THE GREAT CASE OF THE JUSTICES Stated and Determined, TOUCHING Their Duty of putting the Laws in Execution, whether Dissenters were Indulged, or Not. OR, A DISCOURSE concerning the OATH of the justice of Peace, explaining the Extent of its Obligation: Being a Case universally seasonable, in regard to Righteousness, Peace, and the Prosperity of this Nation. Published with Allowance.  
London, Printed by W. D. ●nd are to be Sold by Randal Taylor. 1688.   

ligation upon them, to the Execution of the Statutes of the Realm, having once Sworn thereunto, notwithstanding the King's Declaration for Indulgence, (being short of a Law); so that upon Supposition an Information was Legally brought, they could not forbear doing as they did formerly, without having an Ill Conscience: And if there were no Volubility in Humane Affairs, to Disturb the Dissenters in the Possession of their present Freedom, but that they might think themselves so Safe and Inviolable, as to be out of Fear, That what Hath been, May be again: Yet were it a thing insufferable, for a Dissertation upon this Subject, which is so Elaborate, (being Written with such Care, in weighing every thing it sets down, with so much feeling Tenderness, and pondered Moderation; with such an Acumen, yet Calmness of Style; and which hath been so well Advised, and Supervised by the most Judicious of any I know), to be Cast away, and become as Water spilt on the Ground, which cannot be gathered up. But if, on the contrary, there be many Justices of that Persuasion, and amongst a new set of Aldermen and Justices, there are some likely to be more Tender in a point of Conscience, than They; Then must this Discourse be absolutely Necessary at present, in regard to Such: And if the Fire that is penned up, does but Burn more vehemently, so that when the Indignation breaks out, it is likely to rage's more furiously for the Restraint: And if the Lives of Princes (especially when they are Benign and Good) are not certain to be longer, than other Mortals; Besides, a multitude of other Accidents of Life, that go to the turning about that Wheel, which makes those Persons and Things, that are at the Top now, to be like to be at the Bottom again, at another Season; Then doth it seem Convenient also for Others, that we imitate the Provident Housholder, who sets down a Profitable Receipt in his Book, for an Occasion hereafter; though, at present, never a one of his Family hath need of it.  
This Case (Reader) is a Case of very great Moment, and Difficulty; and the Determination Singular, (for so would it have) been judged undoubtedly, if it bade come out at another Time): But the Author has so managed it, laying his Foundation so sure, as he goes; and then raising his Structure so evenly upon it, that what is Difficult, he hath made appear Easie; and that which is Peculiar, he hath made appear as Common; so that every Body will be ready to say, He would have determined the Point just so himself; when there is a great deal more Study, Learning, and Judgement goes into the Matter, than comes to Another's share to be Master of.  
I will note a few things. There is one short Paragraph in the Book, (let the Reader find it himself) which states that Ticklish Point of the King's Power about the Laws. He has written so Castigately on it, distinguishing the Negative and Positive Power, and offering his Notion in regard to the Public Good, (the Supreme Law), that, I think, so compendious and clear a Determination is not any where else to be found. I will by way of Confirmation thereof, add this Story. Not long before the Death of the Late King, the Justices were sending Mr. Richard Baxter to Prison; but He, out of his kind Nature, (being told, That it would kill the good Man) sent word immediately he should be forborn. Should the King have Controlled the Law to his Hurt, it had been Tyranny; but when it was done only for his Good, with out hurt to any, who is there will not justify the King's assuming Power over Law and Justices both, in that matter? To Usurp Authority over the Law, only for the sake of a Man's self, as to take our Money without a Parliament, were the greatest Latrociny, and which our King does abhor (who hath declared for his Subject's Property, as well as Liberty): But for a King to declare his Pleasure, that He will have all his Subjects be Happy, and Enjoy their Consciences, so long as the Public receives no Detriment by it; and to that end, will forbear to Execute such and such a Particular Law or Laws, which appears to him prejudicial thereunto; I must say, after this Grave Author, That this being a thing altogether for the Welfare of his People, and not for his Personal Benefit, He must be said to Govern still According to Law, seeing He does Act by the Supreme Law, to which all Others are Subordinate, according to the Profound Determination of that Paragraph.  
