THE COURT OF THE GENTILES. PART iv Of Reformed Philosophy. Wherein Plato's Moral, and Metaphysic or prime Philosophy is reduced to an useful Form and Method. By Theophilus Gale. LONDON, Printed by J. Macock, for Thomas Cockeril, at the Sign of the Atlas in Cornhill, near the Royal Exchange. MDCLXXVII. PREFACE. WHat venomous and efficacious Influences Corruptions in Philosophy diffuse into Theology and Christianity, The first Reformers of Philosophy. has been sufficiently demonstrated throughout the precedent Discourse, touching the Vanity of Philosophy; as also by the late practices of the Jesuits, who have made it their principal concern to adulterate Philosophy, thereby to make it subservient to their corrupt Theology. And it has been to me for some while a sad Contemplation, that Students in Philosophy are compelled to have recourse to the poisoned springs of Jesuitic Philosophy, and therewith to imbibe many poisonous infusions in Theologie. Hence it was that our first Reformers, observing what potent influences corrupt Philosophy had on corruptions in Theology, first attempted the Reformation of Philosophy, and that in order to the Reformation of Theologic and Ecclesiastic Affairs. This noble and generose design was begun by Wiclef, Wiclef. that great English Apostle, who first begun to engage against Antichristian Dogmes in Philosophic Disputes; wherein he attained unto a great Eminence and Fame, both in England and Bohemia: for John Husse was at first illuminated by Wiclefs Philosophic Discourses; who was indeed a person, not only of admirable clarity in explicating Divine Mysteries, but also of a marvellous acumen to penetrate the secrets of Nature and Philosophy. Wiclef was followed by Wesselus Groningensis, who, Wesselus. by reason of his incomparable skill in all Sciences, was communly styled, Lux Mundi. He was called by Philip the Elector Palatine to the profession of Theology at Heidelburg, Anno 1477. but being, by reason of his warm zeal for Reformation, forced to leave his Theologic profession, he undertook that of Philosophy, specially Platonic; which he esteemed most profitable and agreeable to Christianisme. Savonarola. The same generose design was espoused by Hieronymus Savonarola, in Italia, a person of great natural Acumen and Sagacity as to Philosophy, as well as flagrant zeal for Reformation. He reduced Philosophy to a more natural Form and Method, rendering it subservient to Theologie, so far as the Darkness and Iniquity of those times would permit; in which noble undertakement he made no small progress, as it is evident by his Epitome of Philosophy. To whom we may add foarnes Picus, Picus Mirandula. Prince of Mirandula and Concordia, a person of prodigiose Parts and Learning; who was also very zelose in his Endeavours for the Reformation of Philosophy, as well as Ecclesiastic Discipline, as it appears by his most elaborate and learned works. Neither were there wanting some in the following Age, who spent indefatigable studies and endeavours for the Reforming Philosophy, in order to the Reformation of Theologie. Among those Ludovicus Vives, Philip Melanchton, Lud. Vives. Jacobus Faber Stapulensis, and Peter Ramus deserve immortal commemoration. Ludovicus Vives, a person of singular parts and Intelligence in Philosophy, made it his design to detect the Vanity and Abuses of the Aristotelean Philosophy, as depraved by the Scholastic Theologues. He addicted himself principally to the Platonic Philosophy, Phil. Melanchton. as it appears by his accurate commentaries, in August de Civit. Dei. Philip Melanchton gave in like manner a very great advance to the Reformation of Philosophy: who was a person endued with a great Vivacity of judgement, and dexterous Sagacity, whereby he penetrated into the deepest Mysteries of Scholastic sophistry, as well as Philosophy. He excelled all Reformers of Philosophy of his times: whence he is styled by Hornius, First Philos l. 6. c. 9 The Author and Restaurator of Philosophy in Germany: So much was the whole of Philosophy refined by him. He illustrated Logic, Physic, Ethic and Mathematic Sciences; and reduced them to an excellent and useful Method: he pared off from Philosophy a great quantity of sterile, inutile, spinose Questions, and clothed her with a more native evident habit or form, whereby she became Beautiful and Amiable. See more hereof in his life incomparably drawn by Joachimus Camerarius Also Jacobus Faber Stapulensis is greatly renowned for his warm endeavours in order to the Reformation of Philosophy, Fab. Stapulensis. as well as Theology in France; for the which he suffered great Persecutions by the Scholastic Theologues at Paris: yet was he preserved by the Mediation of that illustrious Princess Marguerite de Valois, Queen of Navarre. It was this Stapulensis, who, by his elaborate Lectures and Books, brought to light in the University of Paris, that true Logic and Mathematics, in lieu of that Scholastic sophistry, which before reigned there. That which is most marvellous in him is this, that being educated in the midst of Barbarism, he arrived to so great an Elevation of Philosophic Sciences and ingenuous Arts, as also of Theologie. Beza styles him one of the most noble personages on earth, in regard of his Learning, Piety, and generose designs for Reformation. Out of his School proceeded many Learned men, who proved great Instruments of Reformation. But yet, I conceive, none deserves a more illustrious Character among the first Reformers of Philosophy, Pet. Ramus. than Peter Ramus, who followed the steps of Faber Stapulensis, for the Reforming of Logic and Philosophy, as also of other ingenuous Arts; which lay buried under the Barbarism of Scholastic Theology. He at first professed and taught the Liberal Arts, Philosophy, and Mathematic Sciences in the College Prelaea; and afterward in the Royal College, at Paris. He mostly inclined to Plato's Philosophy, greatly opposing Aristotle, which gained him the hatred of Jacobus Carpentarius, professor also of Philosophy; whose Scholars imbrued their hands in Ramus' blood, in the general Massacre at Paris, 1572. This Ramus was a person of a very generose and flagrant zeal for the Reformation of Ecclesiastic Discipline, as well as Philosophy. Thus we see how much our first zelose Reformers thought themselves concerned for the Reformation of Philosophy, The right use and abuse of Platonic Philosophy. in order to a more pure Theology. And indeed no wonder, since the main corruptions in Theologie have had their origine from some corruptions in Philosophy, as it is sufficiently demonstrated throughout the precedent part of Vain Philosophy. These and such like considerations gave the first Impresses and Impulses to this our present undertakement, for the Reduction of Philosophy to a more sane and useful Form and Method. And whereas in my first Conceptions I intended to have discoursed only historically of Plato's Philosophy, since finding upon a review of Plato's Philosophemes a very great Affinity and Conformity of mine own Contemplations thereto, I have discoursed more largely and Philosophically thereon, reducing mine own sentiments thereto; yet not without variety of Restrictions, Limitations, and Amplifications, as the substrate matter may require. And herein we are not without many Precedents both among the more Orthodox of the Fathers, as also our first Reformers. It's well known, how much Justin Martyr, that great Christian Philosopher, delighted himself in the Study of Platonic Philosophy, even to some Intemperance, in that he affirms, Apol. 1. p. 51. That the Dogmes of Plato were not, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, alien from those of Christ And who knows not how much Augustin doth Platonise, Augustinus noster immensas Deo gratias agit, qùod ad ejus manus pervenerint libri Platonicorum. Picus Mirandul. Apol. p. 82. in some of his most sublime Contemplations? Yea, the noble Picus Earl of Mirandula assures us, that Augustin gave immense thanks to God, for the Platonic Books that came to his hands. So great use did his humble, Spiritual mind make of Platonic Philosophemes, in order to the exaltation of free, efficacious Grace. So likewise among our first Reformers, Picus Mirandulanus, Savonarola, Wesselus, Lud. Vives, Ramus, etc. chief addicted themselves to Plato, in order to the Reformation of Philosophy. Thus also Jansenius, that great Patron of Efficacious Grace, greatly prefers Platonic Philosophy before all other. Yea, may we not avouch, that the choicest Physic or natural Philosophemes entertained by our New-philosophers, Gassendus, Cartesius, etc. are but Imitamen of Contemplations laid down by Plato? This we have endeavoured to make good, in our Philosoph. General. P. 1. l. 3. c. 2. Albeit that Plato's Philosophy has been thus generally entertained by the best of Christian Philosophers, yet it cannot be denied, but that it has been the Prolific cause of the worst Heresies and Corruptions in the Church. For whence sprang Arianisme, Pelagianisme, Mystic Theologie, and may we not say the whole Complexum of Antichristianisme, but from Platonic Philosophy, professed in the School of Alexandria? This is evidently demonstrated in the precedent Part of the Vanity of Philosophy. All this being granted, yet it follows not, but that Platonic Philosophy may be greatly useful if well managed, and rendered subservient to Theologie, as in Augustin. Whereas Origen and his Sectators, the Monks of Egypt, by their too fond estime of Platonic Philosophy, and reduction of the Scriptures, yea the whole of Theology to a subordination thereto, gave the first Formation, yea perfect Lineaments to the Man of sin, and his Antichristian Theology. I shall only add on this Theme what Plutarch, in Cleomene, declares of the Stoic Philosophy; If it fall on great and acute wits, it becomes lubricous, inordinate, and incertain; but if it be mixed with a serious, meek, and humble mind, it greatly conduceth to the true and proper good. So greatly useful may Platonic Philosophy be, if lodged in a serious, humble, meek, believing mind; which hath both Wisdom and Grace to render the same subordinate to Theology. But now having prefaced thus much touching the first Reformers of Philosophy, The Design of this Discourse to render Philosophy subservient to Christian Theologie. and what Method may seem most conducible to the Reformation thereof, we may not conclude without some notices of the principal design of this Discourse, and our procedure therein. As for its original Design, it is too too apparent, that our Theology of late has received great damage and prejudice by the old Aristotelean Philosophy, as Sophisticated by the Jesuits; as also by New-philosophie, as abused by Atheistic wits: would it not then be a design of great moment, so to Reform Philosophy, as to render it no longer opposite, but subservient to Theologie? How far we have attained hereto the Reader must be Judge. As for our procedure herein, thus much, it's hoped, we may without Vanity declare, that we have sincerely endeavoured to render our Philosophemes' Conformable to Sacred Philosophy, and the Doctrine of the Church of England. I must confess, as I grow in years, so I daily grow more and more in the Admiration of the Wisdom, Zele, and Piety of our first great Reformers, Cranmer, Jewel, etc. who delivered down to us the Apostolic Doctrine, sealed by some of them with their own blood. O! how curiose and tenacious were they of the Form of sound Words! But Alas! what a reproach is it now, among wanton wits, to be an Orthodox Divine! What a world of new-coined terms of art are foisted into Christian Theology, virtually if not intentionally to the prejudice thereof! chrysostom understands 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 1 Tim. 6.20. of Novel Terms and Forms, which then began to be introduced into the Church: Alas! what would he say, if he lived in our days, and heard those vain Clamours, and babble about words, which are now affected! And was not this the grand crime imputed, by the Orthodox Fathers, to Origen, That despising the simplicity of the Scriptures and Christian Theology, he affected new Terms and Modes of interpreting Scriptures? which his too great confidence in his own Parts, and presuming himself to be wiser than others precipitated him into, to the subverson of Christian Theology, as Court Gent. P. 3. B. 2. C. 1. §. 8. And may we not fear the like Catastrophe as to those exotic Notions of some now-adays? May not the Doctrine of the Church of England, which now lies bleeding, take up that Lamentation, Zech. 13.8. These are the wounds, with which I was wounded in the house of my friends? Have we not just cause to persuade ourselves, that were there but an Uniformity of assent and consent as to the Doctrine of the Church of England, contained in 36 Articles, there would not be so great a difformity and disagreament about Discipline, contained in the other three? Albeit I am no friend to those vexatiose, contentiose, and inutile Disputes of these Times; yet I have been forced to declare my dissent from some learned and pious men of this Age and Nation; with hopes that it will not bring me under the Imputation of being Contentiose, disaffected, or irrespectuose towards persons of so great estime for natural Parts, Learning, or Piety: For I solemnly declare, that it is no small affliction to me to descent, much more publicly to declare my dissent, from any who are of repute for Learning and Piety: neither could any thing induce me to offer such an apparent violence to mine one repose and retirement, did I not conceive myself under an essential obligation, to give my Testimony to those great Truths and Doctrines of the Church of England, which our Ancestors valued more than their blood. I shall conclude with that of profunde and pious Bradwardine, in his Preface to his most excellent Book, do Causa Dei: where having laid open the Pride, Multitude, and continued Successions of the Pelagians, he breaks out into this pure Flame of Divine Zele, Pag. 5. Burning with Zele for the Cause of God I deliberately thrust mine hand into a terrible flame: For I am not ignorant, how much the Pestiferous Pelagians, enraged in their spirits, will with tumultuose clamours bark at, and with cruel Teeth endeavour to rend in pieces this Paper, or Book. A PROEMIAL SCHEME OF REFORMED PHILOSOPHY. §. 1. WHereas I sometimes intended to have cast the whole of Reformed Philosophy into one Systeme, I am herein in part disappointed, in that I have communicated the principal part of what I intended in my Philosophia Generalis. But what I could not well digest therein, I have now made public in this Part iv Of Moral and Metaphysic Philosophy. So that, to speak the truth, I have now put my last period to Philosophy, without the least Intention of making any farther progress therein: only to give the Reader a breviary of the Form and Method I would assume, were I to cast Philosophy into one entire Systeme or Idea; as also to give him an Index where to find all the parts of Reformed Philosophy more professedly discussed by me, I judge the following Scheme of Philosophy most necessary. Philosophy is either General, or Particular: Particular Philosophy is either Notional, or Real: Real Philosophy is either Natural, Moral, or Supernatural. This General Distribution of Philosophy, taken from its object, seems to me of all most genuine and natural; and that which reduceth it to one uniform Syntagme or Systeme, as it may appear by the following particulars. Philosophy in its General Idea comprehends the following particulars. (1) The General History of Philosophy, General Philosophy. and Philosophers; with their several Sects, Dogmes, Modes of Life, Discipline, and Characters: Of which we have treated copiosely, Court of the Gentiles, P. 2. and Philos. General. P. 1, & 2. l. 1. (2) The Generic Idea of Philosophy, Cognition: which takes in all the Intellectual Habits. As [1] Opinion; which is a kind of Medium between Ignorance and Science, arising either from Sense, or Affection, or Confidence, or Conjectures. It's object is things Physic, Sensible, Singular, etc. Its Attributes, Infirmity and Incertitude, obscurity, Instability and Inquietude: Of which see Philos. Gen. P 2. l. 2. c. 1. [2] Experience; its dignity, Object, Subject, Extension, Qualities and Effects: Of which see Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 1. s. 3. [3] Imitation; wherein are considerable its Nature, Origine, Subject, Object, Effects; namely Images and Signs, regular Use and Abuse; of which, Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2 c. 2. [4] Faith; it's Generic Nature, Object both Material and Formal, Act, Subject, Proprieties, Differences, and Species; of which see Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 3. [5] Sapience; its prime Cause, Object, Act, Proprieties, Effects, Conveniences with and Differences from other Sciences, and Corollaries; of which, Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 4. [6] Intelligence; which is said to be an Habit of or Assent to first Principes, not Practic but Speculative, which give all evidence to, but receive no evidence from conclusions; as Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. s. 1. [7] Science; which is a certain assent to necessary conclusions, by some certain Medium; as Philos. General. P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. s. 2. [8] Art; which is an Imitamen of Nature, or habitual Idea and Exemplar inherent in the Mind of the Artificer, whereby he is directed unto a regular Operation; as Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 5. s. 3. [9] Prudence; wherein we have considered its Subject, the Practic Judgement or Conscience, consisting of two parts, Synteresis, and Syneideses: its Object, both End and Means: its End and Offices, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Its Species, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Good Counsel, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sagacity, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Experience, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sensate and reflex Cognition, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Providence: its Material parts, Ethic, Oeconomic, Politic: its Causes both Dispositive and Proxime: its Opposites and Differences, specially from Carnal Policy or Craft in 20 Particulars: its Effects, Characters, and Corollaries. All which we have copiofely considered, Philos. General. P. 2. l. 2. c. 6. Also Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. (3) The General part of Philosophy includes also the Examen of its Object, Subject, Ends, Adjuncts, Difference from Philosophy and Theology, Excellence, Effects, Corruption, Right use, Parts, as also the Characters and Offices of Philosophers: which we have largely discussed, Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 3. §. 2. Philosophy considered in its Particular Ideas, Notional Philosophy or Logic is either Notional, or Real. Notional Philosophy, termed by the Platonistes Dialecticks or Rational, because the ancient mode of Reasoning was by Dialogues, is now communly styled Logic; which properly treats of Notions, either Simple or Complexe. Simple Notions are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Imitamen or Ideas of things impressed on the mind, without either Affirmation or Negation: as the Notion or Idea we have of a Man, Horse, or the like. Complexe Notions are either Propositions, which, being composed of simple Notions, give some judgement of things; or Syllogisms and Discourses, which are composed of Propositions; or Method, which is composed of simple Notions, Propositions, and Discourses. These are the four parts of Logic; which are taken from its proper End, and answer to the four great Operations of the Mind. For what is the End of all Logic, The End of Logic. but to direct and conduct the Mind into the Cognition of things? Hence Logic is termed by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Art of Introduction, i. e. whereby Men are conducted into the knowledge of things: also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Way and Method for the Acquirement of Sciences, and all useful knowledge. Yea Aristotle, as well as Plato, defines Logic, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Method for the right disposing of every Problem proposed. Whence also Aristotle styles Logic, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Organ or Key of all Sciences; whereby we are introduced into the Cognition of allthings. Aristotle made Logic the Organ of Philosophy, yet no part thereof; but Plato made it both an Organ and Part. So Ammonius, as Court Gent. Part. 2. B. 3. c. 8. §. 3. Of what great use Logic is, not only for the Acquirement of Sciences, but also for the Restauration of the mind to its native clarity and Acumen, in order to a right Apprehension, Judgement, Discourse, and Method, in the Cognition or Disquisition of things, is most evident to any that understands the Nature and Use thereof. Yea, according to the Idea I frame of Logic, the Clarifying and Rectifying of the Mind is its principal End, and that of the Acquisition of Sciences much inferior thereto. For of what use are all natural Sciences, but to Clarify and Elevate the Mind, for the contemplation of more Sublime and Noble Objects? So that to make use of Logic only as an Instrument or Key to Sciences is to deprive ourselves of the principal use thereof; which is to Purify and Refine the Intellect, in order to the more distinct, real and perfect knowledge of things, specially such as are most Sublime and Divine. I no way doubt, but that a judicious person, by the aid of Logic, may be greatly Assisted and Capacitated for the more expedite exercise of Mechanic or Politic Employments: but O! of what incomparable advantage might Logic be in Theologic Contemplations and Controversies, were it but well Reform and seated in a solid, judicious, humble, serious, rectified Mind? So much for the End of Logic. The Vtilite of Logic may further appear if we consider the Parts thereof; The first part of Logic, about Simple Ideas or Notions. which are four, answerable to the four Operations of the mind. 1. The prime or first Operation of the Mind consists in its simple Apprehension of things, without Affirmation or Negation, Judgement or Discourse. This simple Apprehension of things is by Ideas, or Notions impressed on the Mind: These Ideas or Notions arise either immediately from the things themselves, considered in their real Natures and Attributes, or else from the Minds Comparation and Abstraction: the former they call first Notions; the later second Notions. Again these Ideas and Notions may be considered, either in regard of their Quality, namely their Clarite and Obscurity: or in regard of their Quantity, i. e. their Extension or Restriction; their Universality, Particularity, and Singularity. Now the mind of Man having been by the Fall much wounded and disabled, as to the regular exerting this first Simple Apprehension of things, in order to the Acquirement of right Ideas and Notions, hence the first part of Logic is to succour and direct the mind in this its first Operation of simple Apprehension, for the procurement of Clear, Distinct, and real Ideas or Notions, both first, and second, Universal, Particular, Objective Ideas or Categories. and Singular. And because all Subjective Ideas or Notions of things arise from, and are indeed but Imitamen or Images of the things themselves, hence Logic, (1) gins with the consideration of the things themselves, as they lie in their Objective Ideas, and are the Original Exemplars of all Subjective Ideas or Notions impacted on the Mind. Logic handles these Objective Ideas, not as any part of its formal Object, but only as the Substrate Mater, or prime Elements, from which subjective Ideas and Notions arise. These Objective Ideas or real Being's considered in Logic are reduced by the Aristoteleans, (from I know not what Pythagorean Superstition) to Ten Categories or Predicaments; unto which they conceit all Being's are to be reduced, as to their proper Classes. But this Distribution being now generally exploded by all awakened spirits, yea disapproved by some of the more candid Aristoteleans, we shall content ourselves with this curt, yet apparently more native and distinct distribution of Being's. Ens, or Being is either Infinite, or Finite. Infinite Being is but one, namely God, who having no terms of Essence, cannot admit terms of Definition; but doth every way transcend all Predicamental Confinement, as the sober Aristoteleans acknowledge. Finite Ens or Being may be distributed into Substance, or Mode. 1. Substance. [1] Substance is either Incorporcous or Corporeous: Incorporeous Substance is divided into Angels, or Human Souls. Corporeous Substance is either Inanimate or Animate: Inanimate Bodies are either Simple, as the Three Heavens, with the four Elements, Fire, Air, Water, Faith: or Mixed; which are again divided into imperfectly mixed, as Meteors: or Perfectly mixed, as Minerals, Metals and Plants. Animate Corporeous Substance is divided into Brutes, or Human Bodies. Of all these we have copiosely Philosophised, Philis. Gen. P. 1. B. 3. c. 2. and Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9 [2] Mode is not a Complete Ens or Being, 2. Mode. neither is it a mere non-entity or Nothing; but of a middle nature between a complete perfect Being and nothing; or, as some properly term it, Appendicula Rei, an Appendicule, or Little Appendix of a thing. A Mode is either Substantial and Essential, or Accidental. A Substantial and Essential Mode is that which Essentially adheres to the thing, and cannot, no not so much as by Mental Abstraction, be separated from the thing: so that to deny it of the thing Modified thereby, implies a slat contradiction, either Virtual or Formal. Thus Quantity is a Mode Essentially appendent to and inseparable from Corporeous Substance: in like manner all Proprieties are Essential Modes of the Subject they are proper to. Accidental Modes are such as appertain not to the Essences of things, and therefore may be separated, at least Mentally, if not Really. Again Modes may be distributed into intern and extern: Union and Corporeous Forms are intern Modes; but Actions and Relations extern. Thus much for Single Objective Ideas lodged in things. (2) As for Simple Subjective Ideas, and Notions, First Notions. they are usually ranged under these two Heads, of First and Second Notions. First Notions, are such as arise immediately from the thing itself, or from the Comparation and Comprehension of several Individual things under one commun Notion. Hence they may be distributed into Singular, and Universal. A singular first Notion or Idea is the simple Imitamen or Representamen of some one indvidual thing in the mind: as the Idea of Alexander, Plato, or the like. An Universal first Notion, is that which comprehendes and representes many different Species, or Individuals: As Animal, Man, Brute. These Universal Ideas or Notions are either Generic, as Animal; Second Notions. or Specific, as Man. Second Notions are only Terms of Art abstracted and assumed by the busy Mind, the more distinctly to apprehend and express things. All Disciplines, specially Organic, have certain terms of Art, whereunto they reduce things comprehended under those Disciplines. Such are the parts of speech in Grammar, Noun, Pronoun, Verb, etc. Thus in Logic there are certain Second Notions or Ideas, framed out of first Notions collated or compared together. As by comparing all Animals together, we find there is one commun Nature, in which they all agree, albeit they may have in other regards their Specific Differences. Thus it appears, that all Animals agree as to Sense, etc. Thence we conclude that Animal is Genus: which is a second Notion or Term of Art, under which all Animals are involved. So that indeed these second Notions are not Real, but only Mental or Rational Being's, framed out of Real Being's, and unto which all Real Being's are reduced, as to so many Artificial Classes. These second Notions are by some distributed into Separate or Simple, and Conjunct. Separate second Notions are such as agree to things apart: as Genus, Species, Difference; the Whole and the Part; the Cause and the thing Caused; the Subject and the Adjunct, or the Accident. Conjunct Second Notions are such as agree to things Conjunctly: as Convenience, Diversitic, Opposition, and Order. Which are copiosely discussed by Logicians, specially the Ramistes; who in Imitation of Cicero, term this first Part of Logic, which treats of Simple Ideas and Notions, INVENTION; because it furnisheth our Invention with Topics and Arguments, in order to a Judgement and Discourse of Things. 2. Propositions and Judgements. The second Part of Logic regards Propositions or Judgements, as it answers to the Second Operation of the Mind, which consists in a judgement of things by Affirming or denying the same. For albeit the Mind may have a simple Idea or Notion of a thing by simple Apprehension; yet it cannot make a Judgement thereof, without Affirmation or Negation. So that the proper object of this second part of Logic, is, to use Aristotle's stile, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Complexe orations, Notions, or Ideas; such as carry with them an Affirmation, or Negation. Propositions, in regard of their Species and Affections, admit of various distributions. (1) In regard of their Species, or Kind's, Propositions, are distributed, [1] into Simple and Composite. A Simple Proposition is that which cannot be resolved into other Propositions. The Simplicity of a Proposition is taken from the Unity of its Subject, Predicate, and Verbal Copule. As, A man is Rational. A Composite Proposition is that which is composed of other Propositions conjoined. The Principal of Composite Propositions are Hypothetic, and Disjunctive. The parts of an Hypothetic Proposition are copulated by the conditional particle, If: as, If he be a man, he is rational. The first part is called the Antecedent, the later the Consequent. The Verity of an Hypothetic Proposition consists not in the truth of the Parts, but in their Connexion. If the condition be impossible, an affirmative Hypothetic is equipollent to a simple Categoric Negative. A Disjunctive Proposition is that which hath parts conjoined by a Disjunctive particle: as, Every Animal is either a Man, or a Brute. [2] Proposition, as to its kind, is divided into Pure and Modal. (2) The Affections of Propositions are either Absolute, or Relate: Absolute Affections are Quantity and Quality. [1] A Proposition in regard of its Quantity, is either Universal, Particular, or Singular. The notes of Quantity regard the subject of Propositions, which is either Universal or Singular. If the subject be Universal and taken Universally, i. e. in its utmost Latitude and Extension, expressed by the note Al, or No, than the Proposition is Universal: as All men are rational. If the subject be Universal, but limited and confined by some note of Particularity, than the Proposition is Particular: as, Some men are learned. If the subject be Singular, than the Proposition is such: as, Plato was a Philosopher. The Aristoteleans add, though without reason, a fourth sort of Propositions, which they call Indefinite, consisting of an Universal Subject, without any note of Quantity. As, Man is learned: Virtue is beautiful. But their mistake herein is obvious: for if an Universal subject be found without restriction and limitation, it must be taken Universally. Whence the first Proposition, Man is learned, is false; because all men are not so: but the second, Virtue is beautiful, is true, yet not indefinite, but Universal; because all Virtue is so. [2] In regard of Quality, a Proposition is Affirmative or Negative, True or False. A Proposition is true, when it conjoins things to be conjoined, or divides things to be divided. A Proposition is false, when it conjoins things to be divided, or divides things to be conjoined. The Relate Affections of a Proposition are Conversion, Equipollence, Subalternation, and Opposition. 3. Syllogism and Discourse. The third part of Logic is of Syllogisms, answerable to the third operation of the Mind, which is Ratiocination or Discourse. That which induceth a Necessity of Ratiocination and Argumentation is the Composition and Limitation of the human Intellect, which cannot judge of the Verity or Falsity of a Proposition, by the sole consideration of its Terms, without assuming a middle Term or Argument, for the demonstration thereof. A Syllogism may be considered either in regard of its Composition and Constitution; or in regard of its Division and Species. In the Composition and Corstitution of a Syllogism, we may consider both its Mater and Form. 1. The Mater of a Syllogism is either remote or proxime. The Mater of a Syllogism. (1) The Remote matter of a Syllogism is its three Term; too whereof are Extreme, the other Middle. The Predicate of the Question is always the Major Extreme; because it is ever more Universal and Extensive than, or equal to the Subject. Hence the Subject of the Question is ever the Minor Extreme, because less, or not more extensive than the Predicate. The Middle Term is assumed as an Argument to prove the Question, and is collated and compared both with the subject or minor extreme, as also with the predicate and major extreme; either separately, as in simple Syllogisms, or conjunctly, as in composite. This middle Term is so termed not in regard of its Site, but Office: yet in the first Figure it is middle as well in regard of Site as Office. (2) The Proxime mater of a Syllogism is its Propositions; which in a simple perfect Syllogism are three; Major, Minor, and Conclusion. The two first are usually termed the Premises; the last, the Conclusion; which is the same with the Question, or Thesis to be demonstrated. 2. The Form of a Syllogism. The Form of a Syllogism consists in the apt disposition of the Premises, so as the Conclusion may thence necessarily follow. And because all kinds of Conclusions cannot be deduced from all kinds of Premises, hence Logicians prescribe certain general Rules, for the regular deduction of Conclusions from their Premises: These Rules they bottom on certain Axioms, General Axioms and Rules. such as these: (1) Particular Propositions are contained in the general of the same kind. (2) A Proposition becomes Particular or Universal from the Particularity or Universality of its Subject. (3) The Predicate of an Affirmative Proposition having not greater Extension than its Subject, is always considered as taken Particularly; because it is by accident that it is sometimes taken universally. (4) The Predicate of a negative Proposition is always taken universally. From these Principes the following general Rules, for the right constitution of simple Syllogisms, as to their form, are deduced. [1] From two particular Propositions nothing regularly can be concluded. [2] From two Negatives nothing duly follows. For two negative Propositions separate both Predicate and Subject from the middle term. [3] The middle term must once at least either in the Major or Minor, be taken universally. For if it may be taken twice Particularly, it may be taken for divers parts of the same whole: whence the terms of the Conclusion can neither be rightly conjoined, nor separated. As, Some Animal is a Man: Some Animal is a Beste: Therefore some Beste is a Man. [4] The Conclusion ever follows the weaker Part. i. e. If any one Proposition be Particular or Negative, the Conclusion also is Particular or Negative. The reason is; because the Premises are the cause of the Conclusion: now we all know, that what infirmity is in the cause, follows also in the effect. [5] The terms of a Conclusion may not be taken more universally in the Conclusion, than in the Premises: and the reason is manifest; because we may not argue from a Particular to an Universal. [6] The Minor term or extreme is the same in the Conclusion, as it is in the Premises: i e. if it be Particular in the Premises, it is so in the Conclusion: and if it be Universal in the Premises, it must be such in the Conclusion. [7] When the Minor Proposition is an Universal Negative, the Conclusion also must be Universal. [8] When the Conclusion is Negative, the Major Proposition cannot be a Particular Affirmative. [9] When the Conclusion is Negative, the Major term must be taken universally in the Major. The reason is; because it is taken Universally in the Conclusion. [10] A Negative Conclusion cannot be proved by two Affirmative Propositions. The Reasons of these Rules see more fully, L'Art de Penser, or the Jansenistes Logic, Part. 3. C. 3. These general Rules for the right formation of a simple Syllogism being premissed, Figures and Modes. we proceed to Figures and Modes, wherein the formal Constitution of a Syllogism is placed. A Figure is the regular Disposition of the middle term or Argument with the two extremes, or the parts of the Question. A Mode is the regular disposition of the three Propositions, according to their differences as to Quantity or Quality: which Logicians express by these four vowels, A, E, I, O. A denoting an Universal Affirmative; E, an Universal Negative; I, a particular Affirmative; O, a particular Negative. There are three Figures. (1) In the first Figure the middle term or Argument is the Subject in the major and the Predicate in the minor Proposition: hence it becomes middle not only as to Office but Site. This first Figure has four Modes, expressed by certain terms of Art, whose vowels express the Quantity and Quality of the Proposition annexed thereto. As [1] Barbara: which notes each Proposition in the first mode to be Universal and Affirmative. [2] Celarent: which notes the first Proposition to be Universal and Negative; the second, Universal and Affirmative; the third, Universal and Negative. [3] Darij: which notes the first Proposition to be an Universal Affirmative; the second and third particular Affirmatives. [4] Ferio: which notes the first Proposition to be an Universal Negative; the second a particular Arffimative; the third a particular Negative. Of these Modes two are Affirmative, two Negative: the Affirmative are grounded on this principe: Whatever agrees to an Idea or Notion taken universally, agrees also to all that which is comprehended within the extension of that Idea or Notion. Or thus: Whatever is affirmed universally of an Universal Idea or Notion, is also affirmed of all that is contained under that Universal Idea. Thus the Notion of Sense agrees to all Animals; therefore to all Men and Brutes. The Negative modes are founded on this principe: Whatever is denied of any Idea or Notion taken universally, is denied also of all that, of which that Idea or Notion is affirmed. Or thus: Whatever is denied universally of any Universal Notion, is also denied of allthings contained under that Universal Notion. Thus a Brute is denied Universally of all men; therefore also of Peter, John, etc. This first Figure hath two Rules, [1] The major aught always to be Universal. [2] The miner ought always to be Affirmative. The perfection of this first Figure, beyond that of the second or third, consists in these two particulars. [1] In that all manner of Problems, as Universal Affirmatives, Universal Negatives, Particular Affirmatives, Particular Negatives may be concluded herein: whereas in the second Figure the Conclusion can be only Negative, and in the third only Particular. [2] In that the necessity of the Syllogism consequence appears more evidently in this first Figure, than in the second or third. Hence it is, that Logicians advise, that our Arguments be, so far as it may be, reduced to this first Figure; for which they give us many useful Rules. (2) In the second Figure the middle term is the predicate both in the major and minor Proposition. The Modes of this Figure are four, expressed by those fictitiose terms of Art: Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco. The Rules of this Figure are two. [1] The Major aught always to be Universal. [2] One of the Premises, and thence also the Conclusion must be ever Negative. (3) In the third Figure the middle term or Argument is the subject in both Premises. It's Modes are six: Darapti, Eclapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison. Its Rules are two. [1] The Minor must be Affirmative. [2] The Conclusion must be Particular. So much for the Constitution of simple Syllogisms: whereunto we must also reduce Enthymemes; which are imperfect simple Syllogisms, curtailed of some one of the Premises, which lies latent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the mind: thence Enthymeme. A Composite Syllogism is twofold: (1) That which has one or both Premises Composite: This is either Hypothetic, or Disjunctive, A Composite Syllogism. Hypothetic. or Relative. [1] An Hypothetic Syllogism, is that wherein the Major, or Minor, or both Propositions are Hypothetic. If the Major only be Hypothetic, the Conclusion is Categoric: but if the Minor be Hypothetic, the Conclusion also must be Hypothetic. Disjunctive. [2] A Disjunctive Syllogism is that whose Major is Disjunctive: which if it consist only of two members immediately opposite, we may argue from the Position of the one, to the Remotion of the other; or from the Remotion of the one, to the Position of the other. If the Major has more members than two, some being removed, what remains is concluded. When upon the Remotion of both or all the members the whole is removed, the Syllogism is from the enumeration of the parts. [3] A Relative Syllogism is that whose Major includes a relation of the parts. Relative. (2) A Syllogism composed of many Syllogisms is either a Dilemma, or Sorites. Dilemma. [1] A Dilemma is an argumentation from two members, whereof both are attended with incommodity. It consists of a disjunctive Syllogism, wherein from the Remotion of the parts we conclude the Remotion of the whole; Sorites. and two Categorics, whereby the remotion of the parts is confirmed. [2] A Sorites is an Argumentation consisting of many Propositions, so connected, that the predicate of the precedent Proposition is the subject of the subsequent; and thence the last predicate concludes of the first subject. Thence a Sorites contains so many Syllogisms as there are terms between the subject of the first Proposition, and the predicate of the last: as in that of Paul, Rom. 8.29, 30. 4. The fourth part of Logic is touching Method, Method. which directs the fourth operation of the Mind, called Disposition. For the mind of man, so far as rectified, is the Orderer and Disposer both of Notions and Things: and the principal End and Office of Method is to succour and assist the mind in the ordering and disposing of notions and things. And look as Syllogism cures the Mind of Errors, so Method of Confusion. Yea indeed, to speak the truth, Method is very influential on all the former parts of Logic, as also on the operations of the mind, about which they are conversant: For how can the mind define, or divide, or distinctly explicate simple Ideas and Notions without Method? How imperfect and confused will its Judgements, Ratiocinations and Discourses be, unless Method assist? Hence the Ancients, Plato, and others, reduced the whole of Logic to Method, which without all peradventure is the most utile part thereof, if not Comprehensive of the whole. In the general, Method is an Art, whereby the Mind is rendered capable rightly to dispose a series of many simple Notions or Apprehensions, Judgements, and Ratiocinations, in order to the Investigation, Explication, and Demonstration of truth; as also the deeper impression thereof on the Memory. In this description we have both the Object, Ends, and Effects of Method. The Object of Method is, (1) Simple Notions and Apprehensions. Wherein we are to consider their Definition and Distribution: In the Definition we are to consider, [1] The Name. And herein the principal care is to clear the Name from all Obscurity and Equivocation: which is best performed by an Examen of and Inquisition into its Etymology, or Origination, homonymy, and synonymy. [2] The Definition of the Thing; which must be expressed in terms most known and essential: for what is a Definition but the Idea or manifestation of a Thing? As for Distribution, it is of the whole into its parts; which gives a distinct Idea or Notion of a thing. (2) Another Object of Method is, Propositions and Judgements. Wherein we are to avoid all Precipitance, Anticipation, and Prejudice; giving to all Propositions that Measure of Assent as their insite Reason, or Authority requires; admitting nothing as certain or evident, but what we know or have reason to believe is certainly or evidently true. (3) The last object of Method is Ratiocination and Discourse. Wherein we are [1] To leave nothing ambiguous or obscure in the Terms. [2] To deduce all Ratiocinations from principes most certain and evident in themselves, such as no one invested with common sense may gainsay. For first principes give evidence and force to all conclusions, but receive none from them. [3] All Cogitations and Ratiocinations employed for the Investigation of Truth, or Remotion of any error must be digested and ranged into the most natural order: beginning from things more general, simple, and easily to be known; and thence passing on to things more difficult and composite. [4] In seeking out Arguments and examining Difficulties there must be a complete enumeration of all singulars and parts, with a distribution proportionable thereto; that so nothing be omitted, that may conduce to the examen of truth. More touching Method, see Court Gent. Part 2. B. 3. c. 8. §. 3. & B. 4. c. 1. §. Thus much for Logic, wherein we have been the more large; because we have not where treated distinctly and fully of it. §. 3. Real Philosophy may be, according to its different Objects, Real Philosophy. distributed into Natural, Moral, and Metaphysic or Supernatural. Natural. 1. Natural Philosophy regards things considered in their natural Ideas, and Essences: or things considered in their notional extension. (1) Things considered in their natural Ideas and Essences belong to Physic or Natural Philosophy strictly so termed: Physic. which considers Things Natural, [1] In their General Principes and Affections. [2] In their parts; which are two, the Macrocosm or greater world, and the Microcosm or Man. Of which see Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 2. and Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9 (2) Natural things considered in their Notional Extension or Quantity are discoursed of in Mathematics, Mathematic. which comprehend Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, Music, Optics, Geographie, Mechanics, etc. Of which, Philos. Gen. P. 1. L. 1. c. 2. s. 2. 2. Moral Philosophy is, according to its object, Moral Philosophy. distributed into Ethic, 1. Ethic. strictly so termed, Oeconomic, and Politic. (1) Ethic strictly so termed regards the morals of private persons. Wherein we may consider, [1] It's Generic Idea, Moral Prudence: whereof we have copiosely discoursed, Philos. Gen. P. 2. L. 2. c. 6. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. §. 1. [2] It's prime Object, which is the last end and chiefest good: which we have largely discussed, Philosoph. Gen. P. 1. L. 1 3. c. 3. s. 1. & P. 2. L. c. 1. s. 3. also Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 2, 3. & P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. §. 2. [3] The Principes of Human Acts: Practic Judgement, Volition or Intention, Consultation, Election: of which Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 24-27. & P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. also Philos. Gen. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. §. 4. [4] Subjective and Formal Beatitude: wherein we are also to consider Use, Fruition and Delectation, or Joy. Of the first see Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s. 1. §. 2. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s. 3. §. 2. also Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 23. But of Use, Fruition, and Delectation, see Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 1. §. 4-8. [5] The Morality of human Acts: of which, Court Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 29. & P. 4. B. 1. c. 2. § 1, etc. also Philos. Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s. 3. §. 1. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s. 4. §. 1. [6] Natural Liberty, which we have copiosely explicated, Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s. 2. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s. 4. §. 2. also Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9 s. 3. §. 11, 12. & B. 4. c. 1. §. 28. [7] Moral Good, or Virtue, its Causes, Formal Idea or Nature, Parts, and Adjuncts: Of which Court Gent. Part 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 29-32. & P. 4. B. 1. c. 2, 3. also Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s. 3. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s. 4. [8] Moral Liberty: of which, Court Gent. Part 4. B. 1. c. 3. also Philos. Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s. 3. [9] Sin, its Nature, and Causes: of which, Court. Gent. P. 2. B. 4. c. 1. §. 33. & P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. also Philos. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s. 4. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. s. 4. §. 6. [10] The effects and servitude of Sin: Oeconomic. of which, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. (2) Oeconomic: of which, Politic. Philos. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s. 6. (3) Politic: of which, Court Gent. Part 4. B. 1. c. 5. & Philos. Gen. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. s. 6. 3. Metaphysic or prime Philosophy, Metaphysic. which principally regards the supreme most excellent Being and prime Cause of allthings, namely God; his Existence, Essence, and Attributes; his Acts of Creation, and Providence; his Concourse and Gubernation, both Natural and Supernatural, and Creatural Dependence, etc. Which we have more copiosely discussed, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. more cursorily, Court Gent. P. 2. B. 2. c. 8. also Philos. Gen. P. 1. L. 1. c. 2. s. 5. & L. 3. c. 4. BREVIARIE OF CONTENTS. The COURT of the GENTILES. PART iv Of Reformed Philosophy. Preface. THE first Reformers of Philosophy, Wiclef, Wesselus, Savonarola, Picus Mirandula, Lud. Vives, Melanchton, Stapulensis, and Ramus. 1. The Right Use and Abuse of Platonic Philosophy. 4. The Design of this Discourse to render Philosophy subservient to Christian Theologie. 6. A Proemial Scheme of Reformed Philosophy. Philosophy Considered, 1. Generally (1) in its History. (2) In its generic Nature, Cognition. Which includes nine Intellectile Habits. (3) In its Ends, Adjuncts, Differences, Right Use, Abuse, Parts, and Characters, etc. 1. 2. Particularly, 1. As Notional, or Logic. Wherein consider, (1) Its End, the Refinement of the Intellect. 3. (2) Its Parts, touching, [1] Simplo Ideas or Notions, both Objective and Subjective, and these both first and second. 4, 5. [2] Propositions and Judgements. 6. [3] Syllogism and Discourse, its Mater and Form, Figures and Modes. 8, 9 [4] Method, which regards the former three Parts. 12. 2. Real Philosophy. 13. (1) Natural: Physiclogic and Mathematic. Ib. (2) Moral: Ethic or Private, Oeconomic, and Politic. Ib. (3) Metaphysic or Prime. 14. BOOK I. Of Moral Philosophy. CHAP I. Of Prudence, the last End and chiefest Good, Use, Fruition, and Delectation. MOral Philosophy, its Genus, Prudence. 2 Prudence, its Nature and Object. Ib Its Offices and Parts, (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (2) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (3) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 3. (4) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 4. The Subject of Prudence, Conscience. 5. The Law of Conscience. Ib. Synteresis and Syneidfies what. 6. The Rule of Purdence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 7. (1) Subjective right Reason. Ib. (2) Objective right Reason. 8. The Last End its influence in Morals. 9 The last End as extensive as the First Principe, and but one. 10. The last End desired infinitely. 11. God the Last End of al. 12. Assimilation to the Divine bonity the Last End of Man. 13 To adhere to God as our Last End speaks Perfection. 14. The Chiefest Good its Proprietles Ib. (1) It's the Idea of all Good. 15. (2) It's the Preme Beautle. Ib. The Nature of Beaurie Explicated. 16. The Sovereign Beauty of God. 17. (3) The chiefest good most proper. 18. Use and its Regulation. Ib. What Temperance is. 19 The Utility of things in reference to their Last End. 20. Concupiscence the Fruition of created good for itself. 22. Intention of God as the Last End, how it must be ever actual. 23. Fruition, its Difference from Use. 25. All Fruition imports, (1) Love. 26. (2) Union and Possession. 28. (3) Communion with the best Good, 29. By Contemplation and Love. 30. (4) Delectation and Joy. 31. Which requires, [1] a sweet Good. 32. [2] Possession thereof. 33. [3] Action thereon. 34. Adjuncts of Delectation, [1] Reality. 35. [2] Connaturalitie and agreement. 36. [3] Uniformity and Harmony. 37. [4] Purity, [5] Force. 39 [6] Infinitude without excess. 40. The Effects of Delectation, [1] Amplitude. Ib. [2] Quietation and Satisfaction. 41. CHAP. II. Of the Morality of human Acts, and Moral bonity. THE Morality of human Acts. 42. Moral bonity in Conformity to the Divine Law. 46. The measure of Moral Good Perfect. 48. The Universality of a perfect Law. Ib. Subjective right Reason not the measure of Moral Good. 50. No human Law a perfect Rule. Ib. The Divine Law the rule of Moral Good. 51. Right Reason Objective Light. 52. The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule. 54. The Parts and Causes of Moral Good. 55. The Mater of Moral Good. 56. Things Indifferent in Genere and Specie. 57 No Action Indifferent in Individuo. 58. A Virtuose Will the Effective Principe of Moral Good. 60. The best End Essential to Moral Good. 62. The Form of Moral Good in Conformity to the Moral Law. 63. How the Form of Good Consists in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Welldoing. Ib. How far Circumstances Moralise. 64. The Unity and Uniformity of Good. 68 All Good and Virtue Supernatural. 69. The Difficulty of Moral Good. 70. The Virtues of Pagans only lesser Sins. 71. The Distribution of Virtue into Piety and Justice. 72. CHAP. III. Of Virtue and Moral Liberty. MOral Virtue an Habitual Perfection. 74. Moral Liberty as to State in Virtuose Habits. 76. Virtue gives, (1) Dominion. 78. (2) Life, Health, Vigour, and Force. 79. (3) Amplitude and Enlargement. 80. (4) Nobility and Dignity. 82. (5) Beauty and Glory. 84. Moral Liberty as to Exercise. 85. (1) Contemplation of God. 86. (2) Adherence to the chiefest Good. 87. (3) Dependence on the first Cause. 90. (4) Conformity, [1] To God's Precept. 93. [2] To his Providential Wil 95. (5) The reference of allthings unto God, as the Last End. 96. Moral Libertle of Exercise the highest, demonstrated, (1) From its Order. 98. (2) From its spontaneity and suavity. 99 (3) From its Vitality. 101. (4) From its Amplitude. 103. (5) From its Purgation of Sin. Ib. (6) From its Stability. 104. (7) From its Improving Virtue. 105. (8) From its Formal Beatitude. 106. CHAP. IU. Of Sin and Moral Servitude. SIN a Transgression of the Law. 108. Sin as to its formal Reason Privative. 110. The Causes of Sin, (1) Man's defectibility. 111. (2) The vitiosity of human nature. 112. The Nature and Influence of Original Sin. 114. (3) Practic Error. 115. (4) Self-love. 119. Sins of Ignorance, Passion, Wilful. 121. The Moral Servitude of Sin. 122. (1) Sin repugnant to human Nature, 123. [1] As a Falling from God. Ib. [2] As it strips of the Image of God. 124. [3] As Enmity against God. 125. [4] As it divestes men of Humanity. 126. (2) Sins repugnant each to other. 127. (3) Sin most Impotent. 128. (4) Sin the defilement of the Soul. 129. (5) Sin full of Shame and Reproche. 130. (6) Sin the Tyranny of the Soul. 132. (7) Sin full of Penury and Want. 133. (8) Sin the Fetters of the Soul. 134. (9) Sin Folie and Madness. 135. (10) Sin makes Men Bestes. 136. The Adjuncts and Effects of this Servitude. 137. The Servitude of Sin, (1) Voluntary. Ib. (2) Necessary: the Degrees and Kind's of this sinful Necessity. 138. (3) Infinite as to Number and Magnitude. 141. (4) Penal: with the Nature of Punishment. 142. (5) Sin in itself the greatest Punishment. 144. (6) Other Punishments of Sin. 145. [1] Sin breeds Fear and Shame. Ib. [2] Sin full of Instability. 146. [3] Sin full of Anxiety and Torment. Ib. [4] Eternal Punishment of Sin. 147. Sinners Dead in Sin. 148. (1) The Death of Sin not Metaphoric or Hyperbolic, but Real. 149. (2) No Seeds of Virtue or Spiritual Life in Corrupt Nature. 150. (3) The Impotence of Corrupt Nature to what is Good Universal and Total. 152. (4) Man cannot prepare himself for the Reception of Virtue. 153. (5) No Freewill in Nature to Moral Good. 155. CHAP. V Of Plato's Polity, its Essential Constitution, and Administration. POlitic Philosophy what. 158. Polity, its Form in Order. 159. The Object of Polity, the Multitude or Community. 161. God the Founder of all Polities. 162. Man's Inclination to Sociatle. Ib. Consociation constitutes a Politic Body or Society. 163 Al Consociation by some Law. 164 Perfect Polity requires Amity and Fraternity. 165. Religion the Principal Ligament of Politic Society. 166. The Ends of Polity, (1) God's Glory. 169 (2) To render men Virtuose. 170. (3) The Good of the whole. 171. (4) Mutual Assistences. 172. A Politic Body or City what. Ib. Legislation, its Origine. 176. The Necessity of Laws. 177. All Laws Originally from God. 178. The Qualification of human Legislators. 179. All Laws from the Multitude. Ib. All Laws for public Good. 181. Virtue a principal End of Laws. 182. The Qualities of good Laws. 183. The Law of Equity, its use. 184. Conservators of Laws. 185. A Law its Equity and Constitution. 186. Three kinds of Politic Administration; Monarchy, aristocraty, Democraty. 187. Monarchy mixed with Democraty. 190. Mixed Polity its use. Ib. Moderate Empire best. 191. Tyranny Empire, its Origine, etc. 192. The Evils of Tyranny. 193. Civil Magistrates, 1. Their End. 194. 2. Their Qualifications, (1) Wisdom both Natural and Acquired. 195. Knowledge of human Laws and Facts. 196. Knowledge of Divine Laws. 197. (2) Virtue, both Natural and Moral. 198. (3) A Public Spirit, free from Self-interest. Ib. A Magistrates Diet and Richesses'. 199. (4) His Education and Examen. Ib. Scriptural Qualifications. 200. A Magistrates Faculty and Authority. Ib. (1) Divine, (2) Human. 201. Magistrate's Conservators of Laws. 202. The Magistrates Exerclce of his Office, (1) With Justice, without Bribery. 204. (2) With Temperance. 205. (3) Moderation, (4) Clemence, (5) Fidelity. 206. The Effects of Polities Good and Bad 207. Things destructive to Republies, (1) Atheism. Ib. (2) Lururie and Idleness. 208. (3) Prosperity and Poverty. Ib. (4) Divisions. (5) Injustice. 209. BOOK II. Of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophy, etc. CHAP. I. Of Metaphysic in General. ARistotle's Metaphysics. 210. Metaphysic Sapience, what. 211. Metaphysic a Natural Sapience. 212. Contemplation, its proper Act. 213. Contemplation of God best. 214. CHAP. II. Of Atheism, and the Existence of a Deity. THe Origine of Atheism. 215. Atheism, (1) From Polytheisme. 216. (2) From Vain Philosophy and Policy. 217. (3) From Man's Carnal Mind and Pride. 218. Three sorts of Atheism. 220. The Monstrose Nature and Pestiferous Influences of Atheism. 221. The Punishment of Atheism. 222. The Existence of God demonstrated, (1) From Universal consent. 223. (2) From the Subordination of second Causes to a First. 224. The World made by a Prime Cause. 225. (3) From a Prime Motor. 228. (4) From the Order of the Universe. 230. (5) From the Connate Idea of God in the Soul. 231. (6) From Practic Arguments. 232. [1] From Conscience, its Notions and Exercices. 233. [2] From the sense of Religion. 234. [3] From the Politic World. 235. [4] From the Atheists Cavils and Enmity. 236. CHAP. III. Of God his Names, Nature, Attributes, Unity, and Simplicity. Gods' Name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being. 237. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah. 239. Jehovah the proper Name of God 240. The explication of Jehovah and Jah. 241. Ehjeh, Elohim, El, Shaddai, Adonai. 242. Elion, Zebaoth, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 243. The Divine Essence and Attributes. Ib. God not Capable of a Definition. 244. God's Essence Absolute and Independent. 245. 1. The Divine Unity demonstrated. 249. 2. The Simplicity of God Explicated. 251. The Simplicity of God demonstrated. 254. CHAP. IU. Of God's immutability, Infinitude, Eternity, Immensity, and incomprehensibility. 3. THe immutability of God. 257. God Immutable, (1) In his Essence. 259. (2) In his Immanent Acts. 260. (3) In regard of his Word. 263. God's immutability demonstrated. Ib. 4. God's Infinitude demonstrated. 266. (1) By his Independence. 267. (2) From his Unity and Simplicity. 268. (3) From his Transcendence. 269. (4) From the Idea of Perfection. 271. (5) From the infinite bonity and Beatitude of God. 273. (6) From God's Infinite Power. 274. 5. God's Eternity explicated, (1) By Scripture. 275. (2) By Plato's Philosophemes. 276. The Eternity of God demonstrated. 277. What Eternity is. 279. (1) Eternity not measurable by time. Ib. (2) Eternity without beginning or end. 281. (3) Eternity most Simple and Uniform. 282. (4) How Eternity coexistes to the parts of Time. 283. (5) Eternity a fixed Instant. 284. (6) Eternity the same with the Divine Essence. 286. 6. God's Immensity and Omnipresence. 288. The Explication and Demonstration thereof, (1) From the Infinitude of the Divine Essence. 290. (2) From God's Simplicity. Ib. (3) From his Infinite Power and Operations. 291. 7. God's incomprehensibility. 292. It's Demonstration by 6 Arguments. 294. How far we may apprehend God. 296. Against Poetic figments of God. Ib. Against Curiosity in our Inquiries after God. 297. The least Notices of God of great moment. 299. All Notices of God by Divine Revelation. Ib. The Grades or Ascents of Knowing God, (1) Natural. 300. [1] By way of Causalite. 301. [2] By way of Eminence. 302. [3] By way of Rematiom. 303. (2) Supernatural, [1] By Christ. Ib. [2] By the Scriptures, etc. 304. CHAP. V Of God's Life, Knowledge, Will, and Power. THe Life of God. 305. Life in its generie Notion. 306. The Life of God, (1) most Spirituose. 307. (2) Most Actuose. 308. (3) Most Self-moving. 309. (4) Life itself. 310. (5) Eternal Life. 311. (6) The first cause of Life. Ib. God's Science and 〈◊〉 most Perfect. 312. The Object of God's knowledge. 313. (1) The Divine Essence. Ib. (2) Allthings cognoscible. 114. The Object of God's Owniscience, (1) Complexe Intelligibles. 315. (2) Incomplexe Intelligibles. 316. (3) The Human soul. 317. God knows allthings by his Essence. 318. How the Divine Ideas represent allthings. 321. God's Science, (1) most Simple. 322. (2) Intuitive, not discursive. 323. (3) Immutable and Necessary. 325. (4) Most Certain. 327. (5) Absolute and Independent. Ib. (6) Eternal. 329. (7) Infinitely perfect, Essentially, Intensively, Extensively. 330. God's Simple Intelligence. 331. God's Science of Vision. 332. God knows things future by his Wil Ib. Against Scientia Media. 334. The Will of God. 336. (1) The Object of the Divine Wil 337. (2) The Divine Will one pure Act. 338. (3) The Divine Will Independent. 339. God Independent Physically and Morally. 340. (4) The Divine Will Immutable. 343. (5) Gods Will Absolute, not Conditionate. 344. (6) Gods Will Antecedent, not Consequent. 347. (7) The Divine Will most perfect. 348. [1] Intensively. [2] Extensively. 349. [3] Effectively. 350. (8) The Divine Will most Free. 351. What Indifference may be ascribed to the Will of God. 352. (9) Gods Will Irresistible. 353. God's Will distributed, (1) Into Decretive, or Preceptive. 355. (2) Into Secret, or Reveled. 356. (3) Into Complacential, Providential, and Beneplacite. 357. God's Power. Ib. God's Power his Essence. 358. God's Ordinate Power the same with his Wil 359. The Object of God's Power, every thing possible. 360. What things are Impossible. 361. Divine Power Omnipotence. 363. CHAP. VI Of God's Justice, veracity, and Sanctity. Also of the Trinity. THe Justice of God. 365. God's Absolute Justice as to the afflicting the Innocent, and acquitting the Nocent. 367. How far God's Punitive Justice is necessary. 368. God's Ordinate Justice from his Wil 370. God's Ordinate Justice the same with his veracity. 371. No Acception of Persons with God. 372. The Difference between the Justice of God and that of Men. Ib. How far God's Justice regards the Qualities of its Object. 373. God's veracity and Fidelity. Ib. (1) In fulfilling Promises. 376. (2) In fulfilling Threats. 377. God's veracity Demonstrated. 378. The Sanctity of God. 379. Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinity, with their Abuse. 382. CHAP. VII. Of God's Prime causality, Efficience, and Concourse in general. 1 GOD the first Cause of allthings. 387. 2. The Object of Divine Concourse. 391. (1) God's Concourse not merely conservative of the Principe. 392. Durandus' Objections against Gods Immediate Concourse to all Operations answered. 394. God's Concourse to the Substrate matter of Sin what. 395. (2) Divine Concourse reacheth the human Will, and all its Acts. 396. (3) God's Concourse universally extensive as to all Objects. 397. (4) God's Concourse Principal. 398. How Second Causes are all Instruments of the First. 399. 3. Divine Concourse as to its Principe or Subject. 401. (1) God's Concourse not his Essence absolutely considered. 402. (2) God's Concourse proceeds not from any executive Power in God. 403. (3) The Divine Will Omnipotent. 404. (4) The Divine Will of itself Operative and Influential on all second Causes and Effects. 405. 4. The Adjuncts of God's Concourse. 406. It is, (1) Immediate. Ib. [1] God Concurs Immediately to every Act of the second Cause. 408. [2] God Concurs Immediately to the second Cause itself. 409. [3] The Act of the first and second Cause the same. 410. (2) Independent and Absolute. 412. (3) Previous and Antecedent. 416. (4) Total, not Partial. 417. (5) Particular, not general only. 420. Objections against Gods Particular Concourse answered. 421. (6) Most potent and efficacious. 422. God's Moral and Physic Concourse. 426. God's Efficacious Concourse Demonstrated. 427. (7) Congenial and Connatural. 428. The suavity and Efficace of Divine Grace. 429. CHAP. VIII. Of Creation, and Providence in General. Gods' Creation demonstrated and explicated. 431. Creation the Production of something out of nothing. 432. Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil 433. Passive Creation a mode of the thing Created. 435. The Providence of God demonstrated. 436. The Wisdom of Divine Providence. 439. The Eternal Law of Providence. 441. The Wisdom of Providence Active. 442. Providence an Act of the Divine Wil 443. The Spirit the Immediate Efficient of Providence. 445. Platonic notions of the Mundane Spirit. 447. Providential means used by the Spirit. 449. No second Cause can act but in Subordination to God, and by his Providence. 450. Fire the Create Universal Spirit. 452. The Object of Divine Providence Universal. 453. The particular Objects of Providence. 454. The Adjuncts of Providence. It is (1) Efficacious. 455. (2) Immobile and fixed. 456. (3) Connatural and Agreeable. 457. (4) Beautiful and Perfect. Ib. (5) Mysterious. 459. The distributions of Providence. 460. Of Miracles. Ib. Providential Conservation proper to God. 461. God's Conservative Influx Immediate. 463. God's Conservation by his Word or Wil 464. God's Conservation by Means. 465. God's Extraordinary Provision for some. 466. Conservation continued Creation. 467. The Object of Divine Conservation. 468. CHAP. IX. Of Divine Gubernation in general; and as to Sin. DIvine Gubernation. 469. God the supreme Gubernator. 470. Divine Glory the last end of Divine Gubernation. 471. The order of Divine Gubernation fixed. 472. None can avoid Divine order and Gubernation. 474. The order of God's Gubernation a Law. Ib. God's Gubernation by second Causes. 475. God's Gubernation reaches allthings. 476. Divine Gubernation as to Man, (1) Moral, by Law. (2) Efficacious. 477. Wicked Men fall under God's Gubernation. 478 God's Gubernation about Sin. Ib. The Causes and parts of Sin. 479. God not the Author of Sin. 480. God the Prine Cause of the Entitative Act of Sin. 482. God's Concourse to the Entitative Act of Sin Demonstrated. 483. How Sin falls under the Divine Wil 485. God's Will about the Obliquity of Sin Permissive. Ib. God's Permissive Will about Sin Efficacious. 486. God's Gubernation of Sin Ordinative. 487. Judicial Gubernation of Sin. 488. God's Attributes Illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin. 489. CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue, Virtuose Men, and Angels. SVpernatural Illumination from God. 490. The Infusion of Virtues. 493. God's care of Virtuose Men. 496. God's Gubernation of the Angelic World. 498. The Angelic Law, Obedience, and Disobedience. 500 Good Angels Ministry as to God. Ib. Good Angels Converse with Saints. 501. Angels employed, (1) at the giving of the Law. 502. At Christ's Birth, and for the propagation of the Gospel. Ib. (2) For the Conservation and Protection of the Saints. Ib. (3) For Information, Counsel, Conduct, and Consolation. 503. (4) Angels Communion with Saints. 504. (5) The final service of Angels. 505. God's Gubernation as to evil Angels. Ib. Satan's the Prince of this World. 507. Satan's Power to Temte. 508. CHAP. XI. Of Creatural Dependence, both Natural and Supernatural. CReatural Dependence what. 509. Every Being Dependent or Independent. 510. One Prime Independent Being. 511. Dependent Being by Participation. 512. The Origine of Dependence. 515. (1) Passive Power. Ib. (2) The Dominion of God. 516. Every Creature Dependent. Ib. Dependence the same with the Essence. 517. Dependence Imports, (1) Subordination. 519. (2) posteriority. Ib. (3) inferiority. 520. Creatural Dependence, (1) As to Futurition. Ib. (2) As to Essence and Conservation. 521. (3) As to Operation. 522. (4) The Dependence of the human Will in all its Acts. 523. Dependence Natural, Moral and Supernatural. 524. Supernatural Dependence on Christ, Ib. (1) For Habitual Grace. 526. (2) For Actual Grace. 527. Table of Hebraic Notions Explicated. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Adonai, my Lord 242, 339 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Ehjeh, I shall be 242 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Light and Fire 452 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Then, Eternity 275 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, El, the potent God 242, 358, 430 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Eloah, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Elohim 242, 358 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, If, a formule of swearing 374 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Amen ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Truth, Fidelity 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, desperately sick 128 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Prince, or Principatie 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Belial, lawless 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a son, devoted 122 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to create 419 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Gillulehim, filthy Idols 129 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to adhere 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a word, or thing 363, 428 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Doth, Order, Law 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, mad sinners 136 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Hallelujah 241 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, separate 496 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, glued 135 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, force or power 429 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to see 35 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Aberration 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Ability, force 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, notes Gods sovereign Will 340, 345 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to search 317 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Jah, its import 241 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Jehovah, its explication 239, 240 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, together 318 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to form 318, 419 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, denotes God's Eternity 275 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, they that dwell, morally 425 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to consume 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Stratagems 506 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the essential Word 385 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Prodigies 461 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Nabal 130 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Villainy, folly 129 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, free, who 83, 130 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Willingnesses 429 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to break 343 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Eternity, strength 374 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to lift up the face, what 366 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to break, infringe 343 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, rebellious 125 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Iniquity 123 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the most High 243 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, toilsome labour 123, 147 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is determined 343 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to evacuate 526 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, tormenting Idols 135 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God's determinate purpose 343 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to supplant 155 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to perfect 419 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, naked 131 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the shadow of death 425 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Zebaoth 243 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Speculator 211 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, holy 82 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Kanna, a Canon 48 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a beam of the Sun 423 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to see 35, 380 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Impetus 125 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Amplitude 80 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to amplify 142 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, poison 128 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Shaddai, self-sufficient 242, 497 Table of Grecanic Notions Explicated. A & Ω, what in Scripture 267 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an Angel, what 498, 499 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sociable 163, 164 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Veneration 82 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ignorance, what 117, 136 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sagacity 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Truth, what 376, 492 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sin, what 108 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Independent 339 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Discord 123 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, unimpedible 515 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Transgression of the Law 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to adhere 89 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, upon, for 525 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Insensibility 140 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Essulgence 304 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mars 82, 104, 156 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Principatie 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, absurd, what 136 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a self-subsistent Idea 327, 339 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-motion 99 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, how applied to God 349 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Democraty 188 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Miracles, what 461 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an Image 304 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Experience 4 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to demand 508 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, He is, proper to God 276 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, been, the form of Good 63 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a good Sensation 4 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God's complacence 345, 357 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Dexterity, what 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Nobisitie, what 83 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God's Beneplacite 345, 357 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Facility of Judgement 4 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, good Order 99 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to take alive 506 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Sun of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El 242 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God, its Origination 243 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Contemplation, what 213 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Jao, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jah 241 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, vitiosity of Nature 115 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Canon, whence and what 48, 99 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Comprehension 8 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to swallow down 507 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to cauterise 140 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Society 158, 159 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, what 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Word 383, 384 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to play the Widwise, in Morals, what it notes 398 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Method of cheating 506 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Monarchy 188 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an Oriental Tradition 299 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Stratagems 506 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Law, what 46, 52, 55, 181, 186 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Castigation 143 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Divine Mind 383, 384 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, proper to Eternity 275, 284 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Concauses, or Instruments 399 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, oligarchy 188 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Being, Gods Name 211, 237, 246 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an Instrument 400 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Right Reason 7, 8, 50, 52 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Definition not proper to God 244 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the eternal Exemplar 441 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, what 258 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Transgression of the Law 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Stupor 125 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to obey fully 138 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to circumvent 506 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a City, what 172, 173 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 159 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 torment 147 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, antecedent Aide 416 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Providence 3, 439 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Larve, Face, Person 369 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Acception of the person 366, 372 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, callose concretion 140 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Miracles 461 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to winnow 509 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Sieve ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sophe 211 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, what 135 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Conscience 6 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Conscience ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to walk by rule 99 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, q. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Sepule●e 149 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Slaves 144 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Order, what 98, 161, 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to order 127 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Prodigies, what 461 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ordained 347 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Trinity among the Platonistes 382 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Tyrant, who 192 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Hypostasis 383 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Law of Conscience 5 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Self-love 119 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Lover of Traditions 211 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Fraternity 115 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Prudence, what 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Character 304 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Poison 128 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to lie, or deceive 375 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the mundane Spirit, what 382, 384, 447 Table of Scriptures Explicated. Genesis. Ch. Verse. Pag. 1. 1 242 1. 3 358, 433, 452 2. 17 377 2. 18 172 2. 23, 24 161 3. 7, 9, 22 124 4. 12, 13 146 10. 9 194 11. 4 274 14. 19 243 14. 20 242 15. 2 ibid. 17. 1 ibid. 18. 14 363 22. 16 373 Exodus. 3. 12 242 3. 14 212, 238, 241, 246 6. 3 241 15. 3 240 15. 11 378 16. 30 128 18. 21 200 22. 8 242 32. 25 131 Numbers. 27. 16, 17 201 Deuteronomie. 1. 13 200 6. 4 249 7. 6 82 8. 3 444 16. 18, 20 205 17. 18, 19, 20 197 29. 17 129 29. 18 128 29. 29 356 32. 40 305 33. 2 502 1 Samuel. 2. 2 379 14. 39 306 15. 29 374, 378 1 Kings. 21. 20 131 Nehemiah. 9 6 468 Job. 8. 16 424 11. 7, 8, 9 292 15. 34 205 26. 13 446 26. 14 358 37. 6, 7 467 38. 41 466 42. 2 314 Psalms. 5. 9 151 7. 9 318 7. 14 146 8. 3 446 10. 4 218 14. 1 ibid. 16. 3 82 16. 4 142 17. 7, 8 496 18. 20 374 19 6 424 25. 13 33 27. 4 35 27. 13, 14 527 31. 1 373 32. 2 109 32. 10, 11 343 33. 6 446 33. 13, 15 318 34. 12, 13 102 34. 7 503 36. 5 374 39 3 87 47. 8 379 51. 10 412 55. 19 275 61. 2 527 63. 8 88, 527 65. 11, 12 465 72. 6 406 73. 26, 28 88, 527 75. 2, 3 167 82. 1, 2 205 87. 7 525 89. 1, 8, 33, 34, 35 374 90. 2, 3, 4 275 91. 1, 4, 10 497 92. 12 379 93. 2 275 97. 1, 2 459 101. 3 109 102. 27 251, 164 103. 4 498 104. 27, 30 446 104. 34 35 106. 5 ibid. 107. 20 444 110. 3 428 115. 3 354, 359 119. 45 80, 93 119. 89 343 119. 123 371 119. 137 365 119. 165 103 135. 5, 6 339, 354, 359 139. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 317, 440 139. 7, 8, 9, 10 288, 410 139. 11, 12, 13 318 141. 8 526 145. 3 269, 292 145. 15 466 147. 4 440 147. 5 314, 330 147. 15, 16 444 147. 9 466 Proverbes. 3. 7, 8 80 4. 23 61 8. 22, 23 275 15. 3 316 Ecclesiastes. 3. 1 467 8. 4 479 Canticles. 1. 4 527 6. 10 161 8. 5 526 Esaias. 1. 4. 156 9 2 425 9 5 242 9 17 129 10. 21 430 14. 20 139 19 18 425 22. 17 130 22. 20, 21, 22 202 25. 1 374 26. 19 406 28. 17 365 32. 5 130 40. 17 238, 246 41. 4 267 43. 1 412 43. 7 419 43. 13 275 44. 5 430 44. 6, 48 241, 246 46. 10 353 53. 11 398 55. 11, 12 406 57 4 150 64. 6 129 Jeremy. 5. 1 137 13. 33 153 17. 9 155 23. 23, 24 288, 314 51. 58 147 Ezechiel. 16. 6 413 16. 44 153 23. 7 129 33. 11 345 Daniel. 2. 20 467 4. 30 218 4. 34 306 11. 36 242 Hosea. 2. 21, 22 438, 465 4. 12, 16 125 4. 17 135 6. 2 146 8. 8 129 11. 12 78 13. 1, 2 131 14. 5 406 Jonah. 1. 14 340 3. 9 377 Amos. 3. 6 482 5. 12 142 Micah. 5. 2 275 6. 9 312 Habakkuk. 1. 13 380 2. 5 142 2. 13 147 3. 4 423 Zecharie. 3. 7 505 9 16 82 Malachi. 4. 2 424 Matthew. 3. 9 413 4. 4 444 6. 20, 24 89 6. 22 24 7. 8 61 7. 18 72 8. 2 360 12. 25 209 13. 12 105 16. 16 305 19 17 273 20. 21 366 22. 29 364 Mark. 3. 5 141 Luke. 1. 19 500 1. 37 363 10. 42 214 12. 29. 146 12. 24 466 15. 13, 14, 15 134 16. 13 89 17. 5 525 22. 3 507 22. 29, 30 97 22. 31, 32 508 John. 1. 9 51 1. 13 156 1. 14 87 1. 16 525 3. 8 413 4. 24 251, 308 5. 4 502 6. 63 308 12. 26 98 Acts. 2. 44, 46 165 7. 53 502 8. 9 135 8. 23 128 13. 48 347 15. 18 315 17. 25 271 17. 26 349 17. 28 311 Romans. 2. 2 365 2. 11 365, 372 2. 14, 15 8 3. 9 133 3. 23 125 5. 12, 13 214 5. 21 133 6. 12 133 6. 13, 16 138 6. 23 144 8. 2 94 8. 7 125, 127 8. 21, 22 23 9 11 346 9 16 359 11. 5 346 11. 17 416 11. 33 295 11. 36 397 12. 3 299 12. 11 104 1 Corinthians. 2. 11 313 2. 14 137, 493 4. 7 157 6. 12, 13 96 6. 17 88 7. 31 21 13. 1 501 13. 12 304 15. 45 308 17. 10 504 2 Corinthians. 2. 11 506 4. 4 304 10. 13 48 12. 9 91 12. 9, 10 527 Galatians. 6. 16 48, 99 Ephesians. Ch. Verse. Pag. 1. 4, 5 341 1. 9, 11 342 2. 2 122 2. 8, 9, 10 414 2. 11 506 4. 24 72 4. 29 129 Philippians. 2. 12, 13 396, 526 3. 16 48 Colossians. 1. 15 304 1. 16 499 2. 5 161 1 Timothic. 4. 2 140 6. 12. 107 6. 16 293, 306 2 Timothy. 2. 19 339 4. 7, 8 107 Titus. 3. 6 127 Hebrews. 1. 3 304, 444, 464 2. 2 502 4. 13 415 6. 17, 18 375, 377 9 14 308 11. 3. 320 12. 1, 2 526 12. 11, 12 106 12. 15 128 12. 22 504 13. 8 284 James. 1. 17 258 1. 25 94 2. 8 52 4. 15 345 1 Peter. 5. 8 507 2 Peter. 1. 3 156 2. 12 137 3. 7 465 1 John. 3. 4 109 Judas. 12 166 Revelations. 1. 4, 8, 11 240, 246, 267 4. 11 360 8. 2 501 18. 13 144 19 1, 3, 4, 6 241 ERRATA. Proemial Scheme, etc. PAg. 2. l. 37. l. philology. p. 5. l. 23. deal, Three. p. 6. l. 23. deal, al. p. 8. l. 1. deal, been. Pag. 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15. Title, for Sect. l. §. p. 5. l. 30. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 14. l. 39 l. Repub. l. 2, 6, 9 p. 18. l. 26. deal hereafter. p. 19 l. 5. l. and pleasures and griess. p. 21. l. 26. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 39 l. 26. l. is, for are. p. 43. l. 7. l. P. 2. p. 52. l. 5. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 63. l. 37. l. P. 2. B. 4. p. 74. l. 31. l. Chap. 2. §. 4. p. 92. l. 34. l. Manuduction. p. 108. Contents l. 15. deal, A Sum of the Pelagian History. Item, l. ult. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 132. l. 7. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 143. l. 24. l. B. 2. Chap. 6. §. 1. p. 156. l. ult. l. Man. p. 202. l. 19 l. N. T. Rom. 13.1. p. 204. l. 38. l. shall. p. 207. l. 25. l. Policy, Item l. 31. l. Policy. p. 215. Contents l. 2. l. Policy. p. 227. l. 38. l. Hurtado de Mendoza. p. 235. l. 2. l. void. p. 250. l. 13. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 258. l. 13. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Parallaxes. p. 260. l. 39 l. 2. p. 262. l. 33. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 263. l. 36. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 288. l. 37. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 290. l. 1. l. 1. The. p. 292. l. 21. l. God's. p. 298. l. 36. deal, Lastly. p. 327. l. 5. l. See Greg. p. 343. l. 29. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 360. l. 36. l. pro Sect. 4. Chap. 7. p. 361. l. 19 l. Ens possibile. p. 381. l. 18. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 382. l. 24. l. Sect. 35. p. 385. l. 29. l. §. 9 Item, l. 34. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 386. l. 16. l. Cabala. p. 398. l. 28. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 416. l. 26. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 421. l. 32. deal 1. p. 424. l. 17. pro and, l. is. p. 426. l. 3. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 440. l. 3. l. 2. Item l. 5. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 465. l. 28. deal, liquors. p. 469. l. 27. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 492. l. 8. for as, l. is. p. 493. l. 27. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 494. l. 14. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Item l. 16. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 514. l. 24. l. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. THE COURT of the GENTILES. PART iv OF REFORMED PHILOSOPHY: Wherein Plato's Moral and Metaphysic Philosophy is reduced to a useful Form and Method. BOOK I. Of Moral Philosophy. CHAP. I. Of Prudence, the last End and chiefest Good, Use, Fruition, and Delectation. Moral Philosophy, (1) It's Genus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which connotes Prudence: wherein consider its Objects, Offices, and Acts: which are, [1] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, [2] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dexterity, [3] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sagacity, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, [4] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. (2) The subject of Moral Prudence, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and particularly the Conscience: Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Law of Conscience, [1] In the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is the seat of Principes. (2) In Syneideses, which is a reflexive Light, and springs from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sensation. (3) The Rule of Moral Prudence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is either subjective, or objective: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Rom. 2.14, 15. James 2.8. The last End, its Influence in Morals: the chiefest Good, its Characters, (1) The Idea of Good. (2) The first Beauty. (3) Most proper. Use, its Regulation and Intention. Fruition, its parts, (1) Love, (2) Union, (3) Communion, (4) Delectation, considered [1] In its Causes, a sweet Good, Possession and Action. [2] In its Adjuncts, Reality, Connaturalitie, Uniformity, Purity, Force, and Infinitude. [3] In its Effects, Enlargement, and Satisfaction. §. 1. HAving discussed Plato's Natural Philosophy, we now descend to his Moral, which regards the Morals of single Persons, Families, The Idea of Moral Philosophy. and Cities, or Republics. We find the Idea of Philosophy, as it relates to Morals, and Active Sciences, in the Platonic Definitions, pag. 414. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Philosophy is a prudent or studiose consideration of the Soul according to right reason. Wherein we may consider, (1) The Genus, (2) The Subject, (3) The Measure, or Rule of Moral Philosophy. 1. The Genus, 1. It's Genus. Moral Prudence. in this Platonic Definition of Moral Philosophy, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifies a prudent Inspection, studiose Consideration, and solicitous Care, communly styled by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Prudence, or Moral Wisdom; which we have thus copiosely described in the Platonic Definitions: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Prudence is a faculty of itself effective of human Happiness. Prudence what. Wherein we have, (1) The Specific reason, whereby it is differenced from contemplative Science, expressed by that notion Effective. (2) It's ultimate End, which is to make men happy. Again, Prudence is defined in the same Platonic Definitions, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A Science of good and evil. Again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A Disposition, whereby we judge what is to be done, and what is not to be done. In all which Definitions laid together we have these Considerables. 1. The ultimate End, It's Object. and supreme Object of moral Prudence or Philosophy, namely human Happiness, which is the measure of all moral Acts, and the first thing treated of in moral Philosophy, according to that of Aquinas: The end of moral Virtues, is the chief principe of Prudence, as Luke 10.41. Of which Chap. 2. 2. We have here the intermediate Objects of moral Prudence, which are in general all Agibles or Practicables. (1) Singulars. (2) Things present. (3) Things in our power. (4) Things good, or evil. 3. Here is also considerable the proper Exercices or Offices of Prudence, which are according to Plato, (in his Charm.) (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Its Offices. To do what belongs unto us. (2) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, To understand a man's self. (3) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, To use all things well, i. e. with respect to our supreme end. (4) Rightly to distinguish 'twixt good and evil. (5) To conserve the rectitude of the Wil. (6) To moderate the Affections. (7) To govern the whole Life. Of which see more fully Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 6. s. 3. 4. This moral Prudence may be considered in its Integrals; The parts of Prudence. which are, according to the Platonic account, four: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Providence, which, 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Providence. in the Platonic Definitions, pag. 414. is thus described: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Providence is a preparation (or provision) for somewhat future. Which implies, [1] An universal comprehension of all circumstances, means, difficulties, encouragements, which may make for, or against our end. [2] Serious consultation about, and prudent determination of what is to be done. [3] Prudent precaution of what may impede, etc. this is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Caution, according to that of the Stoics, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A wise man ought never to fear, but always to use caution, etc. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Dexterity of Judgement. (2) Another part of moral Prudence is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Dexterity in judging things: which in the Platonic Desinitions, pag. 413. is thus defined: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Facility of judgement, is a connate ability of reasoning, or discerning. And Plato, de Repub. 4. pag. 428. says, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Facility of judgement is certainly some kind of Science, etc. (3) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sagacity or perspicacity of finding out things, 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sagacity. which Plato makes to be an excellent kind of Prudence, or a natural Invention, which directs the Reason to find out things wrapped up in Nature: which he elsewhere calls a Sagacity of Nature. So in his Epino. pag. 976. There remains a marvellous faculty, whereby we easily and expeditely learn any thing; and having learned it can faithfully commend it to memory, and as occasion serves, by an happy celerity recall it, which some call Wisdom, others good Nature, but others, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sagacity of Nature. This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or natural Sagacity, Plato makes to be the same with his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, good Nature: So Plato, Defin. pag. 412. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sagacity is a natural generosity of mind, whereby a person is enabled happily to conjecture what ought to be done. Again 'tis styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an acumen of judgement. This natural Sagacity, Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 376. makes very essential to a Magistrate, in order to his more exact judging of persons and things, and final decision of Controversies. Solomon we know was endowed with this natural Sagacity, even to admiration; which discovered itself in the decision of that arduous case between the two Harlots, 1 Kings 3.23, 24, etc. as also in resolving the Queen of Sheba's questions, 2 Chron. 9.1. which kind of Sagacity Politicians call Kingcraft. This natural Sagacity is elsewhere styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. a facility of judgement: which in the Platon. Defin. pag. 414. is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A good judgement tenacious of what is determined by reason. Again, this natural Sagacity passeth sometimes under the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is defined, Platon. Defin. pag. 412. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, An habit elective of what is best. One great office of this natural Sagacity, consists in the knowledge of men, their several Humours, Inclinations, Designs, Interests, 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Experience. and Combinations, etc. (4) Another part of moral Prudence is Experience, which Plato calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and makes very essential to a true Philosopher. So Plato, Repub. 9 pag. 582. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The experienced person endowed with prudence is the only true Philosopher. Then he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thence (in the same Repub. 9) he joins Prudence and Experience together with Reason, which he makes the best Judges of human Affairs: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, We rightly judge by Experience joined with Prudence and Reason. And Plato, in his Gorgias, gives us the reason, why Experience is so essential to Prudence: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Experience makes our life to pass away according to Rules of Art; whereas inexperience makes us live casually. Again: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, There are many Arts experimentally found out among men, from several Experiments, etc. And because experimental Prudence is gained by sense and sensible observation; thence Plato Timaeus, pag. 103. defineth it a subtlety of sense, or good sensation of the Soul: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Prudence is a good sensation of Soul. Expetience is indeed the main Seminary of human Prudence. (1) In that it furnisheth us with the choicest observations of past and present times, whereby we are capacitated to make some prudent conjecture of what is likely to succeed. (2) Experience draws down general Rules and Precepts of Wisdom to particular and proper use. (3) Experience gives men a more inward feeling and lively apprehension of themselves and others. Thence Plato makes this self-knowlege the highest piece of Prudence; which he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a good sensation. (4) Experience does much greaten and add to the quantity of our knowledge, by furnishing the mind with fresh observations: whence Plato brings in Solon speaking thus, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The longer I live, the more I know and teach. (5) Experience adds not only to the quantity, but also to the quality of our knowledge, by rendering it more clear and distinct. For experience reduceth particular observations, in themselves confused, unto a regular Series and Orders; whence general Rules are framed, which makes our knowledge more distinct and certain. (6) Experience greatly fixeth and confirmeth our Notions of things. 2. Having finished the Generic Notion of moral Philosophy, 2. The Subject of Moral Prudence the Soul, and particularly the Conscience. which is moral Prudence, we now proceed to the Subject thereof, expressed in the Platonic Definition by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Soul: for indeed moral Prudence moveth and influenceth the whole Soul, and therefore it is not unjustly seated therein; though the proper seat thereof be the practic Judgement, which Divines term Conscience; which is a petty God, or God's Vicegerent, and Vicar in the Soul, to command, or threaten; to accuse, or excuse; to justify, or condemn. This Vicarious Divine office of Conscience, Plato seems to have had some Traditional Notices of: whence he terms Conscience 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Fame; and makes it to be a kind of Demon, or petty God in men. So de Leg. 8 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, This Law of Fame partakes of a marvellous faculty, seeing no one durst to breathe otherwise than according to the Dictates of her Law. Serranus here acquaints us, Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Conscience's Law. That Plato calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, his Law of Fame, that Imperial power of Conscience well known to all; which comprehends those common Principes, That God is to be feared, etc. This Law of Conscience he says is unwritten, yet notwithstanding there is in all men's minds, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Sacred Law, whose force and efficace tames every Soul, and compels it, by fear, to obey positive Laws. From the authority of this Law it is, as the Philosopher teacheth, that men come to understand the difference of good and evil. Again Serranus adds: Our Philosopher calls this Divine Law of Conscience, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Law of Fame; and says, that it is connate in all men, it being a Science that teacheth the difference of good and evil; and the Conservator and Vindictor of all Laws; and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Precursor of that most excellent Chorus of Virtues; whose admirable faculties and actions flow from no other Fountain, than the sparks of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. This Law or Light of Conscience is twofold. (1) Habitual, which is called in the Schools 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Synteresis. (2) Actual, which is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Syneideses. (1) The Synteresis, 1. Synteresis, the Habit of Principes. or habitual Light of Conscience is defined, in the Schools, a natural habit of active Principes. For as speculative Reason discourseth of Speculatives, so practic Reason of Practics: as therefore there are naturally implanted in us certain speculative Principes, which appertain to Intelligence; so also are there certain active Principes, which belong to that natural habit of Conscience, called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Synteresis, as Aquinas, Part. 1. Q. 79. And this habitual Light or Law of Conscience, is the same with Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Law of Fame, which is elsewhere by him termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 2. The Syneideses, self-reflexion. Right Reason, as anon. (2) The actual Light or Law of Conscience called by the Ancients 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is Conscience strictly taken. So Aquinas, Part. 1. Quaest. 79. Art. 13. Conscience taken properly is not a power, but an Act; whereby we apply our Science to what we undertake; which application is followed by Testification, or Ligation, or Excusation, and Accusation. By which it appears, that the proper office of this Syneideses is self-reflexion; whence follows accusation, or excusation, etc. as Rom. 2.15. And because this reflexive Light of Conscience does necessarily suppose inward sense, hence 'tis oft called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sensation, also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Synesis, or sensate judgement. So Aquinas, Synesis, or sensate judgement imports a right judgement about particular operables. So Plato, in his Theaet. makes all true Science to be a kind of Sensation, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Science is nothing else but Sensation. And more particularly, in his Timaeus, pag. 103. he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Prudence, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a good Sensation: which exactly answers to the Scripture Phraseologie, which sets forth this reflexive act of Conscience by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Phil. 1.9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. and thence Heb. 5.14. we read of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Phil. 1.9. etc. The life of the new Creature, as well as of the old, consists in these self-reflexive Acts of Conscience, which spring from inward sense and feeling. And Plato, in his Alcibiad. pag. 133, 134. tells us, That he that reflectes upon himself, his own Soul and Wisdom, thereby becomes as it were omniscient: whereas they, who know not themselves, know not what is good or evil for them; nor yet what belongs to themselves, or to other men: such therefore can never make good Politicians, or Occonomists, etc. In brief; Self-reflexions, or our actions upon ourselves, are of all the highest and noblest, and those by which we live and work as men, and perfect that part of the Soul called Conscience; which directs all we do, according to right Reason, etc. 3. As for the Measure or Rule of Moral Prudence, 3. The Rule of Prudence, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Right Reason. we find it expressed in the forementioned Platonic Definition under this notion, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to right Reason. This Platonic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (which is asserted in like manner by the Stoics, and others) right Reason is the same with the Light or Law of Nature, which is twofold. (1) Subjective. (2) Objective. 1. As for Subjective Right Reason, Light or Law of Nature, Right Reason is 1. Subjective. it is no other than those common Principes of Morality, seated in that part of Conscience which they call Synteresis, of which in the foregoing §. 6. This Seminary of engrafted active Notions, or moral Principes is styled by the Stoics 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Commun Law; also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, right Reason; against which, say they, nothing is to be done; as Diog. Laert. in Zeno. 'Tis termed by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Law of Being. So Minos, pag. 315. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, where, says Serranus, by this appellation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Plato understands the Eternal Law of Nature, which, amidst the various Laws of Nations and their vicissitudes, continues uniform and the same; and thence is truly termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Being; therefore he calls it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the right Reason of the Eternal Law: and because our actions are to be measured by the Rule of these common Notions, therefore Plato names this Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Royal Law. So again, Serranus in Plato de Legib. 8. The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Delineation of this Eternal Law is this. There is in the minds of all, as soon as they are borne, a certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sacred Law. He that consecrates this Law in his mind, as a certain sacred, is thereby furnished with an excellent remedy against the insolence and impotence of human lusts; as it was said of the Tyrant, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. These active Principes, contained in this intern Law of Conscience, are generally styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, commun Notions: they were named by Zeno 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Comprehensions; because they comprehended the first seeds or principes of knowledge. Cicero tells us, that Epicurus called them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Anticipations, (as he translates the word) because they supposed a Previous formation of things in the Soul. The Stoics used the same term likewise. Chrysippus defined this natural Law, or Conservatorie of common Principes, a natural Intelligence of those things, which universally are. Cicero styles these common Notions, Inchoate Intelligences, of which see Lud. Vives in August. Civ. lib. 8. cap. 7. The Scripture also styles these common Principes fixed in Conscience, a Law; so Rom. 2.14, 15. where the Gentiles are said to be a Law to themselves, etc. And indeed these common seeds of natural light are a private Law, which God has deeply engraven on men's Consciences, and is universally extensive unto all, though with a latitude of degrees; it being in some more, in some less, but in all in great measure obliterated, and defaced since the Fal. It is also by Divines generally termed the Light, or Law of Nature; because it flows in, and with, and from human Nature, either immediately, or mediately. 2. As for the Objective 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 2. The Objective 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Law of Nature. Right Reason (which Plato seems to have had some traditional notices of) it contains those broken Traditions of the Moral Law, which were scattered up and down among the Gentiles. That Plato had received some fragments of God's Law; and that by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Right Reason, he does import the same, seems very probable, both from that expression in his Minos, pag. 315. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Law of Being, i. e. of the first Being, as he usually styles God: as also from that other expression of his, Minos, pag. 317. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, This right Reason is the Royal Law, i. e. God's Divine Law, which is so styled Jam. 2.8. In this sense right Reason may be said (as the Schools will have it) to give 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse morale, or Morality to human Acts: so Stobaeus de Virtut. Ser. 1. fo. 9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Virtue is a conformity according to right Reason, and Sin is a transgression against right Reason. Where, by right Reason we must understand not the subjective Light, or Law of Conscience, which is imperfect; but the objective Light of Nature comprised in the Moral Law. In this sense we must understand that Principe in the Schools, That right Reason gives the esse morale to moral Being's. Thus much for the Platonic Definition of Moral Philosophy. §. 2. Next to the generic Notion of Moral Philosophy, The last End its Influence in Morals. the first thing that comes under consideration is the last End, which is first in intention, though last in execution. Yea, indeed the last End is the first Principe of moral Prudence: For what is Prudence, but the right disposition and ordination of all means and actions? And is not the last end the rule and measure of all order? Is not every thing then rightly disposed, when it is conveniently brought into a subordination to its last end? Wherefore the contemplation of the last end is of greatest moment in Moral Philosophy. And they say, that Plato was the first that used the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in this philosophic and strict Notion: for Homer and other of the Ancients used the word to express an Effect in its accomplishment and perfection; but Plato restrained it so, as to signify thereby a final Cause, or that which is last in the series of things desired, yet first in intention. This Cicero interprets extreme, last, chiefest. What force, efficace and influence the last end has in Morals, Plato frequently inculcates. So in his Theaetetus, he assures us, That all Science is inutile, yea noxious, without the notice of the best End. This last End he makes to be, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the principal End of allthings: which Proclus calls, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the End of Ends. And for the more full and clear explication of this last End, its universal influence and excellence, the following Propositions are diligently to be considered. 1. Prop. It is necessary, that we constitute some last End, as well posititively as negatively, in every Series of Actions. This Hypothesis is well argued by Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 24. Sect. 1. And the reason is most evident: for look as in Descent from the intention of the end to the election and execution of the means, we must necessarily at last stop in some one or more means, which are first in execution, though last in intention; so in Ascent from the means to the end, it is as necessary that we at last stop in some last end, which is first in intention and last in execution. Again, as there is a subordination of second Causes to the first Cause; so in like manner of inferior Ends to the last End. For in Ends, and those things that conduce thereto, there cannot be a progress into infinite; but as there is a first means from whence the motion gins; so there must be a last end, in which it terminates. In Ends there is a twofold order, (1) of Intention, (2) of Execution: and in both orders there must be a first and a last. That which is first in the order of Intention is as it were the Principe, which moves the appetite, and gives bounds to it; and therefore can be no other than the last End: that which is first in the order of Execution, is the first means conducing to the last End. So that a progress into infinite is on neither part possible: if there were not a last end, nothing could be desired, no action of the appetite could be terminated, neither would the intention of the Agent ever cease: if there were not a first means, from whence the execution should begin, no Agent could begin to work, etc. 2. Prop. The last End of allthings must be as extensive and ample, as the first Principe or Cause. Thus Plato, de Leg. 4 p. 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God, (as the old Tradition testifies) having in himself the Principe, and End, and Medium of allthings. In which he plainly indigitates, That God is the first Cause and last End of allthings. That the last End is as large as the first Principe is evident, because the order of Ends must correspond and answer to the order of Agents: as they who are under God, ought not morally, neither can they physically move, but as dependent on the motion and concourse of God, the first Cause; so neither ought they to desire any thing under God, but what may conduce to God as their last End. Such as the Universality of the first Cause is in giving Being or wellbeing; such is the Universality of the last End in requiring and calling for the improvement of al. Neither doth man pay the homage due to his first Cause, farther than his regress thereto answers his progress therefrom. God as the first Principe gives Being, and as the last End terminates and fixeth the Being conferred. Wherefore the Creature that dependeth on God as the first Cause, must tend to him as his last End. 3. Prop. The last End of allthings can be but one. This Hypothesis both Plato and Aristotle concord in. And the reason is most apparent; because allthings desire their utmost perfection, which consists in their tendence to the most perfect Being. Now the most perfect Being can be but one: For if there should be more than one most perfect, than the one would have somewhat which the other hath not; and so neither would be most perfect. Every good by the addition of some other good is made better and more perfect, except the most simple and perfect Good, by the participation whereof all other goods are made better. Hence 4. Prop. Every man, in every human Act, virtually, if not actually, intends some last End. This is manifest; because in every human Act something is desired for itself, which cannot be referred to any other thing: and what is this but some last end? Again, man naturally desireth the compliment of all good: and albeit there may not be an actual elicit intention in every man as to his last end, yet there is a natural propension thereto; whence proceed all Acts about particular goods. 5. Prop. The last End is desired infinitely, without end or terms. Thence Aristotle, (following Plato herein) in his Magn. Moral. lib. 1. cap. 1. defines the last End thus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The perfect End is that, which being obtained, we neither desire nor need any thing beyond it. So the Stoics, who were akin to the Platonists, define the last End, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That for the sake of which all offices are performed, but it for nothing else. So that the last End gives terms and bounds to allthings, but admits no terms or measure. As to take away the first Cause of our Being, supposeth us not to be; so to take away the last End, supposeth a confused infinity as to acting. Therefore something must be simply desirable for itself and for no other: For that which a man desireth in order to a further end, the same he desireth in such a measure as is most conducible to that end: but what he desireth for itself, towards that his desire is infinite: for the better it is, the more desirable: therefore if infinitely good infinitely desirable, without terms or bounds. The only measure of loving our last End is to love it without measure: for the last End being the term of the appetite, it may not receive terms or limits from any other thing; but by how much the more it is loved, by so much the better is the love. In allthings appetible the last End gives measure but receives none; because the proper reason of allthings we desire is taken from the End. Hence 6. Prop. The last End is the term and measure of allthings. What Principes are in Demonstration, the same is the last End in Action: for all means receive their Necessity, Goodness, and Specification from the last End. Whatever is ordained to an end ought to be proportioned thereto, and so measured thereby. The last End has the same influence on the means, as the Aristotelean Form is said to have on the matter: They say the form gives the main of Essence, Distinction, Virtue, Operation, and Perfection to the body; and doth not the End give the same to the means? How little desirable are the means, as means, without their reference to the End? Is not the distinction and perfection of allthings, morally considered, taken from their End? This is well expressed by Plato, Phileb. pag. 25. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, All these things must be referred to the one infinite, i.e. the last End. So again, de Leg. 4. pag. 716. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But truly God is to us the chief measure of allthings, i.e. God, as our last End, is the measure both of essence, faculty, and operation: all the multitude of means ought to be reduced to and governed by the Unity of our last End: which is the true meaning of that moral Axiom, All multitude ought to be governed by Unity. Thus also Aristotle, Eth. l. 3. c. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Everything is defined or bounded by its End. Hence the End is styled the Term, which confines and fixeth the flux of things, which without it are full of confusion and indetermination. And therefore by how much the more the Soul departs from God, its last End, by so much the more instable, confused, and vagrant it is. Hence 7. Prop. God is the last End of allthings. This Hypothesis resultes out of the former, and is in itself most evident: for every thing is so far only an end as it is good: wherefore the last end must of necessity be the chiefest good: and what is this but God? Is not God the prime Cause of all goodness in every good? And is he not thence the Cause of every End? Must he not then of necessity be the last End of allthings? For that for which every thing is such, must needs be more such. Again, is not God the supreme and first in order of Causes, and therefore the last in order of Ends? Thence Plato, Gorg pag. 499. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Allthings seemed to us to be undertaken for good. Art thou of the same opinion with us, that the end of all actions is good, and that allthings else are undertaken for its sake; but the end itself is not undertaken for any thing else? Wherein he proves, (1) That every end is good, and the last end the chiefest good. (2) That allthings else are undertaken for the last end, but it for nothing else. Whereby it's evident, that God is the last end of allthings; because the chiefest good, for which allthings else are desired. Thence Proclus, that great Platonist, Theolog. Plat. lib. 2. cap. 4. calls God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The End of Ends, who convertes all Ends to himself, and subsistes in or about himself. Hence 8. Prop. The ultimate formal Reason or proper Motive of loving things is, not their own goodness, but the Divine bonity. For the end having the reason of good, and the last end of the chiefest good, hence allthings are so far desirable as they refer to the last end and chiefest good, which is God. The end as compared with its means has the same regard, that the formal reason has to its object: now is not the object specified by its formal reason? and must not the means also be specified, determined, and ordered by their last end, which is God? Allthings are so far good as they come from and tend to the Divine goodness; which is the first effective Principe, Exemplar, and final Cause of all good. So Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 357. tells us, That the chiefest good, which makes allthings else good, is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which is desired for itself: yea, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Goodness itself and Being itself. Whence it necessarily follows, that nothing can be the ultimate formal reason of love or desire, but the Divine bonity. For the necessity and goodness of all means is taken from their last end, which is the first Mover in the order of Ends, as the first Cause is in order of Efficients. Hence 9 Prop. Assimilation to the Divine bonity is the last End of allthings, specially human operations. For so far as any thing participates of the Divine bonity, so far it is made like unto the same: if therefore allthings tend to God as their last end, that so they might participate of his Divine bonity, it necessarily follows, that the last end of allthings is Assimilation to God. What are all Creatures but Imitamen of the Divine bonity? And is not every thing so far participant of the Divine bonity, as it is assimilated thereto? Do not allthings then in their motions tend to the divine similitude, as to their last end? It's true, the tendence of inanimate Creatures and Brutes, yea of all Minkind in their natural state is only passive and remote: they are reduced to their last end the Divine bonity, but they have no active power of adhering thereto. Hence all lower Creatures, yea man himself in his apostate state, have only some vestigia or dark shadows of the Divine bonity; the bright image thereof being peculiar to pious Souls, and good Angels. That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Assimilation to God is the last end of human Nature, Plato frequently inculcates. Thence saith he, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The end of good men is to be assimilated to God. So in his Theatet. pag. 176. he makes Assimilation to God the end of his Philosophy; which he elsewhere makes to be Contemplation, Love, and Imitation of God. Hence 10. Prop. Adherence to God as our last End imports not only subjection and dependence, but also the best Constitution, Complexion, and Perfection of a rational Creature. For by how much the higher the end is, by so much the more noble and perfect is the act: as the intention regulates and qualifies the Action; so the end regulates and qualifies the intention. Now Assimilation to the Divine bonity being the ultimate end of the rational Creature, it necessarily follows, that Adherence to this Divine bonity be his supreme perfection. The Divine bonity, saith Proclus, Theolog. Platon. l. 1. c. 21. is conscrvative of allthings, constitutive and fundative of allthings, impletive of allthings, and conversive of allthings to itself. Such as the last end is, such is the wills motion: that is the best election, which doth most actually intent God as its last end. The nearer the Soul approacheth to God, the more perfect it is: the last end attractes the appetite to itself: for to tend to an end is to be drawn by that end: and by how much the more strongly the Soul is drawn by God as its last end, by so much the more intimately it adheres to him. The motion of the Soul towards its last end is much stronger than that towards the means; and therefore the adherence is the greater. What more natural than for a rational Creature to adhere to its last end? And O, what perfection ariseth hence! To be drawn by God as our last end, is to be drawn by our most noble, perfect, and best self; and therefore this speaks not only Subjection, but blessed Constitution and Perfection. §. 3. Having summed up Plato's Philosophemes of the last End, The chiefest Good, its Proprieties. we now proceed to his Contemplations of the chiefest Good; which hath intimate connexion therewith. His main Discourses of the chiefest Good he lays down in his Philebus, his Convivium, 1. It is the Idea of Good. and de Repub. l. 26. c. 9 we shall reduce the whole to these following proprieties. 1. Plato styles the chiefest Good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Idea of all good. So in his Philebus, having proposed this Question, Wherein the chiefest Good consists? he resolves it into the Idea of Good. Which he elsewhere styles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Good, meaning the chiefest. He terms the chiefest good, the Idea of all good, (1) because it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a self-sufficient Good, yea Goodness itself, in the abstract: i. e. all Good, pure Good, Good by himself, and so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, perfectly Good. The chiefest Good is Good by his own Goodness, and not by any participated Goodness. Whence some of the Platonists style him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, superessential Goodness. Where ever is the chiefest Good, there is the Essence of Good: Goodness in the abstract, and the chiefest Good are convertible: you cannot find the one, but you'll find the other also. Whatever good is predicable of any Creature is in the chiefest Good in the abstract: and all know, that Abstracts speak Forms and Essences. So that the chiefest Good must needs be essential Goodness in the abstract, and thence by consequence all Good in Idea. Thus Basil, in Psal. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The self-good [or Ideal good] is really blessed, unto which all look, and which all desire, as the measure of all good. (2) Plato styles the chiefest Good the Idea of Good; because he is both the prime Efficient and Exemplar of all Good. [1] He is the prime Efficient of all good. As all Creatures flow from and reflow to God, as the Ocean or plenitude of all Being; so also their Goodness participates of the like flux from, and reflux to the Divine Goodness. No Creature hath any good in it, further than it partakes of the chiefest Good: whatever you possess, if you want the chiefest Good, you possess nothing. Hence, (2) the chiefest Good is the measure of all Good. Every thing is so far good to us, as it corresponds with and refers to the chiefest Good. So Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 357. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, We love the chiefest Good for its own sake, as also allthings else that flow from it: meaning the chiefest Good is the only measure of our love. So Arist. Rhet. l. 1. c. 7. makes that the chiefest Good, which is chosen for itself, and thence the measure of all good. 2. The chiefest Good, according to Plato, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 2. The chiefest Good the first Beauty. Beauty itself: or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the first Beauty. So in his Conviv. pag. 210. Whosoever is brought thus far, to contemplate things beautiful rightly and in their order, arriving to the end of things lovely, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he shall immediately contemplate that wonderful native Beauty, for the sake of which we have hitherto undertaken all our labours. Wherein he teacheth us, that we may not fix our eyes only on these inferior Beauties, but by them, as by so many ascents, mount up to the contemplation of the first supreme Beauty, which is our chiefest good. That the prime Beauty is the chiefest good will be most evident, if we look into the nature of Beauty as opened by Plato, who makes all Beauty to consist, (1) in Symmetry and Proportion. So in his Timaeus, pag. 87. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Every Good is beautiful: and what is beautiful cannot want measure, order or proportion. Aquinas makes this difference between bonity and Beauty, that bonity or Goodness properly regards the Will, but Beauty the Eye and Understanding: thence beautiful colours arise from that variety and convenance, which is in them to please the eye. That Symmetry is essential to Beauty, Timaeus tells us, p. 103. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. The Principes of Beauty are Symmetry or proportion of parts, etc. Thence Plato, Leg. 3. makes Wisdom to be most beautiful: because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the chiefest of Symphonies, or Harmonies. So Conviv. pag. 205. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Wisdom is the greatest of Beauties. Now Plato, Conviv. pag. 211. saith, The chiefest Good is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of itself, with itself, the most uniform and simple Being; and therefore most beautiful. Again, is Wisdom most beautiful, because most concordant with itself? And is not God the chiefest Good also the most uniform Wisdom? The proportion required to Beauty is well expressed by Sales, de l'Amour de Dieu, l. 1. c. 1. Union, saith he, established in distinction makes order: order breeds convenance, agreement, and proportion: and convenance in things entire and accomplished makes Beauty. An Army is beautiful, when it is composed of all its parts, so ranked together in their order, that their distinction is reduced to that agreement, which they ought to have together. To make Music beautiful, there is required not only that the voices be clear and well distinguished, but also that they be conjoined in such sort one to tother, that they make one just consonance and harmony, by means of the union that is in the distinction, and the distinction that is in the union of the voices, which may deservedly be called a discordant Accord, or rather an accordant Discord. Hence (2) All Beauty ariseth from Perfection and Integrity of parts. Those things are most beautiful in their kind, which are most perfect: And is not the chiefest Good most absolutely and simply perfect? (3) The last and main Cause of Beauty is Splendour, Light and clarity. Thence Beauty is defined by Plato the Fulgor and Lustre of Good. Splendour and Brightness is essential to Beauty, to the end that it may be visible or intelligible. Obscurities, Shadows, and Darknesses are deformed, and render allthings deformable; because nothing in them is visible or intelligible: neither order, nor distinction, nor union, nor convenance. So Job 10.22. in the description of the grave, he saith, It is a land of darkness, as darkness itself, and of the shadow of death, without any order, and where the light is as darkness: i.e. There is no light, therefore no order and beauty. Light gives life to brightness; which is but a dead inutile thing, if splendour and beauty give not life and efficace to it, as we see in lively colours. So in man, his beauty is not accomplished without a good grace and lustre, which is the life of beauty. Thus in the sovereign Beauty of God, the Splendour and Brightness of his Perfections renders him most beautiful. Whence Beauty and Glory, both in profane and sacred Philosophy, have one and the same Idea: for what is beauty, but the effulgence, or shine of all perfections in any object? And if this fulgor or splendour be illustrious and most bright, it's termed Glory. So the beauty of the Sun, what is it but the gloriose effulgence or brightness of its light? Whence it being a grand Question among the Ancients, What in Nature was most beautiful? it was answered, Light. Hence beauty is defined by the Orator, A due congruence, with a certain suavity of colour. This suavity of colour is nothing else, but the light or splendour of that perfection or goodness which is in the subject. Whence Aquinas defines Beauty, A certain bland face of bonity or Goodness. And do not all these notions of beauty greatly illustrate the surpassing heart-ravishing Beauty of God the chiefest Good? What more gloriose, resplendent and effulgent than the chiefest Good? Where may we expect more gloriose light and beauty, than with the Fountain of Light, in whose light alone we behold light? Has not the chiefest Good the most sweet colour and bland face of goodness? Yea Plato, Repub. lib. 6. pag. 509. discriminating 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 those things which are good by participation only, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the chiefest Good; he adds, That this has 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a certain infinite immense Beauty. So Conviv. pag. 211. he assures us, That allthings else are beautiful, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. by participation and in some certain mode only; but the first Beauty is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. most sincere, pure, immixed; not contaminated with human colours, or other trifles. And then he breaks forth into this rapture of Admiration: O what a blessed sight would it be, to contemplate this divine, sincere, incontaminate, simple, uniform Beauty! Yea, he positively affirms, That God, who is the chiefest Good, has 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the most illustrious and amiable Beauty. Thus the spurious Dionysius, de Nom. Divin. cap. 4. saith, That God, as the sovereign Beauty, is the Author of the sovereign Convenance, beautiful Grace and lustre, which is in allthings, making the distributions and departments of his rays, by which allthings are made beautifully to shine forth. God intending to render allthings beautiful and good, hath reduced their multitude and distinction to a perfect unity, i. e. to subserve the enjoyment of himself as the first Beauty. 3. Plato makes the chiefest Good to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The chiefest Good most proper, etc. most proper. So Repub. 9 pag. 586. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That which is best for every one, that is most proper. Thus Conviv. pag. 205. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The chiefest Good is most proper to every one, and yet commun to all: Propriety with Community is proper only to the chiefest Good. There are several other proprieties of the chiefest Good mentioned by Plato, namely that it is the most pleasant, solid, substantial, vital, uniform, agreeable, infinite, eternal, necessary, divine Good: which by his own concession are applicable to none but God. Of which hereafter more in Aristotle's Philosophy, B. 4. c. 1. §. 22. §. 4. Next to the last End, Of Use and its Regulation. and chiefest Good follows Use and Fruition; the former belonging to the Means, the later to End. Use properly consists in the subordination and reference of allthings to our last end, which alone is the object of Fruition. The whole life of man is distributed into Use and Fruition. Use is a tendence or referring thing to our end. This by Plato is oft expressed under the notion of Temperance, which he makes to be the moderate use and reference of allthings to our last end. So in his Gorgias, pag. 507. he gins thus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The temperate Soul is good. Thence he collects, That the intemperate Soul is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, mad and dissolute. Whence he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The temperate man will do that which has a decorum both towards God and men. And he gives the reason of it: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For it is not the part of a temperate man to prosecute or fly from what he ought not; but to fly from and prosecute both things, persons, and pleasures as need requires; as also patiently to tolerate the same. Thence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. This seems to me to be the primary and chief end of a regular life, that Justice and Temperance be always present. In which we have these observables. (1) That the temperate Soul is the best, and the intemperate the worst. (2) That Temperance formally consists in giving all persons and things their just decorum, and measure. (3) That we then give allthings their just measure, when we prosecute, or fly from them, in that manner and measure as we ought. (4) That we then prosecute and fly from things as we ought, when we use, or use them not in subservience to our last end, which is the measure of allthings. This is well expressed by Aristotle, (who followed Plato herein) Eth. l. 3. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Wherefore in a temperate man the concupiscent part ought to conform to reason: for moral good is the end of both. Thence a temperate man desires what he ought, and in that manner as he ought, and when he ought: which is the Constitution, Law, and Order of Reason. Whereby he fully confirms Plato's sentiment, that Temperance gives allthings their just number, weight, and measure, by reducing all to such an Order, as may render them subordinate to the last end. The Stoic expresseth this Temperance in the use of things by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sustain what is grievous, and abstain from what is delicious. Which is thus expounded: The temperate man, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sustains without grief the absence of pleasures, and abstains from the fruition of them when present. This some make to be a great degree of fortitude: for the valiant man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, bears things terrible, and forbears things audacious. The sum of all is, that the temperate man is not inordinately afflicted for the loss, or excessively affected with the presence of any inferior good, but useth allthings in measure and subservience to his last end. This Temperance in the use of things Plato also illustrates by the notions of Order and universal Justice. So Gorg. pag. 506. The virtate of every thing is its order: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That therefore which is constituted and conformed by order, is the virtue of every thing. Wherefore the Soul that keeps its order is better than that which wants it. And what is it, in Plato's sense, for a Soul to keep its order, but to use allthings, servato ordine finis, in subordination to its end? This is well illustrated by Jansenius, August. Tom. 2. l. 2. c. 19 where he proves out of Augustine, That virtue is nothing else but the order of Love. For by Love, as a Divine Pondus, the Soul reduceth allthings to its last end, namely God. This is incomparably well expressed by Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 24, 25. Whatsoever things seem to have excess or defect, more or less, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, all those aught to be referred to the infinite Being, as the only measure. This he more openly expresseth, Leg. 4. pag. 716. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. God is to us the measure of allthings, unto which scope and mark all our actions, as so many arrows, aught to tend. So Repub. 1. pag. 331. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I count the possession of things of great use, yet not for every man, but he who is moderate and temperate, i. e. who refers all to his last end. Thence he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That riches are most useful for a wise man, who can and will use all in subordination to his last end. Whence a thing utile, definite. Plat. p. 414. is thus described: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A thing utile, is that which renders us capable of suffering well, or doing good, in order to our last end. So also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, conducible is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which conduceth to good, namely our last end. These and such like are Plato's Philosophemes about Use, which may be all reduced to these following Propositions. 1. The Utility of any created good consists not in its own goodness, but in its reference to our last end. Herein consists the good of every inferior good, when it subserves and tends to our chiefest good. The good and evil of allthings is to be judged by their relation to, or distance from the last end. Things are so far good as they enable us to do good by serving God. Al that we have, or can do is of God, and therefore aught to be for God. Nothing is to be loved or enjoyed for itself, but the chiefest good. Thus Aristotle, Eth. l. 4. c. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Those things that come under Use, we may use either well or il. Thus Riches are reckoned among utile goods. Now he that is endowed with virtue for the use of any thing, doth use that thing in the best manner. Therefore he useth riches best, which hath attained to that virtue, which belongs to the use thereof. Thus riches and all other lower goods must be referred to God. Hence 2. To use any thing, is to refer it to some other thing superior in our estime. Herein consists the formal difference between Use and Fruition: Things are enjoyed for themselves their own goodness; but they are used in order to something else. We do not properly enjoy, but use the means, neither use but enjoy our last end. Hence it follows (1) That all Use of God as a means for the obtainment of some other end is inordinate. (2) That all Use of the Creature, which is not referred to God, is also sinful. This perversity and inordination is found in every sin, whiles men enjoy what they ought to use, and use what they ought to enjoy. This Augustine makes to be the perversion of all order, fruendis uti velle, atque utendis frui: When men enjoy the means and use the last end. But of this more, Prop. 4. 3. Things are then used orderly when they subserve and are subordinate to our last end. Herein chief consists the order of Love, when it resolves all lower goods and actions into the chiefest Good. All lower goods are to be desired not for enjoyment, but use; and when we have them, we must use them well. This is well explicated by Simplicius, in Epictet. cap. 1. pag. 2. where he tells us, This is the Spirit of Philosophy, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to keep the force of the mind free from the body and brutish affections, and to refer the use of all to the chiefest Good. Wherefore it doth allow the moderate use and fruit of extern things, which are esteemed as good, so far as they agree with the true or best good: but yet so far as they differ therefrom, [i. e. subserve not the chiefest Good] she commands, that they be rejected. A Philosopheme worthy of a Christian mind. This is the import of that Divine Admonition, 1 Cor. 7.31. And they that use this world as not abusing it: 1 Cor. 7.31. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as not overusing it. When ever we overuse any lower good, we abuse it, i. e. turn it off from its proper use. Man has a great liberty to use allthings indifferent indifferently, yet so as all must conduce to his last end. And indeed we are no further master of any thing, or free in the use of it, than it is brought into subservience unto God. Hence, 4. Concupiscence. To use or enjoy any inferior good for itself is to abuse it. This lower Universe and each part thereof was not made for man's Fruition, but Use. It's true, Brutes have liberty to enjoy the good things of senses; because they are not capable of any higher good: but man's liberty lies in the using these inferior goods for an higher end, the enjoyment of God: and when he perverts this order, he falls under miserable cursed bondage. Thus Plato, Gorg. pag. 507. having laid down this Hypothesis, That Temperance consists in the regular use of allthings, he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, And thus he must act, lest giving the reins to lusts, and suffering them to wander where they list, whiles he thinks to satisfy them, he fall into an infinite evil, and live a robbers life. Whereby he means, that when men's lusts grow irregular in the use of things, they soon prove infinite and insatiable. This inordinate love to the Creature for itself is usually styled Concupiscence and Lust: which is nothing else but a brutish desire after, and fruition of the Creature for itself, without reference to God, the chiefest Good. This tyrannic Concupiscence Plato accurately philosophiseth on, Repub. 9 pag. 574. where he describes it, as the greatest Tyrant in the world: Of which see Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 5. §. 2. This perversion of the order of Love, and abuse of inferior goods Augustine sadly complains of, in that men hereby use what they should enjoy, and enjoy what they should use, i. e. they use God and what belongs to him as means to promote their inferior goods, the object of their fruition; and that against the order of true Charity, yea of human Nature, which requires, that we should use all lower goods in subordination to God the chiefest Good. Creatures, when they are used in subservience to God their last End, they are then in their proper place and amiable; but when they are made the object of Fruition, they are then in the place of God, and so most abominable. Jansenius, August. Tom. 2. de Nat. laps. l. 2. c. 19 pag. 156. gives this reason à priori, why it is unlawful to love or enjoy any Creature for itself; because it is against that natural order, which is established by the eternal Law. For such is the natural condition of a rational Creature, that, according to the order of Nature, he is placed beneath God, coordinate with intellectual Creatures, but above corporeous Creatures. Wherefore seeing God alone is superior to the rational Creature, he ought, according to the Law of Nature, by the Pondus of Love to subject himself to God only: which so long as he continues to do, he remains just and virtuose, and most ordinate in his kind; sithat virtue is the best state of a rational Creature; or, according to Augustine, nothing else but the order of Love: and by Love, as by a weight, the Soul is kept in this middle state, under God the most supreme Being, and above inferior Creatures. This therefore is the bitter root of all inordinate motion, when the Soul doth by its love, as a terrene Pondus, move inordinately towards the Creatures, so as to become subject to them. Yea, doth not this perverting the order of Love bring the whole Creation under bondage, as Rom. 8.21, Rom. 8.21, 22. 22? Wherein consists the present bondage of the Creatures, but in this, that they are perverted and turned aside from that Order for which they were made, namely from the serving their Creator, to feed the lusts of men? The Creatures are not put to that use for which they were made by God, and this makes them groan to be delivered, etc. Herein consists the Liberty of all Creatures, and our Liberty in the use of them, that we are thereby made more free in the service and fruition of God; by subjecting ourselves and all inferior goods to God, for the serving and enjoyment of him, we gain dominion over ourselves and allthings else. But if the heart be inordinate in adhering to or use of the most lawful comforts, we immediately fall under bondage to them. The way to have the Spirit free in the use of any created good, is not to use or enjoy it too much, by letting the Spirit to run too far into it, or loving it for itself: for thereby we become slaves it. 5. The more actually the Soul intends God as its last End, Intention. in the use of inferior things, the more perfect is the use of them. It's a great Saying, The most actual Intention is best: Intention is the most eminent act of Love: and the most perfect intention is that which most eyes God in the use of allthings. To intent any thing, as Suarez well observes, is to tend towards it by all manner of vehement desires, and important endeavours. Indeed intention differs not from efficacious desire of the end, together with the means conducing thereto: whereby it is differenced from velleity; which is only a conditionate, saint, imperfect volition of an end, without regard to the means. The more strongly and actually we intent our end, the sooner shall we arrive thereto in the use of means: Mat. 6.22. a single straight intention keeps the Agent straight in its way to its end. Thus Mat. 6.22. If therefore thine eye, i.e. the intention of thy will, be single, i.e. if it hath a single end, namely God. Jansenius, out of Augustine, Tom. 2. l. 2. c. 20. pag. 162. informs us, that allthings are to be referred to God, not only by habitual Intention, as the Schools determine, but also by an intention virtually actual. And he thus demonstrates it: because the mind, when it acts, must requiesce in the love, not of the Creature, but of God. For this is most certain, according to Augustine, that an habitual Intention only without actual or virtual will not suffice; because the just, when asleep, have habitual intention, yet they cannot then be said to refer their actions to God. Wherefore there is always necessary an actual, or at least virtual intention of referring allthings to God. A virtual intention in human acts hath the same force as actual intention: for it acts in virtue and force received from some former actual intention. As when a man in a journey is carried on towards his end by a virtual intention, influenced by some former actual intention. A right intention is the deliberation of a bended will towards God as the last end: for where the intention is right, God is the predominant end. The end of an action discovers its kind: and the intention discovers the end: For intention properly belongs to the Will, whose office it is to refer all to the last end. The intention is the guard of the thoughts and desires, that which girds up the mind, and keeps it fixed on its last end, in the use of all means. He that doth not intent and eye God in his worldly concerns, will not intent him in his best duties and services. To have the intention of the Will actually directed towards God in all inferior goods is the Spirit of right Use. And herein indeed consists much of the Souls liberty as to means, to intent God in al. It's a good Notion of Aquinas, That the Soul, by intending temporals in order to God, is elevated and advanced; otherwise it is depressed and brought down, namely when it intends any temporal thing for itself. Thus also Jansenius, in his August. Tom. 2. l. 1. c. 6. pag. 40. where he gives this difference between Use and Fruition: Whatever is loved as an end, which a man desires to enjoy and to be blessed therein, that rules over the Lover: for this is the difference between Use and Fruition, that the Will depresseth itself under what it enjoys, but it elevates itself above what it useth: so that it is a Servant of that which it enjoys, but Lord over what it makes use of. This inferior visible World what is it but a Map of things invisible? And ought we not then firmly to intent God in all these lower things? And is not this the most perfect use, when the Soul doth spiritually and actually contemplate, intent, and adhere to God in all these lower goods of time? As Intention directs the Will, so Faith directs the Intention in the use and prosecution of all means: it is the Intention that regulates the quality of the action in the use of things; and it is divine Faith and Love that regulate the Intention. This is well explicated and demonstrated by Greg. Ariminensis, 2. Sent. Dist. 38. Quaest. 1. Art. 1. where he proves, That according to the bonity or pravity of the Intention of the Worker, we are to measure the bonity or pravity of the work. Which he demonstrates by these Conclusions: (1) That Intention only is right or morally good, whereby that is intended or loved for itself, which ought to be loved for itself. (2) Every Intention of a Worker, whereby any thing besides God is intended for itself, that Intention is evil. And the reason is invincible, because every rational Creature ought to refer all his acts to God as his last end. Hence, according to the bonity or pravity of the Intention, we may take a measure of the bonity or pravity of Use: Every Intention of the Agent, wherein any thing but God is intended as the last end, is a depraved Intention: because nothing is to be intended for itself but the last end. Whence it follows, that no Intention is right or morally good, but that whereby we intent or love for itself, that which ought to be intended or loved for itself, namely the last end and chiefest good, using and referring allthings else, as means subordinate thereto, as it is acutely demonstrated by Ariminensis, in 2. Sent. Dist. 38. Quaest. 1. Art. 1. §. 5. Having explicated the nature of Use, Fruition. we may with more facility and expedition examine what Fruition imports. As to use a thing, is to intent, elect, and employ it for the acquirement of some other thing; so to enjoy a thing, is by love to adhere unto it for itself, without reference to any other thing. Thus Jansenius, Aug. Tom. 2. l. 1. c. 6. gives us this difference between Use and Fruition. He that useth a thing has dominion over it, to refer it to this or that end; but he that enjoys any thing doth bring down his Soul by love unto a subjection thereto, and is in that regard inferior to it, though superior to whatever he doth use. This Ariminensis, in Sent. Part. 1. Dist. 1. Quaest. 1, 2, 3. has acutely determined: where he gives us the nature of Fruition, and its difference from Use in these Conclusions. (1) No Nolition is Fruition: because every Nil is the slight of the will, and that which is ordained for some other. (2) Every Volition is either Use or Fruition: because every thing is willed either for itself or some other. (3) No Use is Fruition: because no one that wils a thing for another, can be said to will that thing as his last end: because the volition of the last end is the cause of the volition of that which refers to that end: but nothing can be the cause of itself: Ergo. (4) Fruition and Use may consist together in the Will, as to different objects. (5) The Will ought not to Use God: i. e. as a means conducible to some other end. (6) A Love of Fruition must terminate no where but on God. (7) To love any thing for God, is nothing else than to love it, because God is loved: i. e. to love it as conducible to God. In Fruition there are four considerables, (1) Love. (2) Possession of and Union with the Object beloved. (3) Communion. (4) Delectation and joy. Of these in their order. 1. All Fruition imports Love. For no man can enjoy what he doth not love: all Love tends to Union, specially with its last end: Yea, according to the Schools, there is a mutual Inhesion between the Lover and Beloved. The Lover lives in the Beloved, and the Beloved in the Lover: which is most true in regard of that Love of Fruition, whereby the Soul enjoys God: for God lives in the Soul that loves him, and the Soul lives in God, who is essential Love. This Love of Fruition is well expressed by Plato, Repub. 6. pag. 485. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But in that man, whose affections are greatly ravished with one object, they are infirm and remiss towards other things, as rivers, derived elsewhere. His mind is, that Love of Fruition is properly towards one object, namely the last end. But more expressly, in his Phaedo, he saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, He that is wise desires always to be with and enjoy that which is better or his best good: i. e. Union and Fruition is the main thing his Love aims at. Every one is strongly carried forth by Love towards his last end: yea those very acts of love and desire are fruition in part. Thence Arist. Rhet. lib. 2. cap. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Because all are wont to be conversant about what they love. This intime connexion between Love and Fruition is excellently well explicated by Jansenius, August. Tom. 2. l. 1. c. 6. pag. 40. Love of Fruition ordains and disposeth the Love towards its Beloved: whom it regards as its first Principe or Cause, and its last end, in the fruition of which it expects perfect felicity. For what is Fruition but this, to adhere to and acquiesce in another as its first principe and last end? But now every thing that is ordained to another, is in that respect necessarily inferior to that other. Whence Love of Fruition keeps the Soul in subjection to God its last end, but gives it dominion over every inferior good. This Jansenius more fully explicates, Tom. 2. l. 2. c. 16. pag. 149. Many, saith he, think they love not such things, to which they are indeed intimately and strongly united: but this is with facility detected by Fruition: for Love cannot be well understood without Fruition, nor yet Fruition without Love; because Love is the beginning of Fruition, and Fruition the end of Love. No man enjoys but what he loves; and no man loves any thing as his last end, but what he would enjoy: whence, as there is no Fruition but what is sweetened with Love, so there is no Love but what tends to Fruition. Therefore Love, according to Augustine, is nothing else but the Will, by its Pondus, tending to Fruition. What is Love, but a secret Fountain streaming towards Fruition? And what is Fruition, but an Ocean of satisfaction, in which Love is immersed and swallowed up? Is not then Fruition near akin to Love? Thence Augustine, explicating the nature of Fruition, tells us, that to enjoy, is to adhere to a thing for itself: for if it be not adhered to for itself, it is not properly loved or enjoyed, but that other thing, for whose sake it is embraced. But to speak precisely, every kind of Love is not Fruition, but that only which solaceth itself in the embracements of its beloved: which if absent, the will moves towards it by desires. This is well expounded by Plato, Phaedro, pag. 251. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Wherefore every Soul, so long as it is pricked and wounded with desires, it feels grief, and is enraged thereby; and then again it is recreated with the memory of that first Beauty it once beheld. And thus variously affected, by reason of impatient fury, it cannot sleep, but wanders up and down with desire to see the first Beauty: which when it has once got a glance of, then breaking all bounds of Modesty it solaceth itself in the embraces thereof, etc. By all which it is apparent, (1) That all Fruition of, or love to any Creature for itself is sinful concupiscence. (2) That God alone is to be embraced with a love of Fruition as our last end; because he alone is to be loved for himself. He that loves any thing with God, and not for God, loves him not as he ought. 2. Union. The next part of Fruition is Possession of and Union with the Object beloved. All complete Fruition supposeth Possession and Union: Frui est terminus desiderii. Suar. for if the object be absent, there can be only love of desire, not perfect Fruition: because to enjoy a thing is the term of desire. Plato, in his Timaeus, informs us, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Beatitude, consists in nothing else but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to have a good Demon dwelling in himself, etc. whereby he understands God. The like also in his Politicus, pag. 309. he shows how the Soul being united to the first Beauty or chiefest Good, it thereby becomes happy. And Thales being asked, What was most sweet? answered, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to possess, meaning the chiefest Good. This possession of the supreme Good, which belongs to Fruition, is well expressed by Aristotle, Eth. lib. 4. cap. 4. art. 37. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For the virtue of possession and of work is not the same: For the virtue of possession is that it might be most esteemed, precious and dear. Where by Possession he seems to mean Fruition, as by work, Use. So Aristotle, Rhet. lib. 2. cap. 18. speaking of Rich men, their Fruition of riches as their last end, saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, They receive a great impression from the possession of riches: for they are so affected as if they enjoyed all good: i. e. possessing Riches they enjoy them as their chiefest good; and so have their spirits form by, yea transformed into them: for allthings are fashioned and framed into the image and idea of those good things which they possess and enjoy as their last end: Fruition breeds first imitation of or likeness unto, and then union with what we enjoy. Neither doth Fruition import possession only, but also union with its last end, i. e. moral and objective union at least, if not physic and real: for without union there can be no Fruition of that good we possess. Now the union which the Soul has with its chiefest Good is most intimate, firm, and inviolable. For the Union of Spirits is far more intimate and firm than that of bodies among themselves, or with Spirits. The senses in extracting pleasures out of sensible good are conversant only about the extern accidents: Moreover the pleasures taken in by the senses come not in altogether, but gradually and by parcels: therefore the union of object and subject is more remote and partial only: But the Soul, in the Fruition of the chiefest sweetest good, being spiritual, and of the same nature with its object, has a more complete reception thereof, and intimate union therewith: whence the pleasures that attend the same are of all the most spiritual, pure, intense, and permanent, as hereafter. 3. All Fruition imports Communion with our chiefest Good. Communion. Frui, ex vi nominis est, capere fructum à re. Suar. For to enjoy a thing, according to the origination of the word among the Latins, is to participate of the fruits thereof. And may any participate of the fruits of the chiefest Good, without communion therewith? Indeed all union, at least with the supreme Good, is in order to communion; which doth formalise, yea consummate the Souls Beatitude in its most perfect state. It is not the possession of any good can make them happy that have it, unless they enjoy what they possess. This is lively illustrated by Plato in his Phaedo, pag. 80, etc. This Phaedo coming to Socrates at the time when he was ready to die, Socrates philosophiseth, even to admiration, on the Souls immortal state after death, and its felicity in communion with the chiefest Good. His words are these: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But the Soul, being a thing invisible, departs to such a place, as is most generous, pure, and invisible, namely to the state of the dead, where it enjoys God the most wise and choicest Good; where, if God will, my Soul must immediately go. Thence he adds, pag. 81. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Doth not therefore the mind thus qualified go to that divine Being like itself? I say, that divine, immortal, and wise Being? Where when it arrives, doth it not evade altogether happy, being freed from Error, Ignorance, Terrors, wild Loves, and other human Infirmities; and as we say of those who are initiated in Sacreds', spend the rest of its time in communion with God? This he makes to be the state of pure Souls separated; whereas impure polluted Souls pass unto their place of punishment as he in what follows demonstrates. This Communion with God Plato, Contemplation. Tim. 90. makes to consist, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in giving the Soul its proper food and motions: which he chief placeth, (1) in the Contemplation of God. This he more fully explicates, Conviv. pag. 211. where he makes, The Contemplation of the first Beauty, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. that divine, sincere, uniform, simple, pure, incontaminate, perfect Beauty, to be the most ravishing spectacle; and that which makes us perfectly happy. Acts of Contemplation on God are most tranquille, pleasant, congenial to the Soul, uniform, self-sufficient, and permanent. Thus Aquinas, 2.2. Quaest. 179. Art. 1. Every thing manifestes its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and whereunto it is chief inclined: Now, in as much as Contemplation is the proper act of man whereunto he is most inclined, and wherein he delights most, it follows, that herein the main of his life consists. To contemplate the first cause and last end of allthings how delicious and agreeable is it! Contemplation binds the mind to its object, and thence insensibly transforms it thereinto. Is it not sweet to the eye to contemplate light? And is not the last end the prime light of the Soul? Doth not the contemplation of our last end give us a divine light to improve all other objects we converse with? And are not allthings hereby turned into God? Doth not the Contemplation of God, as our choicest Good, enable us to live in God, and to him? (2) But yet together with Contemplation there must be divine Love and Complacence, Love. which is another part of the Souls communion with its last end. Contemplation brings in the chiefest Good into the Soul; but divine Love carries out the Soul to it, by adherence to, and delight in it. The amorous Soul living in God by love, dies in itself. How many artifices doth divine Love use for the enjoyment of its choicest Good? As man lost God by loving the Creature more than God; so by loving God more than the Creature he again finds God, and satisfaction in him. Love to God settles the Soul in one point, out of which it needs not stir to find Felicity. Dulcius est amare quàm amari. Sen. A Soul thus inspired with the flames of divine Love has a little Heaven in it. The Stoic thinks it sweeter to love than to be beloved. Certainly divine Love is most unitive and perfective: it has a violence and pain, which is most sweet and delicious. The Soul by loving its last end possesseth, enjoys, and lives in it. Have not allthings a desire of union and communion with what they love? And the more vehement our love is, if it be of the chiefest good, the sweeter our fruition thereof is. This love gains strength by opposition: it makes the most difficult service sweet. The only limits this victorious divine Love proposeth to itself, is to have no limits. Where ever the Soul turns it cannot but feel dolours, if it acquiesce not in God; but so far as it adheres to God, it feels no pain. Augustine, that great Doctor of Love to God, comprised all Christian Morals in Love; which is the plenitude of the Law and our best Instructor in every Duty. It is a luminous fire that discovers things most secret, and penetrates things most profound: it is an incomparable Antidote against human corruption. Whence also Augustine termed all Virtue but the order of Love: and its admirable efficace is seen in this, that it doth lift the heart above all things create, and yet at the same time depress it at the lowest centre of self-nothingnesse. All the labours of this Love are full of divine suavities, and carry their rewards in them: Afflictions blunt not its edge: cast it into an ocean of misery, and it swims above all: it estimates its misery only by the loss, and its Beatitude only by the fruition of its last end. Mediocrity, which in other things is esteemed Virtue, is a Vice in Love to God, which admits no excess. These and such like are the Acts of the Soul in Communion with God, as our last end. This Communion with God, the Romans, in their manner and according to their obscure sentiments, expressed by their Lectisternia, or Beds placed in their Temples, whereon they conceited they feasted and had communion with their Gods: Of which see Lud. Vives in August. Civ. lib. 3. cap. 17. §. 6. Lastly, Delectation and Joy. Fruition of the choicest Good carries with it satisfying Pleasures, Suavities, and Delights. No one properly enjoys a thing, who hath not some joy in the Fruition thereof. Frui, est cum gaudio frui. August. The Quietation, Delectation, and Satisfaction, which the Soul finds in the enjoyment of its last end is greatly illustrated by Plato, in his Philebus, where he treats professedly of this subject. So pag. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, He that being young having tasted thereof, like one overjoyed, as if he had found a treasure of wisdom, leaping for joy, and as it were under a divine Enthusiasm or rapture, he moves every discourse cheerfully and orderly. This Transport of divine Joy is proper to no act but the Fruition of our last end. Thence Phileb. pag. 40. he thus distinguisheth between true and false pleasures: There are in the minds of wicked men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, painted pleasures, but such as are altogether false. Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Wherefore wicked men for the most part are glutted with false pleasures; but virtuose men with such as are sincere and genuine. Wicked men's pleasures are sucked from some dirty terrene goods; and therefore only imaginary and spurious; but the virtuose man's pleasures are form out of the chiefest good, and therefore genuine and satisfying. But to philosophise more distinctly of that Delectation, Joy, and Pleasure, which attends the fruition of the chiefest Good, we shall examine and inquire into, (1) The Causes, (2) The proper Adjuncts, (3) The Effects thereof; and that according to Plato's Philosophemes. 1. 1. The Causes of Delectation. Three things are essentially requisite to the constitution of true Delectation and Joy. (1) A sweet Good. (2) Possession of that Good. (1) A sweet Good. (3) Actions consequent to that possession. (1) There must be a sweet Good, out of which all true pleasure is form: and by how much the more sweet and pleasant the good is, by so much the more perfect is the delight. Satisfying joy is form out of nothing but the most amiable best good. This Plato frequently inculcates. Thus Phaedr. pag. 251. treating of the Contemplation of the chiefest Good, he saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Whom when it shall see, and instil the desire of him into itself, it shall then break all bounds of modesty, and having got liberty of breathing, it shall cease to be exagitated by pricking dolours. This most sweet pleasure it enjoys in the presence of its sweetest good, so that it can never departed from its embraces, neither doth it value any thing more than its beloved. Such infinite pleasure flows from the presence of the sweetest Good. Perfect Joy cannot form itself out of any inferior good: it springs only from the best sweetest good, which infuseth its divine suavities into the Soul. What but the first essential, universal, Soul-satisfying good can feed immortal Souls with perfect delights? (2) Another Spring of Delectation is Possession; (2) Possession. which as it is essential to all Fruition, so in a particular manner to Joy that attends the same: for every one is delighted in the obtainment of what he loves: and by how much the sweeter the object beloved is, and the possession more intimate, by so much the greater is the delight. Generatio voluptatis ex copulatione finiti & infiniti. Thence it is a great Philosopheme with Plato, That true Joy issueth from the copulation of finite and infinite, i. e. to speak nakedly, from the Union of the Soul with God. This Plato, according to his allegoric mode, expresseth, Conviv. 206. All men, saith he, in their manner conceive and are pregnant; and when they have gone their time, Nature desires to bring forth. Thence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore as oft as that which is pregnant adheres to the first Beauty or sweetest Good, it is affected with joy, hilarity, and pleasure; and brings forth and generates: but on the contrary, when it adheres to what is base and fordid, it is contracted by sorrow and grief; and thence, being not able to bring forth, it is tormented with pains and dolours. By which he describes to the life the different effects which follow on the Souls adhering to God, and to inferior Goods: upon the Soul's adherence to God follows the generation of Soul-ravishing pleasures; but upon adherence to base worldly good no true pleasure follows, but vexatious dolours and torments. This pleasure, that follows on adherence to, and possession of God, is well expressed by David, Psal. 25.13. Psal. 25.13. His Soul shall dwell at ease: Heb. loge in goodness. When God dwells in the Soul, it than doth loge in goodness, or dwell at ease: where there is want, there can be no perfect ease and delight: but when the Soul logeth in divine Goodness, it than finds ease and pleasure. Every want wrings and pincheth the Soul: it can never loge with ease, till it loge in the chiefest Good by possessing the same, whereby all its wants are supplied. The Soul, when it sits most uneasy as to inferior goods, so far as it dwells in God, and God dwells in it, so far it finds ease. Properly we never enjoy any thing, till we find rest in it: this the Soul finds so far as it possesseth God. Whence springs delectation and pleasure: Possession gives the obtainment of desires: and desires so far as obtained fill with joy proportionable to the desires. (3) The immediate effective Spring of Delectation and Joy is Motion or Action. (3) Action a cause of Joy. Whence Joy is defined by Cicero, a sweet motion in sense. Yea, things in themselves bitter and irksome, how sweet are they oft made by exercise! It is generally determined in the Schools, That operation and motion is the proper cause of Delectation: and is not the operation and motion of the Soul in the fruition of the sweetest good of all the most noble and perfect? Actings of the Soul on the chiefest good, O what sweet inspirations of Divine suavities are they attended with! Thus Plato, Repub. 9 pag. 582. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. How great pleasure the contemplation of the first Being brings with it, none but a Philosopher can taste. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 249. speaking of the Contemplation of the first Being, he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, This is the most ravishing ecstasy and composed of the best things. That all true pleasure ariseth from virtuose exercices about the sweetest good, Aristotle, in imitation of his Master Plato, has well demonstrated. So Eth. l. 1. c. 9 p. 43. As in the Olympian Games not he that is most beautiful, or most valiant carries away the Crown; but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but they that contend for Victory: So in this human life, they that do good, are made partakers of good things. And then he adds the reason: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Their life is indeed sweet and joyous of itself— He is delighted or recreated in just things, who by love embraceth justice— To those that are studiose of virtue, virtuose acts are of themselves pleasant and delicious: i. e. they carry in them their own reward, a divine suavity. And he subjoins the reason: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. But their life needs not pleasure as an additament or appendix, but has pleasure included in it: For besides what has been spoken, he is not a good man, who is not delighted in good actions. Neither doth any call him just, who doth not take pleasure in just deeds: or liberal, who is not delighted in liberal acts. So in other Virtues. Whence he concludes: If so then, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, virtuose acts are of themselves sweet. Whence he collects this general Conclusion: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, formal Beatitude is the best, fairest, and sweetest thing: i. e. Nothing so sweet as by virtuose acts to adhere to, and enjoy the sweetest and best good. And indeed herein Plato and Aristotle accord and agree with sacred Philosophy. For David assures us, that nothing was so sweet to him, as the Contemplation and Fruition of God, by acts of Faith, etc. So Psal. 27.4. Psal. 27.4. One thing have I desired— to behold the beauty of the Lord: Heb. to behold with singular delight. For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 construed with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in signifies, to see with great pleasure and delectation, as v. 13. O! how sweet and delicious was it to David to look on the golden Ark, the Symbol of Christ's Humanity, and there by Faith to adore the Deity! So Psal. 106.5. That I may see the good of thy chosen, Psal. 106.5. that I may rejoice in the gladness of thy nation: Heb. to see in good, i. e. to enjoy the good seen with pleasure and satisfaction: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 construed with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies, to enjoy with pleasure. O! how deliciose is the fiducial contemplation of the sweetest Good! What is formal Beatitude, but the immediate, gloriose, perfect Intuition or Vision of the supreme Beauty? And what infinite delectation ensues hereon? What a joyous contemplation is it to behold the Deity in the Ark of Christ's Humanity? What infusions of Divine suavities flow hence? Doth not the Beauty of the first Cause and fairest Good captivate all hearts that behold it? How much spiritual delectation is there in one glance on the sweetest Good? How soon is the holy Soul filled with divine suavities, when it can, in any measure, contemplate the Glory of the prime Beauty. Thus Psal. 104.34. My meditation of him shall be sweet: Psal. 104.34. I will be glad in the Lord. Yea, would not an appropriating view of the admirable perfections of God, the sweetest Good, turn Hell itself into Heaven? Such are the divine suavities, which attend virtuose acts, in the Fruition of the sweetest Good. §. 7. 2. The Adjuncts of Delectation. We now descend to discourse of and explicate the nature of Delectation in regard of its proper Adjuncts, which are various. (1) All Delectation and Joy must be real and sincere: (1) It is real. and the more real and sincere it is, the better it is. And doth not this give a great advance to those joys and suavities which attend the fruition of our last end and sweetest good? May any delices be compared with these, in point of sincerity and reality? What are all other pleasures in comparison of these, but painted shadows, yea mere lies? This is lively illustrated by Plato, Phileb. pag. 40. where he styles all terrene pleasures, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Phantasms or Imaginations painted in our minds: as when a man conceits he has a vast treasure of gold in his possession, which he has not, yet takes pleasure in such a sick dream. Whence he adds: There are false pleasures in the minds of men, which yet, by men's ridiculous figments, imitate true pleasures. And then he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Neither do I judge, that we may consider pleasures in any other regard evil, but as they are false. B● which he invincibly demonstrates, that no pleasures are truly ●●ch, but those that are sincere, real, and substantial; which he makes proper to virtuose men, who adhere to the sweetest Good. This real pleasure is elsewhere styled by him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sincere genuine pleasure; which he makes to be peculiar to the fruition of the best Good. This he more openly expresseth, Repub. 9 pag. 580. where he assertes, That a wise or virtuose man only, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, doth taste of the most genuine and true pleasures. So pag. 583. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Neither is there any true pleasure, but that of a wise man. Whereby he, (as Solomon) understands a virtuose man. Thus Plato the Jew, that great Platonist: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Because all genuine and sincere joy is found only in the minds of good men; therefore every wise man rejoiceth in himself, and not in things foreign. Thence, saith Seneca, Those things in which the vulgar sort delight themselves, have only a thin superficial pleasure; and sometimes an adventitious joy, which hath no funde or bottom. There is no solid substantial joy, but what slows from, and some way refers to the fruition of the sweetest good: all other pleasures are only opinionative, and grounded on false imagination. (2) The Delectation that flows from the Fruition of the sweetest Good is most congenial, (2) Congenial Pleasures. and proper to the Soul; and therefore most perfect. Thus Plato, Repub. 9 pag. 585. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, If therefore to be filled with things consentaneous to nature be sweets then that which is indeed filled with the first Being, and those things that partake most of Being, is more truly affected with true pleasure. His Argument lies thus: Nothing is more delicious to human Nature, than to be filled with such things as are most consentaneous and agreeable to its more noble part the Soul: Now to be filled with the fruition of the first Being and sweetest Good is most proper and agreeable to the Soul: therefore this is most delicious to human Nature. So Plato, Repub. 