OF THE INFALLIBILITY OF THE CHURCH OF ROME. A Discourse written by the Lord Viscount FALKLAND. Now first published from a Copy of his own hand. OXFORD, Printed by H Hall Printer to the UNIVERSITY: M.DC.XLV. printer's device of Henry Hall, an arch with two pillars (not in McKerrow) OF THE Infallibility of the Church of ROME. TO him that doubts whether the Church of Rome have any errors, they answer, § 1. that She hath none, for She never can have any. This being so much harder to believe then the first, had need be proved by some certain arguments, if they expect that the belief of this one should draw on whatsoever else they please to propose: Yet this is offered to be proved by no better ways then those by which we offer to prove she hath erred: Which are, arguments from Scripture, Reason, and Ancient Writers; all which, they say themselves, are fallible; for nothing is not so but the Church; which if it be the only infallible determination, and that can never be believed upon its own authority, we can never infallibly know that the Church is infallible: for these other ways of proof (they say) may deceive both them and us; and so neither side is bound to believe them. If they say, § 2. that an argument out of Scripture is sufficient ground of Divine faith, why are they so offended with the Protestants for believing every part of their Religion upon that ground, upon which they build all theirs at once? and if following the same Rule with equal desire of finding the truth by it, (having neither of those qualities, which Isidorus Pelusiota says, are the causes of all Heresies; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Pride and Prejudication) why should God be more offended with the one than the other, though they chance to err? They say, § 3. the Church is therefore made infallible by God, that all men may have some certain Guide; yet though it be infallible, unless it both plainly appear to be so, (for it is not certain to whom it doth not appear certain) and unless it be manifest which is the Church, God hath not attained his end; and it were to set a Ladder to Heaven and seem to have a great care of my going up, whereas unless there be care taken that I may know this Ladder is here to that purpose, it were as good for me it had never been set. If they say we may know it, § 4. for that General and constant Tradition instructs us in it, I answer, that ignorant people cannot know this, and so it can be no Rule for them; and if learned people mistake in this, there can be no condemnation for them. For suppose to know whether the Church of Rome may err, (as a way which will conclude against her, but not for her; for if She hath erred, certainly She may; but though she hath not erred hitherto, it follows not that She cannot err,) I seek whether She have erred; and conceiving She hath contradicted herself, conclude necessarily She hath erred; I suppose it not damnable though I err in my judgement: because I try the Church by one of those touchstones herself appoints me; which is, Conformity with the Ancient. For to say I am to believe the present Church that it differs not from the former, though it seem to me to do so, is to send me to a witness, and bid me not believe it. Now to say the Church is provided for a Guide of faith, § 5. but must be known by such marks as the ignorant cannot seek it by, and the learned may chance not to find it by, though seeking it with all diligence and without all prejudice, can no way satisfy me. If they say, § 6. God will reveal the truth to whosoever seeks it these ways sincerely; this saying both sides will (without means of being confuted) make use of; therefore it would be as good that neither did. When they have proved the Church to be infallible, § 7. yet to my understanding they have proceeded nothing farther, unless we can be sure which is it; for it signifies only that God will always have a Church which shall not err; but not that such or such a Successiion shall be all ways in the right; not that the Bishop of such a place, and the Clergy that adheres to him shall all ways continue in the true faith. So that if they say the Greek Church is not the Church, because by its own confession it is not infallible; I answer, that it may be now the Church, and may hereafter err, and so not be now infallible; and yet the Church never err; because before their fall from truth, others may arise to maintain it, who then will be the Church; and so the Church may still be infallible; though not in respect of any set persons whom we may know at all times for our Guide. Then if they prove the Church of Rome to be the true Church, § 8. and not the Greek, because their opinions are consonant either to Scripture or Antiquity, they run into a circle, proving their tenets to be true, first; because the Church holds them & then theirs to be the true Church, because it holds the truth: which last, though it appear to me the only way, yet it takes away its being a Guide which we may follow without examination, without which all they say besides is nothing. § 9 Nay suppose they had evinced, that some Succession were infallible, and so had proved to a Learned man that the Roman Church must be this, because none else pretends to it; yet this can be no sufficient ground to the ignorant, who cannot have