A REVIEW OF THE GRAND CASE OF THE Present Ministry, Whether they may Lawfully Declare and Subscribe as by the late Act of Uniformity is required? In Reply to a Book Entitled; A Short Survey of the Grand Case, etc. Wherein all their Objections against both the Declarations are Considered and Answered. By the same Hand. Job. 4. 2. If we assay to commune with thee, wilt thou be grieved? but who can withhold himself from speaking? London, Printed for T. Dring, and are to be sold at the George in Fleetstreet, and by M. Mitchel, at the first Shop in Westminster Hall. 1663. THE PREFACE To my Reverend Brethren, the Surveighers of the Grand Case. 1. I Find some Learned Men have observed, Jackson on the Creed. both an Equivalency of Errors throughout most Ages and Nations; and also, an Equivalency of means to evince and to vindicate the truth; by the wisdom of God, so proportioned to the diversity of times, as no Age could have better than the present. 2. May I observe, that our present Age and the differences of it, are of that strange and singular Humour, that they need an Exception from that Learned Intimation in both Respects. 3. As for the things in Controversy betwixt us, though, haply, they may be reduced to some Ancient Topics, yet the Mat●●● of ou● Cases, as they now aris● from the force of the New Law, the Act for Uniformity, they have much of peculiarity and newness in them: and whilst the Burden of Resolving them remains upon so weak a shoulder, the means ●a● justly be Censured, as inequivalent▪ what so ever the blessing of God may be. 4. Yet, considering, the Discussion of the present Debates depends more upon a due examining of Rational Consequences, then upon Authority's of Antiquity, or any other Learning, that requires long Experience and Observation, I am not much discouraged: yea seeing, upon the Review (you have occasioned me to make) I myself do discern some things betwixt us more clearly than before, I take encouragement to hope (as I hearty wish) that you, my Brethren, may do so too. 5. I am sure my Aim is good, as, I I know, 'tis great. I could not hope to hit it, at the first or second shoot: but, through your Invitation, I venture again; that, if possible, by any means, I might at length attain it: However, I shall reckon the success far more worthy than all my abours, if I only gain a little ground in what I prosecute, and come nearer and nearer to my desired end, for my Brother's sake, and the peace of Jerusalem. 6. You do quicken this expectation in me, while you, modestly indeed (as you say) signify to me, that, though my Resolution of the Grand Case hath not made on you that impression, nor produced that effect I might Rationally promise to myself; yet your selves cannot but observe, it hath effected it in many others. What, you think, I might rationally expect before, I hope, I may more cheerfully pray for, now: For without Arrogance, I presume to commend to your own reason, whether most, if not all, of your main exceptions are not blown quite off, by this Second Ventilation of the matters in difference. 7. I cannot doubt, but that you will easily be satisfied, that a Comparative Approbation is a sufficient ground for unfeigned Assent and Consent according to the Act. 8. Also, that seeing you intimate, you could ●ear the particulars you except against in the Common-Prayer Book, which cannot be without some Assent and Consent; and seeing, that no Assent and Consent cannot be other then Real; and seeing, all Real Assent and Consent, is, therefore, unfeigned; that you will not find further reason to scruple, to give your unfeigned Assent and Consent to the same. 9 For the matter of the Covenant, I hope you will better consider that the great hinge upon whic● that Controversy turns, is not the necessity of Episcopal Government, but the lawfulness of it: For, though you think it not necessary in itself, or by the Word of God; yet if it be lawful, that is, not sinful, it becomes necessary upon us, by the Laws of the Land, and may not be sworn against. 10. Moreover, I would fain believe, that the great stones of the Reality and Nationality of the Covenant (it being essential to Oaths, in the judgement of the Reverend Casuist Bishop Sanderson, to be personal, and to bind but the Takers only:) as also, that, about Church-Government established by Law; and the dissolution of the Long-Parliament, are perfectly removed out of your way. 11. But I shall not Anticipate: I leave the Book to your Christian and candid perusal; accounting it no mean felicity, that it hath to do with persons Ingenuous and Learned, and truly desirous of satisfaction. 12. Yet, I must tell you, it much troubled me, that you took those expressions of felones, sures, & proditores de ●e, so tenderly to your selves. 13. I told you, they were the words of Dr. Donne, and wished they were not applicable in our Case. Indeed, it was far from me, to conclude all dissenters with them: nor dare I say, you deserved the charge in the least degree. 14. Yet I dare say, you will not plead for all dissenters: yea, that you do concur with Cassianus, that some men (he saith many) are carried to desire sufferings by humane respects, by the Spirit either of their Parents, or the Spirit of Levity, or the Spirit of Liberty; or, as I may add, the Spirit of a party: Yea, it is storied of one Eulalia, a Maid of 12 years old, that came from her Father's house, declared herself to be a Christian, spit in the Judge's face, and provoked him to execute her. 15. Now, no doubt, my Brethren, the same Spirit o● ●eal may work irregularly, in any, and in our Age: especially, when an opinion, that all the Godly, must suffer persecution, is spread over the people. 16. It is noted by Bodin, that Christians, in Tertullia's time, were so pleased with suffering, that sometimes Edicts wore made by their very persecutors, that no more Christians should be executed, because they perceived; that the Martyr's delighted in dying; and, my Dear Brethren, (if Christian Magistrates must be persecutors, and the effect of the Law persecution, and) if the readiness of your numbers to suffer, or any other consideration should prevail for a like Edict to stop your sufferings; I beseech you, do not think, I should be against it, I would not be thought your enemy, because I would ●ell you the truth, and earnestly persuade you to do your duty, and not to suffer when you need not. 17. I would rather stroke you with the seather, then prick you with the pen; ●●cept to provoke you to good works, and to mind you of your danger. Indeed, I feared, at the time I wrote my last Book, that many of my worthy Brethren were falling; and I was (in my Epistle) somewhat earnest to save them, and that, I hope, was all my Crime, and no more than Ingenuous persons are willing to pardon. Give me leave to conclude with those notable words of Famous Doctor Collet, in his Sermon, p. 28. which I desire to do with the same Spirit, that he spoke them; if peradventure it be thought that I have passed my Bounds, or have said anything out of temper, forgive it me, and ye shall forgive a man speaking out of mere zeal; a man hearty lamenting the Decay of the Church: and consider the thing itself, not regarding my foolishness. Consider the miserable end and State of the Church, and endeavour yourselves with all your Souls and Abilities (as he, to reform it, so I) to save it. Now the Lord of peace himself give you peace, always, and by all means: Job 29: 2. and O that you were as in months past, My dear Brethren, Farewell. THE CONTENTS. CASE 1. WHether it be lawsul to declare in the words of the first Declaration. Page 1 CHAP. 1. Touching the Book of Ordination. 1. CHAP. 2: Touching the Book of Common-Prayer. 13 SECT. 2. Of, let us beseech him, etc. 16 SECT. 3. Of popular Responds. 21 SECT. 4. Of the Holy Table. 22 SECT. 5. Of the old Translation of the Psalms. 28 SECT. 6. Of the Salvation of Infants. 30 SECT. 7. Of Assent and Consent unfeigned. 35 SECT. 8. Of the phrase in the Act, [the use of all things, etc.] 43 CASE 2. Whether it be lawful to Declare in the words of the second Declaration. 51 CASE 6. Whether we may lawfully declare in these words, I do hold there lies no Obligation on me, or any other person, from the Oath commonly called the Solemn League and Covenant, to endeavour any change or alteration of Government in the Church or State? 52 CASE 7. Whether any private or single person may lawfully endeavour the Alteration of Church-Government by virtue of the Covenant. 51 SECT. 1. Of the dissolving the long Parliament. 59 SECT. 2. Of the Reality and Nationality of the Covenant. 66 SECT 3. Of the capacity of all Covenanters. 68 CASE 8. Whether to endeavour to alter the Government of the Church be against the Right of the King. 76 CASE 9 Whether to violate the Kings Right be not sinful. 77 SECT. 1. Of the Kings Right as Supreme Executor of the Laws. 78 SECT. 2. Of the King Right in the Government of the Church. 79 SECT. 3. Of the Kings Right as Legislator. 80 SECT. 4. Of the King's Proclamation against the Covenent. 89 CASE 10. Whether the Covenant to endeavour the Extirpation of Episcopacy be against the Laws, and consequently sinful. 95 CASE 11. Whether the present Church-Government was established by Law before the Covenant was taken? 99 SECT. 1. Church Government is fixed by Law. ibid. SECT. 2. The Original of Prelacy is not to be sought in Law. 100 SECT. 3. Church-Government is established by Law. 102 CASE 12. Whether the Covenant can oblige against a Future Law. 114 CASE 15. Touching the word [Endeavour] and the sense and force of it, in the Covenant, and in the Act. 118 SECT. 1 Endeavour is distinguished. 120 SECT. 2. Of the Acts of Endeavour justified by my Brethren. 122 SECT. 3. Of Endeavour by popular groans and complaints. 127 SECT. 4. Of Endeavour by Disputations. 128 SECT. 5. Whether to petition be to Endeavour properly, and in the Act. 131 SECT. 6. Whether to Endeavour, etc. be at all times sui Juris to every Subject, etc. 135 CASE. 16. Whether the Covenant be not against the Liberty of the Subject. 143 CASE. 17. Whether the Covenant be not against former Obligations. 145 SECT 1. Whether the Covenant be not against the Law of Obedience to Authority. 146 SECT. 2. Whether the Covenant be not against former Oaths and Promises. 152 SECT. 3. Whether the Covenant can oblige to the laying down of the Ministry. 155 CASE I. Whether it be lawful to Declare in the words of the first Declaration. CAP. I. Touching the Book of Ordination. 1. I Find myself inclined, (whether from the easiness of my Nature, or a love of Peace) to all just means of a good accommodation, especially with Brethren: And confess in a Temptation upon me to use such Mediums, as in my own observation are least disputed by my opponents: because it is the easiest way to encounter, and the likeliest to reconcile them. For the nearer▪ I am to my adversary, the fairer is my advantage to lay hold upon him; and when we are agreed in the premises, I cannot but hope for a good Conclusion. 2. Such as are friends to Conformity could not choose but discover this peaceable design of my last Book; viz. the Grand-Case, etc. Though give me leave to Note, that you my dissenting Surveyors of it seem not to apprehend it, by your great mistake even of the first Argument therein improved; by which mistake alone you labour to avoid the Consequence of it. 3. I distribute the first of the Declarations into two parts. The first part concerns the Liturgy. The second, the Book of Ordination. I begin with this second part, touching the Book of Ordination, and determine thus. 4. It is lawful to declare our unfeigned assent and consent to the form and manner of Making, Ordaining, and Consecrating Bishops, Priests, and Deacons: and I do indeed conclude this, partly, from the practice of many of your selves, who had formerly subscribed as much in ●our subscriptions to the 39 Articles. 5. This you say, is an Argument à facto ad jus, and not concluding; and if it be absolutely considered, as it is by you, I confess as much; but if it be Argumentum ad homines, and bear open respect to the persons with whom I dispute, as I plainly intended it; methinks it carrieth force enough. 6. For, in Charity we reckon, that such as did formerly subscribe, did it in judgement and Conscience: neither have we r●●son to believe, that they are dissatisfied with their former subscriptions in point of Conscience, until they have told the world so much, and given us the grounds of such their Conviction; and till then, why may we not conclude à facto ad jus, against such as have formerly subscribed, what they now refuse. Viz. That by their former▪ practise not yet disclaimed; as against their Conscience, themselves conceive this part of the declaration to be lawful, and that they may lawfully declare accordingly. 7. Most have done a thing, therefore all may lawfully do it, is indeed bad Logic. But that which you judge, you may lawfully do, you cannot say you may not do it. Now I only assume, that you judge you may lawfully do that which you have formerly done; and if this fail, I think it yet lies upon you to show us and the world the reason why. 8. But a little more plainly, my Argument lay thus; Those that have subscribed this part of the Declaration already, in the 39 Articles, and read their allowance of it openly to their several Congregations; and that are convinced, that had not this been required in the new Declaration, no Conformity, without subscribing the 39 Articles, of which this is one, could legally suffice; and yet affirm, that had not these new Declarations been required, they intended to have Conformed; may doubtless, lawfully, as to their own principles (for you could not choose but see that my Argument was ad homines) declare their unfeigned assent and consent to the book of Ordination. 9 But you venture also to gainsay my Assumption, which you please to term a confident assertion, and say, you cannot but conceive strangely of it. I shall not be moved to say this is strange confidence; only I humbly conceive, you may well abate somewhat of it by a new survey and second thoughts. 10. My Assertion, (as you have collected it) is this; that the most who had Live, had, at the writing my Book, subscribed the form and manner of Making, Ordaining, and Consecrating of Bishops, Priests, and Deacons, required by this Article. This Assertion you assault after this manner. We do not know, say you, the most that then had Live; and therefore cannot ask them the question; but we think they must be most of them reordained according to the new form. Presbyterial Ordination had sure be●n very Active and Extensive, and Presbyters were easy wheelers. 11. But pray consider, why must the most of the Ministers that possessed Live before the 24, of August last, be Reordained according to the new form? were there not many that enjoyed their Live to that very day that were never Episcopally ordained? But your thoughts spent upon Re-ordination had been better improved upon the Ejection of those Ministers that were found in other men's Live; this might have rendered my Assertion less strange to you. 12. I do not say that the Presbyterians were easy wheelers; yet you know they were upon the wheel; and very many of them were by virtue of a former Act of Parliament turned off, and others that were Episcopally Ordained, and had been Legally inducted into the same places long before, had the better turn of being restored. 13. Now I hope I may have leave to conclude, that the many Ancient Ministers that were thus restored, added to the number of such, both Presbyterians and others, as had continued in their places, during all the time of our great Distractions, may easily make the Number of Subscribers, even at the time of writing my Book, to exceed the number of Ministers that then enjoyed their Live, and had not subscribed. Your next Objection is, that it was not the same Book of Ordination, which was subscribed before, it being in several things altered. 14. But, my dear Brethren, do not let us quibble away our Unity and Peace. Can you say, I am sure you do not say, that these books are not the same for substance? Can you believe that any can subscribe the Old, that can refuse the New? Yea, is not the book altered for the better in your own apprehensions? and cannot yourselves rather subscribe the New one? 15. You, indeed, offer that some Additions and alterations made may bar your subscriptions: but certainly, if any such there be, it is but fair, either to discover them, or not to argue from them. 16. I shall not ask you, whether every accidental alteration doth change the individual Subject? Whether the paring of your Nails, or the suffering the Alteration of every day's Nutriment, render you not the same men? if so, whom do I reply unto? or where shall I find my Surveyors? 17. But your next Item calls me to be more serious, viz. that black mark your pen hath cast upon some Cheshire Ministers; to which I have only this to say, that though I dare not approve, but did personally dissuade some brethren from the same Action; yet [give methinks the Love of Brethren] might have had a better interpretation, or at least a milder reprehension, if not a more private one for it; especially considering the reason of State that prevailed for such alterations in order; Mainly for the satisfaction of such as are unwilling to conform without a Reformation; and therefore not likely to give any dissatisfaction to such as could Conform before; yet I would not plead for a scandalous practice, as I fear that was. 18. You do further object, That the Law might be satisfied with reading and subscribing so many of the thirty nine Articles as contain only the Doctrine of Faith, and of the Sacraments, with an omission of that which concerns the Book of Consecration, according to the Statute. 19 I know this hath been the opinion of many; yet I ever thought it a mistake, grounded upon a misunderstanding of the Statute. 20. The words of the Statute are these, [And subscribe to all the Articles of Religion which only contain the Doctrine, etc. [which only] refers too the antecedent [all the Articles] and serves by way of explication of the Nature of all the Articles, and not by way of exclusion of any of the number; the sense is this; which, that is, all which Articles contain only the Doctrine of Faith and Sacraments. 21. It is not said, All those Articles only which contain; or, Those Articles which only contain; but, All the Articles which contain only; explaining the Nature of the whole, and not excluding any one of the number; the Statute requires subscription to the whole number, which are all of that nature. 22. Here is the Continent: All the Articles of Religion, which we know are nine and thirty; the thing contained, and that is, only the Doctrine of Faith and Sacraments; there is not one excepted, either from this Nature, or from our Subscriptions: besides, if we exclude an Article after this manner, we fail in Arithmetic as well as Grammar; and while we have but thirty eight, we cannot be said to read or subscribe the nine and thirty Articles of the Church of England. 23. You intimate, That the Artcile touching the Book of Consecration is no Doctrine of Faith, or of the Sacrament●. 24. I answer first, This is only to quarrel with the fitness of the explication, and the Parliament that gave it us, who, surely, did ill to tell us; That all these Articles contain only such Doctrine as is not to be found in one of them: But the Grammatical construction of the words will stand well enough, and carry it, That all the thirty nine Articles of Religion contain only such Doctrine, in the judgement of the parliament that made that Statute, unless you can show us the exception of any one of those Articles, made by the same Authority, either in this or some other Law. Vhi Lex non distinguit, etc. 25. Besides, Who knows not that the Doctrine of Discipline, Government, and Worship, and the Doctrine of Imposition of hands and Ordination is to be believed, and in a large sense is a Doctrine of Faith; in which sense, if the thirty nine Articles of Religion are said by the Statute to contain only the Doctrine of Faith, and of the Sacraments; 26. However the Article touching the Doctrine of Ordination be understood to be a Doctrine of Faith, or not, it matters nothing as to our question, or to the unreserved subscriptions of most of the Ministers to all the nine and thirty Articles, of which this is one. 27. Lastly, you say, That the form of subseription required in this particular, by the new Statute of Uniformity, is such as was never required by Law before, this requiring an unfeigned afsent and Consent. 28. But give me leave to ask you, Did you not subscribe to the thirty nine Articles, before, ex animo? And were you not required so to do? Now what act of your Mind was exercised in that your subscription, if you did not assent? And if you did assent, did you not assent unfeignedly, but hypocritically? Or if you did assent unfeignedly, did you not consent also thereunto? 29. I need not tell you, that very learned men judge, that there is very little or no difference betwixt Adsentire and Consentire; and, doubtless, if the object of both be the use of things, as it is in the present Case, they are all one, though, if there seem any difference between them, assent hath the advantage, consent seeming, of the two, to be the weaker, and the less free expression of ourselves. 