9 pag. 580. saith, A wise man from the contemplation of God enjoys, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, pleasures proper to himself, and therefore the best. The perfection of all human pleasures and joys ariseth from their connaturalitie to the Soul: for this being man's most noble part, yea indeed (according to Platonic as well as sacred estimation) a man's self, the more congenial our pleasures are hereto, the more perfect they are: Now the pleasures and suavities, which flow from the fruition of our sweetest good, are of all most connatural and congenial to the Soul. For by how much the more immaterial, spirital, and intellectile our joys are, by so much the more agreeable they are to our Spirits: and are any joys more spirital, than those that flow from the fruition of our last end and sweetest good, which is God? Can any thing affect the Soul with higher delectation, than the fruition of the chiefest good, which is so agreeable to it, and which she receiveth immediately without the ministry of her extern senses? This is well expressed by Digby, of the Souls Immortality, pag. 459. We are sure that what pleasure a man receiveth, he receiveth by means of his Soul, even all corporeal pleasure: for be the working object never so agreeable and pleasing unto him, he reapeth thence small delight, if his Soul's attention be carried in the mean time another way from it. Certainly then those things affect the Soul most powerfully, which are connatural to her, and which she seizeth on and relisheth immediately; rather than those impure ones, which come sophisticated to her, through the muddy channels of the senses. Observe but the different comportment of an ambitiose and sensual man, and you will easily perceive this. Are not mental pleasures, specially in the contemplation of the first Beauty, most savoury and delicious? Yea, do not these by exercise become as it were one with the Soul? Again, are not spiritual pleasures most rational, judicious, discrete, and wise? O! what a world of folly and indiscretion, yea, may I not say, for the most part, brutish passion lies wrapped up in sensual pleasures? Lastly, these pleasures, which flow from the fruition of the sweetest good, do most elevate, dignify, and ennoble the Soul; and therefore are most agreeable thereto: whereas sensual pleasures degrade and bring down the Soul, yea place it below the rank of Brutes, as Hos. 4.10, 11. (3) Another proper Adjunct of that Delectation, (3) Uniform Pleasures. which attends the Fruition of the sweetest Good, is Uniformity and Harmony. By how much the more uniform and concordant pleasures are, by so much the better they are: what makes Music so sweet and delicious, but its Consent and Harmony? Hence Plato makes this a character of true pleasure, that it be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, uniform: and the Stoics, who were enemies to pleasure, yet allowed an uniform regular joy, which they made to attend, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the tranquillity and undisturbed state of the Soul. And where may we expect this regular tranquille serene Joy, but in the enjoyment of the chiefest Good? Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 26. makes these pleasures to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, symmetrous and harmonious, but terrene joys to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a discordant jarring passion. And he gives us a lively illustration, by the sweet Harmony that is in Music; which, saith he, is composed of Acutes and Graves, swift and flow, with other infinite Tones, which conjoined make a complete Harmony: So, adds he, True pleasure is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, symmetrous; whereas petulant false pleasure is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, dissonant, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, circumscribed by no bounds, without measure or order, etc. And indeed all sensual pleasures are extreme jarring and repugnant, not only to human Nature, but amongst themselves. Doth not the pleasure of Sensuality fight against the pleasure of Avarice, and both against that of Ambition? This is well illustrated by Aristotle, Eth. lib. 1. cap. 9 pag. 43. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Those things which seem sweet to the multitude, have an intestine war among themselves; because they are not such by nature: i. e. The pleasures of the multitude are difforme and repugnant each to other; because they are opinionative, artificial, and inordinate, not natural and regular. There is no joy uniform, regular, or natural, but that which flows from, or tends to the fruition of our last end, which is the measure of uniformity and harmony in Morals. Again, this delectation is by Plato made to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, impassable, i. e. such as receives not impression from, and therefore admits not conformity to the various mutations of terrene objects. For whatever receives impression from sensible objects, must needs fall under the same variations and vicissitudes, that those objects are obnoxious unto. And this is the true reason why all sensual pleasures are so variable, difforme and dissonant; because the objects, by which they are impressed and influenced, are most mutable and difforme. But now those pleasures that attend the fruition of God the sweetest Good partake of his Simplicity, immutability, and Uniformity. No Joy so regular, uniform and harmonious as those that proceed from the fruition of God. (4) The Delectation that attends the fruition of the sweetest Good is most pure and immixed, and therefore most perfect. (4) Pure immixed Pleasures. Thus Plato, Repub. 9 pag. 583. makes the Pleasure of his wise man to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, pure; but that of other men to be, not pure, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, only an umbratile pleasure. The delectation which follows the enjoyment of the chiefest Good rejoiceth in a twofold Purity, (1) Objective, as it is fed and maintained by pure objects; whereas all the pleasures of sense are but seculent and dirty; in that their matter is only sensible terrene good: but the joys and pleasures, which flow from the sweetest original good, partake of the crystalline purity of their object, which is most pure. (2) Effective, as it doth banish all sorrows and grief. So Plato, Phileb. 53. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, All pleasure so far as it is free from grief, it is more pleasant, true, and fair. Thus Repub. 9 he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Pleasure to be the cessation of grief, and grief the cessation of pleasure. So also, Phileb. pag. 66. he avoucheth true pleasures to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, without mixture of sorrow, and pure. Which is the peculiar privilege of those pleasures that attend the fruition of the sweetest Good: for all other pleasures are mixed with much grief and sorrow; they being indeed but bitter-sweets; yea more bitter than sweet. (5) The Delectation which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good are most intense and strong. Thus Plato, (5) Strong Pleasures. Phileb. p. 44. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, We must look, not to the least pleasures, but to such as are supreme and most vehement, if we will make a true judgement of pleasure. For the stronger any pleasures are, the better they are: and the more pure they are, the stronger they are Sensual pleasures are feeble and impotent, because impure and mixed; but spiritual joys are most potent and vehement; because most pure. Again, the vehemence and intenseness of any pleasure is proportionable to the energy, power, and activity of the subject, which is assected with such pleasure, and to the Pondus, Bent, or Impetus that it hath to the object it takes pleasure in. Now how vehement is the Pondus, Impetus, and Energy of the Will, whereby it shooteth itself into its sweetest Good; which when it enjoyeth, what an ecstasy, rapture, and transportt of joy is it affected with? Doth not Plato style this, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The best and strongest of all Ecstasies? (6) The Delectation which attends the fruition of our last end is infinite and without excess. (6) Joys without Excess. Thus Plato, Phileb. pag. 27. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For pleasure is not all good, unless it partake of an infinite nature. His design is to prove, that pleasure is not the chiefest good; because it is not in its nature infinite, so as to partake of all good: yet so far as it is a consequent that attends the fruition of the chiefest good, so far it is infinite. For as the chiefest good admits of no excess in our fruition; because it is in itself infinite and all good; so, by a parity of reason, the joy and pleasure that attends the fruition of the chiefest good is infinite without excess; because the object is infinitely sweet and amiable. The pleasure the Soul takes in the fruition of inferior goods soon admits excess, which it endeavours to cure by change of objects. Thus Aquinas, 1.2. Quaest. 33. Art. 2. Corporal delectations, when augmented and continued, do exceed the natural habitude, and therefore become nauseous; as it is evident in the delices of food: whence the appetite desires change and variety. But spiritual delectations never exceed the natural habitude, but perfect nature: whence the more they come to a consummation, the more they delight us. How soon are men glutted with the best of pleasures that sense can afford! And what remedy have they but intermission or exchange of objects? But now in the fruition of the sweetest Good there can be no excess, either in the act of fruition, or in the pleasures that attend it; and therefore there is no need either of intermission or exchange. §. 8. 3. The Effects of Delectation. Having explicated Delectation in its Causes and proper Adjuncts, we now proceed to the Effects thereof, thereby to demonstrate that the most perfect delectation is that which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good. There are two great Effects of this divine Delectation, (1) Amplitude and Enlargement, (2) Quietation and Satisfaction. 1. 1. Enlargement. The Delectation that attends the fruition of the sweetest Good brings with it Amplitude and Enlargement. Indeed all delight and joy brings Enlargement; which ariseth from the Sympathy between the object and the subject, or faculty; specially if the object be ample, how doth the faculty spread itself to enjoy the same? When the animal or vital Spirits are recreated, what enlargement follows thereon? How diffusive are they? Whereas Grief and Sorrow contracts and coarctates the Spirits. This is in an higher degree verified of that spiritual Joy, which attends the fruition of the best Good. There is a twofold Enlargement that follows spiritual Delectation in the fruition of the chiefest Good. (1) There is an Enlargement of the Faculty or Subject. The more pleasure the Soul finds in the enjoyment of its last end, the more its desires are enlarged. Thus Plato, Phileb. pag. 45. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; But what? are not those pleasures most excellent, whereof the greatest desires are kindled in us? Whereby he shows, that those are the greatest and best pleasures, that most enlarge the heart in desires after them. Indeed there is an intime connexion between true joy and enlargement; and therefore in sacred Philosophy one word is expressive of both. So Psal. 4.1. Thou hast enlarged me when I was in distress. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both to exhilarate and dilate: or to dilate by exhilarating. His spirit was straitened, narrowed and confined by distress; but dilated and enlarged by spiritual joys from God's presence. This Dilatation or Enlargement, which follows on spiritual Delectation, is well explicated by Aquinas, 1.2. Quaest. 33. Art. 1. Dilatation is a motion unto Latitude; and it agrees to Delectation both in regard of its apprehensive and appetitive virtue: for as man apprehends the conjunction of some convenient good, so his Soul is dilated towards it, in order to its perfect fruition thereof, and satisfaction therein, etc. (2) Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of the sweetest good brings with it also enlargement in Operation and Acting. All joy is vigorous and active: as it is the effect of precedent, so the cause of subsequent operation. Delight is the Spring of motion: it puts the Soul into a continual agitation: for by how much the more we delight in any object, by so much the more vehement and strong are our operations about it. Delectation makes us ardently and vehemently to move in the fruition of our sweetest good, and in all acts that tend thereto. What divine suavities doth it infuse into all our acts? Thus Plato, Conviv. pag. 210. The mind that converts its eyes to that so great amplitude of the first Beauty, doth no longer regard human affairs, but is as it were captivated thereby, etc. 2. The Delectation which attends the fruition of the sweetest Good, brings with it infinite Quietation and Satisfaction. Satisfaction. These spiritual pleasures do not only amplify and widen the Soul, but also bring satisfaction. Carnal joys breed a vexatious enlargement of the desires, but never sil them with satisfaction: they may slater and tickle the senses, but never quiet the appetite: the best they leave behind them is repentance. This is well explicated by Digby, of the Soul, pag. 460. The violence of fruition in those foul puddles of flesh and blood presently glutteth with satiety, and is attended with annoy and dislike: and the often using and repeating it, weareth away that edge of pleasure, which only maketh it sweet and valuable, even to them that set their hearts upon it: and nothing heighteneth it but an irritation, by a convenient hunger and abstinence. Contrary, in the Soul, the greater and more violent the pleasure is, the more intense and vehement the fruition is; and the oftener it is repeated, so much the greater appetite and desire we have to return unto the same. Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of our last end doth not only widen, but fill the Soul, and crown its desires with satisfaction. Delectation is the quiet of the Appetite in the fruition of its end: where there is no rest, there can be no perfect delight or satisfaction: and where there is want, there can be no rest: every want wrings the Soul, and keeps it in a restless condition. So that Quiet and Satisfaction is appropriated to the fruition of the last end and sweetest good. Thence Plato, Conviv. pag. 211. assures us, That the contemplation of the first, sincere, most perfect Beauty is formal Beatitude, that which brings with it perfect Delectation and Satisfaction: for they who arrive hereto, are content to live alone, in conversation with this first Beauty, etc. Of which see Philos. General. Part. 1. lib. 3. cap. 3. sect. 1. §. 2. CHAP. II. Of the Morality of human Acts, and Moral bonity. The Morality of human Acts. Moral Goodness in Conformity to the Divine Law. The measure of moral Goodness perfect. The Universality of a perfect Law. Subjective right Reason not the measure of Moral Good, but the Moral Law. Right Reason among the Philosophers the objective Law of Nature. The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule. The Parts and Causes of moral bonity. (1) The Mater: Things indifferent in genere & specie: Nothing indifferent in individuo. A virtuose Will the Principe of Moral Good. The best End essential to Moral Good. The form of moral Good Conformity to Gods Law. How 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gives Form. How far Circumstances formalise Moral Good. The Unity and Uniformity of all Moral Good. There is no real, moral, or natural Good, but what is supernatural. Moral Good most difficult. The Virtues of Pagans lesser sins only. The distribution of Moral Good into Piety and Justice. §. 1. HAving dispatched the generic Idea and last End, The Morality of human Acts. which has the place of a first Principe in Ethics, we now pass on to the Morality of Human Acts, and their bonity. And here we should first treat of the natural intern Principes of human Acts; namely the practic Judgement or Knowledge, Volition, Consultation, and Election: But having discussed these more largely in Court of the Gentiles, P. 1. B. 4. c. 1. §. 24. we shall not here undertake the discussion of them. As for the Morality of human Acts, there are great disputes in the Schools, Wherein the Esse morale of human Acts doth consist? Suarez, in 1.2. (which vulgarly they style his Ethics) Tract. 3. Disp. 1. pag. 207. discourseth largely of the Morality of human Acts under these heads. (1) He makes the formal denomination, or that form whereby an Act is denominated moral, to be more than an Ens rationis properly so termed, or a figment of men's minds, something in or appendent to the things themselves. This we grant. (2) He thence deduceth, That the Esse morale in the act of the Will, besides its Entity and substance, adds a certain mode of emanation or moral dependence on the Reason adverting, and the Will freely working. This Hypothesis needs animadversion and restriction. It's true, the Morality of human Acts hath dependence on the Reason and Will as the subject of those Acts: for all moral Acts depend on the physic Principes of those Acts: there is no moral Being but has its foundation in some physic or natural Being: As all moral capacity is subjected in natural, so all moral Acts. Virtue flowing from God has its seat in the Creature, and so supposeth a create intelligent Nature as antecedent thereto. Thus Cyril Alexandr. Compend. Dialog. de S. Trinit. Tom. 5. part. 1. pag. 673. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That which is holy by participation, being the receptacle of adventitious Sanctity, that of itself existes primarily in proper nature: namely as Man and Angel, or any other rational Creature. So Damascene, Dialect. cap. 59 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That is first by nature which is inferred, but infers not, i.e. secundùm existendi consequentiam: if there be Grace there must be human Nature wherein it is seated; but if there be human Nature, it doth not necessarily follow, that there must be Grace. Thus the human Understanding and Will precede Virtue, as the subject thereof. Yet hence it follows not, as Suarez seems to conclude, that moral Acts receive their formal denomination from their relation to the Understanding and Wil (3) Hence Suarez concludes, that the Esse morale is a mode not physically and intrinsically inherent in the moral act; but in the extern act it speaks denomination from the free act of the Will: and in the very act of the Will, besides its physic emanation from the Will, it speaks denomination from the reason directing, and the Will acting with a plenary power. Though, as it has been granted, all Morality of human Acts doth presuppose the emanation of those acts from the Understanding and Will, as their main Principles; yet it follows not hence, that the formal reason of their Morality must be taken from this mode of emanation. May we not as well argue, that all virtuose acts are formalised by their relation to the natural Principes of human acts; because they flow thence? But there lies a mystery in this Jesuitic Hypothesis, which when laid open will soon evidence its vanity and falsehood. The Jesuits, and some other Schoolmen, in imitation, yet on mistaken grounds, of the ancient Philosophers, place the formal reason of all moral Virtue in conformity to right Reason. Hence no wonder if they make all Morality, formally considered, to be a mode dependent on Reason and Wil But the falsity hereof will appear by what follows. If we consider the Morality of human Acts as stated by Plato, it cannot be denied but that he also makes mention of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a right Reason, which he seems to make the measure of all Morality, bonity, and Vice. But what a vast distance there is between Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, right Reason, and that maintained by the Jesuits and some other Schoolmen, we shall, when we come to discourse of moral bonity, sufficiently evince. For the present we shall endeavour to determine the true nature of Morality, so much darkened by scholastic niceties, in the following Propositions. (1) Prop. All Morality of human Acts speaks some fundamental subjective dependence on the natural Principes of human Acts. For there is nothing in Morality but has some relation to, yea dependence on human Nature as its subject and fundament. Morality is but a mode or relation, which cannot subsist of itself, without a subject and foundation in Nature. Can a man know and love God, without reason and will? (2) Prop. The Morality of human Acts is not formalised or specified in genere moris by the relation such Acts have to Reason or Wil For every thing is specified and formalised by its formal reason: and what is the formal reason of any thing but the Idea of its Essence? And wherein consists the essence of moral Acts, but in their conformity to, if good, or difformity from, if bad, the perfect measure of Morals? and what is the perfect measure of Morals, but the moral Law? (3) Prop. The Morality of human Acts is a real mode, not absolute but relative, appendent to those Acts. That Morality is not a mere figment of Reason, but something real is generally confessed, and that on invincible grounds; because it has real influences and effects. Moreover, that Morality is not an absolute mode, but relative, is as evident; because the whole of its essence speaks a relation to somewhat else. Hence, (4) Prop. The Morality of human Acts speaks some relation to the last end. For the last end in Morals hath the force of a first Principe, Form, and Measure. It's a great Effate in the Schools, That the End specifies in Morals. Allthings are defined and measured by their last End, but this by nothing. The last end, as a pregnant universal Principe, contains all Morals in its womb. (5) Prop. The object matter doth also in some degree concur to the formalising of moral Acts. Thence, saith Aquinas, A moral Act receives its species from the object and end. And Petrus à Sancto Joseph, Thes. 165. adds, That an Act is moral from the order it has to its object, not considered in its being but morally, as subject to the Rules of Morality. To this of the object we may add all essential moral circumstances, which oft add much to the being and intention of Morality. (6) Prop. But yet we must conclude, That the adequate exemplar and perfect measure of all Morality, formally considered, is the Law of God: This comprehends and gives measure to all other Rules of Morality: the last end, object, and circumstances are all measured hereby. Thus Scotus, and other of the Schoolmen determine, That the Esse morale, or Morality of an Act as such is its relation to that Law, unto which it is referred. And the reason is most evident; because all Morality speaks a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or relation to some Rule: And what adequate perfect Rule is there of moral Acts, but some moral Law? And thus we must understand the ancient Philosophers, as also some late Divines, who make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, right Reason the only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or measure of moral Acts. That by right Reason we are to understand an objective Reason or a divine Law will be most evident by what follows touching moral bonity and its measure. §. 2. Moral Goodness in conformity to the Divine Law. Having inquired into the Morality of human Acts in the general, we descend to examine their moral bonity and pravity. Every thing is so far good as it answers to its proper measure and rule; but evil, so far as it comes short thereof: And what is the measure or rule of moral bonity, but the divine Will and Law? Thus Plato, Repub. 9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That is most distant from reason, which is most remote from Law and Order: i. e. Things are so far conformed to reason and good, as they are conformed to Law and Order. Whence, definite. Platon. pag. 4.13. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Law, is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which puts an end to controversies about what is unjust or just. Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an obedience of virtuose Laws. And on the contrary, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Injustice is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an habit that over looks Laws. This Plato more fully explicates, Gorg. 504. And truly that wherein the order of the body consists may, as it seems to me, well be termed salubrity; whence the body's health ariseth: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but those things wherein the order and ornament or goodness of the mind consists, we call legal and Law: whence men become legitime and orderly. He compares the bonity of the Soul to the sanity or health of the Body; which as it consists in the order and regular temperament of all humours; so the goodness of the mind doth in like manner consist in its order or conformity to Law. This is well explicated by his Scholar Aristotle, Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 9 art. 9 pag. 44. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Righteousness truly is a virtue by which all have what is their own, and as the Law establisheth: But Injustice, by which men possess what is not their own, against the precepts of the Law. What he here determines of Justice and Injustice in particular holds true of all other Virtue, and bonity, or Vice. But to bring Plato's Philosophemes to sacred Philosophy, touching the conformity of all moral Good to the divine Law, we shall determine the whole in the following Propositions. 1. Prop. All moral bonity, Moral bonity in conformity to a Law. whether objective or subjective and formal, denotes a conformity to some Law. The Schools distinguish moral bonity or Honesty into objective and formal. The former is that which constitutes a thing morally good as an object; but the later, that which constitutes an act as an act morally good. (1) In the objects of human Acts there is necessarily required a moral goodness, which agrees thereto as objects, as Suarez 1.2. Tract. 3. Disp. 2. strongly proves. And the reasons are demonstrative: For [1] If the object or matter be not morally good or lawful, the act conversant thereabout can never be good: because all moral good requires an integrity of causes: an irregularity in the object will render the act irregular. [2] The object of the Will is good as good: therefore that bonity which moves the Will cannot slow from it, but must be supposed as inherent in or appendent to its objects. [3] This moral goodness of the object doth not only agree to human Acts, but also to all other things which may be lawfully loved and embraced. [4] This moral objective bonity ariseth from the matter as clothed with all its conditions and circumstances, whereby it is rendered a meet object for the Soul to close with. [5] The moral goodness of any object consists in its conformity to or agreement with the Divine Law. (2) There is also formal bonity or Goodness, which constitutes a man formally good. For [1] An object, though never so good, cannot constitute a man or his act formally good. It's true the Act receives some goodness from its object, yet only materially and terminatively, not formally, so as to constitute the Act formally good. [2] The Act is so far formally good as virtuose, i. e. proceeding from right Principes, tending to a right end, and measured by a perfect Rule. All which presuppose some divine Law as the measure. 2. The Measure of Moral Good perfect. Prop. That Law, which is the measure of moral bonity, must be perfect. This Hypothesis is most evident, and will appear to be such, if we consider either the nature of a measure, or the condition of the thing measured. (1) As for the nature of a measure, Plato, Repub. 6. well explicates the same: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A defective measure of such things is no measure; for that which is imperfect cannot be the measure of any thing. Every Measure or Rule is indivisible, and therefore capable neither of addition or substraction. Thus Phavorinus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A Canon or Rule is an infallible measure, admitting neither addition nor detraction. And thus much indeed is formally included in the notion Canon: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Canna, whence it is derived, primarily denotes a reed of such a just longitude, whereby they measured their Lands: and thence it was used in the general for an exact measure: as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Job 38 5. is rendered by Aquila 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 2 Cor. 10.13. Phil. 3.16. Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 2 Cor. 10.13. is explicated by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such is its use, Gal. 6.16. Phil. 3.16. whereby the perfection of the Divine Law is illustrated. (2) That the measure of moral bonity must be perfect, is easily demonstrated from the condition of moral bonity: for a plenitude of being, or integrity of bonity is essential to all moral good. Moral evil ariseth from the least defect, but moral good requireth an integrity of causes and parts. If there be the least circumstance misplaced or mistimed, it renders the act vitiose. Now if all moral good must be thus perfect and entire, than it necessarily follows, that its measure and rule must be perfect and entire. But of this more in what follows. 3. The Universality of a perfect Law. Prop. The perfection of a Law, as it is the measure of moral bonity, consists in its comprehension of the most perfect objective mater, end, and principes. The explication and demonstration of this Proposition depends on the explication of moral good, as to its constitutive parts and causes. It was said before, that all moral good requires an integrity of Being and Causes. In the Schools they make four Causes of moral Good, proportionable to those in natural productions, namely Mater, Form, End, Efficient. We shall not at present think ourselves obliged to examine or defend the legality of this distribution; but endeavour to demonstrate, that a perfect measure of moral bonity comprehends each of these Causes and Principes. (1) It must comprehend the objectmater of all moral bonity in its fullest Amplitude, Extension, and Universality. Thus Plato, Leg. 1. pag. 630. Truth and Equity require that they who will discourse of a divine Republic, determine, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that the Legislator has respect, not to one only particle of virtue, and that truly the least; but rather to all virtue, and that he find out Laws according to those several Species of Virtue: i. e. The Law of moral bonity must extend itself to all the various Species and Offices of Virtue. If there be any moral Duty, which the Law of Morality extends not to, it is no perfect measure. And this argues the imperfection of Nature's light in us, and all human Laws, as hereafter. (2) As for the Form of moral bonity, it consists in conformity to the Rule or Law of Morality; which if perfect, exacts the most perfect conformity. Thus Plato, Leg. 1. pag. 630. Our whole discourse tends to this, to show, that this Legislator, and all other who will institute utile Laws, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, aught, in framing Laws, to aim at the highest Virtue, i. e. at the highest conformity to the best Law. (3) That a perfect Law of Morality comprehends the most perfect End is also most evident; because the end is as the Soul and Spirit in Morals: all offices of virtue are but as a dead Corpse, without a spirituose perfect end, as Jansenius demonstrates out of Augustine. Thence Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 444. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Good Institutes or Laws make way for Virtue, but bad precipitate men into vice. Now he elsewhere assures us, That the end gives life and perfection to all virtuose Acts. Yea, Leg. 1. he openly saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, All Laws are to be so constituted, as that they may promote the best end. (4) The Law of moral bonity must be perfect as to the Efficient or Principe of Morality: i. e. it must extend itself to the qualification of the subject, and its virtuose disposition: for as the end directs the act, so the principes or dispositions of the subject direct the end. Arist. Eth. lib. 3. c. 10. assures us, That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the end of every act is according to the habit: i. e. if the mind be not well-disposed, or clothed with virtuose habits, it will never aim at a virtuose end. Thence that great Saying of Augustine, The intention of the best end makes the work good, and Faith directs the intention. So that the Law of Morality, if perfect, extends itself to all virtuose principes and moral habits, which the subject ought to be invested with. 3. Subjective right Reason not the measure of moral Good. Prop. Subjective right Reason, or objective human Laws are not a perfect Rule of moral bonity. There are two parts in this Proposition to be examined: (1) That subjective right Reason is not a perfect Rule of moral bonity. To explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis we grant, [1] That Reason is the Organ of apprehending, albeit not the measure of our duty. [2] That practic Reason or Conscience, so far as illuminated by the Spirit of God, is the regula regulata of our duty: for Conscience is God's Deputy, and a Law unto a man's self. Yet we deny that there is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or right Reason in nature corrupted, which may suffice as a Rule of moral Goodness. I am not ignorant how much the Light of Nature, or, as some term it, Right Reason is cried up by some as the only Rule of Morality. Thus Seneca would needs persuade us, That we have this merit of Nature, that virtue doth premit its light into the minds of all: yea those that will not follow, yet see it. And not only some vulgar capacities now a-days, but also the Stoics of old generally cried up the Light within them, as the Rule of Morality. The Schoolmen also, in imitation of Aristotle their Oracle, generally proclaim right Reason to be the formal Rule of moral Good. But that Aristotle and Plato by their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, right Reason, understood the objective Law either of Nature or Moses, I no way doubt but hereafter to demonstrate. Indeed all our subjective Light by Nature is no other than a nocturne, dreaming, tenebrous knowledge, as Plato styles it. (2) That no human Law or Laws is the perfect measure of moral bonity, No human Laws a perfect Rule of moral Good. is also evident; because all human Laws are extreme defective in their extension and prescripts as to all the Causes and Principes of moral Goodness: how deficient are they both as to the Mater and Manner of moral Good! What Restrictions, Emendations, and Alterations do they need? What an infinite number of particular cases are there, which no human Law can reach? Well therefore doth Androcles, in Aristotle, Reth. l. 2. c. 25. inform us, That all human Laws need another Law to correct them, as fishes need salt, to preserve them from putrefaction. This corrective Law they term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Equity, which indeed is no other than the Law of Nature, as hereafter, cap. 5. §. 5. 4. The Divine Law the Rule of moral Good. Prop. The adequate perfect rule and measure of moral bonity is the Divine Law. This Hypothesis being the main will require more ample explication and demonstration. (1) The Divine Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the first essentially just and holy Being; and therefore the first essential rule or measure of all Justice and Sanctity. (2) But the Divine Essence being too remote and distant from the Creature, he hath therefore given us a divine Law, as the Miroir and Idea of his essential Sanctity, to be the rule of all moral bonity as to us. (3) This Divine Law given us, as the Rule of moral bonity, was concreate and connatural as to Adam, it being impressed and engraven on his nature, and so needed not any further promulgation. (4) Hence the objective and subjective Law or Light of Nature was to Adam, in his innocent state, one and the same; he having a perfect understanding and comprehension of the whole Duty of man, and so became a Law unto himself. (5) But lapsed man having lost his subjective Law and Light of Nature, as to supernaturals, and very far as to naturals and civils', retaining only some fragments or broken notices, our most benign Lord, out of his great clemence and pity to lapsed man, gave a new Edition of that natural Law, and therein fresh notices of his sovereign. will and pleasure, touching man's duty. So that the World was never without an objective Law and Light of Nature, albeit the subjective was lost in Adam. Yea, some Divines of great note conceive, that those very common natural Notions, communly called the Fragments or Remains of the Image of God lost by Adam, are vouchsafed to us by the Covenant of Grace in and by the Mediation of Christ. Thus they interpret, Joh. 1.9. of Christ's illightening every man: Joh. 1.9. i. e. not only supernatural light vouchsafed to the Elect, but even the natural notices or Light of Nature vouchsafed to the lapsed Sons of Adam is the effect of the second Covenant and Christ's Mediation. And the reason seems demonstrative; because our very Being's and all the comforts of our Being's having been forfeited by the breach of the first Covenant, whatever good we enjoy on this side Hell, is but the overflowing of the Grace of the second Covenant, and Christ's Mediation, by which the whole World stands. So far are we from any real claim to a subjective Light of Nature, by virtue of the first Covenant, as that both subjective and objective Light is from Christ. The objective Light or Law of Nature is styled by the Hebrews, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and its Offices, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the known Duties, i.e. by nature: to which they opposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Divine, namely Institutes, or positive Commands of God. For Jus naturale, the natural Law is not opposed to supernatural, but to positive Laws, as Grotius hath well observed. Right Reason the objective Law of Nature. (6) This objective Law of Nature, in its second Edition, as contained in divine Revelations of moral bonity, was not altogether unknowen to the wiser of the Heathen: and that Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Right Reason, was but an Imitamen hereof, we now undertake to demonstrate. He discourseth hereof professedly in Minos, pag. 317. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That which is Right, is the Royal Law. (1) That by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he means the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is to me unquestionable, and I think it will clearly appear so to others by what follows. (2) He saith this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Royal Law, which is the stile the Hebrews gave their moral Law, as Jam. 2.8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Jam. 2.8. And why doth he term it the Royal Law, but because it was the supreme Law of God, the King of Kings? Thence Socrates adds, We therefore rightly granted, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that this Law was the invention of Being itself, or of the first independent Being. For this generally he understands by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thence, Defin. Plat. pag. 416. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sin is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an operation against right Reason, i. e. the objective Law and Light of Nature. Thus also Aristotle, Eth. l. 2. c. 2. art. 6. pag. 76. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, And truly this, to act according to right Reason is commun to all, and let it be fixed as a Canon. So again, Eth. l. 3. c. 8. pag. 153. he saith, Virtues are mediocrities freely undertaken, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and so as right Reason shall prescribe. This right Reason he elsewhere terms, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the universal common Law, which all by nature are subject to. So Rhet. l. 1. c. 14. art. 3. pag. 69. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. I say, Law is either proper or common: proper or private Law is that written Law, which belongs to particular Nations. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The common Law I call that which is according to nature: for there is a certain common Just and unjust, which all consent unto, albeit there should be no society, or confederation of men. This common Law of Nature is the same with his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. For look as in speculative Sciences there are certain first Principes, which are the foundation of all demonstration; so in Practics and Morals, there is an objective Law or Light of Nature containing certain practic Principes, which are the Rule of Conversation. Thus also we are to understand the Stoics, if we will make a right use of their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of which Diog. La●rt. in Zeno: The Stoics say, that to live according to nature, is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to do nothing that the common Law prohibits, which is right Reason diffusing itself throughout allthings. Where it deserves a remark, That they make the common Law of Nature the same with right Reason. Which cannot rightly be understood of subjective right Reason, but of objective it may. Again, they say, This right Reason diffuseth itself throughout allthings. Which cannot be understood of any subjective reason, which is confined to individuals; but must be applied to the common objective Light and Law of Nature, which is diffused throughout the whole Creation, according to the various conditions of things. Thus Hierocles in Pythagor. Carm. pag. 106. saith, That the vices of the mind are, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Aversions and Errata from right Reason: And pag. 209. he adds: This right Reason is the great Legislatrix and Judge of all human affairs, etc. And Stobaeus, de Virt. Serm. 1. pag. 9 also informs us: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Virtue is a Syntaxe, or orderly contexture according to right Reason; but Vice a Transgression against right Reason. Where by right Reason we must necessarily understand the common objective Light or Law of Nature, not that dark subjective Light in the minds of blind Mankind. Thus also we must understand Parker, Amyraldus, and other Divines, who make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, right Reason the unic Criterion or Rule of moral Virtue. Though I deny not, but that the Stoics generally, and perhaps Aristotle, as many of his Followers among the Schoolmen, by right Reason understand the subjective Light of Nature in men's minds; yet I am very apt to persuade myself, that Socrates and Plato, who seem to be the first Promulgators of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, meant thereby no other than the objective Light and Law of Nature, whereof some more commun Precepts were conveyed down by the posterity of Noah; but those irradiant and bright notices thereof, which shone among them, they received by oriental Tradition from the sacred Books of Moses, wherein Plato was not a little versed, and which by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, royal Law he seems to allude unto. 5. The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule. Prop. That Divine Law, which is the adequate perfect Rule and Measure of moral bonity, is not where to be found but in the sacred Philosophy or Scriptures. Here, and here only is extant Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. This sacred Rule, whereof he had great notices, he sometimes calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Divine Word. Here also Aristotle's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Commun Law of Nature in its perfection is alone to be found. Hence likewise it was that Pythagoras, Lycurgus, Solon, Minos, and Plato borrowed the principal heads of their best Laws, as we have at large proved, Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 9 The sum of the Law of Nature, and all divine Precepts is contained in the Decalogue or Moral Law delivered by Moses, which is thence styled by the Hebrews 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the matrices of the Law and its roots. And indeed what are the Ten Commandments, contained in the moral Law, but a Transumt, Compend, Abstract, or rather extended Copy of the Law of Nature given to man in the beginning, from that first original Exemplar the eternal Law? Is not the formal reason of all Equity prescribed and expressed in the moral Law? Ought not this then to be the term, measure, and scope of all Laws? To clear which we are to remember, that the Ten Commandments, contained in the moral Law, must not be taken literally as ten Words, but in a more ample extensive notion, as Christian Pandects, or commun heads of all moral Duties towards God and man, to be explicated and extended accordingly to the Illustrations and Commentaries of the Prophets, our great Lord, and his Apostles. Though the Decalogue doth not mention each particular Duty in the Gospel, yet it doth command obedience to all that are or shall be specified; and expresseth every particular Duty generically or synecdochically: and although it were not a Duty from the general Precept, till it was specified in the Gospel, yet when it is once a Duty, the neglect of it is a sin against the Decalogue. Indeed are there not almost in all the Precepts manifest Synecdoches? Is it not then ridiculous for men to restrain the most ample sense of the moral Law to the narrow confines of its words? Doth not the great Legislator take the blackest sins, as Murder, Adultery, Theft, etc. and place them, as so many common Heads, in the Decalogue, that so by these we may be instructed, how black and odiose all those other sins, reducible to those heads, are? Wherefore to penetrate and dive into the nature and contents of the Ten Commandments, we must in a particular manner inquire (1) What in every Command is treated of, (2) The end for which it was given, (3) What therein is displeasing or pleasing to God. And after all we shall find, that the moral Law is spiritual, holy, just and good, as Rom. 7.12, 14. reaching all the motions and dispositions of the heart. And indeed how absurd is it to conceit, that he, who made the heart, and knows all the diverticules, or turn and wind of it, should make a Law to reach only the outward acts, and not the inward principes and motions? May we not then conclude, that the Decalogue and moral Law of the supreme Legislator extends its Precepts to the whole Soul, and all its Principes, Powers, Inclinations, Thoughts, Affections, and Operations intern and extern; directing the same to their right objects and ends; affecting them with their inseparable Accidents and Modifications; clothing them with their immutable circumstances; in such sort, that the action good by this Law can never be made evil; that which is evil by this Law can never be made good; that which is good or evil by this Law can never be made indifferent? Hence Plato brings in Pindar speaking thus of the regal Power, as I take it, of the Law of Nature: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Law is King over all both mortals and immortals. And Aristot. Pol. l. 4. c. 4. affirms: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That the Law ought to command al. Which is most proper and peculiar to the moral Law, that lively Idea and Image of the Divine Sanctity and Will, the original and universal Exemplar of moral bonity, that great bond of union, by conformity whereto man's Will becomes one with the Divine Will; yea, man himself one with God. Whence, as Tyndal, pag. 83. well observes, Man's imagination can make the Law of God neither greater nor lesser: neither can it add to or diminish from the Law of God: God's Commandment is as great as himself. Such is the Amplitude of the moral Law as the immutable, universal Rule of moral bonity. §. 3. Having considered the Measure and Rule of moral bonity, The parts and causes of moral Good. we now pass on to examine the Nature and Causes thereof. It was before suggested, that all moral bonity requires a plenitude of Being, and integrity of Causes; albeit any defect render an action morally evil. This Canon holds true whatever distribution we give the causes of moral bonity. Jansenius, in imitation of Augustine, makes two essential constitutive parts of all moral Good, (1) The Office or Mater of the Act, which he makes to be as the Corpse: and the End, which he makes to be as the Form that specifies. (2) Plato, in his Theaetetus, pag. 187. and Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. seem to distribute moral Good into the good deed done, and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the welldoing of it: i.e. into Bonum, and Bene. The good deed-done is as the matter: and the been or welldoing of it, as the form. (3) Others, according to the Aristotelian distribution of the causes, make four causes of all moral Good, the Mater, Efficient, End, and Form. Albeit I judge this distribution of Causes, as to Naturals, every way absurd, and that which can never be defended; because it makes the same things both constitutive Parts of the whole, and yet also Causes thereof: so that it hence follows, the matter and form are causes of themselves, which constitute the whole: yet in Morals, where the causes need not such an accurate distinction from the parts, we may admit this distribution: or else we may take the matter and form as parts, and the efficient and end as causes of moral Good. This being the common and received distribution, I am not scrupulose in following the same, yet so as not to exclude the two former divisions. 1. The Mater of moral Good. If we reflect on the Mater of moral Good, it comprehends all human Acts, with the Objects and Circumstances relating thereto, whether things necessary or indifferent. It's true, as to the Circumstances of moral Good, there are some that relate to the form; others to the efficient and end; yet some also that regard the matter. The matter of every good action is either good or indifferent: it is good when commanded by and conform to the moral Law, the measure of objective goodness as before: it is indifferent when neither good nor evil, but as it were in the middle between both. Here that which chief requires an examen and discussion is the nature of things indifferent; which, so far as it may concern moral Good, we shall inquire into. Plato, in his Gorgias, Things indifferent. calls a thing indifferent, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, neither good nor evil, but a middle between these. So Diogenes the Cynic taught, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That things between virtue and vice were indifferent. And the Stoics held, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Of things some were good, some bad, some neither good nor bad, i. e. indifferent. These neuters, or things indifferent, they said, were such as neither profited, nor did hurt. Again, they affirmed, That things might be termed indifferent two ways. (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Such things as pertain not either to felicity or misery, as Riches, Glory, etc. (2) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Such things as men act neither with an Impetus, nor aversation: as the extending the finger, or numbering the hairs of the head, etc. as Laertius, in Zeno. But the more fully to explicate the nature of things indifferent, we are to consider, that things are said in the general to be indifferent, which in themselves are neither good nor evil, but equally inclined to either. Now this indifference of actions or things, may be considered physically or morally, according to the generic, specific, or individual nature of Actions and Things. 1. If we consider Actions and Things in genere & abstracto, Physic Indifference in Genere. in their generic abstract nature, without the supervenient determination of the moral Law, so they are in themselves nakedly considered indifferent: For allthings physically considered, without their moral estimation and respect to the Law, are neither morally good nor evil. Thus all our Thoughts, Words and Actions nakedly and physically considered, without respect to the moral Law, (which is the rule and measure of moral Good and Evil) are said to be indifferent. 2. Actions and Things are said to be indifferent in specie, Moral Indifference in Specie. when the matter of them is neither commanded nor forbidden by the moral Law. For as allthings are of God, through God and for God, so it belongs to his regal Will to give moral or spiritual determination to them, whereby they are made good or evil in specie, as to the matter of them. Neither can any created limited power make that which is good, evil, or that which is evil, good, or that which is indifferent, good or evil, except on supposition of predetermination from him, who, being Creator of all, has an absolute dominion over al. Every Creature having terms to its Essence, has also terms to its dominion and operation: a limited Cause must necessarily have a limited power and activity. Except man had being of himself, and a World of his own framing, he could not be a rule to himself, for the determination of his actions; but must be determined by the Law of his Maker, for the specific nature or quality of his acts as good, Quando dicimus, dari actus indifferentes quoad speciem, qui non sunt boni nec mali, id intelligendum est negatiué. Petr. à Sancto Joseph, Thes. 167. or evil, or indifferent. Thence a thing is said to be morally indifferent in specie, when it is neither commanded nor forbidden by God, and so neither good nor evil: for all moral determination ariseth from the Divine Will expressed in the moral Law. Whence it appears evident, that The reasons of good and evil are not eternal, as some Platonists would fain persuade us; but dependent on the divine Will and Determination: for allthings are therefore good or evil in specie, because so determined by the sovereign Will, promulgated in the natural or moral Law. Whence also we may easily perceive the danger of that common Notion, among some Divines, That somethings are good because commanded, other things are commanded because good. Indeed this Maxim may be of use, to express the difference between moral and positive Precepts, with this limitation, that positive Precepts, which regard Worship, etc. are good because commanded; but moral Precepts are commanded because good, i. e. agreeable to human Nature, not that they have any moral goodness antecedent to the divine Will and Determination. Hence, 3. No Action indifferent in individuo. No Action considered, in individuo, in its individual nature is morally indifferent: i.e. every individual action considered as clothed with its Circumstances, and in relation to its Principes, Manner, and End is either good or evil. That moral Indifference hath place only in specie, in the specific nature of Acts, not, in individuo, in their individual nature, is generally avouched by the Orthodox, yea among the more sober of the Schoolmen. This was one of John Husse's Articles, condemned in the Council of Constance, Art. 16. Quòd nulla sint opera indifferentia, sed haec sit divisio immediata humanorum operum, quòd sint virtuosa vel vitiosa, That there are no works [in individuo] indifferent; but this is an immediate division of human works, that they are either virtuose, or vitiose. This indeed we may argue from Plato's Placites, who strongly proves, That all our Acts ought to tend to some good end. So Gorg. pag. 499. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It seems, that allthings must be done for good, etc. So elsewhere he saith, That God is the mark and scope, unto which all our Acts, as so many arrows, aught to tend. This is well determined by Aquinas, 1.2. Quaest. 18. Art. 9 It happens sometimes that an Act is indifferent as to its Species, which yet considered in individuo, is either good or evil: and that because every moral Act receives its bonity not only from its object, but also from its circumstances— And it's necessary, that every individual Act hath some circumstance by which it is drawn to good or evil; at least as to the intention of the end. For in as much as it belongs to Reason to order all human Acts; if any Act be not ordered to its last end, it is so far evil: if it be ordered to its last end, it is then good, etc. Thus Gibieuf de Libertat. pag. 74. We most evidently gather from the subordination of our Will to its last end, that there are no human Acts indifferent in individuo; but all are good or evil: for it is not lawful for a rational Creature, so long as he is such, not to return that back to God which he received from God. Again, p. 77. Every thing ought to act according to its nature: and he that doth otherwise is deficient; because nature is the measure of other things. If therefore man puts forth an human Act, he ought thereby to be converted towards God. Indeed Indifference can no more be found in individual Acts, than it can be denied as to some Acts considered in their Species. All Acts of Man in Innocence were good: all the Acts of man under the dominion of corrupt Nature are evil: all the Acts of man in Glory shall be good: all the Acts of man under Grace are either good or evil: not one of all these indifferent. Were all our actions regulated by the Divine moral Law, they would be all good. Yea our very natural and civil Acts, as to their manner, so far as they are morally good or evil, are all regulated and determined by the moral Law. For albeit the Divine Law be not, as it ought not to be, a general sum of Arts and Sciences; nor yet a particular Directory for the Government of States or Politic Acts; yet the particular determination of all our Acts falls under the Divine Law, so far as they are moral and Christian; according to the nature of all Professions and Sciences, coincident for the most part in the mater, but distinct in the manner of consideration. Thus much Petrus à Sancto Joseph, that late compilator of Schole-Divinitie, Thes. 167. acknowledgeth: There is not, saith he, any Act indifferent in individuo; but every such Act, if it proceed from sufficient deliberation, is either good or evil, although not as to its object, yet in regard of its circumstances. The scratching of the head, or the taking up of a straw, is either good or evil. This seems a Paradox to some that are ignorant, and disgustful to Libertines, who would be so; yet generally granted by Philosophers and Divines, yea scarce ever professedly denied by any, save some sew, who distinguish between Acts proceeding from mere Imagination, and such as are deliberate. That no Acts in individuo are indifferent, see the Commentators in Sent. lib. 2. dist. 41. and in Thomam, 1.2. Quaest. 18. Art. 9 2. A virtuose Will the Principe of moral Good. Having discussed the Mater of moral Good, we now proceed to its next efficient Cause or Principe; which is the Will, or rather Soul clothed with supernatural Habits of Virtue or Grace. The moral Law requires, that to the constitution of an Act morally good, there concur a good Principe: now the Will or Soul as willing being the fountain of all moral efficience and operation, its rectitude is necessary to constitute an Act morally or spiritually good. Such therefore as the disposition of the Will is, such will the action prove as to its goodness or pravity. The bent of the Will is as a Pondus that carries the whole Soul either to good or bad: when the deliberation and intention of a bended Will concurs in a good mater for a good end, the action is good: And what bends the Will in this manner, Actio recta non erit, nisi recta fuerit voluntas: ab hac enim est actio. but virtuose habits? So many degrees as there are of a sanctified Will in any Act, so many degrees there are of moral Good therein. Morality, as well as Divinity, is in a more special manner conversant in ruling the Will, which is the measure of good and evil. The bent of the Will makes a good or bad man, as also act. Thus Plato, Meno: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Virtue is to will, and to be able to perform good. Again: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, If he will not to do unrightcously, this is sufficient; he shall not do unrighteously. But more particularly Plato, Leg. 3. thus philosophiseth: This is not to be desired, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that allthings follow his Will, but that his Will follow Reason: i.e. that it prosecute what is good. This is well expressed by Simplicius, in Epich. c. 1. pag. 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For when the Will is free and pure in the power of Reason itself, on which our nature depends, than it is carried to things truly eligible; yea, to truth itself. Wherefore the proper good of the Soul is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Virtue, because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, properly desirable, and attained by real election. Simplicius here, in imitation of Plato, (whom he much follows) asserteth, (1) That the moral Goodness of human Acts depends on the purity and goodness of the Wil. (2) That moral Good is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Virtue, because most eligible. Which derivation he borrowed from Plato. What Virtue properly is, and how it disposeth the Will to what is morally good, will hereafter §. 4. and sect. 3. §. 1, 2. come under contemplation: at present this may suffice to demonstrate, that all moral Good requireth a moral Principe virtuously inclined for the production thereof. And had we no other evidence hereof but what sacred Philosophy doth assord, it might suffice. Thus Solomon (the wisest of mere men, since the Fall) Prov. 4.23. Above all keeping keep thine heart: Prov. 4.23. for out of it are the issues of life: i. e. all spiritual life and moral good issueth from the heart rightly disposed and qualified with virtuose graciose Principes: where the heart thus qualified is not the Spring, there no Act is morally or spiritually alive towards God, but dead. Be the actions never so seemingly splendid and gloriose as to the matter of them, yet if they flow not from this living Fountain, they are but as your Automata, those artificial Machine's or Images called Puppets; which seem to move their eyes, hands, feet, etc. whereas indeed they are moved only by artificial foreign impresses: such are all moral Acts that flow not from a vital Principe virtuosely disposed, morally dead, albeit they may seem to have shadows of life. Or look as no member of the body performs any action of natural life, wherein a pulse derived from the heart beats not; so no action is morally good, wherein there beats not some pulse of a virtuose rightly disposed Wil Actions are conformable to the fountain whence they spring: no living virtuose Act can proceed from a dead corrupt Principe: Being, life, and motion go together in Morals, as well as in Naturals: such as the Faculty, Spring, and Principe is, such will the motion and operation be, both in Grace and Nature, as Medo has well observed, on Prov. 4.23. Thus Augustine, on Mat. 7.18. where by the good Tree he understands a believing Will, which he makes essential to every good Act: for if the Will be bad, the Act cannot be good: and every unbelieving Will is a bad Will: for where there is no Faith in Christ as the first Principe of life, there can be no love to God as the last End: as the end forms the Will, so Faith forms the End. Thence that of the supposed Ignatius: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Faith is the Principe of life, Love the end: these two in unity perfect the man of God. And chrysostom saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Nothing is good without Faith. 3. The best End essential to moral Good. To the Constitution of moral Good there is also essentially requisite the best End. Thus Plato, Gorg. pag. 499. assures us, That all Acts must be undertaken for the last end and best good, as before, Sect. 1. §. 2. This is well explicated by Aquinas, 2.2. Quaest. 2.3. Art. 8. It must be said, that in Morals the form of an Act is principally to be attended in regard of its end: and the reason is most evident; because the Will is the Principe of moral Acts, and the End the main Object, and as it were the form of the Will: but now the form of an Act always follows the form of an Agent: whence in Morals it is necessary, that what gives an Act its order to an end, give it is also form, etc. This is more nakedly laid down by Angustine: Whatever good is done by man, but not for that end for which it ought to be done, albeit the office itself [i. e. the matter of the Act] seem good, yet the end being not right, it is sin. This is well explicated by Jansenius, August. Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 10. Two things are to be regarded in every act of a virtuose Will; (1) The office or work itself done: (2) The cause for which it is done, or the End. In the weighing the bonity of any Virtue, our main regard must be to the End. This is as it were the last rest and scope of the mind in acting, that which the Will, its habit, and act most incline unto. This deservedly rules all Offices, which flow from its Empire, are tinctured with its colour and sapor, and aught to be referred to it. This is the genuine cause why so many vexatious litigations were found among the Gentile Philosophers, touching the chiefest Good. So again he saith, That the Office itself is but as the Corpse of Virtue, which is animated by the End, which gives form and life, without which the office is but as matter without form, or a carcase without Soul. Aristotle well instructes us, That the end is the measure of allthings: which is true as to moral Good. Thence Petrus à Sancto Joseph, Thes. 166. assertes, That an human action takes its bonity or pravity, not only from the intrinsec end of the work, which is coincident with the object; but also from the extrinsec, which is the end of the Worker. Certainly Offices are to be weighed not so much by their Acts, as Ends: And what is the last end of all good works, but the Glory of God? which, though last in Execution, yet aught to be first in Intention, at least virtually, if not formally, in all we do. Thence, saith Angustine, That is not true Virtue, which tends not to that end, wherein the best Good of man consists. And Gregor. Ariminensis, 2. Sent. Dist. 29. Quaest. 1. proves that, Every volition, which refers not to God for himself, or to other things for God, is vitiose. 4. The last Cause, The Form of moral Good conformity to the moral Law. or rather constitutive part of moral Good is its Form, which consists in its Conformity to the divine moral Law. This may deservedly be termed the Form of moral Good; because it gives form and measure to all the former Principes and parts: For wherein consists the Goodness of the Mater, Principes, and End, but in their Conformity to the Divine Will and Law? This therefore is the formal Idea or Reason of all moral Good, whereby all difference and perfection is to be measured. Arist. Eth. lib. 5. cap. 2. tells us, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That the great difference of things is according to their Idea or formal Reason. Hence Conformity to the Divine Law being the formal Reason or Idea of all moral Good, by this we are to take our measures of all differences or perfection therein. This Conformity of moral Good to the Divine Law is described by Plato, under various emphatic notions: as (1) it is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. So Protag. pag. 326. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, All the life of man ought to consist of Consent and Harmony: i. e. of Uniformity and Conformity to the Divine Law. Hence (2) In his Phaedo, he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, All Virtue consists in Harmony: whereas vice is a confused inordination or irregularity. So in his Timaeus, pag. 47. he saith, That Harmony being very near akin to the motions of the Soul, it is given us to reduce the disorders of the Soul to a decorum. So Stobaeus, Serm. 1. de Virtut. pag. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Virtue has for its rule a decorum, or that which is most convenient, i.e. agreeable or conformable to the Law of Nature. Hence (3) This Conformity is styled by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Symmetry and Symphony. All these notions Aristotle comprehended under his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Mediocrity, of which more fully B. 4. C. 1. §. 30. and Philos. General. P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. sect. 4. §. 4. Others place the Form of moral Good in the mode or manner of doing, namely that it be done well: How the Form of Good consists in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, well doing. and we find some foundation for this Hypothesis in Plato's Theaetetus, pag. 187. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It's better to a little well, than much i'll. Where he seems to make the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the w●l doing, the form and measure of good. So Aristotle, Eth. lib. 2. cap. 3. pag. 83. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. He therefore shall be a Grammarian, who doth what is Grammatic, Grammatically, i.e. according to Rules of Grammar. But yet he adds, by way of caution, That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the welldoing of Arts is not the same with that of Virtues: for the perfection of Arts is included in themselves, without regard to the perfection of the Artificer: but the perfection of Virtue requires, that the subject be so and so qualified. And then he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, He is a righteous and temperate man, not that doth those things, but doth them in such a manner as righteous and sober men do them, i.e. rightcously and soberly. Hence that vulgar Effate, That good works are to be judged by Adverbes: for all must be done with those adverbial conditions of sacred Philosophy, Tit. 2.12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, soberly, and righteously, and piously. This is in a peculiar manner true of good actions, where the matter is indifferent; because such have no goodness at all, but what is from the Adverb. So that it sufficeth not that the Act be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, good, but it must have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a right manner of being done: and herein, according to some, the Form of its goodness doth consist, even in the manner of it; and any defect herein will render the action evil: according to those scholastic Maxims, The form gives being, and any omission or defect therein gives millitie as to moral Good. So in the Canon Law they tell us, That the form must be precisely and punctually observed. And indeed this notion of the form of moral Good amounts to the same with the former, and must be resolved thereinto. For a moral Act may be said then to have its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or bene factum, well done, when it is in all points exactly conformable to the moral Law: for all moral Good is a relation of conformity with the rule of Morals; but the least privation thereof is sin. But, How far Circumstances formalise moral Good. to descend to particulars, an human Act is then conformable to the Law and well done, when it is not only good for the matter, but also clothed with all those Circumstances, which necessarily attend its moral goodness. The particular form of moral Good consists much in the Circumstances that attend it. The Circumstances oft formalise and specisie the Act, making it good or evil: sometimes they only make it better or worse. But the Circumstances have the greatest sway in things indifferent, where the manner of doing doth chief specify the Act. We find the Circumstances of human Acts well expressed by Aristotle, Eth. l. 2. c. 5. Virtue, saith he, consists in the well doing of things: for we may fear, trust, desire, hate, despise, be angry, pity, rejoice, and grieve, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not duly. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But truly to be moved with these affections, when, and in what things, and towards whom, and for what end, and in that manner as we ought, this is the golden mean, and that which is best, wherein Virtue consists. Whence also Aristotle, Eth. lib. 3. cap. 10. art. 5. pag. 160. assures us, That a defect in any one Circumstance renders an Act evil: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But sins may be committed, some, when that is done that ought not; others, when not as it ought; others, because not at that time when it ought, or the like. Thence, art. 10. he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For a valiant man suffers and acts according to the dignity of the matter, and when, and in that manner as reason [or the Law of Nature] dictates. Thus we see how Plato and Aristotle require to the constitution of moral Good, not only a right mater, but that it be clothed with all due Circumstances, whereby it may be rendered conformable to the Law as to manner. This Hypothesis has been generally maintained among the more sound Schoolmen. Thus Aquinas, 1.2. Quaest. 7. Art. 2. A Circumstance is a condition or accident of an human Act, which toucheth it extrinsecally. And seeing human Acts are disposed towards their last end by circumstances, the contemplation hereof greatly concerns Theologues. For a Theologue considers human Acts, as a man is thereby ordained to Beatitnde: Now whatever is ordained to an end ought to be proportionate thereto: But Acts are rendered proportionable to their end by a certain commensuration, which they receive from due circumstances: whence the consideration of circumstances chief belongs to a Theologue. What these circumstances are he adds, Art. 3. In human Acts, Who did it; By what aides or instruments; What, Why, How, When, and Abour what he did it, are to be inquired into. Some explain these Circumstances thus: (1) Quis, who, must not be taken for the efficient cause, but for his condition and quality, as a private person, or public, etc. (2) Quid, what, must not be understood of the matter or object, but of the quality thereof. (3) Neither must Quomodo, how, be taken for the form or manner, but whether it be done openly or secretly, etc. Greg. Ariminensis, 2. Sent. Dist. 38. Quaest. 1. Art. 1. strongly assertes and proves, That no moral Act wanting its due Circumstance is morally good. By an Act morally good, I understand, saith he, no other (according to the Doctors) than an Act conform to right Reason, [objective, i.e. the Divine Law] according to all circumstances requisite to this, that the Act be truly virtuose. When therefore a moral operation is not conform to right Reason, [or the Law] according to all due circumstances, it is vitiose and morally evil. This his Hypothesis he proves by two Conclusions. 1. Conclus. That no moral Act wanting any one due Circumstance, is truly virtuose. This he proves by showing that the contrary implies a contradiction. For if a moral Act want any one due circumstance, it is not as it ought to be: therefore it is evil. Due circumstances are communly said to be such things, as are required to this, that the Act be truly virtuose: and if an Act be truly virtuose it is conform to right Reason, or the moral Law: and if such, than it wants not any due circumstance: wherefore if any Act wanting a due circumstance should be truly virtuose, it will then necessarily follow, That it doth want, and yet that it doth not want a due circumstance: or, That it is truly virtuose, and yet that it is not truly virtuose. 2. Conclus. That every such Act as wants its due Circumstances is morally evil and sin. It is evil because it wants its due bonity or goodness, namely its due circumstance. For sin is nothing else but the want of a due good, or voluntarily to act against the Divine Law. Thus much also Suarez grants us, That some conditions that are only circumstantial and accidental to an Act in esse rei, as to the physic being, are yet essential in esse moris, as to its moral being. So Suarez, 1.2. Tract. 2. Disp. 5. pag. 169. The first opinion, saith he, is, That an human Act may be considered in its natural or moral being: and that circumstances are so called in relation to the natural, not the moral being of the Act; but that all these conditions are substantial Principes or proper Causes of the moral action as such. He mentions this as the opinion of some Schoolmen, namely, that there are no accidental circumstances of human Acts morally considered; but that all these Circumstances are essential and properly influential on the said moral Acts. Which indeed is a great truth, whereunto, though not fully, yet thus far he assents: It is true, saith he, what the first opinion asserted, That some conditions may be accidental to the act, in esse rei, as a natural act, and yet essential to it, in esse moris, morally considered. And the reason, adds he, is taken à priori, because the esse morale or moral being of an Act primarily depends on the order of Reason; (we say of the Law:) but now it oft happens, that an act or object hath a divers order to reason, by reason of divers conditions of those things that concur to the moral Act. Thence pag. 174. he tells us what Circumstances are essential. Right Reason, (which must be understood objectively) is the rule of human acts and their circumstances: therefore the affection or reason of these Circumstances cannot be better explicated, than by their order or regard to right Reason, (I would say the Divine Law.) And the same rule is to be used for the understanding when the conditions of moral Acts are not properly Circumstances, but essential, namely when they are such as, according to right Reason, are altogether necessary, not only as to degrees, but simply as to the honesty or turpitude of the act. For when a Circumstance altogether changeth the conformity or difformity of an human act, it changeth its Species. In which he plainly grants, That all those Circumstances which change the conformity or difformity of an human act, are specific and essential: Which is all that we need contend for; because the Controversy is not about natural or civil Circumstances, but such as belong to the act morally considered: which if good requireth an integrity of Causes and plenitude of Circumstances: so that if one Circumstance due to the moral bonity of the act be defective, the whole act is changed and rendered morally evil. By the whole of which it is most evident, that all Circumstances due to the moral goodness of an human act, are essential and specific, such as concur to formalise moral Good; which requires a complete conformity to the Divine Law, not only in Mater, Principes, and End, but also in all Circumstances morally due to the integrity of such an Act: For all good (as has been sufficiently demonstrated) requires an integrity of Causes; whereas sin ariseth from the least defect: according to that known Effate of the spurious Dionysius, Divin. Nom. cap. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Good is from one and complete cause, but sin from many and singular defects. §. 4. The Unity and Uniformity of all moral Good. Having considered moral Good in its Causes and constitutive parts, we now descend to the contemplation thereof in its proper Adjuncts, and Attributes, which we shall deduce and draw forth in the subsequent Corollaries. 1. All moral Good, Virtues, and virtuose Acts have one and the same simple uniform Idea and Nature. For all moral Good and virtuose Acts flow from one and the same virtuose Principes, tend to one and the same End, and are formalised by one and the same conformity to the Divine Law. Thus Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 445. It appears to me, as it were in a Watchtower, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that the face or form of Virtue is one; but that of improbity, manifold and almost infinite. His mind is, that all Virtues have one and the same formal Idea or face; but sins have variety, yea almost infinite deformed shapes. This Aristotle, Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having proved, that all moral Virtue consists in a Mediocrity and Uniformity, he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Moreover we may sin many ways: (for as the Pythagoreans conjecture, sin is infinite and boundless; but good is terminate and bounded) but there is but one way of doing good. Wherein we may observe, (1) That all sin is difforme, boundless and endless: it hath no form, measure or number. (2) But Virtue and moral Good is bounded and uniform. Whence he concludes with a Verse out of some ancient Poet, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For good men truly are simply and uniformly such; but wicked men are difformely and variously so. Thus also Aristotle, Mag. Moral. lib. 1. cap. 25. affirms, That all Good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, uniform; but all Vice 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, multiforme. Hence Plato asserted, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That which is just, is equal and uniform. Whence that Stoic Hypothesis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, All moral goods are equal and uniform, i.e. conform to the rule of Morality. All this is well expressed by Augustine, who makes all Good to consist, in Modo, Specie, & Ordine, in Mode, Species, and Order, i.e. in a uniform conformity to the rule of Morality. Hence, 2. All moral Good and Virtue supernatural. There is no real moral Good, or natural Virtue but what is supernatural. This Corollary evidently follows from the former, and indeed from the whole of this discourse about moral Good. For if all moral Virtue or Good requires an integrity of causes, and is formalised by conformity to the Divine Law, thence it necessarily follows, that moral Good or Virtue can be but one uniform simple thing. Thence chrysostom, Hom. 4. in Gen. calls Grace, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a gift above nature, overcoming nature. And Cyril in Esa. terms it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, above proper Nature; as elsewhere, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Prerogative above Nature. I am not ignorant that many of the Schoolmen, and too many of our Divines, in imitation of them, make a twofold Good and Virtue; one natural and moral: the other spiritual and supernatural. The natural Virtue and moral Good they make to be that which a man may, by the force of natural Conscience and other natural Principes, attain unto: The spiritual and supernatural Good or Virtue they make to be infused. Albeit this distinction may, with due limitations, pass for orthodox; yet in as much as it was at first framed by the Pelagians, and taken up by their Sectators in the Schools, I should be glad if Jansenius' advice for the utter extirpation of it, were embraced: who, in his August. Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 14. pag. 256. gives us the origination of this Distinction, which he makes to be first taken up by the Pelagians from the Gentile Philosophers, specially the Peripatetics and Stoics; who held, that there were in men natural seeds of Virtue, which being well cultivated, might arise up to perfect Virtue. These natural seeds of Virtue, adds he, first the Pelagians and Semipelagians brought into their Heresy; and afterwards the Schoolmen introduced the same into the Christian Schools, to the great prejudice of our Doctrine. For those Heretics held, that out of those philosophic seeds true Virtues-might be educed by the alone power of the human Wil But because the Schoolmen saw that this Dogme was openly contrary to the constantly received Doctrine, they therefore framed a double man in one man; and thence a double Charity, double Virtues, double Works; some natural, others supernatural; of which there is not the least footstep in the whole Doctrine of Augustine. As if those very Virtues, which the Philosophers and Schoolmen call Natural, were not, by Augustine, styled Vices. And Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 2. pag. 326. he assures us, That he has oft greatly wondered, that many of the Philosophers had more truly, accurately, and holily philosophised of the main Heads of moral Doctrine, than many Schoolmen; who would fain frame two men in one; the one a Philosopher, and the other a Christian: whence they also coined a twofold Charity, twofold Virtues, twofold Works, and a twofold Beatitude, the one natural, the other supernatural. Hence, 3. The difficulty of moral Good. To perform any moral Good or virtuose Act is most difficult and rare. O! how difficult and rare is it for men to perform what is good, from good Principes, Ends, in a good manner as to Circumstances, and universal Conformity to the Divine Law! Thus Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 476. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; But of such as can arrive to the first Beauty, and contemplate him in himself, are there not very few? So Phileb. pag. 16. he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, To explain Wisdom is not very difficult, but to reduce it to practice and use most difficult. So again: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, What way men may attain to be good is most difficult, i.e. to understand and practise Again, he saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It is difficult for a man to be made good, and to continue such. Whence in his Cratylus, pag. 385. he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, According to the old Proverb, things good are very difficult. Thence also, in his Epinomis, pag. 973. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I say it is not possible for men to be blessed and happy here, except some few only. Lastly Plato, in his Repub. 6. saith, That Virtue hath the most perfect accurate form, and therefore it requires, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the most perfect exactitude and diligence for the acquirement thereof: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Do not the greatest things require the greatest exactitude? And what things greater than moral Goods and Virtues? Thus Aristotle also, in imitation of his Master, once and again demonstrates the difficulty and rarity of moral Good. So Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having showed, That there were variety of ways, wherein men might sin; but one only way of doing good; he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore it is most easy to offend, but most difficult to do good: for to err from the scope is most-facile, but to hit it, is most difficult. So in like manner, c. 9 pag. 108. he saith, Virtue consists in mediocrity, i.e. in one indivisible point of conformity. Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Wherefore to acquire Virtue is most difficult and laborious: for it is an hard work to attain to the middle of any thing. As every one cannot find out the point of a Circle; but only the intelligent Mathematician: So to be angry, to give money, or the like, is easy; but to be angry, to give money, etc. to whom, and in such a measure, and at such a time, and for such an end, and in such a manner as we ought, this is not easy. Thence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The been or manner of doing good, is difficult, laudable, and beautiful. Wherein indeed he gives us an excellent account of the nature and difficulty of moral Good. (1) He supposeth all moral Good to consist as it were in one middle indivisible point; so that the least deviation therefrom destroys it. Quò enim magis strenuè currit extra viam, eò longiùs à scopo recedit, ideóque sit miserior. Calvin. (2) That it is very difficult to find out this golden mean, but much more difficult to reach it by our actions. True indeed it's no difficult work to perform the act materially good, as to give alms, or the like; but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the well doing of it, i.e. from those Principes, for those Ends, and with those Circumstances, that the Act requires in regard of its formal constitution, this is most rare, difficult, and only laudable. Hence, 4. The splendid Heroic deeds of Pagans, The Virtues of Pagans lesser sins only. and all such whose minds are not virtuosely disposed, are but lesser Sins. This is most evident by the confessions of the Philosophers themselves, who require to moral Good an integrity of Causes and constitutive Principes: so that it sufficeth not, that the Mater or Office be good, but there is also required a good disposition and habit, the best end, and all such Circumstances as essentially concur to formalise the Act, or denominate it morally good. Now let us inquire, did ever any Pagan or man in his natural state perform any one Act thus morally good? What? can we produce any Pagan or natural man, who had his mind so far sanctified by Faith and Love, as to act by force received from God, out of love to God and his Glory? Truly Augustine, and Jansenius out of him; are not afraid to declare, that all those Heroic Acts and Exploits, which the Philosophers and Schoolmen honour with the title of natural or moral Virtues, are indeed but more splendid sins; because poisoned with pride and vainglory. Yea, they rise higher and affirm, that the Stoics themselves, who seemed to be the greatest admirers and sectators of Virtue, did indeed come under the Apostles condemnation, Rom. 8.6, etc. of living after the flesh; because they made their carnal Reason, Freewill and Self the only measures and springs of their pretended Virtue. Lastly, all moral Virtue, according to philosophic Placits, is but one: so that the Virtues of Pagans must be supernatural, or none at all, as before. Thence Greg. Nazianzen, Orat. 3. in Julian. speaking of the Platonists, Stoics, and peripatetics, saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Virtue to them is only a speciose name, and in nothing more lasting than this life. Thus chrysostom, Hom. 27. in Joan. It is not yet apparent to me that the Gentiles lived well— For if the hope of the celestial Kingdom, and the commination of Hell, with other such like solicitude, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, can scarce keep men in Virtue, those who are persuaded of none of these things, will not embrace Virtue. But if some of them counterfeit the same, this they do out of desire of Glory, etc. This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated by Augustine; and he grounds it on that eternal Verity of our Lord, Mat. 7.18. Mat. 7.18. Neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. So contra Julian. l. 4. c. 3. The unbelieving will, as every Christian grants, is an evil tree, which cannot produce any other than evil fruits, i.e. sins only. The like Cyril, in Hos. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. probity in those that God hates is without its reward, and good manners tending not to true good shall be always reprehended by him. Not but that many Heathens, as Christian Hypocrites, may perform Acts and Offices materially good, which yet may be deservedly (as they are by the Ancients) termed Sins, as they proceed not from Faith in Christ, and Love to God, the main Principes of all true moral Good. So Chrysost. (Tom. 17. Hom. 17. Edit. Paris.) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, They are good works (i.e. materially) but dead, because they have not Faith. 5. The distrioution of moral Good or Virtue into Justice and Piety. Albeit all Virtue, according to its formal Idea and Reason, be but one; yet, according to its objective material consideration, it may be variously distributed. Thus in sacred Philosophy moral Good or Virtue is distributed, as to its object or matter, into Holiness and Righteousness, Ephes. 4.24. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, In Righteousness and Holiness. Righteousness comprehends all Second-table-duties, which regard men; and Holiness, all First-table-duties, which regard God. This distribution is most ancient, and, I presume, was communly received among the Jews. Sure I am Plato has it, and, as I conjecture, from the Mosaic Institutes. Thus in his Gorgias, pag. 507. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But now he that comports himself decently towards men, doth righteous things; but he that behaveth himself aecently towards God, doth holy or pious things: but he that doth both righteous and holy things, must necessarily be righteous and holy. Wherein observe, (1) That he distributes all moral Good into just or righteous, and pious or holy. (2) That he makes Justice or Righteousness to regard men, but Piety or Holiness to regard God. (3) That some may seem to be righteous towards men, who yet are not pious or holy towards God; as on the other hand, some may pretend to be pious towards God, who yet are not just and righteous towards men. But (4) he that is just and righteous towards men, in giving them their due, as also pious and holy towards God, in giving him his due, such is indeed a virtuose man, morally good, just, and pious. Thus also Serranus, on Plato, Alcibiad. 2. pag. 136. takes notice, how Plato distributes Virtue, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, into Piety and Justice; the former relating to the Worship of God, the later to men; whereby our whole life is duly framed and regulated; these being two seminal roots or commun heads of particular Offices and Duties. Lastly Plato, in his Minos, pag. 319. saith, That we should take diligent heed first that we offend not in word or deed against God: and then that we offend not against men, specially such as are divine. A Golden Rule for moral Duties. CHAP. III. Of Virtue, and Moral Liberty. Moral Virtue an habitual Perfection. Moral Liberty as to state in virtueses Habits. Virtue gives, (1) Dominion, (2) Life, Health, Vigour, (3) Amplitude, (4) Nobility and Dignity, (5) Beauty and Glory. Moral Liberty as to Exercise consists in virtuose Acts. (1) The Contemplation of the first Truth. (2) Adherence to the chiefest Good. (3) Total actual dependence on the first Cause. (4) Conformity to the divine preceptive Will, as also submission to his providential Wil. (5) Using allthings in subordination to the Fruition and Service of God. Moral Liberty as to exercise the greatest; because it brings (1) Order, (2) spontaneity and suavity, (3) A Divine Life, (4) Amplitude, (5) Freedom from Sin, (6) Stability of Spirit, (7) Improvement of Virtue, (8) Formal Beatitude. §. 1. Moral Virtue an habitual Perfection. THE general Idea and Nature of Moral bonity having been discussed, we now proceed to the discussion of Virtue, as it is the origine and cause of moral Liberty. Plato discourseth of Virtue in his Meno, the title of which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Virtue properly, according to its orgination, signifies a Power or Efficace; it being derived from Virro, which primarily signified among the Ancients a stout valiant man; answering to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 among the Hebrews. So the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily and properly signifies warlike Virtue or Courage, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Mars; and this from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 arits, terrible, valiant, potent; or, as Vossius, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, marats, to wax strong. Hence in the N.T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used to express the Divine power and efficace of God, as 1 Pet. 2.9. and 2 Pet. 1.3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i.e. by his gloriose power. Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is expounded by Hesychius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a divine power. So the LXX. translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifies the gloriose power of God, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Hab. 3.3. Zach. 6.17. Neither is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 used in the N. T. more than once, if ever, to denote a virtuose disposition of mind, namely Phil. 4.8. So curiose were the sacred Penmen in avoiding philosophic terms, which had been so much abused. But by moral Virtue we here understand an habitual disposition of Soul conform to the Rule of Morality, the Divine Law. In which strict notion it has one and the same formal idea or reason with supernatural Grace, as Jansenius, Amesius, and others understand it. For that there is no real moral Virtue but what is supernatural, has been sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Section, §. 4. Whence true moral Virtue is nothing else but a certain perfection, whereby man is ordained and disposed towards God, as Aquinas, 1. Quaest. 95. Others call Virtue, the most regular and best state of a rational Creature. Whether Virtue be a Power, Affection, Habit, or merely Act, has been disputed among the ancient Philosophers, Gratia non est habitus propriè, sed habitudo sive sanitas mentis. Aq. 1.2. Quaest 100 Art. 3. as well as Schole-Divines. But the communly received opinion is, that it is an Habit, or as Aquinas expresseth it, an Habitude of the Soul. That Virtue is an Habit Aristotle largely demonstrates, Eth. l. 2. c. 4. as Philos. General. P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. sect. 4. §. 3. An Habit properly is of a middle nature between a Power and an Act, which gives the power an accidental facility of acting. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a power, definite. Platon. is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which is of itself effective, or operative: but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an Habit, is defined, pag. 414. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a disposition of the Soul, whereby we are said to be so or so qualified for acting. So that every Habit is in order of nature at least, if not of time, before the Act, but subsequent to the Power. For the Soul by its Habits is made more facile or capable to act. The definition and cognition of Habits depends on the cognition of their proper Object, Subject, Mode of existing in their Subject, and Acts. For the form of the Act follows the form of the Agent: and such as the Habit is in relation to its object, such is the Agent. Hence, by how much the more noble and perfect the habit is, by so much the more noble and perfect is the Agent and his operation. Whence Virtue is a supernatural Habitude, Habit, or active Form, whereby the Soul is elevated to supernatural Acts. Thence Virtue is termed by Basil, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Completive of Nature. This indeed might be evinced out of Plato's Definition of Virtue, drawn into form by Serranus, Meno, pag. 68 Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the habit of the Soul rationally operating by the natural power, the best work, and aiming at the best end. So that all Virtue requires not only the best matter or object, but also the best end. And indeed such as the habitual aptitude or disposition of the Soul is, such will the end be, as Aristotle, Eth. l. 3. c. 10. pag. 160. well observes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The end of every action is such as the habit is: as an habit of fortitude makes men affect valiant acts. Again, lib. 4. cap. 13. pag. 254. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Such as every man is, such is his action, and speech, and such is his life: i.e. such as a man's habitual frame of Spirit is, such is his end, acts, and life. All habits are as a Pondus affixed to the Soul, whereby it is strongly bend and inclined towards objects, ends and acts, suitable thereto. All habitual Virtues are one and the same in regard of principe and seed, though different as to their proper objects and acts. The same habitual Entity as it facilitates to know God, is called Divine Knowledge; but as it facilitates to love God, it's called Divine Love; and so in the other virtuose Habits. That Supernaturalitie is a Mode intrinsically and essentially included in all virtuose Habits, is evident, because human Nature, specially as now corrupted, cannot reach an end or act supernatural: For if a natural power should have any activity in respect of a supernatural act and object, it may, by a parity of reason, by degrees attain to the highest supernatural objects and acts, as Alvarez, de Auxil. Disp. 65. demonstrates. Of the nature of Supernaturalitie, and how it is intrinsically and essentially included in the substance of all graciose Habits, see Choquetius, de Grat. l. 1. Disp. 7. & 12. Also Thomas Hurtado, Praecursor Theologus, de Supernaturalitate Entis, Disp. 1. Controvers. 1, etc. §. 2. Moral Liberty as to state in virtuose Habits. From what has been laid down touching the nature of Virtue it evidently follows, that all moral Liberty ariseth from those virtuose habits the Soul is clothed with, and agreeable exercices flowing therefrom. What Natural Liberty is, has been fully explicated Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 9 Sect. 3. §. 11. How much moral Liberty differs from natural may easily be discerned by any that impartially considers the same. The later indeed is essential to and inseparable from man as man, and all human acts; but the former is proper to man as virtuose, as will sufficiently appear by what follows. Every man is so far morally free as he is near to God. Allthings aim at Unity: God, who is the supreme Unity, convertes allthings to himself: and every thing is so far free and perfect, as it comes near to God. The human Soul has a twofold approach to God, (1) by Similitude, (2) by actual real Union and Fruition. (1) The more like the Soul is to God, the more one it is with him, and free: all similitude is a kind of Unity: and whence springs the Souls similitude to God, but from virtuose habits? (2) The Soul has actual real union with, and fruition of God by virtuose exercices. Hence ariseth a twofold moral Liberty: (1) As to State, (2) As to Exercise in that state. The former depends on habitual Virtue; the later on virtuose exercices. Of each in their order. Moral Liberty as to state consists in virtuose dispositions of Soul, whereby it is capacitated for and made like to God. Thus the spurious Dionysius, Eccles. Hier. cap. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Seing the Divine Nativity or Regeneration is a certain Divine state, certainly he that has not attained to that divine state, shall never know, much less do the things delivered by God. Whence also he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The principal progress of divine dilection in the sacred observation of divine Commands consists in the most ineffable framing of our divine state. This Athanasius, Dialog. 1. contr. Macedon. terms, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The participation of sanctity by Grace. And the supposed Ignatius, ad Magn. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the forment of Grace: i.e. that which gives a forment or principe of operation to the whole Soul. And Greg. Nyssenus styles this State of Virtue or Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Transelementation, or Restauration of the Principes of the divine life, or of the Soul, whereby it is made like to God, and capable of adhering to him. Whence Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. lib. 2. cap. 12. gives us this excellent Character of Man, as invested with the Image of God: God made man a little world in the greater, another Angel, an Inspector of the visible Creature, and Disciple of the intellectual; King of those things that are on earth: both terrene and celeste, temporal and immortal, and that which is supreme, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by access to God to be deified: but to be deified not by transalition into the Divine Essence, but by participation of the divine irradiation. Thence Augustine styles Liberty the best disposition of Soul. Similitude to God is the highest Liberty as to state: so far as any is made virtuose, so far he is made free: The connexion between Piety and Liberty is so intimate, as that indeed they have one and the same beginning, progress, and consummation. By how much the more ample, spiritual, pure, and perfect the Soul is, by so much the more free it is: and whence springs the Amplitude, Spirituality, Purity, and Perfection of the Soul, but from virtuose habits? Indeed Plato esteemed nothing good but Virtue, and moral Good: whence Antipater the Stoic writ three Books with this Title, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That according to Plato Virtue only was good. That Virtue is the most perfect state of the Soul, and that which brings with it most moral Liberty is most evident; because hereby it is rendered capable of adhering to its first Cause, and last End, which is the top of moral Liberty. For wherein consists the perfection of moral Liberty, but in its conformity to its most perfect Exemplar, which is the Divine bonity? And is not this the privilege of moral bonity or Virtue? Hence Virtue is defined by Aquinas, Dispositio perfecti ad optimum, The Disposition of a perfect Subject, to the most perfect Exemplar and End. Virtue indeed is more perfect than the Soul itself: so Aquinas: Grace, saith he, in itself and according to its essence, is more noble than the nature of the Soul; because it is an expression or participation of the divine bonity: and that which is substantially in God, is accidentally in the Soul participating of the divine bonity. That which belongs to God by nature, belongs to us by Grace. And Suarez saith: That Grace is the Bond, whereby man is conjoined to God, his last end. Now by how much the more the Soul is conjoined to God, by so much the more sublime, free, and perfect its state and condition is. In sum, Liberty of state consists in a virtuose or graciose disposition of Soul, whereby it is enabled to understand, embrace and adhere to what is good, in that manner and measure as it ought. Take all the notions of true moral Liberty, and they agree to none but the virtuose man. 1. Virtue gives Deminion. Liberty is defined by the Platonist, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Principality or Dominion of Life: also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a plenary power over allthings. Which the Stoics interpret, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a self-moving authority or power. And whence ariseth this Dominion of the Soul over itself and other things, but from virtuose habits? Plato assures us, That a virtuose temperate man is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, stronger than himself: i.e. by virtue he has dominion over his sensitive part. Again, Repub. 9 he instructes us, That he who is best is most happy and august or royal; because he is able to govern himself, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: But he that is most wicked is most miserable, because he is a Tyrant over himself. May we account him a man fit to govern himself, who is a slave to his unlawful passions and lusts? The Orator defines Liberty, a power of living as men list: and who hath this power to live as he list, but the virtuose man, whose will is conformed to the divine Will? Doth the voluptuose sensual man live as he list, whose mind is distracted and torn in pieces by unbridled lusts, as by so many wild Horses? Can it be imagined, that the ambitiose man lives as he list, whose mind is still on the rack of ambitiose designs? Doth the avaricious man live as he list, who the more he has, the more he wants? It's most evident, that no man lives as he list, but the virtuose man, who has a will slexible to the divine Wil This Dominion that attends moral Liberty is well expressed in sacred Philosophy: Hos. 11.12. So Hos. 11.12. But Judah yet ruleth with God, and is faithful with the Saints. (1) Observe, That Judah's ruling with God is opposed to that of Ephraim, who ruled also, but not with God, as v. 7. Ephraim endeavoured to exalt himself on the ruins of God's Worship, by erecting Calves at Dan and Bethel, etc. But Judah ruled with God, and was faithful with the Saints. (2) Judah rules with God: i.e. by serving and obeying God obtains Dominion and Rule over himself and all lower things: he lives as he lists; because his will is conformed to the Divine Wil 2. Moral Liberty consists in the moral Life, Health, Vigour, Virtue gives life, health, vigour and force. and Force of the Soul, which also ariseth from virtuose Habits. All natural freedom supposeth a vital subject in which it inheres: and so, by a parity of reason, all moral spiritual Liberty supposeth a moral spiritual life and vital subject: and indeed life renders every thing most beautiful, active, and perfect. Whence, by how much the more noble, excellent and perfect the life of any thing is, by so much the more raised, noble, and excellent is its state, and all its operations. Life is that which seasoneth every thing: and every life draws to it things suitable to its nature: so the spiritual, divine, virtuose life has Principes above human Nature, more noble and excellent: and herein consists moral Liberty as to state. Plato, Repub. 4. pag. 444. informs us, That the health of the body consists in the equal temperament of all humours, etc. So in the Soul, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Virtue truly is a certain health, pulchritude and good habitude of Soul: but sin is the disease, turpitude and infirmity thereof. Health, according to Augustine and Jansenius, consists in the vigour, force and strength of Nature: and what makes the Soul more vigorous and strong than Virtue? Whence is the vigour and force of any Creature, but from its Spirits? And are not virtuose Habits the Spirits of the Soul? That Virtue is the vigour and force of the Soul, Plato once and again assertes. So in his Gorgias, pag. 467. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Power is of good, etc. Also pag. 470. he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, To be able to do much is to be good. And in his Hippias, pag. 375. he saith, Righteousness is the vigour and power of the Soul: for the more righteous the Soul is, the more potent it is. Divine Light and Virtue is the strongest thing in the World. In the sensible World nothing is so strong as Light: and in the rational World nothing so strong as Truth and Virtue. All the force and vigour of lust comes from impotence; but Virtue is as a Pondus or weight on the Soul, which strongly impels it to its last end. What more potent than Love, whereby the Soul adheres to its last end? By how much the more spiritual and pure any faculty is, by so much the stronger it is: and is not Virtue the purity of the Soul? Again, the strength of every thing consists in its adhence to its first Principes, and last end: departure from our first Principe and last end speaks impotence: And what is it that enables us to adhere to our first Principe and last end but Virtue? The strength of the Soul lies in its ability to do good and suffer evil: and whence is this but from Virtue? The better any thing is, Prov. 3.7, 8. the stronger it is. Thence Prov. 3.7, 8. The fear of the Lord is said to be health to the navel, and marrow to the bones. The navel is the great organ, which conveys both food and physic to the infant inthe womb: also marrow gives strength and vigour to the bones, as Job 21.24. Such is Virtue to the Soul, both health and strength. e. Moral Liberty as to state consists chief in a divine Amplitude and Enlargement of Soul, The Amplitude of virtuose Habits. whereby it is made capable of enjoying its first Principe and last End. Indeed all Liberty, both natural and moral, implies Amplitude. Thence, amongst the Hebrews, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both Liberty and Amplitude, as Psal. 119.45. And whence comes all moral Amplitude as to state, but from virtuose habits? The first most ample Being is God, who has no limits to his Being, or his Felicity: and so far as man is like to God, so far he enters into this Divine Amplitude of state. Hence the Platonists assert, that Amplitude is founded in Unity, namely God, and from this divine Unity it takes its origine and measures. For every thing is by so much the more ample and extensive, by how much the nearer it comes to pure Act. All matter and passive power brings with it limits and coarctation: every thing is so far straitened and narrowed in its being and appetite, as it partakes of matter either physic or metaphysic: but on the contrary, so far as things approach unto pure Act, which is God, so far they rejoice in Amplitude and Enlargement, either of Being or Appetite: and who approach nearer unto God, who is pure Act, than virtuose Souls, who partake of the Divine similitude? Do not these then partake most of divine Amplitude as to state? How miserably is the Soul straitened, pinioned, and cooped up by sin? But O1 what a boundless moral Amplitude do virtuose habits bring with them? Subjection and Adhesion to God by Virtue brings the highest Amplitude and Dominion. For God being the first Efficient, that gives Being, and the last End, that gives blessed Being; it hence necessarily follows, that Subjection and Adhesion to God, in both these respects, must bring the highest Amplitude and Dominion with it. As man, by departure from God, is subject to a miserable necessity, and coarctation of sin; so by regress and return to God he passeth into Divine Amplitude. Is not the Assimilation of the Soul to God by virtuose habits, its ultimate perfection as to state? Must not then all divine Amplitude take its origine hence? This is well illustrated by Plato, in his Theaetetus, pag. 176. We may not presume, that sin finds place with God: wherefore we must endeavour to fly from it, as much as may be: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But this flight consists in this, that we are assimilated and conformed to God, so far as possiby we may be: and that which assimilates us to God is Justice and Sanctity conjoined with divine Wisdom. His mind is, that Assimilation to God by virtuose habits puts the Soul into a state of distance from sin, and conjunction with God, whence all moral Amplitude doth emerge. Thence Cyrillus, lib. 1. in Joan. terms Grace, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sanctity infused from without by Grace, according to the divine and supermundane Image. And Greg. Nazianzen, in Apolog. terms it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Deification; also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Appropinquation of God. And the spurious Dionysius, Eccles. Hierar. cap. 2. saith, That in the divine Regeneration men attain, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to a divine state or existence. Whence Virtue is termed by Ammonius, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as it were a Quality of the Divinity in us. Indeed what is the pious virtuose Soul, but an immense bosom and living receptacle of the chiefest Good? And O! what an infinite Amplitude must such a Soul rejoice in? It's a common Saying among the Platonistes, Bonitas est nexus cum unitate. That bonity is a nexe or conjunction with Unity, i. e. God. And must not such an intimate conjunction necessarily bring with it the highest Amplitude? Again, Plato and his Sectators generally inform us, that all Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a participation of the divine Nature. So Plato, in his Phaedo, assures us, That a virtuose man is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, akin to God, because partaker of the divine Nature, as the sacred Philosophy, 2 Pet. 1.4. This he explicates at large, Repub. 6. pag. 501. as Gen. 1.26. Now then, if Virtue be such an expression and participation of the divine Nature, must it not of necessity also partake of the divine Amplitude and Liberty? In short then, the nearer and more like to God the Soul is, the more ample and capacious it is: and by how much the more virtuose it is, by so much the nearer, and more like to God it is: doth it not then necessarily follow, that according to the degree and measure of Virtue, such is the degree and measure of divine Amplitude as to state? Consinement to what is good, gives the greatest amplitude and enlargement of heart, for the knowledge, love, and imitation of God, as Psal. 119.45. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Amplitude, etc. The Soul never walks in greater amplitude and liberty of spirit, than when it most firmly and inviolably adheres to God and his Divine Wil 4. Moral Liberty as to state imports Nobility, Dignity, Eminence, Excellence, Nobility, Dignity, Greatness from Virtue. Singularity, Separation, and Magnitude or Greatness of Disposition, and Condition of Life. And are not all these essentially and intrinsically included in Virtue, both as to name and thing? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Virtue is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Mars; as this from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, arits, a potent valiant man: which notes, that Virtue is most potent and great. So Plato, in his Cratylus, makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Good, to be the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, excellent, eximious, preeminent. And indeed all the notions of Virtue or Sanctity in sacred Philosophy import Discretion, Separation, Singularity, Preeminence. Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, holy, is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to separate from common use: and it is sometimes synonymous with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifies peculiar, most pretiose, excellent, etc. Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an holy people, Deut. 7.6. Deut. 7.6. & 14.2. is there interpreted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a most excellent, eximious, noble people: by the LXX. as also, Tit. 2.14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a select, peculiar, superexcellent people. And Psal. 16.3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Psal. 16.3. Saints, is interpreted inwhat follows, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, magnisicent, eximious: which shows that none are truly magnificent but virtuose holy persons. Thence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, holy, pure, is deduced from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, veneration, worship; and this from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to worship: which they also derive from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 azaz, to honour. That Sanctity and Virtue is the Crown of all other Excellences, is evident from Zach. 9.16. Zach. 9.16. For they shall be as the stones of a Crown, lifted up as an Ensign on his land: i. e. God will deliver his Saints out of their dangers and troubles; as also lift them up to that honour, which pretiose stones have in the King's Diadem. The word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both Separation and a Crown: which notes here, that every Saint is separated by God, as a Jewel in his Crown. Thence God terms them, Mal. 3.17. My Jewels. Which notes both separation and propriety, as also dignity and excellence. Indeed Sanctity and Virtue is the Glory and Crown of all other Excellences; because it implies separation from all impurities, and a comprehension of the highest perfections: It raiseth things and persons, otherwise commun and vulgar, to the highest degree of excellene, even to the Image of God, which is the perfection of human Nature. Thus Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 716. largely demonstrates, That conformity to the divine Image is the highest perfection of human Nature: Of which see Philos. General. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 3. §. 5. But more particularly, That Virtue brings with it the highest Nobility, Magnificence, and excellence, is evident from many Platonic Philosophemes. Thus definite. Platon. pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Nobility is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Virtue of generose manners. So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Magnificence, is pag. 412. defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Dignity according to the most august or venerable right Reason: i. e. according to Virtue. For indeed all the ancient Philosophers made Honour and Nobility to be but the shadow and reward of Virtue. A free man, according to the Hebrews is styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nadib; which signifies also a Prince or Noble man, one endowed with noble, generose, virtuose dispositions. What more sublime and noble than Vitue? Ut foelicitatis est, quantum velis posse; sic magnitudinis, quantum possis velle. Plin. ad Trajan. Is not that a generose Soul, that is well-disposed and inclined to generose heroic deeds? Is any Soul more great than he, who can despise great mundane things for Virtues sake? It is accounted by some a great piece of felicity to be able to do what they will: but is it not a greater piece of liberty to will what we ought, which alone belongs to virtuose persons? Is he not truly great, who has a great measure of Virtue? Hence among the Heroic Virtues, there was found out an Apotheosis; which was nothing else but an extension of Virtues and human conditions to a perfection not human. Virtuose persons are the greatest men in the world: they have the greatest Souls: yea nothing is really great, but what is good. The best Nobility lies in the mind endued with Virtue: what mind more great than that, which is subject to the great God? Who is greater than he, who is least in his own eyes? Is not such a Soul most great in divine favour? It was a great Saying of Zeno the Stoic: You are not therefore good, because great; but you are therefore great because good. 5. Moral Liberty as to state implies Splendour, Beauty, and Glory. The Splendour, Beauty and Glory of Virtue. Plato makes Beauty to arise from the predominance of the form over the matter, which otherwise is distorme. By the form I understand the spirituose active Principe; and so indeed it holds true of the Soul, the Beauty whereof consists in the predominance of virtuose habits, which are as the spirits, and form of the Soul. For look as the Soul, which is the form of a man, giveth life, vigour, perfection and beauty to the human body; so proportionably virtuose habits give life, vigour, perfection and beauty to the human Soul. Plato abounds much in this argument, that Virtue is the Beauty of the Soul. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 279. O Friend Pan [the Ape of the Messiah] give me to be beautiful within: i.e. in my Soul. Thence pag. 250. he saith, The Beauty of divine Wisdom [which is the Spirit of Virtue] is so illustrious and amiable, that if it were seen with eyes it would stir up wonderful Loves. All Beauty ariseth from Light, spirits, and proportion of parts: and what gives Light, Spirits, and proportion to the Soul but Virtue? Some define Beauty, the fulgor, or bland face of Goodness: and doth not this speak Virtue most beautiful? Cicero defines Beauty, a due congruence with suavitic of colour: and what hath a more due congruence and sweet colour, than Virtue? Among the Beauties of Nature nothing more beautiful than Light: and O1 what a gloriose illustrious Light attends Virtue? Is not divine Verity the Spring of Virtue, the most virgin, unspotted, gloriose, affective Light? Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 64. saith, That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Idea or face of Good is composed of three things, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Beauty, and Symmetry, and Truth. Yea, he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The very Images of things beautiful, are beautiful. And is not God most beautiful, yea the first Beauty, as before Chap. 2. §. 2. And what is true Virtue but the gloriose Image of this first Beauty? Must it not then be most beautiful? Aristotle, Eth. lib. 1. cap. 8. assures us, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to the Delphic Inscription, That which is most just is most beantiful. And Seneca, Epist. 115. adds: If it were lawful to look into the mind of a good man, O! what a beautiful face should we see? How holy, how resplendent a mind, composed of a magnific and placid countenance? yea, saith he, Virtue is so graciose and beautiful, that it is natural even to wicked men to approve better things: neither has any one so far banished the natural Law, or put off humanity, as to espouse wickedness for wickedness sake. So Plato and Aristotle: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, No man is voluntarily wicked for wickedness sake. Which shows, that Virtue in itself is most amiable. Greg. Nyssenus, Hom. 2. in Cant. terms Virtue, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Grace of the Beauty of the Soul flowing from God, the supreme Beauty. And Basil, in Psal. saith, That Grace is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Beauty of the Soul. Also Corysostome, ad Theodor. Paraen. 1. tells us; That a deformed body cannot be made beautiful, but a deformed Soul may be rendered such by Grace: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. To render the Soul beautiful, although it be fallen into extreme turpitude, to reduce it to the most excellent pulchritude, and so to make it amiable and desirable, etc. In sum, what is Beauty but the splendour and lustre of those perfections, which are lodged in any subject? And thence is not God the first Beauty, because most perfect? And are not allthings so far beautiful as they partake of his Divine Perfection and Goodness? For what is all created Beauty, but a ray of the Divine Beauty? And among created Beauties, doth any thing more ressemble the Divine Beauty than true Virtue? ‛ Plato, in his Phaedrus, pag. 250. saith, That Justie and Temperance and other Virtues in this our imperfect state have little Light and Beauty: but in the future state, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, than we shall contemplate the most perfect Beauty, etc. And then he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But now Beauty [of things divine] has gained this dignity, that it is the most illustrious and amiable of allthings. §. 3. Having explicated and demonstrated moral Liberty as to state, we now descend to consider it as to its Exercise, Moral Liberty as to Exercise in virtuose Acts. which consists in virtuose Acts. For it is a good Theorem in Philosophy, That the second Act follows the first: such as the state is, such are the Exercices in that state: As in natural and civil Liberty, such as the state is, such are the Exercices in that state: if a man be, sui juris, a free man, he may act as such in that Corporation wherein he is free: Thus in moral Liberty, such as are free as to state, by having their Souls clothed with virtuose habits, they will exert and put forth virtuose Exercices in that state. So that moral Liberty as to Exercise is nothing else but a liberty to act according to that dignity of state they are invested with. Now for the more full explication and demonstration of moral Liberty as to Exercise, we are, (1) To explicate what it is, and (2) To demonstrate, that it is the supreme Liberty of a rational Creature. As for the explication of moral Liberty as to Exercise we may comprehend it in the following Propositions. 1. Moral Liberty as to Exercise consists in the spiritual, affectionate, permanent Contemplation of the first beauty or Truth. To contemplate the first Truth, The Contemplation of the first Truth. as well according to sacred, as Platonic Philosophy, is one of the supreme parts of moral Liberty as to Exercise. Contemplation, according to the Platonist, is the Exercise of the mind on things intelligible: and what more intelligible, than the first Truth? Thence Plate, in his Phaedrus, pag. 247. tells us, That the mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, beholding for some while the first Being, and satiating itself in the contemplation of Truth, and giving up itself thereto, is thereby nourished and recreated with the highest pleasure. As sight is of all the most noble sense, and most quick in apprehension; so contemplation or the sight of the first Beauty and Truth is one of the highest Exercices of moral Liberty; that which brings in most tranquillity, satisfaction and pleasure to the mind. Of all Contemplations there is none so powerful, so sweet, so free, as the contemplation of the first Cause and last End. As God is infinitely better than all Creatures, so the contemplation of God is infinitely better than the contemplation of all the Creatures. That the contemplation of the first Being is one of the highest Acts of moral Liberty is most manifest; because (1) Contemplation is the highest Act of the Soul; and therefore when placed on the supreme Being and highest Object, must needs bring the highest Liberty and Perfection with it, Joh. 17.3. (2) The mind of man, when rectified, has a flagrant ardent desire to contemplate the first Beauty and Truth. Aristotle assures us, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That those who are conversant in the inquisition of truth have been sweetest manner of life. How sweet and free is it then to contemplate the first Truth? (3) The contemplation of the first Being gives a wise improvement of all other Being's and Objects which occur. This spiritualiseth and draws out the Elixir of all objects, providences, persons and things we converse with. (4) The contemplation of the first Beauty is that which most assimilates the Soul thereto. If there were a beautiful Picture, which persons by looking on, should gradually be made like unto, who would not gaze thereon? And is not the first Beauty such, which makes all those as spiritually contemplate thereon, beautiful, and free? Joh. 1.14. Joh. 1.14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, We have diligently and attentively beheld his glory, as on a Theatre. The Human Nature is that gloriose Theatre, on which the Deity descends and offers himself to our contemplation: and O! what a gloriose contemplation is this, to behold the Deity in the golden Ark of Humanity? How is the Soul hereby transformed into the same gloriose Image, as 2 Cor. 3.18? (4) Spiritual contemplationof the first Being gives possession therefo. Truth is made one with the Mind by contemplation: and doth not the first Truth become one with the Mind, by lively affectionate contemplation thereof? (5) Contemplation of the first Beauty is most influential on the divine Life, and therefore a main Spring of Moral Liberty. Is not this a great Source of Divine Wisdom? Are not contemplative persons in things natural and moral the wisest of men? And is not this most true in things moral and divine? Was it not a great Saying of that great Divine, The greatest Musers are the best Artists? and doth not this hold most true here? yea, doth not the Psalmist assure us, Psal. 39.3. Psal. 39.3. That whiles the heart museth, the fire of divine affection burneth? Doth not contemplation on the first Beauty fortify the heart against every tentation, tune it for every service, and sweeten every cross? Is it not both food and physic to the Soul, the life of our life, yea universally useful in every state and condition. 2. Another Exercise of moral Liberty consists in an intimate and inviolable Adherence unto the last End and chiefest Good. Adherence to the last End and chiefest Good. What the last End and chiefest Good is, with the proper Characters of each, we have, §. 1. of this Chapter, fully discussed: our present work is to explicate what moral Liberty the Soul acquires by adhering thereto. The last End possesseth the greatest Amplitude, Universality, and Liberty imaginable, as to all means: it is, as an infinite Ocean, an immense universal Principe, that contains all Morals in its bosom: allthings receive bounds and limits from their last end: but this receives bounds and limits from nothing. Now the last end enjoying such an infinite Amplitude and Liberty, it necessarily follows, that the more intimately and firmly the Soul adheres to it, the more liberty as to exercise it is possessed of. Thence Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 715. saith, That God (according to the ancient Tradition, I suppose Judaic) is the Principe and End of allthings. And then he adds, pag. 716. That he, who adheres, with a composed mind and sirme purpose, to this last end, is most blessed and free. And in what follows, he lays down the manner how the Soul adheres to God, namely, by conformable Acts of Piety, etc. And herein indeed his Philosophemes are consonant to sacred Philosophy; which frequently placeth moral Liberty as to exercise, in inviolable close Adhesion unto God, as our last End. Psal. 63.8. So Psal. 63.8. My Soul adheres closely to thee, as the Original 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 imports. We find the same word in the same sense, Deut. 10.20. Ruth 1.14, 16. Job 41.17. Psal. 119.31. and it primarily denotes, that intimate inviolable conjugal Adherence, which is or ought be between man and wife, who are, by Law of Nature, one flesh, as Gen. 2.24. And that this Adherence to God as our last End, and chiefest Good is a main part of moral Liberty, Psal. 73.28. as to exercise, is further evident from Psal. 73.28. But it is good for me: i. e. it is my chiefest Good, that wherein my highest liberty consists. To draw near to God, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Appropinquation, Access, Adherence to God. Thence the LXX. render it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, To adhere to God, to be as it were glued to God: So the word, in its primary notion, signifies. Thence it is frequently used to express that intimate conjunction that ought to be between man and wife, as Mat. 19.5. yea Ephes. 5.31. it signifies the conjugal adherence and union between Christ and his Church. 1 Cor. 6.17. And we find 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 used in the same sense, 1 Cor. 6.17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, He that is glued, or conjugally united to God as his chiefest Good, as the precedent words import. And O! what an high piece of moral Liberty is this, intimately and inviolably to adhere to God, as our last End and chiefest Good? Is the heart ever more free, than when it doth most strongly, by all manner of affectionate exercices, adhere to its chiefest Good? So many grains as there are of a bended will for God, so much moral Liberty. A tenacious, resolute, invincible adherence unto our last end, by acts of love, desire, and other affections, makes the Soul exceeding free in all its motions. Psal. 73.26. Thus Psal. 73.26. My flesh and my heart faileth, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to consume with desire, or, to fail with long expectation. This poor man's case was thus stated: He saw the wicked to flourish, and the godly oppressed, which brought him under anxious disputes about the chiefest Good: but, upon inquiry in the Sanctuary, he was resolved to adhere inviolably to God as his chiefest Good So it follows: But God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever. Some render it, the reck unto which my heart adheres: others, the firm adhesion of my heart is to God, my chiefest Good. Whence follows his liberty v. 28. Psal. 86.4. Thus Psal. 86.4. Rejoice the Soul of thy servant: i. e. make me free for and in all moral exercices: and why? for unto thee, O Lord, do I lift up my Soul: i.e. unto thee as my chiefest Good do I adhere. So Psal. 25.1. This tenacious adherence of the Soul to its last end, is lively illustrated by our Lord, Mat. 6. 20-24. v. 20. He exhorts them, Mat. 6. 20-24. To lay up treasures in Heaven: i. e. to make God their last End and chiefest Good: to cleave to himwith an inviolable intime bend of will: and he gives the reason of it, v. 21. For where your treasure is there will your heart be also. the heart and the Treasure are ever together. This our Lord illustrates by a lively notion, v. 24. He will hold to the one, and despise the other, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, mordicus adhaerebit. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies, to hold fast a thing, in opposition to those that would pluck it from us: Thence, to be very tenacious in adhering to persons or things: So in Plato, Xenophon, and Isocrates. It's emphatically here, as Luk. 16.13. Luk. 16.13. applied to the Souls tenacious adhering to its last End and chiefest Good. Whence it's added, and despise the other. A Soul that tenaciously adheres to its chiefest Good, despiseth all frowns or blandishments that may assault it. Thence v. 25. our Lord concludes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore: i. e. If you adhere to God as your chiefest Good, you will not be so anxiously concerned about the goods of Time. To sum up this Argument. Every Creature has an Element to live in: and when it s in that Element it is most free: The Souls Element is its last End and chiefest Good: and every man is more or less morally free, as he more or less adheres thereto. For such as a man's last end is, such is the motion of his Soul as to moral good or evil, and moral liberty or bondage. By how much the more we love, delight in and enjoy our last end, by so much the more free we are in all our ways. The liberty of a rational Agent consists, not in having variety of objects to adhere to, and take complacence in, but in transmitting all to his last end, which is his best good. That a Will actually and strongly bended to adhere to its last End and chiefest Good is most free, will appear by the following Particulars. (1) The more the Will is fortified by true Virtue to adhere to its last End and chiefest Good, the more free it is from sin, which is the worst servitude. He indeed is truly noble and generose, who is not a vassal to any base lust. All power to sin is the diminution of liberty. Impeccabilitie or an utter impossibility of sinning is so far from destroying liberty, as that it is perfected hereby. The sweetest and highest liberty is to have no power to sin. Now the more the Will actually adheres to its last end, the less power it has to sin. (2) Moral liberty consists in the Souls being preserved from whatever may damnify or prejudice it: and wherein consists the preservation of every things, but in its Unity? Doth not division ever bring dissolution? And what preserves the Souls unity so much, as actual adherence to God, the first Unity? (3) The moral liberty of the Will consists chief inhaving all inferor things subject to it: and when are allthings more subject to the dominion of the Will, than when it is, by a resolute actual adherence, subject to the Will of God? (4) The more harmonious and uniform the Souls acts are, the more morally free they are? And whence springs this harmony, but from actual regard and adherence to the last end? (5) Where ever the Soul finds rest and satisfaction, there it finds moral libetie: and doth not the Rest of the Soul arise from its adherence to its chiefest good. Thence that great Essate of the spurious Dionysius: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, bonity [or the chiefest Good] convertes allthings to itself: i e. allthings tend to and acquiesce therein as in their Centre or ultimate perfection. (6) The more the Will is conformed to the Divine Will, the more free it is: and whose Will is more conform to the Divine Will, than his, who actually and resolutely adheres to God? Doth not such a Will touch the Divine Will in every point, as two straight Lines? 3. Moral Liberty as to Exercise consists in an actual, Dependence on the first Cause. total, and immediate Dependence on the first Cause of allthings. Every Creature having something of Nothing, or passive Power, either physic or metaphysic and obediential; it thence falls under the Law of Mutability, which is the root of Dependence. novity of Being, Deficience and Dependence is essential to the Creature, as Eternity of Being, immutability, and Independence is to the Creator. For every Creature being only Being by participation; hence Dependence becomes intrinsecal to it, and inseparable from its nature, as Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 20. Sect. 5. acutey demonstrates. Yea, Disp. 31. Sect. 14. he further demonstrates, That Subordination or Dependence of a created Being, both in acting and causing, formally belongs to its essential reason as such; because this dependence is founded, not in any quality or propriety of the Creature, extrinsical to its Essence, but in the very intrinsical limitation thereof. So that the very Essence of the Creature, as such, is the root of this dependence: and to suppose a Creature, and not to suppose it to be dependent in essence and operation, implies a contradiction. Neither has the rational Creature a natural dependence only, but also moral on its first Cause. We find both mentioned by Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 715. where he shows, That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Principe and End of all Being's, whose conduct he that follows, shall be happy. And Epinom. pag. 980. he assures us, That he, who praying to God doth trust in his Benignity, shall act well. So in his Timaeus, pag. 27. he tells us, That all, who have any thing of an awakened mind, when they attemt any matter either great or small, are always wont to call on God. Which is an high act of Dependence. Thence Theages, pag. 128. he brings in Socrates philosophising of his Dependence on God, thus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ▵ AIMONION, For there is a certain DEMON, which has followed me with a Divine Afflation even from my childhood This is a voice that signifies to me what I must do, etc. What this Daemon of Socrates was, is greatly controverted by the ancient Philosophers, who have written Books concerning it. That it was some Divine Afflation or Inspiration they generally grant, as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 1. §. 4. It certainly imports his great sense of Dependence on some Divine Power, either Real or Imagivary. Yea, Planto, in his Timaeus, saith, That Beatitude or moral Liberty is nothing else but to have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Daemon dwelling in him. Whereby peradventure he may allude to the Hebraic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Shekinah, i.e. the Divine Habitation of Gow with men. Thence the Greek Fathers term efficacious Grace and our Dependence thereon, in imitation of sacred Philosophy, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the inhabitation of the holy Spirit, also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, indwelling Grace. Which alludes to that of Paul, 2 Cor. 12.9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 2 Cor. 12.9. that the power of Christ might tabernacle or dwell on me. It evidently alludes, both name and thing, to the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or habitation of God with and in men; which denotes the highest Dependence. And indeed herein consists one main part of moral Liberty as to exercise. Look as the beams of the Sun touch the Earth, yet hang on the Sun as their original Cause; so doth all true moral Virtue on its first Cause. Virtuose persons, who are most feeble in themselves, are most strong and free by dependence on their first Principe. Where there is a subordination of Causes, either moral or natural, it is the liberty of the inferior to depend on, and receive from the superior. Doth not the first Cause give forth actual assistances usually according to the measure of our actual dependence on him? If he drop not in every moment new spirits and influences, how soon do all moral Virtues whither and die away? What more natural than for the second cause to depend on the first? Where there is a limited essence, is there not also a limited dependent Activity? Can a dependent cause produce any more than a dependent effect? Must not every mutable, variable, defectible Being he reduced to some immutable indefectible first Cause? That which had not Being from itself, may it have Operation independently from itself? Is not the operation of the second cause founded on the operation of the first? If the created Will cannot subsist of itself, may it expect the privilege of acting from itself, independently as to the first Cause? Is not the human Will a mere passive, though vital, instrument as to the reception of divine influences, albeit it be active as to its own operation? Must not then its dependence on the first Cause be absolute and total? Yea, is not this Dependence immediate? And, O! how is the Soul enlarged, according to the measure of its actual dependence on the first Cause? Without this dependence the most facile moral duties are most difficult; but with it the most difficult are most facile. The Soul is well compared to a Glass without a foot, which so long as the Divine hand holds there is no danger of its being broken; but if God withdraws his hand, it soon sals to the ground, and is deshed in pieces: he need not take it, and throw it against the wall; it will break of itself. Hence the efficacious Grace of God is termed by the Ancients, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Munudaction; also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, assistant Grace: Again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the energy and cooperation of God: Basil terms it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, all manner of energy: Cyril, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the aid from above: chrysostom, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the auxiliant or assistant Power. Greg. Nyssen. in Psalm. saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Aid of God is the Head and Sum of Virtue. And chrysostom, in Gen. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The whole of good is from the Grace of God. Whence God is termed by Cyril, in Esa. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Creator and Framer of all good: and his efficacious Grace is termed, by him, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the multiforme Energy: also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the efficacious Aid: as by chrysostom, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the invincible Assistence. Of which more hereafter. The moral divine Life is nothing in regard of the first Cause, but continual effusions and insusions into the Soul, and in regard of man nothing else but constant regard towards God, and continual dependence on him. As the excellence of the Angelic nature could not preserve them, when self-dependent; so the impotence of Human nature cannot prejudice us, so long as we are dependent on the first Cause. True moral Virtue is a celestial Plant, fed by some invisible root in the celestial World; from which it derives its influences. Members and branches live no life, but the life of their head and root: all divine and moral Respirations toward the celestial world, are from sweet Inspirations of divine Concourse. We cannot actively draw down divine influences, but we may enlarge our passive receptive capacity by actual dependence thereon. All moral Being's, even the Angels themselves, as they have new services to do for God daily, so they are dependent for new assistances; and herein consists a main part of their moral Liberty. Those who are strongest in self dependence, are soon foiled; as Peter. 4. Another Exercise of moral Liberty consists in actual conformity unto God, and imitation of him, both by obedience to his preceptive, Conformity to the Divine preceptive Wil and submission to his providential Wil. (1) It's a great essential part of moral Liberty, to conform to the preceptive Will of God. God being the prime Exemplar and Measure of all Liberty, it necessarily follows, that the more we imitate and follow God, the more freedom we obtain: and who imitate and follow God more, than they, who conform most to his Divine preceptive Will? Nothing more commun in sacred Philosophy than this, That Adherence, Conformity and Subjection to the Divine Law is the top of moral Liberty. Thus Psal. 119.45. Psal. 119.45. I will always walk at liberty; because I seek thy precepts. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in amplitude: i. e. I will walk in all manner of Amplitude and Liberty both of heart and ways; because my heart adheres inviolably to thy royal Law of Liberty. The Law of God written on the heart is no other than the very Image of God, a bond or cord of Love, whereby the heart is knit to God, and so made free for the fruition of him. Delight in and conformity to the Divine Law, by all manner of virtuose exercices, is the highest liberty. O! what a regal, gloriose liberty is this, to be always found in ways of obedience to the divine Will? What a practic contradiction is it to expect moral Liberty in ways of sin? When the Spirit of God takes the Law of God, and transcribes it on the heart, and thereby makes it free to perform actual conformity to the extern Law, Rom. 8.2 what a sovereign Liberty is this? Thus Rom. 8.2. For the law of the Spirit of life, i. e. engraven on the heart, as 2 Cor. 3.3. hath made me free from the law of sin and death: i. e. enabled me freely and cheerfully to conform to the Divine Law, etc. Thus also, Jam. 1.25. Jam. 1.25. But whose looketh into the persect law of liberty: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 denotes (1) an accurate inspection or prying into a thing, as they who bring their eye close to an object, in order to a more distinct perception thereof. (2) A dwelling on an object: as some curiose persons, who spend much time in dressing themselves, do, as it were, let their eye dwell on their glass; just so the eye of the mind should dwell on the Divine Law, which is the glass, wherein we contemplate the Divine Will, Image and Sanctity. Thence follows the object, the perfect Law of Liberty. (1) The Divine Law is called perfect, as it is an absolute perfect Miroir or Glass, wherein we contemplate the Image and Will of God, and whereby the mind is perfected. (2) It is termed a Law of Liberty, [1] As evangelised and sweetened by evangelic Grace. [2] As it makes those free, that conform to it. So far as the heart is made conformable to divine Commands, so far its actings in conformity thereto and free and cheerful. Hence a godly man is said to be a Law unto himself: i. e. if there were no Law extant, yet he would do the same virtuose acts, from that inward Law engraven on his heart. Whence Jam. 2.8. it's styled the Royal Law: and v. 12. The Law of Liberty: because conformity thereto, from an inward principe of Virtue, is the highest Liberty, according to Divine estimation. And as sacred Philosophy, so Platonic placeth much of moral Liberty in actual conformity to the divine Law. Plato, Repub. 9 pag. 592. assures us, that in Heaven there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a perfect Exemplar, for him that will behold it, and by beholding be conformed thereto. Meaning God the original essential Exemplar of all Sanctity, whose sacred Will is the grand Pattern of our Conformity. And leg. 4. pag. 716. he largely demonstrates, That by how much the more conformable the Soul is to the Divine Will, by so much the more perfect and free it is. It is most evident, saith he, that every man ought mostly to attend this, how he may be of the number of those that follow God. What action therefore is it, that is most beloved by God, and most consentaneous to his Will? Truly but one, according to the old Proverb, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because like is beloved by lie, whereunto it is conformable, etc. Wherein he shows, that moral Liberty consists chief in following God; which is performed by actual conformity unto his Wil Thence Philo Judaeus, that great Platonist, in his Book, That every virtuose man is free, demonstrates at large, That to be free is to follow God by conformity to his divine Wil And indeed what is Liberty as to exercise, but adhering unto God? and who adhere to God, but they who conform to his divine Will and Law? Doth not moral Liberty arise from subjection to God? And are not they most subject to God, who conform most to his Law? It was a great Saying of Pythagoras, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Fellow God. Thus also Epictetus, in Arrian. lib. 1. cap. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The end of Philosophy is to follow God, i.e. to conform to his divine Law. And the ancient Philosophers, specially Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato, made Assimilation to, and Imitation of God the main end of all Philosophy. (2) This actual Conformity unto God implies subjection and submission to his providential Will, both Afflictive and Diretive. Conformity to God's providential Wil And herein also much of moral Liberty doth consist. Is not that mind most noble, great, and free, which can bear great crosses with equanimity and patience? Doth not this give more liberty and enlargement than any temporal affliction can deprive us of? O! what a sweet thing is it to have a free generose mind under a straitened consigned condition! How facile are burdens made hereby! A virtuose Spirit, that follows God in afflictive providences, becomes a King over his crosses: his losses prove his gain; his reproach, his glory; his confinement, his liberty. This is incomparably well expressed by Epictetus, in several Philosophemes. So Enchirid. cap. 38. Know, saith he, that this is the main part of Religion towards God, that thou conform thyself, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to obey him, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and to acquiesce in allthings that happen, and willingly to follow, as that which is best governed by the most excellent Mind. Thus also in Arrian. l. 1. c. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. To submit the mind, to the mind that governs allthings, as good Citizens to the Law of the City, this is liberty in its perfection. So lib. 3. cap. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. I always rather will what happens; for I estime what God wils, better than what I wil I adhere to him as a minister and sectator: I desire what he desires, and simply will what God wils. thus Seneca: That is a great and free mind, which has given up itself too God. 5. Moral Liberty as to exercise imports the using and referring allthings in order to the service and fruition of God. The reference of allthings to God. Liberty, according to both sacred and Platonic Philosophy, consists 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in the consent, harmony, symmetry, and right order of allthings: i e. when all subserve our last end. And what is the last end of man, but to serve and enjoy God? Whence Plato, Protag. 3. pag. 326. saith, That the whole life of man should be composed of harmony and uniformity: i. e. all actions, means, occurrences should sweetly conspire and agree for the promoting our supreme end. The mind is morally free, not by extending itself to variety of objects, but by reducing all to unity, or God, who is the supreme Unity, which reduceth allthings to itself. Again, Liberty implies Election: and is not that the best election, which refers all to its last end? the respect we have to Creatures depends on the respect they have to God: and so far as we refer them to God, so far we are free in the use of them. By subjecting ourselves, and all enjoyments to the service of God, we gain dominion and freedom over allthings: but if the heart be irregular and inordinate in adhering to the use of the most lawful comfort, it is immediately captivated thereby. This is most evident from sacred Philosophy: as 1 Cor. 6.12. Allthings are lawful to me. 1 Cor. 6.12, 13. Paul seems to have taken up the common Phrase of those Corinthian Libertines, who under a pretext, that allthings were lawful, did abuse their just liberty to the grieving of their weak Brethren. It's true, saith he, allthings are lawful: I grant it: yet withal remember, that allthings are not expedient: if you have not a great care, your desires and use of things lawful will soon prove unlawful. For my part, adds he, allthings are lawful for me, but I will not be brought under the power of any: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Here is an elegant Paronomasy between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which the Corinthian Libertines boasted of, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifies primarily, to be brought into bondage, under the power of another. They that use things lawful, without regard to their expendience and subservience to the service of God, are brought under bondage to them. Thence the Apostle adds, v. 13. Meats are for the belly: i. e. for the ventricule or stomach and intestines, to supply them with nutriment: and the belly is for meats: i.e. to receive and digest them. But God shall destroy both it and them: i. e. take away the use both of meats and ventricule in Heaven. The Apostle brings this as an argument to prove, that our Christian Liberty doth not lie simply in the use of these things; because when we are most free, there will be no use of them. God gives not men liberty to enjoy what they list, but what they ought: the free use of Creatures consists in this, to make us more free inthe service of God: herein lies the goodness of any Creature, in our being thereby enabled to do good. Those that subject their hearts to God in the use of Creatures, are most free therein: yea, you are never free longer than you serve God by them. That to serve God is the highest Liberty that human Nature is capable of, sacred Philosophy doth abundantly assure us. It's an old Saying, but most true, that To serve God is to reign. This is a King's life. Every one hath his Talon from God; and as he doth more or less employ it for God, so he is more or less free. It's honour enough for the Creature to be employed by his Creator. Yet over an above this God rewards every degree of servicer with some degree of liberty, tranquillity and peace. There is nothing that has greater dignity and liberty entailed on it, than the service of God. Thus Luk. 22.29. Luk. 22.29, 30. And I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed unto me. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to appoint or dispose by Will and Testament. The mind of our Lord is, that, as the Father appointed to him a Kingdom to be acquired by suffering and service; so in like manner he appointed to his Servants a Glory and Dignity next to his royal Majesty, to be acquired in the same manner and way. This our Lord adds to give check to their carnal ambitiose humour, v. 24, 25. It follows v. 30. That ye may eat and drink at my table, and sit on thrones judging the twelve Tribes of Israel. There are two things wherein the preeminence of Nobles and Peers is most illustrious. (1) In the honour vouchsafed them by their Prince. (2) In their Power and Authority over others. Both of these are here mentioned, as belonging to Christ's Servants. (1) Their honour consists in sitting at Christ's table. (2) Their power, in sitting on Thrones, etc. Yea, we find a strange and unusual honour vouchsafed by Christ to his Servants, Luk. 12.37. He shall gird himself, and make them sit down to mean, and will come forth and serve them. Joh. 12.26. O1 what an incomparable honour is this! The like Joh. 12.26. If any man serve me. Our Lord here speaks of himself as a great King, who hath many Ministers of State to order his Affairs: and every Minister of his is a King in his place. Thence he adds: And where I am, there also shall my servant be: i. e. in my Kingdom of Glory, if he follows me in the Kingdom of my Patience. yea, he adds: If any man serve me, him will my Father honour: i. e. he shall not only be happy, but most honourable. Neither is this Dignity and Liberty reserved only for Heaven, but even in this life God investes his saithful Servants therewith. Thus it was with Joshua, Zach. 3.7. And I will give thee walks among those that stand by: i. e. among the Angels, that stand by and minister to me, and my Church, as Tarnovius. §. 4. Having explicated what moral Liberty as to Exercise is, we are now to demonstrate, Moral Liberty of Exercise the highest. that this is the supreme Liberty that a rational Creature is capable of. 1. The more ordinate and regular human Acts are, the more morally free they are: It's Order, for all moral freedom denotes order and reference to our last End: and are not virtuose Acts most ordinate and regular? Thus Plato, Gorg. pag. 504. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Soul and its acts receive order and ornament from the Law: whence men are made regular and orderly: which belongs to Justice and Temperance: i. e. all Acts are so far regular, as they partake of Justice and Temperance, which give order and harmony to all our Exercices. Justice and Temperance, according to Plato, are universal cardinal Virtues, which regulate and dispose all human Acts according to the best order, wherein their freedom chief consists. Whence Plato makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Chorus of Virtues, wherein all move in the most regular orderly manner. Yea, he affirms, That the whole life of man should consist of Harmony, Order, and Uniformity. And Rep. 3. pag. 412. he informs us, That a life composed of Contemplatives and Actives, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is most musical and harmonious: i. e. The whole life of a virtuose man must be composed, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of Symphony or Consent and musical Rhyme: so that Thoughts and Affections must answer to Rule, Words to Thoughts, and Actions to Words: and herein consists the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, good Order and Liberty of human Exercices. So again, in his Laches, pag. 188. he assures us, Non est hujus animus in recto, cujus acta discordant. Omnia facta dictáque tua inter se congruant ac respondeant sibi, & una forma percussa sint. Virtus aequalitas ac tenor vitae per omnia consonans sibi. Sen. Epist. That is the best Music, when words and life concord, or agree among themselves, as also to the Rule. Virtuose Exercices consist in all equal tenor of life, agreeable to itself, and to the Law; which is always attended with a good order, and liberty. It is an excellent Character of Padre Paul the Venetian, mentioned in his Life, pag. 133. That his life was singularly composed of active and contemplative: he always yielding to God what he could, to his Prince what he ought, and of that which belonged to his own Dominion more than he ought by any Law, but that of charity. Again, pag. 175. That which made him most admired, was the coupling together of Virtues, and with conditions that are not usually met in one and the same subject: as Knowledge and Humility; Prudence with Meekness; Retiredness and Officiousness; Seriousness and Pleasantness; Argutenesse without offence; Brevity and Perspicuity; Sweetness and Solidity. So great was the consent and order of virtuose Exercices in this great Soul. Indeed order is the life and perfection of moral Acts: and the more of order the more of liberty. Now virtuose Acts are of all most regular and orderly; because they are measured by the exactest Rule, and directly tend to the last End, which is the first Principe in Morals. Thus in sacred Philosophy, Gal. 6.16. Gal. 6.16. And as many as walk according to this rule peace be unto them. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies a Reed whereby Geometers measured their ground: also the white Line in the Grecian Race. And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here signifies, so to walk as to keep an exact order, not to deviate the least from the white Line in our Race. And what is the privilege of those who thus walk? Peace be to them: i.e. moral Liberty and Tranquillity. 2. The Liberty of an Act both Natural and Moral is to be measured by its spontaneity, Connaturalitie, Facility, and suavity. Virtuose Exercies most spontaneous and sweet. For all Liberty consists in an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a self-motion: and by how much the more spontaneous, connatural, facile and sweet the self-motion is, by so much the more free it is judged to be. And what motions of the Soul are more spontaneous, spiritually connatural, and sweet, than such as are virtuose? Plato, in his Lysis, assures us, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Good is most proper to our nature, and what is better than virtuose acts? are they not than most proper or connatural? Thence definite. Platon. pag. 411. Temperance is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a self-motion according to nature: i.e. connatural, or agreeable to rectified human Nature. And Plato, in his Timaeus, tells us, That the best motion of the Soul is in itself; because this is most akin to rational Nature. And when doth the Soul move more in itself, than when it moves virtuosely towards its last end? Is not the last end the best part of ourselves? Therefore when the Soul moves virtuosely towards it, doth it not move most in itself? It's a great Notion among the Platonists, That Virtue is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, most proper and congenial to man; but sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, most alien and repugnant. And Bradwardine strongly demonstrates, That to adhere to God, as our first Cause and last End, is the most natural act of a rectified Soul: and is it not than most free? Every motion of the Soul is so far free as connatural and proper: O! then how free are virtuose Acts? The Platonist instructes us, That to a good man God is a Law, but to the wicked Lust is a Law: Now if God be a Law to a good man, than all his motions toward God are most free. There is indeed a divine Sympathy between a virtuose Soul and the divine Law: Repugnanti non volenti necessitas est. In volente necessitas non est. Sen. and therefore he most freely obeys it: for all obey what they love, as Plato assures us: Hence a virtuose man is a Law to himself: he has the divine Law impressed on his Soul: and thence the Law of God is to him a Law of Love and Liberty: so that he obeys it not out of force, but choice: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, force cannot touch love. There is a service of Love which is most free: by how much the more closely and inviolably the Soul is, by virtuose acts, subjected to God, by so much the more free it is: for the very act of love, as terminated on the Creator, is formal moral Liberty, as Jansenius acutely demonstrates, August. Tom. 2. pag. 41. Yea virtuose exercices are not only spiritually natural to the virtuose Soul, but also most facile, sweet and delicious. Plato, Timae. pag. 81. tells us: Whatever is repugnant to Nature, is most irksome; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but what is consentaneous to Nature is most sweet. Now that virtuose acts are most agreeable to rectified Nature has been already demonstrated. What can furnish us with greater dexterity, facility, and alacrity in acting than virtuose Principes? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Alacrite is defined, definite. Platon. pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A manifestation of practic election: and who manifest more free practic election, than such as act virtuosely? Frequency of exercices both in Nature and Virtue give a great facility. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Customs are defined by Galen, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, superadded Natures: and Arist. Rhet. l. 1. c. 11. pag. 57 saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Custom is akin to Nature: whence he adds, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Custom makes every thing sweet. Now virtuose exercices frequently repeated breed a divine spiritual custom, which is attended with divine suavity and delight. The frequent repetition of the same exercise makes it more facile, dexterous and sweet. Experience teacheth us, that whatever is long customary, turns into our natures, even diseases and poisons. How much more than spiritually natural and sweet are divine customs and habits attend virtuose acts? Thence Heb. 5.14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Heb. 5.14. Virtuose customs and habits make the exercices of spiritual senses most familiar, pleasant and sweet, and therefore most free: for the freedom of an act is much to be measured by the delight and pleasure that attends it. And what acts of the Soul have more of true pleasure and delight attending of them, than virtuose exercices? O! what sweet inspirations, what divine suavities are infused into the Soul upon virtuose actings? Frequency of acts makes bitter things sweet: and is not the bitter cross sweetened by virtuose exercices? are not the most difficult services made facile hereby? Doth not every act of Virtue carry some degree of pleasure, and therefore of liberty in it? And by how much the more pure and spiritual any virtuose act is, by so much the more pure is that joy which attends it. For all joy and pleasure is the effect of some operation: and the more raised and spiritual the operation is, the more refined and strong the pleasure and joy is. The purest and strongest pleasures are such as attend the Souls actual adhesion to its first cause and last end: for the nearer things come to their first Principes, the more joyful and free they are: and what brings the Soul nearer its first Principe than virtuose Acts? Is not then a virtuose life the sweetest and most free? Do not acts of Virtue bring with them the most judicious, real, solid, pure, spiritual, strong, self-sufficient and permanent pleasures and delights, as Psal. 119.14, 16, 20, 35? 3. The Liberty of moral Acts consists much in their Vitality. Virtuose Exercices most lively. The more excellent and noble the life is, the more free the acts are: and the more virtuose the acts are, the more of the divine life they carry in them. Thus Plato, Charmid. pag. 171. Sin being banished from the Soul, and Rectitude presiding in every act, it's necessary, that those who are thus disposed, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, do act well: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and that those who act well, do live happily. The same pag. 173. But rather let us endeavour discreetly to lead our lives and act, that so we may live blessedly. Whereby he intimates, that virtuose Acts are always blessed and free: no man that acts virtuosely can live miserably. Thus also Aristotle, Eth. l. 1. c. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, To live well is to act well. The life of every living Creature exerts and manifests itself most in that operation, which is most proper to it, and unto which it is most naturally inclined: and are not virtuose Acts most proper and natural to man considered in his best state? What is life, but the actuosity of the Soul informing the body? And what more promotes this actuosity than exercise? Is not also the life and actuosity of the Soul morally considered improved by virtuose exercices? Where there is natural life there will be some pulse and motion of the Spirits: So where there is a moral life of Virtue there will be exercise. Quantò perfectiùs quis à se movetur, tantò perfectior est modus vivendi. Aquin. By how much the more perfectly any thing is moved by itself, by so much the more perfect it; mode of living is: and are not those who act virtuosely most perfectly moved by themselves? Plato tells us, Phaedr. pag. 245. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. By which he shows, That it is proper to life, to move itself by itself. And when doth the Soul most freely move itself by itself, but when it acts virtuosely? And as all life consists in action, even the life of God in a pure Act of understanding and willing; so in like manner the divine moral life in virtuose actions. A virtuose Soul, as it has Principes of life above Nature, so also actings: for by how much the more noble and excellent the life is, by so much the more excellent is the operation. The life and motion of virtuose hearts, is upward, like that of fire, which is of all the most noble, active, and free life. Thence in facred Philosophy, Life is frequently put for a noble, comfortable, free, blessed condition of life, Psal. 34.12, 13. consisting in virtuose exercices. So Psal. 34.12. What man is he that desireth life, i. e. a blessed, free, sweet life. And how may such a life be acquired? That he tells you, vers. 13, 14. Depart from evil and do good, etc. The like, Psal. 22.26. & 69.33. & Psal. 119.77. Eccles. 6.8. 1 Pet. 3.10. And Augustine gives us the true reason of this facred phraseology; namely, because there is no true life, but what is virtuose, blessed, and free. So that as there is no moral liberty without a divine life; so there is no divine life without virtuose exercices. Whence by how much the nearer the Soul comes to God by virtuose Acts, by so much the more divine and free its life is. 4. Virtuose Exercices most ample. The moral Liberty of human Acts may be much measured by their Amplitude and Magnitude. And are not virtuose Acts of all most ample and great? Actual adhesion to God and his divine Law imports not only subjection, but also enlargement and liberty. Thence Psal. 119.96. the divine Law is said to be exceeding broad or ample: and why? because it is the expression and Character of the divine Sanctity and Will, which is most ample. Whence the Soul, by actual adherence to the divine Law, rejoiceth in the divine Amplitude and Liberty. Thus Psal. 119.165. Great peace have they who love thy law. Or, Psal. 119.165. ample peace, with liberty as to walking. Thence it follows: and nothing shall offend them. Or, they shall have no stumbling block: ie. They shall walk in the King's highway, according to the royal Law of Liberty, with all manner of liberty and boldness. Liber ab infinito, ad infinitum, super infnitum movetur. It's a great Saying of the Platonists, That one free is moved from infinite, to infinite, upon infinite: i.e. a virtuose man, in all exercices of Virtue is moved, (1) From God, as the first Cause and original Spring. (2) To God, as the last End, and infinite Good. (3) Upon, or according to the infinite Will and Law of God, as the measure and rule of all his virtuose exercices. Whence also they tell us, That the motion of a free Soul is circular, from God, as the first Cause; to God, as the last End; and by God, and his divine Will, as the measure. Such is the amplitude and magnitude of the Soul in all the exercices of Virtue: So that it falls under no coarctation or confinement, either in regard of Principe, or End, or Rule; but partakes in its measure, of that Amplitude, which its Principe, End, and Rule rejoiceth in. For such as a man's first Principe, last End, and Exemplar is, such is he as to liberty, or servitude. Quantò finis altior, tantò actus volun●● est libe●●. By how much the more ample and sublime the end is, by so much the more ample and free is the Act. Again, the virtuose Soul adhering to and depending on God as the first Cause obteins great enlargement. Whereas sin, being an aversion from God our first Principe and last End, puts fetters, chains, limits and confinement on the Soul. 5. Moral Liberty as to exercise consists in the freedom from vitiofe Inclinations, Affections, and Motions. Plato, in his Timaeus, 〈…〉 persuades us, That the culture and cure of every thing consists in giving it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, its proper diet and exercices: and what more efficacious to cure the Soul of its vitiose humours and maladies, than to give it its proper virtuose exercices? When is the Soul more vigorous and healthful, than when it is most in virtuose exercitations? Allthings are purified by perfective fermentation: and is not the Soul also purified from its noxious peccant humours by the divine fermentation of virtuose affections? Thus Rom. 12.11. Rom. 12.11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, fermenting or boiling in spirit. Syr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is spoken of boiling waters, Job 41.22. So Job 30.27. LXX. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, My bowels fermented or boiled. The more the affections ferment and boil by virtuose exercices, the more free they are to serve God, and less obnoxious to the service of sin. By how much the less we serve sin, by so much the more free we are: And who serve sin less, than they who are most deeply engaged in virtuose exercices? Plato, Tim. pag. 89. tells us, That the most healthful purgation is by Gymnastic exercitation. What is health but the spirituose vigour of Nature? And what more promotes this spirituose vigour than exercise? And doth not this hold true as to the Soul? Is not its most healthful purgation by virtuose exercitation? Doth not this most promote the spirituose vigour and health of the Soul? What makes the fire to conserve itself in its purity, but its grand and perpetual activity? Doth not also the running stream keep itself pure, whiles the standing Pool gathers mud? Are allthings in Nature purified by motion? Quantò virtus aliqua intensiùs tendit in aliquid, tantò fortiùs repellit omne contrarium. Aquin. and shall we not also allow the same efficace to virtuose exercices? It's true, virtuose exercices do not purge out sin by their own innate force, as Physic purgeth out i'll humours; but by the divine promise, concurrence, and benediction. By how much the more intensely the virtuose Soul actually tends to its last end, by so much the more strongly doth it repel whatever is contrary thereto. 6. Virtuose Exercices most stable and permanent. Virtuose Exercices are most stable, firm and permanent: Therefore most free. Moral Liberty as to exercise consists much in the firmitude, stability, and permanence of such exercices. Whence Plato, in his Cratylus, pag. 415. derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Virtue, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because it is always in flux or motion: whence he makes it to be synonymous to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a facile and expedite progress: For, saith he, it always flows in an equal stable manner. The Soul, according to Plato, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an ever-moving Principe; and therefore it ought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to be always in action. Now it is most certain, that no acts of the Soul are more stable, firm and permanent than virtuose acts. Thus Arist. Eth. l. 1. c. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Virtuose exercices are most permanent. And he gives this reason of it: Because blessed Souls live and dwell always in such Acts, without tediousness or oblivion. And Plato, in his Cratylus, tells us: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sloth is the greatest bond and fetter of the Soul, which obstructs all virtuose exercices. The firmity and stability of every thing ariseth from its adhesion to its first Principe and last End: and by how much the more the Soul departs from these, by so much the more instable and sluctuating it is: To stand invariable and immutable in adhering unto God, under all the vicissitudes and various changes of this World, argues great moral liberty as to exercise: and wherein consists the Soul's adhesion to God as its first Principe and last End, if not in virtuose exercices? 7. Virtuose Exercices do greatly improve and advance Virtue, Virtuose Exercices improve Virtue. and so by consequence moral Liberty. Plato, in his Timaeus, pag. 90. assures us, That when the faculties of the Soul grow sluggish and lazy, they are rendered more infirm and impotent; but by continual action they are made more robust and vigorous. And doth not this Philosopheme hold valid in Morals, as well as Naturals? Doth any thing render the virtuose Soul more robust and vigorous, than virtuose exercices? So pag. 103. The Soul is nourished and corroborated, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by labours and exercices. And are not virtuose labours of all most nourishing and corroborative? Thence, saith Seneca, Labour nourisheth generose minds. O! Generosos animos labor nutrit. Sen. then how are virtuose minds nourished by the labours of Virtue! As the native heat is preserved by the Pulse, or twofold motion of the heart; so is Virtue by its exercices. It's a trite Saying in the Schools, Cessation from acts diminish habits, but continuance therein emproves the same. It's true, there is a difference in this regard between acquired habits, and virtuose, which come by infusion; because acquired habits are the natural products of their acts, but virtuose habits are not naturally produced by virtuose acts, but given in by God of mere Grace. God rewards virtuose exercices with farther degrees and advances of Virtue, or Grace, and that of mere Grace. So Mat. 13.12. Mat. 13.12. For whosoever hath, to him shall be given. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here doth not signify the mere having of a Talon, but the employing, using, or occupying the same: for it is a good Rule among Grammarians, That Verbs, which primarily signify to have or possess, oft denote the using of what we have. So here Hath notes to use, occupy, or traffic with what we have. To such it shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: i. e. God will reward his diligence in using and occupying his Talon, be it natural or supernatural, with much more in the same kind. If his Talon be natural gifts or commun illuminations, he shall receive more in that kind: if true moral supernatural Virtues, his stock shall increase in its kind. Whence it follows: But whosoever hath not, i. e. employs not by exercise: from him shall be taken away even that he hath: i. e. his Talon shall be taken from him: his common gifts and seeming virtues shall whither. Yea, virtuose exercices in the sharpest winter of affliction make Virtue to flourish and prosper. Heb. 12.11, 12. Thus Heb. 12.11. Every chastisement for the present seems not to be joyous, but grievous; but afterward it yields the tranquille fruit of righteousness, to them that are exercised thereby. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, exercised as in the Gymnade: whence it follows, v. 12. Wherefore lift up the hands that hang down. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, signifies such a remission or dissolution as is opposed to intention, firmitude, strength. It here denotes sloth and remissness as to labour, whereof the hand is the instrument. Thence he adds: and the feeble knees. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the paralytic knees, such as are as it were struck with a Palsy, and therefore unapt for motion. This later clause seems to refer to the Race, which required the exercise of the knees; as labour, that of the hands. 