any infallible foundation for their belief that the Church of Greece pretends not to the same; and even to the Learned it is but an accidental argument, because if any other company had likewise claimed to be infallible, it had overthrown all so proved. Nay it is but an arbitrary argument, § 10. and depends upon the pleasure of the adversary; for if any society of Christians would pretend to it, the Church of Rome could make use of it no longer. The chiefest reason why they disallow of the Scripture for Judge, is, because when differences arise about the interpretation, there is no way to end them; § 11. and that it will not stand with the goodness of God, to damn men for not following his will, if he had assigned no infallible way how to find it. I confess this to be wonderful true 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and let them excuse themselves that think otherwise. Yet this will be no argument against him, who believes that to all who follow their reason in the interpretation of the Scriptures, and search for Tradition, God will either give his grace for assistance to find the truth, or his pardon if they miss it: and then this supposed necessity of an infallible Guide with this supposed damnation for want of it, fall together to the ground. If they command us to believe infallibly the contrary to this, § 12. they are to prove it false by some infallible way (for the conclusion must be of the same nature, and not conclude more than the premises set down,) now such a way, Scripture and Reason, or infused faith cannot be (for they use to object the fallibility of them to those that build their Religion upon them) nor the Authority of the Church, for that is part of the question, and must be itself first proved, and that by none of the former ways, for the former reasons. The Pope's infallibility can be no infallible ground of faith, § 13. being itself no necessary part of the faith (& we can be no surer of any thing proved than we are of that which proves it,) and if he be fallible, no part is the more infallible for his sideing with them. So if the Church be divided, I have no way to know which is the true Church, but by searching which agrees with Scripture and Antiquity, and so judging accordingly. (But this is not to submit myself to her opinions as my guide, which they tell us is necessary.) Which course if they approve not of as a fit one for a Learned man, they are in a worse case for the ignorant, who can take no course at all, nor is the better at all for this Guide, the Church; whilst two parts dispute which is it, and that by arguments he understands not. If I granted the Pope, § 14. or a Council by him called to be infallible, yet I conceive their Decrees can be no sufficient ground (by their own axioms) of Divine faith. For first (say the most) No Council is valid not approved by the Pope (for thus they overthrew that held at Ariminum) and a Pope chosen by Simony is ipso facto no Pope. I can then have no certainer ground for the infallibility of those Decrees, and consequently for my belief of them, than I have that the choice of him was neither directly nor indirectly simoniacal; which to be certain of, is absolutely impossible. § 15. Secondly, suppose him Pope, and to have confirmed the Decrees; yet that these are the Decrees of a Council, or that he hath confirmed them, I can have but an uncontradicted attestation of many men, (for if another Council should declare these to have been the Acts of a former Council, I should need again some certain way of knowing how this declaration is a Counsels) which is no ground (say they) of faith, I am sure not so good and general a one as that Tradition by which we prove that the Scripture is Scripture, which yet they will not allow any to be certain of but from them. Thirdly, for the sense of their Decrees, § 16. I can have no better expounder to follow then Reason; which if, though I mistake, I shall not be damned for following, why shall I for mistaking the sense of Scripture? Or why am I a less fit interpreter of one, then of the other were both seem equally clear? And where they seem so (I mean equally clear) and yet contradictory, shall I not as soon believe Scripture, which is. without doubt, of at least as great authority? But I doubt whether Counsels be fit deciders of Questions; § 17. for such they cannot be, if they beget more, and men have cause to be in greater doubts afterwards (none of the former being diminished) than they were at first. Now I conceive there arise so many out of this way, § 18. that the Learned cannot end all nor the Ignorant know all. As besides the forenamed considerations. Who is to call them, the Pope, or Kings: Who are to have voices in them; Bishops only, or Priests also: Whether the Pope or Council be Superior; & the last need the approbation of the first, debated among themselves: Whether any Countries not being called, or not being there (as the Abyssines, so great a part of Christianity, & not resolvedly condemend by them for Heretics, were absent at the Council of Trent) make it not- general: Whether if it be one not every where received (as when the Bishops sent from some places have exceeded their Commission, as in the Council of Florence) it be yet of necessity to be subscribed to: Whether there were any surreption used or force, and Whether those disannul the Acts: Whether the most voyees are to be held the Act of the Council, or those of all are required, (As Canus saith, All the Council cannot err, the most may; which never yet agreed) or Whether two parts will serve (as in the Tridentine Synod,) a considerable doubt, because, Nicephorus Callistus relateing the resolution of a Council at Rome against that of Ariminum makes them give three reasons. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Tom: 2, pag. 172. One That the Bishop of Rome, was not present. The second That most did not agree to it. Thirdly That others thither gathered were displeased at their resolutions: which proves, that in their opinions, if either most not present agree not to it, or all present be not pleased with it. a Council hath no power to bind. All these doubts, I say, persuade me that whatsoever brings with it so many new questions, can be no fit ender of the old. In those things in which, § 19 before a General Council have defined, it is lawful to hold either way, and damnable to do so after; I desire to know how it agreeth with the Charity of the Church, to define any thing, and so bestow upon the Devil one path more for us to walk in to him? If the infallibility of a General Council be a point of faith I desire to know why it is so? § 20. Scripture and Tradition seem to me not to say so: But if they did, so I suppose you will grant they do of this doctrine, [That the souls of the blessed shall see God before the day of judgement, and not be kept in secret Receptacles] For else the doctrine of prayer to Saints cannot stand: and yet for denying this doth Bellarmine excuse Pope John 22 (of which belief they know he was not alone) because the Church (he means, I doubt not, a General Council) had not then condemned it. I desire to know why should not he be condemned as well without one as many Heretics that are held so by their Church, yet condemned by no General Council? which if he makes to be the rule of Heresy, it had been happy to have lived before the Council of Nice, when no opinion had been damnable but some against the Apostles Council at Jerusalem, because there had yet been no General Council. At least, why shall not I be excused by the same reason, § 21. though I believe not a Council to be infallible, since I never heard that any Council hath decreed that they are so? Neither, if it have, can we be bound by that Decree, unless made certain some other way that itself is so. If you say, we must believe it because of Tradition; § 22. I answer sometimes you will have the not believing any thing, though not declared by a Council, to have power enough to damn (that is when it makes against us) at other times the Church hath not decreed unless a Council have, and their error is pardonable, and they good Catholics. Next, § 23. (as I have asked before) how shall an ignorant man know it? for he, in likely hood, can speak but with a few, from whom he cannot know that all of the Church of Rome's part do now, and in past ages have believed it to be Tradition so certainly as to make it a ground of faith, (unless he have some revelation that those deceive him not.) Neither indeed can those that should inform him of the opinions of former times be certainly informed themselves; for truly if (as they would persuade us) the relation of Papias could cousin so fare all the Prime Doctors of the Christian Church into the belief of the doctrine of the Millenaries, so as that no one of those two first ages opposed it, (which appears plain enough, because those that after risen up against this opinion, never quoted any for themselves before Dionysius Alexandrinus, who lived at least two hundred & fifty years after Christ.) Nay if those first men did not only believe it as probable, Dial. cum Tryph p. 307. lib. 5. cap. 33. but Justin Martyr lays, he holds it, and so do all that are in all parts Orthodox Christians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Irenaeus sets it down directly for a Tradition, and relates the very words that Christ used when he taught this; (which is plainer than any other Tradition is proved, or said to be (out of Antiquity) by them.) If (I say) these could be so deceived, why might not other of the Ancients as well be by others deceived in other points? And then, what certainty shall the Learned have, when after much labour they think they can make it appear that the Ancients thought any thing Tradition, that indeed it was so? And that either the folly, or the knavery of some Papias deceived them not? I confess it makes me think of some that Tully speaks of, who (arcem amittunt, dum propugnacula defendunt) lose the fort, whilst they defend the outworks; for whilst they answer this way the arguments of Tradition for the opinion of the Chiliasts, they make unuseful to them the force of Tradition to prove any thing else by. For which cause it was rather wisely then honestly done of them, who before Fevardentius set him forth, left out that part of Irenaeus which we allege (though we need it not much, for many of the fathers take notice of this belief of his;) Yet he justifies himself for doing it by a worse blow to them then this itself, which is, saying, that if they leave out all errors in the books they publish (that