, I pray? What, as this Author would have it, with two acts of Love really and numerically distinct, and these as flowing either from two mere Modes, or if not so, from two really and numerically distinct Essences? How absurd is all this, when it's evident to any Smatterer in Theology, that the internal acts thenselves are of the divine Essence, and only their Distinction from relative Modes; so that there's no need either of more numerically distinct Essences for Performance of these acts, or to have them attributed to mere Modes, or to have the divine Person ungodded, and their true Subject destroyed, as this Author does vainly and idly pretend. What he adds, § 42. is to no more purpose, unless he could prove that we make the divine Acts, Titles, Attributes, of one Person really distinct from the Acts, Titles, Attributes, of another, which he can never do. The Author, in his following §. viz. 43. would make the World believe that the Orthodox were forced to this way of explicating themselves about the Trinity, because they had no other way to keep up the Face of a Trinity, and avoid professing the apparent Tritheism of the Nicene Fathers, who held the Three Almighty substantial Persons, were not otherwise one God, than because they had the same common Nature, even as Three Men having the same Humane Nature, are but one Man.  
Answ. Not to mention here the old false Trick of seeking from the multiplying of Persons in God to multiply Substances, and Almighty's: As to that open Tritheism of the Nicene Fathers, as holding the Three Persons, no otherwise one God, than as Three Men partaking of one common Humane Nature, are one Man, it is such an impudent shameless Calumny, that it can deserve no other Answer, than to have the Brand of a notorious Lie set upon it; such a false and blasphemous Notion, as that God should be a Genus to more divine Persons, so as Man is a Genus to singular Men, I know not whether it ever entered into the Heart of any; but that it should be the Notion of the Nicene Fathers, and entertained by them, is so expressly contrary to their Canons, and the Orthodox Doctrine of the Fathers at that time, that it needs no further Confutation.  
Obj. As to what is added by the Author, §. 44. (besides his Reproaches which will light on himself) there's nothing but what we have had before over and over, and hath been so fully answered, in our having shown that the glorious Almithty Being, doth not propagate Personality, by Termination of Extension, so as a finite rational Being doth, and that it's highly consistent both with Scripture and Reason, and that he doth this by the aforesaid reflex Acts, terminated on himself, that no more needs be added here. But, §. 45. he tells us, that granting there are never so many Modes, yet if each Person has the divine Substance, he must necessarily have all the Modes, because they are Modes of the divine Substance; each Person has the divine Substance as limited by a peculiar Mode, or relative Property, and therefore cannot possibly have all the Modes, quite contrary to what is absurdly inferred by this Author.  
Ans. I come now to Chapter 5. to weigh the Author's Reflections 
On Ch. 5.  on the Hypothesis of Dr. W. S. of the Author of the Trinity placed in its due Light, and the rest of the Nominal Trinitarians.  
In this Chapter the Author tells us, that besides the Abettors of this Opinion, there are a great many Trinitarians, who no otherwise differ from the unitarians but in Name, whose Trinities they not only allow, but contend for: some of them say (and Dr. Wallis hath writ in Defence of it) That the three Persons are only three external Denominations of God, according to the three different Operations of his Goodness towards his Creatures, in creating, redeeming, and sanctifying them; a little after he saith, Others say, that the three Persons are the same in God as Faculties in Man (viz.) Understanding, Will, and Memory: Others, that the three Persons are the three Attributes of God, Power, Wisdom and Goodness: Here you have his Charge. But,  
Answ. 1. I shall believe it to be a false Charge, so prone I find him to charge things on the Trinitarians, till such time as he doth quote the Author, at least his Book and Page where the Matter charged is expressly contained. (2.) Tho I readily grant that those three Denominations of Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, are three external Denominations of God, according to the different Operations of his Goodness towards his Creatures, in creating, redeeming, and sanctifying them; yea, and that these three different Operations, Imo omnes operationes ad extra (according to Scripture, Joh. 13. chap. chap. 5. 17. and the granted Maxim) sunt trium personarum communes, yet withal I affirm, that in respect of the Order that is amongst the three Persons, the Holy Scriptures do in a more special manner appropriate the first kind of these Actions, as the Acts of Creation to God the Father, as first Person; and those which in Nature are next to these, as of Preservation and Redemption, to God the Son; and those which come last in Order, as the ultimate completing Acts, to God the Holy Ghost; and accordingly do appropriate the external Denominations of Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, as resulting from the said Acts. But that any Man of common Sense holding the Doctrine of the Trinity, should affirm, that the Three Persons are only three external Denominations of God, according to his said different Operations, I am far from believing. (3.) Tho I grant, that some, who assert a Trinity of Persons in God, may tell us, that these Three glorious Persons in God, are represented by those three Faculties in Man, viz. Understanding, Will, and Memory, or these three Attributes of God, Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, but that these should say, that the Three Persons are the same as Faculties in Man, viz. Understanding, Will, and Memory; or that they are those three Attributes of God, Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, I cannot believe; but shall rather account, that he saith (till he make it good) a mere Calumny. And now being so persuaded as I am, I might justly desist from giving myself any further Trouble in this Place, save for some few Passages in this Chapter, which I may not wholly pass over: One is in §. 46. A Question grounded on his own false Hypothesis (viz.) of there being no other Trinity but of infinite Goodness, Wisdom, and Power, in one divine Being; Hence he puts the Question, Is it not Idolatry to pay divine Worship to three Being's, each of which (since each is God) has infinite Wisdom, Power, and Goodness?  
It's granted, that to pay divine Worship to Three Being's, whatever Attributes we cloth them with, is Idolatry; but to pay divine Worship to Three glorious Persons, Father, Son, and Spirit, who are one and the same divine Being, and so equally share in all the glorious Attributes, and infinite Perfections of that Being, is that true Worship, which the Holy Scriptures, and the infallibly inspired Penmen of it, have prescribed to us; and to call this Idolatry, is the highest Blasphemy, tending to overthrow the very Foundations of the Christian Religion, and of the Christian Faith.  
Obj. But this Author propounds another Question, viz. If there be but one Being with infinite Vunderstanding, is it not unlawful to adore three such Being's, each of which has an unlimited Understanding?  
Answ. If this Author had propounded this Question to Dr. Sherlock, or some, whom he styles real Trinitarians, he might perhaps have had some Grounds for it; but to propound it to those, with whom he hath to do in this Place (when he knows they grant as fully as himself, or any Unitarian can do, that it's unlawful to adore Three Being's, each of which has an unlimited Understanding) is not only a frivolous idle Question, but on his part very malicious, as importing that those, whom he styles nominal Trinitarians, do this, when he knows the contrary; that he knows the contrary, is evident from his own following Words, wherein he tells us, that the Trinitarians are really as zealous as they pretend to be, to defend the sacred Truth of only one divine Being: Well then, if these Trinitarians be zealous Asserters of only one divine Being, as well as his Unitarians, how comes he to ask them, if it be not unlawful to adore three such Being's? As if they did this, when he knows they abhor it. But this Author will tell us here,  
Object. 1. That it's not in Sincerity, but only in Pretence, that these Trinitarians seem zealous in Defence of one Being.  