30. Therefore, let the Statute itself decide the difference, viz. that of 13 Eliz. 12. which hath rendered the Latin, ex animo, by the very term in controversy, an unfeigned assent, clearly intimating, That all that have subscribed the thirty nine Articles ex animo, have already given to the form and manner of Making, Ordaining, and Consecrating Bishops, Priests, and Deacons, their unfeigned assent, and, by consequence, their consent too, and need not, without some other reason to the contrary, scruple to do it again. 31. But I hasten to the Case arising from the first part of this first Declaration, which concerns the Liturgy, against which you grant, that there lieth the greatest burden of exception. CHAP. II. Touching the Book of Common-Prayer. SECT. 1. 1. WE come now to review the second Case, arising from this first Declaration, which is this. 2. Whether it be lawful to declare our unfeigned assent and consent to all and every thing contained and prescribed in and by the Book Entitled, The Book of Common Prayer. 3. This I affirm, and in the defence of my Assertion, still stand upon my former ground, viz. a supposition, that I deal with persons that intended to have conformed, had not these Declarations been required. 4. To this you also encourage me while you say, that though you could have conformed, yet you cannot make and subscribe this Declaration. 4. But, my dear brethren, give me leave to demand once more, What hath hindered you? cannot you assent and consent to that which yourselves can practise? or cannot you do it unfeignedly? or cannot you declare so much? 5. You say, I tell you the Object of our Assent and Consent is not the words but things: There are several Expressions, which though we could safely read, yet we do not so hearty approve them, as we seem to be required: not every thing, as there expressed, but every thing contained in the Expressions must have our Assent. 6. Here pardon me, if I fear you were somewhat in haste, when you took your survey by Review; you will find you have (may I say, too carelessly) shuffled in an Objection I made betwixt the parts of my Answer to it: and so force me to speak your own sense, or indeed Nonsense. 7. But, I am about things and not words, though I cannot but note, that all you say about your wordy things are words that signify nothing as to your own Case, who say you could Conform to the book of Common Prayer, and consequently, I hope, read the words thereof with your unfeigned assent and consent to the lawfulness of the same. 8. This was the close of my former Answer to the Objection proposed; and though you could not but think yourselves obliged thereunto, yet you have taken no notice of it in your survey at all. 9 But, at last, you come home and object, that there are some things contained in the Expressions, which you cannot assent and consent unto: but what are they? SECT. 2. Of, let us beseech him, etc. 1. FIrst you are scandalised at that alteration in the Absolution, Wherefore we beseech him, is now rendered, wherefore let us beseech him to grant us true Repentance, etc. It now seemeth (you say) to be an Authoritative Sacerdotal Absolution. But truly, if you think again, I am very confident you will change your mind, and judge, with me, that as the words are now altered, they do not look so like an Authoritative Sacerdotal Absolution, as they did before. 2. Besides, when you have well considered, that we have constant and daily need to beg pardon and mercy, and to receive Absolution, for safety and Comfort, from the Word of God: I believe you will not much object against the declaring the word of mercy to the penitent by the Minister of the same; though it should have been (as now it is not) made a standing piece of solemn worship in every approach to God. 3. But you add, if it be not a form of Authoritative Absolution, yet it is a Ministerial Exhortation of the people. But what then? methinks that should pass well enough with us; it being not refused, but constantly practised in Scotland itself; yea it is the substance of all our Sermons. 4. But than you intimate, that the Amen of the people thereto subjoined, is impertinent. 5. Pray, why impertinent, subjoined to an Exhortation, more than to the Creed, a Confession of our Faith; or the Denunciation of the Curses? Deut. 27. Let us not discourage the people to declare their unfeigned assent and consent to an Exhortation to their duty, though it be with an Amen. 6. But this, you hint, you stick not at. Ah, what then? You add, we are to be convinced, that the Words of the Lords Prayer are the Necessary and only lawful Petition for pardon of sin in every approach to God; yet that is constantly subjoined. 7. Pray reflect a little upon these words of yours, and I hope you will pardon me. if I say you mistake. 8. What can the force of these words be, but that if you assent to the book of Common-prayer, you must assent to that of which you are yet to be convinced; viz. That the Lords Prayer is the necessary and only lawful Petition for pardon of sin in every approach. 9 First, I desire you to consider, upon what occasion you utter this: because the Lord's Prayer is subjoined to the Exhortation in the Absolution. Now, if you observe, you will find, we are not here exhorted to pray for pardon expressly and directly, but for true Repentance, acceptance of our present Duties, the holy Spirit, a holy Life, and Eternal Joy; as the words of the Exhortation plainly import. 10. Again, if this be granted to be a Ministerial Exhortation; to pray for pardon of sin, how doth it follow that the Lords Prayer is accounted the necessary and only lawful Petition for this mercy in every approach to God? is the Absolution in every approach to God? Or if the Lords Prayer be, must it therefore be accounted the only lawful petition of pardon of sin? 11. Lastly, all the reason you express, to enforce this Conclusion, is in your last words [that the Lords Prayer is constantly subjoined;] but that indeed is no reason at all: for though it be constantly, it is not only enjoined as a Petition for pardon of sin; and therefore, you cannot say that it is reputed or enjoined as the only lawful Petition for that end, and consequently ●our Objection vanisheth. 12. Can it be affirmed by any that converse with the Book of Common-prayer, that if we do assent unto it, we assent that the Lords Prayer is the only lawful Petition for pardon of sin, while we find so frequent and so various forms to that purpose, even from the beginning to the end of the said Book besides that of the Lords Prayer? 13. What do those words in the Confession signify? But thou O Lord, have mercy upon us miserable offenders; spare thou them that confess their faults, Restore thou them that be penitent? How often do we meet with, Lord have mercy upon us, have mercy upon'u miserable sinners. 14. Again, more expressly, Remember not Lord our offences, nor the offence of our forefathers, neither take tho● vengeance of our sins; Deal not thou with us after our sins, nor reward us after our iniquities; mercifully forgive the sins of thy people, and abundance more in the Office of Communion, the visitation of the Sick, Commination; and indeed, either more expressly, or implicitly, in every approach to God by the book of Common Prayer, we have other Petitions of pardon of sin, besides the words of the Lords Prayer▪ 13. Thus we see, that wise and good men may have cause to join with us, in the words of our Liturgy, that it may please thee to forgive us all our sins, negligences, and ignorances'. SECT. 3. Of popular Responds. 1. SEcondly, you complain that you cannot Assent and Consent to the word [Answer] and the other directions for popular Responds; for these are, you say, in Mr. Croftons' Dialect, Repugnant to the Apostles Rule, Let all things be done decently and in Order. 2. My dear brethren, pray consider, that though these things seem so directly repugnant to the Apostles rule of decency and order with you & Mr. Crofton; yet they did not seem so, to our present Governors. What Order can be prudently expected in Church or State, if every private spirit should be Judge thereof; and accordingly, Act or Reject in public Administrations? Yea, I dare in this thing appeal to yourselves; were you in the place of Government, durst you trust the management of all indifferent things, and all external Circumstances about God's Worship, to every private Discretion? I am sure the Apostles did not. 3. However, you say in your Preface, that you have admitted and could admit many inexpediencies for the liberty of your Ministry. Now I am confident you will not say these are other than inexpediencies in your own judgements; and the reason of this confidence yourselves have given me, page 15. where, referring to these things, you say, you could submissively bear these things; which cannot be understood, but in the use of them, and conformity to them: Now how you can admit inexpediencies in your practice, and bear with these things, and yet not give some assent and consent thereunto, I am still to learn, especially that they are indifferent, and not simply sinful, though perhaps inexpedient in your opinion. SECT. 4. Of the Holy Table. 1. AGain, you are offended at the word [Holy] as an Adjunct to Table, frequent in this Book; for you know no holiness of Places or Instruments under the Gospel. 2. For answer hereunto, pray ask yourselves in what sense Places and Instruments might be said to be holy in the time of the Law, that the Gospel dispensation cannot bear, as you seem to intimate. 3. Nay rather, is not that holiness that was restrained to some places and some things in the time of the Law, now spread, by the coming of Christ, over all places and all things; To the pure all things are pure. What God hath sanctified, call not thou common or unclean. 4. So that any place or any thing that is capable of use, in order to God's Service, by this grace of the Gospel we have liberty to use it, and to set it apart for that peculiar use about the Worship of God; as this public house and not another, this particular Table and not another, etc. 5. This, I know, neither you nor M. Crofton will scruple at; and this granted, you must needs confess that the exception against the word Holy, as given to the Table, is only a strife about a word; for indeed you allow the thing, and all the thing which this word, as applied to the Table, intends to signify. 6. Neither can you reply, that it is improper to call a Table, in this sense, Holy; seeing you may easily know, the Church doth not intent by calling the Table Holy, a proper but a figurative holiness, or a holiness not inherent in the thing, but predicated of it, with respect to the end and use for which it is set apart; which distinction (I need not inform you) hath undeniable ground in Scripture. 7. Yet, seeing you say you know no holiness of places under the Gospel, give me leave to remember you of the Holiest of all, Heb. 9 3. and that peculiar to the Gospel-state; the Holy Ghost signifying that the way into the Holiest of all was not yet made manifest, while the first Tabernacle was yet standing, v. 8. 8. Yea, this seems to be a place to be entered into even in this life. Having therefore boldness to enter into the Holiest by a new and living way— And having a High Priest over the House of God. Let us draw near with a true heart— not forsaking the assembling of ourselves together, as the manner of some is, Heb. 10. 19 to 26. To this the Holy City answereth, Revel. 11. 2. & 21. 2. & 22. 9 9 But I am afraid of being mistaken; let me therefore have leave to add, that the end of my alleging these Scriptures is only to let you know, that Holiness is attributed to places under the Gospel. Contenting myself with my former Answer to the Objection, without any strict Application of the Scriptures pointed at to that end and purpose. 10. Howbeit, if you acknowledge, as I know you do, with the Apostle, that there is such a thing as Sacrilege Rom. 2. under the Gospel; you may easily persuade yourselves that some things may warrantably bear the Attribute of Holy, even under the Gospel: for what is Sacrilege? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; it unquestionably imports, that either the things that are stolen, or the place out of which they are stolen, are called Holy. 11. In a strict sense, Sacrilege is a Robbing or stealing things out of the Church, or any Holy or Consecrated place; and than Sacrum in Sacrilegium, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, signifies the Church; which very words carry Consecration or Holiness in them. For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is properly quid sacrum: As sacrum is that which Is Holy, and the Church is therefore called both, because it is Holy. 12. Yet in very usual, and generally allowed speaking, Sacrilege is a larger Notion, and intends any spoiling or alienating any thing devoted or dedicated to God in order to his Service. Thus the things are called Holy, that are given to an Holy Use, or the service of the Holy God, and separated from common use to that special purpose; and he that steals and spoils the Church of the same, is Sacrilegius, or one that Robs God, and commits Sacrilege. 13. Thus Churches, Lands, Table, Chalice, Cup, may be said to be Holy; not in themselves, but their end and use. Therefore, to dedicate a thing after this manner, is by the Latines called Sacrare, by the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and may in English, I think without any just offence, if well understood, be expressed by Consecrating or making Holy. 14. I am sure the Apostles word is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and that hath 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or sacrum in it, which from the Caldie is rendered diripis aedem sacram, making an house Holy. The Syriac, furaberis vasa Templi, intimating that either the Temple or the Vessels thereof, or both, are Holy. The Aethiopic. Expilus Domum Dei? calling the place of Worship, the House of God, and consequently, Holy. 15. What rema●ins, but that you no longer startle at the Holy Table which you know is set apart for the Supper of the Lord, to bear the Cup of the Lord, to serve the Communion of the Body and Blood of the Lord, and the Holy Communion, or the Communion of Saints. SECT 5. Of the old Translation of the Psalms. 1. AS to your Exceptions to the old Translation of the Psalter, and the pointing of it, they are not strengthened with any proof at all; nor so much as an Instance. 2. It yet lies on you to evince that this Translation is corrupt, as you have asserted, that the pointing makes manifest Nonsense, (which indeed serves not the sense at all, but only the Music) that it varieth the Text from the Original, yea, from Truth itself. 3. I confess, that such strange exceptions have been thrown against it heretofore, by the old Non-conformists; but, I suppose, you know they never wanted Answers. 4. You add the corrupt Translation of the fourth Commandment, where in the close of it, the seventh day is put for the Sabbath day. 5. But though I do not vindicate this Translation, yet I cannot but observe the extreme emptiness of this Objection. Was not the Sabbath day then the seventh day? It is said, God rested the seventh day, and blessed the Sabbath: Yea, was not the seventh day the Sabbath day? it is also said, the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God. 6. Besides the Septuagint, the Arabic, and the Syriac, do all agree in the same Rendition. with our own Translation: so that if it be so gross an error as you pretend, it is a very old one. But indeed, whether the not altering of the word, were an overfight in the Examiner's, or not, the sense must needs be yielded by you to be the same either way. 7. However, here again, I must needs remember you; that you could submissively bear these things; that i●, by conforming to use them as Ministers; and that this your bearing of them doth undeniably suppose such an Assent and Consent unto them as the Law requires; which I doubt not to Evidence in its due place. SECT. 6. Of the Salvation of Infants. 1. I Am now arrived at the la●● of your exceptions of this kind; and that is taken from those words in the Liturgy, touching the Salvation of Infants. It is certain by the Word of God▪ that Children being baptised, dying before they commit Actual sin, are undoubtedly saved. 2. You say you can Christianly believe the Regenerating Nature and Efficacy of Baptism: but, that the undoubted Salvation of all baptised infants dying before they commit Actual Sin, is certain by the Scriptures you say you cannot s●●. 3. But truly, my brother; I cannot s●e, that So much is required of you: And therefore I must be bold to mind you that the universal Note [All] is of your own inserting. It is not said ●ll Children, but Children. 4. It is an indifinite Proposition; a● it is a Proposition, and consequently, neither Rubric for direction, nor any part of Administration, it is not of a practicable Nature; and I humbly conceive, it will appear anon, we are not required by the Act to subscribe to it; the Act makes the Object of our Assent and Consent, in the Declaration, to the use of the things contained and prescribed in the Common-Prayer. 5. Again, as it is an Indefinite Proposition, I conceive you need not scruple it, seeing you allow, and believe with a Christian belief, the Regenerating nature, use and efficacy, of Baptism. 6. For upon this belief, we must agree thus far: that this Efficacy of Baptism hath its Effects upon some of its Subject; and if this belief be grounded upon the Word of God, then so much is certain from the Word of God, that some Children being Regenerated, 〈◊〉 put in a state of Salvation by Baptisms and therefore, dying before they commit Actual sin are undoubtedly saved. 7. But you reply, it is not said, some Children, but that is Children, all Children. 8. I therefore proceed upon this Foundation to inquire, whether the Proposition in Controversy be to be understood in a Universal sense, or not. This is indeed the Question; yet by my consent, you have liberty to Answer it yourselves. 9 For first, if this Proposition be to be understood Universally as to all such Children that are mentioned in it, the matter of it must be necessary. For the form of the Proposition is indefinite, and an indefinite Proposition is not equipollent with an Universal, but in Materiâ Necessariâ. 10. You have yet your choice to say, whether the Matter of this Proposition be necessary or not. 11. If you say the Matter of it is not necessary, than the meaning of the Proposition is not Universal, and the difficulty is over, seeing it is agreed, that Baptism is regenerating, and some such Children are saved. For if some Children, than Children, thus dying, are saved; and that is sufficient, if the Matter be not necessary; and consequently the Proposition not to be understood Universally. 12. Again, if you urge that the matter of this indefinite Proposition is necessary; then I am content you conclude it universally, & extend it to all such children. 13. For what is the matter of the present proposition, but the salvation of baptised Children; dying before they commit actual sin. Now this is granted to be true of some, else the Promise is of none effect to the Children, and Baptism of no efficacy; and if it be said to be necessary, it must be true of all; and you need not doubt to Assent unto it in a universal Proposition. 14. Thus Jesus Christ, the Text saith, Came into the world to save sinners. This is a true Proposition, whether the matter be necessary or not; because it it is certain that he came into the world to save some sinners. 15. For if the matter be necessary, than it is Universally true, if not necessary, than it is indefinitely true; if he came with a purpose to save all, he came to save sinners: and if he came not with a purpose to save all, yet he came to save some sinners; and therefore sinners. 16. Once more, that Baptism is for the Remission of sins, is a certain Truth, or an undoubted proposition, grounded on the Scripture, be Baptised for Acts ●. the Remission of s●●●. 17. This is a Proposition of an indefinite Nature; if the matter of it be necessary, it is true, as I have said, Universally; (where its efficacy is not impeded by the incapacity of the Subject▪) as it is not in Children:) but if the matter be not necessary, the Proposition is still true, that is, indefinitely. 18. To conclude, either all such Children are saved, or some only; in either send●, the Proposition being but indefinite is true; if all such Children are saved, than the Matter is necessary, and the Proposition equipollent with an Universal Proposition: if some only, than the Matter is not necessary; and consequently, there is no necessity, yea, no liberty left us, to stretch the Proposition which is indefinite, both in its Form and Matter, unto an Universal signification. SECT. 7. Of Assent and Consent unfeigned. 1. HAving dispatched your exceptions against the Objects of your Assent and Consent required by the Act. viz. The book of Ordination, and the book of Common-Prayer. 2. We proceed to review these Acts themselves, this unfeigned Assent and Consent; upon which a greater stress of Controversy yet remains. 3. An Objection that I proposed and Answered in my last book, seemed, if not to create, yet to provoke and very much to heighten this part of the quarrel. 4. The Objection that I proposed, was this: I suppose it might be said by some, that though we could use the things, it is only for Peace sake, and in Obedience to Authority; not that we would choose or can absolutely approve of the things in themselves. 5. Hereunto, I answered, as you well note, that we may approve a thing absolutely, or comparatively, or respectively, and consequently, so give our Assent and Consent unto it, and that the Act cannot be thought so strict as to allow of no Assent or Consent but such as ariseth from an absolute approbation of the things themselves, without any other extrinsiek considerations, that may move and sway us to such an Approbation. 