8. Formal Beatitude in virtuose Exercices. A great and main part of moral Liberty consists in virtuose exercices; because herein consists formal Beatitude. Both Plato and Aristotle place formal Beatitude in virtuose operations. Thus Plato, in his Conviv. pag. 211. makes the perfection of human Felicity to consist in contemplating, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. the most sincere, uniform, divine Beauty, etc. of which before Chap. 1. The like in his Phaedrus, pag. 250. So Aristotle, Eth. l. 1. c. 7. defines formal Beatitude, the exercise of the rational Soul, according to the best and most perfect Virtue, in the most perfect life. And Cap. 8. he adds, That to act well and live well makes man happy. And the demonstration hereof is most evident. For (1) Operation and exercise is the end of all virtuose Habits and Principes, and therefore their perfection: for every Form, Power, or Habit is ordained to its act, as to its perfection. Whence Basil terms Grace, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, completive or perfective of Nature. Which chief belongs to gratiose Acts. Thence Aristotle strongly argues, that formal Beatitude cannot consist, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in possession of objective Beatitude and habitual union therewith, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in use and exercise. For a man may possess the chiefest good, and have habitual likeness thereto, and yet not formally happy, as virtuose men asleep. (2) The more Virtue is in exercise, the more it ressembles the Divine Liberty and Perfection. The Divine Being and Liberty is a pure simple Act, without the least habit or passive power, either physic or metaphysic: and therefore the more actuose Virtue is, the more like it is to God. (3) Virtuose exercices bring most satisfaction with them. Both Plato and Aristotle instruct us, That virtuose Acts are of themselves 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-sufficient. They inspire sweet satisfaction into the Soul, as before Chap. 1. §. 6. And this is very commun in sacred Philosophy. Yea we are herein assured, that by virtuose exercices we may have some prelibations of formal Beatitude, even in this life. This seems the import of that Exhortation, 1 Tim. 6.12. 1 Tim. 6.12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Exercise thyself in that famous contest of Faith. Our Apostle alludes to those famous Olympian Games, specially that of the Race, wherein they contended for a Crown. Thence he adds, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, lay hold of eternal life. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here, as v. 19 is of the same import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 1 Cor. 9.24. Phil. 3.12. in which places the Apostle seems to allude to such as ran in the Race, who, when they came to the end thereof, laid hold on the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Crown on the top of the Goal. Thus Christians, by virtuose exercices, lay hold on eternal life, as the Crown at the end of their Race. Thus he speaks of himself, 2 Tim. 4.7, 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 2 Tim. 4.7, 8. I have exercised myself in that famous contest. The double Article adds a great Emphase, and shows with what vigour and activity he had dispatched his Christian race, and therefore now was in expectation of the Crown. Such efficacious and sovereign influence have virtuose exercices on man's formal Beatitude and moral Liberty. CHAP. IU. Of Sin and moral Servitude. Sin a Transgression of the Law. Sin, as to its formal reason, privative. The causes of Sin, (1) Man's defectibility, (2) The vitiosity of human Nature, (3) Practic Error, (4) Self-love. Sins are either of Ignorance, of Passion, or wilful. The moral Servitude of Sin, as (1) Repugnant to human Nature, (2) Repugnant each to other. (3) The Disease of the Soul. (4) Defilement. (5) Shame and Reproche. (6) Tyranny. (7) Penury. (8) Captivity. (9) Folly and Madness. (10) It makes men Brutes. The Adjuncts of this Servitude. It is (1) Voluntary. (2) Necessary. (3) Infinite. (4) Most penal. Sin the worst punishment. Other punishments of Sin. It brings (1) Fear and shame, (2) Instability, (3) Anxiety, (4) Eternal punishment. All naturally Slaves of Sin. No seeds of Virtue in corrupt Nature. Natural impotence to what is good. No moral Free wil A sum of the Pelagian History. §. 1. HAving examined the nature of moral Good, Virtue, and Liberty, we now pass on to the discussion of moral Evil, and that Servitude which attends it. It's a good Notion of Aristotle, Rhet. l. 3. c. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Parallel opposites illustrate each other. So in his Ethics, l. 5. c. 1. a. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For the most part therefore the contrary habit is known by its contrary. Which holds true here; in as much as the beautiful Idea of moral Good serves greatly to illustrate the deformity of moral Evil. Sin a Transgression of the moral Law. Doth all moral Good consist in conformity to the moral divine Law? What then is moral evil or sin but a Transgression of the Law, as 1 Joh. 3.4? That all moral Evil or Sin is a Transgression of the Law, is an Hypothesis frequently inculcated, as well in Platonic as in sacred Philosophy. Thence definite. Platon. pag. 416. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a practice against right reason, which must be understood objectively, of the Law of Nature, as before. Whence Plato himself, Rep. 9 saith, That Sin is most distant from Law and Order. Again, Leg. 10. he affirms, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That Sin is an intemperate excess of the Soul. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of the same import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and signifies primarily the excess of any humour in the body: and thence the inordinate and irregular excess of the Soul and its Affections. For look as Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Consent and Symmetry of the Soul; so sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Asymmetrie and Ataxy. Hence also Plato, in his Epinom. pag. 978. calls Sin, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. A motion void of reason, order, decorum, measure, yea a confused agitation, whereby the Soul is depraved, and contaminated. Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, injustice, definite. Platon. is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an habit overlooking, or despising Laws. Yea, Plato, Repub. 9 pag. 574. calls sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Transgression of the Law, as sacred Philosophy, 1 Joh. 3.4. Thus also Aristotle, 1 Joh. 3.4. both in his Ethics and Rhetoric, styles sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Transgression of the Law. But this Hypothesis shines with more illustrious beams in sacred Philosophy, whence Plato borrowed his choicest Philosophemes. Thence in the O. T. all the notions, whereby sin is expressed, signify a Transgression of the Law. We find three several notions of sin together, Psal. 32.1, 2. (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Psal. 32.1, 2. which denotes Defection, Rebellion, Prevarication against God. (2) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifies Aberration and Deviation from the right way of Gods Law. (3) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which imports perversity, Obliquity, Iniquity, Privation of Rectitude. (4) Sin is styled, Psal. 101.3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Psal. 101.3. a matter of Belial: i. e. a lawless mater, such as will not come under the yoke. From 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, without a yoke: which the LXX. translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and whereto Paul seems to allude, 2 Cor. 6.14, 15. (5) Sin is styled a Violation, or making void the Law, Psal. 119.126. Zeph. 3.4. & Hos. 4.2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They break the bounds of the Law. An allusion to Inundations, and Land-flouds, that break down all bounds. So great is the violence, which sin offers to the Divine Law. (6) Sin is said to be a Tortuositie or wresting of the Law, Psal. 125.5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Obliquations or crooked ways. (7) Sin is called a Declination, Aberration, Deflexion, Psal. 119 51, 67. & Psal. 101.3. yea, v. 4. it is styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, perverse. (8) It is termed Rebellion, Psal. 5.10. & 66.7. Which terms, though different in themselves, yet they all import Transgression of the Law. Thus also in the N. T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, with other notions, whereby sin is expressed, do all import Transgression of the Law. Hence the Stoics held, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That all sins are equal; because the least deviation from the Law is a Transgression, as well as the greatest. Yet hence it follows not, but that there are degrees and aggravations of sins, according to their various objects, and circumstances. Hence it follows, Sin as to its formal Reason privative. that sin, as to its formal Idea, Reason, or Nature is not positive, but privative. For the clearing whereof we may consider these following Propositions. (1) All moral Evil or Sin is founded in some natural Good. For albeit there be pure good, which has no mixture of evil, either natural or moral, as the chiefest Good; yet there is no pure Evil, which has not for its subject some natural good. It's true there are some Acts that are intrinsically evil, that is, so far evil, as that they can never be good: as the hatred of God, and the like. Yet these Acts are called intrinsically evil, not as if their evil were intrinsecal to the natural entity of the acts; for it's possible that the evil may be separated from the acts; but because they cannot be put forth towards such an object morally considered without sin. (2) All Sin is an aggregate composite Being, composed of positive and privative. The material Subject or natural Act is positive; but the formal Reason, or moral deficience of Rectitude is privative. The positive Act of itself, abstracted from the privation, is not sinful; but both together, as matter and form, make up one Compositum. It's a Question in the Schools, Whether Sin thus compounded of privative and positive be unum per se, or per accidens? And Suarez well solves this difficulty, telling us, That if we consider sin as a physical real Being, it is unum per accidens; but if we consider it as a moral Being, so it is unum per se; because the positive act and privative deficience, are so intimately conjoined for the constitution of one moral Evil, that they may be looked on under the notion of act and power, or matter and form; so that the act cannot be evil without the privation; nor the privation without the act. (3) Every Privation as such is evil, as every Form or Act good. For what is a privation but the want of some due perfection? And is not every want of due perfection evil to that subject that wants it? Every thing, if it want any good that belongs to it, is so far evil. (4) When we say the formal reason of Sin is privative, the term formal must not be taken strictly, but in a lax notion, and morally. For the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Obliquity of sin being that by which it is formalised, and yet not formally intended by the Agent, hence sin in a strict sense cannot be said to have any formal Cause: yet because this obliquity or privation of Rectitude doth morally constitute the act sinful, it may in a more lax notion be rightly termed the formal Reason or Cause. (5) Sin, as to its formal reason, is not a Physic or Logic privation, nor yet pure nothing; but a moral privation, or deficience as to moral rectitude. In this respect some Divines ascribe to sin something positive, not absolutely, as if it were somewhat subsistent, but relatively and morally, as it is opposed to pure nothing: for, say they, sin is a privation, which makes the act whereto it belongs sinful; and therefore it is not mere nothing. So Suarez saith, that sin is not a real Being, yet it is such a Being as may suffice to the truth of a proposition. Thus indeed Plato, in his Sophist, teacheth us, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nonens may be considered as pure nothing, and so it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, unintelligible, and ineffable: or else it may be considered, as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which truly is not, yet not simply, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nonens, or nothing. And such is sin, not simply and purely nothing, yet according to its formal reason, not a positive real Being, but a moral privation, or as others, a privative relation. That Sin, according to its formal Idea and Nature, is privative, was generally asserted by the ancient Philosophers, both Platonists and others. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 380. denies God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the moral cause of sins; because there cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a positive idea of sin. So Proclus argues from this place, That there cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an Idea of sins; because than it would follow, that God should be the Cause and Author of sin. And Plato himself informs us, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an irregular affection; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, privation of order: also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Injustice against Law: Again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a privative Being: and lastly, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, privation of moral Being, as the night is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the privation of the Sun's light. But among the ancient Philosophers none hath more acutely and solidly defended this Hypothesis, than Simplicius, on Epicbet. cap. 34. pag. 171. where he largely demonstrates, that, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sin really is not in the nature of Being's, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a privation of good. Of which see Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 4. §. 2. Among the Schoolmen this is strongly proved by Ariminensis, Sent. 2. D●st. 34. Quaest. 1. Suarez in 1.2. Tract. 3. Disput. 7. sect. 3. pag. 275-278. & Barlow Exercit. 2. §. 2. Having discussed the formal Nature of moral Evil or Sin, we now proceed to its Causes; among which, Man's defectibility the first Origine of Sin. if we will ascend up to its first Origine, we must reckon first the defectibility of the human Creature, as the original cause of all sin. For, to speak in the Platonic mode, Man, as all other Creatures, being composed of something and nothing, yea more of nothing than something; hence passive power and defectibility is essential to his Being. For whatever sprang out of nothing is capable of returning to its originary nothing. Where there is place for Proficience, there also remains a capacity of Deficience. Every Creature, because made by God, is capable of Proficience; but because made out of nothing, it is also capable of Deficience. It's true, Man, as made by God, was void of all moral deficience or sin; yet as Man, he was never void of defectibility and Mutability: he had a moral freewill for good; but a natural freewill or defectibility as to sin: which passing from power into act gave being to the first sin. This is well explicated by Suarez: In a free Agent, saith he, the mode of failing in an act, ariseth from the dominion he has over his act: hence sin in a free cause doth not always suppose the like sin in the same cause: for it may arise merely from the liberty of the Creature, which is good. That the Will of Adam, in his innocent state, was capable of sinning, was a natural defect, conjoined with a natural perfection: for it was also capable not to sin: and this mutable capacity being drawn forth towards a prohibited object, was the first origine and root of all sin. Thus moral Evil sprang out of natural liberty in itself good, but evilly applied. Adam's person being vitiated by that first Sin, The vitiosity of human Nature. he thereby vitiated his own and our Nature. Yea, his personal actual sin is originally ours by imputation: whence there adheres a vitiosity to our natures, whereof we find frequent and great notices in Plato, and other Philosophers. Plato, in his Timaeus, pag. 90. makes mention of a Sin contracted, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in our head, [which I understand of Adam] whereby our nature, from the first generation, is corrupted. And Timaeus Locrus, from whom Plato borrowed many physic Philosophemes, pag. 103. explicates the origine of this vitiosity thus: vitiosity comes from our Parents and first Principes, rather than from negligence and disorder of public manners; because we never departed from those actions, which lead us to imitate the primitive sins of our Parents. A great confession of a Pagan, beyond what many that profess Christianity will allow. So Plato, in his Critias, saith, That in times past the Divine nature flourished in men [i. e. in the state of Innocence] but at length it being mixed with mortal, [i. e. upon the Fall] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, human custom [or sin] prevailed to the ruin of mankind: and from this source there followed an inundation of evils on men. So Leg. 5. pag. 731. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The greatest Sin is ingenite in men's Souls. And Grotius assures us, That the Philosophers confessed, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that it was congenite or connatural to men to sin; whence the Platonist makes mention 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of an evil nature: which, definite. Plat. pag. 416. is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a vitiosity in nature: also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the natural disease, or disease of nature. Thence Plato, in his Politicus, pag. 274. being about to treat of Civil Polity, gives this demonstration of its necessity; because the nature of mankind is greatly degenerated and depraved, and all manner of disorders infest human Nature: and men being impotent are torn in pieces by their own lusts, as by so many wild Horses. And thence he concludes, That from this plague of vitiosity men were driven to great straits and confusions. The like Stobaeus, Serm. 2. pag. 31. out of Lycurgus' Dictates, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Fie! how depraved is man's nature altogether! otherwise there were no need of Laws. Dost thou think that man is any thing more excellent than Bestes? Truly but little, except only in figure: Brutes look towards the earth; but man has an erect countenance. Thus also Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 906. affirms, That Souls living on the earth are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of a brutish nature. And it is said of Democritus, that he affirmed, The diseases of the Soul to be so great, that if it were opened, it would appear to be a sepulchre of all manner of evils. Yea Aristotle, albeit he were too much a friend to corrupt nature, yet he hath left this ingenuous confession of its vitiosity, Eth. lib. 1. cap. 13. pag. 64. That there is in us somewhat, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, naturally repugnant to right reason. But Seneca doth greatly illustrate this Vitiolitie of Nature. So Epist. 50. Why do we deceive ourselves? our evil is not from without; it is fixed in our very bowels. Again, All Sins are in all men, but all do not appear in each man: He that hath one Sin hath al. We say that all men are intemperate, avaricious, luxurious, malign; not that these Sins appear in all; but because they may be, yea are in all, although latent. A man may be nocent, although he do no hurt. All Sins are perfect, [i. e. in corrupt nature] before they break forth into effect. These and such like great confessions, touching the vitiosity of human Nature, made Jansenius break forth into a rapture of admiration, that Socrates, Plato, and other poor Heathens should leave us truer and better Philosophemes hereof, than the Pelagians and later Schoolmen. Yet it cannot be denied, but that many of the ancient and modern Schoolmen have given us great notices of this natural vitiosity, specially such as were Sectators of Augustine, as Aquinas, Ariminensis, Bradwardine, Alvarez, etc. We may reduce the explication of the whole to the following Propositions. (1) Adam's personal actual Sin becomes the natural original Sin of all his Posterity. This the Gentile Philosophers were ignorant of: they had some notices of the corruption of nature, but were ignorant of the originary cause and manner of its traduction, as Augustine hath well observed. Iste Tullius rem vidit, causam nescivit. August. Peccatum introivit non per modum imitationis, sed per modum originis. This Traduction of original Sin from Adam to his posterity is well demonstrated by Aquinas, contra Gentiles, lib. 4. cap. 50. where he demonstrates, from Rom. 5.12, 19 against the Pelagians, That this original Sin infects all Mankind, not only in a way of imitation, which the Pelagians grant, but by propagation and traduction. And Cap. 52. he farther explicates, how Adam's personal, actual Sin, by imputation becomes our original and natural sin. This original Sin is termed natural; because congenite with, proper to, and inseparable from corrupt nature, as to any power of its own. It consists formally in the privation of original Righteoùsnesse: which privation is both our punishment and sin: as original Righteousness, upon the imputation of Adam's Sin, is by divine Justice denied to us; so this privation is our punishment: but as it ought to be in us, and is wanting, by reason of Adam's Sin become ours, so it is our sin. (2) The vitiosity of Nature or original Sin is said to be voluntary as it inheres in the Will, and corrupts the same. Aristotle tells us, Acts are voluntary, because they pass from the Will; but habits, because they are received into the Will, and impressed thereon. Such is original Sin as to its vitiosity, which is as an habitual Pondus impacted on the Will, and inclining it to all manner of vitiose acts. Others make original Sin to be voluntary, with respect to the common representative Will of our first Parent, whose Will, as he was a common Head, politically included ours. So Davenant, and the Schoolmen. (3) The vitiosity of corrupt Nature is seminal, radical and universal both extensively and intensively. As every man naturally considered is a Microcosm or little abridgement of the greater World; so morally considered, he is a Macrocosm or a great World of corruption. Yea, all that is of contagion in the greater World comes from the superfluity of vitiosity shut up in the heart of man. If corrupt human Nature were not on the earth, there would be nothing in the World but what was good. Yea farther, there is more of vitiosity in one corrupt Nature, than a world of Sinners can vent. Every man hath sin enough in his own nature to defile the whole Creation. And this corruption of nature is so deep, that all the fire in the World, yea of Hell, will not fetch it out. It is universal both as to extension of parts and degrees. The man is infected with it from top to toe: it poisons his eye, ear, tongue, hand and every part: it dogs him from place to place. This Plague of corrupt Nature is greater in some than in others, and usually greatest in those of greatest condition. All sins in the heart do not act alike at all times; yet all are there in the seed and root of corrupt nature. Many lusts work indirectly as Principes that lie low: men act in the power of them, and yet observe them not. (4) This universal vitiosity of corrupt Nature is the sovereign reigning Sin, which breeds, foments, and influenceth all other Sins. Adam's person first corrupted our Nature; and human Nature being corrupted, corrupts our persons: and our persons being corrupted, corrupt all our actions, and thereby increase the corruption of our Natures. It is a great Question in practic Theology, What is a man's reigning Sin? But if we consider reigning sin simply and absolutely, it is no other than corrupt nature. It's true, there are in particular persons, according to their particular inclinations, tentations, and circumstances, particular sins that bear sway and rule: but these are but as Viceroys and Vicegerents under the vitiosity of corrupt nature; which is the supreme Sovereign and Lord, as a cruel beast nourished in our bowels, ever ready to devour us. The main part of our enmity against God, and his enmity against us lies in the vitiosity of our natures, and its contrariety to God, Rom. 8.6. §. 3. The first product of Original Sin, Practic Error the cause of all Sin. and that which has a malign efficacious influence on all sin, is practic Error, or Ignorance. How great, universal, and venomous the Ignorance of all Mankind by nature is, Plato frequently inculcates. He gives us a lively description hereof in his Repub. 7. pag. 514. Suppose, saith he, a subterraneous Dungeon, in which men should be, from their infance, bound neck and heels together; so that they can see nothing, but some glimmerings of light, or rather shadows just before them: such is the barbaric ignorance of Mankind by Nature. It's true, many attain to great speculation and contemplation of things divine, even by nature's light and heat, assisted by common illuminations; yet how defective are they as to all practic knowledge, which is the worst ignorance? Thus Plato, Leg. 3. pag. 689. What is the worst ignorance? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Lo, when a man loves not but hates, what he knows and estimes to be honest and good: but, on the contrary, loves and embraceth what he knows to be evil and injust. Wherein he instructes us, that speculative knowledge conjoined with practic error renders our ignorance most inexcusable and dangerous. And that which yet adds greater malignity to our ignorance is, when men fond conceit they sufficiently understand, what indeed they are really ignorant of: such proud conceits are the worst self-deceits and errors: all the use such make of their knowledge is to conceal their ignorance from themselves and others: their very light adds to their darkness. And their terrible darkness is by so much the more deplorable, in that they take it for light; which they follow with pleasure, as children do the Ignis Fatuus, which leads them to Precipices. Thus Plato, Leg. 5. pag. 732. From the same sin this a so happens to men, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that every one counts his ignorance his wisdom: Hence it comes to pass, that whiles we know nothing, we think we know allthings. And are not those greatly to be pitied, who make no other use of their reason but to render themselves more unreasonable and ignorant? Is any thing more worthy of compassion, than the blindness of such as seem most quicksighted and sage in the World? And whence comes this proud affected ignorance, but from men's not knowing God and themselves? Is it not a strange thing, that the Soul which knows allthings else, should be so ignorant of itself, and of its Maker? Thence Plato, Alcibiad. 2. pag. 144. saith, It is no wonder, that they who are ignorant of God, should account that which is worst best. Whence he concludes, That the ignorance of the best good is the worst evil. And as to the ignorance of ourselves, he openly affirms, Theaecet. pag. 176. That those are by so much the more what they think they are not, [i. e. ignorant] by how much the less they think they are so. And that this proud affected practic Ignorance of God and ourselves is the root of all sin, he further demonstrates, Alcibiad. 1. pag. 117. Thou seest therefore that Sin is appendent to action by reason of that ignorance, whereby a man thinks he knows, what indeed he is ignorant of. And he subjoins the reason: Those are left under error, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who knowing nothing, think they know every thing. Confidence of knowledge is a sure mark of ignorance. Whence he concludes, pag. 118. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, This very ignorance therefore is the cause of Sins, and most opprobriose. Lastly, Leg. 5. pag. 732. he assures us, That when we attemt those things whereof we are ignorant, we grossly err. Such a venomous, malign, efficacious influence has proud, conceited, practic Error on all sin. Indeed the power of sin lies in the power of darkness or ignorance: practic Errors foment and maintain lusts. The mind, like a silkworm, lies entangled in those errors, that came out of its own bowels: when lust hath put out Reason, it soon takes the Chair: men of corrupt minds, are men of sinful lives: Mind and Will do reciprocally vitiate each other: whiles lust bribe's conscience out of office, it cooperates with sin. Divine light is a burden to a corrupt conscience; which delights to spin out of itself sick dreaming errors, thereby to create its own chains and fetters: a carnal mind vainly puffed up out-reasons all good convictious of duty: surely there is no duty done by that man, whose conscience doth not its duty: for there is nothing in man active for God, when conscience is not first active. It's evident then, that practic error of conscience opens the door to all sin. And as Plato, so Aristotle, his Scholar, hath greatly explicated and demonstrated the pestiferous influence which practic error hath on all sin. Thus Eth. l. 3. c. 2. pag. 121. where he makes this difference between Sins of ignorance, and ignorant Sins. A drunken man, that kills another in his drunken fit sins ignorantly; and yet his sin is not a Sin of Ignorance, because that ignorance was voluntarily contracted. Thence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Therefore every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do, and from what he ought to abstain: and by this they are made unjust and wicked. And Eth. l. 3. c. 7. pag. 144. he distributes this practic ignorance into its several kinds. (1) There is, saith he, an ignorance, the cause of which is in ourselves. As when drunken men sin ignorantly; which ignorance was contracted by their voluntary drunkenness. (2) There is an Ignorance of Right or Law: when men are ignorant of their duty, which they ought to know. (3) There is an ignorance from our own neglect: which had we been diligent in the use of means we might have avoided. (4) There is an ignorance from depraved affections and custom in sinning. We may reduce these Philosophemes of Plato and Aristotle to this more formal distribution. Man is directed in his action by a twofold knowledge, the one universal, the other particular: a defect in either of these causeth sin. Whence it follows, that a man may have an universal knowledge, that this or that is sinful in general, and yet want a particular judgement of its sinfulness in this or that case. So that particular ignorance is very well consistent with universal knowledge. But now, sithat universal knowledge, though most certain, is not so influential on our actions, as particular; because actions are about singulars; hence it follows, that particular ignorance has more force to lead men into sin, than universal knowledge has to prevent it. This particular ignorance may be again distributed into natural or voluntary: and voluntary may be again divided into that which is antecedent, or that which is consequent to the act. Yea all ignorance which ariseth from the Will, may be looked on as voluntary. For what is involuntary, if it arise from some precedent voluntary act, it may be judged voluntary, according to moral estimation. As in that instance which Aristotle gives of a Drunkard, whose ignorance is voluntary; because arising from the act of his own Wil For it is a good Rule of Aristotle, That those Acts whose Principe is in us, may be said to be ours and voluntarily undertaken by us. Lastly we may, with Aristotle, distinguish between sins which are per ignorantiam, i. e. when ignorance is the cause of the sin: and such as are cum ignorantia: i. e. when albeit ignorance attends the sin, yet the proper cause of that ignorance lies in the sinners will: The former are those which we call sins of ignorance, but the later not; because the ignorance is voluntary. Men want not so much means of knowing what they ought to do, as will to do what they know. Reason may rightly discern the thing which is good, and yet the will of man not incline itself thereto, as oft as sensual passions, prejudice, or affected ignorance prevail. So that some practic error or inconsideration lies at the root of every sin: either because men do not practically consider all circumstances; or if they do consider them, yet they do not practically determine this or that Act to be evil; but instead thereof they foist in another false Conclusion, That this or that sinful Act is sweet, or profitable. A corrupt Conscience may assent to good premises, and yet descent from the conclusion, yea consent to a bad conclusion. Lust's pervert Conscience, and sil it with partiality and prejudice in its inquiries. The light of a carnal mind is easily reconciled with lust: for a secure Conscience takes up such a Religion as will not distaste its lusts; nor yet its lusts molest it. There is a peace between the lust and light of a carnal heart: It's easy for a secure Conscience to cast light into prison, and detain the truth of God in unrighteousness: to believe as it list, not as it ought. A corrupt Conscience hath many turn and wind, various coverts and hiding places for lust: Sometimes the veil of hypocrisy, yea of Religion is made use of to cover sin, as Mat. 23.14. Sometimes a good name is put on a bad thing, or a bad design is justified by a good end: or a good cause is made use of to justify a bad action: or when men's lusts will not comply with the rule, men bring down the rule to their lusts. Again, sometimes new lights are pleaded to maintain old errors: men's lusts make many controversies about sin: they make great sins little, and little none at al. Thus practic error and ignorance is the cause of all sin. Of which see more fully Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 4. §. 5. §. 4. Not only practic Error, Self-love a radical cause of Sin. but also Self-love has a malign venomous influence on all sin. Plato hath excellent Philosophemes on this Theme. So Repub. 9 pag. 574, etc. he describes to the life, the servile condition of a wicked person, under the Tyranny of Self-love; how he is thereby violently impelled and hurried into all sin. So also in what follows, pag. 577. of which hereafter. Thus likewise in his Leg. 5. pag. 731. he lively demonstrates, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That Self-love is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an ingenite evil, in which they who indulge themselves, have no remedy against sin. Then he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, And to speak the truth, self-love is altogether the cause of all those evils, in which the life of man is involved. And he gives the reason of it: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For he that loves is truly blind about what he loves; and thence misjudgeth things just, good, and honest; being in this opinion, that there is more honour due to him than to truth. And Aristotle gives us the reason hereof; Because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a self-lover acts a! for himself, according to his profit. Every self-lover is chained to that great Idol Self, which he makes his God, and the only Centre, in which all the lines of his Affections and Actions meet. Self is the last end of self-lovers, even in their highest acts of self-denial: if they give their goods to the poor, or their bodies to be burned for Religion, it is all to please self. They may cross their own wills, but never cross self as their last end: if they seek after God, it is to advance self: self-love forms all their actions and passions into a subservience unto some carnal self-interest. What makes superstitiose persons so much to vilify, mortify, and with so much severity torment their bodies, but thereby to exalt their inward excellences? And as self-lovers make self the last End, so also the first Principe of all they do. Self-love ever affects self-dependence: it would fain have a World of its own to live, act, and breathe in: it lays the whole weight of religiose services on self as the bottom of its dependence: it would live and die within the sphere of its own activity, as well as interest. It's exceeding sweet to self to have a stock of its own even in things religiose to trade with, and thereby merit divine favour. And alas! how soon are men overcome by tentations, when they are self-dependent and self-strong? He that thinks to keep himself from sin by self-strength, will soon be overcome by it. Now Self being the last End and first Principe of self-love, it hence becomes a spermatic universal cause of all sin. Every self-lover is his own Idol: and whiles he inordinately embraces and adheres to himself, he is soon overcome thereby, and so hurried into sin. Yea self-love makes the best duties and services for God most carnal, vile, and abominable to God. Where self is predominant, the intention of the Soul is spurious and rotten: and a bad intention makes the best works bad. Where self rules, it forms even religiose services into a conformity to carnal lusts: wherefore he that cannot departed from self, will soon departed from God, and tumble headlong into all sin. Self-love is the strongest carnal concupiscence, and most directly opposite to divine love. The sovereign power of Lust increaseth according to the obedience men render to themselves and self-love: by obeying self and its particular movements men make it a God: yea, the more men endeavour to humour and gratify it, the more tyranny it is. Man has not a worse or more dangerous Companion than himself, his carnal self, which is so potent to draw him into sin. It has always been the ambition of the Creature to deify itself, not by being equal in nature with God, but by being its first Cause and last End, which is the spring of all departure from God, and conversion to the Creature. And that which makes self-love more potent to promote sin is its policy and many artifices to conceal its self and sin. How oft doth carnal self-love put on the mask of true lawful self-love, and thereby delude the Soul into sin? There is a great ressemblance between spiritual self-love and carnal: whence the later oft conceles itself under the vizard of the former. The more a man loves himself, the less he conceits he loves himself: as the more mad a man is, the less he judgeth himself so. Self-love is so artificial in its colours, as that it can discolor virtue with the face of vice, and vice with virtues face. Thus by its frauds and deceits in concealing itself and sin, it greatly advances sin. The members of self-love are principally three. (1) Concupiscence, or adherence to the Creature as our last end. (2) Carnal confidence, or dependence on self as the first cause. (3) Spiritual pride, or an over-valuing estime of self-excellences. Each of these have a venomous influence on all sin, as we have largely demonstrated out of Plato and others, Philos. General. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 4. §. 8, 9, 10. §. 5. Next to the Causes of moral Evil we may consider its Species or Kind's. All moral Evil or Sin may be distributed into involuntary, Sins are either of Ignorance, of Passion, or wilful. or voluntary: again involuntary, into sins of Ignorance, or of Passion. We find the foundation of this distribution in Plato, Phileb. pag. 22. where he saith, That those who choose sin, do it either involuntarily and ignorantly, or out of a voluntary miserable necessity. 1. As for involuntary Sins, they are, (1) Sins of Ignorance, when the ignorance is not affected, either from prejudice, voluntary neglect, or custom in sin, as before, §. 3. (2) Sins of Passion or Infirmity, when the passion is antecedent to the will, and doth as it were extort the consent of the will, being vehement and violent. For if the passion be consequent to the act of the will, or but a languid remiss motion, such as doth not force the will, the sin is not so much of passion, as voluntary: whence passions that arise from evil customs, and follow the will, do not constitute a sin of passion. Thence Aristotle. Eth. l. 3. c. 3. saith, That every sin from passion is not involuntary. Thus also Suarez, 1.2. Tract. 5. Disp. 4. pag. 395. Now involuntarinesse, in sins either of ignorance or of passion, takes away something of their aggravation: where there is real unaffected ignorance, passion or perturbation, there is less of sin. Where there is involuntary Ignorance, there is want of that which might help the understanding: where antecedent involuntary passions hurry men into sin, there is voluntary dissent or subsequent repentance. Hence the Disciples of Aristippus said, That they who sin from perturbation, not voluntarily, deserve pardon, as Laertius. 2. Voluntary wilful Sins, are such as proceed from a strong bent of will, without ignorance or passion as the original cause thereof. Such sins are of greater aggravation, because of less provocation, and excuse. From a perseverance in voluntary sins, and frequent repetition thereof proceeds a fixed custom and rooted habit of sin, touching which we find many good Philosophemes in Plato, of which hereafter §. 7. of the necessary servitude of Sin. §. 6. The Nature, The moral servitude of Sin. Causes, and Kind's of moral Evil being laid open, we may with more facility explicate and demonstrate, what that moral Servitude is which attends it. That all moral Evil or Sin is attended with the highest moral Servitude is evident from sacred Philosophy, as also the Philosophemes of Plato and others. There were three ways whereby men were brought under civil servitude among the Ancients: some were made servants by being taken in war; others were bought with a price; others became such by being borne in the house of servants, as Ishmael. Sacred Philosophy, in treating of the servitude of sin, alludes to all these three kinds of service. (1) Sinners are said, 1 Kings 21.20. & 2 Kings 17.17. To sell themselves, to work evil: i.e. deliberately and voluntarily to commit sin, and that with a full bent of heart: which is opposed to Paul's being sold under sin, Rom. 7.14. (2) The servants of sin are said to be led captive by sin, 2 Pet. 2.19. (3) All men by nature are said to be borne slaves of sin, Ephes. 2.2. & 5.6. Eph. 2.2. Children of disobedience: i.e. addicted, devoted, given up to it. So Ephes. 5.6. & Col. 3.6. This is an Hebraic Idiotism: for among them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Son, being put in the state of Regiment, and construed with a Noun signifying an inanimate thing, is emphatically used to note that such a person or thing is addicted or given up to that which is predicated of it. Thus a child of disobedience, is one that is a perfect slave or devoted to it. And Plato, Rep. 9 pag. 575. tells us, That he who is subject to the Tyranny of his own Lusts, is the greatest slave imaginable: for he cannot do what he would; but is shut up in the prison of his own unbridled lusts. Therefore in his Cratylus, as he derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Virtue, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, always to flow, which imports liberty; so he derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Vice, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because a wicked man is ever fettered and chained by his lusts. But to illustrate the miserable vassalage and slavery which attends all Sinners by nature, we shall consider this servitude of Sin, (1) In regard of the Adjuncts and Effects that attend Sin. (2) In the proper Adjuncts, or Attributes that attend this servitude. First as to the Adjuncts and Effects that attend Sin, we shall draw them forth according to the mind of sacred and Platonic Philosophy, in the ensuing Propositions. 1. All moral Evil or Sin is repugnant to human Nature. The Civilian, Sin repugnant to human Nature. Justin. Institut. l. 1. tit. 3. defines Civil Servitude, a constitution of the Law of Nations, whereby one is subject to the Dominion of another against Nature. And is not this most true of the moral servitude of Sin? What more against human Nature, than to be subject to the tyranny of irregular passions? Yea doth not Sin make not only the Creatures an enemy to man, but also himself the greatest enemy to himself? That Sin is most repugnant to human Nature, may easily be evinced out of Plato's Philosophy. Thence he calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Discord and Confusion; because it causeth an intestine war, discord, and confusion in human Nature. Thus also in his Lysis, he saith, All good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, proper and agreeable to human Nature, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, evil is alien and repugnant to it. Good, albeit it slow not from Nature, yet it inclines us to what is most for the perfection of human Nature; whereas all Sin tends to its ruin. As all moral Liberty consists in Virtue, which gives an elevation and advance to human Nature; so all moral servitude arising from Sin implies a depression of human Nature. Thus Psal. 106.43. And were brought low for their iniquity. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies attenuated, depressed. Psal. 106.43. Vitium contra naturam est, ut non possit nisi nocere naturae. Non itaque esset vitium recedere à Deo, nisi naturae, cujus id vitium est, potiùs competeret esse cum Deo. August. de Civ. Dei, l. 11. c. 17. It's here spoken of their being brought down from an high to a low condition. Then follows the cause of this their being brought down: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for, or in their iniquity. Their iniquity was not only the meritorious cause, but also the instrument or machine by which they were brought down. Nothing doth so much empoverish and bring down human Nature, as Sin. So Psal. 107.12. Therefore he brought down their heart with labour: they fell down, and there was none to help. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with toilsome labour. The toilsome labour of Sin is most potent to bring down human Nature. (1) Sin brings down human Nature, and is most repugnant to it, in that it imports an aversion and falling from God, who is our most laudable and excellent Being, our first Principe and last End. This is implied in that dreadful interrogation of God to Adam, Gen. 3.9. Gen. 3.9. Where art thou? In this Question we may consider [1] That it regards not Adam's place, but state: Where art thou? Not in what place, but in what state? How is it with thee now Adam? How dost thou do? Is all well? What is the condition of thy Soul? Art thou in that state I placed thee in? [2] It's a question not of ignorance as to God, but of conviction as to Adam: it is the question of a Judge making inquisition after the Malefactor. Where art thou? Where is now thy confidence in thine own strength? Dost thou see unto what a condition thy pride, thy unbelief has reduced thee? Thou aimedst to be as God, free from my yoke and Law. But is it so with thee? Art thou not fallen into a miserable bondage? Doth not thy fear, thy running away, and endeavour to hid thyself, discover thy guilt and servitude? [3] It is a sarcastic, biting, upbraiding question. Where art thou? O! how is it with thee now Adam? Hast thou not brought thyself to a sine pass? Where is the Deity thou affectedst? Plato seems to give frequent hints and intimations of this Fall of Man, and the servitude that attends it. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 245. he compares the Soul, in its innocent state, to a winged Chariot, that flies aloft; but in its lapsed state, he makes it to have lost its wings, and to be imprisoned in the body. And the Platonists generally complain of the Souls servitude in the body, as a punishment of some former sin. Which makes Steuch. Eugubinus and others to think, that Plato knew more of the Fall, than he would discover, which he disguised under that Hypothesis, of the Preexistence of Souls. So Eusebius, Praep. Evang. lib. 12. cap. 11. pag. 584. thinks that Plato, in his Symposium, expressed the Fall allegorically under the Symbol of Porus, of which see Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 5. §. 1-6. (2) Sin pulls down and is repugnant to human Nature, Sin strips off the Image of God. as it divestes men of the Image of God. Thus in sacred Philosophy, Gen. 3.7. Gen. 3.7.22. And they knew that they were naked: i.e. they perceived themselves divested of the image of God. Thence v. 22. God said: Behold man is become like one of us! i.e. Ironically, most unlike unto us, a sad spectacle, a prodigiose monster, unlike the Creature made by us. It alludes to the words of Satan, v. 5. And ye shall be as Gods. It is said, Gen. 5.1. That Adam was created in the likeness of God. But v. 3. it's added, That he begat a son in his own likeness, i.e. sinful, as he was. This deprivation of the image of God is well expressed by Paul, Rom. 3.23. Rom. 3.23. For all have sinned and come short of the glory of God. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, are deprived, spoiled, divested of the glory of God. This may be taken (1) Actively: All have come short of the gloriose image of God, and conformity to his Law, which Adam was at first invested with. (2) Passively, as to future Glory. The former sense seems primarily intended here. Adam's Soul was filled with the gloriose image of God; but ah! alas! how has sin defaced and dissigured the Soul! how far short doth it now come of that gloriose Image! This Fall of man from the Image of God Plato was not altogether a stranger unto: for, in his Critias, he saith, that anciently there flourished in our first Parents, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a divine nature, which rendered them happy, but human custom or sin prevailing, an inundation of evils followed. (3) Sin brings down human Nature and is repugnant thereto, Sin is enmity against God. in that it infuseth a Principe of confusion, enmity, and rebellion against God. The perfection of human Nature consists in an intimate adherence and subjection to God; but sin puts a law of enmity and rebellion into the heart, Rom. 8.7. Rom. 8.7. The carnal mind is enmity against God, i.e. a complexe or systeme of all manner of enmity: yea nothing but enmity: enmity in the highest-degree: for abstractes speak forms and essences. Greg. Nazianzen, in Apolog. makes three Species of the carnal minds Rebellion and Reluctance against Grace. (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a servile departure from God. (2) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a contentiose aversion and obstinate reluctation against God. (3) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a stupor in sin: when men rush into sin, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, with a bare face. The carnal mind is the greatest enemy God has. All sin in corrupt nature is a kind of Antipathy against God; that which puts men upon all acts of rebellion against, and aversation from him. Hos. 4.12. A spirit of fornication: Hos. 4.12, 16. i.e. of Idolatry, which is spiritual fornication. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Spirit denotes a vehement fervour, flame, or impetus of lust: such as carries with it the highest impetuosity, effort, and force. For the Hebrews call all the extraordinary motions or perturbations of the mind, Spirit. Thence it follows: from under God: i.e. from under his Power, Empire, and Dominion. From under hath the force of a privation, and denotes their aversion from God. Thence he adds, v. 16. For Israel slideth back, as a back-sliding heifer. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as a rebellious, contumacious, refractory heifer: such as thinketh herself free, casts off the yoke from her neck, and is impatient of subjection, as Deut. 32.15. The meaning is, that Israel, like a lascivious refractory Heifer, had cast off all regard to divine Commands, and wandered up and down according to her own lusts. Thence follows her punishment answerable to her sin: The Lord will feed her in a large place. She affects a wand'ring, vagrant, licentious course of life, and she shall have it: The Lord will feed her in a large place, or barren desert, not in a fruitful place. When Churches or people wander from God, he will feed them in a desert of affliction, as Hos. 2.14. Such is the state of those that wander from God. Sacred Philosophy and the Greek Fathers express this enmity of the carnal mind against God, by such expressions as these: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to resist God; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to resist the Spirit; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to affect to overcome the power of God; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to make void, or repel Grace; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to deride God. And what greater bondage can there be, than for a rational Creature to turn his back on God, and fly from his chiefest good? Doth not this pull down and impoverish human Nature? Thence Plato, in his Politicus, tells us, That after the Golden Age, i.e. the state of Innocence, had its period, sin brought into the world a deluge, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of confusion and disorder, etc. (4) Sin is most repugnant to human Nature, Sin strips men of Humanity. in that it strips men of the right use of their Reason, Will, Affections, yea of their comfortable Being and Humanity. Plato, in his Theaetetus, assures us, That the excellence of man consists in his Ressemblance unto God; but so far as he falls short thereof, he falls under, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nothingness, and Inhumanity. Sin reduceth human Nature to a kind of Inhumanity and nothingness, in that it spoils it of the right use of its rational Being and operations. For man having an intrinsec relation unto God, as his first efficient and last End, he so far enjoys his Being, as he doth adhere to God: he that bids farewell to, or departs from God, bids farewell to, and departs from himself, as to all right use of what he has. Man is then said to live, when he useth and enjoyeth things as he ought; which sin deprives him of, in that it makes him use things that are to be enjoyed, and enjoy things that are to be used. Thus it invertes the order of things. Hence it was a common Saying with Socrates, as also the Stoics, That all Vice is against Nature; because human Nature as such, was made to adhere unto God as its first Cause and last End; which state man by sin doth relinquish; and so by consequence lose the right use of his Being, Life, Reason, Will, Affections, and all human Acts. Such is the Repugnance of Sin to human Nature. 2. Moral Evils or Sins are not only repugnant to human Nature, Sins repugnant each to other. but to themselves. This greatly demonstrates the servitude and bondage of Sin: for all moral Liberty implies Order, Harmony, and Uniformity, which ariseth from Virtue: but Lusts are extreme jarring, dissonant and opposite each to other. Oh! what strange discords, confusions, and seditions are there among lusts in the heart? How is the heart distracted and as it were torn in pieces by them? Lust's are extreme mutinous and lawless; they keep no order. Thence in sacred Philosophy it is said, The corrupt mind cannot subject itself to the law of God. Rom. 8.7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Rom. 8.7. cannot keep the place, order, and rank the Law of God has put the Soul into. It alludes to Military order: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily denotes the order and discipline of Soldiers. Yea it's added, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, neither indeed can be: namely, because the Law is the rule of order, but Lusts are all for disorder: they disagree among themselves, as well as from the Law of God. Lusts have no end, bounds, measure: what is sin, but a confused Chaos of all manner of disorders? How do sensual passions fight, not only against God's Law, but against each other? And oh! what a slavery ariseth herefrom? Thence sinners are described, Tit. 3.6. Tit. 3.6. Serving lusts and divers pleasures. These sinful pleasures are not only divers as to Number, but also as to Quality, as different and opposite each to other. Thence Jam. 4.1. Lust's are said to maintain an intestine war in men's Souls, whence all extern wars and contests arise. Thus Plato makes frequent mention of the discords and intestine wars of Lusts. So Repub. 5. pag. 444. he makes injustice to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Sedition of the Soul, or Insurrection. So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, pag. 214. he makes all virtrose persons to be like each other, and friends; but as for profligate wicked men, they differ as well from themselves, as each from other. And in his Phaedo, pag. 92. he saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. All sin is full of discord, but virtue is harmonious. The reason of this Discord and Repugnance among lusts is this: All concord and agreement in the Soul ariseth from its adherence to God, who is the first Unity: so far as men depart from this prime Unity, so far they fall under confusion, Nulla major poena nequitiae est, quàm quod sibi & suis displicet. Sen. Epist. difformity, and disorder. And what greater punishment of sin is there than this, that it is displeasing, yea repugnant to itself? How oft do men relinquish the lusts they longed for, and then reassume what they relinquished? What a conflict is there between avaricious and prodigal lusts? But of this more in what follows. 3. Sin most impotent and infirm. Sin is the Disease of the Soul, full of impotence and infirmity. All moral Liberty implies health, vigour, force and strength: and wherein consists the vigour and strength of any thing, but in adherence to its first Principes? The more any thing departs from Unity, the more Division, Contrariety, Dissolution, and Infirmity. And is not God the first Principe or Cause of the Soul? Doth it not by departing from him departed from its first Unity and strength? O! then how impotent and infirm is sin? This is every where intimated in sacred Philosophy. Ezech. 16.30. So Ezech. 16.30. How weak is thy heart! i.e. how sick, faint, and impotent by reason of lust. Yet it follows: Seing thou dost all these things, the works of an imperiose whorish woman. She had potent imperiose lusts, but a weak heart to resist tentations. Sin is said to be a poisonous bitter root, which sheds its malign influences on all our Affections and Actions. Deut. 29.18. Thus Deut. 29.18. Apostasy is said to be a root bearing gall and bitterness. The Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rendered Gal, signifies a poisonous herb; and so it must be rendered here, a root, whose influences and fruits are poisonous and bitter. Thence the LXX. render it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, springing up in gall, or poison and bitterness. For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both gall and poison, answerable to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because the poison of some Serpents lies in their gall. Act. 8.23. Peter alludes hereto, Act. 8.23. where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, signifies the bitter poisonous root of corrupt nature. So Heb. 12.15. Heb. 12.15. Root of bitterness: i.e. poisonous root of sin. Nothing so poisonous and kill as sin. Whence sinners are said to be, Jer. 17.9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, desperately sick, even unto death. So Esa. 24.4. languisheth, as a feeble, crazy, consumtive body, as v. 5. Basil, in Psal. saith, That men are rendered by Virtue or Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, without wound and blemish: whence they become, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, inexpugnable and free, as before, Chap. 3. Thence it necessarily follows, that sin is the wound and blemish of the Soul, that which renders it most impotent and servile. That sin is full of impotence and infirmity Plato once and again inculcates. So Repub. 4. pag. 430. he saith, An intemperate man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, weaker than himself; whereas a temperate man is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, more potent than himself, i.e. than his sensual appetite. Thus in his Timaeus, pag. 86, 87. he proves, That the irregularity of our affections is the worst disease. So Repub. 10. pag. 608. he informs us, That evil is that which dissolves and corrupts things, but good conserveses and relieves. And thence he concludes, That a servile Sinner hath nothing sound. Lastly, Repub. 1. he saith, Unrighteousness is the disease of the Soul. 4. Sin is the spot, stain and defilement of the Soul, Sin the defilement of the Soul. and therefore the greatest servitude. Virtue gives a Nitor, Lustre, Splendour, Beauty, and Glory to the Soul; but Sin is the Blot and blemish of human Nature: indeed nothing can pollute and defile the Soul but Sin, and sinful Idols. Hence we find mention, Deut. 29.17. Ezech. 23.7. Deut. 29.17. & Ezech. 23.7. of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, gillulim, filthy Idols. The word signifies both filth and Idols, or sordid, dunghill, filthy Idols, such as pollute by the very touch. So Levit. 26.30. Psal. 106.28. The Soul, by its lusts, running into and being made one with filthy Idols, is thereby made filthy and impure: as on the contrary, when it mingles with things above it, God and things virtuose, it's thereby made more pure and excellent. We read also, Tit. 1.11. of filthy lucre. Lucre is not filthy in itself, but being beneath the Soul, it defiles the same when it is coveted thereby. For when the heart of man runs down into things beneath itself, it is thereby defiled, whence such things are called filthy Idols. This also Plato observed: whence in his Minos, he tells us, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A good man is of all most sacred: but a wicked man most impure and polluted. Sin indeed pollutes the whole man. (1) It defiles men's persons: whence sinners are termed Swine, Mat. 7.6. which are the most unclean Creatures. (2) It defiles men's Minds and Consciences, Tit. 1.15. (3) It defiles men's Discourses, words, and communications: Esa. 9.17. Every mouth speaketh folly. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is rendered villainy, Chap. 32.6. signifies the flowers and leaves of plants putrified and rotten. So Ephes. 4.29. No corrupt communication. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies rotten, stinking, noisome, like rotten fruits or stinking breath. (4) It defiles men's Actions and Fruits: Mat. 7.17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 malign fruits. (5) It pollutes whole Nations and Churches. Hence Israel in her Apostasy is said to be, Hos. 8.8. Hos. 8.8. a vessel wherein is no pleasure: i.e. as some expound it, like such vessels as are most abject, and exposed to the most sordid uses, to retain only excrements. So Lam. 1.8, 9 Zeph. 3.1. (6) Yea Sin pollutes our very Righteousness and makes it unclean. Esa. 64.6. Esa. 64.6. As an unclean thing, or person; because the term is masculine. As a lump of some filthy matter, or such unclean stuff, as by the Law was to be burned, Leu. 13.55, 57 or like some leprous person; or one labouring under some noisome disease, even from the crown of the head to the sole of the foot, as Chap. 1.6. Thence he adds: And all our righteousnesses as filthy rags. There are different interpretations of these words: some take them as an allusion to Beggar's Rags: others, to Rags polluted by putrified sores: others, to garments defiled by blood: others, to menstruous rags: but all generally agree in this, that the term notes much defilement. In sum, there is this universal defilement on human Nature: Adam's person first polluted our nature; and our natures polluted defile our persons and whatever proceeds from us, or is inherent in us. Hence, 5. Sin is the Reproach, Sin full of shame and reproach. Dishonour, Shame, and Disgrace of the Soul. As God has entailed honour and renown on true Virtue, so shame and disgrace on Sin: neither can the wit and power of man cut off this Entail. This is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophy, which teacheth us, That Sin doth degrade men, and strip them of their highest excellence, clothing them with shame and reproach. Esa. 32.5. Thuch Esa. 32.5. The vile person shall no more be called liberal, nor the churl said to be bountiful. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nabal signifies primarily a vile person, a man of no worth, like a withered flower, or leaf in Autumn. Thence it signifies a fool, as Abigal's speech imports, 1 Sam. 25.25. Such a vile foolish sinner shall no more be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nadib, i.e. free, noble, ingenuous, generose Prince. No Nabal or vile sinner, shall, in the days of Christ's gloriose reign, (which this Text refers to, as v. 1, etc.) be called Nadib, free, generose Prince. Esa. 14.20. This is more fully expressed, Esa. 14.20. The seed of evil-doers shall never be renowned. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, shall not be named: or shall not be men of name, or renown for ever. The great God delights to cloth proud sinners with shame and reproach. Thus Esa. 22.17. Esa. 22.17. Behold the Lord will carry thee away with a mighty captivity, and will surely cover thee. Hebr. in covering will cover thee. This repetition, according to the Hebrew Idiom, imports, (1) Certainty, (2) Expedition, (3) Abundance, (4) Continuance. He shall certainly, speedily, abundantly, and continually cover thee. Ay but with what? With shame and reproach. It implies such a covering as persons fallen into disgrace, or carried captive, or condemned to die were wont to have, whose faces were covered, as unworthy to see light. And who was it, who should be thus covered? It was Shebna the King's Treasurer, a man covered and clothed with gorgeous apparel, and many Titles of Honour, as v. 18. God first or last clothes the highest of sinners with shame and reproach. Sin strips men of their highest excellences, and then God, in just judgement, clothes them with disgrace. Exod. 32.25. So Exod. 32.25. And when Moses saw the people were naked. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, naked, in the shame of their sins, divested of the glory of God. So it follows: For Aaron had made them naked unto their shame amongst their enemies. Unto their shame, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or, unto their infamy. LXX. a rejoicing and mockery, namely to their adversaries. Sin makes men a shame, infamy, and reproach to their friends, and the scorn, mockery, and rejoicing of their adversaries. What more contumeliose and reproachful to human Nature, than to be a voluntary drudge of Sin and Satan? Whiles Nations and Churches keep close to God, they are formidable and terrible to their enemies; but when by sin they depart from God, they are the reproach of al. Thus Ephraim, Hos. 13.1. When Ephraim spoke trembling, Hos. 13.1, 2. he exalted himself in Israel. Some read it thus: Ephraim was a tremblement to him that heard him: i.e. so long as he kept close to God, he was formidable to all his enemies, he was exalted in honour and renown. But when he offended in Baal he died: i.e. he is now most abject and contemptible in the eyes of al. And why? because he hath departed from the Worship of God to worship Baal. Thence it follows, v. 2. And now they sin more and more. Hebr. They add sin to sin. O! what an ignoble thing is sin? Doth it not bring all under a scorn? Thus Israel in Babylon, Lam. 3.14. I am made a derision to all my people. Or, as others, to all people, namely round about. Thence Paul demands of the Romans, Rom. 6.21. What fruit had ye then in these things whereof ye are now ashamed? The state of sin is always attended with shame and bondage. This was also well observed by Plato and many of the wiser Heathens. Thus Plato, in his Phaedrus, calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, concupiscence, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the contumely or reproach of human Nature. So in his Gorg. pag. 477. he says, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The pravity of the Soul is the basest and vilest of allthings. Yea, he affirms: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It is not only by Law, but by Nature more base to do an injury than to receive it. So in his Symposium, pag. 183. he saith, That love is of itself neither excellent nor vile; but if it be irregular, it is most vile. Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It is therefore a vile thing, vilely to obey any vile thing, such as sin is. And he adds, pag. 184. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, To lust after riches or civil power is most base and vile. The like in his Leg. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Injustice is the basest thing imaginable. And he subjoins the reason: For he that fills his Soul with sins, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth reproach it, and make it vile. Indeed nothing can make man vile, unless he first make himself vile by sin. Thence Anacharsis being upbraided by an Athenian, that he was a Scythian, of a base Country; he replied, My Country is a disgrace to me, but thou art a disgrace to thy Country: meaning by his vitiose courses. And is not this too true of too many Englishmen? It's true, many, by reason of their high condition in the world, may be exempted from the punishment of their sin, yet assuredly none is or can be exempted from the shame of it. Thence Basil, Psal. saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That there is a turpitude and impressed stamp or print of sin, as it were of an indelible tincture. All other excellences cannot keep a man from being vile, if sinful. Antiochus a King is said to be a vile person, because wicked. Seneca tells us, That none is contemned by another, but he who first makes himself contemptible by sin: a free noble mind may live in a Cottage; whereas servitude may inhabit a marble golden Palace. Pious humility exalts the Soul by making it subject to God, but proud self-exaltation brings down the Soul: nothing more servile and base than to be subject to the imperiose dictates of proud vile lusts. 6. Sin is the greatest Tyranny, Sin the Tyranny of the Soul. and therefore its servitude greatest. Plato, Repub. 9 pag. 574, etc. gives us a copiose, lively, and emphatic illustration of the Tyranny of Self-love: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. When the Soul has subjected itself to the Tyranny of Love, it's hurried into all manner of flagitiose vices, neither can he abstain therefrom: but that tyrannic Love living in him, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in all manner of Anarchy and lawless Empire, as a great Monarch, precipitates him into all manner of vices. So also pag. 577. The mind being subject to tyrannic Lust cannot do what it would, but is torn in pieces by violent assaults, etc. Yea he affirms, That by how much the more men indulge and observe the commands of Lust, by so much the more tyrannic and insolent it is. So in his Gorg. pag. 478 He must needs live miserably, who carries about with him unrighteousness, that imperiose Lady, whose commands he can never be free from. And indeed thus much sacred Philosophy informs us, That he who refuseth to be under the sweet Empire of the divine Law, falls under the miserable servitude of sins tyranny. Thus Rom. 5.21. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Rom. 5.21. Sin is brought in as a great Tyrant, ruling with the greatest rigour imaginable, even unto death. So Rom. 6.12. Rom. 6.12. Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal bodies, that you should obey it in the lusts thereof. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he brings in Sin as an infamous imperiose Lady, whom to serve is most unworthy of a free ingenuous Spirit. Thus Rom. 3.9. For we have before proved, both Jews and Gentiles, Rom. 3.9. that they are all under sin. Schmidius reads the first part thus: For we have been all long ago accused and convinced, namely Psal. 14.1, 2, 3. of what? That all are under sin. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to be under sin, is to be under the Jurisdiction, Tyranny, and Subjection of Sin; which is here brought in as some imperiose domineering Lord, that delights to tyrannize over his Vassals. Sin is the basest thing in the world: O then how servile is subjection to its Tyranny! A sinner addicted to any base tyrannic Idol he lust's after, doth not possess that beloved Idol, but that possesseth him, and brings him under a miserable Tyranny, so that he can neither part with, nor enjoy what he lust's after: and by how the more the Idols he lusts after are multiplied, by so much the less power has he over himself, or the things which he possesseth. And the sovereign power and tyranny of sin appears in nothing more than in this, that men do voluntarily obey its dicates and commands. Such whose hearts are chained to any inferior Idol, have no power over themselves: they are not their own: they have no dominion over their own persons, actions, objects of use or fruition, in moral estimation. There is nothing that human Nature more abhors, than to be under the Tyranny of others; and yet all sinners electively embrace a self-tyrannie, to be under the power of tyrannic lusts. 7. All Sin is full of Penury, Want and Necessity; Sin full of penury and want. which is another attendent of servitude. Plato, Repub. 9 pag. 577. tells us, That the Soul under the Tyranny of Sin, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, must necessarily be always under an indigent insatiable condition. So in his Politicus, pag. 274. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, By all these things, [meaning such as attended the Fall of Man] men were driven into great straits. Thus also, Rep. 9 pag. 579. speaking of one under the tyranny of lust, he saith, He is a slave; neither are his lusts ever satisfied: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and he indeed appears to be a beggar, if any one knows how to look into his Soul. There is nothing so indigent and greedy as lust: the more it has the more it wants: which denotes great slavery. Luk. 15.13, 14, 15. Thus we find exemplified in the Prodigal, Luk. 15.13, 14, 15. What is spoken here of famine, want, feeding on husks with swine, etc. demonstrates that great penury, slavery and misery, which those who are slaves to their lusts are obnoxious unto. This is in a more peculiar manner visible in such whose hearts are captivated by richesse, Neminem pecunia divitem facit: imo contrà nulli non majorem sui cupiditatem incussit. Quaeris quae sit hujus rei causa? Plus incipit habere posse, qui plus habet. Seneca. pleasures, or honours. The avaricious man has a vehement desire to be rich, and yet that very desire or lust makes him poor: yea, the richer he is as to this world's goods, the poorer he is as to the real use and comfort of what he has: whiles he endeavours to increase an infinite treasure of riches, his lusts also are infinitely increased, which make him most poor. Thus also sensual and ambitiose men, the more they have the more they want: the increase of what they lust after makes them poorer as to real comfort and satisfaction therein. Sin indeed makes men most poor, in that it deprives them of God, who is the best riches. O! what a poor, shiftless, forlorn, miserable thing, or rather nothing is Sin. 8. Sin captivates the Soul, Sin the fetters of the Soul. puts chains and fetters on it; which is a great piece of servitude. All lusts do contract, pinion, and bind up the Soul, which is in itself most ample and extensive. Thus Plato, in his Phaedo, pag. 83. saith, The mind, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is bound or fettered by sensual lusts. And he subjoins the reason: Because every pleasure and every dolour of the mind, being as it were armed with a nail, doth fasten it to the body, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and makes it corporeous, or sensual like the body. Wherein he gives us a lively symbolic image, how the Soul, by sensual lusts, becomes glued and chained to the body, yea transformed thereinto. Every Idol lusted after captivates the heart: so many lusts so many chains: yea every repeated act of sin brings the Soul under new fetters and bonds: the longer such go on in ways of sin, the greater slaves they are. It's true, some men's chains are lined with pleasures, or gilded over with terrene richesses; but yet that adds not to their liberty: yea, the greatest natures and most noble dispositions, if sinful, have the greatest chains: for by how much the more free such conceit they are, or affect to be, by so much the more they are entangled in their lusts, as Esa. 44.20. Such as feed on any Idol, are chained thereto, neither is it possible for them to deliver their own Souls. Thus Hos. 4.17. Ephraim is joined to Idols, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bound, glued, chained. It alludes to the conjunction of unclean persons, whereby they become as it were one flesh, as 1 Cor. 6.16. Israel was chained to her Idols by indissoluble bonds of false Worship, and it was impossible to pull her thence. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idols, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifies grief, straits, trouble. Idols do greatly straiten, torment, and vex sinners, and yet they cannot part with them. Plato, Repub. 9 pag. 579. tells us, That sinners are shut up in the prison of their own lusts, and fettered by their irregular desires. Yea, indeed every sinner is chained to the worst of Idols, himself, and fettered by his own lusts. This we find exemplified in Simon Magus, Act. 8.9. giving out that himself was some great one: i.e. potent in miracles, Act. 8.9.23. one that could do great feats. Ambitiose self was that unhappy Centre, unto which he was chained. And it is worthy our serious observation to consider, how this Idol chains and fetters his heart, even by and under a profession of Religion. The case stood thus: Simon perceiving the Apostles to outshine him in doing miracles, he has a mind to turn Christian, thereby to gain the same power, they were invested with, as v. 19 Give me also this power. Peter smelling out his ambitiose rank hypocrisy, tells him, in plain terms, v. 23. I perceive thou art in the gall of bitterness and bond of iniquity. This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, bond of iniquity signifies, (1) a Covenant or compact with iniquity: such as is between Servants and Masters, or those who are in some deep conspiracy. And so the sense is: he was still a sworn slave of iniquity: one bound to sin by an Oath of Allegiance and Supremacy. (2) It is used by the LXX. to express the bands of iniquity, or a chain, such as prisoners are kept in, Esa. 58.6. (3) It denotes, the binding up of many things together. Thus was Simons heart bound up by the chains of many sins. And we find something like to this in Plato's Cratylus, pag. 415. where he saith, That the vitiosity of the mind appears much in sloth: and he thence concludes; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore sloth indicateth, that the bond or chain of the Soul is most potent and tenacious. 9 Sin is the greatest servitude, in that it makes men sots, fools, Sin folly and madness. and mad men: it deprives of the use of reason. Thus Plato, Protagor. pag. 332. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Do not they who act irregularly, act foolishly and madly? So, in his Phaedrus, pag. 231. he makes inordinate love a kind of madness. Also in his Timaeus, pag. 86. he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ignorance, specially of the supreme Being and Truth, to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the disease and madness of the Soul. And the reason is evident; because the proper office and use of Reason is to unite the mind to its object Truth, and so by consequence to that Truth primarily, which is first, and most intelligible in itself, namely God, in the contemplation of whom the minds perfection consists. But now sin disunites the mind from God, and fills it with ignorance, folly, and madness. Hence the knowledge of the wicked is termed by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nocturnal knowledge; because it neither illuminates, nor directs, nor delights them, which are the three main offices of knowledge. Thus our Lord, the first Light and Truth, assures us, Mat. 6.23. That the very light and knowledge of wicked men, though never so much cultivated and elevated by acquired notions, or commun illuminations of the Spirit, is but darkness, yea the blackest darkness. Stobaeus also informs us, That, according to Plato, nothing was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ridiculous or absurd but sin. And Grotius tells us, That Plato conjoined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Luk. 23.41. so that nothing is indeed absurd but sin. Hence frequently in sacred Philosophy sinners are said to be without 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an heart, i.e. practic judgement or conscience rightly informed, as Jer. 5.21. and in the Proverbs oft. Yea wicked men are styled, Psal. 5 5. as elsewhere, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, mad men. Thence it is said of the Prodigal, Luk. 15.17. When he came to himself, i.e. to an awakened conscience and sound mind: which denotes, that so long as he lived in sin, he was not himself, but like a mad man. And indeed the more wit men have, if under the power of sin, the greater mad men, fools, and slaves they are; because their wit doth but serve to entangle them in their lusts: their reason doth but fortify their minds with arguments and cavils against the means of their liberty. 10. Sin, Sin when prevalent makes men Bestes. when in its dominion and prevalence, transforms men into mere Brutes, which is the worst of servitude. Plato styles sensual affections the brutish part of a man, which when they prevail, transform him into a beast. For whatever the heart of man doth vehemently adhere unto, it receives a stamp and character from; yea is transformed thereinto: if the Soul strongly adhere to God, it has the impress of his image stamped on it: if unto the world, it is transformed into the spirit of the world. And the reason is evident; because all love is a kind of ingress, or running of the heart into what it loves: Thence follows first Union, and then, if it may be, Unity with its beloved. And where it cannot attain to Unity, it affects Ressemblance and similitude. Thus sinners having their hearts glued to the Idols of time, are transformed into their likeness: by loving sensual carnal objects, they become sensual and carnal. Hence we find sensual sinners styled, 2 Pet. 2.12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, natural brute beasts. Neither is this the case of sensual sinners only, but of the most refined spirits under the power of any base lusts. The Apostle speaking of all mankind in a natural state, saith that every man is, 1 Cor. 2.14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an animal brutish man. Sin has made all human Nature inhuman and brutish: a man is not a man, in true moral and divine estimation, till he be virtuose: the wisest and best of men, if not sanctified, are but animal and brutish. Thence the Lord makes diligent inquisition throughout Jerusalem, If there were a man to be found, Jer. 5.1. How few men than are to be found in this sensual age! All sinners carry the image of Satan or of Bestes: they are either like Satan in subtlety and malice; or like Bestes in sensuality. And ah! what a miserable Metamorphosis is this, for man to be made like a beast! were it not much better for man to be a beast, than to be like a beast? For man by being like a beast degrades himself, yea placeth himself below the condition of a beast, which keeps in that state it was made by God. §. 7. Having considered the servitude of Sin in regard of the Adjuncts and Effects that attend sin, we now come to consider this servitude in its own proper Attributes and Affections, thereby farther to demonstrate how miserable it is. 1. The servitude of Sin is most voluntary and wilful, and therefore most miserable. Electively to espouse evil is the worst of evils. The servitude of Sin is most voluntary. The slavery of sin is in this most miserable, that men voluntarily elect their slavery. They that take the most liberty in sinning are the greatest slaves; because voluntary slaves: Nulla servitus turpior quàm voluntaria. Every sinner naturally estimes his Prison his Palace; his Hell, his Heaven. The will tamely and voluntarily puts itself into the fetters of sin, which renders its servitude most sordid: for the more there is of the will in sin, the more of sin and slavery: when the servitude of sin becomes a rational choice to the sinner, it is extreme miserable: when men hug and embrace their chains, love and delight in their sins, yea take a kind of satisfaction therein, what forlorn slaves are they! Who can pity such, who have no pity for themselves? Now that all the slaves of sin are voluntarily such, and so most miserable, Plato assures us, in his Phaedrus, pag. 238. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. It's altogether necessary, that he who voluntarily subjects himself to the empire of lust, be as a sick man, etc. i.e. restless in every condition. So Aristotle, Eth. l. 3. c. 15. saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Old men voluntarily serve lucre or profit, as their Idol. This voluntary servitude of sin, the Scripture sometimes styles a selling a man's self to do evil, as 1 Kings 21.20. 2 Kings 17.17. To sell himself to do evil implies a deliberate, Nec voluptates sibi emit, sed se voluptatibus vendit. Sen. Rom. 6.16. voluntary, wilful giving up himself to sin, which is the highest servitude: for he that sells himself to be a slave, is deservedly such. This is lively expressed in sacred Philosophy, Rom. 6.16. Know ye not, that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey: whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to whom ye yield yourselves servants. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is, so to yield a man's self a servant to another, as to observe every beck and nod of him to whom he yields himself a servant, with all manner of promtitude to obey his commands: yea it signifies, to seek an occasion of serving him. Thus those that yield themselves servants of sin to obey it in the lusts thereof become voluntary slaves thereof, and seek all manner of occasions to serve it. We find the same word used in the same sense, v. 13. Neither yield your members weapons of unrighteousness unto sin. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Neither observe all the becks and nods of sin, do not catch at occasions for the serving of it: be not ready to obey its irregular dictates; as it is the practice of those who are slaves thereof. The word is not where else used in the N.T. This voluntary servitude of sin is expressed Mich. 7.3. by doing iniquity with both hands earnestly, or strenuously, i.e. with a violent impetuose, deliberate bend of heart. The will is in every thing the best or the worst: when men's wills are in their sins O! how loath are they to part with their chains, their burdens! how do they hug themselves therein! If men's wills be in their slavery, it is by so much the worse: men are never so much slaves, as when their wills are in their slavery. 2. The servitude of Sin is not more voluntary, The servicude of Sin most necessary. than necessary; which adds much to its miserable state. The more voluntarily men sin, the more necessarily: and the more necessarily, the more voluntarily: the voluntariness of sin adds to its necessity; and the necessity to its voluntariness; and both to its servitude. This necessity, whereby the sinner is determined only to sin, ariseth from his own free and voluntary impiety. It's dura necessitas, as Augustine phraseth it; and therefore the more servile, because voluntary. As a person labouring under a violent fever the more he drinks to extinguish his heat, the more his heat and thirst is augmented: so sinners the more greedily they drink down sin, the more is the feverish heat of lust inflamed; thence the more necessarily do they thirst after it. Wherefore this wretched necessity, that attends sin, doth not oppose its voluntariness, but arise from it: the more the sinner delights in sin, the more he is enslaved to it: and the more necessarily he is enslaved to it, the more freely doth he act it. Such a miserable necessity is he under: For the more insuperable and inevitable any servitude is, the more miserable it is: and such is the slavery of sin: all the wit, power, and conflicts of corrupt Nature cannot deliver the sinner from it. Men are easily drawn into sin, but not from it. No man ever did by his own forces deliver himself from this slavery, and therefore no man can: an argument from the Act to the Power is here valid. Yea, this servitude of sin is so invincible and necessary, that the sinner wants not only an active power to deliver himself, but the next passive power and desire of being delivered from it. This necessary servitude of sin is termed by Plato, a miserable Necessity. So in his Phileb. pag. 22. he saith, That those who choose sin choose it either, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ignorantly and against their will, or from a miserable necessity. Wherein observe, (1) That he distinguisheth sins into such as are from ignorance and involuntary; and such as are voluntary and necessary. (2) He saith the necessity that attends sin is miserable. He elsewhere makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a blessed Necessity, which attends moral liberty, i.e. when men necessarily elect and adhere to what is best: but as for this Necessity, which attends men's voluntary adherence to sin, Oh how miserable is it! Men are tormented by their sins, and yet cannot leave them. This miserable Necessity of sinning is both connate and adnate, Necessity of Sin connate and adnate. arising partly from the corruption of Nature, partly from custom in sin. Continuance in frequent voluntary repetitions of sinful acts breeds a fixed custom and rooted habit of sin, whereby the servitude of sin becomes necessary and insuperable. Thus Plato, Repub. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. The least prevarication, like a joke, secretly and easily creeps into men's minds, and by custom becoming familiar to us, by little and little steals into private and public manners: wherefore good education is necessary. Thence, Leg. 5. pag. 728. he saith, It is the greatest punishment to be assimilated to wicked men; for thereby they imbibe their customs, and come to have one and the same affection with them. So Leg. 7. he saith, Man is an Animal, which by good education is made tame and mild; but by bad, wild and fierce. Whence beholding some playing at dice, he greatly rebuked them for it: and being asked, Why he so severely reprehended them for such a small matter? he replied: But the custom is not small: meaning, that sinful customs, though about small matters, were not small, in that they drew on a necessity of sinning. So in his Timaeus, pag. 86. he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, By an evil habit or custom an evil man is made evil, in an high degree. Hence Antisthenes, being demanded, What was chief to be learned? replied, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to unlearne evils, i.e. evil customs. Radicated customs produce a necessitude of sin and servitude, in that they occecate, indurate and harden conscience in sin. This occecation and induration of conscience was styled by Plato and others, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Apathy and Insensibility. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Apathy, definite. Plat. is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, An habit, by which we abhor from affections. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Insensibility of sin is well expressed by Aristotle, Rhet. l. 2. c. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The greatest sins are least sensible. By how much the more stupid and senseless conscience is, by so much the more necessary and incurable is the servitude of sin. This Apathy or Insensibility of conscience, 1 Tim. 4.2. is well set forth, 1 Tim. 4.2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Having their conscience cauterised, or marqued with a cauter. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to burn, signifies a cauter or hot iron, or whatever may be used by Surgeons to burn the flesh. Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by burning to set a mark, or to dead the flesh. The sense is, that their consciences were burned, made dead and senseless by lusts; as proud flesh by a Cauter. Again, this Apathy of Conscience is in sacred Philosophy set forth by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which being derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a stone, signifies properly a callose concretion, like that of stones; thence Hardness, Insensibility, Inflexibilitie, immobility. It is used metaphorically, Mar. 3.5. Mar. 3.5. to denote the callose concretion and hardness of heart, by reason of sin. Whence it is expounded by Suidas, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, occecation. Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is immediately deduced) is by Suidas and Phavorinus interpreted, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to harden, and petrify, or turn into a stone: by the LXX. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to hebetate, Gen. 27.1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to darken, Deut. 34.7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to make heavy, 1 Kings 3.2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to exanimate, or dispirit, Ezech. 21.7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to excecate, Zach. 11.17. Yet according to the proper strict notion, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 differs from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Joh. 12 40. By all which it appears, that frequent repeated custom in sin renders the conscience blind, obdurate, and senseless; Difficulter reciduntur vitia, quae nobiscum creverunt. definite esse remedio locus, ubi quae fuerant vitia mores sunt. Sen. so that the greatest moral evils are not felt, whereby sin becomes necessary and immobile. For when once conscience is, by frequent repetition of sins, cauterised, dispirited and made senseless, it leaves men to the swinge of their own lusts; whereupon follows a miserable necessity of sin and servitude; which ends at last in judicial hardness. Neither doth this immobility and necessity of sinning diminish, but aggravate the guilt of sin: for this necessity is contracted by the wils voluntary pursuit after sin: and is it not just with God to leave men under the power of their lusts, seeing they electively desire to be under them? The sum of all is this. (1) There is a natural obduration or hardness of conscience, which is innate and connate with corrupt Nature. (2) There is an adnate or acquired hardness by custom in sin, Heb. 3.13. (3) There is a judicial hardness inflicted by God as a punishment, which seals up sinners from the darkness of mind to the darkness of Hel. Each of these Hardnesses has a necessary servitude of sin attending of it, though gradually different. For the second superaddes to the first, as the third to the second. 3. The servitude of Sin is infinite. The servitude of Sin infinite. This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated not only in sacred, but also in Platonic Philosophic. The servitude of sin is infinite, (1) If we regard the object of sin, as it is a departure from an infinite good. (2) If we consider the object or matter it turns unto, which is an infinite number of Idols. So Psal. 16.4. Their sorrows shall be multiplied, that hasten after another God. Their sorrows, or according to the Hebrew, their Idols: i.e. They that forsake the true God, shall multiply to themselves an infinite number of Idol-Gods, according to their lusts: which indeed is a great piece of servitude; because every Idol is a great Tyrant. Thus Plato, Rep. 9 saith, An avaricious man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whiles he endeavours to heap up an infinite treasure of richesse, involves himself in infinite evils. (3) This servitude of Sin is infinite in regard of the Subject, the Soul, its infinite insatiable desire after its Idols. Hab. 2.5. Thus sacred Philosophy, Hab. 2.5. Who enlargeth his desire as Hel. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 amplifiath, extendeth, even to infinity. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his Soul, desire, or lust 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Hell, or rather as the grave, which is never satisfied with dead carcases. Thence it follows: and is as death, and cannot be satisfied. This infinite inextinguible thirst after terrene goods is well illustrated by Plato, in his Gorg. pag. 507. And therefore he must take care, lest that giving way to his lusts, and causing them to wander up and down unpunished, whiles he endeavours to satisfy them, he bring in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an infinite evil, and live a vagrant, robbers life. Natural desires are finite, but sinful infinite, as Seneca. (4) The servitude of Sin is infinite, if we consider the nature and kinds of Sin. Thus Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 445. I see as it were from a watchtower, that the face of Virtue is one, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but the face of Sin is multiforme and infinite. Which his Scholar Aristotle well explicates, Eth. l. 2. c. 5. pag. 89. Moreover there are many ways to sin: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for sin is interminate and infinite, but good terminate and finite, as the Pythagoreans hold. This he expounds thus: There is but one way to hit the mark, but infinite ways to miss it. Thence, saith Seneca, Men follow sins without measure, without end: for indeed they have neither end nor measure. All moral good is bounded and measured by God as its last end, and the Law of God as its rule: but sin knows no bounds either of End or Law. Virtue consists in number, weight, and measure; but sin is void of each. This infinitude of sin and its servitude is set forth to the life in sacred Philosophy; Amos 5.12. For I know your manifold transgressions and your mighty sins. Here is infinitude both as to multitude and magnitude. This infinite servitude of Sin is oft set forth by a miserable Amplitude. So Prov. 5.23. And in the amplitude of his folly, or sin, shall he wander. So Prov. 21.4. Esa. 57.10. Jer. 13.22. 4. The servitude of Sin is most penal and afflictive, The servitude of Sin most penal. and therefore most miserable. There were among the ancient Romans servi poenae, servants only of punishment, such as were condemned to dig in metallic Mines, or to sight with wild beasts: and such is every slave of sin; he is obnoxious to the most severe punishments. This we shall explicate in the following Propositions. (1) All moral Evil has guilt appendent thereto, as its immediate effect. Gild is not a physic accident or mode inherent in the Sinner; but a moral debt contracted by him: which as to God imports a certain moral right he has to punish the offender. Whence Gild is said to be a medium or middle thing between sin and punishment: for as to its term it belongs to punishment; but as to the judge, it belongs to sin: yet it more properly belongs to the sin than punishment; because it doth indeed antecede the punishment, but is inseparably conjoined with the sin. Noxa sequitur caput. Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both Gild and Sin, denoting that guilt doth essentially and inseparably adhere to all moral evil. (2) Punishment is an evil of passion inflicted for some moral evil action. Punishment is said to be the necessary debt of sin, and naturally due to the Sinner, as he stands in relation to divine Justice; Qui malum fecit, malum ferat. yet the actual inflicting of this punishment is not absolutely necessary in regard of divine Justice, but rather the effect of his will: it is most just and morally necessary that the sin should be punished: but yet it is not unjust for God to remit or relax this punishment, for the greater advance of his glory. Every Soul that sins deserves punishment, and falls under an essential, natural, and necessary obligation thereto: and the execution of this punishment is morally necessary for the vindication of divine Justice: of which more fully, Chap. 11. Of the Justice of God. (3) Punishment is either for the correction and emendation of the person offending, or for the satisfaction of Justice and the person offended: the former is usually styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, castigation, which Plato makes to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the medicine of the Soul. So Plato, Gorg. pag. 478 tells us, That castigation is the medicine of impiety, etc. Thence definite. Platon. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 castigation is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The curation of the Soul from its sin. This castigatory punishment is well consistent with moral liberty: for it's a good Maxim among the Civilians, Jure nullus ingenuus fit servus ex supplicio. Gloss. in Justin. Instit. That by right no ingenuous man is a servant of punishment: i. e. albeit he may be punished as a free Citizen, yet he is not as a slave devoted and destined thereto. But vindictive, judiciary punishment, for the satisfaction of Justice and the person-offended, always carries servitude with it. Such offenders are properly poenae servi, according to sacred Philosophy children of wrath, i. e. sentenced and adjudged to punishment. Hence that Effate among the Civilians: A Servant, whiles he lives, is, according to the civil Law, reputed as dead. Whence Slaves were anciently by the Grecians called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Rev. 18.13. Bodies, as Rev. 18.13. because they had no power over their own life, wills, or persons, but were wholly their Lords. Hence, (4) Every Sinner under the Dominion of Sin, is, Servus poenae, a Slave adjudged to the punishment of Sin. Punishment is the usual attendent of servitude, and the proper effect of sin. Indeed sin and punishment came into the world together, and all the art of man cannot separate them. Gen. 2.17. Thus, Gen. 2.17. In dying thou shalt die. This reduplication, according to the Hebrew Idiom, notes the certainty, suddenness, perfection and perpetuity of this death. The righteous God never intended that any should purchase sin at an easy rate: he gathers his rods for punishment from the same tree, we planted by our sin: Sin is the proper soil wherein punishment grows: those that make bold with God's Law, must expect that he make bold with their peace and comforts: Sin is never so swift in flying from God, but divine vengeance is as swift in pursuing of it. Divine wrath, which is the sorest vengeance, lies in the bowels of every sin: Death is the proper wages of sin. Rom. 6.23. So Rom. 6.23. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies that stipend of fish or food, which they gave to their Soldiers, to eat with their bread. Death is the proper stipend, which Sin gives to its Soldiers and Slaves to feed on, to preserve life: it is the reward of all their labours and toil in the ways of sin: 'tis their sustenance and food; all they have to keep them alive unto all eternity. And O! what a miserable life is that, which is maintained by death? (5) Sin is in itself the greatest punishment, Sin in itself the worst Jounishment. because the greatest evil. Sin was the first evil that came into the world, that which opened the door to all other evils, and contains in it the spirits, venom, and malignity of all evils: therefore there cannot be a more severe punishment of sin, than to be left to a course of sin. This Plato once and again takes notice of. Thus in his Gorgias, pag. 477. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The moral evil of the Soul is of all evils the greatest. This is an universal evil: nothing but evil is in sin: it is the Spirit and Elixir of all evil: all evil is in sin; and sin is in all evil. So pag. 479. Thou accountest unjust men happy if they escape punishment; but I account them more miserable. And he gives the reason of it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For not to be punished for sin is the stablissement of Sin. So pag. 472. According to my opinion, O Polus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an unjust man is of all most miserable: yet he is more miserable, who acting unjustly avoids punishment. For what greater misery or punishment can there be, than to be given up by God to the swinge of a man's own lusts, without check or rebuke? Are not such punishments, which seem most silent, most severe and desperate? Albeit men may enjoy security in their sin for a while, yet is not this the worst part of their punishment? Doth not the righteous God oft convey his worst curses and plagues in the sweet wine of temporal prosperity? There is no one blessing that such a Sinner enjoys, but there is a curse stamped on it. Divine Justice writes a piece of Hell on all his temporal comforts, as he writes a piece of Heaven on all the chastisements of the righteous. Thus also Plato, in his Meno, pag. 78. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; For what else is it to be miserable, than to desire evils and to possess them? And this indeed is a general Dogme with Plato, as in his Gorgias, That to be punished by a Judge for sin is not the greatest punishment; but even then when they are involved in their sins, they fall under the most severe punishment. That sin that is guilt in the commission of it, Maximum scelerum supplicium est in ipsis. Statim puniuntur cum facta sunt, imo dum fiunt. Non nascitur ex malo bonum: ad semen nata respondent. Sen. Epist. 87. is punishment in the power of it: so much pleasure as men take in the commission of their sin, so much torment they find in the issue. The evil of punishment is answerable to the evil of doing: He that departs from God executes on himself his own doom: and the farther he departs from God, the more he is involved in chains of darkness. O! what an indissoluble connexion is there between sin and punishment? Can any sin be so deliciose in the commission, as it is bitter in the issue? Is not sin a pregnant mother with child of misery? Yea, doth it not carry Hell in its womb? He that loseth his God by sin, doth he not lose comforts, life, yea self and all? (6) Albeit the servitude of Sin be in itself the greatest punishment, Other punishments of Sin. yet there are many other punishments that attend it. [1] All Sin is attended with fear and shame. As sin breeds guilt, so guilt breeds fear and shame. So Plato, Leg. 5. tells us, That he who fills his Soul with sin clothes it with reproach and shame, as before §. 6. Prop. 6. And that Fear always attends sin is frequently asserted by the ancient Philosophers; who tell us, Tuta scelera esse possunt, secura non possunt. Sen. That Fortune may deliver some from punishment, but none from fear: A nocent person has sometimes the privilege to lie hid, but never any true confidence: Sins may be safe, but not secure: it's a great portion of security to do no i'll. Thence Bion said: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That impiety is the worst companion of confidence. And it was a good observation of Tertullian, That Nature hath clothed all Sin either with fear or shame. [2] The servitude of Sin is attended with Instability. Plato, in his Philebus, Imperitis ac rudibus nullus praecipitationis finis est. In Epicureum illud chaos decidunt inane sine termino. Sen. pag. 59 saith, That such things as have no firmitude in them, are most instable. Such is Sin. The firmitude of the Soul consists in its adherence to its first Principe and last End. Thence by how much the farther men depart from God, by so much the more instable they are. He that leans on a thing instable must needs be instable in all his ways: and what more instable than Sin and sinful Idols? Whatever the Soul, by inordinate love cleaves unto, it is overcome by, and suffers changes, as that object lusted after changeth. As a Ship is poised by its ballast, and a Bee poiseth its airy body by a gravel; so the heart is poised by virtue: but corrupt Nature and sinful passions are full of Levity and Instability, whereby the heart is kept in suspense, as a Meteor in the Air, as Luk. 12.29. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. This was cain's curse, and a great part of his servile punishment, Gen. 4.12, 13. Gen. 4.12. A fugitive and vagabond shalt thou be in the earth: i. e. in an instable vagrant condition, both as to soul and body: and what follows? v. 13. And Cain said unto the Lord, My punishment is greater than I can bear. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 my punishment, or my sin. O, what an heavy piece of servitude is this to an awakened conscience, to have a wand'ring vagrant spirit! Jam. 1.6, 8. This instability, which attends the servitude of Sin, Hos. 6.2. is well illustrated, Hos. 6.2. But they all like men have transgressed the Covenant, Hebr. like Adam: i.e. like vain inconstant man. Adam had no sooner entered into Covenant with God, but he broke it. Thus all his seed turn after him. [3] Another punishment that attends the servitude of Sin is Anxiety and Torment. Thus Plato, Repub. 9 pag. 579. speaking of the Soul under the Tyranny of Sin, he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It is inflamed with perpetual sparks of Fears, Angors, and Agitations. So in his Symposium, pag. 206. he informs us, That the Soul, when it adheres to sin, is under dolours and torments, and yet brings forth nothing but wind, Isal. 7.14. as Psal. 7.14. He traveleth with iniquity, and hath conceived mischief, and brought forth a lie. It's spoken of saul's mischievous yet abortive designs against David: and it alludes to the pangs and torments of a woman in travel. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies hard toilsome miserable labour, such as poor slaves are tormented with. The LXX. render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which in the Greek Glossary, (found at the end of Cyril) is rendered dolour. So in the N. T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies vexatious grief and torment, as Rev. 16.10, 11. & 21.4. Hence the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an evil man received its derivation. For every 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, conceives and brings forth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 miserable torments, David's meaning here is, Qui voluptari tradidere principia— non ipsi voluptatem, sed ipsos voluptas habet, cujus aut inopia torquentur, aut copia strangulantur. Sen. That Saul had been long hatching mischievous designs full of torment and anxiety; and endeavoured by much travel and sore labour, like a woman in travel, to bring them forth and accomplish them; but he could bring forth nothing but a mere lie: he was frustrated in all his mischievous contrivements. Note here an elegant Allegory in these terms, Conceiveth, traveleth, and brought forth: which argues the highest vexation, travel, and torment, which Sinners labour under, in all their mischievous designs, as Jer. 4.31. Wicked men are as much tormented with the sin they love, as with the fear of the punishment they hate: all their labour is pain. So Jer. 51.58. & Habak. 2.13. Sinners are said to labour in the fire, Jer. 51.58. or for the fire: i. e. (1) In vain, without any profit: as if any one should wove a thread over the fire, which brings not only loss of labour, but of materials also. (2) To labour in the fire, notes a dangerous, tedious, toilsome, servile labour, such as is proper to slaves. What more tedious, irksome, and fruitless than the drudgery of sin? Eccles. 10.15. So Eccles. 10.15. The labour of the foolish wearieth every one of them. As in Nature, it is not storms without, but vapours within the bowels of the earth, raised up by subterraneous fires, that cause Earthquakes and Tremblements; so in the Soul, it is not afflictions from without, but the intern fire of lusts and sinful vapours that cause torments and tremblement in Conscience. It's better to be possessed of the Devil in the body, than of lusts in the heart, which always breed labour and pain. No Sinner ever attains to what he aims at: he would be somewhat else than what he is; and these desires breed anxiety and torment. [4] The servitude of Sin is of all most penal, in that eternal punishment is annexed to and entailed thereon. This is the top of all punishment, that Sinners shall be turned into Hell, with all their sins at their back. Neither was this kind of punishment altogether hid from Plato: for in his Gorg. pag. 522. we find this punishment thus described: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For a Soul to descend down to Hell laden with many sins, is the most extreme of evils. A great Philosopheme for a Pagan, and that which argues his acquaintance with sacred Philosophy; which more fully instructes us, that sin is eternally punished in Hell; because it makes a man eternally willing to sin. The righteous God takes the same course in punishing sin, as men take in the committing of it: he sees men have an eternal love for and delight in sin, and therefore they shall have an eternal punishment for sin: As sinners lay up eternal treasures of sin, so God lays up eternal treasures of wrath and punishment. In fine, what more just than that he, who by sin acts eternally against the will of God, should suffer eternal torments against his own will? And can there be a more penal afflictive servitude than this? §. 8. Having explicated and demonstrated the servitude that attends Sin, All men borne servants of and dead in Sin. it now only remains to demonstrate that all mankind are borne in this state of servitude. It's a Maxim in the Civil Law, Just. Institut. l. 1. tit. 4. That among Servants there is no difference, so as one should be more a Servant than another: though among Freemen there are many differences. This holds true in moral servitude: for among the Ilaves of sin there is no difference as to state; because all are dead in sin; and death as well moral as natural admits no degrees: all dead men are equally such without difference. Whence the Civilians have another great Saying; That a Servant is reputed dead whiles he lives. Such are all the servants of sin, who are really dead, whiles they seem to live. Lapsed man is under a miserable, natural, yet voluntary necessity of sinning, wherefore altogether uncapable of erecting himself to a state of virtue, as before §. 7. That all men by nature are dead in sin, is an Hypothesis avouched not only in sacred, but also in Platonic Philosophy. Thus Plato, in his Gorgias, pag. 493. I heard this from the wise men, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that we are now dead, and that our body is the sepulchre of our Soul. By the wise men, I presume, he means the Barbarians, specially the Egyptians and Hebrews, from whom he received this Tradition, That men are naturally dead in sin. Thus Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. 5. pag. 419. In the Barbaric Philosophy they call those dead, who have fallen from their Dogmes, and subjected their minds to lusts. This Pythagoras expressed by the Symbol of a Coffin, which he placed in the room of any expelled out of his School, thereby to indigitate, that he was dead. Thence that other Symbol of Pythagoras: Abstain from the dead: i.e. from conversation with dead sinners, which Symbol Grotius makes to be derived from the Hebraic Philosophy, according to that of our Lord, Mat. 8.22. Let the dead bury the dead. Moreover Plato calls the life of men dead in sin, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a life without life. Also he saith, That men's Souls are in this life, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of a ferine or brutish nature. Yea, Aristotle, Problem. S. 10. Prob. 45. assures us, That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Nature doth allthings that are wicked. Among the primitive Christians nothing more commun than this Hypothesis, That Virtue or Grace could not be educed out of the potence of corrupt Nature, because all men by nature are dead in sins. Thus Clemens Alexandr. Strom. 2. proves against the sectators of Basilides and Valentinus, those forerunners of the Pelagians, That faith is not, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the good effect of freewill, nor yet the prerogative of Nature. But to explicate and demonstrate, how all men by nature are under this spiritual death and moral servitude of sin, take the following Propositions. 1. Prop. This Philosopheme, That all men are by Nature dead in sin, is not hyperbolic, but metaphoric and real. Plato speaking of the moral death of the Soul, he understands it, in his dark way, according to the mind of sacred Philosophy, whence he borrowed this as other of the choicest of his Philosophemes. Now in sacred. Philosophy this moral death of the Soul is not hyperbolic, but real, albeit metaphorically expressed. Psal. 5.9. Rom. 3.13. Thus Psal. 5.9. cited by Paul, Rom. 3.13. Their throat is an open sepulchre. What David ascribes to the throat, Plato, Gorg. 499. attributes to the whole body, namely, that it is but the sepulchre of the Soul. Whence he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be, by a Paronomasy, derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a sepulchre, as before. And Democritus said, That the diseases of the Soul were the greatest: which if mwn could open, they should find there, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a sepulchre full of evils. David calls the throat an open sepulchre, because (1) the heart or soul of all by nature lies morally dead and rotten in the body as in a sepulchre. (2) The Soul lying dead in this sepulchre continually sends forth loathsome and noisome smells: as if you draw nigh to an open sepulchre, where dead bodies newly rotten lie buried, you will soon scent their noisome sums. (3) men's mouths and throats are as it were the mouth of this sepulchre, by which men's dead rotten hearts breathe forth their loathsome smells. You may scent men's corrupt hearts in their words, which pass through their throats, those open sepulchers Again, that men are borne naturally and morally dead in sin is well illustrated, Esa. 1.4. Ah! Esa. 1.4. sinful nation! a people laden with iniquity, as with a mountain of lead. But lest men should conceit, that all this iniquity comes only by custom and frequency of sinful acts, he adds: a seed of evil doers, or malign sinners. This notes, that men are borne sinners, a sinful brood; that sin is hereditary, and not only by custom. Esa. 57.4. Thus Esa. 57.4. Children of transgression: i. e. (1) borne in sin, of sinful parents. (2) Addicted to transgression, given up to it: for according to the Hebrew Idiom, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a child, being used with a Genitive Case of Appellatives, is taken for such an one as is wholly addicted and devoted to such a thing. Thence it follows: a seed of falsehood: i. e. a lump or mass of hypocrisy: wholly composed and made up of iniquity, an adulterous brood. All sin is in the heart of man, and the heart of man is in all sin, albeit he be not always hurried into all acts of sin. Hence Plato mentions, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an innate and connate evil, or vitiosity of nature, commun to all, as before §. 2. of this Chapter. And Seneca assures us, That corrupt Nature has drunk in such deep draughts of iniquity, which are so far incorporated with its bowels, as that you cannot get it out, but by tearing out its very bowels. Hence, 2. Prop. There are no seeds of spiritual life, No seeds of Virtue in corrupt Nature. no active power or disposition to what is spiritually good in corrupt Nature. Thence Cyril Alexandr. terms Virtue or Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Prerogative above the Creation. And chrysostom, in Gen. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Gift above Nature overcoming Nature itself. Where there is a spiritual death, there is a total privation, without the least seed of active power for the production of a virtuose life. Freewill in corrupt nature is alive to do evil, but dead as to the doing what is good: it is mighty knowing and potent to do evil, as Jer. 4.22. but every way ignorant and impotent as to doing what is good: it can find legs to run away from God, but none to run to him. And if the person be dead, can his acts or works be alive? May we expect a good thought, or word, or deed from such all their days, so long as they continue in such a dead state of sin? Is it possible for a dead corpse to take up its coffin, and grave upon its back, and thence to arise and walk? And is it not much more impossible for a dead Soul to dispose itself towards a virtuose life? It is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophy, That there are no seeds of spiritual life in corrupt nature. A human power is not sufficient to produce an act more than human. The divine life and motion towards God must proceed from God. Man's sin and misery come from his own freewill, but all Virtue and Beatitude from free Grace: he that is not acted by divine Grace, is necessarily acted by carnal lust: corrupt nature is not only emty of, but contrary to all good; and therefore all works done by it are dead works; because they proceed from a dead nature, and tend to death: wherefore true moral Virtue cannot be extracted out of the power of Nature. Thus Cyril Alexandr. lib. 1. in Esa. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It's proper to human Nature in no wise to receive any heavenly gifts of Grace out of its own nature, but to enrich itself with the gifts of God above Nature. This Hypothesis, albeit the Stoics and Aristoteleans contradict it, is evidently deducible from Socrates and Plato's Philosophy. Thus Plato, Meno, pag. 99 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Virtue comes not by Nature, neither from the Institutes of Learning, but by divine Afflation or Inspiration, without the concourse of the human mind, in those in whom it's produced. It's true, the Stoics held, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That Virtue might be taught; because there were sparks or seeds thereof in human Nature, which might be drawn forth by good institution: but this Socrates greatly opposed, as that which was inconsistent with the depraved state of the Soul, and divine concourse for the production of Virtue. And sacred Philosophy is most positive in this, that there are no seeds of spiritual life or virtue in man. Psal. 5.9. Thus Psal.. ●. 9. Their inward part: or the most sublime, refined, intimate part of the Soul, is very wickedness, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, wickednesses, pravities. The Plural for the Singular, and abstract for the concrete; which denotes (1) an Universality both of the predicate and subject: that all their inward parts were full of sin, and that all sin was in their inward parts. (2) The perfection of Sin. For abstracts, specially in the Plural Number, speak Essences and Spirits. The Elixir and Spirits of Sin are in the inwards of corrupt Nature, Hence, 3. Prop. The inclination of corrupt Nature to evil, Natural impotence to what is good. and its impotence as to what is good is universal and total. This naturally follows from what precedes: for if the Soul be morally dead in sin, without any seeds of spiritual life, or moral virtue, than it follows, that its impotence to good is total: for as in naturals death is a total privation of life; there is not the least seed for the reduction of the life lost; so in morals, such as are dead in sin, are under an universal privation of spiritual life, and total impotence to what is spiritually good. This Hypothesis may be demonstrated, (1) From the universal ignorance of the natural mind. Plato discourseth accurately of this Theme, as we have in what precedes §. 3. mentioned; but more fully, Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 4. §. 5. Yea so great and sovereign is the natural ignorance of the mind, that those very common notions of knowledge lodged therein are not to be esteemed, as some call them, the fragments of the Image of God, but rather effects of divine Bounty vouchsafed his lapsed Creature upon the Intercession of the Mediator, who illuminates every man that comes into the world, as Joh. 1.9. That all true knowledge of things divine is the effect of divine illumination has been generally confessed by Platonists as well as Divines. Thence Clemens Alexandr. calls Faith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a supernatural contemplation. So chrysostom calls divine Grace, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which instructes and illustrates the mind; Grace from above, not from human Nature. (2) From the formal Idea and nature of moral or spiritual good; which consists in a conformity to the moral Law, and that not only as to its matter, but also as to its end and manner: now it is impossible for corrupt nature by its own power to reach a supernatural end, or conform to the moral Law. (3) From the disproportion and incapacity of the subject. The natural power of the Will, as now vitiated, has no connatural capacity, next power, or formal capacity, for the production of what is spiritually good. Alas! what proportion is there between a carnal mind and spiritual objects? And can an object be received into the mind, unless there be some proportion? Is not every thing received according to the nature and disposition of the recipient? Can then a carnal mind have any other than carnal notions of things spiritual; as a spiritual mind has spiritual notions of things carnal? See 1 Cor. 2.14. Joh. 6.44. & 8.43. & 12.39, 40. So also for the corrupt will, it cannot possibly have any connatural virtue, next power or formal capacity for the production of any virtuose Act. Is it possible, that a natural power should have any causal connexion with or connaturalitie unto a supernatural act or effect? (4) Should we suppose corrupt Nature to have any moral power for the production of Virtue, would not this subvert the whole Oeconomie and Dispensation of efficacious Grace? For [1] Thence the whole efficace of Grace would be measured and specificated according to the complexion of Freewill, and so variated according to its diversity. [2] Whence also the last differential reason whereby Grace is differenced from Nature must be resolved into Nature. [3] Natural Freewill would, from this Hypothesis, be of itself and nextly flexible to spiritual good; and so Virtue not the gift of God. Aristotle himself, who was a good Friend to corrupt Nature, confesseth, all good to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the gift of God. (5) From sacred Philosophy. Jer. 13.33. Thus Jer. 13.23. Can the Ethiopian change his skin? etc. Consider [1] That this is a proverbial speech, touching the vain attemts of such as endeavour to bring about things impossible. Hence that common Proverb, To wash a Black-moor, relating to such as attemt things impossible. [2] The manner of expressing it is very emphatic: for such rhetoric interrogations carry in them more vehement logic negations. Then he adds: or the Leopard his spots? Then may ye also do good, who are accustomed to do evil. And that this impotence is total and universal, on all mankind, is evident from that other Proverb, Ezech. 16.44. As is the mother such is the daughter, Ezech. 16.44. i. e. This contagion runs in the blood, it is an hereditary disease, commun to all mankind. Hence sinners are said to be borne in sin, Psal. 51.5. and to be in sin, Exod. 32.22. 1 Joh. 5.19. The whole world is said to be in sin, i. e. immersed and plunged thereinto. What this impotence to sin is, and how far natural, we have explicated Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 5. §. 1. 4. Prop. Man under the servitude of Sin cannot dispose or prepare himself for the reception of Virtue. Thus Greg. Nyss. or de Scopo Christ. Man cannot prepare himself for Virtue. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The force of human virtue is not of itself sufficient to elevate Souls void of Grace to a form of divine life, unless God build the house, etc. That there can be no disposition, though never so remote, unto true moral Virtue from the alone faculty of Nature, is evident; because nothing can dispose itself to a condition above its nature, by its own force, unless it be influenced by a superior Agent. A man in the state of corrupt nature cannot by all his own forces natural or moral (1) overcome any one tentation: or (2) mortify any one lust: or (3) attain any one good thought, inclination, or desire: or (4) remove the Remora, or bar in his heart against conversion: or (5) by doing what in him lieth lay any obligation on God to give grace. I know it is a Position maintained by some, That such as improve their natural abilities to their utmost power, shall thereby obtain supernatural Grace. But for answer hereto [1] It's certain, that none ever did or will improve to the utmost their natural abilities. [2] Or if men should improve their natural forces to the utmost, what obligation is there on God to give to such supernatural Grace? Is God obliged by any law or promise to give grace upon the performance of such an act or condition which is in itself sinful, and hath nothing of true moral virtue in it? And have we not already sufficiently proved, that there can be no true moral virtue but by supernatural Grace? That there is no law or obligation on God to give supernatural Grace to natural emprovements is well demonstrated by Bradwardine, de Caus. Dei, l. 1. c. 37. pag. 316. Yea doth it not imply a contradiction in the Adject, that man should make a right use of his natural abilities, or prepare himself for the reception of supernatural Grace? Is it not also a sacrilegious Hypothesis to suppose, that God should fetch the common rule of his giving or not giving grace from man's dignity or indignity? Corrupt nature wants not only an active power to do good, but also an immediate passive power to receive good: thence it can't dispose itself to virtue, which is above its natural capacity. Is not all true virtue above the whole sphere of corrupt nature? The Greek Fathers, such as were more orthodox, acknowleged, That the preparation to Grace was from Grace: whence it was by them termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the direction of the way: also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the preparation of the will: likewise, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the attraction of God. That man cannot either the condigno or de congruo merit the first grace, is generally asserted by the sober Schoolmen, as Bradwardine de Causa Dei, l. 1. c. 39 and Greg. Ariminensis, Sent. 2. Dist. 26. Quaest. 1. Thence the Dominicans in the Council of Trent, (Hist. Counc. Trent, pag. 209.) denied, That the works preceding vocation are truly preparatory, and ever gave the first place to God. And Alvarez, Auxil. Disp. 36. Can. 1. demonstrates, that God never established any Law for the giving grace to such who should improve to the utmost their natural power. But none has more fully improved this Hypothesis, than Jansenius, August. Tom. 3. l. 1. c. 5. where he proves, that men's actions in their natural state merit damnation; and therefore they cannot thereby merit grace. And sacred Philosophic informs us, Jer. 17.9. Jer. 17.9. The heart is above allthings fraudulent. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to supplant and undermine, whence the word here signifies perverse, full of wiles, fraud, guile. Thence it follows: and desperately wicked: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, desperately sick, diseased, incurable, wicked. And if so, then how impossible is it, that it should prepare or dispose itself for the reception of virtue? See this more fully demonstrated, Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 5. §. 1. Hence, 5. Prop. Freewill in lapsed corrupt Nature hath no moral active power or faculty flexible to any spiritual or truly moral good. In corrupt Nature no Freewill to moral Good. This Proposition is but the result of the former, and may be demonstrated from these following Heads. The Assertion of such a moral Freewill in lapsed Nature doth (1) raise up the human corrupt Will to the condition of God, and is the Nurse of all Sin. It feeds men's pride and affectation of a Deity, vainglory, carnal confidence, security, Atheism, unbelief, ingratitude. It also cuts the nerves of all divine consolation and peace of conscience. (2) It pulls down God from his Throne of Grace, and reduceth him to the condition of a Creature. [1] It strikes at the very Being of God, making him to be dependent on, and moved by the human Wil [2] It subvertes all the divine Attributes; the Simplicity, immutability, Infinitude, Omnipotence, Science, Goodness, Will, and all the Decrees of God. [3] It strikes at the Dominion of God over his rational Creatures, and ties him up by Laws and Rules of Justice dependent on the merits of his Creatures. [4] It cuts off God's Providence and Gubernation over the human Will, making it to be independent as to God's Concourse. [5] It abandons and banisheth out of the world all supernatural efficacious Grace: admitting no Grace but what will stoop and submit to the dominion of the human Will, and its sovereign Empire. [6] It is blasphemously injuriose to Christ, and all his mediatory Offices. It subvertes his Priestly Office, by laying a foundation for human Merits, etc. It strikes at his Prophetic Office, by denying a necessity of divine Revelation and Illumination, in order to Salvation. It undermines his Imporial Throne as King, by denying him any Jurisdiction over the human Wil It dispirits his special Love to the Elect, by attributing to him universal grace and love to all, even Reprobates. [7] It takes away the office of the Spirit of Grace. [8] It enervates the whole Covenant of Grace, by reducing the whole of man's Salvation to a Covenant of Works. Yea [9] whiles it seems to exalt the Law of God, it doth really take away the use thereof as a rule of life. These and many other are the injuries which this Freewill offers to God and man. (3) Sacred Philosophy is positive and express in denying corrupt Nature any Freewill to what is morally good. Joh. 1.13. So Joh. 1.13. Not of blood, i. e. by natural generation. Nor of the will of the flesh: i. e. Freewill in corrupt Nature, which is frequently in the Scriptures termed flesh by reason of its impotence and infirmity. So Joh. 3.6. Whatever is borne of the flesh, i. e. of corrupt Nature, or Freewill in its highest elevation and refinement, as adorned with the most raised commun illuminations and graces, as Esa. 40.6. Nor of the widow of man: i. e. the best of men or Ministers, as God's Ambassadors. But of God: i. e. by his gloriose efficacious power. So 2 Pet. 1.3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 2 Pet. 1.3. by glory and virtue: i. e. by his gloriose virtue or power. For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue in God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, his divine power, as Hesychius. So it's used by the LXX. Hab. 3.3. Zech. 6.17 where it answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifies Glory, Power, or gloriose Power. And indeed it seems to be the grand design of sacred Philosophy to divest corrupt Nature and Freewill of all pretence to what is morally or spiritually good. Can a vitiated corrupt Will be supposed to have any natural connexion with, or Virtue formally effective of a divine life? Is it possible that the new Creature should be borne of the will of the flesh, which is potent and good for nothing but sin? And must indeed the divine Will be subordinate to man's Freewill in the dispensation of grace? Is it not more becoming the human Will to be subordinate to the divine? Must we take the adequate reason of God's dispensing grace from the improvement of Nature? Is not the gift of Grace a participation of the divine Nature? Must it not then exceed the whole sphere of create Nature? Is it not strange Theology, to reduce the discrimination of good and evil men to the contingence of man's ambulatory corrupt Freewill? May we not justly apply Augustins' complaint against Cicero to such Divines, who, to make men free, make him also sacrilegious, and a robber of God? In sum, we deny not, but that the Will is naturally free as to its physic act, but we deny that it is morally free as to the mode or manner of acting well. Thus we see how this Pelagian Philosopheme doth elevate the Creature to the condition of God, and pulls down God to the condition of a Creature. Thence Cyril, Thes. assert. 32. to 5. pag. 268. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For we deny, that there is one natural operation of God and the Creature: that we may not elevate that which is create to the divine Essence; nor, on the contrary, depress the excellence of the divine Essence to a place agreeable to Creatures. Wherein he sums up the grand design of the Pelagians then newly started up. Clemens Alexandr. Strom. l. 2. & 5. is very invective against the fectators of Basilides and Valentinus; because they head, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that Faith is natural: i. e. educible out of the potence of corrupt Nature. Which Hypothesis all the Assertors of moral Freewill are fond of. Theodoritus, in Psal. 118.32. saith peremtorily: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Neither can human Nature rightly perform virtue without divine aid. It's a great Effate of Basil, in his Homily of Humility, where explicating that of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 4.7. And what hast thou that thou didst not receive? 1 Cor. 4.7. etc. he thus philosophiseth: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Here all the sublimity of pride falls to the ground: there is nothing left thee, O man, as matter of arrogance. Tell me, why dost thou lift up thyself, in reference to thine own good works; whenas thou oughtest rather to render thanks to the Donor of them? For what hast thou, which thou hast not received? And if thou hast received any thing, why dost thou glory, as if thou receivedst it not? Thou hast not known God by thine own justice, but God hath known thee by his own benignity. Thence he adds: It is the greatest stupidity not to understand a man is partaker of grace, but to arrogate to his own Virtue what belongs to Grace. CHAP. V Of Plato's Polity, its essential Constitution, and Administration. Politic Philosophy what. Polity its Form in Order: its Object, the Community: its first Founder, God. Man's inclination to Society. The Constitution of a Politic Body from Consociation; which is formalised by some Law. Politic Amity and Fraternity, founded in Religion. The Ends of Polity, (1) God's Glory. (2) Virtue. (3) Public Good. (4) Mutual Assistance. A Politic Body or City what. Legislation, its Origine. Laws their Necessity and Origine. The Qualifications of Legislators Laws from the multitude: for public Good: their principal end Virtue. Their Qualities: the Law of Equity. Politic Government, Monarchic, Aristocratic, Democratic, or mixed. Moderate Empire best. Tyrannic Empire, its Origine, etc. Civil Magistrates, their End. Their Qualifications, (1) Wisdom, (2) virtue, (3) Public Spirits. Their Education. Their Authority and Office as Conservators of the Law. The Exercise of their Office, with Justice, Temperance, Moderation and Clemence. Things destructive to Polity; Atheism, Luxury, Divisions, Injustice. §. 1. MOral Philosophy regards persons either in their single Capacities, Politic Philosophy. or as conjunct in Societies: the former which they style Ethic, we have dispatched, and therefore pass on to philosophise, though more cursorily, of the later. A Society, called by the Grecians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Community, or Communion, is either of a single Family, or of many Families incorporated: Moral Philosophy, as it regards a single Family, is termed Oeconomie; as many Families incorporated, Politic. The former is but a species of the later, and may be deservedly included therein; and therefore Plato hath not philosophised distinctly thereof. But of the later, namely Politic, he philosophiseth most copiosely and accurately, in his Menexenus, Politicus, Minos, Epinomis, X. Books of Republic, and XII. Books of Laws. That Plato traduced the chief Ideas of his Politic Philosophemes from Mosaic Politics, either immediately or mediately, is generally asserted by the Learned both ancient and modern. Thus Clemens Alexandr. Strom. 1. pag. 256, 257. and Admon. ad Gentes. Eusebius, praepar. Evang. l. 12. c. 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 47, 48. Of which see Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 9 §. 6. & Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 6. §. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Polity, according to the Platonic Definition, Polity its form in Order. pag. 4.13. is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A lawful or regular communion of a multitude sufficient to Beatitude. In which Description we have the formal Constitution, Object, and End of Polity. 1. It's formal constitution, which consists in a lawful regular Communion, or Order. Thus Aristotle, Polit. 3.1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Polity is the Order of the City. That Order is the Form, Spirit, and Life of all Polity is generally asserted by Politicians, and Philosophers. Thus Plato, Repub. 4. pag. 433. philosophising of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or good Order of a Republic under the notion of Universal Justice, he makes it to consist in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the regular consent of Governors and Governed, so that every one keeps his proper place and station, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that every one acts his own part, and intermeddles not with what is alien. This is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, good Order, which gives life and form to all Polity, that there be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a mutual consent between Magistrates and people, to walk and act according to that common Law or Rule they are under. Thus also pag. 443. he makes Justice to be the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Eutaxie of moderate Empire, i. e. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the natural constitution of Governors and Governed: when each understands and acts his proper parts. This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good Order, he makes to be, pag. 444. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Virtue, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Preservation, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Health, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the good Habitude, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Pulchritude or Beauty of a Republic. Whereas, on the contrary, Disorder, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, when men keep not their stations, but invade the offices or places of others, he makes to be that which brings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Disease, Turpitude, Infirmity, vitiosity, and Anarchy, or Confusion to a Republic. Thus pag. 434. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore seeing there are these three distinct orders of men in a City, a curiosity in meddling with the Office of another, and mutual Permutation or Invasion of each others place, is that which without all doubt brings the greatest damage to a City, and therefore may be rightly termed its peste. This Invasion of each others place he makes to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a certain sedition, as also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Insurrection and Ataxy or want of good order in the City. Plato tells us also, That the best and most perfect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polity consists 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in a well agreeing temperament or harmony of all parts, so that every member keeps its station. This also, Repub. 2. pag. 372. he makes to be the Universal Justice of a Republic, that allthings be acted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to right Order. The force of which order diffuseth itself throughout all parts, and is in a special manner visible in the distinct Administrations and Subordinations of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Rulers and Ruled: which have each their proper offices and works. Thence, in his Repub. 4. he makes the Justice of a City to consist in this, That every one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 do what belongs to him; and thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, what is convenient: So that albeit there are divers Ranks of men, yet they all, by virtue of this universal Justice, conspire to make up one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Symmetry or exact proportion and good order, which gives form and perfection to every Society. Thence that of Nazianzen, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Order is the Mother of Being's, as also their security. This good Order, definite. Plat. pag. 413. is thus defined: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Order is a similitude of office and action in all persons and things that relate each to the other: or, more concisely and distinctly, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a proportion of Society or Communion: i. e. when every person and thing keeps its proper place and station. The seeds of this Order are diffused throughout all parts of human Polities, and are the main Foundation of all Society and Communion: For where things are not bounded by Order, there infinite confusions disturb Societies. Thence Augustin, de Civit. Dei, l. 13. c. 13. defines Order the Disposition of things equal and inequal, giving to every thing its proper place. And herein he makes the Health both of Soul and Body to consist: yea indeed the Conservation, Beauty, Perfection, Vigour, and Activity of all Bodies, both natural and artificial, Military, Politic, and Ecclesiastic, seem chief to consist in their right Order. Thence Job 10.22. the confusion of the grave or state of the dead is lively illustrated by this, that it is a land of darkness without any order: i. e. where there is no orderly succession of day and night; or no order among men. Plato philosophiseth accurately of the great Advantages which allthings acquire by Order. So in his Gorgias, pag. 503. If we consult Painters, and Builders, and all other Artificers, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, how each of them dispose their work distinctly in the best order, and compel allthings to agree each to other, till their whole work be constituted and composed in order, and with ornament. Thence he adds, pag. 504. That Order is that which gives Beauty, Form, and Perfection to all Bodies: of which see more in what follows, §. 5. Again he saith, pag. 506. The virtue of every thing, both of an instrument, and of body, and mind, and lastly of every thing animate is not rashly and confusedly acquired, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but by Order and Rectitude, etc. Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That therefore which is constituted and conformed by Order, is the virtue of every thing. And thence he subjoins: That Order or ornament which is proper and peculiar to every thing, brings good to allthings. By all this it appears, that the Life, Beauty, Well-being, and Perfection of any Society consists in its Order. And the reason is evident; because all Polities and politic Bodies, whether Civil or Ecclesiastic, are not composed of homogeneous similar parts, all of like name and nature with themselves and the whole, but of dissimilar, such as consist of divers Members, of distinct Offices, Forms, Situations, Places: as the human body is composed of divers members, which have all their proper situation, office, etc. So in politic Bodies there is variety of Members, which are all to keep their station, and legitime subordination, without invading each others place or function. Whence Plato placeth Civil Justice in this, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not to invade the affairs of others; but to perform each his own work. And as Order gives Form, Beauty, Vigour, and Perfection to Military, Natural, Artificial and Civil Bodies, so also to Ecclesiastic. Thence the Apostle saith, Col. 2.5. it was a great joy to him, Col. 2.5. to behold their order. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily notes military Order, which of all Orders seems most beautiful and exquisite. Whence the Church, in regard of her incomparable admirable Order, is said to be, Cant. 6.10. Cant. 6.10. Terrible as an Army with Banners. What more terrible to an enemy, and admirable to friends, than to see an Army on the March, wel-disciplinated, with Banners flying, and every part moving orderly? §. 2. The formal Reason of Polity being dispatched, The object of Polity. we now pass on to its Object, which in the Platonic Definition is brought in under the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Multitude or Community, not simply considered, but as consociated or conjoined by some common ligament and bond. For in as much as no man can politically rule himself, nor yet one another properly, therefore Polity requires a multitude united together, which Community is termed a City or Republic. And indeed man is borne for Society, as his Speech, and Affections do sufficiently indigitate: wherefore all persons naturally incline to consociation, either Domestic or Politic. Domestic Consociation is either the first community and unity of man and woman, Gen. 2.23, 24. instituted by the Law of Creation, Gen. 2.23, 24. or of parents and children; or of the whole Family. Politic Consociation is of many Families in one City, or of many Cities in one Republic. And for the more full and distinct explication of the whole we are to inquire into the original Foundation, Causes, and Effects of politic Consociation and Community. 1. God the Founder of all Politics. The original prime Founder of all politic Society is God. Thence Plato, Leg. 4. tells us, That every Republic rightly constituted depends, not on human Comments, but on Divine Constitution or Laws: whence he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore in order to the right constitution of a City let us first call upon God, that he being present would favour our desires, and adorn our City with good Laws. Whence Politic. pag. 290. he saith, That among the Egyptians the King was a Priest, to show that he ought to consult God in all his Administrations. Thence all your great Legislators and Founders of Cities, when they were about to lay the foundation of their politic Societies, consulted, in appearance at least, some divine Oracle, as that without which they expected no happy issue of their undertakements. Thus Numa pretended, that he had his Laws for the Roman Government from the Nymph Egeria, in the Arecine Grove; and Zaleucus, his for the Locrian Constitution, from Minerva; and Lycurgus, his for the Lacedaemonian Republic, from Apollo at Delphos; and Minos, his for the Cretians, from Jupiter in the Cretensian Den. And that Plato did really traduce the best of his politic Constitutions from the divine Constitutions delivered by Moses, we have more largely proved, Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 9 §. 6. 2. Man's inclination to Society. God hath implanted in Mankind a natural Inclination to Society. Thus Plato, in his Politicus, pag. 261. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But we shall not find that a Politician doth concern himself about one single thing only, as he that drives an ox, or dresseth an horse: but he is rather like such as provide for a number of horses or bullocks. Whereby he illustrates how Politics regard not single persons, but men in Society and Community. Whence in what follows, he calls this politic Science, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Nutrition of an Herd, or the common Nutrition: i. e. as he explicates his own mind, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the common Nutrition, or Gubernation of many. He makes politic Philosophy to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, namely as it concerns a Community or Company of men, who are of all other living Creatures most 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, inclinable to flock together as Herds. For as God hath given Man the benefit of Reason and Speech, the principal Organs of Society; so he has also given him natural inclinations and affections of and for Consociation. And that which renders these natural inclinations more efficacious and forcible, is the indigent necessitous condition of man in this his lapsed condition, which calls for the Advice, Conduct, Assistance, and Relief of Society, as hereafter, when we come to the Ends of Polity. 3. Albeit man has a natural inclination to Society, Consociation constitutes a politic Body. yet that which formaliseth and constitutes any politic Body is Confederation and Consociation. For a politic Body being an aggregate collected out of many individuals, cannot acquire any real union but by Confederation. Thus Plato, Repub. 4. pag. 433. makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The consent of Governors and Governed to be the formal bond of all politic Societies. This consent or confederation is either in a way of Subordination between the Governors and Governed, or in a way of Coordination between the Governed themselves. That Confederation is essential to all politic Society is evident from the very nature of Order, which gives form to all Polity. What is Order but the union of the things ordered? And what union can there be between variety of persons, but by mutual consent? The Order, Beauty, Vigour, Force, Consistence, flourishing, and perfection of allthings both Natural, Artificial, Moral and Politic consist in their Unity: Division ever brings with it Dissolution and Confusion: every natural body hangs together by some ligament or common bond of Union; so in like manner all politic Bodies. Now what bond of union can there be in a politic Body but Confederation? Plato, Repub. 4. assures us, That the best Term or boundary of any City is its Unity: and what more conduceth to the Unity of a City than Consociation by mutual consent? This may be also argued from the very nature and Idea of a City; which is defined by Grotius, de Jur. Belli & Pacis, pag. 6. A perfect Company of Freemen consociated for common utility, and enjoying the same Right. So that Confederation is by all made essential to a politic Body, whether Civil or Ecclesiastic. 4. Confederation by some Law. The Confederation and Consociation of every politic Body must be bounded and regulated by some common Law. There can be no politic Society without consent unto some certain Bond of Consociation: which Bond is that common Law, whereby the Order of that Society is bounded and regulated. Thus Plato, in his Politicus tells us, That in all politic Community and Society, for the preventing Tyranny and Anarchy, there must be Laws agreed on, according to which Magistrates must rule and people obey. Thus also, Leg. 3. he saith, That man being by nature, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sociable and communicative, he cannot want society: neither can human society want a Law: which Law gives bounds and measures to all Orders, whereby the excesses of the more patent are restrained, and the defects of the more infirm relieved. The like in his Protagoras, pag. 326. where he tells us, That a wel-governed Republic is bounded by the formule of certain Laws, which prescribe the Offices both of Rulers and Ruled, and compel each to live accordingly. This is also well expressed by Hooker in his Ecclesiastic Polity, pag. 25. Two foundations there are which bear up public Societies; the one a natural Inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship; the other an Order, expressly or secretly agreed upon, touching the manner of their union in living together. The later is that which we call the Law of a Communwealth, the very Soul of a politic Body, the parts whereof are by Law animated, held together, and set on work in such actions as the common good requireth. Thus much touching the necessity of some common Law as the bond of Confederation: but as for the Origine, Nature, and Effects of politic Laws, we are to treat thereof under politic Legislation, §. 5. 5. Amity and Fraternity. Perfect Polity requires not only Confederation, but also intime Amity and Fraternity. Plato, Repub. 3. pag. 415. gives us a Phenician Fable, touching the original Fraternity of all men, which he makes to be the foundation of Polities: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Ye are indeed all, who converse together in the City, Brethren; but seeing God has made those of you, who are fit to rule, as Gold, and those who are to assist them, as Silver; the Ruled are but as Iron and Brass. Two things are here laid down, (1) That all the Members of a politic Society are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, borne out of the Earth, that commun Mother, and therefore a Fraternity. (2) Yet so as that this Fraternity may not destroy the distinct Orders of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Governors and Governed. This Amity and Fraternity is sometimes termed Familiarity, which definite. Plat. is thus described: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Familiarity is a Communion or Society of the same kind. Sometimes it is styled Fellowship, which is thus defined: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Fellowship is an Amity according to the same custom of life. According to the Civil Law, a Society is defined, a right of Fraternity. Societas est jus fraternitatis. Thence Bacon, in the Life of Henry VII. tells us, (what we all know by experience) That Colleges and Societies of Merchants and Artificers, according to the English mode, are called Fraternities. So the Pythagoreans called, in imitation of the Essenes', their Society 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Fraternity. Plato carried this Amity and Fraternity so far as to take away all distinction of meum and tuum, and to reduce all to a community of Goods. So Repub. 5. pag. 462. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, These words Mine and not Mine are not used in the City. And pag. 464. he gives the reason of this community of allthings: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, There are no contentions or Lawsuits each with other, because none shall have any thing proper to himself, but his own person: allthings else are commun to al. This community of allthings, if well bounded, and not abused, may be of great use in some cases; as in the primitive Churches it was a great effect of that Fraternity and Amity which was among them, as Act. 2.44, 45, 46. Thence Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 463. Act. 2.44, 46. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, He estimes and calls his familiar friend as himself. We find this Fraternity and Community established to an high degree by Lycurgus in the Spartan Republic, as Plutarch in the Life of Lycurgus, pag. 49, etc. relates: Lycurgus persuaded the Spartans' to make a new division of their Lands equally among themselves; to live from thenceforth as Brethren together, so that none should seek to go before each other, save in virtue only: thinking there should be no difference or inequality among inhabitants of one City, but the reproaches of dishonesty and praise of virtue— Further he made another Law for eating and drinking, and against Festes and Banquets. First he commanded them to eat together all of one meat, and chief of those he had permitted by his Ordinance. In these common Repastes, which the Cretians called Andria, and the Lacedæmonians Philitia; either because they were places wherein they learned to live soberly, from Phido, to save or spare; or else because their amity and friendship grew there one towards another, as if they would have called them Philitia Love-festes, by changing d into l. And Plato, Leg. 11. pag. 915. makes mention of such a kind of Love-feste in use among the Grecians. His words are: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. In that kind of Feste, which is made up of Symbols or Collations, and called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and celebrated among friends, etc. This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Love-feste was for the preservation of love and amity among those of the same Society; which was in use also among the Jews, as it appears by their Feste after the Passeover; whence the Grecians seem to have borrowed their custom, as the Christians their Love-festes, mentioned Judas 12. Judas 12. See more of the nature of this Friendship, Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 6. §. 1, etc. 6. Religion the principal foundation of Polities. The principal Foundation and Ligament of all politic Fraternity and Society is Religion. Thus Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 713. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But it behoved, if the City be designed by this name, that it be called by the name of God himself, who is the true Lord of wise men. His mind is, that a City ought to be composed of wise virtuose men, who have God for their Lord, and therefore may be called the City of God. Whence he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Namely this Discourse retaining the vestigia of the primigenous Truth teacheth, that there will be no cessation of evils and troubles in those Cities, whatsoever they be, in which not God, but some mere mortal ruleth: but it commandeth, that, with all possible endeavours we imitate that life, which was under Saturn, i. e. in the golden Age of the state of Innocence, in which Religion and Virtue flourished. Thence in his Politicus, pag. 290. Plato acquaints us, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. That among the Egyptians it is not lawful for a King to rule without a Priesthood: yea if any one out of the Royal line should by violence usurp the Empire, he is forced to be initiated in Sacreds'. Moreover in many Cities of Grece, and specially among you [Athenians] thou shalt find the chief Sacreds' to be instituted by the supreme Magistrates. For among you they say, that the most august Sacreds' and most ancient Rites of Religion are committed to the charge of the King created. By which he shows how much the supreme Magistrate, both among the Egyptians and Grecians, was concerned for the conservation of Religion. Thence Campanella, Pol. cap. 8. pag. 156. saith, That the Priesthood acts God's part in an Empire: therefore there never was any Republic or Society of men, nor yet can be without a Priesthood. So essential is Religion to politic Societies. How much the Civil Magistrate is to concern himself for the conservation of Religion is evident from the promise and practice of David, Psal. 75.2, 3. Psal. 75.2. When I shall receive the congregation, I will judge uprightly. David promiseth in these words, that when he should obtain the full gubernation of the Kingdom, he would administer it with justice, and settle Religion, which was then miserably dissolved. So it follows v. 3. The earth and all the inhabitants thereof are dissolved: I bear up the pillars of it. By the Earth he means the Judaic Kingdom, which was grown very dissolute: but, saith he, I do or [by an Enallage of Tenses] I will bear up, or confirm, the pillars thereof. Some by pillars understand just and religiose Magistrates: others, Religion and Justice, which are the primary pillars of a Nation, and these David promiseth to confirm, when King. That Religion is the principal Pillar of any State Plato more expressly inculcates, Repub. 4. pag. 424. where he premits this as a preliminary proposition: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For a Republic, if it be once well begun, doth always increase as a circle. Whereby he shows, that the perfection of a Republic depends greatly on a good beginning. Thence he proceeds to show, That the best beginning and perfection of a Republic consists in Religion, which he symbolically expresseth under the notion of Music: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore the Fortress, as it seems, in which the Office of the Keepers is constituted, consists in Music. And the prevarication hereof doth secretly steal into and influence men's minds. (1) By the Keepers he understands the Magistrates, whom he makes to be Conservators of the Laws. (2) He saith, the Fortress and strong Tower of these Conservators of the Laws consists in the Discipline of Music. That by the Discipline of Music must be understood Religion, is evident by the coherence, as also by the use of this phrase elsewhere: For Plato, herein following the Pythagorean mode, styleth Virtue and Religion Music or Harmony. (3) He saith, the prevarication or perversion of Religion hath a great force and efficace for the corrupting men's minds: and therefore the preservation of it has great influence on the well-being of Societies. Thence, in his Leg. 12. pag. 966. he saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Is not this one of the chiefest things, concerning which we have hitherto much discoursed, namely touching God, that he is, and how great and august his forces are, as to human affairs? Whence he concludes: That no one ought to be elected to the Office of a public Magistrate, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, save he that is divine or religiose, and addicted to divine studies. Wherein he assertes (1) That the knowledge of God is the best Wisdom and the very Soul of Virtue. (2) That nothing is more 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, impolitic, or against the interest of a politic Society, than the ignorance of God, and neglect of Religion: For without Laws a Republic cannot be happy: neither can there be good Laws without a prudent knowledge of what is best: neither can there be a prudent knowledge of what is best, without the knowledge of God. (3) He shows also that a Republic cannot be happy without Virtue, which also belongs to Religion. (4) Having placed Religion as the Foundation of an happy Republic, he explicates the parts thereof, such as are most influential on politic Bodies, namely the knowledge of the Deity, his Providence, Justice, etc. Thus elsewhere Plato makes Religion to be the principal Fundamen of a Republic, and thence more ancient: wherefore the first care of Legislators and Politicians, in order to the right constitution of any Republic, as also for the preservation thereof, aught to be for the establishment of Religion. The like Aristotle, Eth. l. 1. c. 13. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It's manifest that a Politician ought to know what concerns the Soul, as he that will cure the eyes, must understand the whole body. His design is to show that it belongs to Politicians and Statesmen to make the people happy, and thence to make them virtuose. Campanella, Polit. cap. 7. tells us, That three Causes, (to speak politicly) found and govern Empires, namely God, Prudence, and Occasion; but in some Empires one is more visible, in some another. In the Hebraic Kingdom God was more visible; in the Roman, Prudence; in the Spanish, Occasion. Although physically God is the Cause of all other Causes. Whence Cap. 8. he adds: That all Governements (except wicked Machiavelli) have acknowleged, that Prudence doth not so far avail, as to foreknow what Goods or Evils are approaching; therefore all Nations have had recourse to God, etc. But how much the Interest of any politic Body or State lies involved in that of Religion, is excellently laid down by Padre Paul the Venetian, that pious and great Politician, as we find it in his Life, pag. 161. Touching the provisions that were to be made from time to time with the Senators, the Father gave his opinion and counsel viuâ voce and vehemently upon all occurrents, having always taught and inculcated, that not only for Truth and Conscience sake, but even for Necessity and Reasons of State every faithful man, but most of all Princes ought to invigilate the maintenance and conservation of Religion. He affirmed, that to this end God had constituted Princes as his Lieutenants, in those States wherein the Church was planted, and conferred their greatness on them, to make them Protectors, Defenders, Conservators of the holy Church, as sacred Scripture makes mention: in which calling the greatest of them can never give a sufficient discharge of himself, except it be by a godly and vigilant care in matters of Religion. Thus that great Master of Wisdom and true Christian Politics. How much Religion is the support of States, is well determined by Solomon, the wisest Politician, or rather by Christ himself, Prov. 8.15. By me King's reign, etc. or, as some render it, In me, i. e. in the exalting of me Kings reign most prosperously. The exaltation of Christ is the support and exaltation of States: Religion is both the conservant and promovent Cause of States, 1 King. 11.37, 38. Jeroboam held his Crown by it. So Deut. 9.25, 29. §. 3. Having finished the original and principal Causes of politic Societies, we now descend to its principal Ends, which, The Ends of Polity. in the Platonic Definition are all included in that notion, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for the Beatitude, or well-being of a politic Body. This politic Beatitude implies many particulars. God's Glory. As 1. The Glory of God, which is the last end not only in Ethic or moral, but also in politic Beatitude. Thus Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 713. assures us, That all manner of evils will befall that State, where God reigns not. And he adds the reason, pag. 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. God hath in himself the principe, and end and middle of allthings: i e. allthings not only natural and moral, but also politic have their origine from God, dependence on him, and therefore ought to end in him, as their main Centre. Whence, pag. 716. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. But God is to us principally the measure of allthings. Lastly, pag. 717. he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. This [namely the Worship and Service of God] is the primary end of our life, unto which all our actions ought to collime, as arrows to their Scope. Thence he proceeds, according to his blind capacity, to show how we ought to honour and worship God. Hence, 2. Virtue. Another principal end of politic Society is to render men virtuose, and like unto God. This indeed Plato greatly inculcates. So Leg. 4. pag. 716. he saith, That a good man follows God, and is like unto him, and therefore only fit to honour and worship him; which gives stability to a State. So Leg. 12. he makes the knowledge of God and Virtue the great pillars and principal end of Politics. Thence Leg. 9 pag. 877. he saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It behoveth a City to have its Families, so far as it may be, most holy and most happy. Wherein he seems to place the happiness of a City in its Holiness and Virtue. So Alcibiad. 1. pag. 134. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It cannot therefore be, that any should be happy unless good. Whence he adds: Therefore, Alcibiades, Cities want not Walls or Naval forces to render them happy: neither can they be so by a multitude of men, or by the magnitude of power without Virtue. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But if thou dost purpose to govern the Republic rightly and worthily, Virtue is to be communicated to thy Citizens. Thence definite. Plat. pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, politic Philosophy is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Science of things honest and utile: Also, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Science effective of Justice in the City. The like Aristotle, in his Ethics, l. 1. c. 13. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. And it seems, that he who is really a Politician gives his mind and endeavours chief to this; [namely Virtue] because his design is to make Citizens good and obedient to Laws. We have instances hereof in the Cretensian and Lacedaemonian Legislators: who made it the grand design to promove Virtue. So l. 1. c. 9 he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, We made the last end of politic Philosophy to be the chiefest Good: but this makes it the chiefest Concern to render the Citizens well qualified, and good, and Agents of the best things. Such illustrious notices had these poor Pagans of the essential connexion between Virtue and true Politics. 3. Another principal end of politic Society is the good of the whole, The Good of the whole. not only of particulars. Thus Plato, Repub. 4. pag. 420. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, We constitute a City, not for this end, that some one particular number of Citizens be separately happy, but principally that the whole City be so. The like he subjoins: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Now therefore we frame a Republic as happy, when not a few only therein are such, but the whole. That the public good is a principal end of all Polity, and politic Society Plato frequently assertes. So Repub. 1. pag. 345. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But now I esteemed it necessary for us to confess, that all Empire, as Empire, must regard the good of none other, but such as are subject to that Empire, and committed to its care, whether it be in politic or private Empire. Then he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, As if the profit from that dignity of governing were not to return to them, but to those that are subject to them. By which he instructes us, that Magistrates ought to intent not their private interest, but the public. Again, he saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That must be done which seems best for the City. And elsewhere he saith, That neither Republics nor Laws are good, but seditiose, when the public good is not principally regarded. Thence Leg. 9 pag. 859. he tells us, That Legislators ought to put on the person of a Father, not of a Tyrant, i.e. they ought to aim at the public good, not their own private advantage: For public Laws ought to regard public good. But of this more in what follows of politic Administrations, Laws, and Magistrates. Hence, 4. Mutual Assistance. Mutual Assistance is another principal end of politic Society. This Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 369. largely philosophiseth on, as that which gave the original foundation to all politic Societies. He gins thus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. A City thence received its origine, because none of us was of himself sufficient, but deficient as to many things. Thence he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [scil. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But our necessity, as it seems, will make this City. (1) He makes our necessity and indigence that which first gave origine to all Cities and politic Societies. (2) The cause of this necessitic he makes to be the insufficience of all men to live of themselves, without mutual assistances each from other: Hence it was, saith he, that men at first congregated into Societies, for the mutual relief each of other, Gen. 2.18. according to that general Edict of God, Gen. 2.18. It is not good that man should be alone: which, albeit there it regards conjugal Society, yet it may be extended to all politic Society. For, as Aristotle saith, It was necessary, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that they consociate together, who cannot subsiste without each others assistance. Thence Plato proceeds to show the various degrees of Necessity, which forced men to congregate into politic Societies. (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The first and greatest kind of necessity is the provision of food, that we may subsiste and live. (2) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the second, of Habitation. (3) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the third, of Raiment and such like. Now for the supply of these necessities, he saith there must be in a politic Society variety of Artificers; for all are not sufficient for all employments; neither must any one invade the office of another; but every one ought to take that part as is most proper to him, of which more in what immediately follows §. 4. §. 4. A politic Body or City what. From what has been laid down touching the Constitution and Ends of Politic, we may with facility delineate the true Idea of a politic Body, as also what is preservative or destructive thereof. The Grecians usually confine the notion of a politic Body to a City; because at first their Republics and Polities were usually confined to one single City. Plato's Idea of a City with its origine we have, in what immediately precedes, hinted. He gives it us, Repub. 2. pag. 369. (as before) making the necessities of men the ground of their consociation; adding, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore in this manner whiles one associated to himself another, seeing there was need of many for that affair, necessity caused, that those first men congregated many into one seat and place of habitation, as companions and coadjutors each of other. This company of men we call a City. Wherein he gives us a summary description of a City, its Origine, End, Mater, and constitutive Parts; which he more copiosely explicates in what follows. (1) He makes the origine, end, and occasion of men's congregating into Cities to be commun necessities and mutual assistances. This he more fully explicates in what immediately follows: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But one again imparts what he hath to the other, or receiveth from his companion; thus mutually giving and receiving each from other; accounting this way of reciprocal communication ever best. Mutual assistance and communication is the original end and occasion of all politic Societies. The sum is this: Men being not in their single capacities 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-sufficient, they find themselves under an essential obligation to congregate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 into Corporations, that so they might assist each other by their mutual 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or conversation, which consists in their giving to, and receiving from each other. (2) As to the Mater of a City, as also other politic Bodies, he tells us, That it is not sufficient that it consist of three or sour members, but there must be a Society of different Occupations and Offices. This he insistes on, pag. 369, & 370. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, There is need therefore of more than four to provide those things of which we have spoken: i. e. Food, Raiment, Habitations, and other Conveniences; for which he tells us, that there is need of Husbandmen, and all manner of Artificers. And he gives his reason for it, pag. 370. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Because truly first every one is not borne alike to every one, but very divers in nature, therefore one is naturally more inclined to one work. Thus also pag. 371. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore our City needs many Husbandmen and other Artificers. And he gives the reason in what follows: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For which causes, namely that there might be a free Commerce and Trade, we have instituted a City. So that the main end of a City being freedom of commerce and mutual conversation, it's necessary that there be a multitude or community to constitute the same. (3) As to the formal Constitution of a City, as of all other politic Societies, he saith, this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Communion must not be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Confusion, but allthings must be transacted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, with Eutaxie or good Order, which he terms Justice, as it consists in the prescribing to each member his proper rank, place, office and exercise in the politic Body. For this good Order or universal Justice requires [1] That every member has his proper place and work prescribed to him; and that he take diligent heed not to invade the office and work of another. Which invasion Plato greatly condemns, as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a curiose and pragmatic interposition in other men's affairs. [2] That there be a due observation of the distinct Orders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of Governors and Governed. (4) last, he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the plenitude and perfection of a City or Republic to consist in the forementioned community and multitude under their different offices, conspiring together and falling into one certain harmony, for the common utility of the whole. Thence definite. Platon. pag. 415. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a City is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an habitation of a multitude of men using the same commun Decretes or Constitutions: Also, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a multitude of men, which are under the same Law. Whence it is added: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Virtue of a City is the constitution of a right Polity. Whence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Politician or Statesman is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, one that understands the constitution of a City or Republic. Agreably to those Platonic Philosophemes Aristotle, in his Politics, 1. & 5. makes a City to be a kind of animate or animal nature. For look as an Animal, rightly disposed according to nature, is composed of certain proportionate parts mutually ordinate, and communicating each to other, as also to the whole their exercices and operations; so in like manner a City, when duly disposed and instituted, is constituted of such proportionate parts, for the mutual aid and assistance each of other. And such as the comparation of an Animal and his parts is as to sanity, such is that of a City or Republic and its parts, as to tranquillity. And what is sanity, according to the Philosophemes of the wisest Physiologistes, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a good Disposition or right Order of all parts in the Animal, whereby they are capacitated perfectly to exert all exercitations and operations convenient to their nature: according to which Analogy or proportion the Tranquillity of a City or Republic is nothing else but its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, good Order or right Disposition of all its parts counected together by some common Law, as Marsilius Patavinus, that great Politician, in his Defensor pacis, cap. 2. pag. 6. has well determined. Cicero defines a Republic, Rem populi, the Affair of the People: and he desines the People, a Society of the multitude, Populus coetus multitudinis juris consensu & utilitatis communione sociatas, Cic. consociated by the consent of Right and communion of Utility: i. e. according to our English phraseology, The people are a Societis consociated by common consent and according to some Law, for public Good. This Strabo also, lib. 16. makes to be the origine and formal constitution of all ancient politic Societies, as we shall show §. 