Ans. If he could make the World believe, that these mean the same by Being, as they do by Person, which in this very Place he does cunningly, but most falsely insinuate in his Jumbling those two Terms together, Being or Person, as if they were the same in the Language of Trinitarians as well as Unitarians: Then he might well persuade, that their Zeal, for Defence of one Being, whilst they assert Three Persons in God, was but a pretended Zeal; But when he knows that all these do assert Three Persons in God, yet but one Being, then what less can his charging these with want of Sincerity in their Defence of one Being, be, but mere Calumny? His other railing Language in this §. hath, for its Foundation, not the true Doctrine of the Trinitarians, but his own ignorant or wilful Mistakes about that Doctrine. But, 2. I proceed to consider, what this Author lays down i● the two last Sections of this Chapter, §. 47, 48. One while he represents these Trinitarians as such, to whom the Unitarians own their utmost Acknowledgement for vindicating their way of Worship, and for joining with them against the Politheists, and disguised Pagans (as Dr. Sherlock) Another while as the same with Polytheists or disguised Pagans, or as he means, with the real Trinitarians. Again, he tells us, he knows not under what Head to rank these who will be thought to be neither real nor nominal Trinitarians; he thinks they believe no Trinity at all, that they are forced, in adoring the Trinity, to confess they adore an unconceivable Mystery, which is only worshipping of Words and Sounds, or a Trinity of Ciphers; that if they declare what the Three are, they must inevitably run into Polytheism or Unitarianism; that in saying the first of the Three is God the Father, the second God the Son, the third is God the Spirit, they make them Three Gods, whom they equally adore: And p. 16. he ask what these Three are, Father, Son, and Spirit; Are they three Gods, three Parts of God, three Properties, three Names? And concludes in a scoffing way, that it seems, the whole Mystery of the Trinity lieth in this, tho' every one can tell what each of the three is, yet none can tell what three they are, or how they are three.  
You see how this Author runs on in his old Cant, refusing to take in any Satisfaction as to his Doubts and Queries above the Trinity, which he might have done a thousand times from the Writings of eminent Divines on this Subject, had he been desirous to be informed, or to have had his Doubts satisfied, as he pretends to be. For,  
1. Do they not tell him, that the Three, who bear Record in Heaven, viz. the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, are Three Persons in one Godhead? And does he not know that they say so? Why then does he propose those idle Questions, Are they three Gods, three Parts of God, three Properties or Powers of God, three Names; and why does he belly them, when in Answer to that Question, What Sort of three are they, He makes them say that's impossible to be known?  
2. Do they not tell him likewise, that these Three Persons are one and the same great and blessed God, and yet distinguished from each other by personal Properties? that the first Person or Father is God, as limited with the personal Property of begetting or conceiving; that the second is God, as limited with the personal Property of being begotten; that the third is God, as limited with the personal Property of proceeding from Father and Son, and of being sent as Comforter; so that one Person cannot be another Person, and yet all the Three are one and the same blessed God?  
Object. 3. Let me add, Is it only these Divines that speak thus, or is it not the divinely inspired Penmen of the Holy Scripture, who speak the same? The Author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, doth he not tell chap. 1. v. 3. That the Son is the express Image of his Father's Person; and can he be a Son, representing as a lively Image, the Person of his Father, and yet not a distinct Person? Doth not St. John, chap. 1. expressly tell us, that the Word was made Flesh, and was this the Father, or the only begotten of the Father? See v. 14. This only begotten of the Father, when in the Humane Nature he was baptised, was he not a distinct Person from the Person of the Father, testifying of him by a Voice from Heaven, This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased? And was he not a distinct Person from the Holy Ghost, who descended in a bodily Shape like a Dove upon him? Luke 3. 21, 22. And does not our Lord Christ himself, when speaking of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, clearly distinguish these as Three Persons, in telling us, John 14. 26. But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my Name, he shall teach you all things; have we not here the Person sending, the Person sent, and the Person in whose Name he's sent? But what need I thus argue for a Distinction of Persons? I done't at all question here, but this Author will readily grant, that the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, as set forth in Scripture, are three different Persons, for he tells us, P. 32. §. 94. It is evident that in Scripture, God the Father is as much distinguished from the Son as two Men or Angels can be; and Mankind that are incapable of apprehending Metaphysical Niceties, cannot but conceive them so; and hence it is (as we have shown before) that he makes God and the Father, or Person of the Father, equivalent Terms, so excluding the Son and blessed Spirit from being God, or equal to the Father, so that he owns them not otherwise to be Three Persons, than as three Being's or Substances, which do really differ one from another.  
Answ. You will thus see at length, what this Author is, and how his sometimes seemingly applauded Unitarianism ends in Arianism; and the Truth is, the very worst Dregs of the Poison of his Doctrine lie here, not in his denying any Trinity of Persons, but his denying a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the divine Essence; he can be well enough content that the Word be the Person incarnate, the Holy▪ Ghost the Comforter, or Person sent, so he can but strip them of their Divinity, or make that Divinity, which the Scripture seems (as he grants) to ascribe to them, to agree to them only in a tropical or figurative Sense; but to ascribe this truly to them, together with proper divine Worship, this he makes to be Idolatry. Here,  
1. I would have it noted (that I may meet with and refute his Raillery, which hath diffused itself through a great Part of his Pamphlet) that when this Author speaks of the Trinitarian's worshipping the Three Persons, as Three distinct Almighty Being's, as Three Gods, as Three complete distinct Objects of Worship, and as paying at other times divine Worship to one of them, and at the same time not paying it to another, that all this is mere Calumny, and hath not a Word of Truth in it; they worship indeed Three Persons as they are one and the same Almighty Being or God, but not as Three Almighty Being's or Gods, such Tritheism they abhor as much as himself or any other. They worship Three Persons, what, as three distinct Objects of Worship? No, but as all three in Conjunction, making up the one great complete and adequate Object of our Worship; they worship the Son and blessed Spirit as well as Father; but do they, when they worship the Son, not worship the Father and blessed Spirit at the same time? Or when they worship the blessed Spirit, do they not worship the Father and the Son at the same time, as this Author would Persuade? That's false; yea, it's impossible that divine Worship should be paid to one of these, and not to another, when the Three are but one and the same God, blessed for ever.  