6. The Act requires but an unfeigned Assent and Consent; and an unfeigned Assent and Consent may arise from such a comparative Approbation, as a man may unfeignedly Assent and Consent to his Child's Marriage, though he like not the Match very well, for the avoiding of some greater inconveniencies that otherwise might happen. 7. I further observed, that to interpret the Act into such an absolute approbation, is against charity to ourselves and our Governors, and against common reason; seeing it is a moral impossibility, that all men should be exactly of one mind in so many particulars required of us; seeing also the grounds of this Assent and Consent are not specified in the Act, but left to ourselves; and lastly, seeing that the very Act itself brings motives with it to persuade us ●o Conformity, which would signify nothing, if no consideration of the Case; besides, the absolute goodness of the things themselves is allowed any force to prevail upon us. 8. I therefore conclude, that we are left at liberty by the said Act, to compare the Consequences of obedience with those of dibedience, and accordingly to approve so and declare, or not. 9 Now let us examine what you say to these things. 1. To my argument from charity, you answer it, only, with less Charity. 2. To my augment, that the grounds of Assent and Consent are not specified in the Act, but left to ourselves you answer nothing, because you mistake it. 10. You observe well, that I say, the grounds of this Assent and Consent are not specified in the Act, But how strangely do you Comment upon it? 11. If by ground (say you) I mean the reasons inducing the Legislators to require such an Assent and Consent you must be bold to deny what I affirm. Then you show the grounds in the Act, for enjoining such a declaration of Assent and Consent: And this is all you answer 12. Now had I meant as you suppose, I confess you had answered me. But if my words could not signify any such thing, as upon review you will be easily convinced, you have answered yourselves, and not me at all. 13. Pray then Consider, is there not a difference betwixt the grounds of Assent and Consent, and the grounds of the Governors to enjoin a declaration of Assent and Consent? could the scope of my argument, or the very words of my proposition, intent the latter, or not the former? 14. The grounds of enjoining such a declaration are in the Legislators; and are the grounds of the Act requiring: these, indeed, are specified in the Act of uniformity: But the grounds of Assent and Consent, or of declaring the same, are in the Subjects; and are properly the grounds of obedience to that Act; which, I must still say, are not at all specified in it. 15. To my other argument, taken from the motives which the Act itself affords us, you only say, that such Arguments, as the avoiding a severe penalty, a legal opportunity of serving the Church; not showing ourselves cross to authority, etc. are bad inducements to an unfeigned Assent and Consent. 16. But, upon second thoughts, I cannot believe you will maintain the Quarrel with such motives as these; which have, doubtless, a divine sanction; what more familiar, with the Spirit of Scripture, then to use such Topics of wrath, threats, curses, death, and Hell itself, to dissuade from sin, and to move towards Heaven; and yet, I hope, the Assent and Consent, wrought hereupon, is not always feigned, or always a faint unfeigned Assent and Consent. 17. Neither, can I believe, that you are tenacious in this; because you say it might somewhat satisfy us, if we had assurance from our Legislators that such a comparative approbation would satisfy the Law. For I conclude from hence, that what ever you say, there is not, even in your apprehensions, any inconsistency or contradiction betwixt such a comparative approbation and an unfeigned Assent and Consent. Though I can see no reason, in the world, why the Legislators should expressly declare so much. 18. We have the intention of the Act, and why should we further trouble ourselves about the intention of the makers of it: The Act intends, and therefore requires uniformity, in order thereunto; conformity, and security thereof, by this declaration of an unfeigned Assent and Consent. 19 So that, it is the intention of our Governors, that we should assure them, as much as in us lies, as to uniformity in practice, by giving our unfeigned Assent and Consent thereunto; it is not said upon an absolute or upon a comparative approbation: If it be unfeigned, that is the very thing required, and therefore, intended. Then the great Question is, that which is indeed beyond all question. viz. whether we may be drawn to give Assent and Consent, and that unfeignedly, from other considerations besides the very goodness of the thing itself, absolutely, and in itself alone, considered. 20. If it be granted, as it cannot be questioned, than our Governors have already declared, that such a comparative approbation doth satisfy the Law. 21. For if there be an universal agreement in the worship of God, though upon differing motives, and uniformity be effected, though not from an Exact unanimity in every particular reason or ground thereof, the Law hath its end quoad executionem, which, I conceive, is the best measure of its end quoad intentionem, 22. I say, indeed, had the word [Free] been used in the place of unfeigned, there had been were colour of objection. And for this you take me up, and learn me, that Freedom is essential to unfeigned. 23. But what then? might there not be more colour of objection, if not more reality? 24 I thought, I might have been easily understood according to that vulgar use of the word free, wherein the objectors used, and I interpreted it. viz. When we do choose a thing of our own accord, and Assent and Consent unt● it for itself, without any further inducement thereunto from the laws enjoining it. 25. Moreover, take Freedom in its strict and proper sense, as moralists use it and doubtless, it is as Essential to Assent and Consent as it is to unfeigned; yea unfeignedness is as Essential to Assent, and Consent, as Freedom is to unfeigned; and then what have you gained by this interruption? 26. Therefore unfeigned, the word so much stuck at, that bears the very burden of general complaint, gives only the colour, nothing of the truth of the weakest objection. 27. For it really adds nothing to Assent or Consent, or to the declaration at all for all; Assent and Consent, as such, is both unfeigned and free. And 'tis a plain contradiction, to say a feigned, Assent and Consent; we may indeed, make a feigned Declaration of our Assent and Consent, but we cannot declare a feigned Assent or Consent; for there is no such thing. 28. What remains, but that we lift out foot over the word unfeigned, and stumble no longer at it; but proceed to Assent and Consent, which ever carry the thing of unfeignedness with them. So that, if we can truly Assent and Consent, we do it unfeignedly. And if we do Assent and Consent, unfeignedly, let the grounds and motives be what they will, the Law is satisfied, and so may we. SECT. 8. Of the phrase in the Act, [the use of all things, etc.] 1. BUt I humbly conceive the, matter is yet more easy to our Affent and Consent, if it be considered not in its speculative but practical capacity; or with respect to Conformity, and our use thereof in the worship of God, as the Act most plainly alloweth us to do. 2. Indeed, if you demand, what we must yield our unfeigned Assent and Consent unto; the declaration tells you, to all and every thing contained and prescribed in the Book of Common-prayer. 3. But if you again demand, in what respect, or after what manner, you must Assent & Consent to the same; The Act interprets as they are practically considered, or with respect to their use, in order to public uniformity in the worship of God. 4. Therefore the words immediately foregoing this declaration, I have noted, are these; every Minister shall declare his unfeigned Assent and Consent, to the use of all things in the said Book contained, and prescribed in these words, and no otherwise they are the words of this Declaration. It is further to be observed, that wheresoever this Act doth any time mention the said Declaration, it puts this very meaning upon it; that thereby we are to declare our unfeigned Assent and Consent to the use of Common-prayer, and that is all is intended by the words of this Declaration. 5. The sum is this; in these words, as the Act interprets them, we do but declare our unfeigned Assent and Consent to the use of common-Prayer; wheresoever there is an Assent and Consent to the use of common-Prayer, there is an unfeigned Assent and Consent thereunto: and where there is a purpose to Conform were not this Declaration required, there is doubtless an Assent and Consent, yea an unfeigned Assent and Consent to the use of Common-prayer, which is all in this particular, we are desired to declare, and what yet can hinder us? 6. You say, that this refers our Assem and Consent to the using Act, and that only: you cannot see, neither indeed can I see how you infer it from my words immediately repeated by yourselves: All things with respect to their use. 7. The using Act, and a thing with respect to its use, are not all one; they differ formally: the one is the Act, as you express it, the other the Object of that Act, as I must needs intent it; one would think beyond all possibility of misapprehension. 8. Yet, upon this misapprehension, you proceed and enlarge yourselves above one page, answering your own Supposition, not my Proposition at all. 9 I do clearly grant, that we do not Assent and Consent to the use of the things exclusively to the things themselves, which sounds to me an impossibility in itself, yet we Assent and Consent to these things only; (I mean, we need do no more) as they are practicable; or as I plainly expressed it at first, with respect to their use. 10. So that all the Dust you raised upon this false ground, about Uniformity, with its spur, Unanimity is fallen to nothing; seeing my first Expression about it, which yourselves also noted, that alloweth the Object of Assent, and Consent, to be all things with respect to their use, carrieth both Uniformity, & Unanimity in it. 11. Only let me enter this caveat; let not Unanimity outstretch Uniformity; while we Assent to the use of all things in the book, we assent to those things are to be used, and to no more. 12. Uniformity is restrained to the public Worship of God; so far, a Universal agreement therein by Assent and Consent is to be allowed; to be the sense of the Law; that is, to the use of all things in the Book of Common-prayer; and to the things themselves as they are practicable, or proposed to be used, or, as before, with respect to their use in the worship of God. 13. Hence appears the difference betwixt the two Declarations easily enough. In the first, we consent to the use, and the things to be used: in the Second, we move then Consent, we promise that we ourselves will use them, or conform unto them. 14. Give me leave to subjoin two advantages, which offer themselves from this interpretation, towards a good accommodation betwixt us. 15. 1. Then if there be any such thing found in the book of Common-prayer, as is not of a practical Nature, as a port of a public Liturgy, or capable of use in public Worship, (and I humbly offer whether that touching Children dying Baptised not such) it need not be concerned in our Declaration or Subscription. 16. 2. Things, with respect to their use, are properly, and more immediately to be considered, as fit, not as good in themselves, but as fit for the services for which they are intended: yea, it is not necessary that this filness be referred to the things to be used, but rather, the person that is to use them, and our use of them. 17. So that, upon the just weighing of all Circumstances, if we can consent, that for the avoiding of certain great inconveniences, the use of these things (not sinful in themselves) is a thing to be chosen, that this, Conformity is to be practised, we have sufficient ground according to the Act, to declare our Assent and Consent thereunto. 18. What remains, but that we are yet allowed thus to reason. Here is such a Declaration required by Law, and such a severe Penalty annexed, for all that disobey it: though I could rather have liked the book of Common-prayer, if such and such things had been altered; yet rather than lose my Living, and therewith all legal Opportunity of serving the Church, rather than show myself cross and disobedient to Authority in lawful things, rather than Ruin myself and Family, for a thing indifferent, though in itself I judge it inconvenient; I do choose to be obedient and conformable; and in order thereunto, upon these grounds, I declare my Assent and Consent unfeignedly to every thing to be conformed unto. 19 Give me leave to add the Objection of others, which you mention not. They say, if it had been said that we must assent to all things prsecribed only, it might have served my interpretation well enough; but it is all things contained, as well as prescribed, must be consented unto. 20. I answer, First, it is contained and prescribed. Not prescribed and contained; so that prescribed seems to bond contained. 2 'tis contained and prescribed, not, or prescribed; so that what is contained, if not also prescribed; we need not give our assent unto it: it must be both contained and prescribed. 21. But, if there yet remain any doubt, about the legal meaning of these words, the Act itself explains it beyond all dispute: You see in the words before cited, that both the words [Contained and Prescribed] are referred to the use of the things: [to the use of all things contained and prescribed] so that the Objection is nice and verbal only, and thus vanisheth. 22. If you should desire to have your own sense yet more secured; I humbly conceive there would be no offence done to the law, if you express yourselves after this manner. Having read the Morning and Evening Prayer— according to the Book of Common-Prayer, at the times thereby appointed; and being required by the Act of Parliament, after such reading thereof, openly and publicly before the Congregation to declare my unfeigned Assent and Consent to the Use of all things in the said book contained and prescribed, in these following words and no other; Accordingly, I do declare my unfeigned Assent and Consent to the Use of all things in the said book contained and prescribed in these words and no other, I. A. B. do here declare, etc. 23. What possible Exception can lie against such a recital of the words of the Act which are set immediately before the Declaration, in order to the making and subscribing of it, while we add no words of our own, nor take any from the Act, or from the Declaration? 24. If it be said you fear that a Declaration will not be accepted, that is thus exclaimed and conditioned. 25. Give me leave to say, I cannot but believe there is no reason to doubt it; or to desire it as a favour from any: seeing you add no words, nor put any sense upon the Declaration; only reciting the words of the Act, requiring and declaring, according as is required, in these words of the Declaration, and none other. 26. However, suppose (that that is not to be supposed) that such a Declaration should be refused; and that without such a kind of explaining yourself, you are resolved not to declare or subscribe at all. Yet consider by so doing, though not accepted, you are not the worse, or further off from your Living then you were before: and now you may fit down quiet with this reflection; that however you have done your utmost to satisfy the Law, the World, and your own Conscience. CASE the Second. Whether it be lawful to Declare in the words of the second Declaration. 1. YOu consent to the distribution I made of the second Declaration into 3 parts: That which concerns the taking Arms against the King, Conformity, and the Oath called the solemn League and Covenant. 2. The two Cases arising from the first part, taking Arms against the King, you say, do not much concern you; and give me leave to return, that I am not concerned to answer others. 3. To the Case about Conformity, arising from the second-part, you add nothing, out seem in haste to get into your strong hold, in the last part of this Declaration, touching the Covenant, and thither I am ready to attend you, and to engage with you. 4. We are therefore fallen upon the main Case, which was the sixth in order in my last book it is; CASE VI Whether we may lawfully declare in these words; I do hold there lies no Obligation on me, or any other person, from the Oath commonly; called the solemn League and Covenant, to endeavour any change or alteration of Government in the Church or State? 1. THis I affirm, and undertook to prove it by an Argument taken from the matter of the Covenant, as is here specified: not with respect to the Government of the Kingdom, there we are agreed; but with respect to that of the Church, wherein we differ. 2. You also grant my Consequence; that if this part of the matter of the Covenant appear to be sinful, the Covenant is so far, void of itself. 3. The very Question than is, Whether to endeavour a change of Church-Government be sinful or not. I affirm it, and give you my Arguments once again for it; and hearty wish, they may find, in their new attire, better entertainment with you. 4. You observe, I make my first onset by Doctor Sanderson's distinction of Juramentum illicitum de se, & per accidens. You farther say, I grant that the matter of the Covenant is not simply, and of itself unlawful; you intimate, that I hold it only sinful by accident. 5. My dear Brethren, I cannot forbear to tell you, that you make too much haste, & stumble at the threshold; you fall both upon that Reverend Person and myself with too plain mistakes. 6. The Bishop's distinction which you intent, is not that of illicitum per se vel per accidens; I do not here use that distinction; I do not grant that the matter of the Covenant is not simply and of itself unlawful; much less, that the matter of the Covenant is sinful per accidens only: The truth is, both the Bishop and myself, in the very places your words refer to, do more than once say quite contrary to what you affirm; in all which, will you but take the pains to read over again that Chapter in Doctor Sanderson's Book, and in mine, that are here concerned, your own eyes shall judge betwixt us. 7. The place you intent in Bishop Sanderson's Book is, Pag. 71, 72. Sect. 9 the Case is, De●●re illicitâ Secundariò, wherein, indeed, he is so directly against you, that it is much so many eyes should not observe it. 8. A thing (saith he) is unlawful secundarîo, when it is not so in its own nature, or to all persons: Sed quibusdam tantùm pro conditione fuarum personarum, prout sunt membra alio●j●● c●mmu●●tatis, an●●ins: certo aliqua vitae genere versanturie illicitum enim idque ex se non ex accident tantùm his qui sunt membra alicujus communitatis, quicquid legibus illius communitatis repugnat: His reason there is, because it is forbidden by God, though not primario, yet secundariò; that is, in the command of obedience to our Governors, and consequently the Laws of the Land. 9 Now, that your discourse of this distinction intends this very place of the Bishop's Book, you give us a full demonstration in your next words following. 10. You say, you must make bold to mind me, that the Learned Casuist hath determined the Case with an Ordinariè; Haec juramenta ordinariè non obligant; meaning, such Oaths as are taken to do a thing that is thus evil, not simply, absolutely, or to all persons; but to us, that by reason of our places are not allowed to do it, they ordinarily do not bind. 11. I acknowledge he subjoins (though nothing to your advantage) Ordinariè dico, quia fortasse possunt dari casus in quibus juramentum quod videtur alicui legi communitatis aut vocationis adversari, & si non debuerit suscipi, susceptum tamen potest obligari. 12. You add, That the Advocates of the Covenant think they may bring the Covenant within our Casuist's exception; but upon an reading our Casuist's following explication of himself, there is nothing more evident than the contrary; herein also yourselves shall be Judges. 13. Yet, first, give me leave to note, our Casuist's Caution is with a fortassis; perhaps such a Case may be; he never thought, you know he never said the Case of the Covenant was such; yea, his [videtur] adds no strength to the exception, that is, when the Oath seems, but seems to be against the Laws of Community; but that he might leave no room for the scruple, he hath explained himself in his own Instance in a disjunctive penal Law. 14. His Case is this; Let the Law of the City be (saith he) that no man being chosen to the Office of a Praetor shall refuse it: or if he do, he shall find such a sum of Money, Caius swears he will never be Praetor: but after his Oath, he is chosen to that Office. The Question our Casuist puts hereupon is, Whether Caius be bound to keep his Oath or not: and answer it thus he ought not to have sworn; but having sworn, he ought to keep his Oath, and pay the Fine. 15. Now, how far this is from the Case of the Covenant, in itself, I need not say; and how far it was so in the judgement of our great casuist, his following Discourse doth sufficiently Demonstrate. 16. I would here (saith he) be understood Praecisè in quantum adversatur legi Civitatis. Nam respectu finis aut alterius causae, imo respectu ipsius etiam Materiae quatenus est impeditiva majoris boni publici, aut aliunde, potest justa subesse ratio quae Obligationem tollat. 