THE COURT OF THE GENTILES. PART IV. Of Reformed Philosophy. BOOK III. Of Divine Predetermination. WHEREIN The Nature of Divine Predetermination is fully Explicated and Demonstrated, both in the General, as also more Particularly, as to the Substrate Mater, or Entitative Act of Sin: WITH A Vindication of Calvinists and others from that Blasphemous Imputation of Making God the Author of Sin. By Theophilus Gale. Si Pelagio tantillum dederis, danda sunt omnia. Cornel. Jansen. Praefat. in Pelag. LONDON, Printed for John Hill at the Black Lion in Fleetstreet, and Samuel Tidmarsh at the Kings-Head in Cornhill. 1678. PREFACE. THE strong and almost invincible Inclination I have to Solitude and Retirement, with a natural aversion from the Controversies of this Age, wherein there is so little of Christian Candour, Fidelity, Ingenuity, and Moderation to be found, hath given me no small satisfaction in my being exempted hitherto from those vexatious Conflicts which I see many learned and pious men involved in: and it seems to me a thing no less than prodigious, to consider, with what warm zeal and self-complacence some learned men contend in the mists and clouds of ambiguous terms, as if they had no other design but that of some Mercenary Soldiers, who do what they can to protract the War. These and such like considerations have kept me, for some Months, from the publication of this Discourse, with hopes there might be found out some Expedients for the putting a period to those unhappy Controversies it refers to, which I now have little hopes of. But enough of that. The Discourse itself both as to its first conception and present publication, has not been without various agitations in mine own thoughts; and how little my natural Inclinations have induced me hereto, is well known to some. But I must confess, the crime charged on us being no less than Blasphemy against the God of Heaven, it may be deservedly judged too great a violation to the Laws of Christianity not to purge ourselves from so black an Imputation; and yet in as much as some reverend Divines, of repute among us both for their Learning and Piety, have entertained Sentiments opposite to our Hypothesis, we have been very studious, yea emulous to deliver our own thoughts in such a mode or form, as may be least obnoxious to passionate emotions, personal reflections, or whatever may unbeseem one that lies under essential obligation to love and honour the Persons of some that differ in Judgement about these points. Wherefore, to render our Discourse the less offensive, we have cast it into a thetic and dogmatic Method, rather than agonistic and polemic. And because it is altogether impossible distinctly and demonstratively to discuss such an Hypothesis, without some opposition against such as defend the Antithesis, we have pitched on Strangius as our principal Antagonist, who indeed, to give him his merited character, has ventilated this Controversy with candour, perspicuity, and force of Argument beyond his Sectators. Yet we must also do the Cause we undertake this justice, as to declare, that we have not omitted to examine the Reasons and Arguments of other Reverend Divines, who oppose our Hypothesis, albeit we have, as in duty we conceived ourselves obliged, concealed their Names. For indeed, of what use are such personal Nominations and Reflections, but to render us a grief to Friends, and reproach to Enemies? As for my Style, if any judge my pen too much drenched in Scholastic Theology, I shall not deny, but that I have spent some time in those Studies, neither do I as yet see any reason to repent thereof; for I have found those Controversies about Divine Concourse and Efficacious Grace, no where more accurately examined and demonstratively determined, than among the Schoolmen, specially, Bradwardine and Alvarez, neither can I conceive how any one can distinctly and perfectly discuss these Controversies, specially as now miserably perplexed with ambiguous obscure terms, without some inspection into and knowledge of Scholastic Theology. For doth not a principal part of the Controversy depend on that scholastic Notion of freewill? Yea, is there any thing New started by the Arminians or New Methodists, but what has been fully examined and answered by some among the more sober Schoolmen, specially Aquinas, Ariminensis, Bradwardine and Alvarez. Whatever others may judge of them, yet Reverend Mr. Baxter, Cathol. Theol. Part 1. p. 124. prefers the Schoolmen before Arminians. And albeit I have a particular kindness for some of the more sober Schoolmen, as to such points wherein they serve not the Papal Interest, and their own vain Imaginations; yet what a low and cheap estime I have of the Schoolmen in the general, is sufficiently apparent, by the Character I have given them, Court of the Gentiles, Part III. B. 2. c. 2. S. 1. §▪ 2. And indeed I would read them, with the same indifference and suspension of mind, as I read Plato and Aristotle. But to conclude, if any private Christian desires, not to charge his thoughts with the Scholastic part of this Controversy, but only to satisfy his Doubts and confirm his Faith in the Scriptural part, he may confine himself to Chap. III. of this Discourse, (which contains almost a third Part of the Book) where we have under seven general Heads largely given the Scriptural Demonstrations of our Hypothesis, Touching God's Concourse to the entitative Act of Sin, with Solutions to such false Glosses and Comments as our Adversaries give thereto; which are suited to Vulgar Capacities. BREVIARIE of CONTENTS. The COURT of the GENTILES. PART IV. Of Reformed Philosophy. BOOK III. Of Divine Predetermination. CHAP. I. The Explication of the Terms. THE Controversy about Predetermination to the entitative act of Sin. p. 2 Seven heads to be discussed by us. 3 The Explication of the Terms. 4 1. Of Sin. (1) It's origine. ibid. (2) It's substrate mater. 5 (3) It's formal Constitution. 6 [1] All acts in their generic nature indifferent. ib. [2] All moral Constitution from the Divine Law. ibid. [3] Sin formally considered privative. 7 (4) The Kind's of sinful actions. 8 [1] Actions modally sinful. 9 [2] Actions intrinsically sinful. ib. 2. The natural liberty of the Will, what. 10 The New Methodists distinction of Liberty largely and strictly taken, examined and refelled. 11 The true Idea of Liberty. 12 3. Moral Liberty, or Freewill to good. 13 Of Necessity, Impossibility, Possibility. 15 4. The Will of God, its Distribution into significative and decretive. 17 5. Divine Concourse. (1) Its Immediation, consisting not in a mere Hability to act, but in exciting to act. 19 (2) Its efficacity and Predetermination. 21 [1] Efficacious Concourse, what. 22 [2] Determinative Concourse, what. 23 [3] Predeterminative Concourse, what. 24 Predeterminative Concourse active and passive: also Physic and Moral. 25 Gods Predetermination to wicked acts. 27 CHAP. II. The state of the Controversy. THE agreement of the Predeterminants' and Antipredeterminants' in ten Propositions. 28, etc. The Antipredeterminants' differences among themselves in 5 particulars. 34, etc. The difference between the Predeterminants' and Antipredeterminants' in 7 particulars. 40, etc. CHAP. III. Scriptural Demonstrations of our Hypothesis. 1. FRom God's prime causality. 45, etc. 2. From God's predetermining natural actions to which sin is annexed. 52, etc. [1] The Vendition of Joseph. ibid. Evasions as to joseph's Vendition solved. 56 [2] The Crucifixion of Christ. 58 Evasions about Christ's Crucifixion taken off. 65 3 From Gods making use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his people. 69 4. From God's immediate hand in the Acts of Sin. 72 Shimei's cursing David from God. 73 God moved David to number the People. 75 Other Acts of sin from God. 76, etc. 5. From God's efficacious permission of sin. 85 6. From God's judicial Induration. 90 The false Comments of Adversaries reselled. 94 Gods concourse to the individual act which is sinful. 96 How God judicially hardens men, without being the Author of sin. 97 7. From God's efficacious ordering men's sins for his own glory. 101 CHAP. IV. An Historic Idea of Predeterminants' and Antipredeterminants'. THe Assertors of Gods predeterminative Concourse to the substrate mater of Sin. 108 Augustins Sentiments touching it. 109 Prosper and Fulgentius. 110 Anselm, Hugo de Sancto Victore accord hereto. 111 Aquinas express herein. 112 Scotus also positive herein. 114 Greg. Ariminensis demonstrates the same. 116 So Holcot and Altissiodorensis. 117 Thomas Bradwardine his Character and zeal for efficacious Grace. 118 Also for efficacious Concourse to the substrate mater of sin. ibid. His Sentiments touching Gods willing sin. 119 Also how the entitative act is from God's predeterminative Concourse. 121 Moreover how God spontaneously impels men to the entitative act of sin. 122 The Sentiments of Dominicans, Alvarez, etc. 123 The doctrine of Jansenius, concordant with ours. 125 The Jansenists sentiments agree also. 126 The Roman Catechism consonant. 127 Reformed Divines, Wiclef, Calvin, Zuinglius, fully agree. 128 Chamiers defence of our Hypothesis. 130 The Testimony of Lud. Crocius for us. 131 The Synod of Dort and Church of England, Davenant, Ward, Abbot, etc. for us. 132 Such as deny God's concourse to the substrate mater of sin. 136 Martion, Manes, Pelagius, Nic. Bonetus. 137 Durandus against God's immediate concourse. ib. Who they are that symbolise with Durandus. 138 The Consentiments of Jesuits and Molinisis. 139 Lud. à Dola a sectator of Durandus. 140 Arminius' Consentiments. 141 The Remonstrants and Anabaptists consent. 142 The New Methodists how far consentient. 143 Camero and Amyraldus their consent. 144 Placeus in suspense. 145 Le Blanc and Baronius how far they agree. 146 Strangius our principal Adversary. 147 How these New Methodists fell into this their New Method in imitation of Semipelagians. 149 Who of the New Methodists may be esteemed orthodox. 150 CHAP. V. Rational Demonstrations of our Hypothesis. ARguments for Predetermination to the substrate mater of all sin; 1. From the Futurition of allthings. 151 Objections against this Argument solved. 152 2. From the Certitude of divine Prescience. 155 Our Adversaries Evasions from the force of this Argument. 157 3. From the divine Will and Decrees, specially that of Reprobation. 159 Davenant's Hypotheses about absolute Reprobation. 161 4. From Divine Concourse: (1) It's Principe. 163 (2) Its Nature. [1] totality. ibid. [2] Universality as to Effects. 164 [3] Particularity as to manner of working. ib. [4] Immediation. 166 [5] Priority and Antecedence. 167 [6] Absolute Independence. 169 (3) From the Efficace of God's Concourse: 170 [1] As to all natural acts. 170 [2] As to supernatural Acts and Effects. 172 The Objections urged by the New Methodists against Predetermination to the substrate mater of Sin, urged with as much force by Arminians against predetermination to good. 174 5. From the Nature of Sin: (1) It's Mater. 176 (2) Its formal Reason. 178 6. From God's Permission of sin. 179 Divine Permission explicated. 180 7. From God's Providence about Sin. 182 8. From Creatural Dependence. 185 CHAP. VI The Objections against Predetermination to the substrate mater of Sin solved. 1. OBject. That this Hypothesis makes God the Author of Sin. 189 1. This Objection as urged by Baronius. ib. 2. The Objection as urged by Strangius. 191 General Solutions for the freeing God from being the Author of Sin. 195 (1) Gods Will the effective cause of the substrate mater, not a defective cause of Sin. ibid. (2) None the Author of sin, but the particular moral cause thereof. 196 (3) God concurs only to what is naturally good in sin. ibid. 2. Object. From God's Essence and Attributes. 197 (1) God's Sincerity and Fidelity vindicated. ib. (2) His Justice also cleared. 198 (3) The Vindication of his Mercy. 199 (4) His Sanctity also vindicated. 200 3. Object. From God's Word. (1) Preceptive. 202 (2) Promissive and Inviting. ibid. [1] Al Promises primarily for the Elect. 204 [2] Their use as to Reprobates. ib. [3] The Antithesis of Antipredeterminants' destroyeth the use of Promises, etc. as much as our Hypothesis. 206 [4] What Power we allow Reprobates. 207 4. Object. From the Overthrow of Religion. 208 5. Object. From the Liberty of the Wil ib. The injustice of the New Methodists in urging this Objection, and its inconsistence with their own Sentiments. 209 CHAP. VII. The genuine Hypotheses of the Predeterminants' and Antipredeterminants' with their Consequents. THe genuine Hypotheses of the Predeterminants', with the false Hypotheses and Consequents imposed on them. 211 The Antitheses of the New Methodists and Antipredeterminants', with their dangerous Consequents. 215 Table of SCRIPTURES Explicated. Genesis. Ch. Verse. Pag. 45. 5, 7, 8. 53 Exodus. Ch. Verse. Pag. 9 14, 15, 16. 102 1 Samuel. Ch. Verse. Pag. 2. 25. 86 26. 19 76 2 Samuel. Ch. Verse. Pag. 12. 11. 72 16. 10, 11. 73 16. 22. 72 24. 1. 75 1 Kings. Ch. Verse. Pag. 11. 31, 37. 77 12. 15, 24. 77 22. 23. 79 2 Kings. Ch. Verse. Pag. 9 3, 10. 78 10. 30. ibid. Job. Ch. Verse. Pag. 1. 21. 71 12. 16, 17. 88 Psalms. Ps. Verse. Pag. 33. 15. 47 69. 22. & 81. 12. 90 105. 25. 71 Proverbs. Ch. Verse. Pag. 16. 4. 103 21. 1. 49 Esaias. Ch. Verse. Pag. 6. 10. 91 10. 5, 6, 7. 69 19 14. 92 26. 12. 45 29. 10. 91 44. 18, 19 92 60. 2. ib. 63. 17. 89 Jeremy. Ch. Verse. Pag. 16. 16. 70 Habakkuk. Ch. Verse. Pag. 3. 4. 49 Matthew. Ch. Verse. Pag. 26. 24. 58 Luke. Ch. Verse. Pag. 22. 22. 24, 60 John. Ch. Verse. Pag. 19 10, 11. 61 Acts. Ch. Verse. Pag. 2. 23. 24, 62 4. 28. 63 7. 9 55 11. 21. 49 17. 26. 23 17. 28. 51 18. 21. 52 Romans. Ch. Verse. Pag. 1. 28. 93 8. 29, 30. 24 9 17, 18. 102, 103 9 21, 22. 104 11. 8, 10. 92, 91 11. 36. 45 1 Corinthians. Ch. Verse. Pag. 2. 7. 24 4. 19 52 4. 28. 24. 12. 6, 11. 22. 2 Corinthians. Ch. Verse. Pag. 4. 12. 22. Ephesians. Ch. Verse. Pag. 1. 11. 22, 24, 46 1. 19 & 3. 7. 22. Philippians. Ch. Verse. Pag. 3. 21. 22. 2 Thessalonians. Ch. Verse. Pag. 2. 11. 93. Hebrews. Ch. Verse. Pag. 4. 7. 23 James. Ch. Verse. Pag. 4. 15. 53 1 Peter. Ch. Verse. Pag. 2. 8. 105 Judas. Ch. Verse. Pag. 4. 107 Revelations. Ch. Verse. Pag. 17. 17. 81 Table of Hebraic Words Explicated. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, verily. p. 102 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to termine, and determine. 23 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to decree. 24 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to make to stand. 102 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, daub, or dim. 91 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to contrive. 55 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he hath daubed. 92 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Judgement. 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he infatuateth. ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to found. 104 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he excited. 75 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, mine omnipotent severity. 103 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to ordain. 104 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because. 86 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to be determined. 23 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to cover over by daubing; thence to expiate and purge. 100 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Stumbling-stone or block. 100, 105 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to mingle, or pour forth. 92 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, stumbling, or smiting. 100 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to predetermine. 80, 81 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, they were designed. 105 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to work efficaciously. 22 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to declare. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to work. 22 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, thick darkness. 93 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, efficaciously to work. 103 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to explicate more clearly. 60 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to erect. 102 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to stupefy. 91 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to seal, or constitute. 24, 65 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a deceiver. 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, spoiled. ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to constitute, or destiny. 106 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to predetermine. 90, 102 Table of Grecanic Words Explicated. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, reprobate, drossy. 93 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a fixed decree. 62, 63 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he peremtorily willed. 86 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a determined decree. 81, 82 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, hath predetermined. 80, 81 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, efficacity what. 22 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to work efficaciously. 22 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I have constituted. 102 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, legal Authority. 61 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to Predetermine. 103 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, what. 91 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, aptly to fit or frame. 104 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to determine. 23, 24, 60 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a stupifying Portion. 91 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, designed. 107 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to predetermine. 24, 60, 64 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to preordain. 24 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Stone of offence. 100, 105, 107 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, bow down. 91 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to cooperate. 22 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to constitute. 106, 107 THE COURT OF THE GENTILES. PART IV. Of Reformed Philosophy. BOOK III. Of Divine Predetermination: Wherein the Nature of Divine Predetermination is fully explicated and demonstrated, both in the general, as also more particularly, as to the substrate matter or entitative act of Sin. CHAP. I. The Explication of the Terms. (1) The Origine of the controversy about Predetermination to the entitative act of Sin; with the method we proceed in. (2) The Nature of Sin, its Origine and material constitution; all acts in their generic nature indifferent: All Morality determined by the Moral Law: Sin as to its formal reason a privation: Of actions modally and intrinsically evil. (3) The Liberty of the Wil: The new-coined distinction of Liberty, largely and strictly taken, with its abuse: A true Idea of Liberty. (4) Moral Liberty or Freewill to good: Necessity, Impossibility, Possibility what. (5) The Will of God, its Distribution into Significative and Decretive. (6) Divine Concourse, its Immediation, efficacity, and Predetermination: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, with the Nature of Predetermination explicated. §. 1. THE Doctrine of Divine Concourse, and Creatural Dependence The Origine of the Controversy. has in all Ages of the Church, but more specially since the rise of Pelagianism, received vigorous assaults from many learned and potent Adversaries: and indeed no wonder, sithat corrupt Nature propagated from Adam has, in imitation of its first parent, been ever aspiring after an equality to the Deity; and that not only in being the last End of its Acting, but also the first Principe of its Dependence. This vain attemt has appeared more visibly in some daring and proud spirits, such as Nebuchadnezar, Dan. 4. 30. Is not this great Babylon that I have built, & c? But in others the Design and opposition against the Concourse of God has been more refined, under a pretext of vindicating the Divine Majesty from the blasphemous imputation of being the Author of sin. And because all pious Souls have so great a veneration for the Blessed Deity, as to abhor the very shadow of such Blasphemy, therefore the Adversaries of Divine Concourse have in all Ages pitched on this as the most puissant argument to oppose the same, that it brings the most holy and blessed God under the black imputation of encouraging, yea impelling men to Sin. And albeit those that assert Gods efficacious Concourse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin, do most vehemently detest in their own souls, and solemnly protest against the least thought or opinion that makes God the Author of sin, yet nevertheless this direful piece of blasphemy is still charged on them. Moreover, there being in this Doctrine of Efficacious Concourse (as in all other great Mysteries of Faith) some intricate difficulties, which the wise God has left us under, to try our faith and submission to divine Revelation; hence also many learned, and some pious men have been at a great loss in their Inquiries, how to reconcile the Liberty of the human Will with the Efficace of Divine Concourse, so as to free the blessed God from the imputation of impelling men to Sin. These and such like considerations made me the more prolix in the philosophic metaphysic contemplation of the Divine Concourse, its Nature, Origine, and manner of working, particularly as to the entitative act of what is sinful; together with the creatures Dependence thereon: which I have more fully discussed, Court of the Gentiles, Chap. 7, 9, 11. with design and endeavours, if it might be, to give the blessed God and his sinful Creature both their deuce, and remove those extremes which men are apt to fall into. But these my sincere desires and endeavours have not had that The method of our procedure. success which was desired; which brings me under a fresh obligation to vindicate mine own Hypothesis, touching the efficacious concourse of God to the substrate mater or entitative act of what is sinful. I must confess, the province before us is difficult on many accounts, but principally, because whiles we endeavour to defend the Concourse and Providence of God about the entitative act of sin, it is suggested by some, and believed by others, that we make the holy God the Author of sin, which is the dregs of blasphemy, and that which every serious spirit abhors more than Hel. Yet we need no way to doubt, but that, with divine assistance, we may firmly assert and demonstrate the efficacity of Divine concourse to the material entitative act of that which is sinful, and yet fully vindicate the Divine Majesty from that blasphemous Imputation of being the Author of sin. And for our more distinct and demonstrative procedure herein, we propose this method or form as most apt for the subject mater before us. (1) To examine and explicate the Terms formally implied in, or virtually relating to, the subject in controversy. (2) To show wherein the opposite parties agree, and wherein they differ both among themselves and each from other; together with the original and principal motives, grounds, and causes of such Differences. (3) To give a Scriptural Explication and Demonstration of our own Hypothesis, touching Gods efficacious concourse to the substrate mater of that which is sinful; with an answer to those false glosses and comments, which our Adversaries the Jesuits, Arminians, and some new Methodists give to those Scriptures for the evading the force of them. (4) To draw up a brief History or Narrative of this controversy, and its state in all periods of the Christian Churches to this day. (5) To give the Demonstration of our Hypothesis from Reasons grounded on Scripture, with the Vindication of those Reasons from the ungrounded invalid answers given to them by our opponents, Strangius, and others. (6) To solve and answer the Objections urged by those that oppose our Hypothesis, particularly Strangius, Baranius, Le Blanc, with others. (7) And finally, to lay down the proper Sentiments and Hypotheses of the Orthodox about this subject, in opposition to those false Opinions which their Adversaries charge upon them: as also to produce the proper opinions of the adverse party, and the dangerous consequences that naturally and necessarily flow from them. §. 2. Our first and indeed principal task, in order to a clear The explication of the Terms. and demonstrative procedure in this controversy, will be, to explicate the terms, and disabuse them from those ambiguities, confusions, and false impositions, in which at present they are involved. And here indeed I cannot but break forth into a doleful Lamentation over the bleeding state of the Churches of Christ, by reason of those vexatious controversies which rend and tear out their very bowels, and all from the sophistic abuse or Ambiguity of terms. And I no way doubt but to make it most manifest, when opportunity is offered, that most of the controversies of this Age are fomented and maintained from the obscurity and abuse of terms misapplyed by subtle wits, for the establishment of their own Hypotheses. This is most evident in our present case, which makes it a duty absolutely necessary, before we enter on our province, to clear up the way by a distinct and particular explication of those terms that relate thereunto. The first Term we are to consider is Sin: wherein we are to Of Sin▪ examine its Origne, Causes, Constitution, both material and formal, and Kind's; particularly the nature of Acts substantially or intrinsically sinful: all which we shall discuss with that Brevity and Perspicuity the mater will admit. 1. As for the Origine of Sin, it 1. It's Origine. came first into the world from the defectibility of our first Parents their Freewill, and has been ever since maintained and fomented by the vitiosity of human nature depraved by Adam's sin, as we have copiosely demonstrated, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. §. 2. and Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 4. §. 3. 2. Sin, as to its material constitution, has for its substrate mater 2. It's substrate mater. or subject some natural good: For all sin being, as to its formal nature, but a moral privation or relation, it necessarily requires some natural good as its substrate mater or subject. The wise Creator and Gubernator of allthings has by his Law so constituted all moral Being's, both Virtues and Vices, as that they cannot subsist but in something natural: albeit sin be, according to its formal reason, a mere privation, yet it requires some positive, real natural Being for its subject, according to the nature of all other privations. Thus Augustin: That which is evil by reason of vice, Quod malum est per vitium, bonum est per naturam, Aug. contra Advers. Leg. & Prophet. cap. 5. is good by nature. Again he saith, That sin is not nature, but the vice of nature. And that trite Maxim communly received by all the Ancients, That all evil is founded in some good, i. e. natural, sufficiently demonstrates this our assertion. Thus Augustin, Enchirid. 97. Although therefore things sinful, as sinful are not good; yet not only that good things, but also that sinful be, is good: i. e. things sinful are good, not morally, but naturally, as means utile and conducible to the promoting of Divine glory: for albeit they oppose the bonity of the creature, yet materially considered they oppose not the bonity of the Creator; who can extract the greatest good out of the greatest evils. Doth it not then belong to the infinite bonity of God, to permit sins to be? Yea, doth not the ingress of sin into the world belong to the perfection thereof? is not then the substrate mater thereof some natural good? This is well demonstrated by Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 11. sect. 3. p. 252. Sin as sin has a material cause, which is always some good. So Augustin saith, That there can be no evil but in good, because if there were pure evil it would destroy itself: and the reason is, because sin, as to its formal cause, is not purely positive, Absurdum esset, si diceretur, ullum defectum aut peccatum, aut ullum peccatum aut defectum, posse per se existere, cum nullum detur separatum malum, sed omne malum sit in bono, Strang. de Volunt. l. 3. c. 19 p. 629. or a pure negation, but a privation of debit perfection, therefore it requires a subject unto which such a perfection is due; which subject must be some good, etc. Yea, Strangius himself, our principal Adversary in this Controversy, grants in this particular as much as we demand, pag. 629. That it is absurd to say, any sin or defect can exist of itself, sithat there can be no separate evil; but all evil is [seated] in good. Yea, he ingenuously confesseth, pag. 245. That hatred of God, [which is an action intrinsically evil] as it is an Act and Being, so it is from God, namely as it is hatred. For, adds he, So hatred truly, as it is abstracted from this or that object is a physic action, to which the metaphysic bonity of Ens or Being agrees, and it is morally indifferent; but as it is determined to God, hence is its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Obliquity. This concession of Strangius, if well considered, would not only overthrow his own Antithesis against our Hypothesis, but also put a period to this Controversy, as in what follows we shall demonstrate, Chap. 6. §. 1. 3. But the principal thing to be examined in the explication of sin is its formal Constitution or Reason, which we shall endeavour to manifest in the following Propositions. (1) All human acts considered All Acts in their generic nature indifferent. in their generic physic Entity or natural Being, abstracted from their moral constitution, are neither good nor evil, but morally indifferent. All moral Being's or Acts are seated, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in proper nature, as Cyril; neither can they existe without that proper nature whereunto they are appendent. There is no virtue or vice which has not something of nature for its subject and seat: it's true, there may be nature where there is no morality, yet there cannot be morality where there is not some nature to sustain the same. Now all human nature, as also all natural Acts considered in their generic natural Idea, albeit capable of virtue or vice, yet are in themselves morally indifferent. All thoughts, words and actions considered physically and abstractly, without regard to their moral determination by the Will and Law of God, are neither good nor evil. For Morality is a mode not physically or intrinsically inherent in human acts, but appendent to them from the determination of the Divine Law: The very acts of loving and hating God, considered in their generic, physic and entitative nature, as abstracted from the moral relation they have to their object, are morally neither good nor evil; because moral bonity and vitiosity are differences of human acts merely accidental or modal, as Suarez and other Schoolmen generally grant. Thus much Strangius frequently grants; as pag. 158. he saith, That moral bonity and vitiosity are accidents of natural Actions. So pag. 875. The Actio seorsim per se & physicè considerata indifferens est moraliter, nec minùs virtuti quam vitio substerni potest. All moral constitution from the Divine Law. action considered apart and physically is morally indifferent, neither may it be less subject to virtue than to vice. Hence, (2) All Morality and moral Acts, whether good or evil, receive their Constitution and Determination from the moral Divine Law. This Hypothesis is defended by Scotus, and other Schoolmen, and that on the highest reasons: For the Divine Will is the supreme measure and rule of all Justice and Sanctity: Things are therefore just and good because God wils them; and whatever God wils is for that very reason, because God wils it, good and just. Therefore that Platonic notion defended by some learned men, That the reasons of good and evil are eternal, is of dangerous consequence, albeit it hath somewhat of Truth (as other errors have) mixed with it: we grant, that in things morally good, there is a natural condecence or congruity to human nature, even antecedent to the Divine will and constitution. As on supposition of man's being created, he immediately falls under a necessary and essential obligation of loving God, hating sin, etc. These are duties naturally congruous, yea morally necessary to human nature. Whence it is, that Divines usually determine, That Original Righteousness was natural to Adam, i. e. most condecent, congruous, and morally necessary to his Nature. Yet all this hinders not, but that the formal Determination of all Morals arise from the free constitution of the Divine will and Law. The Law of God is the great Expansum or firmament, which God has spread over the rational world, whereby all Mankind are moderated and regulated in all their moral Acts, and by which they shall be at last day judged: whence it necessarily follows, that all moral constitution must proceed hence, as we have more amply demonstrated, Court Gentiles, P. 4. B. 1. c. 2. §. 1, 2. Thus also Voetius, Disput. Theolog. Par. 1. de jure & justit. Probl. 10. p. 351. proves, That the divine will is the fountain and rule of all Goodness. So much also Strangius grants us, p. 89. namely, That, as whatever is true is therefore true, because conform to the first Truth; so whatever is good, is therefore good, because conform to the first Goodness: and as the Truth of God belongs to his Intellect, so Goodness to his Wil The like Mr. Baxter, Catholic Theolog. Part 1. p. 100 All created Justice and Holiness is such, i. e. good (for goodness is their essence) because God's efficient will made them so. Hence, (3) The formal reason or nature of Sin consists in its being a Deordination, or Transgression of the Divine Law. This Proposition is fully stated and demonstrated in Sacred Philosophy, as we have copiosely proved, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. §. 1. and Philos. General. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. §. 1. so that it requires not further Explication or Demonstration. Hence, (4) Sin as to its formal constitution and nature is not a positive Sin as to its formal nature a privation. real Being, but privative. This Hypothesis has found general assent to it among all the Ancients both Pagan Philosophers and Christians, excepting some few, Martion and Manes, with others. It's true, the Manichees held Sin to be a positive Being, and they took up principes suited thereto, namely, That there were two first Being's or Causes, one of good, the other of evil: But the sober Philosophers and Christians abhorred such sentiments. Simplicius on Epictetus, c. 34. p. 171. has an excellent Discourse to prove that sin is not in the nature of Being's, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a privation of Good, which we have largely explicated, Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3 §. 4. §. 2. And this was generally asserted by the Greek and Latin Fathers. Thus the spurious Dionysius assures us, that Sin must necessarily be, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, without nature, without subsistence. So Greg. Nyssen. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sin is an insubsistent Being, or privation. And it was a general conclusion in the Greek Schools, that sin resulted, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from the absence of good, as darkness from the absence of light. Thus also among the Latins, Augustin asserted, that Sin was not Nature, but the evil of Nature. Again: the Amission of Good has taken up the name of Sin. And Strangius, who is our principal adversary in this controversy, yet l. 1. c. 13. p. 97, etc. he strongly demonstrates this Hypothesis, That the formal reason of sin consists in Privation. This I conceive deserves a particular remark, because some late Authors, and those not of inferior note, make great use of this Antithesis, namely, That Sin is as to its formal nature positive, as their chief engine to oppose our general Hypothesis, touching Gods efficacious concourse to the substrate mater of that which is sinful. They tell us, that Sin, as to its form, is not a mere privation, but a moral Relation, which has so much Reality as a relation. But to obviate all mistakes and verbal contests, we grant, [1] That Sin may be termed a moral privative relation, or rather, relative privation, as it is a transgression of, and so must have relation to, the Moral Law. [2] That Sin is not a mere nothing, but has some kind of logic positivitie or notional entity, so far as to render it capable of being the term of a Proposition, as we have more fully shown, Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. §. 2. But, [3] We may not yield, that Sin is a moral positive Relation, much less a positive act or real Being, such as is the term of a natural production: For such a persuasion will necessarily force men to grant, that God is the Author of Sin, or to hold with the Manichees, that there are two first Causes, one of good and the other of evil. 4. Touching the kinds of sinful Actions, that which principally concerns our present controversy is the distinction of sinful Actions, into such as are modally only, or such as are intrinsically evil. (1) By actions modally evil they generally understand such as are Actions modally sinful. substantially good, yet have some modal accidental vitiosity or sinfulness appendent to them. Such are all the sincerely pious acts of good men in this imperfect state; which have an evangelic perfection and goodness in them, yet mixed with much corruption and imperfection. For such is the profunde mysterious wisdom of God, that he permits a mixture of sin even with the best good works on this side Heaven, thereby to render the methods of his Grace the more illustrious: so that the same Act, which is in evangelic estimation sincerely good, is also modally sinful and imperfect. Thus Strangius, l. 2. c. 9 p. 205. Sithat all transgression of the Law is sin, men sin both by doing what is forbidden, as also by doing what is commanded, if not in that manner as commanded: Again, both by not doing what is commanded, as also by abstaining from what is forbidden, if they abstain not in a regular manner. Thus oft it comes to pass, that the action may be good according to the substance of the work, and yet evil as to the mode of acting. As for example; to give Alms to the poor is a work substantially good, yet if it proceed not from Faith and Charity, and respect to the glory of God, it is evil as to the mode of acting. Thus Strangius. But I add, that the best works of Unbelievers are substantially evil, in that they have nothing of sincere good in them; but full of hatred of God; and the best works of pious souls in this imperfect state are modally evil, because they have a tincture of vitiosity appendent to them. (2) By Actions intrinsically evil, they generally understand Actions intrinsically evil. such as being referred to and determined by such or such an object, carry in them an intrinsec vitiosity and malignity; so that whiles under such a reference and determination they can never become good. And the common instance is in hatred of God, and Blasphemy. Not that those acts are in their physic material entity or substance sinful, but only in their moral constitution and formal determination or reference to their object. Thus much is also acknowledged by Strangius, l. 1. c. 13. p. 89. When, according to the common sentence, it is said, that some also are in themselves or intrinsically evil, the acts are not understood as abstracted from their Object, but as they refer to their object, in regard of which they have their vitiosity.— It seems to me, that the vitiosity, which is in the hatred of God, doth not belong to the material, but formal of Sin. Which is an ingenuous confession, and will be of much use to us in what follows. At present we shall only remark; that this notion of Acts intrinsically evil, if duly examined, will be of no use to our Opponents, albeit they seem to lay the most stress on it. For [1] They grant, as Strangius here, that the vitiosity, which is in the hatred of God [and so in all other acts intrinsically evil] doth not belong to the material but formal of sin: so that God's concourse to the material or substrate mater of sin doth not suppose his concourse to the formal obliquity of sin. [2] In acts sincerely but imperfectly good, and modally evil, the substrate mater or material act, which is both good and evil, is one and the same: now our Adversaries grant Predetermination to the material act as good: how then can they deny predetermination to the same material entitative act which is evil, though not as such? But of this more hereafter, c. 5. §. 3. The next term to be discussed by us is the Natural The Liberty of the Wil. Freedom, or Liberty of the Will; which is indeed the hinge on which our whole controversy turns, as our more intelligent Opponents confess. A reverend Divine, Cathol. Theologie, Part 3. p. 80. saith, I do readily confess, that, as the sum of all the controversy is, Whether man hath truly any freewill; etc. I do readily concur with him in this, That the sum of all the controversy must be resolved into this notion of freewill; and therefore if we cannot make good our ground here, we must necessarily fall under the efforts of our Antagonists. And I must confess this conception has been deeply engraven on my thoughts, for twenty five years or more, that the whole of the Pelagian and Arminian controversy centres in this point, touching the Liberty of the Will: and he that endeavours to remove those maladies, but overlooks those Pelagian infusions that lie hid in the heart of freewill, doth act but like the unskilful Physician, who, to remove an Hectic Fever, endeavoured to cure the Itch. What made Durandus drive Gods immediate Concourse to human acts, but this persuasion, that it destroyeth the Liberty of the will, and so makes God the Author of sin? And what makes the Jesuits deny Predetermination, but the like groundless persuasion? So also Baronius, in his Metaphysics, Sect. 8. Disp. 3. §. 79. p. 147. Here it was that the Pelagians of old took Sanctuary, and under the shadow of this term Freewill concealed all their venomous Infusions: here, by their sophistic logic and ambiguous cloudy distinctions, they fortified themselves against the Defenders of Efficacious Grace. Thus Jansenius, August. de Natur. Laps. Tom. 2. l. 4. c. 24. proves largely out of Augustine, that the principal fraud and cheat of the Pelagians lay in their philosophic hallucination about natural freewill, which they placed in Indifference, but Augustine in a rational spontaneity. Herein they are followed by the Jesuits and Arminians, who indeed differ not scarcely one hairs breadth from the Pelagians and Semi-pelagians. Yea Baronius, (whom Rutherford rangeth among the Arminians) with confidence maintains Bellarmine's definition of Liberty, as justifiable and orthodox, Metaphys. Sect. 12. p. 285. But other of our Antagonists, Strangius, Le Blanc, etc. perceiving The new coined distinction of Liberty largely and strictly taken. that our Reformed Divines have generally placed Natural Liberty in a Rational Spontaneity, and so presumed, that voluntary necessity is very well consistent therewith, hence they have found out an artificial distinction for the reconciling the Calvinists with the Jesuits, Pelagians and Arminians: They distinguish Liberty, into that which is largely, or strictly taken: and they confess, (1) That Liberty taken largely, as it is a perfection of the Soul, so it has one and the same notion with Rational spontaneity; and such is the Liberty of glorified Souls. This Liberty they make essential to the will; of which see Strangius, l. 3. c. 14. p. 686. also p. 691, 702, 703. But, add they, (2) There is also a liberty strictly so termed, which consists in the Indifference of the will to this or that object, also to act or not to act: and this Liberty is most proper to this our imperfect state, as Strangius, p. 188. 687. 689. 711. So likewise Le Blanc, p. 435. and others. There were some first lines of this distinction drawn by Camero, who makes liberty strictly so termed to be about the means, not the end; yet his Notions about Liberty are tolerable, in that he makes Divine Predetermination consistent with human Liberty. But the first creator of this distinction touching a twofold Liberty, among those who owned the Synod of Dort, was Strangius, who asserts a twofold Liberty, one considered in its own Nature, which is essential to the will, and the other as limited to lapsed man, which includes Indifference, etc. as in places above cited. What these new Methodists mean by this new-coined distinction of Liberty, unless it be a gratification to the Pelagians, I cannot conjecture: Certain I am, that I never could find it among the ancient Philosophers, Primitive Fathers, Scholastic Theologues, or any other but these new Methodists or their Sectators. Do any of the Greek Philosophers make mention of any liberty, but what is essential to the will and all human acts? Can we find among the Greek Theologues any notices of this twofold Liberty? Yea do not the very Jesuits herein concur with us, that Liberty is essential to all moral acts, both in the future, as well as the present state of the Soul? Is not Liberty constituted by them and the Arminians as the foundation of all Morality? Doth not Amyraldus, de Libero Arbitrio, as well as we, make Liberty properly taken essential to the will and all its Acts? Of what use then can this distinction of a twofold Liberty be? Will it satisfy the Pelagians, Jesuits or Arminians? No; because they all make Liberty strictly taken essential to all Moral Acts. Or, will it any way relieve the Calvinists in their conflicts both with Jesuits and Arminians, to say the will is sometimes free and sometimes not? If it be supposed, that Indifference be essential to liberty in this imperfect state, will it not then be replied by Pelagians and Arminians, that the will is not, according to these new Methodists, free in Conversion, because not indifferent? It were not difficult to demonstrate, how invalid this new-coined distinction of Liberty is, and unapt to reach those ends for which it was designed by the authors thereof. As for the true Idea and notion of Natural Liberty, we have, The True Idea of Liberty. with what study and diligence we could, inquired into and discussed the same, Court of the Gentiles, P. 2. B. 3. c. 9 S. 3. §. 11, 12. & B. 4. c. 1. § 29— 32. also Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. S. 4. §. 2. the sum whereof may be drawn forth in these following Propositions. (1) Natural Liberty, as it denotes a power, has one and the same Idea or Nature with the Wil This is copiosely demonstrated, in the forementioned places. Hence, (2) All acts of the Will have liberty in the strictest notion essentially appendent to them. (3) The Dominion which a free Agent has over his own Act is not absolute, but limited and conditionate. (4) The necessity which ariseth from the concourse of God the first cause, no way diminisheth, but establisheth the Natural Liberty of the Wil For nothing offers violence to the Will, or is injuriose to its Liberty, so long as the act it puts forth is voluntary: so long as the will doth voluntarily elect and embrace what it is predetermined unto, the act is in its own power and free: for as Aristotle, Eth. l. 5. c. 12. well observes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nothing happens to such an one, but what he wils. (5) Actual Indifference to variety of Objects or Acts, is no way essential to natural Liberty, but only an Accident resulting from its imperfection. (6) The formal, native and genuine Idea or notion of natural Liberty, both as to state and exercise, includes no more than a rational spontaneity. This last proposition, which is the principal, Strangius f Libertas voluntatis in genere nihil aliud esse videtur, quam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 spontaneum intellectuale. Strang. l. 3. c. 14. p. 686. owns; and Le Blanc de Libr. Arbit. Thes. 19 p. 405. confesseth this to be the general opinion of our Reformed Divines, even of Amyraldus, Placeus, and other new Methodists. That this also is asserted by our Judicious Davenant, see his Determinations, Quaest. 22. That the Divine Decree takes not away Liberty. These Propositions about natural Liberty, we have in the forecited places more amply demonstrated, because the whole Pelagian and Arminian controversy, and particularly this about God's concourse to the substrate mater of sin depends thereon: and he that shall undertake this Province of resolving our present Question, without a clear Explication and Demonstration of the Wills natural Liberty, doth nothing to purpose. §. 4. Next to the natural Liberty of the Will, we are to consider Moral Liberty or freewill to good. Moral Liberty or Freewill, as also what is possible or impossible to corrupt Nature. By Moral Liberty or Freewill is generally understood the moral potence or spiritual ability of the Soul to do good. This moral and spiritual Liberty, our Adversaries the Pelagians, Arminians and new Methodists confound with natural Liberty, and from our denying the later in corrupt Nature, they falsely charge us with denying the former: therefore to remove this confusion of the terms, and those false imputations which are charged on those that defend efficacious concourse, the following Propositions will be of use unto us. 1. Natural Liberty is essential to the Will and all its acts, but moral Liberty or freewill to good only accidental and separable. The Will is not a Will if it be not naturally free in all its acts; whatever act is voluntary, is for that very reason free; Voluntary and free being in Scriptural estimation, as also by the determination of the best Philosophers, terms synonymous and equipollent, as we have demonstrated, Philos. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. §. 1. But now as for Moral Liberty and freewill to good, that is only accidental to the human Soul; it may come and go, be present and absent without the natural destruction of the Soul, or violation to natural Liberty. It's true, that Moral Liberty, consisting in virtuose Habits, Inclinations and Exercices, is the Perfection of Man, yet so as the Essence of the Soul is not diminished or destroyed by the loss thereof. 2. Our first Parents in their innocent state were invested not only with natural but also with moral Liberty or freewill to good. This is granted on both sides, and therefore needs not further demonstration. 3. Since the fall corrupt Nature in its unregenerate state lies under a total, universal and naturally moral Impotence as to all Moral and spiritual good. I call this Impotence total and universal, as it overspreads the whole soul, and has stripped it of all seeds of, or inclinations to, any spiritual or truly moral good. I term it also natural, or naturally moral, in that, albeit the subject be moral, yet the Impotence being communicated together with corrupt Nature, connatural or congenite and proper thereto, as corrupt, and as to all natural power inseparable therefrom, it is become a moral Nature. I am not ignorant, that some new Methodists, together with the Arminians, stiffly contend, that this Impotence is not natural but only moral; but either they intent under the ambiguity of the terms to conceal some Pelagian Infusions of natural seeds of virtue and Freewill to Moral good, or else they must wrest the terms Moral and Natural from their native sense, and what is intended by those that defend a natural impotence. For all know, that by moral Impotence is generally understood an Impotence contracted by frequent Acts of and Custom in Sin; and so on the contrary by natural Impotence is understood such as is traduced together with, and through the miserable contagion of sin inseparably appendent to corrupt nature. Of this see more Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 5. §. 1. Hence, 4. Sin in corrupt Nature becomes necessary, and the observation of Divine Precepts impossible. This Proposition has ever been in all Ages of the Church, the great bal of contention between the Patrons of Freewill, and the Defensors of Freegrace. The Pelagians of old as the Arminians of late have made this their main Refuge for the defence of their Diana of Freewill. If Sin, say they, be necessary, and so inevitable, than it ceaseth to be sin: if it be voluntary, than it may be avoided. But these Pelagian Arms Augustin and his Sectators have stoutly refelled, by showing, (1) That the Law was not originally impossible to man's Nature, but only is become so accidentally by reason of Sin, and the impotence of corrupt Nature. (2) That this Impotence is not less voluntary than necessary, yea the more necessary it is, the more voluntary: The necessity of this Impotence is seated in and ariseth from the Will, and therefore most voluntary. Thence Augustin terms it dura Necessitas, an hard Necessity, because the more necessary this impotence is the more voluntary, and the more voluntary it is the more necessary. Plato, Phileb. p. 22. gives it the character, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of a miserable necessity; which he opposeth to that blessed necessity of adhering to the chiefest good, of which see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. §. 7. (3) That albeit the avoiding of sin and the observation of Divine commands be legally impossible to corrupt nature, yet both are Evangelicly possible through the habitual and actual assistances of the Spirit of Grace. See more of the impossibility which is in corrupt nature for the observation of Divine precepts in Jansenius, Aug. Tom. 3. l. 3. c. 15, etc. Philosoph. General. Part. 1. lib. 3. cap. 3. sect. 5. §. 1. Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. §. 8. 5. Notwithstanding the necessary impotence of corrupt nature as to what is morally and spiritually good, yet it still retains a physic or natural faculty and remote passive power capable of receiving spiritual good. No one denies, but that the Soul, as a rational and voluntary subject, is remotely, passively, and naturally capacitated for the reception of gratiose infusions; all the Controversy is about a proxime or next, active, and moral power, which we deny to remain in corrupt nature. 6. The Necessity of consenting and Impossibility of resisting which Necessity, impossibility and possibility what. attends the will on the supposition of Divine concourse efficaciously moving and applying the same to act, is only consequential, hypothetic, or conditionate and voluntary, not simple, absolute, and coactive or violent. Here we are to inquire what a simple and absolute impossibility is, and how it is differenced from a conditionate and limited Impossibility. A thing is said to be simply and absolutely impossible, when it is in no regard possible: for if it be in any respect possible, it cannot be said to be simply and absolutely impossible. Now nothing can be said to be in no regard possible, or simply and absolutely impossible, but what in its own nature implies a repugnance of existing: and surely nothing in its own nature implies a repugnance of existing, but what involves a contradiction: that which involves a contradiction comes not within the compass of possible, because contradictions have no passive power of being verified; for the affirming of the one is the denying of the other; the truth of the one makes the other false: But whatever implies not a contradiction or repugnance of existing, that may be; and therefore cannot be simply and absolutely impossible, of which see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. § 4. Now that the Concourse of God predetermining the will to the substrate mater of sinful acts cannot render the opposite act of obedience simply and absolutely impossible is evident; because (1) the opposite act of obedience implies no contradiction or repugnance of existing: For God can and doth work it in some: albeit it be in a limited sense impossible to corrupt nature, yet it is possible to Grace, as before. (2) The will predetermined to one act has an habitual indifference or radical flexibility to the opposite act; and therefore the impossibility is only conditionate and limited. A reverend Divine supposeth, That God's determinative concourse to the substrate mater of sin leaves it undeniable, that the mater of all his Laws, in reference to all such actions, are a simple and most strictly natural impossibility. Which I conceive to be a great mistake, and that according to the confession of our principal Adversary, Strangius, who lib. 3. cap. 8. pag. 625. speaks thus: Therefore the Divine determination either by efficacious grace, or any other way [which includes concourse to the entitative act of sin] being granted, there is truly inferred a necessity of the consequence; because that act of the will unto which it is determined by God must necessarily follow, but it is not a necessity of the consequent, which in its own nature remains contingent; and therefore in a composite sense the will, when it is determined by God to act, cannot but act. Whence some Schoolmen say, That in freewill there is a simultie of power to opposites, In libero arbitrio est simultas potentiae ad opposita, sed non potentia simultatis, Alvarez. but not a power of simultie, i. e. a power of embracing opposites at one and the same time: whereof the reason is this, because a power to one act is not opposed to the power unto the negation of the same act, or to a contrary act, but two contraries or contradictories cannot be together in the same subject. Of which mater Alvarez discourseth learnedly, de Auxil. l. 9 Disp. 94. & l. 12. Disp. 115. Note well here, that Strangius in this point falls in with the Dominicans, and fully assents and consents to their mode of conciliating Divine determination with human liberty, which if the forementioned reverend Brother and others would do, I should judge our Controversy very near, if not fully at an end. The sum of all is this, That the determination or predetermination of Divine concourse to this or that act doth not make the negation of that act, or a contrary act a simple or most strictly natural impossibility, as some would persuade us, but only infers a necessity of the consequence, the will having still, in sensu diviso, i. e. on supposition of the withdrawment of Divine concourse, an habitual indifference to act or not to act, though, in sensu composito, as predetermined by Divine concourse, it cannot but act. Or summarily thus: The will has at that very time, when it is predetermined by God to this or that act, an habitual power or radical indifference to the negation of that act, or to the putting forth a contrary act: So that Divine predetermination excludes only a contrary act, not the radical power to that act. Thus also Davenant, Animadv. against Hoard, p. 240, 333, 341, 360, 402. proves strongly and accurately, That absolute Election and Reprobation may stand with a possibility to contrary events, though not with contrary events. Of which more hereafter. §. 5. The next term that falls under consideration is the Will of The will of God, its distributions, etc. God, its different Ideas and various Acceptions in the Scriptures, under which our Opponents conceal themselves, and their misrepresentations of our sentiments. The ancient distinction of the Divine will, (which they say Hugo de S. Victore first formed) was, into voluntatem signi & voluntatem beneplaciti, God's significative will and his beneplacite wil (1) God's significative will they make to consist of Precepts, Promises, Prohibitions, Permissions, Counsels, and Admonitions. By Permissions here we must understand such as are moral, not natural, which as to sin properly belong to God's beneplacite will, as anon. This significative Will of God some Divines term his Reveled will, from Deut. 29. 29. others term it his Legislative or Preceptive will: others his Approbative will, whereby he declares what he approves and what he disapproves, of which see Davenant Animadv. against Hoard, pag. 222, 356, 391— 399. Lastly learned Chamier, and Daillé out of him, term this significative will of God, his will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of complacence, or complacential will, whereby he declares, what is most agreeable to him, and what not. Our judicious Davenant makes use also of this term, as having one and the same Idea with the former notion of God's Approbative wil These several notions of Gods significative will, albeit they may differ in some formality, yet they agree in substance and import, denoting Gods reveled will touching man's duty, and that which is most agreeable to his holy will and nature. (2) As for God's Beneplacite will, commonly ●…iled his will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of good pleasure, it is that whereby he decrees, effects, or permits all events and effects: whence it is distributed into effective and permissive. God's effective beneplacite will, is that whereby he decrees and produceth all natural and supernatural effects: Gods permissive beneplacite will, is that whereby according to his eternal Decree he efficaciously permits the existence of sin. This distribution of the Divine will is greatly opposed by the Pelagians, Arminians, and new Methodists. (1) The Jesuits, whom we may without breach of charity term Pelagians, do what they can to baffle this distinction: so Molina, the Head of that Faction, in Thom. Part. 1. Quaest. 19 Art. 12. tells us, That these signs of the Divine will signify properly and formally some nolition or volition in God; and therefore God's significative will cannot be contradistinguisht to his beneplacite wil The same is urged by the Arminians. But the Orthodox both among Papists and Protestants reply, that Gods reveled significative will is only equivocally, analogically, figuratively and improperly termed his will, as the Edicts of Princes, and Laws of States. So Sanderson de Obligatione Conscientiae, Praelect. 4 sect. 20. tells us, That God's beneplacite will is that whereby God has from all Eternity constituted with himself what he will do: his significative will is that whereby he has appointed unto us a Law, by signifying what he will have done by us. Whereof the former is properly and univocally the will of God, but this later improperly and analogically so called. The like Davenant, Animadvers. pag. 392. It's true, Divines grant, that this significative will of God has some Decree or Act of the beneplacite will answering thereto: for the wise God decreed, that this or that should be man's duty; but they deny that this reveled will of God touching man's duty is the same with his decretive will touching events. (2) Our Adversaries pretend, that by this distinction of the significative and beneplacite will we make two opposite wills in God, and such as clash each with other. This makes a reverend Brother to reject this distinction, as of no use in our present case. But Divines answer, that these wills are not opposite in God, but only disparate and divers: the things decreed, and the things reveled and constituted by God's significative will may oppose each other, but the decretive and reveled will never oppose each other. The most holy and wise God really intends whatever he commands, or approves, with an intention that it shall be man's duty, and rewarded if performed, but not always with an intention that it shall be effected. (3) Our Opponents, and particularly the new Methodists, confound God's Beneplacite Decretive Will, with his Will of Complacence and Approbation: and under this confusion endeavour to secure their opposition against Gods willing the Permission of Sin. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 548. None can be said to will what he doth not approve. Thence others make Love of complacence essential to all acts of the Divine Will: and thence conclude, if God will the permission of Sin, he must necessarily take complacence therein. But the reply hereto is not difficult: we say, that God takes complacence in all his own Acts, but not in all the objects they refer unto: but now love of complacence is not so termed from the act, but object about which it is conversant; which must be some good either natural or moral. Whence it is evident, that God may will the permission of Sin, and its existence as a consequent thereto, and yet not take complacence in or approve of sin. See more of God's Will and its various Distributions, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. §. 3. §. 6. The last term that needs our Explication is Divine Concourse, Of Divine Concourse. its Immediation, efficacity and Predetermination. Strangius, l. 1. c. 11. p. 59 distinguisheth Concourse from Influx thus: (1) Influx is more large than concourse: for the causality of every efficient is termed Influx; and therefore the Influx of God is seen in many things, in which his concourse is not, as when he acts without the concurrence of a second cause. Thence, (2) the term Influx is absolute, not denoting the respect of any other cause, but that of concourse is relative. I have no mind to quarrel about terms without just ground, and therefore can easily admit this distinction, though it make neither for nor against either party. But that which more immediately concerns our Immediate Concourse what. present controversy is, 1. To give the true Idea and Notion of Immediate Concourse, as generally asserted and stated in the Schools: which we shall endeavour to explicate both negatively and positively. (1) Negatively, Immediate concourse to an Act consists not in the preservation of the principe, or rendering of it apt and habile for any congenerous action. I know a learned and pious Divine, who seems in terms to grant immediate Concourse as to the substrate mater of sinful actions, yet in the close placeth it only in this, That God as the first Mover, so far excite and actuate those powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous action, to which they have a natural designation; and whereunto they are not sinfully disinclined. But all this, as I conceive, no way reacheth the true notion of Immediate concourse, neither is it consistent with itself. For, [1] If God as the first mover excite and actuate those powers, then are they necessarily by him drawn or applied to act, which is more than being apt and habile for any congenerous action: certainly to excite and actuate a power is more than to render it apt and habile for an action. [2] If the Powers by God's exciting of them are rendered only apt and habile for any congenerous action, then where is immediate concourse as to the Act? Did or would any term this immediate concourse, so far to excite and actuate those powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous Action? [3] What this Aptitude and Hability is, which the Powers receive by being thus excited and actuated by God, I cannot divine: Are not the powers of the soul as powers apt and habile for natural actions, such as the substrate mater of sin is? What other Aptitude or Hability doth God give unto the natural faculties as to sinful acts, but merely the faculty of acting? Need sinners any other faculty, power, Aptitude or Hability to sin, but the rational faculties depraved? It's true, God applies those faculties to the entitative act of that which is sinful, but yet doth not add any aptitude or hability to sin. [4] Doth not Durandus and his Sectators grant all this, and yet deny immediate concourse as to the entitative act of sin? The Hypothesis of Durandus doth no way exclude any kind of Aptitude or Hability, but rather include the same; it only excludes the immediate application of the power to its act; which also is excluded by this lax notion of Immediate concourse. [5] Lastly, if they who oppose God's concourse to the substrate mater of all sinful acts, do indeed and in truth assert and own an immediate concourse to any one entitative act that is sinful, all those black and direful consequences, which they cast on the assertors of Predetermination, may with as much facility be retorted on them, as we shall demonstrate, chap. 5. §. 4. Hence, (2) Affirmatively, Immediate concourse as to its formal Idea not only gives an Aptitude or Hability to act, but also immediately produceth the very act itself. That this notion of immediate concourse is universally received in the Schools, is most evident. I shall desire the Reader to consult our Countryman Compton Carleton, a learned and acute Jesuit, who had his first education in Cambridge, and is more moderate than most of that faction. He saith, Philosoph. Disput. 28. de Causa prima, Sect. 3. p. 319. God therefore concurs with all his Creatures immediately to all their actions, not only by the Immediation of Virtue, but also of Supposite, i. e. that action, whereby the creature operates, doth also flow immediately from God himself, and not from any other substituted in his place. A clear explication of Immediate concourse, so far as it regards its Immediation. Whence Disput. 29. Sect. 2. he determines thus, touching Gods Immediate concourse to the act of Sin: We must say therefore, that God doth physically and immediately concur to the act of sin, together with the create Wil And he confirms this Hypothesis by Arguments out of Aquinas, Suarez, Vasques, Anselm, Tanner, Zumel, Montesinus, Mulderus, Arriaga, and Oviedo. So that this notion of Immediate concourse seems to have been generally entertained by all parties, both Thomists, Scotists, and Jesuits, as that which is most rational and self-evidencing. 2. But the principal point in controversy is touching the efficacity Efficacious and predeterminant concourse. and Predetermination of Divine Concourse; wherein the Jesuits and Arminians oppose the Dominicans and Calvinists. I must confess, when I first undertook the explication of Divine Concourse, specially as to the substrate mater of Sin, I studiosely avoided the term Predetermination, (although it be frequently fathered on me) as is intimated Court Gentiles, P. 4. B. 2. c. 11. §. 7. partly to avoid needless countests about words, and partly because I would not professedly espouse the interest of any one Sect, but adhere to Scriptural terms; but since, upon a more accurate inquiry, finding the term expressly laid down in Scripture, and that as to the very mater in controversy, touching God's concourse to the substrate mater of sin, I see no reason why we may not make use of it, notwithstanding the prejudices some endeavour to load it with. Therefore for the more full explication of this term I shall endeavour to show, (1) What efficacious concourse notes; and (2) How this efficacious concourse may be termed Predeterminative. 1. Divine Concourse is termed efficacious as it doth most potently Effications concourse what. and invincibly produce its effect. The Grecanic term, whereby the efficacity of Divine Concourse is expressed in the Scriptures, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, efficacity, or energy, which notes the puissant force of any operation. So Ephes. 1. 19 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Eph. 1. 19 according to the energy or efficacious working of the might of his power. Here is, (1) Power or force. (2) Might of power or most potent power; and (3) The efficacious working of this most potent power: Which note the puissant efficacity of divine concourse. Thence the Syriac renders it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to the efficace. So Ephes. 3. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Ephes. 3. 7. according to the energy or efficace of his power. The like, Phil. 3. 21. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Phil. 3. 21. according to the efficacious working, whereby he is able even to subdue allthings unto himself. So Col. 1. 29. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to his efficacious working, which worketh in me mightily. In all these Texts we have mighty power, yea omnipotence joined with the efficace of divine Concourse; which demonstrates its invincible manner of working, in the production of all its effects. So that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies Gods intime presence with all second Causes, and efficacious concurring with and actuating of them in all their operations. The like import may be applied to its conjugate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which notes, to effect any thing in the most efficacious manner, so as to overcome all resistance made against the force of the Agent. So 1 Cor. 12. 