THE AUTHORITY OF THE MAGISTRATE, About RELIGION, DISCUSSED, In a Rebuke to the PREFACER of a late Book of Bishop bramhall's.  
BEING A Confutation of that misshapen Tenent, Of The Magistrate's Authority over the Conscience in the matters of Religion. And the better asserting of his Authority Ecclesiastical, by dividing aright between the use of his Sword about Religious Affairs, and Tenderness towards men's Consciences.  
AND ALSO For Vindication of the grateful Receivers of His Majesties late gracious Declaration, against his and others Aspersions.  
By J. H.  
London, Printed for the Author. 1672.   

The AUTHORITY of the MAGISTRATE about RELIGION Discussed.  

SECT. 1.  
I Have met in the Booksellers Shop with some Sheets of late, put out under the pretence of a Preface to another Book: but with the design of so much Malevolence, in the abuse of one particular worthy person, that I am astonished at the man, That ever one of parts and understanding, (though so young a Doctor as he is) should be so forsaken of his Discretion, of Religion, of Morality, of Ingenuity, of the knowledge of himself, and all discernment of his duty, to God and to his Neighbour, as to suffer this Half Book of his now upon cold blood after so great a Whole one, which was enough to have rid another's stomach if it had been a Stable, to look the World in the face, and his own Cheeks not be abashed. Alas, that the Talents of our Lord, and excellent parts which he hath given this man, should become to him such a temptation! Not a Novice (says the Apostle) lest he fall into the condemnation of the Devil. Is it because the young man perhaps is misled, abused himself, and drawn in by some of eviller nature and more inveterate, that he can sprinkle himself thus in gall, and delight his soul in such an insulting malice, petulant hatred, and an implacable disposition? Can he indeed think and believe or any else for him, that this is what becomes a Christian, and a Minister, to set himself for so many weeks as he hath been writing this, to the exercise of wrath, revenge, spite, uncharitableness, rancour, reviling, calumny, wrong, evil speaking? Is this indeed the serving of God and going to Chapel? Alas, that the zeal of this Chaplain for the cause of the Church should be shown only in such good works! Ego quando cuique vel dicendo vel scribendo respondeo (says St. Austin) etiam contumeliosis criminationibus lacessitus, quantum mihi Dominus donat, fraenatis atque coercitis vanae indignationis acul●is, auditori lectorive consulens, non ago ut efficiar homini convitiando Superior, sed errorem convincendo salubrior. This is a passage it is like this youthful Divine never read, I am sure he hath not yet practised, and it will be worthy his future observation. Contra litteras Petiliani, l. 3. c. 1. Shall I be sorry now and mourn over the man for his sin, which he hath sinned against God, against all good men, and against his neighbour, and wish him with all earnestness to repent of so great iniquity that he may be forgiven? If I do so, I am afraid it will do nothing. Shall I excuse him as overtaken with passion, prejudice, haste, precipitancy, unadvisedness, surprise? No, he will by all means be believed thus insolent deliberately, with a composed mind, and upon choice. Shall I then commend his Christian bravery, magnanimous charity, and pious adventure in his agressing of one person, and reproving another of so much eminency and ability which others are afraid to cope with, merely out of tenderness of Conscience, and great compassion to the souls of people, lest they should be hurt by their esteem and good name, and for no other reason in the World hath he done this. Why this is possible: But what meaneth then the bleating of the Sheep, and lowing of the Oxen that I hear? Is this the language or voice of a man so affected: on of a tongue which setteth on fire the course of nature, and is set on fire of Hell? What! is it then the pride, self conceit, ostentation, vanity, the arrogance of this young man, and infinite presumption upon his voluble tongue and parts, which he can draw upon any body (and yet with a heart not malicious), that hath made him do thus, and ●all upon this worthy person so unworthily as he hath done? who being a reverend man, a Doctor of Divinity, of so much gravity, of long standing, excelling in Learning, and all sorts of it for his profession, of Dignity in his time as much as any have been capable of, a person of not d●constant piety and a studious life, of universal affability, ready presence and discourse, liberal graceful and courteous demeanour, that speak him certainly (whatsoever he be else) one that is more a Gentleman than most in the Clergy, and is accordingly favoured sometimes with his Prince's converse, and the general veneration of the people: And for such a man to be treated after this barbarous prostituted manner, with so horrid insolent a disdain and contempt, as if he were the vilest Caitiff, and son of Belial, with the like expressions, it is such a monstrous piece of immorality in the thing itself, a villainy to Religion, and indignity to humane nature, a breaking the hedge of what is Sacred, laying open the enclosures of all modesty and civility in making the worthy common and level with the infamous, to the affront of the whole Nation, while every man in Justice is bound to defend his neighbour from injury (so far as he can) as well as do him none, that we all me thinks should be ready to rise up as one man to the rebuke of such a crime, and go with our desires to the King and to the Council, that the young man be made an example. It is my just indignation at the fact only makes me use this vehemence in my expression, but my meaning is, that he be brought to public penance and recantation. And then shall all the people hear and fear, and none shall do any more so presumptuously:  
For the appearance of some method to his Preface, this Author tells us at the beginning that he intends two things: To say something of the Treatise: and something of the seasonableness of it. As for me, I have nothing to say of either of these, they require it not. Only I perceive that is not past four of five leaves, but himself hath done with these two particulars as insignificant to spend more time upon, and then there is forty more for him to ramble in about the matter of his former Books, and one new matter he hath started, and against Doctor Owen; which indeed is the Helena that hath given life to this publication. Well! I have no more to say to him about that Doctor: only I have one thing to offer in the way to the Doctor about him, and it shall be that advise out of Augustine: Si non aurem solum percutit iracundia criminantis, verum etiam conscientiam mordet veritas criminis, quid mihi prodest si me continuis landibus totus Mundus attollat? Ita nec malam conscientiam sanat praeconium Laudantis: nec bonam vulnerat convitiantis opprobrium. Cont. lit. Pet. l. 3. c. 7. For the Treatise itself likewise of the Bishop, I leave it to one who is able if he see it good to examine it. Whatsoever the Book be, or the person who seemeth to be somewhat, it maketh no matter to me, and perhaps as little to Mr. B. I meddle not with it. But two things in good earnest there are in this Preface of general concern, which I must take notice of, for the one will be worthy of our time, and the other I will not quite slide over.   

