A SURVEY Of the Insolent and Infamous LIBEL, ENTITLED, NAPHTALI, etc. Wherein several things, falling in debate in these times are considered; and some Doctrines in Lex Rex and the Apolog. Narration (called by this Author Martyrs) are brought to the touchstone. PART I. Representing the dreadful aspect of Naphtali's Principles upon the powers ordained by God, and detecting the horrid consequences in practice necessarily resulting from such Principles, if owned and received by people. Job 13.7.9.11. Will you speak wickedly for God, and talk deceitfully for him? Is it good that he should search you out? or as one man mocketh another, do ye so mock him? Shall not his excellency make you afraid, and his dread fall upon you? Psal. 144.10. It is he that giveth Salvation unto Kings, who delivereth David his servant from the hurtful sword. Prov. 24.21, 22. My son, fear thou the Lord and the King, and meddle not with them that are given to change: For their calamity shall rise suddenly, and who knoweth the ruin of them both? Printed, Anno Dom. M. DC. LXVIII. THE PREFACE. IT hath been, and is the lot of the Lord's Militant-Church, to be tossed with manifold tempests, and to be (as it were) grinded betwixt the two millstones of a professedly profane and atheistical world, and of a party pretending highly for Truth and Piety, hanging out the Flag of the fairest Profession for both; whiles both are really undermined and fought against. Such are the destroying methods of that ghostly enemy of men's Souls, that not succeeding in his work of pestering the Church by profaneness, (these who have received the truth in love, and have it intimately engrafted in their hearts, abhorring that way; yea, such as have but the literal knowledge of the Gospel, being thereby moved to abstain from, and led to escape the gross pollutions that are in the world) He takes another course, debauching some cleanly like instruments under fair forms of godliness, without the power of it, to promote the efficacy of his deceit upon well-meaning people, ensnaring them (by their means) into erroneous Doctrines, or impious and scandalous Practices. As the former ages of the Church of Christ, have abounded in experiences of this kind; So also, since the light of the blessed Reformation (after a long and dark night) did break up, the enemy hath studiously sowed his tares while the good grain was in sowing, and in deep deceitfulness accommodating his tentations to the course then begun and carried on, would put in to be a Reformer, and did yoke in his lightsome-like and well-dressed Agents to be (with others) purgers and builders of the Church of God. By these men, walking under most specious colours of great humility, fervent zeal, sincere devotion, real mortification and self-denial, (graces, where they are in truth, never sufficiently valued) he did insinuate himself into, and possess himself of the minds of the simple, apt to believe every thing, and led them away captive into most dangerous errors and damnable practices: So that in the event, these shining glorious-like purgers and builders of the Temple of God, proved dreadful defilers and destroyers thereof. This moved the heroic Worthies employed by God to waste and pull down the Kingdom of Anti-christ, to turn their golden and mighty pens against that glittering seed of the Serpent, these celestial Prophets (as they were then termed) who by overdoing, were undoing the work of God in their hands; and who, under pretence of further and through Reformation (as they called it) did really hinder the course of the Gospel. What wrestle the eminent Servants of God, Luther (who was by them accounted a little less Antichrist then the Roman, and who died an heartbroken man because of them) Zwinglius, Melanchton, Calvin, Bucer, Bullinger and many others, had with this sort of men, their own Writings, and the Histories of that time can testify. We speak of the Sect of the Anabaptists, (so called from their most common, but not from their greatest errors) a Sect which under much toleration, because of the seeming harmlessness and holiness of its favourers, grew to that strength in Germany, Switzerland and other parts, that it became formidable to the States and Countries where it had place, and which at last (letting the mask fall off) did break forth fearfully in gross voluptuousness, tumults, rapines, horrid murders, bloodshed and rebellions against lawful Magistrates and Princes, (whom they thought they were called of God to root out, as being the ungodly of the world) And in these tumults, confusions and rebellions, there perished above one hundred thousand men. The contagion of this way hath, less or more, spread itself to some other reformed Churches; and lately did come to some strength in Britain: A thing which was justly feared, and wisely foreseen, by men of great gravity, judgement and wisdom in our Neighbour Land, Dr. Whitgift and Mr. hooker's near one hundred years ago; who expressed in their Writings, their jealousies and fears, that England might be taken and tainted with the infection of that evil. These godly, sage and sagacious persons, were neither so transported with passion, nor so void of charity, as to impute the direct intention of bringing in the errors of that way, unto those who were contrary minded to them in the matters of Church-discipline. But, when they seriously considered the tendency and consequence of some of their Principles who were vehement for the form of Discipline, which they desired to obtrude upon that Church, and the conformity of some of their Practices to the way of the Sect of the Anabaptists in other Countries; they did, upon too good ground, fear the breaking out of that evil, which we in our days have seen come to pass in a very high measure: And, who knows where it shall sister? It is a thing too too evident, that under sundry external forms of Government; that mystery of iniquity worketh to the confusion of humane Societies, to the bringing of divine Ordinances into contempt, and to the introducing of Libertinism, Quakerism, Rantism and Atheism. That Chamelion-like and various Sect, can shroud itself under divers external forms of Church-government. If it be true that Dr. Ames. saith, Fresh Suit, p. 93. the Anabaptists in Zealand and Friesland have their own Bishops: in the Congregational and Independent way, there are many of that stamp; nor is the Presbyterian way so privileged, but that under the lap thereof, men of that furious spirit do lurk. It is not intended by any thing that shall be said of the naughty courses of others, to cast any blot upon those who are deemed the moderate men of that way. Only it must be said, that they would do themselves a great deal of right, if the concerns of God's glory, and the honour of his reformed Churches, the compassion due to Souls seduced, and ready to be seduced, and the true interest of their own Reputation might prevail with them, by some evidence of a public deed to disclaim and damn the scandalous and shameful Doctrines and Practices, whereby evil men strive to support the Presbytery. Otherwise, what marvel is it, that they be looked upon in the esteem of these who value them as involved in the guilty connivance and consent to all the vile things that issue from Napht. and his party? And that this Libeler be looked upon as the common allowed Advocate of the Presbytery, and who reads the Book, will with some ground say, crimine ab uno disce omnes. Neither is it our design or will, to grieve or give offence to the generation of the humble, meek and self-denied seekers of God's face, partakers with us of the same precious faith, and running to obtain the same prize of the inheritance with us, (however differing in judgement in some particulars) nor shall we take them as partakers with this furious Author and his adherents. For who can imagine, that a meek people, who hath the promise of Gods teaching, should be so far transported, as to take the circumstantials of Religion, for the great and weighty matters of the Law and Gospel, without which known and beloved, none can come to God? Who can think, that an intelligent people should account, that the concerns of Christ's Kingdom and their own salvation, doth lie with so much stress upon this point, that the weakest and most ignorant Minister shall have a potestative parity with the man of greatest Gifts, Learning and Knowledge; that the Minister weakest in his Prudentials, should have equal Authority in managing the matters of God's house, with the wisest and one of the most noted prudence; that the youngest, rawest, most unexperienced Minister, should have as much power in ruling the house of God, as the man fullest of years, whose judgement is consolidated and ripened for Government, and who hath for a long time given such documents of good and wise behaviour, that makes him fitter to rule the younger sort, then to be ruled by them? Or, who can see the prejudice to Christ's Kingdom and precious souls, if such a worthy person (as is described) be entrusted with an inspection over other Brethren and Churches in a reasonable bounds, not with a dominative or lordly power, but paternal and fatherly; not to do after his own arbitrement, and as one unchallengeable in his actions, but to be regulated by acts of the Church and Land, and to be responsible to his Superiors in case of maleversation, not to rule folly, but with the consent and counsel of Presbyters? Can this way be disrelished by sober Christians, being so strongly pleaded by the light of sound reason, making so much for the comeliness and order of Christ's Church, being so suitable and correspondent to the ancient Government of the Church of Israel (where there were Priests and chief Priests, and several ranks of Ministers, an order which was neither typical nor temporal, but hath a standing reason reaching us) being so conform to the beginnings of Christ's ordering the New-testament Ministry (where there were Apostles above the seventy Disciples) being so agreeable to the Apostles constitution of the Government of the Churches of the New Testament, which was in an imparity of Power in Ministers, (as is luculently exemplified in the Power of Timothy and Titus, who were no Evangelists, nor ever accounted so by the Spirit of God) And finally, our ascended glorious Saviour, having honoured persons invested with that precedency by Letters written by his Secretary John unto them, Rev. 2.3. chap. wherein he shows the approbation of their office and power, reproving their neglects, yet honouring them with the stile of Angels to the Churches, or his Messengers in special manner. To the Angel of the Church of Ephesus, etc. which cannot without notable perversion of the Scripture be otherwise understood, but of single persons presiding over Presbyters. And this order Christ's Church and dear Spouse, having since that time retained in all places, where Churches were constitute without exception, in all times without interruption, until this last Age, wherein through hatred of corruptions adhering thereto under Popery, and because of the enimity of the popish Bishops to the Reformation, some have utterly, without any reason, rejected the office itself. Who can think, that a Christian people will not readily follow the footsteps of the flock in former generations? Neither is there any intention to provoke any fearers of God, who have been perhaps in an hour of tentation miscarried to irregular courses, following too readily in the simplicity of their hearts cunning leaders, who have had too much dominion over their faith; these we judge worthy of greatest tenderness in dealing with them: nor are we without hope, that God who stills the noise of the seas, the noise of the waves, and the tumult of the people, Ps. 65. v. 7. will in time allay their animosities and rebuke the stormy wind and seas of their passions, that they may be still, and that he will bring them to consider their ways wherein they have exceeded, and give them to know how ill and bitter a thing it is to forsake their own mercies in the ordinances of God, for the want or having of this or that form of external Government. But these we aim at in this parallel with Anabaptists, are the Naphtalian party, i. e. the furious sort of these, who under the conduct of this teacher and his like, make sport of rebellions, murders, assassinations, that have so hardened and harnessed their hearts (as appears by their writings and deeds) that they have become stout in a dedolent greediness to commit any wickedness, which they account meet to serve their design, as if their supposed good cause could legittimat the worst course, who make no reckoning, as their Doctor here professes, of overturning Thrones, making the Land drunk with the blood of the Inhabitants, multiplying fatherless and widows in the midst thereof, and introducing greatest confusions and calamities, that may make all faces gather blackness, and all to smite on the thigh, crying, alas for the day! if so be, they may upon the ruins of all, erect the idol of pretended parity of Ministers; which when they have set up, the imperious agitators will, (as they have done formerly) baffle, if any offer be to levelly them to others, and howsoever the weaker brethren must be entertained with fair words, and noddified with notional disputes anent their parity with the best, that they may think themselves somewhat: yet, how disdainfully was it, and yet would be taken if these low shrubs should essay a practical parity with the tall Cedars in the Government of affairs. Imparity was then without a title, now it is with it, and there is our change and great defection; and surely that which hath been, will be, and there is no new thing under the Sun. This furious Napht. coming in upon the back of the Apology, as another envenomed Egg, hatched (belike) by one and the same Cockatrice; the second justifying the rebellion to which the first did instigate, and inflaming to more, may let them, who will not shut their own eyes, see the mystery of Anabaptistical confusion, working and spreading: for, although the Author pretendeth highly for Presbytery, which he and his complices (Hawks of the right nest) have long ago hewed down in this Church, as to the practice of it: Yet, evident it is, that his pretences for Presbytery are but Prefaces to some further great design of mischief to the Church and State. For, having sold himself to work confusion and rebellion, he goes about to overthrow all the powers ordained of God in most cyclopic boldness, displaying a banner against all invested lawfully with any degree of Civil or Church power, bending his spirit to the uttermost, to renew and revive our confusions, and to bear people in hand, that grossest rebellion is religious duty and real godliness. And in managing his matters, the Author behaves not himself like Naphtali, (the hind let loose, which giveth goodly words, or words of goodliness, fairness and pleasantness, as, Gen. 49.21. it is said of Naphtali; who therefore is satisfied with favour, and full of the blessing of the Lord, Deut. 33.23.) But, as in his heart there are evil treasures of wickedness; So, in his lips and pen there is a burning fire, he strives to inflame all with the rage of his tongue, and runs upon all sorts of Authorities from the highest to the lowest, like a savage Beast or wild Boar let loose to waste and confound miserably both the visible Kingdom of Christ in the Land, and the civil Kingdom thereof settled upon the best foundations; and that his Book might want nothing of the compleatness of an infamous Libel, he falls upon particular persons by name, to asperse their credit, the constant integrity of whose conversation, will easily stop his foul lying mouth in the consciences of God's people who know them. What to do anent this bundle of impudent lies and falsehoods, gross slanders and revile, was much doubted. Upon the one hand, it was thought best to neglect the rage of this man (if one that hath so much renounced humanity, as he is here seen to do, may be so termed) lest by being noticed, he might think himself somewhat, especially lest people (who as they affect, are ordinarily opinionated) might have too much matter to feed their humour, to furnish their light discourses, and to ensnare their souls, by representing to them the matters of this Libel (worthy to be buried in oblivion) they being too apt (whatever salvo might be added) to receive the poison without the antidote according to their prejudices. It seemed also a matter full of tediousness to a well composed heart, to enter into a fire of endless strife and continual reciprocation of altercations, wherein a man is not likely to find more truth than he hath already, (truth in the most important matters in the Book, having been of old fully vindicated by learned hands, and nothing now opposed, but old songs, chanted over and over again) although like enough to lose much of that charity and calm and composed temper of heart which he had before. What man is he, that knowing, how much more important work he hath upon his hand, for his own salvation, and honouring God in his station in the world, would willingly engage in endless contests with persons, whose idleness gives them too great opportunity of evil doing; and who having cast by the Lords work in building his Church, are too much set to do Satan's work in dissipating the same? It seemed honourable enough to decline this contention and strife, which is like the letting out of waters, in expectation that either the man's conscience (if it be not infinitely corrupted) may confute him in most of his assertions and standers, or that his manifest unchristian dealing may help to open the eyes of such he labours to delude, and bring them to abhor his way, or that the really religious and righteous dealings of Church and State may more forcibly put him to silence then words or writings can. Sometimes keeping silence is seasonable, the man according to Gods own heart, would not suffer Shimei's revile to be repaid upon the head of that dead dog; Hezekiah discharged to answer a word to railing Rabshakeh; Jeremiah the Prophet contradicted by the false Prophet Hananiah, went his way and said nothing; the wise Solomon forbids to take heed to all words that are spoken and to answer a fool according to his folly. The Lord of Kings and Prophets, sometimes answered not his accusers a word. So it seemed fit to let alone an insolent and froward railer and mocker, and not to lavish out precious time, which might be better bestowed, upon one that gives such visible evidences both of a reasonless and unchristian spirit, whose Libel may be reckoned amongst the things quae spreta exolescunt, and worthy to be answered with nothing but silence and contempt. But upon the other hand, it seemed something hard, (especially in such a distempered time) to suffer an insolent person, in whose mouth is a rod of pride, to cast the truth down to the ground without control, and to tread upon and triumph over a holy and righteous cause, and upon honourable persons of all ranks, engaged in the maintenance thereof in so abusive, despiteful and intolerable a way, and not give him any check. Not to put some stop to this furious driver, who again and again assaults this Church with vile lies and reproaches, looked like the deserting and betraying of an honest and honourable cause, or like the hirelings seeing the wolf and flying and leaving the flock to be destroyed with delusion, fugisti quia tacuisti. There is an evil silence that leaves men in sin, as well as an evil speaking that leads men to sin; and we are not only to give an account pro otioso verbo, but pro otioso silencio; for, idle silence, when God and the public necessity of the Church, or Society whereof we are members, calls for a valiant (not brutishly violent and forcible that way, such as this man pleads for) and rational contending for the truth. It is sinful pusillanimity, and not warrandable prudence to see truth fall in the streets and not lift it up. And verily, this man seems to be amongst these, of whom Solomon says, Prov. 26.5. who must be answered, lest he seem wise in his own conceit; and to be amongst these, Tit. 1.10, 11. unruly and vain talkers and deceivers, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whose mouths must be stopped, that the gangrane of his words may not creep further to the consumption and subversion of Church and State. But the great difficulty, in dealing with this man of no forehead, (or if he have any, it is of the hardest metal) of little conscience, but of infinite loquacity, and of a most unbridled tongue, which is a treasure of all reviling language, (whereof he is exceedingly profuse, in bestowing it upon persons of all ranks) The great difficulty (I say) in dealing with him was how to moderate and temper a stile of writing toward such a one; Difficile est Satyram non scribere contra Satyrum: for hardly can a man meet in any book with more bitter invectives against all Authorities and Dignities, appointed and approven by God, then are here to be found. All that have gone that path before him, seem but children in wickedness in comparison of him. He deserves to be in the first class of these, Judas 8. who despise Dominion, and speak evil of Dignities. Yet it must be confessed, that the man deserves well (albeit beside his intention) of all the Authorities civil and ecclesiastical in the Land, for while others do politicly keep in, supprimit Orator quae rusticus edit inepte, He hath plainly laid open the spirit of the faction, for which he is Advocate, and gives (as we will hear) fair warning to the King, that he must not expect impunity (if they can have their will,) and to all the Nobles and Magistrates, whose places and dignities, forfeited (as he saith) by them, private persons, in a Phineas-like spirit, are allowed to possess, removing and taking order with them for great apostasy and patronising abominations (as he speaks) but especially to all the ministry, (whom he calls Wolves and Thiefs) and mainly to the Bishops what they are to expect; for loading them outrageously with all sorts of reproaches, which his wicked heart could prompt him to utter, he directly endeavours to stir up the people to imbrue their hands in their blood, and to destroy them in their innocency, with tragical oh ˢ! awakening the rage of the rudest multitude (which he calls zeal of God) to execute judgement on them, that the fierce anger of God may be turned away; and tells them if they do not so, they are plagued with stupidity and blindness. All sorts of rulers in the Land, may see their dittay and their doom drawn in this Libel; and the man should have thanks for discovering the malicious bloody and cruel designs of his party, that these who are concerned, being forewarned, may be fore-armed, professa perdunt odia vendictae locum; when the snare is set in a man's sight, he deserves to fall into it, that will fall into it. When a man's deadly enemies proclaim their intentions, if he take not warning and be not upon his guard, who will not think, that in his life-time he were worthy of a fair hood and bells, and because he perishes in the snare that was set in his sight, he will be thought worthy of Abners' Epitaph, Died Abner as a fool dyeth? This man will make us wise, whither we will or not, and force us to keep our eyes in our head. But as to this infamous Libeler, how irksome a thing were it to follow him closely in all his foolish reasonings that are continually interlaced and larded with foul revile? How unsuitable were it for one, who desires to keep the constant composure of a Christian spirit, to indulge a humour in retaliating, according as the indignity of his abuses requires: verily, in dealing with men of this stamp (outrageous in their opprobrious speeches) defenders of the truth are at a great disadvantage, in regard of these who have sober and grave adversaries to deal with. But it almost transcends humane patience, to treat mildly with such an insolent one as this, who transgresseth so far the bounds of all humane modesty in dealing with all sorts of persons in Authority, as will be seen anon, Although then, a more than ordinary vehemency of a keen stile should be used, in beating down the fierceness of one so excessively insolent (whose intemperate pride despiseth moderate remedies) good and wise men will not judge it very criminal, but at least, somewhat excusable. Shall Masters of confusion, indulging themselves in their proud morosity, unworthily demean themselves toward the sober defenders of the truth? and will not this be sufficient Apology for them, to put forth some sting, and use some measure of vehemency in this case? Should such a person as this, who (as the Poets feign of Hecuba, metamorphosed into a mad barking bitch, after the destruction of Troy) barks and bawls, and dares with his furious petulant and pestilent pen overrun and bespatter King, Parliament, Council, Nobles, Judges, Bishops, Ministers and all ranks of people in the Land? should he be smoothed and stroaked with soft words? might not possibly a too faint-like and toothless defence of the truth tend to harden him and his complices, and breed suspicion of some signs of diffidence, distrust and timorousness in owning the truth and righteousness of the cause that is owned against him? Sed motos praestat componere fluctus. It shall be fitter to consider what becomes us to utter, than what becomes him to hear, or what he is worthy of. There lies indeed a tentation in these nameless writings (which therefore, it is to be wished were not in use) to exceed in passions and to utter words (incognito) that will not be stood to; but remembering, that we have not so learned Christ, as to render revilling for reviling, and that man's wrath works not the righteousness of God; (though sometimes it is for people's edification to see the due characters of such as lead them out of the way) so far as humane infirmity permitts, the truth shall be searched after, and spoken in love; all bitterness, wrath, anger and clamour with all malice being put away: but if any thing aculeat and pungent do escape, it not being used in any private cause or quarrel, but in the public concerns of truth, of the Church of God and of the State of the Commonwealth, nor proceeding from any private revenge (there being room enough in our fraternal affection for any, who will leave their unchristian, sanguinary and inhuman ways) it will at least be excused by the judicious and wise. And if any such thing be, it is heartily wished, it may prick the Libeler to repentance for these things, wherein he hath already put himself to shame. But to prepare for consideration of the matter of this infamous Libel, it shall be fit, to advert how palpably and closely this man treads in the footsteps of the old Masters of confusion the Anabaptists: It shall not be said, that his complices or he, are arrived to the owning of the highest mysteries of that Sect, in the points of Enthusiasm and Libertinism, nor that they are so cruel, as to exclude Christian infants from their Birthright privilege of Baptism; howbeit, it is worthy to be considered, how far the common demand of express command or example in Scripture, for Episcopacy may reach the Anabaptists conclusion concerning infants. And this man, doth let fall such tenets, as smell too rankly of the foul scum of the high flown Anabaptistical and Enthusiastical way; while he tells us, (pag. 21. etc.) That mere private men may now a days, take their impulses of Zeal, as a sufficient call, to pull down all Magistrates from their seats which they abuse, to execute judgement on them, and to place themselves in their rooms; thinking, that Phineas act may justify them, and while he tells us, pag. 105. that a Ministers external call, is not in ordination by them, who have power upon trial of gifts; but in having such a visible evidence of the call of Jesus Christ, as in reason and charity doth oblige all men, to receive the person so called, as truly sent: These with several other points, tending to Libertinism; yea, and to the abolishing of the sense of grossest sins in people, are vented here, as may be seen in the progress. But our main work shall be, to show the face of this man's way, and how Anabaptistical-like it looks, in some particular practices, wherein the similitude will hold without much halting, that if he will not be he healed, others may be warned. 1. The Sect of Anabaptists laboured much, (as the learned men that knew them and dealt with them declare) to overthrow Magistracy, in the places where they lived; they represented the secular powers unto the people, as the ungodly of the world, instigating and stirring them up, to pull them all down, as the oppressors of their liberty in spirituals and civils': They denied all authority to Magistrates in Church matters, averring, they ought not to meddle in matters of Religion or Faith, nor use any compulsion on men, so much as to urge them to the use of the external means of God's worship. And upon the ground, (Luke, 22. The Kings of the Nations, etc. it shall not be so amongst you, which is pressed against Superiorities amongst Churchmen) They pleaded with no less plausibleness against superiority of Magistrates, amongst and over Christians, although when they came to some strength at Munster, they would have their own King, John of Leyden the Tailor. 2. As they studied to overthrow the ordinance of Magistracy, so also the other divine ordinance of Ministry; these being, as it were, the two great lights, the Sun and the Moon, which God hath appointed to guide the world: These masters of confusion, would extinguish them both, that they might vent their wares in the world, for destroying not only humane Societies, but the Souls of men. In order to the ruin of the Ministry, they declaimed most bitterly against all of that function, (that were not of their way) as Hirelings, Thiefs and Wolves, Ignorant-beasts, Priests of Baal, cursed Creatures, Servants of Satan, and what ever else their envenomed hearts could prompt them to utter against Christ's Ministers to work their disgrace amongst the people, and so to defame them, that they might be useless in the service of God: Their great work was, to exclude faithful Ministers from the esteem of God's people, that they might affect them only, and that they might have ready access to poison them with their perverse Doctrines and Dictates of sublime, unconceivable nonsense, set forth under the garb of a glancing novelty of words. 3. They bent themselves to work division in the Church of God, and to move people to forsake the assembling of themselves together in Church-meetings, and to follow them to seek Christ in private Conventicles, where they might with freedom enough open their hearts, and debauch them into their way. The Church meetings they reckoned no better of, then as of droves and herds of hogs, confused mixtures, unworthy the name of Churches and wherein no blessing was to be expected to the Ordinances. 4. They were above all men arrogant and proud despisers of such as were not of their way, as being men without God in the world, reprobate and wicked, denying to them even common civilities. 5. When any of theirs were punished, either for their errors, or for felony, murder or rebellion, they heavily lamented the removal of the dear servants of God; crying them up for Martyrs, and complaining tragically, that truth and godliness was oppressed; and that men, who would have all things done according to God's word, were not suffered to live in a persecuting world. How near this man (with his complices) doth approach to the manners of that odious Sect in these particulars, may some way appear from this Libel, and the Apology. When the spirit, that stirreth in these furious writings (especially in Naphthali, wherein the evil man waxeth worse and worse) is considered; how much confusion may be seen to be portended to Church and State, if hearts be infected with the Doctrines therein held forth. It is greatly to be wished and prayed for, that the Lord may give his people such understanding, that they be not ignorant of the wiles of Satan, who drives a deeper design against this poor Church and Land, than the subversion of this or that exterior form of Church-Government. The controversy rests not in matters touching a Bishop, or a Presbytery, which (if men's passions or prejudices might permit) may be for the advantage of the Gospel well consolidated by their mutual paying of due respects one to another, the episcopal inspection not abrogating, but strengthening the due right of Presbyters, and Presbyters not despising that lawful inspection, but all concurring together in a kindly mutual assistance, and amicable conjunction, for carrying on the real interests of Christ's Kingdom without imperiousness on the one side, and without froward disorderliness on the other. But this polemical Presbyterian (as he would seem to be, though he and his brethren in evil have ruined that way of Presbytery long ago) accounts such matters too low to stand upon. The design his Libel runs upon, is to open a gap to endless rebellions, under whatsoever constitution of Church-Government. And not only to bring all our Magistrates from the highest to the lowest under disgrace (which is the next step to destruction, and to make them a sacrifice to the fury of the wicked people) but to ruin Kingly Authority and Magistracy, the Ordinance of God, and to dissolve humane Societies and Kingdoms (as shall be seen) and especially to ruin this Kingdom. There is a great noise made, (it may be, it is not causeless, and it were to be wished, Rulers looked to it) of the increase of Popery: but truly, when the spirit of such writings as this, is considered, it will be found, there is cause to fear, (unless the wisdom and goodness of God, and the prudence of the King and Governors under him prevent) That as one way, the Roman Antichrist may come in; So, some furious successor of John of Leyden, under pretence of a Phineas-like spirit, come in another way, upon our Church and Land, to lay it waste, and to make it a field of confusion and blood; the seeds of future miseries, being too visibly sown by this man and his complices; whose mouths, are full of Blasphemies, as their hearts and hands are full of blood. That this Libel and the like, are not more quickly followed, with meet animadversions, is not to be marvelled at by any, who knows they are like the Pestilence that walks in darkness; and that hardly do they come to the hands of any, but such as are willing to be deceived by them, being intended for the blinding of these, not for the opening the eyes of others; Yet now, (that this piece is in our hand) it (with its fellows) deserves some consideration, and what shall be said, shall be reduced to these heads, viz. The Libelers endeavour to confound humane Societies and to overthrow Magistracy; His injurious revile of the King's Majesty, Parliament, Council, Commission, Judges, Town of Edinburgh, etc. His reproaches against the Ministry of the Church and all ranks thereof, with his unsound Doctrines anent their Callings and Stations; His endeavours to dissipate the Church of Christ in this Land, and therein to state a perpetual schism; His Damnable pride and contempt of all others; His tragical complaints of persecution, and vain glorying in the Martyrs of his way. In touching upon these, the most material things of his book shall be spoken to, in the following part of this treatise; withal, for the Reader's edification, we shall now and then turn aside to useful digressions. As, 1. Concerning his Majesty's Supremacy in Church affairs, which this Libeler calls falsely an usurpation of the Crown of Christ. 2. Concerning the Covenants and obligation thereof, and the falsely alleged perjury in owning Episcopacy. 3. Concerning the warrantableness of the Episcopal office, falsely called by the Libeler Antichristian usurpation. 4. Concerning the lawfulness of the calling of the present Ministry of Scotland, whom he calls Thiefs, Wolves, etc. 5. The sinfulness of stating a separation from our Church-assemblies, which he calls Curate's Conventicles. Those things being with any satisfaction spoken to, once for all, (for, Who can endure that profusion of precious time, as to be always drawing the rug-saw of contention about such matters?) will contribute to clear our judgements and allay our animosities. The Lord give us understanding in all things, and bless us with truth and peace. THE CONTENTS. CHAP. I. THe Libeler his endeavours to confound and dissolve humane Societies, and to overthrow Magistracy in this Land. Page. 1. CHAP. II. Of violent resistance to the Powers ordained of God, by mere private persons their Subjects Page 12. CHAP. III. That such as are invested with sacred and inviolable Sovereignty, have divine exemption and privilege of impunity from their own Subjects. Page 71. CHAP. IU. Anent the following of Phineas fact; of heroic or extraordinary impulsions, and concerning some courses taken at our first Reformation, and their exemplariness. Page 104. PART I. CHAP. I. The Libeler his endeavours to confound and dissolve humane Societies, and to overthrow Magistracy in this Land. GOD Almighty, having made Man a rational Creature and fit for society, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the Philosopher speaketh) hath appointed (besides aeconomical Societies) the coalition of people into greater Bodies, consisting of many Families under one Political Government, for mutual help to be given by men (one to another) in their necessities; for protection both of the whole Body, and of every Member interessed in the Society, and for the procuring of the good and happiness of all in this life, and in a better. That these Societies might be orderly regulated in their acts, the God of order hath appointed superior Powers and Heads over the multitudes of men, in several bounds of the world where he hath disposed their habitations. Magistracy, God's Ordinance, is that golden clasp and band, that holds together humane Societies in a consistent unity, that men's corruptions may not dash them one upon another, as potsherds, to their mutual ruin and general confusion. Magistracy is as the vital Spirits of humane Societies, without which they were but as dead carcases; it is as the Nerves and Sinews in the Body, without which there could be no right motion. Hence there are no Nations so barbarous, but by natural instinct and the dictates of reason, are led together into politic associations for their subsistence in general, for the mutual help one of another, and for the protection of the weaker against the violence and wrongs of the stronger. And by a divine instinct, great multitudes of men embodied together, are brought to humble themselves and submit to Magistracy of one sort or another; which is not a mere device of wise men, but an holy Ordinance of the only wise God. Vocatio est (saith Calv. lib. 4. inst. cap. 20. S. 4.) non modo sancta & legittima coram Deo, sed sacerrima & in totâ mortalium vitâ longè honestissima. Now, albeit the Lord hath not, by any precept, particularly determined the bounds of every embodied political Society (there being some greater, some lesser, acting under their several Heads and Sovereign Magistrates) Yet when politic Bodies are settled in voluntary associations, or what ever way in the course of Divine Providence they have been reduced to live under the same Laws and Authorities, and have continued long in the union of a common interest, under the protection of Magistracy, to break off from the body in seditious secessions, cannot but be displeasing to God. And they are no other than Firebrands, confounders of humane Society, fighters against God and his Ordinance, who (working upon the advantages they have from people's discontentments upon whatever pretence) do instigate them either to cut off themselves from the body of the Commonwealth, whereof they are Members, or to fall with violence upon the whole body, (though they be the far lesser part thereof) or to invade the inviolable (by Subjects) Majesty of the supreme Authority, which bears the sacred impress of God. How far this Libeler goeth this way, shall appear by his Tenets. This libeler's mind is plainly this, That when the ends of Government are manifestly perverted, the injured persons (one or moe) obligation thereunto ceaseth, the band thereof is dissolved, they are liberate from it, and do relapse into their primaeve liberty and privilege; and as the similitude of their case and exigence of cause doth require, may upon the very same principles again associate and join for their better defence and preservation, as they did at first enter into Societies. Thus he, Pag. 16. Pag. 150. And further he avows, That not only no obedience, but no allegiance (n. b.) is to be given to any created Power on earth, but with this restriction, in defence of Religion and Liberty, according to the Covenants, Pag. 177. And what Religion he means, in application to the hypothesis of the Times, he explains plainly, Pag. 54. where he says, The extirpation of Prelacy is the main covenanted Religious Duty, in the endeavour whereof, all the zeal of the faithful should be concentred. And as to the liberty of the Subjects, the determining of what it is, must not be referred to the Subject's Representatives in Parliament: For, saith he, Pag. 102. The Parliament, under pretence of vindicating and declaring the King's just Right and Prerogative, have wholly corrupted and innovated the well-tempered and firm constitution of our ancient Government, and utterly subverted the liberty of the Subject, Pag. 95. So that what this liberty is, must be referred to the private discretive judgement of every man, and this must determine him to his Acts of violent resistance, and vindication of liberty according to the Covenant. And in reference to the case of the Nation in these Times, the man is so far transported as to teach the people, That their liberty is so far lost, that they are reduced to the condition of a most insupportable and unnatural conquest, which should be a most just cause and provocation to all ingenuous Spirits and good Patriots, to undertake the asserting of their own liberty upon the greatest peril, Page 116. And that the pressures and grievances of the Nation, by reason only of that Court of Commission for executing the Laws anent Church matters, do far exceed all the pressures and injuries of that Spanish inquisition, whereupon the United Provinces have justified and approved their revolt from the King of Spain, Page 126. So that this man's design is clear from his words, to dissolve and confound this Kingdom, to move them who will be taken in his snare, to renounce Allegiance to the King; to revolt from him, as having better cause than the United Provinces had to revolt from the King of Spain; to combine themselves in new Societies to their own mind (they being now relapsed into their primaeve liberty, and the obligation to the Government being loosed) and that every man and every Party, as they find themselves strong enough, should upon their own discretive judgement of what is their due civil Liberty, as well as what is right Religion; and upon their greatest peril undertake not only violent resistance of all powers above them, but valiant vindication of Religion and Liberties, and reforming what they think amiss vi & armis, even to the punishing all and whatsoever person that will oppose them in their way. The particulars shall be after spoken to, but now more generally we consider his fundamental Doctrines of confusion. That the true ends of instituting civil Government, are the true happiness of People here and hereafter, and the glory of God: and that Magistrates and Governors are obliged to prosecute these ends, no judicious Christian will question. All the question is, anent the Duty of the fearers of God, in the case of the perversion of the ends of Government by these in whose hand it is, whether, when this perversion is manifest, the band and tie to the Government ceaseth, as to the persons injured thereby; and whither this be the case, as matters are now stated, that private persons, or any number of them, are for the present (supposed) perversions of the ends of Government, disobliged from all ties to the same, and relapsed into their primaeve liberty and privilege, to combine in Societies which are to their mind (as at first they did associate themselves in the political bodies whereof now they are members) for their own good and preservation. As for the general position, or affirmative