6. 1 Cor. 12. 6, 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who efficaciously worketh allthings. The like v. 11. of which hereafter. This efficacious concourse, as it cooperates with the second cause is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cooperation or concourse, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to cooperate. So Mark 16. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Lord cooperating, or efficaciously concurring. So elsewhere, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as applied to God notes his actuose, efficacious, and predeterminative concourse in and with allthings, is evident from the use of the word both in sacred and profane Authors. So with Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to work readily. It's rendered by the Syriac, sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to work, as 1 Cor. 12. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where it notes not only an universal general concourse, but a particular, present, certain, efficacious force or efficacity of Divine Concourse, exerting itself in all individual acts and effects. Again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is rendered by the Syriac, Rom. 7. 5. Rom. 7. 5. 2 Cor. 4. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 11. and 2 Cor. 4. 12. by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to work, to act with diligence, to be efficacious, as Boderianus. And 1 Cor. 12. 11. it is rendered by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to act, to work, to perform, to effect, as Boderianus. Lastly, it is rendered by the Syriac, Ephes. 1. 11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who hath Eph. 1. 11. efficaciously wrought allthings. Which sufficiently demonstrates the predetermination of God's concourse, as to all second causes and acts. Hence, 2. This efficacious Concourse, as it determines and applies the Determinative Concourse what. second cause to act, is both in sacred Scripture and by scholastic Theologues termed Determinative and Predeterminative. We find both these terms in Scripture applied to Divine Concourse. Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a term or limit; (1) primarily and properly signifies to termine, set bounds or limits to any cause, effect, or thing. So Acts 17. 26. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Act. 17. 26. hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation: i. e. God has determined or predetermined to every Man, Nation, and Kingdom their fixed terms of duration and life. So Arrian, Epictet. lib. 1. cap. 12. speaking of God, he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And Virgil's Song is remarkable: Stat sua cuique dies, Every one's day stands fixed or determined: which Servius understands, of the fixed determined period of human life. So that we see that not only sacred Philosophy, but the very Pagans by their dim light, asserted a fixed period of Divine life, as determined by God; albeit some that profess themselves Christians deny the same. Then he adds, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the bounds, or the position of terms: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies the position of terms or limits to any cause, action, effect, or thing. God by his eternal Decree has predetermined or set terms and limits to all second causes, their actions, effects, and events: there is nothing so contingent in nature, but it is predetermined by the Divine wil We find the Verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 applied to times and places, as well as to causes and acts: So Heb. 4. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he determines or limits Heb. 4. ●. a day. Thence in the glossary, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a stated or determined day: and so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I termine or limit as to place. Whence Hesychius makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he determines, to be the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he gives term or limit. Thence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with the LXX. answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to termine, determine, or constitute terms to any place or thing, Num. 34. 6. Josh. 13. 27. & 15. 11. also to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be bounded or determined. Whence lastly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies a definition, which is the term or boundary of an essence, according to Cicero, who renders it, the circumscription of a thing. (2) From this primary notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 follows a secondary, namely, to decree, destiny to a certain end, predestine, predetermine. In which sense it signifies the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to predetermine: and so it is transferred to predestination, predetermination, or the decree and purpose of the Divine will, even about the substrate mater or entitative act of sin; as Luke 22. 22. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as it was determined, Luke 22. 22. or predetermined, decreed. Our Lord speaks of his Crucifixion, which was the greatest of sins and intrinsically evil, and yet lo! as to the substrate mater or entitative act, predetermined and decreed by God. The same Acts. 2. 23. Him, being delivered Acts 2. 23. by the determinate counsel, and foreknowledge of God: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by that defined, determined, or predetermined counsel: of which more Chap. 3. §. 2. Hence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to decree, deliberate, determine is expounded by Theodotion, Job 22. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And Hesychius makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he determines synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which when applied to the Divine will note predefinition and predetermination. As the simple 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so also the composite 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to predestine Predeterminative concourse what in Scripture. 1 Cor. 2. 7. Rom. 8. 29, 30. Eph. 1. 5, 11. Acts 4. 28. or predetermine is used six times in the N. T. (1) of things appertaining to salvation, 1 Cor. 2. 7. (2) of persons elect, Rom. 8. 29, 30. Eph. 1. 5, 11. (3) of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin, yea that which was intrinsically evil. So Act. 4. 28. For to do whatsoever thine hand and thy counsel determined before, or predetermined to be done. For so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may more properly be rendered. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily signifies to predefine, predestine, predetermine, to set limits, bounds, terms to persons or things. Thence, as to this present text and point, when it is said here, that those who crucified Christ did what Gods hand and counsel predetermined to be done, it must be understood of the substrate mater or entitative act, which was predetermined by God, as in what follows, Chap. 3. §. 2. The Syriac version interprets 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to seal, constitute, or make firm any thing, which is rendered by the LXX. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to order, dispose, constitute, institute. The Divine Will and Decree gives order, constitution, limitation, determination, yea predetermination to allthings: all persons and things, times and places, ends and means receive terms, limits, destination, and predetermination from the Divine Will and Decree. Hence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the N. T. is made synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to foreknow, 1 Pet. 1. 20. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to preordain, Act. 17. 26. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to propose, or purpose, Rom. 1. 13. Eph. 1. 9 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to prepare, Rom. 9 23. 1 Cor. 2. 9 By all which we evidently see, what footsteps predetermination, and as to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin, has in the sacred Scriptures. We now proceed to examine this notion as used by scholastic Predeterminative Concourse active and passive. Theologues, and how far their sentiments thereof are applicable to our present Controversy. (1) Some distinguish between God's predefinition and his predetermination: his predefinition they restrain to his Decrees, and his predetermination to his Concourse. Others distinguish the predetermination of God into extrinsec and intrinsec: by extrinsec predetermination they understand the act of the Divine Will or Decree, whereby the creature is predetermined to act: by intrinsec predetermination they mean the previous motion of God upon the creature, which continually moves and applies it to act. But I should rather distinguish predetermination, (as Creation and all other Acts of God ad extrà) into active and passive: [1] By active predetermination I mean nothing else but the Act or Decree of the Divine will, whereby all second causes, persons, acts, effects and things receive their terms, order, and limitation as to power and activity. This is the same with predefinition, predestination, and extrinsec predetermination. That this active predetermination proceeds only from the efficacious previous act of the Divine will, without any impression or actual influx on the second cause has been defended by Scotus and others of great name in the Schools, and that on invict reasons: for if God will, that the second cause, (suppose it be the human will) act, immediately on the volition of God the action of the second cause will follow, not from any previous impression on the second cause, but from its natural subordination and as it were sympathy with the first cause: as at the beck of the human will every inferior faculty of man moves. See Suarez, de Auxil. l. 1. c. 5. n. 3. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 3. [2] By passive predetermination I understand the concourse of God as applying the second cause to its act, and not really, but mentally or modally only distinct therefrom: For as active predetermination is the same with the Divine will, so passive predetermination is the same with the second cause, its act and effect, as we have demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 8. §. 1. (2) Predetermination is usually distinguished into physic or natural, Predetermination physic and moral. and ethic or moral. This distinction depends on that of causes into physic, and moral: a physic or natural cause is that which is truly efficient, and so doth really influence the act and effect, in a way of proper efficience or causality: whence an Ethic or moral cause is that which doth not immediately, directly, or in a way of real proper efficience produce the act and effect, but only morally, by proposing objects, motives, precepts, promises, or the like moral means and influences, with excitements and persuasions. Thus proportionably we may distinguish predetermination into physic and moral. [1] By physic predetermination we must understand not corporal, or natural in a strict notion, which is proper only to things inaminate or Brutes, but such a predetermination as really applies the Agent or second cause to its act, and really, yea immediately influenceth both act and effect. Thus Suarez, Metaphys. Disput. 17. sect. 2. num. 2. A physic cause [and so predetermination] in this place is not taken for a corporal or natural cause, acting by corporeous and material motion; but it's taken more universally, for a cause that truly and really influenceth the effect: for as nature sometimes signifies any essence; so physic or natural influx is that which by true and proper causality worketh the effect: to which when a moral cause is opposed, it is to be understood of such a cause which doth not of itself and truly act, yet it doth so carry itself, as that the effect may be imputed to it: such a cause is he that comforts, beseecheth, or hinders not when he may and aught. Hence [2] by moral predetermination, as it regards God's influence on the moral rational world, we must understand his moral influence on man as his last end, his stating man's duty by moral precepts, inviting thereto by Evangelic promises, dehorting from sin by penal comminations, and all other moral influences. Here we are to note, that albeit physic and moral predetermination be comprehended under physic and moral causality, yet the later is more comprehensive than the former: for physic predetermination properly belongs to a superior cause as acting on an inferior, but physic causality to any efficient, as Strangius doth well observe. But to sum up the whole, both the Dominicans and Calvinists agree with the Jesuits and Arminians in this, That the holy God doth not morally predetermine any to sin: for he neither counsels, encourageth, commands, or invites any one to the least sin. The Question therefore must be understood of physic predetermination; which I shall describe according to the explication of Strangius, l. 2. c. 4. p. 159. thus: By the physic predetermination of God in this place is understood the action of God, whereby he moves and applies the second cause to act, and so antecedently to all operation of the creature; or in order of nature and reason before the creature works, God really and efficaciously moves it to act in all its actions: i e. he acts and causeth, that the creature acts and causeth whatever it acts and causeth: so that without this premotion of God the creature can do nothing: and this premotion being given it is impossible, in a composite sense, that the creature should not act and do that, unto which it is premoved by the first cause. And more particularly, though concisely, as for God's predetermination of the human will, Strangius, Praedeterminare voluntatem est applicare voluntatem ad agendum, & facere ut faciat, Strang. l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. gives it us thus: To predetermine the will, as they teach, is to apply the will to act, and to make it act. Which description of predetermination I do readily close with, and so the Question before us will be summarily this, Whether God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto all their natural actions, even those that have sin annexed or appendent to them? Affirm. I am not ignorant, that a reverend and learned Divine who opposeth our Hypothesis, states the question otherwise, as if we held, That God doth by an efficacious influence universaelly move and determine men to all their actions; even those that are most wicked. But this Hypothesis, as proposed and intended, I know no sober mind but abhors: whoever said, that God determines men to the most wicked actions as such? were not this to make him the Author of sin, which every pious soul detestes? For to determine to wicked actions as such, implies also a determination to the wickedness of those actions: and this determination cannot be physic; because sin as sin has no physic cause or determination: therefore it must be moral: and surely whoever determines morally to the most wicked actions cannot but be the moral cause, and Author of them: and is not this an high piece of blasphemy? We are so far from asserting, that God determines men to the most wicked actions, as that we say, he determines men to no wicked action; no not the least: Yea we add further, that in actions sincerely but imperfectly good, and in part sinful, albeit God predetermines men both naturally and morally to the goodness of the action, and naturally to the substrate mater or natural act, yet he predetermines not to the vitiosity of the act, or the act as sinful. So the sum and whole of our Hypothesis is this, That God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto all their natural actions, even such as have sin appendent to them. This Hypothesis we no way doubt but to make good both by scriptural and rational demonstration. CHAP. II. The state of the Controversy. (1) Ten general Propositions wherein the New Methodists and Predeterminants' agree. (2) The New Methodists differences among themselves about Prescience, Futurition, Divine Concourse, and God's permission of sin. (3) The differences of the Predeterminants' from the New Methodists about absolute Decrees, the Futurition, Divine Permission, Prescience, Providence, Predefinition, and Predetermination of Sin. THE prolixity we have used in explicating and stating our Question will render our subsequent work more facile and concise. For here that old Proverb holds true, A good beginning is half the work. But before we enter on the Demonstration of our Hypothesis it will be necessary to manifest, (1) Wherein we and those who maintain the Antithesis do agree. (2) Wherein our Opponents, who maintain the Antithesis, differ among themselves. (3) Wherein we differ from them. The explication of these Particulars will not a little conduce to the more perfect state and determination of our Question. §. 1. Wherein we and our Opponents, who maintain the Antithesis, Wherein we and our Opponents agree. do agree. Some there are who conceive our differences greater than they are; others on the contrary make them less: our first work therefore will be to show, wherein we agree; which I shall endeavour to lay down in the following Propositions. 1. Prop. That God hath decreed allthings that come to pass. Herein our Adversaries generally concord with us; albeit they differ from us, as also among themselves about the manner how God decrees the substrate mater of sin. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 3. p. 558. But also we confess and say, that God doth truly decree allthings that happen, but not allthings in one and the same manner; but some things effectively, other things permissively: which is the common opinion of Theologues, according to that famous Axiom of Augustin: There is nothing done, which the Omnipotent doth not will, either by permitting that it be done, or by doing of it. Yet the said Strangius, in what precedes, gives us a very dangerous position touching the Divine Decrees: It is not needful, saith he, that we appoint so many particular Decrees of God, touching his Concourse to be afforded, as there are actions of the creature and particular objects of them. Sithat that one general Decree or Institute of God may suffice, whereby he hath determined to concur with all the actions of the creature, as he hath given them a power to act, etc. This general Decree, foisted in to salve his own Hypothesis, is most unworthy of the Divine Being, in that it overthrows the Prescience of God, imposeth imperfection on the Divine Will, and opens an effectual door to Pelagianisme. 2. Prop. That Election of some to Grace and Glory is absolute, and no way dependent on the prevision of any act of man. This Proposition, although it be denied by the Pelagians, Socinians, and Arminians, yet it is generally granted by our Adversaries, the New Methodists, Amyraldus, Strangius, Le Blanc, and others. For these, albeit they make Reprobation conditional and dependent on man's sin, yet they grant a particular absolute Election of some to Grace and Glory: which to me seems very strange and inconsistent with their Hypothesis about Reprobation: For if the Decrees of God be absolute as to Election, why should they not be Volitiones pure conditionales sunt alienae à sapientia & prudentia Dei, Ruiz. de Volunt▪ Dei, Disp. 20. §. 1. also esteemed such as to Reprobation? Can the Divine will be moved by any thing but itself? Are not conditional Decrees inconsistent therewith? Doth not God in the glass of his own Decrees foresee all acts and events of the human will? Must they not then be all decreed absolutely by God? See hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 3. 3. Prop. That God hath a certain Science or Prescience of sin, as well as of all other Events. This Proposition is universally granted by all the New Methodists, Amyraldus, Strangius, etc. as also by most Arminians, although it be utterly incompossible and inconsistent with the sentiments both of the one and t'other Party. For all the wit of man, yea I will with confidence add of Devils, will never be able to explicate and demonstrate a certain prescience in God of things future, but what is originated in and dependent on his own Decrees. I must solemnly profess, I can see no way left to evade the force of Socinus' argument against the certainty of God's prescience, if we resolve it not into the free determination of his own will decreeing all future events: of which more in what follows, Chap. 5. §. 2. 4. Prop. That whatever God absolutely predefines or predestines from Eternity, he predetermines in time. This Proposition the New-Methodists seem generally to grant. So Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. When we speak of absolute predefinition, we willingly grant, that the predefinition of God from eternity, and the Predetermination of the create will in time mutually follow each other; so that whatever particular singular Act God hath absolutely predefined should be done by us, to the same he doth determine our will: For whatever God hath by his Decree so predefined, it is necessary that he effect the same, or cause that it be done; because the Decree of God, seeing it is absolute and efficacious, must necessarily have its effect; which it cannot have but by efficaciously applying the create will to the predefinite act: otherwise, if the will should not act that which is predefined, the Predefinition and Decree of God would be frustrated, which is absurd. A good concession, which will be of use to us in what follows, Chap. 5. §. 3. 5. Prop. That God doth predetermine the human Will to all acts and effects morally good, as also to some other commun acts and effects. This Proposition is generally rejected by the Arminians, as also by Baronius, yet the New Methodists, who have chalked out a middle Way, generally entertain it. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 5. p. 584. We have shown, that God doth not in all things predetermine the human Will, namely not in actions intrinsically evil, and to which vitiosity is necessarily annexed; albeit in things lawful, not only in works of Grace, but also in others that are commun, according to his own pleasure, he determines it, with the preservation of its own native liberty, sithat he can never offer any violence to the will, but only moves it sweetly according to its own nature. See more on this argument in what follows, c. 3. §. 1. on Prov. 21. 1. This great concession of Strangius indeed cuts the nerves and sinews of all his arguments against our Hypothesis: For if God can and doth predetermine the will to some acts, without any violence offered to its Liberty, why may he not also predetermine it to all its acts, without prejudice to its Liberty? The force of this consequence is so strong, that it forceth Baronius and the Arminians to deny all Predetermination. See Chap. 5. §. 4. 6. Prop. That God predetermins the Will to the substrate mater of some sinful acts, even of such as are not intrinsically evil. This Proposition is granted by Strangius, l. 4. c. 1. p. 766. But although in the actions of wicked men, when God doth use them as Instruments for the execution of some peculiar works, it may peradventure be said, that God doth determine their wills, yet it seems more incommode to say, that God moves and predetermines to all other acts, as to acts of hatred of God, blasphemy, etc. So that he yieldeth, that God may predetermine to the mater of some sinful acts: and indeed it cannot be rationally denied; sithat Acts imperfectly good are also in part sinful; and the substrate mater of the act as good and sinful is the same: wherefore if God predetermine the human will to the substrate mater of the act as good, must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the act as sinful? When I say, that God doth predetermine the will to the substrate mater of the act as sinful, As here must not, yea cannot be taken Reduplicatively, but only Specificatively, as it specifies one and the same Act, and distributes it into its opposite Adjuncts of Good and Evil: So that the meaning is no more than this, that God predetermines the will to the substrate mater or entitative act which is both good and evil: and if he predetermine the will to the substrate mater of the Act which is imperfectly good, (as our Adversaries grant) he must also necessarily predetermine the will to the substrate mater of the act whereunto sin is annexed: because the substrate mater of the Act as good and evil is the same. When our Adversaries shall have given us a rational and distinct solution to this argument, I shall confess they have done much for the subversion of our Hypothesis. Of this Argument, see Chap. 5. §. 4, 5. 7. Prop. That there is no real positive Act or Entity in nature, whereof God is not the efficient cause. This is generally granted by all those that deny sin to be a positive Being. So Strangius, l. 3. c. 3. p. 557. There is no Entity, and no action as it is an action or has any reality, whereof God is not the cause, or which he hath not decreed either absolutely or respectively. So l. 4. c. 11. p. 859. The entity of the Action is reduced unto God, as the first cause, on whose concourse and influx it depends. So a Reverend Divine, Cathol. Theol. Part 1. Sect. 17. p. 85. ` It is certain, that as motus vel actio is quid naturale, it is of God as the first cause of Nature: and so when a sinner acteth, it is not without the first Universal Cause. One would think that this concession, if well stated and prosecuted, would put an end to our controversy: For all that we demand is, that the real positive act, whereunto sin is annexed, be from God as the first cause of Nature: But yet what our Opponents grant, as limited by them will not answer our expectations. For some hold with Durandus, that the action is from God, but not immediately; others, that it is immediately from God, yet not by a predeterminative concourse. Hence, 8. Prop. That God concurs immediately to the substrate mater or entitative act whereunto sin is annexed. This Proposition is not granted by such as follow Durandus either in words or sense, yet by others it is. Thus Strangius, l. 1. c. 10. p. 54. But we must judge, that God doth immediately reach every action and effect of the creature, and that both by the Immediation of virtue and supposite or person. For as God himself, so his virtue is every where present and energetic. For the proof whereof he citys Isa. 26. 12. Rom. 11. ult. 1 Cor. 12. 6. Act. 17. 28. with other Scriptures. So Ch. 11. p. 61. he confesseth, that there is a common influx of God unto all actions, which he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the energy and efficace of God, whereby he doth subordinate second Causes to himself; so that whatever they are or do act, they essentially depend on him in both respects. Whereby he seems to evince, that God's Influx doth not only render the subject habile to act, but also immediately reach the very act, even that has sin annexed to it. The like he adds, l. 4. c. 1. p. 760. It may truly be said, and men are wont so to speak, That God is the cause of vitiose actions, albeit he be not the cause of the actions as they are vitiose. And more fully l. 4. c. 3. p. 783. From what has been said, it may in some manner be understood, how in a sane sense God may be said to impel or incline to some sin, when yet he is void of all sin: specially if these things be observed. (1) That it be not understood, that God moves or inclines men to sin in general. (2) Neither that it be said, that God moves to all sin, but only to such, in which he useth depraved wills as instruments to execute his good works. (3) Neither that it be understood, that God doth properly move to sin simply and formally taken, or sin as sin; but only to the material of sin, i. e. not to the sin of the Action, but to the Action as substrate to the sin, so that he be not the Author of the vitiosity, which he only permits, but of the substrate Act, and of his own direction and ordination, which he exerciseth about the vitiose Action, etc. Yea in Actions intrinsically sinful, he seems to grant, that the Act, as it is a physic or natural Being, is from God. So l. 4. c. 12. p. 876. That which is also true of Actions which are intrinsically evil, such as the hatred of God, perjury, etc. In which also we must distinguish the physic or natural Being from the Ethic or moral evil.— That God concurs to the physic action, but not to the moral vice of the action we have above shown. There are two observables in these concessions of Strangius, which, if he were candid and uniform in granting us, would put a period to the controversy. [1] That in Actions intrinsically evil there is a physic or natural entity separable from the ethic or moral vitiosity. [2] That the physic or natural entity of all sinful Actions, even such as are intrinsically sinful, is immediately from God, as the first cause of Nature. But I must confess, I cannot find that Strangius is candid or uniform in these his concessions, but elsewhere he seems to overthrow what he has here granted. For, [1] He sometimes asserts, that the natural act of hating God is so intrinsically evil, as that the vitiosity cannot be separated from it. Again, [2] albeit he seem frequently to grant an immediate concourse to the substrate mater of sinful acts, yet when he comes to explain what he intends thereby, he doth too much verge unto, if not wholly espouse Durandus' mediate concourse, as to acts intrinsically evil. Thus also Amyraldus, as it is well noted by Le Blanc, Thes. Conciliat. Arbitrii, etc. Thes. 48. p. 436. 9 Prop. That God's Providence is universally and efficaciously active in the directing and governing the Sins of men unto his own Glory. This most of the new Methodists grant, albeit some seem to deny it, at least in part. Our Proposition is granted by Strangius, l. 3. c. 4. p. 469. Neither doth it follow from our opinion, that any free act is substracted from the Providence of God, if man doth that which God permits, sithat whether it be good or evil that man doth, God must foreknow, and direct and order it to the end appointed by himself. So l. 4. c. 1. p. 760. ` Furthermore it must be observed, which we have oft mentioned, that God albeit he doth not will sin as sin, yet he doth advisedly permit, direct, and ordain it in the best manner, to execute his righteous judgements, and illustrate his glory. The like p. 764. Albeit we deny that God doth ever determine the will to sin formally taken, or to the actions unto which sin is necessarily annexed, yet we acknowledge, that God doth so rule and order the sinful wills of Men and Devils, that by permitting tentations, offering objects, subministrating occasions, denying Grace, which he owes to none, letting loose the reins to Satan, removing impediments, or by operating in any other secret manner, the event which he pre-appoints infallibly follows, and specially that that work be performed, for the effecting of which God useth their ministry. How much would this concession conduce to put a period to this controversy, were our Adversaries but ingenuous in their assent and consent to it? Doth he not say here as much as we, abating only the term Predetermination? and yet elsewhere how doth he start off from what is here granted? 10. Prop. That God doth no way concur or predetermine the human will to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin so as to be the cause or author of Sin. This Proposition we cheerfully and with our whole Souls assent and consent unto; although it be the grand design and unwearied endeavours of our Adversaries, both Pelagians, Jesuits, Arminians and new Methodists, to fasten the Antithesis on us, namely, That we make God to be the Author of sin. Which Imputation has been in all Ages of the Christian Church fastened on those that defended Efficacious Grace and Divine Concourse, as we shall show in what follows, Chap. 4. §. 2. Having laid down the general Propositions, wherein our Wherein our Opponents differ among themselves. Opponents generally, though not without some variation, concord with us, it follows, that we show briefly wherein they differ among themselves. Indeed, so great is the difference of our Adversaries, specially the New Methodists, Amyraldus, Baronius, Strangius, Le Blanc, and others among themselves in this point touching Gods efficacious concourse to the substrate mater of sin, as that it is very difficult for us to form commun principes or Hypotheses wherein they all agree. And albeit they generally agree in their opposing our Hypothesis, touching Gods immediate predeterminative concourse to the substrate mater of actions intrinsically evil, yet they lay down their own Antithesis with so much caution, suspension, and hesitation of mind, as if they were afraid the contrary might prove true. Placeus, Tractat. de Liber. Arbit. p. 174. cunningly waves the determination of the Question, with this modest concelement of his mind: Truly we, according to the reverence we have towards the infinite Majesty of God, dare not define what the Dependence of the second cause on the first is: It sufficeth us, that too much dependence cannot be asserted, provided that it doth not asperse God with any the least spot of our sins. Which we readily close with, renouncing all such dependence as brings the holy God under the imputation of sin. So Baronius, Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp. 3. §. 78. pag. 147. having given us the mention of the Thomists previous predeterminative concourse, namely, that the human will is in all its motions excited by God, and efficaciously, i. e. irresistibly moved, first to act, and then to act this rather than that, before he undertakes the refutation hereof he thus premonishes us: In the mean while we profess these two things: (1) That we do much against our will recede from this opinion, and that because we conceive so honourably of those great men, which are Patroness thereof. (2) That we are ready, if any thing may follow from this our Doctrine against any article of faith, to reject it. Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. Thes. 55. pag. 438. seems to wave the Controversy; yet Thes. 56. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius, That God cannot physically promove and predetermine free causes to acts intrinsically evil, without being the Author of sin. But Thes. 57 he confesseth, That provided God be not made the Author of sin, the dependence of the second causes on the first in acting cannot be too much asserted, etc. And Thes. 58. he concludes, That the force and efficace of the Divine providence even about sinful acts, is not to be restrained to a certain general indifferent concourse; but that God doth many ways procure, promove, direct, and moderate sinful events. So great is the hesitation of our Adversaries. Yea, how frequently do the very same persons differ from themselves in their sentiments about this point? Doth not the same person sometimes seem to grant an universal concourse immediately influencing all natural acts, and yet elsewhere deny the same to acts intrinsically evil? And so in other points controverted by us. But the differences of our Opponents among themselves are more palpable and visible as to the following Particulars. 1. They are greatly confused and at variance among themselves as Their differences 1. about God's Prescience. to God's Prescience of sinful acts. All the New Methodists generally grant Gods certain prescience of all sinful acts, but yet they are at a great difference, yea contradiction among themselves in the stating of it. (1) Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 594. tells us, That among all the modes which are wont to be explicated, that seems the most probable, which is taken from the presence of allthings in Eternity. Wherein he follows the Dominicans, and so must by consequence resolve the futurition of sin into the will of God permitting it, which overthrows his Hypothesis. Yet cap. 8. pag. 622. he resolves the certainty of Gods foreknowing future events into the more Essence of God. And pag. 626. he resolves it into the actions themselves and their determinate causes. Lastly, cap. 10. pag. 646. he in down right terms confesseth, That the science of future sins is referred to the science of Vision. Which is all that we contend for, and that which necessarily resolves God's prescience of sin, into the act of his will permitting it. Some of our Opponents resolve Gods certain prescience of sin into the infinitude of his science. Thus Le Blanc De Concord. Libert. p 444. Thes. 39 As for the fourth opinion, which seeketh the certitude of Divine prescience in the infinity of the Divine Intellect, and in the determinate verity of those things which are contingently future, it layeth down nothing but what is certain and indubitate. Yet Thes. 40. he confesseth, That this opinion doth not satisfy the Question, nor take away the principal difficulty. For that which is here most difficult to be understood is, how future contingents do from Eternity pass from mere possibles into the nature of future's, that so under that reason they may be perceived by God. Which knot he endeavours to untie, by telling us, that the same causes that give existence to things future give them also their futurition. But this is a very jejune and poor evasion, as we shall hereafter show, Chap. 5. §. 1. (3) Others refer God's certain prescience of sin to the Jesuits middle science, whereby God foresees, that if the will of man come under such a connexion of causes, circumstances, and providential concurrences, the effect will certainly follow, albeit in itself merely contingent. Thus Lud. Crocius, Dyodec. Dissert. Dissert. 7. where he largely but weakly defends this middle science: which Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. pag. 449. Thes. 26; etc. makes to be the opinion of Baronius and others. Le Blanc himself, pag. 444. Thes. 42. confesseth, That it wants not great difficulty, how a thing which is supposed to depend on a cause in itself indeterminate should be certainly known by the Divine Intellect: for the Divine Intellect although infinite cannot see what is not, nor yet change the nature of its object. Whence he concludes, Thes. 43. That seeing there is so much darkness on all sides, our safest and most ingenuous course is to confess our own ignorance herein. The like subterfuge Strangius makes use of, l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. etc. 6. p. 591. with this pretext, That the mode of Divine prescience is not reveled in Scripture. A poor refuge indeed! why then do they so daringly sift and pry into the Divine prescience, and draw it down to the model of our corrupt reason? We easily grant, that the mode of Divine prescience is incomprehensible by poor mortals, and therefore can content ourselves with scriptural descriptions thereof: but this we assert, that it is impossible the Divine prescience, which is in itself most certain, should depend on the most incertain ambulatory will of man; and so much Scripture and Reason grounded thereon doth fully demonstrate. 2. Our Adversaries differ greatly among themselves about the 2. The futurition of sin. futurition of sin, and God's predefinition thereof. Strangius, l. 3. c. 11. holds, That some free acts are absolutely future, and known of God as such, without any Decree predetermining the free causes to those acts: and yet he denies, that those free contingent future's can be known by God according to any Hypothesis, which doth not necessarily infer the determination of the create will; and thence which doth not include an absolute Decree of their futurition. Whence it will follow, that God can foreknow no contingent sinful act as absolutely future, but what he first decreed to be absolutely future; which yet Strangius admits not. Herein he is opposed by Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. pag. 455. 3. Our Opponents are also at variance among themselves 3. Divine Concourse. touching God's concourse, its immediation, totality, priority, efficace, and predetermination as to sinful acts. (1) How many of them incline to the sentiments of Durandus, denying all immediate concourse to sinful acts? And of those that grant immediate concourse in terms, how many yet deny it in reality? Among those that grant immediate concourse both name and thing, do not many espouse such consequences as are inconsistent therewith, yea repugnant thereto? (2) Our Adversaries also differ much about God's total particular concourse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin. Some grant a total concourse to the physic entitative act in the general, but not in particular: others grant a total concourse to the entitative act in particular, abstracting the reference it has to its object: Thus Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 3. who grants, that God doth concur by a special concourse to the special effects as they are specifically distinguished not morally but physically; which is all that we contend for: Others, on the contrary, make God's concourse to the substrate mater of sin only partial and general, asserting with Molina, Part. 1. q. 14. a. 3. Disp. 6. That God is only a partial cause of the entitative act of sin: So a Divine of name among us; yea he asserts, that God never totally permits sin. (3) Our Opponents differ also among themselves touching the Priority of God's concourse to the substrate mater of sin. Some grant God's concourse hereto previous, though not predeterminative; so Strangius: but others make it to be only simultaneous; asserting, that God concurs with the will of man in the same moment of nature and reason, to the same act. So Baronius, wherein he also follows Lud. Molina and the Arminians. (4) Last, the principal difference among our Adversaries is about the efficacity and Predetermination of Divine concourse as to the substrate mater of sin. Some make the concourse of God to be only general and indifferent, and so determinable by the second cause, as the influence of the Sun is by the mater it works upon. Thus Baronius, Metaphys. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. §. 73, 74, 75. pag. 142, etc. where he makes God's concourse to the substrate mater of sinful acts to be the same with that of the Sun concurring to the generation of a man or horse. Wherein he follows the Remonstrants and Jesuits, more particularly Molina, Concord. Liber. Arbitr. cum Grat. donis, etc. Quaest. 14. Disput. 26. Thus a reverend Divine of name among ourselves openly asserts, that God's concourse is determinable by the creature. But Strangius, albeit he too far falls in with the sentiments of Baronius against predetermination; yet he rejects this Hypothesis of a general indifferent concourse as too gross and Pelagian. So l. 2. c. 3. p. 154. We say not therefore, that God concurs only by a general concourse, as the Sun concurs in the same manner to the generation of a man, and of an horse, and of a mouse; but we determine, that the influx of God is special to special effects, as they are physically distinguished specie, and unto all kind of entity, but not to the reason of moral iniquity, which consists in privation. Strangius here seems to oppose Baronius' Hypothesis touching a general indifferent concourse; but yet, I must confess, upon a more accurate research I cannot find that he differs materially from Baronius herein: for although l. 1. c. 11. p. 61. he calls this concourse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, efficace, yet he makes it be but common, and no way determinative, and therefore only indifferent. The like l. 2. c. 19 p. 373. And I am very positive in this, that no man living can rationally exempt themselves from the imputation of the Jesuits indifferent concourse, and assert an efficacious special concourse, but what is determinative as to the subject it works on. And thence Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. part. 3. thes. 36. p. 434. confesseth, That Strangius ' s opinion as to this point differs but little from that of Baronius. Lastly, Baronius denies all predetermination both as to good and evil actions; as Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. §. 78, etc. p. 146. Strangius allows predetermination to all acts moraly though but imperfectly good, and to many other acts of the will, whensoever God pleaseth, or need requireth; yet he denies it to all acts of the creatures, specially to such as are intrinsically evil, as lib. 2. cap. 4. pag. 162. and elsewhere. Herein he is followed by some Divines of note among ourselves, who I am very confident will never be able to maintain their singular Hypothesis, but will at last be driven to the opinion of Baronius, the Remonstrants, and Jesuits, or else fall under the load of all those black consequences they clog our Hypothesis with; of which hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 4. 4. Our Adversaries differ much among themselves about God's 4. God's permission of sin. permission of sin, its nature and efficace. (1) A Divine of repute among ourselves assertet● that no act of sin, no not the active selling of Joseph, or crucifying of Christ was willed by God; but only the passive vendition and crucifixion or effect; yea he saith, That God doth not will sin as a punishment in a proper sense: but others allow, that God wils the acts of sin as penal, or conducible to his own glory, though not as sinful acts. Thus Strangius, l. 4. c. 2. p. 773. where having refuted that distinction (at first framed by Bellarmine, and of late reassumed by a Divine of great name among ourselves) of active and passive vendition and crucifixion, he concludes thus: Therefore here was not an otiose or idle permission, but an efficax operation in the selling of Joseph, which is more orthodox and consistent with itself, than the former Hypothesis which seems to be contradictory to itself, as hereafter, Chap. 3. §. 2. (2) Some of our Opponents assert, God's permission of sin to be altogether inefficacious, yea idle and unactive: but others allow it an efficace, and energy for the limiting, directing, and ordering of sinful acts to their proper ends; albeit not about the act itself; which I conceive no better than a modest contradiction: for how can God's permission limit, direct, and order sinful acts, but by influencing the very act itself materially considered? See more of this, Chap. 5. §. 6. 5. Our Adversaries also differ greatly among themselves about 5. The nature of sin. the Nature of sin, its formal Reason, etc. Some, and those of no small repute among ourselves, hold sin, as to its formal reason, to be a positive real Being: which indeed is most agreeable to their Hypothesis touching acts intrinsically evil, which they deny to be as to their substrate mater or entitative act from God. I must confess this opinion would carry somewhat of probability with it, if we could with the Manichees hold two first Principes or Causes, one of good, the other of evil; but for us that assert but one first Cause of all create positive Being's, I cannot imagine how any can maintain this Hypothesis of the positivitie of sin, without making God the Author of sin, or making man's corrupt will independent, and so the first cause of a real positive act. Therefore Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 13. to avoid these black consequences strongly argues, with the Orthodox, that the formal reason of sin consists in privation. But withal we are here to note, that this Hypothesis utterly overthrows his other Hypothesis touching acts intrinsically evil, which he denies to be from God as to their substrate mater; of which more hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 5. There are other points of moment wherein our Antagonists differ among themselves, as well as from us; namely, touching the natural or moral liberty of the will, natural impossibility and possibility, God's decretive and approbative will, of which before Chap. 1. And indeed we need no way wonder, that our Adversaries thus differ among themselves, sithat their Hypothesis is liable to so many inconsistences and contradictions: for how is it possible, that they should agree among themselves, when as their principal Hypothesis is so disagreeing from itself? But more of this when we come to the demonstrative part, Chap. 5. §. 3. We proceed now to show, Wherein we differ from those of difnew the new method, Strangius, Baronius, Le Blanc, and others, about God's concourse to the substrate mater of sin. Immediately on the breaking up of the Synod of Dort, wherein the Antitheses and sentiments of the Arminians were so strongly and fully refuted, there sprang up some Divines, who gave their assent and consent to the Canons of the said Synod, but yet contrived a new method, specially as to universal Grace, Reprobation, and God's concourse to the substrate mater of sin, in order to a coalition with the Arminian party, as we shall hereafter demonstrate. And the principal Agent, who undertook the new modelling this last head, was Strangius; which he has copiosely treated of, according to the new method, in his Book, De Voluntate & Actionibus Dei circa peccatum: whose sentiments we are to examine in what follows; but at present we shall only lay down in several Propositions wherein we differ from him, and those who follow his method in the stating God's Concourse to the mater of sin. We assert, 1. Prop. God has an absolute efficacious Decree about the substrate 1. As to God's Decrees. mater or entitative act of all sin. This Proposition Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 547. grants to be true in allthings but sin; specially the first sin, and such acts as are intrinsically evil: which sufficiently proves our Proposition; for we say and are ready to demonstrate, that the substrate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed, is not in itself or its natural entity sinful, but naturally good. What there is of sin annexed to it ariseth from its moral estimation and relation to the Law of God violated thereby: in which regard we peremptorily deny that it is from God. Yea Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 569. grants, That God is the cause of the act, though he doth not absolutely predestine or decree the same: and then to that objection of Alvarez, That the Divine preordination and eternal predefinition extends itself to all those things unto which the causality and efficience of God extends, he replies, That God decrees allthings either absolutely or respectively. But this is a very poor Pelagian evasion: for respective or conditional Decrees are every way unbecoming the Divine perfections of God, as our Divines, particularly Davenant Animadvers: against Hoard, pag. 226. have proved against the Arminians. Lastly, Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 576. denies, That God decrees all sins, specially the first sin: which we shall in its place endeavour to prove, with the solution of his objections against it. Hence, 2. Prop. The Decree of God gives futurition to the substrate mater 2. The Futurition of sin. or material entitative act whereunto sin is annexed. The Antithesis hereto is defended by Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he affirms, That it is not repugnant to the nature of God, or of the thing itself, that something be future, which God has not predefined. So c. 9 p. 628. he denies, that God hath decreed all future's, namely the fall of Adam, or the sin against the Holy Ghost. This Proposition is also violently impugned by Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. Hum. par. 1. thes. 55, etc. But specially I can no way approve of what Twisse doth in many places assert, That the Decree of God and his will is the sole and only cause of the futurition of every event. And he instanceth in the fall of Adam and the Angels. His Arguments against the futurition of the substrate mater of sin from the Decree of God, we shall examine in what follows, Chap. 5. §. 1. 3. Prop. The permissive Decree of God about sin is not idle but efficacious. 3. God's permissive Decree. This Proposition is opposed by Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 556. Neither do we grant, what some affirm, that the permissive Decree of God, whereby he permits all sin, is efficacious, albeit not effective. For so the fall of Adam and all other sins should proceed from the efficace of the Divine Decree: which is an hard saying. Neither is that less hard, which some affirm, that God hath absolutely decreed, that men do not more good than what they do, and omit not more evil than what they omit. This Hypothesis is so far from being hard, as that I conceive Strangius' opposite persuasion is most dangerous and destructive of the Divine Decrees, as we shall show in its place. Yea Strangius himself, in what follows, pag. 557. grants what Lombard, lib. 1. didst 47. assertes, namely, that the will of God is always efficacious, etc. 4. Prop. God's Prescience of things future, and particularly of acts 4. God's prescience of sin. whereto sin is annexed is founded on his Decrees. Thus Hilary, de Trin. lib. 9 What God decreed to do, those things he knows in his wil This sentence of Hilary Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 576. owns as orthodox, but yet denies, that the absolute Decree of God is the reason of knowing allthings. So Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. par. 1. thes. ●3. I see no reason, why we should deny unto God the knowledge of those things which are freely future under a certain condition, albeit in that condition there be not included a decree of predetermining the free cause to this or that. But Scotus and his followers fully espouse our Hypothesis, asserting, That God certainly knows all future contingents, because his Divine Essence, which is the reason of knowing, representes to the Divine Intellect the thing determinately future from the determination of his own wil And then as to the prescience of sin, they hold, That albeit God doth not predefine sins as such, yet he predefines the permission of sins, in which he knows them to be future. Which is orthodox, and that which we shall demonstrate hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 2. 5. Prop. It belongs to the Perfection of Gods will and providence to 5. Divine Predetermination. predefine and predetermine all the free acts of the wil This predefinition and predetermination as to gratiose acts Strangius, lib. 2. c. 8. p. 188. and the rest of the new Methodists, excepting Baronius, grant; but they deny it as to the Fall of Adam and other acts intrinsically evil. So Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 568. But if it be said, that God predefined and predetermined that Adam should at that very time eat, abstracting from the object which he did eat of, that cannot be. Then he gives his reasons, why God could not predefine and predetermine Adam to the act of eating, abstracting it from the reference it has to its object. And then he adds: Moreover we deny, that it belongs to the Perfection of God or of Divine Providence, that he absolutely predefine all free acts, and predetermin the Will unto them. The Arguments he urgeth for this his Antithesis we shall endeavour to solve, and demonstrate our own hypothesis in its due place, Chap. 6. §. 1. 6. Prop. God's predefinition of and predetermination to the substrate 6. Human Liberty. mater of sinful Acts destroys not their Liberty. Strangius and his Sectators grant, That Predefinition and Predetermination destroys not that Liberty which is essential to the Will, but only that which consists in Indifference. So Strangius, l. 3. c. 14. p. 681, 682, 683, 685, 686. and c. 16. p. 711. But how frivolous this opinion is, and how unapt to serve the design for which it was coined, we have already intimated, c. 1. §. 3. and intent more fully to demonstrate, Chap. 6. §. 5. 7. Prop. Predefinition in the divine Decree and Predetermination 7. God not the Author of Sin. in time of those entitative Acts whereunto sin is annexed, do not make God the Author of Sin. This is the principal point in controversy, the Antithesis whereof is strongly urged, though weakly defended by our Opponents. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 548. But I judge it no way consentaneous to the natural sanctity of God, that he will and decree sin to be, the vitiosity to exist, and that he predefine such acts, whereunto the vitiosity is necessarily annexed; specially the Fall of the evil Angels and our first Parents, from whence all sins sprang. So c. 5. p. 579. Whether it be said from the permission, or from the Decree of God permitting, or from the action of which God is the cause, that sin is necessarily inferred, truly the necessity of sinning is ascribed to God as the Author; namely because he decreed and caused that from which sin necessarily follows. The like p. 587. Neither hath God predetermined the will of Adam to the very act of eating the forbidden fruit, which yet as to its entity is reduced to God as the first cause: neither was that act or its vitiosity necessarily inferred from the permission of God. That this Antithesis of Strangius and his Sectators is most false, and our Hypothesis most true, it remains on us to demonstrate, Chap. 5. Thus we have given the true and full state of our Controversy; which by reason of the subtle evasions and subterfuges of our Adversaries lies under so much obscurity and confusion: and indeed it is to me a deplorable case, and that which argues men's diffidence of the merits of their cause, that they contend with so much passionate vehemence for their own Phaenomena, and yet never explicate the terms, or state the Question in controversy. I have thereby given the Reader as well as myself the more trouble in this part of our Province, that so what follows may be the more facile both for him and me. CHAP. III. Scriptural Demonstrations of our Hypothesis. Scriptural Demonstration, (1) That God is the first Cause of all natural Actions and Things, Esa. 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Psal. 33. 15. Prov. 21. 1. Act. 17. 28. Jam. 4. 15. (2) That God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed. [1] Joseph's vendition, Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8. Gen. 50. 20. Acts 7. 9 [2] The Crucifixion of Christ, Mat. 26. 24. Luke 22. 22. John 19 10, 11. Acts 2. 23. & 4. 28. Our Adversaries Evasions taken off. (3) That God makes use of wicked Instruments to punish his People, Esa. 10. 5, 6. Jer. 16. 16. Psal. 105. 25. Job 1. 21. (4) God's immediate hand in the Act of Sin, 2 Sam. 12. 11. & 16. 22. 2▪ Sam. 16. 10, 11. & 24. 1. 1 Kings 11. 31, 37. & 12. 15, 24. 2 Kings 9 3. & 10. 30. 1 Kings 22▪ 23. Rev. 17. 17. (5) Gods efficacious permission of Sin, 1 Sam. 2. 25. Job 12. 16, 17, 20. (6) Gods judicial hardening Sinners, Psal. 81. 12. & 69. 22-27. Rom. 11. 10. Esa. 6. 10. & 29. 10. & 19 11- 14. & 44. 18, 19 & 60. 2. Rom. 1. 28. 2 Thess. 2. 11. The nature of Judicial Induration in six Propositions. (7) God ordering Sin for his glory, Exod. 9 14-16. Rom. 9 17, 18. Prov. 16. 4. Rom. 9 21, 22. 1 Pet. 2. 8. HAving explicated the terms relating to and given the genuine state of our Hypothesis, namely, That God doth, by an efficacious power and influence, move and predetermine men to all their natural actions, even such as have sin appendent to them; we now proceed to the Demonstration hereof. And because all demonstration must be grounded on some first principes, which give evidence, firmitude and force thereto; and there are no proper principes of Faith and Theologie, but what are originally in the Scriptures, we are therefore to begin our Demonstration Scriptural Demonstrations. with Scriptural Arguments, which we shall reduce to these seven heads. (1) Such Scriptures wherein it is universally affirmed, that God is the first Cause of all natural actions and things, and more particularly of all even the most contingent acts of man's Wil. (2) Such Scriptures as directly demonstrate, That God doth predefine, predetermine, and foreordain such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed. (3) Such Scriptures wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his People, in such a way wherein they could not but contract guilt. (4) Such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those acts whereunto sin is appendent. (5) Such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious permission of some to sin. (6) Such Scriptures as demonstrate Gods giving up some to judicial Occecation and Obduration. (7) Such as clearly evince Gods ordering and disposing the Sins of men for his own Glory. §. 1. We shall begin our Scriptural Demonstration with such 1. God the first Cause of all natural Actions and Things. Texts as universally affirm, That God is the first cause of all natural Actions and Things; and more particularly, of all even the most contingent acts of man's Wil. 1. The Scriptures that speak God to be the first Cause of all natural Actions and Things, are many and great: we shall mention some; as, Esa. 26. 12. Thou hast wrought all our Esa. 26. 12. works in us, or for us. This Text is urged by Strangius, p. 54. to prove Gods immediate concourse to all actions of the creature, though it doth in a more peculiar manner regard the deliverance of the Church; wherein God predetermines and overrules many actions of wicked men, which have much sin annexed to them. Again, this universal prime causality of God efficaciously influencing all natural Acts and Effects is apparently expressed Rom. Rom. 11. 36. 11. 36. For of him, and through him, and to him are allthings. Of him, as he frames allthings; By him, as he operates in and cooperates with allthings; and for him, as the final cause of allthings. Thus God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, multiforme energy, as Cyril styles it, reacheth all manner of Natural actions and effects: and if so, then surely such natural entitative Actions as have sin annexed to them. Is there any sin so intrinsically evil, which has not some entitative act or subject as the substrate mater thereof? And if allthings are of God, and by him, and for him, must not also the entitative act of sins intrinsically evil be so? Strangius, p. 342. replies thus: All that God works must tend to his Glory: But what Glory redounds to God from those Actions of hatred of God, blasphemy? etc. A strange reply indeed for a Divine to make. (1) Was there not much Hatred of God, and Blasphemy in the crucifying of Christ? And yet was there any action more conducing to the glory of God than this? Yea, (2) Doth not Strangius himself, and those of his party grant, that God directs, disposeth, and overrules all sinful acts, even such as are intrinsically evil, so as that they conduce to his glory? And how can God direct, dispose, and overrule them, unless he concur, yea predetermine the Will to the entitative act? Again Strangius, p. 561. answers to this Text thus: None that is orthodox ever extended these words to sins; as if sins were of God, by God, and for him, etc. [1] Neither do we extend these words to sins formally considered: [2] But must we thence necessarily conclude, that the entitative act, whereto sin is only accidentally appendent, is not from God, nor by him, nor for him? Yea, [3] May we not say with Divines, that sin formally considered, although it be not of God and by him as an Efficient, yet it is for him, i. e. conducing to his Glory, as wisely ordered and overruled contrary to the intent of the sinner? Thus much Augustin once and again inculcates, as De Genes. ad litter. lib. Imperfecto, cap. 5. * Name & vitiorum nostrorum non est auctor Deus, sed tamen ordinator est. For God is not the Author of our sins, yet he is the Ordinator of them, etc. And thus much indeed Strangius, p. 860. confesseth. Another Text that evidently and invincibly demonstrates Gods efficacious predeterminative Concourse to all natural as well as supernatural Actions and Effects is, Ephes. 1. 11. Who worketh allthings Eph. 1. 11. after the counsel of his own wil We find three particulars in this Text which greatly conduce to explicate and demonstrate Gods efficacious Concourse to all Actions, and particularly to the substrate mater of sinful acts. (1) We may consider the object, allthings, i. e. whatever is clothed with the Notion and Idea of real positive entity: allthings must be here taken distributively into all singulars: there is no Being, that partakes of real entity but is wrought by God. (2) Here is to be considered, the Act, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who worketh energetically, or efficaciously: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to work with an invincible efficace; and thence it is oft joined with words denoting infinite power and activity, as before, c. 1. §. 6. It notes here Gods efficacious predeterminative Concourse, working in and with allthings, according to their natural propensions. Thence (3) follows the original principe of this predeterminative efficacious operation, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to the counsel of his own wil Which notes, that God's efficacious predeterminative will is the supreme and first cause of allthings: there is no executive power in God distinct from his Will: his Concourse in regard of its active attingence is no more than his simple volition: so that divine Predetermination is the same with divine Predefinition, as we have largely demonstrated, Court Gent. P. 4. c. 7. §. 3. Whence also it follows, that Gods working allthings according to the counsel of his will, has one and the same Idea with his predetermining all actions and effects, even such as have sin appendent to them. Strangius, p. 560. replies to the Argument drawn from this Text thus: From this place nothing more can be collected, than that God has decreed those things that he worketh: as it is certain, that God hath decreed nothing which he doth not execute— not that God worketh sins, etc. [1] This Text speaks more than what Strangius allows it to speak, namely, that God has not only decreed those things that he worketh, but also that he works by his Decree, or omnipotent Volition: for we own no other executive power in God but his divine Will, as Scotus, Bradwardine, and some of the greatest Scholastic Theologues demonstrate. [2] Who saith, that God worketh Sins? surely none but Martion or Manes, or such as hold Sin to be a positive real Being. [3] But yet we do with the Orthodox affirm and prove from this Scripture, that God worketh that entitative natural Act, whereunto sin is appendent: for otherwise, how can he be said to work allthings? Is this good sense or Logic, to say, God works allthings, not only according to their generic or specific distribution, but also according to their distribution into each singular, (for so the Syncategoreme Al is here taken) but yet he worketh not all singular entities, namely the substrate mater of Sin? Doth this amount to less than a downright contradiction? He works allthings, but yet doth not work allthings? What Logic or wit of man can reconcile these Notions? 2. Unto our first Head we may also reduce such Scriptures, as in a more particular manner mention Gods efficacious predeterminative concourse to all human actions and effects, even such as are most contingent and dependent on the ambulatory will of man. Thus Psal. 33. 15. He fashioneth their hearts alike: he considereth Psal. 33. 15. all their works, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who fashioneth, formeth, frameth, as the Potter doth his clay: it notes not only, yea not so much the first Creation of the human Soul, as its actual figments, frames, imaginations and thoughts: this is evident from the scope and contexture of the words: for what is the Psalmists intent and undertakement, but to demonstrate Gods infinite prescience, and its perfect comprehension of all the figments, frames, thoughts, intentions, and affections of the heart, as vers. 13, 14? And how doth he prove this? Why, because he fashioneth their hearts alike, i. e. puts all the first thoughts, inclinations, intentions and movements of the heart into what form, frame, or fashion he pleaseth. There is also a great Emphase and significance in that term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which we render alike, but may be as properly rendered together, as it is by the Latin simul; neither is it to be referred to the Verb frameth, but to the object Hearts: and so it notes an universality distributive into all singulars, without the least exception of any. And then the sense will be; who fashioneth, formeth, or frameth the hearts of all mankind in all their very first motions, conceptions, imaginations, resolutions, end, interests, contrivements, ebullitions, affections, prosecutions, and fruitions, or other actions whatsoever. Whence he adds, He considereth all their works: what works doth he mean? Surely not only the works and labours of men's hands, but also the workings, movements, and figments of their hearts: and how can God consider them, if he did not form, frame and fashion them? Yea, there yet lies a deeper notion in the coherence of these parts; namely, that Gods forming, framing and fashioning the hearts of all men is the ground and cause of his considering their works: For how God can perfectly consider and know the works of men's hearts, unless he be the former, framer, and fashioner of them all, as to their real entitative acts, all the wit of man can never devise or make clear unto us. So that God's Science of Vision, or Prescience as to the figments of man's heart ariseth from this, that God is the framer, former, and fashioner of men's hearts and all their natural movements; which also implies his predefinition and predetermination of man's heart and all its first motions, inclinations, and affections. So then to form and sum up our Argument from this Text: Doth God indeed fashion, form and frame the hearts of all men in all their natural motions, imaginations, and affections? And may we without apparent contradiction to the light of this Text exclude the entitative acts of any sins, though never so intrinsically evil? What is this but to exclude the far greatest part of human acts from being form and framed by God? Or how can the omniscient God consider all the works of men's hearts, if he be not the former and fashioner of them all, as to their natural entity? I must confess the validity of this argument from God's prescience is to me so firm and great, as that should it be baffled, I see no way left, but to turn Socinian, and so to deny the certainty of God's prescience as to the contingent imaginations of man's heart, which implies much Atheism. Another Text that proves God's efficacious and predeterminative Concourse as to all human acts is Prov. 21. 1. The King's heart is Prov. 21. 1. in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water; he turneth it whithersoever he wil (1) He mentions the King's heart, as the measure of all other men's; because Kings generally have a greater sovereignty and Dominion over their own hearts, than other men: if any men's hearts may plead the privilege of exemtion from God's efficacious predeterminative Concourse, surely Kings may, specially such as Solomon was, who obtained from God such an amplitude of Soul, and self-Dominion: yet he grants, that the King's heart was not exempted therefrom. (2) By the Heart we must understand, according to the Hebraic mode, the whole soul, and all its movements, imaginations, ratiocinations, contrivements, purposes, and undertakements. (3) In the hand of the Lord: i. e. under his efficacious predeterminative influx or concourse. The Hand being the instrument of our most potent operations, it's usually put in Scripture for the energetic, potent and predeterminative Concourse of God: So Hab. 3. 4. He [i. e. Christ whose Hab. 3. 4. brightness was as the light] had horns, [i. e. beams, as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes] coming out of his hands [i. e. most potent will, the spring of all his efficacious operations: whence it follows] and there was the hiding of his power, i. e. his most potent efficacious predeterminative concourse lay hid in the beams irradiated from his omnipotent hand or wil So Act. 11. 