ESSAYS ON SEVERAL Important Subjects IN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION.  
By JOSEPH GLANVILL, Chaplain in Ordinary to His Majesty, and Fellow of the R. S.  
Imprimatur, Martii 27.1675. Thomas Tomkins.  
LONDON, Printed by J. D. for John Baker, at the Three Pigeons, and Henry Mortlock, at the Phoenix in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1676.   

ESSAYS. VIZ.  

I. Against CONFIDENCE in PHILOSOPHY.  
II. Of SCEPTICISM, and CERTAINTY.  
III. MODERN IMPROVEMENTS of Knowledge.  
IV. The USEFULNESS of PHILOSOPHY to THEOLOGY.  
V. The Agreement of REASON, and RELIGION.  
VI Against SADDUCISM in the matter of WITCHCRAFT.  
VII. ANTIFANATICK Theologie, and FREE Philosophy.    

To the most Honourable HENRY Lord Marquis, and Earl of Worcester, Earl of Glamorgan; Lord HERBERT Of Chepstow, Ragland, and Goure, Lord Precedent of Wales, Lord Lieutenant of the Counties of Gloucester, Hereford, Monmouth, and Bristol; Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter, And one of the Lords of His Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council, etc.  
MY LORD,  
ALthough perhaps in strictness of judging there is somewhat of Impertinency in such Addresses, yet Custom hath obtained licence for us Writers thus to express our acknowledgements of favours, and to give public testimonies to the Deserts of excellent Persons: Your Lordship affords me plenty of subject for both these, and I humbly crave your leave to use the Liberty that is granted without ●…ensure ●…n such occasions, to declare part of my resentments of them.  
There is nothing more substantial, or valuable in Greatness, than the power it gives to oblige; for by doing benefits we in some measure are like to Him, who is the Lover of Men, and causeth his Sun to shine upon the good, and upon the evil: Nor doth God Himself glory in the absoluteness of his Power, and uncontroulableness of his Sovereign Will, as he doth in the displays of his Goodness: This, my Lord, is the right, and honourable use of that Greatness he is pleased to vouchsafe unto Men; and this is that which makes it amiable, and truly illustrious: Your Lordship knows this, and are as much by Nature as by Judgement, form to live according to such measures: And I think there was never Person of your Lordship's rank, whose genera●… fashion, and converfation was more suited to the sweetest and most obliging Rules of living: For besides that your natural Genius hath nothing ●…aughty, or rough in it, nothing but what is modest, gentle, and agreeable, your Lordship's whole deportment is so affable, and condescending, that the benignity of your temper seems to strive for superiority over the greatness of your quality, which yet it no way lessens, but illustrates. This is that which highly deserves, and commands the love, and venerations of all that have the honour, and happiness to know you: And you may justly challenge their devotion, and highest esteem upon all other accounts that can give a great. Person any title to them. For your immediate descent is from a long masculine line of great Nobles, and you are a Remainder of the illustrious Blood of the PLANTAGENETS. What your Family hath deserved from the Crown, the vast supplies afforded his late Majesty by that Loyal M●…quess, your Grandfather, and the sufferings of your House for Him, do sufficiently declare to the World: But your Lordship hath no need that Arguments of Honour, and respect should be fet●…ht from your Progenitors; the highest are due to your personal Virtues; and that way o●… living whereby you give exa●…ple to Men of quality, and show, how Honour, and Interest is to be upheld. For you spend not your time, and Estate in the ●…anities and Vices of the Town, but live to your Country, and in it, after a sp●…d, and most honourable Fashion, observing ●…he Mag●…ence and Char●…ty of the ancient Nobility, with all the Decency, and Impr●…ements of 〈◊〉 Times. And perhaps your L●… ●…ay is one of the best P●…ns the A●… yie●… of a Regular greatness, 〈◊〉 which gr●… is without vanity; and Nobleness without Luxury, or Intemperance: Where we see a vast Family without noise, or confusion; and the greatest ●…lenty, and freedom, without provocations to any Debauchery, or Disorder. So that your Lordship's cares, and thoughts are not taken up with the little designs that usually entertain idle, or vainly employed Men, but in the Service of your King, and Country, and conduct of your Affairs, with prudence and generosity; in which you not only serve the present Age, but provide for the future. And, my Lord, among the acknowledgements that are due to your Virtues, I cannot but observe the care you t●…e for the constant, daily Worship of God in your Family, according to the Protestant Religion, professed by the Church of England, and the example your Lordship gives by your own attendance on it. This is the f●…rest Foundation of greatness, yea 'tis the Crown, and lustre of it: And when all other magnificence is in the dust, and is shrivelled into nothing, or at the best, into a cold, and faint remembrance, the effects of this will stay by us, and be our happiness for ever; And all other splendours, in comparison, are but like the shining of ●…ten wood to the Glories of the Sun, and Stars. This also is the best fence and security to our present comforts and enjoyments, both in respect of that temperance and so●…ety it produccth, and chiefly on the account of the blessing of the Supreme Donor, who hath made it the promises of this Life, as well as of that which is to come: And therefore the wickedness of those that take Liberty from their Riches and worldly greatness, to defy God, and despise Religion, is as foolish and improvident, as 'tis monstrous and unreasonable: and those brutish Men do not render themselves more hateful for their impiety, than they are despicable for their folly. But I need not say this to your Lordship, who are sensible of the absurdities, and malignity of this vice, and give not the least countenance, or encouragement to it by your practice; being cautious to abstain from all expressions, that grate on the Honour of God, as you are free from any that can give just offence unto Men: For your Lordship is none of those that shoot the arrows of bitter words, and set their mouths against the Heavens; but your discourse and conversation is adorned with that modesty and decency that becomes a great Nobleman, and a good Christian.  
My Lord, I have not given you 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 just acknowledgements, with design to ●…fie or please your Lordship, I know I need your pardon for the trouble your modesty receives from them; but I have done it for the sake of others, because we live in an Age wherein there is scarcity of such examples. I know 'tis ufually indecent to commend Persons to themselves; but the custom of Dedications will excuse this, which even severity and ill nature cannot impeach of flattery, or extravagance.  
And as I owe this Testimony to the merits whereby you serve and oblige the Age, so I should acknowledge the Obligations your Lordship hath conferred on myself: but this will be a great duty, and business of my Life; for such empty expressions as these verbal ones, are very unsuitable returns for real and great favours; and if ever better acknowledgements are in my power, I shall still remember what I owe your Lordship.  
I now most humbly present you with a Collection of some Essays upon subjects of importance. The design of them is to lay a foundation for a good habit of thoughts, both in Philosophy, and Theology. They were some of them written several years ago, and had trial of the World in divers Editions: Now they come abroad together (with some things that are new) reduced to such an Order, as is most agreeable to my present judgement. I could have added much upon such fertile, and useful Arguments; but I am willing to believe, I have said enough for the capable and ingenious, and I doubt too much for others. If your Lordship shall pardon their imperfections, and accept of the devotion wherewith they are offered you, it will be the greatest honour, and satisfaction to,  
My Lord, Your Lordship's most humble, Most obliged, and most entirely devoted Servant, JOSEPH GLANVILL.   

The PREFACE.  
I Shall not trouble the R●… with much formality, or 〈◊〉 of Prefacing, but only give a brief account of the following Discourses. I know it will be no pl●…usible excuse for any of their Imper●…ctions to allege, that some of them were written when I w●… very young; since they came abroad again in an Age wherein more maturity of judgement is expected. But the truth is, I am not grown so much wiser yet, as to have altered any thing in the main of those conceptions. If I had thought it worth the while, I might have been more exact in new modelling, and could perhaps have given them a turn that would have been more agreeable to some fancies, but my Laziness, or my Judgement made me think there was no need of that trouble.  
The FIRST Essay against Confidence in Philosophy, is quite changed in the way of Writing, and in the Order. Methought I was somewhat fettered and tied in doing it, and could not express myself with that case, freedom, and fullness which possibly I might have commanded amid fresh thoughts: Yet 'tis so al●…'d as to be in a manner new.  
The SECOND of Scepticism, and Certainty, was written when I was warm in the Consideration of those matters, for the satisfaction of a particular Friend; what I say was enough for his use, though the Subject is capable of much more; and I had enlarged on it, but that I am lo●…h to engage further in Philosophical Arguments. I have annexed some of the things I said to Mr. White, but the main of this Ess●…y was never extant before.  
The THIRD of Mod●…rn Improvements, was first a Controversy: I have here given it another shape. As I never begun a Quarrel, so I never will continue any, when I can fairly let it fall. The Discourse was written violently against by one, who was wholly unconcerned. The interest be pretended, was the defence of his Faculty against a Passage, wherein he would have me say, That the ancient Physicians could not cure a C●…t-finger; which I never affirmed, or thought. But that Person it now so well known, that I need say no more of him, or of that C●…est. His long studied, and triumphant Animadversions have given me no reason, or occasion to alter any thing in the Treatise, except some few Errors of the Press, over which he most ●…d. He hath writt●… divers things against 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉, I have kept the promise I publicly made, and have never read them.  
Besides this Antagonist, the learned Dr. Meric Casaubon, writ Reflections on this Essay in a Letter to Dr. Peter Du Mo●…n, who it seems had presented it to him. They were Printed in ●…e year 1669, and my Answers soon after ready; But consider●…g that the Doctor allowed all that which was my main design, ●…d only opposed his own mistakes, and suspicious, I thought fit to suppress my Reply; and was the rather silent because not willing to appear in a Controversy with a Person of Fame and Learning, who had treated me with so much Civility, and in a way so different from that of my other Ass●…ants.  
I have further to advertise concerning this Essay, That whereas I mention several Discourses of Mr. boil's, as intended for the Public, 'tis likely that some of them by this may be extant, though my privacy and retirement hath not afforded me the notice of their publication.  
The FOURTH Essay of the Usefulness of Philosophy to Theology, was Printed under the Title of Philosophia Pia●… I was commanded to reprint it by a Person of Honour, and great Fame, for whose Learning and universal Accomplishments I have high and just venerations. This put into my thoughts the design of revising of some of my other Writings, and bringing them together into a small Collection, which I have here done.  
The FIFTH of the Agreement of Reason and Religion, was at first a Visitation Sermon, twice Printed before; I have now only cast it into the form of a Discourse. It contains the substance of many thoughts and anxieties about that important matter, in a little compass. My chief care was to state, and represent the whole affair clearly; which I think I have done. The subject ●…b been written on by divers since, who some of them have perplexed the matter again; others have added no one thought. They have written a great deal, I wish I could say, to purpose. I know this freedom is capable of a wrong interpretation, but I am urged to it by a little vexa●…on that the pr●…enders to such a subject should afford me no advantage for the improving my conceptions on it.  
The six Essay was one of the first written, and printed four times already. It stands in this place because it 〈◊〉 a p●…rticular service Philosophy doth, in securing one of the outworks of Religion. The Daemon of Tedworth that was annexed, is ready to be Printed by itself, with a further Confirmation of that certain●… though much oppos●…d Relation. Since the publishing of these Considerations there hath a thing been put out, of the Question of Wi●…choraft, denying there are Witches, upon some of the weakest pretences I have urged, and disabled. Who ever reads this Essay will see that that Writer was answered before he gave himself the trouble to be an Author on that Subject.  
The SEVENTH is entirely new. 'Tis a description of such a Genius in Theology and Philosophy, as I confess I myself like and I believe some others may. But I blame no Man's differen●… sentiment, who allows the liberty of judging that himself takes. I have borrowed the countenance, and colour of my Lord Bacon's story; of which I have given the brief contents. The Essay is a mixture of an Idea, and a disguised History.  
Reader, I have done now: But I make thee no promise that I will not write again; for I perceive that those promises are hardly kept. To appear often in the Press I know is censured; but I see not why that should be a fault, whilst the Books themselves have not greater. If a Man write well, he may deserve excuse at least; if otherwise, by use he may mend; or if there be no hopes of that, his writing often is not worth objecting. Nor hath any one need to complain, since no one is concerned about what another Prints, further than himself pleaseth: And since Men have the liberty to read our Books, or not: Methinks they might give us leave to write, or forbear. This I say, because I know this ill-natured humour, puts restraint upon the Pens of some great Men; and tempts others to make promises, and excuses, which I think do not become them. For my part I have as little leisure to write Books as other Men, for I have that to do which may be reckoned an Employment; but every Man hath some va●…ancies, and I love now and then in this manner to employ mine. 'Tis an innocent way of entertaining a Man's self, to paint the image of his thoughts, and no better a Writer than myself may happen to divert, if not to instruct, some others by it.   

ERRATA.  
The Reader is desired to take notice of the following Errors of the Press, some of which are so near, in sound, 〈◊〉 the words of the Author, that they may easily be mistaken for his.  

ESSAY. I.  For. Read. Page. Line. BEst compact●…ess Fo●…st compactness, 13 2 The herb, and the flower Herb, and flower, 16 2 Before us, our discoveries Before us, our discoveries, 25 34 All opinions All their opinions, 26 21 Old Law, Old Saw, 28 29 Heavens above, etc. Heavens above it, 28 32 Other opinions Opinions, 30 11 His saying His sayings 31 24  

ESSAY. II.  Revile against Rail against. 43 4 Boasts of; Boasts; 47 16 Isell●…s Psellus 53 19 Are certain Contain, and are 62 13  

ESSAY. III.  I take 'twas I take it 'twas, 4 10 Virulam Verulam 34 14 Self-absurd Self-assured 52 12  

ESSAY. IV.  Since then Since them 17 16 Difference Deference 26 25 Jumbling, intermixtures Jumbling and intermixtures 32 13, 14 Flighted Slighted 34 7  

ESSAY. V.  Their own interest Their interests 28 8  

ESSAY. VI  For Read. Page. Line. Streams Steams 14 22 F●…m whatever What ever 56 17 She apprending She apprehended 56 22  

ESSAY. VII.  To them, All To them, All 6 13, 14 From the World From your World 6 37 Such of them that Such of them as 7 1 They that made That they made 11 6 Main works Main marks 30 33 (〈◊〉.) (2.) 43 31  
Note, that the Sum of my Lord Bacon's Atlantis, being the brief contents of his Story, printed in the beginning of the 7th Essay, was intended as a Preface to it, and should have been in the Italic Character; but the Printer hath not done that; nor made a sufficient Break to distinguish my Lord Bacon's Contents (ending Page 2. Line 12.) from the Author's Story.   

Essay I. Against Confidence in Philosophy, And Matters of Speculation.  
ONE of the first things to be done in order to the enlargement, and increase of Knowledge, is to make Men sen●…ible, how imperfect their Understandings are in the present state, and how liable to deception: For hereby we are disposed to more wari●…ess in our Inquiries, and taken off from ●…old and peremptory Conclusions, which are some of the gre●…test hind●…rances of Intellect●…al improvement●… in the World. Therefore, by way of Intr●…duction to Philosophy and grounded Science, we must endeavour first to destroy the confidence of Assertions, and to establish a prudent reservd●…ss and modesty in Opinions. In order to this, I shall here set down some thoughts I have had on this Subject. And in doing it, I shall  
1. Offer some considerable Instan●… of Humane Ignorance and Deficiency, even in the main, and most usual things in Nature. 2. I shall inquire into the Ca●…ses of our imperfection in Knowledge, which will afford further evidence and proof of it: and 3. Add some Strict●…es against Dogmatizing in Philosophy, and all matters of uncertain Speculation.  
My Instances shall be drawn, 1. From the Nature of our Souls; and 2. from the Constitution of our own, and other Bodies.  
Ab●… 〈◊〉 former I consider, That if Certainty were any where to be expected, one would think it should be had in the Notices of our Souls, which are our true selves, and whose Sentiments we most in wardly know: In things without us, our shallowness and ignorance need not be matter of much wonder, since we cannot pry into the hidden things of Nature, ●…or obs●…rue the first Springs and Wheels that set the rest in motion. We see but little parcels of the Works of God, and want Phaenomena to make entire and secure Hypotheses: But if that whereby we know other things, know not itself; If our Souls are strangers to things within them, which they have more advantage to understand than they have in matters of external Nature; I think then, that this first will be a considerable Instance of the scantness and imperfection of our Knowledge.  
(1.) I take notice therefore, That the Learned have ever been at great odds and uncertainty about the Nature of the Soul; concerning which every Philosopher (almost) had a distinc●… Opinion: The Chald●…ans held it a Virtue without f●…n; Xenocrates, and the Egyptians, a moving N●…ber; Par●…ider, a compound of Light and Darkness; Hes●…od and An●…minder, a consistence of Earth and Water: Th●…les called in a Nature without rest; Heraclides supposed it to be Light; Empedocles to be Blood; Zeno, the Quintessence of the Elements. G●…len would have it to be an hot Complexion; Hypocrates, a Spirit diffused through the Body; Plato, a self-moving Substance; Aristotle, an Entelechy, or no body knows w●…; and Var●…o, an heated and dispersed Air.  
Thus have some of the greatest Men of ●…ntient times differed in one of the first Theories of Humane Nature, which may well be reckoned an Argument of uncertain●…y and ●…perfection: And yet I account not the difficulties about this, to be so hopeless, as they are in les●… noted Mysteries. The great occasion of this diversity, and these mistakes, is, That Men would form some Image of the Soul in their Fancies, as they do in the contemplation of corporeal Objects; But this is a wrong way of speculating Immaterials, which may be see●… in their effects and attributes, by way of reflection; but if, like children we run behind the Glass to look for them, we shall m●… nothing there but disappointment.  
2. There hath been as much trouble and diversity in enqui●…ing into the Origine of the Soul, as in se●…hing into the nature of it: In the opinion of some learned M●…, It was from the beginning of the World, created with the Heavens and Light: others have thought it an extract from the Universal Soul: Some fancied, it descended from the Moon; others from the Stars, or vast spaces of the Aether above the Planets, some teach, That God is the immediate Author of it; some that it was made by Angels; and some by the Parents. Whether it be Created or Traduced, hath been the great Ball of contention to the latter Ages, and after all the stir about it, 'tis still as much a question as ever, and perhaps may so continue till the great Day, that will put an end to all Differences and Disputes. The Patrons of Traduction accuse their Adversaries of affronting the Attributes of God; and the Assertors of Immediate Creation impeach them of violence to the nature of things: And while each of the Opinions strongly opposeth the other, and feebly defends itself, some take occasion thence to say, That both are right in their Oppositions, but both mistaken in their Assertions. I shall not stir in the Waters that have been troubled with so much contention: The Famous St. Austin, and others of the celebrated Ancients, have been content to sit down here in a professed Neutrality, and I will not endeavour to urge Confessions in things that will be acknowledged; but shall note some Difficulties, that are not so usually observed; which perhaps have more darkness in them, than these so much controverted Doctrines.  
1. I begin with the Union of the Soul and Body: In the Unions that we understand, there is still, either some suitableness and likeness of Nature in the things united, or some middle, participating Being by which they are joined; but in this there is neither. The natures of Soul and Body, are at the most extreme distance; and their essential Attributes most opposite: To be impenetrable, discerpible and unactive, is the nature of all Body and Matter, as such: And the properties of a Spirit are the direct contrary, to be penetrable, indiscerpible, and self-motive: Yea, so different they are in all things, that they seem to have nothing but Being, and the Transcendental Attributes of that, in common: Nor is there any appearance of likeness between them: For what hath Rarefaction, Condensation, Division, and the other properties and modes of Matter, to do with Apprehension, Judgement, and Discourse, which are the proper acts of a Spiritual Being? We cannot then perceive any congruity, by which they are united: Nor can there be any middle sort of Nature that partakes of each, (as 'tis in some Unions) their Attributes being such extremes: or, if there is any such Being, or any such possible, we know nothing of it, and 'tis utterly unconceivable. So that, what the Cement should be that unites Heaven and Earth, Light and Darkness, viz. Natures of so divers a make, and such disagreeing Attributes, is beyond the reach of any of our Faculties: We can as easily conceive how a thought should be united to a Statue, or a Sunbeam to a piece of Clay: how words should be frozen in the Air, (as some say they are in the remote North) or how Light should be kept in a Box; as we can apprehend the manner of this strange Union.  
2. And we can give no better account how the Soul moves the Body. For whether we conceive it under the notion of a Pure Mind, and Knowledge, with Sir K. Digby; or of a Thinking Substance, with Des-Cartes; or of a penetrable, indiscerpible, self-motive Being, with the Platonists; It will in all these ways be unconceivable how it gives motion to unactive matter: For how that should move a Body, whose nature it is to pass through all Bodies without the least jog or obstruction, would require something more than we know, to help us to conceive. Nor will it avail to say, that it moves the Body by its vehicle of corporeal Spirits; for still the difficulty will be the same, viz. How it moves them?  
3. We know as little, How the Soul so regularly directs the Animal Spirits, and Instruments of Motion which are in the Body; as to stir any we have a will to move: For the passages through which the S●…rits are conveyed, being so numerous, and there being so many others that cross and branch from each of them, 'tis wonderful they should not lose their way in such a Wilderness: and I think the wit of Man cannot yet tell how they are directed. That they are conducted by some knowing Guide, is evident from the steadiness and regularity of their motion: But what that should be, and how it doth it, we are yet to seek: That all the motions within us are not directed by the mere mechanic frame of our Bodies, is clear from experience, by which we are assured, that those we call Sp●…taneous ones, a●…e under the Government of the Will: at least the determination of the Spirits into such or such passages, is from the Soul, whatever we hold of the con●…eyances after; and these, I think, all the Philosophy in the World cannot make out to be purely mechanical. But though this be gained, that the Soul is the principle of Direction, yet the difficulty is no less than it was before: For unless we allow it a kind of inward sight of every Vein, Muscle, Artery, and other Passage of its own Body; of the exact site and position of them, with their several Windings, and secret Channels, it will still be as unconceivable, how it should direct such intricate Motions, as that one that was born blind should manage a Game at Chess, or marshal an Army: And if the Soul have any such knowledge, we are not aware of it; nor do our minds attend it: Yea, we are so far from this, That many times we observe not any method in the outward performance, even in the greatest variety of interchangable motions, in which a steady Direction is difficult, and a Miscarriage easy: As we see an Artist will play on an Instrument of Music without minding it; and the Tongue will nimbly run divisions in a Tune without missing, when the Thoughts are engaged elsewhere: which effects are to be ascribed to some secret Art of the Soul (if that direct) to which we are altogether strangers.  
4. But besides the Difficulties that lie more deep; we are at a loss even in the knowledge of our Senses, that seem the most plain and obvious of our Faculties. Our eyes that see other things, see not themselves; and the Instruments of Knowledge are unknown. That the Soul is the percipient, which alone hath animadversion and sense, properly so called; and that the Body is only the receiver, and conveyer of corporeal Motions, is as certain as Philosophy can make it. Aristotle himself teacheth it in that Maxim, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: And Plato affirms, That the Soul hath life and sense; but that the Body in strictness of speaking, hath neither the one nor other: Upon which position all the Philosophy of Des-Cartes stands: And it is so clear, and so acknowledged a Truth, among all considering Men, that I need not stay to prove it: But yet, what are the Instruments of sensitive Perception, and particular convers of outward Motions to the seat of Sense, is difficult to find; and how the pure Mind can receive information from things that are not like itself, nor the objects they represent, is, I think, not to be explained. Whether Sensation be made by corporeal Emissions, and material Images; or by Motions that are conveyed to the common sense, I shall not dispute: the latter having so generally obtained among the Philosophers: But, How the Soul by mutation, and motion in matter, a substance of an other kind, should be excited to action; and how these should concern it, that is of so divers a nature, is hardly to be conceived. For Body cannot act on any thing, but by Motion; Motion cannot be received but by Matter, the Soul is altogether immaterial; and therefore, how shall we apprehend it to be subject to such Impressions? and yet Pain, and the unavoidableness of our Sensations evidently prove, That it is subject to them.  
Besides, How is it, and by what Art doth the Soul read, That such an Image, or Motion in matter, (whether that of her Vehicle, or of the Brain, the case is the same) signifies such an Object? If there be any such Art, we conceive it not: and 'tis strange we should have a Knowledge that we do not know. That by diversity of Motions we should spell out Figures, Distances, Magnitudes, Colours; things not resembled by them, we must ascribe to some implicit inference, and deduction; but what it should be; and by what Mediums that Knowledge is advanced, is altogether unintelligible. For though the Soul may perceive Motions and Images by simple sense, yet it seems unconceivable it should apprehend what they signify, and represent, but by some secret Art and way of inference: An illiterate Person may see the Letters, as well as the most Learned, but he knows not what they mean; and an Infant hears the sounds, and sees the motion of the Lips, but hath no conception conveyed to him, for want of knowing the signification of them: such would be our case, notwithstanding all the motions and impressions made by external things, if the Soul had not some unknown way of learning by them the quality of the Objects. For instance, Images and Motions have but very small room in the Brain, where they are received, and yet they represent the gr●…st Magni●…; The Image, Figure, (or what-ev●… else 〈◊〉 may be called) of an Hemisphere of the Heavens, cannot have a Subject larger than the pulp of a Walnut; and how can such petty Impressions, make known a Body of so vast a wideness, without some kind of Mathematics in the Soul: And except this be supposed, I cannot apprehend how Distances should be perceived; but all Objects would appear in a cluster. Nor will the Philosophy of Des-Cartes help us here; For the moving divers Filaments in the Brain, cannot make us perceive such modes as Distances are, unless some such Art and Inference be allowed, of which we understand nothing.  
5. The Memory is a Faculty in us as obscure, and perhaps as un●…ccountable as any thing in Nature. It seems to be an Organical Power, because Diseases do often blot out its Ideas, and cause Oblivion: But what the marks and impr●…ssions are by which the Soul r●…members, is a question that hath not yet been very well res●…'d. There are four principal Hypotheses by which an account hath been attempted; The Peripatetic, the Cartesian, the Digbaean, and the Hobbian.  
1. According to the Peripatetic Schools, Objects are conserved in the memory by certain Intentional Species (as they call them) a sort of Being's, that have a necessary dependence upon their Subjects; but are not material in their formal Constitution and Nature. I need not say much against these arbitrary precarious Creatures, that have no foundation in any of our Faculties: Or be that how it will, They are utterly unintelligible; neither bodily, nor spiritual; neither produced out of any thing, as the matter of their production; nor out of nothing, which were Creation, and not to be allowed to be in the power of every, or any finite Being. And though there were no such contradictious contrivance in the framing these Species, yet they could not serve any purpose, as to the Memory, since 'tis against the nature of ●…native Effects, such as these are, to subsist but by the continual influence of their Causes; and so, if this were the true Solution, we could remember nothing longer than the Object was in presence.  
2. The account of Des-Cartes is to this purpose; The Spirits are sent about the Brain, to find the tracks of the Object●… we would call to mind; which Tracks consist in this, viz, That the Pores through which the Spi●…ts that came from the Objects past, are more easily opened, and afford a more ready passage to those others that seek to enter; whence ariseth a special motion in the Glandule, which signifies this to be that we would remember.  
But if our Remembrance arise from the easy motion of the Spirits through the opened passages (according to this Hypothesis)? How then do we so distinctly remember such a variety of Objects, whose Images pass the same way? And how the Distances of Bodies that lie in a Line? Why should not the impelled Spirits find other open passages, besides those made by the thing we would remember? When there are such continual motions through the Brain from numerous other Objects? Yea, in such a pervious substance as that is, why should not those subtle Bodies meet, every where an easy passage? It seems to me that one might conceive as well, how every Grain of Corn in a Sieve should be often shaken through the same holes, as how the Spirits in the repeated acts of Memory should still go through the same Pores: Nor can I well apprehend but that those supposed opened passages, would in a short time be stopped up, either by the natural gravity of the parts, or the making new ones near those; or other alterations in the Brain.  
3. The Hypothesis of Sir Kenelm Digby, is next, viz. That things are preserved in the Memory by material Images that flow from them, which having impinged on the common sense, rebound thence into some vacant Cells of the Brain, where they keep their ranks, and postures, as they entered, till again they are stirred, and then they appear to the Fancy as they were first presented.  
But how is it conceivable, That those active Particles which have nothing to unite them, or to keep them in any order, yea which are continually justled by the occursion of other minute Bodies, (of which there must needs be great store in this Repository) should so long remain in the same state and posture? And how is it that when we turn over those Idaea's that are in our memory, to look for any thing we would call to mind, we do not put all the Images into a disorderly floating, and so make a Chaos of confusion there, where the exactest Order is required: And indeed according to this account, I cannot see but that our Memories would be more confused than our Dreams: and I can as easily conceive how an heap of Ants can be kept to regular and uniform Motions.  
4. Mr. Hobbs attempts another way; there is nothing in us, according to this Philosopher, but Matter and Motion: All Sense is Reaction in Matter [Leviath. Chap. 1.] the decay of that Motion, and Reaction, is Imagination; [Chap. 2.] And Memory is the same thing, expressing that decay. [Ib.] So that according to M. H. all our Perceptions are Motions, and so is Memory: Concerning which, I observe but two things;  
1. Neither the Brain, nor Spirits, nor any other material Substance within the Head, can for any considerable time conserve Motion. The Brain is such a clammy Consistence, that it can no more retain it than a Quagmire; The Spirits are more liquid than the Air, which receives every Motion, and loseth it as soon: And if there were any other corporeal part in us, as fitly tempered to keep Motion as could be wished; yet (2.) the Motions made in it would be quickly deadned by Counter-Motions; and so we should never remember any thing, longer than till the next Impression: and it is utterly impossible that so many Motions should orderly succeed one another, as things do in our Memories; For they must needs, ever and anon, thwart, interfere, and obstruct one another, and so there would be nothing in our Memories, but Confusion and Discord.  
Upon the whole we see, that this seemingly plain Faculty, the Memory, is a Riddle also which we have not yet found the way to resolve.  
I might now add many other difficulties, concerning the Understanding, Fancy, Will, and Affections: But the Controversies that concern these, are so hotly managed by the divided Sohools, and so voluminously handled by disputing Men, that I shall not need insist on them: The only Difficulties about the Will, its nature and manner of following the Understanding, etc. have confounded those that have enquired into it; and shown us little else, but that our Minds are as blind, as that Faculty is said to be by most Philosophers. These Controversies, like some Rivers, the further they run, the more they are hid: And perhaps after all our Speculations and Disputes, we conceive less of them now, than did the more plain, and simple Understandings of former times. But whether we comprehend or not, is not my present business to inquire, since I have confined myself to an Account of some great Mysteries, that do not make such a noise in the World: And having spoken of some that relate to our Souls; I come now to some others that concern  
II. BODIES: I begin with our Own; which though we see, and feel, and have them nearest to us, yet their inward Constitution and Frame, is hitherto an undiscovered Region: And the saying of the Kingly Prophet, that we are wonderfully made, may well be understood of that admiration, that is the Daughter of Ignorance.  
For, 1. There hath no good account been yet given, how our Bodies are form: That there is Art in the contrivance of them, cannot be denied, even by those that are least beholden to Nature: and so elegant is their composure, that this very Consideration saved Galen from being an Atheist: And I cannot think that the branded Epicurus, Lucretius and their Fellows were in earnest, when they resolved this Composition into a fortuitous range of Atoms: 'Twere much less absurd to suppose, or say, that a Watch, or other curious Automaton, did perform divers exact and regular Motions, by chance; than 'tis to affirm, or think, that this admirable Engine, an Humane Body, which hath so many Parts, and Motions, that orderly cooperate for the good of the whole, was framed without the Art of some knowing Agent: But who the skilful, particular Archaeus should be; and by what Instruments, and Art this Fabric is erected, is still unknown. That God hath made us, and fashioned our Bodies in the nethermost parts of the Earth, is undoubted; But he is the first and universal Cause, who transacts things in Nature by secondary Agents, and not by his own immediate hand: (The supposal of this would destroy all Philosophy, and enquiry after Causes) So that He is still supposed; but the Query is of the next, and particular Agent, that forms the Body in so exquisite a manner; a Question that hath not yet been answered. Indeed by some 'tis thought enough to say, That it is done by the Plastic Faculty; and by others 'tis believed that the Soul is that that forms it. For the Plastic Faculty, 'tis a big word, but it conveys nothing to the Mind: For it signifies but this, that the Body is form by a formative Power; that is, 'tis done, by a power of doing it. But the doubt remains still, what the Agent is that hath this power? The other Opinion of the Platonists, hath two Branches: some will have it to be the particular Soul, that fashions its own Body; others suppose it to be the general Soul of the World: If the former be true, By what knowledge doth it do it? and how? The means, and manner are still occult, though that were granted. And for the other way, by a general Soul; That is an obscure Principle, of which we can know but little; and how that acts (if we allow such a being) whether by knowledge, or without, the Assertors of it may find difficulty to determine. The former makes it little less than God himself; and the latter brings us back to Chance, or a Plastic Faculty. There remains now but one account more, and that is the Mechanical; viz. That it is done by mere Matter moved after such, or such a manner. Be that so: It will yet be said, that Matter cannot move itself; the question is still of the Mover; The Motions are orderly, and regular; Query, Who guides? Blind Matter may produce an elegant effect for once, by a great Chance; as the Painter accidentally gave the Grace to his Picture, by throwing his Pencil in rage, and disorder upon it; But then constant Uniformities, and Determinations to a kind, can be no Results of unguided Motions. There is indeed a Mechanical Hypothesis to this purpose; That the Bodies of Animals and Vegetables are form out of such particles of Matter, as by reason of their Figures will not lie together, but in the order that is necessary to make such a Body; and in that they naturally concur, and rest; which seems to be confirmed by the artificial Resurrection of Plants, of which Chemists speak, and by the regular Figures of Salts, and Minerals; the hexagonal of Crystal, the Hemi-spherical of the Fairy-Stone, and divers such like. And there is an experiment mentioned by approved Authors, that looks the same way; It is, That after a decoction of Herbs in a frosty Night, the shape of the Plants will appear under the Ice in the Morning: which Images are supposed to be made by the congregated E●…uvia of the Plants themselves, which loosely wand'ring up and down in the Water, at last settle in their natural place and order, and so make up an appearance of the Herbs from whence they were emitted. This account I confess hath something ingenious in it; But it is no solution of the Doubt. For how those heterogenous Atoms should hit into their proper places, in the midst of such various and tumultuary Motions, will still remain a question: Let the aptness of their Figures be granted, we shall be yet to seek for something to guide their Motions: And let their natural Motion be what it will, gravity or levity, direct or oblique, we cannot conceive how that should carry them into every particular place where they are to lie; especially considering they must needs be sometimes diverted from their course by the occursion of many other Particles. And as for the Regular Figures of many inaminate Bodies, that consideration doth but multiply the doubt.  
2. The union of the parts of Matter, is a thing as difficult as any of the former: There is no account that I know, hath yet appeared worth considering, but that of Des-Cartes; viz. That they are united by juxta-position, and rest. And if this be all, Why should not a bag of Dust be of as firm a Consistence, as Marble or Adamant? Why may not a Bar of Iron be as easily broken as a pipe of Glass; and the Egyptians Pyramids blown away, as soon as those inverst ones of smoke. The only reason of difference pretended by some, is, that the Parts of solid Bodies are held together by natural Hooks; and strong ones, by such Hooks as are more tough and firm: But how do the parts of these Hooks stick together? Either we must suppose infinite of them holding each other; or come at last to parts united by mere juxta-position, and rest. The former is very absurd, for it will be necessary, That there should be some, upon which the Cohesion of all the rest should depend; otherwise, all will be an heap of Dust. But in favour of the Hypothesis of Des-Cartes, it may be said, That the closeness and compactness of the parts resting together, makes the strength of the Union: For, (as that Philosopher saith) Every thing continues in the state wherein it is, except something more powerful alter it; and therefore the Parts that rest close together will so continue, till they are parted by some other stronger Body: Now the more parts are penned together, the more able they will be for resistance; and what hath best compactness, and by consequence fewer parts, will not be able to make any alteration in a Body that hath more. According to this Doctrine, what is most dense, and least porous, will be most coherent, and least discerpible; which yet is contrary to experience. For we find the most porous, spongy Bodies, to be ofttimes the most tough of Consistence. We easily break a Tube of Glass or Crystal; when one of Elm, or Ash, will hardly be torn in pieces: and yet as the parts of the former are more, so are they more at rest; since the liquid Juice diffused through the Wood is in continual agitation, which in Des-Cartes his Philosophy is the cause of fluidity; so that according to his Principles, the driest Bodies should be the most firm; when on the contrary, we find that a proportionate humidity contributes much to the strength of the Union. (Sir K. Digby makes it the Cement itself) and the dryness of many Bodies is the cause of their fragility, as we see 'tis in Wood, and Glass, and divers other Things.  
3. We are as much at a loss about the composition of Bodies, whether it be out of Indivisibles, or out of parts always divisible: For though this question hath been attempted by the subtlest Wits of all Philosophic Ages; yet after all their distinctions, and shifts, their new-invented words, and modes, their niceties and tricks of subtlety, the Matter stands yet unresolved. For do what they can, Actual, Infinite extension every where; Equality of all Bodies, Impossibility of Motion, and a world more of the most palpable Absurdities, will press the Assertors of Infinite Divisibility: Nor on the other side, can it be avoided, but that all Motions would be equal in velocity: That the Lines drawn from side to side in a Pyramid, would have more Parts than the Basis: That all Bodies would be swallowed up in a Point; and many other Inconsistencies will follow the Opinion of Indivisibles. But because I have confined myself to the Difficulties that are not so usually noted; I shall not insist on these, but refer the Reader, that hath the humour, and leisure, to inquire into such Speculations, to Oviedo, Pontius, Ariaga, Carelton, and other Jesuits, whose management of this Controversy, with equal force on either side, is a considerable Argument of the unaccountableness of this Theory, and of the weakness of our present Understandings.  
I might now take into consideration the Mysteries of Motion, Gravity, Light, Colours, Vision, Sounds, and infinite such like, (things obvious, yet unknown) but I insist no further on Instances, but descend to the second thing I propounded to treat of, viz.  
II. The CAUSES of our Ignorance, and Mistakes; And in them we shall find further evidence of the imperfection of our Knowledge. The Causes to be considered, are either, 1. The Difficulties and Depth of Science: Or, 2. The present temper of our Faculties. Science is the Knowledge of things in their Causes; and so 'tis defined by the Pretenders to it. Let us now inquire a little into the difficulties of attaining such Knowledge.  
1. We know no Causes by Simple Intuition, but by Consequence and Deduction; and there is nothing we so usually infer from, as Concomitancy; for instance, We always feel heat when we come near the Fire, and still perceive Light when we see the Sun; and thence we conclude, that these are the Causes respectively of Heat, and Light; and so in other things. But now in this way of inference there lies great uncertainty: For if we had never seen more Sun, or Stars, than we do in cloudy weather, and if the Day had always broke with a Wind, which had increased and abated with the Light; we should have believed firmly that one of them had been the cause of the other; and so Smoke had been undoubtedly thought the efficient of the Heat, if nothing else had appeared with it. But the Philosophy of Des-Cartes furnisheth us with a better Instance; All the World takes the Sun to be the Cause of Day, from this Principle of Concomitance: But that Philosopher teacheth, That Light is caused by the Conamen, or endeavour of the Matter of the Vortex to recede from the Centre of its Motion; so that were there none of that fluid Aether in the midst of our World, that makes up the Sun, yet the pressure of the Globuli (as he calls those Particles) upon our Eyes, would not be considerably less: and so according to this Hypothesis, there would be Light though there were no Sun, or Stars; and Evening, and Morning might naturally be before, and without the Sun. Now I say not that this Opinion is true and certain; but 'tis possible, and I know no absurdity in it; and consequently, our concluding a Causality from Concomitancy, here, and in other Instances may deceive us.  
2. Our best natural Knowledge is imperfect, in that, after all our confidence, Things still are possible to be otherwise: Our Demonstrations are raised upon Principles of our own, not of Universal Nature; And, as my Lord Bacon notes, we judge from the analogy of our selves, not the Universe: Now many things are certain, according to the Principles of one Man, that are absurd in the apprehensions of many others: and some appear impossible to the vulgar, that are easy to Men of more improved Understandings. That is extravagant in one Philosophy, which is a plain truth in another: and perhaps what is most impossible in the apprehensions of Men; may be otherwise in the Metaphysics, and Physiology of Angels. The sum is, We conclude this to be certain, and that to be impossible from our own narrow Principles, and little Schemes of Opinion. And the best Principles of natural Knowledge in the World, are but Hypotheses, which may be, and may be otherwise: So that though we may conclude many things upon such and such Suppositions, yet still our Knowledge will be but fair, and hopeful Conjecture: And therefore we may affirm that things are this way, or that, according to the Philosophy that we have espoused; but we strangely forget ourselves when we plead a necessity of their being so in Nature, and an impossibility of their being otherwise. The ways of God in Nature (as in Providence) are not as ours are: Nor are the Models that we frame any way commensurate to the vastness and profundity of his Works; which have a depth in them greater than the Well of Democritus.  
3. We cannot properly and perfectly know any thing in Nature without the knowledge of its first Causes, and the Springs of Natural Motions: And who hath any pretence to this? Who can say he hath seen Nature in its beginnings? We know nothing but Effects, nor can we judge at their immediate Causes, but by proportion to the things that do appear; which no doubt are very unlike the Rudiments of Nature. We see there is no resemblance between the Seed, and the Herb, and the Flower; between the Sperm, and the Animal; The Egg, and the Bird that is hatched of it; And since there is so much dissimilitude between Cause and Effect in these apparent things, we cannot think there is less between them and their first, and invisible Efficients: Now had not our Senses assured us of it, we should never have suspected that Plants, or Animals did proceed from such unlikely Originals; never have imagined, that such Effects should have come from such Causes, and we can conceive as little now of the nature and quality of the Causes that are beyond the prospect of our Senses: We may frame Fancies and Conjectures of them, but to say that the Principles of Nature are just as our Philosophy makes them, is to set bounds to Omnipotence, and to circumscribe infinite Power, and Wisdom, by our narrow Thoughts and Opinions.  
4. Every thing in Nature hath relation to divers others; so that no one Being can be perfectly known without the knowledge of many more: Yea, every thing almost hath relation to all things; and therefore he that talks of strict Science, pretends to a kind of Omniscience. All things are linked together; and every Motion depends upon many prerequired Motors; so that no one can be perfectly known singly. We cannot (for instance) comprehend the cause of any Motion in a Watch, unless we are acquainted with other dependent Motions; and have insight into the whole mechanical contexture of it; and we know not the most contemptible Plant that grows in any perfection, and exactness, until we understand those other things that have relation to it; that is, almost every thing in Nature. So that each Science borrows from all the rest, and we attain not any single one, without comprehending the whole Circle of Knowledge.  
I might say much more on this Subject, but I may have further occasion of speaking to it, under the second General, viz. The Consideration  
II. Of the Imperfection of our present Faculties; and the malign Influence our Senses and Affections have upon our Minds. I begin with the SENSES; and shall take notice, 1. Of their Dulness; and 2. of their liableness to Error and Mistake.  
1. Our Senses are very scant and limited; and the Operations of Nature subtle, and various. They are only its grosser Instruments, and ways of working that are sensible; the finer Threads, and immediate Actions are out of reach; Yea, it's greatest works are performed by invisible, insensible Agents.  
Now most of our Conceptions are taken from the Senses, and we can scarce judge of any thing but by the help of material Images, that are thence conveyed to us. The Senses are the Fountain of natural Knowledge; and the surest and best Philosophy is to be raised from the Phoenomena, as they present them to us: when we leave these, and retire to the abstracted notions of our minds, we build Castles in the Air, and form Chimerical Worlds, that have nothing real in them. And yet when we take our accounts from those best Informers, we can learn but very little from their Discoveries. For we see but the shadows, and outsides of things; like the men in Plato's Den, who saw but the Images of external Objects, and but so many as came in through the narrow entrance of their Cave. The World of God, no doubt, is an other thing, than the World of Sense is; and we can judge but little of its amplitude and glory by the imperfect Idea we have of it. From this narrowness of our Senses it is, that we have been so long ignorant of a World of Animals that are with us, and about us, which now at last the Glasses, that in part cure this imperfection, have discovered; and no doubt, there is yet a great variety of living Creatures that our best Instruments are too gross to disclose: There is Prodigious fineness, and subtlety in the works of Nature, which are too thin for our Senses, with all the advantages Art can lend them: And many, the greatest, and the best of its Objects are so remote that our Senses reach them not by any Natural or Artificial helps: So that we cannot have other than short and confufed apprehensions of those works of Nature: And I sometimes fear, that we scarce yet see any thing as it is. But this belongs to an other consideration, viz.  
2. Our Senses extremely deceive us in their reports, and informations; I mean, they give occasion to our minds to deceive themselves. They indeed represent things truly as they appear to them, and in that there is no deception; but then, we judge the exterior Realities to be according to those appearances, and here is the Error and Mistake. But because the Senses afford the ground and occasion, and we naturally judge according to their impressions, therefore the Fallacies and Deceits are imputed to their misinformations. This I premise, to prevent a Philosophical mistake, but shall retain the common way of speaking, and call those the errors of the Senses. That these very frequently misreport things to us, we are assured even from themselves: a strait stick seems crooked in the Water, and a square Tower round at a distance; All things are Yellow to those that have the Jaundice, and all Meats are bitter to the disaffected Palate: To which vulgar Instances it will presently be answered, that the Senses in those cases, are not in their just circumstances; but want the fit medium, due distance, and sound disposition: which we know very well, and learn there was somewhat amiss; because our Senses represent those things otherwise at othertimes: we see the stick is strait when it is out of the Water; and the Tower is square when we are near it. Objects have other Colours, and Meats other tastes, when the Body, and its Senses are in their usual temper. In such cases, Sense rectifies its own mistakes, and many times one the errors of another; but if it did not do so, we should have been always deceived even in those Instances: and there is no doubt, but that there are many other like deceptions, in which we have no contrary evidence from them to disabuse us; not in the matters of common Life, but in things of remoter speculation, which this state seems not to be made for. The Senses must have their due medium, and distance, and temper; if any of these are amiss, they represent their Objects otherwise to us than they are: Now these, we may suppose they generally have, in the necessary matters of Life, if not to report things to us as they are in themselves, yet to give them us so, as may be for our accommodation, and advantage: But how are we assured, that they are thus rightly disposed, in reference to things of Speculative Knowledge? What medium, what distance, what temper is necessary to convey Objects to us just so, as they are in the realities of Nature? I observed before that our Senses are short, imperfect, and uncommensurate to the vastness and profundity of things, and therefore cannot receive the just Images of them: and yet we judge all things according to those confused, and imperfect Ideas, which must needs lead us into infinite errors, and mistakes.  
If I would play the Sceptic here, I might add, That no one can be sure that any Objects appear in the same manner to the Senses of other men, as they do to his: Yea, it may seem probable, that they do not? For though the Images, Motions, (or whatever else is the cause of Sense) may be alike as from them; yet the representations may be much varied according to the nature and quality of the recipient: we find things look otherwise to us through an Optic Tube, than they do when we view them at a distance with our naked eyes: the same Object appears red, when we look at it through a Glass of that Colour, but green when we behold it through one of such a Tincture. Things seem otherwise when the Eye is distorted, than they do, when it is in its natural, ordinary, posture; and some extraordinary alterations in the Brain double that to us, which is but a single Object: Colours are different, according to different Lights, and Positions; as 'tis in the necks of Doves, and folds of Scarlet: Thus difference in circumstances altars the sensation; and why may we not suppose as much diversity in the Senses of several men, as there is in those accidents, in the perceptions of one? There is difference in the Organs of Sense, and more in the temper and configuration of the inward parts of the Brain, by which motions are conveyed to the seat of Sense; in the Nerves, Humours and Spirits, in respect of tenuity, liquidity, aptitude for motion, and divers other circumstances of their nature; from which it seems that great diversity doth arise in the manner of receiving the Images, and consequently in the perceptions of their Objects. So then, though every man knows, how things appear to himself, yet what impressions they make upon the so different Senses of another, he only knows certainly, that is conscious to them And though all men agree to call the impression they feel from such, or such an Object, by the same name; yet no one can assuredly tell but that the Sentiment may be different; It may be one man hath the impression of Green from that, which in another begets the Sense of Yellow; and yet they both call it Green, because from their infancy they were wont to join that word to that Sentiment, which such an Object produced in their particular Sense; though in several men it were a very divers one. This I know some will think hard to be understood; but I cannot help that: Those that Consider will find it to be very plain; and therefore I shall spend no more words about it.  
The Sum is, Our Senses are good Judges of Appearances, as they concern us: but how things are in themselves, and how they are to others, it should seem, we cannot certainly learn from them: And therefore when we determine that they are, and must be according to the representations of our individual Senses, we are very often grossly deceived in such sentences; to which yet we are exceeding prone; and few but the most exercised minds, can avoid them. Of this I'll give a great Instance or two.  
1. It is almost universally believed (at least by the vulgar,) that the Earth rests on the Centre of the World; and those ancient Philosophers have been extremely hooted at, and derided, that have taught the contrary doctrine: For my part, I shall affirm nothing of the main question; but this I say, That the common inducement to believe it stands still, viz, the Testimony of Sense, is no argument of it: And whether the opinion of Pythagoras, Copernicus, Des-Cartes, Galileo, and almost all late Philosophers, of the motion of the Earth, be true, or false; the belief of its Rest, as far as it ariseth from the presumed evidence of Sense, is an error.  
That there is some common motion that makes the day, and night and the varieties of seasons, is very plain and sensible; but whether the Earth, or the Sun be the Body moved, none of our Senses can determine; To Sense the Sun stands still also; and no Eye can perceive its Actual motion. For though we find, that in a little time it hath changed its Position, and respect to us; yet whether that change be caused by its translation from us, or ours from it, the Sense can never tell: and yet from this, and this only, the greatest part of mankind believes its motion. On the other side, The standing still of the Earth is concluded the same way; and yet, though it did move, it would appear fixed to us as now it doth, since we are carried with it, in a regular and most even course, in which case motion is not perceiv●…d; as we find sometimes in sailing in a Ship, when the Shores seem to move, and not that;— Littus, Campique recedunt.  
But I give another Instance of a like deception; It is, 2. The translation of our own passions to things without us: as we judge Light and Heat, and Cold, to be formally in the Sun, Fire, and Air; when as indeed they are but our own perceptions. As they are in those external Subjects, they are nothing, but such or such configurations and motions in matter; but when they work on us, they produce different sentiments, which we call Heat, and Light, etc. This will appear to be true to any one that can freely and attentively consider it; and yet it will be thought so strange and absurd by the generality of men, that they will assoon believe with Anaxagoras, that Snow is black, as him that affirms, that the Fire is not formally hot; that is, that the very thing we feel, and call Heat in ourselves, is not so in that body: when as there, it is but a violent agitation of the subtle, and divided parts of matter, that in itself is nothing like what we perceive from it, and call Heat: That we are hot ourselves, we feel; but that the Fire hath any such formal quality as is in our Sense, no Sense can inform us; and yet from its supposed evidence men generally so conclude. Which is an other considerable Instance of the false judgements we make on the occasion of our Senses.  
And now, It is not only common understandings that are abused, and deceived by their Senses; but even the most advanced Reasons are many times miss by them: And since we live the Life of Beasts before we grow up to Men, and our minds are Passive to the impressions of Sense, it cannot be, that our first knowledge should be other, than heaps of Error, and misconception; which might be rectified by our after-judgments, but that 'tis another unhappiness of our natures, that those early impressions stick by us, and we are exceedingly apt pertinaciously to adhere to them: And though our improving understandings do in part undeceive us, and destroy some grosser errors; yet others are so fastened, that they are never after removed, or dissettled. So that we are not quite weaned from our Childhood till we return to our second Infancy, and even our Grey-Heads out-grow not those errors, which we learned before the Alphabet. And therefore since we contracted so many prejudices in our tender years, and those Errors have as plausible an appearance, as the most genuine truths, the best way to attain true Knowledge is to suspend the giving our confirmed assent to those Receptions, till we have looked them over by an impartial inquiry; To reckon of them all as false, or uncertain, till we have examined them by a free, and unpossest Reason; and to admit nothing but what we clearly, and distinctly perceive. This is the great Rule, in the excellent Method of Des-Cartes; but the practice of it requires such a clear, sedate and intent mind, as is to be found but in a very few rare tempers; and even in them, prejudices will creep in, and spoil the perfection of their Knowledge.  
I might discourse next of those Errors that do arise from the fallacies of our Imaginations, whose unwarrantable compositions and applications, do very frequently abuse us: and indeed, the Reason of the greatest part of mankind is nothing else but various Imagination; Yea, 'tis a hard matter for the best and freest minds to deliver themselves from the Prejudices, of Fancy; which, besides the numerous lesser Errors they betray us into, are great occasions (particularly) of those many mistakes we are guilty of in speculating Immaterial Natures, & enquiring into the Attributes of God; and we are much entangled, and puzzled by them, in all things we think, or say about Infinity, Eternity and Immensity, and most other of the sublime Theories both of Philosophy, or Theology. But these all arise, either from the false Images of Sense, and the undue compositions, and wrong inferences that we raise from them; and therefore I shall not need make this a distinct head from the other, of which I have just treated.  
I come now, II. To consider the evil Influence our Affections have over our Understandings, by which they are great Reasons of our Ignorance, and Mistakes. Periit Judicium ubi res transiit in affectum. That Jupiter himself cannot be Wise, and in Love, was a saying of the Ancients, and may be understood in a larger Sense than They meant. That understanding only is capable of passing a just Sentence, that is, as Aristotle saith of the Law, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; but where the Will and Passions have the casting voice, the cause of Truth is desperate. Now this is the present unhappy state of Man; our lower powers are gotten uppermost, and we see like Men on their Heads, as Plato observed of old, That on the right hand, which indeed is on the left. The Woman in us still prosecutes a deceit like that begun in the Garden; and we are wedded to an Eve, as fatal as the Mother of our Miseries. The Deceiver soon found this soft place in Adam, and Innocency itself did not secure him from this way of seduction: We now scarce see any thing but through our passions, that are wholly blind, and incapable: So that the Monsters that story relates to have their Eyes in their Breasts, are pictures of us in our invisible selves.  
And now, all things being double-handed, and having appearances both of Truth, and Falsehood, the engaged affection magnifieth the shows of Truth, and makes the belov'd opinion appear as certain; while the considerations on the otherside being lessened and neglected, seem as nothing, though they are never so weighty and considerable. But I shall be more particular in the account of these Deceptions.  
Our Affections engage us, by our love to ourselves, or others; the former in the Instance of, 1. Natural disposition, 2. Custom and Education, and 3. Interest: the latter, in our overfond Reverence to 4. Antiquity and Authority.  
1. There is a certain congruity of some opinions to the particular tempers of some men: For there is a complexion, and temperament in the mind, as well as in the body: And the doctrines that are suited to the genius, and special disposition of the understanding, find easy welcome, and entertainment: whereas, those that are opposite to it, are rejected with an invincible contempt and hatred. On this account we find men taking in some particular Opinions with strange pleasure and satisfaction, upon their first proposals; when they are incurably barred up against others, that have the advantage of more reason to recommend them. And I have observed often, that even some Theories in Philosophy will not lie in some minds, that are otherwise very capable and ingenious: of which I take this to be a considerable Instance, That divers learned men profess, They cannot conceive a Spirit (or any being) without extension; whereas others say, They cannot conceive, but that whatever is extended is impenetrable, and consequently corporeal; which diversity I think, I have reason to ascribe to some difference in the natural temper of the mind.  
2. But another very fatal occasion of our mistakes, is the great prejudice of Custom and Education: which is so unhappily prevalent, that though the Soul were never so truly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (as the Philosopher called it) an unwritten table in itself; yet this doth very often so scribble on it, as to render it incapable of other impressions: we judge all things by those Anticipations; and condemn, or applaud them, as they differ, or agree, with our first Opinions. 'Tis on this account that almost every Country censures the Laws, Customs, and Doctrines of every other, as absurd, and unreasonable, and are confirmed in their own follies beyond possibility of conviction. Our first Age is like the melted wax to the prepared Seal, that receives any impression; and we suck in the opinions of our Clime and Country, as we do the common Air, without thought, or choice; and which is worse, we usually sit down under those Prejudices of Education and Custom all our Lives after: For either we are loath to trouble ourselves to examine the Doctrines we have long taken for granted, or we are scared from enquiring into the things that Custom and common Belief have made Venerable and Sacred. We are taught to think, with the Hermit, that the Sun shines no were but in our Cells, and that Truth and Certainty are confined within that Belief, in which we were first instructed. From whence we contract an obstinate adherence to the conceits in which we were bred, and a resolved contempt of all other Doctrines: So that what Astrologers say of our Fortunes, and the events of common life, may as well be said of the opinions of the most, that they are written in their Stars, having as little freedom in them as the effects of Destiny. And since the Infusions of Education have such interest in us, are so often appealed to as the dictates of Truth, and impartial Reason; 'tis no wonder we are so frequently deceived, and are so imperfect in our Knowledge. Another cause of which is,  
3. The power that Interest hath over our Affections, and by them over our Judgements. When men are engaged by this, they can find Truth any where; and what is thought convenient to be true, will at last be believed to be so Facilè credimus quod volumus. So that I do not think, that the learned Assertors of vain, and false Religions, and Opinions, do always profess against their Consciences; rather their Interest brings their Consciences to their Profession; for this doth not only corrupt men's Practice, but very often pervert their Minds also, and insensibly misled them into Errors.  
4. But our Affections misguide us by the respect we have to others, as well as by that we bear to ourselves: I mentioned The Instances of Antiquity, and Authority. We look with a superstitious Reverence upon the accounts of past Ages, and with a supercilious Severity on the more deserving products of our own: a vanity that hath possessed all times as well as ours; and the golden Age was never present. For as an inconsiderable Weight by virtue of its distance from the Centre of the Balance will outweigh much heavier bodies that are nearer to it; so the most light, and vain things that are far off from the present Age, have more Esteem, and Veneration than the most considerable, and substantial that bear a modern date: and we account that nothing worth, that is not fetched from a far off; in which we very often deceive ourselves as that Mariner did, that brought home his Ship Fraught with common Pebbles from the Indies. We adhere to the Determinations of our Fathers as if their Opinions were entailed on us; and our Conceptions were ex-Traduce.  
And thus while every Age is but an other show of the former, 'tis no wonder that humane science is no more advanced above its ancient Stature: For while we look on some admired Authors as the Oracles of all Knowledge, and spend that time, and those pains in the Study and Defence of their Doctrines, which should have been employed in the search of Truth, and Nature; we must needs stint our own Improvements and hinder the Advancement of Science Since while we are Slaves to the Opinions of those before us. Our Discoveries, like water will not rise higher than their Fountains; and while we think it such Presumption to endeavour beyond the Ancients, we fall short of Genuine Antiquity, Truth: unless we suppose them to have reached perfection of Knowledge in spite of their own acknowledgements of Ignorance.  
And now whereas it is observed, that the Mathematics and Mechanic Arts have considerably advanced, and got the start of other Sciences; this may be considered as a chief cause of it, That their Progress hath not been retarded by this reverential awe of former Discoveries: 'Twas never an Heresy to out-limn Apelles, or to out-work the Obelisks: Galilaeu●… without a Crime, out-saw all Antiquity, and was not afraid to believe his Eyes, in reverence to Aristotle and Ptolemy. 'Tis no disparagement to those famous Optic Glasses that the Ancients never used them; nor are we shy of their Informations, because they were hid from Ages. We believe the polar virtue of the Loadstone, without a Certificate from the days of old, and do not confine ourselves to the sole conduct of the Stars, for fear of being wiser than our Fathers. Had Authority prevailed here, the fourth part of the Earth had been yet unknown, and Hercules Pillars had still been the Worlds Ne ultra: Senecd's Prophecy had been an unfulfilled Prediction, and one Moiety of our Globes an empty Hemisphere.  
'Tis true, we owe much reverence to the Ancients, and many thanks to them for their Helps and Discoveries; but implicitly and servilely to submit our Judgements to all Opinions, is inconsistent with that respect that we may, and aught to have to the freedom of our our own Minds, and the dignity of Humane Nature. And indeed (as the great Lord Bacon hath observed) we have a wrong apprehension of Antiquity, which in the common acception is but the nonage of the World. Antiquitas seculi est juventus M●…di: So that in those Appeals, we fetch our Knowledge from the Cradle, and the comparative infancy of days. Upon a true account, the present Age is the greatest Antiquity; and if that must govern and sway our Judgements, let multitude of days speak. If we would reverence the Ancients as we ought, we should d●… it by imitating their Example, which was not supi●…ly and superstitionsly to sit down in fond admiration of the Learning of those that were before them, but to examine their Writings, to avoid their Mistakes, and to use their Discoveries, in order to the further improvement of Knowledge: This they did; especially the Philosopher Aristotle used the most freedom in censuring and reproving the supposed Errors and Mistakes of the elder Philosophers, of any that ever had that Name: And therefore there is the less reason why Men should make his Writing Textuary, and as it were infallible, without daring to use the liberty that he taught by his practice.  
It was from this servile humour of idolising some fortunate and famed Authors, that arose that silly vanity of impertinent Citations, and alleging Authorities in things, that neither require nor deserve them. The Man, no doubt, thought the saying to be Learning, and an Elegancy, That Men have Beards, and that Women have none; when he had quoted Beza for it: and that other aimed to be accounted no mean Clerk, that could say, Pax res bona est, saith St. Austin: This folly, as ridiculous as it is, was once very common among those that courted the reputation of being Learned; and it is not quite worn out of use yet among the Vulgar of Scholars, though all the wiser have outgrown, and do despise it; And the rest will do the same, when they come to consider, how vain and inglorious it is, to have our Heads and Books laden, as Cardinal Campeius his Mules were, with old and useless Luggage. And if the magnificence of many Pretenders to Knowledge were laid open, it would amount to no more, than the old Boots and Shoes of that proud and exposed Ambassador. Methinks it is but a poor easy Knowledge that can be learned from an Index; and a mean ambition to be rich in the Inventory of an others Treasure. Authorities alone make no number, unless evidence of Reason stand before them, and all the cyphers of Arithmetic, are no better than a single nothing.  
But I return to the consideration of Antiquity: If we impartially look into the Remains of ancient days, we shall find but little to justify our so slavish a veneration of them: For if we take an account of the state of Science from the beginning, and follow the History of it through the most famous Times, we shall find, that though it hath often changed its Channel, removing from one Nation to another; yet it hath been neither much improved, nor altered, but as River's are in passing through different Countries, viz. in Name, and Method: For the succeeding Times subscribing to, and copying out those that went before them, with little more than verbal Diversity, Knowledge hath still been really the same poor and mean Thing, though it hath appeared in pompous Clothing, and been dignified by the services of many great and renowned Names. The Grecian Learning was but a Transcript of the Chaldean and Egyptian; and the Roman of the Grecian. And though those former Days had, no doubt, many great Wits, and those that made noble Discoveries; yet we have reason to think that the most considerable and most worthy of them, have perished and are forgotten. For as the forementioned great Man, the Lord Bacon hath observed, Time, as a River, brings down to us what is more light and superficial, while the Things that are more solid and substantial are sunk and lost.  
And now after all this, it will be requisite for me to add, That I intent not these remarks in favour of any new Conceits in Theology, to gain credit to such by disparaging Christian Antiquity: No, Here the old Paths are undoubtedly best, quod verum id prius: And I put as much difference between the pretended New Lights, and Old Truths, as I do between the Sun and an evanid Meteor: Though I confess in Philosophy I am a Seeker. Divine Truths were most pure in their Beginnings; they were born in the fullness of time; and, (as some say the Sun was Created) in their Meridian Strength and Lustre: But the Beginnings of Philosophy were in a very obscure Dawn, and perhaps 'tis yet scarce Morning with it. And therefore what we cannot find among former Inquirers, we are to seek in the Attempts of more Modern Men, and in the Improvements of nearer Ages: And not be discouraged by the Old Law, Nil dictum quod non dictum prius. For as to Knowledge, there is no doubt but there are many things new under the Sun, and this Age hath shown many Novelties even in the Heavens above, etc.  
I have thus shown thee How our Senses and Affections misled our Understandings, and so are great occasions of our Ignorance and Errors; to which I may add,  
III. That the Understanding more immediately contributes to its own Deceptions, through its Precipitancy, and hast in concluding. Truth is not to be attained, without much close and severe inquiry: It is not a wide Superficies, easy to be seen, but like a Point or Line that requires Acutness and Intention to discover it; which is the more difficult, because it is so mingled with Appearances and specious Errors, like the Silver in Hiero's Crown of Gold; or rather like the Grains of Gold in a Mass of base Metals; It requires much Care, and nice Observation to extract and separate the precious Oar from so much vile Mixture; so that the Understanding must be patient, and wary, and thoughtful in seeking Truth; It must go step by step, and look every way, and regard many Things: It must distrust Appearances, and be shy of Assent, and consider again and again before it fixeth. This Method is necessary to the attainment of Knowledge; but the Mind is generally indisposed to so much Labour and Caution. It is impatient of suspense, and precipitant in concluding; averse to deep Meditation, and ready to catch at every Appearance: And hence also it is that we embrace Shadows of Fancy and Opinion, and miss of true and substantial Knowledge.  
Having now given Instances of the Imperfection of our present Knowledge, and shown some of its Causes, which are further evidence of it; I come to offer a few Considerations on the whole, against Dogmatizing, and Confidence in uncertain Opinions. As,  
1. Confidence in Philosophy, and Matters of Doubtful Speculation betrays a grosser, and more stupid sort of Ignorance; For 'tis the first step of Knowledge to be sensible that we want it: The most exercised Understandings are most conscious to their Imperfections; and he that is sensible of the frequent failings of his Judgement, will not lean with much trust, and assurance on that which hath so often deceived him, nor build the Castle of his intellectual Security in the Air of Opinions: But on the other side, the shallow, unthinking Vulgar, are sure of all things, and bestow their peremptory, full assent on every slight appearance. Knowledge is always modest and wary; but Ignorance is bold and presuming, as Aristotle hath observed of the confidence and forwardness of Youth. Thus those that have always lived at home, and have never seen any other Country, are confidently persuaded that their own is the best; whereas they that have travelled, and observed other Places, speak more coldly and indifferently of their native Soils; and so those confined Understandings that never looked beyond the Opinions in which they were bred, are exceedingly assured of the Truth, and comparative excellency of their own Tenants; when as the larger Minds that have travailed the divers Climates of Opinions, and considered the various Sentiments of enquiring Men, are more cautious in their Conclusions, and more sparing in positive Affirmations. And if the Dogmatist could be persuaded to weigh the Appearances of Truth and Reason, that are in many other Opinions that he counts unreasonable and absurd, this would be a means to allay, if not to cure his Confidence.  
2. Dogmatizing in things uncertain, doth commonly inhabit with untained Passions, and is usually maintained upon the obstinacy of an ungovered Spirit. For one of the first Rules in the Art of Self-Government, is, to be modest in Opinions: And this Wisdom makes Men considerate and wary, distrustful of their own Powers, and jealous of their Thoughts: He that would rule himself, must be circumspect in his Actions; and he that would be so, must not be hasty, and over-confident in his Conclusions. 'Tis Pride, and Presumption of ones self that causeth such forwardness and assurance; and where those reign, there is neither Virtue nor Reason; No regular Government, but a miserable Tyranny of Passion and Self-will.  
3. Confidence in Opinions, is the great disturber both of our own Peace, and of the quiet of other Men. He that affirms any thing boldly, is thereby engaged against every one that opposeth it; He is concerned, and undertakes for his Tenent, and must fight his way: He confronts every different Judgement, and quarrels all Dissenters; He is angry that others do not see that, which he presumes is so clear; he clamours and feviles; He is still ditrating, and still in a storm: He cannot bear a Contraction, nor scarce a Suspense of Judgement. So that his Peace is at every one's Mercy, and whoever will cross his saying, throws him into the Fire, and destroys his Quiet: And such a Man need not be more miserable. On this account the Stoics affected an indifferency and neutrality in all Things, as the only means to that freedom from Passion and Disturbance, which they sought: and if there be any repose attainable by the Methods of Reason, there is nothing so like to afford it, as unconcernment in doubtful Opinions. The contrary Zeal and assurance, as it robs every Man of his private happiness, so hath it destroyed the Peace of Mankind: It hath made the World an Ac●…ldama, and a Babel. For this is the ground of all the Schisms, and strive of Sects, that have filled our Air with Smoke and Darkness; yea, and kindled the fierce Flames that have con●…ed us. Every vain Opiniator is as much assured as if he were infallible; His Opinions are Truths, certain Truths, Fundamental Ones; and the contrary Doctrines Heretical and Abominable. Hence arise Disputes, Hatreds, Separations, Wars, of which we have seen, and yet see very much; and God knows how much more we may: Of all which Mischiefs here is the Ground, viz. men's presumptions of the certainty of their own Conceits and Ways: and could they but be induced to be modest in them, and to look on them with the eye of less assurance, it would abate their Heats and A●…imosities, and make way for Peace, and charitable Agreement in the things that are undoubtedly True, and Good.  
4. Confidence in Opinions is ill Manners, and an affront to all that differ from us; For the Dogmatist chargeth every one with Ignorance and Error, that subscribes not his Saying. In effect, he gives the lie to whosoever dares dissent from him; and declares that his Judgement is fittest to be the Intellectual Standard. This is that Spirit of Pride and Rudeness, that faith to every different Apprehender, Stand off, I am more Orthodox than thou art; a Vanity that is worse than any simple Error.  
5. Dogmatizing, and Confidence in doubtful Tenants, holds the Opiniator fast in his Misconceits and Errors. For he that is confident of all things, is unavoidably deceived in most; and he that assures himself he never errs, will always err: His Presumptions will defeat all attempts of better Information. We never seek for that which we think we have already, but reject those Aids that make promise and offer of it. And he that hugs Vanity and Falsehood, in the confidence of undoubted 〈◊〉 and Silence, is commonly intractable to the Methods that should rectify his Judgement. Ignorance is far fooner cured, than false conceit of Knowledge: and he was a very wise Man that said, There is more hope of a Fool, than of him that is wise in his own Eyes.  
6. Dogmatizing shows Poverty, and narrowness of Spirit: There is no greater Vassalage, than that of being enslaved to Opinions. The Dogmatist is penned up in his Prison, and sees no Light but what comes in at those Grates. He hath no liberty of Thoughts, no prospect of various Objects: while the considerate and modest Inquirer, hath a large Sphere of Motion, and the satisfaction of more open Light; He sees far, and enjoys the pleasure of surveying the divers Images of the Mind. But the Opiniator hath a poor shrivelled Soul, that will but just hold his little Set of Thoughts: His Appetite after Knowledge, is satisfied with his few Mushrooms, and neither knows nor thinks of any thing beyond his Cottage and his Rags.  
I might say a great deal more to the shame of this folly, but what I have writ will be enough for the Capable and Ingenious; and much less would have been too much for others.  
And now when I look back upon the main Subject of these Papers, it appears so vast to my Thoughts, that methinks I have drawn but a Cockleshell of Water from the Ocean: Whatever I look upon, within the Amplitude of Heaven and Earth, is evidence of Humane Ignorance: For all things are a great Darkness to us, and we are so to ourselves: The plainest things are as obscure, as the most confessedly mysterious; and the Plants we tread on are as much above us, as the Stars and Heavens: The things that touch us, are as distant from us as the Poles, and we are as much Strangers to ourselves, as to the People of the Indies. On review of which, methinks I could begin anew to represent the imperfection of our Knowledge, and the vanity of bold Opinions, which the Dogmatists themselves demonstrate, while each Disputer is confident, that the others confidence is vain, from which a third, with more reason, may conclude the same of the confidence of both: And one would think there should need no more to bring those assured Men to modest Acknowledgements, and more becoming Temper than this, That there is nothing about which the Reason of Man is capable of being employed, but hath been the Subject of Dispute, and divers apprehension: So that the Lord Montaigne hath observed, Mankind is agreed in nothing, no not in this, That the Heavens are over us; Every Man almost differs from another, yea and every Man from himself; and yet every one is assured of his own Schemes of conjecture, though he cannot hold that Assurance but by this proud Absurdity, That he alone is in the right, and all the rest of the World mistaken. I say then, there being so much to be produced both from the natural and moral World, to the shame of boasting Ignorance; I cannot reckon of what I have said but as an imperfect Offer at a Subject, to which I could not do right, without discoursing all Things: On which account I had resolved once to suffer this Trifle to pass out of Print and Memory: But then considering, that the Instances I had given of humane Ignorance were not only clear ones, but such also as are not ordinarily suspected; from whence to our shortness in other things, 'tis an easy Inference; I was thence induced to think it might be useful to promote that temper of Mind that is necessary to true Philosophy and right Knowledge.   