Another thing I will note, in regard to the Candour of this Gentleman, who no doubt, does Write in Favour of the Dissenters, & could not be pleased with any Cause or Party, who were for Persecution; Yet does he, very purposely, Vindicate the Church of England, her Liturgy, and the Law, from the abuse of such Justices and cursed Informers, who (as they dealt with many People) did make them worse than Mahumatism; while they pressed Them only to militate against the Sober Exercise of the the unquestionable duties of Christianity. This Author will not have That which is barely the Fault of the One, to be Imputed to the Other.  
Reader, I have no room to proceed to any further Note; but commit this Piece to Thy Hands, as a Jewel in my Opinion.   

THE Justice's CASE.  
THERE was a Book (I cannot tell just how many Years ago, but it was at a time, I remember, when the fanatics were not troubled) which, together with some other Books, was put out de industria, toward the raising a Storm upon such People: the Contents whereof came to this, That the Oaths of the late Times, the Covenant, the Negative Oath, the Engagement, were unlawful, and not to be kept; but the Oath which the Justices of Peace take, is unquestionable, and must oblige: And if they do not therefore Execute the Law to their utmost upon the Dissenter, they are Perjured Persons; and must every Man of them, for aught I could see by that Book, be inevitably Damned.  
I am very apprehensive, That His Majesty's Justices of Peace, throughout the Realm, are little beholding to any Men for such Discourses. If they were to be supposed of that profligate Conscience, that they thought they might Swear any thing, and not be obliged to Perform what they Swear, than might such a Book be Serviceable (though not so much, I hope, as barely Reading over the Third Commandment): But if there be any thing of Judgement or Discernment required in an undertaking of that Nature, to yield the Reader the expected Fruit of establishing his Conscience, if he be a Justice of the Peace, (whether Lord, Knight, Mayor, Alderman, or Gentleman) I must not wish any Body to seek it from that Book: Of which, as the Bookseller than did not name the Author, I will not now rake up the Title. Only the Distress of many Serious, Conscientious, Pious Gentlemen, that are (or at least have been, or may be) called to this Office, in regard to the Taking and Keeping that Oath, which is then put upon them (in which Case, the tender Constable also may be included, in regard to His) does require a more Candid determination.  
In all Oaths that are Promisory (we are to know) there are some Conditions to be supposed, or understood, as the Ground of the Lawfulness of such Oaths, which else could be nothing but Snares to any good Men that took them. I do not think it easy presently, nor needful, to reckon up all such Conditions: But as for the Execution of the Laws of the Land, unto which the Justices Swear, there is this One most certain, viz. That these Laws still be Executed in Subordination to the Supreme Authority. There are several things might be Instanced, which a Justice is to do according to Law; when, upon Command from Above, he is to Surcease: His Authority is Subordinate to the King; and the Laws to Almighty God. God now is the Supreme Authority in the World; and consequently, there is no Man takes such an Oath to see the Laws Executed, but it must be understood with Subordination to the Authority of Heaven, as that of the King. If therefore there be any thing in the Laws of the Land, that will not stand with our Duty to God, according to the Law of Nature, or his Revealed Word, the Justice is to be supposed that he Swore not to Execute That; but this Salvo is to be understood in his Oath, Saving the Rights of God Almighty, no less than those of the Crown.  
The Ground of this does lie a little more deep, than every one at first sight does see: which is, That every thing that is such, is not indeed Law. That which the Justice Swears to Execute, is the Law: But if this or that particular thing enjoined by Man, be disagreeable to the dictates of Nature, or the Scripture, which both are God's Will, such a thing cannot be made Law, is no Law; and he is to look to himself, as not Sworn to perform it.  
I suppose the Justice will readily give his Ear to this, and it is thus confirmed. Power is a Right to Command. This Right is the Grant of the Superior Authority. God is Supreme of All. He does not grant that a Man, or any Men should Command what he Forbids. Whatsoever then is disagreeable to his Will, cannot be Commanded, that is, cannot be Law; and the Justice Swears only to Execute Law.  
I remember, a great while ago, I applied myself to a Justice, to deliver a Quaker out of Goal; I found him willing hearty, but he believed he might not, for fear of his Oath. I went away, not daring, if he thought so, to press him any more to it, but I thought upon it. I considered it was a hard thing that Men by the Law should be Imprisoned, and kept Year after Year, only for their Persuasion. I considered again, that Goodness which makes Men like God, the Rule of Righteousness [Quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri, ne fieris], the Law of Love, and the Duties especially of Mercy, Kindness, Gentleness, (which Christ requires of his Followers) did prompt to acts that are Contrary. I resolved then, if the Law required one thing, and Christianity or the Law of Nature another, the Law of God must take place; and no Oath consequently could bind against God's Commandment.  
is to be Exercised: And the Issue perhaps will come to this, That according as he believes, the sparing or not sparing such made Faults (that is, Faults of Man's making by Law, upon such extrinsical accounts, and not God's) to be conducive to those ends (if they be good) he is to be guided in his actings.  
