OF liberty AND necessity A TREATISE, Wherein all controversy concerning Predestination, Election, freewill, Grace, Merits, Reprobation, &c. is fully decided and cleared, in answer to a Treatise written by the Bishop of London-derry, on the same subject.  
By Thomas Hobs.  
Dedicated to the Lord Marquess of Newcastle.  
LONDON, Printed by W. B. for F. Eaglesfield at the Marygold in S. Paul's churchyard. 1654.   

To the Sober and Discreet Reader.  
IT made S. Chrysostom tremble when ever he reflected on the proportion, which those that went the narrow way, bore to those which marched in the broad, how many were the Called, & how few the Chosen, how many they were that were created for and in a capacity of eternal beatitude, and how few attained it. This consideration certainly would make a man look upon the holy Scriptures, among Christians, as the greatest indulgence of heaven, being all the directions it hath been pleased to afford poor man in so difficult a journey as that of his eternal bliss or misery. But when a man cometh to look into those transcendent writings, he finds them to be the works of a sort of innocent harmless men, that had little acquaintance or familiarity with the world, and consequently not much interessed in the troubles and quarrels of several Countries; That though they are all but necessary, yet were they written occasionally, rather than out of design; and lastly, that their main business is, to abstract man from this world, and to persuade him to prefer the bare hope of what he can neither see, hear, nor conceive, before all the present enjoyments this world can afford. This begat a reverence and esteem to them in all those who endeavour to work out their salvation o● of them. But if a man, not weighin● them in themselves, shall consider the practices of those, who pretend to be the interpreters of them, & to make them fit meat for the people, how that instead of renouncing the world, they endeavour to raise themselves into the greatest promotions, leisure, and luxury; that they make them the decoys of the people, to carry on designs and intriques of State, and study the enjoyments of this world more than any other people, he will find some grounds to conclude, the practices of such men to be the greatest disturbance, burden, and vexation of the Christian part of the world. The complaint is as true as sad; Instead of acquainting the credulous vulgar, with the main end of their functions, and the great business of their embassy, what a great measure of felicity is prepared for them, and how easily it may be forfeited? they involve their consciences in the briars of a thousand needless scruples, they spin out volumes out of half sentences, nay, out of points and accents, and raise endless Controversies about things (were men free from passion▪ & prejudice) in themselves clear enough, and when they have canvased their questions, till they are weary themselves, and have wearied hearers, and readers, and all they have to do with, every one sits down under his own vine, and hugs his own apprehensions, so that after all their pains, bandings, and implacable adhesion to parties, the inconvenience remains still, and we as far from any solid conviction, as at first setting out.  
The Controversies betwixt Rome and the Reformation, are long since beaten out of the pit, by other combatants of their own brood, so that if we speak of Protestant and Catholic, they are in a manner content to sit down with their present acquests; for as to conviction he certainly is a rare Prosolite, at whose conversion, interest, humour, discontent, inclination, are not admitted to the debate.  
But to come yet nearer our purpose, Let us consider our own fractions, of fractions of Religion here in England, where if that saying, That, It is better to live where nothing is lawful, than where all things, be as true in Religion as policy, posterity may haply feel the sad consequence of it. What I pray is the effect of so many sermons, teachings, preachings, exercises, and exercising of gifts, meetings, disputations, conferences, conventicles, Printed books, written with so much distraction and presumption upon God almighty, and abuse of his holy Word? Marry this, It is the seminary of a many vexatious, endless and fruitless controversies, the consequence whereof, are jealousies, heartburnings, exasperation of parties, the introduction of factions, and National quarrels into matters of Religion, and consequently all the calamities of war and devastation. Besides, they are good lawful diversions for the duller sort of Citizens, who contract diseases for want of motion; They supply the building of Pyramids among the Egyptians, by diverting the thoughts of the people from matters of State, and consequently from Rebellion.  
They find work for Printers, &c. if the parties interessed are troubled with the itch of popularity, and will suffer themselves to be scratched out of somewhat by way of Contribution to the Impression. Hence are the Stationer's shop furnished, and thence the Minister's study in the country, who, having found out the humour of his auditory, consults with his Stationer, on what Books his money is best bestowed, who very gravely, it may be, will commend coal upon the Philippians before the excellent (but borrowed) caryl upon Job. But as to any matter of conviction, we see every one acquiesces in his own sentiments, every one hears the Teacher who is most to his humour, and when he hath been at Church, and pretends to have sat at his feet, comes home & censures him as he pleases.  
To be yet a little more particular, what shall we think of those vast and involuble volumes concerning Predestination, freewill, freegrace, Election, Reprobation, &c. which fill, not only our Libraries, but the world with their noise and disturbance, whereof the least thing we are to expect is conviction; every side endeavouring to make good their own grounds, and keep the cudgels in their hands as long as they can? What Stir is there between the Molinists and Jansenists about Grace and Merits, and yet both pretend S. Augustin?  
Must we not expect, that the Jesuits will, were it for no other end but to vindicate that reputation of Learning they have obtained in the world, endeavour to make good their Tenets, though the other were the truer opinion? Is Truth then retired to that inaccessible rock that admits no reproaches? or are we all turned Ixion's, and instead of enjoying that Juno, entertain ourselves with the clouds of our own persuasions, of which unnatural coition, what other issue can there be but Centaurs and monstrous opinions? To these questions I shall not presume to answer, but in the words of this great Author, who answering the charge of impiety, laid upon the holding of necessity, says thus; If we consider the greatest part of Mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is, as men, whom either the study of acquiring wealth and preferment, or whom the appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong Principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth of things, I must confess, &c.  