5. on that head of Legislation. A People is defined by Augustin, de Civ. Dei, l. 19 c. 24. a Society of the rational multitude consociated for concordant communion, in those things they consent unto. Which is by so much the better, by how much the more they concord in what is best; and by so much the worse by how much the more they concord in things that are worse. And as the process of Nature and Art is always from things less perfect, to that which is more perfect; so it hath been with all Societies, which begin at first only with two, Man and Woman, Gen. 2.18, etc. which Plato terms 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Whence this imperfect Society extended itself to more perfect families: and then domestic Society extended itself to Pagus, i. e. to the Society of Villages: for anciently Pagani were those in the same Pagus or Village, who drank of the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Dor. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. This Society of Villages at last extended itself to that of a City; as this, to that of a Republic, as Aristot. Polit. l. 1. c. 1. A City was at first instituted for the security, preservation, and well-being of the whole. Hence a City is defined by Augustin, de Civit. lib. 15. cap. 8. A multitude of men collected together by some common bond of Society. So also, de Civit. Dei, l. 1. c. 15. he saith, A City is nothing else but a concord multitude of men. Thence Grotius, de Jure belli, pag. 6. defines a City, a company of men consociated together for the enjoyment of the same Right and commun Utility. Wherein note (1) The generic Idea of a City, which is a Company or Community, i. e. perfect: for it is essential to a City, both as to Mater and Form, that it be perfect. It is perfect as to Mater, in that it is composed of all manner of Artificers and Occupations necessary for the subsistence and welfare of a Community. It is also perfect as to Form, as it has a perfect Order and Regiment, for the conservation and gubernation thereof. (2) Whence follows the formal constitution of a City, which consists in its regular consociation, of which before. (3) Thence also its End is, for the enjoyment of the same Right and commun Utility, of which also in what precedes. Touching a City, its constitution and perfection see more fully that pious and great Reformer, not only of Religion, but also of Philosophy, Savonarola, Epit. Ethicae, l. 10. §. 5. Legislation its Origine. Having hitherto discussed and explicated the essential Constitution of a Polity and politic Body, we now pass on to the Empire thereof, which consists in Legislation and Administration or Jurisdiction. That all politic Bodies are bounded and governed by Laws has been already proved, §. 2. And we find a clear account hereof in Strabo, Geogr. l. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Men that are politic or civil do lead their lives after one common Law, appointing them what to do: for otherwise, that a multitude should, without harmony among themselves, concur in the doing of one thing, it is impossible. Of what great use Laws are for the right ordering and governing Republics and all politic Bodies is well laid down by Plato, Protag. pag. 326. where speaking of the Education of Youth, he saith, That after they depart from under their Preceptors, the Republic compels them to learn the Laws, and to live according thereunto; a certain Formule being framed, that so none act rashly according to their own wills: but as Writing-masters prescribe such as begin to write certain half-letters, and strokes of the pen thereby to form their hand, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. So the Republic, having framed a Formule of Laws, invented by good and ancient Legislators, according to their prescript compels both those that govern and those that are governed to act: but if any transgress their bounds, him they punish: which kind of punishment they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Correction. 1. The necessity of Laws. Touching the Necessity of Laws, we have an excellent Disscourse in Plato, Leg. 9 p. 874 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. It's necessary that Laws be framed for men, that so they may live according to Laws: for if they should live without these, they would in nothing differ from the savage beasts. The cause whereof is this; because no man's ingeny is so framed by nature, as that he should certainly know what conduceth to the common utility of human life: or if he should know what is best, yet he is not always able or willing to act the same. This grand reason of State inducing a necessity of Laws he explicates in the parts thereof. (1) He saith it is very difficult without Laws for any to understand what most conduceth to the public good, which is the measure and bond of Societies. So pag. 875. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For first it is very difficult [without Laws] to know what that public, not private, interest is, which true politic Discipline is to provide for. Thence he adds: (2) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Moreover, although peradventure some one may, by the aid of politic Science, abundantly understand these things; yet if it be so, that he hath gained an absolute power, and is not obnoxious to the check of any other, he will not be able throughout his life to persevere in this resolution of preferring the public Interest as best, and of postponing his private concerns after the public utility; but mortal nature always impels him to his proper interest and private opportunity; which without all reason flies from grief and pursues pleasure— and thence will fill the City with all manner of evil. These are the principal reasons which enforce the establishment of Laws, namely mens ignorance of what is best, and their strong inclination to promove their private interest, more than the public good. Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Namely, if any mortal were endued with such a nature, as could understand the public good, and were, by a divine afflation, made apt to undertake the same, such an one would not need Laws or their Empire. But such a Divine nature, adds he, is not where to be found, and therefore there remains an absolute necessity of Laws, to instruct men in what is their duty, to restrain them from the prosecution of their private interest and lusts, as also to constrain them to what is good. Laws have much more force to compel men to their duty, than the wisest of men: For let men, though never so wise and just, oppose themselves in the wisest and most just manner to the irregularities of others, yet how inefficacious are their endeavours for reformation! what contradictions do they meet with from those they endeavour to reform? Yet let the same persons be instructed in their duty by a Law, and they are with more facility convinced thereof and inclined thereto: and why? because they presume the Law doth speak without prejudice, partiality, and private interest: therefore they look on it as the Oracle of God. 2. All Laws originally from God. As for the Origine of Laws, Plato assures us, That the best are such as come from God. For he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, No mere mortal can make Laws to purpose. Whereby he instructes us, that a Republic ought not to depend on mere Comments of men, but on some Divine Law, namely the eternal Mind and Will, which is the source of all true politic Laws. Whence also he saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Let us therefore call upon God for the right disposition of the City, and that he favouring us may be present, and grant our requests, and constitute our Laws and City. And touching the first Institution of Laws he saith expressly, Repub. 4. pag. 427. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It belongs not truly to us: but to the Delphic Apollo the chiefest, best, and first Institutes of Laws belong. (1) That by Apollo he symbolically indigitates the true God, though unknown, will be evident to any that observes his phraseology. Thus also Lycurgus (as Plutarch in his Life relates) being about to frame his Laws, he consultes first with the Oracle of Apollo, to establish good Laws in his Country— And Lycurgus took so great care to establish well his Laws, that he brought an Oracle from Apollo's Temple for the chief of them, which Oracle is to this day called Retra, i. e. the Statute-Oracle. Thus also Plato, in his Minos, pag. 319. treating of the Origine of Laws, brings in Homer commending Minos, for consulting Jupiter in order to the framing right Laws: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For he saith, Sanè caeterorum Legislatorum, quos tantopere admirata omnis vetustas est, sanctiones multae Mosaicis similes fuêre. Cunaeus, de Repub. Jud. that Minos conversed with Jupiter, and used secret conference with him for nine years' space: and that he addressed himself to Jupiter, as to a certain Sophist, that he might be instructed, i.e. how to frame Laws aright. (2) That Plato owns God as the supreme Legislator, from whom the best and first Laws came, is as evident, and that not only from his confession, but also by his practice, in making such a curiose inquisition into the sacred Mosaic Laws, and traducing thence the choicest of his Laws, as we have more largely proved out of his own Works, as also out of Clemens Alexandr. Eusebius and others, Court. Gent. B. 3. C. 9 Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 6. §. 6. 3. Human Legislators ought to be men of Wisdom, public Spirits, and virtuose. We find an excellent Character of an human Legislator in Plato, Leg. 9 pag. 858. where he puts this Question: Whether ought we to consult a Legislator, more than other Writers, touching things honest, good, beautiful, just? Which being granted, he assumes: It is consentaneous, that of all the Writings, which are used in Republics, those that concern Laws be most accurately composed; and that all the Writings of other men be so far approved, as they agree to these Laws, and so far exploded as they are dissentaneous. Whence he concludes, pag. 859. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Let us therefore take this course in framing Laws for Cities, that the Legislator entirely cloth himself with the person of a Father and Mother: that so those written Laws may represent the image of men endued with a certain solicitous affection, whereby they take care of those for whom they dictate Laws; as also with a sagacious prudence, whereby they know how to consult things good and commodous for them: But they must not put on the person of a Tyrant, and some impotent domineering Lord, who with an infinite or absolute kind of Empire commands what he lists, and adding menaces, wils that his pleasure stand for reason and Law; whereby he begets only hatred and envy. Wherein we find many great Characters of a good Legislator. He saith (1) He must have a sagacious prudence, or prudent sagacity, to find out what Laws are best and most commodous. (2) He must put on the person of a Father and Mother, i. e. all manner of tender affections, such as are solicitous for the good of those for whom the Laws are made. (3) He must avoid all shadow of Tyranny and absolute Dominion of such as make their Will their Law, without Reason. (4) He must make such Laws, as may beget, in those for whom they are made, a good opinion of and love to them, not hatred. Hence, 4. All Laws from the Multitude. All politic Laws ought to proceed originally from the Multitude or from their Representatives. Thus Plato, in his Gorgias, pag. 488. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Doth not the Law of Nature constitute, that MANY [or the multitude] are better than ONE? who truly make Laws for one, namely for the common good. Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore the Laws of the MANY, or Multitude are the Laws of the most excellent. Whence he farther argues, That the Laws of the Multitude are of the best: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Are they not also the Laws of the best? For they that are more excellent are better. Thence he adds another Argument: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Are not their [the many] Laws according to nature beautiful and honest; because they are most excellent? Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Do not therefore the MANY [or multitude] judge, that it is just to live according to some equal Right, [or Law of Equity] and more base to do injustice, than to suffer it? By all which he demonstrates, that the most equal Laws are such as proceed from the MANY or Multitude. Thus Plato, in his Minos, shows, That it is both useful and necessary, that Laws be framed by the free suffrage of the people. And his reason is invincible, namely, because all Laws ought to regard the public Utility, and therefore aught to be confirmed by public consent: Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur. Jus Civil. For that which concerns all must be approved by al. And herein Plato is followed by his Disciple Aristotle, who Polit. l. 3. c. 6. demonstrates, That the Legislative power belongs to the people, and university of Citizens, or to their Representatives congregated in some general Assembly. This politic Hypothesis is strenuously defended by that great Christian Politician, Marsilius Patavinus, in his Defensor Pacis, cap. 12. pag. 36. where he proves it by these Arguments. (1) The University of Citizens, or Community do more perfectly understand and affect the public Good, which is the principal end and measure of all Polity. (2) Laws framed by the whole multitude or their Repreentatives are better observed, than such as are imposed on them against their consent. For a City being a Community of Freemen, as Aristot. Pol. 3.4. all Laws are most confirmed by their consent. Again he proves that the coactive power is in the multitude or their more prevalent part, and therefore those Laws are best observed, which are made by their consent. (3) The Community or University of the multitude do best understand what is most commodous or incommodous for the preservation and promotion of their Society: now all Laws are for the preservation and promotion of the Society: therefore they ought to be approved by all: according to that common Maxim: That which toucheth the common good of all must be approved by al. Thence he proceeds p. 42. to solve a common objection against the people's consent in Legislation, namely, That the multitude are ignorant, depraved, perverse, etc. To which he respondes: (1) That the whole multitude hath a better judgement and affection, than any single part; because the wisdom of single persons is included in the whole. (2) That the first invention and examen of Laws may be committed to prudent men; and yet the approbation and confirmation of them appertain to the university or common multitude. (3) The multitude may commit the whole of Legislation to certain Representatives elected by them. Thus Hooker Ecclesiast. Polity, pag. 28, 29. By the Law of Nature, whereunto God hath made all subject, the lawful power of making Laws, to command whole politic Societies of men, belongeth so properly unto the same entire Societies, that for any Prince or Potentate of what kind soever upon earth to exercise the same of himself, and not either by express commission immediately and personally received from God, or else by Authority derived at first from their consent, upon whose persons they impose Laws, it is no better than mere Tyranny. But approbation not only they give, who personally declare their assent by voice, sign, or act; but also when others do it in their names, by right originally at least derived from them. As in Parliaments and like Assemblies. The like Campanella, Polit. cap. 4. As Virtue is the private Law of an individual person, so the Law is a public Virtue of the Community: therefore none may make a Law but the Republic, in whom the common reason and consent is; or the most wise men, to whom this common reason is committed by the Community, as Solon, and Lycurgus, and Numa; or God, who takes care of all, and is the supreme Reason. Hence, 5. All politic Laws must tend to, All Laws for public Good. and be measured by the public Good. For that which has its origine from public consent and dependence thereon, must tend to the public Good: All Laws being but an effect of the public Will, aught to end in the public Good: whence it is a Maxim in the Civil Law, Publicum jus publicam utilitatem respicit. Just. Institut. Public Right regards the public Utility. Thus Plato, Minos, pag. 317. from the origination of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (which is generally derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to distribute) styles a Legislator 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good Distributor, one that distributes to every one what is proper to him. Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Law, is that which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, distributes to all their due, measuring all by the common good. Whence he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore the distributions hereof and Laws are best: and he that observes in these things the most accurate reason of Laws, is most skilful in Law, and the best Distributor. His mind is, that he that frames Laws, and distributes to every one according to what is due to him and the public Good, is the best Legislator and Distributor of Justice. Thus, pag. 320. discoursing of Minos' Legislation, he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore he framed such Laws for his Citizens, by the Benefice whereof both Crete enjoyeth a perpetual felicity, and Lacedaemon, from the time that she began to use these Divine Laws. So greatly were Minos' Laws calculated for the public Good. But this Plato more fully determines, Leg. 4. pag. 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Truly we deny those to be Republics; neither do we account those to be right Laws, which are not referred to the common Utility of the City. But those, who so indulge their lusts, as that they make Laws in favour of some Parties, we affirm those to be not Citizens, but seditiose persons; and all those Titles of Right and Laws, which they, by their Comments, pretend, to be void. So severe is Plato ' in this point, as that he judgeth all Laws made in favour of some one Party, and not for the common Good, to be ipso facto seditiose and void. And he gives the reason, Leg. 9 pag. 875. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For the public Reason and Good doth firmly connect and keep together Republics, but obliqne regard to private Interest doth subvert and overthrow them. 6. The principal public Good, Virtue a principal end of Laws. unto which all Laws ought to tend, is universal Justice and Virtue. For as Virtue is a private Law, so Law is the public Virtue, or that whereby the Virtue of the whole Community is measured and promoted. Thus Plato, Leg. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, All Laws are to be constituted for the best end, namely for Virtue. So he explicates himself, pag. 630. where he saith, That a Legislator sent by God to establish utile and commodous Laws, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, will, in the constitution of Laws have regard to no other than the chiefest Virtue. Yea he adds: That he who will constitute a Divine Republic, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, must, as Legislator, have respect, not only to one particle of Virtue, and that the least, but to universal Virtue, and accordin gto the forms or kinds of Virtue find out Laws, proportionable thereto. The like he lays down, Repub. 4. pag. 444. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Do not therefore the preclare and illustrious Institutes, or Laws of living make way to Virtue; but base Laws precipitate men into vice? Whereby he instructes us, that Laws, if good, have an efficacious force for the promoting Virtue; but if bad, of Vice. Hence, 7. All politic Laws must be natural, voluntary, facile, expedite, Laws must be proper, and universal, otherwise they cannot reach that universal Virtue and public Good they tend unto. (1) All Laws ought to be Natural. So Plato, Leg. 3. pag. 690. saith, Natural. That Laws ought to be constituted, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, against nature, but according to nature, i. e. the natural condition and exigence of the Community. (2) Laws must be Voluntary, Voluntary. or such as the Community may cheerfully assent and consent to. Thus Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 684. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. But now many prescribe that to Legislators, that they frame such Laws, as the people and Community may freely receive; as if any should command Physicians, that they heal with a kind of pleasure and jucunditie to such as they heal. Hence, Facile. (3) Laws must be facile and expedite, otherwise how can the Community consent thereto, or cheerfully observe the same? Thus Plato, Leg. 3. pag. 684. in what follows on the former: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That also had great force at that time, that Laws were more easily constituted. Campanella, Pol. cap. 4. tells us, That those Laws are best, which are curt, facile, few in number, accommodated to the manners of the people and public Good. Whereas tyrannic Laws are numerous, obscure, difficile, as many snares, utile only to one or few, neither accommodated to public manners and utility. (4) Laws ought to be proper and agreeable to the Community, Proper. their state and condition. Hence that common Aphorism among Politicians, That laws are to be fitted to times and persons as the shoe to the foot. In matters of Government men must do what they can, not what they would. Universal. Hence, (5) Laws must be universally extensive unto all cases. So Plato, Leg. 1. pag. 630. saith, Laws ought to reach 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, universal Virtue. Thus Aristotle, Pol. 3. where he gives us this difference between the particular judgement of a Judge, and Laws: A Judgement is a particular Law, but a Law is an universal Judgement: i. e. such as must reach all cases; though indeed all human Laws are greatly defective in this particular, as it will appear by what immediately follows. Hence, 8. The Law of Equity. Seeing human Legislators cannot by their Laws reach all particular cases, therefore all politic Laws need 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Law of Equity to correct their defects, as also Conservators to keep them from degenerating. (1) That all human politic Laws are greatly defective as to their comprehension of particular cases is most evident from their Generality. Thus much Plato acknowledgeth, Leg. 4. p. 718. where he saith, That allthings cannot be opportunely reduced to one certain formule of Law; therefore a Legislator ought to lay down some general indication, before he proceed to a singular constitution of Laws: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Moreover these things are such, as that they cannot be comprehended and defined by one certain formule. Wherein he instructeth us, that seeing Laws cannot be prescribed to all things singular, therefore a Legislator ought to draw up some general Institutes, etc. This imperfection of Laws was taken notice of by Solon and others, who have compared Laws to Spider's webs, which ensnare and entangle the lesser flies, but let the greater break through. Hence, (2) all human Laws need 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Law of Equity for the correction of their defects. Thus Plato, Minos, pag. 317. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, In these things therefore that concern matters just and injust, and universally such as regard the commodous disposition and ordering of the City, that which is RIGHT is the royal Law. [1] That by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which is right he understands the Law of Nature and Equity is most evident, in that he styles it the Royal Law. [2] He saith, that by this Law of Rectitude or Equity all other Laws and politic Institutes are to be regulated and corrected. [3] This Equity of Nature he makes to be the fundament of all good Laws, in as much as it is one uniform, sempiterne and incommutable Rule of Justice in all times and Nations: whereas all particular Laws of Nations are various and mutable, according to the various conditions and mutations of Times and Nations. This Law of Equity he describes also, Minos, pag. 314. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Law therefore is the invention of him, that truly IS. Serranus by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which is, understands the eternal Law of Nature, which is the source of all private Laws; which is a truth: But considering Plato's phraseology, I should rather understand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of God, from whom the Law of Equity and all other Laws have their emanation. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Equity, definite. Plat. is described, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The imminution and correction of things just and utile: moderation in commerces: a good composition of the rational Soul as to things honest and base. That all politic Laws need a Law of Equity to correct them, was anciently observed by Androcles, (cited by Aristotle, Rhet. lbi. 2. cap. 25.) who said, That all Laws need a Law to correct them, as fishes need salt to preserve them. Touching this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Law of Equity, its Necessity, Use, and Nature see Idea Theolog. lib. 1. cap. 8. sect. 2. (3) Politic human Laws need not only a Law of Equity to correct them, but also Conservators to keep them from degenerating. Conservators of Laws. Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Authority, definite. Platon. pag. 415. is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Tuition of the Law. Thence Plato, Leg. 12. pag. 951. institutes a College for the inspection and conservation of Laws. His words are: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Let him have recourse to their College, which is constituted for the inspection of Laws. Let this College consist of Juniors and Seniors; and daily at the break of day, before the Sun rising, let them convene. First let there be of the Priests such as excel in the offices of Virtue: then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Conservators of the Laws ten of those that excel in age and virtue, etc. The sum of all is this: In as much as Laws, without diligent conservation, are apt to degenerate, and fall under depravation, from the unbridled lusts of men, therefore there is need of certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Conservators of Laws to keep their Authority inviolable: on which account Plato constituted this his sacred College. 9 From what has been laid down of Laws in the general, A Law what. we may with facility form a particular Idea of a Law, which, definite. Platon. is thus described: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A Law is a politic Decree of the Community constituted not for a certain time only. This last clause is added to discriminate a Law from a Suffrage or Vote, which is there thus defined: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A Vote or Suffrage is a politic Decree constituted only for a certain time. To speak more distinctly of a Law, it includes two formal essential parts, 1. It's Equity. Equity, and politic Constitution. (1) Eqitio is as the Soul of the Law, that which gives vital spirits and life to it; and is one and the same immutable Reason, which ought to diffuse itself throughout all Laws. Whence a Law is defined by Pet. à Sancto Joseph, The Ordination of Reason, promulgated by him that hath the care of the Community, for the common Good. Whence he proves, That all Laws, so far as they participate of right reason, are derived from the eternal Law, as also from natural Precepts. By the Eternal Law they understand the Divine Decree or sovereign pleasure of God, whence the Reason and Equity of all Laws both natural and politic receives its derivation. Of this Equity we have suffiiently discoursed in what immediately precedes. 2. It's Constitution. (2) Politic Constitution is that which draws down general equity, and applies it to this or that politic Society, according to the various exigences, circumstances, and reasons of State, which are peculiar to that Society or Republic for which the Laws are made. [1] This politic Constitution is that which gives formal reason to politic Laws, and renders them obligatory to the Society, for which they are made. Thence, definite. Plat. pag. 415. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Legislator is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Framer of Laws, accordin gto which we ought to live in Republics. [2] This politic Constitution is the measure of all Controversies, Determinations, and Civil Justice in any politic Body. Whence, Definite. Platon. pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Law is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Disceptation whether things be done justly, or not. And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the bonity of Laws is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the obedience of right Laws. [3] This politic Constitution is that which gives Order to all Polity. Thence, definite. Platon. pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Order, is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a similitude of Office and Action of all those things that are compared among themselves: or more briefly, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Symmetry or proportion of Society: i.e. when all that appertain to such a Society consent to walk and live together by soem common Law. That politic Constitution or Law gives Beauty, Perfection and Order to all politic Bodies, we are assured by Plato, in his Gorgias, pag. 503, 504. where he shows, that allthings both natural and artificial receive their perfection from Order: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore an house having acquired order and ornament, will be good and commodous. Whence he concludes, That as health is the virtue and order of the body natural; so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Legal and Law is the Order of the Soul, as also of Bodies politic. Politic Law and Order are intimely conjoined both as to Name and Thing. As for Names, whence had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Order its origination but from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, doth, (or as we may pronounce it, that) Law, Order? Hence sprang 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, with its Derivates, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. And as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies Law as well as Order; so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to distribute orderly) Order as well as Law. Neither do Law and Order agree in the reciprocation of Names only, but also in their Natures. Hence Plato oft useth them promiscuously one for the other, and joins them together as exegetic each of other. So ●eg. 7. pag. 780. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For whatever in a Republic is comprehended under a certain Order and Law, and by the conduct thereof is governed, cannot but be conjoined with the greatest goods: But on the contrary, either when there is no Order, or when things are il constituted, there cannot but follow the greatest perturbation: which pervertes that good Order and all that Utility that floweth thence. Wherein we have these observables. (1) He useth Order and Law promiscuously for one and the same thing. So Leg. 9 pag. 875. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. In the next place we ought to choose Order and Law, which propose what we are to consider, and concerns the common use of life. (2) He saith, that from this legal Order and its conduct the bonity and perfection of things politic ariseth. (3) that from the defect and want of this legal Order all perturbation, confusion, and evils in a politic body do arise. More touching Order see §. 1. §. 6. Having explicated Legislation, The several kinds of politic Administration. which takes in the first part of Empire, we now pass on to the second, namely Administration or Jurisdiction, which in Plato's Philosophy passeth under the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Regiment or Government, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 arch a Prince, Principatie or Government. Whence Lot is styled by the Rabbins, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prince of the Judges. So Rom. 8.38. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is taken for Principaties. definite. Platon. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Principatie is defined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The care or charge of the whole: Which is a good Idea of politic Jurisdiction and Administration. And that which we are herein to consider may be reduced to these two common Heads. (1) The several kinds of politic Jurisdiction or Administration, with their preferences. (2) The Civil Magistrate, who is the Administrator of politic Jurisdiction. First, as for the several kinds of politic Jurisdiction or Administration, they are reduced by Plato (as by others) to these three Heads, Monarchy, aristocraty, and Democraty. Monarchy, aristocraty, Democraty. Of these he treats distinctly in his Politicus, pag. 291. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Monarchy is one form of politic Gubernations. Then he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, And after Monarchy we may place the Government of a few, i. e. aristocraty. Lastly he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The third form of Government is it not that of the people, called Democraty? These three forms of Administration he distinctly explicates, according to their legitime constitutions, excesses, and comparations each with other. The excess of Monarchy he makes to be Tyranny, when Princes govern without, or contrary to Law: and the excess of aristocraty he makes to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, oligarchy, when a few usurp the sole Administration of politic Affairs: the excess of Democraty is Anarchy or popular confusion, when there is no distinction between Governors and Governed. As for the comparation of these three Forms among themselves he affirms, that Monarchy or the Administration of One is to be preferred, so far as it is moderated and bounded by good Laws, together with a good Moderator and interpreter of those Laws; but on the contrary, if it degenerate into Tyranny, it is then of all the worst. His own words are: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Monarchy bounded by good Laws is of all best; but if it be lawless, it is of all the most difficult and intolerable. Thence definite. Plat. pag. 415. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a King is said to be, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Prince that governs according to Laws; whereby he is opposed to a Tyrant, who is said to be one that governs only according to his will; as hereafter. In aristocraty there must be one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, chief among the Senators, who ought to direct and order affairs: The Athenian Polity mixed of aristocraty and Democraty. yea, in Democraty there is something of aristocraty from the people's consent. Thence Plato, in his Menexenus, pag. 238. treating of the Athenian Republic, its original state, as also that it then enjoyed, he saith, It was an aristocraty mixed with Democraty. His words are these: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. For there was the same form of Polity then as now, namely aristocraty, under which now we live, and have kept the same for a long time. Some would call it Democraty, others by another name. But to speak truth it is the Gubernation of the best men, with the people's consent. For we had in times past Kings: and these truly sometimes came to the Government by inheritance, sometimes by the suffrage of the people. But now, sithat the power is in the people, they commit the Administration to some most excellent and virtuose persons: neither is any laid aside by reason of infirmity, or poverty, or low degree of parentage; neither, if the contrary conditions are found, is he therefore promoted, as in other Cities: but there is one Rule of determining all Offices, namely he that is judged the wisest and best man, he is called to public Administration and Office. And the cause of this Administration among us is our equality and parity as to origine. For other Cities being composed of persons different and inequal, they have inequal and different forms of Administration, namely Tyranny and oligarchy: also some are Slaves, others Lords: but we, being borne all of one Mother, judge it not equal, that some be Lords, and some Vassals: but that equality of stock hath made us to find out this equality of Polity, that none precede the other, but in the estime of Wisdom and Virtue. Wherefore their parents and ours having been educate! in all kind of liberty, many noble deeds for the common utility of Mankind have been performed: having always judged it necessary for liberty, to fight against the Grecians for the Grecians, and against the Barbarians for the Grecians. Thus Plato of the Athenian Polity, wherein he shows, that Democraty doth not require, that all Administrations be transacted by the people, but that the supreme Power be in the people, and that they be their free suffrage elect such as they judge to excel in Wisdom and Virtue as Administrators, or Magistrates of public Affairs. This he exemplifies by the Athenian Republic; which was a Democraty, in which, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the supreme Power was in the Community, yet so as that the Administrationof that Power was by the people's suffrage committed to such as they judged most eminent for Wisdom and Virtue. So that this Polity was indeed, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an aristocraty with the people's consent, i. e. mixed with Democraty. Plato here joins Democraty with aristocraty, Monarchy mixed with Democraty. so in his Leg. 3. pag. 693. he joins Monarchy and Democraty as the two constitutive parts of a good Polity: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. There are as it were two Mothers of public Administrations or Polities, out of which he that shall say other forms of Gubernation resulted, speaks the truth: the one of these is called Monarchy, the other Democraty: the former is most eminently in use among the Persians, the later among us. And almost all other kinds of Polities are variously composed out of these. And it's necessary, that a City, which would enjoy her liberty and amity with prudence, participate of both of these: which indeed our common speech signifies, when we say, that a City destitute of these cannot be rightly administrated and governed. In which he demonstrates that Regal Monarchy contempered with popular Democraty is the most equal and best of Dominations, provided that it be well confined and bounded by Laws: for such a mixed Polity comes nearest to pattern Authority, which is most natural. By comparing these Philosophemes of Plato it is evident, that, according to his mind, Mixed Polity its use. a mixed Polity or Gubernation of Monarchy, aristocraty, and Democraty, if well limited and bounded by Laws, is generally useful. Thus the Stoics also held, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That the best Polity or Regiment, is that which is mixed of Democraty, the Regal Power, and aristocraty, as Laertius in Zeno. And the reasons hereof are these: Monarchy has an unitive efficace, for the rpeventing Division, Dissolution, and Ruin; which usually ariseth out of Factions; unto which Democraty and aristocraty is obnoxious: Democraty hath a diffusive faculty, as it takes in the concerns and interest of each individual: aristocraty has a collective virtue, as it gathers up the interest of the whole Community into a system of the wisest and best Administrators. As all these three kinds of Polities have their virtues and efficaces, so also they have their excesses: Monarchy with facility degenerates into Tyranny, aristocraty into oligarchy, and Democraty into Anarchy, as Plato, Repub. 8. pag. 563. hath well observed. Whence for the preventing the excess of each some great Politicians, as also Theologues have judged a complexe or mixed constitution of all these to be the best of Regiments. But to speak natively and distinctly, Moderate Empire best. as these three kinds of polity Administrations and Regiments may make an excellent Composition; so may they also do well distinctly and apart, if suited to the complexion, exigences, and condition of States, well moderated by Laws, and committed to prudent wel-qualified Administrators. No one of these Polities is in itself unlawful, or unuseful, but its excess: It is not Monarchy, but Tyranny; nor aristocraty, but oligarchy; nor Democraty, but Anarchy that is injuriose to Republics. Each of these Empires, if well moderated, and suited to the condition of the State may be very useful, as Plato well determines. Thus Leg. 3. pag. 690. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That Empire is most natural, which is, not violent, and against the will, but voluntary, as to those that obey. Then he tells us what this natural and voluntary Empire imports, namely, a certain blessed Empire approved by Divine judgement, whereby he that is elected governs, etc. Thence he goes on to demonstrate, That an infinite power bounded by no limits is the peste of all Empires: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Whether or no did not that happen, because they were ignorant of that great Saying of Hesiod, That Half is oft better than the Whole? seeing it is dangerous to usurp the WHOLE of Power; whereas to assume HALF only is moderate: now that which is moderate is always to be preferred before that which is immoderate, etc. Wherein he shows (1) that the Half of Empire is better than the Whole: or moderate limited power, better than Immoderate and Absolute. (2) He adds the reason, because infinite, immoderate power brings ruin to Republics. This he lays down in more naked terms, pag. 693. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Let us inquire what else aught to be done: namely sole and absolute Empire ought not to be constituted: and the reason of this our sentiment is; because a City ought to be free and friendly to itself, and therefore a Legislator ought to aim at this end. Whence he proceeds to show, that a mixed moderate Empire is best, because most agreeable to and preservative of public Liberties and Republic. So Leg. 6. he saith, That an infinite absolute Empire is permiciose; but that is the best Idea 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Polity, which is a middle between Monarchic and Democratic Domination, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is intermediate between Monarchic and popular Polity. Whence Plato is very severe against tyrannic and all immoderate Empire. Tyrannic Empire its origine, etc. Thus in his Gorgias: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I call that Tyranny, when a Magistrate counts it lawful to do what he please in the City, etc. According to that French Maxim, The Justice of a Prince consists in his power: i. e. he may do what he can. Whence Plato adds, pag. 510. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Where there is a Tyrant, is he not a cruel and barbarous Lord? if there be any in the City much better, doth not the Tyrant fear him, and can never be cordially a friend to such? So Repub. 8. pag. 569. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Thou sayest a Tyrant is a Parricide, and a severe nourisher of old age, and that Tyranny brings the most cruel servitude. Yea Repub. 9 he saith, That one who is really a Tyrant is really a Slave. Again: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A Tyrant leads the most miserable life. And Repub. 8. pag. 564. he tells us, That the origine of Tyranny is from the abuse of Democraty: For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, out of excessive liberty ariseth much and most cruel vassalage. Thence on the contrary, Leg. 3. he shows, how the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Democraty sprang otu of the Tyranny of Monarch's: for when the people could no longer bear the Tyranny of great Men, casting off their yoke they vindicated their Liberties. definite. Platon. pag. 415. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Tyrant is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, one that governs the City according to his own pleasure. This self-will Gubernation Plato greatly inveighs against, Alcibiad. 1. pag. 134. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. For he that has a power to do what he list, being destitute of prudence, can we expect that any thing else should happen to him, whether he be a private person or Republic, than what happens to a sick man, who hath power to act what he list, but no mind to be healed, yea rageth impotently and tyrannically against him, who would reduce him from his extravagances? what can be expected but that his body perish? Whence he concludes, pag. 135. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore O most excellent Alcibiades, thou mayst not make provision for Tyranny, either over thyself or the City, if thou desirest they should be happy, but for Virtue. Wherein note (1) that for any to govern themselves or a City merely according to their own will, without regard to any superior Law, is Tyranny. A man may be a Tyrant over himself by letting the reins lose to unbridled passions, as well as over a Body politic. Yea politic Tyranny seems to have its origine from self-Tyrannie. (2) That as self-Tyrannie makes a man miserable, so politic Tyranny a State. Seneca, in his Instructions to his Pupil Nero, (who after proved a Tyrant) has excellent Philosophemes' touching the evils of Tyranny: To be able to hurt, saith he, is the most pestiferous power, or rather impotence: Regal crudelity doth increase the number of Enemies, by taking them away. Thy Grandfather pardoned those whom he conquered: for had he not pardoned them, whom should he have had to reign over? The power of Tyrants is execrable, but short: A Tyrant differs from a King in deeds, though not in name: He errs, who thinks a King to be safe there, where nothing is safe from the King: the security of a Prince is maintained by the mutual security of his Subjects: The love of the Citizens is the inexpugnable Fortress of the King. All crudelity is from infirmity: neither can that power stand long which is upheld by the evils and sufferings of many: It's necessary that he feareth many, whom many fear. It's more dangerous to be feared, than to be despised. It's Sacrilege to hurt the Country; therefore also to hurt a Citizen, who is part thereof. Some have observed, that the reason why Nature hath not given a sting to the King of the Bees, is to teach Princes, that nothing becomes Princes less than Tyranny; also that their only defence should be in the strength of their Subjects. The origine of Tyranny we find in the description of Nimrod, Gen. 10.9. Gen. 10.9. As Nimrod mighty in hunting before Jehovah. Note here (1) that this was a common Proverb among the Patriarches, whereby they described a Tyrant: (2) He is said to be mighty in hunting: i. e. persecution, oppression, and Tyranny over men, as Jer. 16.16. So the Jerusalemy Paraphrase expounds it. (3) Before the Lord, i. e. openly, daringly, in the very sigh tof God. Hence, Mede, Diatr. 3. pag. 539. on 2 Pet. 2.1. saith, that old Babylon was the Foundress of tyrannic Domination, as also of Idolatry: and he makes their Tyranny the effect of their Idolatry; because God usually punisheth Idolatry with Tyranny and Vassalage. This is most true of New Babylon or the Roman Church, which brought in Tyranny into the Christian World together with Idolatry. And is not this a just recompense and retaliation for God to leave men under the iron yoke of Antichristian Tyranny, when they electively and voluntarily embrace Antichristian Idolatry? O! how proportionable is the plague of Antichristian Tyranny to the sin of Antichristian Idolatry? §. 7. Civil Magistrates. Having examined the nature of politic Administration and Jurisdiction in regard of its various forms and modes, we now pass on to its Administrators, their Aptitude, Faculty, Authority, and Office. The Administrators of politic Jurisdiction or Empire are usually comprehended under that general notion of Civil Magistrates. We shall not here consider a Civil Magistrate as confined to this or that form of Jurisdiction, but more generally under such Ideas and Notions as may agree to every form of Jurisdiction. Now in a Civil Magistrate, under this general Idea, we are to consider, (1) His End: (2) His Aptitude and Qualification: (3) His politic Faculty, Commission, and Authority: (4) The Exercise and Execution of his Office. Of these briefly in their order. 1. 1. Their End. As for the End of Civil Magistrates, Platonic, as well as sacred Philosophy informs us, that the proxime immediate end for which they were instituted is the public or commun Good of the whole Community. This is the great end of all politic bodies, whether Cities or Republics, as we have before proved, §. 3. and therefore of all Civil Magistrates. Thus Plato, Repub. 3. pag. 413. discoursing of the Office of Magistrates he saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, We must chief endeavour that they conceive what they judge will mot conduce to the common Good. Thence Politicus, pag. 274. he saith, A King and Civil Magistrate is a Pastor of men; and in this regard a God to mortal man, i. e. as God's Vicegerent for the good of men, as hereafter. Hence Petrus à Sancto Joseph and others make this difference between a King and a Tyrant, That a King has his eye on the good of his Subjects, but a Tyrant on his own private Good and Interest. But of this sufficiently in what precedes, §. 3. 2. That which next follows is the Apitude and Quadratus ification of a Civil Magistrate. 2. The Qualifications of a Magistrate. Plato gives us many illustrious Characters of a Civil Magistrate. 1. Wisdom natural. (1) He makes Prudence and Wisdom an essential constitutive Quality or Requisite of a good Magistrate. Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It is convenient that he who manageth the greatest affairs, should participate of the greatest wisdom. There is a twofold wisdom required to the constitution of a well qualified Magistrate. [1] He must be invested with a natural Sagacity and Dexterity of judging Persons and Things. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 376. compares the Sagacity of a Magistrate to that of a Dog, which can at the first glance discern his friend from his enemy. Thence Aristotle, Rhet. l. 1. c. 16. pag. 76. compares a good Magistrate to a Goldsmith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A Judge must be like a Goldsmith, that he may discriminate adulterine just from what is true. This natural sagacity Solomon was in an incomparable degree endued with, as it appears by his sentence given in the case of the two Harlots. [2] As he must have natural sagacity, 2. Acquired. so also acquired Wisdom and Prudence. Thus Plato, Gorg. pag. 489. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Oft therefore one wise man is more excellent than an infinite number of fools, as thou sayest; and it is most consent aneous, that this wise man obtain the Empire; and that those are subject to him. By which he instructes us, That wise men ought to rule, and fools obey. Whence he adds, pag. 490. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For this I conceive to be just by nature, that the prudent is the more excellent, and that he ought to rule over the more vile. Wherein he lays down two Maxims of State. (1) That the more prudent men are, the more excellent they are: (2) That the more excellent men are, the more fit to rule. The reason of this Maxim is taken from the foundation of all Empire, which ariseth from that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or supereminence of the Ruler above the Ruled. And because prudence is principally acquired by multitude of years and experience, therefore Plato institutes, that Magistrates be chosen out of the more ancient Citizens. So Repub. 3. pag. 412. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That the Seniors ought to rule, and the juniors to be ruled. Thus among the Romans the Senators were elected out of the more ancient Citizens, and the juniors employed in War. Which was but an Imitamen of the Judaic Polity. How much wisdom is essential to a Civil Magistrate Plato oft inculcates. Thus Repub. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Either let Philosophers reign in the Cities, or let Kings philosophise. His mind is, that Kings ought to have the wisdom of Philosophers joined to their Majesty, in order to their more happy Gubernation. This Plutarch takes notice of as an excellent Character in Numa Pompilius: Under Numa, saith he, there was constant peace without innovation or conspiracy: which verified that of Plato, that the only mean of true quiet and remedy from all evil, is when, from some divine Ordinance from above, there meeteth in one person the right Majesty of a King, and the mind of a wise Philosopher, to make Virtue Governess over men. So Campanella, in his Politics, Cap. 3. observes, That Wisdom only rules well and naturally; not sophistic, but philosophic; not eremitic or monastic, but civil; not opposite to God, but supposite or subordinate. There is a threefold acquired Wisdom or Prudence necessary to the right qualification of a Civil Magistrate. 1. Knowledge of human Laws. [1] He ought to understand well 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the first Principes of Right and Law. Thus Plato, Rep. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. I conceive therefore, that he, who ignores or knows not the reasons of just and honest, deserves not the name of a Keeper or Magistrate. It is an Effate among Civilians, That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or the Law of Equity lies in the bosom of the Magistrate, i. e. he ought to have clear notices not only of municipal Laws proper to Nations, but also of the Law of Equity, whereby he ought frequently to direct himself for the correcting the defects and excesses of municipal Laws. Whence it is also an Aphorism in Justinian's Law, That ignorance excuseth a man from public Office. 2 Knowledge of Facts. [2] A Civil Magistrate must have not only knowledge of Law both natural and municipal, but also a particular comprehension of Facts and Cases that may occur. A Magistrates prudence consists not only in the knowledge of the Law, but also in the application of it to matters of Fact, and particular Cases that may occur. For there are no human general precepts so universal, but such circumstances may occur, as may cause much variation in matter of Justice. It's a good observation of the Philosopher, That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, prudence is about things singular, which are much varied by circumstances of Time, Place, Persons, etc. Therefore the prudence of Magistrates ought to inquire, not only what is lawful, but also what is expedient in this or that case. Much of politic prudence consists not so much in understanding the Rule, as in applying it to the Case ruled. It's a good observation of Padre Paul, that great Venetian Politician, That it is proper to the Prince alone to know what is expedient. None knoweth how to govern a Territory but the Prince himself, who alone knoweth all the necessities of it. I shall conclude this Character touching the Wisdom of a Magistrate, with what Plutarch in the Life of Lycurgus observes touching his Prudence: Men, saith he, communly disdain those that are not wise in commanding; so that the faithful obedience of the Subjects dependeth much on the sufficient Command of the wise Prince: for he that directeth well, must needs be well obeyed. For look as the art of a good Rider is to make his horse gentle and ready at command; even so the chiefest point belonging unto a Prince is to teach his Subjects to obey. Wherefore the Lacedæmonians procured, that not only other people did willingly obey them, but also desired to be ruled by them. [3] A Civil Magistrate must have also some knowledge of the Divine Law. Thus Deut. 17.18. 3. Knowledge of divine Laws. Deut. 17.18, 19, 20. And it shall be, when he sits upon the Throne [i. e. as King] that he shall write for himself the copy of this law in a book, out of that which is before the Priests and Levites. The original Book of the Law was kept in the Sanctuary, as Deut. 31.26. and ot of that was the King's Copy to be written with his own hand, for his instructiion how to govern. Thence it follows v. 19 And it shall be with him: i. e. in all places whither he went, he was to carry this Copy of the Law with him: and why? that follows: that he may learn to fear Jehova his God, etc. The fear of Jehova includes not only intern Affection and Reverence, but also the extern Worship and Service of God, yea all Religion. Thence follows another end v. 20. That his heart be not lift up above his brethren, etc. Because the Dignity of a King is so august and great, therefore he is to be much versed in the Divine Law to keep him humble, as David was, Psal. 131.1, 2. (2) Another essential Character of Quality of a Civil Magistrate is Virtue. 2. Virtue. There is a twofold Virtue requisite to the right constitution of a Magistrate; the one natural, the other moral. [1] A Magistrate ought to have a natural Virtue which consists in an heroic Spirit and natural Grace as to his extern presence, Natural. whereby he sweetly, and yet with Majesty draws his Subjects to obey him. Those whom divine Gubernation intends for Empire he oft endues with a great and heroic natural Spirit. Thus Plutarch mentions of Lycurgus, in his Life, pag. 47. As for Lycurgus, the Spartans' thought of him thus; that he was a man borne to rule, to command, and to give order; as having in him a certain antural Grace, and power to draw men naturally to obey him. But yet, [2] the main Virtue requisite for the qualification of a Magistrate is moral. Moral. Thus Plato, Leg. 12. p. 966. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It shall not be permitted, Virtus praecellens in Rege praecipua causa est regnandi civiliter. Wicles. that any take on him a public Office, but he who with much labour and firm faith hath embraced a pious sentiment of God. Again: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, We must endeavour, that the Censors of manners be divine men. Again: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Wherefore the Censors ought to be most illustrious for a manner of Virtue. Again he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That none ought to be chosen a Keeper of the Laws, but he that is divine. So Bacon, in the Life of Henry VII. pag. 26. saith, That it is incongruous, that they should give Laws to others, who are themselves lawless. Whence Plato, Repub. 3. pag. 416. saith, That a Magistrate should have his gold not in his purse, but in his mind, meaning Virtue, as in what immediately follows. (3) Plato requires of a Civil Magistrate, 3. Public spirited and against self-seeking. that he be of a public Spirit, not avaricious or confined to his private interest. Thus Plato, Minos, pag. 321. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Those therefore of the Ancients were the best Legislators, and Pastors of the people: as Homer calls a good Imperator the Pastor of the people. Now a Pastor, specially of men, implies a public Spirit, free from self-interest. Thence he adds, Repub. 1. pag. 347. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore good man affect Empire not for lucre's sake, nor yet for honour— for they are not amb●ttose. Again: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For if the City consisted of good men, the Citizens would strive to avoid the office of a Magistrate, as now they contend for it. Thence it is apparent, that a genuine Magistrate is so spirited, as not to seek his own private interest, but the public good of those subject to him. This Theme Plato more fully prosecutes, A Magistrates Diet and Richesses'. Repub. 3. pag. 416. where he shows, That Magistrates ought so far only to be furnished with Richesses' and other necessaries, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. as that they may not cease to approve themselves the best Conservators: i e. lest being made drunken with too much prosperity, they wax insolent and worse, to the public detriment of the Citizens. Consider therefore whether it be not better, that they be so furnished with necessaries, as to life and habitation, that they possess nothing as proper, but what urgent necessity requires. Moreover, that they have neither house nor Buterie, but what is open for al. But as to their provision and Diet, that they have so great plenty, as temperate Soldiers need: and that they receive such a salary for the discharge of their Office from the Citizens, as that they may neither want, nor have what is superfluous. But this must be inculcated on their spirits, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that they ever have gold and silver, and that truly divine and august, in their Soul, so that they need not men's gold and silver. (4) For the acquirement of these Qualifications Plato requires that Civil Magistrates have the best Institution and Education. 4. Magistrate's Education and Examen. Thus Repub. 2. pag. 376. treating copiosely of the Institution of a Magistrate, he distributes the Discipline, in which he ought to be instituted, into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Gymnastic and Music: by Gymnastic Discipline he understands such Virtues as appertain to an Active life, namely Temperance, Fortitude, Justice, etc. by Music Discipline he means such Virtues as concern Piety and Religion, which is the Music of the Soul and Republics. So again in his Repub. 3. pag. 395. he shows, how a Magistrate ought to be instituted and instructed even from his infance in the best Principes and Exemples. And he gives the reason of it: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Because imitations imbibed from the childhood, and of long continuance are converted into Manners and Nature: According to that common Effate, Custom is a second Nature. Neither ought a Magistrate to have good Education only, but also general Approbation. So Repub. 3. pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, And he that hath been tried throughout the degrees of all ages, namely of Childhood, Youth, and virile Age, and on that examen has approved himself innocent and spotless, let him be constituted Prince and Conservator of the City. These Qualifications of a politic Magistrate are more lively and perfectly laid down in sacred Philosophy. Qualifications of Magistrates in Scripture. Exod. 18.21. Thus Jethro, as inspired by God, to Moses, Exod. 18.21. And thou, provide out of all the people, men of ability, fearing God, men of truth, hating avarice. (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, men of Ability. Or of Power, Force, Virtue, Activity: i. e. virtuose, active, and able men, in body and mind, as Gen. 47.6. LXX. able or potent men. The Hebrews describe them thus: Men of Ability are such as are potent in the Commandments, and exactly look unto themselves, and subjugate their passions, so that there remains nothing dishonest or reproachful in them, nor evil name. And generally Able men are such as have a potent or courageous heart, to deliver the oppressed out of the oppressors hand, as Moses, Exod. 2.17. Maimonides, in Sanhedr. cap. 2. sect. 7. (2) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, men of Truth: i. e. just men. So LXX. also Zech. 7.9. so Maimonides, in Sanhed. cap. 2. sect. 7. Men of Truth are such as follow after justice for itself, who do love the truth, etc. (3) Fearing God, i. e. religiose. (4) Hating Avarice, Deut. 16.19. To these four Qualities here expressed three more are added, Deut. 1.13. Deut. 1.13. (5) Wise men, (6) and Understanding, (7) and Known, i. e. approved. Under which seven proprieties the Hebrews include all other good Qualities, as Maimonides Sanhedr. cap. 2. sect. 7. Hence, 3. A Magistrates Faculty and Authority. From the Aptitude and Qualification of a Magistrate we pass on to his Faculty, Commission, and Authority, which is the second essential part. For Civilians make two essential constitutive parts of any politic Administrator: (1) His Aptitude, which has been already dispatched, (2) his Faculty or Commission; whence his Authority doth proceed: of which we are now to discourse. 1. Divine. (1) As for the Original Faculty, Commission and Authority of all Magistrates, Plato assures us, that it comes from God the supreme Rector of the Universe. So Leg. 4. pag. 713. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. When Saturn [i. e. God] understood no human nature was able to govern human affairs, but if it should govern all according to its will, the World would be filled with all contumely and injustice; he constituted as Governors over human Societies not men, but Demons of a more divine and excellent nature. The great difficulty here will be, to find out who those Demons were, which God constituted as the first Magistrates. I conceive by these Platonic Demons we are to understand [1] the Patriarches and the great Hero's, who were the first Magistrates, whereof Plato had many notices. [2] But yet these Demons formally include the Souls of great men deified, which the wiser Philosophers constituted as Mediators between the supreme God and men, as also Administrators of human affairs, in imitation of the Judaic Messiah, (whereof they had many imperfect fragments and Traditions) as we have at large proved, Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 4. sect. 4. as also, Court Gent. P. 3. B. 2. C. 2. S. 2. §. 3. And herein Plato imitates Moses, who makes the Faculty, Commission, and Constitution of Magistrates to be from God. Num. 27.16, 17. So Num. 27.16. Let Jehovah the God of the Spirits of all flesh. He terms Jehovah the God of the Spirits of all flesh, not only as Creator of men's Souls, but also as he gives them spiritual Gifts, of Wisdom, Knowledge, Government, etc. So Spirit is used, 1 Cor. 14.12. God first qualifies men with an Aptitude or Gifts; and thence follows the Constitution or Ordination: Set a man over the Congregation. Set or Visit, i. e. provide or constitute for Bishop or Overseer: who therefore is called v. 17. a Pastor or Shepherd. So among the Grecians, Homer, Plato, and others, a Magistrate is styled the Pastor of the people. Whence it follows, v. 17. which may go out before them, etc. By this Hebraic Idiom of going out and coming in, and that which follows, leading out and bringing in, is noted the Administration of the Civil Magistrate, as Deut. 31.2. alluding to the office of a Shepherd, who in these times and countries went out from and came into the Fold before his sheep: whence the same phrase is applied by our Lord to himself as Pastor of Souls, Joh. 10.4, 9 Thus God is said to choose David his servant, Psal. 78.70. Whence Magistrates are said to be, Psal. 82.6. Gods, and the children of the most High: i. e. constituted and appointed to their Office by God. Thence also God saith Esa. 22.20. I will call my servant Eliakim: Esa. 22.20, 21, 22. i. e. he shall not intrude into his place, but be called by God. So much the very name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eliakim imports, namely one raised up or settled by God, as Jehojakim. Thence he adds v. 21. And I will cloth him with thy robe, and strengthen him with thy girdle: i. e. I will give him thy power and authority, and confirm him in thy place. The Robe and Girdle were Emblems of Power and Office. Thence it follows: and I will commit thy government into his hand, etc. So v. 22. The key of the house of David will I lay upon his shoulder, etc. The Key was also an Emblem of Power and Authority. As for the seat of the divine Faculty, Commission, and Authority, from which all Civil Magistrates derive their Authority originally, it is lodged in the Law of Nature, particularly in that moral Precept, Honour thy father, etc. which gives divine constitution to the power of the Civil Magistrate. This we have more fully laid down in the N. T. The powers that be are ordained by God, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. are ordained by the constitution and commission of God. (2) As for the human Faculty, 2. Human. Commission, and Authority of the Magistrate, Plato derives it from the people's Election and Consent. So Repub. lib. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thus Leg. 6. treating of the Election of Magistrates, he saith, Such should be chosen as are most eminent for prudence and probity, and best qualified for the Offices they are elected unto; as also will attend the same with fidelity and industry. The terms used to express this Election and Creation by, are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. (3) Touching the Authority of Civil Magistrates Plato makes it to be not Absolute, 3. Magistrate's Conservators of the Law. but Subordinate to the Law: For his great Character of a Magistrate is, that he be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Conservator and Minister of the Law. He layeth down this for a fundamental Principe, That a Magistrate may not do what he list, but what he ought. Thus Alcibiad. 1. pag. 134. where Socrates instructes young Alcibiades in this manner: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore remember, that Power and Empire is not to be acquired, that thou mayest rule over thyself or the City as thou list, but according to justice and wisdom. Thence in his Politicus, pag. 276. he distributes civil Government into, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Tyrannic and Voluntary. Tyrannic Government he makes to be violent, when Subjects are forced against Law; but voluntary, when men are governed by their own Laws: and this kind of Administration he saith becomes most, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, one that is truly a King and Civil Magistrate. So pag. 305. he makes a Civil Magistrate to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Conservator or Keeper of Laws. Hence he citys a great Saying of Pindar: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Pindar saith, the Law is King over all, both mortals and immortals. Whence that Latin Effate, Lex est Rex, The Law is King. The subordination of the Civil Magistrate to Law, Plato more fully expresseth, Leg. 4. pag. 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. I have styled Magistrates Ministers of the Law not from an affectation of novity; but because I am persuaded, that the safety of a Republic consists herein; but the peste and ruin in the contrary. And he subjoins the reason of this his persuasion: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For I behold ruin prepared for and present to that City, in which Laws are not superior to the Magistrates, but Magistrates to the Laws: but, on the contrary, safety to that City, where the Law rules over Magistrates, and Magistrates are Servants of the Law, i. e. they subject themselves to the Law and obey the same. For I apprehend all manner of good things, which God usually confers on Cities, to attend this City. So prosperous is the condition of that City, wherein the Magistrates Administration and Jurisdiction is bounded and circumscribed by, as also subordinate to the Law, which is, to speak in Pindars phrase, the King both of Magistrates and People. Whence, Leg. 6. pag. 761. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But let no Judge or Magistrate be exempted and free from rendering accounts, but let him render the account of his discharge of his Office to the Citizens: only those excepted, unto whom the last Appeal is made, according to the exemple of the Regal power. Whence pag. 767. he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But in public crimes it's in the first place necessary, that the affair be brought to the community or multitude: for when the City is affected with an injury, it belongs to all to take cognizance thereof: therefore the people may justly take it i'll, if the cognizance of such affairs should be wrested from them. Therefore the beginning and end of this controversy ought to be brought to the people, but the examen and dijudication to the three chief Magistrates. Thence definite. Platon. pag. 415. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Authority is defined, the Tuition of the Law. 4. The Magistrates Exercise of his Office. Next to the Faculty and Authority of the Civil Magistrate we are to consider him in the actual Administration or Exercise of his Office, which ought to be performed with the greatest exactitude and fidelity. It's a good observation of Aristotle, Rhet. l. 2. c. 19 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Dignity makes great men more conspicuous and illustrious: wherefore such act with greater moderation and exactitude. Whence also that great Aphorism of Pittachus, mentioned by Laertius: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Magistratie or Government discovers what the man is. If there be an irregular principe or passion in a Magistrate, it usually appears in the exercise of his Office. Therefore Plato, Leg. 12. requires, That a Magistrate be most eminent for all manner of Virtues, as before. Now the main Virtues which ought to appear most illustriously in a Magistrates exercise of his Office, are such as these, Justice, Temperance, Moderation as to passions, Clemence, Self-denial, Courage, Industry and Fidelity, of which we find many and great Philosophemes in Plato. (1) The Magistrate's Administration of his Office must be with Justice, 1. Justice and against Bribery. without Bribery, Partiality, and all Respect of persons. Hence Plato, Leg. 12. requires, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That a Judge be sworn before he come to judge. And that he may pass a righteous Sentence, he also ordains, Demodocus, pag. 383. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Neither judge any cause before thou hast heard both parties. And against Bribery he speaks expressly, Leg. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That a Magistrate ought to administer Justice without Gifts. Yea the 12 Tables determine, That a Judge convicted of Bribery shalt be punished with death. Bribery in Courts of Judicature is like judicial Astrology, which, as Tacitus observes, is always forbidden, and yet always retained. But sacred Philosophy doth strictly oblige Magistrates to the exercise of Justice, and against all Bribery, in their Administrations. So Psal. 82.1. Psal. 82.1, 2. God standeth in the congregation of the mighty. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 standeth, i. e. as Precedent and supreme Judge, teaching others how they are to judge, and punishing them if peccant. So it follows: he judgeth among the Gods: i. e. rewarding those that are faithful, but punishing the unfaithful and unjust. Thence v. 2. How long will ye judge unjustly and accept the persons of the wicked? Selah. As if he had said: Dare ye be so unjust and partial, when as God sits Precedent in the midst of you?— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and accept the face or person of the wicked, as Leu. 19.15. Ezra renders it: lift up the faces of the wicked: i. e. by your favour exhilarate and make glad the wicked. Thence he proceeds v. 3, 4. to exhort the Judges to the execution of justice. And v. 5. he shows the ruins that follow on unjust Administrations: v. 5. They know not. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. This notes their ignorance of Right or Law. Neither will they understand— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. this notes their oscitance and negligence in examining Causes, and matters of Fact. They walk in darkness, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. This some understand of being blinded by private Affections, and Bribes, so that they cannot see what is just and equal; according to Exod. 23.8. And thou shalt take no gift, for the gift blindeth the wise, and perverteth the words of the just. Now by reason of these things, he saith, All the foundations of the earth [i. e. the Judaic State] are out of course. Which shows, that injustice destroys the very foundations of a Nation. Thus Job 15.34. And fire shall consume the tabernacles of Bribery. How much Justice is necessary to preserve States, and commanded by God, appears, Deut. 16.18. And they shall judge the people with judgement of justice: Deut. 16.18, i. e. with an equality towards all parties and in all matters. So v. 20. Justice justice shalt thou follow: i. e. all manner of justice, v. 20. nothing but justice, exactly, diligently, continually. (2) The Office of a Magistrate must be administered with Temperance. Temperance. Thus Plato, Repub. 3. pag. 403. We have said, that the Keepers [of the Laws, or Magistrates] be commanded, that they altogether abhor Drunkenness: for it is lawful for any man to be drunk, rather than for a Keeper. And he gives this reason of it: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For it is ridiculous, that a Keeper should want a Keeper. Meaning that a Drunkard wants a Keeper himself, and therefore is not fit to be the Keeper of others. Thus Solomon's Mother, Prov. 31.4. Prov. 31.4. It is not for Kings to drink wine. Hebr. it is not convenient for Kings to drink wine: i. e. a large quantity of it: which the Grecians term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a drinker of wine, or one given to wine. Whence Plato adds, pag. 404. That the diet of the Magistrate ought to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, simple, not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, with variety of dainties, which is most destructive to sanity. (3) Magistrates must administer their Office with moderation as to passions, 3. Moderation. and freedom from discords. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 378. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Magistrates of the City ought to be possessed with this sentiment, that it is the basest thing for them to contend by mutual discords. How much irregular passions are unbecoming a Civil Magistrate is well expressed by Aristotle, Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 1. art. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It is not lawful to pervert a Judge, by provoking him to anger, or to envy, or to compassion: for this is all one as if one about to use a rule should pervert the same. (4) Clemence also ought to be illustrious in magistratic Administrations. 4. Clemence. Thence Plato, Politicus, pag. 274. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, We said, that a King and Civil Magistrate is a Pastor of Mankind, and in this regard a God for mortal man. Wherein he makes a Magistrate to be God's Vicegerent, and a Pastor of mankind, which denotes his clemence. Thence that of Seneca to Nero: The clemence of a Magistrate works a shame of sin in the Subjects: that is the greatest punishment, which comes from the mildest Magistrate, etc. (5) Magistrates ought to exercise their Office with Self-denial, 5. Fidelity, etc. Diligence, Courage, and Fidelity. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 374. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Ex quo se Caesar orbi terrarum dedicavit sibi cripuit. Seneca. By how much the greater the Office of Magistrates is, doth it not require by so much the greater vacation, and thence the greatest art and diligence? How much sloth and negligence is unworthy of a Civil Magistrate we are assured by Homer, Iliad. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. It becomes not a Magistrate to sleep swectly the whole night; to whom the people and so great cares are committed. Again, Plato, Leg. 6. requires, that a Judge be endued not only with judgement and prudence for the understanding of matters, but also with fidelity in and for the determination of them. §. 8. Having explicated the essential Constitution and Administration of Polity, we now proceed to the Utility thereof; The effects of Polity both good and bad. as also to what is Conservative and Destructive thereto. As for the Utility of a good Polity we have it well laid down by Plato, in his Menexenus, pag. 238. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Polity is the Nurse of men; good truly of good men, but bad of bad men. And we are now to explicate, that our Ancestors were educated in an excellent form of Polity: by the benefit whereof, both those that now live have become good, as also they which made a good end of their days. He being about to describe the Polity of the Athenian Republic gins with a Preface, touching the efficacious influence of good Polity, to make men good; as also of bad, to render men bad. Touching those things that are Preservative or Destructive of politic Bodies Plato has given us many Philosophemes. Things destructive to Republics. As for the Preservatives of a politic Body, they are sufficiently evident in what precedes touching politic Constitution and Administration; and they will farther appear by showing what things are destructive thereto. 1. 1. Atheism, and carnal Polity. As Religion is the main Foundation and Pillar of politic Society; so Atheism and carnal Polity, in subjecting Religion to private interest, is that which brings ruin to the same. What influence Atheism has on the ruin of Republics Plato frequently inculcates, particularly in his Leg. lib. 10. and elsewhere, as hereafter, when we come to discourse professedly of Atheism, B. 2. C. 1. S. 2. As more open Atheism, so carnal Polity in prostituting and subjecting Religion to private interest, either of State or single persons, is a great cause of ruin unto States. This was that which brought ruin to the ten Tribes; who after their revolt from Rehoboam and Judah, being afraid, lest that, if the people should go up to worship God at Jerusalem, they would again be thereby induced to return to their old Allegiance, they, upon corrupt reasons of State, erected Calves at Dan and Bethel; hoping thereby to keep the people in obedience to Jeroboam, who had usurped the Government. Now this their politic contrivement in making Religion to subserve their State-interest, whereby they hoped to preserve their usurped Polity, proved indeed the main cause of their destruction. So sotish is the solely of those, who endeavour, by subjecting Religion to State-interest, to secure themselves: which is indeed the most compendiose way to State-ruine. 2. 2. Luxury and Idleness. Another great cause of Ruin to politic Bodies is Luxury, Sensuality and Idleness. Plato assures us, That Polities are composed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, out of the manners of Republics, which, whatever way they incline, draw on other things with them: i. e. if a Republic be given to sloth and sensuality it is near ruin. Thus Repub. 9 pag. 564. he saith, That idleness and prodigality are the peste of Republics: and where these two i'll humours are found, they infest a Body politic, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as choler and phlegm the natural body. Thence Aristotle, in his Politics saith, That Husbandmen and Shepherds make the best Citizens, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because such converse according to Laws; for they get their livelihood by working, neither can they be idle. Whereas other Vocations are more obnoxious to idleness and luxury. 3. 3. Prosperity and Poverty. Also excess of Prosperity or Poverty greatly promoves the ruin of Republics. Prosperity hastens the ruin of Republics; as it oft causeth Luxury, Insolence, and Divisions: Poverty, as it produceth Injustice and Idleness. How much excess of prosperity promoveth the ruin of a Republic Plato, Repub. 9 pag. 564. illustrates, by the Republic of the Bees, which, when it abounds with much honey, the Drones come and devour all: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Rich men therefore, according to my opinion, are deservedly styled the Herb of Drones, which they devour. Thence Plato, Repub. 4. pag. 421. saith, That there are two things that corrupt and debauch Citizens, and so bring ruin to Republics, namely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Richesse and Penury. And he gives the reason of both. Richesse makes men idle and factiose: An Artificer, saith he, when he grows rich, casts off his Trade. Again, poverty hinders men from work, in that it deprives them of necessaries. Whence he concludes, That Magistrates ought to take diligent heed, that a City be not brought to ruin, by the excess of these two, Richesse and Poverty: whereof the former breeds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Luxury, Sloth, and Innovation: and the later, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sordidness, evil Practice, as also desires of innovation. Again, Repub. 8. pag. 552. he saith, Excess of richesses or poverty threaten ruin, because the former makes men Drones; and the later makes men Thiefs, sacrilegious, and addicted to evil practices. 4. Animosities, Factions, and Divisions are a principal cause of State-ruine. 4. Divisions. It's a Maxim of Politicians, concordant with Plato's Politics, That the principal causes of ruin to politic Bodies is from themselves, as in Bodies natural: And what more potent principe of self-dissolution is there than Division? Sacred Philosophy teacheth us, That a kingdom divided cannot stand, Mat. 12.25. as Mat. 12.25. for indeed Division in allthings naturally draws on dissolution. Plato, Repub. 4. assures us, That Unity is the best bond of any Society, whereas divisions cause dissolution. Thence Repub. 5. pag. 464. he requires in his Republic, That there be a Community as well of Goods as Affections, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whence truly it comes to pass, that men are free from all contentions and divisions. 5. The last cause we shall mention of State-ruine is Injustice. 5. Injustice. Thus Plato, Repub. 4. pag. 444. makes Injustice to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the vitiosity, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the disease of persons and Republics. This is well set forth by Augustin, de Civit. l. 4. c. 4. Without Justice what are Kingdoms but great places of Robbery? And what are places of Robbery but little Kingdoms? For indeed the Pirate taken by Alexander, being asked by the King, What he meant thus to infest the Sea, answered elegantly and truly, And what meanest thou thus to infest the whole World? But because I play the Pirate in a little Ship, therefore I pass for a Robber: whereas thou doing the same with a great Navy, passest for an Emperor. See more of politic Justice and Injustice, in what precedes, §. 7. Parag. 4. REFORMED PHILOSOPHY. BOOK II. Of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophy: wherein Plato's Metaphysic Philosophemes are methodised and improved. CHAP. I. Of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophy in general. A general Idea of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophy: It's generic notion, Sapience: Its Object things most excellent, etc. It's difference from Theology, as a natural Sapience: It's formal Act, Contemplation. §. 1. Metaphysic or prime Philosophy in general. BEfore we enter on the body of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophy it will be necessary that we give some general Notion thereof, thereby to disabuse the minds of men, who have been so long imposed on by false Ideas, collected out of Aristotle's supposed Metaphysics. For since Aristotle's Metaphysics possessed the Schools, all men have endeavoured to conform their metaphysic Philosophemes to them, as the original Exemplar, on a supposition that they were a part of Aristotle's genuine Works. But I conceive it no difficult thing to demonstrate, what some Learned men have undertaken, that those Metaphysics, which pass under Aristotle's name, are spurious, and not to be reckoned among his genuine Works. For who can imagine, that such a learned and accurate man as Aristotle was, should be guilty of so great an absurdity, as to stuff up a great part of his Metaphysics, with the ten Predicaments, and other Logic Notions, which he had so prolixely handled in his Organ of Logic? May we not take it for granted, that nothing properly belongs to Metaphysics, but what is supernatural, as the name imports? Yea doth not the synonymous title, that Aristotle is said to give this Science, cut off above the moiety of his Metaphysics? For Stobaeus tells us, That it was Aristotle's manner to call Metaphysic, Theologie. And this indeed he learned from his Master Plato, who seems to attribute unto Metaphysic one and the same Idea with natural Theology; the object whereof is God and things supernatural, so far as they may be contemplated by natural light. Hence we may define Metaphysic, or Prime Philosophic, according to Plato's mind, A natural Sapience or Theology, for the contemplation of things supernatural and divine. As for the generic Idea or Notion of Metaphysic the Platonists general term is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sapience; which is deduced from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sophe, Metaphysic Sapience. a Speculator or Contemplator; because the ancient wise men were Contemplators, specially of things divine. Indeed Cicero, Tusc. 4. calls all Philosophy, the study of Sapience: but the Grecian Philosophers, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle seem to confine Sapience to Metaphysic: wherefore they define it, the knowledge of things most excellent and divine, specially the first Being and Cause of allthings. Whence they make the Object of this Sapience to be in the general (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, things most excellent and eximious, as the first Being and Cause: (2) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, things wonderful: i. e. such oriental Traditions as Thales, Pythagoras, and Plato brought from the Barbarics, namely the Hebrews, etc. touching the first Origine of Things, the Wonders of Providence, the Worship of God, and Mysteries of Religion: which Aristotle esteemed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, things inutile; because beyond the sphere of his confined corrupt Reason. Whence he styles those first Philosophers, who traded in such oriental Traditions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Lovers of Fables or Traditions: For, saith he, a Fable is composed of things wonderful. (3) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, things most difficult to be known, namely Immaterials. (4) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, things divine. It was a general Principe among the Ancients, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sapience is a Science of things divine. Hence they made Sapience to be the same with Theologie. (5) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which essentially is; also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which always existes; again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Being itself; and lastly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Being simply, or the first Being, namely God. For Plato generally by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Ens or Being, understands the first independent Being, God, in comparison of whom allthings else are said not to be, or to be mere nothings, as hereafter cap. 3. §. 1. Thence Plato makes Sapience to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the knowledge of Being, i. e. God. Whence also among the Egyptians, in the Temple dedicated to Minerva, the Goddess of Wisdom, there was this Inscription: I am that which was, which is, which shall be. Which is contained in the Mosaic description of God, Exod. 3.14. Exod. 3.14. and denotes thus much, that God, who is the first, yea only independent essential Being, is the prime Cause and supreme Object of all Sapience, of which hereafter more fully. As for the proper act, properties and effects of Sapience in the general, we have fully handled them, in Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 4. §. 2. Metaphysic a natural Sapience. We define Metaphysic a natural Sapience, whereby it is distinguished from supernatural divine Theology. It's true, Plato seems to make all Sapience divine and supernatural. Thus in his Epino. pag. 989. he makes all true knowledge of God to be from God. So Repub. 6. pag. 483. he proves, That the mind of man needs divine illumination for the understanding things divine, as much as the eye needs the light of the Sun to see things visible. Hence also Plotinus, En. 5. l. 8. c. 5. pag. 546. makes God to be the essential Sapience, from whom all the rays of created Sapience stream, as beams from the Sun. But in as much as these Gentile Philosophers came altogether short of all supernatural knowledge of God, which since the Fall of man is by God appropriated to the second Covenant, it necessarily follows, that if we will make Metaphysic a Science distinct from supernatural Christian Theology, it can be no other than a natural Sapience of objects supernatural: such as the wiser of the Philosophers, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato attained unto, partly by the advantage they had from oriental Traditions, and partly from the working of their own inquisitive minds thereon. So that by Metaphysic here we understand only that natural Sapience, which Plato and other Philosophers gained by their own inquisitive thoughts, dwelling on oriental Traditions, and may be further improved by natural contemplation on objects supernatural. For we see by daily experience what great contemplations of God and things divine the natural mind of man may arrive unto, by means of supernatural Revelations, and the workings of his own thoughts thereon, together with some more commun illuminations of the Spirit; without any supernatural divine knowledge. We find this fully exemplified in multitudes of Platonic mystic Divines, who have given us many raised sublime spiritual notions of some of the highest Mysteries in Theology, without any supernatural knowledge or sense thereof. The same may be said of many Schoolmen, their contemplations of God and things divine. Again we call Metaphysic a natural Sapience, as it has for its fundament or proper ground rational Arguments, whereby it is distinguished from supernatural Theology, which has for its proper ground and foundation divine Testimony and Authority. In Metaphysic, as it is a part of Philosophy, Reason is the highest Authority; but in Theologie the Authority of God is the highest Reason. Yet in as much as Metaphysic ought to be subordinate to Theology, we also may, yea aught sometimes to explicate and demonstrate several parts thereof by divine Testimonies. For as Metaphysic at first borrowed its object from Theology, so some of its best Arguments, Demonstrations and Explications are to be fetched thence. §. 3. The proper Act of Metaphysic is Contemplation: The proper act of metaphysic Contemplation. whereby it is distinguished from moral Prudence, which chief regards Action. Thence in the Platonic Definitions, Sapience is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a contemplative Science. Not that Socrates or Plato excluded Action from Sapience and Metaphysic, or Contemplation from moral Prudence and Ethics: for no active Science can be well managed without contemplation, neither is any contemplative Science right, if it end not in Action. So that contemplative and active Sciences, according to Socrates and Plato, are not to be opposed, but composed, and made subordinate each to other; at least the former to the later: Contemplation ought to assist Action in Morals; and Action ought to crown Contemplation in Metaphysics. When therefore we make Contemplation the proper Act of Metaphysic, in distinction from Action, which is the proper effect of moral Prudence, it must be understood, not in Aristotle's sense, who makes contemplative or speculative, and active or practic Sciences opposite species, and so inconsistent each with other; but in Plato's, who, Repub. 2. distributes Disciplines into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Music or Contemplative, and Gymnastic or Active: the former he makes to respect things divine, and the later things human. Whence the object of Metaphysic being things divine, its proper Act must necessarily be Contemplation: For the highest and most noble act of the Soul about things supernatural and divine is contemplation; whence all Affections and Actions proportionable thereto follow in their course. Hence the formal Beatitude of the rational Soul is generally placed in vision or contemplation as the principal part thereof. This Contemplation, Contemplation of God the most excellent. wherein the Platonists place the formal Act of Sapience or Metaphysic, is well described by Alcinous, in his Systeme of Platonic Philosophy: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Contemplation is a vigorous operation of the Intellect understanding things intelligible. The proper object of this Contemplation they make to be Truth, specially the first Truth, whereby the life of the Understanding is nourished and maintained. Thence Plato, Repub. 6. pag. 485. tells us, That nothing is more akin to Wisdom or Metaphysic than Truth. And in his Timaeus, pag. 90. he makes Contemplation of Truth, principally divine, to be the proper motion of the Soul. And more expressly, Repub. 5. pag. 475. he saith, Those only are true Philosophers, who are much conversant 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in the contemplation of that which essentially is, namely God: also, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, such as are most greedy to contemplate the first Truth. So, in his Phaedrus, pag. 247. he assures us, That the contemplation of God with a pure mind, furnisheth us with all other convenient cogitations: for the Soul contemplating that which truly is, and acquiescing in this contemplation, is thereby nourished and recreated with the highest pleasures: and then having acquired the genuine Sapience or Science of that which essentially is, and immutably such, being as it were feasted with these delices, it again enters into the interior parts of Heaven and returns home. Wherein he gives us a lively description of those satisfactory pleasures and delights, which attend the contemplation of God. Thus in the Schools they usually determine, That a contemplative life is more excellent than an active: and they ground their determination on the preference that our Lord gives to Marie, Luke 10.42. Luke 10.42. And their reasons are such as these: because a contemplative life is, (1) more tranquille and serene: (2) more desirable for itself: (3) more permanent and lasting: (4) more self-sufficient and satisfactory: (5) more delicious and sweet: (6) more agreeable to man's more noble part, the Soul: (7) more divine and beatific. Which being understood of the contemplation of God, holds most true, provided that this contemplation be rightly qualified, namely that it be real, pure, spiritual, lively, distinct, firm, solid, affective, effective and influential on the divine life. CHAP. II. Of Atheism, and the Existence of a Deity. The Origine of Atheism, (1) from Polytheisme, (2) from vain Philosophy and carnal Polity, (3) from the carnal Mind, Pride, etc. Three sorts of Atheism: practic Atheism worst. The pestiferous Influences and punishment of Atheism. The Existence of the Deity demonstrated from, (1) Universal Consent. (2) A first Cause: against the Eternity of Mater, etc. (3) A first Mover. (4) The Order of the Universe. (5) The innate Idea of a Deity in the Soul. (6) Practic Arguments from [1] Conscience. [2] Religion. [3] The politic World. [4] The Atheists enmity against a Deity. §. 1. HAving given some summary general Idea of Metaphysic, That there is a God. we now descend to its principal Object, namely God; who may be considered either in regard of his Being, or Operations. As for the Being of God, the first thing to be undertaken, is the demonstration, that there is a God. Plato abounds with many pregnant and cogent Arguments to demonstrate the Existence of God, against the Atheists of his Age. We shall reduce the whole to the following particulars. First, Plato explicates the original roots of Atheism, The Origine of Atheism. which began to spring up in his days, with its prodigiose nature, and pestiferous malign influences. 1. He expounds to us some of the principal roots of Atheism. Thus, de Legib. 12. pag. 967. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, There are some who think, that they who are much conversant in the studies of these Arts and Sciences, namely Astronomy, and other cognate necessary Disciplines, become Atheists; from an apprehension, that things are made and governed by the necessities of certain natural Causes, and not by the force and providence of the divine Wil In which Platonic Philosopheme there are these Propositions worthy of our contemplation. (1) That there was an opinion abroad, that the Mathematics and other Sciences made many Atheists. (2) That Philosophy abused made men Atheists, by resolving all the Products, Events, and Phenomena of the natural and politic World into natural Causes, not the divine Will and Providence. (3) That these Atheistic infusions and persuasions sprang not really from Philosophy, but the abuse thereof. These Platonic notions we shall endeavour more fully to explicate in the following Propositions. 1. Atheism 1. from Polytheisme. Atheism was not the firstborn of corrupt Nature, but was ushered into the World by Polytheisme, it's elder Brother, and nursed up by vain Philosophy and carnal Policy. So long as the Deity maintained an awe and reverence towards itself in the consciences of men, by a sense of its prodigiose operations in creating and governing the World, Atheism found no place in Nature. We hear little of it till the beginning of the Roman Monarchy: at which time God withdrew the sensible experiments and prodigiose effects of his Omnipotence, which had so long preserved the old World from Atheism: But beginning now to govern the World more by wisdom, without those miraculose operations before vouchsafed to the infant-world, the effects of his power were not so sensible: whence the brutish sensual World began to call in question the very existence and providence of God, and that from the many ridiculous Deities which were idolised by men. For Polytheisme gave a great advance to Atheism: To multiply the Divinity is to destroy it: he that has power to believe many Gods, is very capable of falling into Atheism, to believe there is no God. The corrupt mind of man observing bright impresses and characters of the Deity in the works of his hands, began very early to worship the Creature instead of the Creator, Rom. 1. 19-23. Hence sprang up first Zabaisme or planetary Deities, and then Hellenisme or Polytheisme, a multiplicity of all manner of Gods; which laid a foundation for Atheism: For he that is inclined to believe a plurality of Gods, may easily be induced to believe there is no God. So intimate is the cognation and connexion between Polytheisme and Atheism: As the Atheist believes there is no God, so the Polytheist, or superstitiose person wishes there were none: for all superstition has a legal fear wrapped up in its bowels, which strikes at the very Being of the Deity. But albeit Polytheisme opened the door to Atheism, yet it was hatched, nursed up and maintained by vain Philosophy and carnal Policy, as we have at large proved, Court Gent. P. 3. B. 2. C. 1. §. 4. 2. 2. From vain Philosophy and carnal Policy. Philosophy abused makes men Atheists, by resolving all the Phenomena of Nature, and States into natural Causes, exclusively as to the Divine Will and Providence. This lies evident in Plato's Philosopheme before cited. Who makes mention (1) of Astronomy, and other parts of Mathematics, as influential on Atheism. For the Pagan Astronomers then, as many judicial Astrologers now, held, that there was a natural subordination of all inferior Causes and Effects to the Stars: whence they reduced all natural effects, yea many politic, to abstract forms and figures: to some insensible Influences or fatal Necessity. Again, Mathematicians inuring themselves to ocular sensible Demonstrations, expect the same in divine matters: a bare Testimony, though never so divine, signifies little or nothing with them: whence they disbelieve every divine Mystery, which falls not under certain rational Demonstration. Witness the great Leviathan of our Age and Nation, (for so he is pleased to title his Book) who has not been ashamed to make public profession of his Atheism, and disbelief of allthings, which admit not of sensible Demonstration. (2) physiology or natural Philosophy, as also Medicine has had no small influence on Atheism; in that some of the principal Masters in these Sciences have endeavoured to reduce all natural products and effects, either to the accidental Concourse of Atoms; or to some hidden virtues and spirits in Nature; or to the various modifications of matter; or to some mundane Spirit, exclusive as to the first Cause and divine Providence. Thus we find the first appearance of Atheism to be among those philosophic Wits of Grece, Democritus, Epicurus, etc. who did all ways possible try if they could salve the Phenomena of Nature without a Deity. (3) Eristic Logic has had too great influence on Atheism, as Plato, Repub. 7. pag. 539. seems to intimate, telling us, That young men, by frequent Dialecticks litigations and contradictions each of other, at last come to disbelieve every thing. For Scepticism naturally tends to Atheism: he that disputes every thing, at length comes to believe nothing, even in things divine. (4) But yet the principal Parent and Nurse of Atheism has been in all Ages carnal Policy. The chief lineaments of Atheism were form at Rome, when it became the Seat of state-policy. For the secular Politician ascribes all the revolutions of States and human Affairs to some politic contrivement or defect therein. And what makes the present Conclave at Rome and all their adherents so much to abound with Atheism, but the great confidence they have in their carnal policy? Neither hath this politic Atheism infected Rome only, but also diffused itself throughout the European World. Hence Machiavelli, that great secular Politician of Florence, layeth Atheism at the foundation of his carnal policy. And it is to be feared there are too many such politic Atheists amongst us: some are so bold and daring, as that they are not ashamed openly to profess it: others, by their doubtful Scepticism give cause of suspicion. I wish we had not too strong motives to force such a belief, that a great part of those who profess themselves Christians, had they but the advantages of interest and such like selfish motives, could with as much facility turn Atheists. It is natural to carnal reason and policy to step up into the Throne of God, and take the Sceptre of his Providence out of his hand, as we find it exemplified in Nebuchadnezar, Dan. 4.30. Dan. 4.30. Is not this great Babylon that I have built? i. e. by my wisdom and power, etc. 3. 3. From the carnal Mind, Pride, etc. Atheism springs not from true Philosophy, but from the abuse thereof by the carnal mind of man. This Plato has well observed, in the place forecited, de Leg. lib. 12. pag. 967. where he shows that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Atheists, who opposed the existence and providence of God, as also overthrew the main fundaments of Religion, were but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sophistic, spurious Philosophers. Hence that grand Effate of Sr. Francis Bacon, That a little Philosophy makes a man an Atheist, but a great deal cures him of Atheism. And indeed, to speak the truth, it is not Philosophy simply in itself, but the infidelity, carnal reason, and spiritual pride of man's heart that makes men Atheists. Psal. 10.4. This we are assured of by sacred Philosophy; as Psal. 10.4. The wicked through the pride of his countenance. The Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 through is causal, denoting the proper intern impulsive cause of the wicked's Atheism. The countenance here is brought in, not as the formal subject or proper seat, but as the Index of his pride: that wherein it doth chief discover itself; though the proper subject of it be the heart. Thence the Thargum thus paraphraseth it: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 through the pride of his spirit. Thence it follows: will not seek after God. This notes his practic Atheism, founded in speculative. Whence it follows: all his thoughts are, that there is no God. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies mischievous thoughts, politic designing imaginations. The wicked, through the pride of his heart, is full of politic Atheistic imaginations that there is no God. Thus Psal. 14.1. Psal. 14.1. The fool hath said in his heart there is no God. The fool here is not such an one as wants reason, but he that abuseth it unto practic Atheism. This I am bold to assert, that the genuine and proper cause of that overspreading Atheism, which covers the face of this politic World, is the carnal Reason, Infidelity, and spiritual Pride of men's hearts, not any defect of evidence in the objects of our Faith. This is very clear; because the most of your modern Atheists are as credulous in their way, as any other of the simplest of men: Why else do they so greedily assent unto any infirm Hypothesis of those they admire, upon as sleight and trivious reasons as may be imagined? Certainly, this so great credulity in things natural or politic, is a sufficient demonstration, that it is not so much the want of evidence in matters of Faith, that makes men Atheists, as the pride and folly of their carnal reasons, which they idolise. It is a thing most prodigiose, that those who abound with such soft facile credulous humours and inclinations, to believe, yea idolise false Deities created by their own lusts, should have their minds prepossessed with an incredulity so obstinate and unpenetrable by all the impressions of the true Deity. 2. Plato gives us an account not only of the origine of Atheism, Threesorts of Atheism. but also of its kinds. Thus, de Leg. lib. 10. pag. 888. with mild and soft words he endeavours to convince the proud Atheists of his Age, under the Symbol of a young man, in these words: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. My Son, thou art yet young: neither do I doubt, but that progress of time will make thee change thy opinion. Expect therefore, I beseech thee, that now thou give thy judgement of the highest points. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But that which thou now judgest a matter of no moment, is indeed a point of the highest consequence, namely, that any one, thinking rightly of God, lives well or il. But first touching this matter, I will signify to thee one great thing, lest I should seem to thee a liar in this matter, and it is this: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Not thou alone, nor thy friends have been the first who have entertained this [Atheistic] sentiment of God: but from all memory there have been more or fewer who have laboured under this disease. And I will tell thee what has happened to them: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, namely no one of them, who from their youth entertained this opinion that God is not, hath persevered therein even unto old age. We find a great instance hereof in Bion, (mentioned by Laertius in his Life) who in his health said: The Gods were nothing: but being worn out by a long disease, and fearing death, he acknowleged their existence, etc. Plato adds: As for the two other opinions about God, namely (1) that there is a God, but yet he doth not regard human affairs; or (2) if he doth regard them, yet that he is easily reconciled by the prayers and sacrifices of men, there have been some, though not many, who have been infected with these blasphemous sentiments of the Deity. Plato here, as before in the beginning of this Dialogue, pag. 885. mentions three sorts of Atheists, which in his days diffused their venomous blasphemies against the Deity. (1) Such as denied the Existence of God. (2) Such as held there was a God, but yet denied his Providence and Government of human affairs. (3) Such as held God's providence and observation of men's good and evil acts, but yet withal denied the Justice of God in punishing sin, affirming that God was easily reconciled by Prayers and Sacrifices. Now Plato sets himself to refute each of these, of which hereafter. The last of these three kinds takes in practic Atheism, which is indeed of all the most pestiferous and diffusive. For when men believe there is a God, and that the World is governed by him, yet, then to think that he will be pacified by their hypocritic and imperfect prayers and services, is, in Plato's estime, an high piece of Blasphemy and practic Atheism: and therefore he spends much force of Argument to prove, That the righteous God cannot be pacified by the services of the wicked. Of which we shall discourse more fully, in the Justice of God. Plato, Repub. 10. pag. 886. tells us, That those who truly believe the Existence of God, will not indulge themselves in sin. Whence the Stoics, following Socrates, held, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That every wicked man was an Atheist. For they held there were two forts of Atheists, (1) Such as were contrary to God. (2) Such as despised God, by disobeying his Laws, etc. And it was a great Saying of Picus, Earl of Mirandula, That there was but one thing in the World worse than a speculative Atheist, and that was a practic Atheist. The roots of practic Atheism lie low, as an insensible Spring and Principle, which moves and works all, and yet is not discerned. Some of the greatest Professors of a Deity, may be the greatest practic Atheists. 3. In what follows Plato manifests a warm zeal and passion against these Atheists and their Atheistic infusions, as the peste of Families, Republics, yea of human Nature. Thus Leg. 10. p. 890. having mentioned the opinion of some Atheists, affirming, The monstrose nature and pestiserous influences of Atheism. That the assertion of a Deity was not from Nature, but the politic constitution of Statesmen, to keep men in awe, he replies: What a monstrose thing, O my Host, dost thou relate? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and how great a peste, which invades the minds of young men, to the ruin and subversion of Republics and private Families? Whereby he demonstrates, that this prodigiose peste of Atheism tends to the subversion of States, Families, Persons, yea human Nature. And we have a good observation to this purpose in Campanella, Polit. cap. 8. When Sects [of Philosophers, or others] shall turn to Atheism, the top of divine wrath, and ruins of people are near: for when they are come to deny the Providence of God, or the Immortality of the Soul, things necessarily suffer a mutation or reformation: because the bridle is taken off from men's consciences, and they also are destroyed by impious Princes. Yea, formal Atheism is repugnant to human Nature, not only morally, but physically, as hereafter. O! what a servile base thing is Atheism? How doth it bow down the Soul to the basest of conditions! Doth it not expose a man to a miserable venture of all future miseries, but strip him naked of all hopes of future happiness? Is not every Atheist divided against himself? Do not those remains of light in Conscience, and those secret fears of a Deity war against his corrupt atheistic Ratiocinations? Have not his irregular passions full liberty to captivate him and tyrannize over him without check? Yea, doth he not bid farewell to his best being, his first cause and last end? Would it not be thought unnatural for the Plant to bid adieu unto its Mother-earth, which bred and nursed it up? or should the branch renounce and bid defiance to its root, would not all condemn it of unnatural madness and ingratitude? Did the Earth ever disclaim its dependence on the Sun for warm influences, light, and heat? Was the stream ever so foolish, as to bid farewell to its Fountain? And yet is not this the case of every Atheist? Doth he not disclaim his original Fountain, Root, Sun, Parent and first Cause? Alas! how much doth he depose and forfeit his Reason, yea human Nature! What are all his atheistic Reasonments but assaults against himself; endeavours to banish himself from himself? O! what venomous poison doth Atheism drop on human Nature! It doth indeed commit a rape on humanity, and plunder it of its native glory, beauty, dignity and perfection: it doth unhinge and separate man from his most laudable, noble, and best self: it makes him a slave and vassal to Mater and Motion: it robs not only his Creator of the works of his hands, but himself of human felicity and tranquillity: yea, it placeth man many degrees below the Brute animal, which enjoys some happiness in this present state; whereas the Atheist can enjoy neither present contentment, nor yet hopes of future bliss. So repugnant is Atheism to human Nature. 4. The punishment of Atheism. Thence Plato proceeds, Leg. 10. pag. 890. to show what should be the punishment of such Atheists. He saith: It belongs to the Magistrate to endeavour their conviction by reason; and if they obstinately persevere, to punish them: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, some by death, others by stripes, others by bonds, others by infamy, others by banishment, others by miserable poverty. And in the conclusion of this Discourse, pag. 907. he sums up all thus: We affirm therefore that those three things that were proposed by us, namely, that there is a God: and that he takes care of allthings: and that he is not inclined by men's services beyond what is just and equal, have been abundantly demonstrated. And then he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. But for the contentions of wicked Atheistic men, we have discoursed more vehemently and warmly of this matter. Namely for this reason, O Clinias, we have used greater vehemence, lest peradventure these profligate Atheists, should, by their disputations, conceit themselves to have the better of us, and thence to act allthings according to the dictates of their lusts, and belch forth their blasphemous atheistic opinions of God. Wherefore to silence the madness of those Atheists, we have used the greater vehemence. And after all he establisheth this Law, That if any speak or act any thing atheistically and impiously against God, he be punished by the Magistrate. If Plato were so zelose and warm against the Pagan semi-Atheists of his Age, what vehemence and zeal would he express against the bold daring Atheists of this Age? O! what an ignoble, base, degenerate, uncomfortable thing is Atheism? how repugnant both morally and physically is it to human Nature? Ought not the Atheist sooner to doubt of his own being than God's? For if he be, God who made him, must needs be. Thence Padre Paul, that great Venetian Politician, composed a Treatise, That Atheism is repugnant to human Nature, and is not to be found therein: but that they who acknowledge not the true Deity, must necessarily feign to themselves some false ones, as it is mentioned in his Life, pag. 71. In sum, Atheism is a proposition so disnatural, monstrose, and difficult to be establisnt in the mind of man, that notwithstanding the insolence, vanity, and pride of Atheists, who endeavour by violence to raze out all notices of a Deity in their Conscience, yet still they give us some evidences of their fears that there is a Deity, by listing up their eyes and hands towards Heaven, or such like Indicia in sudden and great calamities. §. 2. 1. Universal consent for the Existence of God. Plato's zelose Philosophemes against Atheism having been discussed, we descend to his Demonstration of the Existence of God. First, That there is a God, he demonstrates from the universal consent of all Times and Nations. Thus, Leg. 10. pag. 887. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. But now giving credit to those Traditions, which together with their milk they sucked in, and which they heard from their Motkers and Nurses; who made it their business, to implant these sentiments on their minds, etc. Wherein he shows, how those that deny the Existence of God contradict the universally received Tradition, which they sucked in with their mother's milk, and that which is indeed engraven on their very Being's, as hereafter. Yea, he makes this Hypothesis, That there is a God, to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a self-evidencing first Principe, which needs no argument for the confirmation thereof; because Nature itself instructes us therein, it being that which the most prostigate men cannot raze out of their Souls. Thence Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 3. saith, That it never came into Controversy among the most of Grecians, that there was a God. And he gives this reason for it: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The knowledge or notion of God's Existence is naturally insite and ingenite to us, or engraven on our Natures. We may draw forth the force of this Platonic Argument, in Plato's own dialect thus: Have not all mankind in all times and places given their assent and consent to the existence of a Deity? Doth not all the Polytheisme of the Pagan World give evident testimony for the existence of a Deity? What made the Egyptians, Grecians and Romans so fond of their base multiplied Deities, but a notion engraven on their Being's, fomented by universal Tradition, that there was some supreme Being they owed Homage unto? It's true, their Homage and Worship was misplaced as to its proper object, but doth not the act sufficiently argue, that they owned a Deity, albeit not the true God? Hath not the whole World subscribed to the notion of a Deity? Was there ever any Nation so barbarous, as not to pay Homage to some supreme Being? Can we give instance of any part of the habitable World, where professed Atheism gained place or habitation? Has there not been an universal Tradition among the more intelligent of men, that God made the World and governs the same? Yea doth not this notion of a Deity run, not only through all Times, Ages, and Nations; but even through the Principes of human Nature; yea in the venes and blood of men? Well then might Plato say, That men sucked it in with their mother's milk. So much for inartificial Argument. 2. 2. From the subordination of Causes to a first Cause. Plato demonstrates the Existence of a Deity rationally, from the Subordination of second causes and effects to a first Cause. Thus in his Timaeus, pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Whatever is produced, it is necessary that it be produced by some Cause: for it cannot be, that any thing should be produced or made without a Cause. Then in what follows 〈◊〉 proves the World was made: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The World was made, because it is seen and touched, and has a body: But it is clear that such things are produced, etc. Whence he concludes, that God was the Parent and first Cause of the Universe. Plato bottoms his demonstration on these two Hypotheses, (1) That the World was made. (2) That it was made by some precedent Cause. (1) That the World was made and not eternal, was an Hypothesis generally maintained by all the Philosophers before Aristotle; who asserted, That the first Mater was eternal: and that on a mistaken Principe, That nothing could be produced out of nothing. But Plato strongly proves the World could not be eternal; because it is sensible and corporeous: and therefore the effect of some precedent Cause. And his argument may, in his own interrogatory mode, be thus improved: If the World be eternal, must it not also be immutable and invariable? Can there be any generation and corruption in that which is eternal? For where there are generations and corruptions, there must be causes and effects, which imply priority and posteriority: for the cause naturally precedes the effect: but can there be any priority and posteriority in what is eternal? If the World was from all eternity, must not the things that are generated and corrupted eternally have been, and eternally not have been? Must not the present way of Generation and Corruption correspond with the World's Eternity? Doth not our reason, yea commun sense assure us, that the World's present course of generation and corruption is inconsistent with its Eternity? Is it not most absurd and irrational to conceive, that one man should beget another successively from all Eternity? Doth not the very conception of succession in Eternity imply a flat contradiction? Moreover doth not generation and corruption suppose an inequal succession of ascent and descent? and is not this incompatible with an eternal Being? Again, if there were an infinite succession of generations and corruptions, how is it possible there should be any effect or issue? for can there be an end, where there is no beginning? Against the Eternity of the World, see more largely Derodone, L'Atheisme convaincu, pag. 5. where he proves from all the principal parts of the World, the Sun, Moon, etc. that it could not be eternal: and thence makes good his Hypothesis, that it was created by God. See also Sr. Charles Wolseley's unreasonableness of Atheism, Edit. 3. pag. 47-64. & 177. (2) Plato's next Hypothesis to prove God to be the first Cause, The World made by some prime Cause. is, That the World was made by some precedent Cause. For, saith he, whatever is produced, is produced by some Cause. We see nothing but what is produced by somewhat else; and therefore must rationally conclude, there must be some first Producer. Our reason compels us to look out for some first Cause, that gave being to allthings we see. Doth a man beget a man? and was not this man begotten by some other man, and so upward, till we come to some first man? And how came that first man to be produced but by some first Cause? In all subordinate Efficients, is not the first the cause of the middle, and the middle, whether many or one, the cause of the last? If then there be not a first, can there be a middle and last? So that may not men as well deny all Effects, yea themselves to be as deny a first Cause to be? Surely if God had not a Being, nothing else could be: in things subordinate one to the other, take away the first you take away all the rest. Therefore it must necessarily be, that the World was made by some precedent first Cause. This Hypothesis Plato lays down against the Antithesis of Leucippus and Democritus, which Epicurus afterward espoused, namely, That there was an infinite vacuity or emty space, in which were innumerous Atoms, or corporeous Particles, of all forms and shapes, which by their weight were in continual agitation or motion; by the various casual occursions of which, this whole Universe and all the parts thereof were framed into that order and form they now are in. Against this Antithesis Plato seems to have framed his Hypothesis, laid down in his Timaeus, pag. 28. where he asserts, That the Universe received its origine, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (as it is in the Autographe) not from any casual occursion of Atoms, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but from a prudent potent first Cause, who framed this Universe according to the most accurate Exemplar of his own divine Ideas. So in his Sophista, pag. 265 he saith: Natural things were produced, not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from a casual cause without intelligence; but that they were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, fruits or works of God the supreme Opificer of allthings. We may form his Argument, according to his own dialecticks mode, thus: Is it possible that this beautiful wel-ordered Universe should emerge out of a casual concourse of Atoms in the infinite Vacuity? What! were these corporeous Particles eternally there; or only introduced in time? If eternally, then is not necessary that they be invariable and immutable? for doth not all variation and alteration belong to time the measure thereof? Can any thing that is in a strict sense eternal vary? are not eternal and variable terms contradictory, as before? Or will they say, that these Atoms were introduced or produced in this vacuous space in time? must they not then have some cause of their production? And will it not hence follow, that there is a first Cause or Deity, as anon? Again, what a world of absurdities, yea contradictions is this Epicurean Hypothesis clogged with? Is it possible to imagine that such minute corporeous Particles should, in this imaginary vacuity, be invested with an eternal gravity, whereby an eternal casual motion is caused here and there, without any tendence to a Centure? Can it also be imagined, that these poor Corpuscules should continue in perpetual motion, till by chance they hit one against the other, and so were conglomerated into this order we find them in the Universe? Is it not a fond sick-brain conceit, that phlegmatic dull matter, and stupid motion should by chance produce such an harmonious Universe? Alas! what a system of contradictions would follow hereon? See Sr. Charles Wolseley against Atheism, pag. 87. But to descend to the affirmative of Plato's Hypothesis, That the World was made by some precedent first Cause. This he also inculcates in his Theaetctus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, We must take it for granted, that nothing can make itself. Whence it is necessary, that at last we come to some first Cause. (1) That in the subordination of Causes there cannot be a progress into infinite, we are told by Aristotle, (or who ever were the Composer of that Book) Metaph. l. 1. c. 2. and the reason is most evident; because what is infinite is incomprehensible, and impertransible; as also adverse to all order: for in infinites there is no first or last. Again, if in the subordination of Causes there should be an infinite Series, than it would follow hence, that there never was any Cause which was not subsequent to infinite Causes precedent: whence also it would follow, that there were infinite Causes before any Cause. (2) That nothing ever did or can make itself is most evident from multitudes of contradictions that follow this Hypothesis: for then a thing should be said to act physically before it had a being: to be superior and inferior, dependent and independent, to exist and not to exist in the same instant and in one and the same respect. (3) That this Universe was made by some Cause precedent to itself is evident; because it hath a possibility not to be: whence it follows, that once it was not: for whatever has a possibility not to be, has a passive power at least metaphysic, if not physic: and where any passive power is, there is something of the original nothing, out of which allthings were made, by him who is pure Act and perfect Being. Thus Damascene, Orthodox. Fide, l. 1. c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. All Being's are either created, or increate: truly if create they are altogether mutable: For it's necessary, that those things which began by mutation, should be always obnoxious to mutation, either by being corruptible, or alterable, according to pleasure. But if all Being's be increate, then are they all immutable. Thence he adds: Who therefore will not conclude, that all Being's sensible, yea that the very Angels may be many ways changed and altered? Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Therefore, seeing the Opificer of things is increate, he must be also altogether immutable. And what can this be other than God? (4) That God made allthings, is strongly demonstrated by Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 2. c. 15. of which hereafter. See also Mendoza Hurtado, Phys. Disp. 10. Sect. 1. §. 3. 3. The Existence of God from a first Motor. Another Argument whereby Plato proves the existence of a Deity is taken from the dependence of all motions on a prime Motor, or first Mover. Thus Leg. 10. pag. 893. being about to demonstrate the existence of a Deity against the Atheists of his Age, he makes this Preface: Let us make this Preface to our Discourse; sithat it is our purpose to prove there is a God, we ought with greater study and diligence to call upon him for his aid now, than at other times. Wherefore being as it were confirmed by these bonds, let us begin our Discourse— Therefore if any shall demand of me: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whether or no therefore do allthings stand still, and is nothing moved? or, on the contrary, are allthings, or somethings moved, and doth nothing stand still? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I will answer, that somethings are moved, and somethings stand still, etc. In which discourse, to prove his Thesis touching the existence of a Deity, he lays down this Hypothesis: That God was the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the primary and principal Mover in Nature, (as the Soul in the body) who moves himself and allthings that are, were, or shall be in the Universe. This Hypothesis he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and as it were the bonds of the whole disputation. Thence he proceeds, pag. 894. thus: Let there then be one motion, [i. e. Motor] which moves itself, but cannot move other things; being always uniform: another which always moves both itself and other things, by conjoining and disjoining, augmenting and diminishing, generating and corrupting, which motion is distinct from all the rest. By the former motion he understands that of things natural; by the later that of the first Motor, who moves himself and allthings else; which he thus explicates: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It is necessary, that he, who can move both himself and other things, do infinitely excel, and that the other Motors are much posterior and inferior thereto. Whereby he gives an infinite preference and priority to the first Motor, or Mover in comparison of all other second Movers. And then that there must be one prime Motor he demonstrates in what follows thus: When one thing is moved by another, and that other by another whom must we acknowledge to be the first Motor of all these? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Him truly that moves himself: for he cannot be changed by any before, seeing there can be no mutation before him. Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Therefore we must acknowledge, that the principe of all motions is be that moves himself, and is the most ancient and excellent cause of all mutations. Wherein he demonstrates (1) That there is one prime, Motor, which is not obnoxious to the motion or mutation of any precedent Motor. (2) That this prime Motor is the principe and cause of all other motions and mutations. Thus also in his Phaedrus, pag. 245 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Only therefore that which moves itself, and is the cause of motion to other things, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, This is the fountain and principe of moving, but a principe has no origine: for from it allthings arise; but it from nothing else: neither indeed were it a principe, if it were produced by any thing else. Whereby he proves, that God is the first Motor and Principe of all motion, who moves allthings, but is moved by nothing. This Demonstration of Plato seems so strong and binding, that Aristotle his Scholar was not only satisfied therein, but improved the same very much, Physicor. 8. where he thus argues: Whatever is moved is moved by some other: whence there is some first Mover, which is immobile; or there must be a progress into infinite, from which nature abhors: now the first immobile Mover is simply the first cause of all motions; as the first Mover in every kind of inferior motions, is the cause of all motions in that kind. This Platonic and Aristotelic Demonstration may be thus drawn forth: Doth not all motion proceed either from some prime Motor, or else from an innate and self-originated principe of motion? If from an innate self-originated principe of motion, then must not such a motion necessarily be eternal? and if eternal, then can a thing that so moves ever cease to move? Can any thing move, that was not at first moved by some prime Motor, or that doth not infinitely and eternally move itself? Can we imagine any thing not to have a beginning, but what is infinite and eternal? And need we a better argument to prove that all motion had a beginning, than this, that we see it has an end? Do not the several periods, which all motions as well natural as artificial fall under, clearly evince, that they are not self-originated, but had some beginning and prime Motor? This Demonstration R. Moses Maimonides, in summa Talmud. lib. de fund. Leg. c. 1. thus expresseth: The Heaven is always moved: but it cannot be moved without a Motor: and the Motor is God blessed without hand or body. This Argument from a prime Motor is well improved by Aquinas contra Gent. l. 1. c. 13. & l. 2. c. 6. §. 4. 4. The existence of God from the Order of the Universe. Plato demonstrates the Existence of a Deity from the admirable Order, Harmony, Beauty, and Perfection of the Macrocosm or Universe. Thus, Leg. 12. pag. 966. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The admirable order of the Universe, namely the reguiar motion of the Stars and other celestial Bodies ordered by the Divine Mind, demonstrate a Deity. For he that shall look into these things with a diligent inquisitive eye, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, no such one among mortals can be so far an Atheist, as not to acknowledge the existence of a Deity. So pag. 967. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, affirming that the Divine Mind made and orderly disposeth allthings. This Argument of Plato may, according to his own dialecticks mode, be thus improved: Is there not an accurate innate order and rectitude in the World? Do not allthings sweetly conspire and tend to one commun end? Lo! what an exact subordination of things one to another, and to the whole is there? Can it be imagined, that the Sun, Moon, and Stars should have such regular motions, course, order, and influences, without some infinitely wise Director and Disposer? Is it not a most absurd conceit, that all the regular subordinations of natural Causes and Effects in their proper dependences and uses should be produced by mere Chance? Is there not a most beautiful consent and concatenation of all parts in the Universe? And whence comes it, but from infinite Wisdom and Providence? It's true, confusion is a genuine product of Chance, to use the Atheists phrase; but is not all order the effect of Wisdom and Art? In a curiose Machine or piece of Art doth not the Order, Beauty, and Harmony of different parts speak the skill of the Artificer? And can we suppose, that the infinite Order and Beauty which is in the Universe should proceed by Chance, and not from an infinitely wise Agent? Consider the Sun, that Eye of the Universe; in its own gloriose structure, situation, conjunctions, regular motions, efficacious influences, and orderly disposition of seasons, according to the indigence and necessities of this inferior Word, and can we imagine that all this should be the result and product of Chance, and not of an infinitely wise divine Mind, as Psal. 19.1, 2, 3? Might we not also descend from those celestial Bodies, to the Regions of the Air and the Meteors lodged therein, both ignite and aqueous, their admirable order, perfection and influences? Likewise as to this inferior World, if we examine the origine of Fountains, dive into the Ocean and observe its regular Fluxes and Refluxes, etc. if we rake into the bowels of the Earth, and inquire into the origine of Stones both preciose and commun, mineral Juices, and Metals: Lastly, if we destil Plants, or anatomise Animals, what an incomparable Harmony, Order and Perfection shall we find in each of these, both in reference each to other, and to the whole Universe? This is well done by Plato, in his Timaus, pag. 28, etc. whence he concludes, That there must be an infinitely wise Mind, who frames all these things into such an admirable order, agreeable to his own eternal Ideas. Thus also Joan. Damascenus, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But that God, who in his own nature is invisible, is made visible by his operations, we know by the admirable constitution and gubernation of the Universe. Wherein he demonstrates the invisible Essence and Existence of God from his visible operations and works, as Rom. 1.20. §. 5. 5. God's Existence from the connate Idea of God in the Soul. Plato demonstrates the Existence of a Deity from the Microcosm or Man, specially his Soul, and those innate Ideas of a Deity lodged there. Thus Leg. 12. pag. 966. Do we not know that there are two things which make us believe that there is a God? one which we before mentioned, touching the Soul, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that it is the most ancient and divine of allthings made: I say, of those things, whose motion admits generation, but so as that it hath obtained an everlasting essence for itself. There are two parts in this Argument which demonstrate the existence of a Deity. (1) The divine origine and nature of the Soul. (2) Its Immortality. (1) The divine origine and nature of the human Soul fully evinceth the existence of God. Thus Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 899. Let him, who formerly denied there was a God, prove that we speak not truth, in giving the Soul the first place; or let him believe us, and so for the future order his life, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that he doubt not of a Deity. But let us consider whether to those that think there is no God, we have not abundantly proved there is a God. So in his Phaedo, p. 81. Doth not the mind thus affected go, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to the divine Being whereunto it is like? This Platonic Argument may be thus improved: Is there not a connate Idea of a Deity impressed and stamped on the very nature of the Soul? Doth not its immaterial, spirital, impassable nature speak its physic cognation with some supreme Spirit, that first conferred that spirital Being on it? Has not the Soul a physic Amplitude, yea infinite Capacity, albeit only remote and passive of contemplating some first Truth, and loving some chiefest good? Has not the mind an universal empire and dominion over all objects, to compound things most opposite, and divide things most intimately conjoined; to descend from the highest cause to the lowest effect, and then to ascend from the lowest effect to the highest cause? Has not the Will an infinite thirst after good, yea is never satisfied without the fruition of some supreme infinite good? And do not these infinite capacities, albeit only natural, remote and passive, imply some infinite object adequate thereto? Was there ever a faculty or power in Nature without an object suited thereto? Cicero tells us, de Nat. Deor. lib. 1. That Nature herself has impressed a notion of a Deity on the minds of al. As if he had said, according to Plato's mind, Has not God stamped an Idea of himself on human Nature? May we not as well abandon our very Being's, ourselves, as abandon the notices and characters of a Deity engraven on our Being's? Doth not every human Soul carry the signature and mark of his Creator impressed on itself? Is there not an impress and Idea of a Deity incorporated and contempered in the very complexion and constitution of the Soul? And albeit man by sin runs away as a fugitive from his Lord and Maker, yet has he not secured his claim to man, by his mark and physic Idea stamped on the Soul of man? The Ideas and Characters of a Deity are more clearly and lively stamped on the Souls of men, than upon any part of the sensible World. (2) As for the Immortality of the Soul, doth not this also imply an eternal object answerable thereto? Thus Plato, in his Symposium, pag. 207. informs us, That man, who is mortal as to his terrene part, seeks to be immortal as to his more noble part. And if the Soul seeks to be immortal, must there not be an immortal, eternal, infinite good, in the fruition of which it seeks immortal Beatitude? Of this see more fully, Philos. Gen. P. 1. lib. 3. cap. 2. sect. 10. §. 5. §. 6. The Existence of God demonstrated by practic Arguments. 1. From Conscience. Plato has given us some practic and moral Demonstrations of a Deity. As (1) some moral though imperfect notices of good and evil impressed on Conscience, with affections of fear and shame on the commission of sin. Plato, in his Minos, pag. 317. makes mention of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a royal Law of Nature, some notices whereof remain on degenerate human Nature. These notions the Stoics term, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: the Aristotelians, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, common and innate notions. Among which they reckon up such as these: That there is a God: that this God was the Maker, and is the Conservator, and Rector of the Universe: that he is infinitely wise, just, good, etc. That he is to be worshipped: that virtue is to be embraced, vice avoided, etc. These common notices they make to be connate and engraven on the Soul. And indeed sacred Philosophy assures us, that there are such common notices of good and evil naturally engraven on men's consciences, as Rom. 2.14, 15. which yet are improved by the works of Providence, as Act. 14.17. where rain and fruitful seasons are said to be God's witness. Now all Notions of good and evil clearly demonstrate the existence of a Deity: for the distinction of good and evil, as to man, refers to some principe above him: were there no supreme Rector and Judge to reward good and punish evil, the very notions of good and evil would vanish into smoke and vapour. What can be good, if there be not some Being originally and infinitely good, to which it refers, and by whole Law it is measured? Can we imagine how the notions of good and evil should exist in men's minds, if there were not a supreme Rector to give Laws for the measure thereof? If man had not some supreme Lord to give Laws to him, how could he be guilty of any moral transgression? Can he that is his own Law be guilty of an offence? Who can charge any man with doing i'll, unless he break the Law of some Superior? What could be just or unjust, if there were not a supreme Rector to measure and regulate the same? And could there likewise be any punishments or rewards, if there were not an infinitely wise and righteous Judge to distribute the same? Again, we may with facility evince the existence of a Deity from the Accusations, Tremblements, and Fears of a guilty Conscience. The Atheist may dispute against a Deity, but doth he not sometimes fear and tremble at a secret apprehension of that Deity he disputes against? When the Sergeants of Death come to arrest him, what pannic fears, what convulsions are in his Conscience? Doth he not quake and tremble before that Deity he formerly derided? Thus it was with Bion the Philosopher, who when he lay under the pangs and terrors of death acknowleged that Deity he before disclaimed. And would the Atheist be but true to himself, and so ingenuous as to lay open his breast, would not his own tremblements and fears of Conscience at times bassie his own infidelity and disbelief of a Deity? Have not all Nations in all Ages more or less fallen down before the Notion of a Deity? O! what stings and remorses have there been on the Consciences even of those who have been exempted from the punishment of human Laws? Have not many Tyrants trembled on the Throne, as Felix, when the condemned innocent rejoiced, as Paul? Ask Tiberius and Nero, those potent Emperors, what made them to tremble and fear? Were these fears the product of false imagination, and not rather of a guilty Conscience? (2) Another practic moral Demonstration of a Deity is taken from that sense of Religion, 2. From the sense of Religion. which the most barbarous Nations have more or less been possessed with. Thus Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 887. It is not possible, but that they believe there is a God, whiles they see their parents with the greatest care sacrifice for themselves and their children; and address themselves to God, with earnest prayers in their behalf. Yea, he adds, That all mankind, both Greeks and Barbarians, when they are pressed with adversity, or enjoy prosperity, fall down to the ground and adore some Deity, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, neither do they give the least suspicion, but that there is a God. We may draw forth Plato's mind thus: Was there ever any People or Nation so barbarous, as not to fall down before and worship some Deity? It's true we hear of some that live without human Laws, yea without clothes and other necessaries, to secure them from the injuries each of other, and of seasons, etc. but did we ever hear of any that lived without some supreme object of Devotion? May you not assoon find a Nation without men, as without some Deity? Nay, are not some so superstitiose, as wherever they see any created impress of a Deity, to worship that as God? Are not the Plants in the Garden, the Birds that fly, the Fishes in the Sea, the Brutes that serve men, worshipped by some as Gods? And lest men should after all miss of the true God, have they not also framed an Altar to some unknown God, as Act. 17.23? Have not all men naturally recourse to some supreme Being in their extremities? When they find themselves past their own protection, do they not cast their eye upward to some omnipotent Being for relief? Will the Atheist object, that all these religiose Rites and Actions are but the politic contrivement of Politicians, to keep men in awe and under subjection? Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 889, etc. gives a full answer to this Objection, assuring us, That it is void of all reason to imagine, that Religion and all sense of a Deity is the mere comment or figment of men, instituted as an Artifice, to keep men in their Duty, by overawing them with the conceit of some supreme Power: than which there cannot be a more capital crime, because the notion of a Deity is most naturel. (3) Hence we may deduce another moral Demonstration of a Deity from the politic World, 3. From the politic World. and the necessity it has of some supreme Rector to keep it in order. This Argument is well managed by Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 713. The primigenious Truth teacheth us, that there is no cessation of evils in those Cities, in which, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not God but some mere mortal presides, etc. In which he makes Religion the foundation of a Republic, which ought in the first place to be provided for: and he gives us this description of Religion, That we believe there is a God, who is the Beginning, Middle, and End of allthings; and whose Providence runs through all parts of the Universe. Thus also, Leg. 10. pag. 800. he assures us, That to deny the existence of a Deity is the subversion of all politic Societies, as before, §. 1. The force of this Argument lies in this, That the Constitution of all Republics, Nations, and politic Societies is such, that the notices of a supreme Rector and Deity are absolutely necessary for the preservation of them. Is it possible, that there should be any politic civil Society, unless there be some bond of Confederation and Consociation? And can there be any Confederation without some fidelity and confidence each in other? Who will associate with others, unless they can confide in them, at least be secure, that they shall not be ruined by them? Who will care to live and converse with such, as they look on as their enemies, and by whom they expect to be destroyed? And what ground can there be of confidence and trust in any, if the notions of a supreme Rector and Deity be banished out of the world? Who will make conscience of keeping his word, or not violating all bonds and obligations, if he be not overawed by a sense of some supreme Rector that can punish and reward him? Let us suppose a City or Republic of Atheists incorporated under some common Laws, and consider what confusion, disorders, and inevitable ruin would follow on such an Hypothesis. Would there be any regard or conscience made of words or actions? Doth not. the Atheist, who denies any God above him, destroy all conscience within him? And he that knows he makes conscience of nothing, will also believe, that all his Companions, who are acted by the same atheistic principes, make no conscience of word or deed towards him: and than what diffidences, jealousies, and treacheries necessarily follow hereon? Surely nothing gives men greater confidence and security from inhuman violences than a conscience and sense of some supreme Deity, who is just to punish offenders. Would not every man without this be as a Leviathan, ready to devour his neighbour? Well indeed might that daring Atheist title his Book of Politics Leviathan, seeing every Atheist is or would be such, if he follow his own principes? Are not Dissimulation and Violence the two Cardinal Pillars of the Atheists Republic? O! what Schisms, Seditions, Tyranny, Anarchy and universal Dissolution must inevitably attend a Republic of Atheists? Who will ever make conscience or mind Justice, Order or Subjection to men, who are not overawed with a sense of a supreme Deity? When every man's Will is his Law, who will mind commun justice and equity? How can the Atheist give cordial subjection to any Superior, who owns no supreme Rector to punish, and reward him? Thus we see miserable confusions and dissolutions in States and Republics follow on the denying a Deity and supreme Rector of the politic World. Doth not then the Atheist in denying the Being of a Deity, deny the well-being, yea subvert the very Being of the politic World, and all civil Society? (4) last, 4. From the Atheists Cavils and Enmity. all the Atheists Cavils and Enmity against a Deity, do clearly evince the existence thereof. Were there not indeed a God, the Atheist would not be so sedulous, industrious, indefatigable, and implacable in his assaults and attemts against him. We have a good instance hereof given us by Diogenes the Cynic, cited by Laertius in his Life, thus: Lysia the Apothecary ask Diogenes, Whether he believed there were any Gods? Diogenes replied: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; How can I but believe it, when I consider what an enemy thou art to the Gods? May we not make the same reply to the most subtle and proud Atheists? Can we imagine that Atheistic Spirits would spend their most subtle Ratiocinations, the vigour of their Spirits and malice to subvert the belief of a Deity, were there not indeed a God, whom they hate, and therefore would fain pull off his Throne? If the existence of a Deity were a poor emty shadow, a mere figment or nothing, would proud Atheists pursue it with such violent passion and vehemence as they do? No; their enmity against a Deity strongly proves his Existence. CHAP. III. Of God, his Names, Nature, Attributes, Unity, and Simplicity. God's Names. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ens, Being: God only IS in a strict sense. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehova explicated. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jah. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ehjeh. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elohim. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Shaddai. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elion. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sabaoth. The Divine Essence and Attributes. God's Unity, and Simplicity. §. 1. THE Existence of a Deity being demonstrated, God styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Ens, or Being. Exod. 3.14. we now proceed to explicate, so far as he has reveled himself, his Names, Nature, and Attributes, both according to Sacred and Platonic Philosophy. As for the Names of God, Plato, in his Parmenides, pag. 142. tells us, that properly, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he has no name. This is well expressed by Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. The Deity being incomprehensible, he thence is altogether without Name. Therefore seeing we ignore his Essence, we may not inquire after the Name of his Essence. For names are manifestative of things. Yet, adds he, Albeit he be incomprehensible and without Name, as the Author of allthings, he assumes Names from allthings, even from a contraries, as from Light and Darkness, etc. Of these Names some are negative, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, signifying that superessential Being; as inessential, without time, independent, invisible: some are affirmative, which relate to him as the cause of allthings: among which those are most proper which are taken from the most excellent things. Whence cap. 12. he saith, That the best Name that can be given to God, is that Exod. 3.14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who is, which denotes plenitude of essence, as in what follows. Non nomen Dei quaeras; Deus est nomen. Minut. Foelix. Thus Plato generally styles him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Ens, or Being: whence Aristotle also makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ens, the object of his Metaphysics: yet with this difference; whereas Plato, by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, understood God the first Being; Aristotle by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, meant an universal Ens, Being, or rather notion abstracted from all actual Being's really existent. That Plato by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ens, or Being understood God, is evident to any that is acquainted with his Philosophemes: whence he makes it to be the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Being itself, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which really is: for, according to his Placits, conformable to sacred Philosophy, nothing in a strict and proper sense can be said to be but the first essential Being: allthings else, if compared with God the first Being, are said not to be, Esa. 40.17. Exod. 3.14. Esa. 40.17. That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who is, Exod. 3.14. or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ens is the most principal, essential, and proper name of God, Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 12. thus demonstrates: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore the most principal of all the Names given unto God seems to be this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, WHO IS, as he answered Moses, Exod. 3.14. Who Is sent me. And he subjoins the reason: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For comprehending all in himself, he has Being itself, as it were, an infinite boundless Ocean, or which hereafter. Hence Damascene, c. 15. tells us, That the best Names we can give God, are such as are composed of Affirmatives and Negatives: as, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, superessential Essence, and the like. Thus Plato, in his Timaeus, makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which always is, namely God, to be the only true and proper Being: whereas allthings else are in a continual flux; and therefore cannot be said, in a strict sense to be existent. This is the reason why he appropriates the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being, to God the first Being. And we have an illustrious Commentary hereof given us by Plutarch, on the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Thou art, engraven on the doors of Apollo's Temple: who tells us, That he saw written there in golden Letters two compellations; (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Know thyself; thereby the God Apollo saluted those that came to worship him: who resaluted their God with this Title of Honour, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Thou art. He tells you that many gave their Comments on this Title; but for his part, his sense thereof was this: That the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signified not either order, or number, or any deficient part, as some conceited, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but is of itself a perfect compellation of God: whereby those that saluted him declared, That Being properly and strictly belongs only to him: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. for truly we are not participant of Essence; but all mortal nature, being on the confines, yea in the midst of corruption, is but a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or emty shadow of Being, scarce apparent; on which if you fix your thoughts, it will soon fly from you. For, as Heraclitus well observed, No man ever enters a second time into the same river; neither can any apprehend the same frail essence a second time, in the same state: because the celerity of its mutation doth soon dissipate it: Yea assoon as it existes it perisheth: it recedes assoon as it accedes. Whence that which is made cannot properly be said to be: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nothing of nature is permanent, yea nothing is: because all Creatures participate more of nothing than of something. But then of God he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. But God properly IS, and without regard to time, immobile Eternity: in which there is nothing first or last: nothing past, ancient, or new; but it being one present 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, NOW, it fills up all Duration: in which regard, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which is said TO BE truly IS, not future, not past, not beginning, not ending. Thus God is with the study of veneration to be saluted: unless thou hadst rather reassume the ancient formule, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, THOU ART ONE, etc. Wherein Plutarch gives us an incomparable explication of Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, why this name must be appropriated to God. But to run up this Platonic Name to its first origine, it is evident, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah. that it was at first derived from sacred Philosophy, and the proper essential Name of God, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah. For the demonstration hereof we have both indubitable testimonies of the Learned, and also invincible reasons from the thing or name itself. As for testimonies, Eusebius, praepar. Evang. lib. 11. cap. 9 pag. 523. assures us, that this name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as appropriated to God, was derived from Exod. 3.14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. So Augustin, Civ. Dei. l. 8. c. 11. Where Lud. Vives shows us the manner how, and reason why 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, was changed by Plato into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The like Steuch. Eugubinus, de peren. Philosoph. l. 3. c. 7. of which before in Pythagoras' Metaphysics, P. 2. B. 2. C. 8. §. 4. But to come to the reasons of the thing, the very name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the LXX. turn it, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Plato, received its origination from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah, and is indeed of the same import. For we must deduce 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from the ancient Greek Verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I am: and this from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the name of Juno; or else immediately from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which they derived from Jehovah: otherwise we may deduce 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ho he is, which is a part of the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah, which coming from the root 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he was, properly and primarily signifies nothing else, but HE THAT WAS, the same with Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the LXX. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But to explicate this more fully, Jehovah the proper essential Name of God. we must know, that this Name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah is the most proper and essential name of God, whereby his infinite Essence and Perfections are most lively set forth. The Hebrews style this name Jehovah 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the name of Substance, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the name of Essence; answerably whereto the Greeks style it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the name of essence; because it doth most properly describe the Essence of God, who, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, contains the whole of Being or Essence in himself, as an infinite immense Ocean. That Jehovah is the proper name of God, Critics prove (1) from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which being prefixed notes a proper name, as in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Isaac, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jacob, with others. (2) In that it hath no Plural Number. (3) In that it's never put in state of Regiment. (4) In that it's never found with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prefixed. (5) Nor yet with an affixed Pronoun in the end. That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah is a name most proper to God, is evident from Exod. 15.3. Exod. 15.3. Jehovah is his name. Thence the Hebrews term it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the proper name: also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the separate name; because separate from other names of God, which are attributed to the Creatures. They likewise term it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the four-lettered Name; because it is composed of four Letters. Thence the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Pythagoras' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of which before, Part 2. B. 2. C. 8. §. 1. pag. 182. Again, they call it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which the Greeks interpret 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the name of Remembrance, Psal. 30.4. answerably to Psal. 30.4. Lastly, they term it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the gloriose and terrible Name, from Deut. 28.52. The force and essicace of this name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is well expressed by John, The Explication of Jehova. Rev. 1.4, 8. & 11.17. & 16.5. Rev. 1.4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, He that is, that was, and that is to come, or will be. So v. 8. & 11.17. & 16.5. In which explication note, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which Beza placeth, Rev. 16.5. and that according to the Idiom of the Hebrews, who express the word future, sometimes by a word that signifies to come. And Critics draw all these three differences of time from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah. For, say they, the letter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the beginning denotes the future, he will be: and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the middle, being a Participle of the Present Tense, He is: and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the end with kametz under-written, what is past, He was: which is also denoted by the Radix 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 havah. This the Hebrew Doctors acknowledge: for R. Bechai, on Exod. pag. 65. saith, that these three times, past, present, and to come are comprhended in this proper name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And they add, That God reveled to Moses, Exod. 3.14, 15. those two names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Exod. 3.14, 15. because out of them may be composed those three, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I was, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I am, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I shall be. Hence we may conclude, that this name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehova is most sacred, essential, and proper to God, and descriptive of (1) his Eternity, in that it eminently comprehendeth all differences of time, as john expounds it, Rev. 1.4, 8. (2) His simple independent Essence, as he is Being itself, pure, absolute, perfect Being and Act, void of all passive power, composition, and imperfection. He being indeed and properly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Esa. 44.6. Esa. 44.6. (3) His efficacity and causality in giving Being and Existence to all his Creatures. He being not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the first independent Essence; but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, He that give Essence and Being to all his Creatures. (4) His Omnipotence and veracity, in giving being and effect to his promises, and word. In which regard God saith, Exod. 6.3. that he was not known to Abraham, Exod. 6.3. Isaac, and Jacob by the Name Jehovah, i. e. because he had not fulfilled and given effect to his promise made to them, and thence not opened this name. From this name Jehovah, the Greeks framed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Latins their Jovis, etc. There are other Names given to God in sacred Philosophy, whereof we sinned some Imitaments in the Grecian Philosophy. As (2) God is styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jah. This is also a proper Name of God, Jah. which some of the Hebrews make an abregement and part of the Name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehova, as R. Moses Maimonides, de Fundament. Legis, cap. 6. sect. 4. Hence the LXX. render it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as they do 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and so it signifies the eternal, independent Essence of God, who gives essence and existence to all his Creatures, and Woods. It is seldom used but in Songs and Psalms, as Exod. 15.2. Psal. 68.5. and elsewhere. Whence the Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hallelujah, praise ye Jah, is kept by the Greek Rev. 19.1, 3, 4, 6. Rev. 19.1, 3, 4, 6. Thus also in the Paean, or Song sung to Apollo, they began and ended it with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Eleleu Je, which is an evident imitamen of hallelujah. From 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jah also, which some Greeks pronounced 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, was derived Jupiter, i. e. Father Jah, Juno, Janus, Diana: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the fire of Jah, etc. (3) Another essential Name, whereby God describes himself, Ehjeh. Exod. 3.12, 14. is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ehjeh, I shall be, as Exod. 3.12, 14. which the Hebrews also reckon among the ten Names of God. (4) God is likewise styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eloah, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Elohim, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Elohim. ? Elohe in the Plural Number, which some derive from the Arabic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to worship: others from the Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to swear: but the most probable origination is that of Marcus Marinus in Arca Noae, Abarbenel, and others; who derive it form 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being added, and so it signifies most potent and sovereign Lord. It speaks God's relation to, Dominion and sovereign Authority over his Creatures; Gen. 1.1. therefore Moses, Gen. 1.1. treating of God's Creation and Dominion calls him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Whence Abarbenel makes it to be attributed to God, as the omnipotent Effector and Productor of allthings; because when God is brought in as Creator the Scripture styles him by this Name. So Nachmanni makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be q. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El hem, their strength, meaning the Creatures; because he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the force of forces, i. e. the supreme Virtue and Essicace of all Creatures. The Hebrews generally make it to signify properly a Judge or Magistrate: Thence it is attributed to Civil Magistrates as God's Vicegerents, Exod. 22.8. Exod. 22.8. From 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eloah came 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elohim. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mentioned in the fragments of Sanchoniathon. El. (5) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El, another Name of God, is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Fortitude, force, or from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Fortitude, Virtue, Power, etc. So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies the potent powerful God, who contains in himself the virtues and efficaces of allthings. Thence, Exod. 15.11. Psal. 89.6. saith Moses, Exod. 15.11. Who like thee, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, among the potent, O Lod? So David, Psal. 89.6. Who among the sons of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elim, of the mighty can be likened unto thee, O Lord? Whence God is styled, Gen. 14.20. Gen. 14.20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most high El, or mighty God: also Esa. 9.5. Esa. 9.5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El Gibbor, the most mighty God. Aquila renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to its origination, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Again, God is styled, Dan. 11.36. Dan. 11.36. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El Elim, the most potent of all potents. From this name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El, the Syrians styled their Saturn 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Damascius, in Photius. Hence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Sun received its origination. Shaddai. (6) God is also called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Schaddai; which is most oft joined with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El, Gen. 17.1. as Gen. 17.1. & 35.11. as elsewhere. Some deduce it from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to destroy: others from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sufficient q. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Scheddai, Adonai. who is sufficient. (7) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai is another illustrious Name of God, which is first in Scripture given to him by Abraham, Gen. 15.2. Gen. 15.2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and signifies primarily Lord, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eden, a basis; because a Lord is the basis or pillar of a family: according to the origination of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a King, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the basis of the people: So that according to its origination 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies my bases, stays, or pillars: and fitly applied by Abraham to God, who, as a basis or pillar, sustained him in all his infirmities. Some think it implies a Mystery of the whole Trinity. It properly belongs to God as he is Lord of the Universe, a great house built and founded by him: thence among the Latins Dominus à Domus. From Adonai came the Pagan God Adonis. (8) God is styled also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elion, the most high; Elion. which is an Adjective frequently added to some other name of God, as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El Elion, Gen. 14.19, 22. Gen. 14.19, 22. El Elion the Genitor of Heaven and Earth. Which in Sanchoniathon's fragments is thus expressed: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Which fully explicates the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 most high. (9) The Hebrews reckon also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sabaoth, Hosts among the Names of God: but, Zebaoth. as it is well observed by Buxtorf, this name put absolutely is never attributed to God, but only as appendent to some other divine Name, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or both conjunct, and expressed in our Version the Lod of Hosts. (10) The Greeks call God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which some derive from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to run, as it denotes the swift motion of the Sun, which was the first and principal God among the Grecians: and in this notion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than, to come. Others derive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as it notes to dispose and order the Universe, which is proper to God: Others derive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to see; because God sees a'things. These three Originations I find together in Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 12. Lastly, others deduce 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 day, it sufficeth; and so it answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 shaddai, the Name of God denoting his Alsufficience. But here we are to take notice, that both Sacred and Ethnic Philosophy ascribe unto God various Names, not to make any schism or breach in his Unity, but thereby to express his various Attributes, and Operations, as in what follows of the Unity of God §. 9 §. 2. The various Names of God lead us into the contemplation of his Nature and Attributes whereby he has reveled himself. The Divine Essence and Attributes. The Divine Essence, as in itself, by reason of its absolute Simplicity and Infinitude, can neither be defined by us, nor yet apprehended under any one adequate conception or notion. Derodone would needs persuade us, that God may be capable of a definition, as he comprehends himself, etc. But how improper yea absurd such an Hypothesis is, will be evident, if we consider, either the nature of a Definition, or of God. (1) The nature of a Definition evidently demonstrates, that God is not capable thereof: Doth not the very notion of a Definition exclude the Deity from its confines? What is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Definition but the term of limits of an Essence? Do not all Definitions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 limit things? And may God, who hath no limits to his Essence, fall under the limits of a Definition? Whence proceed all terms of Definition but from terms of Essence? And can what is infinite be limited? Whence, (2) The Nature of God absolves him from all laws or terms of Definition. As for Derodones' reply, That God may be said to define himself, because he perfectly understands himself, it is very jejune, and unworthy of so learned a Philosopher. For (1) God is the object of the Definition, and not the subject: all definitions are said to be perfect or imperfect in regard of our minds the subjects thereof. (2) May we not as well say, that God can limit and bond himself, as define himself? for every definition is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the term or Boundary of the Essence. Would it not be accounted next to blasphemy, to say God can confine himself, or make himself finite? and yet such is the import of this Hypothesis maintained by Derodone. And as God cannot be defined, so neither be apprehended by one adequate notion: For how can a compound finite capacity take in a simple infinite object by one single apprehension? Hence it has pleased the divine Being to revele his infinite simple Essence under divers Names and Attributes, thereby to render his perfections more apprehensible and intelligible by our finite and compound capacities. These Attributes are identified both among themselves, and with the divine Essence: neither are they many in God, but one most simple Essence. Yet, according to our manner of considering things, which is compound, we apprehend them as divers: For we conceive God, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to divers considerations, not as if there were any real composition in God, as Athanasius. Hence Plato compares God to a Circle: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God always acts as in a circle, or makes a circle. Which Symbol he had from the Egyptians, who defined God, an intelligible Circle, whose Centre is everywhere and Circumference no where. A Circle is of all figures most simple, because without angles; and yet most capacious and perfect: wherefore a lively symbolic image of the divine Essence and Perfections. God is the beginning of allthings as the centre, and the middle of allthings as the Diameter, and the end of allthings as the circumference. Thence Plato. Leg. 4. pag. 713. saith, God is, according to the old Tradition, the beginning, end, and middle of allthings. Again, God gives being to allthings as the Centre, governs allthings as the Diameter, conserveses allthings as the Circumference. God as a Centre moves all and yet is immobile; as the Circumference comprehends al. The Centre, as it is one immobile point, indigitates and illustrates God's Unity, Simplicity and immutability: The circumference, being without beginning and end, most capacious and perfect, poihnts out God's Eternity, infinity, Immensity, and Perfection. As the divine Attributes are lively displayed in the Word of God, so also in his Works. The Omnipotence of God shone forth with most irradiant beams in the Creation of the World, and its infant state by many miraculose experiments of divine Providence: The Wisdom of God has been ever most illustrious in the counterworking all the politic Contrivements and Undertakements of his Church's enemies: His common Bounty, in the preservation and support of Mankind since the Fall: His Justice, in punishing sinners: and all his Attributes in the redemption of sinners. Such are the various Theatres on which Gods Attributes display themselves. First, God is an absolute independent self Being or Essence. God an absolute independent Essence. This Hypothesis Platonic as well as sacred Philosophy maintains. Thus much all the forementioned essential Names of God, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Ehjeh demonstrate. So likewise the description of God, Exod. 3.14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. whereto Plato's, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concord, as it has been fully demonstrated in what precedes §. 