is, I suppose, all opinions contrary to the Church of Rome) bona pars Scriptorum Patrum Orthodoxorum evanesceret, a good part of the writings of the Orthodox Fathers must vanish away. But the Tradition that can be found out of Ancients (since their witnessing may deceive us) hath much less strength when they argue only thus: § 24. Sure so many would not say this is true, and join in opinions, if there were no tradition for them. I would have you remember they can deliver their opinion possibly, but either before the controversy arise in the Church (upon some chance) or after. If before, it is confessed that they writ not cantiously enough; and so they answer all they seem to say for Arrius and Pelagius his faith before themselves, and so consequently their controversy (though it may be not their opinion) arose. If after, than they answer often (if any thing be by them at that time spoken against them) that the heat of disputation brought it from them, and their resolution to oppose Heretics enough; I desire it may be lawful for us to answer so too, either one of these former ways; or that it is (as often they say too) some Hyperbole, when you press us in any thing with the opinions of Fathers. At least, I am sure if they may deceive us with saying a thing is a Tradition, that is not, we may be sooner deceived if we will say and conclude it for a Tradition, when they speak it only as a Truth, and (for aught appears) their particular Opinion. For besides, if when Salvian, § 25. comparing the Arrians with evil Livers, (and that after they were condemned by a Council) extenuates, (by reason of their believing themselves in the right) with much instance the fault of the Arrians, and says, How they shall be punished for it in the day of Judgement, none can know but the Judge. If (I say) they confess it to be his opinion, they must also confess the doctrine of their Church to be different from that of Salvians times; because he was allowed a Member of that for all this saying; whereas he of the Church of Rome that should say so of us would be accounted Sesqui-haereticus, a Heretic and a half: Or else they must say (which they can only say and not prove) that he was so earnest against ill men, that for the aggravation of their crime he lessened that of the Heretics; and said, what at another time he would not have said; which if they do, will it not overthrow wholly the authority of the Fathers? Since we can never infallibly know what they thought at all times, from what they were moved to say by some collateral consideration. Next to this certain and undoubted damning of all out of the Church of Rome; § 26. which averseth me from it; next comes their putting all to death, or at least pains, that do so, where they have power: which is an effect, though not a necessary one, of the first opinion; and that averseth me yet more; For I do not believe all to be damned whom they damn, but I conceive all to be killed whom they kill. I am sure if you look upon Constantine's Epistle, written to persuade concord upon the first disagreement between Alexander and Arrius, you will find that he thought (& if the Bishops of his time had at first thought otherwise, he would have been sure better informed) that neither side deserved either death or damnation. (and yet sure this question was as great as ever risen since:) For having spoken of the opinions as things so indifferent, that the Reader might almost think they had been fallen out at Spurn-point or Ketle-pins, he adds, Niceph. Tom. 1. p. 555. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. For that which is necessary is one thing, that all agree and keep the same faith about divine providence. I am sure in the same Author, Moses, a man praised by him, refusing to be made Bishop by Lucius because he was an Arrian, and he answering, Tom. 2. p. 206. That he did ill to refuse it before he knew what his faith was, Answered, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The banishing of Bishops shows ENOUGH your faith. So that it is plain he thought punishing for opinions to be a mark which might serve him to know false opinions by. I believe throughout Antiquity you will find no putting any to death, § 27. unless it be such as begin to kill first, (as the Circumcellians or such like;) I am sure Christian Religions chief glory being that it increased by being persecuted, and having that advantage of the Mahometan (which came in by force) me thinks, De Regno. (especially since Synesius hath told us, and reason told men so before Synesius, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Every thing is destroyed by the contrary to what settled and composed it) It should be to take ill care of Christianity, to seek to hold it up by Turkish means: at least it must breed doubts, that if the Religion had always remained the same, it would not be defended by ways so contrary to those by which it was propagated. I desire recrimination may not be used: § 28. for though it be true that Calvin hath done it, and the Church of England a little, (which is a little too much) for Negare manifesta non audeo, & excusare immodica non possum, yet She, confessing She may err, is not so chargeable with any fault as those which pretend they cannot, (and so will be sure never to mend it) and besides, I will