THE Certainty and Necessity OF Religion in General: Or, The First GROUNDS & PRINCIPLES OF Humane Duty ESTABLISHED; In Eight Sermons Preached at S. Martin's in the Fields at the Lecture for the Year 1697, founded by the Honourable Robert boil, Esquire.  
By FRANCIS GASTRELL, B. D. Student of Christ-Church, Oxon.  
LONDON: Printed for Tho. Bennet at the Half-Moon in S. Paul's Churchyard. 1697.   

TO THE Most Reverend Father in God THOMAS Lord Archbishop of Canterbury; 

Sir Henry Ashurst, Baronet;  
Sir John Rotheram, Sergeant at Law;  
John Evelyn Senior, Esquire;  
trusties by the Appointment of the Honourable ROBERT boil, Esquire.    
Most Reverend and Honoured,  
HAving by your Appointment preached the following Sermons, and published them by your Command, I humbly desire this Dedication of them to you may be accepted as some Acknowledgement for that great Trust you have been pleased to honour me with.  
I have nothing to say for the Performance, but that I have endeavoured all I could to proportion my Care to the Subject and Design of the Lecture; and where the Management is faulty, I have reason to hope the Evidence of the Truths I defend will bear me out.  
I have taken the Liberty to Print my Sermons all together in a continued Discourse, that the Strength of the Proofs there given may appear more plainly from their Connexion.  
If it shall please God to render what I have done, in any degree or measure serviceable towards the raising or promoting a Sense of Religion among us, I shall extremely rejoice at my Success; and I am sure I shall have my Satisfaction increased by your Approbation of my Endeavours, and by your farther Protection and Defence of the same Cause in which I am now particularly engaged, and which ought to be the general Concern of Mankind. I am,  
Most Reverend and Honoured, Your most faithful and obedient Servant, FRANCIS GASTRELL.   

The PREFACE.  
IN every Age of the World we have any Account of left us, the Wickedness of Mankind has much the largest share in their History; and if we believed the Complaints of the several Historians who acquaint us with what passed in their days, we should be disposed to conclude, that those particular times we were reading of were certainly a great deal worse than any that went before, and that consequently Vice having been always growing and gathering Strength as the World advanced in Age, the present Generation of Men must far exceed all their Predecessors in Wickedness: but tho' I have a very ill Opinion of the Age we now live in, I cannot look upon this Reflection as just and well-grounded.  
The true Occasion both of the Observation and the Complaints grounded upon it, I take to be that variety of Wickedness whereby the several Ages and Countries of the World have been distinguished from one another. For there have been as many different Methods and Fashions of sinning among Men as Forms of Government; and as many Changes and Revolutions in Vice as in Empire. Some Periods of Time have been remarkable for open Cruelty, Rapine, and Oppression; others for Treachery, and private Revenge, and all the secret ways of Destruction; other Ages there have been, when Luxury and Riot, and all manner of extravagant Lust and Debauchery, were the public reigning Vices; sometimes Profaneness and a public Contempt of Religion have prevailed, at other time's Indifference, and a careless Neglect of all that's good; sometimes Hypocrisy and an open pretence to Piety and Virtue have been used for a Cover to a close and secret practice of all manner of Vice, and at other times Men have had the Impudence to defend the worst Actions by endeavouring to make them appear consistent with Religion.  
These, and many more such like Differences, are observable in the History of former times; but the peculiar distinguishing Character of this Age is a public Denial of Religion, and all the Obligations of it, with an Endeavour to disprove the Evidences brought for it, and to offer a more rational Scheme of Libertinism. 'Tis true indeed, this aught to be the Plea of all wicked Men that are resolved to continue in their Vices, and upon that account it may be justly wondered at that the number of Atheists and professed Libertines has not been much greater in former Ages than in this in which we pretend to juster Views and stronger Proofs of Religion than they had heretofore: But 'tis plain, there never were more than there are now to whom those Characters do truly belong, whatever softer Names they are pleased to distinguish themselves by; and the reason of it I look upon to be this:  
The Scriptures of the New Testament, which are generally in this part of the World believed to contain the Revelations of God, are so plain and particular, so full and express in the Account they give of the Duties required of Men, and the future Rewards and Punishments appointed for them, according as they observe or neglect these Duties; and the World is so enlightened now by the great Improvements of Knowledge that have been lately made, especially by a critical and exact Search into the Design and Meaning of the Sacred Writings, that 'tis impossible for Men of Sense to reconcile a wicked debauched Life with those Ideas of God and Religion they meet with in the Scriptures; and therefore they find themselves obliged, in defence of their Vices, which they cannot persuade themselves to part with, to deny, not only Revelation, but all manner of Religion too; since, if there be any Religion at all, they are forced to acknowledge the fairest and most rational Draught of it seems to be laid in the Writings of the New Testament.  
This Method of reasoning is now found to have a stronger Influence in quieting the Conscience, and making a wicked Man satisfied with himself, than any Plea formerly used, because it has a greater show of Fairness and Sincerily in it; 'tis so very reasonable and honourable a thing for a Man to act up to his Principles, that wicked Men are easily disposed to entertain a good Opinion of the Principles of Irreligion, because the constant Agreeableness of their Practice to them makes their Character consistent and all of a piece, and gives them a great Advantage both in point of Judgement and Honour over those who pretend to other Principles, and yet act just as they do.  
But, whatever Preference may be due to these Men in a comparison of them with wicked Professors of Religion, and whatever Ease and Satisfaction it may afford them in a continued Course of Vice that their Judgement and Practice agree together, I think it may be made very evident that they have only found out a new Artifice to deceive themselves; and that all their Reasonings are not only vain and groundless but directly opposite to the clearest Corruptions of Truth and Happiness Mankind is capable of.  
This is the Design and the Pretence of the following Discourse; and, to render it more effectual for the checking and putting some stop to the reigning Corruption of this Age, it is so contrived as to bear with equal Force against all the Principles that can be made use of to support Irreligion.  
I know very well, that the Folly and Unreasonableness of downright Atheism are so manifest, and the pernicious Consequences of no Religion at all so visible in themselves, and besides have been so justly and largely exposed already in many late Discourses, that no body will dare to own the Title or Character of Atheist, whatever his private Sentiments may be; and therefore I have endeavoured to give such a Proof of Religion as will overthrow all the lose Principles and Objections now commonly made use of to evacuate the practical Force and Power of it; all which may properly be ranked under the Style of Irreligion, if they will not be allowed to come under that of Atheism; which, as far as we are concerned to know or do any thing in the World, I take to be much the same thing; as will be more fully made out in the Discourse itself.  
The Being of a God is not indeed openly and directly questioned, because the Theory of the Universe cannot be so easily and conveniently explained without some such Notion to which the Name of God may be given; but, if what some Philosophers vouchsafe to call by the Name of God be not an intelligent Being, or be not Governor of the World, or does not More particularly concern himself with the Actions of Men; 'tis all one to us whether there be any such Being as God or no; all Hypotheses concerning the Origin, Duration, and present state of the World are then alike, that is, they are all equally fit to entertain our Imaginations, and help us to be insensible of the Tediousness of living; which, if those notions of God that I have laid down are not true, is all the Business we have to do here.  
But still it will be urged, that allowing that Notion of God which I have given, there are few, if any, that can properly be called Atheists, because the generality at least of those who are commonly thought to deserve that Name do profess to believe a God of all those Attributes I have ascribed to him, and to acknowledge that Men are under some Obligations of Religion; but, if we examine all their Principles together and consider the necessary Consequences of them, they are by Title and Profession only distinguished from Atheists, and not by any real Difference in their Faith: For the Religion of these Men is nothing else but a few honest Principles relating to Justice, Friendship, and Society, which are wholly owing to their Complexion or Education, and not to their Belief of a God; and the practical Influence even of these commonly reaches no farther than that particular Set of Men whose Company or Interests they are most engaged in, and is entirely bounded and regulated by their present Ease, Advantage, or Reputation, and not by any Future Prospects in another Life; and those of them who seem to allow some Future State, when they come to explain themselves, make it such a one as Men need have very little regard for in this.  
These are all the Principles which the generality of those who have lately insulted the Christian Faith do really believe and act upon; this is the sum both of their Faith and Practice, however they are pleased to magnify the Excellence and Perfection of natural Religion, and whatever regard they pretend to have for the clear and easy parts of the Christian Revelation.  
By Religion therefore I would here be understood to mean that whole Scheme of Humane Duties we find delivered in the Writings of the New Testament, as recommended and enforced by such a future State as is there described; which may properly be called, with respect to the Author of it Christian Morality. 'Tis in this Sense and Extent of the Word that I have endeavoured to establish the Certainty and Necessity of Religion; and 'tis plain, that the Arguments made use of for this purpose will fit no other Scheme but this, there being no other Draught or Model of Life to be conceived that would be capable of producing such a noble Scene of Happiness as I have shown would be the certain effect of an universal Practice of the Christian Morality.  
I have not descended to a particular Defence of several Duties commonly insisted upon as Principles of natural Religion, the Reasonableness and natural Obligation of which is questioned by some who are willing to lie under as few Restraints as they can: this I say is not done not only because it was necessary to give a general Idea of Religion first, and a particular Examination of the several Parts of it was too long a Task to come within that compass of Writing I was confined to; but because I am fully satisfied 'tis a truer and shorter way of reasoning to prove the Truth of the Christian Revelation, and that being throughly proved, to submit entirely to the Authority of it, and regulate all our false and imperfect Views of Religion by that most perfect plan which God himself has given of it in the Scriptures.  
'Tis for the same Reason I have made no farther inquiries into the Condition and Duration of our Future State, and the Nature of those Rewards and Punishments we are to expect hereafter, nor have pretended to explain the several Difficulties that occur in the Doctrine of Divine Providence, because a particular and Satisfactory Account of these things can be had no other way than from Revelation: and in general 'tis a sufficient Answer to all Objections that can be raised from hence, that there is a God; that there are Marks and Tokens of Wisdom in the whole Oeconomy and Course of the World; that Man is made and designed for Religion here while he lives, and for a future State after Death.  
If any of these Principles hold, they all hold; and no particular Difficulties that do not evidently overthrow the whole Scheme, can have any force at all. If there be no future State there's no Religion; if there is no such thing as Religion there is no such thing as Wisdom or Design in the Frame and Constitution of Man, and if the Appearances of Wisdom here have no Reality under them, no other Parts of Nature can afford us greater, and consequently, we can have no proof of such a wise and intelligent Being as God. In this Process of Reasoning we argue upon a full and comprehensive Knowledge of the Principles we argue from, because, if there be no future Life after this, we know the utmost that can be known of the State and Condition of Man: But the seeming Inequalities of Providence in the Conduct of the Universe can be no Argument against any of the Principles before advanced; because, while we have certain Tokens of Wisdom remaining, no doubtful Appearances of the contrary will be sufficient to overthrow them; and all those must needs be so where we cannot carry our Observations to the farthest end of things in all the different Points of distance from us; which is the present Case.  
For except we were able to take a full and exact View of the whole Universe, and all the Relations which the several parts of it bear to one another, 'tis impossible for us to know that such or such a thing was ill contrived in it; except we were sure there was no such thing as a future State, we cannot condenm the present Course of Humane Affairs as unequal or fortuitous; and except we were throughly acquainted with all the Circumstances of our Condition in another World, the just Proportion of future Rewards and Punishments to the Actions of this Life, and the exact Manner and Method of God's dealing with us hereafter, we can never make it appear from Reason that the Scripture-Account of God's future Appointments for us is contrary to the Rules of Justice or Wisdom, and consequently that our Expectation of a future State is vain, because the most probable Representation we can make of it, which is that we find in the New-Testament, is ill-grounded.  
If therefore the General Proof of Religion hereafter given will stand good, no particular Difficulties either in the real Phenomena of Nature, or the arbitrary Schemes and Hypotheses of Men ought to have any weight with us. The next and only thing we are to do afterwards is, to search and examine into the Scriptures, and being convinced of their Truth, sincerely endeavour to form all our Opinions and Practice of Religion upon that most perfect Model of it there laid down.   

THE Certainty and Necessity OF RELIGION In General, etc.  HEB. xi. 6. He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him. 
REligion has been so long in Possession, so powerful have been its Influences, and so universal its Authority, so nearly is Mankind concerned in all it promives or threatens, and such mighty Consequences attend the Truth or Falsehood of its Pretensions, that I have often wondered how the Men of these latter days, who are at such a distance from the first Rise of things, durst dispute a Title so well owned and attested; the Denial of which is so dangerous, and which, if it had at first been false, they have no possible means left of disproving; whereas on the contrary, the Evidences of its Truth are still in being, still fresh, and in all their strength of Conviction: as I hope in some measure to make good in the following Discourse.  
I am very sensible I am engaged in a Subject, which several great and learned Men have already, and some of them very lately, treated of, with the wisest Reflections and justest Reasoning imaginable. But, besides that Truth itself is fruitful, and a Subject of this nature hardly ever to be exhausted, the same Object may admit of different Views, there may be new and more suitable ways of offering the same things to the Understanding, or old Arguments may be strengthened and fenced in from the Objections that have been formerly raised against them by some additional Supports: or, if there should be nothing of all this in what I have to say, it may be sufficiently justified to the Adversaries I have to deal with, if the same things are repeated again to their Shame and Confusion, who have hitherto found nothing to answer to them, and are yet in their Sins and Unbelief.  
But since it is not so much their Conviction, which nothing but unpromised irresistible Grace can effect, as the securing and confirming others in the Truth that I chief aim at; since the increasing and propagating a true sense of Religion among Men is my principal Design, and not a learned Triumph over an Adversary, I have suited my Method accordingly, and consequently have made Choice of such a one which in the general Management is different, tho' in several parts of it, it must necessarily fall in with that of others.  
The Certainty and Necessity of Religion, is what I undertake to prove, and therefore I shall consider Religion all together in the full Latitude and Extent of the Notion, and shall not insist wholly upon the Proof of a God as a first Cause, Mover, or Eternal Being, but so far only as the Existence of God is included in the Idea of Religion, and that in order to show the necessary Connexion betwixt the Being of God and the Obligations of Religion: But since these Obligations result from the Nature of Man, as well as the Being and Attributes of God, and from the Relation the one stands in to the other, I shall chief make Choice of such Arguments, as, being taken from what we know of ourselves, are best perceived by us, and entertained with the least Resistance or Suspicion.  
All nice and philosophical Reasonings I shall forbear, as much as I can; but, where the Nature of the Subject, or the particular Prejudices of the Persons to be satisfied require a more speculative and metaphysical Proof of things, I shall choose out such Arguments of this kind, as will give the Understanding the least difficulty to comprehend, and shall avoid all such, which tho' convincing to some that are already well used to Speculation, may chance to be suspected by others of too much Fineness, and so will probably, tho' very unjustly, create in them a Disgust to all the rest. And I shall all along take a due care to distinguish betwixt such Notions and Opinions as are absolutely necessary to the Being of Religion, and those others, which, tho' oftentimes used in the Defence of it, and earnestly contended for, do not destroy what they were brought to prove if they should be false, nor so much as alter any thing in the Nature or Obligations of Religion.  
Now in order to pursue my intended Method with the more Clearness, I think myself obliged in this place to give an account what I mean by Religion; a right Notion of which being first laid down, 'twill afterwards more easily and plainly appear, whether there be any such thing; and if there be, whether it is reasonable or necessary for Mankind to be influenced by it.  
By Religion then, in general, I mean all that Worship, Service, or Obedience, we that call ourselves Men are to pay to God; or whatever we are, in any respect, obliged to upon the Prospect of his Favour, or under the Penalty of his Displeasure in this or a future State. From whence 'tis plain, that in order to make it appear there is such a thing as Religion, we must prove that there is a God, or some superior Being, who can, and does oblige Man to live after such a particular manner; and that Man is capable of, and actually under such an Obligation, the Performance or Neglect of which, will be attended with very different Consequences, and those sufficient to determine him to act one way rather than another.  
But if a Man was desirous of convincing such Persons as denied all this, where should he first set out in his Proof? What Order should he give his Thoughts? Where must he take his Rise when he is to prove original Foundation-truths'? What Evidence will be powerful enough to prevail upon those who love a Lie, and hate to be reformed? How are they to be attempted who are strongly fortified with their Prejudices, and have hardly left a Man that would attack them any Ground to stand upon? Such an unreasonable Defiance of the common Sense of Mankind, is justly thought by the Wisest Men to deserve no other Confutation but that of Punishment? However, since those who are yet innocent or indifferent may be corrupted, and those who are just entering upon the ways of Irreligion may be farther advanced and confirmed in them by more settled Atheists, the same is to be done for the Security of those as should be applied to the Conviction of these, if they were judged capable of being convinced; and therefore the Method to be used upon this Occasion must be such as will surest destroy the Pretences of Atheism, as well as give the easiest Account and most undeniable Proofs of Religion; that so the Arguments made use of by the Perverters of Mankind may lose all their Power and Force upon others, by losing the Advantage of coming unanswered.  
In order therefore to satisfy those who have not quite renounced their Reason of the Truth of Religion according as I have before described and stated it, and the Falsehood of those Grounds upon which it is opposed, I shall proceed in this manner.  
First, I shall give some Account of the Nature of Man, the Nature of God, and that Relation there is between them, so far as is necessary to establish the Notion of Religion.  
Secondly, I shall prove that there is a God, or a Being of such a Nature as I before supposed.  
Thirdly, From the Knowledge I have shown we have, or are capable of having, concerning the Humane and Divine Natures, I shall deduce a positive and direct Proof of Religion.  
Fourthly, I shall farther evince the Truth of Religion, from a Comparison of it with Irreligion, and the necessary Consequences arising from thence.  
Fifthly, I shall consider the Grounds and Pretences of Irreligion, what can be alleged in Defence of it, and what are the usual Pleas for it; and from thence show the Absurdity and Folly of their Principles and Actions who have no better Reasons for what they Believe and Do, than those upon Examination will be found to be.  
Sixthly, I shall make some Inquiries into the Causes of Atheism and Irreligion, or the Reasons that induce Men to take up such Opinions.  
And conclude with a short Explication of the different Notions of Atheism and Deism.  
I. First then, I am to give some Account of the Nature of Man, the Nature of God, and the Relation there is between them, so far as is necessary to establish the Notion of Religion.  
The Knowledge of Religion, as of all other Things whatsoever, must begin from the Consideration of ourselves. Now our Existence being granted, the same Consciousness that satisfies us of this, if we carefully attend to what passes within us, will farther inform us, that we are capable of Thinking, Perceiving, and Knowing; which Capacity is usually styled Understanding; and that we have a Power of determining ourselves to Think and not to Think, or Perceive and not Perceive certain Objects or Ideas, and to move and not to move certain parts of our Body, and by that means other contiguous Bodies; as likewise a Power of Acting and not Acting, according to our own Determination: that is, we can actually entertain a Thought, or dismiss it; cause a Motion, or hinder it, when we have so determined with ourselves, and that barely by determining so to do: which general Power of determining ourselves, and executing our own Determinations or Commands, is called the Will, and includes all that, is active within us. And upon further Reflection we may find, that in several Instances we have an equal Power to determine ourselves to Think or not to Think, to Move or not to Move, and in several Instances an equal Power to Act or not to Act according to such Determination; but in several others we can determine ourselves but one way; and in some, where we can determine ourselves either way, we can obey but one Determination: In the first Cases we act with Liberty, in the latter we are under a Necessity: But all our Actions, in all the several Instances before mentioned, are styled voluntary, as proceeding immediately and effectually from ourselves, only when the Acting or not Acting proceeds wholly from some extrinsic Violence surmounting the Strength of our Bodies, which is properly called Force as distinguished from Necessity; the Effects of which cannot truly be said to be ours, but belong to those Being's who employed that Force upon us.  
'Tis plain also from Experience, that we are capable of Pleasure and Pain, by which I mean all manner of agreeable and disagreeable Sentiments, whether caused by ourselves, or occasioned by any thing without us; that these are the first and only Springs of Action which set all our Powers awork, and give Rise to all our Determinations, the obtaining the one and avoiding the other being the whole Employment of the Soul; and that there are some Things which we are naturally, by our very Frame and Make, pleased or displeased with, without being taught by one another to be so, and consequently, that we desire and do, are averse from and forbear several things in Compliance with these first original Sentiments: From whence it follows, that there is something antecedent to all manner of Action begun within ourselves, which is the Reason of it, without which it had not been, which when taken away or ceasing, the Action ceases too, and there follows a Rest, Acquiescence, or Satisfaction. This Reason or Motive of Action is called an End; the Perception of which at a distance, or future, as such as would be, all things considered, more agreeable to the Mind when present, than any thing it feels now, is the Cause of all those Actions which are looked upon as requisite for the Attainment of it. Now if this Representation be true, and the Actions proper and fit, a Man is said to act wisely, and for his true Interest and Advantage; but, when either of these Conditions is wanting, he acts foolishly, and to his Disadvantage.  
But, since by the same Experience we are informed that we may, and often do, act foolishly, and to our own Prejudice, by lessening or discontinuing our present Satisfaction, or bringing more Pain and Trouble upon ourselves than we already feel; and that the only Cause of this, is the different Representation of things future from what they are perceived to be when present, both in themselves, and in their Consequences and Dependences; we are from hence convinced that there is no other way of remedying this Evil, and preventing our being accessary to our own Misery, but by rectifying our Perceptions of Things, which, being future, do not by immediate Impressions assure us that they really are what they appear to us to be. And, if we strictly examine ourselves about these Matters, we shall find that what we now actually feel or perceive we cannot possibly imagine to be otherwise than as we feel or perceive; that is, we must be undeceivably conscious of all our own Sensations and Perceptions: But how we shall hereafter be affected, we can not otherwise know than by knowing the different Natures of the Things that are to affect or be affected, with the Connexion and Dependence of one thing upon another, in order to promote or hinder the one's being so affected by the other.  
Now, as to the Knowledge we are capable of in this kind, we are to consider these farther Observations upon ourselves: That there are some Ideas or Notions that appear with that Light and Clearness to our Understandings, that we immediately perceive them in all their Extent, and a necessary Agreement or Disagreement betwixt them, and afterwards the Dependence or Independance of others upon them; to the Truth of which Appearances we cannot possibly deny our Assent: That there are some Propositions which do not appear with such Evidence as to command our Assent, but have more to incline us to believe them true than false; and this according to different degrees: That there are others that appear with equal Motives of Credibility, which hold us in Suspense, and will hardly suffer us to determine either way: And a great many things we have no manner of Notions of at all, for the Truth or Falsehood of which, nothing at all appears to us.  
But, besides these general Differences in the Appearance of things as certain, probable, doubtful, or exceeding our present Reach, we are moreover to take notice of two other kinds of Difference; the one between the real Nature of Things and their Appearances to us, the other betwixt the Appearance of Things to us with respect to Truth or Falsehood, and their Appearance to us with respect to Action, and the Consequences of it, Happiness or Misery. As to the first of these Differences, we find that what we are once really certain of, always appears certain to us; and what cannot appear to us but as certain, we cannot possibly conceive should be otherwise in its own Nature: But what is in its own Nature certain, may appear doubtful to us at one time, and probable at another; and what we assent to as probable now, may afterwards command our Assent as certain; and there are things, which, altho' we are not certain of their Truth or Falsehood, we are sure we know as much as we can of, by the strength of our present Faculties. As to the other Difference in the Appearance of things, with respect to Action and its Consequences, it often so happens, that where the Truth of a Thing seems doubtful to us, it plainly appears to be safer, and more to our present Advantage, or affords a better Prospect of future Happiness to act one way than another: and abundance of Instances there are in which we find ourselves under a Necessity of Acting one way or other where neither side appears certainly true, but one only probable, or both equally doubtful.  
This is all the Account of Humane Nature which I thought necessary to my present Design of establishing the Truth of Religion: And I persuade myself, I have said nothing upon this Subject, which any Man, that fairly consults himself, can possibly call in question. But, if any Objections do lie against any part of what I have now laid down, they shall be considered before I make use of it as a Proof of any thing else.  
All Questions concerning the Origine and Substance of the Soul, its Union with the Body, and separate Existence, I have purposely waved, as things which do in a great measure lie out of the Reach of natural Reason, and consequently admit of no certain Proof from thence; are, as commonly handled, involved in great Ambiguity of Terms, and, which way soever explained, I think, as far as I have hitherto seen, make no manner of change, either as to the Truth or Nature of Religion. Whether the Soul be infused or derived, material or immaterial; whether it depends upon the Body in all its Actions, or sometimes acts of itself, is dissolved with it, or exists after it, if what I said before concerning our own Experience be true, it will be found that Religion has a very good bottom to stand upon, without being supported by any of these Opinions. But if the Soul came from without the Body, is of a different Nature from it, can Act independently of it, and Exist after its Dissolution, as there are several very probable Reasons, and a great deal of certain Revelation for, then are there so many additional Arguments for the Truth of what may be sufficiently proved without 'em, from plainer and more undeniable Principles; as I shall endeavour to make good in the following Discourse.  
The next Thing I am to do, is to consider the Nature of God, or what that Notion or Idea is to which I affix that Name: which in short is this; An Eternal Being of all possible Perfections in himself, and from whom every thing else derived its Being, and whatever belongs to it.  
But, to give a more particular Account of my Thoughts in this Matter, I conceive God to be One unchangeable Being, of an intelligent Nature, who always necessarily Existed of himself, who knows every thing that can be known, who can do every thing that is possible to be done, who does every thing he wills, and nothing but what he wills himself, who enjoys an unalterable State of the greatest Happiness that can be enjoyed, who never wills or does any thing inconsistent with this State, who makes himself the ultimate end of all he does, and next to that the Good or Happiness of all such Being's as are capable of it; which together with all other Being's, and every thing that belongs to them, were from him, and depend upon him for their Continuance; and lastly, who brings about whatever he wills or designs by the fittest and most proper Means.  
This seems to me to be the easiest Notion of God we are capable of conceiving; and if it can be proved that there really is such a Being as is here described, I think 'tis all that's necessary upon this Subject, with respect to what I have undertaken: For whether we represent God to our Thoughts as a pure and simple act, a spiritual Substance, or subtle Matter; as the whole mass or Substance of the World taken all together, or as the Soul and active Principle of it; as confined to the Heavens, or diffused through the whole extent of Being; as the Maker and Creator of all things, or as the Principle and Fountain from whence they flowed; or consider him under any other Idea our Reason or Imagination can frame; if we allow all the Characters of a Deity before mentioned, 'tis the same thing, as to Religion, which soever of these Opinions we embrace, as will hereafter appear: But, if any of them are urged to overthrow that Notion of a Deity I have given, the Proof of such a Being to which that Notion belongs will be a full and sufficient Answer to them.  
Now as to the Relation there is betwixt God and Man, we thus conceive; That God is our Creator and Parent, the Author of our Being and Nature, and all the Powers and Capacities of it, and that we are his Creatures, the Issue of his Power, and the Workmanship of his Hands; that God is our Protector, Governor, and Master, and we are his Dependants, Subjects, and Servants; that God is our Benefactor and Author of all our Happiness, and we obliged and indebted to him for whatever we enjoy. All which Relations do necessarily result from the Natures of the Being related, as will plainly appear upon a just Comparison of them together, and will be farther manifested when we enter upon the particular Proofs of Religion.  
Supposing therefore that I have given a true Account of the Nature of Man, which being taken from Experience, can admit of no other Proof, nor no greater Certainty; the only thing remaining to be done, before I come to the main Argument I proposed, is to prove,  
II. That there is a God, or a Being of such a Nature as I have endeavoured to represent; which is the second Thing I undertook.  
In discoursing of which Subject, that I may express my Thoughts with the more Clearness, give every Argument its due weight, and everywhere proportion my Building to my Foundation, I shall consider the Being of God under the different Degrees of Possible, Probable, and Certain.  
First then, As to the Possibility of such a Being, I cannot imagine any Man of such an irregular Make of Understanding, as to apprehend that Description I have given of a Deity to be absurd and chimerical, or to have any Inconsistency or Contradiction in it. I am sure I have said nothing but what I very well conceive myself, and I think is as easily conceivable by any Body else; and I have used the plainest and most intelligible Expressions I could upon this Occasion.  
But, farther to assist the Weakness of our Understandings in framing a more distinct Conception of God, we will consider the several Ideas of which this complex Notion is made, and see whether they will not suit very well together.  
Now 'tis plain to any Man that reflects upon the Ideas he has in his Mind, that he has a Notion of Time, and the several Periods of it, which he can place at what distance he pleases to measure the Duration of any thing by, but never at such a distance by all the Addition his Imagination is capable of, but that he can still suppose some Being to exist both before and after; which Being, before and after which he cannot conceive any Time or other Being, he calls Eternal.  