1. Thus Damascemus, de Fide Orthodoxa, lib. 1. cap. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, WHO IS seems to be the most principal and proper of the divine Names: so it contains in it the whole of Essence, as it were an infinite Ocean. Thus Author Lib. de Fundamentis, l. 2. c. 27. Therefore it is manifest, saith he, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. That the name Ens cannot be properly attributed to any Being, but God. For of other Being's it cannot be said, that they always are, but only whiles they exist, not before, or after. But the blessed God, because he always remains in the same state, therefore his Essence is truly Ens. The notion of Ens is properly ascribed to him, whose Being depends not on any but himself. For in that his Being depends on his own Essence, he is no way contingent— No Creature can be said absolutely to BE; because it depends on another: neither is Being due to it, but with relation to its Cause. The like Eulogus, in Photius: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Essence itself is one thing in the superprincipal Trinity, and another thing in us: for there it is superessential, but here it is not properly Ens. For how can that be properly Ens, which is produced out of Nothing, and of its own nature returns to nothing? All Creatures have a tincture of their primitive Nothing, yea more of Nothing than Something; and therefore deserve not the name of Being if compared with God the first, absolute, independent Being, as Esa. 40.17. Esa. 40.17. Hence God is styled by Damascene, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, superessential Essence. And the Egyptians generally, in imitation of the Mosaic Philosophy, styled God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Ens. Thus Plutarch, in his Isis and Osiris, informs us, That at Sai, in Egypt, there was a Temple dedicated to Minerva, whom they suppose to be the same with Isis, which had this Inscription on it: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I AM ALL THAT EXISTES, AND IS, AND SHALL BE: AND MY VEIL NO MORTAL YET UNCOVERED. This Inscription is but a Periphrase of Exod. 3.14. And by her Veil, with which she was pictured, is meant the incomprehensibility of the divine Essence, which no mortal yet unveiled, as hereafter. Yea, Aristotle, Metaph. l. 1. acknowledgeth, that Melissus thought, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the one God, to be necessarily 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Being itself. But sacred Philosophy gives us the most lively notices of the divine Essence. Thus Moses enquiring after God's Name, Exod. 3.14. he describes himself thus: Exod. 3.14. I am that I am: i. e. absolute, necessary, simple, independent Being, yea as it were all Being. Esa. 44.6. Rev. 1.8, 11. So Esa. 44.6. I am the first and the last, besides me there is no God. Which stile Christ assumes, Rev. 1.8. I am 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. I am the beginning and the end, the first and the last, as v. 11. The same c. 21.6. & 22.13. which descriptions of the divine Essence imply these particulars. (1) That God is the first Being. Thus Esa. 44.48. Esa. 44.48. I am he, I am the first, I also am the last. Thus also in Platonic Philosophic God is styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the first Being. Hence, (2) God is Ens 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an independent Being. Thence Plato styles him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-Being: i. e. neither from any other, nor of any other, nor by any other, nor for any other. That must needs exist of, and in and for, and from itself, whose Essence is the adequate reason and cause why it existes. Essence and Existence have one and the same formal Idea in God; because he existes in and by his own Essence. It is not so in Creatures: they cannot be said to exist in and by the force of their own essence, but by the force of their causes, specially the first: whence it follows, that they are Being's not by essence, but by participation and reception of essence and existence from the first Cause. Hence, (3) God is a Being absolutely and simply necessary. For God existing in and by his own Essence, it is impossible for him not to exist: his Essence is so infinitely and absolutely perfect, as that it includes existence, yea an impossibility of not existing. Existence agrees not essentially and necessarily to any Creature, but contingently: whatever Creature existes, might not have existed, and may yet not exist, if it seems good to the first Being. But the first independent Being has Existence absolutely and simply necessary: he is so much in Act, as Ens in its most universal notion is in power: his Essence being infinite, necessarily and eminently contains whatever is or may be of perfection in all Being, either existent or possible. Whatever is once essentially, simply and absolutely such, is always such; yea necessarily such: if a thing be once simply and absolutely possible, it is always possible: and if it be once simply and absolutely necessary, it is always necessary; because what doth not once imply a contradiction, never doth. We see in the World some things are possible, and yet not ac tually existent: now all things that are possible must be reduced to some first necessary Being, that gave them their possibility, and must give them their actual existence, or they will never attain to it. Hence it follows, that the Essence and Existence of the first Being is simply and absolutely necessary. Whence (4) God is in a sense Al Being; because he is the first independent self-Being, simply and absolutely necessary, containing in himself all Being, and imparting to allthings all possible essence and existence. All Being's by participation do essentially and necessarily depend on the first necessary self Being. This the spurious Dionysius, according to the Pythagorean and Platonic mode, expresseth by Unity. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Unity, saith he, hath all number in it singularly and unitely: so the divine Being, all Being's and Perfections. The same he illustrates by the Centre of a Circle, in which all the lines unite and subsist. Indeed created Being's considered in themselves, without relation to the first Being, deserve not the name of Essence, but Privation: for what are they, it abstracted from the first necessary Being, but mere painted or rather possible shadows of Being? Hence, (5) Nothing is univocally commun to, or predicated of the first independent Being, and created dependent Being's. It's true we call the Creature Ens, as well as God; but it must be understood not univocally, but analogically; so as the notion Ens primarily, eminently, and most properly belongs to the first Being; and to the Creatures only analogically, or as some equivocally. So also Divines make mention of communicable Attributes, commun to God and the Creatures: yet so, as that they primarily belong to God, and to the Creatures only secundarily: albeit they are transferred from the Creatures to God, and so in their formal Idea are primarily attributed to the Creature. That nothing can predicate univocally of God and the Creature is most evident; because an efficient, cannot receive a name, taken from that nature, according to an univocal denomination or predication: Now nothing made by God can arrive to the same kind of perfection with God; and therefore nothing can be univocally affirmed of God and the Creature. And this seems to be the genuine reason why Plato appropriated the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to God; (though Aristotle gives it to other things) because it originally, primarily, and most properly belongs to him, in comparison of whom allthings else are deservedly said not to be, as in Job and Esaias. (6) The divine Attributes are said to be distinguished from the Essence, as also among themselves, not only ratione ratiocinante, but also ratione ratiocinata, so as the fundament of the distinction be in God himself, as Amesius. (7) last, we find the divine Essence and Attributes well described by Damascene, Orthodox. Fie. lib. 1. cap. 2. out of the primitive Greek Theology thus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. But that God is without cause, without end, sempiterne and e4ternal, increate, immutable, inalterable, simple, incomposite, incorporeous, invisible, intangible, incircumscripte, infinite, incomprehensible, good, just, ommipotent, the Opificer of all Creatures, comprehensive of allthings, provident of allthings, the supreme Sovereign and Judge, we both acknowledge and confess. Also that God is one, namely in Unity of Essence; which is known in three Persons, Father, Son, and holy SPirit, etc. §. 3. The first Attribute that occurs for explication of the divine Being is Unity, The Divine Unity. whereof we find great and lively notices both in sacred and Platonic Philosophy. Thus Moses, Deut. 6.4. Deut. 6.4. Hear O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord. Mose here first calls for their solemn attention, and then lays down his assertion touching the Unity of the divine Essence; which he seems to bottom on the very name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 subjoined as a part of the predicate, denoting, that he who is the first independent Essence and Essentiator of allthings can be but one. Thus frequently in the N. T. Mar. 12.32. Rom. 3.29, 30. 1 Tim. 2.5, etc. And we find much in Platonic Philosophy of the same import. Thus Plato, in his Parmenides, (where he lays down his prime metaphysic Philosophemes) pag. 142. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. If there be One, can it possibly be, but that it should part ache of Essence? Where he seems to make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Ens & unum convertible, namely that Ens is one, and one Ens. So he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For ONE always embraceth ENS, and ENS ONE with mutual embraces. His plain naked mind is, that the first Being and One admit of reciprocation, i. e. God the first Being is the prime Unity. Aristotle also and his sectators make Ens and Vnum convertible; but in a far different manner from Plato, who understood both of God. Thus also Pythagoras held, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That Unity is the first principe of allthings. It's true Plato, as others, makes mention of many Gods; yet he tells us, That it was from the Authority of their Ancestors, and by reason of the severity of Laws, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, without Demonstration or Oriental Tradition: yea he confesseth that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Polytheisme was repugnant to right reason. And this he learned from his Master Socrates, who was so zelose and warm in this particular, that he was content to suffer a Pagan martyrdom for the avouching the Unity of God, against the Laws and Customs of the Athenians. Plutarch, on the INscription 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 E 1, Thou art, engraven on the doors of the Delphic Temple, assures us, that the ancient name given unto God was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 E 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 EN THOU ART ONE. For there cannot be many Gods but one: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, One ought to be Being, as Being one. For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Diversity or Alteritie is placed with the difference of Being: but One is sincere, and without mixture: for by the mixture of another with another a thing is made compound and impure. Wherein he strongly proves, that God can be but one, because a pure, necessary, absolute Being, or Act, without mixture and composition. Plutarch also, in the Life of Numa Pompilius, assures us, That some learned Romans, and that not without cause, do attribute the order of the beginning and end of man's life to one self-God and Power divine. So Laertius, in the Life of Zeno, informs us, That the Stoics held, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that there was one God called by divers names, according to his Proprieties, or Attributes and Operations. Thus Seneca: There are so many Names of God, as there are Offices. Hence they styled their Jupiter, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. not that they intended to assert many Deities; but one and the same Deity, with regard to his various opertions. So Aristotle, in his Book de Mundo, confesseth, There was but one God, called by divers names from his effects, Thus also Augustin, de Civit. l. 7. c. 11. All these names they imposed on the one God, by reason of his divers powers and causalities: not that from the diversity of effects they asserted divers Gods. And that almost all the learned Philosopher asserted one God is maintained by Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 30. sect. 10. pag. 97. As for rational Arguments, the Unity of God may be thus demonstrated. (1) That there is a God, who is a necessary independent Being, has been already proved: hence it is evident, that he can be but one: For a Being absolutely necessary, and from itself, has a necessity of Being so far as it is singular: therefore it is not multiplicable or more than one. For if a singular is not multiplicable; then whatever agrees to any thing as singular, admits not of multiplicabilitie. That a Being absolutely necessary and independent has its necessity of Being as singular is evident; because singularity is essential and necessary to a Being absolutely necessary as such: for a Being absolutely necessary is such so far as in act: and it is in act as singular: whence singularity intrinsically and essentially belongs thereto, as Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 30. sect. 10. Thus the Author of the Book de Fundament. l. 2. c. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. There is therefore in the World a Being necessarily existing of itself, which hath no cause nor equal; seeing it is the Cause of allthings; from which their substance and existence is, but his existence depends not on any thing without himself. This is the blessed God: who is therefore one; because an Ens necessarily existing. (2) Again, if there be two or more Gods; then they are all infinite, independent, and self-Beings; or some produced and finite: The first implies a coutradiction; because there cannot be many infinites: the later also; because such Being's should be produced by real efficience and yet eternal; also essentially divers from the first Being that produced them, and yet equal, because God. (3) That which is most singularly perfect, self-sufficient and infinite can be but one. For if there were two things or more singularly perfect and infinite; then they would differ really, or be the same. If the same, than they are not two: if they really differ, than one has somewhat which the other has not: if so, then neither is most singularly perfect and infinite. For infinite comprehends all perfection. Thus Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. The Divinity is perfect and indeficient every way— If then we assert many Gods, they must be different: but if there be a difference among them, where is their perfection? For if one be different either in bonity, Wisdom, Virtue, etc. he so far comes short of perfection: See more of God's Unity, Aquinas contra Gent. l. 1. c. 42. §. 4. Next to the Unity of God follows his Simplicity, The Simplicity of God explicated. which is most absolute, as both Sacred and Platonic Philosophy teacheth. Sacred Philosophy expresseth the absolute Simplicity of God under the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah, as also by the Paraphrase thereon, Exod. 3.14. I am that I am, i. e. a simple pure Act; Exod. 3.14. a Being necessarily existent in Act, and therefore most simple, without the least shadow of Power, either objective, or receptive. So Psal. 102.27. Psal. 102.27. but thou art the same, i. e. a uniform simple Being. Plato in imitation of sacred Philosophy, expresseth the same by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the first, entire, perfect, uniform, most simple Being, without the least composition. Thence, in his Conu. p. 211. he styles God, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the sincere and uniform Beauty; because without all mixture and composition: The Simplicity of God is described by our Lord under the notion of a Spirit, Joh. 4.24. God is a Spirit, Joh. 4.24. i. e. (1) As he is a pure Act, void of all passive power, either physic or metaphysic. Allthings are so far spirital, as they partake of Act: and by how much the more spirital things are, by so much the more simple. Among the Elements, the Wind and Fire are most simple, because most spirital; Angels and human Souls are in an higher degree spirital and simple; because exempted from all Laws of physic Mater: yet they are in some respect composite of Act and Power, Substance and Accidents; because they are under the laws of metaphysic obediential passive power, as Creatures. But God is so pure a Spirit and Act, as that all metaphysic as well as physic power is denied of him. (2) God is said to be a Spirit, as most vigorous and active. Our Lord assures us, that the Wind being of a spirital nature, Joh. 3.8. bloweth whithersoever it listeth. Yet Angels and human Spirits are much more active and potent: But God infinitely transcends all other Spirits in point of activity and efficacity: which also speaks the simplicity of his Being. For by how much the more simple any thing is, by so much the more active and vigorous: All matter is dull and phlegmatic. Plato philosophiseth much of the Simplicity of God. So Repub. 2. pag. 380. he saith: God doth not vary his form or shape, but that he is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a most simple Being; and of allthings lest varies from his own Idea or Essence. So pag. 381. he saith: God remains always, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, simply one, and in the same form. Of which more in what follows, of God's immutability. But he treats more fully of the Simplicity of God in his Metaphysics, Parmenid. pag. 137. If one [i. e. God] be any thing, it cannot truly be many, i. e. compound: and he gives this reason of his Hypothesis: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Neither can there be any part thereof, neither can it be a whole: for a part is the part of a whole: and that is a whole to which no part is wanting. Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Wherefore neither will it be a whole, neither will it have parts, if one shall be one. His meaning is, that God, who is one simple Being, is neither whole, nor has he parts. This Argument he more fully improves pag. 138. Simplicity doth not add any real entity or mode to that which is thereby denominated simple; but only a negation of composition: For simplicity is the same with perfect and indivisible Unity. This Simplicity of God is most absolute: For (1) he is not composed of Logic parts, as of Genus and Differentia; because there is nothing before God, nor yet a Species contradistinct to him. (2) God is not composed of physic parts, either essential or integral; because he is a Spirit. Thus Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. lib. 1. cap. 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Whatever things are spoken of God corporally, are spoken symbolically; but they have an higher mind: for the Deity is simple, and has no figure. (3) Neither is he composed of metaphysic parts, namely Act and Power; because he is pure Act. (4) He is not composed of Ens and Essence; or of Essence and Existence; because he is Being in the abstract, Exod. 3.14. He so lives, as that he is life itself, Joh. 5.26. & 14.6. (5) He is not composed of Subject and Accident; because whatever is in God is God. Moreover, God being the most perfect Being, he can neither admit nor need any accidental perfection. So Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 18. In us habits come and go; but not in God: for in him nothing comes or goes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for he is inalterable and immutable; neither is it lawful to ascribe any accident unto him: for goodness in God is coincident with his Essence. The same he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Neither may we say that there is a Quality in God, or that he is compounded of Essence and Quality. (6) He is not composed of Attributes; because they are the same with his Essence. Thus Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 13. having spoken of the divine Attributes and Relations, he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore all these must be considered in the whole Deity in common, and as the same, and indistinctly, and unitely. (7) Neither is he composed of Decrees; because they differ not from his Nature. (8) He is not composed of Essence and Relation, or Nature and personality; because the personal relations, albeit they admit some kind of distinction, yet they give no composition; seeing each Person is the very divine Essence, though with some incomprehensible modification. Thus Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For the Deity is not a composite; but in three perfect, [Persons] one perfect, indivisible, and incomposite, [Essence.] So cap. 8. God is both Father always existing, and ingenite: God is also the Son, who always, eternally, influxibly, impassibly is begotten of the Father: God also is the holy Spirit, etc. The Essence and personality are included in the Person of the Father, Son, and Spirit, in a way not of composition, but of ineffable conjunction and union. (9) Neither is the Deity composed of Essence and Operation. It's true, the operations of God, considered in their passive Attingence, and as they terminate on create effects, are the same with or at least only modally distinct from the effect, and therefore really distinct from God; but if we consider them in regard of their active Attingence, as relating to God the Principe, so they are the same with the Divine Will, and therefore not really distinct from the Divine Essence, as in what follows, Chap. 7. §. 3. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. lib. 1. cap. 13. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. The true word teacheth, that God is simple, and hath one simple operation. So Chap. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. The divine effulgence and operation is one Essence, both simple, and impartible, and boniforme in things partible variate [as to operation] and distributing whatever is constitutive of proper Nature, it remains simple: i. e. albeit it acts variously, according to the indigence of its subject, yet it remains invariable and simple. Hence (10) we must, with Plato, deny, that God, the most simple Being, may be styled a whole; because he can in no regard be said to have parts. The absolute Simplicity of God may be demonstrated (1) From the Perfection of God. The Simplicity of God demonstrated. All parts as parts are finite, incomplete and imperfect. Again, every whole is dependent both on its cause and on the parts whereof it is composed: but there is nothing incomplete or dependent in God; because he is most perfect. Moreover all parts are in order of nature before the whole, and therefore need some bond of union to knit them together: but God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, without all cause, priority, or posteriority. Lastly, in every kind things are by so much the more noble and perfect, by how much the more simple they are: wherefore God being the most perfect Being must needs be most simple. (2) From the Unity of God. This Argument Plato useth, as before. So Parmenid. pag. 144. We did not therefore speak truly even now, when we said, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that Essence, [i. e. God] was divided into many parts: for he cannot be divided into more than one: for unto him all (as it is most consentaneous) are equal. Neither is Being wanting to Unity, neither Unity to Being [i. e. God] but these two are altogether equal. Wherein he proves the Simplicity of God from his Unity: and it may be thus improved. Unity is generally described negatively by indivision in regard of itself, and division from other things. Now the divine Essence is most indivisible as to itself, but most divided and distant from allthings else: therefore it is most one: and if most one, than also most simple. Thus Aristot. Metaph. l. 4. c. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Those things, whose essential notion is indivise and inseparable, such are most one and simple. And is not the first Being such? May we conceive the least divisibility in his Essence? This Argument is well urged by Simplicius, in Epict. cap. 1. pag. 9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, One bonity produceth many Bonities; and one Simplicity and Unity, which excels all others, many Unities; and one Principe many Principes: For One, Principe, Good, and God are the same. Where he proves the Simplicity of God from his Unity. Thus also the Author of the Book de Fundamentis, l. 2. c. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. The name ONE is truly said of that, which is indivise in itself and divise as to allthings else. And by how much the more proper it is to any thing to be distinguished from other things, by so much the more it may be said to be one. Thence he concludes, That nothing in the world can be said to be so one, as to be truly distinct from allthings else, but God, who is therefore most simple. So Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 19 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Deity [or Divine Unity] is multiplied in things partible impartibly, drawing and converting things partible, to his own Simplicity: i. e. The Deity, being in itself the most simple Unity, is multiplied as to operations in allthings according to their indigence, yet without the least multiplicity in itself; but it convertes allthings multiplied to its own simple Unity. (3) From the nature of Composition. What is Composition, but the union of things distinct? And doth not imperfection always attend distinction? Take the most subtle and refined composition, which they make to be of Ens and Essence, or of Essence and Existence, and doth there not some imperfection attend the same? Doth not all Composition import some efficience, and thence dependence? Can that which is compounded be eternal? Doth it not imply a beginning, and that something was before it? Is it not a flat contradiction to say, something was compounded from Eternity? Lastly, where Composition is, there division may be; and so by consequence dissolution, which to affirm of God is blasphemous. This Argument is well improved by Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. The Deity is simple and incomposite: but that which doth coalesce out of many differences is composite. If therefore we shall say, that increate, independent, incorporeous, immortal, eternal, good, Creator, and the like, are substantial differences, and different substances in God, being composed of so many things, he will not be simple, but composite: which truly to affirm is extreme impiety. It's meet therefore to conceive, that each of these, as affirmed of God, do signify, not what he is in Essence, but either what he is not, or a certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, habitude which he hath to those things that are distinguished from him, or that participate nature and operation from him. Wherein he gives us the genuine reason, why the divine Essence, which is in itself most simple, is expressed under various Names, and Attributes; namely thereby to remove all imperfection from him, or to illustrate some perfection that is in him, by the habitude which he has to things made by him. (4) From God's prime causality and Efficience. That God is the frist Cause of allthings is clearly evident from what has been before laid down of his Existence. Hence it necessarily follows, that he is most simple: For whatever is composite, is such by some preexistent cause, which framed its composition. This Argument is well managed by Simplicius, in Epict. c. 1 p. 9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For God is the first Being and Cause of allthings: But now what is first, is necessarily most simple. For whatever is composite, as it is composite and multiplied, it is posterior to one. (5) From God's Actuality. That there is one pure Act, which is actuated by nothing else, but actuates allthings else, is most evident to any, that dare not grant a progress into infinity, as to Acts. Now what partakes of pure Act, but the first Being, who was never in possibility to be, but always a pure Act as to his Essence? God the first Being is actually and eternally whatever he may be; neither can he ever be what actually he is not. Every Creature had a possibility not to be before it was; and it still retains the same possibility: but God is such a pure Act, as that not the least possibility, or potentiality can be affirmed of him. He is such a pure subsistent Act, as excludes all state existing in power or potentiality, either passive or objective; which speaks the highest simplicity. (6) From the immutability of God. Whatever is composite is mutable: for where there is composition, there may be division, which implies mutability. But God is most immutable, as we shall, in what immediately follows, demonstrate. This Argument is well managed by Plato, in his Phaedo, pag. 78. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore it is most agreeable, that those things which are always and equally the same, be incomposite: but things that are otherwise, and not the same, that those are composite. (7) From the infinity of God. Whatever is compound has parts: If God has parts, they must be finite or infinite: finite they cannot be; because infinite cannot be composed of finites: also, there is nothing in God, but what is God. Neither can God be composed of infinite parts; because there should then be something greater than infinite; for the whole is ever greater than some one part: also there would be many infinites, which implies a contradiction. CHAP. IU. Of God's immutability, Infinitude, Eternity, Immensity, and incomprehensibility. God's immutability in Nature, immanent Acts of Knowledge and Will; as also in his Word. God's Infinitude as to Essence, and Perfection. His Eternity explicated and demonstrated. Also his Immensity. God's incomprehensibility demonstrated. How far we may apprehend God: Against poetic Figments of God, Curiosity in our Inquiries after God. Notices of God natural and supernatural. §. 1. NExt follows the immutability of God, The immutability of God. which resultes from his Simplicity, whereof we have great notices and demonstrations both in sacred and Platonic Philosophy. As for sacred Philosophemes, the stile God assumes Exod. 3.14. I am, fully explicates and demonstrates his immutability. For this phrase denotes, that there is no passibility, dependence, succession or variation in God. The same may be argued from the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah, which indigitates and points out to us the necessity, simplicity, Mal. 3.6. and immutability of the divine Essence. So Mal. 3.6. For I am the Lord, I change not. Which is explicated, Jam. 1.17. Jam. 1.17. With whom there is no variableness or shadow of turn. All these notions are Astronomic: God is here compared to the Sun, as he is the Father of Lights; yet so as that he infinitely outshines and excels the Sun in regard of his immutable Nature and Essence. For the Sun, although it be not so variable as the Moon, yet, as Plato in his Timaeus well observes, it has its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Paralaxes and Changes: it appears otherwise at rising, otherwise at noon, otherwise at setting: but now the blessed God admits not any of these variations. Again, the Sun has its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, tropic shadow, or shadow of turning: it has its annual Tropes, or Turns and Vicissitudes, which they call the Solstices; whereby it is nearer to, or remoter from us: according to which Recesses or Accesses it casts various shadows, and causeth variety of seasons, Summer, Winter, Spring, Autumn: such is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or tropic shadow of the Sun. But now the immutable God admits no such tropic shadows of variations: he falls under no Eclipse, defect or diminution of light. Indeed the Sun as to itself is never eclipsed; albeit it be sometimes hid from our sight, by the interposition of the Moon; yet it then shines with as intense light as ever, somewhere else. Yea, if we will speak properly, the Stars cannot be said to rise and set in regard of themselves, or the Heavens, but only as to us. So the blessed God may vary in his aspects, regards, or providences as to us, yet in himself, yea in regard of his word he admits not the least variation or shadow of turning. To express the same more familiarly: when we are in a Ship or Coach that moves, the earth and hills seem to us to move: namely, because our vision or sight is made by a Pyramid, the basis of which is in the object seen, but the point thereof in our eye: Now our eye being swiftly moved by the rapid motion of the Coach or Ship, and the point of the Pyramid moved therewith, hence the basis, and thence the object itself seems to move: Just so it is as to our knowledge of God; our thoughts and conceptions of God being always in flux, succession, and motion; we foolishly conceit, that the immutable God moves and varies; whereas all the motion and variation is in us, not in him. The immutability of God is greatly explicated and demonstrated by Plato, God immutable in his Nature. whose Philosophemes on this Theme may be reduced to the following particulars. 1. God is immutable in his Essence. Thus Plato, in his Phaedo, pag. 78. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That very Essence, which we defined always to existe, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; namely that which is Equality itself, Beauty itself, Singularity itself, doth it admit any mutation? Or truly can any of those, namely that which is uniform Being, which existes of itself, and is always the same, and never in any degree admits the least alteration? Whereby he strongly proves, that God cannot fall under the least mutation; because he is an equal, uniform, simple, self-existent Being. This Argument he more fully prosecutes, Repub 2. pag. 380. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Dost thou think, that God is a Prevaricator, and as it were one lying in wait, to appear under different shapes? And sometimes to be this, sometimes that; and so to change himself into divers forms? or rather oughtest not thou to judge, that he is most simple, and of allthings lest departs from his own Idea? Then he adds the reason, why it is impossible for God to be mutable or variable in his Essence: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Is it not necessary, if any thing depart from its own Idea or form, that it be changed by itself or by some other? (1) That God cannot be changed by any other he thus proves: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Truly such things as have the best constitution are not changed by any other. The same Principe he repetes, pag. 381. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; etc. Whatever is well constituted, either by Nature, or Art, or both ways, doth it admit the least change? On this hand there can no mutation happen to God. Thence (2) he proceeds to demonstrate, that God cannot change himself: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But doth he change and alter himself? It is evident he doth, if he be in any sort altered. Then he demonstrates, that God cannot change himself: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Whether doth he change himself for the better and more excellent, or for what is worse and base than himself? He replies: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It's necessary that he be changed for the worse, if he be at all changed: For we may not say, that God wants pulchritude or virtue in any degree. Then he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Dost thou think there is any one either of the Gods o men, who will of his own accord make himself worse in any manner? Thence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It is therefore impossible, that God should be willing to change himself, but, as it is most consentaneous, seeing each of them is most excellent and best, that he remains one and the same simply in the some form. In which excellent explication and demonstration of the immutability of God, we have these observables. (1) He makes mention of Gods in the Plural Number, by reason of the severity of their Laws, and Customs, but intends thereby one only God, as before in the Unity of God. (2) He demonstrates this one God to be immutable; because he cannot be changed either by any other or by himself. That he cannot be changed by any other he proves; because all change is for the better: but God cannot be changed for the better; because he is best. The same argument he useth to prove, that God cannot change himself. For such a mutation would be either perfective or amissive: God is not capable of any perfective mutation; because he is the best and most perfect Being: neither is it possible, that he should affect any amissive mutation, because none willingly change for the worse. Proclus adds, that God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 invariable; because all mutation is a sign 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of infirmity, as it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is inconsistent with the omnipotent Essence. In sum, this immutability of the Divine Essence is that Attribute, whereby God is said to preserve his own Being, without the least power of not Being, or conversion into any other Essence, or increment and decrement, or alteration and motion. 1. God immutable in his immanent Acts. God is immutable in all his immanent Acts, and Decrees. There is a twofold mutation, physic and moral: physic mutation is by Addition or Ablation and Substraction of some real Entity. Moral mutation is either of Science and Knowledge: as when a man judgeth that false, which he before thought to be true: or else of Will and Purpose; when a man wils that, which before he nilled, etc. God is absolutely immutable in all these respects: he is neither capable of physic nor yet of moral mutation, either as to Knowledge or Wil For all mutation either of Knowledge or Will implies inconstance and imperfection, if not imprudence and infidelity; which are all inconsistent with the Divine Being. 1. Knowledge. (1) God cannot be said to change in regard of his Knowledge; because his Knowledge is not distinct from his Being: he knows himself and allthings else in and by himself: he cannot know any thing that he did not know before; neither can he know any thing otherwise than he did before. He knows things successive without succession, by intuition: also things complexe by one simple intuitive act. His Knowledge is as necessary and eternal as his Essence; and therefore most perfect and immutable, both extensively and intensively. Objects known by God are variable, but his knowledge of them and of their variations invariable. Allthings are the same to God's knowledge, as they are in their own Being's: things past, present, future are present to God in all their circumstances and differences. If God's Science should be changed, it would be about things future, when they are present, and so pass into preterite or what is past: but this cannot be, because those circumstances of future, present, past are all determined by the Divine Will, and so present to his Science of Vision. Moreover no objects are the cause of the Divine Knowledge; but, on the contrary, the Divine Knowledge and Will the cause of all objects, future, present, and past. In sum, God knows all particular objects and circumstances intrinsically in the glass of his own Essence; and therefore invariably and uniformly. Things both complexe and simple may vary; but God knows them all invariably, in the infinite clarity of his own Divine Essence and Ideas. Every thing future, if we compare it with the prescience of God, it is necessary, and necessarily known by him. This immutability of the Divine knowledge Plato oft inculcates under his Divine Ideas, by means whereof he makes God to have the most accurate, absolute, infinite, eternal, and immutable knowledge of allthings. So in his Timaeus, pag. 28. as in his Parmenides, pag. 134, etc. as before P. 2. B. 3. C. 9 S. 1. §. 4. and in what follows, Chap. 4. (2) God is immutable in all the Acts and Decrees of his Wil 2. Wil For these also have one and the same Idea with the Divine Essence. Again, if God's Will were mutable, his Knowledge must also be so: for God cannot know things future, but by the determination of his own Will, whence they receive their futurition. It's true, God wils all mutations of things, yet his Will admits no mutation. It's one thing to change a Will, Deus non mutat voluntatem, sed vult mutationem rerum. Aquin. and another to will a change: For God by the same immutable Will decrees that in such a period of time such a thing shall be, and in another, the contrary; without any beginning to will what he willed not before, or ceasing to will what he before willed. God gins to will or nile nothing: all his Wills and Nils are eternal. He hates nothing that he before loved, nor loves any thing that he before hated: neither doth his Will admit any degrees of some or less. No immanent Act or intrinsec denomination can happen the nov● unto God; albeit many, yea infinite extern relative denominations may be attributed to him. Thus the extern relative denomination of Creator is given to God in time, not intrinsically but extrinsecally: the change of Creation was not in God, but in the Creature: the very act of Creation taken passively and extrinsecally is in the Creature, and not really distinguished from it: if we consider it actively as in God, so it is the same with the Will and Essence of God: in which regard God may be said to be Creator from all Eternity, as his Will is the productive cause of athing. Thus all other extern relations and denominations attributed to God in time, as Lord, Father, etc. are not because of any new thing in God, but in regard of something new in the Creature from God. There is no new Act in God which was not from eternity, albeit the effects of those Acts were not from eternity, but in time. All mutations are proper to Creatures only, because Creatures: and the mutability of the Creature can have no influence on the immutable God. Thus Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore God is altogether immutable and inalterable: for he hath determined allthings by his Prescience; every thing according to its proper and convenient season, and place. Wherein note, (1) That by God's Prescience, must be understood the Divine Decree, whence his Prescience resultes, and therefore oft put for it: (2) That by this Divine Prescience and Decree allthings though most mutable and variable, as to their proper times and places, are immutably determined. 3. God is also immutable in regard of his Word. God's immutability in regard of his Word. God being the first Intellect and Truth, he cannot but speak truth: The Divine veracity is equally immutable in respect of future and past: God cannot but do what he hath said he will do; because his Will is immutable. He is most simple and true both in his words and works: as he cannot be deceived, so neither can he deceive. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 381. refels the false Ideas and Idols, which the Poets frame of the Gods, as if they should change themselves into divers shapes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and by certain delusions should delude us, that they might seem various to us. Which he makes to be repugnant to the Nature of God, who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, immutable, invariable, inalterable, and one that cannot lie; because he is Truth itself. Whence he concludes, pag. 382. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Wherefore God is simple and true, both in his works and words: neither is he changed, neither doth he deceive others, either by fantastic delusions, or speeches, or signs, or visions, or dreams. Of which more fully in the veracity of God, Chap. 6. §. 2. Only here we are to obviate an objection, which is made from what is mentioned in Scripture of God's Repentance, Gen. 6.6. 1 Sam. 15.11. This manner of speech is only after the manner of men, when they would have that undone which was formerly done: as to God it speaks no alteration in him, but only in his Dispensations and Actions. According to propriety of speech God cannot be said to repent, as Num. 23.19. But to give a more full Demonstration of God's immutability, The immutability of God demonstrated. we may consider the Divine Essence and Attributes, which concur all to make good this demonstration. (1) The Divine Essence and its necessity gives us an invict argument of God's immutability. For that which has a necessity of Being cannot acquire its Essence by any action or mutation: and if it depend not on any other for its Being, it cannot lose the same. Thus Plato, Phileb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The first one necessary Being is not capable of generation and corruption. Thus Jamblichus: God, saith he, necessarily is, not by an extern necessity, but intern and natural. Now whatever is necessarily such, is immutably such. This Argument is well improved by the Author libri de Fundamentis, l. 2. c. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Whatever is changed is changed by some other: But that which necessarily existes of itself hath not any cause by which is should be changed: for the same thing cannot be the changer and changed: for so it should consist of two things, one that changeth, and another that is changed. All change ariseth either from some extern or intern cause: But God hath nothing without that can make any impression on him: neither is there any thing within him, that can give or receive any impression or change. There is no active power, either without or within God, that can make, nor any passive power within God to receive any impression or mutation. Thus Damascene, Orthedox. Fid. l. 1. c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Being's therefore create are altogether mutable: it's necessary therefore that the Opificer and Framer be increate— and if increate then immutable. So l. 2. c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for every create Being is mutable: the increate only is immutable. And he gives this reason of his Hypothesis: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for whatever hath beginning may naturally have an end. (2) We may demonstrate the immutability of God from his Simplicity. For all mutation properly considered requires some Composition; because there is required some common subject remaining under both terms of the mutation. This Argument is well managed by Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 381. It is impossible that God should be changed; because he remains 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, always the same simply in his own form. So Phaedo, pag. 78. he proves, that God being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a uniform Being existing of himself, and always the same, cannot admit the least alteration, as before Thence, in his Timaeus, he calls God, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, one same Being always like himself. God being one simple Being, without Quantity, Quality, or any Accident, having nothing in himself but what is himself, it is impossible, that he should admit any alteration or mutation. Psal. 102.26, 27. Thus sacred Philosophy, Psal. 102.26, 27. They [the Heavens] shall perish, but thou shalt endure— thou shalt change them and they shall be changed. But thou art the same and thine years shall have no end. Where he foundes and bottoms the immutability of God on the Simplicity and Identity of his Essence. (3) The immutability of God may be demonstrated from his immobility. Thus Plato in his Parmenid●. pag. 138. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Because if he, [the one God] should be moved, he should be either moved locally, or alterated: for there are only these motions. Very good. But now if this one God should be altered, he should not be one: therefore he cannot be moved according to alteration. Thence he proceeds to prove, that he cannot be moved locally; because he has no parts. Whence he concludes, pag. 139. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The one God therefore is, as to all kinds of motions, immobile. The force of this Argument lies thus: God being the prime Motor and Principe of all motion and mutation must necessarily be immobile and immutable: For all grant the first Motor to be immobile: and all motion and mutation to be founded in some immobile immutable Principe. Thence Aristotle held God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the first, immobile Being. So Philo Judaeus makes God to be, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the immobile immutable Being, who no way stands in need of any other thing. Again, Plato argues, That whatever is altered or changed, cannot be primarily, simply, and absolutely one, as God is. (4) We may demonstrate the immutability of God from his pure Actuality and impassibility. The most pure Act cannot be changed, because passive power, either physic or metaphysic and obediential, is the root of all mutability and dependence. Thus Jamblichus, a great Platonist: God, saith he, hath nothing in himself passable: and this impassibility he hath not by acquisition, but by nature. An uniform Essence, of itself incorporeous and permanent admits not any passions or divisions either of alteration or mutation. Where there is perpetual order there can be no passion. (5) The immutability of God may be evinced from his Eternity. Whatever is eternal must necesfarily be immutable; because without beginning and end. That which was before all time cannot be liable to any changes of time. Thus Plato, in his Parmenides, pag. 141. and in his Phaedrus, p. 245. strongly proves, That the first one Being can have neither beginning nor end, and thence no alteration or mutation, as hereafter in the Eternity of God §. 3. (6) The Perfection of God demonstrates his immutability. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 381. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. God, and those things that belong to God are best, and most perfect; therefore he cannot admit any mutation: for what is best is never changed. The force of the Argument lies thus: God, by the necessity of his Being, has a plenitude of Essence and Perfection, and therefore admits not of any augmentation or diminution: for what by necessity of Nature has a plenitude of Being and Perfection, that cannot extend itself any further, but must be infinite: and what is infinite cannot be greater, or lesser; neither can any thing be taken from or added to it. Hence, God being by a necessity of Nature most perfect, cannot be more or less perfect: therefore he cannot fall under any mutation either perfective or corruptive, augmentative or diminutive. §. 2. God's Infinitude as to Essence and Perfection. Hence follows God's Infinitude as to Essence and Perfection. For a Being necessarily, simply, and immutably such must of necessity be infinitely perfect. A Creature simply and absolutely finite may be in some limited sense said to be infinite; as the Soul of man is in regard of its capacity said to be infinite; because capable of an infinite object: but nothing is absolutely, simply, and essentially infinite and perfect but God. infinity really excludes all negation of Entity from God, and also includes that God is in pure Act, whatever Ens in its most extensive universal latitude and notion doth include. For an infinite Essence necessarily contains, either formally or eminently, whatever is or may be of perfection in all Being's, either actually existent or possible. But to treat more philosophically and distinctly of this Attribute, we are to consider, that infinite is a negative notion, which includes a negation of all terms or bounds: now a thing may be said to be terminated, bounded, or finite in reward (1) of its Essence and Perfection, (2) of its Duration, (3) of its Presence, (4) of its Comprehensibilitie. In all these regards God is said to be infinite. He is infinite (1) in Essence, as most perfect and independent: (2) in Duration, as eternal: (3) in Presence, as omnipresent, or immense: (4) as to our Comprehension, in being incomprehensible. We shall here treat only of God's Infinitude as to Essence and Perfection; and of the other, as distinct Attributes resulting from this Infinitude of Essence. God's Infinitude as to Essence and Perfection may be various ways explicated and demonstrated. God's Infinitude from his Independence. Thus Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 2. c. 19 describes God, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The increate, independent, immortal, infinite, eternal, immaterial, chiefest Good— the immutable, impassable, incircumscript, immense, indefinible, incorporeous, invisible— without indigence, absolute, most free, omnipotent, and infinitely potent. By each of these divine Attributes the Infinitude of the Divine Essence may be demonstrated. As 1. By his Independence. The Infinitude of the Divine Essence consists in a negation of all limitation and terms. The terms that limit any Essence are its causes: therefore that which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without any cause, must needs be without terms, and so infinite. And is not the Divine Essence thus independent, without all causal terms and limitation? Must not God then be infinite in his Essence? This Independence of the Divine Essence as to all causes and causal limitation is well expressed in sacred Philosophy, by Gods being the first and the last: as Esa. 41.4. I the Lord, Esa. 41.4. the first, and with the last, I am he. So Chap. 44.6. I am the first, and I am the last: and besides me there is no God. Those also Chap. 48.12. I am he: I am the first, I also am the last. God is said to be the first, as having no causal principe or efficient that might give limits to his Essence: and the last, as having no final cause, or end, that might give moral limits or bounds to his Wil This Infinitude and Independence of the Divine ssence as the first Cause and last End, is well illustrated, Rev. 1.8, 11. & 21.6. & 22.13. Rev. 1.8, 11. & 21.6. & 22.13. I am 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the beginning and the end, the first and the last: i.e. as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the first letter and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the last of the Greek Alphabet; so God is the first causal Principe or Efficient, and last End or final Cause, that gives terms and limits to all created Essences; but receives limits and terms from none, and therefore is infinite in Essence and Perfection. Hence God is said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-Being, or Being of himself, not by any positive influx; for that is impossible, that any thing should give Being to itself: but negatively, by reason of his independence on any other Cause. For God as the first, has no efficient, and as the last, has no final Cause; thence by consequence no causal terms or limitation. This Independence and Infinitude of God, as the first Efficient and last End is well explicated and demonstrated by Plato, in his Parmenides, p. 137. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore if he [the one God] hath no part, neither truly shall he have any beginning, or end, or middle; for such are the parts of a thing. Where he proves, that God has no beginning nor end, [i. e. he is the first and the last] from his simplicity, or not having parts. And in what follows he gives us the reason of his consequence: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But the end and the principe is the term of every thing: i. e. every thing is terminated and bounded by its causal Principle or Efficient, and last End: therefore, to speak in the language of sacred Philosophy, He who is the first and the last, without a first causal principe, or last end to terminate his Essence, must needs be infinite. Thus Plato concludes, in what immediately follows: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The one God therefore is infinite, if he hath neither principe nor end. This Argument, which agrees with that of sacred Philosophy, is most cogent: for that which has no causal terms either of beginning or end, but is the first causal principe and last end of allthings, must needs be infinite. 2. God's Infinitude from his Unity and Simplicity. The Infinitude of the Divine Essence and Perfection proceeds from and may be demonstrated by God's Unity, Simplicity, and pure Actuality. Thus Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, One [namely God] is as many and infinite: and many are as one only. Plato here describes the first infinite Being, under the common Pythagorean notion of one and many: as being one in regard of the simplicity of his Essence, and yet many, in regard of his infinite Perfections and Ideas or Decrees. So pag. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. That the one [God] is many and infinite. The force of this Argument lies thus: God being one simple pure Act, must needs be infinite in Essence and Perfection: for that which renders every Creature finite is its essential constitution and composition of Act and passive Power, either physic or metaphysic. It's true Angels and human Souls have no physic passive power, yet they have metaphysic and obediential, as made out of nothing, and so reducible thereto, if their Creator please. But now the first Being God, being one simple pure Act, without the least shadow of passive power, whereby all Creatures are terminated and bounded, it thence necessarily follows, that he must be infinite in Essence and Perfection. God actually and eternally is, whatsoever he may be, and cannot hereafter be, that which now he is not. All Creatures are somewhat in possibility, which they are not as yet in act: whence they have an inclination to or at least a passive power for something which they have not: which being attained unto makes them more perfect. But now where there is one pure Act, all perfection is; because there remains no passive power or capacity of receiving additional perfection. Every Act is by so much the more perfect, by how much the less of passive power is mixed therewith: whence the one simple pure Act, which has nothing of passive power mixed therewith, must necessarily be without terms of Essence and Perfection. Again, every Essence is so far perfect, as it is in Act: thence the Divine Essence being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in a most transcendent singular and infinite degree actual, it must needs be infinitely perfect. Thus Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 1. c. 28. Every thing is so far perfect, as it is in Act; but imperfect as it is in power, with privation of Act. That therefore which is no way in power, but pure Act, must needs be most perfect: such is God. 3. We may explicate and demonstrate the Infinitude of God's Essence and Perfection by his Transcendence in Being. Thus Plato, God's Infinitude from his transcendent Essence. Repub. 6. pag. 509. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The chiefest Good, [God] is not Essence, but something greater and more august, and infinitely transcending both in dignity and virtue the nature of allthings created. Wherein he makes God to be the Cause of all Essences, yet not properly Essence in that manner as the Creature is, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, superessential or transcendent Essence, self-Essence, self-Eternitie. This transcendent Essence and Perfection of God is termed in sacred Philosophy Magnitude: as Psal. 95.3. Psal. 95.3. For the Lord is a great God, and a great King above all Gods: i. e. a transcendent Being. This transcendent magnitude of the Divine Essence and Perfection must be understood principally intensively, as God contains in him eminently and transcendently all perfections. Thus Psal. 145.3. Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised; Psal. 145.3. and of his magnitude there is no investigation. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: i. e. the magnitude of his Essence is an infinite Abyss or Ocean which no mortal finite capacity can dive into. So the LXX. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, there is no term or bound to it. This is well expressed by Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 19 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It [the Deity] being above Intelligence, and above Reason, and above Life, and above Essence, etc. Whence the common title he gives God, according to the Platonic mode, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, superessential, as before, Chap. 3. §. 1. This infinite transcendent Magnitude of the Divine Essence is also well expressed by Plato, Parmenid. pag. 137. where treating of the one God, without beginning and end, he saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It is infinite: therefore also without figure: neither doth it partake of a round figure, nor yet of a strait: i. e. God being infinite in Essence is not limited by terms of magnitude or figure. This Argument from the Transcendence of the Divine Essence may be thus improved: That which is transcendently Ens or Being, See Suarez, Metaphys. Disput. 30. Sect. 2. is such per essentiam, essentially: thence it cannot be limited. That which has Being only by participation from a superior Cause, may be limited either by the pleasure of the superior Cause, that gives it so much perfection, and no more; or else from the capacity of the Recipient, which is capable of receiving so much perfection, and no more. But now the Divine Essence, being transcendently and essentially such, without participation, cannot be limited either way; but is invested with an infinitude of essence and perfection altogether indivisible; not precise and limited to one kind of perfection, as it is with the Creature, but containing, in a most eminent transcendent manner, whatever is of perfection in the Creature, Whence it is that the divine Infinitude and Perfection admit a reciprocation: For Being subsisting of itself contains in it the whole perfection of essence: and the perfections of allthings belong to the perfection of essence: wherefore God being a pure Act, and Being subsisting of himself, nothing of perfection can be wanting to him. Hence God the first necessary, transcendent Being cannot be defined or limited to any certain degree of perfection, but must be infinite, as is well demonstrated by Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 29. Sect. 3. Thus also the Stoics held, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That God is invested with all Essence: who also is incorruptible, and ingenerable, being the supreme Opificer and Creator of the whole structure of the Universe, as Laertius, in Zeno. The sum of all is this: God being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-Being, and transcendent superessential Essence, he must needs be universally and eminently al-Being, and so infinite in essence and perfection, of which more fully in the following Argument. 4. God's Infinitude from the nature of Perfection. The Infinitude of the Divine Essence and Perfection may be further explicated and demonstrated from the formal Idea of Perfection, and its peculiar appropriation to God. All perfection imports some kind of university: because that is perfect, to which there is nothing wanting: whence the more any thing is contracted to some certain mode of perfection, the less perfect it is: and the more the university of perfection agrees to any thing, the more it partakes of perfection. Now God having the whole of essence in himself, must necessarily have an university of perfection. God has all kinds, extents, and degrees of perfection in him either formally or eminently: he hath need of nothing because infinitely perfect in his essence: there is nothing without or within him that may limit or bond his perfection. The most perfect of Creatures have much of imperfection in them; because they are limited in their Being's: one excels in one perfection, another in another: but none in all perfections: they are all negatively imperfect, if not privatively. Again, the Creatures perfection is for the most part accidental, and separable; as it appears in fallen Angels and men: But God's perfection is essential, absolute and universal; and therefore infinite. Thus in sacred Philoso-, phie, Act. 17.25. Neither is he worshipped with men's hands, Act. 17.25. as though he needed any thing; seeing he giveth to allthing life and breath and allthings. Paul demonstrates, to the curiose Wits of Athens, that God is most perfect and wants nothing; because he gives all perfection to the Creature: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 has a peculiar significance which carries much emphase in it. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies simply to want: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be totally indigent: but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies, to have something, yet to want something belonging to its perfection. Such an indigence the blessed God falls not under: he needs nothing as an additament to his felicity, having in himself an university of perfection; and giving forth to all his Creatures according to their indigence. Hence God is styled by the Hebrews 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, E● shaddai, God A●sufficient, Gen. 17.1. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 381. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For we shall not say, that God in any degree wants either pulchritude, or virtue. Whence elsewhere he makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-sufficient, and therefore most perfect. Thus Aristotle, Rhet. l. 1. c. 7. pag. 35. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, And that which is less indigent of any other or other things, [is best and most perfect] because it is most self-sufficient. So in his Ethl. l. 1. c. 5. he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That which is perfect is self-sufficient and in nothing indigent: such is the Divine Essence. Thence Plato, Repub. 6. pag. 509. assures us, That God, who is the Idea of all good, his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an infinite and immense pulchritude. But more fully to explicate and demonstrate the infinite Perfection of God, it is apparent by what has been laid down out of Platonic as well as sacred Philosophy, That a thing is said to be perfect, when it wants nothing: which may be understood either privatively or negatively. That is privatively perfect, which wants nothing due to its integrity: that negatively, which wants nothing of possible perfection. God is in both these regards perfect, and therefore infinitely such. (1) God wants not any perfection privatively: For as he is God of himself; so of himself he has all perfection due to himself: The most simple independent Being cannot be deprived of any perfection due to him, as Suarez well demonstrates, Metaphys. Disput. 30. Sect. 1. pag. 42. (2) God is negatively perfect, as he wants no possible perfection. Possible perfection is either create or increate. God, as the first Cause of allthings, contains in him all create possible perfection: and as the first most simple infinite Being, all increate possible perfection: For the first Being is such by a necessity of Being; and therefore absolutely and infinitely perfect; containing in himself either eminently or formally all created perfections. (1) God contains in himself all created perfections eminently, as he has such a perfection in a superior eminent degree, as virtually contains whatever is in an inferior perfection. Whence all the perfections of Creatures, as they are eminently in God, are nothing else but the creatrix Essence of God. The Divine creatrix Essence is said to be eminently allthings, as it can by its own eminent virtue and efficace communicate those perfection to allthings. For the first supreme Cause existent of itself, and independent contains all possible perfections simply and eminently in the fontale Unity and infinite Abyss of his own Essence. God dwelling in the Abyss of his own Infinitude, which the Hebrews call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, cannot but contain in himself all created perfections in a most eminent degree. (2) God contains formally in himself all perfections simply simple: i. e. such as in their formal reason involve no imperfection, but pure perfection. It's true, no created perfection, according to that adequate reason which it hath in the Creature, is formally in God, but eminently only. For there is not in God any created goodness, etc. but he is said formally to contain some of those perfections which are in the Creature; because according to them he has a formal convenience with the Creature, by means whereof the same perfection is, according to the same name and formal reason, attributed to God and the Creature, the infinite disproportion which is between God and the Creature being preserved, as Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 29. Sect. 3. pag. 39 Thus God giving perfection to allthings has similitude and dissimilitude with all: Similitude, in that whatever perfection is in the Creature, is formally or eminently in God: Dissimilitude, in that all those perfections, which agree to other things according to divers forms or modes of participation, agree to God according to the infinite Unity and Simplicity of his Essence. Albeit God be void of all composition, yet he contains in himself all perfections scattered up and down among the Creatures in the most simple, united, and eminent degree. In sum: according to the mode of Essence such is the mode of perfection: for every thing has less or more of perfection, as it has more or less of essence: Therefore God, who has all Essence, must necessarily have all perfection. 5. The infinite bonity and Beatitude of God. The Infinitude of the Divine Essence and Perfection may be further explicated and demonstrated by the infinite bonity and Beatitude of God. Sacred Philosophy every where instructes us, That God is infnitely good and blessed in himself. So Platok, Repub. 6. pag. 508. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Idea of all good, i. e. such a good as contains all good in him: the good of every good. Whence pag. 509. as elsewhere, he styles God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Good: according to that of sacred Philosophy, There is none good but God, Mat. 19.17. Mat. 19.17. i e. there is no original Idea of good but God. Whence Plato calls all created goods, not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, simply goods, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, certain forms or kinds of goods, so far as they participate of the divine good; But, saith he, the Idea of good gives essence to every thing, yet is in itself superessential. Thus Damascene, a great Platonist, Orthodox. Fid. l. 2. c. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore because God is good, yea transcendently good, not contented with the contemplation of himself, but from the superabundance of his goodness it pleased him, that somethings should be made to which he might do good, and which might participate of his goodness: and so out of nothing he brought them unto Being, and framed allthings. Whence we may conclude the infinite perfection of God. So Aristot. Eth. l. 1. c. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. That which is best, is most perfect; and that which is desired for itself, simply perfect: i. e. infinitely perfect. Such a most perfect good is God, who is essentially good, and therefore infinitely good. Hence also springs the infinite Beatitude of God, which gives us further demonstration of his infinite Essence and Perfection. Thus in the Platonic Definitions God is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an immortal living Being, self sufficient as to happiness. The proper good of every intellectile Nature is Beatitude: Therefore God being the first Intelligent, Beatitude must necessarily be his most proper good. Now by how much the more noble and excellent any Beatitude is, by so much the more perfect is the subject to which it appertains. This speaks the infinite perfection of God, in that he is essential bonity and Beatitude. 6. God's Infinite Power. God's infinite Power in the production of allthings demonstrates his Infinitude of Essence and Perfection. The magnitude of any virtue or power is measured by the magnitude of its Action and Effect: An Action is by so much the more perfect, by how much the more efficace and force it has to produce its effect: and what actions so efficacious to produce their effects, as the Actions of Divine Omnipotence? Every Agent is by so much the more efficacious in acting, by how much the more remote the passive power by it reduced into act is: now mere nothing, which is as the passive power in Creation, being, as to existence, infinitely distant from Act, therefore the power that brings it into act must needs be infinite. Are not something and nothing terms, as to existence, infinitely distant? Can then any but an infinite power reconcile them, or bring something out of nothing? And is it possible that an infinite power should be in any but an infinite Being? Doth not the operation follow the essence? is not every thing such in working as it is in Being? May we not then hence conclude, that God, who is of infinite activity as to working, is also infinite in his Essence and Perfection? Thence Plato makes God to be the infinite Opificer or Creator, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who by his efformative omnipotent words gave essence to allthings, as hereafter, in the causality of God. It is indeed altogether impossible, that a finite power should create so many degrees of things, and that out of nothing. §. 3. God's Etenritie. From the Infinitude of God's Essence and Perfection resultes his Infinitude in Duration, or Eternity. For as things are in Being, such likewise are they in Duration: as a finite Being cannot have an infinite Duration; so neither can an infinite Being have a finite Duration. Hence the Eternity of God necessarily follows from the Infinitude of his Being. The Eternity of God is lively set forth in sacred Philosophy. Psal. 90.2, 3, 4 So Psal. 90.2. Even from everlasting to everlasting thou art God. Being to treat of the frailty of human life, he briefly toucheth on the Eternity of God, that thereby it might appear, how frail man's life is. God is said to be, from everlasting to everlasting, thereby to denote his absolute Eternity without beginning and end. The Souls of men and Angels are to everlasting, because immortal: but they are not from everlasting; and therefore not eternal. Every eternal is immortal; but every immortal is not eternal. Thence it follows: v. 3. Thou turnest man to destruction, and sayest, Return ye children of men, He alludes to that Gen. 3.19. Thou art dust, and to dust thou shalt return. Then the Psalmist adds, v. 4. For a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday, when it is past; and as a watch in the night. The Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 some interpret not as a rational conjunction, but as an Adverbe of confirmation, Truly: so that the sense is: Truly, O God, thou art immortal and eternal: so that a thousand years of human life, being compared with thy Eternity, are but as yesterday, or as a watch of the night, which is very short and full of difficulties and miseries. The Hebrews divided their nights into four watches, which denote brevity and danger. So Psal. 55.19. God is said to be, he that abideth of old, Psal. 55.19. or in all eternity. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 abideth, or is permanent. Which denotes Gods permanent essence and existence without all succession, in Eternity. Indeed God's Eternity is but as one permanent fixed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or instant, without all succession. I am not ignorant, that some learned men endeavour to baffle this Hypothesis, That God's Eternity is one fixed instant, whose reasons we shall examine more fully anon, when we come to treat of the Nature of Eternity, 5. Prop. At present we pass on to confirm it by Scripture. So Psal. 93.2. Psal. 93.2. Thy Throne is established of old: thou art from everlasting. Of old. Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ante tunc, before then, i. e. before any certain finite time, expressed by that Particle tunc. The prefix 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 denoting time signifies before. The sense is, that God's Throne was established from all Eternity, before all moments of time. The like Prov. 8.22, Prov. 8.22, 23. 23. The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before all time. It's spoken by Christ as a declaration of his Eternity with God the Father. So Esa. 43.13. Yea, Esa 43.13. even before the day was, I am he. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, before there was any day, [or time] I am he, i. e. Jehovah the eternal Being. Mic. 5.2. The like Micah 5.2, Whose go forth have been from of old, from everlasting. It is spoken of the eternal generation of the Son of God. From of old. Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before any principe or beginning. Thence it follows: from everlasting. Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, before the days of time, not of Eternity: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, day of Age, doth not properly signify days of Eternity, as our Margin renders it, but time long before, as Micah 7.14, 20. Amos 9.11. Malach. 3.4. The Eternity of God is well described by Moses, Deut. 33.27. The God of Antiquity: i. e. the eternal God. So David, Psal. 55.20. God that sitteth from Antiquity: and Asaph, Psal. 74.12. God is my King from Antiquity: i. e. Eternity. But the Eternity of God is more expressly declared, Esa. 57.15. Who inhabiteth Eternity. So 1 Tim. 1.17. As for Plato's Philosophemes' touching the Eternity of God, they are indeed great and illustrious, yea very far conform to sacred Philosophy. So in his Timaeus, pag. 37. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. But all these are parts of time: but we truly do not rightly attribute to the eternal Essence those distinctions of time, namely HE WAS, and HE SHALL BE. For we say: IT WAS, IT IS, and IT SHALL BE. But truly to that Eternity IT IS properly only agrees. IT WAS, and IT SHALL BE belongs to the articles of time, which is produced: for they are motions, or successions. But what is always and immutably the same, is not more ancient or young, etc. Wherein we have these particulars very observable. (1) That the distinctions of time, Was, Is, and Shall Be, are proper only to things sensible and created, which fall under the duration and succession of Time. (2) That thence they cannot properly be attributed to God, who is an Eternal Essence, without beginning or succession. (3) That HE IS is only properly ascribed to God, according to sacred Philosophy, Exod. 3.14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Esa. 43.13. I am he. So the Inscription on the Delphic Temple, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, THOU ART. All which illustrations of Gods permanent Eternity are included in the Name Jehovah, as before, Chap. 3. §. 1. Thus also the Eternity of God is lively explicated and illustrated by Plato, in his Parmenides, p. 140. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; But what?: doth the one God seem to have elder or younger, or the same Age, that so he may be? The same pag. 141. Therefore the one God is neither younger, nor elder, nor of the same age, either in regard of himself or any other thing. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Therefore the one God, if such, can never be in time: For that which is in time, is it not necessarily elder than itself? And is not that which is elder, always elder in regard of some junior? Therefore that which is always elder than itself, must be always younger than itself, which is a contradiction. He design is to prove, that God being always the same, is not signior or junior in regard of himself, or any thing else: for than he should be always signior, and yet always junior in regard of himself. Which Argument is indeed demonstrative and cogent. Then he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, If therefore the one God no way participate of time, truly he was not ever made, or hath been, neither is he now made, neither shall he ever be made, or be. He here proves the Eternity of the one God from his Independence, of which more hereafter. But the more fully to demonstrate and explicate the mind of Plato, and sacred Philosophy touching the Eternity of God, The Eternitle of God demonstrated. we shall endeavour, (1) to demonstrate, that God is eternal; and then, (20 to explicae what this Eternity of God imports. First that God is eternal may be various ways demonstrated: As (1) from the Infinitude of the Divine Essence. The mode of existence always follows the mode of essence: because existence, according to the confession of the Schools, adds nothing to essence but Actuality; neither is it indeed really distinct from essence: Now duration is nothing else but continued existence: whence it necessarily follows, that if God's Essence be infinite, his Existence and Duration must be also infinite. The Divine Essence necessarily existes of itself, and therefore is always in act, never in power to be: whence it must necessarily be eternal. That which is absolutely infinite as to essence, can have no principe of its essence; and therefore it must be absolutely eternal as to Duration. What is infinite cannot give Being to itself: for than it should be before and after itself; the cause and thing cause; independent and dependent in one and the same regard. Neither can what is infinite receive Being from another: for that other must be finite, or infinite: it cannot be finite; because it is impossible, that a finite Principe should give an infinite Being: neither can that other be infinite; because this would lead us into the labyrinth of a progress into infinite. Hence we may conclude with Plato, that God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an eternal Essence. (2) We may demonstrate the Eternity of God from his Independence. Thus Plato, in his Parmenides, pag. 141. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. The one God doth not participate of Essence, i. e. is not Ens by participation, as he explicates himself, therefore he is eternal. So in his I hadrus, pag. 245. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. A Principe has no origine: for allthings arise from a Principe, but the first Principe ariseth from nothing: neither were it a first Principe, if it were originated by some other. And if it hath no beginning, it can have no end. The Argument lies thus: That which is independent as to any first Cause or Principe, must needs be absolutely eternal: Now that God depends not on any precedent Cause or Principe has been sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes. (3) God's Eternity may be demonstrated from his immobility and immutability. Thus Plato, Tim. pag. 37. What is always and immutably the same, is not elder or younger, etc. as before. Whatever gins or ceaseth to be must sal under motion and mutation: for what has beginning hath Being after not-being: and whatever has end hath not-being after Being; and this in a way of succession and motion. But now the immutable God admits not such a succession of Not-being and Being. We may not say, that ever he was not, or that ever he shall not be: he never began to be, neither shall he ever cease to be; but is always the same immutable indivisible Essence. Thus Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, He determines, that the one God is not of those things that have beginning and end. And he gives the reason of his Hypothesis: namely because it is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, always one and the same immutable Being, which receives not generation nor destruction; but is one firmity and Constance: ie. The one God, having a Firmitude, Constance, and immutability of Being, cannot be obnoxious to the Laws of Mutation, Generation, or Corruption; but must be eternal. Thus Plato, in his Timaeus, pag. 27, etc. proves, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That the first Being, who is always the same, can have neither beginning nor end. Thus Plutarch on God's Name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 emgraven on Apollo's Temple: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore that which truly is one and the same is eternal, without beginning or end. (4) The Eternity of God may be demonstrated from his Perfection. The most perfect Being can never begin to be; because that which gives Being is more perfect, than that which receives the Being conferred. Again, the most perfect Being must necessarily have the most perfect mode of Duration, which is eternal. Lastly, the most perfect Being cannot depend on any other for any degree of perfection, and therefore it cannot begin to be. Having demonstrated the Eternity of God, What Eternity is. we now proceed to explicate the same, so far as sacred Philosophy gives us light and evidence: For indeed without divine light it is impossible for mortal man, who is confined by Time, to contemplate immortal Eternity. Have not many great errors had either origine from proud men's confining the Eternity of God to the Laws of Time? This is incomparably well expressed by great Bradwardine, de Causa Dei, l. 2. c. 52. These things, saith he, of Eternity I have more copiosely discussed; because I repute it the most difficult thing for temporal man, who is always accustomed to measure things by the differences and laws of fluent Time, to mount up, above the differences of Time, to the contemplation of Eternity; which is without mutability of succession. And then he gives us an ingenuous confession, that this was his great error, when young and infected with Pelagian infusions: I, saith he, when I was young and ignorant of the Scriptures, and the power of God, being blinded with this ignorance, or rather borne blind, and deceived with a false imagination, I conceited, that the Divine Knowledge and Will was changed and otherwise disposed by the vicissitudes of Times, as human Knowledge and Wil As to such as supersicially read the Scriptures it may seem, that God is this or that way variously affected, as men are. And this ignorance I judge to be the cause, why some others like to me, think that God is otherwise and otherwise disposed intrinsically, etc. Therefore to cure these ignorances' and errors about Eternity we may consider the following Propositions. 1. Eternity not to be measured by Time. Prop. Eternity cannot be measured by any differences or Laws of Time. This Proposition is laid down in express terms by Plato, Tim. pag. 37. where he largely demonstrates, That no differences of Time, either future or past can be attributed to Eternity, as before. It's true, he tells us, That God made time 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a certain mobile Image of immobile Eternity; yet so as that none of its differences can properly be ascribed thereto. So Parmen. pag. 141. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The one God no way participates of time, as before. So Philo Judaeus, de Mundo: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, lo Eternity there is nothing past, nothing future, etc. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Whatever hath beginning may naturally have an end: but God only is ever existent, yea rather about ever: for he is not under time, but above time. And whereas it is said, That the Eternity of God is oft in Scripture described by differences of time, we answer, That these are but metaphoric modes of speech, wherein the Spirit of God, condescending to our narrow capacities, describes the eternal infinite duration of God by the differences of time, yet so, as that he expressly declares, that they do not properly agree to God, but are only assumed as symbolic Images of God's Eternity, which is Plato's own phrase. And Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 51. gives us the reason of this Translation: The cause of this Transumtion is, because we have not a word which properly signifies the stable mansion of Eternity: wherefore we are forced to transfer, by way of similitude, our temporal words, according to certain temporal differences, to Eternity, and Gods coeternal intrinsec Acts. That neither God, nor any intrinsec Act of God can be properly measured by time, or any difference thereof is evident; because Time and all its differences are a variable, mutable, and divisible measure; but the Eternal God and all his immanent Acts invariable, immutable, and indivisible. In Eternity there is no divisibility; no majority, or minority; no priority, or posteriority; no accession, recession, or succession; no successive difference of time; but one indivisible, simple, permanent instant. Thus Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 50. Sect. 3. pag. 639. proves, That what is eternal cannot, as to its own nature, admit the differences of past and future, albeit, by reason of our imperfection, we so speak of it sometimes. How far time and its differences may be comprehended by Eternity we shall explicate in what follows, 4. Prop. 2. Prop. Eternity is an interminable Duration, Eternity without beginning or end. without beginning or end. In Eternity and all eternal Acts neither first or last can be properly assigned. This interminable duration of Eternity is lively illustrated in sacred Philosophy by all those descriptions of God, which make him to be the first and the last, as Esa. 41 4. & 44.6. & 48.12. Rev. 1.8, 11. He being the First Being, and so without beginning; and the Last, as having no end. Thus the Stoics held, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God is incorruptible and ingenerable, i. e. without beginning and end, as Lacertius, in Zeno. (1) That the Eternity of God is without Beginning, is evident by many Philosophemes of Plato. As Phaedrus, pag. 245. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A first Principe has no beginning, but it gives beginning to allthings. So in his Parmenides, pag. 141. he proves, That the one God had no beginning, etc. as before. Thus Thales, in Laertius: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God is the most ancient of Being's; because without beginning. (2) That the Eternity of God shall have no end, Plato assertes in his Phaedo, pag. 106. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But God, saith Socrates, the very Idea or Essence of life, (as I judge) and if any thing be immortal, it is evident to all, that he cannot cease to be. He makes the Soul to be immortal also; but the Immortality of God, who is the original Idea and Essence of life, to be of a more transcendent Nature. Thus in his Timaeus, he distinguisheth between the Eternity or Immortality of Angels and the human Soul, which have no end; and the Eternity of God, which is absolute, without beginning and end: The Eternity of God he makes to be, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, primary, absolute, and independent as to all causality, and therefore not communicable to the Creature: but the Eternity that belongs to the Creature is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to a participation of Being, i. e. dependent on the pleasure of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as that of Angels and the human Soul, which shall have no end, albeit they had beginning. The best of Creatures have but an half-Eternitie: albeit they have no end, yet they had a beginning: They may be to everlasting, but are not from everlasting, as God is, Psal. 90.2. Besides, the Eternity of Creatures is not intrinsecal from a necessity of Being, but dependent on the pleasure of God. 3. Eternity most simple and uniform. Prop. Eternity is a measure most simple, uniform, absolutely indivisible, without the least composition or succession. (1) When we call Eternity a Measure, it must not be understood formally, either as to God, or the Creature; because every measure formally considered speaks relation to the thing measured: but if the Creature never had been, God had been eternal. Neither can a measure formally considered be applied to God; because a measure is ever distinguished from the thing measured; but Eternity is not distinguished from God. Therefore when we call Eternity a Measure, it must be understood metaphorically, and according to our manner of speech. (2) We say Eternity is a simple uniform measure: i. e. without all parts, divisibility, or succession. The Antithesis to this Thesis is maintained by Vorstius and the Socinians, contrary to the Dictates both of sacred and Platonic Philosophy. Thus Plato, Tim. pag. 37. assures us, That the parts of time IT WAS, and IT IS agree not to Eternity; because these imply motion and succession; but Eternity is always immutably the same, as before. The like Aristotle, Metaph. l. 11. c. 4. where all succession is denied of Eternity. Succession is either privative or positive: Privative succession is between Being and not-being; as mutation, corruption, or annihilation attends the essence of things, which all Creatures are liable unto. Positive succession is when things remain not in their Being, without some mutation. The Eternity of God is in neither of these regards successive: Heraclitus' PHilosopheme, That allthings are in flux or succession, and nothing permanent, is true of allthings but God, who by reason of his Eternity admits not of the least succession. This is implied in his Name I am, Exod. 3.14. assumed by our Lord, Joh. 8.58. Vorstins makes the Eternity of God no other than an everlasting duration, consisting of temporal parts and succession, as time. And the Socinians follow him herein. But this blasphemous Antithesis is generally impugned by the Orthodox, and that with invincible Arguments. As, (1) Eternity was before all Time, and therefore cannot be composed of parts of time. (2) If Eternity were a divisible successive measure, than the parts of which it is composed are either finite or infinite: They cannot be finite; because no infinite can be composed of finite parts: They cannot be infinite; because then every part is as great as the whole: for things infinite admit no degrees. (3) Eternity is the same with God himself, and therefore admits of no parts, composition, or succession, as hereafter, 5. Prop. 4. Prop. Albeit Eternity be in itself a simple, How Eternity coexistes to the parts of Time. and indivisible Duvation, yet it may be said to coexiste unto and comprehend all parts of time and things. Eternity in itself has neither succession nor extension; yet it has a permanence, according to which it is said to coexiste to allthings, that fall under daily succession. In this regard Plato calls Time, an Image of Eternity, as all its parts and successions are comprehended thereby. For our Divines acknowledge, that Time is contained in the measure of Eternity, as the permanent fixed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Instant of Eternity coexsistes to all the differences of time, and allthings succeeding in time, not as together, but successively as they existe. Thus the whole of Eternity coexistes to this day, as also to the next day, etc. Yet we may not say that Eternity doth attemper itself to the nature of things temporal, whiles it comprehends and measures the same: For by measuring and comprehending things temporal, we only mean, that Eternity doth coexiste to them: whereby Eternity is not more attempered to the nature of time, than time, by coexisting to Eternity, is attempered to the nature of Eternity. Eternity may be said to contain successive quantity or the parts of Time, in the same manner as the Immensity of God contains the permanent quantity of things. Now it is well known, that the Immensity of God is not otherwise said to contain permanent quantity or Bodies, but as it coexistes or may coexiste unto, yea infinitely exceed all bodies, although most spatiose: so in like manner the Eternity of God cannot otherwise be said to contain the successive quantity or duration of things, than as it is coexistent to allthings as they existe, and transcends all their durations. Not only things temporary in their vicissitudes coexiste to God and his Eternity; but also God and his Eternity coexistes to them: which denomination implies no vicissitude in God, or in his Eternity; but only a vicissitude of the things temporary, and their gradual succession. It's true, as we have before proved, the differences of time past and future are repugnant to Eternity, as to all intrinsee denomination: for in Eternity there is nothing past or future, first or last: yet these differences are not repugnant to Eternity in regard of extrinsec denomination. For in the coexistence of God with things fluent and successive, there is priority and posteriority, not in God, but in the things temporary. The coexistence of things with God is other and other, or successive, according to the vicissitude of the things; and so by consequence the coexistence of God with the Creatures admits of some kind of succession as to extern denomination; not as if there were any new existence of God with the Creatures, but only by reason of the new existence of the Creatures with God. Hence Christ, Heb. 13.8. in regard of his Eternity, is said to be, Heb. 13.8. The same yesterday, and to day and for ever: i. e. in regard of extrinsec denomination, as he coexistes in one and the same uniform indivisible Eternity with things and differences of time, of successive and divisible duration. Thus the Eternity of God is said to comprehend and measure all differences and successions of times and things. 5. Eternity a fixed Instant. Prop. The Eternity of God considered in its genuine Idea, is but one immutable, permanent, fixed Instant. This in sacred Philosophy the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Jehovah, and I am, Exod. 3.14. fully indicate. Thus also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to its origination, primarily denotes, being derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, everbeing, or existing. Whence God, who is Eternity, is styled by Plato and his Sectators, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, everbeing. So also the Poets style their fictitious God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ever-Beings, in imitation of sacred Philosophy, which styles God, Jehovah, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Who Am, thereby denoting, that he is a fixed, permanent, eternal Being, or an ever-standing Now: For I AM, or HE IS, the sacred Characters of God, primarily belong to Eternity. Nothing can be said It Is in a strict sense as having, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a standing permanent Being, as Plotinus phraseth it, but what is eternal. So Plato, Tim. pag. 37. saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It is, only belongs to Eternity: i. e. Eternity is only one permanent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Now. Thus Plotinus (a great Sectator of Plato) Ennead. 3. l. 7. num. 2. pag. 327. He that contemplates all these things contemplates Eternity, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, contemplating life permanent in the same state, having the whole a ways present: but not now this, and anon that, but all together: neither now some one part, and afterward some other, but an indivisible end. Wherein he declares, that the Eternity of God is one and the same indivisible, interminable state or fixed instant, without succession. Whence he immediately subjoins: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Where, as in a point, allthings are together, without falling under any flux, but remaining there in the same instant, i. e. in itself, without permutation or succession of past and future. And then he concludes with this description of Eternity: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That therefore which neither was, nor shall be, but only IS, having a fixed permanent Being, because it is neither changed for the future; neither by what is past, that is Eternity. It is therefore about Being in itself, a life together total and full, and every where altogether without distance. This is the Eternity we inquire about. In these Platonic Philosophemes about Eternity we find these observables. (1) That Eternity has no differences of time or succession of parts, either past or future. (2) That it is but one only fixed permanent Is or Instant. (3) That it is in itself total and full, without distance of parts. Whence Eternity is defined by Boethius, an interminable possession of life total, perfect, and all at once. It is total, not in regard of parts, but as it includes the most perfect negation of succession. It is all at once, as it is but one fixed instant. Thus Justin Martyr, in Paraen, calls it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The eternal and infinite Now, or Instant. But here we must distinguish 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an Instant, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Nunc, aliud est stans, aliud est fluens. into that which is permanent or fixed, and that which is fluent: Eternity is not a fluent Instant, such as they make to be in time, but nunc or instans stans, a standing fixed permanent Instant; or, as Plotinus styles it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a standing Being, without past or future, possessing allthings at once, totally and perfectly, without the least vicissitude. Thus Bradwardine, de Causa Dei, l. 2. c. 50. pag. 830. Hence it evidently follows, that there is but one and the same immutable Instant throughout all Eternity; and that the whole of Eternity is not more or greater than its Instant; nor the Instant of Eternity more simple or less than it; but that Eternity and its Instant are really one and the same. But here, before we proceed farther, we cannot, without violence offered to the Laws of Philosophic Disquisition, let pass unexamined the assaults, which learned More, in his Divine Dialogues, Dial. 1. S. 15. pag. 58. makes against this common notion of Eternity, That it is a permanent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Instant at once. This Idea of God's Eternity he clogs with these Contradictions: (1) That allthings should have been really and essentially with God from all Eternity at once, and yet be borne in time and succession. This Objection is, as I conceive, fully answered in what precedes, 4. Prop. To which we may add, that allthings were present with God even before their existence, not in the Dominicans notion, by reason of any real presentialitie or coexistence to God's Eternity, but only by their intentional coexistence in the Divine Decree, as Twisse has well demonstrated against the Dominicans, Scientiae Med. lib. 2. pag. 377, 400. (2) Learned More adds: That eternal Duration should be at once, is also to me utterly unconceivable, and that one permanent instant should be commensurate or rather equal to all successions of Ages. To which we answer, [1] as before, That Eternity is not a fluent, successive Instant, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a standing Instant. [2] That it is not a temporary, finite create Instant, but an eternal, infinite and increate Instant, and therefore every way commensurate to all the successions of Ages. But (3) he adds: Besides, if the Duration of God be all at once, sigh no Agent acts but within the compass of its own Duration, God must both create and destroy the World at once. Whence it seems impossible, that eternal Duration should be indistant to itself, or without continuation of Intervals. To which it's answered, [1] That this consequence seems very inconsequent, and unworthy of so learned a man, because not ad idem: for God's Eternity, which he makes to be a successive Duration, is really the same with his Essence; but his Creation and Destruction of the World, as Acts ad extra, and in regard of their passive attingence, coincident with the Creature, fall under successive Duration, and so cannot be simultaneous, or at once. [2] His Conclusion, That God's eternal Duration cannot be without continuation of Intervals, seems to me of very dangerous consequence, and that which both Plato and Plotinus, whom he values, abhor, to say no worse. But [3] to conclude, I grant, that the notion Instant, as applied to God's Eternity, is but metaphoric, and rather negative than positive, to exclude all manner of succession, or duration by intervals from God, as before. Hence, 6. Eternity the same with the Divine Essence. Prop. Eternity has one and the same Idea with the Divine Essence. Eternity is nothing else but the increate Duration of God, or God himself. Whence the Platonists stile God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, supereternal, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, transcendent Eternity. And Plato's mind herein is incomparable well explicated by Plotinus, Ennead. 3. l. 7. num. 1. pag. 325. What therefore must we call Eternity? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the very intelligible Divine Essence. For seeing we conceive of Eternity as most venerand, there is nothing more venerand than the intelligible Divine Essence. So pag. 326. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Again the intelligible World and Eternity comprehend in themselves the same things. By the intelligible World he means, according to Plato, the ideal World, i. e. God as decreeing allthings. So num. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; What therefore principally shall that be, by which we say the whole divine World is eternal and everlasting? Where he makes Eternity to be the first Divine Essence, as it connotes an interminable state of Identity and Life. For to persevere in an Identity of Essence, with an absolute and intrinsec necessity, is the most noble and perfect mode of Duration, which differs more than generically from all other modes of Duration, and therefore most proper to God, whose Eternity is a permanent increated Duration. Vorstius and his Sectators make the Eternity of God to be an Accident, and divisible successive Duration: but this Plotinus refutes, num. 3. pag. 327. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Neither truly may we imagine, that Eternity happens to that Divine Nature extrinsecally and as an Accident, but that it is in it, and of it, and together with it. For it is considered as intimately united to and essentially one with the Divine Nature. Wherein he clearly proves, that Eternity is not an Accident, but the same with the Divine Essence. Which argument may be thus improved. (1) If Eternity in God be an Accident, either it is caused by God, or not: if it be caused, than it has a beginning, and so not Eternity. If it be an Accident not caused by God, than it was caused by itself, or without cause: which are both absurd. (2) If the Eternity of God be an Accident, then finite or infinite: It cannot be a finite Accident; because a finite duration cannot be commensurate to an infinite Being. It cannot be an infinite Accident, because then there would be somewhat infinite besides God. (3) It is apparent, that Eternity cannot be an Accident, if we consider the very nature of Duration, which is not really distinct from the subject whereunto it belongs. For what is Duration, but the persevering of a thing in its existence? And in like manner Eternity is nothing else but the increate, permanent, adequate essential duration of God; which essentially includes all perfection of Essence, and consequently all intern Acts of God, either as to Knowledge or Wil In sum, Eternity is the perfect duration of the Essence, Perfection, and Operations of God, as Suarez has well demonstrated, Metaph. Disp. 50. Sect. 3. pag. 638, 639. §. 4. God's Immensity and Omnipresence what. Next to God's Eternity follows his Immensity, or Omnipresence; which denotes his presence in allthings, and all spaces; whereof we have lively notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophy. As for sacred Philosophy it gives us great illustrations of God's Immensity and Omnipresence. 1 Kings 8.27. Psal. 139.7, 8, 9, 10. Thus, 1 Kings 8.27. Behold the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain thee. So Psal. 139.7. Where shall I go from thy Spirit, or whither shall I flee from thy presence? v. 8. If I ascend up into Heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in Hell, behold thou art there. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, thou art there, i. e. by thy immense omnipresent Essence. Thence he adds: v. 9 If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the utmost parts of the Sea: v. 10. Even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand hold me. This is coherent with what precedes, and the sense of the whole is this: If I should endeavour to fly from the presence even unto the utmost part of the World, yet must not thy hand of Providence conduct me thither? and cannot then the same hand apprehend me there, and correct my foolish infidelity for conceiting that I could hid myself from thy presence? The like Jer. 23.23, 24. Jer. 23.23, 24. Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hid himself in secret places, that I shall not see him, saith the Lord? do I not fill Heaven and Earth? God is said to fill Heaven and Earth, by reason of the Immensity of his Essence. For God being infinite as to his Essence and Perfection, must necessarily also be infinite as to his Presence; so that his Essence cannot be limited by any finite space. Thus Damascene, Orthod. fid. l. 1. c. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore the Deity only is free from circumscription, existent without principe, without end, comprehending allthings, and yet comprehended by nothing. In that he saith, The Deity only is free from circumscription, he hath discovered a truth, which the Aristotelean Schools are unacquainted with: for albeit Angels and the human Soul are not circumscribed by corporeous place, yet they are by their Vbi, or definitive space, as Damascene demonstrates. Thence c. 19 he saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Moreover it belongs to the Deity to diffuse itself through allthing impermixtly, but nothing through it. This degree of infinity they call Immensity; which is prperly esteemed by the regard it has not only to finite space, but to all imaginary space. So that by God's Immensity we understand the intimate presence of his infinite, indivisible Essence in all space, both real and imaginary, actual and possible. Not that God's Immensity is the same with space, as Derodone in his Physics, and others would fain persuade us; who make God's Immensity no other than an infinite space: and thence they suppose allthings to be in space, as they are in God's Immensity. But what dangerous consequences attend this Hypothesis may appear from this, That it supposeth either that God's Immensity is only an Accident or Mode distinct from God; or, which is worse, that allthings formally and essentially existe in God, as in their proper space or place, and so are not really distinct from God; which is little short of blasphemy. Some distinguish between the Immensity of God, and his Divine Presence; making his Immensity to be an absolute propriety, but his Presence relative, as it relates to the Creature. But I see no necessity of restraining God's Presence to the relation he has to his Creatures; seeing it is as infinite as his Essence, and so has respect not only to finite, but also to infinite imaginary space, whether actual or possible. Neither doth God's infinite Presence speak any actual or real habitude to any thing without himself: therefore we may estime it as absolute as his Immensity, and not to be distinguished therefrom. It's true, God is said in sacred Philosophy to have his Throne in Heaven, as also in his Churches; but this must be understood only of his gloriose manifestation of himself, and gratiose operations. So Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God is said to be in a place, and a place is said to be of God, where his operation is manifest. For he diffuseth himself through allthings parely and without the least commixtion with them; and makes allthings to participate of his operation, according to their indigence and receptive capacity. Whence he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Therefore that is said to be the place of God, which most participates of his operation and Grace. Wherefore Heaven is said to be his Throne; because in it the Angels do his will— And the Church is said to be the place of God; because it is his Temple, etc. The Immensity and infinite Presence of God may be explicated and demonstrated by the Infinitude of the Divine Essence. God's Immensity demonstrated and explicated. For that which is infinite in its Being, must necessarily be infinite in its Presence: all terms and bounds as to place or space arise from the terms of Essence: that therefore which hath no terms of Essence, can have no terms of Presence, but must be immense. Thus Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 899. having proved, that there is one infinite Being, by whom allthings are disposed and governed, he concludes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that allthings were full of God that immense Being. So Diogenes the Cynic held: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For allthings are full of God; therefore men should be reverend. 2. The Immensity and infinite Presence of God may be explicated and demonstrated by his absolute Simplicity. Thus Plato, in his Parmenides, pag. 138. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But that which neither hath any parts, neither is a whole, much less can it be, that it should be confined to any place to space, either in regard of parts or whole. Therefore it neither changeth its place by going into any place, or by remaining in the same place; or by being carried thither, neither by being altered. Wherein he proves, That the one God is immense and infinite in his Presence, because he is present in all places and spaces, not by parts, or as an whole compound Being; but by his simple indivisible Essence. So Damascene, l. 1. de Fide, c. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God therefore being immaterial and not circumscribed, is not in a place; for he is place to himself, filling allthings, and yet above all, and containing al. Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, We must know that the Deity is indivisible, the whole totally existing every where, and not part in part corporally distracted, but the whole in all, and the whole above al. Thence Chrysippus the Stoic said, That the most simple and pure Reing, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which also they first call God, doth diffuse himself throughout all bodies in the Air, and all living Creatures, and all Plants, and throughout the Earth itself. God is essentially and indivisibly in all Being's and space; albeit all Being's are not in God as in their proper space; as Derodone and others too boldly assert: For if allthings are in God, as in their proper space, how can we possibly avoid that blasphemous consequence of the Familistes, who make allthings but particles of God? Is it possible that any thing is or can be in God, which is not God? If God's Immensity be the same with his Essence, as undoubtedly it is, will it not necessarily follow, that allthings, by existing in God's Immensity, existe also in God? I greatly value Derodone's acumen in many philosophic Contemplations; but yet I find dangerous consequences attending some of his Philosophemes' bordering on Theology; and therefore cannot but conceive myself under an essential obligation to premonish young Students thereof. 3. The Immensity and infinite Presence of God may be explicated and demonstrated by the infinite power, and operations of God both actual and possible. This Argument Plato much insistes on, proving, that God is an universal Spirit, who diffuseth himself throughout the whole Universe, conserving, fomenting, animating and actuating allthings. So Leg. 10. pag. 895. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore the principe of all motions, and the first motion, which is in those things that are permanent, and those things that move, is, as we must necessarily confess, he that moves himself, and therefore the mast ancient and excellent. Whence pag. 896. he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. God is a Soul universally ruling and dwelling in allthings that are moved. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 17. having demonstrated, that Angels are confined to some space, he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For it is proper solely to God, to be present every where, according to the same operation. And he explicates the mode of this divine Ubiquity thus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But God existing every where and above every thing, works differently every where and according to the same, by one simple operation. To draw forth the force of this Argument; Gods infinite Presence and Immensity in allthings actual and possible may be demonstrated, (1) From his infinite Power in creating allthings, that are or may be. For God being able to create 100000 Worlds, 100000 times greater than this World, his Presence must be infinite; because God works by the Presence of his Essence: Deus immediatè agitimmediatione non solùm virtutis, sed & suppositi. neither can he work where he is not present. God works all immediately, not only by the Immediation of his Virtue, but also by the Immediation of his Essence. Aristotle, Phys. lib. 7. tells us, that the mover and moved must be together: and look as a particular cause is present with its particular effect, so the universal cause with his universal effect. Now God, the universal Cause of allthings, hath no other way of Presence with all effects, but by his Essence: Hence that of Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Allthings are distant from God, not as to place, but nature: i. e. God, who is infinitely distant from his Creature as to Nature, is yet ever present with it in regard of the Omnipresence of his Essence. (2) Gods infinite Presence is manifested in the Confervation of allthings: as the creatrix Essence was immediately present in making allthings, so the conservatrix Essence is immediately present in the supporting allthings. (3) Gods infinite Presence may be demonstrated from his immediate actuating all second Causes, as Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 30. Sect. 7. §. 5. God's incomprehensibility. The Infinitude of the Divine Essence, Duration, and Presence being discussed, we now are to proceed to God Infinitude as to our Comprehension, or his incomprehensibility, whereof we find bright notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophy. Thus Job 11.7, 8, 9 Job 11.7, 8, 9 Caused thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection? This Rhetoric interrogation implies a vehement Logic negation. Thence it follows: It is as high as Heaven, what canst thou do? deeper than Hell, what canst thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the Earth, and broader than the Sea. Psal. 145.3. So Psal. 145.3. Great is the Lord and greatly to be praised, and his greatness is unsearchable. Where he makes the infinite magnitude of God's Essence the cause of his incomprehensibility. Comprehendere propriè est arringere rem secundùm omnem modum & omnem rationem quâ res est cognoscibilis, etc. Aquinas. For to comprehend an object is to apprehend it according to every mode and reason as it is intelligible, thereby to define it, or give terms and bounds to it: For a definition is but the boundary of an Essence: he that perfectly comprehends and defines a thing gives limits and bounds to that thing in his intellect. Now that which has no bounds or terms of Essence, can have no bounds or terms as to our comprehension or definition. Hence properly and strictly God cannot be said positively to comprehend himself, though negatively this Attribute may be given to him, as he knows himself perfectly. Whence that Hypothesis of Derodone and some others, who assert, That God may be defined by himself, is too presumptuous and during; seeing all definitions give terms and limits to the essences of things: whence if God cannot be limited, he cannot be defined: for terms of definition follow terms of essence. Much less can God be defined by a created intellect unto which all definitions refer, as before, Chap. 3. §. 2. Thence it is said of God, 1 Tim. 6.16. 1 Tim. 6.16. That he dwells in the light, which no man can approach unto. The Divine Essence, by reason of its Immensity and Infinitude, is infinitely elevated in Splendour and Glory, beyond the capacity of our finite intellect. Thus Plato held, God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a celestial light ineffable, etc. So in his Timaeus, pag. 28 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and truly it is very difficult to find out that Parent of the Universe: and when he is found out, to declare what he is unto all, is a thing impossible. So in his Parmenides, pag. 134. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore Beauty itself and bonity itself is unknown as to us, and all these things which we estime Ideas. And more fully, pag. 142. he thus speaks: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Wherefore he [God] is neither named, nor declared, nor conceived, nor known, neither perceived by any of those things that are. Which indeed are lively illustrations of the incomprehensibility of God. And that Parmenides himself, (whose name Plato affixeth to this his metaphysic Dialogue) had the like notices of God's incomprehensibility, seems probable, by what Lacrtius relates of Melissus his Scholar, who said, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That men should not attended to describe God; because there is no comprehensive knowledge of him. This is well expressed by Damascene, de Fide, l. 1. c. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Divinity therefore is infinite and incomprehensible; and this only of him is comprehensible, that he is infinite and incomprehensible. So again, c. 13. he saith, That God hath given us a participation of his bonity, by producing us out of nothing, and investing us with a faculty of knowledge, yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as he has not made us participant of his Essence, so neither has he given to us the knowledge of his Essence. For it is impossible that Nature [human] should perfectly know that Nature which is infinitely above it. Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; How can that which is superessential be known? The like he adds, c. 17. God, saith he, comprehends allthings, but is comprehended by nothing: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for he solely is incomprehensible and infinite, known by none; but he solely is the Contemplator of himself. But the more distinctly to explicate and demonstrate the incomprehensibility of God, we must consider, that a thing is then said to be comprehended, when it is perfectly known so far as it is cognoscible or intelligible. For comprehensive knowledge is that whereby the whole of an object, so far as it is intelligible, is known either intuitively or discursively. This manner of speech is taken from the dimension of bodies, which are said to be comprehended, when their whole quantity and extension is so contained in another, as that nothing of their quantity is beyond the comprehension of the continent. Hence Zeno and the Stoics his sectators called first Principes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Comprehensions; because they fully and perfectly comprehend all conclusions. Now that God is, as to all finite capacity, incomprehensible is evident, (1) from the nature of Comprehension, which denotes an adequate perfect penetration and definition of a thing, as to all its essential Differences, Predicates, Proprieties and Parts: But now God having no Genus or essential Difference cannot be defined, neither can his Essence be penetrated by any finite capacity. (2) From the infinite disproportion between a finite capacity and the infinite Essence of God. An object is comprehended when it is understood by the intellect so far as it is intelligible: now God being infinitely intelligible, is also infinitely distant from, and so not to be comprehended by a finite intellect. God, as he is of infinite Essence, so also of infinite cognoscibilitie and truth: whence he is not comprehensible by any but himself. (3) From the comparation of things intelligible. The more abstract things are from matter, and remote from sense, the more difficult to be understood. Thence Aristot. Metaph. 2. saith, That our Intellect is disposed, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, towards first Being's most manifest by Nature, as Bats towards the light: i. e things by how much the more pure and spirital they are, by so much the more difficult to be understood. Thus Bradwardine, lib. 1. cap. 1. pag. 27. If there be something difficult to be fully understood, and something more difficult, and something yet more difficult, and so forward; must there not be something most difficult to be understood, which is God? For as in Mathematic Conclusions, so in the Creatures, the later is more difficult than the precedent, but nothing most difficult to be understood, but God: which his Immensity and infinity both extensive and intensive clearly demonstrate. (4) From the Operations and Providence of God. How little doth the most sagacious Philosopher understand, much less comprehend of the Works and Providence of God? How impossible then is it for poor mortals to comprehend the Essence of God? Paul cries out, Rom. 11.33. Rom. 11.33. How unsearchable are his judgements, and his ways past finding out! And if God's works, which are finite and so bear some proportion to our understanding, are so unsearchable, how unsearchable then is his Essence? (5) From our ignorance and incomprehension of the least things in Nature. Alas! how little do we know of the least of Being's? Is not our ignorance much more than our knowledge in the common products of Nature? How little then must we needs know of the God of Nature? This Argument is incomparably well improved by Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 1. pag. 27. against the prond Philosophers of his Age, presuming they could by their reason give an exact model of the divine Decrees and Operations; whom he thus seriously derides: Prithee, O Philosopher, tell me, what dost thou fully know? I suppose thou darest not say the least Creature. I know, thou dost not perfectly know the least Atom in the Sun, the least dust of the Earth, nor the least drop of water. For in every corpuscule there are infinite figures linear, superficial, and corporal, etc. Thence he concludes thus: If therefore thou knowest not the least things, yea thou art infinitely ignorant of more than thou knowest, how caused thou fully know the greatest Being? Presume not, but acknowledge thyself to be a man, and that thou art infinitely ignorant of more of God than thou knowest. So Aquinas contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 3. proves from our ignorance of things sensible, how ignorant we are of the supreme Being. (6) From the mutable variable nature of human Knowledge. In those things whereof we conceive we know most, how much are we contradicted by others, who are as confident of their Antithesis, as we are of our Hypothesis? Yea, how oft do we contradict ourselves, and that in those very things, wherein we thought our knowledge well grounded? And if our comprehension in things natural be so superficial, variable, and contradictory, how much more is it such in the comprehension of God? That God is incomprehensible as to any created intellect, albeit supernaturally elevated, see Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 30. Sect. 12. pag. 118. Although man cannot attain to a comprehensive Knowledge of the incomprehensible God, How for we may apprehend God. yet an apprehensive Knowledge he is capable of. For the Infinitude and incomprehensibility of God hinders not, but that he may be apprehended by a finite understanding, so far as he reveles himself in his word or works. It's true, all knowledge implies some proportion between the object known and the apprehensive faculty: and to speak strictly there is no proper proportion between an infinite object and a finite subject; yet such is the condescendence of the infinite God, as that he has not left us without some means, both natural and supernatural, which have an illative proportion to himself, whereby we are enabled, as by so many gradations, to ascend up to the knowledge of himself. And we find not only in sacred Philosophy, but also in Plato many good rules to conduct us in our inquiries after and contemplations of the incomprehensible God. 1. Against Poetic figments of God. Plato severely prohibits all his Sectators the entertaining any fabulose Poetic figments of God, whereby he is transformed into various shapes and forms, according to the proud daring conceits of men. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 377. condemns Hesiod and Homer for those Fables they coined touching the Gods: and then tells us what those Fables were: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. When any one doth importunely and wickedly forge and represent the nature of the Gods, and Heroes; neither doth duly describe them as they are: just as a Painter, who without the least ressemblance paints those things which he intends to imitate. Thence he proceeds to aggravate the crime of those, who coin such unworthy Fables of God: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. First truly, the greatest lie is in the greatest matters: whereof Hesiod is the Author, who feigns such false stories of Heaven, etc. He makes Hesiod's Fables about the Gods to be of the blackest guilt; because in the greatest matters. Thence he concludes, in the end of this lib. 2. pag. 383. thus: Albeit therefore we may commend many things of Homer, yet this we do not commend, that he feigned such things of Jupiter— When therefore such things are spoken of the Gods, let us be filled with indignation, and banish the Poets: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Neither let us permit the Professors of Learning to make use of such fabulose Poets for the instructing of Youth: If truly the Magistrates of the City be religiose and divine, they will, so far as men may, take care hereof for us. An excellent Law for the expelling all fabulose Poets. Thus in the 12 Tables it's reckoned as one of Romulus' Laws: That men believe not the Fables of the Gods. Laertius relates of Pythagoras, That descending down to Hell, he saw Hesiod's Soul bound to a brazen Pillar making a lamentable noise; and Homer's Soul hanging on a Tree, with Serpents about it, for those things which they feigned of the Gods. And Zenophanes Colophonius writ against Homer and Hesiod, deriding them for their Fables of the Gods. So much did the wiser Heathens abominate those fabulose narrations of God. It was a great Saying of Bias, mentioned by Laertius, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Speak of God as he is. 2. Plato forbids all curiosity in our inquiries about God. Against Curiosity in our inquiries after God. Thus Repub. 6. pag. 506. having undertaken to discourse of God, under the notion of the chiefest Good, he gives a caution, that we be not too curiose in prying into the incomprehensible things of God. Dost thou, saith he, conceive it consentaneous, that any discourse of a thing whereof he is ignorant? No surely, so far as he is ignorant. Dost thou not know, that opinions without science are base; of which opinions the best are truly blind? Dost thou judge, that they who opine, or measure things by their own opinions, without understanding, differ any thing from those who being blind yet conceit they go in a right path? no surely. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Wilt thou therefore contemplate base, blind, and obliqne opinions (of God) when thou mayst hear clear and excellent discourse from others? An excellent rule for the confinement of our notions and contemplations touching God to sacred Revelations. Then he adds in Socrates' name: But truly, as for me, I am no way fit for this so great an affair; [namely to discourse of the chiefest Good] and therefore lest going beyond my capacity I should come short of what I aim at, and make myself ridiculous, I again and again tremble at my task. But, blessed Sirs, what that chiefest Good is, let us now let pass: for the Majesty hereof, believe me, greatly transcends the terms of our knowledge: but let us now consider what are the effects of this chiefest Good, which have most similitude to his nature. Wherein Socrates winds off his Auditors from the curiose prying into the Nature of God, and exhortes them rather to contemplate God in his effects, specially such as partake most of the Divine Nature. Thence he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, And I wish I were capable of unfolding, and you of receiving so great a Mystery, that ye might perceive not only some effects and issues, but also the nature of the Parent: i. e. God himself. What an excellent remedy doth Plato here afford us against all presumptuose and daring inquisition into the Nature and Secrets of God? Magnitudinem Dei qui se putat nosse minuit: qui non vult minuere non novit. Minute. Foelix. Indeed he that attemts to comprehend the Divine Essence and its magnitude, doth but diminish it, and confound himself: not one conceives aright of God, but he that conceives him to be incomprehensible. Plato gives us good advice, that the Nature and Secrets of God ought to be held in a Mystery, farther than he reveles himself. How soon are volatile and curiose Wits unhinged by the wingy Mysteries of the Divine Essence? He that indulgeth his curiositle herein, doth but thrust himself into a Labyrinth, out of which he can never extricate himself. The Socratic modesty is very becoming Christians, not to dive into the Miseries of the Deity, farther than he hath discovered himself in his works or word. He that affects to be a curiose Scrutator of the Divine Majesty shall soon be swallowed up by his Glory. And how many have lost their Religion and Devotion, by a seeming religiose and devote prying into the Secrets of God? It was opportunely said of that serious Christian, who, being by a curiose Wit in way of derision, demanded, What God did before the World was made? replied, He made Heks for curiose Wits, who busy themselves about such vain questions. And indeed such as now indulge their curiosity in such frigid jejune speculations about God, shall one day, to their dreadful torment, feel and know how much better it had been for them, with a learned pious ignorance, to pass by the incomprehensible Secrets of God, than by a proud blasphemous ignorant curiosity to dive into them. Lastly, what profit is it to use curiose conjectures in those things, which transcend all human conjectures? To conclude, as for our contemplations about the Divine Perfections of God, we have a good caution given us by Naxianzen, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Be not curiosily inquisitive about the mode. To which we may add that of Pluto, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to be modesely and temperately wife, is to be greatly wife. Which agrees with sacred Philosophy, Rom. 12.3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Rom. 12.3. 3. Plato instructes us, The least notice of God of great moment. That the least notices of God and his Divine Perfections ought to be of great moment and estime with us. So in his Critieas, pag. 107. by an allusion taken from Painters he illustrates this Hypothesis thus: When Painters draw the Pictures of the Gods, etc. we think it sufficient if they give us but any dark representation of them, neither do we being unskilful animadvert with a censorious eye on their work; but rest abundantly satisfied in what representation they give us. But when they come to draw our own picture, or the picture of any that belong to us, we more severely animadvert and censure them, if they err in the least point. The same is to be observed in the explication of these things, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. When we discourse of things celestial and divine, we think ourselves abundantly satisfied, if there be the least evidence brought for the explication of their nature; but on the contrary in our examen of things mortal and human, we are wont to use greater diligence. Wherefore if those things, which we are now about to discourse of, be not so exactly, as their dignity requires, represented by us, you'll pardon us. An excellent preface to a discourse of things divine touching God, which Plato is here entering on. Hence, 4. All notices of God by Divine Revelation. Plato adviseth us not to expect or desire farther discoveries of God, than his own revelation and illumination shall afford to us. So in his Timaeus, pag. 29. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It must be remembered both by me that speak, and by you who are Judges of my discourses, that we have but human Nature, and therefore if we can but attain unto some Oriental Tradition or probable relation of these things, [touching God, etc.] we may not inquire farther about them. That by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we must understand some Oriental Judaic Tradition originally of divine revelation, I think, will appear evident to any that considers the use of this phrase in Plato. Indeed in our contemplations and discourses of God it is neither profitable nor safe to proceed further than divine Revelation and Illumination shall conduct us. Neither need we be ashamed to be ignorant of such Secrets of God, the humble ignorance of which argues more solid knowledge, than curiose and vain speculations thereof. These are the best bounds for our inquiries about God, not only to follow God learning, but also to leave off enquiring when and where God leaves off to teach: as we may not neglect what God has reveled of himself, so we may not search into what God has kept secret: for as the former argues too much sloth and ingratitude, so the later too much pride and curiosity. It was a great Saying of Augustin: We may safely follow Scripture, which as an indulgent mother goes softly, that she may not go beyond our infirmity. A believing ignorance in things not reveled about God is much better than a rash science. All natural reason and investigation about God, aught to follow not precede faith. Hence, 5. The Gradation of our ascent to God. Plato informs us, That our ascent in the contemplation of God musk be by the same degrees, by which he descends to us, either in his works or words. Thus Repub. 6. pag. 509, etc. he informs us, That it is above all human capacity to comprehend the Majesty of the chiefest Good, as it is in its inaccessible splendour, yet we may ascend thereto by certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Gra es or degrees: which Grades of Ascent must be taken from God's Grades or degrees of Descent unto us; that so we may, by a certain Analogy and similitude, ascend up to the knowledge of God, so far as it is possible for man. Yet he gives us this needful caution, That we must speak soberly of these so great Mysteries, and take heed that we ascribe not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a spurious birth to the Parent of the Universe. The grades or degrees whereby God descends to us, and we ascend to him are either natural or supernatural. 1. Natural Grades of knowing God. The natural Grades or Degrees, whereby God descends down to us, and we ascend up to him, are all the Effects, Products and Works of God, with all their Virtues, Efficaces, Orders, Varieties, and all manner of Perfections. So Plato, Repub. 6. treating largely of God's causality, he saith, All natural Causes and Effects are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Works, Artifices, and Children of God the great Parent of the Universe, whereby we may ascend up to the knowledge of God. This is more natively and clearly laid down in sacred Philosophy, Rom. 1.19, 20. as Rom. 1.19, 20. where he saith, the visible works of God, as so many ascents, lead us up to the contemplation of the invisible perfections of God, specially his eternal power and Godhead. That there is a natural knowledge of God gained by the Book of Nature is most evident, albeit the Socinians, to serve their Hypothesis, deny it. This natural knowledge of God is either insite or acquisite. So Dion Prusaeensis said, that our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, persuasion of God was either innate, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, acquisite. Our insite and innate knowledge of God consists in those common notices of God, both speculative and practic, which are impressed on the Conscience. Our acquisite natural knowledge of God is that which is gained by actual comparation and discourse from the works of God. This acquisite knowledge may, according to the distribution of that spurious Dionysius, (who was indeed a great Platonist) cap. 2. the Mist. Theolog. be acquired and promoved three ways: by way of causality, by way of Eminence, by way of Negation. (1) By way of causality, when by the Effects of God, 1. By way of causality. which are either little Images, or at lest Vestigia, Footsteps of God, we mount up to the knowledge and contemplation of God, the original Parent or first Cause of al. For indeed the effect carries with it the signature, impress, and ressemblance of its Cause; as you frequently see the Parent's complexion or conditions in the Child. Thus Plato, Repub. 6. pag. 507. having laid down this preface, that it was impossible to comprehend, yea to apprehend any thing of the Divine Majesty in himself, he tells us, That he would inquire after him in his offspring or effects: and then he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but take heed lest I should against my will give you a spurious Idea of the Child of this great Parent. He speaks in the language of Aratus, cited by Paul, Act. 17.28. we are all his offspring; Act. 17.28. and applies this notion to all lower goods, which he makes to be the offspring or issue of the chiefest Good; and therefore by them we ascend up to the contemplation of their Parent. So Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But those things that are spoken [of God] affirmatively, are predicated of him as the cause of allthings. And he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But he shall be more properly named from things more excellent and more akin to himself: now things immaterial are more excellent. Wherein he instructes us, (1) That our affirmative notices of God are chief drawn from his effects. (2) That among his effects those give us the most lively Ideas of God, which are most excellent and akin to him; namely things immaterial, as the human Soul, etc. God so manifestes himself in the whole opifice of the Universe, that we can no sooner open our eyes, but may behold the gloriose Ideas of his Divine Wisdom, Power, and Goodness: which ever way we turn our eye, there shines forth some ray of the Divinity. What is the whole Universe, but a visible Map or Picture of the invisible Deity? Is not the Creators Name written in golden Characters on every page of the Book of Nature? It's true, some want eyes to see and read their Creator's Name in the Book of Nature, but it follows not hence, that there is no natural knowledge of God, as the Socinians would needs persuade us: For that a thing be called natural, it is not necessary, that it be actually in all men; but it sufficeth if it may be derived from a natural principe: because some men are blind, we may not thence conclude, that sight is not natural to a man. (2) Another natural grave or way of knowing God is by way of Eminence. 2. By way of Eminence. These Notices of God by way of Eminence are best when composed both of Affirmatives and Negatives, as also of terms most simple. Thus Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The sweetest notion of God is that complexion of both [Affirmatives and Negatives] as superessential Essence, superdivine Divinity, supercausal Cause, and the like. When we see any perfection in the Creature, we attribute the same to God in a more eminent degree and manner. And here we are to remember, that the more general notions of created perfections, albeit they are more imperfect as belonging to the Creature, yet they are more properly attributed to God, than more special notions; because the former are more abstract and simple, the later more concrete and composite: For by how much the higher we ascend to the generic notions of things, by so much the more simple our notions are. Hence it is, that Knowledge is more properly ascribed to God, than Sense or Reason; because it is more generic and simple: so Life, than Vegetation; Spirit, than Soul: hence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Being, as Jehovah which denotes the same, are the most proper Names we can give God; because the most generic and simple notions. And the reason of the whole is this: Seing the Divine Essence is more aptly and familiarly expressed by Abnegation or Remotion, than by Affirmation, hence it follows, that by how much the more concrete and special our notions are, by so much the less they agree to God; and on the contrary, by how much the more simple and general they are, by so much the more they agree to God; because they are by so much the more remote from the imperfections of the Creature, as Twisse, Scient. med. pag. 309. Hence, (3) The best natural way or degree of knowing God is by Negation or Remotion: for the Divine Essence, 3. By way of Remotion. by reason of its Immensity and Infinitude, exceeding all the Ideas or notions our Intellect can form of it, cannot better be apprehended, than by removing all imperfections from it. So Aquinas, Sum. 1. Quaest. 10. Art. 1. Things simple are best defined by Negation; not as if negation were essential to them, but because our Intellect, which first apprehends things composite, cannot arrive to the cognition of things simple, but by the remotion of all composition. The same he more fully explicates, contra Gent. l. 1. c. 14. In the consideration of the Divine Essence the way of Remotion is chief to be used: for the Divine Essence, by reason of its Immensity, exceeds all form that our Intellect can attain unto; wherefore we cannot apprehend it, by knowing what it is; but we have some notices thereof, by knowing what it is not. For we by so much the more draw near to the knowledge of God, by how much the more we can by our Intellect remove imperfections from God: for we by so much the more perfectly know every thing, by how much the more fully we contemplate its differences from other things: for every thing has in itself its proper essence, whereby it is distinguished from all other things. But because in the consideration of the Divine Essence we cannot conceive what it is, or its Genus, nor its distinction from other things by affirmative differences, it is therefore necessary, that we conceive of it by negative differences. Indeed the most simple, spirital, divine, and excellent things are best set forth by negatives. Hence God himself is best expressed and apprehended by way of negation. We know rather what he is not, than what he is. 2. The supernatural grades or degrees whereby God descends to us, and we ascend to him are either Graciose or Glorious. The supernatural Grades whereby we ascend up to God. (1) The grades of Grace whereby we ascend up to God are either objective or subjective. [1] The supernatural objective grades of Grace are either simple or complexe. 1. Christ. (1) The simple objective grave of Grace, whereby we ascend up to God and the contemplation of him, is Christ, the Mediator, who is the essential Glass, wherein all the Glory of the Deity is most resplendent, as 2 Cor. 3.18. He is the image of God, 2 Cor. 4.4. 2 Cor. 4.4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an image is an express ressemblance or imitamen of an exemplar, according to its form or kind; and so it differs from Ves●igium, or a Footstep, which gives only some dark notices of a thing, by its causality. There are some vestigia or footsteps of God impressed on the sensible world; yea an accidental Image of God on the renewed Soul; but Christ is an essential Image of God, in whom all the invisibile perfections of God become visible to an eye of faith. Thence he is said to be, Col. 1.15. Col. 1.15. the image of the invisible God: i. e. God who is invisible in himself becomes visible in his Son. Whence also he is styled, Heb. 1.3. Heb. 1.3. the effulgence of his glory, and character of his person. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the splendour or effulgence of the Sun communicated in and by its rays, specially as they fall on a cloud, and so make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Parelius, or a reflex image of the Sun, which seems to be another Sun: so Christ he is the Parelius or reflex Image of God, who is in himself a Light inaccessible and full of Glory, as 1 Tim. 6.16. Thence it is added: and the character of his person: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes an Effigies or express figure engraven, or impressed: All the Divine Attributes and Perfections of God are impressed or engraven on Christ's human Nature, in legible and golden Characters: whence he is styled Emmanuel God with us. He is indeed the golden Ark wherein the Deity lies couched; a visible Image of the invisible Deity: whose mediatory Offices and Relations seem imperfectly expressed in Plato's Demons, of which before. 2. The Scripture. (2) The complexe objective grades of our ascent up to God are all divine Words or Revelations, both preceptive and promissive, whereby the Divine Nature and Will is reveled to us, as 1 Cor. 13.12. 1 Cor. 13.12. For we now see through a glass darkly. We see the face of God in the glass of divine Words and Ordinances, yet only enigmatically and obscurely. And Plato makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Divine Word, whereby things divine are reveled to us: which, 3. The light of Grace. if I mistake him not, alludes to the sacred Scriptures. [2] The subjective grades whereby we ascend up to the knowledge of God are all Divine Illuminations, whereof we find great notices and Philosophemes in Plato, 4. The light of Glory. as hereafter Chap. 10. §. 1. (2) There are also Grades of Glory, whereby glorified Spirits ascend up to the beatific Vision of God, of which elsewhere. These are the various descents of God to man, and the ascents of man to God, whereby his incomprehensible Being is in some degrees apprehended, though never comprehended by poor mortals. CHAP. V Of God's Life, Knowledge, Will, and Power. The Life of God in the Actuality of his Essence: God's Life most spirituose, self-moving, Life itself, immortal, and the Cause of all Lafe. God's Science, its Perfection; Object both complexe and incomplexe; particularly the human Soul: The Mode of Divine Science by the Divine Essence and Ideas: God's Science most simple, intuitive, immutable, certain, absolute, eternal, and perfect. Simple Intelligence, and Science of Vision: Middle Science what. The Will of God, its Object, Actuality; Independence, immutability, Absoluteness, Antecedence, Perfection, Liberty, Efficace, Distinctions. God's Power, and its Identity with his Wil: Its Object things possible: Its Infinitude. §. 1. HItherto we have considered the Essence of God as existent, The Life of God. we now proceed to consider it as actuose, which is usually termed the Life of God, whereof we find great notices in Sacred and Platonic Philosophy. In sacred Philosophy Life is ascribed to God on various reasons: (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in opposition to all false Gods, or Idols; and so it denotes the Verity and Truth of his Essence and Existence, as Mat. 16.16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Mat. 16.16. of the living God, i. e. of the true very God, in opposition to all false Gods. So Act. 14.15. 1 Tim. 4.10. as in the O. T. Deut. 32.40. Psal. 84.23. Jer. 5.2. (2) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by way of Eminence, to distinguish his Actuality and manner of acting from that of the Creature: for all life consisting in a spirituose actuosity; every thing is said to live, so far as it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a self-moving Principe, as Plato phraseth it: now God being the most pure Act and Spirit, and the prime 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-moving Principe, which moves allthings, but is moved by-none, hence Life in the most eminent degree belongs to God, as Joh. 1.4. and elsewhere. (3) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, effectively, as he gives life to all, either natural, Act. 17.28. Deut. 30.20. or spiritual, Hos. 1.10. 2 Cor. 4.11. Ephes. 4.18. or gloriose, Joh. 14.9. (4) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, essentially, as the Divine Essence is in and of itself actuose. For the Life of God is God himself: hence when he swears by his life, as Deut. 32.40. Deut. 32.40. he swears by himself. And so men, when they would swear by God, they swear by his life, 1 Sam. 14.39. Ruth 3.13. 1 Sam. 14.39. And because God's Essence is ever actuose, therefore he is said to live for ever, Dan. 4.34. Dan. 4.34. who liveth for ever. So Rev. 4.9. This Life of God essentially considered is well described by Plato, in his Phaedo, pag. 106. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But that God, saith Socrates, who is (as I take it) the very species, form, or idea of life, if any thing else be immortal, can never die, is confessed by al. In which description of the Life of God we may consider, (1) the mode of life he ascribes to God, in that character, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the very species, form or idea of life, whereby the Life of God is essentially differenced from all other Lives. For no created life can be said to be the form or idea of life: The Angelic life is of all created lives the most actuose, spirituose, and noble; yet it cannot be said to be the species or idea of life; because it contains not the whole of life: for the species and form contains the whole essence. But now the Life of God is the species, form, or idea of life, because it contains in itself eminently and essentially all life: whatever Spirituositie or actuosity there is in any created life, it is in a transcendent eminent degree comprehended in the essential Life of God. (2) Plato makes this Life of God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, immortal. So Aristotle, lib. 2. de Coelo, cap. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Energy or actuosity of God is Immortality: and this is life eternal. This Immortality of the Divine Life is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 1. Tim. 6.16. natural, absolute and essential, as 1 Tim. 6.16. but the immortality of Creatures is only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, acquisite, as Plato in his Timaeus: or in the phrase of sacred Philosophy, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by grace and free donation. Angels and human Spirits are immortal by divine donation, but they possess not Immortality, as the Divine Life doth. But to explicate the Life of God more fully, Of Life in its generic notion. according to the Analogy it bears to the Animal and Rational Life, we must a little examine what Life in its generic notion imports. And here indeed we can give only some poor conjectures; in as much as nothing is more difficult to be understood than Life, albeit nothing more commun. This is one of the Mysteries of Nature; which not falling under the perception of sense, farther than by its effects, we can only give some probable conjectures of it. But thus much we find by the effects to be included in the generic notion of Life: (1) a spirituose Principe, or Spirituositie. So among Animals, by how much the more spirituose they are, by so much the more perfect and noble their life is. The animal life is indeed composed of vital and animal Spirits in agitation: Hence vigour, health, strength, sense, vegetation, and all the issues of life proceed. And by how much the more potent and vigorous the Spirits are, by so much the more active and perfect is the life. So in the rational Life, the more spirituose the exercices of Reason, and Will are, the more perfect the life is. (2) Life in its generic notion imports also actuosity. Life consists not in a mere spirituose principe, but in the agitation of that principe. And the more actuose the spirituose principe is, the more perfect the life is. (3) But the main character that seems most essential to life in the general is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-motion. This Plato makes commun to all life, as well create as increate: Brutes they have an animal self-motion, men rational, Angels intellectile, but God absolute, essential, and independent. Thus much being premissed of Life in its generic notion, we now proceed to explicate how far the Life of God participates hereof. 1. The Life of God carries in it the most perfect Spirituositie, The Life of God most spirituose. as he is the most simple pure Spirit, without the least shadow of Mater either physic or metaphysic. The less any thing has of matter, the more spirituose it is: Angels and human Souls are called Spirits; because they are void of all physic matter: but yet they have metaphysic matter, or passive obediential power, and therefore are not pure simple Spirits metaphysically considered. Though I cannot without inhuman violence to mine assent take in that notion of a Spirit given us by Learned More, in his Divine Dialogues, Dialog. 1. Sect. 24. pag. 94, etc. where he makes extension agreeable to a Spirit, and so not proper and essential to Mater solely, according to the Cartesian and ancient Hypothesis. For if a Spirit be capable of extension in a strict and physic notion, which he seems to defend, I cannot imagine how it should be exempt from physic mater, and all those laws of physic corporeity, dissolution, and corruption which attend Mater: yet I can easily persuade myself and grant that learned Author, that all Spirits have, according to the degree of Spiritalitie, an Amplitude of Essence, which is not confined to the narrow space of a Needle's point, as the Schools of old dreamt. As for create Spirits both Angels and human Souls we may justly allow them, without injury offered to their spiritalitie, metaphysic accidental extension, according to the space they occupy; as also metaphysic matter, as composed of Act and passive obediential power, without the least physic extension or matter. But now God being void, not only of physic, but also of metaphysic Mater, or all passive Power whatsoever; therefore he is said to be a pure, simple Spirit in the most eminent transcendent degree, Joh. 4.24. as Joh. 4.24. God is a Spirit, i. e. the most simple spirituose Being, and therefore the most living Being. Hence Christ, in regard of his Deity, is styled a quickening Spirit, Joh. 6.63. or Spirit that gives life, Joh. 6.63. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It is the Spirit [i. e. the Deity which they were ignorant of] that quickeneth, or gives life. Allthings give and have life so far as they are spirituose: Christ as God being the most pure Spirit, he must therefore necessarily be the most living and life-giving or quickening Spirit. 1 Cor. 15.45. So 1 Cor. 15.45. Christ as Mediator is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a quickening, or life-giving Spirit, as he is the Fountain of all spiritual life, and gives out all to his Members. Again, Heb. 9.14. Heb. 9.14. it's said, that Christ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by the eternal Spirit, [i. e. by the infinite efficacity of his Deity] offered up himself. So that the Life of God consists much in his Spirituality, or Spirituositie. 2. 2. The Life of God most actuose. The Life of God carries in it the most pure and perfect actuosity. This Character of the Divine Life follows on and flows from the former: for by how much the more spirituose things are, by so much the more actuose they are: and by how much the more actuose they are, by so much the more living. Nothing can be said to live farther than it is actuose: when it ceaseth to act, it ceaseth to live. Life may be considered either in actu primo, the first act, or in actu secundo, the second act: the first Act of life consists in the spirituose Principe or Spirituositie of the Agent, before mentioned: the second Act of life consists in the actuosity or Operation, that flows from the first Act or Principe. But in the Life of God, which is most perfect, the first and second Act are one and the same; because he is a pure Act, without the least composition of Act and Power, or first and second Act. In all created life the Principe or first Act is distinct from the Operation or second Act; and both together make an accidental composition of Cause and Effect, or Act and Power: but in the Life of God there is an Actuation without any true causality or proper motion. We must conceive therefore of the Life of God as having the most perfect actuosity and Actuation, yet so as to exclude all real causality, Composition, and Imperfection, which attends every create life, by reason of the distinction between its first and second Act, which God admits not; because he is pure Act without all Power, either essential or accidental, active or passive: his Esse and Agere are the same: his Act is his Essence: which can be said of no create Being: but of God it must be affirmed, because he is the first, most pure, and perfect Act, without all power either objective or receptive. The pure Actuality of God is demonstrated by this, that pure Act is more perfect, than Act and Power: but God is most perfect, therefore pure Act. Every power is indigent, needing an Act to actuate the same: whence it necessarily follows, that we must either admit a progress into infinite, or grant some first pure Act, which needs no other Act for its actuation, as Bradwardine acutely demonstrates, l. 1. c. 2. pag. 163, etc. Whence we conclude, that the Life of God is most actuose and perfect; because it is a pure Act, without all potentiality. Hence, 3. The life of God is of all most 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-moving. The Life of God self-moving. Plato abounds much in this Character of Life, which he makes to be most essential thereto. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 245. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Every body that is moved by an extern pulse is inanimate: but that which is moved by itself from an intern Principe, is animate. Wherein he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self motion from an intern Principe the essential character of life. And by how much the more perfect this self-motion is, by so much the more perfect is the life: Plants are said by some kind of Analogy to live, because they have a shadow of self-motion, which appears in their Vegetation; yet they cannot be said properly to live; because they rejoice not in any true 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-motion, or spontaneity. Brutes are said properly to live; because they have a true self-motion and spontaneity, arising from the actuation of their animal and vital spirits: yet their life is much short of the rational life; which consists in a rational 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-motion or spontaneity of moving towards the last end. And yet the Angelic life is higher than the rational, in that the Angels have no dependence at all on physic mater. But the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-motion of the Life of God is of all most perfect, in that it is absolutely independent. The most noble Creatures have but imperfect self-motion: Angels move themselves, but not primarily, and independently as to God the prime Motor: yea their being moved by God, the first Motor, is in order of nature before their own self-motion: so that they are but, as man, moved self-movers. But God being independent in his Being, is also independent in his self-motion: he moves himself and allthings else, but is moved by nothing. This is excellently illustrated by Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 894. where he proves, That God, who is the prime Motor, moving himself and allthings else, doth infinitely excel, of which more largely before, Chap. 2. §. 3. Thus also Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 1. c. 97. Life is in this respect attributed unto things, as they are said to be moved by themselves and not by another: hence those things which seem to move themselves are said, by way of analogy, to live, as living Springs, and Quicksilver. But properly those things are said to move themselves, which are composite of mover and moved, as animates. But nothing operates from itself so much as God; because he is the first Cause of allthings, etc. Hence, 4. God Life itself. God is Life itself. For God's Life being his Essence as actuose and independent, he doth not only live, but is Life in the abstract. Whence Plato, Phaedo, pag. 106. calls God, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the very species, form, or idea of life, as before. Creatures live, but they are not life itself; because they have their life by participation: and every Being by participation must be reduced to somewhat that is such of itself: therefore the life of the Creature must be reduced to God, who is life itself. Thus Aquinas, sum. part. 1. Quaest. 18. Art. 3. God being Essence itself and Intelligence itself, therefore life doth chief belong unto him. For the clearing whereof we are to consider, that seeing things are said to live so far as they operate of themselves, and are not moved by others, therefore by how much the more perfectly this mode of self-operating doth belong to any thing, by so much the more perfect its life is— Hence those things that have understanding have the most perfect mode of living; because they have the most perfect mode of self-moving: but albeit our Intellect doth in somethings act itself, yet in somethings it is acted by others— Therefore that which in its own nature is Intelligence itself, and is not determined or moved by any other, that obtains the highest degree of life, and is indeed life itself. Hence, 5. God is eternal immortal life. Thus Plato, Phaedo, God's Life immortal. pag. 106. proves, that God's life is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, immortal; because he is the Idea of life. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 245, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That which is ever moved is immortal: but that which moves another and is moved by another, because it hath an end of its motion, it must necessarily have an end of its life. His design is to prove, that the Soul being a self-moving principe must necessarily be an ever-moving principe; and so immortal. And his Argument is this: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Whatever is moved by itself, i. e. rationally or intellectually, that is ever moved, and therefore immortal. Thence he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Seing it is manifest, that what moves itself is immortal. So Johan. Grammaticus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That which is moved of itself (i. e. intellectually) is ever moved: and what is so, is immortal. That God's Life is immortal, is most evident; because, (1) it has no beginning; therefore no end. (2) God being the prime Motor, must necessarily be immobile, without succession or mutation. (3) All death imports dissolution: and where there is dissolution, there must necessarily be composition and parts: But God is most simple. 6. God is Life effectively, God the Cause of all Life. Act. 17.28. as he is the first cause of all life to his Creatures. Act. 17.28. In him we live and move and have our being: i. e. we receive all life from him, because we receive all motion from him: and we receive all motion from him; because we receive our being from him. So Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 19 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, And it, [the Deity] gives to allthings Being as their Nature requires: and it is the Being of Being's, and the Life of things living, and the Reason of things rational, and the Intelligence of things intellectile. Thus Plato, Phaedr. pag. 245. Therefore that only that moves itself, because it is never deserted by itself, can never cease to be, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, yea to all other things that are moved this is the fountain and principe of motion. The first self moving Principe or Cause cannot cease to move, because it gives motion to allthings, but receives motion from nothing. It is the fountain of all motion, and therefore of all life. Of the Life of God; that it is intellectual, self-sufficient, most blessed, etc. see Suarez, Metaphys. Disput. 30. Sect. 14. pag. 116. §. 2. God's Science or Knowledge. Having discoursed of the Life of God in the general, we pass on to explicate the modes and ways, in which this life is said to be actuose. For as the actuosity of the Rational life is manifested by Acts of Intelligence and Volition, so proportionably the actuosity of the Divine Life is explicated by Acts of Divine Intelligence and Volition. We shall begin with the divine Intellect, Intelligence, Science, and Sapience; which are one and the same in God, and no way distinct from his Essence. For God being a pure Act, the Intelligent, Intellect, intelligible Species, Act of Intellection, and objective Idea, are but one in him. God is the prime Being, the prime Life, and the prime Self-mover; and therefore the prime Intelligent. His Intellect is that whereby he understands himself, and allthings without himself, which either are, or were, or shall be, or may be; together with the various Modes, Orders, and Habitudes of allthings; and all these, not by any abstract Ideas, Species, or Images taken from the extern objects; but in the glass of his own Essence; not successively and by discourse, but intuitively; not in time, but his own Eternity. All this will be evident by what follows. First, God's Intellect and its Perfection. as for the Intellect of God and its infinite Perfection above all Human or Angelic Intellect, we find great notices thereof both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophy. We find the perfection of the Divine Intellect lively described, Psal. 139. 1-16. which we shall more fully explicate, when we come to God's knowledge of the heart. Mic. 6.9. So Micah 6.9. The Lord's voice crieth unto the city: and the man of wisdom shall see thy name. The last clause is rendered according to the Hebrew, by Tarnovius and others, For thy name shall see that which is, i. e. thy most sacred Majesty and Essence sees allthings as they are. So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be rendered. Plato describes the Perfection of the Divine Intellect, in his Parmenides, pag. 134. where he assures us, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. With God there is the highest and most exquisite Domination, and the highest and most exquisite Science: for otherwise he could not know human affairs. Then he concludes: Were it not an insolent and importune discourse, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, if any one should spoil God of his knowledge? The Perfection of God's Intellect, beyond all Human and Angelic Intellect, will appear by a view of its nature, object, and mode of apprehending. The Intellect of God, as to its nature, has one and the same Idea with the Divine Essence; neither is it invested with any abstract Species, Forms or Ideas of things, either habitual or actual, distinct from the Essence of God. It's true, man's Intellect is not, as I conceive, distinct from his human Soul; yet it cannot understand any object but by species or ideas actual and habitual distinct from its Essence. Man's Intellect, as to the Act of Intellection, is passive, receiving the intelligible species from its object: which imperfect mode of Intellection appertains not to God, who sees allthings in the glass of his own Essence, as anon. God's infinite Science admits not any intelligible species, whereby the object is united to the faculty in us: such intelligible species belong only to Human and Angelic Intellects, which receive impression and causality from their objects. But the Intellect of God receives no impression or causality from its objects, it being the cause of allthings. In human knowledge the thing understood is the measure of our understanding; but the divine knowledge is the measure of allthings known. Again, the Divine Intellect understands things complexe incomplexely; but the human Intellect understands things most simple and incomplexe, complexely. But of these things more in what follows. As for the object of the Divine Knowledge, it is most universal, The Object of God's Knowledge. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, allthings intelligible. But more particularly the object of Divine Science is either primary, or secundary: The primary object of Divine Science is God himself, the Divine Essence, Persons, 1. God himself. 1 Cor. 2.11. and Relations, 1 Cor. 2.11. That God is the prime Intelligible is evident, because he is the prime immaterial Being. For allthings are so far intelligible, as they are immaterial: therefore God being the first immaterial and most simple Being, he must necessarily be the first Intelligible. And if God be the first Intelligible, then there must be an Intellect and Science proportionate to him: which can be no other than himself; who is both Intelligible, Intellect, Intellection, and intelligible Species. Again, God being a pure Act, of supreme immateriality, he cannot but understand himself by himself. For God having nothing of potentiality, it is absolutely necessary, that the Intellect and intelligible species be in him the same: whence he cannot but understand himself by himself. For in Creatures the thing understood being brought into the Intellect by its intelligible species or idea, hence the perfection of Intellection depends on these two particulars: (1) That the intelligible Species or Idea be perfectly conform to the thing understood. (2) That it be perfectly united to the Intellect: which is by so much the more perfectly accomplished, by how much the more efficace the Intellect has in understanding. But now the Divine Essence being both Intellect and intelligible Species, it cannot but understand itself, and allthings else in the most perfect manner. Hence it is that God perfectly understands himself, so far as he is intelligible: he also knows himself to be of infinite Power, to have a Will sovereign, omnipotent, and universally efficacious. Whence he knows allthings else in himself, his infinite Essence and omnipotent Wil The secundary Object of the Divine Science is allthings else besides God: 2. God knows allthings. Allthings possible and future, complexe and incomplexe; allthings past and present; universal and singular, necessary and contingent, good and evil: with all the Modes, Orders, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or relations, which things have among themselves. That God's Science is really omniscient, or universally, yea infinitely extensive to all objects intelligible is positively affirmed both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophy. As for sacred Philosophy we find therein illustrious notices of God's Omniscience: as Psal. 139. 1-16. Heb. 4.13. But to give a more particular demonstration of Gods knowing allthings, we may argue it, (1) from the infinite power of God thus: God's knowledge is as extensive as his power: but his power extends to allthings: therefore his knowledge. Thus Job 42.2. Job 42.2. I know thou canst do every thing: and that no thought can be withholden from thee. Or as some render the last clause, no thought of thine can be hindered. Which-ever way we read the words, the sense will be much the same, namely that God's Omnipotence is the ground and argument of his Omniscience. He that can do allthings, Psal. 147.5. cannot but understand allthings, that he can do. The same Argument is insisted on, Psal. 147.5. Great is our Lord, and of great power: his understanding is infinite. The later is a consequent of the former: The Power of God being infinite, therefore his Understanding is infinite. Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of his understanding there is no number. This may be understood both extensively and intensively: his Understanding is most perfect in itself, and most extensive as to all objects. (2) The Omniscience of God may be demonstrated from his Immensity and Omnipresence: God's Science must necessarily extend so far as his Essence; Jer. 23.23, 24. because his Knowledge is his Essence. Thus Jer. 23.23, 24. Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hid himself in secret places, that I shall not see him, saith the Lord? Do not I not fill Heaven and Earth, saith the Lord? Wherein God demonstrates his Omniscience from his Omnipresence. So Heb. 4.13. Heb. 4.13. Neither is there any creature that is not manifest in his sight, because he is present with al. Suppose there were a body, (as they fancied Argus) full of eyes, or all eye, would it not discern allthings round about it, without the least turn or mutation of its posture? So God being full of eyes, or all eye, and present with all Being's, is it possible that any thing should be hid from him? Hence Plato held, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, allthings are full of God, and therefore nothing could he hid from him. (3) God's Omniscience may be argued from the Divine Ideas, or Decrees. Allthings were the object of God's knowledge before they were in being, by reason of his Divine Ideas, which were the original Exemplar of allthings. This Plato much insistes on, both in his Timaeus and Parmenides, as hereafter. (4) God's Omniscience may be demonstrated from his universal causality in giving Being unto allthings. So Act. 15.18. Act. 15.18. Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world. (5) God's Omniscience may be argued from his preservation of and providence over allthings. Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 901, etc. proves, That God's Providence extends to the vilest and least of things, whereof he has an accurate knowledge, being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the most wise Opificer and Framer of allthings. For every intelligent Workman must have a full knowledge of his own work; in as much as the idea or knowledge of the Workman gives form to the work: whence God being the most intelligent Framer and Disposer of allthings, he cannot but have an accurate knowledge of al. But to descend to the particular objects of God's Science, The Object of God's Omniscience. we may distribute allthings intelligible into complexe, or incomplexe. Complexe Intelligibles are propositions and discourses: Incomplexe, 1. Complexe Intelligibles. real things. 1. The Divine Science has a full comprehension of all complexe Intelligibles, or propositions and discourses, both divine and human, mental, oral, and scriptural. Complexe Intelligibles are either antecedent to the Will of God, or subsequent. (1) Complexe Intelligibles antecedent to the Will of God, are such as belong to the Divine Essence: as that there is a God: That God is eternal, immutable, etc. These God knows by his Essence alone, and not by his Will, because antecedent thereto. Complexe Intelligibles subsequent to the Divine Will, are all such, whose truth is caused by, and so depends on the Divine Wil These God knows not by his Essence simply considered, nor by the things themselves concerning which they are affirmed or denied, but by his own Wil For as Gods Will gives Being to allthings, so all propositions that belong to them depend on, and are known by the same Divine Wil In which regard that common Saying, The Reasons of good and evil are eternal, if understood as antecedent to the Divine Will, it is most false. For there is no natural or moral Verity belonging to any created object or term, that can be said to be antecedent to the Divine Wil That all complexe Intelligibles or Propositions subsequent to the Divine Will are known thereby, see Bradwardine, de Caus. l. 1. c. 18. pag. 200. and Greg. Ariminensis, Sent. l. 1. Dist. 38. Quaest. 2. pag. 135. 2. 2. Incomplexe Intelligibles. Create incomplexe Intelligibles are either things possible, or future. (1) Things merely possible to God are known in his Divine Essence. (2) Things future in his Will, which gives futurition to allthings. Things future as to us are distinguished into necessary and contingent: but things contingent as to us, are necessary in regard of the Divine Will; and therefore necessarily known by God. That things most contingent are necessary in regard of God's Will, and so certainly known by him, is most evident, because they are all present to God. For what makes a thing contingent uncertain as to us, but because it is future? When it is present, it is certainly known what it is: wherefore allthings being present to God by reason of his Divine Will, which gives suturition to allthings; therefore they must be all, even things most contingent as to us, certainly known by him. Even among men, those that understand the causes of things, and their certain coherence with the effects, may have a certain knowledge of an effect long before it is in being: so an ginger foresees an Eclipse: and shall not the omniscient God, who gives Being to all Causes, and actuates them in all their causalities and causal influxes, be allowed a perfect knowledge of all effects? Thus Homer, Iliad. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Who knows things present, to come, and past. There is nothing so vile, so inconsiderable, but it falls under the omniscient eye of God, Prov. 15.3. as Prov. 15.3. The eyes of God are in every place beholding the evil and the good. God knows whatever is good by his Divine Will, the productive Cause thereof, and whatever is evil, by its opposite good, as also by the positive Entity or Act wherein the evil is seated, which also falls under the determination of the Divine Will, so far as it is a real positive Being. For he that perfectly knows a thing, must needs know all the accidents, modes, and appendents thereof: now all Evil being but a privation of what is good, it cannot be hid from the divine Omniscience: otherwise he should not perfectly know the good whereof it is a privation. Again, Evil being but a privation cannot exist but in some positive subject, neither can it be known but by the form whereof it is a privation: which being known to God, thence the evil also must necessarily be known to him. The principal object among incomplexe simple Intelligibles is the heart of man: if this be known by God, God's Omniscience as to the human Soul. then surely nothing can be hid. Now that the human Soul, and all its Principes, Habits, Cogitations, Inclinations, Ends, Designs, and Acts are all known to God, is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophy. As for sacred Philosophy, it is in nothing more positive and express. To begin with that great series of Demonstrations, Psal. 139.1, etc. O Lord thou hast searched me and known me. Psal. 139.1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, thou hast searched me narrowly, sifted me to the bran: thou so knowest me, and all that is in me, as he who knoweth a thing exactly, after the most diligent and accurate inquisition. So much 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 imports, v. 2. Thou knowest my down-sitting and uprising, v. 2. thou understandest my thoughts afar off. The sense is, there is no part of my life hid from thee: whether I sit or rise, thou knowest it: all mine actions and enterprises are known by thee, as 2 Kings 19.27. all my thoughts are present to thee, long before they are existent. Lyra interprets afar off of Eternity: my thoughts were in thy Eternity apprehended by thee, before they were mine. Thence it follows, v. 3. Thou compassest my path, v. 3. and my lying down, and art acquainted with all my ways. Thou compassest, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, thou winnowest, or huntest my paths. And art acquainted with all my ways. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, thou hast been accustomed, or, thou so knowest, as one who by long custom and familiar acquaintance understands a matter. In these two verses he enumerates all the postures of the body, sitting, rising or standing, going and lying, whereby, according to sacred Philosophy, all human actions are expressed, as Deut. 6.7. Then he adds, v. 4. For there is not a word in my tongue, v. 4. but lo, O Lord thou knowest it altogether. The sense is, before my word is form in my tongue, thou apprehendest it in my thought. v. 5. v. 5. Thou hast beset me behind and before; and laid thine hand upon me. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, thou hast besieged me, or taken hold of me with a strong hand, so that I can by no artifice fly thy presence: or, thou hast arrested me, v. 6. and seized on me as thy prisoner. v. 6. Such knowledge is too wonderful for me: it is high I cannot attain unto it. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, thy knowledge is marvellous above me: i. e. this thy knowledge is so admirable and so far above my capacity, as that I can by no means reach unto it: albeit I know thou knowest allthings, yet I am altogether ignorant of the mode how thou knowest allthings, by one and the same simple intuitive act, without discourse or succession. Thence. v. 7, 8, 9, 10. he proves the Omniscience of God from his Omnipresence. v. 11, 12. And v. 11. adds: If I say surely the darkness shall cover me: even the night shall be light about me. v. 12. Yea the darkness hideth not from thee, but the night shineth as the day: the darkness and the night are both alike to thee: i. e. the most obscure things are as well known to thee, as the most evident. Whence he adds, v. 13. v. 13. For thou hast possessed my reins, i. e. my most secret thoughts and affections: thou hast covered me in my mother's womb: i. e. thou gavest me being, and therefore canst not but fully understand every thought of my heart. How can it possibly be, but that thou shouldest understand me fully, seeing all that I have or am was from thee? Psal. 7.9. So Psal. 7.9. For the righteous God trieth the hearts and reins: i e. the most abstruse and hidden thoughts, affections, inclinations, and movements of the heart. Psal. 33.13, 15. Thus Psal. 33.13. The Lord looketh from Heaven: he knoweth all the sons of men. And he gives the reason of this divine Omniscience, v. 15. He fashioneth their hearts alike: he considereth all their works. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who formeth, frameth. An excellent reason of God's infinite knowledge and its extent to all the thoughts, inclinations, intentions, and affections of the Soul. As if he had said: Hath not God framed the hearts of all men? Can any thing then in the hearts of men be hid from God, as Psal. 34.5? The Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which we render alike, properly signifies here together, i. e. all of them universally, none excepted: neither is it to be referred to the Verb frameth, but to Hearts; and so denotes God's exact knowledge of all men's hearts, and that upon this account, because he made them. So Psal. 94.11. and elsewhere. But so much for the Object of God's Science. As for the Mode of Divine Science, God knows allthings by his own Essence. both Sacred and Platonic Philosophic informs us, that God knows allthings, not by images, or species received from extern objects, but in and by himself, the essential glass of the divine Intelligence. It's true we poor mortals, who have only a composite successive knowledge of things, cannot apprehend any extern object, but by some abstract idea or image conveyed in and by the senses, and impressed on the mind, as the stamp of the seal on the wax: but the Divine Essence being most simple, without the least shadow of passive receptive power, is not capable of such an imperfect successive mode of understanding things. God being a pure Act contemplates in his own eternal omnipotent Essence the Archetype of allthings possible, and in his own Will, the efficient of all future evenements. If Gods eternal Knowledge should arise from any intelligible species or representation distinct from himself, than there must be something eternal besides God; also passive Power, and Accidents; which to assert is a dangerous error. One and the same Divine Essence is the universal Exemplar or Idea of allthings. For look as in Nature the more noble and perfect Being's are the exemplars of the less noble and perfect; so the Divine Essence, being most perfect, containing in it, in a most eminent manner, the seminal Reasons or Ideas of allthings, it thence becomes the most perfect exemplar and glass to the Divine Understanding, wherein it sees allthings. It's true, all Ideas of things in us, who acquire our science and knowledge by Analysis, are taken from the objects understood, and thence impressed first on our senses and fantasy; which is as a glass to the human understanding, according to which it forms all its intelligible ideas, forms, or notions of things: but it is not so with the Divine Intellect; which understands allthings by Genesis, without analysing of things, and therefore has allthings preexisting in himself, before they existe in themselves. In us the Ideate or thing understood is before the Idea, and the original exemplar of all our knowledge; but in God, his Idea is the original Exemplar, and the Ideate in the create but a Parelius and reflex image or similitude of the Divine Idea. All perfections in the Creature flowing from the efficacious Will of God, must necessarily preexiste in the Divine Will and Essence, before they existe in themselves: as the effect ever preexistes in its cause: hence the Divine Intellect comprehends in the glass of the Divine Essence all Creatures, and their proper essences, perfections, distinctions, respects, and operations; and that in a way not of composition, but perfect intuition. These Ideas of allthings in the Divine Essence considered absolutely are but one; yet if we consider them in the various 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and regards they have to the several Creatures, so we may look on them as many: for we may conceive the Idea of a man in the Divine Essence, as distinct from the Idea of any other Creature, though in truth it be but the same essence. Hence that famous Essate among the Pythagorcans and Platonistes, mentioned by Plato in his Parmenides, That God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, one and many, i. e. one, as to his most simple Essence, and yet many, as to the divine Ideas, considered in their relation to the particular Ideates they refer unto. These divine Ideas, as they are the original Exemplar of allthings made, and so the object of God's Science, are well expressed, Heb. 11.3. Heb. 11.3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, So that we may determine, that those things we see, were not made of things apparent: or were made of those things that appear not: i. e. all the visible things of time were made according to the invisible Ideas of Eternity: there is nothing extant in this inferior sensible world, but what had its Idea in the superior intelligible world of Divine Ideas. Thus Plato, in his Timaus, pag. 28. treating of the Origine of the Universe, saith, God in the framing thereof, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, had an eye on the eternal Exemplar, or Idea, which as a seal impressed its similitude on allthings made. Whence that common Saying among the Platonistes: Plato Ideas vocar, ex quibus omnia quaecunque videmus fiunt, & ad quas cuncta formantur. Grosseteste. This Universe is but the imitamen of the Divine Mind. That by Plato's Ideas, we are to understand the divine Decrees as the Exemplars of allthings future, Robert Grosseteste, that great Impugnator of the Papal Tyranny, in his acute Tractate de Libero Arbitrio, (which is to be found in MSS. in Exeter College Library, Oxon.) proves out of Augustin super Gen. Augustin saith, Plato calls Ideas those by which allthings we see are made, and according to which allthings are form: these are immortal, immutable, invariable. Hear what an Idea is: (according to Plato) An Idea is of those things that are necessary: it is an eternal Exemplar: such infinite Exemplars the natures of things, of Men, of Trees, of Fishes, etc. have, according to which whatever ought to be made is expressed. These Exemplars of allthings God hath in himself, and thereby contains in his mind the numbers and modes of allthings that are to be made or done. He is sul of these figures or forms, which Plato calls Ideas, immortal, invariable, infatigable. These Ideas in the Divine Mind Plato, in his Parmenides, pag. 134, etc. discourseth more fully of, and the sum of all his Philosophemes about them is this, That these Ideas are most simple, immaterial, eternal, infinite, and immutable, etc. as we have more fully explicated and demonstrated, Court Gent. P. 2. c. 9 §. 4. & Philos. Gen. P. 1. l. 1. c. 2. sect. 5. §. 3. & l. 3. c. 2. sect. 1. §. 2. & c. 4. sect. 1. §. 9 Thus we see how God contemplates and knows allthings in the glass of his own Divine Essence and Ideas; How the divine Ideas represent the Creatures. not as if the divine Ideas were to be considered as a formal concept, but only as objective: whence they are properly styled by Plato, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an Exemplar, which always imports an objective concept, according to which this or that is framed. Thus also Bradwardine, de Caus. Dei, l. 1. c. 19 pag. 225. Things understood by God move the Divine Intellect, not properly, but only metaphorically, [or objectively,] because the Ideas and similitudes thereof are in God, i. e. his Divine Essence, which most distinctly representes all Inteligibles— And because God hath all these Ideas and similitudes from himself only, and not from the things understood, which are posterior, he is not said to be moved by them to understand, but very metaphorically and less properly. Things future are, according to their proper existence present unto God, yet not simply but in some respect only, namely in the Divine Will and Prescience. So Aquinas assures us, That the Essence of God as understood by God is the Idea of things. The Essence of God albeit it doth not formally contain things create, by a formal convenience and similitude, yet it doth contain them according to their formal representation. The very Essence of God is the objective Exemplar of understanding himself, as also of understanding the Creatures. The Divine Essence representes allthings according to their proper reasons: which reasons of things in God are the very creatrix Essence, which is the exemplary representation of all Essences; as the sufficience of God is of all things possible, and the Will of allthings future. The divine Essence, which representes allthings; as an Exemplar directs the operation of God in producing the Exemplates or things form according thereunto. For there is something in God that correspondes to all the perfections of Creatures: not as if there were a formal similitude between the Idea and Ideate; but there is something formally existing in God that representes all the perfections of Creatures. Thus all the Creatures are in the Divine Mind representatively, albeit they are not as to their own formal essences really the same therewith. Some over and above this Representation, make these divine Ideas to be also energetic and operative causes of things: but this must be understood (1) either as they are conjunct with the divine Will, which is the prime Efficient of allthings; or (2) not of a proper efficience; but only exemplary. For an Idea in the mind of an Artificer, albeit it work not as a proper efficient cause, yet it doth work as an exemplary cause, which is reduced to the efficient. Thus the divine Ideas may be said to operate, as they are the grand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exemplar, according to which the divine Wisdom directs itself in the production, conservation, and disposition of allthings. These Ideas, as was hinted, are either of things merely possible; and so they are represented by the divine Sufficience or Essence nakedly considered, and belong to the simple Intelligence of God: or else they are of things future; and so they are represented by the divine Will, which is the Efficient of allthings future. For look as an Artificer has an Idea of his work; so God contemplates in his own Will the original Exemplar of allthings future, as Plato, Timeus, pag. 28. One and the same knowledge of God receives divers denominations, according to the various state of the things known: For if the things known be only possible, than God contemplates them in his divine Essence; but if they are future, present, or past, than he contemplates them in the determination and decree of his Wil Hence God, by means of these his divine Ideas, the original, universal, and perfect Exemplars of allthings, has the most perfect comprehension of allthings, whether possible or future, past or present, complexe or simple, necessary or contingent, absolute or conditionate. The mode of God's Science in the general being thus explicated, Particular Characters of God's Science. we hence may draw several particular essential and proper characters thereof. 1. Most simple. As 1. hence it follows, That the Divine Science is but one simple Act, without the least shadow of composition or division. God's Science having one and the same Idea with his Essence, it thence necessarily follows, that in God the Intellect, intelligible Species, Object understood, and Act of Intellection be one and the same. The divine Essence is a spiritual light, most intelligible, and most intelligent of itself and allthings else, in the most simple manner. Hence Plato makes his divine Ideas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 immixed or pure Act, without the least mixture of Act and Power. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 19 Moreover, saith he, it belongs to the Deity, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to know allthings by a simple knowledge, and simply to contemplate allthings by its divine, omniscient, and immaterial eye, both things present, past, and future, even before they are. Our intellection passeth from habit or power into act: but God's intellection admits not either habit or power, but is pure act. Where there is habitual knowledge, there is composition of Act and Power; but the divine Essence and Intellection being the same, there can be no such composition in either. This is well expressed by Maximus Tyrius, that famous Platonist, Dissert. 1. where discoursing, what God is, according to Plato, he thus describes him, pag. 10. It remains, that we place God, in the principal Intellect as in a supreme Tower. But here I see a double Intellect: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For one can understand, [i. e. it has an habit or power of understanding] albeit it doth not understand, [i. e. actually:] but the other doth understand: [i. e. always, actually: for so he explains himself in what follows] who is not yet perfect, unless he understand always and allthings, not one after another. Wherein he assertes, [1] that Gods Intellect is always in act, without habit or power. [2] That he understands allthings. [3] That he understands allthings at once, not by succession, and one thing after another. Hence, 2. God's Science is not discursive but intuitive. 2. God's Science. 1. Intuitive not discursive. For it being most simple, and the same with the divine Essence, it cannot admit of the least succession or discourse. Our intellect takes things in, not at once or together, but one after the other by composition, division, and succession: as when we contemplate a man, we consider, (1) his animality, than (2) his rationality, and (3) his Risibilitie. So in complexe notions, we, (1) make a Proposition, (2) then a Syllogism, thence (3) a series or method of discourses: And all this we do by composition and division, passing from what is more known, to what is less known; and so taking in one after another: which argues much imperfection in us. But now the divine Knowledge is free from all these imperfections; it admits neither composition nor division, nor yet the least succession; but takes in all objects by one simple intuitive act. This is very well illustrated by Maximus Tyrius, Dissert. 1. pag. 10. thus: If it pleaseth, we will illustrate what we have spoken by a similitude: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Compare the Divine Intellect to the sight, but the human to speech or discourse: for the cast of the eye is of allthings most swift: which presently, even in the same moment, draws its object to it: but the operation of discourse is like unto a soft pace. Or, that we may use another comparison: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Let us compare the Divine Intellect with the irradiation of the Sun, which views one whole Hemisphere of the Earth at once: but the human Intellect with the motion of the Sun, which visits one place after another successively and gradually. Two lively Metaphors to express the perfection of the divine Intellect beyond the human. For first, as the eye doth in a moment take in the most remote objects, so doth the divine Intellect: whereas all discourse, whereto he compares the human intellect, is but successive and slow. Again, as the Sun doth irradiate one whole Hemisphere of the Earth in a moment, but is many hours in its moving through it: so the divine Intellect doth in a moment of Eternity comprehend all objects; but the human is very slow and successive in its apprehension of things. To these Platonic illustrations we may add that of Aquinas, P. 1. Quaest. 14. Art. 13. where he compares the Intuition of God to the vision of such as are on an high Tower or Mountain; who in a moment view a series of objects very remote: but the human ratiocination to such as walk in an high way, who see only things nigh and before them. It's true, the mind of Christians hath some imperfect intuition of God here by faith, as 2 Cor. 3.18. but it's only reflex and in a glass: but God comprehends allthings by direct intuition, without the least reflection. Again, Angels and glorified Souls have some kind of direct intuition of God, without those imperfect glasses of instituted ordinances; but yet their Intuition is only apprehensive, not comprehensive and simultaneous as the divine Science. Lastly, Angelic and human intuition, if real, necessarily requires the actual existence of the object; but God's intuition requires only the intentional existence of the object in the divine Will: for things future are the object of God's intuition, not as actually existent in Eternity, as the Dominicans avouch, but only as intentionally existent in the divine Decree or Wil Of which see more fully Twisse Scientia Media, pag. 41-58. That God's Science is not discursive may be demonstrated, (1) because it is not successive: there is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Max. Tyrius. All discursive science or ratiocination proceeds from Principes to Conclusions; but God views allthings in his own Essence. (2) All discursive knowledge is composed of Act and Power: for the Conclusions are potentially in the Principes, and drawn into act by ratiocination: But God's Science is pure Act. (3) In our mode of knowing things, the more distinctly we can apprehend any thing by its own evidence and light, the more evident and perfect is our knowledge; as in our apprehension of first Principes: wherefore God's mode of knowing things being most perfect, it must necessarily be without ratiocination. (4) In all discourse the assent is the effect caused, and the Argument is the cause: but God's Science is not caused. (5) In all discourse there is priority and posteriority, composition and division; which implies much imperfection, and may not therefore be ascribed to God. (6) In all discourse there is much of ignorance mixed with our knowledge; because it is a progression from that which is more known to that which is less known: But God's Science hath nothing of ignorance mixed with it. Hence, 3. God's Science is immutable and necessary. 3. God's Science immutable and necessary. This follows on the former Characters: for in as much as the divine Science is not dependent on the objects known, but the same with his own Essence, hence it must be necessary and immutable. All human knowledge, being caused by Ideas collected from the objects, is mutable and variable, as the objects are; at least so far as it regards singular sensible objects: for if the object be contingent and mutable, the Science cannot be necessary and immutable: But now the divine Science being no way dependent on the object, it is not obnoxious to those laws of mutation and variation which the object necessarily falls under. The Truth of our Understanding is mutable, because dependent on extern objects and Mediums; but the Truth of the Divine Understanding immutable, and therefore the measure of all Truth, as Aquinas well notes. This is incomparably well illustrated by Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 24. pag. 244. God, saith he, by reason of his most infinite clarity comprehends allthings, and all particles of time, as they are most truly in himself: for he needs not comparation or relation of things past or future to the present instant, according to the manner of our human infirmity; but he understands allthings together and most clearly by his own Essence and Will, which represences allthings uniformly and invariably. As if there should be an immobile eye in the Centre of the Heavens, which should see by extramission and actively, as God seethe, it would then always see uniformly without all mutation every part of the Heavens turning round; and the same part now in the East, and anon in the South, and then in the West: Thus God in like manner sees all variable objects and parts of time, with their distinct vicissitudes and successions, without the least variation or succession; because he sees allthings, not passively, by species and impressions received from the things themselves, but actively in his own Essence, and Will, the active Principe of al. We poor mortals, by reason of our infirmity, cannot distinctly apprehend all the particles of time, always fluent and succeeding each other, and therefore we take the present instant, which of all time is most actual and best known to us, and make it the measure of past, present, and future time: whence our knowledge also is successive and mutable; but God, who knows allthings in his own Eternity, is not liable to such succession and mutation: his Science being a pure necessary Act, must needs be immutable and invariable, albeit it terminates on objects in themselves most mutable and variable: the mutation of the object makes no mutation in the divine Science; because the mutable object is only the secundary object of God's knowledge: the primary object is the divine Essence, which is immutable; and therefore the divine Science such also. Should God's knowledge depend on the objects known, than it would be mutable as they are, but not otherwise. God necessarily knows every Entity both actual and potential: wherefore (1) he can never know any thing that he is ever ignorant of. (2) He can never be ignorant of what he ever knows. (3) He cannot know more of fewer things than he knows. (4) He cannot begin to know what he before knew not, or not to know what before he knew, because nothing gins to be future. This immutability of the divine Science, as to things future, arising from the determination of his own sovereign Will, and not from any thing in the object, is nervosely demonstrated by pious and learned Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln, in his elaborate MSS. De Libero Arbitrio, which lies buried in Exeter College Library, Oxon. Wherein he copiosely demonstrates, That the Causes, Origines, and Reasons of allthings future, though in themselves never so instable, are most stable, immutable, necessary, yea eternal in the divine Decree and Will: whence also the Divine Science is most certain, necessary, and immutable. This he confirms by Plato's Ideas, which are immutable and invariable exemplars of allthings future, as before. That the Divine Science is immutable and necessary, so Greg. Ariminens. Sent. l. 1. Dist. 39 pag. 130, 140. Hence, 4. The Divine Science is most certain and infallible. 4. Divine Science most certain. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 382. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. I judge no mortal would be really willing both to deceive, and be deceived, or to be ignorant of supreme Being's, much less God. The Science of God being necessary ad immutable, it cannot but be most certain and infallible. To know things certainly, is to know them in their causes: now Gods Will being the Cause of allthings, he thence knows them perfectly. God's Science is as certain as the future events: for where there is a determinate effect, there must be a determinate cause: and where the cause is determinate, there the science also may be determinate. The knowledge of things future in God is as certain, as the knowledge of things present: for every future, compared to God the first Cause and his Science, is necessary and necessarily future; albeit as compared to the second causes, some effects may be contingent, or contingently future. The primary object of the divine Science being infinitely perfect, namely the divine Essence, it cannot but be most certain and infallible: if there be any certainty and infallibility in human Science, how much more in divine Science, which penetrates all Essences and Truths with the most perfect light, and most simple intuition, contemplating every Being and Truth, as it is in itself, in the glass of the divine Essence? The divine Intellect sees allthings as existent in themselves, by the infinite light of the divine Essence, and therefore most certainly and infallibly, as Esa. 40.13, 14. Hence, 5. The D●●●●e Science is absolute and independent, not conditionate and dependent on any create Object. Thus Plato, 5. God's Science absolute and in dependent. in his Parmenides, pag. 134, etc. makes his divine Ideas to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-subsistent, and independent, as to all extern objects and condition: For otherwise, saith he, God should not have a certain knowledge of and sovereign dominion over human affairs. It's impossible, that any effect should be, or be understood as future in any case, but dependently on its efficient cause: Now what is the first and universal Essicient of all effects, but the Decree of the divine Will, on which every effect depends, more than on its proxime cause? Therefore as nothing is antecedent to the divine Will, so no Hypothesis or condition is cognoscible or knowable antecedently thereto. God's knowledge as it depends not on the existence of created objects, so neither on any Hypotheses or conditions that are appendent unto such objects, placed in such circumstances. For all future's, whether absolute or conditionate, are known by God, not from the determination of second causes, but from the determinatin of the divine Will, which is the first Cause. For whence springs the futurition of things, but from the determination of the divine Will? And must not then the determination of the divine Will be precedent to the determination of the second 'Cause? And if so, may we not then hence conclude, that God's Science arising from the determination of his own Will depends not on the existence of, or any conditions that belong to future objects? If the divine Essence be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and independent, must not the divine Science, which is identified therewith, be also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and independent? Or if the divine Science should depend on the mutable conditions of its object, can it be any other than conjectural? Where any science depends on its object, it cannot be more certain than the object is: whatever contingence belongs to the object, will also influence the Science and make it contingent: whence if the divine Science be certain, as without all dispute it is, than it cannot depend on its mutable contingent object, but must be absolute and independent. Is it less than blasphemy to conceive, that the infinite Science of God should depend on any finite object, or finite mutable conditions appendent thereto? Yea, is not such a conditionate Science altogether impossible as to God? For must not the object as such be before the act? And may we suppose any created object or condition appertaining thereto in any regard to be before the divine Will and Science? Is not the futurition of allthings both objects and conditions, the effect of the divine Decree, ●●●refore in order of Nature subsequent to the divine Will? And if so, then are not all objects and the conditions appendent thereto foreseen by God, in his divine Decrees, without the least dependence on the things themselves or their contingent conditions? Indeed a conditionate Science, to speak properly, is that which as yet never existed, but will follow on the position of the condition: whence truly such a Science cannot existe even in men, before the condition be performed: and therefore where the condition is never performed, it can never existe. How impossible then is it, that such a Science should be found in God, who no way depends on extern objects for his Science? We must therefore conclude, that God, in the absolute and efficacious Decree of his own Will, hath predetermined all future's both contingent, free, and necessary in particular, and thence certainly and infallibly knows them to be future, both as to their substance and circumstances. As for sins future God certainly and infallibly knows them both as future and present, in the determination and permission of his own Will, whereby the create Will is determined to the entity of the sinful act, as a real act, and permitted as to the moral pravity of the act, as before, in the object of Divine Prescience. Hence, 6. The Divine Science is eternal. Thus Plato, 6. Divine Science eternal. both in his Timaeus and Parmenides, makes his Divine Ideas to be, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, eternal and sempiterne. And the reason is most evident; because the Divine Science is the same with the Divine Essence. If God should begin to know any thing that he knew not before, his Intellection should depend on the object known, which is impossible. Again, if God should begin to know what he knew not before, than he should be composite or compounded of Act and Power, and so not a pure Act: then also he should not be most perfect, and most blessed: for every Act adds to the perfection of the habit or power. All the successions and vicissitudes of time or things in time are foreseen by God in his Eternity, by one simple intuitive Act. Thus Maximus Tyrius, Dissertat. 1. pag. 10. The Divine Intellect is not perfect, unless it be added to it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, always to understand. Thus also Aquinas, Part. 1. Quaest. 14. Art. 13. God knows all contingents not only as they are in their own causes, but as they are each of them actually in themselves. And albeit contingents are brought into act and existence successively, yet God doth not know them successively as they are in their own Being, as we do, but all at once; because his knowledge is measured by Eternity, as also his Being: but now Eternity being existent all at once, doth compass about all time: whence allthings that are in time are present to God from all Eternity, not only as the reasons of allthings are present with him, but because his intuition is from Eternity cast on allthings as they are in their presentialitie. This presentialitie must be limited to the Divine Will, which gives futurition to allthings, and so makes them present to the Divine Understanding. Hence, 7. The Divine Science is infinitely perfect. 7. Divine Science infinitely perfect. Thus Plato ascribes to God, Parmenid. 134. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the most exquisite perfect Science: otherwise he could not be Rector of the Universe. So Maximus Tyrius, Dissert. 1. pag. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That he be most perfect who understands both at all times, and allthings, and at once. Psal. 147.5. God knows allthings, always, and at once; therefore most perfectly. Thus Psal. 147.5. Great is our Lord and of great power: his understanding is infinite: or of his understanding there is no number: i. e. his Understanding is every may perfect: he knows allthings, and that in the most perfect manner. And it is observable, that the Psalmist grounds the Infinitude of God's knowledge on the Magnitude or Infinitude of hsi Essence and Power: whereby we are informed, that God's knowledge depends not on the objects known, but ariseth from his own omnipotent Will and Essence. The perfection of the Divine Science may be considered essentially, intensively, extensively. (1) Essentially, as Gods knows himself perfectly, in himself and by himself; and allthings else in himself. God knows allthings distinctly in the clarity of his own Essence: those things that are divers and multiplied in the Creatures, are most simply and unitely in God: Man according to the diversity of objects, has divers notices or apprehensions of things. As he understands first principes, so his knowledge is styled Intelligence; as Conclusions flowing from first Principes, so his knowledge is called Science; as the highest Cause, so Sapience; as things practic and moral, so Prudence: But all these God comprehends by one simple Act of Intuition in his own Essence. (2) God's knowledge is most perfect intensively. For every Intelligent is so far perfect as to degrees of knowledge, as he partakes of immateriality. Brutes have some degree of apprehension, as they have spirituose Souls; but these their animal Spirits being but the purer parts of matter, therefore their apprehension is most imperfect, and not reckoned among the species of true knowledge. Man's apprehension depending very far upon his senses and material objects, it's therefore more imperfect than that of Angels: yea, the Angelic Intelligence being made up of act and power, which is a kind of metaphysic matter, hence there is much of imperfection mixed therewith, if compared with God's Intelligence; which being pure Act and exempt from all mater, as well metaphysic as physic, hence it is most perfect intensively as to all degrees of knowledge. (3) God's Science is most perfect extensively; not as to kinds or parts of Science, (for it is most indivisible and simple, without all extension of parts) but as to objects; because it extendeth unto all objects. God, by reason of his most infinite clarity, comprehends all particular things, with all the particles of time in and by himself. God being in the highest degree immaterial, it necessarily follows, that his Science is most ample and extensive as to its object: for every faculty is by so much the more extensive, by how the more immaterial it is: hence the human Intellect by its act of understanding is said to become allthings: how much more true is this of the Divine Intellect, which is in the highest degree spiritual? The Divine Science albeit it be one most simple Act in itself, yet it is most universal and infinite as to its object. Thus Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 1. c. 78. proves that God's knowledge extends to an infinity of things; because God perfectly knows his own Virtue and Power, which is infinite. Again, by how much the more efficacious and clear any Intellect is in knowing, by so much the more able it is from one to gather many things: But now the Divine Intellect being infinitely efficacious, it must therefore necessarily extend to an infinitude of objects. So Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 1. pag. 7. proves, That the Scientivitie of God and his Intellect is never satisfied with any finite or infinite number of existent singulars, of any one species, or all; but infinitely exceeds each of them, yea, a whole multitude of all, if they could be congregated together. That the Science of God is most perfect essentially, intensively, and extensively, see Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 30. Sect. 15. pag. 121. Having largely discussed the essential Modes or Characters of the Divine Science, we now proceed to its distinctions, God's simple Ditelligence. with relation to its objects. For albeit the Divine Science be in itself one simple Act, identified with the Divine Essence, yet this hinders not but that we may, by some inadequate conception of reason, distinguish this Science, by reason of its object, into different kinds. The common distribution of God's Science is into simple Intellience, and Science of Vision. 1. God's Science of simple Intelligence is of allthings possible; which he contemplates in the Alsufficience of his Essence. For God being in the highest degree Intelligent, he must necessarily understand allthings that are intelligible: but now whatever may be, may also be known: wherever there is a possibility of existence, there is some intelligibilitie. Again, God perfectly knows his own Essence and Power: therefore he perfectly knows not only what is future, but also whatever is possible. Not that the existence of things possible is known by God, but only their Essence, which he contemplates in his own EssEnce. Hence this Science of simple Intelligence is called by some Abstractive; because it abstractes from the actual existence of its object. 2. God's Science of Vision, God's Science of Vision as to things future. is that whereby he knows things as future, in and upon the Decree of his Wil Here we must premit, that when we say, God's Science of Vision terminates on things as future, the conjunctive Particle As, must be taken not formally, as if it denoted any reason of the Divine Cognition taken from the futurition of the thing, but only materially; and so it denotes only thus much, that Gods knows things future to be future, and that by the determination of his own Wil Bradwardine, de Caus. Dei, l. 1. c. 18. pag. 220, etc. largely demonstrates these Propositions. (1) That God doth not know things future merely by his Essence, without the determination of his Will; because nothing is in its own nature future, but by the Decree of the Divine Wil. (2) That God doth not know things future by the Divine Intellect only: because the Divine Intellect considered in itself is not practic, but only as subsequent to the Divine Wil. (3) That God doth not know things future by the infinity of the Divine Science: because the infinity of the Divine Science being supposed, it doth not thence necessarily follow, that this or that thing be future. (4) That God doth not know things future by the knowledge of their second Causes: For such a knowledge implies discourse from the cause to the effect: again, such a knowledge would be contingent when the second causes are such. (5) That God doth not know things future by the infinity or Immensity of his own Scibilitie or Scientivitie. (6) That god doth not know things future by the sole permission of his own Wil: because than God's knowledge should not be certain. Hence he positively concludes, God knows things future by his Wil (7) That God knows things future by that which gives them their futurition, namely by his Divine Wil For, as Aristotle 1. Post. 2. instructes us, To know a thing is to know it by its cause: and is not the Will of God the first Cause that gives futurition to allthings? Again, how can God certainly know future contingents, such as all human acts are, but in and by some necessary certain cause? And what certain necessary cause can there be of future contingents but the Divine Will? We may not then search for the causes of Divine Prescience in things future, but in the cause of their futurition, the determination of the Divine Wil Not as if the decree or determination of the Divine Will, whereby things become future, did in any moment of Nature precede the Divine Prescience; but in one and the same moment of Nature God decrees what shall be future, and foresees it future. Thence he takes the reason of his knowing things future, not simply from his Essence, or sufficience; nor yet from their presentialitie to God, as the Dominicans persuade us, but from the determination of his own Wil Certainly Gods Will is most efficacious, omnipotent, immutable, and most known to himself: and therefore it is necessary, that whatever he wils should be future, be so, and known to him to be so: for he wils not only the things themselves, but also all their modes and conditions of contingence, necessity, liberty, etc. Whatever gives any thing its futurition must necessarily also give it its cognoscibilitie or intelligibilitie as future: wherefore the Divine Will giving the former, it cannot also but give the later. Damascene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 12. tells us, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God may be deduced from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to see: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for nothing can be hid from God, yea he is the Inspector of allthings. And then he gives us the mode how God comes to know allthings: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For he beholdeth allthings before they are produced, eternally understanding every thing, according to his voluntary eternal Intelligence: i. e. his eternal Intelligence grounded on his own Wil Thus Bradwardine, de Caus. Dei. l. 1. c. 19 pag. 226. But here we must know, that a thing as future in the Divine Will and Predestination causally, and not extrinsecally in its own proper nature, is the cause [or object] of the Divine Science or Prescience: For God no way needs extrinsec things as objects of his knowledge; but he hath allthings future with himself intrinsically cognitiuè, causatiuè, intuitiuè, seu scientificè, cognitively, causatively, intuitively, or scientificly from himself only; and so he knows allthings, etc. So also Cap. 18. pag. 223. God, saith he, knows things future, by that whereby they are future, namely by his Divine Wil And he urgeth for this that Principe of Aristotle, 1. Post. 2. To know a thing certainly is to know it by its cause: But now God knows all future's certainly, therefore by their most true cause, even that which virtually contains all other causes and causations; and this is no other than his own wil That God knows allthings future in the determination of his own Will was the common Hypothesis of the ancient Scholastic Theologues, as of Augustin before them. So Robert Grosseteste in his M. SS. De Libero Arbitrio. Thus Scotus assures us, That the Root of the Divine Science as to future Contingents is the determination of the Divine Will: which determination is not only necessary to cooperate with the free Creature, but also to determine the Will of the Creature to act freely. This Hypothesis is also excellently well explicated and demonstrated by Alvarez, de Anxil. Grat. l. 2. Disp. 7. p. 106. God, saith he, in the absolute efficacious Decree of his own Will, predetermining in particular all future Contingents, as also free acts, knows certainly and infallibly those to be future, as to all circumstances, as well as to their substance. Therefore from this Decree there may be assigned a sufficient Reason of the certitude of Divine Science as to all futurs, which are not morally evil. And he thus proves his Hypothesis; A determinate cause, which is so efficacious as that it cannot be hindered by any other cause, must needs infallibly produce its effect: but such is the Divine Decree. Ergo. Then p. 108. he explicates how God knows sin: God certainly and infallibly knows all future sins in that Decree, whereby he decrees to predetermine the create Will to the entity of the act of sin, so far as the act is ens, and to permit the moral evil of sin as sin, etc. as before. 3. The Jesuits superadded to the two former Sciences of simple Intelligence and Vision, Scientia media. Scientia Media, a middle Science, whereby God is supposed to foresee such or such events to be future, on condition that such or such causes he so or so constituted. This Middle Science (1.) supposeth that some events are certainly future independently as to the Will of God; which is altogether impossibly: for a thing merely possible cannot pass from its state of possibility to a state of Futurition, without some cause of that transmutation: now there can be no cause of futurition but the Divine Will, as we shall prove hereafter. Nothing can be future either absolutely or conditionately, but what the Divine Will has decreed shall be future: therefore the object of this Middle Science cannot be things future, but only possible. Doth not this Middle Science, by feigning that future which is only possible, overthrew the very foundation of the Divine Science as to things future? Is it not impossible, that the prescience of a thing future should precede the decree of its futurition? So Avarez, de Auxil. l. 2. cap. 7. Nothing can make a thing cognoscible as future, but what gives futurition thereto: And what gives futurition to any thing, but the decree and determination of the Divine Will? (2) It supposeth God's Science to depend upon its object, which also is impossible; because than it should be variable and mutable as the object is. Yea, to speak properly, the object of this Middle Science is not at all cognoscible or knowable: For nothing is knowable farther than it is clothed with some degree of necessity, at least as to essence or existence: what is not either necessarily existent or future, cannot be known: now the object of this Middle Science is not either existent or future: therefore not cognoscible. Again, God takes not the reason or idea of his cognition from the things themselves or any Hypotheses they fall under, which are all variable, but from the invariable determination of his own Will, as before. It's true, our Intuition and Cognition is form by a passive reception of species from its object; Nostra intuitio fit patiendo abobjectis, non sic intuitio divina. and therefore it is murable and variable, according to the variations of the object: but can we imagine, that this imperfect mode may attend the Divine Intuition and Cognition? Should the principe and reason of the Divine Cognition proceed from and depend on its finite object, must not God also be finite, passive, and dependent? Is not the Divine Idea before its Ideate, yea eternal? How then can it depend thereon? (3) This Middle Science supposeth the Divine Science to be only conjectural and uncertain. For such as the object is, such is the Science thereof: a contingent object cannot give a necessary certain Science: all Logic scientific necessity is founded in physic necessity: That which may otherwise be, cannot be necessarily known: as God's knowledge would be false, if he knew those things to be future which shall never be; so would it be incertain, if the object be not certainly future: if the object be certainly future, it must have a certain cause of its futurition, which can be no other than the Will of God. But now, according to this hypothetic Middle Science, God cannot divine which way man's Freewill will incline itself, before it hath inclined to this or that object. and doth not this render the knowledge of God only conjectural, yea no knowledge at all? For how can a thing be certainly known to be future, without some cause determining it to be such? That Gods knows allthings future, though never so contingent in themselves, most certainly in the determination of his own Will, see Greg. Ariminens. Sent. l. 1. Dist. 38. Quaest. 2. also Grosseteste, de Libero Arbitrio. Wherefore if God has a certain prescience of future contingents, as without all peradventure he has, we must search for the causes of this Divine Prescience, not in the extrinsec objects, which can never give it, but in God himself, and in the determination of his own Will, in regard of which all future contingents are necessary; not absolutely, but hypothetically, on supposition of the said determination. (4) This Middle Science enervates and destroyeth the Grace of God. [1] It destroys the Grace of Election; in that it supposeth, that Peter could from his own freewill, consent to the Call of God, provided he were put under such circumstances, and invested with such common aides, even antecedently to his Election to Grace and Glory; which they make to follow the prevision of his Faith by this Middle Science. And thus the whole of Election depends on the improvement of Freewill, and the prevision thereof by this Middle Science. [2] It enervates and dispirits the whole of Christ's redemption; in that it makes all the efficace of Christ's Death dependent on the prevision of man's assent and consent to him as Lord. It supposeth that Christ died for no man absolutely, but only on condition that men by their corrupt Will embrace him. [3] It overthrows efficacious Grace in the vocation and conversion of sinners; in that it resolves all into a moral capacity or power in corrupt Nature to convert itself. [4] It subvertes the Covenant of Grace; in resolving the whole of it into a Covenant of Works. [5] It destroys the Grace of Perseverance; in that it makes the perseverance of the Saints dependent on their own mutable Freewill. §. 3. As for the Will of God, The Will of God. although it be not really different from his Understanding and Essence, yet we may, in regard of its effects, conceive of it as in some manner distinct. The Will of God is taken either properly, for the Divine Volition, Intention, or Decree, whereby allthings receive their Futurition and Existence; or else improperly, for the legislative, declarative, significative Will of God; which is the measure of our duty. The former is that which we are first to discourse of, whereof we find lively notices in Sacred Philosophy; and something also in Plato, Phileb. p. 16. where being about to Philosophise of the Divine Will, as the original Exemplar or Idea of allthings future, he makes this Preface: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For allthings that ever were invented, being joined together by a certain affinity and cognation with Art, by means hereof are declared. His meaning seems to be this, that look as allthings made by Art have their Idea in the mind of the Artificer, according to which they are framed; so allthings of Nature have their Idea in the Divine Mind and Will, according to which they are accurately form. Thence he adds: And truly the Ancients, who were better than we, and lived nearer to God, delivered to us this report or Tradition, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That allthings consist of ONE and MANY, which are said ever to be. (1) That by these Ancients, whence this Oriental Tradition came, we must understand primarily the Hebrews, has been sufficiently demonstrated, P. 2. B. 3. C. 2. and elsewhere. (2) That by this ancient tradition of One and Many, we must understand the Divine Essence and Ideas or Decrees of the Divine Will seems also manifest. Whence he subjoins; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That we ought, things being thus constituted, always to inquire after one Idea of every thing in particular, and accurately to observe the same, etc. That by this ONE IDEA, which we are to inquire after, must necessarily be understood the Decree of the Divine Will, I think will be evident to any, that seriously considers Plato's Philosophemes of the Divine Ideas, delivered in his Timaus, and Parmenides, of which before, P. 2. B. 3. c. 9 §. 4. And indeed he seems positively to assert, Parmenid. p. 134. That the Origine of these Ideas cannot be in the object, but must be in the Divine Essence and Wil We shall reduce the whole of our Philosophemes about the Divine Will to the following Propositions. 1. Prop. God primarily Wills himself, and allthings else in subordination to himself. The Object of the Divine Wil (1.) That the Divine Essence is the primary object of the Divine Wil. is most evident; [1.] because the principal thing willed is to every one the cause of willing: if therefore God should have any other principal object of his Will besides himself, he should have something besides himself as the cause of his willing; which is impossible: for nothing can move the Divine Will but his own bonity. [2] The Divine Essence is most amabile and appetible for itself, therefore the primary object of the Divine Wil. [3] The primary object of the Will ought to be equally proportionable thereto: for the virtue and efficace of a faculty is measured by its commensuration and Adequation to its primary object: and what is equally proportionable to the Divine Will, but the Divine Essence? Hence, (2) God by willing himself, wils allthings else in subordination to himself. For he that wils an end, wils allthings else in order thereto. God wils allthings in order to his own bonity: The Will of God terminates on other things so far as they relate to the Divine bonity, and participate thereof: God wils himself Necessarily, but allthings else so far as they relate to himself. Hence (1) God wils all singular Goods, so far as they partake of goodness. For God willing himself as his last end, wils allthings so far as they conduce to himself: but every thing so far as it is good participates of, and tends to the Divine goodness: therefore as such it is willed by God. Hence, 2. Prop. The Will of God considered in itself is but one, simple, indivisible, pure Act. The Divine Will one pure Act. Thus Plato, Phileb. 16. saith, we ought always to inquire after, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, one idea of allthings. Whereby he notes, that the Divine Will, as the origine of all things, is but one. The multitude of objects willed is no way repuguant with the Unity and Simplicity of the Divine Will: for God by one simple act wils himself and allthings else. Allthings are one in the Divine Will and bonity; in as much as the Divine bonity is the exemplar of all bonity; and the Divine Will by one and the same act wils both the Divine bonity and all other bonity. It is otherwise with the Humane Will, which by one act wils the end, and by another, the means conducing to the end: whence the willing the end is the cause of willing the means: but in the Divine Will there is no such causality of end and means to be found; in as much as by one and the same simple act it wils both end and means: and all grant, that the same thing cannot be the cause of itself. Thence Suaxez Metaple. Disput. 30. §. 16. p. 127, etc. proves, That Gods Will is not a real power, but the last pure Act: for there is no receptive power in God: allthings that are in God are as actual as his effence, and as pure from all potentiality. Hence, 3. Prop. The Divine Will is most Sovereign and Independent. The Divine Will Independent. Thus the Platonistes generally assert, that the Divine Will is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, without cause, and Independent: and Plato makes his Divine Ideas to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Self-subsistent and Independent; because allthings else depend on them, but they on nothing else. This Independence and Self-subsistence of the Divine Will is set forth in Sacred Philosophy under the notion of a Foundation, 2 Tim. 2.19. 2 Tim. 2.19. The foundation of the Lord standeth sure, the Lord knoweth who are his. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes the firm purpose of the Divine Wil: As those that build great Palaces lay a firm foundation, which depends not on any part of the Structure, but the whole Structure depends on it; so God being to build a Celestial House, lays the eternal purpose of his own Will as a self-subsistent independent foundation, on which the whole depends. This sovereignty and Independence of the Divine Will the Hebrews expressed by the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai, which denotes Gods Sovereign Dominion over the Creature, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a pillar or basis, on which the whole Fabric depends, but it depends not on the Fabric: so allthings depend on the Sovereign Will of God, but it on nothing. Thus Plato, Epist. p. 312. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, About the King of allthings, allthings are: and allthings are for his sake 〈◊〉 and he is the cause of allthings beautiful. Wherein note, (1) th●●e styles God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Sovereign King or Lord of all, i. e. according to the origination of the word, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the basis of all answerably to the import of Adonai, Lord. (2) He saith allthings are for God, i. e. to be disposed of according to his Sovereign Will and pleasure. And (3) he adds the Reason, because he is the cause of allthings. i e. God, by virtue of his prime causality and efficience, has an universal Dominion over all things, to dispose of them as he pleaseth for his Glory. The light of Nature teacheth, that every one ought to be the supreme moderator of his own work: Hence what ever God wils is just, because he wils it. This sovereignty and Independence of the Divine Will is lively expressed, Psal. 135.5. Psal. 135.5, 6. For I know that Jehova is Great, and that our Lord is superior to all Gods, Jehovah, i. e. the first Supreme Being, who gives being to allthings, but receives nothing from any Creature. Is Great, i. e. Infinite in being, and therefore most Sovereign and Independent in his Will and Pleasure. Whence it follows: and superior to all Gods: i. e. infinitely above Angels and Men, though never so potent; who all depend on his sovereign independent Wil Thence he adds, v. 6. Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did he in Heaven and in Earth. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whatsoever the Lord willeth: which notes the sovereignty, Independence, and Omnipotence of his Wil Jonah 1.14. So Jonah 1.14. For thou O Lord hast done as it pleased thee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to thy sovereign independent Wil The greatest Notions or Attributes that our shallow judgements can invent, are infinitely too short to express the sovereignty of the Divine Wil But the more fully to explicate and demonstrate the sovereignty and Independence of the Divine Will, God independent physically and morally. we are to consider that as causes, so dependence on those causes is twofold; physic, or moral: Physic Dependence is that whereby an inferior depends on a superior Cause for real efficience: Moral Dependence is that whereby an inferior depends on its superior for moral influence. And there is this common to both: as in Naturals inferior causes dependent on superiors in acting, have no power to act contrary to the efficace of their superiors; so in Morals. But now God is neither physically nor morally dependent on any superior cause. (1) He has no physic dependence on any superior cause; because he is the first in the order of physic Causes: Again, he is superior to all Gods, as Psal. 135.5. and therefore cannot be influenced by any. So Plato, Repub. assur●● 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That an hypocrite is neither able to hid himself from God, nor yet to force him. The Divine Will receives no real efficience or influence from the human Will, but the human Will is really influenced by the Divine Wil: God wils not things, because we will them; but we will things, because God wils them. (2) Neither is God morally dependent on any other. Moral dependence is founded in natural: where there is natural independence in an absolute degree, there cannot be moral dependence in any degree: The rational Creature having a twofold relation to God, as a Creature, and as rational, hence he has a twofold dependence on God, one natural, the other moral: but God being independent as to his Essence, must necessarily also be independent as to Morals. Moral dependence is either Legal, or Final: Legal dependence is, when an inferior depends on the Laws, Remunerations, or Distributions of any Superior. Final Dependence is, when an inferior depends on some supreme last end. The Divine Will is in neither regard dependent. [1] It is not legally dependent; because not subject to the law of any. The Divine Will gives Laws to all Creatures, but receives Laws from none: yea, it hath no legal dependence on any meritorious acts of the Creature: God willeth nothing without himself, because it is just; but it is therefore just, because he wils it: The reasons of good and evil extrinsec to the Divine Essence are all dependent on the Divine Will either decernent or legislative. [2] The Divine Will has no final dependence on any superior end; because it's own bonity is its only end. The End is the Cause, Reason, or Motive of willing allthings that conduce to the End: but now nothing can move the Will of God, but his own bonity; which indeed is the same with his Will and Essence: wherefore it cannot be properly said to be the cause of his Will; because nothing is said to be the cause of itself. When Theologues affirm, That God wils one thing for another, they mean not, that the other thing is the cause or motive of the Divine Will; but that God wils there should be a causal connexion between the things willed. As God willed the Sun, Moon, and Stars should be for the production of fruits, and these for the use of man, etc. God's willing one thing for another notes a causal connexion between the things willed, but no causal influence on the Divine Wil: Deus vult hoc propter hoc: non autem propter hoc vult hoc. Ephes. 1.4, 5. God wils this for that, yet for this he doth not will that: i. e. God wils effects and causes; and that the effects are for the causes; yet he doth not will the effects for the causes, as if the causes were the motives of his Wil Thus we must understand that Text, Eph. 1.4. According as he has chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love. How are the Elect chosen in Christ? (1) Negatively, they are not chosen in Christ, as the meritorious Cause of Election; nor from a prevision of their Faith in Christ, as the motive of Divine Election, according to the Pelagian Hypothesis. But (2) They are said to be chosen in Christ, as their common Head, that by him they might be made new Creatures, and so partakers both of Grace and Glory. Christ and Faith have no causal influence on the Divine Will; but the Divine Will decrees, that Christ and Faith should have a causal influence on Salvation. Thence it follows, v. 5. Having predestinated us unto the Adoption of Children by Jesus Christ unto himself, according to the good pleasure of his Wil Here Christ is brought in as the meritorious, antecedent Cause of our Adoption, but as an effect and consequent of Election: For so much the Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by denotes, namely that Christ as Mediator is the effect of Predestination or Election, but the cause of our Adoption. This is strongly argued by Augustin in his Book, De Praedestinatione Sanctorum. And surely if the Merits of Christ have no causal influence on the Will of God, much less can man's Faith or Merits influence the same. Thence he adds: according to the good pleasure of his Wil: which argues the Independence of his Wil Thus we see how God wils Christ and Faith for the Salvation of the Elect, and yet doth not will the Salvation of the Elect for Christ and Faith as the moving causes of his Will, which is most independent. So God wils both the means and the end; and the means for the end; yet he doth not for the end will the means, as if the end did move him to will the means. For in God the volition of one thing is not the cause of his willing another; because there can no efficience of cause on effect, or dependence of effect on the cause be affirmed of the Divine Will, which is but one simple indivisible act both as to end and means; and therefore neither one nor tother can be said to move or influence the Divine Will; albeit the same Divine Will doth will a causal connexion between the things willed: in which regard Scholastic Theologues assign reasons of the Divine Will, affirming, That the passive attingence of the Divine Will in respect of one thing, is the cause of its passive attingence in regard of another thing, albeit neither the cause of the Divine Will: i. e. to speak natively and properly, God wils that one thing shall depend on another, yet the Divine Will neither depends on nor is moved by either Gods sovereign independent Will is full of reasons, as to the admirable dependence of the things willed, according to their subordinations, yet there may not be the least reason or shadow of reason assigned as the cause or motive of the Divine Wil Thus Ephes. 1.11. Ephes. 1.9, 11. Who worketh allthings according to the counsel of his Wil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. There is the highest counsel and wisdom in the Divine Will, and yet no reason or cause can be assigned of it. So v. 9 Having made known to us the mystery of his Will, according to his good pleasure, which he hath purposed in himself. The Divine Will is here said to be (1) full of mysterious wisdom, whereof no reason can be assigned without itself. Thence, (2) it is styled good pleasure, which denotes its sovereignty and Independence. Hence (3) it is said to be in itself: i e. no reason or cause extrinsec to itself can be assigned thereof: though it be full of mysterious wisdom and sublime reasons, yet they are all within itself. That there can no cause either physic or moral, legal or final be assigned of the Divine Will is evident; (1) because the Divine Will is one simple, pure Act; and therefore not capable of any Passion, Impression, and causality from any extrinsec object. (2) Because allthings else are the effects of the Divine Will, and therefore cannot be the cause thereof: because the same thing cannot be the cause of itself. (3) Because the Divine Will is eternal; but allthings else of finite duration: and is it possible, that what is temporal and finite should influence what is eternal and infinite? That there can be no cause of the Divine Will, see Aquinas, Part. 1. Quaest. 19 Art. 5. & contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 87. Hence, 4. Prop. The Divine Will it immutable. The Divine Will immutable. This immutability of the Divine Will ariseth from the Independence, Simplicity, and immutability of the Divine Essence, with which it has an essential connexion, yea identity. Plato discourseth accurately of the immutability of the Divine Will, both in his Philosophemes of Divine Ideas, as also in his Phaedo, pag. 78. where he proves, that the Divine Essence and Will is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. one uniform Being, which existes of itself, and is always the same, without the least degree of mutation, etc. of which more fully before, in God's immutability, cap. 4. §. 5. But this immutability of the divine Will is more clearly illustrated and demonstrated in sacred Philosophy. Thus Psal. 33.10. Psal. 33.10, 11. The Lord bringeth the counsel of the Heathen to nought. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he hath infringed, dissipated, made void: from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break. Thence it follows: He maketh the devices of the people of none effect. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he hath broken: from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break, properly the mind or purpose. The divine Will delights to break and dash in pieces the strongest resolutions and most fixed purposes of proud men. But than follows the immutability of the divine Will, v. 11. The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever; the thoughts of his heart to all generations. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the fixed counsel, or determinate purpose of Jehovah. Standeth for ever: i. e. is inviolable and immutable. This verse contains the Antithese of the precedent; whereby David teacheth us, that the divine Will makes void the proud will of man, but no human will can frustrate or alter the divine Will, as Job 12.13, 14. Thus Psal. 119.89. For ever O Lord thy word is settled in Heaven. Psal. 119.89. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is fixed, established. R. Ezora understands this of the decrees or purposes of the Divine Will, which are firm, established, and immutable. So Malach. 3.6. I am the Lord, I change not; therefore the Sons of Jacob are not consumed. I change not: This regards the Will of God, as well as his essence; so much the subsequent inference imports: for the reason why the Sons of Jacob are not consumed, must be resolved into the immutable Will of God, as the original cause. It's true, the things willed by God are oft under mutations; and God wils those mutations; but with an immutable will: the mutation reacheth not the will of God, but only the things willed by God; who wils this thing shall be now, and the contrary afterward, without the least alteration in his wil A will is then said to be changed, when any gins to will that, which he before nilled; or to nil that, which he before willed: which cannot be supposed to happen, but in case of some mutation in knowledge, or disposition: but neither of these can be affirmed of God. (1) God is infinitely wise, and foresees all contingences, circumstances, and accidents that may happen; and therefore cannot alter his thoughts or purposes for want of wisdom, as we poor mortals frequently do. (2) God's disposition towards all objects is ever the same. (3) The human will is obnexious to mutations, from impotence and want of power to accomplish what we will: but the Divine Will is omnipotent and irresistible, as Esa. 46.10. (4) If the Divine Will were mutable, God could not have a certain prevision of future contingents: because the certainty of God's prevision supposeth a certainty of Divine Ideas and Decrees in the will of God: for God's Science of Vision or foresight of things future ariseth from his Will, which gives allthings their futurition. But it is objected from Scripture, That God is said sometimes to repent: and all repentance denotes a change of the wil The Response is sacile: when Scripture ascribes repentance to God it is only improperly and in condescendence to our fragile capacity, thereby to denote a change, not in the Will of God, but in his dispensation towards the Creature, upon some change in the Creature: So upon the repentance of the Ninevites God repent, i. e. changed his dispensation towards them. Otherwise, when the Scripture speaks properly of Repentance, it saith expressly, That God is not as man, that he should repent, Num. 23.19. 1 Sam. 15.29. 5. God's Will Absolute, not conditionate. Prop. Gods Will is Absolute, not conditionate. The Divine Will receives no conditions from the human Will, but gives all to it. So Jam. 4.15. For that ye ought to say, If the Lord wil Jam. 4.15. This was an ancient saying mentioned by Bensyra, Sent. Moral. xi. Let man never say, he will do any thing, before he hath prefaced this, If the Lord Wil And we find something answerable hereto, in Plato, Alcibiad. p. 135. where Socrates instructs Alcibiades, that he must say, he will do so and so, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. If God wil So in his Laches: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But I will do this, and come to thee to morrow, if God will. By which it is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophy, that our Will must expect and receive all conditions from the Divine Will, but impose or ascribe none to it. There are several Texts of Scripture which some urge to prove a conditionate Will in God: as Psal. 81.13, 14. Ezech. 33.11. Mat. 23.37. Joh. 3.16. (1) As for the two first Texts, Psal. 81.13, 14. and Ezech. 33.11. Ezech. 33.11. it seems most probable, that they refer primarily to temporal deliverance and destruction, specially that of Ezech. 33.11. as it appears by v. 2, 3. (2) If we understand these Scriptures as referring to matters of Salvation, than they note only Gods Will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of complacence, not his Will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Beneplacite. So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Ezechiel useth, signifies not simply to will, but to acquiesce in a thing. And then the sense is, that Gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or complacence is not in the Death of sinners simply as such, but in this, that men turn from their sins and live. But (3) our principal response is this: God declares by these and such like Scriptures his gratiose propensions and inclinations towards penitent sinners: [1] Hereby to demonstrate that intime and indissoluble connexion, which he has, according to his Evangelic Constitution, established between sincere Reppentance and Salvation. [2] That so these general Declarations and Invitations of Sinners to repent might prove an efficacious instrument of particular vocation and conversion to the Elect. For God's Free Grace albeit it be in itself absolute and particular; yet it is proposed to sinners in Indefinite and Universal Propositions, thereby the more efficaciously to allure and draw their hearts to the embracement thereof. [3] Hereby impenitent Sinners are left without all excuse; in as much as God has so freely and cordially offered Mercy to them, would they but embrace the same. All this implies no proper conditionate Will in God, but only some conditions in the extern propositions and offers of his Grace; which God confers on the Elect. There are many Scriptures that speak Gods Will to be Absolute. Rom. 9.11. So Rom. 9.11. That the purpose of God according to Election might stand, not of Works, etc. Where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes Gods free absolute purpose or Decree, no way dependent on any merits or conditions in the Creature: which Rom. 11.5. he terms, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to the election of Grace: i. e. God's free absolute Wil The like, 1 Thes. 1.4. and 3.5. That God wils nothing conditionally is evident (1) from the impossibility of such a Will in God. For if God wils any thing conditionally, he wils that condition also, or not: if he doth not will the condition, than it is impossible that it should be; and so God is said to will things on impossible conditions; and then by consequence to will things impossible; which is too great a reproach to be cast on the Deity: If God wils the condition, than he wils it either absolutely or conditionally: if absolutely, than his will is absolute: for to will a thing conditionally, and yet to will the condition absolutely, is to will the thing itself absolutely. If God wils the condition conditionally, than the condition of this later condition, conditionally: which opens the door for a progress into infinite. (2) If Gods Will should be conditionate, than it would hang in suspense, and depend on the humane will; and so it should be in the power of the human will to make void and frustrate the Divine Will: yea the Divine Will should be more in the power of man's will, than the will of the most miserable slave is in the power of his Lords wil This destroys the sovereignty and Independence of the Divine Wil. (3) To suppose the Divine Will to be conditionate takes away the futurition of that thing it wils: for nothing can be future of itself, without some cause of its futurition: and there can be no cause assigned why a thing should pass from being only possible to future, but the Divine Wil. (4) To suppose a conditionate will in God destroys the certainty of Divine prescience: for if the condition hang in suspense, and be not willed by God, the thing willed cannot be certainly known. (5) A conditionate will ascribes to God imperfection, in that it supposeth his will to be incomplete, inefficacious, passive, dependent, mutable, etc. But yet take notice, that albeit we exclude all conditions from the Divine Will, yet we do not exclude them from the things willed: The things willed may be conditionate, and yet the Divine Will absolute. Hence, 6. Prop. Gods Will is Antecedent not Consequent. God's Will antecedent, not consequent. The distinction of God's Will into Antecedent and Consequent, albeit it were by some of the ancient Scholastic Theologues made use of as to the things willed, yet as it is now generally used by the Jesuits and their Sectators, and applied to the immanent will of God, it is most injurious to him. That Gods Will is ever Antecedent, is plainly evident from Sacred Philosophy. So Act. 13.48. Act. 13.48. And as many as were ordained to eternal life believed. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ordained here cannot signify disposed or prepared, as the Remonstrants and their Sectators would persuade us: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 differs much from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, neither is it any where in Scripture or any Greek Author, as I can learn, used to signify an intern Quality or Disposition; but it generally signifies to Ordain, primarily in military affairs; and thence in any other matters. So Act. 22.10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cannot be here taken nominally, but must signify Ordained, is most evident from the sense: For it's said, they were ordained to eternal life, as the term; not unto faith only, as the means: wherefore if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 should signify disposed, the sense must be, they were disposed to eternal life, as many as were disposed: for what is faith but a disposition to eternal life? It's most evident therefore, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must signify not nominally, but participally such as were ordained unto eternal life as the term, and unto faith as the means, by the absolute and antecedent will of God. That Gods Will properly so termed is ever Antecedent and never Consequent may be demonstrated, (1) From the Eternity of Gods wil According to Plato, the Idea or Decree of the Divine Will is ever 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, eternal and sempiterne: Now if the will of God and its Ideas be all eternal; than not any one of them can be consequent to any act of the Creature, which is in time. (2) From the Simplicity, Independence, and immutability of the Divine Wil A consequent will in God supposeth his Divine Will to hang in suspense, and dependent on the mutable ambulatory will of man: and is it possible, that the prime cause should depend on, or be influenced by the inferior second cause? What? must the Supreme Sovereign Will attend, yea subserve the nods and becks of human created will? The act of willing in God cannot depend on any act of the creature as something consequent thereto; because then as oft as the act of the creature is changed, the will of God must be changed. (3) From the perfection of the Divine Wil A consequent will in God, as stated by the Jesuits and their Followers, supposeth an Antecedent imperfect will, consisting only in a natural velleity or imperfect inclination, which is unworthy of the most perfect wil (4) From the Omnipotence of God. If God wils a thing antecedently to the act of the creature, which shall never be, than the will of God is not Omnipotent; but in the power of the Creature, either to fulfil or frustrate the same. And Oh! how incongruous are such Sentiments to the Divine Omnipotent Will? If Gods Will be in the power of the Creature and dependent thereon, than it may be wholly frustrated as to all its counsels and decrees touching the rational world. (5) This distinction of the Divine Will into Antecedent and Consequent is contumelious to the Beatitude of God. For every one is so far blessed, as he has his will fulfilled: To have our wills crossed or frustrated is accounted by all no small portion of misery: may we then imagine; that the Divine Will properly so termed is ever frustrated? (6) This distinction of Gods will into antecedent and consequent is also injurious to his Bounty and goodness. Sacred Philosophy compareth God to a liberal Prince, who deviseth liberal things, Esa. 32.8. and thereby establisheth his Throne, Esa. 32.8. But the liberal deviseth liberal things, and by liberal things he shall stand. It's spoken of Christ as Mediator, or the great King of Zion, as appears, vers. 1. who deviseth all manner of liberal things, and thereby stands, or is established on his Throne, as the word denotes in the Hebrew. Did not Christ keep open house and distribute all his gifts and good things liberally and freely, his Throne would not be established; he would have no Subjects to fill up his Kingdom. But now the distinction of the Divine Will into Antecedent and Consequent cuts asunder all the nerves and ligaments of Christ's Liberality, in that it makes him to have an imperfect Antecedent will towards all, but a Consequent Will towards none, but those who can by their good merits purchase his favour. This distinction of God's Will into Antecedent and Consequent is excellently well refuted by Gregor. Ariminensis, Sent. 1. Distinct. 46, 47. where he concludes thus: All the good things that we have are given us by God out of his Bounty and Grace: and this speaks, that God will them to us by an Antecedent Will; because no cause antecedes in us, but all our good things flow from his bonity. 7. The Divine Will most perfect. Prop. The Divine Will is most perfect. This Adjunct of the Divine Will is but the result of the former, and that which makes way to what follows. The perfection of the Divine Will may be considered intensively, extensively, or effectively. 1. Intensively. (1) The perfection of the Divine Will considered intensively consists in its not admitting any intention and remission, or latitude of degrees; but being always intense in the highest degree. For the Divine Will having one and the same Idea with the Divine Essence, it is one simple pure Act, without the least gradual remission, or intention. Hence it is styled by Plato, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the perfect Idea of good, which admits no latitude of degrees, no velleity or incomplete wil That Gods Will is always perfect and complete, without the least velleity or conditionate volition may be demonstrated, [1] from the Simplicity and pure Actuality of God. For all composition and latitude of degrees is inconsistent with a pure Act. [2] From the Identity of the Divine Will with the Divine Essence, which admits not the least latitude of degrees. [3] From the immutability of the Divine Wil For all velleity being but an imperfect will denotes a progression to a more perfect, and so mutation. [4] From the Wisdom of God. For all velleity implies ignorance: and supposeth that God understands not fully what the issues and events of the human will may be. [5] From the Omnipotence of God. All velleity notes impotence to accomplish what we wil We may not therefore imagine, that Gods Will is capable of any velleity, or conditionate incomplete volition, either formally or eminently; but that it is ever most perfect as to degrees; because it is the same with the Divine Essence. (2) The Divine Will is most perfect extensively, 2. Extensively. as to Objects, in that it extends itself to all objects. So in sacred Philosophy, Act. 17.26. Acts 17.26. And hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation. It is said, that God hath determined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. by his sovereign, perfect Will given terms, bounds, measures, and limits to allthings: the Divine Will is infinite and unlimited; it receives limits and terms from nothing, but gives bounds and terms to allthings. Hence God is said by Plato always 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to play the Geometer, i. e. to measure out to allthings their just essences, virtues, perfections, and limits: for Geometry, according to its primary notation and use among the Egyptians, (from whom Plato borrowed the notion) signifies to measure the bounds and terms of land. And it is most appositely applied by Plato to the divine Will, as it gives measures and terms to allthings. (3) The divine Will is most perfect effectively, 3. Effectively. as it is the efficacious Efficient of all effects; of which hereafter in the divine causality, where we hope fully to demonstrate, That the Divine Will is the prime Efficient and efficacious Cause of all effects. The perfection of the divine Will may be demonstrated either absolutely or comparatively, as compared with the human wil (1) If we consider the divine Will absolutely, so its perfection may be demonstrated, from its Simplicity, pure Actuality, Eternity, immutability, Omnipotence, etc. as before. (2) If we consider the divine Will relatively, or comparatively, as compared with a create human or Angelic will, so its perfection appears, (1) in this, that the divine Will gives all bonity and goodness to things; whereas every create will presupposeth goodness in things that it wils: every create will depends on, because it's moved by, the goodness of its object; but every create good depends on the goodness of the divine Wil Hence there can be assigned no cause of the divine Will, but what is in itself: whereas every create will has a formal reason, cause and motive without itself, whereby it is moved and influenced. (2) In the human will the volition of the end is the cause of its willing the means: but in the divine Will, both end and means are willed by one simple indivisible pure Act. (3) In man's will, Volition and Nolition are distinct Acts: not to will in man implies a negation or suspension of the wils act: but in God, by reason of the pure actuality of his Nature, Nolition and Volition are the same. We may not imagine, that the divine Will is capable of any suspension or negation of Act; but whatever he wils not that it be, that he wils that it be not: also whatever he wils not that it be not, that he wils that it be. (4) Man's will is circumscribed and limited by justice: he may not will but what is just; but Gods Will is not circumscribed by any Laws of Justice: he doth not will things, because just; but they are therefore just, because he wils them. Quicquid Deus non vult ut fiat, illud etiam vult ut non fiat: item quicquid non vult ut non fiat, id ipsum etiam vult ut fiat. (5) Man's will is limited as to the sphere of its Activity: he wils what he doth, but he cannot do all that he wils: terms of essence suppose terms of power and activity. But God doth not only will what he doth, but also do what he wils: his power is as extensive as his will: he can do what he will: his Will is omnipotent; because the same with his Essence, as Psal. 115.3. 8. Prop. The divine Will is most free. The Divine Will most free. Liberty being one of the supreme perfections that belong to an intelligent rational Creature, it may not be denied to the divine Wil Yea nothing else could be free, if the divine Will were not free; because this is the first Principe of all Liberty: as take away the first Cause, you also destroy all second Causes; so take away liberty from the divine Will, you take it away also from all create wills. Liberty in the divine Will is absolute, precedent, and regulant; liberty in the human will is conditionate, subsequent, and regulated. The first in every kind is the measure of all in that kind: now the divine Liberty is the first in that kind, and therefore the grand Exemplar of all create Liberty. The most perfect Cause must necessarily have the most perfect mode of acting: but now God is the most perfect Cause: therefore he must have the most perfect mode of acting: which is to act freely. Yea, the divine Will is so infinitely free, as that it is moved by nothing without itself: it has not so much as an end extrinsec to its own bonity, whereby it is moved: which kind of independent liberty no create will may challenge. For every create will, as it has a first Cause, whereby it is moved physically; so a last end, whereby it is moved morally: but the Liberty of the divine Will is independent in both these regards; and therefore most supreme and perfect. The Liberty of the divine Will may be considered as relating to the operations ad intra, or to those ad extra. (1) The Liberty of the divine Will as relating to the operations ad intra is only concomitant; not antecedent: for all the operations of God ad intra, i. e. such as terminate on himself, namely loving himself, etc. they are all from a necessity of Nature, not from election and choice. God cannot but love himself: he necessarily adheres to his own bonity and enjoys himself, without the least indifference either of Specification, or Exercise. And yet even in these Acts ad intra, which terminate on the divine Essence, and are attended with a natural necessity, the divine Will has a concomitant Liberty or divine spontaneity; which is sufficient to denominate those Acts free. For as the human will adheres to its last end by a kind of natural necessity, which yet is attended with a rational spontaneity; so in like manner the divine Will adheres to and enjoys itself by a natural necessity, and yet with a concomitant liberty or divine spontaneity. This is well expressed by Jamblichus, a Sectator of Plato, de Myster. Egypt. It is, saith he, necessary, that God be as he is, not by an extrinsec violent necessity, but by a natural and most voluntary; seeing he never would be other than he is. Here we see the highest necessity conspiring and according with the highest liberty. (2) If we consider the Liberty of the Divine Will as relating to its operations ad extra, such as terminate on the Creature, so it is not only concomitant, but also antecedent: i.e. the Divine Will terminates on the Creature, not from any necessity of Nature, but by election and choice. For all Creatures, as referred to the Divine bonity, are but means: wherefore the Divine Will has an antecedent liberty either for the electing or refusing of them. This some call Liberty of Election; because all election properly regards the means. Again, God in willing his own bonity necessarily, wils allthings so far as they participate of his own bonity: Now the divine bonity being infinite, there are infinite ways whereby the Creatures are participable thereof; but all dependent on the election and determination of the Divine Wil Lastly, if the divine Will should terminate on the Creatures from a necessity of Nature, and not from free election, there could nothing be contingent, as Suarez and others prove. But here occurs a knotty objection, What indifference may be ascribed to the Will of God. which is thus urged: How can the Divine Decrees admit of an antecedent liberty of election, when as they are the same with the Divine Essence, and so attended with the same natural necessity? This objection has greatly perplexed the acutest Wits among Scholastic Theologues. Bradwardine, de Caus. Dei, l. 1. c. 14. pag. 212. answers thus: That between the state of possibility and the futurition of things in the divine Decree there is a priority of origination; not of time, but of nature. But more fully lib. 2. cap. 52. pag. 834. he explicates, in what sense it may be said, that God could before nil, what he now wils: It is manifest, saith he, that God could not, either in regard of Time or Eternity, before nil privatively or positively what he now will; but only by a priority of Nature or Cause, namely by a priority of the volutive power in relation to its act. By the volutive power we must understand God's Will as the effective Principe, not that it is really a power in God. So Gregor. Ariminensis, Sent. l. 1. Dist. 45. pag. 161. answers sundry objections relating to this Hypothesis, and at last concludes, That the Will of God, as the first Cause of things, may be said to be both necessary and contingent: necessary, as the same with the divine Essence; and yet contingent, as it might not have willed the futurition and existence of things. Alvarez, de Auxil. l. 2. Disp. 7. pag. 114. saith, That we may conceive signum rationis, a moment of reason before the Decree of the divine Will determing what should be future. And Disput. 116. pag. 913. he distinguisheth indifference into privative and negative: Negative Indifference he makes to be that, which in itself is not more determined to this object than to that; or to act than not to act: and in this regard, adds he, the divine Will was, before it determined to create the world, in that [signo rationis] moment of reason indifferent to create or not create the world, etc. which negative indifference imports no privation of perfection in God. Al these solutions are much of the same import, and may be resolved into this: That the divine Decrees may be considered as they are in themselves and with respect to the divine Essence; and so they are necessary: or as they terminate on the Creatures, and are the cause both of their futurition and existence, and so we may ascribe to them a moment of reason, nature, or causality, in which they might not have been. And this we style Antecedent Liberty, or Liberty of Election, which imports no mutability in the divine Will, but only a priority of causality, which very well accords with the necessity of the divine Wil. To conclude this Adjunct touching the Liberty of the divine Will, Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 30. S. 16. pag. 134. grants, That a necessity of immutability agrees to the Divine Will, and no way prejudiceth the perfection of its Liberty. 9 Prop. Gods Will is most efficacious and irresistible. God's Will irresistible. This Adjunct of the divine Will is expressly laid down in sacred Philosophy. So Esa. 46.10. My counsel shall stand, Esa. 46.10. and I will do all my pleasure. The like we find in Homer, Iliad. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The counsel of Jupiter was fulfilled. Thus also, Rom. 9.19. Who hath resisted his Will? By which the Apostle excludes all manner of resistance, not only actual, but also possible. That the divine Will is most efficacious and irresistible may be demonstrated (1) from God's prime universal causality: God, according to Plato, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the most sovereign Cause; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Cause of all second Causes; which are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ministerial instrumental Causes of God, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who gives essence to allthings. Now the first universal Cause of allthings cannot be resisted by any second particular cause. For herein lies the difference between the first universal cause and second causes: these may fail of their effect by reason of some other cause impeding; but the first universal cause can never fail of his effect; because he contains under his Jurisdiction and Sovereign Power all other causes: he that gives Being and Power to allthings can be resisted by nothing. Now how is God the first universal cause of allthings? Is it not by his Divine Will? We may not conceive any other causal executive Power in God but his Divine Will: he effects and operates immediately by his will, without any distinct executive power, as we shall prove anon. (2) From the Omnipotence of the Divine wil The Psalmist informs us, Psal. 115.3. Psal. 115.3. and 135.5, 6. That God doth whatsoever he pleaseth. So Psal. 135.5, 6. God's Sovereign will backed with Omnipotence is invincible. The Psalmist shows the transcendent universality and efficace of the Divine will above the human: men will what they can do, but God can do what he will; because his will is omnipotent. If Gods will were not Omnipotent, he could not do whatever is possible: for he works allthings by his will: neither is he on any other account styled in the Creed, Omnipotent or Almighty; but because he can do what he wil The Divine Omnipotent will always obtains its effect, because its volition is its operation: it's fiat, is its factum esse, its word, its deed. Thence that of Augustin: Gods will is most certain, because most potent. Of which see more fully Ariminensis, Sent. 1. Dist. 46, 47. and Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 29. I will not, saith he, have him for my God, who is not Omnipotent in Acting; who has not a most Omnipotent Dominion over my infirm will; who cannot in the most Omnipotent manner make me to will and do, what he will; who hath not a will universally efficacious, infrustrable, indefectible, and necessary in causing; yea, whose will is not to me necessity. (3) From the Beatitude of God. Aristotle, as reason, assures us, that all men do what they will, if they can; because herein their Beatitude seems to consist. So Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. p. 138. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. And if he could, and would, he hath also done it: for all, when they can and will, act; for there is no impediment. Beatitude is the supreme end of all rational Appetition: therefore what men desire, they do, if they can, as Aristotle subnectes. Hence the Divine will, if it could not do what it would, it should not be blessed; because Beatitude is the ultimate term of all volition. So Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 27. Yea, I constantly and freely avouch, I will not have him for my God, whose most blessed will poor, miserable, sinful I can, when I please, pull down from the Throne of his Dignity, and subjugate, etc. (4) From the Infinitude of God. An Infinite Agent can neither be hindered from doing what he would, nor forced to do what he would not: a Passive Subject cannot resist an Active Principe or Agent, unless it has at least equal power: How then is it possible, that a poor, infirm, impotent Creature should resist the Divine Will? Thus Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 10. Now it remains to show, that the Divine Will is universally efficacious, insuperable, and necessary in causing; being not to be hindered or frustrated any manner of way. For who knows not, that it altogether follows, if God can do any thing, and will do it, he doth it, etc. But of this more when we come to the causality of God, C 7. §. 4. Having explicated the Adjuncts of the Divine Will, God's Will 1. Decernent or preceptive. we now descend to treat briefly of its Distinctions: and to omit that spurious Jesuitic distribution of the Divine Will into Antecedent and Consequent, which is most injurious and repugnant to the perfection of the Divine Will, as has been demonstrated, we may distribute the Will of God in regard of its object and our apprehensions, 1. into Decernent or Decretive, and Legislative or Preceptive. God's Decernent or Decretive Will is usually termed in the Schools his Voluntas Beneplaciti: and his Legislative Preceptive Will, Voluntas Signi. This distribution has its foundation in Sacred Philosophy: for God is oft said in Scripture to will things that are never offected, as the salvation of Reprobates, or the like, which cannot be understood of his decernent decretive Will, but may very well, of his preceptive Wil But to clear up this distinction, we are to consider, (1) That God's decernent or decretive Will is univocally and properly said to be his Will; but his voluntas signi or preceptive Will is only equivocally, or analogically, and figuratively such. God's decretive Will is the Divine essence decreeing allthings, and so properly and univocally styled his Will; but his preceptive Will is only analogically or figuratively termed his Will, [1] Metaphorically, as Princes signify their intern will, by their extern commands, which are thence termed their Wil [2] Metonymically, as God's Precepts are effects or adjuncts which partly revele his intern will and pleasure. Yet they are not in a strict proper univocal sense the will of God, as Sanderson, De Obligat. Conscient. p. 132. Davenant against Hoard, p. 392. and Ruiz prove. Hence (2) Gods Decretive and Preceptive Will are disparate or divers, but not opposite: The things decreed by God and the things commanded by him may oppose each other, but the will decreeing, and the will commanding do not oppose each other; because they are not ad idem: the Decretive Will of God is as it were his Law, or the measure of his operation and permission; but the preceptive Will of God is our Law, or the Rule of our operation and offices. The Decree of God determines what he will do, or not do; the Precept what we ought to do or not to do. God's Decernent Will or good pleasure is the sole Rule and Reason of all his actings towards the Creature; but his Reveled Will is the sole Rule, Reason, and Measure of all the Creatures actings towards him. (3) The Decretive Will of God is ever Absolute, efficacious, and particular; but the preceptive will of God is sometimes absolute, sometimes conditionate; sometimes universal, sometimes particular; sometimes efficacious and sometimes not. (4) Gods decretive will is intern and immanent, called in Scripture his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good pleasure, which is the measure of his own Affects, and Effects: But God's preceptive will is extern, and therefore not the measure of Gods Affects or Effects, but only of our Duty. 2. God's secret and reveled Wil Deut. 29.29. Hence follows another distinction of the Divine Will into Secret and Reveled; which is much the same with the precedent, mentioned, Deut. 29.29. The secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but things which are reveled, unto us. i e. God's secret Will is the measure of his operation, but his reveled will of ours. So Prov. 25.2. It's the Glory of God to conceal a thing. God's will is styled secret (1) as the things he wills are unknown to us: (2) as the causes and reasons of his Will cannot be penetrated by us: (3) as it is as it were the Law, Rule, or measure of his Divine operations. God's reveled will is so termed; because it is his pleasure reveled either in his Word, or Works: every act of God's Providence shows somewhat of his Will, as well as his Word. (1) Gods Will reveled in his Word is either promissive or preceptive: Reveled promises are the measure of God's Benefices towards us: Reveled precepts are the measure of our Offices or Duties towards God. (2) Gods reveled providential Will is either directive or afflictive. There is a conformity, which the rational Creature owes to each of these reveled wills of God: To the will of God reveled in his word there is an active conformity or obedience due; to the promissive reveled will there is an obedience of faith due, to the preceptive an obedience of love and subjection. To the providential will of God both directive and afflictive there is a passive obedience of Submission, Resignation and Dependence due. Lastly, this reveled will of God is never opposite to, albeit it be oft divers from, his secret will; and the reason is, because they are not about the same object: Gods secret will regards the events of things, his reveled will the duty of man, either active or passive. 3. Aquinas and others distinguish Gods Will into Complacential, God's Will Complacential, Providential and Beneplacite. Providential, and Beneplacite. (1) God's Complacential Will, is his simple complacence in all the good Actions, Habits, and Events of men; yea it extends not only to moral, but to natural goods, as Gen. 1.31. There is a perpetual necessary volition in God, which taketh pleasure in all good, whether create or increate. Such is the infinite bonity and Purity of the Divine Nature, as that it cannot but take infinite complacence in all good. This they call God's Love of simple complacence, of which see Ruiz, de Volunt. Dei Disp. 6. §. 2. p. 38. and Disp. 19 p. 214. (2) God Providential Will is that, whereby he is said to will and intent an end, when he in his providence, either graciose or commun, affords such means which have an aptitude to produce it. As where God sends his Gospel, he may be said really to intent the salvation of those to whom it is sent, albeit they are not all saved; because he vouchsafeth them those means which have a real aptitude to produce the same, were they but really embraced and improved. In this regard Davenant and others affirm, that Christ's death is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an universal remedy applicable to all, and that God, by his Voluntas Providentiae (as Aquinas styles it) intended it as such. This intention or will of God is measured by the nature of the means, and therefore reducible to God's Legislative Will, which gives constitution and measure to all the means of man's salvation. (3) There is God's Beneplacite or Decretive Will, which is only strictly and properly styled the will of God, as before: So Ruiz de Volunt. Dei, Disp. 18. §. 4. p. 185. §. 4. Next to the Will of God we are to treat of his Power, God's Power. which as executive and effective has one and the same formal Idea with his Will, as will appear by what follows. The Divine Power is in Sacred Philosophy illustrated by several names of God, specially by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 el, and its derivatives, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signify most potent and sovereign Lord. Therefore Moses being about to treat of God's infinite Power in creating allthings, styles him Gen. 1.1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. which Nachmanni makes to be derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 el hem, their strength, noting the Creatures: and Abarbenel makes this name to be given to God, as the omnipotent Effector and Productor of allthings, as before. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, properly signifies the potent, powerful God, who contains in himself infinite force, energy and power. Whence God is styled, Gen. 14.20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most high potent. And Esa. 9.5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, el gibbor, the most mighty potent. And Dan. 14.20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the most potent of all potents. In the N.T. God is styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, omnipotent, 2 Cor. 6.18. Rev. 1.8. & 4.8. & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the sole potentate, 1 Tim. 6.15. which terms signify both his Legal Power and Authority, as also his energetic efficacious power. The Power of God is elsewhere frequently inculcated in Scripture: as Job 26.14. Job 26.14. But the thunder of his power who can understand? God's power is compared to Thunder, because nothing more terrible and potent in this inferior World. Psal. 65.6. Which by his strength setteth fast the mountains being girded with power. So Psal. 77.14. Thou art God that dost wonders, thou hast declared thy strength among the people. And Psal. 93.1. The Lord is clothed with strength, wherewith he hath girded himself: the world also is established, that it cannot be moved. And Psal. 62.11. Twice have I heard this, that power belongeth unto God. Twice: i. e. frequently. That God's power doth infinitely transcend all create power may be deduced from that of Plato, Leg. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whereby he proves, that God's power is above all create force. But to discourse more distinctly of the Power of God, God's Power his Essence. we must remember, that God being a pure Act, active Power cannot in a proper strict notion be ascribed to God, as it denotes a first Act, or Principe of operation, distinct from the second Act, or Operation itself; but only as it respects the Creature, which is properly said to receive the impressions and influences of God's Power. God is said to have an active Power, in regard of the effects produced by him, as Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 30. Sect. 17. pag. 144. Thus Aquinas, Part. 1. Quaest. 25. Seing God is most in act, and simply perfect, it's most agreeable to him, that he be the Principe of Acts, and active Power, but not passive. And more fully, contra Gent. l. 2. c. 10. he informs us, That power in God is not as a Principe of Action, but only as a Principe of Fact. And because all power imports respect to another as a Principe, it is manifest, that all power is affirmed of God with respect to Facts or things made, according to truth; and with respect to Action, only according to our manner of understanding; as our Intellect doth, by divers conceptions, consider both, namely the Divine Power, and its action. Whence if any actions agree to God, which pass not into some fact or effect, but remain in the Agent; there can no power be affirmed as to such actions; more than according to our manner of understanding, not in truth. Such as are the actions of Understanding and Willing, which imply no power in God. The Power therefore of God, to speak properly, respects not such actions, but only effects. And the reason is evident; because power in God is the same with his Essence, and therefore a pure Act, not distinct from the second Act, but only from the Effect. Albeit the Power of God be in itself one and the same, God's absolute Power. yet for our more distinct conception of it we may distinguish it into absolute, and ordinate or actual. (1) God's absolute Power is that whereby he is considered as simply potent to effect allthings possible, although they never shall be: as Mat. 3.9. & 26.53. Mar. 10.27. Ephes. 3.20. This has one and the same idea with the Sufficience and Essence of God; and is looked on by us as antecedent to the Science of Vision and Will of God: whence it is styled by Bradwardine God's precedent Power. God's ordinate Power the same with his Wil (2) The ordinate and actual Power of God, is that whereby God is said to execute what he wils or decrees: which some term Gods Volutive Power, partly because it is executive of Gods will, but principally, because it has the same formal idea with the Divine Wil For that the executive Power of God admits not the least formal difference from his Divine efficacious Will, is an Hypothesis which both sacred Philosophy and the greatest Scholastic Wits greatly persuade us. As for sacred Philosophy it assures us, that God's executive Power is the same with his effective Wil So Gen. 1.3, Gen. 1.3. etc. Moses makes Gods fiat, or Will the prolific Principe of all productions. Thence Psal. 33.9. God's Word or Will is said to give existence to allthings. So Psal. 115.3. Psal. 115.3. He hath done whatsoever he pleased 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whatsoever he willed. The like Psal. 135.6. Psal. 135.6. The Lord doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whatsoever he pleaseth, or willeth. Rom. 9.19. Rom. 9.19. Who hath resisted his will? which denotes the will of God to be irresistible, omnipotent, and the same with his executive Power. And more particularly, Rev. 4.11. Rev. 4.11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, And by thy will they are, and were created. Our Version renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for, which is true, but not primarily intended here: yea, therefore allthings are For God's pleasure, because By it, as the first effective executive Principe. By which it's evident, that God's executive Power is the same with his actual will; he actually doth what he wils: and his mere Will is the effective Principe of his doing. Hence we find, that those who came to our Lord for any effect of his power, drew an argument from his will to his power, Mat. 8.2. as Mat. 8.2. Lord, if thou wilt thou canst make me clean: as elsewhere: whereby not only the Deity of Christ is acknowleged, but also the Identity of his power with his will; that his power is as extensive as his will: or, that his will is omnipotent. This Hypothesis, touching the Identity of God's executive Power with his Will, has been avouched and defended by the most acute Scholastic Theologues. Thus Bradwardine, de Caus. Dei, l. 1. c. 10. pag. 197. where he proves, That Gods Will is of itself operative; neither may we place in God any other executive power. And his reasons are cogent. For (1) if there were any thing more required, to the production of an effect, than the Divine Will, it would thence follow, that the Divine Will is not of itself sufficient to act, contrary to the forecited Texts. (2) It's evident, that the Will of God is in some manner operative of itself, even as our wills are in moving our own bodies. And if the Divine Will be in one degree operative, why not in every degree? Doth it need any executive virtue for the supply of its deficience? Is it not omnipotent? (3) If any such executive power be placed in God, it must naturally mediate between the Divine Will and effect: but this cannot be, because the effect necessarily follows upon the Divine Volition. The same Hypothesis is defended by Alvarez, de Auxil. l. 2. p. 129. conclus. 1. We may not place in God, besides his Intellect and Will, any third executive power eminently or formally distinct for the production of things. But of this more in God's Efficience, Sect. 4. §. 3. Prop. 2. & §. 5. Prop. 4. The object of God's Power is every thing possible: The object of God's Power every thing possible. For every power must have some object adequate thereto: and by how much the higher and more universal the power is, by so much the more universal is the object: and is not the active power of God the first Cause most supreme and universal? Must it not then comprehend under its object all possible Entity? And the more fully to understand this, we are to understand, that a thing may be said to be possible two ways: (1) Positively: and so that is possible, which may be produced by a power. Things possible are not said in this sense to be the object of God's power: for then the same thing would be explicated by itself: for to say the power of God is extended to allthings positively possible, is the same as if we should say, it is extended to all such things as are by it denominated possible. Wherefore (2) a thing may be said to be possible negatively, in a way of non-repugnance, as it implies not any repugnance of existing: and so allthings are possible which imply not a contradiction. And in this sense things possible are said to be the object of God's infinite Power; What things are impossible. which extends itself to whatever implies not a contradiction or repugnance of existing. For, in as much as nothing is more repugnant to Ens than non Ens, Ens and non Ens being contradictories, it thence follows, that whatever involves a contradiction cannot come within the comprehension of Ens possible, possible Being, but must be simply and of itself impossible. God cannot verify contradictions; because they have not a passive power or possibility of being verified: for the affirming of the one is the denying of the other: they cannot be both true; because they should not be contradictions, if the truth of the one did not necessarily make the other false. That what involves a contradiction comes not within the latitude of the object of God's power, is not from any defect of power in God; but because the thing has not in itself any possibility of existing, or of being reduced into act: for no power can be denominated such in relation to a term or effect, which implies an impossibility of existing; as what is contradictory doth. All power extends itself to that which can be actuated thereby: as all sensitive power is conversant about sensible objects, so far as they may be actuated thereby: so the power of God is conversant about all possible things, so far as they are capable of being actuated thereby. Whence it appears, that the impossibility of contradictions ariseth from the incapacity of the matter, not from any defect in the power of God. Now the impossibles which imply a repugnance of being done by God, are either such as regard God himself, or the Creature, or both. 1. The Impossibles that regard God himself are either absolutely such, or only in some limited sense. (1) The Impossibles, which regard God himself absolutely, are all such as are simply repugnant to the Divine Essence. As God cannot deceive or be deceived: he cannot sin, or be the moral cause of sin: he cannot condemn or punish, (though he may afflict yea torment) the innocent, or justify the wicked without a satisfaction. (2) The Impossibles that regard God in a limited sense, are such as imply a certain mode of acting, or a certain Hypothesis repugnant to the Divine Essence. [1] Such as imply a certain mode of acting; as God cannot exert the natural or vital acts of an animal body: he cannot eat, drink, speak, etc. in that mode we do, etc. [2] The Impossibles under a certain Hypothesis repugnant to the Divine Essence, are such as these: not to do what he has decreed, or promised. 2. The Impossibles which regard the Creature, or the extern object of God's power, are such as destroy the essence of the object. Thus God cannot make a Creature independent, or not to depend on himself, both as to Being and Operation. For dependence is essential to a Creature: and therefore to suppose a Creature not to depend on God as well in Operation as Being, is to suppose a Creature not to be a Creature, as Suarez strongly demonstrates against the Hypothesis of Durandus, who denies God's concourse to the material act of sin. Again, to suppose that God in the Eucharist should Transubstantiate or commute the Bread into the Body of Christ, and yet the Quantity and visible Accidents of the Bread still remain, implies a contradiction; because Quantity or Extension is essential to a body. Besides, this Popish Hypothesis of Transubstantiation implies other contradictions, in that it supposeth two bodies to be in the same place or space, and the same body of Christ to be in two places at once, etc. In like manner we say God cannot, according to the Lutheran Consubstantiation, make the body of Christ to be at the same time in the Heavens, and circumscribed thereby, and yet in and with, and under the Bread. 3. Things impossible both in regand of God and the Creature are such as are repugnant to the Essence of both. Thus God cannot, by his infinite Power, produce an effect equal to himself, infinite in Essence: For by making an effect infinite, he should make his own Essence finite: it is as essential to all products of God to be finite, as it is to God to be infinite, as Suarez, Metaph, Disput. 30. Sect. 17. pag. 147. That, notwithstanding all these impossibilities, arising from the incapacity of the thing, the Power of God extends universally to allthings possible, see Suarez Metaph. Disput. 29. Hence the Power of God is, in regard of its object and its extent, Divine Power Omnipotence. Gen. 18.14. said to be, as really it is Omnipotence. This is frequently inculcated in Sacred Philosophy, as Gen. 18.14. Is any thing impossible for Jehovah? Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Is any thing, or word [i. e. whatever can be spoken of, or whatever God has promised] Impossible, or Marvellous for Jehovah: i. e. above or beyond his power. It is spoken by the Angel, upon Sarah's unbelieving smile, and conceit that it was impossible for God to give her a Son, in her old age. Again, the manner of the speech being in a way of Rhetoric Interrogation implies in it a most vehement Logic Negation. We find the very same character of God's Omnipotence given by the Angel to Marie, the Mother of our Lord, in relation to her miraculose conception, Luke 1.37. Luk. 1.37. For with God nothing shall be impossible. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which we translate thing, primarily notes a word; and so it answers exactly to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Gen. 18.14. which signifies primarily Word, and then Thing, specially as applied to God; because all his Words are omnipotent and so equivalent to things. Mark 10.27. With God allthings are possible. Hence God is styled in Scripture 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Omnipotent, he being indeed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as elsewhere. The Omnipotence of God was generally recognised by the most sage Pagans. So Homer, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, This to thee O God is but a small thing, albeit to me it be great. i e. Thy omnipotence can with the greatest facility achieve it. So in his Il. speaking of God, he saith— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, his power is the greatest, or omnipotent. This omnipotence of God, or the extension of his Divine Power to allthings possible, may be thus demonstrated: (1) Every perfect Virtue doth extend itself to those things, unto which its proper effect can extend itself: but now the effect of God's Power extends itself to whatever is possible: therefore the Power of God must be as extensive. (2) Every Passive Power has some Active Power adequate and commensurate thereto: for every Power is for its act; as the matter is for the form, according to the Aristoteleans. Whatever therefore is in the passive or obediential power of a create Being, all that God can by his active power actuate, and accomplish. (3) The mode of Virtue or Power in every Agent, is according to the perfection of its nature or essence: But now God's essence being the most perfect pure Act containing in it all perfection, hence it necessarily follows, that his active virtue must extend itself to allthings capable of any perfection, i. e. which imply not a contradiction or repugnance of existing. See Aquinas, Contra Gent. l. 2. c. 22. Hence it follows, God's Power infinite. that God's Power is Infinite. (1) The magnitude of power answers in proportion to the magnitude of essence: whence, where there are no terms of essence, there can be no terms of power. Essence and Power in God are the same: wherefore his Essence being infinite, his Power also must be so. Crea tures are limited in their Essence, and therefore in their Power: but the great God having no terms to his Essence can admit none as to his power. What can be too difficult for the Divine Power, which brought all things out of nothing? When the Sadducees doubted of the Resurrection, our Lord resolves their Error into an ignorance of the Power of God, Mat. 22.29. Mat. 22.29. intimating thereby, that the Power of God was Infinite, and could extend itself to all effects. Thus Aquinas, Part. 1. Q. 25. a. 2. It's necessary that the Active Power of God be infinite: for by how much the more perfect the form of any Agent is, by so much the greater is his power in acting: whence the Divine Essence (whereby God acts) being Infinite, his Power also must be Infinite. The like he adds, Contra Gent. l. 1. c. 43. Every thing acts according to its form, which is its Essence, or a part thereof. Whence Gods Essence being Infinite, his Power also is such. (2) The Infinitude of God's Power may be demonstrated from the manner of his working in creating things: where the passive Power is infinitely low, the active Power must be infinitely high: but now in Creation the passive Power is in a lax sense infinitely low, in that it is purely nothing; thence Gods active Power must be infinitely high. (3) It must, according to Natural Reason, be granted, that there is in the University of Being's a power, than which nothing can be conceived greater: and to whom doth this Prerogative belong but to God? And if we can conceive nothing greater than God, must we not also conceive him to be Infinite in Power? for may we not conceive something greater than all finite Power? (4) Reason also instructes us, that there are somethings simply possible, which cannot be produced, but by a power intensively infinite, etc. That God's Power is simply infinite, see Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 30. Sect. 17. p. 144. Greg. Ariminens. Sent. l. 1. Distinct. 42. p. 152. CHAP. VI Of God's Justice, veracity, and Sanctity: also of the Trinity. God's Justice, Absolute and Ordinate. How far God's punitive Justice is necessary. How far God's Justice regards the Qualities of its object. God's veracity explicated and demonstrated. Also his Sanctity. Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinity, with their Use and Abuse in Theologie. §. 1. THe next Attribute, that occurs to be discoursed os, The Justice of God. is the Justice of God; whereof we find great characters both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophy. As for Sacred Philosophy it sets forth the Justice of God in lively colours, Psal. 19.9. The Judgements of the Lord are true and righteous. Psal. 36.6. Thy righteousness is like the great mountains: Psal. 119.137. and Psal. 119.137. Righteous art thou O Lord, and upright are thy judgements. Here are two distinct particulars assigned to the Justice of God. (1) He is righteous, and (2) his judgements are upright. Men may be just, and lovers of Justice, and yet their Judgements not upright. But it is not so with God. The like Psal. 50.6. and 96.10. and 98.9. and 99.4. Thus also Esa. 28.17. Judgement also will I lay to the line, and righteousness to the plummet. Esa. 28.17. A Metaphor taken from the practice of Masons or Carpenters, who, when they will have a thing done exactly, are wont to do it by line and level, as Amos 7.8. so accurate and exquisite are the Judgements of God. Rom. 2.2, 11. So Rom. 2.2. But we are sure that the judgement of God is according to truth. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Reason itself dictates so much to us: were he not just, he were not God. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to truth, or justice: for so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here imports: and it is opposed to the Roman Judgements, which were at this time most unjust. And he adds the reason, v. 11. for there is no respect of persons with God. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies the face; from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aph the face, or from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies, (1) That which, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is admoved to, or bound about the face: a Larve, Person, or Masque. For persona, q. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to its primary notion signifies a vizard, or one that wears it. (2) The face, that part 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which was covered, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, with the larve or vizard. Thence, (3) The whole man, or person, considered essentially and substantially. (4) Also the extern Figure, Form, Quality, or Disposition of a person considered accidentally. Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to accept the person, is to accept or regard any extern Qualities, Relations, Dispositions, or Conditions of the person, which ought not to come under consideration in Judgement. Mat. 20.21. So Mat. 20 21. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 answers to the Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, lifting up the face: and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to lift up the face is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to accept the face or person. For in those times, the ancient gesture of salutation was by casting the face down on the earth: and he that was saluted lifted up the face of him that saluted; as David Saul. Which custom yet continues in those Oriental parts. And from this custom of Salutation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was traduced to signify the acceptation of the person, contrary to the merits of the cause or thing. For to respect a person is when that in judgement is respected, which ought not to come into judgement. When God is said, not to respect persons, the notion Person doth not denote a man, but the condition of a man, which ought not to be regarded. Acceptation of persons is only when favour or affection, or the like extrinsec considerations prevail, contrary to Equity: in which regard God cannot be said to accept persons, because he is under no obligation or Laws of Justice, more than what his own Freewill has brought him under. Plato discourseth accurately of God's Justice, Leg. 10. pag. 904. There being an Objection raised by a juvenile Wit, That albeit God regards Human Affairs, yet it were an easy matter for wicked men, by gifts and favours, to gain his favour. To which Plato thus replies: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. But neither thou, nor cory other may be thought ever so far to prevail with God by prayers, that he should exempt himself from Divine Judgement, or decline the Tribunal of God: for he hath firmly determined, that no mortal shall escape it. For thou art never neglected by this Judgement; no, albeit thou wert so small as to creep into the profundity of the earth: nor yet if thou wert so sublime, as being elevated with wings to fly into the Heavens: but thou shalt suffer deserved punishment, either here or in Hel. Then he adds, p. 906. This Oration is usurped by him, who affirms, that God can be easily reconciled to unjust men, as if he should cousent to divide the spoil with sinners, even then when they sin: just as if the Wolves should give a small portion of their prey to the dogs; and these being pacified with their gifts, should give the Wolves leave to devour the sheep. Is not this the import of their Oration, who conceive God to be easily reconciled to wicked men? Then he concludes, pag. 907. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Is not God of all keepers the greatest, and employed in the greatest affairs? Can we then imagine, that he, who keeps the best things, and doth infinitely excel in the Art and faculty of keeping, is worse than Dogs or poor Mortals, who yet cannot be bribed by rewards from wicked men, given with an i'll intent, to do what is unjust? Plato here compares God to a Shepherds Dog, which cannot be bribed by the Wolves to deliver up the Sheep for a prey: much less, saith he, can God be bribed to do unjustly. So Leg. 4.716. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Justice is the avenger of those that come short of the Divine Law. The more fully to explicate the Justice of God, God's Absolute Justice we must distinguish between his Absolute Justice, and that which is Ordinate. 1. God's Absolute Justice is founded on the infinite perfection of his Essence, and has one and the same Idea with his Sovereign Dominion over his Creature. For so great is the Majesty of God, and so Absolute his Dominion, as that he is obnoxious to no Laws, Obligations, or Ties from his Creature: this Absolute Justice or Dominion regards not any qualities or conditions of its object; but God can by virtue hereof inflict the highest torments on his innocent Creature, and exempt from punishment the most nocent. as to afflicting the Innocent. (1) By this Absolute Justice and Dominion God can inflict the greatest torments, even of Hell itself, on the most innocent Creature? For every Creature as such is subordinate to God both in suffering, as well as doing what he pleaseth, as Suarez in 1. 2ae. Tract. 5. Disp. 7. p. 418. We must deny, saith he, that God, as Supreme Lord, cannot inflict on an innocent man all that Evil that is in the torments of Hel. Thus in his Metaphys. Disput. 31. Sect. 14. God hath a full Dominion over his Creature, to use it as it pleaseth him, for any use that involves not a contradiction. For that Dominion is not in all regards perfect, which includes not a Power to dispose of its object unto every possible use. Again, God cannot make a Create Being, whereof he has not the full and perfect Dominion. To this full and absolute Dominion in God there corresponds a full and absolute subjection in the Creature: for these two are correlatives. Hence, there is no Justice properly so termed in respect of the Creatures, whereby God stands obliged to them, antecedent to the constitution of his own Wil Nothing more unjust than to deny unto God an absolute Dominion to dispose of the Creature made by him as it pleaseth him. And that God did the facto inflict the highest torments on an innocent pure spotless Creature, even the human Nature of his own Son is most evident. They who deny Gods absolute Dominion over the Creatures, deny him to be their Creator. Must we not allow God, who made allthings, a power to order all to the ends he made them for? Doth not God give to every Creature what shape he pleaseth? and may he not then appoint them to what end he please? Is it not an end sufficient for the Being of a Creature to be the objective glory of any Divine Attribute? And therefore if God should make an innocent Creature to destroy it, thereby to illustrate the Glory of his Power, who can say he is unjust? The greatest notions that our minds can frame are too narrow to express the absolute Dominion of God over his Creature. (2) God, How far God's punitive Justice is necessary. by reason of his absolute Justice and Dominion, could, if it had-seemed good to him, have freely pardoned sinners without satisfaction. And here I find myself involved in that grand Question, Whether the vindictive or punitive Justice of God, as to its egresses, be necessary? I am not ignorant that great and holy Divines are divided in their thoughts and determinations hereof: Some strongly defending the Affirmative; others the Negative. I may not be so far mine own flatterer, as to presume myself to be capable of reconciling such extremes, yet may I not humbly offer somewhat tending thereto? And first we must distinguish the terms, and then we shall with more facility determine the question so as to include the sense of both extremes. We must distinguish, (1) between the merit of punishment, and the actual adjudging sinners unto punishment. (2) Between the obligation on God to punish, and the obligation on the sinner to receive punishment. (3) Between Natural Necessity and Moral. (4) Between natural Congruity and natural Necessity. (5) Between God's absolute Justice or Dominion, and his ordinate Justice. These distinctions premissed, we offer these following Propositions for the determining the question and reconciling the extremes. (1) Prop. All sin necessarily merits punishment, albeit actual punition be not an effect absolutely and physically necessary for the vindication of Divine Justice. All sin has guilt necessarily appendent thereto: and all guilt necessarily implies a merit of punishment: for guilt is but a middle between sin and punishment; it necessarily follows sin, and binds over the sinner, or makes him obnoxious unto punishment: yet actual punition is not absolutely necessary for the vindication of Divine Justice. (2) Prop. There is a necessary debt or obligation on the sinner's part to receive punishment, albeit there be not a debt or obligation absolutely and physically necessary on God's part to punish the sinner. Gild is not a physic but moral Accident; or mode, or debt improperly so termed, whereby the offender is bound over to suffer such punishment, as the merit of the sin requires: whence on God's part it implies a certain moral right or power of punishing: not that God is bound by a necessity of nature to punish, although the sinner be bound by a necessary obligation of his nature to receive and suffer punishment. Hence, (3) God has a natural right to punish sin, yet he doth not punish it from a necessity of nature, but freely. God most justly punisheth sin, yet he would not be unjust, if we consider his absolute Justice, if he did not punish it. If Gods punishing sin be from a necessity of nature, and not from the free constitution of his Will, he must punish sin as necessarily, as he loves himself: and then it will follow, that God cannot relaxate his penal Laws, as to the time, measure, and manner of punishing: yea he cannot accept of the satisfaction of a Mediator: for that is a degree of relaxation. It's true, God necessarily loves his own Glory which is darkened by sin: but yet it is not God's essential Glory, but only his manifestative Glory which is hurt by sin, as Elihu, Job 39.6. Hence Gods punishing sin is not from a necessity of nature, such as that whereby the fire burns, or God loves himself: For in all the Acts of God ad extra there is not only a concomitant but also antecedent Liberty, or Liberty of Election, which supposeth some possibility of rejection, at least according to the priority of reason or nature, as before, Chap. 5. §. 3.8. Prop. Whence Gods punishing sin being an act ad extra dependent on the free constitution of his Will, it cannot be from a necessity of nature. (4) Albeit, God be not under a natural necessity of punishing sin, yet he is under a moral necessity to punish the same. By moral necessity I understand that moral obligation he is under for the vindication of his Justice as Rector of the World. This some call a natural congruence or condecence, which obligeth God to vindicate his own Justice, and declare his infinite displeasure against sin, by punishing of it. (5) last, Albeit God might, by his absolute Dominion, considered antecedently to his Will, let sin pass unpunished, yet by his ordinate Justice, he necessarily punisheth the same. In the consideration of God's moral efficience on his Creature, we are not to consider what God can by his absolute Justice or Dominion do, but what by his ordinate Justice and moral Constitution he can do. And in this regard it is most true, that God is under a necessity of punishing sin, without a satisfaction: and he were inevitably unjust, if he should not punish it. And thus, as I humbly conceive, both opinions, though seemingly opposite, may be easily reconciled. And indeed we find this very Controversy on foot many hundred years since. For Augustin held, That God could save sinners without a satisfaction: and Anselme held, he could not. And Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 52. pag. 841. undertakes my task, to reconcile both, by the distinction of God's absolute Power, and his ordinate Power, as Rector of the World. In the former sense he can, but in the later he cannot save sinners but by Christ. Hence, 2. We pass on to God's ordinate Justice, God's ordinate Justice from his Wil which has a necessary relation to some quality in its object, in this or that manner affected or constituted; which quality being supposed, its egress to or execution on its object is necessary, not by any physic necessity of nature, but by a moral necessity or natural congruity, subsequent to the free constitution of the Divine Will, in order to the manifestation of the Divine Glory. And in this sense the Justice of God, in sacred Philosophy, is usually taken, namely for that Attribute whereby God executes the Decrees and Constitutions of his own sovereign Will and Word, for the manifestation of his own Glory. So that this ordinate Justice of God implies several particular Ideas, which we shall endeavour to explicate in the following Propositions. 1. Prop. Gods ordinate Justice ariseth from the free Constitution and Determination of his own Wil Antecedently to the Will of God nothing is so far just, that it ought to be, but only that it may be justly and conveniently done, if God will it: there is no Law of Justice in the actions of God, but what his own Will prescribeth: the Will of God is not circumscribed by his Justice, but his Justice by his Will: for nothing is just in Divine Actions, but what he wils, yea because he wils it. Thus Carthusianus, in 4. Dist. 46. Quaest. 1. The whole order of Justice is originally reduced to the Divine Will: whatever God wils is just, neither is his Will properly restrained by Justice. So Scotus, l. 4. Dist. 46. Quaest. 1. That is always just, which is actually willed by the Divine Will; and because it is actually willed by the Divine Wil The Rule of Justice, whereby men are to act, ties them up to one part of the contradiction, so that they are unjust if they act not so; but there is no such Rule of Justice to be affixed to God, farther than the free constitution of his own Will has tied him up. God's Will reveled is a Rule of Justice to us his Creatures, but his absolute sovereign Will is that alone that regulates him in all his actions. Therefore learned Davenant saith, That God cannot will any thing but saluâ justitiâ, i. e. he can do nothing contra justitiam; yet he may will and do many things praeter justitiam: i. e. he may freely decree and do many things, where saluâ justitiâ, he might as freely have decreed and done the contrary. So Lombard. l. 1. Dist. 43. God could have omitted what he doth, and have done what he omits, without injustice. Hence, 2. Prop. Gods ordinate Justice towards the Creature has one and the same Idea with his veracity or Fidelity. God's ordinate Justice the same with his veracity. Psal. 119.123. Thence in sacred Philosophy the Righteousness of God is oft put for his veracity and Fidelity in making good his word. So Psal. 119.123. For the word of thy righteousness: i. e. the word of thy promise, which thy righteousness or fidelity is obliged to make good. So Psal. 31.1. & 89.14. There is indeed in God no Justice properly so termed, in which respect he may be said to be obliged to his Creature: but that which we style the Justice of God towards his Creature, is no other than his Fidelity, which presupposeth some constitution of the Divine Will: wherefore, abstracting such a constitution, God cannot be said to do any thing repugnant to his Justice. For what is Justice, according to its general Idea, but to give every one his own? And what has the Creature that it may claim as its own, but what it receives from the Divine Will? Again, Justice is a Conformity or Equality, according to the obligation or debt which every one falls under: Justitia Dei est agere secundum condecentiam Bonitatis aut Veracitatis suae. Albert. p. 1. tract. 19 q. 77. and what obligation or debt can there befall God, with relation to his Creature, but what his own goodness and will lays upon him? How can God be obliged to any, but by his own will and word? What then is his Justice, but to act according to the condecence or congruity of his own veracity or bonity, as the Schoolmen determine? Hence in things where there is no express declaration of the Divine Will, Covenant, or Promise on God part, if he should pretermit that which he doth, or do that which he pretermits, if he should deal more severely, or more mercifully with any than he doth, there could be no injustice fastened on him. Hence, 3. Prop. There can be no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, No acception of persons with God. or Acception of persons charged on God. This is expressly laid down, Rom. 2.11. of which before: And the reasons are most evident, (1) Because Acception of persons has place only in him, who is under an obligation to distribute justice, not according to his pleasure, but according to certain Qualities, Reasons, or Conditions inherent in or appendent to the persons, to whom the said justice is to be distributed. But now God is under no obligation, but what flows from his own sovereign pleasure, to distribute rewards or punishments to any. (2) Acception of persons cannot have place in the distribution of good things merely gratuitous and free; but only in such as are of debt: But now God's distributions of good things are merely gratuitous. Thus Aquinas: Acception of persons is only of a thing due; and therefore it cannot be ascribed to God. None can owe any thing to another, but by this, that he doth in some manner depend on, or hath received something from another: but God depends on no one, neither doth he receive any thing from any other. Acception of persons has place only where, in the dispensation of things due, any favours one more than another, with respect to some circumstance of the person, contrary or beside the merits of the cause. Therefore, albeit God give, out of his mere liberality, inequally to persons equal, yet this is not Acception of persons; because there is nothing due. Hence, 4. Prop. There is an infinite distance between the Justice of God, The difference between the Justice of God and Men. and of men. (1) All human Justice ariseth from an obligation and debt; but God's Justice from the mere free constitution of his Wil: Man wils things, because they are just; but things are therefore just with God, because he wils them. (2) Many things that are injust with men, are just with God. The rule of Justice which toeth men to do justly, doth also render them injust, when they do otherwise: But now God, where he hath not brought himself under an obligation by his own free constitution and promise, hath a liberty of acting or not acting, of doing this or the contrary in the distribution of rewards, and gifts. If he should not do what he doth, or if he should do what he doth not, his Justice were the same. If God spoil the Egyptians to enrich his people, or if he every the Assyrians by the spoils of his people, he is just still. Where God hath not obliged himself by his own Word, he has a liberty of doing one thing or the contrary without injustice. Yet, 5. Prop. So far as God hath obliged himself by the constitution of his own Will and Word, God's Justice regards the Qualities of its object. his ordinate Justice ever regards the Constitution and Qualities of the object. God's ordinate Justice being the same with his veracity and Fidelity, it always respects such Qualities and Conditions as its object, by reason of his own constitution, is invested with. For God, in the executions of his ordinate Justice, assumes the quality of a Judge: and a Judge cannot duly abstain from the administration of Justice: neither is Justice duly administered, unless the Qualities of the objects, and merits of the cause be fully inspected and considered. God's ordinate Justice as Rector and Judge of the All is chief exercised in the reduction of allthings to that equality and order, which his Divine Wisdom and Will has prescribed unto them. Hence these two things necessarily follow this Divine ordinate Justice: (1) It never exerts itself, but where those Qualities and Conditions, which it has prescribed its object, be found. As it never punisheth any but for sin; so it never rewards any but the Godly, etc. (2) Wherever these Conditions or Qualities are found, it necessarily exerts itself. It cannot but punish sin wherever it be; neither can it but reward holiness if sincere. There is a necessity, not Physic but Moral attends all its egresses; and that from the free Constitution of the Divine Wil §. 2. Next to the Justice of God we are to discourse of his veracity and Fidelity, God's veracity and Fidelity. which is not really distinct from his Ordinate Justice. Thence we find the Justice of God frequently put for his Fidelity. So Psal. 31.1. Deliver me in thy Righteousness, Psal. 31.1. i. e. according to thy Righteousness, whereby thou dost declare thyself just in making good thy promises. Some make this distinction between God's Verity, Fidelity, and Justice: God's Verity obligeth him to this, that he promise sincerely: his Fidelity, that he keep his promise: and his Justice, that he perform his promise by giving the thing promised. Touching the veracity of God we find lively Illustrations and Notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophy. As for Sacred Philosophy, it is most express in the asserting God's veracity. Gen. 22.16. So Gen. 22.16. By myself have I sworn, assuredly saith Jehovah. Assuredly saith: or, the faithful saying. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neum is peculiar to God's Oracles, which are all faithful say, 1 Tim. 1.15. and 3.1. Of the same letters transposed comes also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Amen, which notes the faithfulness of God. Thus Esa. 25.1. Esa. 25.1. For thou hast done wonderful things, thy counsels of old are faithfulness and truth. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In faithfulness and firmness. Gataker conceives the word here to note firm or firmness, rather than true or truth; because the word, in the singular no where else found, is used in the plural for pillars, 2 Kings 18.16. The veracity of God is farther explicated, 1 Sam. 15.29. 1 Sam. 15.29. The Eternity or strength of Israel will not lie. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both eternity and strength, which are both great pillars of the Divine veracity. So Psal. 33.4. Psal. 33.4. The Word of the Lord is right, and all his works are done in truth. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in truth, veracity, or constancy. So Psal. 18.20. Psal. 18.20. As for God, his way is perfect. This seems to be meant of the veracity and constancy of his promises. Thence it follows: The Word of the Lord is tried. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 examined, i. e. pure, sincere, like Silver well refined, neither do they ever fail, as Psal. 12.6. Psal. 36.5. So Psal. 36.5. Thy faithfulness reacheth to the clouds: i e. it is Immense and Infinite. The space between us and the Clouds is vast, Psal. 89.1, 8. and seemingly immense. Thus Psal. 89.1. I will sing of the mercies of the Lord. By Mercies Kimhi and Ezra understand Gods free Constitution antecedent to his promise. Whence it follows: With my mouth will I make known thy faithfulness. Mercy makes the promise, but Fidelity is engaged for the performance of it. So v. 2, 3. and v. 8. O Lord God of Hosts, who is a strong God like unto thee? or, to thy faithfulness round about thee? He styles God most potent, in regard of his veracity and Fidelity in making good his promises: and then he adds, that God's faithfulness is round about him, which is a Poetic description, denoting that God is always and in every posture or regard most faithful. And he proceeds, in the following Verses, lively to describe the Fidelity of God: v. 33, 34, 35. particularly v. 33. Nor suffer my faithfulness to fail. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Neither will I lie against my Truth, or in my Truth: i. e. I will not violate my veracity, by not performing my promise. So v. 34. My Covenant will I not break. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I will not profane my Covenant, or offer violence to it. Again, v. 35. Once have I sworn by my Holiness, that I will not lie unto David. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 once, i. e. irrevocably, as Kinthi and Ezra. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, if I lie to David. The particle if, being used as a formule in swearing, doth greatly deny. For the ancient Patriarches were wont, under this formule, by a kind of Aposiopesis, silently to couch an Imprecation of evil on the head of him that swore, if he did violate his faith. The great God assumes this formule of swearing from human custom, thereby to declare the firmitude of his veracity and Fidelity in performing his oath. All this is lively explicated, Hebr. 6.17, 18. Heb. 6.17, 18. God being willing more abundantly to show to the heirs of promise, the immutability of his counsel, engaged his fidelity by an oath: That by two immutable things, in which it was impossible for God to lie, or to deceive: for so Grotius conceives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aught to be rendered, which signifies an event that frustrates expectation, as Leu. 6.2. Jos. 24.27. Esa. 58.2. Hos. 1.2. Hab. 3.17. God's Providences oft seem to cross his Promises, and so to frustrate our expectations, but really there is not the least mutability on God's part: he cannot lie or deceive, being bound by two immutable things, his Word and Oath, which give abundant assurance of his Fidelity. Plato also gives very great and illustrious notices of the veracity of God, and those not a little consorme to Sacred Philosophy. Thus Repub. 2. p. 382. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Dost thou not know, that both God and men do truly hate a lie? And then he adds the Reason: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That there is no mortal who would in his soul either deceive, or be deceived, or be ignorant, or be involved in the darkness of a lie, as to Supreme Being's. Thence he subjoins: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Truly a lie should be hated, not only by God, but also by men. Then he adds: shall we imagine, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; that a lie is utile to God? What, therefore because he understands not ancient things, & c.? Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Wherefore God is both simple and faithful, both in work and word: neither is he himself changed, neither doth he deceive others, neither by fantastic delusions, neither by words, neither by signs, neither by visions, neither by dreams. Plato here enumerates the several ways, whereby God reveles himself, in each of which his veracity is most illustrious. Whence p. 383. he makes this Law for the right establishment of Religion, That men speak and believe touching God, that he is no Deceiver, or Seducer of others, either by Words, or otherwise. But to discourse more Philosophically of the veracity of God, we must first distinguish of Verity in the general; which is either simple or complexe. (1) Simple verity is either in the mind, or in things themselves. [1] Simple Truth in the mind consists in the conformity of our Notions unto things. And in this regard the Truth of God imports the verity of his Ideas, or knowledge of things. [2] Simple Truth in Things, is nothing but their conformity to their specific Idea, or formal definition and nature. So we say, that is true Gold, which conforms to the specific Idea of Gold. This some Aristoteleans stile Metaphysic or transcendental Truth: others Physic Truth; it being no other than the real existence of things. For, as Aristotle, (or whoever were the compilator of that Book) Metaph. min. l. 1. c. 1. observes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, every thing has so much of truth, as it has of existence. Now the verity of God in this regard, is nothing else save the simple pure actuality of his essence and existence. (2) Complexe Truth is either Mental, or Oral. [1] Complexe mental Truth is the conformity of complexe mental Ideas, Notions, or Propositions unto things: which cannot be ascribed to God, because he has no complexe knowledge, but only simple: albeit he knows all propositions, yet it is not by any complexe notions, but in the most simple glass of his own essence. [2] Complexe Oral Verity is either Logic or Ethic: Logic Oral Verity is when Propositions or Discourses agree with things: Ethic Oral Verity is when our words agree to our thoughts, which is termed Sincerity; or our deeds to our words, which is veracity. This veracity as to God regards all his words; God's veracity in fulfilling but in a more particular manner his Comminations or Threats, and Promises; yet with this difference. (1) Promises. (1) Promises give a right to the persons to whom they are made, which cannot be taken from them without injury: for albeit it be free to any to make a promise; yet having made it, his fidelity is obliged to see it performed. So that in Promises there is no room for Relaxation or Dispensation; but the words must be taken in the largest sense, and as most favourable for the persons to whom the Promise is made: according to that common maxim in Civil Law, Favours must be amplified. And that which adds to the obligation of promises is when they are confirmed by an Oath, which renders them every way Immutable and Irrelaxable. Such are all the Promises of God, as Hebr. 6.17. Heb. 6.17, 18. Where God is said to confirm his promise by an Oath, whereby it became every way immutable, as vers. 18. (2) But now as to Comminations or Threats, (2) Threats. there is no right or debt accrues to the persons, to whom they are made, save only a debt or merit of punishment: the threat renders them obnoxious to punishment, if they break that Law whereto the threat is appendent: yet in many Cases, ' specially as to circumstances, the Superior, who made the Law and affixed a threat thereto, has a liberty of relaxing, or dispensing with the penalty of his Law. The Commination declares the Merit of punishment in the offender, and the Power of punishing in the Superior offended; but yet it doth not always suppose a necessary egress or execution of vindictive justice for the punishing the offender; at least not as to all circumstances threatened; but still there remains place in the breast of the Judge, or Superior, ' specially if he be Absolute, and Sovereign, either to relax or dispense with the penalty of his Laws, either in whole or part. Thus in God's Threats and penal Laws, he reserves to himself a liberty of Relaxation or Dispensation in many Cases, thereby to make way for his Clemence or Mercie, without the least violation of his veracity or Justice. So in the first commination or penal Law, Gen. 2.17. Thou shalt surely die. Gen. 2.17. Heb. in dying thou shalt die. Which Hebraisme denotes a certain, immediate, perfect, and constant death. And yet our Sovereign Lord, out of his Sovereign rich Mercy, was pleased very far to relax and mitigate the rigour of this commination or penal Law, as to many circumstances, by admitting of a Mediator, and new Evangelic Covenant. In this regard God is said to repent or turn from the fierceness of wrath, as Jonah 3.9. Who can tell if God will turn, Jonah 3.9. and repent, and turn away from his fierce anger, that we perish not. God by reason of their legal imperfect faith and repentance, turned away his fierce wrath for that time, albeit afterward it came down with vengeance, as History assureth us. Neither is it to be feared, lest the veracity of God should receive any injury, if all his Threats are not always in all circumstances or parts fulfilled: because all comminations and threats, which have not some character or sign of irrevocabilitie assixt to them, are, according to their own nature, so to be understood, as not to diminish the right of the Superior, who makes them, to relax the same. Thus we see what latitude the Divine veracity admits in the fulfilling Comminations and Threats, beyond what can be admitted in fulfilling Divine Promises, as Grotius well observes. God's veracity and Fidelity in fulfilling his word, God's veracity demonstrated. is founded in and may be demonstrated by, (1) his essential Verity. Plato makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the first Truth, yea, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Truth itself; whence he cannot but be true and faithful in his words. God is Truth essentially, not participatively, therefore nothing but Truth can pass from him. Again, God is pure Truth or Verity, with whom not the least shadow of Falsity, Hypocrisy, or Fraud in word or deed can mingle. Pure Truth and falsity are incompatible. There are no thoughts or ideas of man's heart so true, but there is some mixture of error or falsity in them: no words or deeds so sincere and faithful, but something of hypocrisy and falsity mixed with them: because there is no pure truth in man's thoughts or words. But God being the first, pure, essential Verity, his veracity is most pure and perfect, without the least shadow of falsity. (2) God's veracity is founded on, and may be demonstrated by his Eternity and Omnipotence. Thus in sacred Philosophy, 1 Sam. 15.29. 1 Sam. 15.29. The Eternity or strength of Israel will not lie. All lies are from impotence and infirmity: Truth and veracity is ever potent and strong; but falsity most impotent. (3) From the Holiness of God, of which we shall immediately discourse. I shall conclude this Divine Attribute with a pleasing observation I long since met with in the Life of Jansenius, Bishop of Ipre, that great Patron of Divine Grace, who being demanded, What Attribute of God was most in his heart, whereby he was most awed? Replied, The Truth or veracity of God. And he that writes his Life, prefixed to his Augustinus, assures us, That in his Garden-walkes, and solitary Meditations, with his eyes fixed on Heaven, he was oft seen and heard to break forth into this acclamation: O Truth! So great an Admirer was he of Divine Verity and veracity: and indeed no wonder, seeing it is the great Spring of the Divine life and consolation both here and hereafter. §. 3. The last Divine Attribute, The Sanctity of God. we are to discourse of, is the Sanctity or Holiness of God, whereof we find great and illustrious Characters in sacred Philosophy. (1) We find the Sanctity of God set forth in Scripture in a way of eminence and distinction from all created Sanctity. Exod. 15.11. So Exod. 15.11. Who is like unto thee, O Lord, amongst the Gods, or mighty men! Who is like unto thee gloriose in Holiness, & c! Where he placeth God's transcendent Eminence and Elevation above all Creatures, as that wherein his essential Sanctity chief consists. And indeed the peerless Eminence of God's sacred Majesty is that wherein his Sanctity chief consists, as we intent anon more fully to demonstrate. Thus 1 Sam. 2.2. There is none holy as the Lord: 1 Sam. 2.2. for there is none besides thee: neither is there any Rock like our God. Hannah here, as Moses before, placeth the Sanctity of God in his Supereminence above all Creatures. (2) Hence God is frequently brought in, as an object of Divine Worship, with regard to his Holiness. So Psal. 30.4. Give thanks at the remembrance of his Holiness: i. e. of his peerless Eminences. And Psal. 71.22. Unto thee will I sing with the harp, O thou holy One of Israel. Also Psal. 92.12. Psal. 92.12. And give thanks at the remembrance of his Holiness: or celebrate the memorial of his Holiness: i. e. Lift up his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or transcendent Excellences. Again, Psal. 98.1. O sing unto the Lord a new song; for he hath done marvellous things: his right hand and his holy arm hath gotten him victory. His holy arm, or the arm of his Holiness: i. e. of his holy power so much above all other powers. The like Psal. 99.3. Let them praise thy great and terrible name; for it is holy. Also v. 9 Exalt the Lord our God, and worship at his holy hill: for the Lord our God is holy. The like v. 5. As God is a transcendent superlative Majesty, exalted above all other Gods, or Majesties, as Exod. 15.11. so in all Acts of Worship we must exalt him, by giving him a singular, incommunicable, peculiar Worship. Whence in Scripture those that give that Worship which is due to God, to any besides him, or in conjunction with him, by way of object, either mediate or immediate, are said to profane his holy Name, Ezech. 20.39. & 43.7, 8. because God's Holiness, consisting in a superlative incommunicable Majesty, admits no corrival in point of Worship. Hence, to sanctify the holy Name or Majesty of God, is [1] to serve and glorify him; because of his transcendent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Eminence; and [2] to do it with a peculiar, separate, incommunicated Worship; because he is holy and separate above allthings else. Not to do the former, is Irreligion, Profaneness and Atheism; not to do the later is Idolatry and Superstition, as judicious Mede well observes. Hence (3) God is said to sit on a Throne of Holiness, Psal. 47.8. God sitteth upon the Throne of his Holiness. Psal. 47.8. Alluding to the Thrones of Princes, which were in the midst of the people, exalted and lift up, that so their Majesty might appear more illustrious. God being, by reason of his transcendent Eminences, exalted infinitely above all Creatures, he is therefore said, to sit on the Throne of his Holiness. (4) We find God's Holiness, in a most eminent manner and with emphatic Characters, proclaimed by such as have any views of God. Thus Esa. 6.3. Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts. So Rev. 4.8. (5) The Sanctity of God is sometimes described by purity. Hab. 1.13. Hab. 1.13. Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on iniquity. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prae videndo. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is comparative: as if he had said; O! how pure are thine eyes? how impossible is it for thee to behold sin, with the least delight or approbation? So 1 Joh. 3.3. As he is pure. (6) The Sanctity of God is sometimes described by Rectitude. Psal. 25 8. Good and upright is the Lord. So Psal. 92.15. To show that the Lord is upright. We find also in Plato many great notices of the Sanctity of God, conformable to those of sacred Philosophy. So Theaetet. pag. 176. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Evils find no place with God. Again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God is in no manner unrighteous, but as it seems most righteous. So Repub. 2. pag. 379. he saith, That in Theology we should use such modules, as come nearest to the Nature of God, and demonstrate what God is. Thus we must constantly ascribe to God things consentaneous to his Nature. Whence he subjoins: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Must we not determine then, that God is indeed good? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But no good is noxious. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; But that which hurts not, doth it do any evil? No surely. Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Good therefore is not the cause of allthings; but of those things that are good it is the cause; but of evils it is not the cause: i. e. God is the first Cause and Author of all natural and moral good, but as for moral evil he is not the Author or Cause thereof as it is evil; because moral evils as such have no efficient cause but only deficient. Thence he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Of good things we must own no principal cause but God: but as for evils we must inquire after some other causes of them; for God must not be esteemed the cause of them. His mind is, that God must be owned as the cause of all good, both Natural and Moral; yea, of the materia substrata, or the material entity of sin, which is a natural good: but as for the proper Moral cause of Sin, as Sin is a deordination or difformity from the Divine Law, that is proper to the sinner: for God must not be thought to be the Author or Moral cause of sin. This he farther explains, p. 380. Either we must not at all attribute evils to God, or if we do, it must be in that manner as before, namely, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, we must say, that God hath acted well and justly, and has inflicted those punishments on them, that thereby he might bring some profit. Wherein he informs us, that God is the cause of penal evils, not as evils, but as conducing to good. Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. That God, who is good, should be the Author or Moral Cause of Evil to any, this we must with all manner of contention refute, and not suffer any in the City to speak or hear such things. Plato strongly assertes, that God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the principal cause of all good, but not of sin as sin; i. e. he neither commands, invites, encourageth, nor by any other Moral causality produceth sin: albeit God doth concur to the material act or physic entity of sin, which is naturally good, yet he doth not at all concur to the moral production, obliquity or deordination of sin, which has indeed no real efficient cause, but only deficient, according to that of Proclus: There is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Idea of moral evils. But the more distinctly and yet concisely to explicate the sanctity of God, we are to know that his original Essential and Absolute Holiness is nothing else but the incommunicable superlative 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or supereminence of his Divine Majesty, as separate from allthings else. For all Sanctity, and all the notions thereof, specially Grecanic and Hebraic, imply separation and discretion. Whence the Sacred Majesty of God, being, in regard of its infinite Perfection and Dignity, infinitely exalted above all Being's and Dignities whatsoever, it must necessarily be the prime sanctity. Yea, Holiness is so far appropriated to the first Being, as that the Heathens ascribed a fictitious sanctity and eminence to all their spurious Deities: whereby they generally acknowleged, that the prime Holiness belongs only to the first Being. It's true, good Angels and Men are Holy by participation and derivation; but they are not Holiness in the abstract: this appertains only to he prime, original, essential Holiness, who is infinitely separate from all other Dignities and Eminences: in whom all Holiness is in the abstract and essentially; from whom also all Holiness flows as from the source and spring. §. 4. We find in Plato not only Characters of the Divine Essence and Attributes, Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinity. but also some dark notices of the Trinity; which, I no way doubt, were originally traduced from the Sacred Fountain of Hebraic Philosophy. We have Plato's Sentiments about a Trinity mentioned more expressly in his Sectators, Plotinus, Porphyry, jamblichus and Proclus. And the whole is well explicated by Cyril Alexandr. Contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit. Paris. 1638. thus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For Porphyry, expounding the Sentiment of Plato, saith, that the essence of God proceeds even to three Hypostases; but that the Supreme God is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Supreme GOOD; and that after him, the second is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the prime Opificer or Creator; moreover, that the third is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the mundane Soul: (or Universal Spirit:) For the Divinity extended itself to the Soul of the Universe. This Platonic Trinity Cyril refutes, as that which gave Spawn and Seed to Arianism, as hereafter. I am not ignorant, that Learned Cudworth, in his New Book, against Atheism, B. 1. C. 4. §. 34. p. 590, etc. endeavours to apologise for this Platonic Trinity, and reconcile it with the Christian: Yet he ingenuously acknowledgeth, pag. 580, and 601, etc. That the most refined Platonic Trinity supposeth an Essential Dependence and Subordination of the second Hypostasis, to the First, and of the Third to the Second: Yea, he grants, that the Platonists generally held these three Hypostases to be three distinct Gods, as in what follows. I conceive those endeavours to reconcile the Christians Trinity with the Platonic, to be of most dangerous consequence, and that which proved Origen's Peste, as Part. 3. B. 2. c. 1. §. 8. The chief place I find in Plato, wherein he gives us some dark adumbration of a Trinity, is Epist. 6. p. 323. Let this Law be constituted by you, and confirmed by an Oath, not without obtesting, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, both God, the Imperator of allthings, both which are, and which shall be; and the Father of that Imperator and Cause: whom indeed, if we truly Philosophise, we shall all distinctly know, so far as that knowledge may fall within the power of blessed men. This description of God Clemens Alexandrinus and others interpret of God the Father, and God the Son, who is indeed the Imperator of allthings. We find also in Plato's Epinom. mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as elsewhere of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which they attribute to the second person in the Trinity. Whence the Poets make Minerva to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the mind of Jupiter, or his Wisdom, produced out of his head, without Mother: as the true Messiah was styled by the Hebrews, The wisdom of God, without Mother. Plotinus, Ennead. 5, Lib. 1. Philosophiseth copiosely of this Platonic Trinity; the Title of which Book runs thus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Of the Three Principal or Causal Hypostases. And he gins, Cap. 2. with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Mundane Soul, its Dignity and Office: and Ennead. 5. l. 5. c. 3. speaking of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Mind, the second Hypostasis in the Platonic Trinity, he saith, that he is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Second God. And En. 5. l. 1. c. 7. p. 489. he saith, That this Second God, the First Mind, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Being now begotten [by the first God] begot also all entities with himself, namely the whole pulchritude of Ideas; which were all intellectile Gods. Furthermore we must conceive that this [Begotten Mind] is full of allthings begotten by him, and doth as it were swallow up allthings begotten. Thence he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But the progeny of this Mind is a certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Hypostasis consisting in cogitation, etc. Proclus, in Plat. Timae. p. 93. calls this Platonic Trinity, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the tradition of the Three Gods; and he makes, according to Numenius, the First God, to be the Grandfather, the Second to be the Son, the Third to be the Grandson: i. e. the Second God to be begotten by the First, and the Third by the Second. Porphyry also, explicating Plato's mind, calls God the Creator of allthings, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Pattern Mind: who also makes three subsistences in the essence of the Divinity; the first he calls the Supreme God; the second, the Creator; the third, the Soul of the Universe. The like jamblichus his Scholar, concerning the Egyptian Mysteries: The first God, the prime being, the Father of God whom he begets, remaining in his solitary unity, etc. And Plotinus writ a Book of the three Persons or Subsistences: whereof the first he makes to be the Supreme Eternal Being, who generated the second, namely the eternal and perfect Mind, as before. So in his Book of Providence, he saith, That allthings were framed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by the Divine Mind. Thus Plato in his Phaedo saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Divine Mind is the framer and cause of allthings. That these Platonic Philosophemes were the Seminary of Arianisme, we have endeavoured to demonstrate, Part. 3. l. 2. c. 1. §. 9 And this is well observed by Cyril, contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit. Paris. 1638. where speaking of Plato, and his Trinity, he saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Truly he contemplated not the whole rightly, but, in the same manner as they who follow Arius, he divides and supposeth Subjects, inducing Hypostases subordinate among themselves, and conceits the Holy and Consubstantial Trinity to be three distinct Gods. And albeit Learned Cudworth, B. 1. C. 4. p. 590. against Atheism, endeavours to wipe off this aspersion, yet he grants the conclusion, as hereafter. But to speak the truth, I find no express mention of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Trinity in Plato; only he speaks confusedly of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Father Lord, and of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Mind, etc. But among the later Platonistes of the School of Alexandria, 'specially those of the golden succession, the Sectators of Ammonius, Plotinus, Porphyry, jamblichus, Proclus, we find frequent mention and notices of a Trinity, which they thus distinguish. (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Supreme self-being: whom also they style 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the one, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Good. (2) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Divine mind, the Creatrix or Framer of allthings: who is also termed by them, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Word, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the seminal Word or Reason, that gives Being to allthings. (3) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Soul of the Universe: and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the first Soul, as c. 8. §. 2. These more distinct notices of a Trinity, I am very apt to persuade myself they received not so much from Plato, but from Ammonius, the famous Head of that Succession; who was either a Christian, or a friend to their Sacred Philosophy, out of which he stole most of his choicest Philosophemes, and incorporated them into the body of his Platonic Philosophy, in order to a refinement thereof: which, albeit his design might be good, yet it proved the peste and subversion of the Christian Theology, at least among those of that School. For Origen, his Scholar, following in his steps, out of too fond a love for Platonic Philosophy, reduced Sacred Philosophy to Platonic Dogmes: which proved the original cause of the greatest Errors that befell the Church in succeeding Ages. Thus he makes the Three Persons in the Trinity, to be, according to the Three Platonic Hypostases, One, not in Essence, but Will only. So Origen. contra Celsum, l. 8. p. 386. (Edit. Cantabr. 1658.) Where having cited that, Act. 4.32. There was of all the Believers one Heart and one Soul, he brings it to prove what our Lord affirms, Joh. 10.30. I and the Father are one. And thence in what follows concludes thus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Therefore we religiosely worship the Father of Truth, and the Son who is Truth, as being truly two in Hypostase, but one in concord, consent, and identity of Wil: So that whosoever sees the Son,— shall in him see God, as in the Image of God, etc. Hence Origen, in imitation of these Platonistes supposed an essential dependence of the Son, the second Hypostasis, on the Father; as also of the Spirit, the third, on the Son: of which essential dependence and subordination, see Cudworth against Atheism, L. 1. C. 4. p. 581, etc. Yea Origen, in his Comments on John will needs persuade us, That the Word in Divine things is taken only metaphorically. How far Origen's Platonic Philosophemes laid the foundation for the Arian and other Heresies touching the second and third Person in the Trinity, see Court Gent. p. 3. l. 2. c. 1. §. 8, 9 Samosatenus also had his pestiferous infusions from Plotinus' Philosophemes about the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and Arius his from the same School, as we have more fully proved in our Discourse of the Vanity of Philosophy, B. 2. C. 1. §. 8. But whereas Amelius of old, and some late Socinians would fain persuade us, that John borrowed his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Joh. 1.1. from Plato, it's evident, that he had it from the Sacred Philosophy among the Hebrews: for in the ancient Chaldaic Thargum we find frequent mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word of Jehovah, whereby they understood the Messiah, as Gen. 3.8. Psal. 2.12. and 27.1. as elsewhere. Yea Celsus would needs persuade us, That the Christians came to call their Jesus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, THE SON OF GOD, from their Pagan Ancestors, who called the World made by God, the Son of God: But this is refuted by Origen, Contra Celsum, l. 6. p. 308. Edit. 1658. Where he proves, that this Character of Jesus was to be found in the Writings of Moses and the Prophets, who writ long before the Grecian Philosophers. That all those confused notices of a Trinity among the Platonistes were originally traduced from Sacred Philosophy, see Clem. Alexandr. Strom. 5. p. 436. Eusebius, praepar. Evangel. l. 11. from cap. 14. to 23. Philos. General. Part. 1. l. 1. c. 2. sect. 5. §. 2. and l. 3. c. 4. sect. 1. §. 13. also Court. Gent. P. 1. B. 3. c. 5. §. 7. Learned Cudworth, in his Book against Atheism, B. 1. C. 4. sect. 35. p. 548. saith: We may reasonably conclude, that which Proclus asserteth of this Trinity, as it was contained in the Chaldaic Oracles, to be true, that it was at first 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Theology of Divine Tradition or Revelation, or a Divine Cabala, viz. amongst the Hebrews first, and from them afterwards communicated to the Egyptians and other Nations— However, adds he, we freely acknowledge, that, as this Divine Cababa was but little understood by many of those who entertained it among the Pagans, so was it by divers of them much depraved and adulterated. For (1) the Pagans universally called this their Trinity, a Trinity of Gods, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the First, the Second, and the Third God. (2) Whence, p. 557. he proceeds to demonstrate, that the direct design of this Platonic Trinity was nothing else but to lay a foundation for infinite Polytheisme, Cosmolatrie, and Creature-worship. Where by the way he well observes, That these Pagans (who so much cried up this Platonic Trinity) were the only public and professed Champions against Christianity, and the Christian Trinity. (3) He adds, p. 559. That the Three Hypostases or persons asserted by the Christians are truly and really one God; and not one only in Will, as Origen and the Platonistes avouch. (4) He informs us, p. 564. That Proclus and other of the Platonistes intermingle many particular Gods with those three Universal Principes or Hypostases of their Trinity; as noah's, Minds or Intellects superior to the first Soul; and Henades and Agathotetes, Unities and Goodnesses, superior to the first Intellect too; thereby making those particular Being's, which must needs be Creatures, superior to those Hypostases that are Universal and Infinite. So great confusions, yea contradictions attends the Platonic Trinity, which yet is too much admired. CHAP. VII. Of God's prime causality, Efficience, and Concourse in general. God the first Cause demonstrated. The Object of Divine Concourse. God's Concourse not merely conservative of the Principe. Durandus' Objections answered. Divine Concourse as to the human Will, and all create Objects. God's Concourse principal. How second Causes are Instruments. Divine Concourse as to its Principe the same with the Divine Wil No executive Power in God distinct from his Wil The Divine Will of itself omnipotent and operative. God's Concourse (1) Immediate both as to the second Cause, its Act, and Effect. (2) Independent. (3) Previous. (4) Total. (5) Particular. (6) Efficacious. (7) Connatural. §. 