be bound to defend no more than I have undertaken, which is, to give reasons Why the Church of Rome is fallible. I confess this opinion of damning so many, § 29. and this custom of burning so many, this breeding up those who know nothing else in any point of Religion yet to be in readiness to cry To the fire with him, and To Hell with him, (as Polybius saith in a certain furious faction of an army of several nations, and consequently languages, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, All of them understood only this word, Throw at him) this I say in my opinion was it chiefly which made so many so suddenly leave the Church of Rome, that indeed to borrow the Author's phrase, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉— They needed not persuasion to do it but only news that others had begun: For as this alone if believed makes all the rest be so too; So one thing alone misliked, overthrows also all the rest. If it were granted that, § 30. because it agrees not with the Goodness of God to let men want an infallible Guide, therefore there must be one; and that the Church of Rome were that one; yet if that teach any thing, to my understanding, contrary to God's Goodness, I am not to receive her doctrine, for the same cause for which they would have me receive it, (it being as good an argument, this Guide teaches things contrary to God's Goodness, therefore is not appointed by God; as to say, It is agreeable to his Goodness there should be a Guide, therefore there is one) And sure it is lawful to examine particular doctrines, whether they agree with that principle which is their foundation; and to that (me thinks) to damn him that neither with negligence nor prejudication searcheth what is God's will, though he miss of it, is as contrary as the first can be supposed. I would know whether he that never heard of the Church of Rone shall yet be damned for not believing her infallible. § 31. I have so good an opinion of them as to assure myself they will answer, he shall not. I will then ask, Whether he that hath searched what Religions there are, and finds hers to be one, and her infallibility to be part of it, if his reason will not assent to that, shall he be damned for being inquisitive after truth? (for he hath committed no other fault greater than the other) & Whether such an ignorance (I mean after impartial search) be not of all the other the most invincible? Nay grant the Church to be infallible, § 32. yet me thinks, he that denies it and employs his reason to seek if it be true, should be in as good case as he that believes it and searcheth not at all the truth of the proposition he receives: for I cannot see why he should be saved, because, by reason of his parents beleise, or the Religion of the Country, or some such accident, the truth was offered to his understanding, when had the contrary been offered he would have received that; and the other damned that believes falsehood, upon as good ground as the other doth truth; unless the Church be like a Conjurer's circle that will keep a man from the Devil though he came into it by chance. They grant that no man is an Heretic that believes not his Heresy obstinately; § 33. and if he be no Heretic, he may sure be saved. It is not then certain damnation for any man to deny the infallibility of the Roman Church: but for him only that denies it obstinately, and then I am safe; for I am sure I do not. Neither can they say I shall be damned for Schism though not for Heresy, § 34. for he is as well no Schismatique, though in Schism, that is willing to join in communion with the true Church, when it appears to be so to him; as he is no Heretic though he hold Heretical opinions, that holds them not obstinately, that is (as I suppose) with a desire to be informed if he be in the wrong. Why, § 35. if it be not necessary always to believe the truth, so one believe in general what the Church would have believed, (for so they excuse great men that have held contrary opinions to theirs now, before they were defined or they knew them to be so) why (I say) shall not the same implicit assent to whatsoever God would have assented to (though I mistake what it is) be sufficient? When indeed to believe implicitly what God would have believed is to believe implicitly likewise what the Church teacheth, if this doctrine be within the number of those which God commands to be believed. I have therefore the less doubt of this opinion, § 36. that I shall have no harm for not believing the infallibility of the Church of Rome because of my being so fare from leaning to the contrary, and so suffering my will to have power over my understanding, that if God would leave it to me which Tenet should be true, I would rather choose that that should, than the contrary. For they may well believe me, that I take no pleasure in tumbling hard and unpleasant books and making myself giddy with disputing of obscure questions and dazzled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Caesariut. If I could believe, there should always be (whom I might always know) a society of men, § 37. whose opinions must be certainly true, and who would 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Synesius. labour to discuss & define all arising doubts, so as I might be excusably at ease, & have no part