OF SCEPTICISM AND CERTAINTY. Essay II.   

Essay II. OF SCEPTICISM and CERTAINTY: In a short Reply To the Learned Mr. Thomas White.  
To a Friend.  
SIR,  
I Here send you a Supplement to the former Essay. About two years after my Vanity of Dogmatizing was first printed, there appeared a Book written in Latin against it, which had this Title, SCIRI, sive scepties & scepticorum a jure Disputationis exclusio. The Author was that Learned Man, who hath published so many Writings, and is so highly celebrated by Sir Kenelm Digby; especially famous for his Tract de Mundo: He calls himself sometimes Thomas ex Albiis East Saxonum; in other Writings, and particularly in this, Thomas Albius: His English Name is Thomas White, a Roman Catholic, and famed Writer for that Church, though censured for some of his Doctrines at Rome. I writ a civil Answer to his Book, which was annexed to the Vanity of Dogmatizing, reprinted 1665.  
That Answer was in English, because the Discourse it defended was so; and I did not think the Matter worth the Universal Language: Besides, I was induced to reply in that Tongue, by the Example of a Noble Philosopher, one of the great Ornaments of his Age, and Nation, who had then newly answered a Latin Book, written by one Linus against him, in English. About the same time that my Reply was printed, his SCIRI came forth again in our Language, whether translated by himself, or any Disciple of his, I do not know; The Title was, An Exclusion of Sceptics from all title to Dispute: being an Answer to the Vanity of Dogmatizing: by Tho. White. Now because there was nothing of Reply in that new Edition of his Book, I thought to have concerned myself no more about it: but having made you a promise of some Notes concerning Scepticism and Certainty, I have thought fit to treat of those Matters by way of further Answer to that Learned Man.  
He principally insists on three things. (1.) The Charge of Scepticism. (2.) The Accountableness of those Philosophical Difficulties I have mentioned, as things not yet resolved. And, (3.) The Defence of Aristotle. The first is the Subject for which I stand engaged to you; and the second belongs to it, and will be a very seasonable, if not necessary Supplement to the Essay against Confidence in Philosophy. But for the third, I shall refer you to what I have said in my other Answer, and in my Letter concerning Aristotle; being not willing to meddle any further in Affairs of that nature.  
I. The charge of Scepticism seems to be the main thing: For, besides that it makes up the Title, the Author hath been pleased to write a solemn Warning to the Youth of the Universities, on the occasion of my Book, which he calls Vleus Glanvillanum, in the first page of his Preface; and declares this pretended Scepticism of mine to be the occasion of his engagement, in the first paragraph of his Discourse.  
Now because a great and celebrated Philosopher, with whom I am not fit to be named, is brought in as the Reviver of this deadly Scepticism, which I am supposed to endeavour to advance after him; I shall repeat the whole Passage, that I may the better vindicate both him and myself against this Objection; and treat a little of this so common Imputation, which is almost every where alleged against all Free Philosophers, who dare think or say any thing that Aristotle hath not taught. The Learned Man Objects thus, p. 1.  
Scepticism born of old by an unlucky miscarriage of Nature, for her own credit carried off the Tongues of the Eloquent, where it had long been fostered and buried by the steadiness of Christian Faith; this Monster snatched from the Teeth of Worms, and Infects, Peter Gassendus, a Man of a most piercing Sagacity, of neat and copious Eloquence, of most pleasing behaviour and wonderful diligence, by a kind of Magic, hath endeavoured to restore again to Life. He, a Person (which is the strangest of all) most tenacious of Catholic Faith, and never suspected guilty of mischievous Tenants: whereas, yet, this scepticism is the Mother of infinite Errors, and all Heresies, and that very seducing Philosophy, and vain Fallacy which the Saints warned by the Apostles have taught us to beware of. Her this Man, otherwise eminent, in his paradoxical Exercitations against the Aristotelians, hath dared to expose, not vailed as before, and wand'ring like a Quean in the dark, but boldfaced, and painted, to the Multitude, and Market place.  
By his example, the Author of the Vanity of Dogmatizing, hath produced her amongst us, beauteously tricked up, in English: He too a great Master of Wit and Eloquence; nor indeed are vast Mischiefs to be dreaded from vulgar Heads. This is the occasion of my undertaking.—  
This is the Charge; but the severe imputation is sweetened by many very kind words of commendation, which are most justly due to the renowned Gassendus, but given gratis, and undeservedly to the Author of the Vanity of Dogmatizing. In answer to this charge, I shall set down my Thoughts of Scepticism and Certainty, Subjects well worth considering.  
The word Scepticism is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifies to speculate, to l●… about, to deliberate: An ancient Sect of Philosophers ●…nce called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sceptics; as also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Se●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Doubters; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Pyrrhonians, fro●… ●…rho the first noted Author of this Sect. This Pyrrho lived about the time of Alexander the Great, and was born at Elis: He was at first a Painter; some say an ill one; and yet he had better have so continued, for his Philosophy was worse than his Painting. He seems to me, according to the account we have of him, to have been a gross and humoursome Fanatic; especially if that be true that is related by Laertius, That he shunned and heeded nothing, and would not step aside out of the way for Wagons, Precipices, or Dogs, so that he was followed and looked after like an Idiot, and a Child, than whom his Actions were more stupid: Besides which testimony, we have a worse character of him from Aristocles, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉—, viz. That he neither invented, nor writ any thing that was good, but railed both at Gods and Men. And yet it should seem, by the honour his Country did him, that he was not so very a Sot as some thought, and as divers Passages in the Story of his Life speak him: For he was made High Priest, and great Immunities and Privileges given to Philosophers for his sake. But I have nothing to do with the Story of his Life: His Disciples were many, the most eminent of them reckoned by Laertius; but none hath left so exact an account in writing of the Sceptic Doctrines, (if they may be so called) as Sextus Empiricus, one much later than those Sectators of Pyrrho. The chief ground of Scepticism he saith, is this, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That every reason hath an equal one opposite to it: So that they gave no assent to any thing. They allowed Appearances, but would not grant, that things really are in themselves as they appear to our Senses: or that we can by our Reasons judge any thing truly, and certainly of them: That there is nothing fair or foul, just or unjust, nothing true or real in any thing; as Laertius speaks of the belief of Pyrrho. And therefore their Phrases were, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, Not more this than that, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; perhaps, and not perhaps; viz. perhaps it is, perhaps it is not. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I suspend, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I determine nothing; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, I comprehend not. And for fear they ●…d be Dogmatical, even in these Phrases, Empericus sait●… 〈◊〉 they do only declare their present Affections, express●… 〈◊〉 things appear to them, without determining any thing, 〈◊〉 even not determining so much as this, I determine nothing.  
Now besides the professed D●…ples of this Sect, divers other ancient Philosophers spoke doubtfully, and unresolvedly of things: and Cicero in Licullus saith thus of Empedocles; Empedocles, ut interdum mihi furere videatur, abstrusa esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil omnino quale sit posse reperire. Sextus Empiricus mentions divers others, who it seems were thought to be Sceptics, or very near them; as Heraclitus, because he taught that Contraries are in the same thing: Democritus, for denying Honey to be sweet or bitter: The Syrenaick Sect, holding that only the Affections are comprehended: Protagoras, for making the Phaenomena particular to every single Person. But all these he shows to have been Assertors, and very different from the Pyrrhonian Sect. He inquires also of the Academic Philosophy, how it agreed with, or disagreed from the Sceptic. These Philosophers were reputed anciently, and by some ever since thought to be too much addicted to that way. But Sextus clears them from it, beginning with Plato the Founder of the first School, of whom he saith, That though in his gymnastics, where Socrates is brought in deriding the Sophists, he hath the Sceptic, uncertain Character; yet in declaring his Opinion, he was a Dogmatist; particularly in his Doctrines of Ideas, Providence, the preference of a Life of Virtue: Which if Plate assent to as existent, he affirms dogmatically; if as probable, he differs from the Sceptic, in preferring one Opinion before another. Those of the New Academy say all things are incomprehensible, in which, saith Sextus, they differ from us, because they assert this; but we do not know but that they may be comprehended. They differ also in asserting Good, and Evils, and that some things are credible, others not; whereas the Pyrrhonians count all to be equal. To this purpose he speaks of them: But for the middle Academy founded by Arcesilaus he saith, that that Philosopher's Institution, and theirs were almost the same, in that Arcesilaus asserted nothing of the existence, or nonexistence of things, not preferring one Opinion before another, but in all things suspending. Which he did to make trial of his Discipl●… whether they were capable of the Doctrine of Plato, which he taught to his Friends.  
Thus that famous Sceptic doth honour to the memory of those Ancients, by endeavouring to take what he thought to be credit from them, which indeed was ever a disgrace, and aught to be so esteemed still. For those Pyrrhonians, that were of the right strain, seem to me to have been a sort of conceited Humorists, that took a pride in being singular, and venting strange things; opposing all knowledge, that they might be thought to have the most, and to have found out that universal ignorance, and uncertainty, which others could not see far enough to descry. Which way of pretended Philosophy, as it gratified their pride, so it served their malice and ill-nature, which delights much in the Spirit of Contradiction, and contempt of other Men. This they showed in great degree according to Laertius, who saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; They accounted all Fools that were not of their own Party. So that they were in no wise to be reckoned as Philosophers; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Aristocles speaks in Eusebius; For they plucked up the Principles of Philosophy by the Roots. And indeed their doubting and suspension was not in order to the forming a surer Judgement, but a resolution to sit down for ever in despair of Knowledge: And therefore they were very improperly called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sookers, since their great Principle was, that nothing was to be found. Upon the whole, it was not without cause that Cicero●…, Aristocles, and other sober Philosophers spoke of their way as downright madness; and we have great reason to believe so of the Founder of the Sect, if that be true which is related by Laertius, and others, of his washing a Sow, and running into the Forum with a Spit of Meat in his hand after the Cook that had offended him; a thing very unbecoming the Professor of the so much talk●… of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or freedom from disturbance. And his unconcernment another time was as sottish, when he passed on, and would 〈◊〉 help or take notice of his Friend Anaxarehus, when he 〈◊〉 ●…n into a Ditch; which was brutish stupidity, rather than Philosophical Indifference. And indeed this Sect endeavoured to divest themselves of H●…ne Nature, as Pyrro's answer implied, when he was upbraided for avoiding a Dog, viz. that 'twas hard wholly to put off Man; and so they were destructive to the Societies, and all the Interests of Mankind: This I say upon the supposition that they were in earnest, and believed themselves; but I incline to think, that they were only humoursom, and conceited Fellows; rather than I will say that they were absolutely distracted.  
Thus you see I could revile against the Sceptics, as well as my Antagonist; but letting further censure of them pass, I might take notice on this occasion, what odd extravagant People have of old had the name of Philosophers, as if those Ages (as the Turks now) had a reverence for Madmen: For many of their Actions and Opinions were very wild freaks of Fancy and Humour, and would gain Men in these days (as foolish and bad as they are) no better name, than that of Lunatics, or Bedlams. This will appear to any one that shall impartially survey the Histories of their Lives, if those Accounts were true that are given of them. But indeed there is reason enough to doubt that: For the Relations we have of old times are usually very fabulous and uncertain, and where the Grecians were concerned as much as any where, for they had the same Character given them, that the Apostle bestows upon the Cretians; Graecia mendax. Which among other things shows, how little reason there is we should be superstitiously fond of the broken, dublous, imperfect Remains of those days. But methinks those Philosophers should be greater Men, than they were made in those Histories of their Lives and Doctrines, or else one may justly wonder how their Names come down to us with so much Renown and Glory. But to return to more particular Discourse of the Sceptics.  
Besides Those anciently, that had that name without just ground sometimes affixed on them, several worthy Moderns have suffered under the imputation: and indeed by some all Men are accounted Sceptics, who dare descent from the Aristotelian Doctrines, and will not slavishly subscribe all the Tenants of that Dictator in Philosophy, which they esteem the only true and certain Foundations of Knowledge: This learned Man seems to be one of those, for the great Gassendus is charged with so much Scepticism on this account, that he writ an Exercitation against Aristotle, p. 2. and those that slight Aristotle's Grounds (saith our Author in his Preface to the Universities) Aristotle's Works it seems are the infallibe Canon of Truth and Certainty; in him are hid all the Treasures of natural Wisdom and Knowledge; and there is no name given under Heaven, by which we can be saved from Scepticism, and everlasting uncertainty, but his. If this be so, all the modern Free Philosophers must be Sceptics, and there is no help: and the Author of the Vanity of Dogmatizing hath no way to escape the imputation; nor indeed, (if this be all) hath he any concern to avoid it. But the Learned Man may be remembered, that in one respect they are not Sceptics, being confident in this belief, that the Principles of Aristotle are not such Certainties, but that 'tis possible, succeeding Mankind may sometime or other find error and imperfection in them; and discover (if it have not been done already) that they are not the infallible Measures of Truth and Nature.  
But the Free Philosophers are by others accounted Sceptics from their way of enquiry, which is not to continue still poring upon the Writings and Opinions of Philosophers, but to seek Truth in the Great Book of Nature; and in that search to proceed with wariness and circumspection without too much forwardness in establishing Maxims, and positive Doctrines: To propose their Opinions as Hypotheseis, that may probably be the true accounts, without peremptorily affirming that they are. This, among others, hath been the way of those Great Men, the Lord Bacon, and Des-Cartes; and is now the method of the Royal Society of London, whose Motto is, Nut●…ius in Verba. This is Scepticism with some; and if it be so indeed, 'tis such Scepticism, as is the only way to sure and grounded Knowledge, to which confidence in uncertain Opinions is the most fatal Enemy. Nor doth the Learned Man accuse me of any more than this, in his Preface, in which he thus speaks. I am not angry with the Man, who with a great deal of Wit, and an unfordable stream of Eloquence (excessive courtesy) which will ripen with his years, prosecutes what he proposeth to himself, and takes for a truth, not without some savour of modesty: For neither doth he derogate from Faith the power of teaching its Tenants, nor disclaim all hopes of attaining Science hereafter through a laborious amazement of Experiments.— Here I am absolved from being a Sceptic, in the ill sense; For I neither derogate from Faith, nor despair of Science: and the Opinions of those of that character are directly destructive of the one, and everlasting discouragements of the other. Or, if I should affirm that I despair of Science, strictly and properly so called, in the Affairs of Philosophy and Nature; If I should say, we are to expect no more from our Experiments and Inquiries, than great likelihood, and such degrees of probability, as might deserve an hopeful assent; yet thus much of diffidence and uncertainty would not make me a Sceptic; since They taught, That no one thing was more probable than an other; and so withheld assent from all things.  
So that upon the whole I cannot but wonder, that this Philosopher, who seems to be so concerned for the advancement of Knowledge, should oppose me in a Design that hath the same end: only we differ in the Means and Method; For he thinks it is best promoted by persuading, that Science is not Uncertainty; and I suppose that Men need to be convinced, that Uncertainties are not Science. Now the progress of Knowledge being stopped by extreme Confidence on the one hand, and Diffidence on the other; I think that both are necessary, though perhaps one is more seasonable: For to believe that every thing is certain, is as great a disinterest to Science, as to conceive that nothing is so: Opinion of Fullness being, as my Lord Bacon notes, among the Causes of Want. So that after all, we differ but in this, That the Learned Man thinks it more suitable to the necessities of the present Age, to depress Scepticism; and it may be, I look on Dogmatizing, and confident Belief as the more dangerous and common Evil: And indeed between the Slaves of Superstition and Enthusiasm, Education and Interest, almost all the World are Dogmatists; while Sceptics are but some more desperate Renegadoes, whose Intellects are either debauched by Vice, or turned out of the way by the unreasonable Confidence of vain Opiniators. In opposing whose Presumptions, I designed also against the neutrality of the Sceptics; and did not conceited Scioluts ascribe so much to their Opinions, there would be no need of SCIRI'S, or Persuasives to easy and peremptory Assents; which indeed have more need of Restraints than Incentives; since 'tis the nature of Man to be far more apt to confide in his Conceptions, than to distrust them; and 'tis a question whether there be any Sceptics in good earnest. So that I am so far from deserving Reproof from the Adversaries of Intellectual Diffidence, that were there reason for either, I might expect Acknowledgements: For Confidence in Uncertainties is the greatest Enemy to what is certain; and were I a Sceptic, I would plead for Dogmatizing; the way to bring Men to stick to nothing, being confidently to persuade them to swallow all things. For among a multitude of things carelessly received, many will be false, and many doubtful: and consequently a mind not wholly stupid will some time or other find reason to distrust and reject some of its Opinions: Upon review of which, perceiving it embraced Falsehoods for great Certainties, and confided in them as much as in those it yet retains, it will be in great danger of staggering in the rest, and discarding all promiscuously: Whereas if a Man proportion the degree of his Assent, to the degree of Evidence, being more sparing and reserved to the more difficult, and not throughly examined Theories, and confident only of those that are distinctly and clearly apprehended; he stands upon a firm bottom, and is not moved by the winds of Fancy and Humour, which blow up and down the conceited Dogmatists: For the Assent that is difficultly obtained, and sparingly bestowed, is better established and fixed, than that which hath been easy and precipitant.  
Upon the whole Matter it appears, that this Learned Person had no cause to write against me as a Sceptic: And I somewhat the more wonder at it, because I find such things attributed to those, he is pleased to call by that name, that no way agree with the Way and Spirit of those Philosophers, whose genius I recommend and desire to imitate: On which account I thought he had some other notion of Sceptic than was usual; and casting mine eye over his late Purgation presented to the Cardinals of the Inquisition, I found that his Sceptics were some of the Modern, Peripatetical Disputers: These, it seems by their many complaints against his Writings, had obtained a general condemnation of them from the Pope and Consistory of Cardinals; whom therefore in his Appeal to the said Cardinals he accuseth of Ignorance, Corruption of the Aristotelian Doctrines, and Tendency to Heresy and Atheism: And that these are the Sceptics he means, appears from the Preface against me, and divers other Passages of his Book: So that 'tis yet more wonderful, that Gossendus, and the Author of the Vanity of Dogmatizing, should be called by a Name, which he bestows upon those of so different a temper.  
And thus of that charge of Scepticism, with which he begins as the occasion of his writing: Having premised which, he endeavours to lay the sure Foundations of Science, and to establish Certainty in Knowledge. But whatever imperfections there are in that pretended demonstration, I shall not for the present take notice of them; but only observe, that this Gentleman is the Author of that Science, Demonstration, and Self evidence, of which M. Sargeant, a late controvertial Writer for the Roman Church, makes such boasts of; and here are his Grounds: Which those learned Men, that are concerned with him, may if they please, when they have nothing else to do, examine.  
Having said thus much of Scepticism, and the Sceptics, I shall inquire a little into the matter of Certainty, a subject of both difficulty and importance.  
It is taken either (1.) for a firm Assent to any thing, of which there is no reason of doubt; and this may be called Indubitable Certainty; or (2.) for an absolute Assurance, that things are as we conceive and affirm, and not possible to be otherwise, and this is Infallible Certainty.  
In the first of these Des Cartes lays his Foundations: I cannot doubt, but I think, though nothing should be as I conceive; and there I cannot suspect neither, but that I myself, that think, am. I am as sure that I have Ideas, and Conceptions of other things without me, as of God, Heaven, Earth, etc. Thus far that Philosopher is safe, and our Assent is full; and it is so in this likewise, That we can compound, or disjoin those Images by affirming, and denying; and that we have a faculty of Reasoning, and inferring one thing from another: So much as this we clearly perceive, and seel in ourselves, whatever uncertainty there may be in other matters. To these we give a resolved and firm Assent, and we have not the least reason of doubt here. Besides which Principles we find others in our minds that are more general, and are used and supposed by us in all our Affirmations and Reasonings, to which we assent as fully, such are these: Every thing is, or is not: A thing cannot be and not be, in the same respects: Nothing hath no Attributes: What we conceive to belong, or not to belong to any thing, we can affirm, or deny of it.  
These are the Principles of all Propositions, and Ratiocinations whatsoever: and we assent to them fully, as soon as we understand their meaning, to which I add this great one more, That our Faculties are true, viz. That what our understandings declare of things clearly and distinctly perceived by us, is truly so, and agreeing with the realities of things themselves. This is a Principle that we believe firmly; but cannot prove, for all proof, and reasoning supposeth it: And therefore I think Des-Cartes is out in his method; when from the Idaea's he endeavours to prove that God is, and from his Existence that our Faculties are true: When as the truth of our Faculcies was presupposed to the proof of God's Existence; yea, and to that of our own also. So that, that great Man seems to argue in a Circle. But to let that pass; This we constantly assent to without doubting, That our Faculties do not always delude us, That they are not mere Impostors and Deceivers, but report things to us as they are, when they distinctly and clearly perceive them. And so this may be reckoned one of the prime certain Principles, and the very Foundation of Certainty in the first sense of it.  
These and such like Principles result out of the nature of our Minds: But,  
2. There are other Certainties arising from the evidence of Sense: As, That there is Matter, and Motion in the World: That Matter is extented divisible and impenetrable: That Motion is direct, or oblique: That Matter, and Motion, are capable of great variety of Modifications and Changes. We learn that these, and many other such things are so, from Sense, and we nothing doubt here; although the Theory and Speculative consideration of those Matters be full of difficulty, and seeming contradiction. In these our Assent is universal and indubitable: But in many particular cases, we are not assured of the report of our Senses; yea, we descent from, and correct their Informations, when they are not in their due Circumstances, of right Disposition, Medium, Distance, and the like: and when they pronounce upon things which they cannot judge of: on which account, though our Senses, and the Senses of Mankind do represent the Earth as quiescent: Yet we cannot from thence have assurance that it doth Rest, since Sense cannot judge of an even and regular Motion, when itself is carried with the movent; so that though it should be true that the Earth moves, yet to Sense it would appear to rest, as now it doth; as I have discoursed elsewhere. But when the Senses are exercised about their right Objects, and have the other Circumstances that are requisite, we then assent without doubting. And this fullness of assent is all the certainty we have, or can pretend to; for after all, 'tis possible our Senses may be so contrived, that things may not appear to us as they are: But we fear not this, and the bare possibility doth not move us.  
3. There are Certainties arising from the Testimony of others. This in ordinary cases is very doubtful, and fallacious, but again in some it is indubitable. As when the Testimony is general, both as to time and place uninteressed, full, plain, and constant, in matters of Sense and of easy Knowledge: In such circumstances as these, the evidence of Testimony is no more doubted, than the first Principles of Reason or Sense. Thus we believe, without the least scruple about it, That there are such places as Rome, and Constantinople, and such Countries of Italy and Greece, though we never saw them; and many other Historical Matters, which ourselves never knew. The Foundation of which assurance is this Principle, That Mankind cannot be supposed to combine to deceive, in things, wherein they can have no design or interest to do it. Though the thing have a remote possibility, yet no Man in his Wits can believe it ever was, or will be so: and therefore we assent to such Testimonies with the same firmness, that we would to the clearest Demonstrations in the World.  
The second sense of Certainty is that, which I called Certainty Infallible; when we are assured that 'tis impossible things should be otherwise, than we conceive and affirm of them: This is a sort of Certainty, that humanely we cannot attain unto, for it may not be absolutely impossible, but that our Faculties may be so contrived, as always to deceive us in the things which we judge most certain and assured: This indeed we do not suspect, and we have no reason to do it; which shows that we are certain in the former Sense: But we may not say 'tis utterly impossible; and consequently we cannot have the certainty of this latter sort: which perhaps is proper only to Him, who made all things what they are; and discerns their true natures by an infallible and most perfect knowledge.  
The sum of which is, that though we are certain of many things, yet that Certainty is no absolute Infallibility; there still remains the possibility of our being mistaken in all matters of humane Belief and Inquiry. But this bare possibility (as I said) moves us not, nor doth it in the least weaken our assent to those things, that we clearly and distinctly perceive: but we believe with as much firmness of assurance the Matters that our Faculties do so report to us, as if there were no such possibility; and of greater Certainty than this there is no need. It is enough for us, that we have such Principles lodged in our minds, that we cannot but assent to; and we find nothing to give us occasion to doubt of the truth of them.  
This is Humane Certainty, and let vain and affected Sceptics talk what they will, they cannot in earnest doubt of those first Principles which I have mentioned. They are universal, and believed by all Mankind; every one knows, every one useth them: For though they do not lie in the minds of all Men in the formality of such Propositions, yet they are implicitly there; and in the force and power of them every Man reasons, and acts also. These are the Seed of Reason, and all the Conclusions (at never so great a distance) that are truly deduced from those first Certainties, are as true and certain as they are; and both together make up what we call Reason. So that this is not so various and giddy a thing as some vain inconsiderate Men talk; but 'tis one steady Certainty, and the same all the World over. Fancies, Opinions, and Humours, that mistaken Men call Reason, are infinitely divers, and fallacious; But those Principles and Conclusions that are clearly and distinctly perceived by our minds; those that are immdiately lodged in them, and the consequences that truly arise from those, and the right informations of Sense, they are one, and certain, without variety or deceit. Now all Men partake of Reason in some degree (of the prime Principles at least, and the Faculty of deducing one thing from another); But the most use that little perversely, and to their own deception, arguing from prejudices of Sense, Imagination, and customary Tenants, and so filling up their minds with false and deceitful Images, instead of Truth and Reason. 'Tis the office and business of Philosophy, to teach Men the right use of their Faculties, in order to the extending and enlarging of their Reasons; and one principal Rule it gives is, To be wary and diffident, not to be hasty in our Conclusions, or over-confident of Opinions; but to be sparing of our assent, and not to afford it but to things clearly and distinctly perceived: And this was the aim and design of that Discourse, which this Learned Man accuseth as such a piece of Scepticism, and discouragement of Science.  
I have now said what I intended concerning the first thing, on which my Assailant insists, The charge of Scepticism, and I suppose I have sufficiently shown the injustice of it.  
I proceed to the second main Business of his Book, which is to give an account of those difficulties which I have mentioned, as yet unresolved: Concerning those I affirm not, that they are impossible to be unridled, but that they have not been explained by any yet extant Hypothesis; a sad Argument of intellectual deficience, that after so much talk of Science and endeavour after Knowledge, we should be yet to seek, and that in those Matters which we have the greatest advantages to understand. But this learned Man thinks he can resolve them; and I have so great a kindness for any ingenious attempts of this sort, and so great a desire to be satisfied about those Theories, that I am ready to entertain any good probability that shall be offered, even by a prosest Antagonist; for Truth is welcome to me from any hand that brings it. I have therefore candidly, and impartially considered this Gentleman's Solutions, but cannot satisfy myself with them. The Reasons of my Dissatisfactions I shall now give in an examination of his Accounts.  
He takes occasion from my waving the difficulties of Magnetism, and the flux and reflux of the Sea, to give his solution of them, But I am not concerned here, they are none of the things on which I insist, yea I professedly decline them; and intimate that these are better known, than less-acknowledged Mysteries; Des-Cartes his Hypothes●…is are fair and probable, but I think this Philosopher's Accounts very obnoxious, especially there where he makes so constant and regular an effect, as is the flux and reflux of the Sea to be caused by so uncertain, and proverbially inconstant a thing as the Winds. But I shall not trouble myself to remark on Matters, with which my Discourse hath nothing to do. My business is with the pretended Answers to the Difficulties I mention, as not well resolved by any yet known Hypothesis: On which the Learned Man enters, Plea 5th, and in order begins with those about the SOUL, in these words.  
1. In the third Chapter therefore of his most eloquent Discourse, he objects our Ignorance of that thing we ought to be best acquainted with, viz. our own SOULS, p. 30.  
This I do, and to the Difficulties I propound about the Origine of the Soul: It's Union with the Body: It's moving of it, and direction of the Spirits; The general, short Answer is, That to suppose the Soul a Substance, that may be made, come, and join●…d to another, a Subsistence, Thing, or Substance, is a most important Error in Philosophy, of which, he saith, none can doubt, that is able to discern the opposition of one, and many, [ibid.] The meaning of which must be, That the Soul is no distinct Substance from the Body: And if so, almost all the World hath hitherto been mistaken: For if we inquire i●…to the Philosophy of the Soul, as high as any accounts are given of it, we shall find its real substantial distinction from the Body to have been the current belief of all Ages, notwithstanding what this Gentleman saith, That none can doubt that this is an error in Philosophy, that knows the opposition of one and many. For,  
(1.) The highest times, of whose Doctrines we have any History, believed its Preexistence; and consequently that it is a certain Substance, that might be made, come, and be joined to another. Of this I'll say a few things.  
If credit may be given to the Chaldean Oracles, (and perhaps more is due to them than some will allow Preexistence is of highest Antiquity. We have that Doctrine plainly taught in those ancient Verses: 

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
‛ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.—   

Oportet te festinare ad Lucem, & patris Lumina,  
Vnde missa tibi est anima.—    
And afterwards more clearly, 

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.—   

Quaere tu animae canalem, unde aut quo ordine  
Co●…pori inservieris in ordinem a quo effluxisti  
Rursu●… restituas.—    
And Isellus in his exposition of the Chaldean Theology tells us, That according to their Doctrine Souls descended hither, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Either through the moultring of its Wings, or the will of the Father of Spirits, that they might adorn this Terrestrial State: And again Zoroa●…ter, speaking of Humane Souls, saith they are sent down to Earth from Heaven, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
2. Trismegistus (if those remains that bear his Name may be allowed) is express in asserting the same Doctrine: In his Minerva Mundi he brings in God threatening those he had placed in an happy condition of Life and enjoyment, with Bonds and Imprisonment, in case of Disobedience; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: and they transgressing, he adds, That he commanded the Souls to be put into Bodies; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: And in another place assigns this for the cause of their Imprisonment in Bodies; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. He would have them acknowledge that they sustained that punishment, and imprisonment in Bodies for the things they had done before they came into them.  
3. It was also the Opinion of the Ancient Jews; That all Souls were at first created together, and resided in a place they call Goph, a Celestial Region. And therefore 'tis said in the Mishna, Non aderit filius David, priusquam exhaustae fuerint universae Animae quae fu●…t in Goph. So that they believed all Generations on Earth to be supplied from that Promptuary, and Element of Souls in Heaven; whence they supposed them to descend by the North Pole, and to ascend by the South; whence the saying of the Cabalists, Magnus Aquilo Scaturigo Animarum; From which Tradition 'tis like Homer had this Notion, 

— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

— Janua duplex:  
Haec Boream Spectans homines demittit: at illa  
Respiciens Austrum divinior, invia prorsus  
Est homini, praeb●…tque viam immortalibus unis.    
4. 'Tis notoriously known, that Pythagoras and his Sectators held the Doctrine of Transmigration, which supposeth Preexistence, and both, that the Soul is a Substance, which can come, and be joined to another thing. Some Pythagoreans write, that Pythagoras himself after 216 years' Transanimation returned to Life again. Now this Opinion being so universally imputed to this Philosopher, and his School, I shall not need to insist on it as far as it concerns them: but I take notice, that both Jews, Persians, Indians, Arabians, and divers other Nations, etc. did of old, and do still hold the same Doctrine. Manasseh ●…en Israel ascribes the Opinion of Transmigration to Abraham; and the Cabalists teach, that every Soul is successively joined to three Bodies: So the same Soul they say, was in Adam, David, and the Messias; and the same in Seth, Shem, and Moses, according to R. Simeon, who (as the Cabalists generally do) stops the course in the third Transmigration: as is noted from him by a Learned Man of our own. There are at this day great Sects among the Indians of the East, that retain this Doctrine of Transanimation, believing that the Souls of some descend again into Humane Bodies; but that others pass into the Bodies of Beasts: So did some of the Ancient Pythagoreans, who taught, that good Men returned to their former blessed and happy Life; but that the wicked in their first Transmigration changed their Sex; in the second they descended into Beasts: yea, some supposed them at last to go into Trees, and other Vegetables.  
Now all these committed the great Error in Philos fie, of which I am accused, in supposing the Soul to be a certain Substance, which may directly be made, come, and be joined to another thing, and so, according to our Author, They could none of them discern the opposition of one and many.  
But, (2.) This pretended important Error in Philosophy of the Soul's being a Thing, and Substance; and one distinct from the Body, must be held by all, that believe its natural Immortality: for Separability is the greatest Argument of real distinction; especially that which the Schools call Mutual. Now the Soul's Immortality hath had a general Reception from the wiser and better part of Mankind: The Egyptians, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Indians, Jews, Greeks, and universally all that had a name for Wisdom among the Ancients, believed it. And the same hath been the apprehension of latter Ages. A Council of the Church of Rome itself hath defined it, and recommended the demonstrating of it to all Christian Philosophers. And if the Soul lives after the dissolution of the Body, 'tis certainly a Substance distinct from it; for nothing can subsist without itself: and real separability cannot consist with Identity and Indistinction.  
3. The Sacred and Mosaical Philosophy supposeth the Soul to be a Substance that can come, and be joined to another: For it tells us, That God breathed into Adam's Nostrils the Breath of Life; by which generally is understood his infusing a Soul into him: And all the Arguments, that are alleged from Scripture to prove its immediate Creation, do strongly conclude it to be a distinct Substance from the Body.  
And, (4.) The same Doctrine is more than once affirmed by Aristotle himself, for saith he, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, It remains that the Mind (or ●…oul) comes from without, and is only a Divine Thing. Again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Mind is separate, etc. a thing apart from the Body. For elsewhere he saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Operations of the Body do not communicate with its (the Soul's) Operations. He calls it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Substance, or Subsistence; for supposing which I am reprehended by our Philosopher: And affirms further, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; The Mind is a Divine and Impassable Thing. It appears then from the Testimonies (and I could allege more, if there were occasion) that Aristotle taught the real Distinction which I suppose, and so, according to our Author, is one of them that understands not the opposition of one and many. Yea,  
(5.) Our Philosopher's learned Friend and Admirer Sir Kenelm Digby is another, for that ingenious Gentleman affirms in his Immortality, That the Soul is a Substance, and a Substance besides the Body: and almost all that Discourse depends on that supposal.  
(6.) This Author himself affirms as much in his Peripatetical Institutions, as ever I supposed: For he saith, ['Tis most evident, that the Mind is something of another kind from Quantity and Matter; That 'tis a substantial Principle of Man, and no mode or determination of divisibility, and that there is nothing common to Body and Spirit]. Besides which in the fifth Book of the same Institutions he discourseth of the Soul's separation from the Body, and asserts it to be evident, that it perisheth not with it, because it hath Actions that belong not to a Body, but hath of itself the Nature of a Being: and its power of Existence is not taken away, when the Body fails, the Soul being apart from, and besides it; and that matter is not necessary to the Soul's Existence: Many other Expressions there are in that Discourse to like purpose, which speak the Soul's Real Distinction from the Body, in as great variety of Phrase, as Diversity and Distinction can be spoken. But all this is forgotten, and now 'tis a most important Error in Philosophy to suppose the Soul to be a certain Substance, which may directly be made, come, and be joined to another, and of this none can doubt that understand the Opposition of one and many.  
I think now by all this 'tis pretty clear, that my supposition of the Soul's being a distinct Substance from the Body, is not peccant, except all the wiser World, both Ancient and Modern, have been mistaken, and our Author himself.  
But besides all, (2.) It seems to me evident even from the nature of the things, abstracting from Authority. And I think it appears,  
(1.) From all the common Arguments that prove the Soul Immaterial; For Perception, Perception of Spirituals, Vniversals, Mathematical Lives, Points, Superficies, Congenit Notions, Logical, Metaphysical, and Moral, Self-reflection, Freedom, Indifferency, and Universality of Action: These are all Properti●…●…t all agreeing with Body or Matter, though of never so pure and simple a Nature: Nor is it conceivable how any of these should arise from Modifications of Quantity, being of a divers kind from all the Effects and Phaenomena of Motion.  
2. If the Soul be not a distinct Substance from the Body, 'tis then a certain Disposition and Modification of it; which this Author in the tenth Lesson of his Intitutions, seems to intimate, saying, That since the Soul is a certain Affection— which is introduced, and expelled by corporeal Action— Hence he infe●…rs something that is not for our purpose to relate: And if so, since all diversities in Matter arise from Motion and Position of Parts, every different Perception will require a distinct order and position of the Parts of the Matter perceiving, which must be obtained by Motion: I demand then, when we pass from one Conception to another, is the Motion (the cause of this Diversity) merely casual; or directed by some Act of Knowledge? The former I suppose no Man in his wits will affirm, since then all our Conceptions will be nonsense and confusion; Chance being the Cause of nothing that is orderly and regular: But if there be a knowledge in us of that directs the Motions that make every distinct Conception; I demand, concerning that Knowledge, whether it be in like manner directed by some other; or is it the Effect of mere Casual Motion? If the former, we must run up in infinitum in our inquiry; and the latter admits the alleged Absurdities. There is no way then of defending the Assertion of the Souls being Matter, or any modification of it, but by affirming with Mr. Hobbs, a certain connection between all our Thoughts, and a necessary fate in all things, which whoever affirms, will find Difficulties enough in his Assertion to bring him to mine, that there is a Vanity in Dogmatizing, and Confidence is unreasonable.  
I have insisted the longer on this, because the distinction of the Soul from the Body is a very material Subject, the proof of which is very seasonable for the present Age; and by it I have disabled our Author's pretended Solution of the three Difficulties I mention, viz. of the Origine of the Soul; its Union with the Body, and its moving of it. Concerning whi●…●…st he adds,  
P. 33. That true it is, one animated Me●…●…oves another, but not that any Substance, that is a pure Soul, moves immediately any Member in which the Soul is not. Which last I know no Body that saith; I cannot affirm the Soul moves any Member immediately, but 'tis like it doth it by the Spirits its Instruments. Much less did I ever say, That the Soul moves any Member in which it is not: But the Seat-of-Sense, and Original of Animal Motion is in the Brain or Heart, or some other main part (of which in particular I determine nothing). Thence the Soul sends its Influences to govern the Motions of the Body, through all which it is diffused. 'Tis true, one animate Member moves another, but the Motion must somewhere begin: In Actions purely Mechanical, it begins in material Agents that work upon the Body, and its Parts: but in those that are immediately under our Wills, the Motion hath its beginning from the Soul moving first something corporeal in us, by which other parts are moved. But our Author appeals to other Animals, in which, he saith, There's frankly denied a Soul independent on the Body: But this Learned Man knows, The Platonists assign them Souls immaterial B●…ings divers from the Body; and the Peripatetics, substantial Forms distinct from Matter. Des Cartes indeed thinks them to be pure Machine's moved altogether after the manner of a Clock or Engine; which if it should prove to be truly their case, yet have we no reason to believe it so in ourselves, since we feel it otherwise, viz. That we can move and stop many of our Motions upon the command and direction of the Will; which Faculty belongs to some Principle Immaterial: And if this be always determined by something Corporeal, and not in our own power, as he seems to intimate; Farewell Liberty, and welcome Stoical Necessity, and irresistible Fate in all things.  
For the other things that follow pag. 35. in answer to the Doubts about Sensation, particularly our decerning Quantities, Distances, etc. 'Tis evident by what he speaks of demonstrating those things by the Optics, that he understands not the force of the Objection, and hath said nothing that comes near it; as will appear plainly to any capable Person, that will take the pains to compare what we both write.  
He comes next, p. 36. to my Difficulties about the Memory; concerning which I say not, (as he suggests) That 'tis impossible to be explicated; but that none of the known Hypotheseiss have yet explained it; which is sufficient for my general conclusion of the present Imperfection, and the Narrowness of our Knowledge. But our Author thinks Sir K. Digbies account to be the true Solution; and answers to my Objection, that 'tis as conceivable how the Images, and representations of Objects in the Brain should keep their distinct and orderly situations, without confusion or dissipation; as how the Rays of Light should come in a direct Line to the Eye; or how the Atomical Effluvia, that continually flow from all Bodies, should find their way. To which I reply.  
(1.) The multiplying Difficulties doth not solve any: for supposing these to be unaccountable, or very hard to be explained; yet this would only argue another defect in our Knowledge, and so be a new evidence of the truth of my general Conclusion. But, (a.) The proposed Instances are not so desperate: For 1. supposing Light, with Des-Cartes (which is most probable) to consist in the conamen of the aethereal Matter, receding from the Centre of its Motion; the direct tendency of it to the Eye is no difficulty worth considering; or if the Rays be Atomical Streams, and Effluxes from the Sun, there is then nothing harder to be conceived in this Hypothesis, than in the direct spouting of Water out of a Pipe; nor any more, than in the beating of the Waves against the side of a Ship, when it swims in the Sea. And 2. for the other Instance of corporeal emissions that find their way to the Bodies, with which they have intercourse; it would require to be proved, that the secret Operations of Nature are performed by such material effluvia: Perhaps 'tis more likely that those strange Effects are not Mechanioal, but Vital, effected by the continuity of the great Spirit of Nature, which is diffused through all things: or however, to suppose the Memory to be as clear and plain as Magnetism, and Sympathies, will be no great Advantage to the belief of the intelligibleness of it.  
There needs no more here; only I take notice of the Charge, p. 41. in these words,— I'd remember the ingenious Author, that he mis-imposeth the third Opinion (which relisheth nothing of Philosophy) upon Aristotle, who taught the Digbaean way. To which, I say, if the Doctrine of Intentional Species be not Aristotle's, than the Universities of Europe (who have taught this Opinion to be his) have hitherto been mistaken; and this Assertion, that Aristotle delivered the Dighaean Doctrine of Atomical Effluvia, will alter the whole Hypothesis; and then there will be little or nothing of Aristotle in his Schools. (2.) The Digbaean, Atomical Opinion is notoriously known to have been the way of Democritus, and Epicurus, which Aristotle frequently and professedly opposeth; That Democritus taught the Atomical Hypothesis we have Aristotle's affirmation to justify: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (speaking of Leucippus and Democritus) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.— Dicunt 〈◊〉 Printas magnitudines, multitudine quidem infinitas, magnitudine vero indivisibiles— and as he goes on, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Horum complexione, & circumplexu omnia gig●…i. And that these solved the way of Sensation by material Images we have from Plutarch: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Democritus, Epicurus per Idolorum ingressus putarunt visivum evenire. This Hypothesis Aristotle endeavours to confute, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉— Absurdum e●…iam quod illi non ●…nerit in mentem clubitare, cur oculus vidit solus, aliorum vero nullum quibus apparent idola. And again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉— Democritus & plurimi Physiologerum, quicnque loquuntur de sensia, absurdi●… quidd●…m faciunt; omnia enim sensibitia tactilia faciunt. We see then Aristotle thought the Doctrine of Sensation by Corporeal Images absurd in Democritus and Epicurus, and therefore he must have much contradicted himself, if he taught the same Doctrine with Sir K. Digby about the Memory, which was one with that of those Ancients. And there is little doubt but that the Memory is excited to Action by the like Instruments that the external Senses are, consonantly to that of Plato in his Ph●…do, (speaking of the Senses) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, viz. That the Memory is begot of them: And the same Aristotle affirms almost in the same words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Memory is begot out of the Sense. So that I think I am not mistaken in this matter; or if I am, I err with the great Body of his Sectators.  
But whether the Doctrine 〈◊〉 Intentional Species be Aristotlts or not, 'tis no great matter, I make this no charge against him; And if it be no●… 〈◊〉, 'tis however the common Tenent of his Schools, and so lit to be considered as an Hypothosis, which I have done, and sh●…wn it to be an insufficient account of the Memory.  
To the Difficulty I propose about the Formation of Animals, our Author offers two Things; The first of them may deservs a word or two about it 〈◊〉 In his own words 'tis thus expres●….  
Conceive the first thus; L●…'s say the Seed of a Plant, or Animal, contains invisible parts of all the Animal's Members: These let's say supplied with moisture increase, with some slight mutation whereof the reason may be easily rendered (for example that some parts drier and harder, others are more throughly watered, and grow soft) and what great matter will be apprehended in the formation of living things?  
You may remember Sir, that once, when you and I were talking of the wonderful discoveries of the Microscope, and the many complete Animals it discloseth, which lay hid from our unaided sight, we fell thence into a discourse of the strange and incredible subtlety of Nature in forming so many distinct Parts, and Members, and Passages in those invisible Creatures; and of the grossness of our Senses in comparison of the fineness and tenuity of those works: I than made an offer to you of this Hypothesis of the Formation of Organical Bodies, which I expressed to this effect: That the Seeds of things are certain, and are the things themselves in little: having all that is in the completed Body in smallest and invisible parts; and so generation is but accretion, and growth to greater bulk and consistence. To this purpose our Author here speaks; and the Hypothesis receives probability, and advantage from the late discoveries of the ingenious Malpeghius, and Dr. Grew in his Anatomy of Plants: Nor is it unlikely but that Vegetables are folded up in their Seeds; and that their Vegetation is only the expanding and unfolding of them. But in Animals the thing is of more difficult conception, since the immediate matter of many, if not of most, Generations is an homogeneous fluid. To which I know it will be said, that the organised Body is in it, though it be so small as to be invisible: But it is not very probable, that an invisible Atom of a Creature should expand itself into the vastness of a Whale or Elephant; or that the Original Bodies of those immense Creatures, should be undecernable by the acutest sight, when the seminal Body (if I may so call it) of very small Plants are plainly visible. And if this be so, that the Seed of Animals actually contains the form Bodies of the Animals themselves, those little Bodies must either be supposed created by God, in the form and consistence in which they are, from the foundation of the World; or they are produced after, in an orderly course of Nature: If the former be said, some will be apt to ask, Whether this will not destroy all Philosophy, being so immediate a recourse to Creation, and the infinite Power of God? And the manner of those Formations is never the more intelligible for being resolved into the immediate efficiency of incomprehensible Power and Wisdom. But if they are produced in a natural way, we are then as much a●… a loss to find by what Agent, and what direction those Corpuscles are formed, as we are to understand the way and manner of it in greater Bodies. Or, be they produced how they will, by Creation, or Nature, yet still the Trouble and Doubts will be as many and great in the conception of their growth to their visible Bulk, which we call their Generation: For still must be a Director of the Matter by which each part is increased, that must separate, dispose, guide, and proportion it so, as that ●…o part may exceed, none may want: and so the Queries, and Difficulties, that concern the Generation of Organical Bodies, are unanswered notwithstanding this Hypothesis.  
Our Author's second Solution concerns only the gross and material Ingredients in the formation of Bodies, of which he pretends some account. But this is nothing at all to our business, which was to inquire after the Principle of Direction of those various and methodical Motions that are requisite to the formation of an Animal, or other Organical Body. And the Chemical Processes, and Elementary Solutions of which he speaks p. 43. signify no more to the Matter, than if a Man should answer an enquiry about the Art and Method of the Motions of a Watch, by saying, They are performed by Steel, Iron, Brass, or Silver, wherein the Matter of the Work indeed is declared, but not the Artifice.  
The Learned Man comes next to the Solution of two difficulties I propose about Matter, the Union of its Parts, and the composition of Quantity, p. 45. His answer in short is, That there are no actual parts in quantity before division: Which if it be so indeed, there is then no ground for the Questions how they are united; or of what compounded. But I shall show; 1. That there are actual Parts; and, 2. That the Grounds of the contrary Assertion are weak and insufficient.  
1. The formal nature of Quantity is Extension, in the Notion of Aristotle's Schools; and divisibility in the Philosophy of Sir K. Digby, and our Author; both which suppose parts, and parts actual: for to be extended, is to have parts extra parts (as the School Phrase is); and if the Extension be actual, the Parts must be so: for it is not conceivable how a thing can be extended but by parts, which are really distinct from one another, though not separate: Nor can a thing be divided, except we suppose the Parts preexistent in the divisible; for Divisibility is founded upon real distinction, and 'tis impossible to divide that which is one without any diversity. (2.) Except there are parts in Matter before Division, there are none at all: For after they are divided they are no parts, but have a compleatness and integrality of their own, especially if their Subject were an Homogeneous Body. (3.) If there are not actual Parts in Quantity, Contradictions may be verified de eodem in all the Circumstances, which the Metaphysics teach to be impossible: For the same Body may be seen, and not seen, black and white, hot and cold, moist and dry, and have all other the most contrary Qualities. To this Sir K. Digby answers, [That it is not one part of the thing that shows itself, and another that doth not, one that is hot, and another cold, etc. But it is the same thing, showing itself according to one possibility of Division, and not another.] To this I say first, These distinct Possibilities are founded upon distinct Actualities, which are the parts I would have acknowledged: and such a capacity of receiving things so different cannot be in the same Subject without the supposal of parts actually distinct and divers. 2. The Subjects of these contrary Qualities are things actual, whereas Possibilities are but Metaphysical Notions; and these Subjects are distinct, or Contradictions will be reconciled: from which the Inference seems necessary, that Quantity hath Parts, and Parts Actual; and distinct Possibilities will not salve the Business. And, 3. why must the common Speech of all Mankind be altered? and what all the World calls Parts be called Possibilities of Division? Which yet, if our Philosopher will needs name so, they be acknowledged distinct, and proved actual, or at least founded immediately upon things that are so; my Questions will as well proceed this way as in the common one, viz. How the things that answer to these distinct Possibilities are united, and of what compounded?  
There is another Answer which I find in our Author's Peripatetical Institutions; the sum of which is, [That the Contradictions have only a notional repugnance in the Subject as 'tis in our Understandings; and since the parts have a distinct Being in our understanding, from thence 'tis that they are capable to sustain Contradictions]. Which answer, if I understand, I have reason to wonder at, for certainly the Subject sustains the Contradictories as it is in re; and I never heard of a Notion, black or white, hot or cold, but in a Metaphor: 'Tis the real Substance is the Subject of these Contrarieties, which were impossible, if it had not divers Realities answering to the Qualities that so denominate: and therefore 'tis not the Understanding that makes the divers Subjects of these Accidents, as our Author suggests: but their being such is the ground that we so apprehend them. This I think is enough to show that there are actual Parts in Quantity. To which I must add,  
(2.) That the Grounds of Sir K. Digby, and our Author, on which they build their Paradox, are insufficient. The Reasons are; ¹. Quantity is Divisibility; ¹. Divisibility is Capacity of Division; ³. What is only capable of division, is not actually divided; ⁴. Quantity is not actually divided, and therefore hath no parts actual. To which I say,  
(1.) That Quantity is divisibility, is presumed; but extension is before it, in Nature, and our Conception; and it is the received Notion, though I think Impenitrability is the truest. (2.) Division supposeth Union, and Union parts united. (3.) What is only capable of Division in a mechanical Sense, may, and aught to be divided in a Metaphysical: That is, they ought to be divers in their Being, before they can be separated, and distinct in their Quantity; for Separability must suppose Diversity.  
But, (2.) It is pleaded against Actual Parts in Quantity; that if we admit them, we cannot stop till we come down to Indivisibles; of which to suppose Quantity compounded, is said to be absurd and impossible. In answer to which, I grant the Inference, and have acknowledged the Hypothesis of Indivisible; to be full of seeming Inconsistencies, as is the other also: and therefore I reckon both among the things that are unconceivable: of which there can be no greater Argument, than their having driven such great and sagacious wits upon an Assertion, that is contrary to our Senses, and the apprehension of all the World: That there are no parts in Quantity. And, (2.) 'Tis no good method of reasoning to deny what is plain and obvious, because we cannot conceive what is abstruse and difficult: To say that Quantity hath no actual Parts, contrary to the suffrage and senses of Mankind, because we cannot untie the Difficulties that arise from its being compounded of Indivisibles, a nice and intricate Theory.  
Sir, I crave your pardon for this Spinose and dry Discourse, which I could not well avoid, it being one of the main things of Sir K. Digbies and Mr. White's Philosophy, and pretended by the latter, as such a Solution of the Doubts I propounded, as renders them scarce any Difficulties at all: For the other things he objects, they are smaller Matters; and if you have leisure for such Trifles, I refer you to the discussion of them in my larger Answer, annexed to my Scepsis Scientifica: in which also you will find what concerns his justification of Aristotle and his Philosophy.  
I am, Sir, Your affectionate Friend and Servant, J. G.    


MODERN IMPROVEMENTS OF Useful Knowledge. Essay III.   

