THE Case of the Times DISCUSSED: Being a Serious Exercitation of two Cases grounded upon Romans 13. Vers. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  
First, How far we are bound to Obey, when we are not Satisfied that the Laws are for our Good?  
2 d, Whether Subjection implies more than not to Resist the Powers?  
To which is added, Some Remarkes upon a late Book, Entitled, The Protestant Reconciler.  
By Fr. Fullwood, D. D. in Exon.  
LONDON, Printed for Jonathan Wilkins, at the Star in Cheapside, next Mercers Chapel, 1683.   

To the RIGHT REVEREND Father in God THOMAS Lord Bishop OF EXON.  
My Good Lord;  
YOur Lordship is very sensible, that as Policy requires Obedience to the Laws for the Preservation of the Public Peace; So Religion (especially the Christian) requires That Obedience from a Principle of Conscience. And I know your Lordship accounts it Your Honour to be a Minister of that Excellent Religion, whose Zeal and Piety is so concerned, both by Your convincing and free Discourses upon all Occasions, and by Your exceeding Constant and Exemplary Devotions, to promote that Christian and Peaceable Principle into due Practice. This also being the Chief End of the following Papers. I have made Bold to send them forth under the Countenance of Your Great Name, as well as to Acknowledge the many Personal Obligations I stand under by Your Lordship's Favours.  
If such a Conscientious Obedience to the Laws could be generally obtained among us, how happy a Prospect would it give us! However, if our Dissenting Brethren cannot be satisfied of the Fitness of every thing that is enjoined, or of the direct Obligation of Our Laws upon their Consciences, my Prayer for them and our Israel is, That they would consider and see Reason in the words of their great Friend (the Protestant Reconciler, p. 177.) viz. It seems to be the Duty of Inferiors to Comply rather with the Commands of their Superiors, tho' they conceive them Burdensome and Inconvenient, then to administer Occasion to all those dreadful Evils both to Church and State, of which we have (and may have) so sad Experience. And O that God would grant (as our Church prays) that they may both perceive and know what things they ought to do; and also may have Grace and Power faithfully to fulfil the same. I am  
My Lord Your Lordship's Obliged and humbly Devoted Servant Fr. Fullwood.   

THE Introduction, DISSENTERS Reasons Not from the SINFULNESS, but the INCONVENIENCY of the things required by LAW.  
I Have often wondered that so many, otherwise Sober and Ingenious Persons, continue their Refusal to join with us in our Public Worship; and by their Ill Example, Encourage Separation in the people to this day. I shall not wholly impute it, either to their Ignorance or Stubbornness or Interest; but am willing to conceive, that they have some Latent Principle, upon which they imagine, they support their Consciences, and satisfy themselves in their Way of Disobedience.  
I have studied to find out What this Principle should be: It must lie in some Exception they have against our Divine Offices; and I cannot imagine it can be any thing, but either their supposed Sinfulness or unfitness.  
1. I do not think, that they do really and in earnest believe or suspect our public Worship to be directly Sinful; for these Reasons, because so many learned and pious Men have frequently and abundantly solved All Objections of that kind, both as to Substance and Ceremony; which I presume our considering Brethren have well weighed and approved as Satisfactory. Especially seeing the old Puritan Nonconformists, whose Steps they pretend to follow, wrote so well and zealously even for the Necessity of our People's communicating in our Parocbial Service. Yea, consonant hereunto, many of the more learned Nonconformists since the happy Restoration, have openly and frankly Justified and Vindicated our Ordinary Public Worship. And one of their Great Men, in his late Pleas for Peace (or rather for Non conformity) tho' he offers several Objections against its Lawfulness, yet, as I take it, he Disowns them as for himself, and puts them upon Others, that do or may so object. And indeed, at other times he has argued strenuously for all parts of our public Worship, to which he Conforms himself, tho' some are positive, That His Continuing to Preach among the Dissenters, is an unaccountable Patronage of their Separation. Besides, it cannot be unknown and unobserved, That most of those Non-conformists, that have given us any Reason of their Desertion, have said nothing against the Lawfulness of our Communion, but have urged only such things as are in the Conditions of our Ministration, an nothing to our People's Communion. Some could not renounce the Covenant: Some could not give their Assent and Consent to all and every thing contained in the Book, meaning, some Proposition and Computation of no practical Nature or Concern to the People's ordinary Attendance in our Parish Churches: Others scrupled at Re-ordination, & some perhaps liked not Canonical Obedience; and others, some of the Thirty Nine Articles, and its possible some were offended at All these things: but what are all these to our Lay-Communion? And therefore by the way, those angry Persons that exclaim against the Hardness of the Terms of our Communion from such things as these, are in my Opinion much to blame, as well as overseen: seeing all these things are extrinsical, and not so much as Accidents of our Ordinary Communion: and are only Conditions of the Exercise of the Ministry, to which no man is bound.  
The Substance and Matter of our Common-Prayers is beyond this Exception of unlawfulness; and hath ever been so accounted by all, but Persons infected by Brownism; and indeed, almost every Phrase or Sentence in them, are either express Scripture, or the evident Sense of some Particular Passage in the Word of God.  
If any thing will bear a Dispute, 'tis the Sign of the Cross at Baptism; yet this their great Pleader, himself denyeth not the Lawful use of, as a Teaching Sign; and it is no other, by the very words of the Administration in the Common-Prayer-Book. Besides, What is the Use of the Cross to so many as have No Children? Or to others, when they have no occasion to be particularly concerned? Or indeed, to any, but to the Administrator? What is this to the common or ordinary course of God's Worship amongst us? Can any be so weak as to think, they are thus Excused for their Constant Absence or Total Separation from us?  
As for Kneeling at the other Sacrament, if a Man should tell me, That He thinks it Sinful, I would not believe him. All the Dissenters that had Offices when the late Test came forth requiring them to receive the Lord's Supper according to the Church of England, that is, Kneeling, gave a Plain Experiment, That they did not think or suspect them to be Unlawful; for they did certify, That they had So Received it; neither did I ever hear, That their Friends were much Offended at their such Advantageous Conformity. Besides, as before, What is this to the Ordinary Use of Common Prayer, when there is no Sacrament Administered?  
2. From the Premises I think I may conclude, that it is not any supposed Sinfulness in our Worship, but something else, that is the true cause of their separating or dividing from us, and therefore, I cannot but observe, that when they are urged to give us their Reason, they are backward to give us any, muchless to show the unlawfulness of any thing required. And truly, I cannot apprehend that any thing sticks with them, but the bare Inconveniency; that is, the Unagreeableness of our Worship to their own Notion, Apprehension and Desires. That is, plainly, they do not like our Way of Worship, tho' perhaps they are not agreed among themselves what they would have in the room of it. In general terms, the old Brownists were for a purer Worship; and in the Modern Language, they would serve God better: and perhaps, they have kept off so long from us in hopes that we might be induced by their Distance, and Numbers & Clamours to Reform, and bring things nearer to their apprehensions.  
Besides, what hath been observed to evince this, it may be further considered, That as the Dissenters, to save their Offices, did conform, as before we noted, which could not Consist with an Opinion of the Sinfulness of Conformity; so by their Separation before and since the Test, they declare plainly, they are against our Worship: that is, In their Opinion, 'tis not Sinful, but Inconvenient; viz. They do not like it.  
The same Evidence they gave us in the time of Indulgence. When a very great Body of the People, called Presbyterians, who before joined with their Neighbours in our public Worship, took their Liberty to leave us, and went to the Allowed Meetings; and being demanded a Reason of that Practice, they gave no other but this, The Non-conformists Way was more Edifying, and they Liked it better; and many of them, I fear, have not yet found the way back again to this day.  
And do not we find daily, that the severer Use of the Laws brings in many of the Dissenters to us, tho' 'tis confessed, that a great Number are yet more hardy, and stand it out, who, we cannot perceive have any better, or other Reason for Separation, than those that do come in? And why did these Continue their Distance from us so long before? Charity must answer, while they could enjoy their Own Choice without Loss or Trouble, they did so; but since they cannot now, they are content to deny themselves, i. e. not to do that which is Sinful, but only Displeasing to them, rather than Suffer.  
Thus upon the whole, I persuade myself; that this lies at the bottom of Separation: Men like not our Worship: Not because they Judge it to be Sinful, but only Inconvenient: 'Tis not fitted to their private Notion and Idea. But how this can satisfy the Consciences of reasonable and considering Christians is the Question.  
Satisfaction in this Case, must Depend upon such Propositions as these.  
1. We are not bound to Obey the Laws that are not good in our Opinion, or Persuasion. That is, tho' they be not Sinful, but Inconvenient, and we dislike them.  
2. Or that we have Liberty to run the Hazard of the Penalty, and to Refuse or Deny Obedience to such Laws.  
These we find hinted in some late Discourses; which indeed give Temptation to the following Exercitations; wherein you will find, we have at large examined, how far these Principles will support and warrant such Disobedience and Separation.   

The First QUESTION. Whether we are Bound in Conscience to Obey our Rulers, when we are not satisfied the Laws are for our Good. Seeing, the Apostle says (Rom. 13. 4.) The Ruler— is the Minister of God to thee for Good— wherefore we must needs be Subject.  