Certainly we have some reason to expect an effectual cure from this man, since he hath so fortunately found out the disease. Now if he in so few sheets hath performed more than all the voluminous works of the Priests & Ministers, and that in points of soul-concernment and Christian interest, as Predestination, freewill, Grace, Merits, Election, Reprobation, necessity, and liberty of actions, and others, the main hinges of human Salvation, and to do this, being a person, whom not only the averseness of his nature to engage himself in matters of controversy of this kind, but his severer study of the mathematics, might justly exempt from any such skirmishes; We may not stick to infer, that the Black-Coats, generally taken, are a sort of ignorant Tinkers, who in matters of their own profession, such as is the mending and soldering of men's consciences, have made more holes than they sound; nay, what makes them more impardonable, they have neither the gratitude nor ingenuity to acknowledge this repairer of their breaches, and assertor of their reputation, who hath now effected what they all this while have been tampering about. I know this Author is little beholding to the Ministers, & they make a great part of the Nation, and besides them, I know there are a many illiterate, obstinate, and inconvincible spirits, yet I dare advance this proposition, how bold soever it may seem to some; That this Book, how little and contemptible soever it may seem, contains more evidence and conviction in the matters it treats of, than all the volumes, nay Libraries, which the Priests, Jesuits, and Ministers have, to our great charge, distraction, and loss of precious time, furnished us with. Which if so, I shall undertake for any rational man, That all the controversial labours concerning Religion in the world, all the Polemical Treatises of the most ancient or modern, shall never breed any maggots of scruples, or dissatisfactions in his brains, nor shall his eyes or head ever ache with turning them over, but he shall be so resolved in mind, as never to importune God Almighty with impertinent addresses, nor ever become any of those Enthusiastical spiritati, who as the most Learned M. White says, expound Scripture without sense or reason, (and are not to be disputed with, but with the same success▪ as men write on sand) and trouble their neighbours with their dreams, revelations, and spiritual whimsies. No; here is solid conviction, at least, so far as the Metaphysical Mysteries of our Religion will admit. If God be omnipotent, he is irresistible; if so, just in all his actions, though we (who have as much capacity to measure the justice of God's actions as a man born blind to judge of colours) haply may not discern it. What then need any man trouble his head whether he be Predestinated or no? Let him live justly and honestly according to the Religion of his country, and refer himself to God for the rest, since he is the Potter, and may do what he please with the vessel. But I leave the Reader to find his satisfaction in the Treatise itself, since it may be I derogate from it by saying so much before it. This Book, I doubt not will find no worse entertainment than the Leviathan, both in regard of its bulk, and that it doth not strike so home at the Ministers and Catholic party as that did. And yet here we must complain of want of sufficiency or ingenuity, to acknowledge the truths, or confute the errors of that book, which till it is done, we shall not count the Author an heretic. On this side the sea, besides the dirt and slander cast on him in Sermons & private meetings, none hath put any thing in Print against him, but Mr. Rosse, one who may be said to have had so much Learning as to have been perpetually barking at the works of the most learned. How he hath been received beyond Seas I know not, but certainly, not without the regret of the Catholics, who building their Church on other foundations than those of the Scriptures, and pretending infallibility, certitude, and unity in Religion, cannot but be discontented that these Prerogatives of Religion are taken away, not only from Tradition, that is to say, from the Church, but also from the Scriptures, and are invested in the supreme power of the Nation, be it of what persuasion it will.  
Thus much, Reader, I have thought fit to acquaint thee with, that thou mightest know what a jewel thou hast in thy hands, which thou must accordingly value, not by the bulk, but the preciousness. Thou hast here in a few sheets what might prove work enough for many thousand sermons and exercises; and more than the Catachisms and Confessions of a thousand Assemblies could furnish thee with; Thou hast what will cast an eternal blemish on all the cornered caps of the Priests and Jesuits, and all the black & white caps of the Ministers; to be short, Thou art now acquainted with that Man, who, in matters of so great importance as those of thy salvation, furnishes thee with better instructions, than any thou hast ever yet been acquainted with, what profession, persuasion, opinion, or Church soever thou art of; of whom and his works make the best use thou canst, &c. Farewell.   

RIGHT HONOURABLE  
I Had once resolved to answer my Lord Bishops Objections to my Book De CIVE in the first place as that which concerns me most, and afterwards to examine his discourse of LIBERTY and NECSSITY, which (because I had never uttered my opinion of it) concerned me the less. But seeing it was your Lordships and my Lord Bishops desire that I should begin with the latter, I was contented so to do, and here I present and submit it to your lordship's judgement.  
And first I assure your Lordship I find in it no new argument neither from Scripture nor from Reason, that I have not often heard before, which is as much as to say, I am not surprised.  
The preface is a handsome one, but it appeareth even in that, that he hath mistaken the question. For whereas he says thus, If I be free to write this discourse, I have obtained the Cause, I deny that to be true, for 'tis enough to his freedom of writing, that he had not written it unless he would himself. If he will obtain the cause, he must prove that before he writ it, it was not necessary he should 〈◊〉 it afterward. It may be his Lordship thinks it all one to say; I was free to write it, and It was not necessary I should write it, but I think otherwise; for he is free to do a thing that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear, if he have the will to forbear. And yet if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to do it, the action is necessarily to follow; and if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The Question therefore is not whether a man be a free Agent, that is to say, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent according to his will, but whether the will to write and the will to forbear come upon him according to his will, or according to any thing else in his own power. I acknowledge this Liberty that I can do if I will, but to say, I can will if I wilt. I take to be an absurd speech, wherefore I cannot grant my Lord the cause upon his preface.  
In the next place he maketh certain distinctions of liberty, and says he meaneth not liberty from sin, nor from servitude, nor from violence, but from necessity Necessitation, inevitability, and determination to one.  
It had been better to define Liberty than thus to distinguish, for I understand never the more what he means by liberty, and though he say he means liberty from necessitation, yet I understand not how such a liberty can be, and 'tis a taking of the Question without proof, for what is else the Question between us, but whether such a Liberty be possible or not?  
There are in the same place other distinctions, as a Liberty of Exercise only (which he calls a liberty of contradiction, namely of doing not good or evil simply, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil respestively) and a liberty of specification and exercise also (which he calls a Liberty of contrariety) namely a Liberty not only to do good or evil, but also to do or not do this or that good or evil.  
And with these Distinctions his Lordship says he clears the coast, whereas in truth, he darkneth his own meaning and the Question, not only with the jargon of exercise only, specification also, contradiction, contrariety, but also with pretending distinction where none is; For how is it possible that the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, can consist (as he says it does in God and good Angels) without a Liberty of doing or not doing good or evil?  
The next thing his Lordship does, after clearing of the coast, is the dividing of his forces (as he calls them) into two squadrons, one of places of Scriptures, the other of Reasons, which allegory he useth I suppose, because he addresseth the discourse to your Lordship, who is military man, All that I have to say touching this is, that I observe a great part of those his forces do look and march another way, and some of them fight amongst themselves.  
And the first place of Scripture taken from Numb. 30.14. Is one of those that look another way; the words are. If a wife make a vow it is left to her husband's choice either to establish it or make it void. For it proves no more but that the husband is a free and voluntary Agent, but not that his choice therein is not necessitated or not determined to what he shall choose, by precedent necessary causes.  
For if there come into the husband's mind greater good by establishing then abrogating such a vow, the establishing will follow necessarily, and if the evil that will follow in the husband's opinion outweigh the good, the contrary must needs follow, and yet in this following of one's hopes and fears consisteth the nature of Election. So that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose this, and consequently choosing and necessity are joined together.  
The second place of Scripture is Joshua 24.15. The third is 2 Sam. 24.12. whereby 'tis clearly proved, that there is election in man, but not proved, that such election was not necessitated by the hopes, and fears, and considerations of good and bad to follow, which depend not on the will, nor are subject to election. And therefore one answer serves all such places, if there were a thousand.  