Saul binds the People with a Curse, That they shall not Eat till the Evening: Jonathan, knowing nothing of this, Eats; and upon Lot and Discovery is Commanded to be Slain. The People, for all this Oath, will not Execute that Law or Command, but save Jonathan. Now look, what would justify the People in refusing Obedience to that Oath, will acquit the Justice; who upon the same account (for all his Oath) does not Execute some Law of the Realm. The People thought it a rash Determination, an unreasonable Sentence, and a Sinful Command against the Sixth Commandment, that the Innocent should be Punished. It had been Murder, if they had pursued the Oath. And upon that account, we are to judge Saul reproved of his unadvised Curse, and he bound to Repent, but no body to Execute what he had Sworn: And yet all of them, nevertheless, bearing still the same Faith and Allegiance to the Anointed of the Lord.  
If you desire more than this, I will distinguish in the next place between the Law and the Reason of it; the Letter of the Law, and the Purpose of it, according to which it receives its Construction. If a Justice of Peace does act according to the Intent and Reason of the Law, I do apprehend he does perform his Oath better than if he rigorously stood upon the Letter. Nay, he may contract Gild upon himself in the One, when he shall not in the Other. The Laws now against the Dissenter, I apprehend to stand in general upon this Reason, They would have them come to Church, and secure the Peace of the Nation. If a Justice then apprehend, that the using of Rigour will but drive more from the Church, and enkindle disturbance; I ask, Whether he be most obliged for the observation of his Oath, to Forbearance or Prosecution? Severity, it is true, hath been found a little of late (as it so happened) to have done something: But at another time, with other Persons, where the Conscience is Steeled, it hath done, and it can do just nothing, unless where it is Over-Cruel; and that makes Desolation, and at long running, doth but widen the breach. Solitudinem faciunt, & pacem vocant.  
Again, Though the Law pass in Parliament, the Executive part is committed to the King. I will suppose now a Prince to be of the Mind, that Tenderness is like to be more conducive to the Good these Laws design, than Violence, or to be in his Judgement against Persecution: I ask then, Whether the Justice, who acts under the King, might not satisfy his Conscience in this, That he shall, according as he Judges, by Indulgence rather than by Rigour, best comply with the Will of the Supreme Governor? I remember well, in the time of the late King, That I myself once heard Him, with my own Ears, declare at Council-Board, and that Solemnly, (for he risen up, saying so), That He was against the Persecuting any for their Consciences. This I take to have been his Native Judgement; and whatsoever his Adventitious Practice might be, upon the Scene-altering, there are none but must confess both alike favourable, at the time of his Declaration to his Loving Subjects; which is not so many Years past, as to be out of our Remembrance.  
rightly, according to a Man's Conscience, not erring intolerably, is) instead of Vice and Ill-doing: I do ask, How can the Justice be bound by his Office to do that which does prevent the Institution itself?  
But let us suppose a Justice of Peace, who is of the mind that the Dissenters are ill Men, and their Conventicles not to be endured: I pray let me see this Justice as Zealous also against Profaneness, Swearing, Drunkenness, and Debauchery of all sorts, which are Offences against the Law, and alike Punishable by him: or else, if the Man be so Hot for Restraining Meetings, but Cold for Repressing Vice, I can hardly think, that what he does is done merely out of Conscience of his Oath.  
There is a Law, That a Nonconformist may not abide within Five Miles of a Corporate Town: What now if his business brings him thither, and he cannot possibly live else? Is this a piece of Evil-doing, unto which the Ruler should be a Terror? Suppose an Informer should come to a Justice of Peace, and Swear against a Brewer for Brewing with Hops: There is a Law made against That, as I have taken it up, (though it may not be in the ordinary Book of Statutes, which pretends only to Collect those which are fit for use), and the Justice Swears, He will do his Office after the Statutes of the Realm: I will ask now, Upon what account can any equal Justice dismiss such a Brewer, and not Punish him upon that Complaint; but he may, upon the same, dismiss a Nonconformist, who is accused of being in a Corporation, notwithstanding his Oath? If a thing be not Evil, it is against Righteousness to Punish it. No Law but must give place to Righteousness, no Oath can bind against it.  