The Argument for the Negative.  
THe strength of the Argument for the Negative, as it is hinted and scattered, especially in some late Books, seemeth to be thus.  
The Laws of Rulers bind the Conscience only as they are God's 
Arg. Contr  Ministers: And they have no Authority from God to make Evil Laws, or any Laws that are not for the Good of the Subject; being God's Ministers only for our Good. Consequently, such Laws having none of God's Authority, cannot bind the Conscience; or we are not in Conscience bound to obey them.  
The Question Stated, and the Argument Retorted.  
Ruler's may be supposed to be of three sorts: First, Such as have not stated and known Laws, but govern only by Personal Command. 2 d, Those that have Laws, but such as themselves make, by their own single and absolute Power. 3 d, Such as are to Govern by Laws, which are first chosen or consented unto by their People  
Now, in case the first sort, not regarding either Reason or Equity, make their Will their Law, to hurt and destroy their People; or the second sort, impose (as Nabuchadnezzar or Pharaoh) impious or grievous Edicts: or the last sort, shall slight their wholesome Laws, (the acknowledged Measures of Rule and Right) and use only an Illegal Arbitrary Power against public Safety,; and to the Injury of their Subjects. In all these Cases, indeed, great Authors speak hard words. In Tyranno nihil ordinatum a deo. Qui perdendae reipublicae animum gerit— rex esse desinit. Rex non est Dei sed Diaboli, dum declinet in Injuriam: that is, When he both forsakes the Just Rules of Law, and also acts Injustice and Oppression, Contrary to Law. And in this sense, Dr. Taylor acknowledges, He is the Minister of God to thee for Good, saith St. Paul, otherwise he is none of God's Minister, Cas. lib. 3. pa. 35.  
Thus men may show their Learning and Discourse at large; but what's all this to our own Hypothesis? if our Case be otherwise, as indeed it is, what are we concerned in such Suppositions? Do our Kings pretend to govern with their Personal Commands? or to make Laws without the people's Consent? or yet to an Arbitrary Government, much less to oppress and destroy us; either contrary to, or besides the Laws, quas vulgus elegerit, which ourselves have chosen? and to which they are sworn, according to our ancient Constitution; wherein is supposed or employed, the universal agreement of the whole Community, for many Ages.  
Now is it not hard to say, while our King, as such, acts faithfully to God and Man, and in discharge of his Oath and Trust, by the just and impartial Execution of those Laws, which we ourselves have chosen and desired, because some of his scrupulous Subjects have gained a dislike of some of these Laws, and that only in some small matters, is it not hard, yea very unconscionable to conclude hence, that our King is no Minister of God; and such his Laws are No Laws; and we are not in Conscience to Obey or Regard them: or to transfer the imagined Faults of the Law upon our Rulers; or their Faults upon the Law; or to charge both, or either, without Cause; while the Government proceeds according to the Laws of our own choice? and yet this is our very Case. And in such a Case, show me that Learned, Wise or Good Man, that ever thundered out his Sentence of Condemnation against the King and Government.  
Bracton indeed is our Ancient and Renowned Lawyer; and because his words may be thought pertinent, (as they are severe) and are much insisted on, we shall set them down at large; and then we shall easily perceive how far they concern our present Circumstances; he saith much, indeed, to magnify, but nothing to question or quarrel the Laws, or the Execution of them.  
His words are these, besides many more to the same purpose.  
Attribuit rex regi quod lex attribuit ei, viz. dominationem & potestatem. Non est enim rex ubi dominatur voluntas, et non lex, lib. 1. fol. 5.  
Potestas sua juris, & non injuriae— exercere igitur debet rex potestatem Juris, sicut dei vicarius & minister in terra quia illa potestas solius dei est; potestas autem injuriae diaboli & non dei, & cujus horum opera fecerit rex, ejus minister erit, cujus opera fecerit. Igitur dum facit Justitiam, vicarius est regis aeterni, minister autem. Diaboli, dum declinet ad injuriam— Rex— Tyrannus dum populum sibi creditum violenta opprimit dominatione temperet igitur potentiam suam per legem, quae fraenum est potentiae. Nihil proprium imperij quam legibus vivere, Lib. 3. fol. 107, 108.  
Perhaps, it may be said, Nothing more is intended by these Quotations, but to secure us against Arbitrary Government. Be it so. But give us Reason then for the present use of them, in such a nick and crisis as this. Hath not his Majesty given us sufficient assurance, that he will ever govern us by the Laws of the Land? or do we find any Cause to Complain of the contrary? Is not this an Engine to cast the Waters (or rather the Fire) of Jealousy upon the Common People? Is it not an unseasonable and sly Insinuation (not to say an Evil and Scandalous Reflection) upon the Government.  
Certainly, the present Grievance of such as are dissatisfied with the Government, is not Tyranny, Oppression and Arbitrary Power Contrary to Law, but Government according to Law, viz. the Execution of the Laws.  
2. But let us come a little nearer to the Argument, and we shall find it as strong to the Sense of its Author; as it is to our Case. It doth by no means answer the size of their own Notion: and makes the Argument of the Apostle to conclude a great way short, or beyond their own Mark. They plead (to serve another Turn, as you will find upon the Second Question) that the Apostle requires Subjection, and explains his Subjection by Nonresistance, and not by Obedience, or doing what is required by Law. And therefote if we do not resist the Power, tho' we do not actually obey, we do what the Apostle enjoins.  
Therefore, if when the Laws are not for our Good, the Apostle's Inference be of no force, his Injunction doth not bind us. That is, We are not bound to be Subject, but we may Reject. For the Apostle commands us to be Subject, and they say, He means by Subjection, Nonresistance.  
Now these Objectors themselves confess, That Subjection is a necessary Duty: and on no hand would be thought to allow Resistance. Yet 'tis plain, this their own Argument, from the Apostle's words, you see, doth first of all and more directly take away Subjection, and allows Resistance, against their own sense, before it can gratify them with Liberty to Disobey, which they contend for. And therefore, if consonant to themselves, they must confess this their great Argument is fallacious.  
This might suffice. But lest I should seem only to slur this esteemed Argument, and be afraid to encounter it in earnest; and the rather that I might vindicate the Apostle, and evince the Grounds of Christian Obedience according to his excellent Doctrine satisfactorily, I shall apply myself to a direct and more distinct Consideration of this Argument against the Necessity of Obedience: and all along endeavour to accommodate my Reason and Discourse, as near as I can, to our own Case. I shall reduce what I have to say against the Argument to two Heads.  
1. I shall show, that the true Force of the Apostle's Argument is, herein, Over-seen, and made to rest where he never intended it.  
2. And Secondly, That the Sense of the Apostle's words, upon which their Argument is grounded, is grossly mistaken.  

SECT. I. The True Force of the Apostles Argument Over-seen; and made to rest where he never intended it.  
THe chief Argument for our Obedience is intended in the first words of the Apostle's Proposition, he is the Minister of God, as they are distinguished from the Latin words, to thee for Good; as is more plainly expressed by the Syryac Translation Minister dei, sed tibi in bonum. But this is little heeded, tho' it be congruous to the Scope and Reason of the Apostle's whole Discourse upon this Point. We must, says he, be Subject: 
Rom. 13, vers. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  Why? because, he is the Higher Power, vers. 1. Because All Power is of God, appointed of God. The Ordinance of God. Our Ruler, and God's Minister. i e. One that wears God's Image, God's Name, God's Sword, Minister & vicarius dei, as the words of our Law are, plainly alluding to these of the Apostle: Thus we see, the Argument used by the Apostle, takes its strength from the Fountain of Humane Authority, and not from the End of it, as this Argument would insinuate.  
2. Indeed the Apostle notes also, the great End of all Authority; and assures us, it is appointed for our Good: and this is a very great Encouragement of Subjection and Obedience, that the Wise and Good Governor of the World, has appointed his Ministers to rule us for our Good: and worthy of a better Acknowledgement than it usually obtains. But who sees not, that the Apostle intends this Consideration rather as a Motive to our Obedience and Subjection, than a Condition of the Obligation.  
We must needs be Subject, partly (if you will) because he is a Minister ordained for our good; but principally and chief, because he is the Minister of God, he is a Minister to us for Good: this indeed commends Obedience to us as matter of Prudence, rather than Conscience. Therefore observe it, that he might effectually superside this Sophism, and fit his Argument beyond this Quirk and fine Subtlety, he repeats the very words for the more direct Obligation of Conscience [He is the Minister of God] and omits the words before, viz. [to thee for Good] the very words they ground their Argument upon. He is, says he in this very same Verse, the Minister of God, an Avenger, etc. and thereupon immediately concludes, Wherefore we must needs be Subject, not only for Wrath, but also for Conscience sake. As if he had said, Not only for Wrath, because he is an Avenger, to execute Wrath; but because he is the Minister of God for Conscience-sake.  
Thus, if otherwise there might have been a Doubt, where the Apostle intended the force of his Argument, whether upon the first, or last part of his Proposition, the Apostle himself hath resolved us, and the Ground of that Doubt is gone.  
Yet supposing we could admit that the Force of the Apostle's Argument doth rest upon the latter words [to thee for Good] unless our Sense of these words, be the same with the Apostles, we are still deluded with a gross Fallacy.  