Sect. 2.  
That which I take notice of, and make not my task is this, the resolution he offers to a certain question he is pleased to raise, what danger there is of the return of Popery in this Nation. The question is certainly a male-pert question, and he does as briskly resolve the business. That the fanatics and Athists are like indeed to bring it in, but else there is no danger at all of it. There are, he says, a sort of Athists among us, not like those of old that expecting no life to come laboured only to live merry, and free themselves from care, but these of our age says he are a sort of Devilish and malicious wretches, whose proud and arrogant minds make them love mischief for mischief sake. I doubt there are some persons of note, greater parts, quality and spirit, that do slight this proud young man, and that that is the English of these words. It is hard for those that come near of a trade, to like one another. The Athists of this age (which Mr. Hobbs and he, while they put conscience under humane Authority, are like to make as fast as they can get any to believe them) are of the same kind, no doubt with those that have been formerly, though the age generally, is more wicked, and I see no reason why the Atheist, more than the Adulterer, Drunkard, or Sweater, should be willing to change the Government of our d●ar Church, which is indeed so mild and gentle to them (as he speaks) to being in Popery, that might perhaps put them into the Inquisitions or any other Ecclesiastic discipline else, that would punish them, twenty to one else, more for their Vices and Debaucheries, than others for the enjoyment only of Liberty of Conscience. On the other hand for the fanatics, I must profess I never perceived yet that they are sensible of any such plot of theirs in hand, and it is huge like if they had any such, they themselves might come to the knowledge of it. The truth is, it is not the fanatics so much as the Episcopal party that raise these jealousies of Popery. The fanatics have no Dignities of Pluralities to lose, and it is the losers', and those that fear to lose, that speak. No, let me speak more freely, if Popery should indeed prevail upon the Nation, it is these Episcopal Bigots that we must be beholding to for it. For the God of these men, that is Uniformity, that so blinded their eyes and infatuated their judgements, that they will ventore the ruin of all, rather than abate any thing for an accommodation with their Brethren that should join their shoulders against it. That Popery and Fanaticism are to be resisted by comprehension, is day light: But these High Conformists are blind, obstinate, perverse. And all must say at the last, it is they may thank themselves for this.  
There are two parts of that Parliamentary Grace, which is necessary to this Kingdoms better establishment. The one lies indeed in Indulgence or Forbearance towards all, which is the Nations interest, and this the King seeing hath granted: The other lies in an Accommodation or Comprehension, which is of those only (that is some) that are capable, and this is the Bishop's interest, but their party will not see it. There are accordingly two sorts of dissenters. One that own the National Ministry and our Parochial Congregations, and are in that capacity of coming in upon that account, and desire it hearty upon condescension to them in some matters: The other that own not our Churches, and so are uncapable to come in, and cannot desire it or seek it.  
For the one then that which we propose, is only a farther latitude in the established order of the Nation, that such may be received. Let us suppose nothing else required of a man to be a Minister of a Parish, than there is to the Parishoner to be a Member of a Parish Church, as part of the National. If a person Baptised will come to Church and hear Common Prayer, and receive the Sacrament and does nothing to be excommunicated for it, he is, he may, and must be received as a Parochial member: In like manner if a Minister first ordained (and so approved in his abilities for that function) will but read the Book of the Liturgy, and administer the Sacraments according to it, and does nothing deserving suspension, why should not this suffice for his enjoying a Living, and exercising the Office to which he is called. Let these Declarations only which are imposed (whether to be made, subscribed or sworn) be laid aside, or left at least to our own words, and every Minister (out of the Cathedrals) be left to their choice about the Cross, Surplice, Kneeling at the Sacrament, and that is the sum of this business.  
For the other, it is not I count righteous or charitable, that any who were able to come in upon any such relaxed terms, should be willing to have persecution reached forth on their Brethren that cannot. Besides that Persecution as well as Preferment are both alike animaters to engagement. If the Presbyterian be comprehended, he will be satisfied to act in his Ministry without endeavouring any alteration otherwise of Episcopacy: If the Congregationalist be Indulged, he will be satisfied though he be not Comprehended. for that he cannot submit unto: and so shall there be no disobligation put on any, but all be pleased, and the Church's work, if the Parliament will, be soon done.  
And who is there among you that feareth the Lord, and obeyeth the voice of his Servants, his God be with him, and let him go up to Jerusalem, and build the House of the Lord. We have indeed his Majesty's late Declaration, Thus saith Cyrus: but where are our Jeshuahs' with his Brethren the Priests, & our Zerubbabels? Where are those heads of our Tribes, whom like the children of Issachar, God hath made wise hearted to know what to do at such a time as this? Alas, that instead of those words, Let us arise and build, we should hear the speeches and read the writing of Rehun the Chancellor, and this Shimshai his Scribe. Be it known to the King that if the City be built, It is a rebellious City and hurtful to Kings, that they have moved Sedition, in the late War, and aught to be destroyed. The contest now (saith the Prefacer) as it relates to the real concernments of the Nation is, which shall prevail Loyalty or Faction? whether such Preachers should be permitted the liberty of making Proselytes, when all that are seduced into their Communion, are at the same time alienated from the Government, and listed into a combination against it. How miserably this tart Gentleman is out, he will see himself in good time, for we do all own Loyalty, when we do not yet obey their impositions. But who hath given licence to the man (if himself were not the Licenser) to make any such saucy reflection in print as this, upon that which his Majesty with great wisdom hath thought fit to be done? Let him produce any of those who come in and accept the King's Grace, that can be accused of the least disaffection to, and much less of combination against his Government. If he mean the Episcopal Church, why are not these men as sagacious to combine us with them? Would he have the King no wiser for his own and the Nations interest, than they are for theirs? It is pity this so necessary, as well as Royal and kind act of the Kings to this Nation, should so nettle the high flown of these Conformists. It is pity indeed, but they should be offended, because so many honest innocent persons, who never did them any hurt in their lives, and yet they prosecuted with such hate, have escaped their talons. For my part I bless God in my inward Chamber, that he hath put in into the heart of his Majesty, to show this kindness to his people. And that it may fret his and our Malignants the more, I will tell them how much the rather I am pleased with it, in regard of the King's free, constant, universal recognising of it, especially to those that come to him with their humble thanks and submission. I will record this one expression of his to the Ministers of Wilts. Go thank them (says he), and I will assure you, there shall never be any more persecution for conscience sake, while I live. These are words of an open, honest, candid, clear, single hearted Gentleman that we may trust, as having nothing of the counterfeit in them in the Earth. These are words that I think may serve us, so long as by our prayers we can keep him, and make those that envy us look black. I do therefore set this up for my stone of remembrance, and I will engrave my short inscription on it. Hitherto. For it is true there is something moreover that some of us would have, but not of the King. To let in any into the public Vineyard, and to make it signify, must be by an Act against pluralities with it. His Majesty does see that Comprehension does draw deeper than his single will. And who shall come come after the King, that hath once talked with him, for knowledge in this matter? Seeing therefore, that by thee we enjoy much quietness, and that very worthy deeds are done unto this Nation by thy providence, we accept it always, and in all places most noble Felix with all thankfulness.  
But what, does not the King assume an Authority in this Declaration more than he hath, when he himself dispenses with an Act and Acts of Parliament? and what say you to that? I answer, I will not take upon me to decide such a case as this is, which belongs to the Lawyers: but as a Divine, so far as conscience is concerned, (and it is but a man's own conscience he goes by) I will speak my opinion. The King himself does tell us that the Law does give him such a supremacy as this in Ecclesiastical matters, and that it is asserted in several Statutes. Now what reason there is for any of us to believe contrary to his assertion, unless we ourselves were better lawyers than his Council & He, I know not. I will take the hint from this man, Elias dicat quando venerit. We all know that the King hath power to dispense with some Laws, & for any Lawyer to undertake to lay down the precise critical note of difference between those Laws which he may suspend, & those he may not, I believe will be hard: whereas we that go only by Politics in general think this most easy. The Supreme Law must overrule all under it; and in all human Laws salus Reipublicae is suprema lex. It is certain, when any Laws prove disadvantageous to the Community, they themselves grow into disuse; and when we have power to suspend our duty, why the King as Executor of the Law, may not suspend the penalty, or may not proceed so far as this Declaration, Elias dicat quando venerit. The King I suppose may call the Clergy to make Ecclesiastical Constitutions, and by his Authority alone, without a Parliament, ratify or put a sanction on them: & whether then he may not do as much as he hath done for us in this gracious Indulgence, Elias dicat quando venerit. I have observed in reading the Statute-Book wherein the King's Supremacy is concerned against the Pope. That the Crown of England is called Imperial: whether that be any thing or no, to signify his Authority to be absolute without his Parliament in matters Ecclesiastical though not in Civil) I cannot tell; but if it be, Elias dicet quando venerit. When in Henry the Eighth's time they took away the Supremacy from the Pope, they gave the same to the King: and if the Pope's Authority in Ecclesiasticals was undoubtedly over the Parliament, whether the Kings may not be so also, Elias dicat quando venerit. We know that the sole power of the Militia, which is one Right of Majesty, is declared to lie in the King, in some late Acts, when Legislation and the Purse belongs not to him without his Parliament: and why he may not have such a Supremacy in Ecclesiasticals which he hath not in Civils, as well as one of the Rights of Majesty and not others, according to the temperature of our mixed State, Elias dicat quando venerit. Above all, could we suppose the whole Nation convened, and were to give their vote, whether the King should have this power he hath exerted, or whether it should lie in the power of this present Parliament, and not in Him alone, I believe the major vote would be for the King. And when in the erecting of Commonwealths it is the consent of the people, is that which is the conditio regnandi, or causa sine qua non, & the Authority of self flows immediately from God upon that condition being put: whether that Prince who is persuaded in his conscience, he does nothing but that for which he hath the hearts & good-wills of the generality, as in this good deed of his Majesty in this Declaration, he may not have a good conscience toward God, however he be judged by men, or the Sages of the Law, I must leave that also till Elias come: Elias dicet quando venerit, as the Jews speak. I will conclude with that saying however of Bracton. Si ab co peccatur, locus erit supplicationi quod factum suum corrigat & emendet, quod quidem si non fecerit satis erit ei ad paenam quod Dominum expectet ultorem. Nemo enim de factis suis praesumat disquirere, multo minus contra factum venire, Brac. l. 1. c. 8.  
But again in point of Divinity. Fanaticism, and Popery, is sin, Idolatry; and may sin, any sin be tolerated? I distinguish, there is a Private, and Public Toleration: and public Toleration is either in the Church, or in the State. No sin is to be privately tolerated, but every soul is bound to renounce every sin, and to live in no evil course of life with will and knowledge unto death, upon pain of damnation. Again, no sin may be tolerated publicly by the Minister, but he is to reprove all, and spare none, that he may deliver his own soul: Besides, if any sin be lived in contumaciously to the scandal of others, such sinners are not to be tolerated in the Church, but to be cast out till they repent. But to think that no sin therefore must be tolerated by the Magistrate in the World, or in the State, without considering whether it be consistent or no with the public peace or welfare which is external, is a thought that must be unthought again. For the world are Idolators, the World lies in wickedness, and if the wicked be cast out of the Church, it is into the World they are cast. Nay surely, if God had appointed every sin to have its punishment in this World, what need were there of a general Assizes in the next? I wrote to you, not to company with Fornicators: yet not altogether with the Fornicators of this World, or with the Covetous, or Extortioners, or with Idolaters, for than must ye needs go out of the World. This is certain, God does suffer sin to be, when he might hinder it, and that by a course of Justice, if he would immediately strike men dead, for example. I cannot but judge therefore, that though no sin may be done by the Magistrate himself, nor may he be partakers of it with others, that good may come of it: yet may he tolerate the sinner in his sin which he concurs no ways in, as God permits it in the World, viz. when a greater good does accrue to his subjects by that Toleration, then by the Punishment. Distinguish (say Divines) between cogere ad fidem, and interdicere exercitio in heterodoxia. Posterius ad evitandum corruptionem & scandala competit Magistratui. Distinguish again (say they) of a Commonwealth or Kingdom free, and not free from divers Religions. Ibi cavendae, hic tolerandae, sed cum conditione ne publica Religionis exercitia facile concedantur. One would think his Majesty no small casuistica Divine, by the carriage of this Declaration. I will close this up with that pertinent passage and Comment of Augustine. Cum Apostolus precipit nolite iungi cum infidelibus, exite de medio corum, non intelligunt neminem coniungi cum insidelibus nisi qui facit peccata Paganorum, vel talia facientibus favet: nec quunquam fieri participem iniquitatis, nisi iniquam vel agate, vel approbat. Contra Epistolam Parmeniani, l. 2. c. 18.  
After this, I must confess as to Popery, I do hope that there is indeed no Foundation of those surmises which this Prefacers' question must buzz amongst us, for all his saying also, that there is none. For to go to bring in a Religion upon a people which is no more prepared for it, than we are for Popery in this Nation, were but the committing of a rape or ravishment upon the public conscience; and possession being got without getting our good wills, could not likely be long retained, nor could be lost again neither, but with an exceedingly increased disadvantage to that party. Nevertheless seeing our Prefacer hath offered the supposition, I do both declare the effectual means to prevent it, and who they are must be the cause of it, if the event comes upon us.  
But the King's Majesty's Declaration I know sticks still in their stomaches. The penal Laws are taken off from the Papists, and from the fanatics. And what then? I do believe we shall have never the more Papists nor fanatics for that. No, they have one Argument, Difficulty and Suffering the less, for their Church. The penal Laws did but whet their appetite, their own fullness will serve to cloy them, and give them enough. But the Church is divided, division countenanced, and is not Schism and Separation forbidden? It hath been declared to me of you, that there are contentions among you. I answer, the King's Declaration found these Divisions in the Nation, it does not make them. Division and Separation simply considered, are neither good nor evil. There may be reason to divide or separate some persons from others out of prudence, as the Catechumen from the fully instructed of old, for their greater edification. It is not all division or separation is Schism, but sinful division. Such Divisions as the Apostle here also calls Contention. I must confess I have been a man professed still against Separation: but this Declaration does seem to me to take away the very sore itself which was in our separate Meetings till now. It is by God's providence a Medicinal Declaration. And I will tell you my thoughts freely, as I use to do when I write. I look upon the call of a Nation to the Christian Religion, and and the Nations answering that call, to make a Church National. The King is head over his people as a Nation, and that in Ecclesiasticals, as well as Civils. As National head he hath appointed the Parochial Churches, and required that all his Subjects should frequent these Assemblies for the acknowledging, glorifying, or National serving and worshipping the true God, and Jesus Christ, whom we have received. This worship and service in the nature of it being intrinsically good, and the external order (such as that of place and the like circumstances) being properly under his jurisdiction, it hath seemed hitherto to me, that unless there was something in that order or way by him prescribed which is sinful, and that required too as a condition of that Communion, there is no man might refuse his attendance on those Parochial Assemblies, without the sin of disobedience, and consequently his separation thereby becoming sinful, it was Schism. Now Sirs! It having pleased the Almighty to put it into the heart of the King, not only to forbear and connive at the Nonconformist in their Preaching, but to allow, appoint, and design by his solemn Declaration, stated places for their Assemblies (according to the good hand of our God upon him) it does appear to me that these particular Assemblies, having the Authority of the Supreme Head of the Church, equally with the Parish Churches, they are manifestly constituted thereby parts of the Church National, whereof he is Head, no less than the Parish assemblies. The matter is all one, as if a Parish only which was too big, should be divided into two, where I say there is Separation, no Schism. I will undertake to make it good, that the Bishop's Consecration of a Church is not necessary, to the making the Society that Assembles therein to be a particular Church, or part of the National: but that the King's Authority alone is enough for that Relation. Nay I know not but the King upon the same account might constitute unmaintenanced Bishops over those particular Congregate Churches, if he pleased, as well as he hath maintained Bishops over those that have Live, if it were to any purpose at all, and for his people's edification. Well now then, if any Licenced person shall gather their Congregations in a way of opposition to the Parish Churches, which he hath also established, by denial of them to be true Churches, I do account still that all such partaking thereby with the Novatian and the Donatist of old, must come under the condemnation of the Fathers and Counsels passed upon their error, and that is that which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we call Separation. If any again shall gather a people in a way of strife, pride, vainglory, envy, contention, which are breaches of Christianity, when the end of the Commandment is Charity, I will account this also being sinful, it does make those conventions Schismatical. But if a man shall come honestly and peaceably in the fear of God with prudence and innocency, as becomes a Christian, to set up one of these Meetings by virtue of the same Authority as the Parish Priest hath his: I will desire any that can, to show me now, where the sin is to be found. If he can show it me I will consent to him, that he shall call all these Meetings Schismatical still, upon condition that if he cannot, he will pardon them henceforth who do go to these particular Churches (by the King's appointment now parts of the National) with the same veneration and regard as to the Parish Congregations. We will thank the late ingenuous Author, who advised us to take heed that Toleration be not abused, and we do show wherein that care is to be taken, that we may not abuse it: but when he would have had the Nonconformist under pretence of not abusing his liberty, to take such a course only as not to use it at all (though the generality of us do judge they should most glorify God this way) he deserved to be blamed; who upon the conviction, will perhaps as soon as any, be ready to thank God with us, if a door so effectual be opened, than we may without offence, and without Schism, join our strength in a mutual love and concord for the carrying on the great work of man's Salvation throughout the Nation.  
But are not these Presbyterians very Knaves, who stood before on Christ's Authority for their Preaching, and now take Licenses of the King? While their plea was the same with the Apostles, that they ought to obey God rather than Man, we could bear with them; but now we shall never abide them more. I pray Sirs, good words! As Charity always thinketh the best, I see this all will still thinketh nothing but evil. If it were the duty of the Nonconformist Minister to Preach before his Majesty's Declaration, it must be his duty still: and if when we have obtained such grace as this is, the Presbyterian should not accept it, (when there is no more doubt of prejudicing our Ministry thereby, than the Apostles did theirs, when they had leave of the Masters of the Synagogues to say on), who would have fallen on the whole party so foully for refractory and perverse fellows, as these men? It is true, we look on Christ's Commission to be enough for our Preaching when we judge it for God's Glory; but to Preach in such a place, and in such circumstances, is, we count in the dispose of the Magistrate. The Magistrate hath the power of external order, and may forbid a man to Preach, I say in such a place, when he cannot forbid him to Preach; or else our Pulpits were our own still, for all the Act of Uniformity. The Presbyterians take Licenses of the King in reference to the place of their Assemblies. Nay this authority of the King in slating these places and Meetings for them, does incorporate them as integral parts, or particular fellow congregations with those of the Parochial constitution, into the Church National, united under him as the Supreme Head: which is a matter of that great weight and consequence, as we have not yet looked about us, to bless God enough for it. Hereby can the Nonconformist make his public acknowledgement (which he would have) of the King's Supremacy in Ecclesiasticals no less than the Bishop, and yet his conscience not be burdened with the Diocesan. Truly I know not but his Majesty really hath discerned more for the hitting the business of coagulating his whole people into one Ecclesiastical National society or body under him hereby, than any of us were a war of, who could not see before any reason for such proceed as are taken in this Declaration, which we shall approve henceforth with a great deal of satisfaction. But did not these men in the late Wars take part with the Parliament, and now they submit to the King's Declaration against an Act of Parliament? Be it so. The Act of Parliament is against the command of God: The King permits what God bids. Who should the subject obey, but God and the King? As for the War, I perceive it will still be ripped up though against the Act of Oblivion. It was not upon the account of Religion (it must be first known) that it will be owned. In the cause of Religion if we be persecuted, we may fly, Christ allows us, but we may not resist. The case than I account a singular case. It was upon the Militia they began, the old King said. The King and Parliament was divided that is certain, and the question was, where the Authority (or the most of it) did lie? some thought in the one, some in the other, and so were engaged. I will speak now once for all, that the mouths of these men may be stopped with reason, for nothing else will do it. There are some have thought thus. The Government of this Nation is mixed. A mixed Government is where the supreme Authority is not placed purely in the People, or the Nobles, or the Monarch, but mixedly in them all. The supreme Legislative power in this Nation lies in the King and his two Houses jointly, not severally, as one Corporation (says Judge Jenkins) or to speak surely, as one Parliament. The Parliament which is to be one in Law being divided, the constitution is broken, that being broken, the Government is dissolved, and the power returned at that season to the people. The people being at liberty, many men of sober spirits thought themselves bound to go that way, which would most tend to the advancement of Religion. And this is the true state of their cause, which, though I myself in my judgement for my university Oaths sake was otherwise inclined, I do humbly offer, in Justice, for their Apology. Only I must add this, that the occasion which happened once, that was the Kings own deposing his power of dissolving the Parliament at that time, being like never to be again, there is no hurt at all in it. If after this, these men will yet press us further; I will return that the state of the case being quite altered, the King brought in again, and with universal consent, into the old constitution, here is a wonderful kind of thing fallen out, that the Fanatic, or Anti-Episcopial party of the Nation, are really turning to be the Royalist, who are for Prorogative, & Supremacy in Ecclesiasticals, when the Bishop's party who have made it hitherto a proverb that without them no King, are the men bandy against it, for the maintenance of these Acts of Parliament. And thus much shall suffice as to the first thing offered by the Prefacer about Popery and the King's Declaration.   

Sect. 3.  
I come then now to the other thing that requires our notice, which is a matter indeed of great moment, and therefore intended by me for the main task of my present engagement, and that is his asserting an authority in the Magistrate over the conscience of his Subjects in matters of Religion. So he hath expressed it, and made it the subject of two other Books, and insists upon it still in this Preface. I am willing therefore to enter into a dissertation with him about the point: for it will be worthy not only of our two labours, but of another learned, pious, studious and worthy Knight, who was the Author of the Papers entitled, Liberty of Conscience; and whom I shall purposely engage with the Prefacer, that, if it be possible, we may all three together (will we, nill we) beat out the right determination of the business.  
As for the Prefacer, I must needs say, that I take him to be a man of fewer years and quicker parts, and of a more flourishing Pen than to be fit, at least of himself, for the undertaking any such point as this is. For either a man must be of a patiented complexion that can read over all that is written by others about the subject, and then give us the Compendium, according to his judgement: or he must be able, by fixing long upon one thing, and inculcating the thoughts of it upon the mind, to frame his own notion, in such a forecasting of it through the whole train of its consequences to the end, as to make it hold together, which is not the work unius Diei, or unius liturae, to use the expression of the Bishop offered to my hand. I know that the happiness of the first conceit does much, but it is not the nimbleness of the Pen, and a torrent of words, does the rest. Nay rather, it is this volubility of the tongue which is Truth's great Harlot, while the handsomeness of the expression will be ready still to allure away the judgement from that closer attendance to the dry notion, that Controversal points, or Cases of Conscience, do require; which should not therefore be writ in the style of this age. For the language particularly of this person, I cannot but compare methinks to a like present fashion in the Garments of Women, the superfluity of whose dimensions may perhaps make their bodies look more stately, but it will trip their heels up, besides the cumbersomness, if they take not heed to themselves, or some other come after to keep them from falling. Well! the business this notable eloquent Gentleman hath to do in this Preface, is, for aught I see really, only to abuse the Non-Conformists, and so fasten upon them some charge if he could tell what, & against whom in reference to their loyalty or duty to the Government. But the charge being founded at the bottom only upon his first Book, or the cause he hath there managed, the best way to answer all his particulars, will be to let them quite alone, without raking the Dunghill up, and to touch only in general upon the foundation.  
There are two passages than I will cite out of this Preface, for there are no more I count of that nature, which I make my concern. All their exceptions relate either to the Power in itself, or to the matters of the Command. The first are directly levelled against the very being of Authority; and Magistrates, of what kind soever, according to their general pretences, must not dare to put any restraint upon their subjects consciences, lest they invade the Divine Prerogative, overthrew the fundamental liberties of human nature, and undo honest men for their loyalty to God and their Religion. Now if this right be claimed without limitation, than the consequence is unavoidable, That subjects may, when ever they please, cross with the authority of their Governors, upon any pretence that can wear the name of Religion. But this being grossly absurd, the necessity of a Sovereign power in matters of Religion, is granted, and all Arguments that prove it in general necessary to Peace and Government, are allowed, or at least are not contradicted: for what ever admits an Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, howsoever bounded and limited, admits it; and that is enough to the first assertion of a supreme Authority over the Conscience in matters of Religion. Again, after eighteen pages farther, And they are exhorted above all things to keep their Consciences (i.e. themselves) free from the usurpation of all human Laws, that is, in effect, they are forbidden to make any conscience of subjection to Princes: for it is only Conscience that is capable of the obligation of Laws, so that if they be exempt, the whole man is at liberty.  
By these two passages it does appear to me, that this Ecclesiastical Politician from the beginning of his setting out to the end, does run all along in that confusion, as it will be hard to bring him to sorts. But it shall suffice me to offer two distinctions, which alone as I hope may serve to do this work, both of drawing him out of his darkness, and convincing others thereby of the injury of his accusations. Distinguish we than first between the Authority of the Magistrate over his Subjects in matters of Religion, and an Authority over the Conscience in any matters whatsoever. It is manifest in the very expression of his Title, and the customary language of his first Book, and of this Preface, That he does confound Conscience with the Matters of Religion; whereas there are matters of Religion wherein the Conscience may not be concerned, and matters wherein the Conscience may be concerned, & they be no Ecclesiastical matters. The second distinction than is, between Subjection, which refers to the Authority residing in the Magistrate himself, and which is our duty in opposition to resistance or rebellion; and Obedience which lies in the doing what he commands. It is apparent in the last passage how he confounds these two things, when the making conscience of subjection to Princes, and obligation to the Law, is belike all one with him in his present conception. But that there is a difference to be put between these two, it does appear undeniably from one consideration, that we are always bound in conscience to the one, that is subjection: but we are not always so bound to the other, to obedience. The things that are commanded may be sometimes sinful, or hurtful to the Commonwealth, and then it will be our duty not to obey them: or they may be idle, vain, frivolous, which we may choose therefore to do out of prudence, for fear of wrath, and to avoid contempt and scandal, when we are not otherwise to hold ourselves bound in conscience.   