17. Now admitting this exception of the Rule, it is not possible to apply it to the Covenant; however, if the Covenant could be granted by some thing extraordinary in it to be excepted also, yet you see the Casuist hath provided several other Topics to render it non-obliging; from the end, or the very matter itself, if it may hinder a greater public good; aut aliunde potest justa subesse ratio quae obligationem tollat. 18. Give me leave also to remember you, that I made my meaning touching the said distinction plain enough. I did not distinguish, as you assert I did, That the thing sworn might be illicitum per se vel per accidens; but I rather distinguished of illicitum per se as to the matter of the Covenant, and that was either simply and primarily evil, or secondarily and quoad nos; when though it be not sinful in the primary consideration of it, yet to such and such persons it is sinful, that is, forbidden by God, as I did sufficiently explain myself. 19 I did further conclude, that a thing thus sinful, quoad nos, as being some way or other prohibited us to meddle with, is illicitum per se secundariò, and therefore not only so per accidens. Th●se are my words: To them to whom a thing is forbidden it is as it were unlawful in itself, (as the Apple to our first Parents) and as it is unlawful for us it goes into the matter of the Covenant which we take; and by consequence, that which is only unlawful to us, if sworn, doth make that Oath unlawful in itself, that is, in the very matter of it. 20. So that the Consequence being granted, if this be proved, that it is unlawful in either sense, either simply or quoad nos, to endeavour the Extirpation of Church-Government, we may bring the difference to an happy conclusion. 21. But I rather chose to argue upon the latter branch, that to alter the Government of the Church is unlawful quoad nos; and that because it is against the Rights of the King, the Laws of the Land, the Privileges of Parliament, the Liberty of the Subject, and the former Obligations that lay upon the Nations; all which I am bound to defend. CASE VII. Whether any private or single person may lawfully endeavour the Alteration of Church-Government by virtue of the Covenant. 1. TO that which I have said upon this Case you only return a discovery of three Principles, which you affirm I take for granted, though they are denied by my Adversaries. 1. That the Long Parliament is dissolved. 2. That the Covenant is only private and personal. 3. That each single person is concluded by my subsequent Arguments. These you call ungranted Principles; but if they may not be granted, though they are Principles, I shall endeavour that they may be proved; though, I hope, very few of the people of England need satisfaction in such points as these. SECT. 1. Of the dissolution of the long Parliament. 1. TOuching the Dissolution of the Long Parliament, I could not dream, that so ingenuous persons had any scruple: I would fain hope that you want a Refuge, when I find you in so bad a Sanctuary. 2. Yet when I read your words, so warily conditioned in this great particular, I find some small encouragement to think, that though you now stumble at this stone; if every other stone were removed, you would stumble over it. You say it hath been said, you dare not say it, and in obedience to present laws you are submissively silent. 3. Are you indeed Obedient? to what? to the present Laws? Who made them? the Parliament. How comes this to be a Parliament, if the Long Parliament be not dissolved. 4. If the Long Parliament be yet in being, the Present is none, their Laws are none, your Obedience is none: if you acknowledge the present Laws, you acknowledge the present Parliament; and thereby you are over the stone of stumbling before you are ware; for you acknowledge the Long Parliament dissolved 5. Now there are but two ungranted principles; for one you have granted upon a better Argument than I had thought of, your own Obedience to the present Laws. 6. Truly, I took you to be so ingenuous before hand, and therefore I presumed to take this for granted, and thought I might do it without offence. For it is not only the ground of Obedience to the present Laws, but the Foundation of our Peace, our Liberty, our Pardon, our Lives, and indeed of all we are worth in this world; and such a stone, (not of stumbling, but) of the Comer, that it is hardly safe to touch it, though with an intent to fasten it. But, blessed be God, it is fast enough already in our constitution, and I hope not much loosened in your opinions. 7. Yet, if you are in doubt of what disease that great body died: I refer you to Judge Jenkins and Mr. Prin; who, though in other things they differed too much, agree very well in this great point. 8. Indeed the Name, Parliament, which signifies to consult and treat; together with the Writ whereby the two Houses are Assembled, are a full Demonstration of its departure or dissolution long agone. They are thereby called to consult and treat with the King: therein it signified that Rex est habiturus Colloquium & Tractatum cum praelatis, magnatibus, & proceribus. Rex in hoc individuo. 9 Hence Judge Jinkins argues, that the Parliament dissolved upon the Kings being forced from them, and put into an incapacity of Treating with them; however at his death they died on course. 10. The King dying, with whom they are to Treat, and for which end they have their being, the end of their assembling, and consequently of their being, is gone with him, and they are no longer a Parliament. A Parliament is a Relative term; the Relate and Correlate die together. Therefore, the King, in our Laws, is Principium, Caput, & finis Parliamenti. 11. It may be said, the Act secured them against the King's death. 12. 'Tis plainly otherwise; indeed, it secured themselves from any violence to be done to that end, by the King himself: there is no such clause in the Act, that they should not be capable of dissolving any other way, much less, in particular, by the King's death, no security to save the Body when the Head was off. 13. But a Parliament may be dissolved, or dissolve: die, or be killed: the Act secured them from being dissolved by the King's power, without their Consent; not against the law of Mortality, or their dissolving on course at his decease. 14. This is very evident in ul Parliaments: if the King's favour shall continue a Parliament his whole time, that Parliament hath all that the long Parliament desired or obtained, by the Act specified: yet upon the King's death, such a Parliament dissolves, according to the nature of the thing and the constitution of the Nation. 15. Who can be so fond, as to imagine, that it was ever intended, either by the King, or both Houses, (especially if the Reasons be weighed, with which this Act was prosecuted,) that the constitution of the Nation, or the nature of a Parliament, should be altered by it; or more, then that the King should not dissolve them by violence; that is, without their own consent. 16. 'Tis as frivolous to mention, that the King never dies in this respect; For 〈◊〉 is evident, that as the King is the Head of the Parliament, the Relate & Reasons of a particular Parliament, so he doth die. For, as was said, a Parliament 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dissolved by the King in his life time, dissolves of itself, at his death, and why, but because in this sense the King dies? 17. I never heard such Arguments as these following answered, though indeed we need them not. They are Judge Jenkin's. He affirms that the Act for the continuance of the long Parliament is Repugnant to those for Annual and Triennial Parliaments; which being all Acts of one Session, are all Acts of one day, and repugnant to common Right and common Reason; and impossible by the King's Mortality: and maintains, that when an Act of Parliament is thus against common Right and Reason, and repugnant and impossible to be performed, the common Law shall control, and adjudge such an Act to be void, and that these are the words of the Law. 1. Par. D. downham's Case, fol. 11S. 8E. 3. 3. 30. 33. E. Cessavit. 32. 37. H. O. Annuity 41. 1. Eliz. Dier. 313. 18. I hope, you will not demand who shall judge of such a Case, since all parties have practically resolved this long agone. 19 The Rump thought that Parliament too long; the whole Nation were offended at the Rump: The Long-Parliament men themselves, when they were together again, in order to the blessed Restauration of the King, had a desire to be dissolved, and did what they could themselves to do it: and you know, that both King, Lords and Commons, have since made a Law, to which you say you yield Obedience, that brandeth it for an high offence, for any to say that the Long Parliament is not dissolved. 20. But my dear brethren, because you intimate that you are not fully satisfied in this point; out of my hearty desire to do you any service, I have advised with a very learned Sergeant in the Laws, from whom I received these 3. Reasons: every one of which, he affirms, demonstrates that Parliament to be dissolved; in sua arte credend. etc. and I hope you will be fully satisfied with them: they are these. 21. 1. By the death of the King; there being nothing in the Act of continuance that doth or can secure them against that. 2. Because every Court in England dissolves on course, if it rises without adjourning, or doth not meet again, at the time and place appointed. 3. Because, when a Parliament Recedes, and the Electors choose new Representatives, the first are dissolved thereby, I need not apply these Rules; only, if you yet doubt the force of them, and desire, as I know you will do, more full satisfaction; you will certainly without my advice confer with some able Lawyer, whom you may safer in your own apprehensions confided in. In such a case we must take things upon trust; and if we will be satisfied, we must trust some body, choose your Friend. SECT. 2. Of the Reality and Nationality of the Covenant. 1. IN the second place, you intimate that I take it for granted, that the Covenant was personal, and not Real or National. But Master Crofton hath affirmed it is real and National, Obliging all the Nation, and all after Generations, side Anglorum, thereby engaged. This, you say, he hath enforced beyond all capacity of Contradiction. 2. Truly, I confess, I did not imagine (however confident I find you to the contrary) that such a principle had needed proof, with such as I proposed to deal with: but I see the Foundations are yet out of Course. 3. Much less, could I divine, that whether the Covenant be personal or re●l, it could any way concern me in my present Design to trouble myself; seeing it was my work only to prove that the matter of the Covenant was sinful; and then, whether it be a real or a personal Covenant, I think it comes all to one, viz. A sinful Covenant, and not Obliging. 4. Besides, upon your second Survey, you will easily discern, that I distinguished single and private persons, from the Parliament, and not from the Nation; and considered both Members of my distinction; as taking the Covenant; And did not find myself obliged to say, that some not: but rather, that none at all were so far bound by virtue of it, as to endeavour any alteration or change of Government: so that your exception here, If it have any weight, it is impertinent and ill placed. 5. But seeing I must be assaulted with Mr. Crostons' authority. give me leave to oppose it, with Authority as valid, I hope, without any disparagement to him, in your own apprehensions: it is that Reverend Casuist Bishop Sanderson. 6. Bishop Sanderson asserts, that it is essential to an Oath to be personal; and consequently, that there is no such thing as Juramentum real, such a Real Oath as you have pretended. 7. Non tantùm (inquit ille vir Magnus) tenetùr Haeres vi Juramenti defuncto praestiti. It a ut si non solverit, injustus tantùm sit, non item perjurus: cujus ratio est, quia Juramentum est vinculum personale, & inducit Obligationem Spiritualem tantùm, etc. At in personalibus nemo ligatur fine proprio consensu. p. 115. 8. Again, he adds, At non potest quis alteri inducere Obligationem nisi ipse quoque volverit, & proinde non potest Actu suo spiritualiter nisi seipsum tantùm— Obligatio Juramenti non transit ad successores, p, 117. 118. nothing can be more plain. 9 Therefore, I must have leave to demand, what Casuist, Author of Note, or Learned Man uninterested in the present Controversy hath used or allowed this distinction, besides Master Croston. Thus his authority is matched; what reasons you hint for it, I proceed to give reason to Answer. 10. You add no reasons in this place, yet because I shall make but one work of it, I shall gather the reasons that serve to this purpose from the other parts of your book where I find them; they are but two, to the best of my Observation, both received from Master Crofton: and I presume the best he hath, for that you improve no other. 11. The first I find upon Case the 14. by way of Expostulation, thus. Was the law of Saul, the Princes of Israel, against the Gibeonites, to be justified? Why should they and all other Conventions of them be bound by the Oath of Joshua, and the Princes with him? 12. The answer is at hand, in the Reverend Bishop's words: Saul, Injustus tantùm sit, non item perjurus. Paul's sin was cruelty and injustice, and not perjury. Not the Oath of Joshua, immediately, but the Law of Righteousness bound Saul to the contrary. 13. If any Obligation lay upon Saul rome Joshua's Oath, it was not formalier, but effectiuè only; not as an Oath, but in the effects of it: which was to preserve and maintain Justice and every man's right; even that right of the Gibeonites which they had obtained, by virtue indeed of their Covenant with Joshua long before. 14. Methinks, it may thus be resembled; a Parliament in England is not obliged; to continue all the Acts of precedent Parliaments, but hath power to alter them as they think fit; yet no Parliament can void an Act of pardon made by any former Parliament. 15. The Reason is, not that one Parliament hath not power to undo what another hath done abstractly considered; but because a Parliament itself may not be unrighteous and do injustice. 16. But, why is it injustice from a Parliament to void an Act of pardon? the Reason seems to be this: An Act of pardon hath its effect the first day of its being, and gives actual Right to every one concerned in the mercy granted; they are actually pardoned, and the offence forgiven and done away. And now, if this pardon should be taken off again, Right is violated and punishment inflicted where there is no Crime. 17. Thus was it in the Case of the Gibeonites; they had received an Act of pardon long before, a Legal restitution to the privileges they enjoyed by virtue of the Oath of Joshua, and the Princes of Israel: and the violation of their Rights, so long after, with the taking away of their lives, by Saul, was iniquity and cruelty in him, and most justly, though severely, punished by the God of Righteousness. 18. This Answer is plainly gathered from the Holy Scripture, whence the Objection itself is framed. 19 The Famine (saith the Lord to David) is for Saul, and for his bloody house, because he slew the Gibeonites, 2 Sam. 21. 11. 20. It is rendered, in several of the Oriental Tongues, House of bloods; and so it is in the Hebrew: it was not perjury but blood filled his house, because he slew the Gibeonites, and broke the Act of Pardon, not the Oath of Joshua formally considered. 21. It is said, that the children of Israel had sworn to them, v. 2. but not Saul: yea the children of Israel in opposition to Saul: the children of Israel had sworn unto them, and Saul sought to slay them in zeal to the children of Israel. Therefore, in the Septuagint, we read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, upon Saul, and upon his house; Injustitia in morte sanguinum ejus pro eo. quod morti. tradidit Gibeonitas, for that he delivered the Gibeonites to death: Injustice, it is not said Perjury, but injustice, and blood is laid upon him and his house, and so severely punished. 22. Secondly, the Covenant was sworn (say you, in Mr. Croftons' words) by those P. 45. Real capacities, Noble Men, Knights, Gentlemen, Citizens, Ministers of the Gospel, and Commons of all sorts, which pass and will pass to our Successors, whilst England is England; and therefore it is Juramentum real, and obligeth the whole Nation for ever. 23. But it is to be remembered, before we conclude so confidently, that though the Proem runs thus, We Noblemen, Barons, Knights, Gentlemen, Citizens, Burgesses, and Ministers of the Gospel, as well as Commons of all sorts, have so Resolved and Determined; yet most Noblemen, Barons, Knights, Citizens, Burgesses, Ministers, and Commons of all sorts, had not thus Resolved and Determined when the Covenant was penned or published. 24. For it was brought from Seotland, and by a few men, at first, a little altered in England, and then, by an Order of some of the Commons, printed and published. 25. Now, if this be to make a Real and National Covenant, three or four private persons may as easily write over these great words, and as easily oblige the whole Nation and Posterity for ever; but this is ridiculous. 26. Again, 'tis certain that many individual Persons, from the King, the Nobles, Barons, Knights, Burgesses, Citizens, Ministers, and Commons of all sorts, never took the Covenant, but ever, as occasion was offered, declared their abhorrency of it. 27. Yea, the Popish, the Milignant, and the Prelatical Parties, which certainly were then no mean part of the Nation, if not the greatest, are supposed in the Covenant itself to be enemies to it, and are, indeed, sworn against it. And are these obliged by the same Covenant, and their Posterities after them? Are they sworn to oppose and destroy themselves? You will not say it. 28. Again, if these words can create a Real Covenant in your sense, not only Scotland, who framed it, and England, who knew not of it for the most part till it was taken, but Ireland too, and its Posterity, are obliged by it; and all the Rebels there are taken into Confederation, and thousands of people there, that never saw it, or perhaps never heard so much as that there was any such thing in the world for divers years after this their pretended Obligation by it. 29. Truly I thought the Covenanting Party would not have entered into so Solemn a League with a Prelatical, Malignant Party, much less with Papists, and Irish Rebels; yet such is the consequence of your Notion of a Real Covenant. 30. Moreover, this Argument is confuted in the very Proem of the Covenant itself, so plainly and evidently, that I must needs wonder that so many quick and perceiving eyes should not have discovered it: Wherein it saith (speaking of the form and manner of giving and taking the Covenant) wherein we all subscribe, (therefore, no more do take the Covenant then do subscribe it) and beyond all contradiction adds, [and each one of us for himself] then no one for another, much less for so many thousands as your Real Notion would infer. 31. Therefore the pressers of the Covenant durst not trust your Logic, but would have not only Parents, but their Children; not only Masters, but Servants; not only Tutors, but Pupils, and such as were under the tuition of others, to subscribe for themselves, according to the phrase, Every one for himself. 32. But, to conclude, if it be against the very Nature and Essence of an Oath to be any more than personal, to bind succession or posterity, or to be National and Real, as you pretend; alas! what can words do more then to make a noise, to trouble men's minds, and to beget trouble in the Church by needless Disputation? But that it is so, I hope our Casuist (whom yourselves and all men else admire) hath put it out of doubt, to your full satisfaction. SECT. 3. Of the capacity of all Covenanters. 1. THe third Principle which you intimate I take for granted, is, That all Persons that took the Covenant are in the same capacity with ourselves. You say, you cannot yield unto it. 2. I have laboured to find out your meaning, and cannot discover any thing, but the exception of the single person, that you can stand upon. 3. But if you please to review what I said from pag. 93. to pag. 97. you will see your oversight, and grant that I did not take it for granted. 4. And until you give Answer to the reason there offered, as also in some other places of my Book, I think I am not at all concerned to trouble you further about it, but shall now take up my shield, and appear in defence of my particular Arguments. CASE VIII. Whether to endeavour to alter the Government of the Church be against the Right of the King. CASE IX. Whether to violate the Kings Right be not sinful. 1. YOu well observe, that these two Cases contain my first Argument, to prove the matter of the Covenant, sinful. My major Proposition, you say, is determined in the second of these Cases: This you grant, in Mr. Crofton's words. The proper and adequate Act of Justice is Jus suum cuique; the Authority, Power, and Liberty of King, Parliament, and People. 2. The minor then contained in the first of these Cases is the thing in Controversy, viz. whether the Covenant engaging against the Government of the Church, or to endeavour to extirpate the same, do not violate the Kings Right. 