21. And the hand of the Lord was with them, Act. 11. 21. i. e. the efficacious predeterminative power of Divine Grace; the hand being the instrument whereby man exertes and puts forth his power. So Solomon saying, That the hearts of Kings are in the hand of God, it must be understood of God's puissant predeterminative Concourse, whereby he applies the heart to its acts, conduceth and guideth it therein, and determineth it as he pleaseth. So it follows, (4) As the rivers of waters, he turneth it whithersoever he wil How easy is it by Aquaducts to turn waters this or that way as men please? And is it not infinitely more facile for the wise omnipontent God, to turn the hearts of men, and all their natural conceptions, products, and issues which way he lists? All this may be evinced from Strangius' gloss on this Text, lib. 1. cap. 9 pag. 50. where having given us the mention of Gods preserving and directing the wills of men even in evil actions, he adds a third and more special mode of Divine influence, whereby God doth bend, impel, and incline human wills which way he please, not by proper compulsion, but by sweet inspiration and motion: For albeit God doth never take away that liberty which is essential to the will, yet he doth at times, and when he please, efficaciously move and impel the wills of men: and what Solomon predicates of the King's heart, Prov. 21. 1. that very same may, on a greater account, be affirmed of the heart of every man. So Augustin, de Grat. & Liber. Arbitr. cap. 20. If the Scripture be diligently inspected, it shows, that not only the good wills of men, but even the bad are so in the power of God, that where he will and when he will, he causeth them to be inclined, either to perform benefits, or to inflict punishments, by a most secret, yet just judgement. So again August. de Corrept. & Grat. cap. 6. God hath in his power the wills of men, more than they themselves; without doubt having most omnipotent power to incline men's hearts where he pleaseth. What could be said more categorically and positively to evince Gods efficacious and predeterminative Concourse to all the natural products and issues of man's heart, even such as have intrinsecal evil, as they call it, appendent to them? Yea, Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 182. grants, That God doth sometimes efficaciously move and predetermine the wills of men not only to supernatural works, but also to natural and civil, as oft as it seems good to him, to perform certain ends which he has preordained. So Prov. 16. 7. He maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him. And how so? Surely by overruling their hearts even in the sinful movements. Thus he bent and determined the revengeful mind of Esau to embrace his brother, Gen. 33. So he gained the hearts of the Egyptians towards the Israelities, Exod. 11. 2, 3. & 12. 35, 36. Thus God determined the will of Cyrus to bring back the Captivity of the Jews, 2 Chron. 36. 22. Ezra 1. 1. Thus God bent the mind of Darius and Artaxerxes to grant the Jews liberty for the rebuilding the Temple, Ezra 6. 1, etc. & 7. 2. Neh. 2. 4. So God dealt with Jeremy's enemies, Jer. 15. 11. All these predeterminations even in civil and natural actions are allowed by Strangius: whence we argue, That it is impossible, but that God should predetermine to the substrate mater of sinful actions: for all these actions being exerted by wicked men, had nothing of moral or supernatural good in them, albeit God made use of them for the succour of his people, yea they were full of hatred against God. To these Scriptures we may add, Act. 17. 28. For in him we Act. 17. 28. live, and move, and have our being. Not only Being in general, and Life, which implies more than simple being, but also all our movements or motions are from God as the prime Motor: which Paul demonstrates out of one of their own Poets: for we are also his offspring. As if he had said: Do not your own Poets tell you, that we are the offspring of God? Is he not then the first Cause and Motor of all our motions? Doth not Aristotle, Phys. 8. also strongly demonstrate, That all our natural motions must arise from one first immobile Motor? And to whom doth this Prerogative belong but to God? Must not then the substrate mater of all sinful motions, even such as are intrinsically evil, be reduced unto God as the prime Motor? I shall conclude this first Head of scriptural Arguments with Jam. 4. 15. For that ye ought to say, If the Lord will, we shall live, Jam. 4. 15. and do this or that. There were a number of Free-willers, who proudly conceited, that they had an absolute and plenary dominion over their own wills and actions; whom James rebukes, and tells them, they ought to say, If the Lord will, etc. So that he plainly resolves all the acts of man's will into the will of God, as the original Cause and Principe. But let us see how poorly Strangius shifts off the force of this Argument, lib. 2. cap. 10. pag. 227. he saith, Who ever understood these words, if God will, i. e. if God predetermine my will to do this or that? Then he adds his own gloss: But truly nothing more can be understood by that condition, IF GOD WILL, than this, if God shall permit, or will permit, as it is elsewhere explicated, Act. 16. 7. & 1 Cor. 16. 7. I must confess I cannot but wonder, that a person of so great reason, and under so many advantages and assistances from Divine Revelation, should satisfy himself with so slender an evasion, which not only Reason and Scripture, but even Pagan Philosophemes contradict. For (1) it is most evident, that James here, (as Luke, Act. 16. 7. and Paul, 1 Cor. 16. 7.) speaks not of a mere permissive will, but of an efficacious influential concourse, arising from the will of God, which is the alone principe and spring of Divine concourse: for all actions both natural, civil, and supernatural must be resolved into the will of God, as their prime cause: so that If God will here, is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 elsewhere, if God concur, if he assist, if he by his efficacious predeterminative will, without which we can do nothing, concur. And that this is the genuine mind of this Text is most evident by the use of this phrase among the Ancients both Jews and Pagans. Bensyra, that ancient Hebrew, Sent. moral. xi. thus speaks: Let man never say he will do any thing, before he hath prefaced this, If the Lord will, i. e. assist or concur, not permit. So among Pagans, Hom. Iliad. B. vers. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. The like Demosth. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, If God wil But none speaks more fully to this point than Plato, Alcibiad. pag. 135. where Alcibiades demanding, How he ought to speak touching Divine Si Dii volunt, volentibus Diis, Cic. in Offic. efficacious concourse, Socrates replies, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, If God will: and in his Laches: But I will do this and come to thee to morrow, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, If God wil Whence it's evident, that this formule of speech was ordinary even among the Heathens, as well as Jews and Christians, noting not only a permissive or Directory, but Decretory and predeterminative wil So the same Phrase must be understood, Act. 18. 21. If God will, and 1 Cor. 4. 19 If Act. 18. 21. 1 Cor. 4. 19 the Lord wil Is it possible that these Phrases should be understood of a mere permissive will? Do not all mankind need an efficacious concourse and predeterminative will to conduct them in all their affairs? Again, (2) Gods permissive will is either natural or moral: it cannot be meant of God's natural permissive will, because that regards only sin, which there is no mention of in these Texts, neither is it necessarily included. Neither can it be meant of God's moral permissive will, because that was already declared and manifest in the Laws of God: for all moral permission belongs to God's Legislative will declared in his word. It remains therefore that this phrase, If God will, be understood of God's efficacious will, whereby all natural motions and so the entitative acts of sin are predetermined. §. 2. I now descend to the Second Head of Scriptural Demonstrations, God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed. namely, That God doth predefine, predetermine, and fore-ordain such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed. I shall mention only two Actions, The Selling of Joseph, and the Crucifixion of our Lord, whereof the former was but a Type of the later. 1. I shall begin with the Selling of Joseph, mentioned Gen. 1 Arg. from joseph's Vendition, Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8. 45. 5, 7, 8. Joseph saith v. 5. Now therefore be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither: for God did send me before you to preservelife. Joseph here has a double aspect on his Brother's sin; the one regards their hand in the sin, which he, out of a noble generous principe of fraternal Love, passeth by; the other regards the special hand of Divine Providence in this their Sin, which he admires and adores, in that it by an efficacious predeterminative Concourse brought so great a good out of so great an evil; which no finite power could do: men may make good use of what is in itself good, but who can bring so great good out of so great evil, but a God omniscient and omnipotent? (1) Let us remark their Sin in selling Joseph, and of what a black Idea it was. [1] It sprang from Hatred, yea a deliberate rooted hatred, as Gen. 37. 4. They hated him, and could not speak peaceably unto him. Their hatred was grounded on his father's love to him. Yea, [2] There was much Envy and Indignation joined with their hatred, as v. 8. Shalt thou indeed reign over us? etc. whence v. 11. and his brethren envied him, etc. [3] There was in like manner bloody Cruelty, yea intended Murder in this sin, as v. 20, 21, 22, 24. [4] There was also notorious Lying evident in this sin, v. 32, 33. [5] That this sin was of a very crimson bloody guilt is evident by their own Convictions and Confessions, when God began to awaken their Consciences, as it is conjectured about fourteen years after, Gen. 42. 22. Behold his blood is required! [6] By all which it is most evident, that this vendition or selling of Joseph was a sin intrinsically evil. For certainly if a sin of such bloody Aggravations deserve not the name of intrinsically evil, I know not what sin doth. Hence, (2) We are to demonstrate, that God did predefine and predetermine joseph's Brethren to the entitative act or substrate mater of this Sin. And this Province we no way doubt but to make good out of the Text, Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8. compared with other Texts. [1] Joseph saith, v. 5. 7. God did send me before you to preserve life. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sent me forth, by his efficacious predeterminative hand, which conducted me hither. The LXX. render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifies, to send forth with a mighty hand, as Captives into Liberty, Luke 4. 18. also, to send forth with commands, authority and power, Mat. 10. 16. & 11. 10. as elsewhere: again, to send forth executioners, Mat. 2. 16. lastly, to direct the course of a Ship. In all these notions Gods efficacious predeterminative concourse in sending Joseph into Egypt, is necessarily included. This also appears [2] by what is added v. 5. God did send me before you to preserve life. Note here, that God certainly and absolutely foresaw the Famine and joseph's being sold into Egypt, which he intended to turn for good, even for the preservation of jacob's Family and the Elect seed in him. Now how could God foresee this absolutely and infallibly, but in the predefinition or fore ordainment of his own Will? And Strangius grants this, that where there is Predefinition, there also follows Predetermination: Must we not then conclude, that this Vendition of Joseph was both predefined and predetermined by God? Yea, [3] Joseph adds v. 8. So now it was not you that sent me hither, but God, etc. You see here Joseph makes a threefold mention of God's overruling hand in this their sin, and that for their as well as his good: And he tells them plainly, that it was not they that sent him, but God. As if he had said, You indeed sent me to be a poor Vassal in Egypt; but did not God send me to be a Ruler over Egypt? You sent me to destroy me, but why did God send me, but to preserve both you and me? You sent me out of Hatred and Malice; but did not God send me out of great Love and pity both to me and you? And what could be spoken more emphatically to illustrate and demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concourse to the substrate mater of sin than this, It was not you that sent me hither, but God? Why doth he use this manner of speech? was it not they that sold him? Yes; but because they were but as mere passive Instruments or Midwives to bring forth that great predeterminative Decree, and to subserve Divine Providence in the ushering into Egypt Joseph their temporal Saviour, and the Type of our Eternal Saviour, therefore the entitative action is wholly taken off from them, (albeit the moral vitiosity of it is imputable to none but them) and ascribed unto God, as the principal Agent. This manner of speech is Hebraic, and must be understood, (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it was not you, i. e. not only you: you were but the Instruments of Divine Gubernation and Predetermination. (2) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, emphatically, it was not you, i. e. if we consider the act of selling me in its natural entitative Idea, as the substrate mater of Divine Providence, ye had the least hand in it, it was not you, but God that sent me hither. We find the like Hebraisme, 1 Sam. 8. 7. Not thee but me, i. e. principally and comparatively. So that it's most evident that Joseph ascribeth the whole Act considered entitatively and naturally unto God's efficacious predeterminative and principal concourse and conduct, whereof they were but the Instruments; albeit, if we consider the act morally, as to its obliquity, so it Non refert in Deum peccatum fratrum, sed transitum suum in Aegyptum. Erasm. was wholly theirs, not Gods: it is not his brethren's sin morally considered, but the entitative act that he refers to God. [4] That this is the genuine mind of joseph's words is evident from other Scriptures. So Gen. 50. 20. But as for you, ye thought evil against me, but God meant it for good, etc. Here we have their moral evil separated from God's natural and moral good in and by the Vendition of Joseph. Their Act proceeding from hatred, envy, and attended with Murder, was intrinsically evil, and designed nothing but evil against Joseph: but the same Act considered physically and entitatively as proceeding from the efficacious predeterminative conduct of God, was naturally good; and as it tended to the designed exaltation of Joseph, and rendered him a temporal and typical Saviour of Israel, so it was morally good. The aggravation of their Sin, and efficace of God's predeterminative Concourse may be both greatly illustrated by an inspection into the native import of the Hebraic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, used here to note their malitiose plotted evil, and Gods plotted predeterminative concourse in and about the same act. (1) He saith, Ye thought evil against me, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ye plotted, contrived evil against me. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies to excogitate, deliberate, consult, compute, calculate, contrive, reason. It is oft used to signify plotted, inachinated evil, as Psal. 10. 2. The same word is used to note Gods determinate counsel and will about the entitative act of their Sin; but God meant it unto Good, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. from all Eternity contrived and predetermined it for good. Their plotted contrived evil, was counter-plotted and contrived by God for good: Which notes that it was not a thing casual or accidental, but fore-ordained and predetermined by God, according to the determinate counsel of his wil The like may be deduced from Stephen's words, Act. 7. 9 And the Patriarches moved with envy, Act. 7▪ 9▪ sold Joseph into Egypt; but God was with him. Here we have their Moral evil aggravated from its original Spring, and Gods natural and moral good in the same Act. How was God with him? Not only in his passive Vendition, or passing into Egypt and continuance there, as some would persuade us; but also in the very Active Vendition, or act of selling him to the Ishmaelites, considered naturally and entitatively: for God was with Joseph in causing the Ishmaelites to pass by at that very time, in determining his brethren's wills to take him out of the pit and sell him to the Ishmaelites, and inclining or determining these to accept the bargain. In sum, God was with Joseph by an efficacious predeterminative conduct, determining every circumstance of this Vendition naturally considered. I am not ignorant what Responses or Answers are framed by The Objections against joseph's Vendition answered. the Jesuits, Arminians, and New Methodists against our Argument deduced from this Vendition of Joseph: Molina, (the Head of the Jesuits as to their Pelagian Dogmes) the Concord. q. 19 Disp. 2. tells us, that this Vendition of Joseph is ascribed to God, as merely permitting it. The like Ruiz, de Volunt. disp. 18. Sect. 2. and Lessius, de Efficac. Grat. Sect. 2. and others. Arminius, de Efficac. Provide. Disput. 11, 12. over and above this mere Permission of the Jesuits, adds God's oblation, direction, and determination of Arguments and Occasions, yea some kind of concourse in this Vendition of Joseph, etc. But all these frivolous subterfuges to avoid the force of this Text are incomparably well blown off by Rutherford, de Divina Provident. c. 16. p. 192, etc. I shall therefore only give the solution of such as have been coined since by the New Methodists, which indeed are much the same with those of the Jesuits and Arminians. A Divine of name among us, gives this reply to our Argument, That the Venditio activa, the active Vendition of Joseph was not willed by God, but only passiva, the passive, or effect and consequents; which are only mentioned in the Text. I must confess this answer gives me some amazement, but no difficulty to answer it. For, (1) What this Reverend Author means by his passive Vendition I cannot divine: I know that in the Aristotelean Schools Action and Passion have been really distinguished and so distributed into two distinct Predicaments; but I think this imaginary distinction is now generally hissed out of the Schools by all awakened Disputants; yea, how many of those, who are zelose Sectators of Aristotle in other points, have subscribed the banishment of this distinction? So that to distinguish active Vendition from passive, what is it but to distinguish one and the same Act from itself? But (2) grant there be such a distinction in Nature, yet is it not most apparent, that it can have no place here? Doth not Joseph ascribe the very active Vendition or action of Selling him, unto God? Is it not said v. 8. So now, it was not you that sent me hither, but God? Can this, with any tolerable sense be applied to the passive Vendition, or the effects and consequents of the selling Joseph? Must it not necessarily be understood of the very same active Vendition, which, considered in its natural entitative act, they were the Instruments of, but God the principal Agent and Conductor? (3) This Distinction of Active and Passive Vendition was not indeed forged by the Reverend Author before mentioned, but taken up from Bellarmine, who the Amiss. Grat. l. 12. c. 11. distinguisheth the Action of selling Joseph and crucifying Christ from the Passion, and grants, that God willed and decreed the Passion, but not the Action, which inferred the Passion; and because the said Author has so great an estime for Strangius, whom he generally follows in this point, I shall give him the answer which Strangius, l. 4. c. 11. p. 772. gives to this distinction of Bellarmine, thus: However it be, in the Text there are two things to be observed, [1] That Joseph there cannot distinguish the Action from the Passion, as if the Passion were to be ascribed to God, not the Action: for it's plainly said and repeated in the Text, according to the Hebraic verity, Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8. that God sent him. [2] Thence c. 50. 20. he doth plainly distinguish between the good work of God and their evil in the same mater, from the diversity of the Intention: You designed evil against me, but God designed that for good— Then he adds: Here the various operation and provident administration of God is seen, that he might bring to pass what he had presignified before by the dreams of Joseph, etc. And p. 773. he subjoins: There is no incommodity if it be said, that God elected and also procured the Vendition of Joseph as a means to the end fore-ordained by him, and that may be understood not only of passive Vendition, but also of active, which truly can never be separated. For if God willed that Joseph be sold, he willed, that some one should sell him, and that no other should sell him but his brethren. For neither was that Vendition a thing in itself evil, if it be considered apart from the vitiosity and defect of the second Causes. Then he concludes: The Permission of God here was not otiose, but an efficacious operation in the tradition of Joseph, subministration of occasions, out of the concourse which he made both by the direction of all circumstances, and moderation of the will of his brethren, that their purpose of killing him being changed, they might do no other than what God intended. And the same efficace and force of Divine providence shines brightly in working, disposing, and directing all other things that relate to this History. This Answer of Strangius to Bellarmine I have been the more prolix in reciting, (1) because the forementioned Divine of so much repute among us makes great use of this distinction touching active and passive vendition or crucifixion, endeavouring thereby to solve all our Arguments from the vendition of Joseph and crucifixion of Christ; whereas Strangius, one of his own party, rejectes it as spurious and frivolous. (2) Because the concessions of Strangius in this his Answer to Bellarmine do indeed give a mortal wound to his own cause: For if the active vendition of Joseph was from God's efficacious providence and will decreeing the same, than actions intrinsically evil are as to their entitative act or substrate mater naturally considered from God, albeit their moral vitiosity is to be ascribed to no one but the sinner. 2. I now pass on to demonstrate, That God doth predefine, or 2. Arg. from the Crucifixion of Christ. foreordain and predetermine such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed, from the Crucifixion of Christ. And the Texts that confirm this part of our demonstration are so great and illustrious, that I cannot but greatly wonder how any Christian, that assents to the veracity and authority of Scripture, can evade the evidence thereof, or descent from our Hypothesis. (1) I shall take the Scriptures as they lie in order, and begin with Mat. Mat. 26. 24. 26. 24. The Son of man goeth, as it is written of him; but woe unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed. [1] Note here that Christ's death was infallibly predicted or foretold: so much, as it is written of him, necessarily infers. Now how could the death of Christ be infallibly predicted, if it were not predefined and preordained by God? Yea, if the death of Christ were not necessarily predefined and preordained by God, how could God infallibly foreknow the salvation of any one elect soul, which necessarily depends on the death of Christ? So that it remains most certain, that the death of Christ was predefined and foreordained by God, and that in every the least circumstance thereof: the whole series of intentions and actions in Judas' betraying his Lord, and the Jews malitiose and bloody crucifying of him was predefined and preordained by God. [2] Hence also it follows, that all the bloody contrivements, barbarous and cruel executions, with all the particular circumstances in the betraying and crucifying of Christ were predetermined by God. Thus much reason strongly evinceth, and Strangius with others grant, that eternal predefinition or predestination, and predetermination in time are parallel and commensurate each to other: whatever is eternally predefined or preordained by God is predetermined by him in time. Indeed if we will take the true Idea of Divine Predetermination, what is it but the eternal act of the Divine will, whereby God predefined or preordained all persons, actions, and effects to existe in such or such a period of time? So that, to speak truth, predefinition and predetermination differ not really and originally as to their active principe; albeit we may, out of compliance with the Schools, put this difference between them, by understanding Predefinition, Preordination, or Predestination of the eternal active Decree of God, and Predetermination of the execution of the Decree, or its passive Attingence in regard of the effect. But take predetermination in what sense you please, it must necessarily be applied to the Crucifixion of Christ and all the most minute circumstances thereof. And so much indeed is implied in those words, The Son of man goeth, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Where? or to what? Surely to die, and how? without all peradventure, as efficaciously conducted, moved, yea predetermined by the Divine wil There was not the least step he took to the Cross, the least intention, action, or circumstance in the whole complexe or systeme of Christ's Crucifixion, as well active as passive, but was predetermined by God. But [3] note also hence, that this Crucifixion of Christ, although it were predefined and predetermined by God, yet this Divine predefinition and predetermination did not at all diminish the guilt of those bloody instruments, who had their hands embrued in that immaculate blood. This is particularly specified in those words: but woe unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed. Judas neither did nor could justly plead Divine preordination or predetermination, as an excuse for his treachery. No, his own conscience told him, that he had voluntarily, yea malitiosely betrayed innocent blood: neither could the Jews plead the same, in as much as their own malitiose and bloody wills were as deeply engaged in this Crucifixion, as if there had been no predetermination, which doth no way diminish the liberty of the wil Hence, [4] it is most evident, that this Crucifixion of our Lord was a sin intrinsically evil. For was there not a world of enmity and hatred of God in it? Did there not much blasphemy attend their wicked deeds? Is not the shedding innocent blood, yea the blood of God, as it is styled, Act. 20. 28. a sin intrinsically evil? And doth not this sufficiently demonstrate, that the substrate mater of an act intrinsically evil is predefined and predetermined by God? (2) Another Text that evidently demonstrates the Crucifixion of Christ to be predefined and predetermined by God, is Luke 22. Luk. 22. 22. 22. And truly the Son of man goeth, as it was determined; but woe unto that man by whom he is betrayed. This Text is the same, and refers to the same passage with that before of Matthew, yet with this difference; Matthew saith, As it is written of him; but Luke, As it was determined; which puts it out of all doubt, that Christ's crucifixion was determined or predetermined by God. And for the more full explication and demonstration hereof, we are to remark, that Luke being a Physician, was most intimely versed in the Greek Tongue: for a Physician in those days was of little repute, if not well acquainted with the Grecanic Monuments relating to medicine. And thence we find, even by the confession of some Atheistic spirits, that Luke's Greek both in this his Evangel, as also in the Acts of the Apostles, is most pure, elegant, and significant. And among other this notion here used gives us a specimen of his accurate skill in the Greek. For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is a philosophic notion, of much use among the Grecians to signify that which is defined, determined, predetermined, predestinated, decreed, constituted, and ordained by an unalterable Decree, as we have more copiosely demonstrated from the genuine import of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, cap. 1. §. 6. Of determinative Concourse. And that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here may be properly rendered predetermined, is evident from the use of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Act. 4. 28. To do whatsoever thine hand and thy counsel Act. 4. 28. determined before to be done. Where it is in the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, predetermined. And indeed Determination and Predetermination as to the Divine concourse admit not so much as any mental distinction, according to the confession of some Adversaries. The Syriac, Luk. 22. 22. renders it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it is defined. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the O. T. signifies to expand, to make clear, to explicate more fully and clearly by the distribution of all parts, etc. Whence it is rendered by the LXX. Ezech. 37. 12 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to separate: and Num. 15. 34▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to decree: which sense agrees with the mind of our Lord, Luk. 22. 22. So that it is most evident, that this notion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here considered in itself, and in all its synonymies, notes the Crucifixion of Christ in all its circumstances both active and passive, to be determined, predetermined, and foreordained by God. Yea, we have for this a great concession of Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 13. pag. 665. But that the works of Christ, specially his Passion and voluntary death were absolutely predetermined by God is manifest from Scripture, Luk. 22. 22. Act. 2. 23. & 4. 28. Whence I argue, that if the death and crucifixion of Christ were absolutely predetermined by God, than the substrate mater of a sinful act, yea of an act intrinsically evil was absolutely predetermined by God. How poor and evanid the evasions of Strangius and others are as to this Text we shall examine and lay open when we have explicated the following Texts, which demonstrate the same. (3) I pass on to the Conference between Pilate and our Lord, Joh. 19 10. Then saith Pilate unto him, Knowest thou not, that I Joh. 19 10, 11▪ have power to crucify thee, and have power to release thee? Pilate having power of life and death committed to him by Tiberius Cesar, he threatens our Lord therewith: and what reply doth our Lord make? vers. 11. Jesus answered: Thou couldst have no power at all against me, except it were given thee from above: therefore he that hath delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin. We find several particulars here very remarkable for the demonstration of our Hypothesis. [1] Whereas Pilate boasted of his power to crucify, or release our Lord, he tells him plainly, that he could have no power against him, except it were given him from above. The power that Pilate pretends unto was legal Authority backed with an executive power committed to him: so much 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes: our Lord doth not deny his claim of legal Authority, as commissionated by Cesar; but yet confines and restrains the execution thereof to God's predeterminative Concourse. As if our Lord had said: I grant thy power and authority of life and death as Caesar's Commissioner and Minister; yet know, thou couldst not execute this thy power on me, unless the providential concurrence of my Father did efficaciously move and predetermine thee thereto. [2] Observe here the double negative, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which among the Grecians implies a more vehement negation. As if he had said: Alas! thou hast not the least umbrage or shadow of power to execute against me, but what is dispensed forth unto thee by the efficacious predeterminative hand or providential concourse of my Father; whose wise and omnipotent hand has put in every bitter ingredient into the Cup I am to drink of. [3] Neither doth all this excuse Judas, the Jews, or Pilate as to their guilt in crucifying the Lord of Glory: no, God's predeterminative concourse is so far from excusing these Traitors, as that it aggravates their sin. So it follows: Therefore he that hath delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin. Therefore, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for this very reason, because my Father hath left that traitorous wretch Judas to be hurried, by his own avaricious lust, into this horrid Treason of betraying me, and predetermined thine execution thereof, his guilt is the greater. [4] Lastly, hence also we may argue, that this sin of crucifying our Lord was intrinsically evil. So much that last clause, hath the greater sin, implies. As if he had said: Oh! what a world of treason, murder, blasphemy, hatred of God and all manner of sin is involved in the womb of this sin? (4) We find the predefinition and predetermination of Christ's crucifixion more expressly explicated and demonstrated, Act. 2. Act. 2. 23. 23. Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel, and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain. What could more plainly be said for the predefinition and predetermination of our Lord's crucifixion, as to its substrate entitative act, and yet for the aggravation of their sin in acting their parts in this bloody Tragedy? Let us examine the particulars. [1] It's said, he was delivered by the determinate counsel, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily notes counsel with a decree, or a decreed fixed counsel, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cast of an arrow, or the like. Whence the formal act of the will is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is but a derivation from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But Luke, to express Peter's mind more significantly, adds, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by that determinate, defined, firm, immutable, decretive, predeterminative counsel of God, as the word imports, according to our former explication of it, on Luk. 22. 22. whereto this Text seems to answer. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is by Glossaries made synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to ordain; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to preordain; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to constitute; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to establish; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to predetermine. Among the LXX. it answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to termine, determine, predetermine, as Num. 34. 6. Josh. 13. 27. and elsewhere. By which it is most evident, that it is here by Luke used to denote Gods efficacious, absolute, predeterminative counsel and purpose touching the crucifixion of our lord [2] Then he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and foreknowledge of God. Note here, that God's foreknowledge or Prescience of Christ's crucifixion, and so by consequence of the sin annexed thereto, follows the predetermination or determined counsel of his own will: God therefore foreknew, because in his determined counsel he foreordained or decreed the Passion of our Lord. And yet [3] this necessary predefinition and predetermination of Gods will with his infallible prescience touching the crucifixion of Christ, did no way lessen their sin: for adds Peter, Him ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain. Albeit he was predefined and predetermined by God to go (as himself declares, Luk. 22. 22.) to the Cross, yet they, by their wicked bloody hands, took him as voluntarily, yea with as much bloodthirsty greediness, as if there had been no predefinition and predetermination of the act by God. Lo! what a plain conciliation is here of efficacious predefinition and predeterminative concourse of the substrate mater of sin, with the voluntary and free election of the sinner as to his part in this bloody Tragedy. [4] Note that phrase, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by wicked hands, i. e. sacrilegious, bloody, God-murdering hands. Which certainly denotes their sin to be of the first magnitude, and intrinsically evil. And that this Text fully demonstrates the predefinition of Christ's Passion, Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 3. pag. 563. freely acknowledgeth. So lib. 4. cap. 2. pag. 768. he saith, That it is not to be doubted, but that the whole humiliation and passion of Christ flowed from the decree and will of God; and what God from Eternity decreed, the same he executes and procures in time. But what his reply is to the force of our argument from this absolute Decree of God we shall examine anon. (5) I come now to that other parallel Text, which fully demonstrates the predefinition and predetermination of Christ's crucifixion by God, Act. 4. 28. For to do whatsoever thine hand and thy Act. 4. 28. counsel determined before to be done. He speaks of the gathering together both of Jews and Gentiles for the crucifying the Son of God, as vers. 26, 27. he saith, They did nothing but what Gods hand and counsel predetermined to be done. [1] By the counsel of God we may here understand his Decretive counsel, or the counsel and purpose of his will, whereby he predefined and predetermined the crucifixion of our Lord. Thus some term Gods efficacious predeterminative Concourse, quoad attingentiam activam, as to active attingence, which is nothing else but the very will of God, according to his eternal counsel predetermining and foreordaining all future events, as Scotus and others assure us. Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be understood, Act. 2. 23. as before. Whence [2] by the Hand of God, we are to understand his most efficacious and potent execution of his decretive counsel, predetermining the whole substrate mater, or all entitative acts and circumstances in the crucifixion of our Lord, which they term his predeterminative Concourse, quoad attingentiam passivam, as to passive attingence. For man's hand being the instrument of operation, whereby he puts forth his power and force, it is thence applied to God, to denote his most potent execution of his Decrees in predetermining and applying all second causes to their act, as before §. 1. of this Chapter. We find a very good gloss hereon in Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 2. pag. 769. In the other place, saith he, Act. 4. 28. there is mention made not only of the counsel of God, but also of the hand of God; that counsel may be referred to the Decree, and hand to the execution. To decree is presupposed the wise counsel of God, and to execute the power of the Divine right hand. And here truly what God hath decreed in his counsel, he also by his hand hath executed: For in this whole work the hand of God hath appeared, howbeit many wicked hands did concur. So the Hand of God here is opposed to wicked hands, Act. 2. 23. The hand, I say, of God appeared in moderating, ordaining, governing, and directing all the machinations, endeavours, sayings and deeds of his enemies, that they should will and perfect that very same thing which he willed, though with a far different counsel and purpose, whatever their malice were. Lo! what a full testimony is here? who would not think Strangius orthodox in this point, did he acquiesce here? But there lies a Snake in the grass: he elsewhere starts off from what he here grants, as hereafter. Only this note, that he here, as elsewhere, strongly impugns and opposeth that passive crucifixion which Bellarmine and a reverend Divine of repute among us only ascribe to God: for he expressly saith, That the very act of crucifixion was executed by the hand of God; yea all the machinations, endeavours, sayings, and deeds of Christ's enemies, moderated, ordained, governed, directed by the same Divine hand. What could be said more for the predefinition and predetermination of the substrate mater of an act intrinsically evil? But I pass on to the act of Divine predetermination expressed in the Text before us by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What the genuine import of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is, we have shown, Chap. 1. §. 6. In the general it signifies to predefine, predestine, predetermine: it's applied in the N. T. both to persons and things, and these both good and evil. It is here limited and confined to Gods predefining, predestining, and predetermining the substrate mater or entitative act of Christ's crucifixion, which was a sin of the first magnitude, containing in its pregnant womb blasphemy, hatred of God, murder, yea God-killing blood-guiltiness. The Syriac turns it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to seal, constitute, and make firm any thing. And surely if the blessed God ever sealed, constituted, made firm, or predetermined any thing in the world, it was the crucifixion of his Son, on which the salvation of all his Elect depends. Augustin renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here praedestinavit, he has predestined. So the old Latin renders it, 1 Cor. 2. 7. And Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 582. is herein (as in some other points) very ingenuous and free in confessing, That Augustin doth use the words to predestine, predefine, determine, constitute, ordain, and dispose, indifferently, so as they may be extended to allthings which God hath decreed. So that it's clear by his own confession, that the crucifixion of Christ taken actively was predestined, predefined, constituted, foreordained, and predetermined by God. Whence by a parity of reason we demonstrate our Hypothesis, that the substrate mater or entitative act of that, whereunto intrinsical sin is necessarily annexed, is predefined and predetermined by God. The inference and conclusion to me is so natural and evident, that I cannot see how the wit of man can evade it. But let us examine what subterfuges and evasions our Opponents Our Adversary▪ evasions examined. frame to evade the force and evidence this second Head touching Christ's Crucifixion gives to our Hypothesis. 1. Bellarmine and from him a reverend Divine of name among 1. Evasion touching active and passive Crucifixion. ourselves reply, That the passive crucifixion of Christ was from God, not the active: i. e. Christ's Passion and the effects of it was from God, but not the actions of those that crucified him. (1) How poor and shiftless this shift is we have already demonstrated on the vendition of Joseph from Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8. (2) But more particularly as to this Head, I cannot but wonder how any, who have not quite banished Reason and Religion from their minds, can satisfy themselves with such jejune notions and evasions: Did not the blessed God predefine and predetermine the very act of Christ's crucifixion? how else could he certainly foreknow that he would be crucified? Or what certain prescience could he have of the salvation of any one elect soul, which wholly depends on the death of Christ? Again, what finespun nonsense is this, God predetermined the Passion of Christ's crucifixion, but not the Action? as if God predetermined that Christ should be kissed and so betrayed by Judas, but not that Judas should kiss and betray Christ: again, that Christ should be mocked, blasphemed, scourged, etc. by the Soldiers and Jews, but that these should not mock, blaspheme, scourge, etc. Christ. Lastly, that the Spear should be thrust into the side of Christ, but yet not that any thrust it in. What Logic, Reason, or sense is this? Do not the very Aristoteleans grant us, That action and passion are not really, but only modally distinct? As the way from Athens to Thebes, and so back again from Thebes to Athens, is but one and the same way, diversified only from its relation to different terms; so the same flux as it proceeds from the Agent is called Action, and as it termines on the patient, Passion. Is it possible then that God should predetermine or concur to the passion and not to the action of crucifixion? But enough of this, which is so strongly refuted by Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 11. pag. 772. 2. Another reverend Divine of estime among us for parts and 2. Evasion. piety evades thus: [Christ's crucifixion] was a thing which Gods hand and counsel had determined before to be done, Act. 4. 28. i e. foreseeing wicked hands would be promt and ready for this tragic enterprise, his sovereign power and wise counsel concurred with his foreknowledge, so only, and not with less latitude, to define or determine the bounds and limits of that malignity, than to let it proceed to this execution. And to deliver him up (not by any formal resignation or surrender, as we well know, but permitting him) thereunto. Though the same phrase of delivering him, hath elsewhere another notion of assigning or appointing him to be a propitiation for the sins of men, by dying; which was done by mutual agreement between both the parties, etc. This reply of this learned pious Divine (so far as I can penetrate and understand it, which seems involved under much obscurity) may be resolved into the following parts. (1) He makes God's prescience or foreseeing the crucifixion of Christ by wicked hands, to proceed or go before the concurrence and determination of God's wise counsel or predefinition thereof. Wherein he falls in with the Jesuits middle Science, making God's prescience precedent to his predefinition or decree, and so dependent only on the mutable will of men as to the act of sin; which he elsewhere seems to intimate: whereas the Scripture, which he refers to, Act. 2. 23. makes the foreknowledge of Christ's crucifixion subsequent to the predifinition of his determinate Counsel or Decree. And certainly all the wit of man summed up in one cannot conceive or demonstrate, how God should have a certain prescience of Christ's crucifixion, which depends wholly on the contingent uncertain will of man, and not on the determinate counsel of his own wil (2) He makes Gods determinate counsel or hand only to determine the bounds and limits of that malignity, etc. As if the bounding and limiting of the malignity, and not the substrate mater or act itself entitatively considered were from God. Whereas the Text saith categorically, That the hand and counsel of God predefined and predetermined whatever those wicked hands of theirs executed. (3) He gives us a new Gloss or Paraphrase on that phrase delivering him, Act. 2. 23. as if it implied only an assigning or appointing him to be a propitiation, etc. But how little this gloss will accord with the sense of these Texts is evident. For that assigning and appointing him to be a propitiation was immanent and eternal in the Divine Decrees, but the delivering him here is meant of his being delivered into the hands of those that crucified him, and that according to the determinate counsel of God. 3. We come now to the more plausible subterfuges of Strangius, Strangius ' s Evasions. whereby he endeavours to evade the evidence of those Texts, which mention Gods predetermining the crucifixion of our Lord. He answers, lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 573. thus: The occision and crucifixion of Christ, also the kind of death were from God: and as they were from God, they were good and greatly gloriose, and properly the means to procure our salvation: and God is deservedly judged the Cause and Author of them, Who by his determinate counsel and precognition delivered his Son to them, whom with wicked hands they killed on the cross, Act. 2. 23. Here truly in the same work the good action of God is distinguished from their evil action: therefore their wickedness and malice was not from God; neither was it willed or predefined by God, who cannot be said to be the Cause and Author of any sin. Therefore speaking absolutely, the occision of Christ was not sin; (otherwise God should be the Author of sin:) as to kill a man is not sin. And truly if God had commanded men to kill Christ, and they out of conscience to that command had obeyed God, they had not sinned. But to prosecute Christ out of hatred and il-wil is intrinsically evil, neither can that be any way well done, or commanded by God. Observe here (1) he grants that the crucifixion of Christ, Answer. with all its natural circumstances entitatively considered were from God, as the God of nature, and so naturally good: yea, that they were morally good and greatly gloriose as means to procure our salvation; and therefore God is deservedly judged the cause and author of them, as Act. 2. 23. And (2) we deny with him, that the wickedness and malice of those acts was from God. (3) He also grants, That the occision or killing of Christ considered absolutely was not sin. Whereunto we retort, That neither the hatred of Christ considered absolutely without relation to its object is sin. But, (4) he concludes: But to prosecute Christ out of hatred and il-wil is intrinsically evil, etc. Whence we argue, That the crucifying of Christ was a sin intrinsically evil, and yet as to its substrate mater and entitative acts from God. For did not the Jews prosecute Christ out of hatred and malice, yea malice blown up to the sin against the Holy Ghost in some of them? And was not, in this good work of crucifixion, the good action of God, and the evil action of the Jews the same as to the substrate mater or natural entitative act? This pincheth Strangius closely, and therefore he seems to make the natural entitative act of God distinct from the natural entitative act of the wicked Jews: For he saith, Here truly in the same work the good action of God is distinguished from their evil action; and therefore their wickedness and malice was not from God. Here we grant, [1] his consequence or conclusion, That their malice was not from God. [2] We thus far also grant his Antecedent, That the good action of God, considered both naturally and morally, was distinguished from their evil action considered formally and morally: for the malice and vitiosity which formalised the action as theirs, is no way imputable to God's act considered either naturally or morally. [3] But yet we still avouch, and no way doubt but to demonstrate in its place, that in the crucifixion of Christ the act of the wicked Jews considered materially, naturally, and entitatively was one and the same with God's act: So much all these Texts clearly evince; so much also reason dictates: For if there were two acts, the one primarily, yea only from the wicked instruments, the other from God the prime Efficient, then how could they be said to be the instruments of God's Efficience? Must we not then also suppose two Crucifixions, one from God, and the other from the Jews? What a world of absurdities would follow this Hypothesis, That the action of God in the Crucifixion of Christ considered entitatively, materially, and naturally, was really distinct from the action of the Instruments considered entitatively, materially, and naturally? But to conclude, we find an excellent solution to all these evasions and subterfuges in Augustin, Epist. 48. ad Vincentium, Quum Pater tradiderit Filium, & Christus Corpus suum, & Judas Dominum, cur in hac traditione Deus est justus & homo reus, nisi quia in re una quam fecerunt, causa non est una ob quam fecerunt. August. Epist, 48. ad Vinc. thus: When the Father delivered his Son, and Christ his own Body, and Judas his Lord, why in this Tradition is God just and man guilty, but because in one and the same thing which they did, the cause was not one and the same. A solution sufficient to satisfy any sober mind: Wherein note, (1) That the act of Tradition and so of crucifying Christ, was one and the same entitatively and physically considered both in regard of God and the sinner. (2) That the difference sprang from the Causes: God delivered his Son to Death, thereby to bring about the greatest good that Sinners could wisn for, their Salvation; but Judas and the malitiose Jews delivered the Lord of Glory to death, with wicked hands, out of an avaricious humour, malice, etc. Hence, (3) The Action was most just and gloriose on God's part, but most unjust and wicked on the Sinners part. This answer of Augustin is so great, that it might serve to answer all the objections against our Hypothesis, were not men bend to cavil against the truth. §. 3. I come now to a third Head of Scriptural Arguments, namely such, wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishing or afflicting his people in such a way, wherein the Instruments could not but contract guilt. I shall divide this Head into two members; (1) Such Scriptures, wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishing his sinful people. (2) Such as mention God's afflicting his righteous People by sinful Instruments. 1. We shall begin with such Scriptures wherein God is said to 1. God's punishing his sinful People by wicked Instruments. make use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his sinful people. So Esa. 10. 5, 6. O Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, I will send him against an hypocritical Nation. The Assyrian is sent by God as his rod to punish his sinful people; and every stroke of this rod was Esa. 10. 5, 6, 7. from God; his hand guiding, ordering, and actuating the rod in all its motions. And yet, how much sin was there committed on the Assyrians part in punishing Israel? How little did he intend to serve God herein? were not Pride and Ambition the main springs of his action? Thence it's added v. 7. Howbeit he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so, etc. whence v. 12. God threatens to punish him for his sin. So that it's evident, this sending of the Assyrian by God, mentioned v. 6. cannot be meant of any legal permission or commission given him by God, but of the secret efficacious predeterminative concourse and Providence of God, ordering what should come to pass. So Jer. 16. 16. Behold, Jerem. 16. 16. I will send for many fishers, saith the Lord, and they shall fish them, and after will I send for many hunters, and they shall hunt them from every mountain, etc. Note, (1) That these words contain not a promise but threat, begun v. 9 This is evident from v. 17. (2) By Fishers and Hunters in the general we must understand enemies to the Jews. To fish and to hunt, is to take and destroy. War has a great ressemblance with fishing and hunting, which is a kind of war against beasts; as war is a kind of fishing and hunting of men: whence Nimrod the first Warrior after the Flood, is styled Gen. 10. 9 a mighty hunter, i. e. of men. Ay, but more particularly, (3) Who are these fishers? Why, as it is supposed, the Egyptians, who are called Fishers, Esa. 19 8. (4) And who are the Hunters? The Babylonians, as it is generally said: But, (5) Who is it that sends for these Fishers and Hunters? It is God, I will send, etc. (6) Why doth God send for them? To punish his sinful People, and that by those very Nations in whom they had so much confided, and to whom they had so much conformed, as is intimated v. 17. And what more just, than that Professors should be punished by such Instruments, as have been the ground of their confidence, and the exemplars of their sins? (7) How doth God send for these Fishers and Hunters? Surely, not by any legal Act or formal Commission given to them, but providentially, by exciting their minds, applying their wills, and drawing forth, yea determining the same to the substrate mater or material entitative act of afflicting the Jews, whereunto there was much malice, murder, and hatred of God and his People annexed. Yea, God did not only send Nebuchadnezar to afflict Israel, but also give him a reward for his service; as Jerem. 27. 6. And now have I given all these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezar the King of Babylon, my servant. God gives him the neighbour Nations as a reward for his service against Israel. The like Jer. 43. 10. Multitudes of Texts might be added to show, how God makes use of wicked Instruments in the punishment of his sinful people, and in a providential way efficaciously concurs to and predetermines all their actions materially and naturally considered, and yet is no way the Cause or Author of their sin. 2. To mention one or two Scriptures, which speak of Gods 2. God's afflicting his righteous Servants by wicked Instruments. using wicked Instruments in afflicting his innocent People. So Job 1. God makes use of the Sabeans, and Chaldeans, yea of Satan himself, to afflict Job; and yet he saith, v. 21. The Lord taketh away. He saw by faith God's hand moving, yea predetermining the hearts and hands of his adversaries to every act of theirs materially Job 1. 21. considered, albeit not to the vitiosity. So Psal. 105. 25. Psal. 105. 25. He turned their heart to hate his people, to deal subtilely with his servants. Here it's said expressly, that God turned, i. e. efficaciously moved and predetermined the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his People Israel. God's turning their hearts doth expressly and formally denote his efficacious predeterminative concourse to the entitative material natural act of hatred, albeit not to the vitiosity and malignity thereof. So much also the next clause imports, and to deal subtilely with his servants, i. e. all their subtle stratagems, machinations, and politic contrivements for the extirpation of Israel, by putting to death their Males, oppressing them with hard labours, etc. all these were, as to their substrate mater and physic entitative acts from God, who turned their hearts thereto: And what could be more nakedly and evidently said to demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concourse to the substrate mater of sin? Let us now see what our Opponents reply to these Scriptures and our Arguments drawn thence. Strangius, l. 4. c. 4. p. 791. evades the force of this last Text thus: What is said Psal. 105. 25. that God turned their hearts to hate his people, it must be understood, that God did it not by perverting the hearts of the Egyptians, but by doing good to his people, whence the Egyptians took occasion of hatred. (1) We say not that God perverted the hearts of the Egyptians; that's the common odiose consequence which our Adversaries impose on us. But, (2) We avouch, that God did more than give occasion to the Egyptians of hating, by his doing good to his people. Is not this a strange Comment, God turned their heart to hate his people, i. e. gave occasion of hatred, by doing good unto his people? Doth not God's turning the heart in Scripture Phraseologie always import his effica●… predeterminative concourse in applying the will to its act? 〈◊〉 it's said, Prov. 21. 1. God turneth the heart whithersoever he w●…, is it not meant of an efficacious concourse? Do not also the following words, Psal. 105. 25. to deal subtilely with his servants, clearly imply an efficacious act of God upon their hearts, predetermining them to their act? Certainly such Comments are very poor evasions to elude such clear Texts. As for the other Texts, Strangius' general answer p. 774, 775. is, That God is the Cause of the act in those sins, but not of the pravity of the Instruments, etc. And what do we say or desire more? But yet there lies a sting in this very concession of his: for he adds, p. 774. That God hath decreed nothing by his Will of good pleasure, but what he approves as Good. i. e. God hath not absolutely decreed to permit sin, because he doth not approve of it. Wherein note, [1] How he doth, with the Pelagians and Arminians, confound Gods Decretive Will, with his Approbative complacential Wil [2] We deny not but God approves of all his own Acts; but the Question is touching objects, Whether God approves of all objects which by his Decretive Will he decrees to permit? This we peremptorily deny, and no way doubt but to make good our denial in its place. §. 4. Another Head of Arguments, contains such Scriptures as 4. God's immediate hand in the Acts of sin. mention Gods own immediate hand in those Acts whereunto sin is appendent. We begin with 2 Sam. 12. 11. where God tells David by Nathan, that for his folly committed with Vriah's wife, and 2 Sam. 12. 11. murder, Behold, I will raise up evil against thee out of thine own house, and I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbour, etc. This threat we find fulfilled, 2 Sam. 16. 22. And Absalon 2 Sam. 16. 22. went in unto his Father's Concubines in the sight of all Israel. What could be more plainly and distinctly expressed to demonstrate Gods immediate concourse to that entitative act of Absalom's Sin? Here Strangius, l. 4. c. 4. p. 789. acknowledgeth, (1) That Absalom's Incest in violating his father's bed is by God owned as his own Fact. But, (2) then he answers, that this was acknowledged for the reason abovementioned, namely, by reason of God's efficacious Gubernation, Moderation, and Direction, which he afforded, according to the modes already explicated, about the sinful Wills of Absalon and Achitophel, and their actions in this wickedness; which fact is related 2 Sam. 16. 20, etc. For this is usual, that the effect, which ariseth from two causes, whereof the one is effective, and the other directive, be ascribed to both, but in a different respect, etc. This is the common answer, which he and his Sectators give to such Scriptures, which speak Gods immediate hand in the entitative acts of sin; let us therefore a little examine the force of this answer. (1) Take notice, that he allows God's Gubernation, Moderation and Direction of the Act whereto sin is annexed, but not the production of the act. This is evident by the Conclusion, wherein he makes the Sinner to be the effective cause, but God the directive only. But I reply, how can God efficaciously Govern, Moderate, and Direct the Act, unless he be also the effective Cause thereof? Take his own instance, the sinful wills of Absalon and Achitophel, how is it possible, that God should efficaciously govern and direct those immanent acts of their sinful wills, but by influencing their wills, and efficaciously predetermining them to act? If God did, as he grants, efficaciously govern, moderate, and direct their sinful wills in those immanent acts of Lust, certainly he must necessarily produce those acts. (2) Neither will this answer at all solve the Difficulty: for suppose we grant, that God doth only efficaciously govern, moderate, and direct the sinful act, not produce the entitative mater thereof, yet this efficacious directive influence doth as much make God the Author of sin, as our effective predeterminative concourse. For God's efficacious Moderation and Direction of the sinful act, denotes his efficacious Preservation of the act, which is as sinful as the effection or production of the Act. But more of this hereafter, Chap. 5, 6. Another Scripture which speaks Gods immediate predeterminative Shimei' s cursing David, how from God. 2 Sam. 16. 10, 11. concourse in the entitative act of Sin, is 2 Sam. 16. 10. where David saith of Shimei, That the Lord said unto him, Curse David. And v. 11. Let him curse; for the Lord hath bidden him. Now the force of this argument depends on the explication of this word or command of God to Shimei, which must be here taken either morally, for a divine precept and injunction, or physicly for an efficacious Concourse and influence. (1) That it cannot be here taken morally for a preceptive word, is most evident; because had God commanded Shimei to curse David, he had been the moral cause and so the Author of his sin. (2) Therefore it remains, that it be here taken only physicly, for God's efficacious Concourse secretly and powerfully inclining and applying Shimei's will to the entitative act of this cursing. And in this sense the Word of God is frequently taken in Scripture, namely, for his efficacious predeterminative concourse, in the Creation, Conservation, and Gubernation of things. Now what doth Strangius reply to this? Why, l. 4. c. 4. p. 786. he saith, That Shimei's Cursings being intrinsically evil, we may not say, that God did move or impel him thereto in a proper manner of speech, neither that Shimei was the Instrument of God in these actions, as they were determined to such an object; but only as directed by God to his just judgements: and that most certain direction of God, with the administration of Circumstances and Occasions was as a Precept. In which Response note, (1) That he grants, that Shimei his cursing was an action intrinsically evil: which is a great concession, and will clearly overthrow his own Hypothesis, and prove ours, That God doth predetermine the will to the substrate mater of actions intrinsically evil. For if Shimei's Cursing was an action intrinsically evil, then surely such also was the Vendition of Joseph and the Crucifixion of our Lord, which were both as to their entitative acts predetermined by God. But (2) he denies, that Shimei was the Instrument of God in these actions, as determined to such an object. In the last clause of this Antithesis lies the spirit and force of all his objections against predetermination to the substrate mater of sin; which we intent more fully to examine Chap. 6. §. 1. at present, we say, [1] That Shimei was not the instrument of any moral but physic influence from God: the precept or bidding here specified was not moral but physic and real: God did not morally command Shimei to curse David, but physicly and naturally incline him to the entitative act of Cursing him; which was as a Precept: this Strangius grants in the close as to God's direction. [2] Hence if we consider Shimei's cursing as physicly determined to such an object, it was not morally evil but good, and so from God: It's true, as it was morally determined by Shimei the moral Agent to its object David, so it was intrinsically evil, but as it was physicly or naturally determined by God, for the punishment of David, so it was both naturally and morally good and from God. (3) He placeth the whole of God's Influence to this act, in directing his Actions to his just judgements, etc. To which I answer. [1] How could God direct these actions of Shimei; specially, the immanent acts of his will, (which were the worst part of his malediction) but by an efficacious predeterminative influence on his will and its acts? [2] He grants, that this Direction of God was most certain and efficacious: if so, then certainly predeterminative: and if the direction be predeterminative, is not God's concourse to the sinful act considered materially and entitatively, predeterminative? [3] If God's directive concourse be predeterminative, as Strangius must by his concessions grant, will not those ugly consequences which he loads our Hypothesis with, be all retorted on him? Did not God's efficacious direction termine on Shimei's cursing as determined to such an object, namely David? And was he not the Instrument of this efficacious direction? Baronius, Metaph. S. 8. Disp. 3. p. 158. answers this Text thus: To that malediction of Shimei it is answered, That God commanded Shimei to curse David, not by bending his will, but by opening to him the way to this evil, and by shutting it to all other evils, i. e. by permitting him to act this only, whenas he was ready for many other evils. A poor evasion indeed, and such as if admitted would make the whole Scripture but as a Nose of Wax. (1) Doth not David say categoricly, that God bid, [i. e. not morally but physicly] Shimei to curse? And what can this imply, but the bending his will to the substrate mater, or entitative Act? (2) Can it be imagined, that David could mean only a mere otiose and speculative permission, and not an active concurrence to the act itself entitatively considered? (3) Doth not Baronius confess, that God opened to him the way to this evil? And if so, must he not then open Shimei's heart to the mater of it? Did not the main act of malediction arise from his will? And if that were not opened to the entitative act, would the way to this evil have been ever opened? Again, God's immediate predeterminative hand in those acts, whereunto sin is necessarily appendent, may be demonstrated from 2 Sam. 24. 1. And again the anger of the Lord was kindled 2 Sam. 24. 1. against Israel, and he moved David against them, to say, Go number Israel and Judah. Here it is expressly said, that God moved David to number the people. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and he moved or excited, i. e. efficaciously determined and applied his will to the substrate mater of this command to number the people. Hence Strangius, pag. 790. answers, (1) That the He here must be meant of Satan, who is said, 1 Chron. 21. 1. to stir up David to number the people. And he citys for this Comment Junius with others. But alas! what poor subterfuges will men fly unto to avoid the force and evidence of Divine light? Doth not Grammatic construction, as well as the mind of the words utterly reject such a gloss? The Particle He here is not a distinct Pronoun, as our English Version reads it, but included in the Verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is by the Copulative ו joined to the former part, and the anger of the Lord was kindled: so that if the passive, was kindled, belongs to the Lords anger, than also must what follows, and he moved. Neither is this sense alien from other Scriptures: for 1 Sam. 26. 19 David saith, That God had 1 Sam. 26. 19 stirred up Saul against him, i. e. efficaciously moved him to the entitative act of persecuting David. Thence (2) Strangius fearing the ruinous downfall of this refuge flies to another, thus: But if we follow the common interpretation, it appears, that the same fact is ascribed to God and Satan; and therefore it must be on a different account: and here also the variety in the end and mode makes the unspotted Justice of God to shine forth, and the malice of Satan and pravity of man to discover itself. For [1] the action of numbering the people was not in itself evil. [2] Divines distinguish between tentation of probation and seduction. [3] Hear the sane things concur, which were before explicated of the same sense, whereby God is said to incline to evil, namely the permission and laxation of the reins to Satan, the oblation of occasions and irritaments, impediments being removed, and the suspension of Divine Grace: which things concurring with the pravity of nature, sin necessarily follows. (1) We grant, that the same fact is ascribed to God and Satan on different accounts: God put the thought entitatively considered into David's heart, but Satan stirred up his heart to the act of numbering the people; God in judgement gave over David to this sin, that it should be at this time when God was angry with Israel: There is a special providence of God even in the ebullitions of lusts in the hearts of his own people. Thus also in the wicked; who put that thought of murder considered materially into the heart of Esau, When my father is dead I will slay my brother Jacob? Was it not from God? Whence came that motion into the heart of Judas to betray Christ, with all the circumstances materially considered referring thereto? were they not from God? Thus here, God put the entitative thought of numbering the people into the heart of David, albeit Satan stirred it up; and God was the Orderer, albeit Satan the Abettor and in some sense the Author of it: for God is only the prime physic cause of the natural entity, but Satan the moral cause or Author of the vitiosity: again, the concourse of God to the natural entitative act is immediate, efficacious, and predeterminative, but Satan's concourse only mediate, objective, and suasive, though with more or less degrees of moral efficacity, as Eph. 2. 