But his Lordship supposing, it seems, I might answer as I have done, that necessity and election might stand together, and instance in the actions of children, fools, or bruit beasts, whose fancies, I might say, are necessitated and determined to one; before these his proofs out of Scripture desires to prevent that instance, and therefore says that the actions of children, fools, mad men, and beasts, are indeed determined, but that they proceed not from election, nor from free, but from Spontaneous Agents. As for example that the Bee, when it maketh honey, does it Spontaneously, and when the Spider makes his web, he does it Spontaneously but not by election.  
Though I never meant to ground my Answer upon the experience of what Children, Fools, Mad men, and Beasts do, yet that your Lordship may understand what can be meant by Spontaneous, and how it differeth from voluntary, I will answer that distinction, and show that it fighteth against its fellow Arguments.  
Your Lordship therefore is to consider, that all voluntary actions, where the thing that induceth the will is not fear, are called also spontaneous, and said to be done by a man's own accord. As when a man giveth money voluntarily to another for Merchandise or out of affection, he is said to do it of his own accord, which in Latin is sponte, and therefore the action is spontaneous (though to give one's money willingly to a thief to a void killing, or throw it into the Sea to avoid drowning, where the motive is fear, be not called spontaneous.) But every spontaneous action is not therefore voluntary, for voluntary presupposes some precedent deliberation, that is to say, some consideration and meditation, of what is likely to follow, both upon the doing and abstaining from the action deliberated of; whereas many actions are done of our own accord, and are therefore spontaneous, for which nevertheless, as my Lord thinks, we never consulted nor deliberated in ourselves. As when making no question nor any the least doubt in the world, but the thing we are about is good, we eat and walk, or in anger strike or revile, which my Lord thinks spontaneous, but not voluntary nor elective actions, and with such kind of actions he says necessitation may stand, but not with such as are voluntary and proceed upon election and deliberation. Now if I make it appear to your Lordship, that those actions, which he says, proceed from spontanity, and which he ascribes to Children, Fools, Madmen and Beasts, proceed from election and deliberation, and that actions inconsiderate, rash, and spontaneous are ordinarily found in those, that are by themselves and many more thought as wise, or wiser than ordinarily men are, than my Lord Bishops Argument concludeth, that necessity and election may stand together, which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his Arguments to prove.  
And first your Lordships own experience furnishes you with proof enough, that Horses, dogs, and other Bruit Beasts, do demur oftentimes upon the way they are to take, the Horse retiring from some strange figure that he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And what else doth a man that deliberateth, but one while proceed toward action, another while retire from it, as the hope of greater good draws him, or the fear of greater evil drives him away.  
A Child may be so young as to do what it does without all deliberation, but that is but till it have the chance to be hurt by doing of somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the rod, for the actions, wherein he hath once had a check, shall be deliberated on the second time.  
Fools and Madmen manifestly deliberate no less than the wisest men, though they make not so good a choice, the images of things being by disease altered.  
For Bees and Spiders, if my Lord Bishop had had so little to do as to be a spectator of their actions, he would have confessed not only election but art, prudence and policy in them, very near equal to that of mankind. Of Bees, Aristotle says, their life is Civil.  
Again, his Lordship is deceived if he think any spontaneous action after once being checked in it, differs from an action voluntary and elective, for even the setting of a man's foot, in the posture for walking, and the action of ordinary eating was once deliberated of how and when it should be done, and though afterward it became easy & habitual so as to be done without forethought, yet that does not hinder but that the act is voluntary and proceedeth from election. So also are the rashest actions of choleric persons voluntary and upon deliberation, for who is there but very young children, that hath not considered when and how far he ought, or safely may strike or revile? Seeing then his Lordship agrees with me that such actions are necessitated, and the fancy of those that do them determined to the action they do, it follows, out of his Lordships own doctrine, that the liberty of election does not take away the necessity of electing this or that individual thing. And thus one of his Arguments fights against another.  
The 2 Argument from Scripture consisteth in histories of men that did one thing, when if they would, they might have done another, the places are two. One is 1 Kings 3.11. where the history says, God was pleased that Solomon, who might if he would, have asked Riches, or Revenge, did nevertheless ask wisdom at God's hands; the other is the words of S. Peter to Ananias, Acts 5.4. After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?  
To which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former places, that they prove there is election, but do not disprove the necessity, which I maintain of what they so elect.  
The fourth Argument (for to the 3 and fifth I shall make but one answer) is to this effect. If the decree of God, or his foreknowledge, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of causes, or the last dictate of the understanding, or whatsoever it be, do take away true liberty, than Adam before his fall had no true liberty. Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odi.  
That which I say necessitateth and determinateth every action, (that his Lordship may no longer doubt of my meaning) is the sum of all things, which being now existent, conduce and concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the effect could not be produced. This concourse of causes, whereof every one is determined be such as it is by a like concourse of former causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the Decree of God.  
But that the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of any thing, cannot be truly said, seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge depends on the existence of the things known and not they on it.  
The influence of the stars is but a small part of the whole cause, consisting of the concourse of all Agents.  
Nor does the concourse of all causes make one simple chain or concatination, but an innumerable number of chains, joined together, not in all parts, but in the first link God Almighty, and consequently the whole cause of an event, doth not always depend on one single chain, but on many together.  
Natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary Agents and necessitates the will, and consequently the action; but for moral efficacy, I understand not what he means.  
The last dictate of the judgement, concerning the good or bad that may follow on any action, is not properly the whole cause, but the last part of it, and yet may be said to Produce the effect necessarily, in such manner as the last feather may be said to break a horses back, when there were so many laid on before as there wanted but that one to do it.  
Now for his Argument that if the concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect, that then it follows, Adam had no true liberty, I deny the consequence, for I make not only the effect, but also the election of that particular effect necessary, in as much as the will itself, & each propension of a man during his deliberation, is as much necessitated, and depends on a sufficient cause as any thing else whatsoever. As for example, it is no more necessary that fire should burn than that a man or other creature, whose limbs be moved by fancy, should have election, that is liberty, to do what he hath a fancy to do, though it be not in his will or power to choose his fancy, or choose his election and will.  
This doctrine, because my Lord Bishop says he hates, I doubt had better been suppressed, as it should have been, if both your Lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer.  
The Arguments of greatest consequence, are the third and the fifth, and they fall both into one, namely; If there be a necessity of all events, that it will follow, That praise and reprehension, and reward and punishment are all vain and unjust, and that if God should openly forbid, and secretly necessitate the same action, punishing men for what they could not avoid, there would be no belief among them of Heaven and Hell.  
To oppose hereunto I must borrow an answer from S. Paul, Rom. 9.11. From the 11 verse of the Chapter to the 18 is laid down the very same objection in these words. When they (meaning Esau and Jacob) were yet unborn, and had done neither good nor evil, that the purpose of God according to election, not by works, but by him that calleth, might remain firm, it was said unto her (viz Rebecca) that the elder should serve the younger, &c. What then shall we say? Is there injustice with God? God forbid. It is not therefore in him that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God that showeth mercy. For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh, I have stirred thee up that I might show my power in thee, and that my name might be set forth in all the earth. Therefore whom God willeth he hath mercy on, and whom he willeth he hardeneth. Thus you see the case put by S. Paul, is the same with that of my Lord Bishop, and the same objection in these words following.  