Sect. 4.  
To begin with the former. By me Kings Reign, says Wisdom, and if they rule by God, it is fit they should also rule for him. He is the Minister of God for our good, says the Apostle. The Minister is to look to his Lords will, and the good of the Subject is not only their Temporal but Spiritual good. And if he be God's Minister for our good, there can be no exemption of Sacred things any more than Civils from his Authority, under God, for the good of his People. And hence are we taught to pray for Magistrates, that we may lead peaceable lives under them in all Godliness as well as Honesty. Kings and Emperors (says Grotius from some other) are equally to take care of Sacred and Secular things: but only when we come to particulars, it must be confessed that the jus imperii is more narrow in matters of Religion, then in other matters upon this one account, that the Divine Law does appoint or determine more things concerning Religion, and so takes them out of the Magistrates liberty, than it does concerning other matters. In hoc Reges sicut cis Divinitus praecipitur Deo serviunt in quantum Reges sunt, si in suo regno bona jubeant, mala prohibeant: non solum quae pertinent ad humanam sicietatem, verum etiam quae ad Divinam Religionem, says Augustine, Contra Cresco nium, l. 3. c, 51. The affairs of Religion I must say again are of the greatest concernment, and it is not fit God's Minister should neglect his greater affairs, to take care only of the less. Besides there are no matters in the Earth which have so great an influence on men's spirits to put them in agitation, as the matters of Religion: and if they were exempted wholly from the authority of the Supreme Governor, it would be a very hard thing for any mortal to govern at all. The Non-Conformists therefore deny not the authority of the King in matters Ecclesiastical. No, they may perhaps be rather accused shortly for acknowledging it too much, (as hath been intimated) seeing they do accept of his Declaration, nor do they scruple his Title of Supreme Head. We distinguish indeed between a Civil head of the Church and the Constitutive head. The King we acknowledge the civil Head or Governor of the Church of England as well as the State, that is in whom the only Supreme Coercive authority does lie over all persons in Ecclesiastical as well as other matters. But as to the constitutive head of our Church as an Ecclesiastical organical body, it will be hard for those who own not be Bishops jure Divino, to assign. The National Church hitherto I took to be the Integrum of our Parochial Congregations, and the Pastors of all the Parish Churches in England virtually associated (for they are not actually) are I think the constitutive head of the Church of England under Christ, in that external formal Government of it, he hath committed to them. There is the internal Government of the Church, which belongs only to Christ and his Spirit, who alone can rule men's hearts: or the external Government of it. This external regiment is either formal which belongs to the Ministers: or Objective, which belongs to the Magistrate. The Magistrate cannot therefore by virtue of his Office enter into the function of the Priest to do his work, though he can make the Minister himself do it, and punish him if he neglect his duty. He can give a call to the Pastoral Rulers to meet and frame Ecclesiastical constitutions; and when himself cannot make them, they shall not yet be obligatory to the subject, unless they have his Sanction. This external authority over the Church, which is Objective (that is, which is conversant about Ecclesiastical affairs, but does not exercise them, which is Circa Sacra not in Sacris, according to Constantine of old, Episcopus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) does differ from the formal (which is from Christ to us as his Stewards and Ambassadors, and so to be put in execution no otherwise then as it is prescribed by him in the word) in this mainly, that the one is Declarative, that can direct what is God's will, and persuade to it, and threaten only with reference to another world; but the other is a power to make that our duty, which it requires, and enforce it to be done by present punishments, that is, a power which is juris Constitutinum and Coercive. There are two sorts then of things, which are subject to the Magistrates Power or Government. Things or actions determined by God himself in his word: or things that are less undetermined by him, as neither commanded nor forbidden. For the former, the Magistrates power does lie in his being made the Keeper of the Tables, having no authority to change a title of God's Law; so that his work in respect of such things consists in protecting those that observe them, and encouraging such by removing what will hinder, and promoting what will further them in their duty: as also in his discouraging the Transgressor, by withdrawing the occasions of their sin, and punishing them for it. For the latter, the power of the Magistrate does lie in his liberty to determine all such things as being before not determined, so as by that determination to make them our duty which were indifferent before; to make it our duty, I say, to avoid, or do such things according as he requires or prohibits them for the common edification. Haes sive Sacra sive profana sint (says Grotius) determinare in alterum partem jus est summae potestatis. Provided always that such commands as these do indeed answer that end; For seeing power in the original, is derived from God as Supreme Lord; [Thou couldst have no power, says, Christ to Pilate, unless it were given thee of God]: and it is given of God to none but for the common good, we are to conceive that the things that are commanded in Civils are for the good of the Commonwealth, and in Ecclesiasticals for our Spiritual edification, or else though they must be done, rather than we resist or suffer, they do not bind us in our consciences. The will of God that such a one should command, is I say, power in the root. This will is that he command nothing but for our edification, or the common good, [According to the power given us of God for edification]: If his command then be not indeed such, it is destitute of God's authority, and becoming thereby a command in foro alieno (that is in foro exteriori only), and in aliena materia, the conscience (whose adequate rule the will of God only is) must be left to its liberty. The Body indeed is bound (says Dr. Taylor), and we must suffer patiently the evil which we cannot deprecate: but Laws that are made to purposes beyond these measures do no ways oblige the conscience. He is the Minister of God for good, says St. Paul, otherwise he is not God's Minister, and hath to other purposes none of God's authority, and therefore cannot oblige the conscience to an active obedience, in such where the power is incompetent to command. Duc. Dub. B. 3. c. 1. r. 3.  
Having then granted and stated one member of the distinction, I must come to the other, which is, that though the Magistrate hath an authority over his Subjects, in the matters of Religion as well as civil matters, yet hath he no authority for all that over the conscience of any. Conscience is the judgement of a man concerning himself and actions with reference to the Judgement of God. It is a faculty whereby we discern what is God's Judgement of us and our actions, and there is no man must do any thing contrary to that judgement. If the Magistrate then have power over the conscience, in any thing whatsoever, he must have power, either to make us change our judgement of that thing, and judge otherwise: or else though we judge thus, to do otherwise then that judgement; that is though we judge that it is Gods will we should do thus, the command of the Magistrate shall make it lawful for us to do oterwise. The first of these is against reason, there is no man can make himself, to judge otherwise of a thing in good earnest than he does judge: and it cannot then be in the power of the Magistrate to make him do it, any more than it is in his power to make him fly in the Air, or live under water. This is so manifest, that this ingenious Author hath spoken enough of it himself in his first Book. The latter is against Piety, for to do the thing which I judge to be the will of God I should not do, because the Magistrate does command it, is manifestly a preferring the will of Man before Gods, that is, an having of other Gods before him, which is the sin of the first Commandment. The truth is, to go about the making of the Magistrates will to be the rule of conscience in any thing, let it be what it will, is manifestly to deflower conscience, to make that which is peculiar to God to be common with man, or profane. For conscientia importing in the very word and thing, the judgement of God together with ours, it must be his will, and that alone must be the rule of it, and if any thing else be once made its rule, it is gone. If the Magistrate have an authority over the conscience in any thing, the reason will be the same for all. I mean, if I may do any thing which I judge contrary to Gods will (which judgement I say is my conscience), then cannot that be a reason to restrain me in another. The reason why I dare not commit Adultery, or do the like heinous crime, is because it is against my conscience, and if that reason be rendered insufficient, that a thing may be done, though it be against a man's conscience, there is an end of Religion. If the Magistrate have an authority over the conscience, then must the internal acts of men be subject to his Government, when it is God only that knows, and can rule the heart: But Grotius hath taught us well here. There are internal acts of men, and the external. Those acts of men (says he) which do subiacere humano imperio are his external acts only: and our internal acts can be commanded no further than they are concerned in the external. The inward acts of man's soul in general, and much less his conscience are not within his cognizance, and so not under his jurisdiction. If the Magistrate hath power over the conscience, then good and evil should be founded in jure positivo, and not in jure naturae: Then might he impose on us a new Faith, nor new Articles in our Creed: Then must we have no Religion but his Will, and no God but Leniathan only. It is true that when the Magistrate commands me any thing for my good, or for the common good though to my loss, that thing is now become my duty; and as I know it is God's will that I should obey such commands, I am obliged in conscience: and if this very nimble Gentleman, will but be contented with this interpretation, and declare that by the Magistrate's authority over the conscience, he intends not either that he hath power to force the judgement, or the action against the judgement (when upon the last indeed it is he does entrench), I may descend to the other distinction.   