I would put it here to the question, Whether the not coming within Five Miles of a Corporation, as the Brewing without the Ingredients of Beer, be matters of that Nature as aught to be brought within the Sanction of a Law, any more than that a Man shall not make Water against a Wall? Quod non habet rationem publici commodi, non potest proecipi lege humana. I would make it a Moot Case at the Inns of Court, as well as a Problem in the Schools. What is unreasonable, methinks, should be against Nature, and cannot be commanded for a Law, seeing Laws are grounded upon Reason. I will not be so bold as to aver, That the Execution of such an Act does Clash with Magna Charta, Nullus liber homo capiatur, imprisonetur, aut disseisietur de tenemento, vel libertatibus utlegetur, exulatur, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nisi per legem Terrae: But if it does but clash with that which ought to be the end of every Commandment, (The end of the Commandment is Charity), it will be more certainly enough to take off the obligation from the Conscience. See Dr. Taylor. Duc. Dub. l. 3. c. 1. r. 3.  
But I must advance a step farther: I do not apprehend only, That when the Execution of a Law will not consist with the Law of Nature, or God's Word, that is, with Religion, and Moral Good, but when it will not stand with that Political Good which the Law intends, the Magistrate is not in that case to observe it. For, when the King and his Justices are bound to see the Execution of the Laws, they are not to be looked on as Blind, Brutish Executioners of them; but that they must judge of them on necessity, so far as concerns their own acting about them. The King must judge whether the matter be good for his passing the Law. The King and Justices must judge, whether it be still good, as to the Execution. Nay, every single Man must Judge of the Laws made, so far as concerns his own Obeying them; seeing, If he be bound to do nothing that is ill, he must likewise be bound before he does any thing, to satisfy himself whether he does ill or no; as is very honestly said, though in an adverse Book, Entitled, Toleration Discussed; which came out about the same time with the Book at first intimated, but not named.  
By the way, We must upon necessity observe here, the Case being brought on to this state; That the King, as well as the Justice, is concerned in it. There is therefore the Positive and Negative Power of the King, and there are matters Civil and Ecclesiastical. It is true, That the Government of England, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Government Regulated by Laws, and that the King can Positively do nothing but according to Law: But there is this other thing to be known and considered also, That the great Law, the Supreme Law in all Polities, is the Common Good. And in the use of that Power which is Negative, or in Suspending his own Act (which the not permitting a Process in his Name, or the granting a Nolle prosequi (I think) is no other) in the Execution of his Government (at least in matters Ecclesiastical, wherein he hath all that Authority given him by the Statute, as the Pope ever had) a Prince is never to be said, Not to Govern according to Law, when he does only give Pre-eminence to That which is the Greatest, the Weal of the Community. Salus Populi Suprema Lex esto.  
And thus much being said in reference to the King, Let any one that please, reason what will follow, in regard to the Justice, who is but an Officer (I suppose) under Him, to act in his stead, and in his Name. If the Magistrate then (to go on), whether Supreme or Subordinate, does judge that such or such a Law be good, and good to be executed, that is, That the Execution of it will tend to the Public Good, which is intended in it (as in all Laws it must be), and that it is not inconsistent with Religion or Morality (in which case the Superior Law does vacate this), then is he to look to himself, and what he hath Sworn; knowing that God will not hold him Guiltless, that beareth the Sword, and much less him that taketh his Name also in vain. But if he judge sincerely in his Conscience, That the Execution will not be for the Good, but rather Hurt to the Government, and the People, (though otherwise the thing be not unlawful), I do apprehend the Execution of his Office, in this case, does lie in the Non-Execution of that Law (if the Higher Powers be contented), and he shall do his Duty, by leaving such work undone. I have heard that some Judges, in their Charge to the Jury, have given Directions to Prosecute the Dissenter, upon One Statute of the Queen, and not upon some Other; which, in effect, is a suspending that Law at present, and justifies this Plea.  