Thou wilt ask me then, why does God yet complain, for who hath resisted his will?  
To this therefore the Apostle answers, not by denying it was God's will, or that the decree of God concerning Esau was not before he had sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to do what he did; but thus; Who art thou O man that interrogatest God? shall the work say to the workman, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay, of the same stuff to make one vessel to honour another to dishonour? According therefore to this answer of S. Paul I answer my Lord's Ojection, and say, the power of God alone without other helps is sufficient justification of any action he doth. That which men make amongst themselves here by pacts and covenants, and call by the name of justice, and according whereunto men are accounted and termed rightly just or unjust, is not that by which God almighty's actions are to be measured or called just, no more than his counsels are to be measured by human wisdom. That which he does is made just by his doing it, just I say in him, though not always just in us.  
For a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if▪ he punish him that he so commandeth for not doing it, it is unjust. So also, his counsels are therefore not in vain, because they be his, whether we see the use of them or not. When God afflicted Job, he did object no sin unto him, justified his afflicting of him by telling him of his power. Hast thou, saith God, an arm like mine? Where wert thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? and the like. So our Saviour, concerning the man that was born blind, said it was not for his sin, or for his parent's sin, but that the power of God might be shown in him. Beasts are subject to death and torments, yet they cannot sin, it was God's will they should be so. Power irresistible justifies all actions, really and properly, in whomsoever it be found, less power does not, and because such power is in God only, he must needs be just in all his actions, and we, that not comprehending his Counsels call him to the bar, commit injustice in it.  
I am not ignorant of the usual reply to this answer, by distinguishing between will and permission, as that God Almighty does indeed sometimes permit sins, and that he also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth shall be committed, but does not will it, nor necessitate it.  
I know also they distinguish the action from the sin of the action, saying, that God Almighty does indeed cause the action whatsoever action it be, but not the sinfulness or irregularity of it, that is, the discordance between the action and the Law. Such distinctions as these dazzle my understanding; I find no difference between the will to have a thing done, and the permission to do it, when he that permitteth can hinder it, and knows that it will be done unless he hinder it. Nor find I any difference between an action & the sin of that action, as for example, between the killing of Uriah, and the sin of David in killing Uriah, nor when one is cause both of the Action and of the Law, how another can, because of the disagreement between them, no more than how one man making a longer and a shorter garment, another can make the inequality that is between them. This I know, God cannot sin, because his doing a thing makes it just and consequently, no sin, as also because whatsoever can sin is subject to another's Law, which God is not. And therefore 'tis blasphemy to say God can sin; but to say, that God can so order the world, as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any dishonour to him. Howsoever, if such or other distinctions can make it clear, that S. Paul did not think Esau's or Pharaoh's actions proceeded from the will and purpose of God, or that proceeding from his will, could not therefore without injustice be blamed or punished, I will, as soon as I understand them, turn unto my Lord's Opinion, for I now hold nothing in all this question betwixt us, but what seemeth to me, not obscurely, but most expressly said in this place by S. Paul, And thus much in answer to his places of Scripture.  

To the Arguments from Reason.  
OF the Arguments from Reason, the first is that which his Lordship saith is drawn from Zeno's beating of his man, which is therefore called Argumentum baculinum, that is to say, a wooden Argument. The story is this, Zeno held, that all actions were necessary, his man therefore being for some fault beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it, to avoid this excuse, his Master pleaded likewise the necessity of beating him. So that not he that maintained, but he that derided the necessity, was beaten, contrary to that his Lordship would infer. And the Argument was rather withdrawn than drawn from the story.  
The second Argument is taken from certain inconveniences which his Lordship thinks would follow such an opinion. It is true that ill use might be made of it, and therefore your Lordship and my Lord Bishop, aught at my request to keep private what I say here of it. But the inconveniences are indeed none, and what use soever he made of truth, yet truth is truth, and now the question is not, what is fit to be preached, but what is true.  
The first inconvenience he says is this. That the Laws, which prohibit any action, will be unjust.  
2. That all consultations are vain.  
3. That admonitions to men of understanding, are of no more use, than to children, fools, and mad men.  
4. That praise, dispraise, reward and punishment are in vain.  
5.6. That Counsels, Acts, Arms, Books, Instruments, Study, tutors, Medicines, are in vain.  
To which arguments his Lordship expecting I should answer, by saying, the ignorance of the event were enough to make us use the means, adds (as it were a reply to my answer foreseen) these words. A lass! how should our not knowing the event be a sufficient motive to make us use the means? Wherein his Lordship says right, but my answer is not that which he expecteth, I answer.  
First, that the necessity of an action doth not make the Laws that prohibit it unjust. To let pass that not the necessity, but the will to break the Law, maketh the action unjust, because the Law regardeth the will and no other precedent causes of action. And to let pass, that no Law can possibly be unjust, in as much as every man maketh (by his consent) the Law he is bound to keep, and which consequently must be just, unless a man can be unjust to himself. I say what necessary cause soever precede an action, yet if the action be forbidden, he that doth it willingly may justly be punished. For instance, suppose the Law on pain of death prohibit stealing, and that there be a man, who by the strength of temptation is necessitated to steal, and is thereupon put to death, does not this punishment deter others from Theft? is it not a cause that others steal not? Doth it not frame and make their wills to justice?  
To make the Law, is therefore to make a Cause of Justice, and to necessitate Justice, and consequently 'tis no injustice to make such a Law.  
The intention of the Law is not to grieve the Delinquent for that which is past, and not to be undone, but to make him and others just, that else would not be so, and respecteth not the evil act past, but the good to come, in so much as without the good intention for the future, no past act of a Delinquent could justify his killing in the sight of God. But you will say how is it just to kill one man to amend another, if what were done were necessary? To this I answer, that men are justly killed, not for that their actions are not necessitated, but because they are noxious, and they are spared and preserved whose actions are not noxious. For where there is no Law, there no killing nor any thing else can be unjust, and by the right of nature, we destroy (without being unjust) all that is noxious both Beasts and Men, and for Beasts we kill them justly when we do it in order to our own preservation, and yet my Lord himself confesseth, that their actions, as being only spontaneous, and not free, are all necessitated and determined to that one thing they shall do. For men, when we make Societies or commonwealths we lay not down our right to kill, excepting in certain cases, as murder, theft or other offensive action; so that the right, which the commonwealth hath to put a man to death for crimes is not created by the Law, but remains from the first right of nature, which every man hath to preserve himself, for that the Law doth not take the right away in the case of Criminals, who were by the Law excepted. Men are not therefore put to death, or punished for that their theft proceedeth from election, but because it was noxious and contrary to men's preservation, and the punishment conducing to the preservation of the rest, in as much as to punish those that do voluntary hurt, and none else, frameth and maketh men's wills such as men would have them. And thus it is plain, that from the necessity of a voluntary action, cannot be inferred the injustice of the Law that forbiddeth it, or the Magistrate that punisheth it.  