3. This I affirm; for by such Endeavours the King is injured, first, as he is the Executor of the Law, and in all Causes and over all Persons Ecclesiastical Supreme Governor, both with respect to his Officers and to his Government; secondly, as Legislator. SECT. 1. Of the Kings Right as Supreme Executor of the Laws. 1. I Do still affirm, That the King is the Supreme Executor of the Law, and all inferior Officers are his Commissioners, to execute that Government under him, in which he is alone the Supreme Governor, as we swear him to be in Church and State; for, Reges sa●ro oleo uncti faut capaces spiritualis Ju●isdictionis. 2. Now, I say, take away the Body of Governors, and the Head must fall; and if all inferiors be removed, where will the Supreme be? 3. For Answer hereunto you only desire my clear Answer to two Inquiries. The first of your Queries is in these words: 4. Are Ecclesiastical Officers essential to the Regality of the King? 5. To this I return my clear Answer; No. Yet they are plainly essential to his being a Supreme Governor in all Causes and over all Persons Ecclesiastical. 6. Supreme doth necessarily suppose and respect Inferiors; and Supreme Governor Inferior Governors. 7. Your second Query is this: Are these specifical Commissioners essential to the King's Regality; that Archbishops, Bishops, etc. taken away the head must needs fall? 8. To this, I hope I may clearly Answer, that the removing of the inferior Governors hath a Natural tendency to the falling of the Head, as such, that is the Head of them, or the Supreme; but hath no natural ordination to the substitution of other kind of Governors. 9 There is nothing in the pulling down of the walls that goeth into the support of the roof; nothing in pulling down Archbishops and Bishops, etc. that serves to uphold the Supremacy of the King in governing the Church, but to destroy it, as the twenty years' experience past doth sadly demonstrate. SECT. 2. Of the Kings Right in the Government of the Church. 1. THe second Medium I use to prove, that endeavours to extirpate Episcopal Government you observe to be this; that thus to endeavour is not only against the Kings Right as Executor of the Laws, by opposing and seeking to destroy his Commissioners, but his very government itself; and this is the express sense of the Covenanters, that according to the Covenant they are bound in the whole course of their lives against that Government which they know is the King's Ecclesiastical Government. 2. This you grant: only you say the Covenanters do not mean such endeavours as I mention: Again, you plead that some others deny the Government of the Church to be the King's Government, because they find it not established by the Laws of the Land, whereof it is his Right to be Executor, and this is all you say; only touching these things here, you refer their discussion to their proper places; where I intent, God willing, to meet them again. SECT. 3. Of the Kings Right as Legislator. 1. AGain, you note that I argue, to endeavour the alteration of Church Government is against the Kings Right as Legislator, as the maker, as well as the Executor of the laws, as appears by that sense of the Covenant which the practice of the Covenanters hath put upon it. 2. To this you answer, that the terms do so condition it, that it doth not appear to engage us to endeavour the extirpation of Episcopacy without the King's Consent. 3. Here, I must have leave to remember you, that though it be true the terms of the Covenant which you specify are soft and mild, viz. through the grace of God, in our places and callings; yet there are other expressions visible in it, that do more than seem to exact such proceed as were ve●y inconsistent with our places and callings; or the grace of God, viz. to our power, and with our lives and fortunes. 4. What need was there then of our power, or lives and fortunes, to be exposed in such endeavours, but in opposing the King, and his Army? and how could that possibly be done in the present matter of endeavour to extirpate Prelacy; but by Acting therein without the King's consent, and against his express mind to the contrary. so that take a true measure of the Covenant by all such terms together, as in fair reasoning we must needs do; and it is too too evident that it puts us on endeavours that have no regard to the King's consent at all. 5. Besides, if the true extent of endeavour covenanted be yet in doubt, you would force me to resolve it by that black Comment of the state of things when the Covenant was pressed at first: from the occasion of it, which, as the King sadly observed, was that fatal confederacy with the Scots, for their invading this Kingdom with Arms. The obvious and declared judgement of the Scots, that created it, touching the place and power of public conventions and private persons in such matters. The sudden course which the two Houses took to demolish this Government, (and that by virtue of the Covenant,) and to bring in another. 6. These things I say, soberly considered and pondered upon, methinks should rationally, and satisfactorily Evince to such sober persons as I am Treating with, that endeavour in the sense of the Covenant itself, and the prime Covenanters, doth entrench souly upon the King's Prerogative and Crown; Notwithstanding those other small, saint, and after endeavours with the King to ratify what they had laboured with all their power, in a way of Hostility so long together to do without him, and against his most signal express dissent, so often reiterated. 7. Which little endeavours to procure his consent, I imagine, you would hardly have mentioned, had you had in your mind, that at the same time the King was at lest quasi a prisoner, and was denied by the same persons that treated him the liberty to repair to the place where, according to the Order of the Kingdom, he useth to add his fiat to the making of Laws: I mean the Parliament House. 8. Further, I am loath to remember that even then, when the King (at the I'll of Wight) and his two Houses were nearest to an accommodation; the force of such endeavours as the Covenant exacted provoked them to reply to his Majesty's papers, that they were yet unsatisfied as to an agreement with, and reception of his Majesty, because he would only grant them a suspension of Episcopal-Government for 3. years, and not an eternal extirpation of it, for which they had covenanted: vid. Biblioth. Reg. p. 153. 9 But to return to the Covenant itself; the close of it doth effectually conclude, that in its prime and native intention, it least of all regarded the Consent of the King; and as to any such thing, it was utterly desperate. 10. The words are these: We shall all the days of our lives zealously and constantly continue therein against all opposition, and promote the same according to our power against all lets and impediments whatsoever: and what we are not able ourselves to suppress or over come, we shall reveal and make known, that it may be timely prevented or removed. 11. Now I beseech you to consider; here is a promise to continue in this cause; which refers, no doubt, to the whole or the main matter of the Covenant. Now as the Author of the Covenanters plea observes; the main scope of the Covenant is against Church-Government, to which all other things seem subordinate. Therefore, this same last Article repeats the beads of this common cause, and gins it with Religion; that is the Reformation of Doctrine, Worship and Discipline, and the extirpation of Episcopal Government. The words are this common Cause of Religion, Liberty, and peace of the Kingdoms. 12. Now, in this Cause, observe, They swear to continue zealously and constantly all the days of their lives: and what is the plain sense of that, the King being known to be then in the fields. and in arms against the Covenanters; I say, what can the plain sense be; but that they would continue therein, though the King himself should forbid. Though the King should deny his Assent, and declare his most express Dissent and threats against it, yet they would persist therein all the days of their lives. 13. Yea, though King and Parliament (as is now come to pass) should make Laws against it, they must be zealous and constant in this common Cause: so little regard will the Covenant allow, to this day, to the King's Consent. 14. Yet heed what follows; against all Opposition, and promote the same against all lets and impediments whatsoever; give me leave to say, though this Opposition, these lets and impediments be from the King himself, as you know they were at this very same time▪ This being imposed by the two Houses, and taken by the people; and the King himself in Arms to defend his own and the Church's Government. 15. Pray resolve, where then was the King Consent, or, if the King please, to be understood in the Covenant. 16. Moreover, doth not this Article, which is the close and perfection of the rest, plainly engage to such endeavours as carry opposition too? Be yourselves the judges: the words are, against all opposition; how can you be engaged to endeavour against all opposition, but by opposition? against all opposition, but by opposing all oppositions? even that which the King himself should make, or rather, indeed, did make. 17. Now, how you can oppose the King, or the opposition made by him and his commission, and yet understand his consent in the same matter, I think you will not go about to inform me. 18. Once more, that the endeavours of the Covenant carry force and opposition in them, according to the Grammatical Construction and Logical resolution of the same, appears in that [Power] is engaged to our Power: and Power in order to the suppressing and overcoming the opposers: for it is added, and what we are not able ourselves to suppress, etc. by our own power: and on the other hand, we shall assist and Defend all those that enter into this League and Covenant in the maintaining and pursuing thereof. 19 Which expressions (I should abhor to infer it, did not my Argument force it) do beyond all capacity of Contradiction engage the Covenanters in a party to live and die together in an hostile way of Opposition against the King, and his Armies and Friends, in a pursuit of the ends of the Covenant. 20. Which cannot consist with the places of Subjects, or lawful endeavours; or Possibly suppose the King's consent. 21. I cannot rejoice to conclude, that this meaning of the Covenant was expressed at first, by the prime inventors and contrivers of the Covenant; such words as these you find in a Declaration, called the Declaration of the convention of Estates of the Kingdom of Scotland. 22. To our knowledge, say they, upon swearing and subscribing of this League and Covenant, the opposite Malignant party will rage's and Tumultuate more than ever: and therefore, unless we will either betray our Religion, Liberties and Law, and all that we and ours do possess, and suffer ourselves to be cut off and massacred by the bloody and barbarous cruelty of those our enraged enemies; There is a necessity of taking Arms for mutual defence. 23. Lastly, That the King's Consent was little intended or understood in the Covenant, is yet more manifest, if it be considered, that it was not only made, and published, and pressed, without notice given him, and at such a time too, and condition of affairs, as had served the King from the Covenanting party, but it was still carried on against the King's dislike, and express dissent and prohibition of it, in a timely and solemn Proclamation against it. SECT. 4. Of the King's Proclamation against the Covenant. 1. THe King was pleased, upon the first hearing of the Covenant, published in Print by the Order of the Commons, (which I conceive was sometime before the Order of the Lords and Commons for the tendering and taking of it;) to issue out his Proclamation from his Court at Oxford, entitled, His Majesty's Proclamation, forbidding the tendering and taking of the Covenant, called the solemn League and Covenant for Reformation. 2. The Use of this Proclamation in the present controversy, is twofold. First, it Demonstrates beyond all contradiction, that the intention of the Covenanters did not regard the consent of the King, which runs clearly against the King's Supremacy. Secondly, It renders the Covenant void, even from its creation, before ever it was ordered to be taken. For Datur irritatio Juramenti aliquando per superiores, si in illa ipsa materia s●nt superiores cirea quam Juramentum versatur. 3. Now so far as the Government of the Church cannot be altered but by Law, it is under the power of the King, at least not to alter it: He having a Negative upon both Houses, and the King's Proclamation having denied his Assent thereunto, and proclaimed his prohibition of it, thereby voided it long agone, according to the Rule. 4. A Rule never disputed, grounded evidently upon Scripture and Natural Reason; and indeed I find not, that yourselves do question the Proposition; though I confess you put me to a task that I little expected, by doubting the Assumption. 5. You say, It remaineth upon you a doubt, whether there ever were any such Proclamation; you desire me to help you to a Copy of this Proclamation, and inform you, where to find the Original: Concluding, that the Obligation, without it, cannot be voided. 6. I hope you do hereby intimate, that upon the sight of this Proclamation you will be satisfied, that the Obligation of the Covenant was voided at the first; therefore I am much encouraged to transcribe it, and to inform you where you may find it. 7. It is indeed in Print, in more books than one, of unquestionable credit; particularly, you have it in a Book called, Bibliotheca Regia in terminis, thus, p. 332. 8. Whereas there is a Printed paper, entitled, A solemn League and Covenant for Reformation and defence of Religion, the Honour and happiness of the King, and the Peace and safety of the Kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland: Pretended to be ordered by the Commons in Parliament, on the 21. day of September last, to be Printed and published: which Covenant, though it seems to make specious pretences of Piety and Religion, is in Truth nothing else but a Traitorous and Seditious Combination against us, and the established Religion and Laws of this Kingdom, in pursuance of a Traitorous design and endeavours to bring in Foreign forces to invade this Kingdom: We do therefore straight charge and command all our loving Subjects, of what degree or quality soever, upon their Allegiance, that they presume not to take the said Seditious and Traitorous Covenant. And we do likewise hereby forbid and inhibit all our Subjects to impose, administer or tender the said Covenant, as they and every of them will answer the contrary to their utmost and extremest perils. Given at our Court at Oxon, Oct. 9 in the 19 year of our Reign. 9 If you will cast the Controversy upon the sight of the very Original, I do not despair to effect it for you: provided I may know whom I may pleasure with it, and where; for it is not possible I should print the Original. 10. However, I shall offer you such Evidence, that this is a true copy; that I verily believe ingenuous persons will receive it as next to demonstration. 11. Note first, that the Covenant was ordered to be printed by the Commons, Sep. 21. An. Dom. 1643. This Proclamation is said to be issued, Oct. 9 1643. and I have a learned book by me, called the Anticonfederacy, that was printed the very next year, viz. 1644. that labours to invalidate the said Covenant with the said Proclamation. 12. He does not indeed transcribe the whole Proclamation, as I have done; yet so much of it, and of the most material passages of it, as you cannot choose but know it to be the same; and to say, that he should feign such parts of a Proclamation, at such a time as that; or that the King should not be as quick to proclaim against the Covenant, as he had been a little before against the Assembly of Divines, June 22. 1663. are both unreasonable and ridiculous to any sober man. 13. The words of that book mentioned are these; The true scope and aim of this League (speaking of the Covenant) as it is declared by our most gracious King, (and we cannot receive it from a better hand,) is in pursuance of a Traitorous design and endeavour to bring in Foreign Forces to invade this Kingdom: and is therefore by his Majesty justly sentenced; notwithstanding its specious expressions of Piety and Religion, to be nothing else in Truth, but a Traitorous and seditious Combination against him, and against the established Religion ●nd Laws of this Kingdom, which are the very words of the Proclamation itself. 14. I hope you will now no longer doubt, whether there were indeed any such Proclamation, or whether it be of force to void the Covenant. 15. You say, you allow that Rule of Ames; datur irritatio aliquando per superiores: but you note it must be, si in illa ipsa materia sint superiores circa qua●●ersatur Juramentum. 16. But let me recommend it to your second thoughts, whether endeavour simply considered, or endeavour with its object, extirpation of Prelacy, be the matter of the Covenant, and whether the King in this very matter of extirpation of Prelacy, or endeavours to do it, be not allowed to be our Superior. 17. Admit, there were a Covenant taken by private persons, to Endeavor to bring in foreign forces; endeavour indeed is to every man, sui juris; but that this endeavour, and consequently, such a Covenant, is not in a matter subordinate to the King, I think you will not dispute. 18. Lastly, you seem to wonder that I make it a Problem, whether supposing the Proclamation had voided the Covenant at first, the King's after-consent could revive it. 19 If you understand my words, with respect to the first engagement actually made and voided by the Proclamation; I think yopu need not much wonder if I should have affirmed, whereas I only quaeried, Whether the same Act, made void could be made in force again? I am not afraid to write over the words once more: I think it may well be a Problem, Whether the King's after-consent could revive it, if it had indeed been dead and buried sop many years before? 20. For the Covenant being voided by the Kings protest against it, and the Parliament dissolved that promoted it, I think you would wonder more at it if I should affirm, That the King hath power, without a Bill to that purpose from the two Houses, by His own single Act to revive a matter of so high a nature to His Subjects, so long time after. CASE X. Whether the Covenant to endeavour the Extirpation of Episcopacy be against the Laws, and consequently sinful. 1. I Proceed to argue, That seeing the standing Laws of the Land are the express and fixed consent of the King and Supreme Authority, and this extirpation of Prelacy cannot be effected but by offering violence to the Laws of the Land, which cannot be lawfully done without the Consent and Act of the King and supreme Authority; it is sinful to swear to endeavour it, without submission to their will and pleashres. 2. This is evident by the former Arguments, by the rules of all Casuists, and particularly of Mr. Perkins, who conckludes, That a Covenant taken against the Laws of the Land is void of itself. 3. To apply this Argument to our Case, I observe, The great Objection of Mr. Crofton, the Covenanters-Plea, and you, my Surveyors, is this, That Episcopal Government is not established by Law in England. 4. This Objection I labour, first, to avoid by a distinction in general; and then I argue the point particularly, That this Government is established by Law in England. 5. My distinction is this: We may endeavour against the Laws, and swear accordingly, two ways; either when the thing we swear against is expressly established by plain Law, or when the thing we swear against cannot be abolished without the abolition or alteration of Law. Hence I argue, That admit there were no express Law appointing this Form of Government sworn against, yet how doth this clear the Covenanters from swearing against Law, when they swear to extirpate that Government which cannot be extirpated without the alteration of many Laws. So that this evasion, I think, is perfectly obstructed. 6. All that you answer is leveled against this distinction; you ask, Is it against Law to endeavour the alteration, yea the abrogation of some Laws and things thereby established? 7. Now I beseech you consider, whether you have any thing at all in these words to enervate or avoid my distinction, or to render it poor as well as plain, as you seem to glory; notwithstanding your confidence, your ingenuity shall judge betwixt us. 8. Consider therefore the end for which I proposed it, and you will confess you have not evaded it; was it not in express terms to obstruct the Objection of Mr. Crofton, and the Author of the Covenanters Plea, viz. That Episcopal Government is not established by Law; to which I said, That it is all one whether it be established by express Law, or cannot be abolished without the alteration of Law: Now to this use of my distinction you have yet answered nothing at all. 9 Besides, in your Querie, Whether it be against Law to endeavour to abrogate Law? Unless you discover a double meaning in acting against Law, you contradict yourselves; and if you do discover it, you also discover a plain way for me to escape your Answer, and to defend and justify my plain distinction. 10. Surely to endeavour the abolition or destruction of Law, is to endeavour against Law. Now if you affirm, That it is not against Law thus to endeavour, what remains, but that this term [against Law] in one Proposition hath not the same sense with [against Law] in the other; and there are four terms in the Argument, and nothing concluded, as yet, against my plain distinction. 