In like manner, when we consider the Variety of Being's in the World, with their several Modes and Relations, we are not able to imagine or suppose such a number of any of them that there cannot still be a greater; and this possible Variety of Things never to be exhausted is styled Infinite. And if we can conceive such an Infinity of Things possible, we can conceive a Power proportionable that can produce whatever is possible to be produced, and a Knowledge answerable to that which can know whatever can be known, and that is whatever can be.  
Thus it is we conceive an eternal intelligent Being of infinite Knowledge and Power.  
And this we do very easily without such Intenseness of Thought, and nice Abstraction, as People are apt to imagine; for we find Infinity almost in every Thing: All our Studies and Inquiries lead us to this Notion.  
When we consider the Extent or Dimensions of Matter, we lessen and magnify them till we are lost either way, and still find ourselves as far from any Bounds as when we first set out upon the Search: When we run our Thoughts over the Variety of natural Bodies in the World, the more Differences we observe, the more we comprehend possible, each new Difference taken notice of, affording an inconceivable Variety of Combinations with those observed before.  
'Tis the same thing if we contract our View, and keep within the Compass of one Kind or Division of Bodies only, as Plants, Minerals, and the like, the farther we advance our Observations, the more still do the Species or Sorts multiply upon us, and the possible Variety of more does proportionably increase, till confounded with the growing Prospect, we are content to admire what we tried in vain to reach.  
'Tis thus also in the intellectual Nature. The different Degrees of Knowledge, Power, and Happiness, we are conscious of, do sufficiently assure us, that we are capable of greater and greater still; and, whatever Notion we can frame of our own State with respect to any of these Qualifications, from the utmost top of what we are arrived to, we can look farther still, and conceive higher Advancements of each kind possible in ourselves, in other Men, or at least in other Being's of larger Capacities; and this in a continual Rise, without any thing to terminate our View.  
From whence we are farther enabled to conceive, that God is infinitely happy as well as infinitely knowing and powerful; that is, that he enjoys all the Happiness that can possibly be enjoyed by any Capacity of being.  
Having got thus far over the Notion of a Deity, I think, we may with less Difficulty conceive, that such a Being as this did necessarily exist of himself; that is, that an eternal Being had nothing before it to be the Cause or Author of its Existence; And farther, that he is unchangeable or always the same; that is, that an eternal Being always is, and a Being of infinite Knowledge, Power, and Happiness, is always alike, knowing, powerful, and happy. The actual Production of all things, which are not God, from him, and their Dependence upon him for their Continuance, and all other Circumstances of their being, are no hard Things to be conceived by those that acknowledge he can do all things possible; and he that knows every thing that can be known, may as easily be supposed to effect whatever he designs by the fittest and most proper means, and that is to be infinitely wise: And what other Reason or Motive can we frame for an intelligent Being of infinite Happiness to act upon, but his own free Pleasure? And who can hinder the Almighty from doing what he will? But that the Happiness of all such Being's as are capable of it, so far as it is consistent with his Wisdom to grant them the Enjoyment, should be very agreeable to his Good Will and Pleasure, we are not, I believe, disposed to doubt.  
And this completes the Account I have before given of the Nature of God in short, and have now examined over again more particularly.  
From all which, I think, I may safely conclude, that the Idea we have formed of a God is no Chimaera or extravagant work of the Imagination, but a very possible consistent Notion; and that those who affirm there is some such Being to which this Idea belongs, cannot be censured for vain incoherent Thinkers, who have put things together without any ground or warrant from Reason.  
How far the bare Conception of such an Idea as that we have framed of God, or the mere Possibility of such a Being, does, without the Assistance of other Principles, prove the Reality of his Existence, I shall not here examine. The Arguments drawn from hence, tho' in themselves perhaps certain, to several Persons convincing, and not to be disproved by any, do not fit every Understanding, nor have that regular uniform Face of Truth which takes at first sight as well as pleases after farther Examination: only thus much I shall allege in their Defence, that the greatest and commonest Objection made against this kind of Proof is very ill grounded.  
For 'tis usually urged, that Arguments drawn from the Idea or Possibility of a God, are of no force in this particular Case; because they do not universally conclude. It cannot be said that whatever is possible, or we have an Idea of, for that Reason actually is, and therefore 'tis thought that the actual Existence of a God does by no means follow from the Possibility or Conception of such a Being; whereas the Conclusion may hold in this Case, and no other whatsoever: for Conception supposes Possibility, and Possibility a Correspondent Power; and a Power of Existing, when applied to such a Being as God, must necessarily infer Actual Existence; as might be farther made out if there was occasion for it: but, because the unusual Niceness of the Proof may probably raise some Prejudice against it, I shall wave the Prosecution of it; and to cut off all Colour of Advantage from such as are disposed to cavil, I shall content myself at present with having shown that 'tis very probable and conceivable, that there may be a God, and pass on to the next Enquiry I am to make, whether it is not very probable that there is one.  
A common Argument for the Being of a God, (and 'tis never the worse for being common) is the general Concurrence and Agreement of Mankind in the Acknowledgement of this great Truth. We will consider the Argument itself in its full Strength, and then see what fairly follows from it.  
The Sum of what may be said upon the first is this: That all Accounts and Relations of the present State of the World, and all the Histories of past Ages that are now extant do agree to assure us, that, since the first Memory of Things was preserved till now, there was no period of Time, nor any Nation under the Sun, in which the Being of a God was not acknowledged and believed by a vast Generality of all that were then and there living.  
And farther, that not only the greatest part of Mankind taken in gross, nor the greatest part of every Nation considered as a distinct Society of Men, were of this Belief, but the greatest part of every Sect or Division, as they stand distinguished by their different Opinions in other things, their different Capacities, Interests, Ways, and Manners of Thinking; as, the Learned and Ignorant; those that had examined the Point, and considered the Reasons for and against it; and those who had only had it proposed to them, without any proof either way but what was immediately offered from the nature of the thing; the Mahometan and Idolater who add absurd things to the Nature of God, as well as the Jew and Christian who think more consistently of him; those that hold the World to be Eternal, or made by Chance, as well as those who look upon it as the Effect of Wisdom; those that explain the Works of Nature by Mechanical Powers, and those that in their Account of the System of Things make use of Intelligences and abstracted Notions: not only the Religious and Superstitious, and such as expect any good or ill Consequences should attend their Belief of a God, but those whose other Opinions declare they have nothing at all, or very little, to hope or fear from a God, as the Epicurean, the Sadducee, the Hobbist, and the Deist: and lastly, all sorts of wicked Men who are uneasy under the Thoughts of a God, and endeavour to shake them off.  
Those few that in different Ages of the World have opposed the common Belief, have had no Followers, and several of them at the Seasons of greatest Seriousness and Recollection have renounced the Opinions they maintained at loser hours: so universally has the Opinion of a God obtained among Men.  
From whence I think I may fairly infer thus much at least, That such a Persuasion as this is very suitable to the Understanding, and agrees very well with all the Principles of our Knowledge; and therefore, tho' it could not be certainly proved to follow from those evident Perceptions we have of other Truths, yet being readily entertained by our Reason, without any Opposition from them, it must upon this Account only be extremely probable and fit to be believed.  
For suppose it to be an Error, what can we assign for the Cause of such an universal Error?  
'Tis possible indeed, that the Generality of Mankind may be deceived in a Judgement founded upon the Reports of Sense or Imagination; they may believe that the Sun is very near of the same bulk in which it appears to the Eye, when 'tis so many times bigger than the Earth; or, that it moves when it stands still; or, if they do not believe Wrong in either of these Points, there may be something else of such a Nature supposed, in which all Mankind may be mistaken, as most of the Learned think the rest of the World are in both these Judgements. But the Notion and Existence of a God are Matters of pure Thought and Reason, in the Conception of which, Sense and Imagination have no share; and therefore they can never owe their Original to them.  
'Tis true, the Mind, by the Help of these Faculties, may make a great many false Representations of the Deity, and consequently occasion a great Variety of Errors concerning him; but it cannot be inferred from hence, that therefore those Notions and Opinions of a God in which all Men agree proceed from the same Fountain as these additional Errors do, in which they differ so very much, and that consequently, in their own nature, those may be as much Errors as these other are, tho' they are nor yet discovered to be so.  
The contrary, I think, is very plain: For the Difference of the Representation in this latter Case proves an Incapacity in the Faculties to perceive the Objects they were employed about; whereas in the other Supposition, the Constancy and Universality of the Perception is an Argument both of the Suitableness and Truth of the Matter perceived.  
There's nothing in the Idea of God, as I have endeavoured to describe it, that falls under the Cognizance of our Senses, nor is any Man conscious to himself that he has perceived God at any time this way; and therefore all sensible Ideas applied to him must be as wild and extravagant as the Ideas of blind Men concerning Colours, or at least of those of any other Men concerning the Inhabitants of Planets and ethereal Regions, because there is no manner of Resemblance betwixt the Ideas of one Faculty and those of another, nor any discoverable betwixt a new Idea and those we perceive already: so that if we should endeavour to represent a pure Idea, which is the Object of Reflection only, by sensible Images, no wonder if the Representation be very different, when all the Ideas of Sense have an equal Pretence to be Representatives, no one being liker the Original it stands for than another: And the same may be said with respect to a new unknown Idea; for, whatever it be in its own Nature, and whatever Resemblance there be betwixt that and any other we have already perceived, out of our whole Stock of Ideas we have no more reason to choose one than another to represent it by; and consequently, different Men must represent it to themselves very differently: From whence it plainly appears, that if the Notion of God be purely intellectual, or if there be something sensible in it, and we are not conscious to ourselves that we have actually perceived it, as 'tis plain we are not, the sensible Representations of him must be very various, and therefore very false: But when all Men think alike concerning Objects not perceivable by Sense, 'tis not only a certain Sign that their Ideas are suitable and proportionate to the Faculty that perceives them, but 'tis very probable also they are truly sorted and put together.  
 there is a general Agreement in the Perception, there is certainly an Uniformity in the Appearance, which is as necessary to make an universal Error as an universal Truth; and therefore, supposing all Men mistaken about the Bulk or Motion of the Sun, it necessarily follows from hence, that whatever appears to the Sense in this Case appears the same to all Men; so that the Errors occasioned by this means are not in the Sense, but belong to another Faculty; nor are they either necessary or invincible, not necessary, because we need not have made any Judgement at all concerning these Appearances offered to our Sense, several Requisites to a just Sensation being wanting, without which, we know, we cannot judge with Assurance; not invincible, because our Opinions concerning these things may be afterwards altered and corrected by Reason; which, being a Faculty superior to Sense, may preserve us from the Illusions of it.  
But when all Men agree in Matters of pure Reflection and Reason, we have all the Assurance we can have, that they are in the right. For whence should any Error proceed? 'Tis certain the Appearance must in this Supposition be uniform, and the Faculty employed about its proper Object. Besides, if there be a Clearness in the Appearance, the Understanding necessarily closes with it, and if in such a case it should be deceived, there is no higher Faculty to correct the Mistake: How then can we imagine the Minds of Men to be so disposed as to be under a Necessity of being deceived, as they must be if a constant universal Appearance of Truth should be only the Veil of Falsehood: For how can any Man help believing that to be true which always appears so to him, and concerning which he can receive no other Information from himself or any body else?  
But here perhaps it may be said, where the Evidence is not so strong as to command our Assent, Error may wear the Face of Truth, tho' we have not yet been able to discover the Cheat; and therefore 'tis our own Fault if we are deceived in this as well as in the other Instances of Sense, since we are not under a necessity of giving our Judgements according to the Appearance. To which I answer, that allowing a bare Possibility of erring in the present Case, all that I designed to prove from this Argument of General Consent holds good still; which is, that because all People have agreed to acknowledge a God, 'tis therefore very probable there should be one, and very agreeable to the Reason of Mankind to believe so; so that altho' a Man is not from hence fully convinced of the Certainty of it, he cannot help believing 'tis a very reasonable Opinion, and that there's very great likelihood 'tis built upon sure Foundations, tho' he has not yet searched so far as to discover them: For he cannot give an Account how all Men should come to be mistaken in a matter of this Nature; and, if they were, how they could ever be undeceived: which may be done in all the Instances of Sense or Imagination in which any Error can be judged possible.  
All that can be farther supposed to countenance a Suspicion, is, that possibly there was a time when Men believed otherwise, but some People having started such an Opinion, and dressed it up very plausibly, it took mightily in the World, and so was handed down from one to the other, and in succeeding Generations spread and prevailed, till it became universal. But there is no manner of ground for such a Supposition:  
1. Because, let us look as far back as we can, there are no Marks or Footsteps to be found of the Rise and Original of this Opinion, no gradual Propagation of it discoverable, it being in every Age we have any account of, as universally believed as it is now.  
2. Because no parallel Instance can be assigned which might give any colour for a suspicion in this, no Persuasion of the like nature having ever been detected to be an Error after so long and so wide an Establishment.  
I do not know of any Opinion whatsoever that actually obtained so universal a Belief as that of a God, and afterwards was proved to be false; and 'tis very difficult to imagine how such a thing should come to pass: however I can conceive and allow it to be possible, that a mistaken matter of fact or a conjectural Hypothesis of something belonging to natural Knowledge, may, at some distance of time from its first appearance in the World, be pretty generally believed as certain, and afterwards by a Discovery of fresh Circumstances in the one, or making new Observations about the other, a great part of Mankind may come to be of another Opinion, of the Truth of which they may be much surer: but these are things of a very different Nature from that we are discoursing upon, and an Error in either of these cannot prove the Possibility of a Mistake in the Case in question. For, besides that a distant matter of fact, and a natural Hypothesis of something out of the present Reach of our Senses are hardly ever known to the greatest part of Mankind taken in general, and therefore a general Belief of them can respect only the Learned, whereas the Being of a God has in every Age been actually and expressly believed by the generality of all sorts of Men; besides all this I say, the Notion and Existence of a God, being Matters of Reason and Reflection only, do not depend upon any such particular Circumstances of Time or Place, or other external Helps and Instruments of Knowledge as are the peculiar Privileges of a few, to whom the rest of the World must be beholding for all they know concerning several Truths, as is plain in the Cases before mentioned.  
All the Observations of Sense, upon which the Belief of a God is founded, lie open to every man, and are the same now they ever were; and the Inferences drawn from them are very easy, and within the reach of common Capacities. If some have refined upon them, and carried their Reasonings much farther than others, it has been only to satisfy the unwarrantable Scruples and Suspicions of a few Pretenders to Learning, who make use of that little Knowledge they have to argue themselves out of all. But the Generality of Mankind, both Learned and Ignorant, have so firmly believed upon the first plain obvious grounds of Assent, as not to require or stand in need of farther Satisfaction; and therefore their Faith cannot be owing to the plausible Colours or specious Reasonings of any first Inventors of false Notions and Opinions.  
But, after all, allowing the Supposition to be true, tho' I think it impossible that it should, that there was a time in which God was not where acknowledged in the World; whoever invented the Notion, whatever were the Motives it was first invented upon, or the Arguments upon which it was first believed, the Propagation of it afterwards, and the Constancy and Universality of the Belief ever since, must be owing to the Agreeableness of such an Opinion to the common Reason of Mankind, and all their other Knowledge, and to the Strength and Sufficiency of those Reasons upon which it is now, and has been so long received. For all the first Motives and Arguments, if they were any other than what we have now, and which have been the same in all Ages we have any Knowledge of left, have been all lost, and consequently their Influence spent, long ago; neither in any of the ancient Discourses yet extant concerning the Being of a God, is there any Appeal made to Authority or Antiquity; as if Men were obliged to believe this Truth because it was so ancient, or because such and such eminent Persons had first recommended or enjoined the Belief of it: But all the Arguments made use of are wholly built upon the Reason of the thing, which is always the same; the same plain Reasons for the Being of a God have always had the same Influence, which, upon Examination, will be found to have no Art or Sophistry in them, and every body may examine them that will.  
Nothing then remains, but to inquire into the Force and Validity of those Reasons upon which our Belief of a God is originally founded.  
I suppose it now but a probable Persuasion, arising from that Readiness and Assurance of Assent with which we embraced this Truth, and yielded to the first obvious Proofs of it, upon a bare Proposal of them to the Understanding; in which Persuasion we are very much confirmed by knowing that all Mankind have constantly agreed with us in it, being fully satisfied from hence, that no peculiar Temper of Mind or Scheme of Thoughts, no private Interest or national Byass, has disposed us to make a wrong Judgement, but something common to the whole humane Nature.  
This is all the ground the Generality of the World believe upon; and tho' to a nice Examiner of things it is not certain irresistible Conviction, yet 'tis sufficient to justify a full and entire Assent, and to warrant our acting according to it. For to suspect a thing to be false, and act as if it were so, upon a bare Possibility imaginable that it may be so; or rather, because we have not received the highest degree of Proof the thing is, in its own Nature, capable of, when, at the same time, we have no manner of Reason to distrust what we have; can be neither rational, prudent, nor safe.  
However, Since there are Persons whose Actions and at least pretended Opinions come up to this Character, we will consider the common Proofs of a Deity more closely and throughly, and see if what upon the first View appears so probable, and makes so strong an Impression upon the Mind, may not, upon farther Examination, strike us with that Certainty and Evidence that we cannot resist, without questioning all our other Knowledge, and disclaiming all manner of Distinction betwixt Truth and Falsehood: which is,  
III. The Third Consideration I proposed in treating of this Argument: Whether it is not only a possible or probable Opinion that there should be a God, but a certain and infallible Truth that there is one.  
All the common natural Arguments and Reasons upon which the general Belief of a God is founded, are taken from the visible frame of things called the World, and those several parts of it which fall under every man's Notice and Observation; upon a slight Survey of which, any man that is in the least capable of Reflection, wherever his Thoughts light, will perceive or imagine that he perceives plain Marks and Tokens of Power and Wisdom, much of the same kind, tho' in proportion far greater than he has observed in any of the most wonderful Effects of humane Skill and Strength; the immediate Result of which, I believe, would be this Conclusion, That certainly there is some Being, exceedingly more powerful and knowing than Man, who was the Author and Contriver of this stupendous Fabric.  
And, if Admiration and Curiosity invite him to farther Inquiries, as 'tis difficult to suppose they should not, the Compass and Extent of the whole Work, the Variety of Objects in it, the Constancy and Uniformity of some Appearances, and regular Changes and Revolutions of other, the Connexion and Dependence of the several parts, the Union and Confederacy of multitudes of different kinds towards some common Production, and the various particular Ends and Uses of things, all assistant to one another, and subservient to some general Design; all these, I say, well considered and weighed together, would strengthen and confirm his former Judgements, and farther dispose him to conclude, That the Author of all these Instances of Power is able to do whatever else can be conceived possible, nothing else conceivable seeming more difficult to this Inquirer than what he sees already done; That a Being of so much Knowledge as his Works declare him, so vastly exceeding Man's, is able to do Things which are far above Man's Reach and Comprehension to conceive at all; And that he who has so wisely ordered and disposed every thing he has made to such proper Ends, has exercised his Power so far and no farther, because it was most agreeable to his Wisdom so to do.  
There's nothing, I think, in all this, but what is easy and natural, and what may very well be imagined to be found out without the help of much Learning or an extraordinary Talon of Reflection; and yet this is what has constantly, in all Ages, satisfied both the Learned and the Thoughtful, and stood the Test of Time, and Sophistry, and Malice.  
But suppose some extravagant Thinkers, entirely under the Government of their Senses and Lusts, because they were not by when the World was made, and do not see the Hand which supports the Frame, and moves all the several Wheels of it, should therefore distrust all their Reasonings of this kind, and doubt the Being of a God notwithstanding the Testimony of Nature; is there no certain Proof to be given that They are not mistaken who believe a God upon these Grounds? Several have already shown there is, and this is what I shall at present endeavour to make good in the clearest and most unexceptionable manner I can.  
But, before I enter upon this Argument, I think it necessary to inquire what Certainty is, that we may know what kind or degree of Proof may be properly and truly called Certain, and what not.  
Now Certainty or Evidence (which I shall all along take in the same Sense) considered in the Things or Ideas which are the Objects of our Understanding, is a necessary Agreement or Disagreement of one part of our Knowledge with another; as applied to the Mind, 'tis the Perception of such Agreement or Disagreement, or such a firm well-grounded Assent as excludes not only all manner of doubt, but all conceivable possibility of a Mistake: And thus I suppose, and take it for granted, that we are certain of all our own Perceptions and Sensations, whatever we feel or are conscious to ourselves of; and that we are fully and undeceivably assured of a great many of our Judgements founded upon the just and well-regulated Reports of our external Senses, to the same degree as we are of the Agreement and Disagreement of any pure intellectual Ideas.  
Except this be allowed, we have no Principles to reason from, nor indeed any Knowledge at all, not so much as Scepticism; but universal Darkness and Confusion cover humane Nature: But he that grants thus much, and is true to his own Reason, must acknowledge there is a God; as will appear from the following Considerations.  
Being then, as I suppose, by an infallible Consciousness, satisfied of our own Operations and Existence, and, by a passive Perception of various kinds and sorts of Impressions by the help of certain Organs of the Body, fully convinced of the reality of things without us, of different Natures or Manners of Existence, upon a farther Exercise of our active Powers, and Application of our Senses to external Objects, and then reviewing and reasoning over the Observations that result from thence, we come to these certain Conclusions:  
That there are a great many Changes in the World; That a great many new Appearances present themselves, which before were no where to be found, some of which are observed to disappear again, as others likewise are, the rise and original of which we never knew; That under all these Changes and Varieties of Appearance, there is something which is constantly the same which we call Matter or solid extended Substance; That the different Appearances our Senses inform us of in Matter, proceed immediately from the Differences of Bulk or Number, Figure, Motion, and Rest; That we are conscious of several things in ourselves, which we perceive as different from all these; That we were not always thus conscious, but that there was a time when this Consciousness, and all that we perceive in ourselves as distinct from Matter, which we call Mind or Spirit, was joined and united to a certain portion of Matter, or Collection of material Particles called humane Body; That, when this humane Body changes its Appearance, and such a particular Union of the parts of it is dissolved, than that Consciousness, and all those internal Operations which are now the Object of it, cease to be joined with that Matter they were just before united to.  
Being well assured of the Truth of all these Conclusions, we are from thence immediately led to these following Inquiries.  
How comes all this about? How came there to be such a thing as Matter? When and by what means did it exist? What is the Cause of all those Changes that are continually making in it? And why does it exist after so many different manners? Whence are we ourselves? What was it that gave us such conscious Being's? How are they united to Matter? What limits the Continuance, and afterward dissolves the Bond of this wonderful Union?  
Now in pursuance of these Inquiries, we find it utterly inconceivable and impossible that any thing should make itself; that a Being which once did not exist should begin to be of itself, by the force of its own Nature or Power, without the Assistance of some other Being which existed before it: From whence we are irresistibly convinced that something must be eternal, otherwise nothing could ever have been; for if any Time can be supposed in which nothing did exist, nothing would ever have existed at all, unless a Being that once was not could put itself into Being; but that is impossible, and 'tis certain something now really is, therefore something must be eternal.  
And as from hence 'tis evident that something must be eternal, so 'tis plain from the several Changes we observe in the World, the Succession of new conscious Being's, and different Dispositions of Matter, that every thing is not so; now, if something be eternal, and a great many things are not eternal, than it plainly follows, that every thing that is not eternal was made by that which is; (i. e.) originally received its Being, and whatever belongs to it, from an eternal Author or Cause: otherwise, either something must be supposed to have made itself, which before is proved to be impossible, or one temporary Being must make another, which it cannot do but by the Force and Efficacy of such Powers which together with its Existence it received from some other Being, and so on till we come to the eternal Fountain of all Power and Being.  
The only Question than is, What is eternal? for upon this depends the Resolution of all our other Doubts and Inquiries: For the better and more certain Satisfaction in which, I shall  
First, Consider all the Claims and Pretensions made to this glorious Prerogative of eternal Existence:  
Afterwards, I shall examine what those Attributes are that must necessarily belong to an eternal Being:  
And then show that that Being to which all these Attributes agree, is what we call God, and there is no other Being that is or can be invested with the like Characters.  
1. First then, As to the Claims and Pretensions to eternal Existence, these, I think, are all the Suppositions that can be made; either that Matter alone is eternal, or that the only eternal Being is what we call Mind and Spirit, or that Mind and Matter are both eternal.  
But Matter alone or coeternal with Mind, may be considered under several different Respects: for either we imagine it as having been from all Eternity rolled up in one entire solid Mass, without any Distinction or Motion of its parts, or as lose, and divided into innumerable little Particles, all in constant Agitation or Motion; out of which quiet Mass or moving Atoms the present frame of things was in time struck out and formed: or else we must suppose that the World, as it now is, has eternally existed under the same Form as to the principal parts of its Structure, with a constant Succession of several of the chief Species or sorts of things in it.  
There's nothing else imaginable but an eternal Succession of new Worlds and new Species of Being's in them; which is an Opinion too extravagantly absurd to be owned by any body: For in this Hypothesis every new World must make itself, otherwise they are only new Forms which all own their Production to some common Principle which is eternally the same, and then the Hypothesis falls in with some other before mentioned.  
2. But which of those has Truth and Certainty of its side, is the next thing to be enquired into; and the Matter will best be determined by considering the necessary Attributes and Characters of an eternal Being.  
It has been proved already, that all Being's which exist in Time must be made by something that was eternal, because it was impossible they should have existed any other way: The same will now appear à priori from the Nature of an eternal Being, the inseparable Characters of which are necessary Existence and all possible Perfection; which are both included in the Notion of an eternal Being, and both evidently infer one another: so that an eternal Being must exist necessarily, and have all possible Perfection; and whatever exists necessarily must have all possible Perfection; and whatever has all possible Perfection must exist necessarily.  
An eternal Being must exist necessarily because it exists of itself, by the nature of its own Being; for it always was what it is, it always had the same Nature it has, and therefore there always was the same Reason, which is the same necessity for its existing; which may farther be proved thus:  
That Being is said to exist necessarily which not to have existed we conceive utterly impossible, but 'tis utterly impossible that what we allow to be an eternal Being might not have existed: For than we must suppose some Power sufficient to hinder its Existence, which we cannot do without allowing the Existence of some other eternal Being by whose free Power This exists to which we deny a necessity of Existence; but than what we take from the one must be granted to the other, and there must be some original eternal Being which always necessarily existed: and this is sufficient to my present purpose, tho' I think it may be proved also, that there can be no eternal Derivations or Emanations from this Fountain but must have the same necessity of Existence as the original Being from whence they flow.  
The other necessary Character of an eternal Being is, that it has all possible Perfection; that is, that there is nothing conceivable or in the Nature of things possible, which added to it would give it any Advantage, or in any sense render it more perfect than it is.  
This is a plain and certain Consequence of its necessary Existence; for if any Perfection was wanting, than a Being of greater Perfection might be conceived possible, which could have hindered the Existence of this; and if so, than its Existence is not necessary, because it is not impossible but it might not have existed; but an eternal Being does exist necessarily, as has been proved before, therefore it is endued with all possible Perfection.  
But farther, if there can be an eternal Being, necessarily existing of all possible Perfection, as 'tis plain there may, whatever is eternal, and necessarily exists, must have also all other possible Perfection, except we suppose that two eternal necessary Being's of unequal Perfections, and independent of one another, may possibly exist at the same time; which is an Absurdity there's no manner of countenance or colour of Reason for. For why should not one eternal necessary Being have as much Perfection as another, when both are supposed independent and neither of them to have any other Principle of its Existence and Perfection but its self? Why should the one limit its own Perfections, and the other not? Or, if it could not have from itself any more, whence should this Impotence proceed in one eternal necessary Being, which was not in another? Eternity and necessity of Existence are the same in both; whatever is eternal and necessary is equally so; and therefore wherever these Attributes are found, there must be the same Powers, and all the like Consequences must flow from them.  
Another way of proving that an eternal Being must have all Perfection possible is, that the very Notion of Possibility does imply a Power somewhere correspondent to the utmost extent and capacity of things possible; so that to say a thing is possible, is to say, there is some Power capable of producing or having it; and therefore if you suppose an eternal necessary Being to want any Perfection, what is imagined to be wanting to it must be, for that very reason, impossible: For it cannot be conceived to want what is in its own Power to have, and it can receive nothing from any other Being: For no other Being of greater Power is conceivable or possible; not a temporary Being, because its Existence and Perfection is derived from that which was eternal; not an eternal necessary Being, because this which is supposed imperfect is as much an eternal necessary Being as the other, and therefore must have all the same Perfections: So that when I say that the Perfection supposed wanting is, for that reason, impossible, I do not mean only that 'tis now impossible, considering the present Constitution of things, but that 'twas absolutely and from all Eternity impossible; because there never could be any greater Power than what an eternal necessary Being must have.  
3. Now if something certainly is eternal, and necessary Existence, and all possible Perfection, are the essential Characters of an eternal Being, as has sufficiently been proved, than this eternal Being must be what we call God; the Characters and Attributes of an eternal Being belonging to Him and no other, as will easily appear by applying them to the several Hypotheses before mentioned.  