2. Again, (2) we grant, that the different ends and modes of operating make God's unspotted Justice and man's pravity to shine forth. (3) We are glad, that Strangius will grant, the action of numbering the people not to be in itself evil. Whence, by a parity of reason, we argue, That no action, though never so intrinsically evil, is in itself, i. e. as considered in its physic entitative act, and according to its substrate mater, sinful: for certainly if David's numbering the people, which was a sin attended with so much pride, vainglory, and confidence in an arm of flesh, with other aggravations, which so greatly provoked God, were not in itself evil, no other sin considered in its mere entitative and physic act is such. Yea, I as yet see no reason why this sin of David considered in its individual circumstances and moral relation to its object and principes, may not be esteemed a sin intrinsically evil, as well as Shimei's cursing David. But (4) Strangius' summary conclusion, That God's concourse to David's sin was only an idle permission, laxation of the reins to Satan, and oblation of occasions, with suspension of Divine Grace, is very contradictory both to the letter and mind of the Text, which saith positively, that God moved, or excited, and stirred up the mind of David, not morally, but physicly, to the entitative act of numbering the people. Certainly, when the Scripture speaks so categoricly and positively of Gods moving the will to its act, to restrain such moving influences and causality, only to mere idle permission, or objective oblation of occasions, or negative suspensions of Divine Grace, what is this but to make the Scripture contradictory to itself, or affirmation and negation applicable to the same words? How easily might an Atheist hence take advantage to elude all Scripture! But to pass on to other Texts, that clearly express Gods immediate predeterminative concourse to the substrate mater of sinful acts. 1 Kings 11. 31. the Lord saith, I will rend the kingdom 1 King. 11. 31, 37. & 12. 15, 24. out of the hand of Solomon. So vers. 37. to Jeroboam, I will take thee and thou shalt reign, etc. Whence 1 Kings 12. 15. it's said, that the cause why Rehoboam harkened not unto the people, was from the Lord, that he might perform his saying, etc. So vers. 24. God saith expressly, The thing [i. e. the revolt of Israel] is from me. So of Jehu, God saith, 2 Kings 9 3. I have anointed thee 2 Kings 9 3. & 10. 30. King: and chap. 10. 30. Jehu is said to do unto the house of Ahab all that was in God's heart. From these Texts its most evident, that the holy God assumes to himself the production of such entitative natural acts, which had sin necessarily appendent to them. Now let us examine what response Strangius gives hereto: l. 4. c. 4. p. 793. rejecting the answer of Bellarmine, (which to me is as good as his, yea not really different) he answers, It is not unlikely but that Jeroboam and Jehu, albeit in taking the Kingdom they sinned not as to the thing itself and substance of the act, because instructed by Gods-command, yet in manner of acting, as they were profane men, they variously sinned by mingling their own ambition and depraved affections with the work of God. Thence he concludes, That whatever their sins were, yet the justice of God sufficiently shines forth in the whole of this Administration, because God used both the Kings and people in this work only as instruments to execute his just judgements, etc. To give a brief reply hereto, it is very evident, that all that Answer. Strangius hath given us in answer to these Texts, doth but more confirm us in the true sense we give of them. For (1) it is manifest, that Jeroboam and Jehu, with the Revolters their Adherents, sinned not only in the mode or manner, but in the very substance of their acts: For is not High treason against a lawful King an act sinful as to its substance? And were not Rehoboam and Ahab both lawful Kings? Was not Rehoboam Solomon's Son, whom God made King? It's true, Jeroboam and Jehu had private prophetic Instructions and Unctions, but yet those gave them no real title before the people, but only secret intimations what God would in his providence bring to pass. David had a promise of the Kingdom and also Divine Unction; and yet he confesseth, that God gave him no actual title to the Kingdom in the eyes of men; but he still owns Saul as his Sovereign King, and the Lords Anointed: and so ought Jeroboam and Jehu their lawful Soverains, till God had given them a legal title before men. (2) But suppose Jeroboam and Jehu's sin were only in the manner, not in the substance of the act, yet certain it is, that the people's sin, before God had declared his sovereign will to them, was high Treason, and so substantially evil. (3) Yea further, grant that they all sinned but in the mode, not in the substance of their acts, yet whether the act be substantially or modally only sinful, it comes all to one in this case of Divine concourse and predetermination: For if God concur to the substrate mater of acts modally sinful; why may he not as well concur to the substrate mater of acts substantially sinful? Do not our Adversaries hereby, according to their Principes, make God the Author of modal sins? Or, is not the entitative act of modal and substantial sins the same as to kind, namely a real physic or natural good? and therefore if God concur to the one, why not also to the other? Assuredly, the most refined Wits will never find out a sufficient disparity between acts modally and substantially sinful, so as to allow God an efficacious concourse to the substrate mater of the one, but not of the other. (4) Strangius grants in the close, That God used both these Kings and their mutinous Adherents as instruments in this work, to execute his just judgements, etc. Did he so indeed? Did he not then also make use of their politic contrivements, ambitiose wills, and rebellious affections as instruments in this work? And if so, did not God also move, excite, apply, yea predetermine their wills to the substrate mater of their traitorous rebellious designs and exploits? Do not all these consequences hang together in an indissoluble chain of invict Reason? To close up these arguments with that of Calvin, Institut. lib. 1. cap. 18. §. 4. pag. 78. But now how it may be from God, and governed by his secret providence, which men wickedly undertake, we have an illustrious document in the Election of King Jeroboam; in which the madness and temereity of the people is severely condemned, because they perverted the order established by God, and perfidiosely departed from the family of David: and yet we know, that God would have him anointed; whence in the words of Hosea, c. 8. 4. there appears a kind of repugnance; because God there complains, That that Kingdom was erected contrary to his will and knowledge; and yet c. 13. 11. he declares, That he gave Jeroboam to be King in his wrath. How can these things agree? Thence he concludes, We see therefore that God, who nilled the perfidy or treachery, yet, for another end, justly willed the defection. And if God justly willed the defection, he also justly moved and predetermined them to the substrate mater thereof; for predetermination answers adequately to God predefinition or absolute volition, as Strangius grants. We add to the forecited Texts, 1 King. 22. 23. Now therefore 1 Kings 22. 23. behold, the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy Prophets, and the Lord hath spoken evil concerning thee. (1) The Lord hath put, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, hath given forth, delivered, or put. LXX. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, hath given. It notes here an efficacious enthusiastic infusion, which of all kinds of predetermination is most prevalent and irresistible. (2) Note also the sin, it is a lying spirit, which certainly denotes an act intrinsically evil: For is it not a sin of the first magnitude to forge lying Prophecies, and impose them on men as the Oracles of God, thereby to delude their souls into Hell? Such was the case here: and yet, lo! it's said, that this very sin was, as to its substrate mater or entitative act, from God: can any thing be spoken more nakedly and clearly to evince and demonstrate the truth of our Hypothesis? What doth Strangius reply to this? His answer we find, lib. 4. cap. 4. pag. 788. We must note, that this oration from the Prophet Micaiah is parabolic, in which various things are spoken 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to our capacity; and in a Parable allthings are not to be cut open to the quick, but that only must be regarded, which belongs to the scope of the Parable— But in that God said, vers. 22. Go forth and do so, it must be understood of Divine permission: for we use the Imperative Mode not only in commanding, but also in permitting, or giving licence. And albeit there be mention made of a Divine precept, yet that is not otherwise to be taken, than for the efficacious direction of God, for the execution of his just judgement, that God delivered Ahab and his false Prophets left by God to be deceived by Satan: of which Tradition afterward. In answer hereto, (1) what Strangius means by his parabolic Oration is not easy to divine. For we know, that all Parables consist of two parts, the Proposition and Reddition or moral: and what is there to be found of these in this Text or Contexture? But this seems most like to Strangius' design, to bring this Text to a parabolic image, thereby to elude its argumentative force: for Divines grant, That parabolic or symbolic Theology is not argumentative, further than the scope and mind of the Symbol reacheth. That here is something spoken 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or according to human capacity I easily grant, but this doth not at all invalidate the argument, but rather confirm it. The wise God speaks according to the manner of men, enquiring, examining, and expecting what the issue would be, thereby the more fully to demonstrate his efficacious predeterminative concourse to the substrate mater of this sinful act. (2) As for the command of God, vers. 22. Go forth and do so, it can in no sober sense be understood of a mere permission. For all permission is either moral or Physic and natural: it cannot be meant of a moral permission, which Strangius seems to incline unto: for if God had given the lying spirit a licence, or legal permission to deceive, how could he be vindicated from being the Author of the sin? Is not lying a sin intrinsically evil? Should not the holy God then, according to this sense, be the Author of a sin intrinsically evil? Neither can it be meant of a mere speculative physic permission, as to the substrate mater: for it's expressed in a term of the most active import, the Lord hath put, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. This Divine precept therefore must denote an efficacious real influence, such as predetermined those lying spirits to the substrate mater of their sin. Yea, (3) is there not so much included in the last clause of Strangius' reply, wherein he grants, This Divine precept to be taken for the efficacious direction of God, for the execution of his just judgement? Now what is God's efficacious direction, but a part of his efficacious predeterminative concourse? And how could God efficaciously direct these lying spirits in Ahabs false Prophets, but by a predeterminative influence applying their minds and wills to the substrate mater of their false prophetic inspirations? I shall conclude this Head with Rev. 17. 17. where speaking of Rev. 17. 17. the ten Horns, which gave their power to the Beste, he saith, God hath put into their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree and give their kingdom unto the Beste. That phrase 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is very emphatic, and notes not the infusion of any vitiosity, but the efficacious predetermining their wills to the substrate mater or entitative act, and permission of the vitiosity. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here exactly answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 1 Kings 22. 23. which the LXX. render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and here signifies, to cause the mater effectually to be brought about, as the same word signifies, Mat. 12. 39 & 16. 4. & 24. 24. Mar. 13. 22. Act. 2. 19 & 14. 3. Rom. 15. 5. Rev. 3. 4. and elsewhere. Whence it follows: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to fulfil his wil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here signifies, powerfully to effect, or to perform with singular efficace, in which sense it is used also Mat. 7. 22. & 13. 58. or to effect with labour and industry, as it's used, Act. 9 39 & 19 24. Heb. 8. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies properly a decree, sentence, or confirmed purpose; so here. So that the mind of this Text seems this: The blessed God passed an absolute irreversible decree or purpose, that the Adherents of Antichrist should give up their Power and Kingdom to him; and thence he, by an efficacious concourse, predetermined their wills to the substrate mater of those acts, whereunto sin was annexed, for the glorifying of his Justice, on Antichrist, and his power and mercy towards his afflicted Churches. Now let us examine the subterfuges men shelter themselves under, to avoid the force of this Text. A reverend Divine of name among us replies thus: (1) He that readeth Dr. Hammonds Exposition applying this to Alaricus sacking Rome, with the effects, will see that the very subject is so dubious and dark, as not fit to found such a Doctrine on. (2) It was the effect of sin that God willed, and not the sin. (3) He is not said to put the sin into their hearts,— but only to do his pleasure, and agree to give up, etc. which he could most easily do by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts, which with their own sins, would have that effect, which he willed: if a thief have a will to rob, God may put it into his heart to go such or such a way, where a wicked man to be punished will be in his way. Thus that reverend Divine. In answer hereto we say, That whatever men's Comments may be, yet certainly the subject is not so dark, but carries evidence enough with it, that it can be meant of no other than of the ten horns, which give up their Kingdom to the Antichristian Beste. (2) Whereas he saith, It was the effect of their sin that God willed, and not the sin, this seems contradictory to the very letter as well as to the mind of the words: for it's said, [1] God hath put it into their hearts, i. e. not only the effect, but the very material entitative act. Then [2] to fulfil his will, i. e. his decree, so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here must note. Now God decreed the very act, and not only the effect; and therefore his predetermining concourse must also reach the very act: according to that great theologic Axiom allowed by Strangius and others, That predetermination necessarily follows predefinition, or Gods absolute Decree. Yea [3] it's said, That God put into their hearts, not only to fulfil his will, but also to agree and give their Kingdom to the Beste. To agree, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, unanimously to make one Edict or Decree, and that at a Council-table. Which clearly denotes a deliberate, firm, unanimous consent of giving up their power to the Beste. And doth not this clearly speak the act of their sin, as well as the effect? And is not this act as to its entitative mater, said to be put into their hearts by God? So much also the next Verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 imports, namely their deliberate free donation of their power, wherein the formality of their sin lies: and yet this very act, as to its substrate mater, is said to be from God. Whence (3) whereas he saith, God is not said to put the sin into their hearts,— but only to do his pleasure and agree, etc. I easily grant, [1] That God did not put the sin formally considered into their heart; for God temtes no one to sin; but yet he put the material entitative act of the sin into their heart. For wherein lay the malignity of their sin, but in this, that they unanimously and peremtorily agreed or decreed to give up their power to the Beste? And is not this very act, entitatively considered, said to be put into them by God? And was it not also God's pleasure or stated Decree, that they should thus agree? etc. And [2] whereas he saith, God could make them do his pleasure most easily, by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts, etc. is not this a very slender evasion? what the least mention is there of any such thing in the Text? Yea, is it not expressly said, That God put into their hearts to agree, & c? And did not the poison of their sin lie in this malign bloody agreement? Albeit the holy God be sufficiently vindicated from the least imputation of any hand in this conspiracy, in that he decreed and produced only the entitative act, not the vitiosity. [3] His instance or similitude from the Thief that hath a will to rob, etc. is extreme lame and nothing to the purpose; for it's evidently said in the Text, that God not only concurred to the extern acts and effects, but that he put it into their hearts to agree, etc. So that the very will and consent, entitatively considered, was from God. Let us now examine what Strangius replies to this, who lib. 4. cap. 10. pag. 855. acknowledgeth this Text Rev. 17. 17. to be meant of the ten horns giving their power to the Beste; but yet so as that if we understand the words (1) of Gods putting it into their minds to agree, etc. than the sense must be no other than, 2 Thes. 2. 11. Rom. 1. 28. and like places, which speak of Gods delivering men up to a reprobate mind, and sending the efficace of error, that they might serve Antichrist. And here the distinction must always concur, when in the same action sin and punishment concur, that not men's sins, but God's judgements and punishments must be ascribed to God. In this sense God is said to excite, impel, and incline to sin. Before we pass on to Strangius' second answer, let us a little examine this. [1] He grants, that God judicially may and doth concur to sin, yea excite, impel, and incline men to it. And doth not this fully overthrow his own Hypothesis and confirm ours? For if God in judgement impel, excite, and incline men to one sin, as a punishment of another, is he not then as much the Author of sin in this way, as in ours? [2] How doth God judicially punish one sin by another, but, to use his own words, by delivering such up to a reprobate mind and the efficace of error? And if so, then must not the substrate acts of such judicial dereliction be from God? Of this hereafter, §. 6. But (2) I pass on to his second answer, whereon he seems to lay the most weight, though indeed most feeble: But, saith he, because those words, Rev. 17. 17. are immediately subjoined to vers. 16. and are connected therewith by the rational Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which points out the reason of that which next follows, namely, that those ten Kings having changed their opinion, should destroy the Whore and Antichrist, it seems to me more commodious, if in that vers. 17. there be a reason given of this famous change, that they who were before the friends and vassals of Antichrist, should be afterwards enemies and adversaries to him, namely, because God hath put this into their heart. And the first words of vers. 17. sufficiently accord to this Exposition— But what is subjoined, That they might give their Kingdom to the Beste, until the word of God should be consummate, I should think aught to be expounded negatively, etc. Thus Strangius. A strange comment indeed! let us a little inquire into it. (1) How infirm is his argument from the rational particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to make what follows, the fulfilling of God's will, to refer only to the destroying of Antichrist? whereas the particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seems rather to refer to the whole verse, and more particularly to the last clause, until the Word of God shall be fulfilled; and so it notes, that God put it into their hearts to fulfil his Will, [1] In agreeing to give their Kingdom to the Beste, and [2] When the words of God were fulfilled, i. e. Antichrists reign expired, then to hate the Whore, etc. And this makes the whole contexture of the words natural and evident. So that v. 17. is not only a reason of the change, mentioned v. 16. but also an account of the whole series of their actions both whiles friends to, and enemies against Antichrist. (2) As for what is subjoined v. 17. That they might give their Kingdom to the Beste, I cannot but admire with what shadow of reason Strangius can understand this negatively, as if they should not give their Kingdom to the Beste: certainly if such glosses should be admitted, we might easily find in Scripture subterfuges for the worst Heresies and Immoralities? Why may not the most profane debauched wretch, when he is pressed with those Commands, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, etc. reply, that these Scriptures must not be taken negatively but affirmatively, Thou shalt commit adultery, & c? But Strangius saw full well, that the affirmative sense of those words, That they might give their Kingdom to the Beste, would quite subvert his forced sense of the foregoing words, and therefore he saw no way left, but to secure himself by reducing this later affirmative clause to a negative, though contrary to the express letter and mind of the words. But (3) being after all his glosses sensible of the infirmity and invalidity of this response, he p. 856. flies again to his old refuge, telling us, That if any shall think this exposition of the last member not sufficient, but that beyond it there must be also signified, that God did put it into their hearts to give their Kingdom to the Beste, I have no mind to contend about this mater, sithat the sense is sufficiently sane, which ever way the words be understood. In evil works God is not the cause of the moral evil, but of the substrate act and punishment, or Judgement which is annected to the sin; but in good works, not only of the substrate act, but also of the moral bonity, etc. Who of us denies this? would our Adversaries but stick here, how soon would our Controversy be ended? But here lies the sting, even in this plausible concession, Strangius with the rest would fain persuade us, that there are some acts of sin so intrinsically evil, as that you cannot separate the physic natural act from its moral vitiosity. §. 5. We descend now to such Scriptures as mention Gods God's efficacious Permission of Sin. efficacious Permission of sin. The former Heads regard only the substrate mater or entitative act of sin, but this sin in its formal nature. Our Adversaries, the Pelagians, Jesuits, Arminians and Semiarminians or New Methodists, all grant God's permission of Sin, but only such as is otiose, speculative, negative and naked, without any efficacious active Influence for the production of its entitative act, or direction of it to its proper ends: But the sacred Scriptures ascribe to God a positive, efficacious, directive, and ordinative permission of sin, arising from his positive absolute volition to permit it. So it's said of Eli's Sons, 1 Sam. 2. 25. They 1 Sam. 2. 25. harkened not to the voice of their father, because the Lord would slay them. The conjunction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is Causal, and resolves their sin into the efficacious permissive Will of God: The Sovereign Lord had, by an absolute peremptory decree, predetermined to leave the Sons of Eli to this sin of Disobedience both against their Father and God, which should prove the cause of their temporal and eternal ruin; and thence it's said, they harkened not, because the Lord would slay them: the will of God was not properly the cause of their sin or slaughter, yet their sin was a consequent of Gods Will efficaciously permitting it to be. I am not ignorant, that some of late have endeavoured to give the causal particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a more soft, as they phrase it, Version; and among these some make it conclusive, and so render it ideo, idcirco, quapropter: others render it quamvis, as Turnovius; others otherwise: But certainly our English Version, which renders it causally, because, seems much more agreeable to the mind of the Words and all the ancient Versions: So the LXX. who render the words thus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because the Lord in willing willed to destroy them. In willing willed, i. e. according to the Hebraic Idiom, peremtorily, efficaciously, immutablely and absolutely willed. Thus also the ancient Syriac and Arabic Versions, with some later, Munster, Pagnine, Arias Montanus, Junius and Tremelius, Osiander, Piscator, Malvenda, with the Tigurine and Belgic Versions; yea Castalio not excepted, render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 causally, because, according to our sense and interpretament. Let us examine now what Strangius returns in answer to this Text, lib. 4. cap. 6. pag. 809, etc. He answers, (1) That the sons of Eli were, for their flagitiose impieties, destined and devoted by God to ruin. (2) That the punishment of death here mentioned, seems properly and directly to be understood of temporal, not eternal. (3) That however it be, as it is manifest, that sin precedes damnation and the inflicting of punishment, so it's necessary that the prescience of every sin be presupposed in the eternal purpose of God, of damning and inflicting punishment, whether temporal or eternal. (4) That the particle Quia Because, here used, doth not always denote a proper cause, but a reason of consequence, which may be taken from the effect, and other arguments besides the cause, etc. Strangius here raiseth a great deal of dust, to blind our eyes from beholding the Meridian light of this Text; but to answer briefly: (1) We say, that his first answer smells too rankly of Pelagianism, in that it makes the sins of men the cause of the Divine Wil: The Sons of Eli were not for their flagitiose Impieties destined by God to ruin, as if their flagitiose Impieties were causative of and influential on Divine destination; but the Sovereign God destined, by an absolute decree, to leave them to those flagitiose sins, and for them to destroy them. What are the dangerous consequents of such a conditional Reprobation, we intent more fully to show hereafter, c. 5. §. 3. (2) That the Death here intended and inflicted was only temporal, is too crude a notion for a Divine instructed in the knowledge of divine wrath: Yea, Strangius confesseth, that they merited eternal wrath; and how then could they be exempted from it, who had rejected the Merits of their Messias? (3) What he adds, touching the prescience of every sin to be presupposed in Gods eternal purpose of damning men, has a tincture also of rank Pelagianisme: for if the prescience or prevision of actual sins, yea of final Impenitence, be that which moves the divine Will to decree the Damnation of men, than it will, by a parity of reason, necessarily follow, that the prescience or prevision of men's Faith and final Perseverance is that which moves the divine Will to elect men: for if Reprobation be conditional, Election must be so also, as our Divines on Scripture-reason strongly demonstrate. Davenant in his Animadvers. against Hoard, invictly proves, p. 226. and elsewhere, That Decrees purely conditional are very much unbecoming the Divine Wil But of this more in what follows, c. 5. §. 3. (4) As for the Particle Quia, Because, [1] We grant, that it doth not always denote a proper Cause, but a reason of Consequence, and that taken sometimes from the effect. But, [2] that it cannot denote a reason of Consequence taken from the Effect in this Text, is most evident; because Gods Will to slay them was not the effect of their disobedience, but their disobedience was the consequent of Gods will to slay them. [3] Take notice, that we do not say, that God's will was the cause of their disobedience or ruin, but only that the later was the consequent of the former: God in his most sovereign wise and efficacious purpose decreed to leave the sons of Eli to such flagitiose sins, as should prove the cause of their ruin, both temporal and eternal: and hereupon their sin and ruin followed, as Darkness is the consequent of the Sun's retirement into the inferior Hemisphere. Again, God's efficacious permissive will about sin may be demonstrated from Job 12. 16. The deceiver and deceived are his. Job 12. 16, 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, His or unto him is the deceiver and the deceived, h. e. Justo judicio permittit errare & seduci, Vatablus. i. e. he doth in just judgement permit men to deceive and to be deceived, as Vatablus on this Text. Which Mercer thus more fully explicates: I understand this not only of false Worship, but also of all errors that are committed every where; although more specially in Polities and Cities to be governed, where God stirs up some who draw others into error, that they might follow their fallacious counsel, and enter on a perniciose course for their own damage.— God therefore impels and draws some into error: not that the Lord is the Author of Error or Sin, but that their sin and defection from God leads them thereto, God not only merely permitting, but also ordaining, etc. Whence it's added, v. 17. He leadeth counsellors away spoiled, and maketh the Judge's fools; spoiled, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. of their wisdom and counsel, as it follows. So it's taken, Psal. 76. 6. The valiant are spoiled of their heart, i. e. deprived of their courage. And maketh the Judge's fools, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, infatuat, or ad insaniam adigit, as Mercer. He infatuates them. Again, v. 20. He removeth away the speech of the trusty, and taketh away the understanding of the aged. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Judgement, Discretion, Counsel, Prudence, Sense: Hebr. the savour or experimental taste. So v. 24. He taketh away the heart of the chief of the People of the earth, and causeth them to wander in a Wilderness where there is no way. The like Deut. 28. 28. and Esa. 19 11, 12, 13, 14. Now let us see what answer Strangius, l. 4. c. 9 p. 836. gives hereto: It must be observed, saith he, that Job in this Chapter doth in an illustrious manner discourse of God's Providence so ordering things, that nothing comes to pass casually or fortuitously, nothing without his destinated counsel, that nothing is done but what he wils, either by permitting that it be done, or by doing of it, as August. Enchirid. c. 95. so that God doth effect and procure whatever things are good, and also wisely foreknowing the future event, doth permit sins, which he directs to good ends ordained by him.— Deservedly therefore Job among other things observes, that it is from Divine Providence, that some err, and draw others into error; and that both as to matters of Religion, and in other matters of this life; not that is he the Author of seduction and errors, but because God, for the contemt and abuse of his light, delivers them destitute thereof into a mind void of judgement, and presenting objects and occasions, opens a way, wherein they wander, etc. Though this Paraphrase be far short of the mind of the Text, yet there is enough in it to confirm our Hypothesis, and subvert his own Antithesis. For (1) he grants, That nothing happens casually, without God's destinated counsel, according to that of Augustin, That nothing is done but what God wils, etc. Now certainly God destinated counsel or determined will is most efficacious and irresistible: so that if the permission of sin be from God's destinated counsel, it must be also determined by his efficacious wil (2) He grants, that God wisely foreknows all future events, even the sins of men: and how this can be without the efficacious predetermination of his own will to permit the same, neither Strangius himself, nor any of his sectators, could ever yet make out. (3) He grants also, That God directs those aberrations and sins to good ends appointed by him. And how can God direct the immanent aberrations of the mind, but by an efficacious predetermination of the substrate acts, and permission of the vitiosity? (4) He yet further grants, That God delivers them unto a mind void of judgement: and what do we say more? Doth not this evidently denote an active efficacious permission of sin? But then (5) his last clause, presenting objects and occasions, etc. overthrows all his former concessions: for the wise God doth not only present objects and occasions, and thereby open a way to men's infatuation, but he also predetermines the mind to the entitative act, and efficaciously permits the vitiosity, without the least finger in the sin. There are other Scriptures which demonstratively prove Gods efficacious permission of sin; as Esa. 63. 17. O Lord, why hast thou Esa. 63. 17. made us err from thy ways, and hardened our hearts from thy fear? Strangius, pag. 839. grants, that the Verb in both Members being in Hiphil oft notes a double action, as when we say, That one makes another to do a thing; though he pretends, that sometimes it only notes a permission of the action. But it is certain, that it cannot here denote a mere naked permission, but such as proceeds from the efficacious will of God. The like Jer. 20. 7. O Lord, thou hast deceived me and I was deceived. Whereto answers, Ezech. 14. 9 And if the Prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord have deceived that Prophet. Which Texts speak certainly more than a mere idle speculative permission, namely such as resultes from the active, efficacious, directive and ordinative will of God, as Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 9 pag. 840— 844. grants. What this permission of God is, and how far it extends, see what follows, Chap. 5. §. 6. §. 6. Let us now pass on to such Scriptures as mention God's God's judicial hardening Sinners. tradition or giving up some to judicial excecation and induration or hardness of heart; which will give a more evident demonstration of God's efficacious predeterminative Concourse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin. Not to insiste on Gods hardening Pharaohs heart, Exod. 4. 21. which has been already solidly and demonstratively explicated by a judicious Divine, in his Letter to a Friend, etc. pag. 28— 30. I shall begin with Psal. 81. 12. So I Psal. 81. 12. gave them up to their own hearts lusts, or to the hardness of their own hearts, as Kimhi. Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and I sent them away in the depraved cogitation of their heart. LXX. render it, Deut. 29. 19 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Jer. 3. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Whence it follows: and they walked in their own counsels. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in their own depraved imaginations. It's just with God to give up men to that spirit of hardness which they affect: his way of hardening is mysterious and invisible: he delivers sinners up to the bent of their own lusts, and then lets them enjoy what they lust after: when men add acquired hardness to natural, God justly inflicts on them judicial hardness. And oh! how righteous is it with God judicially to harden such as sinfully, yea voluntarily harden themselves! And then the heart which is an Adamant towards God and things spiritual, is as wax towards sin and Satan's tentations. And what is the effect of this judicial hardness, but to seal up sinners from the darkness of mind to the darkness of Hell? Thus God, albeit he be not the Author of sin, yet is the Orderer of it, and the cause of the substrate act unto which sin is annexed. The like Psal. 69. 22. Let their eyes be darkened that they see not, Psal. 69. 22. and make their loins continually to shake. Let their eyes [i. e. their minds] be darkened. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, be made so obscure and dark, as that they may not see their way: let all true wisdom be taken from them, and make their loins continually to shake: i. e. take from them all force, vigour and ability of acting as they ought; let them stagger and reel like to a drunken man. The shaking of the loins argues imbecility and want of force, which is chiefly seated in the loins. Thus he proceeds, and then vers. 17. brings Divine wrath to a black conclusion: Add iniquity to their iniquity, etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which implies, that God adds the punishment of judicial hardness to the iniquity of their voluntary acquired hardness. We find this piece of judicial hardness cited by Paul, Rom. 11. 10. Let their eyes be darkened that they may not Rom. 11. 10. see, and bow down their back always. The Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is here rendered by Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, bow down; the sense being the same; for the bowing down of the back argues the defect of strength in the loins. To these Texts we may add, Esa. 6. 10. Make the heart of this Esa. 6. 10. people fat: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 make the heart fat, or gross, i. e. stupid and senseless: for the fat of animals has little sense. It alludes to the heart in the animate body overgrowen and oppressed with fat. These words are six times repeated in the N. T. Whence it follows: and shut their eyes. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is rendered by some, dim them, or make them dim; by others, daub them, as with plaster, or other like mater: by others, close them: all which notes the efficacity of error and blindness, that follows on judicial hardness. The like curse we find, Esa. 29. 10. For the Lord hath poured Esa. 29. 10. out upon you the spirit of deep sleep, and hath closed your eyes. LXX. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is rendered by Aquila 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and by Theodotion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which Act. 10. 11. notes a deep sleep or ecstasy: and the radix 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to overwhelm with deep sleep; and it's rendered 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Dan. 10. 9 So that by the spirit of deep sleep, must be understood such a stupor of spirit as leaves men without all sense. The allusion is to some soporiferous stupifying wine, or potion, or medicine, which, being given to a man, or sprinkled on him, casts him into a deep sleep. Hence the Prophet ushers in these words with a direful exclamation, vers. 9 Stay yourselves and wonder— they are drunken, but not with wine, etc. i. e. the Lord hath made them drunken with a soporiferous stupifying potion. As for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it is not derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to prick, Act. 2. 27. but from the ancient word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The simple 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being put for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which also remains among the Latins, as nuo, nutus, nutare. Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifies to nod, or shake the head, as they are wont to do who have drunk any stupifying potion. So that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is such a spirituose, stupifying potion as deprives men of their senses, makes them shake the head, stagger and reel as drunken men. Thence it follows: and hath closed your eyes. When God judicially pours out a spirit of deep sleep, how soon is the heart stupefied and made senseless! This Text is cited Rom. 11. 8. and explicated by Paul, Rom. 11. 8. According as it is written, God hath given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, etc. The first part, God hath given them the spirit of slumber, notes the stupor of their minds, unto which they were judicially delivered up by God. Thus also Esa. 19 11— 14. He begins vers. 11. Surely the Princes Esa. 19 14. of Zoan are fools, etc. Thence he proceeds to give the reason of it vers. 14. The Lord hath mingled a perverse spirit in the midst thereof, etc. The Lord hath mingled, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, poured out, or given them to drink. God's judicial excecation and induration is here, as elsewhere, compared to a cup of intoxicating liquor, which being very strong and heady distempers men, and makes them to reel and stagger: so much the following phrase importeth, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a spirit of perversities. The Hebrew word, not elsewhere to be found in the O. T. is derived from a Verb that signifies to pervert, turn away, or make crooked: it's here plural of a duplicate form, and notes all manner of perversities both extensive and intensive. They boasted of their wisdom, vers. 11. but God made them drunk with a spirit of error and perversities. The Chaldee and LXX. render it, with a spirit of error or seduction; the Latin, with a spirit of giddiness. The sense is the same. We may add hereto, Esa. 44. 18. They have not known nor Esa. 44. 18, 19 understood; for he hath shut their eyes, that they cannot see, and their hearts, that they cannot understand. He hath shut, Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he has daubed; Shindler renders it, crustavit, aut obduxit parietem. God did as it were plaster their eyes with a spirit of slumber: whence it follows, vers. 19 and none considereth in his heart, etc. Those profane Idolaters did shut their eyes, that they might not see, and the righteous God comes and as it were daubs or plasters them over, that they shall not see. This judicial excecation is also lively expressed, Esa. 60. 2. Esa. 60. 2. For behold darkness shall cover the earth, and gross darkness the people. The Prophet having exhorted the elect among the Jews, vers. 1. Arise and shine, for they light is come, etc. i. e. the Messias is come and shineth on thee with the gloriose beams of Evangelic light; in this vers. 2. he gives us the dreadful curse of those that should wilfully shut their eyes against this light. For behold— thick darkness. Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which seems compounded of a word that signifies to drop or destil, and another that signifies a mist or fog: so that the compound notion here properly notes a mist or fog so thick, that it even drops again; such as the Egyptian mist was, that filled the earth with darkness, Exod. 10. 22, 23. When men wilfully shut their eyes against Evangelic light, God judicially leaves them to wander up and down in the thick mist of their own darkness, so that they stumble at noon day. Thus God dealt with the Gentiles, even the wisest of them, for the abuse of nature's light, as Rom. 1. 28. And even as they did Rom. 1. 28. not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things that are not convenient. They did not approve of or acknowledge God in their practic judgements or consciences, and therefore God did not approve of or own their practic notions, but delivered them up to a reprobate, spurious, drossy, vain, adulterine, rejectaneous mind; so much 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes. A Divine of note among us saith to this Text, Here is nothing at all but a penal desertion and permission, etc. So that by this Tradition he understands only a negation of Grace, and mere permission of men to sin; but Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 7. pag. 813. is more ingenuous, and grants, that this Tradition imports something positive: though what that positive is he doth not, neither indeed can by his Hypothesis, explicate. The like Tradition or delivering up to a reprobate mind we find foretold touching the Sons of Antichrist, 2 Thes. 2. 11. And 2 Thes. 2. 11. for this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie. When secure Professors will not receive the Truth in the love thereof, that they may be saved, it is just with God to send them strong delusions, that they should believe a lie; that they might all be damned, etc. as vers. 12. The forementioned reverend Divine answers to this Text thus: Here is nothing signified, but (1) That God will permit Magicians and false Teachers to vent deceits. (2) And permit wicked men to believe them: which is mentioned as a permitted consequent, and not as an end intended by God. And the word sending is mentioned, because the permission was penal for their sin, etc. But this response is too slender and jejune for so great a Text: For (1) whereas that reverend Divine makes mention of Gods permitting Magicians, etc. this savours too much▪ of a Grotian and Cassandrian spirit, which I presume, he has no kindness for, whereby all those prophetic predictions about Antichrist are fixed on Simon Magus, or some other false Teacher in the Primitive Churches: whereas it is most evident, that this sending them strong delusion is ascribed immediately to God, as a righteous Judge. (2) Neither is this only a mere permitted consequent, as he phraseth it; but the term sending imports active efficacious influence on God's part that sends, not on the sin formally considered, but on the substrate mater, or act entitatively considered. But Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 10. pag. 853. is here also more candid, granting, Gods sending the efficace of error, to be the same with Gods pouring out a spirit of slumber, Esa. 19 14. and Jerome thinks, that Paul took his words from Esa. And pag. 855. Strangius adds, That this sending strong delusions may be ascribed to God, as a punishment of their former sin, in not receiving the truth in the love thereof: which sufficiently proves our Hypothesis, That the substrate mater of sin is from God, as hereafter. But let us a little more fully examine the general solutions The false comments of Adversaries refuted. which our Adversaries give to these Texts touching Gods active excecation and induration. 1. A Divine among ourselves, whom I love and honour, thinks, that those Texts in the O. T. which speak of Gods hardening men, etc. might, according to the Hebrew Idiom, have a softer sense; so (as I suppose he must mean) as a mere permission is intended thereby. But to answer hereto in the words of Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 9 pag. 839. The Hebraic form is oft in Hiphil, which denotes a double action, to make a man to do a thing; yea sometimes this induration is expressed by Verbs in Piel, of an active import, as Exod. 4. 21. & 9 12. & 10. 20, 27. & 11. 10. & 14. 4, 8. Deut. 2. 30. Josh. 11. 20. Whence Strangius concludes, That this phrase of Scripture oft occurring denotes much more than a mere naked permission. Though what this should be he is at a great loss. 2. Baronius, Metaphys. Sect. 8. Disp. 3. §. 99 pag. 159, 160. answers, That there are four actions of God in induration; (1) He punisheth former sins by permitting men to fall into greater. (2) He offers to them an occasion of repentance, etc. (3) He gives them not grace to improve the occasion; whence they are said to be blinded and hardened. (4) He offers to them occasions of greater sins, by such things as objectively move them to sin. But all this, which Baronius allows God in judicial execation and Induration, comes far short of what the forecited Scriptures mention. For besides the mere permission of Sin, privation of Grace, and offering occasions and objects, the Scripture mentions a Tradition and delivering up to the very act of sin, yea, God's immediate efficacious hand in the very act of sin, considered entitatively and materially. 3. But we come to Strangius, who, in his concessions goes beyond the former Divines, yet comes short of the genuine mind and spirit of those Texts, which speak of God's judicial Excecation and Induration. (1) He grants, (contrary to the sentiment of a reverend Divine among us) that active excecation is ascribed unto God. So l. 4. c. 8. p. 819. Active excecation, saith he, is ascribed to God, Satan, and the Sinner himself. Satan and the Sinner in that action do greatly sin, but God acts most justly. God can as justly punish Sinners with excecation of mind, as he punished Elymas the sorcerer with corporal excecation, Act. 13. 11. (2) Thence p. 822. he adds: Herein the whole difficulty lies, that in this action we rightly distinguish that which is sin, and the cause of sin, whereof God is not the cause, from the punishment, which God in just judgement inflicts. So p. 829. In all vitiose action, the action substrate to the vice, or whatever there is of entity and positive therein, must be reduced to God as the first cause, who doth concur therewith, as considered separate from the vice or defect annexed thereto; and therefore whatever entitative or positive is found in any obduration, in like manner it must be referred to God, albeit he hath no commerce with the vice of the action. This ingenuous concession of Strangius, did he not overthrow it by other positions, were sufficient to period our controversy: for what do, or need we desire more than what he here grants? If whatever be entitative or positive in obduration be from God, then surely the substrate mater or entitative act of that whereto sin is annexed, is from God. But here lies the point of our Controversy with Strangius, he holds that there be some acts so intrinsically evil, as that you cannot separate the entitative act from the sinful reference it has to its object. But, (3) Strangius adds, p. 831. That in the same Indutation the sin and punishment are conjunct, etc. This indeed is a great concession, that which overthrows Strangius' Antithesis; for, if in the same Act the sin and punishment be conjunct, then how can God concur to the act as a punishment, and not concur to the substrate mater or entitative act which has sin annexed to it? This Knot the acutest of Strangius' Sectators will never untie. Again, (4) He adds, p. 831. That the very Permission of God is the act and effect of the will of God.— For to will to permit, and advisedly to permit is also to act. What is done by God negatively in regard of his transient act, is done also positively, in regard of his intern immanent act. Herein also he lays before us a pregnant Truth, which is directly contradictory to his own Hypothesis: for, [1] If God's permissive Will as to sin be not only negative but also positive, than it must be efficacious. Again, [2] If God's permission of sin be positive and efficacious, then also his Decree of Reprobation to permit sin must be positive and absolute, which directly impugneth Strangius' Opinion. (5) He adds, p. 832. That other actions also concur with God's Permission, because he also rules, moderates and ordains what he permits, and concurs to the actions substrate to the sin itself. Is it so indeed? What then do we contend so vehemently for? what made Strangius write such a voluminous discourse, and oppose Rutherford, Twisse, and other Calvinists with so much violence, when as here he grants whatever they contend for? But to speak the truth, there yet lies a Snake under the herb; albeit Strangius seems to grant so liberally Gods efficacious concourse to the substrate act of sin, yet indeed, when he comes elsewhere to state this concourse, he makes it be only a remote concourse to the act considered in genere, in its generic nature, not to the individual particular act as so or so circumstantiated. And herein he is followed by God's Concourse to the individual act which is sinful. a Divine of Name among us: wherein lies the spirit of all their solutions and oppositions. But how inept and evanid this subterfuge is, will be very evident, if we consider the nature of all physic or natural acts. Is not every natural or entitative act individual or singular? Are not all natural Acts the effluxes of singular Supposites or persons? and if the subject be singular, must not the Action be also singular? To talk of a natural action in genere, or specie, what a wild conceit is this, that which all true Logic and Philosophy both new and old contradicts? It's true, human acts, as to their moral consideration, may be distinguished into generic, specific, or individual: but if we consider human acts in their natural entitative Being, so there neither is nor can be any such thing as actio in genere, action in general; but all are singular and individual. So that if God concur to the act of sin, it must be to the act in its individual singular nature, not morally but physically and entitatively considered; of which more hereafter, Chap. 6. §. 1. But to give a distinct and Theologic Idea of God's Judicial How God judicially hardens men without being the cause of sin. Excecation and Induration, with the Vindication of his Sacred Majesty from being the Author of Sin, the following Distinctions and Determinations may be of use to us. (1) We are to distinguish God's concourse in Judicial Induration or Hardness, from that of the Sinner. (2) God's Concourse in Judicial Hardness may be considered either in regard of his Decree, or in regard of his Providence and actual execution. (3) Induration may be distinguished into Moral and Natural: or into sinful and penal. These things being premissed, the true nature of God's judicial excecation and Induration will appear in the following Propositions. 1. Prop. God's Decree is not properly the cause of man's Hardness of heart or Damnation, but only of the Negation or withdrawment of preventing Grace, which God is no way bound to give. The Decree of Reprobation is not the proper efficient or formal cause of the Sinners Induration or Condemnation, but his own wilful obstinacy. This sufficiently clears the Sanctity and Justice of God. 2. Prop. Yet supposing the Decree of Reprobation, the sinner's Induration or Hardness follows infallibly, and in some sense necessarily; i. e. by a modal hypothetic necessity, not brutish or coactive, such as should destroy Liberty. The holy God doth not infuse hardness, or by any compulsion hurry men into it, but leaves them to the swinge of their own lusts, which violently hurry them into such courses as necessarily harden. This also cleareth God's Justice from the imputation of sin. 3. Prop. God's Providence in Judicial excecation and Induration is very efficacious and illustrious. (1) God leaves men to the Blandishments, Allurements, and Ensnarements of an heart-bewitching world, which insensibly harden. (2) He delivers up men to the power of Satan, the God of this world, whose subjects and vassals they willingly become, 2 Cor. 4. 3, 4. and so are taken alive captive at his will, 2 Tim. 2. 26. (3) God so disposeth and order all his Providences, as that they do all accidentally, by reason of men's lusts, conspire to harden them: Mercies become Curses to them, Rom. 11. 9, 10, 11. Yea, (4) The very means of Grace, become the means of their hardening, their Food and Physic become Poison to them, 2 Cor. 2. 16. Esa. 28. 12, 13, 14, 15. (5) Christ himself, the chief Cornerstone of salvation becomes to them a stone of stumbling and offence, Esa. 8. 14. a stone of stumbling, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of smiting, such as lying in the way the foot may smite against, and thence stumble and receive hurt. It answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, scandal in the New Testament: Thence it follows, and for a rock of offence. Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not a bare Stumbling-stone, or block, such as a man may make a shift to avoid or get over, or if he stumble, yet recover himself again; but he is a rock of offence, which notes, [1] The Offence to be inevitable and unavoidable, as the removing of a rock: [2] The ruin to be certain, as that of a Ship falling on a rock. Whence he adds: for a gin and for a snare, such as men should neither by power, wit, or craft escape. Whence it follows, v. 15. And many among them shall stumble and fall, and be broken, and be snared, and be taken. The like Rom. 9 33. (6) God puts a period to the day of Grace, and leaves men to the plague of their own heart, Esa. 22. 14. Surely this iniquity shall not be purged from you till you die. Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, If this iniquity be purged. It is the concise form of an Oath, frequently used in Scripture, as Chap. 5. 18. whereby God sweareth, that their iniquity should not be purged. So Luke 19 41, 42. Heb. 3. 7. (7) God doth positively, yea efficaciously concur to all that is positive, material, entitative, and natural in judicial hardness, without the least hand in the obliquity or vitiosity. 4. Prop. The suspension of restraining Grace in Judicial excecation is not properly a privation of any Grace due to the Creature, but a negation or withdrawment of undeserved and abused Grace. For the clearing whereof we are to consider, the difference between Man and God in this particular: No mere man may or aught to permit or deliver up another to sin or hardness, if it be in his power to hinder: (1) Because all men are under a Law and obligation of subjection to their Creator, whereby they are obliged to promove his Glory, and prevent sin and rebellion against him the most they can. (2) Because all men are under a communion of Natures, and therefore bound to afford assistance each to other, so far as they may for their natural and moral good. But now the sovereign Creator of man is under no such obligation, and therefore may as he please dispose of his own grace, or suspend it, specially when abused by sinners. 5. Prop. God doth not deliver up men to judicial hardness simply as hardness, under that reduplication, but penally, as it conduceth to the vindication of his Justice. For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we are to remember, that there is nothing in the world of itself, purely, and simply evil: for if there were any pure and chiefest evil in the world, than God, who is the chiefest good, could not will it: but the greatest evil has something of good mixed with it; and this God wils. Thus in judicial hardness there is a penal vindictive good, which God wils for the illustration of his Justice. 6. Prop. In judicial hardness, that which is morally evil in regard of man and his transgression, is naturally good in regard of God and his Providence. For albeit God doth concur with the sinner, who is deficient as to his duty, yet God is no way deficient. (1) All moral evil of sin is only such to him whose it is, or to whom it doth belong, as the Author thereof, by virtue of some Law he offends against: But now this judicial hardness or sin doth not belong to God as the proper Owner or Author of it, but only to the sinner; neither doth the holy God offend against any Law. (2) The specific quality of an effect is not to be ascribed to the universal first cause, but to the second particular cause, from which it receives specification. (3) The sinner is only the moral cause of his own hardness; because he is the meritorious cause thereof, and also a voluntary, yea wilful Agent therein. Al his hardness is voluntarily contracted, albeit judicially inflicted by God: he suffers his heart voluntarily to be deflowered by sinful objects: God threatens to suspend his Divine influence, and the obstinate sinner cries, Content: Satan comes and blinds his eyes, and he hugs him for it. So that the whole deficience or moral causality is on the sinner's part, not on Gods. The sinner wants Divine influence and is willing, yea glad to want it: therefore his depraved will is the sole formal, vital, subjective and moral efficient cause of his own hardness and sin. §. 7. We come in the last place to such Scriptures as mention God's efficacious ordering men's sins for his own glory. Gods efficacious ordering, disposing, and directing the sins of men unto his own glory, which evidently demonstrates his immediate concourse and predetermination to the substrate mater or entitative act thereof. Thus Exod. 9 14, 15, 16. God threatens Pharaoh, Exod. 9 14, 15, 16. vers. 14. to send all his plagues on his heart, i. e. in a way of judicial excecation and induration. And why? That thou mayst know there is none like me in all the earth: i. e. that I may magnify my Vitiorum nostrorum non est auctor Deus, sed tamen ordinator, August. vindictive Justice and Power on thee. Whence he adds, v. 15. For now I will stretch out mine hand, that I may smite thee, and thy people with pestilence, and thou shalt be cut off from the earth. It runs in the Hebrew in the time past, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I sent out mine hand, i. e. by the pestilence or murrain among the beasts, as v. 3, 6. and so it follows: and I had smitten thee, with the same pestilence; and thou hadst been cut off, deservedly; but for another cause (which is mentioned vers. 16.) I have spared thee. This seemeth the genuine meaning, namely, that God spared Pharaoh in this plague, thereby to magnify his vindictive Justice and Power the more in his final ruin. God let him alone to run on in full career in his way of sin, yea, concurred to the substrate mater of all his sins, and caused all his plagues to meet on his heart, in order to his final obduration, thereby to render his vindictive Justice more illustrious in his ruin. And so vers. 16. And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for to show in thee my power, and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in very deed, or verily: it notes a great asseveration, such as with God amounts almost to an oath. For this. The Apostle Paul, Rom. 9 17. adds a Pronoun of intention, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for this very same, i. e. cause or purpose, as the Greeks expound it, for this cause have I raised thee up. The LXX. render it, thou hast been preserved or kept alive; but Paul more emphaticly, Rom. 9 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Rom. 9 17. I have made thee stand up, or, have constituted, or set thee up, as on a Theatre before all the world, to be a vessel of wrath, and an exemple of Divine vengeance. The Syriac renders it thus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I have made thee to stand up; which emphaticly paints forth God's absolute will in his Reprobation. So in the Hebraic Verb, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I have made thee stand up, as a monument of vindictive Justice. This making to stand up, notes the constitution and being of a thing, as elsewhere in Scripture: the righteous God gave being and constitution to Pharaoh for this very end, to magnify the glory of his vindictive Justice on him. So it follows: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for to show, or that I may show in thee, or show thee. But the LXX. add the Particle In: so Paul, Rom. 9 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That I may give a specimen, or demonstration of my power in thee. Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, my power, or my force, my omnipotent severity. Thence it follows: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for to declare, or tell my name. The righteous God suffered Pharaoh to run on with a vehement impetuosity in his sinful rebellion, that so the world might ring of God's vindictive Justice in his ruin. From all this the Apostle strongly demonstrates our conclusion, Rom. 9 18. Therefore God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he Rom. 9 18. will he hardeneth. Observe here, (1) the Apostle ushers in this inference with the conclusive note, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, therefore. He layeth the premises in Gods judicial proceedings with Pharaoh for the manifestation of his vindictive punitive glory in Pharaohs ruin: whence he infers this universal conclusion. Therefore God, etc. (2) He resolves Gods hardening men into his absolute will or decree of Reprobation, which he in this regard, makes parallel to his absolute decree of Election: for as God hath mercy on whom he will, i. e. according to his absolute purpose or decree; so in like manner, he hardeneth whom he will, i. e. according to his absolute decree of Reprobation. And it is most certain, according to the Scripture, no man can maintain absolute Election, but he must also maintain absolute Reprobation: and if Reprobation be absolute, then also God's concourse to the entitative act of that which is sinful must be efficacious and predeterminative, as hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 3. There are other Texts that make express mention of God's efficacious ordering and disposing of wicked men and their sins for his own glory. So Prov. 16. 4. The Lord hath made allthings Prov. 16. 4. for himself; yea even the wicked for the day of evil. Note here (1) the end of Gods making allthings, which is for himself, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. for the manifestation of his own glory. (2) The manner of Gods making allthings for himself, included in the Verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, hath made, which signifies [1] God active efficience, or his energetic, architectonic Decree, whereby allthings are made. [2] Gods passive creation, or his efficience in time. [3] God's conservation of allthings in their beings and well-beings. [4] Gods efficacious actuating and governing allthings to their ends. Thus Psal. 46. 9 Eccles. 11. 5. Esa. 5. 12. The LXX. generally render it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which Joh. 5. 17. our Lord useth to express Gods efficacious concourse and predeterminative influence. And Strangius, pag. 804. grants, that whether we understand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here of God's production in time, or of his eternal Decree to produce man, or of his ordination and constitution of man to punishment, the difference is not material. I would therefore take it in the largest notion as comprehensive of all its significates before specified. (3) Whence follows the particular object, even the wicked, i. e. considered not only in their substance as men, but also in all their Modes, Adjuncts, Accidents, and Operations. There is not the most minute accident or action of a wicked man but God makes it, i. e. decrees, influenceth, and orders it for himself. Whence (4) the wicked are said to be made by God, for the day of evil, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. for the day of vindictive wrath, or punishment inflicted for the illustration of Divine Justice: which includes also their being left to sin; for the forest piece of Divine vengeance is men's being given up to their own hearts lusts. Add hereto Rom. 9 21, 22. Hath not the potter power over the Rom. 9 21, 22. clay, & c? Here Paul refutes the proud Pelagian blasphemies by an argument taken from God's absolute Dominion and sovereignty over his creature. As if he had said: Has not the Potter an absolute dominion over the clay, to form it into what shape he please? and shall we not allow the great Creator of allthings the same absolute dominion? Did he not make allthings? and therefore may he not assume the Prerogative of ordering allthings to the ends for which they were made? As he gives to every creature what shape he please, so cannot he appoint them to what end he please, and direct them infallibly to that end? Is it not an end sufficient for the being of any creature, to be the glory of any Attribute? and therefore if God make a creature to be a vessel of wrath fitted to destruction, is there any injury done to the creature? The Pythagoreans have an effate, That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the worse is made for the service of the better, which holds most true here of the vessels of wrath or wicked men, who are made for the better, i. e. their Maker's glory, as Prov. 16. 4. Thus Paul concludes, vers. 22. Vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, signifies primarily aptly to fit, frame, or set together: thence, to ordain, decree, or constitute. Whence among the LXX. it answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to found, as Psal. 8. 2. Out of the mouths of babes he hath founded or ordained praise: also to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to ordain, decree, establish, as Psal. 67. 10. & 73. 17. Thus it signifies here, namely God's eternal ordination or absolute Decree of Reprobation founded on his absolute sovereignty. Observe here the difference between the vessels of mercy, and the vessels of wrath: of the former he speaks actively, vers. 23. That he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had prepared unto glory; but of the later he speaks only passively, vers. 22. fitted to destruction. The reason of this difference seems this: The vessels of mercy are wholly from God, both as vessels, and as vessels of mercy; they receive from God both their natural good of being, and their moral good of grace, well-being, and happiness: but now the vessels of wrath are such partly from God, and partly from themselves: That they are vessels, and vessels of wrath ordained to destruction, they are from God; but that they are vessels deserving wrath, this they are from themselves: their sins and punishment morally considered are from themselves; but consider them entitatively and penally, and so they are from God. I am not ignorant of the many false and Pelagian glosses which are affixed to this Text, without shadow of reason. Another Text that evidently demonstrates Gods efficacious predeterminative concourse in ordering men's sins for his own glory is, 1 Pet. 2. 8. And a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence, 1 Pet. 2. 8. even to them that stumble at the word, being disobedient, whereunto also they were appointed. This Text is taken partly from Esa. 8. 14. Here Christ the chief Cornerstone of the Church, is said to be a stone of stumbling and rock of offence to wilful unbelievers. The Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are synonymous, and of the same import here; though 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be in its general notion more extensive: It notes originally any thing that may offend the foot, or other part, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to halt, or from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, distorted: more particularly, it signifies (1) that tigillum, or cross piece of wood in your traps for Mice, Foxes, or the like: (2) a sharp stake, whereby the foot is hurt: and so it is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, interpreted by Hesychius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is by him made to be the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an impediment: it was called also by the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, denoting a military instrument, like a sharp stake, whereby they annoyed their enemies: in which sense the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used in that Apocryphous book, Judith 5. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. (4) A stone that offends the foot: and so it answers with the LXX. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Leu. 19 14. in which regard it is made synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, both by Peter; and Rom. 14. 13. by Paul: and this they both denote here, 1 Pet. 2. 8. the great offence which sinners took at Christ, to their own ruin. Whence it's added: Whereunto also they were appointed, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. What doth this note? why take Grotius' Note on this Text, who was no friend to Calvinists: Unto this, saith he, Unbelievers were destined by God, that they might most grievously fall— For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, oft signifies to ordain, destiny, or decree, as Joh. 15. 16. So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 1 Thes. 5. 9 The Syriac in this place renders it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, they were designed; the Arabic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, they were constituted, namely by the Divine Decree. Thus Grotius, who here speaks like a Calvinist, though generally no friend to the sentiments of Calvin. The like 2 Pet. 2. 11. As natural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed. Is not absolute Reprobation here, and that by the concession of Grotius, no friend thereto, clearly and fully asserted? And if Reprobation be absolute, must not also God's concourse to the substrate mater of sin be efficacious and predeterminative? The immutable connexion between absolute Reprobation and predetermination to the substrate mater of that which is sinful we intent to demonstrate hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 3. But a reverend Divine of name among us answers to this Text thus: Resp. 1. This [1 Pet. 2. 8. whereunto also they were appointed] hath respect to Luke 2. 