A LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN To the Honourable Ed. Howard Esq Occasioned By a CIVILISED EPISTLE OF Mr. DRYDEN'S, Before his Second Edition of his INDIAN EMPEROR. In the SAVOY, Printed by Thomas Newcomb, 1668. SIR, I Have now for some time expected an Answer from your Honourable Brother, Sir Robert Howard, to Mr. Drydens' Epistle before his Indian Emperor; But I perceive that your Brother thinks it unworthy of his Thoughts; nor can any Ingenious Person blame Him, that He rather despises to give Himself the least Trouble, where nothing of any weight of Reason can justly challenge it; and besides, possibly being conscious to Himself, that he could not so well make a Return in a Billingsgate stile, which he saw so exactly performed by his Angry Opponent. But least Sir, that scolding Text should want a Commentary, I humbly offer unto you these my Observations upon it, and will make no Excuse for my own weakness, since the Cause itself affords Abilities enough to any that has a just Respect to the peculiar Honour of your Brother, and a General Love to Justice, and Good Manners. But having called this Angry Author, Mr. Dryden, and He having been displeased before with that Honourable Person for calling Him an Author; I will rectify both Errors, and try to Please him (being a wrathful man with the Title of an Esquire, which he Bestows on Himself, or modestly endures his Bookseller to put upon him; yet withal hoping he can prove it better by the Heralds than he has done the Rest; I proceed Sir, to take notice, that the Squire having fixed some Ironical Compliments upon that Honourable Person your Brother, instead of the Cause he is to maintain, he takes notice of two verses in the beginning of the Duke of Lerma, for which he would have him lose the opinion of sober men, as it seems he has done His; not that it is a Consequence, that he should lose any worthy man's Good opinion for the Squires Ill one, who perhaps not so well able to defend his own Paradoxes, is disordered with so much passion, which so confounds his expressions, that I know not what he is most angry at. If he means the Two first Lines, and the other Twenty, (which he glances at) are Nonsense, or Ill ones; the Reader is the best Judge, and he only saying they are so, it is enough to say I think they are not so: But if the Squire would have it understood, that the Honourable Person used some things in the old Play, he has acknowledged it already, and professed he would have used more, had not the Alteration of the whole design deprived him of the Benefit. But the Squire having writ down the two first lines, what ever he means, I that have read the old Play will assure him, that the Honourable Person used but the two first words of it, though he has preserved the method in the beginning. But the Squire perhaps is justly angry to see any one use the least thing of another Writer, and enter into his Jurisdiction, claiming the right of Theft perhaps by continual Custom; witness his Maiden Queen stolen out of the Queen of Corinth: a great part of his Indian Emperor, and most of his Mock ginger, which he means (for he is a Critic) the Feigned ginger out of French Plays and Romances; from whence I cannot but observe that he is in danger to be thought an ill-natured Squire; since the Charactor of an Engrossing Plagiary may possibly be more justly due to him than the Title of Esquire, which he has been pleased to assume. The next thing Sir, that I shall take notice of, is his admiration, to be thought so ridiculous as to dispute whether Prose or Verse be nearest to ordinary Conversation; by the Squire's favour the Honourable Person never said so, but only presumed to say, that a Play seemed to represent Persons speaking Extempore, which indeed is ordinary Conversation, and then acknowledged that the Squire raised Arguments only unanswerable against himself, by laying down the rule for every thing, to be nearest the nature of what it represents: And I hope this is no fault in the Honourable Person, who never contended for the Rule; so that as to this Particular, I think there needs no more to be said, only adding this small observation, that the Squire cannot endure to be thought Ridiculous, though he deserves it. The Squire is then pleased to tell us of a Gentleman, who maintained a Contradiction in the face of 300 Persons; when he will vouchsafe to tell us the Person and Contradiction, the Party I suppose will give an answer; which by what I have heard, I believe none can be ignorant, that Honourable Person can as little as any be suspected to be the Party; and yet I dare not say so much for him, as the Squire once ventured to say on his own behalf to a Lady of most Eminent Quality (equalled with a great Virtue and Parts) when he was so bold, as to tell her, a Gentleman could not err, and then certainly a Squire is infallible. After this he seems satisfied, that the Honourable Person says he had rather read good Verse than Prose; I believe he had and rather his, than his Prose, unless it were written with a better temper; but the Squire demands no more than This from all others, I am his Intercesser, he may obtain his desire; and leave it to them that are pleased to grant it, to judge, whether they have bettered his Arguments by their Affections. Next he urges, that a Play is supposed to be the work of a Poet, imitating or representing the Conversation of several persons; the words of the Honourable Person, just before, (which he quotes, and quarrels at) are, That a Play is supposed to be a Composition of several persons speaking