Secondly, I deny that it maketh consultations to be in vain, 'tis the consultation that causeth a man, & necessitateth him to choose to do one thing rather than another, so that unless a man say that that cause is in vain which necessitateth the effect, he cannot infer the superfluousness of consultation out of the necessity of the election proceeding from it. But it seemeth his lordship's reasons thus, If I must do this rather than that, I shall do this rather than that, though I consult not at all, which is a false proposition and a false consequence, and no better than this, if I shall live till to morrow, I shall live till to morrow, though I run myself through with a sword to day. If there be a necessity that an action shall be done, or that any effect shall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing necessarily requisite as a means to bring it to pass, and therefore when it is determined, that one thing shall be chosen before another, 'tis determined also for what cause it shall so be chosen, which cause, for the most part, is deliberation or consultation, and therefore consultation is not in vain, and indeed the less in vain by how much the election is more necessitated, if more and less had any place in necessity.  
The same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconvenience, namely that admonitions are in vain, for the Admonitions are parts of consultation, the admonitor being a counsellor for the time to him that is admonished.  
The fourth pretended inconveence is, that praise, dispraise, reward and punishment will be in vain. To which I answer, that for praise and dispraise, they depend not at all on the necessity of the action praised or dispraised. For what is it else to praise, but to say a thing is good? good I say for me, or for some body else, or for the State and commonwealth? And what is it to say an action is good, but to say it is as I would wish? Or as another would have it, or according to the will of the State? that is to say, according to the Law. Does my Lord think that no action can please me, or him, or the commonwealth that should proceed from necessity? things may be therefore necessary, and yet praise worthy, as also necessary, and yet dispraised, and neither of them both in vain, because praise and dispraise, and likewise Reward and Punishment, do by example make and conform the will to good and evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion, that Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, where he says that he was good by nature, Et quia aliter esse non potuit.  
To the fifth and sixth inconveniences, that Counsels, Arts, Arms, Instruments, Books, Study, Medicines and the like would be superfluous, the same answer serves as to the former, that is to say, that this consequence, If the effect shall necessarily come to pass, than it shall come to pass without its causes is a false one, and those things named Counsels, Arts, Arms, &c. are the causes of these effects.  
His lordship's third Argument consisteth in other inconveniences, which he saith will follow, namely Impiety and negligence of religious duties, as Repentance, and Zeal to God's service, &c.  
To which I answer as to the rest, that they follow not. I must confess, if we consider the greatest part of mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is, as men, whom either the study of acquiring wealth, or preferment, or whom the appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong principles have made unapt to discuss the truth of things, I must I say confess, that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help their piety, and therefore if his Lordship had not desired this answer, I should not have written it, nor do I write it but in hopes your Lordship and his will keep it private. Nevertheless in very truth, the necessity of events does not of itself draw with it any impiety at all. For piety consisteth only in two things; one that we honour God in our hearts, which is, that we think as highly of his power as we can, (for to honour any thing is nothing else but to think it to be of great power.) The other is, that we signify that honour and esteem by our words and actions, which is called▪ Cultus, or worship of God. He therefore that thinketh that all things proceed from God's eternal will, and consequently are necessary, does he not think God Omnipotent? Does he not esteem of his power as highly as is possible? which is to honour God as much as may be in his heart. Again, he that thinketh so, is he not more apt by external acts and words to acknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? yet is this external acknowledgement the same thing which we call worship. So that this opinion fortifies piety in both kinds, external and internal, therefore is far from destroying it. And for Repentance, which is nothing else but a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being out of the way; though the cause that made him go astray were necessary, yet there is no reason why he should not grieve; and again though the cause why he returned into the way were necessary, there remained still the causes of joy. So that the necessity of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of Repentance, grief for the error, and joy for returning.  
And for prayer, whereas he saith that the necessity of things destroy prayer, I deny it, for though prayer be none of the causes that move God's will (his will being unchangeable) yet since we find in God's word, he will not give his blessings but to those that ask, the motive of prayer is the same. Prayer is the gift of God no less than the blessing, and the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed. 'Tis manifest that Thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing past, and that which is past is sure and necessary, yet even amongst men thanks is in use as an acknowledgement of the benefit past, though we should expect no new benefit for our gratitude. And prayer to God Almighty is but thanksgiving for God's blessings in general, and though it precede the particular thing we ask, yet it is not a cause or means of it, but a signification that we expect nothing but from God, in such manner, as he, not as we, will, and our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray thy will, not our will, be done, and by example teaches us the same, for he prayed thus, Father if it be thy will let this cup pass, &c. The end of prayer, as of thanksgiving, is not to move but to honour God Almighty, in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by him only.  
The fourth Argument from Reason is this, The order, beauty and perfection of the world requireth that in the universe should be Agents of all sorts; some necessary▪ some free, some contingent. He that shall make all things necessary, all things free, or all things contingent doth overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world.  
In which Argument I observe first a Contradiction, for seeing he that maketh any thing in that he maketh it, maketh it to be necessary, it followeth that he that maketh all things, maketh all things necessarily to be; As if a workman make a garment the garment must necessarily be, so if God make every thing, every thing must necessarily be. Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth (though we know it not) that some Agents should work without deliberation (which his Lordship calls necessary Agents) and some Agents with deliberation (and those both he and I call free Agents) and that some Agents should work, and we not know how (and their effects we both call Contingents) but this hinders not but that he that electeth may have his election necessarily determined to one by former causes, and that which is contingent and imputed to fortune, be nevertheless necessary and depend on precedent necessary causes. For by contingent, men do not mean that which hath no cause, but that which hath not for cause any thing that we perceive; As for example, when a Traveller meets with a shower, the journey had a cause, and the rain had a cause sufficient to produce it, but because the journey caused not the rain, nor the rain the journey, we say they were contingent one to another. And thus you see that though there be three sorts of events, necessary, contingent, and free, yet they may be all necessary without destruction of the beauty or perfection of the universe.  
To the first Argument from Reason, which is, that if liberty be taken away, the nature and formel reason of sin is taken away, I answer by denying the consequence; The nature of sin consisteth in this, that the action done proceed from our will and be against the Law. A Judge in judging whether it be sin or no which is done against the Law, looks at no higher cause of the action, than the will of the doer. Now when I say the action was necessary, I do not say it was done against the will of the doer, but with his will, and necessarily, because man's will, that is every volition or act of the will and purpose of man had a sufficient, and therefore a necessary cause, and consequently every voluntary action was necessitated. An action therefore may be voluntary and a sin, and nevertheless be necessary, and, because God may afflict by a right derived from his Omnipotence, though sin were not, and because the example of punishment on voluntary sinners, is the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less frequent, for God to punish such sinners (as I have said before) is no injustice. And thus you have my answer to his lordship's Objections both out of Scripture and from Reason.   