left for me but that of obedience, which must needs be a less difficult and so a more agreeable way then to endure endless volumes of commentaries, the harsh Greek of Evagrius, and the as hard Latin of Irenaeus, and be pained by distinguishing between different senses and various lections, and he would deserve not the lowest place in Bedlam that would prefer these studies before so many, so much more pleasant, that would rather employ his understanding, then submit it; and if he could think God imposed upon him only the resisting temptations, would, by way of addition, require from himself the resolving of doubts. I say not that all these books are to be read by those who understand not the languages, for them I conceive their seeking into Scripture may suffice. But if I have, by God's grace, skill to look into them, I cannot better use it then in the search of his will, where they say it is to be found, that I might assent to them if there I find reason for it; or if I do not, they may have no excuse for not excusing me. For whereas they say, § 38. it is pride makes us doubt of their infallibility; I answer that their too much laziness and impatience of examining is the cause many of them do not doubt. Next, what pride is it, never to assent before I find reason for it, (since they, when they follow that Church as infallible, § 39 pretend reason for it, and will not say they would, if they thought they found none) and if they say, we do find reason but will not confess it, than pride hinders not our assent, but our declaration of it; which if it do in any one, he is without question, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, condemned by himself, and it must be a very partial advocate that would strive to acquit him. One much prevailing argument which they make, § 40. is this, that whosoever leave them, fall into dissension between themselves, whereas they in the mean while are always at unity. I answer, first, in this whereof the question is now, they all consent. Secondly, when there is fire for them that disagree, they need not brag of their uniformity who consent. Thirdly they have many differences among them (as whether the Pope be infallible, Whether God predeterminate every action, Whether Election and Reprobation depend upon foresight,) Which seem to me as great as any between their adversaries; and in the latter the Jesuits have Ancienter and more general Tradition on their side, than the Church of Rome hath in any other question; and as much ground from reason for the defence of God's goodness, as they can think they have for the necessity of an infallible guide; yet these arguments must not make the Dominicans Heretics, and must us. If they say, § 41. The Church hath not resolved it (which signifies only, that they are not agreed about it, which is that we object) I answer, It ought to have done, if conformity to the ancient Church be required, in which all that ever I could hear of before Saint Austin (who is very various I confess in it) delivered the contrary to the Dominicans, as not doubtful; and to say, it is lawful for them to disagree whensoever they do not agree, is ridiculous: for they cannot do both at once about the same point. And if they say, § 42. they mean, by the Churches not having concluded it, that a Council hath not, I answer that they condemn some without any, and why not these? Next, I say that the opinion of the Diffused Church is of more force than the conclusion of a Representative (which hath its authority from the other) and therefore if all extant for four hundred years teach any thing, that is more Heresy to deny that then any Canon of a Council. But may not howsoever any other company of People (that would maintain themselves to be infallible) say as much, § 43. that all other sects differ from one another, and therefore should all agree with them? Would those not (think they) ascribe all other men's dissensions and learned men's falling into divers Heresies to their not allowing their infallibility to their not assenting to their Decrees? and not suffering them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to sit as teachers of those things that come in question, and to have all others in the place of Disciples obedient to them? which is that which Nilus, a Greek Bishop, professeth, that because the Greeks would not allow the Romans, was the only cause of separation between them. They use much to object, § 44. How could errors come into the Church without opposition, and mention both of that opposition in history? I answer, they might come in not at once, but by degrees; as in the growth of a child and the motion of a clock, we see neither in the present, but know there was a present when we find it past. Next, so many Authors being lost, who can make it certain to me that from none of those, we should have had notice of this opposition, if they had come to us? Next I say there are two sorts of errors, to hold a thing necessary that is unlawful and false, or that in but profitable and probable: Of the second sort that errors should come in, it appears not hard to me, and especially in those ages where want of Printing made books, and consequently learning not so common as now it is; where the few that did study busied themselves in Schoole-Speculations only, when