11. Give me leave to be plain, and the sum is this; It is not against Law, that is, it is not unlawful to endeavour against Law; therefore, to endeavour against Law is not to endeavour against Law; and then my distinction of endeavouring against that which is established by Law, or against that which cannot be abolished without the alteration or abolition of Law, is a poor distinction. 12. But you call me off to prove, That such an endeavour to extirpate Church-Government as was Covenant-ed, was against the Law, both antecedent to the Covenant, and subsequent; this done, you say, would much avail; but you expect my evidence. CASE XI. Whether the present Church-Government was established by Law before the Covenant was taken? THe sum of what I said upon the Resolution of this Case is reducible to three heads. SECT. 1. Church-Government is fixed by Law. 1. First, there is no need that we prove the Government to be established by Law in such a manner as the Covenanters seek for, while we find it beyond all controversy, that this Form is legal, and established in the Laws, though no express Statute should be found appointing it; and it is so much allowed, so far fixed and established by the Laws, that he that shall any way engage against it doth so far engage against known Law. 2. Now until this be questioned, to what end do we trouble ourselves any further? All that is more than this is exubundanti, and hath no necessary place left in the Argument. 3. Yet of this, whereon the very hinge of the Controverfie turns, you have spared the pains to take any notice at all. SECT. 2. The Original of Prelacy is not to be sought in Law. 1. IN the second place I intimated, that it seems to me unreasonable to expect such proof, That the Government of the Church should be established by Law in such a manner as you seek for, That it should have its Original Establishment in Law. 2. For before, and at the first making of Christian Laws in this Kingdom, this Government was found existing; and to have first destroyed this Government, and then again to have established the same by Law, would have been plainly ridiculous; which yet must have been done, in order to such an establishment as you require proof of. 3. It is acknowledged by Mr. Fox, Act. Mon. Tom. 1. pag. 148. that in Elutherius his time An. Dom. 180. when this Realm was first converted to Christianity, there were appointed in the same three Archbishops and twenty eight Bishops; and since that time the Government of the Church by Archbishops, Bishops, etc. hath been further established by Magna Charta, which hath been confirmed above 30 times by Parliament; and by the Statute called Confirmatio Chartarum, still in force, it was ordained, that all Laws contrary to that Charter should be void; and that Bishops, twice every year, should excommunicate all that did, either do or advise contrary to it. 4. The Government of the Church was at first founded in Prelacy; therefore so far as we are a Christian Nation, and governed by Christian Laws, Episcopal Government goes into our foundation. 5. I mean only it is so of the foundation, as to be from and in the beginning of Church-Government and Christian Laws among us: I do not say, so of the foundation as to be unalterable, yet others do; however, it is not yet actually altered, and that is as much as the Argument requires, and to warrant that expression which I thought augmentative, though you pass it by unnoted, viz. that there is the less reason to expect that the Power, Office, or Government of Bishops should have their origin from the Laws of the Land, or that the Child should beget the Father. SECT. 3. Church-Government is established by Law. 1. THirdly, I laboured to prove, that so far as a Government, that was prae-existing before the Laws concerning it, could be reasonably expected to be established by Law, the present Church-Government is established by Law: For, 2. First, the Laws of this Land, since they were Christian, have ever allowed it and taken it for granted (as having its foundation sufficiently laid before) upon all occasions; not only by those special Laws that particularly relate unto it, but indeed in every Law which expresseth the Consent of the Lords Spiritual. 3. Here you only catch at the weakest part about the Consent of the Lords Spiritual to the Acts of Parliament, leaving the strength of the Argument grounded in those many special Laws which relate to this Government, and apparently allow and continue it, without any exception or observation. 4. Yet I am not at all satisfied that the allowance and recording of their Consent to every Law, by the King, Peers, and Commons, is not a plain acknowledgement of Episcopal Power and Government. 5. Secondly, I affirm, That the present Government is established by Law, though not in its Office which was before the Law, yet in its Political Power, and the Exercise of it, in this Kingdom. 6. Therefore the several Legal Names of Prelatical Governors, with their distinct Jurisdictions, and the Crimes punishable by them, and the Authority allowed so to punish, and the Fees of their Courts, and the Form and Manner of Consecrating Bishops are found and founded in the Laws of the Land. 7. In your Recital of this Argument you only mention the Exercise of this Government, and take no notice of its Political Power given by Law; and therefore your Answer is short. 8. But that this Political Power of Ecclesiastical Governors is settled and authorized by the Laws of the Land is most evident in that of the 24 Hen. 8. c. 12. & Eliz. An. 1. 2. 9 By 24 Hen. 8. c. 12. Jurisdiction touching Matrimony, Wills, Tithes, Oblations, etc. is expressly given them; and it is added, that all such Spiritual Causes shall be from henceforth heard, examined, discussed, and clearly, finally and definitively adjudged and determined within the King's Jurisdiction and Authority, and not elsewhere, in such Courts Spiritual and Temporal of the same as the natures of the Causes shall require. 10. Note, That if the Temporal Courts have any Authority given them by this Statute, so also have the Spiritual; they are joined together; such Courts Spiritual and Temporal. 11. The point of Appeals is also established by the said Statute; and Bishops are expressy authorized to receive Appeals from Arch-Deacons Courts; and the Arch-Bishops from the Bishops, with Authority hereby given them, or established in them, to put a final end to all such Controversies. You may read though Statute at large. 12. Yet, I conceive, that of Eliz. 1. c. 2. is more precise to our purpose, Where it is Ordained and Enacted, that all and singular Archbishops and Bishops, and every of their Chancellors, Commissaries, Archdeacon's, and other Ordinaries, having any peculiar Ecclesiastiel Jurisdiction, shall have full Power and Authority by Virtue of this Act, as well to inquire in their Visitations, Synods and elsewhere, to take Accusations and Informations of all and every the things above mentioned within the Limits of their Jurisdiction; and to punish the same by Admonition, Excommunication, Sequestratien, or Deprivation, and other Censures and Process, in like Form as heretof over hath been used in like Cases by the Queen's Ecclesiastical Laws. 13. Here, we cannot but see, not only the legal Names of Ecclesiastical Governors, mentioned; but their political Power and Authority allowed, yea, formally invested and established in them to inquire, and to punish. To punish with Admonition, Excommunication, Sequestration and Deprivation, and all this by Virtue of this Act. 14. Had we nothing more to prove Episcopal Government to be established by law, but this very Statute, I cannot apprehend but that the work is done, and all Objections to the contrary for ever superseded. 15. Is here only a liberty to exercise a power given them? is it not express, that Power and Authority is also given them? 'Tis not declared, that they have Power and Authority by Virtue of their Office, or any other way; but it is enacted that they have Power and Authority to inquire and punish, etc. by Virtue of this very Act. 16. Yea, though it is intimated, that the same Course had been used formerly; it is not enacted only, that this shall continue; but as if such a kind of Objection had been in prospect; it is enacted, that by Virtue of this Statute all these Ecclesiastical, Governors shall have full Power and Authority to proceed in like Form as heretofore bathe been used in like cases by the Queen's Ecclesiastical laws. 17. While I read the Statute so express and punctual in the Case, I know you will not blame me, if I wonder at your so frequent comparing the Government of the Church with Usury, and her Governors with Usurers. 18 I do not know of any Statute that gives so much countenance to Usury and Usurers, as to say, be it enacted that power and Authority be given to Usurers, or that makes them a politic body, and invests them with Government over so much as their own Tribe, and in Cases peculiar to their own way, abuses and faults of Usury: Do not reflect so unbeseemingly. 19 Thirdly, I affirm, that should we yield unto you that there is no express Statute immediately Authorising Ecclesiastical Governors; yet immediately it it cannot be denied, to be established by Law: I mean such Law as empowers the King to Commission and Authorise the Governors in the Church. 20. That the King hath such a power in him is manifest from the Oath of Supremacy. For being supreme Governor in all causes Ecclesiastical, he is so over all persons Ecclesiastical, as to Commissionate all his inferior Governors; therefore, they all, either mediately or immediately, receive their Commissions from him; which is, no doubt, Legal, in the Judgement of all that understand these Protestant Laws, that revolve the power usurped by the Pope, upon Henry the Eighth, and all his successors, in the Crown of England for ever. v. 26. Hen. 8. c. 1. & Eliz. 1. where you read thus: 21. All Jurisdictions heretofore lawfully exercised by any Ecclesiastical power or Authority for Visitation, Reformation, etc. are united and annexed to the imperial Crown of this Realm: and that your Highness, your Heirs and Successors, shall have full power and Authority, by virtue of this Act, by Letters Patents under the great Seal of England to Assign, Name, and Authorise persons to exercise all manner of Jurisdictions, and to Visit, Reform, Redress, etc. 22. Your Answer is, this at most concludes but for the Governors, and not for the Frame of Government. 23. But do you not hereby grant as much as my Argument needs? For if the Governors of the Church are Authorized by Law; you owe them Obedience, and the Law in them; and your Covenant provokes you to disobedience. 24. Again, How can all the Governors be Authorized by Law, and not the Frame of Government too? He that by Law Commissionates all the Governors, doth he not thereby establish the Frame of Government? 25. Yea, where will you look for the Frame of Government, but in the Seat of Governors, and that according to the Covenant itself? You there engage against Prelacy; that is the Government of the Church by Arch-Bishops. etc. Viz. the several Governors of it. 26. You add the King's Supremacy may exist in, and operate by other Church Covernours, as well as these. 27. I answer easily; that admit what you say, yet as no other sort of Governors can be Legally so, until the King Commissionate them as he hath done these; so this kind, viz. Episcopal Government, must of necessity continue to be Legal, until the King shall Commissionate others of another Method; or at least withdraw his Commission from these in the present form of Church-Government; if he hath power to do it by Law. 28. Lastly, I urge you, that this Government is plainly established by Common Law. 29. To this you say, that Prescription is a poor Fence to Usurpation; Usury hath prescription. 30. But how doth it appear that the present Government is an Usurpation: so weighty a charge deserves proof. 31. Church Governors are the King's Ecclesiastical Officers; they have their power and authority to Govern, given them by Act of Parliament: this appears, but that their Government is Usurpation, appears not. 32. To make good your charge, two things require proof. First, that Episcopal Covernment was an Usurpation at first. Secondly, that it is so still, and that it hath not obtained a good Title in law, all this while. The Statutes now mentioned prove the present Title of it. And Magna Charta is a sufficient Evidence, that so long agone it had Legal Authority, and was no Usurpation. 33. I rather mention Magna Charta here, because, it is accounted Common Law, and adds much strength to my Argument thence, and from long continuance: Especially, seeing there is much for the Church and Bishops, but nothing for Usurers and Usury to be found in it. 34. The Plea, that Magna Charta is in behalf of the Abhots at well as Bishops hath nothing at all against us. For Abbots were since abolished by law, so were not Bishops. We are not arguing that nothing confirmed by Magna Charta can be lawfully altered: but that Episcopal Government confirmed by Magna Charta is established by that Law, and not removed by any other. 35. Yea, this Objection answers it self, and all the rest of its Company; and yields us an Argument that might pass for an Instar omnium. Abbots and Bishops were both confirmed by the Law of this Land. Abbot's are removed by Law and not Bishops; and in the Law, exceptio firmat Regulam in non exceptis; and therefore the Law that removed the Abbots, did establish the Bishops: and thus Episcopacy is established by Law. 36. But are there not State-Officers that had not their original in the Statute-Laws, but only in the Common-Law of this Land, (as hundred-Constables and Crownets, etc.) will any say, that these are not established by law? These were before the known written statute Laws, and so were Bishops in England before any Christian Laws. 37. Indeed, methinks, the very Concessions of yourselves, Mr. Crofton, yea and of the two Houses of the Long Parliament, is as much as my Argument and the Government of the Church can stand in need of. 38. You grant in one place of your P. 28. 19 Book, your selves, that the Government of the Church by Prelacy, is not only limited, restrained, regulated, but directed; yea, in some things authorized by the King's Laws. I think you will hardly say Usury is so; or that any thing Authorized by law can be destroyed, but by law: And that sufficeth my Argument. 39 Again, methinks, Mr. Crofton decides the Controversy against himself in his Berith. Anti-Baal. p. 25. There he chargeth the late Bishop of Exon, because he pleaded for the Jus Divinuin of Episcopacy, that he did confront King and Parliament in what all their Statutes declare to be their own creature and constitution even from the Statutes of Carlisle, and the 25. of Ed. 3. declaring against the Pope, that Holy Church was founded in Prelacy by their own Donation, Power and Authority. 40. Now, I conceive, this was never said of Usury, or indeed, of any thing▪ not established by Law. For how is this Donation, Power and Authority, put forth in framing this Creature and Constitution of Parliaments, but in Acts of Parliament, that is, the laws of the land. 41. If there be any doubt, what judgement the two Houses that imposed the Covenant, had touching the Legality of the Government of the Church of England, we are satisfied of that, by their Applications to his Majesty for the extirpation of it, at the I'll of Wight. 42. Their words are these: for the Abolishing of Episcopacy we take leave to say, that it is not the Apostolical Bishop, which the Bill desired of your Majesty, intends to remove; but that Episcopacy formerly was established by law in this Kingdom: Again, only to put down him by law who was set up by law. 43. Note first, that the Long Parliament did not doubt, but that Episcopacy was established by Law. Secondly, that the imposens of the Covenant did extend the sense of the Covenant against that which was established by law. Thirdly, that yet in their own Judgement, that which is set up by law is not to be pulled down without law. These things they saw at last, though their many years practise before had contradicted them, vid. Biblioth. Regi. p. 350. CASE XII. Whether the Covenant can oblige against a Future Law. 1. YOu deny that Episcopal Government hath received any more express Establishment by the Acts of Parliament since the Kings Return, than it had before; but I cannot find, that you say, it hath received no Establishment thereby, only that its establishment is not more express in the new laws, than it was in the Old; but that I need not dispute. 2. The Establishment of Episcopacy was express enough in my judgement before; and if the new laws be found to establish it at all, my Argument is not interrupted. 3. And truly, methinks, after 20. years shaking, and almost Ruinating, we may fairly count the laws, that restore this Government upon its legs again, and not only to its quiet and safety, but to its liberty and power of exercise, should deserve the name of Establishing laws; and the Government be thought to be Established by them, though it stand upon au elder Bottom, which I never denied. 4. Besides, for a law so far to encourage and Countenance of Government that was trodden under foot so long together, as to punish all kind of disobedience to it, is plainly to re-establish the same. 5. I might add, we see the King, according to law and his own Supremacy, hath filled the Church again with all the several sorts of Ecclesiastical Officers, and hath set again the whole Frame of Government in the very terms of the Conant over us: and thus the Government is Established by law, diametrically against the Covenant: and then surely the Engagement of the Covenant is as opposite to the law as it is to Episcopacy. 6. Consequently, whether the Act of Uniformity doth precisely prohibit Endeavours against this Government, or not, (upon which Argument I cannot but acknowledge you are very ingenuous. Other laws require obedience to it, that were indeed made of old, but are now renewed and reinforced by these new laws. 7. Therefore, the Covenant cannot oblige us against this Government, but it doth equally oblige us against these new laws: which to do, I have at large proved to be sinful, and you have said nothing at all to disparage my Arguments. 8. You intimate, your labour is saved in that point; and you need not discuss how far an Oath may bind against law. But truly, to me this seems to be your proper work; and that you have questioned the wrong Proposition all this while. I cannot satisfy myself, that what ever you pretend, that you doubt the legality of Episcopal Government. 9 The Exceptions of the Antagonists you mention are answered before: and I have no more to do upon this Case, but to note one Expression of your own in the close of it. 10. You seem to fear Atheism, in that which only serves to Vindicate God against our selves. His Authority in his Sovereign pre-obligations upon us, against and after-Obligations contracted by our selves, though by way of Oath and Covenant to the contrary. 11. I cannot but believe that God's preobligation upon us, to obey Authority in lawful things, is so firm and indissoluble, that no Covenant of ours to the contrary can make those things unlawful, or warrant disobedience therein. 12. This I assert, though our Covenant precede the laws, requiring such lawful things, which needs must pass with abundant Evidence; If these after-laws, as you affirm, do only revive and reinforce those Ancient laws that had obliged us to the same things before we Covenanted to the contrary. 13. Now this methinks, should have more Piety to God shining in it, upon the eyes of such as read and consider, then to be capable of the suspicion of Atheism, or Irreligion, though I charge not the contrary with what you fear, Treason or Sedition. 14. There is nothing said by you on the thirteenth and fourteenth Cases that doth not either consent with me, or is not answered already. I pass to the fifteenth Case. CASE XV. Touching the word [Endeavour] and the sense and force of it in the Covenant and in the Act. 1. TOuching the word [Endeavour] I conceive you aught to have sweat more; for though you find much fault with my endeavours about it, yet I can find very little correction or amendment. 2. I cannot think it my task to deal with you as Censors, but as Disputants; or to answer your passion, but your reason; now the sum of what you say rationally hereupon is shortly this, That [endeavour] is general and indefinite both in the Act, and in the Covenant; and that endeavour is sui juris to the meanest Subject. 3. And this you repeat only as the sense of the Covenanters., without any Answer to the Argumentative part of my Discourse, which I cannot but mind you was your proper concern. 4. Indeed you chide me with some heat, that I had not given you any Etymology, acception, or interpretation of the word [endeavour]; but if you measure the success of your own attempt therein, you will easily excuse my omission of it. 5. For what degree of advantage hath accrued to your selves, your Cause, or your Reader, by your Latin, Greek, and Hebrew rendition of the word endeavour? yea, yourselves had just before intimated, that the English word [endeavour] is a word easy and plain to be understood; neither have you better explained it by its Latin, Greek, or Hebrew, or by any Etymology or Acception at all, more than I had done. 6. I confess you say something as to the Interpretation of it; and so, I think, I did, beyond what you take notice of in your Survey, which provokes me to trouble you with a Review. SECT. 1. Endeavour is distinguished. 