This therefore is next to be considered, what the Apostle means by [GOOD] in this Text? And whether we do not Mistake his Meaning, and argue from a wrong Sense: and Abuse of his words. This is my other, and my chief Exception to the Argument.   

SECT. II. Of the True Sense of this Expression, [To thee for Good.]  
NOthing can be rightly concluded from these words beyond their intended and true Meaning. And seeing the Argument rests here, it is necessary we should have a right Notion of the Goodness the Apostle speaks of.  
1. 'Tis evident he doth not intent a particular and private Good, especially in prejudice of the general & Public Good: For this Cause, saith he, pay you Tribute and Custom; and these, I think, but few reckon to their particular Advantage.  
2. Neither can we understand the Good here, to be a Good by Accident only: the Law and Government hath a direct Tendency to the good of the whole Community, and every Member of it, yet by Accident it may be prejudicial to some good Man, and aught so to be to all Wicked Men: a Terror to Evil-Doers. And indeed, our Rulers, even then, when they are Avengers of Wrath, upon such, are the Ministers of God to us for Good. We Conclude, the Apostle must intent, Salus populi, or the Public Good, which is the proper Effect of, and directly flows from a right Use of Government, upon the whole Body of the Commonwealth, and consequeutly upon every particular person as he a Member of that public Body.  
Now, if you imagine the Good we may expect from Government, to be either a private good, or our own particular Ease and Satisfaction (which we may account our good, without regard to, or in prejudice of the public good) or the Evil which accidentally falls from good Government, upon the Disobedient; to be contrary to the Good in the Text; we abuse the Apostle, and deceive ourselves; for you see this Good consists with our private Loss, by Tribute and Custom, and with the execution of Wrath and Evil upon Evil-Doers. And yet notwithstanding both, our Rulers are Ministers of God to us for Good.  
3. But this offers a Third Distinction, somewhat more direct to our purpose.  
This Good may be supposed, either in the Matter of the Laws whence they are said to be Good Laws. Or with respect to the Execution of the Laws.  
1. The First, namely, the Goodness of the Matter is only intended by the present Objection. But cannot possibly be thought to be the Good which the Apostle intended. Read his whole Discourse here, and you shall not find one word bordering upon the Goodness of the Laws. This the Apostle presumes; that the Laws were good. And gives us an excellent instance and Example of his Modesty, not rashly to Judge the Laws; or without plain Evidence, to call them into question. So their specious Argument when all is done finds no place in the Text.  
2. For nothing can be well more plain and evident, then that this Text only speaks of that Good, which is the Effect of, and follows the just Execution of the Laws Good, Natural, Civil, Moral and Spiritual: the Defence of our Persons and Estates: the keeping of the Peace: the punishment and Reformation of Wickedness, and Vice: and the Maintenance of True Religion and Virtue: as Interpreters generally agree upon the place.  
In praecedente membro potestatem, hic potestatis distributionem & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a deo esse testatur. Bez. in verb.  
Yea, the same is manifest from the whole Context: the Text affirms he is the Minister of God to us for good. How so? No otherwise, but as he executes the Laws impartially: and is thereby a Terror to Evil-Doers, and a Praise to them that do well. Again, therefore wilt thou not be afraid of the Power? do that which is good; for he is the Minister of 
Vers. 3, 4, 5.  God to thee for Good: but if thou do that which is Evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the Sword in vain: for he is the Minister of God, a Revenger, to execute Wrath upon him that doth Evil. And then concludes upon the whole, Wherefore we must needs be subject, etc.  
Now I hope, the Objectors, to say no more, need not boast of their Advantage from this Text.   

SECT. III. Of the Judge of the Goodness of the Laws.  
BUT suppose we should also grant, that the words do extend to the Good of the Matter of Laws. May it not be doubtful, whether the Laws be good or not? And if this be the Controversy betwixt the Rulers and the People, how shall it be determined? There seems to be a Necessity to resolve this Point, before it be drawn into Practice, one way or other.  
The Question than is, When the goodness of the Laws is disputed, who shall be the Judge, those that should be the Doers of the Law, or the Makers of it? Here it seems reasonable, that seeing, as you heard, the public good is the proper intendment of all Laws, and that our Legislators are Public Persons, and of Public Capacities, and Conversation, the Advantage should lie on their Part; especially, when the matter of Humane Laws clasheth not with the Divine: at least, is not so evidently against the Law of God, as Obedience to the Laws of Men, is required by the Law of God. For we must ever obey the Laws of our Rulers; but when, by so doing, we shall Violate GOD'S Laws. So that our clear Knowledge of God's Laws, in that very Point, is supposed in order to our Warranty to disobey Man ' s. This Rule is positively allowed and expressed by Mr. Baxter himself, as well as all other Learned Men, that have considered the Point.  
But I shall hence take occasion to discuss the Matter more amply; and I shall therefore, first Distinguish, and then State the Question, as I intent to handle it, and then pursue it.  
1. 'Tis agreed, that the Matter of a Law, may be either Evil, per se, i. e. when it is contrary to the Moral or Positive Law of God; or only inexpedient, tho', in genere lawful. For the Apostle acknowledgeth, that some things are lawful, that are not expedient. All Things (saith he) Are Lawful for Me; but All Things are Not Expedient.  
2. As to the first kind; 'tis also agreed, that if the Matter of the Law be Evil, per se, at least so evidently, against God's Law, as the Command of Obedience therein is evident, the Subject is bound to judge it Evil, and against God's Law: and to Obey God rather than Man. As Tol. in loc. Ut si aliud jubet proconsu, sic si aliud Imperator aliud Imperator; obediendum est Imperatori, aliud Deus jubeat, etc.  
Man's Laws, whose Matter is against God's Law (as St. Aug.) are really No Laws, and cannot oblige us: but the Reason of it ought to be weighed. It is not properly or immediately, because such Laws are against the public good (as the Argument supposeth) this indeed aught to be the End of all Laws: but the Formality of the Evil of Laws, lies in their Contrariety to God's Laws. That, chief makes them sinful. And they are therefore void, and not binding, because God hath a prior Obligatiou upon us by his own Law, contrary thereunto, who is in the first place to be obeyed.  
But if the Law of our Prince, upon the reason of a prior Obligation cannot bind us; much less can a Law, we unwarrantably put upon ourselves, though it be the Solemn League and Covenant.  
3. As to the second kind: 'tis also agreed, that God doth not allow any Legislators to impose and require any thing in their Laws, that is inexpedient, and not conducing really to public good; tho' it be not directly contrary to the Word of God; for they are entrusted with Salus Populi, and the good of the public, is the only End of all Government.  
Quod necessarium non habet conjunctionem cum fine publici comodi non potest praecipe lege humana. Suarez.  
But impious and inconvenient, have not the same Latitude, neither can we safely argue from one to the other. Indeed, every thing that is impious is inconvenient; but not e contra. Laws whose Matter is impious, cannot bind us, are indeed No Laws: But it doth not follow, that Laws in some respect inconvenient, are not to be observed when made, tho' they ought not to have been made, or aught to be altered. The Reason is, because the Matter of such inconvenient Laws may not be against the Law of God: God may not have before concerned himself with it, in specie, one way or other; but hath left it to his Ministers amongst indifferent things undetermined: And tho' they are Men, and may err in the Application of them, and not observe exactly Isidore's Rule, Lex erit conveniens, etc. Yet it doth not follow, these Laws lose their Force, or the Ruler his Office, but that he is the Minister of God still.  
4. Now we are arrived at the very Question, Who is to be the Determining Judge in the Case of mere Expediency: and in this case, how far the Subject is bound to acquiesce and obey.  
Indeed, some have objected the Unlawfulness, and others, the Doubtfulness of some Matters in our own Laws. But these have been abundantly answered, and baffled over and over again, by very many Pious and Learned Men, especially Bishop Sanderson and Dr. Faukner; therefore in those two Cases, I refer my Reader that desires Satisfaction, to those Excellent Authors.  
The only considerable Doubt, that I find amongst some of our subtlest Dissenters, is touching things Inexpedient; and as I said, our Question here is, who shall finally Judge of these. To which I betake myself.   

SECT IU. Who is the Proper Judge of the Expediency of the Laws.  
THE Question is, Who shall Judge whether the Laws be Expedient or not, the Rulers or the People? I mean, so to Judge, as to determine whether they are fit to be observed or not.  
Obj. On the People's behalf, it is urged, That they have a judgement of Discretion: by which they ought to judge of the Reasonableness of their own Actions, and consequently of the Laws that require their Obedience  
Answ. 'Tis confessed, a Judgement of Discretion, is the Right and Liberty of all Mankind. Yet this Liberty of Judgement, is twofold, either Natural, and at large: or Civil, as bounded and restrained and limited by our relation to our Rulers and Society; and their Concern and Interest in us. I have a Liberty at large to go to LONDON, or not; to go thither when I please: but if I have promised to come thither at such a day, and not before, my Liberty of going thither is restrained by that Civil Obligation, I have put upon myself.  