Essay III. Modern Improvements OF Useful Knowledge.  
NOtwithstanding the show of Science that the World of Books makes, it must be confessed by considerate Men, that Knowledge is capable of far greater Heights and Improvements, than it hath yet attained; and there is nothing hath stinted its Growth, and hindered its Improvements more, than an overfond, superstitious Opinion of Aristotle, and the Ancients, by which it is presumed that their Books are the Ne Vltra's of Learning, and that little or nothing can be added to their discoveries: So that hereby a stop hath been put upon Inquiry, and Men have contented themselves with studying their Writings, and disputing about their Opinions, while they have not taken much notice of the great Book of Nature, or used any likely Endeavours for further acquaintance with it. This, whoever will consider, and speak impartially, must confess: and yet in spite of the evil Instuence of this Humour, there have been some in all Ages, who have freely searched into the Creatures of God as they are in his World, without vainly spending of their time in playing with those Images of them that the fancies of Men have framed in theirs. And perhaps no Age hath been more happy in liberty of Enquiry, than this, in which it hath pleased God to excite a very vigorous and active Spirit for the advancement of real and useful Learning. This every sensible Man should strive, as he is able, to promote: and I shall now endeavour, as far as my weakness will permit, to raise the capable and ingenious, from a dull and drowsy acquiescence in the diseoveries of former tim●… to a noble vigour in the pursuits of knowledge: And this I 〈◊〉 do, by representing the Encouragements we have to proceed, from the Helps and Advantages we enjoy, beyond those of remote Antiquity. In order to this I consider,  
THat there are Two chief ways whereby Knowledge may be advanced, viz. (1.) By enlarging the HISTORY of Things: And (2.) By improving INTERCOURSE and COMMUNICATIONS.  
The History of Nature is to be augmented, either by an investigation of the Springs of Natural Motions, or fuller Accounts of the grosser and more palpable Phaenomena. For the searching out the beginnings and depths of Things, and discovering the Intrigues of remoter Nature, there are THREE remarkable ARTS, and multitudes of excellent INSTRUMENTS, which are great Advantages to these later Ages; but were either not at at all known, or but imperfectly, by Aristotle and the Ancients.  
The ARTS in which I instance, are Chemistry, Anatomy, and the Mathematics: The INSTRUMENTS, such as the Microscope, Telescope, Thermometer, Barometer, and the Air-Pump: Some of which were first Invented, all of them exceedingly Improved by the ROYAL SOCIETY.  
To begin with the Consideration of the ARTS mentioned, I observe, That these were very little cultivated or used in Aristotle's Times, or in those following ones in which his Philosophy did most obtain.  
FOr the FIRST, CHEMISTRY, it hath indeed a pretence to the great Hermes for its Author (how truly, I will not dispute): From him 'tis said to have come to the Egyptians, and from them to the Arabians: Among these it was infinitely roingled with vanity and superstitious Devices: But not at all in use with Aristotle and his Sectators. Nor doth it appear, that the Grecians, or the disputing Ages, were conversant in these useful and lueiferous Processes, by which Nature is unwound, and resolved into the Rudiments of its Composition; and by the violence of those Fires it is made confess those latent parts, which, upon less provocation, it would not disclose. Now, as we cannot understand the frame of a Watch, without taking it into pieces; so neither can Nature be well known, without a resolution of it into its beginnings, which certainly may be best of all done by Chemical Methods: By those Inquiries wonderful discoveries are made of their Natures; and Experiments are found out, which are not only full of pleasant surprise and information, but of valuable use, especially in the Practice of Physic; For It directs Medicines less loathsome and far more vigorous, and freeth the Spirits, and purer parts, from the clogging and noxious Appendices of grosser Matter, which not only hinder and disable the Operation, but leave hurtful Dregs in the Body behind them. I confess, that among the Egyptians and Arabians, the Paracelsians, and some other Moderns, Chemistry was very fantastic, unintelligible, and delusive; and the boasts, vanity, and canting of those Spagyrists, brought a scandal upon the Art, and exposed it to suspicion and contempt: but its late Cultivators, and particularly the ROYAL SOCIETY, have refined it from its dross, and made it honest, sober, and intelligible, an excellent Interpreter to Philosophy, and help to common Life. For they have laid aside the Chrysopoietick, the delusory Designs, and vain Transmutations, the Rosie-crucian Vapours, Magical Charms, and Superstitious Suggestions, and formed it into an Instrument, to know the Depths and Efficacies of Nature. And this is no small advantage that we have above the old Philosophers of the Notional Way. And we have another,  
(II.) In the Study, Use, and vast Improvements of ANATOMY, which we find as needful to be known among us, as 'tis wonderful 'twas known so little among the Ancients, whom a fond Superstition deterred from Dissections. For the Anatomising the Bodies of Men was counted barbarous and inhuman in elder Times: And I observe from a Learned Man of our own, That the Romans held it unlawfal to look on the Entrails. Tettullian severely censures an inquisitive Physician of his time for this practice, saying, That he hated Man, that he might know him. Yea, one of the Popes (I take 'twas Boniface 8.) threatens to Excommunicate those, that should do any thing of this (then) abominable nature. And Democritus was fain to excuse his Dissection of Beasts, even to the great Hypocrates. Nor does it appear by any thing extant in the Writings of Galen, that that other Father of Physicians ever made any Anatomy of humane Bodies. Thus shy and unacquainted was Antiquity with this excellent Art, which is one of the most useful in humane Life, and tends mightily to the eviscerating of Nature, and disclosure of the Springs of its Motion. But now in these later Ages, Anatomy hath been a free and general Practice; and particularly in this, It hath received wonderful Improvements from the Endeavours of several worthy Inquisitors, some of them Ingenious Members of the ROYAL SOCIETY, as Sir George Ent, Dr. Glisson, and Dr. Willis. I instance in the most remarkable of their Discoveries briefly; And those I take notice of are, The Valves of the Veins, discovered by Fabricius ab Aquapendente; The Valve at the entrance of the gut Colon, found, as is generally thought, by Bauhinus; The Milky Veins of the Mesentery, by Asellius; The Receptacle of the Chyle, by Pecquet; The Ductus Virsungianus, by Jo. George Wirsung of Paedua; The Lymphatic Vessels, by Dr. Joliffe, Bartholin, and Olaus Rudbeck; The internal Ductus Salivaris in the Maxillary Glandule, by Dr. Wharton, and Dr. Glisson; The external Ductus Salivaris in the conglomerated Parotis, The Ductus of the Cheek, The Glandules under the Tongue, Nose, and Palate, The Vessels in the nameless Glandule of the Eye, and the Tear-Glandule, by Nich. Steno; A new Artery, called Arterea Bronchialis, by Fred. Ruysch. I add, the Origination of those Nerves, which were of old supposed to arise out of the substance of the Brain, but are found by late Anatomists to proceed from the Medulla Oblongata. And though the Succus Nutritius be not yet fully agreed upon by Physicians, yet it hath so much to say for itself, that it may not unreasonably be mentioned among the New Inventions.  
But of all the Modern Discoveries, Wit and Industry have made in the Oeconomy of Humane Nature, the noblest is that of the Circulation of the Blood, which was the Invention of our deservedly-famous Harvey. 'Tis true, the envy of malicious Contemporaries, would have robbed him of the glory of this Discovery, and pretend it was known to Hypocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and others among the Ancients: But whoever considers the Expressions of those Authors, which are said to respect the Circulation, will find, that those who form the Inference, do it by a faculty that makes all kind of Compositions and Deductions, and the same that assists the Enthusiasts of our days, to see so clearly all our Alterations of State and Religion, to the minutest Particulars, in the Revelation of St. John. And perhaps it may be as well concluded from the first Chapter of Genesis, as from the Remains of those Ancients; who, if they had known this great and general Theory, how chance they spoke no more of a thing, which no doubt they had frequent occasions to mention? How came it to be lost without memory among their Followers, who were such superstitious porers upon their Writings? How chance it was not shown to be lodged in those Authors, before the days of Dr. Harvy, when Envy had impregnated and determined the Imaginations of those, who were not willing any thing should be found anew, of which themselves were not the Inventors? But 'tis not only the remotest Ancients, whom time hath consecrated, and distance made venerable, whose Ashes those fond Men would honour with this Discovery: But even much later Authors have had the Glory fastened upon them. For the Invention is by some ascribed to Paulus Venetus; by others, to Prosper Alpinus; and a third sort give it to Andrea's Caesalpinus. For these, though either of them should be acknowledged to be the Author, it will make as much for the design of my Discourse, as if Harvy had the credit; and therefore here I am no otherwise concerned, but to have Justice for that Excellent Man: And the World hath now done right to his Memory, Death having overcome that Envy which dog's living Virtue to the Grave; and his Name rests quietly in the Arms of Glory, while the Pretensions of his Rivals are creeping into darkness and oblivion.  
Thus, I have done with the Instances of Anatomical Advancements, unless I should hitherto refer the late Noble Experiment of Transfusion of the Blood from one living Animal into another, which I think very fit to be mentioned; and I suppose 'tis not improper for this place: Or however, I shall rather venture the danger of impropriety and misplacing, than omit the taking notice of so excellent a Discovery, which no doubt future Ingenuity and Practice, will improve to purposes not yet thought of; and we have very great likelihood of Advantages from it in present prospect.  
For it is concluded, That the greatest part of our Diseases arise either from the scarcity, or malignant temper and corruption of our Blood; in which cases Transfusion is an obvious Remedy; and in the way of this Operation, the peccant Blood may be drawn out, without the danger of too much enfeebling Nature, which is the grand inconvenience of mere Phlebotomies. So that this Experiment may be of excellent use, when Custom and Acquaintance have hardened Men to permit the Practice, in Pleurisies, Cancers, Leprosies, Madness, Ulcers, Smallpox, Dotage, and all suchlike Distempers. And I know not why that of injecting prepared Medicines immediately into the Blood, may not be better and more efficacious, than the ordinary course of Practice: Since this will prevent all the danger of frustration from the loathe of the Stomach, and the disabling, clogging mixtures and alterations they meet with there, and in the Intestines, in which no doubt much of the Spirit and Virtue is lost. But in the way of immediate injection, they are kept entire, all those inconveniences are avoided, and the Operation is like to be more speedy and successful. Both these noble Experiments are the late Inventions of the ROYAL SOCIETY, who have attested the reality of the former, that of Transfusion of Blood, by numerous Trials on several sorts of brute Animals. Indeed the French made the Experiment first upon humane Bodies, of which we have a good account from Monsieur Dennis: But it hath also since been practised with fair and encouraging success, by our Philosophical Society. The other of Injection, if it may be mentioned as a different Invention, was also the product of the same Generous Inventors; though indeed more forward Foreigners have endeavoured to usurp the credit of both. This latter likewise hath succeeded to considerable good effects, in some new Trials that have been made of it in Dantzick, as appears in a Letter written from Dr. Fabritius of that City, and printed in the Philosophical Transactions.  
I proceed now to my THIRD Instance of ARTS, (if I may take leave to use the word in this large sense) which are Advantages for deep search into Nature, and have been considerably advanced by the Industry and culture of late Times, above their ancient Stature. And the Instance was,  
(III.) The MATHEMATICS. That these are mighty helps to Practical and Useful Knowledge, will be easily confessed by all, that have not so much ignorance as to render them incapable of information in these Matters: The Learned Gerard Vossius hath proved it by induction in Particulars: And yet it must be acknowledged, that Aristotle, and the disputing Philosophers of his School, were not much addicted to those noble Inquisitions: For Proclus the Commentator upon Euclid, though he gives a very particular Catalogue of the Elder Mathematicians, yet hath not mentioned Aristotle in that number: And though Diogenes Laertius takes notice of a Book he inscribed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, another, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and a Third, yet extant, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Yet it appears not that these were things of very great value; and Aristotle's Metaphysical procedure, even in Physical Theories, the genius and humour of his Principles, and the airy contentions of his Sect, are great presumptions that this Philosopher was not very Mathematical: And his numerous succeeding Followers, were certainly very little conversant in those Studies. I have elsewhere taken notice, that there is more published by those Disputing Men on some trifling Question about ens Rationis, and their Materia prima than hath been written by their whole number upon all the useful parts of Mathematics and Mechanics. It would require much skill in those Sciences, to draw up the full History of their Advancements; I hear a very accurate Mathematician is upon it: And yet to fill up my Method, I'll adventure at some imperfect Suggestions about the Inventions and Improvements of this kind: And I begin,  
(I.) With Arithmetic, which is the Handmaid to all the other parts of Mathematics. This indeed Pythagoras is said to have brought from the Phoenicians to the Grecians: but we hear no great matter of it till the days of Euclid; not the Euclid that was the Contemporary of Plato, and Hearer of Socrates; but the famed Mathematician of that Name, who was after Aristotle, and at 90 years' distance from the former. This is the first Person among the Ancients, that is recorded by the exact Vossius to have done any thing accurately in that Science. After him it was advanced by Diophantus, methodised by Psellus, illustrated among the Latins by L. Apul●…ius; and in later times much promoted by Cardan, Gemma Frisius, Ramus, Clavius, and divers more modern Artists; among whom I more especially take notice of that Ingenious Scotchman the Lord Napier,  
Who invented the Logarithms, which is a way of computing by Artificial Numbers, and avoiding the tadium of Multiplication and Division. For by this Method all those Operations are performed by Addition and Substraction, which in Natural Numbers were to be done those longer ways. This Invention is of great use in Astronomical Calculations, and it may be applied also to other Accounts. Besides this, the same Learned Lord found an easy, certain, and compendious way of Accounting by Sticks, called Rabdology; as also Computation by Napier's Bones: Both these have been brought to greater perfection by others, since their first Discovery; particularly by Vrsinus and Kepler.  
To them I add the Decimal Arithmettck, which avoids the tedious way of computing by Vulgar Fractions in ordinary Accounts, and Sexagenaries in Astronomy; exceedingly and lately improved by our famous Oughtred, and Dr. Wallis a Member of the ROYAL SOCIETY. If I should here subjoin the Helps this Art hath had from the Works and Endeavours of Anot●…lius, Barlaam, Maximus Planudes, N●…morarius, Floren●…inus Bredonus, Pisanus, Orontius; and in this Age, from those of Adrianus Romanus, Henischius, Cataldus, Malapartius, Keplerus, Briggius, Crugerus, and a vast number reckoned up by Vossius, I should be tedious on this Head; and therefore I pass lightly over it, and proceed,  
(II.) To Algebra, of universal use in all the Mathematical Sciences, in Common Accounts, in Astronomy, in taking Distances and Altitudes, in measuring plain and solid Bodies, and other useful Operations. The first noted Author in this Method was Diophantus, who lived long since the times of Aristotle. He, and those other Ancients that used it, performed their Algebraical Operations by Signs and Characters suited to the several Numbers, and Powers of Numbers, which they had occasion to use in solving Problems: But the later Mathematicians have found a far more neat and easy way, viz. by the Letters of the Alphabet, by which we can solve divers Problems that were too hard for the Ancients, as far as can be discovered by any of their remaining Works. For there were many affected Aequations (as they call them) that did not equally ascend in the Scale of Powers, that could not be solved by the elder Methods; whereas the acute Vieta, a Mathematician of this last Age, affirms, he could resolve any Problem by his own Improvements. Besides him, our excellent Oughtred another, lately mentioned, did much in this way. But Des-Cartes hath outdone both former and later Times, and carried Algebra to that height, that some considering Men think Humane Wit cannot advance it further. I will not say so much; but no doubt he hath performed in it things deserving much acknowledgement, of which we shall hear more in another place. But I proceed,  
(III.) To the Consideration of Geometry, which is so fundamentally useful a Science, that without it we cannot well understand the Artifice of the Omniscient Architect in the composure of the great World, and ourselves. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, was the excellent saying of Plato; and the Universe must be known by the Art whereby it was made. So that what Galileo notes of Aristotle, is a great sign of his defects, viz. That he reprehended his Venerable Master for his Geometrical Sublimities, accusing him that he receded from the solid Methods of Philosophising, through his too much indulging that Study; Which is so far from being likely, that Geometry is little less than necessary to solid and real Philosophy. And therefore Plato admitted none to his School, but those that were acquainted with that Science: Which practice the mentioned excellent Modern, notes to be directly opposite to the Peripatetic Genius; and some he knew great Men of that way, dehorted their Disciples from it; which he introduceth one applauding as a wise Counsel, since Geometry would detect and shame the futilities of that Notional way. But not to take too large a compass, this is certain, That Geometry is a most useful and proper Help in the Affairs of Philosophy and Life. 'Tis almost as clear from those former intimations, that Aristotle was not much inclined that way; and we know that his late Sectators, have very seldom applied themselves to Geometrical Disquisitions.  
The Result of which is, We must expect the Advantages of this Science, from the declining of his and their Empire; and I need not say expect it, they are both in present view. And if after this any do require accounts of the Improvements Geometry hath received, since the foundation of that Tyranny by the Man of STAGYRA, I shall offer the best I have; and though I am conscious that they will be scant and defective, yet I hope sufficient for my present purpose.  
I note then from the celebrated Vossius, That Euclid was the first that brought Geometry into a Method, and more accurately demonstrated those Principles, which before were scattered among the Greeks and Egyptians, and not so cogently or carefully proved. And Proclus reckons this famous Man as the Compiler and Demonstrator, not as the Inventor of the Elements; and two of these Books (viz. 14, & 15.) are ascribed to Apollonius Pergaeus, who was his nearest Successor in Fame for Mathematical Abilities. This Geometrician improved the Science by four Books of conics, published of old; and three more have been lately (in the year 1661.) translated out of an Arabic Manuscript in the Duke of Tuscany's Library, and are now abroad. This Manuscript Jacob Golius procured out of the East. Besides which, this Magnus Geometra, as he was called, illustrated Euclid by his Learned Commentary upon him. But Archimedes of Syracuse, was a Person of the greatest renown for Geometrical and Mechanical Performances; concerning which, Polybius, Valerius, Plutarch, Livy, and others, have recorded prodigious things: This great Wit carried Geometry from general and idle Speculation, to the use and benefit of Mankind; whereas before him it was an ancient and perverse Opinion, That this Knowledge ought not to be brought down to vulgar Service, but kept up in abstractive Contemplations: upon which score Archytas and Eudoxus, those great Geometricians before Euclid, were scared from the Mechanical and Organical Methods, to the great hindrance of beneficial Improvements in that way. But the excellent Syracusian understood, that this Science is not debased, but promoted and advanced by such Accommodations; and evinced the usefulness and excellency of Geometry, in his admirable Paradox proposed before King Hieron (Datis viribus datum pondus tollere) [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉]. This Mathematician flourished 160 years after the time of Aristotle, who hath the name of the most Ancient that writ in Mechanics, though that Book of his be not mentioned, either by Archimedes, Athenaeus, Hero, or Pappus, Mechanical Authors; and Cardan and Patricius affirm that Work to be none of Aristotl's: Whose ever it was, the Performance hath praise from the Learned, as explaining the general Causes of Mechanical Geometry. But Archimedes was more practical and particular: And though Plutarch in the Life of Marcellus affirms he writ nothing; yet the contrary is abundantly proved by Gerard Vossius, who hath shown that the Books extant under his Name, that contain so many great Maxims of Mechanics, are genuine; and both Strabo and Pappus mention them as his. The Design of Archimedes, of combining Mechanism and Geometric Theary, was after happily promoted by Hero the Elder of Alexandria, who invented those ingenuous Automata, that move by Air and Wires; concerning which he writ a Book that was Translated by Fredericus Commandinus, as also he did another De Machinis Bellicis, by which he well improved Geometric Meohanicks: And Pappus particularly celebrates his exactness in solving the Deliaick Problem, De Cubo duplicando, acknowledging that he took most of his own Accounts about that Matter, from that exquisite Man. Next him, I mention Theodosius of Tripoli, who very much improved Geometry by his three Books De Figura Sphaerica, which afforded great assistance to Ptolemy, Pappus, Proclus, and Theon, in their Mathematical Endeavours. Menelaus' also, who lived in Trajan's time, contributed very much to the perfecting the Doctrine of Sphaericks, as Vitellio well knew, who was famous for those things which he borrowed from that Author. The Performances also of Ctesibius, who lived in the time of Ptolomeus Physcon, are much celebrated by Plivy. He invented many things in Hydraulicks, and according to Atheneus, he was the first Contriver of Musical Organs. These were Mechanical: but Geminus Rhodius the Master of Proclus Lycius, applied Logic to Geometry, out of particular Elements abstracting Vniversals. He demonstrated, That there are only Three similar Species of all Lines, viz. Right, Circular, and Cylindrical: And Perseus following his steps, enriched Geometry with the Invention of three kinds of Crooked Lines, the Parabole, Hyperbole, and Elipsis; for which he expressed his extatick joy, as Thales, Pythagoras, and Archimedes did upon like occasions, in a Sacrifice to the Gods. But to be briefer, Pappus improved the Sphoericks; Theon more methodically digested the Elements of Euclid; Serenus Antinsensis discovered, that the Section of a right Cylindre, is the same with the Elipsis of a right Cone; Copernicus improved the Doctrine of Triangles; Ramus corrected and supplied Euclid, where his Principles were defective; Maurolicus writ first of Secant Lines, Clavius much illustrated and promoted the Doctrine of Tangents, Secants, Triangles, Right Lines, and Sphaericks, besides what he did in his Comment upon Euclid, I might mention with These, the worthy Performances of Gusanus, Pitiscus, Snellius, Ambrose Rhodius, Kepler, Franciseus à Schoten, and others, who contributed very eminently to the Perfections and Advancements of Geometry, and were lare Men.  
But none have done in it like the Excellent Persons whom I reserve for my last mention; The chief are, Vieta, Des-Cartes, and Dr. Wallis.  
To my account of whose Performances, I must premise, That no great things can be done in Geometry, without the Analytical Method; And though some Learned Men conceive the Ancients were acquainted with this way of resolving Problems, yet their skill in it went no higher than the Quadratick Order of Aequations, which They demonstrated by Circles and Right Lines, which They called Loca Plana: but they were able to do nothing in the Cubical Aequations, or any of the Superior Orders; though they endeavoured to cover their defects in this Art, by recourse ad Locos Solidos, (viz. Conic Sections) and Lineares, as they called them, such as the Helix, Conchoeides, and those of like nature. But those tortous and curved Lines being described Mechanically by Compound Motions, the Problems resolved by them, are performed Organically by the Hand and Eye, not Geometrically.  
This was the State of the Analytick Art, as long as Learning flourished in Greece; when That was subdued by the Barbarians, their Learning with their Country passed to the Arabians, and also to the Persians, as we have it from Hottinger and Bullialdus: But these Successors of the Greeks did not advance their Learning beyond the imperfect Stature in which it was delivered to them. In that condition it remained till Cardan and Tartaglia, who made some small addition towards the perfection of it; For they gave some Rules for solving Cubical Aequations, which were certain in some cases, but not in all. Their Invention some other Mathematical Men endeavoured to advance, laying down Rules for solving some Cubick and Biquadratick Aequations; but could never find an universal way, that might reach all such: Yea indeed they utterly despaired, and held it impossible. At length appears Vieta, who by inventing the Method of Extracting Roots in the most numerous Aequations, and by converting the Signs used by the Ancients into Letters, brought Algebra to a very great perfection, as I have noted above; and by enriching the Analytical Art, by the Accessions of his Exigetice Numerosa, and Logistice Speciosa, he hath contributed infinite helps to Geometry. After him, divers other Learned Men polished and adorned his Discourses; among whom I mention chiefly our Countrymen Harriot and Oughtred, who altered Vieta's Notes to advantage, and invented Canons to direct our Operations in the Extracting of Roots, both in pure and adsected Aequations.  
But after these had thus improved the Analytick Art, and well assisted Geometry by it, Renatus Des-Cartes appears, who in a few Pages, opens a way to mighty Performances: He shows us how all the Problems of Geometry may be brought to such terms, that we shall need nothing to the Construction and Demonstration of them, but the knowledge of the length of certain right Lines; and that, as all the Operations of Arithmetic are performed by Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication, Division, and Extraction of Roots (which is a species of Division). So in Geometry, for the preparation of Lines that they may be known, nothing needs more to be done, than that others be added to them, or subtracted from them; or if the Line be single, (which that it may be the better referred to Numbers, may be called Unity) and beside that, two other Lines, that a Fourth be found which shall have the same proportion to one of these Lines, that the other hath to Unity, which is the same with Multiplication; or else, that by them a Fourth be found, which may have the same proportion to one of them, which Unity hath to the other, which is the same with Division; or lastly, That there be found between Unity, and some other Right Line, two or more mean Proportionals, which is the same thing with the Extraction of Quadratick and Cubick Roots. And that he may justify the introducing of Terms Arithmetical into Geometry, he observes, That the avoiding thereof was an occasion of much perplexity and obscurity in the Geometry of the Ancients; of which he could give no other conjecture, but because they did not sufficiently understand the affinity and cognation of those Sciences. But if I should intend an exact History of all his Performances, I must transcribe Him; for he hath said so much in little, that 'tis impossible to abridge those his close Composures. I shall therefore only hint some principal things referring to his Writings for the rest.  
And I take notice first, That he hath proposed an Universal Method for the Solution of all Problems; not only those propounded in Right Lines, Plains, and Solids: but also all that are made in Angles, a thing of most general Service in all parts of Mathematics. By It he resolves the famous Proposition in Pappus, which was too hard for Euclid, Apollonius, and all the Ancients. He discourses the nature of crooked Lines, and shows which are fit to be used in Geometrical Demonstrations; Gives Rules for the place where to apply ourselves in the Demonstration of any Problem; and tells us, That a Problem after it is brought to an Aequation, and reduced to its least terms, and the unknown Quantity is Quadratick, or of two Dimensisions, that then it may be demonstrated by a Right Line and Circles: but if the Aequation, after it is reduced to its least Terms, leave the unknown Quantity, Cubick or Biquadratick, it must be demonstrated by some one of the Conic Sections. Whereas again, if after the Aequation reduced, the unknown Quantity remain of five or six Dimensions, or more, in infinitum, than the Demonstration must be performed by Lines more and more compound, according to the degree of Composition in the unknown Quantity of the Aequation. But because the way by Lines is perplexed and tedious, he gives Rules to reduce Aequations of many Dimensions, to fewer. He shows how to fill up Defects, when any Terms are wanting in the Aequation; how to convert the false Roots into true, to avoid Fractions, and to lessen Aequations. He hath demonstrated, by a Circle and Parabole, the famous Problems so much agitated among the Ancients, viz. the Trisection of an Angle, and the finding two mean Proportionals between two Lines given, with more brevity and expedition than any that went before him. And this shall suffice by way of intimation, concerning that Prince of Mathematicians and Philosophers.  
Since him, others have improved this Method: Schotenius hath demonstrated the Loca Plana of Apollonius: Hadderius hath added Inventions of use and pleasant Speculation in his Tract of Reduction of Aequations. Florimundus de Beaune hath writ ingenious and profitable things, de Natura & Limitibus Aequationum. But 'twould be endless to attempt full Accounts of the Modern Advancements of this Science, or indeed those accessions of growth it hath had since Vieta. And whoever should go about it, must reckon to begin anew as soon as he hath finished what he intended, since Geometry is improving daily.  
I shall therefore add no more here, but only do right to an excellent Person of our own Nation, Dr. Wallis, a Member of the ROYAL SOCIETY, to whom Geometry is exceedingly indebted for his rare Discoveries in that Science. Particularly, he hath propounded a Method for the measuring of all kind of crooked Lines, which is highly ingenious; and put an end to all future Attempts about Squaring the Circle, which hath puzzled and befooled so many Mathematicians, that have spent their thoughts and time about it. This he hath brought to effect as it near as can be done, and showed the exact performance by rational Numbers impossible: He hath proposed excellent ways for the measuring all kinds of Plains, and all multangular and solid Bodies. But 'tis time now to proceed to the consideration of the next Mathematical Science, Viz.  
(4.) Astronomy, one of the grandest and most magnific of all those that lie within the compass of Natural Inquiry. I shall not look back to its beginning among the Chaldaeans, Egyptians, and eldest Grecians, in which Times it was but rude and imperfect, in comparison to its modern Advancements. For the great Men among the Greeks are taken much notice of, but for very ordinary and trite things in this Science: As Anaximander Milesius, for teaching, That the Earth was Globous, and the Centre of the World not bigger than the Sun: Anaximines for affirming, That the Moon shone but with a borrowed Light; That the Sun and It were Eclipsed by the Earth's interposal; and, That the Stars move round our Globe. And Pythagoras was the first that noted the obliquity of the Ecliptic. This Philosopher indeed was a Person of a vast reach, and said things in Astronomy very agreeable to late Discoveries: But Aristotle made very odd Schemes, not at all corresponding with the Phaenomena of the Heavens, as appears from his Hypotheses of Solid Orbs, Epicycles, Excentrics, Intelligences, and such other ill-contrived Fancies. Besides which, if I should descend to consider his now palpable Mistakes about the nature of Comets, the Galaxy, the Sphere of Fire under the Moon, and numerous other such, I should oblige myself to a large ramble. Wherefore to be brief in these Notes, I observe, That after Aristotle, Astronomy was cultivated and improved by Theophrastus, Aratus, Aristarchus Samius, Archimedes, Geminus, Menelaus, Theon, Hipparchus, Claudius Ptolomaeus, and many others among the Greeks.  
Among later Authors, considerable things have been done in this way by both Latins and Arabians: To omit the latter, I shall give you some particular Instances of the other.  
Johannes de Sacro Bosco, ingeniously and methodically explained the Doctrine of the Sphere: Thebit first found the Motion of Trepidation: Regiomontanus published the first Ephemerideses: and did excellent things in his Theoricks of the Planets. Wernerus stated the greatest Declination of the Sun. Albertus Pighius directed the way to find Aequinoxes and Solstices: Baersius framed perpetual Tables of the Longitudes and Latitudes of the Planets: Copernicus restored the Hypothesis of Pythagoras and Philolaus, and gave far more neat and consistent Accounts of the Phaenomena: Joachimus made Ephemerideses according to the Copernican Doctrine: Clavius invented a most useful demonstrative Astrolabe, and writ an exquisite Comment upon Sacro Bosco.  
But I conclude the last Century with the Noble Tycho Brahe, who performed the great Work of restoring the Fixed Stars to their true places, the assignation of which before him, was rather by guess, than any competent Rules, and the mistakes here, were the very Root and Foundation of most Errors in Astronomy. For which reason it was, that Copernicus left that earnest advice to his Scholar Joachimus, that he should apply himself to the restitution of the Fixed Stars; for till this were done, there could be no hopes of attaining to the true places of the Planets, nor doing any thing to purpose in the whole Science. This engaged the Noble Tycho to this Enterprise, and he made it the Foundation of all the rest: The Method he used is described by Gassendus. By the help of this noble Performance he reform the elder Astronomical Tables, both the Ptolomaick and Copernican. And from his Observations of the new Star of 1572, and six others in his time, he asserted Comets into their place among Heavenly Bodies, shattering all the Solid Orbs to pieces; And he hath done it with such cleaer conviction, that even the Jesuits, whose thraldom to the Church of Rome, deters them from closing with the Motion of Earth, confess a necessity of repairing to some other Hypothesis than that of Ptolemy, and Aristotle. I might add to this, That this generous Nobleman invented and framed such excellent Astronomical Instruments, as were for use and convenience far beyond any of former Times: Himself hath a Treatise concerning them. He hath also made exquisite Tables of the difference that Refractions make in the appearance of the Stars, and done more great things for Astronomical Improvement, than many Ages that were before him; for which reason I could not pardon myself in a curt mention of so glorious an Advancer of this Science.  
The next Age after him, which is ours, hath made excellent use of his Discoveries, and those of his Elder, the famed Copernicus; and raised Astronomy to the noblest height and Perfection that ever yet it had among Men. It would take up a Volume to describe, as one ought, all the particular Discoveries: But my Design will permit but a short mention: Therefore briefly; I begin with Galileo, the reputed Author of the famous Telescope; but indeed the glory of the first Invention of that excellent Tube, belongs to Jacobus Metius of Amsterdam: but 'twas improved by the noble Galileo, and he first applied it to the Stars; by which incomparable Advantage, he discovered the Nature of the Galaxy, the 21 New Stars that compose the Nebulosa in the Head of Orion, the 36 that conspire to that other in Cancer, the Ansulae Saturni, the Asseclae of Jupiter, of whose Motions he composed an Ephemeris. By these Lunulae 'tis thought that Jupiter's distance from the Earth may be determined, as also the distance of Meridian's, which would be a thing of much use, since this hath always been measured by Lunar Eclipses, that happen but once or twice a year; whereas opportunities of Calculating by the occultations of these new Planets will be frequent, they recurring about 480 times in the year. Besides, (to hasten) Galileo discovered the strange Phases of Saturn, one while ob●…long, and then round; the increment and decrement of Venus, like the Moon; the Spots in the Sun, and its Revolution upon its own Axis; the Moon's libration, collected from the various position of its Maculae; and divers other wonderful and useful Raritics, that were strangers to all Antiquity: Shortly after Galileo, appears Christopherus Scheiner, who by greater Telescopes viewed the Sun with a curled and unequal Superficies, and in or near the Hori●…n of an Elliptical Figure. He found also, That that supposed uniform Globe of Light, was of a different complexion in its several parts; some brighter than the main Body, as the Faculae, others darker, as the Maculae. He made more than 2000 Observations of ●…m, and described their Number, Magnitude, Situation, Figure, and Revolutions. Kepler is next to be mentioned, who first proposed the Elliptical Hypothesis, made very accurate and luciferous Observations about the Motions of Mars, and writ an Epitome of the Copernican Astronomy, in the clearest and most pers●…icuous Method, containing the Discoveries of others, and divers considerable ones of his own; not to mention his Ephemerideses, and Book about Comets. Ant. Maria Shirlaeus, with a new Telescope of a larger Diameter than ordinary, discovered five other Stars more remote from Jupiter than his Satellites, and a kind of vapid Atmosphere about that Planet. Franciscus Fontana observed the same Star, with nine others, never leaving it more than ten of its Diameters; and in 1636, and 1643. with 8. Anno 1645. with 5, 1646. with 7. on other days with 6. varying their distances one to another, and not to be seen about Mars or Saturn, nor without extending the Telescope more than was fitting for Fixed Stars. These Satellites are observed to suffer a defection of their Light, when Jupiter interposeth between them and the Sun; whence it is inferred, That they have their Light from It, and that Jupiter hath none of his own to impart to them. To be brief, Longomontanus described the World according to all the Hypotheses of Ptolemy, Copernicus, and Tycho Brahe: Jansonius Blaeu made far more perfect and exact Celestial Globes than any were extant before: Gassendus writ judiciously of the Stars about Jupiter, and of Mercury in the Sun, and gave the World most excellent Astronomieal Institutions: Ishmael Bullialdus enriched the Science with a new Method, to find and easily compute the Paralaxes of Solar Ellipses: Hevelius drew a Graphical Description of the Moon in all its Phases, as it appeared in the Telescope, accurately delineating its Spots, and showing the inequality and mountainous protuberances of its Surface, which lends Light to a great Theory. Both these last named are Fellows of the ROYAL SOCIETY. Of the Selenography of Hevelius, Ricciolus made an Improvement, both as to the Number, Figure, Magnitude, Site, Colour of the Maculae, and the Eminencies, Profundities, and Asperities of the Lunar Superficies. Martinus Hortensius found Mercury to have variety of Phases, like the Moon; as, now Horned, then Gibbous, and at other times Round. But I conclude this Account with the most Worthy and Learned Prelate Dr. Seth Ward, now Lord Bishop of Sarum, who among his other excellent Performances in Astronomy, hath demonstratively proved the Elliptical Hypothesis, which is the most plain and simple, and performed by fewer Operations than either of the other. This indeed was first discoursed of by Kepler, advanced by Bullialdus, but demonstrated by this accomplished and venerable Bishop, an Honourable Member of the ROYAL SOCIETY.  
I come next (5.) To consider the Optics, whose Improvements are of great importance in the Matters of general Philosophy and humane Life; since the informations of Sense are the ground of both, and this Science rectifies and helps the noblest of them. Concerning it, there was once a Book of Aristotle's extant, according to Laertius: but it hath submitto Time. Since him, this Science hath been cultivated by Euclid, and the celebrated Archimedes, who is said to have done strange things by it, upon the Ships of Marcellus: As Proclus who improved the Archimedian Artifices, destroyed a Fleet by his Specula Vstoria, that besieged Constantinople. Ptolemy of Alexandria made considerable Improvements of Optics; and Alhazenus the Arabian, is famous for what he did in It. From thief, Vitellio drew his, and advanced the Science by his own Wit, and their Helps. Stevinus corrected Euclid, Alhazen, and Vitellio, in some fundamental Propositions that were mistakes; and in their room substituted considerable Inventions of his own. Roger Bacou our famed Countryman (whom Picus Mirandula calls the Phoenix of his Age, and Vossius, one Learned to a Miracle) writ acutely of Optics. He was accused of Magic to Pope Clement iv. and thereupon imprisoned: But the Accusation was founded on nothing but his skill in Mathematics, and the ignorance of his Accusers. After these, the Dioptrics were improved by Kepler, Gassendus, Mersennus, and the noble and incomparable Des-Cartes, who hath said the most clear, useful, and improvable things about it, that ever were extant on the Subject. But nothing hath so much advanced the Science, as the invention of the Telescope by Metius; and that other of the Microscope, concerning which I have to say in the following Instances. I pass therefore to the last I shall mention in the Mathematics, which is,  
(VI) Geography. In this the Ancients were exceedingly defective. And Aristotle knew the World, by the same Figure by which his Scholar conquered it. 'Tis noted by the ingenious Varenius, that the most general and necessary things in this Science were then unknown; as, The Habitableness of the Torrid Zone; The flux and reflux of the Sea; The diversity of Winds; The Polar Property of the Magnet; The true Dimension of the Earth. They wanted Descriptions of remote Countries, concerning which both the Greeks and Romans had very fabulous Relations. They knew not that the Earth was encompassed by the Sea, and that it might be Sailed round. They were totally ignorant of America, and both the North and South parts of this Hemisphere; yea, and understood very little of the remoter places of their own Asia: Japan, the Java's, the Philippics, and Borneo, were either not at all known, or exceeding imperfectly of old: But all these are familiar to the latter Times: Mexico and Peru, and the vast Regions of those mighty Empires, with the many Isles of the Great Sea are disclosed: The Frozen North, the Torrid Line, and formerly unknown South, are visited, and by their numerous Inhabitants found not to be so inhospitable and unkind to Men, as Antiquity believed. The Earth hath been rounded by Magellan, Drake, and Candish: The great Motion of the Sea is vulgar, and its Varieties enquiring into every day: The diversities of Winds stated, and better understood: The Treasure of hidden Virtues in the Loadstone found and used. The Spicy Islands of the East, as also those of the remote South and North, frequented, and the knowledge of that People and those Countries transmitted to us, with their Riches; The most distant Parts being travelled and described. Our Navigation is far greater, our Commerce is more general, our Charts more exact, our Globes more accurate, our Travels more remote, our Reports more intelligent and sincere; and consequently our Geography far more perfect, than it was in the elder Times of Polybius and Possidonius, yea than in those of Ptolemy, Strabo, and Pomponius Mela, who lived among the Caesars. And if it was so short in the flourishing Times of the Roman Empire, how was it before in the days of Aristotle, and the Grecians? We have an Instance of it in the Great Macedonian, who thought the Bounds of his Conquests to be the end of the World; when there were Nations enough beyond him to have eaten up the Conqueror with his proud and triumphant Armies. So that here also Modern Improvements have been great; and He will think so, that shall compare the Geographical Performances of Gemma Frisius, Mercator, Ortelius, Stevinus, Bertius, and Guil. Blaeu, with the best Remains of the most celebrated Geographers of the more ancient Ages.  
Thus I have touched upon some of the Improvements of the ARTS that search into the recesses of Nature, with which latter Ages have assisted Philosophical Inquiries. And in these I see I have struck farther than I was aware into the account of those things also, which lead us to the grosser Phaenomena; and my remarks about Geography are all of that nature. However I shall not alter my Method; but after I have discoursed the Instruments I mentioned for Useful Knowledge, I shall consider somewhat of NATURAL HISTORY, which reports the Appearances, and is fundamentally necessary to all the Designs of Science. As for the INSTRUMENTS then, that are next, before I come to the Notes I intent concerning them, I observe, That  
The Philosophy that must signify either for Light or Use, must not be the work of the Mind turned in upon itself, and only conversing with its own Idaea's; but It must be raised from the Observations and Applications of Sense, and take its Accounts from Things as they are in the sensible World. The Illustrious Lord Bacon hath noted this as the chief cause of the unprofitableness of the former Methods of Knowledge, viz. That they were but the Exercises of the Mind, making Conclusions, and spinning out Notions from its own native Store; from which way of proceeding nothing but Dispute and Air could be expected. 'Twas the fault that Great Man found in the Ancients, That they flew presently to general Propositions, without staying for a due information from Particulars, and so gradually advancing to Axioms: Whereas the Knowledge, from which any thing is to be hoped, must be laid in Sense, and raised not only srom some few of its ordinary Informations; but Instances must be aggregated, compared, critically inspected, and examined; singly, and in consort: In order to which Performances our Senses must be aided; for of themselves they are too narrow for the vastness of things, and too short for deep Researches: They make us very defective and unaccurate Reports, and many times very deceitful and fallacious ones: I say therefore, they must be assisted with Instruments, that may strengthen and rectify their Operations. And in these we have mighty advantages over Aristotle and the Ancients; so that much greater things may well be expected from our Philosophy, than could ever have been performed by theirs; though we should grant them all the superiority of Wit and Understanding their fondest Admirers would ascribe to those Sages: For a weak hand can move more weight by the help of Springs, Wheels, Levers, and other Mechanic Powers, than the strongest could do without them: And that we really have these Advantages, must be shown by Instance: I mentioned Five that are considerable to that purpose, which I took notice of among many others; and they were the Telescope, Microscope, Thermometer, Barometer, and Air Pump.  
(I.) The Telescope is the most excellent Invention that ever was, for assisting the Eye in remote Discoveries. The distance of the Heavens is so vast, that our unaided Senses can give us but extremely imperfect Informations of that Upper World; And the Speculations that Antiquity hath raised upon them, have for the most part been very mean, and very false: But these excellent Glasses bring the Stars nearer to us, and acquaint us better with the immense Territories of Light: They give us more Phaenomena, and truer Accounts; disperse the shadows and vain Images of the twilight of naked Sense, and make us a clearer and larger prospect: By these Advantages they enlarge our Thoughts, and show us a more magnificent Representation of the Universe: So that by them the Heavens are made more amply to declare the Glory of God, and we are helped to nobler, and better-grounded Theories: I have mentioned in my Account of the Advance of Astronomy some of the most remarkable Discoveries that have been made by these Tubes, which exceedingly transcend all the Imaginations of elder Times; and by the further improvement of them, other things may be disclosed as much beyond all ours. And the present Philosophers are so far from desiring that Posterity should sit down contented with their Discoveries and Hypotheses, that they are continually solicitous for the gaining more helps to themselves, and those that shall follow, for a further progress into the knowledge of the Phaenomena, and more certain judgements upon them. So that these Glasses are exceedingly bettered since their Invention by Metius, and application to the Heavens by Galileo; and several ingenious Members of the ROYAL SOCIETY are now busy about improving them to a greater height: What success and informations we may expect from the Advancements of this Instrument, it would perhaps appear Romantic and ridiculous to say; As, no doubt, to have talked of the Spots in the Sun, and vast inequalities in the Surface of the Moon, and those other Telescopical Certainties, before the Invention of that Glass, would have been thought fantastic and absurd: I dare not therefore mention our greatest hopes: but this I adventure, That 'tis not unlikely but Posterity may by those Tubes, when they are brought to higher degrees of perfection, find a sure way to determine those mighty Questions, Whether the Earth move? or, the Planets are inhabited? And who knoweth which way the Conclusions may fall? And 'tis probable enough, that another thing will at last be found out, in which this lower World is more immediately concerned, by Telescopical Observations, which is, the most desired Invention of Longitudes; upon which must needs ensue yet greater Improvements of Navigation, and perhaps the Discovery of the North-West Passage, and the yet unknown South: Whatever may be thought of these Expectations by vulgar and narrow Minds, whose Theories and Hopes are confined by their Senses, those that consider, that one Experiment discovered to us the vast America, will not despair. But 'tis time to pass from this, to a second Modern Aid, whereby our Sight is assisted, which is,  
(II.) The Microscope: The Secrets of Nature are not in the greater Masses, but in those little Threads and Springs, which are too subtle for the grossness of our unhelped Senses; and by this Instrument our eyes are assisted to look into the minutes and subtleties of things, to discern the otherwise invisible Schematis●…s and Structures of Bodies, and have an advantage for the finding out of Original Motions; To perceive the exactness and curiosity of Nature in all its Composures; And from thence take sensible Evidence of the Art and Wisdom that is in its Contrivance; To disclose the variety of living Creatures that are shut up from our bare Senses, and open a kind of other World unto us, which its littleness kept unknown: This Instrument hath been exceedingly improved of late, even to the magnifying of Objects many thousand times; and divers useful Theories have been found and explicated by the notices it hath afforded; as appears by the Microscopical Writings of Dr. Power and Mr. Hooke, Members of the ROYAL SOCIETY.  
But (III.) The Thermometer was another Instrument I mentioned, which discovers all the small unperceivable variations in the heat or coldness of the Air, and exhibits many rare and luciferous Phaenomena, which may help to better Informations about those Qualities, than yet we have any. And as to this, I observe with the great Verulam, and the other Bacon the Illustrious Mr. boil, That Heat and Cold are the right and left hand of Nature: The former is the great Instrument of most of her Operations; and the other hath its Interest: And yet the Philosophy of Aristotle hath neither done, nor as much as attempted any thing toward the Discovery of their Natures; but contented itself with the jejune, vulgar, and general description, That Heat is a Quality that gathereth together things of a like nature, and severs those that are unlike; and Cold congregates both. But now if we will know any thing deeply in the business of Rarefaction and Condensation, the Doctrine of Meteors, and other material Affairs of Nature, other Accounts about these things must be endeavoured; and the bare informations of our Senses are not exact enough for this purpose; for their Reports in this kind are various and uncertain, according to the temper and disposition of our Bodies, and several unobserved accidental Mutations that happen in them. This Instrument therefore hath been invented to supply their Defects; and it gives far more constant and accurate, though perhaps not always infallible Relations: but the justest are afforded by the Sealed Thermometer. And besides the uses of this Instrument I suggested, it will help very much in framing the History of Wether, which may be applied to many excellent Purposes of Philosophy, and Services of Life.  
But (IV.) The Barometer is another late Instrument very helpful to Useful Knowledge: That there is gravity even in the Air itself, and that that Element is only comparatively light, is now made evident and palpable by Experience, though Aristotle and his Schools held a different Theory: And by the help of Quicksilver in a Tube, the way is found to measure all the degrees of Compression in the Atmosphere, and to estimate exactly any accession of weight, which the Air receives from Winds, Clouds, and Vapours: To have said in Elder Times, That Mankind should light upon an Invention whereby those Bodies might be weighed, would certainly have appeared very wild and extravagant; and it will be so accounted for some time yet, till Men have been longer, and are better acquainted with this Instrument: For we have no reason to believe it should have better luck than the Doctrine of the Circulation, the Theory of Antipodes, and all great Discoveries in their first Proposals: 'Tis impossible to persuade some of the Indians that live near the heats of the Line, that there is any such thing as Ice in the World; but if you talk to them of Water made hard and consistent by Cold, they'll laugh at you as a notorious Romancer: And those will appear as ridiculous among the most of us, who shall affirm it possible to determine any thing of the weight of the Wind or Clouds: But Experience turns the laugh upon the confident incredulity of the Scoff●…r; and he that will not believe, needs no more for his conviction, than the labour of a Trial; Let him then fill a Tube of Glass of some Feet in length with Quicksilver; and having sealed one end, let him stop the other with his Finger, and immerge that which is so stopped into a Vessel of Mercury, the Tube being perpendicularly erected; let him then subtract his Finger, and he will perceive the Quick silver to descend from the Tube into the subjacent Vessel, till it comes to 29 Digits or thereabouts; there, after some Vibrations, it ordinarily rests: The reason that this remainder of the Mercury doth not descend also, is, because such a Mercurial Cylinder is just equiponderant to one of the insumbent Atmosphere that leans upon the Quicksilver in the Vessel, and so hinders a further descent. It is concluded therefore, That such a Cylinder of the Air as presses upon the Mercury in the Vessel, is of equal weight to about 29 Digits of that ponderous Body in the Tube. Thus it is when the Air is in its ordinary temper: But Vapours, Winds, and Clouds, alter the Standard, so that the Quicksilver sometimes falls, sometimes rises in the Glass, proportionably to the greater or less accession of gravity and compression the Air hath received from any of those alterations; and the Degree of Increase beyond the Standard is the measure of the additional gravity. This Experiment was the Invention of Torricellius, and used to little more purpose at first, but to prove a Vacuum in Nature; and the deserted part of the Glass-Tube was by many thought an absolute void, which I believe is a mistake: But it hath been since improved to this design of weighing the degrees of compression in the Air; a thing that may signify much, in giving us to understand its temper in several Places, on Hills and in Caves, in divers Regions and Climates, which may tend to the disclosing many excellent Theories and Helps in Humane Life. And the Air is so Catholic a Body, and hath so great an influence upon all others, and upon ours, that the advantage of such an Instrument, for the better acquainting us with its nature, must needs be very considerable, and a good Aid to general Philosophy. And who yet knows how far, and to what Discoveries this Invention may be improved? The World a long time only rudely stared upon the Wonders of the Loadstone, before its use was found for the advantage of Navigation; and 'tis not impossible, but that future Times may derive so much benefit one way or other from this Invention, as may equal its esteem to that of the Compass. The ROYAL SOCIETY, by their Care and Endeavours in the using this Instrument, give us hopes, that they will let none of its useful Applications to escape us: And I know not whether we may not mention it as the first great benefit we have from it, that it was an occasion of the Invention of Mr. boil's famous Pneumatick Engine: And this is the other Instrument I noted, and called  
(V.) The Air-Pump: concerning the usefulness of which, that excellent Person himself hath given the best Accounts, in his Discourse of Physico-Mechanical Experiments made in that Engine, by which he hath discovered and proved a rare and luciferous Theory, viz. the Elastic Power or Spring of the Air, and by this, hath put to flight that odd Fancy of the Fuga Vacui; and shown, that the strange Effects which use to be ascribed to that general and obscure cause, do arise from the native self-expansion of the Air. The extent of which Elastical Expansion, he hath found divers ways to measure by his Engine, which also discovers the Influence the Air hath on Flame, Smoke, and Fire; That it hath none in Operations Magnetical; That it is probably much interspersed in the Pores of Water, and compressed by the incumbent Atmosphere, even in those elose retreats; What Operation the exsuction of the Air hath on other Liquors, as Oil, Wine, Spirit of Vinegar, Milk, Eggs, Spirit of Urine, Solution of Tartar, and Spirit of Wine; The gravity and expansion of the Air under Water; The interest the Air hath in the vibrations of Pendulums, and what it hath to do in the propagation of Sounds; That Fumes and Vapours ascend by reason of the gravity of the Ambient, and not from their own positive levity; The nature of Suction, the cause of Filtration, and the rising of Water in Siphons'; The nature of Respiration, and the Lungs, illustrated by trials made on several kinds of Animals, and the interest the Air hath in the Operations of Corosive Liquors: These, and many more suchlike beneficial Observations and Discoveries, hath that great Man made by the help of his Pneumatick Engine; and there is no doubt but more, and perhaps greater things will be disclosed by it, when future ingenuity and diligence hath improved and perfected this Invention. (For what great thing was absolute and perfect in its first rise and beginning?) And 'tis like this Instrument hereafter will be used and applied to things yet unthought of, for the advancement of Knowledge, and the conveniences of Life.  
THus I have performed the first part of my promise, by showing what Advantages the latter Ages, and particularly the ROYAL SOCIETY have, for deep search into things both by Arts and Instruments newly invented or improved, above those enjoyed by Aristotle, and the Ancients. I am next,  
(II.) To recount what Aids it hath received from our better acquaintance with the Phaenomena. For this I must consider NATURAL HISTORY more particularly, which is the Repository wherein these are lodged: How this may be compiled in the best order, and to the best advantage, is most judiciously represented by the Immortal Lord Bacon; and to show how highly It hath been advanced in modern Times; I need say little more, than to amass, in a brief Recollection, some of the Instances of newly-discovered Phaenomena, which are scattered under the Heads of the Arts and Instruments I have discoursed, with the Addition of some others: As,  
In the HEAVENS, those of the Spots and Dinettick motion of the Sun, the mountainous protuberances and shadows in the Body of the Moon, about nineteen Magnitudes more of Fixed Stars, the Lunulae of Jupiter, their mutual Eclipsing one another, and its turning round upon its own Axis; the Ring about Saturn, and its shadow upon the Body of that Star; the Phases of Venus, the increment and decrement of Light among the Planets, the appearing and disappearing of Fixed Stars, the Altitude of Comets, and nature of the Via Lactea: By these Discoveries, and more such, the History of the Heavens hath been rectified, and augmented by the Modern Advancers of Astronomy, whom in their places I have cited. In the AIR; Its Spring, the more accurate History and Nature of Winds and Meteors, and the probable height of the Atmosphere, have been added by the Lord Bacon, Des-Cartes, Mr. boil, and others. In the EARTH, New Lands by Columbus, Magellan, and the rest of the Discoverers; and in these, new Plants, new Fruits, new Animals, new Minerals, and a kind of other World of Nature, from which this is supplied with numerous conveniences of Life, and many thousand Families of our own little one are continually said and maintained. In the WATERS, the great Motion of the Sea, unknown in elder Times, and the particular Laws of flux and reflux in many places, are discovered. The History of BATHS augmented by Savonarola, Baccius, and Blanchellus; of METALS by Agricola; and the whole SUBTERRANEOUS WORLD described by the universally Learned Kircher. The History of PLANTS much improved by Matthiolus, Ruellius, Bauhinus, and Gerard, besides the late Account of English Vegetables published by Dr. Merret, a worthy Member of the ROYAL SOCIETY. And another excellent Virtuoso of the same Assembly, Mr. John Evelyn, hath very considerably advanced the History of Fruit and Forest-Trees, by his Sylva and Pomona; and greater things are expected from his Preparations for Elysium Britanicum, a noble Design now under his hands: And certainly the inquisitive World is much indebted to this generous Gentleman for his very ingenious Performances in this kind, as also for those others of Sculpture, Picture, Architecture, and the like practical useful things with which he hath enriched it. The History of ANIMALS hath been much enlarged by Gesner, Rondeletius, Aldrovandus, and more accurately enquired into by the Micrographers: And the late Travellers, who have given us Accounts of those remote parts of the Earth, that have been less known to these, have described great variety of Living Creatures, very different from the Animals of the nearer Regions; among whom the ingenious Author of the History of the Caribbies deserves to be mentioned as an Instance. In our own BODIES Natural History hath found a rich heap of Materials in the abovementioned Particulars of the Venae Lacteae, the Vasa Lymphatica, the Valves and Sinus of the Veins, the several new Passages and Glandules, the Ductus Chyliferus, the Origination of the Nerves, the Circulation of the Blood, and the rest. And all the main Heads of Natural History have received aids and increase from the famous Verulam, who led the way to substantial Wisdom, and hath given most excellent Directions for the Method of such an HISTORY of NATURE.  
Thus I have dispatched the FIRST Part of my Method proposed in the beginning; but stand yet engaged for the other, which is to show,  
(II.) That the later Ages have great Advantages, in respect of Opportunities and Helps for the spreading, and communicating of Knowledge, and thereby of improving and enlarging it. This I shall demonstrate in three great Instances, viz. Printing, the Compass, and the Institution of the Royal Society.  
For the FIRST, Printing; It was, according to Polydore Virgil, the Invention of John Cuthenberg of Mentz in Germany, though others give the honour to one Fust of the same City, and some to Laurentius a Burger of Harlem. But whoever was the Author, this is agreed, That this excellent Art was first practised about the year 1440, and was utterly unknown in Elder Times; at least in all the parts of the World that are on this side the Kingdom of China, which they say had it more early; but it signifies not to our purpose. Now by reason of the Ancients want of this Invention, Copies of excellent things could not be so much dispersed, nor so well preserved either from the Corruptions of Time, and Interest. The Charge of Books was very great, Forgeries frequent, and Mistakes of Transcribers numerous: They were quickly swept away out of those few Libraries in which they were, by Fire and Violence, or spoiled by Dust and Rottenness. And in the absence of this Art, 'twas easy enough for one Aristotle to destroy the most considerable Remains of the Ancients, that the power of his great Scholar put into his hands; which, 'tis credibly reported of him, that he did, to procure more fame for his own Performances: as also to conceal his thefts, and injurious dealings with those venerable Sages, whom he seems to take a great delight to contradict and expose, as I have elsewhere proved. But now, by this excellent Invention, the Knowledge that is lodged in Books, is put beyond the danger of such Corruptions, Forgeries, or any fatal inconvenience: We communicate upon easy terms at the remotest distance; converse with the Wise Men that went before us, and securely convey down our Conceptions to the Ages that shall follow. So that by this means Knowledge is advantageously spread and improved; especially since the Assistance Modern Ingenuity hath brought us, in that other admirable Invention,  
(2.) The Compass. How defective the Art of Navigation was in elder Times, when they sailed by the observation of the Stars, is easy to be imagined: For in dark weather, when their Pleiades, Helice, and Cynosura were hidden from them by the intervening Clouds, the Mariner was at a loss for his Guide, and exposed to the casual conduct of the Winds and Tides. For which reason the Ancients feldom or never durst venture into the Ocean, but steered along within sight of the safer Shore. So that the Commerce and Communications of those Days were very narrow; Their famed Travels in comparison were but domestic; and a whole World was to them unknown. But it hath been the happy privilege of later Days to find the way to apply the wonderful Virtues of the Loadstone to Navigation; and by the direction of the Compass we securely commit ourselves to the immense Ocean, and find our path in the vastest Wilderness of Waters. So that Commerce and Traffic is infinitely improved; the other half of the Globe disclosed; and that on this side the great Sea, better understood: The Religions, Laws, Customs, and all the Rarities and Varieties of Art and Nature, which any the most distant Clime knows and enjoys, are laid open and made common; and thereby the History of Nature is wonderfully enlarged, and Knowledge is both propagated and improved.  
Who it was that first discovered this excellent Mystery, is not certainly known: But one Flavius Goia of Amalphis in the Kingdom of Naples, is said to be the Author; and to have found this incomparable Rarity about 300 years ago. 'Tis pity that one of the greatest Benefactors to Mankind that ever was, should lie hid in so neglected an obscurity; when the great Troublers of the World, who have vexed it by the Wars of the Hand, and of the Brain, have so dear and so precious a Memory. For my part I think there is more acknowledgement due to the name of this obscure Fellow, that hath scarce any left, than to a thousand Alexanders and Caesars, or to ten times the number of Aristotle's and Aquinas'. And he really did more for the increase of Knowledge, and advantage of the World by this one Experiment, than the numerous subtle Disputers that have lived ever since the erection of the School of Wrangling.  
And methinks it may not be improper for me here to take notice of that other great Germane Invention, that useth to be mentioned in the Company, viz. That of Gunpowder and Artillery, which hath done its Service also for the help and propagation of Knowledge, as you will perceive when you shall consider; that by the assistance of these terrible Engines of Death, the great Western Indies were presently subdued, which likely had not been so easily effected by the ancient and ordinary Methods of War. 'Twas this Thunder and Lightning, and the invisible Instruments of Ruin, that destroyed the Courage of those numerous and hardy People, took away the hearts of the strongest Resisters, and made them an easy Prey to the Conquering Invaders.  
And now by the gaining that mighty Continent, and the numerous fruitful ●…sles beyond the Atlantic, we have obtained a larger Field of Nature, and have thereby an advantage for more Phaenomena, and more helps both for Knowledge, and for Life; which 'tis very like that future Ages will make better use of to such Purposes, than those hitherto have done; and that Science also may at last travel into those Parts, and enrich Peru with a more precious Treasure than that of its Golden Mines, is not improbable. And so these Engines of Destruction, in a sense too are Instruments of Knowledge. Of the first Author of this Experiment we know no more, but that he was a Germane Monk, who lighted on it by chance, when he was making some Chemical Trials with Nitre, near about the time of the Invention of the Compass; but his Name and other Circumstances are lost.  
Now whoever considers, with the Noble Virulam, how much the state of things in the World hath been altered and advanced by these THREE EXPERIMENTS alone, will conceive great hopes of Modern Experimental Attempts, from which greater Matters may be looked for, than those which were the Inventions of Single Endeavourers, or the Results of Chance.  
And of all the Combinations of Men that ever met for the Improvement of Science, there were never any whose Designs were better laid, whose Abilities were more promising, or whose Constitution was more judiciously or advantageously form, than the ROYAL SOCIETY.  
This Noble Institution was the THIRD Advantage I mentioned, that the Modern World hath for the Communication and Increase of Knowledge. And here I find I am happily prevented, and need not say much about it; For the HISTORY of their Constitution and Performances that is abroad, gives so full and so accurate an Account of them and their Designs, that perhaps it may be superfluous to do more in This, than to recommend that excellent Discourse to the perusal of those that would be informed about those Matters; which I do with some more than ordinary zeal and concernment, both because the Subject is one of the most weighty, and considerable, that ever afforded Matter to a Philosophical Pen, and because it is writ in a way of so judicious a gravity, and so prudent and modest an expression, with so much clearness of sense, and such a natural fluency of genuine Eloquence, that I know it will both profit and entertain the Ingenious. And I say further, That the Style of that Book hath all the Properties that can recommend any thing to an ingenious relish: For 'tis manly, and yet plain; natural, and yet not careless; The Epithets are genuine, the Words proper and familiar, the Periods smooth and of middle proportion: It is not broken with ends of Latin, nor impertinent Quotations; nor made harsh by hard words, or needless terms of Art: Not rendered intricate by long Parentheses, nor gaudy by flaunting Metaphors; not tedious by wide fetches and circumferences of Speech, nor dark by too much curtness of Expression: 'Tis not loose and unjointed, rugged and uneven; but as polite and as fast as Marble; and briefly, avoids all the notorious defects, and wants none of the proper Ornaments of Language. In this excellent History the Inquisitive may find what were the Reasons of forming such a Combination as the ROYAL SOCIETY, what is the Nature of that Constitution, what are their Designs, and what they have done. For there is Collection of some (among numerous others that are in their Repository) of the Experiments, Observations, and Instruments which they have invented and advanced for the improvement of real, useful Knowledge, and a full vindication of the Design, from the dark suspicions and objections of jealousy and ignorance.  
BUT that I may not wholly refer my Reader, which may look like a put-off, I'll here offer something concerning this Establishment, as it is an Advantage for the communication and increase of Science. I say then, That it was observed by the excellent Lord Bacon, and some other ingenious Moderns, That Philosophy, which should be an Instrument to work with, to find out those Aids that Providence hath laid up in Nature to help us against the Inconveniences of this State, and to make such applications of things as may tend to universal benefit; I say, They took notice, that instead of such a Philosophy as this, That which had usurped the Name, and obtained in the Schools, was but a combination of general Theories, and Notions, that were concluded rashly, without due information from particulars, and spun out into unprofitable Niceties, that tend to nothing but Dispute and Talk, and were never like to advance any Works for the benefit and use of Men.  
This being considered, the deep and judicious Verulam made the complaint, represented the defects and unprofitableness of the Notional way, proposed another to reform and enlarge Knowledge by Observation and Experiment, to examine and record Particulars, and so to rise by degrees of Induction to general Propositions, and from them to take direction for new Inquiries, and more Discoveries, and other Axioms; that our Notions may have a Foundation upon which a solid Philosophy may be built, that may be firm, tight, and close knit and suited to the Phaenomena of things: So that Nature being known, it may be mastered, managed, and used in the Services of Humane Life.  
This was a mighty Design, groundedly laid, wisely expressed, and happily recommended by the Glorious Author, who began nobly, and directed with an incomparable conduct of Wit and Judgement: But to the carrying of it on, It was necessary there should be many Heads and many Hands, and Those form into an Assembly, that might intercommunicate their Trials and Observations, that might jointly work, and jointly consider; that so the improvable and luciferous Phaenomena, that lie scattered up and down in the vast Campaign of Nature, might be aggregated and brought into a common Store. This the Great Man desired, and formed a SOCIETY of Experimenters in a Romantic Model, but could do no more; His time was not ripe for such Performances.  
These things therefore were considered also by the later Virtuosos, who several of them joined together, and set themselves on work upon this grand Design; in which they have been so happy, as to obtain the Royal Countenance and Establishment, to gather a great Body of generous Persons of all Qualities and sorts of Learning, to overcome the difficulties of the Institution, and to make a very encouraging and hopeful progress in their pursuits: For the account of which Particulars, I refer to the History, and only take notice, How ignorantly those rash and inconsiderate People talk, who speak of this Assembly as if they were a company of Men whose only aim is to set up some new Theories and Notions in Philosophy; whereas indeed, Their first and chief Employment is, carefully to seek and faithfully to report how things are de facto; and they continually declare against the establishment of Theories, and Speculative Doctrines, which they note as one of the most considerable miscarriages in the Philosophy of the Schools: And their business is not to Dispute, but Work. So that those others also that look on them as pursuing phansyful Designs, are as wide and unjust in their ill-contrived Censure: Since Their Aims are to free Philosophy from the vain Images and Compositions of Fancy, by making it palpable, and bringing it down to the plain Objects of the Senses; For those are the Faculties which they employ and appeal to, and complain that Knowledge hath too long hovered in the Clouds of Imagination: So that methinks this ignorant Reproach is, as if those that doted on the Tales of the Fabulous Age, should clamour against Plutarch and Tacitus as idle Romancers. For the main intention of this Society is to erect a well grounded Natural History, which takes off the heats of wanton Fancy, hinders its extravagant Excursions, and ties it down to sober Realities.  
But we frequently hear an insulting Objection against this Philosophical Society, in the Question, What have they done?  
To which I could answer in short, more than all the Philosophers of the Notional way, since Aristotle opened his Shop in Greece: Which Saying may perhaps look to some like a fond and bold Sentence: But whoever compares the Repository of this Society, with all the Volumes of Disputers, will find it neither immodest nor unjust: And their History hath given us Instances sufficient of their Experiments, Observations, and Instruments to justify a bolder Affirmation. But I insist not on this: The thing I would have observed is, That those who make the captious Question, do not comprehend the vastness of the Work of this Assembly, or have some fantastical Imaginations of it. They consider not that the Design is laid as low as the profoundest Depths of Nature, and reacheth as high as the uppermost Story of the Universe; That it extends to all the Varieties of the great World, and aims at the benefit of universal Mankind. For could they expect that such mighty Projects as these should ripen in a moment? Can a Cedar shoot up out of the Earth like a Blade of Grass? or an Elephant grow to the vastness of his bulk, as soon as a little Insect can be formed of a drop of Dew?  
No; The true knowledge of general Nature, like Nature itself in its noblest Composures, must proceed slowly, by degrees almost insensible: and what one Age can do in so immense an Undertaking as that, wherein all the Generations of Men are concerned, can be little more than to remove the Rubbish, lay in Materials, and put things in order for the Building. Our work is to overcome Prejudices, to throw aside what is useless, and yields no advantage for Knowledge, or for Life; To persuade Men that there is worthier Employment for them, than tying Knots in Bulrushes; and that they may be better accommodated in a well-built House, than in a Castle in the Air: We must seek and gather, observe and examine, and lay up in Bank for the Ages that come after. This is the business of the Experimental Philosophers; and in these Designs a progress hath been made sufficient to satisfy sober expectations: But for those that look they should give them the Great Elixir, the Perpetual Motion, the way to make Glass malleable, and Man immortal; or they will object that the Philosophers have done nothing: for such, I say, their impertinent Taunts are no more to be regarded, than the chat of Idiots and Children.  
But I think I am fallen into things of which the Ingenious Historian hath somewhere given better accounts; However I shall briefly endeavour to show the injustice of the Reproach of having done nothing, as 'tis applied to the Royal Scociety, by a single Instance in one of their Members, who alone hath done enough to oblige all Mankind, and to erect an eternal Monument to his Memory. So that had this great Person lived in those days, when Men deified their Benefactors, he could not have missed one of the first places among their exalted Mortals: And every one will be convinced that this is not vainly said, when I have added, That I mean the Illustrious Mr. boil, a Person by whose proper Merits that noble Name is as much adorned, as by all the splendid Titles that it wears: And that this Honourable Gentlem●… hath done such things for the benefit of the World, and increase of Knowledge, will easily appear to those that converse with Him in his excellent Writings.  
(1.) In his Book of the AIR, we have a great improvement of the Magdeburg Experiment, of emptying Glass Vessels by exsuction of the Air, to far greater degrees of evacuation, ease, and conveniences for use; as also an advance of that other famous one of Torticellius, performed by the New Engine, of which I have said some things above, and called the AIR-PUMP. By this Instrument (as K have already intimated) the Nature, Spring, Expansion, Pressure, and Weight of the Air; the decrease of its farce when dilated, the Doctrine of a Vacuum, the Height of the Atmosphere, the Theories of Respiration, Sounds, Fluidity, Gravity, Heat, Flame, the Magnet, and several other useful and luciferous Matters, are estimated, illustrated, and explained.  
And (2.) The great Doctrine of the Weight and Spring of the Air is solidly vindicated and further asserted by the Illustrious Author, in another BOOK against HOBBS and LINUS.  
(3.) In his PHYSIOLOGICAL and EXPERIMENTAL ESSAYS, he nobly encourageth and persuades the making of Experiments, and collecting Observations, and gives the necessary Cautions that are to be used in such Designs. He imparts a very considerable luciferous Experiment concerning the different parts and redintegration of Salt-petre; whence he deduceth, That Motion, Figure, and Disposition of parts, may suffice to produce all the secondary Affections of Bodies; and consequently, That there is no need of the substintial Forms and Qualities of the Schools. To this he adds a close History of Fluidity and Firmness, which tends mightily to the elucidating of those useful Doctrines.  
(4.) In his SCEPTICAL CHEMIST he cautions against the sitting down and acquiescing in Chemical and Peripatetical Theories, which many do, to the great hindrance of the growth and improvement of Knowledge. He therefore adviseth a more wary consideration and examen of those Doctrines, before they are subscribed; and for that purpose he assists them with many very considerable Observations and Experiments.  
(5.) In his VSEFULNESS of EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY, he makes it appear how much that way tends to the advance of the Power and Empire of Man over the Creatures, and the universal Benefit of the World; confirming and illustrating his Discourse with innumerable new and useful Discoveries.  
(6.) In his HISTORY of COLD, he hath to wonder cultivated that barren Subject, and improved it (as is noted in the Philosophical Transactions) by near 200 choice Experiments and Observations. He hath there given an account of the defectiveness of common Weather-Glasses, the Advantages of the new Hermetical Thermometers, and an Inquiry concerning the cause of the Condensation of the Air, and Ascent of Water by Cold in the ordinary Weather-wisers; All which afford valuable Considerations of Light and Use. But these are only Preliminaries: The main Discourse presents us with an Account what Bodies are capable of freezing others, and what of being frozen; The ways to estimate the degrees of coldness; How to measure the intenseness of Cold produced by Art, beyond that employed in ordinary Freezing; In what proportion Water will be made to shrink by Snow and Salt; How to measure the change produced in Water between the greatest heat of Summer, the first degree of Winter-cold, and the highest of Art; How to discover the differing degrees of Coldness in different Regions. A way of freezing without danger to the Vessel. What may be the effects of Cold, as to the preserving or destroying the texture of Bodies. Whether specific Virtues of Plants are lost through congelation, and then thawing. Whether Electrical and Magnetic Virtues are altered by Cold? The expansion and contraction of Bodies by freezing; how they are caused, and how their quantity is to be measured. The strength of the expansion of Water freezing, and an Inquiry into the Cause of that prodigious force. The Sphere of Activity of Cold. How far the Frost descends in Earth and Water. An Experiment showing whether Cold can act through an hot medium. A way of accounting the solidity of Ice, and the strength of the adhesion of its parts: What Liquors are its quickest Dissolvents. An Experiment of heating a cold Liquor with Ice. These, and many more such instructive and useful things, are contained in that excellent Discourse To which is annexed a very ingenious Examination and Disproof of the common obscure Doctrine of Antiperistasis, and Mr. Hobbs his Notion of Cold.  
(7.) In his EXPERIMENTAL HISTORY of COLOURS, he hath laid a foundation in 150 Experiments at least, for grounded Theory about these Matters. He hath shown the grand mistake of the common belief, That Colours inhere in their Objects; and proved they depend upon the disposition of the external parts, and the more inward texture of Bodies. He hath stated and explained wherein the Disparity consists between the Real and Exphatical; explicated the Nature of Whiteness and Blackness; rectified some Chemical Principles; compounded Colours by trajecting the Solar Beams through tinged Glasses; showed how by certain Tinctures it may be known, whether any Salt be acid or sulphureous. Hath proved, there is no necessity of the Peripatetic FORMS for the production of Colours, by making Green by nine kinds of mixtures; compounded Colours real and fantastical; turned the Blue of Violets by acid Salts into a Red, and by the alcalizate into a Green; and performed many other extraordinary things on this Subject, for the advantage of Knowledge, and the uses of Life.  
(8.) In his HYDROSTATICAL PARADOXES he showed, That the lower parts of Fluids' are pressed by the upper; That a lighter may gravitate upon one that is more ponderous; That if a Body contiguous to it, be lower than the highest level of the Water, the lower end of the Body will be pressed upwards by the Water beneath; That the weight of an external Fluid sufficeth to raise the Water in Pumps; That the pressure of an external Fluid is able to keep an Heterogeneous Liquor suspended at the same height in several Pipes, though they are of different Diameters; That a Body under Water, that hath its upper Surface parallel to the Horizon, the direct pressure it sustains is no more than that of a Column of Water, which hath the mentioned Horizontal Superficies for its Basis. And if the incumbent Water be contained in Pipes open at both ends, the pressure is to be estimated by the meight of a Pillar of Water, whose Basis is equal to the lower Orifice of the Pipe (parallel to the Horizon) and its height equal to a Perpendicular, reaching to the top of the Water, though the Pipe be much inclined, irregularly shaped, and in some parts broader than the Orifice; That a Body in a Fluid sustains a lateral pressure from it, which increaseth in proportion to the depth of the immersed Body in the Fluid; That Water may be made to depress a Body lighter than itself; That a parcel of Oil lighter than Water, may be kept from ascending in it; That the cause of the ascension of Water in Syphons, may be explained without the notion of abhorrence of a Vacuum; That the heaviest Body known will not sink of itself, without the assistance of the weight of the Water upon it, when 'tis at a depth greater than twenty times its own thickness, though it will nearer the Surface.  
This is the sum of the general Contents of that Discourse, which contains things very useful to be known for the advantage of Navigation, Saltworks, Chemistry, and other practical purposes.  
(9) In his Book of the ORIGINE of FORMS and QVALITIES, he delivers the minds of Men from the imaginary and useless Notions of the Schools about them, which have no foundation in the nature of things, nor do any ways promote Knowledge, or help Mankind; but very much disserve those great Interests, by setting the Understanding at rest in general obscurities, or employing it in airy Niceties and Disputes, and so hindering its pursuit of particular Causes, and Experimental Realities. In this Treatise he lays the Foundations and delivers the Principles of the Mechanic Philosophy, which he strengtheneth and illustrates by several very pleasant and instructive Experiments. He shows, That the most admirable Things which have been taken for the Effects of substantial Forms, and are used as proofs of the Notional Hypotheses, may be the results of the mere texture and position of parts; since Art is able to make Vitriol, as well as Nature; and Bodies by humane skill may be produced, whose supposed Forms have been destroyed. He gives many very ingenious instances to prove, That the Mechanic Motions and order of the Parts is sufficient to yield an account of the difference of Bodies, and their affections, without having recourse to the Forms and Qualities of the Schools; as in the restoration of Camphire to its former smell and nature, after its dissolution and seeming extinction; in the changes of the colour, consistence, fusibleness, and other Qualites of Silver and Copper; in the odd Phaenomena of a certain anomalous Salt, and those of the Sea Salt, dried, powdered, and mixed with Aqua-Fortis; and in the Sal Mirabilis, in the production of Silver out of Gold by his Menstruum Peracutum, in the transmutation of Water into Earth in a certain Distillation of Spirit of Wine, and Oil of Vitriol. I say, This excellent Person hath by Experiments rare and new about these Subjects, made it evidently appear, That the internal motions, configuration, and posture of the parts, are all that is necessary for alterations and diversities of Bodies; and consequently, That substantial Forms and real Qualities are needless and precarious Being's.  
These are some brief and general Hints of those great things this incomparable Person hath done for the information and benefit of Men; and besides them, there are several others that He hath by him, and the Inquisitive expect, in which real Philosophy and the World are no less concerned. I received a late Account of them from an ingenious Friend of his, Mr. Oldenburgh Secretary to the ROYAL SOCIETY, who also renders himself a great Benefactor to Mankind, by his affectionate care, and indefatigable diligence and endeavours, in the maintaining Philosophical Intelligence, and promoting the Designs and Interests of profitable and general Philosophy. And these being some of the Noblest and most Public Employments, in which the Services of generous Men can be engaged, loudly call for their Aids and Assistances, for the carrying on a Work of so universal an importance.  
But I shall have a fitter place to speak of this, and therefore I return to the Illustrious Person of whom I was discoursing, And for Philosophical News, and further evidence of the Obligation the World hath to this Gentleman; I shall here insert the Account of what he hath more, yet unpublished, for its advantage and instruction. And I take the boldness to do it, because himself hath been pleased to quote and refer to those Discourses in his published Writings; concerning which, M. O's Account is more particular, and he received it from the Author. It speaks thus:  
(1.) Another Section of the usefulness of Experimental Philosophy, as to the Empire of Man over inferior Creatures; where he intends to premise some general Considerations about the Means whereby Experimental Philosophy may become useful to Humane Life; proceeding thence to show, That the Empire of Man may be promoted by the Naturalists skill in Chemistry, by his skill in Mechanics, or the Application of Mathematics to Instruments and Engines; by his skill in Mathematics, both pure and mixed: That the Goods of Mankind may be much increased by the Naturalist's insight into Trades; That the Naturalist may much advantage Men, by exciting and assisting their curiosity to discover, take notice, and make use of the homebred Riches and Advantages of particular Countries, and to increase their number, by transferring thither those of others; That a ground of high expectation from Experimental Philosophy is given, by the happy Genius of this present Age, and the productions of it; That a ground of expecting considerable things from Experimental Philosophy is given by those things which have been found out by illiterate Tradesmen, or lighted on by chance; That some peculiar and concealed property of a natural thing, may enable the knowers of it to perform, with ease, things, that to others seem either not feasible, or not practicable without great difficulty; That by the knowledge and application of some unobvious and unheeded Properties and Laws of natural things, divers Effects may be produced by other Means and Instruments than those one would judge likely; and even by such, as if proposed, would be thought unlikely; That the knowledge of peculiar Qualities, or uses of Physical things, may enable a Man to perform those things Physically, that seem to require Books, and dexterity of hand proper to Artificers; That the uses of scarce one thing in Nature, to Humane Life, are yet thoroughly understood; That a great Inducement to hope for considerable Matters from Experimental Philosophy, may be taken from the mutual assistance that the Practical and Theorical part of Physic may be brought to afford each other; That we are not to make our Estimates of what may be hoped for hereafter, when Men shall be assisted with the History of Nature, a method of employing it, and true Principles of Natural Philosophy, and associated Endeavours, by what is already performed without any of those Assistances. (2.) He hath also in a manner promised Essays touching the concealments and disguises of the Seeds of living Creatures. (3.) An Appendix to the Physico-Mechanical Treatise concerning the Air. (4.) Something concerning Heat and Flame. (5.) The Sceptical Naturalist, showing the imperfections of Natural Philosophy as we yet have it. (6.) A Discourse of improbable Truths. (7.) The production of Qualities by Art. (8.) Several useful Series of Inquiries and Directions of his, whereof divers are extant in the Philosophical Transactions; as, (1.) General Heads for a Natural History of a Country small or great. (2.) Observations and Directions about the Barometer. (3.) Inquiries touching the Sea; and, (4.) About Mines. (5.) Queries and Trials proposed, for the improving of that Grand Experiment, for the transfusing Blood out of one live Animal into another. (6.) Others for the finding the Effects of the Rarifying Engine exhausted, in Plants, Seeds, and Eggs of Silkworms. Besides These, he hath a great many other unpublished Inquiries, and Series of Experiments and Observations of the most considerable parts of Natural Philosophy. As, (1.) About precious Stones. (2.) Fermentation. (3.) Heat and Flame. (4.) An Account of a new kind of Baroscope, which he calls Statical, and the advantage it hath above the Mercurial. (5.) A New Experiment, showing how a considerable degree of Cold may be suddenly produced without the help of Snow, Ice, Hail, Wind, or Nitre, and that at any time of the year, viz. by Sal ammoniac. (6.) A way of preserving Birds taken out of the Eggs; and other small Foetus'.  
This is the Account I received of that Noble Person's further Designs for the advantage of Useful Knowledge; and though he hath not made an absolute Promise of those Discourses to the Public, yet he is known to have such, and they are with probability expected, since he is too generous to detain from the capable and inquisitive those his excellent Discoveries, which tend to the common Benefit. And thus I have said what may suffice for general Information about the ROYAL SOCIETY, and the hopes we may justly conceive of this Constitution. And in what I have discoursed, I have not deviated from my undertaking, which was to show the advantage that this latter Age hath, for the promotion and increase of Knowledge, above those of former Times: For by describing the Reasons, Nature, and some of the Effects of this Establishment, I have not obscurely suggested the Helps that the World hath and may expect from Them, for those great and noble Purposes; and 'tis easy to see in the very frame of this Assembly, that they are fitted with Opportunities to collect most of the considerable Notices, Observations, and Experiments, that are scattered up and down in the wide World; and so, to make a Bank of all the Useful Knowledge that is among Men: For either by their whole Body, or some or other of their particular Members, they hold a Learned Correspondence with the greatest Virtuosos of all the known Universe, and have several of their own Fellows abroad in Foreign Parts, by reason of whose Communications, they know most of the valuable Rarities and Phaenomena observed by the curious in Nature, and all considerable Attempts and Performances of Art, Ingenuity, and Experiment: To which consideration, if we add the inquisitiveness of their Genius, and the way of their proceeding, by particular and cautious Observation; the coldness and shiness of their Assent, and the numbers of judicious Men that carefully examine their Reports; I say, If these Particulars be weighed, it will appear to the unprejudiced, That the World had never such an advantage for the accumulating a Treasure of substantial Knowledge, as it hath by this Constitution: For single Inquisitors can receive but scant and narrow Informations, either from their own Experience, or Converses; and those they have, are frequently very imperfect, or very mistaken: There is often either vanity or credulity, ignorance or design in their Relations, which therefore are many times false in the main Matter, and oftener in the Circumstance: So that the Histories of Nature we have hitherto had, have been but an heap and amassment of Truth and Falsehood, Vulgar Tales, and Romantic Accounts; and 'tis not in the power of particular unassociated Endeavours to afford us better: But now, the frame of this Society suggests excellent ground to hope from them sincere and universal Relations, and the best grounded and most useful Collection of the Affairs of Art and Nature, that ever yet was extant: And as they have peculiar Privileges for the gathering the Materials of Knowledge, so They have the same for the impartment and diffusion of them.  
I should now put an end to this Discourse, but that there is another common prejudice against the ROYAL SOCIETY, and all those of that Genius, to which I must speak a little; The Charge is, That they despise the Ancients, and all old Learning, which have been venerable among the best and wisest of all Times. To this I say, That the Modern, free Philosophers, are most ready to do right to the Learned Ancients, by acknowledging their Wit, and all the useful Theories, and Helps we have from them; They read, and consider their Writings, and cheerfully entertain any Notices, or Observations they have imparted to us: They have a respect for their great names, and are ready to do honour to them: But yet they do not think that those, however venerable Sages, should have an absolute Empire over the Reasons of Mankind; nor do they believe, That all the Riches of Nature were discovered to some few particular Men of former Times; and that there is nothing left for the benefit and gratification of after-Inquirers: No; They know, There is an inexhaustible variety of Treasure which Providence hath lodged in Things, that to the World's end will afford fresh Discoveries, and suffice to reward the ingenious Industry and Researches of those that look into the Works of God, and go down to see his Wonders in the Deep. This, no doubt, the modesty and justice of the Ancients themselves would have confessed: But besides this, the Modern Experimenters think, That the Philosophers of elder Times, though their Wits were excellent, yet the way they took was not like to bring much advantage to Knowledge, or any of the uses of humane Life; being for the most part that of Notion and Dispute, which still runs round in a Labyrinth of Talk, but advanceth nothing: And the unfruitfulness of those disputing Methods, which directly and by themselves never brought the World so much practical, beneficial Knowledge, as would help towards the Cure of a Cut Finger, or the Cooling of an Hot Head, is a palpable Argument, That they were fundamental Mistakes, and that the Way was not right.  
For, as my Lord Bacon observes well, Philosophy, as well as Faith, must be shown by its Works: And if the Moderns cannot show more of the Works of their Philosophy in six years, than the Peripatetics can produce of theirs, in the compass of as many Ages, let them be loaded with all that Contempt which is usually the reward of vain, and unprofitable Projectors. I say then the Modern Philosophers arrogate nothing to their own Wit, above that of the Ancients: but by the reason os the thing, and material, sensible Events, they find they have an advantage by their way. And a lame Child that slowly treads the right Path, will at last arrive to his Journeys end; while the swift Footman that runs about in a Wood, will lose himself in his wander.  
But notwithstanding all this, there are some of Opinion that Aristotle had more advantages for Knowledge than the Moderns, because he had the Survey of all Asia, by those who at the charge of his great Scholar were employed to make Experiments. This I have heard alleged; but I think this reason is very defective, both in what it affirms, and in what it would infer.  
For first, 'Tis evident that Aristotle and the Ancients did not know all ASIA; for that part which lay beyond the River, was in a manner a Terra Incognita unto them: so that they knew scarce any thing of the Indies that lie on the other side of Ganges, little or nothing of the vast Kingdom of China, nothing of Japan, or the numerous Oriental Islands, besides the defects in the ancient Geography, noted above; and these made a great, if not the best part of Asia; of which though Aristotle might have heard, yet we have no shadow of Reason to believe that he had any Informations from thence. And then I consider,  
(2.) That the Account he had from the best surveyed Regions, were but from Hunters, Fowlers, Fishermen, and such kind of Inquisitors, who were like enough to make vain and mistaken Reports, and he was fain to depend upon the credit of their Relations; and therefore 'tis observed by Learned Men that his History of Animals contains many things that are frivolous, and many that are palpably false. To which I add,  
(3.) The remark of my Lord Bacon, That though Aristotle made some use of those Experiments; and Observations he had from those Informers, yet it was after he had concluded and decreed. For he did not use and employ Experiments for the erecting of his Theories: but having arbitrarily pitched his Theories, his manner was to force Experience to suffragate, and yield countenance to his precarious Propositions. And on this account, the Great Man saith, he was less excusable than the Schoolmen, who altogether quitted and neglected the way of particular Industry and Experiment. Thus than Aristotle neither knew all Asia, nor had certain Relations of that part thereof, of which he had the best Informations; nor did he use those he had as he ought; which were enough to overthrow the conceit of his Superlative Advantages. But I consider further, That though these things had been otherwise, and as much for the interest of the fond Fancy as could be wished, yet,  
(2.) The Inference must fail, since the latter Ages have a much larger World than Aristotle's Asia; We have America, and the many New Lands that are discovered by Modern Navigators; we have larger and more perfect Geography even of the old World, infinitely more acquaintance and better correspondence in all the parts of the Universe, by our general Traffic, than the Ancients; whose Commerce was narrow, and knowledge of remote Parts consisted but in hearsays, and doubtful Rumours- We have besides, New Heavens as well as a New Earth, a larger and truer prospect of the World above us. We have travelled those upper Regions by the help of our Tubes, and made Discoveries more becoming the Wisdom and Magnificence of our Creator, and more agreeable to the appearances of things, than the arbitrary Fancies and Conjectures of Aristotle and his Schools. We have a greater World of Arts, Instruments, and Observations, as in all Particulars my Discourse hath made good. And what are Aristotle's peragrations of Asia, to all these? To the great Western Indies; to the fuller and clearer knowledge of the Ancient Lands; to those nobler Accounts we have of the Heavens, and universal Nature; to our vast Improvements of Chemistry, Anatomy, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, Geography, Optics, Natural History, Navigation, and all things else of benefit and instruction? I say, What are the glean of a few mercenary Hunters, Fowlers, and Fishermen, over one part of Asia, to these Advantages? And what are the Reports of a few ordinary Fellows, and the Trials of a single Person, to the learned Inquiries and Endeavours of many sagacious inquisitive Ages, and the performances of a numerous Company of deep, wary, diligent, and Eagle-eyed Philosophers, who have the help of those Observations, and the addition of an infinite number more?  
But my Design is, by representing the advantages and hopefulness of the Modern Way, to kindle an ardour towards the generous Experimental Researches, to vindicate Philosophy from the imputation of being notional and unprofitable, and to keep Men from adhering to that which is so, and hath been the occasion of the scandal. And as for those that yet stick there, I have some things to observe concerning the Reasons of their Devotion to that airy disputative Philosophy, and their Enmity to the Practical.  
I consider then, That easy Youth in its first Addresses to Learning, is wholly passive to the Discipline and Instructions of its Teachers, whose Documents are promiscuously received with ready submission of Understandings, that implicitly depend on their Authority. We suck in the first Rudiments as we do the common Air [facili haustu] as my Lord Bacon expresseth it, without discrimination or election, of which indeed our tender and unexcercised Minds are not capable. And, I confess, 'tis necessary we should do so; nor were there any hurt in this innocent easiness, did not most Men all their lives worship the first thing they saw in the morning of their days, and ever after obstinately adhere to those unexamined Receptions: But this is the mischief, we infinitely believe every thing when we are Children; and most examine little when they are Men, but settle in their first Impressions, without giving themselves the trouble to-consider and review them. And these prejudices, by custom and long acquaintance with our Souls, get a mighty interest, and shut them up against every thing that is different from those Images of Education. This is a general fault and infirmity of humane Nature, and from hence it comes to pass, that the tutoured Youth slides easily into the belief of the first Principles of Philosophy, which they are taught, and are confirmed in them by their Exercises and Disputes, and Books and Converses: By these their Understandings, which before were White-Paper, are died and deeply tinctured by the colour they have imbibed; And these infusions insensibly pass as 'twere into the very substance of the Mind, and are appealed to, on all occasions, as unsophisticated Truths. So that having spent some time in learning and trimming those Notions, the most divert to Business, or other Studies, without troubling themselves with any more Philosophical Pursuits; but being satisfied with those Notices which their first Education lodged in their Minds, they seek no further, nor do care to be wiser in those Matters, than they were in the disputing Infancy of their Knowledge.  
All this while no other hurt is done, but that Men thus are injurious to themselves, and hinder their own Improvements: but 'tis much worse when they fond fix these as the Pillars of Science, and would have no body else go further than their laziness or their cares will permit them to travel; but rail spitefully at all Endeavours for the advancement of Philosophic Wisdom, and will be angry with every one that hath outgrown his Cherry-stones and Rattles; speak evil at a venture of things they know not, and like Mastiffs, are fiercer for being kept dark. These are the great Enemies of the useful, experimental Methods of Philosophy: They take it ill that any thing should be accounted valuable, in which they are uninstructed, being loath to learn in an Age wherein they expect to Dictate; and the Satirist hath told them another reason.  