Obj. Here I would ask this Author, when he does in Worship apply himself to God as our great Redeemer, does he in his so doing exclude God our Creator from sharing in that Worship? Or when he doth in a more special manner apply himself to God as our Sanctifier, doth he by so doing exclude God our Creator and Redeemer from sharing in that Worstip? And must he, for this his applying himself unto God under these different Respects, needs be a Polytheist and an Idolater? If not, why then must Trinitarians be such for applying themselves in divine Worship to the Person of the Son, or of the blessed Spirit? If he say it is because three divine Persons are three Gods,  
Answ. This is most false▪ most repugnant to Descriptions given by all sound Trinitarians of divine Persons, and hath fully been answered, and therefore I shall here pass it over as a mere Calumny.  
2. I would have it noted, that when the Author tells us, §. 47, that the Notions of the Trinitarians, when applied to the Incarnation and Satisfaction, must be very uncouth; and further, that when they speak of these, and when they endeavour to prove the Spirit and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be Persons, that then they are real Trinitarians; that is, such (in his Language) as set up three Gods; and further adds, §. 48. that these, who will be thought to be neither real nor nominal Trinitarians, cannot properly be said to believe any Trinity, except at the most a Trinity of Ciphers, and that (as he thinks) it cannot be presumed that Men of so great Sense (to mention no other than Sarum and Worcester) would assert so absurd a thing, but that they knew, if they declared what they suppose the three to be, they must inevitably run into Polytheism or Vnitarianism.  
Answ. 1. And is there then no Medium betwixt these two Extremes? One would have thought that the Writings of so many learned Men as have writ on this Subject, if he had not resolved to have shut his Eyes against clearest Light, should have convinced him that there is. Do not these expressly tell (if we must repeat things again) that these three are three Persons; that however three Persons cannot exist in one singular finite Essence, where Personality flows from the Termination of Essence, yet three Persons may exist in one singular, infinite, immense Essence, where Personality flows from Essence after a different manner (which the boldest Arians and Sacinians dare not deny.) And if Personality does not result from divine Essence, as it does from created Essence, why there may not exist three Persons in the one, when yet there can but one exist in the other, it's neither this Author nor any other Man living (how big soever these may swell with Pride) that can show any solid Reason to the contrary; and when once divine Revelation hath assured us it is so, who is this Man that dare fight against God? Will he tell us, that he hath been in Heaven, or beheld from all Eternity, what God, by eternal Acts, terminated on himself, can do or not do? To hear a vile Worm so talk as he doth, what horrid Boldness is it? Were I minded to do it, I could easily instance in several things about the divine Attributes, as difficult to be explicated and fully resolved as any he can propose to Trinitarians about the Existence of three Persons in the Godhead, and what then must we, because of this, call those divine Attributes into Question? And rather not cry out with the great Apostle, Oh the Depth!  
2. How uncouth then must the Notions of these Trinitarians be, when applied to the Incarnation and Satisfaction, or to the Spirit or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Persons? Ichallenge him or any of his Party, how highly soever pretending to Reason, to show the Inconsistency of these Notions, when so applied, with true and right Reason; or that any such thing as Polytheism (as he vainly pretends) can be inserred from them. Indeed, if one should grant him, that one so often begged absurd Principle of his (viz.) That if God the Son be the same God with the Father, than he must be the same Person with the Father; or if he be God, and yet a distinct Person, that he must be a distinct God; Then it were no wonder, if uno absurdo concesso mille sequerentur. But when he's told by Trinitarians a thousand times over, that the Son, altho' he be the same God with the Father, or the same with the Father as to Godhead, Nature, Essence, Substance, yet he's not the same with the Father as to personal Property; that, although there be three different Personal Properties in one and the same Godhead, yet that same Godhead, as limited by one Personal Property, cannot be the same, as limited by a different Personal Property, that is, cannot be the same Person, however it be in itself the same God head still. And now I pray, why may not one and the same Godhead or divine Essence, as it is with one personal Property, be not incarnate, as it is with another, be incarnate; as it is with one be unbegotten, as with another begotten; as it is with one, receive Satisfaction, as with another make Satisfaction; as it is with one send, as with another be sent? He must be quicker sighted than I, that can see any thing like a Contradiction here; as if contrary Predicates were here affirmed, de eodem, secundum idem, ad idem, etc. when it's clear they are not: So that his loud Clamour, Chap. 6. P. 17. §. 50. That this Supposition, That 
On Ch. 6. Of real Trinitarians. Note, here I shall not concern myself with these, and consequently, not with this or the Author's following Chapters, further there than I find him inveighing against the Orthodox Trinitarians  each Person is the same God, carries with it an innumerable Company of most obvious Contradictions, such as he tells us he will instance in §. 50, 51. will be found to be but a mere empty Sound, without any thing of Sense or Reason, and all his pretended most obvious Contradictions vanish into Smoak, as any Smatterer in Logic might easily show him. That which hath been said, might, I hope, satisfy a judicious Reader, and serve for Answer to such further Cavils and blasphemous Invectives as this Author hath, P. 24, 25, 26, 27. and P. 31. §. 93, 94. of his Letter, not so much against the Trinitarians, as against the sacred Scriptures and the blessed God, Father, Son, and Spirit, as revealed in Scripture, but I fear his glorying, if I should so much as seem to pass them over. Therefore,  
Obj. 1. As to what he saith, chap. 8. p. 24 §. 74. That none of the Trinitarians besides the Author of the 38 Propositions, can say, that any of their Persons is a most perfect God, or a most high God, or the only true God, or supreme God, because there are two others as perfect, as high, as true, etc. will be found to be very idle and trifling, if it be but considered, that each Person in the most blessed Trinity, is the most perfect, high, wise, supreme God; because the same most high God with the other two Persons, and neither a distinct God from them, nor they distinct Gods from him, as this Author doth falsely suppose; and if each one be the same God with the other, than each must be the most perfect, high, true, supreme God.  
Object. 2. As to what he saith, §. 76. of the same Page, That Trinitarians do imagine, that when Man was made, there was a Consult of the whole Trinity about that weighty Affair, and that one said to the others, Let us make Man.  
Answ. The Author might do well to speak out plainly, and tell us, that his Design is to quarrel not so much with Trinitarians, as with the Holy Scriptures themselves, for the Words he quotes to quarrel with, Let us make Man, etc. whose Words are they? Are they the Words of any other Trinitarian, save of Moses, Gen. 1. 26. the infallibly inspired Penman of that Book, or rather of the blessed Spirit himself, as speaking by Mojes? Our Divines, I confess, make use of this Scripture for proving a Plurality of Persons in the Unity of the Godhead, and it's a full and clear Scripture for that purpose; but I cannot wonder at this Author, if after his bold Attempt of stripping the blessed Spirit of his Divinity, he proceed to that Height of Blasphemy, as to make him speak falsely or ridiculously in Scripture.  