To apply it. Every man, doubtless, hath Liberty, Reason and Power, to judge of the Law as it is, or as he apprehends it: and indeed, it seems impossible he should do otherwise: i. e. he must think as he thinks. So that, if the Law be Evil, and he know it to be so, he must so judge of it: if it be only inexpedient, and not otherwise Unlawful, he must judge it to be just so. And thus he may use his Judgement or Discretion, about the Matter of the Law, as a Reasonable Creature, and of Common and Natural Right.  
Yet he hath a Judgement of Discretion too, in a Politic and Civil Sense, as he is a Reasonable Citizen and Subject. And here, he hath not the like extensive and unhounded Liberty. For his Reason is now limited, by his State and Relation, by which he is concerned with his Relatives, and they, in him. And he may thence see Reason, to make another Judgement of Expediency, at least, both of the Laws and the Necessity of Obedience. Now he ought to judge, that he is in a State of Subjection and Communion: That public Order and Peace ought to be valued beyond a little private Satisfaction: That God's Ministers are the proper Judges of what is fit and expedient with respect to the Public Advantage; that may sometimes disagree with his private Interest: That God himself Commands our Obedience, and hath not limited us to things Expedient. And that while we Obey his Ministers, we obey God himself. And that, tho' we see no Convenience in the things required, yet our Governors may; and in that Case, the less Reason we discern in the Matter of the Law, if not against God's Word, the purer is the Honour and Obedience we yield to our Rulers, and to God himself: and it need not be styled implicit, blind and brutish Obedience, that hath all this Light and Reason to guide it.  
Lex nullo privato commodo, sed pro communi utilitate conscripta, ideo in ipsa Constitutione ista Consideranda sunt. Quia cum leges institutae sunt, non erit liberum arbitrium judicare de ipsis, sed oportebit judicare secundum ipsas. Isidor. 2 Stymol. Which my Lord Coke highly applauds. Whence we find the Judgement of the People, touching Laws, is distinguished. When they are once published we may not judge of them, but we must judge according to them; as more anon.  
So likewise their Discretion is altered, or at least limited by the definition which our Law books give of it discretio est decernere per legem quid sit justum. At least, it is our Discretion, not to judge the Laws themselves unjust, without very evident Proof: and not at all Inconvenient so as to refuse to observe them, if they be not evidently unjust.  
But of this also more distinctly in the following Sections.   

SECT. V If we may Judge of Lawfulness, yet not of Expediency.  
Objection.  
THE strongest Argument on the People's behalf, now follows to be examined: 'Tis grounded upon our Concession, and is this; You allow the Subject Liberty to judge of the Lawfulness of things required by Law; what Reason can be given, why they should not equally judge of the Expediency of them?  
Ans. The Reason of the Difference is plain. God is Lord Paramount, to whom all, both King and Subject, own undoubted Obedience. Now, in his Laws, he hath antecedently determined what is Virtue and Vice, what is Duty and what is Sin: and hath so published his Mind and Will therein, that all may and aught to know it; and take notice of it at their Peril. But he hath not pleased to deal so with us in matters of mere Expediency. These, he hath left undetermined, and devolved them upon the determination of Human Prudence, in the course of his Ordinary Providence. So that when Man commands what God forbids, we must not do it, because God hath forbidden it. But when Man commands that which we judge inexpedient, if not forbidden by God, we must do it, because God hath not forbidden it; and because our Superior commands it; whom God hath required we should obey, next to himself.  
Now, that we may speak more plainly to this great Point; let us consider Laws in Act and already made, and constituted: and Laws in Power, and not yet enacted; but to be made.   

SECT. VI The Liberty of Judgement in the People, with respect to the Making of Laws, The Writ Convenes them, Ad Faciendum & Consentiendum.  
IN our most excellent Constitution, 'tis granted, That the People of ENGLAND, have a very great Liberty of Judgement, for the Prevention of Evil or Inexpedient Laws. But this Province being above my Sphere, I should not have aspired to touch it, had I not been somewhat provoked to vindicate myself, against the Charge of Impeaching the Liberty of the Subject in this kind. I hope, that will excuse a small Adventure upon it: And I shall come off well, if I have not need of Pardon, both for meddling with this politic Point, and (not for straitning, but) too much enlarging the People's Privilege as to the making of Laws.  
This Privilege belongs to our People, both at large, and in their Representatives in Parliament.  
1. It is the Natural and Civil Right of all English Men, being liberi homines, to use their Judgement of Discretion for the Choice of Wise and Good Men to represent them in Parliament, in order to our having Good and Wholesome Laws, free from Evil or Inconvenience: yea, and to inform them when assembled, and chosen, what they conceive may be fit to be made a Law. And by the same Reason, what is Inconvenient in any Law already in being, in order to the Altering or Repealing of it. And no doubt, these things require a great deal both of Judgement and Discretion too, both about Laws, either to be made, or already constituted. And lastly, perhaps the Laws have allowed the People within the Bounds of Law to make Petitions, at least by their Representatives (as well as private Significations) to the foresaid purposes. If that be a good Rule in Law, which my Lord Coke mentions: Extra Parliamentum nulla petitio est grata, licet necessaria; in parliamento nulla petitio est ingrata, si necessaria.  
2. But this Privilege is more perspicuous and ample in the People as they are represented in Parliament. They are called together ad faciendum & consentiendum, touching Laws to be made (ordinari de negotijs ante dictis) of weighty Matters: Concerning the King, the State, and Defence of the Kingdom and Church of England; as the Writ speaks. And the Sheriff is therein strictly charged to do his Duty; lest through defect— or by an improvident Choice, dicta negotia infecta remanerent: The greater Matters of the King, Church and Kingdom remain undone.  
Hence 'tis necessary that a Wise Election be made, and Discreet Knights, Citizens and Burgesses be sent to Parliament, where they are to use all their Judgement and Discretion in order to such Laws, as may be beneficial to the Public, and consequently good and expedient. And as none but Discreet Persons are therefore to be chosen, so unless, when chosen, they may exert their Discretion and Judgement in Parliament, they seem to be chosen to no great purpose.  
I know the Learned Knight, Sr. R. F. would improve those words [ad faciendum & consentiendum] in Diminution of the Power of the House of Commons. But if they be not expressly and in terminis called to Consult; they seem to be so plainly enough in the consequence of these very words.  
I dare not affirm what the Extent or Meaning of the word, Faciendum, is: If the Meaning of it be only, that they shall put the Laws in Practice, methinks the word is misplaced: For should not they Consent to the Laws, before they Do them? Besides, their sending Home again, rather than their Calling to sit in Parliament, seems rather to be fitted for that purpose, viz. the Execution of the Laws: Yea, if they had nothing to do about making the Laws, why should they be chosen, or called up at all? Why might not the whole Kingdom, without so much Ceremony and Solemnity, be obliged ad faciendum in this sense, by a general Publication, or Appointment of the Laws to be read in several parts of the Country, as was anciently done? Or lastly, How comes it to pass, that the KING in the Writ of Summons, intimates that the, dicta negotia, the great Affairs for which they are called, will remain undone, if due Elections and Returns be not made?  
But they are called also, ad consentiendum: to Consent to the Laws that shall be made. Well, but must not (usually) something be done by them, in order to the making those Laws, to which they are thus to consent? whether it be the framing of Bills or Petitions, I shall not determine. But I have heard, that our Laws are 
Ld-Coke.  usually grounded upon such Bills or Petitions: and I have greater Authority for it than Sr. R. F.  
However, they are called to Consent: and if this be not in terminis to Consult, it sufficeth, if their Consent be necessary to the making of our Laws; for than their Consent here, doth not suppose the Laws already made, but to be made. For I know not, that their Consent is ever signified, as they are a House, after the Laws are made; they are usually Prorogued or Dissolved upon passing the Bills.  
It is bold to say that ever the English Laws were made without the previous Consent of the People, some way or other sufficiently expressed.  
Leges cum fuerint approbatae consensu utentium, & sacramento Regum confirmatae mutari non possunt nec distrui, sine communi consensu & consilio eorum etc. Bracton, li. 1. c. 2. Whence the Name Parliament implies Parlizing, as J. Jenkins notes: And accordingly Spelman's Definition of a Parliament is, Parliamentum est solemn colloquium omnium ordinum Regni Authoritate Regis, ad consulendum statuondumque de negotijs Regni indictum.  
There is no Act of Parliament but must have the Consent of the Lords, the Commons, and the Royal Assent, as it appeareth by Records and our Books. Coke of Parliaments.  
'Tis certainly now too late to say, Laws may be made Without the Consent of the Commons in Parliament. Is it not affirmed to be the Glory of the English Liberty, that no Laws bind us but what are made by ourselves. See over the Style of our Statutes; anciently, they seem to have been made upon the Petition; and of late, with the Advice and Authority of Parliament.  
In Ancient Time all Acts of Parliament were in the Form of Petitions, as my Lord Coke observeth; but both imply an Antecedent Consent in the People.  