34— And no more can be hence gathered, but that God hath decreed, that as a punishing Judge, (1) he will leave the rejecters of Christ to go on in their own sinful way; (2) and that their opposition to him shall be their ruin: So that [1] he doth not speak this of any but the rejecters of Christ, that deserved it. [2] He speaketh not at all as willing their sin, but only as one that penally denieth them further grace. [3] But the thing that he is said to ordain them to, is not sin, but ruin the consequent of their sin: The word [stumbling and falling] signifying their destruction. Thus that reverend Divine. And now let us a little examine this his Response to our Argument from this Text, which will serve for a reply to most of his subterfuges. (1) In answer to his first particular, we assert, that more may be gathered from this Text, than what he allows, namely, That God hath decreed, that, as a punishing Judge, he will leave the rejecters of Christ to go on in their own sinful way. For he himself grants, (which cannot be denied) That they were appointed to stumble on the rock of offence: And if so, then surely they were destined or appointed to the entitative act of sin: for stumbling doth not only imply their destruction, as he insinuates, but also their sin. Whence, (2) there is something more also implied, than that their opposition to him shall be their ruin. For it's expressly said, That they were appointed, not only to their ruin, but also to their stumbling at the word, and being disobedient, which notes the Decree of Reprobation to be absolute and positive; yea predeterminative of the substrate mater of sin. (3) Whereas he saith, That he speaks not at all as willing their sin, but only as one that penally denieth them further grace, this seems also against the express mind of the Text, which saith, They were appointed, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. according to Grotius, they were ordained, destined, or decreed to stumble at the word, etc. This certainly denotes more than God's penal denial of further grace. (4) Whereas he saith, That the thing that he is said to ordain them unto, is not sin, but ruin, the consequent of their sin, the word [stumbling and falling] signifying their destruction, it seems contradictory to the letter and mind of the words: for both 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signify, according to our precedent explication of them, primarily their sin, and then their ruin or destruction, as the consequent of their sin. This also is evident from that parallel Text, Judas 4. For there are Judas 4. certain men crept in unawares, who were of old ordained to this condemnation, ungodly men turning the grace of God into lasciviousness, and denying the only Lord God. These ungodly men are said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, designed, and as it were before written in the book of God's predetermination, to be given up to this condemnation, of turning the grace of God into lasciviousness, etc. So that it is evident, that God foreordained and decreed, not only their destruction, but to leave them to those sins, which should cause the same. But to sum up the whole of this Head, we grant, (1) That absolute Reprobation is not the cause either of men's sins, or damnation. It's true, elective Grace is the cause of faith and salvation, but the Decree of Reprobation is not the cause of sin or damnation. (2) That Reprobation withdraws not any power from the person reprobated. Yet we deny, [1] That it is injust for God, by an absolute, efficacious Decree, to reprobate some, for the glorifying of his own Justice: For albeit the Decree of Reprobation be not an act of justice, yet it is not injust for God to reprobate any. [2] We deny also, that there is any motive, cause, or condition of Reprobation, as it regards the act of the Divine wil Whence also [3] we deny, that the act of Reprobation is merely negative; but affirm, that it is positive and absolute; of which see Davenant Dissert. de Elect. & Reprobat. p. 113. Hence, [4] It necessarily follows, that when God predestines and preordains any unto Damnation, he predestines and preordains in like manner, by an efficacious act of his own sovereign Will, to leave men to their own sinful courses, and efficaciously to concur to the substrate mater of those sins. See more Chap. 5. §. 3. CHAP. IU. An Historic Idea of Predeterminants' and Antipredeterminants'. The Assertors of Gods predeterminative Concourse to the substrate mater of Sin; (1) Fathers, Augustin, Prosper, Fulgentius. (2) Such as succeeded in the Roman Church, Hugo de Sancto Victore, Aquinas, Scotus, Ariminensis, Holcot, Altissiodorensis: Bradwardine, his Conversion, Parts, both natural and acquired, zeal for Efficacious Predeterminative Concourse, particularly as to the substrate mater of Sin: How God wils Sin: How the entitative act is from God's predeterminative Concourse: How God spontaneously impels or necessitates men to the entitative act of Sin. The Dominicans, and particularly Alvarez's sentiments conform to our Hypothesis. The concurrent persuasions of Jansenius and his Sectators: also of the Tridentine Catechism. (3) The Sentiments of Reformed Divines, Wiclef, Calvin, Zuinglius, Beza, Chamier, Lud. Crocius, the Synod of Dort, and Church of England, Davenant, Sam. Ward, etc. (4) Such as deny God's Concourse to the substrate mater of Sin, more ancient: Durandus, his proper Hypothesis, and who may be accounted his Sectators; Lud. à dola his proper Sentiments and design: Arminius, and his Adherents, the Remonstrants and Anabaptistes. The New Methodistes, Camero, Amyraldus, Placeus, Le Blanc, Baronius, Strangius. How these New Methodistes fell into these Sentiments, and who may be esteemed such. §. 1. HAving given a Scriptural Demonstration of our Hypothesis, The Assertors of Gods predeterminative Concourse to the substrate mater of Sin. touching the efficacious, predeterminative Concourse of God to the substrate mater or entitative act of that which is sinful; we now proceed to lay down the concurrent sentiments of Anti-pelagians in all Ages of the Church; and withal to show who have in all Ages defended the Antithesis of our Adversaries. First, among the Patrons of our Hypothesis none deserves a more illustrious name and mention than Augustin, that great Propugnator Augustin. or Champion of efficacious Concourse. I am not ignorant that some of our Adversaries, as Strangius by name, are so confident as to cite Augustin's testimony in defence of their Antithesis; but this is too palpable an abuse to find place among the indifferent or impartial Sectators of Augustin; whose sentiments touching this subject are sufficiently evident in his Works. Thus, de Grat. & Lib. Arbitr. cap. 20. If the Scripture, saith he, be diligently inspected, it will appear, that not only the good wills of men, but also the bad, are so in God's power, that he can incline them where and when he will, to perform his benefices, or to inflict his punishments, by his most secret, yet most just judgement. Again, in the same book, he saith, That God works in the hearts of men, to incline them which way he please, either to Good, out of his Mercy, or to evil according to their deserts, by his Judgement, sometimes open, sometimes secret, but always just. So De Praedestinat. Sanct. c. 16. It is (saith he) in the power of wicked men to sin; but that by sinning malitiosely they do this or that, is not in their power, but of God dividing the darkness, and ordering it; that so hence what they do against the will of God, might not be fulfilled but by the will of God. Again, De Gen. ad literam lib. imperfecto, c. 5. Some things, saith he, God makes and orders, other things he only orders; righteous men he makes and orders, but sinners, as sinners, he makes not, but only orders, i. e. In good actions he is both the cause of the good, and of the action, but in sinful acts he is not the cause of the sin, but only of the act ordering it for his glory. Again, De Civitate Dei, l. 13. c. 22. he saith, That Sin as it is justly permitted by God, falls under the Eternal Law, that is, the Divine Will or Decree. Moreover, Augustin frequently asserts, that God punisheth one sin by giving men up to another: So Contra Julian. l. 5. c. 3. & de Civitate Dei, l. 15. c. 6. & libro de Natura & Gratia, from cap. 20. to the end. To these Testimonies we may add several Hypotheses of Augustin, which demonstratively evince Gods Predeterminative Concourse to the substrate mater of sin. As, (1) He asserted, that Reprobation was the act of Gods absolute Will, and so in itself positive and absolute (2) He held, That Excecation and Obduration is the consequent of Reprobation: of which see Jansenius, August. de G●…t. Christ. l. 10. c. 3, 4. (3) He maintained, That all sins in lapsed Nature are necessary, because punishments, as Jansen. de Nat. Lap. c. 22. p. 264. Lastly, that Augustin held God's Efficacious predeterminative Concourse to the substrate mater of sin, is evident from the false Imputations charged on him by the Pelagians, who imputed to him the same odiose and forged consequences, which have been ever since imputed to the Assertors of Predeterminative Concourse. As, [1] They falsely charged on him, that he asserted a fatal Necessity, and said, that God compelled money to sin. Whereas Augustin, l. 1. q. 2. ad Simpl. answers (in the same manner as we now adays) That God is said to harden some Sinners, in that he has not mercy on them, not that he impels them to sin, etc. [2] The Pelagians charged on Augustin, That he denied to sinners the Liberty of their Will, etc. It's true, when he Si ergo servi sunt peccati, quid se jactant de libero arbitrio? August. libr. de Spirit. & lit. c. 30. discourseth of Moral Liberty, consisting in Adherence unto God, he denieth, that sinners have any such Liberty; but yet he fully asserts a Natural Liberty, that which is essential to the will, to belong to all sinners, of which see Jansenius, August. Tom. 3. l. 7. c. 12. p. 330. To conclude, there is scarce any imputation falsely charged on those that assert predeterminative Concourse to the substrate mater of sin now a-days, but it was also imputed to Augustin by the Pelagians of old, and wiped off by him, as by us, which sufficiently demonstrates, that his Sentiments were as to this Hypothesis the same with ours. He that will see more of Augustins' mind about this mater, may consult Rutherford, de Providentia, cap. 30. Chamier, Panstrat. Tom. 2. Lib. 3. c. 8. Next to Augustin follow his Sectators and Disciples, Prosper and Prosper and Fulgentius. Fulgentius, whom our Adversaries would fain make to be of their persuasion, but without shadow of Truth or Reason. As for the sentiments of Prosper touching our Hypothesis, they are to be seen, ad capitula Gallorum, where, following Augustin, he makes God to will sin as the punishment of sin. So Fulgentius, l. 1. ad Monimum, c. 26. God, albeit he be not the Author of evil cogitations, yet he is the Ordinator of evil Wills: neither doth he cease to work good out of the evil work of every evil man: neither in the very injust works of the Will, doth he relinquish the just order of his own works; because this he hath in that very order, that he doth justly desert the evil Will— and in the very injust will of the sinner, he fulfils his own Justice, etc. What could be said more evidently to demonstrate our Hypothesis? Is God the Ordinator of evil Wills? doth he not then efficaciously, yea predeterminatively move and order them in their very evil acts? And doth he not cease to work good out of their evil works? Must he not then apply their wills to the entitative act of those evil works? And what is this but to predetermine their wills to the substrate mater of those evil works? Again, if God, in the very injust works of the Will doth not relinquish the just order of his works, then surely he must of necessity apply and predetermine the will of the Sinner to the entitative act of the work, thereby to maintain his own just order. §. 2. We now pass on to such as succeeded the Fathers, and Such as succeeded the Fathers. albeit they lived in the bosom of the Roman Church, yet they still defended the Doctrine of Augustin and our Hypothesis, as to God's efficacious predeterminative Concourse to the substrate mater of sin. I shall begin with Anselm, Bishop of Canterbury, who flourished Anselm. about the year 1095, an Italian by Nation, Monk by profession, of a most acute Ingeny, devotional Sanctity, conjoined with great Prudence and Humility, according to the character given him by Baronius. This Anselm, de Concord. Praescientiae, Praedestinationis, Gratiae & Liberi Arbitrii, c. 1. thus speaketh: God worketh allthings, which are wrought by a just or unjust Will, i. e. both good and evil works; In good works truly he causeth both that they are, and that they are good; but in evil works he causeth that they are, but not that they are evil. Herein he gives us the difference between God's Concourse to good and evil acts, as also the demonstration of our Hypothesis; for if God causeth evil acts that they are, then certainly he efficaciously moves and applies the will to the act, which is all that we mean by Predetermination. Next follows Hugo de Sancto Victore, by Nation a Saxon, (and Hugo de Sancto Victore. so allied to us,) by profession a Monk, contemporary with Bernard, who flourished about the year 1130. This Hugo, de Sacr. Fid. l. 1. c. 13. faith, * Malum esse vult Deus, & tamen malum non vult: vult esse malum, quia bonum est malum esse; non vult ipsum malum, quia bonum non est ipsum malum. That God wils there should be evil, and yet he doth not will evil: He wils there should be evil, because it's good there should be evil; but he wils not evil, because evil itself is not good. An excellent description of God's predeterminative will and concourse to the substrate mater of sin, so as to vindicate his Sacred Majesty from any hand in the moral vitiosity thereof: (1) God wils there should be evil, i. e. he doth, by an omnipotent efficacious decree, will the existence of evil, in willing the substrate mater thereof: and yet (2) He doth not will evil, i. e. he doth not with a will of approbation or any way morally will evil as to its moral vitiosity or formal reason. (3) It's good there should be evil, i. e. as it conduceth to the illustration of God's glory; and so God wils it. But (4) evil itself, [morally considered as evil] is not good, and therefore not willed by God as such. The same Hugo, de Sacramentis, par. 5. cap. 29. affirms, That God by presiding Deum malas voluntates praesidendo, occultâ & invisibili operatione ad suum arbitrium temperare & inclinare. over evil wills, doth, by an occult and invisible operation, temper and incline them to his own wil What could more expressly be said for the asserting Gods efficacious predeterminative concourse to the substrate mater of sin? Doth God indeed preside over the evil wills of men, and so, by an occult and invisible operation, temper and incline them to his own will? how is it possible then, but that he apply and determine them to the entitative act of their sinful works? And whereas Hugo foresaw many would be then, as now also, scandalised at this doctrine, touching Gods efficacious concourse to the substrate mater of sin, he adds this as the reason of the offence: Not because that which is spoken is not well spoken, but because that which is well spoken is not well understood. I wish our Adversaries would well consider this prophetic reflection of Hugo; of which more hereafter in Bradwardines' sentiments. We pass on to Thomas Aquinas, whom some of our Adversaries Aquinas. would fain conjure into their Camp, and make a Patron of their Antithesis: but this is so great an imposition on the intelligent world, that I cannot but admire at the confidence of those who make use of it. Yet this has been the attempt not only of some less conversant in Aquinas' Works, but even of learned Strangius, who is oft more candid and ingenuous than others of his persuasion. Thus Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 14. from pag. 313. to 317. endeavours to demonstrate, That Thomas doth not admit that physic predetermination of God to all and singular actions of the will: The like a reverend Divine of estime among ourselves would fain persuade us, namely, That albeit the Dominicans are for such an universal predetermination, yet Aquinas is not, etc. But let us a little examine the reason of this subterfuge: (1) Was not Thomas Aquinas himself a Dominican, of the Order of Dominic? And are not all the Dominicans sworn Thomists? Albeit they are in regard of their Order Dominicans, yet are they not all in regard of their Doctrine Thomists? How comes it to pass then that they should contend so hotly for physic predetermination of the will by God in all its natural actions, even such as are sinful, and yet Thomas their Master against it? (2) Take the character of impartial Writers, and who ever denied this to be Aquinas' sentiment? See learned and acute Dr. Samuel Ward, Professor of Theology at Cambridge, his Determinations, pag. 117, 118. where he proves God's predeterminative Concourse to all actions of the will out of Thomas. But because Dr. Ward seems to be our friend, we shall appeal unto our Adversaries for the decision of this Controversy, namely to Le Blanc and Baronius. Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. par. 3. thes. 10. pag. 430. assures us, That Thomas and his sectators the Dominicans, teach, for the explication of Divine Concourse— That God doth premove and apply the very second causes to their work: for this the dependence of the second causes on God their first Mover doth require. For, according to their mind, God is therefore said to be the first Mover, because he doth antecedently move and apply all other causes to their operations, etc. What could be said more evidently to explicate Aquinas' mind herein? Thus also Baronius, who, in his Metaphysics, Sect. 8. Disp. 3. §. 78. pag. 146. imputes this celebrious Opinion of God's previous predeterminative concourse to all actions unto Thomas Aquinas, as the principal Founder thereof. So §. 79. pag. 147. And §. 82. pag. 149. he urgeth, That from the opinion of Thomas it follows, that God is the Author of sin. The like §. 85. pag. 151. But (3) to let pass the testimonies of others, if we may be allowed the privilege of believing our own senses, and the reflections of our own reason thereon, it is to me most evident, that Aquinas has copiosely and nervosely defended our Hypothesis, and impugned the Antithesis of our Adversaries. Thus, 1. 2. Quaest. 79. Art. 2. The act of sin is both Ens and Act, and in both regards it is from God: for it's necessary that every Ens or Being be derived from the first Being, etc. And whereas Strangius and a reverend Divine among ourselves pretend, that this includes immediate concourse, but not predeterminative, it is most evident, that Aquinas owned no concourse but what was predeterminative: For what is predetermination of the will, but the application Praedeterminare voluntatem est applicare voluntatem ad agendum, & facere ut faciat, Strang. l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. of it to its act, as Strangius, pag. 244. grants? And is not this the proper notion whereby Aquinas describeth the Concourse of God to all acts of the will? What more common with him, than this grand Effate, That God applies all second causes to their act? Thus in his sums, par. 1. Quaest. 105. Art. 5. he lays down this conclusion, That God acts in every Agent finally, effectively, and formally, yet so as they also act. And then in the explication hereof he saith, (3) That it is to be considered, that God doth not only move things to work, as by applying the forms and virtues of things to their operations, (as also the Artificer applies the axe to cut, who yet sometimes gives not the form to the axe) but also gives forms to creatures acting, and preserves them in being— and because the form is in the thing,— and God is properly the cause of the universal Being in allthings, which among allthings is more intime, it follows, that God works intimely in allthings; and for this reason in sacred Scripture, the operations of nature are ascribed unto God, as working in nature, according to that, Job 10. 11. With skin and with flesh hast thou clothed me, etc. What could have been said more evidently to demonstrate our Hypothesis? He saith, (1) That God acts in every Agent, not only finally and effectively, but also formally. (2) That God moves things to work, by APPLYING (i. e. predetermining) the forms and virtues of things to their operations. Yea, (3) That God applies the second cause to act, as the Artificer applies the instrument to work. Whereby he makes all second causes, the will not excepted, but a kind of instrument of God's principal efficience: For the will, albeit it may be termed a principal cause of most of its acts, yet in regard of the Divine concourse, which it receives, and in virtue whereof it acts, it may safely be termed a vital Instrument. (4) That God acting most intimely in allthings, the very operations of nature are ascribed unto him, which notes predetermination in the highest point. So also Aquinas, Quaest. Disp. q. 3. de Potentia, art. 7. speaks fully of this predeterminative application of all second causes by God. And indeed how frequently is this Hypothesis demonstrated by him? So that I cannot but wonder, that any learned man should urge Aquinas' testimony against us. We descend now to Scotus, (the Head of a Sect opposite to the Scotus. Thomists, yet) who hath given evident and strong confirmation and demonstration to our Hypothesis. I am not ignorant, that a learned and pious Divine makes use also of Scotus' name to patronise his Antithesis: and I shall not deny, but that Scotus has in many points too much favoured the Pelagian interest, which has inclined the Jesuits to follow him rather than Thomas; yet this I no way doubt but to make good, that as to our Hypothesis, touching Gods predeterminative concourse to the substrate mater of sin, Scotus is fully of our persuasion. This will appear evident, (1) if we consider his notion of Divine Prescience of things future, which he makes to arise from the Divine Decree giving futurition to them, as Le Blanc, de Praescient. thes. 33. pag. 443. confesseth. And certainly such as hold God's prescience of sins future to be from his own Decree efficaciously determining their futurition, cannot with any shadow of reason deny God's predeterminative concourse to the substrate mater of sin. (2) Scotus and his sectators generally Scotistae nihil hujusmodi physicum & intrinsecum creaturae inditum esse volunt, sed eam dicunt per decretum Dei extrinsecum, absolutum, & efficax ad agendum applicari, ac determinari, Carleton. Philos. Disp. 30. sect. 1. pag. 327. hold, That God efficaciously concurs to all second causes and their acts, not by any influence or impression on the second cause, (which the Thomists assert) but by his absolute and efficacious Decree applying and determining the second cause to act. Which we judge to be the very truth, as it hath been demonstrated by us, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 3. So that the Thomists and Scotists differ not really as to the point of predetermination, but only as to its origine and principe; the Thomists making it to consist in a physic intrinsec influx impressed on the creature, and the Scotists placing the whole of it in the volition of God, without any force impressed on the second cause, as our Countryman Compt. Carleton, in his Philosophy, Disp. 30. Sect. 1. pag. 327. has incomparably well stated it. But (3) Scotus, in 4. Sentent. Distinct. 49. Quaest. 6. §. 14. pag. 522. (edit. 1620.) has these very words: Est contra naturam ejus, [scil. voluntatis] determinari à causa inferiori, quia tunc ipsa non esset superior: non est autem contra naturam ejus determinari à causa superiori, quia cum hoc stat, quòd sit causa in suo ordine, It's against its nature, [namely the wills] to be determined by an inferior cause, because than it should not be superior; but it is not against its nature to be determined by a superior cause, because it is consistent herewith, that it be a cause in its own order. Wherein Scotus doth most acutely, though briefly, state the Controversy about Predetermination both negatively and positively. (1) Negatively, That the will cannot be determined, or predetermined, by any inferior cause; because than it were not superior: for whatever cause predetermines another to act, is so far superior to it: it being impossible, yea a contradiction, that the inferior should predetermine the superior. (2) Positively, That it is not against the nature of the will to be predetermined by a superior cause, i. e. by God the first cause, who gave it being, and therefore may without violence to its liberty determine or predetermine it in its operation: and Scotus' reason is invincible; because to be predetermined by a superior cause, is very well consistent with the wills being a cause in its own order: Yea, we may raise this reason to a greater height, therefore the will is a cause in its own order, i. e. a particular, proper, principal, or less principal cause, according to the nature of its causality and effect, because it is predetermined to act by God the superior first Cause: so that God's predeterminative concourse to the actions of the will, even such as have sin appendent to them, is, according to Scotus' sentiments, so far from infringing or diminishing the wills natural order and liberty in acting, as that it corroborates and confirms the same. (4) Last, Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist. 37. q. 2. saith expressly, That [albeit God determine the will to the material act which is sinful, yet] the vitiosity of sin is not to be attributed to God, but to the create will, because the create will is under an essential obligation to give rectitude to the action; but God is not bound by any such obligation, etc. Which is the same with the sentiments of Zuinglius and our reformed Divines, albeit opposed by the new Methodists, as well as Arminians and Molinists. Having laid down the concurrent testimonies of the two principal Gregorius Ariminensis. Heads of the Schools, Thomas and Scotus, we now pass on to their sectators, whereof we shall give the mention but of a few more illustrious. To begin with Gregorius Ariminensis, who was by profession a Dominican, and great defendant of Augustin's Doctrine; whom Bishop Usher valued as the soundest of the Schoolmen, and Dr. Barlow, as the acutest: His invict demonstration of our Hypothesis we find, in Sent. 2. Distinct. 34. Art. 3. where he demonstrates God's▪ immediate efficience in producing the entitative act of sin thus: (1) Every evil act when produced is conserved by God. Ergo. The antecedent he proves thus: because otherwise every evil act should not in its existence immediately depend on God, but be independent; and so by stronger reason, the will itself, which is more perfect than its act, should be independent. Again, if it be not repugnant to the Divine bonity to conserve the evil act, neither is it repugnant to it to produce the same. (2) The will is of itself indifferent to any act, therefore it must be determined to every act by God. (3) If God be not the immediate cause of the act, which is evil, he is not the Maker of all Being's. (4) All good that is not God, is from God as the Efficient thereof; but the act morally evil is yet naturally good. Ergo. Hence he proceeds to answer the Objections of his and our Adversaries thus: (1) If God produce Object 1. the same evil act, which man produceth, than he sins as man sins. Whereto he answers, by denying the consequence, and that on this reason; because man doth not therefore precisely sin, because he doth an evil act, as it is Ens or act; but therefore he sins, because he doth it evilly, i. e. against right reason; [or the Law of God] but now God produceth the same act according to right reason, and therefore well. So the same man borne in fornication, is produced by God well, but by the fornicator evilly. But (2) it is farther objected by his Adversaries then, as by ours now, thus: Thou wilt say, that those things that are, per Object. 2. se, in themselves [or intrinsically] evil, as the hatred of God, or the like, can never be well done: therefore neither by God. I respond, saith he, (as we) that there is or can be no entity which may not be well done, albeit not by every Agent: e. g. man envieth; but God, although he produce the same act of envy with man, yet he doth not envy. For all such acts, beyond the simple production or motion of such or such a thing, do connote something on the part of the Author, who is so denominated, which agrees not to God: So to steal, besides the simple translation of the thing from place to place, connotes the thing stolen not to belong to him that translated it: but God translating the same thing, doth not translate what is not his own; and therefore is not said to be the thief, etc. But here we are to note, that whereas Gregorius Ariminensis makes God to be a partial cause of sin, it is not to be understood, as if God were the partial cause of the entitative act, for so he makes God to be a total cause; but he calls God a partial cause of sin, as he produceth only the entitative act, not the vitiosity, whereof man only is the moral cause. Thus also Holcot, our Countryman, super Sentent. lib. 2. Dist. 1. q. 1. Holcot. makes God to be a partial cause of sin, yet not the Author of it: whereby he plainly means, as he explicates himself, that God is the physical cause of the substrate mater, or entitative act only, but man the moral cause of the vitiosity also. This I mention, because a reverend Divine of name among us from these expressions of Ariminensis and Holcot, would persuade us, that they make God the partial cause of the entitative act. We might add to these the testimonies of Altissiodorensis, in Sent. 2. where he proves Altissiodorensis by strong arguments, namely from the Passion of Christ, etc. That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human will; of which more in what follows touching Bradwardine. I now come to Thomas Bradwardine, our pious, learned and profound Thomas Bradwardine his character and zeal for efficacious Grace. Bradwardine, whom, might I be allowed my liberty, I should rather reckon among our first Reformers, than among the Sons of Antichrist; for indeed he was a zelose Patron of, and stout Champion for the fundamental points of the Reformed Religion, specially efficacious free Grace, which he with so much courage, strength of argument, and flaming zeal defended against the Pelagians of those days. This Thomas Bradwardine, borne at Hartfield in Sussex, flourished about the year 1350. He was a person of prodigiose natural ingeny, which he greatly polished by all manner of acquired Sciences, specially the Mathematics and scholastic Theology. He was a great Affecter and Admirer of metaphysic Contemplations, which in his first studies he greedily drank in, even to the neglect of the holy Scriptures, because they favoured not of a metaphysic style, as he himself informs us, in his Book de Causa Dei. When, saith he, in the state of my unregeneracy, I came into the Schools, and heard Lectures on Paul's Epistles of free Grace, etc. it did no way relish with me, quia non sapit stylum metaphysicum, because it savored not of a metaphysic style. It was with me, as it was with Augustin of old, nothing would please but scholastic discourses for free will, etc. But after his Conversion he was, as another Augustin, the greatest Champion for free efficacious Grace. Balaeus, de Script. Brit. cent. 5. cap. 87. tells us, That John Baconthorp, that famous Divine and Englishman, returning from Paris had a great contest with Bradwardine about the points of God's Prescience and Predestination; to whom at last Bradwardine assents in all those points; as the same Baconthorp declares, in Sent. lib. 4. Dist. 1. q. 4. Afterwards he was called to be Confessor to King Edward III. and thence made Archbishop of Canterbury, without any desire of his own thereto. He was indeed a good Mathematician, a great Philosopher, and excellent Divine, being communly styled Doctor profundus, the profound Doctor. Neither was he less renowned for his Piety and Zele in the His zeal for efficacious Concourse to the substrate mater of sin. Cause of God, against the Pelagians, which he defended with great fervour, as well as acumen of spirit; which also is greatly illustrious in his defence of God's efficacious Concourse and Providence about the substrate mater of sinful acts. This he frequently inculcates in his most excellent Book de Causa Dei, specially lib. 1. c. 30, 31, 32, 33, 34. He demonstrates (1) That all voluntary actions are governed by the Laws of Divine Providence, cap. 30, 31. p. 271, etc. (2) That allthings which have any natural Entity or Being, proceed from God's Providence actually and efficaciously disposing them, and not merely permitting. Which he demonstrates many ways: as [1] Because there is no act simply evil and inordinate, by any inordination precedent to the divine wil [2] Because otherwise the whole Universe would not be disposed in the best manner. [3] Because the Scriptures both of Old and New Testments, ascribe to God in his Providence about Sin active Names. Thus cap. 32. p. 288. (3) That about whatever God's Permission is, his actual Volition is also employed about the same. And he gives this demonstrative reason hereof: For albeit those things that are evil as evil are not good, yet it is good that there should be not only good things, but also evil. For unless it were good that evils be, the Omnipotent good would not suffer them to be, as Cap. 33. Hence, (4) He comes l. 34. to the state of the controversy, How God wils Sin. How God wils sin, and how he wils it not. [1] He proves, p. 294, 295. That God must necessarily will the existence of Sin, because he permits it: also God doth voluntarily provide for, yea act all the voluntary acts of the will both good and evil, with all their positive circumstances, which necessarily import sin. Again, This Proposition, Sin is, is true; and therefore there must be some cause of its truth, which can be no other than the divine will, from which all complexe beings as well as incomplexe have their origination. Again, ` Whatever is good must proceed from the first good: but that Sin existe, is good, according to Augustin. So Hugo saith, That God wils that sins existe, because this is good. Moreover, he brings in Hugo speaking thus; (which deserves a great remark) If it be said, God wils sin, this seems harsh and scandalous to the ear; and therefore some pious mind doth refute this, not because that which is spoken, is il spoken, but because that which is well spoken is il understood. [2] Thence Bradwardine proceeds to refute Lombard, who asserts, That God wils sin as a punishment, not under this reason, as it is sin; [i. e. materially or entitatively considered] which Hypothesis of Lombard he refutes, by showing, That the punishment of sin is necessarily conjoined with the Sin: so that if God will sin as a punishment, he must necessarily will the existence of sin. Also whoever knows two things to be necessarily and inseparably conjoined, and wills that they should be so conjoined, and knowingly and rationally will one; the same person will also the other; specially if about both he employ an act of his will: But now God knows and will that those two, Sin and Punishment be conjoined together, and rationally will the one, namely the punishment of sin, therefore also the sin. Again, he that will an Antecedent, will also the Consequent, at least in an universal, albeit not in a particular: for he that will a whole, will all the parts necessary thereto. [3] Thence he proceeds, p. 300. to show, how God wils sin: God, saith he, doth no way will Sin simply, but only in some limited respect: For, to say that God will something simply, is, according to the common manner of speech, to say, that he loves it and approves of it as good. Yea, adds he, may it not be said, that in the whole Universe there is no such thing as Inordination, Deformity, or Sin simply considered, but only Sin in some respect? Because in regard of the prime and supreme Cause, all Being's both positive and privative are sweetly disposed with the highest wisdom, beauty, and justice. Whence [4] He gives us the difference between God's Concourse to sinful acts, and to such as are good, p. 302. God, saith he, is not the Author of sin, as of that which is done well: For of this he is the Author so, as that he alone doth supernaturally create, and give to the wel-doer, Faith, Hope and Love, etc. But it is not so as to sin. i e. As to good, God produceth not only the natural act, but also the moral bonity, but as to Sin, he produceth only the natural entitative Act. [5] He thence p. 302. explicates, how the Apostle Paul and the Fathers denied, that God wils Sin: When, saith he, Augustin and the other holy men deny that God wils Sin, the cause of this negation seems this: Because the Apostle and Augustin, and other holy men placed Predestination, Prescience, and the like on God's part, the Pelagians and other Heretics would excuse Sinners from their sins, and retort the cause and blame on God, who so predestinated or foreknew: therefore these holy men would say, that God by his Predestination, Prescience or such like, doth not compel them against their will to sin, but that they sin freely and by their own will; and that God by predestinating, foreknowing, or willing sins, doth not sin, nor do unjustly, neither is he the first imputable, or culpable cause of sins; but the first, imputable, and culpable cause is the proper will of the Sinner. This indeed is the proper state of our controversy at this day. Then he adds, pag. 303. But if it yet be said, that it always hears i'll with many to say, That God doth any wise will sin, it is certainly true, and that peradventure according to Hugo before cited, not because that which is said is not well said, but Non quia quod dicitur non bene dicitur, sed quia quod bene dicitur, non bene intelligintur. Hugo. because that which is well said, is not well understood. I would to God therefore that they would take the Salt of Divine wisdom, and savour and understand the truth which is savoury to a sane taste; and that they would know, that there is no evil in the world, which is not for some great good: why therefore should we subtract from the World, and from God the Author of the World, this way of doing good, or of benefaction, which is so admirable and great? Yea it seems more miraculose and great, to work good out of evils than out of goods, or to work good only. And without peradventure it seemeth so disgustful to many, if it be said, that God will and produceth the act of Incest of the Father with the Daughter, of the Son with the Mother, of Parricide, Sedition, Blasphemy, and other like sins: and yet not only the Saints, but also the Philosophers speak thus: For who in such an incest prepares the seed, and moves, creates, and infuseth the soul into the foetus, but God? and however it may sound, thus the Saints of God speak, yea the Spirit of God, who speaks in them. What could be said more acutely, demonstratively and divinely for the deciding our controversy, would men but receive it? (5) Again, Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 20. p. 542, etc. proves out How the entitative act is from God's Predeterminative Concourse. of Altissiodorensis, super 2. sent. That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil Altissiodorensis' arguments are these, [1] From the Passion of Christ, which was good, and proceeded from a good cause, namely the Will of God. [2] From the act of Fornication, whereby an holy Prophet is begotten: which act is the cause of good, and therefore good; and yet it is also evil: and therefore an evil action as it is an action is good and from God. Thence he adds the Testimony of Thomas, in Quaest. de malo, q. 19 where he demands, Whether the act of sin be from God? and he answers thus: It must be said, that among the Ancients there was a double opinion concerning this mater: some said more anciently, that the action of Sin was not from God; attending to the very Deformity of Sin, which is not from God: but some said, that the action of Sin is from God; attending to the very Essence of the Act, which must be granted to be from God, and that on a double reason; [1] Commun, because God being Ens or Being by his own Essence, and his very Essence his Being, it must thence necessarily follow, that whatever doth participate of Being, must be derived from him who is Being by Essence. [2] Special: for it is necessary that all motions of second Causes be produced by the first Mover, who is God, as p. 554. (6) Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 22. p. 559. riseth higher, and proves strongly, That it implies a contradiction for any Nature to act or move without God, of himself, properly, actually, and specially applying it to act, and moving of it. Which he demonstrates many ways: as [1] Because no natural virtue or form can operate without God's cooperating therewith. [2] Because all natural things or causes are but as Instruments in regard of God the first Cause. [3] Because the create will cannot subsist of itself; therefore neither can it act of itself, as c. 24. p. 563. [4] Because God, by reason of his infinite Actuality, permits nothing but what he wils. (8) Bradwardine, l. 3. c. 29. p. 739. ascends yet higher, and How God spontaneously impels men to the entitative act of Sin. demonstrates, That God, albeit he impel no man violently against his will, yet he impels all men's wills spontaneously, and draws them to all their free acts, even such as have sin annexed to them. But further, adds he, it may be probably said, that God doth in some sense necessitate to the very act of sin, as to the substance of the act; yet it doth not thence follow that he doth necessitate to sin, or to the deformity of sin, as it is sin, or the deformity of sin: for the omnipotent God may, as it appears, separate the very substance of the act and whatever is positive in it from the Deformity of sin, and can produce and conserve such an effect really positive and good, without such a defect and privative malice: Specially, sithat Sin, Deformity, vitiosity, or defect is not essentially the very act, nor of the essence of the act, nor necessarily a consequent of the substance of the act. Therefore the good God acting rightly, pre-acting and in some sense necessitating to such an act, according to its substance and nature good, the vitiosity or sin doth not thence necessarily follow: whence therefore doth it follow, but from the free will of the Creature freely deficient, and from the will of the Sinner? What could be said more acutely, more judiciously, more demonstratively, and more piously, to put a period to this controversy, had not men a strong impulse to oppose the Truth? I have been the more prolix in rehearsing these illustrious and demonstrative Sentiments of Bradwardine, because I find nothing newly started by our Adversaries, but what I find rationally, solidly, and convictively solved by him, above three hundred years since. As for his solutions to the particular Objections made by his Opponents then, and ours now, we shall produce them in what follows in answer to the Objections against our Hypothesis, Ch. 6. §. 1, 2. Having produced the concurrent Sentiments of the ancient The Dominicans sentiments. Fathers and Schoolmen for the confirmation of our Hypothesis, we might now descend to the later Schoolmen, specially the Thomists; but these lie under the same criminal accusation and imputation with our Adversaries, as the orthodox Calvinist; and it deserves a particular remark, that look as the Pelagian Jesuits oppose the Dominicans in this point under the Bear's skin of being Calvinists; so the Arminians and New Methodists oppose the Calvinists in the same point, under the Bear's skin of being Dominicans: and indeed no wonder, sithat the Dominicans and Calvinists in this point about God's predeterminative Concourse to the substrate mater of sin do greatly accord. And let our Adversaries say what they list against the Dominicans, it's certain, that in this mater they have done great service to the cause and interest of Truth: and particularly Alvarez, who is Alvarez. principally struck at by the adverse party, deserves great honour and diligent inspection by those who have any kindness for our Hypothesis, or any part of the Doctrine of Efficacious Grace. I am not ignorant what an heavy load of Imputations, Strangius, and a Reverend Divine of Name among ourselves, have laid upon him in their Oppositions to what he has writ in the defence of our Hypothesis; but the Jesuits themselves, who are his most puissant Impugnators, give him a more candid and favourable treatment: For in the treaty between them and the Jansenists begun Feb. 18. 1663. the Jesuits rejecting the Arbitrament of Gregory Ariminensis and Estius, whom they judged more severe, they pitched upon Alvarez as the more moderate, to whom they required the Jansenists to conform in those points controverted, in order to an accommodement: and the reasons they allege are of moment: For, say they, Alvarez having assisted at the Congregations de Auxiliis, there is a grand appearance, that he and those others who writ at the same time and since, took up this mode of speech to salve Liberty, according to the movements and sentiments which the Popes, Clement 8 th', and Paul 5 th' had; albeit they made no Decree on this mater; of which see Refutat. de Pere Ferrier, Chap. 6. and Idea of Jansenisme, p. 82. wherein remark, (1) That the Jesuits, Alvarez's sworn enemies, give him a more favourable character, as one, who for his moderation was employed by the Popes to assist at the Congregations de Auxiliis, for the composing the differences in those points in controversy between the Dominicans and Jesuits about Predetermination. Yea, (2) That the Popes themselves, Clement 8th, and Paul 5th, had the same sentiments with Alvarez. Is it not strange then, that the Jesuits, who are professed enemies to Predetermination, and the Popes themselves, who have been generally favourers of Pelagianism, should have a greater kindness for Alvarez's sentiments about Predetermination, than Protestant Divines, whose Doctrine against the Pelagians and Jesuits can never be defended but by those principes on which Alvarez bottoms his Predetermination? For mine own part, I cannot but confess, that in those Notions about Efficacious Grace and Predetermination, I read Alvarez with all possible diligence and exactitude of spirit, and found therein so penetrant an acumen, so profound solidity, and such masculine Demonstrations, as that I never met with his equal, excepting Bradwardine and Ariminensis. This Justice I conceive myself under an essential obligation to do him, to wipe off those undeserved clamours and aspersions which Strangius and another Divine of note among us, have loaded him with. His own Sentiments in the defence of our Hypothesis are laid down in his excellent Disputations the Auxil. l. 3. Disput. 24. where he doth with a great deal of moderation and yet invincible force of argument demonstrate, That God doth by a previous motion, truly and efficiently, or according to the mode of a physical cause, premove freewill to the act of sin, as it is an Act or Being. His Arguments for the demonstration of this Thesis are weighty and invincible, namely from the Participation, Limitation, and Dependence of every Second cause, etc. Of which hereafter, c. 5. Lastly, that the Schoolmen generally, besides such as are Pelagian, assert divine Predetermination to the material entity of Sin, see Twisse, Vind. Grat. l. 2. Digress. 2. I now pass on to Jansenius and his Sectators, who are brought The Doctrine of Jansenius concordant with our Hypothesis. upon the Theatre by our Adversaries as Patrons of their Antithesis: but this is so great a mistake in mater of fact, that I cannot but admire any learned man should take refuge under it. Yet thus Strangius l. 2. c. 14. p. 318. brings in Jansenius opposing Augustin both to the Dominicans and Jesuits as to the point of Predetermination. The like is urged by a Reverend Divine of C. T. p. 3. p. 93. repute among us. But this mistake is too obvious and great to take place among diligent and impartial Inquirers: For (1) It's evident, that Jansenius rejected the term Predetermination as maintained by the Dominicans, not the thing itself as asserted by Augustin: Thus in his August. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. pag. 77, etc. he proves, That there is no manner of speech among the Schoolmen so efficacious and pregnant to express Predetermination by, but Augustin useth the same to illustrate Gods efficacious concourse. And Tom. 3. l. 8. c. 1. p. 343. he acknowledgeth, That those learned men the Dominicans have reached the Marrow of Divine adjutory, and thence the true opinion of Augustin. Again, cap. 3. p. 346. he saith expressly, that herein Medicinal adjutory agrees with physic Predetermination, that the office of physically predetermining the will doth truly belong unto it, and it may be termed by that name taken not only in the abstract, but also in the concrete. Whence in the same Chapter he useth the very term of physic Predetermination to express efficacious Concourse by, albeit not in the same manner as it is used by the Schoolmen. So that it's evident, he was not averse from the thing, albeit he but seldom used the term to avoid the cavils of Scholastic Theologues, as also to confine himself to the terms used by Augustin. (2) That reverend Divine among us, who makes use of Jansenius' name against physic Predetermination, doth yet grant, that Jansenius held, the existence of sin to be necessary as a Punishment. Wherein he opposeth Jansenius, and also Augustin, who held, that sin as a punishment, was willed and caused by God, as before. (3) Jansenius August. de Statu Nat. Laps. l. 4. c. 21. p. 264. assures us, That men in their lapsed state, before Faith be introduced, are under the captivity of lust, and can do nothing but sin; which captivity is the same with that foresaid necessity and coaction, whereby sins committed by unbelievers are said to be necessary, and therefore they have no power to abstain from sin. And Tom. 3. de Grat. Christi, l. 10. he stoutly maintains these following assertions about Reprobation, which clearly evince Gods efficacious predeterminative concourse to the substrate mater of sin. [1] He proves, cap. 2. pag. 420. That Gods negative Reprobation is▪ also positive. [2] He demonstrates, cap. 4. pag. 423. That the cause of Reprobation, according to its comparative consideration, is the absolute will of God. This is owned by reverend Mr. Baxter, Cathol. Theol. part. 3. Sect. 7. §. 22. pag. 93. in these words: [Jansenius' Doctrine is that] the Reprobation of men was by God's positive absolute will, of men in original sin, and the effect of it excecation and obduration. This being his proper opinion, it necessarily follows, that he asserted Gods predeterminative concourse to the entitative act of sin: for, as it is granted by Strangius, and others, efficacious predetermination always follows as a necessary consequent of absolute predefinition: if God absolutely decrees to leave men to sin, it necessarily follows, that he efficaciously determine men to the entitative act of sin. [3] He goes higher than most of our Divines dare do in this point, in asserting, cap. 5. pag. 424. That damnation, excecation, obduration are the effects of Reprobation. But yet cap. 7. pag. 427. he answers the objection of such, that argue hence, That God lies in wait to destroy such as are reprobated; assuring us, that the sinner only is the culpable criminal cause of his own damnation. And cap. 10. pag. 433. he demonstrates, That Reprobates are not created unto damnation, i. e. damnation as such is not the end of their creation: which sufficiently vindicates the holy God from being the cause of their sin or damnation. As for the Jansenists, that they are of the same persuasion with The Jansenists sentiments. the Dominicans as touching our Hypothesis, is evident from their concessions to the Jesuits in their Treaty begun Febr. 18. 1663. mentioned in the Refutation of Pere Ferrier, Chap. 6. also Idea of Jansenisme, pag. 82. The sum was this: The Bishop of Comenge, a friend of the Jansenists, proposed this as an expedient to reconcile the two Parties, That the Jansenists declare, that they had no other sentiment about this mater, but what was taught by the Thomists. And because some of the Thomists fly higher than others, the Jesuits demanded, That the Jansenists should reduce themselves to the form of speech used by Alvarez. So that it seems the Jansenists in the point of efficacious Concourse are looked on by the Jesuits (as indeed they are) as those that went beyond the very Dominicans. The Jansenists replied, That the doctrine of Jansenius was not different from that of the Thomists, albeit it was not his design to render himself conform to them, but to Augustin. And the true reason why the Jansenists do not maintain greater correspondence with the Dominicans, is, not their difference in doctrine, but because many of the Dominicans have by a Spirit of Cabal, or of Faction joined with the Jesuits. Lastly, that our Hypothesis, touching Gods efficacious Concourse to The Roman Catechism. all actions, even to such as have sin appendent to them, was generally owned, not only by single Sects or Parties, but by the generality of the Roman Church, before the rise of the Jesuits, is evident from the Doctrine of the Roman Catechism, published by the command of the Council of Trent; where in the explication of Non solùm Deus universa quae sunt providentiâ suâ tuetur atque administrat, verùm etiam quae moventur & agunt aliquid, intimâ virtute ad motum atque actionem ita impellit, ut quamvis secundarum causarum efficientiam non impediat, praeveniat tamen, cum ejus occultissima vis ad singula pertinear, Sapient. 8. 1. Act. 17. the Apostles Creed, about the end of the first Article, par. 1. cap. 2. §. 20. pag. 23. (edit. 1619.) we find this great testimony to confirm our Hypothesis: God doth not only preserve and administrate allthings that are by his providence, but also doth by an intime virtue, impel those things that are moved and do act any thing, to motion and action; so that albeit he doth not impede the efficience of second causes, yet he prevents them, in as much as his most secret force reacheth unto allthings; and as the Wiseman testifies, Wisd. 8. 1. He reacheth from one end to another mightily, and sweetly doth order allthings. Wherefore it is said by the Apostle, Act. 17. 21. For in him we live, and move, and have our being▪ What could have been said more clearly and fully for the asserting a predeterminative Concourse to all actions and motions of the creature, even such as have sin annexed to them? And by whom is this Doctrine taught? By the Council of Trent, which is the standard and measure of the Roman Faith, and no great friend to the Doctrine of Christ. Is it not strange then, that Reformed Divines, yea such as would be accounted Calvinists, cannot allow the efficacious Concourse of God so much as Trent-Papists allow? §. 3. We have seen how far the Latin Fathers and those who lived The sentiments of Reformed Divines. in Communion with the Roman Church have openly espoused our Hypothesis; let us now descend to Reformed Theologues, and examine what their sentiments have been hereof. And here indeed we have an ample field to exspatiate in, albeit our Adversaries the new Methodists would confine us to a small number of Adherents. We shall begin with John Wiclef, our first English Apostolic Wiclef. Reformer, who following Bradwardine his Colleague in this, as in many other points about Grace, asserted, That as God necessitates the futuritions of instants, so also he necessitates all the events which in those instants are future's, Art. Constant. damnat. 278. Again, he held, That God necessitates all active creatures to each of their acts; as Walden, tom. 1. cap. 21. pag. 35. & cap. 23. pag. 37. also Wideford, pag. 240, 248. Again he asserted, That to whatever God's permission reached, to that also his actual volition reached; as Walden, tom. 1. pag. 39 which clearly demonstrates our Hypothesis. But we pass on to John Calvin, whom some new Methodists, Calvin. particularly Strangius, would force into their Campe. Thus Strang. pag. 384, 554. where he endeavours to take off Calvin from our Party: but he that looks into calvin's Institutions, l. 1. c. 18. will find our assertion not only nakedly owned, but fully explicated and demonstrated, and that by a multitude of scriptural instances. Particularly he proves, (1) That God wils the existence Interdum bonâ voluntate hominem velle aliquid, quod Deus non vult. Rursus fieri posse, ut idem velit homo voluntate malâ, quod Deus vult bonâ, Calv. ix August. of men's sins; so that things repugnant to Gods will of precept, are yet brought about by his efficacious will of Decree and Providence. (2) That God's permission of sin is not otiose, but active and energetic. (3) That God's providence moderates and order the sins of men. And he concludes the Chapter with this seasonable caution: As for those to whom this Doctrine of God's judicial induration may seem rigid, let them but a little think, how tolerable their morosity may be, who reject a thing attested by such clear testimonies of Scripture, because it exceeds their capacity, and count it a crime to bring to light things, which if God did not know to be profitable for our knowledge, he would never have reveled them by his Prophets and Apostles. So in other parts of his Works, as Resp. contra Pighium, de Libr. Arbitr. pag. 225. also Tractat. de occulta Dei providentia, he clearly asserts and demonstrates our Hypothesis. This is well taken notice of by judicious Davenant, in his Animadversions on God's love, etc. p. 322. It is, saith he, calvin's opinion, the occult. Dei provident. resp. ad 2. Lapsum Adae non fortuitum esse, sed occulto Dei decreto ordinatum. God foresaw Adam's fall; he had power to have hindered it, but he would not, because himself had decreed otherwise. This is the effect of calvin's doctrine. But as for the involving of men in sin and damnation out of his only will and pleasure, these are consequents falsely inferred upon calvin's Doctrine, by himself disclaimed, etc. How much Zuinglius favoured this opinion of God's efficacious Zuinglius. Concourse to the entitative act of sin, is sufficiently evident from those great reproaches which the Papists load him with for it; which he wiped off with this answer, That the same action, which is sinful in regard of man, is not so in regard of God, because he is not under the same Law with man. Thus Baronius, Metaphys. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. §. 87. pag. 152. The third mode, saith he, is peculiar to Zuinglius, who teacheth, that God exciting the will to an evil object doth not sin, because God hath no Law set to him, but man hath. To which Baronius answers, That albeit God hath no Law set to him by any Superior, yet he hath a Law set to him by his own nature, not to deal injustly or cruelly with men. This reply, although borrowed from Bellarmine, is now become commun with our Adversaries, yet without the least shadow of reason: for they do but beg the question, in saying, That God hereby deals injustly or cruelly with his creature. As for Zuinglius' proper sentiments about Gods exciting and applying the wills of men to the entitative acts of sin, they are fully and clearly laid down in his Book de Providentia Dei, cap. 6. tom. 1. of his Works, pag. 365. Seeing a Law is given to man, he always sins, when he acts against the Law, albeit he neither be, nor live, nor operate, but in God, and from God, and by God: But what God works by man is turned to man for sin, but not in like manner to God: for man is under a law, but God is free— Therefore one and the same wickedness, suppose adultery or homicide, Umim igitur atque idem facinus, quantum Dei est Authoris, Motoris, ac Impulsoris, opus est, crimen non est; quantum autem hominis est, crimen ac scelus est. Ille enim▪ lege non tenetur, hic autem lege etiam damnatur, Zuing. prov. cap. 2. pag. 365. as from God the Author, Motor, and Impulsor, it is a work, not a crime; but as it is from man, so it is a crime and wickedness: for God is not bound up by law, but man is condemned by law. Thus he proceeds to illustrate by many exemples, of David, etc. Thence, pag. 367. he instanceth in the induration of Pharaoh, etc. wherein note, (1) That he calls God the Author, Motor, and Impulsor of the act; which must be understood, not morally, but physically, as he excites and applies the will to its act. (2) That he frees God from being the Author or moral cause of the sin, because he acts not against any law: a distinction which was valid in his time, albeit scoffed at nowadays even by Reformed Divines, yea Calvinists. Neither was this distinction coined by Zuinglius, as Bellarmine and others would fain persuade, but in use long before Zuinglius, by Scotus, Ariminensis, and other scholastic Theologues, who followed Augustin herein. Thus Scotus, in Sent. 2. Dist. 37. Quaest. 2. saith, The same action is sinful in regard of the create will, but not as to God's concourse, quia voluntas creata debet rectitudinem actioni tribuere, Deus autem non debet, because the create will is under an essential obligation or law, to give rectitude to the action, but God is not, as before. How deeply Beza was engaged in the defence of our Hypothesis Beza. is sufficiently evident by his Controversies in this point: as Tractat. Theolog. vol. 1. pag. 313, etc. in answer to the calumnies of Heshusius about the Providence of God, he saith, (1) That no event ever happens otherwise than God decrees: which he demonstrates from the Omnipotence of God. Thence he proceeds, (2) to demonstrate, That albeit God will, and know, and decree allthings in the world, yet that he is not the Author of sin. So pag. 315. (3) He proves, That God's permission of sin is not idle or merely negative. This he demonstrates, pag. 317. from the vendition of Joseph; the robbing of Job; the ravishing of David's wives by Absalon; david's numbering the people and Gods inciting his heart thereto; Shimei's cursing of David; the defection of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam, etc. (4) He proceeds, pag. 319. to the fall of Adam, which he assertes to be from the decree and ordination of God, etc. The same Controversy he manageth against Castellio, de aeterna Dei praedestinatione, p. 360. where he proves, That Adam's fall was decreed and determined by God. The like, pag. 401. where he proves, That God doth not compel men to sin, or infuse sin into them, but justly and rightly incite their wills to the entitative act which is good. This he confirms by the induration of Pharaoh, and Gods making use of wicked instruments for the punishment of men. That Calvin and Beza did fully espouse our Hypothesis is evident not only by the opposition of Bellarmine and his sectators, but also by that of Arminius, who objectes the very same things against them, as are objected against us, namely, That God ordained that man should fall and become vitiose: by which opinion, saith he, God is made the Author of Adam's fall and sin: of which see Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 554. And indeed all the Helvetian Churches to this very day continue very orthodox and zelose against all the Arminian Dogmes, in this as in other points; which sufficiently appears by their new Articles lately added to their Confession, and signed by their Ministers and Professors, for the condemning the new method of Amyraldus, and others in the French Churches. That not only the German and Helvetian, but also the French Chamiers Difence of our Hypothesis. Churches in their first Reformation fully maintained our Hypothesis, is most evident by the most elaborate, acute, and demonstrative determinations of great Chamier, the greatest light that ever France Reform had, Calvin only excepted, who in his Panstrat. Cathol. tom. 2. lib. 3. gives us a copiose, distinct, and convictive decision of this Controversy as than agitated by the Calvinists and Jesuits; which answers exactly to our present Controversy with the new Methodists. He titles this Book, Of the Author of sin: and proves, cap. 1. That the Reformed Divines do not make God the Author of sin, albeit the Jesuits accuse Calvin, Martyr, and Beza therewith. Thence, cap. 2. he lays down the opinion of the Reformed Divines, namely, That all actions both sinful and good are to be referred to the actuose providence of God. Which he demonstrates by Shimei's cursing David, Absoloms' incest, etc. Whence, cap. 3. he passeth on to the Papists opinion touching the Providence of God about sin, which they make to be only by speculative, idle permission, as some new Methodists. Cap. 4. he proceeds to prove, That God wils the existence of sin. Wherein he answers Bellarmine's Objections against Calvin and Beza as to this point. Cap. 5. he passeth on to the second Argument of the Calvinists, namely, that men are in their sinful acts the instruments of God. Thence, cap. 6. he descends to their third Argument, from God's excecation and induration of men's hearts: wherein he distinctly opens the Scriptures about induration. Whence, cap. 7. he comes to their fourth Argument, from God's energy in sinful acts; which he demonstrates both rationally and scripturally. And thence, cap. 8. he gives us Augustins' opinion consonant to calvin's herein. Whence in the following Chapters, 9, 10, 11, 12. he answers the Objections and Arguments of the Papists, whereby they endeavour to prove, That the Calvinists make God the Author of sin: which imputations are still fastened on us by the Arminians and new Methodists. We may add hereto the sentiments of Ludovicus Crocius, Professor The Testimony of Lud. Crocius. at Breme, and a Member of the Synod of Dort, who in many points, specially that of middle Science and universal Grace, follows the new method, yet in this of God's concourse to the substrate mater of sin, seems orthodox and concurrent to Calvin's Doctrine. So in his Duodecas Dissertat. Exegetic. De voluntate Dei, Dissert. Illam [scil. actionem] non verò hanc, [scil. malitiam] Deus vult ac decernit: hanc, non illam, permittit. 8. thes. 74. pag. 415. where he tells us, That the fundamen of clearing God from being the Author of sin is the distinction of the material and formal part of sin, namely of the action and the vitiosity, which is in the action: for that, not this, he will and decrees; and this, not that, he permits. And his reason is invincible: for otherwise there should be an action independent as to God, and the efficacious providence of God should be denied, which is Epicurean. And then, thes. 99 pag. 426. he tells us, That as to the act of the Divine will about sin, the Scriptures seem to contradict themselves, in that some Scriptures assure us, that God doth not will sin, but hate it, with those that commit it, as Psal. 5. 5, 6, 7. Zach. 8. 17. and yet other Scriptures say, that God wils, creates, and effects sins, as Esa. 45. 7. Lam. 3. 37, 38. Amos 3. 6. Then he solves these seeming contradictions, by distinguishing between the act and the vitiosity of the act: also between the act as it proceeds from God, and as from the Creature: lastly between the decreeing will of God, and the preceptive will of God. Whence he concludes, thes. 100 thus: ` For God both wills and produceth the act, as an act, of itself indifferent to moral bonity and evil, etc. And he adds, thes. 101. ` That this act in itself essentially good, even as it is contaminated by the creature, God wils it as a punishment, and useth it as an ordained convenient means for the best ends. The like thes. 112. p. 430. where he shows, how God wils sin, not as sin, but as a punishment, etc. of which more fully hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 5. These sentiments of Lud. Crocius I rather choose to cite, because he, in other points, follows the new method, and is cried up by some of that party. As for the Judgement of the Synod of Dort touching our Hypothesis, The Synod of Dort. it is sufficiently evident by their Determinations, as also by the oppositions the Arminians made against them in this point, both whiles they sat, and afterwards. I am not ignorant, that some of our Adversaries are so confident as to cite the Synods testimony in favour of their Antithesis; but this is so false an imputation, as that I judge no intelligent impartial Reader can give credit to it. There needs no more to evince the Synods concurrence with us in this point, than their stout defence of absolute Reprobation; of which see Davenants Animadversions on God's love, pag. 242. We might add almost an infinitude of Testimonies from Reformed The Church of▪ England. Divines, Churches, and Synods for the confirmation of our Hypothesis: but in what remains we shall confine ourselves to the Doctrine and Testimony of the Church of England, and those renowned Professors of Theology who have maintained and vindicated our Hypothesis. The Church of England as to Doctrine imbibed, even in her first Reformation, the sentiments of Calvin and the Reformed Churches in France, Holland, Helvetia, and Germany; albeit as to Discipline she stuck unto Episcopal Jurisdiction. This is evident by that noble design of Cranmer and our first Reformers, to reduce the Doctrine of all the Reformed Churches unto one Confession. I shall here only cull out a few Testimonies of some great Professors of Theology both in Oxford and Cambridge, who were of an Episcopal Judgement as to Discipline, yet stout Champions for our Hypothesis. We shall begin with Davenant, a great Master of Reason, and Davenant. one that went as far as he could, and I think, as far as any aught, in compliance with those of the New Method; yet he still asserted, and with great strength of reason defended absolute Reprobation and Gods predeterminative concourse to the substrate mater of sin. Thus in his Determinations, when Professor of Theology at Cambridge, Quaest. 22. In evil acts, saith he, God hath decreed to permit the event, to concur with the Agent as an universal Motor, and lastly to order the event itself according to that of Hugo, de sacr. fid. lib. 1. cap. 13. God wils that sin be, and yet he wils not sin, i. e. with a will of approbation. So Quaest. 25. pag. 118. he grants, That God's decree to permit sin is efficacious, so as to extract good out of it. But he speaks more fully for the defence of our Hypothesis, in his Animadversions on God's love to mankind, pag. 72. But those who derive the evil actions of men from their own free will as the proper efficient cause, and the existing or coming of such actions in eventum à Decreto Dei permittente & ordinante, are in no error at al. But if any shall go about to set man's will at liberty, and to tie up short the decreeing and determining will of God, as if this had not the determining stroke amongst all possible evil actions or events, which shall infallibly be, and which shall infallibly not be, he may avoid the suspicion of Stoicism and Manicheisme, but he will hardly avoid the suspicion of Atheism. For the greater number of men's actions being wicked and evil, if these come into act without Gods determinate counsel and decree, human affairs are more overruled by man's will, than by Gods. What could be said more acutely and distinctly for the demonstration of our Hypothesis? He here alsertes, (1) That the existence of evil actions is from God's decree permitting and ordering of them. (2) That God's decreeing will doth determine [or predetermine] all possible evil actions or events, which shall infallibly be. And do or need we assert more than this? And frequently in that Book Davenant assertes and demonstrates, That the decree of Reprobation is absolute, determining sinful acts and events, yet so as that it leaves no man under a compulsion to sin. So pag. 253. he saith, God's decrees carry with them a necessity of infallibility as to the event, but not a necessity of compulsion as to the manner of acting. And elsewhere he frequently inculcates, That let Reprobation be absolute or conditional, it leaves the same possibility and the same liberty to the Agent. So pag. 333, 340, 341, 351, 360. Yea, he proves, That the Arminians must, and do grant immutable absolute decrees, which admit the same objections and difficulties, as those of the Antiarminians. So pag. 354, 400, 418, 419. Lastly he proves, That infallible prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much a necessity on the will, as absolute Reprobation, asserted by the Calvinists. So p 418, 419, 442, 462. Davenant was succeeded by Samuel Ward, Doctor of Divinity, Ward. and Margaret Professor of Cambridge; a person of great natural acumen, and deep insight into the main points in Controversy between us and the Papists, as it appears by his acute and learned Determinations and Prelections published by Dr. Seth Ward. With what clear lights and heats he defended our Hypothesis is fully manifest by his 24. Determination, pag. 115. where he stoutly demonstrates this Thesis, That the concourse of God doth not take away from things their proper mode of operation; according to that great saying (though in an apocryphous Book) Wisd. 8. 