Obj. 3. As to what he adds in the same § that according to the Trinitarians, the Son, as God, really wanted Glory, and prayed to the Father, John 17. 5. to give it him, telling us (in a scoffing way) it is strange that a most high God should want and beg of another to supply him.  
Answ. 1. It's false, that the Trinitarians suppose, that the Son, as God, really wanted Glory; they do indeed suppose, that the Son, as God, being made Flesh, or taking our Nature on him, by his dwelling in a poor humane Nature, during the State of his Humiliation, had the Glory of his Divinity much obscured and eclipsed, so that it did not shine forth with that Lustre as before; otherwise the essential Glory was still the same, and there was no want as to this, but only as to its Manifestation, which may very well agree to the most high God, as this Author himself must be forced to grant, if he will grant such a Variety of divine Providences towards the Sons of Men, as make his Glory to shine forth brightly at some times, but suffer it to be eclipsed and not manifested to these at other times. But,  
2. Seeing the Author would seem so quicksighted as to find an Argument in this Scripture, John 17. 5. against the Divinity of Jesus Christ, but so stark blind as to find none in the same Scripture for it; I would therefore improve it a little, for getting the Scales of his Blindness removed; and whereas our Lord Christ prays, Glorify me with thine own self, with that Glory which I had with thee before the World was: Hence I argue; if the Glory that Christ the Son had with the Father before the World was, was not the increated Glory of the Son as most high God (which this Author does ridicule) than it was but the Glory of a created Being. But that could not be: For,  
1. If it was but the Glory of a created Being, then there was a created Being, before Creation, yea, before the first Moment of Creation: But that's impossible, and the Author himself who is so good in finding out Contradiction (where there's none) will sure see a Contradiction in this.  
The Consequence is undeniable, for the very first Moment of Creation God gave Being or Existence to the Heaven and Earth, as the Phrase in Gen. 11. clearly imports, and yet the Son had his Glory with the Father before this, (i. e.) through the boundless Tracts of Eternity. Let the Author answer this Argument if he can. But (2.) If the Glory which the Son had with the Father before the World, was no other than of a created Being, than it highly concerns this Author to declare what created Being he means; for (1.) it could not be that of his Humane created Being, for Christ had no such Being before he was born of the Virgin Mary: If then the Glory which the Son had with the Father, before the World was, was the Glory of such Being, it must then be the Glory of such Being, when there was no such Being▪ if this be not downright Contradiction, I know not what is.  
2. It could not be the Glory of Angelic created Nature, for Scripture is express, that Christ took not on him the Nature of Angels, Heb. 2. 16. Besides, Scripture sets him above all Angels, making him the Object of their Worship, Heb. 1. 6. yea, in the very same Place, where it mentions them as ministering created Spirits, it mentions the Son as God having an eternal Throne, and as the great unchangeable Creator of this great World, Heb. 1. 7, 8, 10, 11, 12. Now if the Son did exist before the World, and yet neither as God, Angel, or Man, I wonder what Species of Being's this Author will reduce him to: He who in Scorn so often asks the Trinitarians what a something they mean by a second or third Person in the Trinity; may well be asked what a something he means by the Son of God, as having Glory with his Father before the World was, and what a Compound he will make the Person of our Redeemer, as consisting of an Humane Nature, and of some other (yet never before heard of) pre-existing Nature? I doubt, before he have done, he'll turn that great Mystery of God, manifested in the Flesh, into a mere Chimaera; but I tremble to mention such Blasphemies.  
4. As to what this Author adds, P. 25, 26, 27. of his Letter, §. 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83. though I find little besides idle Repetitions of former Matter which hath already been fully answered; yet some few Remarks I shall make, and 1. Whereas he tells us, P. 25. That it is impossible that the same numerical Act of Creation could be done by three Persons, because the self same Act could not be done three times, and if one Person does an Act, no other can do the sells same. Answ. Such Stuff as this and that which follows, argues the Author's gross Ignorance about the divine Persons, whom he supposeth to be separate divided Being's like Humane Persons acting divisim & separatim; were this so, his arguing would be to purpose: But he knows well enough (and so his Ignorance will be found to be wilful Ignorance) that the Three Divine Persons, according to the Doctrine of all Orthodox Trinitarians, are not divided Being's, Minds, Natures, Essences, but one and the ●ame most pure and simple divine Being's, Minds, Natures, Essences, with three distinct relative Properties, which do not so much as make any real Composition in that one glorious Being, and yet are true Relations arising from their proper Foundations in that one most simple immense Being, as he may easily understand, from what hath been said, if he have a Mind to be informed; and so he might have satisfied himself, that it contradicts no Idea of ours at all, that one divine Person does the very same numerical Action another does.  
2. Whereas in the same Page he does insinuate, That infinite Divine Wisdom teacheth Men (he means according to the same Doctrine of the Trinitarians) that there are two needless and useless Persons in God himself, whose Actions are to no manner of purpose, only to do what the first Person is not only all sufficient to do, but actually and wholly does; that if the Son and Spirit must necessarily do the same Act, they are no other than necessary Agents, and all the Power must be in him with whom they cannot help doing the same Acts he wholly does. Answ. This whole Discourse is false and impious, and not without greatest Calumny fixed on Orthodox Trinitarians. For may he not find (if he will but take notice of it) generally averring,  
1. That the Second and Third Persons are so far from being needless and useless, that they do as necessarily subsist in the divine Essence as the first Person? 2. That although the Father has a free Will and Power to do or not do (viz. ad extra) whatever he pleaseth, yet this must be so understood, that he hath this in Union and Conjunction with the Son and Spirit, and not as divided or separated from them? Therefore, what he would infer, that the Son and Spirit must necessarily do the same Act the Father doth; consequently, that they are no other than necessary Agents; that all the Power must be in him, with whom they cannot help doing what he wholly does; is idle and blasphemous, as if the Power of doing, a●d Will for doing, were the sole Power and Will of the Father, and not the joint Power and Will of Father, Son, and Spirit; or as if the Son and Spirit did not in entire Conjunction with the Father perform the same Act ad extra, and with the same Freedom, when the Act is the Joint Act of all Three? And I pray, is that we say here the Language only of some late Tritarians, and not the Language of sacred Scriptures, yea, and of Christ himself? What else do those Words of our Lord import, John 5. 17. My Father worketh hitherto, and I work, did not the Father work Miracles? Did not Christ work the same in Conjunction with him? And does not that Scripture, John 1. 1, 2, 3, 14. expressly affirm, that the Word (styled the only begotten of the Father) was in the Beginning, was with God, was God, the great Creator and Maker of all things, that without him was not any thing made that was made? It's a Wonder this Author, when he reads such a Scripture as this, can forbear for to cast forth Reproaches on the divinely inspired Evangelist himself? for could any Trinitarian have, with greater Evidence set forth, That, 1. this Word was from the Beginning, and before the Beginning of all created Being's, and therefore from Eternity? 2. That in this Beginning he was with God, and therefore a distinct Person from God the Father? 3. That he was God, viz. the same blessed God with the Father as to Essence? 4. That all things were made by him, and that without him was not any thing made that was made, that therefore the Father did make nothing but in Conjunction with the Word or Son, not in Separation from him, as this Author would have it? And as nothing that was made, was made without this Word, so this Word himself was not made, except he make himself, but is the eternal increated Being: Let this Author show now if he can, what he hath to charge Trinitarians with, which he may not as well charge on this blessed Apostle.  