Sect. 5.  
The second distinction then, that must bring some light to this young Doctor's understanding, if he be not yet too old to learn, and confutation to his charge, which he so frivolously without any cause, & to no purpose, does advance against he knows not whom, may appear with conviction upon himself from these words, speaking of the Non-Conformists exceptions, which relate (says he) either to the Power itself, or the matters of the command. If then he distinguishes well, the power itself and it commands, the duty or obligation that arises upon the subject, in reference to these which are two, must be distinct likewise. The force of it cannot be avoided, let him seem never so much to neglect it. He is pleased indeed, to say that we exhort people in effect to make no conscience of subjection to Princes, because we say that they are not always bound in conscience to their Commands; that is because we do instruct them so about the obligation of human Laws, as they may know they are not to make the will of the Magistrate, but the will of God alone, to be the rule of the Conscience. We do therefore here instruct them right, and that which this man would have, were to pervert them. He does discover plainly his ignorance of this distinction, and this distinction the vanity of his accusation. We are always bound in conscience to subjection unto the Powers that are, we acknowledge this, this, we Preach it, we Print it, and are ready to maintain it: but we are not always bound in conscience to Obedience: And God forbidden that we should. If he could have distinguished these two things, he might have spared most of his labour. There is a Book entitled, The Obligation of human Laws discussed, which I Printed a year since; I must desire my Reader to get it (and bind it together if he can with this), for they are of two subjects that do interfere very much; The authority of the Magistrate in the matters of God discussed, was the intended Title of this, but I could not Print it till this Preface now hath given me the occasion. I use the expression of Scripture in the matters of God, because I would include all matters wherein the conscience is concerned, as well as Ecclesiastical matters. Now I have in that Book laid down this distinction with one more, as the ground work of my determination of that point, and I have need to say a little more to prevent some cavil, which may be raised by this person upon my reproof, which I must also give him for the next words he uses, viz. 'Tis conscience only (says he) that is capable of the Obligation of human Laws, so that if that be exempt, the whole man is at liberty. I wonder at the Man for this; I do hate this pride methinks for being indocible and perverse no less than for being ugly. Pride is an overweening conceit of ones self with the contempt of others. There is nothing more visible than this filthy pride in this young man, and that Author who wrote the Friendly Debate, but only with this difference, that I judge this the more ingenuous or open, the other the more cankered and sly; I pray God forgive them both with all my heart. It is a base piece of immorality I am sure in either, that when they have to do with any such person as Dr Owen, of years so much elder than themselves, and who are not without some reputation at least with other persons, to use such contemptuous disdainful scorning language as they do altogether, which arising so manifestly too from the conceit and confidence alone they have of themselves, does declare them two such Sons of the morning, such a couple of proud Despisers, that until they do show some repentance and acknowledgement for their fault, they do deserve really to be excommunicated out of the good thoughts of all men, that most deservedly otherwise do honour them never so much. Well! This man cannot it seems understand how he should be obliged at all, unless he be obliged in Conscience. He cannot discern belike between an obligation simpliciter, & the obligation of conscience. He cannot discern that the conscience which judges of our duty only in relation to God is bound only by a Divine obligation, and that a Divine obligation may be distinguished from an Human obligation. Is it not indeed strange that a man of such quick parts, hath yet so little solid judgement? Is it not one thing (thinks he) to be bound to an action, because it is Gods will, and for fear of Hell, or Divine punishments: and another to be bound to it out of fear only of the Law, and to escape suffering? Does not the Apostle, when he tells us, We must be subject not only for wrath, but also for Conscience sake, imply this distinction, that there is an obligation then only for wrath sake, and an obligation out of conscience? And cannot this exceeding fine witted man by any means discern this? And will not he nor the Debater learn, though it be never so ingenuous for them to come here to some acknowledgement, that themselves as well as others may be able to live in this World under Laws, with peace to their souls? I do profess sincerely that of all the Books that ever yet I wrote, I am most pleased in my heart with that Book I now mentioned, as being a subject so needful for all persons, though it be the worst printed. I will supply some little I want in it in this place. It is this.  
If this Author were a man of as much judgement as wit, he would not have laid down himself so rawly, and excepted at the thing, but at the terms of the distinction which I have used with other Divines. For when Doctor Taylor speaks of the Bodies being bound, and I have said the outward man, in distinction to the Conscience, it must be confessed that these terms are taken from custom, and that it does far with them, as it does usually with other School-terms, that they will not strictly hold the examination. The Law of man which binds the subject for wrath sake only, does so bind him to the external act, as the will to that act must be included; for to bind him in the Body without the Will were to put him in Fetters, but it is no human obligation. This I have said in my Book, and I add here, when I say, we distinguish not the Will from the outward Man, in the Obligation of human Laws, it must be conceived that the will is guided still by the understanding, and is supposed by some to be nothing else but the last practical act of it. I distinguish not then the outward man from the inward so far as the inward acts are necessary to that which is external, when I distinguish both from the conscience. There is the understanding (N.B.) that I shall suffer if I do not such a thing, and therefore I will do it, is one thing: and the understanding that I sin if I do it not, and therefore I will do it, is another. The one is that our Divines mean by this term of the outward man still: and the other is the conscience. You may ask how comes it to pass that when there goes all this to an act the Magistrate commands, so that the subject in his will and understanding (so far as to do the thing) is obliged, we do yet call it but the outward man, or forum exterius, and can distinguish it with all that, from the conscience? I answer, we call this the outward man upon this account, because it is the external acts only that are subject to the Magistrates Government, or can be required for themselves, and the acts of the will and understanding are not required, but indirectly in relation only to these external acts; therefore I say do we well call all this still but the outward Man: and this is distinguished plainly from the conscience, because a man may know that such a thing is not required of God, and that God will not punish him, though he does not do it, when yet he does know that it is prudent for him rather than suffer, and therefore wills it. In the one there is the external act with the will and understanding so far as that act is concerned: but so long as my understanding is that it is not Gods will, but man's will that I perform, such a thing may be said to be done out of understanding (and will as well as by the outward man): but not out of conscience. It is not my knowledge of a thing, and that I am to do it: but my knowledge that it is God will, or my knowledge of his judgement of the thing to be the same with mine, that makes it Conscience. I think I am full enough now. You may then object, that I sometimes seem in that Book, to make the obligation of the outward man to be negative, not to rebel; and another time to be positive also to some act. I answer, 'tis true that from the beginning, I do make the obligation of the outward man to lie in both these, a necessity never to resist, and upon that necessity to act rather than suffer. But interest of fear or self preservation, binds the reason, as well as the sense. I say true, and that there is the reason then of the outward man which is one: and the reason of the conscience, which is another. When my reason is the fear of suffering, because I may not resist and therefore I will, it is my outward man is bound: but when my reason is, that the thing hath God's Authority, and it will offend him if I do it not, and therefore I will, then am I bound in conscience. A human Law which is for the common good, binds me from reason of conscience: a Law which is unprofitable or against it, binds me only from the outward man's reason. There is Candour indeed to be allowed to this distinction (which I have intimated) as to most terms of Art, but they are not therefore to be left, both because of their constant use, and also for their profit, in the shorter cut which we get to what we would have by the use of them. Only they are verily to be at once first throughly understood, and then shall all that which we signify by them be as completely represented with a word, as if it were drawn out in the full expression. That which I have to offer upon this, against the Prefacer and Debater who are companions in this cause, is this, that whereas they see no more, but to think that the stability of Crowns and Sceptres, and so of all Government does lie in the Ministers, especially the Episcopal Divines, preaching such Doctrine as theirs, which is to lay an obligation upon the conscience of the subject to obey them in all things indefinitely, unless they be apparently forbidden in the Word of God, they are exceedingly mistaken: for if there were nothing else to support Sovereignty but that, the King's Crown might perhaps stick no longer on his Head, then till the Parliament sits again, seeing we may then very likely have more Laws that we shall make no conscience to obey, and yet we shall make conscience (God willing) of our Loyalty to his Majesty, and must do while we live, by the command of the Almighty. It is not the point of Obedience then, it must be inculcated upon which the Government of Kings is established: but upon the point of Subjection. Let me say it over again. It is not on the point of obedience out of Conscience: but on the point that we must obey, because the Magistrate beareth the Sword, and that not in vain, that the whole World is kept in Order. And also upon this point of Conscience, that whether we have cause to obey or not obey, we must however never resist upon pain of damnation. Let the Book before mentioned be herein further consulted.  
And after this, there will be little reason for our Prefacer to talk any more of exceptions leveled at the Power itself, by any Pretences of the Nonconformist against the Sovereign right of the King in the matters of the Church any more than of the State, for we own no such, no more than he, though the way of his expressing himself by putting a restraint upon his Subjects consciences, is so feat and grating till it be digested, and withal so wayward, that I cannot but point it to the Readers correction, by what will hereafter follow. If he hath any thing then to charge us with, it must be in regard to the matters of the command, unto which therefore he proceeds. But then they say there are some particular things exempted from all humane cognizance, which if the Civil Magistrate presume to impose upon the consciences of his Subjects [He should say upon his Subjects, not upon the consciences of his Subjects, for the Magistrate imposes nothing but upon the outward man, requiring the external act, and the inward acts follow only so far as they are necessary to the external], as he ventures beyond the Warrant of his Commission, so he can tie no Obligation of Obedience upon them, seeing they can be under no subjection in those things, where they are under no Authority. Now this pretence resolves itself thus, that they do not quarrel his Majesty's Ecclesiastical Supremacy, but they acknowledge it to be the undoubted right of all Sovereign Princes, as long as its exercise is kept within due bounds of modesty and moderation. Which being granted all their general exceptions. [Very fine, when we have indeed none at all!] against the sufficiency of the Authority itself are quitted, and they have now nothing to except against, but the excess of its Jurisdiction. So that having gained this ground, [Mighty, to gain what never was with held!] the next thing to be assigned and determined, is the just and lawful bounds of this Power, which may be summed up in this general rule. That Governors take care not to impose things apparently evil, and that Subjects be not allowed to plead Conscience in any other case. This is the safest and most easy Rule to secure the Quiet of all that are upright and peaceable, and all that refuse subjection to such a gentle and moderate Government, make themselves uncapable of all the benefits of society.  
It is well we are come now at last where the water ●…cks. The Nonconformist differs not from the Conformist in the main point that secures all Government that is Subjection: but it is in the point of Obedience only we differ. And here are two questions, The one is about the matters of our obedience in general, what is the rule, or the bounds that must be set to the Magistrates commands, that we exceed not our duty to God, while we are obedient to our Governors? The other is about the particular matters of it, whether the present impositions of Conformity do keep within that compass, and consequently are lawful or unlawful?  
The latter of these is the pitched Field, between the Conformist and Nonconformist, and neither of us have a mind to enter into it. Only I will offer thus much by the way. The Conformists generally do hold that the things we differ about are indifferent, and consequently thaes they may be removed out of the Church by Authority without sin: The Non-Conformists say generally they shall sin if they obey them. What then is to be done in the case, but if my friend be weak and cannot indeed come to me, I must go to my friend, if ever I and my friend come together? Nay, if he be my friend, there is something too I must do else; I must part with something, if he need it, and which I can-spare, to accommodate him with it; to accommodate with him by it. I wish hearty I might live to see a Law, that no man should have any more than one Cure of souls, so long as there are others no less able than they, who may take the burden off their hands. It was upon this account, because they wanted men of ability, that Pluralities were allowed in the Church at first: and when such men do abound, it is wicked to continue them. There is one dispensation only should be authentic for a Minister that fears God to have two Live, and that is when he hath two Tongues. It is this damned hard Argument at the bottom, the Priest's covetousness and corruption, and not their dispute about the Ceremonies, that really hinders our Accommodation. I know these sons of the Horseleech will never be contented with a single portion, whose voice still is give give: A Dignity therefore with a Living, may be allowed to answer their double give: but one Dignity, and one Cure of Souls should be all. If there be any will yet cry give, give, and give, they may be the sons of the Asp, or the Adder, for the Horseleech herself must say she never had any such sons as these, who enlarge their desire as Hell, and are as Death, and cannot be satisfied.  
The former is the question to which we must return, and we are indeed beholding to the Gentleman, for comprising his Books into the Compendium of this Rule. The Governor must not impose things apparently evil: and the Subject must be allowed to plead Conscience in no other case. For the examination of this position, I will ask in the first place who shall be Judge, whether a thing be apparently evil or not? The Magistrate judges it good, the Subject holds it notoriously evil. Shall the Subject take upon him now to control the judgement of his Sovereign, and tell him that is evil which he calls good? Who shall say to his Prince, Thou art wicked? I am not sure what he will first say to this. In the next place, suppose a thing not to be apparently evil, but thought indifferent by the Prince and his Subjects generally, and yet some person hath his reasons upon deep consideration that prove it evil. He is convinced in his own conscience upon these reasons. What will this Author judge now in this case? must he indeed forsake his own judgement and apprehensions, and acquiesce in the determination of his Governor? I know this Author speaks after this rate in his first Book: but I am out of doubt that he may never forsake his conscience (which is that present judgement) for any fear, command, or advantage in the World. Again, suppose a thing be really indifferent in its nature, and it is so to me in my Absolute judgement: yet there are cases in regard of the circumstances or accidents, that make it in my Hypothetical judgement to be sinful, what will he have us to do now? For instance, There are things to me indifferent, which yet are heinous in others, and I may scandalise them in my doing them by my example. It was indifferent to the strong Christian to eat of meats offered to Idols, who knew that an Idol was nothing, but to him that made conscience of the Idol, it was Idolatry: now for a man to whom this thing was lawful, to eat before him to whom it was Idolatry, becomes unlawful, and he may not do it for conscience sake: Conscience I say, not thy own, but of that other. God commands, thou shalt not do that thing, whereby thyself or others will be lead to sin if it be done. The Magistrate commands thou shalt do such a thing: Who must be obeyed God or Man? When a thing is evil by accident, and not intrinsically evil, if we can separate the accident from the thing, we must do it: But if we cannot remove if from the accident, that accident makes it evil, and we cannot be obliged unto sin, by the commandment of man. In the last place, And why must a man be allowed conscience in no other case? is it because he hath, or is to have no conscience in any cases but such? Does not the Apostle require of every one in the case of indifferent things, that they be persuaded fully in their own minds, that they act not but in Faith? Does he not tell us that if they eat before they are so persuaded they are damned, and that to him who esteemeth the thing unclean, it is unclean? Does not the Apostle speak directly and purposely about things here that are not intrinsically and apparently evil, but matters of that nature, which are good and evil, according to the diversities of men's persuasions? How bold is this man then to offer us such a rule, which is directly to lead us if we follow it, against these plain Texts of Scripture, upon the hazard of damnation?  
The just and lawful bounds (says he) of this power, have been already described (viz. in his former Books) as to the most material cases that can occur in human life, which may be summed up in this general Rule, before mentioned. If this Rule then be the sum of what he hath offered in his former Books, it follows, that he being out in this rule, the substance of his Books must fall with it. But if this than be not the rule, you may ask what is? It is easy to throw down, but the difficulty is to build. I answer, it is this is the work and business of my discourse that ensues, and to be presented best by degrees upon the occasion of what is offered also by another: yet seeing the Gentleman hath engaged me with this sum of his thoughts (which is I count ingenuously done, though he be out), I will requite him with the like, though I do some thing prevent my own intentions. I say then that this Author is so far mistaken in proposing this rule to the Magistrates power over men's consciences, that it is Conscience itself is the Rule, even the conscience which is in every particular subject, is the bounds and rule to him of what he must, and must not do, (how far and no farther he must go), in all the commands of Man whatsoever. One would wonder to see what obscurity is cast upon Truth by words and Disputes. There are no Divines but will tell us that it is the will of God, or the Word of God that is the rule of conscience and the adequate rule of it, as Dr Sanderson upon this subject; That it is God's Seat, with the like expressions. And what is the meaning of this, but that Conscience is not, and cannot be under any authority that is human, but is subject to God only? and yet when we come to this point, and ask how far the Magistrate's Authority does reach in the matters of Religion, they are not able to say, Thus far, as far as Conscience, even to these Confines, and it must go no farther. It is God's Authority must be first, That of the Conscience next, and then the Magistrates. So long as the Magistrates commands trespass not upon conscience, they are within his proper Territories, but if they require any thing against that, they are gone beyond their bounds, and their Authority ceases. The truth is, there is but God's Authority and Man's in all, and the conscience hath God's Authority, which must therefore be over man's. There is no Determination almost in any point which hath been held of difficulty, which in the vertical turn is so plain, clear, and perfect as this. The Magistrate I say hath power over his Subject in all things, (N.B.) even in all things whatsoever in the Earth, that he can do (as to the external acts I have said), and the Subject may, or is to obey him in them, so far as his conscience will let him. Lo, here the true rule or bounds of Gods own setting in this business. In short, The Magistrate shall command me in any thing, but my conscience. And who will not be ready to say now that this is indeed that which they knew, and must wonder that they themselves did not make the Determination. Indeed how shall a man be subject to the Magistrate for conscience sake, if the command of conscience had not in it a Superior and more prevalent Power than his? it would be for his own sake, and not for conscience sake, if his authority was greater than it. I know I have something here anticipated what is to follow, in giving my notion so soon, and at once, but I do it for this reason, because I know also it is the dry light at last, and that alone, that must be of force for conviction of those that will receive any, by controversy.   