— Turpe putant parere minoribus, & quae  
Imberbes didicere, senes perdenda fateri.   
This is much the case of many of the Peripatetic Disputers, They employed their Younger Studies upon the Philosophy of Disputation, and, it may be, gained an ability to out-talk many of their Contemporaries in that way. They confirmed themselves in these Notions by instructing others in them, and upon these Foundations have built the Reputation of being great Scholars, and mighty Disputants among their Admirers. So that we are not to wonder, if they are vehemently displeased with the ROYAL SOCIETY, and Experimental Philosophers, since their Designs take away the honour of their Craft, and in this way, They are upon the same level with those that are but beginning; the thought of which must needs be distasteful to self-absured and imperious Minds. And yet, that it may not be thought I speak any of this out of envy to their Fame, I shall do them all the right I can, by acknowledging,  
That I take them for Persons that understand the Quiddities and Haecceities, the Praecisiones formales and the Objectivae, the Homogeneities and Heterogeneities, the Catagorematice's and the Syncatagorematice's, the Simpliciter's, and the secundum Quid's.  
They know, no doubt, that First Matter that is neither Quid, nor Quale, nor Quantum; and that wonderful Gremium materiae, out of which Forms were educed, that were never there. They can tell you fine things of the fiery Element under the Moon, and the Epicycles of the Stars; Can resolve all Questions by the compendious way of Formalitèr, Materialitèr, Fundamentalitèr, and Eminentèr; Tell the difference between Quodam modo, and Modo quodam; and show the causes of all things in Sympathy, Antipathy, Combination of the Elements, and Influences of the Heavens. They see clearly by their Spectactes, That the Milkie-way is but a Meteor, and Comets only kindled Vapours, in spite of the contrary information of the deceitful Telescopes. They can, no doubt, dispute roundly about the composition of Entia rationis, and Vniversals, the Praedications of Genus and Species, and the manner of their conservation in Individuals; of the number of the Predicaments, and what Being is in this, and what in another; of the inherence and propagation of Accidents, the real essence of Relations, the nature of Vbi and Quande, and a thousand other Logical tricks about shuffling and ordering Propositions and Forms of Syllogism.  
They can discourse of the nakedness of First Matter, the Education of Forms out of its Bosom; show, that the want of a Being is a Principle of it, how forms of Elements are refracted in mixed Bodies; Dispute subtly about the Primum incipiens in Motion, the instantaneousness of Generation, the Maximum quod sic, and the Minimum quod non, and infinite more of such wonderful, useful, significant Speculations.  
And in the Metaphysics, I acknowledge them in the words of the incomparable Droll; 
They know what's what, and that's as high  
As Metaphysic Wit can fly.   
These, and other such Profundities, are some of the main things of that Philosophy, for which Peripatetic Disputers are so zealous. But for the Mechanic, that attempts material and intelligible Accounts of things, and is in its grounds much ancienter than that of Aristotle which they admire; for the Experimental Methods, and late Improvements of useful Knowledge; Many of these Men have a suspicion, if not a contempt of them: Nor do they pretend any acquaintance with those Studies: For concluding that nothing more is to be known, than They learned in the Circle of Disputations, they sit down in the Opinion of the perfection of their Knowledge, without caring to be informed what the Inquisitive World is doing in this Age of Enquiry.  
And on this occasion, I observe the incompetency of their Judgements, who are Enemies to the Real Experimental Philosophy, in that they do not (as I intimated) at all, or very little, understand what they condemn, This I have some reason to say, since in the whole compass of my Acquaintance, which is not very narrow, I profess I know not one who opposeth the Modern way, that is not almost totally unacquainted with it. And on the other side, upon the most careful turn of my thoughts among my Philosophical Friends, I cannot light on one of all those, that are for the Free and Experimental Procedure, but who have been very well instructed in the Peripatetic Doctrines, which they have deserted, and most of them much better than those who are yet zealous Contenders for them.  
And for my own part, I must confess, That while I was a Youth in the University, I was much delighted with those subtleties that exercise the Brain in the Niceties of Notion and Distinctions, and afford a great deal of idle Employment for the Tongue in the Combats of Disputation: In which I acknowledge I was none of the most backward, but being highly pleased with those Engagements, I found as much diversion in them, as in my dearest Recreations. But after I had spent some years in those Notional Studies, perhaps with as good success as some others, I began to think CVI BONO: and to consider what these things would signify in the World of Action and Business, I say, I thought; but I could find no encouragement to proceed from the Answer my thoughts made me: I asked myself, what Accounts I could give of the Works of God by my Philosophy, more than those that have none, and found, that I could amaze and astonish Ignorance with Distinctions and Words of Art, but not satisfy ingenious Inquiry by any considerable and material Resolutions. I considered I had got nothing all this while, but a certain readiness in talking, and that about things which I could not use abroad, without being Pedantic and ridiculous. I perceived that that Philosophy aimed at no more, than the instructing Men in Notion and Dispute; That its Design was mean, and its Principles at the best uncertain and precarious; That they did not agree among themselves, nor at all with Nature. I examined the best Records I could meet with about the Author of those current Hypotheses, but could not be assured that Aristotle was he. I saw many Reasons to believe, that most of the Books that bear his Name, are none of his; and those that are most strongly presumed to be so, are mightily altered and corrupted by Time, Ignorance, Carelessness and Design. I perceived that the Commentators and late Disputers had exceedingly disguised and changed the Sense of those very Writings, and made up a Philosophy that was quite another thing from that which those Books contain. So that by these means I was by degrees taken off from the implicit Veneration I had for that Learning, upon the account of the great Name of Aristotle which it bore. And thus the great impediment was removed, and the prejudice of Education overcome; when I thought further, That useful Knowledge was to be looked for in God's great Book the Universe, and among those generous Men that had conversed with real Nature, undisguised with Art and Notion. And still I saw more of the justice of the excellent Poet's Censure of those Notional Philosophers, when he saith, 
They stand  
Locked up together hand in hand:  
Every one leads as he is led,  
The same bare Path they tread,  
And dance like Fairies a fantastic Round;  
But neither change their Motion, nor their Ground.   
From this Philosophy therefore, and these Men, I diverted my Eyes and Hopes, and fixed them upon those Methods that I have recommended, which I am sure are liable to none of those Imputations.  
And here I think fit to add a Caution which I have given in another Discourse, and do it once more to prevent a dangerous misunderstanding, viz. [And it is, That I have said nothing of this, to discourage young Academians from applying themselves to those first Studies, which are in use in the Universities. Their Statutes require Exercises in that way of Learning; and so much knowledge of it, as enables for those Duties, is very fit. Nor do I deny, but that those Speculations raise, quicken, and whet the Understanding, and on that account may not be altogether unprofitable, with respect to the more useful Inquisitious; provided it keep itself from being nice, airy, and addicted too much to general Notions. But this is the danger, and the greatest part run upon the Rock. The hazard of which might in great measure be avoided, if the Mathematics and Natural History were mingled with these other Studies, which would indeed be excellent Preparatives and Dispositions to future Improvements. And I add further, That the young Philosophers must take care of looking on their Systematick Notious as the bounds and perfections of Knowledge; nor make account to fix eternally upon those Theories, as established and infallible Certainties: But consider them in the modest sense of Hypotheses, and as things they are to take in their passage to others that are more valuable and important. I say, The Peripatetic Studies thus tempered, will not, I suppose, be disal-lowed by those who are for the Practical Methods; and so the Vniversity-Establishments can receive no prejudice from the Spirit that dislikes a perpetual acquiescence in the Philosophy of the present Schools.    


The USEFULNESS OF Real Philosophy TO RELIGION. Essay IU.   

Essay IU. THE USEFULNESS OF Real Philosophy TO RELIGION.  
IT is the perverse Opinion of hasty, inconsiderate Men, that the study of Nature is prejudicial to the Interests of Religion; And some, who are more zealous than they are wise, endeavour to render the Naturalist suspected of holding secret correspondence with the Atheist: which things if really they were so, 'twere fit that the Writings of Philosophers should be sent after the Books of curious Arts, that were voted to Destruction by Apostolic Authority and Zeal; and then were they all laid together in a fired heap, and one Drop from my Finger would quench the Flames, I would not let fall that Drop. But 'tis to be hoped there is no such guilt or danger in the case; we may suppose rather, that those unkind surmisals concerning natural Wisdom, are the effects of superstitious Ignorance; yea, I doubt they are some of the Relics of that Barbarism, that made Magic of Mathematics, and Heresy of Greek and Hebrew.  
And now, were this gross conceit about the Knowledge of Nature only the fear and fancy of the mere vulgar, it were to be pardoned easily, and lightly to be considered; but the worst is, the infection of the weak jealousy hath spread itself among some of those whose Lips should preserve Knowledge; and there are, I doubt, divers of the Instructers of the People, who should endeavour to deliver them from the vain Images of Fancy, that foment those fears in their own Imaginations, and theirs. For the sake of such, and those others, who are capable of Conviction, I shall endeavour to justific sober Inquisitions into God's Works; and to show, that they are not only innocent, but very useful in most of the Affairs wherein Religion is concerned. This I shall do, for more clearness of proof, by a gradual motion of Discourse, from things that are plain, and acknowledged (which I shall touch briefly) to the main Matter I would enforce: In this order;  

(I.) That God is to be praised for his Works.  
(II.) That his Works are to be studied by those that would praise him for them.  
(III.) That the study of Nature, and God's Works, is very serviceable to Religion.  
(IV.) That the Ministers and Professors of Religion ought not to discourage, but promote the knowledge of Nature, and the Works of its Author.   
THe FIRST contains two things, viz. That God is to be praised; and particularly for his Works. The former is the constant Voice of Scripture, and Universal Nature; He is worthy to be praised, saith the Kingly Prophet, 2 Sam. 22. 4. Greatly to be praised, saith the same Royal Saint, 1 Chron. 16. 25. We are to offer him the Sacrifice of Praise, Heb. 13. 15. And are encouraged to do so, because, It is good to sing Praises; and praise is comely for the upright, Psal. 1. 47. and Psalm. 33. To recite all the particular recommendations and commands of this duty, were endless, I only mention the next to my thoughts, and add,  
That Nature saith the same; That Praise is the Tribute that is due to the Author of our Being's; And we can offer him nothing less, and in a manner nothing else. All the World have been unanimous in this, and the rudest part of Mankind, have owned the dueness of Praise and devout Acknowledgement.  
And (II.) the other Branch is as clear, That God is to be praised particularly for his Works; For in these we have very full discoveries of his Perfections, and his Mercies, the most proper Subjects for our Praises. But here I must be more large, and therefore propose the following things to be considered.  
(1.) When God himself would represent his own Magnificence and Glory, he directs us to his Works. He illustrates his Greatness to Job, by instancing the Wonders of his Creatures: Among whom we are sent to the Earth, and Ocean; to the Clouds, and Rain●… to the Light, and heavenly influence; to Behemoth, and Leviathan; to the Ostrich, and the Eagle; and the other Furniture of Land, and Air, and Seas, in the four last Chapters of that Book; in all these are the marks of his Glory, and his Greatness, and they are no less so of his Wisdom, and his Goodness; For in Wisdom he hath made them all, Psalm. 104. and the Earth is full of his goodness, Psalm. 119. 54.  
And again (2.) when devout and holy Men would quicken their own Souls, and those of others, to praise him, they use the same method, and send abroad their Thoughts among the Creatures to gather instances of acknowledgement. Thus Elihu in Job magnifieth his Power by the Lightning and Thunder, by the Snow and Rain, by the Whirlwinds of the North, and Cold of the South, and calls upon his afflicted Friend to remember to magnify his Works that Men behold; and again bids him stand still, and consider the wondrous Works of God, Job 36, and 37 Chapters. And the Psalmist upon the same account urgeth his Soul to bless his Maker for his Majesty, and Honour disclosed in the natural Wonders of the Heavens and Earth, the Winds and Waters, the Springs and Grass, the Trees and Hills, Psalm. 104. throughout, and he gives particular thanks again, Psalm. 136. for the discoveries of the Divine Wisdom and Mercy in the same instances of his Providence and Power; which he further celebrates by calling upon the noblest of inanimates to praise him, Psal. 148. Praise him Sun and Moon, praise him O ye Stars and Light; which Creatures of his, though they are not able to sing Hallelujahs, and vocally to rehearse his praise, yet they afford glorious Matter for grateful and triumphant Songs, and by their beauty, and their order, excite those that study and observe them, to adore and glorify their Maker. And therefore the Prophet runs on further into an aggregation of more Particulars, of Fire, and Hail, Storms, and Vapours, Mountains, and Cedars, Beasts, and Fouls, and creeping Things; all which in the same Divine Canticle are summoned to praise him; that is, we are required to use them as the Matter and Occasions of Holy Eucharist and Thanksgiving. To these I add,  
(2.) That God was pleased to sanctify a solemn Day for the celebration of his Works. He appointed a Sabbath for rest, and contemplation to himself; and for praise and acknowledgement to us; and his making Heaven, and Earth, the Sea, and all that in them is, is intimated as the reason of the consecration of that Day; which was observed upon that account among the Jews; and the devout Christians of eldest times kept the same in memory of God's Creation, after the institution of the other Sabbath. This I take to be enough for the first Proposition, viz. That God is to be praised for his Works. I descend to the second, which is,  
(II.) That his Works are to be studied by those, that would praise him for them. We are commanded to sing Praises with understanding, Psal. 40. 7. and the Offering he requires, is that of a reasonable service. His Works receive but little glory from the rude wonder of the ignorant; and there is no wise Man that values the applauses of a blind admiration. No one can give God the Glory of his Providence, that lets the Particulars of it pass by him unobserved; nor can he render due acknowledgements to his Word, that doth not search the Scriptures: 'Tis equally impossible to praise the Almighty, as we ought, for his Works, while we carelessly consider them. We are commanded to search for Wisdom, as for hidden Treasure; It lies not exposed in the common ways; and the chief wonders of Divine Art and Goodness are not on the surface of things laid open to every careless eye. The Tribute of praise that we owe our Maker, is not a formal slight confession that his Works are wonderful and glorious; but such an acknowledgement as proceeds from deep Observation, and acquaintance with them. And though our profoundest Study and Inquiries cannot unfold all the Mysteries of Nature, yet do they still discover new Motives to devout admiration, and new Objects for our loudest Praises. Thus briefly of the second Proposition also, viz. That God's Works are to be studied by those that would praise him for them. From these I now advance to the Third, which will require more thoughts, and it is this,  
(III.) That the study of Nature and God's Works, is very serviceable to Religion. We commonly believe that the glory of God is the end of this; we say 'tis his, and we know 'tis ours, and the Divine Glory is writ upon the Creatures; the more we study them, the better we understand those Characters, the better we read his Glory, and the more fit are we to celebrate, and proclaim it. Thus the knowledge of God's Works promotes the end of Religion.  
And it disposeth us to it, by keeping the Soul under a continual sense of God. He that converseth with his Works, finds in all things the clear stamps of infinite Benignity and Wisdom; he perceives the Divine Art in all the turnings and varieties of Nature, and Divine Goodness in that. He observes God in the colour of every Flower, in every fiber of a Plant, in every particle of an Insect, in every drop of Dew. He meets him in all things, and sees all things are his, and hath an advantage hereby to be instructed how to use them as our Makers, not ours, with reverence and thanksgiving, with an eye to his Glory, and an aim at his Enjoyment. This is the tendency of the knowledge of Nature; if it be abused to different and contrary Purposes, natural Wisdom is not in fault, but he that turns this excellent Instrument of Religion upon itself. But that better use may be made of it, and by some is, will appear by considering particularly how acquaintance with Nature assists RELIGION against its greatest Enemies, which are Atheism, Sadducism, Superstition, Enthusiasm, and the Humour of Disputing.  
FOr the First, Atheism, I reckon thus, The deeper insight any Man hath into the Affairs of Nature, the more he discovers of the accurateness, and Art that is in the contexture of things. For the Works of God are not like the compositions of Fancy, or the Tricks of Jugglers, that will not bear a clear light, or strict scrutiny; but their exactness receives advantage from the severest inspection; and he admires most, that knows most; since the insides and remotest recesses of things have the clearest stamps of inimitable Wisdom on them, and the Artifice is more in the Wheelwork, than in the Case. For if we look upon any of the Works of Nature through a Magnifying Glass that makes deep Discoveries, we find still more beauty, and more uniformity of contrivance; whereas if we survey the most curious piece of humane ingenuity by that Glass, it will discover to us numerous Flaws, Deformities and Imperfections in our most Elegant Mechanics: Hence I gather, That the study of God's Works, showing us more of the riches of Nature, opens thereby a fairer Prospect of those Treasures of Wisdom that are lodged within it; and so furnisheth us with deeper Senses, and more Arguments, and clearer Convictions of the existence of an infinitely intelligent Being, that contrived it in so harmonious and astonishing an order.  
So that if any are so brutish, as not to acknowledge him upon the view of the mere external frame of the Universe, they must yet fall down before the evidence, when Philosophy hath opened the Cabinet, and led them into the Jewel-bouse, and shown them the surprising variety that is there. Thus though the obvious Firmament, and the motions of the Sun and Stars, the ordinary vicissitudes of Seasons, and productions of things, the visible beauty of the great World, and the appearing variety and fitness of those Parts that make up the little one in Man, could scarce secure Galen from the danger of being an Atheist: Yet when he pried further by Anatomical Inquiries, and saw the wonderful diversity, aptness, and order of the minutest Strings, Pipes, and Passages that are in the inward Fabric; He could not abstain from the devoutness of an Anthem of Acknowledgement. And that the real knowledge of Nature leads us by the hand to the confession of its Author, is taught us by the Holy Penman, who suggests that the visible things of the Creation declare him. The Plebeian and obvious World no doubt doth, but the Philosophical much more. So that whosoever saith, that inquiry into Nature, and God's Works leads to any degree of Atheism, gives great ground of suspicion that himself is an Atheist; or that he is that other thing that the Royal Psalmist calls him, that saith in his heart there is no God. For either he acknowledgeth the Art and exactness of the Works of Nature, or he doth not; if not, he disparageth the Divine Architect, and disables the chief Argument of his existence: If he doth, and yet affirms that the knowledge of it leads to Atheism, he saith he knows not what, and in effect this, That the sight of the order and method of a regular and beautiful contrivance tends to persuade that Chance and Fortune was the Author.  
But I remember I have discoursed of this elsewhere, and what I have said for Philosophy in general from its tendency to devout Acknowledgements, is not so true of any as of the Experimental and Mechanic. For the Physiology of the modern Peripatetic Schools creates Notions, and turns Nature into words of second Intention, but discovers little of its real beauty, and harmonious contrivance; so that God hath no glory from it, nor Men any Argument of his Wisdom or Existence. And for the Metaphysical Proofs, they are for the most part deep and nice, subject to Evasions and turns of Wit, and not so generally persuasive, as those drawn from the plain and sensible Topics, which the Experimental Philosophy enlargeth and illustrates.  
This then gives the greatest and fullest assurance of the Being of God, and acquaintance with this kind of Learning furnisheth us with the best Weapons to defend it. For the modern Atheists are pretenders to the Mechanic Principles, viz. those of mere Matter and Motion; and their pretensions cannot be shamed or defeated by any so well, as by those who throughly understand that wild Systeme of Opinions These indeed perceive, that there is only Nature in some things that are taken to be supernatural and miraculous, and the shallow Naturalist sees no further, and therefore rests in Nature; But the true Philosopher shows the vanity and unreasonableness of taking up so short; and discovers infinite Wisdom at the end of the Chain of Causes. I say, If we know no further than occult Qualities, Elements, Heavenly Influences and Forms, we shall never be able to disprove a Mechanic Atheist; but the more we understand of the Laws of Matter and Motion, the more shall we discern the necessity of a wise mind to order the blind and insensible Matter, and to direct the original Motions; without the conduct of which, the Universe could have been nothing but a mighty Chaos, and misshapen Mass of everlasting Confusions and Disorders. This of the FIRST, viz. That the knowledge of Nature serves Religion against Atheism; and that it doth also,  
(II.) AGainst Sadducism. 'Tis well known that the Sadduces denied the existence of Spirits, and Immortality of Souls; And the Heresy is sadly revived in our days.  
(1.) What a Spirit is; and whether there be Spirits, or not; are questions that appertain to the disquisition of Philosophy. The Holy Scripture, that condescends to the plain capacities of Men, useth the word Spirit (commonly) for the more subtle and invisible Bodies, and 'twill be difficult from thence to fetch a demonstrative proof of Spirits, in the strict Notion. That there are Angels and Souls which are purer than these gross Bodies, may no doubt be concluded from thence; But whether these are only a finer sort of Matter, or a different kind of Being's, cannot (I think) be determined by any thing delivered in the Divine Oracles. The Inquiry therefore belongs to Philosophy, which, from divers Operations in our own Souls concludes, That there is a sort of Being's which are not Matter or Body, viz. Being's, self-motive, penetrable and indivisible; Attributes directly contrary to those of Matter, which is impenetrable, divisible, and void of Self-motion. By these Properties, respectively, the distinct nature of Spirit and Body is known; and by the same, that there are Spirits, in the strictest sense, as well as corporeal Being's.  
Now by stating the Nature, and proving the Existence of Spirits, a very considerable service is done to Religion: For hereby our Notion of the adorable Deity is freed from all material grossness, in which way those must conceive him, that acknowledge nothing but Body in the World; which certainly is a very great disinterest to his Glory, and suggests very unbecoming thoughts of him. And by the due settling the Notion of a Spirit, the conceit of the Soul's Traduction, is overthrown, which either ariseth from direct Sadducism, or a defect in Philosophy. Hereby our Immortality is undermined, and dangerously exposed: But due Philosophical Disquisition will set us right in the Theory.  
For the former of the Errors mentioned, viz. the A●…hropomorphite Doctrines, that make God himself a corporeal Substance; Those cannot be disproved, but by the Use and Application of the Principles of Philosophy; Since let us bring what Arguments we can from the Scriptures, which speak of the Perfection, Infinity, Immensity, Wisdom, and other Attributes of God; These no doubt will be granted; but the Query will be, Whether all may not belong to a material Being; a question which Philosophy resolves; and there is no other way to search deep into this Matter, but by those Aids.  
So likewise as to the Traduction of the Soul; The Arguments from Scripture against it are very general; yea many expressions we find there, seem at first sight to look that way. And therefore this other help, Philosophy, must be used here also; and by the distinct representation which it gives of the Nature of Spirit, and Matter, and of the Operations that appertain to each, this Error is effectually confuted; which it cannot be by any other proceeding.  
Thus Philosophy befriends us against Sadducism, in the first Branch of it, as it explodes the being of Spirits.  
(2.) The other is, the denial of the Immortality of our Souls; The establishment of this likewise, the Students of Philosophy and God's Works have attempted in all Ages, and they have proved it by the Philosophical considerations of the nature of Sense; the quickness of Imagination; the spirituality of the Understanding; the freedom of the Will; from these they infer, that the Soul is immaterial, and from thence, that it is immortal; which Arguments are some of the most demonstrative and cogent that the mere reasons of Men can use; but cannot be managed, nor understood, but by those that are instructed in Philosophy and Nature.  
I confess there are other Demonstrations of our Immortality, for the plain Understandings that cannot reach those Heights. The Scripture gives clear evidence, and that of the Resurrection of the Holy Jesus, is palpable; But yet the Philosophical Proofs are of great use, and serve for the conviction of the Infidel, to whom the other inducements are nothing; and the deeper knowledge of things is necessary to defend this great Article of Religion against such Men, since they allege a sort of Arguments to prove the Soul to be mortal, that cannot be confuted but by a reason instructed in the Observations of Nature.  
For the Modern Sadduce pretends, that all things we do, are performed by mere Matter and Motion; and consequently, that there is no such thing as an immaterial Being: so that when our Bodies are dissolved, the whole Man is destroyed and lost for ever; which dismal conclusion is true and certain, if there be nothing in us but Matter, and the results of Motion; and those that converse but little with Nature, understand little what may be done by these; and so cannot be so well assured that the Elevations, Mixtures, and Combinations of them cannot be at last improved so far, as to make a sensible, reasoning Being; nor are they well able to disprove one, that affirms that they are actually advanced to that height: whereas he that hath much inquired into the Works of God and Nature, gains a clear sight of what Matter can perform, and gets more and stronger Arguments to convince him, that its Modifications and Changes cannot amount to perception and sense; since in all its Varieties, and highest Exaltations, he finds no Specimens of such Powers.  
And though, I confess, that all Mechanic Inquirers make not this use of their Inquisitions and Discoveries; yet that is not the fault of the Method, but of the Men; and those that have gone furthest in that way, have receded most from the Sadducean Doctrines. Among such, I suppose, I may be allowed to reckon the Noble Renatus Des-Cartes; And his Metaphysics and Notions of Immaterial Being's, are removed to the greatest distance from all Corporeal Affections; which I mention not to declare, or signify my adherence to those Principles; but for an Instance, to show, that acquaintance with Matter, and the knowledge of its Operations, removes the Mind far off from the belief of those high Effects which some ascribe to Corporeal Motions; and from all suppositions of the Soul's being bodily and material.  
Thus Philosophy is an excellent Antidote against Sadducism, in both the Main Branches of it. But then I must confess also, that the Philosophy of the late Peripatetic Writers doth rather assist, than overthrow this dangerous Infidelity; I mean, in what it teacheth concerning Substantial Forms, which I fear tends to the disabling all Philosophical Evidence of the Immortality of Humane Souls. For these Peripatetics make their Forms, a kind of medium between Body and Spirit, viz. Being's that are educed (as they speak) out of Matter; and are so dependent on it, that they perish utterly, or return into the bosom of the Matter, (as some cant) when they cease to inform it: But yet they allow not that those Forms are material in their essential Constitution and Nature.  
This is the Peripatetic account of substantial Forms, and such they assign to all Bodies, and teach, That the noblest sort of them are sensitive and perceptive, which are the Souls of Brutes.  
If this be so, that Being's which are not Spirits, but corruptible dependants upon Matter, may be endowed with Animadversion, and Sense; what Arguments have we then to show, that they may not have Reason also, which is but an Improvement, and higher degree of simple Perception? 'Tis as hard to be apprehended how any of the results of Matter, should perceive; as how they should join their Perceptions into Reasonings; and the same Propositions that prove the possibility of one, prove both; so that those who affirm that Beasts also have their degrees of true Reason, speak very consonantly to those Principles. And if such material, corruptible Forms as the Peripatetics describe, are sufficient for all the Actions and Perceptions of Beasts, I know not which way to go about to demonstrate, that a more elevated sort of them may not suffice for the reasonings of Men. To urge the Topics of Proof, I mentioned, from Notions, Compositions, Deductions, and the like, which are alleged to prove our Souls Immaterial; I say, to plead these, will signify nothing but this, That Humane Souls are no portions of Matter, nor corporeal in their formal Essence; But how will they evince, that they are not educed from it, that they depend not on Matter, and shall not perish, when their respective Bodies are dissolved. Certainly all those Arguments that are brought for our Immortality, are in this way clearly disabled. For all that we can say, will prove but this, That the Soul is no Body, or part of Matter; but this will amount to no evidence, if there are a middle kind of Essences, that are not corporeal, and yet mortal.  
So that when I say, Philosophy serves Religion against Sadducism, I would not be understood to mean the Peripatetic Hypotheseis; but that Philosophy which is grounded upon acquaintance with real Nature. This, by leaving this whole unintelligible sort of Being's out of its Accounts, (as things for which there is no shadow of ground from Reason, or Nature, but good evidence of their nonexistence from both) disappoints the Sadduce of the advantage he hath from this needless and precarious Principle. And by distributing Substance into Body, and Spirit, without the admission of middle Natures; the Real Philosophy gives demonstrative force to those Arguments for our Immortality, that prove our Souls are not Bodies; and so Sadducism is ruined by it.  
These things I have thought fit to advertise, not out of design to censure any particular way of Philosophy; but for the security of my Discourse. And though I have made a little bold with the Peripatetics here, yet the great Name of Aristotle, to which they pretend, is not concerned; for I am convinced, that he taught no such Doctrine of substantial Forms, as his later Sectators and Interpreters have imputed to Him; who indeed have depraved, and corrupted his sense, (almost) in the whole Body of his Principles; and have presented the World with their own Fancies, instead of the genuine Opinions of that Philosopher.  
But I proceed,  
(III.) THe Real Philosophy, that inquires into God's Works, assists Religion against Superstition, another of its fatal Enemies. That I may prove this, it must be premised,  
That Superstition consists, either in bestowing Religious Valuation and Esteem on things, in which there is no good; or fearing those, in which there is no hurt: So that this Folly expresseth itself, one while in doting upon Opinions, as Fundamentals of Faith; and Idoliziug the little Models of Fancy, for Divine Institutions: And then it runs away afraid of harmless, indifferent Appointments, and looks pale upon the appearance of any usual Effect of Nature. It tells ominous Stories of every Meteor of the Night; and makes sad Interpretations of each unwonted Accident: All which are the Products of Ignorance, and a narrow Mind; which defeat the Design of Religion, that would make us of a free, manly, and generous Spirit; and indeed represent Christianity as if it were a fond, sneaking, weak and peevish thing, that emasculates men's Understandings, making them amorous of toys, and keeping them under the servility of childish fears; so that hereby it is exposed to the distrust of larger Minds, and to the scorn of Atheists; These and many more are the mischiefs of Superstition, as we have sadly seen and felt.  
Now against this evil Spirit, and its Influences, the Real, Experimental Philosophy, is one of the best Securities in the World. For by a generous and open Inquiry in the great Field of Nature, men's minds are enlarged, and taken off from all fond adherences to their private Sentiments. They are taught by it, That Certainty is not in many things; and that the most valuable Knowledge is the practical; By which means they will find themselves disposed to more indifferency towards those petty Notions, in which they were before apt to place a great deal of Religion; and to reckon, that all that will signify, lies in the few, certain, operative Principles of the Gospel; and a Life suitable to such a Faith; not in doting upon Questions, and Speculations that engender strife: and thus the Modern, Experimental Philosophy of God's Works, is a Remedy against the notional Superstition (as I may call it) which hath been, and is so fatal to Religion, and the peace of Mankind.  
Besides which, (by making the Soul great) this Knowledge delivers it from fondness on small Circumstances, and imaginary Models; and from little scrupulosities about things indifferent, which usually work disquiet in narrow and contracted Spirits: And I have known divers, whom Philosophy, and not Disputes, hath cured of this Malady.  
This we may observe, that those Remedies are the best, and most effectual, that alter the temper and disposition of the Mind; For 'tis suitableness to that, which makes the way to men's Judgements, and settles them in their Persuasions. There are few that hold their Opinions by Arguments, and dry Reasonings, but by congruity to the Understanding, and consequently by relish in the Affections: So that seldom any thing cures our intellectual Diseases, (throughly) but what changes these. And I dare affirm, that the Free, Experimental Philosophy will do this to purpose, by giving the Mind another Tincture, and introducing a sounder Habit, which by degrees will repel and cast out all Malignities; and settle it in a strong and manly Temperament, that will master and put to flight all idle Dotages, and effeminate Fears.  
The Truth is, This World is a very Bedlam, and he that would cure Madmen, must not attempt it by Reasoning, or endeavour to show the absurdity of their Conceits; but such a course must be taken, as may restore the Mind to a right Crasis; and that (when it is effected) will reduce, and rectify the extravagances of the distempered Brain, which Disputes and Oppositions will but inflame and make worse. Thus, for instance, when frantic Persons are fond of Feathers, and mightily taken with the employment of picking Straws, 'twould signify very little, to represent to them the vanity of the Objects of their Delights; and when the Melancholist was afraid to sit down for fear of being broken, supposing himself of Glass, it had been to little purpose to have declared to him the ridiculousness of his Fears; the disposition of the Head was to be altered, before the particular Frenzy could be cured.  
'Tis too evident how just this is in the application to the present Age; Superstitious fondness, and fears are a real degree of madness. And though I cannot say that Philosophy must be the only Catholic way of Cure, (for of this, the far greatest part of Men is incapable) yet this I do affirm, that 'tis a Remedy, for those that are strong enough to take it: and the rest must be helped by that, which changeth the Genius; and this cannot, ordinarily, be done by any thing that opposeth the particular Fancy.  
However I must say, (2.) That the sort of Superstition which is yet behind in my account, and consists in the causeless fear of some Extraordinaries, in Accident, or Nature, is directly cured by that Philosophy, which gives fair likelihoods of their Causes; and shows that there is nothing in them supernatural; the light of the day drives away Apparitions, and vain Images that fancy forms in obscure shades, and darkness. Thus particularly the Modern Doctrine of Comets, which have been always great Bugbears to the guilty, and timorous World; hath rescued Philosophers from the trouble of dreadful Presages, and the mischievous Consequences that arise from those superstitious Abodings. For whatever the casual Coincidencies may be between those Phaenomena, and the direful Events, that are sometimes observed closely to attend them, (which, as my Lord Bacon truly notes, are observed when they bit, not when they miss) I say, notwithstanding these, the Real, Experimental Philosophy makes it appear, that they are Heavenly Bodies, far above all the Regions of Vapours, in which we are not concerned; and so they are neither the Signs, nor the Causes of our Mischiefs.  
And for the other little things, which afford Matter for the Tales about Prodigies, and other ominous Appearing, the knowledge of Nature, by exciting worthy and magnificent conceptions of the God of Nature; cures that blasphemous abuse of the adorable Majesty, whereby foolish Men attribute every trivial event that may serve their turns against those they hate, to his immediate, extraordinary interposal. For 'tis ignorance of God and his Works, that disposeth Men to absurd ridiculous Surmises, uncharitable Censures, seditious Machinations; and (so) to Thoughts that are prejudicial to the Glory of God, the Interests of Religion, and the security of Government; to that Justice and Charity we owe to others, and to the happiness that we seek ourselves. To which I add,  
That this kind of Superstition is a relic of Pagan Ignorance, which made Men look on Thunder, Eclipses, Earthquakes, and all the more terrifying Phaenomena of Nature, as the immediate Effects of Powers Supernatural; and to judge Events by flights of Birds, and garbages of cattle, by the accidental occursions of this Creature, and the other, and almost every casual occurrence. But these Particulars have been most ingeniously represented and reproved in a late very elegant Discourse about Prodigies; And though I do not acquiesce in the Design of that excellently penned Book, which is to discredit, and take away all kinds of Presages; Yet I think it hath done rarely well, so far as it discovers the folly and mischiefs of that ignorant and superstitious Spirit, that makes every thing a Prodigy. With such apprehensions as these, the knowledge of Nature fills those Minds that are instructed in it.  
And there is no doubt, but that the Antipathy the Real Philosophy bears to all the kinds of Superstition, is one cause why zealous Ignorance brands those Researches with the mark of Atheism and Irreligion. For superstitious Folly adopts those groundless Trifles, which Philosophy contemns and reproves, into the Family of Religion; and therefore reproacheth the Despisers of them, as Enemies to the Faith and Power of Godliness.  
So it fared with some of the bravest Spirits of ancient times, who have had black Characters fixed upon their great and worthy Names, only for their Oppositions of the foolish Rites and Idolatries of the vulgar Heathen. We know the case of Socrates: And (as to the interest of their Names) that of Anaxagoras, Theodorus, Protagoras, and Epicurus, was much worse; the causeless infamy coming down the Stream as far as the last Ages. Since then, we know who was an Heretic for saying there were Antipodes; and a Pope was taken for a Conjurer for being a Mathematician; yea those noble Sciences were counted Diabolical; and even the Sacred Language could scarce escape the suspicion. In later times Galileo fell into the Inquisition for the Discoveries of his Telescopes; and Campanella could not endeavour to assert, and vindicate the freedom of his Mind, without losing that of his Person.  
I might come nearer to our own days, and knowledge: Gothick barharity, and the Spirit of the juquisition is not quite worn out of the Reformation; Though indeed it ordinarily remains but among the scum and dregs of Men: And no one is either less Religious, or less Wise for being accounted an Atheist by the common Rabble. But wherever the knowledge of Nature, and God's Works hath in any degree obtained, those vile Superstitions have been despised, and put to an infamous flight. But to take another step,  
(IV.) THe Real Philosophy, and knowledge of God's Works, serves Religion against Enthusiasm, another dreadful Enemy. Now Enthusiasm is a false conceit of Inspiration; and all the bold and mistaken Pretensions to the Spirit in our days, are of this sort. What particularly Religion hath suffered from it, would be too long to reckon upon this occasion; It will be enough to say, in an Age that hath so much and such sad experience of it, That Enthusiasm hath introduced much phantastry into Religion, and made way for all imaginable Follies, and even Atheism itself; which it hath done two ways. (1.) By crying up the Excesses and Diseases of Imagination for the greatest height of Godliness; And (2.) By the disparagrment of sober Reason, as an Enemy to the Principles of Faith. And Philosophy assists Religion against both these.  
FOR the first in order; The real knowledge of Nature detects the dangerous imposture, by showing what strange things may be effected by no diviner a cause than a strong Fancy impregnated by Heated Melancholy; For this sometimes warms the Brain to a degree that makes it very active and imaginative, full of odd Thoughts, and unexpected Suggestions; so that if the Temper determine the Imagination to Religion, it flies at high things, at interpretations of dark and Prophetic Scriptures; at Predictions of future Events, and mysterious Discoveries, which the Man expresseth fluently and boldly, with a peculiar and pathetic Eloquence; which pregnances being not ordinary, but much beyond the usual tone and temper of the Enthusiast; and he having heard great things of the Spirits immediate Motions and Inspirations, cannot well fail of believing himself inspired, and of intitling all the excursious of his Fancy to the immediate Actings of the Holy Ghost: and those thoughts by the help of natural pride and self-love, will work also exceedingly upon the heightened Affections, and they upon the Body so far, as to cast it sometimes into Raptures, Ecstasies, and Deliquiums of Sense, in which every Dream is taken for a Prophecy, every Image of the Fancy for a Vision, and all the glaring of the Imagination for new Lights and Revelations.  
Thus have our Modern Prophets been inspired by Temper and Imagination, and not by Design only; For we may not think they are all Hypocrites and knowing Impostors; No, they generally believe themselves, and the strength of their highly invigorated Fancies shuts out the sober Light of Reason that should disabuse them, as sleep doth that of our External Senses in our Dreams. And the silly People that understand not Nature, but are apt to take every thing that is vebement to be sacred, are easily deceived into the belief of those Pretensions; and thus Diseases have been worshipped for Religion. This account the Philosophy of Humane Nature gives of that, by which the World hath been so miserably abused.  
And when we cast our eyes abroad, we may plainly see that those glorious things are no more, than what hath been done by the Extatick Priests of the Heathen Oracles, and the Madmen of all Religions; by Sibyls, Lunatics, Poets, Dreamers, and transported Persons of all sorts: And it may be observed daily to what degrees of elevation excess of drinking will heighten the Brain, making some witty, nimble, and eloquent, much beyond the ordinary proportion of their Parts and Ingenuity; and inclining others to be hugely devour, who usually have no great sense of Religion; As I knew one, who would pray rapturously when he was drunk, but at other times was a moping Sot, and could scarce speak sense.  
Thus also some kinds of Madness, Diseases, Accidents, Peculiarities of Temper, and other natural things that heat the Brain, fill Men with high surprising Conceits about Religion, and furnish them with fervid Devotion, great readiness of Expression, and unexpected applications of Scripture to their crazy Conceits; I say, the Experimental Philosophy of our Natures informs us, that all this is common in alienations, and singularities of Mind and Complexion. And they were remarkable in the Prophets of the Heathen, and the Priest whom Saint Austin knew, that would whine himself into an Ecstasy; In the wonderful Discourses of the American Bishop, that said he was the Holy Ghost, and the canting fluency of the Germane Enthusiasts, some of whose Imaginations were as wild and extravagant; of such Instances I might make up a much larger Catalogue, if I should descend to our Domestic Lunatics, but their temper is well known, and therefore I only add this more;  
That I have often met with a poor Woman in the North, whose habitual conceit it was, That she was Mother of God, and of all things living; I was wont to personate a kind of compliance with her Fancy, and a modest desire to be further informed about it; which gentleness drew from her so many odd fetches of Discourse, such applications of Scripture, and such wonderful references to Things, in which she was never instructed, that looked like glean out of Hobbs and Epicurus, that I have been much amazed at her talk: And yet when I diverted her to any thing else of ordinary Matters, she spoke usually with as much sobriety and cold discretion, as could well be expected from a Person of her Condition; nor did she use to be extravagant in any thing, but about that particular Imagination; which Instance among many others I might produce, very much confirms me in the truth of that Observation of those Philosophers who have given us the best light into the Enthusiastic Temper, viz. That there is a sort of madness, which takes Men in some particular things, when they are sound in others: which one Proposition will afford a good account of many of the Phaenomena of Enthusiasm; and shows that the Extravagants among us may be really distracted in the Affairs of Religion, though their Brains are untouced in other Matters.  
Thus a Philosophical use of observation, and the knowledge of Humane Nature by it, helps us to distinguish between the Effects of the adorable Spirit, and those of an hot distempered Fancy; which is no small advantage for the securing the Purity, Honour, and all the interests of Religion.  
But (2.) there is another mischief of the Enthusiastic Spirit behind, and that is its bringing Reason into disgrace, and denying the use thereof in the Affairs of Faith and Religion: This is an evil that is the cause of many more; for it hath brought into the World all kinds of Phantastry and Folly, and exposed Religion to Contempt and Derision, by making Madness and Diseases Sacred: It leads men's Minds into a maze of confused Imaginations, and betrays them into Bogs and Precipices, deprives them of their Light and their Guide, and lays them open to all the Delusions of Satan, and their own distempered Brains: It takes Religion off from its Foundations, and leaves the Interest of Eternity in men's Souls, to Chance, and the Hits of Imagination; teaching those that are deluded to lay the stress of all upon Raptures, Heats, and Mysterious Notions, while they forget●… and scorn the plain Christianity which is an imitation of Christ in Charity, Humility, Justice, and Purity; in the exercise of all Virtue, and command of ourselves: It renders Men obnoxious to all the Temptations of Atheism, and the blackest Infidelity; and makes it impossible to convince an Infidel, to settle one that doubts, or to recover one that is fallen off from the Faith. These Evils I am content only to name in this place, having represented them more fully in another Discourse; and the experience of our own Age may convince us, with a little consideration upon it, That all those fatal Mischiefs have been t●… Effects of the Contempt, and Disparagement of Reason.  
But yet though I affirm this, I am not so rash, or so unjust as to believe, or say, That this Spirit hath produced all those s●…d things in every one that speaks hotly, and inconsiderately against Reason: I am far from the wildness of such a censure, because I know how much imprudent Zeal, customary Talk, high Pretensions, and superstitious Fears, may work even upon honest Minds, who many times hold bad things in the Principle, which they deny in the Practice, and so are upright in their Wills, while they are very much confused, and mistaken in their Understandings. This I account to be the case of multitudes of pious People in reference to Reason. They have heard hotheaded indiscreet Men declaim against it, and many of them, whose Opinions will not bear the Light, have an interest to do so; Their Pretensions were plausible, and their Zeal great; their Talk loud, and their Affirmations bold; and the honest well-meaning Folks are caught in their Affections; and these lead bad Principles into their Minds, which are neither disposed, nor able to examine: So they believe and speak after their Teachers; and say, That Reason is a low, dull thing, ignorant of the Spirit, and an Enemy to Faith and Religion; while in this they have no clear thoughts, nor yet any evil meaning; But let these Fancies swim atop in their Imaginations, and upon occasions they run out at the Tongue's end, though they are not always improved to those deadly Practices. For Charity and Caution I have said this; but yet nothing hinders but that all the forecited Evils are justly said to be the Tendencies, and in too many Instances have been, and are the Effects of this Spirit.  
And now I doubt not but 'twill be granted readily by all considering Men, that whatever assists Religion against this destructive Enemy, doth it most important service; and this the Free and Real Philosophy doth in a very eminent degree.  
In order to the proof of this, we may consider what I intimated just now, viz. That Men are led into, and kept in this Fancy of the Enmity of Reason to Religion, chiefly by two things:  
(1.) By an implicit assent to the Systemes and Distates of those who first instructed them; And (2.) By defect in clearness of Thoughts, and the ability to state things distinctly, and to understand their Dependencies and Sequels; Both which Imperfections the Free Philosophy cures.  
For as to the First, (1.) That Philosophy begins with the enlargement of the Mind, and attempts to free it from Prejudices and Pre-ingagements, which sophisticate and pervert our Judgements, and render us incapable of discerning Things as they are. Modest, impartial enquiry is the Foundation of the real, experimental way of Philosophy. Not that it teacheth Scepticism and Neutrality in all Things, but this Caution in our Disquisitions, That we do not suddenly give firm assents to Things not well understood or examined: which no doubt is very just and safe. But as to what concerns those, who through ignorance, or other occasions, are incapable of making due enquiry, I think they ought not to concern themselves about Matters of Speculation at all; or at least not to affirm any thing positively about them. 'Tis enough for such to believe and practise the plain Duties of Religion, which are clear in the Holy Oracles, and with which they may be acquainted without much sagacity, or deep Judgement: For Matters of Theory, and difficult Enquiry, appertain not to the vulgar and lower rank of Understandings: But for those who are capable of search after Truth, and are provided with anvantages for it, Freedom of Judgement is necessary in order to their success. With this, I said, the Real Philosophy begins; and in all its progresses still more and more disposeth the Mind to it, and so delivers it from the vassalage of Customary Sayings and Opinions.  
And now whoever is so disposed, will not be so ready to believe that Reason is an Enemy to Religion, till he have considered, and examined the Matter with an impartial Judgement: And I dare say, whoever shall do that, will want nothing to convince him, that such an Opinion is false and groundless, but clear and distinct Thoughts, and the knowledge of Consequence, with which Philosophy will furnish him.  
This is the second way whereby it helps to overthrow this Principle of Enthusiasm, viz.  
(2.) By teaching us to state Matters clearly, and to draw out those conclusions that are lodged in them. For 'tis confusion of Notions, and a great defect in reasoning, that makes dark Zeal to rave so furiously against Reason. Now Philosophy is Reason methodised, and improved by Study, Observation, and Experiment; and whoever is addicted to these, is exercised frequently in inquiry after the Causes, Properties, and Relations of Things, which will enure the Mind to great intentness, and enable it to define and distinguish, and infer rightly; And by these the Allegations against Reason will be made appear to be idle Sophisms, that have no sound sense or substance in them.  
And though the Discourses of some, who have talked much of Philosophy and Reason, have been sometimes bold and saucy, and opposite to the Interests of Religion: Yet true Philosophy, and well managed Reason, vindicate Religion from those abuses, and show, that there was Sophistry and imposture in those Pretensions: So that they are no more to be blamed for the Insolences and Riots of those that usurp their Name, than Religion itself is, for the Immoralities of such as clothe themselves in the Garments of external Piety and Saintship. Thus of the services of Philosophy against ENTHUSIASM. I come now to the last Instance.  
(V.) IT helps Religion against the Humour of Disputing; By which I mean that evil Genius, that makes Men confident of uncertain Opinions; and clamorously contentious against every different Judgement. This is that pestilent Spirit that turns Religion into Air of Notion, and makes it intricate and uncertain; subject to eternal Quarrels, and Obnoxious to Scepticism and Infidelity; That which supplants Charity, Modesty, Peace, and Meekness; substituting in their room, Rage and Insolence, Pride and Bitter Zeal, Clamours and Divisions, and all the Opposites of the Spirit of Christ, and the Gospel. So that, it depraves Religion, and makes its Sacred Name an Instrument to promote the Projects of the Kingdom of Darkness; by envenoming Men one against another, and inflaming their Spirits, and crumbling them into Sects, and disturbing Societies; and so it hinders the Progress of the Gospel, and lays it open to the scorns of unbelievers; it turns Men from the desire of practising, to the itch of talking, and abuses them into this dangerous belief, That Godliness consists more in their beloved Orthodoxy, than in a sober Virtue, and the exercise of Charity; it makes them pert and pragmatical; buste about the Reformation of others, while they neglect their own Spirits; fancying a perfection in the fluency of the Tongue, while the worst of Passions have the Empire of their Souls. These are some of the sad Effects of the Humour of Disputing, which hath done deplorable execution upon Religion in all Places and Times; and therefore 'tis none of the least Services that can be afforded it, to destroy this evil Genius; and there is nothing, merely humane, that contributes more towards the rooting of it out of the World, than the Free and Real Philosophy. For,  
(1.) An intimate Commerce with God's Works, gives us to see the mighty Difficulties that are to be met in the speculation of them; and thereby Men are made less confident of their Sentiments about Nature, and by many Considerations and Observations of this kind, are at length brought to such an habitual Modesty, that they are afraid to pass bold Judgements upon those Opinions in Religion, of which there is no infallible assurance.  
And (2.) By the frequent exercises of our Minds, we come to be made sensible how easily, and how oft we are deceived, through the fallibility of Sense, and shortness of our Understandings; by Education, Authority, Interest, and our Affections; and so are disposed to a more prudent coldness and diffidence in things of doubtful Speculation, by which the Disputing Humour is destroyed at the bottom. Besides which,  
(3.) The Real Philosophy brings Men in-love with the Practical Knowledge: The more we have employed ourselves in Notion and Theory, the more we shall be acquainted with the uncertainty of Speculation; and our esteem, and love of Opinions will abate, as that sense increaseth: By the same degrees our respect and kindness for Operative knowledge will advance, and grow; which disposition will incline us also to have less regard to Niceties in Religion, and teach us to lay out our chief Cares and Endeavours about Practical and certain Knowledge, which will assist and promote our Virtue, and our Happiness; and incline us to employ ourselves in living according to it; And this also will be an effectual means to destroy the Humour of Contending.  
(4.) Philosophy gives us a sight of the Causes of our Intellectual Diversities; and so lessens our expectation of an Agreement in Opinions; and by this, it discovers the unreasonableness of making c●…sent in less certain Tenants, the condition of Charity and Union; and of being angry, and dividing upon every difference of Judgement; By which the hurtful Malignities of Disputes are qualified, and the Disease itself is undermined.  
(5.) It inclines Men to place the Essential Principles of Religion only in the plain, and certain Articles. For Philosophers are disposed to think, that Certainty is in a little room: And whoever believes so, concerning the Tenants of Theology, will not lay the main stress upon any, but the clear acknowledged Principles; by which prudent Caution he serves all the important Concernments of Religion. He will not wrangle for every Conceit; nor divide for every Difference; but takes care to walk in the ways of Charity and Obedience; And so the Church is safe, and Schisms are prevented and cured.  
(6.) The Real Philosophy ends many Disputes, by taking Men off from unnecessary Terms of Art, which very often are the chief occasions of the Contests: If things were stated in clear and plain words, many Controversies would be ended; and the Philosophy I am recommending, inclines Men to define with those that are simplest and plainest; and thereby also it very much promotes the Interests both of Truth and Peace.  
In sum, I say, the Free and Real Philosophy makes Men deeply sensible of the Infirmities of Humane Intellect, and our manifold hazards of mistaking, and so renders them wary and modest, diffident of the certainty of their Conceptions, and averse to the boldness of peremptory asserting. So that the Philosopher thinks much, and examines many things, separates the Certainties from the Plausibilities, that which is presumed from that which is proved; the Images of Sense, Fancy, and Education, from the results of genuine and impartial Reason. Thus he doth before he Assents or Denies; and then he takes with him also a Sense of his own Fallibility and Defects, and never concludes but upon resolution to alter his Mind upon contrary Evidence. Thus he conceives warily, and he speaks with as much caution and reserve, in the humble Forms of [So I think, and In my Opinion, and Perhaps 'tis so—] with great difference to opposite Persuasion, candour to Dissenters, and calmness in Contradictions, with readiness and desire to learn, and great deligh●… in the Discoveries of Truth, and Detections of his own Mistakes. When he argues he gives his Reasons without Passion, and shines without flaming, Discourses without wrangling, and differs without dividing. He catcheth not at the Infirmities of his Opposite, but lays hold of his Strength, and weighs the Substance without blowing the dust in his eyes. He entertains what he finds reasonable, and suspends his Judgement when he doth not clearly understand. This is the Spirit with which Men are inspired by the Philosophy I recommend. It makes them so just, as to allow that liberty of Judgement to others, which themselves desire, and so prevents all imperious Dictates and Imposing, all Captious Quarrels and Notional Wars. And that this is the Philosophic Genius, may be shown in a grand Instance, the ROYAL SOCIETY, which is the Great Body of Practical Philosophers. In this Assembly, though it be made up of all kinds of Dispositions, Professions, and Opinions; yet hath Philosophy so rarely tempered the Constitution, that those that attend there, never see the least inclination to any unhandsome opposition or uncivil reflection, no bold obtrusions or confident sayings. The forbearing such Rudenesses is indeed a Law of that Society, and their Designs and Methods of Inquiry, naturally form Men into the modest temper, and secure them from the danger of the Quarrelsome Genius. This is palpable evidence of the sweet Humour, and ingenious Tendencies of the Free Philosophy; and I believe 'twill be hard to show such another Example in any so great a Body of differing Inclinations and Apprehensions. Thus the Experimental Learning rectifies the grand Abuse, which the Notional Knowledge hath so long fostered and promoted, to the hindrance of Science, the disturbance of the World, and the prejudice of the Christian Faith. And there is no doubt, but as it hath altered and reform the Genius in Matters of Natural Research and Inquiry; so it will in its progress dispose men's Spirits to more Calmness and Modesty, Charity and Prudence in the Differences of Religion, and even Silence Disputes there. For the free sensible Knowledge tends to the altering the Crasis of men's Minds, and so cures the Disease at the Root; and true Philosophy is a Specific against Disputes and Divisions.  
To confirm which we may observe further, That wherever this sort of Knowledge prevails, the Contentious Divinity loseth ground; and 'twill be hard to find any one of those Philosophers, that is a zealous Votary of a Sect: which reservedness doth indeed give occasion to Sectaries, and Bigotts to accuse them of Atheism and Irreligion: But it really is no Argument of less Piety; but of more Consideration and Knowledge. And 'twould make much for the advantage of Religion, and their own, if those fierce Men would understand, that Christianity should teach them that, which they rail against in the Philosophers.  
But now I must expect to hear,  
(I.) That Disputes serve to discover Truth; as latent Fire is excited, and disclosed by the collision of hard Bodies: So that the Pretence is, That Philosophy doth, on this account, rather disserve than promote the Interests of Religion.  
To this, I Answer, (1.) That all the necessary, material Truths in Divinity are already discovered; and we have no need of New Lights there, the Ancientest are truest and best; though in the disquisitions of Philosophy, there will be always occasions of proceeding. I add, (2.) Disputes are one of the worst ways to discover Truth; If new things were to be found out in Religion, as well as Nature, they would scarce be disclosed by this way of Enquiry. A calm Judgement, and distinct Thoughts, and impartial Consideration of many things, are necessary for the finding Truth; which lies deep, and is mingled up and down with much Error, and specious falsehood; and 'tis hard, if not utterly impossible, to preserve any one of these in the heat of Disputation: In such Occasions, the Mind is commonly disordered by Passion, and the Thoughts are confused, and our Considerations tied to those things which give colour to our Opinions. We are bias by our Affections towards our own Conceits; and our love to them is inflamed by opposition; we are made incapable of entertaining the assistance of our Opposites Suggestions by strong prejudice, and inclined to quarrel with every thing he saith by spite, and desire of triumph: and these are ill Circumstances for the discovery of Truth: He is a wonderful Man indeed that can thread a Needle when he is at Cudgels in a crowd; and yet this is as easy, as to find Truth in the hurry of Disputation. The Apostle intimates, 1 Tim. 6. 5. That perverse Disputers are destitute of Truth; and tells us, That of the strife of words come envy, rail, evil surmisings, but no discovery of unknown Verities.  
But (II.) we are told, in favour of Disputes in Religion, That we are to contend earnestly for the Faith that was once delivered to the Saints; and hereby Heresies are said to be confuted and overthrown: So that the disabling and suppressing of Disputes, seems to be a weakening, rather than any advantage to Religion, and the Concernments of it.  
To this, I say, That by the Faith we are to contend for, I conceive, the Essentials, and certain Articles are meant; These we may, and we ought, to endeavour to defend and promote, as there is occasion; and we have seen, how the Real Philosophy will help our Reasons in that Service. But pious Contentions for these, are not the dispute of which I am now discoursing, those are stiff Contests about uncertain Opinions: And such I dare very boldly say, are no Contentions for the Faith, but the Instruments of the greatest mischiefs to it. As for those other Disputes that are used to convince Men of the Truths of the Gospel, and the great Articles thereof; and for the disproving Infidelity and Heresy; they are necessary, and Philosophy is an excellent help in such Contests.  
So that those other Objections pleadable from the necessity of proving and trying our Faith, and convincing Heretics; From the Example of our Saviour's disputing with the Doctors and the Sadduces, and of St. Paul at Athens with the Jews; These, and such other little Cavils, can signify nothing to the disadvantage of what I have said about the Humour of Disputing, in Matters of doubtful and uncertain Opinions; against which the Real Philosophy is an Antidote.  
ANd thus I have shown, under five material Heads, That the knowledge of Nature, and the Works of God, promotes the greatest Interests of Religion; and by the three last it appears how fundamentally opposite it is to all Schism and Fanaticism, which are made up and occasioned by Superstition, Enthusiasm, and ignorant, perverse Dispute. So that for Atheists, and Sadduces, and fanatics, to detest and inveigh against Philosophy, is not at all strange; 'Tis no more than what may well be expected from Men of that sort; Philosophy is their Enemy; and it concerns them to disparage and reproach it: But for the Sober and Religious to do any thing so unadvised, and so prejudicial to Religion, is wonderful and deplorable: To set these right in their Judgement about Philosophical Inquiry into God's Works, is the Principal design of these Papers; and in order to the further promoting of it, I advance to the last Head of Discourse proposed, viz.  
(IV.) THat the Ministers and Professors of Religion ought not to discourage, but promote the knowledge of Nature, and the Works of its Author.  
This is the result of the whole Matter, and follows evidently upon it. And though it will not infer a necessity of all men's deep search into Nature, yet this it will, That no Friend or Servant of Religion should hinder or discountenance such Inquiries: And though most private Christians, and some public Ministers, have neither leisure nor ability to look into Matters of natural Research and Inquisition; yet they ought to think candidly, and wish well to the endeavours of those that have; and 'tis a sin and a folly either in the one or other to censure, or discourage those worthy Undertake. So that I cannot without trouble, observe how apt some are, that pretend much to Religion, and some that minister in it, to load those that are studious of God's Works, with all the studious Names that contempt and spite can suggest; The Irreligion of which injurious carriage, nothing can excuse but their ignorance; And I will rather hope that they neither know what they say, nor what they do, than believe that they have any direct design against the Glory of their Maker, or against any laudable endeavours to promote it.  
I know well what mischief Prejudice will do, even upon Minds that otherwise are very honest, and intelligent enough. And there are many common slanders, and some plausible Objections in the Mouths of the Zealous against Philosophy, which have begot an ill Opinion of it in well-meaning Men, who have never examined things with any depth of Inquiry. For the sake of such, I shall produce the most considerable Allegations of both sorts, and I hope make such returns to them, as may be sufficient to satisfy those whose Minds are not barred by Obstinacy, or Ignorance.  
I speak first of the bold and broad Slanders, among which, that  
(I.) Of Atbeism is one of the most ordinary; But certainly 'tis one of the most unjust Accusations that Malice and Ignorance could have invented. This I need not be industrious to prove here, having made it appear, that Philosophy is one of the best Weapons in the World to defend Religion against it; and my whole Discourse is a confutation of this envious and foolish charge.  
Concerning it I take notice, That Philosophical Men are usually dealt with by the Zealous, as the greatest Patrons of the Protestant Cause are by the Sects. For as the Bishops and other Learned Persons, who have most strongly oppugned the Romish Faith, have had the ill luck to be accused of Popery themselves; in like manner it happens to the humblest and deepest Inquisitors into the Works of God, who have the most and fullest Arguments of his Existence, have raised impregnable Ramparts, with much industry and pious pains against the Atheists, and are the only Men that can with success serve Religion against the Godless Rout; These, Superstitious Ignorance hath always made the loudest outcry against, as if themselves were guilty of that which they have most happily oppugned and defeated. And the certain way to be esteemed an Atheist by the fierce and ignorant Devoto's, is to study to lay the Foundations of Religion sure, and to be able to speak groundedly and to purpose against the desperate Cause of the black Conspirators against Heaven. And the greatest Men that have employed their Time and Thoughts this way, have been pelted with this Dirt, while they have been labouring in the Trenches, and endeavouring to secure the Foundations of the Holy Fabric.  
But besides I observe, That narrow, angry People take occasion to charge the freer Spirits with Atheism, because they move in a larger Circle, and have no such fond adherence to some Opinions which they adore and count Sacred. And for my own part, I confess I have not Superstition enough in my Spirit or Nature, to incline me to dote upon all the Principles I judge true, or to speak so dogmatically about them, as I perceive confident and disputing Men are wont. But contenting myself, with a firm assent to the few practical Fundamentals of Faith, and having fixed that end of the Compass, I desire to preserve my Liberty as to the rest, holding the other in such a posture, as may be ready to draw those Lines, my Judgement informed by the Holy Oracles, the Articles of our Church, the Apprehensions of wise Antiquity, and my particular Reason, shall direct me to describe. And when I do that, 'tis for myself, and my own satisfaction; but am not concerned to impose my Sentiments upon others: nor do I care to endeavour the change of their Minds, though I judge them mistaken, as long as Virtue, the Interests of Religion, the Peace of the World and their own are not prejudiced by their Errors. By this modest indifference I secure Charity for all the diversities of Belief, and equally offer my Friendship and Converses to the several Sects and Persuasions, that stick to the plain Principles of the Gospel and a Virtuous Life, overlooking their particular fondnesses and follies. This is the temper of my Genius, and this some warm People, who have more Heat than Light, are apt to call Scepticism and cold Neutrality: But that it deserves better Names, I have made appear in some other Papers.  
True it is, That the Men of the mere Epicurean sort, have left God, and Providence out of their Accounts; But other Philosophers have shown what Fools they are for doing so, and how absurd their pretended Philosophy is in supposing things to have been made and ordered by the casual hits of Atoms, in a mighty Void. And though their general Doctrine of Matter and Motion be exceeding ancient, and very accountable; when we suppose Matter was at first created by Almighty Power, and its Motions ordered, and directed by Omniscient Wisdom; Yet the supposal, that they are independent and eternal, is very precarious and unreasonable. And that all the regular Motions in Nature should be from blind tumultuous jumblings, intermixtures, is the most unphilosophical Fancy, and ridiculous Dotage in the World; So that there is no reason to accuse Philosophy of a Fault, which Philosophy sufficiently shames and reproves; and yet I doubt too many have entertained great prejudice against it upon this score; and 'tis a particular brand upon some of the modern Men, that they have revived the Philosophy of Epicurus, which they think to be in its whole extent Atheistical and Irreligious.  
To which I say, that the Opinion of the World's being made by a fortuitous concurrence of Atoms, is impious and vile: And this those of Epicurus his Elder School taught: Whereas the late Restorers of the Corpuscularian Hypothesis hate, and despise the wicked and absurd Doctrine; But thus far they think the Atomical Philosophy reasonable, viz. as it teacheth, That the Operations of Nature are performed by subtle streams of minute Bodies; and not by I know not what imaginary Qualities and Forms: They think, That the various Motions and Figures of the parts of Matter, are enough for all the Phaenomena, and all the varieties, which with relation to our Senses we call such, and such Qualities. But then they suppose, and teach, That God created Matter, and is the supreme Orderer of its Motions, by which all those Diversities are made: And hereby Piety, and the Faith of Providence is secured.  
This, as far as we know any thing of elder Times, was the ancient Philosophy of the World, and it doth not in the least interfere with any Principle of Religion. Thus far I dare say I may undertake for most of the Corpuscularian Philosophers of our times, excepting those of M. Hobbes his way.  
And therefore I cannot but wonder at a late Reverend Author, who seems to conclude those Modern Philosophers under the name and notion of such Somatists, as are for mere Matter and Motion, and exclude immaterial Being's: whereas those Learned Men, though they own Matter and Motion as the material and formal causes of the Phenomena; They do yet acknowledge God's Efficiency, and Government of all Things, with as much seriousness; and contend for it with as much zeal, as any Philosophers or Divines whatsoever. And 'tis very hard that any number of Men should be exposed to the suspicion of being Atheists, for denying the Peripatetic Qualities and Forms; and there is nothing else overthrown by the Corpuscularian Doctrines, as they are managed by those Philosophers. So that methinks that Reverend Person hath not dealt so fairly with the great Names of Des-Cartes, and Gassendus, where he mentions them promiscuously with the mere Epicurean and Hobbian Somatists, without any note to distinguish them from those Sadduces; For both those celebrated Men have laboured much in asserting the Grand Articles of Religion against the Infidel and Atheist.  
But (2.) 'tis alleged by some, Philosophy disposeth Men to despise the Scriptures; or at least to neglect the study of them; and therefore is to be slighted, and exploded among Christians.  
To this I say, That Philosophy is the knowledge of God's Works; and there is nothing in God's Works that is contrary to his Word; How then should the study of the one incline Men to despise the other? Certainly had there been any such impious tendency in searching into God's Works to the lessening of our value of the Scriptures, The Scripture itself would never have recommended it so much unto us; Yea, this is so far from being true, that on the contrary, the knowledge of God's Works tends in its proper nature to dispose Men to love and veneration of the Scriptures; For by familiarity with Nature, we are made sensible of the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, fresh Instances of which we shall find in all things; And 'tis one great design of the Scripture to promote the Glory of these Attributes: How then can he, that is much affected with them, choose but love, and esteem those Holy Records which so gloriously illustrate the Perfections he admires?  
Besides, by inquiry into God's Works, we discover continually, how little we can comprehend of his Ways and Menagements; and he that is sensible of this, will find himself more inclined to reverence the declarations of his Word, though they are beyond his reach, and though he cannot fathom those Mysteries, he is required to believe: Such a disposition is necessary for the securing our Reverence to the Divine Oracles, and Philosophy promotes it much.  
So that, though 'tis like enough, there may be those that pretend to Philosophy, who have less veneration and respect for the Scripture than they ought, yet that impious disesteem of those sacred Writings, is no effect of their Philosophy, but of their corrupt and evil Inclinations: And to remove the scandal brought upon Natural Wisdom by those Pretenders, it may be observed, that none are more earnest, or more frequent in the proof and recommendation of the Authority of Scripture, than those of Philosophical Inclination and Genius, who by 〈◊〉 ●…mblick Capacity and Profession, have the best opportunities to give testimony to the Honour of that Divine Book.  
But to justify the imputation of the disservice Philosophy doth Religion, and the Scriptures, it may by some be pleaded,  
That Philosophy, viz. that which is called, the new, teacheth Doctrines that are coutrary to the Word of God; or at least such as we have no ground from Scripture to believe; For instance, That the Earth moves: and, That the Moon is of a Terrestrial Nature, and capable of Inhabitants: which Opinions are presumed to be impious, and Antiscriptural.  
In return to this, I say,  
(1.) In the general; 'Tis very true, that Philosophy teacheth many things which are not revealed in Scripture; for this was not intended to instruct Men in the Affairs of Nature; but its Design is, to direct Mankind, and even those of the plainest Understandings, in Life and Manners; to propose to us the way of Happiness, and the Principles that are necessary to guide us in it; with the several Motives and Encouragements that are proper to excite our Endeavours, and to bear them up against all Difficulties and Temptations. This, I say, was the chief Design of that Divine Book; and therefore 'tis accommodated, in the main, to the most ordinary capacities, and speaks after our manner, suitably to sense, and vulgar Conception. Thus we find that the Clouds are called Heaven, the Moon one of the greater Lights, and the Stars mentioned, as less considerable: and the Stars also, Gen. 1. We read of the going down of the Sun, and of the ends of the Earth, and of the Heavens; and divers other such Expressions are in the Scriptures, which plainly show, That they do not concern themselves to rectify the Mistakes of the Vulgar, in Philosophical Theories, but comply with their Infirmities, and speak according as they understand. So that,  
(2.) No Tenent in Philosophy ought to be condemned and exploded, because there may be some occasional Sayings in the Divine Oracles, which seem not to comport with it; And therefore the Problems mentioned, concerning the Motion of the Earth; and Terrestrial Nature of the Moon, aught to be left to the Disquisitions of Philosophy: The Word of God determines nothing about them; for those Expressions, concerning the running of the Sun, and its standing still, may very well be interpreted, as spoken by way of accommodation to Sense, and common apprehension; as 'tis certain, that those of its going down, and running from one end of the Heavens to the other, and numerous resembling Sayings, are so to be understood. And when 'tis elsewhere said, That the Foundations of the Earth are so fixed, that it cannot be moved at any time, or to that purpose; 'Tis supposed, by Learned Men, that nothing else is meant but this, That the Earth cannot be moved from its Centre, which is no prejudice to the Opinion of its being moved upon it.  
For the other Hypothesis of the Moon's being a kind of Earth; the Scripture hath said nothing of it, on either hand; nor can its silence be argumentative here, since we know, That all Mankind believes many things, of which there is no mention there: As that there are such places as China, and America, That the Magnet attracts Iron, and directs to the North, and that the Sea hath the motion of Flux, and Reflux, with ten thousand such other things discovered by Experience, of which there is not the least hint in the Sacred Volume: And are not these to be believed, till they can be proved from Scripture? This is ridiculously to abuse the Holy Oracles, and to extend them beyond their proper Business and Design.  
To argue against this Supposal, as some do, by Queries, What Men are in that other Earth? Whether fallen? and how saved? is very childish and absurd. He that holds the Opinion, may confess his ignorance in all these things, without any prejudice to his Hypothesis of the Moon's being habitable; or the supposal of its being actually inhabited. For that may be, though no living Man can tell the Nature and Condition of those Creatures.  
But for my part, I assert neither of these Paradoxes; only I have thought fit to speak thus briefly about them, that they may be left to the freedom of Philosophical Inquiry, for the Scripture is not concerned in such Queries. And yet besides this, which might suffice to vindicate the Neoterick Philosophy, from the charge of being injurious to the Scripture in such Instances, I add,  
(3.) The Free Experimental Philosophy which I recommend, doth not affirm either of those so much dreaded Propositions: For neither of them hath sufficient evidence to warrant peremptory and dogmatical Assertions: And therefore, though perhaps some of those Philosophers may think, they have great degrees of probability, and are fit for Philosophical Consideration; Yet there are none, (that I know) who look on them as Certainties, and positive Truths: 'Tis contrary to the Genius of their way; to dogmatise for things of so great an uncertainty; or to be confident against them, where there wants full proof to assure the Negative. But whether the one be true, or the other, Religion and the Scriptures are not at all concerned.  
Thus briefly of the Slanders that are affixed upon Philosophy, viz. of its Tendency to Atheism, and disparagement of the Scriptures. The other lesser ones are answered in the discussion of these.  
BUT besides the foul and slanderous Imputations, fastened on Philosophy; there are some vulgar plausibilities pretended; the chief of which I shall now recite and answer; 'Tis said,  
(1.) There is too much curiosity in those Inquiries; and St. Paul desired to know nothing but Christ, and him crucified.  
To which I answer, That what is unblamable curiosity in things not worth our pains, or forbidden our scrutiny, is Duty, and laudable endeavour in Matters that are weighty, and permitted to our search. So that no ill can justly be fastened upon Philosophical Inquisitions into Nature, on this account, till it be first proved, That a diligent observance of God's Goodness and Wisdom in his Works, in order to the using them to his Glory, and the benefit of the World, is either prohibited or impertinent.  
There is indeed such a depth in Nature, that it is never like to be throughly fathomed; and such a darkness upon some of God's Works, that they will not in this World be found out to Perfection: But however, we are not kept off by any expressness of Prohibition; Nature is no Holy Mount that ought not to be touched; yea, we are commanded, To search after Wisdom, and particularly after this, when we are so frequently called upon to celebrate our Creator for his Works; and are encouraged by the success of many that have gone before; For many shall go to and fro, and Science shall be increased. So that our Iniquiries into Nature are not forbidden; and he that saith they are frivolous, and of no use, when the Art of the Omniscient is the Object, and his Glory, and the good of Men, the end, asperseth both the Creator and the Creature, and contradicts his duty to both.  
As for the latter clause of the Objection, which urgeth that Speech of St. Paul, of his desiring to know nothing but Christ and him crucified, 1 Cor. 2. 2. I return to it, That he that shall duly consider the Discourse of the Apostle in the verse before, and those that succeed, will perceive, That in this expression he only slights the affected Eloquence of the Orators and Rhetoricians; He spoke in plainness and simplicity, and not in those enticing words of Man's Wisdom, which he desired either not to know at all, or not in comparison with the plain Doctrines of the Gospel. Or, if any should take the words in the largest sense, than all sorts of Humane Learning, and all Arts and Trades are set at nought by the Apostle; And if so, the meaning can be no more than this, That he preferred the Knowledge of Christ before these; For 'tis ridiculous to think, that he absolutely slighted all other Science. The Knowledge of Christ is indeed the chiefest and most valuable Wisdom, but the Knowledge of the Works of God hath its place also, and ought not quite to be excluded and despised: Or, if Philosophy be to be slighted, by this Text, all other Knowledge whatsoever must be condemned by it.  
But it will be urged,  
(2.) That there is a particular Caution given by the Apostle against Philosophy, Col. 2. 8. Beware lest any one spoil you through Philosophy.  
To this I have said elsewhere, That the Apostle there means either the pretended Knowledge of the Gnostics, the Genealogies of the Jews, or the disputing Learning of the Greeks; and perhaps he might have a respect to all those sorts of Science falsely so called. That the Disputing Philosophy of the Greeks is concerned in the Caution, will appear very probable, if we consider, That much of it was built on mere Notion, that occasioned division into manifold Sects, which managed their Matters by Sophistry and Disputations, full of nicety and mazes of Wit; and aimed at little, but the pride of mysterious talk of things, that were not really understood. Such a Philosophy the Apostle might justly condemn, and all Wise Men do the same, because 'tis very injurious to Religion, Real Knowledge, and the Peace of Men. But what is this to that, which modestly inquires into the Creatures of God, as they are; That collects the History of his Works, raising Observations from them for the Discovery of Causes, and Invention of Arts, and Helps for the benefit of Mankind? What vanity; what prejudice to Religion can be supposed in this? Is this, think we, that Philosophy, that Wisdom of this World, which the great Apostle censures and condemns? He is bold that saith it, speaks a thing he knows not, and might, if he pleased, know the contrary; Since the Method of Philosophy I vindicate, which proceeds by Observation and Experiment to Works, and uses of Life, was not, if at all, the way of those Times in which the Apostles lived, nor did it begin to show itself in many Ages after; and therefore cannot be concerned in St. Paul's Caution to his Colossians; nor in his smartness against worldly Wisdom elsewhere, for by that we are to understand the Fetches of Policy, the Niceties of Wit, and Strains of Rhetoric that were then engaged against the progress of the Gospel: But what is all this to the Philosophy of God's Works; which illustrates the Divine Glory, and comments upon his Perfections, and promotes the great Design of Christianity, which is doing good; and in its proper Nature tends to the disposing of men's Minds to Virtue and Religion?  
But (3.) If Philosophy be so excellent an Instrument to Religion; it may be asked (and the Question will have the force of an Objection) why the Disciples and first Preachers of the Gospel were not instructed in it; They were plain illiterate Men, altogether unacquainted with those Sublimities; God chose the foolish things of this World, to confound the wise. So that it seems he did not show this kind of Wisdom that respect which according to our Discourse is due unto it.  
I answer, That this choice the Divine Wisdom made of the Publishers of the Glad Tidings of Salvation, is no more prejudice or discredit to Philosophy, than it is to other sorts of Learning; and indeed 'tis none at all to any: For the special Reasons of God's making this Election seem such as these, viz. That his Power might more evidently appear in the wonderful propagation of the Religion of Christ Jesus, by such seemingly unqualified Instruments; That the World might not suspect it to be the contrivance of Wit, Subtilty and Art, when there was so much plainness and simplicity in its first Promoters: And perhaps too it was done in contempt of the vain and pretended knowledge of the Jews and Greeks, over which the plainness of the Gospel was made gloriously to triumph. To which I add this; It might be to show, That God values Simplicity and Integrity above all Natural Perfectious, how excellent soever. So that there being such special Reasons for the choosing plain Men to set this grand Affair on foot in the World, it can be no disparagement to the Knowledge of Nature, that it was not begun by Philosophers. And to counter-argue this Topick, we may consider, That  
The Patriarches, and Holy Men of Ancient Times that were most in the Divine Favour, were well instructed in the Knowledge of God's Works, and contributed to the good of Men by their useful Discoveries and Inventions. Adam was acquainted with the Nature of the Creatures; Noah a Planter of Vineyards; Abraham (as Grotius collects from Ancient History) a great Mists in the Knowledge of the Stars. Isaac prosperous in Georgics. Jacob blessed in his Philosophical Stratagem of the speckled Rods. Moses a great Man in all kinds of Natural Knowledge. Bezaleel and Aholiab, inspired in Architecture. Solomon a deep Naturalist, and a Composer of a voluminous History of Plants. Daniel, Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariab, skilled in all Learning and Wisdom; Ten times better, saith the Text, than the Magicians and Astrologers in Nebuchadnezzar's Realm: And to accumulate no more Instances, the Philosophers of the East made the first Addresses to the Infant Saviour.   