Certain Distinctions which his Lordship supposing might be brought to evade his Arguments are by him removed.  
HE says a man may perhaps answer, that the necessity of things held by him, is not a stoical necessity, but a Christian necessity, &c. But this distinction I have not used, nor indeed ever heard before, nor could I think any man could make stoical and Christian two kinds of necessity, though they may be two kinds of Doctrine. Nor have I drawn my Answer to his lordship's Arguments from the authority of any Sect, but from the nature of the things themselves.  
But here I must take notice of certain words of his Lordships in this place, as making against his own Tenet. Where all the causes, saith he being joined together and subordinate one to another do make but one total cause, if any one cause (much more the first) in the whole series or subordination of causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt maketh the effect necessary. For that which I call the necessary cause of any effect, is the joining together of all causes subordinate to the first into one total cause. If any of these saith he, especially the first, produce its effect necessarily, than all the rest are determined. Now it is manifest, that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to it, and therefore by his Lordships own reason all effects are necessary.  
Nor is that distinction of necessary in respect of the first cause, and necessary in respect of Second causes mine, it does (as his Lordship well notes) imply a contradiction. But the distinction of free into free from compulsion and free from Necessitation, I acknowledge, for to be free from compulsion is to do a thing so as terror be not the cause of his will to do it; for a man is then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to it. As when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed. Thus all men that do any thing for love, or revenge, or lust are free from compulsion, and yet their actions may be as necessary as those that are done by compulsion; for sometimes other passions work as forcibly as fear. But free from Necessitation. I say, no man can be, and 'tis that which his Lordship undertook to disprove.  
This distinction, his Lordship says, uses to be fortified by two reasons (but they are not mine.) The first he says, is, that it is granted by all Divines, that an Hypothetical necessity, or necessity upon supposition, may stand with liberty. That you may understand this, I will give you an example of Hypothetical necessity. If I shall live, I shall eat. This is an Hypothetical necessity. Indeed it is a necessary proposition, that is to say, it is necessary that that proposition should be true whensoever uttered, but 'tis not the necessity of the thing, nor is it therefore necessary that the man should live, nor that the man should eat. I do not use to fortify my distinctions with such reasons, let his Lordship confute them how he will, it contents me; but I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how easy and plain a thing, (but withal false) with the grave usage of such terms as Hypothetical necessity, and necessity upon supposition, and such like terms of schoolmen may be obscured and made to seem profound learning.  
The second reason that may confirm the distinction of free from compulsion, and free from necessitation, he says is, that God and good Angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we. This reason, though I had no need of, yet I think it so farforth good, as it is true that God and good Angels do good necessarily, and yet are free; but because I find not in the Articles of our Faith, nor in the decrees of our Church, set down in what manner I am to conceive God and good Angels to work by necessity, or in what sense they work Freely, I suspend my sentence in that point, and am content that there be a freedom from Compulsion, and yet no freedom from Necessitation, as hath been proved, in that a man may be necessitated to some action without threats and without fear of danger. But how my Lord can avoid the consisting together of freedom and necessity, supposing God and good Angels are freer than men, and yet do good necessarily, that we must examine. I confess, saith he, that God & good Angels are more free than we, that is, intensively in degree of Freedom, not extensively in the latitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise, not of specification.  
Again, we have here two distinctions that are no distinctions, but made to seem so by terms invented by I know not whom, to cover ignorance, and blind the understanding of the Reader: For it cannot be conceived that there is any liberty greater, than for a man to do what he will. One heat may be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than another; he that can do what he will, hath all liberty possible, and he that cannot hath none at all. Also liberty (as his Lordship says the Schools call it) of exercise, which is as I have said before, a liberty to do or not to do, cannot be without a liberty (which they call) of Specification, that is to say, a liberty to do, or not to do this or that in particular. For how can a man conceive he hath liberty to do any thing, that hath not liberty to do this, or that, or somewhat in particular? If a man be forbidden in Lent to eat this, and that, and every other particular kind of flesh, how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh, more than he that hath no licence at all? You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used in the Schools, and I do not doubt but that the imposing of them, by authority of Doctors in the Church, hath been a great cause that men have laboured, though by Sedition and evil courses, to shake them off, for nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannising over men's reason and understanding, especially when it is done, not by the Scriptures, but by the pretence of Learning, and more judgement than that of other men.  
In the next place his Lordship bringeth two Arguments against distinguishing between free from compulsion and free from necessitation.  
The first is, that election is opposite not only to Coaction or compulsion, but also Necessitation or determination to one. This is it he was to prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no new Argument to prove it, and so those brought formerly I have already answered. And in this place I deny again, that election is opposite to either, For, when a man is compelled for example to subject himself to an enemy or to die, he hath ●till election left him, and a deliberation to bethink which of the two he can better endure. And he that ●●led to prison by force hath election ●nd may deliberate whether he will ●e haled and trained on the ground, ●r make use of his own feet: Likewise when there is no compulsion, but the strength of temptation to do ●n evil action, being greater than the motives to abstain, it necessarily determines him to the doing of it, ●et he deliberates while sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the motives to forbear are working on ●im, and consequently he electeth which he will. But commonly when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge necessity; but when we see not or mark not the force that moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not causes but liberty that produceth the action. Hence it is that they think he does not choose this that of necessity choose it, but they might as well say, fire doth not burn because it burns of necessity.  
The second Argument is not so much an argument as a distinction, to show in what sense it may be said that voluntary actions are necessitated and in what sense not. And therefore his Lordship allegeth as from the authority of the Schools (and that which rippeth up the bottom of the Question) that there is a double act of the will. The one he says is Actus imperatus, an act done at the command of the will, by some inferior faculty of the soul; As to open or shut ones eyes, and this act may be compelled, the other he says, is Actus elicitus, an act allured or drawn forth by allurement out of the will, as to will, to choose, to elect, this he says cannot be compelled. Wherein (letting pass that metaphorical speech of attributing command and subjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family within themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in searching the truth of a question) you may observe, first, that to compel a voluntary act, is nothing else but to will it, for it is all one to say, my will commands the shutting of my eyes, or the doing of any other action, and to say, I have the will to shut my eyes; so that Actus imperatus, here, might as easily have been said in English a voluntry action, but that they that invented the term understood not any thing it signified.  
Secondly, you may observe, that Actus elicitus, is exemplified by these words, to will, to elect, to choose, which are all one, and so to will is here made an act of the will; and indeed as the will is a faculty or power in a man's soul, so to will is an act of it according to that power; but as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance, so is it also to say, so that to will is an act allured or drawn out of the power to will, which power is commonly called the will. Howsoever it be, the sum of his lordship's distinction, is, that a voluntary act may be done by compulsion, that is to say, by foul means, but to will that or any act cannot be but by allurement, or fair means. Now seeing fair means, allurements, and enticements produce the action which they do produce, as necessarily as foul means and threatening, it follows, that to will may be made as necessary as any thing that is done by compulsion. So that the distinction of Actus imperatus, and Actus elicitus are but words, and of no effect against necessity.  