1. YOu note (I say not with a black character) that I assign some special Acts by which endeavour may operate; but to assert, that endeavour may be either private or public: and these less or more public; and to add explications and instances of all these (as you know I did) is doubtless more than only to pitch on some special acts of endeavou? for thus you have the kinds and the modification, as well as the acts or operations of it. 2. Moreover, you know I gave you the application of them also: I say, first, That though in a general and unusual sense our private Prayers to God may chance to called endeavours, yet they are not so, either properly, or in any usual way of speaking, by the Covenanters themselves, nor to be presumed to be struck at, in the Act, by the Magistrate, who Governs Kingdoms and not Closets. 3. Again, I offer, That it is hard to assign any other kind of endeavour (if private Prayer be any) for the extirpation of Government that is pure and simple, and without all tincture of Sedition and Danger to the public; or if there should be any such found, I humbly conceived the Civil Magistrate cannot be Rationally thought to intent them in the Act, there being no danger in them, and the Nature of them not properly under his Cognisance. 4. Now, my Brethren, judge whether it had not been fair for you, upon this notable nick of Controversy, to have entered into a clear Debate of these things? did it not become you, either to show the Defect of my Enumeration, or at least, to evince that some of the ways of endeavour; by me pretended to be unlawful, to be good, just and lawful, and in our own power? and then to have convinced us, that some of those lawful endeavours are such as are plainly intended by the Act of Parliament? this, I presume, was your work. 5. Indeed, skipping over what is nearest, you say, you will go to the utmost: and here you demand, is it not possible for those very Acts, which bear in my eyes the worst Aspect, to become lawful endeavours? 6. But, my Brethren, is there no difference betwixt what is so, and what may become so? that which is possible only, is not so much as future much less present. It is certain, What may be therefore is not: and when it is affirmed, that such a thing may become lawful, it is thereby granted, that that thing is now not Lawful. 7. To affirm therefore that such Endeavours may become lawful, is to condemn them as unlawful at present: and consequently, that we cannot be bound unto them by the Covenant. Now observe it, you are not required to declare that there never may, but for the present, there now lieth: or in the present tense there lieth no Obligation upon us thereunto. SECT. 2. Of the Acts of Endeavour justified by my Brethren. 1. GIve me leave also to come to the utmost with you; my Brethren; and to ask you, what those endeavours or acts of endeavour are that you insist on: I mean, that not only may become lawful, but are so, as a present Bar against your Subscription. 2. You seem to grant, that for a Minister to preach, a Lawyer to plead, and the Soldier to fight against Episcopacy, are at present unlawful; for these, you say, may become lawful. If you indeed think there are any such as are square to Rule, in all points justifiable and lawful, it is much you named them not; without this you have done nothing: In generalibus latet dolus; and the word Endèavour is but a . 3. Is it not safe to mention them? however, it is duty and necessary; but surely that cannot be the reason, seeing you began with so much confidence in the English Genius; and have found out ways to insinuate things more obnoxious. 4. Therefore, though in this most fit and proper place you do it not, yet in another you make my Antagonists to serve the turn. In p. 28. I find these words: The Covenanters (say you) will tell me, there are Acts of Endeavour for Extirpation other then what I mention; such as Theological disputation, submiss supplication, popular groans, or complaints of grievances, by and under it, which are consistent with submission to it while existent. 5. My Brethren, I must needs acknowledge, I took great Content and satisfaction to myself from these words; not doubting but you knew how to express our Covenanting brethren's minds, in the point, and that you do it truly. 6. Their Judgement soberly, it seems is this; They hold themselves bound by the Covenant to Endeavour to extirpate Episcopal Government, by no means that are inconsistent with submission to it, whiles existent. 7. This I look upon as a very great Concession from the rigour of former Principles and Practices; and a fair step to a good agreement betwixt us which the Good Lord prosper. 8. For, hereby, you seem to grant 3. things of no small concern in the Controversy. 1. That they can submit unto Episcopal Government, notwithstanding the Covenant: That is, I presume, they can Act under it in several places, and obey it in things lawful: otherwise, they do not submit unto it, as a Government. 2. Therefore, they grant, that Episcopal Government is not an unlawful Government, or sinful of itself, or by the Word of God; otherwise, I believe you would not so far own it, as to obey it, or submit unto it. 3. That if they can find out no such Endeavours against this Government, intended by the Act, as are consistent with submission to it while existent, and liable to no other just exception, we are agreed. For than you may declare there lies no Obligation to such Endeavours as are not; de non ente non est Obligatio. 9 Now, we are so near; suffer me to reach you with a word or two of serious advice, that you would bestow a few thoughts upon the following inquiries. 1. Whether, if the Government of the Church be not sinful, by the Word of God, it be not necessary to us, by the laws of the land, the Oath of Supremacy, and secundariò, by the Laws of God? 2. Hereupon, it is further worthy our inquiry, what Endeavours to extirpate this Government thus necessary are sui Juris to every Subject? I do not say to Reform, but to extirpate it. 3. Thirdly, Admitting the Moderate sense of some Covenanters, that the Covenant doth not intent an Extirpation, but a Regulation of this Government; whether the Declaration be not reconcilable with the Obligation hereunto: seeing there we declare that we are not, obliged to change or alter, not to reform this Government. 4. Lastly, take the sense of the Object how you please, it may be queried, whether you have not done your endeavour? after so long and strenuous Endeavours against it almost 20 years before, and several years since the happy Restauration; we find the King, the Peers and People of England in Parliament, have sufficiently declared, that it shall not be extirpated? So that, to reason, there now appears no further hope of effecting our endeavours; and consequently the Obligation thereunto ceaseth, by the Rule, Nemo Tenetur odd impossibile. 10. Pardon this digression so fairly occasioned; and I now hasten to examine those several Acts of Endeavour. which you have, in the Name of the Covenanters, proposed and Judged to be lawful. Theological disputation; submiss supplication; popular groans, and complaints of grievantes by and under it; of them in Order. SECT. 3. Of Endeavour by popular groans and complaints. 1. IN order to a true Judgement of the lawfulness of these Acts of Endeavour, let us take a glance of the objects of them as you have proposed it; you do not say the Government itself, but grievances by and under it. 2. First, then, for grievances under it, they may be redressed, without the utter Extirpation of the Government itself. 3. Again, we are not required to declare that we are not bound to endeavour to remove them; it is a change of Government, in the Act, and Extirpation, you say in the Covenant, and notes a Reformation, or Redress of grievances only. 4. Secondly, for grievances by it, I Ask, whether you intent such grievances as flow from the Nature, or such only, as happen upon the abuse or Maladministration of this Government: if you say, such as flow from the Nature of it, than you must prove Episcopal Government to be evil in Se.; which I think you will not undertake; but if such as flow from Abuse only, you are not held from Endeavouring against them. 5. If you yet doubt, whether you may not Endeavor against the Government itself, let us proceed to Examine particularly the Acts of Endeavour specified by you: Disputation, supplication, groans, or complaints. 6. For the last sort, groans, and complaints, I cannot understand, how these can be provoked, but where there is burden and grievance to be groaned under, or complained of. 7. That the Government itself is so, you do not say, much less evince: if it be found so, by Maladministration, Complain for me, and spare not; so you do it regularly, and not tumultuously. 8. Yet, I must needs observe, that groans and complaints under a Government must carry sedition in the manner of them, or else they cannot, properly, or without very much straining, be called acts of Endeavor for the extirpation of it. SECT. 4. Of Endeavour by disputations. 1. A Second sort of Acts of Endeavour, specified by you, are Theological Disputations; but these, Neither, are Endeavours properly and directly so called, as to the end intended. 2. For in such Disputations, who knows not, but, as Opponents, we may dispute for Popery, or any other Heresy: by such ventilation, the truth believed in the Church of England, is intended to be vindicated, and not destroyed. 3. Neither are such disputations any Motion towards the Extirpation of Episcopacy, with the persons that have power to do it: seeing our Governors receive no Applications or Impressions by them. 4. Neither, is it the proper Intention of such Scholastic Disputations, to work upon our Governors to that end, who are no way concerned to take notice of them. 5. Yet, admit they were: let me beseech you to propose after what manner these public Disputations are to be managed, as Endeavours for this end. 6. Consider, what will you dispute against? the Lawfulness of the Government? I am confident you do not believe it to be unlawful; either, by the Word of God, or the Laws of the Land; for you say, you bear affection to Episcopacy, yea, such affection to it, as that you would have passed by the Object of this Covenanted Act. 7. Give me leave again; what will you dispute for? the Extirpation of Episcopacy? how can this Consist with your Affection to it? or what Arguments, what weapons, will your Affection to it strike it with, to Ruin and destroy it? 8. Besides, when such Disputation appears to design and endeavour the Extirpation of the King's Ecclesiastical Government, who see's not Manifest Sedition in it? to say no Worse. 9 Especially, when the Supreme Government hath openly and freshly, even just now, declared Their Will to the Contrary, by Restoring this Government, in all its Officers, to it's former Authority and Privileges against all Endeavours for its Extirpation. Lastly, would you dispute only for a Reformation of it: this is not a change or Extirpation: and not concerned in the Declaration, as I have often noted. 13. But you are ready to say, there is a Submiss Supplication: and this is properly Endeavour, and sui Juris to every Subject. 11. Upon both these branches I must demur a little; for indeed, here lies the stress of this Controversy, and the strength Samson; but it must be better proved, 1. That Petition is Properly Endeavour, and in the sense of the Act: and 2. That Petition to Extirpate Government is sui Juris to every Subject. I shall Examine them distinctly and seriously: for if either of these fail, your hair is off. SECT. 5. Whether to Petition be to Endeavour properly, and in the Act. 1. I Cannot so easily grant it, as you take it for granted, that to Petition another to do a thing is to endeavour to do it. 2. We know, that Petition or prayer to God is Ordinarily distinguished from Our own Endeavours for the same thing we pray for. 3. Neither, is there more reason to confound our Petitions or prayers to such men, as are called Gods, with our Own Endeavours: especially, considering, that the things we Ask of God, are capable of our Own Endeavours; yea, if it be for gaining or increasing of grace or peace, our prayers, are a means not only of ask but of effecting the same; but to alter law and government is a thing of that nature, that we can only ask it; we can Act no further towards it: all the work for the effecting of it belongs to our Governors; put any Familiar Instance with yourselves, and resolve the double: will you say that the Child desiring his Father to wind up his Watch is the Child's Endeavouring the winding it up: or to wind it up. 4. I can easily Consent, that Conatus is not effectus: yet you acknowledge it, is a motion towards the Effect: which you call a Natural power: and I doubt not we agree, that Conatus hath essentially in it a Natural tendency and operation towards the effect, Endeavoured. 5. Now simple and bare Petition or submiss supplication hath not so: it hath indeed a verbal motion for the thing desired, but no real Operation or Natural Motion towards the effecting of it. 6. The subject, by Petition, doth desire it; but the Parliament in all those legal methods of debating, veting, committing, engrossing, etc. do properly endeavour the Abolition of any thing legally established. 7. Truly, I soberly discern this distinction of Petition and Endeavour both in the Covenant, and in the Act of Uniformity. 8. The Covenant saith, we shall Endeavour the Extirpation of Prelacy: not desire, or persuade, but Endeavour it: Neither can you possibly persuade yourselves, that such as then imposed and took the Covenant did at first intent such Endeavours as you mean, who took other courses, you well know, to effect the same. 9 It is added, Constantly and zealously: must we be always zealous and hot in our Petitions: must we perpetually solicit King and Parliament with our supplications? this will hardly consist with submiss Supplication. 10. Indeed it is plainly Seditions in itself, take Endeavour in your own sense, publicly to engage by Covenant, zealously, and constantly to Petition the Alteration of Government: this is, to declare to the World, that we will never be quiet under it. 11. Thus, also, it is in the Act: we are to declare, there lies no Obligation to Endeavour a change: it is not said, that we shall not Petition that others may Endeavour it. 12. Rational Endeavour implies, that the persons endeavouring have probably a power to effect: but it is certain, before hand, that, without the Supreme Legislative Power, the Subjects cannot effect the Extirpation of Episcopacy: therefore they cannot rationally or lawfully endeavour it: therefore if they promise or Covenant so to do, it is sinful; and they may lawfully declare they are not obliged unto it, that is, to endeavour what they have no power by Law to do: neither can the Act be thought to intent any more: Stultum est Conari quod nequeas efficere. 13. Lastly, If submiss supplication be yet thought to have any spice of endeavour in it, it cannot be rationally thought to be intended in the word, endeavour, in the Act; you observe that Endeavour in the Act and in the Covenant are of one measure, and it is too evident there was more in endeavour in the Covenant then mere Petition and submiss supplication, which ran us upon those sad consequences that in all reason the Intention of this new Act is but to secure us from: you say to make Laws against simple Endeavor is certainly destructive to the Liberty of the Subject and Privilege of Parliament; Methinks then, you should not apprehend such a simple and bare endeavour is to be disclaimed, as is essential in your own Judgements to the liberty of the Subject and privilege of Parliament. SECT. 6. Whether to endeavour, etc. be at all times sui Juris to every Subject, etc. 1. I Cannot yet consent, that to endeavour to alter the overnment of the Church, is at all times, or at this time, sui Juris to every, or to any, Subject; or indeed to any person in the Nation, to speak home. 2. The King is the proper Judge of what Government is fittest for the Church, both as he is Supreme Governor over it; and as he is the Head of the Parliament. 3. As he is supreme Governor over the Church of England, he is supreme Judge in all Causes; into whom the last Appeal resolves: and consequently, he is supreme Judge in this of the fitness of the Government of the Church, unto whom the last Appeal for a final & definitive sentence and determination is only to be made. 4. Again, as he is Head of the Parliament he is no less. For though the 2 Houses be also Judges of the fitness of the Government, yet still, with submission and reservation to the highest Judge thereof, their Sovereign Lord the King; who hath a Negative upon both Houses, and gives life or death, with his own word, to any Bill tendered to him. 5. So that in matters Legally existing, the King hath this great advantage above his 2 houses: the King hath power of himself to continue the existence of any such thing, without his two houses, that is, whether they will or not: and they cannot remove or abolish any such thing without the King, or whether he will or no. 6. Suppose it be granted, that the people may petition, & both houses may proceed so far as to frame a Bill against a Government absolutely considered, and without respect to any Prior Obligations by Oath, or otherwise, upon the King; and tender this unto the King, in Order to the extirpation of the same: yet if the King refuse to pass the Bill, that Bill so once rejected cannot be revived, during that Parliament: neither may any person, in either house, so much as move it any more, by the laws of Parliament; which nothing can warrant against, but the necessity of the things so to be revived upon the Word of God. 7. The same Reason persuades me, that when both King and Parliament have, by fresh law, declared their dissent to alter the Government against all endeavours used to that end; (and so they have done by the late Statutes for its restauration) then, we the Subjects cannot be bound any longer to endeavour it, if we were bound before. 8. To be bound, still to vex the King and Parliament with perpetual repetition of Petitions, to remove a Government which they have, & still do signify they will not remove: yea, which they do signally own and ratify so much the more; is to be bound to go contrary to authority as well as Law, to trouble the peace of Church and State, and the Government over us; and indeed, to endeavour or labour in vain, all hopes of prevailing being taken away: at postquam palam desperata est, & constat fieri non posse, cessat obligatio, ex jam dicto fundamento, quod Nemo Teneatur ad impossibile. 6. This must needs pass without all control, if we add to the consideration that the King is known to be born to, and bound to take an Oath, by the very constitution of the Kingdom, to maintain and defend the Government iv question, as he is King. 10. It hence irresistably follows, that the King cannot take a previous Oath contrary to his Coronation Oath, but he thereby violates the very constitution of this Kingdom; and there is an Obligation upon him to defend, and to swear to defend, before any Covenant that may be taken by him to extirpate Episcopacy. 11. Yea, the King cannot be bound to endeavour to extirpate Episcopacy, by any such previous Oath, seeing such endeavours cannot consist with the Tenor of his Coronation Oath, to protect and defend the Bishops: and if he should be tempted to take such an Oath, against the Bishops, it is void ipso facto; for as he was born Heir to the Crown he was born Heir to the Oath of the Crown, and bound as King to take it. 12. I need not say the Coronation oath is unalterable in this particular: it is enough, that it is not yet altered, and that it cannot be Legally altered, but by Act of Parliament: I am sure, you will not say the King, much less before he is Crowned, hath power of himself, or with any others besides his Parliament, to make or diminish or alter any known Law, especially that which so much concerns his people's interest & security, in the oath to be taken at his Coronation. 13. Pray, therefore, observe & weigh this Consequence; if an oath taken by the King to the contrary before hand, doth void the Coronation Oath, required by Law, than the King by a private Oa●● may equally bind himself to endeavour to destroy the privileges of Parliament, the liberty of the Subject, and the other great concerns of Magna Charta, as well as to extirpate Episcopacy; and his Coronation Oath taken afterwards, would not at all oblige him to govern by the Laws of the Land. I argue not, now, from the necessity of the things, but from the Obligation of the Laws and Oaths taken by the King about them. 14. The Coronation Oath is part of the Inheritance of the Crown, and all the Subjects in their several capacities are equally concerned in every part of it, as Subjects: for if we allow its violation in any one part, we let go our security in all the rest. 15. Moreover, 'tis certain, that though where the Conscience judgeth the matter of a former Oath lawful, the Conscience is bound against any future Oath to the contrary; yet if the Conscience be convinced or fully persuaded that the former oath was sinful in the matter of it, and doth take upon it a new Oath to the contrary; in such a case the latter oath hinds the conscience. 16. Now it is open and plain to all the world, that (seeing the King hath taken his Coronation Oath for to defend the Bishops & passed those Bills for the protection and preservation of Episcopal Government; and by his other protestations and practices of the like nature;) his Conscience will not suffer him to destroy Episcopacy, but dictates to him that endeavours so to do are very sinful. 