That thinking, and willing, and perception of Pleasure, are Perfections, cannot be doubted of by us Men, who can frame no Notions of any other, every thing else owing all the Goodness and Perfection it is esteemed for to its Ministry and Subserviency to these. For were there no Being's that enjoyed these Perfections, there would be no difference betwixt a regular World and a Chaos, Multiplicity and Variety of Being, and eternal universal Nothing.  
These therefore must be the principal Characters of an eternal Being; and his Knowledge, and his Power (which is his Will) and his Happiness, must be commensurate to his Existence, that is eternal necessary Qualifications, bounded only by himself; and whatever else is made by this eternal Being, as 'tis proved every thing is that is made, must be made for his good Pleasure, and the Happiness of those Being's which are capable of it; there being no other end that such a Being as we here suppose can act upon; and all his Works must carry the Marks of their Author upon them, that is, be such as are fit for a Being of those glorious Qualifications to make and design for such Ends.  
Thus may the whole Idea of God, as it is before described, be easily made out by positive direct consequence from the Principles just now laid down and proved; as plainly appears from the nature and extent of the Principles themselves, and those Instances I have given in the chief and most distinguishing, most contested Characters of the Deity.  
But I am sensible this way of proving a God, tho' in itself the truest and most concluding, and the only direct way of demonstrating this Truth, as proceeding by a regular Connexion of plain intelligible Ideas, the Natures and Properties of which are as much known to us, as those of Figures and Numbers; I am sensible, I say, that notwithstanding all this, the Proof I have now given of a God is not like to meet with so general an Acceptance, or convince so far as a lesser degree of Evidence in another kind; because the Demonstration consisting of a great many parts, and the Ideas upon which it is founded being purely intellectual, and not admitting of any sensible Representation, there are but few that are capable of so much Steadiness and Attention of Mind as is required to perceive the whole force of the Proof.  
But then 'tis certain, that those who deny a God must not own themselves to be of this number, because they will from hence be proved to act very unreasonably in denying what, by their own Confession, they do not understand, and consequently are not fit Judges of; which is as absurd as to deny a Proposition in Mathematics without being able to understand the Demonstration given of it: and here it will be allowed by all, that the Demonstration is never the less true and concluding, because there are but few that have made so great a progress in this Science, and are so well versed in this sort of reasoning as to perceive the Validity of it.  
And therefore I hope I may be excused if I have spent some time and pains in what may be called a metaphysical abstracted proof of a Deity, for the Satisfaction of such as by steady Reflection and a just Use of their Reason will easily understand it, and for the Shame and Confusion of those, who renouncing common Opinions and Arguments upon no Grounds, pretend to new Discoveries in Matters they do not understand, and consequently cannot disprove.  
However, I have been as short as I possibly could upon the positive part of the Argument, and as plain as the Subject would give me leave, having made use of the commonest easiest Terms the Language would furnish me with upon such Matters as I have had occasion to speak of: so that all the Difficulty I can imagine in the Apprehension of what I have said, must arise from the nature of the Ideas and from the connexion and variety of Consequences, which are not easily to be comprehended in one view without any Assistance from Sense. But this could not be avoided.  
Having therefore as clearly and intelligibly as I could, in a positive direct manner proved that there is a God, by showing, That there certainly is some eternal Being; that all the Characters and Attributes of an eternal Being do agree and belong to that Idea we have conceived of God; and that therefore that eternal Being, which certainly is, is as certainly what we call God: Having, I say, positively and directly proved this, I proceed to make good the same Truth negatively or by way of Consequence; which, taking this for proved That there is some eternal Being, I do by showing that the Characters and Attributes of an eternal Being can agree to nothing else but what we call God, therefore they must agree to God, therefore that eternal Being which certainly is, must be God.  
In the Prosecution of which Argument, tho' I make use of the Principles insisted upon in the former, and the Conclusions from them not being direct, have not in their own nature the same degree of Evidence as positive immediate Deductions have, yet I question not but I shall be better and more generally understood, and more satisfactorily prove what I have undertaken, to a great many Persons this way than the other.  
It has been proved already from the present Existence of things, that something must be eternal; we have reckoned up the several Pretensions that can be made to Eternity; and considered the Characters and Attributes of an eternal Being.  
Now, if that which is eternal be not God, and the Characters and Attributes of an eternal Being do not belong to him, than something else must be eternal, and some other of the fore mentioned Suppositions must be true; but upon Examination, I believe it will be found that none of those Suppositions which exclude the being of a God can be true; and therefore, what I have, proved concerning God must stand Good.  
This it is my present Business to show; and moreover I shall endeavour to make it appear, that as God is certainly eternal, and nothing else can be eternal exclusive of him, so likewise he is the only eternal Being, and whatever in any of the other Hypotheses is conceived to be eternal, if it really is so, must in some manner entirely belong to him.  
First then, Let us frame to ourselves a Notion of Matter alone, with its Parts all uniced and atrest: and when we have done so we shall easily judge how impossible it is to conceive that This should have existed necessarily of itself from all Eternity, and that in time the World, and all things in it, in the manner we now behold them, should proceed from or be produced by it.  
But, without running over all the Characters of an eternal Being, the Absurdity of this Supposition will sufficiently appear by what we plainly perceive, and know, and what constantly and irresistibly offers itself to our senses and understandings in the present frame of things.  
Solidity or the Power of Resistance, Extension, Figure, Motion, Perception, and Will, are the chief of all our Ideas, and what we are the best acquainted with; and so far as we perceive them distinct from one another, separately existing or necessarily connected our Reasonings about them are the surest of any we have; so that, if we are mistaken in these, I cannot see how we have, or are capable of having, any Knowledge at all.  
Solidity, Extension, and Figure, I do not only perceive to be constantly united, but necessarily and inseparably to co-exist together in the same Subject, which I call Matter or Body; so that, wherever any one of these is found, I certainly conclude from thence, that there are the other two also; but it does not follow, that where ever these three co-exist together there is Motion, Perception, or Will, there being no necessary Connexion between any of these Ideas and the other Ideas of Matter before mentioned, as is plain, not only from the Natures of the Ideas themselves, but from their separate Existence actually perceived by us.  
How then does Matter, which we suppose to exist without any Motion, Perception, or Will, come to have Motion added to it?  
All the Motion we perceive in Bodies without us is made by Successive Impulses from from one Body to another, where every portion of Matter owes its Motion to some other, but this cannot help us to conceive how Motion should begin where every thing is at rest: the only Idea we receive from Body in Motion is that of a Capacity of being moved when it is at rest, and not of a power of moving its self: this we have from what passes within us, when, without any external Impulse upon us, by a bare Thought or Determination of ourselves we begin a Motion in our own Bodies and, by that means, communicate it to others which were before at rest; which power of beginning Motion we call Will: but Matter is supposed to exist without Perception and Will, and consequently without this power of beginning Motion in its self; and there being nothing else to communicate it to it, it must eternally continue in the same state of Union, Indistinction and Rest.  
There needs no more for the overthrowing this Hypothesis, no stress being ever laid upon it.  
In the next place then, if we imagine all the parts of this Material World lose from one another, and all in motion, 'twill be quite as irrational to think that so it must have been eternally and necessarily, till at some certain time the scattered moving Atoms met together, or were disposed after such a manner as produced the present Structure and Constitution of things.  
Many are the Absurdities and Inconsistencies this Opinion is chargeable with; but I shall at present instance but in two.  
The first is, the supposing an eternal motion of different Particles of Matter before the Production of the World; which implies an infinite succession of Effects without any Cause to produce them: For Motion being something distinct from Matter, and separable from it, does not necessarily exist, because Matter exists, for than it would always exist in every Particle of Matter, nor does it exist of itself by a necessity independent of the necessity of Matter's Existence, because it cannot exist without it; and Matter could not produce it in its self from all Eternity, because it cannot produce it at all; and therefore there can be no such thing as eternal Motion or succession of Motion in different parts of Matter, because every Motion is a mere Effect and Passion, and there is no active power any where assignable or conceivable that could produce or cause such an Effect: so that to suppose an eternal Motion without an eternal Power of moving, is one very great Absurdity those are guilty of that set up the Hypothesis of Atoms.  
The other is, the ascribing such new Effects to Matter and Motion together in the production of the World, as for a whole Eternity before never proceeded from them, and could not possibly at any time be produced by them. For Matter and Motion not implying Perception and Will, several Bodies in motion being now actually perceived to exist without them, and the whole System of moving Atoms being in the present Hypothesis supposed so to exist before the Beginning of the World, we shall never be able from hence to account for the Existence of Being's endued with Perception and Will, which are Qualifications, in their own Natures as utterly distinct from those of Extension, Figure, and Motion, as Figure and Motion are from one another or from any other Ideas we perceive.  
That these last may be, where the other are not, is plain: How then do those other come to be added to them? If Matter at rest, whatever degree of Extension or kind of Figure it is imagined to have, can never make us conceive any possibility of Motion in it without the help of something else besides Extension and Figure; neither can Matter and Motion together,  variety of Bulk, Texture, or Motion we represent to ourselves, give us any Idea of perception and Will, or a power of producing them: But Matter in motion must eternally move on, or rest and move by turns if you please, without advancing to any new Perfections: which is too plain to need any proof, if it had not been very learnedly and fully made out already by others, and therefore I shall not enlarge in the Disparagement of matter, nor expose this ridiculous Scheme of things by showing all the peculiar Inconsistencies in it; but leave the farther Disproof of it to those general Arguments, which equally conclude against all the false Hypotheses concerning the being of the World, which I reserve till I have done with them in particular.  
And the next of them to be considered is that in which it is supposed that the World has eternally existed under the same Form that we now behold it, as to the principal parts of its Structure, with a constant Succession of several of the chief Species or sorts of things in it.  
This Opinion of the Eternity of the World has been the most exploded of any, tho' most of the Favourers of it have at the same time asserted the eternal Existence of a God too; and the Reason of this is, because the greatest part of the most ancient Philosophers and learned Men thought they perceived such visible Marks and Tokens of the Newness of the World, in the Rise, Propagation, and Increase of Societies and Governments, Languages and Laws, Arts and Sciences; and the Tradition of the Original and Beginning of Things was in their time so fresh, and so generally received in all Countries, that few of them were able to reconcile all this with the eternal Duration of the World: And this Tradition having all along continued, and the Truth of those ancient Observations having been more and more confirmed by many new Inventions of things since, and some of them of such general Use that 'tis impossible to imagine they should not have been invented before if the World had been of a very long continuance, or have been lost again after they were once invented, the same Objections have constantly lain against the Eternity of the World; and these have been strengthened by several other Arguments drawn from the many Absurdities and Inconsistencies that seem to be implied in the Notion of eternal Succession.  
All which, and whatever else can be said against the Eternity of the World when asserted together with the eternal Existence of a God, do more strongly conclude against this Supposition, when the Being of a God is not taken into it, under which respect I now consider it; and thus considered, it is moreover, besides what has been already alleged, attended with the same Difficulties and chargeable with the same Objections as the former Hypothesis was.  
For Matter and Motion were no more capable of eternally producing such a Succession of various Objects as we perceive in the World, than they were of producing them and the World together in time; and yet, if we suppose an eternal Succession of new Objects without a God, they must all be produced by the Power of Matter and Motion: For every particular new Object, being produced in time, must owe its Being to that which was eternal; and nothing in this Supposition being eternal but Matter and Motion, which, under all Changes, continue the same, every new Generation of Being's must have their Original from these, the precedent Generation having no other Powers nor Differences from the succeeding, but what arise from the various Disposition of Matter and Motion.  
This is plain as to all such Being's as want the Faculties of Perception and Will; and, upon Examination, the Case will be found to be the same with respect to such as are endued with these Qualifications: For even these also, in the present Hypothesis, must be allowed to derive their whole Being from Matter and Motion; because they are temporary Being's, which began to be, and there is nothing else eternal but Matter and Motion, and consequently there is no other 'Cause assignable for their Production.  
Which need not be proved to those who hold the Eternity of the World without a God, because there are none, I believe, of this Opinion, but do ascribe the Original of Perception and Will to Matter and Motion, making the former only different Modisications of the latter: in which they act very consistently with themselves, in making an absurd Scheme all of a piece, not blending Truth with Falsehood, but taking in all the Absurdities that do any way depend upon one another, and belong to the main building.  
However, that I may leave no room for Exception from any side, I think myself obliged to show that, if Perception and Will are not the Issue and Effects of Matter and Motion, as has already been shown they are not, the Existence of intelligent Being's without a God is inconceivable and impossible; because no other Cause of their Production can be assigned.  
For suppose it should be enquired how such a purticular man came to exist, how he came to begin to be a conscious Being, he did not put himself together in such a manner as we now perceive him to exist, he did not give himself those Capacities and Powers he is conscious of, together with his Consciousness of them; this is a flat Contradiction, and granted to be so on all hands.  
Whence then did he derive this mighty Difference of Being we perceive in him, by which he is distinguished from all other that fall under our Cognizance? Not from some intelligent Being of infinitely greater Perfections, of the like kind with those he perceives in himself; not from any mechanical Powers of Matter and Motion: both these Causes are set aside in the present Enquiry.  
Nothing then remains, but that the Man which now exists, and sometime ago began to be, must have received his Existence, and all those Qualifications which distinguish him from Matter, from some other man of the like nature with himself, who existed before him; but this is absurd and irrational, not only upon the account of the infinite Subordination of Causes and Effects which follows from this Supposition, which, by every body, is rejected as a shocking repugnant Notion; but because it is hereby affirmed that one Being may solely by its own power produce another Being of the same Nature and Perfections with its self, which I take to be the next Impossibility to a Being's making itself.  
For supposing the Existence of a God, and that that may be allowed we have seen before, 'tis impossible that God should have another God of all the like Perfections with himself, but of a distinct Existence, proceeding from him: in like manner, we conceive it utterly impossible that any kind of Matter should produce the least new Particle of Matter: nay, one part of Matter never imparts any Motion to another without losing its self what the other receives; and in all other material Productions there is only a new disposition of the parts of Matter, and not any new Being of a distinct Nature from it; which new Disposition is not received entirely from some other Being of the same kind or texture with its self, but from material Particles and Motions conveyed from several distant parts of Nature; and yet such different dispositions of Matter as are observed in the World cannot be conceived to be the product of Matter and Motion alone, without the Assistance and Regulation of some other Being of higher Perfections, as has been shown before. How then is it possible that one Mind or conscious Being should produce another entire distinct Mind or Being of equal Perfections with its self, without losing any thing from itself, or borrowing any Assistance from any other kind of Being existing in the World? and what is as strange, do all this without being conscious of this its chief Perfection, as well as it is of all its other?  
This, I say, cannot possibly be; and therefore, if the World be eternal without a God, all the continual Changes and new Productions that have ever been in it must be ascribed to matter and Motion; but, Matter and Motion not being able to produce such Effects, from hence I conclude that the Eternity of the World considered as it now is, without the eternal Existence of a God is impossible.  
And thus I have considered all the several Hypotheses which pretend to give any account of the present Constitution of things called the World, with exclusion to the Being of a God.  
I shall now take a short Review of each of them in conjunction with the Existence of a God, and then pass to more general Reflections to show the Incompetency and Falsehood of any other account whatsoever that can be given of the Original and Existence of things besides that of their proceeding in some manner from God.  
But, before I enter upon the Consideration of these Hypotheses, which do all, tho' in different manners, establish an eternal Coexistence of Matter and Mind, I think it necessary to premise something concerning the Nature and Distinction of these two kind of Being's, as far as we are capable of perceiving them; that so I may cut off a great many Disputes and Mistakes occasioned by the Confusion of our Ideas upon this Subject, and what I have to say afterwards may be better understood.  
I do not perceive any such Connexion betwixt the Ideas of Perception and Will and those of Extension, Figure, and Motion, that wherever the former are, there must the latter be also; nor do I see any Reason why Perception and Will may not exist separately from Extension, Figure, and Motion, as well as Extension, Figure, and Motion may exist separately from Perception and Will; only because these are actually perceived so to exist, and we have not yet been actually conscious of such a separate Existence of the other. But this does not hinder but that Perception and Will may so exist, and have a Subject or Substance of their own, distinct from that which supports these Qualities of Extension, Figure, and Motion.  
If Thinking and Willing were common to every Being we knew, we could no more frame an Idea of a pure material Substance existing without these Qualifications, than we can now of a pure thinking Substance, existing without those Qualities we attribute to Matter only: but 'tis certain from an actual Separation of these different Ideas perceivable in different Subjects, that some of them may exist without the other, tho' without this actual Separation we could not have been so certain of it; and therefore, tho' the other have never yet been perceived to exist separately from these, it does not follow from thence that they cannot so exist: but, considering the vast distance and distinction in the Natures of the several Ideas, without any conceivable Resemblance or Relation to one another, 'tis very probable they do arise from different Principles, and are founded in different Subjects.  
However, having no farther Certainty of it from natural Reason, and I purposely wave all other Proof at present, let us suppose that Perception and Will, Extension, Figure, and Motion, have all the same common Subject to support them, are radically and ultimately founded in the same Substance, and issue from the same Principle; which Subject, Substance or Principle, we know nothing more of than that it is something which sustains these different Qualities, or whatever else we call them, which could not exist of themselves without it: Supposing, I say, all this, 'tis ridiculously, and without any colour of Reason, inferred from hence, that therefore Perception and Will are only different Modifications or Dispositions of Extension, Figure, and Motion, or do in some manner or other wholly result from them: For why may not distinct Qualities co-exist together in the same Subject, without being made one from another? or why should Perception and Will be Modifications of Extension, Figure, and Motion, any more than Extension, Figure, and Motion are different Modes of Perception and Will? I cannot see what ground they can have for the contrary of either of these, who affirm what we call the Mind or Soul of Man to be nothing else but Matter under a peculiar Disposition of its Parts.  
But that Thinking and Willing, upon a Supposition that they actually exist in matter and cannot exist without it, are not therefore Modifications or Effects of the other Qualities of Matter which are antecedently in it before the Addition of these, may be farther illustrated by this Instance.  
Motion is something added to the original and essential Qualities of Matter, owes its Capacity of existing to it, and cannot exist without it; but 'tis plain that Motion is no Extension or effect of Solidity, Modification or Figure, which are every thing we conceive in Motion before Matter is added to it; but something in its own nature distinct from all these, and not resulting from any conceivable Difference of them: So that it does not follow that, because Matter is solid, or so and so extended or figured, that therefore it must be in motion.  
And if this be true of Motion, it must be much more so of Perception and Will: For Motion does involve Matter in the very Idea of it: there's no conceiving of Motion without conceiving at the same time something that is moved; and I cannot consider a thing as moved, without considering it as extended too, and Extension necessarily implies the other essential Properties of Matter: but I can form a Notion of Perception and Will, and be conscious of something perceiving and willing, without having any Ideas at the same time of Solidity, Extension, Figure, or Motion; and therefore, if Motion may be joined to the other Qualities of Matter without resulting from them, tho' they are necessarily implied in the Idea we have of it, 'tis much more probable that Perception and Will may co-exist with Motion and all the rest of the material Qualities, without being the effects or product of them, when they carry no Marks of such an Original upon them, and in their Conception have no manner of appearance of any Relation to them. And, if it does not follow that because Matter is of such a nature, and so modified, therefore it moves, much less can it be inferred that, because Matter is so and so disposed and moved, therefore it thinks and wills.  
This being premised, it plainly appears from hence, that 'tis much more probable in Reason that God should be the only eternal Being, than that Matter, any way considered, should be coeternal with him: For the Notion of God is full and complete, without any Consideration of Matter, and the Addition of the Idea of Matter to it does not add any thing to the Perfection of the Divine Being.  
The Power of producing Matter and Motion, and forming an infinite variety of Being's out of them, is indeed a Perfection very worthy of God, and what we justly attribute to him; but the actual Existence of any of these does no way heighten the Idea we have of him, whom we conceive to be as perfect in himself before their Existence, as after it.  
The actual Communication of some of his Perfections to a particular rank of his Creatures, and the giving them the Use and Enjoyment of his other Works, do raise a new Idea of him in them, which they call by the name of Goodness; but this they look upon only as a voluntary opening and disclosing the Glory of his original Nature, and not a necessary additional Advancement of it.  
It is therefore most agreeable to our Reason, and all the Notions we have of the Divine nature, that God should have existed alone from all Eternity, and in time produced the World and all things in it.  
But, if any Man had rather believe that Matter at rest, or Matter and Motion, or the present Frame of the World with the several kinds of beings in it, were coeternal with God, he must at the same time hold that  
Whatever was coeternal with God did either subsist eternally of its self, dictinctly and independently of him,  
Or is really a necessary part of the Divine nature, and helps to make up the Idea of God,  
Or did eternally proceed from him because he had eternally an effectual will to produce it:  
But, the first of these Suppositions cannot be true; for neither Matter itself, nor Matter and Motion, nor the present Constitution of things can be eternal independently of God; because, as has been fully proved already, neither of them can be supposed to have existed eternally without a God.  
From which proof it sufficiently appears, that neither of them have the essential Properties of an eternal Being viz. necessary Existence and all possible Perfection; nor the Consequence of them, viz. the actual production of all temporary Being's:  
For which soever of them is supposed, there are supposed also wanting those Perfections we ascribe to God, which are certainly the chief if not the only ones imaginable by us. And there can be no necessity of Existence where these are wanting, because than we may suppose a necessary eternal Being with them which will be of greater Perfections than another necessary eternal Being without them; but we cannot suppose two necessary and independent eternal Being's of unequal Perfections, therefore what wants any of these Qualifications, we ascribe to God, cannot exist necessarily and of itself.  
And further, what we suppose destitute of Knowledge and Will can have no sufficient power of producing Temporary Being's, was it in its self allowed to be eternal; as is manifest from what has been said upon the several Hypotheses that exclude the Being of a God:  
And therefore what ever is supposed eternal which does not enter into the Idea we have given of God, must be taken into it as necessarily belonging to the Divine Nature, or be looked upon as the free eternal effect of his eternal Will.  
Thus some have affrmed that the World, and every thing we see or know, is God:  
Others, that all things flowed from God; by which, if they mean necessary Emanation, they must be referred to his Being and Essence, if production to his Will.  
So that however we express ourselves upon these Matters, every thing that we can imagine; or frame any Notion of, must be either God, or some way proceed from him, be reckoned to his Nature or his Works.  
The Inference from all which is this: That 'tis most rational to think that no more belongs to the Idea of God than what we have before ascribed to him, and that he did in time, of his own free will, produce every thing not contained in that Idea, even original Matter and Motion as well as the frame and Structure of the World, and the Variety of particular Being's in it.  
But if any Man asserts the Eternity of any of these together with God in the full extent of the Idea we have given of him, however his Opinion may be true or false, it can make no change in our Thoughts with regard to Religion: the Idea of God, being so far the same here as we have established it the same Consequences will every where flow from it; and the Assertors of any such Opinion will bear the same Relation to God, and be under the same Obligations with us that differ from them in some other things relating to God; which however held, have no other Influence upon us than as we are obliged not to Entertain any false Notions of God willingly when we may have better Information; or, if we cannot, yet other Opinions may appear more suitable to our Reason, and more for the Honour of God; which I take to be the present Case, and therefore shall wave any further Enquiry into these Matters, as having no prospect of a Possibility of knowing any thing more about them.  
Thus have I, with as much Brevity and Dispatch as the Subject would allow, examined all the Accounts that are or can be given of the present Existence of things. And, from particular Observations upon each of them, not all that might be made but such as I judged sufficient for my purpose, I think, I have made it very evident, that there must be a God, or Being of such a nature as I before described, who was the true and only Cause or Author of every thing we see, or know, or has over been, beside him; and without the Supposition of such a Being, the World could not possibly have ever existed any other way.  
I shall now add some general Reflections to strengthen the common Hypothesis concerning the Original of the World, and so conclude the Proof of a God.  
That the World is as we now perceive, must be ascribed to Chance, Necessity, or Wisdom; but Chance is nothing, Necessity without a God unintelligible, and therefore Wisdom, or what is meant by it, God, who is a wise Being, made the World, and all things in it, in the form and manner we now behold and admire.  
The World's being made by chance is being we know not how, being made without any Cause: and to speak thus, is to use Words without any Meaning under them.  
There's no Man that has made any Inquiries into the Nature of Things, but knows, that nothing can be that before was not, without owing its Original to some real positive Being of antecedent Existence. Inadequate and insufficient Causes are often assigned for the Production of things; because being next to, and immediately preceding the Effects, they are solely taken notice of, without any regard had to their Subordination to, or Direction by others; and oftentimes something is thought to be the next and immediate Cause of a thing which is no ways concerned in it: but in both these Cases, 'tis by reason of some real Efficiency observed that these Judgements are made, which must all proceed from some real Being, tho' there may be a Mistake in attributing it to a wrong one, or to one that had only a share in the Effect; and therefore there must be something real assigned, which was as much and as properly the immediate Cause of the meeting of the Parts of Matter in order to make a World, as the parts of Matter so met were the Cause of the Production of the World; which can be nothing else but such and such particular Determinations of Figure and Motion in the several parts of Matter; but these must be either eternal, or the Effect of certain eternal sixth Rules resulting from the Natures of Matter and Motion, or be made by a divine Power; in all which there can be nothing casual, but every thing necessary or providential.  
For, supposing the whole System of Matter so and so figured and moved, we cannot consider it as indifferent to several Effects, but necessarily determined to one, which must inevitably follow such a supposed Disposition, unless something extrinsical to Matter should restrain or change the Determination. If any thing extrinsical to Matter, or besides Matter and Motion be allowed, it must be God; if there be nothing else existing but Matter and Motion, then are all the Effects resulting from them necessary, because whatever Disposition or Motion of Matter we suppose, and whensoever in the whole extent of Eternity we suppose it, every following Effect must have been what it is, and there could have been no other produced in the room of it.  
The Reason why certain Portions of Matter so and so figured and moved do not always necessarily produce the same Effects is, because their particular Determinations are restrained or overruled by the necessary Impulses of other extrinsical Matter, or the greater Power of the Divine Will; which, being unperceived by us, make us look upon several of these particular Effects as casual, which can only, and that very improperly too with respect to our Comprehension, be styled so; whereas in reality, with respect to the universal Nature and Efficiency of things, they must be either necessary or voluntary.  
But if we consider the whole Frame and Collection of things together, we cannot form any sort of Idea of Chance, either in the World as it now is, or in its original Formation, unless we will be so ridiculous as to say every thing that is is casual; that every thing that has been from all Eternity happened by chance, and that it was by chance that Matter and Motion were eternal, or that any thing existed at all, Chance having the same Title to all these Effects as to any one of them.  
I need not consider the other Occasion we take of forming this Notion of Chance from the Indifference we are oftentimes conscious of in ourselves with regard to several contrary Actions, which makes the following of one Action rather than another, where the Cause seems equally disposed to both, be looked upon as a casual Result rather than a proper Effect. This may be accounted for otherwise by the Preponderancy of some motive determining us to act this way rather than another, and the seeming Indifference be showed to be the effect of our Ignorance of the whole Nature and all the Consequences of the thing in question, and the several Reasons and ways of acting; but there is no occasion for such a Proof, because those that say the World was made by chance cannot be supposed to use the Word in this Sense, forasmuch as they do not acknowledge that God or any intelligent Being was concerned in the Production of it; or, if they did, would they be so absurd, and entertain such low Notions of him, as to think that some chance Thought or Action of his produced it.  
'Tis plain then, that Chance is nothing else but an insignificant Word, and an ignorant Pretence, which has no Sense nor Reason under it, and therefore can give us no manner of light in our Inquiries into the Nature and Original of things.  
Neither will Necessity, which is the next thing to be considered, give us much better Satisfaction: For, if we examine this Notion well, 'twill evidently appear that there can be no Necessity for the present Existence of the World in the manner we behold.  
The Question is not, whether 'twas necessary that God should make such a World as this, supposing there is a God, tho' this may easily be proved that 'twas not; but, whether 'twas absolutely necessary there should be such a World as this without a God: and I think it may be certainly demonstrated that it was not. For nothing can be said to be absolutely necessary, but what 'tis altogether impossible should be otherwise; but 'tis not impossible that the World should never have existed, or should ever be destroyed now it does exist: For if this be absolutely impossible, then is it absolutely impossible that there should be any thing of greater Perfection and Power than the World; for if there was, that Being of greater Perfection and Power than the World could have hindered the World from existing, or could now destroy it; but 'tis not impossible there should be such a Being because it is not impossible to conceive such a Being, for what may be conceived to exist may exist.  