resolution to the former question, it is undoubtedly both unchristian and unreasonable. When was there at any time greater perversion and straying from the ends of Government, than was in the times of many of the holy Prophets of God, and in the times of Christ, his holy Apostles and the primitive Christians, who were both replenished with much light to know their duties, and much zeal to act for the honour of God against all perils and dangers whatsoever lying in their way? Government was perverted by manifest Idolatry and horrid Tyranny, many monsters of men possessing the thrones of Sovereignty: yet, look over all the sacred Writings of the holy Prophets, look to the history of the life and actions of Christ and his Apostles, or to the history of the great Lights of the primitive Church for many hundreds of years, and see if any of the teachers taught such doctrine, that in case of the manifest perversion of the ends of Government, people did relapse into their primaeve liberty and privilege, to combine with whom they pleased, to forsake the union with these political bodies with which they were conjoined, or that they were liberated from the obligation and band to the civil order and Government under which they were; or if that was the sense of any of the godly, zealous Christians, and fearers of God in these times, who always keeped themselves pure from sinning against God, refusing obedience unto men's unlawful Commandments, but the Doctrine of these new Christians never came in their hearts, that they should make secessions from the civil Societies wherein they lived, so long as they keeped within the bounds over which such or such Government was, and account all their obligation to abused Government dissolved: Yea upon the contrary, as there are never to be found amongst the people fearing God, any such renting of the States and Commonwealths they lived in, approven of God, or enjoined by his Prophets in his name; So, in reproving sins and menacing judgements against these in Authority, (albeit they grievously abused their places) yet the Prophets, Apostles, and Christ also, studied to preserve respects to the Sovereignty and Powers set over People; and while they warned all from the highest to the lowest to amend their ways, they guarded against seditious dissolutions of the Commonwealth on any pretext, never prescribing rebellion and revolting (the greater sin) as the cure of Tyranny or irreligiousness in the Actings of Powers. What abusers of Government, and perverters of the ends thereof, were Tiberius Claudius, Nero, Domitian? etc. yet Christ will have Caesar's due given him; and his Apostles press subjection to them, Honour to be given them, Tribute to be paid to them, Prayers to be made for them; not for destroying them and their Government, but for preserving their Persons and sanctifying their hearts, that they might govern rightly and peaceably, (a Prayer Point-blank contrary to endeavours to disturb their Kingdoms by seditious courses, to dissolve and dissipate them, and to take vengeance on their persons.) So that they must needs be the disciples (not of Christ, or Paul, or Peter) but of Judas of Galilee, and of Theudas, Acts 5.36, 37. who upon account of perversion of Government, teach any part of the people to dissolve and confound the Societies whereof they are members, and that the obligation being loosed from the Government, they may break off from it, and erect themselves in new Combinations and Societies with whom they think best. If this may pass for good divinity, the grand enemy shall never want opportunity of casting Fire-balls in humane Societies, and working confusion and every evil work. But as this position is very dissonant from Religion, so it is no less to sound reason, for it hath a clear tendency, to the breaking and crumbling in pieces of all humane political Societies, all Commonwealths and Kingdoms of the World, which no wit of Man can preserve from dissolution, if once this Principle be drunk into the hearts of People and sink there: For by this man's opinion, the judgement of the perversion of the ends of Government in tyranny, oppression, etc. is always put over to the discretion of the sufferers of prejudice by it, (were they never so few, in comparison of the whole body of the people) they may pronounce upon the same, and according to their discretive judgement, of the injurious perverting of Government, determine their actions, for renouncing or revolting from the society in which, and Government under which, they are, and nothing should hinder them from this, but want of probable capacity to through their work, (as he often speaks) So wise and cautious must his followers be, (though not conscientious) that in working a mischief, they light not upon a mischief. Good God to what times are we reserved, wherein the unmeasurable audaciousness of men, dare present such poison to a Christian People; and to attempt the breaking them in pieces by such Doctrines, which both Religion and sound Reason abhors? Dare this Libeler say, that this is a fundamental constitution of political Societies, that at the arbitrement and lust of any minor part of private persons, pretending a perversion of the ends of Government, (a pretence that will never be wanting, to malcontents and malapert wicked ones even katherines and highlandish thiefs, and it is real to them, if they themselves be admitted Judges) they may make secession from the Society in which they are embodied, and renounce their obligation to the Government thereof? Is not such a principle, rather contra-fundamental to all humane combined Societies? and were it at first entering of the Society, expressly proposed, that when ever any minor party should account the ends of Government perverted, they should be at their primaeve liberty again, to break off from all the magistratical Order, and from society with the major party of these, with whom they are combined: Would not the overture of such a condition be rejected with indignation and upon just reason? for that were to open a gap to continual seditions, divisions and fractions. And all rational men would judge▪ it were better not to join in society with such men, then to join in such terms. Again, suppose there be a breaking off from a magistratical Power, and major part of a society, upon pretention (which will never be wanting to cover sedition and confusion, such is the corruption of men) of a perversion of the ends of Government; the party making secession, may haply meet with that same measure they gave to the Community, wherewith they were formerly joined. For, when they have combined and embodied themselves in a Society, if a minor party arise amongst themselves, with the same accusations against them, which they had against the body they did separate from; Must not that same party, have the same privilege of Primaeve liberty, to combine and erect a corporation by themselves, which they claimed before? will not they plead, that the obligation to the Government and Society ceaseth, and they are free to erect a new one? And where shall there be a stand, till humane Societies be miserably broken in pieces, which seems to be Satan's design, by this Man's Doctrine? Further, can this assertion subsist, that neither alledgiance or fidelity, nor obedience, is to be given unto any created power, but in defence of Religion and Liberty? That obedience is not to be given unto any Creature on earth, against Religion, or the Revealed Will of God, shall be easily granted; we abhor the very thought of so doing. Again, it shall not be said, that obedience is to be given to Powers, against the Liberty competent to us, as Subjects, and consistent with Sovereignty; yet so, that the measure of that Liberty, must not be made by every private man's will; but by the Declarature of the Parliament, representative of the Subjects, which best knows what thereunto belongs: But to say, that all (not only obedience, but) alledgiance and fidelity, due to any created power, is indispensibly restricted to this qualification, in Defence of Religion and Liberty, viz. of the subject, is a most false assertion. It is known, that a restriction excludes all other cases, which are not in the restrictve proposition included; now it is certain, there may be cases, wherein we ought to obey the Magistrate, and yet the act of obedience cannot be properly and directly said, to be either in defence of Religion, or the Liberty of the Subject; there may be some causes that properly concern his own honour; wherein defence of Religion is not concerned, (the Magistrate perhaps not being of our Religion) and far less defence of the Liberty of the Subject, (unless by a very remote and unnecessary consequence) yet am I bound to him in causes concerning his honour; this made the Ministers that disputed with the Doctors of Aberdeen, decline to acknowledge that clause of the first Covenant, in defence of Religion &c. to be limitative or restrictive of duty to the King, affirming it only to be specificativen, aming duties to him in some respects, or in respect to some things, not excluding others: Yea, the General Assembly, 1639. will not have that clause in the Covenant restrictive; for in their supplication to the Commissioner and Council, they speak thus: We have solemnly sworn and do swear, not only our mutual concurrence and assistance, for the cause of Religion, and to the utmost of our power, with our Means and Lives, to stand to the defence of our Dread Sovereign, His Person and Authority, in the preservation of true Religion, Liberties and Laws of this Kirk and Kingdom; but also (n. b.) in every cause that may concern His Majesty's Honour, shall concur with our friends and followers, as we shall be required, etc. So Duty and Obedience to the King is there extended, beyond what is expressly mentioned in the Covenant, (in defence of Religion and Liberties.) But further, as to the point of Alledgiance or Fidelity, that is another matter then Obedience: Alledgiance to a King imports, owning him as Lawful and Rightful King, and that none others have power over him; together with fidelity to his Person, Crown and Dignity, against all conspiracies and treason. Obedience is the result of this acknowledged Sovereignty, (where commands appear lawful.) A man may keep Alledgiance and Fidelity to the King, albeit sometimes there may be commands given, which cannot be obeyed, because of God's countermand; many learned Priests and Papists in England, took the Oath of Alledgiance, when first it was emitted and enjoined, albeit they thought they could not give obedience to the King, as to matters of Religion. But this man is plain in his assertion, that no Alledgiance is due to the King, except with this restriction, in defence of Religion: And (as he said) a main part of his Religion is to erect Presbytery, and root out Prelacy; So that if Presbytery be not defended, people are taught to renounce Alledgiance to the King. How contrary is this to the Confession of Faith, cap. 23. S. 4. Difference in Religion doth not (saith the Confession) make void the Magistrates just and legal Authority, nor free the people from their due obedience to him: But this man will have no Alledgiance due to him, nor Obedience, but in defence of Religion; which it is like he will not defend, if he be of a different persuasion in matters of Religion, and so must his Authority be made void. The contrary Thesis we must rest upon, that although a supreme Magistrate defend not Religion, yet Alledgiance and Fidelity is always due to him, and Obedience also in all things lawful. It is the Lords way for keeping humane Societies from gross disorders, to allow to such as are in supreme Power by lawful calling, the honour due unto their place, even although in the main things they pervert the ends of Government; not glorifying God by advancing true Religion, but dishonouring him by false Religion, or seducing others to their evil way, and persecuting them who follow not their unlawful commandments. Yet, where administrations of Justice in civil things are tolerably managed, and civil Societies by Magistratical Authority kept in tolerable order, (that there be no general out-breaking in outrageous oppressions) God will have due respects paid to the places of Authority and persons therein installed, and will reckon dreadfully with them for any perversions of the ends of Government, in his own time. Though Caesar give not God his due, yet it is Christ's mind that we give Caesar his due, and his Apostles mind that he should be honoured; not for his personal faults or abuse of his power, but because he is invested with power from God; which though he abuseth, yet it remains the Ordinance of God. And hereunto Mr. Calvin fully agrees, lib. 4. instit. cap. 20. S. 24, 25. etc. where at length he asserts, That Alledgiance and Obedience (in things lawful) is due even to the worst of Princes, and who do most manifestly pervert the ends of Government, by private Subjects, (of which our question is now) S▪ 25. Si Dei verbum respicimus longius nos deducet (viz. then to give alledgiance to good Princes) ut non eorum modo principum imperio subditi simus qui probe & qua debent fide, munere suo erga nos defunguntur sed omnium qui quoquo modo rerum potiuntur, etiamsi nihil minus praestent quam quod ex officio erat principum. Again, Omnes (saith he, speaking of evil Princes) illa sancta Majestate sunt praediti, qua legittimam potestatem instruxit Deus. Again, In homine deterrimo, honoreque omni indignissimo, penes quem modo sit publica potestas, praeclara illa & divina potestas residet, quam Dominus justitiae & judicii sui ministris verbo suo detulit, proinde à subditis eadem reverentia & dignatione habendus est, quantum ad publicam obedientiam attinet qua optimum Regem, si daretur, habituri essent. Again, S. 27. he says of an evil King, Assumptus est in Regiam Majestatem, quam violare, nefas est. Again, Nunquam in animum nobis seditiosae illae cogitationes veniant tractandum esse pro meritis Regem, nec aequum esse, ut subditos nos ei praestemus, qui vicissim Regem nobis se non praestet. Any may see, that in the matter of Civil Government, Mr. Calvin was of another and a better spirit than these men, who inflame the people with their seditious Doctrine; and tells them, if the King do not his duty, their alledgiance to him and obligation to his Government ceaseth; and no alledgiance nor obedience due to him, when he does not (or does contrary to) his duty. But, 2. As the Position in itself is most unchristian and irrational, so the application of it to the case in these Times, made by this Master of confusion, is most unjust; for (not to speak of the first times of Reformation, wherein he says, that there was such perversion of the ends of Government, as made the obligation of the injured Subjects thereto to cease, Pag. 16.) he repeats the same more fully, Pag. 150. to justify the late Insurrection against the King; as if now there were such manifest and notorious perversion of the ends of Government, that the band thereof is loosed, and people are relapsed into their primaeve liberty, to join in new Societies and Combinations as they see fit, rejecting the old. Now, may not any see the desperate design of this Libeler and his like, to dissipate and dissolve the immemorially settled frame of this Nation and Kingdom, which through divine Providence, hath in many generations subsisted under our lawful Sovereigns, for the common benefit of the Subjects at home, and to the honour and renown of the Nation abroad; yea, and to the glory of divine Providence, which hath through many storms, in several ages, preserved us in this comfortable constitution. But behold, a foul gap is now opened to let in all confusion upon us, and to dissipate and break us in pieces miserably, (if such wicked Doctrine take upon people, God guard their hearts, we hope sanctiores sunt aures & corda auditorum quam linguae Doctorum, as to this) Now it is left to the arbitrement and lust of every party, even lesser party of the people, to break off the old union with the Nation, to erect themselves into new Societies and Combinations, as being now as free as if they had not been members of this Nation; they are relapsed into their primaeve liberty, and now every Paroch in Galloway is allowed to cantonize themselves into a free Republic, or to become a little Kingdom of Ivetot, or make Combinations, and Heads of these Combinations, as they see fit; for they are liberate and loosed from the old Society and Government, because the ends thereof are so manifestly perverted: And wherein, forsooth? Doth not the true Protestant Religion, as it is held forth in Scripture, and was publicly confessed by our first Reformers, (which Confession is registered, Parl. 1. K. James 6.) through God's mercy, continue with us, without variation from it in the least? Doth not the King's Majesty protect and advance this blessed Truth of the Saving Gospel, and encourage and invite all according to his power to embrace it? Is he not willing and desirous that the Laws be vigorously executed against Papists, and all perverters of this sound Doctrine? If there be deficiency in execution, the blame lies elsewhere then upon him. Are God's people, or any people in the Land, spoiled of their lawful civil Liberties? What one thing hath he done without consent of the people's Representatives in Parliament, at which any may except as a grievance? What burden hath he laid upon their Estates, but by Law, of by their own consent in a necessary exigence? What should be the great ground then of so horrid a dismembering of the body of this Commonwealth and secession from the civil Society, and from subjection to the lawful Government thereof, as this man teaches and would persuade? What is that so fundamental perversion of the ends of Government, that may, to any minor party that pleases, bear the Weight of a rational licence to reject the Government and the Society of the Commonwealth, to erect themselves into new separate and politic Bodies? Or, that may persuade them, as the case stands, they are relapsed into their primaeve liberty, like the Fishes of the Sea that have no Ruler? Or that now being liberate, they are free (as they were at first) to combine themselves in new Societies as they see fit? It must surely be some great thing that should warrant such great actions. It were too much to question their judgement, to assert, that they indeed think, that because the moderate Episcopacy, and inspection of some Ministers over others in several parts of the Land to hold them to their duties, (established by former Laws) is now reestablished by the King, with consent of his people in Parliament, (the lawfulness of which shall be afterwards spoken to) That therefore this, and legal courses for carrying on of this, is sufficient ground for so unnatural a rupture, although the King should not, for the pleasure of an inconsiderable party, recede from owning and prosecuting his just Laws concerning this; experience having abundantly taught, that giving way to evil humours and unreasonable demands, is but a mean to provoke to greater insolences. But under such pretensions against a lawful way, surely something lurketh that doth not yet appear: For, supposing a change of the established way, it is folly to think the matter should there rest; this man and his party are of another spirit then to be satisfied with such low matters, (were they according to his mind) for all, alongs in his Naphtali and Apology Prerogative is the mark that is shot at as well as Prelacy, (as we shall see) the one is as great an eyesore as the other. And were all other quarrels that seemed to touch upon Religion laid aside, yet is not the battle done without retrenchment of Royal Prerogative (even in civil things) which as well as in Ecclesiastical, is disputed down in the Apology, but most weakly and foolishly. And still also, the liberty of the Subject should be a subject of controversy; wherein this highflown man, his Party and complices, will not have the Parliament to be Judge, what is the true Liberty of the People (consistent with Sovereignty) or what not, (for this man sets forth the late Parliament, as the great betrayers of the Liberty of the People) but every Covenanter must make his discretive judgement his rule, to determine his actings for the Liberty of the People. And if there be any Party in sufficient capacity to take the fields, they will, and must, according to their discretion, carve out the measure of the Subject's Liberties, (which it is like will be large enough, at least, toward themselves, if not toward others) and will account themselves bound by Covenant, (according to their own interpretation) to fight to death for what they count Liberty; and to forsake the Government and Society of others in the Land, (though they be the far less part) and erect new Combinations of their own under new Heads, that they may enjoy their Covenanted Liberty, which the perverted Government deprives them of, and from which therefore they are loosed and liberated for ever, and reduced to their primaeve liberty to choose Government and Societies as best liketh them. Oh miserable confusion! that men of perverse spirits strive to drive this poor Nation into! Were Episcopacy out of ●he Nation and out of the World, there have been and are in this Time, such pestilent Principles, vented by perverse Teachers, tending to the perpetual disquietness of the State of the Kingdom; that if People be possessed with the same, there is no security for the most just and justly acting Authority, nor any rest nor peace amongst people, but continual stir are to be looked for, as there are occasions of Firebrands to inflame them. But it is to be hoped, that the wise and godly management of the present Government continued, will in time wear out that irreverence to Sovereign Authority, and unquietness of a seditious humour, that hath too much prevailed by the principles and practices of many in these Times. CHAP. II. Of violent resistance to the Powers ordained of God, by mere private persons their Subjects. THe point of violent resistance to the Supreme Magistrate by Subjects, hath been hotly and violently debated both elsewhere and in those Lands upon sad occasions. The more moderate Asserters of it, do not give the liberty of so doing unto mere private persons, nor against Princes integrae Majestatis, or who have come to their Kingdoms without pactions of restraint put on them by the people: nor do they at all grant the liberty of this resistance, but in the case of immanest Tyranny and extremest Cruelty, against the Body or most considerable part of the Body of the Commonwealth or such like, or in case of sudden personal extra-judicial, illegal invasions, importing irreparable loss of life, etc. (wherein judicious Royalists will not much differ from others) nor do they grant a liberty to proceed beyond the bounds of inculpata tutela, innocent and harmless self-defence; for if either there be a preventive invasion of the Magistrate, or a succeeding revenge if he be brought under, all agree that this exceeds moderamen inculpatae tutelae, so men are not properly self-defenders, but Magistrate-invaders. And whatever power of defence is allowed to inferior Magistrates with the People, yet, that mere Subjects, or private persons, should take on them power of judging or punishing the Supreme Magistrate, or punishing him, it is abhorrent from the common sense of Christian and Learned men. But this Libeler goes a great length: for, not only doth he allow the body of the People, with inferior Magistrates, to make violent resistance to the King, whensoever they think he wrongs them; but allows any part of the People (only requiring that they make sure that they are in probable capacity to carry through their matters) to rise in Arms and make violent resistance to all the Magistrates supreme and subordinate; yea, and against all the major part of the people. And albeit Magistrates act according to Laws agreed upon by the representatives of the people; yet this man allows any part of the People (though no Magistrate be amongst them) to take Arms against all Magistrates, and violently resist them, when they think their Laws either unjust, or the punishments executed unjust; and he maintains, that passive subjection to unjust Laws and Punishments, where there is power to make active violent resistance, is a greater sin than active obedience to unlawful Commands of Magistrates. This seems strange Doctrine, but more and worse will be seen in the following Chapter But that he may get no wrong, look upon his own words, (referring what he speaks of punishing Magistrates to the following Chapter.) There is (saith he, Page 8.) a necessity of Convocations and Combinations, not only without, but even against Authority; and it is sufficiently warranded before God and all men for necessary and just ends. Again, the power of self-defence, Page 14. (as he calls violent resisting the Magistrate) is competent to all men by the instinct of pure nature, and is the principal rule of righteousness, and a privilege competent to all men separately and jointly, not needing any other prerequisite, but intolerable injury, and is completed in exercise, by a probable capacity to encourage to it. And to suffer injury under ptetext of the good of the Commonwealth, is for the delusion of an empty name and for the lusts of others, really to deprive a man's self of all share and benefit in it. Page 15. propelling by force injuries done in the cause of Religion, is the justest quarrel, that men in their primaeve liberty could be engaged into. And, Page 16, 17. Combinations for assistance in violent opposition of the Magistrate, when the ends of Government are perverted (which must be referred to the discretion of them, who minds insurrection) are necessary by the Law of Nature, of Charity, and in order to God's glory; and for violation of this duty, of delivering the oppressed from Magistrates, judgements comes upon people. And, Page 18, 19 not only power of self-defence, but vindicative and reforming power is in any part of the people against the whole and against all Magistrates, and if they use it not, judgement comes on (supposing their capacity probable to bear them forth) and they shall be punished for their connivance, and not acting in way of vindication of crimes and reforming abuses. And, Page 28. they are but Flatterers, and Men that have renounced Conscience, who say, that absolute subjection in suffering may be given to Authority abusing their power, and not absolute obedience to their Commands; and whatsoever reason (saith he) pleads for absolute subjection in suffering, will far more rationally and plausibly infer unlimited and absolute obedience. Absolute obedience may be more rationally yielded, then absolute subjection to suffering. Page 157. to resist and rise up against persons abusing Authority, is to adhere to God; and Page 155. The late rising was altogether lawful, righteous and necessary. But, what needs insisting on his justifying of any number of private persons, rising up and resisting the whole Magistrates and Body of the People, when ever they think they have cause? seeing this is the main scope of his Book, and more too, even to state them in a punitive power of all who are against them, and a power to pull down all Authorities that are in their way, as after shall more clearly appear. But upon this point of resistance, (which he lispeth out as innocent, harmless self-defence) it is fit we should now (abstracting from the other questions of private persons vindicative and punitive power, till the next Chapter) speak somewhat. It is the subtlety of Satan and of man's corruption, that most horrid sins and crimes, are covered under very smooth terms, and cloaked with some Vizard of Virtue, or with something so plausible and sweet to self-nature, that few there are who will not own it. Innocent self-defence and a man's preservation of his own being, is so plausible a Plea, that every one in any vexation that comes upon them, from any (justly or unjustly) are much inclined to take hold of it. It is true, the God of nature, who hath given a being to all creatures, hath also given them inclinations and propensions, to preserve themselves against opposition, destroying nature, the very inanimate creatures have this: Fire preserves and defends itself against water when it is cast upon it; there is a fight between the two contrary qualities of these creatures, the fire with a noise resisting the water, that it be not quenched with the contrary qualities of that creature. So also are the sensitive creatures, the beasts are carried (impetu naturae) to oppose every thing that tends to their destruction, and to preserve their own being, until they be overpowered: And all this self-defence, is without sin; for they being only under nature's Law, and not under any Legal restraints of the exercise of their self-defending power, by God's word, nor under any rule of reason in the exercise thereof, do and may to the uttermost (in all cases) endeavour their self-preservation, and nothing can hinder them from it, but major vis, and a Physical force greater than theirs is: And this self-defending or preserving power and propension, God hath given also unto Men, yet otherwise then to inanimate creatures, or unto beasts; for these being under no other Law or Order, but that of mere Nature, that only seeks its own preservation, and labours in self-defence always, against all things afflicting nature caeca impetu, that self-defence is always sinless. But Man's natural propension to defend himself, is subordinated unto, and limited by, the higher Laws of Reason and Grace, and regulated by respects to the eternal good of the Soul, in following duties to God, (albeit with vexation and trouble upon the outward man) a rational and gracious man, will advert lest in self-preservation, as to his body or outward state, he bring not on self-destruction, as to his Soul: It was wisely said by Thomas, 2●. 2●. quest. 70. art. 4. ad 1. Ideo Homini data est Ratio, (and I may add Gratia) ut eá ad quae natura inclinat, non passim, sed secundum rationis, vel gratia ordinem exequatur, & ideo non quaelibet defensio sui est licita sed quae fit cum debito moderamine. It is too gross Divinity, Lex Rex, p. 344. Apol. p. 162. to bring arguments from Beasts, (who being under no Law of Reason nor Grace, to limit their propensions, may always in all imaginable cases, defend themselves with force) to persuade men that they may do the like, and that their propension for their external preservation, is no more under any restraining rule, to stop the exercise of it, then that of Beasts is. There are many cases of Rational and Gracious restraint, of the exercise of that natural propension for self-preservation, upon Men, which are not upon Beasts. For, 1. the Libeler, (it is hoped) will not allow self-defence, (of violent and forcible defence, not of moral, we do here always speak) or violent resistance of the Magistrate, when Men are not in probable Capacity to mend themselves, or when it is seen to be to no purpose; In this case, he will say it is no fault, for a Man not to use violent resistance, because Reason tells him, it is to no purpose; self-defence of a rational creature, should not be merely natural, but rational; it is natural to a Man to defend himself, as it is to a Beast, but not in the same way, not always when a Beast (upon which, there is no restraint of reason) may do it. It will not be denied, that the obligation of violent self-preservation ceaseth, when a Man is put out (by a Physical-force,) of all probable Capacity to help himself. 2. A Man who is justly condemned to death, both according to a just Law, and by a just process according to the Law; though he were in probable capacity to defend himself, with using Force and Violence upon the Magistrate: Yet were it utterly unlawful for him, to use violent self-defence against the Magistrate, with re-offending him; (what ever may be said of Flying, in such a case, when a door is opened, which is no violent resisting) For, as it is a sinful resisting of the Ordinance of God, to refuse Obedience to the Magistrates Lawful Commands; So it is no less sinful resistance of the Ordinance of God, to resist and re-offend the Magistrate lawfuly punishing, or to use force against him for self-preservation, when we are by Providence, brought under the hand of Justice; if the violence used by the Magistrate, on the Person legally sentenced, be just, the violence of the party against the Magistrate, cannot but be unjust and sinful; for, the violence cannot be matterially just upon both sides. Here is a clear case, where nature's Law of self-preservation, (at least in a way of violence) must cease and be silent, before the Law of Reason and the Will of God, revealed to Men: They are too bold, and come too near to Blaspheme God, (Lex Rex) who say, That it were a mighty defect in Divine Providence, that Men should not have at large a liberty to defend themselves violently, as Beasts have; And that Men were in a worse condition than Beasts, if as Beasts have always power to defend themselves violently, with their Horns, Heels, Teeth, etc. So Men should not have as large a liberty in every case, to use violence upon Magistrates, putting them to vexation, or perhaps troubling them, in life, state, etc. Men have nobler Prerogatives above Beasts, albeit, they be restrained of that brutish liberty, which Beasts have always and against all. 3. May not the exercise of this privilege, of self-defence and violent resistance, be restrained by the Grace of God, and the power of His Command for submission, abiding upon a Man's spirit? How easily could Isaac, have defended himself, against the violence of his aged Father, in binding him, to be laid on the Altar, to have his throat cut, and his body burnt? Yet, conscience of the pleasure and command of the Sovereign Lord of life and death, makes him, to forbear self-defence, or violent resistance; neither was this forbearance, the sin of self-murder, or against the sixth Command; but a highly Gracious act and eminent Obedience, to the first and greatest Commandment. Forbearance of self-defence and violent resistance, was there a virtue; an act of obedience and absolute subjection to God, the Lord of his life, not much beneath Abraham's obedience, that is so highly commended from Heaven. 4. Are there not also some cases, not of this extraordinary sort, wherein self-defence, which this Libeler foolishly calls the supreme Law of Righteousness, and principal Rule of it, Page 14. (of which we shall hear a little anon) must cease: As, may not the defence of our temporal life in some case cease, for the preservation of the eternal life of our neighbour, when it comes to that, that the defence of the one should be the certain loss of the other? 1 John 3.16. Temporalem vitam suam pro aeterna vita proximi non dubitabit Christianus amittere, August. ad Consent. lib. 6. which the Schoolmen have driven so far on, that they have thought, that a man in the state of Grace, being invaded by another in the state of sin, ought rather to be content to be slain by the private aggressor, then to slay him being in such a state of sin and damnation: to which we shall hardly subscribe, lest it should strike against the lawfulness of the wars of godly men against wicked invaders; justice may, and must be done, in wars and otherwise, whatever be the souls estate of the sufferer; that is to be referred to God, and is sealed amongst his secrets: yet, that there may be such cases, that (when need is) the preservation of our own temporal life may be forborn, for the certain preservation of the soul of another, seems agreeable to the cited Scripture. 5. Doth not the obligation to self-defence cease, (speaking of self-defence as to the temporal life) for the public good and preservation of the Commonwealth, or of the Head of the Commonwealth, the King? I know this Libeler jeers at a man's suffering, (under pretext of the good of the Commonwealth) intolerable and inevitable injuries) and says, It is but for the delusion of an empty name, only for the lusts of others, really to deprive a man's self of his whole share and interest in the Commonwealth, Pag. 15. Yet, better Divines than he a great deal, have concluded it as most rational, that a man is bound to suffer the greatest extremity of death, rather than that for sparing of his suffering, the Commonwealth, or Head of the Commonwealth, or main public Person, should suffer. Dr. Ames. Cas. Consc. lib. 5. cap. 31. q. 3. puts the case of a Tyrants invading a City, and threatening vastation to it unless one innocent person (whom he should name) might be delivered to him; he resolves, That the innocent person tenetur jure naturali pro totius Reipublicae salute se morti offer, & Respublica potest ●um neque retinere neque defendere, sed urgere cum ut officium suum hac in parte praestet. He accounts it the duty of the innocent person in that case, to offer himself to death for the safety of the whole Commonwealth; and by natural Right and Law he is bound to this, and the Commonwealth is not in this case bound to defend him. Certainly, this is far contrair to this man's Divinity; who will have none to suffer under pretext of the good of the Commonwealth, if they be innocent, (whether really or in their own eyes) For why, (says he) that is for an empty name and lusts of others, to deprive a man's self of his share in the Commonwealth. What then? if a man do lose his share in the Commonwealth and be found in the way of his duty, he is no loser, he gets a better share than that is. If a General command a Soldier, for the certain good of the Army, (upon the well-being whereof, the good of the Commonwealth depends) to go to such a part or post, where, in his own mind, he saw certain death tristing with him; would this Author teach the Soldier to say, Shall I expose myself to certain death for an empty name of the good of Army and Commonwealth, and at the lust of the General, lose all my share and interest both in Army and Commonwealth? I will not do it; he offers me intolerable injury and inevitable in this injunction: it is a case like inflicting death upon me. 6. It is agreed amongst the Learned, that self-preservation (as to temporal life) when it comes in competition with the preservation of the King or Head of the Commonwealth, or a public Person most necessary to the Commonwealth, must cease and cede thereunto; as the Hand in the natural Body will be cast up (though it should be cut off) to hold off a deadly stroke from the Head, Ames. Cas. Consc. lib. 5. cap. 7. Thes. 14. In bonis temporalibus tenetur quisque personam publicam sibi ipsi praeferre, bonum enim totius pluris faciendum est, quam bonum alicujus partis. And, Lex Rex, amongst many things wrong, hath this which is right, Page 335. I think (saith he) that a private man should rather suffer the King to kill him, then that he should kill the King; because he is not to prefer the life of a private man to the life of a public man. Thus he rightly, (however inconsonantly to his other Doctrines.) If the case come to be, that the King is in manifest hazard of his life, and that I a private man must either lose my life, or he his life; my self-preservation must cease for the public good, and I am to prefer his preservation to mine own. But this man says, Self-defence (the question now is about violent self-defence, as to the temporal life) is a principal rule of righteousness, whereunto the great command of love to our neighbour, by God's Law, is resolved, and whereby it is interpreted, P. 14. therefore it is to be preferred to all duties to men, according to this man's mind. True it is, there is a due order of our charity and love to men and our neighbours; and true love to ourselves, is indeed the rule and measure of love to our neighbour: we are first to love ourselves, and then our neighbour as ourselves, (not as much, but as truly and sincerely; for it is not the quantity, but the quality of love, not equality but sisimilitude of love to our neighbour, in proportion of that to ourselves, that is required.) But it is untrue, that in the exercise of this love of ourselves, in self-defence or preservation of our bodies, stands the principal rule of righteousness: For, there may be cases, (whereof some are pointed at) wherein a man is bound to prefer the preservation of others, to the preservation or defence of his own natural life; and yet in so doing, a man doth truly love himself more than others, in doing his duty to others, although with the loss of his own life and surceasing the defence of it, (se magis diligit ad finem suum ultimum, as the School speaks.) In following his duty toward others, and therein not defending his own life, he loves himself best, in regard of keeping the way to the enjoying of the universal and eternal good. Ames. lib. 5. Consc. cap. 7. saith well, Quamvis vita mea sit mihi magis conservanda quam alterius vita per se non tamen quam alterius vita & mea virtus. A man is rather bound to preserve another man's life in doing his own duty, than his own life simply, and in following his duty, he preserves his best life, though he lose the worst. But too many are so much upon self-defence and preservation of the natural life by any means, that in preserving their bodies, they destroy their souls; and so do not indeed love themselves so much and so orderly as they ought to do. But the great knot of the question anent self- defence is this, whether mere private persons, one or moe, separately or jointly, when they are or think themselves unjustly afflicted, and extremely injuriously handled by the Magistrate, or Supreme Power, proceeding according to Laws agreed to, betwixt himself and the body of the Community? whither or not (upon supposition that these Laws are not just and right) may private persons defend themselves against the violence of the Magistrate thus proceeding, even by violent re-offending; yea, in order to their own defence, cut off the Prince or Magistrate whatsoever, or their Ministers and Officers standing in their way, or when they are punishing them and afflicting them according to Law? This is the true state of the Controversy, at this time: and needless it were to run out upon what the two Martyrs (as Napth. calls them, Page 27.) Lex Rex, the Book might have been better termed Exlex Exrex) and the Apology hath set down tediously, touching Scotland's defensive Arms, as they call them. What sense the people of Scotland (when they have come to liberty) have of these arms, their late representative hath declared; and it were to be wished, that the memory of such ways might be so buried, that the posterity might never look upon them as exemplary; their progenitors have so deeply drunk of the bitter fruits of the same, the result of them having been so much sin, shame and sorrow, vastation, confusion and destruction to Princes and People. This only shall be said, that these Disputes of defensive Arms (in both these Martyrs) proceed (as upon their main foundation) upon most untrue and malicious misrepresentations of matters of fact; all or most of the Arguments run upon false Hypotheses and bitter, untrue reflections on the late King. As if, 1. he had been the first invader of the Nation, whereas it is known, his Authority was first invaded, his Laws trodden upon, his Proclamations openly despised, his Castles violently seized, illegal Tables and Courts set up, his Subjects, walking according to his Laws, persecuted; his Arms he took, were not invasive against the Nation, but defensive of his own Authority, of his Laws and the persons of orderly walking Subjects; and for reducing these who had strayed from their duty. 2. They represent him in their virulent writings, as Nerone ipso neronior, a great persecutor of Religion, intending the total ruin and destruction of the Protestant Profession, and the total ruin and destruction of the whole people of the Land; In a word, as the immanest and most consummate Tyrant in the World (upon such suggestions doth the plea for defensive Arms go.) But the World knows, that that King lived and died a Protestant, and not one, either ignorant or formal, or profane (as too many alas are) but having great knowledge of the truth, ardent zeal for it, and being exemplarly devote, and to the great confusion of his enemies, he laid down his life as a glorious Martyr for the true Religion of God, and laws and Liberties of the people. If there was any thing that could not have a favourable Interpretation in that unhappy Book that gave the rise to the troubles, how timely was it retired, and great satisfaction and security given for Religion? If through default of Ministers of State, any thing had creeped in, that could not abide the test of Law, how willingly was it reform? Yet, all could not sister the begun course of violence, till, through God's dreadful indignation against sinful people, his fatal end might be brought on, not because he had been a Tyrant, but because he had not been such. But I am sensible of a digression. The case now to be noticed is much different from what then was. Then the Primores Regne (upon mistakes which since they have had opportunity to resent) were unhappily engaged in opposition to the Sovereign: but now a Proclamation is made by this Libeler to all mere private persons, (not having any Nobles and Magistrates amongst them) to make insurrections against all Magistrates from the highest to the lowest, and against the plurality of the people (if they think themselves in probable capacity) and what confidence will not desperate men designing confusion have? and not only so, but a liberty is given them by this man to pull all Magistrates out of their seats, to install themselves, and to punish Magistrates, who (as he says) have forfeited their right by the abuse thereof. If this Doctrine hath not a native tendency to the ruin and destruction of this Nation, and of all Nations where this evil seed shall take root, let them who are judicious declare. That Magistrates have no power nor warrant from God to abuse their Authority, or to oppress and deal injustly, is a thing out of all question, (they who do so, will make a sad reckoning for it to the great Judge of all, here and hereafter.) But when the corruption of these who are in power, leads them to abuse their Authority, either in making unjust Laws, or punishing according to these, the question is, what is (in this case) the duty of mere private Subjects, whither they should with violence oppose all Magistrates (under whom they are) from the highest to the lowest, (together with the plurality of the Body of that Community whereof they are Members) yea; and in their own defence, destroy them all (if they be in probable capacity for such work, and if they cannot eschew this and preserve themselves) yea farther, if after they have subdued (Providence so permitting or ordering) all the Magistratical power and major part of the people, they may use a vindicative, avenging and punishing Power upon all? (being only persons of private capacity) This (as will appear by this and the next Chapter) is the true state of the question at this time, as the Libeler in his Book hath stated it. Upon the resolution of this question, this Advocate of the seditious Party shakes hands with many Papists (albeit some of the more Orthodox, are of a contrary opinion) asserting, That any person that is unjustly condemned or pursued, (or that thinks himself so dealt with, by the Magistrate or Judge, (whatever he be, Supreme or Subordinate) may defend himself by Arms against the Judge or Magistrate, and his Officers and Ministers; even by slaying them, if he cannot otherwise escape: because, in that case, the Magistrate is an unjust Invader. And, it is lawful in that case, for a private man to kill the Magistrate, in order to his own defence, as it is to kill a Robber, or a Cutthroat invading a man, while he is going on in his Journey: Thus Becan, Tom. 2. Controu. tractat. 