17. Surely, the King cannot be bound to endeavour against his Conscience, more than to you against yours; much less against his Conscience bound by an Oath his solemn Coronation Oath; the bond of his Fidelity, and people's security: this hath taken hold upon him, and invincibly toeth him under such conviction, to preserve his Conscience, and his oath, and Episcopal Government. 18. In all charity and duty we are bound to judge according to all this appearance; and I cannot imagine that any man doth scruple whether the King be in His Judgement for Episcopal Government, against all the evidence He hath given us of it. 19 So that the Objection of the single Person is removed beyond all suspicion; and seeing we are not to declare wha● things are in themselves, but what we judge them to be, who can possibly stick to declare, That he holds the single Person is not bound by— to endeavour the extirpation of Episcopal Government. 20. Now, for any other Person, whether the Lords or Commons in Parliament or inferior Subjects, how can they, or any of them, be bound, think ye, to endeavour to make the King sin, and in so high a manner as to violate His Conscience, and His solemn sacred Coronation Oath? without which he cannot consent (as His Royal Father proved with His Life) to the extirpation of Episcopal Government. 21. Consent, I say, much less Enact it; and yet without both it cannot be legally done; neither can any endeavour it in any lawful way, but by desiring and labouring to persuade the King thus to Consent and Enact against Oath and Conscience. 22. But lest it should be doubted, whether the King doth swear to defend the Bishops: give me leave to subjoin an Account of that Solemn proceeding, at the Coronation; so far as it relates to our Argument, and I have done with this great part of my Task. 23. I find the Account thus, wherein, I think I am not misinformed. 24. After the many other gracious promises which the King makes to his People; One of the Bishops reading to the King before the People, concerning the Canonical privileges of the Church, and beseeching him that he would be the Protector of the Bishops and the Churches under their Government; The King Answereth in these words: with a willing and devout heart, I promise and grant my pardon, and that I will preserve and maintain to you, and the Churches committed to your charge, All Canonical privileges, and due Law and Justice: and that I will be your Protector and Defender, to my Power, by the Assistance of God: as every good King in his Kingdom, in right, aught to Protect and Defend the Bishops and Churches under their Government. 25. Then the King ariseth, and at the Communion Table makes a Solemn Oath in the presence of the People, to Observe the premises, and laying his hand upon the Book, saith, the things which I have before promised, I shall perform, and keep: So help me God, and the contents of this Book. 26. Now, who can think himself, or any other person, bound by any Obligation whatsoever, to Necessitate (so far as in them lies) His Sacred Majesty to Violate His Oath so Solemnly Sworn at His Inauguration? CASE. XVI. Whether the Covenant be not against the Liberty of the Subject. 1. I Must still assert, the Liberty of the Subject was apparently violated by the Ordinance for the Covenant: seeing the Free-holds of so many Several persons and famous Corporations were thus invaded; while the Persons and Corporations so deeply concerned had none to Represent them in either house of Parliament, when that Ordinance passed. 2. This was the Emphasis of my Argument, which you little observe, and much less answer. 3. I am still of the mind, in my coldest blood, that without Respect to some proportionable demerit, it is not sui Juris to the King, or Parliament, to destroy any person or public Corporation; or to deprive them of their legal Freeholds, especially whilst their Representatives are kept out of Parliament: it being against common Justice, and the Liberty of the Subject, in Magna Charta. 4. To conclude, admit Mr. Crofton do truly Recite the words in the Petition of Right, [whereas many of them have an Oath administered to them, not warrantable by the Laws and Statutes of this Realm] yet my Assertion stands firm enough, that the Covenant is against the Petition of Right. 5. For, it is not warrantable by the Laws and Statutes of this Realm, whether you consider the manner of imposing and taking, or the very matter of it, as hath fully appeared before. 6. 'Tis true, Oaths are given by Colleges, and Corporations: but are they not warrantable by the Laws, and Statutes of the Realm? if not, I am not afraid to infer, that such as impose them run, thereby into a praemunire; if they are, than my argument passeth untouched 7. Indeed, these particular Oaths are not, in so many words, found in the Statutes; yet who doubts, but that the King hath power by the Laws of the Land, to grant such Charters; and to give Authority to Colleges and Corporations to Administer such Oaths? 8. Again, who can, or dare lay claim to such a power, but the King: or Administer such Oaths, without power from the King; much less against his Express will and Proclamation? CASE XVII. Whether the Covenant be not against former Obligations. 1. I Conclude it is so, and therefore, void: the force of the Consequence cannot be resisted in those excellent words of our great Casuist. Obligation Antecedens impedit effectum Juramenti Subsequentis, ne possit Obligare: Semper enim Obligatio prior praejudicat posteriori, & Irritum facit omnem Actum inductivum novae Obligationis sibi Contrariae. 2. I assume, there were three strong Cords and bonds of God upon us, to the Contrary, before ever the Covenant was taken or thought of; to Obey Authority: to keep our Oaths and promises: to Serve the Church in Our Generations; which we shall now review in their order. SECT. 1. Whether the Covenant be not against the Law of Obedience to Authority. 1. YOu would persuade us, that I affirm this only upon my former Principles, because the Covenant is against the Rights of the King, the Laws of the Land, the Privilege of Parliament, and the Liberty of the Subjects: which, you conceive, are all laid in the dust 2. Perhaps, you may find these Principles more potent and vigorous in their Resurrection: however, though I had a General Reflection upon these former Arguments; yet, I added a particular force to the present Argument, (which, having raised a Dust, it seems you did not see,) in these words. 3. More particularly, God first Obligeth us to be Subject and to obey our Governors; and the Covenant would engage us to disobey, disown and destroy them: (I mean our Governors in the Church) the Covenant would discharge us of our obedience, and oblige us to Resistance, Contrary to God's express obligation upon us, which cannot be. 4. God doth immediately by his Word, and likewise by the Mediation and interposition of Civil Authority, command us to obey, to be subject, and not to resist our Spiritual Governors, the Covenant would engage to break all at once; and at once to violate the Laws of God, the King and the Church, and all Authority. 5. Our duty is positive, to be subject, 2. Negative, not to Resist; whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the Ordinance of God— Wherefore we must needs be subject for conscience sake. Rom. 13. Now both these are broken by the Covenant; the one by omission, the other by commission 6. First, Our positive duty of obedience and subjection carrieth in it, by Universal Consent, to defend, preserve, to honour, observe, and to be faithful to our Governors; now how these are consistent with Endeavours to Extirpate, I cannot see. 7. Again, Our Negative part, or Nonresistance, is transgressed too: by the Apostles Logic, not to be subject, is to Resist: whosoever Resisteth— wherefore we must needs be Subject: however, to Endeavour to Extirpate, is too plainly to Resist. 8. For Endeavours to Extirpate a Government are both far beyond the compass of Subjection, they being no part either of Active or Passive Obedience; and deep in the Nature of Resistance, most properly taken. 9 Endeavours to Extirpate have Action in them, and are therefore more than passive Obedience: their Action also is Diametrically opposite to Active Obedience. 10. Again, Endeavours to Extirpate do formally carry Resistance in them: yea, they are the formal Act of high Resistance, not of the Law only, but of the Government itself: not in the Action only, but in the very being of it: for Extirpation is the end and utmost of Resistance; and therefore, Endeavour to Extirpate is properly resistance. 11. Pray, resolve me, to what part of our Duty to our Parents will you reduce Endeavours to Extirpate their Government over us: or how can such Endeavours square and Conform to the Commands of God, and-the Laws of the Land, Not to Resist, but to be Subject to our Governors, Ecclesiastical and Civil? 12. 'Tis vain to say, we are bound to obey he laws, yet we may Endeavour to have them changed: It is not safe to Argue from the Laws, which are but the Rule, to our Governors, who are the object of our obedience. 13. If this consequence be Good; upon an Oath taken of the like Nature, against the civil power, we may hold ourselves bound to Endeavour to Extirpate both King and Parliament. 14. For Government by Monarchy, and the Constitution of Parliaments, you will not say, they are in themselves Necessary to our civil State; and if, because Episcopacy is doubted to be Jure Divino, you conclude it lawful to swear against it; or having so sworn, to Endeavour to Extirpate it, I dare not undertake to find a way for the civil Government to escape the danger: the Inference is easy, from Government to Government; though the one be in the Church, and the other in the State; especially seeing we cannot resist the one, and not disobey the other. SECT. 2. Whether the Covenant be not against Former Oaths and Promises. 1. THis I also affirm, and consequently, that the Covenant was prevented by such Prior Obligations: the Case is fully stated in these words of our Reverend Casuist. Si cui Juramentum suscipiendum defereratur, continens aliquid quod Obligationi priori sive Naturali sive adquisitae adversatur ut si adversetur officio, quod parenti debetur aut principi; vel si repugnet ei quod Ante liciè juratum fuit vel promissum ejusmodi Juramentum, non potest à quoquam saluâ conscientiâ, vel praestari, vel praestitum ad impleri; qui utrumvis fecerit, pejeraverit. 2. I assume, that the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy and the Protestation of May 5. 1641. were taken by the Nation, before any of the Nation took the Covenant, and that the Covenant in the Second Article is Repugnant to them all. 3. In all these, you say, I was fully prevented by Mr. Crofton; and seeing this is all you say against me in these particulars, I shall only return you to one, who in all of them did as fully prevent Mr. Crofton many years agone. 4. He leads us on thus; as his Majesty hath sworn expressly to maintain and defend the Government of the Church, by Arch-Bishops, Bishops, etc. So have we his Subjects implicitly sworn the same, as many of us as have taken the Oaths Supremacy, of Allegiance, and the late Protestation. 5. For first, his Majesty having sworn so solemnly to maintain and preserve this Government of the Church, if any Attempts or Conspiracies should be made against it we are bound by the Oath of Allegiance to maintain and defend his Majesty to the utmost of our power, in his endeavouring to make good that his oath of maintaining & defending that Government of the Church and the Rights and Privileges of these Governors against all those Conspiracies and Attempts. 6. Secondly, we have sworn in our Oath of Supremacy, that the King's Highness is the only Supreme of this Realm, as well in spiritual things and causes, as Temporal; and that we shall to our power assist and defend all Jurisdiction, Privilege and Authority, granted or elonging to the King's Highness: the Government of the Church being such an Ecclesiastical thing, and Cause, as that, next to the Doctrine of the Church, there is not any Ecclesiastical thing or Cause of nearer concernment to the King, and whole Kingdom; and the Regulating and ordering thereof belonging to his Jurisdiction, Privilege, Pre-eminence and Authority, we are obliged by that Oath, not only to acknowledge his Majesty to be the Supreme Governor in that thing and Cause, but also to our power assist and defend that Jurisdiction, Privilege, Pre-eminence and Authority; and not to Assay, or Endeavour aught concerning the Altering, much less the rooting out of that Government, without the King's Consent and Approbation. 7. Lastly, we having sworn in our late Protestation to maintain and defend the Doctrine of the Church of England, against Popery: and one Article of that Doctrine, which the Papists mainly Oppose, viz. six and thirty, together with several other parts thereof, approving and Justifying the Government of this Church; it must be granted, that we are by this Oath bound so far to maintain and defend that Government, as to approve and justify the lawfulness thereof both in itself, and in its Constitution here among us. 8. Besides, we swore expressly in the same Protestation to maintain and defend the lawful Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and every person that made that Protestation; and therefore in that respect until we are convinced, either that Arch- Bishops and Bishops, etc. are no Subjects; or that their Right of Governing this Church is not lawful; we are bound by that Branch of the Oath, not only not to Endeavour the Extirpation of the Government of the Church by them, but to the utmost of our power to maintain and defend them in that their Right of Government: and every person that took the Protestation in whatsoever he hath since done, or shall hereafter do in the maintenance and defence ●thereof. Ante-confederacy, P. 51. 52. Printed 1644. 9 You believe Mr. Crofton will not stick to allow the Nationality of the Protestation: and then the whole Nation was under the Obligation of the Protestation, before the Covenant was taken: and consequently in those things before recited, the Covenant was superseded, and Master Croftons' Imaginary Reality and Nationality of the Covenant, is thrown to the ground by Mr. Croftons' Logic; his Position undermined by his Supposition. 10. Give me leave also to remember, that both in the Oath of Supremacy, and the Protestation, it was sworn to maintain the King's Honour, as well as his Authority: but the Covenant is to endeavour to make the King break his Oath; which is plainly contrary to Endeavours to save his Honour. 11. The King hath sworn to defend and maintain this Government. It is not a necessary Duty from the Word of God to destroy it: there is nothing more dishonourable in a King, then to break his Faith with his Subjects, yea, his Oath to them, his Oath to defend and protect them, and in so deep a measure too, by his Extirpation and rooting them out. Lastly, the Covenant is to endeavour to prevail with the King thus, to break his Faith and Oath with his Subjects, in a thing, in your own judgements, not necessary upon him from the Word of God. Now avoid the Consequence if you can. SECT. 3. Whether the Covenant can oblige us to the laying down of our Ministry. 1. THirdly, I assert, we are first obliged to serve the Church in the work of the Ministry; and the Obligation of the Covenant can no way disoblige us or discharge us of it. 2. The Argument in short, is thus. No man hath power to put a Bar, by any self-contracted Obligation, about a thing not necessary in the way of his duty, to God or his Church; the reason is, God hath first in Nature and Scripture obliged him to his duty. Est illicitum quicquid bono publico adversatur, aut paci Ecclesiast. politicae Domesticae. Sand. & Actus unius non debet praejudicare juri alterius. Our own private Act ought not to prejudice the right of another, much less God & the Church. 3 But now to leave our Ministerial office, because we will not renounce this part of the Covenant as required by law is to put a Bar in the way of our duty to God and his Church, from a self-contracted-obligation, about a thing in itself not necessary. 4. I spent above 8. pag. in the book surveyed by you, in the prosecution of this Argument. Pray read them over again, & judge whether you have soiled, much less as you speak of my other Arguments, laid it in the dust; indeed you have not touched it with one of your fingers. 5. This Argument may grant, or rather give, that it was lawful not to renounce the obligation of the Covenant, before this Act was made; but now the Act requires it as the condition of continuing in the Ministry; the Case is otherwise. 6. For the Covenant could not be taken in a matter not ●necessary, without such a condition, that the performing of it or the non-renouncing of it do not afterwards prove a bar to our duty, be understood. The Rule is known, rebus sic stantibw, vel si in eodem statu res permanserint, upon condition, that no sin hereafter be to be committed, no injury done, no duty omitted by keeping our Oath, or any thing truly consequential thereunto. 7. There is a Case in Bishop Sanderson that brings us very near our own. Si Filius familias, etc. If a Son, saith he, swear to do a thing that is in itself lawful, and his father (not knowing what his son hath sworn) commands him to do something which hinders him from doing that which he had sworn to do, (doth not for bid him to do it, but commands him to do that, quod impediat id fieri quod juratum est.) He resolves the case; filius non tenetur juramento; his reason is, quia lege divina Naturali tenetur parere imperio Patris. 8. Thus admit that you swore a lawful thing in the Covenant, your Civil Parent commands you to do that, which hinders the performing your Covenant; the Renouncing of the Obligation of it, in the Second Article. But, how much greater force is added to the Argument, if you consider the effect of your disobedience to this Command of Authority, your ceasing to work any longer in the Ministry, and disobedience to God that called you to it. 9 Cause Causae est Causa Causati, the Cause of your ceasing to do your duty to God, the Law and the Church, is your Non-Subseription, the cause of your Non Subscription, is the Covenant. Therefore the Covenant is the cause of ceasing to do your duty; and therefore sinful, and not obliging. Supreme Authority hath, doubtless, power to make any conditions of our serving the Church within its Dominions, in things not sinful, according to its own reason of State: the Covenant cannot hold us from performing such condition; for than it hinders us from doing our duty, by hindering from performing the condition, upon which alone we are suffered to keep our places, and to serve the Church, and to which we have a preobligation of God upon us, not to be so easily broken by our own hands. 11. Therefore, my dear Brethren, in the fear of the great God, whose Servants we all are, let me request you once again, seriously to consider: that though, for your oaths sake you ought to quit your own Interest; yet the Churches and the States you cannot. 12. Pray, inquire, who gave you power to expose yourselves to an Incapacity of serving the Church, in the high and holy Calling of the Ministry (to which God hath called you, and for which he hath qualified) you, and in which, he expects you should be constant and faithful by such a Covenant as the renouncing thereof, is now made the condition of our station, and the discharge of our Office. 13. Ask yourselves, was not the Law of God, requiring all that should be received into the Ministry, to preach the Gospel, to watch for souls, not to look back, etc. of force, before the Covenant? how then, can you plead the Covenant for the voiding of it? in such things too, as are certainly no conditions of God's Commands. 15. I do not well know, what you mean, by the last note of your Survey, which only remains to be taken notice of; your words are these. We conceive the best of Actions may be as capable of an Impedit. boni by the intervenient inhibiting Decree of Caesar: and we are to be satisfied that in that case the guilt of non-service to the Church is chargeable on our soul: We may not sin that good should come thereof. 16. So far as I apprehend this Objection, it is most easily answered. 17. First, by yielding that the best of your Actions must be performed, whether Caesar inh●bite or not. 18. Secondly, by denying endeavours to extirpate Episcopal Government to be of the best sort of your Actions: or the not endeavouring the same, or the renouncing the obligation of the Covenant so far, to be fin. 19 I have often said, that thus to endeavour the extirpation of Episcopal Government is not in itself a duty: many of your Actions are so, and particularly, the discharge of your offices and places: therefore, if it so fall out, that, through the command of Caesar, you cannot both discharge your necessary duties, and also hold yourselves bound not to do a thing that in itself, is not necessary, that which would oblige you not to perform such condition of your duties, ceaseth so far to oblige you; and that is the Covenant. 20. Otherwise, by your own Act about an object not in itself a duty, you would supersede the Authority of Caesar in things indifferent, & clip the power which God hath given him; by extending the effect of your Covenant with God, to Caesar's injury. Injuriam alteri facit, qui quasi Jure suo statuit de iis quae sunt juris alieni. Liberavi animam meam. FINIS.