But if any Man shall say he cannot conceive such a Being as could hinder Matter from existing, or destroy it now it does exist, because he cannot conceive a Power of making something out of nothing, or of reducing something to nothing, the last of which is here supposed, and no Account can be given of the present Existence of things without allowing the first if such a Being as this in question is supposed, and the Necessity of the World's Existence is taken away: If any Man, I say, should object this, I answer, that it seems to me conceivable enough from the Idea. I have of God, that what is here ascribed to him may fall within the compass of his Power; which reaching to all things possible, that is, to all things which do not imply a Contradiction, may extend to the Acts of Creation and Annihilation; which, tho' the manner of the Performance be incomprehensible, cannot be proved to carry any Contradiction in them.  
However, if there be those that pretend they cannot comprehend the Possibility of these Actions, yet this is very conceivable by any Man, that there may be some Being of that Perfection and Power, that tho' he could not hinder Matter from existing, or reduce it to nothing afterwards, yet he might have hindered it from being put into any Motion, Form, or Order, and continued it in that State, or could reduce it now to a confused, unmoving Chaos, or scatter it into innumerable incoherent Particles. There's no manner of Difficulty for a Man to frame a Notion of these things, who has seen frequent Instances of the same kind of Power in a lesser degree exercised by Men. And this is sufficient to overthrow the Necessity of the present Frame and Constitution of things, which was the thing designed.  
If therefore the World and all things in it, in the Condition we now behold, do not subsist by a necessity of Being, nor are the result of Chance, it immediately follows that they are the Effect and Product of Wisdom, the Workmanship and Contrivance of a wise Agent.  
This is certainly the most rational Hypothesis that can be devised or imagined; for we that maintain this Opinion, have clear and distinct Ideas of Power and Wisdom by which we explain the Original of Things; but those who ascribe the Existence and Structure of the World to any thing else, have no manner of Ideas of what they ascribe them to. No Man has any Idea of Chance or Necessity, except he annexes the Idea of Power to them; and he can have no Idea of Power without Knowledge, all Power proceeding originally from Mind, which by Consciousness we are Sensible of, and we can frame no Notion of any other Seat or Spring of Power; and therefore we make some Mind or intelligent Being the Author of every thing, as being the only conceivable Fountain of all Power.  
Our Notions of Wisdom, Contrivance, Design, are as clear as that of Power, and known the same way: And if they are ever plainly perceivable in their Works and Effects they are so in the Frame and Constitution of the World, and the several parts of it. If we have any reason to conclude that Towns and Cities were built, and Kingdoms and Commonwealths were modelled by the Thought and Contrivance of intelligent Being's, we have much more Cause to believe that the Universe was made, fashioned, and disposed by the Counsel and Wisdom of some more perfect and capacious Mind; the Marks and Prints of Wisdom being plainer and more legible in the Oeconomy of the World than any of the most admired Works of Man.  
And therefore, if we allow ourselves to have any Ideas of Power and Knowledge we must confess that Power is inseparable from Knowledge; and that there is no Power but there is some Knowledge commensurate to it, it being utterly inconceivable that any thing should be, or be made, which there is no Being that knows.  
And this, I think is of itself Ground enough to believe there is a God who was the Author of the World and every thing in it, without carrying the Proof any higher; but for those that will not be satisfied with this, I have given a farther Demonstration of the Being of God, not with any Hopes of convincing them, but to make it impossible for them to urge any thing to the contrary.  
Thus have I finished the Proof of a God, and (as I think) made it very evident, that there really is such a Being, and that what we call God is a Being of such a nature as I before described, invested with all these Characters and Properties I there attributed to him.  
Which Considerations, together with those plain and easy Reflections before suggested upon ourselves and our own Nature, if carefully attended to, will certainly convince us of the Reality of all those Relations I have supposed between God and Man; and furnish us with many direct and undeniable Arguments of the Truth and Necessity of Religion: which is the third Thing I proposed, and the principal part of the Design I am pursuing in this Discourse.  
III. From the Knowledge I have shown we have or are capable of having concerning the Humane and Divine Natures. I shall deduce a positive and direct Proof of Religion.  
Religion, in short, is whatever we are obliged to by God. In order therefore to prove there is such a thing as Religion, we must show that Man is capable of being obliged to act after such a particular manner, that God has a Power of obliging him so to act; and that Man is actually under such an Obligation, or God does actually will and require something of him.  
Now 'tis plain by the Account we have before given of the Nature of Man, and every one that consults himself may find it to be so, that he has in several cases a Power of determining himself to act or not to act, and a Power of acting or not acting according to such Determination; that he is influenced to act several ways by different Motives and Prospects; and that he oftentimes suffers himself to be influenced by certain Considerations, which he might and ought not to have acted by, as he plainly perceives and knows by condemning himself afterwards for what he has done; and that he often neglects or refuses to obey such Motives and Incitements to Action which he ought to have followed, as his own Approbation of them before and after the Neglect or Refusal convinces him of. From whence it evidently follows, that a Man may be obliged to act one particular way rather than another; that is, there may be such Reasons and Motives for his acting this way, that, upon a just Balance of all the several Inducements that could be offered to him for any other, he must acknowledge aught to determine him; so that should he act the way, he must necessarily approve himself, and should he act any other he must necessarily condemn himself.  
That Being which has a Power of offering such Reasons and Motives to any Man as these, may properly be said to have a Power of obliging him to act such or such a way.  
And that God has this Power is very manifest if we consider what it is that influences and determines us to act; which being nothing else but some kind of Pain or Pleasure in present or in prospect, God, who can do all things possible, and consequently who can put us into, and continue us to all Eternity in a state of Pain or Pleasure, the greatest our Natures are capable of, can, by annexing these to different ways of acting, offer such Motives to us, as we shall be forced to acknowledge aught to determine us to act one particular way; and therefore God can, if he please, oblige us so to act.  
The only Question than is, Whether we are actually under such Obligation; whether God has prescribed such Actions, and annexed such Consequences to different kinds of Action as make it necessary to our Happiness to act that particular way he has prescribed.  
But, before I enter upon the particular Resolution of this Question, I think it requisite to give a fuller Account of the Nature and Ground of what we call Obligation or Duty, together with the Right and Power of obliging.  
Now 'tis plain from what has been already said, That an Obligation with respect to Man is nothing else but such a Reason or Motive as when duly offered to him necessarily determines him to choose or prefer one way of acting before another; and this Reason or Motive can be nothing else but a greater degree of Misery or Happiness to be avoided or obtained by thus acting, than all things considered can be avoided or obrained by acting any other way. Such a Reason or Motive as this, does, in the strictest and properest Sense of the Word, oblige us to act according to it; or, which is all one, we ought, or it is our Duty, so to do; that is, we find ourselves under a necessity of Judging thus.  
There is no other Notion or Ground of Obligation imaginable; or if there be any other pretended, upon Examination it will be found to be ultimately resolvable into this.  
What is meant by the Right and Power of obliging, in what respects they are the same, or, at least, only distinct Conceptions of the same thing, and in what respects they are different, will plainly appear if we consider the several Instances to which these Notions are applied.  
All the Being's capable of obliging or being obliged are those we call intelligent Being's; which, as far as our Knowledge, in these Matters reaches, are only God, Angels, and Men.  
Whether there are any Angels or middle Natures betwixt God and Men, and how they Act with regard to other intelligent Being's, natural Reason does not certainly inform us, but, in general, with respect to all the intelligent Being's we can frame any Notions of, it may be affirmed that no one has a Right or Power of obliging another to act such a particular way be prescribes, any farther than he has a Power of contributing to the Happiness or Misery of that Being he so prescribes to.  
Thus we are led to conclude by all we know concerning God and ourselves;  
For first, as to God; I am not able to comprehend, how he can any otherwise induce an Obligation upon Men to obey him, or live according to the Rules he prescribes, than by making them know that he has it in his Power to render them happy or miserable, according as they obey or disobey him; and that he will certainly make them the one or the other, as their Actions shall deserve.  
'Tis not his great and supereminent Power in creating Men and giving them Being, which is solely in its self the ground and foundation of his Title to their Obedience: This, without a capacity of being happy, could never become a Reason or Motive of acting to them, and consequently, could never 〈◊〉 found any Obligation: For was Misery the certain unalterable Condition: of their being, and they were sure their Misery was to have no End, and was capable of no Increase, how could the Author of their Being be imagined to oblige them to obey his Commands, or act one way rather than another, when he could not offer or propose any thing to them which would determine them so to act; all degrees of Pleasure, or lesser Pain, being supposed impossible; so that which way soever they acted, there could be no ground for approving themselves for it, because they were not capable of that or any other Pleasure, nor for condemning themselves, because their Misery was not capable of that, or any other Addition. They might indeed, by an overruling Power, be forced to such and such Actions; but this is not a rational Obligation, which is acknowledged and submitted to as suitable and agreeable to Reason, and performed with the full Concurrence of the Will of those that obey it.  
In vain then, and very falsely, do some nice abstracted Thinkers magnify the metaphysical Excellence and Perfection of pure Being or Existence, even when joined with the extremest degree of Misery: a Moment's Experience would soon convince them that to be, was not otherwise the Perfection of a rational Being than as it gave him a Capacity of being happy: but if they could be supposed to continue in their Opinion in such a State, and think it better to be miserable than not to be at all, the Satisfaction of knowing themselves to be must out-ballance the other Misery they felt, and consequently, upon that account, give the Author of their Being a Title to their Obedience: but then his Right of obliging them would be solely founded in his Power of making them less or more miserable, by giving, continuing, or taking away, that Satisfaction, they enjoy: which confirms the Truth of what I assert.  
This will farther appear if, in the next place, we consider the Right and Power of obliging that Men have or pretend to have over one another; which, whatever kind or extent it be of, must be all founded in, and commensurate to, their power of contributing to the Happiness or Misery of one another.  
But oftentimes it so happens, that some Men demand to be obeyed by others, and require them to live according to their Orders and Directions, when, at the same time, they have no Power, nor ever will have, to reward their Obedience, or punish their Disobedience so as to make it more for their Interest while they live here to obey than disobey them. Upon which account, the Right of obliging is oftentimes looked upon as existing separate from the Power of obliging, but without any ground.  
For, if there be a God that will judge the Actions of Men, and give to every one according to his work, and the Persons requiring Obedience from others are commissioned by him to require it, they have a Power as well as a Right of obliging them to it, for they have a Power of proposing such Motives and Raesons for their acting, as are sufficient to determine them to obey rather than disobey, viz. the Rewards and Punishments annexed by God to their Obedience or Disobedience; and consequently they have a Power of contributing to their Happiness or Misery, tho' they cannot be the immediate Instruments of either themselves.  
But, if there be no God, then are they not commissioned by him to command others, but they usurp upon the common Liberty and Equality of Mankind; and, in this case they have no more a Right than they have a Power of obliging those whose Interest it is with respect to this Life not to obey them; as will more fully appear hereafter, under another Head.  
Another Instance there is, where the Power of obliging is, or may be exercised without the Right, and that is, when some Men by the Advantages of more Skill and Strength than others, without any Authority from God command their Obedience upon the prospect of great Rewards and Punishments, in such things where the Persons so commanded are left to their Liberty by God to act either way, as shall seem best, or most for their Advantage to them in this Life: In which case, those that prescribe such particular Actions to others, have a Power of obliging them to obey because they have a Power of determining them to act by the Consideration of greater Happiness to be obtained, or Misery to be avoided by acting that particular way they prescribe than would attend the contrary way of acting, but they have no Right to use this Power, because they are themselves under greater Obligations, with respect to God, not to employ it, than those upon whom it is exercised are with respect to them to obey it: but if there be no God, then is their Power their Right.  
From all which it follows, that wherever there is a Right of obliging there is a Power of obliging, and, where there is an absolute  Power of obliging there is, for that very Reason, a Right also; but where there is a subordinate dependent Power of obliging, it may be exercised without Right, that is, contrary to some Obligations which the Persons who exercise it own to a Superior Power.  
But here, by a Right of obliging I would be understood to mean a Liberty of offering such Motives and Considerations to rational Being's, as when duly applied will determine them to act according to them, with the full Consent of their Mind, and make them infallibly approve and be pleased with themselves for so doing; not a title to order and dispose of them and their Actions by an irresistible: Force, according to the free and unlimited Pleasure of that Being to whom the Title is supposed to belong.  
Whether God has such a Right as this over his Creatures, is no part of the Enquiry now; but that he has such a Right and Power of obliging as I have explained, is sufficiently proved from the necessary Attrilutes of God before specified, and from the Nature and Ground of all Obligation, of which I have here given a particular account.  
Whether God has a Right and Title to our Obedience upon any other Foundation but that of his Power to make us happy; whether 'tis possible for Man to act voluntarily upon any other Reason or Motive but that of his own Happiness; and whether Happiness be the ultimate End of all our Actions, and the ultimate Ground of all Obligation, or only a subordinate but necessary and inseparable Consideration; if what I have already said upon these Matters does not satisfy, I shall no farther dispute; because I am very well assured that whatever other Grounds or Motives of our Obedience to God may be imagined by some who pretend to act upon more noble and disinteressed Principles than that of their own Happiness, 'tis impossible to persuade a Man who does not yet believe any Religion at all to become religious, except it can be plainly, or probably at least, made out to him, that he shall better his Condition by it. This I am sure is the only Argument that can prevail upon an Unbeliever to embrace Religion; and I sirmly believe whoever fairly consults himself, will find that he neither does nor can act upon any other ground, 'Tis true indeed, we often act without knowing or considering what the Consequences will be, and we are made and disposed after such a manner, that we readily acknowledge ourselves obliged to submit to the Will and Commands of God without any express Consideration of future Happiness to be obtained by our Obedience; but if it could be evidently proved to us that Misery would be the certain Consequence of those Actions we thought ourselves upon the first View obliged to, we should then be forced to acknowledge that we were mistaken in our first Judgements, and that it would be more reasonable to act another way which we were assured would be more for our Happiness.  
These Things being premised, I return to the main Question, Whether we are actually under any Obligations to God, or which is the same thing in other terms, Whether there be any such thing as Beligion? And in this manner I shall prove there is.  
First, I shall show that there is such a particular way of acting, such a course of Actions, or Scheme and Model of living, which whoever duly and fairly reflects upon, will be forced to acknowledge that if he did live after That manner he should approve himself for so doing, and if he lived otherwise, he should condemn himself for it; and therefore, he that finds himself necessarily determined to approve such a particular way of living, and to condemn the contrary, must acknowledge that he ought or is obliged to act accordingly. From whence I shall draw this Inference, that therefore all things considered, it must be more for his Happiness to act this way than any other, because were it not, his free  Judgement could not, upon a fair Balance of all the several Reasons and Motives of Action, approve him when he did so act, and condemn him when he did not; there being nothing else but the different Motives of Happiness and Misery that can determine the Mind to these different Acts: And from thence it follows, that he is truly and really obliged to act as he judges he ought to act.  
Secondly, I shall prove that God, who was the Author of our Being, gave us such a Nature, by which we are neceflarily determined to judge after this manner, with that End and Design that we should exercise and employ those other Faculties and Powers he has furnished us with suitably hereunto; and that consequently, what our Reason tells us aught to be done, we are commanded by God to do; that 'tis God who proposes those prevailing Reasons and Motives which determine us to act, and gives them all the Power and Influence they have over us; and therefore, what God has made to appear reasonable or unreasonable to us to do, will accordingly conduce to our Happiness or Misgry, and upon that account oblige us to act or not to act. And farther, I shall endeavour to show under this Head, that God purposely created us after such a manner with a Design to oblige us to such and such Performances, not only from the general Consideration of the Make and Nature of Man, but from many other Tokens and Indications of such an End or Design plainly visible in the World. And the Sum of what we are thus obliged to by God, is what we call our Religion.  
Thirdly, I shall positively and directly prove from the Nature of Religion itself, that a regular Practice of all those Duties or Obligations of which it consists would certainly conduce to the greatest Happiness Man is capable of, considered only in his present Condition, as included within the Bounds of this Life.  
Fourthly, I shall show that the Defect of such a Practice, and the Consequences of it, do necessarily lead us to the Acknowledgement of such a future State, as is sufficient to determine us to prefer one particular way of acting before another, upon such Reasons and Motives. that is, such Degrees of Happiness and Misery as we are sure greater and more powerful cannot be offered to us.  
From all which Considerations, the Certainty and Necessity of Religion will be plainly and fully evinced.  
1. First then, I am to show that there is one particular way of acting which we are necessarily determined to prefer to any other; so that, upon a clear and impartial View of pure natural Reason, we cannot but like, approve, or be pleased with this way of acting, and dislike, condemn, or be displeased with the contrary; and farther, that we must judge or acknowledge that what we thus like or approve we ought or are obliged to do, and what we dislike or condemn we ought or are obliged not to do; and consequently that we are really obliged to act according to such Judgements, because it must be more for our Happiness so to act.  
That there are some natural Notions of Good and Evil, Right and Wrong, or some such certain Distinctions founded in or resulting from the Natures and Relations of things, as cannot be altered or destroyed by any arbitrary Agreement or Institution whatsoever; and that these are perceivable by the bare use of our Reason the same way that any other part of our Knowledge is, are Truths which the greatest and wisest part of Mankind have constantly owned, however they may have differed in assigning which they were, and what were the true Grounds and Foundations of them.  
Now, to put these Matters beyond all reasonable doubt, and to cut off all occasion of Contest concerning them, I only desire this may be granted me, that there are some things so clearly and fully proposed to the Mind, that a Man cannot deny or withhold his Assent to them, and that wherever this happens, there is the greatest Certainty we are capable of: This being granted, it necessarily follows that we may be as certain that such or such Things ought or ought not to be done, as that such or such Things are or are not after this or that manner, or are so and so related to one another.  
As for Example: I may be as fully satisfied that I ought to desire and endeavour after my own Happiness, and that I ought not to take away the Happiness of another Man, when I know I shall not add to my own by it, as I can be of the Truth of these Propositions; that every thing that moves is; that 'tis impossible the same thing should exist and not exist at the same time; that is, in both these Instances the things assented to have the same Suitableness or Agreeableness to our Reason, and the same Force or Violence would be offered to our Understandings by a Denial of either: Which is all the Ground and Criterion of Certainty assignable by us.  
Several other moral Propositions might be brought, or deduced from these, that carry an irresistible Conviction along with them, not to be overruled by any after Considerations: But the common Rules and Maxims of Morality which are looked upon as natural, are not so general as those before instanced in, nor have in all respects the same degree of Certainty belonging to them; but what they are, how they are known, and how far they partake of Certainty and Evidence, I shall now give a short Account, and from thence prove that we are necessarily determined to assent to and approve these also, and to condemn and deny the contrary of them; and consequently, that we have all the Reason in the World to believe it will conduce more to our Happiness to act up to these Principles, than to pursue a different course of Life.  
The highest and most general moral Duties commonly instanced in, are such as these, That God is to be worshipped, that Parents are to be obeyed, and all other natural and civil Relations proportionably to be respected; that we ought to abstain from all sorts of Intemperance and Excess, and provide all things necessary for the continuance of our Life; that we should not do any other man an Injury, but contribute all we can to the Happiness of Mankind, and more particularly that Society we are of.  
Now these, and such like Propositions as these, are known or found out by the Use and Employment of our natural Faculties the same way that all other Truths are; that is, Men are taught or made to have the Ideas these Terms belong to, or they get them by their own Observation, and then, by comparing them together, they immediately acknowledge such or such a Relation betwixt them, without being influenced by any other Motive to judge so but what results from the Things themselves.  
The Relations indeed of moral Ideas, as well as the Ideas themselves, are commonly learned from others first, before Men are capable of finding them out themselves; but this is no more an Argument that their Assent to such kind of Propositions is only the Effect of Education, and consequently a mere Prejudice and no right Judgement, than it would be an Argument to prove that all the Mathematical Knowledge a Man has is nothing else but a Set of false Notions thrust upon his Understanding by Education, because he happened to be taught the first Grounds and Elements of this Science while he was young, before he was capable of finding them out by his own Observation; for, when we afterwards come to review the moral Knowledge we got when we were Children, let us be never so jealous over ourselves, and take all the Care we can to deliver ourselves from the Prejudices of Education, we shall still adhere to and be farther satisfied of most of those Truths we were then taught, as is sufficiently proved by the Experience of several thus educated, the Certainty and Impartiality of whose Judgement, has been strengthened by the joint Assent of several of a contrary Education.  
And, for a farther Illustration of this Point, should we suppose a Person entirely ignorant of all such Matters, but capable of understanding them when proposed, and one of these moral Rules or Maxims should be barely explained to him, without any Reasons offered to move or incline his Assent either way, I believe 'tis very difficult to imagine how he could judge otherwise than we do.  
As for Example: Suppose such a Person as this was justly informed concerning his own Nature, and the Nature of God, and what was meant by Worship and all the Notions contrary to it, and he was asked which he should rather do, perform such Acts as would express this Worship, or neglect, slight, and omit them, or else ridicule, dishonour, and blaspheme that Being we call God: or suppose he was told what a Parent was, and that such a Person was his Parent, and that he was himself sensible of a great many Kindnesses he had received from him, and it was proposed to him, after a due Explication of what was meant by these things, to murder him, defend him from some imminent Danger without any hazard to himself, or stand still and do neither; who is there that would not believe that in these Cases, fairly proposed and stated, such an unprejudiced Person as this would not choose to worship his God and defend his Parent?  
We have therefore the same Reason to conclude that moral Truths concerning humane Action are knowable the same way that all other Truths are which terminate in Speculation only; and that Men know more or fewer of them according to the different Capacity and Application of those that are employed in these Inquiries.  
And as to the Certainty and Evidence of such Truths as these, 'tis, as in all other kind of Knowledge, greater or less according as the Propositions considered are nearer too or farther from the first general Axioms or Rules of Morality, from whence all the rest are deduced; such as are those before mentioned of seeking our own Happiness, and not taking away another Man's when we cannot add any thing to our own by it, and such as immediately follow from hence, as that we ought to prefer a greater Good or Pleasure to a less, a lesser Evil or Pain to a greater, and the like, the Evidence of which is as great as of any Metaphysical or Mathematical Axioms whatever.  
But the other moral Duties I had occasion to instance in concerning the Worship of God, Obedience to Parents, etc. which are less general, have not the same degree of Evidence because the Certainty and Necessity of the Connexion of those Actions with our own Happiness, which is the original Foundation of all Action and Duty, is not so clearly discoverable that we immediately perceive it impossible, it should be otherwise; but the Evidence of such Propositions as these which I have mentioned before as the common Principles of Morality is so great, that, when they are fairly offered to the Understanding, without any Consideration of our own Happiness being concerned in them; if this may be supposed, as in several Instances no doubt it may, in such a case I say, we cannot refuse our Assent to them; and if so, there can be no reason assigned why we should judge wrong when there is nothing supposed to determine the Mind either way but the Nature of the Ideas themselves we judge of, and all Men in the same Circumstances necessarily judge the same way; and than it follows, that these moral Propositions have the same degree of Evidence as any other concerning Matters of mere Speculation: But the Truth or Falsehood of these former depending upon their Connexion with our Happiness, the Evidence of them, if true, must be the same in proportion with the Evidence of this Connexion.  
Now the Reason we have to conclude that there is a Connexion betwixt such moral Actions and our Happiness so as to be firmly persuaded that the Performance of these Actions, which without any visible relation to our Happiness we prefer and approve, will be attended with more Pleasure and less Pain than such Omissions or Actions, which, without any prospect of Misery, we condemn; the reason, I say, we have thus to conclude is this: we find ourselves under an absolutely necessity of desiring and endeavouring after our own Happiness and every thing that we know tends to it, and of flying and avoiding whatever we apprehend may lessen or take it away and put us into a contrary State of Misery; we find also, that Pleasure and Pain, Happiness and Misery are the only Principles and Motives of Action, and the obtaining the one, and avoiding the other, the only Ends of all Endeavour and Pursuit; and therefore, we cannot conceive it possible that Being's so made, of such a Nature and Constitution as this should be also contrived after such a manner as to be necessarily determined to approve those Actions, and judge they ought to do them, which would tend to their Misery, and to condemn those Omissions and Performances, and judge that they ought not to be guilty of them which would procure their Happiness.  
Except than it can be proved from Reason, or it is some other way discoverable, that acting according to these moral Rules will certainly be attended with more Misery or less Happiness than acting against them, the present Approbation of our Judgement is a sufficient Argument that they are true, and that the Observance of them will conduce more to our Happiness than the Neglect or Violation of them; and if it is impossible to prove the contrary, as I think it is, and will plainly appear hereafter when I come to consider a future State, then are we necessarily determined to make such Judgements concerning our Actions, as I have mentioned; and if we are necessarily determined to judge thus, we have the same or very near the same Reason to conclude that the Observation of such moral Rules, or such a particular way of acting as our Reason approves will contribute more to our Happiness than that it condemns; and consequently that we are obliged so to act; as we have to conclude that what we are necessarily determined to give or refuse our Assent to should be true or false accordingly.  
For the only Standard and Criterion of Happiness as well as Truth being the original Frame and Constitution of the Mind, and the Mind being as capable of Happiness as Truth, nay, if these can be separated, and there is any Precedence of one to the other, being made first and principally for Happiness, there is as much ground to suppose that Men are not deceived when they are necessarily determined to Judge such a thing ought or ought not to be done, as when they are determined to judge such a thing is or is not; and if so, then consequently such a thing as they have thus necessarily judged ought or ought not to be done, will as certainly tend to their Happiness or Misery accordingly, if they act agreeably to the several Judgements they made; for otherwise they would have been deceived in so judging: and when the Mind is no other way concerned in any thing else than as it has a relation to its self, and has nothing to do to know any further, why should it not judge as truly and certainly of the Suitableness and Unsuitableness of other things to its self, as of their Agreement and Disagreement among one another?  
Since therefore these general Principles or Rules of humane action, which are commonly looked upon as the first Foundations of all Morality or Duty, are found so very agreeable to our purest and most impartial Reason, that upon a bare proposal of them, without any perceivable relation to our Happiness they command our Assent and Approbation, and we cannot but acknowledge that what we approve we ought to do, and what we condemn we ought not to do, it may, I think, be very fairly inferred from hence, that it would conduce more to our Happiness to act according to them than to act otherwise; and consequently, that we are really and effectually obliged, in the full extent and force of the Word, to a strict and careful Observation of these Measures in the whole Course of our Lives.  
From all which it plainly appears, that the Certainty of these moral Axioms or Propositions, which I have placed in the second rank, falls very little short of the Evidence of those first irresistible Judgements or rather Impressions concerning our own Happiness which are inseparable from our Nature and from our Thoughts; for these are known in themselves by immediate Intuition the same way that those are; and if their Connexion with our Happiness, or with those first Propositions concerning it before mentioned, cannot properly and strictly be said to be known either by Intuition or Demor-stration, yet that there is such a Connexion betwixt them, is, in the highest degree that can be, probable, or what they call morally evident. And this is the least that can be inferred from what has been alleged upon this Head: and I am very cautious of laying more stress upon any Argument than it will unquestionably bear.  
2. The next Step I am to make in the Proof of Religion is, to show that what our Reason approves or condemns, and tells us we ought or ought not to do, we are commanded by God to do or not to do, who gave us such a Nature by which we are necessarily determined to judge and be affected after such a certain manner, with that End and Design that we should act accordingly, of which End and Design he has given us several Tokens and Indications: which is a farther Confirmation that 'tis more for our Happiness to observe these Measures of acting than not; and consequently, that we are obliged by God to observe them.  
That we received our Being's, together with all the Powers, Capacities, and whatever else belongs to them, from God, is very evident from the Account before given of the Divine Nature, and is a Truth coincident with that of our Existence; and therefore, when we are necessarily determined to judge or be affected after such a manner that 'tis plainly out of our Power to judge or be affected otherwise, we must conclude that such a Determination is founded in our very Frame and Make, and consequently is the Work of God; who, being an intelligent and wise Being, must be supposed to order every thing he makes to some End; and there being no End he can be supposed to design any thing for but that which it is capable of, and which it is peculiarly fitted to attain, what Reason can be given why we should be capable of such Actions, and peculiarly disposed to them by a necessary Approbation of them, if it was not designed by God we should act accordingly?  
And farther, Since by our very Nature and Constitution we find ourselves invincibly and irresistibly determined to seek and endeavour after Happiness, and avoid Misery, we have all the reason in the World to conclude, that Happiness is the ultimate End of our Being and all our Actions; and therefore, the same God who made us after this manner, having made it also necessary for us to approve such Actions and judge them fit to be done, and to condemn others as not fit to be done, we cannot conceive it possible that he should make it necessary for us to aim at Happiness in all we do, and likewise make it necessary for us to approve such Actions, and judge ourselves obliged to do them as would not tend to our Happiness: for this is to design and determine us to a certain End, and at the same time to make it necessary for us to prefer and approve such means as are contrary to it, and to condemn such as would lead us thither; which is a perfect Contradiction to a wise Being, and cannot be supposed of God.  