extempore, and yet the Squire craves leave to descent, though he says the same thing, all but the word Extempore. And if there be any otherway of Conversation, 'tis only known to the Squire, who has the sharpness to see a difference in the same thing. But now the Squire says he will be bolder, (truly I thought he had been bold enough before) and doubts not to make good a Paradox: for having said, that all things must be nearest the nature of what they represent; he is turned about now, and says Prose should not be used, because it is too near Converse, which is the nature of what it represents. I suppose the Squire had need of a Legion of Parts (which he speaks of) to maintain this: for sometimes every thing is best, that is nearest the nature of what it represents; and presently it is the worse for being too near it; and then as luckily proceeds to tell us, that the most skilful Painters affirm, there may be too great a likeness, and too near a resemblance in a Picture; I am very confident the Squire never heard an indifferent good Painter, much less an excellent one, affirm so ridiculous a thing: but to salve his credit in this, he is left to bring (if he can) such a Certificate from so excellent a Painter, whose great Authority may make us submit our sense so far as to believe the Paradox: But were Sir Anthony Vandyke now living (who I suppose we may allow to have been excellent in that Art) the Squire would hardly get a Certificate from him, whose Fame, if it be true what he says, he has blasted in one sentence, for he has proved him to make worse Pictures than any, because he made all more exactly like, then ever any man did. But I leave the pursuit of such absurdities, nor do I pretend to dwell upon his Reasons, where the honourable Person repeats his, and only fairly returns his own, I leave them to the Reader, who in my opinion will easily judge, that the honourable person could perceive nothing of any new weight to move him to a reply; and I am confident there had been no answer returned, had not the Squire's Passion led him to Invectives, foreign to the Argument. The next favour, the honourable person receives from the Esquire; is about that verse of Seneca. Reserate clusos Regii Posts Laris. And here he will neither allow Him to understand a Latin word, nor an English word; Notwithstanding those Testimonies which in both kinds that honourable person hath given of himself: but if he had not understood the word Resero, nor could have spelt, whereby to have searched it in a Dictionary; yet since the Esquire was pleased to tell us the English of it, he might, (had he resolved to have used any modesty,) have believed it a mistake sooner than so much Ignorance in any one, as not to understand the difference of the words to open and to shut. I suppose therefore in stead of wittily Chiding the Printer, he ought to Chide Himself; But in one Case of the Squires I cannot tell, whether I may assume the Liberty to Chide the Printer for a mistake he committed in the first Edition of his Indian Emperor, in this Excellent Verse— — And follow Fate, that does too fast pursue. which in the second Edition is thus Corrected— — And follow Fate, that would too fast Pursue. There is another Line in his Astraea Redux, which, because the Squire is so severe, I will not omit. An horrid stillness first invades the Eare. I have not heard of the like Expression unless in a Tale of an Officer, that Commanded a Centinel not to stir a Foot, but walk up and down, and see what he could hear. Now whether this first Nonsense be Rectified by the Printer, or by the Squires Increase of Understanding, or, where fault the last is, I dare not Determine. But, for all this, the Squire need not believe, that the Honourable Person can have any Apprehension of the examining any faults of his, since his Passion guides him so ill, as not to distinguish between a Fault and a Mistake, if it be believed, that he understands a Word of English; and therefore he is rather Invited to use his Freedom: For, 'tis possible some may Believe in his Promise, that may find nothing in his Performance. So, leaving him to his own Liberty, I pass over his Arguments, not seeing any thing in them, that appears (to my Apprehension at least) either New or Weighty, but leave them to the Readers better Determination; and proceed to the next mark of his displeasure, which is so ill placed, that the Squire is Angry with that Honourable Person for Calling the Muses his long Acquaintance; if he means in point of time, that Honourable Person is only a proper Judge, whether the time seemed long to him, or no; but if he means he ought to pretend no Acquaintance in the least with them; it is enough to Refer this piece of Anger to those, who have Read his Writings, and among them, the last he obliged the World with, the Duel of the Staggs, is a sufficient Testimony, that the Squire is more angry than he ought to be. The next Charge the Squire is pleased to draw up against Him, is about Notions Politic, and Grave, tending to the Instruction of Princes, and Reformation of States: I know not, that the Honourable Person seems Guilty of any such Design in the least, but if the Squire be, as he says he is, for Distributive Justice, we may justly presume that when his Indian Emperor was first acted, he intended to instruct and reform all Churches in Polemical Divinity, by his admirable Dispute between a Christian and a Heathen Priest; which also shows how great a loss the Church had of him, when he was diverted from entering into Orders. Then he quarrels with the Style of that