Obj. But this Author is so far from granting the Concurrence of the Son or Spirit to the doing of the same Actions with the Father, notwithstanding Scripture does most clearly testify it (as in the Texts before cited) that he does boldly aver, That this is apparently false, the Scripture being f●ll of Actions, especially those they do to one another, as one being sent by another, their going from, and returning to one another, which is impossible to suppose they all equally concurred in; a little after he adds, That they (viz. Trinitarians) cannot deny, but Father, Son, and Spirit act separately ad extra, even with respect to the Creatures; and to prove this, he asks, Did not God the Son take the Man Christ into his Godhead, when neither of the other took him into theirs, or were limited to him? He further adds,— They are so far from being one in a natural Sense, that there is not so much as a moral Union between them; they have different Wills and Inclinations; for instance, the first Person will not forgive Mankind, without having Satisfaction given him by a divine Person, nay, they say his Justice could not be satisfied without it; the Son is so far from being of the same Mind, that he freely offered himself, to suffer to appease the Wrath of the first Person, and still intercedes to the Father. The third Person neither gives nor receives Satisfaction.  
Answ. 1. I know no divine Actions, ad extra, which are expressed in Scripture, whether in a proper and literal, or in a tropical and improper Sense, but they may well enough agree to Father, Son, and Spirit, and they may equally concur in them: It's true, our Lord saith, Joh. 16. 25. I came forth from the Father, and am come into the World. Again, I leave the World, and go to the Father: But these Words do import no more, than that the Word being made Flesh, and dwelling in that Humane Tabernacle, did for such time as that Humane Nature was upon the Earth, manifest the divine Glory in it, and so his leaving the World, and going to the Father, imports no more than his ceasing from such a Way for Manifestation of the divine Glory, and from thenceforth reserving such Manifestation for Heaven, styled God's Throne; so this makes nothing at all to the Author's purpose, only imports God's making in the Person of the Son, Manifestations of his Glory after different ways, sometimes in the Humane Nature on Earth, which is his Footstool, sometimes in Heaven, which is his Throne; so Joh. 14. 26. our Lord saith, but the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my Name, he shall teach you all things: What Action is there, the Words being rightly understood, wherein one Person may not concur as well as another? If the Author say, the Father's sending the Spirit to teach the Church, is such an Action: I answer, The Father's sending here imports no more than the Father's willing that the Church be taught, and illuminated by the blessed Spirit; this being a Benefit which Christ hath purchased for it, and this teaching, such as in respect of Order in operating, is more especially appropriated to the Third Person; but dare this Author therefore say, that the Father does therefore exclude himself, either from willing, that the Church be taught, or from teaching it himself, when the teaching the Church all things, is such a peculiar Work of God, that as it does infallibly evidence the true Divinity of the Holy Spirit, so the joint Concurrence of Father, Son, and Spirit, in it: So we see the grand Arguments of this Author against the Trinity, which he thinks to be invincible, are no other than such as do arise from his own Misunderstanding or perverting the Sense of Holy Scriptures. 2 As to that Query of his, wherewith he thinks doubtless to silence all Trinitarians, viz. Did not God the Son take the Man Christ into his Godhead, when neither of the others took him into theirs, or were united to him? Answ. The Author in this, labours under a double gross Mistake of the Doctrine, both of sacred Scripture, and of Trinitarians.  
1. In his confounding Godhead with Personality: For doubtless the Humane Nature of Christ is truly united to that Godhead which is common to the Three Persons; as divina charismatum communicatis, and as that Name, Immanuel, God with us, or God in our Nature, do clearly import: And as that Scripture, Act. 20. 28. To feed the Church of God, which he hath purchased with his own Blood, does evince; though at the same time, it be but united to the Personality of one of these, viz. the Son, and (through the Contrivement of eternal Wisdom) be made to subsist wholly, Substantiâ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or in the Godhead, as limited by personal Property, that so this glorious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 might become a meet Representative or Sponsor for us.  
2. Tho it be granted (for the Reason aforesaid) that only the Person of the Son, did take the Human Nature into his Subsistence; yet this imports no more than passive Reception of that Humane Nature into his Subsistence, which was added or united to it by the real joint Action of the Three blessed Persons, and wherein they did equally concur, like as they do in other Actions relating to the Humane Nature, See Psal. 16. 10. compared with Acts 2. 24. Yea, do act jointly, as well in preparing a Body or Humane Nature, for the Person of the Son (compare Heb. 10. 5. with Luke 1. 35.) as they do in uniting that Person with the Humane Nature, John 1. 14. The Word was made Flesh. So that you see from the undoubted Testimony of the Word, into what a second gross Mistake this Author is fallen, when he affirms, that the Three Persons do act separately, ad extra, as I have now made appear in that very Instance by himself, given of the Son's Incarnation.  