As therefore we have reason to be satisfied, to the Exclusion of all Doubt, from the Natures of ourselves and other things, that, what we are necessarily determined to judge is or is not, ought or ought not to be done, must be in the truth and reality of things according as we have judged concerning it, because it is impossible to conceive we should be so disposed with relation to other Being's and our own Happiness, as to be under a necessity of being mistaken in the clearest and most immediate Perceptions concerning either we are capable of; so likewise when we consider ourselves and all other Being's as made and contrived by God, this great Truth being allowed, we are farther and more directly convinced of all other Truths we find ourselves necessarily determined to assent to; the Nature of God being a full and express Warrant to us that we cannot be deceived by him, and consequently that we are not mistaken in any of those Judgements which we are necessarily determined to make, because 'tis God that determines us.  
But if any Suspicion of a Mistake could be entertained, there seems to be less ground for it in those Judgements in which our Happiness is immediately concerned than in the Judgements we make upon things that have no relation to us; for 'tis more reasonable to think God should make us after such a manner that 'twas necessary for us to judge wrong in Matters, where the Consequences would be the same to us whether we judged right or not, or were wholly ignorant of them, than to imagine that he should purposely determine us to judge wrong where Happiness and Misery depend upon our Judgement.  
Thus it appears that God did design to oblige us to such a particular way of acting or living, from the general Consideration of the Nature of Man, whereby he is necessarily determined to approve some Actions and to condemn others, and to judge thus of himself that he ought to do what he so approves, and that he ought not to do what he condemns: and therefore we are obliged to obey the Commands of God and our Nature, and pursue our own Happiness by the Directions God has given us, and in the Way and Method he has pointed out to us.  
But, besides the express Judgement of our Reason, which he has set as a certain unerring Guide to lead us to Him and Happiness, he has given us several other Tokens and Indications of his Design and our Duty, both in the Frame and Disposition of our Minds, and in the Oeconomy and Constitution of Humane Society.  
And first, as to the Frame and Disposition of our Mind; he has not only given us such Capacities and Powers whereby we are enabled to know and perform such Actions as he requires of us, but he has made us sensible of all our Obligations by giving us such Inclinations and Propensions to those particular Actions he has designed to oblige us to, that, as soon as ever any Occasion offers itself, we immediately close with it, so that the Action prevents all the Exercise of our Reason, or at least is so quick, that we are not sensible of any antecedent Judgement or Deliberation concerning it.  
Thus upon the receipt of any considerable Kindness, we presently find our Souls ready and disposed to all the Acts of Love and Esteem we are capable of; and, without considering that this is a likely way of procuring more Advantage to ourselves by engaging the good Opinion of all that are Witnesses of those Returns we make, we immediately break out into all the external Actions that are any ways expressive of a grateful Sense of Mind. So, in like manner, when by Reasoning, Information, or any visible Indications of Power, we are induced to believe that such or such a Being is able, at his Pleasure, to contribute very much to our well or ill Being. Happiness, or Misery, as soon as ever we are satisfied of this, we are immediately conscious of all those different Sentiments of Love Fear, and Reverence, and a Disposition to do what we think most agreeable to the Will of such a Being; and our outward Behaviour is suitable to these inward Sentiments without any express Consideration that we shall thereby recommend ourselves to this Being, and dispose him to make use of his Power in our Favour only, and not to our Disadvantage.  
Now 'tis plain, that in both these Cases our Actions are not the Effects of pure Reason only, tho' upon Examination they are found to be exactly agreeable to it; for besides that upon the strictest Observation of what passes within us, we are not sensible in these Instances of those Steps and Degrees which we are conscious of in all manner of reasoning, and which distinguish this Operation of the Soul both from Intuition and Sensation; nor do by Intuition perceive a necessary and immediate Connexion betwixt these Actions and our own Happiness; besides all this, I say, if we acted by reason only, what need would there be of those previous Sentiments we feel? We might perform all the outward Actions upon a bare rational Prospect of the Advantages we were likely to procure to ourselves by them: but, if we look into ourselves, we shall be convinced that we cannot help having those Sentiments we feel upon such Occasions, that we do not reason ourselves into them, and, if by the Unhappiness of our Temper, or any other way, we should want these Sentiments of Gratitude, Reverence, or the like, we should find some difficulty in reasoning ourselves into the same outward Behaviour as would have followed, if we had been so affected; and, tho' we were never so well convinced that our Happiness was really concerned in such a Behaviour, all our Actions would come slower, be performed with more Constraint, and less Conformity to one another, than if they had proceeded from a lively natural Sense, till Habit, which is another additional help to Reason, had given us greater Ease and Dispatch.  
And thus we should find ourselves originally made and disposed with respect to all the general Duties of Morality and Religion, if we entered upon a particular Examination of our whole Frame and Constitution: from whence we may conclude, that these natural and original Inclinations and Propensions to some Actions, and Restraints from and Aversions to others, which we feel in ourselves without being conscious of any previous Deliberation concerning the Reasonableness or Unreasonableness of what we do, or, after Judgements of this Nature made, we look upon as certain Motions of the Soul carrying us on to act according to such Judgements with more Ease, Quickness, and Application of Mind than we should have done upon the bare Conviction of our Reason without them: All these Dispositions, I say, and Sentiments of the Soul being given us by God, and assisting us conformably to the Dictates of our Reason in discharging what we call the Duties of Religion, we have sufficient Cause from hence to conclude, that God did design us for the Practice of such Duties, and consequently, that an obedient Compliance with this Design will contribute more to our Happiness than our Disobedience can; which is a farther Proof that we are actually under Obligations to God, or that there really is such a thing as Religion.  
Which Obligations, together with God's Right of obliging, we are constantly put in mind of by the Oeconomy and Constitution of Humane Society, and the several Relations in it.  
The different kinds of Government and Subjection to be found in the World, are the chiefest Marks and Characters by which Men are distinguished from one another in Society; these take up a large share in their Thoughts and Discourses, and a great part of their Actions are influenced and determined by the Notions and Opinions they have of them; all which do lead us to acknowledge that we are under higher Obligations of Obedience to God than we can be to any humane Governor whatsoever; for, whether we consider ourselves as Servants, Children, or Subjects, or any other way inferior to others, whatever Reasons we allege for our Duty and Obedience to Masters, Parents, or Princes, or for their Right of commanding us, they will conclude more strongly upon us when we consider ourselves with relation to God.  
Now all the Reasons and Grounds of our Obedience to Men, and of their right of obliging us, are Power Goodness and Property. When a person has a Power of contributing to my Happiness or Misery, and I do, some way or other, belong to him, so as to be called his, I look upon myself as obliged to obey him or act according to his Will; and if, besides his having this Power and Property, I consider him as more inclinable to do me good than ill, I conceive myself under higher Obligations of Obedience to him.  
But God has all these Titles to our Obedience in the highest degree possible, for, by giving us our entire Being and every thing that belongs to our Nature, 'tis plain that he has not only a greater Power of contributing to our Happiness or misery than any man can have, but also a greater Property in us by this Act of Creation or Production than can accrue to any Man by Conquest Purchase, Covenant, Generation, or any other way whereby Men come to have a Property in one another. And that he has more Goodness towards us, or is more inclinable to contribute to our Happiness than Misery, is manifest from his own Nature enjoying Happiness, and that other Character of it, his Wisdom in designing every thing for the best Ends they are capable of, as also from the Benefits we have already received from him.  
The inference I draw him from hence is, that, as our Reason and Judgement which tell us what ought or ought not to be done, and natural Inclinations and Aversions preventing or seconding our Reason, but always conformably to it, which dispose us to action, were given us by God with a design of engaging us to act accordingly, so were we put into such a State and Condition with regard to one another, that the necessary Relations resulting from Society might put us in mind of our relation to God, and the proper peculiar Actions consequent upon it; so that by a constant traditional Education in the exercise of these Duties of Subjection of different sorts to one another, we should be led to the Acknowledgement of our Obligations to a Superior Being more easily than if every Man had been left to himself to find them out by the use of his own Faculties only, without these particular Occasions of setting his Reason and Inclinations on work.  
All which Considerations concerning the State of humane Nature and Society, are at least very probable Arguments that we are actually obliged by God to such a particular way of living as we call Religion; and consequently, we have Reason to conclude that a careful practice of Religion, all things considered, will contribute more to our Happiness than a Neglect or Transgression of it, because the same God who designs us for Happiness designs us also for the Practice of the Duties of Religion, tho' we do not yet perceive an immediate Connexion betwixt Religion and Happiness; which is the next thing to be proved.  
3. In the third place than I shall give some positive and direct Proof from the Nature of Religion itself, that a regular Practice of all those Duties or Obligations of which it consists would certainly conduce to the greatest Happiness Man is capable of, considered only in his present Condition, as included within the Bounds of this Life.  
'Tis plainly percieved upon a short transient View and Comparison of the Humane and Divine natures that Man was made and designed by God for Happiness; and we are more nearly and necessarily convinced by the irresistible Desires of Happiness, and Aversions to Misery we Experience in ourselves, and by our constant unalterable Endeavours to attain the one and avoid the other, that the Enjoyment of the purest most unallayed Happiness we are capable of must be the ultimate End of our Being and all our actions.  
Since therefore God has made us capable of, and designed us for such an End, and we find ourselves necessarily determined to aim at this End; since the only way of attaining this End is by our Actions, and we are assured by Experience that all our Actions do not lead to this End, but Misery as well as Happiness may be the Effect and Consequence of our Actions, it follows from hence, that there must be one particular way of acting, which, if steadily pursued, will certainly procure us greater Happiness than we can possibly attain by any other.  
And farther, if we are designed for Happiness, and this Happiness be attainable only by one particular way of acting, 'tis certain that the same God who designed us for such an End must design also that we should act such a particular way as would conduct us thither.  
In Conformity to which Designs, we cannot but believe that, as he has given us a certain Knowledge of and necessary Determinations toward our End, he must have given us also sufficient Tokens and Indications of the Means that lead to it; and, upon Examination we are satisfied that he has so, by framing our Minds after such a manner that we are necessarily determined to approve some Actions and to condemn others, and to judge ourselves obliged to do what we approve, and to avoid what we condemn; by giving us such natural Propensions and Aversions agreeable to the Judgements of our Reason, as by a sudden and unperceivable Influence dispose us to, and assist us in the Performance of the same Actions which Reason prescribes; and by putting us into such a state or condition of Life with respect to one another, where the different kinds of Government and Subjection, and the Notions and Actions resulting from thence unavoidably lead us to the Acknowledgement of God's Superiority, Power, and Right of obliging, and the Necessity of our Obedience to him, in all the several Instances of Duty, in which we conceive ourselves bound to any governing Relation among Men, but in a higher and more exalted manner, as becomes the mighty Inequality between God and Man.  
From whence we are farther led to conclude that all other Duties and Obligations we apprehend ourselves under, with respect to ourselves or others, are the Effect of our Obligation to God the Supreme Governor of the World, whose Power and Right are over all things, original and independent, and all other Powers and Rights are derived from and dependent upon him; the Sense of which Obligation makes all our Actions that are duly influenced by it termed Religious, tho' God is not the immediate Object of them.  
And these are sufficient Marks and Evidences to assure us that God does require us to act such a particular way, and consequently that we are actually obliged to frame our Lives according to those Rules and Measures which come under the Name of Religion, unless it can be shown from more certain Discoveries of the Nature of Man and the Design of God, that notwithstanding all these fair Appearances, Religion is not the Way to Happiness. But, as 'tis manifest from what we have already observed of the Nature of God and our own Frame and Constitution, that no higher Assurances can be given us of the Truth of any thing than we have had in this matter from a Concurrence of our Reason, natural Inclinations, and external Condition, and that we cannot be deceived in assenting to such Testimony; so, upon farther Experiences and Obserxations taken from ourselves and the State of Mankind with relation to Religion, we shall find that Religion is in its own Nature so suited and suited to the Nature of Man, so propertioned to the original Dispositions and Desires of the Soul, as by a proper Tendency and Esicacy to promote his Happiness.  
This appears first by what we feel in ourselves. What just and impartial Reason approves we find a Pleasure in approving; Inclination superadded to Judgement heightens the pleasing Sentiment; acting what Nature inclines to and Reason warrants, is accompanied with a new and higher Satisfaction, all which we repeat and enjoy over again upon Reflection. And, if any Pain or Uneasiness mixes with the Pleasure, or attends it, that does not arise from the same Thoughts or Actions that this does, but from a contrary Application of Mind in ourselves or others, which opposes and obstructs us in the Practice of Religion, or from some other extrinsical Caeuse that has no Dependence upon or Connexion with Religion; so that the due Performance of any Religious Action is never properly the Cause of any Pain or Trouble to him that performs it, however in some Instances it may seem to be the Occasion of it.  
But, in order to be farther satisfied of the natural Connexion betwixt Religion and Happiness, and that we may more clearly perceive that the latter is the true and genuine Effect of the former, we should take off our Thoughts from the present State of Mankind, and represent to ourselves another Generation of Men. living together in a constant regular Observance of all the Duties and Obligations of Religion: for there we should behold such a glorious Scene of Happiness rising before us, that, considering the necessary Circumstances of our mortal Condition, we could not possibly imagine or form an Idea of any thing in this Life beyond it.  
This would be a State of universal Peace, Safety, Tranquillity, and Love; where there would be no Injuries nor Tears, no Envy nor Distrust; where every Man would find all the Pleasures of Friendship in the Company of every Man, and feel his own agreeable Thoughts towards others redoubled by knowing that they had all the same Sentiments for him: In such a State as this all the natural Appetites and Desires of the Soul would be satisfied, without a painful Eagerness in the Pursuit, or Satiety in the Enjoyment; and there would be no irregular imaginary Desires to create the Uneasiness of Disappointment: then every Man would be pleased with all he did, and have his Satisfaction heightened by a full and entire Assurance that his Actions were approved by the World, and acceptable to God.  
Was true Religion so universally and exactly practised among Men, they would engage the Power and Wisdom of the supreme Governor in their Favour by the Honour, Respect, and Obedience they paid him; they would be sure of all the Benefits and Advantages of humane Strength and Skill by a mutual Performance of all the Duties of Society; and by an equal regular Conduct and Management of their own particular Capacities and Powers, they would preserve themselves in the fittest and properest Condition of enjoying those agreeable Satisfactions God had put within their Reach, and prolong the Enjoyment of them by continuing their Lives to the utmost Term they could, by any Endeavours of their own, carry them to.  
Whoever takes a full and distinct View of Religion, in all its Power and Extent, must acknowledge that these are the true and necessary Effects of it, where its Influence is freely dispensed, without Check or Opposition from contrary Causes. And what greater Happiness than this can we, without a larger Date of present Life or a prospect of another, conceive ourselves capable of? or, at least, is attainable by any other Actions besides those of Religion?  
But this, I confess, is all but an imaginary Scene, a bare Idea or Pattern drawn by the Mind, which never was, and perhaps never will be exemplified in the reality of things: and therefore it does not necessarily follow from hence that, when the Generality of Men act contrary to Religion, as now they do, those few that are mixed with them, and live exactly according to the Rules and I recepts of it, shall enjoy more Happiness than any of the rest, much less such whose Practice is inconstant and defective, which is certainly the Case of the best and most careful Observers of those measures of acting which Religion prescribes.  
However, thus much, I think, may justly be inferred, That Religion is in its own Nature productive of Happiness and nothing else, and consequently was designed and ordained by God that it should obtain this Effect.  
From whence I conclude, that if Man was made for Happiness, and directed and disposed to seek it by the means of Religion, and these means are found to be in their own Nature sufficient, but are some way or other, without the Fault of the Person that uses them, rendered ineffectual for the present; from hence, I say, we may certainly conclude that God, who in his great Wisdom has ordered all these things, did not order them in vain, or with an Intention of deceiving; but has contrived it so, that some time or other the End to which they all point shall be obtained; and therefore, if a full and exact Observance of all the Duties of Religion be not attended with a suitable Happiness in this Life, 'tis a strong Proof that there will be a future State, in which there will be Rewards answerable to the highest Performances and Expectations.  
We have Reason also, from the Goodness and Wisdom of God, to hope, that the sincere Endeavours of those, whose Course is sometimes interrupted with voluntary Transgressions of the Rules prescribed them, will notwithstanding, by some Favour or Grace, procure them a State of Happiness. But this we may be sure of, that God will put a mighty Distinction betwixt such as do but sometimes deviate from those religious measures they have proposed to themselves, and those who constantly act by different Principles.  
4. The Proof of this Conclusion is the fourth thing I proposed in order to the Establishment of the Truth and Necessity of Religion. Here than I am to show, that the Defect of a general and regular Practice of Religion, and the Consequences of this Defect, do necessarily lead us to the Acknowledgement of such a future State as is sufficient to determine us to prefer one particular way of Life before another, upon such Reasons and Motives, that is, such degrees of Happiness and Misery, as we are sure greater and more powerful cannot be offered to us.  
'Tis very plain, that Religion is not universally practised in the World, nor do the generality of any Nation or Society of Men make their Duty to God the governing Principle of their Actions. 'Tis manifest likewise, that those few who are sensible of their Obligations, and endeavour to discharge them, do in many Instances neglect them, or act contrary to them: upon which Accounts it happens, that as there is a great deal more Misery in the World than our mortal Condition would otherwise subject us to, so it oftentimes falls to the religious Man's Lot to have the greatest share of it.  
Nor is all the Trouble and Uneasiness he suffers the Effect of vicious Habits and Impressions mixing with, and obstructing the Performance of his Duty, or carrying him to contrary Actions, tho' very much is owing to this Cause, but a great many Afflictions and Calamities are laid upon him by the Malice and Hatred of wicked Men purely for his being religious; so that, did he perfectly and completely fulfil all his Duty to God, there's Reason to believe his Misery would be proportionably increased as far as it was in their Power to do it.  
From whence it plainly follows, that God has provided some other state of Happiness for such as live exactly according to his Purpose and Intention here; which will be so full and sufficient a Recompense for all the Misery they have suffered in this Life, as to justify their Obedience to God upon such Terms.  
For, if God designed Man for Happiness, as 'tis certain he did, and appointed Religion to be the means to it, as manifestly appears from his annexing Pleasure to the purest and most unmixed practice of it, as well as from several other Indications, 'tis impossible to suppose that God should suffer his Ends to be defeated after a due and proper Use of the means, by the derived dependent Power and Contrivance of other Being's, and order it so, that those who were most diligent and exact in observing the truest measures of acting, should, for that very reason, meet with the least Success.  
Should we therefore suppose a few perfectly religious afflicted and tormented by wicked Men barely upon that account, as there can be no other, if they are what we suppose them to be; we must then conclude that God has mighty Blessings in store for them, in comparison of which their present Sufferings are as nothing.  
From hence also we may infer, that those whose sincere Resolutions and Endeavours are not attended with exact and universal Performance, and yet, who are rendered more miserable by the Actions of wicked men than they otherwise would have been for the sake of those degrees of Religion they come up to; 'tis reasonable, I say, to conclude that those will, some time or other, receive more Happiness or less Misery than others proportionably to the difference of their Obedience and Affliction now: For, according as they have pursued the Means, so will their Attainments of the End be; or, if no Reward be due but to a full Discharge of all Obligations, it cannot be imagined that those who have Performed some part of what they were obliged to, and endeavoured at general Obedience should be punished as high as those who have been guilty of a greater or of a total Neglect, Contempt, or Volation of their Duty.  
However therefore it be as to the manner of it, 'tis very agreeable to the Wisdom and Designs of God, according to all the Indications he has given to Mankind of them, to make the Condition of those who act by the Principles of Religion preferable, to that of others who act by contrary Measures, which it would not always be, was there no other State of Life after this is ended.  
From all which it plainly follows that there must be a Future State in which Men will be distinguished from one another by different degrees of Happiness and Misery according to the different regard they had to Religion in this Life.  
The Certainty, of which State we are farther convinced of by the general Wants, Miseries, and Imperfections of our present Nature, which proceed from some Principle or Disposition within us, contrary to that of Religion; which Principle or Disposition is the Reason of that universal Wickedness which reigns in the World.  
Did Mankind enjoy all the Happiness they were otherwise capable of in this mortal Condition, yet, so long as they found in themselves Capacities and Desires of greater unknown degrees of Pleasure, which from the present Frame and Constitution of things they had no Hope or Prospect of, and felt an Uneasiness at the Thoughts of parting with those Enjoyments they were possessed of, by the unalterable Decree of Death, which they knew themselves subject to; were they I say in such a Condition, they would have great Reason from hence to conclude, that God did design them for some other more perfect State, where their whole Capacities would be filled, all their Desires satisfied, and no kind of Pain or Uneasiness check or allay the Fullness of that joy: not that they had then any cause of Complaint, as if God had not dealt kindly by them, in granting them lesser degrees of Happiness than what they were capable of; but because, in such a case as is supposed, their Capacities and Desires would be given them in vain; which does not seem consistent with the Wisdom of God; and moreover the Uneasiness of Defining what was impossible and the painful Fears and Apprehensions of what was certain, which they would then experience, would appear inconsistent with God's Design of making Man for Happiness; and therefore 'twould be more agreeable to all the Notions we have of God, and all the Observations we have made upon his other Works, to suppose that, had this Life been the Extent of Man's Being and Happiness, God would not have given him a sense or prospect of any other: upon such a Supposition as this 'tis highly rational to think that constant even Contentment would have bounded all his Thoughts, that his Soul would always have remained at the same equal Poise, and that he would have lived without desiring more than he enjoyed, and died without any previous Fears of losing that.  
And, if there is good ground to believe that there would be a State of future Happiness tho' Men enjoyed all they were capable of here according to the present Circumstances of their Nature and Condition, because their Happiness here was not complete by reason of some Pain and Uneasiness mixed with it, and because their Capacities and Desires exceeded all their actual Enjoyments; how much more reasonable is it to make the same Conclusion now when we, every way, fall so short of the Happiness the condition of this Life would allow us, as will plainly appear if we compare the present State of the World with that Draught and Representation we have before given of Humane Life under a regular Practice of the Duties of Religion.  
We are now not only conscious in general of larger Capacities, of Happiness than what we enjoy; but there are several kinds and degrees of it within our Knowledge and seemingly within our Reach and Power, which, with all the Endeavours we can use we are not able to attain; and the more Wants we are sensible of, and the better and more particularly we know what they are, the stronger are our Desires and the greater the Uneasiness of Defeats and Disappointments, which Experience assuras us, are very frequent; The Satisfactions we meet with are commonly very short and mixed with Pain, and we have a great many other things to fear besides death.  
But the Troubles and Calamities of Humane Life are too well known to need being insisted upon, and too large a subject to be particularly treated of in this place. 'Tis sufficient to my purpose to remark in general what I think may very safely be affirmed, that, if what falls to every Man's share was fairly computed, the Misery of the greatest part of Mankind would outweigh their Happiness.  
If therefore Man was designed by God for Happiness, and was so framed that he cannot enjoy complete Happiness in this Life without a mixture of Uneasiness, and yet has Capacities and Desires of greater than he can conceive belonging to his Nature and the necessary Circumstances of it here; and farther if Mankind be now involved in such a State or Condition of Life in which they all actually enjoy much less Happiness than they find themselves by Nature capable of here, and the greatest part of them have a larger Share of the Troubles than the Advantages of Life; from hence I think it may be truly and certainly inferred, that there will be another State of pure complete Happiness, answerable at least to the highest Notions and Conceptions we are able to frame of it.  
But since, as has before been proved, God has not absolutely and unconditionally determined all Men to be happy, but has made Happiness and Misery to depend upon our Actions, and consequently has annexed Happiness to a particular way of acting, we have all the Reason in the World to believe that the Happiness of another State will be the Portion of those, and those only, who live according to the Rules of Religion here; and this, I believe, no body is disposed to doubt of that owns a future State, and therefore I shall spend no time in an unnecessary Proof of it.  
And, if there are none to be found that exactly discharge all the Obligations of Religion, yet 'tis more agreeable to our Reason to conclude that those who sincerely endeavour to do it, shall by the especial Grace and Favour of God, in some such way or manner as to his Wisdom shall seem fit, be rendered capable of future Happiness, than to believe that all Mankind shall be miserable, and none obtain Happiness, contrary to all the Marks and Indications of the Design of God in making Man.  
Granting therefore what I think has been sufficiently proved under this Head, that there will be a future State in which all Men will be happy or miserable, according as they have behaved themselves here, with regard to what we call Religion: this I say being allowed, it manifestly follows from hence that it is more for our Happiness to act up to the Rules and Directions of Religion, than to pursue any other Measures, whatever we should happen to suffer in this Life for so doing; because the Happiness of a future State will so far outweigh all the sufferings of this, that when we come to enjoy it we shall be forced to acknowledge, that the end and reward of our Labours was very well worth all the Troubles and Difficulties we found in the way to it; and if it be absolutely, with regard to the whole extent and duration of our Being, more for our Happiness to live Religiously than otherwise, then are we in the highest and strictest sense obliged to live so, which was the thing I undertook to prove.  
Nay further, if besides the natural Pleasure which results from Religious Acts while we are practising them here, God has given us a certain Prospect and well grounded Hope of a State, of greater Bliss hereafter, I dare venture to assert that generally speaking, Religion will prove the surest way to Happiness even in this Life; so that, tho' sometimes the Sufferings of some particular Men upon that account, may exceed all the noble Satisfactions Religion can afford them here, yet all things considered, and the different Methods of acting weighed together with all the probable Consequences that, according to the common course of things, may attend them, there will be sufficient reason for a wise Man to prefer the practice of Religious Duties to the ways of Irreligion upon the score of the present Happiness he is very like to enjoy by that means, reckoning in the Hopes and prospect only and not the Possession of another State: as will more plainly appear under the next General Head of Discourse:  
Which is a Proof of Religion from a Comparison of it with Irreligion, and the necessary Consequences arising from thence.   

ADVERTISEMENT.  
WHat is here Printed was delivered in Five Sermons, upon the first Mondays in January, February, March, April, and May. The Three remaining Sermons will be Preached upon the first Mondays in September, October, and November, and be Published soon after in the same Volume and Character, with the Pages continued; which, together with these, will make up one entire Discourse.   

The THREE Remaining SERMONS PREACHED at Mr. boil's Lecture For the Year 1697.   

FOUR I have before given a positive direct proof of Religion, from certain Principles drawn from the natures and relations of the Being's concerned in it. I shall now endeavour to make good the same Truth, by showing what Absurd and Unreasonable things would follow from a denial of Religion, and how Pernicious and Destructive to Mankind, the establishment of a contrary Belief and Practice would be.  
In the management of which Subject, I shall first consider the several Steps and Degrees of Irreligion, and then show how far they all lead to the same Ends, and what are the peculiar Consequences of each.  
Irreligion, so far as it consists in Opinion or Belief, is of three Sorts: For either men deny the being of a God, and consequently all Religious Duty falls a course by the taking away the Foundation of it; or they acknowledge a God, but deny that Man is any ways Obliged by him, to act such a particular way as we pretend he is; or else they own they are in several Instances obliged to Worship God, and to live according to those rational Principles of Action we have before mentioned, but do not believe there is any future State of Rewards and Punishments after this Life.  
Now these are very different Notions considered barely in themselves as matters of Speculation only; but, if we examine the practical Effects and Consequences of them, we shall find that they all aim at the same thing though several ways: which is the establishing a general liberty of Living as every man pleases, upon Principles contrary to those of Religion.  
This is plain of the two first Opinions, which take away all manner of Religious obgation, and upon strict examination, will be found to be True of the last; which so far Loosens and Weakens the Influence of Religion, that it will not be able to bear up against the force of contrary Motives to Action.  
But let us consider these Notions apart, and then we shall the better perceive what the direct, and immediate Consequences of each Opinion are, and how far they fall in with one another.  
First then, we will suppose that there is no God, and Consequently no Religion: this being supposed, what are we to think of ourselves? What kind of Being's are we? How came we first to exist, and what are we to do while we continue to be?  
That we are, and that we feel ourselves so and so Affected 'tis impossible to doubt: and among the several things that I am infallibly Conscious of, I perceive such an Agreement and Connexion betwixt some of them, that, let me do what I can, I cannot help perceiving them as together: and such a disagreement betwixt others, that I cannot help perceiving them as asunder, or separate from one another. These Complex Perceptions or Appearances, I am assured of the same way, I am assured of my own Being, or any simple Perception whatsoever: but if these things, which I necessarily perceive as together or asunder, and cannot possibly perceive otherwise, should not be Joined or Separated accordingly in the Nature and Reality of things, but only in the Mind: then do I know nothing certain beyond Appearances and the Affections of my own Mind, and yet am invincibly Disposed to believe what may be False, with so strong an assent, that 'tis the hardest thing in the World to command myself to entertain the least Sufpition of a bare possibility of its Falsehood, as any man may experience in himself, if he will but try to Doubt of what we call a self-evident Proposition; which is the reason that there are so few that pretend to be through Sceptics if there ever were really any such, which I dare confidently affirm there never were. But if it were possible that I could prevail with myself to deny the Being of a God. after a full and impartial Consideration of the Proof before given of this Truth, I do not see where my Doubts could stop, or what could determine my Assent to any thing else. Reason, Truth and Evidence would be bare uninforming Sounds, which would cause no other Perceptions in me; my whole Life would be nothing but Suspense and Amazement; Darkness and Ignorance would cover my Understanding, and continual Uneasiness would arise from a restless Succession of vain undetermined Thoughts.  