His Lordship in the rest of his discourse, reckoneth up the opinion of certain professions of men, touching the causes wherein the necessity of things (which they maintain) consisteth. And first he saith, the ginger deriveth his necessity from the stars; Secondly, that the physician attributeth it to the temper of the body. For my part, I am not of their opinion, because, neither the stars alone, nor the temperature of the Patient alone is able to produce any effect, without the concurrence of all other Agents. For there is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is in rerum natura, which because it is a great paradox, and depends on many antecedent speculations, I do not press in this place. Thirdly, he disputeth against the opinion of them that say, external objects presented to men of such and such temparatures, do make their actions necessary, and says, the power such objects have over us, proceeds from our own fault, but that is nothing to the purpose, if such fault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power, and therefore that opinion may hold true for all that answer.  
Further he says, Prayer, Fasting, &c. may alter our habits; 'tis true, but when they do so, they are causes of the contrary habit, and make it necessary, as the former habit had been necessary if Prayer, Fasting, &c. had not been. Besides, we are not moved or disposed to prayer or any other action, but by outward objects, as pious company, godly preachers, of something equivolent. Fourthly, he says a resolved mind is not easily surprised, as the mind of Ulysses, who when others wept, alone wept not, and of the Phylososopher, that abstained from striking, because he found himself angry; and of him that poured out the water when he was thirsty, and the like. Such things I confess have, or may have been done, and do prove only that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to weep, nor for that Philosopher to strike, nor for that other man to drink, but it does not prove that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to abstain (as he did) from weeping, nor for the Philosopher to abstain (as he did) from striking, nor for the other man to forbear drinking, and yet that was the thing his Lordship ought to have proved. Lastly, his Lordship confesses, that the dispositions of objects may be dangerous to liberty, but cannot be destructive. To which I answer, it is impossible; for liberty is never in any other danger than to be lost, and if it cannot be lost (which he confesses) I may infer it can be in no danger at all.  
The fourth opinion his Lordship rejecteth, is of them that make the will necessarily to follow the last dictate of the understanding; but it seems his Lordship understands that Tenet in another sense than I do; for he speaketh as if they that held it, did suppose men must dispute the sequel of every action they do, great and small, to the least grain, which is a thing his Lordship (with reason) thinks untrue. But I understand it to signify, that the will follows the last opinion or judgement immediately proceding the action, concerning whether it be good to do it or not, whether he have weighed it long before, or not at all, and that I take to be the meaning of them that hold it. As for example, when a man strikes, his will to strike follows necessarily that thought he had of the sequel of his stroke, immediately before the lifting up of his hand. Now if it be understood in that sense, the last dictate of the understanding does necessitate the action, though not as the whole cause, yet as the last cause, as the last feather necessitates the breaking of a horses back, when there are so many laid on before, as there needed but the addition of one to make the weight sufficient.  
That which his Lordship allegeth against this, is, First out of a Poet, who in the person of Medea says, 
— Video meliora, proboque  
Deteriora sequor.  but that saying (as pretty as it is) is not true: for though Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her children, yet the last dictate of her judgement was, that the present revenge on her husband outweighed them all, and thereupon the wicked action necessarily followed. Then the story of the Roman, who of two competitors, said, one had the better reason, but the other must have the office. This also maketh against his Lordship, for the last dictate of his judgement that had the bestowing of the office, was this, That it was better to take a great bribe, than reward a great merit.  
Thirdly, he objects that things nearer the sense move more powerfully than reason; what followeth thence but this, the sense of the present good is commonly more immediate to the action than the foresight of the evil consequence to come? Fourthly, whereas his Lordship says that do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his Son than for the sin of his soul, makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding, but it argues plainly that sorrow for sin is not voluntary, and by consequence, that Repentance proceedeth from Causes.  
The last part of this discourse containeth his lordship's opinion about reconciling liberty with the prescience and decree of God, otherwise than some Divines have done, against whom, he says, he had formerly written a Treatise, out of which he repeateth only two things. One is, that we ought not to desert a certain truth, for not being able to comprehend the certain manner of it. And I say the same, as for example, that his Lordship ought not to desert this certain truth, That there are certain and necessary causes which make every man to will what he willeth, though he do not yet conceive in what manner the will of man is caused. And yet I think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive, seeing we see daily, that praise, dispraise, reward and punishment, good and evil sequels of men's actions retained in memory, do frame and make us to the election of whatsoever it be that we elect, and that the memory of such things proceeds from the senses, and sense from the operation of the objects of sense (which are external to us and governed only by God Almighty) and by consequence all actions, even of free and voluntary Agents are necessary.  
The other thing that he repeateth is, that the best way to reconcile contingence and liberty with Prescience and the decrees of God, is to subject future contingencies to the Aspect of God. The same is also my opinion, but contrary to what his Lordship all this while laboured to prove. For hitherto he held liberty and necessity, that is to say, liberty and the decrees of God irreconcilable, unless the Aspect of God (which word appeareth now the first time in this discourse) signify somewhat else besides God's will and decree, which I cannot understand. But he adds that we must subject them, according to that presentiality which they have in eternity, which he says cannot be done by them that conceive Eternity to be an everlasting succession, but only by them, that conceive it as an Indivisible point. To which I answer, that as soon as I can conceive Eternity to be an Indivisible point, or any thing, but an everlasting succession, I will renounce all, that I have written on this subject. I know S. Thomas Aquinas calls Eternity, Nunc. stans., an▪ ever-abiding now, which is easy enough to say, but though I fain would, yet I could never conceive it, they that can, are more happy than I. But in the mean time his Lordship alloweth all men to be of my opinion save only those that can conceive in their minds a nunc stans, which I think are none. I understand as little how it can be true his Lordship says, that God is not just but justice itself, not wise, but wisdom itself, not Eternal, but Eternity itself, nor how he concludes thence that Eternity is a point indivisible, and not a succession, nor in what sense it can be said, that an infinite point, and wherein is no succession, can comprehend all time, though time be successive. These phrases I find not in the Scripture, I wonder therefore what was the design of the schoolmen to bring them up, unless they thought a man could not be a true Christian unless his understanding be first strangled with such hard sayings. And thus much for answer to his lordship's discourse, wherein I think not only his Squadrons of Arguments, but also his Reserve of Distinctions are defeated. And now your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning the same question, with my Reasons for it, positively, and as briefly as I can, without any terms of Art in plain English.   

My Opinion about liberty and necessity.  