3. As to what is further objected by him, viz. That these Persons are so far from being one in a Natural Sense, that there is not so much as a Moral Union between them, that they have different Wills, etc. Answ. This whole Discourse, upon due Search, will be found to be false and idle; for whereas he tells us, that the first Person, viz. (according to Trinitarians) will not forgive Mankind, without having Satisfaction given him by a divine Person, and that his Justice could not be satisfied without it, when yet the Justice of the Second Person can be satisfied without it. How false is this? Where will he find any such Trinitarians as say, That the Justice of the Second Person can any more be satisfied than the Justice of the First without Satisfaction? nay, do they not tell him, that the Justice of the First and Second Person is one and the same Justice? Should they talk as he makes them, they would be as ridiculous as he could wish them. I must tell him therefore, that the Act of being offended with the Sins of Mankind, as well as the Works of Creation and Providence, may as truly be attributed to one as to another Person, and alike to all; notwithstanding that in respect of Order, in operating, some of these are more frequently attributed to one, and some to another: Nor do we matter for his bold and impudent Scoff, of the Persons being a Committee of Gods, where sometimes one is Precedent, and sometimes another is in the Chair, and that accordingly things run in each of their Names, being well assured, that the one great and blessed God subsisting according to his infinite Perfection in Three Persons, viz. as Father, Son, and Spirit, may and doth (as Scripture teacheth) for the Manifestation of divine Order, in the Operations of the Three Persons, and for the Consolation of his People, appropriate in more special manner, some of his great Works, ad extra, to himself as Father, some to himself as Son, some to himself as Spirit, though all the Three do jointly and equally concur in all, and this without giving the least Colour for Polytheism, or Multiplication of Gods. But he adds, That the Son, viz. (according to us) is so far from being of the same Mind with the Father in requiring Satisfaction, that he freely offered himself to suffer, even to Death, to appease the Wrath of the First Person, and still intercedes.— Answ. We have shown that the Son is of the same Mind with the Father, in requiring Satisfaction, and we shall now show that he is of the same Mind, as to the giving of it; for when he comes to give Satisfaction, does he not expressly tell us, Psal. 40. 7, 8 Heb. 10. 7, 9, 10. I delight, or I come to do thy Will O God, yea, thy Law is within my Heart? Can any thing be more evident, than that it was the Father's Will, as well as Christ's that he should make Satisfaction? And did Christ freely offer himself to suffer even unto Death, before the Hands and Counsel of God the Creator of Heaven and Earth had determined this way of Satisfaction by the Death of Christ? See what Scripture saith, Acts 4. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28. And do not all sound Trinitarians say the same? But this Author should consider what Trinitarians tell him, that our Lord Christ hath an Humane as well as a Divine Nature; that to suffer Death and to intercede, are Idioms of the Humane Nature, and must not be attributed to the divine Nature of the Son, and therefore he should be cautious how he father's his own false Notions on these. And what if Trinitarians set forth God as offended with fallen Man, by the Person of the Father; God as willing to recover and redeem saln Man, by the Person of the Son, for Reasons before mentioned? Must therefore God the Father and Son have different Sentiments about Man's Fall, different Minds and Wills about Satisfaction and Redemption? Nothing more false; I hope it's cleared fully, that the Three Persons in these, as in all other real Acts, ad extra, do jointly and equally concur  
Obj. But it's yet hoped, by this Author, that he can baffle Trinitarians by their own Concessions: For do not these grant (saith he) That opera Trinitatis ad intra sunt divisa? And he does instance in the Father's Act of Generation, whereby he gave Being to Son and Spirit, wherein they did not, nor could not act, And what greater Argument (saith he) can there be that they are separate Gods, than that they act separately?  
Answ. Suppose that Maxim, Opera Trinitatis ad intrasunt divisa, such, that taken in a right Sense, it may be granted; yet that wicked Conclusion he would draw from it, That the Three Persons act separately, and so are separate Gods, does no way follow from it; which himself, if he would but weigh the Matter well, would be forced to acknowledge; for what if these Acts be divided, this (in a sound Sense) imports no more, than that the Divine Essence, by its two great Faculties of Intellect and Will, doth exert those two great Acts ad intra, one of eternal Intellection of its self, another of eternal Dilection, which Acts yet are so divided, that neither the one can formally be said to be the other, nor the Essence, as with the one, the Essence as with the other; nor the Essence as with the Act, the Essence as terminating the Act; this is so clear, that no rational Man can deny it, and I question not but the Author himself will acknowledge it: And yet, these Acts, though thus divided, do not so much as imply (as he must needs confess) any real Composition in God, much less separate Agents, or separate Gods: Now, if we bring what hath been said, to the Persons in the Trinity, we shall find, that however these Acts, ad intra, absolutely considered, be those essential Properties or Perfections which are as communicable as the divine Essence itself, yet if we consider them as Foundations of relative personal Properties flowing and resulting from these Acts, as for example, of that personal relative Property of Generation (to instance in that which this Author doth instance in) and which Generation doth include both the foresaid internal Act of the divine Essence, and also the relative Property of God the Father resulting from it, and giving Denomination to it; then this Act, ad intra, so limited by relative Property, is the peculiar Act of God as Father, and not of God as Son or Holy Spirit; even as the divine Essence itself, absolutely considered, is common to Three Person, but as limited by personal Property, is peculiar to one; and now I pray, where's our Author's separate Agents, or separate Gods, necessary for Performance of these Acts ad intra, when it's clear that these Acts, with the Terms of these Acts, are only distinguished and divided as before, amongst the Three Persons by relative Properties; and where's that Polytheism or Multiplication of Gods, which he would so gladly charge on Trinitarians? Doth his arguing here flow genuinely from the Doctrine of Trinitarians, or only from the false Notions and Dreams of his own Brain? Is there any thing in all this Discourse, affirmed of God, but what may be affirmed, and what himself cannot but affirm of every Angel, and of every Humane Soul; save with this Difference, that these Acts, ad intra, in the blessed God, being infinite and essential, are therefore generative and productive of Persons in the Godhead; when in Angels and Humane Souls, where they are but finite and accidental, they are not productive in like manner: After all this, when it is so evident from divine Revelation (without which we should for ever have been silent) that the Acts, ad intra, as they are in the infinite eternal God, do differ in their Products, so as Trinitarians affirm from those Acts, ad intra, which are but the Acts of finite Creatures, and when this stands in no real Contradiction to Reason or the Light of Nature, but, though transcendent to it, yet, when once revealed, is found to stand in sweet Consistency with it; I wonder what it is this Author would be at, unless it be, instead of subjecting himself to the written Word and divine Revelation, to take on him to be a Controller, or rather scornful Gain-sayer of it?  
As to his 79. §. we have shown before, that Creation is the Work, though of one glorious Being, yet as subsisting in three Persons; and here, though we readily grant, that there is but one supreme Preserver and Governor of all things, yet we must tell, or rather let the Scripture tell him, That this supreme Upholder and Governor of the World, is the great God, Father, Son, and Spirit; Son and blessed Spirit, jointly and equally concurring with the Father in this great Work, and not the Father as separated from them; for this see Heb. 1. 3. Is not the Son expressly said here to uphold all things by the Word of his Power? Andis not the Saints new Birth, Illumination, Instruction, or Direction, attributed to the Holy Spirit? Can any thing be more evident than that these glorious Persons do act jointly with the Father in the Preservation of the Creatures, as well as in their Creation? How falsely then does he conclude, §. 80. That Creation, Preservation, and supreme Government of the Universe, demonstrate that there is but one Divine Person? And that the same Conclusion, in his said §. 80. drawn from Adoration, Love, and Gratitude due to God, is as false as the former, I have fully before evidenced, P. 24. As to his 81. §. I must tell him, 1. That all sound Trinitarians do acknowledge as fully as himself or any other, that there is but one divine Being or God, with a Power to know and do all things. 2. That the Heathens were without Excuse for worshipping several. 3. That for him to say, that these Trinitarians do pay divine Worship to more than one necessary spiritual Being, is a Charge so notoriously false, that Satan himself could not have acted the Part of a more false Accuser.  