If therefore there be no God, notwithstanding all those appearances of Evidence that there is such a Being, we have the same Reason to distrust all our other Knowledge. And a continual desire of Knowing, with a constant agitation of Thoughts in the search or pursuit of Knowledge, joined with a continual distrust of all appearances of Truth, without any manner of Rest or Acquiescence, which we should then feel in ourselves, would be such an uneasy State as no man, I believe, could bear; and, I believe, no man ever yet felt; and yet this would be the consequence of the denial of a God, supposing there is the same appearance of Evidence for his Being as we have for any other Truth, as those that have fully examined the proofs of it must Acknowledge.  
But this perhaps is too much to suppose, it being very easy to imagine, that there may be men who deny the Being of God and all manner of Religion, without distrusting their other Knowledge; who in all other matters, Argue from the same Principles, and Act by the same Rules as the rest of Mankind do. 'tis very possible, that persons who never gave themselves the trouble of being acquainted with Mathematics, may think all the Demonstrations there pretended to false, and the whole Science a Cheat, without calling in question any other parts of Knowledge they have happened to be conversant in: and much more conceivable is it that such as never duly and fairly considered the Arguments for God and Religion, should deny both without distrusting their Faculties upon other Occasions; which is certainly the case of all that pretend to such a denial.  
Now in applying myself to these men, I do not think it sufficient to allege that the Proof I have given of these great Truths, is directly and immediately drawn from such Principles as they own, and make use of in other matters, though this may certainly be affirmed; to allege this is not sufficient, because, they may have that easy answer ready which all people give that are fond of their Opinions, and impatient of enquiry into things they would not have otherwise than as they now believe them; thus, I say, they would be apt to answer; That Arguments drawn out to any length are very Uncertain; there may be a Mistake in some part of the Deduction; and consequences, at a great distance from their first Principles, may not have all their Force and Strength conveyed to them; and so, though the whole Contexture of the Proof seems specious, there's no reason to quit such Opinions they are fully persuaded of, for others that they certainly perceive to be False, though they are set out so plausibly, that they cannot tell how to assign the particular Falsehood of them.  
Since therefore the Persons that deny the Being of God and Religion, are not well acquainted with what they deny; have very imperfect Notions of these things, and do not trouble themselves to look into them, or consider the Proofs brought for them; but yet are supposed to understand the contrary Opinions, which they profess to be so well persuaded of, and to act by; it cannot but be very proper to discourse with them concerning their own Persuasions, and supposing their Principles true, consider them in their full Extent, and examine into the genuine consequences of them: and, if when I have given a true Idea and Representation of Irreligion, they will own this to be their Faith still, I desire no better Witnesses to confirm the Truth of what I have urged in the Defence of Religion.  
Supposing then that there is no God nor Religion, and that we must judge and act as our Reason prescribes we should upon such a Supposition, these two things do necessarily and immediately follow:  
1. That all Men are equal, and there is no such thing as Superiority, Right, or Authority of any kind.  
2. That every Man is to act as he himself shall judge most convenient for his own particular Happinefs.  
1. That all Men are equal is very plain if we consider the Original Capacities and Powers of Human Nature, without any external Advantages of Birth, Education and Society: nor do these Differences, without a God, cause any such Inequality betwixt particular Men, as to make one Man subject to another, or lay any Obligation upon the one to act according to the other's Will.  
There needs no further Proof of this but to consider, That there's no Man, whatsoever his Circumstances in the World are, can have such a certain  Power over another as to make it necessary for him to approve or prefer such a particular way of acting which he prescribes: For, whatever a Man promises or threatens, be it never so great in either kind, may, by some sudden unforeseen Accident, be hindered from taking effect, even in the moment of Execution; besides, whatever is promised or threatened, being certainly of no longer continuance than Life, be it never so great in itself, it may not, oftentimes, countervail some other Motive the Person thus accosted is governed by. There may be some particular Enjoyment he is possessed of, which his Imagination has so heightened, or Habit has made so necessary to him, that nothing pleasant or grievous in Life can be of weight enough to determine him to a contrary Choice.  
Thus have we seen Men of no Religion sacrifice all they had, and bear all that could be inflicted upon them, rather than renounce their Ambition or Revenge, or do any thing that they thought would slain the Reputation or Glory their former Actions had procured them.  
From whence it follows, That, without a God, no Man can have a true Right of obliging another; the Right of obliging being founded in such a Power of contributing to the Happiness or Misery of another, as his Reason must necessarily submit to when 'tis made use of.  
It may indeed so happen, sometimes, by the favour of particular Circumstances, that a Man may propose to me to act after such a manner, upon such probable Motives and Reasons, as I may judge it very likely that it should conduce more to my Happiness to act thus than otherwise; but this is not sufficient to give any particular Man, or kind of Men a Right to my Obedience, because I can never be sure of their Power of enforcing these Motives: and therefore, though I do find the World at present so constituted, that Men of such a Character or Relation have more probable Opportunities of contributing to my Happiness or Misery than others, I am not to look upon them as having any Right or Authority over me; but such whose Wills and Counsels I follow oftener than those of others, because I judge it more for my Interest so to do: but when I judge it more for my particular Interest to follow my own or any other Man's, then am I as much obliged to act accordingly; and in such a case, I have as true a Right of my own, or the Person whose Advice I take has as much Right and Authority over me as my Father, Master or Prince.  
All which Titles and Relations, and whatever else are used to imply Government and Subjection, if there be no God, are false imposing Names; and, if any Advantage has been taken in our Infancy to convey any Notions of Authority, Duty or Obligation by them, we are to shake off all these Prejudices, as well as those concerning God and Religion, which have been made use of, no doubt, for the better impressing and enforeing these upon us.  
We must discard likewise those other false Notions of Right and Property; by the means of which some Men challenge to themselves larger Shares and Portions of the necessary Supports and Advantages of Life than the rest of Mankind, for which there is no manner of Ground in reason: For all Men being equal, they have all an equal Right and Title to every Thing they are capable of enjoying or possessing; nor can any Priority of Possession, any Pains or Labour of Acquisition, any Promise, Contract or Agreement whatsoever be sufficient to found a Right or Property in any thing to the Exclusion of any other Man: which will appear very plainly if we consider,  
2. The second Consequence arising from the Supposition of no God nor Religion, which is this, That every particular Man is to act as he himself shall judge most convenient for his own particular Interest or Happiness.  
There's no other Principle, Reason or Motive of Action imaginable in such a case. And, if all Men do and must act according to this Principle, they must also, if they will be consistent with themselves, judge that there is no such thing as Authority or Duty, Right or Property, or any thing else commonly thought to be the Causes of them, implied in them, or to result from them, that is, That there can be no Action of their own or other men's, or any other Circumstance or Relation whatsoever, that can be any bar or hindrance to any Man's Endeavours of bettering his Condition, or advancing his Happiness, when and in what manner soever he shall think fit.  
Now, that this is the necessary and only Principle such Persons as deny the Being of God and Religion can be influenced by in their Actions is very plain, if we consider these two things, which, as has before been shown, Reason and Experience assure us of:  
First, That we are naturally and necessarily determined to seek and endeavour after our own Happiness, whether there be a God or no, or whatever other Notions we have of things.  
Secondly, That, if there be no God, no Man can be conceived to have such a Preeminence of Power above another, that, if he will, he can certainly contribute so far to his Happiness or Misery, that it must needs be unavoidably better for him to act that particular way he prescribes than any other, and that the Person thus prescribed to cannot possibly help judging so.  
And, if no Man has such a Power, there are no other higher Being's that we know of, or, if there be, that, without a God, we can imagine should have greater Power over us than one Man has over another.  
From whence it follows, That every Man, being necessarily determined to act for his own Happiness, and no Man having Power enough to make the Obedience of another to him the certain way to Happiness, no Man is to act according to the Will of another, any further than he himself judges he shall be the happier for so acting.  
And if we consider further how small the Differences of Power are among Men, what reciprocal Advantages they have over one another, how changeable all these distinguishing Circumstances are, and what different Notions and Sentiments Men have of the Happiness of this Life: If, I say, we carefully consider and weigh all this, we shall be still more satisfied that there can be no such thing as Authority or Subjection, Obligation, Right or Property; and better perceive the whole Force and Influence of the forementioned Principle of Action.  
Supposing then Societies established as we now find them, and that due Care was taken to persuade Mankind that there was no such thing as God and Religion; so that they had throughly worn off those Notions and all the consequential Prejudices that attended their former Belief, and every Man was prepared to act what he judged most conducing to his own Happiness: upon this Supposition, I say, it must needs follow, that a great many Men would find themselves very uneasy in the want of several things which they saw others possessed of, and in the performance of several Actions by the command of others that were free from that Trouble themselves; and what could hinder or restrain such Men from seizing upon what they wanted, and freeing themselves from what was so troublesome to them, but the consideration of worsting their Condition by a successless Trial? But this Thought could not hold them long, because there would be so many that found themselves in these Circumstances that they would soon be sensible of their Strength, and being enraged at the Unreasonableness of those few, whom they saw distinguished from them by such over-proportioned Advantages of Life, they would join together in a Design of bringing things to a greater Equality: And those who had tasted the extraordinary pleasures of Government and Excess, whose Imaginations had been entertained with the Pride and Elegance of Living, would endeavour to support the Difference of their Condition, and be restless under the Loss of it, and employ all their Art and Strength to recover their Ground, and trample upon the rest of Mankind.  
This would be the Effect of a full Establishment of Irreligion in the World, if we consider the prefent State and Constitution of all human Societies, there being no Nation or Society of Men, in which the far greatest Part of the People are not forced to use Abundance of Pains, and undergo a great many Troubles and Difficulties in supplying their own Wants, and in ministering to the Ease and Pleasure of others.  
But let us suppose Men united together upon what Terms or Conditions we please, however things are divided, if every Man be convinced that there is no God nor Religiou, the Confusion and Misery of all will be the certain Consequence of such a Belief. For every Man being to act for his own Happiness, and there being as many several Notions of Happiness as there are different Passions and Inclinations in the Soul of Man, all which require different Methods of Pursuit, 'tis impossible but Men must clash and interfere one with another, and every one's Happiness be built upon, or promoted by the Misery of others; which must end in the worst State of War imaginable. When Lust, Ambition, or Revenge is the ruling Passion in a Man's Mind, what should hinder him from making the Misery or Destruction of a Nation the way to his Satisfaction, if he can do it securely, or judges nothing more terrible than the Uneasiness of his present Condition. And the same may be said of any thing else that a Man places his chief Happiness in, whatever was the Cause of such a Choice.  
All that can be alleged to avoid these dreadful Consequences that seem to be the certain immediate Effects of Atheism, is, that the Advantages of Society and Union are so very great, and every Man is so sensible that his own particular Happiness is included in that of the Public; that, by virtue of this very Principle, Men will readily agree to observe all such things as tend to the common Preservation and Welfare of Society.  
To which I answer, That this indeed is a sufficient Motive to Persons who have felt or considered the Inconveniencies and Calamities of a State of Division, to enter into or continue in Society, upon such Terms as do then seem to conduce to their particular Happiness; but if afterwards the breaking of any of these Terms and Conditions shall appear to any of them to contribute more to their Happiness than the keeping them, they are as much obliged to act contrary to their former Promise, Contract or Agreement, as they were at first to make it.  
And, if we rightly consider things, we shall find, That the Generality of every Society are Men of too narrow and confined Understandings to perceive all the ill Consequences, their particular Actions have upon Society: and, if they have some confused Notions of them, the Mischiess do not appear to them so near as to fall in their Days, and involve them, and they have not concern beyond their own Lives.  
Besides, the greatest part both of those that are and are not capable of such Judgements and Reflections are too strongly affected with the Sense of present Good or Pleasure to forego the more certain immediate Gratifications of their Desires upon a faint Prospect of uncertain Mischiefs that may attend them; and which, if they do happen at all, do not seem greater or more difficult to bear than their present Self-denial would be.  
He therefore that is a thorough Atheist, and will pursue his Principles as far as they will carry him, must look upon all the Notions of Government, Right and Property, of what kind soever they be, with all the pretended Grounds and Foundations of them, and the several Relations supposed to result from them; either as false Pretences devised by some cunning Men, by means of which they would have others act under such and such Restraints, that they might enjoy their own Liberty to more advantage; or as useless insignificant Inventions, which make no manner of Change in the Conduct of Life, but leave every Man to act the same way, as he would do if there were no such Notions or Expressions ever heard of:  
He must look upon himself as the Supreme Judge of his own Happiness, and the Chief Governor and Director of his own Actions: and, being fully assured that every Man else is the same, with respect to himself, he is not to expect that any other Man does or will contribute to his Happiness any further than as he thinks he serves his own Interest by it; nor can he conceive a Design of contributing to the Happiness of another Man, but upon the same Considerations: And, being well convinced of these things, and resolved to act accordingly, He must examine wherein his chief Happiness consists, and how he may best attain it; upon which Enquiry he will find, That he must place his Happiness in the Enjoyment of the greatest Pleasure he is capable of, without the least Alloy or mixture of Pain. Now, in pursuing what he thinks the greatest Pleasure, and avoiding what he judges the greatest Pain, He must perform or omit any Action whatsoever in his power, the Performance or Omission of which he judges conducive to those Ends he has proposed to himself; and so he knows must every other Man that acts upon the same Principles, be his Notions of Happiness or Misery never so different from his: upon which account he cannot but acknowledge that all Actions are alike and of the same Nature, and that there is no ground for any distinction of them into lawful and unlawful, just and unjust, virtuous and vicious; because there is no Kind or Sort of Action imaginable, but may contribute indifferently either to the Happiness or Misery of some Man, or to both, when, considered with respect to several Persons, or with respect to the same Person at several times, according to the different Sentiments or other Circumstances of those concerned in the Action, and consequently that he must also grant there can be no certain Rules or Principles of Acting, no particular Set of Actions or Scheme of Life which will certainly procure any Man, that follows it, more Happiness than he could obtain by any other means; but the same Man must be obliged oftentimes to act contrary Ways, and pursue the same End by the most opposite Methods imaginable; and, if he is utterly disappointed of his Hopes by the interfering Pursuits of others, he must change his chief Pleasure, and choose a new Object of his Happiness, or undergo a great deal of Misery for obstinately sticking to his former Choice:  
And further, the Person, whose Character we are drawing, if he will be true to his own Principles, should not be deterred from the Prosecution of his Ends, by any Concern for the Happiness of others, or Sense of their Misery, or by any regard to their Judgement and Opinion concerning his Actions and the Measures he takes;  
He is never to prefer the public Good of a City, Nation or Empire to his own private Satisfaction, though the Duration of it be but a moment, if he cannot be so happy without it: Generosity, Friendship and Gratitude must give place when they do not serve to promote his Attainment of what appears more agreeable to him than the Exercise of such Acts which go under those Names; all Sentiments of Tenderness, Pity and Compassion are to be laid aside when the Sufferings and Miseries of others can procure him what he esteems a greater Happiness than the Ease of complying with those foolish Dispositions of his Nature or Temper, which, together with all other Inclinations he finds in himself, his Reason tells him are to be bend and directed toward his chief Happiness; which is the Gratification of the strongest and most vigorous Passion of his Soul, whichsoever it is that happens to be the uppermost in his Constitution:  
He is to look upon all the Notions of Praise, Honour and Reputation as mere empty Names, when applied to any thing but Cunning and Art in the managing and advancing a Man's own Interest, and bringing about all his Designs of this nature, by the surest and most effectual Means he can; and therefore nothing that serves for the promoting this End is to be accounted base or dishonourable; but, if the World will, contrary to Reason and their other Principles, agree to call some things so, and the Opinion of others is necessary to him in the Prosecution of his chief Pleasure, or the imaginary Uneasiness of Disgrace spoils his Enjoyment of it, he must comply with the established Error, while it prevails, so far only as it stands in his way to Happiness, or helps to promote it:  
And lastly, The Person thus confirmed in Irreligion, being sensible that his Life is the utmost Compass and Extent of his Happiness, all his Cares and Endeavours, all his Concerns and Designs are to be confined within the same Bounds; he is to have no regard to Memory or Posterity, he is not to be concerned if the whole Race of Mankind should end with him, nor abate any thing of his present Satisfaction to procure the greatest Advantages imaginable to succeeding Generations.  
This is a short Draught and Representation of the Faith and Practice of one that, upon a full persuasion of Mind, denies the Being of a God.  
'Tis true indeed, there are very f●w, if any, such clear through Atheists in the World as come up to this whole Character. The Generality of those that are styled so, are either such as never thought any thing of the matter, or else have some small Remains of Religion about them, which their Reason and Education will not give them leave wholly to cast off: But, if the Ignorance of the one and Prejudices of the other were removed; as, if Atheism spread and came into a general Reputation, they soon would be, then should we feel the dismal Effects and Consequences of these Principles far greater and dreadfuller than we can imagine or describe. For there's a great deal of Difference between an ignorant or half-persuaded Atheist, and one that is positively and fully so, upon Judgement and Reflection. Should a Nation of People be duly taught and instructed in the Doctrines of Irreligion, they would be much more astonishingly wicked than those that had never heard of God, or retained some lose imperfect Notions of him.  
And if God should suffer this to be the Result of the bold Talk and Arguing of the present Atheists of this Nation; they would then repent that they did not keep their Atheism to themselves, and make their Advantage of other People's Credulity: For, if all the People, or any considerable Number of them were of their Opinions, they would soon overturn Government, and bring all things to an Equality; and then farewell to all the Pleasures, Enjoyments and Conveniencies of Living, when every Man must labour to maintain his own Life, and be in continual Fear of having it taken away by others.  
What I have said of Atheism, is, with very little Difference applicable to all manner of Deism, which is such an acknowledgement of a God, as does not include any Religion in it. For, if the Deist be of the Epicurean Sect, and makes his God an unconcerned Spectator of Human Actions, he must, as to what concerns his own Conduct, judge and act altogether the same way that the Atheist does: For, if God require nothing of him, is not pleased or offended with any thing he does, nor has annexed any Rewards or Punishments to this or that sort of Life, he has full Liberty to choose for himself, and prosecute his own Happiness in what way or manner he shall think fit; which is exactly the Case of the Atheist.  
'Tis the same thing, in effect, with those that make God a necessary Cause, and Men necessary Agents: For, according to this Opinion, all Actions are alike, as being equally necessary, and all Men must obey their own Determinations; and there can be no general Rules or Principles for Men to act by; there is no such thing as Obligation, Reward or Punishment: nor have any of those Notions or Distinctions, taken away by Atheism, any place or foundation under this Hypothesis.  
As to the Persuasion of those who believe a God, acknowledge some sort of Providence, and think they owe some regard to the sovereign Author and Governor of the World, but deny a future State. There seems indeed to be a considerable Difference betwixt this and the other extravagant Suppositions; and so indeed there is, as to the Credibility of the Opinion, but the Influence it has upon Practice is very near the same; especially with respect to those of these latter days, to whom the Certainty of a future State hath been more fully discovered. For, if we consider the present Posture and Constitution of Human Affairs, and believe that things have always gone on in the same Course from the beginning, without any sensible extraordinary Interposition of Providence, as they that deny all Revelation must believe; If, I say, we are of this Opinion, and observe how things are managed in the World; how Wickedness oftentimes thrives and flourishes, and that not only for a season, but strengthens and fixes itself upon as lasting Foundations as our Happiness stands upon; and how, on the contrary, the Calamitics and Sufferings of the Righteous are commensurate to their Lives, and a great many of them merely owing to that Character, what Force or Power can some slight Sentiments of Religion have upon us, when the present Happiness of this Life may be promoted by acting contrary to it, and we have nothing to lose or fear after Death?  
I shall not examine how far we are obliged to act in such a case, upon the account of the certain irresistible Power of God, which he may exert, if he will, though it should be granted that he has not hitherto done it, or upon the account of the Benefits we have received from him; but we shall find this true in fact, that those who are firmly persuaded that God will exert his Power no otherwise than he has done already, will not, by those promiscuous Punishments they see light upon all sorts of Men at different Times and in different Circumstances, be deterred from prosecuting the Designs they have conceived for the Attainment or Establishment of their own Happiness, by any means they shall think likely to succeed.  
Thus have I endeavoured to give a true account and Representation of all kind of Irreligion, and to show the necessary Effects of it, with respect to the Happiness of Mankind.  
And now, upon a fair and just comparison of Religion and Irreligion together, according to the different Notions and Consequences of them; Religion must needs appear not only more agreeable to the Reason and true Interest of Men in general, more suitable and proportionate to the Capacities and Exigencies of Human Nature; but more conducive to the Happiness of particular Men, in the present Constitution and State of human Societies in the World; so that, upon a due Balance of all the usual Accidents of Life, 'tis very probable a Religious Man should enjoy more Happiness while he lives here, than a Person of another Character: as might be fully and particularly made out if there was occasion; but this requiring a set Discourse on purpose, and not falling directly within my present Design, I think it sufficient to mention some few general Considerations only, which show the Advantages a Religious Man has above another that acts by contrary Principles. Such as are these following:  
He that acts upon a true through Sense of Religion, has, with respect to all the external Enjoyments of the World, more contracted Desires and fewer Wants than another; and, consequently, his Happiness does much seldomer interfere with any other Man's, and is less obnoxious to the Assaults of Envy, Ambition or Covetousness, than the prosperous Condition of the Wicked:  
He is not eager in the pursuit of the necessary Supports and lesser Conveniencies of Life, and takes care to avoid all manner of Injury and Offence of others; and therefore must be freer from the Effects of Anger, Malice and Revenge, than such as advance their own Ease or Fortune by disquieting and robbing others:  
He professes to help and assist in promoting the Happiness of other Men, without any Worldly Advantage to himself; and therefore there will be a great many who will find it their Interest to defend and secure him, and perform several Offices of Kindness to him, to engage his future Endeavours for them when there shall be occasion; whereas, he that is known to act for himself only, will be trusted and assisted no further than his own present Interest is perceived unavoidably to concur with another Man's:  
And lastly, the Happiness a Religious Man proposes to himself in another Life is such, as, he is firmly persuaded, exceeds all Experience, Imagination, or possibility of Comprehension; and, consequently, the Hopes of attaining it, being strong and vigorous in proportion to his Belief, must afford him greater Pleasure here than the Hopes of any other Enjoyment of this Life; and a well grounded Hope of the greatest and happiest Condition a Man can frame to himself here, gradually increasing by a successful Advance of the finest best-formed Designs for the Attainment of it; is, I believe, compared with any actual Enjoyment whatsoever, the highest pitch of Pleasure we can be sensible of, without a future Prospect; which must be all this, and as much higher, as this Religious Hope is greater and more durable in the Possession, and the present Assurance of it less liable to Disappointment and Defeat, as it certainly is, there being no external Accidents or Endeavours that can deprive us of it.  
This being the State and Condition of a Religious Man, he must be generally happier than the Wicked, in Truth and Reality, though perhaps not in their Judgement of him; as enjoying more Ease and Satisfaction in himself, by a constant unalterable Success in the pursuit of his main End; as being less exposed to the Injuries of others, by assisting some, and a due Care not to entrench upon the Happiness of any, and being better able to bear those real Calamities and Miseries that may happen, by a certain, comfortable expectation of such Happiness as will infinitely outweigh all he can suffer within the Compass of this Life.  
This I think abundantly sufficient for the Proof and Establishment of Religion; but for a further confirmation of the Truth, and that I may leave no room for the Enemies of God and Mankind to glory in their Strength, as if they had as much to say for their Opinions if they might be heard;  
V I shall, in the next place, consider the Grounds and Pretences of Irreligion; what can be alleged in defence of it, and what are the usual Pleas for it; and from thence show the Absurdity and Folly of their Principles and Actions, who have no better Reasons for what they believe and do than those, upon examination, will be found to be.  
In the Prosecution of which Subject I shall observe these Steps or Measures: 

1. I shall inquire how far Irreligion is capable of being proved, what Kind or Degree of proof it admits of.  
2. I shall consider the common Ways and Methods of defending it.  
3. I shall answer some of the principal Objections made use of against Religion.  
4. I shall make some general Reflections upon the different Grounds and Foundations Religion and Irreligion stand upon, and the different Conduct of those who act under the Influence of the one and the other.    
1. First then I am to inquire how far Irreligion is capable of Proof; that is, how far a Man is able to prove, there is no God, no Obligation of acting such a way, if there be, or no future State of Happiness or Misery.  
Was a Man disposed to believe all or any of this, or had a mind to convince others of the Truth of these Propositions, what way or Method could he take to satisfy his own or their Understanding? 'Tis plain that none of the things enquired into are Objects of Sense or Internal Consciousness, we cannot see with our Eyes, nor feel with any intimate Perception that there is no God, Religion, or Future State; and therefore, no new Experiments or Observations of this nature, nor any old Testimonies or Authorities, grounded upon such, have any place upon this Subject, any further than they furnish Matter for Reasoning and Reflection, from whence we must immediately derive all the Knowledge we can have of any of the Propositions in question; all which being negative, there's no other way of proving the Truth of them but by showing either their Repugnancy or Disagreeableness to our Reason, and those other Principles of our Knowledge which we cannot possibly doubt of; the first way we demonstrate them to be certain, the latter we make them appear probable.  
As to Demonstration, there's no way of demonstrating a thing not to be, but by proving 'tis impossible and a Contradiction to be; and who will undertake to convince the World that 'tis impossible there should be a God? or supposing there be, that Religion and a Future State are downright Contradictions? What is there in any of these Notions that shocks our Reason, and restrains our Assent? What other more certain Knowledge have we that makes our Belief of these things inconsistent with it? There was never any Proof of this kind offered or pretended to yet; the Vanity of all such Attempts being easily discoverable upon the first Trial of our Understandings that way.  
All that remains then to be done, is, to produce such Reasons and Arguments for the Doctrines of Irreligion, to show such Marks and Characters of Truth upon them as shall render them suitable and agreeable to our Minds; so that, upon a fair Proposal, we shall be easily inclined to embrace and assent to them, though the Evidence be not so strong as irresistibly to determine us.  
This we call arguing from Probability; which is nothing else but an Appeal to the common Reason of Mankind; so that what the generality of Wise Men, in all Ages, have, upon due examination, assented to as most agreeable to right Reason, that opinion is most probable; and, in matters of pure Reflection deduced from the first Principles of Knowledge, which are common to all Men alike, that have the same use of their Faculties, this must be acknowledged to be a very good Rule and Measure of Probability: But Atheism and Irreligion will never stand this test; the wise and learned part of the World having constantly rejected and condemned them.  
But supposing the Disquisition was to begin now, and Men were to choose their Opinions again, how would a Person go about to prove that 'tis more agreeable to Reason and the Nature of Things that there should be no God, no Religion, nor Future State, than that there should be any of these?  
All the Arguments that can be made use of upon this occasion, must be drawn from our own Existence and Constitution, and from the Existence, Frame and Disposition of the World, and all things without us. We are certain that we are, and we know not our Original, or by what Power we came at first to be: We perceive a great many things without us, the Beginning of which we know not, nor by what means they came to exist: Is it therefore more likely and probable that there should be no such Being as we conceive to be the Author of all these things, than that there really is some such perfect Being, which was the Cause of these Effects we perceive? Can we, from the Oeconomy of the World and the Course of Nature, infer, that there is no governing and directing Power in the Universe? Can we, from the Frame and Disposition of our own Minds, prove, that we are under no Law or Obligation of acting? or that Religion is destructive of our Happiness? Can we, from the Circumstances of our Nature or the Constitution of things without us, make it reasonable to think we shall not live again, be conscious of all our former Actions, and be happy or miserable according to the different Kind's of them? However true these things may or are supposed to be in themselves, they will by no means follow from the forementioned Principles, and there can be no other but these imagined antecedent to them: For if God, Religion and a Future State are all possible, as they must be acknowledged to be, the real Existence of any thing else will never furnish any Argument for their Nonexistence.  
2. In vain then do we expect any direct Proof of Irreligion. In the next place therefore I shall consider the usual Ways and Methods of defending it which are these Four.  

1. Ridiculing Religion.  
2. Requiring a more certain Mathematical proof of it.  
3. Endeavouring to show the Possibility of things subsisting without it.  
4. And raising some lose Objections against it, which chief aim at the present Profession and Practice of it in the World.   