Honourable Person (I wish he had proposed him one fit to change for) which he says the Critics have branded with the Name of Obscurity, and False Grammar: Who these Critics be, he is not pleased to tell us, but writes, as he would have preached, as a certain Author hath it; by which the Squire seems to be one of the Quidams damned at least in Quevedo's Visions, where I leave the Squire to read his farther Description. But in his next scolding Paragraph, he is more unhappy in his Anger, and quarrels with the Honourable Person, for saying he was now fettered in Business of more unpleasant Natures, which he will have to be State matters. But the Squire was very much mistaken, for I by accident once heard that Honourable Person complain that two tedious Suits in Chancery had almost deprived him of the right use of any time; and yet I think he need not be ashamed of those Services he endeavours to do his King and Country; so that either way the Squire's Displeasure is very unjustly applied: And above all men, this angry Squire ought not to be his Interpreter: But his Fortune, and that of the Honourable Persons are different; for the Squire mistakingly charges him that the corruption of a Poet, was the generation of a Statesman; but on the contrary the Squire having been employed as a Puny Statesman under his Father a Zealous Committee-man, and Sir Gilbert Pickering a crafty Privy Counsellor in the late times, it may more properly be applied to the Squire, That the corruption of a Statesman is the generation of a Poet Laureate. Then he quarrels at the word Ubi, had that Honourable Person said Where, in English, the Squire would have been angry too. Then he is displeased and says that to perform the manner of a thing is New English, that cannot be helped; but it is Old English to every one else, since, the Proverb is so common, That the manner of doing a thing, is as much as the thing itself. Then he snaries about the word Taste, which is usually applied to any kind of liking: but I should be as rude as he is, to entertain the Reader long with such Vomits of Choler. The next Displeasure he shows, is, that the Honourable Person says, That 'tis not necessary for Poets to study strict Reason (nor good Manners neither, if the Poet Laureate be admitted Precedent) since they are so used to a greater Latitude than is allowed by that severe Inquisition. But he says Moral Truth is the Mistress of the Poet, as well as of the Philosopher: Poesy must resemble Natural Truth, but it must be Ethical; the Poet dresses Truth, and adorns Nature, but does not alter them. These are the Squires words, but since he does not prove this in the same place, I will furnish the Reader with an exact Proof, written by himself in a wonderful Stanza, in his wonderful Poem of the wonderful year 1666. And withal it tells us how the Fire of London was put out, which few Country people knew before; the Stanza runs thus: A hollow Crystal Pyramid he takes, In Firmamental Waters dipped above; With this a broad Extinguisher he makes, And hoods the Flames, which to their Quarry strove. Now the Reader may easily judge, whether this be not Moral Truth; if this does not resemble Natural Truth, if it be not Ethical, and if the Squire has not dressed Truth, and adorned Nature, but not altered them. In the next place he says (with Truth still Annexed to his Poetry) that the Honourable Person attaques all the Ancients, and Moderns, while he fights (as he says) under their ample Shields, as little Teucer fought under the large Buckler of Ajax Telamonius. I know not why the small Squire compares himself to little Teucer, unless it be very pleasant to him to talk of such a safe way of fight: for I never read that the Honourable Person blamed the Ancients for writing Verse, but him, or any, that lay down Rules against the writing of it. For Verse could not be thought nearest Nature by all the Ancients, since Seneca writ all his Tragedies in Verse, and Terence all his Comedies, which may be the Squire did not remember, or knew not. Now if Verse in Tragedy, and Verse in Comedy be both nearest Nature, the Squire deserves his Laurel. But now the Squire gins to be more kind, and offers the Honourable Person his Help in a Logical way, and makes a Syllogism for him, which is, if one Stage cannot properly present two Rooms or Houses, much less two countries' or Kingdoms, than there can be no unity of place: but one Stage cannot properly perform this, therefore there can be no unity of place: And then he denies that which he calls his Minor Proposition. But what needs the Squire make a Syllogism for another, who has no reason to like it. Being pleased to repeat that which is more truly the sense of the Honourable Person, which is, that a Stage being one place cannot be two, I think this is true, and therefore can as little be two Houses as two Countries. But the Squire says it may represent two Rooms successively, so it may two Kingdoms. This Bog he labours to get out of, and I appeal to the Reader, whether he sticks or no. I was going to charge this Notion on his Fancy, but a little after he says, that Fancy and Reason go hand in hand, the first cannot leave the last behind. If this be true, the Squire has salved all the Errors of fantastical people, together with his own. But I doubt that Fancy and Reason are not so good Friends, and if the Squire had kept them closer together, we should have believed better of their Friendships. The Squire is then pleased to Confess that the lesser cannot Comprehend the Greater: yet in a little Glass a whole Room and many pesons may