CONCLUSION.  
WE see upon the whole. That there is no shadow of Reason why we should discourage or oppose modest Inquiries into the Works of Nature; and whatsoever ignorant Zeal may prompt the common sort to, methinks those of generous Education should not be of so perverse a frame: Especially it becomes not any that minister at the Altar, to do so great a disservice to Religion, as to promote so unjust a Conceit as that of Philosophy's being an Enemy unto it.  
The Philosophers were the Priests among the Egyptians, and several other Nations in Ancient Times; and there was never more need that the Priests should be Philosophers, than in ours; For we are liable every day to be called out to make good our Foundations against the Atheist, the Sadduce, and Enthusiast; And 'tis the Knowledge of God in his Works that must furnish us with some of the most proper Weapons of Defence. Hard Names, and damning Sentences; the Arrows of bitter words, and raging passions, will not defeat those Sons of Anak; these are not fit Weapons for our Warfare. No, they must be met by a Reason instructed in the knowledge of Things, and fought in their own Quarters, and their Arms must be turned upon themselves; This may be done, and the advantage is all ours. We have Steel and Brass for our Defence, and they have little else than Twigs and Bulrushes for the Assault; we have Light, and firm Ground, and they are lost in Smoak and Mists; They tread among Bogs and dangerous Fens, and reel near the Rocks and Steeps. And shall we despise our Advantages, and forsake them? Shall we relinquish our Ground, and our Light, and muffle ourselves up in darkness? Shall we give our Enemies the Weapons, and all the odds, and so endeavour to insure their Triumphs over us? This is so●…tishly to betray Religion and ourselves.  
If this Discourse chance to meet with any that are guilty of these dangerous Follies, it will, I hope, convince them, That they have no reason to be afraid of Philosophy, or to despise its Aids in the Concerns of Religion. And for those who never yet thought of this part of Religion to glorify God for his Works, I wish it may awaken them to more attentive consideration of the wisdom and goodness that is in them; and so excite their pious acclamations. And to encourage them to it, I shall adventure to add,  
That it seems very probable, that much of the Matter of those Hallelujahs and triumphant Songs, that shall be the joyful entertainment of the Blessed, will be taken from the wonders of God's Works; and who knows, but the contemplation of these, and God in them, shall make up a good part of the employment of those glorified Spirits; who will then have inconceivable advantages for the searching into those Effects of Divine Wisdom and Power, beyond what are possible for us Mortals to attain. And those Discoveries which for ever they shall make in that immense Treasure of Art, the Universe, must needs fill their Souls every moment with pleasant astonishment, and inflame their hearts with the ardours of the highest Love and Devotion, which will breathe forth in everlasting Thanksgivings. And thus the study of God's Works joined with those pious Sentiments they deserve, is a kind of anticipation of Heaven; And next after the contemplations of his Word, and the wonders of his Mercy discovered in our Redemption, it is one of the best and noblest Employments; the most becoming a reasonable Creature, and such a one as is taught by the most reasonable and excellent Religion in the World.    


THE AGREEMENT OF Reason and Religion. Essay V.   

Essay V. THE AGREEMENT OF Reason and Religion.  
THere is not any thing that I know, which hath done more mischief to Religion, than the disparaging of Reason, under pretence of respect and favour to it: For hereby the very Foundations of Christian Faith have been undermined, and the World prepared for Atheism. And if Reason must not be heard, the Being of a God, and the Authority of Scripture, can neither be proved nor defended; and so our Faith drops to the Ground like an House that hath no Foundation:  
By the same way, those sickly Conceits, and Enthusiastic Dreams, and unsound Doctrines that have poisoned our Air, and infatuated the Minds of Men, and exposed Religion to the scorn of Infidels, and divided the Church, and disturbed the Peace of Mankind, and involved all the Nation in so much Blood, and so many Ruins; I say hereby, all these fatal Follies, that have been the oceasions of so many Mischiefs, have been propagated and promoted. On which accounts I think I may affirm, with some confidence, That here is the Springhead of most of the watter's of Bitterness and Strife; And here the Fountain of the Great Deeps of Atheism and Fanaticism, that are broken up upon us.  
So that there cannot be a more seasonable Service done either to Reason or Religion, than to endeavour the stopping up this Source of Mischiefs, by representing the Friendship and fair Agreement that is between them: For hereby Religion will be rescued from the impious accusation of its being groundless and imaginary: And Reason also defended against the unjust Charge of its being profane and irreligious: This we have heard often from indiscreet and hot Men; For, having entertained vain and unreasonable Doctrines, which they had made an Interest, and the Badges of a Party, and perceiving that their Darling Opinions could not stand, if Reason, their Enemy, were not discredited; They set up loud cries against it, as the grand Adversary of Free Grace and Faith; and zealously endeavoured to run it down under the misapplyed names of Vain Philosophy, Carnal Reasoning, and the Wisdom of this World; and what have been the Effects of this proceeding, we have seen and felt.  
So that, in my Judgement, it is the great duty of all sober and reasonable Men, to rise up (as they can) against this Spirit of Folly and Infatuation: And something I shall attempt now, by showing, That Reason is very serviceable to Religion; and Religion very friendly to Reason. In order to which, I must  
(1.) State, what I mean by Religion? and what by Reason? For there is nothing in any Matter of Enquiry or Debate that can be discovered, or determined, till the Terms of the Question are explained, and the Notions settled. The want of this hath been the occasion of a great part of those Confusions we find in Disputes; and particularly most of the Clamours that have been raised against Reason in the Affairs of Religion have sprung from it. For while ungrounded Opinions, and unreasonable Practices are often called Religion, on the one hand; and vain Imaginations, and false Consequences are as frequently styled Reason, on the other; 'Tis no wonder that such a Religion disclaims the use of Reason; or that such Reason is opposite to Religion. Therefore, in order to my showing the Agreement between True Religion, and the Genuine Reason, I shall, with all the clearness that I can, represent the just meaning of the one, and of the other.  
For Religion first; It is taken either strictly for the Worship of God; or in a more comprehensive sense, for the sum of those Duties we owe to Him: And this takes in the other, and agrees with the Notation of the Name, which imports Binding, and implies Duty. Now all Duty is comprised under these two, viz. Worship and Virtue: Worship comprehends all Duties that immediately relate to God, as the Object of them; Virtue, all those that respect our Neighbour and ourselves. So that Religion primarily, and mainly consists in Worship and Virtue.  
But Duty cannot be performed without Knowledge, and some Principles there must be to direct the Practice: and those that discover the Duties, and guide Men in the performance of them, are called Principles of Religion.  
These are of two sorts; 

Some (1.) Fundamental and Essential.  
Others (2.) Accessary and Assisting.    
Fundamental is a Metaphor taken from the Foundation of a Building, upon which the Fabric is erected, and without which it cannot stand. So that Fundamental Principles are such, as are presupposed to the Duties of Religion (one, or more) and such, as are absolutely necessary to the doing of them: of this sort I shall mention three, viz.  
(1.) The Being of God, and the perfections of his Nature. The belief of these is necessary to all the parts of Religion. He that comes unto God, in any way of Worship, or Address, must know that he is, and in some measure, what: Namely, he must know, and own the commonly acknowledged Attributes of his Being.  
2. A second necessary Principle is, The Providenee of God, viz. the Knowledge, That he made us, and not we ourselves; that he preserves us, and daily provides for us the good things we enjoy: This is necessary to the Duties of Prayer, Praise, and Adoration: And if there be no Providence; Prayer, and Thanksgiving, and other Acts of Worship, are in vain.  
3. A third Fundamental, is, Moral, Good, and Evil. Without this there can be no confession of Sin; no respect to Charity, Humility, Justice, Purity, or the rest that we call Virtues.  
These will be confessed to be Fundamentals of Religion: And I shall not dispute how many more may be admitted into the number. These we are sure are such, in the strictest sense, for all Religion supposeth, and stands upon them: And they have been acknowledged by Mankind in all Ages and Places of the World.  
But besides these, there are other Principles of Religion, which are not in the same degree of absolute necessity with the former, but yet are highly serviceable, by way of encouragement and assistance. I reckon four, viz.  
(1,) That God will pardon us if we repent. (2.) That he will assist us, if we endeavour. (3.) That he will accept of Services that are imperfect, if they are sincere. (4.) That he will righteously reward and punish in another World.  
These contain the Matter and Substance of the Gospel; more clearly and explicitly revealed to the Christian Church; but in some measure owned also by the Gentiles. So that I may reckon, that the Principles I have mentioned, are the sum of the Religion of Mankind; I mean, as to the Doctrinal Part of it: and the Duties recited before, are the Substance of the Practical, which primarily and most essentially is Religion. And Christianity takes in all these Duties, and all these Principles; advancing the Duties to higher degrees of Excellency and Perfection; encouraging them by new Motives and Assistances; and superadding two other Instances, Baptism, and the Lord's Supper. And for the Principles, it confirms those of Natural Religion; it explains them further, and discovers some few new ones: And all these, both of the former and the latter sort, are contained in the Creed. Here are all the Fundamentals of Religion, and the main Assisting Principles also.  
And though our Church require our assent to more Propositions; yet those are only Articles of Communion, not Doctrines absolutely necessary to Salvation. And if we go beyond the Creed for the Essentials of Faith; who can tell where we shall stop?  
The sum is, Religion primarily is Duty; And Duty is All that which God hath commanded to be done by his Word, or our Reasons; and we have the substance of these in the Commandments: Religion also, in a secondary sense, consists in some Principles relating to the Worship of God, and of his Son, in the ways of devout and virtuous living; and these are comprised in that Summary of Belief, called the Apostles Creed.  
This I take to be Religion; and this Religion I shall prove to be reasonable: But I cannot undertake for all the Opinions some Men are pleased to call Orthodox; nor for all those that by many private Persons, and some Churches, are accounted essential Articles of Faith and Salvation. Thus I have stated what I mean by Religion.  
The OTHER thing to be determined, and fixed, is, the proper Notion of Reason.  
For this we may consider, that Reason is sometimes taken for Reason in the Faculty, which is the Understanding; and at other times, for Reason in the Object, which consists in those Principles and Conclusions, by which the Understanding is informed. This latter is meant in the Dispute concerning the Agreement or Disagreement of Reason and Religion. And Reason in this sense, is the same with natural Truth, which I said is made up of Principles and Conclusions. By the Principles of Reason we are not to understand the Grounds of any Man's Philosophy; nor the Critical Rules of Syllogism; but those imbred Fundamental Notices, that God hath implanted in our Souls; such as arise not from external Objects, nor particular Humours or Imaginations, but are immediately lodged in our Minds; independent upon other Principles or Deductions; commanding a sudden assent; and acknowledged by all sober Mankind.  
Of this sort are these,  
That God is a Being of all Perfection.  
That nothing hath no Attributes.  
That a Thing cannot be, and not be.  
That the Whole is greater than any of its Parts.  
These, and suchlike, are unto Us, what Instincts are to other Creatures. And these I call the Principles of Reason.  
The Conclusions are those other Notices that are inferred rightly from these; and by their help, from the Observations of Sense; And the remotest of them that can be conceived, if it be duly inferred from the Principles of Reason, or rightly circumstantiated Sense, is as well to be reckoned a Part and Branch of Reason, as the more immediate Conclusions, that are Principles in respect of those distant Truths. And thus I have given an account also of the proper Notion, and Nature of Reason.  
I AM to show next, (2.) That Religion is reasonable; and this implies two things, viz. That Reason is a Friend to Religion; and that Religion is so to Reason.  
I begin with the FIRST: and here I might easily show the great congruity that there is between that Light, and those Laws, that God hath placed in our Souls; and the Duties of Religion, that by the expressness of his written Word he requires from us; and demonstrate that Reason teacheth All those, excepting only the two Positives, Baptism and the Holy Eucharist. But there is not so much need of turning my Discourse that way; and therefore I shall confine it to the Principles of Religion, which are called Faith, and prove that Reason exceedingly befriends these.  
It doth this (I.) By proving some of those Principles; And (II.) By defending all. For the clearing both, let us consider, That the Principles of Religion are of two sorts.  
Either (1.) Such as are presupposed to Faith; or such as (2.) are formal Articles of it. Of the first are; The Being of a God; and the Authority of the Scripture. And of the second, such as are expressly declared by Divine Testimony; as the Attributes of God; the Incarnation of his Son, and such like.  
(I.) For the former, they are proved by Reason; and by Reason only. The others we shall consider after.  
(1.) That the Being of a God, the Foundation of all, is proved by Reason, the Apostle acknowledgeth, when he saith, That what was to be known of God, was manifest; and to the Heathen, Rom. 1. 19 and he adds, vers. 20. That the invisible Things from the Creation of the World, are clearly seen, being understood by the Things that are made. And the Royal Psalmist speaks to the like purpose, Psal. 19 The Heavens declare the Glory of God, and the Firmament showeth his handiworks. And again, Psal. 148. 3. Praise him Sun and Moon, praise him ye Stars and Light; which intimates, that these Works of his afford Matter to our Reasons for Religious Acknowledgements. And Reason proves the Existence of God, from the beauty, and order, and ends, and usefulness of the Creatures; for these are demonstrative Arguments of the Being of a wise and omnipotent Mind, that hath framed all things so regularly and exactly; and that Mind is God. This Article then, Reason proves, which was the first Branch of the Particular; and I add, that it is Reason only that can do it; which was the other. For there are but three things from whence the Existence of any Being can be concluded, viz. Sense, Revelation, or Reason.  
Sense hath no more to do here, but to present Matter for our Reasons to work on; and Revelation supposeth the Being of a God, and cannot prove it; for we can have no security that the Revelation is true, till we are assured it is from God, or from some commissioned by him. The knowledge of his Being therefore, must precede our Faith in Revelation; and so cannot be deduced from it. So that only Reason is left to assure us here. And thus Reason lays the very Corner Stone of Religion.  
The next to this, is the other Principle mentioned, viz.  
(2.) The Divine Authority of Scripture: This also is to be proved by Reason, and only by it. The great Argument for the truth of Scripture, is the Testimony of the Spirit in the Miracles wrought by Christ and his Apostles: Our Saviour himself useth this Argument to gain credit to his Doctrines, Believe me for the Work's sake; The Works that I do bear testimony of me; and if I had not done among them the Works that no other Man did, they had had no sin, John 15. 24. And the Apostles continually urge that great Miracle, the Resurrection of Christ from the dead, for the conviction both of the Jews and Gentiles, That he was the Son of God, and his Doctrines true. Now Miracles are an Argument to our Reasons, and we reason from them thus: Miracles are God's Seal, and they are wrought by his Power, and he is true and good, and would not lend these to Impostors to cheat and abuse Mankind: Therefore whoever works real Miracles for the confirmation of any Doctrine, it is to be believed, that he is taught of God, and commissioned to teach us: And that Christ and his Apostles did those things which are recorded of them, is Matter of Testimony; and Reason clears the validity of this, by the aggregation of multitudes of Circumstances, which show, That the first Relators could not be deceived themselves, and would not deceive us; nor indeed could in the main Matters, if they had designed it. And the certainty of the conveyance of those things to us is evinced also by numerous convictive Reasons: So that the matter of Fact is secure; and that such Doctrines were taught, as are ascribed to those Divine Persons; and those Persons inspired that penned them, are proved the same way: And so it follows from the whole, that the Gospel is the Word of God; and the Old Testament is confirmed by that. Thus Reason proves the Divine Authority of Scripture; and those other Arguments that use to be produced for it, from its Style, and its influence upon the Souls of Men; from the excellency of its Design, and the Providence of God in preserving it; are of the same sort, though not of the same strength. Reason then proves the Scriptures, and this only; for that they are from God, is not known immediately by Sense; and there is no distinct Revelation that is certain and infallible to assure us of it; and so Reason only remains to demonstrate the Article.  
These two great Truths, The Existence of God, and Authority of Scripture, are the first in our Religion; and they are Conclusions of Reason, as well as Foundations of Faith. And thus briefly of those Principles of Religion that are presupposed unto it; we have seen how Reason serves for the Demonstration of them.  
(II.) I COME now to the other sort of Principles, viz. those that are formally so; They are of two sorts, ●…t and pure: The mixed are those that are discovered by Reason, and declared by Revelation also; and so are Principles both of Reason, and Faith: Of this kind are the Attributes of God; Moral good, and evil; and the immortality of Humane Souls. The Principles of pure Faith, are such, as are known only by Divine Testimony, as the Miraculous Conception, the Incarnation, and the Trinity.  
The first sort Reason proves, as well as Scripture; this I show briefly in the Instances mentioned.  
(1.) That the Divine Attributes are revealed in the Holy Oracles, is very clear; and as plain it is that they are deduced from Reason; For 'tis a general Principle through the World, That God is a Being absolutely perfect; And hence Reason concludes all the particular Attributes of his Nature; since Wisdom, Goodness, Power, and the rest, are Perfections, and imply nothing of imperfection or defect; and therefore aught to be ascribed to the infinitely perfect Being.  
(2.) That there is moral Good, and Evil, is discoverable by Reason, as well as Scripture. For these are Reason's Maxims; That every Thing is made for an end; and every Thing is directed to its end by certain Rules: These Rules, in Creatures of understanding and choice, are Laws; and the transgressing these, is Vice and Sin.  
(3.) The Immortality of our Souls is plain in Scripture; and Reason proves it, by showing the spirituality of our Natures; and that it doth, from the nature of Sense; and our perception of Spiritual Being's; of Vniversals, and of Logical, Metaphysical, and Mathematical Notions; From our compounding Propositions, and drawing Conclusions from them; From the vastness and quickness of our Imaginations, and liberty of our Wills; all which are beyond the Powers of Matter, and therefore argue a Being that is Spiritual, and consequently immortal; which Inference, the Philosophy of Spirits proves.  
Also, the Moral Arguments of Reason from the goodness of God, and his Justice in distributing Rewards and Punishments; the nature of Virtue, and tendencies of Religious Appetites, conclude, I think, very hopefully, That there is a Life after this. Thus in short of the Principles I called mixed, which Reason demonstrates.  
BUT for the others, viz. (2.) Those of pure Revelation, Reason cannot prove them immediately; nor is it to be expected that it should: For they are Matters of Testimony; and we are no more to look for immediate proof from Reason of those things, than we are to expect, that abstracted Reason should demonstrate, That there is such a place as China; or, that there was such a Man as Julius Caesar: All that it can do here, is to assert and make good the credibility, and truth of the Testimonies that relate such Matters: and that it doth in the present case, proving the Authority of Scripture; and thereby, in a remoter way, it demonstrates all the Mysteries of Faith, which the Divine Oracles immediately discover. And it is no more disparagement to our Reasons, that they cannot evince those Sacred Articles by their own unaided force, than it is a disgrace unto them, that they cannot know that there are such things as Colours, without the help of our Eyes; or that there are Sounds, without the faculty of Hearing. And if Reason must be called blind upon this account, because it cannot know of itself such things as belong to Testimony to discover; the best Eyes in the World may be so accounted, because they cannot see Sounds; and the best Palate dull and dead, because it cannot taste the Sunbeams.  
But though I have said, That Reason cannot of itself immediately prove the Truths of pure Revelation; Yet (1.) it demonstrates the Divine Authority of the Testimony that declares them; and that way proves even these Articles. If this be not enough,  
I add thesecond Assertion, (2.) That Reason defends all the Mysteries of Faith and Religion: And for this, I must desire it be noted, That there are two ways whereby any thing may be defended, viz. Either (1.) by showing the manner how the thing is; Or, if that cannot be done, by showing (2.) That it ought to be believed, though the manner of it be not known: For instance, if any one denies, That all sorts of Creatures were in the Ark, under pretence, that it is impossible they should be contained within such a space; He that can show how this might be, by a distinct enumeration of the kinds of Animals, with due allowance for the unknown Species, and a computation of the particular capacity of the Ark; he defends the Sacred History the first way: But if another denies the conversion of Aaron's Rod into a Serpent, upon the same account, of the unconceivableness of the manner how it was done; this cannot indeed be defended the former way: But than it may, by representing that the Power of God is infinite; and can easily do what we cannot comprehend: and that we ought to believe upon the credit of the Testimony, (that being well proved to us) though the manner of this miraculous performance, and such others as it relates, be unknown. And as it is in this last case, so it is in all the Mysteries of Faith and Religion; Reason cannot defend them indeed the first way: But it doth the second, by showing, That the Divine Nature is infinite, and our Conceptions very shallow and finite; that 'tis therefore very unreasonable in us to endeavour to pry into the Secrets of his Being, and Actions; and to think that we can measure and comprehend them: That we know not the Essence and Ways of acting of the most ordinary and obvious Things of Nature, and therefore must not expect throughly to understand the deeper Things of God, That God hath revealed those Holy Mysteries unto us; and that 'tis the highest reason in the World to believe, That what be saith is true, though we do not know how these things are. These are all Considerations of Reason, and by the proposal of them, it sufficiently defends all the Mysteries that can be proved to be contained in the Sacred Volume, and shows that they ought to be received by us, though they cannot be comprehended.  
Thus if any one should ask me, How the Divine Nature is united to the Humane? and declare himself unwilling to believe the Article till he could be satisfied, how; My answer would be in short, That I cannot tell; and yet I believe it is so; and he ought to believe the same, upon the credit of the Testimony, though we are both ignorant of the Manner. In order to which I would suggest, that we believe innumerable things upon the evidence of our Senses, whose Nature and Properties we do not know: How the parts of Matter cohere; and how the Soul is united to the Body, are Questions we cannot answer; and yet that such things are, we do not doubt: And why, saith Reason, should we not believe God's Revelation of things we cannot comprehend; as well as we do our Senses about Matters as little understood by us? 'Tis no doubt reasonable that we should, and by proving it is so, Reason defends all the Propositions of Faith and Religion. And when some of these are said to be above Reason, no more is meant, Than that Reason cannot conceive how those things are; and in that sense many of the Affairs of Nature are above it too.  
Thus I have shown how serviceable Reason is to Religion. I am next to prove,  
That (II.) Religion befriends it: And here I offer some Testimonies from the Holy Oracles to make that good; and in them we shall see, how God himself, and Christ, and his Apostles, do own and acknowledge Reason.  
I consider (1.) that God, Isa. 1. 18. calls the rebellious Israelites to reason with him; Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord; and by Reason he convinceth the People of the vanity of Idols, Isa. 44.9. And he expostulates with their Reasons, Ezek. 18. 31. Why will ye die, O ye House of Israel? And Mich. 6. 3. O my People, what have I done unto thee? And wherein have I wearied thee? Testify against me. He appeals unto their Reasons, to judge of his proceedings. Isa. 5. 3. And now, O inhabitants of Jerusalem, and Men of Judah, judge I pray you between me and my vineyard; are not my ways equal? and are not your ways unequal? In this he intimates the competency of their Reasons, to judge of the equity of his Ways, and the iniquity of their own.  
And (2.) our Saviour commands the Disciples of the Pharisees, to give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's; implying the ability of their Reasons to distinguish between the things that belonged to God, and those that appertained to Caesar. And he in divers places argues from the Principles and Topics of Reason: From that which we call, à majori ad minus, from the greater to the less, John 13. 14. He shows it to be the duty of his Disciples, to serve their Brethren in the meanest Offices, and to wash one another's feet, because he had washed theirs, Vers. 14. enforcing it by this consideration of Reason; For the Servant is not greater than his Lord, Vers. 26. and useth the same, John 15. 20. to show, that they must expect Persecution, because He, their Lord, was persecuted. And Luke 12. 23. He endeavours to take them off from carking care and solicitude about Meat and Raiment, by this consideration from Reason, That the Life is more than Meat, and the Body than Raiment, intimating that God having given them the greater, there was no doubt but he would bestow the less, which was necessary for the preservation of it. To these Instances, I add some few from the Topick, à minori ad majus, from the less to the greater, in the arguings of our Saviour. Thus Mat. 7. 11. If ye being evil know how to give good Gifts to your Children, how much more shall your Father which is in Heaven give good Things to those that ask him? The ground of the Consequence is this Principle of Reason, That God is more benign and gracious, than the tenderest and most affectionate of our earthly Parents. So Luke 12. 24. He argues, that God will provide for Us, because he doth for the Ravens, since we are better than they; How much more are ye better than the Fowls? Which arguing supposeth this Principle of Reason, that that Wisdom & Goodness, which are indulgent to the viler Creatures, will not neglect the more excellent. He proceeds further in the same Argument, by the consideration of God's clothing the Lilies, and makes the like inference from it, Vers. 28. If God so cloth the Grass, how much more will be cloth you? And Mat. 12. He reasons that it was lawful for him to heal on the Sabbith-day, from the consideration of the general Mercy that is due even to brute Creatures; What Man shall there be among you that shall have one Sheep, and if it fall into a Pit on the Sabbath day, will he not lay hold of it to lift it out? How much more than is a Man better than a Sheep? Vers. 12. Thus our Saviour used Arguments of Reason.  
And (3.) the Apostles did so very frequently. S. Paul disproves Idolatry this way, Acts 17. 29. Forasmuch then as we are the Offspring of God, we ought not to think that the God head is like unto Gold, or Silver, or Stone graven by Art. And the same Apostle proves the Resurrection of the Dead by the mention of seven gross Absurdities that would follow the denial of it, 1 Cor. 1. 15. viz. If the Dead rise not, Then 1. Christ is not risen; And then 2. our Preaching is vain, and we false Apostles, And if so, 3. your Faith is vain; And then 4. you are not justified, but are in your sins; And hence it will follow 5. That those that are departed in the same Faith are perished; And then 6. Faith in Christ prosits only in this Life; And if so, 7. we are of all Men the most miserable, Because we suffer all things for this Faith; From ver. 14. to ver. 19 And the whole Chapter contains Philosophical Reasoning, either to prove or illustrate the Resurrection; or to show the difference of glorified Bodies from these. And S. Peter, in his second Epistle, Chap. 2. shows, that sinful Men must expect to be punished, because God spared not the Angels that fell. Instances of this would be endless; these may suffice. And thus of the Second thing also, which I proposed to make good, viz. That Religion is friendly to Reason; and that appears, in that God himself, our Saviour, and his Apostles own it; and use Arguments from it, even in Affairs of Faith and Religion.  
BUt divers Objections are urged against the use of Reason in Religion, from Scripture, and other Considerations: The chief of them I shall consider briefly.  
From Scripture 'tis alleged, (1.) That God will destroy the Wisdom of the Wise, 1 Cor. 1. 19 And the World by Wisdom knew not God, vers. 21. And not many wise Men after the flesh are called, vers. 26. And God chose the foolish things of this World to confound the wise, vers. 27. By which expressions of wisdom and wise, 'tis presumed that Humane Reason, and Rational Men, are meant. But these Interpreters mistake the Matter much, and as they are wont to do, put mere Arbitrary Interpretations upon Scripture; For by Wisdom here, there is no cause to understand the Reason of Men; but rather the Traditions of the Jews; the Philosophy of the Disputing Greeks; and the worldly Policy of the Romans, who were the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The Rulers of that World: That the Jewish Learning in their Law is meant, the Apostle intimates, when he asks in a way of Challenge, vers. 20. Where is the Scribe? And the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, signifies one that was skilled in their Laws and Customs. And that the Philosophy of the Greeks is to be understood likewise, we have ground to believe from the other Question in the same Verse; Where is the Disputer of this World? Which, though some refer to the Doctors among the Jews also, yet, I humbly think, it may more properly he understood of the Philosophers among the Grecians; For the Apostle writes to Greeks, and their Philosophy was notoriously contentious. And lastly, That the worldly Policies of the Romans are included in this Wisdom of this World, which the Apostle vilifies, there is cause to think from the sixth Verse of the second Chapter, where he saith, He spoke not in the Wisdom of the Princes of this World; And 'tis well known that Policy was their most valued Wisdom; Tu regere imperio— To govern the Nations, and promote the grandeur of their Empire, was the great design and study of those Princes of this World. Now all these the Apostle sets at nought in the beginning of this Epistle; Because they were very opposite to the simplicity, and holiness, self-denial, and meekness of the Gospel. But that is this to the disadvantage of Reason; to which those sorts of Wisdom are as contrary, as they are to Religion? And by this I am enabled,  
(2.) To meet another Objection urged from 1 〈◊〉 2●… 14. But the natural Man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can be know them, because they are spiritually discerned. Hence the Enthusiast argues the Universal Inability of Reason in things of Religion; and its Antipathy to them: Whereas I can apprehend no more to be meant by the words, than this, viz. That such kind of natural Men as those Scribes, and Disputers, and Politioians, having their Minds depraved; and prepossessed with their own Wisdom, were indisposed to receive this, that was so contrary unto it. And they could not know those things of God, because they were Spiritual, and so would require a Mind that was of a pure and spiritual frame, viz. free from that earthly Wisdom of all sorts, which counts those things foolishness; and which by God is counted so itself; 1 Cor. 3. 19 which place  
(3.) Is used as another Scripture against Reason. The Wisdom of this World is foolishness with God: But it can signify nothing to that purpose, to one that understands and considers the Apostle's meaning. What is meant by the Wisdom of this World here, I have declared already; And by the former part of my Discourse it appears, that whatever is to be understood by it, our Reason cannot; since that either proves, or defends all the Articles of Religion.  
(4.) And when the same Apostle elsewhere, viz. 2 Cor. 1. 12. saith, That they had not their Conversation in fleshly Wisdom; we cannot think he meant Humane Reason by that; for Reason directs us to live in simplicity, and godly sincerity, which he opposeth to a life in fleshly Wisdom. By this therefore, no doubt; he means the Reason of our Appetites, and Passions, which is but Sense and Imagination, (for these blind Guides are the Directors of the Wicked) but not the Reason of our Minds, which is one of those Lights that illuminate the Consciences of good Men, and help to guide their Actions. And whereas 'tis objected,  
(5.) From Col. 2. 8. Beware lest any spoil you through Philosophy. I Answer, There is nothing can be made of that neither, for the disgrace of Reason; for the Philosophy the Apostle cautions against, is the same which he warns Timethy of, 1 Tim. 1. 4. Neither give heed to Fables and endless Genealogies that minister Questions; calling these, profane, and vain babble, and oppositions of Science, falsely so called, 1 Tim. 6. 20. By all which, Learned Interpreters understand the pretended Knowledge, of which the Gnostics boasted, which consisted in the fabulous Pedigrees of the Gods under the name of 〈◊〉; and it may be the Genealogies of which the Jews were so fond; and the disputing Philosophy among the Greeks, which was properly, Science falsely so called, and did minister Questions, and endless Strife; I say, 'tis very probable these might be comprehended also: But Reason is no otherwise concerned in all this, but as condemning, and reproving these dangerous Follies.  
THUS we see the Pretensions from Scripture against Reason are vain. But there are other Considerations by which it useth to be impugned, as,  
(1.) OUR Reason is corrupted, and therefore is not fit to meddle in Spiritual Matters.  
To this I say, That Reason, as it is taken for the Faculty of Understanding, is very much weakened and impaired; It sees but little, and that very dully, through a Glass darkly, as the Apostle saith, 1 Cor. 13. And it is very liable to be misled by our Senses, and Affections, and Interests, and Imaginations; so that we many times mingle Errors, and false Conceits, with the genuine Dictates of our Minds, and appeal to them, as the Principles of Truth and Reason, when they are but the vain Images of our Fancies, or the false Conclusions of Ignorance and Mistake. If this be meant by the corruption of Reason, I grant it; and all that can be inferred from it will be; That we ought not to be too bold and peremptory in defining speculative, and difficult matters; especially not those that relate to Religion, nor to set our Reasonings against the Doctrines of Faith and Revelation. But this is nothing to the disreputation of Reason in the Object, viz. Those Principles of Truth which are written upon our Souls; or any Conclusions that are deduced from them: These are the same that they ever were, though we discern them not so clearly as the Innocent State did: They may be mistaken, but cannot be corrupted. And as our Understandings, by reason of their weakness, and liableness to Error, may take falsehoods for some of those; or infer falsely from those that are truly such; so we know, they do the same by the Scriptures themselves, viz. they very often misinterpret, and very often draw perverse conclusions from them; And yet we say not, That the Word of God is corrupted, nor is the use of Scripture decried because of those abuses. But here advantage will be taken to object again,  
(2.) That since our natural Understandings are so weak, and so liable to mistake, they ought not to be used in the Affairs of Religion; and 'twill signify little to us that there are certain Principles of eternal Reason, if we either perceive them not, or cannot use them.  
To this I Answer, That if on this account we must renounce the use of our natural Understandings, Scripture will be useless to us also; For how can we know the meaning of the words that express God's Mind unto us? How can we compare one Scripture with another? How can we draw any Consequence from it? How apply general Propositions to our own particular Cases? How tell what is to be taken in the Letter; what in the Mystery, what plainly; whatin a Figure? What according to strict and rigorous Truth? What by way of accommodation to our Apprehensions? I say, without the exrcise of our Understandings, using the Principles of Reason, none of these can be done, and without them Scripture will signify either nothing at all, or very little to us. And what can Religion get this way? This Inference therefore is absurd and impious. All that can justly be concluded from the weakness of our Understandings, will be what I intimated before, that we ought to use them with modesty and caution; not that we should renounce them. He is a Madman, who, because his eyes are dim, will therefore put them out.  
But it may be objected further,  
(3.) That which Men call Reason is infinitely various, and that is reasonable to one, which is very irrational to another; Therefore Reason is not to be heard. And, I say, Interpretations of Scripture are infinitely various, and one calls that Scriptural, which another calls Heretical; Shall we conclude therefore, That Scripture is not to be heard? Reason in itself is the fame all the World over, though men's apprehensions of it are various, as the Light of the Sun is one, though Colours are infinite: And where this is, it ought not to be denied, because follies and falsehoods pretend relation to it; or call themselves by that name. If so, farewel Religion too.  
But (4.) 'Tis Socinianism to plead for Reason in the Affairs of Faith and Religion.  
And I Answer, 'Tis gross Phanaticism to plead against it. This Name is properly applicable to the Enemies of Reason; But the other of Socinianism is groundlessly applied to those that undertake for it; and it absurdly supposeth that Socinians are the only rational Men; when-as divers of their Doctrines, such as, The Sleep, and natural mortality of the Soul, and utter ex●…inction, and annihilation of the Wicked after the Day of Judgement, are very obnoxious to Philosophy and Reason. And the Socinians can never be confu●…ed in their other Opinions, without using Reason to maintain the Sense and Interpretation of those Scriptures that are alleged against them. 'Tis an easy thing, we know, to give an ugly Name to any thing we dislike; and by this way the most excellent and sacred Things have been made contemptible and vile. I wish such hasty Censurers would consider before they call Names; That no Truth is the worse, because rash Ignorance hath thrown dirt upon it. I need say no more to these frivolous Objections. Those that allege Atheism, and tendency to Infidelity against the reverence and use of Reason, are disproved by my whole Discourse: Which shows that the Enemies of Reason most usually serve the ends of the Infidel, and the Atheist; when as a due use of it destroys the Pretensions of both.  
NOw from the foregoing brief Discourse I shall deduce some Corollaries, that may be of use for the better understanding of the whole Matter.  
1. Reason is certain and infallible; This follows from the state I gave of the Nature and Notion of Reason in the beginning. It consists in First Principles, and the Conclusions that are raised from them, and the Observations of Sense. Now first Principles are certain, or nothing can be so; for every possible Conclusion must be drawn from those, or by their help; and every Article of Faith supposeth them: And for the Propositions that arise from those certain Principles, they are certain likewise; For nothing can follow from Truth, but Truth in the longest Series of Deduction. If Error creep in, there is ill consequence in the case. And the sort of Conclusions that arise from the Observations of Sense, if the Sense be rightly circumstantiated, and the Inference rightly made, are certain also. For if our Senses in all their due Circumstances deceive us, All is a delusion, and we are sure of nothing: But we know, that first Principles are certain, and that our Senses do not deceive us, because God, that bestowed them upon us, is True and Good; and we are as much assured, that whatever we duly conclude from either of them, is certain; because whatever is drawn from any Principle, was virtually contained in it.  
(2.) I infer, That Reason is, in a sense, the Word of God, viz. That which he hath written upon our Minds and Hearts; as Scripture is that which is written in a Book. The former is the Word, whereby he hath spoken to all Mankind; the latter is that whereby he hath declared his Will to the Church, and his peculiar People. Reason is that Candle of the Lord, of which Solomon speaks, Prov. 20. 27. That Light, whereby Christ hath enlightened every one that cometh into the World, John 1. 9 And, that Law whereby the Consciences of the Heathen either accuse, or excuse one another, Rom. 2. 15. So that Hierocles spoke well, when he said, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: To be persuaded by God and right Reason, is one and the same thing. And Luther called Philosophy, within its own bounds, The Truth of God.  
(3.) The belief of our Reason is an Exercise of Faith; and Faith is an Act of Reason. The former part is clear, from the last Particular, and we believe our Reasons, because we have them from God, who cannot mistake, and will not deceive. So that relying on them, in things clearly perceived, is trust in God's veracity and goodness, and that is an exercise of Faith. Thus Luke 12. The not belief of Reason, that suggests from God's clothing the Lilies, that He will provide for us, is made by our Saviour a defect of Faith, Vers. 28. O ye of little Faith! And for the other part, that Faith is an Act of Reason, that is evident also: For, 'Tis the highest Reason to believe in God revealing.  
(4.) No Principle of Reason contradicts any Articles of Faith. This follows upon the whole. Faith befriends Reason; and Reason serves Religion, and therefore they cannot clash. They are both certain, both the Truths of God; and one Truth doth not interfere with another, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, saith Aristotle, Truth agrees with all things that are. Whatsoever contradicts Faith, is opposite to Reason; for 'tis a Fundamental Principle of that, That God is to be believed. Indeed sometimes there is a seeming contradiction between them; But then either something is taken for Faith, that is but Fancy; or something for Reason, that is but Sophistry; or the supposed contradiction is an Error and Mistake.  
(5.) When any thing is pretended from Reason, against any Article of Faith, we ought not to cut the Knot, by denying Reason; but endeavour to unite it, by answering the Argument; and 'tis certain it may be fairly answered. For all Heretics argue either from false Principles, or fallaciously conclude from true ones: So that our Faith is to be defended, not by declaiming against Reason, in such a case, (which strengthens the Enemy, and, to the great prejudice of Religion, allows Reason on his side); But we must endeavour to defend it, either by discovering the falsehood of the Principles he useth in the name of Reason; or the ill Consequence, which he calls Proof.  
(6.) When any thing is offered us for an Article of Faith that seems to contradict Reason, we ought to see that there be good cause to believe that this is divinely revealed, and in the sense propounded. If it be, we may be assured from the former Aphorisms, that the Contradiction is but an Appearance; and it may be discovered to be so. But if the Contradiction be real, This can be no Article of Revelation, or the Revelation hath not this sense. For God cannot be the Author of Contradictions; and we have seen, that Reason, as well as Faith, is his. I mean, the Principles of Natural Truth, as well as those of Revelation. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, faith Aristotle, Truth is throughout contrary to falsehood; and what is true in Divinity, cannot be false in Reason. 'Tis said indeed in the Talmud, If two Rabbins differ in Contradictories, yet both have their Opinions from Moses, and from God. But we are not obliged to such an irrational kind of Faith; And ought not to receive any thing as an Article of it, in a sense that palpably contradicts Reason, no more than we may receive any sense that contradicts the direct Scriptures. Faith and Reason accord, as well as the Old Testament, and the New; and the Analogy of Reason is to be heeded also, because even that is Divine and Sacred.  
(7.) There is nothing that God hath revealed to oblige our Faith, but he hath given us reason to believe that he hath revealed it. For though the thing be never so clearly told me, if I have not reason to think, that God is the Revealer of what is so declared, I am not bound to believe it; except there be evidence in the thing itself. For 'tis not Faith, but vain credulity to believe every thing that pretends to be from God. So that we ought to ask ourselves a Reason, why we believe the Scripture to be the Revelation of God's Will, and ought not to assent to any sense put upon it, till we have ground to think, that that sense is his mind? I say, we must have ground, either from our particular Reasons, or the Authority of the Church; otherwise our Faith is vain Credulity, and not Faith in God.  
(8.) A Man may hold an erroneous Opinion from a mistaken sense of Scripture, and deny what is the truth of the Proposition, and what is the right meaning of the Text, and yet not err in Faith. For Faith is a belief of God revealing: And if God have not so revealed this, or that, as to give us certain ground to believe this to be his sense, he hath not sufficiently revealed it to oblige our Faith. So that though I deny such, or such a sense, while I believe it is not from God; his veracity and Authority is not concerned, since I am ready however to give a cheerful assent to whatever is clearly and sufficiently revealed. This Proposition follows from the former, and must be understood only of those Doctrines that are difficult, and obscurely delivered: And that many things are so delivered in Scripture, is certain; For some are only hinted, and spoken occasionally; some figuratively, and by way of Parable, and Allegory; some according to men's Conceptions; and some in Ambiguous and Enigmatical Phrases; which Obscurities may occasion mistake in those, who are very ready to believe whatever God saith; and when they do, I should be loath to say that such err in Faith; Though those that wrest plain Texts to a compliance with their Interests, and their Lusts; Though their Affections may bring their Judgements to vote with them, yet theirs is Error in Faith with a witness, and capable of no benefit from this Proposition.  
(9) In searching after the sense of Scripture, we ought to consult the Principles of Reason, as we do other Scriptures. For we have shown, That Reason is another part of God's Word. And though the Scripture be sufficient for its own end, yet Reason must be presupposed unto it; for without this, Scripture cannot be used, nor compared, nor applied, nor understood.  
(10.) The Essentials of Religion are so plainly revealed, that no Man can miss them, that hath not a mighty corrupt bias in his Will and Affections to infatuate and blind his Understanding. Those Essentials are contained in the Decalogue and the Creed: Many speculative remoter Doctrines may be true, but not Fundamental. For 'tis not agreeable to the goodness or justice of God, that men's eternal Interests should depend upon things that are difficult to be understood, and easily mistaken. If they did, No Man could be secure, but that, do what he could, he should perish everlastingly, for not believing, or believing amiss some of those difficult Points, that are supposed necessary to Salvation; and all those that are ignorant, and of weak understanding, must perish without help, or they must be saved by implicit Faith in unknown Fundamentals.  
THESE are some Propositions that follow from my Discourse, and from one another. The better they are considered, the more their force will be perceived; and I think they may serve for many very considerable purposes of Religion. Charity, and the peace of Mankind.  
ANd now, as a Conclusion to the whole, I shall add some Considerations of the dangerous tendency of the common practice (at least among the Sects) of declaiming against Reason as an Enemy to Religion.  
(1.) It tends to the introduction of Atheism, Infidelity, and Scepticism; and hath already brought in a flood of these upon us. For what advantage can the Atheist and Infidel expect greater than this, That Reason is against Religion? What do they pretend? What can they propose more? If so, there will be no proving, That there is a God; or, That the Scripture is his Word; and then we believe gratis; and our Faith hangs upon Humour and Imagination; and that Religion that depends upon a warm Fancy, and an ungrounded belief, stands but till a Disease, or a new Conceit alter the Scene of Imagination, and then down falls the Castle, whose Foundation was in the Air. 'Twas the charge of Julian the Apostate against the Primitive Christians; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; That their Wisdom was to believe; as if they had no ground for their Faith. And those that renounce and decry Reason, justify Julian in his Charge. If this be so, Religion will have no bottom, but the Fancy of every one that professeth it; and how various and inconstant a thing Imagination is, every Man knows. These are the Consequences of defamations of Reason, on the pretended account of Religion; and we have seen, in multitudes of deplorable Instances, That they follow in practice, as well as reasoning. Men of corrupt inclinations suspect that there is no Reason for our Faith and Religion, and so are upon the borders of quitting it; And the Enthusiast, that pretends to know Religion best, tells them, that these Suspicions are very true; and thence the Debauchees gladly makes the desperate Conclusion: Or at least; when they hear that Reason is uncertain, various, and fallacious, they deny all credit to their Faculties, and become confounded Sceptics, that settle in nothing. This I take to have been one of the greatest and most deadly occasions of the Atheism of our days; and he that hath rejected Reason, may be one when he pleaseth, and cannot reprehend, or reduce any one, that is so already.  
(2.) The denial of Reason in Religion, hath been the principal Engine that Heretics and Enthusiasts have used against the Faith; and that which lays us open to infinite follies and impostures. Thus the Arrians quarrelled with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because it was deduced by consequence, but not expressed in Scripture. The Apollinarists would by no means allow of Reason; And St. Austin saith of the Donatists, that they did calumniate, and decry It, to raise prejudice against the Catholic Faith; and elsewhere, Doctores vestri Hominem dialecticum fugiendum potius, & cavendum, quam refellendum censuerunt. The Vbiquitarians defend their Errors, by denying the judgement of Reason; and the Macedonians would not have the Deity of the Holy Ghost proved by Consequence. The later Enthusiasts in Germany, and other places, set up loud and vehement out-cries against Reason; and the Lunatics among us (that agree in nothing else) do yet sweetly accord in opposing this Carnal Reason; and this indeed is their common Interest. The impostures of men's Fancies must not be seen in too much light; and we cannot dream with our eyes open. Reason would discover the nakedness of Sacred Whimsies, and the vanity of Mysterious Nonsense; This would disparage the Darlings of the Brain, and cool the pleasant heats of kindled Imagination: And therefore Reason must be decried, because an enemy to madness; and Fancy set up, under the Notion of Faith and Inspiration. Hence Men had got the trick to call every thing that was Consequent, and Reasonable, Vain Philosophy; and every thing that was Sober, Carnal Reasoning. Religion is set so far above Reason, that at length it is put beyond Sobriety and Sense; and than 'twas fit to be believed, when 'twas impossible to be proved, or understood. The way to be a Christian, is first to be a Brute; and to be a true Believer, in this Divinity, is to be fit for Bedlam. Men have been taught to put out their eyes, that they might see; and to hoodwink themselves, that they might avoid the Precipices. Thus have all Extravagancies been brought into Religion, beyond the Imaginations of a Fever, and the Conceits of Midnight: Whatever is fancied, is certain; and whatever is vehement, is Sacred; every thing must be believed, that is dreamed; and every thing that is absurd, is a Mystery. And by this way, Men in our days have been prepared to swallow every thing, every thing but what is sober: whatever is wild, will be sucked in like the Air; but what is reasonable, will be fled like Infection. So that if a Man would recommend any Doctrine for his life, to those Enemies of Reason, it must be some odd nonsense, in the clothing of Imagination; and he that can be the Author of a new kind of Madness, shall lead a Party. Thus hath Religion, by the disparagement of Reason, been made a Medley of Fantastic Trash, spiritualised into an heap of Vapours, and form into a Castle of Clouds; and exposed to every Wind of Humour and Imagination.  
(3.) By the same way great advantage is given to the Church of Rome: Which is well known by those that adhere unto it. And therefore Perronius, Gonterius, Arnoldus, Veronius, and other Jesuits, have loudly declaimed against Reason; and the last mentioned, Veronius, presented the World with a Method to overthrow Heretics, (meaning those of the Protestant Faith) which promised more than ordinary; And that was, to deny and renounce all Principles of Reason in Affairs of Faith, absolutely and roundly; and not to vouchsafe an Answer to any Argument against Transubstantiation, or the other Articles of their new Faith; but point-blank to deny whatever Reason saith in such Matters. And he affirms, that even these Principles of Reason, viz. Non entis non sunt Attributa; omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse; and such like, which are the Foundations of all Reasoning, are dangerous to the Catholic Faith, and therefore not to be heeded. This Man speaks out, and affirms directly and boldly, what the other Enemies of Reason mean, but will not own. This is a Method to destroy Heretics in earnest; but the mischief is, all Christians, and all other Religions, and all other Reasonings are cut off by the same Sword. This Book and Method of Veronius was kindly received by the Pope, privileged by the King of Spain, approved by Cardinals, Archbishops, Bishops, and all the gallic Clergy, as solid, and for the advantage of Souls; and the Sorbone Doctors gave it their approbation, and recommended it as the only way to confute us, and all the other Adversaries of their corrupted Faith and Religion. Did these know what they did? And did they, think we, understand the Interest of the Roman Church? If so, we kindly serve their ends, and promote their Designs in the way, which they account best, while we vilify and disparage Reason. If this be renounced in Matters of Religion, with what face can we use it against the Doctrine of Transubstantiation, or any other Points of the Roman Creed? Would it not be blameless and irreprovable for us to give up our Understandings implicitly to the Dictates and Declarations of that Church? May we not follow blindly whatever the Infallible Man at Rome and his Councils say? And would it not be vain self-contradiction to use Arguments against their Decrees, though they are never so unreasonable? Or to allege Consequences from Scripture against any of their Articles, though never so contrary to the Holy Oracles? How easily may they rejoin, when we dispute against them; You argue from Reason, and by Consequences; But Reason is dull and carnal, and an enemy to the things of the Spirit, and not to be heard in the high Matters of Religion? And what can we say next, if allow of the Accusation? I say, by this way, we perfectly disable, or grossly contradict ourselves, in most of our Disputes against the Romanists: And we are very disingenuous in our dealings, while we use Reason against them, and deny it, when 'tis urged against ourselves by another sort of Adversaries; which implies, that when we say, Reason is not to be heard, we mean, 'tis not to be heard against us; But it must against the Church of Rome, or any others we can oppugn by it. So that our denying Reason in Religion is either very humoursom and partial, or 'tis a direct yielding up our Cause to our Enemies; and doing that ourselves, which is the only thing they desire, to undo us; and to promote their own Interests upon our Ruins.  
And thus I have represented some of the Mischiefs that arise from the disparagement of Reason; we see they are great ones, big of many others, and such as are destructive to all Government, and all the Interests of the sober part of Mankind. This is properly Fanaticism, and all that we call so, grows upon it. Here the Enemies of our Church and Government began; upon this they insisted still, and filled their Books, and Pulpits, and private Corners, with these Canting. This was the Engine to overthrow all sober Principles, and Establishments; with this the People were infutuated, and credit was reconciled to Gibberish, and Folly; Enthusiasms, and vain Impulses. This is the Food of Conventicles to this day; the root of their Matter, and the burden of their Preachments. Let Reason be heard, and tie them to Sense, and most of their Holders-forth have no more to say. Their spirituality, for which they are admired, is besides Reason, and against it, rather than above it; And while this Principle of the enmity between Reason and Religion stands, the People will think them the more Spiritual Preachets, because they are the less reasonable: And while they are abused by such a belief, 'twill be impossible for sober Men to have any success in their endeavours to convince them.    


AGAINST Modern Sadducism In the Matter of Witches and Apparitions: Essay VI.   