1. Wisdom [i. e. the wise Providence of God] reacheth from one end to the other mightily, and yet orders allthings sweetly. He first states the Controversy, showing how the Remonstrants fall in with the Jesuits, Bellarmine, Molina, Lessius, etc. in asserting only a simultaneous immediate concourse of God with the second cause upon its action and effect, yet so, that all the modification and determination of the act, specially in free actions, be from the second cause, as pag. 116. Contrary whereto he assertes, (1) That the concourse of God with second causes, even such as are free, is an antecedaneous influx upon the very second causes themselves, moving and applying them to their work. This he demonstrates both by Scripture and Reason. The Scriptures he citys are Esa. 26. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 5, 6. Eph. 1. 11. Rom. 11. 36. His Reasons are cogent, namely from God's prime causality, the instrumental concourse of all second causes, the dependence of the human will, etc. (2) He assertes, pag. 117. That this previous concourse of God the first cause doth, according to its mode, modify and determine all the actions of the second causes. This, which is fully coincident with our Hypothesis, he invictly demonstrates, [1] because the Divine will determines itself for the production of every the most special and singular effect; therefore it is not determinable by any inferior cause, as the influence of the Sun is. [2] Because as man's free will determines allthings subject to it, so much more efficaciously doth the Divine will determine all create things subject to it. [3] He demonstrates the same from the supreme Perfection of Divine Providence, whereunto it belongs determinatively to will and predefine all and singular things which are done in time, and to destiny the same to those ends intended by itself, as also to move and apply all second causes to their determinate effects. [4] Because otherwise the concourse and determination of freewill should be exempted from the modification of Divine Providence; and so God should not have a Providence over allthings in particular, but only in common: for, as Thomas, pag. 1. q. 22. teacheth, The Divine providence extends only to those things, unto which the Divine causality extends: wherefore if God doth not determine the concourse of freewill, he will not have a providence, but only a prescience thereof in particular, as pag. 118. Thence (3) he assertes and demonstrates, That this antecedaneous concourse of God on second causes modifying their actions, takes not away from them their proper mode of operating. This he adds to clear up the conciliation of efficacious predeterminative concourse with human liberty, and he doth it with a marvellous dexterity and sagacity, withal showing, that the Molinists and Remonstrants, with Cicero, make man sacrilegious, whiles they endeavour to make him free. And Determinat. 26. pag. 132. touching absolute Reprobation he saith, that it is the antecedent, but not the cause of men's sin. Lastly, what his sentiments were touching efficacious predeterminative concourse, is to be seen in his most acute Clerum, de Gratia discriminante. From Cambridge we might pass on to Oxford, and without much difficulty demonstrate, that all the principal Professors of Theology ever since the Reformation have cheerfully espoused and strongly defended our Hypothesis against the Jesuits and Remonstrants. Our learned and famous George Abbot, in his Quaestiones George Abbot. sex, Praelect. etc. cap. 6. discusseth this very Question, An Deus sit Author peccati, Whether God be the Author of sin? And pag. 207. he gives us this distinct decision of the whole: 4. In the very actions, which on man's part are vitiose, the divine finger plainly shines forth; but so that God be the motor and impulsor [mark that term which notes the highest Predetermination] of the action and work; but not of the obliquity or curvitie in acting: For God excites [i. e. predetermines] the spirits of wicked men to attemt some things, etc. And he citys for it that great Effate of Augustin, de Praedest. Sanctor. Quòd mali peccant ipsorum est; quòd verò peccando hoc vel illud agunt, ex virtute Dei tenebras, prout visum est, dividentis, etc. What the Sentiments of pious and learned Dr. Holland, Regius Professor of Divinity, and Dr. Prideaux Dr. Holland, Prideaux, Barlow. his Successor, were, is sufficiently evident by their warm zeal against the Arminians. As for Dr. Barlow late Margaret Professor, he has sufficiently declared his assent and consent to our Hypothesis, in his Exercitatio 2 ●, de Malo, Conclus. 7. Rat. 3. where he proves, That it is impossible there should be any finite create Entity which is not from God the Author of all Entity. And to conclude this Head, it is very evident, that not only the Professors of Theology, but also the Bishops and Convocation, together with King James, were greatly opposite to Arminianism, and so friends to our Hypothesis: Yea in Bishop Laud's time, when Arminianism began to flourish, there were but five Arminian Bishops, Laud, Neale, Buckeridge, Corbet, Howson, and Montague, who espoused that Interest, as Dr. Heylin, in the Life of Bishop Laud assures us. By all which it appears most evident, that not only Rutherford, Twisse, and Dominicans, but the main body of Antipelagian and Reform Divines have given their full assent and consent to our Hypothesis, for God's predeterminative Concourse to the substrate mater of Sin. §. 4. Having examined the Testimonies of ancient and later Such as deny God's Concourse to the substrate mater of sin. Theologues that concur with us, let us now a little inquire into the origine of the Antithesis, and who they are by whom it has been defended. The Antithesis to our Thesis, namely, That God concurs not to the substrate mater of Sin, is generally ascribed to Durandus, as the principal founder thereof, who denied God's immediate concourse to actions, under this pretext, that hereby we make God the Author of men's Sins. But to speak the truth, this Antithesis is much more ancient than Durandus. Capreolus in 4. d. 12. q. 1. ad 1. asserts, That this was the Opinion of the Manichees: and Aquinas in 2. d. 37. q. 2. a. 2. saith, That it it is next to the error of the Manichees, who held two Principes, one of Good, and the other of Evil. And the reason why this Antithesis is fathered on the Manichees is this, because whoever denies God to be the cause of the substrate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed, must hold, That there is some real positive entity in sin whereof God is not the cause: whence by consequence such must assert, That there are two first Causes, one of Good, and the other of Evil; which was the error of Martion and Manes, who held, there were two first Principes, the one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the supreme good, who was the cause of all good; the other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the supreme evil God, who was the cause of all evil. And certainly, they that maintain sin to be according to its formal reason something positive or real, or that God is not the cause of the substrate mater of sin, will necessarily fall into the sentiments of Martion and Manes. Again, Hieronymus, Epist. ad Ctesiphontem, makes this Antithesis of Durandus Dicebat [Pelagius] Deum, collato semel libero arbitrio, ulteriùs nobis ad operandum: non esse necessarium. Hieronym. ad Ctesiph. to be the Doctrine of Pelagius, who, saith he, held, That God having once conferred freewill, it is not necessary that he further operate with us: and he speaks of natural operations, as of the motion of the hand, etc. which was Durandus' opinion. Though I cannot but confess, Jansenius, August. Tom. 1. l. 5. c. 20. p. 119. tells us, the Pelagians granted, That God concurs to all the operations of the Wil But the Conciliation of these two opposite Testimonies is not difficult, in that the Pelagians granted God's concourse to all operations in terms, but denied it in effect and consequences, as our Adversaries nowadays. Compton Carleton, in his Philosoph. Vnivers. Disput. 28. Sect. 1. §. 3. assures us, that the opinion of Durandus was asserted and defended before him, by Nicolaus Bonetus, lib. 7. Theol. c. 7. and it is not improbable but it was also by some others. But yet it cannot be denied, but that the principal Author of Durandus against God's immediate Concourse. this Antithesis was Durandus; whence among the Scholastic Theologues it receives the Denomination of Durandisme, which they call a rash, erroneous, dangerous error, little better than Arianisme. Bellarm. l. 4. de Grat. & lib. Arb. saith, it is repugnant to the Scriptures, Testimonies of the Fathers, and manifest Reason. Suarez Metaph. Disput. 22. Sect. 1. n. 7. saith, It is erroneous in Faith: & de Concursu, l. 1. he assertes, That the opinion of Durandus is not only reprehended, but also rejected by all approved Theologues, as an error in Faith. Is it not strange then, that Reformed Divines, yea some of great vogue for Piety and Learning should espouse an error so gross, and so much decried by Papists themselves? But to give a convictive demonstration, that those who deny Gods Efficacious Concourse to the substrate mater of sin really fall under the Imputation of Durandisme, we are first to examine what Durandus' opinion as to God's Concourse is, and then who they are who may be reputed his Sectators. Durandus proposeth his opinion, in sentent. l. 2. Dist. 1. Q. 5. in these words, Vtrum Deus agate immediate in omni actione Creaturae, Whether God acts immediately in every action of the Creature? which he denies; and the principal reasons of his negation are these: (1) Because than God should be the author of Sin. (2) Because such an immediate Concourse destroys human liberty, in that it determines the will, and so puts an end to its Indifference: of which see Strangius, p. 142. So that indeed the very same arguments, which were used by Durandus against immediate Concourse, are used by our Adversaries the New Methodists against predeterminative Concourse as to the substrate mater of Sin. And albeit the most of them profess a great displeasure against the Hypothesis of Durandus, yet, I must freely declare my mind, I cannot conceive how they can, without apparent contradiction, defend their own, but by espousing that of Durandus, which a reverend Divine of great name among us professedly doth; And that the most of our Adversaries, even among the New Methodists, who in profession disown it, fall under the imputation of Durandisme, we shall anon make evident, when we come to treat of their particular sentiments: at present take these Criteria or distinctive notes of Durandisme. (1) All such as assert a Divine Concourse to the principe or subject only, and not immediate unto the Act, fall under the imputation of Durandisme. This is well observed by Strangius, l. 1. c. 10. p. 57 where he tells us, That those who allow only a Concourse to the second Cause, moving it to act, without a continued concourse to the action, fall into the error of Durandus. Herein Durandus is followed by Aureolus, a professed abettor of Durandisme. Thus also Amyraldus, and a Divine of name among ourselves. (2) All those who hold only a general immediate concourse to the act, such as is determinable by the mater it works on, as the Influence of the Sun is by its mater, are deservedly branded with the black note of Durandisme. Thus Baronius, together with the Remonstrants and Molinists. (3) All such as deny every real Being or Entity to be from God by an immediate efficience, justly fall under the mark of Durandisme. Thus Camero, and our Adversaries generally, who deny that God doth efficaciously concur to the substrate mater of Acts intrinsically evil. (4) All those who affirm, That it implies no contradiction for God to make a creature which shall act without immediate concourse, must necessarily symbolise with Durandus. This is acknowledged by Baronius, Metaph. Sect. 8. Disp. 3. S. 61. p. 131. where he brings in this as the Second argument for Durandus, That God can give to the creature a power to act without his concourse, sithat this involves no contradiction. To which he answers well, in the Negative, that for God to make such creatures as should not depend on him in operation as well as in essence, involves a flat contradiction, because dependence in Essence and Operation is essential to the creature. This piece of Durandisme Strangius and others seem chargeable with, as hereafter, in our account of Strangius. But we descend to the particular Sects, who oppose our Thesis, The Jesuits and Molinists. with endeavours to evince how far they fall in with the Hypothesis of Durandus. And we shall begin with the Jesuits, who now generally pass under the name of Molinists, from Ludou. Molina their chief Captain, who in his Concordia Lib. Arbitr. cum Gratiae donis, etc. Quaest. 14. Disp. 26. assertes, (1) That God's immediate concourse terminates not on the human will by applying it to act, but only on the act itself and effect. Whence, (2) That this Concourse is not antecedent or previous as to the act, but only simultaneous; i. e. That God immediately concurs together with the will to the same act, and conserveses the same. Thence, (3) That this immediate concourse of God is not predeterminative, at least as to human acts, but only indifferent and determinable, like that of the Sun. Whence, (4) That as to the substrate mater of Sin, immediate Concourse doth no way determine the will, or apply it to its act, but only influence the act in a general indifferent manner, so as the will still retains its innate indifference, and liberty of acting or not acting. Such are the Sentiments of the Molinists or Jesuits, wherein they are greatly opposed both by Dominicans and Jansenists: Thus Jansenius, August. Tom. 2. lib. 6. singul. c. 14. p. 58. where he proves, That this simultaneous Concourse confers no forces or aid to second Agents, but only accommodates itself to the forces of the create power, etc. which sufficiently demonstrates the identity of this opinion with Durandisme, albeit the avouchers of it oppose Durandus with great vehemence. But of late there started up Ludovicus à Dola, a Capucine Lud. à Dola his following Durandus. Friar, yet learned and acute, who espoused the Hypothesis of Durandus, as the only Medium for the reconciling those two opposite parties, the Dominicans and Jesuits. His book he terms, A Quadripartite Disputation, touching the mode how the Concourse of God and the Creature stand in conjunction for the production of free Acts, of a natural order, specially such as are wicked: He bends his Disputation both against the Predeterminants', as also against the Assertors of Middle Science. His first part is general, stating the controversy between the Jesuits, who assert a Middle Science, and the Dominicans, the Assertors of Predetermination; and withal explicating the origine of the Controversy from the presupposed Immediation and real Identity of the Divine and creatural Concourse. His Second Part is against the Jesuits, to demonstrate, That a next, immediate and identific concourse of God to all acts both good and bad cannot be defended by the artifice of their Middle Science. In his third part he disputes against the Dominicans, proving, That God doth not concur with us to acts of a natural order, specially such as are wicked, by a physic Predetermination, and moreover by an identific and simultaneous concourse. In his fourth and last part he stablisheth and demonstrateth, (with all the force of Arguments such a ruinous foundation will admit) the Hypothesis of Durandus, That the general Concourse of God to acts of a natural order, specially such as are wicked, is not proxime, immediate and identific, but remote, mediate, and really distinct from the act of the creature. This Hypothesis he defends as the only expedient for the conciliation of Divine Concourse with human Liberty, the vindication of God's Sacred Majesty from the imputation of being the Author of Sin, and the putting an end to those endless controversies about Divine Concourse. And I cannot but conceive myself under an essential obligation freely to deliver my mind in this point, that it is impossible for our Adversaries, the New Methodists, or any others, to defend their Antithesis against us from apparent contradictions and inconsistences with itself, or to free themselves from those blasphemous Imputations they charge upon us, unless they betake themselves to this stratagem and subterfuge of Durandus and Lud. à Dola: and therefore I do no way wonder, that a Divine of great name and Head of that party among us, doth openly declare his assent and consent to this Hypothesis of Durandus, it being the only refuge to preserve him and his Adherents from self-contradiction and condemnation. Among the Reformed Churches, the first Impugnators of Arminius' Sentiments. our Hypothesis were the Remonstrants, communly styled Arminians, from Arminius, their first Founder, Professor of Theology at Leyden, who began to diffuse his Pelagian Infusions about the year 1610. His Sentiments about God's Concourse to the substrate mater of sinful acts he layeth down Disputat. publica, Thes. 7. §. 8, 9, 10. p. 193. but more fully, Thes. 9 de justitia & efficacia Providentiae Dei in malo, p. 198. where he distinguisheth God's efficience about the act of sin from that about its vitiosity. This efficience of God about sin he makes to be both about the beginning, progress and consummation of Sin. (1) As for God's efficience about the beginning of sin he distinguisheth it into [1] Impedition, both sufficient and efficacious, whereby God puts an impediment to sin; and [2] Permission, which is contrary to Impedition, the suspension of all impediments, which might hinder the execution of Sin. The fundamen of this Permission he makes to be man's Liberty, and Gods infinite Wisdom and Power to bring good out of evil. (2) God's Efficience about the progress of Sin he placeth in Direction and Determination. [1] Direction of Sin he makes to be an act of Divine Providence, whereby God doth most wisely and potently direct sin to what end he pleaseth, passing on from one extreme to the other mightily, and yet disposing allthings sweetly, according to that great effate of apocryphous Wisdom, c. 8. v. 1. [2] Determination he takes to be an act of Divine Providence, whereby God puts measures to his Permission, and terms to sin, that it run not into infinite, according to the pleasure of the creature. (3) God's Efficience about the consummation and term of Sin he placeth in Punition, and Remission. As for God's Concourse to the Act of Sin as naturally good, he doth craftily, according to his wont mode in such cases, wave that difficult point: Yet in his Articles, De Peccati Causa Universe, p. 779. he Scepticly urgeth the Arguments of our Antagonists, to prove, That we make God the Author of Sin. But to sum up Arminius' Sentiments in this point, Albeit he placeth God's Permission about Sin in a mere suspension of Impediments, which is no way influential on the Act, yet in that he allows also a providential Direction and Determination of the Act to its end and due measures, we may thence evidently demonstrate our Hypothesis, that God predetermines the Will to the entitative act of Sin, of which hereafter, Chap. 5. Arminius' Sectators usually styled Remonstrants, (from their The Remonstrants and their Sectators. Remonstrances in the Synod of Dort) Grevincovius, Vorstius, Episcopius, Corvinus, etc. who being animated by many of the Civil Magistrates of Holland, gave themselves the confidence, but those poor Churches the peste, of divulging their Pelagian Poison; which, by the interposure of King James, (who was a professed enemy to that faction) occasioned the Synod of Dort, An. 1618. where Divines out of England, France, and Germany resorted, to put a period to those Pelagian Dogmes. The Remonstrants in opposition to that Synod, writ their Acta & Scripta Synodalia Dordracena, wherein they greatly impugn the Synods Determinations for Absolute Reprobation, and God's Providence in sinful Acts, falsely charging on our Divines, (1) That they held, the Reprobate were destined to Incredulity, Impiety, and Sins, as the Means and Causes of Damnation. (2) That they made God the Author of Sin, and the like, of which see Acta Synodalia, Scripta Remonstrantium Dogmatica, p. 40, 41. I shall here only add, what is well remarqued by Le Blanc, Conciliat Arbit. Humani, Thes. 32. p. 434. That these Arminians and Remonstrants directly follow the Jesuits and Molinists in asserting a general simultaneous indifferent Concourse, such as is determinable by the cooperation of the human wil These Remonstrants, from a spirit of Cabal, to fortify themselves The Anabaptists of Germany that fell in with the Remonstrants. against the Calvinists, who overpowered them in the Synod, fell into a league offensive and defensive with many Germane Anabaptists, who thereupon drank in many Pelagian and Arminian Dogmes, particularly that of Freewill; which Infusions have been since diffused throughout some, yea whole Churches of that Persuasion in England. I am not ignorant, that a great number not only of Professors but also Churches, who are for Rebaptising, do yet keep themselves unspotted and untainted as to these Arminian Notions; and with these I have no controversy, but particular love and kindness for many of them, albeit I differ from them in the point of Pedobaptisem. But as for those of that persuasion, who fight under Arminius' banner, they seemed most forward, after the breaking up of the Synod of Dort, to oppose the Calvinists in their sentiments about God's Concourse to the substrate mater of Sin. And (that which deserves a particular remark) the very arguments that are now urged against us by the New Methodists, were urged against the Synod of Dorts determinations in this point by them, and that in the same form. Which is to be seen in a Dialogue of the Anabaptists, entitled, A Description of what God hath predestinated concerning man, etc. wherein pag. 16. they have this very expression, which they impute to the Calvinists, (as our Adversaries impute the same to us) namely, that they say, That God punisheth man with Hel-torments for doing those things, which he himself hath predestinated, ordained, decreed, determined, appointed, willed and compelled him to do; and that which a man cannot choose, but must needs do by the force and compulsion of his predestination. Are not the very same forged calumnies charged on us now-adays? See an excellent reply hereto, as to the rest of their false imputations, by pious and learned Ainsworth in his Censure upon this Dialogue, pag. 2, 4, 5, etc. But we descend now to our principal Antagonists, such as The New Methodists. would pass under the name of Calvinists, and yet are professed, yea vehement oppugnators of our Hypothesis. Thus Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. Thes. 34. pag. 434. But of those Reformed Divines, which subscribe to the Synod of Dort, some in this part agree with the Molinists and Remonstrants, neither do they acknowledge any other general concourse of God with second causes, than what is simultaneous and indifferent, whereby God doth not influence the cause itself, but its act, etc. He instanceth in Baronius, Strangius, Amyraldus, etc. And what term or title to give this new Sect of Adversaries more proper than New Methodists I know not, this being the softest title, and that which they seem to recreate themselves in: some term them downright Arminians; and albeit I conceive their Principes directly issue from and tend to Ariminianisme, yet I dare not load them with this reproachful style, because they generally assert efficacious Grace. I think we might term them without injustice Semiarminians, (as the Semipelagians of old, who refined Pelagianism) because they assert conditionate Reprobation and all the consequents thereof: But yet because nothing more becomes an opponent than candour and ingenuity, therefore to let pass all Titles that may carry any thing of reproach, I give them only this of New Methodists, because they affect and attemt to give us a new Method or Scheme of Predestination, efficacious Grace, Divine Concourse, etc. The first that opened the way to this New Method, was John John Camero. Camero, a person of excellent naturals, and those well improved by acquired literature, but too much addicted to innovation in the doctrine of the Gospel, which he could not dissemble, but too oft made profession thereof; as in a Letter to Ludovicus Capellus, where he saith, That many things occurred to him, which neither his own mind nor the reason of the times would permit him to publish. He too much abounded in his own sense and words, with too great contemt of such as differed from him, though more deserving than himself, as Chamier. There were few Theologic Questions professedly handled by him, specially such as belong to the Doctrine of Grace and Freewill, but he divulged something of novity therein: among which novel opinions this was one, That he denied every real positive Being to be from God immediately as the prime Quod negem, omne ens est à Deo tanquam à causa efficiente immediata, Ep. ad Jac. Gallovaeum. efficient cause, as Epist. ad Thom. Rhaedam, (oper. edit. 1642.) p. 526. and Epist. ad Jac. Gallovaeum, pag. 528. Which sentiment of Camero laid the foundation, which Baronius and Strangius his Countrymen afterward built their Antithesis on. Camero had for his intime Camrade Milleterius, who after his death turned Roman Catholic, and published many Antichristian Errors, which he professed to have received from Camero. But Camero's principal Sectator was Moses Amyraldus, who succeeded Moses Amyraldus. him in the profession of Theology at Saumur, and indeed much outwent him in his propensions and closures with Durandisme and the Arminian Dogmes; particularly with this about God's concourse to the substrate mater of sin. And that I may not be thought falsely to accuse so learned a man, one that passed under the name of a Calvinist, I shall faithfully relate the Character given him in this particular by one of his own friends and adherents, Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. par. 3. thes. 48. pag. 436. There are not wanting, saith he, among the Doctors of the Reformed School some who touching the general Concourse of God necessary to all the acts of creatures, seem to have the same sentiments with Durandus, and Ludovicus à Dola, Doctors of the Roman School. For that illustrious man Moses Amyraldus seems not to acknowledge any other general Concourse of God, by which he concurs with all second causes, besides that continued efficace, whereby he doth preserve and sustain the nature of every thing, and the forces given by nature. Whence he gathers, that such a concourse belongs not to liberty. So Amyrald. de Lib. Arbitr. sect. 4. pag. 246. Make, saith he, nature and its abilities able to consist without the aid of such a concourse, and they will truly act freely. Therefore let there be granted a concourse, which performs nothing else, but that these abilities, which would otherwise flag and vanish, consist and be preserved in their natural state, Liberty will thence receive no detriment. He had been speaking of God's concourse to sinful acts, and as Le Blanc well observes, by these words sufficiently indicateth, that in this part he has the same sentiments with Durandus. Wherein note, (1) that Amyraldus grants, that sometimes it is sufficient for God to preserve the subject, and render its faculties habile or capable of acting, without immediate concourse to the act: which is also the opinion of some among us. (2) That this opinion, according to Le Blanc, falls in with that of Durandus, etc. So Thes. 50. pag. 437. Le Blanc adds, That Amyraldus held a double act of providence about evil acts, one extern, and the other intern: as for the extern act, he placeth it in two things, (1) in proposing objects, (2) in permitting Satan to set home those objects with efficace. The intern act of God consists, according to him, in that God doth of many objects inducing to evil, obscure, or remove the one, or cause some other object to be offered, which is most taking. In all which there is no violence offered to human liberty, nor indeed any efficacious immediate concourse asserted. Yea in his Speciminis special. p. 468. he saith in downright terms, That the will of God depends on us, not we on the will of God: which is rank Durandisme and Molinisme. More of his wild sentiments in this as in other Arminian points, see Pet. Molinaei, de M. Amyraldi adversùs Spanhemium libro, Judicium, praesat. Placeus, another Salmurian Professor, albeit in other points he Placeus. stiffly defends the New Method, yea, in that of original sin is greatly Pelagian, yet in this point touching God's concourse to the substrate mater of sin, he seems pendulous and in suspense. Thus, De libero Hom. Arbitr. p. 174. (edit. 1656.) What the dependence of the second causes on the first in causing is, the Papists sharply dispute. It is truly confessed by all, that God doth concur with every cause, so as to operate conveniently with its faculties: but this concourse some make immediate, proxime, and altogether the same with the very action of second causes; but others deny it— But we, according to that reverence we bear to the infinite Majesty of God, dare not determine how great the dependence of the second cause on the first is: it sufficeth us, that, provided the least spot of sin be not imputed to God, too much cannot be ascribed unto God, etc. Le Blanc also, Professor of Theology at Sedan, though he seems Le Blanc. to affect the like suspensive modesty, Concil. Arbitr. thes. 55. yet thes. 56. pag. 438. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius, and others, That God cannot physically premove and predetermine to acts intrinsically evil, without being the Author of sin. But yet thes. 57 he recals himself, and saith, That provided God be not constituted the Author of sin, the dependence of the second causes on the first cannot be too much asserted. And thes. 58. he adds this as most certain, That the aid and efficace of Divine providence, even about sinful acts, may no way be restrained to a certain general indifferent concourse, etc. But from the French Professors we pass on to those of Scotland, Baronius. Baronius and Strangius, who have been stiff and tenacious Adherents to this New Method, about God's concourse to the substrate mater of sin. As for Baronius, he is accused of rank Arminianism; and that which has given just ground for such an imputation is his denying all kind of predetermination as well to good as to evil acts. Thus in his Metaphys. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. §. 78. pag. 146, etc. he endeavours to prove, That God doth not by a previous motion excite 2. causes to act. And his arguments to prove his Antithesis are no other than what time out of mind have been urged by Pelagians, Jesuits, and Arminians: namely that this previous motion and predetermination (1) destroyeth human liberty, pag. 147. (2) That it taketh away the power of the will to opposite acts, pag. 148. (3) That it maketh God the Author of sin, pag. 149. which he endeavours to prove many ways: [1] Because the entitative act of sin as being determined by God cannot be separated from the obliquity, pag. 150. [2] Because the action then as of such a species must be from God. [3] Because this opinion makes God to be injust and cruel, as pag. 151. [4] That hereby God is made the Author of sin more than the sinner. All which are but trite and threadbare arguments, urged by Pelagians and Arminians, to which we shall answer more fully hereafter, chap. 6. §. 1, etc. Thence he proceeds pag. 153. to answer our principal argument, That the second cause doth not act, but as moved by the first, and therein agrees with Suarez and other Jesuits in asserting a previous indifferent concourse. It's true, §. 58. p. 129. he argues strongly against Durandus, yet in fine pag. 153. falls in very far with him, but more fully with the Molinists and Remonstrants; which is well observed by Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. thes. 35. pag. 434. This at least, without all doubt, is the opinion of Robert Baronius, in his Metaphysic, where touching the Concourse of God, and so of its concord with human liberty, he professeth to have altogether the same sentiments with Fonseca and Suarez, namely that this concourse is of itself indifferent, and determined by the second cause to a certain species of action: neither is it needful, that God premove second causes, but it is sufficient, that together with them he influence their actions and effects. And indeed Baronius' own illustration, Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. pag. 143. sufficiently clears this to be his proper opinion; where he compares the Concourse of God to that of the Sun, which is the same in the production of perfect animals and monsters, in itself indifferent, but modified and determined by the mater it works upon: which is the very instance given both by Jesuits and Arminians. Lastly, pag. 159. he gives us four actions of God in the induration of sinners, which are no more than what Molinists and Remonstrants acknowledge. Whence it is to me apparent, that it would not be an act of injustice, should we reckon him among the Arminians, whose sentiments and cause he has espoused; yet by reason of his nominal repute among the Calvinists, I rather incline to the more favourable censure of ranging him among the new Methodists. But yet our principal Antagonist is John Strangius, Professor at Strangius. Glascow, who (as they say) having had his spirit chafed and exasperated by the opposition of Rutherford, writ a great Volume in four Books, Of God's Will and Actions about sin: wherein he bends his forces principally against the Dominicans, Twisse and Rutherford, (who in his influences of the life of Grace, both Preface and Book, oft animadvertes thereon) as if these all, by asserting predetermination to the mater of sinful acts, made God the Author of sin. I must confess, he discovers a natural acumen and a nervose vene of Reason in his Book, yet mixed with so great incongruities and self-inconsistences, yea contradictions, that I cannot but marvel how such a Master of Reason could satisfy himself with such poor subterfuges and evasions: But this I impute not to any defect in naturals, but in his cause, which admits not any solid reason for its defence. And that which yet seems more strange to me is this, that he who opposeth with much vehemence Durandus, Molina, Bellarmine, and the Remonstrants in this point of God's concourse to the substrate mater of sin, yet at long-run falls in with each of these parties in some one, if not all their sentiments about this mater. (1) That he comes very near Durandisme is evident, in that he holds the Concourse of God not to be necessary to all acts of the creature, particularly to such as are intrinsically evil: For to suppose any real positive Being, that falls not under God's efficacious concourse, is to me no less than Durandisme. It's true, Strangius in words appears against Durandus, in owning an immediate Concourse of God to all actions of the creatures, as lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 163. But when he comes to explicate this immediate Concourse as to actions intrinsically evil, he placeth it only (as some now adays among us) in God's conserving the nature and innate disposition of natural Agents, and giving them a self-determining power, whereby they are rendered apt and habile for any congenerous action, as they now phrase it. Thus pag. 164. Ergo si una Dei determinatio sufficiat, quâ Deus Agentium naturalium naturam ac indolem à se insitam ac conservatam determinavit, quid opus est multiplicibus imò innumeris determinationibus ad eundem effectum, etc. So lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 584. he lays down this as his Hypothesis, That God doth not in allthings determine the will, but sometimes permit it a free election, to choose this or that, to do this or that; and therefore in such acts he has not decreed, that man should precisely choose this or that, etc. And he proves it by this argument, That it is not impossible for God, who hath made man a free Agent, and conserveses his nature and forces, to permit something to man's freewill, it a ut per Deum non stet quin homo possit eligere alterutrum, agere aliquid, aut non agere, etc. Wherein he proves, that it is not impossible for God to leave some things to man's indifference, without determining him to either extreme: and he proves this is not impossible, because it implies not any contradiction; which is Durandus' very argument against immediate Concourse. (2) That Strangius conspires with and espouseth the sentiments of the Molinists and Arminians about indifferent simultaneous Concourse is partly acknowleged by his friend Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. thes. 36. pag. 434. having shown the agreement of Baronius with the Molinists and Remonstrants, he adds: Neither doth John Strangius seem to differ much from this opinion: for albeit he thinks, lib. 1. cap. 11. That the action whereunto God and the creature concur, is in order of nature first from God, before from the creature;— and moreover, l. 2. p. 3. denies, That God concurs only by a general concourse; as the Sun concurs in the same manner to the generation of a man and horse; but determines, that the influx of God is special to special effects, as they are specifically distinguished, not morally but physically; yet he doth by many arguments contend and prove, that the premotion and predetermination of God, which the School of Thomas defends, to all and singular acts of the creature is not necessary. Note here, that albeit Strangius seems to differ from the Molinists, Remonstrants, and Baronius in asserting God's Concourse to be previous, particular, and special; yet in that he denies Divine predetermination to all creatural acts, Le Blanc makes him not to differ much from the Molinists and Remonstrants: which to me indeed is a great observation; for I am under a very strong, and I am apt to persuade myself, rational presumption, that predetermination to good acts can never be rationally defended by these New Methodists, who deny predetermination to the substrate mater of all evil acts; as Strangius doth, pag. 167, 584. of which more hereafter, chap. 5. §. 4, 5. Here it were worthy of some labour to inquire How these New How these New Methodists fell into their new Model. Methodists fell into those novel sentiments about Divine Concourse, and on what reasons or grounds? As it was with the Semipelagians of old, so it has befell these New Methodists or Semiarminians: when the Pelagians were by Augustin driven from their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Diana of Freewill and the potence of corrupt nature, the Semipelagians come with fresh forces and assault him in the point of Reprobation, and pretend, that he asserted, That God by a fatal necessity compelled men to sin, and then damned them for what he had compelled them to: Just so the Arminians having been suppressed by the Synod of Dort, these New Methodists owning absolute particular Election and efficacious Grace with the Calvinists, thought they might more securely fall in with the Arminians in the points of universal Grace, conditional Reprobation, and that of denying Predetermination as to the entitative act of sin. Thus they divide the battle between the Calvinist and Arminian. But as Jansenius has well observed out of Augustin, If there be the least point granted to Pelagius, all will be at last granted; so I am very apt to fear, that these New Methodists, by going so far in symbolising with the Arminians, will at last be wholly drawn over into their Campe. Thus much I am very confident of, they can never rationally defend absolute Election and efficacious Grace against Jesuits and Arminians, so long as they deny absolute Reprobation and Predetermination to the entitative act of all sins. As for the principal grounds, which induce these New Methodists to take up those sentiments, we shall endeavour to lay them down, when we come to treat of their proper Opinions and the consequents that attend them, Chap. 7. But whiles we are thus characterising the Authors of this new Who of the new Methodists may be esteemed orthodox. Method, we must do such Calvinists, who incline to them in some points, that justice, as to free them from all imputation or suspicion of Arminianism: It's well known, that some of great worth and truly orthodox in point of Grace, have yet somewhat inclined towards the new Method in point of universal objective Grace, as pious and learned Usher, Davenant, and others both in our and the French Churches, who hold, Christ's death to be an universal remedy applicable to all, but yet are far from asserting an universal subjective Grace, or any velleity in God of saving all men, which Amyraldus and others assert. As for those who hold absolute and particular Election and Reprobation, Original sin in its full extent, men's natural impotence and being dead in sin, efficacious Grace in the conversion of sinners, with God's absolute, efficacious, immediate, total and predeterminative concourse to all natural as well as supernatural actions, as Davenant, and some others, who incline to an objective universal Grace, do, I have no controversy with them, but can own them as friends of Grace, albeit in some modes of explicating it, they differ from us. CHAP. V. Rational Demonstration of God's predeterminative Concourse to the substrate mater of Sin. Arguments for Divine predetermination of the Will to the entitative act of sin. (1) From the Futurition of allthings in the Divine Decree: the objections against this argument solved. (2) From the certitude of Divine Prescience; with the solution of objections. (3) From the Decree of Reprobation. Davenants Hypothesis touching absolute Reprobation and Decrees. (4) From Divine Concourse, [1] It's Principe and Origine. [2] Its Nature; totality, Universality, Particularity, Immediation, Priority, and Independence. [3] Its Efficace, as to all natural and supernatural Acts and Effects. All the Arguments urged against Predetermination to the entitative act of sin, strike as much against Predetermination to what is good. (5) From the nature of sin, its substrate mater and formal reason. (6) From God's permission of sin; which is natural, negative, and positive. (7) From Divine providence about sin, both conservative, restrictive, gubernative. (8) From the absolute, immediate, essential dependence of all creatures on God, as the first cause. §. 1. HAving given a scriptural Demonstration, as also the unanimous Arguments for Predetermination to the substrate mater of all sin. testimony of such as undertook to defend efficacious Concourse in all Ages of the Church, for the confirmation of our Hypothesis, we now proceed to demonstrate the same by rational Arguments grounded on scriptural principes and evidence; which we shall reduce to the following Heads. 1. Arg. From the Futurition of allthings in and by the Divine Decree; 1. Arg. from the futurition of allthings. which we thus form: That which depends on the Divine Decree for its futurition, necessarily falls under Divine predetermination as to its existence: But the substrate mater of all sin depends on the Divine Decree as to its futurition: therefore it necessarily falls under Divine predetermination as to its existence. The major is granted by our Adversaries, particularly by Strangius, who oft assertes, That Divine Predetermination is exactly adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition; so that whatever is predefined by God in his Decree, must necessarily be predetermined by him in the execution and event. And what more rational than this assertion? Yea, what is predetermination of the event, but predefinition in the Decree? The difference between God's eternal predefinition in the Decree, and predetermination as to actual concourse and execution in time differ only as active and passive Creation: as active Creation gives futurition to things, and passive, actual existence; so predefinition and predetermination; and therefore among the Greeks one and the same Verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both to predefine and predetermine. So that our major seems so clear as to carry with it its own evidence. Wherefore we pass on to demonstrate the minor, which our Adversaries principally strike at, and therefore needs our strongest forces: This we shall endeavour to make good in and by the following Propositions. (1) Prop. Nothing is or can be future in its own nature, without some cause of its futurition. How is it possible that any thing should pass from a state of mere possibility, contingence, and indifference, but by some cause? Do not possible, and future differ? and must there not be some cause of this difference? (2) Prop. Whatever is the cause of futurition to any thing must be eternal. This is most evident; because whatever is future was so from Eternity; for God foreknew it to be so: otherwise, how could his knowledge be certain? Hence, (3) Prop. Nothing can give futurition to things but God. For is there any thing but God eternal? (4) Prop. Nothing in God gives futurition to things but his wil His Essence simply considered cannot give futurition to things; because possible and future are the same as to the Divine Essence: neither doth the Prescience of God give futurition to things; for things are not future because God foreknows them, but he therefore foreknows them because future. Hence it follows, that nothing but the Divine will can give futurition to things, as Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 11. §. 9 whence also it necessarily follows, (5) That the futurition of the substrate mater of all sin is from the Divine will and decree. For what can make sinful acts future and so the object of Divine foreknowledge, but the will of God, which gives futurition to allthings? And if Gods predefining decreeing will give futurition to the substrate mater of sin, must not his predeterminative will also give existence to it? But let us examine what assaults our Adversaries make against Objections against this Argument solved. this Argument by Responses and Objections. (1) They reply to our minor, That the futurition of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin is not from the will of God, but from the will of man, that gives existence to it. Thus Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he endeavours to prove, That it is not repugnant that something should be future, which God hath not absolutely predefined, but left to the will of man to effect. So cap. 9 pag. 628. he peremtorily assertes, That God hath not decreed all future's, namely, the Fall of Adam, or the sin against the Holy Ghost, etc. So pag. 631. he saith, Nothing hinders, but that there may be some cause of the futurition of a thing besides the Decree of God, namely the create wil The like Le Blanc, Concord. Libert. Hum. p. 1. thes. 55— 57 where he endeavours to prove, That what is the cause why things existe in time, the same is the cause of their futurition from Eternity: but man's will only is the cause why sin existes in time, ergo, etc. A poor Response indeed, or rather begging of the Question! For is it possible that the second cause lodged in time should give futurition to a thing from Eternity? Is it not an approved Maxim in Philosophy, yea in Nature, that the cause is ever, at least in order of nature, before the effect? and is the second cause confined by time, before the eternal futurition of its effect? (2) But Le Blanc answers hereto, thes. 56. pag. 454. That Futurition is nothing else but a respect of reason, and an extrinsec denomination of the thing, which is said to be future, not something really distinct from the thing future, etc. But the vanity of this subterfuge is most evident; for hereby it follows, that the thing is not future before it is existent: can a modal extrinsec denomination of a thing existe before the thing that gives it existence? How many absurdities would follow hereon? But our Adversaries have one grand Objection, which they lay much weight on, against our minor, and that is this: If the will of God gives futurition to sin, than sin as future hath one and the same Idea with the will of God: and so the futurition of sin must be God. This objection is urged and adorned with many Trophies by Strangius, Le Blanc, and a Divine of name among us. So Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 9 pag. 631, 632. having pag. 626, etc. recited Twisses argument from the eternal futurition of sin, he replies thus: Herein, saith he, lies the whole force of the argument, that there can be no other cause of a futurition made from Eternity, but what is eternal. To which he answers with a scoff thus: A pretty argumentation indeed! why may we not by the same reason prove, that the futurition of sin is God? The same is urged by Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. par. 1. thes. 55, 56. pag. 454. where he endeavours to prove against Twisse, That if the futurition of sin be from the will of God, it is God; which makes God manifestly the Author of sin. The same is urged by a Divine of some note among us. But in answer hereto, I must confess, I cannot but marvel at the confidence of persons so learned, and in other points judicious, on such infirm and rotten grounds: For when we speak of the futurition of sin, which is a complexe aggregate thing, we must distinguish its material from its formal part. (1) If we speak of the material entitative part of sin, which is in itself a natural good, so we may without the least violation of God's sacred Majesty affirm, that its futurition is the same, or not really distinct from Gods will the cause thereof: and why not? is not the futurition of all natural Being's good? And whence proceeds all good but from the immense Ocean of good? Yea, was not all good from Eternity lodged in the bosom of God, and sonot really distinct from him? So that indeed this objection of Strangius and Le Blanc against the futurition of the material entitative act of sin from the will of God strikes at the futurition of allthings, even the most gratiose acts from the same will: for if the futurition of any one natural act may be resolved into the will of man as its first cause, why may not the futurition of all grace be as well resolved into the same human will, specially in Adam's innocent state, who had then perfect freewill? But yet (2) if we speak of the futurition of sin in regard of its formal nature, consisting in its vitiosity and obliquity, so we utterly deny, that its futurition is the same with God: for the futurition of sin as to its vitiosity is not from the effective will of God, but permissive; God decrees to effect the entitative act, but only to permit the vitiosity appendent thereto, which follows on the act, as other privations do on the absence of their habit. To make this evident by a parallel instance; God decrees the diurnal motion of the Sun, and that at night it shall retire into the other Hemisphere, whence darkness necessarily follows: may we thence argue, that the futurition of darkness, or darkness itself is the same with God? Would not any Freshman in Logic hiss such a consequence out of the Schools? And yet who dares deny, but that the retirement of the Sun out of this Hemisphere into the other is from God, as also its futurition? The like may be instanced in all other privations, which have no real being, and therefore no real efficient of their existence or futurition: for nothing can admit a real efficient cause of its futurition, but what has a real efficient cause of its existence: what is the first efficient of the existence of things? Is it not the will of God? and is it not also the same Divine will that gives futurition to things? Yea doth not the very same act or decree of the Divine will that gives real Being's their futurition, give them also, in their appointed periods of time, their existence? So that in this regard the Rule of Strangius and Le Blanc is most true, That the same cause that gives things their existence, gives them also their futurition: this I say holds true of the first cause, but not of second causes, as they would needs persuade us. So that, to conclude this argument, in as much as the will of God gives futurition to all sin, the effective will of God to the entitative act or substrate mater of sin, and the permissive will of God to the formal reason, or vitiosity of sin, hence it necessarily follows, that the predeterminative Concourse of God, (whereby I understand nothing else but the Efficacious Divine Will as operative) gives existence to the substrate mater of Sin. §. 2. Our second Argument shall be taken from the certitude 2 Arg. from the Certitude of Divine Prescience. of God's Prescience; and we may form it thus: God can certainly foreknow nothing, but what he certainly decrees, predefines, and predetermines to be: But God certainly foreknows all sin. Ergo. The Minor is granted by our Adversaries and denied by none, that I know, except Atheists and Socinians: Thus Job 34. 21. For his eyes are upon the ways of man and he seeth all his goings. Our principal work therefore will be to make good our Major; which we doubt not but to perform in and by the following Propositions: (1) Prop. Nothing can be certainly foreknown by God, but what has some certain Reasons, Principes, and Causes of such a foreknowledge. Now there are three causes that give certitude to all Science and Prescience: [1] A certitude of the Object: for if the object be uncertain, the Science can never be certain: can the Structure or Edifice be firm, if the foundation be infirm? [2] A certain Medium, which is the principal fundamen of all Science. [3]▪ A certitude of the Subject: for be the Object and Medium never so certain, yet there can be no certain Science, unless the Subject apprehend the same. And doth not the Prescience of God include all these degrees of Certitude? Must there not be a certitude of the Object, Medium, and Subject? (2) Prop. The Divine Prescience as to future sins admits not any of these degrees of certitude, but as originated from the Divine Will and Decree. [1] How can Sin as the Object of Divine Prescience be certainly future, but by the efficacious Will of God making it so? [2] What certain Medium can there be of Divine Prescience, but the divine Will and Decree? [3] And thence, how can God have a subjective Certitude of sin but in and by his own Will? Hence, (3) Prop. Gods certain Prescience of Sin infers also a certain predefinition and predetermination of the substrate mater of Sin. That God knows nothing future but by his decree making it future, has been the persuasion not only of Calvinists, but also of the most sober Schoolmen in all Ages, Scotus, Ricardus, Hervaeus, Bradwardine, Johannes Major, and others not a few, as Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. Par. 3. Thes. 33. p. 443. confesseth. Yea, Strangius himself grants the futurition of Sin in God's Prescience, as l. 3. c. 9 p. 640. Yea, Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. Hum. Par. 1. Thes. 59 etc. p. 455. proves strongly, That according to Strangius' opinion, there can no contingent [i. e. sinful act] be foreknown by God as absolutely future, but what God first decreed to be absolutely future. His words are these: But some also of those who hold some free acts of God to be absolutely future, and as such to be foreknown by God, without any Decree predetermining the free causes to those acts, as Learned Strangius, yet deny, that free future contingents may be known by God according to any Hypothesis, which doth not include an absolute Decree concerning their futurition: as Strang. de Volunt. l. 3. c. 11. His reason is, because nothing can be certainly known, but what is certainly true: but nothing is certainly true, but what is necessary either absolutely or conditionally. Whence he collects, that future conditionates cannot be the Object of divine Science, which is infallible and most certain, unless there be included the condition, whence that which is said to be future may be certainly inferred. But if this reason prevails, God can foreknow nothing contingent as absolutely future, but what he before decreed as absolutely future; which yet Strangius admits not, who confesseth, that men act many things freely to which they are not predetermined by God. Thus Le Blanc of Strangius' self-contradicting Hypothesis. And indeed, to speak the truth nakedly, there seems so much force in Strangius' reason, whereby he proves, That all God's Prescience of free future Contingents includes an absolute Decree of their futurition, namely from the certainty of divine Prescience, that I no way wonder that he urgeth the same, albeit to the subversion of his own Phaenomena. And I am very bold, yea confident in asserting, and demonstrating these following Propositions. (1) Prop. That God can have no certain Prescience of things future, but from his own decree, the only certain determinate cause of their futurition. And therefore the Socinians denying a certain determinate Cause of things contingent, deny also God's Prescience to be certain, as Le Blanc, De Concord. P. 3. Thes. 1. p. 438. and I cannot see how any can rationally avoid the Socinian objection, who do not resolve the certitude of the divine Prescience into the divine Decree. Hence, (2) Prop. There is an hypothetic or consequential necessity that ariseth from God's certain Prescience. This is well urged, though in the defence of an hellbred Hypothesis, by the Socinians, and cited by Le Blanc (as a knot not easily untied) the Concord. Par. 3. Thes. 22. pag. 441. There is, saith he, much of difficulty here, which in times past has exercised the ingenies of Doctors. For seeing it is impossible, that the Prescience of God may be deceived, it cannot be but that those things must happen, which God foresees will happen; and therefore that allthings happen necessarily: and it is impossible, but that the very will of man must produce those acts, which God from eternity foreknew it would produce. This Objection I despair ever to see rationally answered by our Adversaries without contradicting their own Hypothesis. See more of this Chap. 6. §. 5. Hence (3) Prop. The same arguments that are urged by our Opponents against Gods predetermining the Will to the substrate mater of sin, may be, as they are by the Socinians, urged with as great force against God's certain Prescience of Sin. For our Adversaries, Strangius, Le Blanc, etc. granting the certain futurition of sin in the eternal Prescience of God, fall under all those Imputations and black Consequences which they charge on us, who assert the predefinition, futurition, and predetermination of the substrate mater of Sin in the divine Decree. This Proposition is incomparably well demonstrated by judicious Davenant, in his Animadversions on God's Love to Mankind, p. 418, 419, 442, 462. where he proves, That Infallible Prescience granted by the Arminians, infers as much necessity on the Will, as absolute Predestination and Reprobation. Of which more in our next Argument; also c. 6. §. 5. Let us now a little inquire into the Subterfuges which our Adversaries take Sanctuary in to secure themselves from the force of this Argument taken from Divine Prescience. And here at what a miserable loss and confusion are they among themselves? How few of them agree on any one Principe or Medium for the solving this argument? Some fly for refuge to the Molinists' Middle Science, telling us, That God foresaw that men being placed under such hypotheses, and circumstances, would sin against him, etc. Thus Baronius, Metaphys. Sect. 12. Disp. 2. n. 55, 56. p. 326. where he professedly defends Fonseca's conditionate Science, making God to have a conditionate Science of the first sin, if Eve seduced by the Serpent should temt Adam, etc. Thus also one and another Divine of good note among us. But this subterfuge is greatly disliked by the more soberf of this new Method, particularly by Strangius; who, l. 3. c. 11. p. 651. proves nervo●…. That there can be no such thing as a Middle or conditionate Science in God, because its Object is not certainly Cognoscible, or Knowable: and this he proves; because an object cannot be certainly known, unless it be certainly true: which the object of this conditionate Middle Science is not. Thus also Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. Par. 1. p. 452, etc. Others therefore perceiving the infirmitude of this evasion, have recourse to the Dominicans real presence of things future in Eternity; whereby they make God, by his Science of Vision, to behold the sins of men. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 10. p. 646. If it be demanded, saith he, to what Science God's Knowledge of Sins must be referred, I easily grant that it is to be referred to his Science of Vision, etc. But more fully, l. 3. c. 7. p. 594. Among all the modes which are wont to be explicated, there is none more probable than that which is taken from the presence of allthings in Eternity; because the Eternity of God is Insuccessive and Indivisible. The same he inculcates, p. 595, 596, 597. But this mode also of solving the difficulty, is greatly opposed, by some of his own party, the New Methodists, who take some pains to show the invalidity thereof. So Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. Par. 3. Thes. 37. p. 443. First, saith he, as for that real presence of future's in Eternity, namely as they are supposed to coexiste from eternity to eternity itself, it appears to be a mere figment; for that one thing coexiste to another, it is necessary that both existe, etc. Thus also a learned and pious Divine among ourselves, who has espoused Strangius' Hypothesis, falls soul on the Thomists for asserting, Allthings to be eternally present to the divine Intellect in esse real, etc. Lastly, others therefore to evade the forementioned inconveniences, take up their refuge under the infinity of God's Prescience. Thus Le Blanc, De Concord. Par. 1. Thes. 40. p. 444. As for the fourth opinion, which seeks the certitude of the divine Prescience in the infinity of the divine Intellect, and in the determinate truth of those things which are contingently future, it establisheth nothing but what is certain and indubitable, etc. Yet he grants, Thes. 41. That albeit this opinion contains in it nothing but truth, yet it doth not satisfy the Question, nor remove the main difficulty, namely, How things pass from a state of possibility to a state of futurition, etc. Whence he concludes, Thes. 43. Sithat there is so much darkness on every side, there is nothing more safe than to profess our Ignorance in this particular. And this indeed is the best refuge these New Methodists have, when they see themselves involved in so many self-contradictions, and absurdities, to profess their Ignorance as to the Mode of Divine Prescience. Yea, some of them proceed so far in this pretended modesty, as to profess, That the mode of Divine Prescience is not determined in Scripture. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. That God is omniscient is put out of doubt, but touching the mode and manner of Prescience nothing is expressly delivered in Scripture. The like others. But is it so indeed? Doth not the Scripture declare expressly the mode of Prescience? Why then (1) are our Adversaries so dogmatic and positive in their new modes and measures of Divine Prescience, contrary to the received Sentiments of the Church in all Ages? How comes it to pass, that they contend with so much heat and passion, for that which they confess is not expressly delivered in Scripture? Were not a modest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or suspension of assent more agreeable to such a Confession? But (2) We easily grant them, that the mode of Divine Prescience is unsearchable and past finding out, as indeed all Divine Perfections are, but yet must we thence necessarily conclude, that nothing of the mode of Divine Prescience is expressly delivered in Scripture? [1] Doth not the Scripture evidently declare, That the mode of God's Prescience is far above yea opposite to that of Man's science, as much as Heaven is above the Earth, yea infinitely more? [2] Doth not the Scripture also remove from the mode of Divine Prescience all manner of Imperfections, much more Contradictions? And is not the mode of God's Prescience in his own Essence and Decrees, much more perfect than that which makes his Infallible immutable Prescience dependent on the mutable fallible Will of Man? But see more hereof, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. §. 2. §. 3. We pass on to our third Argument, which shall be taken 3 Arg. from the Decree of Reprobation▪ from the Divine Will and Decrees; and more particularly from the Decree of Reprobation. And here we shall lay down this Principe, which is granted by Strangius, and others of the New Method, That Divine Predetermination is adequate and commensurate to Divine Predefinition or Predestination. So Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. We easily grant, saith he, that the predefinition of God from eternity, and the predetermination of the create will in time, mutually follow each other, so that if God doth absolutely predefine any particular and singular act to be brought about by us, he must also determine our Will to the same. This he inculcates, c. 5. p. 584. Now this ingenuous Concession is as much as we desire to build our Demonstration on: for we no way doubt but to demonstrate, That God doth absolutely predefine the material entitative act of Sin: Which we shall endeavour to make good in the following Propositions. (1) Prop. Reprobation admits no formal motive, proper condition or cause. This Proposition is generally denied by the New Methodists, who grant, That God decrees all good absolutely, but as for Sin, say they, God decrees that only respectively and conditionally. So Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 546-548. But we no way doubt, but, before we have finished this Demonstration, to make it evident, that God's Decree of Reprobation, whereby he determines to leave men to sin, is absolute, as well as the Decree of Election: Yea, it is to me a thing altogether impossible, to defend an absolute Decree of Election, and yet to make the Decree of Reprobation conditional and respective: for if the absolute good pleasure of God be the only cause why some are elected, must it not also be the only cause why others are rejected? Doth not the Election of the one necessarily imply the Reprobation of the other? It's true, our Divines, that follow the Sublapsarian mode, as Davenant, etc. speak of Sin as a common condition belonging to the whole mass of corrupt nature, yet they allow not of any distinctive condition or formal cause or motive, which should incline the divine will to reprobate one rather than another: for nothing can move the divine Will, but what is some way antecedent to it: Now the consideration of all sin is subsequent to some act of Gods Wil. (2) Prop. The act of Reprobation is not merely negative, but positive and efficacious. It's granted, that some of our Divines make mention of a negative act of Reprobation, which they term Nonelection, or Preterition, yet hereby they intent not a suspense act of the Divine will, but include also a positive efficacious act. Thus Jansenius, August. de Grat. Christi, l. 10. c. 2. pag. 420. proves out of Augustin, That God's negative Reprobation is positive. So Davenant, Dissert. de Elect. & Reprob. p. 113. But we must take heed, saith he, lest with Scotus we think, that the Will of God in regard of Reprobates, which he elects not but passeth by, is merely negative: for in this very act, which we express by a Negation, is contained an express and affirmate Will of God. So in his Determinations, Quaest. 25. p. 117. he tells us, That it's most certain, there can be no Decree permitting sin, to which there doth not adhere some efficacious Decree. And p. 118. he instructs us, That this Decree of permitting sin is efficacious, not in a way of efficience, but by directing and ordaining to extract good out of evil. (3) Prop. In the mater of Reprobation God is considered as a sovereign Absolute Lord, not as a Righteous Judge. The Pelagians, Molinists, Arminians, and New Methodists consider God in the act of Reprobation as a just Judge, not as a supreme absolute Lord: whence they conclude, that it is unjust with God to reprobate any but on the prevision of their sins; not considering, that Reprobation is not an act inflicting punishment, but of denying Benefits, wherein the Liberty and Dominion of God is only to be attended; according to that of the Apostle, Rom. 9 21. Has not the Potter power over the clay, & c? What is sovereign Dominion, but an absolute right to dispose of what is our own? And shall we not allow the same Dominion to God, which is allowed to the Potter over his Clay? Is the sovereign Lord tied to his Creature by any Law, more than what is in his own nature and will? Hence it follows, (4) That the Decree of Reprobation is most absolute and Independent as to all distinctive conditions or causes in man. Thus Jansenius, August. de Grat. Christi, l. 10. c. 4. p. 423. proves out of Augustin, That the absolute Will of God is the alone cause of Reprobation. And Augustin complains, That it is a great injury to God, when men search for causes of things superior to his sovereign Will: for his Will is such a supreme Rule of Justice, as that whatever he wils is for that very reason, because he wils it, to be accounted just. So Bradwardine, de Causa Dei, l. 1. c. 47. proves strongly, That albeit God punisheth no man eternally without sin committed in time; yet he doth not eternally reprobate any for sin as a Cause antecedently moving his divine Wil So Alvarez, de Auxil. Disput. 109. 