Sect. 6.  
I must not yet leave this. There are things in their nature indifferent: and things apparently forbidden or required of God. There is no difference between us in the last, God must be obeyed in such things beyond question. Duo sunt genera actuum imperii qui ad jus imperantis non pertinent, Deo vetita jubere, Deo jussa vetare. For the other, there is a double case, The case of mere indifferency, and the case of doubt; That is, there are things which are indifferent in their nature, and appear so to us: and there are things indifferent in their nature, and yet appear to us unlawful. In the one case, the resolution is plain. To do a thing whereof I am in doubt (that is whereof I am not sufficiently persuaded, it is lawful to do) is forbidden. Whatsoever is not of Faith is sin. But the Magistrate hath not power to command me to sin. You may say I had better obey doubtfully, then disobey doubtfully. I answer, my doubt in the one refers unto God, in the other unto Man, and I must prefer God before Man. If I disobey I doubt that I do ill only because of Man's command: but if I obey, I doubt I do ill, because of Gods. I must be resolved that God forbids not the thing before the command of man can take place. I obey then doubtfully: but I forbear in saith. I believe and am assured that God hath not commanded the thing I forbear: but I am in doubt whether he hath not forbidden what I obey. In the other case the resolution in general is, that we are bound to obedience, but it must be offered not indefinitely, but with the distinction of a Political and Moral Obligation. When Samuel tells the people the manner of their King, that he would take their sons for his Charrets, and Daughters for confectionaries, their Fields and Vineyards to give unto his Servants: Here is a political obligation on this people to deliver their Children and Estates for the King's use upon his command, because the Government was such in the Constitution that if he did so, they might not resist him for all that: when yet if any of them could save their sons and daughters, or goods without violence, or offending the King, no doubt but they might, and have a good conscience to God. A political obligation than is to be bound to the thing so as to do it rather than resist: a moral is to be bound to it so, as if we do it not, we sin: We are bound to obey the King in all his commands of things indifferent with a political: we are not bound to obey them with a moral obligation only when they are for the common good. I have used other terms to the same sense in my other Book, and I am free in them being explained, but it may be these are less obnoxious to cavil. The Ecclesiastical Politician therefore (and the Debater both, so far as he goes along with him) hath made a very grievous young Determination in this business, while he so confoundedly asserts that the Magistrate must be obeyed in all things not intrinsically and aparently evil, without any discrimination else whatsoever: whereas the holding this, is manifestly impious in one of these cases, and tyrannous or intolerably oppressive to the conscience in the other. There are some things indifferent I say in their nature, that yet to us are unlawful, while we suppose them unlawful, or are in doubt of it, and to do them in that doubt is sin: and there are some things lawful, but so inconvenient, so unprofitable, so grievous, that we should be loath always when then outward man is, to have the conscience also charged with them.  
I know upon the whole matter, what it is that can mainly be urged. God commands that we honour and obey our Superiors. This is the duty of the fifth Commandment. When the Magistrate than does appoint this or that particular thing, an obligation to it arises upon us as part of that duty: and so the conscience is obliged by God, and that indefinitely in all Laws. I answer, the Reader who hath read my other Book with this thus far, I will receive this instruction as one use of the whole, viz. how the duty which God requires of us the fifth Commandment is to be understood; and it is to be understood thus: When our Superior commands what he ought, we are obliged by the Authority of that particular command, so that if the thing be not done we sin: when he commands what he ought not, as when a Law is not for the people's good, we are obliged only by the Authority which is in his person, and so, if that be preferred otherwise, we sin not though the thing be left undone. And this is but what is ordinarily affirmed, though not ordinarily so well understood by our Divines, in their saying that the commands of men do oblige only so far as to avoid Contempt and Scandal. A determination I must say, to be received only in such commands, which ought not to be commanded: but not in such where the Superior commands what he ought. I will express it if you will in other words. When the Superior commands any thing which he ought, we are obliged for conscience sake, and the fifth Commandment requires us to do the thing, or else we break that command, because this thing bears in it the authority of both Commanders: when he commands any thing which he ought not, we are obliged for wrath's sake, and the fifth Commandment requires only that we do not resist, so that if we resist not, we give that honour and pay that duty to the Magistrate, which we own in this case. If we suffer with submission, or obey rather than suffer, or avoid both the grievance and suffering with prudence, neither bringing contempt on his Authority, or inducing our Brethren to sin, we are to account that we answer the intent of this Commandment. I must add still that this is as much too as the Magistrate himself need desire in the Earth, seeing if he be strict upon it, and the thing be not sinful, he may take any body do what he please upon this account.  
As for our Prefacer, it must be yet a greater reproof to his undertaking, that in this endeavour of his to set up an Authority in the Magistrate over the Conscience in all matters External, he is certainly fallen in with Mr Hobbs, whom yet to avoid the odium, he is fain himself to confute. For when that more considerable person, according to his principles of Government, makes all men by nature before they come into society, to be in a state of War, that gives every man right to every thing: which right upon their agreement into a Commonwealth is given up (he counts) into the hands of the Sovereign to determine Propriety, so that his will thenceforth becomes the measure of right and wrong to the Community, he proceeds so far upon the conceit, as to condemn these two positions. That every man is judge of good and evil Doctrine. That whatsoever a man does against his conscience is sin. See his Leviathan, C. 29. Now let us compare this ingenuously as we ought (seeing else it is so bad) with other places in his Book. That Subjects own to Sovereign's simple obedience in all things, wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the Laws of God I have proved— C. 31. Again, It is manifest enough that when a man receiveth two contrary commands, and knows that one of them is Gods, he ought to obey that, and not the other, though it be the command of his lawful Sovereign, or his Father. C. 43. It does appear then, when the Ecclesiastical Politician does confine the authority he gives the Magistrate over the conscience to external and indifferent things, allowing the authority of the conscience over the Magistrates in things intrinsically sinful, and expressly forbidden by God, he does but the same which Mr. Hobbs does also, if you compare them equally taking one place with another: But herein are they wicked companions both, that they should once offer to take away from reasonable Agents, a judgement of private discretion, in any concernment of conscience whatsoever.  
One may easily indeed perceive what the Contents of this young man's papers do amount unto. He dare not take off all obligations of good and evil from men's consciences antecedent to humane Laws, as Hobbs in that one place (though otherwhere, as it seems, he intended not so far) hath done: because this were not only the way to ruin Religion, but his name, and to bring all Government also to ruin, which he engages to assert. But he would take off all obligations from men's consciences, in the whole business of Conformity, antecedent to the will of the Parliament and Bishops, so as their Acts must be the rule of good and evil to us, as to these matters. He does tell us indeed of a liberty to our Judgements and to our Faith: but when he will allow us to judge and believe of these things as we do, and would yet have us account that the public conscience, the Laws, and not the private dictates of our own must govern our outward actions, it does bring to my mind one passage more in his Friend. What if a Sovereign forbids his Subjects to believe in Christ? I answer (says Mr. Hobbs), it is no effect, because belief or unbelief never follow man's Commands. But what if we be commanded to confess with our Tongues? It is an external thing, and no more than any other gesture, whereby we signify our obedience, and a Christian holding firmly in his heart the Faith of Christ, hath the same liberty herein with Naaman. Leviathan. C. 42. There are no passages but this, and that one before cited, that in my reading over that Book, I observed to be so extreme bad, as folks ordinarily talk: but this I noted for a Devilish Doctrine, seeing it is offered thus indefinitely; for it is directly contrary to all the Holy Martyr's belief and practice, and the express institution of our Lord, that he that confesses him before men, he will acknowledge, and he that denieth him, he will deny, before his Heavenly Father: Yet if any will be so kind to the old Gentleman as I have been before, to produce some passages otherwhere, that may confine h●s meaning here to such compliances of the Tongue and Knee only, as are required in the impositions of Uniformity, and no other but such, then shall the old Leviathan, and the young Leviathan agree very throughly in their opinion. And why the young one should fall upon his Sire so foully as he hath done, whom above all men being alone of his side, he should have rather endeavoured to excuse, unless out of show only and for a colour, or out of invenility and vanity, he shall for me have the Tripos, or be the eighth man, who can give me a good reason.  
I perceive indeed that two points, (and both of which I have had long in my thoughts) are harled together through the skein of this Prefacers' Discourse, that is the Magistrates Authority in Religion, and the Obligation of human Laws: It will be expedient for me to dispatch the one quite out of my hands (being already done in another Book) to be at liberty to attend the other presently altogether. By what hath been then laid down, it may appear that the right and relation of a Subject to his Sovereign may be held good, when yet there are, it may be, some of his Laws not obeyed. Some Laws there are which a man must rather suffer or die then obey, as the Roman Emperors commanding Sacrifice to their Gods: Some we are to obey out of conscience, such are all the wholesome Laws of a man's Country: Some there are that we obey out of prudence rather than suffer, which yet we do not judge our selves bound to obey for fear of sin, or of God's displeasure. The great question then arises what is that rule, according to which the Laws of men are to be measured, that we may know the kind and the degrees of their obligation. This rule I have advanced in my former Book, and I say that, in matters of Religion the Word of God is the Rule: in Morals the Law of Nature: in Politicals God hath appointed a Rule also as sure, and that is, the common good. The Laws of the Magistrates, as the Sermons of Ministers, do carry God's Authority, and oblige the consciences of the people so far, and so much, and no further, or more, than they are commensurate with their Rule: in the one of the Word: in the other I say of the common good. But who shall be judge whether a Law be for the good of the public or no? I have made it my business to speak to this at large in that Book. Every man must have a judgement of private discretion, to compare the matters which are enjoined him with the Rule, in respect to his own actions: or else he acts as a Bruit, or howsoever he acts, he cannot act out of conscience. Conscience lies in this very point, my knowledge of this or that to have the authority of God, but no human law hath any authority of his any further than it agrees with his Rule. Note here, I do not resolve my obedience, but my obedience out of conscience into my private judgement whether the Law be, or be not, for the common good. And here I must say no more, because I refer you thither, where this is made my proper work: and I find nothing remain (after what you have here and there), that is wanting in my mind, but the satisfying two Objections, as to the main Determination.  
The one of them is this, If the common good be God's rule in Politicals, then how may any Law which is not for the common good be obeyed? We may not obey any command of man against God's rule in Morality, and in Religion. I answer, if a thing be notoriously against the Common good, so as to be destructive to it, we must suffer rather than obey such a command, for this very reason, as we dare not go against God's Word, because it is our rule, and God's rule must be obeyed, and not Mans. But if a thing be but a little against the common good, or no more than that the damage to the public by my obeying, will not be so considerable as my own suffering, then is it for the common good that I obey rather than suffer. And I observe my rule still; For though some things in themselves be against the common good, yet may my obeying them commanded, be for the common good. And this is to be laid down, and supposed that in all ordinary and common matters it is better for all in general, or more for the common good to obey, then to resist or suffer. It is for my good, and the common good I will suppose, that I let the thing alone if I can help it, but if I must suffer if I do it not, the thing must be of great moment or detriment to the public, or else it is for the good of most in general that we obey. It is certainly best if a Master commands any thing that will hurt the affairs of his House, that it be let alone, if the Boy or Man can escape without his anger or beating, and it is better the thing be done that hurts him a little, then that I suffer what hurts me more. This is yet most certain that a Coercive power is the hedge of all Order in any State or Family, which so long as that is kept whole, it is safe, and so far as that is infringed, and that only, it verges to ruin.  
The other may be offered thus. The common good is not the end alone of Government, but the honour of the Magistrate, and the Glory of God are ends also, which are served by our obedience, and therefore we are bound in conscience to the Laws, unless they be against the Law of God, whether they be for the common good or not. I answer, the foundation of this supposition is upon a great mistake in Policy, which is that all Societies are form by Contract between the Governor and Governed, wherein both parties have their interests to secure, which lays the leven of Civil Wars: Whereas if it be placed in the mutual agreement of the people themselves in choosing their Governor and kind of Government, as they judge best for their general advantage, this, supposing it agreed at first to be absolute, secures it for ever being set up, and answers the end of the institution. He is the Minister of God to us for good. I do not like therefore the making any more than one end of Polity, as of Medicine, and Theology. The honour of the Ruler is but part of the bonum commune; and is to be distinguished from it no more than the wealth of the Citizens. The good of one is the good of both. And as I like not the making God's Glory, and Man's Salvation two ends of Divinity, for perplexities that have risen from thence: so do I account that the glorifying God in the common good of the pars imperans & pars subdita, which both make up the Commonwealth, to be one end of Politics: and the Glorifying God in man's Salvations to be the one end of Religion. Let every Art, Science, and Profession be distinguished by its proper Object and End. I must say then after this, the Magistrate is honoured in our subjection always: in obedience, when his commands are for the common good, for conscience sake: when they are not, in our obedience only for fear, and rather than resist: or in taking heed of any contempt or provocation of him, if we leave his commands undone. So I conclude, If any receive the information I have brought him, let him give God the thanks: if any receive it not, the the wrong will be to himself, he shall do me no hurt.   

Sect. 7.  
And thus am I glad that I have had opportunity to say all I had need, and desire, in reference to the subject of my other Book, which the Prefacer hath mingled with the subject of this. I shall now apply myself wholly to the present Theme. The Magistrate's Authority in things Sacred. I will begin as it were to discourse of it afresh, as if I had yet said nothing of it; and there are two Books come out some few years since, which do seem to me to offer something (both in their kind) very remarkable on the subject. The one of them owes its birth to the Author of this Preface, (who hath another also to the same effect), which I shall only name again in my way, (having been too long engaged with him already) as being in an extreme on the one hand, while he gives not only a power to the Magistrate in the Religious matters, which is well, but a power over the conscience in Religious matters: The other has a person of honour, and a worthy Student for its Author, who hath proposed a state of the question with some more mature thoughts, and peculiar notion, which affording me a ground work, for further disquisition, hath given me both the rise and ability to carry the point on to a full Determination. And this Gentleman I count hath given too little to the Magistrate on the other hand in the matters of Religion, but hath gone to make it up with giving him too much in Moral and Civil matters. I must be forced to tell this to my ordinary Reader, who else would perhaps hardly believe that it is I, who stand for Liberty of Conscience, that grant the Magistrate his due power in things Sacred as well as Civil: and it is he, is not tender enough of it, when denying him what is his due (the use of his Sword or power) in things Religious, he hath left him without a rule or bounds to his commands in other matters. If I appear to drive on my purpose in this, and other of my Books more dryly and scantily, then in a Subject or Subjects so capacious might be expectted, let not the Judicious Reader impute that to me as a fault, which is a thing so much to be wished in the writings of others, that I do single out the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the main thing altogether which is to be sought, and I do by no means deflect from it, leaving whatsoever else the matter may lead to, as more copious, and where none of the knot lies, to the Volumes of others.   

Sect. 8.  
The first of these Books then, is, A Discourse of Ecclesiastical Polity, the design whereof, as to the substance, consists in the giving a Superiority to the Magistrate over the Conscience, that in all doubtful or disputable cases, viz. in all matters in their nature indifferent (he means according to his Scope, in all matters now in difference between the Conformist, and Nonconformist) a man must account according to that Author's opinion, that if he act against the dictates of his conscience, out of obedience to the lawful Magistrates commands, he does but as a Christian, and is justified by him in the doing. A Doctrine that I take to be not only new and Heterodox, but dangerous to Religion, and the opening a door to the pleasing of man and seeking preferment, above keeping a good conscience before God. In things apparently and intrinsically evil, he grants that the Magistrate is not to be obeyed. But how can this stand on its foundation, if conscience had not certainly an authority over the commands of the Magistrate, and the authority of the Magistrate not over conscience, as he speaks? There need no more proof that conscience must have the superiority in every thing, then to yield it in any thing, seeing it is the conscience of every particular person is the judge to him of what God has forbidden; and the command of God must take place of the command of men in all things alike whatsoever. If this eminently accomplished young Divine then be not too proud to take it kindly, I would help him out here, according to the best that I think can be done. There is the conscience of the universality: and of particular persons. When he says, the Magistrates Authority is over the conscience, let us understand his meaning to be only as to the conscience of such particulars, which in some sense may be granted, while he passes any Law upon the account that it is according to the consciences of the Generality, notwithstanding it proves against theirs. And then whereas he speaks often to this purpose, that the conscience being in doubt, a man should in all matters indifferent make the Law, or will of the Magistrate his rule; Let us understand him favourably, that he means only when a man is satisfied in the main of the thing that it is lawful, and there remains only some scruples that are fit to be shaken off; in which case Divines I think do ordinarily advise it to be safest to obey the Law. But this is to be known also, that the conscience is not to be accounted doubtful in this case, but satisfied; and troubled only as the Traveller is with the Scrupuli the gravel in his Shoe, which he throws out and walks on; whereas if his feet be really wounded, and he does so, he may be undone. That this may be the better relished, I will entreat this person to take good heed, only to a certain Book, which is another such a one as his, and came out then, and I suppose he likes well, a Book entitled Toleration discussed, where he may read these passages for his instruction; Am I to believe every thing to be indifferent, which the Magistrate tells me is so, though it be wicked? No, he answers, (Sect. 21.) You are bound there by a Superior Law, and to yourself you are Judge. Again, I am so far (in another place) from advising you to renounce your reason, that on the contrary, I would have you absolutely guided and concluded by it: and only to obey for quiets sake, so far as you can possibly obey in conscience. Again, The Magistrate is a public Minister, and his Commission reaches not to particular consciences. On the other side, there is as little reason for any ones private opinion to operate on a public Law. So that if I mistake not, we are upon accord thus far, That every particular is to look to one, and the King to the whole. Again, The King is accountable to God for the welfare of his people, and you are accountable to God for the good of your little particular. If you cannot obey the Law, do not, but abide the penalty. And finally, when he hath balanced all the interest he can for the Law, with this alone of Conscience, he hath the same close. And yet I say stick to your conscience. I do cite these passages with pleasure, to see a reverence to conscience in the heart of the Gentleman who wrote that Book, and that merely out of conviction, when the Divine who wrote this Discourse of Ecclesiastical polity hath so carried it, as if in the whole matters which are now in agitation between all parties in the Nation, the Magistrates Authority alone should satisfy every body. When the Dictates of a private conscience (says he) happen to thwart the determinations of the public Laws, they in that case lose their binding power, with several passages to that purpose, which is certainly a fair beginning (as is intimated) for the making the Ruler's favour, and a man's own advancement, very quickly all his Religion. The Magistrate then (which I offer, as what himself, and this Gentleman intends) in the passing any Law, the matter whereof is against any of his Subjects consciences, is to be conceived to go by a Judgement on the Generality, and those Laws to be supposed according to conscience, because they are according to his own, and those of the generality, when else they could not be passed without sinning against God. In the mean time every particular man for himself is to obey only with subordination to his conscience, and is not to have Ghostly encouragement, to go against the Dictates of it, upon any score. Which as it may serve for the information of the Divine, who will receive it perhaps from such a hand, when he would not else from mine; so may it give me occasion to ask the Gentleman two questions: The one is, what if any such things should again come to be put in a Bill at the House, which the King does believe really is against the conscience of the Generality, or of such a particular number at least, as is fit and necessary for him to take cognezance of them? Can he pass such a Bill in point of conscience? The other than follows, whether the pressing this Nation in the main to Conformity, is not really such a thing at this season, when the generality are so divided in their opinions? I require here no more candour in the Gentleman then what he hath shown in that last work. Who as I found him a lover of learning and reading in these present debauched times, should not escape my praise (notwithstanding others odium) for his industry and sufficiency, (especially as one of the Laity) if the design of his writings had been but as commendable as the example.   