be represented, or seen: so may a Country be seen out of a little hole of a Window, but the Room cannot get into the Glass, nor the Country into the Hole. But the Honourable Person spoke not of what may seem represented, but of what really could be; and then inserted there could be no such thing as they pretend to imitate, which was to come nearest to the Nature of that which could not be at all. But immediately he appears as unhappy in his Philosophy as in his Logic. When the Honourable Person only speaks of things absolutely impossibile; the Squire talks of that which is only so ex parte, and then would make it no Impossibility, by the help of the First mover to alter the Nature of it. When by the help of the Squire (who is the first mover of such Philosophy) the nature of things are so altered thot two can be one, the Squire is triumphant, till then 'tis submitted to the Reader. But now he says the Honourable Person is to be Excused for declaring against the Unity of Time, being a person Interessed, for the time of the Play of the Duke of Lerma contained many years; if this be true, he is not to be blamed; for by his favour he writ against that which is impossible to be made a Rule, not against any time shorter, or longer used by any one. But if he had Argued according to what he writ, sure 'tis more Ingenuous, than for the Squire, who so pleads for the Unity of time to write the Indian Emperor, which contains the time of Cortes his landing to the Death of Montezuma; let him consider this, and it will appear, he ought to be more displeased with his own Disingenuity. And now coming to assault the Honourable Person, when he says he grows feeble, (which is the most seasonable time for the Squire to attack any one in) he says according to his usual Custom, that the Honourable Person improves his observation to an Argument, that he might have the glory to Confute it. But it appears on the contrary by his slighting of him, that the Honourable Person apprehends no glory in confuting any Argument of his: And on the other side, I believe he never thought any observation of the Squires worthy to be drawn into an Argument, and accordingly, the Honourable Person called it an Argument, or Observation being it seems as unable, as others are to know justly what Name or Title to fix on such a positive Thesis. But now the storm ceases, and the Illustrious Squire is pleased to shine with more gentle beams on the Honourable Person; and fawningly says, he lays all at his feet, and Honours his Person, and Parts. The Squire must needs be believed, since he has endeavoured to describe him to be the owner of such Excellent ones. He says, he has often employed his Pen in his Commendations, I hope he means this Time for one. He Adds then, He has many particular obligations to him. In this the Squire is like to be credited, since this Return he has made, is so grateful a Testimony of it; yet at the last the Squire is pleased to give him the Title of a Noble opponent; and to this last I am confident he will Receive a just return from the Honourable Person, when ever the Squire pleases to give him cause to call him so. In the mean time, I believe the Squire cannot reasonably expect it from him, since I have heard from a very brave Gentleman, who was lately engaged to wait upon the Squire, that his cold Answer has discouraged the Honourable Person from such an Expectation. Thus, Sir, I have Traveled through this foul way, and have Preserved myself as clean as possibly I could; yet it was so dirty, that some Testimony of such a Passage must needs stick to any that goes thorough it. But, Sir, if I have done like a good Scavenger, and carrried the Filth back to himself the proper Laystall I doubt not but to Receive from you and all other Just persons, the opinion that I love Justice, and good manners, which, I hope, will render me not unworthy of the Title of SIR, Your faithful and humble Servant R. F. Postscript. Sir, SInce I had writ this Letter to you, I happened to meet a Gentleman, who discoursing with me about this Argument, told me he could show me in a Copy of verses of one of the most Excellent Persons of our time, this Question Decided with as clear Generosity as Reason. I begged him to do me the favour, and he immediately shown me the Prologue of the Earl of Orrery to his Play of Henry the fifth. I read it with that content, that I could not but insert it as an Exact Decision of the Argument. THE PROLOGUE. WE have with Foreign Tales so filled your Ears, As if our Poets were all Foreigners; This Author begs you'll lend him but two hours, To entertain you with your Ancestors. He thinks no stories merit to be known, Nor can instruct us better than our own. But look not for great Actions in a Play, Contracted to the limits of a Day. Nor where the Scene is to one place confined, To those strict Rules the French their Poets bind: Yet none of them for this a Reason shows, But to their Mode of Writing, as of , They think the English ever should agree; Well, when some wit of theirs will let us see, Why in two hours they on their Stages play That which presents the Turns of a whole day; Our Poet then will make it full as clear, That in two hours he may include a year. It were not fit, in stories of that Age, When we ruled France, French Laws should rule our Stage. Nor is it just in Poetry to bind Fancy, which is tormented, when confined. He hopes you will excuse him, if he strives To break those Laws a Foreign Nation gives. For sure, without your leave, he'll ne'er submit, That those whom our Swords ruled, should rule our wit. FINIS.