1. HAving explicated the Divine Nature and Attributes, God the first Cause of allthings. we now descend to the explication of the Divine causality and Efficience; which properly belongs to metaphysic or prme Philosophy. Thence Sapience, which takes in the generic notion of metaphysic, according to Aristotle, consists in the contemplation, not only of most excellent Being's, but also of the prime Cause of allthings. That God is the prime Cause of allthings, not only sacred, but also Platonic Philosophy doth assure us. As for sacred Philosophy, it gives frequent and great demonstrations of our Hypothesis. Thus Esa. 66.2. For all these things have my hands made, and all those things have been. So Psal. 104.24. of which more in God's Creation. Plato also hath left us great notices of Gods prime causality and Efficience. So in his Phaedo, pag. 96. he demonstrates, how great the ignorance and folly of such is, who wholly busy their thoughts in the contemplation of second Causes, but neglect to inquire after and into the first Cause, who is not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the principal supreme Cause, but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Cause of causes: whereas all second Causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Concauses and Instruments of the first Cause. Thence pag. 97. he adds: But when I sometime heard some one reading and relaeting out of a certain Book, as he said of Anaxagoras, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. That the Divine Mind doth orderly dispose and govern allthings, and is the cause of allthings; I was indeed greatly recreated with this Cause, and it seemed to me to be rightly determined, namely that the Divine Mind was the Cause of allthings: and thus I reasoned with myself: if it be so, that the gubernatrix and dispositrix Mind do thus dispose allthings, it doth therefore place each particular in that place, where it may be best constituted. If therefore any one be willing to inquire after and into the cause of every thing, both of its existence and corruption, he must also inquire, in what regard it may be best, either as to being, or as to suffering or doing any other thing. Upon this account there is nothing more needful for man to inquire after, either concerning himself or other things, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, than what is best and most excellent: for it is necessary, that such an one also know what is worst; because the science of these things is the same. When I pondered these things in my mind, I much pleased myself in this, that I had got a Master, who would instruct me in the causes of things, according to mine own mind, namely Anaxagoras. In these great Philosophemes of Socrates we have these observables. (1) These contemplations about the first Cause, were some of his dying thoughts, and therefore such as his mind were most intent on. (2) He greedily imbibes and closeth with that great Tradition of Anaxagoras, derived originally from sacred Philosophy, That the Divine Mind was the first cause of allthings. (3) That the Divine Mind disposed, ordered, and governed allthings in the best manner. (4) That he who would inquire into the causes of this, must have his eye on those two, the matter and efficient. For Plato makes but two Principes of things, the Mater, out of which things were made, and the Efficient that form the matter into shape or that particular form or essence. This Efficient he elsewhere styles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Idea, making 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Idea and matter the two Principes of allthings. So the Stoics made two Principes of allthings, the Efficient and Patiented. Plato sometimes makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Efficient and Cause terms synonymous: so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the efficient precedes and the effect follows. (5) That as to efficients, we must always inquire after the best and most excellent, namely God the first Cause: for he that knows the best, i. e. God, may easily know the worst, i. e. second Causes. So Plato, Leg. 4. p. 715. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Principe and End of allthings. Thus in his Sophista, pag. 265. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Namely, doth Nature, by the force of some casual fortuitous cause, without the efficacity of the Divine Mind, produce these things? Or, on the contrary, shall we not determine, that these things have their existence with Divine Wisdom and Science from God? Wherein note [1] that he lays down an Hypothesis, contrary to that of Leucippus and Democritus, That things existe not by the casual fortuitous confluxe of Atoms. [2] That allthings existe by the Divine Mind. Hence, [3] That allthings are framed and disposed in the best order, with the highest wisdom. [4] He makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Word; which some would understand of the second Person in the Trinity, but I should rather take it here for wisdom, as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be understood of Science. The like in his Theaetetus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, We must remember, that nothing can be of itself; therefore allthings are from some first Cause, of which more fully before, C. 2. §. 2. So Repub. 6. he makes God to be the First cause 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, giving essence to allthings: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, every thing receives essence from the efformative words of the great Opificer. Again, Repub. 2. pag. 379. he saith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, And of good things there is no other supreme cause to be acknowledged besides God. So pag. 380. he proves, That God is the cause of all good, whether natural or moral. And Epist. pag. 312. he expressly saith, That God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the cause of allthings good or beautiful. Thus Damascene, (out of Dionysius Areopagita, who doth much Platonise) Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. God is the cause and principe of allthings, the essence of Being's, the Life of things living, the Reason of things rational, the Intellect of things intellectile, the Restitution and Resurrection of them that fall from him, but of those things that naturally perish the Renovation and Reformation: of those things which are moved with a strong impetuosity the great confirmation, of such things as stand the stability, of those things that ascend up to him the way and reductive manuduction. Thence he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Of the illuminated the splendour, the perfection of the perfect, the Deification of the deified, the peace of the discordant, the simplicity of the simple, the union of the united, the superessential and superprincipal Principe of every Principe. For the more distinct demonstration, that God is the prime Cause of allthings, these Platonic Philosophemes may be thus form into Arguments. (1) That which is such by Essence, is necessarily before that which is such by Participation: but now God is a Cause by Essence; whereas all other causes are such only by participation. God gives essence to allthings, but receives it from nothing. Thus Plato, Leg. 6. pag. 509. God the supreme Good gives efficace and force to things, not only for their being known, but also for their existence: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, when yet that chief good is not properly Essence, but superessential; because greatly transcending the whole nature of things create, both in dignity and virtue. (2) All Imperfectes receive their origine from that which is more perfect: and is not God the most absolutely perfect of all Being's? Must not allthings than receive their origine from God? (3) That which is the last end of allthings must needs be the first Cause of all? For the first Cause is of equal latitude and extent with the last end: nothing can terminate and bond the appetite of man, but that which gave Being to him: that which is last in order of final causes, must needs be first in order of Efficients: And is not God the last End of allthings? Are not allthings so far good, as they participate of the Divine Goodness? Is not God, to speak in Plato's language, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the universal Idea and measure of all good? And must he not then necessarily be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the chiefest Good? It's true, there are other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, inferior derivative goods, but is there any universal, essential, independent good but God? And must not the order of Efficients answer the order of Ends? If God as the last End gives blessed Being, must he not as the first Efficient give natural Being? Can any thing return to God as the last end, but what flows from him as the first Cause? Thus Simplicius, a Sectator of Plato, in Epictet. cap. 1. pag. 9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Fountain and Principe of allthings is the chiefest Good: for that which is desired by allthings, and unto which allthings are referred, that is the Principe and End of allthings. Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For the one first Being, Principe, chiefest Good and God are one and the same: for God is the first and cause of allthings. (4) Must not every multiforme, variable, defectible Being be reduced to some uniform, simple, invariable, indefectible Being as its first Cause? And is there any uniform, simple, immutable Being but God? Thus Simplicius, in Epictet. cap. 1. pag. 9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. It's necessary, that the first Being be most simple: for whatever is composite, as composite it is after one, and multitude, and so produced, etc. Whereby he proves, that the first Cause is most simple. (5) Do not all finite, dependent causes need some infinite independent cause to conserve and actuate them? And is there any infinite independent cause but God? Can any thing be the first cause, but he who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without all cause? (6) Is not the order of causes proportionable to the order of effects? Where then there is an universality of effects, must there not also be an universal first Cause, which gives Being to all those effects? Is it possible, that the university of effects which are in Nature should existe, but by the universal efficace of the first independent Being and Cause? Thus Simplicius, in Epictet. cap. 1. pag. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It's necessary, that the first cause have the highest and universal influence; for there is an amplitude and abundance of efficace in him, so that he can produce allthings of himself. §. 2. Having demonstrated God to be the First Cause of allthings, The Object of Divine Concourse. we now proceed to explicate the mode and nature of his causality, Concourse, and Efficience. The prime causality and Concourse of God may be considered with respect to (1) Its Object, (2) It's Subject or Principe, (3) Its Mode of Operation, (4) Its Terms or Effects produced. First, we may consider the prime causality, Concourse and Efficience of God as to its Object, and that (1) Negatively. (2) Positively. We shall state and determine both in the following Propositions. 1. Prop. God's concourse, as to its object, God's Concourse not merely conservative of the Principe. consists not merely in the communication of force and virtue to the second cause, and conservation of the same. The Antithesis hereto was anciently maintained by Durandus (contrary to the Hypothesis both of the Thomists and Scotistes) in Sent. l. 2. Distinct. 1. q. 5, who supposed, That the concourse of God conferred nothing more on second causes, than a virtue or power to act, and the conservation thereof; without any immediate actual influence on the second cause or its Act in order to the production of the effect. The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or principal motive, ground, and reason of this Antithesis is this; If we make God to concur immediately to the Acts and Operations of second causes, he must then concur to the sinful Acts of the will, and so be the cause of sin. This Antithesis of Durandus was generally exploded by the ancient Schoolmen, both Thomists and Scotistes, and is still by the more sober Jesuits. Only in this last Age one Nicolaus Taurelius, in his Book, De rerum aeternitate & triumpho Philosophiae, has undertaken the patronage of Durandus' Antithesis, with this advance, even to the subversion not only of the concourse, but also of the conservation of God. And since there has started up another, Lud. A Dola, a Capucine Friar, who has taken greater pains to defend and promove this Antithesis of Durandus; pretending this as the only expedient for an accommodation between the Thomists and Jesuits. And for the confirmation of this Hypothesis they give this common instance: On the supposition that a stone should hang in the air, and God withdraw all his concourse for the actuating the stone, yet if the force which suspendes its motion downward were removed, it would, notwithstanding the substraction of Divine concourse, move naturally downward, or to the same purpose. Albeit I am no friend to those vexatious disputes, which the Schools of Theologie, as well as Philosophy, now ring of, yet this Antithesis being, as I conceive, of dangerous consequence, I cannot but, with modesty, express my just aversation from, yea indignation against it; with the reserve of that respect and honour, which is due to that learned and pious Divine among ourselves, who hath undertaken the defence of Durandus' Opinion. I shall not now enter on the solemn ventilation and debate of this Antithesis, having reserved this task, if the Lord favour my desires, for another subject and stile, which may be of more public use to foreign Nations; but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirm mine own Hypothesis, with brief solutions of the contrary objections. That God's concourse is not merely conservative of the Principe, Virtue and Force of second causes, without any influence on the Act, is evident; (1) because subordination and dependence of second causes on the first, not only for their Being's and Virtue, with the conservation thereof, but also in their Acting and Causing, doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such. For the Dependence of a Creature on God, not only in Being, but also in Operation, is, not extrinsee to its essence, but involved in the very intrinsec limitation thereof, as Suarez strongly argues, Metaph. Disp. 31. §. 14. Hence God, by his Absolute Power, cannot make a Creature, which should be Independent, and not subordinate to him in operation: for this implies a contradiction, namely, that a Creature should be, and should not be a Creature. For if it depend not on God in all its Operations, it is not a Creature. (2) If the Created Will cannot subsist of itself and maintain its own Virtue and Force, much less can it Act of itself, or by its own power. The force of this Argument lies in this: If the Create Will cannot of itself conserve its own Act in Being, when it is produced, how is it possible, that it should produce the same of itself? Yea, is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the production thereof? Do not Divines say, that Conservation is but continued Creation? how then can the Will produce its own Act of itself, if it cannot of itself conserve the same? Or, why may it not as well conserve its Being and Virtue, as conserve its Act of itself? If we then, as Durandus doth, allow God the conservation of the Being, Principe and Virtue; must we not then also allow him, by a parity of Reason, the conservation of the Act? and if the conservation of the Act, why not also the production thereof? This Argument is well managed by Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 24. and 32. (3) Whatever is independent in Acting, must also necessarily be so in Being: for terms of Essence always bring with them terms or bounds of Activity: a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations: and where there are limits and terms, there must be Subordination and Dependence. Nothing can operate of itself independently as to all Superior Cause, but what has Being in and from itself: for Operation and its limitation always follows Essence and its limitation, as Aristotle assures us. (4) What ever is variable and mutable necessarily depends on somewhat that is invariable and immutable: but every Act of a Create Will is variable and mutable; therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause. See more fully Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza, Phys. Disput. 10. Sect. 10. §. 17. But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators, Durandus' Objections answered. (1.) That this destroys human liberty, etc. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wills Liberty, Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9 sect. 3. §. 11, 12. and B. 4. C. 1. §. 28. also Philosoph. General. p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect. 2. §. 8, 9 Where we fully demonstrate, That the necessary concourse of God is so far from destroying human liberty, that it doth confirm and promove the same; in that it produceth not only the Act, but its mode also, determining the Will to act freely. (2) Durandus objectes, That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect, without the concourse of any other: As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air, which would move downward without a concourse. To which we reply, [1] That this supposition is not to be supposed: for as the concourse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause, so also as to its motion: neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve itself, than to move itself, on supposition that the Divine concourse be abstracted. [2] Suarez well respondes, That it involves a repugnance and contradiction, to suppose the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creator's concourse. And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause, as also of the effect; which being both Being's by participation, essentially depend on the first cause. And God may as well make a Being Independent in Essence, as an Agent Independent in Acting: both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God, and imperfection or limitation of the creature. (3) Durandus objectes: That it cannot be, that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action, unless both be only partial and imperfect Agents. The solution of this Objection will be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concourse, §. 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice, [1] That where total causes differ in kind, it is no impediment or obstruction to either, that both act immediately in their kind: for the whole effect is totally produced by each. [2] That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause; because it is not from any Insufficience or Indigence, that he makes use of the Creature, but only from the immensity of his Divine Bounty, that he communicates a virtue to the second cause, and together therewith produceth the effect. (4) But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts, unto which, if God immediately concur, God's concourse to the substrate matter of sin, what. he cannot but be the Author of Sin. [1] This Objection, albeit it may seem to favour the Divine Sanctity, yet it really destroys the same, in that it subvertes the Sacred Majesty, his Essence and Independence as the first cause, wherein his Essental Holiness doth consist, as before. [2] We easily grant, that God is the cause only of good, not of moral Evil as such, as before, c. 6. §. 3. out of Plato. For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence; and therefore no real efficient cause, but only deficient. But yet, [3] we still aver, that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin, without the least concurrence to the moral obliquity thereof. For the entitative Act of sin is of itself (abstracted from the moral deordination) physically or naturally good. Whence that common saying in the Schools, All evil is founded in good, as in its subject. There is no pure Evil, but what has some natural good for its substrate matter or subject: Now all good, that is not God, must be from God, as the prime cause: if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil, he were not the cause of all good. Yet, [4] Gods immediate concourse to the material Act of sin, doth no way render him obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin: For he concurs to the material Act of sin, not as a moral cause, but only as a physic cause. God neither commands, nor invites, nor encourageth any to sin, but prohibits the same; and therefore is not the Author thereof. An Author, both according to Philosophy and Civil Law, is he that Persuades, Invites, Commands, or by any other moral influence promoves a thing: But God by no such ways doth cause sin. [5] Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entity of sin, yet he concurs not as a deficient cause. For the Sovereign God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is. The same sinful Act, which is a Deordination in regard of man, as it proceeds from God is a conformity to his Eternal Law or Wil The great God breaks no Law, albeit the Creature is guilty thereof. (6) God, as the first cause, brings good out of that very Act, which is evil in regard of the second cause. The crucifying of our Lord, which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments, was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good: Thus the Moral Evils of men, which are opposed to the Creatures good, are yet so wisely ordered by God, as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator. As wicked men oft extract evil out of good, so the blessed God extractes good out of evil. Touching Gods concourse to, and gubernation of sin, see more copiosely, Chap. 9 §. 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concourse influence not only the Effect, The Divine concourse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Will, but also the Will itself. This Hypothesis is expressly laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophy. In Sacred Philosophy we find great demonstrations hereof. So Psal. 110.3. Thy people shall become very willing in the day of thy power: and Phil. 2.13. It's God that worketh in us, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, both to will and to do. Thus also Plato, Alcibiad. 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades, that God alone could change the wil And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative. (1) To suppose the Will to Act, without being actuated and influenced by God, is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts. (2) Either the will of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the will of God in all its acts; or the will of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the will of man. For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part, if there be no room for coordination; as here is none. (3) If God by his concourse produce the act of willing, as our Adversaries the Jesuits and others grant, how is it possible, but that he must influence and actuate the will? Doth not every efficient cause, in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or faculty of the said subject, influence and actuate the same power? (4) All grant, that the effect of the will is produced by God: and may we not thence strongly argue, that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God, and that by immediate influence on the will? Is it not equally necessary, that the concourse of God reach, as well the active as passive efficience of the will? What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuits and Arminians our Antagonistes, why the will should not as much depend on the concourse of God for its act of volition, as for its effect? If the effect of the will cannot be produced, but by the immediate concourse of the first cause, how can the will itself act, without being actuated by God? (5) Can any act pass from the will, but by the concourse of the first cause? and if so, must not also the same first cause influence the will for the production of such acts? 3. Prop. God's Concourse is universally extensive to all create Objects. God's Concourse universally extensive. Rom. 11.36. This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophy, as also in Platonic. Thus Rom. 11.36. Of him, and by him, and for him are allthings. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him, notes God's Operation in framing allthings; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him, his Cooperation in and with all second causes; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him, his final causality, as allthings are for him. This universal causality is termed by Cyril Alexandr. in Esa.. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the multiforme Energy; because it produceth all manner of effects. Plato also mentions God's universal causality as to all objects. So Repub. 6. he makes allthings, not only visible, but also intelligible, as Sciences, etc. Yea all moral goods, as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, things righteous, honest, and good, to fall under the prime causality of God, who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Righteousness itself, Honesty itself, and bonity itself; and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the cause of all goods. Thus also in his Parmenides, pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Essence therefore [i. e. God] is diffused throughout all variety of Being's, and is absent from nothing, neither from the greatest, nor yet from the least of Being's. Thence he adds: One therefore [i. e. God] is not only present to all essence, but also to all the parts thereof, being absent from no part, either lesser, or greater. Wherein he assertes, that God is diffused through and present with all parts of the Universe, and all create Being's, giving Essence, Force, Perfection, and Operation to all Being's. Aquinas makes the Concourse of God to extend universally to allthings, (1) As it gives forces, and faculties of acting to all second causes. (2) As it conserveses and sustains them in Being and Vigour. (3) As it excites and applies second causes to act. (4) As it determines all second causes to act. (5) As it directs, orders, governs and disposeth them so, as that they may in the best manner reach their ends. See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest. 105. & contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concourse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to all objects, may be demonstrated, (1) From the subordination of all second causes to the first cause. Are not all causes, not only efficient, but also final, subordinate to God? Yea do not all material and formal Principes depend on the Concourse of God for all their operations? Of which see Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 21. Sect. 1. (2) From the comprehension and perfection of God. Doth he not, in his own Simplicity, Actuality, and Infinitude, comprehend all perfections both actual and possible? Is he not then virtually and eminently allthings? And doth not this sufficiently argue, that his Concourse is universally extensive unto allthings? (3) From the Superiority and Altitude of God as the first Cause. Is not God the most supreme and highest, because the first Cause? Must not then his Concourse be most extensive as to all effects? Doth not every cause, by how much the higher it is, by so much the more extend itself to variety of effects? Must not God then, by being the first Cause, necessarily extend his Concourse to all effects? (4) From the Providence of God. That allthings fall under the Providence of God Plato, as well as Scripture, greatly proves, as we shall hereafter Ch. 8. §. 2. show: and if so, must not then the Concourse of God universally extend to allthings, so far as they partake of Being, either natural or moral? 4. Prop. God's Concourse in regard of all second causes and objects is principal. God's concourse principal. The Principatie and sovereignty of Divine Concourse, specially as to gratiose effects, is frequently asserted in sacred Philosophy. Esa. 53.11. So it's said of Christ, Esa. 53.11. He shall see the travel of his Soul. Which assures us, that Christ is the principal Parent of the New Creature, as well as of the old: and that all Ministers, or other Instruments are but, as it were, Midwives unto Christ. Thence Plato, in his Theaetetus, pag. 151. brings in Socrates using the same phrase touching himself and his Philosophemes. Socrates being about to instruct Theaetetus, one of his Disciples of great ingeny, the more effectually to engage his attention and diligence, he professeth, That for his part he was but (as his Mother) a Midwife, to assist the Soul in the bringing forth of moral virtue: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God compels me to play the Midwife, but forbids me to generate. Whereby he ascribeth the principal efficience of all moral virtue to God, reserving only a ministerial subservience to man. So great was the modesty of this poor Philosopher, beyond many that profess Christianity. Thus Plato, Repub. 6. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the first and most sovereign cause of allthings; whereas all second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, yea 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as it were children, or effects and products; and therefore all their efficience and causality is only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by commistion with, and participation from God the first Cause. Thence in his Phaed●, pag. 99 he affirms, that second causes, if compared with the first, deserve not the name of causes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to call these causes is very importune, or absued. Thence he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That which is a cause indeed is one thing, and that without which a cause is not a cause another. Plato here makes mention of two sorts of causes. (1) One, which is truly a cause, i. e. the First cause. (2) Another, which is only causa sine qua non, a cause without which the effect is not produced: such are all second causes, whose ministry the First cause makes use of; yet so as that the principal efficience belongs only to the First cause, in respect of which second causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, concauses, or subservient causes, employed by God for the production of things. So in his Timaeus, pag. 46. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, These are concauses, whose ministry God useth to perfect, so far as it may be, the idea and form of what is best. But very many estime these to be not concauses, but causes of allthings. But, he subjoins: Such have no reason or sense for what they assert: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For we must say, that there is a Soul of allthings that existe, to whom only belongs the power of Understanding: but he is invisible. Whence, in what follows, he expressly distinguisheth between the first and second causes, ascribing principal causality to the former, and ministerial or instrumental to the later. There are in these Philosophemes of Plato observable, (1) That God is the principal prime cause of allthings. (2) That all second causes, if compared with God, deserve not the name of causes; but are only concauses, or instruments to transfer the efficience of God unto the effect. (3) That such as ascribe any causality to second causes, more than what as instruments they receive from the First cause, have neither sense nor reason on their side. (4) That there is an universal Spirit or Soul, which diffuseth itself throughout all create Being's, and gives vigour, determination, and motion to all second causes and effects. But now the more fully to explicate Plato's mind touching the principal Concourse of God the first cause, How second Causes are Instruments of the first. and the ministerial or instrumental causality of second causes, we must first distinguish, and then state and determine our Hypothesis. We must distinguish, (1) between principal causality simply considered, and that which is such in its kind, and in some respect. (2) Between the second cause its respect to the first, and its respect to the effect. (3) Between an instrument taken in a lax notion, and in a strict: also between a moral and a physic Instrument: again, between an active and passive Instrument: lastly, between a pure Instrument, and a vital elevate Instrument. (4) Between effects natural and supernatural. These distinctions being premissed, we shall state and determine our Hypothesis in the following Propositions. (1) The causality of God is simply and universally principal, yet that of second causes may be principal in its kind. The concourse of God is so far principal, as that it can and oft doth produce its effect without the concourse of second causes; but second causes can never produce their effects, without the concourse of God the first Cause. Hinc est, quod omnes operationes hominis bonas, quantumcunque fiant à libera voluntate, tribuere solet augustinus ipsi Deo, tanquam qui per voluntatem ut per instrumentum, quod pro libero suo beneplacito agit, impellit, flectit, vertit, inclinat quoliber motus ipsius voluntatis operetur. Ipse, inquit, cantat in nobis, cujus gratia cantamus. Nempe dicuntur ista, non ut homini libera voluntas, sed ut gloriatio de sua voluntate tollatur, ne puter à se esse quod Deus donat. Jansenius, August. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. There is no effect which the second cause produceth, but the first cause can produce it alone: for his omnipotent concourse reacheth to all effects that imply not a contradiction, without the least dependence on any second cause: the second cause needs the first in all its operations, but the first cause needs not the second in any. Yea, where the first and second cause concur to the same effect, the concourse of the first cause is infinitely more principal, than that of the second: because the second cause acts not, but as acted by the first cause: The Excitation, Application, Determination, and Actuation of the second cause is from the first. Yet we may not deny a principal efficience to some second causes, so far as the first cause has communicated to them a virtue of their own to be communicated to their effects, as it will appear by what follows. (2) All second Causes, if compared with the first, are but instruments of his principal concourse. Thus not only Aquinas, Bradwardine and the more sane Scholastics, but also Averro, de Somno & Vigilia; where he affirms, That second causes are moved by the first, as instruments by the Artificer. But here occurs a spinose knotty question much ventilated in the Schools, Whether the Will in the reception of supernatural habits be an instrument or principal cause? According to the former distinctions I should answer, [1] That, according to the general notion of an Instrument, the Will may be termed such in the reception and acting of Grace. As it receives Grace it is a passive instrument, yet as it acts Grace it is an active instrument. [2] That the Will in the receiving and acting Grace is a vital instrument. Hence it is termed by Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Divine Instrument, a rational Instrument, an Instrument composed and knocked at by that preclare Artificer the Spirit of God. In receiving the first Grace the Will is only naturally, remotely and passively vital, as it is a piece of human Nature; but in the actuating what Grace is received, it is a spiritually vital instrument. Grace received elevates the human Soul to a spiritual Vitality and Instrumentalitie for the acting of Grace. Hence, [3] the Will may, as to the acting of Grace, so far as it is clothed with Divine habits, be termed in some respect a principal Agent, under God, specially if compared with the effect produced. It's true, if the Will be compared with God, even in the acting of Grace received, it is but a mere instrument; because both Habit and Act are received from God: yet if we consider the Will as invested and qualified with supernatural habits, which are the same to the Soul that it is to the Body, whereby it is informed and capacitated to produce such or such supernatural Acts and Effects, in this regard we may style it a principal cause: though, I must confess, the notion of an Instrument, used by Aquinas and others, seems more adequate and genuine to express its causality by, in as much as all is from God by supernatural infusion. §. 3. Having inquired into the Concourse of God in regard of its object, Divine Concourse as to its Principe the same with Gods Wil we now proceed to consider it as relating to its Subject or Principe, which will afford to us great notices of its genuine nature. The Scholastic Theologues, in their debates about the concourse of God to the supernatural Acts of the Will, are greatly divided: some placing it in a certain efficacious impulse or motion of God, whereby the Will is determined to consent and act: others, in a certain actual premotion in the manner of a transient quality, together with the operation of the Will: others, in the very operation of the second cause or Will, as it proceeds from the influx of God premoving. These make it to be an efficacious premotion or physic predetermination, whereby the first cause makes the second to act: others place this concourse, as to gratiose effects, in certain pious inspirations, cogitations, and indeliberate motions of love injected by God. Albeit some of these scholastic sentiments may have their place, if we consider the concourse of God with relation to its passive Attingence, or as it terminates on the second cause and effect, yet if we take it strictly, according to its formal Idea, I conceive, no one of these opinions explicate the true nature thereof. Therefore to explicate the genuine nature of the Divine concourse we must consider what relation it has to the Divine Will, whether it be really distinct therefrom, or not. And here we must in the first place reflect on what was asserted and proved in the former C. 5. §. 4. touching the ordinate or executive power of God, and its Indentitie with the Divine Will: which being supposed, as it has been demonstrated, it naturally follows, that God's concourse, as to is active Attingence and effective principe, is nothing else but the omnipotent efficacious volition of God. For God's executive power being the same with his Effective Will, it thence necessarily follows, that his concourse is the same also. Hence Sacred Philosophy every where makes Gods Will the Effective Principe whereby allthings are made, and governed, or directed to their proper Actions and Ends. As Psal. 39.9. and 115.3. and 135.6. Mat. 8.2, 3. 2 Chron. 20.6. and elsewhere, as before C. 5. §. 4. Thus also Plato, Alcibiad. 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates dialogising with young Alcibiades, that Athenian Gallant, in this manner: Dost thou know, saith Socrates, by what means thou mayst avoid this inordinate motion of thy mind? Alcibiad. Yes. Socrat. How? Alcibiad. If thou wilt, O Socrates, i. e. by thy precepts and institutes. Socrat. Thou mayst not say so. Alcibiad. How then? Socrat. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, if God wil Meaning, that God's will was omnipotent, and so could without more ado, merely by his act of volition, work virtue in young Alcibiades. But now to explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis, namely, That the Divine Will is of itself operative, we shall resolve the whole into the following Propositions. 1. Prop. God as the first cause of allthings doth not concur by his Essence absolutely considered. God's concourse not his essence absolutely considered. For, (1) If God should concur by his Essence absolutely considered, he should act allthings by a natural necessity, not with any precedent Liberty: and then Gods making the world, yea things most contingent would be as absolutely and naturally necessary, as his loving himself. It's true, Gods loving himself and all other immanent Acts have a concomitant Liberty or Divine spontaneity attending them, yet they admit not any Antecedent Liberty or Indifference of any kind. But now God's works ad extra, such as terminate on the Creature, have not only a Concomitant, but also Antecedent Liberty, or some kind of Indifference; so that God could, according to a signum rationis, or priority of nature, not have willed them. (2) If God should work allthings by his Essence absolutely considered, things possible should have one and the same Idea with things future; and so God's Science of simple Intelligence should be the same with his Science of Vision. And the reason of the consequence is most evident; because the Essence of God absolutely considered is equally indifferent to things possible, which shall never be, as to things future, which are to be. (3) Again, God's Absolute Power should be the same with his Ordinate, and his Sufficience the same with his Efficience, if he wrought all things by his Essence absolutely considered. (4) Hence also it would follow, that God should always work and put forth his Omnipotence to the utmost extent in all operations. For Causes that work from a Necessity of Nature work to the utmost of their power. 2. Prop. God's concourse proceeds not from any executive Power in God. No executive power in God, distinct from his Wil This Proposition has been already demonstrated, C. 5. §. 4. Yet for more abundant conviction, let us examine the Origine, Necessity, and Use of an executive Power in the Creature; and then we shall see what little ground there is to ascribe the same to God. The great Assertors and Promotors of executive power have been Aristotle and his Sectators; who, on false Hypotheses, presume, That a substance cannot act immediately without some executive power; which they make a species of Quality. Albeit such kind of Qualitative Powers are now generally exploded by all, who resolve not to serve an Opinion of Aristotle, yet there still remains a place for executive powers in nature, when the principal Agent cannot reach the effect immediately. Thus the Soul of Man puts forth all Acts of sense and motion by some executive powers. Yet the human Soul can and doth oft act immediately, specially in its immanent acts, without any executive power. And thus God in all his Effects acts immediately by his omnipotent will, without any executive power: For he is present in and with all effects, and therefore needs no executive power to supply his absence. Again, the Will of God is Omnipotent, as c. 5. §. 3. and we shall anon prove it more fully, and therefore it needs no executive power to execute what it wils. Is not the Divine Will proposed to us in Sacred Philosophic as Irresistible? and if it be so, can it not then execute its own pleasure, without any executive power? Indeed the greatest Scholastic wits have espoused and defended this Hypothesis, namely, That the Will and Executive Power of God are really the same, and not so much as rationally or formally distinct. Thus Joan. Major, 2. Sent. Dist. 1. q. 1. proves, That God Created the World by his Intellect and Will, without any executive Power formally distinct, of which hereafter, §. 5.4. Prop. Thus Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 29. Alvarez de Auxil. l. 2. p. 129. with others, of whom in the next Proposition. And indeed Suarez Metaph. Disp. 22. S. 2. p. 555. doth in part grant our Hypothesis, in that he acknowledgeth, That the concourse of God, as it regards the effective principe, is the same with the Divine Will, which concurs with the Creature to its act. This he calls concursus ad intrà, the intern concourse, which he makes to be the principe of all Acts adextrá. Yet I must confess elsewhere, namely Disp. 30. S. 17. he makes mention of an executive power in God, the same with his Essence, containing in it eminently all create perfections. And so some Divines, as well as Philosophers, assert an executive power in God. Thus Heereboord, Select. Ex Philosoph. Disp. 8. endeavours to prove, that God's concourse, whereby he influenceth things ad extra, is not simply his volition; because God's volition simply is an immanent Act, but his concourse is a transient Act ad extra. But this Argument seems to be of no weight; because we easily grant, that the concourse of God, quoad Attingentiam passivam, as to its passive Attingence is distinct from God, and the same with the concourse of the second cause or effect; but that which we are now discoursing of is the concourse of God in regard of its active Attingence, as it regards God the Principe, and in this respect we only assert, That the concourse of God is the same with his volition simply considered. This will be further evident by the next Proposition. 3. Prop. The Divine Will is of itself Omnipotent and Efficacious. The Divine Will Omnipotent. This Proposition is most evident; (1) because the Divine Will cannot be frustrated. Thus Suarez, 1.2 ae. Tract. 3. Disput. 11. Sect. 2. p. 311. We must say, saith he, that when God will absolutely and efficaciously that man will somewhat, the human Will cannot discord from the Divine. The reason is clear; because the Divine Will efficacious and simply absolute cannot be fruitrated, seeing it is infinite. So Bradward. l. 1. c. 10. Now it remains to show, that the Divine Will is universally efficacious, insuperable, and necessary in causing, nor impedible and frustrablein any manner. Who knows not that it necessarily follows: if God can do any thing and wills, it, he doth it? (2) The Divine Will being the universal first cause of allthings, it cannot but be most efficacious. For is not this the main difference between the first and second cause, the universal and particular cause, that this may fail of its effect, but that can never? A particular cause oft comes short of its effect, by reason of the interposition of some other particular cause, that may impede the same: but the first universal cause can never come short of its effect; because there is no other cause can interpose to hinder it. (3) The Will of God is infinite: therefore Omnipotent and Irresistible: for where the power of the Patient doth not exceed or equalise the power of the Agent, there can be no prevalent resistance: what then can resist the Divine Will which is infinite? (4) If the Divine Will were not omnipotent God were not infinitely happy. For every one is so far happy, as his Will is fulfilled, as Aristor. Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. (5) It's a common Hypothesis in the Schools, grounded on the highest Reason, That it is impossible but that the Divine Will should attain its effect. So Aquinas, Part. 1. q. 19 a. 6. as others, Hence, 4. Prop. The Divine Will is of itself operative and influential on all second causes and effects. Thus Augustin, De Trinit. l. 3. c. 4. The Will of God operative of itself. The Will of God is the first and supreme cause of allthings. Again, A thing is said to be done by God acting, when it is done by God willing. Apud Dominum hoc est velle quod facere; qura ex ejus voluntate res habent esse Augustin. in Psal. 144. And the reasons of this Hypothesis are most manifest: For (1) if God's Will were not of itself Operative and Effective, it were not the first principe and cause of allthings. (2) The will of man is in some things Operative of itself: and must we not allow the same Prerogative to the Will of God? And if it be in somethings operative of itself, why not in allthings? May we not then hence conclude, That there is no active operation or motion received from God into the Will, or any other second cause; but from the simple volition of God the motion of the human Will or any other second cause necessarily follows? This is evident in the first Creation of allthings: for by God's fiat or volition, which is eternal, allthings were made in time, without any other impression or concourse received: and if God's first Creation of allthings was by his simple volition, without any transient concourse, what hinders, but that all other efficience of God should in the same manner consist in the simple volition of his will, without any transient concourse? Thence in sacred Philosophy the Divine Efficience is frequently expressed by the Word of God, as the Word of Creation, Gen. 1.3. Conservation, Psal. 107.20. Gubernation, Destruction, Restitution, etc. thereby to denote the efficacity of the Divine Will, as man's Will is expressed by his word, of which hereafter §. 4.6. Prop. See this Hypothesis well demonstrated in Bradward. Caus. Deil, l. 1. c. 9 p. 190. & c. 10. p. 196. Ariminensi●, Sent. 1. Distinct. 45. Joan. Major Sent. 2. Quaest. 3. §. 4. Having discussed the Concourse of God, The Adjuncts of God's Concourse. 1. It is immediate as it relates to its Object and Subject or Principe, we now come to treat of it in its Adjuncts and Modes of operation, which will give us great indications and notices of its nature. 1. The concourse of God is as to its Mode of operation immediate. This Adjunct or Mode of operation follows immediately on the origine or principe of Divine Concourse: for it being nothing but the simple volition of God, Particularly as to gratiose effects. it thence necessarily follows, that it must be immediate as to all objects and effects. Esa. 55.10, 11. This immediation of Divine Concourse is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophy. So Esa. 55.10, 11. For as the rain cometh down and the snow from Heaven, and returneth not thither, but watereth the earth, and maketh it to bring forth and bud, that it may give seed to the sour, and bread to the eater; so shall my word, that goeth forth out of my mouth; it shall not return unto me void, but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it. (1) This must be understood not only of Gods reveled word, but also of his efficacious word of concourse, productive of things. Psal. 72.6. So Psal. 72.6. (2) Gods effective operative word or concourse is compared to the Rain, which by God's ordinance falls to water the earth, straining itself through the liquid Air, as through a Sieve, dividing itself into millions of drops, and immediately watering every inch of earth, that so every herb may receive its proportion of moisture, gradually and immediately according to its exigence: just so proportionably doth the efficacious concourse of God immediately insinuate itself into all second causes, operations, and effects, specially such as are gratiose. Hos. 14.5. The like allusion we find, Hos. 14.5. I will be as the dew to Israel: he shall grow as the lily. Esa. 26.19. The like Esa. 26.19. For thy dew is as the dew of herbs. The dew, you know, falls in a silent quiet night, in millions of small imperceptible drops; and being of a gentle insinuating nature, gradually and insensibly soaks into the earth, tempers and allays the heat thereof, specially in those hotter countries, and immediately insinuates itself into the roots of plants; which, by reason of its moist benign nitrose quality, it comforts, refresheth, and encourageth; calling forth the fruits hereof, and causing the face of things to flourish with beauty and delight, much more efficaciously than sudden great shours, or land-flouds; which are more violent, but less beneficial: Thus Christ's gratiose concourse and influence falls like dew on the Believers heart, in millions of drops; which grad●aly, insensibly, and immediately insinuate thereinto, causing it to fructify and flourish much more effectively, than all the shours of Divine wrath, or Land-flouds of spiritual Bondage, which suddenly break in on the consciences of many convict legal consciences; but soon dry up again, and leave them more barren and hard-hearted than before. The Greek Theologues express this immediation of Divine Grace various ways: sometimes they term it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the inhabitant or indwelling Grace: sometimes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the inhabitation of the holy Spirit; because it is wrought by the Spirit of God immediately as dwelling in the Believers heart. But to treat more generally of Divine Concourse and its immediation as to all Objects, Operations, and Effects, Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 715 assures us, That, according to the ancient Tradition, God has not only, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the beginning and the end, but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the middle of allthings: i e. God by his efficacious concourse penetrates allthings, and is more intimate and immediate to them, than they are to themselves. So also in his Parmenides, he tells us, That the prime Idea or cause is intimately present with allthings, influencing all both small and great. Whence he terms all second causes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Concauses and Co-operators with God. But before we come to the demonstration of our Hypothesis we must premit somethings by way of explication and limitation. (1) When we say, God's concourse to all second causes and effects is immediate, we do not thereby exclude all means, as if God did so concur as not to make use of second causes and instruments; but that God concurs immediately in and with all means. As in order to health God prescribes and useth means, yet he concurs immediately in and with those means; so in supernatural effects, God useth Ministers and Ordinances, yet concurs immediately in and with them. (2) God concurs immediately to all second causes and effects, not only by the immediation of Virtue, but also [immediatione suppositi] by the immediation of his Essence: for indeed the virtue of God is nothing else but his Essence, or Will as the effective Principe of allthings. The Divine Supposite is not so much as ratione or formally distinguished from his Virtue, which is his effective omnipotent Wil These premises being laid down we proceed to explicate and demonstrate the Immediation of God's Concourse in the following Propositions. 1. Prop. God concurs immediately unto every Act of the second Cause. God concurs immediately to every Act of second Causes. This Proposition is asserted not only by the Thomists, but also by the Jesuits, Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 22. sect. 1. and others. And the reasons are invincible: (1) From the subordination of all second causes to the first. Aristotle, in his Physics, l. 8. c. 5. & Metaphys. l. 2. c. 12. assures us, That in Agents per se and properly subordinate, the inferior cannot act without the influx or concourse of the superior cause. And the reason is evident: because if the inferior cause could act without the influx of the superior, it were not subordinate unto the superior in that act. Neither is it sufficient to say, that the second cause is subordinate to God, as its Essence and Virtue is conserved by God, according to the sentiment of Durandus and his Sectators: for such a subordination of the second cause to the first is only accidental and remote as to its acting: And who knows not, that an accidental remote cause is not properly a cause? All proper subordination implies dependence of the inferior cause on the superior, not only quando but quatenus agit, both when and as it acts. (2) From the limitation and dependence of all second causes. Every Being by participation is limited: and where there are limits of essence, there necessarily are limits of Activity and Operation. A Creature can as well give Being to itself, as actuate itself independently as to the First cause: whatever receives its Being by participation, receives also its Operation in the same mode of Participation. Dependence on God in Operation is as essental and intrinsec to the nature of a Creature, as dependence on God in essence and conservation of that essence. Yea, it is no less than an implicit contradiction to say, that a Creature acts without dependence on God for that act, as Suarez and others prove. And the reason is most demonstrative: for, as Aristotle tells us, The mode of operating always follows the mode of essence: If the essence depend on God for its production and conservation, so must the operation. Whatever is a Being by participation, must also be an Agent by participation. Yea, the very Act of the second cause is a Being by participation; and therefore it requires the concourse and influx of the First cause for its production, conservation, and promotion. (3) From the nature of the First cause and its perfection. If God concur not immediately to every Act of the second cause, he is not the universal cause of allthings, neither is he omnipotent, and most perfect. For that very Act is a real Being, or if you will a mode of Being, and so reducible to real Entity: it cannot be pure nothing; because pure nothing cannot be the term or effect of a real production: If then the Act of the second cause be a real positive Entity or Mode, and yet God not the First cause thereof, than it necessarily follows, that God is not the universal cause of allthings: neither is he omnipotent; because he cannot produce that real Act: neither is he most perfect; because there is something in nature physically perfect, which he is not the cause of. Dependence on God as the First cause, albeit it implies something of imperfection in the Creature as a Creature, yet it imports perfection in God: neither can his absolute perfection as the First cause be preserved and maintained without it. (4) From the Providence of God. If God as the First cause concur not immediately to all Acts of second Causes, how can he order, direct, and govern them, so as they shall all determine in his own glory? Again, how can he hinder such Acts as impugn his own ends and designs? Doth not this Antithesis of Durandus and others, who deny God to concur immediately to all Acts of second causes, cut off the chiefest part of Divine Providence, which consists in the ordering and directing all human Acts for his own glory? 2. Prop. God as the First cause immediately concurs, not only to the Act, but also the second cause itself, and its will, if it be a free Agent. God immediately concurs to second Cause self. This Proposition may be demonstrated, (1) by all the fore mentioned Arguments, which prove Gods immediate concourse to the Act of the second cause: for every efficient cause producing in a subject an Act connatural to the power of he subject, must needs influence and actuate that power: wherefore God the First cause producing in the will of man an act connatural thereto, must necessarily actuate and influence the said will in such a production. (2) That gods immediate concourse reacheth the human Will, and not only its Act, is evident, because it determines the Will to act. For grant but this, that the human Will is not the First cause of its own act, but dependent on God for the production thereof, which the Jesuits grant; it necessarily follows, that it is actuated and determined by God in all its Acts. It's true, the human Will is a free Agent and so a self-determining power; but yet this hinders not but that it is also determined by God as the First cause: God determines the Will to determine it self; as he moves the Will to move itself. If God did not determine and move the Will, it could not determine and move itself. (3) Sacred Philosophy is express herein, that God works immediately on the Will, as well as on its Acts and Effects. So Philip. 2.13. God is said to work 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to will and to do. And how can he work to will unless he work upon the will? Can there be any way assigned how God should work to will, and yet not immediately determine and move the will? Psal. 139.9, 10. So Psal. 139.9, 10. If I take the wings of the morning, [i.e. sly most swiftly as the morning] and dwell in the utmost parts of the Sea: even there shall thine hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me. His mind is, that he cannot fly from the immediate presence of God; because wherever he goes, his immediate hand or concourse must lead him. To lead a man by the hand, and to hold him here denotes God's immediate concourse on the Will and its Acts. 3. Prop. God concurs immediately to the effect by one and the same act with the second cause. The Act of the first and second cause the same. For the explication of this Proposition we are to note, that the causation of the first cause is not the same with that of the second, but only the action whereby the first and second cause concur to the production of the effect. For albeit the influx of the first cause be distinct from that of the second, yet the Act whereby the first and second cause produce the effect is one and the same. Duo individuo opere operantes necessario agant unum & idem, cùm indivisa sit corum actio: si autem agerent diversis actionibus, oporteret operata esse divisa: sicut è contrà actio indivisa non potest sacere divisa opera. Grossetesle, de Libero Arbitrio. This is incomparably well demonstrated by our Learned and great Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, in his Tractate, De Libero Arbitrio, in M. SS. where he acutely proves, That the Action of God and the second cause, whereby the effect is produced, cannot be deverse; because the Effect is but one and the same; which proceeds totally from God as the first cause, and totally from the second cause, as hereafter, Prop. 4. For the more full explication whereof we must distinguish between the Active and Passive Efficience of God: God's Active Efficience is nothing else but the immanent efficacious Act of his Will; which, without all peradventure, differs infinitely from the efficience of the second cause: yet Gods Passive efficience, as it relates to the Act of the second cause, is not really distinct therefrom: for it's no way incongruous or inconsistent, that one and the same act proceed from two different total causes of different kinds, such as the first and second cause is. Whence it follows, that one and the same act both of first and second cause immediately and essentially depend on both in their kind. That the first and second cause immediately concur to the same effect, by one and the same indivisible Act may be demonstrated, (1) from the Dependence which the Act of the second cause has on the active causation of the first cause. The Act of the second cause doth not, as some conceive, depend on any real influx or concourse transient from the first cause, and distinct from the act of the second cause, but on the mere efficacious volition of the first cause; which is the effective principe of all effects. This is acutely demonstrated by Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 21. sect. 3. p. 568. where he proves. That the action of God is not the way or flux to the action of the Creature, but to the effect: neither is an action the term of an action. Therefore to the universal influx of the first cause there is no more required, but that the action of the second cause proceed from his Will— not that it proceed by another extern action; but it can proceed immediately by itself from the will of God. Whence, when the action of the Creature is said to depend on the influx of God, either this influx must be taken for the immanent intern Act, as it influenceth the extern Act of the second cause; or the manner of speech must be taken not transitively, save according to some rational conception. If we would speak properly, it must be said, that the action of the Creature is from God. Whence he concludes, in the same page thus: By comparing the action of the Creature to the intern action of God, it is clear, that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the second cause. Whence it's said, that the concourse of the first cause is before that of the second; because the second cause doth not act but in the virtue of the first. Hence, (2) we may farther demonstrate the Identity of the act, whereby the first and second cause concur to the effect, by the Independence which the act of the second cause has as to all transient acts of the first cause distinct from itself. For if the action of the second cause be from God, by some transient influx distinct from itself; then that influx being a Creature will necessarily require some other transient influx for its production and preservation: and so into infinite. (3) That the action, whereby the first and second cause concur to any effect, is one and the same may be demonstrated from the inutility and needless supposition of any distinction between them. For if there be supposed two distinct actions, one of God, another of the second cause, as necessarily concurring to the production of one and the same effect, than the action of the second is from God, or not: It cannot be said, that it is not from God, but only from the second cause; because than it would be said, that the Effect of the second cause is from God, but not the Act, which is against the nature of a finite limited Being, as we have proved in the precedent Propositions: If it be said, that the act of the second cause is from God, then there is no necessity of supposing any other act of God distinct from this, whereby he concurs to the production of the Effect. Is it not every way superfluous and unnecessary to suppose two distinct actions, one of the first and another of the second cause, as concurring to the same effect, when as it is granted, and cannot rationally be denied, that the very act of the second cause is from God? This Argument is well managed by Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 21. S. 3. p. 567. The sum of all is this: Both the first and second cause concur immediately to the production of the effect by one and the same action; yet the influx or concourse of the first and second cause considered formally as to the effective principes is really distinct. 2. Having dispatched the Immediation of the Divine concourse, God's concourse Independent and Absolute. we now proceed to a second Adjunct or mode of operation appendent thereto, namely its Independence and Absoluteness. That the concourse of God is Independent and Absolute we are assured both by Sacred and Platonic Philosophy. The Absolute Independence of Divine concourse, as to gratiose effects, is frequently inculcated in Sacred Philosophy. Psal. 51.10. Hence we find a creative efficace ascribed to Independent Medicinal Grace. Esa. 43.1. So Psal. 51.10. Create in me a clean heart. Esa. 43.1. The Lord that created thee O Jacob, etc. So Esa. 57.19. as elsewhere. Now what more Independent and Absolute than a Creative concourse? (1) Works of Creation are out of nothing; and so their Efficient must needs be Independent as to matter. (2) Works of Creation require an infinite independent Agent, which admits no social cause: for Creation being the production of something out of nothing, which are terms, as to Efficience, infinitely distant, none but an Infinite independent cause can effect the same: who can reconcile something and nothing, but he who has all Being in himself? (3) Works of Creation are in an instant, and therefore depend not on any Preparations, or material Dispositions of the subject. (4) Works of Creation are Perfect, and therefore require the most perfect independent absolute concourse. How Independnet and absolute efficacious Grace is in its manner of working, is farther evident from that Royal Prerogative which it useth in the conversion of sinners. Doth it not oft let some run on in full career, till they have one foot in Hell, and then snatch them as flaming torches out of that sire? Thus Ezech. 16.6. Ezech. 16.6 I said unto thee when thou wast in thy blood, Live. Christ's Omnipotent, Independent Word carries a vivisie efficace in it. How many Lions has this Omnipotent Word turned into Lambs? What timber or heart is there so crooked, knotty, and crabbed, out of which he cannot frame a Vessel of Mercy? What heart so stony, so rocky, out of which he cannot raise up a Son to Abraham, as Mat. 3.9? Mat. 3.9. Now to change one species or kind of Creature into another, a Lion into a Lamb, a stony heart into a Son of Abraham, doth not this argue Independent, Absolute and Omnipotent Efficace? So little is this gratiose concourse tied to, or dependent on the least Moral Dispositions, Obligations, Merits, Causes, Conditions, or moving Considerations without itself: it is the freest thing in the world, and therefore compared to the motion of the wind, which bloweth where it listeth, Joh. 3.8. Can we suppose, Joh. 3.8. that any thing the Creature performs should lay the least obligation on Sovereign Free Grace? Is it not a childish thing to suppose, that the infinite ocean of Independent Grace should ebb and slow, according to the various changes and conditions of Man's Free Will, that most mutable Moon? But that not only Essicacious Grace, but all Divine concourse is Independent and Absolute, may be proved by these invincible Reasons. (1) From the Independence of the Divine Will, the first cause of allthings. The first cause, according to Sacred and Platonic Philosophy, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, without all cause and dependence. Thus Plato, Repub. 6. p. 509. where bringing in God, under the notion of the chiefest good, and the first cause of allthings, he gives him this character, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, He is not mere essence, but somewhat more august than essence, transcending all finite essence both in Dignity and Virtue. So elsewhere he makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the supreme effective cause of allthings, and therefore Independent as to all subservient instrumental causes. Yea, he will have God the first Cause to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Being itself and Eternity itself; and thence no way dependent on second causes. And the Platonistes generally make God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, superessential, and so most independent. And, alas! how absurd and monstrose is it, that the concourse of the first Cause should depend on the second cause? Is not the Divine Will the first effective Principe of allthings, the same with the Divine Essence? May we not then as well make the Essence of God to be dependent as his Wil (2) From the pure actuality and simplicity of the Divine Wil All dependence implies a passive receptive power as to that on which it depends: there is no dependence without some passive power either physic or metaphysic: But now Gods Will as it is the effective Principe of allthings has not the least passive power: therefore no dependence. (3) From the primaty and Superiority of the first Cause. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God solely being without Principe, or independent, he is the Framer of allthings, etc. God being the first Cause of allthings must necessarily be independent in his causality and Essence. For where there is dependence, there is inferiority and subordination: And may we presume, that the concourse of the first Cause is inferior and subordinate to that of the second cause? Doth it amount to less than a contradiction, to say the first Cause depends on or is subordinate to the second cause? What! can it be first and yet subordinate? What is this but to be first, and yet not first but second? For dependence and subordination is an effential mode of the second cause, as independence of the first. (4) As the concourse of the first Cause is independent, so also absolute; yea therefore absolute, because independent: for that which depends on nothing without itself, must needs be absolute. That the Concourse of God is absolute and no way dependent on any conditions of the subject, or object it works upon, specially as to gratiose effects, is most evident from sacred Philosophy. Eph. 2.8, 9, 10. So Ephes. 2.8, 9, 10. He saith, v. 8. For by Grace ye are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God. It's true, it works through faith; but yet not as a condition in the power of Freewill to perform, but only as Faith is the Organ or Canal through which medicinal Grace is conveyed into the Soul: the whole is the Gift of God: and why? v. 9 Not of works, lest any one should boast. As if he had said: Alas! if this medicinal Grace should be suspended on any moral or Evangelic conditions to be performed by us, than there were indeed room for boasting: which Christ will not allow of. Are the derivations of the fountain suspended on any conditions the streams can perform? doth not the stream own all that it has to the free, independent, and absolute communication of the spring? Thence it follows v. 10. For we are his workmanship created in [or by] Christ Jesus unto good works: i e. look as God created and form the first rude confused Chaos, not for any foreseen goodness in it, but out of a pure nothing; so Christ frames the New Creature, not for any foreseen conditions it can perform, but unto all conditions or good works, as Esa. 19.25. We have an excellent discourse against conditional Grace, in Jansenius, August. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. pag. 83. By the predication of this conditional Grace, which enables us to act if we will, there is nothing gained but the total subversion of Christ's medicinal Grace, and the substituting in the room thereof the Grace of a sound Will, such as Adam had and Angels now have: and thus Christ hath died in vain: for the proper Grace of Christ, which he by his Passion hath brought to heal our infirmities, Gratia medicinalis non est talis, quae dominatrici samulando voluntati, vel influit, vel non influit, prout imperanti sese determinare, vel haerere placet; sed prorsus talis, quae simulac pulsat fores rumpit ostia, repugnantémque domat voluntatem, tollit omnem ejus resistentiam, rapit eam secum, & ex invita volentem ineffabili suavitate facit. Jansen. August. Tom. 3. is such as doth not only work the effect if we will, expecting when our Wills will move, but it enables us to will: for herein lies the precise difference between a sound and sick Wil That the influx and concourse of God is absolute may be demonstrated from the absurdity, yea impossibility of a conditionate concourse in God. How absurd is it to conceit, that God will concur with the human Will in the act of willing upon condition that it will! Yea, how impossible is such a conditionate influx! For if there be any condition required to God's Concourse, than he concurs to the working of that condition, or not: if not, then there is some act of the Creature produced without the Divine Concourse: If God doth concur to that condition, then absolutely, or on some other condition: if absolutely, than his former concourse is not conditionate: for he that requires any condition of his act, and gives that condition may be said to act absolutely: besides if God concur absolutely to the later condition, why not also to the former act? If God concur to the second condition conditionately, then also to the third, etc. and thus there will be a door open to a progress into infinite, which Nature, but much more the God of Nature abhors. Hence, 3. God's Concourse is previous and antecedent. God's concourse previous and antecedent. For the explication of this Adjunct or Mode of Operation we are to consider, that he Priority here meant is not of Time but of causality, as the causality of the First cause is in order of nature antecedent to the causality of the second cause: for therefore the second cause cooperates; because the First cause operates. The Priority and Antecedence of Divine Concourse is most evident in gratiose Operations and Effects. Thus Isidorus Pelusiota, lib. 2. Epist. 72. (Edit. Commelin. 1605.) pag. 121. An evil tree, saith he, cannot bring forth good fruit, Mat. 7.18. Mat. 7.18. How did Paul, when he was a Persecutor, become a Preacher? How did Peter, when he had abjured Christ, get off this spot? By what means was the wild Olive implanted into the good Olive, Rom. 11.17. Rom. 11.17? How did the Thief get admission into Paradise? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, having perceived therefore the force of precedent Divine aid, every one that wils both labours, and moves allthings, (for a naked will sufficeth not) and learns, and attains Salvation. Wherein he assertes, (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that supernatural antecedent aid or Grace works all in matters of Salvation. (2) That the naked will sufficeth not to perform any good. chrysostom, in Genes. Hom. 9 calls this prevenient Grace, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Grace that seeks what is lost, and is found by such as seek it not. Basil terms it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Anticipant Grace. So de Baptis. lib. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, By the prevenient Grace of God we work and confer our duties, according to saith, by love. This antecedence and Priority of Divine Concourse may be demonstrated, (1) From its effective Principe the Divine Will, which necessarily precedes the Act of the second cause; because eternal and independent, as before. (2) From the efficace of the Divine Concourse, as it infallibly determines the second cause to act, and so must be necessarily antecedent thereto, not only. simultaneous, as the Jesuits hold. (3) From the Dependence and Subordination of the second cause to the First. All second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Concauses, dependent on and subordinate to the First cause, as Plato: now where there is dependence and subordination, here must necessarily be Priority and Antecedence of that on which the subordinate depends. Thus Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 21. Sect. 2. pag. 568. By comparing, saith he, the action of the Creature to the intern action of God, it is clear, that the action of God is in order of nature before the action of the Creature: whence it is said, that the first cause doth first influence or concur; because the second cause acts not, but in and by its virtue. Yet it cannot be denied, but that the Jesuits generally allow God only a simultaneous Concourse as o the acts of the Will; because otherwise, as they conceit, the liberty of the Will cannot be preserved. This simultaneous concourse they make to be nothing else but the very action of the second cause, as it proceeds from God. Burgersdicius, Metaph. l. 2. c. 11. grants, that God's Concourse in supernatural Acts is previous; but yet in naturals he allows it to be only simultaneous. But that God's Concourse not only in supernaturals, but also in naturlas is previous the Dominicans strongly prove from the very nature of the First cause, and dependence of the second: for where there is subordination and dependence in causality, there is posteriority, etc. 4. God's Concourse to and with second causes is total. God's Concourse total. This totality of the First cause doth not exclude the totality of the second cause in its kind, but only its partiality and coordination in the same kind. For it's a trite Rule in Philosophy, that in causes subordinate there may be divers total causes in different kinds concurring to the same effect, but not in the same kind. So we say that God, and the Sun, and Man are all total causes in the production of a Man; because they all have different kinds of causality. When therefore we say, that God's Concourse is total, we do only deny the Coordination or Copartialitie of the second cause. We allow the second cause to cooperate with God in a way of subordination, but not to be a coordinate, social, or copartial cause with God. Divine Concourse, specially as to gratiose effects, works all totally and solitarily: it admits not of a Corrival or Copartner: it is no partial cause, but works the whole effect, though not without the subservience of inferior causes and instruments. As in natural causes, you ascribe the whole efficace and causalitic of the instrument to the principal cause; specially if the instrument be purely passive, without any inherent virtue of its own. As you ascribe not the victory to the General's Sword, but to his Valour: so here the instruments which Christ useth in the works of the new Creation are purely passive; they have no efficace, but what is imparted to them by him the principal Efficient; and therefore they cannot be partial, social causes. This totality of Divine Concourse is well demonstrated by that great and pious Witness against Antichrist, even in the darkest times of Popery, Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lancolne, in his MSS. de Libero Arbitrio: Efficacious Grace so works with the Freewill, that at first it prevents the act of the Will, and afterwards concurs; yet not so, as if part were wrought by Grace and part by Freewill, but each in its kind works the whole: for two individual Agents must necessarily work one and the same effect when their action is indivise— This Augustin illustrates by a Rider and the Horse; by whom one and the same act or motion is totally produced: so the Action of God and of the Will concur totally— And so in every effect of every Creature, God and the next second cause produce the same conjointly not apart, or one this part and that the other part, etc. This totality of Divine Concourse as to gratiose effects is frequently and lively illustrated and demonstrated by the Greek Theologues. Thus chrysostom, Hom. 12. ad Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. We see houses beautifully built, Hoc, inquit Bonaventura, piarum mentium est, ut nihil sibi tribuant, sed totum Gratiae Dei: unde quantumcunque aliquis det Gratiae Dei à pietate non receder, etiamsi multa tribuendo Gratiae Dei aliquid subtrahit potestati Naturae: cùm verò aliquid Gratiae Dei subtrahitur, & Naturae tribuitur quod Gratiae est, ibi potest periculum intervenire. Cassandris Consuloat. Art. 18. and we say; the whole is the Artificers: albeit he has work men under him: so the whole of good must be ascribed to God. So in Genes 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The whole is from the Grace of God. So add Ephes. Hom. 18. speaking of Paul, he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thou seest how in allthings be conceles what is his own, and ascribes all to God. So Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 31. speaking of Paul, saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he ascribes all to God. Thus also Cyril Alexandr. and others, as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Ch. 9 Sect. 3. §. 12. This partial concourse supposeth God and the Creature to act together in the same kind of causality, which is repugnant both to the nature of God, as also to the condition of the Creature. (1) This partial Concourse is repugnant to the independent, simple, perfect nature of God, as also to his prime, sovereign, effications causality. What more incongruous and unbecoming the supreme infinite Being, than to be yoked with his Creature as a partial, social, coordinate cause? (2) This also is inconsistent with the Subordination, Dependence, and inferiority of the second cause. For all social, partial causes are as such coordinate and equal: the effect depends on each, but they depend not each on the other. To make the second cause social and coordinate with the first, what is it but to make it a first cause? (3) This also is inconsistent with the priority and antecedence of God's concourse: for a partial causality is only simultaneous, which has been already refuted. (4) The sober Scholastic Divines have ever owned and approved a totality of Divine concourse. So Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 3. cap. 70. It's manifest, saith he, that the same effect is ascribed to the natural and second cause and to the Divine Efficace; not as if it were partly from God, and partly from the natural Agent; but the whole effect is from both in a different mode: as the same effect is attributed totally to the Instrument, and yet totally to the principal cause. The like Alvarez, Disput. 85. The totality of Divine concourse, as to the new Creature and Gratiose Effects, is lively illustrated and demonstrated in Sacred Philosophy. Thus Esa. 43.7. Esa. 43.7 Even every one that is called by my name: for I have created him for my Glory, I have form him, yea, I have made him. Here Christ assumes to himself, as the sole, total, principal Agent, the Creation, Formation, and Consummation of the New Creature. As in the old Creation, God made first the rude Chaos out of nothing: then out of the rude Chaos he form the several species of the Universe, and particularly the Body of Man out of the dust of the Earth; which was Formation: thence in the last place, he breathed into Man a Rational Soul; which gave Consummation to him: So proportionably hereto Christ here assumes to himself a threefold concourse, and each total, in the framing of the New Creature. he saith, (1) I have created him. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. I have educed or called him out of nothing, as I did the first rude Chaos. The new Creature is not educed out of the potence of corrupt Nature, but out of nothing by Divine Omnipotence. But if this be not enough to express the totality of his efficacious Essicience, he adds, (2) I have form him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. This also is a term whereby the formation of Creatures out of the first chaos is expressed: The sense is; I have not only given him some first lines, a rude mass, or shape of a new Creature; but I have fashioned and form him, as I at first form Adam out of a piece of Red Earth or Clay: For so the word signifies, to form or shape a thing, as the Potter doth his Clay, to this or that form. And if all this will not suffice to demonstrate, that Christ is the total Creator and Formator of the New Creature, he adds yet farther, (3) Yea, I have made him, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. i e. I have perfected and completed the whole work: I have made him such as I would have him, conform to mine eternal Idea concerning him: he has no part wanting or misplaced; not a finger or little toe defective: he is a complete, perfect new Creature, and that by virtue of my Creation, Formation, and Consummation. Thus the whole of the new Creature, as well as of the old, is to be ascribed to Christ totally and solely as the Creator, Fictor, and Effector thereof. And here we are also to note, that it was usual with the Hebrews, to express the works of the intern new Creation, under the symbol of the extern old Creation. The totality of the Divine concourse is also we expressed, Esa. 63.5. and Psal. 94.17. 5. God's concourse particular not general only. The concourse of God as the first cause is particular and proper, not only general. This Adjunct or mode of operation may seem novel, but really it is not so. Before we come to the demonstration of it, we must premit some Distinctions and Limitations. (1) We must distinguish between a general providence, and general concourse: we deny not but that God's Providence, as it extends to allthings universally, may be termed general, which yet doth no way induce or suppose a general concourse, i. e. such as is alike commun to all effects and determinable thereby; as the concourse of the Sun is determinable by the effects it works on. Such a general concourse is unworthy of the first cause, who determines all effects, but is determinable by none. Bradwardine de Caused Dei, l. 3. c. 7. p. 668. undertakes to give us the origine of this general influx or concourse, which he makes to be from the Pagan Philosophers, 'specially the Astrologers, who asserted an emanation or irradiation of general influxes from celestial Bodies, which they supposed to be Gods, on all subjects or matters. (2) We must distinguish between a particular cause, and a particular concourse. We do not affirm that God is a particular cause, but an universal cause concurring in a particular manner to all second causes and their effects. And here Heereboord, Select. Disputat. Vol. 1. Disput. 10, and 11. whiles he justly opposeth his Master Burgersdicius, for denying God's concourse to be particular, he himself false into this easy mistake of making God a particular cause. For the obviating of which, as also for the taking away the foundation of all the objections urged against our Hypothesis, we say, that God is an Universal Cause, and yet his concourse, as to the mode of its operation is particular. God is said to be an Universal Cause, in regard of the extent of his causality, as it extends to all objects, effects, and second causes universally: and yet his concourse is particular, as it is not, like that of the Sun, determinable by its object, but doth in a particular manner, according to the exigence and condition of the subject, determine the same. These things being premissed we proceed to demonstrate, that the concourse of God is not general but particular, as to its manner of working with all second causes. (1) From the nature of a General concourse; which is of itself indifferent, but modified and determined by the matter it works on: So the influx of the Sun is only general and indifferent; because modified by the matter it works on, as it is evident by the colours in a Rainbow, as also by the opposite effects it has on the wax and clay. To suppose God's concourse to be thus General and Indifferent is every way unworthy of the first cause, which determines all second causes, but is determined by none. To assert, that the concourse of God is in the power of the second cause or matter it works on, what is this but to suppose the second cause to be first and the first second? (2) From the manifold imperfections that are hereby imposed on God. For if the concourse of God be only General and Indifferent, it than hangs in suspense, and has not efficace enough to reach its effect, unless it be so or so disposed. Whence also it follows, that it is in the power of the second cause to resist or frustrate the concourse of God, so that it shall not reach its effect. Hence lastly it follows, that the concourse of God is not efficacious and omnipotent, which we shall anon prove. (3) That the concourse of God as to its manner of working is not general but particular is asserted and demonstrated by some of the most acute of the Scholastic Theologues. So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 4. and l. 3. c. 7. Joan. major in Sentent. 2. Dist. 28. q. 1. p. 122. Alvarez de Auxil. Disput. 23. with several others. But here it is objected, 1. by Burgersdicius and others: Objections against Gods particular concourse. (1) If God concur by a particular concourse to the specification of the action, than he may be said to walk, discourse, eat, etc. To this Objection we respond, [1] by denying, that God concurs to the specification of the action, albeit he concurs by a particular concourse: for an action is specified from its particular cause, not from the first universal cause. So that here is that which they call a fallacy of many interrogations, whereof one is true the other false. Or, we may call it a begging of the Question, in that they suppose, That, if God concur by a particular concourse, he concurs also to the specification of the action, which is an inconsequent consequence. [2] Those Animal acts of walking, eating, etc. ascribed to the second cause, cannot be ascribed to God the first cause, albeit they more principally belong to him; because they proceed not from pure efficience, but from information, (to use the Aristotelean phrase) or a body so organised. Those actions signify a relation to the particular subject whence they slow, and therefore cannot be properly attributed to God, as Bradward. l. 1. c. 4. p. 178. and Suarez Metaphys. Disput. 21. S. 3. acutely reply, showing that ambulation, eating, etc. do not denote pure efficience, but a subject informed by such motions, which are therefore proper to the said subject. (2) But the main objection of Burgersdicius and others against God's particular concourse is taken from sinful actions, unto which, say they, God cannot be said to concur by a particular concourse, unless we make him the author of sin. This objection makes a great noise, but has little of weight in it. For (1) The deordination of any sinful act can only be ascribed to the second cause, who is the Author of it, not unto the first cause, who only produceth the physical entitative Act. [2] That which is most sinful in regard of the second cause, is so ordered by God, as that it shall conduce to the greatest good, as before, and hereafter in the providence of God. 6. God's Concourse Efficacious. God's concourse is most Potent and Efficacious. This Adjunct and Mode of operation is most express in Sacred Philosophy, specially as to gratiose Influences, which are most potent. Sin is a mighty strong poison, ay but medicinal Grace is a much stronger Antidote. The powers of darkness and Hell are very strong; but Christ the Captain of our Salvation, hath Samson-like carried away the Gates of Hell upon his shoulders and led captivity captive: His Grace is most potent, irresistible, and victorions. Thus Jansenius, Augustin. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. p. 43. having in what precedes sufficiently refuted the Conditional Grace of the Molimstes, he adds: This therefore is the true reason, why no medicinal Grace of Christ ever wants its effect, but all works both to will and to do; because with Augustin Grace and the good work are so reciprocated, that as from Grace conferred the effect of the work may be inferred, so on the other hand, from the defect of the work, it may be inferred, that Grace was not given. By which manner of reasoning it appears, that Grace as the cause, and the operation of the Will as the effect are, as the Philosophers speak, convertible, and mutually inseparable each from other. For so Augustin speaks of the Conflict against Tentations: Agis si ageris, & bene agis, si à●bono ageris: so efficacious is medicinal Grace. Yea Jansenins a voucheth, that there is no manner of speech among the Scholastic Theologues so efficacious to express, that the determination, or predetermination of the Will is from the Grace of God, but Augustin assumes the same, to demonstrate, that the Grace of Christ is not such, that the effect should be suspended or dependent on any condition to be performed by the human Will, but that the effect is most potently produced by it, not if the Will willeth, but by working and determining the Will to wil So Habak. 3.4. Habak. 3.4. And his brightness was as the light: he had bornes coming out of his hand: and there was the hiding of his power. And his brightness was as the light. The brightness of Christ was exceeding gloriose, even like the brightness of the Sun, in its meridian glory. Thence it follows: he had horns coming out of his hands. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies, to send forth beams as horns, to irradiate and shine forth. Beams and horns have some analogy and ressemblance, and therefore the same word among the Hebrews signifies both. Hence the vulgar Version renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exod. 34.29, horns, whereas it signifies there beams, as here. Whence it follows: out of his hands. Hands here denote Christ's power, as Act. 11.21. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hand signifies power, the hand being the instrument of the body, whereby it puts forth its power. Thence he adds: There was the hiding of his power: i. e. his secret power lay wrapped up in his efficacious rays, or concourse, which is exceeding influential and potent, like horns. We find something analogous hereto in Plato, Repub. 6. pag. 509. where treating of God as the first Cause of all good, he compares him to the Sun, and his concourse to the rays thereof, in this manner: Thou wilt say, I presume, that the Sun doth not only cause that things are seen, but also that they are generated, do grow, are nourished: although it be not the generation of those things. Thus therefore determine, that the chiefest good, [namely God] doth give to those things that are known not only that they are known, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but also force and efficace for their existence, etc. Wherein he compares the efficacious Concourse of God to the spermatic potent influx of the Sun, which gives life, sense, motion, nutrition, angmentation and vigour to all manner of Infects. Whence those blind Gentiles made the Sun, under the fictitious names of Apollo and his Son Esculapius, the supreme God of Medicine; because the Virtues of Plants depend on the Sun, See Court Gent. P. 1. B. 2. C. 8. §. 11. its heat and influence: whence they consecrated the Laurel to Apollo, which signified with them the heat and influence of the Sun: the Laurel being a Plant, as they say, hot and always green. Such a sovereign efficace did the Grecian Philosophers ascribe unto the Sun, in regard of its influence, not only on Plants, but also on animal Bodies; and therefore it is deservedly made by Plato a symbolic image of God's efficacious Concourse on all create Being's and Operations. Thus in sacred Philosophy we find Christ, as the first cause of all Grace, compared to the Sun, and his gracious influx to the beams of the Sun. So Mal. 4.2. Mal. 4.2. But unto you that fear my Name shall the Sun of righteousness arise with healing in his wings, and ye shall go forth and grow up as calves of the stall. Christ here, as the first original Spring of all Grace, and compared to the Sun: whence he is said, to arise with healing in his wings: i e. his Beams: for the Beams of the Sun are its wings, whereby it conveys an healing prolific influence to allthings that have life. The Sun indeed vouchsafeth warm efficacious influences to all natural bodies, both vegetable and animal: it has an universal prolific influence on all sublunary bodies. Thence it's said Psal. 19.6. Psal. 19.6. And there is nothing hid from the heat thereof: i. e. it's warm benign influx reacheth, as some conceive, unto all natural effects, even to the very Minerals and Metals. But certain it is, that Vegetables and Plants are greatly influenced by the Sun. Job 8.16. Hence that Job 8.16. He is green before the Sun. Whence is the beauty of Roses, the delicious suavities of Fruits, the medicinal virtues of Herbs, the nourishment of Corn, the fatness of Olives, the cordial and heart-reviving influences of Grapes, but from the Sun? So for the animal life, are not all Infects produced by the Sun? Yea doth not the health, strength, vivacity, and comforts of man's body receive much influence from the efficacious beams of the Sun, as Job 30.28. Eccles. 11.7? Is not then the Sun, both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophy, made an apt Symbol to represent the efficacious Concourse of God as the first cause of allthings, but more specially of supernatural effects? O! what Soul-reviving influences are there in the warm beams of Divine concourse? What universal, inexhaustible, infinite treasures of Divine light and heat are there in the Sun of Righteousness? Are not his beams the light of life, as Joh. 8.12. Psal. 84.11? Such is the efficace of Divine concourse. There is moreover a great emphase and elegance in that phrase, Mal. 4.2. And ye shall go forth and grow up as calves of the stall: i.e. as weak, feeble Calves, which in the winter, by reason of the cold, are kept in the stall, at spring, when they go forth and sport themselves under the warm healing beams of the Sun, how greatly do they grow and thrive: so the sick, infirm friends of Christ, when they lie under the warm, refreshing, corroborating influences of his medicinal Grace. Yea, this efficacious sovereign Grace doth not only cure infirm consumtive Souls, but also give life to dead Souls. Thus Esa. 9.2. The people that walked in darkness have seen a great light, Esa. 9.2. they that dwell in the land of the shadow of death, upon them hath the light shined. (1) This Prophecy refers to our Lords first Preaching among those that inhabited the land of Zabulon and Nephthali, mentioned v. 1. and so applied Mat. 4.14, 15, 16. who were indeed, at the coming of our Lord, under very black Egyptian darkness: whence they are said, to walk in darkness. (2) They are said, to dwell in the land of the shadow of death. [1] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they that dwell denotes a fixed immobile state, not only of such as travel or pass throwo a country, but of inhabitants. Then [2] we have the place of their habitation, the land of the shadow of death. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the shadow of death, whereby we may understand either a deadly shade, such as by the damp thereof strikes dead; which is very frequent in some dark caverns of the Earth: or else, by the shadow of death, we may understand the Grave, which is the dark shadowy habitation of the dead; as Job 10.21. the Grave is styled the land of darkness, and the shadow of death. And look as dead men are lodged in the dark, shadowy Grave; so were these dead Souls in the land of Zabulon and Nephthali lodged in the Grave of sin, under the dark, deadly shade thereof; which implies a total privation of spiritual light and life. Now (3) on these dead Souls dwelling in the Grave of sin the light shined, i. e. Christ the Sun of Righteousness arose with healing under his wings, or warm beams of efficacious Grace. Yea, how oft doth this omnipotent heart quickening Grace pick out the worst of sinners as fit matter to exert its sovereign efficace on? Esa. 19.18. Thus Esa. 19.18. In that day [i. e. when the Sun of Righteousness shall arise on Egypt with healing under his wings] shall five cities in the land of Egypt speak the language of Canaan, [i. e. be converted to God] and swear to the Lord of Hosts: [i. e. bind themselves inviorably to Christ, by an Oath of Allegiance and Supremacy] one shall be called the Citre of Destruction. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which we render the City of Destruction is rendered by Grotius, Gataker and other Critics, the City of the Sun, called by the Grecians who possessed it, Heliopolis; which the Hebrews expressed by Bethsenes, the house of the Sun, i. e. consecrated to the Sun, their principal God, which was with all manner of idolatry Rites worshipped in this City. For Herodotus assures us, that this City Heliopolis was one of the six, unto which the Egyptians used at some solemn times to repair out of all parts, to celebrate the Worship of the Sun; because here was their renowned Temple of the Sun; as also Mnevis one of their sacred Bulls, which they worshipped as God, of which see Court Gent. P. 1. B. 2. C. 8. §. 9 Now this Heliopolis so much addicted to and immersed in Idolatry is made one of the principal objects, on which the Sun of Righteousness should arise with healing under his wings or beams of efficacious medicinal Grace. So v. 22. And the Lord shall smite Egypt, he shall smite and heal it, and they shall return even unto the Lord, etc. What! shall Egypt, yea the most idolatrous City of Egypt, Heliopolis, be healed by the sovereign Grace of the Sun of Righteousness? O! what a potent demonstration is this of the omnipotent efficace of medicinal Grace? May not this Argument be further promoved by a reflection on these Britannic Isles and their prodigiose Idolatry, when the Sun of Righteousness at first arose on them with healing under his wings of Evangelic medicinal Grace? But for the more full explication and demonstration of the officacitie of Divine Concourse, we are to consider, that there is a twofold Concourse of God, one moral; the other efficacious; which some term physic Concourse, because it works according to the manner of physic Efficients. For a physic 'Cause is that which really and properly influenceth the Effect: but a moral Cause, as dictinguished from physic, is that which contributes not any real and proper influx for the production of the effect, yet he doth so far morally concur, as that the effect is imputed to him, as it's well determined by Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 17. Sect. 2. pag. 402. A moral cause doth not reach the effect immediately, neither doth it properly move and determine the Agent, but only objectively and remotely, by Commands, Arguments, Incentives, Motives, and such like moral influences: which is only a metaphoric, indirect, remote, improper, and inefficacious kind of efficience. But now a physic Cause, is that which alone deserves, and therefore in the Scholes has appropriated to itself the name of an efficient Cause; because it doth by a proper, real, direct, and efficacious influx or causality reach its effect. God has both a moral and physic or efficacious concourse in and for the production of moral good. He commands, propones arguments, invites, persuades what is good; as also efficaciously works the same in those he intends to do good to. But as for sinful acts God doth not by any moral concourse concur thereto, and therefore they may not be imputed to him as the Author of them. This being premissed, we proceed to demonstrate the efficacity of God's Concourse. (1) From its sovereign nature and omnipotent manner of working, specially in supernatural, gratiose effects. The efficacity of actual Grace in the Infusion, Conservation, Promotion, and Actuation of Habitual is lively illustrated by the Grecanic Fathers of the Primitive Churches; who stile this efficacious medicinal Grace, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the superne or supernatural vocation and motion: they term it sometimes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the operant and cooperant Grace: also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Energy, Aid, and Assistence of God: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the ineffable Virtue of God; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the assistant Power. It's termed also by them, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the superne and Divine impulse, or inclination; also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Divine hand; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Grace of protection; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the universal Spring of Energy; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of itself perfect and sufficiently operative: chrysostom terms it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a gift above nature overcoming nature: also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, insuperable Assistence. But none among the Greek Theologues seems more lively to describe it, than Cyril Alexandr. lib. 1. de Adorat. Tom. 1. where he assertes, That men are turned from sin, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not only by words injected into the Soul; [i. e. according to the Pelagian persuasion, by moral suasion only] but that God puts forth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an energetic efficacious Aid, whereby the infirm Will is led as by the hand. Clemens Alexandr. l. 1. Paed. c. 3. calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Inspiration of God: also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the subtle and spirituale instructive force of Divine words. And Athanas. contr. Gent. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the power communicated from God. Again he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Grace of God hath overcome. Whence the Greek Theologues termed it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the invincible Assistence. And chrysostom saith expressly, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, all good comes from the Grace and efficacious Virtue of God. (2) From its effective Principe, the Divine Wil We have before, §. 3. demonstrated, that the Divine Concourse supposeth not any transient influx form God, but only the act of the Divine Will: which being omnipotent, it thence necessarily follows, that his concourse is also omnipotent and most efficacious. Whence it is worthy our notice, that the Concourse of God is in Scripture expressed by his fiat or word, as Gen. 1.3, etc. And what is this Word of God but the omnipotent Act of his Will? Hence in sacred Philosophy, the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, signify both Word and Thing, denoting to us, that there is an intimate reciprocation between Divine Words and Things: whatever God speaks and says shall be done, is done: and whatever is done, is but the effect of his Word or Will: every Word and Will of God, which regards the event and issues of things, is omnipotent and operative. (3) From the Determination of the second cause by the first. God's Concourse is not only moral, by propounding objects and persuading thereto; but really operative and productive of things. Now in all cooperation the causes cooperating are either coordinate or subordinate: the first and second cause cannot be coordinate, but the later must be subordinate to the former: and if subordinate to, than it must be determined by the first Cause. It's certain, that either the second cause determines the first, or the first the second: and is it not more likely, that the first cause should determine the second, than that the second should determine the first to act? Can we imagine, that the concourse of the first cause is in the power of the second? Is it not more agreeable to the Nature of God, and the condition of a Creature, to determine, that the causality of the second cause is subordinate unto, and therefore determinable by the concourse of the first cause? This argument is more fully managed by the Dominicans and Jansenistes. See Bradwardine de. Causa Dei, l. 3. c. 7. p. 669. Alvarez, de Auxil. l. 3. Disp. 18-21. & l. 4. Disput. 32. Jansenius, August. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. 7. God's Concourse connatural. Lastly, God's concourse, albeit it be most potent and efficacious, yet is it also most Connatural and Congenial: there is not more of force, than Divine suavity mixed therewith. So Psal. 110.3. Psal. 110.3. Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power. Willing. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 willingnesses. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nadib signifies (1) Free, ready, cheerful, spontaneous. (2) Metonymically, a free gift or oblation. (3) Princes, who ought to be free-spirited, generose, liberal, as Luke 22.25 (4) The word is here used in the abstract, which carries a great emphase: for abstractes speak essences. (5) It is here also in the Genitive case plural; [of thy willingnesses] which the Hebrews use as expressive of a superlative degree. So that the meaning is: thy people shall be in the most superlative degree free, ready, willing, as Noble and Freeborn Princes, to offer up themselves a Free-wil-offering, gift, or oblation unto thee. Hence efficacious Grace was termed by the Greek Fathers, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the intern philtrum or charm: by Basil, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Grace which is sweetly received: by chrysostom, Hom. 31. in Mat. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an opportune vocation. Of which see more Court Gen. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9 S. 3. §. 12. Nihil Augustino certius est, quàm in Scriptures S. Gratiam illam efficacem, per quam solam operamur quicquid. boni operamur, nominedulcedinis, suavitatis, delectationis, nempe spiritualis & coelestis esse significatam. Delectationi Dilectionem, Ardorem, Inflammationemque subnectit. Sunt emim effectus qui immediatè ex illa coelesti suavitate germinant. Jansen. August. Tom. 3. De Grat. l. 4. c. 1. Ubi fusiùs de suavitate hac spiriruali Gratiae Medicinalis tractat. So sweetly doth Medicinal Grace Worke. And yet it works nevertheless omnipotently: for so it followeth: in the day of thy power. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies (1) force, and strength of body, or mind: and thence, (2) Metonymically, richesse or military Forces; because in them men place their strength, job 21.7. Psal. 49.6. We may understand it in both senses: (1) of Christ's powerful, efficacious, heart-conquering Grace; which is the cause: or (2) for his powerful Forces and Armies; which are the effect of this Omnipotent day of Christ. Thus we see what an admirable combination here is of Divine Omnipotence, with human Liberty: how powerfully this medicinal Grace acts, and yet how sweetly: it acts so Omnipotently, as if there were no room left for human Liberty; and yet so connaturally, and so sweetly, as if there were not the least dram of Omnipotence, and Force in it. Oh! what an omnipotent suavity, or sweet Omnipotence is there in this Medicinal Grace? Who would not come under such a silken, soft, sweet violence as this is? Need we then fear, that any prejudice can befall human Liberty, so long as this Wise, Sovereign, Soul-physician works upon the Will? Doth he not understand perfectly what are the proper ansae, or handles of the Soul, and so suit his Medicinal Grace thereto? Hath he not a key exactly sitted to every lock, yea, to every ward in the lock of the will? Is not his Medicinal Grace full of the deepest and highest reason, so that the Mind sees all the reason in the world, why it should embrace the offers made to it by Christ? And doth not the Will, upon this Divine, heart-logic infused by Christ, move as freely, as cheerfully, as connaturally, as if there were no power mixed with medicinal Grace? Doth not Christ take the Will by the hand and teach it to go, as he did Ephraim, Hos. 11.3? and doth he not also draw it with cords of a man, Coelestis illa suavitas mollit viam ut voluntas ex carnaliu rerum visco emergere possit, & seipsam in justitiam diligendam figere. Cum enim non possit morus nisi ab immobili fieri, suavitas illa immobilem quodammodo reddit animum, ut possit in motu liberum spiritalis voluntatis, ac dilectionem erumpere. Ex quo fit consequenter, ut si illa desit, voluntas veluti emortua sit. Jans. August. Tom. 3. de Grat. l. 4. c. 7. and hands of love, i. e. with rational arguments, and moral persuasions, as Hos. 11.4? Thus Esa. 10.21. The remnant shall return, even the remnant of Jacob to their mighty God. Here is a spontaneous cheerful return of back sliding Israel; and yet it is to their mighty God, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the name given the Messiah, Esa. 9.6. Christ draws them by a mighty power, and yet they return as freely, as if there were no power and efficace put forth. So Esa. 11.6, 10, 11. The like Esa. 44. Having spoken v. 3. of the effusion of the spirit of Grace, he adds what followed thereon, v. 5.— and another shall subscribe with his hand unto the Lord, etc. A Metaphor taken from such Volunteers as do freely and spontaneously with their own hand list and enrol themselves under a General. So ineffable and admirable is the suavity of efficacious Grace. Yea may we not conclude hence, that look by how much the more powerfully and invincibly this Medicinal Grace acts on the Will, by so much the more connaturally, and sweetly it acts? For hereby it determineth, confirmeth, and preserveth the Will in its highest Liberty, both of State, and Act. For what more natural to the Will, than to adhere to its chiefest Good? Or when doth it act more freely, than when it is most peremtorily, most inviolably, and most immotably determined to love, and enjoy its best friend, and choicest Good? Thus the Omnipotence, and Efficace of Medicinal Grace, is so far from destroying the Liberty of the Will, as that it doth most effectually preserve, confirm, and promote the same. CHAP. VIII. Of Creation, and Providence in the General. Creation proper to God: the production of something out of nothing: Active Creation the same with the Divine Wil: Passive Creation what. God's Providence demonstrated: The Explication of it: The Wisdom and Eternal Law of Providence. Providence an Act of the Divine Wil The Spirit's Efficience in Providence. Providential means. Fire the create mundane Spirit. The Object of Divine Providence. Its Adjuncts: (1) efficacity. (2) immobility. (3) Connaturalitie. (4) Perfection. (5) Mysterious. Miracles. Providential Conservation, immediate and mediate; Ordinary and Extraordinary. §. 1. HAving examined Divine concourse in its object, God's Creation demonstrated and explicated. effective principe, and Adjuncts or various modes of operation, we now descend to the contemplation of it in regard of its Effects. The Efficience of the first Cause in relation to its effects is usually distributed into Creation and Providence. Creation is the Efficience of the first Cause, whereby he made allthings at first, and still continues to make some things out of nothing. What lively Notices we have of Gods Creating allthings out of nothing, both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophy, hath been sufficiently explicated and demonstrated in Plato's Physics, Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Chap. 9 S. 1. &. Our present task will be to give some general Ideas of the Creation as it appertains to God's prime Efficience. 1. It's most evident, that no finite Being can be eternal or from eternity. All the Philosophers before Aristotle generally asserted the production of allthings by God: but he, from a confined mistaken notion of God's infinite Effcience, fond conceited the first matter to be eternal; because he could not imagine, how something could be educed out of nothing. But true Philosophy, as well as Divine Revelation teacheth us, that allthings were made by God, and nothing besides himself is eternal. That the world was not from eternity we have sufficiently demonstrated, in what precedes touching the existence of God, C. 2. §. 2. This Argument is well managed by Derodone, l'Atheisme Convaincu, C. 1. And Suarez, Metaphys. Tom. 1. p. 536. strongly demonstrates, That it is intrinsically repugnant to Creation that it be eternal. Yet the Jesuits generally grant, That it is possible for the world to be from eternity. Which Hypothesis comes not short of a virtual contradiction: for what difference can be rationally imagined between being eternal, and being from eternity? Is not that which is without beginning eternal? And can we imagine that to have a beginning, which is from eternity? Can any effect and product of the Divine Will be commensurate to it in point of Duration? 2. To Create is the sole Prerogative of God. For (1) the order of actions must be according to the order of Agents: the most Noble and Supreme Action cannot agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent: And is not Creation the most Noble and Supreme of all Actions? Can it then agree to any but the most Noble and Supreme Agent, God? Creation is the most perfect of all actions, by which a participate Being may be communicated; because it primarily speaks the production of the whole entity in its full latitude:. whence it is manifest, that this action cannot be appropriated or attributed to any, but the first cause, who is Being essentially and of himself: no participate being has force enough to produce the whole of Being. (2) That Creation is proper to God may be argued from the Mode of Efficience. For Creation supposeth an Omnipotence and Independence in the Creator; in as much as he has no passive power or matter to work on, but only an objective power or possibility of the object to be Created, which requires an infinite active power in the Agent. For by how much the more remote the passive power is from Act, by so much the greater ought the active power of the Agent to be: whence where there is no preexistent matter to work upon, but a mere obediential objective power or nothing, there the distance between the Power and Act is, as to efficience, infinite, and impertransible by any finite power: therefore nothing but an infinite power can bring the extremes Nothing and Something together. (3) From the Nature of Creation; which is, not a successive but a momentaneous Action: but all the productions of second causes, as they are inferior to, and Instruments of the first cause, are successive motions: for all Instruments act and move in a way of succession. (4) From the limitation of all second causes. For the most perfect of Creatures have only a precarious and Participate Being; and therefore have not in themselves virtue or force enough to Create the least of Being's. To Create requires a virtue of the most Supreme Order, invested with an Active Power in the most universal latitude. And the reason is evident; because the Creative Power extends itself to every thing creable: neither doth it expect on the part of its object any thing, but a non-repugnance or obediential power that the effect may be. This will more fully appear from the following Thesis. 3. Creation the production of something out of nothing. Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing. When we say Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing; the particle out of must not be understood as denoting any succession of one thing after another, (for Creation is but an instantaneous eduction) but only the negation of a material cause. Now that God Created allthings without any preexistent matter may be demonstrated, (1) From his Independence and prime efficience as the first cause. For the first Independent Cause being a pure simple act, must necessarily precede all matter, and thence be the cause thereof: that which is the first in Being's must necessarily be the cause of all the rest: whence it follows, that the first matter was produced by God out of no preexistent matter but out of nothing. (2) From the universal efficience of God, as the first cause. Every Agent, so far as it is confined to matter, so far it is particular and limited: for to be confined to matter in acting, is to act in order to some determinate species, whereunto that matter refers: wherefore that Agent which is universal, and commensurate to all effects possible, cannot be confined to matter: such is the first cause. (3) From the universality of Effects produced by Creation. By how much the more universal the effect is, by so much the higher the cause is: and by how much the higher the cause is, by so much the more it is extended to all effects. Whence the effects of Creation being of all most universal, and the cause most high, there cannot be supposed any preexistent matter out of which they are educed. (4) All productions out of matter suppose successive motion and Transmutation: but Creation is not a successive but momentaneous motion all at once. All successive motion and mutation must necessarily precede, as to Duration, the effect produced by such a mutation or motion: but Creation doth not by any kind of Duration precede the things created: therefore it cannot be successive, out of preexistent matter. 4. Active Creation is nothing else but the Act of the Divine Will, Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil as the effective principe of allthings. This Hypothesis has been fully explicated and demonstrated, Chap. 5. §. 4. of God's executive power, as c. 7. §. 3. And albeit it may seem to carry a novity with it, yet it has sufficient foundation both in Sacred and Scholastic Philosophy. As for Sacred Philosophy, its very mode of expressing Gods active efficience in creating allthings plainly shows that it was no other than the Act of the Divine Wil Gen. 1.3. Thus Gen. 1.3. and God said, Let there be light. Which Word or saying of God can be understood of no other than the Act of his Divine Wil For Speech is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here, and elsewhere ascribed to God, thereby to express the effications efficience of his Divine Will in the production of allthings. Thus Maimonides, More Nevochim, Part. 1. c. 65. demonstrates, That this Speech or Word, whereby allthings were made, must be understood of the Divine Will, not of any proper Speech; because all Speech, whereby any thing is commanded, must necessarily be directed to some Being existent, and capable of receiving such a command: but there was no Being then existent; therefore it must be understood of the Divine Wil Thus Hebr. 11.3. The world was framed by the Word of God. So 2 Pet. 3.5. By the Word of God the Heavens were of old. a why is the efficience of the Divine Will in creating allthings expressed by the Word of God, but to show, that as we, when we will have any thing done, express our Will by our word of command; so God expressed what he will have accomplished, by his Fiat or Creative Word. See more of this effective Word in the Providence of God, §. 3. This Hypothesis of Gods Creating allthings by his Will hath found Patrons not a few among the most accurate Scholastic Theologues. Thus Joan. Major, Sentent. 2. dist. 1. q. 3. proves, That God produced the World by his mere Intellection and Volition, without any other productive power. And his Arguments are these: (1) The Human Will doth not want any other executive power to execute its commands, unless it be in such things as it cannot by itself reach: but the Divine Omnipotent Will reacheth allthings: therefore it can execute its own commands, without the mediation of any executive power. (2) The Efficacious Will of God touching A. gives existence to A. otherwise the Efficacious Will of God were impedible; and so some one might resist his Wil (3) Our Will can by its mere volition produce some effects, namely Habits; it can also move other Powers by its Empire: Therefore the Divine Will can by its sole volition produce all effects. Thus Augustin, on Psal. 144. With God to Will in to do; because allthings receive Being from his Wil The like Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 29. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Allthings that the Lord hath willed, he hath done, and no man hath resisted his Will: he willed that allthings were made, and they were made: and he wils that the world consists, and it consists: and all that he wils he can do, and they are done. From this Active Creation of the Divine Will God is said by some to be a Creator from all Eternity. Thus Gregor. Ariminensis, Sent. l. 1. dist. 28. q. 3. fol. 122. This denomination is not extrinsec but intrinsec to the Divine Essence and Wil Hence Plato styled the World in regard of this active Creation, Eternal, as it lay, from all Eternity, in the Divine Will and Ideas. For the Active Efficience of the Divine Will is every way sufficient to denominate the Passive Power of the World as creable. 5. Passive Creation is something in the thing created, not really, Passive Creation a Mode of the thing Created. but mentally or modally only distinct from it. For the explication of this Proposition we are to note, (1) That Passive Creation doth not so much regard God as the thing Created. God in Creating the World was not reduced from Power to Act, as all Creatures are when they act: for God's Active Efficience was, as has been demonstrated, from all Eternity, and no other than his Divine Will: neither was there, at the passive Creation of the World, any new act in God, which was not before in him: but there was an accession of an act or existence to the things Created, which was not before: whence, by an extrinsec denomination, God is said to be Creator at the passive Creation of things; as, by an intrinsec denomination, he was Creator from all Eternity in regard of his Active Efficience or Decree. (2) Albeit we conceive and express Passive Creation under the notion of a mutation, yet it is not properly such; because all proper mutation implies a succession of one thing after another; which Creation admits not, being momentaneous and all at once, without any term from which, or flux, which all mutation includes. (3) Some, and those not vulgar Scholastics hold, That passive Creation is no way really but only mentally distinct from the Creature. So the Passive Creation of a Man is really and essentially the same with a Man. Thus Ocham, in Sent. 2. q. 9 and Greg. Ariminensis, in Sent. 2. dist. 1. q. 4, & 5. with the Nominals generally; who presume that Action is not a middle thing between the Cause and Effect. And their Arguments in this Case are not to be contemned; for they prove it, [1] From the special Reason of Creation, which is not an Accident, but the very substance or Essence of the thing Created: for if it were some middle thing between God and the Creature, distinct from both, it must be a Creature, and so the term of some other Creation; and this of some other: which would open a door for a progress into Infinite. [2] From the Essential Reason of a Creature: for Dependence on the first Cause is of the Essence of the Creature; therefore it is in the Creature, and not really distinct from it: Now the prime and essential dependence of the Creature on the first Cause is Creation: wherefore it can be no more distinguished from the Creature, than the Essence of a thing is distinguished from itself. That the Dependence of a Creature on its Creator is not distinct from its Essence, they prove by many and strong Arguments, of which hereafter, C. 11. §. 6. (4) Suarez, Metaphys. Disput. 20. S. 5. p. 529. with others, assert, That Creation is somewhat in the thing Create, not really distinct, as a proper entity, yet, ex natura rei, as a mode thereof. But this Controversy is not material, neither doth it want an easy way of reconcilement: for Suarez's modal distinction in effect, as he limits it, amounts to little more than a mental distinction, at least that which they style rationis ratiocinatae, which has some foundation in the things distinguished. However they both agree in this, that Passive Creation is in the thing Created. Hence it follows, 6. That the Relation of the Creator to the Creature doth not-suppose any mutation in God. For Creation may be considered either actively or passively: if we consider it actively; so it is attributed to God by an intern denomination, it being the same with the Will of God: if we consider it passively; so it is the same with, or not really distinct from the Creature, and ascribed or attributed to God only by an extrinsec denomination and relation, which speaketh no mutation in God. See what precedes of God's immutability, C. 4. §. 1. §. 2. The Providence of God demonstrated. From the Creation of God we pass unto his Providence, whereof we find Illustrious Ideas and Notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophy. As for Sacred Philosophemes touching the Divine Providence we shall give the mention thereof in the particular Ideas of Providence; we shall here begin with Plato's demonstration of God's Providence, which he gives us largely, De Leg. 10. p. 900, etc. where he proposeth the blasphemous Antithesis. of an Atheistic Spirit denying the Providence of God in this manner: But thou indeed being carried away with a certain blind and rash madness, because thou canst not belch forth thine Indignation against God himself, neither can the venom of thine enraged Mind reach him, therefore thou fallest into this Affection, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That albeit thou grantest there is a God, yet thou deniest that he takes care of Human Affairs. This Antithesis, which Epicurus afterward espoused, Plato greatly opposeth, as that which is most unworthy of the Divine, Infinitely wise, Bountiful, and Sovereign Being. In the general he affirms, That it is not difficult to demonstrate this, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That God's Providence is as well occupied about the least, as about the greatest and most excellent things. But p. 901. he descends to particular Arguments: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Wherefore whether it be God, or whether it be Man that neglects any affair, is it not for one of those two causes? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Either because he conceives it no way refers to the whole, if small things are neglected: or, if he thinks it doth refer, yet, his Mind being detained by supinitie, sloth, and delicace, he neglects it? In what follows he amply demonstrates, (1) That Providence even about the smallest things greatly conduceth to the good of the whole. And (2) that the least sloth, ornegligence of human affairs may not be imputed to God. Of which see more fully Philosoph General. P. 1. l. 3. c. 4. S. 2. §. 1. The more fully to demonstrate the Providence of God, against the Epieurean Antithesis, we shall draw forth Plato's Arguments into the following particulars. (1) The Providence of God may be demonstrated from his pure Actuality and Activity. Every thing is so far perfect as it is Active: to suppose a first perfect Being, and yet to conceit him to be an idle spectator of human affairs, it no less absurd than sacrilegious. So Plato, Leg. 10. p. 901. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God cannot be corrupted with sloth or negligence: for a remiss timidity can no way befall God. Contrary to this Platonic Demonstration Epicurus held, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The blessed immortal Being neither hath any employment of his own, neither doth he trouble himself with the affairs of others. But what more absurd than this Hypothesis of Epicurus, asserting a Deity and yet denying his Providence? Doth he not hereby discover the infirmity of his Reason, in supposing a most Supreme blessed Being, who yet stands as an idle spectator of all natural and human occurrences? May we not justly conclude, that Epicurus, by denying the Providence of God, had a secret design to undermine the very existence of the Deity? For he could not but know, that if the persuasion of Divine Providence were rooted out of men's minds, the thoughts of a most blessed immortal Being would little overawe or influence men's hearts. Well therefore might Plutarch, Tully and other Moralistes degrade him from the Title of a Philosopher, sithat by denying God's Providence he cut the sinews of all Morality. Do but grant then that there is a God, and it will necessarily follow, that his Providence extends to allthings. (2) The Providence of God may be demonstrated from that admirable Order, Consent and Harmony which is most illustrious in all parts of the Universe. Thus Plato, in his Philebus, tells us, that God put into allthings, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a symmetry and consent, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Right Communion, Harmony and Agreement, whereby they are admirably chained together. The admirable order of allthings and affairs both Natural, Politic, and Moral strongly evinceth a most wise Providence ordering al. Is not one thing ordered and disposed for some other? Doth not the Sun by its warm influences shine on the earth, that so it may be fruitful? And why is the earth fruitful but to feed the Bestes? And are not the Bestes fed to nourish and serve Man? And why doth the wise God take such care of Man, but that he might be more capable to serving his God? Hos. 2.21, 22. Thus Hos. 2.21, 22. I will hear the Heavens, and they shall hear the Earth: and the Earth shall hear the Corn, and the Wine, and the Oil: and they shall hear Jesreel. Here, besides the gratiose Benediction of God, the harmonious connexion of the first and second causes is set forth by a lively Prosopopoeia; Jesreel, i. e. the People of God, they call on or expect relief from Corn, Wine, and Oil: these call on, or expect nourishment from the Earth: the Earth calls on or expects supplies from the celestial bodies: and these call on and expect supplies from God. Now where there is such an exact subordination between variety of things, which understand not themselves, is it not necessary, that there be a wise Mind, that sets all these things in order? If there be Order in things that have no Understanding, must not the ordering of them come from an Understanding infinitely wise? Is there not an admirable Intelligence even in the Natural and Animal world? What a wonderful Instinct is there in the little Bee, as in other Animals? And yet these silly Animals understand not themselves: must there then not be an higher understanding that order all? And that which yet adds to the Order of allthings and proves the Providence of God, is, that all these various parts of the Universe sweetly conspire to promove the Glory of their Creator. Is there not an infinite variety of different species, and those of different orders, in the Universe? And do not all these tend to, and in their ranks subserve the honour of their Creator? Is there not a world of Plants and Vegetables, which subserve Brutes? And is there not a world of Brutes, which serve man? And is there not a world of men, which either actively or passively subserve the Glory of their Maker? And doth not this Tendence and Conducence of allthings to one first Being sufficiently demonstrate an infinitely wise Providence ordering all? Indeed all order presupposeth intelligence and sapience: For order being nothing else but a convenable or agreeable disposition of things, according to the dignity of each, it's necessary for the disposing of things agreably, to compare them among themselves, and to understand their dignity and rank, which is proper to intelligence, and then to range them according to their dignity, which is proper to sapience or prudence: Whence the most perfect order presupposeth the most perfect intelligence and prudence. (3) Plato proves the Providence of God from his wise and potent Gubernation of allthings, even the least, to their respective ends, of which hereafter. (4) From God's Justice in punishing the wicked, and rewarding the righteous. (5) From God's Benignity and Liberality towards al. (6) Lastly he concludes, that to deny God's Providence towards the least things, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it a cogitation both nefarious or blasphemous and erroneous, as Leg. 10. pag. 903. Thus also the Rabbins term him. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Epicurean, or a profane person 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who saith, that the holy and blessed God doth not take care of human affairs. And indeed we have reason to believe, that most of those, whether ancient or modern Atheists, who have espoused this Epicurean Hypothesis, whereby the Providence of God is denied, have taken it up rather out of prejudice or passion, than from any rational conviction. So it's said of Diagoras, that he took up this persuasion, out of a mere humour, because the perjured person was not struck dead by God. §. 3. Having given the Demonstration of God's Providence, The Wisdom of Divine Providence. we now proceed to the Explication thereof. The Divine Providence in the general is that efficience of God, whereby he conserveses and governs allthings, according to the eternal most wise counsel of his own Wil Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 29. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Providence is the Will of God, whereby allthings receive their most exact Order and Regiment. In our definition of Divine Providence there are many things considerable. 1. It includes an eternal Wisdom and Counsel as the origine thereof. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 3. c. 29. explicates the precedent definition: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Butaf all Providence be the Will of God, it's necessary, that allthings ordered or made by Providence be, according to right Reason, best and most becoming God, and that nothing may be better done. In the Schools, Providence, according to its generic Idea, is said to be the Reason of Order, whereby all means are duly disposed towards their end: what then is the Providence of God, but a Divine Reason eminently subsisting in the supreme Rector of allthings, whereby allthings are most wisely disposed to their last end, by most apt means? Thus in sacred Philosophy the Providence of God is described as invested with infinite wisdom and counsel. Psal. 139.1, 2. So Psal. 139.1. O Lord thou hast searched me. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, thou hast sounded me, and penetrated into my most intimate parts. Whence he adds: and known me: i. e. most intimately. Thence he proceeds to particulars, v. 2. Thou knowest my down-sitting and uprising, etc. Of which before in the Divine Science, Ch. 5. §. 2. We find Gods providential knowledge as to Celestial bodies well illustrated, Psal. 147.4, 5. Psal. 147.4. He telleth the number of the stars: he calleth them all by their names. Terms borrowed from Generals mustering or taking an account of their Soldiers: or else from Masters of Families taking account of all their Domestics: or from Kings numbering their Subjects. And what mean these expressions, but to illustrate and express the most particular Providence of God, founded on his infinite knowledge of allthings, which are in appearance innumerable as the Stars in the Firmament, Gen. 15.5? So v. 5. his understanding is infinite. Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of his understanding there is no number. The reasons of his Providence are more in number than the things he provides for, yea every way infinite. These infinite Reasons and Intelligences of Divine Providence are expressed by Plato under the term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Intelligence. Thus in his Philebus, pag. 28. All the wise consent in this, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that the Divine Mind it King of Heaven and Earth. So in his Phaedo, pag. 97. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. It is the Divine Mind that disposeth and directs allthings according to their due orders, and is the cause of allthings. And that this providential Intelligence and Wisdom extendeth to allthings, even to the most minute and least Being's, Plato assertes, Leg. 10. pag. 902. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. To conceit that God, who is most wise, and both will and can provide for his own creatures, should take care only of greater matters, but not of the least, whereof the care is more facile, how absurd is this! But to treat more accurately and philosophically of the infinite Reasons and Wisdom of Divine Providence, The eternal Law of Providence. we must run it up to the Springhead of that eternal Law, consisting in those Divine Ideas lodged in the mind and will of God. The Schools philosophise much of the eternal Law, whereby allthings are governed to their respective ends: yet they speak so confusedly, as that it is difficult to understand what they mean thereby; whether the Law of Divine Decrees, or the Law of Nature inherent in the things governed. Plato seems to speak more intelligibly than many Scholastics touching this eternal Law, making it to be no other than the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the eternal Exemplar of Divine Ideas or Decrees, according to which God frames and governs allthings. So in his Timaeus, pag. 28. he saith, That God in the framing the World had his eye 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 on the eternal Law or Exemplar. Hence Plato calls Fate, (whereby the Ancients expressed Providence) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Law of Adrastie: which Cicero interprete, the eternal Law. And Apuleius, a great Explicator of Plato, saith, Fate was that by which Gods inevitable cogitations and undertakements were accomplished. And Pindar sang: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That the eternal Law was Queen of allthings both mortal and immortal. This eternal Law, as it regards Providence, is nothing else but that order, method, purpose or counsel, which the most wise God hath from all eternity determined with himself in his Divine Decrees, as the rule of his Gubernation and Disposition of allthings for his own Glory. Have not allthings that are some operation, and that not violent or fortuitous, but regular and orderly? And can any thing exert any regular operation, but in order to some end preconceived by some intelligent Agent? And what is that which directs, moderates, regulates and orders allthings to their respective ends, but the eternal Law? Thus Augustin: The eternal Law, saith he, is nothing else but that increate Divine Reason or Will of God, commanding that the natural order be conserved. Every action will not serve for every end: therefore there must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Rule or Law to suit actions to their ends: Do not then allthings so far as they tend to their last end act and move by some Law? And what is the supreme Law, whereby all the Divine operations of Providence are regulated, but the eternal Exemplar of Divine Ideas or Decrees? It's true, every particular singular Creature has a Law impacted and impressed on its Being, which is an irradiation or beam of the eternal Law, and therefore called by some, though improperly, the eternal Law; by others more properly the Law of Nature. For the eternal Law properly respects the works and operations of God; who is both Worker, and the Law of his working: the perfection of the Divine Essence and Will gives perfection and measure to all his works: all God's providences and works own him, not only for their Worker, but also for the Law whereby they are wrought: his Divine Will and Decrees being the measure of all his Operations. So that by this eternal Law allthings are bounded and limited not only in their Essences, but also in their Operations: and all the Divine reasons of Providences are to be resolved into this eternal Law, which is full of infinite Reasons, Wisdom, and Counsel; albeit our shallow capacities cannot comprehend, no nor apprehend the same always, in all works of Providence. Hence it follows: The Wisdom of Providence active. that the Divine Reason, Wisdom, and Counsel, that attends the Providence of God, is not merely speculative, but practic and active: for all Laws properly and primarily tend to action. Whence in sacred Philosophy the wisdom of Divine Providence is illustrated by that of a wise Builder, skilful Physician, expert discreet Master of a Family, etc. Thus also Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 902, etc. istustrates the same by much the same ressemblances, namely by the wisdom of a skilful Physician, also of an expert Gubernator of a Ship, of a prudent Imperator, of a discreet Master of a Family, of a skilful Architect, and of an expert Artificer: all which denote active Science, as it will hereafter appear, when we descend to the Gubernation of Providence. And that the wisdom of Divine Providence is indeed most active is evident, in that God by his Providence directs allthings to their proper end, namely the Divine bonity, which is the last End and first Principe in Morals. Hence it is that all the works of Divine Providence are said to be disposed in Measure, and Number, and Weight, i. e. in the most exact order and manner that may be. That Providence belongs to practic cognition Aquinas largely demonstrates, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 75. & 97. Hence, Providence is an Act of the Divive Wil 2. Divine Providence includes also the Act of the Divine Will Yea, if we will speak formally and distinctly, the Providence of God primarily regards the Will of God: for all the Divine Reasons, Ideas, Decrees, and the eternal Law of Providence must be resolved into the Divine Will, which is the sole measure of God's Operations towards his Creatures. Thence Providence is defined by Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 29. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. the Will of God, by which allthings that are receive their convenient Gubernation, as before. And he demonstrates it thus: It's necessary, that he who made allthings, should provide for them, in the same manner as he made them, i. e. by his Wil Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God therefore is the Maker and Provisor: and his good Will is the effective, contentive, and provisive Virtue. (1) Indeed the whole of Divine Efficience proceeds immediately from the Divine Will, as we have before once and again demonstrated. (2) That Providence belongs to the Divine Will is manifest from its very nature, which consists in a wise ordering allthings for its last end: now there can be no disposition or ordering of means for an end, without the volition of the said end. Divine bonity being the end unto which allthings are directed by the Providence of God, it's necessary, that both end and means be willed by God. Yea, (3) It belongs to the intrinsec Reason of Divine Providence, as Divine, not only to intent and order all means towards its last end, but also infallibly to attain its last end: which implies an absolute, efficacious, omnipotent Wil For albeit Providence, in its generic notion regards not so much the end as the means, it being the ordering of means to an end, yet it includes an absolute efficacious volition of the end: but now it's simply impossible, that God should will any end, and yet that end not be attained. Wherein Divine Providence greatly differs from human, which oft wils an end and provides means in order thereto, and yet falls short of its end. (4) That Providence belongs to the Will of God is evident from the formal parts thereof, Conservation and Gubernation, which are Acts of the Divine Wil. (5) The Mode of Divine Providence, as expressed both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophy, clearly evinceth, that it formally belongs to the Divine Wil In sacred Philosophy the Mode of Divine Providence is expressed by the Word of God. Deut. 8.3. So Deut. 8.3. Man doth not live by bread only, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord doth man live. By Word here, (as Vatablus well observes) we may not understand any preceptive or reveled word, but the providential Word of God, or good pleasure, which provides means, either ordinary or extraordinary, for the sustenance of man. And that this is the genuine sense seems apparent from the design and scope of Moses; which is to show, that when bread failed, God by his omnipotent Word, or Will, in a miraculose manner, provided Manna for them, as an experiment to testify in all Ages, that man lived not by bread only, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God: i. e. by the sovereign pleasure and providential will of God, which is frequently in sacred Philosophy termed, the Word of God. In this sense this Text is cited and interpreted by our Lord, Mat. 4.4. Mat. 4.4. But by every word, etc. Moses' words are repeated by our Lord, and opposed to Satan's tentation, to show, that man lived not by bread only, but by the providential word or will of God, who provides means either ordinary or extraordinary for the relief of man, specially of such as trust in him; and therefore there is no reason why we should distrust his Providence, or make use of any unlawful means. In this sense the Word of God is taken, Psal. 107.20. Psal. 107.20. he sent his word and healed them: i. e. his providential Word, or his omnipotent efficacious Decree and sentence. Psal. 147.15, 16. So Psal. 147.15. He sendeth forth his commandment upon the earth: his word runneth very swiftly: i. e. his providential Word, or the efficacious efficience of his Divine Wil Heb. 1.3. Whence it follows: v. 16. He giveth snow like wool, etc. the effects of his providential word. Thus Heb. 1.3. Upholding allthings by the word of his power: i. e. by his providential word, or omnipotent efficacious wil So 2 Pet. 3.5, 7. In all which Texts, with some others, we must understand God's providential word; which is no other than the efficacious Decree and efficience of the Divine Will, for the sustentation, conservation, and gubernation of allthings; as the same efficacious efficience of the Divine Will, put forth in the creation of allthings, is in like manner expressed by a word, Gen. 1.3, etc. And it is well observed by Maimonides, More Nevoch. Part. 1. c. 65. that by Word here, as elsewhere, must be understood not any formal word, but the Act of the Divine Will, as before of Creation, §. 1. Thus we find other Decrees and Acts of the Divine Will expressed by the Word of God. So Gen. 1.26. And God said, Let us make man. Gen. 8.21. And God said in his heart, I will not again curse the ground: i. e. God decreed and determined with himself, and declared this his Decree to Noah. The efficience of the Divine Will, in governing allthings is expressed in Sacred Philosophy by the Word of God, to denote the efficace of his Will: man's word is oft Preceptive, but not Operative: we declare our wills by our words, but cannot effect what we will thereby: but God's Providential Word is ever operative: whatever he wils, doth immediately existe, in that time and manner as he wils it: his Words and Deeds are reciprocal: and therefore he expresseth his Divine Providential Efficience by his Providential Word. Thus also Plato sometimes expresseth the efficience of Divine Providence by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Word of God. So Plotinus his Sectator: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, from one Mind and Word, which sprang from it, this whole Universe was constituted and disposed. Which possibly may relate to the Increate Word, or Second Person in the Trinity, who made allthings, as John 1. 14. and whereof the Platonistes in the School of Alexandria, who succeeded Ammonius, had great notices, as before in the Platonic Trinity, C. 6. §. 4. 3. But yet the immediate Efficience of Divine Providence is in a more peculiar manner, both by Sacred and Platonic Philosophy, The Spirit the immediate efficient of Providence. ascribed to the Spirit of God. For the clearing whereof we are to consider, that albeit all Divine Operations are usually ascribed to God absolutely, because the same Divine Nature is the individed principe of all; yet sithat, as to the manner of subsisting, there is some Distinction, Relation, and Order between the three Persons, hence the Divine Operations are in Sacred Philosophy distinctly assigned to each person, and eminently to some one. And in as much as the Order of Operation among the distinct persons depends on the Order of their Subsistence, thence the Conclusive and perfective Efficience in all the great Divine Operations is assigned to the Spirit of God, as peculiar to him, according to the mode of his subsistence in the Trinity. Thus in the Creation, the completive and perfective efficience of allthings is ascribed to the Spirit. So in the Fomentation and Formation of allthings out of the rude Chaos, it's said, Gen. 1.2. The spirit of God moved on the face of the waters: i e. in order to the Eduction and Efformation of allthings: for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly notes the fomentation and gentle motion of an Hen, communicating vital heat to its eggs: and it's applied, Deut. 32.11. to the motion of an Eagle over its young ones, for their protection and perfection. This efficience of allthings is well expressed, Psal. 33.6. Psal. 33.6. By the Word of the Lord were the Heavens made, and all the Host of them by the breath of his mouth. By the Word of the Lord, we may understand, (1) The Creative Efficience of the Divine Will, as before §. 1. or (2) Christ, by whom allthings were made, as Joh. 1.3. Thence it follows: by the Breath of his mouth: whereby we must understand the Spirit of God, who is called the Breath of his mouth, to note the manner of his procession, which is in a way of Spiration, as the Scripture assures us. Job 26.13. Thus Job 26.13. By his Spirit he hath garnished the Heavens. Or, according to the Hebrew, His spirit hath garnished, [or adorned, beautified] the Heavens, i. e. decked them with those eye-pleasing gloriose lights. Psal. 8.3. Hence Psal. 8.3. the Sun, Moon, and Stars are said to be the work of God's fingers, i. e. curiosely wrought by the Spirit of God. For by the finger or fingers of God, the spirit of God is in a more peculiar manner denoted, as is evident by comparing Mat. 12.28. with Luke 11.20. where the spirit of God in Matthew is called the finger of God by Luke, as Owen, On the spirit, B. 1. C. 4. Neither did the Spirit's efficience extend only to the production of the Inanimate and Animal world, but also to Man and his more noble part the Soul, as Job assures us, Job 33.4. The spirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life. Answerable to Gen. 2.7. And as the first Efformation and Perfection of allthings in the Creation is ascribed to the Spirit of God, so the Sustentation, Conservation, and Gubernation of allthings in the course of Divine Providence is in a peculiar manner assigned to the same Spirit. Thus Ps. 104.27. Psal. 104. 27-30. These wait all upon thee, that thou mayest give them their meat in due season. 28. Thou openest thine hand, they are filled with good. 29. Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled: thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust. Thou hidest thy face: i. e. withdrawest the providential influence of thy Spirit, and allthings return to dust: the Earth itself, the common Mother of all corporeous Creatures, seems to be dead, 'til the spring come, and allthings receive a new face. Thence it follows, v. 30. Thou sendest forth thy Spirit, they are created: and thou renewest the face of the earth. Thou sendest forth thy Spirit: whose office it is to conserve, foment, actuate, and to give vivific heat, life, and influence to allthings. Whence it follows: they are Created. This Creation is not to be taken strictly of the Eduction of things out of nothing, as at first; no, nor principally of the production of new individuals, though this be included in the Spirits Providential Efficience; but of the Spirits fomenting, vivifying, and renewing things under a kind of natural death or decay. Thence it follows: and thou renewest the face of the Earth. i e. Whereas the Earth in the winter season is as it were dead; the Trees and other Plants divested of their verdure, flourishing beauty, leaves, fruits; yea the very juice and radical moisture is retired unto the root; so that the whole seems dead: And as for Animals and Brutes, the greatest number of those we call Infects are either really or seemingly dead, being without motion: and as for the more perfect Brutes, they are likewise under a kind of partial death; yea the human body also in the more cold Northern Climate: Yet when the Spring comes, the Spirit of God, that Supreme Increate Universal Spirit, making use of the warm benign influences of the Sun, together with subterraneous fire, that great create mundane Spirit, reneweth the face of the Earth: i. e. puts new vital Spirits and vivific heat into all parts of the Universe, both inanimate and animate, 'specially Plants and Animals; so that there is a new face, or verdure, flourishing Beauty, Vivacity, Activity and Fructification in things. Thus, according to Sacred Philosophy, the Spirit of God is said to be that Universal Spirit, by whose Providential Efficience and Concurrence all Creatures are conserved, sustained, actuated, propagated, animated, fomented, disposed, and governed to their proper ends and usages. And we find Philosophemes not a little conformable hereto in Platonic Philosophy. What Plato's Contemplations were concerning 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Soul of the World, we have before examined, Part. 2. B. 3. C. 9 S. 1. §. 5. We shall now treat of the same Universal Spirit, or Spirit of the Universe as to his Providential Influence and Concurrence. Plato in his Cratylus, p. 396. calls this Mundane Soul, or Universal Spirit, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Zena, Jupiter from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Zenocia, to animate or vivify: and he gives this reason of the Origination: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, There is no other cause of life to us Men, and other Animants, than that Prince and King of allthings. Whence he adds: Rightly therefore is God honoured with this name; because it demonstrates, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That God is he, by whom Life is communicated to all Animals. This notion of the Mundane Soul answers to Job 33.4. and Psal. 104.30. of which before. Thus Plato, Leg. 10. p. 896. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But it has been sufficiently demonstrated, that the Soul is more ancient than allthings, sithat it is the principe of motion. His design is to demonstrate the Providence of God from the Soul of the Universe, which moves, agitates, foments, vivisies, influenceth, orders, and governs allthings. And he demonstrates this Universal Spirit or Soul of the Universe to be more ancient than allthings, i. e. Eternal and Increate; because it gave form, life, and motion to allthings. Thence he adds in the same page: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Therefore shall we not necessarily acknowledge, that the Soul doth universally govern and inhabit in allthings that are moved, yea that it governs Heaven? Whence he concludes: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. This Soul therefore actuates and impels by its motions, allthings that are contained in the University of Nature, namely of Heaven, Earth, Sea, etc. So pag. 898. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 etc. Sithat this Universal Soul moves the Sun. Again he adds: That the Soul of the Universe, which is in that round splendid body of the Sun, moves it every where, as the Soul which is in our body leads it every where. He gives us in these three pages several great Philosophemes to prove, That God is the Soul of the Universe, who actuates, vivisies, conserveses and governs allthings, as our Souls do our Bodies. Thus Proclus, in Plat. Timae. p. 93. explicates the Platonic Mundane Spirit: After Amelius, saith he, Porphyry thinking to agree with Plotimes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. calls the Supermundane Soul, the Opificer or Framer of the world. The Spirit of God is called by these Platonistes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Supermundane Soul of the Universe, as being elevated above the Universe, yet animating, actuating, and influencing the whole, and each part thereof. Others term him, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Mundane Soul, or the Soul inhabiting the Universe. All these Platonistes make the Universe to be as it were a great Animal, and the Spirit of God to be the Soul that animates, vegetates, actuates, and perfectes this Animal. Thus Origen, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, l. 2. c. 1. As our Body is made up of many members and contained by one Soul; so do I conceive, that the whole world is to be looked on as one huge great Animal, which is contained as it were by one Soul, the Virtue and Reason of God. And so much seems to be intimated in Scripture. Thus also the Pythagoreans held, as we are assured by Minutius Foelix, That God was the Soul diffused throughout the whole Universe, from whom allthings received Life, Being and Motion. So the Stoics said; That the Divine Mind is diffused throughout all parts of the Universe, as our Soul throughout our body, as Laertius in Zeno. And that these Philosophemes touching the Spirit or Soul of the Universe, must be understood of the Spirit of God, and were so intended, though imperfectly, by the wiser Heathens, we are assured by Cyprian, Sermo, de Spiritu Sancto, p. 329. Edit. Basil. 1558. This Holy Spirit from the beginning of the World is said, Gen. 1.2. to be superfused on the waters: not as if he needed the material waters as a vehicle, which he rather sustained, and gave congruous motion, and fixed limits to what comprehended the firmament. The Eternal Virtue and Divinity of this Spirit, albeit the Ancient Philosophers, those Inquisitors of the Universe, could not find him out, in his proper nature, yet by their subtle conjectures they conceived him to be present with allthings, giving Life, Motion, Terms, Stability and Use to every thing. This Life, this Motion, this Essence of things the Philosophers styled THE SOUL OF THE WORLD: conceiving, that all Celostial Bodies, I mean, the Sun, Moon, and Stars, yea the very Firmament was moved and governed by the virtue of this Soul; and, that the Waters, Earth and Air were impregnated by the Seeds hereof. Who if they had believed that this Spirit is both Lord, and Creator, and Vivificator, and Nutritor of allthings that are under him, they might have had some convenient access to life. But the Majesty of so great a Mystery was hid from the wise and prudent of this world; neither could the pride of human Ingeny concern itself in such celestial secrets, and penetrate the altitude of this superessential nature: and albeit they understood, that the Divinity was the Creatrix and Gubernatrix of things, yet they could no way distinguish what was the Trinity of the Deity, or what was the Unity, or what the propriety of persons— This is the Spirit of Life, whose Vivific heat doth animate, foment, advance and make fruitful allthings, &. See Philosoph. General. l. 1. c. 2. sect. 3. §. 3. and l. 3. c. 2. sect. 1. §. 4. 4. Albeit the Efficience and Concurrence of the Spirit in all Providential Operations be, as to its manner of working Immediate, Providential means used by the Spirit. yet this hinders not but that ordinarily he makes use of means for the execution thereof, not from any defect of his Divine Efficience, but from the abundance of his Benignity, that so in and by the mediation of Instruments he might render his own Efficience more illustrious and conspicuous, and leave some mark of honour on the means. Whence oft times the Spirit of God useth the most unapt and unlikely means for the production of the most Noble Effects. Yea, oft God brings about the Issues of his Providence by contrary means, which carry in them a seeming contradiction to what God intends. By how much the more potent the virtue of any Agent is, by so much the more doth it extend its operation unto things remote. Now is not the virtue of Divine Providence most efficacious? May it not then extend its efficience to means and effects most remote? Doth it not belong to the Majesty, Splendour, and Dignity of a Prince to have many Ministers of State under him, for the execution of his Sovereign Will and Commands? And doth it not in like manner appertain to the Majesty of God, the Supreme Lord, to have variety of instruments and means for the execution of his Providence? All Providence, according to its formal Idea, includes two things Ordination and Execution: The Ordination, being an Act of Intelligence and Sapience, belongs to the Supreme Ordinator; who, by how much the more judicious and prudent he is, by so much the more capacious he is to order all means and affairs in subservience to his end and design: But the Execution, requiring only Force and Power, may as well and oft more aptly be transacted by inferior Agents or Ministers, invested with executive force in order thereto. Thus in Divine Providence the Ordination and Disposition of all means the most wise God reserveth to himself, as a Prerogative peculiar to his Imperial Crown; but the execution he frequently commits to second causes and instruments, furnishing them with executive Forces for the production of the effect, and moreover working immediately, both by the immediation of Virtue and Essence in and with those means. Hence Esa. 28.26. God is said to teach the Husbandman to plough, i. e. how to cultivate and manage his Ground, as also to sow his Seed, etc. That no inferior Agent or second cause can execute any piece of Divine Providence, No second cause can act, but in subordination to God, and by his Providence. but in Virtue received from, and subordination to God the prime Cause, is most evident: (1) Because, where divers Agents subserve one Supreme Agent, it's necessary that the effect be produced by them in common, as they are united in the participation of motion and influence from the Supreme Agent: For many cannot produce one effect but as one: Now the subservient Agents of Providence are so far one in their executions, as they are subordinate to and influenced by God the Supreme Agent. (2) The compliment of the Virtue and Efficace of the Second Agent is from the Virtue and Influx of the First Agent: and is not God the first Agent in all executions of Providence? (3) All Operation consequent to any influence is ascribed to that which gave the influence, as the proper cause thereof: And do not all second Causes receive their influence from God? Must not then all their Executions and Operations be ascribed to him as the prime Cause? (4) All Actions that cannot subsiste without the Impression and Influence of some Agent must be attributed to that Agent as the cause thereof: Now can any executions of second Causes subsist without the impression of the first Cause? must they not then all be attributed to him? (5) Whatever applies the active Virtue or draws it forth to act, may be said to be the cause of that Act: as an Artificer, by applying the virtue of any natural thing to any action, is said to be the cause of that action: Now is not all application of any Virtue in providential executions from God? Is he not then the cause of all such executions? (6) Doth not the Virtue of every inferior Agent depend on the Virtue of the Superior Agent as such? And are not all second Causes in providential executions inferior Agents as to God the Supreme Agent? (7) Is not every Worker by its operation ordained to its last end? And who, in all Providential Operations, ordains things to their last end, but God the first cause of all? (8) As particular Causes are referred to particular Effects, so the universal Cause to universal Effects: and is not God the Universal Cause of all Effects? (9) To subtract or withdraw any providential execution from God's Ordination and Efficience, what is this but to subvert the best Order, even the subordination of second Causes to the first? (10) God is intimely present with and in all providential executions; and therefore cannot but influence the same. The mover and moved are always together: God is the prime mover in all motions, and therefore present with all: the application of Actives unto Passives is by him. That there is not the least execution of Providence but what is influenced by God, see Aquinas, contra Gent. Lib. 3. Cap. 67, 68, 70, 76, 77. Not to mention the various means, Fire the Create Universal Spirit. instruments and second causes, which God employs in his Providential Efficience, there is one which deserves a particular disquisition, namely Fire; which is in its kind an Universal Mundane Spirit, the most potent Instrument of Nature and Art, and that which subserves the Spirit of God (the Supreme increate Universal Spirit) in all material productions of Providence. As for the Origine of this create Mundane Spirit, Gen. 1.3. Moses gives it us, Gen. 1.3. under the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Light or Fire, part of which was dispersed among the Celestial Lights or Fires, and part diffused into the bowels of the Earth, for the Conservation, Animation, Vivification, and Nutrition of all parts of the Universe. Plato makes frequent mention of Fire, as the most potent natural principe or Mundane Spirit, whereby allthings are fomented, agitated, animated, and perfected. So in his Timaeus, p. 31. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Nothing seems void of Fire, etc. So p. 56, & 58. he makes Fire to be the Universal Spirit diffused throughout all parts of the Universe. And elsewhere he calls Fire 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the great Opificer of various effects. And not only the Chemists, but also the Stoics and most of the Ancient Philosophers ascribe to Fire an Universal Efficience, as to all corporeous Effects. Whence do all Minerals, Metals, and Stones receive their Origine but from subterraneous Fires? What gives rise to all Vapours and Fountains but Fire? Whence proceed the Fluxes and Refluxes of the Sea, with its saltness, but from Fire? What gives Life and Motion to all Infects, but Fire, either Celestial or Terrestrial? Whence springeth the fermentation of humours in the bowels of the Earth at Spring, with the vegetation and fructification of Plants, but from Fire? What are the Animal Souls of Brutes and of Man's Body, but a more pure aethereous Fire? These things are more largely demonstrated in our Philosoph. General. P. 1. l. 3. in Plato's Physics. May we not then hence conclude, That Fire is a second Mundane Universal Spirit, under the Spirit of God most Efficacious and Potent in all natural corporeous productions and executions of Providence? §. 4. The Object of Divine Providence Universal. Having finished the principal and instrumental effective Principes of Providence, we now proceed to its Object, which, according to sacred Philosophy, is of the most universal latitude, according to the extension of Divine Omnipotence and Efficience. There is nothing so high, as to be above Divine Providence; nothing so low, as to be beneath it; nothing so ample and extensive, as that it cannot be limited by it; nothing so free as to second causes, but it is necessarily determined by it; nothing so natural and necessary, but its operation may be suspended by it, as the fiery Furnace, wherein the three Children were; lastly, nothing so evil, but this Divine Providence can bring good out of it. Among the ancient Philosophers there were different persuasions about the object of Divine Providence, and its latitude. Epicurus and some before him altogether denied the Providence of God, as before: Aristotle, as Grotius affirms, confined the Providence of God to Celestial bodies; yet Laertius saith he held, That the Providence of God did reach 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. even to things celestial, and that he disposed things terrestrial according to the Sympathy they have with things celestial. Some among the Hebrews held, that God's Providence extended to men, but not unto beasts: which sentiment some impute to Pythagoras, who much imitated the Hebrews. Some also among the Arabians asserted a Providence about Universals, or things in common, but not about Singulars: which sentiment Justin Martyr, in the beginning of his Colloque with Tryphon, reprehends in some of the Grecian Philosophers as impious. But Plato strongly demonstrates, That the Providence of God extends to allthings, even the most minute. So Leg. 10. pag. 902. But what? if a Physician be willing and able to cure the whole body, if he should provide for the greater distempers, but neglect the lesser, would the cure be successful? No surely. So in like manner neither Gubernators of Ships, nor Imperators of Soldiers, nor Masters of Families, nor Ministers of State, nor any sort of men can well manage their affairs, unless they provide for small things as well as greater. Thence Architects deny, that great stones can be well cemented, or joined together in a building without small. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Let us not then conceit, that God is more vile than mortal Opificers; who, by how much the more skilful they are, by so much the more tightly and accurately, by the benefit of their own Art, they consider both great and small things, in such works that belong to their Art. Thence he concludes, pag. 903. It seems to me, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that God doth most easily and opportunely provide for allthings. This also the Stoics generally asserted, whereof we find an excellent account in Arrianus, his Collections of Epictetus' Philosophy, l. 1. c. 12. pag. 118. There are some, saith he, who assert there is no God: others, that grant there is a God, but, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that he is slothful and negligent, and provident of nothing: [I suppose he means the Epicureans:] a third sort, who hold that there is a God, and that he is provident, but only of greater and celestial things, not of terrene: a fourth sort allow him a Providence over terrestrial as well as celestial, but only in common, not as to singulars and particulars: a fifth sort, of which number was Ulysses and Socrates, asserted, that a man could not so much as move without God. Thence he goes on to demonstrate God's Providence over all things. That God's Providence extends itself universally to all and singular Being's, Actions, Substances, Accidents, Modes, etc. may be demonstrated, (1) From the infinite Omniscience and Prescience of God, which extends itself to the most minute singulars. (2) From the omnipotent Will of God, which gives Futurition, Determination, Limits, Activity, and Operation to allthings. (3) From the prime and universal Efficience of God as the first cause of allthings. Whatever is Ens by participation must proceed effectively from God, who is Ens by Essence: and if it proceed from him, it must necessarily fall under his Providence. (4) From the certain Determination, Futurition, and Order of all effects. Either allthings must fall under the Providence of God, or somethings must happen merely by chance, without any certain cause of their Futurition. (5) From the Justice of God in rewarding what is good, and punishing what is evil: for the executions of Divine Justice depend on his Providence. That God's Providence extends to all singulars, even to things most contingent and minute is acutely demonstrated by Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71, 72, 73, 75, 76. So De Potentia Dei, Quaest. 20. he proves, that God is the cause of every action both natural and voluntary five ways: [1] By giving virtue to act. [2] By continued conservation of that virtue. [3] By moving the Agent to act, and applying the virtue to the action. [4] As he is the principal Agent in every Act, and all other Agents but Instruments. [5] As he acts immediately in all Acts of second Agents. As for the particular Objects unto which Divine Providence extends itself they may be thus distributed. The particular Objects of Providence. (1) All natural Being's even the most minute and imperceptible fall under the Providence of God. Sacred Philosophy makes mention of the hairs of the head, which are vile and contemptible even to a proverb. Yea, all natural Generations, Corruptions, Alterations, Motions, and Actions are subject to God's Providence. Not only the Generic natures, and Species of things, both Substances and Accidents, are determined by God, but also all Individuals and Singulars, with all their Circumstances and Modes, yea things most minute. Thus Bradwardine, pag. 7, 25, 291. proves, That the least things come under God's Prescience and Providence. (2) Allthings necessary or contingent. There is nothing so contingent or free as to any second cause, but it is determined and fore-ordained by Divine Providence, as Aquinas accurately demonstrates, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71, 72, 73. So Bradwardine, pag. 271, 274. What more contingent than the Lot? and yet this falls under the Providence of God, as Prov. 16.33. The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposing of it is of the Lord. (3) Allthings politic. All Revolutions, Alterations, Advances, Declinations with all other politic Concerns of State are ordered and governed by Divine Providence. (4) Allthings human. All man's thoughts, inclinations, interests, designs, and undertakements are subordinate to Providence. Hence, (5) All sinful acts fall under the same. (6) Ecclesiastic Affairs and supernatural Acts, Ends and Effects are ordered by Divine Providence, of which hereafter. In sum, God's Providence extends itself to all those things, unto which his omnipotent Will, Efficience and causality extends: i. e. unto whatever comes within the notion of real Entity: it reacheth all natural, preternatural, supernatural and moral actions and events. When men contradict Gods Will of Precept, do they not obey or fulfil his Will of Providence? Is any thing so great, that it comes not within his power, or so small, that it comes not within his care? I am not ignorant how much some of late, as well Divines as Physicians, have essayed to exempt the period or term of human life from the immutable determination of Divine Providence: but how much this Hypothesis contradictes both Pagan and Sacred Philosophy, will be more fully evident by what follows. §. 5. From the effective principes and object of Divine Providence, The Adjuncts of Providence. as before stated, there follow many essential Adjuncts and Characters thereof. As 1. Providence is not merely permissive, 1. It is efficacious. but energetic and efficacious. For (1) Divine Providence necessarily supposeth not only an intention of an end, and the ordering or disposing of means, but also the assecution and attainment of the end. It's true, human providence as such may provide means most proper and expedient, and yet, by the interposition of other second causes, come short of its end; but Divine Providence always reacheth its end. Thus Homer: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God's Counsel and Decree is always fulfilled. (2) All second causes are subject unto, and therefore can no way impede or hinder Divine Providence. Whence ariseth all active and passive virtue in second causes, but from Divine disposition? Is it possible then that the executions of Divine Providence should be hindered by the force or defect of any inferior Agent or Patient? Are not all natural Agents instruments of Divine Providence? And can the instrument act without the concurrence of the principal Agent? What then can we suppose should impede Divine Providence? (3) All providence supposeth an Act of the Will: and are not all Acts of Divine Volition efficacious? Bradwardine frequently assertes and demonstrates, That God permits nothing but what he wils. It's true, man oft permits things, that he neither wils nor doth, because he cannot hinder them; but there is no mere permission with God, without some Act of his Wil This is proved from the infinite Actuality, efficacity, and Omnipotence of the Divine Wil Thus Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 32. pag. 282, etc. spends a whole Chapter to prove, That allthings fall out and are governed by the Providence of God, not only permitting, but actually disposing al. And his arguments are demonstrative. As [1] Otherwise the Universe should not be disposed and ordered in the best manner. [2] The Scripture gives God active names as to all parts of providence, etc. And then Cap. 33. he demonstrates, That wherever there is any permission of God, there also is his actual Volition. Hence, 2. 