3. quest 8. and Swarez, contra Regem Augliae, Lib. 6. Cap. 4. S. 6. where he asserts, a man unjustly invaded by the King, may kill him, if otherwise he cannot defend his own life; And Thomas in this went before them, 2a 2● quest. 70. Art. 4. C. but adds a caution, licet resistere malis Principibus, nisi forte propter scandalum vitandum, cum ex hoc, aliqua gravis turbatio sequeretur. But our Protestant Divines (who are deserted by this man and his complices) are of another spirit. Mr Calvin is plain, Institut. Lib. 4. Cap. 20. S. 31. privatit hominibus nullum aliud, quam parendi & patiendi datum est mandatum, (he supposes where there is not opportunity of flying or withdrawing, which is also a sort of suffering) and speaking of the tyrannies and oppressions of wicked Princes, 298. Non nostrum est (meaning of private men) hujusmodi malis mederi, hoc tantum reliquum est, ut Domini opem imploremus. Again, S. 26. speaking of 1 Sam. 8.11. he expones it thus, that albeit Kings have no jus, or right to do Acts of Tyranny, yet, vocatur jus in populum, cui parere ipsi necesse esset, nec obsistere liceret, eo se proripiet licentiae Regum libido, quam cohibere vestrum non erit, etc. And, Art. 31. nobis summopere cavendum, ne illam plenam venerandae majestatis magistratuum authoritatem, etiamsi apud indignissimos ●esideat, & qui eam sua nequitia quantum in se est polluunt, spernemus aut violemus. Accordingly, Peter Martyr, one of the most learned of our Protestants, Loci come. clas. 4. cap. 20. p. 680. Illi subjecti, qui tantum subjiciuntur, & omnino privati sunt adversus Principes & Dominos suos non debent incitari, ut eos è dignitate seu gradu suo deturbent, & quamvis probe noverim ab aethnicis praemia olim constituta 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, attamen id respondi, quod pietas & sacrae literae persuadent. Certe si populo sit fas Regno de●icere injuste Imperantes, nulli Principes & Reges usquam tuti erunt, quamvis enim probe & sancte regnant, non tamen populo satisfaciunt. And, Page 684. Improbum Principem pii homines, quando privati sunt & super illo jus non habent, ferant oportet, neque illorum est, seditiose adversus eum arma movere. Again, speaking to private men, Adversus Tyrannum non habes quod agas (except Prayers to God and Petitions to them in power) nisi seditionem aut tumultum conspirationemve contra illum excites, aut ipse privata Authoritate interficias, quae aliena sunt a sacrarum literarum sententia. Again, Colum. 2. ibid. quia potestas est à Deo, Tyrannis est ferenda. Again, solummodo ad Tribunal Dei est appellandum, cum non detur alia superior aut major potestas cui tuus Tyrannus pareat. Again, omnes pii hoc sibi persuasum habeant, exauthoratas esse eorum vires ad movendas in republica turbas, eo nomine quod vi aliquod facere veliut adversus publicum Magistratum cujusvis formae fuerit; Thus, famous Martyr. So also Andrea's Rivet, in De●alog. Page 233. non est vera legis naturalis notitia sed depravatio ab humano & corrupto affectu movere seditionem contra injustam magistratus violentiam: And, Page 235. approving their opinion, who say, a man should rather suffer death, then defend his own life, by destroying the Prince's life, or bringing it in danger, (albeit he allow labouring to ward off our own destruction against unjust invasion,) yet if a man cannot deliver himself without destroying the Prince, he says, si tamen evitari non possit malum quodlibet, quod hujus vitae termin● concluditur, praestat mortem oppetere quam fieri reum parricidii, id nos absolute sentimus de Parent & Principe; add Dr. Ames. Lib. 5. Conscien. Cap. 20.4. potestas & authoritas superioris, non magis potest consistere actu sine hac subjectione, quam relatum unum sine suo correlato; huic autem subjectioni omnis violenta insurrectio adversatur. And, 6. he will have this subjection (contrary to violent insurrection, all sorts of which he holds out as unlawful) given even where obedience cannot be given: and, Page 319. persona invadens potest esse talis, & aliae etiam circumstantiae ut magis invasum deceat mortem ipsam pati, quam tali desensione propulsare. To these may be joined moderate Papists; Aestius, Lib. 2. in Sententias, cap. ult. privato n●mini licet superiori etiam tyrannice imperanti resistere, multo minus è medio tollere. Tollet. Lib. 5. the instruct. sacerdotis, cap. 6. non licet cuiquam se defendere a Judice, vulnere vel pugna licet sit innocens. Many more might be cited: But it may be evident, that this Libelers doctrine of the lawfulness of private persons, one or moe resisting the Magistrate violently, with destroying him in self-defence, far more taking on them a vindicative and punishing power (of which in the following Chapter) is against the common sense of Protestant Divines, and of the founder Papists also. Whatever may be said, of moral or legal self-defence, against the Sovereign, by way of petition, or plea in Court, for safety of a man's person or Estate; And whatever may be said of warding off and defensively putting back personal injurious assaults, to the manifest and immediate peril of life; without any colour of deserving, of Reason, of Law or judicial proceeding; or of a Woman's violent resisting attempts, against the honour of her chastity, (dearer to her then life) and tending to ensnare her also in sin against God (whereof her nonresistance, makes her formally guilty) And whatever may be done, in the case of most habited, not our and complete tyranny, against all appearance of Law, manifestly tending to the destruction of the body of a people, or greater part thereof, by hostile furious actions, or in the case of violent attempts, of destruction of all known legal liberties, and the being of Religion, according to Law; or in the case of vendition, alienation of, and giving a whole Kingdom to foreigners or strangers, or some such like; What ever I say in such horrid cases, (which for most part, cannot befall a Prince, in his natural and right wits (a case wherein provision may be made, that he hurt not himself, nor his Dominions) may be done, comes not at all within the compass of our question; although most disingenuously, the discontented and seditious, do strive on all occasions, to aggravate matters so, that the case concerning them, may seem co-incident with these or the like; that so they may justify their violence against the powers. But the question is, (as hath been said) whether, when the Magistrate proceeds according to Law, agreed unto by himself and the body of the Community, (suppose upon the matter, it be Lex male posita, or no right or just Law) may any part of the people, or mere private persons, (who think themselves in capacity so to do) offer violence to the Magistrate, or to his Ministers and Officers, proceeding according to Law, or if they ought to submit to punishment, (or else flee) if they cannot obey the praeceptive part of the Law; being bound up, (as they say) in conscience. As for private persons, going out further to revenge wrongs done them on the Magistrate, or punishing them, that is to be spoken to hereafter: But this now is the true state of the business, at this time, anent violent resistance of the Magistrates; (all of them, from the highest to the lowest, and of the whole body of the Nation) by any minor part of private persons, who apprehend themselves in capacity for that work. It ought to be well considered, and it may be easily perceived, how Satan in these last and worst of times, is mainly labouring to bring in confusion into humane Societies; to raise scandals upon Religion, and to tempt and provoke the Princes of the World, to dislodge the Church of God, out of their Dominions; because of the seditious Principles and unquiet Practices of some Professors thereof; (though Religion, is innocent as to these) which tend to the dissolution of the State-government; yea, and also, of all Church-government. It is to be marked, that when Lex Rex had in several places (See Pag. 463. and, Pag. 313.) vented that Principle, in reference to the Civil Government: That no Man is bound in Conscience to subjection passive, under unjust punishments, inflicted by the Magistrate, more than to active obedience unto unlawful Commands; and that passive obedience, under unjust Sentences, comes under no Command of God: Yea, that it is a sin against God's Command, to be passively subject to an unjust Sentence; And that it is an act of Grace and Virtue, for a Man to resist the Magistrate violently, when he does him wrong, and a self-murder against the sixth Command, not to resist, when he offers to take the life without cause, though, not without Law, pag. 314.322. When, I say, these Doctrines were broached, in reference to the Commonwealth; they were very quickly translated, and applied to the Church, by this man and his party; who pleaded some years ago, very strongly (as they thought) for non-submission unto, and counteracting of, all the Judicatories of the Presbyterial Government, whensoever the persons injured, thought the Sentence wrong and unlawful; so that no excommunicate private person, aught to submit to the Sentence of any, or all the Judicatories, if he thought the Sentence wrong and unlawful; and no Minister should leave his Minstery, but continue acting in it, if he thought the Sentence of deposition, given against him by any, or all the Judicatories of the Church, unjust: And they cried out, (if this might not be admitted for sound Doctrine) that Presbytery was turned into Papacy and absolute Tyranny; yea, they proceeded further than the point of counteracting, for the Agitators of the schimatical Party, would take upon them to possess the power of the most eminent Church-judicatories, (they being the far minor Part) and did in that self-created capacity of Government, over all others, in this Church, act, (excluding others, who were the greater Part) thinking, that though they were the far lesser Part, yet being the founder, (in their own judgement) the Government and managing of it, belonged unto them; and not unto the corrupt plurality of Ministers, who behoved all to bow before them: And how well their Practices in the Church do homologate with their Practices as to the State (proceeding from one and the same Principle) we may now see. For it is the way which they clearly own, that every private person, (when and so long as they are able, or are in probable capacity, to act violently against the Magistrate) ought to counter-act him violently, when he thinks the Magistrate wrongs him; (for this must be referred to every Man's private discretive judgement, as Naphtali tells us, pag. 148.) and nothing excuses from this violent resisting, but quando desunt vires temporales. No submission is to be expected from them, by Magistrates, (when they Govern not according to their mind) but when they cannot otherwise do; nor any submission Pi●u●, or out of any Principle of Conscience, but prudential and politic, because they are not in probable capacity to give him Battle; if they had the tempting opportunity and capacity, the case would be altered: Then not only violent resistance should come to be duty, but pulling of the Magistrate out of his chair of Government, (as we will hear) punishing him, and placing themselves, though but private Men, in his room. How contrary such principles and practices, of private men's non-submission to, and counter-acting of, Church-judicatories, (supposed to do wrong) are unto the Word of God, how subversive of Church-government, how introductory of Schism, Heresies and all Mischiefs into the Church, is well discovered by the learned Reviewer of the Pamphlet, entitled, Presbytery no Papacy, Protesters no Subverters: And with equal reason, may the same grounds be made use of, against this Man's inciting all private persons to counter-act the Magistrate violently; when they think he doth them wrong, or when they account their Sentences unjust. As certain confusion comes on the Church, if the Principles of that Party, be entertained; so, let People once drink in this Man's Doctrine, in reference to the State, there shall be no end of sedition, no security for the powers ordained by God; for, any private persons are made judges of the justice of the Magistrates Sentences and Punishments; (and what Man will readily condemn himself, if he may be admitted to be judge in his own cause?) And upon their own private judgement, of the injustice of the Magistrates dealing with them, are allowed, without any further prerequisite, to use violence against him; pull the sword out of his hand, and pull himself out of his seat; only, there must be probable capacity for this, and nothing excuses from not doing so, but want of that capacity: If that be wanting, there must be submission to unjust Sentences; not out of any conscientious respect to the Power, but ad redimendam majorem vexationem. This is the Libelers mind. Such Doctrine surely is neither consonant to God's Word, to the practices of his dear and approven People, to the mind of his soundest Servants, nor to sound Reason. Who ever will consult the holy Oracles of God, will find, that not only is obedience commanded to be given to Magistrates in their lawful injunctions, and submission, not only for wraths-sake, but also for conscience-sake, to their just punishments of sin and wickedness, (who ever re-offends or violently resists the Magistrate in either of these, no doubt resists the Ordinance of God, and receive to themselves damnation, Rom. 13.2.) but also, that there is a submission required to be yielded them, even when they put us to suffer wrongfully and unjustly, may be evidently gathered from Scripture grounds; in the case of unjust suffering, God hath not left his people without direction what to do, in reference to Magistrates abusing their power. It is true (as hath been said) the Lord hath not given a moral power or warrant to any invested with Authority, to do evil or unjustly; concerning that the question is not: But the question is, what duty is owed, by the Subject, unto the Magistrate, (especially the Supreme; for, there may be remedies had against the injuries of the inferior by appellation) in case of his maladministration and unjust Laws, or Sentences according to these Laws, or Executions according to Sentence; whether they may violate or violent the person invested with Authority, and not submit to him, but counter-act him by force in self-defence against his violence: or, if they be bound in conscience, or by any Law of God, to submit humbly to what he inflicts, (although unjustly) if they can neither move him by their humble petitions to forbear them, nor can flee from his wrath, or go out of his Dominions. This man and his Complices maintain, that if the Magistrate abuse his power in making unjust Laws, or punishing according to these; any private man or company of men, that think themselves strong enough for the Magistrate, ought never to suffer, but use forcible resistance against the Magistrate abusing his power; and that all the patience that is required of Christians, toward oppressing Magistrates, is only to bear suffering patiently when they are out of capacity of acting, and may not better do; and to suffer patiently, when they see they cannot repress the violence of the unjustly-dealing Magistrate with a sufficient contrary violence. This Doctrine, favouring so strongly of carnal selfie-nature, and being too suitable to the way of beasts, who know no other thing but to be carried with a natural impetus to repay violence with violence till they be overpowered, we utterly dislike, and do assert, according to the Holy Scriptures, That even when Magistrates deal unjustly, or put any to suffering wrongfully, (albeit they are for this to give a dreadful account, and albeit Subjects are to judge of their actions as they deserve, and not approve their malversation, but modestly witness against it, as there is opportunity) yet, suffering persons are bound to a passive submission or obedience, enduring wrongs done to them not only with respect to Gods providential Ordinance, (by which their suffering comes to pass) but with respect to his institutive Ordinance of Magistracy, wherewith the persons afflicting them are invested, (albeit in the particular acts concerning them, abusing their power) For, albeit the abuse of the power be not of God, yet the abused power is of God; and the person invested therewith must have respect from the sufferer, (other respect than is to be given to a private invader) intuitu officii, not intuitu abusus officii; and this respect is patient submission under the affliction, though unjustly inflicted; and not daring to re-violent the person invested with Magistratical power (although in a particular toward us he abuse his power) to commit our persons and our cause to him that judgeth righteously, not offering to move sedition, albeit we were able for it. If we shall only look to these three things in the Scripture, we shall see ground for what is said. 1. Consider what is required of Children toward their Parents unjustly afflicting them, and likewise from Servants toward their Masters; and by analogy we may learn somewhat of the mind of God, of the duty of Subjects to their Princes, who are their political Fathers, and have a despotical and lordly power over them. For Children, Heb. 12.9, 10. We had Fathers of our flesh, who corrected and chastened us after their own pleasure, and we gave them reverence; which in the apodosis of the similitude, is exponed subjection, v. 9 This is not only spoken of narratiuè but approbatiuè (if it were not so, the argument taken from our carriage to Parents to enforce reverend subjection to God, were not good.) The Apostle approves the reverend subjection of Children to their Parents, though unreasonably and with mixtures of unjust passion correcting them: he allows not the deed of the Parent for his own pleasure afflicting the Child, but allows the reverend subjection of the Child under such unreasonable and unjust dealing. So, 1 Pet. 2.18. Servants, be subject to your Masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward. For this is thankworthy, if a man for conscience toward God endure grief, suffering wrongfully, etc. v. 20. If when ye do well and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable with God: For even hereunto were ye called. No Master had a moral power or warrant from God to afflict his servant wrongfully, (that was not acceptable to God, but displeasing to him) yet, that Servants should endure a suffering lot in, and for, following their duty to God, with subjection to their Masters afflicting them, and that from a principle of conscience toward God, was a thing acceptable to God. And hereunto were Servants then called; it is not only subjection to patient suffering for their faults they were called to, nor only subjection to endure suffering in well-doing, merely out of prudence, or because they could not help it, not being in probable capacity to violent their Masters though they would; but a subjection to endure wrongful sufferings from their hands, from a principle of conscience toward God moving them to regard their authority, albeit abused by putting them to grievous trouble wrongfully. And though, perhaps, they will say, there is great difference between respects due by Children to their Parents, and Servants to their Lords and Masters, and that which is due by Subjects to Kings, (the King neither having properly paternal, nor yet despotic nor lordly power over his Subjects.) And they will say also, there is great difference between the evils spoken of in these Texts, to be endured by Children or Servants, corrections, bufferings, etc. and that irreparable loss of life, wherein (should it come to that) subjection without resistance is pressed to the wrongful Sentences and Proceedings of the Magistrate or Prince. Though, I say, they will, and do assert this, to show the disparity of the cases; yet, 1. There is a full parity and agreement of these relative Powers, Paternal, Masterly and Magistratical or Royal, in this, that in the inflicting of evils upon those who are under them, (such as are competent to them to inflict within their sphere) a patient, reverend subjection is due from their inferiors, (without violent insurrection against them) even when they abuse their power in some particulars, not in way of justification or respect to the abuse, but in a humble conscientious regard of their being invested with that power they do abuse. 2. King's are not Fathers of our flesh, or by generation, nor can they be truly called so, (political and parental power are different things, although they may be co-incident in one and the same subject, as most probably they were in the first political Governments that were in the world) Yet, as Kings and Magistrates should have fatherly hearts to their Subjects, (they being a sort of official Fathers to them to procure their good, and to defend them from evil, every King should be Abimelech, i. e. my Father King) So Subjects ought to have such hearts to their King, as Children have to their Father, giving them special reverence, subjection and obedience from their very soul and inward affections; and although sometimes they are not such as they should be, yet they ought to account their persons (sealed with God's Ordinance and the Image of his Sovereignty) sacred and inviolable, resolving to suffer any thing of them, rather than to be guilty of parricide, (although under the colour of self-defence.) God's Law, in the fifth Command, hath enjoined reverence and subjection to Princes, under the title of Parents; Calvin, lib. 4. inst. cap. 8. shows, the end of that Command is (under the name and title of Parents, Father and Mother) to show us, that all the degrees of eminency God hath ordered to be over us, should be inviolable; Oportere nobis esse inviolabiles, quia omnium est eadem ratio. God (saith he) under the name of the most amiable relations of Father and Mother, leads us to subjection to all Superiors: Hoc (saith he) the subjectione praeceptum cum humani ingenii pravitate valde pugnat (quod ut est celsitudinis appetentia turgidum aegre se subjici sustinet.) Therefore (he adds) to commend this subjection, he hath communicate his own name to them who are in eminency, In unum ipsum (saith he) ita conveniunt, patris Dei ac Domini tituli, ut quoties unum aliquem ex istis audimus, Majestatis illius sensu animum nostrum feriri oporteat, quos ergo istorum facit participes, etc. S. 35. These whom God makes sharers in these styles, he illustrates them with some sparkle of his own glory, that they may all appear in their places conspicuous and reverend: We ought to think, that he that is a Father to us, habet aliquid divini; for, he carries not a divine title without cause; he that is a Prince or a Lord, habet nonnullam cum Deo communionem: Thus he. And, as he adds further, we are not to doubt but God is in this Command setting down an universal rule, touching Superiors, nec interest (saith he) it is not concerning to consider whether they who are to be thus honoured by us, be worthy or unworthy; for whatsoever they be, they have not attained to such eminency without Divine Providence, Cujus ratione ipse Legislator illos honorari voluit. So that whatsoever reverence and subjection a man is to give to to this natural Father, (when he inflicts punishments that are within his sphere) that same subjection and reverence is to be yielded to the Magistrate that beareth the Sword, punishing in his capacity, albeit, perhaps, he err in his procedure, as Parents may do. 3. It shall not be asserted, that there is no difference, between a Royal or Magistratical power, and that which is called dominative and masterly; seeing, (besides other differences) they do mainly differ in this, that the Master or Lord of Slaves, hath his own profit mainly before his eyes, (which he may under God's glory lawfully have) but the profit of his Slaves only secondarily; and also in order to his own good, which is maintained, by their well doing. But a King or Magistrate, should think, that his power is primarily ordinated to the public good of the community itself, and only secondarily and consequently to the good of himself; it being profitable for him, that the Commonwealth should flourish. 2. In this, that a dominative and masterly power (such as was of old in use, and under which, people were made Slaves, either having their lives spared in a just War, and quitting their liberty to spare their lives; (serva & serviam) or being sold and bought, by the possessors money, (which was no way, like the condition of our hired servants, free to go off when they will) did interest these, who were invested with it, with a greater power over the bodies and goods of these, who were either sold Slaves, or saved in War, (and parting with their liberty, for saving their lives) than a Magistratical or Kingly power, aught to claim over subjects, not of such a condition, (albeit cruelty should be, according to Divine Law, avoided by any invested with any of these powers.) 3. In that the person that hath domination or Masterly-power, (as was ordinarily of old (albeit we have scarce a shadow of that power, which Masters then had over Slaves absolutely, surrendering their liberty to them) hath the Slaves in subjection to him, more out of fear and constraint, than love or delight; but a King or Magistrate hath his inferiors under him, in a civil, free, liberal, voluntary and loving subjection; knowing, that in the Government, their good is aimed at by the Ruler, more than his own; and his subjects will not, (or ought not) for his good and honour, which is inseparably connexed with their own good, spare to expend Life and Fortunes, or what they are or have, as public necessity requires. Yet, though there be these differences, betwixt the Dominative or Masterly, and the Royal or Magistratical Power, the inferiors subjection in suffering, (even wrongfully, if God permit in his Providence the power to be so abused) is no less under the one Power, then under the other, by virtue of Divine Law. Subjects are Sons to the Sovereign, (their Father, and Nurse-father to the Church of God) but they are also Sons, that do under God serve him, (though they be not Slaves) It is ordinary in Scripture, not only to find conquered People called Servants to the Conqueror, as, 2 Sam. 8.14. they of Edom, became David's servants, but also, ordinary Subjects to Kings were called Servants to them (not only their menial Servants, nor only their Guard, nor their Officers only; but generally their Subjects were called Servants, and the King their Lord, as David's Subjects, warring against the Ammonites, 2 Sam. 11.24. are called his Servants, 1 Kings 12.4. We will serve thee, saith Israel to Rehoboam, i. e. we will be Subjects to thee; Subjects, for the public good, the Honour of the Prince, (whom they term, their Sovereign Lord) and for every ones private good, are Servants to the Prince in a free, voluntary, ingenuous, loving way; they are his Servants, as willingly and cheerfully subordinate to him, as their Sovereign, although he also be in a sense, their Servant, (not in relation of an inferior to his superior, for so the Magistrate is only the Minister of God for the People's good, and never called their Minister) but in relation of the means to the end, he is their Servant, as Angels are ministering Spirits, for the heirs of Salvation: And Ministers of Christ, are Ministers and Servants to the People, though in regard of their official power, they are not subject to the People; but rules over them, according to Christ's Gospel. Thus we see subjection, without violent resistance, in case of wrongful suffering, is the duty of all inferiors toward their several correlatives; Neither hath it any weight to make disparity of the cases, the sufferings to which Children or Servants are to submit without violent resistance, as but corrections or buffet, not tending to death or mutilation; but the subjection required to the Magistrate who bears the Sword, (when he abuseth the same) imports suffering death, (if he proceed so far) which is the greatest evil of punishment, and which is not eligible where lawful self defence is at hand. For, Lex Rex, p. 322. 1. the grounds that such men go upon for private persons violent resisting the Magistrate, (viz. the abuse of his power) if they hold good, will as effectually evince a non-subjection and violent resistance to Parents, Masters, etc. abusing their power, (which is contrary to the Scripture) and if the abuse of power by Fathers or Masters, warrants not violent resistance against them; how should it warrant the same against the Magistrates unjust violence? 2. A● death is not, so no punishment unjustly inflicted is eligible, where lawfully it can be warded off: But this is the state of the question, if private persons may lawfully violent the Magistrate abusing his power? If in greater evils unjustly inflicted, there is always a liberty for inferiors violently to re-offend the Powers above them; why not in less evils too, these gradual differences of inflicted evils cannot make such variation in the point of duty, seeing the ground holds equally strong; if a man may resist the Magistrate for abuse of his Power, he may do so also against his Father or Master on the same ground, and if he may not so deal with them, he may not deal so with the Magistrate neither. Again, our Lord and Saviour did foresee and foretell his Disciples, that they were to meet with persecution from the Powers of the world for truth and righteousness sake. And, Mat. 5.10. pronounceth them blessed, who are persecuted for righteousness sake, and who are persecuted and reviled falsely for his sake, asserting, that their reward is great in Heaven, So, 1 Pet. 4.14. If ye suffer for righteousness sake, happy are ye, etc. v. 17. It is better ye suffer for well doing, then for evil doing, etc. In such Texts, there is a commended suffering for Christ and righteousness sake, having the encouragement of a promise of reward (consequently it must be a sort of commanded suffering, seeing God commends, and rewards nothing but what he commands) it is a suffering contradistinct from suffering for evil doing: submission to suffering for evil doing, is out of all question a duty, because in that case, the resistance is a sinful resisting of the Ordinance of God, and of these who are invested with that Ordinance of Magistracy while they lawfully use it. But there is a further matter commended or enjoined in these Scriptures, even a cleanly submission to suffering in, and for well doing, (when God in his Providence permits Rulers so to abuse their power) which passive subjection or submission, is not grounded on the Rulers abuse of his Power through his corrupt will, but upon the peculiar command of God enjoining submission in such cases, to prevent sedition and confusion. The Author of Lex Rex, quaest. 30. jeers at passive obedience, as a chimaera, as a dream, and as involving a contradiction: And he thinks he speaks acutely in saying, God never gave to any a command to suffer for well-doing, nor at all to suffer, (suffering depending on the freewill of another without us, and not on our own freewill, and so not falling under any command of God to us) but he reasons very sophistically, inferring, that because mere suffering, which necessarily depends on the action of another, is not commended to us, therefore subjection to suffering or passive obedience is not commanded when the Magistrate inflicts suffering. It is impossible indeed, that mere passion (as to be whipped, to be hanged or headed) should be the object of an affirmative or preceptive command of God (though the Magistrate may have a command to inflict these) but subjection to the passion, may fall under a command, and this is called passive obedience, which implies more than mere passion or suffering; even a disposition and motion of the heart to lie under that lot with an eye to God, whose ordinance is used upon the sufferer. Only it is called passive obedience, because as to the precise suffering the punishment, there is no external action done, enjoined by the Law or Command of the Magistrate (as there is in active obedience) although there be some dispositive or preparatory actions in order to suffering (not inferring a direct co-operation to a man's own suffering) which he may and aught to do, as going to a Gallows on his own feet, or up a Ladder, or laying down his head on a Block that it may be strucken off. It is an error to say, that such passive obedience is not commanded of God, but only the modus rei, that it be done patiently and christianly, when it cannot be by force avoided. For it is clear, that passive obedience, or submission and subjection to suffering (where the Magistrate hath just cause to inflict the punishment) falls under a command of God (that same command that forbids resisting the Magistrate in doing his duty, enjoins submission and passive obedience to him, although we were able by force to deliver ourselves out of his hand.) In conscience we are bound not to offer him violence in doing his duty, though there were power in our hand so to do, so that it is not only modus rei that in this case is commanded, (viz. that we suffer patiently in a christian way, when it cannot be avoided) but res ipsa, that we submit to the suffering, if there be no occasion of flying, without using force against him. Besides, that in this case, Christian patience and violent resistance are incompatible, there can be no Christian patience opposite to Christian submission and subjection to the Powers ordained by God doing their duty. But, if it might stand with violent resistance, it should be opposite to this Christian submission. Therefore, it appears to be a groundless assertion, that no passive obedience or submission to suffering is under a command. For, it is clear there is a command for this subjection we have spoken of. But then the difficulty is, if passive obedience to unjustly punishing Powers fall under any commandment of God, or if there be any command of submission to cleanly suffering; it is this man's mind, so long as there is any power of violent and forcible resisting, a man is guilty of self-murder, who will not (in this case as well as in the former, and the former as well as this) endeavour the preservation of his own life, by fight and resisting, and re-offending, and all that is required is, (when he is overpowered) then to use Christian patience in bearing affliction. But we assert, that a private person, though wrongfully afflicted by the lawful Magistrate, proceeding according to Law (let it be so that it is Lex male posita, or an evil Law) is bound not only to Christian patience in suffering (to this he is obliged in suffering from any private wicked hand, or from the hand of a manifest Usurper or Intruder in Magistracy, whose violence he may repel by violence, so long as he can) but unto a submission without repelling of violence by violence, and that in conscientious respect to the Ordinance of God, wherewith the lawful Magistrate is invested (although abusing it in this particular) and with a tender regard to the prevention of seditions and confusions in humane Societies, which are unavoidable; if every one, as he thinks himself wronged, shall be allowed to use force upon the lawful Magistrat's proceeding by Law, the greatest Malefactors being ready to justify themselves, and to violate the justest Magistrates in their just proceedings; if once this repelling the Magistrat's force be allowed as a duty. And, no tenderhearted Christian is there, who will not rather submit without resistance to his own private suffering, commending his soul and cause to God, then by such evil and scandalous doctrines, open a wide gap for all wicked seditious persons to work confusion in the Commonwealth, and to overthrow the best and justest Magistrates. Mr. Burroughs, an Independent, writing on the 1. of Hos. 10. v. hath said well to this purpose: When (saith he) things are brought into a Law, suppose the Authority be abused, and there be an evil Law made; then I confess, if the Law be in force, we must either quite ourselves of the Country, or else submit and suffer; when it comes to be a Power or a Law, it is Authority, though abused, and we must yield obedience to it, either actively or passively. This is sound and Orthodox; and it were well, others would homologate this Doctrine, to prevent the scandals of sedition and rebellion, which this tenderhearted Libeler speaks of very slightingly, striving to introduce Libertinism, and to abolish the sense of these sins: For (says he) Napth. Page 39 Treason, sedition and disorder are but formalities and notions, pretended to palliate and colour the King's usurpation. But to add no more from the Scripture, that known passage. Rom. 13.1, 2. etc. with 1. Pet. 2.11. makes for this submission and subjection, which is pleaded for, by us; For, such subjection is there commanded to the powers then existing, or in being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (such as were Caligula, Nero, Domitian, monstruous tyrants, enemies and persecutors of God's people) as is opposed to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to stand in order against them (the word is from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a military term) every Soul is commanded to be subject, or to stand in order under them, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and forbidden to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to stand in military order against them, either defensive or offensive; by powers which are not to be resisted, are clearly m●ant, the persons i● power, as the Apostle after expones himself, 3. and 4. vers. calling them Rulers, and the Ministers of God, he means undoubtedly certain supposita, and persons invested with power; And cannot mean the abstract Ordinance of God, Magistracy or Power in the abstract; for, it can neither be said to exist (separate from persons) nor to be the subject and recipient of duties enjoined to be paid to the Power, nor of the offences forbidden; nor can it be an Agent or Administrator of these Acts attributed to the Power, as to bear the Sword, to be the Minister of God, to praise the good or terrify the evil. So that of necessity, by Power is meant Power in the Concrete, or the person invested with the Power, who is not to be violently resisted, by private persons under him, (when he is acting according to Law, suppose the Law be judged by private men, not just) which is the present case of private persons resistance to Authority. The person of the King, because invested with power, official power, (though in a particular act abused) is not to be violated, nor violence offered to it by private men; a subjection, excluding violent resistance is commanded, and no such exception is put in, that if he abuse his power, or if we be strong enough for him, we are loosed from that subjection, and are at liberty for resisting him, and no submission is required under his abuse of his power, so long, as we can violently act against him. It is said, by those of the other judgement, that even by this same text, Rom. 13. subjection, or submission to unjust suffering by these invested with power, is not commanded, nor resistance in that case forbidden; for, all the subjection commanded to be given to persons in power, is only, so far as they manage their power lawfully, according to God's Ordinance, and as the Ministers of God, for our good, who are for the praise of well-doers, and the terror of evil-doers: And all the resistance forbidden, is only, that they be not resisted while they do their duties; but, when they do not their duties, or do contrary to duty, in afflicting the innocent; they are not powers ordained of God, pro tanto, nor his Ministers for good to people; nor, is resistance to them in such acts unlawful resistance to the ordinance of God, nor to them as the Minister's God; but, only resistance to them is sinful men, serving their own lusts and Satan; their evil-doing, is no ordinance of God, but of Satan. So that in effect, they think subjection here commanded and resistance forbidden, doth only relate to Magistrates, quatenus & quamdiu bene se gesserint, when and so far as they carry themselves rightly in Government; but that from this Text no submission is due to them, no resistance to them is forbidden in their inflicting unjust punishments; but that for any thing said here, Subjects may make insurrections against them whenever they think they do wrong, even any part of private Subjects against all Magistrates of all degrees, the Supreme as well as the Subordinate: So Naphtali teacheth, and borrows this out of his poisoned Fountain, Lex Rex. But as to this, 1● It hath been often granted, and still is, that no man nor Magistrate on earth hath a moral power, commission or command from God to do evil, or to afflict any unjustly. 