Essay VI AGAINST MODERN SADDUCISM In the Matter of Witches and Apparitions.  
IF any thing were to be much admired in an Age of Wonders, not only of Nature, (which is a constant Prodigy) but of Men and Manners; it would be to me matter of astonishment, that Men, otherwise witty and ingenious, are fallen into the Conceit that there's no such thing as a Witch, or Apparition, but that these are the Creatures of Melancholy and Superstition, fostered by Ignorance and Design; which, comparing the confidence of their disbelief, with the evidence of the things denied, and the weakness of their Grounds, would almost suggest, that themselves are an Argument of what they deny; and that so confident an Opinion could not be held upon such inducements, but by some kind of Witchcraft, and Fascination in the Fancy. And perhaps that evil Spirit, whose Influences they will not allow in Actions ascribed to such Causes, hath a greater hand and interest in their Proposition than they are aware of. For that subtle Enemy of Mankind (since Providence will not permit him to mischief us without our own concurrence) attempts that by stratagem and artifice, which he could never effect by open ways of acting; and the success of all wiles depending upon their secrecy, and concealment, his influence is never more dangerous than when his agency is least suspected. In order therefore to the carrying on the dark and hidden Designs he manageth against our Happiness, and our Souls, he cannot expect to advantage himself more, than by insinuating a belief, That there is no such thing as Himself, but that Fear and Fancy make Devils now, as they did Gods of old. Nor can he ever draw the assent of Men to so dangerous an Assertion, while the standing sensible Evidences of his Existence in his practices by and upon his Instruments, are not discredited and removed.  
'Tis doubtless therefore the interest of this Agent of Darkness, to have the World believe, that the Notion they have of Him, is but a Phantôme and Conceit; and in order thereunto, That the stories of Witches, Apparitions, and indeed every thing that brings tidings of another World, are but melancholic Dreams, and pious Romances. And when Men are arrived thus far, to think there are no Diabolical Contracts or Apparitions, their belief that there are such Spirits, rests only upon their Faith, and reverence to the Divine Oracles; which we have little reason to apprehend so great in such Assertors, as to command much from their assent; especially in such things in which they have corrupt Interests against their evidence. So that he that thinks there is no Witch, believes a Devil gratis, or at least upon Inducements, which he is like to find himself disposed to deny when he pleaseth. And when Men are arrived to this degree of Disfidence and Infidelity, we are beholden to them if they believe either Angel, or Spirit, Resurrection of the Body, or Immortality of Souls. These things hang together in a Chain of Connexion, at least in these men's Hypothesis; and 'tis but an happy chance, if he that hath lost one Link, holds another. So that the Vitals of Religion being so much interessed in this Subject, it will not be unnecessary employment particularly to discourse it.  
And in order to the proof that there have been, and are unlawful Confederacies with evil Spirits, by virtue of which the hellish Accomplices perform things above their natural Powers; I must premise, that this being matter of Fact, is only capable of the evidence of Authority and Sense: And by both these, the being of Witches and Diabolical Contracts, is most abundantly confirmed. All Histories are full of the Exploits of those Instruments of Darkness, and the Testimony of all Ages, not only of the rude and barbarous, but of the most civilised and polished World, brings tidings of their strange performances. We have the Attestation of thousands of Eye and Ear-witnesses, and those not of the easily deceivable Vulgar only, but of wise and grave Discerners; and that, when no Interest could oblige them to agree together in a common Lie: I say, we have the light of all these Circumstances to confirm us in the belief of things done by Persons of despicable Power and Knowledge, beyond the reach of Art, and ordinary Nature. Standing public Records have been kept of these well-attested Relations: and Epocha's made of those unwonted Events; Laws in many Nations have been enacted against those vile practices; Those among the Jews, and our own, are notorious: such Cases have been often determined near us, by Wise and Reverend Judges, upon clear and convictive Evidence: and multitudes in our Nation have suffered death for their vile Compacts with Apostate Spirits. All these I might largely prove in their particular Instances, but that 'tis not needful, since those that deny the being of Witches, do it not out of ignorance of these Heads of Argument, of which probably they have heard a thousand times; But from an apprehension that such a belief is absurd, and the things impossible. And upon these presumptions they contemn all Demonstrations of this nature, and are ha●…dned against Conviction. And I think, those that can believe all Histories are Romances, that all the wiser World have agreed together to juggle Mankind into a common belief of ungrounded Fables; that the sound Senfes of multitudes together may deceive them; and Laws are built upon Chimaeras; that the gravest and wisest Judges have been Murderers; and the sagest Persons Fools, or designing Impostors: I say, those that can believe this heap of Absurdities, are either more credulous than those whose credulity they reprehend; or else have some extraordinary evidence of their Persuasion, viz. That 'tis absurd and impossible there should be a Witch or Apparition. And I am confident, were those little appearances removed, which Men have formed in their Fancies against the belief of such things; their own Evidence would make the way to men's assent, without any more Arguments than what they know already to enforce it. There is nothing then necessary to be done, in order to the establishing the belief I would reconcile to men's minds; but to endeavour the removal of those Prejudices they have received against it: the chief of which I shall particularly deal with. And I begin with that bold Assertion, That  

I.  
(I.) THe NOTION of a Spirit is impossible and contradictious; and consequently so is that of Witches, the belief of which is founded on that Doctrine.  
To which Objection I Answer,  
(1.) If the Notion of a Spirit be absurd, as is pretended; that of a GOD, and a SOUL distinct from Matter, and Immortal, are likewise Absurdities. And then, That the World was jumbled into this elegant and orderly Fabric by chance; and that our Souls are only parts of Matter, that came together we know not whence, nor how; and shall again shortly be dissolved into those loose Atoms that compound them; That all our Conceptions are but the thrusting of one part of Matter against another; and the Ideas of our Minds mere blind and casual Motions: These, and a thousand more the grossest Impossibilities and Absurdities (consequents of this Proposition, That the Notion of a Spirit is absurd) will be sad Certainties and Demonstrations. And with such Assertors I would cease to discourse about Witches and Apparitions, and address myself to obtain their assent to Truths infinitely more Sacred.  
And yet (2.) though it should be granted them, that a Substance immaterial is as much a contradiction as they can fancy; yet why should they not believe that the Air, and all the Regions above us, may have their invisible intellectual Agents of Nature like unto our Souls, be that what it will; and some of them at least as much degenerate as the vilest and most mischievous among Men. This Hypothesis will be enough to secure the possibility of Witches and Apparitions. And that all the upper Stories of the Universe are furnished with Inhabitants, 'tis infinitely reasonable to conclude from the Analogy of Nature; Since we see there is nothing so contemptible and vile in the World we reside in, but hath its living Creatures that dwell upon it; the Earth, the Water, the inferior Air; the Bodies of Animals, the Flesh, the Skin, the Entrails; the Leaves, the Roots, the Stalks of Vegetables; yea, and all kind of Minerals in the Subterrancous Regions: I say, all these have their proper Inhabitants; yea, I suppose this Rule may hold in all distinct kinds of Bodies in the World, That they have their peculiar Animals. The certainty of which I believe the improvement of Microscopical Observations will discover. From whence I infer, That since this little Spot is so thickly peopled in every Atom of it, 'tweakness to think that all the vast spaces above, and hollows under Ground, are desert and uninhabited. And if both the superior and lower Continents of the Universe have their Inhabitants also, 'tis exceedingly improbable, arguing from the same Analogy, that they are all of the mere sensible Nature, but that there are at least some of the Rational and Intellectual Orders. Which supposed, there is good foundation for the belief of Witches, and Apparitions; though the Notion of a Spirit should prove as absurd and unphilosophical, as I judge the Denial of it. And so this first Objection comes to nothing. I descend then to the second Prejudice, which may be thus form in behalf of the Objectors.   

II.  
(II.) THere are Actions in most of those Relations ascribed to Witches, which are ridiculous and impossible in the nature of things; such are (1.) their flying out of Windows, after they have anointed themselves, to remote places. (2.) Their transformation into Cats, Hares, and other Creatures. (3.) Their feeling all the hurts in their own Bodies, which they have received in those. (4.) Their raising Tempests, by mattering some nonsensical words, or performing Ceremonies alike impertinent, as ridiculous. And (5.) their being sucked in a certain private place of their Bodies by a Familiar. These are presumed to be actions inconsistent with the nature of Spirits, and above the powers of those poor and miserable Agents. And therefore the Objection supposeth them performed only by the Fancy; and that the whole mystery of Witchcraft is but an illusion of crazy Imagination.  
To this aggregate Objection I return,  
(1.) In the general: The more absurd and unaccountable these Actions seem the greater confirmations are they to me of the truth of those Relations, and the reality of what the Objectors would destroy. For these Circumstances being exceeding unlikely, (judging by the measures of common belief) 'tis the greater probability they are not fictitious: For the contrivers of Fictions use to form them to as near a conformity as they can to the most unsuspected Realities, endeavouring to make them look as like Truth, as is possible in the main Supposals, though withal they make them strange in the Circumstance. None but a Fool, or Madman, would relate, with a purpose of having it believed, that he saw in Ireland, Men with Horns on their Heads, and Eyes in their Breasts; or, if any should be so ridiculously vain, as to be serious in such an incredible Romance, it cannot be supposed that all Travellers that come into those parts after him should tell the same Story. There is a large Field in Fiction; and is all those Relations were Arbitrary Compositions; doubtless the first Romancers would have framed them more agreeable to the common Doctrine of Spirits; at least, after these supposed Absurdities had been a thousand times laughed at, People by this time would have learned to correct those obnoxious Extravagancies; and though they have not yet more Veracity than the Ages of Ignorance and Superstition, yet one would expect they should have got more Cunning. This supposed Impossibility then of these Performances, seems to me a probable Argument that they are not wilful, and designed Forgeries. And if they are Fancies, 'tis somewhat strange, that Imagination, which is the most various thing in all the World, should infinitely repeat the same Conceits in all Times and Places.  
BUT again (2.) the strange Actions related of Witches, and presumed to be impossible, are not ascribed to their own Powers, but to the Agency of those wicked Confederates they employ: And to affirm that those evil Spirits cannot do that, which we conceit impossible, is boldly to stint the powers of Creatures, whose Natures and Faculties we know not; and to measure the world of Spirits by the narrow Rules of our own impotent Being's. We see among ourselves the Performances of some outgo the Conceits and Possibilities of others; and we know many things may be done by the Mathematics, and Mechanic Artifice, which common Heads think impossible to be effected by the honest ways of Art and Nature. And doubtless, the subtleties and powers of those mischievous Fiends, are as much beyond the reach and activities of the most knowing Agents among us, as theirs are beyond the wit and ability of the most rustic and illiterate. So that the utmost that any Man's Reason in the World can amount to in this particular, is only this, That he cannot conceive how such things can be performed; which only argues the weakness and imperfection of our Knowledge and Apprehensions; not the impossibility of those Performances: and we can no more from hence form an Argument against them, than against the most ordinary Effects in Nature. We cannot conceive how the F●… is formed in the Womb; nor as much as how a Plant springs from the Earth we tread on; we know not how our Sou●…s move the Body; nor how these distant and extreme Natures are united; as I have shown elsewhere. And if we are igno●…t of the most obvious things about us, and the most considerable within ourselves, 'tis then no wonder that we know not the Constitution and Powers of the Creatures, to whom we are such strangers. Briefly then, Matters of Fact well proved ought not to be denied, because we cannot conceive how they can be performed. Nor is it a reasonable method of Inference, first to presume the thing impossible, and thence to conclude that the Fact cannot be proved: On the contrary, we should judge of the Action by the Evidence, and not the Evidence by our Fancies about the Action. This is proudly to exalt our own Opinions above the clearest Testimonies, and most sensible Demonstrations of Fact: and so to give the Lie to all Mankind, rather than distrust the Conceits of our bold Imaginations. But yet further,  
(3.) I think there is nothing in the Instances mentioned, but what may as well be accounted for by the Rules of Reason and Philosophy, as the ordinary Affairs of Nature. For in resolving Natural Phaenomena, we can only assign the probable Causes, showing how things may be, not presuming how they are: And in the particulars under our Examen, we may give an account how 'tis possible, and not unlikely, that such things (though somewhat varying from the common road of Nature) may be acted. And if our narrow and contracted Minds can furnish us with apprehensions of the way and manner of such Performances, (though perhaps not the true ones) 'tis an argument that such things may be effected by Creatures, whose Powers and Knowledge are so vastly exceeding ours. I shall endeavour therefore briefly to suggest some things that may render the possibility of such performances conceivable, in order to the removal of this Objection, that they are Contradictions, and impossible.  
For the first then, That the Confederate Spirit should transport the Witch through the Air to the place of general Rendezvous, there is no difficulty in conceiving it; and if that be true which great Philosophers affi●…, concerning the real separability of the Soul from the Body without Death, there is yet less; for then 'tis easy to apprehend, that the Soul, having left its gross and sluggish Body behind it, and being clothed only with its immed●…e Vehicle of Air, or more subtle Matter, may be quickly conducted to any place, by those officious Spirits that attend it. And though I adventure to affirm nothing concerning the truth and certainty of this Supposition, yet I must needs say, it doth not seem to me unreasonable. Our experience of Apoplexies, Epilepsies, Ecstasies, and the strange things Men report to have seen during those Deliquiums, look favourably upon this Conjecture; which seems to me to contradict no Principle of Reason or Philosophy, since Death consists not so much in the actual separation of Soul and Body, as in the indisposition and unfitness of the Body for Vital Union, as an excellent Philosopher hath made good: On which Hypothesis, the Witch's anointing herself before she takes her flight, may perhaps serve to keep the Body tenantable, and in fit disposition to receive the Spirit at its return. These things, I say, we may conceive, though I affirm nothing about them; and there is not any thing in such Conceptions but what hath been owned by Men of Worth and Name, and may seem fair and accountable enough to those who judge not altogether by customary Opinions. There's a saying of the great Apostle that seems to countenance this Platonic Notion; what is the meaning else of that Expression, [Whether in the Body, or out of the Body, I cannot tell] except the Soul may be separated from the Body without death? Which if it be granted po●…sible, 'tis sufficient for my purpose. And  
(2.) The Transformations of Witches into the shapes of other Animals, upon the same supposal is very conceivable, since then 'tis easy to apprehend, that the Power of Imagination may form those passive and pliable Vehicles into those shapes, with more ease than the Fancy of the Mother can the stubborn Matter of the Foetus in the Womb, as we see it frequently doth in the Instances that occur of Signatures, and monstrous Singularities; and perhaps sometimes the confederate Spirit puts tricks upon the Senses of the Spectators, and those Shapes are only Illusions.  
But then (3.) when they feel the Hurts in their gross Bodies, that they receive in their Airy Vehicles, they must be supposed to have been really present, at least in these latter; and 'tis no more difficult to apprehend how the hurts of those should be translated upon their other Bodies, than how Diseases should be inflicted by the Imagination, or how the Fancy of the Mother should wound the Foetus, as several credible Relations do attest.  
And (4.) for their raising Storms and Tempests; They do it not by their own, but by the power of those Evil Spirits that reside in the Air; and the Ceremonies that are enjoined them, are doubtless nothing else but Entertainments for their Imaginations, and likely designed to persuade them, that they do those strange things themselves.  
(Last,) For their being sucked by the Familiar, I say, (1.) we know so little of the nature of Daemons and Spirits, that 'tis no wonder we cannot certainly divine the Reason of so strange an Action. And yet (2.) we may conjecture at some things that may render it less improbable; For some have thought that the Genii (whom both the Platonical and Christian Antiquity thought embodied) are recreated by the Reeks and Vapours of Humane Blood, and the Spirits that proceed from them: Which supposal (if we allow them Bodies) is not unlikely, every thing being refreshed and nourished by its Like. And that they are not perfectly abstract from all Body and Matter (besides the Reverence we owe to the wisest Antiquity) there are several considerable Arguments I could allege to render exceeding probable. Which things supposed, the Devil's sucking the Sorceress is no great wonder, nor difficult to be accounted for. Or perhaps (3.) this may be only a Diabolical Sacrament, and Ceremony to confirm the Hellish Covenant. To which I add, (4.) That the Familiar doth not only suck the Witch, but in the Action infuseth some poisonous Ferrnent into Her, which gives her Imagination and Spirits a Magical Tincture, whereby they become mischievously influential; and the word V●…nesica intimates some such Matter. Now that the Imagination hath a mighty power in Operation, is seen in the just-now mentioned Signatures, and Diseases that it causeth; and that the Fancy is modified by the Qualities of the Blood and Spirits, is too evident to need proof. Which things supposed, 'tis plain to conceive that the Evil Spirit having breathed some vile Vapour into the Body of the Witch, it may taint her Blood and Spirits with a noxious Quality, by which her infected Imagination, heightened by Melancholy, and this worse Cause, may do much hurt upon Bodies that are obnoxious to such Influences. And 'tis very likely that this Ferment disposeth the Imagination of the Sorceress to cause the mentioned 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or separation of the Soul from the Body, and may perhaps keep the Body in fit temper for its reentry; as also it may facilitate transformation, which, it may be, could not be effected by ordinary and unassisted Imagination.  
Thus we see, 'tis not so desperate to form an apprehension of the manner of these odd Performances; and though they are not done the way I have described, yet what I have said may help us to a conceit of the Possibility, which sufficeth for my purpose. And though the Hypothesis I have gone upon will seem as unlikely to some, as the things they attempt to explain are to others; yet I must desire their leave to suggest, that most things seem improbable (especially to the conceited, and opinionative) at first proposal: And many great Truths are strange and odd, till Custom and Acquaintance have reconciled them to our Fancies. And I'll presume to add on this occasion, (though I love not to be confident in affirming) that there is none of the Platonical Supposals I have used, but what I could make appear to be indifferently fair and reasonable.   

III.  
(III.) A Nother Prejudice against the being of Witches, is, That 'tis very improbable that the Devil, who is a Wise and Mighty Spirit, should be at the beck of a poor Hag, and have so little to do, as to attend the Errands and impotent Lusts of a sil'y old Woman.  
To which I might answer, (1.) That 'tis much more improbable that all the World should be deceived in Matters of Fact, and Circumstances of the clearest Evidence and Conviction; than that the Devil, who is wicked, should be also unwise; and that He that persuades all his Subjects and Accomplices out of their Wits, should himself act like his own Temptations and Persuasions. In brief, there is nothing more strange in this Objection, than that Wickedness is Baseness and Servility; and that the Devil is at leisure to serve those whom he is at leisure to tempt, and industrious to ruin. And (2.) I see no necessity to believe that the Devil is always the Witches Confederate; but perhaps it may fitly be considered, whether the Familiar be not some departed Humane Spirit, forsaken of God and Goodness, and swallowed up by the unsatiable desire of Mischief and Revenge; which possibly by the Laws, and capacity of its State, it cannot execute immediately. And why we should presume that the Devil should have the liberty of wandering up and down the Earth and Air, when he is said to be held in the Chains of Darkness; and yet that the separated Souls of the Wicked, of whom no such thing is affirmed in any Sacred Record, should be thought so imprisoned, that they cannot possibly wag from the Place of their Confinement, I know no shadow of Conjecture. This Conceit I'm confident hath prejudiced many against the belief of Witches and Apparitions, they not being able to conceive that the Devil should be so ludicrous, as Appearing Spirits are sometimes reported to be in their Frolicks; and they presume, that Souls departed never revis●… the free and open Regions; which confidence, I know nothing to justify: For since good Men in their state of separation are said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, why the wicked may not be supposed to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the worst sense of the word, I know nothing to help me to imagine. And if it be so supposed that the Imps of Witches are sometimes wicked Spirits of our own Kind and Nature, and possibly the same that have been Sorcerers and Witches in this Life: This Supposal may give a fairer and more probable account of many of the Actions of Sorcery and Witchcraft, than the other Hypothesis, that they are always Devils. And to this Conjecture, Pleadventure to subjoin another, which also hath its probability, viz. (3.) That 'tis not impossible but that the Familiars of Witches are a vile kind of Spirits, of a very inferior Constitution and Nature, and none of those that were once of the highest Hierarchy, now degencrated into the Spirits we call Devils. The common division of Spirits is in my Opinion much too general; and why may we not think, there is as great a variety of Intellectual Creatures in the Invisible World, as of Animals in the Visible? And that all the Superior, yea, and Inferior Regions, have their several kinds of Spirits differing in their natural Perfections; as well as in the Kind's and Degrees of their Depravities? Which if we suppose, 'tis very probable that those of the basest and meanest Orders are they, who submit to the mentioned Servilities: And thus the Sagess, and grandeur of the Prince of Darkness need not be brought in question on this Occasion.   

IV.  
But (IV.) the Opinion of Witches seems to some to accuse Providence; and to suggest that it hath exposed Innocents' to the fury and malice of revengeful Fiends; yea, and supposeth those most obnoxious, of whom we might most reasonably expect a more special care and protection; most of the cruel practices of those presumed Instruments of Hell, being upon Children, who as they least deserve to be deserted, by that Providence that superintends all things, so they most need its Guardian Influence.  
To this so specious an Objection, I have these things to answer.  
(1.) Providence is an unfathomable Depth; and if we should not believe the Phaenomena of our Senses, before we can reconcile them to our Notions of Providence, we must be grosser Sceptics than ever yet were extant. The miseries of the present Life, the unequal distributions of Good and Evil, the ignorance and barbarity of the greatest part of Mankind, the fatal disadvantages we are all under, and the hazard we run of being eternally miserable and undone; these, I say, are things that can hardly be made consistent with that Wisdom and Goodness that we are sure hath made, and mingled itself with all things. And yet we believe there is a beauty, and harmony, and goodness in that Providence, though we cannot unriddle it in particular Instances; nor, by reason of our ignorance and imperfection, clear it from contradicting Appearances; and consequently, we ought not to deny the being of Witches and Apparitions, because they will create us some difficulties in our Notions of Providence. (2.) Those that believe that Infants are Heirs of Hell, and Children of the Devil as soon as they are disclosed to the World, cannot certainly offer such an Objection; for what is a little trifling pain of a moment, to those eternal Tortures; to which, if they die as soon as they are born, according to the tenor of this Doctrine, they are everlastingly exposed? But however the case stands as to that, 'tis certain, (3.) That Providence hath not secured them from other violences they are obnoxious to, from cruelty and accident; and yet we accuse It not, when a whole Townful of Innocents' fall a Victim to the rage and freity of barbarous Executioners in Wars and Massacres. To which I add, (4.) That 'tis likely the mischief is not so often done by the evil Spirit immediately, but by the malignant influence of the Sorceress, whose power of hurting consists in the forementioned Ferment, which is infused into her by the Familiar. So that I am apt to think there may be a power of real Fascination in the Witches Eyes and Imaginations, by which for the most part she acts upon tender Bodies. Nescio quis teneros oculus— For the Pestilential Spirits being darted by a spiteful and vigorous Imagination from the Eye, and meeting with those that are weak and passive in the Bodies which they enter, will not fail to infect them with anoxious Quality, that makes dangerous and strange Alterations in the Person invaded by this poisonous Influence: which way of acting by subtle and invisible Instruments, is ordinary and familiar in all natural Efficiencies. And 'tis now past question, that Nature for the most part acts by subtle Streams and Aporrhaea's of Minute Particles, which pass from one Body to another. Or however that be, this kind of Agency is as conceivable as any of those Qualities, which our Ignorance hath called Sympathy and Antipathy; the reality of which we doubt not, though the manner of Action be unknown. Yea, the thing I speak of is as easy to be apprehended, as how Infection should pass in certain tenuious Streams through the Air, from one House to another; or, as how the biting of a mad Dog should fill all the Blood and Spirits with a venomous and malign Ferment; the application of the Virtue doing the same in our Case, as that of Contact doth in this. Yea, some kinds of Fascination are performed in this grosser and more sensible way, as by striking, giving Apples, and the like, by which the contagious Quality may be transmitted, as we see Diseases often are by the touch. Now in this way of conjecture, a good account may be given why Witches are most powerful upon Children and timorous Persons, viz. because their Spirits and Imaginations being weak and passive, are not able to resist the fatal Influence; whereas Men of bold Minds, who have plenty of strong and vigorous Spirits are secure from the Contagion; as in pestilential Airs clean Bodies are not so liable to Infection as other tempers. Thus we see 'tis likely enough, that, very often, the Sorceress herself doth the mischief; and we know, de facto, that Providence doth not always secure us from one another's Injuries; And yet I must confess, that many times also the Evil Spirit is the Mischievous Agent; though this Confession draw on me another Objection, which I next propose;   

V.  
(V.) IT may be said, that if Wicked Spirits can hurt as by the Direction, and at the desire of a Witch, one would think they should have the same power to do us injury without instigation or compact; and if this be granted, 'tis a wonder that we are not always annoyed and infested by them. To which  
I Answer, (1.) That the Laws, Liberties, and Restraints of the Inhabitants of the other World are to us utterly unknown; and in this way, we can only argue ourselves into confessions of our Ignorance, which every Man must acknowledge that is not as immodest, as ignorant. It must be granted by all that own the Being, Power, and Malice of Evil Spirits, that the security we enjoy is wonderful, whether they act by Witches or not; and by what Laws they are kept from making us a Prey, to speak like Philosophers, we cannot tell: Yea, why they should be permitted to tempt and ruin us in our Souls, and restrained from touching or hurting us in our Bodies, is a Mystery not easily accountable. But (2.) though we acknowledge their Power to vex and torment us in our Bodies also; yet a reason may be given why they are less frequent in this kind of mischief, viz. because their main Designs are levelled against the interest and happiness of our Souls, which they can best promote, when their Actions are most sly and secret; whereas did they ordinarily persecute Men in their Bodies, their Agency and wicked Influence would be discovered, and make a mighty noise in the World, whereby Men would be awakened to a suitable and vigorous opposition, by the use of such means as would engage Providence to rescue them from their rage and cruelties; and at last defeat them in their great purposes of undoing us eternally. Thus we may conceive that the security we enjoy may well enough consist with the power and malice of those Evil Spirits; and upon this account may suppose that Laws of their own may prohibit their unlicenc'd Injuries; not from any goodness there is in their Constitutions, but in order to the more successful carrying on the projects of the Dark Kingdom; as Generals forbid Plunder, not out of love to their Enemies, but in order to their own success. And hence (3.) we may suppose a Law of Permission to hurt us at the instance of the Sorceress, may well stand with the polity of Hell, since by gratifying the wicked Person, they encourage her in malice and revenge, and promote thereby the main ends of their black Confederacy, which are to propagate Wickedness, and to ruin us in our eternal Interests. And yet (4.) 'tis clear to those that believe the History of the Gospel, that Wicked Spirits have vexed the Bodies of Men, without any instigation that we read of; and at this day 'tis very likely that many of the strange Accidents and Diseases that befall us, may be the infliction of Evil Spirits, prompted to hurt us only by the delight they take in mischief. So that we cannot argue the improbability of their hurting Children and others by Witches, from our own security and freedom from the Effects of their Malice, which perhaps we feel in more Instances than we are aware of.   

VI  
(VI) ANother Prejudice against the belief of Witches, is, a presumption upon the enormous force of Melancholy and Imagination; which without doubt can do wonderful Things, and beget strange Persuasions; and to these Causes some ascribe all the Effects of Sorcery and Witchcraft. To which I reply briefly; and yet I hope sufficiently,  
(1.) That to resolve all the clear Circumstances of Fact, which we find in well-attested, and confirmed Relations of this kind, into the power of deceivable Imagination, is to make Fancy the greater Prodigy; and to suppose, that it can do stranger Feats than are believed of any other kind of Fascination. To think that Pins and Nails, for instance, can, by the power of Imagination be conveyed within the Skin; or that Imagination should deceive so many as have been Witnesses in Objects of Sense, in all the Circumstances of Discovery: This, I say, is to be infinitely more credulous than the Assertors of Sorcery, and Demoniac Contracts. By the same reason it may be believed, that all the Battles and strange Events of the World, which ourselves have not seen, are but Dreams and fond Imaginations, and like those that are fought in the Clouds, when the Brains of the deluded Spectators are the only Theatre of those fancied Transactions. And (2.) to deny evidence of Fact, because their Imagination may deceive the Relators, when we have no reason to think so, but a bare presumption, that there is no such thing as is related, is quite to destroy the Credit of all Humane Testimony, and to make all Men liars in a larger sense than the Prophet concluded in his haste. For not only the Melancholic and the Fanciful, but the Grave and the Sober, whose Judgements we have no reason to suspect to be tainted by their Imaginations, have from their own knowledge and experience made reports of this Nature. But to this it will possibly be rejoined, and the Reply will be another prejudice against the belief for which I contend, viz.   

VII.  
(VII.) THat 'tis a suspicious circumstance that Witchcraft is but a Fancy, since the Persons that are accused, are commonly poor and miserable old Women, who are overgrown with discontent and melancholy, which are very imaginative; and the Persons said to be bewitched, are for the most part Children, or People very weak, who are easily imposed upon, and are apt to receive strong Impressions from nothing: whereas were there any such thing really, 'tis not likely, but that the more cunning and subtle Desperadoes, who might the more successfully carry on the mischievous Designs of the Dark Kingdom, should be oftener engaged in those black Confederacies; and also one would expect Effects of the Hellish Combination upon others than the Innocent and the Ignorant.  
To which Objection it might perhaps be enough to return, (as hath been above suggested) that nothing can be concluded by this and suchlike arguings, but that the policy and menages of the Instruments of Darkness are to us altogether unknown, and as much in the dark as their Natures; Mankind being no more acquainted with the Reasons and Methods of Action in the other World, than poor Cottagers and Mechanics are with the Intrigues of Government, and Reasons of State. Yea, peradventure (2.) 'tis one of the great Designs, (as 'tis certainly the Interest) of those wicked Agents and Machinators, industriously to hide from us their influences and ways of acting, and to work, as near as is possible, incognito; upon which supposal 'tis easy to conceive a reason, why they most commonly work by, and upon the weak and ignorant, who can make no cunning Observations, or tell credible Tales to detect their Artifice. Besides (3.) 'tis likely a strong Imagination, that cannot be weakened or disturbed by a busy and subtle Ratiocination, is a necessary requisite to those wicked Performances; without doubt an heightened and obstinate Fancy hath a great influence upon impressible Spirits; yea, and as I have conjectured before, on the more passive and susceptible Bodies: And I am very apt to believe, that there are as real Communications and Intercourses between our Spirits, as there are between Material Agents; which secret Influences, though they are unknown in their Nature, and ways of acting, yet they are sufficiently felt in their Effects: For Experience attests, that some by the very majesty and greatness of their Spirits, discovered by nothing but a certain noble Air that accompanies them, will bear down others less great and generous, and make them sneak before them; and some, by I know not what stupifying virtue, will tie up the Tongue, and confine the Spirits of those who are otherwise brisk and voluble. Which thing supposed, the influences of a Spirit possessed of an active and enormous Imagination, may be malign and fatal where they cannot be resisted; especially when they are accompanied by those poisonous Reaks that the Evil Spirit breathes into the Sorceress, which likely are shot out, and applied by a Fancy heightened and prepared by Melancholy and Discontent. And thus we may conceive why the Melancholic and Envious are used upon such occasions, and for the same reason the Ignorant, since Knowledge checks and controls Imagination; and those that abound much in the Imaginative Faculties, do not usually exceed in the Rational. And perhaps (4.) the Daemon himself useth the Imagination of the Witch so qualified for his purpose, even in those Actions of mischief which are more properly his; for it is most probable, that Spirits act not upon Bodies immediately, and by their naked Essence, but by means proportionate and suitable Instruments that they use; upon which account likely 'tis so strictly required, that the Sorceress should belive, that so her Imagination might be more at the Devotion of the mischievous Agent: And for the same reason also Ceremonies are used in Enchantments, viz. for the ●…egetting this Diabolical Faith, and heightening the Fancy to a degree of strength and vigour sufficient to make it a fit Instrument for the designed performance. These I think are Reasons of likelihood and probability, why the Hellish Confederates are mostly the Ignorant and the Melancholic.   

VIII.  
(VIII.) THe frequent Impostures that are met with in this kind, beget in some a belief, that all such Relations are Forgeries and Tales; and if we urge the evidence of a Story for the belief of Witches or Apparitions, they will produce two as seemingly strong and plausible, which shall conclude in Mistake or Design; inferring thence, that all others are of the same quality and credit. But such Arguers may please to consider,  
(1.) That a single Relation for an Affirmative, sufficiently confirmed and attested, is worth a thousand Tales of forgery and imposture, from whence an Universal Negative cannot be concluded. So that though all the Objector's Stories be true, and an hundred times as many more such Deceptions; yet one Relation, wherein no fallacy or fraud could be suspected for our Affirmative, would spoil any Conclusion could be erected on them. And  
(2.) It seems to me a belief sufficiently bold and precarious, that all these Relations of Forgery and Mistake should be certain, and not one among all those which attest the Affirmative Reality, with Circumstances as good as could be expected or wished, should be true; but all fabulous and vain. Certainly they have no reason to object Credulity to the Assertors of Sorcery and Witchcraft, that can swallow so large a Morsel. And I desire such Objectors to consider,  
(3.) Whether it be fair to infer, that because there are some Cheats and Impostors, that therefore there are no Realities. Indeed frequency of deceit and fallacy will warrant a greater care and caution in examining; and scrupulosity and shiness of assent to things wherein fraud hath been practised, or may in the least degree be suspected: But, to conclude, because that an old Woman's Fancy abused her, or some knavish Fellows put tricks upon the ignorant and timorous, that therefore whole Assizes have been a thousand times deceived in judgement upon Matters of Fact, and numbers of sober Persons have been forsworn in things wherein Perjury could not advantage them; I say, such Inferences are as void of Reason, as they are of Charity and good Manners.   

IX.  
(IX.) IT may be suggested further, That it cannot be imagined what design the Devil should have in making those solemn Compacts, since Persons of such dehauched and irreclaimable Dispositions as those with whom he is supposed to confederate, are pretty securely his antecedently to the Bargain, and cannot be more so by it, since they cannot put their Souls out of possibility of the Divine Grace, but by the Sin that is unpardonable; or if they could so dispose and give away themselves, it will to some seem very unlikely, that a great and mighty Spirit should oblige himself to such observances, and keep such ado to secure the Soul of a silly Body, which 'twere odds but it would be His, though He put himself to no further trouble than that of his ordinary Temptations.  
To which Suggestions 'twere enough to say, that 'tis sufficient if the thing be well proved, though the Design be not known: and to argue negatively à fine, is very unconclusive in such Matters. The Laws and Affairs of the other World (as hath been intimated) are vastly differing from those of our Regions, and therefore 'tis no wonder we cannot judge of their Designs, when we know nothing of their Menages, and so little of their Natures. The ignorant looker-on can't imagine what the Limner means by those seemingly rude Lines and Scrawls which he intends for the Rudiments of a Picture; and the Figures of Mathematic Operation are nonsense, and dashes at a venture to one un-instructed in Mechanics: We are in the dark to one another's Purposes and Intendments; and there are a thousand Intrigues in our little Matters, which will not presently confess their Design, even to sagacious Inquisitors. And therefore 'tis folly and incogitancy to argue any thing one way or other from the designs of a sort of Being's, with whom we so little communicate; and possibly we can no more aim, or guests at their Projects and Designments, than the gazing Beast can do at ours, when they see the Traps and Gins that are laid for them, but understand nothing what they mean. Thus in general.  
But I attempt something more particularly, in order to which I must premise, That the Devil is a name for a Body Politic, in which there are very different Orders and Degrees of Spirits, and perhaps in as much variety of place and state, as among ourselves; so that 'tis not one and the same Person that makes all the Compacts with those abused and seduced Souls, but they are divers, and those 'tis like of the meanest and basest quality in the Kingdom of Darkness; which being supposed. I offer this account of the probable Design of those wicked Agents, viz. That having none to rule or tyrannize over within the Circle of their own Nature and Government, they affect a proud Empire over us (the desire of Dominion and Authority being largely spread through the whole circumference of degenerated Nature, especially among those, whose pride was their original transgression) every one of these then desires to get Vassals to pay him homage, and to be employed like Slaves in the services of his Lusts and Appetites; to gratify which desire, 'tis like it may be allowed by the constitution of their State and Government, that every wicked Spirit shall have those Souls as his property, and particular Servants and Attendants, whom he can catch in such Compacts; as those wild Beasts that we can take in hunting are ours, by the allowance of our Laws; and those Slaves that a Man hath purchased, are his peculiar Goods, and the Vassals of his Will. Or rather those deluding Fiends are like the seducing Fellows we call Spirits, who inveigle Children by their false and flattering Promises, and carry them away to the Plantations of America, to be servilely employed there in the Works of their Profit and Advantage. And as those base Agents will humour and flatter the simple unwary Youth, till they are on Shipboard, and without the reach of those that might rescue them from their hands: In like manner the more mischievous Tempter studies to gratify, please, and accommodate those he deals with in this kind, till Death hath lan●…h'd them into the Deep, and they are passed the danger of Prayers, Repentance, and Endeavours; and then He useth them as pleaseth Him. This account I think is not unreasonable, and 'twill fully answer the Objection. For though the Matter be not as I have conjectured, yet 'twill suggest a way how it may be conceived, which destroys the Pretence, That the Design is inconceivable.   

X.  
But (X.) we are still liable to be questioned, how it comes about that those proud and insolent Designers practice in this kind upon so few, when one would expect, that they should be still trading this way, and everywhere be driving on the Project, which the vileness of Men makes so feisable, and would so much serve the interest of their Lusts.  
To which, among other things, that might be suggested, I return,  
(1.) That we are never liable to be so betrayed and abused, till by our vile Dispositions and Tendencies we have forfeited the care and oversight of the better Spirits; who, though generally they are our guard and defence against the malice and violence of Evil Angels, yet it may well enough be thought, that sometimes they may take their leave of such as are swallowed up by Malice, Envy, and desire of Revenge, qualities most contrary to their Life and Nature; and leave them exposed to the invasion and solicitations of those Wicked Spirits, to whom such hateful Attributes make them very suitable. And if there be particular Guardian Angels, (as 'tis not absurd to fancy) it may then well be supposed, that no Man is obnoxious to those Projects and Attempts, but only such whose vile and mischievous Natures have driven from them their protecting Genius. Against this dereliction to the power of Evil Spirits, 'tis likely enough what some affirm, that the Royal Psalmist directs that Prayer, Psal. 71. 9, 10. Cast me not off in the time of old Age; forsake me not when my strength faileth. For— They that keep my Soul [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the LXX and the Vulgar Latin, Qui custodiunt animam meam] they take counsel together, saying, God hath forsaken him, persecute him and take him, for there is none to deliver him. (2.) 'Tis very probable, that the stare wherein they are, will not easily permit palpable Intercourses between the bad Genii, and Mankind, since 'tis probable that their own Laws and Government do not allow their frequent excursions into this World. Or, it may with as great likelihood be supposed, that 'tis a very hard and painful thing for them, to force their thin and tenuious Bodies into a visible consistence, and such Shapes as are necessary for their designs in their correspondencies with Witches. For in this Action their Bodies must needs be exceedingly compressed, which cannot well be without a painful sense. And this is perhaps a reason why there are so few Apparitions, and why Appearing Spirits are commonly in such haste to be gone, viz. that they may be delivered from the unnatural pressure of their tender Vehicles, which I confess holds more in the Apparitions of Good, than of Evil Spirits; most Relations of this kind, describing their discoveries of themselves as very transient, (though for those the Holy Scripture records, there may be peculiar reason why they are not so) whereas the Wicked Ones are not altogether so quick and hasty in their Visits: The reason of which probably is, the great subtlety and tenuity of the Bodies of the former, which will require far greater degrees of compression, and consequently of pain, to make them visible; whereas the latter are more feculent and gross, and so nearer allied to palpable Consistencies, and more easily reduceable to Appearance and Visibility.  
At this turn, I have again made use of the Platonic Hypothesis, That Spirits are embodied, upon which indeed a great part of my Discourse is grounded: And therefore I hold myself obliged to a short account of that supposal. It seems then to me very probable from the Nature of Sense, and Analogy of Nature. For (1.) we perceive in ourselves, that all Sense is caused and excited by Motion made in Matter; and when those Motions which convey sensible Impressions to the Brain, the Seat of Sense, are intercepted, Sense is lost: So that, if we suppose Spirits perfectly to be disjoined from all Matter, 'tis not conceivable how they can have the sense of any thing; For how material Objects should any way be perceived, or felt without Vital Union with Matter, 'tis not possible to imagine. Nor doth it (2.) seem suitable to the Analogy of Nature, which useth not to make precipitious leaps from one thing to another, but usually proceeds by orderly steps and gradations: whereas were there no order of Being's between Us, (who are so deeply plunged into the grossest Matter) and pure, unbodied Spirits, 'twere a mighty jump in Nature. Since then the greatest part of the World consists of the finer portions of Matter, and our own Souls are immediately united unto these, 'tis exceeding probable, that the nearer orders of Spirits are vitally joined to such Bodies; and so, Nature by degrees ascending still by the more refined and subtle Matter, gets at last to the pure 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or immaterial Minds, which the Platonists made the highest Order of Created Being's. But of this I have discoursed elsewhere, and have said thus much of it at present, because it will enable me to add another Reason of the unfrequency of Apparitions and Compacts, viz.  
(3.) Because 'tis very likely, that these Regions are very unsuitable, and disproportioned to the frame and temper of their Senses and Bodies; so that perhaps the Courser Spirits can no more bear the Air of our World, than Bats and Owls can the brightest Beams of Day: Nor can the Purer and Better any more endure the noisome Steams, and poisonous Reeks of this Dunghill Earth, than the Delicate can bear a Confinement in nasty Dungeons, and the foul squalid Caverns of uncomfortable Darkness. So that 'tis no more wonder, that the better Spirits no oftener appear, than that Men are not more frequently in the Dark Hollows underground. Nor is't any more strange that evil Spirits so rarely visit us, than that Fishes do not ordinarily fly in the Air, (as 'tis said one sort of them doth) or that we see not the Bat daily fluttering in the Beams of the Sun. And now by the help of what I have spoken under this Head, I am provided with some things wherewith to disable another Objection, which I thus propose:   

XI.  
(XI.) IF there be such an intercourse between Evil Spirits and the Wicked; How comes it about that there is no correspondence between Good Angels, and the Virtuous; since without doubt these are as desirous to propagate the Spirit and Designs of the Upper and better World, as those are to promote the Interest of the Kingdom of Darkness?  
Which way of arguing is still from our Ignorance of the State and Government of the other World, which must be confessed, and may, without prejudice to the Proposition I defend. But particularly, I say, (1.) That we have ground enough to believe, that Good Spirits do interpose in, yea, and govern our Affairs. For that there is a Providence reaching from Heaven to Earth, is generally acknowledged; but that this supposeth all things to be ordered by the immediate influence, and interposal of the Supreme Deity, some think, is not very Philosophical to suppose; since, if we judge by the Analogy of the Natural World, all things we see are carried on by the Ministry of Second Causes, and Intermediate Agents. And it doth not seem so Magnificent and Becoming an apprehension of the Supreme Numen, to fancy his immediate Hand in every trivial Management. But 'tis exceeding likely to conjecture, that much of the Government of us, and our Affairs, is committed to the better Spirits, with a due subordination and subserviency to the Will of the chief Rector of the Universe. And 'tis not absurd to believe, that there is a Government that runs from Highest to Lowest, the better and more perfect orders of Being still ruling the inferior and less perfect. So that some one would fancy that perhaps the Angels may manage us, as we do the Creatures that God and Nature have placed under our Empire and Dominion. But however that is, That God rules the Lower World by the Ministry of Angels, is very consonant to the Sacred Oracles. Thus, Deut. 32. 8, 9 When the Most High divided the Nations their Inheritance, when he separated the Sons of Adam, he set the Bounds of the People, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to the number of the Angels of God, as the Septuagint renders it; the Authority of which Translation, is abundantly credited and asserted, by its being quoted in the New Testament, without notice of the Hebrew Text; even there where it differs from it, as Learned Men have observed. We know also that Angels were very familiar with the Patriarches of old; and Jacob's Ladder is a Mystery; which imports their ministering in the Affairs of the Lower World. Thus Origen and others understand, that to be spoken by the Presidential Angels, Jer. 51. 9 We would have healed Babylon, but she is not healed: forsake her, and let us go. Like the Voice heard in the Temple before the taking of Jerusalem by Titus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And before Nabuchadnezzar was sent to learn Wisdom and Religion among the Beasts, He sees a Watcher, according to the LXX, an Angel, and an Holy One come down from Heaven, Dan. 4. 13. who pronounceth the sad Decree against Him, and calls it the Decree of the Watchers, who very probably were the Guardian Genii of of Himself and his Kingdom. And that there are particular Angels that have the special Rule and Government of particular Kingdoms, Provinces, Cities, yea and of Persons, I know nothing that can make improbable: The instance is notorious in Daniel, of the Angels of Persia and Graecia, that hindered the other that was engaged for the Concerns of Judaea; yea, our Saviour himself tells us, that Children have their Angels; and the Congregation of Disciples supposed that St. Peter had his: Which things, if they be granted, the good Spirits have not so little to do with Us, and our Matters, as is generally believed. And perhaps it would not be absurd, if we referred many of the strange Thwarts, and unexpected Events, the Disappointments and lucky Coincidences that befall us, the unaccountable Fortunes and Successes that attend some lucky Men, and the unhappy Fates that dog others that seem born to be miserable; the Fame and Favour that still waits on some without any conceivable Motive to allure it, and the general neglect of others more deserving, whose worth is not acknowledged; I say, these and suchlike odd things, may with the greatest probability be resolved into the Conduct and Menages of those Invisible Supervisors, that preside over, and govern our Affairs.  
But if they so far concern themselves in our Matters, how is it that they appear not to maintain a visible and confessed Correspondence with some of the better Mortals, who are most fitted for their Communications and their Influence? To which I have said some things already, when I accounted for the unfrequency of Apparitions; and I now add what I intent for another return to the main Objection, viz.  
(2.) That the Apparition of Good Spirits is not needful for the Designs of the better World, whatever such may be for the Interest of the other. For we have had the Appearance and Cohabitation of the Son of God; we have Moses and the Prophets, and the continued Influence of the Spirit, the greatest Arguments to strengthen Faith, the most powerful Motives to excite our Love, and the noblest Encouragements to quicken and raise our Desires and Hopes, any of which are more than the Apparition of an Angel; which would indeed be a great gratification of the Animal Life, but 'twould render our Faith less noble and less generous, were it frequently so assisted: Blessed are they that believe, and yet have not seen. Besides which, the Good Angels have no such Ends to prosecute, as the gaining any Vassals to serve them, they being Ministering Spirits for our good, and no self-designers for a proud and insolent Dominion over us. And it may be perhaps not impertinently added, That they are not always evil Spirits that appear, as is, I know not well upon what grounds, generally imagined; but that the extraordinary detections of Murders, latent Treasures, falsified and unfulfilled Bequests, which are sometimes made by Apparitions, may be the courteous Discoveries of the better, and more benign G●…nii. Yea, 'tis not unlikely, that those Warnings that the World sometimes hath of approaching Judgements and Calamities by Prodigies, and sundry odd Phaenomena, are the kind Informations of some of the Inhabitants of the Upper World. Thus was Jerusalem forewarned before its sacking by Antiochus, by those Airy Horsemen that were seen through all the City for almost forty days together, 2 Mac. 5. 2, 3. And the other Prodigious Portents that foreran its Destruction by Titus: which I mention, because they are notorious Instances. And though, for mine own part, I scorn the ordinary Tales of Prodigies, which proceed from superstitious Fears, and unacquaintance with Nature, and have been used to bad Purposes by the Zealous and the Ignorant; Yet I think that the Arguments that are brought by a late very Ingenious Author, to conclude against such Warnings and Predictions in the whole kind, are short and inconsequent, and built upon too narrow Hypotheseis. For if it be supposed, that there is a sort of Spirits over us, and about us, who can give a probable guess at the more remarkable Futurities, I know not why it may not be conjectured, that the kindness they have for us, and the appetite of foretelling strange things, and the putting the World upon expectation, which we find is very grateful to our own Natures, may not incline them also to give us some general notice of those uncommon Events which they foresee. And I yet perceive no reason we have to fancy, that whatever is done in this kind, must needs be either immediately from Heaven, or from the Angels, by extraordinary Commission and Appointment. But it seems to me not unreasonable to believe, that those officious Spirits that oversee our Affairs, perceiving some mighty and sad Alterations at hand, in which their Charge is much concerned, cannot choose, by reason of their affection to us, but give us some seasonable hints of those approaching Calamities; to which also their natural desire to foretell strange things to come, may contribute to incline them. And by this Hypothesis, the fairest Probabilities, and strongest Ratiocinations against Prodigies, may be made unserviceable. But this only by the way.  
I desire it may be considered further,  
(3.) That God himself assords his Intimacies, and converses to the better Souls, that are prepared for it; which is a privilege infinitely beyond Angelical Correspondence.  
I confess the proud and fantastic Pretences of many of the conceited Melancholists in this Age, to Divine Communion, have prejudiced divers intelligent Persons against the belief of any such happy vouchsafement; so that they conclude the Doctrine of Immediate Communion with the Deity in this Life to be but an high flown Notion of warm Imagination, and over-lushious self-flattery; and I acknowledge I have myself had thoughts of this nature, supposing Communion with God to be nothing else but the exercise of Virtue, and that Peace, and those Comforts which naturally result from it.  
But I have considered since, that God's more near and immediate imparting himself to the Soul that is prepared for that happiness by Divine Love, Humility, and Resignation, in the way of a vital Touch and Sense, is a thing possible in itself, and will be a great part of our Heaven; That Glory is begun in Grace, and God is pleased to give some excellent Souls the happy Ante-past; That Holy Men in ancient Times have sought and gloried in this Enjoyment, and never complain so sorely as when it was withheld, and interrupted; That the Expressions of Scripture run infinitely this way, and the best of Modern good Men, do from their own experience attest it; That this spiritualizeth Religion, and renders its Enjoyments more comfortable and delicious; That it keeps the Soulunder a vivid Sense of God, and is a grand security against Temptation; That it holds it steady amid the Flatteries of a Prosperous State, and gives it the most grounded Anchorage, and support amid the Waves of an adverse Condition; That 'tis the noblest encouragement to virtue, and the biggest assurance of an happy Immortality; I say, I considered these weighty things, and wondered at the carelessness, and prejudice of Thoughts that occasioned my suspecting the reality of so glorious a Privilege; I saw how little reason there is in denying Matters of inward Sense, because ourselves do not feel them, or cannot form an apprehension of them in our Minds: I am convinced that things of gust and relish must be judged by the sentient and vital Faculties, and not by the noetical Exercises of speculative Understandings: And upon the whole, I believe infinitely that the Divine Spirit affords its sensible Presence, and immediate Beatihck Touch to some rare Souls, who are divested of carnal Self, and mundane Pleasures, abstracted from the Body by Prayer and Holy Meditation; spiritual in their Desires, and calm in their Affections; devout Lovers of God, and Virtue, and tenderly affectionate to all the World; sincere in their Aims, and circumspect in their Actions; enlarged in their Souls, and clear in their Minds: These I think are the dispositions that are requisite to fit us for Divine Communion; and God transacts not in this near way, but with prepared Spirits who are thus disposed for the manifestation of his Presence, and his Influence: And such I believe he never fails to bless with these happy foretastes of Glory.  
But for those that are Passionate and Conceited, Turbulent and Notional, Confident and Immodest, Imperious and Malicious; That dote upon Trifles, and run fiercely in the ways of a Sect; that are lifted up in the apprehension of the glorious Prerogatives of themselves and their Party, and scorn all the World besides; For such, I say, be their Pretensions what they will, to Divine Communion, Illapses, and Discoveries, I believe them not; Their Fancies abuse them, or they would us. For what Communion hath Light with Darkness, or the Spirit of the Holy One with those, whose Genius and Ways are so unlike him: But the other excellent Souls I described, will as certainly be visited by the Divine Presence, and Converse, as the Chrystaline Streams are with the Beams of Light, or the fitly prepared Earth, whose Seed is in itself, will be actuated by the Spirit of Nature.  
So that there is no reason to Object here the want of Angelical Communications, though there were none vouchsafed us, since good Men enjoy the Divine, which are infinitely more satisfactory and endearing.  
And now I may have leave to proceed to the next Objection, which may be made to speak thus:   