Yet tho', I like not the mentioned Knights Reasoning or Design very well, give me leave by the way to remark, that his Learned & Smart and Bold Antagonist, seemed somewhat transported to another Extreme, when his Argument tempted him to make a Bill of Exclusion of the King and the Bishop out of the Fifth Commandment. For the Decalogue, hath been hitherto taken as the Summary of the Moral Law, to which, as to their Fountain-Heads, all Moral Duties are reducible: and consequently, all the Moral Parts and Precepts in the Scriptures, besides, are but Expositions of those Ten Words. And I cannot remember that any other Person doth (and I am sure I cannot myself) reduce Honour and Obedience to the King or the Priest, so often enjoined in the Word of God to any of the Ten Commandments, but to the Fifth; at least, so directly and intelligibly, as to that.  
But to return, and apply this Discourse. If the Consent of the Commons be necessary in order to the making our Laws; this Consent is supposed to be rational, and to be expressed with due Liberty: therefore they must Debate, and at least Consult with themselves, and if occasion require, Confer also, and, as it were, Consult with the Lords. And consequently, 'tis confessed, they are to use their Judgements about the Lawfulness and Fitness of the Matter of Laws: And they are therefore entrusted, from all parts of the Kingdom, to see that such Laws, and no other, are to be made, but what are expedient, and for the public Good: or as they are excellently described and limited by Isidor, in the place so much celebrated by my Lord Coke, and commended as a Rule for all Parliaments to follow. Erit lex honesta, justa; possibilis, secundum naturam & secundum consuetudinem patriae, temporique conveniens, necessaria & utilis, manifesta quoque ne aliquid per obscuritatem incautum captione contrudat, nullo privato commodo, sed pro communi civium utilitate conscripta; ideo in ipsa constitutione ista consideranda sunt; quia cum leges institutae fuerint, non erit liberum arbitrium judicare de ipsis, sed oportebit judicare secundum ipsas.   

SECT VI. When Laws are once made, we ought to rest satisfied with their Conveniency. Many Reasons for it.  
I Know not that any thing can be added to the Conditions of Good Laws, which are given us by Isidore. These, we see, are to be considered, in ipsa constitutione, while the Laws are making: that is, by the Legislators. Whether they be convenient — & pro commune civium utilitate, or for the public good. But when they are once instituted, there is left no liberum arbitrium, no liberry to judge of them, but it behoves every one to judge according to them, and how to observe them.  
When the Laws are once made, the People at large, (among whom the Parliament Men themselves, when dissolved, are to be numbered) are to acquiesce in them, and the Conveniency of them, and to put them in practice, else they are made to no purpose. And whatever Liberty men may naturally assume, to judge of the Fitness of such Laws, as they are Citizens and Subjects, in this their Civil Capacity, they are not to be Judges but Doers of the Law.  
Do not we choose Discreet and Wise Men, and send them to Parliament for this very purpose, to consider what is Expedient to be made a Law? Do not we devolve our own Power of Judgement in this Case, upon our Representatives, and trust them with it by our very Election? If we give them not this, we give them nothing. Yea, we have thereby put them into the Place, and made it their Office and Duty, to Judge for us. And the Wise men of the Kingdom, by our Act and Consent are together to consult what is best, and have thereby infinite Advantages to judge of public Conveniencies, beyond the rest of the people scattered up and down the Kingdom: Besides, it is an evident part both of the Natural and Civil Honour due to our Lawmakers, and Rulers, to submit our Judgements to their Determinations in matters of mere Order and Conveniency: and an absolute Necessity for Peace and the public Good, obligeth us to it.  
As to our Case; When the Laws are made, our Lawmakers, whom we entrusted for that purpose, have already judged them Convenient. Now, what Reason have we to except against them, if they be not against the Law of God? If you say (as some do) the Civil Authority hath made Laws in the Matters of Religion? 'tis well known, they are also enjoined by the Spiritual Power: If others are offended at the Ecclesiastical, the same things are required by the Civil Laws. And if one of these Powers be not thought Sufficient, you have both: and indeed, in each of them, you have yourselves: For according to our excellent Constitution, you yourselves have determined in your Representatives, both in the Parliaments and in the Convocation, what is Convenient both in Church and State: And if any are dissatisfied with the Constitution, and would have that Altered to please a Humour, they are scarce tolerable.  
All the Commons in the Realm are represented in Parliament by the Knights and Burgesses, Coke's Instit. p. 4, 158. And Sr. Thom. Smith saith, Every English Man is intended to be there present either in Person, or by Procuration; and the Consent of the Parliament is taken to be every Man's Consent. And no Laws are made but in this sense they are said to be, Quas vulgus elegerit, according to the Old Law.  
If you say, The Rulers ought to judge what is expedient in making the Laws; this is nothing, if the Subject hath Power yet to judge them inexpedient, and to refuse to obey. Say, what shall give the binding Sentence as to practise? the Law or private Opinion? That is, plainly, Who shall Govern, the Rulers, of the People? For certainly, they govern, that rule, practice and finally determine what is fit to be done; whether they be Children, or Parents; Servants, or Masters; Wives, or Husbands; or Subjects, or Princes.  
If you say, The Subject aught to yield for Wrath's sake, this placeth Government only in strength: but then, where is Conscience, where is Christianity? Is it not like Christian Meekness, and Peaceable Subjection, and Self-denial, and the Doctrine of the Gospel, to conclude; that God hath provided for the Order & Quiet of the World: he hath therefore stated things necessary himself: and for things of lesser moment and Expedience, he hath ordained Government, to prevent or end all Controversy.  
The sum is, the Judgement of Discretion about God's and Man's Laws. And the Nature, End and Use of Government, if well considered, may effectually convince us, that, so far as Man's Laws contradict not God's, tho' we should imagine something in them not so convenient as we could desire, yet they are to be submitted unto as the Rule of our Practice, and in Conscience of God's Ordinance, and Command, and of the public Good and our Duty to be obeyed: And we are to rest satisfied with this; that our Laws are made by the Higher Powers; who are of God; ordained of God; the Ordinance of God; and our Rulers and Governors, (and such as we ourselves chose to make Laws for us;) and the Ministers of God; and for our good too; viz. for public Order, Safety and Quiet; Wherefore we must needs be subject, not only for Wrath, but Conscience sake.   

SECT. VII. Inexpediency of Law overbalanced, expedient to Obey.  
YET once more, Suppose we could allow the people at large to judge the Laws already constituted; and to have power left them, to discern their inexpediency, and to suspend their Obedience in such a Case: This still acknowledgeth the matter itself to be indifferent, and the practice only in such Cases, not so fit as we would desire.  
Now, it is a clear Rule, that, that is so inconvenient or inexpedit, may be found; by a considering and discerning Judgement, upon the whole, to be expedient. And the matter to change its quality; if overbalanced by a greater Inconvenience on the other side: as Led itself becomes light, when a greater weight is in the other Scale.  
This Rule is so undoubted, that it sometimes extends to things positively commanded by God himself. For, when a Matter morally necessary, shall be neglected for the practice of a positive Duty of God's own Worship, the present Practice of such Duty, becomes not necessary, yea sinful, in the Judgement of our Saviour and great Lawgiver: Go and learn what that meaneth. I will have Mercy, and not Sacrifice. I prefer Mercy, tho' it be but to thy Neighbour's Ox, to my own Service: yea, in that case, I prohibit attendance on myself, and my own Worship: I will not have Sacrifice.  
Apply this seriously, and admit the Law requires something that in itself and singly considered, is inexpedient: Is there nothing in thy refusing Obedience, more inconvenient, and of more Evil Consequence than that supposed Inconvenience, which the Law requires? What if our not yielding to an Inexpedient in the Law may endanger, if not prevent and frustrate the Real Good of God's Ministry and Government, we so much contend for; and bring greater positive Mischiefs upon us? Now, hath not God given us the Judgement of Discretion to balance Inconveniences, to weigh uprightly one against another, and to judge and determine what is best and safest to be done? And indeed, to admit of the less Inconvenience, as reasonable and wise men, for the prevention of greater?  
1. To help us in this Comparison, let us First consider, that the Law is to be understood to be common and general, and the Inconvenience to concern all others, as well as our selves: And if so, Why should not all others observe and boggle at the Inconvenience as well as ourselves, and then judge wisely, what will be the Consequence?  
2. Secondly, 'Tis a Rule that seems not to be questioned by any that have, with any tolerable Learning, disputed this Point; that when the Law requires that which we judge inconvenient, if not forbidden by the Law of God, it is not to be disobeyed, if that Inconvenience cannot be Omitted sine scandalo vel contemptu: without Scandal or Contempt. The Reason is, because the Scandal of our Brother (as St. Paul teacheth us) and the Contempt of Authority, is more inexpedient, than the Practice of a bare Inexpedient required by Law.  
But such Disobedience in a Matter of mere Inexpediency, must needs be notoriously guilty of both.  
1. It cannot be without Scandal to others: For such our Disobedience must of necessity Scandalise others, especially if Conscience be pretended; because it naturally tempts and induceth others, at least, if we have any influence upon them, either by our Parts, or Reputation, or Interest, or Authority, or any other Obligation, to break the Laws, after our Example, as is too too manifest by daily Experience.  
2. And for Contempt of Authority, we can hardly be guilty of more or greater, than by refusing to Obey the Laws, because we judge them Unfit or Inexpedient: For, if we forbear to speak Evil of Dignities, this is certainly to Despise Dominions. And declares openly, that we account our Rulers Weak or False, Ignorant or Malicious. i e. Knaves or Fools, that made the Laws.  