2. The question is not concerning the Magistrat's duty, but anent the Subject's duty, in case, through the permission of Divine Providence, the Magistrate abuse his place and power in unjust afflicting the innocent; whether the private Subject may use violence against, or upon, the Magistrate; or should rather then so do, submit to suffering (though unjustly) not for reverence to the abuse of the power, but in reverence to God, whose Ordinance the power (which is abused) is. It may be easily seen, that subjection to the power (opposite to resistance) is all alongs enjoined, whether the power be rightly used or otherwise: if it be rightly used, subjection without refusing active obedience is required; if it be not rightly used, subjection without resistance, violent or forcible repelling of the power is required, upon this formal reason and ground: Because, even when the power is abused, it remains a power ordained by God, (although the abuse of it be not ordained) even as a man's eye remains his eye, although sometimes it is not rightly used. The formal reason of the subjection and nonresistance pressed, is not the right use of the power, but because it is a power ordained of God (however perverted in the use by man.) And although the spirit of God, in describing the Magistrate, saith, He is the minister of God for thy good, A praiser of the good, and a terror to the evil; it is not meant, that that is the formal reason of subjection to him (in the full latitude of subjection) nor that the Magistrates then existing and in being▪ to whom the people are commanded to be subject, and forbidden to resist them, were such de facto in all their actings (or that all others, in reference to whom the direction may be after extended, should in time coming be such in all their actings) but only it is told, what the Magistrate is ex officio, and what he should be de jure, as it is ordinary in Scripture, that qualifications of Kings spoken of, do not de facto agree to them all, though they seem to be spoken assertively of all; only it is showed what they should do de jure, as, Prov. 14.35. Pro. 16.10.12.13.15. Pro. 22.11. So here, the Apostle speaking of the power, or person invested with power, calling him the minister of God for thy good; no terror to good works, but evil; A praiser of the good, etc. shows only what a Magistrate should be ex officio, and what he is de jure; but lays not this as the ground of subjection and nonresistance to him, but this, that he is a Superior Power ordained of God: If he abuse his place, he is to answer to God for it; but the abuse of the power in a particular, doth not nullify the power, or make it no power; if he do evil, he doth it not as invested with authority from God, yet he abides invested with authority: it cannot be said he hath no authority, when he abuses authority; subjection of one sort or another is due to him, because he is in officio, not because he abuseth his Office. To this purpose, amongst many things wrong, Lex Rex hath that true word, Page 325. We are (saith he) to suffer evil of punishment of Tyrants, some other way and in some other notion, than we are to suffer evil of equals: for, we are to suffer evil of equals, not for any paternal authority they have over us, as certainly we are to suffer evil of Superiors: Thus he. And this is all we require, to suffer evil of the Magistrate or Superior, without violating his person upon the account of his paternal authority, which (though in a particular abused hic & nunc) remains the Ordinance of God: And in a respective reverence to that Ordinance wherewith they are invested, we are humbly to suffer wrong from them (if we cannot by petitions move their forbearance) neither justifying in our consciences the wrong which they do to us, nor judging them to have a commission from God, as to this wrong doing, but regarding both God's Providence and God's Ordinance in their persons, which ceaseth not to be his, although abused in a particular act toward us. This hath been the common sense of the generation of God's children, before this fiery iron age, whose sober examples, tenderly respecting God's Ordinance and the standing of humane Societies, are with us of a great deal more weight and more worthy imitation, than the furious practices of any of late, whereunto they have been inflamed by the Doctrines of popular Parasites and fierce Demagogues, such as this Libeler and his Complices are. The ancient Christians, who lived nearest the light of the Apostolic times, and had hearts fuller of zeal (through the recent warmth of the shed blood of Christ, and of his glorious extraordinary Ambassadors) than we in this frozen age have, knew not, owned not, any such Doctrines of violent resistance to Magistrates, as the new sort of Christians have made a main Article of their Faith. In Tertullia's time, they wanted not abundant power and might to raise arms, and manage war against their persecuting enemies, as he very plainly shows, Apolog. cap. 37. and, ch. 1. ch. 33. They were certainly in a probable capacity to have combined in arms against their persecuting Emperors; and to have carried their will by force, and taken order with these who were over them and did oppress them, (as this Libeler allows all persons of the most private place, if they be strong enough to deal with the powers above them) yet they would never entertain a thought of any such matter, let be to attempt it; they were never (although defamed as enemies to Severus, Emperor at that time) found amongst the seditious, Nunquam tamen Albiniani, vel Nigriani, vel Cassiani; never were they followers of seditious Leaders, Apol. c. 33. Although they had filled all their Cities, their Camps, their Courts, and the Empire every where full of Christians; yet, they made conscience of making insurrection, they knew not such a thing that the Word of God, and laws of Humanity and Christian Charity, obliged them (as now it is pleaded) to take arms against their Emperors, and to combine against them for mutual defence against their persecutions, and for violent taking order with them. Were the ancient Christians so utterly ignorant, or so void of humanity and of Christian love and zeal, that having more than probable capacity, they would suffer their Brethren be put to suffer, and not offer violence to the Magistrate in such courses, and rescue the oppressed out of their hands? (either they were not knowing and loving Christians, or else we have catched an error in our heads that is not Christian, and a fire in our hearts that is not from above.) If we look forward to Cyprians time (long after Tertullian, though in that same age) he is free to tell us, in Epistola ad Demetrianum, when Christians were grown very numerous, beyond what Tertullian saw them to have been; Nemo nostrum, etc. not one of us offers to resist your violence (speaking of, and to, Pagans) or to revenge it, Etiam si nimius & copiosus sit populus noster. Yea, after that the great Constantine had owned Christian Religion, and by his Authority (so far as it could reach) legally established it; so that now Religion became to be a legal right by Caesarean Edicts and Laws, and multitudes embracing it, (as useth to be when examples of religious Princes go before) so there is no doubt, Christians were both for number and power able to hold their own Religion by force against all contrary Powers, and that upon the ground of legal humane right, as well as divine. Yet, when the Arian Emperors Constantius, Valent. etc. and Julian the Apostate persecuted them for Religion, they never attempted such a thing, as to make head against them, and to combine for a resistance, albeit they wanted neither the legal right of humane Imperial Law for it, nor physical Power sufficient against the Apostate and Arian Emperors, nec d●erat jus humanum, nec deerant vires temporales, yet there was never the least attempt made by Christians in these times against their Emperors apostatising, turning heretical and cruel Persecutors. No other remedy did Christians then know against persecuting Powers, but prayers and tears to God and Man, with patience in suffering for Christ; albeit they had arms in their hands, they knew not how to use the same against the Powers above them. When that vile Persecutor Maximian was raging against Christian Professors, Anno 297. He had under him a whole Legion of Christian Soldiers (called the Theban Legion) consisting of six thousand six hundred and sixty six armed men, who had strength a●● power enough to sell their lives dear to any that would seek the s●●●e. Yet, rather than they would offer violence to the wicked Emperor or his Officers, they did lay aside their weapons, and suffered themselves, for Christ's sake, to be slain by the executors of the Commands of that cruel Tyrant. And it is known by the History, that the plurality of the Army under Julian the Apostate were Christians, (as appeared by their joint Proclamation and Declaration, at the entry of Jovinian his Successor (Nos Christiani sumus) yet never did they make head against the Apostate, nor violent him in his courses against Religion, and their Brethren the Professors thereof. Oh silly, foolish and feminine Christians then! who neither knew to use the privilege of self-defence against Magistrates for themselves, nor how to combine for the aid of others, and were so destitute of reason for themselves, and humanity and religious charity toward others; that neither the Paganism, Apostasy, Arianism of the Emperors, nor Persecution of Brethren by them, could move them to such ways of violent and bloody resistance of Powers (though they did indeed resist to blood, striving against sin, as Heb. 12.4.) But, O! how illuminated masculous and martial are the spirits of Christians now a days, and how full of charity one to another, as well as of zeal to God, that any number of private persons are allowed (if they can carry on the business without a seen mischief to themselves) to take the Sword against all Magistrates whom they account oppressors of them (though falsely) to combine in bands against them, to pull them out of their seats, to revenge upon them the injuries done to themselves or their Brethren, and to punish them condignly; yea, it is counted high impiety against God, and want of Christian charity, to omit this. This is the clear doctrine of this Libeler and his Complices (as hath in part, and will further appear.) And what shall we say to it? (I will say, anima mea sit cum animabus veterum Christianorum) shall we think, that they were generally so ignorant, senseless and stupid, that they knew not what belonged to their duty toward God, themselves or their Brethren? Wanted they the light to know their duty, the zeal to God's glory, the Christian love to brethren, which we have so abundantly, that moves us to resisting of Powers, and did not them? Credat Judaeus Apella, non ego. But the truth is this, as in the fear of God they refused to give active obedience to any evil command of Powers above them, so when they could neither mitigate the fury of persecuting powers by Petitions, nor in God's Providence find a way of escaping out of their Dominions and flying (which is no resistance, albeit the pair of Pseudomartyrs have brought forth this Monster of a stoical Paradox, that flying from the Magistrate, is resistance to him, whereas it is only a withdrawing from under his Dominion, and putting one's self under another Dominion, where his Power reaches not: and so by flight and withdrawing from the Kingdoms, the man ceaseth to be a Subject to him, whose Subject he was, and comes to be under other Lords and Laws.) But, I say, when Christians could neither by Petitions nor Apologies allay the fury of Persecutors, nor escape from them, in the fear of God commanding submission to his Ordinance (although in the use perverted as to them) they (having light enough to know their duty, great zeal for Christ, great love to their brethren, sufficient power to have overpowered their enemies) did notwithstanding, without violent resistance or combinations to that end against Powers, meekly lay down their lives for Christ; and choosed rather to suffer then resist. Herein their practice is a better Commentary of Rom. 13. and, 1 of Pet. 2. then all seditious glosses: And, is preferable for imitation to all the contrary actings of men, in these dregs of time. Some go about to question the truth of Tertullia's narration, concerning the number and power of Christians in his time; asserting, that only their weakness excused them from the sin of nonresistance to their Magistrates. But, it is strange to think, that Tertullian in an Apology made to the Gentiles for Christians, should assert so gross an untruth in matter of fact, concerning these of his Religion, whereof his enemies (if they could) would no doubt take advantage. And as strange it is, that any now living, should after thirteen or fourteen hundred years, take on them to know the number and power of Christians in Tertullia's time, better than he did; also to say, that in julian's Army, the Christians were not the prevailing and greater part, is contrary to the truth of the story, as appears by their cry, at the reception of Jovinian (whereof before) yet it is well said (Lex Rex. pag. 372.) that they had scruples of Conscience, and doubts of the lawfulness of resisting the Emperor, being sworn to him, which may make it the more strange, that there is so little doubting now, when our engagement to Magistrates over us, is no less. True it is, Constantine, did make War upon Licinius, whom he had assumed to be an assistant in governing the Empire, for his breach of Faith and of Trust given him in that society of the Empire, and for first denouncing War against him; (the help of the distressed Christians, cruelly persecuted by him, concurring also as a motive) Euseb. lib. 9 Hist. Eccl. cap. 10 but that they sought help from Constantine the Great, against Licinius, is not said in the history; and although they had so done, it only shows, hat the help of the chief Emperor may be sought against him, who was assumed as an Adjutant in the Empire, who in effect was little more than a Deputy. It is also true, that the Christians oppressed by Barabanes King of Persia, in the time of Theodosius, as it is, Hist. Tripart. Lib. 11 cap. 15. did flee to the Romans seeking their help; but then, it is also evident in the story, that remaining in the Country of that King, they made no insurrection against him, albeit the persecution was very cruel; they did flee and withdraw from that Kingdom, to the bounds of the Roman Empire: And the Romans refusing, upon demand of that King, to send back these who had run away, was one ground of the war, that arose between them and the Persian: Again, it is only said, the Christians fleeing to the Romans, sought their help; which will not necessarily import, that they stirred them up, to invade their King in their behalf; but, that having come to them, they might have the help and benefit of their protection, and not be delivered up to the fury of the Tyrant, upon his demand. And further, the Persian Kings had once submitted themselves to the Roman Emperors, as their Lords; two or three of their Kings being given them, at the appointment of the Senate and Emperor of Rome: Augustus, getting both King and Kingdom, submitted to him in his time; and although after that time, there were many changes and revolutions in that Kingdom, the Romans did never quit their claim thereto, but keeped close to their right, and to the possession they had of most of it, till Constantin's time, and even long also after the time of Theodosius. Now, if the Christians presuming upon the Roman right to that Kingdom, as being held of the Emperor, implored this help against a persecutor, whom they thought he had legal power to chastise, what makes this for private subjects (without concurrence of any Magistrate) rising in violence against their own Sovereigns, who have none superior to them but God? But, not to insist too much on this, we only add, that excellent Calvin, in the last chap. of the 4. book of his Institutions, hath (like a primitive Christian and Divine) written so fully and learnedly against private persons resisting the Magistrates by violence, (though they abuse their power) that whoever will read the same, (as it is most worthy to be read throughout) will find a strong confutation of all seditious Doctrines, stirring up private persons to do violence to the Magistrate in any case; and his spirit, will be seen to be another, than theirs is, who teach such things. We come now to consider, how far contrary to the light of sound reason this position, giving liberty to any private persons, (when they are able, and when they think themselves wronged) to use violence upon all Magistrates, is: Surely, that doctrine cannot be of God, which to the eye of sound reason doth remedilessly and unavoidably, (if it be admitted and reduced into practice) overthrow God's Order, for settling Humane Societies, and which opens a wide gap to perpetual seditions, against all Magistrates; not leaving any (even the best of them and most justly governing) in any security from violence. For, in the way of this Libeler, every private person, is not only made judge of his own actings, and what he is to do, or not to do, in obedience to the Magistrate; but, he is made judge of his own sufferings, he must suffer no more from the Magistrate, than he thinks meet, (if he can help himself by force.) And it is held forth as a sin (equal at least to the obeying unlawful commands) to suffer unjust punishments, inflicted by Powers, if men be in capacity to do violence to the Powers, or if they can conspire and combine with others for this end. This is a Doctrine, that will please all wicked malefactors, wondrous well; and, is a fair proclamation to them, whenever they are attached, or arraigned, or condemned, or punished, to bestir themselves to make a party, to do violence to the Magistrate; for, they will never want the colour of this plea of self-defence: And, how few of them will not (if they may be their own judges) say they are innocent and deserve no punishment, or not so great? The judge saith, he is guilty, and that he must be so and so punished; make the man his own judge, he will say, the sentence is unjust, he is not bound to submit to it: And therefore, if he be in probale capacity, he will think it his duty to fall upon the Magistrate, pull the Sword out of his hand, call in to his assistance whom he may, raise violent seditions against the Magistrate; and, what may he not do for his own deliverance? Thus, under this colour, all evil-doers are encouraged, to use violence against the Magistrate; and, let this Libeler consider, how he will stop the gap which he hath opened to confusion; the matter (according to his mind) being referred to each particular person, to judge of the justice of his own suffering; and his discretive judgement anent this, must determine him to resist, (as he is able) when he thinks himself wronged; shall not this be a source of continual seditions, and violent insurrections against the Magistrate, even when he proceeds most justly? Again, how can Magistrates, in doing their duty, be secured from violence (according to this man's way) or from continual insurrections of persons pretending their innocency? It is in vain to say, Let Magistrates rule rightly and not oppress, and then Subjects will do their duty: for, albeit be true, faithful and just Magistrates may in the way of their duty expect from God, that he will incline the hearts of their Subjects to repay duty to them; yet, in the holy permissive providence of God, it comes often to pass, that the best Princes are not best used by their Subjects, (God thus teaching good Princes to rule in his fear and righteousness, with an eye to his will, and with respect to that crown of Life, whatever hard measure they have from seditious people.) How often is it found, that Subjects are unruly and seditious even against good Magistrates? Some crossing of the will of a froward and furious party, may move them to fancy their Prince a Tyrant, and as one that is an injurious and intolerable Oppressor: whereupon they account themselves free to offer violence to him, (under the cloak of self-defence) and goes on from resistance to revenge, if they can have the upperhand over him, and will not cease (the fury of evil consciences instigating them) till they ruin the Prince whom they have greatly provoked, in order to self-preservation from what they ●e●● from him; and they will be ready even to mock Justice in destroying him for saving of themselves (as they call it) but the end is, the destruction of their souls and bodies for such wickedness. Let Histories be looked into, it will be found, that hardly did ever people resist a Prince with violence, but in end the matter came to revenge, (if they had power) neither could they rest but in his ruin. And also it will be found, that ofttimes the best Princes have been worst used, or at least as evil as the naughtiest Princes. Look to the Roman Emperors while they were Pagans, how many amongst them who were good, (as Heathens might be) came under the same, or worse fate, by the unjust violence of their Subjects, with these who were the worst Princes? Look to Christian Emperors and Kings, how many of them who were truly good, were oppressed and destroyed by their Subjects; sometimes inflamed with superstition (which they called Religion) and superstitious respect to the Roman See, (the Sentences whereof were accounted as Oracles in these dark times) and sometimes wrought upon by seditious Ringleaders, buzzing into their ears great abuses done to them in the matter of their Liberties? Yea, amongst our own Kings, some of the best have been as evil used by prevailing parties amongst the people, as some of the worst. When once that gap is opened, and people taught, that any party of them (strong enough) may get up against the King and all Magistrates, when they judge them to deal wrongously and injuriously with them, the reverence of Sovereignty is lost, the evil wit of a seditious Party can soon paint the best King, as a black and ugly Tyrant, and under that form, waken up others to conspire to his destruction; which should make all the fearers of God, rather to endure some acts of real Tyranny, then by their Doctrines or Practices of resistance, open a door to the destruction of good Kings, (by a party not of their spirit, but lurking under their pretences) and to the continual dissolution, concussion and desolation of humane Societies. It is good for us to hold close to that necessary distinction which all sound Divines have held, of obedience or subjection active and subjection passive, where the former cannot be given for fear of sinning against God, (the Magistrat's superior, and who should be obeyed rather than any man in the world) the latter, (if we stay within his Dominions, and withdraw not from under his Sovereignty, putting ourselves under the protection of another sovereign Power) is necessary. And so the Apology, p. 376, 377. acknowledged this to be necessary when active obedience could not be given: but Naphtali, Pag. 28. reputes of this moderation, and contradicts the Apology, calling this submission brutal (though it be upon rational grounds, and the fierce violence against Magistrates is rather brutal) ●ver●ing, That none pleads for this submission, who have not prostituted their conscience to absolute obedience to Prince's arbitrements; and avowing, that illimited obedience is more rational, then illimited subjection; and that they are but flatterers that have renounced conscience, who plead against obedience in all things to the Powers, and yet will plead for passive submission. In this Category must all they stand, who have owned the sound Doctrine of this Distinction, and these are the soundest Divines that ever we had in the Church of God; yea, the Apologist himself (if he be worthy to be named with these) escapes not this blow. Good God To what times are we reserved, to see so certain truths, that may be reckoned among the immovables of Religion, and the ancient landmarks removed by an upstart furious Crew, who by their new Principles (as false as new) seek to confound both Church and State? The lawfulness of private men's counter-acting, and violent resistance to a whole Church and a whole State, is a main Article of their new Faith; and to do so, is one of their new Commandments, added to God's. But the Libeler is all alongs much in pressing violent resistance to all powers, from the highest to the lowest, and of the whole body of the people by any party thereof (though the far minor and lesser part) in the cause of Religion, (his Religion, in the hypothesis debated in the times, is the external form of Church-government, about which, he says, all the zeal of the godly should be concentred, a low zeal, God knoweth, that hath no higher objects.) And laying down grounds (some true, some false) concerning Religion, he labours to animate any party that think themselves able to violent all Magistrates, and the body of the people about this, and to strengthen themselves by combinations, threatening Gods judgements against them who do not combine for violent resistance of all above them, (which he calls Self-defence) and abusing some Scriptures to that purpose. As for Religion, that it is the chief interest that Men and Christians should look after, shall not be doubted; and where it becomes a legal right, and the Magistrate who bears the Sword leads the way, no doubt private persons may follow in the violent defence of it, against all opposing the Magistrate, the Law and themselves in owning it. Neither can it enter into a Christian heart, that it is to be surrendered unto the arbitrement or pleasure of any power in the world, nor of any Magistrate over us, as this man wickedly suggests is done. All the question is (in relation to these Times) anent private men's falling upon the Magistrates over them by violence and force of arms, when they are (by Laws agreed to by the Community) urging an outward attendance on the means and ordinances of Religion; where people needs not fear to be defiled with heresy or idolatry, or false worship, or any thing contrary to Christ's Ordinance; whatever may be said concerning private men's resisting the powers that urge them to idolatry or false worship, or invading their lives if they will not so do, comes not home to the present case. Yet, Lactantius word, lib. 5. cap. 20. is to be well remembered by all private persons; Defendenda est Religio à privatis omnibus non occidendo sed moriendo, etc. But, we shall come off from this matter with a few notes; 1. That the Libeler seems to disallow all violenting of men in the matter of Religion; To be violented in Religion, is the most wicked and insupportable of all injuries, (saith he) Page 15. It is true, to use violence upon any in their persons or goods, to bring them to an external false Religion or Worship, or to drive them from the true, (otherwise Religion cannot be violented) is the greatest of injuries. But, should not such a word be guarded well, lest all co-active power of the Magistrate in matters of Religion, might seem to be disowned, and a fair plea put in their mouths, who are for absolute toleration? It will not suffice to say, that it is only violences done to persons, to avert them from true Religion, and bring them to a false, that are counted injurious and condemned; for, albeit upon the matter it is certain, there is difference between true and false Religion; yet, what Sectary is there in the World, but will pretend he is violented by the Magistrate for true Religion, when he is put to trouble for his way; for, every one of them thinks, and will avow, that in his Conscience his way is right, and according to the Word of God; (be it so or not) and therefore, if he he be put to trouble for his way, will account himself violented in the matter of Religion, and highly injured; it is this man's principle, that every man in his discretive judgement, is judge of the justice or injustice of his own sufferings, and accordingly, must determine anent his resistance to the violence. If every errand be admitted judge of the justice of his own suffering, accounting his own Religion best; he cannot but think, the violenting him in it, is a sufficient injury, to engage him in violent resistance to the Magistrate. And then, what a world of sedition and confusion shall we have, or else the Magistrate must surcease the use of his co-active power in these matters? Again, does not this man, plainly profess to stir up all, with whom he can prevail, to violent others, (Magistrates, Churchmen, People and all▪ in the matter of their profession? For even private men are stirred by bloody exhortations, to be revenged on and punish all Magistrates and others, whose blood they thirst for; because of their not being of their way, which they call Religion: Nor avails it them to say, their way is the true Religion, the way of others in points of Church-government, it is false; and therefore, though they being private men, may violent and punish others, even Magistrates and all Rulers; yet, other Magistrates or any other, may not violent them. But, whether truth lies on their side or not, is the question; and, if they will not admit public Powers and Authorities to be Judges in that matter; far less have these reason, to admit of private persons to be their Judges: But so selfie are such men, that they think they have a right to violent all men, in that they call Religion, to force them to it; but, that no man hath right to violent them in their way: Shall their private judgement capacitate them sufficiently, if they have Power to violent others; and yet, no public Power can violent them, or turn them off, from their persuaded way; which, upon trial, will not be found the safe way? 2. The Libeler appears all along, very cautious of the probable capacity that private persons must have, before they attempt resistance to powers; And thinks, that this, together with the intolerable injury in matter of Religion or Liberty, gives (without need of further) sufficient call; and that such as are injured, and in capacity probable to through their work, sin, if they obey not that calling to rise; and nothing can excuse from not rising, but want of this capacity. This brings to mind Cardinal Bellarmin's excuse he hath, why the ancient Christians took not Arms against Nero, Julian, Valens, etc. because they wanted temporal strength, (wherein he is sound refuted by our Divines) and brings to mind also what Creswel the Jesuit, hath against the Edict of the Queen of England Elizabeth, that Subjects having sufficient power, not only lawfully may, but aught, by virtue of divine Precept, and as they would avoid the damnation, or extreme peril of their souls, to depose and throw down heretical Kings: This Libeler fully consents, with the Jesuits, not only as to the matter of violent resistance to Princes, but even as to the deposing and throwing down of them, and all Magistrates, and punishing them, by private hands; and is more injurious to Princes, than they are, as shall be cleared in the following Chapter. But, in this matter, he hath borrowed the caution from the Jesuits; that, any private persons (si modo vires ad id idoneas habeant, as the Jesuits speak) are bound to resist Powers, and to be revenged on them, and punish them. 3. The Libeler, would bind the necessity of combinations, (as he calls them) or conspiracies against Princes, and seditious insurrections (Naphtali, Page 17.) upon all private persons, not only upon the grounds of humanity, but upon the ground of religious love and fraternal affection; whereby we are bound to relieve the distressed, especially for Religion, and upon the ground of Religious respect to the concernments of God's glory, to which the interests of all Powers and Commonwealths must cede. As to this latter of God's glory, and its concernments; there is no doubt, that is above all humane interests, and they ought to cede to the same. All the question is, whether such violent courses against Magistrates, (though miscarrying in some part of their duty) be for God's glory? God is not glorified by men's sins, but when his own Will is done; it is an ordinary thing, that men in their deep deceitfulness, pretend God's glory, when they are dishonouring him, by disobeying his W●ll, Is. 66.5. Your Brethren that cast you out, for my Names sake, said, let God be glorified, etc. But for the former, anent Christian love, and the obligation thereof, to relieve the distressed, that is surely a duty to love, and relieve the distressed Brethren; but that love, in the external acts of it, must be regulated by sound reason, and by the Word of God: Christian charity binds me, not to relieve and assist a distressed brother, in every manner of assistance; but in that which is within the bounds of my calling, and that which is agreeable to justice. A man is not bound to forsake his own station, or run beyond the limits of his calling, to relieve a distressed brother; No man is bound to steal, that he may give alms; or to defraud others of what he is indebted to them, to exercise his charity to the indigent. And doth not this man himself confess, that prudence should measure and regulate the exercise of love, in assisting a distressed brother, and that no man should put his own life in certain peril of losing, in saving the life of another; nor attempt for that end to use force, where there is no probable capacity to carry the matter through. If brethren be distressed by the Magistrate, (suppose unjustly) we are bound to assist them in love, by our Prayers to God for them, by consolatory words, if we may have access to them, by giving counsel to them, supplying their need as far as we may; yea, by entreaties and humble petitions to the Magistrate, (as we have opportunity) with all dutiful respects to them: But, if nothing can avail for their relief, private persons have discharged their duty, in the point of the exercise of Christian love, and are not obliged, to offer violence to the Public Magistrate, or violently to resist him, in assisting others; but, in the case of their brethren's unjust suffering, commit the matter to him who judgeth righteously, possessing their Souls in patience, as they ought also to do, in the case of their own wrongful suffering. But, it opens a gap to all confusion, to allow private persons (if they think they have power enough) to use violence upon the Magistrate, for relieving their brethren, whom they think oppressed: Such pretences, will not be wanting to the worst of men; and the best Magistrate, proceeding most Legally, shall never have security from seditious parties, (unless they have visible power to crush them) but they shall be resisted, when any party thinks meet; and from resistance, there shall be a proceeding to revenge, (if might and power be sufficient) as seldom, or never is it seen, that resistance of the Magistrate and revenge upon him, (when a party can have the upperhand) are separated in exercise and practice, (whatever be men's notions of the separableness of the same) And the Principles of this man lead to both, as hath appeared, and will yet more. 4. The Libeler holds out from Scripture, one ground which he thinks should engage all to combine to relieve him and his party, when they count themselves oppressed, and that is, Because of the ommission of this duty of relieving the oppressed, or violation of it; Naph. pag. 17, 18, 19 whole Kingdoms and Cities have been involved in the guilt of the oppression, committed by one or few, and fearful judgements have therefore overtaken them, to their utter ruin and subversion. And, pag. 18. he asserts, That for simple connivance and tolerance, (without active compliance with transgressors) God avengeth the sins of Rulers only, or People only, or of any part of the People only, upon the whole body of Rulers and People; and he citys, Jer. 25.15. Deut. 13.12.13, 14, 15. Josh. 22.17, 18, 19 and achan's case, Josh. 7. building also his tenet upon the Covenants express or implicit, betwixt God and the whole People, Rulers and Subjects, etc. And, so is confident, that if the violation of duty, in not relieving the oppressed, (especially for Religion) involve all failers in it, in sin and destruction; all and every private person, is obliged to this duty, to relieve and recover, by violence, oppressed ones out of the hand of the Magistrate; as they would keep themselves pure from sin, and hold off Wrath from themselves, and from the place they live in. Hence a question considerable comes to be resolved, whether God imputes the sin of one man to another, whereunto he is no way acccessory; but that he tolerates what he cannot amend by any means▪ within the bounds of his calling? or, whether he executes judgement upon any for the sins of others, which they are not accessary to, and cannot amend, abiding in the bounds of their calling? And particularly, whether God imputes the sins of Rulers to People, and punishes them for the same? or, imputes the sins of any part of a People, to the whole, or of the major part, to the lesser, and punishes them therefore, when they cannot (abiding within the bounds of their calling) amend the same, but are no otherwise accessary? Not to dip into that question, in the full latitude of it, we do only now inquire, if in Divine justice, a Prince is any time punished for the sins of the People, (at which he doth not connive, and whereto he is not accessary in any degree) or, if a body of a People be punished for one man's sin, whereunto they are not accessary; or, if private persons be punished for the sins of Rulers, or of the body of the People, whereunto they are not accessary; but only with grief tolerates what they cannot amend, abiding within the bounds of their calling; this last, is the point we must fix upon: And herein against this Author, it is asserted; that, first, no man is involved in Divine judgements and punishments for the sins of others, (as the deserving cause of his punishment) if he be no way accessary to these sins of others. 2. That no private subject is accessary to the sins of Rulers, nor involved in the punishments of the same, merely upon the account of his tolerating the sins, or not violent resisting the Magistrate in his sinful courses. A certain thing it is, that (setting aside the satisfactory suffering of Christ, when he put himself under the stroke of Divine justice for the sins of others, having no sin of his own) God doth not properly punish any man, but in reference to his own personal sin, (as the deserving cause of the punishment) albeit he may, and often doth take occasion, in his Wise Providence, to punish men for their own sins, from the sins of others, (and in that only sense, they may be said to be punished for the sins of others) But every Soul suffers for his own sin, Divine justice finding deserving causes of punishment in every one that is punished, either their personal accession to the sins of others, (which is their own sin) or else some other sins; for which, he may in justice inflict the punishment upon them, albeit the impulsive cause or occasion rather for punishing in such a manner or time, etc. be from the sins of others. Every man shall bear his own burden: As no man goes to hell, for the sin of another, without his own deserving; so, no man is afflicted by God on earth, but must say, there are deserving causes of that in himself; howbeit, the lord may have other and higher designs in the affliction, than punishment of sin. It is also no less certain to us, that if the Magistrate do not connive at sins of Subjects, nor neglect to curb and punish them, the sins of the people shall no way be imputed to him (he not being thereunto accessary in any way) nor shall he be punished for their sins, which in his place and calling he is wrestling against, and using his power against them. Also, it is alike certain, that private persons shall not have the sins of Magistrates, or of the body of the people, imputed to them; nor be punished for the same, if so be they honestly endeavour to do all things against these sins, which in their private calling they are bound to do: If they keep themselves pure without any degree of acting these sins, or any way of accession to them; if they mourn and sigh for evils that are done; if they be earnest in prayer, that God may convert others from their evil way; if they (as they can have opportunity) faithfully admonish, and study to reclaim, these who are out of the way, and do such like Christian duties, God will never enter in judgement with them, for not doing violence to the Authorities that are above them, or for not wakening up confusions in the Societies they live in, to the destruction of many. That God's people of old were punished, upon occasion of sins of their Magistrates, Jerem. 15.4. and the like places, was, because they were sharers in the guiltiness themselves, (not by not violent resisting, which they were never exhorted to) but by direct or indirect accession, otherways, Ephraim (says Hosea, ch. 5 11.) is oppressed and broken in judgement; because he willingly walked after the commandment. And, Jerem. 5.31. when the corruption of Rulers is spoken of, it is added, My people love to have it so. It was not the sin of the Rulers that involved the people in guiltiness, or rendered them obnoxious unto judgement, but their own accessions to the Ruler's sin by consent or otherwise. Let Mr. Calvin be read upon Jer. 15.4. he speaks most judiciously, discoursing of the sins of Manasseh that brought on judgement: Non solus Rex fuit author hujus saevitiae, sed consensu populi veri Dei cultores tracti fuerunt ad necem: hinc patet fuisse commune totius populi scelus; spent assensi sunt Regi. And there he shows, they continued in the same sins that broke forth in Manasseh his time, and they were punished for their own sins, albeit occasion is taken to remember that dreadful time of Manasseh, when the wickedness began that was after continued in with obstinacy. And that same excellent Divine, writing on the second and third Verse of Jerem. 