But he tells us, §. 80. That it can no way allay our Crime to call them Persons instead of Gods, since paying divine Worship to them does as much rob the only one of his due, as if we called them so many Gods. Answ. Do we in worshipping Three Persons, rob the only one of his Due, when in express Scripture Language, 1 John 5. 7. we profess that these Three are the only One, and the only One is these Three, viz. Father, Son, and Spirit? If in that Adoration we pay to the Son, and blessed Spirit, we should pay it to them as separated from the Father, excluding the Father from sharing in it, he might have had some Colour for what he says; but when the Father is not excluded, but does equally share in it; nay, when we do profess, that in all that Adoration we do direct to One of the Three, yet we as truly include all the Three, viz. Father, Son, and Spirit, as making up the only one complete and adequate Object of Worship, the blessed God; even as he who does sincerely direct his Worship to God as Redeemer, does yet truly include God our Creator and Sanctifier; will not his whole Charge be found to be false and blasphemous Calumny? In his 82. §. he tells us, that not only unitarians, but all Mankind that worship but one divine Being, are greatly scandalised at those Christians that pay divine Worship to several; and he beseecheth these to let him understand how the Heathens, in their Devotions did or could do more to distinguish their divine Being's, than these do by praying to each by himself, and terminating their Devotion on each? Answ. If this Author have a Mind to be satisfied, I hope I have said enough to satisfy him in this, and to let him see, that these Christians are so far from imitating the Heathen in their idolatrous Worship of more Gods, that none but a Person grossly blinded with Heathenish Malice, taking almost everywhere his own silly and false Hypotheses for granted Maxims, and inferring his Conclusions from such Principles, durst have ventured to have charged them with it.  
Obj. But it is objected, Do we not in our Creed expressly say, The Son is very God of very God? and how can we, after that, pretend they are the same God?  
Answ. Well enough, for the Creed imports no more than that the Son is the very same God with the Father, though as clothed with a different relative Property through eternal Generation, he be God of God, in such manner as is largely before declared.  
Obj. But he tells us here, there are a hundred Actions which Scripture relates of one God, and denies of the other two Gods; as God the Spirit descending in a Bodily Shape, the Father and Son not descending.  
Answ. 1 Tho that Scripture, Mat. 3. 16, 17. does signally evidence the Truth of Three Persons, who in Christ's Baptism did differently represent themselves, viz. Voce Pater, Natus corpore, flamen Ave, which made one of the Fathers say to one doubting of the Trinity, Abi ad Jordanem & videbis; yet no such thing as a Plurality of Gods, can be inferred from any Actions here performed. To mention that which himself does instance in, viz. God the Spirit's descending in a Bodily Shape; I suppose he must needs grant here, that Action of descending cannot be attributed to God in a proper Sense, and therefore supposing the Spirit to be God, as Trinitarians say, can only be attributed to him in a tropical Sense, suited to any manner of conceiving, which is ordinary in Scripture; and whatever of Action it may import appropriated here to the Holy Spirit, yet it is but like all other Actions ad extra, common to the Three, as we have before fully evidenced, P. 30. where he may find what is here or elsewhere by him objected in reference to these Acts fully answered. But.  
Quest. 2. What then does this Author mean in telling of an hundred Actions which the Scripture relates of one God, and denies of the other two Gods? Does he charge Scripture and the divinely inspired Penman of it with Polytheism, or asserting a Plurality of Gods?  
Answ. To do him Right, I think this is not his Meaning; but that by one God, he means the true God, and by the other two Gods, two made Gods, such as truly are not God, but only have such a Name, and are falsely advanced to divine Dignity by Trinitarians, whom therefore he charges as Idolaters, yea, as bad or worse than Pagan's. More Stuff of like Nature he hath in his 9th. Chapter, which, though chief intended against Dr. Sherlock and his Party, yet towards the Close of it, as §. 93, 94. he does bitterly inveigh against the others as Polytheists and Idolaters, having a Creed not stuffed with so many Lines as Contradictions; yea, and when it's evident (as he tells us) that in Scripture God the Father is as much distinguished from the Son, as two Men or Angels can be. In his 83. §. he adds, these things are so frequently objected, and so little Care taken to answer them be our Writers, that I thought I could not do better than to represent those to you, that we may (if it be possible) receive a full and satisfactory Answer.  