the Authority of a man of chief note had a more general influence than now it hath, and so (as Thucydides saith the Plague did in his time, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the disease that first settled in the head easily passed through all the body,) considering how apt all men are to desire that all men should think as they do, and consequently to lay a necessity upon the receiving that opinion, if they conceived that a way to have it received: And then if it were believed generally profitable, (as, for example, Confession,) who would be apt to oppose their calling it necessary, for the same cause for which they called it so? Besides, if this error were delivered by some Father in the hot opposition of some Heretic, it may be none of his side would oppose it, lest they might take advantage by their dissension, and he that disputed for the Orthodox side, might lose by it much of his authority. The word [necessary] itself is often used for very convenient; § 45. and then from necessary in that sense to absolutely necessary is no difficult change, though it be a great one. The Father's use Heretics sometimes in a large sense, and sometimes in a stricter; & so differ in the reckoning them up; Some leaving out those that others put in (though they had seen the precedent Catalogue) The doubtfulness of the sense of those words might bring in error. Names, as an Altar, Sacrifice, Massa, may have been used first in one sense, and the name retained though the thing signified received changes; which may have been the art of the Church of Rome, as it was once of an Emperor of Rome, Cui proprium fuit nuper reperta (I leave out Scelera) priscis verbis obtegere, whose property it was to cover things newly found out with ancient terms. And the same Author tells us, that the same State was as it were cheated out of her liberty because there did remain, Eadem Magistratuum vocabula, The same titles of Magistrates; and I believe that if the Protestants beyond the Seas would have thought Bishops as good a word as Superintendents, (and so in other such things) many, who understand nothing but names, would have miss the Scandal they have now taken. These ways (I think) things may have come, § 46. without much opposition, from being thought profitable to be done, and probable to be believed, to be thought necessary to be both: and how things little by little may have been received under old names, which would not have been so at once under new ones: (the first of these being no such small fault but that part of the Montanists heresy was thinking uncommanded fasting days necessary to be observed, which without doubt might lawfully have been kept.) But my main answer is, § 47. that if for an opinion to be in the Church without known precedent opposition, be a certain note of being received from the beginning, let them answer, how came in the opinion of the Chiliasts not contradicted till two hundred years after it came in. To conclude, § 48. if they can prove that the Scripture may be a certainer teacher of truths to them then to us, so they may conclude the infallibility of the Church out of it, and we nothing; If they can prove the Church's infallibility to be a sufficient Guide for him that doubts Which is the Church, and cannot examine that (for want of learning) by her chief mark, which is conformity with the Ancient; If they can prove that the consent of Father's long together (if they had it) is a stronger argument against us, then against the Dominicans; If they can prove that though the first of them affirm that such a thing is Tradition, and believed by all Christians (and this assertion till a great while after uncontradicted) yet they are not bound to receive it, and, upon less grounds, we are; If indeed any can prove by any infallible way the infallibility of the Church of Rome, & the necessity under pain of damnation for all men to believe it, (which were the more strange, because justin Martyr, and Clemens Alexandrinus among the Ancients, and Erasmus and Ludovicus Vives among the moderns, believe some Pagans to be saved) I will subscribe to it, And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Sophoc. If any man shall vouchsafe to think either this, § 49. or the Author of it, of value enough to confute the one and inform the other, I shall desire him to do it with proceeding to the business, and not standing upon any small slip of mine, (of which sort this may be full) and with that Civility which is fit to be used by men that are not so passionate as to have the definition of reasonable creatures in vain; (remembering that truth in likelihood, is where her Author God was, in the still voice, and not in the loud wind; And that Epiphanius excuseth himself if he have called any Heretics in his anger, Deceivers, or Wretches, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and I request him also to bring me to the Truth (if I be out of it) not only by his arguments but also by his prayers: which ways if he use, and I still continue on the part I am of, and yet do neither 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, neither am wilfully blind, nor deny impudently what I see, than I am confident that neither he will have reason to be offended with me in this world, nor God in the next. FALKLAND. FINIS.