22. (a place abused by Lex Rex and others, to stir up the people to take the sword in their hand to relieve the oppressed, and execute judgement against Magistrates) speaks most judiciously; Hoc maxime ad Regem & Judices ac praefectos spectat, nam scimus privatos homines non esse armatos ad defensionem bonorum. And upon the end of the third Verse, Haec proprie ad Judices spectant, ejus doctrina non nisi ad Regem & Judices publicos dirigitur, neque enim pertinet ad vulgus ipsum aut privatos homines. And he adds, that the reason why that word, execute judgement, etc. is uttered in the hearing of the people, is not that the executing thereof belonged to them, but that, when they heard the house of David, which was Sacrosancta, cited before God's Tribunal, and threatened for omission of these things, (the King's being quodammodo Legibus soluti, as he speaks) people might be moved to examine their own lives, and to repent of their private injustices in their places. And it is to be noted, that the prophetical preachings (reproving the not relieving the oppressed, and not executing judgement, and exhorting to these duties omitted) uttered to the body of Rulers and People, are to be understood as reproving what was amiss in every one in their respective callings, and as injoining such duties as might be done by every one: Salva justitia, salvo ordine & pro modulo vocationis; people are warned against private oppressions, Rulers against public, and every one in their station exhorted to deal righteously. But to say, that whenever the Prophets, in their Sermons, reproved positive oppression, or commanded executing of righteousness, they minded to condemn in the people, the grand sin of nonresistance to the oppressing Magistrate, or to cry out against it, or to incite private persons or people to pull the Sword out of the Magistrates hand, and relieve the oppressed, and execute judgement on the oppressors, even Magistrates, (as Lex Rex doth say, P. 367.) is not only a most fearful perverting of the holy Scripture, to make it a cloak wherewith to cover seditious Practices, but a Doctrine that tends directly to horrid confusion and utter subversion of humane Societies. And verily, let this Principle be once admitted, that the sins of Rulers and Governors involves the people in sin, and makes them obnoxious to judgement (albeit they be not accessary thereunto, directly nor indirectly, only they tolerate what they cannot amend, abiding within the bounds of their calling.) Neither can the consciences of people, nor the State of the Commonwealth, have any true peace or quietness: For, 1. once grant this, than what a continual puzzle should tenderhearted Christians be in, anent the actions of their Rulers and Magistrates, and they behoved to meddle with, and examine all their proceedings, lest they should involve them in sin and judgement, (and to do so, were indeed work enough, and above, to private Christians) and they might be put into this fear to be guilty, or involved in judgement for matters of Government, not probably or morally possible for them to know: What a ground of great disquietness should this be? 2. Would not this be a perpetual Seminary of unavoidable sedition in the Commonwealth, and of exposing the Magistrate to violence, no less when he is acting justly, then when unjustly? Such is the ignorance and corruption of most of people, who will never want this ready pretence, If we suffer the Magistrates to do such a thing, and not oppose them by force, we shall with them be involved in sin and judgement. But, as to the Scriptures he abuses, to prove that people are involved in guiltiness, or made obnoxious to the judgements of God, by the sins of their Rulers, (albeit they have no accession thereunto, but only not violent resisting them) and that one part of people may be so involved in sin and wrath, by the sins of another part: and that therefore they ought to use violent resistance against the sinning Rulers or People: The first place is, Jer. 26.15. where the Prophet Jeremiah, 8. ver. is apprehended by the Priests, the Prophets and all the people, for his faithful preaching, 9 ver. All the people were gathered together in the house of the Lord against him, and said, thou shalt surely die: whereupon the Princes come and sit in the entry of the new gate of the Lords house, and the Priests accuse him before them, ver. 10, 11. The Prophet Jeremiah delivered his message to them all, avows his commission to the Princes and to all the people, closing his speech submissively, 14, 15. Behold, I am in your hand, do unto me as seemeth good and meet unto you. But know ye for certain, if ye put me to death, ye shall surely bring innocent blood upon yourselves, and upon this City, and upon the inhabitants thereof. Where two things are to be marked; 1. That Jeremiah is speaking to the Princes and all the people, or the great confluence of the body of the people at that time, warning them not to meddle with his blood, the Princes that they should not unjustly condemn him, the people that they should not consent to, nor cooperate with, an unjust sentence, as to the execution thereof, (as the manner of execution was amongst that people, stoning, etc.) And, 2. he certifies both, that if they consented and co-operated to his death, they should bring innocent blood upon themselves, and upon the city and inhabitants thereof: he doth not at all incite the people to rise up and rescue him by violence out of the hands of Rulers, if they should give sentence of death against him, (neither did ever any of the holy Prophets instigate people to use violent resistance against their perverse Magistrates, nor did they ever reprove, directly or indirectly, that sin of non-violent resistance to Magistrates, as some excessively bold do aver) But only warns Princes and people both, that they be not by consent or concurrence accessary to his death, lest it should bring vengeance upon them all, because of their consent and concurrence; a deep accession to the same. It will perhaps be said, that the Prophet not only intimates, that they who heard him, Princes and people, should be guilty of his innocent blood, and obnoxious to judgement; but even the rest of the people, who (although the confluence than was great) could not be all present; yea, Children and Infants, and all the dwellers in the City, and the City itself, should be involved in the sin and wrath following it. I answer, that none could be defiled with the sin, but such as one way, or another, made themselves guilty by accession to it; either in action, or in omission of that, which they were in their calling and station, capacitated to do for hindering it; (such as violent resistance of Magistrates, by private persons, was not) neither doth the Prophet mean, that all the absents, all the infants, of that great City, (who knew nothing of the matter) should be guilty of the shedding his innocent blood, (if it were shed) or should properly upon that account, deserve the wrath of God; only he means, that the consentors, actors, and such as were omitting their duty, public or private, in reference to the preventing of that sin, should be involved in the guiltiness of it, and incur the wrath of God for it: But as for other Inhabitants of the City, absents, Children, etc. though for that sin, (they not knowing of it) they could not be judged properly guilty of it, or deserving wrath for it; yet, he intimates, that the Lord by occasion of it, (should it be committed) would bring wrath even upon these, (although for other sins, as the meritorious cause upon their part) And the judgement and wrath, that for the sin of shedding innocent blood, should come upon all the people and inhabitants of that City, might be indeed properly a punishment to the Rulers, for that particular sin, and to the people accessary thereto in any way; but could not be a punishment, (for that sin particularly) upon them who were no way accessary to it, but only a punishment for their own demerits; albeit the execution, hic & nunc occasioned by the sin of others. This is a sure truth, that God may justly punish the Princes or Fathers, in the punishment of subjects or children, Castigantur parentes in siliis, tanquam in sua carne charissima, Zanch. 4. pr. (they being as it were, parts of themselves) may, (I say) punish them, with temporal judgements at least; this is agreeable to his justice, who visits the sins of the fathers upon the children, 2d Command: But yet, when he is punishing Princes or Parents, in their children or subjects, there is also in these who are punished an internal demeriting cause of the strokes laid on, that they shall have no reason to quarrel with God, or to say, The Fathers have eaten sour Grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge, Ezek. 18.2. Sometimes persons may be punished in the affliction or punishment that falls on other persons near to them, but yet the affliction of these other persons, is always deserved by their own sins; albeit, God in his wise providence, makes these very same afflictions to be punishments also of the sins of others, to whom they they are nearly related. But as to this place, it is not the Prophet's mind to intimate, (as this man saith) that for violation of this duty, of not offering violence to the Magistrate, proceeding unjustly, wrath should come on them all of that City, there is not the least evidence of any such intention he had, to stir up the people to do such a thing; only, he gives faithful warning to all ranks, not to consent or cooperate to such a wickedness, which might bring wrath upon them, as Diodat hath it; ye will make yourselves guilty before God of this fact, and burden yourselves with it. Napht. p. 19 Then for that place, Deut. 13.12, 13, 14, 15. If thou shalt hear, etc. he asserts, that it makes much for his position of the lawfulness of people's rising against all Magistrates, supreme and subordinate, or of any part of the people, their rising against the greater part, wickedly back-slidden. And he is bold to say, that astricting this place or the like, to the Hypothesis contained in the letter of the word, etc. is to elude Scripture, and to mock the Holy Ghost, by whom it is given. To which, 1. certainly this Libeler speaks like a Divine, calling a conscientious cleaving to the literal meaning of the Holy Ghost in Scripture, an eluding all Scripture, or mocking the Holy Ghost, by whom it was given; are not they rather deluders of the Scripture, and of the Spirit of God, who labour to make a nose of wax of the Holy Scriptures, wring and wresting them where they will, introducing their own fancies upon the Word, and not embracing the clear sense of the Spirit of God, directly held forth in the Word? In this art of wyre-drawing the Scripture-words, without any warrant or good reason; and of covering crooked courses with God's cloak, (as is said of these, Mal. 2.16. who cover violence with his garment) this man and his complices (men of blood and violence) are singularly experienced. 2. This is a sure rule, That no exposition of a Text can subsist, that is either contrary to other Texts of Scripture, or to found reason: but so it is, that the exposition given by this man of this Text, as if it favoured his position for mere private persons, or any part of a people's taking not only the defensive Sword in hand, but the vindicative and punishing Sword against all Magistrates, higher and lower, and against the body of the Society, whereof they are Members, and the lesser part also, is contrary both to plain Scripture and to reason. The Scripture commits the vindicative and punishing Sword only to the Magistrate, Rom. 13. He only is God's Sword-bearer that way. And amongst Magistrates there is a supreme power, 1 Pet. 2. on whom all others have dependence, as to their call and the exercise thereof. And it is a Doctrine point-blank contrary to reason, remedilessly tending to dissolve humane Societies, and all Kingdoms and Commonwealths, and opening a door to all seditious confusions; to teach, that any mere private persons, or any part of a people (who think themselves strong enough) should take on them to sit and act as punishing Judges over all Magistrates, supreme and subordinate, constituted by the body of a people; yea, and upon the major part of the people themselves. Oh, horrid confusion, to be detested by all rational and Christian hearts! that the minor mere private part of a people, should set themselves down as Judges upon the whole body of a people, and the generality of the Magistrates; and upon their own fancies, led with their own lusts, draw the magistratical Sword, which God never committed to them, and strike both the Magistrates of all sorts and degrees, and their neighbours therewith. This sure is not the work of God, (however it be faced or varnished) but of Satan. 3. The man fancies an adversary to himself, while he brings-in some, saying, That in the case of equal division of Cities, faithful and unfaithful, matters should come to accommodation anent serving or not serving other gods, (the case, Deut. 13.) or that if the major part went wrong, the minor should rest in a sinful acquiescence, and be thereto obliged by the major part. Who ever said so? or, (if there be any spark of God's fear in the heart) will say so? There is no coming to accommodation in such matters, whither the true God, or other gods, should be served and followed, (and yet this man would be very severe, if no Nation in the world might (having before been embodied in a Kingdom or State) continue and abide in their peaceable communion in civil interests, upon supposition of such an equal division arising amongst them.) As for the obligation that the major part of a people might put upon the minor, to a sinful acquiescence, who will allow that? There should be no sinful acquiescence, nor any acquiescence at all to any party, were they never so many, who run away from God after other gods or idols. But (supposing a Government democratic) though the lesser part is not to acqulesce in the way of the greater, running into rebellion against God; but by all means competent to them, bear witness against that way, and study to keep themselves pure, when they cannot prevail to have matters rectified, as to the whole body: yet, cannot people keep their conscience and practice undefiled, unless they overthrew by violence (which is the thing all alongs aimed at by this man) God's order in the Societies whereof they are members, and instate themselves in the power God hath not given them? 4. This Libeler is a very confident person, pronouncing Oracles ex scrin●o pectoris, while he affirmeth, that the constitution of Civil Government amongst God's people, to which the Texts, Deut. 13. Judge 22. etc. do relate, was democratic. Upon the contrary we affirm, that from Moses time (who is called King in Jesurun, Deut. 33.5.) the Lord never appointed, nor allowed, a democratical Government amongst his people, (although the principles of this man and his consorts do lead to the worst sort of Democracy, as the only lawful Government; yea, to an Oligarchick Democracy (if so we may speak) wherein the lesser part of mere private persons may tread down the greater, and all Magistrates also from the highest to the lowest, if they can have strength enough.) The Government of that people until Saul's time, was properly Theocratical, The Lord was their King, 1 Sam. 12.12. in another way and more special, than he is King over all the earth. From him they had their judicial Laws particularly set down to them; He appointed in his Word their high Senate or Sanhedrim, (wherein the high Priest was a chief Member, and other Priests Members also, not eligible by the people, as neither were the heads of the Tribes of Israel) to rule them under himself: He did now and then send out his extraordinary Viceroys (the Judges) till samuel's time, who not only were Saviour's to deliver them from their enemies, but Judges to rule them in times of peace, for many years together: and when these were not sent, they had their settled Sanhedrim or Senate of God's appointment, to govern them. Again, that command, Deut. 13. did reach all times of that Israelitish estate, even when they came to be under Kings and visible Monarches, who unquestionably had the supreme power of the Sword: nor was it free for private persons, upon any pretence, to take hold of it, for revenging or punishing without them, (as this man would have private persons now to do.) And further, though the word, Deut. 13.12. be spoken to the people, If thou shalt hear say, etc. yet, it is always to be understood, that the people's concurrence in the punishing of an apostate City, was to be within the bounds of their calling, and under the conduct of the Magistratical power set over them. As when inticers to idolatry are in the former part of the Chapter enjoined to be taken order with (however nearly they were related to people) and to be stoned; it is not to be supposed, that the charge is given to every private person brevi manu to do this, but judgement was to be execute on them after judicial conviction and sentence given by the Magistrate, as Diodat notes well, ver. 8. Procure (saith he) vengeance on him, in way of justice accusing him to the Magistrate by information or sufficient proof. So also, in the case of apostasy of a City, a judicial process is required, 14. ver. Thou shalt inquire and make search, and ask diligently and behold if it be truth, and the thing certain, etc. Pelargus' notes on the place, Ne indicta causa quispiam temere à nimium fervidis condemnetur, actio à Magistratu est instituenda post famam publicam, defensio reo est concedenda. But this man will have mere private persons, without any judicial proceeding by the Magistrate, to execute vengeance against all apostate Magistrates, and Ministers, and People. This he furiously instigates people to do, and by him and his party, all are held Apostates who differ in a point of external Church-government from them albeit they hold fast the true Protestant Religion (according to God's Word and our good Laws) in the integrity of their souls. The other place abused by him, is Josh. 22.17, 18, 19 (Naph. p. 19) which he thinks gives warrant for private persons to use the revenging Sword upon Apostates, for turning away God's wrath. But, how absurdly abuseth he the holy Scripture? It is most clear, they were no private persons that transacted that business with the children of Reuben, Gad and Manasseh, nor the minor part of that people of God. The Congregation of the Judges and Princes of the people, convened under the conduct of Joshua, their Judge then living. Phineas, the high Priests son, with the rest of the Princes of the Tribes, are sent to treat with the Reubenites, anent the altar they had set up, and they return a satisfying answer. Now, let any judge what makes all this for the encroachment of mere private persons upon the use of the Magistrates avenging Sword on Apostates. Besides the body of the people's concurring, we have the Magistrates, supreme and subordinate, acting their parts in their station, who, had they not used their Authority (had that supposed defection been indeed real) had been truly guilty of sinful connivance. As to the third place cited, Judg. 22. in the case of Israel and Benjamin, that time was indeed the time thrice spoken of, Judges, 17.6.18.1.21.25. When there was no King in Israel, every man did what is right in his own eyes; (if this be aimed at by this man, his heart and ways can tell.) It is hard to show what the Government about that time was. Martyr, on 18. of the Judges, tells us, the People of God in these times were under the power of the Philistines, Collapsa erant omnia (saith he) quod Rege ac Magistratu Respublica destitueretur. Yet shall we not think it likely, but they retained somewhat of their Sanhedrim appointed, Deut. 17. which in such a horrid case might draw together in an extraordinary meeting: but let it be so, that the Government was democratic then (which cannot be proven) yet seeing it is the body or major part of the People that uses the Sword against the lesser, it makes nothing for this Libeler, who will have the minor part to use the Sword, to punish Magistrates of all degrees, and the major part of the people also (if they have strength enough.) As to Achans case, Jos. 7. There is nothing in it to justify private persons rising against the Magistrates, and plurality of the people to avert the judgements of God, nor for using violence upon them, in case of their sinning against God, (which is the Libelers position) what was done to Achan was done by the Supreme Magistrate Joshuah, and not by mere private persons usurping his power. Achans sin being so secret and unknown, could not involve the whole multitude into sin, and render them obnoxious to divine wrath (they not knowing it, far less being accessary to it.) And albeit it be said, Israel hath sinned, 11. v. yet as Diodate and others say well, the meaning is, one of Israel hath sinned, not the whole collective body: and although by occasion of that sin of one member of the body, other members are smitten; yet in the justice of God, these smitten members had their own guiltiness drawing on strokes upon them, the out-letting whereof was in divine wisdom ordered upon occasion of Achans sin. These two things we are peremptory in. 1. That God in his holy justice doth not punish any part of a people for the sins of another part, to which they are no ways accessary, only they tolerate what they cannot amend, keeping within compass of their calling, albeit in his holy Providence and Wisdom, he may, and doth often, take occasion of punishing one part of a People for their own sins, from the sinning of another part of that same Body and Corporation. Every man that is punished, hath in himself the meritorious cause of the punishment; albeit the rise of the execution of the punishment hic & nunc be occasioned by the sins of neighbours, or members of that same body. 2. In this we are peremptory, that whatever opportunities, the Lord in his holy Wisdom doth take of punishing one part of a people, upon the breaking out of the sins of another part of a people, yet private persons have no warrant thereupon to usurp the Magistrates Sword, nor to use it against himself, if he be the offender, or against other offenders; and the pretence of turning away God's judgements from ourselves, will not justify such disorder and intrusion beyond the lines of our Calling. This is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the true question betwixt us, and this man with his complices; in every case where he apprehends defection, he will have private men, usurping the Magistrates punishing and revenging Sword against all, for averting God's wrath (albeit to violent him or his, in matter of Religion, he affirms is the greatest oppression.) He thinks, he and his complices may force all by the Sword to their way, but must not be forced by any. Who can endure such Turkish Tyranny, such Doctrines and Practices, so subversive of humane Societies? If he (or his consorts) can produce either Scripture, Command or allowed Example, warranding any party of mere private persons, to take and use not only the defensive Sword, but the avenging and punishing Sword, against Magistrates of all degrees, and against the Body of a people, upon pretence of Religion or any other, we shall kiss his hands, and humbly yield to God's truth (accounting this our greatest victory) otherwise we must say, he is a very word●e Thraso to tell us, that any thing he says (perverting the sense of Scripture) may stop the mouth of all contradiction; and we must look upon him as Satan's instrument, to introduce confusion in the world. And though he pleads for private persons falling upon Magistrates, and others of the Commonwealth for their sins, that God's wrath may be turned away in their punishment, it hath no weight with us: for, albeit the Lord may, in his holy wise Providence, take the rise of the out-letting of his judgements on some from the sins of others related to them, yet hath he not made his Providence the Rule of our actions to warrant us (being private Persons) to punish them; but we must go to the Law and Testimony to seek the Rules of our actions. And whatever action is not according to this, there is no light in it, it is but a work of darkness, for all the fair colours men can set upon it: albeit God visit the sins of Parents upon Children; yet that gives no warrant to Children to offer violence to their Parents for their sins. But yet the Libeler cannot so leave the matter, but after many ranting and rambling words (which it were a pain to ripe up, nor is it our purpose, minding only to notice his abuses of Scripture, and impertinent reasonings) he comes at length to his great reserve, pag. 30. and says, If all these things do not satisfy (as indeed they are soon pleased, who will be satisfied by him) he hath yet, four or five particulars that will make all sure for his position, which he hath been labouring to underprop, (viz.) That any private persons, may against all Magistrates, and the great body of the Commonwealth, take and use not only the self defending, but vindicative, punishing and reforming Sword.) And, 1. he saith, That the reason of delivering the Kingdom to the People, and not to the King, with the Law itself, (Deut. 17.14. no way contradicted or repealed, by the manner of the Kingdom, and in effect of Tyranny fore told, by way of dissuasive, 1 Sam. 8.10.) doth make much for his position. But, 1. the man utters here, a gross untruth; For, God doth not in the Text, deliver the Kingdom to the People, and not to the King, (as he saith) he doth only before hand, instruct the People anent the right way of setting of a King over them, (when it should come to pass, that they should do so) and leaves in his Word, instructions for the King that should be set over them, how to behave himself: That the Kingdom is here delivered to the People, to be managed by them, as well as to the King, or with reserve of Power to them, to use violence upon and against the King, (if he should deviate from the rules there set down) as this man contends, is most false: the People had not so much Power, as to choose the person that was to be King; God reserved this for himself, 15. ver. Thou shalt in any wise set him King over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose, neither ever did they choose a King, but only accepted of the Kings, chosen and given them by God, and designed to them by his extraordinary Ambassadors; as is clear, first in Saul, and after in David and his Family, the chosen Royal Family. Neither were the People to look on their Kings, as their servants or vassals, or creatures, (as such men use to write) but as set over them, Thou shalt set him over thee, (not under thee) whom the Lord thy God shall choose) neither had they power over the King, but the King by God's Ordinance had Power over them. 2. Were it so, that the Kingdom or the Power of managing it, were delivered to the People, (which is most false) yet this makes nothing to this Libelers position; giving Power to any party of private Persons amongst People, to punish all Magistrates, and the major part of the people too, (if they be strong enough) whatever was granted to the People here, was granted to the body; not to this, or that party of private persons. 3. It is very true, the place, 1 Sam. 8.10. (and not, 1 Sam. 10.10. as he miscites both this and the former Scripture) neither contradicts, nor repeals that Law, Deut. 17.14. but agrees notably with it. But it is false, that only the Tyranny of a King is there spoken of, by way of merely dissuasive: Moses and Samuel do very well agree together, the one shows what a King should do ex officio and de jure, the other what a King may do, by the power he hath, and yet not be obnoxious to punishment, from Subjects; The one shows what a good King should do, the other, what a People should suffer of an evil King, without attempt of violence upon him: The one sets forth God's approbative Law, and instructs Kings in their kingly duties; the other sets down the permissive Law of the King, showing the reach of his Power, (if he should abuse it) without punishment from man. The doing of such things, 1 Sam. 8.10. was in effect tyrannical, not approven by God; but if the King came to abuse his Power so far, he had a permissive Law for him, that it was not free to his Subjects to punish him: As, albeit the Lord approveth not Divorce, or a man's putting away of his wife, yet by a permissive Law, husbands amongst God's People, had liberty, Deut. 24.1. to put away their wives, without being obnoxious to humane punishment for that cause; (albeit God reserved the punishment of the hardhearted husbands to himself) So, the Lord gives no approbation to over-imperious or tyrannical facts of Princes; yet, if they abuse their Power, he will reserve them unto dreadful punishments by his own hand, but will not have the hands of their Subjects to be upon, or against them. As parents do evil in correcting their children, for their pleasure, Heb. 12.9, 10. and have no moral approven power from God so to do; yet, it is a sort of right of parents, that if they so do, their children may not use violence upon them, or rise to destroy them, but be in a reverend subjection to them. But this great Theologue tells us, That it is only the manner of Tyranny, that is here set down by Samuel; And that merely by way of dissuasive, to dissuade them from seeking a King. Ans. 1. It is true, the fact is the manner of Tyranny, but the permissive power without punishment from Subjects, is the just right of all Lawful Kings, of whom, as it may be said, Nil paenas metuunt, nulla quia lege tenentur: So to them (if they deboard and abuse their power) it may be said, Si genus humanum & mortalia temnitis a●ma: At sperate deos memores fandi atque nefandi. 2. Let it be so, that Samuel in setting forth the manner or Law of the King, intended to dissuade the people, from insisting in their petition for a King; yet, that was not his only, nor his main intention: his main intention is, to show the People their duty, under a King's oppression, (though it was not his duty to oppress them) to show them, (I say) what they behoved to suffer under a King, beyond measure imperious, without resistance, (for he is not now teaching the King his duty.) This is clear, for otherwise, to what purpose should he have written the manner of the King in a Book, and laid it up before the Lord, after the King is set over them? 1 Sam. 10.25. when there was no place for repentance, no remedy, no use of terrifying or dissuading them; the only use of recording it, was, to teach the people their behaviour towards the King, and patience under him, and that it should not be free for them, to shake off the yoke of his Government, or to offer violence to him, albeit he should over-stretch his Power too far. This that he recorded, was not the Law of the King, Deut. 17. that was already keeped in the Ark with the rest of the Law, and needed not to be written again in a Book, to lay it up before the Lord. Nor is there any ground for their fancy, who think, that Samuel did write certain fundamental Laws of the Kingdom, to withstand the abuse of absolute Power, and to temper Monarchy, with a liberty befitting the People: This is but a guess without ground; had there been any such special fundamental Laws, the ten Tribes had a fair ground of pleading upon the same, before their revolt; but no such thing is heard of, and it is as easy to deny it,, as it is to affirm, that there was any such thing as these imagined fundamental Laws. Besides, that the People claim no vote in such fundamental Laws or Pactions; and had there been any such thing, it was their interest to be consulted with in the matter; and had they thought of any such Covenants or Laws fundamental, wherein liberty might be left them to resist their Kings, or take order with them, how easily could they have showed the weakness of samuel's dissuasion, and said, If the King become evil, we will resist him, and be revenged upon him; for, we take him to reign, but only on such terms, that he reign well; But no such thoughts had they. I shall only add two or three testimonies concerning this place, 1 Sam. 8.10. Mr Calvin, Instit. lib. 4. c. 20. S. 26. speaking of this Jus Regis, 1 Sam. 8. says well, Certe non id jure facturi erant Reges, quos optime ad omnem continentiam lex instituebat, sed jus in populum vocabatur, cui parere ipsi necesse esset, nec obsistere liceret (n. b.) ac si dixisset Samuel, eo se proripiet licentiae regum libido quam cohibere vestrum non erit (n. b.) quibus hoc restabit unum, jussa excipere & dicto audientes esse. So, Brentius, Hom. 27. 1 Sam. Etiamsi velletis jugum Regis excutere, tamen ut semel susceperitis, nequaquam id vobis licebit. Add Diodat on the place, that this jus Regis was, by consent of Nations and God's toleration, become as it were a right in absolute Kingdoms; God prescribing to Subjects the Law of patience and obedience, and the Prince being no way subject to punishment, albeit Gods express Command, Deut. 17. moderates his actions otherwise. The next thing the Libeler adds in his reserve, to satisfy men's judgements anent his seditious position of private men's using the punishing Sword against all Magistrates, etc. is, the contract and covenant betwixt King and people, etc. Better occasion shall be given to speak of this in the next Chap. Only now we say, it is impertinently alleged to the satisfying of men anent his foresaid position: for, whatever interest the body of a people have to oppose powers above them by that supposed contract and covenant, will not justify mere private persons, and the far fewer and lesser part, in their insurrections against all Magistrates and the Body of the community; for, it is not with them, as separate from the Body, that such a contract (if any be) is made; but it is between the King and the People, nor can it enstate them in a Power of punishing all Magistrates over them and all their neighbours, (being the Plurality) which this man aims at. But he proceeds to seek further protection for sedition in sacred Scripture, out of which he would produce three instances: First, the people's opposing Saul in the case of Jonathan, 1 Sam. 14.45. To which we say, though Saul had made a rash oath, and had rashly and sinfully adjured the people, that they should eat no food till the evening, v. 24. (which L. R. untruly calls a standing Law, which the People had agreed to, P. 349.) yet the people use no violence against Saul, when he goes about to put to death innocent Jonathan (who tasted of the honey, not having heard of the adjuration) But in the heat of a soldierly boldness, (after so great a victory obtained specially by Jonathans' valour, who in that day of Battle wrought with God, and wrought great salvation in Jsrael) do effectually interpose with Saul, and mediate for the life of Jonathan, moving Saul to wave respect to his rash oath, and to regard what was just and right. The people (as Junius saith) adjurat Saulem & appellat ipsius conscientiam coram vivente Deo, ut posthabita juramenti ratione, juris habeat rationem, etc. & se interponentes, Saulem impediverunt, ne eum morti traderet. They interposed by mediation for so worthy a person, and their mediation was willingly welcomed, and not a word is there more of that matter, Saul not counting himself crossed in such mediation for so noble and dear a Son, whom he in his rashness had devoted to death. Neither do the people oppose an oath against Saul's oath, for saving Jonathan: Junius exposition may pass well, that they speak not by way of swearing, but by way of reasoning, abhorring the destruction of such a person. Ab sit, ut vivit Jehova, an cadere debet ullus ex capillis capitis ejus, quandoquidem, etc. As the Lord liveth, should any hair of Jonathans' head fall to the ground, etc. It is a wonder to see understanding men argue from this place, for violent and forcible resistance to Kings, especially when acting according to Laws consented to by private persons; here the King is not acting according to Law, but prosecuting the observation of a foolish and rash oath; Here, the opposition made to the King, is by way of intercession and earnest reasoning, that he ought to regard what was right, more than his rash oath; here, the opposition made by way of intercession, was acceptable and welcome, acquiesced in, and yielded to; Here, the opposition made, is not only by one part of the people, but the Princes of the Land and Captains of thousands, as L. R. saith, p, 348. Now what makes all this for a party of mere private persons making insurrection, and using force and violence upon all Magistrates, acting according to established Laws, and affronting, grieving, dishonouring them, yes, professedly aiming at their destruction? Let Peter Martyr be looked upon this place, and he speaks notably well, his own words will discover, how notourly he is falsified by L. R. p. 349. But yet again, the Libeler produceth the example of the ten tribes rejecting Rehoboam, 1 Kings 12. as a laudable example to justify his position. Belike now the matter goes farther on, then private men's innocent self-defence against violence, for the defection of the ten tribes is held forth as imitable (we see what is the tendency of this man's Principles.) But no sound man will think, the sudden and furious Rebellion of the ten tribes from David's house, upon the rash and furious answer of a young King, was justifiable, (although the Lord in his Providence ordered it so.) And upon the revelation hereof, it was acquiesced in, and arms were not used against the dividing party; and it would be considered also, that they who made the secession, were the major part of the body of the people. But, what is all this to justify the insurrections of any lesser party of private people, against the Magistrate, and all Magistrates supreme and subordinate, as this man would have them to do? Every example recorded in Scripture is not imitable. As to the revolt of Libnah, 2 Chron. 21.10. this is reported in Scripture as a fact, but is not justified and approven, although it be said, they revolted, because Jehoram had forsaken the Lord God of his fathers. This imports not the impulsive cause of the revolt, or motive which they had before their eyes, (for, in that same verse and period, it is said, The Edomites also revolted from him, because he had forsaken the Lord God of his fathers: and the Edomites loved not the true Religion) But the meritorious cause on Jehorams part of that piece of judgement coming on him, is pointed at; as ofttimes God punisheth men's sins by the sinful actions of other men against them; the instruments are sinful, but his justice is holy. But let the Libeler tell us in good earnest, if he thinks that the laying aside of the Presbyterian frame, is the forsaking of the Lord God of our fathers, and a sufficient cause for any one Town in the Kingdom to revolt from the King, (though he do not persecute them nor force them to his way, as there is no evidence that Libnah was thus used) shall a Kings swerving in that one point, or if there be greater infidelity, be sufficient ground of defection from him? Cave dixeris. Libnah was a City of the Priests, Josh. 10. (perhaps much of the temper of this sort of men) but their revolt was sinful, because with the secession from the Commonwealth, they fell off from the Church of God, from Jerusalem, the Temple, and public Worship and place of it, which was (as yet) owned by God, notwithstanding many corruptions: the revolt is only recorded as done, not as well done. As to what he adds, of the Practices, Prophecies, and manner of the late blessed Reformations, and the Right and Constitution of this Kingdom, afterward it shall be considered. But it is a wonder, that upon this point of resistance and taking arms against Kings, he hath omitted David's taking Goliaths Sword, and gathering bands of men for his own defence against Saul's violence; which because he meddleth not with, neither shall we, further than to note what Beza in his answer to Castellio, P. 20. says, Davidis unctio ita eum à privatis distinguebat, ut jure posset armis vim injustam repellere. And it were to be wished, that this Libeler, who mocks at the exemption of Kings from punishment by Subjects (as we will hear) may let David's word sink in his heart, Who shall stretch forth his hand against the Lords anointed, and be innocent? Now to draw to a close of this matter, let these few things be observed, 1. That whatever may be said of the lawfulness of defensive arms, against the illegal violences and extreme oppression of a Prince, who is not integrae Majestatis, by other Magistrates to whom with him the protection of Laws and Liberties is jointly committed, by certain pactions and conditions expressed; that will say nothing to warrant the insurrection of any party of private persons against all their Magistrates, acting according to Laws agreed upon by the Magistrates of all degrees, and the body of the Community. 