Sect. 9  
The other Book is, those papers entitled Liberty of Conscience, which are of another complexion, and moulded with no less ingenuity of matter, than the other in expression. I am very well satisfied with the fullness, aptness, and conviction of the arguments for that Liberty I read there: nevertheless I do apprehend the main state of the very point, does require farther ventilation. If I do provoke that Learned and excellingly worthy person by this means to write again on this Subject, I shall (I think) do the World some service, and perhaps bring more light to my own understanding.  
The substance of the whole in his stating this business, I take it comes to this; The Magistrate is the Officer of God to see his will executed, which un●er the Gospel he must do in that manner God hath appointed▪ and therefore he must not use the Temporal Sword in the concerns of Religion. In this Position thus ●aid down, I must confess I judge there are some clouds, but not without Truth under them. The clouds are to be removed, the truth maintained, and that liberty which is irrefragable to the conscience, must not be lost.  
In the first place therefore, There is a distinction among Divines, which is the foundation this Gentleman goes upon, that he hath drawn beyond the Staple. This distinction, if you consult their common places on that Head De Magistratu, you shall find made by these two questions: Whether the Magistrate is to take care of Religion? Whether he is to compel his Subjects to it? And when the former generally is granted, the latter is denied. This studious, person, it is like, meeting with this hint in some of his Books, hath suffered a deception into these thoughts, that the Magistrate therefore hath indeed something to do about Religion, but he is not to use his Sword about it. For the making his conceptions out, after he hath ingenuously offered three opinions as extremes, in some that make the Magistrate the sole judge of all matters Spiritual and Temporal: in others that affirm the like power but to be exercised in Spirituals, in a perfect subserviency to the Clergy: in a third that make him have nothing to do but in civil matters only, he does endeavour to find himself a middle way, wherein the Magistrate shall have his something to do (a he speaks), and not all to do in these matters, & then offering his notion of what has something he hath to do, is, which is to be the great Officer or Minister of God upon Earth to see his will, which in Religion be accounts only what he hath revealed to be put in executive, he does put in for the rescuing that Liberty, which he would assert for the Conscience, that under the Gospel he must do this▪ in the manner also that Christ hath appointed, and so not by the temporal Sword. A great mistake! The office itself of the Magistrate is to bear the Sword, and by that to act or effect what it has to do. Where a person hath no power of Coercion, he acts not as a Magistrate, but as another man, and to say he may not use his Sword in the concerns of the Gospel, is all one as to deny him any Authority any care, any concernment about Religion at all. The Sword says Bracton does signify potestatem Regni, and this must be laid down for a truth undeniable, that unto whatsoever the Power or Government of the Magistrate extends, his Sword must. What he can command, he may compel: and where he cannot compel he cannot command. It is in vain (I mean) to talk of rule, if he have not power to punish when his command is not fulfilled. The meaning then of our Divines by their distinction at first, is, that Faith indeed cannot be constrained, and so men are not to be driven into Religion by force, but yet that the care which the Magistrate is to have, for maintaining the true Religion being received, is Authoratative, and to be managed, not precario, but by his Sword, is with them also out of question.  
In the second place, Here is a difference seems to be put between the Law and the Gospel, as to the Magistrates seeing Gods will executed in the manner he hath appointed: whereas that manner God hath appointed in seeing his will performed, is only that his Officer should act agreeably to the light of nature, or right reason, in applying such means as are proper to that end, whether under the Law or Gospel. For magistracy itself, and the manner of its actings both, so far as concerns God's appointment, we are to consider does derive from Nature, and not from Positive Institution. By the manner which Christ hath appointed under the Gospel, he must either mean something in opposition to the use of the Sword: or not in opposition to it. If something in opposition, it must be as much as if he had said that the Magistrate must see Christ's will executed by some other way then the use of his Sword, whereas there is no other way or manner quâ Migistrate, he can see any thing done. The use of his Sword is nothing but the using his Authority or Office, which I have said just now, and that he cannot act as a Magistrate any otherwise. If he mean something not in opposition hereunto, then cannot his consequence be valid, that the Magistrate must see Christ's will done, only in the manner he hath appointed, and therefore not by the use of his Sword, seeing the causing it to be done in Christ manner, and the use of the Sword will stand together. And what is it then indeed he means by this manner Christ hath appointed? I turn to his Book and apprehend by this manner he understands nothing but by the means and Ordinances Christ hath appointed. The people are to be brought into Christianity and obey the Gospel, but it must be by preaching, and the use of the like means; for Faith comes by hearing, and by force a man cannot be made to believe. Well now the Magistrate is to s●e the means Christ hath appointed to be used for the setting up the Christian Religion, therefore he must not use his Sword to the end. I answer the direct contrary does follow, therefore he may use it, seeing by his Sword or Authority it is that he must cause these means to be administered. It is true the will of Christ is that the people believe in him, and obey him, but it is not his will that they should believe in him without the use of the means. How can we believe without a Preacher? when the Magistrate then here is to see his will executed, the meaning is, he is to see the means used, that the people may be brought to believe and obey him, and to this purpose he may and must use his Sword, if there be occasion for it. He may and must punish the Minister and others, if they neglect to do their Officer.  
In the third place, this position seems to put a difference between the matter of Religion and other matters, in reference to the consequence inferred; viz. as if the Magistrate acting in seeing Gods will executed in no other manner than God does approve, must not use the Temporal Sword in Religious, when he may in other matters: whereas there is a difference indeed to be put between Things and Things upon this account (for some things come not within the Verge hereof, and some do), but these Things and Things are not rightly stated Religious and Civil matters. This cloud doubtless arises from hence. In regard that in matters of Religion the Conscience is supposed to be concerned, when it is not ordinarily in other things, therefore are Religious matters conceived as reciprocal here with the whole matter of conscience, wherein indeed the distinction does lie, which is to be made in opposition to other matters.  
The fourth cloud is upon the consequence itself. It follows not from the Magistrate acting in no other manner than God approves in the seeing his will performed, 〈…〉 ●ot use his Sword in the concerns of Religion. The King of Ninive Decrees a fast in honour to the true God, not be neglected we may be sure without punishment by any. Nebuchadnezar Decrees that no body speak amiss of the Jews God, under the pain of being cut in pieces. Attaxerxes gives Commission to Ezra, that whosoever would not obey the Law of his God, judgement should be executed, whether unto death, or unto banishment, or to confiscation of goods, or to imprisonment. Indeed these Princes being Heathen, who believed more Gods than their own, are not to be conceived to decree any thing hereby against their proper Religion, or the consciences of of the people upon whom this is imposed: but for the use of Sword, in the matter of Religion, as in other matters it is express in these instances, to pass by what may be heaped hither from the Kings of Judah.  
The last cloud or clouds than follow, that having had difference made there where it needs not, we have indeed no difference made there where it needs. For besides that when the Magistrate is said to be God's Minister to see his will in general to be executed, it ought to be laid down with restriction to men's outward acts only, and a salvo to his power constitutive of duty in indifferent things, there are moreover these two Distinctions mainly lacking for the determining this matter; and which are the groundwork of the whole Exercitation.  
The one is, that whether things be Religious or Secular, under the Gospel or under the Law, we must distinguish between those outward acts which are against men's consciences, and those that are not against them. This is the chief thing to be held fast. In such acts which are against men's consciences, it is true, and a vehement truth, the Magistrate acting in that manner, God hath appointed cannot use his Temporal Sword. It is not agreeable to the Law of Nature, or rule of human reason, to work upon the conscience with outward force, and the manner God hath appointed the Magistrate to act in (as was said even now) is no other but to act agreeable hereunto. Yet is not the reason for this, upon on which I choose to stand here, so much, from the manner wherein the Magistrate is to act (lest that alone be to infirm to bear the stress is laid upon it): as from the matter he is to see done. That which he is to see performed is God's will, and I say that those acts; (these outward acts he were otherwise to see done) which are against men's consciences, are the matter of his forbidden will; and so must he let them alone; But as for all other outward acts of men, which are not against their consciences, Let the Magistrate see that what he requires be for the good of his people, either for their Spiritual or Temporal good, (as whatsoever he requires, which is not against God's Law, we may conceive like to be), and whether they be Religious or Civil, he is under the Gospel as well as under the Law, God's Minister, and beareth not the Sword in vain.  
The other, distinction which must not be forgotten does lie in the difference, I put between a forcing men to that which is against their consciences: and restraining them sometimes from that which they think they are bound to do. The one of these may be lawful, fit, reasonable, and without which the Government itself can hardly be secured: when the other is never to be held so, upon that one reason mentioned, and is irrefragable. Here then are two Questions in those ingenuous Papers, proposed to the life, as the sum of what could be desired if they had but been directly answered when proposed: The one is, How far men must be suffered to do those things which they say they are in conscience obliged to do? The other 〈◊〉, How far they may be commanded and enforced to do such things, which they indeed believe and say they are in conscience obliged not to do? The substance of th●se Questions the Gentleman I perceive took to be one, and so passes them off. But as the putting a difference (I account before) as to some things which (in relation to what is asserted) admits none: so must the confounding that here, wherein the difference bring put is so much to purpose, needs lead him into darkness. To these two questions therefore I answer, instead of those Papers.  
As to the former, which is the case only of restraint, I doubt not but men may and aught to be restrained often times in many things, unto which they think themselves to be obliged, and that for this reason: Because that although God does require every man to act in whatsoever he does according to his conscience, yet he requires not in every thing that is according to his conscience, he should act. His conscience may be Erroneous, or the thing not expedient, if lawful to be done. Again, the Magistrates conscience and his are two; He may think he is bound in conscience to act (suppose in preaching seditious Doctrine), yet if upon restraint he acts not, his conscience cannot accuse him of sin, because he cannot help it, and the Magistrates restraining him is good, and thereupon the does it, for avoiding the evil that would follow if he should suffer him.  
As to the latter question, which is the case of constraint, viz. the constraining of men to do any thing which is against their conscience, I say the Magistrate hath in that case no Authority, and that for this one reason, which is to be insisted on to the last breach of these Papers, viz because, this is manifestly against his Office or work, who being to see Gods Will performed, does hereby directly endeavour the contrary. His will is the man should never act against his conscience whatsoever comes of it, & he is forcing him hereunto. Let me add, Either the conscience of a man is in an error: or it is in the right; If it err not, a man's conscience is as God to him, who can say a word against it? If it be erroneous, I say God's will lies in both these things: that a man should not do against his conscience, because it is his conscience: and that he should not do according to his conscience, because it errs, but that he should lay down his error, and so act. And this is the meaning of that which Divines do say, that such a conscience does ligare not obligare. The Magistrate accordingly may not compel him to that which is positive to act against his conscience: but to that which is negative, viz. not to act according to it: and if he do, and do wickedly, no doubt but he may punish him for it. And so having offered you my Determination, I am glad I can confirm it and that with two testimonies likewise, most of sufficient credit. The one is St. Austin in his second Book, and Chapter 83. against Petilian, who pleading the unlawfulness of compelling them to Religion, Austin answers: Ad fidem quidem nullus est cogendus invitus, sed per severitatem solet perfidia castigari: Si quae erga vos leges constitutae sunt, non eis benefacere cogimini, sed malefacere prohibemini; nam benefacere nemo potest nisi elegerit. The other is Grotius, who letting nothing almost escape him, which is momen● us in any Author, hath fallen in upon this very quotation. Suspenso pede hic incedendum, ut illi qui Divinae Humanaeque ordinationi resistant, non tam cegantur benefacere, quam malefacere prohibeantur; Quae duo in hoc ipso argumento Augustinus olim provide distinxit. De Imperio summarum potestatum circa Sacra. C. 6. S. 10.  
There are two Notes I must leave farther; The one is that when I have laid down my two distinctions for the determining this point, you must take beed of going away with one of them. I know S. Augustins' seventeenth Chapter in his second Book against the second Epistle of Gaudentius, hath this Title, quod ad veritatem cogendi sint etiam inviti, which he makes good with these two instances, of the King of Ninives commanding his people to repent: and the Servants compelling them to come in to the Feast under the Gospel. But neither of these Commands I hope (and as I have said) are to be supposed against the consciences of the one or the other, but only they were unwilling and negligent, and so had need of importunity and enforcement. I deny not therefore but the Magistrate hath power (N.B.) of Constraint and Restraint in the matters of Religion: but I say he hath not power of Constraint in matters Religious (or other matters) which are against a man's conscience. The other Note is, that when I have distinguished between Restraint and Constraint in the matter of Conscience▪ (not in the general matters only of Religion), it does not seem to me safe to descend to particulars, what is, and what is not to be restrained: but in general the Magistrate may use a due restraint when he hath reason, and it is not fit he should restrain any when he hath none. There is reason the Magistrate should restrain a John of Leyden, and Knipperdoling, when he hath indeed none against a peaceable Owen, and honest Kiffin. The Roman Emperor may have cause in general to take heed of innovation, and yet have no cause to disturb the Christian, of whom Pliny wrote to Traian. By this means shall it not follow either that Christianity should be ever kept out of the World, or that when Religion is established, it must be overturned again by faction: but that such a liberty only be allowed to conscience, as is consistent with the Articles of Faith, a good Life, and the Government of the Nation.   

SECT. 10.  
Suppose we now then a Magistrate desirous to bring his People to a Religion, or to a Uniformity in that way of worship he himself best approves; What may he do therein? The first thing he may and is to do, is doubtless to take care that the people have Instruction; that the Word be preached, and such means used which are proper to convince their understandings, and satisfy their consciences, that they may submit to it. This is the chief I count he is to do. In the next place he may and is to cause all those impediments to be removed, which may obstruct them in the reception of this Religion. So Cyrus by his authority repressed the Jews enemies, and made the way open for their return, and rebuilding Jerusalem. In the last place, the Magistrate may tender all the encouragements and advantages (with a restraint of the same to the refusers) that he can possible, to win them over to the way he conceives good for them. When he hath gone thus far he must make a stand, and consider in good earnest whether that which he would impose, be against their Consciences or no. If it be not he may proceed to lay his Injunctions upon them; whereby an obligation does fall upon the conscience (supposing the thing reasonable, and for the common good) to do what his will is; and if they do it not hereupon, he may by the infliction of punishment (that is by his Temporal Sword) enforce them to a due obedience: In sum, He may do all and the very same in the concerns of Religion, as he may do in the other concerns of his Kingdom, upon that supposition.  
But if it be against their Consciences, he can proceed no farther. He cannot lay any obligation on the Conscience, which is contrary to that wherein it stands bound already; and where he can lay no obligation on the conscience, he cannot ex imperio command; and where he cannot command and oblige the Conscience (as human law does bind it, which how, and how far it does, is stated in my other book), he cannot justly punish the man for not doing that which he was not bound to do. So that we see here where the Magistrate must not use his Sword, even while he is using it, and acts not as a Magistrate but by it. He acts by his authority or sword, in seeing the means used, helps administered, obstacles removed. He can, and may force others (whose duty it is) not to be wanting in this, when he cannot then enforce the end to which he causes these means to be used. He cannot (I mean, he ought not) punish any man only because his Conscience is not wrought upon by the means which he has used, and so does not what he would have him. In this case, it is not he, or the man either can help it, and he may as well beat his Dog for not whistling.  
Upon this account, there is very good reason that regard be had so much the more to things that are not attainable without supernatural help, that they be not enforced as other things. So that we are to understand well after this, that the distinctions between the Religious and Secullar things, in reference to the Magistrates Authority, or using his Sword, is for all what is before said, to be held so far as it will reach: but that is only to a majus & minus of his Care, not to the specification of the state of our business. My meaning is, that in things not Religious, but Moral only, or Civil, the Magistrate is more free as to his commands, and using his Sword than in matters of Religion; or he is to take more care of what he imposes in the one, than he need to do in the other: but that will not advance to the stating the point hereupon, that he hath Authority, and may use his Sword in Civil and not in Sacred concerments. The King under the Law was to have the Book of God by him to this end, that he might govern the people according to it, and consequently use his Authority in the things of Religion: And so Jehoshaphat (to name no other) appoints his Officers for the doing justice in the matters of God, as in the King's matters.  
This Proposition, The Magistrate may use his Sword in Civil, but not in Religious affairs, is not a true Proposition, and therefore can determine nothing. And this Proposition, The Magistrate is to take more heed how he uses his Sword in supernatural, than in natural or civil concerns, is a true Proposition, but not a sufficient determination. The main Question still remains. What are those things wherein the Magistrate indeed hath no power, or may not use his Sword? Upon the knowledge of this must the stating the business depend; for when we know in what things he may, and in what he may not use his Authority, the matter is at an end. Here are we now therefore to think upon it, what are those reasons, why the Magistrate is to be more careful in the use of his power in Religious than in other matters, and if it be any where, it is like to be there that we shall find a bottom to determine the main issue. To know these reasons, look whatsoever difference there are to be made between Religious and Civil matters in respect to the Magistrates using his Sword about them, and they must be these reasons.  
The first difference then between Religious and Civil things, that may be offerred as a reason why the Magistrate is to take more care of using his Sword in the one than the other, is, That Religious things are supposed to be of supernatural Revelation, which cannot therefore be known and done without God's grace, and it is not fit the Magistrate should punish a man for the want of that which God does not give him: When in Moral and Civil things he hath the knowledge of them only by Nature, and the practice of the Realm. Now than if this will serve to determine the Question, the Proposition drawn from it must be this: That in all matters that are of supernatural Revelation, the Magistrate may not use his Sword, but in all other he may use it. But this Proposition is alike false with the first, That in all Religious he may not, and in all Civil he may. The Law given by Moses was by Revelation, but the Magistrates might punish the breakers of that Law. The Gospel is by Revelation, but the Magistrate may punish those that keep from Church out of Irreligion. The example of the man that was put to death for gathering Sticks on the Sabbath, is a precedent , that a man may be punished for his Presumption, when he may not for his Conscience, in the matters of Religion.  
The second difference between Sacred and Civil affairs, which may be another reason why the Magistrate is to take more heed as to the one than to the other, is, That the World cannot be governed without the exercise of his Authority in Civils, when if the world were without all that which is of supernatural Revelation (and consequently, if he meddles not at all with those things) it might. It appears then reasonable, that in what the government of the World can be without, the Magistrate should not be so pressing, when in that which it cannot subsist without, he must. Let us then again draw out what is here, and try if it will do. In matters which the world may be governed without, the Magistrate must not use his Sword; but in matters without which it cannot be governed, he may. This Proposition labours with the same failing: for, the Magistrate may use his Authority in things which the world may be governed if it were without, because he can use it in religious matters, as hath been instanced already from Scripture.  
A third difference between Sacred and Civil things; and which is a reason, why the Magistrate is to be more careful of his injunctions, and using his Sword in the one above the other, is, Because it is more like that the things he imposes in Religious concerns should be against men's consciences, than in Civil or Moral matters, and the Magistrate hath no Authority over the Conscience of any. It is the commandment of the most High, that no man should ever do any thing against his Conscience, and the Magistrate cannot use his Authority, but for God. Now let us see if this at last will serve for the determining the question, and if it will, then must this proposition be true. That in all matters that are against men's Consciences the Magistrate hath no authority, and cannot use his Sword; but in all matters that are not against their Consciences, or that are according to them, he may use it. And this proposition I count is true and certain, and to be maintained even in Religious and Civil matters; and so is the foundation concluded upon by me to establish our Determination.   