1. As to the First of these ways; 'tis certain that the Generality of those who advance or any of the forementioned Opinions, contained under the Notion of Irreligion, are such as barely deny the contrary Truths, without giving any Reason for their Disbelief: they speak a bold thing against God and Religion, and so fall to their Sins without ever examining the Truth of what they say; a light Word or Phrase applied to a serious Thing, an odd Simile or Comparison, a ridiculous Turn or Allusion is all they pretend to. Now, there's nothing so well established or confirmed but may be ridiculed though it cannot be confuted; and the greater and more sublime the Subject is the fit for Burlesque; the Boldness of the Raillery heightens the Wit of it. But I need not spend time to prove that a Jest is no Argument: Besides, I shall have occasion to consider the Persons of this Character in another place, and so shall pass on  
2. To the Second Way made use of by the Patrons of Irreligion to justify their Infidelity; and that is, by alleging that the Doctrines of Religion and the Proofs given of it have not that Degree of Certainty they ought to have in order to their Conviction. Why, say they, are not such important Points as those, in which the Happiness of Mankind is so far concerned, made as plain and evident to our Understandings as any Proposition in the Mathematics? prove them to us in the same manner and we will believe them. The Insufficiency and Absurdity of which Plea will manifestly appear from these following Considerations.  
For, first of all, 'tis very absurd for Persons to call for more and greater Proof towards confirming the Truth of any thing before they have confuted one of those Arguments that are already advanced; and therefore the Proof that has been given of Religion, whatever it be, is sufficient till it is overthrown by contrary Allegations.  
In the next place, 'tis ridiculous to ask for other Kind of Proof than the Nature of the Thing will bear; it being the same as to desire that the Nature of Things should be changed: and therefore to call for Mathematical Demonstration in Points of Religion, is as much as to say, let Religion be turned into Mathematics and we will believe it; the Meaning of which is only this, that such Men as these like Mathematics better than they do Religion: For indeed the Persons that call for this kind of Proof in Religion, will allow of no such thing as Demonstration any where but in Numbers and Figures; whereas we have as clear Ideas of many other things, and do as evidently perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of them, and make as certain Deductions from them; and that particularly in the present Subject, where we have as clear and distinct Notions of Knowledge, Will, Power, Duration, and all those other original Ideas from whence we took our first Rise in the Proof of Religion as we have of Number and Figure; we are also as certain of the Truth of those Propositions, that Nothing can make itself, that Something must be eternal, that Motion must begin from Will, and several other from whence all our Arguments for Religion are deduced, as we are of such Mathematical Axioms as these, that the Whole is bigger than any of its Parts, that when equal Numbers are added to equal the whole is equal, and the like; and the Deduction of other Propositions from those former is, in all the intermediate links of Connexion, as evidently perceived there as here, and the main Conclusions as certain as any Mathematical Conclusion at the same Distance from the first Principles of that kind of Knowledge.  
In the Proof of a God this is very plain; and if the Obligations of Religion, and a Future State will not be allowed to have the same degree of Evidence, yet they have all the Certainty 'tis conceivable they should have by way of Deduction from any Ideas our Minds are furnished with; so that, supposing them true, they cannot be proved any otherwise from bare unassisted Reason; and therefore 'tis very unjust to require a further Demonstration of them, when the rational Grounds they stand upon cannot be overthrown by contrary Proofs. I do not mention the additional Advantage of Revelation, not to be disproved by any Counter-revelation, because that belongs to another place.  
But, besides all this, where we are under a necessity of judging one way, as we are in all such matters where it concerns our Happiness to act or not to act, 'tis contrary to Reason not to be determined by that degree of Evidence, whatever it be, that appears on one side, when we have nothing on the other side to balance it, and therefore it must be very foolish and absurd to take the Party of Irreligion for no other reason but this, that the Proofs of Religion have not all that Strength and Evidence of Conviction which some other Truths seem to have. And yet this is the only Defence some People make for their Impiety and Unbelief.  
3. But others there are that pretend to build their Irreligion upon positive Principles: some of which have made new Schemes or Hypotheses, wherein they endeavour to explain the original, Disposition, and Conduct of things without a God; but all that they prove, is, that they who only denied the common Doctrines concerning God, Providence, etc. without advancing any other in their stead were the wiser Men; For all these new Notions of theirs either signify nothing at all, or they mean the same thing as we do by a God, or else they are altogether irrational and contradictory.  
What are Fate, Necessity, Chance, and universal Soul, but mere Covers for Ignorance, of the same kind as occult Causes? the true Result of all which Principles is a new sort of Creation; where all things are made by nothing, or nothing is set up as the efficient Cause of all things.  
But if those that use any of these Names mean, by the Maker or Cause of all things, a Being distinct from the things made; such a Being cannot be conceived without all those glorious Attributes which make up our Idea of God. For, if we will allow the original Author of the World the highest Perfections imaginable by us, as his Work certainly required; if the first great Cause of all things had the noblest Qualities we can conceive, as the Effects produced by it sufficiently declare, we must grant this Author or Cause to be an intelligent Being, endued with Knowledge and Will: For 'tis impossible for Man to frame a Notion of any Powers, Faculties, or Qualities, greater or nobler than these; and 'tis easier to believe that some Man of more refined Intellectuals made the World, than that any other Cause, which wanted these Perfections, could be the Author of it.  
I shall not here enter into a more particular Disquisition of any Scheme or Hypothesis that excludes the Being of a God; having considered them all before, in the former part of this Discourse, and showed them to be, in those Points, where they mean any thing distinct from the common Notions we have undertaken to defend, very absurd and inconsistent.  
And indeed, the Falsh●●● and Absurdity of all these Schemes and Hypotheses which pretend to give an account of the Frame and State of things without a God, or independently of him, are so manifest and notorious, that I am fully persuaded a Man may make good the Charge against a great Disproportion of Parts and Learning; but this is not my business at present, nor is there any occasion for such an Undertaking now.  
For should we allow the Atheist's Scheme of things to be possible and consistent, which is the most that is pretended, yet we are assured, by the common Reason of Mankind, that the Philosophy of a God is most rational without the Help of Revelation and universal Tradition which confirm the Truth of it: and therefore the Possibility of another Hypothesis cannot justify the Defenders of it unless they can also make it appear more reasonable and fit to be believed than that which obtains; but the Atheist will never be able to give an easier, juster and more satisfactory account of all the Phoenomena in the Universe than he who owns a God, if he should offer at such a thing, which is more than any one has ventured at yet.  
And the same may be applied to others who acknowledge a God, and pretend to show there is no such thing as Religion and a Future State: For they cannot say that God who made the World, and all things in it, cannot oversee and govern the Works of his hands; that He, who gave Man his Being, and all his Faculties and Capacities, cannot require him to act after such a manner while he lives, or is not able to renew him again after Death, and continue his Life to him in such a State as he pleases to make agreeable or disagreeable to him, and as long as he pleases: This is to bring Weakness out of Strength, to set Bounds to God within the acknowledged Sphere of his Power, to say he cannot do things which are less than those he can do.  
Nor can they prove 'tis more agreeable to the Nature of God, and all those Notions we have concerning Him and ourselves, that he should not exercise his Power after this manner than that he should. The utmost all the Proof they bring can amount to, is to show, that 'tis possible God may not do all this that we conceive of him: as will plainly appear, if we consider the chief Arguments made use of upon this occasion, which are taken from the supposed Materiality and Mortality of the Soul.  
Here lies the Principal Strength of Irreligion; these are the fundamental Principles the whole Fabric stands upon; and great Endeavours have been used to confirm the Truth of them. Now, 'tis plain to any Man, that duly considers these Notions, without that Confusion and Ambiguity of Terms they are commonly delivered in, that 'tis impossible to prove, that what we call the Soul is not something perfectly distinct from Matter and Motion, and all the Modifications of them, and that it cannot subsist and act after the Dissolution of the Body; nor are there any Arguments producible to persuade us 'tis more probable that the Soul should be something material and dissolved with the Body, than that it should be a distinct Principle and survive it. All that can be said, is, that we cannot, from the Knowledge we have of the Qualities and Operations we attribute to each, certainly demonstrate what we term Soul and Body to be two distinct Substances; though, at the same time, it must be confessed, that Men have been generally more disposed to believe this than the contrary Opinion; and 'tis as demonstrable that what we attribute to the Soul is not any Mode, Composition, or Result of the Qualities we ascribe to Body, as it is that any Idea we have in our Minds is not any other.  
Allowing then that 'tis possible that every thing we ascribe to Body and Soul separately may be united in one common Subject, which is the most that can be supposed; and that this common Subject, at the time we call Death loses those Capacities and Powers we attribute to the Soul, in the same manner as it is divested of Motion; from hence it follows, that it is possible also that the same common Subject may never subsist in the same manner it did before, with all those different Qualities united in it, in like manner as 'tis possible what is now at rest may never be in motion again. But than it is as possible also that it may: God may, if he pleases, put us together again after death, in such a manner that we shall feel ourselves to be the same we were before we died, and be conscious of all our former Life; and that he will do so we have a great deal of reason to think, had we not any assurance of it from Revelation, as has before been proved. And therefore the Arguments for the Materiality and Mortality of the Soul, let them have all the Weight and Certainty they are imagined to have, are wholly trifling and insignificant, with respect to what they are brought to prove: For no new Discoveries are hereby made of the Will and Design of God; and, consequently the Proof that has been given of Religion and a Future State, will have the same Force and Evidence still, though the Soul should be granted to be Material and Mortal: we should have all the same Reason to believe that God does require us to act after such a manner, and will reward or punish us in another Life according as we behave ourselves in this; no Arguments made use of in the Proof of this Point, being taken from the Immaterial and Immortal Nature of our Souls, but from what we certainly, by infallible Consciousness, know of ourselves, and what, by evident Demonstration we collect of the Nature of God, which every Man that owns such a Being must ascribe to him.  
Thus have I examined the Pretences of those Adversaries of Religion, who take upon them to establish new Principles and Hypotheses, to explain the State and Constitution of things by; and have shown, that the utmost that they aim at, is, to make it seem possible that those Appearances in the World, from whence we infer the Being of a God, Religion, and a Future State, may be otherwise accounted for; without endeavouring to destroy our Scheme; or, upon a just comparison in all points, to show that theirs is a more rational System.  
But most of the Professors and Favourers of Irreligion, we have now in these latter Times to deal with, are such as never trouble themselves with Schemes and Hypotheses; They come by their Opinions much easier, and maintain them with less expense of Argument. Some lose unconsidered Objection against any Notion or Doctrine that goes under the name of Religion, or any thing that has any relation to it, is enough for their turn: They never examine what is the just Inference that may be drawn from it, or what Answer may be given to it, but immediately condemn all Religion for the sake of some little remote Consequence their Imagination represents to them as inconsistent with it.  
3. Some of the principal of which Objections I shall answer very briefly, and show the Absurdity of them; which is the Business I proposed to myself under the Third of those Heads into which I divided my Discourse concerning the Grounds and Pretences of Irreligion.  
The chief and most common Objections against Religion are these: 

Mysteries, Inconsistencies and Absurdities in Scripture;  
Extravagant Notions and pernicious Doctrines maintained under the Name of Religion;  
Varitey of Opinions and Censures of one another among those that profess to own the same common Principles of Faith and argue from them;  
Foolish and ridiculous Arguments brought by some in the Defence of true Opinions;  
The Scandalous Lives of great Pretenders to Piety and Virtue, and such as are peculiarly designed to promote the Practice of them among others;  
Religion the Effect of Fear and Education;  
Religion a mere politic Contrivance.    
As to the first of these Objections, I shall consider it no farther than as it is made use of to weaken the Credibility of all Religion; and 'tis sufficient to expose the Weakness of it by showing the Argument barely with its Consequences, which is this; Such a Passage in Scripture I cannot understand or reconcile to another, or such a Story or Account of Matter of Fact does not agree with my Knowledge of things of the like Nature, therefore this Passage or Account is false, therefore the Book in which it was found is false, therefore all the several Books in the whole Bible, which were writ by several Men, in several Places of the World, and at several Times during the space of about two thousand Years, are all false; therefore there is no God, or no Obligation of obeying him if there be, or no Future State.  
Most of the particular Cavils against Scripture have been fully answered by those who have purposely undertook the Defence of Revelation: but this is sufficient at present to show, that nothing of this kind proves any thing against the Truth of Scripture in general, much less against the first Fundamental Principles of Religion, which I have endeavoured to establish.  
The next thing objected against the Truth of Religion, is, Several absurd and pernicious Doctrines proposed to the World under the Name of Religion, and warmly contended for by those that believe and maintain them.  
Some Men place all their Religion in Show and Pageantry, their Worship is all Theatrical, and a great deal of their Faith and Discipline extravagant and Romantic; therefore all Religion is Priest-craft, and all Scripture Legend, saith the Atheist; but Socrates and Plato would not have argued thus; those wiser Heathens, though they laughed at the Gods and Devotion of the People of their Times, did not therefore turn Atheists, but employed their whole Reason to search out higher Notions of God, and frame to themselves a more rational Religion.  
Bigotry and Superstition have oftentimes produced as dreadful and pernicious Consequences to a Country or Nation, as the wild Liberties and Extravagancies of Atheism could do: but what's that to Religion, which suffers equally both ways, and is no more the Cause or Occasion of the one than the other? Cruelty and Revenge, and all Actions tending to the mischief or Destruction of Mankind are as contrary to the Nature of Religion when exercised by a superstitious Zealot, as when practised by an Atheist; though the former covers them with that Name, and the latter does not: and therefore true Religion is very unjustly and unreasonably condemned upon this account.  
Another foolish Objection is, that variety of Opinions which is found among the Professors of Religion, and their peremptory Censures of one another for holding false and absurd Doctrines.  
What a strange Disagreement is there among Men in Points of Religion? say those that have none at all. Some believe one thing and some another; some expound Scripture in this Sense, and some in that; Creed is set up against Creed, and Altar against Altar; what one Man thinks his Duty, another apprehends Damnation from. Supposing then we have our Opinions to choose, what is to be done in such a Case? shall we take the strongest Side, what the most, or what, we think the wisest believe? or shall we examine the Reasons of all Sides impartially without Prejudice, and let our Judgements be determined by the greatest Appearance of Evidence? No, we will do none of all this; but, without examining their several Pleas, we will take up Opinions different from all of them: and because one Man denies one thing, and another another, we will be sure to be free from those Errors they condemn one another for, and deny what no Body else does, what all the different Parties subscribe to and agree in. These are the Resolutions of the Irreligious; and what a strange Contradiction is this to make Unity of Consent the Character of Truth, and yet allow no Opinions to be true but those that have the least pretence to it?  
Neither is it more just and reasonable to condemn all Religion upon the account of the weak Defence and Patronage of some of its Professors. What if the Atheists should be able to defeat some trifling Argument of ignorant well-meaning Honesty or superstitious Zeal? to triumph presently, and cry out that Ignorance or Frenzy was the Mother of all Devotion would be as foolish a Boast as for a General to despise the Weakness and Cowardice of his Enemy, because he had plundered two or three small open Villages, when all the great Towns, and the chief Strength of the Kingdom had been unassaulted or attempted in vain.  
The scandalous Practices of Men of great Pretences to Piety, and such as, by their peculiar manner of Life, are looked upon to be wholly in the Interests of Religion is another very unwarrantable Occasion of some men's disbelieving every thing that goes under that Name: who infer from hence, that such Persons as these do not believe Religion themselves, and consequently there's no more Reason to think that others do, though they disguise their Notions better, in order to serve their present Interest; especially if they be Men of such Sense as is sufficient to put them above the suspicion of vulgar Credulity. But this Argument is false and unconcluding in all its Parts.  
For, First of all, it does not follow, That such Men as these believe nothing themselves of what they profess; the truer Inference is, That corrupt Nature, vicious Habits, and a lose Education are oftentimes too hard for Conscience and Reason, it being very plain that the same thing happens in several other Cases. For there's no Man whatsoever, be his Principles never so lose and wide, his Reason never so much depraved, but shall many times do what he himself shall condemn himself for doing, and which contradicts the Principles he resolved to stand by: and therefore, for a Man to infer from some gross Sins of a Pretender to Religion, that he does not believe any thing of what he professes, is as absurd as to prove that an Atheist does certainly believe a God, whatever he says to the contrary, because he often swears by him, and invokes him in his Curses.  
Besides, suppose this true of some Men who pretend to a great Sense of Religion themselves, or undertake to promote it in others, that they do not believe any thing of it; as there are sometimes Presumptions strong enough to induce us to judge so, what reason have we from hence to conclude that others of a more unsuspected Conduct are all of the same mind, if we could but see to the Bottom of them? or, what if there be a great many false Pretenders to Religion? how is this an Argument against the Truth of it? we have no reason indeed to believe it upon their Word; nor does their contradicting what they say by their Practice give us any more reason to disbelieve it. Nor, if some of those whose peculiar Employment it is, and whose present Interest it seems to be to propagate and advance the Belief of Religion in the World, should be supposed to believe nothing of it themselves, would it follow from hence, that their Unbelief was occasioned by knowing more of it than others, and being better acquainted with the whole Mystery and Contrivance: this is evidently proved to be false by the Experience of those who have thought more and enquired further concerning these things than the rest of the World have done; for the more they have considered the fundamental Doctrines of Religion, and the more just and exact they have been in tracing and examining all their Reasonings about them, the stronger have they been confirmed in the Belief of them. But if there really are such Men, as, for argument's sake, we have supposed, they were certainly Atheists before they put on the Garb of Religion: and what should hinder an Atheist from taking up this Disguise, and preparing himself for it by a close Dissimulation, who thinks all Means lawful for the promoting his present Interest in this World; and 'tis not every Atheist's good fortune to be better provided for in another Condition of Life, than he might probably be in acting a Religious Part.  
But, if the Generality of all sorts of Men must be allowed really to believe the Religion they profess, this, says the Unbeliever, is the Reason of it; A strange prevalence of Fear, and strong Impressions of Education have captivated their Understandings, and disposed them all to the same way of Reasoning. Upon this account it is that there have been so few true Philosophers, that were able to think rightly and judge clearly of things; But now and then some bold Genius has ventured to shake off his Chains, and assert the Liberty and Prerogative of human Nature; and as one Alexander or Caesar, so one Epicurus or Lucretius is enough for one Age: such Spirits are not of the common Make, and appear in the World but seldom, and are therefore to be admired. To which it may be sufficient to answer, that I have already proved Religion to be the necessary Issue and Product of Reason, and the first unquestionable Principles of all our Knowledge; and therefore, whatever else is assigned as a Cause of it must be false.  
But I have this further Consideration to add, viz. that the Effects of Fear and Education never are so uniform, lasting and universal as the Belief of Religion is observed to be, especially when they act contrary to the Truth and Reason of things, as they are supposed to do in this case; That Men are as much and as often disposed to deny as to believe what they fear, when the Grounds and Reasons for fear are the same, and more inclined to the former when the things feared are represented at a great Distance; That sensual Appetites, Habits of indulging them, present Enjoyments, or near Prospects of Pleasure, and Customs of living contrary to the Rules of Religion, have a much stronger and more powerful Influence upon the Judgements of Men, than such Impressions of Fear or Education which contradict all these; especially if Reason be of the same side with them, as the Patrons of Irreligion must say; And therefore, neither Fear nor Education nor both together can be the true Cause of such a general Belief of Religion as is professed in the World; but the Reason and Evidence of the things believed.  
The last Objection I shall mention, which the Atheist thinks the most formidable, and a perfect Discovery of the whole Mystery, is, That Religion is a Politic Contrivance.  
Now, that which gives occasion for such a Suspicion, is, That all the chiefest Politicians, in their wise Precepts of Advice, have thought it necessary for every Prince to encourage and promote Religion in his Country, and to have a Show of it himself whatever his inward Sentiments were. But this is so far from being any Plea for Atheism, that 'tis a very strong Argument for the Truth, Reasonableness and Necessity of Religion: For that is certainly highly rational which is most suitable and agreeable to the public Reason of Mankind considered together in Society; without which there would be little Use of Reason at all. And, if Men are born sociable Creatures, if they naturally desire Society, and Society cannot possibly subsist without Religion, as the Objection itself supposes, then is Religion as agreeable to the Nature of Man, and as necessary to his Happiness as Conversation and living together. And were it not for other men's having Religion, the Atheist would find it very uncomfortable living in the World.  
These are the chief Pleas, Defences and Objections commonly urged and insisted upon by the Enemies of Religion. And, if there be any other, which have not been here particularly considered, they admit of the same Answers as those that are here mentioned, or may be as easily accounted for out of the Proofs before given of the Truth and Certainty of Religion; and therefore, without spending more time in making little Cavils and groundless Suspicions look considerable by a formal Examination and Answer of them, I shall pass to the  
4. Next thing I proposed to do, in order to show the Absurdity and Folly of the Principles and Practice of those who reject the great important Truths. of Religion; and that is to make some general Reflections upon the different Grounds and Foundations Religion and Irreligion stand upon, and the different Conduct of those that act under the Influence of the one and the other.  
Now, upon a strict and impartial Review of all that has been offered or advanced in this Cause, we shall find that all the several Propositions, contained under the Notion of Religion, have been proved to be true and agreeable to our Reason, by a direct Deduction from the first Principles of our Knowledge; which Deduction, in most of the Parts of it, has all the Evidence and Certainty any consequential Truths can have, and in the other as much as the Nature of the things proved is capable of, in the present Condition and Circumstances of our Being, and such as the Mind fully assents to, without being able to entertain the least Suspicion of a Mistake, though it cannot prove there is not a bare Possibility of Error.  
It will likewise appear that Religion, in all the particular Branches and Duties of it, is admirably fitted for the promoting the Happiness of Mankind in general, considering their present State and Condition in the World: And further, that 'tis highly probable at least, if not evident, that the greatest degree of Happiness every particular Man, absolutely speaking, is capable of, will be the Consequence of his regular Discharge of all the Obligations of Religion, and that proportionably to a Man's Behaviour, in this respect, while he lives, shall his Reward be in another State; but in every proportion greater than can be conceived or imagined by us now.  
And as the Truth of these Matters will appear to be made out from the Reason and Nature of things; so will it be further manifest that the general Opinion of the World has always went the same way: and, if Testimony or Authority could be of any use here, that far the most and greatest is on this Side.  
Besides, we shall not be only satisfied of these things by a positive direct Proof; but we shall see the contrary Hypotheses proved absurd and impossible; or, where any thing possible is advanced, we shall perceive it less probable in itself, and the Consequences drawn from it false and ridiculous.  
As we shall likewise be convinced that Libertinism and Irreligion do evidently and directly tend to the Misery of Mankind in general, with respect to the State they now are in, and will very probably, if not certainly, render every particular Person that owns or acts by these Principles, inconceivably more miserable in another State of Life; and that in proportion to his Neglect or Violation of the Duties prescribed by Religion.  
On the contrary, we shall find that the Doctrines of Irreligion have none of these Grounds of Credibility, nor are or can be defended by any of these Ways or Methods by which Religion is established.  
That they, consisting wholly in the Denial and Contradiction of other Propositions, do not admit of any positive direct Proof, but must be proved by overthrowing the Truth of the Assertions denied;  
That the Assertions denied cannot be showed to be false, either from their Repugnancy or Disagreeableness to our Reason, and antecedent Principles of Knowledge; or their Inconsistence with our Happiness; nor from the common Suffrage and Testimony of Mankind;  
And that the negative Principles of Irreligion and the practical Consequences of them cannot, upon a just Comparison, be proved to be more suitable to our Reason or Happiness than the contrary Doctrines.  
We shall likewise, upon a slight Review of the common Arguments and Pleas for Irreligion, be easily satisfied that nothing of all this is so much as pretended to; but that the strongest Effort of human Invention that way reaches no further than an Offer at explaining the common Appearances, the Original, Order, Course and Event of things, without a God, independently of him, or with Exclusion to those particular Consequences respecting Men, which go under the Name of Duty and Sin, Reward and Punishment; and that the most any Endeavours of this kind can amount to, is, to show that 'tis possible things may be, after that particular manner they are explained to be.  
These are the different Grounds and Proofs of Religion and Irreligion: which if we carefully compare together, it will easily appear that they do not only differ as more or less rational; but that all the Reason lies on the side of Religion; the Conception or Proof of a bare Possibility of the World's subsisting without any such thing, being no manner of Argument that there is none. And therefore it must be very absurd to deny all the Principles of Religion, and every thing brought in defence of them upon this account only.  
But allowing there may be a great deal more said for Irreligion so as to render it something probable to be believed; yet if the positive direct Proofs for Religion stand good, without considering those which pretend to show the Absurdity and Impossibility of a contrary Scheme, the former cannot stand upon so sure and firm a bottom as the latter, nor be advanced to so high a Degree of Credibility; and therefore it must be very unreasonable to give our assent on that side where there is the least Appearance of Probability.  
But supposing the Proof on both sides equal, such different Consequences do attend the Belief of the one and the other, that 'tis the Extremity of Madness and Folly to prefer the Party of Irreligion. Which, besides the present particular Pains, Troubles and Disadvantages it is said to bring upon the Persons that make this Choice, and the Mischiefs and Inconveniences Mankind will certainly suffer from one another upon this account; besides all this, I say, it is threatened with eternal, inexpressible Misery to come after this Life. And this is a Consequence so concerning and dreadful, that it must be a vast Preponderancy of Proof that can justify our running the hazard of it; which, I am sure, is more than any Man that makes the venture can pretend to.  
I do not here argue, that a Man ought to prefer Religion before Irreligion merely because 'tis safer so to do; because, by the Confession of all Parties, a Man shall not suffer any thing in another state by such a Choice, whereas he that chooses Irreligion has only his own Opinion for his security, and is threatened by the Persons of a contrary Persuasion with eternal Misery after Death: I do not think this alone a sufficient reason to determine a Man's Choice to one side, against all other Arguments to the contrary; for then a Man might be threatened out of any thing: but, if the Evil threatened be very considerable, and 'tis full as probable that it should happen, as it is that it should not, which is the Case now supposed, he acts very rationally and wisely, who chooses rather to undergo some lesser Inconveniences at present than put himself in danger of greater. Now, that the Misery annexed to Irreligion is very considerable cannot be denied, it being supposed greater than can be imagined or conceived by us: and that it is as probable it should be the Portion of all those that believe and act by such Principles as not, must be allowed whatever Hypothesis be true.  
For if Chance made the World, notwithstanding all the Characters of Wisdom we behold in it, why may it not as well happen that there should be a Future State, and that those we call Irreligious should be miserable in it, and the Religious happy? It looks indeed like Wisdom, and so does the Regularity of the World, and a great many constant Discriminations made there. Why should the Wind blow down the rotten Fruit and leave the sound? why should the Plague sweep away some and leave others in the same City or House? but there are natural Reasons and Causes for these things: so there may be for the other, for aught we know; the Wicked may be peculiarly disposed to be miserable; the same Temper and Constitution of Body or Soul that inclined them to be wicked may to be miserable also when they live again, and there is as much Chance for their living again as for their first Being.  
But if all things exist by Necessity, than a Future State may be necessary too, and the Wicked necessarily miserable in it, for any thing there is in this Hypothesis to the contrary.  
Where every thing is supposed casual or every thing necessary, 'tis impossible to give any reason why any thing that may be conceived future should or should not exist, or should or should not be after such or such a manner; and therefore all things of this nature must be equally probable: nothing can be alleged to determine the Mind one way rather than another.  
But, if there be a God, and the World, and all things that are, have been, or are to be are acknowledged to be the Effects of his Will, there are no Reasons to persuade us 'tis more probable that God will not punish the Wicked in another State than that he will; at least they have not yet been produced.  
From whence it follows, That it being equally probable in every Hypothesis that the Irreligious will be extremely miserable, they have no more reason to choose that side they are of than the other, by their own Confession and Account of things; and therefore, in this Case, a Man must not act at all, or, if he does prefer acting one way rather than another, the general Opinion of others concerning the safest side should determine him. But moreover, it is not only as probable that the Irreligious should be miserable in a future state allowing any of their own Hypotheses to be true, but, by their own way of Proof it appears that our Hypothesis is as likely to be true as any advanced by them, nothing further than a Possibility of theirs being aimed at.  
And not only so; but we do moreover pretend by many direct and positive Arguments to evince the Certainty of ours; and at the same time to show all theirs to be absurd and impossible.  
Wherefore, if upon an equal Probability we ought to take the safest measures, much more are we obliged so to do when Reason and Happiness are both of the same Side.  
Nay farther, He that prefers that Faith and Practice which Eternal Misery in another State is denounced against, ought not only to have more Grounds of Probability of his side, but Certainty and Evidence of Conviction; he should be fully satisfied, from certain direct Principles, that his own Opinions are right, or that the contrary are absurd and irrational: because the Consequences are of that vast importance that the present Inconveniences we are like to sustain by acting a contrary way can bear no proportion to the hazard or likelihood of Misery that attends this.  