2. That the late rising against, and resisting the King and all Authorities in the Land, was utterly unwarrantable, not only upon the account of their being mere private persons who did take arms, but because there was neither sufficient ground for that deed, (had it in its nature been lawful) nor did they abide within due limits of an innocent defence. The Author of L. R. tells us, P. 329. When there is no actual invasion made by a man seeking our life, we are not to use violent re-offending. Again, he saith, P. 327, 328. Private men must not presently use violence to the King's servants, till they supplicate; nor may use re-offending, if flight may save; and must not use violent re-offending against the servants of the King, but in the exigence of last and most inexorable necessity. And, P. 321. Any mean not used for preventing death, must be an act of revenge, not of self-defence. And adds there, That in paying tribute, or suffering a buffet of a rough Master, we are not to use any act of re-offending, etc. Now the world knows, the life or blood of these people was not sought upon any terms, there was no forcing them to idolatry, to false worship, nor frighting them to any thing of that kind upon pain of their lives; only for their contempt of the outward Ordinances of God, purely administered in an Orthodox Church, they were put to pay such moderate fines, as the public Laws had appointed; without any actual invasion of them or their persons, they were the first aggressors and invaders, wounding and murdering the King's Servants and Ministers, and seizing on his chief Officer. Napht. p. 137. confesseth they shed the first blood, and first murdered the King's Servants. They had never before that essayed supplicating these in power, for mitigation of their fines (which was not forbidden them to do, if so be they would have done it without tumults and combinations) but being inflamed by furious Agitators, they would flee to the Sword, and provoke others to combinations with them: And so, (spoiling loyal persons who would not concur with them, and their hearts being full of much more mischief) they marched on to mock Authority with armed Petitions, as they had mocked God by sinful prayers to prosper their evil course, (as if he had been altogether such a one as themselves) But not only have others, but themselves also, cause to praise God that they had no success in sin, which might have been a snare and a stumbling block to them and others also. It is Gods great mercy not to thrive in an evil way. 3. All the people of God are to advert carefully, to the dangerous principle of this Libeler, and his adherents, which is this, (all alongs his Book) That it is as (or more) irrational and unlawful, to suffer unjustly from the Magistrate, (so long as there is strength enough to act against him) as it is to obey actively, his unlawful commandments: This doctrine cannot but be a source and spring of perpetual seditions, under every kind of Government, Civil and Ecclesiastical: For thus, every man is made judge of his own suffering and passion, as well as of his own practice, and no man must suffer, more than he thinks he deserveth; (but counteract all Authority, if he be strong enough to do it.) And no man is to submit to unjust sufferings, by abused Authority, but ad redimendam majorem vexationem, and when he cannot otherwise mend himself by the use of violence against the Magistrate: Thus no malefactor ought to submit to punishment if he think it unjustly inflicted by the Magistrate, but do violence to him if he can; and, no Minister is to forbear preaching, if he judge himself unjustly deposed; and no Christian forbear intruding himself on the Communion, if he judge himself unjustly dealt with by Church-Judicatories: This is a subversion of all order in humane and Christian Societies, for all is made dependent upon the fancies and thoughts of private sufferers; who are like enough, to be very favourable judges to themselves, in prejudice of public Order, which (notwithstanding) any tenderhearted Christian will regard more than his own private will or well-being; however, Naphtali mocks at God's order, pag. 152. asserting, the observance thereof, to be but a dispensable formality, when he and his party takes it in their heads, that it is conducible to break the observance of God's order, for God's glory: What woeful confusion shall we be reduced to, if such fancies possess the heads of heady people? These great teachers, would assure us, it is an act of Grace and Virtue to resist the Magistrate, unjustly afflicting us: And that it is both well consistent with the honour due to the Magistrate, by the fifth Commandment, to knock him down by violent force of Arms, when we think he wrongs us; and also, a necessary commanded duty, (by virtue of the sixth Command) so to do, when he offers violence to our life, (although he proceed by Law, which we count an unjust Law.) This is the doctrine of L. R. and of his fellow witnesses, whom Napht. calls Martyrs: It is true, L. R. pag. 322. strives to allay and mollify the matter, (wherein he is not so far wrong as Naphtali) asserting, That in lesser injuries, (beneath mutilation, or loss of life) as bearing tributes, or losses in estate, etc. a man hath given him of God a greater comparative dominion, then over his life: And that he may as to these matters, suffer unjustly from the Magistrate, without resistance, and aught to do so; (and this was the only case of the western Sufferers, if they may at all be looked on, as unjustly suffering) although he ought not to suffer death unjustly, if he can help himself, because God hath not made this eligible by any man. But certainly, his writing involves gross contradictions, for the ground of resisting the Magistrate pursuing a man's life unjustly, which he doth lay down, (viz. That there is no more obligation lying on us, to suffer unjustly from an abused power, (if we can violently resist him) then to do unjustly upon the unlawful command of the Power) doth reach not only to the case of taking away the life, but taking away the goods unjustly; for if it be true, (as he says) that by virtue of the sixth Command, we are obliged to resist the Magistrate, when we think he takes our life unjustly; certainly by virtue of the eight Command, we are obliged to resist him, when he takes our goods unjustly, or lays on oppressive tributes; and by virtue of the ninth Command, are obliged to resist him violently, if reproach or infamy be rubbed on our name and reputation, (which to men, uses to be dearer than life or state) by him. And seeing this Witness and his fellows, do speak of submission to sentences of Judges, which they reckon unjust, as a matter at least of equal guiltiness, (where there is Power to resist violently) unto the guiltiness of active obedience given to unlawful Commands; no degree of such unjust suffering, is eligible, more than any degree of wicked obedience, to unjust commands: God hath not given to us a comparative dominion over our actions, that we should do a less sin rather than a greater; (seeing all sin is to be abhorred) So, if by divine precept, we be bound to resist Powers, inflicting on us greater punishments unjustly; we are also obliged to resist them, in inflicting the lesser punishments, (if they do unjustly.) And non-defense, even against lesser injuries, (being sin) it is not eligible, and if non-defense against greater injuries be sin, against the lesser it must be sin also. So by this doctrine, nothing at all is to be suffered at the hand of the Magistrate, (if we think, he deals unjustly with us, and if we have power enough to master him) but a continual repugnancy there must be in all Subjects against all Magistrates (when they apprehend wrong is done to them) and violence upon violence must be offered them, where there is force and strength enough in the persons accused as guilty: yea, no man is to suffer any thing from Powers above them, without a physical necessity of force upon him; nor must in submission do any thing that may be dispositive or preparatory to his own suffering. No man, if he think himself injured, (though sentenced to banishment) is to go on his own feet, till he be by force ejected; no man, fined in pecuniary Mulcts, is to pay them till he be under force, and his money plucked from him; no man is to go the place of execution (when sentenced by the Judge) till he be trailed by force, if he think himself innocent; nor lay down his head on a block, till he be violented: For, albeit he be not in probable capacity to deliver himself from death, or from these other punishments; yet, every man is in capacity probable enough to command his own loco-motive faculty not to stir toward the accomplishment of the execution of the unjust sentence, till there be a force upon him. And it is Naphtali's Principle, that so far as probable capacity is to resist violently, there should be no submission; and then there must be patience perforce. Can such Doctrines, or the tendencies thereof, relish to the people of God, or to any rational people? CHAP. III. That such as are invested with sacred and inviolable Sovereignty, have divine exemption and privilege of impunity from their own Subjects. THe matter in dealing with Magistrates (according to Naphtali's mind) rests not in a mere resistance of them by mere private persons, but goes on to retaliating and revenging upon them, wrongs supposed to be done, not only upon all inferior Magistrates, but upon the Supreme, who is invested with Majesty and Sovereignty over all under God. For this man, again and again, jeers at the Sovereign Powers privilege and Impunity of divine exemption; (See Napht. Pag. 28, 29.) and (reflecting not obscurely upon the horrid murder of our late Sovereign, insinuated as the memorable instance of the times whereof he now speaks, no other instance being producible at any time he now speaks of) asserts, That according to God's Word, the approbation of God's providence, and of his people animated by himself, the pretended exemption and impunity of Princes is made void, their Carcases removed, and their Sceptres broken, P. 29. And, P. 151. he allows any private persons to step forward, and remove them who abuse their Authority and occupy their places, and assert the interests which these wicked persons (Magistrates) have so traitorously forfeited and deserted. And when they do so, (though but private persons) he avows, they are acting in their places and callings, according to the Covenant. Most of the venom this man hath against the Powers ordained of God, he hath sucked out of the breasts of Lex Rex. It were not right to dig up all the pestilent untruths of that Piece, set forth in most impertinent and sophistical reasonings, mixed with infinite inhuman bitterness against the late King: only, as it were to be wished, that such errors might be buried in eternal oblivion; So it is to be regretted, that too too many of the Ministry and others in Scotland, have been poisoned with such Principles; and the same not being very like to be suddenly extirpate, the more need have the Powers above us to be watchful. To come to the matter then. 1. It would be observed, that in all political Societies, there is according to God's Ordinance, a supreme Subject of Majesty; in all these Societies, the chief Power is either subjected in one person, or in more persons in an united way. The God of order hath, in all humane political Societies, appointed under himself a supreme Power, whither subjected in a single person, or in a complex company, which is as one by political union. This supreme Power (or they who are vested with it) order the whole body, and hath nothing before or above it, in the nature and order of civil Power and Authority. And this first and supreme Power governs all in the Society, and is governed by none therein. In all order, there is a necessity to arrive at something that is first, before which, or above which, there is nothing in that order; In ordine, impossibile est abire in infinitum. To say that in civil Societies, a person is first and chief, and hath the Majesty of the Society resident in him, and withal, that that same person hath a Superior or equal, is to speak contradictions; for then the Power, or Person endowed with power should be both Supreme and not Supreme, in the same kind of civil order. Wise men have said, that the multitude of gods is the nullity of gods; a multitude of infinites so called, makes none of them infinite. The Gentiles, who had many gods, were indeed Atheists and without God in the World. So a multitude of Supreme Powers in one humane civil Society, destroys the divine order set by God himself, and allowed by the light of reason in humane Societies; a chimaera of idle distinctions is whelped by the late masters of confusion, of coordinate and collateral Sovereigns in one Kingdom, the fountality of Royalty in the people (resumable at their pleasure) is talked of, also Kings and People, their being mutual Magistrates to punish one another. And besides, ordinary Courts of Justice (where the Magistrate, God's Sword-bearer bears sway) Courts of necessity and Tribunals of Nature, where People are Judges, Accusers, and all, are bigly talked of, but these are only cloaks of fig-leaves to cover horrid Rebellion and Disorder. It is certain supreme Power is indivisible and incommunicable to distinct Subjects in any one political Society. There is no political Society, but the Sovereign Power must rest either in one single person, who hath no Peer, let be Superior, or in the plurality either of the best or chiefest, or of the most and greatest number, and which are in a manner one by aggregation. And there is no part of the Society or persons equal to, or above these in whom the Supremacy is. In a democratic constitution, the supreme Majesty is in the body or plurality of the People, So we often hear in Tully of majestas populi Romani; In an Aristocratick constitution, the Majesty and right of Majesty is in the body or plurality of the Nobles, or Lords, or Patritii, or however they be named in several such states. And in a Monarchy, the Sovereign Majesty is indivisibly and incommunicably resident in the person of the King, who hath none coordinate with him in the politic body, nor superior to him, he is solo Deo minor, which was the loyal faith of the primitive Christians concerning their Emperors, as Tertullian tells us, and was the ancient Language of our Parliaments concerning the King, (as may be seen in regiam majest. lib. 1. c. 1.) the loyal simplicity of the ancient Christians, and of our ancient forebeers in this Land, would have accounted the distinctions of the needle-headed seditious which we hear for levelling Royalty, very monsters. But why should we doubt, that where there is a King, (one truly so) his Sovereignty is matchless on earth, when the Scriptures calls him Supreme? 1 Pet. 2.13. Is there any equal to the Supreme in order of civil Government, by whom he is judgeable or punishable? if there be any, he is not Supreme, nor the Government Royal, Monogamy admits no Rival, so neither doth Monarchy, truly and properly so called. 2. It is certain, no man can be judged or punished but by his own Judge who is above him, and hath Authority over him by lawful commission from God, or from men authorized by God, to give such commission: Now, who shall be judge to the person or persons invested with Sovereign Majesty, seeing every Soul under them, is Commanded to be subject to them, Rom. 13.1. and seeing the supreme Power of the Sword, is committed unto them, and not to others, but by deputation and in dependence upon them? In an aristocratical constitution of Government, (as is at Venice) who shall be judges to the Patritii or Senators, if they, or the major part deviate or do wrong? In a democracy, (such as sometimes was at Rome, Athens, and other places) where the people are the supreme receptacle of Majesty, or the plurality of them, who shall judge, them, when they do wrong, either to particular persons, or to considerable parts of the people; as at Athens, Socrates was put to death, for avowing the only true and one God; just Aristides, was billetted into banishment, for no cause; valiant Themistocles had that same lot, and many more? and how often in such a constitution, hath the corrupt majority or plurality, extremely wronged considerable parts of the people? yet, who had power to punish them? who could be Judges between the doers and sufferers of the wrong? Is there not in both these Governments, a necessity of impunity and exemption, for these invested with the Soveraginty, (as to their subjects) unless a door be opened to most horrid confusions and dissolutions of States? So also, in a true Monarchy, there must be an exemption and impunity (as to subjects) of the person invested with Sovereignty and Majesty: God's law, nature's light and sound reason, are all for this, that the person (or persons) invested with sovereign Majesty, having the Legislative-power, the Jurisdictional-power, the Coerecive and Punitive-power originally in himself; must enjoy exemption and impunity, (as to subject's actings against them.) The contrary tenet overthrows the order of God and nature, and precipitates humane Societies in a gulf of endless confusions. 3. This hath been the constant sense of the generation of the righteous, and the ancient Christians, and great lights of God's Church, whom none will call flatterers of Princes, but such as have lost their foreheads: Tertul. apol. contra gentes, imperatores sunt, in solius Dei potestate, a quo sunt secundi, post quem primi, ante omnes Deos, & super omnes homines: And a little after, Majestatem Caesaris soli Deo subjicio: So, ad Scapulam, Imperator omnibus major est, dum solo deo est minor: So, Optat. contra Parmenian, super imperatorem, non est nisi solus Deus qui fecit imperatorem. And, Jerom. epist. ad Rusticum, speaking of David's words, Ps. 51. Against thee, against thee only have I sinned; says he spoke so, quia Rex erat, & alium non timebat. And Ambrose, in Apol. Davidis, cap. 4. & 10. speaking of the same words, says, Rex utique erat, nullis ipse legibus tenebatur, (he means, as to fear punishment from man) quia liberi sunt Reges a vinculis delictorum; neque enim, ullis ad paenam vocantur Legibus tuti Imperii potestate, homini ergo non peccavit, qui non tenebatur obnoxius. There is no doubt, but David was sensible both of the horrid injury he had done to Vriah, (the occasion of that Psalm) and of the scandal he had given to God's people, in which sense, he might be well said to sin against both: But in this word, against thee, thee only have I sinned; As he minds to acknowledge, that God only was conscious to his sin in committing it: So also, he shows, that this above all touched his conscience, that he had violated God's Law; and shows, that he is touched with his terrors, as his only Judge, though (as Diodat on the place says well) as he was a King, he was exempted from the punishment of man, and not obnoxious to humane Tribunals: And excellent Mr. Calvin, in that 20. Ch. of the 4. Book of his institut. S. 2 7. Assumptum in Regiam Majestatem, violare nefas est, nunquam nobis seditiosae istae cogitationes in mentem veniant, tractandum esse pro meritis Regem. S. 29, Personam sustinent voluntate Domini, cui inviolabilem Majestatem ipse impressit & insculpsit. And if Princes be tyrannous, nostrum non est hujusmodi malis mederi, etc. and so, S. 31. fully to our purpose, it is a wonder how many who pretend respect to Calvin, (as he is indeed most worthy of respect) should dare to violate the Sacrosanct Majesty of Kings, if they will but read over that Chapter, wherein he speaks most notably against the seditious Doctrines of our times, as if he had been living in them. 4. It is not denied, that the King is bound before God, to rule his people according to the Law of God, of reason and nature; yea, and to take his direction in Government, from the rational Laws of the Kingdom, (which are deductions from, or determinations of, the Law of God, reason and nature, to particular circumstances) agreed to, by the consent and with the good liking of his people. It is too gross a saying, Regi quicquid libet, licet; a good King will turn the word, and say, Regi quod licet (supposing it expedient) libet, he will make use of good Laws, as his instruments, in governing the people, and account it his honour and a thing greatly becoming his Majesty, to do nothing contrary to Law, in the ordinary course of his Government, and not at all stray therefrom, but when great reason urges an equitable interpretation of the Law, and respect to the end and aim of it, when precise cleaving to the rigidity of the letter thereof, might make summum jus, summa injuria: It is a royal thing for a King, to live by the same good Laws which are given by him to the people; and it is of efficicious influence upon them, to move them to walk in their duties orderly; Rex tenetur servare Leges, si non ut Leges, tamen ut rationes. But, if the supreme Power should deviat, we maintain that as a sure truth, which this man proudly and traitorously jeers at; That impunity (as from Subjects) necessarily attends Sovereignty and supreme Majesty; which hath this inseparable privilege of exemption from violence by Subjects, by the Law of God, Reason and Nature, whatever sort the Government be, Monarchical or Polyarchical: For, no man can be judged or punished, but by a Judge above him, and the Supreme hath none such, otherwise he were not Supreme. To teach contrary to this, is but to confound God's Order, and dissipate humane Societies, by continual rebellions. Yet, this inviolableness of the sacred persons of Kings, and supreme ●owers invested with Sovereign Authority from God, thus asserted, should be so far from licensing or encouraging them to do what they list, that they have the greater cause to walk with holy fear within the boundaries of God's Law, and their own just Laws; for the more immunity they have from men's violence, (which must be granted, unless all things be turned into confusion) the sadder punishments they shall have from God, if they debord. The sixth Chapter of the Book of Wisdom (though it be Apocrypha) is well worthy to be read by Kings and Potentates, and to be trembled at; for the matter is very agreeable to God's Word. The heaviest vengeances that are recorded in History, sacred and profane, have come upon flagitious and tyrannous Kings: their exemption from men's hands reserves them to fall into the hands of the living God, which is a fearful thing; who (besides the wrath that is to come) sometimes calls for foreign scourges upon them; sometimes suffers an evil spirit of rebellion to go out amongst their own Subjects, who though they do wickedly, in stretching forth their hands against the sacred head of the Lords Anointed, yet it is ordinary for the great God, to do the work of his holy Justice by wicked hands, and when men are serving their own lusts, and crossing his revealed will, (for which vengeance attends them) yet they may be in these actions serving his Providence, and his Justice against wicked Powers, albeit they think not so, nor comes it into their minds or hearts: But Potentates should remember the word, Potentes pa●ce debent uti potestate sua, ut semper eam retinere possint. But, the Libeler will have the memorable instance of the times, whereof he now speaks, (Naph. P. 30.) of casting away the Carcases, and breaking the Sceptres of Kings, to be remembered; and says, such a thing had the approbation of divine Providence, of his Word, and of his People animated thereto by himself. Albeit his speech be subdolous and double-faced, leaving it doubtful of what times he speaks, wherein this memorable instance of murdering Kings and dethroning them is to be found, (at the time of Reformation, whereat he seems to hint, no such thing was there) yet, it is too palpable he points at the horrid instance of the murder committed upon the sacred Person of our late King, by the vile and desperate Sectaries, (the instance (saith he) of the times we now speak of, is worthily recorded) another instance, in the times of first Reformation, of such murder, we know not. But, it is most falsely and wickedly said, (whether that particular be meant or not) that God's Providence or God's Word approves the murdering or deposing of Princes; or that he thereunto animates his people. God's Word never warranded any Subjects to take the Sword to destroy their Sovereigns, or to adjudge them to death under any pretence, (they not being their Judges above them, but under them) and what God's Word approves not, his Providence doth not approve, (although he may, and doth in his holy Providence, permit many things to be, which he approves not in his Word, which is our rule, and not his Providence.) And to say, God animates his people to such horrid actions, is blasphemy, making God the author of sin: he animates none to any thing that is against his Word (the ordinary rule of our walking) albeit extraordinarily he may stir up the spirits of some to actions, not according to the ordinary rule (as in the times of the Judges) but they were sure of their warrant from him, the like whereof none have ground to wait for now. But, God save the King from such people so animated, (as this man would have them) he may call them the people of God, that carry such murthering-hearts towards Princes; but it is to be feared, God will say to them, Depart from me, I know you not. One of Naphtali's commended Pseudomartyrs, the Apology, labours to produce many instances of the Parliaments of Scotland, punishing Princes for their enormities; all which he sets forth as laudable and imitable precedents and examples: Yet, the most that all of them amounts to, is nothing but the insurrection of Nobles (Proceres, as Buchannan calls them) against the Kings, and violent oppressions of such of them as have been flagitious and tyrannous, (such were several of them, as it happens every where, and was so in Judah, where were more evil Kings then good, by far.) But neither Buchannan nor this Apolog. can produce any one instance of our lawful Parliaments or People's taking on them, in a judicial way, in cold blood, and under forms of process, to punish or destroy their Kings, howsoever evil. Whatever insurrections have been wherein Kings have perished, and not a few people also, (as ofttimes the cure of Tyranny is worse to the people, than Tyranny itself, Minori cum periculo tyrannus toleratur quam ejicitur) yet God hath, since the foundation of our Kingdom to this day, preserved our Parliaments and People from such a way against their Kings, even when they were under Paganism (for some ages) even when Popery did overgrow the Land, choking and darkening the light of the Gospel, after it was come amongst us; and when the Land was in many ages under much barbarity, it never came in the hearts of Parliaments or People, to sit as Judges on their Sovereigns in cold blood, and advisedly with forms of Process, to attempt their destruction, (however evil they were.) The more shame do they cast upon these, who in the fair daylight of the Gospel, endeavour to poison souls with such a Doctrine of devils; or who instigate to, or approve of such ways against the Powers ordained by God. But to pull out this Libeler and his Complices from the Sanctuary of the Word of God, which (he says) does approve the destroying of Princes, and makes void their exemption and impunity as to men, (their Subjects.) Let it be considered, what colour there is for this horrid Tenet from the Word of God. A little we must reflect upon his Magazine, whence he borrows all his stuff, printing that precious matter that is there over and over again under different shapes. L. R. quest. 26. is bold to say, That the Sanhedrim might and should have put David to death for the matter of Vriah. For (says he) he sees no exception God makes in the Law, of great or small, but the murderer should be put to death, according to Gen. 9.6. Numb. 35.30, 31. and if men make difference, be craves leave to say, à facto ad jus non sequitur; and though it be an humane politic constitution, that the King be free of all coaction of Law, because it conduceth for the peace of the Commonwealth: Yet, if we make it a matter of conscience, I see no exception that God makes, the persons of the Great must not be excepted, Deut. 1.17. 1 Chron. 19.6, 7. Levit. 19.15. So also, P. 348. and 428. and 238. And often elsewhere, he will have the estates executing the moral Law (as he calls it) on the King, and punishing him, not only resisting him. And why? because he says most Thrasonically, P. 460. I have unanswerably proved, that the Kingdom is superior to the King, and the people may be their own Judge in the Tribunal of necessity. To which, we say, 1. What should he mean to make it conducible to the Peace of the Commonwealth, that the King be free of the coaction of Law, and yet not so, if it be made a matter of Conscience? Is the preservation of the Peace of the Commonwealth, no matter of Conscience to him? or, Is not the constitution, freeing the King from coaction of Law (for that end) warrandable? 2. It is good that this Metaphysical Statist, was no chief Priest or Levite, or such a member of the Sanhedrim in David's time, for he would certainly have afforded a corrupt exposition of the Law, in reference to the King, that he might be cut off; What sots, or cold-rife senseless men were the Priests and the Prophets of that time, who did not instigate the Sanhedrim, to execute the moral Law on David, that wrath might be turned away from the Land? this man could (in his sublime speculations) have instructed the Sanhedrim better in their duty, and could have told them, that albeit David was not bound to draw his Sword against himself, yet the Judges under him should not accept his person, because he was a great man; he could have told them the Sanhedrim is above the King, to punish him as well as another man for his sin, and in point of Conscience, and by God's Law, they were bound to do it. 3. He utterly mistakes the meaning of the Word of God, Gen. 9.6. (as for the other Texts, they clearly concern Magistrates only toward such, over whom they have power, but do●s neither instigate the inferior Magistrates against the superior, nor the People against any of them) where it is said, He that sheds man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; concluding hence, that there is here a Precept, that the blood of every man (though he be in the supreme Power) should be shed by his Inferiors, if he shed blood innocently and without cause; for, supposing this word, not only to be predictional or interminative, foretelling and threatening, what should come upon shedders of innocent blood (as some expone it) but also diatactick and preceptive; there must be meet limitations of the sentence, both in the subject and the attribute, that it may agree with other sentences of holy Scripture. The subject is, (he that sheds man's blood) which is not to be understood of every one that sheds man's blood, but only of such as have no authority, and do it out of private revenge (for we must not own the fancies of Photinians and Anabaptists, that condemn lawful wars, or capital punishments by the hand or Authority of Magistrates, albeit they argue from this place.) Again, the attribute, or that which is affirmed or commanded, concerning the shedder of man's blood (by man shall his blood be shed) is to be considered. Certainly, taking the words as a Precept, it is not meant, that it is the duty of every man, or any man indifferently, to shed the blood of the person, who sheds innocent blood; but the man who is to shed the Blood of that person, is the Magistrate, who is his Judge above him. All interpreters are agreed, that here is (if not the institution, yet) the approbation of the office of the civil Magistrate, and his capital punishing of murderers. Pareus saith, Sancitur hic lex civilis, ut homicidae plectantur capitaliter per hominem, non quemvis, sed gladio divinitus armatum; h. e. per Magistratum. Peter Martyr, loci come. p. 634. non temere nec per quemvis est effundendu● homicidae sanguis (id enim esset valde absurdum) quare colligendum est ex illis verbis, Magistratum non obscure esse a Deo institutum, qui animadvertat in homicidas. So, Musculus, Bezelius, Diodat, and every one almost, will have the man impowered here to shed the blood of the murderer, to be the Magistrate and the Judge. And the Chaldee Paraphrast hath well exponed it, qui effuderit sanguinem hominis, per testes juxta sententiam Judicum, sanguis ejus fundetur. And Bezelius says well on the place, that here God is communicating his right and power to the Magistrate, giving him jus vitae & necis, and power to kill murderers. Certum hominem intelligit (saith he) qui ad eam executionem constitutus est. So the man, that in this Text, hath power to shed the blood of the homicide or murderer, is the Magistrate or Judge that is above him, constitute by God in politic power, over the Society whereof he is a member. But if the persons invested with supreme Power of the Sword, abusing their power, become guilty of shedding innocent blood; who (in that Society, whereof they are heads) shall judge or punish them? Who is superior over the Supreme to punish him? It is true, God will take the matter in his own hand in his time, (and so taking the words as a prediction or threatening, they may be comprehensive of the supreme Power itself, and of men in that power abusing the same.) But it is inexplicable, how that any, in whom the Sovereign Majesty and magistratical Power resides, or who is therewith invested, should according to order be punished by Subjects, who are not appointed to be his Judges nor to be God's Sword-bearers, for executing Justice. The Text always supposes, that he who is the avenger of bloodshed, must be Judge above him that shed it, being in one body of one Society civil. When the Apostle, Rom. 13. says, let every Soul be subject to superior Powers, that (every Soul) doth not comprehend the supreme Power itself, (for how can the man invested with it, be subject to a superior Power?) but it is meant, that every Soul under the superior Power or Supreme, should be subject to it: And let men (as they will) indulge themselves in their seditious notions, they must at last ●ist in some supreme Power on earth, which is not judgeable nor punishable by any: if sovereign Majesty be placed in Parliament or people, (who may be guilty of shedding innocent blood, as well as a King) who shall shed their blood, (I pray you) when they transgress? where shall we have Judges to sit upon them, and to punish them, unless this be referred to the sounder and smaller part of the people? (as this man saith, p. 240.) And then, there is ground enough laid for eternal confusion; any lesser part when they have, or think they have wit and strength enough to through their business, will undoubtedly call themselves the sounder part, and labour to bear down the corrupt plurality, (as we did see not many years ago, in our Church-business) God pity us, if these Principles be embraced and put in practcie. But the christian Reader may easily see, how hard this Author is put to it, and for all his saying, that according to God's law, Kings must be punished as well as others; yet, is he forced to acknowledge, a supremacy of Power in some, not punishable by any but by God: For, L. R. p. 389. when he hath given all power to the Parliament over the King, he objects to himself, who shall punish and coerce the Parliament, in case of exorbitance? he answers, posterior Parliaments, and p. 211. he sayeth, by the people and conscience of the people, are they to be judged, (let all our Nobles and Parliaments hearken to this.) Now, who ever heard of this, that one Parliament posterior, should punish the prior? Their acts they may retract indeed, but to punish them for their acts, it is most absurd; because, the prior Parliament, in the capacity of that Judicatory, had as much power as the posterior; Statesmen will wonder at such Doctrine, that members of a Parliament should be punished for their free votes, by a succeeding Parliament; and far more at the subjecting them to the conscience of the people, (as he speaks.) But then another objection he makes, posterior Parliaments, and people both may err; he answers, all that is true, God only must remeed that: Well then, if Parliament or people, destroy and murder persons innocently, God only must remeed that, there is no Power on earth to call them to an account. Who sees not, that at last this Author is driven to acknowledge a Power (which if it deviate) cannot be judged by any on earth, and there is no remedy but in God, against its unjust violence? although he will not acknowledge this Power to be in the King; yet, in the people, as contradistinct from Parliaments, he acknowledges it; whereby also, it may be seen, that his Principles lead him to own a mere democracy, (which is the worst of Governments) as the only lawful Government; he placeth and fixeth the unpunishable Sovereignty there. Kings and Parliaments may be, (according to him) punished by the people; but, they have a Power attended with impunity from men, if they err, God must amend that only: we see where we are, and that the resolution of all supreme Power is upon the people under God, (according to these men's tenets) the rabble of the multitude, against King and all Nobles and Rulers, are instated in the Sovereignty under God; yea, Napht. goes further, giving to any part of mere private persons, power over King and all Magistrates and Nobles, to judge, depose and punish them, or the major part of the people, (if there be strength enough) and that uncontrollably upon their own judgement of discretion, as we have heard, and will hear further. But now, ventum est ad triarios, we come to the great Guns, whereby Napht. and his witnesses, L. R. and the Apol. strives to batter down God's order, and to make sovereign Powers, (in the case of abuse of Power) punishable by their inferiors and subjects, (a thing which all the Lords and Superiors in Scotland, had need to look to; for, with as good reason may their tenants and vassals, be exhorted to rise against them, and take order with them, when they think they do them wrong, as subjects may be exhorted to rise against their King.) Lex Rex harps much upon the Covenant, betwixt the King and the people, and betwixt both together with God, quest. 14. and 40. asserting, That the King is only a King conditionally and Covenant-wise; that this Covenant, giveth the people a coactive Power over the King to punish him, if he fail in his duty, and that if it be not performed on his part, (although it be but a tacit and implicit Covenant) the people for their part are loosed from the Covenant: These, and many such Doctrines consequent on these, he hath in these questions. But, Naph. out-stripes his leader, for albeit he also harps upon that supposed Covenant, p. 19 p. 30. and elsewhere, laying much of the stress of resistance against, and revenge upon the King abusing his power, upon that rotten foundation; Yet, he goes a greater length then L. R. doth; for, L. R. takes the Covenant as the warrant for the body of the people, with their Rulers of inferior degree, to resist and punish the King; but Napth. pleads the Covenant for any party of mere private persons, to rise against, resist, throw down King and all Magistrates, Supreme and Subordinate, and in their Phineas-like motions, to use the vindicative, punishing, reforming Power of the Sword, especially in case of defection in matter of Religion; (such as he thinks the cause now to be.) And the great stress of the business, is still laid upon these Covenants, tacit and virtual, or express; and, it is pleaded, the people or any part of the people, have by that Covenant, a joint obligation with the King and all Magistrates, lying upon them, to use a vindicative and reforming Power, in case of defection in Religion; yea, even against all back-slidden Rulers and the plurality of an apostate Nation. There is a twofold Covenant they talk of, as the foundation of all humane Societies, 1. the religious joint Covenant between the King or Sovereign and people with God. 2. The civil Covenant betwixt the King and the people. Concerning the former, it is Naph. mind, p. 18. That albeit the care of Religion toward God, in a vindicative and punishing way, and reforming it, etc. lieth upon the King or Magistrates mainly, (he should have said only, for none can produce a commission, but the Powers ordained of God, for using the vindicative, punitive and reforming Sword, about which the question is now but only the Magistrate) Yet, there is a joint obligation lying upon the people, and every party thereof, to vindicate and reform Religion, in a public punitive way, even against all Magistrates and Nobles, (if they be the principal perverters and patrons of abominations, and against the plurality of the people; for, says he, 18. p. Idolatry, perjury, etc. aught by all means (n. b.) to be suppressed, restrained and severely punished: So that if any part of the people, do think the Magistrates, (all of them) or the plurality of the people, Patrons of abominations, (as in the present case he challenges them to be) any private party that think they have power enough, may slay to the vindicative, punishing and reforming Sword; and fall upon all Rulers and others, whom they think to be in a defection, and will boldly say, that in truth they are so. This is the man's fine Doctrine: he conceals not his own intentions and his parties, upon the account of the Apostasy which they now fancy, to fall with bloody cruelty on all Magistrates and people too, who stand in their way: he shows his bloody teeth, but God will knock out the teeth of this sanguinary Faction, as he hath done. Yea, Naph. runs yet higher; for, upon the conceit of setting up Government for Truth and Religion and God's Worship, as the main ends, P. 16. he asserts, The cessation of the obligation to the Government, when there is a perversion in that great design of it, and a returning of people to their primaeve liberty (as he often speaks) to erect Governments to their mind, and to combine with whom they will, (as before we heard.) Concerning these things, we say, 1. That albeit it be Gods holy will, that in erections of Civil Government, his Truth, sincere Worship and Glory in these, should be mainly minded and intended by men, and it is men's duty so to do: yet, it is clear, that in many places de facto it is not so; although men profess in the general, aiming at Truth and right Worship, yet there are aberrations in the particular. 2. Albeit there be, in the point of Truth and the Worship of God, (which the jure should be principally cared for in Government) a notable perversion and swerving; that doth not at all invalidate the Authority or Government, nor break the obligation thereunto, although it be injurious to favourers of Truth and right Worship: For, God so far regards the keeping of humane Societies in tolerable order, that albeit the great duties of advancement of his Truth and Worship be not minded by Rulers; yet, he will not have the Commonwealths, where justice between man and man is maintained for his Glory, (although Religion not minded as it ought to be) casten lose; nor will have men think themselves loosed from obligation to the Government, albeit there be perversion in the managing thereof, as to Religion: for, neither must they be heard, who hold, That civil Dominion is grounded on Grace; nor they who say, That infidel, heretical or excommunicate Magistrates fall from their power, or that the Subjects obligation to them ceaseth. 3. It shall be easily granted, that the people, and every one of the people, aught to reform themselves from all real corruptions in the Worship of God, and keep themselves pure from abominable things, every one is bound to amend one, and so all will be more easily amended: yea, no man should say, Am I my Brother's keeper, but by faithful instruction, warning, reproof, strive to save others from the evils of the times and places wherein they live. But, 4. That there lies upon the people, with the Magistrate, a joint obligation of public reforming, and using the avenging or punitive Sword in amending things amiss against the will of all Magistrates, or even turning that Sword in a violent way against him; or that such obligation lies upon one part of the people, against all Magistrates and their fellow Subjects, as to violent them in matters of Religion (or which they account Religion) it is utterly denied, acting in a public co-active way, or by the use of the vindicative and punitive Sword. For, Reformation in a co-active way is so fully and only the Magistrate's duty, that whoever will intrude into it (being persons of mere private capacity) they slain Religion, and brings scandal on it by their Rebellion. Though the result of the work be good, the manner is evil; God needs no man's sin to help him in his work; nor will he ever impute it as sin to private persons, that they did tolerate (with grief) what they could not amend, nor that they did forbear violent forcing the Magistrate to their mind (supposing them in the right.) If in a way God hath set me in, I cannot without manifest schism and sedition, and leaping beyond the limits of my calling, do a good work, I am to leave it to God to do it in his own cleanly way; it is well if I keep myself pure, mourning for abominations done, and praying to God against them, and using all charitable and fraternal means becoming a private Christian; and thus my tolerating of what I cannot amend, shall not be my sin, albeit it is sin in them who have a public Power, and do not reform, but connive at abuses. As no part of a people or private persons, have power to usurp the Office of a Minister, to preach, minister Sacraments, etc. So, no private persons can lawfully, under whatsoever pretence of good intentions, meddle with the Magistrates work, or intrude in the public actings only competent to his place who is the Minister of God, invested with Authority by him. Far less can they, in case of his deficiency or opposition, use the vindicative or punishing Sword against him, for not being of their Religion (supposing ●t to be true) nor against their fellow-subjects: but all this is according to this man's mind. The great mistake in all this matter, is, that the Magistrate and People are, as to Covenant with God, or engagements to him for advancing his Truth, looked upon as two debtors bound in a Band, conjunctly and severally, for one sum; so that in the deficiency of the one, the other must pay all, and hath power to stress the deficient: So they think, there is a joint and equal obligation betwixt Princes and People, as touching the public promoting of Religion. If the Magistrate be deficient, they must do it, yea and fall on him for his deficiency. But there is no such joint obligation: it is true, the Magistrate in his place is bound in a public way to advance Religion; the people are also bound in their private capacities and callings, to advance Religion, and to serve the Magistrate therein, as he employs and calls them. But there is no such joint obligation of King and People unto God, that either of them should be so bound for the other, that if the one be deficient, the other party contracting becomes therefore obliged to the duty to which the deficient party is obliged, or becomes guilty, if he intrude not in the part of their duty. Nor is there a mutual tye on both to force one another to their duty. Qui diversimode obligantur ad diversa non sunt correi in promittendo. The case betwixt the King and People in the religious Covenant with God, is like the case of two men binding in one band for their several moieties of a sum; if the one be deficient, the other is not stressed for it, nor is the payer bound to force the deficient by virtue of the band. If the People reform themselves, and keep themselves pure from abominations, the Magistrates deficiency (which they tolerate with grief) shall not be imputed to them, because God gives them not a calling to intrude into the Magistrate's office, or to use the reforming Sword, or vindicative and puniing acts of it (which only are committed to the Magistrate.) The King indeed is bound, both as a Christian, to own Religion for his own souls good, and as a King, to use his magistratical Power to force his Subjects to the use of external means of Religion (which is all he can do) and if he do this, and meet with the insuperable stubborness of an evil people, the guiltiness lies not on him, but on them. But upon the people, there lies no obligation to force the King, or their fellow subjects to external means of Worship and Religion, because that is not within the verge of their calling, only they are to keep themselves pure, and to use all moral means usable by persons in their station, to move others to embrace true Religion. And having done this, they discharge themselves sufficiently, and may commit the rest to God. The late Covenant itself doth only bind private persons in their places and callings (which certainly are private, and to be managed by private means) to endeavour reformation, and doth not bind any number of mere private persons, to pull the Sword out of the Magistrates hands, when they think he useth it otherwise then he should, and then they would have him use it. It is not, can never be the place and calling of mere private persons, and the minor or far minor part of the People, to use the vindicative, punishing and reforming Sword against all Magistrates (reckoned by them as Apostates) and against all the body of the Land. If the Covenant be passive of such Commentaries as this man puts upon it, that whatever any private party accounts Reformation, they may use the vindictive punishing Sword against all of all degrees that stand in their way to advance the same, we have little reason to be in love with it; and just cause to cast it by, till it be cleared of such corrupt gloss●●. But, let us now consider the civil Covenant betwixt the King and the People, Napht. touches on it on the forecited places, and the Author of L. R. puts forth his strength (such as it is) upon this matter, avowing, that the King is not King, but Covenant-wise and conditionally, and that by Covenant; the people have a civil claim against him, may punish him, and have a right to a coactive power over him in Courts set up by themselves. And may as they see fit, resume what power he hath, for he is but their Servant and Vassal (as he saith.) What can Protestant Princes expect, but destructive doctrine from this hand and pen, that hath written up, (Page 178.) John Marian the Jesuit, lib. 1. de Rege, for one of his approved Authors (as he calls them) a reprobate Author, (amongst all good men) is the man, and his book commending regicide by any means, is infamous in all Christendom; however this man count of him as an approved Author: and his spirit may be no less seen in that, while he approves this man, he hath set this mark on famous Bishop Andrews, known in his time to be most adverse to Papists, P. 423. Bishop Andrews (saith he) his name is a curse on the earth, his writings prove him to be a popish Apostate. What of his writings this man hath seen, who can tell? but all that the world hath seen of his writings, prove him a great Antipopist and sound Protestant. But to our purpose: This civil Covenant 'twixt King and People, is pleaded as that which is essential and fundamental to the constitution of all politic Societies; and whereupon, peoples both resisting the Prince, and revenging themselves upon him, is mainly grounded. Yea, Naph. will have it to be a sufficient ground, not only for the Proceres or Body of the people, to proceed vindicatively against the King, but (in application to the Rebellion, he intends to justify) for any private persons whatsoever, if they be in probable capacity to do mischief, without drawing mischief upon themselves; and so out-stripes his master, (who gives not much to any private persons upon this account, but to the States of the Land and inferior Magistrates with the Body of the people.) But as to the Covenant betwixt King and People, both L. R. and Naph. urge it as the ground for not only resisting, but punishing Kings and all Magistrates, (when they account them Tyrants.) and will have a tacit virtual Covenant as valid for their ends, as where it is express; avowing it to be essentially fundamental in the constitution of all political Societies. This brings to mind the folly of the man, that would have all to be tied in a Band that he had made, aswell these who subscribed not, as these who subscribed it. But to be serious, as to this matter; we say, 1. it is easily conceded, that there is a mutual obligation betwixt Magistrates and Subjects to mutual duties, which is indeed essential to the constitution of the politic Body; but this obligation arises not from any tacit or express Covenant betwixt them, but from the Ordinance and Will of God, enjoining them these duties in such relations, in that Society wherein they are combined. 