3a Conclus. The positive act, whereby God from eternity would not admit some into his Kingdom, was not conditionate, but absolute, antecedent, in a moment of Reason, to the i'll use of Freewill. And it is proved, [1] Because there can be no cause of Reprobation. [2] Because supernatural Beatitude is not due to any upon the account of natural improvements: Therefore God could from all eternity without any Injury, before the Prescience of the good or i'll use of freewill, elect some to life eternal, and by a positive act will not to admit others. And our Divines generally grant, That there can be no other cause assigned of Reprobation, than the absolute 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or good pleasure of God. But none is more categoric and positive in this, than judicious Davenant's Hypotheses about absolute Reprobation. Davenant, (who yet in some points came nigh the new Methodists) in his incomparable Animadversions on God's love to mankind. Wherein he doth pvissantly defend the following particulars greatly conducing to the establishment of our Hypothesis. [1] That Gods secret will of good pleasure is very different from his reveled, preceptive, complacential will, as pag. 221, 349, 376. [2] That Gods reveled, complacential, approbative will is the measure of our duty, but not of God's decrees or operations, pag. 222, 356, 391, 399. [3] That Gods beneplacite will or good pleasure is only properly his will, pag. 392. [4] That Gods beneplacite will or good pleasure is moved by nothing but itself, pag. 375, 376. [5] That the absolute Decrees of God contradict not general conditional promises of life and threats of death, pag. 241, 332, 375, 387, 398. [6] That God may be said, according to his will of complacence and approbation, to intend the salvation of sinners, yea Reprobates, by providing the means of grace conducing thereto, pag. 271, 376, 394. [7] That the extern means and offers of grace must be measured and interpreted according to the known nature of the means, not the unknowen will of God, pag. 353. [8] That God, by his approbative complacential will unfeignedly wils what he commands, pag. 329, 393, 394, 401. [9] That all under the means of grace are under some remote conditional possibility of salvation, pag. 256, 257. [10] That Gods evangelic, providential intention of saving sinners is oft frustrated as to its events by man's sin, although his decretive beneplacite intention is never frustrated, p. 377, 381, 387, 388, 395. [11] That absolute Election and Reprobation may stand with a possibility to contrary events, though not with contrary events, pag. 240, 333, 341, 360, 402, 253. [12] That absolute Decrees oppose not the Justice of God; with its difference from that of men, pag. 232, 321, 336, 339, 342. [13] That absolute Decrees oppose not God's Holiness, pag. 240-272. [14] That absolute Decrees oppose not the Mercy of God, pag. 277-310. [15] That mere conditional Decrees are inconsistent with Gods sovereign Being and Independence, pag. 226. [16] That absolute Reprobation is not repugnant to God's Truth, pag. 349-362. [17] That absolute Reprobation takes not away the end and use of God's gifts, pag. 374-404. [18] That absolute Reprobation leaves no man under an absolute necessity or compulsion to sin, pag. 253. [19] Let Reprobation be absolute or conditional it leaves the same possibility and liberty to the Agents, pag. 333, 340, 341, 351, 360. [20] That the Arminians grant an absolute, immutable, fixed Decree of Reprobation, which admits the same objections that they urge against the Calvinists, p. 302, 332, 333, 340, 351, 354, 400, 418, 419. [21] Infallible Prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much necessity on the will, and compulsion to sin as absolute Reprobation, pag. 418, 419, 442, 462. [22] Lastly, he shows us, What is the right use and abuse of absolute Decrees, pag. 454-526. These Propositions clearly and fully explicated by our judicious Davenant give great evidence and demonstration to our Hypothesis, as also distinct solution to the objections of our Opponents, of which hereafter, Chap. 6. §. 4. Our next Argument shall be taken from Divine Concourse, 4. Arg. from Divine Concourse. its Principe, Nature, and Efficace; the explication whereof will give us a full demonstration of our Hypothesis; which we shall endeavour to lay down in the following Particulars. 1. That God predetermines the will to the substrate mater or 1. It's Principe. entitative act of that which is sinful, may be demonstrated from the Principe of all Divine Concourse. What is the active principe of all Divine Concourse, but the Divine will? Doth not sacred Pagine expressly speak so much? So Eph. 1. 11. Who worketh allthings after the counsel of his own wil And more particularly as to the substrate mater of sin it's said, Act. 4. 28. that those who crucified our Lord, did act but what Gods hand, or will and counsel predetermined to be done, of which before. And Strangius himself grants us, lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 63. That concourse, as to its prime act is in God, and the same with God. Now such is the Omnipotence of cum voluntas Divina sit efficacissima, non solùm sequitur, quòd fiant ea quae Deus fieri vult, sed quòd eo modo fiant, quo Deus ea fieri velit, Aquin. part. 1. the Divine will, that allthings must necessarily be done, which he wils to be done, and in that manner as he wils them, as Aquinas well determines. How then is it possible, but that if God will that the substrate mater of sin existe, it must necessarily existe, and in that manner as he wils it? Can any person or thing resist the Divine efficacious will? And what is all active concourse but the determination of the same efficacious will? See more of Gods will being the spring and principe of Divine concourse, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. §. 3. 2. That God predetermines the will to the substrate mater of 2. It's Nature. sin may be demonstrated from the nature of Divine concourse as to its totality, Universality as to effects, Particularity as to manner of working, Immediation, Antecedence, and sovereign absolute Independence. (1) The totality of Divine concourse sufficiently demonstrates 1. totality. its predetermination as to the substrate mater of sin. That God's concourse to all second causes, acts, and effects is total we have sufficiently demonstrated, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. pag. 417. Thus much is also granted by Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55. Adeò ut tota actio pendeat à Deo, & tota à Creatura. where he assertes, That the whole action depends on God, as also on the creature; otherwise God should not concur immediately: Though I am not ignorant that a Divine of name among us, as also of the same party with Strangius, denies God's concourse to the substrate mater of sin to be total; yet because he is singular therein, and different from his own party, I shall take it for granted, that God's concourse is total, and thence endeavour to prove its predetermining the will to the substrate mater of sin. For if God totally concur to the substrate act of sin, must he not also concur to the will that puts forth that act? And if God concur to the will in the production of the act, must he not also necessarily determine the will to that act? That Gods total concourse doth not only reach the act and effect, but also the will itself is granted by Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 6. pag. 171. Neither, faith he, do we say, that the Concourse of God doth reach only the effect, but not the efficient cause, sithat the very 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Energy of the second cause must be from God; and the action is not less an effect than the work, etc. (2) The Universality of Divine concourse as to all effects whatsoever 2. Universality. gives us a further demonstration of its efficacious predetermination as to the entitative act of sin. That Divine concourse is universally extensive to all acts of the will, as well as to all other objects, by giving forces and assistances to faculties, exciting and appling them to their acts, and ordering them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends, we have copiosely demonstrated, Court Gent. Part 4. Book 2. Chap. 7. §. 2. pag. 296, 297. And doth not this sufficiently demonstrate God's concourse to the substrate mater of sin to be predeterminative? Yea, to speak properly, is there, or can there be any real efficience, influx, or concourse sent forth by God as the prime universal cause of allthings, which is not predeterminative? To talk of an universal general concourse of God, which immediately influenceth the will and all its natural acts, and yet doth not predetermine, i. e. excite and apply the will to its act, what is it but pure nonsense and virtual contradiction? (3) The Particularity of God's concourse as to its manner of 3. Particularity. working doth also invictly demonstrate its predetermination as to the entitative act of sin. Divine concourse, albeit it be universal as to the extent of its object, yet it's most particular and proper as to its manner of working. Our Adversaries generally, both Pelagians, Molinists, Arminians, and New Methodists talk much of a general indifferent concourse, alike commun to all effects, and determinable by its substrate mater; as the general influence of the Sun is determinable by the mater it works on. But, alas! how unbecoming and incongruous to the Divine perfections is such a general indifferent concourse? Doth not this make the first cause to be second, because dependent; and the second cause first, because independent? And doth it not hence also necessarily follow, that the first cause may, by the indisposition of the mater or resistance of second Agents, be frustrated of its intended effect? What more expressly overthrows the sovereign Dominion and universal Concourse of God, than such a general indifferent Concourse? And yet is not this one of the most plausible subterfuges our Adversaries have to shelter themselves under? They object, If God should by a particular predeterminative concourse determine the will to act in sins intrinsically evil, as the hatred of God, or the like, than the specification of the act and moral determination of it to its particular object would be from God; and so God inevitably should be the Author of sin. This is their principal and indeed their only objection worth a naming against our Hypothesis; to which we intent a more full answer in the next Chapter, §. 1. at present let this suffice, [1] We say not, that God is a particular cause, but universal, working in and by a particular concourse suitable to the indigence of the mater it works on. [2] We say not, that this particular Concourse of God doth morally specify, or determine the sinful act to its object, but only physically individuate or naturally modify the substrate mater of the sinful act. This is incomparably well explicated by Dr. Samuel Ward, that great Professor of Theologie, in his Determination of God's Concourse, pag. 117. where he strongly demonstrates, That the previous Concourse of God, as the first cause, doth in its way modify and determine all the actions of second causes: and if so, then surely the substrate entitative act of sin, as hereafter. [3] That general indifferent concourse, which our Adversaries so warmly contend for, sithat they grant it to be causative and influential on the sinful act, doth equally infer God to be the Author of sin, as our predeter minative concourse. For if it be causative and effective of the act, then surely of that individual act, as determined to such an object: for to talk of its concurrence to the act in genere, in the general, and not in individuo, in its individual determination to its object, is such an absurdity in Philosophy, that all awakened Philosophers will decry it: for what Tyro cannot inform us, that all physical acts are suppositorum, of individual singular substances, and so without all peradventure individual and singular: and if so, then must not their general concourse reach not only the action in general, but also individually considered, as relating to its object, not morally, but physically? And will it not hence follow, that their general concourse is causative of the entitative act, as determined to its object, and so makes God the Author of sin, as much, at least as well as our predeterminative concourse, as more fully Chap. 6. §. 1. Of the particularity of Divine Concourse see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. §. 4. (4) The Immediation of Divine Concourse strongly demonstrates 4. Immediation. the predetermination of the will as to the entitative act of sin thereby. Our Adversaries generally, both Jesuits, Arminians, and new Methodists, excepting some very few that adhere to Durandus, grant an immediate concourse to the entitative act of sin; which if well followed will necessarily infer predeterminative concourse, specially according to the concessions of the new Methodists; who say, That this immediate concourse reacheth not only the effect and act, (which the Jesuits and Arminians grant) but also the very will itself, as the immediate efficient of the act. Touching this immediate Concourse see Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 54, etc. & lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 163. And among the Jesuits none has more acutely demonstrated this, than Suarez, Metaphys. Disp. 22. Sect. 1. and our Countryman Campton Carleton, in his Philos. Vnivers. Disp. 28. Sect. 2, 3. pag. & Disput. 29. Sect. 1, 2. pag. 323, 324. where he demonstrates strongly, against Lud. à Dola, That God immediately together with the creature produceth the very act of sin. Now hence we thus argue: If God, together with the human will, immediately produceth the very act of sin, then certainly he must of necessity predetermine the will to that entitative act: For suppose the sinful act be motus primò primus, as they phrase it, or a mere simple volition of the will, how is it possible, that God should immediately produce this act of the will, without applying the will to the act? Do not the very Jesuits, Suarez, Carleton, with others grant, That one and the same sinful act is produced by God and the human will? And doth not Strangius with others of the New Methodists also acknowledge further, That God's Concourse to this sinful act of the will is previous to that of the will, not only simultaneous, as Strang. lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 56? Yea Strangius and those of his persuasion grant yet more, That God's immediate concourse reacheth not only the act and effect, but also the will itself, as Strang. pag. 171. And is it not most evident, from these ingenuous concessions of our Adversaries, touching immediate concourse, that God doth predetermine the will to the entitative act of sin? Can we imagine, that one and the same sinful act should be produced immediately by God and the human will, and yet God not apply the will to its act, which is all that is meant by predetermination? Yea, doth God not only concur with the will to one and the same act, but also influence the will in the production of that act, as Strangius and others grant, and yet not apply it to act? How is it possible, that God should influence the will in the production of any act, without actuating or drawing forth the will to act? And if God actuate or draw forth the will to act, doth he not apply it to the act, and so predetermine the same? Again, doth God by an immediate concourse not only influence the will and its act, but also antecedently and in a moment of reason and causality before the will concurs to its own act, as Strangius also grants? and doth not this give us a more abundant demonstration, that God predetermines the will to that act? Can there be any previous concourse immediately actuating and influencing the will in its act, but what is predeterminative? Doth not the will necessarily depend on the previous concourse of the first cause? and if so, must it not be applied and predetermined to its act thereby? But more of this previous concourse in our next Argument. Lastly, if we allow (with the Jesuits) unto God only an immediate concourse to the act of the will, all those black consequences which our Adversaries cast on the Assertors of predetermination, may with the same facility be reflected on them: for if they make God, by an immediate concourse to concur to the act of sin, do they not make him the cause and so the Author of sin as well as we? More of immediate Concourse, see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 4. (5) The Priority and Antecedence of Divine Concourse doth invictly 5. Priority. demonstrate its predetermining the will as to the substrate mater of sinful acts. We shall here reassume a Principe already established, and granted by Jesuits and New Methodists, namely, That the action of the first cause concurring with the second, is not, as to passive attingence, distinct from the action of the second cause. This is generally granted by the Molinists, as Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. par. 3. thes. 28. pag. 433. and by Jansenius, August. tom. 1. lib. 5. cap. 20. pag. 119. It's true, the Concourse of God the first cause is really different from that of the second, as to active attingence or principe, because God's concourse, actively considered, is the same with his will; yet as to passive attingence, the action and effect produced by God differ not from the action and effect produced by the second cause. This being premissed, we proceed to demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the priority and antecedence of Divine concourse, and that in and by the following Propositions. (1) Prop. The first cause doth in order of nature or causality concur before the second. This Proposition is potently demonstrated by the acute Dr. Sam. Ward, Determinat. de Concurs. Dei, pag. 116, etc. And the arguments for it are invict: for [1] where there is subordination and dependence in causality, which is proper to every second cause, there posteriority is essentially appendent. Again, [2] all second causes in regard of God are but instruments, as Aquinas proves: yea the will of man as dependent on God is but a vital instrument, albeit in regard of the effect it may sometimes be termed a principal Agent: Now doth not every instrument subserve the principal Efficient? And doth not that which is subservient in order of causality move after that which is the principal Agent? But here we are to remember, that when we assert God's Concourse to be previous in regard of its principe and independence, we deny not, but that it is also simultaneous in regard of the action and effect produced by the second cause, as Alvarez, lib. 3. de Auxil. Disput. 19 num. 4. & Twisse, Vind. Grat. lib. 2. de Criminat. part. 3. pag. 56. But that which we deny is, That God's Concourse is solely concomitant and simultaneous; and that [3] because this simultaneous concourse makes God only a partial cause, and dependent on the second cause in the production of its effect. Yea, some of the Jesuits grant, That if we consider the concourse of God absolutely, without respect to this or that second cause, so it is in order of nature before the influx of the second cause. So Fonseca, Metaphys. lib. 6. cap. 2. quaest. 5. sect. 13. The like Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 60, 61. Thus also Burgersdicius, Metaphys. lib. 2. cap. 11. grants, God's concourse in supernaturals to be previous, albeit in naturals he would have it to be only simultaneous: which is most absurd: for the active concourse of God, being nothing else but the immanent act of his will, must necessarily be the same in naturals as in supernaturals. More of the priority and Antecedence of the Divine Concourse, see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 4. p. 416. Hence, (2) Prop. This previous Concourse of God as the first Cause must necessarily move and apply every second cause to its act and effect. For how is it possible, that the second cause should act, unless the first move and apply it to its act? Can a second cause move itself to an act, unless it be first moved thereto by the first cause? Whence, (3) Prop. This previous Concourse of God in applying and moving the Will of man to the substrate mater of sin predetermines the same. For if one and the same sinful action be produced by God and the human Will, and God concurs in order of nature before the will, yea premove and apply it to the act, must he not necessarily predetermine the same? All the wit and subtility of our Adversaries will never extricate themselves or satisfy any awakened mind in this point, How God doth by a previous concourse move and actuate the Will, and yet not predetermine it to the act. Indeed to speak the truth, the Sentiments not only of the Arminians, but also of the new Methodists, Baronius, Strangius and others about Concourse, fall in with those of the Jesuits for a simultaneous Concourse only, albeit some of them in terms disown it. (6) Last, the sovereign and absolute Independence of God's Concourse 6. Absolute Independence. gives us further demonstration of his predetermining the will as to the substrate mater of sin. That God's Concourse is not Conditionate but absolute and independent, we have copiosely proved, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 4. p. 412, etc. And indeed, what more absurd, yea impossible, than such a conditionate Concourse, whereby the Molinists and Arminians suppose God's concurrence to depend on man's? Is there not hereby an effectual door opened to a progress into infinite? For if God concur on condition that man concur, doth God concur to that condition, or not? If not, is there not then some act of the creature produced without God's concourse? If God concur to the working of that condition, then absolutely, or conditionally: if absolutely, than his former Concourse is not conditional: if conditionally, than what an infinitude of Conditions will follow hence? We take it then for granted, that God's Concourse is not conditional, but absolute and independent. And hence we thus argue: If God concur absolutely and independently to the substrate mater of sin, than he doth predetermine the will thereto: the consequence is rational and clear: For where two Agents concur totally and immediately to one and the same action and effect, the one must necessarily depend on the other; and that which depends on another must be determined by that other: for every cause that is dependent on another, is so far as it depends thereon determinable thereby. It's true, natural corporeous effects have some dependence on the Sun, without being determined thereby, because the Sun is a limited cause, and has not efficace sufficient to determine the mater is works on, but is rather determined thereby, and so in that respect dependent thereon: But as for God the first cause whose will, the principe of his concourse, is omnipotent and most efficacious, it's impossible, that he should have any dependence on, or be any way determinable in his concourse by the mater he works on: he being the most universal cause, infinitely perfect, and void of all potentiality or passive power must necessarily predetermine all second causes to their acts, but be determined by none. But more of this in what immediately follows of the efficace of God's Concourse. 3. Having demonstrated Divine predetermination to the substrate 3. The efficace of Divine Concourse proves predetermination. Nos autem eo nomine, [sc. influxus communis] non determinationem seu praedeterminationem intelligimus, sed vim, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & efficaciam Dei, quâ causas secundas sibi subordinat, etc. Strang. l. 1. c. 11. 1. Efficacious Concourse as to natural acts. mater of sin from the Principe and Nature of Divine concourse, we now proceed to demonstrate the same from the Efficace thereof. Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 61. albeit he denies God's general Concourse, whereby he concurs to the mater of sin, to be predeterminative, yet he grants it is efficacious, calling it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the force and efficace of God, whereby he subordinates second causes to himself; so that whatever they are or act, they essentially depend on him in both respects. And this ingenuous concession touching the efficace of Divine concourse, is all that we require to build our present Demonstration on, which we shall distribute into two branches, (1) God's efficacious concourse unto all natural acts and effects. (2) Gods efficacious concourse to all supernatural acts and effects. 1. We shall demonstrate Divine predetermination to the substrate mater of sin from the efficacity of Divine concourse as to all natural acts and effects; which evidently appears in the following particulars. (1) God's concourse to all physic or natural causes, motions, and effects is most efficacious. This Proposition the sacred Scriptures do abundantly confirm, as Esa. 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Act. 17. 28. of which before Chap. 3. §. 1. Thus much Strangius and those of his persuasion grant us, as before, c. 2. §. 1. (2) The efficace of Divine concourse depends on the efficace and determination of the Divine wil For what is efficacious concourse, considered actively, but the efficacity of the Divine will predetermining to act so or so? To presume that active concourse is any thing else but an immanent efficacious act of the Divine will is to cross the mind of sacred Scriptures and the most awakened Divines, as we have copiosely demonstrated, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. §. 3. (3) Gods will being efficacious and determinate determines all second causes to all their natural actions and effects. Is it not impossible, but that the will of God being omnipotent and determined for the production of such an action of man's will, the said action or effect must necessarily follow? Is not the will of God sufficiently potent to determine the will of man in all its natural acts? Is not the efficacity of the Divine will so great, that not only those things are done, which God wils shall be done, but in that manner as he wils Non solùm sunt ea quae Deus vult fieri, sed etiam eo modo fiunt quo Deus vult fieri, Strang. l. 2. c. 11. p. 266. them? Doth not Strangius confess so much lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55. & lib. 2. cap. 11. pag. 266.? Whence if God in his own will purpose and determine, that the human will should produce such or such an action, suppose that whereto sin is necessarily annexed, is not the human will necessarily in regard of the Divine will, and yet freely in regard of its own manner of working predetermined thereto? This is most evident in the crucifixion of our Lord, expressed, Act. 2. 23. By the determinate counsel, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. Act. 2. 23. by the decreed, fixed, determined will of God. The like Act. 4. 28. of which places before, Chap. 3. §. 2. Hence (4) The efficacious concourse of God modifies, and according to its mode determines all actions of second causes, not only necessarily but freely. Doth the Divine will determine itself to the production of every singular individual effect? and may it not, yea must it not then determine the human will to all its natural acts? Has man's infirm ambulatory will power to determine all such faculties, acts and effects as are subject to its Empire? and has not the Divine will, which is infinitely more efficacious, power to determine all inferior powers, acts and effects subject to its universal Dominion? And doth it not hence follow, that the sovereign Divine will doth by its efficacious concourse predetermine all the free acts of the human will, which necessarily fall under its Empire and modification? See this well demonstrated by that judicious Professor Sam. Ward, Determinat. de Concursu Dei, pag. 118, etc. Whence (5) The efficacious predeterminative concourse of God equally extends itself to all natural good, even to the substrate mater of sinful acts. Strangius and others of our Opponents grant, That God's efficacious predetermining Concourse extends itself not only to all supernatural good, but also to all natural good, that has not sin intrinsically annexed to it: whence we may, by a parity of reason demonstrate divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of all actions, though never so intrinsically evil: for the substrate mater of all actions though intrinsically evil, is naturally good. Take the Hatred of God, which is reckoned to be an act most intrinsically evil, and if we consider it in its substrate mater or entitative act, so it is naturally good, and if it were exerted against sin, its proper object, it would be also morally good: So that indeed the substrate mater of bad and good actions is the same, namely some natural good, and God's Concourse to the one and other is the same. Yea this indeed is acknowledged by Strangius, l. 2. c. 3. p. 154. All natural acts are good by the bonity of Being, i. e. entitatively and naturally— whence he concludes, and so as to Concourse we say, that God concurs Et sic quantum ad concursum attinet dicimus, Deum concurrere eodem modo ad generationem ex legitimo matrimonio & adulterio, quia physicè eadem est specie utrobique actio. Strang. l. 2. c. ●. p. 254. in the same manner to generation from lawful Matrimony and that from adultery; because the action on both sides is physically of the same kind. A great concession indeed, which would our Adversaries fully come up unto, how soon and how easily might we put a period to this Controversy? For if the same action may be, as to its substrate mater naturally good and sinful, and both physically of the same kind, and so God's Concourse to both the same, why then may not God be allowed to predetermine the will to the substrate mater of that which is sinful, as well as to the substrate mater of that which is good? Surely if the action be, as to its substrate mater, in one and tother naturally good, and physically of one and the same kind, there can be no rational account given, why God should not predetermine the will to the substrate mater of that which is evil, as well as to that which is good. In short, as there is no moral act so perfect in this imperfect state, but has some vitiosity adherent to it, so there is no natural act so sinful, but it has for its substrate mater some natural good: and as God by predetermining the will to the moral good is no way the Author of the vitiosity appendent to the act; so by predetermining it to the natural substrate mater of the sinful act, he is as much exempted from being the Author of the sin. The substrate mater of the one and the other being the 2. Efficacious Concourse as to supernatural Acts and Effects, same, of which more §. 5. 2. We proceed to demonstrate Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of Sin from the efficacity of Divine Concourse as to supernatural Acts and Effects. Our Adversaries the New Methodists, Baronius only excepted, grant that efficacious Concourse as to supernatural good is predeterminative; from which we no way doubt, but to draw an invict Demonstration, that Divine Concourse is also predeterminative as to the substrate mater of sinful acts, even such as are intrinsically evil. This Province we shall endeavour to make good by several Arguments, (1) From the Principe of all Predetermination: what is the principe of all Predetermination, but the omnipotent efficacious will of God? And how are all Acts and Effects predetermined by the Divine Will, but by an immutable predeterminative Decree, termed his Determinate Counsel, Act. 2. 23? which is said, Act. 4. 28. to predetermine the Crucifixion of Christ? Doth not therefore the same determinate Counsel or will of God predetermine the substrate mater of sin, as well as any act morally good? Is not then predetermination as to its active Attingence or principe one and the same, both as to natural and supernatural good, albeit as to its passive Attingence and effect it be greatly different? For albeit there be a double Concourse required to supernatural good, one to the substrate mater, which is a natural good, and the other to the moral good, which is supernatural, but only a single concourse to the substrate mater of sin; yet in point of efficace the predetermination to the later is equal to the former, as to Divine efficience: For there is as much power and efficace required to predetermine or premove the will to the substrate mater, or natural entitative act of sin, as there is to any supernatural good: both are alike facile to the divine omnipotent will: and surely no reason can be given, why predetermination is necessary for the production of any gracious act, and not as necessary for the production of the entitative act of sin: for the Will of Man is equally uncapable of acting at all, as of acting graciously without Predetermination, whatever some may imagine to the contrary. (2) From the substrate mater of all natural and supernatural good. Are not all gracious acts and habits lodged in human nature? What is supernatural good but a ray of the divine Nature irradiated into human Nature, and seated therein as its proper subject? Is not all grace a supernatural mode implanted in human nature? whence, if God by efficacious Grace predetermine the will to receive any habitual infusion, or act of Grace, must he not also necessarily predetermine the will to the natural act which is the substrate mater of that supernatural mode? And if God predetermine the will to the natural act of that which is good, must he not also predetermine it to the natural act of that which is evil? What difference can there be assigned between the natural act of Crucifying our Lord, which was intrinsically evil, and that of crucifying the Thiefs, which was a piece of Justice? Did not God then as much predetermine the former as the later? Yea, to raise this Argument higher, hath not the same substrate mater, which is supernaturally good and gracious as to its substance, some modal vitiosity and obliquity appendent thereto in this imperfect state? If then God predetermine the Will to the substrate mater of that which is supernaturally good, must he not also necessarily predetermine it to the substrate mater of that which is also evil? I am not ignorant what is replied hereto, which we no way doubt but will prove invalid, and no better than smoke or vapour, when we come to enlarge more fully on this Argument, §. 5. (3) We demonstrate the necessity of Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of what is sinful, from the invalidity yea vanity of those reasons which are urged by our Adversaries against it, which do with as much force strike at Predetermination to what is supernaturally good. [1] One principal Objection that our Adversaries urge against predetermination to the substrate mater of sin, specially such sins as are intrinsically evil, is That it destroys the liberty of the Will, etc. We shall not now attemt any answer to the Objection, but reserve it for its proper place, Chap. 6. §. 5. only we are to show, that the whole of this Objection, and the reasons urged to enforce it, do with as much force strike against all Predetermination, even that which is granted to supernatural good: For doth not Predetermination to gracious acts, lay as much compulsion on the will, and thence as much destroy its liberty, as predetermination to the substrate mater of sin? And is not the same objection with its reasons as much urged, and that with as great colour of Reason, by the Molinists and Arminians, against all Predetermination to gracious acts? I must confess, I could never, neither do I think any else can maintain and defend our ground against the Jesuits and Arminians, if those reasons and grounds which our Adversaries urge against Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin, be admitted as valid. [2] The like may be said of that other objection or reason, why our Adversaries reject Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin, namely, That it makes all God's Laws naturally and absolutely impossible, etc. Is not this very objection, and the reason urged to enforce it, as much urged by Molinists and Arminians, against all Predetermination even to gracious Acts? And are not the reasons as valid on the later as on the former side? What reason do the new Methodists give, that Predetermination to the entitative act of sin makes God's Laws impossible, but that it takes away the Wills Indifference, and destroys the natural power that the will is invested with to act or not to act? And doth not Predetermination to good as much destroy the wills indifference, and its power to act or not to act? [3] Our Adversaries urge, That this Predetermination takes away the use of Promises, Invitations, and all evangelic offers of Grace, and supposeth God not to deal sincerely with Sinners, in making offers of Grace, and yet irresistibly determining their Wills against the acceptance of these offers? Is not this very objection, with its reason urged, and that with as much force of reason by Jesuits and Arminians against Predetermination to gracious Acts? For if no man can entertain those offers of Grace by his own freewill, without a predeterminative Concourse, are not all gracious Promises, Invitations, and offers of Grace to Sinners, who fall not under this Predetermination, vain and useless? Our Adversaries the new Methodists generally, (some few excepted) deny any sufficient Grace or Freewill in corrupt Nature for the reception of evangelic offers and Grace: and is not then the vicious will of corrupt Nature as well determined by its own vitiosity against the offers of Grace, as by the predeterminative Concourse of God? [4] Our Adversaries object, That this Predetermination to the entitative act of sin, supposeth God to compel and force men to sin, and so makes him to be the real Author of Sin, yea more than the Sinner that is under a violent compulsion, etc. and is not this very argument urged by Jesuits and Arminians against all Predetermination even to what is good, and that with as much colour of reason? For say they, If God predetermine the will to what is good, than he compels and forceth the will to be good; so that the will being under a compulsion cannot be said to be the Author of its own act, but is as a Stock or Stone in the exercise of that act, which destroyeth all moral good, etc. Which objection is as valid as that of our Adversaries, and can never be solidly answered if their objection be good; though according to our Principes neither the one or the other objection has any force in it, as we shall demonstrate, c. 6. §. 5. To conclude this argument, I am very confident, our Opponents the new Methodists will never be able to defend an efficacious determinative Concourse to what is morally or supernaturally good, so long as they deny the same to the substrate mater of sin, which is naturally good: for all, or at least the most of those arguments they urge against the later, may, and are urged by the Molinists and Arminians against the former, and that with equal force. And this Baronius did by his natural acumen foresee, and therefore he took a course more seemingly rational according to his Principes, though less friendly to divine Concourse, to deny all Predetermination as well to supernatural as natural good; of which see his Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput. 3. n. 66. etc. p. 136. §. 5. Our fifth Argument shall be taken from the Nature of Sin, 5. Arg. from the Nature of Sin. its substrate mater and formal reason. 1. As to the general Idea and substrate mater of sin, we have demonstrated, Ch. 1. §. 2. (1) That all human acts considered in their natural entity, abstracted 1. It's mater. from their moral constitution, are neither good nor evil. (2) That all moral acts whether good or evil receive their formal Constitution and Determination from the Moral Law. (3) That no human Act considered physically, or according to its natural entitative substance, is intrinsically evil, but only morally, in regard of its moral specification or determination to such or such an object. Hence, (4) That sin has for its substrate mater some natural good. Now these Propositions being laid as so many Principes, we hence argue, That God must necessarily concur to, yea predetermine the substrate mater of actions intrinsically evil: For, if all sinful acts, even such as are intrinsically evil morally, are, according to their substrate mater physically good, doth it not necessarily follow, that God the first cause must concur thereto, yea predetermine the same? Must not every second Cause as such be actuated and so determined by its first Cause and his efficacious Concourse? Doth not the subordination of the second Cause to the first, necessarily demonstrate, not only its dependence on, but also Predetermination by the same in all its natural operations and effects? Is not every Being by participation necessarily limited, defined, and predetermined in all its natural entitative motions by the first Being, which is such by Essence? May not this also be demonstrated from the very concessions of our Adversaries, who grant, that vitiosity follows not any Act as a natural Act? So Strangius, l. 2. c. 11. p. 243. We confess, saith he, that vitiosity doth not follow the Fatemur quidem, malitiam non sequi actum peccati ut est actus, alioqui omnis actus esset peccatum, etc. Strang. act of sin as an act; for then every act would be sin; also that it doth not follow, as the act proceeds from God, for then every act that proceeds from God, would have sin. Now if sin follows not the act of sin as an act, what reason can there be why God should not efficaciously concur to, yea predetermine the entitative act of Sin? This is well explicated by Lud. Crocius, (that Breme Professor, who was a member of the Synod of Dort, and there began the New Method) Duodecas, Dissert. de Volunt. Dei, Dissert▪ 8. Thes. 99 p. 426. As to the Act, saith he, of the Divine Will about sin, the effates of Scripture seem to contradict themselves, whiles that some expressly affirm, That God nils and hates sins, and those that commit them, Psal. 5. 5, 6, 7. Zach. 8. 17. but others seem to say, That God wils, creates, effects them, Esa. 45. 7. Lam. 3. 37, 38. Amos 3. 6. But these things do well agree, if the distinction be rightly observed, (1) Between the Act, and the vitiosity of the Act. (2) Between the Act as it is from God, and as it is from the Creature. (3) Between the will of God decreeing, and the will of God commanding. Whence he concludes, Thes. 100 p. 427. For God will and produceth, by the Creature as the first Cause by the second, the Act, as an Act, of itself indifferent to moral bonity, and vitiosity; and wills and effects the same, albeit depraved by the Creature, as invested with his moral rectitude, because he produceth it by his own power, from his immaculate Sanctity and Justice, which can never be made crooked or corrupted by any second Cause. Whence he adds, Thes. 101. And this act essentially good, even as defiled by the Creature, God justly and holily useth either as an Instrument of punishment, or of exploration or exercise, and as an ordinate convenient Medium, according to his Justice for the best ends. Thes. 102. In this sense God is said, To create evil, to produce it out of his mouth, to send Joseph into Egypt by the Vendition of his Brethren, to rob Job of his goods, to command Shimei to curse David, to use Absalon for the defiling his Father's Concubines, to deliver Christ into the hands of Jews and Gentiles. Thes. 103. For God decreed to produce those acts, as acts, and to permit the depravation of them by the Sinners, and to use them albeit depraved, wisely and justly to ends holily ordained by him. 2. Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin may 2. From the formal reason of sin. be also demonstrated from the formal nature of Sin, which consists in the privation of that moral rectitude due to actions, as Ch. 1. §. 2. we have more fully explicated. Whence we thus argue: If every deflexion from the Law of God be sin, then certainly God necessarily predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins: and if of some, why not of all, even such as are intrinsically evil? That God predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins is evident, and that from the concessions of our Adversaries, who grant, That God doth predetermine the Will to actions imperfectly good, which also, according to their own confessions are modally sinful: Whence we thus argue; The substrate mater of the same action as good and as sinful is the same: wherefore, if God predetermine the will to the substrate mater of the action as good, must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the same action as sinful? When we say, That God predetermines to the substrate mater of the same action as sinfil, As here, may not be taken reduplicatively, but only specificatively, i. e. as it specifies and distributes the same action into good, and sinful; which are different modes of one and the same substrate mater or entitative act: so that our Opponents granting, that God doth predetermine the will to the substrate mater of the action as imperfectly good, how can they possibly deny, that God predetermines it also to the same substrate mater which is modally sinful? When I can see a rational solution given to this argument, (which I despair of) I shall think our Adversaries have done much service to their Cause. But they reply, If God concur by determinative influence to imperfectly good actions, it doth not thence follow, that he concurs to actions intrinsically, and in the substance of them evil. But I conceive this evasion will soon vanish into smoke and vapour, if we consider well, (1) That the least sin may not be imputed unto God as the Author of it, any more than the greatest: the difference between sins modally and intrinsically evil finds no place here: dare our Adversaries say, that God is the Author of that modal sin which adheres to actions imperfectly good, but not of that intrinsical evil which is in the hatred of God, or the like? Whence, (2) The force of our Argument ariseth from this parity of reason, If God doth concur, yea predetermine the will to an act only modally sinful, without falling under the imputation of being the Author of sin, why may he not also predetermine the will to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsically evil, without the like imputation? Albeit there be a disparity in the sins, yet is not the parity of reason for the one and the other the same? Ought we not to be as cautelous in exemting the Sacred Majesty of God from having any hand in the least sin, as in the greatest? And if we allow ourselves the liberty of making him the author of the least sin, will not that open a wide gate for atheistic blasphemous wits to impute to him the greatest sins? Whence, if we can prove, what our Adversaries will never be able to disprove, yea what they approve of, namely, that God doth predetermine the will to the substrate mater or entitative act, which is imperfectly good, but modally sinful, it thence follows by necessary consequence and inevitable parity of reason, that he can and doth predetermine the will to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsically evil, without the least imputation of being the Author of sin annexed thereto. I would fain have our Opponents weigh impartially the force of this Argument. §. 6. Our next Argument for God's Predetermination to the 6. Arg. from God's Permission of Sin. substrate mater of sin shall be drawn from his Permission of Sin. And to make way to this demonstration we must distinguish of Permission; which is either legal or natural: Natural Permission is either divine or human; and both either negative or positive. (1) God gives no legal Permission or Indulgence to sin, but on the contrary severely prohibits it, and that on pain of death. (2) Gods natural Permission as Rector of the World is not of sin simply as sin, but as conducible to the principal ends of his divine Gubernation. It's true, Divine Permission regards not only the substrate mater of sin, but also sin formally considered, and so sin under that reduplication, as sin, yet not simply considered, but as it has a tendence or conducibilitie to the advance of Divine Glory: and so much is confessed by Strangius, l. 2. c. 22. p. 399. If the Reduplication be joined to the term sin, it's true, that sin as sin is permitted by God, physically not morally. Yet I add, not simply, but respectively, as conducible to God's supreme ends of Government. And Lud. Crocius, Duodec. Dissert. 8. Thes. 74. pag. 415. assertes, That God, albeit he wils and decrees only the material of sin, yet unbelieving and disobedient, both jews and Canaanites, etc. 2. Whereas he tells us, that the Mythologists say, Mars was the first that invented military weapons and affairs, etc. This may as well refer to Joshua, as to Nimrod. For albeit Nimrod began wars in Asia the greater, or Babylon; yet we find no considerable wars amongst the Canaanites, or Phoenicians, till Ioshua's time; who by reason of his great military Exploits and victories, might well be reputed the God of War, Mars, or Hercules. 3. That which may add to this parallelizing of Mars with joshua is, that the Mythologists (whom Diodorus here brings in as the Authors of this description) found abundant more matter and reason to reduce the stories they had received by Tradition touching joshua, unto Mars, than those of Nimrod. For the stories of joshua were then, when Mythology began to creep into the world, very fresh and pregnant, etc. 4. We have proved before, out of the concessions of Vossius himself, that Mars was the same with Hercules, and therefore with joshua. 3. Yet we need not reject, but may also allow, without any contradiction, a parallel betwixt Mars and Nimrod: as 1. Nimrod Mars' his parallel with Nimrod. was called by his subjects, Belus. So Servius on Virg. Aen. 1. says, that Belus was the first that reigned in the Assyrian Monarchy. Mars also had the same title given to him; whence some derive bellum war, from Belus, Mars' name. 2. Nimrod is said to be a mighty hunter, i. e. Warrior, Gen 10. 8. so Mars. See more of this parallel betwixt Nimrod and Mars, in Vossius, de Idololatr. lib. 1. cap. 16. CHAP. VI The theogony of Vulcan, Silenus, Pan, Prometheus, Neptune, Janus, Aeolus, Rhea, Minerva, Ceres, Niobe, and the sirens. Vulcan the same with Tubal cain, Gen. 4. 22. Silenus' parallel with, Silo, Gen. 40. 10. etc. Silenus the same with Silas and Silo. Silenus is said to be without Father and Mother; as Silo and Melchisedek his Type Heb. 7. 3. Silenus is said to be the greatest Doctor of his Age, from Silo's Character Gen. 49. 10. Silenus' riding on an Ass, from Silo's Gen. 49. 11. Silenus' being filled with Wine, from Silo's Gen. 49. 12. Silenus' meat Cows milk, from Silo's Character Gen. 49. 12. Silenus' Parallel with Balaam. The theogony of Pan and his Parallel with the Hebrew Messias. Pan the same with Silenus, Faunus, and Satyrus. Pan's parallel with Abel, Israel, and Cham. Prometheus' theogony and Parallel with Noah: as also with Magog. Neptune's theogony and Parallel with Japhet. Janus' Parallel with Noah, and Javan. The theogony of Aeolus, Rhea, Minerva, Ceres, Niobe, and the sirens, Hebraick. §. 1. FRom Mars we pass to Vulcan, who was exactly parallel Vulcan the same with Tubalcain Gen. 4. 22. unto, and derived from Tubalcain, as both their Names and Attributes prove. First, as to the name Vulcan, Vossius de Idolatr. lib. 1. cap. 16. shows us that Vulcanus is the same with Tubalcanus Gen. 4. 22. only by a wont and easy mutation of B into V. and casting away a syllable: as from Vade nisi à Tubalcain Vulcanus. Sandf▪ de Desc. l. 1. §. 21. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lacte and from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rura: 2. As for the main Art or Office attributed to Vulcan, we have it mentioned by Diodorus lib. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. By Vulcan, as they say, was invented the fabrication of Iron, Brass, Gold, Silver, and all other metals, which receive the operation of fire; as also the universal use of fire, as employed by Artificers and others. Whence the Masters of these Arts offer up their prayers and sacreds to this God chiefly: and by these, as by all others, Vulcan is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fire, and having by this means given a great benefit to the common life of men, he is consecrated to immortal memory and honour. Thus Diodorus: wherein he gives us an exact account why the Mythologists consecrated Vulcan, and made him the God of Fire, and all Arts perfected by fire. Which exactly answers to the character given to Tubalcain Gen. 4. 22. Tubalcain an instructor of every Artificer Gen. 4. 22. in iron and brass, etc. Thence Bochart in his Preface to Phaleg speaks thus: The Grecians, when they write of the first Inventors of things, to Tubalcain, who first invented the conflature of Metals, they substitute the Curetes, or the Cyclopes, or Vulcanus Lemnius, etc. This also exactly answers to Sanchoniathons' character of Vulcan, whom (according to Philo Byblius' Version) he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Phenician Tongue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Chores ur, i. e. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one, who by the operation of fire, fabricates metals into any form: whence Lucian calls Vulcan 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Poets feign him to be the chief fabricator of all Jupiter's thunderbolts, etc. So Bochart Can. lib: 2. cap. 2. §. 2. We now come to Silenus, so famous amongst the Silenus' the same with Silo. Gen. 49. 10. Poets, whom they place in the order of their Gods; whose Names, Genealogy, and Attributes, apparently prove him to have been, by a monstrous Satanick imitation, of sacred origination. 1. As for his Greek name, which is variously written either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Bochart (Can. lib. 1. cap. 18. fol. 482.) makes it to be an evident derivative from the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Silo, the Messias' name Gen. 49. 10. for from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Silo comes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Silan, whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Silenus. 2. Neither does Silenus agree with Silo, the Jewish Messias, in Name only, but also in Genealogy, according to that of Diodorus lib. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The first that ruled at Nysa was Silenus; whose Genealogy is unknown by all, by reason of his antiquity. Nysa where Silenus reigned the same with Sina, or Nissi. 1. As for Nysa, where Silenus reigned, it seems either the same with Mount Sina (by the transposition of S. and N.) the place where God delivered the law to Moses, who therefore was said to reign there, as Vossius; or else Nysa is the same with the place where Moses, Exod. 17. 15. built an Altar, and called the name of it Jehovah Nissi. as C. 5. § 3. Whence Nysa according to Bochart, as before. And that which makes this more evident is, that this Nysa, where Silenus reigned, is the same with that of Bacchus, who is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the God of Nysa from that of Moses, Exod. 17. 15. Jehovah Nissi. For Bacchus and Silenus are made by the Poets to be inseparable companions as C. 3. §. 3. 2. As for Silenus' Genealogy, Diodorus also tells us, that it Silenus' Genealogy, as Silo's unknown. Heb. 7. 3. was unknown to all by reason of its Antiquity or Eternity: which answers to the Hebrews account of their Messias, Hebr. 7. 3. without father, without mother, having neither beginning of days, etc. the character of Melchisedek, the type of Christ. 3. There is yet a more exact Parallel betwixt Silenus and Silenus and Silo agrees in offices. Gen. 49. 10. the Hebrew Silo or Shiloh, as to Attributes, and Offices: for 1. Of Silo 'tis said Gen. 49. 10. and to him shall be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Doctrine of the people, or the Congregation of the people, to be endoctrinated. Thus Silenus is also made by the Poets to be the greatest Doctor of his Age: for he is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Bacchus's Praeceptor, i. e. according to Vossius' account, Bacchus was Moses, and Silenus was Silo or Christ, who instructed Moses on Mount Sina or Nysa, the place where Bacchus and Silenus were said to be. Again Tertullian, de Anima cap. 2. makes Silenus' the great Doctor; as Silo is styled. Silenus to be a Phrygian, who being brought by the Pastors to Midas the King, he lent him his great Asses ears. Vossius (de Idololat. lib. 1. cap. 21.) thus deciphers this fable. It is no wonder that Midas is said to lend Silenus his Ass' ears; because he was the most intelligent of his Age both in nature and Antiquity. The import is; that Midas listened greatly to him as his Instructor. I suppose Silenus is said to be a Phrygian, because the Phrygians were some of the first great Mythologists, who traduced fables into Greece, particularly this of Silenus, from the Phoenicians and Hebrews. 2. Another Attribute given to Silenus is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Silenus' riding on an Ass, from Silo's Gen. 49. 11. carried for the most part on an Ass: and hence Silenus had a particular remark for riding on an Ass: which Bochart refers to that prophecy of Silo Gen. 49. 11. binding his Ass' colt to the choice Vine. 3. The Mythologists fable Silenus, comrade of Bacchus, to be employed in treading out the Grapes. This Bochart refers to Gen. 49. 11. he washed his garments in wine, and his clothes in the blood of Grapes, which is explicated Esa. 5. of such as tread out the grapes. 4. They characterise Silenus, as one that was always drunk; Silenus' being filled with wine, from Gen. 49. 12. as 'tis supposed from what follows Gen. 49. 12. His eyes shall be red with wine: which Solomon makes the character of one overcome with wine, Prov. 23. 29, 30. to whom redness of eyes, etc. 5. They ascribe to Silenus for his meat, Cow's Milk: which Bochart Silenus' meat Cows milk, from Gen. 49. 12. makes to be traduced from Gen. 49. 12. and his teeth white with Milk. Whence he concludes thus: The Devil could have imagined nothing more abominable whereby to profane the most holy mysteries of our Religion, and to expose it to the cavils of most wicked men, etc. 6. That Silenus had his original traduction from Silo the Jewish Messias will farther appear from that of Pausanius Eliacon. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The monument of Silenus remains in the Country of the Hebrews, i. e. all the Traditions of Silenus came from the Hebrews, whose Messias he was. I know, that Sandfordus de Descensu Christi l. 1. §. 21. Silenus' parallel with Balaam. supposeth Balaam to be Silenus. Nothing, saith he, hinders, but that Balaam should be Silenus; namely, he who was so famous for his Ass, and Prophecy. The Ancients fable, that Bacchus gave a reward to a certain Ass that he should speak with human voice, with which the Giants, which were Bacchus' enemies, were terrified. Whence came these things but from the sacred Scriptures? Numb. 22. 28. the Lord opened Num. 22. 28. the mouth of the Ass, etc. which being divulged far and near, we need not doubt but that the Moabites were terrified thereat. So Stilling fleet, Origin. S. Book. 3. cap. 5. sect. 11. makes this whole fable of Silenus to be taken from the story of Balaam, to whom he seems parallel; in that both were noted for their skill in Divination; both taken by the water, Numb. 22. 5. both Num. 22. 5. noted for riding on an Asle, etc. Though 'tis possible, that many Branches of Silenus' story may be referred to that of Balaam, yet I should rather refer the main of it to Silo, Gen. 49. 10. according to that of Bochart (Can. lib. 1. cap. 18. fol. 482.) The first of Bacchus' companions is Silenus, whose fable took its original from the prophecy of Silo, Gen. 49. 10. in a monstrous manner detorted etc. This may be farther evinced by what follows, of Pan, which some make the same with Silenus. §. 3. That Pan, whom the Poets feign to be the God of The theogony of Pan, and his parallel with the Jewish Messias. Shepherds, was parallel to, and, as 'tis presumed, originally traduced from the Jewish Messias, styled the Shepherd of Israel, may be evinced from their parallel Names, Attributes, and Offices. 1. As for the origination of Pan, Bochart (Can. lib. 1. cap. 18. fol. 483.) groundedly draws it from the Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pan, which signifies such an one as is struck, or strikes with astonishing fears, and stupifying terrors, as Psal. 88 16. and the reason of this notation is considerable: for Pan being supposed to be one of Bacchus' Commanders, is said to have sent astonishing fears on all their enemies; whence that proverbial speech, of Panic fears. This seems to allude to the story of Israel's being conducted in the wilderness by Christ, the Shepherd of Israel, who cast Panic fears on all their Enemies: according to that confession of Rahab, Joshua 2. 9 Your terror is fallen upon us, etc. so v. 24. Josh. 2. 9, 24. The inhabitants of the country do faint because of us. The like Joshua 5. 1. Their heart melted, neither was their spirit in them Josh. 5. 1. any more, because of the children of Israel. 2. Pan is called also by the Latins, Sylvanus: which some derive from Sylvis; but other, on more probable conjecture, make it the same with the Pan the same with Silenus. Greek Silenus, or Silas: and so in Scripture the same person, who is called Sylvanus, 1 Thes. 1. 1. is styled Silas, Act. 17. 4. as Grotius, and Deodati. Now Silas is the same with Silenus, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Silo, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Silan. 3. That which makes this farther evident, Pan the same with Faunus. is the identity betwixt Pan and Faunus; which Bochart Can. lib. 1. cap. 18. asserts in these words. Faunus, amongst the Latins, is the same God, and of the same original with Pan: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with some sounds Fun. Thence Ovid, in Phaedra; — Faunique Bicornes Numine contactas attonuere— And Bochart (can. lib. 1. cap. 33.) affirms, that many make Faunus to be the same God with Sylvanus, and both the same with Pan: and then he adds, And truly, Evander Arcas was the first that brought the worship of Faunus into Latium, out of Arcadia, where Pan was worshipped. 4. Yea Vossius de Idololatr. lib. 1. cap. 8. seems to make Satyrus the same with Pan, Satyrus the same with Pan and Silenus. Faunus, and Silenus: and the main difference he makes between them is only this; That whereas Pan, Faunus, Silenus, and Satyrus, are all wood Deities, the name Satyrus is more general, and usually attributed to the younger; whereas that of Silenus was given to the more ancient. That which makes for this affirmation is, that Pan, Faunus, Satyrus, and Silenus are all reckoned as companions of Bacchus in his expedition. Bochart (Can. lib: 1. cap. 18. fol. 483.) derives satire from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sair, which amongst the Hebrews signifies both a Goat and Devil; (as Maimonides) because the Devil oft presents himself in the form of a Goat etc. But 2. To pass from names to the thing itself. Pan is said to be an Egyptian God, who came up with Bacchus to fight against the Giants. So Diodorus Sic. Bibl. 1. Unto this God Pan the natives not only erect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Images in every Temple; but also they have a city in Thebais, which they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [i. e. Cham's city,] but interpret it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the city of Pan. By which it is evident, that Pan was an Egyptian God, and, as we may presume, the same with the Hebrew Messias, who conducted Moses (the Egyptian Bacchus) and the Israelites out of Egypt, unto Canaan, striking terrors into the Canaanites, as before. That Pan, the Pan a fall of the Messias. God of Shepherds, and those many fabulous Attributes and Offices given unto him, were originally borrowed from the Jewish Messias, held forth in the old Testament under the Emblem of a Shepherd, is proved at large by Jackson, in his discourse of the Divine Authority of sacred Scripture, fol. 31. where he citys a relation out of Plutarch, touching the mourning of the Demoniac Spirits, for the death of their great God Pan, and the ceasing of all their Oracles thereupon: which was truly and only verified in Christ, whose death put a period to all Heathen Oracles, as both sacred and pagan stories relate. But to finish this Genealogy of Pan, Bochart (in the Preface to his Phaleg fol. 2.) reduceth his original to Abel. The Greeks (says he) when they Pan Abel. write of the first Inventors of things, substitute Pan the Arcadian unto Abel, the Prince of Pastors, etc. Sandford, de descensu Christi l. 1. §. 19 supposeth Pan to be the same with the Pan Israel. Patriarch Israel, or Jacob. His words are these: for Joseph is that Israel Patriartha verus sorten Pan Gentilium. Park. ex Sandf. Pan Cham. old Osiris, nourished by Pan, whom I conceive to be Israel. Dickinson, Delft, Phoenciz. cap. 4. makes Pan the same with Cham: which he endeavours to prove from that of Diodor. Sicul. l. 1. where the same city in Egypt, which is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. the city of Cham, is interpreted by the Natives, the city of Pan. We need not exclude either of these Parallels with Pan; because we find that the Mythologists were, according to their different humours, very difforme and different in the application of their Fables. Only, I suppose, the great Pan, so much idolised by the Poets as the God of Shepherds, refers chiefly to the Jewish Messias, the great Shepherd of Israel, as before. §. 4. We now proceed to Prometheus, and his Genealogy, Prometheus' his theogony and parallel with Noah. Names, and Attributes, with their parallel in sacred story and persons. There is some difference among Philologists about the Traduction of Prometheus; some reducing him to Noah, others to Magog, Japhet's son: which controversy may be, with much ease, reconciled, by taking in both reductions. For its certain that the old Mythologists were no way uniform or conform in the application of those fables, they gleaned up in the Oriental parts. Therefore to begin with those who make Prometheus the same with Noah: as Vossius de Idololatr: lib. 1. cap. 18. pag. 141. The Patriarch Noah (says he) is adumbrated to us, not only in Saturn, but also in Prometheus, whose Feast is called at Athens 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in which there is a contest of Lamps; also an Altar in the Academy, on which the Lamps are wont to be kindled in this Contest; as 'tis attested by Harpocration, etc. Thus Vossius. This Rite, consecrated to Prometheus, I presume, had its original Idea from the Lamps which burned in the Temple at jerusalem, and from the fire on the Altar: whence also that fable of Prometheus' stealing fire from Heaven: (which may allude to Elijah's praying for fire, which descended from Heaven, etc.) But as to the parallel betwixt Prometheus and Noah, take these particulars. 1. As under Noah, so also under Prometheus, the great Flood was supposed to happen. So Diodorus, lib. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. They say that Nilus having broken down its bounds, overwhelmed a great part of Egypt, especially that part where Prometheus reigned, which destroyed the greatest part of men in his Territory. Whereas some may object, that this is meant only of a particular Deluge in Egypt, under Prometheus etc. 'tis replied, that as the Grecians attributed the general Flood to Deucalion, so the Egyptians attributed the same to Prometheus, or, as Eusebius, to Ogyges; whereas all these fabulous Deluges, were but broken Traditions of the real universal Deluge under Noah. And particularly, that this under Prometheus was the same with that of Noah, Vossius endeavours to prove from the notation of the name: for (says he) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies one who is so wise, as to foresee evil; whereas on the contrary, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is one, who is too late, or after-wise: which agrees to Noah, who being divinely taught, foresaw the flood, and so preserved himself and his. 2. Prometheus is said to rebuild and restore human kind after the flood: which exactly answers to Noah, the father of Mankind, etc. 3. Herodot: lib. 4. tells us, that Prometheus' wife was called Asia. And indeed, Noah's wife was no other than Asia, or Asiatica, an Asiatic. But whereas it may be objected, that Prometheus is made to be the son of japetus, and therefore cannot be Noah, but must be his Grandchild; Vossius replies, that 'tis no wonder, if in Ages so remote, posterity miscalled the Father and the son, and so confounded one with tother. 2. Bochart, to avoid this contradiction, makes Prometheus to 2. Prometheus' parallel with Magog. be Magog the son of japetus, or Japhet. So Bochart Phaleg lib. 1. cap. 2. fol. 11. also lib. 3. cap. 13. where he proves, that Prometheus is the same with Magog. 1. In that he is styled the son of japetus; as Magog was the son of Japhet. 2. From the eating of Prometheus' heart; which fable sprang from the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Magog; which, being applied to the heart, implies its consumtion, or wasting away. 3. Prometheus is said to have his seat, and to lie in Caucasus; because Magog, and his posterity seated themselves there. 4. They fable, that fire and metals were invented by Prometheus, (as formerly by Vulcan:) because there are many subterraneous fires and metals in these places. Stillingfleet; Orig. S. book 3. cap. 5. § 9 etc. follows Bochart herein. §. 5. From Prometheus we pass to Neptune; which is indeed Neptune the same with Japhet. a name rather appellative and common, than proper. For as in ancient times, especially before the Trojan wars, they styled all illustrious Kings, Jupiter, and all renowned Captains, Mars, or Hercules; so also they called every Insular Prince by the name of Neptune: whence multitudes partook of one and the same name; which made their characters and stories the more fabulous and ambiguous: yet are we not without evident ideas and notices of their Traduction, originally, from some sacred person or story, as has been already demonstrated by a large enumeration of particulars; which will farther appear by the genealogy and story of Neptune, who according to the general consent of the Learned, was originally Japhet the son of Noah. For look, as the memory of Noah was preserved in Saturn; and of Shem (whose posterity possessed the septentrional and oriental Asia) Unde etiam Japetus nisi à Japhet. Sandf. Desc. l. 1. §. 22. in Pluto; and also of Cham (whose progeny seated in the Meridional, Asia, & Africa) in Jupiter Hammon: so also the memory and story of Japhet was continued in Neptune, as Philologists generally accord, and that one these rational conjectures: 1. From the very name Neptune; which Bochart derives from The parallel 'twixt Japhet and Neptune. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Niphtha, which belongs to Niphal, or the Passive Conjugation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Patha to enlarge; whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Japhet, according to the allusion of Noah Gen. 9 27. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Japht Gen. 9 27. Elohim lejaphet, i. e. God shall enlarge Japhet. Proportionable whereto Neptune was called by the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the same origination with Japh. ●. Grammarians in vain attempt to deduce from the Greek tongue; seeing, as Herodotus in Euterpe assures us; the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, was at first used by none, but the Libyans or Africans, who always honoured this God. Namely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the same with the Punick 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pesitan; which signifies Expanse or broad; from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pesat to dilate, or expand. Whence it appears, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Japhet are Synonymous; and both derived from Radix's, signifying latitude: which well suits with Neptune's Character; who is styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 latè imperans and latifonans; as also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one that has a large breast, etc. See more of this Bochart, Phaleg. lib. 3. cap. 1. 2. From the Genealogy of Neptune; whom the Mythologists make to be Saturn's son; as Japhet was son to Noah, who passed for Saturn. 3. Neptune was fabled to be the God of the Sea, and Instructor Neptune the God of the Sea, from Japhets possessing the Islands. of Navigation; So Diodorus lib. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. The Cretenses say, that amongst other Gods borne of Saturn and Rhea, Neptune first began to manage the Affairs of the Sea, and to instruct for Navigation; he having obtained this prefecture from Saturn, whence it came to pass, that in after time the common Vogue so far obtained, that whatever was done at Sea, was said to have been in the power of Neptune, and therefore the Mariners sacrificed unto him. Thus Diodorus. All which seems to have been taken up from the real story of Japhet, & his Posterity, their possessing the Lands in the midland Sea, Greece, etc. So Bochart Phaleg lib. 1. cap. 2. Japhet (says he) passed for Neptune the God of the Sea; because his portion was in the Lands and Peninsules. In the Lands are Britanny, Ireland, Thule, Crete, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Baleares, etc. In the peninsules are Spain, Italy, Greece, Asia minor, etc. So Lactantius de falsa Relig. l. 1. c. 11. All the maritime places, with the Lands, belonged unto Neptune, etc. This suits with Plato's origination of Neptune's Greek name; who (in his Cratylus) deriveth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from his giving drink, i. e. the Sea and Water unto all: which argues thus much, that they looked on Neptune as the God of the Sea, and that in allusion to Japhets possessing the maritime parts of Europe, etc. 4. Neptune was also called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Equestris: which is thus explicated by Diodorus lib. 5. where having spoken of Neptune as God of the Sea, he adds. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They add also this of Neptune, that he was the first that tamed horses; and that the Science of Horsemanship was first delivered by him; whence he was styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good horseman. This also Vossius applies to Japhet: (Vossius de Idolol lib. 1. cap. 15. pag. 118.) his words are these: Japhet had for his portion the Mediterranean Lands, and the European continent: wherefore his posterity had need of a twofold Science, 1. Of Nautick, to direct them in their Navigation, 2. Of Horsemanship to conduct themselves in those rude and wild countries, thorough which they were to pass into the Northern and Western parts of Europe. This I conjecture was the cause why Neptune, whom I interpret Japhet, was made to be the God of Nautick Science and sea Affairs, as also of Horsemanship, etc. But touching the Parallel 'twixt Japhet and Neptune, see more Bochart Phaleg. lib. 3. cap. 1. § 6. As for the theogony of Janus and his parallel; if Janus' theogony and Parallel 1. With Noah. we consider him historically, and according to the Mythology of the Poets, so he refers to the story of Noah, or Javan. That which inclines some to make him Parallel with Noah, is 1. The cognation of his Name, with the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jain wine; whereof Noah was the first Inventor, according to Vossius. Again, 2. Janus was pictured with a double forehead; because he saw a double world, that before and after the Flood: as Noah. 3. As the beginning and propagation of mankind, after the Flood, was from Noah; so also they ascribe the beginnings of all things unto Janus: whence the entrance to an house is called by the Romans, Janua; and the entrance to the year Januarie. Whence some make the name Xisythrus, given by the Assyrians to Noah, (as in the story of the Flood Book. 3. chap. 6. §. 4.) to signify an entrance or door, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ziz a post or threshold of a door; as Vossius. 4. Latium, where Janus' seat was, (whence part of old Rome was called Janicule) was called Oenotria. Now 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 comes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wine. Thus much for Janus' parallel with Noah. Others refer the origination 2. With Javan. (both name and person) of Janus to Javan the son of Japhet, the parent of the Europeans. For 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Javan is much the same with Janus. 2. Thence that of Horat. l. 1. 3. Japeti Genus. So Voss. Idol. l. 2. c. 16. Janus' name taken historically is the contract of Javan. §. 7. To Janus we might subjoin Aeolus, the God of the winds Of Aeolus his Origination. and King of the Aeoliar Lands, with notices of his Traduction from the Phoenicians and Hebrews. But we shall touch only on his name, which seems to be a good key or Index to decipher his fabulous Office. This fable of Aeolus, the God of the winds, is supposed to have been first brought into Greece by Homer; who had it from the Phoenicians; with whom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aol (as the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) signifies a storm or tempest: which the Chaldee Paraphrase more fully expresseth by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 alol: and the King Aeolus is thought, by the Phoenicians, to be the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aolin of Tempests: as Bochart Can lib. 1. cap. 33. fol. 658. §. 8. Having discoursed, at large, touching the chief of the Grecian Goddesses of Phenician and Hebrew extract. 1. Rhea from Gen. 29. 20. Grecian Gods, and their Traduction from the sacred Oracles; we shall briefly touch on sundry of their Goddesses, and their derivation from the same sacred fountain, 1. Noah is called Gen. 29. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a husband of the earth, i. e. a husband man. Whence the Mythologists made Saturn, i. e. Noah, the husband of Rhea, i. e. the Earth. Some derive Rea, by an easy anagrammatisme, from Era. So Sandford Descens. l. 1. §. 26. The Greeks refer Era. (Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ever's.) i. e. the Earth, unto the number of their Gods: by what ceremony? Namely according to the old Grammarian rule, changing Era into Rea. After the same manner Aer began to be Hera: for this origination 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we have from Plato. I should rather derive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from the Chaldee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hera, Libera, which was Juno her name; whence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cora, or Hora, and Ceres as before, C. 2. §. 1. & C. 5. §. 1. etc. 2. As for Minerva; Vossius (de Idololatr. lib. 1. cap. 17.) 2. Minerva. makes her to be the same with Naamah, Tubalcains sister, Gen. 4. 22. Her name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Stephanus makes to be Phenician; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: which Bochart derives from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to move war; whence the Oncean Gates at Thebes. The fable of Minerva her being borne out of Jupiter's head, they generally refer to the generation of Christ, the Divine wisdom. 3. Ceres is by Bochart substituted, and made parallel to Adam, 3. Ceres. or Cain, the first tilers of ground. 4. Niobe is by some made 4. Niobe. the same with Lot's wife, who was turned into a pillar of Salt, i. e. of Sulphureous, bitumenous, and salty matter; wherein she was partaker of Sodom's judgement, which overtook her: whence the fable of Niobe, her being turned into a pillar of stone, etc. 5. As for the sirens, (which according to the fable were in number three, partly Virgins, partly Birds, whereof one 5. sirens. sung with voice, the other by pipe; and t'other by Harp) Bochart (Can. lib. 1. cap. 28.) makes the name to be purely Phenician, or Hebrew; in which tongue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sir, signifies a song, (whence Solomon's Song of songs,) thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Siren, a singing monster, etc. 6. As for Juno, & Jana, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, thence also Diana, Astarte, Venus, etc. we have fully handled them before, chap. 2. §. 9 Thus much for the theogony of the Grecian and Roman Gods, and Goddesses, which will receive farther evidence from what follows touching the Genealogy of the Phenician and Egyptian Gods. For that the former were but the product of the later, is evident. Thus Sandford de descensu l. 1. §. 6. We may not fetch the names of the Gods from the Grecians, but from the Phoenicians or Egyptians. It remains therefore that we treat of the Apotheosis of the Barbarian names, which among those Ancients had not one and the same origination. For either some thing was coined out of foreign letters, the name being relinquished: or the name, together with the thing, was traduced unto some mysteries of Religion. This again was accomplished two manner of ways; either when a foreign Name, (so far as the nature of the Tongue would admit it) the right order of the Letters being relinquished, was referred unto the Gods; or else the Letters being transposed or changed, a new name was composed out of the old; which thence, according to the same laws of Tongues, was invested with the Rite of some Deity. Thus all those appellations of the Gods, which Greece borrowed from the Barbarians, may be digested into 3 ranks. 1. Either they flow from the sole explication of Nature; as from Abaddon sprang Apollon; or if you will rather, according to the sacred phraseology, Apolluon: or 2. from the pronunciation of the name; thus from Japhet was made japetoes: or lastly from an Enallaxis of the Letters; according to which for me it is as clear as the light, that from Adamah first sprang Hadam, and hence Hadan. Thus Sandford of the origination of the Grecian Gods from the Egyptian, Phenician, or Hebrew names. See more of this Chap. 7. §. 12. CHAP. VII. The theogony of the Phenician and Egyptian Gods, with their Hebrew origination. Baal from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Bel from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El. Beelsamen from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Beelzebub, 2 King. 1. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Baal Peor, Pf. 106. 28. Numb. 25. 1, 2, 3. Moloch the same with Baal. Adramelech and Anamelech. 2 King. 17. 31. Esa. 30. 33. Tophet and Gehinnom, whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The Samothracian Cabiris, Phenician Gods. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God's name, Ps. 119. 137. Cabiri from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Axieros 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Axiokersoes from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Cadmilus from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the minister of God. Eliun from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God's name. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Jud. 8. 33. Plautus' Paenulus: Alonim etc. from Gen. 14. 19 Ilus from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; whence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Heliogabalus. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elohim. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Gen. 28. 18. The Egyptian Gods, their original Hebrew. Apis, a symbol of Joseph; so Serapis, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Gen. 45. 8. Osiris' the same with Moses or Adam, as Isis with Eve, from Ischa. Mnevis the same with Joseph. Of Orus, Remphan, etc. The Metamorphoses of the Gods in Egypt. The causes of Mythologick Theologie▪ §. 1. HAving gone through Hellenisme, or the Grecian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The theogony of the Phenician Gods Hebraick. we now pass on to the Oriental Gods, with endeavours to demonstrate how their Genealogy, Names, and Attributes, received their derivation from the sacred Language and Oracles: We shall begin with the Phenician Gods, which were the first, if not as to time, yet as to dignity; whence the Grecians traduced Of Baal from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Bel from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. the chiefest of their Gods. And amongst the Phenician Gods, the chief was Baal, Bel, or Belus; concerning which there is some difference amongst Philologists; yet all unanimously concur in this, that its origination was from some Hebrew and sacred name; which will evidently appear from the notation thereof. Damascius, in the life of Isidore, mentioned by Photius, tells us, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Phoenicians and Syrians call Saturn El, Bel, and Bolathen. Vossius makes Bel the contract of Beel, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Baal, the Lord, which name belonged originally to God, as it appears from Hosea 2. 16, 17. But Servius, on Virgil, supposeth Bel to come of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El, Hos. 2. 16, 17. Gods name; whence the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El, and the Digamma being added, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Bel, and so Belus. Bochart, in a personal conference he favoured me with, gave me a good conciliation of these two opinions, by affirming, that there was originally a twofold Belus, the one Assyrian, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, originally 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Assyrian God; whence Nimrod, the first of the Assyrian Monarchy, was called Belus: the other Belus was a Phenician, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Baal, the Phenician God; whence Ithobaal, King of Tyre, and Jezabel his daughter; as also many of the Phenician Kings, who were called Belus. 'tis true; Bochart makes the Phenician 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Baal, to have had its original from the first Phenician King of that name; but yet I conceive it not improbable, but that the first Phenician King, might be so called from their God's name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Baal; which was the title they gave the Sun, from his office, Gen. 1. 16. as he was reputed the Lord of Heaven: or else, which seems most probable, we may suppose the Phoenicians to have had various 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Baalim; some supreme, which they styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, natural and immortal Gods; such were the Sun and Moon: others, which they styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, mortal Gods, viz. the souls of their great Heroes and Kings. As for the former supreme natural Gods,▪ they called the Sun Baal, and the Moon Baaltis or Beltis, that is, in the Scripture language, the Queen of Heaven. As for the mortal or made Baalim, they were no other than the Souls of their chief Heroes, or Princes, which after their death received an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Deification; and so became a kind of middling Gods, or Mediators betwixt the supreme Gods and men, (which the Greeks called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Demons) whereof we find frequent mention in Scripture as Jud. 10. 6. The Supreme Baal styled Beelsamen. 13. The Phoenicians styled their supreme Baal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Baal Samen. So Sanchoniathon, according to the Version of Philo Byblius, in Eusebius praepar. lib. 1. cap. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A drought happening, they lift up their hands to heaven, to the Sun. For this (says Sanchoniathon) they account the only God; calling him Belsamen, the Lord of Heaven. Beelsamen here, according to Philo Byblius' explication, is in the Phenician Tongue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 beelsamen i. e. the Lord of Heaven: whence Philo Byblius immediately subjoins. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is in the Phenician Tongue, Lord of heaven. To which he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but in the Greek tongue, he is zeus Jupiter. So that Belsamen is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jupiter Olympius. So Vossius, de Idolol. lib. 2. cap. 4. This (says he) we may confirm from the Hebrew Tongue, which differs in dialect only from the Phenician. For what the Phoenicians pronounce Beelsamen, the Hebrews write 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 baal Schamaim, i. e. Lord of heaven etc. Thus also Bochart (Can. lib. 1. cap. 42.) And indeed all this touching Belsamen, Sanchoniathon seems to have evidently traduced from that function or Office, which God had laid on the Sun, mentioned Gen. 1. 16. the greater light to rule the day as Psal. 136. 8. §. 2. This Phenician God Beelsamen, the Jews called Beelzebub, The theogony of Baalzebub. 2 King. 1. 2. as 2 King. 1. 2. Baalzebub the God of Ekron. Concerning the Etymon of Baalzebub, various are the conjectures of the Learned. The additament 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 zebub signifies a fly: whence some think it was added by the Jews in a way of opprobium, or scorn; as if one should say, the Lord of a fly. It is most probable, that this name Beelzebub was given this Idol God, not by the Accaronites or Phenicians, but by the Jews; and that from a great contempt and just hatred of the Accaronitick Idolatry. Yea Vossius (de Idolol. lib. 2. cap. 4.) following the conjecture of learned Jos. Scaliger herein, thinks that this name Beelzebub was curtailed by the Jews; who, by an easy mutation, turned the Accaronitick name (according to Scaliger) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 baal zebahim, the Lord of Sacrifices, into the contemptuous Title of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Baal zebub, the Lord of flies, i. e. a God that regarded only flies; or that could not drive away the flies, by reason of their multitude, from the Sacrifices. This name Beelzebub is, in the New Testament, changedinto 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Beelzebul. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being made 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 zebul, for greater contempt sake: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies dung or abominable, by which name the Gentile Gods are characterized, 2 King. 23. 24. whence this name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is in the New Testament 2 Kings 23. 24. applied to the Prince of the Devils: as indeed this Accaronitick Beelzebub was the chief of their Idols. Hence also Hell was by the Greeks called Accaron, according to that of the poet, Acheronta movebo; because Beelzebub the Prince of those Daemon Idols, was God of Accaron, as M●de and Bochart. The like Glassius (lib. 4. Grammat. S. Tract. 3. observ. 4.) The name Baalzebub 2. Kin. 1. 2. which in the New Testament is written 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 2 Kings 1. 2. B being changed into L. Mat. 12. 24. Luk. 11. 15. refers Mat. 12. 24. to the Idol of Ekron, and signifies the Lord of a fly or flies: peradventure because it was thought to drive away those pernicious flies which infested the Ekronitish country, as Hercules was styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from his driving away Locusts, and Apollo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from dispersing the Phrygian mice.— The Jews traduced the name of this Idol to express the Devil by, and moreover changed Beelzebub into Beelzebul, which signifies the Lord of dung. See more of this in Selden de Diis. Syrum Syntag. 2. p. 211. That Beelzebub was the same with Beelsamen etc. See Owen de Idolol. lib. 5. c. 5. §. 3. This Phenician Baal passed amongst the Moabites and The theogony of Baal Peor Hebraick. Num. 25. 2, 3, 6. Hos. 9 10. Midianites under the Name of Baal Peor. So Numb. 25. 2, 3, 6. Psal. 106. 28. Hos. 9 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Baal peor, which the LXX render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. He was called Baalpeor from the mountain Peor, where he was worshipped as Num. 23. 28. So Apollinaris Psal. 106. 28. (Catena patrum Graecorum) on Psa. 106. 28. And they were joined to Baal peor] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: The Idol of Baal is in the place of Peor; but the Greeks call Baal Belus, whom they affirm also to be Saturn. Joseph Scaliger makes Baal Peor to signify the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thundering Jupiter. Jerom on Hos. 9 lib. 2. tells us, that Baal peor the Idol of the Moabites, is the same with Priapus. So Isidorus Orig. lib. 8. cap. 11. Baal peor (says he) is interpreted an image of ignominy; for it was an Idol of Moab, surnamed Baal, on the mount of Peor, which the Latins call Priapus, the God of Gardens, etc. That this Baal peor was the same with the Grecian Priapus, seems evident by their parallel sacrifices and worship. For, as fornication was a main piece of worship, they performed to their lascivious God Priapus, so we find the same performed to Baal peor, even by the Israelites. So Numb. 25. 1. Israel is said to commit whoredom Num. 25. 1, 2, 3. with the daughters of Moab: which is explicated v. 2. by bowing down to their Gods]. i e. in a way of fornication: whence 'tis said vers. 3. Israel joined himself to Baal peor] i. e. worshipped him by fornication. We have it expressed in the same manner, Psal. 106. 28. By, joining themselves to Baal peor, is meant their Psal. 106. 28. worshipping him by fornication: and by eating the sacrifices of the dead we must understand (with Austin on this place) their sacrificing to dead men, as to Gods or Baalim. They worshipped Baal peor, their chief God, (which Vossius makes to be the Sun) by fornication and sacrifices: or else we may refer these sacrifices of the dead to those they performed to their inferior Baalim, which were but some noble Heroes or Princes; who after their death were deified, and so became middling Gods or Mediators; as elsewhere. But thus much for Baal peor, concerning whom, see more Vossius de Idololatr. lib. 2. c. 7. §. 4. The Phenician Baal passed amongst the Ammonites Moloch amongst the Ammonites the same with Baal. under the name of Moloch, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Melek, the King. So 1 King. 11. 7. Moloch is styled the Abomination of Ammon, 1 King. 11. 7. Leu. 18. 21. Leu. 20. 2, 3, 4, 5. 2 Kings 23. 10. Amos 5. 26. Act. 7. 43. which v. 5. is styled Milcom, etc. So Leu. 18. 21. Leu. 20. 2, 3, 4, 5. 2 Kings 23. 10. Thus Amos 5. 26. with the parallel, Act. 7. 43. we find mention of the Tabernacle of Moloch; where junius and Tremelius subjoin this exegetick Note: You have ministered in show in the Tabernacle of the Living God; but you have worshipped really Moloch, the God of the Ammonites, (which by your impiety you have made yours) and other Gods of the Heathens, Synecdochically. This God of the Ammonites the Prophet, in this place only, mentions, because the Ammonites being their neighbours, he would more sharply strike at their Idolatry. Tarnovius says, that the Affix in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes, that the Israelites framed an Idol proper to themselves, according to the form of the Ammonitick Idol. See more Glassius Gram. S. lib. 4. Tract. 3. observ. 17. (pag. 867. edit. 22.) That Moloch is the same with Baal or Belus, appears 1. from the parallel import of the names: for as Baal signifies Lord, so Moloch King. 2. We find them also both joined in one word, Malech Belus, i. e. Lord King. 3. Their identity is farther evident from the image of Moloch; which consisted of 7 conclaves, relating to the Sun, Moon, and 5. Planets; answerable to that of Baal. 4. Baal and Moloch had also the same reference: for as Baal passed for the Sun and Saturn, so Moloch. 5. Their Identity is farther apparent from the samenes of their worship. So Owen (de Idololatr. lib. cap. 7.) That Moloch (says he) is the same with Baal, seems to be evident from the samenes of their worship: for they sacrificed also their sons to Baal and that in the valley of Hinnom, as Jer. 7. 31. etc. As for the worship performed to Moloch, we have a general account thereof in the Scriptures above named; namely, that the Parents in honour of this Idol God, were wont to traduce their children through the fire. This Traduction, as Vossius (de Idolo. lib. 2. cap. 5.) will have it, was not a burning of them, but februation, i. e. purgation of them; or a certain kind of expiation, wherein the children were led or drawn by the Priests, or parents, through a space between two great fires, etc. This he conceives is the meaning of all these Scriptures which mention their passing through the fire, not their combustion. Though he denies not, but that, besides this kind of Februation, there were also expiations made by burning of persons in times of calamity, etc. This explication of that Learned man seems not to answer fully the mind and import of those Scriptures, which mention the sacrificing their children to Moloch: for Psal. 106. 37, 38. 'tis said, they sacrificed Ps. 106. 37. 38. their sons and daughters to Devils, and shed innocent blood, the blood of their sons etc. Unto Moloch we may refer the Gods of Sepharvajim, Adramelech, and Anamelech; to whom also Adramelech and Anamelech. 2 King. 17. 31. they burned their sons, as 2 King. 17. 31. Adramelech, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, signifies the great and valiant Moloch, or King. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Addir is an attribute given unto God, which signifies properly potent, valiant, great, excellent, as Psal. 93 4. Anamelech imports the oracle, or answer of Moloch: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 implies an answer. Or else it may be derived from the Arabic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifies rich, as Voss. lib. 2. c. 5. Bochart (Can. lib. 1. cap. 28. fol. 584.) tells us, that Adranus is the name of a Syrian or Phenician God, as the Compound Adramelech, 2 King. 17. 31. which Idol, some of the Hebrews make to have the effigies of a Mule, others of a Peacock. This Adramelech signifies a magnific King, etc. I shall conclude this of Moloch, with that account I find of him in Bochart, (Can. lib. 1. cap. 28. fol. 528.) Tophet, amongst the Hebrews, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the fire of Gehinnom, i. e. the valley of Job. 17. 6. Esa. 30. 33. Hinnom, or Hell, as they take it Job. 17. 6. and Esa. 30. 33. the translation being taken from the valley of Tophet, which is also Gehinnom; in which they were wont to cast their children alive into the fire, in honour of their Idol Moloch, as 2 King. 23. 2 King. 23. 10. Jer. 7. 31, 32. 10. and Jer. 7. 31. 32. which custom the Phoenicians usurped before Moses' time; as it appears Levit. 18. 21. Deut. 18. 10. and the Carthaginians retained this impious superstition even unto Hannibal's time. Thus Bochart. The Samothracian Cabiris, Phenician Gods. §. 5. Amongst the Phenician Gods we may reckon the fourseth the Sincerity and Fidelity of God, in giving Laws with severe Prohibitions against sin, Promises and Invitations unto Sinners to repent, etc. To this first branch of their Objection we shall answer more distinctly and in its parts in what follows, §. 3, 4, 5. at present let this general Response suffice, that the Sincerity and Faithfulness of God is sufficiently vindicated, in that God's Commands, Promises, and Invitations unto Sinners, flow from his complacential, legislative Will, which is the Measure, Rule, and Reason of our duty and actings towards God; but his Predeterminative Concourse flows from his Beneplacite Decretive Will, the Rule and Measure of his own actings towards his Creature: Now these two wills, albeit they are not repugnant each to other, because they are not ad idem, yet they are disparate and divers: the things commanded by God may be repugnant to the things predetermined by him, yet his will commanding is not repugnant to his will predetermining. Indeed Gods preceptive will is only in an analogic, figurative improper sense termed the will of God, as significative of his sovereign pleasure for the Government of his Creature; and therefore Gods predetermining men to the material act of what is sinful, implies not the least shadow of repugnance to his Sincerity and Fidelity in giving Laws and Prohibitions against Sin, or Promises to penitent Sinners. Yea, there is nothing that our Adversaries can urge against us for asserting a predeterminative Concourse, but may be retorted against them for asserting an immediate previous Concourse to the substrate mater of Sin: Yea, let them but grant, as they do, God's certain prescience of sin, and the same black Imputations which they load us with, will all fall with as much weight on themselves, as before Chap. 5. §. 2. 2. As for what they urge from the Justice of God, that our 2. From Divine Justice. Hypothesis is contradictory thereto, in that he cannot in Justice punish that Sin, which he predetermines men unto, we answer, (1) That God's Predetermination lays no violent force or compulsion on the will to sin: he doth only as the first cause and God of Nature sweetly though potently apply the will to its act. (2) The will doth in the very same moment, wherein it is predetermined by God, voluntarily and freely, as a deficient depraved faculty, elect the very act it is predetermined unto; so that it doth as freely, deliberately, and fully espouse the act, as if there were no Predetermination on God's part: and what more just than that the Sinner should be severely punished for that sinful act which he doth deliberately and voluntarily exert? (3) Here is in this objection a poor Sophism, which they call Nocause for a cause: For Gods predeterminative Concourse is not the cause of men's sins, albeit men's sins be a necessary consequent thereof. (4) The same difficulties, which our Adversaries urge us with in point of Divine Justice, return on them, who assert an immediate previous Concourse to the Mater of Sin; neither can they without apparent violence to their own Reason impute this objection to us, which their own Hypothesis is as much obnoxious unto. 3. They urge us with an Imputation on the Clemence and Mercy 3. From God's Clemence and Mercie. of God, in that predeterminative Concourse to the entitative Act of Sin, makes the blessed God to be cruel towards his poor Creature; and this two ways: As (1) In that it makes God absolutely to predestine or reprobate men to eternal Punishment, without regard to their Sins. (2) In that it supposeth the blessed God to threaten and punish Sin with eternal Torments, and yet irresistibly to predetermine yea impel men thereto, as Baron. Metaph. p. 151. This Objection our Adversaries adorn and exaggerate with many specious and plausible pretextes for the Vindication of Divine Clemence and Mercy, as they pretend, and for our confusion; Yet we no way doubt but to make it appear, that all is but as emty vapour before the Meridian Sun. Therefore to answer, (1) to the first branch of the Objection, That our Hypothesis makes God absolutely to predestine or reprobate men to eternal Punishment, without regard to their sins, [1] We grant, that the Decree of Reprobation is, and must be according to our Hypothesis, absolute, because there is an adequate commensuration between absolute Predefinition and Predetermination, as our Adversaries also maintain; of which before Chap. 5. §. 3. [2] Yet we peremtorily deny, that God reprobates or predestines men to eternal punishment without any regard to their sins. Divines say, that albeit sin be not the motive or ground moving God to reprobate men, yet it is considered in the Decree of Reprobation as that for which God will at last condemn men. It's true, the Supralapsarian Divines, who make man as labile the object of Reprobation, differ somewhat from those of the sublapsarian persuasion, who make the corrupt mass, or lapsed man the object of Election and Reprobation; yet they both take in the consideration of sin in the Decree of Reprobation; and they both make the Decree of Reprobation in itself absolute: for the Sublapsarians make sin only a common condition of the corrupt Mass, not distinctive or discriminative of Reprobates from the Elect; as Davenant, Animadvers. on God's Love, p. 84. proves, That the Supralapsarians charge not God's Reprobation with man's destruction; Though he himself goes the Sublapsarian way. But, [3] Here lies the bitter root of this forged Imputation affixed on us by our Adversaries, that they consider the Decree of Reprobation as an act of Divine Justice, which regards the object as already constituted, and not the constitution thereof. This is incomparably well observed by judicious Davenant in his answer to Hoard, Animadvers. p. 229. For those Inferences therefore, That if absolute Reprobation be granted, God may be properly called a Father of Cruelty, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I marvel how he trembled to think of them, and how he never trembled to utter them. That wherein he perpetually is mistaken, is, the making of Nonelection or Negative Reprobation a Vindicative act, the confounding it with the judicial Sentence of Damnation, the conceiving it to work in the Non-elect an invincible necessity of committing Sin, with such like monstrous fancies, which he takes for Principles needing no proof, whereas they are such gross errors as need no confutation. (2) The second part of the Objection, which supposeth the blessed God to threaten and punish Sin with eternal torments, and yet irresistibly to predetermine and impel men thereunto, has been sufficiently refuted in what precedes, §. 1. and indeed throughout this whole Discourse, and will also come under consideration in what follows. 4. Our Adversaries charge also our Hypothesis with a Repugnance 4. From Divine Sanctitis. to the Sanctity and Purity of the Divine Nature, in that, by asserting Gods predeterminative Concourse to the substrate mater of Sin, we make the act of sin to be wel-pleasing to God. This objection is greatly aggravated by a Reverend Divine among ourselves, who in the confutation of Twisse, argues thus: If God willeth that sin existe by his Permission, (1) He willeth Sin. Yea, (2) God wils sin as much as man. Yea, (3) This makes God equally to will Sin and Holiness. Yea, (4) Then God takes complacence in Sin. Answer. These are high charges indeed, and if they could be made good against us, we should not deserve protection from any wel-governed Kingdom or State: for what more inconsistent with civil Government, than to make the Supreme Rector and Governor of Mankind equally to will Sin and Holiness? But these Calumnies and Reproaches are not of yesterday, but have been time out of mind imputed to the assertors of Efficacious Concourse, and therefore we have been more large in the refuting of them, §. 1. of this Chapter. Thus Bradwardine, De Caus. l. 2. c. 28. p. 572. When it is argued, saith he, that the sinful act doth please God Well, (1) The Adverbe Well may determine the Verb to please God, in regard of the Divine complacence, and so there is no doubt, but that as the evil Act [entitatively considered] doth please him, so it is highly wel-pleasing to him: or (2) in regard of the Act that is wel-pleasing; and that either in regard of the substance of the act, or in regard of its vitiosity: [1] If we regard the act naturally, so it's true, that it is wel-pleasing to God, but if we regard it morally, so it's false. [2] If we regard the vitiosity of the act, so it is not properly effected by man, nor yet by God, it being not properly an effect, but pure Privation only. An acute and excellent Decision of this Controversy, were not the minds of men eaten out with Prejudices; the sum whereof is this, The Act of sin entitatively and substantially considered is naturally good, and so wel-pleasing unto God, the Author of Nature; yet if we consider it morally in regard of its vitiosity, so it is infinitely displeasing to God. This is as a Key to open the door to a more full solution to all objections against us: so that at present we need say no more than this, that our Hypothesis is no more obnoxious to these aspersions, than that of our Adversaries. Is not the Divine Sanctity as illustrious in Gods predetermining to the substrate mater of Sin, as if we held only with our Adversaries an immediate previous concourse thereto? Are not those very Acts, which are morally evil as to the Sinner, both naturally and morally good as to God? Suppose he predetermine to the entitative act of sin, yet must we thence necessarily conclude, that he predetermines men to sin formally considered? Must not the sinful qualities of all moral effects be imputed to the second particular cause, and not to the first universal cause? It's true, the Sinner comes short of the Divine Law, and therefore sins, but doth God come short of any Law? Has not his Will the same Rectitude which his Nature is invested with, and therefore whatever he wils must be right and holy, even because he wils it? The sin which he governs, is it not only sin in regard of the Creatures will, not in regard of his will? It is confessed, that God and the Sinner concur to the same sinful act materially considered; but yet is their Concourse the same? Yea is there not morally an infinite distance between the one and the other? Doth Sin as to God's Concourse, include any more than a natural act, which is in regard of God and the conducibilitie it has to his glory morally good? but doth it not, as to man's Concourse, speak moral vitiosity? Again, what doth God's permission of sin imply, but a natural or judiciary Negation of that Grace he is no way obliged to give? But doth not sin as to the sinner denote a moral privation or deficience of that rectitude which ought to be in his act? Is there any thing in the world purely, simply, and of itself sinful, without some substrate mater naturally good? What reason therefore can our Adversaries allege, why God may not predetermine the will to the said substrate mater, without prejudice to his Sanctity? §. 3. We descend now to a third objection taken from the Object. 3. From God's word. Word of God, both Preceptive and Promissive, which divine Predetermination of the will to the substrate mater of sin, doth, according to the Antithesis of our Adversaries, render useless, impossible, yea collusive and unsincere. For say they, God's Precepts, Promises and Comminations, whereof man's Nature is capable, should be all made Impertinences, through his constant overpowering those that should neglect them. 1. As to God's Laws and Prohibitions they urge, That our ●. Preceptive. Hypothesis renders them altogether useless, yea naturally and simply impossible. This they exaggerate with many fine words and rhetoric flourishes, which are the best arms they have to defend their declining cause with. But having God and Truth, though naked and simple, on our side, we no way doubt but to stand our ground against all their fiery, or venomous darts. And in answer to the first part of their Objection from the Impossibility of divine Precepts and Prohibitions, we answer, (1) That our Adversaries greatly please themselves in their false sophistic Ideas and Notions of what is possible, or impossible; which we have endeavoured to clear from that ambiguity and confusion, Chap. 1. §. 4. with endeavours to explicate what is possible and what impossible to corrupt Nature, as to divine Commands. (2) We are to know, that the Laws of God in their Second Edition were primarily intended to subserve the ends of the Gospel as to the heirs of Salvation, to whom they are by Grace in an Evangelic way made possible. The Law is said to be given in and by the hands of the Mediator, i. e. to subserve his ends, which principally regard the Elect. (3) Yet we grant, that the Law is also of great use even unto Reprobates, [1] In that it lays a great restraint on them, not only as to wicked actions, but also as to lusts in some measure, as Exod. 34. 24. The Authority and Majesty of Divine Precepts, backed with many severe Curses, leaves a great awe and restraint sometimes on the most debauched spirits, and so keeps their lusts from open violences. [2] The Precepts are so far useful to Reprobates, albeit they have no power to observe them, in that they are thereby instructed, how much obedience is wel-pleasing to God, and how ungrateful they are in not performing of it: whereby they are left without all Apology or Excuse. The Precept shows us what we ought to do, not what we can do: it is always imperative, albeit not always operative: and may not the Sovereign Lord require of man the payment of his debts, although by reason of his profligate bankrupt humour he hath disabled himself from the payment of them? What excuse is it for the Sinner to say, it is impossible for him to obey the Precept, whenas the impossibility lies in his own will, not in any force or defect on God's part? Doth he not in that very moment, wherein he is predetermined by God to the entitative act of Sin, voluntarily espouse and will that act? And doth not this leave him without all shadow of Excuse? Where can he loge the blame of his Sin but on his own crooked depraved will, which electively and freely determines itself to the Sin, in the same moment of time, though not of nature, that it is predetermined by God to the entitative act? (4) We affirm, that God's certain Prescience of men's sins, with the conditional Decree of Reprobation, God's immediate previous Concourse to the entitative act of sin, and man's universal impotence to perform what is spiritually good, which are all granted by our Adversaries, bring sinners under as great impossibility of obeying God's Commands, as absolute Reprobation and predeterminative Concourse to the mater of Sin asserted by us. This is well demonstrated by a judicious and awakened Author in his late Letter touching God's Providence about sinful Acts, etc. from p. 67. to 74. But because he is a party, I shall mention only the Response of Davenant, Animadv. p. 341. As for God's Law, which cannot be kept without supernatural Grace, we say, that men are as capable of any supernatural Grace, considered under the absolute Decrees maintained by S. Augustine, and by the Church of England, as considered under the conditional Decrees of late framed by Arminius. And p. 418. he strongly proves, That Divine eternal Prescience of future Actions or Events infers as absolute a necessity of such events and impossibility of the contrary, as the Decrees of absolute Predestination and Reprobation do▪ of which hereafter, §. 8. 2. As for the later part of our Opponents Objection, From 2. From God's Promises and Invitations. the Promises and Invitations of God, which are made useless and collusive by our supposed divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of Sin, we answer, (1) That all God's Promises and evangelic Invitations, which (1) All Promises primarily intended for the Elect. are but branches of the Covenant of Grace, are primarily intended for the elect Heirs of Salvation, to whom they are many ways useful, notwithstanding Divine Predetermination: For the blessed God promiseth life and happiness on the condition of Repentance and Believing, not as if there were any potence or ability in corrupt nature, by its own freewill, to accept of these offers, or perform the Condition on which the offers depend, but thereby convincing the Soul of its extreme impotence, he doth together with the offer and invitation made convey Grace into the elect Soul, for the enabling of it to perform the Condition: So that these general and conditional Promises are in reference to the Elect, for whom they are primarily designed, operative of Grace, albeit as to others they are only exactive of duty: whence the impossibility which attends corrupt Nature is taken off as to the Elect by Divine Grace. (2) Neither are those general evangelic Promises and Invitations (2) The use of evangelic Promises as to Reprobates. useless as to Reprobates: for, [1] They declare the infallible and essential connexion which there is between the condition and the thing promised therein, namely, Life and Salvation. And to make this more clear, we are to remember, that both Logic and rectified Reason assures us, that a conditional enunciation doth not always note a possibility of the Antecedent, and Consequent, but only their necessary connexion: that in all conditional Propositions, on which evangelic Exhortations and Invitations are founded, there cannot be supposed an indifferent and indeterminate possibility of the Antecedent and Consequent, but only the connexion of the Antecedent with the Consequent, is evident from that of our Lord, John 15 6. If a man abide not in me he is cast forth, etc. Whence it is apparent, that a solid and serious Invitation unto Sinners may be built on a Condition in some mode impossible: The God of all grace has, by his evangelic Constitution and Covenant, established an inviolable connexion between Faith and Salvation, so that this Proposition is infallibly true, If thou believest, thou shalt be saved: and the holy God has given his Minister's Commission to preach it to all Mankind, neither is there the least collusion or fraudulent intention on God's part, albeit he doth predetermine the Most of men to the substrate mater of Unbelief: for the sincerity of God's intention appears in the reality of the offer, which consists in the infallible connexion of the Consequent with the Antecedent, grounded on the evangelic Pactum or Ordination, as Davenant well observes, Animadvers. on God's Love, p. 377. where he shows, That the Decree of God, permitting Pharaoh to abuse the gifts of God to his own destruction, was not contrary unto the end or use whereunto those gifts and actions of God had a fitting ordination in their own nature. So p. 387, 388. he demonstrates, That Divine eternal Decrees, whereupon may infallibly be inferred the abuse of Grace temporally offered, do not cross the end for which such Grace is administered to persons not elected. And he gives this reason for it, p. 352. God meaning must be always interpreted according to the known nature of the Means, and not according to the unknown Will of God concerning the infallible event or success of the Means. God's meaning, when he offers any Grace unto men, is that they should perform such actions whereunto such grace conduceth: and his meaning when he promiseth glory unto any man, if he believe and persevere, is truly to perform it if he so do. But it is not always God's absolute will to cause men to use his Grace to their own good.— If the Remonstrants will have nothing termed God's meaning but his absolute Will, in their opinion as well as in ours it will follow, that God had no meaning to give Cain or Judas saving Grace or Glory. Lastly, p. 392, 393, 394. he proves, That God doth by his will of Approbation and Complacence unfeignedly will what he commands and exhorts men to, albeit he decree the contrary event. Hence, [2] These general Promises and Invitations have this use also as to Reprobates, that it leaves them without the least shadow of pretence or Excuse for their unbelief: for if God doth by such Promises and Invitations declare his real intention to save men if they believe, and withal an expectation that they accept his offers, yea, his complacence in such an acceptation in order to life, with a provision of all means necessary thereto, what excuse can men have for unbelief? Will they say, that Gods predetermining men to the entitative act of unbelief contradicts such a real intention? Take the Reply of Davenant, Animadv. p. 271. We answer, that God is no otherwise said to intend outward events, than by providing orderly means for the producing such events. Nonelection provideth no means of making men sin, and therefore it includeth no intention of God to make men sin, though it include a prevision of sinful Events, and a Decree to permit them, etc. (3) The Hypothesis of our Adversaries in granting Predetermination (3) The Antithesis of Antipredeterminants' destroyeth the use of Promises, etc. as much as our Hypothesis. to what is good, and Divine Prescience of sinful acts, doth as much dispirit and destroy the use of Divine Promises and Invitations as ours. For, [1] In that they assert none can perform the condition required, and so embrace the evangelic offer made, without efficacious predeterminative grace, do they not leave all Reprobates under as great an impossibility of Believing as we do? Are not all offers, for want of this predeterminative Grace, altogether useless to them, for whom it never was intended? [2] So also as to God's certain Prescience of their Sins, did not God, according to their Concessions, certainly foreknow, that they would never, yea never could accept of the offers made to them, without predeterminative Grace, which he decreed never to give them? Hence doth not this certain Prescience infer as natural and absolute impossibility, as our predeterminative Concourse to the entitative act of Sin? This is well argued by Davenant, Animadv. p. 242. His [Hoard's] nibbling at the Synod of Dort, and charging them with maintaining a fatal Decree, is to little purpose. If he call that fatal, which is certain and immutable, we are not afraid to affirm, that all Gods eternal Decrees are certain and immutable; and that very eternal Decree of Reprobation, which he imagines to follow upon the foresight of men's final impenitence, is as absolute and immutable, and in this sense as fatal as that which we defend. Thus also p. 332. The Remonstrants (we add also the New Methodists) dare not promise Salvation to any persons reprobated, according to their decree founded upon the prevision of their final Infidelity and Impenitence, but under these Conditions, Si crediderint & poenituerint, if they shall believe and repent: we assure them of Salvation under the same conditions, notwithstanding the absolute Decree of their Nonelection, we add, and God's Predetermination to the entitative act of Sin. (4) To put a period to the vain Cavils of our Adversaries, 4. What Power we allow to Reprobates. we grant, that even Reprobates, notwithstanding Gods absolute Reprobation, and Predetermination unto the entitative act of sin, still retain a remote radical power and Indifference of will to embrace the good things offered in the Gospel. For neither doth the natural corruption of the will, nor yet Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin take away the radical Indifference or Flexibility of the Will, or the passive, natural remote power it is naturally invested with, as a rational elective faculty, to embrace whatever good, whether natural or spiritual, that is absolutely or conditionally tendered to it: and this sufficeth to ground divine Exhortations and Invitations on; for the Propositions and Offers being made to rational Creatures, they might, were they but willing, embrace the things that belong to their peace tendered to them; but here lies the Plague of their hearts, Joh. 5. 40. They will not, etc. So that the blessed God making such gracious offers, so suitable to the needs of a rational creature, and having given him a remote, passive, natural power of understanding and will suited thereto, doth not this suffice to leave him without all excuse for his wilful Impenitence and Infidelity, notwithstanding the predeterminative Concourse of God to the entitative act of his Sin? And that this is the Doctrine of the Calvinists and Church of England, we are assured by Davenant, Animadv. p. 257: They confess, that under the Evangelical Covenant, Si credideris, salvus eris, If thou believe, thou shalt be saved, every man hath a true claim to Eternal Life: They confess, that wheresoever is Christ's Church, there is such a sufficient administration of Grace as would have saved the Non-elect, had they not opposed a malignant voluntary act of their own will against the motions and operations of Divine Grace; according to those words of our Saviour, Joh. 3. 17. & 12. 47, 48. & Act. 13. 46. Calvin saith as much, in Joh. 3. Mundi nomen iterum iterumque repetit, ne quis omnino arceri se putet, modò fidei viam teneat. He therefore, as well as the Remonstrants, grants a conditional possibility of Grace and Salvation to all men; but we say, the non-elect are always permitted to fail in the performance of the condition. And doth not this sufficiently vindicate the sincerity of God in all his Evangelic promises, invitations, and tenders of grace and happiness, yea every way as much as the new Method of our Adversaries, who grant certain prescience and predetermination to what is good? §. 4. Another Objection urged by our Opponents against predetermination Object. 4. From the overthrow of Religion. to the substrate mater of sin, is, that is overthrows all Religion, and makes men's faculties, whereby they are capable of moral government, remiss, sluggish, useless and vain; yea they stick not to avouch, that this our Hypothesis opens the door to Familisme, Enthusiasm, and the most prodigiose impieties and enormities: This they aggravate with many rhetoric aggravations. Answer, This Objection is grounded on the same false Hypothesis with the precedent, namely, that the will predetermined by God is moved only by an inward violent impulse, which makes all God's precepts, promises, and comminations mere impertinencies, and men's faculties useless and vain. What a gross Sophism this is, and how much the Hypothesis of our Adversaries falls under the force of it, as well as ours, we have already, in what precedes, sufficiently demonstrated, and shall do again in what follows. We shall only add at present an excellent demonstration and solution given by judicious Davenant, Animadv. pag. 418. For the second branch of this reason, whereby he goeth about to prove that absolute predestination and reprobation destroy both Hope and Fear; it is grounded upon an error confuted and rejected by the common consent of all Divines, namely that the eternal Decrees of God concerning future events make the contrary events impossible, do make the temporal and immediate Agents to do all they do out of an absolute necessity, having no liberty in modo agendi to abstain from so doing, or to do the contrary. Were this true, the Remonstrants, who acknowledge eternal and absolute Decrees, upon a presupposal of an eternal absolute prescience, should by their Doctrine destroy hope and fear (the nerves of Religion) as well as we. But more of this in answer to the next Objection. §. 5. The last Objection we shall mention, (which is indeed first Object. 5. From the liberty of the Wil. in order of nature) is, that our Hypothesis overthrows the liberty of the will, introduceth a fatal necessity, and is the darling of Hobbes, with the like unjust and scandalous reproaches. This is much urged by Strangius, Baronius, and some of name among ourselves. Answer, (1) In this I confess the spirits and principal forces of The injustice of the New Methodists in urging this objection, and its inconsistence with their own sentiments. all their Objections centre, and that which the Defendants of efficacious concourse have been in all Ages urged with by the Pelagians and Patroness of free wil Thus Augustin was ever and anon upbraided by the Pelagians with a design to introduce a fatal necessity: the like the Synod of Dort has been reproached with by the Arminians: and now, because the name of Hobbes sounds very harsh in Christians ears, therefore that is fastened on us. But this is no new method, but long since invented by the Accuser of the Brethren, for the oppressing of this suffering truth. (2) What the true Idea and notion of Liberty includes, and thence how little our Hypothesis doth infringe the same, we have sufficiently demonstrated in the explication of the liberty of the will, Chap. 1. §. 3. (3) We answer with Bradwardine, lib. 3. cap. 29. pag. 739. that God violently impels no man to sin, albeit he spontaneously impels or draws the will voluntarily to the substance of that act which has sin annexed to it; of which see what precedes Chap. 4. §. 2. (4) Our Adversaries seem herein very unjust, in that they fasten their false Ideas of predeterminative concourse and liberty on us, and so make us to hold what follows upon their sentiments. For they placing the wils liberty in an actual indifference and indetermination; as also making all predeterminative concourse to act by violent impulses on the will, which being so impelled remains no longer free, but is acted as a machine, etc. it's no wonder, if from such false principes their forged consequence and conclusion follows naturally. Thus Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 11. p. 243. makes Gods predetermination to the entitative act of sin, to be an impulsion to sin. The like is urged by one and another Divine of name among us, who will allow no predetermination to the entitative act of sin, but what is violent impulsion. It's true Bradwardine, lib. 9 cap. 29. pag. 739. useth the word impel for Gods predetermining concourse, and the like Twisse; but then they limit it to such a spontaneous voluntary impulsion, as is no way prejudicial to the wills liberty: But our Adversaries make all predeterminative concourse, even in the supernatural acts of Grace, to be by violent impulses, such as leave the will no more power to act in a contrary way, than a mere Machine, which is impelled by a vis impressa, a force impressed from some extrinsec efficient: for thus they express themselves, that to be predetermined even in the supernatural acts of Grace, is to be constantly managed as mere Machine's that know not their own use. I must confess had we such Ideas of predeterminative concourse, it would necessarily follow, that the human will is thereby divested of all its liberty; neither can I see how our Adversaries will be ever able to defend themselves against the Pelagians and Arminians on their principes, which suppose all predetermination to be a violent impulsion like that of Machine's. I ever disliked the Cartesian Hypothesis, which makes the souls of Brutes to be but Machine's; but to make the human soul and will of man to be but a Machine in the reception of predeterminative grace or concourse introduceth that fatal necessity the darling of Hobbes, which is injustly fathered on us. We say, that predeterminative concourse is as to its principe and mode of working the same as to natural and supernatural acts; neither doth it in the one or tother at all infringe the liberty of the will, but fortify and confirm the same, in that it works sweetly according to the indigence of the wil And this I shall with much confidence assert, that we can with as much reason defend the conciliation of human liberty with Divine predetermination of the will to the substrate mater of sin, as our Adversaries the New Methodists can defend the conciliation of human liberty with Divine predetermination to the supernatural acts of Grace: for albeit the terms produced be different, the one a supernatural, the other only natural good; yet predetermination as to its principe the Divine will, as also as to its manner of working, which is agreeable to the condition and liberty of the will, admits no difference. And this Baronius was sufficiently apprehensive of, and therefore denied all predetermination; and I no way doubt but that in the issue our Adversaries will be forced to deny all predetermination, or to grant us what we contend for as to the substrate mater of sin. Yea, (5) we shall yet ascend a degree higher and affirm, That God's certain prescience of sin, which our Adversaries generally allow, infers as much a necessity on the will, as predeterminative concourse to the entitative act of sin. This we have sufficiently demonstrated, Chap. 5. §. 2. and therefore shall here only superadded an excellent demonstration of judicious Davenant, Animadv. pag. 418, 419. For the Divine eternal prescience of future actions or events inferreth as absolute a certainty, immutability, necessity of such events, as the Decrees of absolute Predestination and Reprobation do; (we may add, by a parity of reason, predetermination which is adequate to absolute Decrees) And therefore the Schoolmen are as much troubled in answering the Question, Whether the Divine prescience, or providence brings a necessity to the things foreknown? as in the other, Whether Divine predestination imposeth a necessity on things? And the Philosophers, who never dreamt of Predestination or Reprobation, were yet much troubled to show, how any thing could be fortuitous or contingent, admitting an eternal and infallible prescience of all future events in God— So that if this Author, or any other Remonstrant, will but take the pains to consider, how the Schole-Divines clear the eternal and infallible prescience, will, and providence of God from imposing fatal necessity upon events foreseen, willed, provided, he may with the same facility know how to clear the eternal absolute Decrees of Predestination and Reprobation from imposing on men's actions any fatal irresistible necessity. As God's absolute prescience doth not take away the possibility of the contrary action or event, no more doth his absolute Decree. Thus our judicious Davenant, in vindication of the absolute Decree of Reprobation, which holds most true also of Divine predetermination as to the substrate mater of sin: for according to the confession of our Adversaries, Strangius and others, absolute Reprobation necessarily infers Divine predetermination as to the entitative act of sin. CHAP. VII. The genuine Hypotheses of the Predeterminants', with the Antitheses of their Adversaries, particularly the New Methodists. (1) The genuine Hypotheses of the Predeterminants', with the false Hypotheses and consequents imposed on them by the Molinists, Arminians, and New Methodists. (2) The Antitheses of the New Methodists, with their dangerous consequents. §. 1. IT has been the practice of our Adversaries in all Ages to cloth our Hypothesis of efficacious predeterminative Concourse with the Bear's skin of many false Ideas and black ugly consequences, but their own Antithesis with the sheep's clothing of many fair and colourable pretextes; wherefore to vindicate ourselves and unmasque them, we shall add, as a Coronis to this Discourse, the genuine sentiments of such as defend Divine predetermination, etc. as also the proper Antitheses of their Adversaries. The genuine Hypotheses of of the Predeterminants'. 1. THere is nothing future but dependently on some absolute Decree of God, either effective or permissive. 2. The Futurition of the entitative act of that which is sinful, is from the effective will of God. 3. The Futurition of sin is from the permissive will of God, efficaciously decreeing to leave men unto sin. 4. The actual existence of sin is the consequent, but not the effect of Reprobation. 5. God absolutely decreed to permit Adam's Fall, Strang. 858. Davenant, Animadv. p. 322, 323. 6. God's Decree to permit sin is not otiose, but efficacious. 7. God efficaciously decrees to permit sin for the manifestation of his own Glory. 8. God's absolute Decree of Reprobation impels no man to sin, Ward, pag. 132. 9 There is no act so substantially and intrinsically evil, but the vitiosity thereof may be separated from the entitative act. 10. God doth not predetermine, much less impel any man to the least sin. 11. God doth not predetermine the will to any sinful act, as it morally refers to its object, but only physically, Alvarez, refer. Strang. 240— 242. 12. God's predetermining the will to the material entitative act, whereunto sin is annexed, doth not bespeak him the Author of Sin. 13. God, by his efficacious will and actuose providence permits the will to sin, but is no moral efficient thereof. 14. God, by predetermining the will to the entitative act of sin, doth not temt men to sin, Jam. 1. 13. 15. In sinful acts God predetermines the will only to the entitative act, not to its sinfulness; but in good acts, God predetermines the will not only to the act, but also to the goodness thereof. 16. Sin is committed against God's will of complacence and approbation, but not against his will of natural permission. 17. Predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin is very well consistent with the natural liberty of the will, and its natural, passive, remote power of receiving Laws, and obeying the same. 18. God's predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin may very well be reconciled with his wisdom, veracity, and sincerity in the prohibition and punishment of sin. 19 God punisheth one sin by leaving men to another, yet without being guilty of the least sin. 20. Sin by Divine wisdom is made a means accidentally utile and subservient to Divine glory, albeit it hath no moral bonity in it. 21. All God's invitations, comminations, exhortations, and promises argue in God a real will of approbation, and Evangelic intention that Sinners repent and live, albeit they never repent. 22. God's physic complacence is towards the entitative natural act of sin, and yet his moral displicence is against its obliquity and vitiosity. The false Hypotheses and Consequents imposed on the Predeterminants', by Molinists, Arminians, and New Methodists. 1. GOds absolute Decrees, which give futurition to things, take away all power from the creature of acting contrarily, yea make the contrary naturally, and simply impossible. 2. The futurition of sin is from the effective will of God, yea very God, Str. 631, 632, 635. Le Bl. Concord. Libert. par. 1. Thes. 55, etc. p. 454. as before, c. 5. §. 1. 3. The Decree of God giving futurition to sin necessitates men to sin. 4. The existence of sin is from Reprobation as the proper cause thereof. 5. God impelled and necessiated Adam to fall, Baron. Metaphys. 150, 151. 6. God's efficacious Decree to permit sin makes him the Author of sin. 7. God wils and decrees sin as sin, yea simply wills and intends the damnation of Sinners. 8. God's absolute Decree of Reprobation impels men to sin. 9 In acts intrinsically evil the vitiosity cannot be separated from the entitative act considered in its individual nature. 10. Predeterminative concourse brings men under a fatal and Hobbian necessity of sinning. 11. In acts intrinsically evil God predetermines the will to the act as sinfully relating to its object, Strangius, pag. 206, 234, 240, etc. 12. God's predetermining the will to the material entitative act of sin makes him the cause of sin, Strang. pag. 341, 342. Baron. Metaph. 150, 151. 13. The Sinner doth not determine himself to any sinful act any other way than God, Strang. pag. 242, 243. 14. God doth more than temt men to sin, in that he predetermines the will thereto, Strang. pag. 269. 15. Predeterminative concourse to the entitative act of sin maketh God to afford as much influence and concurrence to the worst of actions as to the best, Strang. pag. 277. 16. God doth not only permit sin, but approve of it, yea take complacence in it. 17. Predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin, destroys the liberty of the will, introduceth a fatal necessity, and makes the mater of all God's Laws to Adam and his posterity, a natural, simple, and absolute impossibility, Strang. 567. Bar. Metaph. 150. 18. God's predetermination to the entivative act of sin is irreconcilable with his wisdom and sincerity in prohibiting and punishing sin, Baron. Metaphys. pag. 151. 19 God, in punishing sin by efficacious dereliction or leaving men to sin, becomes guilty of sin. 20. God wils sin and approves of it as a means naturally and morally conducing to his glory. 21. That Gods predeterminative Concourse to the substrate mater of sin makes him not really to intend what he pretends to by all his invitations, promises, comminations, and exbortations to repent: 22. God takes not only physic complacence in the entitative act, but moral complacence in sin, by predetermining the will to the entitative act thereof. §. 2. Having given the proper Hypotheses of the Predeterminants', The Antitheses of the New Methodists and Antipredeterminants', with their consiquents. with the false Hypotheses and consequences imposed on them by their Adversaries, we now proceed to lay down the proper Antitheses of the Antipredeterminants', and more particularly of the New Methodists, and the dangerous consequences which naturally result therefrom. The Antitheses of the New Methodists and Antipredeterminants'. 1. THE Futurition of allthings is not from the Divine will and decree, Strang. 628, 631. 2. The futurition of allthings is not simple, but complexe, Strang. 640. 3. The futurition of allthings is not eternal. 4. The same particular cause that gives existence to any thing gives futurition to it. 5. The futurition of the entitative act of sin is not from the will of God, but the will of man, Strang. 585, 628, 631, 632. Le Blanc, 454. 6. Whatever God wils he approves: or complacence is essential to all acts of Gods will, Strang. 546, 548. 7. God decrees not the entitative act unto which sin is intrinsically appendent, Strang. 562, 587. 8. There is a twofold Decree in God, one absolute, the other respective, conditionate, and consequent, Strang. 546. 9 All God's Decrees are not particular, but some general only, Strang. 558. 10. Reprobation is not absolute, but conditional, dependent on the prevision of men's actual sins. 11. God's prescience of men's sins is conditional, and dependent on men's freewill, not on the Decree of God, Strang. 642, 647. 12. God's permission of sin is only privative and inefficacious, Baron. Metaphys. 157, 158. 13. God wils only his own permission of sin, not the existence of sin by his permission, Arminius. 14. There is a twofold Concourse of God, the one predeterminative, the other only general. 15. It doth not belong to the perfection of God's Providence absolutely to predefine and predetermine all free acts of the human will, Baron. Metaphys. 147. Strang. 568, 584. 16. All positive real Being's and acts are not from God as the first cause of Nature, Strang. 584, 630. 17. God predetermines to what is good, but not to the material entitative act of that which is intrinsically evil. 18. What is predetermined is naturally and simply impossible. 19 Man in his lapsed state has a moral power to close with Divine exhortations and offers. 20. Unregenerate men may prepare themselves for the entertainment of Grace. 21. To predetermine the will to the entitative act of sin is to impel men to sin. 22. Divine predetermination to the entitative act of sin puts an end to human liberty. 23. Some human acts are indifferent in individu●, and so neither good nor evil. 24. Some human acts are so intrinsically evil, that the vitiosity cannot be separated from the entitative act. The dangerous Consequents of those Antitheses. 1. NOthing is certainly and infiallibly future. 2. Complexe Propositions are in order of Nature before their simple terms. 3. God did not from all Eternity foresee allthings future. 4. Nothing is future before it is existent, at least in its particular causes. 5. The futurition of sinful acts is a mere contingence to God. 6. There is in God a velleity, or imperfect conditional volition which never takes effect. 7. There is something in Nature which was never decreed by the God of Nature. 8. God hath a general antecedent conditional love and desire of the Salvation of all men. 9 Some Decrees of God may be frustrated and never come to pass. 10. The reason why God hated Esau and loved Jacob must not be resolved into the 〈◊〉 or good pleasure of God, but into his prescience of Esau's actual and final disobedience and jacob's obedience. 11. There is Scientia media, or middle Science in God, dependent on man's ambulatory will, and so only conjectural and uncertain. 12. God as an idle Spectator looks on the wicked world, but doth not, neither can omnipotently rule, dispose and order their sinful acts for his glory. 13. When it's said, that God wils the permission of sin, it must be understood only of the effect. 14. All Divine Concourse is not particular, total, immediate and efficacious. 15. The creature is in some natural acts independent and the first cause of its own acts: or, the second cause can act without being applied and actuated by the first cause. 16. God can make a creature, which by having its capacity preserved and made habile, can of itself act without immediate efficacious concourse, Baron. 131. 17. Supernatural good is from God, but not all natural good. 18. Efficacious grace in Conversion destroyeth human liberty. 19 God's efficacious Concourse is in the power of men's natural free will, either to use or refuse the same. 20. God vouchsafeth to all men sufficient grace, which if well improved, he will reward with efficacious grace, Strang. 229. 21. All Predetermination impels the will, and acts it as a mere Machine. 22. There is a twofold liberty, one essential to the will, but less proper, the other accidental, consisting in indifference, which is most proper. 23. Alhuman acts ought not to be performed for God's glory. 24. The vitiosity of sin is essential to some human natural acts, as natural. We do not produce the consequents here drawn from the Antitheses of Antipredeterminants', as their proper sentiments, at least not of all that espouse those Antitheses, but only as such as may be naturally and logically deduced from their Antitheses, albeit they do not formally assent to all of them. FINIS. ERRATES. BOOK II. PAge 489. l. 31. for God read us. BOOK III. Page 10. l. 33. for drive r. deny. p. 22. l. 26. after elsewhere put a period. Item l. 36. deal by. p. 23. l. 32. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 24. l. 39 deal and. p. 28. l. 1. deal and stating. p. 42. l. 36. r. that God only. p. 76. l. 19 r. same. p. 79. l. 38. r. to Gods. p. 80. l. 31. for like, r. agreeable. p. 86. l. 7. r. Tarnovius. p. 89. l. 3. for is he, r. he is. p. 111. l. 18. for Baronius r. Bellarmine. p. 119. l. 16. r. c. 34. p. 129. l. 23. r. This he. p. 142. l. 5. deal who. p. 145. l. 2. r. so not. p. 166. l. 26. r. Compton. p. 170. l. 9 r. it works.