SECT. 11.  
There is one thing yet seems wanting: I do speak here to one branch of the main position as false, while in things Religious, though they could not be known but by Revelation, and the world could be governed without them, I affirm the Magistrate hath authority, and may use his Sword, as he may in other matters; that is, provided they be not against men's Consciences. But as to the other branch, in things Civil and and Moral, which men may know by natural light, and in which the Government is more concerned, I have not said whether it be true or false. I will proceed therefore and declare, that as the Position laid down at first, or the worthy maintainer of it, goes too low in denying the Magistrate the use of his sword in Religious things, which is to be granted (I count) herein as in other matters, to wit, upon supposition of both to be not against, but according to their Consciences: So does he go too high in yielding it in Civils, without the same limitation, whereof we must be still as tender as of our Eye, or of our Salvation. I do think also, of the two, the last is the more dangerous extremity.  
I argue then, If the Magistrate may not use force, or the temporal Sword in Religious affairs, because such things are of that nature as the Conscience is like to be concered in them; and if it be against their Conscience it is unlawful: then when the Conscience likewise is concerned in Civil things, he may not use the Sword neither. For if the ground be good in the one, it must be good in the other; if it will not hold in both, it may be denied in either. Again, the things perhaps are Civil things, but the man, or men, makes a Conscience of them, and so the case must be the same to them, as if it were in Religion. To make a conscience of a thing is to look upon it as commanded or forbidden of God, and to go about to perform or avoid it upon that account. But to do or leave a thing undone upon the account of the command or prohibition of God, is an act of Religion. Consequently though the thing be Civil, yet so long as a person, or persons, make a consciscience of it, it is all one to them, I say, as if the things were religious, and the authority of the Magistrate can be no more in the one than the other.  
I will propose some instances. Doeg accuses the Priests to Saul. He hears their cause, condemns them as Traitors; commands his Servants to do execution upon them, they refuse the execution; It is against their Consciences. Saul here hath no authority over those Servants in this case either to command them to act, or to punish them for not acting against their Consciences. If they obey him they sin against God. Saul might urge here the thing was of Civil concern, and if all should do as they did, that is, question the Judge's sentence, and refuse to execute it upon pretence of conscience, the Government could not stand; yet this wont serve, they must not act against their Consciences for all that. If he falls upon them for it, they must bear it; but it will be tyranny over them, and injury to Heaven; the superiority of whose authority over his, being the thing in effect they asserted, by that refusal. You may say, this is an instance indeed in Civil things, wherein the Magistrate had not authority; and consequently when Civil things are imposed against a man's Conscience, the case is the same as in Religious. But you will add, the Consciences of these men was in the right, and you would have some instance in Civil things where the Conscience is erroneous. I will offer you therefore other instances. A Garrison under Scanderbag is besieged by the Turks, it has but one Well in it, a Traitor throws in a dead Carrion. The Soldiers are under a superstition that the water hereupon is unclean, and that they cannot drink it without sin. Rather than do so they yield the place, otherwise impregnable. This instance I once used elsewhere on another occasion. let me offer you one more authentic out of the Maccabees. The Jews are of the general persuasion that they may not fight on the Sabbath. Their enemies come upon them on that day on purpose; rather than act against their Consciences they suffer themselves all to be slain. I will ask now upon this persuasion of these men that the doing these necessary things, as drinking that water, and defending themselves was sin, whether the Captains of those Soldiers could command them to drink, or to fight and force them to it? Nothing can be pleaded of more moment in any case. The whole Government and their lives depend on it, and the light of nature might teach them that necessity should take place of their superstition. Nevertheless until they had consulted the thing and their Consciences were satisfied of the lawfulness of it; that is until they came to find out the substance of what Christ afterward revealed, That man was not made for the Sabbath, but the Sabbath for man, There was no Captain or Governor (I suppose) could have power to command them, or force them in the case. I will descend to an instance frequent in the present Nation. It is a Civil thing for any of the King's Courts to grant a Writ for a man to come, and give his testimony by Oath to any Cause that is before them. I will suppose now that some, and that many, have received the impression, that it is unlawful for them to Swear at all, and thereupon they refuse to Swear. It may be urged in this case, what a civilly evil opinion this is, which is both destructive to the Government (in the Administration), and injurious to particular persons, who may be undone in their Estates for want of such an Oath. Nevertheless there are many of the Quakers ready to go to prison themselves, and lose all their own Estates; and we may suppose their Lives, rather than they will be induced to swear. I ask, What will you say now to this case? Hath the Magistrate power over these men's Consciences? If he hath, he may command them to judge, otherwise than they do, and punish them that they act according to this judgement. And if he can command and use his Sword upon them, to make them swear, he may, to make them come to Church; and if he was a Papist Magistrate, to come to Mass; and if a heathen Magistrate, to sacrifice to Idols. If he have not power over their Consciences, and to command them to have other judgements, then must he let them alone (as generally our Justices have done), or challenge an authority to make men act against their Consciences, which is to use the power which he hath from God, against him. If you think there is here some difference between such cases as these, and that of the Maccabees before, it matters little: But if you make none between them, but say the Commanders of those Jews, and those Soldiers, might have compelled them in those cases; I say, if any of them could, they ought; and they should not have been said then to die in their innocency. I say again, if they might, then can a Magistrate command and force a man to act against his conscience; then can he command him to sin; then can he command what God has forbidden; then must man be above God. The earth itself methinks can as soon be moved, as this foundation.   

SECT. 12.  
What shall we say then to these things? Shall we complain that God Almighty hath put in man such a sturdy thing as Conscience is, which makes him so often to become refractory to the commandments of his Superiors, whensoever they do but require any thing against it? No, there is good reason, God should maintain to himself an Authority above any mortal in the earth, and that his name should be glorified by his servants, in the confession of it to be world. Or shall we complain of Government, desiring to be rid of it, as that which is so uneasy to our Consciences, that we cannot hardly serve God, but we must disobey man, and incur danger about it? Shall we rise up therefore in rebellion, and acquit ourselves? God forbidden! It is the will of Heaven who hath put into the heart of man an awe to his invisible being as our supreme Lord, to constitute the Magistrate to bear his Image and representation in the earth, that in his person, himself may be honoured, so long as we obey only with subordination to his will, and the common good, which is the end of his appointment. If neither of these, what then? Shall we be even content in this state of corruption and imperfection, when the Fall hath brought so much difficulty upon all things else, as well as Government, to offer the best composition we can between the duty the Magistrate owes to God and his people, and the obedience the people own to him and their consciences; so that we may not put off any truth which stands irrefragable by the pleading inconvenience, when these inconveniences are by prudence to be prevented, and if we do it but as well as we can, that is, as the state of man's corruption, or human frailty and infirmity will allow, it suffices, and the rest must be born. Shall we agree upon this? if we shall, I have but a little more to say hereunto, and I have done.  
The Office of the Magistrate is to make the Laws, and to see to the execution. In all things as well Religious, I have said as Civil, which are for the people's good, he may pass, and execute any Laws, so long as they be agreeable to the Word of God, and men's Consciences; but he can command or enforce nothing which is against men's Consciences. This is delivered already. Those things now which are against men's Consciences (let us consider in the last place, which hath been intimated also from one or two occasions before) are either such as are against the Universality, or against so many of their Consciences as the Magistrate is to take Cognizance of them: or, against the Consciences only of so few as is not meet for him to take cognizance of them. In the first case he is not to pass such a Law I count upon any terms; if he do, he sins against his Charge, and he hath no authority to sin himself, or cause any to sin. In the second, we may suppose that the Consciences of a few particular persons only are not sufficient to put an obstruction to any law really good for the Community, but it is to be accounted for the universalities sake, to be according to the subjects Consciences, and not against them. But when I have said thus as to the passing of the Law, I must say also that in the execution of such Laws, I hold that even those particular persons ought to be regarded. In order hereunto,  
There are some that pretend conscience of a thing, when indeed they make none of it. Understand not this so, as if all that could not give a reason sufficient for what they hold, did not make a conscience of it (which hath cause a great prejudice and false reckoning of this business); but when they believe not the thing really in their heart to be so as they pretend.  
When men pretend they make a Conscience of a thing, and indeed do not, I would have the Magistrate above all men to execute the Law upon such, (supposing they judge that Law righteous), and make them an example. If you will say, But how shall a Magistrate know this, seeing no man can judge of another's heart, I acknowledge readily this is a difficulty, and the chief thing which requires the Magistrate's prudence and faithfulness: Yet this I say, That every man for all that being judge of his own acts, and the punishing of forbearing a person being what the Magistrate does, he must go, and can but go, according to his judgement. He uses the Mediums as a wise man does, and lawfully may take his conjecture (the tree is known by his fruit), and it is not necessary it should be certain, but only that it be certain he so judges, and if he be convinced in his Soul, and indeed judges the man's profession only to be pretence, it is his own judgement, and nothing else can determine him. Although where the person is serious in what he declares, and not under any public note of perfidiousness, the rule of Charity, which hopeth all things, and believeth all things, and thinketh no evil, must incline him to the best construction.  
When men do truly make the conscience they pretend, let the Justice take heed, and see that he likewise reverence Conscience, no less than they do. If the penalty be such only as the man is like to endure it without scruple, rather than do that which is against his Conscience, the Magistrate may be the bolder in executing that Law upon him: But if it be such as he is like rather to do the thing against his Conscience than suffer it, I would not be that Magistrate who should put such a Law in execution upon any. In the mean time every particular man for himself is to look to his Conscience as his Judge in the business of his Soul, and account that authority void to him whatsoever it be, that commands any thing contrary to what that dictates. And the supreme Authority is to conceive that those that act under it will use prudence upon that account. Which prudence I fear me really in this case can hardly be Christian but it must come to this, That either they must totally forbear, and not so much as threaten prosecution of the Law upon such a person: or else persuade him first to resolution, to bear the penalty, and not do the thing against his conscience. They must in effect say thus to the man, If this thing be against your Conscience we advise you not to it. If our prosecuting the Law upon you will make you do it rather than suffer, we dare not prosecute you to destroy your Soul: but if you will for the sake of the general commodity, or good example, bear the punishment rather than do the thing, and we be assured of it, then can we do our office without hazard, either of yours, or our own damnation.   

SECT. 13.  
After this, I begin to think what does hinder, but that this worthy Knight my friend and I should reconcile? As for the main business, we hold together against any that shall oppose us, That in all matters of Religion, the Magistrate may not use his Sword to force any against their Consciences; and so long as we agree in the main, we may have leave to abound each in his own sense otherwise. The difference than we have under this agreement does I suppose lie in two things. The one is, That in things Religious this Gentleman seems to deny the Magistrate the use of his Sword altogether, and I deny it him not, but merely when such things are against men's Consciences. And herein methinks he should come over to me, for seeing Liberty of Conscience is the thing mainly he is engaged for, in the denial of the Magistrate the use of his Sword in these things, there is no need he should deny it at all when Conscience is not concerned in them. The other is that in Civil things he grants the Magistrate the use of his Sword, as over liberally as he takes it away in Religious; whereas I suppose that as long as there is still the same reason, that is, so long as the thing is against a man's conscience the Magistrate may not force any one to it, whether it be Civil or Religious. And herein indeed should I be as ready to come over to him, who knows how prudent it must seem in standing for Liberty, to confine it to things of Supernatural Revelation, lest the Magistrate be offended if we touch on Civils: but that if I did so, I must really forsake the Patronage of Conscience, which I am not willing myself, nor that this Gentleman should do. For if we grant once that Conscience may be forced in any one thing, there may be the same or the like reason urged to force it in another, and so in all, and then here liberty is gone. If we will not stand by her in all distresses, we cannot defend her in any. The ground of all's is, Conscience is a thing which can be ruled by none but the Almighty. And for as much as all Authority or power resolved into its original, is, the will of God that such a one should command, it seems not a thing consonant to reason to suppose it the will of God that a Superior should require that of a person, which it is his will that person should not do.  
Things then which are Civil may be so in themselves, and yet come under some consideration which is religious, or may have Religion incidental to them. If this worthy Gentleman be content to hold that in things Civil under every consideration that is but civil, the Magistrate may use his Sword without scruple, I yield to him: but if a thing secular does come under a consideration which is religious, and in that consideration is against a man's Conscience, I cannot conceive, but that the case is the same here as if the matter were itself Religious. For whatsoever the thing be, in that respect, as he makes a Conscience of it, I have said before, it is a point of Religion to him.  
The Fifth-Monarchy-man thinks in his Conscience, he may not pay Taxes. A strange opinion! Against Scripture, Sense, and Righteousness: Yet if you ask the man his reason, he will bring you a Text perhaps out of Daniel or the Revelations, and the sum of all will come to this, that if he does, he thinks verily he shall receive the mark of the Beast, and be cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, and rather than venture that, he will choose to suffer, though it were death. I count this man now as one in a Fever, that is, touched in his head, and who can help such a conceit? his opinion is grounded on the Revelation, and we agree, that in matters of supernatural Revelation, the Magistrate may not force any against their Consciences. What then shall he do? I answer, In this case, and the like as this is, it is the management only of the Laws with prudence, will decide such difficulties. It is against the man's Conscience, voluntarily to pay his Tax, it will wound his Soul if he does: but it is not against his Conscience, nor will it wound him, that he is assessed, and that the Officer comes, and distrains, and pays himself. So long as he bears his testimony by a nonpayment, he is willing to have the money taken by force. And thus does the Officer do right, for the Law is, he shall pay, or be distrained: and the man keeps his Conscience, and no hurt is done. But if a Magistrate would not be content here, unless the man pays his money in specie, and by way of acknowledging his Authority from God, or else he will hang him, or burn him, I have not a heart so hard to justify any such rigour, which appears more than needs. Unto this instance, no doubt but we may suppose many more, wherein there may be required of persons some things which are apparently their duty (as this rendering to Caesar the things which are Caesar's, is,) by the Law of God, as well as man, and yet in regard of some principles some have received, or some circumstances they are in, they are against their Consciences: You may ask therefore in general, Does not the Magistrate well to use his Sword, and execute the Law upon offenders in such cases? I answer, no doubt but he does; because he acts upon supposition, that such things are according to their Consciences, and he is not to suppose otherwise: Nevertheless, if it come within his cognizance, that the thing indeed is a matter of Conscience to him, I do humbly apprehend, and say, that the great duty of Charity which he owes to his brother's Soul, and is above any Law of man, aught to prevail with him for some such middle course in the execution of the Law, that neither may the man be hurt in his Religion, nor the public suffer by his ill example: but that both his Conscience be regarded, and righteousness also take place.  
You may say perhaps, You would indeed have the magistrate have a care, and not force a man to any thing against his Conscience: but you think notwithstanding, he may very comfortably punish him, if he do not what was enjoined. I will ask then, For what could you comfortably punish him, for being true only to his Conscience, which is to be faithful to God? I do not find, if I were a Magistrate, that I could have any great comfort in that. Indeed if a man were doing, or does a thing which is evil or destructive to the Government and common good, though it be according to his own Conscience or judgement but what he ought to do, I think the Magistrate may punish him with comfort, and may restrain him more comfortably from what he would do: but I do not think he may punish him with any such content for not doing that which yet were good, so long as it is against his Conscience. My reason I give is this, Because in the one, the man does what God would not have him: in the other, he does what God would have. God would not have him do evil because of his erroneous Conscience, but that he should lay down his error and do good: but God will have every man so regard his Conscience, though erroneous, that he must not do any thing against it, for any fear or advantage in the world. Again, as for what cause, I will ask, For what end could you punish him? Is it for the most ordinary end of punishment, the party's amendment, that is, the making the man do what he now leaves undone? I answer, Then your distinction here becomes void, when you say, you would not force him to any thing against his Conscience, but you can punish him; for the Magistrates forcing a man to any thing against his Conscience, is to punish him for not doing the thing to make him do it. Or is it only for example sake to others? If so, Then must these others be either such as the thing is also against their Consciences, and then I say, you are no more to punish one man, to enforce others thereby to do against their Consciences, than to force himself to act against it: Or these others must be such as it is not against their Consciences, though against his, and in such a case, if their be indeed a punishment can be inflicted, so as will not be inductive, either to the man himself, or others, to do the thing which is against their Consciences, but will only induce others, who can do it according to theirs, to the doing, I am not careful though it be executed upon any; yet cannot say steadily, that you may execute it, because the very nature of punishment is such, as unless it be for a fault, and that which deserves it, there is no other end without this, can justify the infliction of it. You see at last still unto what all will be reduced. Things are, or things are not against men's Consciences. And there is a forcing positively, or negatively. Understand these terms as I have unfolded myself, and so judge of the weight or insufficiency of my Undertaking.   