2. That obligation, though it be mutual in the relations they are in; yet, it is not conditional: there is a mutual obligation to mutual duties betwixt Parents and Children, but it is not conditional; nor is there such a Contract or Covenant, that if Parents be undutiful, Children should be loosed from their duty, or upon the contrary: but Children are bound to be subject to their Parents, without any condition or paction on their part, (only in point of obedience active, Gods will is to be preferred to theirs, and nothing is to be done contrary to Gods Will for their pleasure) otherwise the subjection is not conditional, but absolute. So also, people's obedience to Kings (properly and truly so called) is not conditional, (si meruerint) nor is the duty of the King to them conditional, (si meruerint) but each of them is absolutely bound to do duty in their own relations, wherein they are one to another, the obligation is absolute, (salva Deo obedientia.) Reverend Mr. Calvin speaks home to this purpose, lib. 4. inst. cap. 20. S. 29. preventing an objection against obeying wicked and tyrrannous Magistrates; At mutuas (inquies) subditis suis vices debent praefecti. Id jam confessus sum, verum si ex eo statuis non nisi justis imperiis rependenda esse obsequia, insulsus es rationator; nam & Viri Vxoribus & Liberi Parentibus mutuis officiis astringuntur, etc. He says, that albeit Parent's discedant ab officio, etc. depart from their duty, and exceedingly provoke their Children to wrath, and Husbands use their Wives reproachfully, whom they ought to entertain kindly; yet, improbis & inofficiosis subjiciuntur Vxores & Liberi. And he adds there gravely, that inferiors should not so much inquire into the duties of their superiors, as every one should search what is their own duty; and no think themselves disobliged from their duty, because the other bound to do duty to them, is therein deficient: this is Christian divinity indeed. As the Magistrate is not to think the performance of his duty is dependent upon the condition of the Subjects doing their duty; So, neither are the Subjects of a lawful King, to account themselves bound only conditionally to him, if he do his duty. 3. The fancy of a tacit, virtual, natural Covenant, betwixt King and People, (as they use to call it) equivalent to all ends that an explicit and express Covenant can have; overthrows the distinction that all sound Protestant Divines and Politicians make, betwixt a limited or pactional Prince, and an absolute Prince, or one who is integrae Majestatis, who takes not his Kingdom upon conditions prescribed to him, so as in case of failing he be subject to their censure or punishment; Est alius principatus absolutus, saith Rivet. Ps. 68 p. 420. Est etiam alius sub conditione pacti conventi temperatus, to that same purpose Gerhard, de Magistrate. p. 935. wherein they agree with Calvin, lib. 4, inst. cap. 20. art. 31. But now, this man is bold to say, There is no absolute King, that such a King is contrary to the Word of God, (L. R. p. 107.) and herein he (deserting our Protestant Divines) sides with Bellarm. recognit. lib. de laicis, where he saith, Inter principem & subditos est reciproca obligatio, si non expressa tamen tacita, ut Magistratus potest subditos ad obedientiam vi illius obligationis cogere, ita subditi possunt à Magistratu deficere, si capita illius foederis transgrediatur. Whereupon and the like speeches, Gerhard in the foresaid place speaking, asserts, Totam horum & similium argumentorum structuram uno impetu dejicit Apostolus; Omnis anima, Rom. 13. etc. and says, that Barclay, Cunerus, Albericus, Gentilis, Arnisaeus, solid refutarunt, have refuted solidly the arguments of the Antimonarchists, as they have done indeed. But, as to an absolute Prince, albeit this Statist says, he is contrary to the word of God, it is most untrue. For, as our Laws (which this man cares not to contradict) allows our Kings to be absolute in express terms, Jam. 1. Par. 18. an▪ 1606. Act. 2. So the Scripture is not against an absolute Prince, as our Laws and we understand him, (qui non sumit aut ponit secures, arbitrio popularis aurae) no King is so absolute to rule as he lists, (we abhor quicquid libet licet) he is subordinate unto God and his Will; and he ought also to walk according to the particular good Laws he hath made with consent of his people; Digna vox est Majestate regnantis se alligatum legibus principem fateri; and we doubt not our King doth, and will do so: but he is so absolute, that if he deviate (which God avert) he is not under co-active power of Subjects, that they should have Law-claim against him, and in their Courts of Nature and Necessity (as this man loves to speak) pronounce judgement upon him to destroy him. A Crown was never given him, never accepted by him, on such horrid terms; far less, that by virtue of this supposed tacit Covenant, any minor mere private party of the people might, without and against the great body, have liberty to pull, not only the King, but all Magistrates out of their seat, punishing them, and possessing themselves in their rooms, which is the express doctrine of Naph. outstripping his Master, Sequiturque patrem non passibus aequis. 4. There are several ways of conveyances of Kingdoms: Where there is freedom of election of the particular person to reign, there may possibly be express limiting conditions, allowing a reserve of Power to some not mere subjects, to coerce and reduce in order diviating Sovereignty: As in the Empire of Germany and Kingdom of Poland, (or if there be any like) whose Kings are not, veri nominis Reges, but personated Kings and Monarches, (as a p●inted man is not a man) there is some likeness to a Kingship and Monarchy, and some power over others, given for executing the Laws: But the Supreme Majesty, doth not wholly reside in these, more than in the mock Kings of Sparta, when they were under the tutory of the Ephori: But in the conveyances of many Kingdoms, and all (properly called Monarchies) there is neither tacit nor expressed Covenants, impowering others to be Judges over the King, which is the design these Covenants are pleaded for; how many Kingdoms are, and have been attained to by conquest in a just War? (which is a sufficient title, and no the right of robbers, as some call it) albeit there be direct opposition, so long as there is power, and a tacit dissent, (when their power is gone) yet, the conquest coming by a lawful and well grounded War; the dominion and the authority, even over the unwilling and repining subjects is lawful, though it may be made surer, by their after consent to submit. And if this purchased power be hereditarily transmitted, the successors receives power from their Parents, not from the people; nor is there any shadow of tacit or express Covenant in this matter; if ye Rule well, we shall obey you; otherwise, not. 5. If we look to our own Kingdom of Scotland from the beginning, there will be found no such Covenant, on which the constitution of the same is founded: There are four or five remarkable instances concerning this Kingdom, to clear the matter. 1. Look to the foundation thereof in Fergus the first, 330. years before Christ's birth; Buchannan himself cannot say, that he is admitted King upon conditions: the subjects indeed by their oath, confirmed the Kingdom to him and his posterity; but no oath was required of him, nor of any of his successors, till King James the sixth his time, (of which we shall anon hear.) Of this Fergus, the black Book of Pasley (as I have heard from credible Reporters) saith, Fergusius se Regem fecit. 2. Fergus the second, the 40. King, the great restorer of our Nation, who began to Reign, Anno. Chr. 404. did by his valour, (under the conduct of divine Providence, and by the help of Strangers, Danes and others, with some small remainder of Scots, recover the Kingdom, after that the whole Nation was banished, and no Scots-man might abide in Scotland under pain of death; he was not beholden to the people for the Kingdom, nor had it by paction with them. 3. Kenneth the first, the 50. King, Anno Chr. 605. who destroyed the Picts, and enlarged his Kingdom, by the accession of theirs, purchasing more and better Lands than he had before, which he distributed to his subjects; he held not this purchased Kingdom of them, by contract or paction to be subject to them, on whom, he bestowed the Lands thereof. The 4. is Robert Bruce, the 97. King, Anno Chr. 1036. Whom our Laws of Regiam Majestatem, etc. calls, Conquestor magnus: he reconquered the Kingdom, when it was almost wholly alienated and subdued by the English, and but little reserved. The English held it for many years: And the Nobility of Scotland first at Barwick, then at St. Andrews, in plain Parliament, swore homage and obedience to the King of England; Yet, that Prince having a prosperous gale of divine Providence assisting his Valour, recovered the Nation out of bondage: And who will assert, there were pactions between him and the people, to bring him under their coactive judicial Power? A fifth instance there is, right memorable in our own times; It is known, our Nation was totally subdued by the English, and continued so, for the space of ten years: The representatives of Shires and Cities and Towns, combined into a Common-wealth-government, and sent their Commissioners to the meeting thereof at London, where the King's interest was disclaimed; yet in a wonderful way, God brought him in again, and finding us at his coming a fully conquered and subdued Nation, restored us to our freedom from the bondage of Foreigners. If any will say, that it was upon his account, the Nation was brought to the suffering of that bondage, and that there did lie bands upon him as our sworn King, to free us when he should be in capacity to do it; It may be answered, 1. It is known, that when the fatal stroke that sunk us into bondage was given, there was an express disowning of his right, by public Judicatories of the Land, in the quarrel with the English Sectaries before Dumbar. 2. Whatever engagements were upon him for the good of the Nation; Yet, if these men's principles were to be followed, they could had no force on him, to move him to labour our vindication into liberty; for, do not they teach, that in the mutual Contract and Covenant betwixt King and People, the People are loosed from their duty, if the King fail in his, frangenti fidem, fides frangatur eidem; And why then is not the King loosed, if the people fail on their part? It is known, that (although the Nobles, and Body of the People were well enough affected to the King, and cordially loved him, when they were overpowered and could do nothing) yet by their representatives he was disowned (which in Law would be reckoned their own deed.) And if a sworn people, desert and disclaim their King by their representatives, may not the King also have the benefit of the conditional Covenant, and leave them as he found them, in bondage to foreigners. But such was his Majesty's Graciousness and Wisdom, as well as Conscience of duty, that although the Nation had failed much to him, he would not walk after the counsels of these men. And we may, (all things considered) assert, that the people of Scotland do rather owe their liberty to him, than he doth owe his Authority to them, or by virtue of any Covenant with them. But not to dwell too much on this, as to any express Covenant enstating the People, or any part thereof in a coactive judicial Power over our Princes, to punish them in case of aberrations in Government; from the foundation of our Kingdom of Scotland, there is no such thing to be found: Buchannan himself can never show, that before King James the sixth his time, any of our Kings at their installing did swear to, or covenant with the people, (albeit the people have sworn homage to them) none of them all before that time did swear covenant-wise at their reception of the Crown, nor can it be evidenced, that Loyalty was engaged to the King, if they thought he ruled well and no otherwise. Some of our Historians cited by Blackwood, make mention of one of our Kings, Gregory the Great, who did reign Anno Chr. 876. who when he was crowned, did (in his piety) swear to defend the liberties of Christian Religion, of the Church, of all the Priests and Ministers of Religion; and ordained, that all his Successors, Kings of Scotland, should swear that oath at their entry to the Government. Yet this is not mentioned by Buchannan, lest perhaps our Kings might think, obligations do lie on them by that Law, to maintain Popery, far advanced in Gregory's time. But no other oath is mentioned, till James the sixth his time; when he was in the cradle, his Regent Murray framed an oath to be sworn by him, and his Successors, recorded Parliament 1. King James the 6. but that oath never any did swear for him, (albeit at his Coronation in the month of July, before that Act, which was not made till the 15. of Decemb. after, Anno 1567. the Earls of Mortoun and Hume, did promise some such thing for the King, as Buchannan says) nor did he himself ever swear it, when he came to be Major and from under the Tutory of Regent's. When he entered actually to reign, and accepted the Regiment in his own person, Anno 1577. being of the age of twelve years, no man durst ever offer that oath to him, nor when he came to be of full and perfect age. Not, but that it is in itself (and rightly understood) a good and godly oath, but in regard of the evil Principles, with which some Subjects were in that time poisoned, as if such an Oath and Covenant gave a coactive right and power to Subjects over their Prince, in all their apprehensions of his failing (as now we are taught by men of the seditious stamp) it was thought fit to wave the putting such an oath unto him at his entry to the actual Government (he not having taken it before) that the fancy of such a coactive Covenant, which might breed evil humours in the Subjects, might be removed. Whither King Charles the first did swear that same oath, recorded in the first Parliament of King James the sixth, we cannot certainly say (there is nothing left upon public record of that matter at his Coronation) but if he did so, he was the first King of this Nation, that received the Crown in way of Covenant with the people, or swearing to them yet had he reigned eight years over us before that time; and no man durst, or in reason could say, as now is printed, that he was no King till he took the Coronation oath. How this came to pass we know not, but it is to be believed on good ground, could that King once have thought, that his taking of that oath (although it be in itself godly and good) should have been so far mistaken by his Subjects, as that he should have been thought thereby to have submitted himself to their coactive and punitive power in every case, wherein they, or any party of them (being mere private persons) might think him deficient, he would rather have endured any death, than so to cast himself away, at the pleasure of malcontented parties amongst the people, taking advantage against him by that oath. But it shall be avowed, that that King of glorious memory, did never shrink from the observance of that godly oath, whatever the malice of his clamorous and embittered enemies represents to the contrary. Neither hath his Majesty that now reigneth, swerved from the observation of that oath hitherto, and we are hopeful, God's grace shall preserve him hereafter from any such thing. But the matter concerning this civil Covenant, is not yet at an end; for, the Author of L. R. bends his wit to wrest the holy Scriptures to make this Covenant necessary, (yea, for such ends as he designs, viz. the coaction and punishing of the Prince) and backs his wrested Scriptures with some sophistical reasonings. Did we indeed find sufficient ground for such a Covenant, or for such ends in holy Scriptures, we should strike sail, and no wait for ragged reasonings to cast dust in our eyes. But when we look to God's directions, about setting up of Kings amongst his people, and upon the doing of the thing suitably to these directions: We profess in sincerity, that we find nothing, but that it was God's mind, that both King and People should do their mutual duties (the one to the other) but that there is any such Covenant impowering people to use force upon the King, to throw him down, punish or destroy him, when they or any particular party of mere private persons apprehend the ends of Government to be perverted. There is no mention of any such Covenant, Deut. 17. where the manner of setting a King over them is prescribed; there is no such thing done, when Samuel by God's appointment, anoints and sets a King over the people: nor is there any such thing found at the entry of any of the Kings of God's people to their Government: only there are two instances (upon special and extraordinary occasions) of such Covenants betwixt the King and People, the import of neither of which, is to state the people in coactive judicial Power over these Kings, and which cannot by any Logic be drawn to be Patterns of necessary doing such a thing in all Kingdoms. The first instance is of David, 2 Sam. 5.3. 1 Chr. 11.3. where (though he had reigned seven years and a half in Hebron, over the men of Judah, without any such Covenant, 2 Sam. 2.4.) Israel and the rest of the Tribes, having all that time resisted David and cleaved to Ishbosheth, Saul's Son, as their King, 2 Sam. 2.10. The King being killed, and Abner the General, they come to a submission to David; and he being willing to entertain them, enters in covenant with them, in a piece of holy policy meet for that time, to gather together the scattered people of God, who might be tempted otherwise to other courses; they were now coming to be his Subjects, who were not so before, but were under another King; and fit it was to give them security, touching his good mind toward them, they having so long stood it out in arms against him. But the question is, what was the nature, the matter and import of that Covenant: The Scripture says not, it was such a Covenant, (as these men would have) I shall rule you rightly, if you obey me dutifully, otherwise not, (upon the King's part) And upon the people's part, We shall obey you and be subject to you, if ye rule us rightly; otherwise, we will not, but use our co-active power upon you, to dethrone and destroy you and punish you. That there was any such conditional Covenant expressed or meant, is far from the truth: David neither minds to admit them to be his Subjects conditionally, or to subject himself to their co-active power; nor mind they to offer themselves to be his Subjects in such terms. On the contrary it appeareth clearly in the Text, that they recognosce his right of reigning over them is from God, and that he was not subject to be removed by them; see 2 Sam. 5.2. 1 Chr. 11.2, 3. They say, The Lord said to thee, thou shalt feed my people Israel, and shalt be Captain or Ruler over them. And it is added, Therefore they came, etc. and anointed him King over Israel, according to the Word of the Lord by Samuel. They humbly declare him King whom God had constituted, whom they could not lawfully reject: and it is impious to think, that they recognoscing God's constitution of him, yet should fancy a Paction or Covenant, giving them co-active superiority over him, to remove him when they thought meet, though God had set him on the Throne by a special appointment. All the Covenant that can be supposed here, is upon the people's part, an engagement to humble subjection and homage: And upon the King's part, a Covenant of indemnity for former oppositions to him (wherein they had need to be comfortably secured) or at most, we shall not repugn, if it be called a Covenant both of protection and right ruling of them; yet so, as not subjecting himself to their censures or co-action, or that they should be his Subjects only upon that condition, being otherwise free to fall upon him. The Covenant may be to mutual duties, and yet on neither side conditional, but absolute; each party obliging themselves to their own duty absolutely, but not on condition that the other party do their duty. As if a man bind himself by oath to give me one hundred pounds; and I bind myself again by oath to him, to give him one hundred pounds, without conditional provision that he pay me the money he promised me: Albeit he should fail in his oath and not pay me, yet must not I fail in mine, but must pay him; because my oath is separate from his, and independent upon it, and hath a separate obligation absolute, which no failing of the other party to me can lose. Indeed the case is otherwise, when there is a reciprocal contract of things to be done by one party, upon condition of some things to be done by the other, (as in Covenants of Peace between Nations) there the breach of condition by one party, loses the promise of the other, which was only conditionally made. But, subjection is not engaged to Kings conditionally, but absolutely, albeit obedience to God be reserved, when any active obedience contrary to him is called for. Again, for the other instance of the Covenant, which Jehoiadah, made between King Joash and the people, 2 Chr. 13.2, 3. 2 Kings 11.17. this was also made upon an extraordinary occasion, (for ordinarily, we never hear of any such Covenants amongst God's people and their Kings; and extraordinaries cannot Found ordinary Rules.) Athaliah had murdered all the royal Seed, 2 King. 11. 2 Chr. 23. except Joash, who was kept secret six years in the house of the Lord, while the usurper possessed the Kingdom: Now when the godly Priest Jehoiadah, the King's Tutor, saw a fit time, he engaged the principal men in Covenant of fidelity to the King, 2 King. 11.4. and showed them the King's Son; This was a necessary piece of holy Policy, when the Usurper and her faction, had so long strengthened themselves, to engage the chief men to special fidelity to him. And after that, 12.17. He brought forth the King's Son, and put the Crown upon him, and gave him the Testimony, and they made him King and anointed him, and they clapped their hands and said, God save the King; and Jehoiadah, made a Covenant betwixt the Lord and the King and the people, and that they should be the Lords people, between the King also and the people. Joash was then but seven years old, and not in capacity to make a Covenant with the people; but, his godly Tutor did preside in that business: But two things to our purpose are remarkable; 1. That he is Crowned and made King before the Covenant is made, (as is clear in the Text) which crosses our Antimonarchists, who assert, the King cannot be made King, until he make the Covenant with the people, and that he gets the Crown and royal Authority, Covenant-wise and conditionally; whereas, here he is made King antecedently to any Covenant, as the Text clears it. 2. That albeit the matter of King and people's Covenant with God be expressed, viz. That they should be the Lords people; yet, it is not told us, what the tenor of the Covenant betwixt King and people was, nor what the King or Jehoiadah Covenanted in his name, the young King of seven years old, what could he say in Covenanting? Jehoiadah was only Precedent in the matter. Diodat seems to say well, that in this place, Jehoiadah made the people swear alledgiance and fidelity to the King, (as before he had made the Rulers do, vers. 4.) and no more, he took an oath of fidelity of them: But, how shall it be cleared, that it was conditional, and with a reserve of coactive and punitive Power over him? (as these men will have it.) But passing from this, let it be so, (which cannot be asserted with warrant) that all the Kings of Judah, made such conditional Covenants with the people, (as is supposed) yet, will any judicious man force the particular customs of that Nation on all Nations, that might be best for that Nation that was not simply best, their customs without a Law of God bearing a standing reason, cannot be obligatory on others, lest we judaize too much. But the constant practice of all the Prophets and people of God in that Kingdom, when their Kings were very wicked, idolatrous and tyrannous, speaks clearly, that they never had such thoughts of a liberty by virtue of covenant, to fall with violence on their Kings: The Prophets of God, never taught them insurrections against Kings, (as false Prophets do now) albeit they had as great cause as ever people had (under some of their Kings) and were in capacity probable enough to crush them, they never suggested to them that their obligations to subjection unto their Kings, being but conditional, they were set free, when they became so extremely wicked, idolatrous, etc. nor did ever Godly people, (although they strove to keep themselves pure, and to gain-stand in their private capacities the evils of the times) think themselves free, to use violence against Powers above them; had this been their duty, no doubt God's Prophets would plainly and downright have told them of it, without circumlocutions, but this they never did; either that was no duty, or the Prophets were not faithful in not admonishing them of their duty: When at first, that people sought a King from Samuel, they resolved not to take him conditionally, si bene regnaverit, but with all the faults that might follow him; neither reserved they Power to coerce him, (which had it been in their thoughts, would easily have answered and weakened samuel's terrifying dissuasive; for they could have said, we take him only as King, on condition of his good behaviour; otherwise, we will take order with him) but would have one, as other Nations had Kings about them, (of whom Buchanan says, they were not legitimi Reges, but tyranni in his language, because not under Law coaction) And so also, they behaved themselves toward them, not using them as they deserved; but forbearing violence against them, although they were very evil Princes many of them. But yet further it is pressed, that such an Oath and Covenant betwixt King and People was in use then, because, Eccles. 8.2. It is said I counsel thee to keep the King's commandment, and that in regard of the oath of God. Therefore, there was (say they) an Oath or Covenant betwixt King and People. Ans. 1. The most that can be made of this place, is (as Diodat in his note thereupon affirms) that the subjects swore the oath of Allegiance and Obedience to the King, upon the ground whereof, they were to obey him; it was at most foedus unilaterum (as they call it in the Schools) but it imports not mutual engagement of the King to them, or that he swore to them, much less that the Oath they made to him was conditional, with a reserve of Power to punish him for his deviations (which in this same King that writes this were very great) albeit we grant all such oaths to Kings to be understood, salvo jure Dei, & salva Deo obedientia. 2. We do not see ground to assert, that ordinarily amongst that people, there were oaths of fidelity and obedience given to their Kings (whatever was done in the extraordinary cases above mentioned) far less, that Kings engaged to them by oath ordinarily; both the King ruled without such an oath, and the people obeyed without such an oath or engagement. Neither is there in Deut. 17. or Sam. 8. or any where else, such a rule set in the institution or constitution of the King, that any such matter should be done. Nor hear we in the History of this same King Solomon, who writes this, that when he entered to the Throne, either he swore to the people, or they to him, unless perhaps, 2 Sam. 29.24. may import this as to Solomon. Junius translation of this Text (wherein he is followed by Cartwright) may well pass, praestitutum Regis observa, sed pro ratione juramenti Dei, i. e. Keep the King's Commandment so far as it may be keeped, retaining fidelity to God, to whom absolute and illimited obedience is sworn; So not the motive of obedience to the King (because of the oath sworn to him) is here imported, but only the measure and moderation of our obedience due to him, so as it may consist with the duty sworn to God: our obedience to the King is here cautionated (saith Cartwright) dummodo non pugnet cum juramento quo divino imperio obstricti sumus, we are to obey him. 3. We may hold close to our own translation, and yet not be necessitate to grant, so much to be spoken of here as an oath of the people to the King; let be a mutual Oath and Covenant betwixt King and People, (neither of which was in ordinary use amongst that people, nor mentioned in sacred Scripture as ordinary. For, they were all bound by oath to obey all God's Commandments (this was the oath of God) and amongst his Commandments, this was one, that they should obey the King in the Lord, and obey all the Kings lawful Commandments, in regard of their general oath and engagement to God, to obey all his commandments: they were bound to obey the Kings Command under God, and in subordination to him, albeit they never took any particular oath to obey the King, and dealt not covenant-wise with him. And thus the sense runs fairly, I counsel thee to keep the King's commandment, and that in regard of, (or, propter) the oath of God: because thou hast sworn to obey God, obey the King in all lawful things, for this is the will of God. The motive of obedience is taken not from any particular oath made to the King, but from the general oath made to God, engaging in all things to obey him. But yet this business of the civil Covenant is not at an end; for, it is urged (L. R. P. 97.) that this Covenant ties the King (be it tacit or express) not to God only, but to the people, and brings him by reciprocation of bands, to be under a Law-obligation; to be subject to the people's censure and punishment in case of failing, as well as they are subject to to him in case of failing; and that all covenants and contracts betwixt man and man, bring the covenanters under a law and claim before men, if the contract be broken. And that the King becoming bound to the people, he comes under action and claim by them if he fail, and is punishable as they are, if they fail. And that the King and they, have a mutual coactive power one over another, and are mutually Magistrates one to another; and the people, if the King fail, may judge him in their tribunal of necessity; and that there needs no judge on earth between them, more than between two Nations independent one upon another, when they war together. And that in reformations of things amiss, (especially in Religion) people may extraordinarily intrude in the Magistrate's office, and not only reform themselves actibus elicitis, but reform others actibus imperatis. And that people, by virtue of this supposed covenant, may (when they see cause) formally and effectively excercise upon their Kings that royalty which they have in themselves virtually and fountally. Much of that sort of stuff is to be found, quest. 14.40. and every where in that Book. And it is lamentable, that while they who labour to preserve God's order in the world, should be branded as flatterers and Parasites of Princes, such flatterers of People to their own confusion and destruction, should (with their writings) have such entertainment and countenance. But yet it must be said, that L. R. is far more tolerable than Naph. for, what he grants only to the body of the people or the inferior Rulers and Nobles with the people, in acting against the King, Napht. extends in favours of any party of mere private persons amongst the people against all Magistrates, supreme and subordinate; and affirms, what the whole body with inferior Magistrates may do against a King (deviating from his duty) any small part of mere private persons (if they have strength enough) may by virtue of the Covenant, do the same against all Magistrates supreme and subordinate, not only as to resistance, but as to revenge and punishing them. A few notes shall be sufficient upon the former Doctrine, and then the matter shall be at an end. 1. Where a Covenant is made between a King and a People, (a King I say, that is truly such a one) it's granted that the Covenant on the King's part binds him not only to God, in relation to the people, as the object of his duty, but doth bind him to the people formally, yet not so as if he be deficient in his duties, they are enstated in a power above him, to sit as his Judges, or that they are loosed from all duty to him, and free to do him violence. If a Father swear to do his fatherly duty to his Child, that makes not the Child his Superior to punish him if he fail; when a Minister is admitted to teach a people, he swears to them to be dutiful, but they are not therefore made his Superiors to punish him if he fail. It is a most false assertion that goes alongs that whole Book, that a right is given (by the covenant sworn) to the inferiors and subjects in the politic Society, to judge and punish their superiors in case of failing. No man can lawfully be judged and punished (whatever contract be) by another than his lawful Judge that is above him in that Society, whereof he is a part, L R. Pag. 100.101. 2. There is a very great difference between these who are in different political Societies, when they break their Contracts or Covenants one with another; and betwixt the head and body, or members of one and that same civil Society. God having allowed lawful Wars, allows seeking of reparation or repelling of wrongs done by one Nation to another, by force of the Sword, when no rational means can bring the doers of the wrong to do right; and there being no other remedy, he himself, the Lord of hosts and God of armies, sits Judge and Moderator in that great business, and in the use of War is appealed to as Judge, there being no common Judge on earth to sit on the causes of these independent Nations. But God, having set and established in one particular and political Society or Nation, his own Ordinance of Magistracy, to which every soul must be subject, and all subject to the Supreme; he hath not put the punishing Sword in any hand, but in the hand of the Magistrate his Sword-bearer, Rom. 13. Nor hath allowed liberty to mere private persons to manage it against the supreme Magistrate, no nor to inferior Magistrates (as to him) who in respect of the supreme Majesty, are but private persons, whatever they be toward their inferiors. The Magistrates (chiefly the Supreme) are by their official power above the whole Nation; and as absurd it is to say, they are above the powers which God hath set over them, (as L▪ R. p. 460. saith Thrasonically, he hath proved unanswerably) as to say, that every Parish is above the Minister, in an Ecclesiastical way, though he have official power over them all; or that every Lord in Scotland have their Tenants and Vassals above them, a thing which the Nobles of Scotland had need to look to: For certainly, the Principles which lead to subject Kings to people, lead clearly, and by undoubted consequence, to subject them to their Vassals, and to all under them; yea, and all Masters to Servants, and Parents to Children, and to confound and invert the order of all humane Societies. This truth we must cleave to, that in one and that same civil Society where God hath appointed Rulers and ruled, Subjects cannot without sacrilegious intrusion and contempt of God, snatch the Sword out of the Magistrates hand to punish him with it, (though in some particulars he abuse it) Neither can a War, intended for this end by mere private persons, be lawful against their head or heads; nor can any foreign War be managed, without a lawful Authority on the Part of the undertakers. 