3. Yea, this Principle, if pursued and practised, is so highly injurious to Government itself, both ways, both by Scandal and Contempt, that it plainly dissolves the Power and Obligations of all Laws; for none can secure us, that what is said against one or two Laws, (that they are inconvenient) shall not be charged on the rest. It makes the Prudence of the People the only Law to themselves; for thus a Law, to them is no Law, if they judge it inexpedient. Therefore it sets the Conscience at so wild a Liberty, that when it shall be improved a little further by scrupulous People, it must needs end in perfect Ataxy and a general Distraction.  
4. Nay, hath it not already sadly divided us? loosened all Duty and Respect to Governments? wasted the Conscience of due Obedience? and enervated our Laws? and disturbed the Order, and broken the Quiet and Peace both of our Church and State? And do we not see a Black Cloud arising hence, and gathering upon the Face of our Prosperity; darkening the Age; threatening all the Good we expect from God's Ministers; and even exposing our Constitution itself to all imaginable Danger.  
Yea, which is more sad yet; doth it not seem to Eclipse and Obscure the Brightness and Glory of our Profession; and hazard the very Light of our Gospel; and the Removal and Loss of the best Religion (once restored, and often preserved with Wonders of Providence) from us and our Posterity forever? and the Readmission of such a Religion as we most fence against, and as you will find but untowardly consisting, either with Liherty, Property or Piety. Consider it sadly; for if this should happen, both we, and the Children unborn, may have Cause, hereafter, and too late, to Curse, such Unwarrantable Niceness and Pernicious Scrupulosity.  
5. last; If all these Mischiefs are at too much distance, and we cannot see so far off; Let me speak home to you that yet indulge to yourselves this Groundless Disobedience. Methinks your own present Inconveniencies by it, should be put into the Scale. Doth not it render you obnoxious to Law and Justice? You, perhaps, have hitherto escaped; but are you not liable every day to have your Peace and Quiet and Possessions disturbed? Doth not your Disobedience to the Law expose your Persons and Families, as well as others, to the Penalties of Law? Neither can you well expect it should be otherwise, if you continue Obstinate, and refuse to obey it. For our Rulers are Ministers of God to us for Good, and ordained on purpose to prevent the  Mischiefs; and therefore they must be a Terror to Evil-doers; that is, all that violate and regard not their Laws; and Revengers of Wrath upon all that do Evil; especially such Evil, as if not suppressed, may undo all: Yea, are they not, and do they not think themselves bound in Conscience, both of their Trust and Duty, to God and Men, in Conscience of yours and the public Good, not to suffer all to run to Confusion.  
Perhaps you take it to be in your Choice, whether you will Obey or Suffer: Deceive not your ●elves: God Commands you as well as Man; and certainly God's Command reacheth the Conscience whatever you dream of Man's. And you must answer to God as well as to Man for your groundless Disobedience; especially when, by it, you through away or hazard the Blessings and Talents he hath put into your Hands, and entrusted you withal: This is ungratefully to Despise the Riches of his Goodness. God and Nature have given you a Law of Self-preservation; and you have no Liberty to destroy yourselves, by neglecting your Duty to yourself, and affronting his Providence.  
No Man is so absolutely his own, but God, the King and Country, his Relations and Dependants, have some Interest in him. Men that have Estates and Families, and Parts and Capacities fitting them for theirs and the public Service, may not causelessly throw them away, or dispose of them, but when and as God calls for them. And if the Law requires nothing of them, which God forbids; they cannot, for any other Satisfaction, suffer their Estates to be wasted, their Wives and Children to be distressed, their Lives to be soured and obscured, and their Parts and Capacities rendered Useless to God, their King and Country, by the Choice of Punishment for their Disobedience.  
Active Obedience, so far as lawfully you can, is necessary, even from the Word of God Himself; were there no other Argument for it, but that of Wrath, viz. Escaping Punishment. For we must needs be subject, even for Wrath's sake; and the very Argument from Wrath, obligeth the Conscience.  
Now, all these considered, let me beseech you to reason this Point calmly by yourselves. You have had the Inconveniencies of your Disobedience, laid against some things inexpedient, as you suppose, required in our Laws. And you say, you have a Judgement of Discretion: hath not God given you this Judgement to weigh these one against another? And do you not discern the Difference between them? Certainly, the Matter being supposed in itself Indifferent, that is, not any ways forbidden by God, the less inexpedient is eligible, and to be chosen before the greater: Yea, as you have seen, 'tis comparatively expedient for us, to obey the Laws that we think inexpedient, for the avoiding those greater Mischiefs of Disobedience. And upon the whole, I can hardly imagine, that you should still think it Fit, for a small Satisfaction to a Humour or a Scruple to incur the guilt of so many, great and Real Evils, both upon your selves and the whole Kingdom.  
Let us, therefore, so manage ourselves, that our Rulers may be Ministers of God to us for Good indeed: which must be obtained by a MEAMS contrary to the Cause, of the aforesaid Evils, our unaccountable DISOBEDIENCE. That is, By a Peaceable, and Cheerful, and Conscientious OBEDIENCE to them and to the Laws. I speak as unto WISE MEN, Judge what I have said, and the GOD of PEACE give you Understanding.  
The Sum of the Answer is this. The Apostle's Words, as here insisted on, First allow, what yourselves condemn; RESISTANCE of our Rulers: Besides, you take little of no Notice of that which is Argumentative in them, and place the Force of his Argument where he did not intent it: For the Necessity of our Duty, lies in the first words of the Proposition [HE IS the MINISTER OF GOD] and the later words [TO THEE FOR GOOD] are rather a Motive to our Obedience. Further, should we yield, that if the Laws be not FOR GOOD, the Obligation to Obedience ceaseth; yet you plainly mistake the Good which the Apostle intendeth; for it is not the GOOD of the Matter of the Laws, but of the EXECUTION of them; and thus his Argument is directly Against, and not for Disobedience. Again, should we yet allow, that the GOOD of the Laws themselves, is here meant; yet 'tis only the Good of Public Convenience, of which the RULERS, and not Private Men are the proper Judges. Lastly, Suppose it were fit that Private Men might Finally Judge of the Conveniency & Inconveniency of Public Laws; yet they are to Judge equally of the Convenience and Inconvenience of DISOBEDIENCE: And if you Judge Righteous Judgement, you will certainly find, that the Inconveniencies of DISOBEDIENCE, do exceedingly overbalance the supposed Inconvenience of the Laws: And consequently, for the avoiding those greater Evils, both Public and Private, that follow upon your Disobedience, Obedience to the Laws that you judge inconvenient, in such a Case, becomes Expedient, and Good; and even by your own Argument, NECESSARY.  
All which I hope hath been sufficiently proved to the Satisfaction of the Sober and Peaceable Dissenters.    

Quest. II. Whether to be Subject in Ro. 13. be only, not to Resist the Powers; or also Actively to Obey their Laws?  
IN their new Politics, some seem to defend their Disobedience after this manner. The Apostle, say they, requires, Subjection 
Arg.  indeed: but what is that to Active Obedience? He tells us he means, by Subjection, Nonresistance: and we abhor Resistance though we do not Obey.  
This is the best Argument of the modest and most moderate Dissenters; and I hope they intent it for our Security: But certainly more is intended in the Text. I would not be Uncharitable, or suppose that the wiser and better sort of our Dissenting Brethren themselves, intent it so far, as thereby to enervate the Apostle's Obligation to all Active Obedience: For, indeed some of them seem to explain themselves otherwise. Yet because this is often hinted, and may prove Prejudicial to Government, from the Intention of the Argument, if not of the Persons that so familiarly use it, I have given them my following thoughts about it, and Answer to it.  
Answ. 1. Every Fallacy hath its Verisimilitude or Likeness to Truth, otherwise it could not be a Fallacy, that is, apt to deceive. I take the colour of the present, to lie in this. That when the higher powers requires any thing that is Impious, even then, we must be subject; that is we must not resist the powers: yet we must not actively obey their Wicked Commands. And this is so plain and great a truth, that if we are Christians, we must Join in the Concession of it. And in this Case our only duty is patiently to Suffer in Obedience to God. But if this may be termed Passive Obedience, it must be so termed, with respect only to God's Law, which thus we do Observe, and not to Man's, which, for God's sake, we do not, dare Obey; but plainly Disobey.  
Yet, if well considered, the Strength of this Objection rejects the too common Abuse of it: We must in this Case, it is said, OBEY GOD, and not Man. But in what Case? When, if we Obey Man, we should DISOBEY our God. And why then should we Disobey God, but because God hath declared his Will to the contrary; that is, Hath Commanded we should not do that thing which Man requires? For consider, how do we in this Case Disobey Man, but by doing Contrary to Man's Laws? Even so in the same Case, we Obey God only, by doing and observing God's Laws? For Sin is the Transgression of the Law. And 'tis Convertible; where there is no Law there is no Transgression.  
Show us therefore, that Law of God which forbids any thing which our humane Laws require; and in that case, but no further, content yourselves with Non-resistence, without Active Obedience. If you cannot, you do not obey God, but plainly Disobey him, by refusing, on any other pretence whatsoever, Actively, and Conscientiously to observe the Laws, both of our Church and State; herein Nonresistance, or passive OBEDIENCE, cannot excuse you.  