XII.  
(XII.) THe belief of Witches, and the wonderful things they are said to perform by the help of the Confederate Daemon, weakens our Faith, and exposeth the World to Infidelity in the great Matters of our Religion. For if they by Diabolical Assistance, can inflict and cure Diseases, and do things so much beyond the comprehension of our Philosophy, and activity of common Nature; What assurance can we have, that the Miracles that confirm our Gospel were not the Effects of a Compact of like nature, and that Devils were not cast out by Beelzebub? If Evil Spirits can assume Bodies, and render themselves visible in humane Likeness; What security can we have of the reality of the Resurrection of Christ? And if, by their help, Witches can enter Chambers invisibly through Keyholes, and little unperceived Crannies, and transform themselves at pleasure; What Arguments of Divinity are there in our Saviour's showing himself in the midst of his Disciples, when the Doors were shut, and his Transfiguration in the Mount? Miracles are the great Inducements of Belief; and how shall we distinguish a Miracle from a Lying Wonder; a Testimony from Heaven, from a Trick of the Angels of Hell; if they can perform things that astonish and confound our Reasons, and are beyond all the Possibilities of Humane Nature? To this Objection I reply;  
(1.) The Wonders done by Confederacy with Wicked Spirits, cannot derive a suspicion upon the undoubted Miracles that were wrought by the Author and Promulgers of our Religion, as if they were performed by Diabolical Compact, since their Spirit, Endeavours, and Designs, were notoriously contrary to all the Tendencies, Aims, and Interests of the Kingdom of Darkness. For, as to the Life and Temper of the Blessed and Adorable JESUS, we know there was an incomparable sweetness in his Nature, Humility in his Manners, Calmness in his Temper, Compassion in his Miracles, Modesty in his Expressions, Holiness in all his Actions, Hatred of Vice and Baseness, and Love to all the World; all which are essentially contrary to the Nature and Constitution of Apostate Spirits, who abound in Pride and Rancour, Insolence and Rudeness, Tyranny and Baseness, Universal Malice, and Hatred of Men: And their Designs are as opposite, as their Spirit and their Genius. And now, Can the Sun borrow its Light from the Bottomless Abyss? Can Heat and Warmth flow in upon the World from the Regions of Snow and Ice? Can Fire freeze, and Water burn? Can Natures, so infinitely contrary, communicate, and jump in Projects, that are destructive to each others known Interests? Is there any Balsam in the Cockatrice's Egg? or, Can the Spirit of Life flow from the Venom of the Asp? Will the Prince of Darkness strengthen the Arm that is stretched out to pluck his Usurped Sceptre, and his Spoils from him? And will he lend his Legions, to assist the Armies of his Enemy against him? No, these are impossible Supposals; No intelligent Being will industriously and knowingly contribute to the Contradiction of its own Principles, the Defeature of its Purposes, and the Ruin of its own dearest Interests. There is no fear then, that our Faith should receive prejudice from the acknowledgement of the Being of Witches, and Power of Evil Spirits, since 'tis not the doing wonderful things that is the only Evidence that the Holy JESUS was from God, and his Doctrine True; but the conjunction of other Circumstances, the Holiness of his Life, the Reasonableness of his Religion, and the Excellency of his Designs, added credit to his Works, and strengthened the great Conclusion, That he could be no other than the Son of God, and Saviour of the World. But besides, I say,  
(2.) That since Infinite Wisdom and Goodness rules the World, it cannot be conceived, that they should give up the greatest part of Men to unavoidable deception. And if Evil Angels, by their Confederates are permitted to perform such astonishing things, as seem so evidently to carry God's Seal and Power with them, for the confirmation of Falsehoods, and gaining credit to Impostors, without any Counter-evidence to disabuse the World; Mankind is exposed to sad and fatal Delusion: And to say that Providence will suffer us to be deceived in things of the greatest Concernment, when we use the best of our Care and Endeavours to prevent it, is to speak hard things of God; and in effect to affirm, That He hath nothing to do in the Government of the World, or doth not concern himself in the Affairs of poor forlorn Men: And if the Providence and Goodness of God be not a security unto us against such Deceptions, we cannot be assured, but that we are always abused by those mischievous Agents, in the Objects of plain Sense, and in all the Matters of our daily Converses. If One that pretends he is immediately sent from God, to overthrow the Ancient Fabric of Established Worship, and to erect a New Religion in His Name, shall be born of a Virgin, and honoured by a Miraculous Star; proclaimed by a Song of seeming Angels of Light, and Worshipped by the Wise Sages of the World; Revered by those of the greatest Austerity, and admired by all for a Miraculous Wisdom, beyond his Education and his Years: If He shall feed Multitudes with almost nothing, and fast himself beyond all the possibilities of Nature: If He shall be transformed into the appearance of extraordinory Glory, and converse with departed Prophets in their visible Forms: If He shall Cure all Diseases without Physic or Endeavour, and raise the Dead to Life after they have stunk in their Graves: If He shall be honoured by Voices from Heaven, and attract the Universal Wonder of Princes and People: If he shall allay Tempests with a Beck, and cast out Devils with a Word: If he shall foretell his own Death particularly, with its Tragical Circumstances, and his Resurrection after it: If the Veil of the most famous Temple in the World shall be Rend, and the Sun darkened at his Funeral: If He shall, within the time foretold, break the Bonds of Death, and lift up his Head out of the Grave: If Multitudes of other departed Souls shall arise with Him, to attend at the Solemnity of his Resurrection: If He shall, after Death, visibly Converse, and Eat, and Drink with divers Persons, who could not be deceived in a Matter of clear Sense, and ascend in Glory in the presence of an astonished and admiring Multitude: I say, if such a One as this should prove a Diabolical Impostor, and Providence should permit him to be so credited and acknowledged; What possibility were there then for us to be assured, that we are not always deceived? yea, that our very Faculties were not given us only to delude and abuse us? And if so, the next Conclusion is, That there is no God that judgeth in the Earth; and the best, and most likely Hypothesis will be, That the World is given up to the Government of the Devil. But if there be a Providence that superviseth us, (as nothing is more certain) doubtless it will never suffer poor helpless Creatures to be inevitably deceived, by the craft and subtlety of their mischievous Enemy, to their undoing; but will without question take such care, that the Works wrought by Divine Power for the confirmation of Divine Truth, shall have such visible Marks and Signatures, if not in their Nature, yet in their Circumstances, Ends, and Designs, as shall discover whence they are, and sufficiently distinguish them from all Impostures and Delusions; And though wicked Spirits may perform some strange things that may excite wonder for a while, yet He hath, and will so provide, that they shall be basfled and discredited; as we know it was in the Case of Moses and the Egyptian Magicians.  
These things I count sufficient to be said to this last, and shrewdest Objection; Though some, I understand, except, that I have made it stronger than the Answer I have applied. That I have urged the Argument of Unbelievers home, and represented it in its full strength, I suppose can be no matter of just reproof; For to triumph over the weakness of a Cause, and to overlook its strength, is the trick of shallow and interessed Disputers, and the worst way to defend a Good Cause, or confute a Bad One. I have therefore all along urged the most cogent Things I could think of, for the Interest of the Objectors, because I would not impose upon my Reader or myself; and the stronger I make their Premises, the more shall I weaken their Conclusion, if I answer them; which whether I have done, or not, I refer myself to the Judgements of the Ingenious and Considerate; from whom I should be very glad to be informed in what particular Points my Discourse is defective; General Charges are no Proofs, nor are they easily capable of an Answer. Yet, to the mentioned Exception, I say,  
That the strength of the Objection is not my fault, for the Reasons alleged; and for the supposed incompetency of my return, I propose, that if the Circumstances of the Persons, Ends, and Issues be the best Notes of Distinction between true Miracles and Forgeries, Divine and Diabolical Ones, I have then said enough to secure the Miracles of our Saviour, and the Holy Men of Ancient Times. But if these Objectors think they can give us any better, or more infallible Criteria, I desire them to weigh what I have offered about Miracles in some of the following Leaves, before they enter that Thought among their Certainties. And if their other Marks of Difference will hold, notwithstanding those Allegations, I suppose the inquisitive believing World would be glad to know them; and I shall have particular Obligations to the Discoverer, for the strength with which he will thereby assist my Answer.  
But till I see that, I can say nothing stronger; or if I saw it, which I shall not in haste expect, I should not be convinced but that the Circumstances of Difference which I have noted, are abundantly sufficient to disarm the Objection; and to show, that though Apparitions, Witchcraft, and Diabolical Wonders are admitted: yet none of these can fasten any Slu●…, or ground of dangerous Doubt upon the miraculous performances of the H. Jesus and his Apostles. If the dissatisfied can show it, I shall yield myself an humble Proselyte to their Reasons; but till I know them, the General Suggestion will not convince me.  
Now, besides what I have directly said to the Main Objection, I have this to add to the Objectors, That I could wish they would take care of such Suggestions; which, if they overthrew not the Opinion they oppose, will dangerously affront the Religion they would seem to acknowledge. For he that saith, That if there are Witches, there is no way to prove that Christ Jesus was not a Magician, and Diabolical Impostor, puts a deadly Weapon into the hands of the Infidel, and is himself next door to the Sin against the Holy Ghost: of which, in order to the persuading greater tenderness and caution in such Matters, I give this short account.  
THe Sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be Unpardonable; by which sad Attribute, and the Discourse of our Saviour, Mat. 12. from the 22 to the 33 Verse, we may understand its Nature. In order to which we consider, That since the Mercies of God, and the Merits of his Son, are infinite, there is nothing can make a Sin unpardonable, but what makes it incurable; and there is no Sin but what is curable by a strong Faith, and a vigorous Endeavour: For all things are possible to him that believeth. So that, That which makes a Sin incurable, must be somewhat that makes Faith impossible, and obstructs all means of Conviction. In order to the finding which, we must consider the Ways and Methods the Divine Goodness hath taken, for the begetting Faith, and cure of Infidelity: which it attempted, first, by the Prophets, and Holy Men of Ancient Times, who, by the excellency of their Doctrine, the greatness of their Miracles, and the holiness of their Lives, endeavoured the Conviction and Reformation of a stubborn and unbelieving World. But though few believed their report, and Men would not be prevailed on by what they did, or what they said; yet their Infidelity was not hitherto incurable, because further means were provided in the Ministry of John the Baptist, whose Life was more severe, whose Doctrines were more plain, pressing and particular: and therefore 'twas possible that He might have succeeded. Yea, and where He failed, and could not open men's Hearts and Eyes, the Effect was still in possibility, and it might be expected from Him that came after, to whom the Prophets and John were but the Twilight and the Dawn. And though His miraculous Birth, the Song of Angels, the Journey of the Wise Men of the East, and the correspondence of Prophecies, with the Circumstances of the first appearance of the Wonderful Infant: I say, though these had not been taken notice of, yet was there a further provision made for the cure of Infidelity, in his astonishing Wisdom, and most excellent Doctrines; For, He spoke as never Man did. And when these were despised and neglected, yet there were other Means towards Conviction and Cure of Unbelief, in those mighty Works that bore Testimony of Him, and wore the evident Marks of Divine Power in their Foreheads. But when after all, These clear and unquestionable Miracles which were wrought by the Spirit of God, and had eminently his Superscription on them, shall be ascribed to the Agency of Evil Spirits, and Diabolical Compact, as they were by the malicious and spiteful Pharisees; when those great and last Testimonies against Infidelity, shall be said to be but the Tricks of Sorcery, and Complotment with Hellish Confederates; This is Blasphemy in the highest, against the Power and Spirit of God, and such as cuts of all means of Conviction, and puts the Unbeliever beyond all possibilities of Cure. For Miracles are God's Seal, and the great and last Evidence of the truth of any Doctrine. And though, while these are only dis-believed as to the Fact, there remains a possibility of Persuasion; yet, when the Fact shall be acknowledged, but the Power Blasphemed, and the Effects of the Adorable Spirit maliciously imputed to the Devils; such a Blasphemy, such an Infidelity is incurable, and consequently unpardonable. I say, in sum, the Sin against the Holy Ghost seems to be a malicious imputation of the Miracles wrought by the Spirit of God in our Saviour to Satanical Confederacy, and the Power of Apostate Spirits; Then which, nothing is more blasphemous, and nothing is more like to provoke the Holy Spirit that is so abused to an Eternal Dereliction of so Vile and so Incurable an Unbeliever.  
This account, as 'tis clear and reasonable in itself, so it is plainly lodged in the mentioned Discourse of our Saviour. And most of those that speak other things about it, seem to me to talk at random, and perfectly without Book.  
I Have thus endeavoured to remove the Main Prejudices against the belief of Witches and Apparitions; and I'm sure I have suggested much more against what I defend, than ever I heard or saw in any that opposed it, whose Discourses, for the most part, have seemed to me inspired by a lofty scorn of common belief, and some trivial Notions of Vulgar Philosophy. And in despising the Common Faith about Matters of Fact, and fond adhering to it in things of Speculation, they very grossly and absurdly mistake: For in things of Fact, the People are as much to be believed, as the most subtle Philosophers and Speculators; since here, Sense is the Judge. But in Matters of Notion and Theory, They are not at all to be heeded, because Reason is to be Judge of these, and this they know not how to use. And yet thus it is with those wise Philosophers, that will deny the plain Evidence of the Senses of Mankind, because they cannot reconcile Appearances to the fond Fancies of a Philosophy, which they lighted on in the Highway by Chance, and will adhere to at adventure. So that I profess, for mine own part, I never yet heard any of the confident Declaimers against Witchcraft and Apparitions, speak any thing that might move a Mind, in any degree instructed in the generous kinds of Philosophy, and Nature of things. And for the Objections I have recited, they are most of them such as rose out of mine own Thoughts, which I obliged to consider what might be to be said upon this occasion.  
For though I have examined Scot's Discovery, sancying that there I should find the strong Reasons of men's disbelief in this Matter: Yet I met not with any thing in that Farrago that was considerable. For the Author doth little but tell odd Tales, and silly Legends, which he confutes and laughs at, and pretends this to be a Confuration of the Being of Witches and Apparitions. In all which, His Reasonings are Trifling and Childish; and when He ventures at Philosophy, He is little better than absurd: So that I should wonder much if any but Boys and Buffoons should imbibe Prejudices against a Belief so infinitely confirmed, from the loose and impotent Suggestions of so weak a Discourser.  
But however observing two things in that Discourse that would pretend to be more than ordinary Reasons, I shall do them the civility to examine them. It is said,  
(1.) THat the Gospel is silent, as to the Being of Witches; and 'tis not likely, if there were such, but that our Saviour or his Apostles had given intimations of their Existence. The other is,  
(2.) MIracles are ceased, and therefore the prodigious things ascribed to Witchcraft, are supposed Dreams and Impostures.  
For Answer to the First in order, I consider, (1.) That though the History of the New Testament were granted to be silent in the Business of Witches and Compacts, yet the Records of the Old have a frequent mention of them. The Law, Euod. 22. 18. against permitting them to live, is famous. And we have another remarkable prohibition of them, Deut. 18. 10. 11. There shall not be found among you any one, that maketh his Son or his Daughter pass through the Fire, or that useth Divination, or an Observer of Times, or an Enchanter, or 〈◊〉 Witch, or a Charmer, or a Consulter with Familiar Spirits, or a Wizard, or a Necromaneer. Now this accumulation of Names, (some of which are of the same sense and import) is a plain indication that the Hebrew Witch was one that practised by compact with evil Spirits. And many of the same Expressions are put together in the Charge against Manasses, 2 Chron. 33. viz. That he caused his Children to pass through the Fire, observed Times, used Enchantments, and Witchcraft, and dealt with Familiar Spirits, and with Wizards. So that though the Original word which we render Witch and Witchcraft should, as our Sadduces urge, signify only a Cheat and a Poisoner; yet those others mentioned, plainly enough speak the thing, and I have given an account in the former Considerations, how a Witch in the common Notion is a Poisoner. But why mere poisoning should have a distinct Law against it, and not be concluded under the general one against Murder; why mere Legerdemain and Cheating should be so severely animadverted on, as to be reckoned with Enchantments, converse with Devils, and Idolatrous Practices: I believe the denier of Witches will find it hard to give a reason. To which I may add some other Passages of Scripture that yield sufficient evidence in the Case. The Nations are forbid to hearken to the Diviners, Dreamers, Enchanters, and Sorcerers, Jer. 27. 9 The Chaldaeans are deeply threatened for their Sorceries and Enchantments, Isa. 47.9. And we read that Nabuchadnezzar called the Magicians, Astrologers, Sorcerers, and Chaldaeans, to tell his Dream. My mention of which last, minds me to say, that for aught I have to the contrary, there may be a sort of Witches and Magicians that have no Familiars that they know, nor any express Compact with Apostate Spirits; who yet may perhaps act strange things by Diabolick Aids, which they procure by the use of those Forms, and wicked Arts that the Devil did first impart to his Confederates: And we know not but the Laws of that Dark Kingdom may enjoin a particular attendance upon all those that practise their Mysteries, whether they know them to be theirs or not. For a great interest of their Empire may be served by this Project, since those that find such success in the unknown Conjurations, may by that be tolled on to more express Transactions with those Fiends that have assisted them incognito: Or, if they proceed not so far, yet they run upon a Rock by acting in the Dark, and dealing in unknown and unwarranted Arts, in which the Effect is much beyond the proper efficiency of the things they use, and affords ground of more than suspicion that some Evil Spirit is the Agent in those wondrous Performances.  
Upon this account, I say, it is not to me unlikely but that the Devils may by their own Constitution be bound to attend upon all that use their Ceremonies and Forms, though ignorantly, and without design of Evil; and so Conjuration may have been performed by those who are none of the Covenant-Sorcerers and Witches. Among those perhaps we may justly reckon Balaam, and the Diviners. For Balaam, Moncaeus hath undertaken to clear him from the Gild of the greater Sorcery. And the Diviners are usually distinctly mentioned from those that had Familiar Spirits. The Astrologers also of Elder Times, and those of Ours, I take to have been of this sort of Magicians, and some of them, under the colour of that Mystical Science, worse. And I question not, but that things are really done, and foretold by those pretended Artists, that are much beyond the regular Possibilities of their Art; which in this appears to be exceedingly uncertain and precarious, in that there are no less than six ways of erecting a Scheme, in each of which the Prediction of Events shall be different, and yet every one of them be justifiable by the Rules of that pretended Science. And the Principles they go upon, are found to be very Arbitrary, and Unphilosophical, not by the ordinary Declaimers against it, but by the most profound Inquirers into things, who perfectly understand the whole Mystery, and are the only competent Judges.  
Now those Mystical Students may in their first Addresses to this Science, have no other Design, but the satisfaction of their Curiosity to know remote and hidden things; Yet that in the Progress being not satisfied within the Bounds of their Art, doth many times tempt the Curious Inquirer to use worse means of Information; and no doubt those mischievous Spirits that are as vigilant as the Beasts of Prey, and watch all occasions to get us within their envious reach, are more constant Attenders, and careful Spies upon the Actions and Inclinations of such, whose Genius and Designs prepare them for their Temptations.  
So that I look on Judicial Astrology as a fair Introduction to Sorcery and Witchcraft. And who knows but that it was first set on foot by Evil Spirits, as a Lure to draw the Curios●…'s into those snares that lie hid beyond it. And yet, I believe also, It may be innocently enough studied by those that aim only to understand what it is, and how far it will honestly go; and are not willing to condemn any thing which they do not comprehend. But that they must take care to keep themselves within the Bounds of sober Enquiry, and not indulge irregular Sollicitudes about the knowledge of Things, which Providence hath thought fit to conceal from us; Which whoever doth, lays himself open to the Designs and Solicitations of Wicked Spirits; and I believe there are very few among such as have been addicted to those Arts of Wonder and Prediction, but have found themselves att●…qued by some unknown Solicitors, and inti●…d by them to the more dangerous Actions and Correspondencies. For as there are a sort of base and fordid Spirits that attend the Envy and Malice of the Ignorant and viler sort of Persons, and betray-them into Compacts by Promises of Revenge; So, no doubt, there are a kind of more Airy and Speculative Fiends, of an higher rank and order than those wretched Imps, who apply themselves to the Curious: and many times prevail with them by offers of the more Recondite Knowledge; as we know it was in the first Temptation. Yea, and sometimes they are so cautious and wary in their Conversations with more resined Persons, that they never offer to make any express Covenants with them. To this purpose I have been informed, by a very Learned and Reverend Doctor, that one Mr. Edward's, a Master of Arts of Trin. Coll. in Cambridge, being reclaimed from Conjuration, declared in his Repentance, that the Daemon always appeared to him like a Man of good fashion, and never required any Compact from him! And no doubt, They sort themselves agreeably to the State, Port, and Genius of those with whom they converse; Yea, 'tis like, as I conjectured, are assistant sometimes to those, to whom they dare not show themselves in any openness of appearance, lest they should fright them from those ways of Sin and Temptation. So that we see, that Men may act by Evil Spirits without knowing that they do so.  
And possibly Nebuehadnezzar's Wise Men might be of this fort of Magicians; which supposal I mention the rather, because it may serve me against some things that may be objected: For, it may be said, If they had been in Confederacy with Devils, it is not probable that Daniel would have been their Advocate, or in such inoffensive terms have distinguished their skill from Divine Revelation; nor should he, one would think, have accepted the Office of being Provost over them. These Circumstances may be supposed to intimate a probability, that the Magis of Babylon were in no professed Diabolical Complotment, and I grant it. But yet they might, and in all likelihood did use the Arts and Methods of Action, which obtain Demonaick Cooperation and Assistance, though without their privity, and so they were a loss criminal sort of Conjurers; For those Arts were conveyed down along to them from one hand to another, and the Successors still took them up from those that preceded, without a Philosophical Scrutiny or Examen. They saw strange Things were done, and Events predicted by such Forms and such Words; how, they could not tell, nor 'tis like did not inquire, but contented themselves with this general account, That 'twas by the power of their Arts, and were not solicitous for any better Reason. This, I say, was probably the case of most of those Predictors; though, it may be, others of them advanced further into the more desperate part of the Mystery. And that some did immediately transact with appearing Evil Spirits in those times, is apparent enough, from express mention in the Scriptures I have alleged.  
And the Story of the Witch of Endor, 1 Sam. 28. is a remarkable Demonstration of the Main Conclusion; which will appear, when we have considered, and removed the fancy and glosses of our Author about it, in his Discovery: where to avoid this Evidence, he affirms, This Witch to be but a Cozener, and the whole Transaction a Cheat and Imposture, managed by herself and a Confederate. And in order to the persuading this, he tells a fine Tale, viz. That she departed from Saul into her Closet, Where doubtless, says he, she had a Familiar, some lewd crafty Priest, and made Saul stand at the Door like a Fool, to hear the cozening Answers. He saith, she there used the ordinary words of Conjuration; and after them, Samuel appears, whom he affirms to be no other than either the Witch herself, or her Confederate. By this pretty knack and contrivance, he thinks he hath disabled the Relation from signifying to our purpose.  
But the Discoverer might have considered, that all this is an Invention, and without Book. For there is no mention of the Witch's Closet,. or her retiring into another Room, or her Confederate, or her Form of Conjuration; I say, nothing of all this is as much as intimated in the History; and if we may take this large liberty in the Interpretation of Scripture, there is scarce a Story in the Bible but may be made a Fallacy and Imposture, or any thing that we please. Nor is this Fancy of his only Arbitrary, but indeed contrary to the Circumstances of the Text. For it says, Saul perceived it was Samuel, and bowed himself, and this Samuel truly foretold his approaching Fate, viz. That Israel should be delivered with him into the hands of the Philistines; and that on the morrow, He and his Sons should be in the state of the Dead; which doubtless is meant by the Expression, that [they should be with him]; Which contingent Particulars, how could the Cozener and her Confederate foretell, if there were nothing in it extraordinary and preternatural?  
It hath indeed been a great Dispute among Interpreters, whether the real Samuel was raised, or the Devil in his likeness? Most later Writers suppose it to have been an Evil Spirit, upon the supposition that Good and Happy Souls can never return hither from their Celestial Abodes; and they are not certainly at the Beck and Call of an impious Hag. But then those of the other side urge, that the Piety of the words that were spoke, and the seasonable Reproof given to despairing Saul, are Indications sufficient that they came not from Hell; and especially they think the Prophecy of Circumstances very accidental to be an Argument, that it was not uttered by any of the Infernal Predictors. And for the supposal that is the ground of that Interpretation, 'tis judged exceedingly precarious; for who saith that happy departed Souls were never employed in any Ministeries here below? And those Dissenters are ready to ask a Reason, Why they may not be sent in Messages to Earth, as well as those of the Angelical Order? They are nearer allied to our Natures, and upon that account more intimately concerned in our Affairs; and the example of returning Lazarus, is evidence of the thing de facto. Besides which, that it was the Real Samuel they think made probable by the Opinion of Jesus Syrac, Ecclus. 46. 19, 20. who saith of him, That after his death he prophesied and showed the King his end: which also is likely from the Circumstance of the Woman's Astonishment, and crying out when she saw him, intimating her surprise, in that the Power of God had overruled her Enchantments, and sent another than she expected. And they conceive there is no more incongruity in supposing God should send Samuel to rebuke Saul for this his last folly, an●… to predict his instant ruin, than in his interposing Elias to t●… Messengers of Ahazias when he sent to Beelzebub. Now if it were the Real Samuel, as the Letter expresseth, (and the obvious sense is to be followed when there is no cogent Reason to decline it) he was not raised by the Power of the Witches Enchantments, but came on that occasion in a Divine Errand. But yet her Attempts and Endeavours to raise her Familiar Spirit, (though at that time overruled) are Arguments that it had been her custom to do so. Or if it were as the other side concludes, the Devil in the shape of Samuel, her Diabolical Confederacy is yet more palpable.  
I Have now done with Scot, and his presumptions; and am apt to fancy, that there is nothing more needful to be said to discover the Discoverer. But there is an Author infinitely more valuable, that calls me to consider him, 'Tis the great Episcopius; who, though he grants a sort of Witches and Magicians, yet denies Compacts. His Authority, I confess, is considerable, but let us weigh his Reasons.  
His First is, That there is no Example of any of the Profane Nations that were in such Compact; whence he would infer, That there are no express Covenants with Evil Spirits in particular Instances. But I think that both Proposition and Consequence are very obnoxious. For that there were Nations that did actually worship the Devil, is plain enough in the Records of Ancient Times; and some so read that place in the Psalms, The Gods of the Heathen are Devils; and Satan we know is called the God of this World. Yea, our Author himself confesseth, that the Nation of the Jews were so strictly prohibited Witchcraft, and all transaction with Evil Spirits, because of their proneness to worship them. But what need more? There are at this day that pay Sacrifice, and all Sacred Homage to the Wicked One in a visible Appearance; and 'tis well known to those of our own that traffic, and reside in those Parts, that the Caribbians worship the Devil under the name of Maboya, who frequently shows himself, and transacts with them; the like Travellers relate concerning divers other parts of the Barbarous Indies: and 'tis confidently reported by sober intelligent Men that have visited those places, that most of the Laplanders, and some other Northern People, be Witches. So that 'tis plain that there are National Confederacies with Devils; or, if there were none, I see not how it could be inferred thence, that there are no Personal Ones, no more, than that there were never any Daemoniacks, because we know of no Nation universally possessed; nor any Lunatics in the World, because there is no Country of Madmen. But our Author reasons again,  
(2.) To this purpose; That the profligate Persons, who are obnoxious to those gross Temptations; are fast enough before; and therefore such a Covenant were needless, and of no avail to the Tempter's Projects.  
This Objection I have answered already, in my remarks upon the IX Prejudice, and say again here, that if the Designs of those Evil Spirits were only in general to secure wicked Men to the Dark Kingdom, it might better be pretended that we cannot give a Reason for their Temptations and Endeavours in this kind; But it being likely, as I have conjectured, that each of those Infernal Tempter's hath a particular property in those he hath seduced and secured by such Compacts, their respective Pride, and tyrannical desire of Slaves, may reasonably be thought to engage them in such Attempts, in which their so peculiar Interest is concerned.  
But I add what is more direct, viz. That such desperate Sinners are made more safe to the Infernal Kingdom at large, by such Hellish Covenants and Combinations; since thereby they confirm and harden their Hearts against God, and put themselves at greater distance from his Grace, and his Spirit; give the deepest Wound to Conscience, and resolve to wink against all its Light and Convictions; throw a Bar in the way of their own Repentance, and lay a Train for Despair of Mercy: These certainly are sure ways of being undone, and the Devil we see, hath great Interest in a Project, the success of which is so attended. And we know he made the Assault de facto upon our Saviour, when he tempted him to fall down and worship. So that this Learned Author hath but little Reason to object,  
(3.) That to endeavour such an express Covenant, is contrary to the Interests of Hell; which indeed are this way so mightily promoted. And whereas he suggests, that a thing so horrid is like to startle Conscience, and awaken the Soul to Consideration and Repentance; I Reply, That indeed considering Man in the general, as a Rational Creature, acted by Hopes and Fears, and sensible of the Joys and Miseries of another World, one would expect it should be so: But then, if we cast our Eyes upon Man as really he is, sunk into Flesh, and present Sense; darkened in his Mind, and governed by his Imagination; blinded by his Passions, and besotted by Sin and Folly; hardened by evil Customs, and hurried away by the Torrent of his Inclinations and Desires; I say, looking on Man in this miserable state of Evil, 'tis not incredible that he should be prevailed upon by the Tempter, and his own Lusts, to act at a wonderful rate of Madness, and continue unconcerned and stupid in it; intent upon his present Satisfactions, without sense or consideration of the dreadfulness and danger of his Condition; and by this, I am furnished also to meet a fourth Objection of our Author's, viz.  
(4.) That 'tis not probable upon the Witches part, that they will be so desperate to renounce God, and eternal Happiness, and so, everlastingly undo their Bodies and Souls, for a short and trivial Interest; which way of arguing will only infer, That Mankind acts sometimes at prodigious degrees of brutishness; and actually we see it in the Instances of every day. There is not a Lust so base and so contemptible, but there are those continually in our Eyes, that feed it with the Sacrifice of their Eternity, and their Souls; and daring Sinners rush upon the blackest Villainies, with so little remorse or sense, as if it were their design to prove, that they have nothing left them of that whereby they are Men. So that nought can be inferred from this Argument, but that Humane Nature is incredibly degenerate; and the vileness and stupidity of Men is really so great, that things are customary and common, which one could not think possible, if he did not hourly see them. And if Men of Liberal Education, and Acute Reason, that know their Duty and their Danger, are driven by their Appetites, with their Eyes open, upon the most fatal Rocks, and make all the haste they can from their God and their Happiness; If such can barter their Souls for Trifles, and sell Everlasting for a Moment; sport upon the brink of a Precipice, and contemn all the Terrors of the future dreadful day; why should it then be incredible, that a brutish vile Person, sotted with Ignorance, and drunk with Malice, mindless of God, and unconcerned about a future Being, should be persuaded to accept of present delightful Gratifications, without duly weighing the desperate Condition?  
Thus, I suppose, I have answered also the Arguments of this Great Man, against the Covenants of Witches; and since a Person of such Sagacity and Learning, hath no more to say against what I defend, and another of the same Character, the ingenious Dr. Parker, who directed me to him, reckons these the strongest things that can be objected in the Case, I begin to arrive to an higher degree of Confidence in this belief; and am almost inclined to fancy, that there is little more to be said to purpose, which may not by the improvement of my Considerations be easily answered; and I am yet the more fortified in my Conceit, because I have, since the former Edition of this Book, sent to several Acute and Ingenious Persons of my Acquaintance, to beg their Objections, or those they have heard from others, against my Discourse or Relations that I might consider them in this: But I can procure none save only those few I have now discussed, most of my Friends telling me, That they have not met with any that need or deserve my notice.  
By all this it is evident, that there were Witches in Ancient Times under the Dispensation of the Law; and that there were such in the Times of the Gospel also, will not be much more difficult to make good. I had a late occasion to say something about this, in a Letter to a Person of the highest Honour, from which I shall now borrow some things to my present purpose.  
I Say then, (II.) That there were Compacts with Evil Spirits in those times also, is methinks intimated strongly, in that saying of the Jews concerning our Saviour, That he cast out Devils by Beelzebub. In his return to which, he denies not the Supposition or possibility of the thing in general; but clears himself by an appeal to the Actions of their own Children, whom they would not tax so severely. And I cannot very well understand why those times should be privileged from Witchcraft and Diabolical Compacts, more than they were from Possessions, which we know were then more frequent (for aught appears to the contrary) than ever they were before or since. But besides this, There are Intimations plain enough in the Apostle's Writings of the Being of Sorcery and Witchcraft. St. Paul reckons Witchcraft next Idolatry, in his Catalogue of the Works of the Flesh, Gal. 5. 20. and the Sorcerers are again joined with Idolaters, in that sad Denunciation, Rev. 21. 8. And a little after, Rev. 22. 15. they are reckoned again among Idolaters, Murderers, and those others that are without. And methinks the Story of S●…non Magus, and his Diabolical Oppositions of the Gospel in its beginnings, should afford clear Conviction. To all which I add this more general Consideration,  
(3.) That though the New Testament had mentioned nothing of this Matter, yet its silence in such Cases is not Argumentative. Our Saviour spoke as he had occasion, and the thousandth part of what he did or said is not Recorded; as one of his Historians intimates. He said nothing of those large unknown Tracts of America; nor gave any intimations of as much as the Existence of that Numerous People; much less did he leave Instructions about their Conversion. He gives no account of the Affairs and State of the other World, but only that general one, of the Happiness of some, and the Misery of others. He made no discovery of the Magnalia of Art or Nature; no, not of those, whereby the propagation of the Gospel might have been much advanced, viz. the Mystery of Printing, and the Magnet; and yet no one useth his silence in these. Instances, as an Argument against the Being of things, which are evident Objects of Sense. I confess, the omission of some of these Particulars is pretty strange, and unaccountable, and concludes our ignorance of the Reasons and Menages of Providence; but I suppose nothing else. I thought, I needed here to have said no more, but I consider, in consequence of this Objection, it is pretended; That as Christ Jesus drove the Devil from his Temples and his Altars, (as is clear in the Cessation of Oracles, which dwindled away, and at last grew silent shortly upon his appearance) so in like manner, 'tis said, that he banished him from his lesser holds in Sorcerers and Witches; which Argument is peccant, both in what it affirms, and in what it would infer. For,  
(1.) The coming of the H. Jesus did not expel the Devil from all the greater Places of his Residence and Worship; for a considerable part of barbarous Mankind do him public solemn Homage to this day: So that the very Foundation of the Pretence fails, and the Consequence without any more ado comes to nothing. And yet besides,  
(2.) If there be any credit to be given to Ecclesiastic History, there were Persons possessed with Devils some Ages after Christ, whom the Disciples cast out by Prayer, and the Invocation of his Name: So that Satan was not driven from his lesser Habitations, as soon as he was forced from his more famous Abodes. And I see no reason  
(3.) Why, Though Divine Providence would not allow him publicly to abuse the Nations, whom he had designed in a short time after for Subjects of his Son's Kingdom, and to stand up in the Face of Religion in an open affront to the Divinity that planted it, to the great hindrance of the progress of the Gospel, and discouragement of Christian Hopes; I say, Though Providence would not allow this height of insolent Opposition; yet I see not why we may not grant, that God however permitted the Devil to sneak into some private skulking Holes, and to trade with the particular more devoted Vassals of his wicked Empire: As we know that when our Saviour had chased him from the Man that was possessed, he permitted his Retreat into the Herd of Swine. And I might add  
(4.) That 'tis but a bad way of arguing, to set up fancied Congruities against plain Experience, as is evidently done by those Arguers, who, because they think that Christ chased the Devil from all his high Places of Worship when he came; that 'tis therefore fit he should have forced him from all his other less notorious Haunts: and upon the imagination of a decency, which they frame, conclude a Fact, contrary to the greatest Evidence of which the thing is capable. And once more  
(5.) The consequence of this Imagined Decorum, if it be pursued, would be this, that Satan should now be deprived of all the Ways and Tricks of Cozenage, whereby he abuseth us; and Mankind since the coming of Christ, should have been secure from all his Temptations; for there is a greater congruity in believing, that, when he was forced from his haunts in Temples and public Places, he should be put also from those nearer ones, about us and within us in his daily temptations of universal Mankind; Then, that upon relinquishing those, he should be made to leave all professed Communication and Correspondence with those profligate Persons, whose vileness had fitted them for such Company.  
So that these Reasoners are very fair for the denial of all Internal Diabolical Temptations. And because I durst not trust them, I'll crave leave here to add something concerning those.  
In order to which, that I may obtain the favour of those wary Persons, who are so coy and shy of their assent, I grant; That Men frequently, out of a desire to excuse themselves, lay their own guilt upon the Devil, and charge him with things of which in carnest he is not guilty: For, I doubt not but every Wicked Man hath Devil enough in his own Nature to prompt him to Evil, and needs not another Tempter to incite him. But yet, that Satan endeavours to further our wickedness, and our ruin by his Enticements, and goes up and down seeking whom he may devour, is too evident in the Holy Oracles, to need my Endeavours particularly to make it good; Only those diffident Men cannot perhaps apprehend the manner of the Operation, and from thence are tempted to believe, that there is really no such thing. Therefore I judge it requisite to explain this, and 'tis not unsuitable to my general Subject.  
In order to it I consider, That Sense is primarily caused by Motion in the Organs, which by continuity is conveyed to the Brain, where Sensation is immediately performed; and it is nothing else, but a Notice excited in the Soul by the impulse of an External Object; thus it is in simple outward Sense: But Imagination, though caused immediately by material Motion also, yet it differs from the external Senses in this, That 'tis not from an Impress directly from without, but the Prime and Original Motion is from within ourselves: Thus the Soul itself sometimes strikes upon those Strings, whose Motion begets such and such Phantasms; other-while, the loose Spirits wand'ring up and down in the Brain, casually hit upon such Filements and Strings, whose Motion excites a Conception, which we call a Fancy or Imagination; and if the Evidence of the outward Senses be shut out by Sleep or Melancholy, in either case, we believe those Representations to be real and external Transactions, when they are only within our Heads; Thus it is in Enthusiasms and Dreams. And besides these Causes of the Motions which stir Imagination, there is little doubt, but that Spirits, Good or Bad, can so move the Instruments of Sense in the Brain, as to awake such Imaginations as they have a mind to excite; and the Imagination having a mighty influence upon the Affections, and they upon the Will and external Actions, 'tis very easy to conceive how Good Angels may stir us up to Religion and Virtue, and the Evil Ones tempt us to Lewdness and Vice, viz. by Representments that they make upon the Stage of Imagination, which invite our Affections, and allure, though they cannot compel our Wills.  
This I take to be an intelligible account of Temptations, and also of Angelical Encouragements; and perhaps this is the only way of immediate Influence that the Spirits of the other World have upon us. And by it, 'tis easy to give an account of Dreams, both Monitory and Temperamental, Enthusiasms, Fanatic Ecstasies, and the like, as I suggested.  
This may suffice for an Answer to the first Pretence, viz. the silence of the Gospel in this Matter. I come to examine the other, That  
(2.) MIracles are ceased, therefore the presumed Actions of Witchcraft, are Tales and Illusions.]  
To make a due return to this, we must consider a great and difficult Problem, which is, What is a Real Miracle? And for answer to this weighty Question, I think,  
(1.) That it is not the strangeness, or unaccountableness of the thing done simply, from whence we are to conclude a Miracle. For than we are so to account of all the Magnalia of Nature, and all the Mysteries of those honest Arts which we do not understand.  
Nor (2.) is this the Criterion of a Miracle, That it is an Action or Event beyond all Natural Powers; for we are ignorant of the Extent and Bounds of Nature's Sphere and Possibilities: And if this were the character and essential Mark of a Miracle, we could not know what was so; except we could determine the extent of natural causalities, and fix their Bounds, and be able to say to Nature, Hitherto canst thou go and no further; And he that makes this his measure whereby to judge a Miracle, is himself the greatest Miracle of Knowledge or Immodesty. Besides, though an Effect may transcend really all the Powers of mere Nature; yet there is a world of Spirits that must be taken into our Account. And as to them also I say,  
(3.) Every thing is not a Miracle that is done by Agents Supernatural. There is no doubt but that Evil Spirits can make wonderful Combinations of Natural Causes, and perhaps perform many things immediately which are prodigious, and beyond the longest Line of Nature: but yet these are not therefore to be called Miracles; for, they are Saecred Wonders, and suppose the Power to be Divine. But how shall the Power be known to be so, when we so little understand the Capacities, and extent of the Abilities of Lower Agents? The Answer to this Question will discover the Criterion of Miracles, which must be supposed to have all the former Particulars; viz. They are unaccountable, beyond the Powers of mere Nature, and done by Agents Supernatural; And to these must be superadded.  
(4.) That they have peculiar Circumstances that speak them of a Divine Original. Their mediate Authors declare them to be so, and they are always Persons of Simplicity, Truth, and Holiness, void of Ambition, and all secular Designs: They seldom use Ceremonies, or Natural Applications, and yet surmount all the Activities of known Nature: They work those wonders, not to raise admiration, or out of the vanity to be talked of; but to seal and confirm some Divine Doctrine or Commission, in which the Good and Happiness of the World is concerned, I say, by such Circumstances as these, Wonderful Actions are known to be from a Divine Cause; and that makes and distinguisheth a Miracle.  
And thus I am prepared for an Answer to the Objection, to which I make this brief return, That though Witches by their Confederate Spirit do those odd and astonishing things we believe of them; yet are they no Miracles, there being evidence enough from the badness of their Lives, and the ridiculous Ceremonies of their Performances, from their malice and mischievous Designs, that the Power that works, and the end for which those things are done, is not Divine but Diabolical. And by singular Providence they are not ordinarily permitted, as much as to pretend to any new Sacred Discoveries in Matters of Religion, or to act any thing for confirmation of Doctrinal Impostures. So that whether Miracles are ceased or not, these are none. And that such Miracles as are only strange and unaccountable Performances, above the common Methods of Art or Nature, are not ceased, we have a late great evidence in the famous GREATREX; concerning whom it will not be impertinent to add the following account, which I had in a Letter from Dr. G. R. Lord Bishop of D. in the Kingdom of Ireland, a Person of singular Piery and Virtue, and a great-Philosopher. He is pleased thus to write.  
THe great discourse now at the Coffeehouses, and everywhere, is about M.G. the famous Irish Stroker, concerning whom it is like you expect an account from me. He undergoes various Censures here, some take him to be a Conjurer, and some an Impostor, but others again adore him as an Apostle. I confess, I think the Man is free from all Design, of a very agreeable Conversation, not addicted to any Vice, nor to any Sect or Party; but is, I believe, a sincere Protestant. I was three weeks together with him at my Lord Conwayes, and saw him, I think, lay his hands upon a thousand Persons; and really there is something in it more than ordinary: but I am convinced it is not miraculous. I have seen pains strangely fly before his hand till he hath chased them out of the Body, Dimness cleared, and Deafness cured by his Touch; twenty Persons at several times in Fits of the Falling-Sickness, were in two or three minutes brought to themselves, so as to tell where their pain was; and then he hath pursued it till he hath driven it out at some extreme part: Running Sores of the Kings-Evil dried up, and Kernels brought to a Suppuration by his hand: grievous Sores of many month's date, in few days healed: Obstructions, and Stops removed; Cancerous Knots in the Breast dissolved, etc.  
But yet I have many Reasons to persuade me, that nothing of all this is Miraculous; He pretends not to give Testimony to any Doctrine; the manner of his Operation speaks it to be natural; the Cure seldom succeeds without reiterated Touches, his Patients often relapse, he fails frequently, he can do nothing where there is any decay in Nature, and many Distempers are not at all obedient to his Touch. So that I confess, I refer all his Virtue to his particular Temper and Complexion, and I take his Spirits to be a kind of Elixir, and Universal Ferment; and that he cures (as Dr. M. expresseth it) by a Sanative Contagion.  
This, Sir, was the first Account of the Healer I had from that Reverend Person, which with me signifies more than the Attestations of multitudes of ordinary Reporters; and no doubt but it will do so likewise with all that know that excellent Bishop's singular Integrity and Judgement. But besides this, upon my inquiry into some other Particulars about this Matter, I received these further Informations from the same Learned Hand.  
As for M.G. what Opinion he hath of his own Gift, and how he came to know it? I Answer, He hath a different apprehension of it from yours and mine, and certainly believing it to be an immediate Gift from Heaven; and 'tis no wonder, for he is no Philosopher. And you will wonder less, when you hear how he came to know it, as I have often received it from his own Mouth. About three or four years ago he had a strong impulse upon his Spirit, that continually pursued him from whatever he was about, at his Business, or Devotion, alone, or in company, that spoke to him by this inward Suggestion, [I have given thee the Gift of Curing the Evil.] This Suggestion was so importunate, that he complained to his Wife, That he thought he was haunted: She apprehending it as an extravagancy of Fancy; but he told her he believed there was more in it, and was resolved to try. He did not long want opportunity. There was a Neighbour of his grievously afflicted with the Kings-Evil, He stroked her, and the Effect fucceeded. And for about a twelvemonth together he pretended to cure no other Distemper. But then the Ague being very rife in the Neighbourhood, the same Impulse after the same manner spoke within him, [I have given thee the Gift of curing the Ague;] and meeting with Persons in their Fits, and taking them by the Hand, or laying his Hand upon their Breasts, the Ague left them. About half a year after the accustomed Impulfe became more general, and suggested to him, [I have given thee the Gift of Healing;] and then he attempted all Diseases indifferently. And though he saw strange Effects, yet he doubted whether the Cause were any Virtue that came from him, or the People's fancy: To convince him of his incredulity, as he lay one night in Bed, one of his Hands was struck dead, and the usual Impulse suggested to him to make trial of his Virtue upon himself, which he did, stroking it with his other hand, and then it immediately returned to its former liveliness. This was repeated two or three Nights (or Mornings) together.  
This is his Relation, and I believe there is so much sincerity in the Person, that he tells no more than what he believes to be true. To say that this Impulse too was but a result of his temper, and that it is but like Dreams that are usually according to men's Constitutions, doth not seem a probable account of the Phaenomenon. Perhaps some may think it more likely, that some Genius who understood the Sanative Virtue of his Complexion, and the readiness of his Mind, and ability of his Body to put it in execution, might give him notice of that which otherwise might have been for ever unknown to him, and so the Gift of God had been to no purpose.  
This is my Learned and Reverend Friend's Relation: I shall say no more about it but this, That many of those Matters of Fact, have been since critically inspected and examined by several sagacious and wary Persons of the Royal Society, and other Very Learned and Judicious Men, whom we may suppose as unlikely to be deceived by a contrived Imposture, as any others whatsoever.   

I Have now done with my Considerations on this Subject, which I could wish were less seasonable and necessary than I have reason to believe they are: But, alas! we live in an Age wherein Atheism is begun in Sadducism: And those that dare not bluntly say, There is no God, content themselves, for a fair step and Introduction, to deny there are Spirits, or Witches. Which sort of Insidels, though they are not so ordinary among the mere Vulgar, yet are they numerous in a little higher rank of Understandings. And those that know any thing of the World, know, That most of the small Pretenders to Wit, are generally deriders of the belief of Witches and Apparitions: Which were it only a slight, or mere speculative Mistake, I should not trouble myself or them about it. But I fear this Error hath a Core in it worse than Heresy: And therefore how little soever I care what Men believe or teach in Matters of Opinion, I think I have reason to be concerned in an Affair, that toucheth so near upon the greatest Interests of Religion. And really I am astonished sometimes to think into what a kind of Age we are fallen, in which some of the greatest Impieties are accounted but Bugs, and terrible Names, Invisible Tittles, Piccadillo's, or Chimeras. The sad and greatest Instances, are Secriledge, ●…ellton, and ●…hcrast. For the two former, there are a sort of Men (that are far from being professed Enemies to Religion) who, I do not know, whether they own any such Vices. We find no mention of them in their most particular Confessions, n●…r have I observed them in those Sermons that have contained the largest Catalogues of the Sins of our Age and Nation. 'Twere dangerous to speak of them as Sins, for fean who should be found guilty. But my Business at present is not with these, but the other, Witchcraft, which I am sure was a Sin of Elder Times; and how comes it about that our Age, which so much outdoes them in all other kinds of Wickedness, should be wholly innocent in this? That there may be Witches and Apparitions in our days, notwithstanding the Objections of the Modern Sadduce, I believe I have made appear in the foregoing Considerations; in which I did not primarily intend direct Proof, but Defence.  
Against which if it should be Objected, That I have for the most part used only Supposals, and conjectural Things in the vindication of the Common Belief, and speak with no point-blank assurance, in my particular Answers, as I do in the General Conclusion. I need only say, That the Proposition I defend is Matter of Fact, which the Disbelievers impugn by alleging, That it cannot be; or, it is not likely: In return to which, if I show, how those things may be, and probable, notwithstanding their Allegations, though I say not downright that they are in the particular way I offer; yet 'tis enough for the Design of Defence, though not for that of Proof: for when one saith a thing cannot be, and I tell him how possibly it may, though I hit not the just manner of it; I yet defeat the Objection against it, and make way for the evidence of the thing de Facto.  
But after all this, I must confess there is one Argument against me, which is not to be dealt with, viz. A mighty Confidence grounded upon nothing, that swaggers, and Huffs, and swears there are no Witches. For such Philosophers as these, let them enjoy the Opinion of their own Superlative Judgements, and enter me in the first rank of Fools for crediting my Senses, and those of all the World, before their sworn Dictates. If they will believe in Scott, Habbs, and Osborne, and think them more infallible than the Sacred Oracles, the History of all Ages, and the full experience of our own, who can help it? They must not be contradicted, and they are resolved not to be persuaded. For this sort of Men, I never go about to convince them of any thing. If I can avoid it, I throw nothing before them, lest they should turn again and rend me. Their Opinions came into their Heads by chance, when their little Reasons had no notice of their entrance, and they must be let alone to go out again of themselves the fame way they entered. Therefore not to make much noise to disturb these infallible Huffers, (and they cannot hear a little for their own) I softly step along, leaving them to believe what they think.  
I have only this further to add, That I appear thus much concerned for the justification of the belief of Witches, because it suggests palpable and current Evidence of our Immortality. For though we have reasonable Evidence enough from the Attributes of God, the Phaenomena of Providence, and the Nature of our Souls, to convince any, but those who will stupidly believe, that they shall die like Beasts, that they may live like them: Yet the Philosophic Arguments that are produced for the Article, though very cogent, are many of them speculative and deep, requiring so great an attention and sagacity, that they take no hold upon the whifling Spirits that are not used to Consider, nor upon the common fort that cannot reach such Heights: But they are both best convinced by the Proofs that come nearest the Sense, which indeed strike our Minds fullest, and leave the most lasting Impressions; whereas high Speculations being more thin and subtle, easily slide off, even from Understandings that are most capable to receive them. This is one of the Main Reasons that engaged me on this Argument, because it affords considerable Evidence of that great Truth, which every Christian ought to be solicitous to have made good.  
And really if we compute like Men, and do not suffer ourselves to be abused by the Flatteries of Sense, and the deceitful Gaieties that steal us away from God, and from ourselves, there is nothing can render the thoughts of this odd Life tolerable, but the expectation of another: And Wise Men have said, That they would not have a Moment, if they thought they were not to live again. This perhaps some may take to be the discontented Paradox of a Melancholic, vexed and mean Condition, that is pinched by the straightness of Fortune, and envies the Heights of others Felicity and Grandeur; But by that time those that judge so, have spent the Heats of Frolic Youth, and have passed over the several Stages of Vanity; when they come to sit down, and make sober reflections upon their Pleasures and Pursuits, and sum up the Account of all that is with them, and before them, I doubt not but their considering Thoughts will make Solomon's Conclusion, and find, that 'tis but a misery to live, if we were to live for nothing else. So that if the content of the present Life were all I were to have for the hopes of Immortality, I should even upon that account be very unwilling to believe that I was mortal: For certainly the Pleasures that result from the Thoughts of another World in those, that not only see it painted in their Imaginations, but feel it begun in their Souls, are as far beyond all the titillations of Sense, as a real lasting Happiness is beyond the delusive Images of a Dream. And therefore they that think to secure the enjoyment of their Pleasures, by the infamy of our Natures, in the overthrow of our future Hopes, endeavour to dam up the Fountain of the fullest and cleanest Delights; and seek for limped Waters in the Sinks and Puddles of the Streets.  
But this would afford Matter for another Discourse, into which I must not digress, but here make an end of this.     


Antifanatical Religion, AND Free Philosophy. In a Continuation of the NEW ATLANTIS: Essay VII.   

Essay VII. The Sum of My Lord Bacon's NEW ATLANTIS.  
WE parted from Peru, with design to pass to China and Japan by the South Sea: and after we had been long driven up and down by contrary Winds, and wandered in the greatest Wilderness of Waters in the World, without the least hopes of making any Land, in that immense undiscovered Abyss, that was beyond both the Old World, and the New; it pleased God to bring us into the Harbour of a most Angelical Country, that lay hid in the greatest Ocean in the Universe.  
We found there a People of singular Goodness and Humanity, who received us with most affectionate kindness, and provided for us with a Parentlike Care and Indulgence: We were lodged in a fair Pile of Buildings, called the Stranger's House, appointed for such Occasions, and there we had all things, both for our Whole and Sick, that belonged to Charity and Mercy. The Governor of that House (a most obliging and benign Person) acquainted some of our number with divers remarkable Matters concerning the Kingdom of BENSALEM (so it was called); Particularly, with the strange entrance and beginning of Christianity there, and the excellent Foundation of SOLOMON's House, a Royal Society erected for Inquiries into the Works of God: After we had been there a little while, one of the Fathers of that House came to the Town where we were. He entered in State; and within few days having had notice of us, he ordered that one of our Company should be brought to him: The rest chose me to wait on the great Man, which I did, and was received by him with much goodness; He gave me a particular account of the Foundation of Solomon's House, and the State of Philosophy in Bensalem, granting permission it should be declared to the World. Accordingly it was published by Verulamius, in his History called the NEW ATLANTIS; and thus far his Account went.  
But now I shall enter upon a Relation of things, of which yet there hath been no News from Bensalem.  
On the third day after I had been with the Father of Solomon's House, a Servant came to me from the Governor of ours, just as we had dined, to desire me to spend the Afternoon with him: I received the invitation with a cheerful respect, and went immediately with the Officer to attend his Lordship; He led me through the Garden of our House into another, the largest and most beautiful I ever saw; It was encompassed with a lofty Stone-Wall; The Stone were blue, naturally streaked with green. It had Mounts, Grottoes, and Summer-Houses, very pleasant and magnificent; The Walks were large, planted with Ever-greens, and the Fruit-Trees (of all sorts that we have, and many that we have not) set in the old Quincuncial, Lozenge Figures, after the manner of the ancient hanging Gardens of Babylon; It had Wildernesses, Ponds, Aviaries, and all things else that can render such a place agreeable. I could have dwelled in this Paradise; but the Servant led me on into a square Cloistered Court, having handsome Buildings on all sides, fenced on the South with a tall Grove of Cedar: The Cloisters were paved with red and green Marble, and supported with polished Pillars of a speckled Stone, very clear and shining; Hence we went into a fair spacious Hall adorned with large Maps of all sorts; here were some Servants decently clad, they were playing at Chess; as soon as I entered, they arose, and saluted me very civilly with a modest sweetness in their looks, that seemed very obliging. My Guide conducted me up Stairs into a noble Gallery, hung with most excellent Pictures of Famous Men, and Philosophers; and, at which I was much surprised, of some that I had seen. He left me here, to give the Governor notice that I was come; and presently I saw him enter, with a mild cheerfulness, mixed with a manly gravity in his Countenance: He had on a long Robe of Purple Silk, and a kind of Turban on his Head of the same colour, which had a Star of Gold wrought on it, worn just before: He embraced me with much affection, expressing great satisfaction in the opportunity of entertaining me alone: He enquired after the welfare of our People, and whether we wanted any Accommodation, either for our Whole or Sick; I bowed with a low reverence, and answered, That we wanted nothing, but an occasion to speak our acknowledgements of the Bounty and Humanity of that blessed Place; and particularly to express how much we were obliged to his Lordship's generous favours: He replied smiling, That Compliments were not in use in Bensalem; and taking me by the hand, he led me into an handsome square Chamber wainscotted with Cedar, which filled the Room with a very grateful odour: It was richly painted, gilt, and full of Inscriptions in Letters of Gold: He sat him down on a Couch of Green Velvet, and made me take my place by him.  
After some more particular inquiry into the condition of our Sick, of whom I gave him an account, he told me, That the Father of Solomon's House commanded him to acquaint me with the state of Religion in Bensalem, as himself had with the condition of Philosophy there; and that he would have done this too, but that the urgent Business of the Public State, which lay upon him, would not afford him time; I rose up at these words, and answered with a low submission, That I knew not in what terms to express my sense of the Father's Condescension and Goodness; and that his excellent Relation of the state of Philosophy, and its ways of improvement in that Kingdom, had inflamed me with desire to know what I might, concerning the Affairs of its Religion, since the so miraculous plantation of Christianity in it; And particularly, Whether it had kept its ancient Purity, and Simplicity in that Realm; which was lost in most other places? This Question, replied He, (making me sit down again by him) I shall fully answer in the things I have to say to you; and having paused a little to settle his Thoughts, he began his Narrative in this manner.  
AFTER the Conversion of this Land by the Evangelism of St. Bartholomew, (of which you have heard) Religion underwent some Revolutions, that I shall not mention; But take my ground from the last, which happened no very long time since: For the understanding which, you must know, That upon the South-West of this place, in the unknown Ocean also, lies an Island, famous for the rise it gave to a very spreading Sect in Religion: From this unfortunate Country, came certain Zealous Persons hither, that pretended to extraordinary Illuminations, and to more purity, strictness, and Spirituality, than other Christians; They taught, That our Rites and Government were Superstitious and Anti-christian; That we wanted Pure Ordinances, and Gospel-Worship; That our Good Works; and Christian Virtues, were nothing worth; That the best of our People were but Formalists and mere moral Men; That our Priests were uninlightned, strangers to the Power of Godliness, and Mysteries of Religion; and that there was a necessity of a thorough Godly Reformation of our Government, and Worship.  
The Men at first were only gazed upon by our People, as strange Persons; But at length, by the vehemence of their Zeal, and glory of their Pretences, they began to make impression on some, who had more Affection than Judgement: By them, and the continuance of their own restless Importunities, they wrought upon others; And in process of time and endeavour, through the secret Judgement and Permission of God, prevailed so far, that the great Body of the People, especially of those that were of warm and Enthusiastic Tempers, was leavened (more or less) with their Spirit and Doctrines.  
Here he stopped a little, and then said; 'Tis wonderful to consider how some Ages and Times are disposed to changes; some to one sort of alteration, and some to another: In this Age, one Sect and Genius spreads like Infection, as if the public Air were poisoned with it; and again, in that those same Doctrines and Fancies will not thrive at all, but die in the hands of their Teachers; while a contrary, or very different sort, flies and prevails mightily: There is something extraordinary in this, the contemplation of which would be noble Exercise, but not for our present purpose: 'Tis enough to note, That the Age at the coming of those Seducers hither, was inclined to Innovation, and to such particular sorts of it: So that in few years the generality of the Zealous, and less considerate, were tainted with those new and gay Notions; And so p●…ssest they were with the conceit of the divineness and necessity of their Fancies and Models, that they despised and vilified the Ecclesiastical Government, and Governors, and vehemently assaulted our most excellent SALOMONA, the King of this Realm, with continual Petitions and Addresses, to establish them by Law, and to change the whole Constitution of Religion, in compliance with their Imaginations: But he was a Wise and Religious Prince; He saw the folly and danger of such Alterations, and endeavoured, by all the ways of Lenity and Goodness, to allay the heat of their unreasonable Prosecutions: But they being the more emboldened by this moderate Course, and provoked by the little inclination the good King showed to their New Models, broke out, after some less violent struggle, into downright Rebellion, which after many Revolutions, too long to be mentioned now, succeeded so far at last, that the Pious Prince was deposed and murdered; the Government usurped by the prevailing Tyrants: And, not to mention the disorders of the Civil State that followed, the Ecclesiastical was most miserable. For now, all the Sects that have a Name in History in any part of the known World, started up in this Church, as if they had all been transplanted hither: They arose as it were out of the Earth, which seemed to bring forth nothing but Monsters, full grown at their Birth, with Weapons in their hands ready for Battle; and accordingly they fell one upon another with strange rage and fierceness. For having torn and destroyed the Ancient Doctrine and Government, every one contended to set up its own, and to have its beloved Opinions and Models, entertained and worshipped, as the infallible Truths and Ways of God: So that all places were filled with New Lights, and those Lights were so many Wildfires, that put all into Combustion. We saw nothing of Religion but glaring Appearances, and Contention about the Shells and Shadows of it. It seemed to run out wholly into Chaff and Straw; into Disputes and Vain Notions; which were not only unprofitable, but destructive to Charity, Peace, and every pious Practice. All was Controversy and Dissension, full of Animosity and Bitterness; For though they agreed in some common Falsehoods and Follies, yet that made no Union; every dissent in smallest Matters was ground enough for a Quarrel and Separation. But these things were common to them.  
All hated the former Constitutions; All cried up their own Clan, as the only Saints, and People of God: All vilified Reason as Carnal, and Incompetent, and an Enemy to the things of the Spirit: All had confident, false, and perverse Notions of the Divine Attributes, and Counsels; All decried Virtue and Morality as a dull thing, that was nothing in the account of God. All filled their Discourses with the words of Light, Faith, Grace, the Spirit; and all talked in set Phrases, phancifully and ignorantly about them: All pretended to great Heights in Knowledge, though that consisted in nothing but an ability to repeat those Phrases of their Sect, like Parrots: All talked of their extraordinary communion with God, their special Experiences, Illuminations, and Discoveries; and accordingly all demeaned themselves with much sauciness and irreverence towards God, and contempt of those that were not of the same fantastical Fashion: All were zealous in their proper set of Doctrines and Opinions; and all bitterly opposed and vilified every different Judgement. These are some of the main things that made up the common Nature of the Parties: In particulars, as I have said, they were infinitely at variance.  
While things were in this condition, some of our Missionaries in Foreign Parts returned, and among the other Books, and Rarities from the World, they brought the Works of some of your Episcopal Divines, and other Learned Men, particularly those of Hammondus, Taylorus, Grotius, etc. Such  
of them that were written in English, they translated into Latin, the rather because they judged those Discourses very seasonable and proper to obviate the Evil Genius of the unhappy Age. As soon as they came abroad in the general Language, they were read by the sober sort of our Divines with great approbation and acceptance; and from them they had Light and Advantage for the detecting the Follies and Extravagancies of the Times.  
For my part, I was then a Student in the University, and therefore shall choose to relate what effect those Writings had there, and particularly upon divers of my mine own Acquaintance, who are now very considerable in this Church, and have done great Service in it.  
It was one Advantage that the Young Academians had from that unhappy Season, that they were stirred up by the general Fermentation that was then in men's Thoughts, and the vast variety that was in their Opinions, to a great activity in the search of sober Principles, and Rules of Life. I shall not undertake to describe the Spirit and Temper of all the Theologues and Students of those Times, but shall give you an account of some that I knew, who have been very useful to the Church in confuting and exposing the Fanatical Principles and Genius, and who derived much of their Spirit and Doctrines from those excellent Authors of your Country.  
Here I told the Governor that things had been lately also in our parts much after the manner he had described the Condition of theirs; and that therefore I was very desirous to know by what Ways and Doctrines the People were reduced to a better temper. I said also, that I had relation to one of our Universities, and on that account likewise was solicitous to understand how those Academical Divines were form; and what they did when they came abroad.  
He answered, that he was ready to gratify my desires; but then, said he, I would not have you think that I magnify the Persons I shall describe to you, or their Learning and Performances, above all our other Clergy: No, thanks be to God, we have numbers of Excellent Men, famous for their Piety, Learning, and Usefulness in the Church: of whom, by reason of my distance, and constant Employments in this place, I have no personal knowledge; and therefore I choose to speak only of those that were bred in the University about mine own Time; and the rather, that you may observe the Providence of God in raising Men so serviceable to his Church in the very worst of Days. Having premised which, he fell immediately to an account of their Preparations in the University, and thence to a Relation of their Performances after. Of the former he spoke thus;  
THose Divines, of whom I have undertaken to say something, went through the usual course of Studies in the University, with much applause and success: But did not think themselves perfect, as soon as they were acquainted with the knowledge contained in Systems: No, they passed from those Institutions, to converse with the most Ancient and Original Authors in all sorts of profitable Learning. They begun at the top, with the Philosophers of the Eldest Times, that were before the days of Aristotle: They perused the Histories of their Lives and Doctrines, and then read all the remains of them that are extant: They considered their Principles, only as Hypotheseis, with Minds free and untainted: They studied, them to know the several Schemes of their Opinions, without passing Judgements yet, upon their Truth, or Falshood. They read Plato, and conversed much with that Divine Philosopher: They acquainted themselves with Aristotle, his great Scholar; and by his Original Writings, they found how much he had been misrepresented and abused by his Commentators, (especially by those of later Times) and saw how different a thing Aristotelian Philosophy was in his own Works, from that which they had met in compendiums, and the Disputing Books that pretended to it: They made themselves intimate with Plutarch and Cicero: And dealt much with the other chief Writers, both Greeks and Romans: By which means, they were well instructed in the History of Philosophy, and the various Thoughts and Opinions of the greatest Men among the Ancients.  
But yet, notwithstanding this Conversation with those Sages, They were not so pedantically, and superstitiously fond of Antiquity, as to sit down there in contempt of all later  
Helps and Advancements. They were sensible, That Knowledge was still imperfect, and capable of further growth, and therefore they looked forward into the Moderns also, who about their time, had employed themselves in discovering the Defects of the Ancients, in reviving some of their neglected Doctrines; and advancing them by new Thoughts and Conceptions: They read, and considered all sorts of late Improvements in Anatomy, Mathematics, Natural History, and Mechanics, and acquainted themselves with the Experimental Philosophy of Solomon's House, and the other Promoters of it. So that there was not any valuable Discovery made, or Notion started in any part of Real Learning, but they got considerable knowledge of it. And by this Universal way of proceeding, They furnished their Minds with great variety of Conceptions, and rendered themselves more capable of judging of the Truth, or likelihood of any proposed Hypothesis. Nor did they content themselves with Reading, and the knowledge of Books, but joined Contemplation, and much thoughtfulness with it: They exercised their Minds upon what they read; They considered, compared, and inferred: They had the felicity of clear and distinct thinking, and had large compass in their Thoughts. By reading they rendered their Understandings full; and by Meditation they kept that fullness from being disorderly and confused.  
Being thus prepared, They addressed themselves to the more close, particular, and thorough study of Divinity: They thought it not enough to read a few Systems, and bundles of Novel Opinions, to understand the current Orthodoxy of the Times, or to gain the faculty of speaking to the People in the taking T●… and Phrase, (●…hings that made up the Divines of that Age): But enquired into the state of Religion in former days: They read the Histories of the Church, and applied themselves to a careful perusal of the Fathers of the three first Centuries: In them they looked for the Doctrine and Practices that were in the beginning: They considered, that Religion was most pure in those Primitive Times of Holiness and Matyrdom; and that by knowing what was the belief and use then, they might be enabled to judge better of the more Modern Ways and Opinions: That though other Knowledge grew, and was much advanced by Time, yet Divinity was in its perfectoon, in the days of the Apostles, and nearest Ages to them; and had still been degenerating (more or less) in following Times. That it was therefore best to inquire after the old Ways, and to take the Measures of Faith and Practice, from Primitive Doctrine and Usage; and accordingly they endeavoured to form theirs. They conversed with the Works of your Excellent Writers, whom I mentioned, and other Learned Men, whom Providence raised about that Season, to direct the World to those eldest, best Patterns. They read also the Histories, and observed the growth of Sects: They examined the Books of the chief reputed Heretics, and considered the Arguments wherewith they endeavoured to establish their Opinions. They descended even to the Wild Scribbles and Contentions of the several Parties in our distracted Land; They acquainted themselves thoroughly with their Spirit, Principles, Phrases, and ways of Reasoning; as judging, that none could deal effectually in the exposing and confuting any Sect, but those who well understood it. Besides all this, They directed their Studies (many of them) to the Jewish Learning, That they might be instructed in the Rites, Opinions, and Usages of that People, for the better understanding of many things in the Scripture that relate unto them. They enquired into the Reasonableness of the great Principles of Religion, and particularly of the Christian; and provided themselves thereby to deal with Atheists, Infidels, and Enthusiasts, with which that Age abounded. I could say much more, but this is enough to show that these Men were qualified to do something in the World.  
Here I interrupted the Relation a little, and said, That it seemed to me that such Preparations should have taken up the better part of their Lives, and not have left much time for Action. He answered, That Diligence, Meditation, and a right Method of Studies would go very far, and do mighty Matters in an indifferent Time; and that he who knew the shortest cut, and went constantly on, would pass over a considerable Desert in a few days, while another that loitered, or was ignorant of the way, might wander all his Life in it to little purpose. That those Men took the direct Course, and had the best Guides, the choice Books of all sorts; one another's excellent Company, and improving Converse. That they spent no unprofitable time, among the Voluminous Triflers; and in the confused Rubbish of Learning. That they went strait on towards their end, without diverting to buy and impertinent Matters. They that made even their most common Conversations to serve them, in their study of Humane Nature, the Inclinations and Passions of Men: And even the wildness and humours of Sects afforded them instruction in the nature of Enthusiasm, and Superstitions of all kinds. So that their Understandings and Observations were advanced far, while their years were not many; and they had the happy Conjunction of the Judgement of Ripe Age, with the vigour of Youth. I bowed to declare my satisfaction, and He went on.  
IT will be time now, after the Discourse of their Preparations, to let you know what they did; and what were the Effects of these promising beginnings. This I shall do, By representing  