3. It is a very false assertion, That the people gave the Kingdom to David only conditionally, if he did such and such duties to them; and if not, reserving power to dethrone him, L. R. p. 97. God having set David upon his holy hill as his King, and not only made him King by his Providence, but express designment, special command and word, none on earth were left at liberty to undo what God would have done and appointed to be. 4. It is very weakly reasoned, (L. R. p. 97.) That because God's people may humbly plead with himself, upon the account of his own fidelity in promising, or (as this man says) have action of Law and jus quoddam (a bold enough expression) against God to plead with him; that therefore the King's Covenant gives the people ground of civil action against him, to coerce or punish him. It had been better said, that upon this ground they might humbly plead with him, supplicat and reason with him as God's Deputy, bearing the impress of his Majesty and Sovereignty on earth. But, as God cannot otherwise be pleaded with, upon account of his promise, (wherein he is bound not so much to us, as to his own fidelity to evidence it, reddit ille debita nulli debens) and cannot be pleaded with by force or violence: So his Deputies on earth, on whom, under himself, he hath stamped inviolable Majesty, whatever they be (as Calvin writes, in the place often cited) are not to be pleaded with by strong hand and force (howsoever in somethings they miscarry, a thing not competent to the Majesty of God) For, he hath not in his Word given any commission to any of their Subjects to rise violently against them, or use the punishing Sword upon them. If this commission can be produced, we have no more to say, but Good is the Word of the Lord: but till this be seen, we shall cleave to Rom. 13. that makes the Magistrate the only Sword-bearer of God to avenge or punish, however perhaps he hath his aberrations in using it. If this man can show a Superior on earth to use the Sword upon the Sovereign Magistrate, people shall have fair liberty to plead their claim or lawsuit as he calls it before him. But who will judge it more reason, that these who are Plaintiffs shall be judges of the Party they complain of, more than the party (or Prince) Judge to them? Is not this a perversion of all judgement that in one and the same body politic, the accuser and Judge shall be coincident in the same persons or person? And they shall use the punishing Sword over all Rulers, to whom God never committed it, the notions of original, fountain, virtual royalty in the people, which they may render formal, effectual and actual, when they see fit, are but high flown unregardable fancies of the masters of confusion. All magistratical Authority is originally and fountally in God alone, whose Minister the Magistrate is (and not the peoples, although for the people's good) whatever interests people may have in instrumental application of the power to such or such persons sometimes; Government is not in the people virtually (though wrongously sometimes they usurp it.) No man hath the Power of the Sword over his own life, nor over the life of his neighbours, (as he is a private man, not invested with magistratical Authority) and so cannot transmit that to another, which he hath not himself. None have this avenging Power of the Sword over men's lives, but the Magistrate alone, whom people by God's law are bound to choose, if they want one in their Societies and Combinations, but whomever they design they do not empower him; it is God by his Ordinance that doth this, the Power is from God, not from them, albeit the application of the person to the Power, or of it to him, be instrumentally and dispositively by the people's act, where they have liberty for such acts. 5. Though it be true, that all Covenants and Contracts amongst men, embodied in a Society, brings each of the contracters under a Law-claim, in case of failing, (coram Judice proprio) before his own and competent Judge; yet, it is not true, that any Contracts betwixt man and man in one and the same Society, gives the party keeping contract, coactive Power over the party breaking; it is true, the Judge hath a coactive Power, to lay forth in behalf of the keeper against the breaker, but that is not the keeper his coactive Power, but the Judges employed for his good; the one party is not Judge of the other, but the Magistrate is Judge over both: Now, there is no Judge over all Magistrates, nor the supreme Magistrate, before whom a complaining people can plead wrong done to them: This complaint lies before God only to take order with it. And it must needs be a strange assertion to say, (as some do) that it leads Kings to Atheism, to tell them, They are countable to God only; whereas this leads them genuinly, to stand in awe of God, and the less fear they have from men, to be in greater dreador of more terrible strokes from God, if if they do wrong: ordinarily where there is much fear of man's punishments, there is less fear of Gods; but when it is told Princes, the more exemption they have from man, the more terribly will God handle them, if they do wrong, this may make the highest and stoutest hearts, to tremble at the dreadful vengeance, by the hands of the living God, which will strike a deeper stroke than creatures can. 6. To provoke people to go about the meddling with the advancing Religion, actibus Imperatis, which is the Magistrates part; and not only actibus elicitis, is but a ruining of all order God hath set; the imperate acts for advancing Religion, are not to be done, but by these to whom God hath given the Empire: It is not his will, that people run out of their rank and calling to serve him; more than it was his will, that Saul or Vzziah offered sacrifice or incense; the works were good in themselves, but the workers were not warranded to do the same; extraordinary necessities, are more easily pleaded then justified, as ground sufficient for actions, whereto there is no extraordinary call. If Magistrates be deficient, as to their imperat acts in advancing Religion; private persons are sufficiently discharged, if they keep themselves pure, and do what possibly they can, for advancing Religion in their private capacities, and by their elicit acts: Nor shall they be involved in guiltiness, for not intruding in the Magistrate's office, or doing his duty, (wherein he hath failed) If a man's eyes be put out, his ears or other senses, will go as far to supply that defect, for the good of the body as may be, yet, cannot help the body by elicit acts of seeing; So, whatever length private persons may go, for the good of the body, they must not go to exercise and exert formally acts Magistratical, upon whatever pretence of extraordinary need, (which will never be wanting to a people, inflamed with a seditious spirit) August. Lib. 2. contra literas Petiliani, Auferenda idola non potest quispiam jubere privatis. Lact. instit. S. 20. Defendenda est Religio, a privatis omnibus non occidendo, sed moriendo, etc. It is a dangerous and destructive tenant, to be held forth to be believed by people, That in all cases, whither concerning Religion or Liberty, when they account the Magistrate to pervert the Government, that they are eatenus, and so far even as they had no King, and that the royalty hath recurred to themselves, and they may act and exercise it formally as if they had no King at all; which is the express Doctrine of L. R. p 99.100. And more intolerable is Naphtali, who grants this not only to the body of the people and inferior Magistrates, but to any the least mere private part of the people, against the whole body, and against all Magistrates supreme and subordinate. Where, or when shall confusions end, if these Doctrines have faith or free passage? CHAP. IU. Anent the following of Phineas fact; of heroic or extraordinary impulsions, and concerning some courses taken at our first Reformation, and their exemplariness. THat every man should walk in his own calling with God, 1 Cor. 7.20. and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, love the honour to be quiet, and do his own business, 1 Thes. 4.11. yea, ambitiously contend (as the word bears it) so to do, is agreeable to the mind and will of the God of Order; it is a godly ambition to act within the precincts of our own calling: but Satan striving to make men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, disorderly and unsubject to these whom God hath set over them, under several colours, of extreme necessity, the lawfulness of the matter of actions in themselves, the goodness of ends and intentions, the want or deficiency of others to do the work, mens own probable capacity to do it, doth often drive men out of their ranks and stations, to act such things whereof God will say, I never required them at your hands; in your hands they are evil, quia ego non jussi: and because sometimes God hath given extraordinary callings, or incited men by his Spirit with heroical motions, to such acts as were not according to ordinary rules of procedure, thence they would bring warrant for their irregularities, and for going out of their line. This vain Orator Naph. (p. 21, 22, 23, 24, 25.) catches hold on the instance of Phineas, Numb. 25.7, 8. executing justice upon an Israelitish Prince, and will have that a precedent for any private persons (such as lately did rise) under colour of high pitches of zeal and fortitude, whereto they are incited (as he says by God's Spirit) to execute justice upon all the powers and people of the Land, they being fallen in such a fearful apostatic as (keeping the true protestant Religion) to vary from them in the external ordering of the Ministry of the Church, and embracing that way and order, against which there is no command of Christ; yea, for the consonancy whereof to his word, much and very much, may be said and hath been. And although he cannot but see the dreadful consequences of extracting a general rule for these times out of such an example, yet, though he turns himself Proteus-like into many shapes, distinguishing about heroic and extraordinary motions, denying Phineas act to be extraordinary, but only heroical, talking much of good intentions, warrandableness of the work in itself, deficiency of others in doing it, and of God's power to give rare heroic incitations, etc. he cannot by any thing he says, put a sufficient bar against confusions under such pretexts, but he opens a door he cannot close again. And the result of all is, to fasten the last insurrection upon the holy spirit of God, to justify their attempts against all Authorities in the Land; and to assert, they were no more to be condemned as Traitors, than Phineas should be for his executing judgement, seeing they were led with the same spirit, and had as good warrant as he. And the design further is, to inflame people again to the like courses, under the like pretences, for justifying the same. When this man's discourse concerning Phineas fact, and the exemplariness thereof, and concerning pretended extraordinary or heroic incitations he talks of, was first looked upon; men of any judgement considered, that as the former bloody insurrections were endeavoured to be justified by him, so he was laying down grounds for some merciless massacre, or horrid assassinations on persons in power, and others (if any people might be found so deserted of God, as to be serviceable to him in that wickedness) for now no man can have security of his life, if any private persons be allowed under Phineas cloak to come and cut the throats of all, whom this man will point forth as black Apostats, Such deeds must be fathered upon the holy Spirit of God, and his excitations to zeal; which are held a sufficient calling, though that so called zeal, will prove no other but a corrupt lust, proceeding from another spirit. And we must forsooth (when these men will have us so do) own these irregularities as being from God, and say, He is employing the weak things and foolish of the world to confound the mighty and wise, and must not condemn them as Usurpers, or Intruders (although they be but mere private men) more than we would have done Phineas in his fact. Thus he. What great Villainies have been under such pretences carried on in the world, by persons taking their heroical motions and excitations of zeal, for a sufficient calling to their irregular actions (which is the direct Doctrine of this man) the World knows well. How the Munster madness was carried on under extraordinary shows of zeal, is known, and how also God confounded that way. The murders of the two Kings Henry's of France, (the third and fourth) have been famous or infamous in this last age, by the cruel hands of two Zelots, inflamed by seditious Predicants and Jesuits, they fell. The assassinates actions were cried up by such as set them on against these nero's of the time (as these Kings were called by them) as actions most heroically zealous, most Phineas like, proceeding not from common virtue or grace, sed à dono speciali Spiritus Sancti, (proh nefass!) And they taught, that it was of God to excite these miscreants to cut the Basilick vein (as they spoke) to prevent the State and Churches falling into a burning fever. And to come nearer home, the remembrance of the Gunpowder Traitors, who attempted at one blow to destroy King James and all his Family and Parliament, is yet recent: a deed which wanted nothing of the high commendation of an heroical and Phineas-like fact (amongst the Zelots of the antichristian party) but that it wanted success, which marred all. Further, in the time of Queen Elizabeth of England, Anno 1591. Some male-contented Presbyterians, being taken in the head with the same fancy of Heroical motions of zeal, as a sufficient calling to attempt something beyond rule, in the desolate and colapsed estate of the Church (as they called it) began first to question and propose it as a case of conscience, If in such a case, God might not give such high measures of zeal, fortitude, courage and rare excitations of his Spirit to mere private persons against oppressing powers, which might be a sufficient call to attempt somewhat against Magistrates, not suiting ordinarily rules, and committing the event to God. The men were, Arthington, Coppinger, and Hacket the chief of the three, as they were all marvellous zealous for the discipline; So this third having debauched his estate, surpassed in zeal this way (perhaps looking for some reparation by it) and was, (as the History tells us) a man of highest pretences of the internal unction of spirituality and of pure zeal, and one who could ex tempore pray to admiration. The godly Ministers, who were of their persuasion in matters of discipline, for the most part disliked, and dissuaded them from their course (albeit some too furious entertained and encouraged them.) After this, they went to action; Hackets two complices went to the most open and public streets of the City of London, declaring to them, that Hacket (who was to be found at his lodging, in one Mr. Walkers in Cripplegate) was sent of God, to represent Jesus Christ on earth, with his fan in his hand, to separate the precious from the vile and to erect the holy discipline in all Europe; they having a great concourse of people flocking about them, declared themselves to be his extraordinary Prophets, the one to preach vengeance to them, who would not obey them; the other to preach mercy to all, who would obey them. And in the great concourse of people, they ceased not to cry, repent, repent, O England! and embrace the Gospel, and opportunity of Reformation. As for the Queen, they cried she had fallen from her right to the Kingdom; And that most of her Counsellors, were but betrayers of the Kingdom. And all their doctrines they set forth, with terrible imprecations against themselves, if they spoke not truth. The Queen being at Greenwich, and hearing of the uproar at London, sent two of her Councillors to see what the matter was; the deceivers all three were apprehended and arraigned, as stirring up sedition against the Queen, and designing to destroy her, to murder her Councillors and Bishops, to bring in their new King, and trans-form all things in Church and State, to their own fancies. Hacket the King was executed, and died blaspheming. Coppinger in a fury pining himself with hunger, at last beat his own brains against the wall and died. Arthington, upon his repentance, obtained mercy of the Queen. Such abominable courses carried on, under pretext of Heroic motions, and rare excitations of the Spirit, should make the fearers of God, very cautelous against the Principles of this man, which lead this way; For he asserts, There needs no standing upon an external call, if men think they have this internal call, to use the Sword for vengeance against Apostate Magistrates (all and sundry) such as he reckons they are in this time, (Napht. p. 24.) Any party of private men, may (according to his mind) rise up in a Phineas like fortitude against not only Princes, but all the Primores Regni, becoming Patrons of abominations, to execute Judgement upon them, (Napht. p. 22.) and to reform an Apostate Church, their zeal, etc. is a sufficient call without further. If such Doctrines pass for current and good coin, and if our people be so principled, it were better living under the great Turk, where no man is to loss his life but by Law, then in Scotland; where all Magistrates and others, shall be proclaimed liable to the fury of any private persons, who can pretend rare and Heroic excitations of the Spirit, to zealous executing justice upon men, whenever they, thus animated, think there is cause: For, this man proclaims these inward excitations, as a sufficient call, without any other external call. But this man, seeing the mischief of his evil Doctrine, (though he is loath to part with it) would gladly add some Salvo, if he could: for saith he, p. 24. We held not such instances, (viz. as that of Phineas) as regular Precedents for all times and persons universally. That is well said, but where is the caution that is put in against any, that will pretend Heroical excitations by the Spirit, as a sufficient call: He hath opened a door, but how will he close it again. It is easy to raise the Devil, but not so easy to lay him again; the man would say something to satisfaction, if he could set down certain rules, to bar a heady people, under a pretence of Phineas-like motions and excitations, to arise upon every occasion to confound all: But, as he cannot do this, so doth he not attempt it; he cannot give any remedy against confusion in all cases, having proclaimed this libertinism to private persons, upon pretence of Heroic excitations of zeal, etc. to rise up against all Powers above them; for they are made Judges (in their own private discretion) when it is fit to fall in hand with such irregular practices: And when it is, that such Heroic excitations are upon their Spirits; and when it is, that matters are so far out of order, that they cannot be amended, without their violent interposing and pulling down of Powers: all this, is referred to private persons private discretion; and if this man's party were possessed in Power, upon their principles, another party, perhaps of Quakers, Ranters, etc. could easily start up, and plead their impulses from above, to rectify the corrupted and collapsed estate of affairs, and to reform and punish offenders; So, there shall be no end of confusion, when these are got into the saddle, others shall met to them in that same measure, erranti nullus terminus, there shall be a progress to confusion in infinitum. And never shall people, (when they mind changes) want the pretexts of corruption in Rulers, and in all besides themselves, and will lay hold on any probable capacity, which qualifies them for exercise of Justice against all, not of their way. And although they be not in probable capacity, to take the fields, or levy Armies; yet, they will go so far in executing justice upon all Magistrates, (Phineas-like) as upon patronisers (p. 24.) of abominations, (as he says, all our Magistrates of all degrees are now) for he tells us (p. 18.) They ought without doubt, be suppressed by all means, (n. b. by all means) if there be no probable capacity for armies, a dag or a dagger, a pistol or poisoned poinard, a Spanish-fig, or some secret applications may do the business, with some great ones: And any Heroic Saint, may be in probable capacity for such matters, (these are amongst the generality of any means usable, for suppressing Powers) it is all one matter, if Justice be execute and the evil removed, whatever way, it is all one as Phineas did it with his Javelin, and God should be praised, when justice is executed on adversaries, an apostate Church (such as now is) reform. Of this no more shall be said; But we are to pray, that the life of our dread Sovereign may be bound up with the Lord his God in the bundle of Life; and also, that the same great and good God, may be a shield and buckler to his servants, (who desire in honouring the King, to fear him, the King of Kings above all) against the generation of men of blood and violence, who bewray their ungodliness too much, in daring to seek patrociny for villainous assassinations from the holy Scriptures of God. But behold, how the man wrings his wit, to work out (Napht. pag. 21, 23, 24, 25.) an Apology for the seditions from Phineas example; he tells us, Phineas was but a private man, that he had no extraordinary calling to execute judgement, only he had heroical motions, and zealous excitations to it, and that God who is the same yesterday, and to day, and for ever, and hath the residue and plenty of his Spirit, to pour out upon mere private persons, may by giving them such or the same Spirit of zeal, magnanimity and courage, sufficiently call them by his breathe upon them, to execute justice on adversaries, and to reform an apostate Church, etc. and when it is so, we should not condemn, but honour God's instruments; for, if they did not step in to act, impiety would quickly gain an universal empire to the extermination of all goodness. To all which we say, 1. As to the person Phineas, (from whose actings Patrociny is ●ought, for justifying the violence of private persons against the Magistrate and their usurping over him as Judges, to punish him) it is much doubted, if he was a mere private person he was the high Priests son, a chief Priest himself, and afterward he became high Priest himself, he was a singular person and a Prince in his tribe, employed with other Princes by God's people, in great Embassages both in Peace and in War, Numb. 31.6. Josh. 22.31.32. he was one of the great Council of the people, of the heads or rulers, and famous men amongst them, (called the congregation, or the renowned of the congregation, Numb. 1.16.16.2.) who did, in that dismal time, wherein so much sin did break forth, and so much wrath from the Lord attending sin, meet with Moses the chief Magistrate, Numb. 25.6. to lament the abominable idolatry and bodily filthiness, committed at that time, and to consult and advise, about the authoritative restraining of this wickedness: In the mean time, when the great Council are humbled before the Lord, for the common wickedness, and for the wrath that was upon them, Zimri, a Prince of Simeon, with his Midianitish woman, are in their very sight going into the Prince of Israel's tent; and Josephus tells us, that before Moses and the Council he justified the fact, and pleaded frowardly to have and retain her. In this case of so effronted wickedness, Phineas then one of the congregation or great Council, 7. ver. Rose from amongst the congregation, (or great Council, which shows, he was sitting amongst them) and under the eye and knowledge and approbation of Moses, the supreme Magistrate, pursued them both to the tent, executing judgement on them, and thrusting them through. The words of Diodat on ver. 8. are, That this was an act of extraordinary zeal and motion of God's Spirit, in a cruel and fierce delict, which was approved in Phineas by God, after the act was done: And (n. b.) by Moses the supreme Magistrate, the execution being done under his eyes and known of him; Thus Diodat. To this purpose Aquinas, 2● 2ae. quest. 60. Art. 6. where he disputes, Vtrum Judicium reddator perversum per usurpationem, Resolves, That judgement cannot be execute upon any without public Authority, more than a Law can be made without public Authority; and speaking of the fact of Phineas, he says, He did this by divine inspiration, being moved with the zeal of God: and adds, Albeit he was not the high Priest, yet he was the Son of the high Priest; and the executing of judgement belonged to him as to other Judges, to whom that was commanded of God. Gerhard, de Magistratu, P. 841. Phineas non fuit omnino privata persona, he was one of the chief Priests, who as Aaron's rod tells us, lib. 1. cap. 1. had equal power with all other members, both in decrees and executions of judgements. So that he (in all probability) being no mere private person, and doing what he did, with approbation of the Sovereign Magistrate, it is a very weak argument that is brought from him, to enstate any private persons in a power of executing judgement. 2. Suppose Phineas to have been a mere private person; yet, seeing he did this act under the eye and presence, with the approbation and goodliking of Moses (as Diodat rationally saith) and of the great Council there assembled, and he is to be looked upon as the executor of their unaninimous sentence against effronted villainy: As at another time, Exod. 32.27, 28. Moses, as God's Vicegerent, set the Levits and others on work to execute judgement by the sword upon an idolatrous people; in which case they were satellites Magistratus, and had his Commission: and why might not Phineas have here the like warrant from Moses? If any say, it is not written; it may be answered, In rebus facti à non scripto ad non factum non valet consequentia; all things done are not written. We have heard famous Authors accouning him to have had warrant, whether as a Judge or Executor of the will of the great Council and of Moses, who did well approve his deed. But, how absurd is it to bring an argument from this instance, to warrant any private man to do justice when he thinks there is need, not only without the Magistrates consent, but even upon all Magistrates, supreme and subordinate? which is the scope this man's writing drives at. 3. The case wherein Phineas executed judgement, was when horrible idolatry and villainous whoredom was avowedly, and with an high hand, committed in the sight of the Sun; and in way of open doing despite to God and to all Magistrates, and the supreme Council then assembled to mourn before God, and to take course for remedying by their Authority, the horrible looseness broken forth at that time. But, dare this man say, that there is now such horrid wickedness? although he is bold to call all the Magistrates, supreme and subordinate, Patrons of abominations, and men acting in the mere spirit of wickedness: while the true Protestant Religion, according to the Scriptures and the Laws at our first Reformation, and Confession of Faith, recorded in Parliament, is sincerely and constantly held. There is a change and regulation of the exterior form of Church-government, anent which godly men differ, and the change that is made will be maintained against this man, to contain nothing contrary to God's Word. Yet, forsooth, this is the great abomination and so gross, that it may licence every private person to rise up against all Magistrates, supreme and subordinate, to depose them or cut their throats; and this must be called executing judgement for the Lord, and a Phineas-like fact. 4. Let it be so, that Phineas was a mere private man, and had no warrant from the supreme Magistrate to do what he did (which yet cannot be proved) his fact can be no warrant for private men to attempt the doing of such acts; unless they can show as good warrant and approbation from God, as he could. God, who is the Lord of all Magistrates and of all men's lives, can (when it pleaseth him) cross ordinary rules, and can appoint some to execute his judgements extraordinarily; wherein they are not to be followed by such as have not the same spirit, the same warrant and command, or commission. He may send Moses to kill the Egyptian, Eglon to kill Ehud, Elias to destroy companies of men with fire from Heaven, or to kill Baal's Priests (an instance which it is strange the Libeler omitted, seeing it is the ordinary dialect of the Faction, as may be seen in the Apology and elsewhere, to call (most wickedly) all Churchmen dissenting from their way, Baal's Priests) God may command Abraham to kill his Son Isaac, he may excite David to a bloody duel, and Samson to murder himself with others: so also might he stir up Phineas (though a private man) to execute judgement: but, 1. he had the motion and direction of God's Spirit setting him on to that work; such motions were loco specialis mandati, as Divines speak; and Calvin, Ps. 106. speaking of this same fact, saith, he had singularis & extraordinarius motus qui ad communem regulam exigi non debet. And when he hath compared Moses killing the Egyptian with this fact of Phineas, he saith, Talis fuit impulsus in Phinea, nam et si nemo putabat gladio Dei esse armatum, ipse tamen potestatis divinitus concessae probe sibi conscius fuit. Augustin, speaking of Samson, lib. 2. the civet. Dei, c. 21. Nec Samson, saith he, aliter excusatur quod seipsum cum hostibus ruina domus oppressit, nisi quod latenter Spiritus sanctus hoc jusserat. So he is accounted amongst heroic Believers, Heb. 11.32. And of his fact, Bernard saith, lib. de precept. & dispensatione▪ Si defenditur non fuisse peccatum, privatum habuisse à Deo consilium indubitanter credendum est. 2. Phineas had not only a large reward of his fact, Numb. 25.12, 13. but an ample approbation of it, Ps. 106.31. It was accounted to him for righteousness, i. e. as a righteous action, both as to the intention of it (Gods honour) and as to the ground and warrant of it (Gods direction.) God does not approve or remunerate any action, which one way or another he doth not command: there are none of these extraordinary actions mentioned in Scripture, but either Gods stirring men up to the same, or his approbation of the same, one way or another is noted; See Judg. 3.10. and, 5.7. and, ●0. 23. and, 3.9.15. and, 2.16.18. he raised up, stirred up men's spirits, or afterward approved them expressly in these actions. As for the private persons, which this man will have to take the punishing Sword in their hand against all Magistrates, as they cannot pretend extraordinary special commands; So the real rebukes of God given them, proclaims they have not his approbation. 5. Divines have given it as a good rule, Opera liberi spiritus non sunt exigenda ad regulas communes, nec trahend● in exemplum vitae. If once men come to make rules of the actions specially warranded beyond the common rule of the Word, where will they stand? As to instance this same example of Phineas. If they will go on to press the imitation of it, 1. They must say, that even when the Magistrate is godly and zealous and willing to execute judgement (as Moses, and the great Council were) private persons may do it without them, and not wait their warrant, as they think Phineas did not. 2. That any private person may go to men's Tents or Chambers, and stab them without any legal Process (which Phineas, they will say, used not.) 3. That if such things be done inconsulto pro Magistratu (such as Moses was) yet the doer must not be challenged, as Phineas was not challenged by Moses. 6. The Libeler, striving to parallel the Acts of his party, (which he justifies and incites unto) with Phineas his act, as he dare not say the acts which he justifies and instigates unto are extraordinary, but only heroical; so he asserts Phineas act was not extraordinary, nor upon extraordinary warrant, but heroical and imitable by others, who may have such measures of zeal as he had. He should in order to this, laboured to have set some distinction betwixt heroical and extraordinary acts, but this he doth not, only labours to jumble the matter, and speaks so confusedly, that as others cannot understand him, so he gives evience he did not understand himself in this matter; only something he would gladly say to encourage men to irregular actions, under the pretence of Phineas fact. But the man, if he would, might have known the distinction betwixt extraordinary and heroical acts. Philosophers and Divines too, distinguish betwixt heroical virtues with the acts suitably thereto, and common virtues and their acts, (3● pars Thomae, qu. 7 art. 2a ad 2 m, ●) and aggree in this, that there is no difference between heroical virtues and virtutes communiter dictae, nisi secundum perfectiorem modum. A heroic act doth not deviate from the rule of a common virtue, but only proceeds from a more intense disposition to a high pitch of virtue, and of the acts thereof, but yet keeps within the bounds of the ordinary rule of such or such a virtuous action. But, an extraordinary action goes beyond any ordinary rule of common reason or divine Word; as, that Abraham should kill Isaac without any hatred of him, or cause in him, was an act of extraordinary obedience to a special mandate of God. Albeit the love that is due to God above all, and the respect due to his Sovereignty, should incline to obey whatever he enjoins: yet, the particular act of slaying his harmless child, merely upon the declared will of God, was an extraordinary act of obedience, not comprisable within the lists of common virtues, that direct our actings toward men under God. Extraordinary actions are such as are done upon special mandate of God, and are not within the compass of ordinary acts of obedience according to the rule that is set. Men may have heroic motions and actions within the bounds of an ordinary calling, as sometimes, though they have extraordinary calling, they may want heroical motions. Luther had no immediate nor extraordinary calling to reform the Church; but within the bounds of ordinary calling, he had special excitations of God's Spirit, and was elevated unto heroic actings for God's glory, in an exceedingly corrupt and collapsed state of the Church. Peter had an extraordinary calling and immediate, yet he wanted sometimes heroical motions and actions, as when he dissembled, Gal. 2. Phineas had not only excitations of zeal and heroical motions, but (supposing him a mere private Person) he is to be looked upon, as having extraordinary calling from God, which is fully enough insinuated, both by Gods approving and rewarding him, Numb. 25. (and he rewards not our will-service, nor approves it, but what he hath enjoined himself) and also by Ps. 106. where it is said emphatically, it was imputed to him for righteousness, though judging according to ordinary rules, it might be imputed to him for sin (supposing him a mere private man.) Yet, having Gods warrant, whose will is the rule of righteousness, the deed was imputed to him for righteousness. 7. Great gifts, secret impulses, heroical motions, do not (as this man suggests) give men sufficient call to go beyond the ordinary rules God hath set to men in their callings (though they dispose them to act eminently in their callings) yet cannot give a new or another calling. Every calling a man hath to any work▪ God sets him about, must be either mediate or immediate (there is no midst betwixt these two, as there is not between contradictories.) If men be not called to a work by the intervention of men, and their allowance, they must plead an immediate calling from God. And we would gladly hear, if this man will allow the private persons, whom he instigates to insurrections against Magistrates, an immediate calling (by virtue of their secret impulses and excitations) for we are sure, they have no mediate ordinary calling. If he will go on to say, that great gifts of zeal, etc. great excitations and impulses, allows people to desert their own calling and state, (like these spirits, Judas 6. that kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation) and to intrude upon the Magistrate's office always, when they think there is cause, without an external vocation from men. Where will he rest, till he confound all within Church and State? If such gifts and impulses be sufficient call for intruding in the office of the Magistrate to execute justice, why is it not also sufficient for the office of the Ministry, without call from men externally? And thus Anabaptists, Enthusiasts, Photinians and the like, denying the necessity of external call to the Ministry; avowing gifts and excitations to be a sufficient call, shall gain the day; a man may take the honour of a Ministry to himself, without waiting man's call, as well as the honour of Magistracy: a self-called-Magistrate, and a self-called Minister, are very sib together. And how shall the Libeler refuse to admit women to baptise children in case of necessity? (the thing itself being good and for a good end, and there being none other to do it, and the exigence great) or how will he hold back any private persons from preaching and ministering all Sacraments, though they have no external call? It is easy to pretend as great need for this, as for intruding into the Magistrate's office. 8. It is in vain for this man to tell us, that God's hand is not shortened, and he hath plenty of the Sp●rit to give, and is the same yesterday, and to day, and for ever, and can give such gifts and excitations and such allowance in acting, as Phineas had. For our question is not anent God's power, or what he may do; (we adore that glorious Majesty, who doth what he will in heaven and in earth, and can do above all we can think) But our question is, if now, after that the Canon of holy Scripture is perfected, sealed and consigned, we have warrant to look for any extraordinary persons, having Gods secret and special mandates to do works, which any ordinary calling they have by allowance and approbation of men, according to the rules of common reason and the word, doth not interest them in, such as Phineas act (supposing him a private man) is to be esteemed. The man falls out in wishing, that all God's people were as Phineas, and had the same Spirit of holy Zeal; that by removal of the cause, his fierce anger against this poor Land might cease: We shall easily concur with him, in wishing and praying that God's people may be filled with zeal to his Glory, as Phineas was; but not that they should have that same exercise of zeal that he had, nor follow his fact, unless they could be certified of their warrant and calling to do so, as he was. The Apostles of Christ, are to us examples of zeal for God in their Ministry; but, who will say, that the acts which they zealously did, by virtue of their extraordinary calling, are for our imitation, albeit their zeal be? Peter in zeal to God's honour, killed Ananias and Saphira, who lied to the holy Ghost; Shall therefore Ministers slay men that deal deceitfully with God, or shed their blood? the zeal was imitable, but not the fact; the fact is not justified, merely by the zeal that puts on to it, but by the calling and warrant. To follow all the facts of them, who have been truly zealous for God, is indeed a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an evil zeal, like the zeal of the disciples, Luke 9.54. Who knew not of what Spirit they were. Peter Martyrs word, speaking of imitation of extraordinary examples of zeal and facts done that way, Loc. com● Clas. 2. cap. 9 is good, Nobis cavendum est ne illa quae vehementer & extraordinario cupimus aliquo exemplo Majorum velimus constabilire, cum inusitata volumus aggredi contra ordinaria Dei praecepta, non est satis exempla produxisse Majorum, sed excutiendus Spiritus quo ducimur, ne sp●cioso quodam praetextu carnis affectum & prudentiam sequamur. And Perkins on the Creed, pag. 194. says well. If a man be zealous for Christ, he must be zealous within the compass of his Calling; and not be zealous first, and then look for a Calling; but first look for a Calling, and then be zealous: Which thing, if Peter had marked, he would not have dealt so rashly in drawing his sword and smiting; for, being without compass of his Calling, he could not but do amiss: But, yet this man urgeth (Nap. p. 24) impiety shall quickly gain an universal Empire, to the extermination of all goodness; if for fear of accidental hazards, virtue and virtuous actions of private persons, shall be utterly neglected. Ans. None offers to hinder virtue and virtuous actions of private persons, but only their vicious usurpations upon the Magistrate; no evil should be done, either that good may come of it, or a worse evil prevented; the exercise of the Magistrates office in executing judgement is good, being done by him, but it is evil, being done by a private person, that hath no calling so to do; every man hath not a calling to do all good, but only that good which is competent to him in his calling to do: when iniquity is like to prevail, it is my part, who am a private person to mourn for it, to pray against it, to use fraternal loving warnings to others as I have occasion, and to keep myself pure from pollutions; in so doing, I may sit down with contentment, referring the remedy of evils to God in his own way and time; but, to break God's order, by intruding into public places and the actions of Magistrates, for preventing or remedying impiety, is but to cure one sin by another. And when we have invaded the Magistrate's place, being private persons, others will do the like to us, and there shall be no end of confusion; Fearers of God, would not listen to the charms of vain talkers; but, beware of removing the ancient limits God hath set of men's callings, were it, for prevention of greatest idolatry or wickedness, nothing that is either evil in itself, or evil as circumstantiated in our hands, from whom God hath required no such thing, is to be done; Will ye speak wickedly for God, and talk deceitfully for him? Job. 13.7. But this Libeler insists upon the matter of private men's usurping the Magistrates place, not only in the first part of his Book, speaking in reference to our first Reformation and Way of it, which he brings to justify present insurrections; but in the latter part, p. 151.152. he will have private men taking the punishing and reforming sword in their hands against all Magistrates, and says expressly, people of inferior degree, may step forward to occupy the places and assert the interests, which wicked Rulers have forfeited and deserted; And this, he says, is according to the Covenant, where they swear in their places and callings, to endeavour reformation, etc. which clause, (he says) is to be taken, not restrictively, but (as he speaks) the clause is exegetick and ampliative, and that the sense is, that if others in their respective places, concur in advancing the work, every one shall confine himself to his own place and calling; but if these in higher employment fail in their oath, it is the place and calling of private persons to reform or remove them, and step in and occupy their places. Thus the profane Juglar, (if he will deservedly take the stile, which he undeservedly gives his opposites, p. 54) makes a Welch-man's hose of the words of the Covenant, to provoke people to intrusion in the Magistrate's office. Who ever heard of such a thing, that these words (in our places and callings) do not restrict private men's endeavours to ways fit for their places and callings? What a strange exigesis or explication, (as he calls it) is that of our endeavours in our places and callings to reform, i. e. That we shall go out of our places and callings, to reform? and being private men, shall occupy the Magistrate's place and remove him and punish him; or, that private men only did swear conditionally to act in their places and callings, so long as they in eminency acted in their places and callings for Religion, with a reserve, to run out of our places and callings, when they deserted and abused theirs? What Jesuitical juggling, in the matter of the Oath, is this? This is a new discovery this man hath given us, of the deceitful ambiguities of the Covenant, to help us out of love with it. The words (saith he) are exegetick, and ampliative; exegetick thus, I swear in my calling and place, all days of my life to endeavour, etc. i. e. When I see cause, I swear, I shall flee out of my place. and calling, to do so good a work, and will not be restricted to it. But how are they ampliative, the vain Orator would tell us? Are the words that bind to do in our places and callings obliging to a duty, more amply and extensively than they import? viz. That we should stretch ourselves beyond our line, and intrude in places God hath not called us unto. How intolerable is this abuse offered to the Covenant and God's people too, in such vain and senseless glosses? O! But he builds much upon the practice of our first Reformers, and Phineas fact must justify that, and that must justify all modern insurrections. As to the work of Reformation of Religion, at first in this Land, it is our desire to speak honourably of it, so far as we can with truth. Blessed be God for that great work of bringing in his Truth amongst us, and delivering us from the dark and miserable bondage of antichristian Tyranny; and he who delivered us, keep us from returning to that house of Egyptian bondage: But we cannot (holding to the truth) justify all courses that were used then for carrying on the work of Reformation; neither are we much concerned so to do. If some instruments thereof were guilty of sedition or sacrilege, or self-seeking, (while the work of God was in hands) what is that to us, who own the result of the work as good, great and glorious, through the Lords marvellous operation? If sinful courses were then used by men, the mercy of God, in the result of the work, was to us the more marvellous, and the fuller of glorious Grace, that God did not, for the disorders of instruments, disappoint the work, and leave us destitute of the Gospel-light. We may say, as the blind man in the Gospel who had his eyes opened, said, Whether he was a sinner that opened his eyes or not, he knew not: but this he knew, that whereas he was blind, now he did see, Joh. 9.25. So, whither they who were instrumental in our Reformation, sinned in their way or not, we are not much concerned to inquire: But we know, that through God's good guiding, a merciful work, in the result was wrought to them and to us, which work we own and cleave to, and will (through grace) do so to the end; it is an ordinary matter for the alwise providence of God, to bring forth, out of men's dark and disorderly actings, great works of light and order. The Saviour of the world was crucified by wicked hands; yet, the result was the redemption of the world. How many Ministers go to hell, for their unsincere handling of God's Word, and miscarriages in their life; yet, God makes use of his own Ordinance in their hands, to bring Souls to Heaven, notwithstanding of their corrupt manner of dealing in his holy things. A leprous hand may sow good seed, but he were a fool of the first magnitude, who would either make a panegyrics in praise of a leprous hand, or persuade all that sow good seed to have such hands. Heirs of glory may be gotten in bastardy, or fornication and adultery; and yet these are not good, but evil. Let God be glorified, who in his wisdom brings order out of confusion, and light out of darkness. But, let us not stand superstitiously upon the justifying of all their deeds that went before us; nor endeavour to imitate and follow the same, further than they are according to God's mind. Be ye not as your fathers, is a good rule when fathers fall off and deviate from the rule of God's will: we are not to live by examples, but by precepts; and if we will look to examples, we want not these of the primitive Christians to set before us, whose practices in bringing in Religion into the world, (wherein they never used any undutiful resistance to, or violence upon Magistrates) is more regardable by us, than any precedents in these dregs of time, and in the end of this corrupt world. Some have said, Religion would never have been reform, if violence had not been used upon Magistrates: but, why should men take on them to limit God? Hath he not showed his power in several parts of the world, in working on the hearts of supreme Magistrates, and causing them to go before others in reformation of abuses? and could he not so do also elsewhere, without the aid of popular tumults, which are but evil examples to the posterity? But men are too apt to be bold in ante-verting God's way, and to follow their own carnal prudence and affections in that which they are set upon, and thereupon (when they prosper) to fancy a divine approbation of their way: so self-loving are men ordinarily. But, let it be so, that much of the way of these who were at first instrumental in the Reformation in this Land, were justifiable upon the account of purging the Church from the horrid grossness of idolatry, corruption of doctrine, tyranny and usurpation over poor Souls, wherewith the man of sin had for many ages, defiled and burdened the poor Church; and upon the account of the open hostility to the Truth, wherein Magistrates than stood, together with the inbringing of foreign furious forces upon us, even to the heart of our Land. How unlike was the case then to what it is now? And how unable is the case now to bear the burden of a conclusion for such practices as then were used? Seing we can avow it, in the presence of God, that we contend for that same Faith and Religion, that our Predecessors stood for against the powers of that time; and will maintain the same against all Novators, who upon account of a piece of Church-order, allowed by our Reformers) now reestablished, instigate any private, persons, who have power enough, to destroy all Magistracy and Order in the Land, because of the owning thereof; and to occupy their rooms, (as N. clearly doth) And then, forsooth, this man and his complies shall be in their places and callings, according to the Covenant, (as he expones it) when they get in to the Chair of Government, and all our Nobles and Magistrates driven into corners, or made to lackey these purely mortified Statesmen. In the Pictland-hill business, an Essay for this was made, but the party magnis excidit ausis. They had thoughts to repair their losses, and to make themselves rich by a pure Reformation, getting all the interests of the Kingdom at one clap into their hands, (though perhaps they would have forced us to believe, that all their external gains had been but accidental consequences of their heavenly designs.) But God rolled out of the way such a stumbling and snare to many, which might have arisen from their success; it was infoelix scelus, and so escaped the reputation of a Virtue, and of an heroical Exploit. FINIS.