2. For Subjection is the Duty here expressly required; and the Apostle doth not tell us, that by Subjection, he intends Nonresistance only, or Exclusive of Active Obedience. Yea, he assures us otherwise, and that he intends it in its due Latitude. Subjection is denied two ways: by Opposition, and by simple Disobedience: and the Apostle strikes at both these expressly. And Active Obedience being more properly and the best Expression of Subjection, he is more ample and express in his Argument against Disobedience. Indeed, he mentions Resistance in Vers. 2. but not exclusively; for he insists upon Obedience and Disobedience in the several following Verses, which he styles EVIL-DOING and WELLDOING, as will appear presently.  
3. As for the Penalty of Damnation or Judgement, it yields us no Argument to the contrary, whether we suppose it to be God's or Man's Judgement, or both, but clearly confirms it. No doubt Resistance, whose parts are Sedition, Rebellion, or any kind of Opposition, merits the Damnation or Judgement of God; for he that Resisteth, resisteth God's Ordinance; and yet he that Causelessly Disobeyes God's Ministers, provokes God too; and cannot be secure from Divine Judgement: For Subjection, as such, and in its full Latitude, is to be yielded to God's Ministers, even for Conscience sake; that is, as opposed to Resistance and Disobedience; as the Apostle Argues, Vers. 5. after he had so explained himself, and therefore if denied in any due part of it, we wound the Conscience, and are guilty before God, and incur his Judgement.  
But if it be Man's Judgement that is here threatened; this is more expressly directed against Disobedience, under the Terror of the Sword, the Wrath and Vengeance of God's Ministers; who bear not the Sword in vain, but are Revengers, to execute Wrath upon all that do Evil, (Ver. 4.) or are Disobedient; as truly, if not as severely, as, on those that resist God's Ordinance.  
4. But, if Simple Disobedience be found a Degree or part of this Subjection, the Argument hath no colour from the Text: And indeed it is so very plainly, both in the Reason of the thing, and the Apostle's Intention. First, one kind of Resistance is, to Refuse to be Subject, as the Aethiop. renders the word in the Text. Resistance, saith Grotius, is a Military word: And Tol. reasons upon it thus, Sicut Miles qui locum sibi a duce destinatum, duci resistit ipsiusque ordinationi adversatur; as a Soldier which keeps not his place, resists his Captain, and opposeth his Command. And consequently Pisc. and Paraeus in loc. Qui resistit: i. e. see subdure renuit, qui recusat obedire legi & edicto quod a potestate procedit; modo lex sit justa. He which resists, i. e. refuseth to obey the Law or Edict of the Power, etc.  
5. Accordingly the Apostle explains it himself after the same manner: For otherwise what is the meaning of such Expressions as these are, which immediately follow. He that Resists— for Rulers are not a Terror to Good Works, but to the Evil: Wilt thou not be afraid of the Power? Do that which is Good. But if thou do that which is Evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the Sword in vain.  
Thus, the Apostle tells us what he means by Resistance, a Doing Evil, and a not doing Good. What Evil, but that which the Law forbids? What Good, but that which the Law requires? For Rulers, as such, take notice of no other Good, or Evil. Neither did the Apostle so much as question those Laws, that then forbade those Evils, and required that Good, which he supposeth: for there was then no occasion for it, as one saith upon the place, as yet, non saeviebatur Romae in Christianos: And Agrippa in Josephus notes, Nullos a Romans Magistratibus missos ut bonis noceat. And agreeable hereunto, is the Apostle's whole Discourse, wherein he doth not observe the least Reason of scrupling Obedience from the Matter of the Law: or of Suspicion, that their Obedience must be Unwarrantable. Besides, you see what it was, that alone could secure them from Punishment, namely, the Doing Good. And is not that something positive? if we must do good, must not something be done? and if we do the good, that will secure us from the Power, must it not be the very good thing, which the Law of the Power requires? And he must have certainly an extraordinary Logic that can conclude that, this Doing Good here, is a doing Nothing. i e. a not doing the Evil of Resistance. Again, If thou do that which is Evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the Sword in vain. What Evil? that of Resistance only? No certainly, but that Evil, which the Law forbade. For the Sword would be born very much in vain, if it should be drawn only against such as Resist the Power in their sense; that is, by Violence and Opposition or Rebellion; thus the Minister of God should rather Revenge himself than God.  
6. Sixthly, This Argument is repugnant to the very Nature and End of all Law and Government. Was it ever the Intention or Reason of a Law, either Negative or Positive; that it should not, or need not be observed? Yea, the very Threats and Penalties of the Law that we pretend to submit unto, intent we should fulfil the Law, and not suffer the Punishment; and for that very purpose they are annexed to the Law. And to the same purpose, are the Rewards of Obedience proposed in a Law: and the Ministers of it are sent for the Punishment of Evil Doers, and the Praise of those that do Well. That is, those, that perform what the Law accounts WELL, and avoid what the Law reckones EVIL-DOING, or DISOBEDIENCE.  
And as this is the End of the Sanction of the Law, in the Threats and Promises, so 'tis the very Reason of the preceptive part or the Command itself: thus, When God himself gave forth his own Laws, his first and chief Intention was, that Men should Obey those Laws, by doing what he requires, and not doing what he forbids therein; and certainly not only by Not Resisting him, in this strict Sense of Resistance the Argument insists upon. And thus doubtless, the Ministers of God, after his Example, in all their Laws, intent primarily, to have them observed: and God that enjoins our Subjection to them, requires, that we Obey them, as his Ministers, in the same method, that he requires Obedience to Himself. That is, By Doing what their Laws require, and not only by not Resisting or REBELLING against them.  
7. The Argument also prevents or frustrates the great use and benefit of all Government: That is as the Apostle notes, the Public Good. He is the Minister to us for Good. But now, suppose we should do all the Evil that is forbidden in the Laws, & neglect to do all the Good towards God, the King, our Neighbour and our selves. That the Laws require, only we do not resist Authority, what Good do you think shall we reap from God's Ministry? Will Nonresistance only, will that secure us from all that Evil, and Compensate for all that good 'tis beyond the Sphere of Imagination?  
8. But to put the matter quite out of Countenance, the Apostle hath sufficiently explained himself in the very Text. And we are assured from his own words, that he required more by Subjection, than this Nonresistance. for he hath given some plain instances, even of Active Obedience; and they are prescribed also, as parts of that Subjection which he obligeth us unto. Wherefore, saith he, we must needs be subject— for this cause pay you tribute also. Yea render to all their deuce, (especially to Authority) Trihute, Custom, Fear, Honour; and own no man (especially to Authority) Tribute, Custom, Fear, Honour, and own no man any thing. and are not these more than bare Nonresistance.  
9 Therefore lastly we must conclude, this is but a Novel fancy, and refuge of Figg-leaves to hid the Naked: And that by Subjection, here we must understand Active Obedience, in the primary sense of the word; and intention of the Text, as Beza's note is, Subjici i. e. Obedire Magistratui ejusque legibus & edictis: to be subject, that is, to Obey the Magistrate, and his Laws, and Edicts- And as Grotius adds usque ad arras. Another learned man upon the place, as fully to our Purpose, glosseth non dicit, Obediat, honorem exhibeat, etc. ha' parts quidein sunt sed totum est Subjectio. Paraeus. i e. The Apostle doth not say, Obey, and Honour, etc. These are parts indeed, but the whole is Subjection. And the Apostle himself in another place, expressly explains his Subjection, by Obedience. Be Subject to Principality's, &c. and Obey Magistrates. Tit. 3. 1. Put them in mind, or Admonish them, to be Subject to Principalities and Powers, and to Obey Magistrates. that is, to show their Subjection by their Obedience. Ut imperata faciant. Grot. And showing their Obedience, by doing the things that are commanded, being ready or disposed (as it follows) to every good work, or Duty required by their Governors. For as that great Man infers, q. d. qui bene & honesti vivere non recusant, libenter parebunt Magistratibus, quip qui ad humani generis conservationem ordinati sunt. that is, those that do not refuse to live well and Honestly, will freely and readily Obey Magistrates, seeing they are ordained for the conservation of Mankind. i e. are Ministers of God, to us for Good.   

THE Postscript.  
REFLECTION UPON THE Protestant-Reconciler.  
SInce these Papers were in the Press, a Great Friend of the Dissenters was brought to me, called; The Protestant Reconciler: The Book is a pleading for Condescension in things Indifferent: And indeed, 'tis written with more Exactness, Sobriety, and Strength, than any that I have met with upon that Argument.  
In this Book I find some Passages, let fall by the By, that are pertinent to my purpose; and of Present Use and Advantage to both sides: These we should take notice of: But for the main Drift and Scope of it, we need not at present be much concerned about it; for it seems calculated for another Time, and perhaps for other Persons, viz. a Parliament.  