And now I hope the Christian Reader may fully see what this Author would be at; and I should not thus far have raked into the filthy Dunghill of his Blasphemies, but to make a full Discovery of him, and that even the weaker and more incautious Readers may now see him in his perfect Colours. For such Conclusions as these are clearly deducible from his own Words, and the most candid Construction that can be put on them. viz. 1. That God the Son, and God the Spirit, when worshipped by Christians with Divine Worship, become mere Idols. 2. That those Christians who adore these, or either of these, as true God, are as gross Idolaters as Pagans, who worship Stocks and Stones, and in some respects, more vile than they. 3. That all such as write in Defence of a Trinity of Persons, in the Unity of divine Essence, are simple Persons, fond of venting absurd and silly Hypotheses, and Books and Creeds stuffed with nothing but flat Contradictions; and what I pray will follow from these Conclusions, but that, 1. All Christians in the World, for many hundred Years together, were mere Idolaters, yea, as bad, or worse than Pagan Idolaters? 2. That Idolatry destroying the very Essence of a true Church, Christ therefore, for about a thousand Years, i. e. from the Time that Arianism was exploded by the Christian World, till the time that it was broached anew by Socinus, had no true Church? Can any Pagan or Mahometan have disgorged the Poison of a bitter Spirit against Christ and his Members, at an higher rate than this? But this Man pretends to believe Divine Revelation; let me then expostulate the Matter a little with him. Can he cast all this Dirt on Trinitarians, and not on Scripture and the sacred Writers of it, yea, on Christ himself? Is it only Trinitarians that say, Christ is God equal with the Father; and doth not blessed Paul say the same, Phil. 2. 6? Is it these only that say, that we must honour the Son as we honour the Father, and doth not Christ himself say the very same, Joh. 5. 23? Do these only tell us that Christ the Son is the great Maker, Preserver, and Upholder of all things, and doth not the great Apostle St. John, in the first Chapter of his Gospel, and Paul, in the first Chapter to the Hebrews say the very same? Is it these only that say, that the Son is the mighty eternal God, and doth not the great Prophet Isaiah say as much, Chap. 9 Vers. 6. styling him the mighty God, the everlasting Father, or Father of Eternity? Or is it only these who pay that same Divine Worship to the Son, become our Redeemer, which they pay to the Father in Conjunction with him, and do not the innumerable Companies of blessed Angels and Saints, yea, ten thousand times ten thousand of these, with every other Creature in his Kind, pay the very same? Let him consult Rev. 5. 11, 12, 13. and he'll find they do; and must all these therefore be Idolaters? Oh Blasphemy! And as to the blessed Spirit, is it only the late Trinitarians who acknowledge his Infinity and Omniscience, did not the Royal Prophet David do the same? See Psal. 139. 7, 8, etc. Is it only these that declare him to be the true God, the great Searcher of Hearts, and did not the great Apostle Peter, in the Case of Ananias, who lied to the Holy Ghost, declare as much, when he told him, Act. 5. 3, 4. Thou hast not lied unto Men but unto God? And did not Ananias to his Cost find it so? The Author might do well to consider, who it is he casts his blasphemous Reproaches on; were it only upon a Company of poor frail Men, who possibly may err, this were not so much, but to cast these on sacred Scripture, on the infallibly inspired Penmen of it, and on glorified Angels, who say, and do as much as Trinitarians do; yea, and on Jesus Christ himself, and on the Holy Spirit; this is dreadful. Before he had gone thus far, he might well have considered what our Lord saith, Mat. 12. 31. All manner of Sin and Blasphemy shall be forgiven unto Men, but the Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto Men; or, if it be not too late, I wish he might yet consider it and repent. He pretends, §. 83. that his End in writing was to receive (if possible) a full and satisfactory Answer from those learned Persons, to whom he writes; and what if such an Answer come from one, sometimes Member of one of those famous Universities, to whom he makes his Address? Is not this as much as may suffice both for detecting and confuting his fallacious arguing, and for giving ample Satisfaction, if he have an Heart prepared for Reception of it? However this be, thus much I can sincerely profess, that for so much of his Letter as relates to those Trinitarians, whom he doth abusively style Nominal, and who indeed are the sound and Orthodox Trinitarians, I have been so far from overlooking any thing that might seem to have any Weight, or to carry any Colour of Reason with it, that I have chosen, rather as to some of his Objections repeated again and again in different Places, under somewhat different Terms, to give Answer again and again, rather than suffer the incautious Reader to be deluded with them; only thus much I must mind the Reader of, that in the whole of this Discourse, I have not meddled at all with Dr. Sherlock, or those of his Party who assert that the Persons in the Trinity are Three distinct infinite Minds or Spirits, and Three individual Substances: And whom this Author styles real Trinitarians: These I confess have given too just Occasion of Offence and Scandal to all sober Christians, who do not stand in need of such Weapons for Defence of the Trinity against the Extremes, either of Arius on the one hand, or of Sabellius or the Unitarians on the other; for seeing, I find, these justly censured by those learned and worthy Persons— The Vicechancellor, and Heads of the Colleges and Halls in Oxford, in their Decree of Novemb. 25. A. D. 1695. I do fully acquiesce therein. But as to the Author, with whom I have to do, when I came to that Part of his Letter, viz. Chap. 6, 7, 8, 9 which seems only to refer to these, and so had thought to have rid my Hands of him, yet perusing these Chapters, I found so many things interwoven relating to the former, whose Defence I had undertaken (as if his Arrows were chief leveled at these) that I did plainly see, either I must do more, or leave this Author to glory, as if I had left some of his chief Arguments unanswered; which now I hope he will not so much as pretend.  
And now I would shut up my whole Discourse, but that his last Chapter about Mystery, may call for these few brief Notes on it, viz. 1. That it argues intolerable Pride and Folly in him to prefer Reason as in fallen Man, yea, his own magnifyed Ideas (of things which we have found already to be so false) to the most undoubted Traditions and Revelations of God in the Word, and to make those the Rule and Touchstone for trying these by, as it's clear he doth, §. 11.  
2. That it argues highest Impudence, and Impiety for him to make, as §. 103. 104. Mystery, no mark of Christ or true Religion, but only of Antichrist and Irreligion, when yet sacred Scripture tells him, 1 Tim. 3. 16. that great is the Mystery of Godliness, God manifest in the Flesh, which clearly shows, that there's as well a Mystery of Godliness relating to Christ, as a Mystery of Iniquity relating to Antichrist.  
3. Whereas he rails against the Mystery of the Trinity as a cunningly devised Fable, for to keep People in Darkness, and make such as were Children, be as Children still, §. 95. I must tell him, this is no better than false and lying Slander; for he sees how ready we are to enter the List with him, and to vindicate our Doctrine both by Scripture and Reason from all his black Calumnies.  
Obj. 4. Whereas he pretends, that there's no Mystery in Religion, as to the things themselves, which are revealed, but only as to the manner of them (I suppose he means not as to their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) see his §. 96, 97, 98. and then tells us, that the Mystery of the Trinity is a Mystery as to the things themselves, i. e. such wherein we have no Ideas of the things at all, or but such as are contradictory to the true, and contain an Affirmation and Negation of the same thing; which he would more fully evidence §. 102. telling us, that to say, Three Persons and one Person are the same God, is as great a Contradiction as to say, Three Persons and One are the same; and that we may as soon apprehend a Round Square, or a Mountain without a Valley; which yet Trinitarians would maintain under Pretence of Mystery; and this when not only Unitarians, but all Mankind that worship but one Divine Being, are greatly scandalised at them for it is, as §. 82.  
Answ. The whole of what is here objected, hath in the preceding Discourse, been so fully answered; the Definitions of Person in general, and of divine Person, so clearly laid down; the Difference there is betwixt Substance, substantial Essence, and Person, so fully cleared; His pretended Contradictions (not resulting from Trinitarian Doctrine (as he would have it (but from his own false Ideas about these things) so clearly refuted and confuted; that I would persuade myself, would he and those of his Party betake themselves to an impartial and unprejudiced Consideration of what hath been said, this, if it had no further Effect, yet would make both him and them for ever hereafter to desist from these their loud and lying Clamours against Christ's Church and faithful Servants; and make them grant, that these, by the true Doctrine of the Trinity, are so far from multiplying Gods, or Objects of Worship, that they do not so much as attribute to our great and blessed God, any Properties, whether absolute or relative, but what are revealed in the Word, and which being so revealed, Reason itself, and the Light of Nature, must grant to be such, as may flow from the Divine Essence, and its eternal intrinsic Acts, if the Perfection of these and their infinite Distance from finite Essence and Acts, be but duly known and considered.  
FINIS.