In the Oath which the Justice takes, for the Executing his Office, the words run thus; You shall do equal Right to Rich and Poor, after your Cunning, Wit, and Power. By which Word [Cunning] continued from Ancient Use, I understand not so much according to the best of a Man's Skill and Knowledge of the Law; which is comprised rather in the Word [Wit]; But according to the best of his Discretion, Wisdom, and Prudence; which includes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i.e. Candour, Moderation, in Cases that require it: That is, You shall well and truly do trary to the Law of Nature and Reason, lose their force, and are no Laws at all; Finch's Law, p. 75. The Law of Nature and Reason is unchangeable and perpetual, and no Statute can prevail against it; Doctor and Student, p. 4. Constat profecto ad salutem civium vitamque omnium beatam conditas esse leges (says Cicero): Ex quo intelligi par est eos qui perniciosa populis jussa descripserint, quodvis potius tulisse quam leges; in his two excellent Books, De Legibus, which have, indeed, given the first Light to all things, almost, which our Divines and Lawyers have said well on this Subject. I will add St. Augustine, and turn to no more: Mihi lex esse non videtur quae justa non fuerit; De Lib. Arb. l. 1. c. 5.  
After these Testimonies, it is yet needful I explain the thing a little more, for which I bring them. When I say, therefore, That a Command or Law made against Charity, Righteousness, the Public Good, is No Law; I understand not, but that any Bill which passes the Houses, and the King, is a Law, or Statute of the Realm; that is, a Law in Foro Humano, in Man's Court, or at the Bar in Westminster; and if any Justice will Execute it, the Outward Publicum: And consequently, if a Law prove otherwise, or is against the Common Good; it must be supposed, also, That such a Law is devoid of their intention, or is not according to their Will; and so does not bind the Conscience, even upon a double ground; both because it is destitute of the Authority it should have from God, and its Authority from the Will of Man also, upon the account already given.  
If any Man now rise up again, with a But who shall be Judge? he may return to his Seat, unless he choose to be a Bruit; seeing every man (according to the Religion of Protestnnts) must be allowed a Judgement of Private Discretion to be his Guide, in all which himself acts: And if, when a thing is commanded him, he must judge, whether it be agreeable to God's Word (which is so much harder), how much rather, whether it be aggreeable to Right Reason (which is the Law of Nature) and the Common Good?  
There were two Laws made in the latter Long-Parliament, One about Burying in Woollen, and the Other about Wagons; Neither of which were at first regarded: But the Woollen Act being found good for the Public, was renewed, and is observed; but the Other not being so, is neglected; that is, as to the number of Horses, very frequently; but as to the breadth of the Wheels, altogether. I ask now, Whether the Waggoner, that makes no Conscience how many Horses he puts in his Wagon, no more than of the dimension of his Wheels, and breaks this Law, does sin in it? If he does, seeing he does it every day, and continues without amendment, how can he be Saved? If it be no Sin, because the Common Good supersedes the Law; I ask, Who then is Judge, whether this Law be for the Public Good, or not? It is plain, the Man himself finds the Inconvenience of it, and he judges what is good for his Wagon, and can do it better than they that Passed the Act; and so order his matters accordingly. Suppose then, an Informer comes to the Justice, and Swears against him; the Justice may Punish him if he will; but he, judging it no ways conducive to the Public Advantage, as well as the Waggoner (at least, not so much as can countervail the private damage of the Poor Man), lets him go. Here the Justice of Peace does judge of the Law, in regard to his Execution of it; and the Waggoner put Fear into the Heart of Man, to be the Instrument by which his Vicegerents Govern the World.  
And now, having stated the Case I took in hand, as near as I can to my Mind, I will suppose, the most of such Gentlemen, who are in Commission for the Peace (if they may choose), would be willing to live quiet with their Neighbours; and if they may enjoy Their own Consciences, be loath to vex others about Theirs; but yet, That there are some of another Make, who either out of Hatred to the Conventiclers, or Zeal for the Church, or Sense of their Office, or Instigation of Others, or put upon it by some Informer, are still for the Executing the Law against the Dissenting Meeter: I must therefore, take upon me to argue a little with the Justice of this sort, and ask him two Questions; What a Conventicle is? and, In what Manner he will proceed?  