SECT. 14.  
I remember in the life of Josephus, when some of the Trachonites came in for rescue to the Jews, where himself was Governor, and the Jews would thereupon constrain them to be circumcised, or else let them not abide with them, he would not permit that injurious zeal, alleging," That every man ought according to his own mind, and not by man's compulsion, to serve God. In our English story (to suit this), when Ethelbert the first Prince that received Christianity of the Sexon Heptarchy, was converted by Austin, sent hither by Gregory, and many thereupon came into the Church, it is said," He specially embraced those that came in, but compelled none, for he had learned, that the faith and service of Christ ought to be voluntary, and not of constraint. It helpeth much to establish the public Tranquillity (says the Imperial Edict of Constantine and Licinius), for every man to have liberty to use and choose what kind of worshipping himself pleases: And for that intent is this done of us, to have no man enforced to one Religion more than another." A Prince who would draw his Subjects divided into Sects and Factions, to his Religion, should not in my opinion use force, says Bodin. Which he enhaunses more particularly from the example of Theodosius toward the Arrians. John Barclay (not William that wrote adversus Monarchomachos) hath a Discourse on purpose to this effect about the Calvinists (as it is thought) under the name of the Hyperephanians, in one Chapter of his Argenis." It was observed by the Pope's Council (says Guiccardine) that the prosecution of Luther, since it was not accompanied with their own Reformation, did increase his Reputation; and that it had been a less evil to dissemble the knowledge of such a matter, which would perhaps have dissolved of its self, than by blowing at the brand, to make the fire burn the more. There may be some Notes conferred with this out of Davilah, upon the deliberations of the Politic Katherine Regent of France, about the Pacification in her Son Henry the Thirds time. I will rest in one, after Henry the Fourth succeeded. That great Prince thought good to declare himself Catholic, but gets that same Edict for Liberty to the Hugonats, to be renewed and passed the Parliament of Paris;" By which means endeavouring to remove suspicion from their minds, and confirming them by good usage, together with some gifts and promises to the chief Heads, he insensibly took away (says the Historian) the pulse and strength of that Party; so that those that are versed in the Kingdom believe that a few years of such sweet poison (if he had not been disabled in this course through want of money) would have extinguished that Faction, which so many years of desperate War, had not with the effusion of so much blood, been able to weaken." Violent courses (says my Lord Cook) are like hot waters, that may do good in an extremity; but the use of them doth spoil the stomach, and it will require them stronger and stronger, and by little and little they will lessen the operation." They that love this Commonwealth (says Judge Jenkins) will use means together with the restitution of the King, to procure an Act of Oblivion, and tender Consciences a just and reasonable satisfaction, else we must all perish first or last. I will crown the rest of these Testimonies with that experienced advice of our late King to his Son our now consenting Sovereign." Beware of exasperating any Faction by the crossness and asperity of some men's passions, humours, or private opinions employed by you, grounded only upon the differences in lesser matters, which are but the skirts and suburbs of Religion, wherein a charitable Connivance, and Christian Toleration often dissipates their strength, whom a rougher opposition fortifies, and puts their despised and oppressed party into such combinations as may most enable them to get a full revenge on those they count their Persecutors, who are commonly assisted by that vulgar commiseration which attends all that are said to suffer under the notion of Religion. I set down these passages which myself occasionally have noted: I may add many more out of others.  
It is not like in the three first Centuries of the Church that any thing is to be found in the Christian Writings for the use of the Sword in Religion, while themselves were under it. In the next ensuing we have Constantine, Constantius, Jovian, Valentinian, Valens, Theodosius; and after those, Honorius, and Arcadius may be cited for their larger permissions, especially toward the Jews, by those that will be at the pains to do it. In the year 386, Idacius and Ithacius were condemned by the Gallican Bishops, for being Authors of bringing the Priscillianists to execution. And St. Augustine no doubt with the Fathers generally are against any Sanguinary Laws in this matter. Nullis bonis in Catholica Ecclesia, hoc placet, si usque ad mortem in quenquam haereticum saeviatur. Contra Cresconium l. 3. c. 50. Hence were they called Ithacians, and held for Heretics who maintained that those who erred in Religion ought to be put to death. And it is observed it was Dominick was the first that brought up the fire among Christians upon that account. Withdraw from them, avoid them, says the Scripture, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but not beat or persecute them as the Heathens do, says Ignatius. For it is an unheard of strange kind of preaching the Gospel (says Gregory) to exact belief (as the Egyptian their Bricks) with stripes. Decere arbitramur (say Theodosius and Valentinian) nostrum Imperium subditos nostros de Religione commonefacere. They chose not to say, Imperare, but Commonefacere; signifying that Religion ought not to be forced. Nihil enim (says Lactantius) tam voluntarium quam Religio, in quasi animus est sacrificantis aversus, jam sublata, jam nulla est. Religio imperari non potest, says Cassidodore. And, Suadenda (says St. Bernard) non imperanda. Praecepit sancta Synodus (says a Toledan Canon de Judaeis), Nemini deinceps ad credendum vim infer. And the new Law (says Tertullian) does not vindicate itself ultore gladio. The Jews took no such course (as pestilent as their Doctrine was) with the Sadduces; nor Christ with the Samaritans. See Luc. 9.55. Mat. 13.28, 29. Jo. 18.36. Jo. 6.67. And will ye also go away, says Christ to the Twelve? Which are words removing all force and necessity from man in the choice of his Religion. So chrysostom, Athanasius, Cyprian, I may add Augustine and Salvian, all, or most out of Grotius, put his two Books, De jure belli, and De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra together, in certain places. And at the last let us hear that learned and judicious man himself, for as the man is, such is his strength. Quid de illis armis dicemus quae inferuntur populis aliquibus eam ob causam quod illi Christianam religionem sibi propositam amplecti nolunt? Duo notanda dicimus. Prius est veritatem Christiane religionis argumentis mere naturalibus persuaderi non posse, quo fit ut penitus in animum admitti nequeat nisi secretis Dei auxiliis accedentibus, quae si quibus negantur id fit ob causas plerumque nobis incognitas, ac proinde humano judicio non punibiles. Alterum hoc est, Christo novae legis auctori omnino hoc placuisse ut ad legem suam recipiendam nemo hujus vitae poenius aut earum metu pertraheretur. De jur. bell. l. 2. c. 19 I forget not Camerarius in his Historical Meditations, who l. 3. c. 18. hath a discourse, as learned, full, and grave as need to be upon this argument.  
For all this, there is a difference I account to be held firm, between the forcing of people to the profession of a Religion which they have not received yet into their minds and belief (and so cannot worship God in it, who is a spirit, and must be worshipped in spirit and truth): and the preventing or restraining exorbitances in that Religion which a Nation does already profess. I cannot drive any person (over whom I have the greatest power) against his will unto God; yet should I not methinks, if I can help it, let him go to the Devil. Notandum (I remember the same Grotius has it otherwhere) puniri delicta non tantum quae directe alios laedunt, sed & quae per consequentiam. Religio autem suos habet in societate humana effectus maximos. It cannot be denied by me that Hezekiah, Josiah, Asa, Jehoshaphat, threw down the High places: Nor that some good Emperors through the like care of Unity in Religion, forbade Heretical and Schismatical Conventions, gave their Churches to the Orthodox, laid mulcts upon the ordainers, and the ordained amongst them, debarred them from Preferments, yea even from their Rights by Testaments. And if in all this they are defended, by Austin against the Donatists (See his first Book against the Epistle of Parmenian, and De Horum correptione, more at large), it may be believed that the use of some sort of temporal punishments for the reclaiming of Schism and Error, which cut not men off from repentance as death does, was not abhorrent altogether to the ancient Church. Exhibitus igitur & convictus Crispinus, decem tamen libras auri (quam mulctam in omnes haereticos Imperator Theodosius constituerat) intercedente Possidio, non est compulsus exolvere. Cont. Cres. l. 3. c. 47. It were perhaps easier to say what is lawful, than what is fit, and to speak more that is true, then convenient for the season. The Commonwealth (says Patricius) is as a Ship, quae omnium manibus officioque indiget. A leak in a Ship (says my Lord Cook) hereupon) is timely to be repaired. For as it is in the Natural, so is it in the Political body, Non morbus in plerisque sed morbi neglecta curatio, corpus interficit. Jnst. part. 4. c. 1. p. 50. I will add what I find a few leaves before, (pag. 35.) when it was demanded in a Parliament of Henry the Sixth by what means they might have good success, the answer is thus set down. Eritis insuperabiles, si fueritis inseparabiles. Explosum est illud diverbium, Divide & impera, cum radix & vertex imperii in obedientium consensu rata sunt.  
The scope of all this leads to reconcilement, and the middle path between the Oppression, and Licentiousness of the Conscience, that the due Liberty thereof, and no more, being maintained, the care of Religion may not be neglected, nor good Laws be condemned; but different minds may be born, yet dangers stopped, and the Church upholden. In omnibus vero tenendus est modus aptus humanitati, congruus charitati: ut nec totum quod potestatis est exeratur: & in eo quod exeritur dilectio non amittatur: in eo autem quod non exeritur, mansuetudo monstretur, August. count. Cres. l. 3. c. 51.  
I descend not now to any particulars in reference to the entendment named; for I know how touchy the age is, and that the proper Anvil to have such things beaten upon, were Conventus sapientum, or magna servorum Dei frequentia, in the stile of some ancient Lawyers. There is one thing only yet I cannot pass as what is more conspicuous in that Father last cited; who having occasion in reference to the Donatists, to consult with his Brethren about this matter, he tells us the result they came to was this; Non esse petendum ab Imperatoribus ut ipsant haeresim juberent omnino non esse, poenam constituendo eis qui in illa esse voluissent, sed hoc potius constituerent ut eorum furiosas violentias Catholici non paterentur. That is, they would not have their Legates desire of the Emperor to pass any such Law that no man should be suffered to be Donatists, or that if they were, they should be punished only for being of that opinion: But that the violences they offered against the Orthodox might be repressed, and particularly that the mulct which by a Law of Theodosius was laid on Heretical Preachers, might be inflicted on these men that were disturbers. Indeed the Emperor afterwards hearing of the fury of their Circumcellioes, passed some Laws more severe than Augustine would have desired, against all the Sect: And that Father, it must be acknowledged, in many places of his several Books, does seem to rejoice much in the great success they found by them; insomuch as I will not omit one or two of his expressions. Multi qualem causam haeresis haberet nunquam antea cogitaverunt: mox ubi caeperunt advertere, & nihil in ea dignum invenire propter quod tanta damna paterentur, sine ulla difficultate Catholici facti sunt. Docuit enim eos sollicitudo, quos negligentes securitas fecerat. Again, Non vel tot sunt illi homines qui sua voluntate pereunt, quot liberantur per istas leges ab illa pestifera pernicie, Fundi, pagi, viri, castella, municipia, civitates. De correptione Donatistarum, ad Bonifacium.  
By this little and by all the rest, we may see what a difference there is, and aught to be of judgement, according to diversity of states, and circumstances in this business. It is certainly true on both sides; On the one, that Laws and Punishments are ordinarily the direct means to suppress any evil that is growing, and consequently any party, sect, or opinion, that the Ruler shall think fit to suppress: On the other, that Persecution is the most quick and active course, to engage the hearts and spirits of the believing and zealous, in their way which is Religious, and wherein they judge that God still must be obeyed before man, above any other (even of Preferment itself) that could be invented to do it. And consequently, when we have stated the Magistrates power, whereby we come to see what he may strictly do in these matters, we must leave him at the last to prudential considerations still, whether he had best to exert that power or no, and what is best in the exerting of it, according to the condition of this people. For my own part, I am here in Genere demonstrativo, not in Genere deliberativo. And I may debate with that Gentleman in the one, unto whose Arguments I would refer to choose of any, in the other.  
There are two Rules in the Preamble of the Statute primo Mariae. The one is that the state of a King standeth more assured by the love of his Subjects, than in the dread and fear of Laws. The other is, That Laws justly made without extreme punishment, are more often, and for the most part better obeyed than those that are made with that extremity. Unto which the before named Lord Chief Justice Sir Edward Cook subjoins this sentence, Mitius imperanti, melius paretur. I will close up all with that gracious end of one Speech of the present Lord Keeper to the Parliament. If any just grievances shall have happened, his Majesty will be as willing and ready to redress them as you to have them presented to him: And his Majesty doubts not but you will give healing and moderate Counsels, and imprint that known truth in the hearts of his Subjects, That there is no distinct interest between the King and his people, but the good of one, is the good of both.  
FINIS.    

ERRATA.  
PAg. 26. lin. 12. for then read that. p. 28. l. 11. r. we shall perhaps. p. 59 l. 14. r. allowed to plead. p. 66. l. 17. for preferred r. preserved.