FIrst I conceive, that when it cometh into a man's mind to do or not to do some certain action, if he have no time to deliberate, the doing it or abstaining necessarily follow the present thought he hath of the good or evil consequence thereof to himself. As for example, In sudden anger, the action shall follow the thought of revenge, in sudden fear the thought of escape. Also when a man hath time to deliberate, but deliberates not, because never any thing appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the action follows his opinion of the goodness or harm of it. These actions I call VOLUNTARY, (my Lord) if I understand him aright that calls them SPONTANEOUS. I call them voluntary, because those actions that follow immediately the last appetite are voluntary, and here where is one only appetite, that one is the last. Besides, I see 'tis reasonable to punish a rash Action, which could not be justly done by man to man, unless the same were voluntary. For no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so sudden, because it is supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of Anger, shall nevertheless be justly put to death, because all the time, wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one continual deliberation, and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed fronelection.  
Secondly, I conceive when a man deliberates, whether he shall do a thing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to consider an action, is to imagine the consequences of it both good and evil. From whence is to be inferred, that Deliberation is nothing else but alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or (which is the same thing) alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite to do or quit the action of which he deliberateth.  
Thirdly, I conceive that in all deliberations, that is to say, in at alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the WILL, & is immediately next before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other Appetites to do, and to quit, that come upon a man during his deliberations, are called Intentions, & Inclinations, but not Wills, there being but one will, which also in this case may be called the last will, though the Intentions change often.  
Fourthly, I conceive that those actions, which a man is said to do upon deliberation, are said to be voluntary, and done upon choice and election, so that voluntary action, and action proceeding from election is the same thing, and that of a voluntary Agent, it is all one to say, he is free, and to say, he hath not made an end of deliberating.  
Fifthly, I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this manner; liberty is the absence of all the impediments to Action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the Agent. As for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have liberty to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impediments. And though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the liberty to ascend, but the faculty or power, because the impediment is in the nature of the water, and intrinsical. So also we say, he that is tied wants the liberty to go, because the impediment is not in him, but in his bands, whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the impediment is in himself.  
Sixthly, I conceive that nothing taketh beginning from itself, but from the Action of some other immediate Agent without itself. And that therefore, when first a man hath an appetite or will to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will, is not the will itself, but something else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controversy, that of voluntary actions the will is the necessary cause, and by this which is said, the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.  
Seventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient cause, to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the effect. The same also is a necessary cause. For if it be possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect, than there wanteth somewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient, but if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, than is a sufficient cause a necessary cause (for that is said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce it.) Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced is produced necessarily, for whatsoever is produced hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been, and therefore also voluntary actions are necessitated  
Lastly, should that Ordinary Definition of a free Agent, namely, That a free Agent is that, which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it, implies a contradiction, and is nonsense, being as much as to say, The cause may be sufficient, that is to say, necessary, and yet the effect shall not follow.   

My Reasons.  
FOr the first five points, wherein it is explicated 1. what Spontanity is. 2. what Deliberation is. 3. what Will, propension and appetite is. 4. what a free Agent is. 5. what Liberty is, there can no other proof be offered but every man's own experience, by reflection on himself, and remembering what he useth in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth when he saith an action is Spontaneous, a man deliberates; such is his will, that Agent or that action is free, Now he that, reflecteth so on himself, cannot but be satisfied, that Deliberation, is the consideration of the good and evil sequels of an action to come; that by Spontanity is meant inconsiderate action (or else nothing is meant by it) that will is the last act of our Deliberation, that a free Agent is he that can do if he will, and forbear if he will, and that Liberty is, the absence of external impediments. But, to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able, or will not take the pains to consider what they think when they hear such words, no Argument can be sufficient, because experience and matter of fact is not verified by other men's Arguments, but by every man's own sense and memory. For example, how can it be proved that to love a thing and to think it good is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by those word? Or how can it be proved that Eternity is not nunc stans to a man that says those words by custom, and never consider how he can conceive the thing in his mind?  
Also the sixth point, that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin without a cause, can no other way be made known, but by trying how he can imagine it, but if he try, he shall find as much reason (if there be no cause of the thing) to conceive it should begin at one time as another, that, he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times which is impossible, and therefore he must think there was some special cause why it began then, rather than sooner or later; or else that it began never, but was eternal.  
For the seventh point, which is that all events have necessary causes, it is there proved in that they have sufficient causes. Further let us in this place also suppose any event never so casual, as the throwing (for example.) Ames Ace upon a pair of dice, and see, if it must not have been necessary before 'twas thrown. For seeing it was thrown it had a beginning, and consequently a sufficient cause to produce it, consisting partly in the dice, partly in outward things, as the posture of the parts of the hand, the measure of force applied by the caster, the posture of the parts of the Table, and the like. In sum there was nothing wanting which was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular cast, and consequently the cast was necessarily thrown, for if it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it, and so the cause had not been sufficient. In the like manner it may be proved that every other ac●ident how contingent soever it seem, or how voluntary soever it be, is produced necessarily, which is that that my L. Bishop disputes against. The same may be proved also in this manner. Let the case be put, for example, of the weather. 'Tis necessary that to morrow it shall rain or not rain. If therefore it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain, otherwise there is no necessity that the proposition, It shall rain or not rain, should be true. I know there be some that say, it may necessarily be true that one of the two shall come to pass▪ but not, singly that it shall rain, or that it shall not rain, which is as much as to say, one of them is necessary, yet neither of them is necessary, and therefore to seem to avoid that absurdity, they make a distinction, that neither of them is true determinate, but indeterminate, which distinction either signifies no more but this, One of them is true but we know not which, and so the necessity remains, though we know it not, or if the meaning of the distinction be not that, it hath no meaning, and they might as well have said, One of them is true Titirice but neither of them, Tu patulice.  
The last thing in which also consisteth the whole controversy, namely that there is no such thing as an Agent, which when all things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it, or (which is all one) that there is no such thing as freedom from necessity, is easily inferred from that which hath been before alleged. For if it be an Agent it can work, and if it work, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action, and consequently the cause of the action is sufficient, & if sufficient, then also necessary, as hath been proved before.  
And thus you see how the inconveniences, which his Lordship objecteth must follow upon the holding of necessity, are avoided, and the necessity itself demonstratively proved. To which I could add, if I thought it good logic, the inconvenience of denying necessity, as that it destroyeth both the decrees and the prescience of God Almighty; for whatsoever God hath purposed to bring to pass by man, as an instrument, or forseeth shall come to pass, a man, if he have Liberty (such as his Lordship affirmeth) from necessitation, might frustrate and make not to come to pass, and God should either not foreknow it, and not decree it, or he should foreknow such things shall be, as shall never be, and decree that which shall never come to pass.  
This is all hath come into my mind touching this question since I last considered it. And I humbly beseech your Lordship to communicate it only to my Lord Bishop. And so praying God to prosper your Lordship in all your designs, I take leave and am,  
My most Noble and most obliged Lord  
Your most humble servant Thomas Hobbs. Roven Aug. 20. 〈◊〉.   
FINIS.