For the former, The Act against Conventicles declares against all Assembling under Colour or Pretence of any Exercise of Religion, in other manner than according to the Liturgy and Practice of the Church of England: And the Oxford Act describeth such Meetings as, under Colour of any Exercise of Religion, are contrary to the Laws and Statutes of the Kingdom. It is not all Meetings then of above Four, that are not of the same Family, to perform a Religious Exercise, are Conventicles; but such as can be proved to be in other manner than according to the Liturgy and Practice of the Church; or, are contrary to the Laws of the Kingdom. The Church and Law now of England, does own the Word of God, and God's Word commandeth Religious Exercises at home and abroad, as well as Church-Worship. Christ Prayed and Preached on Mountains, in Houses in Ships; and so did his Disciples. Cornelius called together his Kinsfolks and Friends to hear Peter. The Apostle commands, To Exhort one another daily, and to consider one another to provoke to good Works. The Thirteenth Canon requires all Persons to Celebrate the Lords Day, not only by Public, but Private Prayer, Confessing their Sins, Reconciling themselves Charitably to their Neighbours, and using all Godly Conversation. Queen Elizabeth's Injunctions, 1559. allows a Minister at all times, when necessity requires, to comfort his Flock with the lively Word of God, which is the stay of Man's Conscience. Moreover, The Church hath appointed the Psalms in Metre, for Private Houses, Forms of Prayer, bound up with the Bible, the Practice of Piety, Nowel's Catechism, Jewel's Works, to be kept in every Parish, where more than Four may Read them. If more than Four or Forty meet to Feast together, the Church and Liturgy forbids them not to give Thanks for their Meat, no, nor to Pray, or read the Scripture, or a Licenced Book, or Sing a Psalm, if they will, at the end of their Supper. If any one than shall go to turn the Law and Church against God, by threatening Godly Persons for doing these things, and would seduce the Justice to Prosecute them for it, with Mulcts and Imprisonment, let the Accusation be heard. Is it for the mere number of such that meet, that they must be made Criminal, or for the Faultiness of the Thing that they meet about? It cannot be for the mere number, because there are more allowed to meet at a Playhouse, a Sessions-House, an Exchange, at an Horse-Race, a Cock-Match, a Bull-Baiting, a a Bearbaiting, an Hunting, an Execution, in the Street, in a Ship. It must be the unlawful Exercise, then, must make it a Crime, or nothing; for to lawful Exercises no Limits are set. And what, I pray, then is that? If it be only reading God's Word to more than Four, besides the Family; that is not unlawful; nor a Licenced Book, no, nor Repeating a Sermon; for, where does the Law or Liturgy forbidden either of them? If Men Meet to call themselves adistinct Church, and to form Rules of Discipline, and Impeach the Government or Liturgy; This indeed, the Canon forbids, and makes it the Character of a Conventicle, and so expounds the Name. Tutor's may Catechise more at once than Four; and more than Four may join in Prayer: If a Godfather have Four and Four God-childrens, may he not, after they are Sixteen Years of Age, Exhort them together to perform their Vow, which he made in their Name at Baptism? May not more than Four together give God Thanks at a Table? More than Four Travel together, or Visit; and are they forbidden Religious Conference, to Edify one another? Should the Church or Law forbidden this, what were the Church but an Anti-Church, and the Law the Devil's Militia, to Fight against Piety, and men's Salvation?  
Well then, The Church and Law not forbidding, but allowing these things, I come, in the next place, to inquire how the Justice will proceed; for I will conceive him to be a Man of Temper, who acts with Prudence and Righteousness, with Care and Conscience in what he does.  
If any Witness will Swear only in general, That above Four met for Religious Exercises, in other manner than the Church and Law alloweth; either they must Swear also what that unlawful Exercise was, or they do not. If not, the Liberties of English-Men are brought to a sine pass, when two Persons, that list, may take them away, and undo Folks at their Will. Is it thus, besides, in all the Courts of Justice? Do they Hang Men as Felons, when any will but Swear that they are Felons, and never tell what they Stole, nor from whom? Will the Lords Condemn a Peer for Treason, if two will Swear that he spoke Treason, and never tell what Words he spoke? Will the Church excommunicate a Man, if two will Swear that he is a Murderer, but cannot tell of any body he Murdered? Turks and Heathens abhor such do, as we abhor Toads and Snakes. If they Swear what the unlawful Exercise was, it is supposed they are but Witnesses and Accusers, and not the Judges. If every Woman or Beggar, that can but Swear, does become a Judge, whether the Religious Acts of Lords, Knights, Minister and People, be according to the Law and Church, or not, when they know not what the Law and Church is; it were far better be among Serpents and Tigers, than for People to have their Estates and Lives at the Will of such Persons: for, who dare then displease any Beggar, Rogue, or Servant? It is not the Accuser, therefore, but the Justice is Judge; and he must Examine the Witness, (seeing else he must become but a Register or Executioner), and that must be of two things; What the unlawful Exercise was? (as is already Suggested) and how the Witness knoweth it?  