First, He assures us, he intends to plead more stiffly, and he hopes with more Conviction for Submission to the Constitutions of the Church of England, than he hath done here for Condescension, pa. 59 Preface. He further telleth them roundly, That tho' it could be Lawful for the Dissenter to Refuse Obedience to th● things imposed, yet if it be not absolutely his Duty so to do, he cannot be Excused for neglecting what is so expedient, for the Peace, Unity and Welfare of the Church, and therefore highly Edifying, pag 149. of the Book. Yea, he adds, If Dissenters do not think it better that all the Evils (of Disobedience and Schism) should ensue, then that they should Comply or bear with these Few Ceremonies; then, must they in these matters Submit to the commands of their Superiors. p. 22.  
Thus, we have his Testimony, that if we know no Sinfulness, in the things required, as he doth not, we are in Conscience and Prudence Bound to Conform: And that the moderate Dissenters do not believe any such Sinfulness, he observes also as I have done, at least of late, (that is not insisted on (I hope they are better satisfied in the Point now, then formerly) for the Unreasonableness and Danger of Imposing indifferent and unnecessary Things, bears the great stress of all their modern Pleas and Arguments, as my Author witnesseth.  
I am persuaded, saith he, in my Conscience, that such Considerations (which He had noted out of Mr, Baxter's Book taken from heads distinguished from Sinfulness) do more alienate the Minds of Men from that Submission which is due to our Governors, and from communion with them, than all the Arguments they have, or can produce against the Lawfulness of any of the Rites now practised in the Church, pag. 329.  
Again, The same learned Author observes with me (pag. 3. of his Book) That the Dissenters are very prone on all Occasions to cry out against Imposing of these things as the Conditions of Communion— but they say little of any weight or moment to show it is utterly Unlawful under the present Circumstances, to yield Obedience or Submission to the things imposed.  
But here, I cannot forbear to wonder, that the same Author that makes this Observation, useth the same Weapon in Favour of Dissenters. His main Point is this, That Things Indifferent, which may he changed and altered without Sin— especially under our present circumstances, ought not to be Imposed by our Superiors as Conditions of Communion, etc. This is the Subject which he makes the Scope and Business of his Treatise. Now, tho' I intent not to enter upon this Argument, yet I must note the unseasonable pressing it under our present Circumstances: And I am bold to say, it seems to be rather Clamour than Scruple: Clamour without Reason; and a plain abetting the Error he observes in others, and all to draw on his Designed Condescension, which yet no Body can grant him.  
1. For, even those that made the Law for Conformity, are themselves sub lege, under that Law. And none have Power, out of Parliament (not now in being) to Alter the Law. And tho' the same Persons that made the Law, be still our Superiors, they are not now our Legislators, but only Doers, or at most but Administrators of the Law, already made; and have no Power to Condescend in these Matters, as his Phrase is. Of this, the Learned RECONCILER himself was ware, tho' the Design of his Book would persuade to the contrary. I therefore wonder, saith he, at the Wickedness and Injustice of those Men, who clamour so much against them, because such Condescensions are not immediately made: i. e. because they do not change the Law which 'tis not in their Power to do, p. 9  
2. Yea, as the Conformist cannot Condescend to the Dissenter, by Altering the Laws, so neither can he Meet him in the Abatement of his Conformity according to them, without Breach of his Duty, and becoming a Dissenter himself, and a Transgressor of the Laws; yea, a Violator of his Engagements, Promises and Oaths. And if this Sentence be true, what would our Dissenting Brethren have us to do? The Case is plain: If the things required be not sinful, They may and Ought to come to us; but we cannot, there is a Great Gulf fixed, I say, we cannot come to them. Certainly, in our present Circumstances, this is worthy their saddest Meditations.  
3. Hence, give me leave to observe, That supposing, as our late Pleas for Condescension do suppose, that the things required are Indifferent, tho' Unnecessary, the Face of the Controversy seemeth to look Otherwise than it did heretofore; for indeed, the great Argument betwixt us is quite inverted. Before, it was thus, on their side, when the Pretence was, That they could not have Communion with us, Without Sin.  
You acknowledge the Things in Controversy are in themselves Indifferent & alterable, we believe they are Sinful. Therefore we cannot Ascend to you, but you May and Ought to Condescend to us, and remove the Difference.  
But now 'tis quite otherwise, on the Conformists side. He now pleads, You acknowledge the Matters struck at, to be Indifferent (though you like them not) We say, Tho' they are so in themselves, yet the Use of them is by the Law, etc. made Necessary: You may come to Us Without Sin; We cannot, Without Sin, come to You. Let the Fault, the Breach, the Schism, and all the Dread Consequences of it, and Fears attending it, be laid no more at the Conformists Door.  
4. To Conclude; Let me beseech the Protestant-Reconciler, seriously to reflect upon his late Book; and consider, Whether he hath pursued the True Point, whereon our present Duty, and Peace, and Safety depends. He hath very industrously laboured to lay Grounds for a Happy Accommodation, when we shall have a Parliament and Convocation. But in the mean time, where are we? Our Condition is deplorable; But what is the present Remedy? Would not half this pains have been better bestowed to Persuade Dissenters, that Union, Submission to Authority, and the doing of our duty, is always necessary: and that we are bound in Conscience to attend Gods Public Worship among us Established by Law, seeing there's nothing there required, but what we may Lawfully Practice? and that this is the only probable means, in Reason, Policy and Divinity: to Scatter our fears, defeat our Enemies, and Secure us from Destruction? Especially Considering, we know not Certainly when we shall have a Parliament, and we know less, whether when we have a Parliament, they will see reason in all that he hath said, to Alter the Law, for their Satisfaction. And lastly, that the question, what the King and Parliament ought to impose, doth not so much Concern us, as what is our Duty to do.  
5. Yet I must not charge this our Reconciler with a total Omission of that necessary Point; I have noted something already. And in his pag. 58, 59 we find him ask some Pious, Seasonable and Argumentative Questions, of our Dissenting Brethren; which, I hearty pray, they would seriously weigh, and then answer, not in Word, but in Deed, and in Truth. Thus he accosts them in the midst of his Many Arguments on their Behalf.  
Here, let it be noted (saith he) that those Arguments propounded from the Example and Say of our Saviour, against the Imposing of Indifferent Things. I say, these Arguments fall, many of them, with more weight on the Dissenters, provided they can show no Law of God plainly Forbidding their Submission to these things.  
For, let me ask them in the Spirit of Meekness these few Questions; Do they prefer Mercy before Sacrifice, who will not submit to Rites and Circumstances, or to the use of things, no where forbidden in the Word, to prevent Schism, and all the Dreadful Consequences of it; but rather will cause their Superiors to judge them Scandalous Resisters of Authority, and pertinatious Disturbers of the Church's Peace? Are they Compassionate towards the Sheep, according to our Lord's Example, who rather will Refuse to become Labourers in the Harvest, than Suhmit to these Little Things, in order to their regular Performance of this Blessed Work? Do they not Scandalise, and Contribute unto the Ruin of CHRIST's Little Ones, who do involve them in a wretched SCHISM on the Account of things which They may Lawfully Submit unto? Do they not shut up the Kingdom of Heaven against Men, who Forbidden them to ENTER IN when they may? Do they not Impose Heavy Burdens also, who say to their Disciples, Hear Not the COMMON PRAYER; Receive not the SACRAMENT Kneeling; suffer not your Children to be signed with the Sign of the CROSS; communicate not with that Minister who wears a SURPLICE, or with the Church which Imposeth any Ceremonies, or any Constitutions, but concerning the Time or Place for Public Worship? If the good Shepherd should lay down his Life for the Sheep, should not they lay down their Unnecessary Scruples for their sakes? If Nothing doth so scandalise Christ's Followers, as to find their Teachers at Discord, can they act as his Disciples who are not willing to procure Concord, and to avoid this Scandal by their Submission to Things Indifferent in their own Nature, and not forbidden in the Law of God?  
THE END.   

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SCOTIAE INDICULUM: Or the Present State of SCOTLAND: Together with divers Reflections upon the Ancient State thereof.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Or a Philosophic Discourse of MAN; being the Anatomy both of his Soul and Body. Wherein the Nature Origin, Union, Immaterality, Immortality, Extension and Faculties of the One, and the Parts, Humours, Temperaments, Complexions, Functions, Sexes and Ages, respecting the Other, are concisely delineated. By Samuel Haworth Student in Physic.  
New and Curious Observations on the Curing the VENEREAL DISEASE; and the Accidents that it produces in all its Degrees, explicated by Natural and Mechanical Principles; with the Motions, Actions and Effects of Mercury, and its other Remedies. Wherein are discovered on the same Subject the Errors of some Authors, and the most notorious Cheats of Empirics, Mountebanks, and generally of ignorant Pretenders and Impostors. Written in French by Mo●sieur de Blegny, Chirurgeon in Ordinary to the French Queen; Englished by Walter Harris, Doctor of Physic, late Fellow of New College in Oxford. With the several Approbations of the most Eminent Doctors and Surgeons in Paris.  
The Damnable Principle of the JESUITS touching the Murdering of Kings; Fully laid open in Two Eminent Instances de facto, by their own Confession.  
Prophecies concerning the Return of POPERY into England, Scotland & Ireland: By Archbishop Usher, Mr Herbert, Dr Paraeus, Mr Burroughs. Mr Selden, Mr Baxter, Dr M. Luther, Archbishop Grindal, Bishop Jewel, Bp Gauden, Mr Hooker, Dr Sutcliffe.  
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