(1.) Some things that were more general.  
(2.) Their particular Endeavours in the Affairs of Religion.  
(3.) A more full account of their Genius, and Thoughts, in some main Parts of Learning.   
I BEGIN with their more General Actions and Declarations of their Thoughts.  
ONe of the first things they did, was, to deliver their own Minds (and to endeavour the same for others) from the Prepossessions, and Prejudices of Complexion, Education, and implicit Authority; Asserting the Liberty of Enquiry, and thereby freeing their Reasons from a base and dishonourable Servitude, and vindicating this just Right of Humane Nature. For though they knew, That Green Youth, and Vulgar Inquirers, ought not pragmatically to call their Teachers to account for their Doctrines, or to venture upon deep Speculations without assistance; Yet they thought, that Men who were bred in the way of Study, had first submisly heard the Opinions of their Instructors, and been well acquainted with their Dictates, who were arrived to maturity of Understanding, and a good capacity to seek after Truth; might at length be permitted to judge for themselves; that so they might choose, like reasonable Creatures, and not have their Principles brutishly obtruded on them. This they saw was a natural Right, and that the Tyrannical Custom of overruling and suppressing it, had held the greatest part of Mankind in fatal Chains of Ignorance and Error.  
Here, I say, They begun, and taught, That all lovers of Truth, whose Judgements were competently matured, aught to free their Minds from the Prejudices of Education, and usurping Authorities; that is, so far, as not to conclude any thing certainly true, or false, merely on the account of those Impressions: But to try all things, as Scripture and Reason require, and encourage us; and to suspend the giving up our full, and resolved assent to the Doctrines we have been taught, till we have impartially considered and examined them ourselves. That in our Researches, we ought to retain a Reverence for Antiquity, and venerable Names; but not blindly to give up our Understandings to them, against clear Evidence of the Divine Oracles, or Impartial Reason. That when other Considerations, on both sides, were equal, the Inducements of old Belief, and reverend Authorities ought to determine us to a probable assent on that side: But when God's Word, or our Faculties stood on the other, we ought not to be inclined.  
Thus they modestly asserted the Liberty of Judgement, and bounded it with so much Caution, that no Prejudice could arise to Legal Establishments from that freedom: For they allowed it not to immature Youth; or to illiterate or injudicious Men, who are not to be trusted to conclude for themselves in things of difficult Theory: But advised such, to submit to their Instructors, and so practise the plain things they are taught, without busy intermeddling in Speculative Opinions, and things beyond their reach. Such a Liberty of Judgement as this they taught, and such was necessary for the Age, in which the Minds of Men were enthralled by the Masters of Sects, and the Opinions then styled Orthodox, from which it was accounted Heresy and Damnatiou to recede. So that nothing could be done, to set them at large from those vain Fancies and Ways, till they were persuaded to examine them with freedom and indifference, and to conclude according to the Report of their Faculties. They knew, That Truth would have the advantage, could it but procure an impartial Trial: That the False Doctrines, and Fanatical Practices of the Times would be detected and shamed, were it not for the superstitious straightness that suppressed all Enquiry; and that those Old Truths that were exploded with so much abhorrence, would, in all likelihood, gain upon the Judgements and Assents of all that were free, and durst to be inquisitive. On such accounts they pressed the Liberty of Judgement; and in a time when it was very seasonable, and no hurt could directly arise from it. Since  
(2.) They taught, and urged much modesty together with it; and allowed not Dogmatical Affirmations, but in things that were most fundamental and certain: They considered, That our Understandings, at best, are very weak; and that the search of Truth is difficult; that we are very liable to be imposed on by our Complexions, Imaginations, Interests, and Affections. That whole Ages, and great Kingdoms, and Christian Churches, and Learned Counsels, have joined in Common Errors; and obtruded false and absurd Conceits upon the World with great severity, and flaming Zeal; That much Folly, and great Nonsense have many times generally obtained, and been held for certain, and Sacred; That all Mankind are puzzled, and baffled in the disquisition of the seeming, plainest, and most obvious things, In the Objects of Sense, and Motions of our own Souls: That (in earnest) we cannot tell, How we speak a Word, or move a Finger; How the Soul is united to the Body; or the Parts of Bodies to one another; how our own were framed at first; or how afterwards they are nourished. That these nearest things, and a thousand more, are hid from our deepest Inquiries.  
Thus they considered often, and filled their Thoughts with a great sense of the narrowness of humane Capacity, and the Imperfections of our largest Knowledge; which they used not to any purposes of unwarrantable Scepticism, or absolute neutrality of Judgement, but to engage their Minds to a greater wariness in Enquiry, and more shiness of Assent to things not very clear and evident; to more reservedness in their Affirmations, and more modesty in their Arguings.  
After this manner they practised themselves, and thus they discoursed to others, and nothing could be more proper for those times, in which everyone (almost) was immoderately confident of his own way, and thereby rendered insolent in his Dictates, and incurable in his Errors; scornful to opposite Judgements, and ready to quarrel all Dissenters; So that the World was hereby filled with Animosity and Clamours; whereas modesty in Opinions would have prevented those Mischiefs; and it was taught by those Men as the likeliest way of Cure. For there is no hopes, either of Truth or Peace, while every one of the divided, thinks himself infallible: But when they come to grant a possibility of their being out in their Beloved Tenants, there is something then to work upon towards their better Information.  
But (3.) there was still less danger in the Liberty they promoted: for as much as they practised and persuaded much prudence to be used in the publishing of their Tenants; They allowed not any declaration of private Sentiments, when such a Declaration might tend to the disgrace or dissettlement of Legal Appointments, or any Articles of the Established Religion; provided there were no Idolatry, or direct Heresy in the things enjoined: But believed, and taught, That Men ought to content themselves with their own Satisfactions, in the Supposed Truths they have discovered, without clamorous Disputes, or Wranglings. And though in the large compass of Enquiry they took, and the Considerations they had of all sorts of Idaea's, that enter into the various Minds of thinking Men, it could not be, but that they should have several Apprehensions, different from vulgar Thoughts; Yet they were very cautious in discovering their Conceptions among the illiterate and unqualified; They had no delight in speaking strange things, or in appearing to be singular and extraordinary: They were not so fond of their own Opinions, as to think them necessary for all others: Nor were they infected with the Common Zeal, to spread and propagate every Truth they thought they knew: No, they considered, there were Truths which the World would not bear, and that some of the greatest would be received here with the bitterest contempt and derision: So that to publish, would be but to expose them to popular scorn, and themselves also: Their main Design was, to make Men good, not notional, and knowing; and therefore, though they concealed no practical Verities that were proper and seasonable, yet they were sparing in their Speculations, except where they tended to the necessary vindication of the Honour of God, or the directing the Lives of Men: They spoke of other Matters of Notion only among their known Friends, and such as were well prepared, able to examine, and disposed to pardon or receive them: Among these they discoursed the greatest, freest Speculations, with as much liberty in their Words, as in their Thoughts; and though they differed in many Notions, yet those Differences did nothing but serve the pleasure of Conversation, and exercise of Reasoning: They begot no estrangements or distastes, no noise or trouble abroad.  
Such was the prudence that They practised and taught; and this also was very proper for those Times, when every Man vented his Conceits for Articles of Faith, and told his Dreams for Revelations, and then pretended he was extraordinarily enlightened, and strove to make Proselytes, and quarrelled with all that did not embrace his Fancies, and separated from the Communion of the Church, and endeavoured to involve the World in Hurries and Distractions; and all this, for the sake of a few pitiful, needless, senseless Trifles: In such a time, this prudent Spirit and Practice was singularly seasonable and useful.  
But though they were thus cauteous and wary about Theories more remote, and not necessary; yet they were not altogether indifferent to what Men believed and thought: No, They were concerned, and zealous against the Fanatic Conceits and Humours of the Age, which were the occasions of so much Folly, Irregularity, and Disturbance: And my next Business is to declare in some great Instances, how they demeaned Themselves in opposing of them. This was the second thing I undertook to relate; namely, Their particular endeavours in the Affairs of Religion.  
But before I fall on it; I must declare to you, That They had not any Religion different from that of other Catholic Christians, but were faithful adherers to the old acknowledged Christianity, as it was taught by the Church of Bensalem: To this Church they conformed heartily; though they were distinguishable from some others of her Sons, by the application of their Genius and Endeavours: I have told you, They grew up among the Sects; They were Born and Bred in that Age, which they could not help; But as they ordered the Matter, it was no hurt to the Church, or them, that they were educated in bad times: They had the occasion thence, of understanding the Genius, Humour, and Principles of the Parties, which, those that stood always at distance from them, could not so thoroughly and inwardly know: By that means they had great advantage for providing, and applying the Remedies, and Confutations that were proper and effectual; And by daily Converse, and near Observation, they settled in their Minds a dislike of those ways, that was greater and juster than the Antipathy of some others who saw only their outsides, that in many things were specious and plausible. They studied in the Places where some of the chief of the Sects governed, and those that were ripe for the Service, preached publicly, as other Academical Divines did. This they scrupled not, because they were young, and had been under no explicit engagements to those Laws, that were then unhappily overruled: But in those, and in their other Vniversity-Exercises, they much served the Interest of the Church of Bensalem, by undermining the Ataxites, (so the Sectaries are here called) and propagating the Antifanatical Doctrines, which they had entertained and improved: So that I cannot look upon that Spirit otherwise, than as an Antidote that Providence then seasonably provided against the deadly Infection of those days: On which account, they were by some, called the Antifanites, because of their peculiar opposition of the Fans, or Fanites, (as the Ataxites were sometimes named): And though some Persons thought fit to judge, and spoke of Them as a new Sort of Divines; Yet they were not to be so accounted, in any sense of disparagement; since the new Things they taught, were but contradictions of the new Things that were introduced; and new Errors and Pretences, will occasion new ways of Opposition and Defence.  
I have now (I doubt) said the Governor, almost tired you with prefacing, but these things were fit to be premised: I expressed myself well-pleased, both with the Matters he related, and the order which he thought convenient to declare them in; and so he proceeded to the second main Head; Their particular Principles and Practices.  
I MUST tell you then, said He, first, That they took notice of the loud Out-cries and Declamations that were among all the Sects, against Reason; and observed, how by that means all Vanities and Fanatic Devices were brought into Religion: They saw, There was no likelihood any stop should be put to those Extravagancies of Fancy that were impudently obtruding themselves upon the World; but by vindicating and asserting the use of Reason in Religion; and therefore, their private Discourses, and public Exercises ran much this way; to maintain the sober use of our Faculties, and to expose and shame all vain Enthusiasms: And as Socrates of old, first began the Reformation of his Age, and reduced Men from the wildness of Fancy, and Enthusiastic Fegaries, with which they were overgrown, by pleading for Reason, and showing the necessity and Religion that there is in harkening to its Dictates; So They, in order to the cure of the madness of their Age, were zealous to make Men sensible;  
That Reason is a Branch and Beam of the Divine Wisdom; That Light which he hath put into our Minds, and that Law which he hath writ upon our Hearts: That the Revelations of God in Scripture, do not contradict what he hath engraven upon our Natures: That Faith itself, is an Act of Reason, and is built upon these two Reasonable Principles, That there is a God; and, That what he saith is true: That our Erroneous Deductions are not to be called Reason, but Sophistry, Ignorance, and Mistake: That nothing can follow from Reason, but Reason; and that what so follows, is as true and certain as Revelation: That God never disparageth Reason, in Scripture, but that the vain Philosophy, and Wisdom of this World there spoken against, were Worldly Policies, Jewish Genealogies, Traditions, and the Notional Philosophy of some Gentiles: That Carnal Reason is the Reason of Appetite and Passion; and not the Dictates of our Minds: That Reason proves some Main and Fundamental Articles of Faith, and defends all, by proving the Authority of Holy Scripture: That we have no cause to take any thing for an Article of Faith, till we see Reason to believe that God said it, and in the sense wherein we receive such a Doctrine: That to decry, and disgrace Reason, is to strike up Religion by the Roots, and to prepare the World for Atheism.  
According to such Principles as these, They managed their Discourses about this Subject: They stated the Notions of Faith and Reason clearly, and endeavoured to deliver the Minds of Men from that confusedness in those Matters, which blind Zeal had brought upon them; that so they might not call Vain Sophistry by the name of Humane Reason, and rail at this, for the sake of Fallacy, and the Impostures of Ignorance and Fancy. Hereby they made some amends for the dangerous rashness of those inconsiderate Men, who having heard others defame Reason as an Enemy to Faith, set up the same Cry, and filled their Oratories with the terrible noise of Carnal Reason, Vain Philosophy, and such other misapplyed words of reproach, without having ever clearly or distinctly considered what they said, or whereof they affirmed: And this they did too at a time when the World was posting apace into all kinds of madness; as if they were afraid the half-distracted Religionists would not run fast enough out of their Wits, without their Encouragement and Assistance: And as if their Design had been to credit Frenzy and Enthusiasm, and to disable all proof that could be brought against them. This I believe many of those well-meaning Canters against Reason did not think of, though what they did had a direct tendency that way: And accordingly it succeeded; For the conceited People hearing much of Incomes, Illuminations, Communions, Lights, Discoveries, Sealing, Manifestations, and Impressions, as the Heights of Religion; and then, being told, that Reason is a low, Carnal Thing, and not to judge in these Spiritual Matters; That it is a Stranger to them, and at enmity with the Things of God: I say, the People that were so taught, could not choose but be taken with the wild Exstatical Enthusiasts, who made the greatest boasts of these glorious Privileges; nor could they easily avoid looking upon the glaring of their own Imaginations, and the warmths and impulses of their Melancholy, as Divine Revelations, and Illapses. To this dangerous pass thousands were brought by such Preachments, and had so well learned to apply the Doctrines they had been taught, that he that should endeavour to undeceive them, was sure to hear what an Enemy this Reason, this Carnal Reason, this Vain Philosophy, was to Free Grace and Faith; and how little able to judge of those Rich, those Precious, those Spiritual Enjoyments.  
'Twas time now, in such an Age as this, to assert the sober use of Reason, and to rescue Religion by it. And They did this happily, and shamed all false pretences to the Spirit, showing,  
That there was nothing but Nature and Complexion in the Illuminations, Incomes, Raptures, Prophecies, New Lights, fluency of Expression, mysteriousness of Phrase, and other wonderful things of the Enthusiasts, which were ignorantly taken to be Divine Communications, to the great abuse of Religion, and the Souls of Men: Perceiving (I say) that this dangerous Fanatic Spirit was the evil Genius of the Age, they bent all their force against it, and detected the imposture, and laboured zealously to disabuse the credulous People, who were exceeding apt to be taken with such glorious Nothings. (But of this, I shall have another occasion to speak more.)  
ANd because the wildness of Enthusiasm, and reproaches of Reason, had exposed Christianity itself to the Suspicions of some, and Contempts of others, as if it were a precarious unreasonable thing, that depended only upon men's Fancies; Therefore here They laboured also, with very pious pains, to demonstrate the Truth and Reasonableness of the Christian Religion; The Being of God; The Immortality of Humane Souls; And Authority of Scripture; which they did with much Zeal, and much Judgement: And these Doctrines were too seasonable and necessary in that Age, in which the most glorious Professors laid the whole stress of Religion upon Fancies, and thereby undermined the Foundations of Faith, and Truth; and by many Vanities, and endless Divisions, had made so many Infidels, and unhappily disposed so many others to go the same way: Against these therefore They bent their strength, and rescued multitudes, especially those of the springing Generation, from the hands, both of the Enthusiast and the Infidel; Answering and discrediting all the new Pretensions and Objections, both of the one and the other: And their Endeavours here were very needful, because the Ancient Books of those kinds were despised and neglected by the concerned Parties; and they were not so suitable to the Guise and Fashion of our Age; and many Exceptions were started anew, and many other vain things boasted of, to which those elder Discourses did not apply their force: But these new Defenders of the Christian Truths met them all, and spoke the things that were suitable, as well as those that were strong and true: By these means the reasonable sober Spirit began to propagate; and the Enthusiast, who took notice of it, and knew it would destroy his Glorious Imaginations, raised a loud clamour against these Men as Socinians, and advancers of Proud Reason, above Free Grace and Faith.  
From this envious and foolish Charge, they sufficiently justified themselves by several Sermons, and public Determinations in their Academical Solemnities, against the chief Principles of Socinianism, sirenously asserting the Deity of Christ, and Immortality of Humane Souls, etc. and vigorously opposing the main Socinian Tenants: In consequence of which, they showed the sure and safe ways to destroy those Opinions, without hurting the Catholic Doctrines, which many had wounded to do them spite; and in this Design some of them appeared in public with great success.  
HAving thus asserted the Honour of our Faculties, and maintained the Fundamental Interests of Religion, They took notice, what unworthy and dishonourable Opinions were published abroad concerning God, to the disparagement of all his Attributes, and discouragement of virtuous Endeavours, and great trouble and dejection of many pious Minds; and therefore here they appeared also to assert and vindicate the Divine Goodness and love of Men in its freedom and extent, against those Doctrines, that made his Love, Fondness; and his Justice, Cruelty; and represented God, as the Eternal Hater of the far greatest part of his reasonable Creatures, and the designer of their Ruin, for the exaltation of mere Power, and arbitrary Will: Against these sour and dismal Opinions They stood up stoutly, in a time when the Assertors of the Divine Purity and Goodness, were persecuted bitterly with nicknames of Reproach, and popular Hatred. They gave sober Accounts of the Nature of God, and his Attributes, suitable to those Declarations of himself he hath made by the Scriptures, and our Reasons: They showed continually how impossible it was that Infinite Goodness should design or delight in the misery of his Creatures: That God never acts by mere arbitrary Will, but by a Will directed by the Perfections of his Nature: That to act arbitrarily is Imperfection and Impotence: That he is tied by the excellency of his Being, to the Laws of Right, and Just, and that there are independent Relations of True and Good among things, antecedent to all Will and Understanding, which are indispensible and eternal: That Goodness is the Fountain of all his Communications and Actions ad extra: That to glorify God, is rightly to apprehend and celebrate his Perfections, by our Words, and by our Actions: That Goodness is the chief moral Perfection: That Power without Goodness is Tyranny; and Wisdom without it, is but Craft and Subtilty; and Justice, Cruelty, when destitute of Goodness: That God is not pleased with our Praises, otherwise than as they are the suitable Actings of his Creatures, and tend to make them love him, in order to their being happy in him.  
By such Principles as These, which are wonderfully fertile, and big of many great Truths, they undermined, and from the bottom overthrew the fierce and churlish Reprobatarian Doctrines; And those Truths they proved from the Scripture, and the Nature of God, and Reason of Things, with all possible clearness, and strength of Evidence.  
OBserving further, That Faith was preached up as the whole of Religion; and that represented variously, phantastickly, and after an unintelligible manner, dressed up in Metaphors and Phrases, and dangerous Notions, that prescinded it from Good Works, and made them unnecessary: Here they appeared also, and detected the vanity and canting of this Airy Divinity; Stating the Notion of Faith plainly and clearly, and stripping it out of its Chimerical clothing, Teaching,  
That Faith in the general is the Belief of a Proposition affirmed; and Divine Faith, the belief of a Divine Testimony; and Evangelical, Saving Faith, such a Belief as works on the Will and Affections, and produceth the Works of Righteousness: So that the Faith that is said to justify, (in the forensick sense) is a complex thing, and takes in an Holy Life, and all the Graces of the Spirit, which are called by the name of Faith, because that is the Root of all the rest. Thus they asserted the necessity of a real, inward Righteousness, against the Solifidian and Antinomian Heresies, which had poisoned the whole Body of the then Current Theology, and was counted the only Spiritual Doctrine.  
In those days Men were taught, that we are justified only by the Jmputed Righteousness of Christ, by which they said, we are formally Righteous; That Faith justified only as it laid hold of that, (as they phrased it) and that Inherent Righteousness was to be renounced, and had nothing to do here. These were the great dear Mysteries of their Theology, that seasoned all their Doctrines and Instructions, which by this means also were rendered exceedingly fanciful and dangerous: Therefore in this likewise, those Divines interposed and demonstrated the vanity and mischief of such fulsome and groundless Conceits; They stated the true and warrantable sense in which Christ's Righteousness is imputed, viz. Metonymically, and as to Effects; That is, That for the sake of his Righteousness, God was pleased to pardon Penitents, and to deal with them upon their Faith, and sincere Obedience, as if they had been Righteous themselves: Not as if he passed false, and mistaken Judgements, and looked on Christ's Righteousness as really and properly theirs; but that for his sake He pardoned their sins, and accepted of their personal imperfect righteousness, as if it had been perfect. They showed that this account was agreeable to Scripture, and the Analogy of sound Faith, and Practice; and that the other sense was nowhere delivered in the holy Oracles, but was a mere imagination contrary to the Attributes of God, and to the Doctrines, and designs of the Gospel, and exceedingly pernicious to Christian Life, and Virtue: They alleged that Christ's Righteousness is nowhere in Scripture said to be imputed: That he is no otherwise made Righteousness to us than he is made Sanctification, and Redemption; that is, He is the great Author and procurer of them; and that in that sense he is the Lord our Righteousness. They took notice how that by this odd Fanatic principle, Personal Righteousness was undermined, and disparaged; and one of the first things the people were taught, was, to renounce their own Righteousness, without restriction, or limitation, in which Counsel there is much show of humility; but much nonsense and much danger, if it be not delivered, and taken in a cautious sense: For the Apostles, and primitive Believers never renounced any Righteousness, but that of the Mosaical dispensation, in which some of them had gloried much before their conversion; But after it, were convinced, It was nothing worth, and counted it as dross, and dung in respect of that Righteousness that Christ taught: They never disparaged real, inward Righteousness: Yea they took ground of confidence, and rejoicing from it, viz. from the simplicity and sincerity of their conversation, from their having a good Conscience in all things; from their steadfastness amidst Tribulations, and patience in their Sufferings; and they plainly tell us, That Religion was doing Righteousness, and consisted in visiting the Widow and Fatherless, and being unspotted with the World; in denying all ungodliness, and worldly lusts, and living soberly, righteously, and Godly; They warn us to beware of those deceivers that would persuade a man may be righteous; withou●… doing righteously; yea they declare the promises to be entailed upon those, that by patient continuance in well-doing seek for Glory, and Immortality.  
But said He, I forget myself, and run out too far into this Discourse, in which I suppose I need not inform you, the Scriptures being so full in it.  
Here I took liberty to move a Question, and asked him, Whether those Divines did teach, or allow men's relying, and depending on their own inward Virtues, or outward Works? To this he said, They had not the least imagination, that there was either Merit, or Perfection in our qualifications, or performances; but that in those respects they renounced their own righteousness, and obedience: That they acknowledged, and declared that our highest, best services could never deserve the divine notice, or acceptance by any worthiness in them; But then, added He, They said also, that Christ's obedience was Perfect, and Meritorious, and that God was so well satisfied with it, that for his sake he promised to pardon the failings of our duties, and to accept of Sincerity instead of Perfection: That on this account, our short, defective righteousness was received, as if it had been adequate, and complete; we being through Christ, under a Covenant of Grace, and Pardon, and our obedience not judged according to strict measures, and proportions, but by the rules of mercy, and favour. Thus they stated that matter clearly, and struck at the root of Antinomian follies, and impostures.  
ANd because Morality was despised by those elevated Fantastics, that talked so much of Imputed Righteousness, in the false sense; and accounted by them, as a dull, and low thing; therefore those Divines laboured in the asserting and vindicating of this: Teaching the necessity of Moral Virtues; That Christianity is the highest improvement of them; That the mere first-table Religion is nothing, without the works of the second; That Zeal, and Devoutness, and delight in Hearing, Prayer, and other externals of worship, may be in very evil men: That Imitation, and Custom, and Pride, and Self-love may produce these: That these are no more than the Forms of Godliness: That the power of it consists in subduing self-will, and ruling our passions, and moderating our appetites, and doing the works of real Righteousness towards God, and our Neighbour.  
And because there was a Religion that had got into credit, that did not make Men better, but worse in all relations, worse Governors, and worse Subjects, and worse Parents, and worse Neighbours; more sour, and morose, and fierce, and censorious; Therefore, They pressed Men to consider, That the design of Religion was to perfect humane Nature; To restore the empire of our minds over the will, and affections; To make them more temperate, and contented in reference to themselves, and more humble, meek, courteous, charitable and just towards others. On such things as these, performed sincerely, by the assistance, and encouragement of Faith in Christ, and from a desire to be ruled by his Laws, they laid the whole stress.  
ANd being the Age was unhappily disposed to place much Religion in their conceited Orthodoxy, and Systems of Opinion, to the destruction of Charity, and Peace; To the dissetlement of Religion, and great hindrance of real Godliness: They therefore zealously decried this superstition of Opinions, and smartly reproved Dispute, and eagerness of contest about Notions, and lesser Truths: Showing the inconveniencies, and mischiefs of that spirit, and its inconsistency with Charity, and the peace of Mankind: They persuaded modestly in all extraessential Doctrines, and suspense of judgement in things that were not absolutely certain; and readiness to pardon the mistakes of those that differ from us in matters of speculation.  
In order hereunto, They made this one of their main Doctrines; That The principles which are necessary to Salvation are very few, and very plain, and generally acknowledged among Christians: This they taught, and were earnest in it, because they saw it would secure Charity to dissenters, and prevent all vehemencies of captious dispute, all schisms, and unnecessary separations, and many Wars, and Persecutions upon the account of Religion: For if the things in which Men differ, be not Religion, be not Faith, and Fundamental; If this be true, and this truth acknowledged, All these would want pretence; and so Peace and Unity would possess the spirits of Men. They saw that Religion, which was shaken by divisions, and rendered suspected of uncertainty through the mixture of uncertain things, would stand safe, and firm when 'twas laid only upon the plain, infallible, undoubted propositions: That holiness would thrive, when men's zeal was taken off from talking, and disputing against others, and directed inwards to the government of themselves, and the reformation of their own hearts, and lives: That Papism, which in those times of distraction began to spread even here, would drop to the ground, if it were believed, That the necessary principles of Religion were few, and plain, and those agreed on: For then there would be no need of an Infallible Interpreter, and Judge: I say, They were sensible, that all the great Interests of Religion, and Mankind might be served by the acknowledgement of this one Reasonable Principle; which they saw was the only way to bring us to stability, and consistence; ●…o Peace, and Union.  
In Consequence of this Spirit, and Doctrine, they discoursed the things wherein they differed from others, with mildness, and modesty, without anger, and damning sentences; and afforded their converses to all sorts of good Men, though they believed them mistaken: They never expressed rage in their conversations, or discourses against bare errors, and mistakes of judgement: But for the pride, and confidence, censoriousness and groundless separations, that are the frequent attendants of different opinions; These sometimes moved them to anger, and expression of just resentment; because they looked on them as great Immoralities, and very pernicious sins: And on the occasion of these spiritual vices, they were warmed with zeal, against the Sectaries, and Bigots; for the taking down of whose pride, and confidence, They thought it necessary to detect the Impostors, and to expose their vanities; which they did successfully, and showed:  
That their Divinity consisted most in Phrases; and their boasted spirituality, in fond affections: That their new lights were but freakish fancies; and old Heresies revived; and the precious Mysteries of their Theology, but conceited absurdities, and nonsense in a fantastic dress: They happily drew the parallel between our Separatists, and those ancient ones, the Pharisees; and proved that the same spirit acted the Ataxites, that governed those Jewish fanatics: And because their pretences were taking, and specious, and had caught great numbers of the easy, well meaning people of Bensalem; Therefore, to disabuse them, they laboured much to show the shortness of their kind of Godliness; and the danger of placing all Religion in Praying, Hearing, Zeal, Rapture, Mysteries, and Opinions.  
Accordingly they declared, and proved, That 1. Fluency, and Pathetic eloquence in sudden Prayer may proceed, and doth, many time, from excited passion, and warm imagination; from a peculiar temper, and heated melancholy: That these are no sign that a man prays by the spirit, nor do they argue him to be one jot the better, than those that want the faculty, or any whit the more accepted of God for it: That to pray by the spirit is to pray with Faith, Desire, and Love; and that a Man may pray by the spirit, and with a Form.  
2. That people may delight to hear from other causes, than conscience, and a desire to be directed in the government of their Lives: That hearing is very grateful to some, because it feeds their opinions, and furnisheth their tongues, and enables them to make a great show of extraordinary Saint-ship: They represented that mere animal Men, and fond lovers of themselves may be much taken with hearing of the Gracious promises, and Glorious privileges of the Gospel; when at the same time, they are told they are all theirs, and theirs peculiarly, and exclusively to the rest of Mankind: That pride, and vanity, and self-love will recommend, and endear such preaching; That it is most luscious to fond, and conceited men, to hear how much better, and more precious they are then their Neighbours; how much dearer to God, and more favoured by him; what an interest they have in free, distinguishing Grace, and how very few have a share in it, besides themselves: How their enemies are hated of God, and how sad a condition they are in, who differ from them in practices, and opinions: To dote on such preaching, and admiringly to follow such Preachers, They showed, was but to be in love with flattery, and self-deceit: That it was no sign of Godliness, but an evident argument of pride, malice, and immoderate selfishness; That these are the true causes of the zeal, and earnestness of many after Sermons; and of the pleasure that they have in hearing, though they would persuade others, and believe themselves, that the love of Religion, and sense of duty are the only motives that prevail with them.  
3. Concerning zeal, They taught; That zeal in itself is indifferent, and made good, or bad, as its objects, and incentives are; That mere education, and custom, natural conscience, and particular complexion, do sometimes make Men very zealous about things of Religion: That though the fervours of the Ataxites for their Doctrines, and ways, were not all feigned; but real and sincere; Yet their zeal was nothing worth, being but mere natural passion, kindled by a fond delight in their own self chosen practices, and opinions; That their coldness to the great known necessary duties of Justice, Charity, Obedience, Modesty, and Humility was an evident sign, that their heat for pretended Orthodox tenants, and modes of worship, had nothing Divine in it: That true zeal begins at home with self-reformation; and that where it was employed altogether about amendments of external Religion, and public Government, it was pernicious, not only to the World, but to a Man's self also.  
4. And because the heights of zeal ran up sometimes into raptures, and exstacies, which were looked on as wonderful appearances of God in the thus transported persons; Therefore, here also They undeceived the people (as I said in the general before) by showing,  
That these alienations may be caused naturally, by the power of a strong fancy, working upon violent affections: That they together may, and do, oft, produce deliquiums of sense; That the Imagination working then freely, and without contradiction, or disturbance from the external senses, and being wholly employed about Religious matters may form to itself strange Images of extraordinary apparitions of God, and Angels; of Voices, and Revelations; which being forcibly impressed on the fancy, may beget a firm belief in the exstaticall person, that all these were divine manifestations, and discoveries; and so he confidently thinks himself a Prophet, and an inspired Man, and vents all his conceits for Seraphic truths, and holy Mysteries: And by the vehemency of his affirmations, and the strange effects of his distemper, others are persuaded into the same vain opinion of him, that he hath of himself, to the great disparagement of Religion, and deception of the simple.  
This whole mystery of vanity, and delusion They laid open to the World, and showed, that all was but a natural disease, and far enough from being sacred, or supernatural: That very evil Men, and even the Heathen Priests have felt all those effects, and pretended to the same wonder●… and were as much inspired, and divinely acted, as those exstatical Dreamers:  
5. And whereas those high flown Enthusiasts talked much of mysteries; and the Sects, (generally contending which should, outdo the other here) made up their schemes of divinity of absurdities, and strange, unintelligible fancies; and then counted their groundless belief of those wild freaks, a great sign and exercise of Faith, and spirituality; The Divines (of whom I am speaking) employed themselves worthily to detect this taking imposture also; They gave the true senses in in which the Gospel is a mystery, viz. A secret, hid in the councils of God, and not discoverable by reason, or humane inquiries till he was pleased, in the fullness of time, to unfold it clearly, and explicitly by his Son, and by his Spirit, who revealed the mystery that had been hid from ages: That Religion may yet be called a mystery, as it is an Art that hath difficulty in the practice of it: And though all it's main, necessary Articles are asserted so clearly, that they may be known by every sincere Inquirer, and in that respect have no darkness, or obscurity upon them; Yet They asserted, that some of those propositions may be styled mysterious being inconceiveable as to the manner of them: Thus the Immaculate Conception of our Saviour, for instance, is very plain as to the thing, being revealed clearly, That it was; Though unexplicable, and unrevealed as to the mode, How: They said, That our Faith is not concerned in the manner, which way this, or that is, except where it is expressly, and plainly taught in Scripture; but that the belief of the simple Article is sufficient: So that we are not to puzzle ourselves with contradictions, and knots of subtlety, and fancy, and then call them by the name of mysteries. That to affect these is dangerous vanity, and to believe them, is silliness, and credulity: That by, and on the occasion of such pretended mysteries, The simplicity of the Gospel hath been destroyed, the minds of Men infatuated, sober Christians despised, the peace of the Church disturbed, the honour of Religion exposed, the practice of holiness and virtue neglected, and the World disposed to Infidelity, and Atheism itself.  
6. And since the being Orthodox in Doctrine, and sound in their new conc●…ed Faith, was in those times a great matter, and one mark of Saint-ship; as error on the other hand was of unregeneracy, and Reprobation; They showed, That bare knowledge of points of Doctrine was nothing worth, in comparison of Charity, Humility, and Meckness; That it did not signify in the divine esteem without these, and such other concomitant Graces: That a man was never the better for being in the right opinion, if he were proud, contentious, and ungovernable with it: That ignorance, and mistake in lesser things when joined with modesty, and submission to God, and our Governors, was much to be preferred before empty turbulent, and conceited Orthodoxy: That errors of judgement are truly infirmities, that will not be imputed, if there be no corrupt, and vicious mixture with them: That they are not hurt to him whom they do not seduce, and misled; nor do they make any alteration in our state: That God pardons them in us, and we ought to overlook and pass them by in one another.  
By such ways and representations as these They disabled the main works whereby the fond Ataxites concluded themselves to be the Godly; and destroyed the chief grounds on which they built their proudest pretences. So that their wings being clipped, they came down to the ordinary level with other mortals; leaving the title of Godliness, and Saint-ship to be made out by quiet devotion, and self-government, by Meekness, and Charity, Justice, and Patience, Modesty, and Humility, Universal Obedience to God's Commands, Reverence to Superiors, and Submission to Governors; and not by the other fantastical, and cheap things, consisting but of imaginations, and phrases, and mystical nothings.  
ANd for as much as each Sect confined the Church, Saintship, and Godliness to itself, and entailed the Promises, and Privileges of the Gospel upon its own People; Therefore here They stood up, and reproved the Anti-christian pride and vanity of that cruel, and unjust humour; Showing, That the Church consists of all those that agree in the profession, and acknowledgement of the Scripture, and the first comprehensive, plain Creeds, however scattered through the World, and distinguished by names of Nations, and Parties, under various degrees of light, and divers particular models, and forms of Worship, as to circumstance, and order: That every lover of God, and of the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity, who lives according to the few, great acknowledged Doctrines, and Rules of a virtuous and holy life, is a true Christian, and will be happy; though he be ignorant of many points that some reckon for Articles of Faith, and err in some, which others account sacred, and fundamental: By which Catholic principle, foundation is laid for universal Charity, and Union; and would Christian men be persuaded to govern themselves according to it, all unnecessary Schisms, and Separations would be prevented, and those Hatreds, and Animosities cured, that arise from lesser disagreements.  
AGain, whereas as the Ataxites had made Religion a fantastic, and unintelligible thing, (as I have told you) and dressed it up in an odd, mumming, and ridiculous disguise; Those Divines laboured much to reduce it to it's native plainness, and simplicity; purging it from senseless phrases, conceited mysteries, and unnecessary words of Art; Laying down the genuine notions of Theology, and all things relating to Faith, or Practice, with all possible perspicuity, and plainness: By which means many scandals were removed, and vain disputes discredited, divisions stopped, Religious practice promoted, and the peace of the Church at last established. They told the Ataxites that though they talked much of closing with Christ, getting in to Christ, rolling upon Christ, relying upon Christ, and having an interest in Christ; and made silly people believe that there was something of Divine Mystery, or extraordinary spirituality under the sound of these words; That yet, in good earnest, either they understood not what they said, and meant nothing at all by them; or else the sense of them was but believing Christ's Doctrines, obeying his Laws, and depending upon his Promises; plain, and known things: They showed that all the other singular phrases, which they used, and which the people were so taken with, were either nonsense, and falsehood; or but some very common, and ordinary matter at the bottom: That they had generally silly, and fantastic conceptions of Free Grace, Gospel-liberty, Saving knowledge, Pure Ordinances, The motions of the Spirit, Workings of Corruption, Powerful preaching, Liberty of Conscience, Illuminations, and Indwellings: That their Admirers generally talked those words by rote, without knowing the meaning of them; and that the Teachers themselves understood them in a false and erroneous sense: That bating such words, and the talk of Outgoings, Incommings, Givings-in, Dawnings, Refining, Withdrawing, and other Metaphors, there was nothing extraordinary in their whole Divinity, but the nonsense, and absurdities of it: Thus They declared freely against the Gibberish of that Age, and stated the right Notion of those points of Religion, which the others had so transformed, and abused.  
FUrther: Whereas the Sects kept up loud cries against the Church of Bensalem, as guilty of Superstition, Will-worship, undue Impositions, and Persecution; They took them to task here also and declared,  
That Superstition in the properest sense of it, imports, An over-timerous, and dreadful apprehension of God, which presents him as rigid, and apt to be angry on the one hand; and as easy to be pleased with flattering devotions on the other; so that Superstition works two ways, viz. by begetting fears of things, in which there is no hurt; and fondness of such, as have no good in them: on both which accounts they declared the Ataxites to be some of the most superstitious people in the World: They showed, That their dreadful notions of God, which represented him as one that by peremptory, unavoidable decrees had bound over the greatest part of men to everlasting Torments, without any consideration of their sin, only to show the absoluteness of his power, over them; I say, They declared that those black thoughts of Him, were the Fountain of numerous superstitions: That their causeless fears of the innocent Rites, and usages of the Church of Bensalem, which were only matters of order, and decency, appointed by the Governors of the Church, and not pretending any thing, in particular, to divine Institution, was very gross, and silly superstition: That they were very superstitious in being afraid, and boggling at prescribed Forms of Prayer; kneeling at the holy Sacrament, the Cross in Baptism, and the like becoming, and decent Institutions: That 'twas Ignorance, and Superstition to fly off with such dread from a few enjoined Ceremonies, because (forsooth) they were symbolical, and significant; That the Ceremonies that are not so, are vain, and impertinent: That the Ruling Powers may appoint such, for the visible instruction, and edification of the People, and for the more reverence, and solemnity of Worship: That the current principle among them, [That Nothing is to be done in the Worship of God, but what is particularly commanded, and prescribed in Scripture] is a foolish, groundless conceit, and the occasion of many Superstitions: That though this is always pretended, and said, yet it was never proved: That to observe the Church in such appointments, without any opinion of their antecedent necessity, is a due act of obedience to it; But to fly from them as sinful, and Anti-christian, is great Superstition.  
These things they declared, and proved against the negative Superstitions of Taste not, Touch not, handle not:  
And They showed also, how justly chargeable the Ataxites were with many Positive ones; in that they doted upon little, needless, foolish things, and laid a great stress of Religion upon them: That the keeping such stir about pretended Orthodox opinions, and the placing them in their Creeds, among the most sacred and fundamental Doctrines, was a dangerous and mischievous Superstition: That it was very superstitious to dignify private conceits, or uncertain tenants, with the style of Gospel-light, God's Truths, precious Truths, and the like expressions of admiration, and fondness: That to entitle the Spirit of God to the effects of our imaginations, and the motions of natural passions, was Superstition; and that so was the opinion of the necessity, and spirituality of sudden conceived prayer: That there was much Superstition in their Idolising their particular ways of Worship, and models of Discipline, as the pure Ordinances, and Christ's Government, and Scripture Rules: And that in these, and many other respects they that talked so much against Superstition, were themselves most notoriously guilty of it.  
As to Will-worship They taught, (after your most learned Hammondus) That the Apostle in the only place where it is mentioned, Col. 2. doth not speak of it, in an evil sense; But that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 imports a free, and unconstrained worship, which is the more acceptable for being so: That Sacrifices before the Law; Free-will-offerings under it; The feasts of Purim, and Dedication, David's design of building the Temple; the Austerities of the Rechabites; and St. Paul's refusing hire, for his labour among the Corinthians, were of this sort. That men are not to be blamed for Will-worship, except they would impose it without Authority, as necessary. That when they thus teach for Doctrines their own Traditions, and grow so proud, and conceited with them, as to separate from the public Communion, upon the fancy that they are more pure, and holy than others; That this their Will-worship is sinful, and Pharisaical; which was the case of the Ataxites, who therefore were Will-worshippers in the evil sense; But the Antifanites showed, that the pious Institutions of just Authority were no way liable to any such imputation:  
That such might impose particular Circumstances, and Decencies, and that those Impositions were no way contrary to Gospel Liberty: That that was only Freedom from the Jewish yoke, from the bondage of sin, and power of Satan: not Liberty from the Injunctions and Appointments of Civil, or Ecclesiastical Governors: That all, or the chief power of these, conconsisted in fixing, and appointing circumstances of order, and decorum, that were left undetermined, and not prescribed in Scripture: That if they may not do this, they are in a manner useless: That the Church of Bensalem imposed nothing that was grievous, or prohibited: They minded the Ataxites that themselves were great Imposers, That they imposed Oaths; and Ceremonies in that part of Religious Worship, a form of words, the lifting up of the hand; and That they would have imposed numerous, doubtful, and false opinions, to have been subscribed as a necessary Confession of Faith; making thereby their own private tenants of equal moment, and certainty with the great fundamental Articles, which is proper imposing upon the Conscience: That they would not, by any means, allow Liberty of Conscience, when they were in power; that this than was the great Abomination, and the most accursed thing in the world: That they persecuted the Bensalemites for their Consciences with wonderful inhumanity; That when other power is taken from them, they are grievous persecutors with their Tongues, and are continually shooting the Arrows of bitter, scornful words against all that are of different judgement.  
Thus Those Divines disabled all the charges, and pretences of the Fanites; and turned the points, and edge upon themselves. And they managed their Rebukes of these self-condemned men, with much judgement, and wit, without any thing of fierceness, or scurrility: They showed them the Immorality of their spirit, and its contradictions, and antipathy to the genius, and temper of the Gospel; and urged, That though they hated debauchery, and some gross Carnal sins, as the Pharisees did the Publicans, Yet they were given up to many other sorts of wickedness, to spiritual Pride, Malice, Envy, Avarice, Stubbornness, Disingenuity, and Disobedience: That they harboured, and kept warm these, under their pretences of Christ's Righteousness, and their specious forms of Godliness: That though they were always confessing sin, in the general, with much seeming remorse, and trouble of spirit, yet they seldom, or never, made acknowledgements of these. That though they loved to hear the sins of Drunkenness, and Profaneness vehemently declaimed against; Yet they could not endure to have these throughly detected, and reproved: That even their own Teachers durst not touch here, and that when others did it, though without naming parties or pointing out persons, they called it Railing and Persecution; and made no other use of those just rebukes: That though they showed great seeming tenderness of Conscience in other smaller matters of Mint, anise, and Cummin; Yet they seldom appeared sensible, or troubled at their transgressions in those greater matters of the Law.  
ANd because these people were always making complaints, and sad mo●…ns of their sins, without endeavouring to amend; Those Divines represented to them, that such complaints were but forms, and a fashion that they followed: That sad looks, and whinings, were but a show of Humility, and Repentance: That if they were sensible of their sins indeed, they would use the Grace of God to overcome them, till at last they arrived at victory; and not still continue in a state of whimpering, and complaining: That these men cozened themselves into a false opinion of their penitence, and were persuaded, that this was enough without conquest, and true reformation of heart, and life, that their remaining sins were but infirmities, and the spots of God's children, which were covered with Christ's Righteousness, and not seen in the Elect: By which they deluded themselves into dangerous presumption, and security. These our Divines endeavoured to destroy, and to pluck away the fig-leaves of all their false, and imperfect marks of Godliness; and showed that their usual complaints, were but like the noise of Parrots, without an inward sense; That when men were only sensible, and sorry, they were yet but under the Law, and a state of bondage: That the Gospel aims at Liberty, and Victory, and that we are but just entered, and are yet very imperfect, till we have attained some considerable measure of that: That the great mark of sincerity, is, to be proceeding, and going forwards, and towards the conquest of sinful habits and inclinations: That we are not to look on these, as failings, and infirmities, and so sit down contented with some tears, and customary confessions under the power of them: That Infirmities are but single acts, and such too as have not the will in them: That God hath afforded us sufficiency of means, and helps enough to subdue all the evils of our natures; and that if we neglect to use those aids, and live at rest under any sinful appetites and passions, we are Hypocrites, and our boasted Faith, and spiritualities will signify nothing to us.  
HEre the Governor made a little stop, and then said; I have run over these things as they offered themselves to my mind; I might have set them in a better order, and have added many other particulars, but as to method, there is no great need of curiosity in it in such a relation: By the things I have told you, you may gather what was the Genius of those Divines in many others, which for brevity I omit.  
I said, that though one might collect the opinion of many matters more, by what he had been pleased to represent to me; yet there were two things which I had a desire to be informed in further, viz. Their Notion of Free Grace; and Justification by Faith.  
Their Doctrines about these, answered He, might in great part be gathered from some of those principles I have mentioned; but however I shall gratify you with a short account of them:  
For Free Grace, it was ever in the mouths of the Ataxites, and they seemed to be transported, and ravished in the admiration of it: But their notion was very perverse, and false: For they made it an arbitrary kindness, bestowed upon some very few persons, for no reason in the world; Not for the sake of any virtue, or divine qualifications, but only for mere, uncountable will, and pleasure: And said, That God from this Free Grace (as they called it) changed the hearts of the Elect by an immediate, irresistible power; and created Faith, and other Graces in them, in the same way of omnipotent operation.  
Against these dangerous conceits, they taught, That God loves Virtue, and Holiness, and is no fond Respecter of Persons: That those are the proper objects of his special kindness: That there was a general Grace which had appeared unto all men, in the light of Reason, the Laws written upon our hearts, and common aids of the Spirit: That its freedom, consisted in its universal diffusion through the world without let, or impediment; and in the spontaneity of it: This said he may seem somewhat a hard word; but I have no plainer to express the fullness of my sense by; and I never use a difficult term, when the thing can be spoke as well in one that is more easy and familiar. I answered, that I understood it very well, and that he meant that God's Grace was willing, and unforced; flowing from the benignity of his nature; still communicating itself to all Subjects that were capable: You apprehend me right, continued the Governor, and thus he hath imparted himself to all Mankind: But than added He, There is a Grace, more special, that concerns Christians only, without us; the declaration of the Gospel: and within us; those divine virtues that are wrought by them, and therefore called Graces: He said, The Gospel persuadeth without force, and God works upon us by it, in a way proper, and suitable to reasonable Creatures, by our Reasons, and our Interests, by our Hopes, and our Fears: assisting all good desires, and endeavours by the operation of his holy Spirit.  
This, said he, acts as a General Cause, according to the dissposition of the Subject: our endeavours would be weak and fruitless without it; And yet, It never works alone by mere omnipotence, without our endeavours: They operate in conjunction, as the Sun, and moisture of the earth, and seminal principles do in the production of Plants, and Flowers; each cause doing what is proper to it: The Dictates of the Spirit are contained in the Gospel, and the Spirit enlighteneth, and teacheth by that. And so he came to the great Doctrine of  
Justification by Faith: Here he called to my mind what he had related before concerning Faith, and the false notions of it among the Fanites: and then said,  
Justification is either taken for the making us just, or the dealing with us as if we were such: And that Faith is taken as a single Grace, viz. The belief of the Gospel; or complexly, as it comprehends all the rest, viz. The whole body of Holiness. Having premised which necessary distinctions, He told me, That Faith in the single acception of it, was the great instrument of the Gospel, to make us just; and so justified in the proper, Physical sense; But that as it compriseth the other Graces, it justifies in the forensick, and less proper sense, viz. That God deals with the Faithful, namely those that are sincerely obedient to the Gospel, as if they had been strictly, and perfectly just, and had fulfilled his Laws. By the help of which short, and plain state of the controversy, methought I saw clearly into the whole matter, and was freed from many perplexities, and confusions in which I was wont to be involved.  
And being thus informed of the principles of those Divines in those chief heads of Doctrine, I had a curiosity to have an account of their mind, concerning the Form of Ecclesiastical Government, about which there had been so much stir in our European parts of Christendom, and therefore entreated him to represent their opinion to me in this subject: To which he answered me thus.  
The Ancient Form of Church Government in this Island ever since the plantation of Christianity in it, hath been Episcopal: But of later years, it was very much hated, and opposed by the Ataxites, who set up new Models (every sect it's own fancy) as the only divine Government, and Discipline of Christ; So that the Scriptures were racked, and every little word, and point forced, and many subtleties of interpretation suborned to declare for the beloved imagination: and then the whimsy was voted to be of divine right, and the only Scripture-Government; and the advancing of it, made no less than the Interest of God's Glory, and the promoting of Christ's Kingdom. On the other side, the ancient Government was decried as superstitious, Church Tyranny, Humane Invention, a limb of Antichrist to be extirpated root, and branch, by a thorough, Godly Reformation: In which design (as I told you) they succeeded to the subversion both of the Civil, and Ecclesiastical state: But when they had destroyed, they knew not how to build; for they could never agree upon the Platform to be erected in the room of that which they had subverted: For every Sect was for setting up it's own frame; and every one had a different Model from every other; and each was confident, that its Form was Christ's Institution, and so by no means to be receded from, in the least point: The effects of which were endless Animosities, Hatreds, and Struggle against each other, and the greatest rage, and violence of them altogether, against the Church of Bensalem, and all Episcopal constitutions.  
Amidst these Bandying, some Antifanatick Divines taught, That there was no reason to think, that any particular Model was prescribed in Scripture, so, as to be unalterable, and universal: That it was necessary there should be a Government in the Church; That the Apostles had appointed General Officers, and General Rules, such as God's Glory, Edification, Decency, Order, avoidance of Offence, and the like; but that it did not appear, they had determined the particular Circumstances, and Form: That there was no express command of them; and that the plea of Apostolical example (could it be made out) would not hold for an universal Law to the Church in all ages, except where there was some intrinsic, necessary goodness in the things practised; or some annexed Precept to enforce it: That there was neither of these in the present case; and therefore they urged, That the Form, and Circumstances of Government, was to be left to the Ruling Powers in the Church, to be ordered by them so as should seem best to suit with the General Rules, and Ends of Government.  
By the means of which Principles, Foundation was laid for Peace, and Obedience; and that age was prepared for the reception of the old, Legal established Government, when it should be restored. Concerning This those Divines taught,  
That it was of all the most venerable Form, and greatly to be revered for its Antiquity, Universality, and the Authority it had from Apostolical Practice, and our Fundamental Laws: That on these, and other accounts, it was infinitely to be preferred, and chosen, before any new-fangled Model, upon the score of which declarations, and discourses, in the Ataxites times, great complaint was made by them, among the foolish Zealots of their party, that the Universities, were overrun with a Prelatical spirit, than which, nothing was more odious in those days: But the prudent men took no notice of their clamours, but went on with the design of propagating such sober Principles, as tended to the healing of the Nation. When the public Government of the Church was restored; They most cheerfully put themselves under it, and submitted to its Orders heartily, upon the belief of its being the most Primitive, Catholic, Prudent, Legal Government in the world.  
I Have now, said the Governor, passed over the particulars, in which you desired to be informed; much more might have been said of them, but I know your own thoughts will improve these suggestions, which are enough to give light to the main Notions. I returned him my humble acknowledgements for the care, and pains he had taken to satisfy, and inform me in these, and the other heads of those men's Doctrines. To which he answered, That it was a great pleasure, and satisfaction to him if he had given me any content by his relation; and then willed me that if there were aught in the Theological part, that I had any query about, I would propose it freely: For, said he, we have a little time more to spare in talking of this first General, if you have any curiosity to be informed further of any thing belonging to it. I answered that he added to his favours by the liberty of Questioning, he was pleased to allow me, and that I had one thing more to desire a few words of, if he so pleased, which was, what Way of Preaching those Divines followed: This said He, I should have minded myself, and am very glad you remember me of it!  
You must know then, continued He, That there was not a greater diversity in any thing in Bensalem in the Age of which I now speak, than in the Modes of Preaching; of which amongst other evils, this was one, and not the least, That the people distasted, and contemned all the Doctrines, and Instructions that were not delivered after their own fashion, though otherwise never so seasonable, and wholesome; and inordinately admiring their own men, who spoke in the Phrase, and Mode that they fancied, they vilified, and despised those others, that used another method, though it were never so solid, edifying, and useful. And indeed, things were come to that pass in Bensalem, that there was scarce any other use made of Preaching, but to pass judgements upon the Preacher, and the Sermon; which was not only undertaken by the people of Age, and Experience: or by those only of better education and more advanced knowledge; But every Age, and every condition, was thought fit to judge here, every Youth, and Ignorant; every Rustic, and Mechanic would pass absolute, and definitive sentence in this matter. Accordingly the most empty, and fantastical Preachers were generally the most popular: And those that dealt most in jingles, and chiming of words, in Metaphors, and vulgar similitudes, in Fanatic Phrases, and Fanciful schemes of speech, set off by pleasing smiles, and melting Tones, by loudness and vehemency; These were sure to be the taking, precious men, though their discourses were never so trifling, and ridiculous. But the Divines, whom I describe, were no admirers of this ill-gotten, and ill-grounded Fame: They had no ambition to be cried up by the common Herd, nor any design to court their applauses: They cared not for their favour, or kind thoughts further, than those afforded advantage and opportunity for the doing of them good. This they considered as the end of their Ministry, and this they made the Rule and Measure of their Preaching; which I shall describe to you under these following Characters.  
1. It was Plain both in opposition to, First, Obscurity, and Secondly, Affectation. First, They preached no dark or obscure notions; For though their thoughts were conversant about the deepest Theories, both in Philosophy, and Religion, yet they knew, that such were not fit for Pulpits, or common hearers They had no design to make themselves admired by soaring into the Clouds: Their great aim was the edification, and instruction of those to whom they spoke; and therefore they were so far from preaching the heights of speculation, That they usually avoided (as much as they could) all the Controversies of Religion, in which the Essentials of Faith, and Practice were not concerned. And when either of these called for discourse of Doctrinal matters, their great care was to be understood. For secondly, They did not involve their discourses in needless words of Art, or subtle distinctions; but spoke in the plainest, and most intelligible Terms: and distinguished things in the most easy and familiar manner that the matter of discourse would bear. They took this for an established Rule, That unwonted words were never to be used, either in Pulpits, or elsewhere, when common ones would as fitly represent their meaning: and they always chose such, as the custom of speaking had rendered familiar in the Subjects on which they spoke, when those were proper, and expressive. And though many sorts of thoughts, and Subjects cannot be made obvious to the mere vulgar; yet they endeavoured to render such as were out of the common road of thinking, clear, and plain to those that are capable of the matters they were to express. Thirdly, They did not trouble their hearers with pretended Mysteries: They led them not into the dark places of Daniel, and the Revelations: nor fed them thence with their own imaginations under pretence of secret, and hidden Truths: No, they taught them from the plain Texts, and Doctrines of the Holy Writings: and gave them the sincere milk of the Word without any mixture of elaborate fancies, or mystical vanities. Fourthly, They slighted, and avoided all canting Fanatic Phrases, which were so much the Mode of those times. For They saw, they did but please with their sound, without conveying any sense into the minds of those that were so much delighted with them. So that the pretended plain preaching of those days, was really not at all understood; nor as much as intelligible. Therefore instead of such phrases, They used the most proper, and natural expressions, and such as most easily opened the mind to the things they taught.  
I do but slightly mention these particulars here, said the Governor, because I have spoken of them before in my larger accounts of these men: And so he went to the second thing mentioned, viz.  
(1.) The plainness of their preaching, in opposition to Affectation. Now the usual affectations of Preachers, said he, relate either to Learning, Wit, or Zeal; from all which They were very free. For first, They affected not to ostentate Learning, by highflown expressions, or ends of Greek, and Latin: They did not stuff their Sermons with numerous, needless Quotations; or flourish them with the names of great Authors: ways to be admired by the Vulgar, and despised by the Wise: No, their Learning was not shown in such cheap trifles as these, but it abundantly appeared to the intelligent, by the judgement and strength, the reason, and clearness with which they spoke. Secondly, They despised the small essays of appearing witty in their Sermons: They used no jingling of words, nor inventions of sentences, no odd fetches of observation, or niceness in laboured periods: They affected no gayness of metaphors, or prettiness of similitudes: no tricks to be played with the words of their Texts; or any other of the conceited sorts of fooling: but spoke with seriousness, and gravity, as became the Oracles of God; and showed their wit in the smartness, and edge of the things they delivered, without vanity, or trifling. Thirdly, They did not put on fantastical shows, and appearances of affected zeal: They used no set Tones, or clamorous noise; no violent, or Apish actions: They spoke with a well-governed affectionateness, and concerment; and such as showed they were in earnest: and very sensible of the weight of the affairs they were about: But without any thing of indecency, or extravagance.  
And now, said He, after what I have mentioned under this first Head, I may spare my pains of speaking much under the rest that follow; and therefore I shall be brief on them.  
(II.) Those Divines were methodical in their preaching: not that they were nice, in running their Texts into all the minute divisions of words; or formal in tying themselves just to one order on all Subjects: But they divided their matter into the substantial parts of Discourse; or resolved it into some main Proposition; and so treated of their subject in the method that was natural to it, and most beneficial for the people they were to instruct: They went not on in a cryptick undiscovered order on the one hand, nor did they spin out their matter into numerous, coincident particulars on the other: But made their Method very easy, and obvious, and their Heads few, and very distinct; which is helpful both to the understandings, and memories of the hearers.  
(III.) Their preaching was Practical: For though they taught all the great substantial principles of Religion; yet still they directed them to Practice, and laid the main stress on that. According to the saying of our Blessed Lord, If ye know these things, blessed are ye if ye do them. They taught the true, practical Divinity, without whimsies, and Romantic strains; and laid down the Rules of Life that are practicable, and such as sort with the plain Precepts of the Gospel, and the condition, and possibilities of humane nature: They spoke here, as those that understood the passions, appetites, and ways of men; and the course that was to be taken, to set them in right order: They did not talk by rote out of Books, or Enthusiastic experiences; They did not direct by Metaphors, and Phrases, and unpracticable fancies: But laid down the true, sober, rational, experimental method of action.  
(IV.) Their way was earnest and affectionate: They were not cold, or trifling, in matters of such vast consequence: They did not invite with indifference; or reprove with softness; or direct with negligence and unconcernment: But did all these, with a zeal, and warmth suitable to such weighty occasions. But then, They endeavoured to excite men's affections, not by their senses, and imaginations only; not, as I said before, by mere empty noise, and Tones, and Gestures, and Phrases, and passionate outcries; but by the weight of their sense, and the reason of their persuasions, endeavouring by the understandings, to gain the affections; and so to work on the will, and resolutions. Such was Their way of Preaching, on which I might have much enlarged, but I give you only the brief Heads.  
Here I asked him, what entertainment this their preaching met with in Bensalem? He answered, That for a long time it was but coldly received by the people, whose imaginations, and humours used to be fed upon Allusions, and Phrases, and Metaphors, and Opinions: And therefore, they hated sound Doctrine, and distasted the sincere Word: Their palates were so vitiated by the fantastical food, to which they had been used, that the substantial and wholesome diet would not down with them: So that those Divines were not at all popular at first, but the People generally ran after the affected, fanciful men, who entertained their itching Ears with jingles, and mysteries, and new nothings.  
And after that many of These Teachers had forsaken the public places of Worship, and in opposition to the Authority of the Church, and Edicts of State, betook themselves to holes and private corners, The bewitched multitude followed them into those places; Their zeal, and admiration of their own Men being increased, and heightened by the prohibition, and restraint that was upon them: For they doted on the fancies They taught; and could not endure sound sense: But the Judicious of all sorts, entertained, and relished the sober, unaffected preaching of the Anti-fanaticks; And at length also, by time, and their approbation, and example, most of the well-meaning, misled people were recovered back to the Church of Bensalem, and brought to a relish and liking of the plain way of Instruction.  
And now said He, I have done with what concerns the Theological Genius, and Principles of the men I undertook to describe, 'Tis too late for us at present to enter upon their way of Philosophy and Learning: of this I have given some short hints, but I intent you a larger account at our next meeting; and if you are not tired already with my discourse, that shall be to morrow in the afternoon, which I hope I shall have at liberty: If you will come hither at that time, you will find me ready to acquaiut you with what is further considerable in the Story of those Men.  
I thanked him, with a profound reverence for the satisfaction and pleasure he had afforded me already in his Relation; and for that further entertainment he was pleased to design for me; saying, that I never counted time better spent than that, which I had the honour to pass in his Instructive Conversation, and on Subjects of such delight, and importance. And so I took my leave for that night, and was conducted back by the same Messenger to my Lodgings.  
I Went the next day, at the appointed time, and found the Governor in the same room. After some Reflections on his past Relation, and a few common matters of Discourse (which I need not remember) He told me, He would acquaint me now with some things relating to the Opinion, and Genius of the same Men, in several sorts of Learning: of this, said He, you heard somewhat in the beginning, which will shorten this Account: I answered, that I did well remember what was told me of their universal way of study, and converse with the best Authors, both Ancient, and Modern. I therefore shall omit further discourse of that, said He, and tell you their Opinion (as far as I apprehend it) of the several chief parts of Philosophy, and Learning. I begin with  
LOGIC: As to this, They opposed not the usual Systems of the Schools, as they were Exercises, and Institutions for Youth: But They did not like the formal Syllogistical way among maturer Reasoner●… They many of them more approved of the Logic of Plato, which teacheth first to explain the Terms of the Question, and then to proceed by orderly Gradations from one proposition to another, till we come to the thing we would prove. A method of Reasoning more quick, and close, and much less subject to fallacies, and wander, than the way o●… Syllogism.  
And to move the propositions from whence a man would infer his conclusion, in the modest, Socratical way of Question; In my judgement, is a very good, and advantageous method. For in this, the occasions of passion which are ministered by positive assertions, are taken away, and the Arguer is engaged no further, than he thinks fit. He may break off when he pleaseth, without prejudice to his credit, which he hath not engaged, by undertaking Dogmatical proof of any thing: And so disputes may be brought to a short, and fair issue; and extravagant heats may be avoided: for the Arguer may keep himself uningaged, and so see more clearly how to apply his force, and restrain the discourse within the bounds of the subject: whereas in the positive way of disputing by Syllogism, there are these contrary disadvantages:  
Our Reasons are led a great way about; men's minds are concerned for the credit of their assertions, which they positively undertake to prove; Ambiguous and Aequivocal Terms steal-in, and insensibly misled the Reasoners; or distinctions are applied, which misled them more; The Disputer takes up one end, and runs away hastily in an opposition of it, perhaps without clearly understanding what it means, and without observing how this new pursuit works him off from the main business; He goes on still, and is still turned out of his way more, and more, by him that he opposeth: For if he seek occasion to evade the force of the Argument, he may do it well, and salve his credit to, and the deceit shall not easily be perceived. In like manner the opponent for his part, may by Syllogism draw his answerer, though a wary person, almost whether he pleaseth, and impose upon him by Terms, and fallacious Contexture of words, although he be one that understands consequence well, in plain reasoning: And so in this way, men may talk endlessly, but come to no result; and when they are weary of rambling, they may sit down, if they please, but be it when, and where they will, they know not how they came thither, nor what is become of the Question at first debated. This is the usual issue of all Syllogistical disputes; But in the Platonical, and Socratical method, these extravagancies may easily be avoided: which therefore I think to be the better way for men, that would find truth, and inform one another: But for the Youth that would try their wits, and appear subtle in arguing, Syllogisms may be proper for their purposes.  
For PHYSIOLOGY; They did not sit down in any System, or Body of Principles, as certain and established: They considered the incomprehensible wisdom that is in the works of God; the difficulties that occur in the seeming plainest things; the scantness, of our largest knowledge, and shallowness of our deepest inquiries; of which I spoke before: and therefore gave but timorous assent to any notions in Natural Philosophy: They held no infallible Theory here: Nor would they allow any speculations, or accounts of Nature to be more than Hypothesis, and probable conjecture: And these they taught were not to be raised from abstracted notions, and the unassisted operations of the mind, but to be collected leisurely from a careful observation of particulars: So that they thought, with much reason, that the best Foundation for Natural Philosophy would be a good History of Nature: This they saw to be very defective in their Time, and that while it remained in that imperfection, the knowledge of Nature, and the use of it, would be very scanty, and inconsiderable: But that from its enlargement, more, and surer Light might be expected, and the uses of Life, and Empire of man over the Creatures, might be greatly promoted, and advanced. For These ends the Foundation of Solomon's House, about that time, was laid; and This divers of them thought the best design that ever was for increasing Natural Knowledge, and the advantages of Humane Life, and infinitely beyond all the disputing, notional ways, from which nothing could arise, but dispute, and notion: They considered this method of joint endeavours, in such a royal, and noble Assembly, about the Phoenomena, and effects of Nature, to be the way to make Philosophy operative, and useful: To take it off from spending its strength in forming vain Ideas of fancy, and wrangling endlessly about Chimeras; and to make an Instrument of Action, and profitable works.  
But notwithstanding this, They did not wholly slight General Hypotheses, and Philosophical conjectures: No, They enquired into all the considerable speculations, that are extant, both Ancient, and Modern; though they addicted not themselves to any of the Sects of Philosophers: They rejected no probable Opinion with contempt; nor entertained any, with fondness: They doted on none, because they were Ancient; nor did they contemn any, because they were new: But received the likelihoods of Truth, and Knowledge of any date, from any hand, or in any dress.  
Here I asked, whether these men were not enemies to Aristotle, and his Philosophy? He answered, That They gave that respect to Aristotle, that was due to his antiquity, parts, and reputation in the World: That they read his Books, and thought as well of him, as of some others of the Philosophers: That they gladly received any of the Truths, or Probabilities, that he taught: But then, That they did not make his Authority absolute; or slavishly submit their judgements to all his Dictates; They did not reckon him infallible in Philosophy; no nor yet free from many actual, great mistakes: They did not prefer his judgement before all the elder Philosophers, or those of his own time; Nor did they think he was without Equal, or Superiors, both in Knowledge, and Virtue: They had not that partial, unjust fondness for him, that the moors, and Monks, and some other vain men had, to the prejudice, and disvalue of the Philosophers, that were before Him, from whom he took most of his Notions.  
He said, That the Philosophy taught in some common Schools, for Aristotle's, was a depravation, and corruption of it: That it was but Monkery, and Moorish Ignorance form into idle, and unintelligible whimsies. That the main Principles, Foundation, and Soul of that Philosophy, Their first matter, Substantial Forms, and Qualities, were mere Imaginations, that had no ground either from Sense, or Reason: That they were utterly unaccountable in themselves; and served no purpose of Knowledge or Life: But rendered all the Philosophy that was built on them fantastical, and useless.  
On the other side he said, That the Corpuscular Philosophy was the eldest, and most accountable Doctrine: That it was as ancient as Natural Philosophy itself: That it was applicable to the Phoenomena of Nature, and that it was very easy, and intelligible: This Theory, added he, those Philosophers preferred much to the other of Qualities and Forms, which in comparison is novel.  
They examined the Philosophy of your Gassendus, which restored, and amplified the Atomical Doctrine: And enquired into the Hypotheses of that other great man of your World, Renatus Descartes; Both whose works had been brought hither, by our Missionaries. This làtter they considered, and studied much, and in him they found a prodigious wit, and clear thoughts, and a wonderfully ingenious Fabric of Philosophy, which they thought to be the neatest Mechanical System of things that had appeared in the World; However, they adhered not to it, as the certain Account of Nature; nor yielded their assent as to positive, and established Truth; But entertained what they thought probable, and freely dissented in other matters. Yea some of them, who thought highly of his Mechanical wit, and believed he had carried matter and motion as far they could go; declared earnestly against the compleatness, and perfection of his Hypotheses; and learnedly showed, That the Mechanical Principles alone would not salve the Phoenomena; and that his accounts though they were pretty, and ingenious, were yet short, defective, and unsatisfying; and in some things not very agreeing, and consistent. These judged that nothing could be done in Physiology without admitting the Platonical 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and Spirit of Nature; and so would have the Mechanical Principles aided by the Vital: But in these matters, others of them had different thoughts; though all agreed in the modesty, and freedom of judgement and discourse.  
As to MORAL PHILOSOPHY, They did by no means approve of the Contentious, Disputing Ethics, that turned that useful knowledge, into Systems of unprofitable niceties, and notions; and made it (as Cicero speaks) to be rather Ostentatio Scientiae, then Lex Vitae: But they founded theirs, upon the excellent knowledge of Humane Nature and Passions: Into these they enquired much, and observed the various inclinations, and workings of the Humours, and Appetites of Men; especially they studied themselves, and entered into the recesses of their own souls: Nor did they stop here, but form their knowledge, and observations into solid Rules of Life, for the commanding of their passions, and bounding their desires, and governing themselves, by the Laws of Virtue and Prudence. Such were their Ethics; and their Tempers, and Practices were suitable.  
For though they were men of raised understandings, and great learning; Yet were they not, in the least, haughty, or conceited; but their behaviour was generally most sweet, and obliging: They cared for no man's wit, that wanted goodness; and despised no man's weakness, that had it: They hated the humour of those learned men, who were stately, and imposing; and disliked nothing more than Ill-nature: whatever their own was by Birth and Temper, their care was to make it sweet, by Discipline and Usage; and so, exercised their Moral Pinciples, and Rules upon themselves: They were no admirers of Popularity, but pitied those that were at pains for Air and noise: They followed a sober, virtuous course, without flaunting shows, and pretensions; and lived in an innocent, even cheerfulness, without rapture, on the one hand, or dejection, on the other: They were free in their Conversations, and not superstitiously scrupulous about things that are harmless and indifferent. But, said the Governor; I consider, I need not insist thus on the description of their Moral Temper of Spirit; It may be collected in these, and many other particulars, from what hath been said before: And therefore I now pass immediately to their  
METAPHYSICS, About which, I must first tell you, That they had no opinion of those of the Peripatetic Schools, which consisted of Logical niceties, and empty notions, that sophisticated men's reasons, and inclined them to hover in abstracted generals, and to rest in mere Terms of Art; to the neglect of the more material ratiotinations: Such Metaphysics were in use at that time in the Universities of Bensalem; and therefore out of respect to the Statutes of those Seats of Learning, They did not professedly endeavour to expose those studies: No, They were against rude and violent Innovations; But yet as they had opportunity, they prudently advised such Youth as they knew, to take care that they did not dwell on those Airy Notions; or reckon of them, as any part of that standing Knowledge, which they were to use, through the course of their future lives: They allowed them for exercise, but cautioned against the reception of them, as Principles of Truth, and Science.  
Here I asked, whether Those men were against all Metaphysics? or what sort they allowed? He made answer; That They were not against all. But that  
1. Some of them counted, The explication of General Terms, and notions of things to appertain to Metaphysics; and this they reckoned to be most necessary, and useful for the avoiding confusions, and mistakes in reasoning: So that they never entered into any Controversy, or Enquiry, without stripping the words, and notions, they were to treat of, from all fantastry, and borrowed senses, and fixing them in their natural, and genuine acception: Knowing, that most disputes and errors in reasoning arise from mistakes of simple Terms.  
2. But than others of Them, who as highly esteemed of this course, judged it to belong to Logic, and that it was not to be brought under this science, the only object of which, They made the Spiritual, and Immaterial World: And in this sort of Metaphysics, the Science of Spirits, they were not all of one Opinion; For some were for the Doctrine of Plato, making Sprita, extended, penetrable, indiscerpible, self-motive substances: Whereas others thought with Descartes, that extension, motion, and the like Attributes, belonged only to Bodies, and had nothing to do with Spirits, which could be defined by nothing, but Thinking, and the Modes of it. But this difference in Opinion produced no rudeness, or heats of opposition, only it gave exercise some times, to their wits, in their private Philosophical entertainments.  
As for the Doctrine of the common Schools of Tota in Toto— Both sides esteemed it contradictious, and vain: And knew, that this was one great occasion of the Sadducism, and disbelief of Spiritual Being's, which was so much the Mode of that age.  
I said, That I had heard something of both these Doctrines; And that each of them seemed to me, to contain opinions that were very strange; adding, that I desired to know, whether those Gentlemen entertained the conceits, that the old Platonists, and our Cartesians did, in their Hypotheses? He asked me what notions I meant; I answered, That the Platonists held, There was an Anima Mundi; and the Praeexistence of particular Souls, things seemingly very uncouth, and absurd. And the Cartesians, on the other side, taught, That all things were Mechanical, but Humane thoughts, and operations; and that the Beasts were but mere Automata, and insensible machines; which, said I; seem very odd, and ridiculous fancies.  
As to these Opinions replied he, They had different thoughts, as other Philosophers have; Some of them supposing that the Platonical Opinions are very fit to be admitted, to give assistance to the Mechanical Principles; which they think very defective of themselves. And Others judging, That the Cartesian Hypotheses are probable, and Mechanism sufficient to account for the Phoenomena; and that there is no need of introducing so hopeless, and obscure a Principle, as the Soul of the World.  
In the Matters, and Mysteries of Providence, They also take several ways of Opinion: But then, the dissenters to either judgement, do not condemn the opposite, as ridiculous, and absurd: Knowing, That there is a great appearance of truth in the contrary Doctrine; and no certainty in that, which they approve most.  
As to the Opinion of Praeexistence of souls: It hath said He, been the Doctrine of many of the wisest men of eldest times, both Gentiles, Jews, and Christians, and the almost general belief of the old Eastern World: It contains no opposition to any Article of Faith, and some believe, It will give a very plausible, and fair solution of the main, and most difficult things in Providence: On which accounts it should not, I think, be rashly, condemned as absurd; but may very well deserve to be heard, and is very worthy to be examined: Though, added He, I affirm nothing positively of it; And I suppose many of the persons I describe, were disposed to like thoughts with these, in reference to that Hypothesis.  
I prayed him to acquaint me with their Opinion of the MATHEMATICS? He Answered, That They were great valuers of those Sciences; which they accounted excellent preparatives, and helps to all sorts of Knowledge, and very serviceable particularly in this, That they used the mind to a close way of reasoning, and were a good Antidote against the confused, and wand'ring humour of Disputers: For which reason, Some of them thought, it would be very well, If they were used as the first Institutions of the Academic Youth; judging, that these Sciences would exercise the wit, as much, as the usual Logicks, at least; and beget a much better habit in the mind, than those contentious studies.  
Besides This, said He, I cannot at present think of any thing more, considerable, concerning their inclinations, in mere Humane Knowledge: But as to their way of Learning, as Divines, something may be added,  
And with Relation to this I may say,  
1. That they are not much taken with the Schoolmen, but rather think, That those subtle, and Angelical Doctors have done Religion no small disservice, by the numerous disputes, niceties, and distinctions they have raised, about things, otherwise plain enough: By which, The natural, and genuine conceptions of men's minds are perverted, and the clear light of Reason, and Truth intercepted, and obscured: And they judged, There was less cause in the latter ages to reckon of School-Divinity, since the Peripatetic Philosophy, on which it was grounded, grew every where into discredit: So that they thought it not safe, to have Religion concerned, in that, which did not truly help it; and which was not now able to help itself.  
2. They did not admire many of the Commentators, and Expositors of the Scripture: For though they praised those Industrious Men for their Zeal, and Devotion to the holy Writings: Yet they did not think much due to divers of their performances. For a considering Man could not but observe, how they kept voluminous stir about the plain Places, which they never left, till they had made Obscure; while they let the difficult ones pass without notice. Besides which, the manifold Impertinencies, Fancies, Disputes, Contradictions to one another, and the Scriptures, which were observable among those Writers, rendered divers of them of mean account in the Judgement of those Men. However they had a just esteem of many of the Critical Interpreters, and particularly of those famous Lights of your end the World, well known to us also, Grotius, and Hammondus, whose learned works and expositions they beheld with great respect, and veneration.  
(3.) As for the ANCIENT FATHERS; They valued those greatly of the first 300, yea 500 years, who lived before Christianity was so much mingled with Opinions, and corrupted by disputes; and the various devices of Men: Their works they reverenced, because there was much holiness, in those venerable persons, and much simplicity in their writings, and among others, there are two particular reasons, why they had those sages in so much esteem.  
(1.) Because the Controversies they handle, are mostly such, as Concern the main things of Religion, in opposition to the Jews, Heathens, and some gross Heretics, who undermined the Foundations of Faith, and Life: These were undertake worthy the zeal, and pains of those holy Ancients; who did not multiply unnecessary quarrels, and occasions of dispute; or make speculative opinions Articles of Faith, and fundamentals of Religion, and presently denounce thick anathemas against all, that differed from them in lesser matters; But they stuck firmly to the few, plain things, and placed their Religion principally in a holy Life, and lived in Charity, and Love, and frequent communion: Those days, and those Men the Antifanites celebrated much, and prayed, and endeavoured for the Restauration of Christianity to that Primitive Temper:  
(2.) They reverenced those Fathers, because living nearer the times of the Apostles, they had more advantages to know their Doctrines, and Government, and Usages, than the ages at a greater remove have: on which Accounts, They attend more to their practices and opinions, then to those of succeeding times, when pride, ambition, covetousness, and disputes had lead Men aside into the various ways of fancy, and faction: These than they accounted excellent witnesses of Christianity, and our best Interpreters of its Dectrines, and Constitutions; though they did not make them Judges in affairs of Faith, and Religion, or reckon all to be infallible, that they did, or said. Thus were they disposed towards the first Fathers.  
For Those of the following ages They esteemed their piety, and zeal; and praised God for the good they did in their Generations; and gave all due acknowledgements to their pious endeavours; and were ready to embrace their instructions in the ways of Godliness, and Virtue; and willing to receive the evidence of any truth from them: But They did not equal them in their estimation with the Elder Fathers, nor superstitiously dote on all their sayings; nor take them for the best Guides in all the Doctrines of Religion.  
For those Fathers lived in the disputing ages, when pride, and interest and prevailing faction had espoused opinions, as essentials of Faith, and made Men quarrel, and divide, and break the peace of the Church, of the World, for Trifles; They much differed from one another; and some of them, at times, from themselves; and many of them, in some things, from Scripture, and Reason, and more primitive Antiquity: They disputed often with much eagerness; and were very angry with each other about things of no great moment; and vented unseemly passions, and were too often very impatient of Contradiction, and different judgement. They, some of them spoke hastily, and determined too soon in a heat, against one kind of opposites; and then, forgot at another time, and affirmed the quite contrary, against an other sort of Adversaries: They made too much of their opinions, and were many times too severe to harmless dissenters. These, and divers more such, were the weaknesses of many, of those Reverend Men: which I do not mention, said He, to detract from their worth in other things, or to lessen their just honour and valuation: but to show you some of the things, which, 'tis like, were the reasons, why those Divines did not esteem of the latter, as they did of the most ancient Fathers.  
These, and such like, I say, I judge might be the reasons: But They themselves were very cautious in saying any thing that might look like detractions, or disesteem of those venerable Persons: They contented themselves to omit poring on such of them, as They thought there might be less cause to admire, or less need to study; without discovering their nakedness, and imperfections; or discouraging others from following their inclinations to converse with them. Yea, they neglected not to read them themselves, as they had time, and occasion: But then, they read them not with design to gather fine sentences to adorn their discourses, nor to gain Authorities in speculative matters, to confirm their opinions: But to improve their reasons, to get direction from their pio●…s councils, and to inform themselves of the Genius, Principles, and Customs of the Times, in which they successively lived: That they might not be imposed on by the pretenders to Antiquity, who endeavoured to gain pretence to their Innovations, by pretence of ancient 〈◊〉: And this is enough of their Inclinations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
I have now, said: He, 〈◊〉 a word to speak m●…, under this Head, and that shall be briefly;  
(4.) About their opinion of the Rabinical Learning: Among the Authors of this sort, divers of them were very conversant: not out of any great esteem of the Men, or their Learning; but from a desire to acquaint themselves by Them, with the Doctrines, Terms of speech, and Customs of the Jews, in order to their better understanding of the Scriptures, and the defence of Christianity, against those enemies of the Cross. On these accounts, they 〈…〉 Writers, notwithstanding the 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉, with which their Books were loaded, to be very useful for a Divine, and like to be of more behoof to him, than all the tedious volumes of the Schoolmen: And some thought, it would not be amiss, if the Rabbins succeeded in those places, which those other Doctors, were leaving vacant.  
And now, said He, I have also given you a Taste of the Genius, and Humour of those Divines in some chief parts of Learning: And though I have mentioned only some particular sorts, yet I do not thereby exclude them from their share in the Languages, History, and other kinds of knowledge; which I have omitted in this account, only, because their sense of them, for the most part, was common with the judgement, and opinion of other learned Men.  
I have represented to you their Genius and endeavours, not with design (as I intimated before) to exalt, and magnify them above the other Divines of Bensalem, but to show how the Providence of God overruled those evil times, in which those Men were bred, and to raise a good and generous Spirit amid the extravagances of an unhappy age: and I have thus particularly described their Principles, and Practices, not to exclude other worthy, and Reverend Men (with which, thanks be to God, this Church abounds) from the share of acknowments that are due to their pious, and excellent Labours, but because those Persons are better known to me, than any others of our Clergy.  
At this Period of his discourse, a Servant came in, and with low reverence, acquainted the Governor that some Persons of quality were come to speak with him. Upon which, he rising up, told me, He was sorry for this interruption, but hoped ere long, to have the freedom of another opportunity of Conversing with me.  
FINIS.    

Books Published by Mr. Joseph Glanvill.  
THe Way of Happiness represented in its Difficulties, and Encouragements; and freed from many popular, and dangerous mistakes.  
Catholic Charity, recommended in a Sermon before the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of London.  
A Fast Sermon on the King's Martyrdom.  
Lux Orientalis, being a modest Philosophical Enquiry into the Doctrine of Pra-existence.  
A Prefatory Answer to Mr. Henry Stubbs.  
A Further Account of Mr. Stubbs.  
A Letter concerning Aristotle.  
An Apology for some of the Clergy who suffer under false, and scandalous Reports, on the occasion of the Rehearsal Transprised.  
An Earnest Invitation to the Sacrament of the Lords Supper.  
Seasonable Reflections and Discourses, in order to the cure of the Scoffing and Infidelity of a degenerate Age.  
ESSAYS, Philosophical, and Theological.   

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A Rational Account of the Grounds of Protestant Religion; being a Vindication of the Lord-Arch-Bishop of Canterbury's Relation of a Conference, etc. from the pretended Answer of T. C. folio.  
Sermons preached upon several occasions, with a Discourse annexed concerning the true Reasons of the Suffering of Christ, wherein Crellius' Answer to Grotius is considered. fol.  
Irenicum: A Weapon-Slave for the Church's wounds: In quarto.  
Origines Sacra; or a Rational Account of the Grounds of Christian Faith, as to the Truth and Divine Authority of the Scriptures, and the matters therein contained, quarto.  
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An Answer to several late Treatises occasioned by a Book entitled, A Discourse concerning the Idolatry practised in the Church of Rome, and the hazard of Salvation in the communion of it, the first Part, Octavo.  
A second Discourse in vindication of the Protestant Grounds of Faith, against the pretence of Infallibility in the Roman Church, in Answer to the Guide in Controversy, by R. H. Protestancy without Principles, and Reason and Religion; or the certain Rule of Faith, by E. W. with a particular enquiry into the Miracles of the Roman Church, Octavo.  
An Answer to Mr. Cresy's Epistle Apologetical to a Person of Honour, touching his Vindication of Dr. Stillingfleet, Octavo. All written by Edw. Stillingfleet, D. D. Chaplain in Ordinary to his Majesty.  
The Rule of Faith, or an Answer to the Treatise of Mr. J. S. entitled Sure-Footing, etc. by John Ti●…lotson, D. D. Preacher to the Honourable Society of Lincolns-Inn. To which is adjoined a Reply to Mr. J. S. his third Appendix, etc. by Edw. Stillingfleet, D. D. Chaplain in Ordinary to his Majesty.  
Knowledge and Practice: Or a plain Discourse of the chief things necessary to be known, believed and practised in order to Salvation: By. S. Cradock, Quarto; a Book very useful for Families.  
The Remains of Sir Walter Raleigh, in Twelves.  
A Discourse of War and Peace, by Sir Robert Cotton, in Octavo.  
The Moral Philosophy of the Stoics, in Octavo.  
Hodders Arithmetic, Twelve.  
The Triumphs of Rome over despised Protestancy, Octavo.  
The Original of Romances, Octavo.  
The Advice of Charles the Fifth, Emperor of Germany and King of Spain, to his Son Philip the Second, upon resignation of his Crown to his said Son, Twelve.  
Observations upon Military and Political affairs, by the Right Honourable George Duke of Albemarle, Folio, Published by Authority.  
A Father's Testament: by Phineahs' Fletcher, in Octavo.  
A Sermon preached before the King, January 30. 1675. by Greoge S●…radling, D. D. Dean of Chichester, and one of his Majesty's Chaplains in Ordinary.  
A Sermon preached before the King, May 9 1675. by John Sadb●…ry, D. D. Dean of Durham, and Chaplain in Ordinary to his Majesty.  
The Reformation Justified, in a Sermon preached at Guild Hall Chappel, September 21. 1673. before the Lord Mayor and Aldermen, etc. upon Acts 24. 14.  
A Sermon preached November 5. 1673. at St. Margaret's Westminister, upon St. Matthew, 7. 15, 16.  
A Sermon preached before the King, February 24. 1675. upon Heb. 3. 13, These three last by Edw. St●…, D. D. Chaplain in Ordinary to his Majesty.   

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DUPORT in Psalmos 4. Greek, and Latin.  
Cantabrigiae. 4. 

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Beveridge Grammatica Orientalis. 8.  
Gore Nomenclator Geograph. 8.  
Seldeni Eutichyus. 4. Arab. Lat.  
Ailsbury de Decreto Dei. 4.  
Dionysius de Situ Orbis. 8. Grace.  
Comenii Janua. 8. Lat. cum Figu.  
Confessio Fide●…. 8.  
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Ignoramus. 12.  
Vossii Elementa Rhetorica. 8.  
Elegantiae Poeticae. 12.  
Exaletation of Ale. 8.  
Comenii Vestibulum. 8. Lat. Eng.  
Pasoris Lexicon. 8. Gr. Lat.  
Quintiliani Orationes. 8.  
Glanvil on the Sacrament. 12.  
Burroughs Remedy against Grief. 12. bound together.  
Directions about Death 12. bound together.  
Emperor Augustus' speeches to the Married and Unmarried.  
Dr. Meggots Sermon before St. Paul's Scholars on St. Paul's day, 1675.  
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Praeces scholae Paulinae. 8. Lat. Eng.  
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