He must examine first, What the unlawful Exercise was? If they say now, There was a Meeting, and plead Notoriety of Fact: So is there at a Play, at a Market, in a Ship, and other such greater Meetings, as are beforenamed. If they say, There was Notoriety of a Religious Meeting: So is there in all Church-Meetings, in Meetings only for House-Prayer, Holy Conference, Grace at Table, and the like, not forbidden; which are also before touched. At Doctors-Commons they do meet about Admonishing, Excommunicating, Absolving, and these are certainly Religious Exercises, of Grand Importance; and yet performed without reading Common-Prayer. Either the Crime that Men are Accused for, is Omission of something required; or Commission of somewhat forbidden. The Omission of the Liturgy cannot here be Criminal, because the reading That, is required in Church Worship; but it is not imposed on Private Persons, and Places, Families, Converse, or Occasional Meetings: And there is no Crime of Commission, because neither the bare number of Men, nor any of these Exercises beforenamed, (and supposed only here used), are forbidden. If they say, That the Law forbids not above Four to be at a Play, a Tavern, a Feast; but it forbids all above Four, of another House, to be at any Religious Meeting, it is a Slander; for the Law never forbidden more than Four to be at Any Religious Exercise, but Forbidden Exercises, which differ from the Church Liturgy and Practice; which none of the  Exercises do.  
The other thing the Witness must be Examined upon, is, How they know the Accusation to be true? And if it be Omission of the Liturgy, that they Swear, they must Swear they were present from first to last, else they cannot Swear, that it was not Read; and Men must not be Judged and Ruined upon Presumptions and Opinions of others, without Proof: If part of the Liturgy is said to be omitted, (even in Church) they must Swear which Part. But if they be Crimes of Commission that are Sworn, the Words and Deeds must be recited, with all that is Integral to the Sense, before any Judgement can be given. It is against all Humanity, Law, or Reason, that any Man should be refused to speak for himself, and see his Accusers Face to Face, and know what they are, and have leave to put Interrogatories to them. If you reply, That Leave to know the Accusers and Witness, will hazard and discourage them, and Leave to plead for ones Self, it may frustrate all, both Judgement and Execution. I answer, If indeed you stick there, you are not the Man I took you for, that is, no fair Man; and if that be the Rule you would go by, I will tell you, there is a nearer way than yours yet: Never stand troubling us, or yourself with Laws, Courts, Judge, or Witnesses; but take all men's Goods and Money that you have a mind to, or Imprison or Hang up any Man that you will, without giving any Reason or account for it. It will be considerable Clemency to a Man to let him Die as Innocent, and escape the Infamy of Accusation. Jesus Christ and his Apostles had not so much Justice.  
These are things that the Justice, who is of the Prosecuting Persuasion, is to think upon; and if he be a London Justice, there is one thing more to be put to him. There are at least a Hundred, or two Hundred Thousand Souls in the great Parishes, in and about London, more than can hear in the Churches: I ask him now, Would you have all, or half these Persons to live as Atheists, and Worship God in no manner at all, in any Congregation, or would you not? If you would not, Why do you Prosecute them for going to Private Meetings, when they cannot come to the Public, in their own Church, which will not hold them? If you would, I desire, Sir, than very fairly to have done with you; for it were better to have to do with a Mahometan, than with a Christian of such a Mind.  