2. Immobile and fixed. God's Providence gives to all second Causes and Events a most immobile, immutable, fixed and certain order: things most contingent and free, as to second causes, are necessary and fixed as to Divine Providence. Hence the Stoics, as also Plato, expressed this fixed order of providence by Fate, which they made to be an immutable connexion or series of things determined from eternity, whereby allthings are infallibly directed to their ends, of which hereafter in the Gubernation of Providence. That providence puts into things a fixed, immutable order is evident; because, (1) nothing falls out, but what was fore-ordained from all eternity by infinite Wisdom and an omnipotent Wil. (2) All particular causes and effects are contained under and subservient to the Universal Cause; and therefore subject to his Order. Yea, this Order must necessarily be most indissoluble and certain; because it is founded in the efficacity of the Divine Will, Efficience and Gubernation, as more fully anon. 3. Divine Providence is most Connatural and Agreeable to the exigence and condition of the second causes or subjects it works upon. The Necessity and immobility, 3. Connatural and agreeable. that attends the Providence of God, doth no way infringe or impair the Contingence and Liberty of second Causes, but confirm the same. Therefore men act freely, because the Providence of God determines them so to act: So that nothing more conduceth to the natural liberty of the Will, than the necessary Determination of Divine Providence, because it determines allthings to act according to their Natures: it offers not the least force or violence to the Human Will, but sweetly, though necessarily moves it to the end appointed. God's manner of ordering and conducting second Causes is without the least prejudice to their proper manner of working: he guides them sweetly according to the principes and instincts he has put into them. For (1) Doth not Divine Providence furnish every second Cause with its Power, Virtue, and efficacity to work? (2) Doth not the same Providence maintain and conserve that Power and Vigour imparted? (3) Is not also the actuation of that Power from Providence? (4) Doth not Providence also most wisely and sweetly, yet powerfully order the manner of working, as also perfect the same? Is it not than most sweet and connatural in all its Executions? Hence, 4. Divine Providence is most Beautiful and Perfect: 4. Beautiful and perfect. all its executions are in Number, Weight and Measure. Doth not the Wise Man assure us, Eccles. 3.11. That every thing is beautiful in its season? Is not every execution and particular event of Providence most beautiful and proper at the season allotted it by God? What are all the travels and births of time, but the Eternal and wise Decrees of Providence brought forth into light? Have not all issues and events, not only natural and necessary, but also the most contingent and voluntary their fixed time and limits constituted by Divine Providence, which renders them most beautiful and perfect? Are not those very products, which in their own nature seem most monstrose and deformed, most beautiful in their time and place, as they relate to Divine Providence? Is not God infinitely wise to order allthings in the best manner? And is he not also infinitely powerful to execute whatever he ordains and decrees? Is not that, which in regard of man's Providence and Execution is most sinful and deformed, in regard of God's Providence and Execution most beautiful, as Christ's Crucifixion? What must we say of all that confusion that seems to be in States and Churches, Persons and Things? Doth it reach the Providence of God? Is it not only in regard of second causes, and our mistakes as to the first cause? Cannot, yea, will not Divine Providence bring a beautiful order out of all this confused chaos? It's true, Sacred Philosophy tells us of evil days, which should come to pass in this last Scene of the World: but whence springs the evil of these later days? Is it not from the Lusts of Men, not the Providence of God? Are not the worst of days Naturally good, yea Morally also to those who are good and do good? Is it not the Moral Evil of Men that makes all Times Evil? If Men were better, would not the Times soon prove better? Yea, are not those very Disorders and Confusions, that arise from the Lusts of Men, ordered by Divine Providence in the best manner for the good of the whole? As in Nature variety adds Beauty, so in the Providence of God variety of changes renders it more beautiful. It was a great saying of a Stoic: He that will take upon him to mend things, let him first take upon to mend God. Certainly nothing is done by God, but that which to leave undone were not so good: Many things that seem disorderly and confused as to parts, are not so if we consider the whole. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 29. having proved, that God provides and governs allthings according to his most wise Will, he adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Therefore God solely is good and wise by nature, or Essentially: As therefore he is good, he provides: for he that provides not, [for such as are under his care] is not good: but as he is wise, he takes care to provide the best things. Therefore it becomes us, attending to these things, to admire all, to praise all, to receive, without curiose inquisition, all the works of Providence, albeit they may seem to many injust; because incognite, and incomprehensible, as in what follows. That the Providence of God is most perfect, see Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 94. Alvarez, de Auxil. Disput. 28. p. 270. 5. Divine Providence is most mysterious and incomprehensible. 5. Mysterious. The Providences of God are much like his Being, very full of mysteries. So Psal. 36.6. The Judgements of God are said to be a great deep. And Psal. 97.1. The Lord reigneth, let the Earth rejoice: Psal. 97.1, 2. because all his Judgements and Executions of Providence are most Equal and Righteous. Yet it follows, v. 2. Clouds and darkness are about him. i e. Albeit his Government is most Righteous, yet much darkness and mysterious Providences attend it: there are deep mysteries in his Providential Procedures, albeit Righteousness and Judgement are the habitation or establishment of his Throne, as it follows. God's Providences are always matter of our Admiration, but not of our Comprehension, or Imitation: To measure Providence by our shallow Reason, what is it but to set the Sun by our false Dial? It's well observed in the Life of Padre Paul, p. 114. In the success of human things Divine Providence is ever to be admired, where human prudence vanisheth out of sight: it being most certain, that in actions there is an eternal force, and a long chain of Causes, so far without us, that neither our knowledge, or any consideration of ours can ever come near. The works of Providence are much like many curiose pieces of Nature and Art; whereof we see the frame and operations, but that which is the intern moving principe, and gives the greatest force to the operations we see not: So in the works of Providence, we see the Executions and Effects, but O! how mysterious are the intern Reasons? Is there not a particular though mysterious Providence ordering and directing the Operations of every individual and single Essence? And is there not in every work of Providence something Divine, which doth puzzle the most sharp-sighted Reason, and hath more in it, than the most acute Philosopher can discover? And why is it that the most of men mistake and censure Providence, but because they cast their eye on some few particulars, but consider not the whole frame and complexe? It's above our narrow Capacities to contemplate the whole frame of Providence, and is not this the genuine reason, why we misjudge and mistake the parts? That is not disorder in the whole, which seems so in some one particular, as in the motions of a Watch. These mysteriose procedures of Divine Providence are well expressed by Damascence, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 29. We must, saith he, admire all the works of Providence, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, albeit they may appear to many injust; because Divine Providence is unknown and incomprehensible; and our cogitations, and actions, and things future are known to it only. Thence he adds, towards the close of the Chapter: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But we must know, that there are many modes of the Divine Providence, which can neither be explicated by speech, nor comprehended by mind. §. 6. The distributions of Providence. From the Adjuncts of Divine Providence we pass on to its various Distributions, which are for the most part Modal only, not Specific. As (1) Providence in regard of its Object is distributed into General and Special: General Providence is that which respects allthings in general: Special Providence, that which respects some under a special relation to God, as his people. (2) Providence in regard of its manner of working is distributed into Mediate and Immediate: Mediate Providence is that wherein God makes use of Means for the execution thereof, of which before. Immediate Providence is, when God produceth Effects without the use of Means. (3) Providence is distributed into Ordinary and Extraordinary: Ordinary Providence is, when God in the production and governing of things observes that Order, which was constituted at first by himself. Extraordinary Providence is when God in the Production, Conservation, or Gubernation of things breaks that natural Order constituted by himself. Of Miracles. The Effects of such extraordinary Providences are, by a Metonymy of the Effect, termed Miracles. A Miracle properly is a Specimen of Creation; because the constituted order of Nature being broken, the Mater has only an Obediential Power for the production of the Effect. Hence nothing but Omnipotence or Infinite Power can properly and physically, in a way of principal efficience, produce a Miracle. It's true the Ministers of God have, when called to it by him, been Instruments of doing Miracles; yet their concurrence or efficience was only Moral and Instrumental: they wrought all in the Name of God, in a way of faith and dependence on him, and for the manifestation of his Glory. Wherefore our Lord Christ, by working Miracles in his own Name and Authority, without any moral dependence on another, gave an evident Conviction and Demonstration of his being God. For no Creature can work a Miracle by its own Principal and Physical Efficience: No; this is the Prerogative of the first Cause and Omnipotent Deity; because every Miracle is educed out of nothing, either as to the thing itself, or at least as to the mode and manner of its being wrought. In Nature, and according to the ordinary course of Providence every passive power has an active power suited to it: and by the application of Actives to Passives the effect is produced: where therefore there is a defect of passive or active power, and yet the effect is produced, that we call a Miracle: which may be said to be wrought out of nothing three manner of ways. (1) When there is no substrate matter at all to work on. (2) If there be a substrate mater, yet when the matter is so inhabile and unapt, as that it has no natural passive power or capacity for such an effect. Or (3) when there is a natural passive power and capacity in the substrate matter, yet there wants an active Principe or Efficient for the educing the effect out of that matter. In all these regards a Miracle may be said to be produced out of nothing, and so the peculiar effect of Divine extraordinary providence. And indeed the very names, both Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, import a power extraordinary and Divine. To let pass the origination of the Latin, which is obvious, Miracles are called by the Greeks, (1) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as they are Signs of the Divine Efficience and Presence, given for the succur of our Faith; (2) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Powers, as they are manifestations and demonstrations of Divine Omnipotence, which is most illustrious therein; (3) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Prodigies, or tremendous Signs, such as not only ravish men into admiration, but leave also a terror and astonishing stupor on the mind. So Phavorinus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A Prodigy is a thing that leaves an astonishment on the Beholders, by reason of the Miracle that is wrought. Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is deduced from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, q. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which terrefies and astonisheth. All which note, that Miracles are the peculiar effects of extraordinary Providence. The former Distributions of Providence seem only modal, Providential Conservation proper to God. its formal, essential, and specific distribution is into Conservative and Gubernative. Conservation and Gubernation are usually esteemed the proper adequate species of Providence. Providential Conservation is that Act of God's Will, whereby he makes things to persist and persevere in their individual Existence, Vigour, Acts, and specific Essences or Species. As for the particular Ideas of providential Conservation we shall draw them forth in the following Proposition. 1. Prop. God is the necessary Conservator of allthings. No Creature is sufficient to conserve itself, or any thing else: no particular Agent as such can be properly styled a conservant Cause; because conservation is but a kind of continued Creation. That no Creature is sufficient to conserve itself, without the immediate conservative influx of God, is evident, (1) because every Creature has but a fluid transient nature: wherefore it needs the conservative concourse of the first cause to fix its fluxible Being. It was a great and good Effate of Heraclitus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Allthings are in flux, nothing is permanent: i. e. the natures of things create are like a river, the parts whereof are always in flux; neither doth the same part ever return again, but emties itself into the Sea, where it is swallowed up: so all Creatures are in continual flux; and if God, who alone is pure Act and immutable, did not fix their Being's by his conservative influx, they would soon drop into their primitive nothing. (2) It implies a contradiction, that a Creature should persevere in its being without God's conservative concourse. Doth it not imply a contradiction, to say, that God made a thing, and yet that thing was not made and caused by God? Now to say God hath made a Creature, which needs not his conservative influx, what is this but to say, that God made a Creature, which yet was not made by him? So essential is Divine Conservation to the very essence and existence of a Creature, as Bradwardine, pag. 162. Thus also Aquinas, 1. Quaest. 104. demonstrates, That it is not a thing communicable to any Creature, that it should conserve itself in Being without God. (3) Whatever is Ens by participation necessarily depends on that which is Ens by essence for its existence and subsistence. All create Being's in their very essence depend on Divine Conservation; because every effect that depends on any cause directly and of itself primarily for essence, must necessarily also depend thereon for conservation: But now God is so the cause of all effects, that they from their very nature and by an intrinsical necessity depend on him for Being; therefore also for conservation, as Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 21. pag. 540, etc. God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah, in some sense Al Being, as Exod. 3.14. I am: i. e. nothing hath essence, existence, and persistence in Essence, but from the pure Actuality and Efficience of God. (4) If God educed allthings out of nothing by his efficacious Will, than it necessarily follows, that the Will of God must be the Conservatrix of allthings: For allthings are so far, and so long existent, as God wils they shall be. Indeed what is conservation but continued creation, or the continuation of a thing made in Being? Is it not necessary then, that the same Divine Will, that at first gave Being to any thing, conserve the same thing in Being? Thence Aquinas, 1. Quaest. 104. proves, That God conserveses every thing by the same virtue and operation, by which he produced it, i. e. by the efficience of his Wil (5) There is great proportion and Analogy in point of conservation between the works of Art and Nature. For look as every work of Art doth presuppose a principe and work of Nature, as well for its conservation as first production; so every work of Nature doth presuppose a Divine Efficience for its conservation as well as for its first production. Is it impossible that a piece of Art should conserve itself without matter? and is it possible, that any work of Nature should conserve itself without Divine Efficience? (6) No impression can remain on any effect, longer than the vis impressa, or force and action of the Agent continue: and what is the essence of any Creature but vis impressa, or force impressed by God thereon? All create Essences are but impressions or participations from God, and therefore essentially require new force and efficience every moment for their conservation and continuation. (7) Unless God conserve allthings, how can he order, dispose, and govern them to their respective ends? Not only the operations, but the very essences of things are ordered by God to his own Glory: and how can this be, if the essences of things are not conserved by God? That God is the necessary Conservator of allthings, see Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 65. Bradward. l. 1. c. 2. pag. 146, etc. 2. Prop. Gods conservative Influx and Efficience is most intime and immediate in allthings. This Proposition is most evident, God's conservative Influx immediate. (1) From God's power to annihilate allthings. For if things were conserved by God only mediately, he could not annihilate them so long as that intermediate conservant 'Cause should concur to their conservation, as it's well demonstrated by Ariminensis, Sent. 1. Dist. 45. pag. 160. (2) From the passive power or potentiality of all Creatures. For every potential or thing in power must be actuated by some Act immediately: now every Creature in respect of God is but a potential Being; and therefore must be actuated immediately by God, who is a pure Act, and that not only in its operation, but also for the conservation of its Being. (3) From the Omnipresence of the Divine Essence. God being not circumscribed or defined to any space, but immense in his Being, it thence follows, that he is intimately and immediately present to all Being's, and by this his immediate presence and volition conserveses the same. As the creatrix Essence was immediately present by the Divine Volition in the first Creation of allthings; so the conservatrix Essence is also immediately present in the conservation of allthings. God is not more distant and remote in the conservation, than he was in the first causation of things: God is more intimate to every thing, than the most intimate part of its own Essence is. Thus Suarez, Metaphys. Disput. 30. Sect. 7. pag. 70. proves, That God doth not diffuse his creative or conservative Action, but is intimately in every thing, conserving of it, etc. So Bradward. pag. 164. (4) From God's prime causality, and the subordination of all Creatures to God. Every second cause, whether causant or conservant, cannot cause or conserve any effect, but in dependence on and subordination to God, the first Cause: Hence the Efficience of God must intervene between it and the effect, whether it be for causation or conservation: whence it follows, that the Divine Efficience, both in causation and conservation, is more immediate than the efficience of any second cause. Again, the causality of the first Cause is more essential and necessary than that of the second cause: there is no effect, which the second cause produceth, but the first cause can produce it by itself. So also as to conservation. The first cause works by its own proper virtue, and therefore more intimely and immediately than any second cause: The virtue of an inferior cause is not conjunct with the effect, but in and by the virtue of the superior. (5) From the efficacity and vehemence of God's conservative Influx. By how much the more vehemently and efficaciously any cause worketh, by so much the more penetrant, intime, and immediate is its influx. Now God, as the first conservant Cause, doth more vehemently adhere to and efficaciously influence the effect, than any second cause can do. Concerning the immediate Conservation of God, see an excellent Discourse in Bradwardine, de Caus. lib. 1. cap. 2. pag. 164, etc. 3. God's Conservation by his Word or Wil Heb. 1.3. Prop. God conserveses allthings by the word of his Power or immediate Volition. Thus Heb. 1.3. Upholding allthings by the word of his power. The Apostle ascribeth unto God infinite power in and for the conservation of allthings, whether great or small. It is infinite power that upholdeth the Earth, that stretcheth out the Heavens, etc. And yet the same infinite power is put forth in the conservation of the least things, as also for their motions. The same power that moves the Heavens, is also exerted in causing a feather to move: the same power that shakes a leaf, can shake yea rend the mountains: the same strong arm that upholds a dust or atom, can and doth uphold the Earth. And he saith all this is by the word of his Power: i. e. by his omnipotent Volition. So 2 Pet. 3. having old us, v. 5. That by the word of God the Heavens were made: he adds, v. 7. But the heavens and earth, 2 Pet. 3.7. which are now, by the same word are kept in store: i. e. by the omnipotent Will of God. God's Word being put for his Will, because we usually express our wills by our word. That God's Word or Will is the immediate cause of allthings and their conservation, we have before fully demonstrated, §. 3. of this Chapter. 4. Prop. Albeit the conservative Influx of God be immediate, God's Conservation by means. yet in the ordinary course of Providence he makes use of means for the conservation of his Creatures, at least such as are corruptible. So Hos. 2.21, Hos. 2.21, 22. 22. I will hear the heavens; and they shall hear the earth; and the earth shall hear the corn, and the wine, and the oil; and they shall hear Jezreel. (1) In this gradation we have a lively description of Divine Conservation, both as to the whole Universe, as also in regard of the principal part thereof, man, and more specially the Church of God. (2) Neither doth this Prosopopoeia only point out to us the Divine Conservation of allthings, but also their causal connexion's and subordinations' each to other. Jezreel [i. e. according to its proper origination, the seed of God] calls on corn and wine and oil for sustenance and food: and these liquors call on the Earth for fructifying juices and vigour, in order to their production: and the Earth calls on the Heavens, i. e. [1] on the Aereous inferior Heaven, where the Clouds, Snow, Rain, Dew, and Vapours are, for moist influences; [2] on the Ethereous Heaven, where the Sun and Stars are, for warm influences: And then lastly the Heavens call on God; who gives out both vigour and heat to the Celestial Bodies; and these influences to the Earth; which thence gives juices and vigour to the Plants; whence Corn, Wine, and Oil is given forth to Jezreel. Such is the admirable gradation and subordination of allthings, as means of Divine Conservation. Thus Psal. 65.9, 10, 11, 12, 13. Psal. 65.11, 12. Thou visitest the earth, etc. Thence v. 11. Thou crownest the year with thy goodness. i.e. Throughout the whole year thou dost abundantly do good to thy poor Creatures, and so dost as it were adorn, beautify, and make glad the year. Whence he adds: and thy paths drop fatness. Thy paths, orbitae, i. e. the clouds, which are the paths wherein the chariot of thy Providence moves. Drop fatness: i. e. Rain and Snow, which by their sulphureous nitrose efficaces make the Earth fat and flourishing, whereby Man and Bestes are conserved. Whence it follows: v. 12. They drop on the pastures of the wilderness, and the little hills rejoice on every side. Or are girded with joy. Some understand this of metallic venes, which are in the bosom of the Earth, and do as it were gird it with joy, or metals that cause joy. We find mention also of the providential provision that God makes for his Creatures, Psal. 145.15 The eyes of all wait upon thee, Psal. 145.15. and thou givest them their meat in due season. 16. Thou openest thy hand and satisfiest the desire of every living thing. We have here a lively Image of God's providential conservation, who is brought in as a great Master of a Family, largely distributing Food, even from his own hand, to all under his care. Such abundant provision doth the Benign Lord make for the conservation of his Creature. Whence some derive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Shaddai the name of God from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a dug or teat that yields milk, implying that God feeds all, and supplies them with nourishment. Others deduce Shaddai from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 day sufficient, q. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Scheddai, who is sufficient: because God is Alsufficient to supply all his Creatures. 5. Prop. When ordinary means fail, God oft provides extraordinary for the relief of his Creatures. God's extraordinary provision for some. Thus God provided for Eliah, and many other of his Servants in their exigences, whereof we find abundant instances in Sacred Philosophy and History. Yea how oft doth our liberal Lord make extraordinary provision for mere Brutes in their indigent cases? Psal. 147.9. Thus Psal. 147.9. He giveth to the Beste his food, and to the young Ravens which cry. The last clause, Job 38.41. and to the young Ravens which cry, is taken out of Job 38.41. Luke 12.24. Who provideth for the Raven his food? When his young ones cry unto God, they wander for lack of meat. So Luke 12.24. Our Lord makes mention of Gods feeding the Ravens. Which places put together seem to note some more than ordinary provision that God makes for them. The Rabbins, Rasi and Kimhi, with some others tell us, that the young Ravens, by reason of their white colour, are left by their Parents to shift for themselves; whence the Providence of God, in an extraordinary manner, causeth flies or worms to arise out of their dung, by which they are nourished. Pliny and Albertus Magnus incline much to this Opinion of the Hebrews. Others refer this not to the young Ravens newly hatched, but to such as are ready to fly: which being cast out of the nest by their Parents, and very much affected with hunger sly up and down the Air, making loud cries. Which seems to agree to that of Job 38.41. Thus Aristotle and Elian tell us, that the young Ravens are expelled from their nest by the old ones. To this sense Vossius, Mcy, and others incline. The former sense of the Hebrews is refuted by Calvin, as also by Bochart, de Animal. Tom. 2. p. 203, etc. who makes this case of the young Ravens the same with that of the young Lions, Job 39.39. Psal. 34.10. and 104.21. both of which by reason of their vehement appetite, and unskilfulness to acquire food suffer great hunger, and are in a more than ordinary manner supplied by the Providence of God. What extraordinary provision God makes for the conservation of his own People will hereafter occur in the Gubernation of God. 6. Prop. The Conservation of a Creature and its first Creation or Production, as they refer both to God, differ only mentally. Conservation continued Creation. Creation gives Being and Existence unto things, Conservation, Continuation in Being. Somethings are conserved immediately by God, becuase subject only to him, as Spirits: That the conservation of such differs only mentally from their Creation is evident: Other things are conserved by God not so immediately as to exclude Means, yet so as that God conserveses them immediately in and by those means. Now that the conservation of such things also, as to God's immediate conservative influx, differs not really, but only mentally from their first production is manifest; because conservation as to God, whether it be by means or without means, is but one act continued from the first instant of its Creation or Production: not that there is any real intrinsec succession in Gods Active Conservation, which is no other than his most simple volition; but we conceive Gods Passive Conservation as successive in regard of the Creatures Duration. Thonce Aquinas and his Sectators hold, That Conservation is a continued Creation. Which must not be understood of proper continuation, but according to our manner of understanding, or by reason of its coexistence to true continued succession: For continuation properly so termed is only in things divisible: but Creation and Conservation are one indivisible act, without any successive duration or real continuation as to God, but only a most simple indivisible permanence, as Suarez, Metaphys. Disput. 21. Sect. 2. p. 343. demonstrates. Hence we may easily understand, how Creation or the first production of things, and their Conservation as to God differ only Mentally. For the difference is only according to the different mode of our conception, and expression: Things are not said to be conserved in the first moment of their production, nor to be Created in regard of their subsequent continuation: For Creation connotes a negation of precedent Being, but conservation on the contrary connotes the possession of Being before produced. Creation includes a novity of Essence, which conservation excludes; and conservation includes precedent Existence, which Creation excludes. Nehem. 9.6. Thus Conservation is continued Creation, as Nehem. 9.6. where God is said to preserve allthings made by one and the same Act. John 5.17. So John 5.17. My Father hitherto worketh and I work: i. e. for the Conservation as well as the first production of things; neither are these Acts as to Divine Efficience really distinct, albeit we may distinguish them as to second causes and means used by God, for the production and conservation of things. 7. Prop. Divine Conservation as to its Objects and Effects is various. The Object of Divine Conservation. Albeit the Conservation of God be in itself one simple Act, not different from the first production of things, save by some connotation only, yet it admits various Objects and Effects. (1) God conserveses Individuals, some to all Eternity, without the least corruption or alteration: as Angels and Human Souls: Other Individuals shall be conserved for ever, yet not without some alteration and resinement, as the celestial Bodies, etc. 2 Pet. 3.10, 12. (2) Such Individuals as are the effects of Natural Generation or Production God conserveses in their Species, and in the whole: for the corruptions and defects of some parts belong to the Constitution and Continuation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the whole Universe, unto which there is more regard to be had, than to any part: albeit the parts also are conserved in their Species, when they decay as to their individual Natures. (3) God conserveses also the vigour, virtue and efficacity of all second causes, together with their Operations so long as they are existent. CHAP. IX. Of Divine Gubernation in general; and as to Sin. God the Supreme Gubernator. The end of Divine Gubernation. It's Order most perfect, and immobile. It hath the force of a Law. Its use of means. It's extent to allthings. God's Gubernation as to Men: particularly as to Sinners, and Sin. The Origine of Sin, and its causes. God not the Author of Sin. How God is the cause of the material act of Sin. How far Sin falls under the Divine Wil God's Will about Sin Permissive; not merely Negative, but Ordinative. God's Judicial Gubernation of Sin. What Attributes of God are most illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin. §. 1. HAving discussed the Conservation of God, Divine Gubernation. we now descend to his Gubernation, whereof we find illustrious notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophy. As for Sacred Philosophemes touching Divine Gubernation they are very many and great, as it may appear in the particulars thereof. I shall at present give only the mention of Platonic Contemplations concerning it. Thus Plato, Phileb. p. 28. What, O Protarchus, may we determine, that allthings, and this which is called the Universe, are governed by a certain temerarious power void of Reason, as Fortune will? Or rather on the contrary, should we not affirm with our Ancestors, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that the eternal Mind, and a certain admirable Wisdom, ordering all in the most accurate manner, doth govern? He saith, that according to the Opinion of the Ancient Wise Men, the Providence of God governs and moderates allthings in the wisest manner, and with the best order. Thus also jamblichus saith, That the Egyptians, when they introduce God under the Symbolic Image of one that governs a Ship, thereby signify his Domination and Empire as Gubernator of the Universe. For as a Gubernator of a Ship in one moment doth easily move, govern, and direct the Ship; so doth God the world. We find the same similitude used by Plato, Leg. 10. p. 902, as before. Hence, this Gubernation of God is that act of Divine Providence, whereby he directs, governs, and brings all his Creatures to their proper ends, in the most orderly manner. This general Idea of Divine Gubernation may be resolved into the following Propositions. 1. Prop. God is the Supreme Moderator, God the Supreme Gubernator. Eccles. 8.4. Sovereign Gubernator, and absolute Rector of allthings. Thus we may apply Eccles. 8.4. Where the word of a King is, there is power; [or Domination] and who can say to him what dost thou? i. e. by how much the more Sovereign any person is, by so much the greater is his Domination. God being King of Kings, and Lord of Lords must necessarily be most Absolute in Power and Domination. This is oft inculcated by Plato, and carries with it its own Evidence. For (1) allthings receiving their Being, Perfection, Virtue and Operation, from God, it cannot be, but that he should have an Absolute Dominion and Sovereign Empire over them. (2) Allthings tend to God as their last end: therefore he is the Supreme Rector of al. For when many things tend to one last end, it's necessary that there be some Supreme Rector and Moderator that ordains them thereto. For Gubernation is nothing else but the directing the things governed to their last end. Thus Aquinas, 1. q. 103. a. 3. Seeing the end of the Gubernation of the world is the best good, it's necessary, that the Gubernation of the world be best: But now the best Gubernation is that which is by one, etc. (3) God is infinitely wise to order allthings, and potent to bring them to their ends; therefore he is the Supreme Moderator of al. So Plato, Leg. 10. p. 902. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But that God who is most wise, both can and will take care of his own Creatures, etc. (4) The bonity of God argues him to be the Absolute Rector of allthings. For it belongs to Divine bonity to reduce allthings made by him to those proper ends for which they were made. Whatever flows from God as the first Cause, must return to him as the last end. (5) This is the great concern of Divine Gubernation, to see that allthings reach the end for which they were made. For things will never certainly and infallibly reach the end for which they were made, unless they be directed and governed by the same power which made them. It argues imperfection in an Artificer not to direct the work he made, to the end for which it was made. And may we impute such an imperfection to the first Framer of allthings? Hence, 2. Prop. Divine Gubernation proposeth the Glory of God as the last end of a things. The last end of Divine Gubernation. What is all Gubernation but the directing allthings to some last end? And what is the last end of allthings, but the Glory of God? Thus Plato, Leg. 10. pag 903. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Let us persuade this young man, that he, who by his providence takes the care of the whole, that he may conserve and adorn it with necessary virtue, doth wisely dispose and order allthings to this end: the force and efficace of whose Providence doth diffuse itself into all parts of the Universe, according to their nature. Whereby he explicates to us, how God doth order and dispose allthings for the good of the whole and his own Glory. This he more fully lays open in what follows: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. But thou knowest not, that all generation of singulars is for this, that the life of the whole may be blessed: his Essence is not for thy sake, but thou wert made for his sake. For every Physician, and every skilful Artificer, makes all for the sake of the whole, aspiring after the common utility. Thence he makes not the whole for the sake of the part, but the part for the sake of the whole. But thou art full of indignation, because thou canst not see, how that which is best may accord with the common good, and thy proper interest. Here are several things remarkable for explication and demonstration, that the Glory of God is the last end of Divine Gubernation. (1) He saith, All singulars are for this, that the life of the whole may be blessed. Why may we not by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the whole understand God? That Plato sometimes understands God by this notion, specially in his Timaeus, pag. 90. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the contemplations of the whole, etc. I could easily persuade myself. (2) But grant, that we must understand this of the Universe strictly taken, yet it must at last be resolved into God: for is not the Universe and allthings else for God's sake, not God for the sake of the Universe? (3) Plato illustrates this by the Symbol of a wise Physician and skilful Artificer, who works all for the sake of the whole: and is not the Divine bonity and Glory that great University or whole, into which all lower ends must be melted? (4) Plato blames his young Atheist, and in him the most of men, for preferring their private good before the good of the whole; which Theology teacheth is no other than the Glory of God. That allthings are ordered and disposed by Divine Gubernation, for the Glory of God is manifest, (1) From the prime motion and causality of God. For God being the prime Motor of allthings, and moved by nothing, it thence necessarily follows, that by his Providence he govern and move allthings to himself, as the last end. The order of ends necessarily answers the order of Agents: the first Cause and Motor must needs be the last end of allthings. (2) From God's Dominion over allthings. Every Agent has power to use his own works for the end he made them: and are not all Creatures the works of God's hands? Has he not then power to use them for his own Glory? (3) From the perfection which allthings acquire by subserving the Glory of God. By how much the nearer any Creature approacheth to the Divine bonity, by so much the more perfect it is: and is not every thing by so much the nearer the Divine bonity, by how much the more subservient it is to the Glory of God? It was a good Saying of the spurious Dionysius: The supreme bonity convertes allthings unto itself, which all desire as their last end, and by which they all subsist as their most perfect end. Hence, 3. Prop. The order whereby Divine Gubernation disposeth and reduceth allthings to their last end is most fixed, The Order of Divine Gubernation fixed. Esa. 40.26. immobile, and perfect. This according to sacred Philosophy is well expressed, Esa. 40.26. Lift up your eyes on high, and behold who hath created these things; that bringeth out their host by number: he calleth them all by name: by the greatness of his might: for that he is strong in power not one faileth. Observe here; (1) he calls on mankind to lift up their eyes for the contemplation of the Creatures thereby to instruct themselves in the Gubernation of God. (2) He found'st Divine Gubernation on omnipotent Creation. (3) He expresseth Gods fixed admirable order in governing things, specially the Celestial bodies, by bringing out their host by number. O! what an accurate order do all the Celestial bodies observe in their motions! Is not every one numbered and ranged in its proper place by Divine Gubernation? Doth not every one keep its rank and slation, perform its office, and move most regularly, according to that Law which Divine Ordination has appointed it? Thence it follows: And calleth them all by name: i. e. has an accurate knowledge of and command over all, as a wise General that can call all his Soldiers by name, whose beck and nod every one obeys. Such is the admirable Dexterity and Domination of Divine Gubernation. But whence springs all this? that follows: By the greatness of his might. The magnitude of Divine Power is the cause of his admirable fixed Gubernation: because he is omnipotent, therefore it is impossible that he should fail in his Gubernation. Thus it follows: For that he is strong in power not one faileth. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, faileth, or is deprived, i. e. of that fixed order and station, which Divine Gubernation has allotted to it: there is not one that detractes its office, but all subserve the Divine order. Thus Plato, in his Phado, p. 97. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It is the eternal Mind that disposeth allthings in the best order, and is the cause of all— And thus I determined with myself, if it be so, that this gubernative dispositive Mind doth thus dispose allthings, than allthings are placed in that station and rank, where they may be most rightly constituted. The Stoics also, as Laertius in Zeno assures us, held, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That the world was governed and ordered by the Divine Mind and Providence, which disposeth allthings in the best manner. This gubernative Providence, as it includes a fixed order and series of causes and effects, they called Fate; which they made to be a connexe series of things, or reason, whereby the world was governed. So Chrysippus said: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. That Fate was a natural Syntaxe or regular connexion of allthings, mutually following each other from all eternity, by an immutable and inviolable complication. Whereby indeed they seem to understand no other than the series and order of Divine Gubernation, decreed by God from all eternity. So Stobaeus, in his Physics explicates their mind: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The reason of those things, which are governed in the world by Providence. And that this was the original import of the Stoic Fate we are assured by Seneca, Minutins Faelix, Lud. Vives, and others. Thus Robert Grosseteste, that great Philosopher as well as Divine, in his Tractate de Libero Arbitrio, (to be found in MSS. in Exeter College Library:) We must know, saith he, that Fate may be taken for Providence, according to Boetius, Lib. Consol. Philos. 4. who saith, that Fate is the same with Providence, yet they may admit different considerations; because Providence is that Divine Reason in the Sovereign of allthings, which disposeth allthings; but Fate is the disposition inherent in things mobile, by which Providence knits them together in their proper orders. In what follows he proves out of Cicero, Boetius, and others, that Fate is really the same with Providence: of which see Philos. Gen. P. 2. l. 1. c. 3. §. 5. Hence, 4. None can avoid Divine Order and Gubernation. Prop. No second cause can totally decline the order prefixed by Divine Gubernation. And the reason is evident; because this Gubernation of God intrinsically includes, not only a prudent provision of the best means, but an efficacious execution of them, so as they shall infallibly reach their end. It's true, wicked men oft do subtract and withdraw their neck from the obediential yoke of God's preceptive Gubernation, but yet they cannot totally withdraw themselves from the order of God's providential Gubernation: whiles they violate the moral and sacred order of Divine precepts, do they not fall into the penal order of Divine punishments? Yea, oft do not those very means, which they use to violate the Divine order, Gen. 11.4. promove the same? Thus Gen. 11.4. And they said: Go to, let us build us a city, and a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth. You see their design in building the Tower of Babel was to prevent the judgements of God, or to secure themselves against a dispersion and scattering: and yet, lo! the wise Gubernation of God made this very Tower of Babel, v. 8. which they intended as a means to prevent their dispersion, the cause thereof, as v. 8. So the Lord scattered them abroad, etc. And yet out of this very dispersion which they feared and felt, Divine Gubernation brought another sacred order, even for the peopling the whole Earth. Thus the most unnatural confusions are ordered by Divine Gubernation: the order of Divine Providence is frequently advanced by that which may seem to obstruct or pull it down: whiles men endeavour to escape one order of Divine Gubernation, they fall into another. 5. The Order of God's Gubernation a Law. Prop. The order of Divine Gubernation, whereby allthings are appointed and reduced to their end, has the force and efficace of a Law. Thence Plato terms this Order of Divine Gubernation, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Law of Adrastie, i. e. God's fixed Order. So Pindar: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Regal Law of allthings: i e. that Order which the Eternal Law of Divine Decrees has constituted for the Gubernation of allthings. This Law, whereby Divine Gubernation orders and disposeth things, as it refers to things inanimate and Brutes, comprehendes in it all those Natural Instinctes, Instigations, Inclinations, and Propensions, whereby they are conducted to their proper ends and usages. Do not things Natural, which are not invested with rational notices, or spontaneity certainly observe some Laws and Dictates of Nature, which, you may assoon banish them from their Natures, as divest them of? Are not the several kinds of their Operations constantly framed and determined according to this Order or Law of their Natures? And do they not hereby follow Divine Gubernation towards their end, albeit they know not what they do nor why? Doth not the silly Bird curiosely frame its nest, and the simple Bee its cel always after the same form and figure? and so in all other natural operations and productions of mere Brutes, what a fixed Order is there agreeable to the Law of their Being's? And whence comes all this, but from the infinite Wisdom and Gubernation of the Divine Mind, who conducts things most irrational in the most intelligent prudent manner to their ends? May we not then conclude, that the Natural Generations and Operations of allthings proceed from that Universal Law engraven on their Being's, whereby they are, by the wise Conduct of Divine Gubernation, directed to their respective Ends? In sum, this Natural Law of Divine Gubernation consists, (1) In the Natural Principes of things. (2) In their Natural Inclinations. (3) In all Natural Instinctes, and Impulses of Nature. (4) In their Obediential Capacities or Powers, whereby they are ready to receive any extraordinary Impressions, which Divine Gubernation shall offer to them. 6. Prop. God's Gubernation by second Causes. The Executions of Divine Gubernation are oft committed to second Causes and Instruments, yet so as it acts immediately in and with them, yea sometimes contrary to their natural Inclinations. Thus Plato, Leg. 10. p. 903. speaking of God's Sovereign Providential Gubernation, saith: That albeit God takes the care of the whole Universe himself, yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, And over all these parts [of the Universe] are set Rulers and Moderators, who constantly govern allthings, even the most minute parts; that so by these they may govern all, even to the last part, unto their end. By those Rulers under Divine Gubernation, I presume, he understands all second Causes made use of thereby. Divine operations do not exclude the operations of the second causes, but these include subordination to Divine operations. Divine Gubernation orders and governs Inferior Creatures by Superiors, Corporals by Spirituals; and Inferior sublunary bodies by Superior and Celestial. Thus he governs allthings immediately as to the manner of Order, and yet many things mediately as to the execution thereof: So that nothing can fall out against or beside the Universal Order of Divine Gubernation, albeit many things do contrary to the order of particular Causes. Touching the Executions of Divine Providence, see §. 3. Prop. 4. 7. God's Gubernation reacheth allthings. Prop. The Object of Divine Gubernation is allthings in their most extensive latitude. Thus Plato Leg. 10. p. 902, 903. proves, That nothing is so minute and inconsiderable, but it falls under Divine Gubernation. But to descend to particulars. (1) Divine Gubernation disposeth of all Seasons, both Natural and Politic. [1] Natural Seasons, Eccles. 3.1. as Eccles. 3.1. To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose. A Season: i. e. a certain fixed, determinate time. [2] Politic Seasons, for Human and Politic Actions. (2) Gods Divine Gubernation orders all Vicissitudes and Changes in the world, without the least vicissitude or change in himself. Dan. 2.20, 21. So Dan. 2.20. For Wisdom and Might are his: i. e. for the Gubernation of allthings. Whence it follows, v. 21. And he changeth the Times and the Seasons: he removeth Kings, and setteth up Kings. (3) Divine Gubernation orders all the Meteors, Snow, Job 37.6, 7. Rain, etc. So Job 37.6. For he saith to the Snow, be thou on the earth: likewise to the small Rain, and to the great Rain of his strength. Whence it follows, v. 7. He sealeth up the hand of every man, that all men may know his work. He sealeth up the hand of every one. Elibu's meaning is, that when God sendeth his Snow and shours of Rain, he thereby seals up, or shuts up the hand of the Husbandman, that so he may retire out of the fields home, and consider his work. Then the Bestes go into Dens, as v. 8. (4) God governeth all motions of second Causes, even such as are most contingent and voluntary, in the most certain manner. (5) God governs all Events of things. It was a great saying of Julius Caesar, which he gained by experience, That Fortune, (whereby the Ancients expressed Divine Gubernation) has great force in allthings; but more particularly in the affairs of war: wherein oft the most inconsiderable rencontres or occurrences produce the greatest changements. Such is the wise and potent Gubernation of God in Military Affairs. §. 2. Divine Gubernation as to Man. Having dispatched the Gubernation of God in the general notion thereof, we now descend to consider it in its special relation to Man, both in his sinful and renovate State. Gubernative Providence doth reach the whole Universe; but in a more special manner Man and his Affairs. So Plato saith, Leg. 4. p. 709. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That God truly, and with God Fortune and Opportunity govern all human affairs. By Fortune and Opportunity we must understand Divine Gubernative Providence, which in a more peculiar manner regards Man; because he is capable not only of Natural, but also of Moral Gubernation. God governs every Creature according to its capacity, whether Natural or Moral: but now all Creatures inferior to man are capable only of Natural Gubernation and Passive Reduction to their last end: they may be governed and directed to their last end, but they cannot govern or direct themselves thereto. But Man being invested with a Natural, Passive, remote capacity of understanding and Will, can, when in a special manner aided and assisted by supernatural Gubernation, actively conduct and direct himself to his last end. Hence Divine Gubernation as to Man is either Moral, 1. Moral by Law. or Efficacious. (1) God's Moral Gubernation is by Laws and Institutions. Look as irrational Creatures are governed by natural Instinctes, and Inclinations, which are to them a Law directing them to their end; so Rational Creatures have a more express formal Law, which was at first impressed on their Being's, but now under a new Edition by Divine Revelation, whereby they are directed to their last end. For a Law being nothing else but a certain Reason or Rule of operating, it properly only can belong to intellectual rational Creatures, who alone can understand the reason of their operations. And that this Law is given to Man principally to direct him to his last end is evident, because the Supreme Intention and Efficace of the Divine Law is, to bring Man into subjection to God: and who are subject to God but those, who refer all to him as their last end? Is it not the Intendment of every Lawgiver to make those good, to whom his Laws are promulgated? And wherein consists the goodness of Man, but in subjection to God, and adhering to him as his last end? So that the main end of all Laws both Positive and Moral is to direct man to his last end. (2) This also is the main design of Divine Efficacious Gubernation, 2. Efficacious. namely to reduce man unto to a subordination and subservience to his last end. Only it has a different ay of operation as to wicked and pious men. Wicked men, if they persevere in their wickedness, are by Divine Gubernation reduced to their last end only passively, by penal executions, in order to the vindication of Divine Justice: but elect pious Souls are actively reduced and directed to their last end, by the supernatural Gubernation of the Divine Spirit. Of both these in their order. That wicked men, Wicked men fall under God's Gubernation. and all their sinful Acts and Deeds are, by Divine Gubernation, reduced to the last end of all, the Glory of God, will appear evident, if we reflect on what was before hinted, that if the Creature withdraw itself from one order of Divine Gubernation, it immediately falls under another: if lawless irregular men subtract and withdraw themselves from God's gracious and easy yoke of obedience in order to life, they deservedly fall under God's Iron Yoke of vindictive Justice, and Eternal Death: and so whiles they violate one Will and Order of Divine Gubernation, they fulfil another: If they will not willingly do Gods Will of Precept, which brings happiness with it, what more just, than that they suffer Gods Will of punishment, against their Wills? Thus wicked men fulfil God's providential Will, whiles they break his preceptive Wil Yea, Satan himself is under chains of irresistible Providence: He is not an Absolute, much less a Lawful Monarch, but Usurper; who has a restraint upon his Power, though not upon his Malice: He cannot Act as he would. And as the persons of the wicked, God's Gubernation about sin. both Men and Devils, fall under the Providential Gubernation of God, so also their Sins. And here we are inevitably engaged in that grand Philosophic and Scholastic Question, How far Sin falls under the Providential Gubernation of God? For the solution whereof we shall first premit some Distinctions: and then resolve the whole into certain Propositions. As for Distinctions, (1) We may consider Sin [1] in regard of its Causes, Essicient and Final: or [2] in regard of its Essential and Constitutive parts, Mater and Form. (2) We may consider the Permission of Sin; which is either merely Negative or Positive: and both, as belonging to a Legislator, or to a Rector. (3) We may consider the Providence of God as to its Natural Efficience or Judicial Gubernation. These Distinctions being premissed, we shall resolve our Question in the following Propositions. 1. Prop. All Sin, as other things, has its Origine, Causes, and Constitutive parts. The Causes and parts of Sin. The Ethnic as well as the Christian Schools have admitted many Debates, touching the Origine of Evil, or Sin: and we have this copiosely ventilated by Simplicius, an acute Philosopher, in his Commentaric on Epicterus, C. 34. p. 175. etc. And he seems to state it thus: That Sin, being a privation, has no proper principe or cause, though as to its substrate matter it may fall under some causality. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. p. 380. and Proclus on him, deny, that there is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, any Cause or Idea of Evils; because, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Evil is an irregular passion, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of Being; which must be understood of the formal Reason of Sin: for as to is substrate matter, Plato and his Followers grant, that all good has its Causes. Suarez, Metaphys. Disp. 11. Sect. 3. p. 251. proves well, (1) That all Sin must have some Cause: [1] Because nothing is Evil of itself: therefore from some Cause. [2] Because nothing is Evil, but as it recedes from some perfection due to it: but nothing fails of its due perfection, but from some cause either Agent, or Impedient: Now (2) this being granted, That all Sin has some Cause, it thence necessarily follows, That some Good must be the Cause of Sin. For in as much as we may not proceed into Infinite, nor yet stop at some Sin that has no Cause, we must necessarily stop at some Good, which is the cause of Evil. Hence, (3) to explicate in what kind Sin may be said to have a Cause, we must know, [1] that Sin formally as Sin requires not a final Cause, yet it may admit the same in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent. That sin formally as sin requires not a final Cause, is evident; because consisting in a privation and defect, it is not properly and of itself intended in things. Thus Simplicius in Epictet. C. 34. pag. 174. tells us, That all Act, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, does participate of Good, and therefore Evil can have no end. And yet that Sin may have a final Cause, in regard of the extrinsec intention of the Agent, is as evident; because the Agent may intent what is Evil for some end: for what is Evil in one kind, may be conducible, or utile in some other. [2] As to the Efficient Cause, all Sin has some Efficient Cause, yet not per se, of itself and properly, but by Accident, and beside the primary, intrinsec intention of the Agent. Man is said to be Efficient or rather the Deficient Cause of Sin, by producing that Action, to which Sin is appendent or annexed. God is said to be the Efficient, not Deficient Cause of the material Act of Sin, by reason of his immediate Universal Efficience to all real Entity. (4) As for the constitutive parts of Sin, namely its Mater and Form; [1] All Sin as sin has a Material Cause, or Substrate Mater, which is always naturally Good. Whence that great Effate in the Schools: All Evil as Evil has for its fund or subject some good. Thence Augustin said, That Evil cannot be but in some Good: because if there were any pure Evil, it would destroy itself. And the Reason is manifest; because Sin, as to its Formal Reason, is not a thing purely Positive, neither is it a pure Negation; but a privation of debit perfection: therefore it requires a subject to which such a perfection is due: And must not this subject then be something naturally good? Is not every real positive Being naturally good; because the Effect of Divine Efficience? Can any perfection be due to any Subject, unless that Subject be naturally good? [2] As for the Form of Sin, such as it has, it consists in the privation of that moral Rectitude which is due to the Substrate Mater or Subject. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. Lib. 1. Cap. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Evil is the privation of Good, or substance. So Lib. 2. Cap. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sin is nothing else but a secession from Good, as Darkness is a secession from Light. Of which see more, B. 1. C. 4. §. 1. and Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. sect. 4. §. 2. Indeed, to speak properly, Sin hath no Formal Reason or Cause; because it is a privation. Thus Plato, Rep. 2. and Proclus, deny, that Sin has any Formal Idea, as before: Yet, according to the common acceptation of a Formal Cause or Reason, we make its Deordination, or difformity from the Law the formal reason thereof. Hence, 2. God not the Author of Sin. Prop. Gods providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin doth no way denominate him the moral cause or Author of sin. Thus Plato, Repub. 10. saith, That God is the principal cause of all good: but as to sin he is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, no cause thereof: because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he is properly the cause of sin that chooseth it. So Repub. 2. pag. 380. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. We must with all manner of contention refute that opinion, that God who is most good, is the Author, or moral cause of sin: neither must we concede, that any speak or hear any such opinion in the City, if we desire to have it well constituted and governed. That this Platonic Sophism cannot be well understood of God's natural Efficience to the substrate matter of sin, but only of a moral causality as an Author, is evident from the very reason that he gives thereof; namely, because God is most good: which only excludes God's moral Efficience from sin as sin, not his natural Efficience from the substrate matter or entitative act of sin, which is in itself good, and therefore from God, the Cause of all good. So that Plato's argument is so far from denying Gods natural Efficience to the entitative act of sin, as that it confirms the same. The holy God, in all his providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin, whether it be permissive or ordinative, is gloriosely vindicated from being the Author or moral cause of sin; because he doth nothing deficiently, as failing from that eternal immutable Law of Righteousness. This is incomparably well explicated by Simplicius, in Epictetus, cap. 1. pag. 24. Our Souls whiles good desire good: but when they are sinful, sinful objects: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, And both, [i.e. good and bad] act from their own election, not as being compelled by any violent necessity. Wherefore God may not be said to be the Author of sin: for he made the Soul, which is naturally capable of evil— as being good according to the riches of his bonity. In which he clears God from being the Author or moral cause of sin; because all his providential Efficience about sin is only as he is good. An Author ' properly, as the Civil Law teacheth us, is he that gives command, Is à quo consilium accepimus, Auctor noster translatè dicatur. Unde Tutor propriè Auctor pulillo dicitur cui consilium impartit. Justin. Institut. counsel, or encouragement to an Act. So a Tutor is said to be the Author of what his Pupil doth, by giving him counsel. So again he is said to be an Author, who doth approve what another doth. In Philosophy, he is said to be an Author, who by suasive or dissuasive reasons, doth exhort the principal Agent to, or dehort him from any action. The same they call a Moral Cause, as opposed to effective. Now in no one of these respects can God be said to be the Author or moral Cause of sin: for he neither commands, nor counsels, nor encourageth, nor approves sin, nor yet dissuades from virtue. Neither doth God violently necessitate or compel men to sin; but concurs only to the material entitative act of sin, as the prime universal Efficient, not as a particular deficient moral Cause. 3. God the prime Cause of the entitative Act of Sin. Prop. Albeit God be not the moral deficient Cause or Author of sin, yet he is the efficient and prime cause of the material entitative act of sin. This is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophic. Thus Amos 3.6. Shall there be evil in the city and the Lord hath not done it? I acknowledge this primarily to be understood of the evil of punishment; yet we are to remember, that evils of punishment in regard of second causes are evils of doing: Gods punishing Israel, albeit it were good as from God, yet it was usually sinful as to the instruments made use of therein: and yet in this very regard God was the prime Efficient of the material entitative act, albeit he were not a moral deficient cause of the obliquity. Thus Plato, Repub. 10. pag. 896. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Must it not then necessarily be conceded, that the Soul [of the Universe] is the cause of allthings good, both honest, and evil, and base: of allthings just and unjust, and of all contraries; in as much as we assert him to be the cause of allthings? Wherein observe, (1) That he philosophiseth here of God, as the universal Soul or Spirit of the Universe, influencing and governing allthings. (2) He saith, this universal Spirit or Soul is the prime Efficient of allthings good. Yea, (3) not only of things honest or morally good, but also of things evil, base, and unjust, i. e. as to their entitative material act: because in this regard they are good. (4) He grounds this Hypothesis on the universal causality of God, as the prime Cause of allthings. Thus also Plato, in his Timaeus, pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It's necessary, that whatever is produced, be produced by some cause. If so, than all natural products must be produced by God, the first Cause of allthings: and is not the entitative act of sin a natural product? That the substrate matter, or material entitative act of sin falls under the providential Efficience of God, as the first universal Cause of allthings, has been universally avouched and maintained in all Ages of Christians, both by Fathers and Schoolmen, Papists and Protestants, excepting only Durandus, and two or three more of his Sectators. Thus Augustin, de duab. Anim. contra Manich. c. 6. about the end, where he proves against the Manichees, [who held two first Principes, one of good and another of evil] That whatever really is, as it is, must proceed from one God. Thus also Bradward. de Caus. Dei, pag. 739. where he strongly proves, That God necessarily concurs to the substance of the act of sin, albeit not to its deformity. The like pag. 289, 290. Gregor. Ariminensis, Sent. 2. Distinct. 34. Art. 3. pag. 110, etc. gives us potent and invict demonstrations, That God is the immediate cause of the entitative material act of sin. Not to mention Alvarze, de Auxil. l. 3. Disp. 34. and other late Dominicans, who, as I conceive, are unjustly loaded with prejudices, by a Divine of name, in this particular. Indeed the very Jesuits and those of their Faction concur with us in this Hypothesis. Thus Suarez, Metaph. Disput. 22. Sect. 1. pag. 551, etc. where he strongly demonstrates, That every action both natural and free, good and evil, as actions, are produced immediately by God, as the first cause. This Hypothesis he maintains stoutly against Durandus and his sectators, and as I judge with arguments never to be answered. Thus also Ruiz, de Voluntate Dei, Disput. 26, 27. Yea Penottus, de Libertat. l. 8. c. 11. assures us, that all Divines accord, That God is the cause of the natural Entity of Sin. Among Reformed Divines this Hypothesis is generally maintained. I shall mention only Davenant (who was not rigid in this way) in his Answer, to God's love to Mankind, pag. 143, 147, 174, etc. also de Reprobat. pag. 113. where he greatly explicates and demonstrates our Hypothesis. But to explicate and demonstrate our Proposition by force of reason, take notice, that we say not, that God is the cause of sin, God's Concourse to the entitative Act of Sin demonstrated. but that he is the cause of the material entitative act of sin. For the clearing of which we are to consider, That many things, which are true under an Hypothesis, and in a limited sense, are not so absolutely. Thus here we may not say simply and absolutely, that God is the cause of sin: yet we may not deny, but that he is the cause of the substrate matter, or material entitative act of sin. This was long ago well observed by Aquinas, who tells us, that all locutions, in which it is signified, that God is the cause of sin, or of moral evil, aught to be avoided, or very cautelously limited; because names that imply deformity conjunct with the act, either in general, or in particular, it cannot be said of them, that they are from God: Whence it cannot be said of sin absolutely and simply, that it is from God; but only with this addition or limitation, that the Act, as it is a real Entity, is from God. This being premissed, we proceed to demonstrate our Proposition, That God is the prime efficient cause of the material, entitative Act of Sin. This may be demonstrated, (1) From the subordination of all second causes to the first Cause. Whatever is produced must have some cause of its production, as Plato, Tim. 28. and if it have a cause, must it not also have a first cause? And what can this be but God? unless we will, with the Manichees, asset two first Causes, one of good, and the other of evil. (2) From the Participation and Limitation of every finite Act and Being. Must not every participate, finite, create, dependent Being be reduced to some essential, infinite, increate, independent Being, as the prime Efficient thereof? (3) From the conservation of the material entitative Act of Sin. Is not the material entitative act of sin a create Being? And can any create Being conserve itself? Doth not Durandus and his sectators grant, that the conservation of Being's is from God? And if God's providential Efficience be necessary to the conservation of the material entitative act of sin, is it not as necessary to its first production? What is conservation, but continued production, as to God? This argument is well improved by Ariminensis, Sent. 2. Distinct. 34. Art. 3. pag. 110. and by Suarez, Metaphys. Disp. 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. (4) From the Determination of the second cause of its particular effect. Every second cause being indifferent to variety of effects, cannot be determined to any one individual effect, but by the immediate cooperation of the first cause. Thus Suarez, Metaphys. Disp. 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. (5) From the substrate Mater of all evil, which is physically and naturally good. There is no moral evil, which is not founded and subjectated in some natural good: even hatred of God, albeit the highest moral evil, yet as to its entitative material act it is naturally good: which is evident by this, that if that act of hatred were put forth against sin, it would be morally good. (6) From the Ordinabilitie of all evil to some good. There is no act so evil, but the wise God can turn it to some good: the Crucifixion of our Lord, which was one of the highest evils, what good was by Divine Gubernation brought out of it? Doth it not much exalt the skill of a wise Physician so to order poison, as to make it medisinal? So it exalts Divine Gubernation to bring good out of evil: as it aggravates the impiety of wicked men, that they bring evil out of good. (7) Doth it not take from God the main of his Providence, to deny his Concourse to the substrate matter of sin? What more conduceth to the Amplitude of Divine Providence, than to allow him a Concourse to and Gubernation of all real Acts and Events? (8) To deny God's Concourse to the material entitative Act of Sin, doth it not, by a parity of Reason, subvert the supernatural concourse of God to what is good? For if God can make a Creature that shall be Independent as to any one natural Act, why may he not also make a Creature that shall be independent as to good Acts? Hence, 4. Prop. The substrate matter, How Sin falls under the Divine Wil or material entity of Sin falls under the Divine Wil This follows on the former; because the whole of Divine concourse or efficience must be resolved into the Will of God, as before once and again. But more particularly, (1) The Futurition of Sin, as to its substrate matter, falls under the Eternal Decree of the Divine Wil Whatever Good or Evil there is under the Sun, as to its real Entity, must have its futurition from the Divine Wil Immo & peccatum, quatenus à Deo justè permittitur, cadit in legem aeternam. Augustinus, de civitat. Dei, L. 19 C. 22. sin itself so far as it is justly permitted by God falls under the Eternal Law of the Divine Will, as Augustin well observes. Sin in its own nature, as Antecedent to the Divine Will, was only possible: now how could it pass from a condition of mere possibility to a state of futurition, but by some intervening cause? And what can we imagine to be the cause hereof, but the Divine Will? May we not then hence conclude, that Sin was future; because the Divine Will determined, for just ends, to permit its futurition? (2) The Divine Will is not only the cause of sins futurition; but it has moreover a providential Gubernation and Efficience about the actual existence of sin. [1] As for the Natural Entity of Sin the Divine Will is the total immediate efficient thereof, as Ariminensis, Sent. 2. Dist. 34. Ar. 3. pag. 110. [2] The Divine Will also physically permits the moral pravity and obliquity of Sin, as that which may conduce to the advance of Divine Glory. For this greatly conduceth to the illustration of Divine Providence, to permit some defects that may render the whole more beautiful, as Aquinas at large demonstrates, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71. of which hereafter. Hence, 5. God's will about the Obliquity of Sin permissive. Prop. Gods Will about the formal reason or obliquity of Sin is not effective, or defective, but only permissive. (1) That Gods will about the obliquity of Sin is not effective is evident, because Sin as to its obliquity has no effective cause. (2) That the Will of God is not a defective cause of Sin, is as evident; because the same act which is defectuose and sinful in regard of the second cause, is not such in regard of God: Man breaks a Law, and therefore sins, but God breaks no Law: all his Actions are conform to the Eternal Law. Whence, (3) Gods Will about the obliquity of Sin is only permissive. But now to clear up Gods permissive Will about Sin, we are to consider [1] That permission properly as to men is not an action of the Law, but a negation of action: when any permits another to do, what he might hinder, but is under no obligation to hinder. Hence no man may permit Sin; because he is under an obligation to hinder it: but God may; because he is under to obligation to hinder it; as also because he can bring good out of it. [2] That Permission is either of a Legislator, or Rector. God's permission of Sin is not as he is Legislator, but only as Rector and Governer of the World. God gives no man a legal permission of sinning, but as Rector he doth providentially permit Sin. [3] That God's permission of Sin as to the event is nothing else, but the privation of that assistance, which being granted would efficaciously impede and hinder the existence of sin. [4] That God's permission of Sin can be no way sinful; because he has an absolute Dominion over his own Influences, and may exert them as he pleaseth, without injury to his Creature: whereas all Mankind are bound together by such a mutual sraternitie and cognation; as also by that obedience they own their Creator, as that they cannot permit Sin without being partakes thereof. All men are under a communion of Natures, and therefore bound by the Law of Nature to afford relief and aid each to other so far as they may for the avoiding of sin. Again, all men are under an essential obligation of subjection to their Creator, and so far as they may to prevent sin in others: therefore they cannot permit sin, without being guilty thereof. But the Supreme Rector, being under no Law or obligation of subjection, may, for the illustration of his own Glory, permit Sin. 6. God's permissive Will about Sin Efficacious. Prop. Gods permissive Will about Sin, is not merely Negative, but Efficacious, Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 33. p. 289. demonstrates, That unto whatever God's permission extends, unto that his actual volition extends also. And his Reasons are invict; because God permits nothing, but what he wils to permit, etc. So again, C. 34. he thus argues: (1) either God wils or nils the permission of Sin: he doth not nil it; for than it cannot be: therefore he wils it. (2) God voluntarily provides for all voluntary works with all their circumstances: therefore he voluntarily orders and permits sin. (3) That Sin is, is a true Proposition: and whence comes the truth of this Proposition, but from the first truth? Thence doth not God will, that this Proposition, Sin is, be true? Whence God wils the permission of Sin. He gives us many other Arguments to demonstrate, that God has an actual Efficacious Will about the permission of Sin, p. 295, etc. In the permission of Sin God doth not only nil to hinder it, but he also wils not to hinder it. Divine permission in this regard differs much from human: Men therefore permit things to be; because they neither will that they be, nor yet will that they be not: whence many things fall out besides what they intent or wil But it is not so with Divine Permission: nothing falls out, but what God intends shall be; and therefore there can be no Negative Permission ascribed to his Providence about sin. To ascribe unto God a mere Negative Permission about Sin, what is this, but to make God a mere idle spectator of Human Affairs? And is not this unbecoming the Supreme Rector of the Universe, to stand and look on, but not to concern himself about the Gubernation of sinful Acts? Surely if the permission of God be merely a negation of Will, it will necessarily follow, that those things that fall out by the permission of God, be either against, or beside his will: if against his Will, than he nils them: if beside his Will, than he wils them not: But now Sin falls out neither against the Will, nor beside the Will of God, but according to it. Yea indeed to speak properly and strictly there is no such thing as a Negative Will of God: the Will of God taken properly for his immanent volition is always efficacious. 7. Prop. Gods Providential Gubernation of Sin is not only Permissive, God's Gubernation of Sin Ordinative. but also Ordinative. Thus Plato, in his Politicus, tells us, there is a twofold motion of the Universe, one Uniform and Regular: the other difforme, irregular, and defectuose. And he expressly faith, that these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Parallaxes or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 circumvolutions and irregularities are governed and ordered by God. i. e. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Albeit Sin be in regard of the second Cause a defect, yet God's Gubernation of those defects, so as that they may subserve his own Glory, argues no defect in him: all defects as such belong to the particular cause as defectuose, not to the first Universal Cause, who order all those defects to the best end: And that the Ordination of those defects belongs to the Gubernation of God is most evident, (1) because this greatly conduceth to the Order and Beauty of the whole Universe. There would be no perfect bonity in things create, unless there were an order of bonity: now the order of bonity in things human doth suppose worse and better; and that the worse be ordered for the Better: And to whom doth it belong to order the worse for the better, but to the most wise God the Supreme Rector of all? It's a great Platonic Philosopheme, That Lust never useth Lust well, but Reason doth. Meaning the Divine Reason in the Gubernation of Evils. May we not then allow this wise and potent Gubernator of allthings this Prerogative, to order all sinful defects to the best end? Libidine non bene utitur Libido, sed Ratio. Jansen. August. (2) Are there not many Heroic Virtues and good Qualities, which would find no room in the universe, were there not some human sinful defects? What room would there be for the patience of the Just, if there were no malignity in the unjust, as Aquinas observes? As in Naturals, the corruption of one thing is the generation of another, so in Morals, oft the corruptions of wicked men are so ordered by Divine Gubernation, as that they tend to their Regeneration. Therefore if Sin were totally excluded from the University of Nature the wisdom of Divine Gubernation, in the bringing good out of evil, would not be so illustrious and refulgent. (3) The best and most perfect mode of Gubernation is, so to provide for the things governed, as that they be permitted to act according to their natures: for herein consists the due order of Regiment. Now Divine Gubernation in permitting men to sin, and ordering the same to the best end, doth but leave men to act according to their natures. See this Proposition more fully demonstrated by Aquinas, contra Gent. L. 3. C. 71. 8. Judicial Gubernation of Sin. Prop. Gods Providential Gubernation of Sin is not only Permissive and Ordinative, but sometimes also Judicial. God's Judicial Gubernation of Sin consists in the leaving men to judicial Occecation and Induration in, and by, and for Sin. Of this Judicial Blindness and Hardness in and by Sin we find frequent mention in Sacred Philosophy, and somewhat also in Platonic. So Plato in his Gorgias; p. 472. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Injust Man is of all most miserable; yet he is more miserable, who acting injustly avoids punishment. So in his Theaetetus, he tells us, that a licence to Sin is the greatest punishment of Sin: for a power to do Evil is the worst destruction. Now this Judicial Gubernation of Sin consists of these several particulars. (1) God suspendes and withdraws the Celestial Influences of Divine Grace, and means of restraint. Thus Gen. 6.3. My Spirit shall not always strive with man. How soon will the softest heart grow harder than the Adamant, if God withdraw his celestial dews of Grace, as Zach. 7.12. & 14.17, 18? Hence, (2) God leaves men to the plague of their own corrupt hearts, which is, Plato notes, is the worst judgement. (3) God leaves Sinners to the heart-betwitching allurements and blandishments of this World. Thus Balaam, Num. 22, etc. 2 Pet. 2.14, 15. (4) God delivers Sinners up to the power of Satan, 2 Cor. 4.3, 4. 2 Tim. 2.26. (5) God so orders and disposeth his providences, as that all do accidentally, by reason of their corrupt hearts, tend to their induration. Rom. 11.9, 10, 11. (6) Yea, God permits that the very means of life be to them the savour of death, 2 Cor. 2.16. Esa. 28.12, 13, 14. (7) Yea, the Prince and Mediator of life is to such a strumbling-stone and occasion of death. Esa. 8.14, 15, 16. & 38.13. (8) God leaves them to a spirit of slumber, or spiritual occecasion. Rom. 11.8. Esa. 19. 11-14. & 44.18, 19 & 60.1, 2. 2 Thes. 2.10, 11. 9 Prop. In the whole of Divine Gubernation about Sin his Wisdom, Justice, and Sanctity, God's Attributes illustrious in his Gubernation of Sin. with other Attributes are most illustrious and resplendent. (1) God's Wisdom is eminently manifest in his gubernation of Sin, in that he brings the greatest good out of the greatest evils: those very sins whereby wicked men endeavour to darken the Glory of God, he turns to the advance of his Glory. We have a good Philosopheme to this purpose in Plato, Theaetet. pag. 167. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A wise man makes those things which are in themselves evil turn to good, and to seem such, as a wise Physician turns poison into a medicament, which similitude he useth. (2) The Justice of God is most resplendent in the punishing that sin he permits to be. (3) God's Sanctity is also most conspicuous, in that those very acts, which are morally evil in regard of God, are both morally and naturally good in regard of Divine Gubernation. The sin which God governs is not sin in regard of God, but of the Creature, that comes short of the Divine Law. The holy God violates no Law by concurring as an universal Cause with the Sinner, that violates his Law. The sinful quality of a moral effect may not be imputed to the first universal Cause, Duo cùm faciunt idem, non est idem, Proverb. but only to the second particular cause. Here that common Proverb holds true: When two do the same, it is not the same: i. e. the same sinful act, whereto God and the Sinner both concur, is not the same as to both; but morally evil as to the Sinner, and yet naturally yea morally good as to God's concurrence. Sin as to God speaks a negation of his concourse, not a privation of any thing due: neither doth God will sin simply as sin, under that Reduplication, but only as good and conducible to his Glory. The reason of God's willing and governing sin, both in the Elect and Reprobate, is univocally one and the same, namely the advance of Divine Glory: For the greatest evil of sin has something of good mixed with it; which God wils and orders for his Glory. There is nothing in the world purely, simply, and of itself evil: if there were, God, who is the chiefest good, could not will it. Lastly, man only is the proper and formal cause of sin or moral evil; because he alone comes short of the rule of moral good: so that Divine Gubernation both as permissive, ordinative, and judicial about Sin is sufficiently vindicated from the least imputation thereof. CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue, Virtuose men, and Angels. Supernatural Illumination from God. The Infusion of Virtues. God's care of virtuose Men. God's Gubernation of the Angelic World. The Angels, Law, Obedience and Disobedience. Good Angels their Communion with Saints. The Ministration of Angels. (1) At the giving of the Law and Christ's Incarnation. (2) For the Protection of Saints. (3) For their Conduct. (4) Their Sympathy with Saints. Their Ministration at the final Judgement. Divine Gubernation as to evil Angels. Satan's power to temt, and his Limitation. §. 1. Supernatural Illumination from God. HAving discussed Gods Diune Gubernation about Sin, we now pass on to his supernatural Efficience and Gubernation of Virtue and virtuose Men. We intent not to treat hereof, as it belongs to Christian Theology, but only as it falls under metaphysic or prime Philosophy, termed by some Natural Theology. 1. Plato gives us frequent and great notices of Divine Illumination, which is the Origine of all supernatural Virtue. Thus in his Theages, he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, If it please God, thou shalt profit much and speedily: otherwise not. So in his Philebus, he assures us, That the cognition of the supreme infinity Being is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the gift of God to men. The like, Epinom. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; How is it, that God should be accounted the cause of all other good things, and not much more of wisdom, which is the best good? But to treat more distinctly of Divine Ilumination, we are to know, that as there is a twofold spiritual Darkness, the one objective, in the things to be known, the other subjective, in the mind that is to know them; so proportionably there is a twofold Light, the one objective, whereby God reveles the things to be known, the other subjective, whereby God takes off the veil from the mind, and thereby inables it to apprehend supernatural Objects. Now by this twofold Light Divine Gubernation conducts the Rational Creature to his supernatural end. (1) God conducts the Rational Creature by an objective Light, or Divine Revelation of his Will, whereby he reveles man's supernatural end, and the means conducing thereto. Some imperfect fragments, or broken notices of this Divine Revelation were gleaned up by the wiser Heathens, Pythagoras, Solon, Socrates, Plato, which gave them sufficient cause to admire, and in some superstitiose manner to imitate the Judaic Institutes and Laws, as the Fountain of the best Wisdom, as it was foretold by Moses, Deut. 4.5, 6, 7. and as we have sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Parts. Whence we find mention in Plato, Minos, pag. 317. of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Royal Law; as elsewhere of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Divine Word: which, if I mistake not, refer to Divine Revelations vouchsafed the Church of God, for its conduct unto eternal life. (2) As God governs and conducts the Rational Creature by an objective, so also by a subjective Light, which is essentially requisite for the acquirement of its supernatural end. Of this also we find some and those not vulgar notices in Plato. So in his Repub. 6. pag. 507, 508. where he makes an incomparable parallel between natural Vision, and Divine Illumination. In natural Vision, saith he, there must be a visive Faculty, an Object visible, and Light to discern the Object. This Light is derived from the Sun, which is the principal and next cause of Vision. For, adds he, as oft as the eyes are converted to such things as are illustrated by the Sun, vision in the eyes is very apparent. Then he draws up his parallel, pag. 509. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Thus also think of the mind: For when that in which Truth itself, and Being itself shines forth, inheres in it, it doth consider and understand the same, and then it seems to have an illuminated Mind and Divine Intellect. Wherein observe (1) That God, who is Being itself, as also Truth itself, or the first Truth. (2) That before there can be any true light in the mind, this first Truth must shine forth and irradiate the same. (3) That when God illuminates the mind, there is not only a transient, but a fixed light firmly impressed on it. This Divine Light doth become one with the mind, and so forms, conforms, reforms, yea transforms it into the things known. (4) That the Intellect thus illuminated becomes truly Divine. Thence he subjoins: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That therefore that gives truth to those things that are known, as also a faculty to know them, call thou the IDEA OF GOOD, namely the cause of Science, and Truth, which is understood by the Intellect. Note here, that (1) he calls God, considered as the Fountain of all Illumination, the Idea of Good, i. e. the supreme Idea of all Perfection and Truth, in whose light alone we can see light. (2) He saith, that this Idea of good gives truth to those things that are known: i. e. all objective wisdom impressed on things, as also all objective Revelation, whereby things mysterious are reveled. (3) Also a faculty to know things intelligible: i. e. subjective Illumination and Light both habitual and actual. (4) Hence this Idea of good is the cause of all Science and Truth, which is understood. The sectators of Plato thus explicate his mind about Divine Illumination. [1] They make God to be the true essentia Wisdom. Thus Plotinus, En. 5. l. 8. c. 5. pag. 546. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The true Wisdom is Essence: and again the true Essence is Wisdom: i. e. God who is Essence itself, is Wisdom itself. [2] This essential Wisdom or Light doth illuminate all, but is illuminated by none: as the Sun gives light to allthings, but receives not light from any thing. [3] The create finite Intellect being irradiated by this essential light of life, is invested with true forms and Ideas of things, and is thereby conducted into the knowledge of things mysterious and Divine. This Divine Illumination is every where inculcated in sacred Philosophy, and generally acknowleged by the Greek Theologues. chrysostom styles it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The illuminant Intellect, the superne Grace, the gift of the Grace of God, not of human Nature. Greg. Neocaesar. Orat. Panegyr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The greatest gift of God, and the illustrious afflate from Heaven. And the reasons which enforce the necessity of such a Divine Illumination for the apprehending of supernatural Truths are taken from the sublimity of the Object, and the imperfection of the human Intellect: we find both conjoined, 1 Cor. 2.14. The animal man is not capable of the things of the Spirit, 1 Cor. 2.14. etc. By the animal man we are to understand every man void of supernatural light, by which alone things spiritual are discerned: for all knowledge supposeth some proportion between the Object and the apprehensive Faculty: now what proportion is there between the natural Intellect and supernatural Truths? Can an animal faculty take in spiritual objects? Is it possible then, that the natural mind may, by its own force without Divine Illumination, reach supernatural Mysteries? Thence saith Augustin, de Trinit. l. 14. c. 7. Tho human intellect cannot apprehend sublimer intelligibles, unless it be fortified and perfected by a stronger light. And Greg. Nyssenus, 2. in Eunom. assures us, That it appertains to the Father, Son, and holy Spirit, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to illuminate minds with the light of Divine knowledge. Whence this Divine illumination is styled by the Greek Theologues, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, illumination, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, irradiation, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, illustrant Grace. 2. Having explicated Divine Illumination, The Infusion of Virtues. we now proceed to treat of the infusion of all other supernatural Habits or Virtues, whereby the Rational Creature is governed and conducted to his last end. That all true moral and supernatural good is no way attainable but by Divine infusion, is every where inculcated in sacred Philosophy. Thus also in the Theology of the Grecians, it was frequently inculcated, (1) That no one could 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, avoid the snares of sin, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he who was assisted and fortified by God, as Basil, Eth. c. 3. So Greg. Nyssen. Orat. 3. in Orat. Domin. Tom. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, He that will avoid domineering sin must call God for his succour, always having him in his eye, who exerciseth him by tentations. (2) That all true moral or supernatural good comes from God, by Divine infusion. This gratiose infusion of Virtue by God was by various and emphatic notions illustrated by the Greek Fathers, who term medicinal efficacious Grace, the Spring of this supernatural Infusion, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the salutary Grace; also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, manuducent and assistant Grace. Again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Divine infusion, or inspiration: For, say they, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that we can do any thing morally good, is from the impulse of God. Yea they make, not only the first infusion, but also the prosecution and conservation of all moral good to be from God. Whence Divine Grace is termed by them, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, persequent, or actuating and conservant Grace. Hence, (3) the Act, whereby the Soul is turned from Vice to Virtue, is termed by the Greek Theologues, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Restauration, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Revocation, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Discession, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, putting off the old man, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Progress from a bad state to a good, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Transmutation of Soul. Of which see more in what precedes of efficacious Concourse, c. 7. It was a great Question among the ancient Philosophers, Whether Virtue came by institution; or by Divine afflation and infusion? The Cynics and Stoics held, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That Virtue was teachable, as Laertius: But Socrates, and Plato his sectator held the contrary. So Plato, Protag. pag. 361. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Virtue is not a thing that may be taught, or gained by institution. This he more copiosely demonstrates in his Meno, pag. 89. where he proves, (1) That men are not good or virtuose from the power of Nature: For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. if men were good by Nature, then certainly some would be so in their tender years. (2) Then he proceeds to another Question: Therefore seeing men are not good by Nature, may they not yet be such 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by Discipline and Institution? This also he denies, demonstrating, That Virtue is not a Science, such as may be taught by Precepts: If Virtue, saith he, may be taught, then there must be Masters and Disciples of it. On the contrary, may we not rightly conjecture, that what has neither Masters nor Disciples, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, cannot be taught? Whence Socrates assumes thus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Truly I have oft sought diligently, whether there were any Masters to be found, who could teach Virtue, but I could never as yet find any. Thus pag. 93. Now let us consider, whether good men can communicate that Virtue they have unto others: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Or, whether virtue be such, as that it can be delivered to no one by Institution, nor yet be received by any one in such a way. He demonstrates the later, and exemplifies it by Themistocles, who, saith he, was, according to commun estime, a good man, and a skilful preceptor of Virtue, if any ever were. And canst thou think he would make others good, and not his own Son Cleophantus? But this, adds he, he could not do. Whence he concludes, that Virtue could not be taught. Thence he proceeds to make inquisition into two sorts of men, who professed themselves Masters of Virtue, namely Sophists and Politicians, and demonstrates that neither of these could indeed teach men to be virtuose. Yea, p 99 he saith, That God oft makes use of the most unapt Instruments for the producing Virtue: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; Is it not meet, Meno, to call those Divine Men, who being without understanding, excellently perform many of those things they both do and speak? Whence he concludes: But if in this whole Disputation we have rightly found out the case, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Virtue is acquired neither by Nature's force, neither by any Institutes of Discipline or Doctrine; but it comes to those who have it by Divine Afflation, or Infusion, without the active concurrence, providence, and industry of the human soul. Lastly he closeth up his Dialogue with this, That supposing any should by Institution acquire somewhat of Virtue, yet this is but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to be adorned as it were with a shadow; whereas Virtue is a thing real and solid: i. e. All the forces of natural power or artificial Institution give men only a shadow, form, or semblance of Virtue; whereas the truth and real power thereof comes from God. Whence Bias, as Laertius informs us, advised: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, What Good thou shalt perform, refer to God, as the Author of it. We have already demonstrated, that the supernatural infusion of Virtue by God was generally asserted by the Greek Fathers: (albeit too many of them inclined to favour Origen's corrupt infusions about Freewill.) Thus Damascene, (who gives us a sum of the Greek Theology) Orthodox. Fid. L. 2. C. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, But we ought to know, that Virtue is given to human nature by God; and that he is the Principe and Cause of all Good; and without his cooperation and aid, it is impossible that we should will or act any good. And this he demonstrates from God's prime causality, L. 3. C. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God, who gives Being, is he that gratiosely vouchsafeth Well-being. And John. Climacus, scal. Parad. grad. 23. assures us, That, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. the extremity of pride consists in the negation of Divine Aid; and the lifting up of our own Virtue is a Demonic Affection: for he that thinks he can of himself, without supernatural Grace, perform any good, denies God to be his helper in allthings. And Greg. Nyssen. saith well, That the Grace of God is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the sum of Virtue. That supernatural Good and Virtue comes from God by Divine Infusion is generally asserted and demonstrated by the Sectators of Augustin and Aquinas. Thus Gregorius Ariminensis, 2. Dist. 29. q. 1. where he demonstrates these Conclusions. (1) That no just person, invested with habitual Grace, can avoid any one sin, without Divine special assistance: because no just person can by Grace received avoid any one tentation, or persevere in good. (2) That Adam, before he fell, could not by his own forces, with the general insluence of God, without special assistance, perform any one good act. Touching the necessity of habitual and actual Grace for the performance of any action really morally and spiritually good, see Jansenius, August. Tom. 3. de Grat. L. 2. C. 2. & 22, 23, etc. §. 2. God's care of virtuose men. As all Divine Knowledge and Virtue come under God's supernatural Efficience and Gubernation, so in like manner all virtuose men. Sacred Philosophy every where inculcates, what a paternal and special Providence God vouchsafeth his peculiar people. Thus Psal. 17.7. Psal. 17.7. Show thy marvellous loving kindness, O thou that savest by thy right hand them which trust in thee. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Separate thy Benignities, or make thy Benignities marvellous. So the LXX. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, make wonderful: i. e. exert thy wonderful Benignity, as thou art wont to do, towards those that trust in thee. So v. 8. Keep me as the apple of thine eye. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the pupil the daughter of the eye. There is an elegance in the similitude. As the Pupil or Apple of the Eye, being like a tender delicate Daughter, the darling of the Eye, is the main of its care; so are the Children of God his darlings. Whence he adds: Hid me under the shadow of thy wings. Which seems to allude to the providence of an Hen, which hides her young under her wing, thereby to protect, foment, and nourish them. It may also allude to the wings of the Cherubims, which spread themselves over the Propitiatory, Exod. 25.20. thereby pointing forth God's protection of his People. Thus, Psal. 91.1. Psal. 91.1. He that dwelleth in the secret place of the most high. It seems to allude to the Holy of Holies, which, in Scriptural phraseology, is termed the secret place of God, where he dwelled. The meaning is: whoever commits himself to the Tuition of God, by flying unto his Sanctuary, he shall be safe. So it follows: shall abide under the shadow of the Almighty. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 shall sojourn, or continually loge. Of the Almighty. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Shaddai is one of God's names, which signifies Self-sufficient, as containing all sufficience in him, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 day sufficient: or it may signify, potent to destroy all, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to destroy. God is both Alsufficient to provide for his People, and Omnipotent to destroy all that oppose them. Thence, v. 4. Verse. 4 He shall cover me with his feathers, etc. i. e. He shall overshadow me with his wings, and defend me from all injuries of weather, or birds of prey, even as an Hen protectes her Chicken. So v. 10. Verse. 10 There shall no evil befall thee. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, There shall be no evil impelled to thee, or there shall no evil fortuitously occur to thee: but all be governed and ordered by a pattern hand of Providence. Thus, v. 14. Because he hath set his love upon me, therefore I will deliver him, etc. The like description of God's pattern providence we find Psal. 121.4, 5, 6, 8. as elsewhere. As for Plato's Philosophemes' touching God's pattern providential Care and Gubernation of virtuose persons, they are many and great. So in his Apology for Socrates, having proved at large, That Death was no way to be feared by a wise virtuose man, he gives this reason for it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because there can no evil happen to a good man, either living or dead: neither are his affairs ever neglected by God. So Repub. 10. he saith: Whatever happens to a friend of God is best for him. The same he inculcates elsewhere. So Pindar, Od. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, God thy keeper provides for these cares, taking this solicitude on himself. And Pythagoras held, Charior est illis [Diis] homo quam sibi. Juven. Sat. 10. that Man, so far as he had cognation to God, fell under his special Providence. Yea Plato made virtuose men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the possessions of God, according to Sacred Dialect. Indeed God's pattern Providence towards the righteous determines all events sweetly and for the best: it extractes good out of the most bitter crosses: they shall need nothing, but what they can better need than enjoy: If God keep them not from misery, he will keep them in it: the less they have of human help and provision, the more they shall have of Divine. God reserves to himself the care of Temporals, that they might be the more obliged to mind Spirituals. Thence said Socrates: Seing God is so careful for you, what need you be careful for any thing yourselves? There is not any Attribute or Relation assumed by God, but his People have it engaged for them. §. 3. Next to the Rational follows the Angelic World, which is the Supreme Object of Divine Gubernation. God's Gubernation of the Angelic world. As for the Creation of the Angels Sacred Philosophy gives us but few if any notices thereof; because its design chief is to describe unto us the state of the Church collected out of men and redeemed by Christ, in which the Angels have no share: yet in as much as they are used by God as Ministers of his Church, so they belong to Divine Gubernation; on which account we find frequent mention of them in the Scriptures. As to their natures they are said to be Spirits Intelligent and Wise, 2 Sam. 14.20. excelling in strength, and in all ready and swift execution of the Divine Will, Psal. 103.20. The Life of blessed Angels consists in the beatific Vision and Contemplation of the face of God, as Mat. 18.10. In Heaven the Angels do always behold the face of my Father: i. e. They always contemplate the infinite Beauty of the Divine Essence, the gloriose Majesty of his Throne, the transcendent splendour and brightness of his Wisdom, bonity, and other gloriose perfections. And the sood of Angels, whereby this their Intellectual Life is recreated and strengthened, is that ineffable delight and satisfaction, which attends this their beatify Intuition and Contemplation of the face of God together with the contemplation of whatever else hath any conformity to God, or subservience to the illustration of his Divine Wisdom, Power, Goodness, Grace, Justice, with his other gloriose perfections. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. L. 2. C 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, they see God, and are fed hereby, etc. As for the Ministry of Angels, we find mention thereof, Psal. 103.4. Psal. 103.4. Who maketh his Angel's Spirits: his Ministers a flaming fire. They are called a flaming fire by reason of their Spiritalitie and Activity in serving God: for nothing in the sensible world is so pure, spirital, and active as fire; it being the most potent Minister or Instrument of Nature and Art. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fig. L. 2. C. 3. makes an Angel to be, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a spirit or immaterial fire. For which he citys Psal. 103.4. where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, flaming fire, saith he, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, denotes Agility, Ignition, Fervour, penetrability, and Acumen about the Divine Desire and Ministry; as also their elevate refined nature and freedom from all material intelligence. Whence he gives us this description of an Angel: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, An Angel therefore is an intellectile substance, ever-mobile, free, incorporeous, by Grace obtaining immortality in nature. As to their Illumination, he adds: that they are, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Secondary intellectile lights, receiving illumination from the first independent Light. Their vast Wisdom and Science is also mentioned, Matth. 24.36. Mark 1.3.32. Their mighty Puissance, Force and Power is described, 2 Pet. 2.11. Their Glory, Dignity, and Excellence above other Creatures is frequently inculcated. As to their Dignity and Office, they are styled, Col. 1.16. Thrones, Dominions, Principalities, Col. 1.16. and Powers. They are also said to be Dan. 10.13. the Chief Princes, above all the Princes of the Earth; and the Title of Gods is given to them, Psal. 8.5. and 97.7. in as much as God imparteth to them his Counsels, 1 King. 22.19, 20. Zach. 1.11, 12. and useth their Ministry in the Gubernation of the world, but in a more particular manner of his Church, as Hebr. 1.14. Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for them, who shall be heirs of salvation? In which description we have (1) Their Nature signified by Spirits. (2) Their Office, to minister. (3) The main Object of their Ministry, the heirs of salvation. We find no particular mention in Plato, or the more Ancient Philosophers touching Angels; yet we find frequent and great notices both in Plato and others touching Demons, and their Ministerial Office between the Supreme God and Men, for the Gubernation of human affairs; which Mede understands partly of Angels. Plato discourseth at large of Demons, in his Cratylus, pag. 397. in his Symposium, p. 202, 203. and in his Repub. 5. p. 468, 469. He makes them to be a kind of mediatory Gods, between the Supreme God and Men, to transport the Sacrifices and services of men to God, and the gifts and favours of God to men; as also to govern human affairs. Which its possible may be partly but a broken Tradition of the Ministration of Angels; yet I conceive the Office of these Demons primarily refers to the mediatory Office of the Hebraic Messiah, and was but a corrupt Imitamen thereof, as we have more fully demonstrated, in what precedes, B. 2. C. 8. §. 11. and Vanity of Philosophy, B. 2. C. §. 4. also Philosoph. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 4. §. 4. As all Divine Gubernation gins with a Law, either natural or moral, The Angelic Law, Obedience and Disobedience. so the Angels those intelligent, celestial, gloriose Creatures had their Law, whereby they were to be directed and ordered to their supreme end. What the particulars of the Angelie Law are is not specified; but it is supposed they are for substance the same with those moral Precepts impressed on Adam's Soul, excepting such as relate to the gubernation of the human body, which Angels are not invested with. It's most certain, that those immaterial gloriose Creatures, as they are in nature more pure, and in power more potent than man; so likewise those of them that have kept their station, are in the Contemplation, Admiration, Affection, Adoration, Imitation, and Obedience of their Creator perfectly conformed to that Law imposed on them. Whence our Lord makes their obedience the Idea and Exemplar of what we are to pray for, Mat. 6.10. & 18.10. Yet part of those gloriose Creatures, through the voluntary breach of that Law, whereby they were to be governed, soon fell from their blessed station, even before the Fall of Man. What their sin was cannot be peremtorily determined; yet it s generally conceived to be spiritual pride in the reflection on their own sublimity, dignity, and excellence, which ravished their understandings into such an exorbitant degree of self-admiration, that they lost the sense of their subordination to, and dependence on their Maker: whence their Contemplation, Admiration, Adoration and Imitation of God immediately vanished: and of gloriose pure Spirits they became most impure and unclean, as Luk. 8.2. & 9.42. As for the elect blessed Angels their offices as to God and Men are various. The good Angel's ministry as to Gad. 1. As to God, (1) they serve him, by standing before his Face, and observing all his Commands. So Gabriel, Luk. 1.19. Luk. 1.19. I am Gabriel that stand in the presence of God. To stand in the presence of God, denotes a posture for the observation of all his Commands, and a promtitude to execute the same. The allusion is taken from Courtiers, who stand in the presence of their Prince, ready to observe and obey all his dictates and commands. The like Mat. 18.10. Their Angels do always behold the face of my Father. So Rev. 8.2. Rev. 8.2. And I saw the seven Angels that stood before God: i. e. to observe and execute his pleasure for the destruction of Babylon. (2) They minister to the Sons of God, Mat. 4.11. Joh. 1.51. (3) They laud and adore God the Father and his Son Jesus Christ, Luke 2.13, 14. Rev. 5.11, 12. & 7.11. of which hereafter. And these praises they perform with so much eloquence and suavity, as that it became a Proverb, To speak with the tongue of Angels, whereby they understood the highest Divine eloquence and suavity of speech, as 1 Cor. 13.1. 1 Cor. 13.1. Though I speak, with the tongue of men and Angels, etc. (4) They also serve God in the executions of his Threats and Punishments on wicked men, specially the Enemies of his Church. As Act. 12.23. Rev. 7.1, 2. & 8.7, 8, 10, 12. & 9.1, 13. (5) They shall attend and subserve Christ at his second Coming to Judgement. As Mat. 16.27. & 25.31. Luk. 9.26. 2 Thes. 1.7. (6) They ministered to Christ in the first promulgation of the Law and Gospel, as in what follows. 2. But our supreme Lord intending the Angels as ministering Spirits for the heirs of Salvation, Heb. 1.14. Good Angels, converse with Saints. he has also joined them as Parties in the Communion of Saints, under one Head, who is Christ, Col. 2.10. But because they are Spirits and have no flesh, therefore under the Old Testament, whiles the Church was in its Infant-state, they frequently appeared in corporal visible shapes, thereby to strengthen their Faith and assure them of their commerce with and ministration to the Elect of God. Mede drives this notion much higher than I dare extend it, who on Gen. 3.13. supposeth, that the Law of Converse between Spirits and men requires, that the Spirit always presents himself under the shape of some visible thing; yea, of some such thing, as may less or more ressemble its condition. But I conceive, that the highest Communion between Angels and Men is spiritual, without the assumption of human shapes, specially in these last times: Yet we must not deny, but that the patriarchs and Saints under the Law had frequent Apparitions of Angels in visible forms of men, who conversed with them, eating and drinking, and discoursing familiarly with them, touching the affairs they were sent about, as Gen. 18.1. & 19.1 and elsewhere. Sometimes they appeared in more gloriose shapes, like winged Creatures, Esa. 6.2, 6.7. Dan. 8.15, 17. & 9.21, 22. Sometimes they appeared, but spoke not, as Gen. 18.12. And sometimes they spoke, when no mention is made of their Apparition, Act. 8.26. As for the subordination and subservience to Divine Gubernation, Angels employed at the giving of the Law. in ministering to the Heirs of Salvation and Churches of Christ, we find very great and illustrious notices thereof in sacred Philosophy. 1. Divine Gubernation made use of Angels and their ministration to usher in both the severe Law on Mount Sinai, as also the Mediator of the new Convenant, who reigns on Mount Zion. (1) That God made use of the ministration of Angels at the giving of the Law on Mount Sinai, is evident, from Act. 7.53. Gal. 3.19. Act. 7.53. Deut. 33.2. This also seems to be the import of Moses' words when he blessed the people, Deut. 33.2. And he said, The Lord came from Sinai, and risen up from Seir unto them: he shined forth from mount Paran, and he came with ten thousands of Saints: from his right hand went a fiery Law for them. By the ten thousands of Saints, we must understand the holy Angels, that attended Gods Divine Gubernation in giving out the Law. Heb. of Sanctity: i. e. Spirits of Sanctity, which Jonathan, in his Thargum, interprete, holy Angels. Heb. 2.2. Whence the Law is called, Heb. 2.2. the word spoken by Angels. So Zech. 14.5. and all the Saints with thee: this may be understood, at least in part, At Christ's birth and for the propagation of the Gospel. of holy Angels. (2) Thus also the Lord of Glory and Mediator of the New Covenant, when he came into the World, was ushered in by a Chorus of Angels, Luke 2.13, 14. And suddenly there was with the Angel a multitude of the heavenly Host, praising God and saying, Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will towards men. These Angels still sing loud the praises of the Lamb about the Throne of God, as Rev. 5.11, 12. (3) These blessed Spirits were employed also in the solemn Declaration of Christ's Resurrection, Mat. 28.2, 5. Luke 24.4. Joh. 20.12. (4) They also serve the Church in the promoving and propagating of the Gospel, Luke 2.9, 10. Act. 8.26. 2. Divine Gubernation makes use of the ministry of Angels for the Conservation and Protection of the Heirs of Salvation. 2. For the conservation and protection of Saints. (1) They are sometimes employed by God for the healing of sicknesses and diseases, as it appears by that famous instance at the Pool of Bethesda, Joh. 5.4. where an Angel went down, at a certain season, putting a medicinal virtue into the waters, or drawing forth and applying what virtue was there. (2) They are employed as Watchmen and Guardians to keep the Heirs of Salvation, and succur them in their ways. So Psal. 91.11, 12. For he shall give his Angels a charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways: they shall bear thee up in their hands, lest thou dash thy feet against a stone. Hence they are styled Watchers, Dan. 4.13. Yea their commission and care extends to little children, Mat. 18.10. This protection over the Church of God was symbolicly pictured forth by the Cherubins, which environed the Tabernacle, Exod. 26.1. as the Lifeguard of Angels environs the Church. Hence, (3) They are made use of by Divine Gubernation as an Host of Warriors, to defend the Church from its Enemies, Psal. 34.7. Psal. 34.7. The Angel of the Lord encampeth round about them that fear him, and delivereth them: i. e. from all their enemies. They are Gods powerful Hosts to smite his enemies with sore diseases, Psal. 78.49. Act. 12.23. So at Hezekiahs' prayer, an Angel came and killed 185 thousand of his enemies, Esa. 37.21, 22, 36. They being most vigorous and active Spirits sight against the Enemies of God's Church, pursue and scatter them as chasse before the wind, Psal. 33.1, 5, 6. Dan. 10.20. whence they are called God's Host, Gen. 32.1, 2. (4) They provide food for the Heirs of Salvation, when there is need. Thus Eliah, 1 Kings 19.5, 6, 7. was by an Angel supplied with food, in his flight from Jezebel. (5) By Angels the people of God have been delivered out of impendent or present sufferings. So Lot from the flames of Sodom, Gen. 19.1, 2. Sadrach, Mesach, and Abednego from the fiery Furnace, Dan. 3.28. Daniel from the Lion's mouths, Dan. 6.22. and Peter out of Herod's Prison, Act. 17.8, 9 (6) Angels attend on the Heirs of Salvation at the very moment of their Souls departure out of their bodies, and thence convey them into Abraham's bosom, as Luke 16.22. And was carried by the Angels into Abraham's bosom. 3. Divine Gubernation makes use of the Ministry of Angels for the Information, Counsel, Conduct, 3. For Information, Counsel, Conduct, and Consolation. and Consolation of the Heirs of Salvation. (1) God by Angels informs his people of mercies intended for them. Thus Abraham, of the Birth of Isaac, Gen. 18.10. Manoah and his Wife of the birth of Samson, Judg. 13. Zecharie of the birth of John Baptist, Luke 1.13. Marry of her Conception, Luke 1.30, 31. and the Shepherds of the Nativity of our Lord, Luke 2.10. The Women of his Resurrection, Mark 16.1, 5, 6. and the Apostles of his second Coming, Acts 1.10, 11. (2) Yea not only particular mercies, but Church-Restaurations and Deliverances have been imparted to the Heirs of Salvation by Angels. Thus Daniel was informed of the state of the Church from his time to Christ, Dan. 7.10, 16, etc. & 8. 13, 15, 17, etc. & 9.21, etc. & 10.5, 6, etc. And Zecharie was certified of the Restauration of Jerusalem, Zech. 2.3, 4. And John of the state of the Church from his time to the end of the World, Rev. 1.1. (3) The People of God have been informed by Angels, touching Gods Judgements on the wicked. Thus Abraham of the Destruction of Sodom, Gen. 18.17, 20. And John of the Destruction of Antichrist. (4) the Heirs of Salvation have been conducted in their ways by Angels. Thus Abraham's Servant was conducted in his journey by an Angel, Gen. 24.7, 40. Philip to go and preach to the Eunuch, Acts 8.26, 29. Paul to the Macedonians, Acts 16.9, 10. (5) The Heirs of Salvation have been counselled and comforted in their sufferings by Angels. Thus Jacob was comforted and encouraged in his going to, and returning from Mesopotamia, Gen. 28.12. & 32.1, 2, 11, 21. Joseph was counselled to fice with Christ from Herod's persecution, Mat. 2.13. The Lord of Glory was comforted in his Agony in the Garden by an Angel, Luke 22.43. And there appeared an Angel to him from Heaven strengthening him. So Paul was comforted against the peril of shipwreck by an Angel, Acts 27.23, 24. Yet we are to remember, that God doth not use the good Angels to excite, much less to infuse grace; because this is the proper office of the Spirit of Grace. 4. Many Acts which imply Inspection, Angel's Communion with Saints. Affection, and Communion with the Heirs of Salvation are ascribed to the holy Angels. (1) They are said to be present in and spectators of the Assemblies of Saints, Heb. 12.22. Heb. 12.22. to the innumerable company of Angels. Hence Paul requireth of women modest and submissive attire in Church-Assemblies, 1 Cor. 11.10. by reason of the Angels being present, 1 Cor. 11.10. (2) Thence also they are said to be not only spectators of the affairs of Churches, but also in a spiritual manner to be affected therewith, yea to join in the celebration of the Lamb's praises, Rev. 5.11, 12. Rev. 5.11, 12. And I behold and heard the voice of many Angels round about the Throne, and the Bestes, and the Elders— saying with a loud voice, Worthy is the Lamb, that was slain, to receive power, etc. The like, Revev. 7.11, 12. They seem to have a great sympathy with the Heirs of Salvation; which they manifest by their glorifying the Lamb, who was slain for them, as also by the Joy they have in their Conversion, as Luke 15.7, 10. (3) They desire to look into, and to be instructed in the manifold wisdom of God, reveled in and unto the Churches, Ephes. 3.10. 1 Pet. 1.12. (4) They are witnesses with the Lord of those charges laid upon the Servants of God, in order to their service, 1 Tim. 5.21. 1 Tim. 5.21. 5. The Angels shall be the Ministers of God, at the final Judgement, The final Service and Communion of Angels with Saints. to reap the Earth, to sever the wicked from the righteous, and thence shall live for ever with the Saints, praising and enjoying God. (1) They shall be employed in reaping the earth, and severing the wicked from the just at the last day, Mat. 13.39, 41. Mat. 13.39, 41. And the Reapers are the Angels— The Son of Man shall send forth his Angels, and they shall gather allthings that offend, etc. So Mat. 24.31. And he shall send his Angels, with a great sound of a Trumpet, and they shall gather together his Elect from the four winds, etc. (2) The Heirs of Salvation shall at last day be made conformable to, and equal with the Holy Angels; and together with them shall praise, serve, and enjoy God in all manner of intime communion, unto all eternity, Luk. 20.36. For they are equal to the Angels. Thus some interpret Zech. 3.7. And I will give thee places to walk, Zech. 3.7. [or walks] among those that stand by: i. e. the Holy Angels, that minister before God. This may include Service both in the Church Militant on Earth, as also the Church Triumphant in Heaven: for Angels stand by, and minister in both. How potent, promt, and agile the holy Angels are to execute every Will of God, is well expressed by Damascene, Orthod. Fid. L. 2. C. 3. The Angels, saith he, are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Angels are potent and promt to fulfil the Divine Will, and are by the agility of their nature, found every where present, as the Divine beck commands them. So much for the Gubernation of the Holy Angels. §. 4. Divine Gubernation extends itself not only to the good Angles, but also to the Evil. Satan, by God's providential permission, God's Gubernation as to Evil Angels. is the God of the wicked world, who rules in the Children of disobedience. 1. Satan is the Prince of this World, Joh. 12.31. (1) He is not a Lawful Prince, but Usurper. he usurps Christ's Crown, and intrudes himself on his Throne. He affects a Deity, to be God over the noblest part in Man, his Mind, as 2 Cor. 4.4. (2) He is not an Absolute Prince, but limited: his Power is much narrower than his Will and Malice: He can do nothing but by Divine Permission and Gubernation. (3) He is not a Free Prince, but Vassal: confined by Chains of Providential Gubernation, Judas 6. (4) The main of his Kingdom consists in the Free Election of wicked men. Evil men electively put the Crown on his Head, and bow the knee before him: His Crown is supported by the voluntary subjection of wicked men. Ephes. 2.2. Ephes. 2.2. According to the Prince [Arbitrio Principis: i. e. according to the Sovereign pleasure of the Prince] of the power of the Air, [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, here notes his Dominion and sovereignty in the Air, i. e. in this inferior part of the Universe.] The Spirit that now worketh [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes his working with efficacity] in the Children of Disobedience: i. e. Such as are addicted and have given up themselves to the disobedience of God, but obedience unto Satan: such as are his voluntary slaves. (5) Satan is a Magnificent Prince, having Legions and vast Armies under his command, Eph. 6.12. Rev. 12.6, 7. (6) He is a Prince of great Wisdom, Experience, and Subtlety, to deceive all that listen to him. His Prudence as a Spirit is vast, and his Experience of more than 6000 years greatly adds thereto. 2 Cor. 2.11. So, 2 Cor. 2.11. Lest Satan should get an advantage of us. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, lest we should be overreached or circumvented by Satan. It answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and signifies primarily to have more than we ought; thence, to cheat, defraud, etc. The Metaphor seems taken from avaricious Merchants, who take all occasions to circumvent. Thence he adds: For we are not ignorant of his devices. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, answering to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, notes here Stratagems, Machinations, Plots, Fallacies, etc. which he terms, Ephes. 6.11. Ephes. 6.11. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the wiles of Satan. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, saith Chrysost. is, artificially to circumvent, to cheat by rules of Art, by a compendiose method to reduce persons or things under our power. So that Satan it seems, has got the art and method of deluding and cheating souls. Whence he is styled, Joh. 8.44. The Grand Old Liar, 2 Tim. 2.26. or Cheater. We read also, 2 Tim. 2.26. of the snare of the Devil, whereby he takes men captive at his wil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a military word and signifies to take alive, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. So 2 Chron. 25.12. Satan has such a snare, as he can thereby take sinners captive alive, and at his pleasure. (7) As he is a Prince of Power and Prudence, so also of great malice and rage against the good of Souls. 1 Pet. 5.8. Thus 1 Pet. 5.8. he is termed a Roaring Lion, [which notes his rage] seeking whom he may devour. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, drink up at a draught. Yea, so great is his Rage against the good of Souls, that he counts it a torment to be kerbed or hindered in the execution of his malitiose designs, as Matt. 8.29. Mat. 8.29. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to torment us. O! what a torment is it to him to see a Soul delivered out of his snare? Hence, 2. Satan, being the Prince and God of this World, has, Satan's Power to temte. by providential permission a great power to temte and draw men unto sin. (1) Satan as to us is not a mere Creator of his own Tentations, but he takes the matter from those whom he temtes, or from some circumstances that environ them. Satan is oft the Father, but Sin the Mother of Tentation. (2) Satan cannot reach the human Soul or any Act thereof immediately. The heart of Man is a privy Chamber, into which none can enter but the King of Kings: The thoughts and inclinations of the Soul have a covering over them, which none can take off, but he that made the Soul. Satan may cast in Fire balls, or send in Messengers, and Letters, by the mediation of the Fantasy, but he cannot enter into the heart directly, nor compel it to sin. (3) Satan, by God's permission, can work curiously and efficaciously on the Organs of the Body, Spirits, Blood, and other Humours, as Melancholy, etc. which are united to the Soul, and have no small indirect influence thereon. (4) Though Satan cannot work immediately on the heart, yet he can work immediately on the corporeous sensitive Soul, particularly on the fantasy, by making impressions thereon, and forming such Ideas there, as may affect the mind. Satan may temte and persuade to Sin not only Morally, by false suggestions and Images offered; but also in some sense Physically, by impressing and fixing those Images on the fantasy, and coloring them over with the appearance of good. (5) Satan has a very great and intime access unto the spirits of men, not only as he is a Spirit, but also as he is an unclean Spirit, and his Kingdom a Kingdom of darkness. Hence he is said, Luke 22.3. Luke 22.3. to enter into Judas. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, notes an intime access into Judas, as into his proper house. He had been casting in darts into Judas' heart before, as John 13.2. The Devil having now put into the heart of Judas— to betray him. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Devil having now injected, or cast in this Tentation into his heart to betray his Lord. Now Judas having yielded to the suggestion, or injection of Satan, it's said Luke 22.3. Satan entered into him, i. e. as into a conquered fortress or castle; he now takes possession of him, as one devoted to his service. The Spirits of wicked men being very much like unto Satan, by reason of Sin and impurity, as also they being his Children devoted to his obedience, thence he comes to have a far greater access to and power over them, than he had at first by Creation. Satan being the Prince of darkness stirs up that darkness that is in the heart of man to oppose Divine Light, as he stirs up Lust to oppose the Will of God. It is difficult but not necessary to know all the Mysteries of Satan's Power, whereby he ensnares poor Souls, as Birds, 2 Tim. 2.26. (6) Satan has a very great Power over the Air, and all sensible parts of the Universe. He is said, Ephes. 2.2. & 6.12. Ephes. 2.2. to be the Prince of the Air, which is the Seat of his Empire. Whence Ephes. 6.12. those impure Spirits are termed, spiritual wickednesses in heavenly places: i e. in the inferior Heaven, or Regions of the Air. According to the sentiments of the Hebrews, all that vast space between Earth and the Astriferous Heaven, which we call the Air, is full of these impure Spirits. Thence Satan can, by reason of his great sagacity and skill in the mysteries of Nature, together with his Power as a Spirit do wonders, though not Miracles, in and by the Air: He can so apply Actives and Passives together, as that thence shall follow various and strange transmutations in nature; whereby he kept the Old Pagan World, as now the Indians, in great bondage. (7) Lastly he can temte extrinsecally, by visible Species and Representations, or without, as Mat. 4. 1-8. Albeit Satan be the Prince and God of this World, Satan's restraint as to the Elect. yet as to the Heirs of Salvation, he is cast out, and remains under chains of irresistible Providence and Restraint, John 12.31. 2 Pet. 2.4. as John 12.31. 2 Pet. 2.4. Satan and all his Host are in prison, under the bolts and chains of invincible obduration and eternal despair. It's true, he oft accuseth the Heirs of Salvation, and winnows them by his Tentations; but never prevails finally and totally, to bring them under his Empire and Jurisdiction. Luke 22.31, 32. Thus we are assured, Luk. 22.31, 32. Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sister you as wheat●: But I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies not merely, hath desired, but as an Accuser, hath demanded. For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 among the Grecians, notes to demand a Malefactor, for Inquisition or torment. Thus Satan demanded Job 1.11. So Revel. 12.10. he is said, to accuse them before God day and night. He accuseth them as Hypocrites, and demands power to temte and torment them. So it follows, Luke 22.31. that he may sift you as wheat. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not a Verb of frequent use, yet to be found in Classic Authors. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a cribe or sieve; so Hesych. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the chaff of the wheat. Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is expounded by Hesych. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to sift or winnow with a sieve, as you winnow the chaff from the corn. Satan's demand was, that he might winnow Peter and the rest of the Disciples as chaff, or Hypocrites: But Christ's prayer prevails, as v. 32. I have prayed forthee, as for all other believers. Hence all Satan's maliciose plots and undertakements against the Heirs of Salvation are so ordered by Divine Gubernation, that they all tend to his torment, but to their Salvation. But so much for Divine Efficience and Gubernation. CHAP. XI. Of Creatural Dependence, both Natural and Supernatural. Creatural Dependence in the general. Every Being Dependent or Independent. One prime Independent Being. Every Dependent Being by participation. The Origine of Dependence; (1) Passive Power: (2) The Dominion of God. Every Creature Dependent. The Dependence of a Creature not distinct from its Essence. Creatural Dependence in Subordination, posteriority, and Inferiorities Creatural Dependence (1) as to Futurition. (2) As to Essence and Conservation. (3) As to Operation. The human wills Dependence on God. Dependence Natural, or Moral and Supernatural: Supernatural Dependence for Habitual and Actual Grace. §. 1. Creatural Dependence. AS appendent to Divine Efficience we may add Creatural Dependence, which also appertains to Metaphysic and prime Philosophy. Paul being to discourse among the Philosophy Wits at Athens, and to demonstrate the Unity of God, and thence the simplicity of his worship, he bottoms his Argument on the Creatures Dependence on God, Act. 17.28. Act. 17.28. For in him we live, and move, and have our being. Dependence on God for Being, Life, and Motion is essential to every Creature as such: For all Creatures receiving whatever they have, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by participation from God, it thence necessarily follows, that they depend on him for al. Plato also gives us frequent and good notices of this creatural Dependence. So Leg. 4. pag. 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. God, having in himself the Principe, Middle, and End of allthings, goes strait on, expanding his force and power throughout the whole Universe, and all its parts. Wherein we have, (1) The Dependence of allthings on God, as their first Principe, Middle, and End. God is the first Principe, as he gives Being to allthings; the Middle, as he conserveses the Being conferred and moves it; the End, as he gives consummation and perfection to allthings. Thence that Platonic Effate, That allthings move from infinite, upon or by infinite, and to infinite: i. e. from God, as the Principe of their Being's; upon, or by God, as the Principe or Cause of their conservation and motion; to God, as their last end. (2) God's expansion and diffusion of his force and power throughout the Universe and all its parts, as it were an universal Soul or mundane Spirit, (which Plato oft inculcates) whereby the dependence of allthings on God is emphaticly illustrated. Whence he adds, pag. 716. That he who is puffed up by spiritual pride, or swollen with self-confidence, as though he were independent, and needed not Divine conduct, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is deserted by God and left destitute as to all Divine Efficace and Influence; and being deserted, disturbs al. A lively image of a self dependent Creature. We find the whole of this creatural Dependence well expressed, according to Plato's mind, by Proclus thus: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Allthings depend on the ONE, by MIND, and SOLDIER: i. e. to speak plainly, allthings depend on God, that supreme Unity, by Christ, the Eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Mind, and by the Spirit, that universal Soul, or mundane Spirit, as before, c. 8. §. 2. But to give a more full and convictive demonstration and explication of the Necessity and Nature of creatural Dependence, we shall resolve the whole into the following Propositions. 1. Every Being dependent or independent. Prop. Every Being is dependent or independent. That this distribution of Ens into independent and dependent is adequate and commensurate, is generally confessed by such as discourse of Metaphysics. And for the demonstration and explication hereof we are to consider, That a dependent Being, and that on which it depends do really differ in number. And the reasons are demonstrative: (1) Because nothing as such can be said to depend to itself. (2) The dependent is in order of Nature, at least, posterior and inferior to that on which it depends. (3) Dependence imports subordination to that on which the dependence is. Hence Divines say, that the Son of God, albeit he be, as to Origine, from the Father; yet in as much as he partakes of the same Essence with the Father, he cannot be said to be dependent on him: For he being in the form [or Essence] of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, Phil. 2.6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Phil. 2.6. here is generally rendered by all Rapine or Robbery; and we may take it properly; and so make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he did not unjustly assume or arrogate to himself this title and character of being equal with God. For that is accounted Rapine or Robbery in a proper sense, when any injuriosely assumes or takes to him, that which belongs to another: Thus the fallen Angels and Adam committed rapine or robbery against God, by endeavouring or affecting an equality with God. Thus also should a Creature affect or arrogate an independence, either in Essence or Operation, it may justly fall under the imputation of Robbery against God; because it thereby equaliseth itself too God. But our Lord Christ accounted it not robbery to be equal with God, i. e. independent as God is. For one person in the Trinity is not essentially divided from the other; but the Son is so generated by the Father, as that he is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, another essence or thing, albeit he be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, another person. The Son has the same numeric independent Essence with the Father, and the Spirit. So that although one person be really distinct from the other, yet this distinction being involved in one most simple Divine Essence, it implies a contradiction to say one person depends on the other, which was the great error of Origene, imbibed from Platonic Philosophy, as before Ch. 6. §. 4. & P. 3. B. 2. C. 1. §. 8, 9 §. 2. One prime independent Being. An independent Being is that which needs not any other Being essentially precedent to itself, as the cause of its Being and Operation. This Proposition may be demonstrated and explicated by its parts thus. (1) There is one prime independent Being. This is evident from the series of causes, in which we find, that allthings obey the superior Power, from which they derived their origine: whence it necessarily follows, that to prevent a progress into infinite, we stop in one prime, supreme, infinite Power, which received no this Being from any other, but is truly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Self-being and Self-sufficient, or Independent. Again, that there can be but one prime independent Being is manifest; because wherever there is Participation, Limitation, potentiality, and Contingence, there must needs be Dependence: But now all Being's, except the first Cause, admit Participation, Limitation, potentiality, and Contingence as to their Essence: and therefore none but the first Being can be independent. Hence it follows, (2) That the first independent Being admits not any precedent Being, as the cause of its Being. For whatever presupposeth the efficience of some precedent cause, supposeth also Participation, posteriority, and inferiority: which the prime independent Being excludeth. Whence also it follows, (3) That the prime independent Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Self-being, or from himself. When we say the prime independent Being is from himself, it must not be understood positively, as if he did effectively produce himself; for that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and impossible; but negatively, that he receives not his Being from any other. Hence we conclude, (4) That Independence is as essential to the first Being and Cause, as Dependence is to second Being's and Causes. As it is essential to the Creature to be defective, indigent, limited, receptive and dependent; so it is as essential to the Creator to be infinite, alsufficient, and without all deficience, indigence and dependence either actual, or possible. Hence, §. 3. Dependent Being by participation, etc. Whatever is dependent is Ens or Being by participation, finite, potential, contingent, and defectible. (1) Every dependent is Ens by participation. For whatever is not Being by Essence and independently, must necessarily be such by participation: where there is not self-Being, there must be a reception of Being from some other, which connotes participation. (2) Whatever is dependent is also finite and limited, both in Being, Virtue, and Operation. [1] Whatever is dependent is finite in Being; because its Being is by participation, and according to communication of the superior Cause. (2) Every dependent is also finite in virtue and efficace: For whatever is limited in its essence must necessarily also be limited in its virtue and efficace. Hence, [3] every dependent is also finite in its Operation: For the sphere of Activity cannot be larger than the sphere of Essence: if the principe be limited, the operation cannot but be limited. (3) Whatever is dependent is also potential. To explicate and demonstrate this Attribute of a dependent Being we must consider, [1] that nothing is pure Act, but the first most simple independent Being: no Creature is pure Actuality: where there is dependence, there is somewhat of potentiality or passive Power, either physic or metaphysic. All matter hath a physic passive power, or natural possibility of being corrupted: Spirits have not a physic passive power, or natural principe of corruption, yet they have a met a physic passive power of being annihilated, or cast back into their primitive nothing. [2] Besides the natural power, which a dependent Being has, there is an obediential power appendent to its nature. For the explication of which we are to know, that it is essential to a create Being to be subject and subordinate to the first, increate and independent Being so far, as to obey it in receiving all impressions, and acting under it whatsoever implies not a contradiction. Hence the Schools distribute the power of the second cause, or dependent Being's into natural and obediential: their natural power of receiving influences from the superior cause, or acting is that which is appendent to their natures, and whereby they naturally receive or act, and produce effects proportionate to their natures. But the obediential power of dependent Being is, that whereby they are, according to the Law of their natures, apt to obey the first independent Cause, namely God in the receiving or acting any possible effect, that implies not a contradiction; albeit it may exceed the natural capacity, force, or efficace of their Being's. So that this obediential power regards supernatural effects, which the second cause cannot reach by its own Virtue and Activity; but only as elevated by the efficacious Concourse of God. Thus the Humanity of Christ had an obediential power to the Hypostatic Union, unto which it was elevated by the supernatural efficacity of the Spirit of God. This obediential power which is essential to every dependent Being, is founded in the participation and limitation of a Creature, and its subordination to the absolute Dominion of God, of which more anon. Hence, (4) every dependent Being is contingent. For whatever has any passive or obediential power, is obnoxious to the sovereign pleasure and concourse of its first cause, to which it owes absolute obedience, even to annihilation. Hence, (5) every dependent Being is defectible. For as it is essential to the first independent Being to be indefectible; so also to all second dependent Being's to be defectible. The supreme God being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, self-being, and self-sufficient, a pure simple Act, without the least matter or passive power, it is impossible that he should ever fail in any thing: but every Creature being Ens, or Being by participation, and so composed of Something and Nothing, or of Act and Pfassive Power, it cannot be but that it should be Defectible, or apt to fail, which is the root of its Dependence, as it will appear by the next Proposition. §. 4. The Origine of Dependence. 1. Passive Power. The Root and origine of all Creatural Dependence is the creatures passive power, and Gods Absolute Dominion ever it. 1. One Root and Origine of all creatural Dependence is that passive power, which every Creature is invested with. For the explication whereof we are to consider, that all Creatures, being educed by God out of Nothing, still retain a tincture or mixture of their Primitive Nothing: so that no Creature can be said to be pure Being: for this is an attribute peculiar to the first Independent Being, whose name is, Exod. 3.14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who is, or according to Plato's phraseology, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Being. Every Creature has something of Nothing contempered with its Being; yea more of Nothing than of Being, which makes it obnoxious to Limitation, Contingence, Mutability, defectibility, and Dependence. Thus Damascene, Orthod. Fid. L. 2. C. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The increate being solely is interminate or unlimited in nature: for every Creature is terminated or limited by God who created it. Now all limits as to Nature and Essence speak a mixture of Nihilitie, Passive Power, and Dependence resulting therefrom; whence Damascene adds: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Deity only is impassable: namely because exempt from Nihilitie, Passive Power, and Dependence. This Nihilitie or nothingness of the Creature is the same with its Passive Power either Physic or Metaphysic; Natural or Obediential, whereby it is limited, and confined to such or such a degree of Entity, Existence, and Operation. For wherever there is any matter or passive power of any kind, there is ever coarctation, and confinement: Nothing is or can be Infinite but the first pure simple Act, who is void of all power and composition; and therefore of all finitude and limitation. But every Creature being compound of Something and Nothing, i.e. of Act and Power, it's thereby rendered finite and limited to such a degree of Essence and Activity: and according to the Degree of its Entity and Actuality such is the Degree of its Amplitude and Perfection. Angelic and human Spirits have of all Creatures lest of Nihilities or Nothing, and most of Entity and Actuality: and therefore they have least of passive power and confinement: But yet because they retain something of their Primitive Nothing, and Passive Obediential power, therefore they have something also of limitation and confinement. So for all other Creatures, which are by so much the less or more limited and confined in Essence and Operation, by how much the more or less they partake of matter or passive power. So that all Dependence ariseth from the Nihilitie, Passive Power, and limitation of the Creature. Hence, 2. Another main root of Dependence is the Dominion of God the first cause of allthings. For all Creatures having been educed, 2. The Dominion of God. by the Omnipotent Power of God, out of Nothing, and invested only with a finite limited Being, composed of Something and Nothing, or Act and Passive Power, hence it necessarily follows, that all are subject to the Absolute Dominion of their Creator, and impedible, according to his pleasure. Where ever there is passive Power, there is impedibilitie: There is nothing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, unimpedible but God, who is Pure Act, and Lord of all. God has an Absolute Dominion over his Creature, for all uses that imply not a contradiction: This plenary and absolute Dominion of God appertains to his Infinite Omnipotence and Supremacy, as the first Cause of allthings: For no Dominion is complete and perfect, unless it include a Power for all possible use. May we estime that a perfect Dominion, which has not an absolute dispose of all under its Dominion? And to this absolute Dominion of God must there not correspond an absolute subjection in the Creature? Are not these two correlates? And doth not this absolute subjection of the Creature to God, speak its absolute dependence on God? Is it possible that any Creature made by God should be exempted from his Absolute Dominion? And doth not Absolute Dependence on God necessarily follow hence? Neither doth this absolute Dependence on God regard only the Essence and Conservation of the Creature, but also all its operations: for otherwise the Creature were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, unimpedible, which is against the Law of its Creation and Dependence, as §. 11, 12. Thus every Create Being is under the Absolute Dominion of God, both as to its Essence, Existence, Activity and Operation: God can deprive it of each of these as he pleaseth, yea reduce it to its first Nothing. Hence Dependence on God as to each of these is essential to every Creature, as in what follows. §. 5. Every Creature as such is Dependent on its Creator or first Cause. Every Creature Dependent. For the Demonstration of this we shall lay down this Hypothesis, which I conceive all will grant, That it is impossible the same thing should be, and not be. This being premissed we proceed to demonstrate our Proposition thus. (1) Dependence both in Essence and Operation is so essential to a Creature, as that the negation of it supposeth the Creature not to be a Creature. The force and evidence of this Argument will more fully appear in the explication of the next Proposition, wherein we are to demonstrate the intime connexion between Dependence and the Essence of a Creature. At present it may suffice, that we assert, that Dependence is so intrinsically, essentially, and formally included in the very notion and essence of a Creature, that the negation of it implies a contradiction in the Adject, or an Opposite in an Apposite. For what doth the notion of a Creature import, but its eduction out of nothing, by the Infinite Power of its Creator? And he that educed allthings out of nothing, is it not in his power also to reduce allthings back to their primitive nothing? And doth not this speak an obediential power in allthings as to their Creator's Sovereign pleasure? And where there is an obediential power, is there not also subordination and subjection? And doth not all this formally speak Dependence? Thus Aquinas, contra Gent. L. 2. C. 25. demonstrates, That God cannot make a thing, which shall want any essential principe: for upon the remotion of any essential principe follows the remotion of the thing itself: So that if God should make a thing without any one essential principe, he should make a thing to be, and not to be. And in what follows he proves, that dependence is an essential principe, or mode of a Creature, as Suarez, and that not only as to Essence and its Conservation, but also as to operation, of which, §. 10. (2) The Creatures absolute subjection and subordination to God demonstrates its dependence on God. That God has an absolute Dominion over the Creature has been demonstrated in the precedent Proposition: and if the Dominion of God be Absolute, than the Creatures subjection to and dependence on God must also be absolute and necessary. It belongs to the Being of a Creature as such to be subject to and dependent on God for the receiving and acting whatever implies not a contradiction. As it is impossible, that God should make a Creature, whereof he has not a full and absolute Dominion; so it is as impossible, that a Creature should be made, which may not depend on him, as Suarez, Metaphys. Disput. 31. Sect. 14. p. 215. (3) The Indigences and Exigences of the Creature demonstrate its dependence on God. Is not every Creature Multiforme, Mutable and Defectible? And must not every Multiforme, Mutable and Defectible Being be reduced to some Uniform, Immutable, and Indefectible Being, as the Original principe of its dependence? is there not a natural levity and vanity in every Creature, which renders it fluxible, variable and inconstant? was it not a great and most true saying of Heraclitus, That allthings are in flux or motion? Do not allthings than need some first Being and Cause to fix their Being's and Motions? Again, doth not every potential Being need some pure Act, to actuate the same? And is not every Creature a potential Being, which needs God, the most simple pure Act, to actuate the same? Doth not every Recipient as Recipient need the active influx of that principe from women it receives all? And is not every Creature a mere passive recipient as to God, who is the first influential Cause of its existence, motion, and all? Yea, is not every Creature a mere passive Instrument in regard of the Divine Influx? Can it subsist or act without Divine concourse? Cut off the dependence of a Creature from its Creator, and what an endless Agitation, yea Annihilation would it fall into? See Aquinas, contra Gent. L. 3. C. 91. and Bradwardine, L. 2. C. 20. p. 541. (4) The Dependence of the Creature on God may be demonstrated from its Connaturalitie. What more connatural to the Creature than dependence on its Creator? Doth not the Stream naturally depend on its Fountain for derivations? and is it not a violence to it, to be cut off from this dependence? Where doth the infirm member go for animal Spirits in order to sense and motion but to the Head? And is it not most natural to the Ray to hang on the Sun, which gave it existence? O then, how natural is it to the Creature to depend on its Creator, the prime Cause of its existence and operation! What a violence is it to the Creature to be taken off from this dependence? Hence, §. 6. Creatural Dependence is not really distinct from the Essence of the Creature. Dependence the same with the Essence. That the Creatures Dependence is not really distinct from its Essence is evident; because every Creature being Ens by participation, it must necessarily follow, that dependence on the first cause, from whom it participates of Being, is most essential to it. As it is essential to the first cause to be Being by Essence, and so Independent; so it is also essential to the second cause to be Being by Participation, and so Dependent: So that the very notion and Idea of a Creature doth inseparably, essentially, and formally include Dependence on God, as that which is not really distinct therefrom. This is incomparably well demonstrated by Suarez, Metaphys. Tom. 2. Disput. 31. Sect. 14. p. 214. As to the root of this Dependence, it must be said, that it is really nothing else but the very essence of a create Being as such; because if we, by the force of our Intellect, remove whatever is superadded to such an essence, we shall find that of itself it has Limitation and Imperfection; so that of itself it is not sufficient to act or cause any thing: and therefore, according to the absolute power of God there cannot be such a create Being, which should not have such a subordination to the increate Being: Therefore it is a sign that is founded in the very essential Reason of a create Being. Wherefore albeit we may, by the precision of Reason, and some inadequate conception of mind apprehend Dependence in Essence in regard of some moment of reason before Dependence in causing,— yet this later really superadds nothing to the Essence of a Create Being. Wherein note well, that he makes not only dependence as to Essence and its Conservation, but also as to Causation and Operation the same with the Essence of the Creature. Which Hypothesis he demonstrates and establisheth against Durandus and his Sectators, who assert, the Creatures dependence on God, as to Essence and Conservation, but yet deny it as to causation and operation, specially as to the substrate matter of sin. It may not be denied, but that Suarez, in his first Tome of Metaphys. Disput. 20. Sect. 5. p. 530. saith, That this Dependence of the Creature on the Creator is not altogether the same with the Creature, but a mode distinct therefrom. Yet these thing he grants. (1) That this Dependence of the Creature on God is something really and intrinsically existing in the Creature. For all confess, that passive Creation is in the Creature: But now Dependence is nothing else but passive Emanation or Creation, if we speak of the first Creation, from God. (2) That this Dependence is a substantial or essential mode affecting the substance of the Creature, albeit it constitute not the same. (3) He limits this modal distinction to the dependence of the Creature in its first Emanation or Creation, but grants, that its dependence in operation is really the same with the Essence of the Creature. (4) Suppose we allow a modal distinction between the Creatures dependence and essence, yet who knows not, but that the most awakened Philosophers now generally grant, that Modes, specially such as are substantial and essential, do not really differ from the things modified. Thus Calovius, Metaphys. pag. 434. Dependence, saith he, is a mode of a create Being, agreeing to it by reason of its imperfection, which is not the very Essence of the Creature, nor yet a new Entity distinct from the Essence; but something affecting the create Essence. And he citys Suarez for this his Hypothesis. Hence, §. 7. Creatural Dependence, according to its formal Idea and notion, Dependence imports Subordination. imports a presupposition of influence, or subordination, posteriority, and inferiority. (1) Creatural dependence imports a presupposition of influence, or subordination to the first Cause. This is primarily and formally included in the very notion of Dependence, neither doth it add any real entity or mode distinct from the Creature; but explicates only the intrinsec condition and habitude of the Creature relating to the omnipotent causality and influence of God. This subordination to God as the first cause ariseth from the imperfection of the Creature, and the absolute Dominion of God. And as to its latitude and extent, it regards both natural and supernatural Influences and Being's. By supernatural Being's and Influences I mean such as being above the sphere of Nature, are not connatural to or producible by its force and power. These supernatural Being's have causalities proportionable to their Entities, in which they are subordinate to God and dependent on him, as natural Being's in their kind. And in this respect the Creatures subordination to, and dependence on God in the whole of its causality, is commun both to natural and supernatural Being's. Yea, supernatural Being's, by virtue of their subordination to God, may be elevated and raised to act and cause somewhat beyond that causality which is connatural to them. For even in this regard they are not less subordinate and subject to God, than natural Being's are in their kind, as Suarez well urgeth, Metaph. Tom. 2. Disput. 31. Sect. 14. pag. 215. Such is the subordination both as to Naturals and Supernaturals, which creatural Dependence on God as the first cause formally includes. Hence, (2) follows posteriority. 2. posteriority. Every dependent as such is posterior to that on which it depends: so the Creature as to God. Aquinas tells us, That all second causes act by virtue received from the first cause, as instruments act by the direction of Art; wherefore it is necessary that all other Agents, whereby God fulfils the order of his Gubernation, act by virtue from God; and thence that they are posterior to him And this I think, if well understood, might satisfy all those, who with so much vehemence oppose all kind of predetermination by Divine concourse, as to the human Wil: For if we grant, That God is the first cause of the Wills motion, I cannot see how we can deny him the predetermination of the Wil Though to avoid needless 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I generally abstain from the term predetermination; yet without that prejudice which some, I conceive, undeservedly load it with. For if the Concourse of God be previous to the causality of the Will, so as to determine the same to act, as we have demonstrated Ch. 7. §. 4. I as yet cannot, according to my shallow capacity, see any cogent reason, why the said previous concourse may not be termed predeterminant. But to return to our Argument, Creatural Dependence implies a posteriority, [1] as to Nature and causality. [2] As to Origination and Order. [3] As to Dignity. 3. inferiority. Whence (3) Creatural Dependence imports also inferiority: For every dependent as such as inferior to that it depends on. Thus Alvarez, de Auxil. Grat. Disput. 90. pag. 714. Dependence properly in causes efficient imports a certain subordination and inferiority of him who depends to him on whom he depends: therefore the Divine operation of the first cause doth not depend on the cooperation of the second cause; but on the contrary, the cooperation of the second cause depends on the operation of the first cause which is previous, as Ch. 7. §. 4. §. 8. Allthings create depend on God as to their Futurition. Creatural Dependence as to Futurition. For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we may consider, (1) That allthings future must have some cause of their Futurition. Nothing future is of its own nature, or by its own force future, but indifferent to Futurition or Non-futurition. If things were in their own nature and of themselves future, than they would be always future and never present: for that which agrees to any thing of its own nature, agrees to it inseparably. Hence it follows, that Futurition cannot agree to things of their own nature, but by some cause, which brings them from a state of indifference and possibility, to a state of Futurition. And assuredly that which has not a certain determinate cause of its Futurition, cannot be certainly and determinately future, but only possible. (2) That which gives futurition unto allthings is the Divine Will, and Decree. It's impossible, that any thing should pass from a state of pure possibility to a state of futurition, but by the will of God. Things are not foreseen and decreed by God, because future, as some would needs persuade us, but they are therefore future, because decreed by God. Thus Wiclef held, That the Determination of God gave the highest firmity in the futurition of his work, as Walden, Tom. 1. L. 1. C. 23. pag. 37. and Bradwardine asserted, That every Proposition of what is future is subjected to the Divine Will, and originated thereby: So that indeed not Create Being, either simple or complexe, can be future antecedently to the Divine Wil Whence it necessarily follows, (3) That allthings future depend on God for their futurition. Every thing may as well give Being to itself, as Futurition. Of this see more, Ch. 5. §. 2. Of God's Science. §. 9 All Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Conservation. (1) All Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Existence. Plato, in his Timaeus, p. 28. saith, Creatural Dependence as to Essence and Conservation. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That every thing produced, is necessarily produced by some Cause. For nothing can be the cause of itself: As novity of Essence is essential to the Creature, so also Dependence on God for that Essence. Yea, every mutation and state of the Creature, with all its various modifications are from God. Yea, Suarez, Metaphys. Tom. 2. Disp. 31. sect. 14. p. 216. tells us, That a create Being as such, considered precisely and abstractly, requires no other cause but the increate Being, in whom it hath a sufficient cause both Efficient, Exemplar, and Final. For albeit some create Being's require other efficient causes besides God, at least for their more connatural production, yet the reason of a create Being as such requires them not. And in what precedes he saith, that the dependence of an effect on any create second cause is not so essential, as its dependence on the increate first cause. (2) All Creatures depend on God for their Conservation. This has been sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes, C. 8. and it ma be further argued from the impossibility of a Creatures being conserved, but in a way of dependence on God's conservative influence: For if a Creature should be conserved by itself, or any other cause, without dependence on the first cause, God should not have an absolute Dominion over it, neither were it in his power to annihilate the same. §. 10. Every Creature depends on God as to Operation. This Hypothesis, though denied by Durandus, Creatural Dependence as to Operation. and some very few more, yet it is generally owned by Scholastic Theologues, and that on invict evident grounds. For (1) Operation is the Index of the Essence: what is dependent in Essence cannot be independent in Operation. (2) Let us consider the series of causes, and we shall find, that every Inferior is obedient and subordinate to its Superior in acting. (3) What is an Action but that special Dependence, which the effect has on its efficient cause? And is not God the prime efficient of allthings? (4) No Virtue or Efficace of any second Cause can actuate itself, but necessarily requires for its actuation the Divine Concourse, which gives all Virtue, as also the conservation and actuation of the said Virtue. The Virtue of the Inferior Agent always depends on the Virtue of the Superior, in as much as the Superior gives Virtue to the Inferior, as also the conservation and actuation of the same Virtue. (5) Whatever is limited in its Essence, is also limited in its Activity and Operation: and where there is limitation, there is subordination and dependence, as well in operation as in essence. (6) If every second cause depend not on its first for all its operations, than it is impossible, that the first cause should hinder such operations, for the exerting whereof the second cause depends not on him. Who can hinder that Action, which he cannot by any influence reach? And if this be granted, what will become of the Providence of God? Must we not, with Epicurus, allow God to be only a Spectator, no way a Rector or Gubernator of the most considerable part of Human Affairs and Acts? That no Creature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, unimpedible in operation, we have demonstrated in what precedes, §. 4. of this Chapter. (7) It implies a contradiction that the second cause should act, and yet not be actuated and influenced by the first cause. And here, whiles under the review of these Sentiments, I may not let pass, without some Animadversion, the Reflection of a Learned Author (in a new Piece about God's Prescience) on this Argument, namely, That it can never be proved, that it implies a contradiction, for God to make a Creature, which should be capable of acting without an immediate concourse; if I apprehend his meaning, as laid down, p. 35, 36, 37. But because that Learned Author gives us only his Supposition, without any Demonstration thereof, or solution of those Arguments which the Schools both of Thomists, and Scotistes, as also the Jesuits, Suarez and others have urged against the Hypothesis of Durandus, which he seems to espouse, I do not conceive myself obliged to superadd any Arguments for the re-enforcement of this Hypothesis, which as been already copiosely demonstrated, §. 5, 6, 7. also Chap. 7. §. 2, 4. and Chap. 9 I shall only add thus much, that I cannot, according to the utmost extension of my narrow apprehension, conceive any medium between the extremes of this disjunctive Proposition: Either the Human Will must depend on the Divine Independent Will of God for all its natural motions and operations; or God must depend on the Human Will in itself Independent, for all his Prescience, motives of Election, and all discrimination as to Grace, and gratiose operations. I am not ignorant of the general reply, That this Hypothesis I oppose only cuts off God's concourse as to sinful Acts. But I would willingly be satisfied in these Queries: (1) Whether there be any Action of Man on Earth so good, which hath not some mixture of Sin in it? And if God concur to the substrate matter of it as good, must be not also necessarily concur to the substrate matter of it as sinful? Is not the substrate matter of the Act both as good and sinful the same? (2) Again, as there is no Action in this imperfect state so good, but it has some sin mixed with it; so is there any Action so sinful, which has not some natural good as the substrate matter thereof, as we have largely proved, Chap. 9 §. 2? (3) last, if we cut off the material entity of sinful Acts from Dependence on God's immediate concourse, do we not indeed thereby cut off the most illustrious part of Divine Providence in governing this lower world? But of these sufficiently in what precedes, specially C. 7. § 9 Hence, §. 11. The Will of Man is necessarily subordinate to and dependent on the Will of God in all its Operations. The Dependence of the Human Will in all its Acts. The Will of Man cannot be the solitary cause of its own Act, so as to exclude the efficience of the prime cause, as C. 7. §. 4. It's true, the Will is a total cause in its own kind, yet not so as to exclude the total influx of God as the first cause. Yea, God is not only the total, but also the immediate cause of all voluntary Acts; which argues the Wills total and immediate Dependence on God in all its Acts, as C. 7. §. 4. Thus Aquinas: Seing every mutable and multiforme must be reduced to some immobile principe, as unto its cause; and the Intellect and Will of Man appear to be mutable and multiforme, it's necessary, that they be reduced to some superior, immobile, immutable, and uniform cause. Yea, he saith, that God is most intimely present to the Will, and as it were acting in it, whiles he moves it to act. And Scotus, in 2. Sent. Dist. 37. Q. 2. Queries, Whether the Create Will be so far a total and immediate cause of its own Act, as to exclude the immediate Efficience of God? And he proves the Negative, because, (1) If so, than it would necessarily follow, that God doth not certainly know the future evenements and acts of the Will: because his knowledge of things future depends on the determination of his own Will, as Chap. 5. §. 2. (2) If so, then God were not the best and most perfect Being; because he should not have Dominion over the Human Will, as chap. 5. §. 3. (3) Again, if the Human Will could produce its own Act without the immediate concourse of God, it could also intent the same even to the highest degree of merit without Divine assistence. (4) The Understanding cannot produce its act, without God's illumination, therefore neither can the Will its, without God's concourse. See this more fully in Bradwardine, L. 2. C. 20. p. 541. Also Philosoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. C. 3. S. 3. §. 4. Prop. 1. p. 524. and what precedes, in this Part 4. C. 7. & 9 §. 12. Lastly, Dependence Natural, Moral, and Supernatural. Creatural Dependence, as to its parts, is either Natural, or Moral and Supernatural. Natural Dependence is that whereby all Creatures as Creatures depend on God for Essence, conservation and operation. Moral and Supernatural Dependence is that whereby the Rational Creature depends on God as to Morals and Supernaturals. We find both these dependences conjoined in Man: for he having a double 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or habitude to God (1) as a Creature; and (2) as a Rational Creature: he hath also a double dependence on God, Supernatural Dependence on Christ. (1) Natural, of which in what precedes. (2) Moral and Supernatural. And as in Naturals Inferior Causes depending on their Superiors in acting, can do nothing without, much less contrary to the efficace and concourse of their Superiors, so also in Morals and Supernaturals. Supernatural Elevation is the total, next, and formal Reason of acting supernaturally: and by how much the nearer the receptive Soul is to God, its supernatural influencing cause, by so much the more it partakes of his influence: as in Nature by how much the nearer the thing moved is to the mover, by so much the more efficaciously doth it partake of its Impression. God doth most potently, and yet most sweetly influence the Affect, Act, and Effect of the virtuose Soul, Phil. 2.13. All effusions of virtuose Acts are proportionate to the Souls dependence on the efficacious infusions of God. Yea the natural Will, by virtue of its Supernatural Dependence, is elevated to act above Nature. This Supernatural Dependence of the New Creature on Christ, as Mediator and Spring of all Grace, is lively illustrated in Sacred Philosophy. Thus Psal. 87.7. As well the singers, Psal. 87.7. as players on instruments shall be there: All my springs are in thee. Glassius renders the words thus: And they shall sing as those that lead the Dances: All my springs are in thee. The Psalmist having given us, in the foregoing Verses, a Prophetic Description of the gloriose Reign of the Messiah on Mount Zion, or in Evangelic Churches, and the great number of Converts who should sing forth his praises there, he concludes with this as the burden of their Song: All my springs are in thee: i. e. All the Springs of my Divine Life are in thee, O great Mediator: Thou alone art the prime cause and object of my dependence. The New Creatures dependence on Christ for supernatural Grace, is Universal, Total, Absolute, and Immediate; and that both for Habitual and Actual Grace. For Habitual Grace. 1. Christians have an Universal and Absolute Dependence on Christ for Habitual Grace. So John 1.16. And of his fullness have we all received, Joh. 1.16. and Grace for Grace. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here signifies, either the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 upon; and then the sense is: Grace upon Grace, i. e. abundant Grace, and that freely: or it may note the Analogy which is between the Grace received from Christ, and Nature received from Adam; and then the meaning is this: Grace for Grace, i. e. as the Child receives from his Parent's Member for member; or as all the Sons of Adam receive from him Lust for lust; for there was no lust in his heart, but what was communicated to his Posterity; so the Children of Christ, the second Adam, receive from him Grace for Grace, i. e. all manner of habitual Graces, answerable to those in his Human Nature. This Supernatural Dependence on Christ for Habitual Grace is also well expressed by the Disciples, Luk. 17.5. Luk. 17.5. And the Apostles said unto the Lord, Increase our Faith: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Add Faith to us, i e. some additional degrees of Faith. The Apostles had been oft rebuked by their Lord for their Infidelity, and therefore now, having by their frequent relapses gained some sense of their own insufficience, they depend wholly on him for supplies: their own impotence engageth them to depend on his Omnipotence. Grace is a Celestial Plant fed by an invisible Root in Heaven, and by Juices derived from a Principe above itself. As the strength of Adam's Habitual Grace could not preserve him when he trusted thereto, and did not depend on his Creator; so the impotence of the New Creature cannot hurt it, so long as it depends on Christ. 2. The New Creature has an Universal, For Actual Grace. Psal. 141.8. Absolute, Total, and immediate Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace. Thus, Psal. 141.8. But mine eyes are unto thee, O God the Lord: in thee is my trust; leave not my soul destitute. Hebr. make not my soul naked, or emty. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to evacuate or make naked. So the Targum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. It notes his total dependence on god. We find the Churches absolute and immediate dependence on Christ for Actual Grace lively described, Cant. 8.5. Who is this that cometh up from the Wilderness, leaning upon her Beloved? Who is this? i. e. this Woman, or Church, that cometh up out of the Wilderness. This shows her abandoning her own forces and strength. Leaning, or Cleaving to. The Original word is not where else found in the Old Testament. The LXX. render it by a word that signifies, confirming herself: which denotes her dee sense of her own insufficience, with absolute and total Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace. Christian's ought to live immediately and totally on that Grace which is in Christ, and not on habitual Grace received from him. Members and Branches live on life, but the life of their Head and Root: So Christians ought to live not in the strength of their own Graces, but in the strength of that Grace which is in Christ, as Paul, Gal. 2.20. When men are more ready to act in the force of Grace received, than in dependence on Christ, they soon fall into sin. This Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace is well illustrated, Phil. 2.12, 13. Phil. 2.12. Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling. This fear and trembling doth not imply doubting, as the Papists would needs persuade us; but a modest, humble, self-abasing sense of our own insufficience, with an absolute dependence on God's all-sufficient Grace. Thence it follows, v. 13. For it's God that worketh in you to will and to do, of his good pleasure. This is a strong inducement to work the Soul to an holy self-despair and humble trembling Dependence on Divine Grace, because God works both to will and to do of his good pleasure. Heb. 12.1, 2. So Hebr. 12.1, 2. Let us run with patience the race set before us, looking to Jesus the author and finisher of our faith. This looking implies absolute constant dependence, as Esa. 45.22. Look unto me, and be ye saved, etc. This Evangelic Supernatural Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace is very comprehensive, taking in the whole of the life of faith as to Sanctification. (1) It includes dependence on Christ for Actual Grace in order to Divine Conduct in all our ways. So Cant. 1.4. Draw me, Cant. 1.4. we will run after thee. This drawing notes impotence in them that are drawn, but Omnipotence in Christ that draws. So Hos. 11.3, 4. I taught Ephraim also to go, etc. This Divine Conduct is also lively expressed, Psal. 119.133. Order my steps in thy Word. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 confirm, dispose, etc. (2) It includes dependence on Christ for Actual Grace, in order to the fortifying and corroborating the Spirit under all Infirmities, and against all Tentations. Psal. 61.2. Psal. 61.2. When mine heart is overwhelmed: lead me to the Rock that is higher than I This representes one tending to some place of safety, whose own forces fail him to bring him thither. Whence he adds, to the Rock that is higher than I: i. e. too high for me to mount up unto, by mine own strength., So Psal. 27.13. I had fainted, unless I had believed: Psal. 27.13, 14. i. e. being surrounded with so many difficulties, I had been quite overwhelmed, had I not depended on, and encouraged mine heart in my God. Thence he adds, v. 14. Wait on the Lord, be of good courage, and he shall strengthen thine heart. Be of good courage, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 confirm thine heart by dependence on God. LXX. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 play the man: and then it follows: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and he shall make thine heart strong. The like Psal. 73.26. Psal. 73.26. My flesh and mine heart faileth, but God is the strength of mine heart. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Rock of mine heart; or the firm Adhesion and Dependence of mine heart is on God. We find all this exemplified in Paul, 2 Cor. 12.9. 2 Cor. 12.9, 10. Most gladly therefore will I glory in mine infirmities, that the Power of Christ may rest upon me: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that the Power of Christ may tabernacle or dwell on me, and frequently manifest itself. And he gives the reason of it v. 10. For when I am weak then am I strong: i. e. Christ is never so strong in me, as when, being most weak in myself, I depend most on his strength. How oft are the strongest Christians foiled by the least Tentations, when they endeavour to overcome them in their own strength? And on the contrary, how oft do the weakest Christians overcome the greatest tentations, when they depend on Divine Grace? (3) It includes also dependence on Christ for Quickening Grace, in order to the performance of all Duties and Services. Psal. 119.25. Quicken thou me according to thy word. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 put life into me. The like v. 37, 40, 88, 107. Look as worms that are dead in the Winter, live again at Spring, when under a warm Sun; so the dead heart, when dependent on the warm beams of Actual Grace, as Mal. 4.2. Dependence on Actual Grace brings sweet Inspirations of Grace into the heart, whence flow Divine Respirations of the heart towards God. (4) It includes also Dependence on Christ for Actual Grace in order to Divine Fructification. Psal. 52.8. So Psal. 52.8. But I am like a green Olive-tree in the House of God. the Olive-tree being full of an unctuose juice, is always green and flourishing with fruits; so was David's heart, by Dependence on Divine Grace. So it follows: I trust in the Mercy of God for ever. To conclude this Subject, it is well observed by Suarez, That the Dependence of a Supernatural Being on God agrees with the Dependence of a Natural Being, the due proportion being observed: i. e. as Natural Dependence is Absolute, Immediate, and Total; so Supernatural. See more hereof in what precedes, Chap. 10. §. 1. also B. 1. C. 3. §. 3. FINIS.