Thus do we of the Protestant Faith defend ourselves against the Papists, when they peremptorily condemn us to everlasting Misery for being of contrary Opinions to theirs, without meeting with the same Returns from us; and then urge us to take the safest side: Thus, I say, do we answer; did we believe their Opinions or Censures probable, the 'twas possible, and to us perhaps seemed as probable or more so, that they might be false, we would then allow some Weight in the Argument: But we do not now go over to them upon the account of Safety, because we not only think our Opinions certain and theirs impossible, absurd or irrational, and are fully persuaded we have proved them so; but, supposing ourselves to err in all the Points in controversy betwixt us, we think it demonstrable from common Principles, owned on both sides, that none of these Errors, which, upon due care for better information, are believed by us as Truths, can expose us to the hazard of Damnation, if in all things else we live up to the Principles of our Religion. And if the Atheist and Irreligious can make the same Defence for himself; if the Doctrines of Religion, and the supposed Consequences of Irreligion seem as absurd and contrary to all the Principles of his Knowledge, owned by him, as the Popish Tenets do to a Protestant, or as ridiculous and unwarrantable as the Visions, Resveries or Predictions of every little Enthusiast or Fortune-teller to a Man of calm, sedate Sense; and he is able to make this good in the usual ways and methods of Reasoning, then may he despise our Threaten and laugh at the Misery of a Future State securely.  
But to deny all these important concerning Truths, without offering at any Proof of their Falsehood; to say they are doubtful and uncertain Points, and yet to act with the same Assurance and Security as if they were certainly false; to refuse our Assent to them for want of greater and more evident Proof, without confuting the Arguments already advanced, or producing stronger on the contrary side; to laugh at the Terrors of the Lord, without proving them first to be vain or resistible; to contradict the general Belief of the World, without making any new Discoveries or Observations; to lay aside a whole Scheme and System of things, which has been proved and established in all the principal Branches and Connexion's of it, because we are not able to comprehend or account for some little remote Consequence; and to venture eternal Misery upon a seeming Possibility of an Escape, which very few perceive or allow: These are all egregious Instances of the absurd Faith and foolish Conduct of the Enemies of Religion; and consequently good Proofs of the Judgement and Wisdom of those who believe and act upon contrary Grounds and Measures.  
There's another thing also which the Atheist commonly discovers his Folly in, and that is the publishing and propagating his Opinions: For 'tis more the Atheist's Interest that other People should have Religion than 'tis the Religious Man's. For, his whole Happiness being in this Life, the more other People are restrained, and the better they are persuaded he acts by the same Rules they do, the larger will his Liberty and Advantages be, and the less he will suffer from their Designs and Pursuits; whereas the Religious Man's Reversion is not endangered but confirmed by what he loses or suffers here.  
Other Proofs likewise, of the Unreasonableness and Absurdity of Irreligion might be brought from the Inconsistency both of the Faith and Practice of such as are professed Favourers of it: such as their Credulity and readiness of Belief in common indifferent Matters, and sometimes embracing absurd Opinions exploded by all the World, when at the same time they are distrustful of every thing upon the Subject of Religion; their believing Matters that concern their present Happiness upon less Grounds; their exposing themselves to greater Troubles and Inconveniences, and running greater Hazards upon a fainter Prospect of future Happiness in this Life; and sometimes, on the contrary, fearing and avoiding things upon a less Appearance or Likelihood of Danger than what Religion affords; and lastly, their acting contrary to their own Principles, and denying themselves what they esteem substantial Happiness out of a regard to imaginary Notions, which have no Foundation but in the Opinion of Men. But, these being Matters of common Observation, and too long to be fully insisted upon here, I shall think it sufficient to have hinted at them, and so pass on to the  
VI Sixth and last general Branch of my Discourse proposed in the beginning of it, and that is, To give some Account of the Causes of all Atheism and Irreligion, or the Reasons that induce Men to take up such Opinions.  
There's nothing People are better satisfied of than the Power nnd Influence of Prejudices and false Motives of Judging; every body being apt to resolve the Cause of another Man's differing in opinion from him into some particular Bias upon his Understanding. But this we do commonly without examining whether the Person that differs from us has not better Reasons for his Dissent than we have for our Persuasion; whether the Opinion he is of be not, in the Reality of things, true, though he believes upon false Grounds; or whether we ourselves are not disposed to judge as we do, upon some of the like Motives we suppose him to be directed by. By which means we are often not only guilty of the same Partiality we charge upon others, but either confirmed in our Errors, or else prevented from making just Inquiries into the Truth of things; so that, if we are in the right, it is by chance, and more than we are able to prove to ourselves or others.  
Upon which account I think it a very preposterous and deceitful Method of proving a thing false, to assign some peculiar Prejudices and wrong Motives of judging, which may possibly induce Men to be of such an Opinion, though the Truth should be of the other side, and which have often had the like Influence upon Men's Understandings in other Matters; and from thence immediately, without any further Proof, to infer, that such and such Persons have no other Reasons for their Belief of the point in question, and consequently, that they are in the wrong: this, I say, is not a fair way of arguing. But, after plain and manifest Proofs of the Truth of an Opinion, according to the standing Rules and Principles of Reasoning, it is not only proper to inquire how any People came to be of a contrary Persuasion, but the Strangeness and seeming Unaccountableness of the thing make it expected, and in some respect necessary, in order to a fuller Satisfaction of those, who, notwithstanding all the appearance of Evidence to themselves, may be apt to have such favourable Notions of Mankind, as not to imagine that Persons who have the same Faculties and all other Advantages of Knowledge as they have should deny what appears so plain to them, without some rational Grounds for their Denial.  
Having therefore, as I persuade myself, fully and evidently proved the Truth of Religion; I think, I may now be allowed to say, That all Atheism and Irreligion must be the sole Effect of Prejudice and Prepossession, if any such Cause of it is assignable.  
And if we search the Heart of Man, and look into the hidden Mysteries of Iniquity lodged there, if we consider all the false and corrupt Reasonings, and the several Arts and Methods of Deceit which are used by Men to delude themselves, we shall soon discover the secret Spring and Original of all Atheism and Unbelief.  
Now, the Causes from whence it proceeds are these two, The Fear of an After-reckoning for a wicked Life, and The Pride and Vanity of appearing greater or wiser than other Men. The first of which is the principal and most powerful Cause, and is only assisted and strenghened afterwards by the Accession of the latter. And what other Reason can be assigned?  
It cannot be the Force and Evidence of Truth, as plainly appears, not only from the foregoing Proofs of Religion, but from the Confession and Conduct of the Atheists themselves. It is not because the Notions of God, Immortality and a Future State shock the Understanding, and contradict the plain Principles of Reason, that they deny these Foundations of all Religion. Was the Being of God considered only as an Hypothesis to solve the Difficulties of Nature by, without those troublesome Consequences of Duty, Sin and Punishment, the Atheist would not scruple this Philosophy, and Lucretius himself would easily grant the Soul to be immortal, to be separated from the Body and reunited again, would you allow him that Conclusion, that neither separate nor reunited it hath any Sense or Remembrance of what was done before the Separation. God should also enjoy the Fullness of Perfection, he should be clothed with all the magnificent Attributes that Man could conceive, so his whole Employment was the Comprehension of himself, and the Contemplation of his own Glory, and he was not unnecessarily troubled to take account of our Actions. This is the dreadful Apprehension that perverts men's Reason, and makes them deny what they fear, when they are resolved to run the hazard of it.  
The quieting and laying these Fears Lucretius confesses is the whole Design of his Philosophy. Which is a farther Confirmation of what I have undertaken to maintain; as will appear from these following Remarks.  
For first this Philosopher observes, and seems to wonder at it, that the Fears of Death were very general, and made strong Impressions upon the Minds of Men.  
2. He affirms that these Fears were occasioned by an Apprehension of some other State after this Life.  
3. He takes notice only of those whom we style Wicked, that were afraid of a future State, they were the chief Objects of his Pity and Compassion, who, besides the Fear of Scourges, 
L. 3. v. 1025, etc.  Racks and Prisons in this World, were tortured with the Dread of new and more terrible Punishments in some other; and all his Arguments serve only for the Consolation and Encouragement of such unhappy Wretches, who, through Fear of future Pains, either denied themselves some present Gratification, or were uneasy under the Gild of past Actions, none but the Wicked and Impious being concerned in all the Fabulous and Poetic Stories of future Torments, 
Lib. 5. ver. 1222.  which he derides.  
From all which it is very plain that a Resolution to enjoy the Pleasures of Sin, and live in them without Damp or Disturbance is the reason why Men deny and seek for Arguments to overthrow those Opinions, which would otherwise be embraced as most rational; as is manifest from Lucretius' own Observations.  
For the universal Apprehension of something after this Life, which he plainly intimates, is no slight Argument of the Truth of another State: as, I am sure, the distinguishing Fears of the Wicked is a very strong Proof of the essential Difference of Good and Evil, and the Dueness of Reward and Punishment accordingly. For, otherwise, why should the Wicked condemn themselves for what they do? or, supposing a future State, why should they expect to be punished in it? why should they not rather conceive God to be of their Side, give him contrary Attributes, and make him punish the Righteous and reward the Wicked? or, if that be too harsh a Notion of the Deity, why do they not change the Natures of Good and Evil, call Evil good and Good evil? The Consequence is still the same. If it be Wisdom to live as they do, if they live most up to their Nature, and most agreeably to their Reason, what need they fear? Almighty Wisdom and Perfection will approve and be pleased with their Actions. Since therefore these Opinions offer too great a Violence to their Reason to be embraced by them, it is plain that they must acknowledge not only that there is a Difference in Actions, but that theirs are evil; not only that some Actions deserve Reward, and some Punishment, but that the latter is due to theirs, or else what reason is there for Fears? or why do not all Men fear a future State alike, the Righteous as well as the Wicked? Now, when Men are resolved to commit what they know to be ill and punishable, there is no Refuge left but to contrive some means of Impunity, and escaping the Sentence threatened; and this they promise themselves by denying either the Judge or the Place of Punishment. And this is the true Cause and Spring of Atheism. For no Man ever denied a God that thought his Way and Course of Life acceptable to such a Being; no Man ever questioned a future State that could possibly persuade himself, if there was one, Happiness would be his Portion in it.  
As than it is not a Zeal for Truth that makes Men Atheists, so neither is it a generous Undertaking to free the World from the Bondage of Religion. For they cannot but be convinced that it would be very much for the Advantage of Society and Mankind in general if all Men lived up to the strict Rules of Religion. What noble Ideas does such a Speculation as this afford us? and how dismal would the Prospect be, if Atheism spread as fast as Christianity did in the first Ages of the Gospel? But not to pursue this any farther, what Bondage or Slavery is there in Religion, and what Abridgement of our Liberty? Those that bear the Yoke think it easy and pleasant, and, without a future Reward, preferable before Atheism, as much as a just and easy Government is to be preferred before Anarchy and living Wild. Why then should they who never felt the Burden complain of the Weight of it? but there are some Pleasures and Enjoyments that Custom hath made them fond of, and rendered difficult to be left off, and therefore they are resolved to enjoy them still; which they cannot do fully and to the height, without some Damp and Regret till they have got rid of those Fears of a future Punishment their own Consciences and the general Faith of the World threaten them with: in order therefore to this End, every little Objection or Suspicion is improved into an Argument against Religion, and, by the advantage of strong Wishes and a gradual Decay of contrary Impressions, heightened into Demonstration; till, what, at first, their Lusts suggested to them with a perhaps there may be no such thing as God or a future State, is, at last, ripened into a bold Denial.  
And, when they have once got this Mastery over themselves, then do they sit free, and despise the rest of the World in Fetters, and laugh at what others adore. Then do Novelty and Boldness pass for Truth and the Pleasure of Believing is the Ground of Faith. For how exquisite and transporting is the Pleasure of a new Notion or Invention? and how are Men's Wits set upon the stretch to find out fresh Opinions, and dress up old ones in a different manner, to get the Character of Men that think out of the road? Men shall live like Beasts in the State of Nature, and devour one another, couch in their Dens at night, and in the morning seek their Prey: Beasts, on the contrary, shall be so rational as to erect Commonwealths and Governments, if it serve for a new Notion to establish the Reputation of the Author.  
Besides, the exposing and ridiculing common Opinions, especially the despising what is very much respected and admired carries a peculiar Satisfaction in it; there being nothing that recommends any Notion or Reflection, any stroke of Wit or Reason so much as the Boldness of it. From hence it comes to pass that Treason and Blasphemy are entertained with a greater Gust than Private Calumny and Detraction; and the same Expression is counted wittier when it strikes at God or the King than when it is levelled against a Herd of common Mortals: For, to ridicule the greatest Actions that have been done in the World, to laugh at the noblest and most celebrated Schemes of Knowledge that have ever been laid together, is thought to argue a Spirit capable of greater Performances. And to despise and contemn what the rest of Mankind stand in awe of, seems to show such a Superiority of Sense or Courage as easily tempts Men to affect this Character without considering whether they are able to support it.  
Thus are Men confirmed and established in Atheism by the Pride and Vanity of appearing greater or wiser than others, and being thought Masters of finer and more extraordinary Talents either of Wit or Reflection: as is plain also from another Instance, in which Men show themselves to be very much influenced by these Motives in matters of Religion; and that is, a groundless unreasonable Diffidence and Jealousy of being put or imposed upon; calling every thing Trick or Imposture that they do not understand, or any body else gets an Advantage by. For, by this means, they imagine they establish to themselves a Reputation of great Sagacity and Reach, and seeing far into matters; whereas, in reality, this overmuch Cunning of theirs only betrays the Weakness of their Judgements, and shows them to be of the same size of Understanding with those foolish Politicians, who find a thousand Mysteries in State-Affairs more than the Managers themselves ever knew of, and think every the most natural and undesigning Action of a Prince to be the effect of some secret Counsel and Contrivance.  
Now, that these beforementioned are the true and proper Causes of Atheism; and that the Belief and Patronage of the Doctrines of Irreligion is the sole Result of Prejudice, and not deliberate Reason, will further appear from the following Reflections.  
1. Those who go under the Name of Atheists or Deists, whether real, pretended or reputed, are generally Persons of no great Reach or Capacity, Men of strong Lusts, and irregular Imaginations, without a due Ballast of Reason; impatient of Thinking and Attention, and consequently, unable to examine any Variety of Pretences, or to distinguish betwixt Colour and Argument. Those of them who are furnished with a better stock of natural Sense, have it wholly unimproved and uncultivated; or, if they have made any Advances in Knowledge by Study or Industry, they have either begun late, and so fell into the middle of Learning without the Assistance of the first grounds and Rudiments, and applied themselves to such Books they light upon, or which happened to be recommended to them, without due Choice and Direction; or else they have been chief conversant in such Studies as have by no means qualified them to be Judges out of their own Way.  
For a Man may be very well versed in History, Antiquities, or Experimental Knowledge; he may be a great Master of Language and Criticism, and a nice Discerner of the true Meaning or Reading of an ancient Author; he may have a just Relish for Wit and Elegance of Expression, and have Skill enough to discover the Beauties and Faults of the most celebrated Models of Writing: and yet, after all, in matters of general and abstracted Reasoning, not be able to understand a plain, easy Consequence. For, 'tis not difficult to observe how ridiculously oftentimes Men of known Abilities in some of these or the like respects, argue and infer; and how incapable they are of making or perceiving a just Deduction, in points of moral or civil Knowledge, and such in which the Conduct of Life and Happiness of Mankind is immediately concerned: whereas, on the contrary, those who are acquainted with the general Rules and Laws of Reasoning, and the different kinds and manners of Proof are capable of making true Judgements and Inferences in any Subject they have been ever so little conversant in, upon a bare explication of the Terms, and just relation of Facts belonging to the Matter to be judged of. Now, this is a piece of Knowledge that I may venture to say, the Favourers of Irreligion have been always the greatest Strangers to; and the less any of them have been acquainted with this kind of Learning, the less they have employed and exercised their rational Faculties, and still the less common natural Sense they have been born with, the stronger, more confident, and more unscrupulous Atheists have they been.  
2. Secondly, as we are satisfied, from the Character and Capacities of the Atheists, that they are wholly determined to their Opinions by Prejudices and false unequal Motives of Judging; so are we further confirmed in this Persuasion by the Manner and Process of their Faith. For they commonly believe first before they enter upon any Examination or Proof of their Principles. What they understand of the matter, all the Arguments or Objections they are furnished with are found out afterwards, not to satisfy and convince themselves, but to make a show of Defence against the Charge of others; they take up their Opinions hastily and of a sudden; they do not proceed by Degrees, by cautious and wary Steps, weighing and balancing the Arguments on both sides, sometimes inclining to the one and sometimes to the other, calling in the Advice and Reason of other Men to their assistance, and all along showing a Concern and Fear of being mistaken, suitable to the Importance of the thing to be judged of. Thus do Men commonly behave themselves in a Change from one Sect of Religion to another, if they sincerely aim at Truth, and are not governed by any other false Motive. But who ever heard of a Man who took this method of turning Atheist? Which of them all can say he considered and compared the Proofs of both Opinions before he left one and took up the other? When was any body called in to plead in the behalf of Religion, before it was cast off, and to settle the first Mistrusts and Waver of an Atheistical Conscience? Afterwards perhaps, upon some Checks and Reluctance of his Mind, an Atheist may have had some faint Designs of examining into the Truth of Matters, and may have discoursed with others about it; but then a long custom of thinking and talking one way, and the troublesome Consequences attending a Change of Faith, may have indisposed him to entertain or relish the Arguments for Religion, not to mention any thing of a judicial Blindness inflicted upon him from God, for his long unreasonable Opposition to the Truth. But, if an Atheist will examine fairly into the first Rise and Original of his Faith, he will find it was a hasty Effort occasioned by high Blood and a raised Imagination, or some bold Strain of Wit, that struck him when he was rightly disposed to be pleased with it. And, if we should examine into these things more particularly, I believe, it would appear that all irreligious Opinions are first taken up in Company, and that no Man receives the first Impressions of Atheism alone from his own calm and sedate Reflections.  
And thus, as Irreligion springs from Prejudice, so is it nourished and fed the same way; by a constant Application to such Books and Company as give it any countenance or colour of Defence; with an industrious avoiding and ridiculing the contrary; picking out such things as minister most occasion for Raillery; and magnifying every bold thing that is said by any Man, without any regard to his other Opinions, or the Consequences even of that that is liked; 'tis no matter whether it really proves any thing against Religion or no, so it is thought by the Professors of Religion to bear hard either upon the fundamental Principles, or any remote acccessional Doctrines owned by them.  
From whence it comes to pass that the present Atheism is a promiscuous Miscellany of all the bold notions that have ever been vented by those they style Free-thinkers: where, whatever seems to be leveled against any Point of Religion is embraced as the most sensible and rational account that can be given of the thing; but those Parts of Religion which are established by the same Authors are slighted and passed over as weakly done; whereas I will be bound to prove that there is never an Article or Duty of Religion, professed by us, but is owned and maintained by some or other of these bold Free-thinking Authors, which are so highly approved and commended by the present Atheists. And what a gross Partiality is this, not to allow those whom they cry up for unprejudiced Men to talk a Word of Sense or Reason, but when what they say makes for their Purpose?  
3. But Thirdly, we have a more convincing Proof that the Doctrines of Irreligion are the genuine Issue and Effects of the Causes before assigned, from the open Confession of several Atheists themselves; who, upon just Convictions of Conscience, having disclaimed their Atheism, have freely and sincerely owned that they threw off Religion without ever examining or considering the Proofs of it; that they were disposed and induced to entertain irreligious Notions by the Power and Influence of their Lusts, or such vicious Habits and Customs of living as they thought irreconcilable with a contrary Belief; that the Reasons why they endeavoured to persuade themselves of what their Course of Life inclined them to believe were, to defend those Liberties of Practice they took against the Censures of others, and to secure their own Minds in an easy undisturbed Enjoyment of them; that commonly the first and strongest Impressions of Unbelief were occasioned by some bold Hints and Insinuations, or some witty Ridicule or Raillery upon the Subject of Religion; that, as these either in Books or Discourse, coming from others, gave them very great Pleasure, and by that means Assurance, in embracing these new Principles, so were they further pleased and confirmed together in their Belief of them, by applauded Trials and Exercise of their own Wit the same way; especially when the general Disposition of the Persons they conversed with, made this Entertainment very agreeable and very frequent. All this have several Atheists, upon their Repentance, acknowledged.  
And that which strengthens the Argument drawn from hence, is, that those who have renounced their Irreligious Principles, and given this account of themselves, have been, some of them, Men of the best natural Abilities, and greatest acquired Improvements, of any that ever took the Party of Atheism, and their Repentance has been free and voluntary, and not extorted by any frightful Representations, or importunate Addresses, in the seasons of Fear and Weakness; it has begun from themselves, and been wholly owing to the overruling Impressions of a Divine Power and not to Human Persuasion; and their Blindness and Prejudices being, by this means, removed, the Arguments for Religion have prevailed upon them by their own Strength, as suggested to them by their own Reason, without receiving any Advantage from the Management and Art of others.  
And this I think sufficient to show that Atheism proceeds from strong Prejudices and false, disproportioned Motions of judging, and is not the result of just Reasoning and impartial Reflection.  
I have now gone through the several Branches of my Discourse, I proposed to myself in the beginning of it; and finished the Proof I undertook of general or, as 'tis commonly called, natural Reliligion.  
All that I have further to add upon this Subject, at present, is, to give some account of the Notions of Atheism and Deism; which Words I have been forced to use sometimes promiscuously, and in a different Sense from the common acceptation, for want of a fit and proper Word to express a Belief or Profession of any such Opinions which take away the practical Influence and Power of Religion. For which reason I think it convenient in this place, that I may remedy any Confusion or Mistake, the Liberty I have taken in the use of these Terms may have occasioned, to set down distinctly what I look upon to be the common Notions of Atheism and Deism, and what Ideas I should choose to affix these Words to.  
By an Atheist is commonly meant such a one as will own no Being under the Name and Title of God. And he who does acknowledge such a Being, let his Conceptions of him be what they will, is no Atheist. And, in this Sense of the Word, it may well be made a question, Whether there be any such thing as an Atheist in the World? For, 'tis hard to find a Man who has not some Idea in his Mind, which he will allow the Name of God to: tho, upon Examination, perhaps it will be found to be nothing else but a confused Notion of some vast Power, First Cause, Original Mover, or Immortal Being, enjoying Eternal Rest and Quiet.  
Now, according to this Notion of Atheism, he who professes to believe a God, whatever Nature, Characters and Attributes he ascribes to him, and Denies his Providence or Government of Mankind is called a Deist.  
But, in such places where the Pretences of Revelation are acknowledged and defended, he that is called a Deist is one that owns a God, and believes some sort of Providence, and natural Obligations, but denies all manner of Revelation; confines his Duty to matters of Civil Justice and Commerce; makes these his chief Principles, not to injure another, and to keep his Word; grounds his Practice upon the Reason and Interest of Societies, and his own present Advantage, not Obedience to God, or a future Prospect; believes, no future Life, or at least such a one as can have no great Influence upon a Man's Actions here. This is the common general Use of these Words.  
But, by an Atheist, I think, may properly and justly be meant, not only he that absolutely denies the Being of a God, but whosoever says there is no God that governs the World, and judgeth the Earth; there is no God that has appointed Laws and Rules for Men to act by; there is no God to whom Men are accountable for all their Actions, and by whom they shall be rewarded or punished in a future State according to their Behaviour here; and, in general, whoever holds such an Opinion which exempts him from all Obligation of Duty to a Superior Being, or cuts off the Expectation of Rewards and Punishments consequent thereupon.  
For Atheism is to be considered as a Vice and not a mere Error in Speculation. And therefore, he that denies Providence, Natural Law, or a Future State, is as much an Atheist as he that denies God's Being: For, it's all one, with respect to Practice, to say there is no God, as to say there's no Obedience due to him, or no Punishment for Disobedience, if there be: it is likewise all one to deny divine Punishment directly, and to deny the Immortality of the Soul, or the Scriptures, in the Sense of those who at present deny these things: For they who say the Soul dies with the Body, think hereby to prove that God cannot punish; and they who deny the Scriptures do it in order to show that he will not punish, that is, in another Life; and, as to the present, they perceive that those who are styled Wicked fare as well, and have as large a Portion of the good things of this World as their Righteous Brethren. The End and Design then of all these Opinions is the same; namely, to establish a Liberty for every Man to live as he pleases, and to do whatsoever is right in his own Eyes; and what is this but to say, there is no God in Israel?  
This is the Notion I have of an Atheist; and accordingly I have applied the word indifferently, as I had occasion, to any Persons that denied any of the Principles of Religion I have endeavoured to establish: And I have used the word Deist in the same Sense with that of Atheist, every where but where I am particularly concerned in the Proof of God's Being, as distinguished from the other Parts of Religion.  
But here, in opposition to the Character I have now given of an Atheist, by a Deist is to be meant such a one who acknowledges all the Principles of Religion here maintained; who thinks he is obliged to inform himself truly of his whole Duty to God, and to live up to the highest and purest Rules of Morality he can form to himself, by the Assistance of his own Reason, and the united Lights of other Men; who looks upon all the moral or practical Part of the Scriptures as very useful and instructive, and consequently to be read and valued as Tully and Aristotle are, upon the same Subject: but does not believe any such thing as Revelation, or assent to any of those peculiar matters of Fact, or Doctrines which are wholly grounded upon that extraordinary way of Conveyance, and are not levelly to his Reason or discoverable by it.  
And, if a Deist be such as I have described, it would be as just a matter of Enquiry whether there be any Persons to whom this Title belongs, as whether there be any real Atheists in the World. For my part, I will not positively say there is no such thing as a true Deist, in that sense I have given of the word, because, I believe, there hardly was any Opinion known among Men, that some body was not of; but this, I think, I may venture to affirm, that it would be the difficultest thing imaginable to find a Man in a Christian Country, who was acquainted with the Books of Holy Scripture, and the common Proofs of Christianity; who was fully persuaded of the Truth of all the Principles of Natural Religion here laid down, and seriously endeavoured to conform his Life according to the Moral Rules and Precepts of the Gospel, and yet denied Revelation, and all those particular Truths which stand distinguished by the Name of Revealed Religion: such a Man as this, I believe, is hard to be met with. For it is not Prophecies or Miracles or Mysteries that puzzle the Faith of those that now go under the Name of Deists; but a plain and full Discovery of a future State of Rewards and Punishments. This is the shocking repugnant Doctrine, in comparison of which the Trinity and Incarnation are easy Notions and very reconcileable to their Reason.  
Upon this account it is, that I have several times mentioned Deists as Enemies of Natural Religion, and so properly coming within my Subject, and not as mere Opposers of Revelation, which belongs to another Argument.  
And now, having pointed out who they are that are particularly concerned in the foregoing Discourse, it might be expected that I should address myself to them to embrace those Principles of Religion I have there proved, and to bestow some serious Thoughts about the Danger of their Unbelief; but I am too well acquainted with their Character to trouble them with any Advice of this nature: If they are not convinced and bore down by Arguments, I am sure they will never yield to Persuasion; neither indeed is it proper to go about to persuade Men to believe; they only are to be applied to in this manner, who are satisfied of the Truth of what you would persuade them to, but want sufficient Motives and Incitements to practise.  
I shall therefore shut up this whole Discourse with my earnest Prayers to God, that he would be pleased to incline and dispose those who are doubtful and wavering in the Concerning Points of Religion, to weigh and consider well the Proofs it stands upon, before they venture to withdraw themselves from under the Influence and Government of it; that he would defend the Innocent, and such as are unacquainted with the Ways of Irreligion, from the false Suggestions, and Insinuations of Unbelievers; that he would convince the Careless and Indifferent of the absolute Necessity of having some Religion; and that he would be further pleased to enable those that are already convinced of this Truth to stop the mouths of Gain-sayers, by a steady and uniform Practice of their Duty every way answerable to their Knowledge and Profession.  
FINIS.   

ERRATA  
In the Preface, p. v. l. 2. for corruptions r. conceptions.  
IN the Book, Pag. 26. l. 9 for probable read possible. p. 47. l. 21. the r. our. p. 74. l. 24. extension-modification r. modification-extension. l. 26. motion-matter r. matter-motion. p. 89. l. 2●. than any r. than in any. p. 95. l. ult. del. have. p. 113. absolutely r. absolute. p. 127. l. 22. d. him p. 132. latter end, r. observations. proportioned. efficacy. p. 142. l. 19 that r. their. l. 27. defining r. desiring. p. 151. l. ult.: r., p. 162. l. 15. to hap. r. to his happiness p. 165. l. antepenult. r.? p. 169. l. antepenult. when, d., p. 174. l. 13. d. to. p. 175. l. 16. and there r. and then there. p. 187. l. 20. d. 4. p. 188. l. 1. r. advance or profess. p. 189. l. 6. d. the. p. 194. l. 16. may make r. may be able to make. p. 201. l. 8. r. variety. p 208. l. antepenult. r. are any such. 209. l. ult. one r. an. p. 210. l. 10. these— Considerations. p. 238. l. 16. self r. selves.