After this, I must return to the state of our Case, to touch it again in the main Point. If any Law of Man be inconsistent with God's Will, either manifestly by the Light of Nature, or Scripture, such a Law should not have passed by the Lawgiver, and is not to be Executed by the Inferior Magistrate, or observed by the People: But if the Matter of a Law be such, as is of an indifferent Nature, and, all Circumstances considered, it does appear doubtful and difficult to us, what we are to do: There is some Rule to be laid down, on necessity, to walk by, or we are at a loss. Now, as God hath given us a Rule in Matters of Religion, which is the Scripture, by which we are to judge and try what is to be Believed and Practised therein; and every Man's own Private Judgement or Conscience must be the Discerner of it: And as in Moral things He hath given us the Dictates of Reason for our Rule: So in Matters that are Political, hath He given us our Rule or Test also which is the Public Utility, (for the Apostle, speaking of the Higher Powers, that give Laws, or Supreme Ruler, does tell us, That he is the Minister of God for our Good, as I have noted); and Man being a Creature endued with Discernment, by his Rational Faculties, he is to attend, and compare such things with that Rule; And as they agree, or not agree thereunto, he is to Pass to Execute, to Obey a Law, or Not to do it, accordingly. This is a Truth, I am persuaded, or Light, that I have struck out of the Collision of many Thoughts; and do propose it therefore, as Tasted, Clear, Fixed, and Established, to Others. When a thing now (to proceed upon it) is really against the Common Good, or a Man so judges (his Judgement not being the Rule itself, but the Discerner of it), such a thing (at least, to that Man) is never to be thought to have the Authority of God (as that Religion hath none of it, which hath not Foundation in Scripture), nor indeed the Intent of Man (this Public Utility being the scope of the Lawgiver, or which ought to be in all his Laws) as hath been before signified and settled; And consequently, whether it Be, or be Not so, (as whether it Be (more predominantly) or Not agreeable to God's Word) is, for the most part, therefore, the chief point to be inquired into, as to the Obligation of Conscience, in these matters Any Man may be made to do the thing for fear of Wrath, whether Justice or People: So that, if the Supreme Power will have it, they must do it, or Suffer, all Resistance being forbidden; (and as for the Law, it is all one whether a Man act out of Conscience or not, so long as it makes him do it): But if a Man, really in his Soul, does judge the thing Commanded to be against the Common Good, the Justice that Executes not that Law, and the Man that Obeys it not (if they can escape with Man) are not obliged for Conscience-sake (even, as when they think it against God's Will; for God's Will, indeed, is, that Men should Rule only for our Good), so as they need think, by that Omission, they Sin against God. I pray, note all the way, I speak still, not of what is safe in point of Law, but of what is Innocent in point of Conscience. And when I allow a Private Man to judge of a Law, whether it be for the Public Good or not, this is not to have a hand in determining the Question, Whether I am obliged or not to obey it, under the Penalty of the Law, but under the Gild of Sin and God's Judgement?  
Neither must I forget to distinguish from that well Studied Divine, Dr. Field, upon the Church, between Subjection and Obedience; and consequently, between the not Obeying a Law, and Resisting of Authority; the latter whereof is made always Damnable by the Apostle; and the former is Good or Evil, or Indifferent, according to the Matter required, with consideration of the Circumstances a Man is in. And, though I am persuaded (as to the point of Obedience), that when a Law is unprofitable, that is, when a Man does Impartially judge the Matter Commanded, not to be conducive to Public Benefit, (or, at least, if he truly judge the same to be against it), such a Law does not, such a Law cannot oblige the Inner Man (which all wholesome Laws, I hold, do) any farther than to avoid Contempt and Scandal: Yet do I (in the point of Subjection) hold and maintain, and am ready (so far as it may concern me) to declare, That I hold it unlawful for any Subject, or Subjects, to take Arms (that is, Levy War) against the Authority of the King (that is, against the Supreme Executive Power, which God hath committed into his hands, according to the Constitution of this Realm), whether as Residing in his Person, or issued out from Him to any other Person or Persons, by his Commissions, upon any Pretence whatsoever. Which I do declare the rather, because I am out of doubt, that those they call Nonconformists, as well as the Conformists, who understand themselves on both sides, (however it comes to pass, that One Party of them are scrupled for want of but so little Explication as this is), are perfectly reconcileable on that Point.  
To conclude, The Law in such or such a particular Case, requires the Justice to act against the Common Good: What must he do then? I speak not of what he may choose to do, in point of Prudence (which, in case a Law is directly against God's, or so extremely to Public hurt, as quite over-ballances our Sufferings, is not to be consulted); but of what he is bound to, in point of Conscience: And every one, I think, will give this Answer, That the Superior Law must have still the Pre-eminence, unless there be something particularly to be alleged, in regard to that Matter; which is not exceptionable in the Case, if it be against God's Word. He must himself judge in reference to his own Act, or he acts as a Beast, and Punishes as an Horse strikes. And he is also the Minister of God, under the King, for the People's Good. This is the very End Of Magistracy itself, Of the Laws, Of the Execution. Consequently, the Common Good, Salus Populi, being the Supreme Law; whosoever he be that sincerely seeks That, whether he Executes or Forbears a Statute, he is, he must be, in the Forbearance or Execution thereof, upon that account, the best Minister Of the Laws, Of God, and Of the King: Princeps est Dei imago; Lex Principis opus; Finis Legis Justitia; Ex Justitia Communis Salus.  
Deo Gloria.  
FINIS.   

ERRATA.  
PAge 9 Line 8. for fieris read feceris p. 20. l. 7. for prevent r. pervert. p. 45. l. 3. for are r. may be. p. 57 l. 9 for forbid r. forbade.