THE OBLIGATION Of Human LAWS Discussed.  
By J. H.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
We are to give to Princes and the Powers that are set over us by God, such Honour and obedience as may not hurt us. Polycarpus.  
Too rigorous were it that the breach of every Law should be held a deadly sin, a mean there is between these extremities, if so be we could find it out. Hooker.  
London, Printed in the Year. 1671.   

Reader,  
THese Papers were prepared against Easter Term last year, but the Printers failed us. Nevertheless the Subject being of perpetual occasion, and so long as there is any Commonwealth and Laws there is none can say, I have need of thee, I see no reason to hinder the coming out now to the same public advantage.  
The Author.   

I Have perused this Discourse and do judge it will be of singular use unto all such as desire conscienti-ously to order their obedience unto Magistrates in civil things: For although it is written in the way of a defence of what was formerly more briefly offered unto the same purpose, yet the subject matter of it is so managed, and the truth asserted in it so vindicated from the opposition of another, that the understanding Reader, will be satisfied in the proper Rule of civil things, and in the reasonableness of every Man making a Judgement of their own actions in reference thereunto.  
J. O.   

THE Obligation of human Laws discussed.  

CAP. I.  
WE have before us a famous question, which is not only of great moment, constant use and concernment, but of so much difficulty, and doubtful dispute, as that some learned men of great note in the Romish Church, have judged it fit only for the Pope in Cathedra to determine it. I am not furnished so much as with my own books, which are from me, and much less with so many others as it would require to inform myself, or my Readers, in the several judgements, of all, or the chief Doctors in the Schools, with other Divines, and Lawyers, who have written of this point. But this I take to be notorious, that there are many of very great magnitude in the Church or Schools, with multitudes of several sorts of Divines, who have, or do hold, that humane Laws bind not the Conscience, whereof God only is the Lord, and which can be bound be nothing but his authority, as will be confessed. On the contrary there be others and perhaps of no less, or of greater eminence and number, who yet on both sides, when they oppose one another may not defend themselves from extremity, but that there is a mean according to the judgement of sober and indifferent men, to be sought in these things, if we can light of it.  
I must confess I should very hardly expect any thing but confusion in my own thoughts if I trusted myself altogether to books, among such variety. By the little I sometimes read concerning this dispute I must need say, it did but serve to leave me at a loss, and how I have since retired my thoughts more into my own mind, to look upon that writing which is congenial with us, even those principles of truth which nature and so God hath implanted in man's own heart, and having proposed from the result of all a determination so plain, and in the middle path, being careful that neither conscience should be left lose and dissolute, nor tied by Man's command or Laws, any farther than God doth tie it, It hath pleased the reverend Author of the friendly debate, by an opposition in a Postscript to his Appendix to draw me out to my defence, and a farther explication, mainly of what I have in a lesser room before written.  
I perceive there is an expression fell from me among others of respect, concerning the Debater, that hath moved him to so much indignation that I know not how I shall pacific him, for a man shall not lightly see two or three sheets of paper written thus tetrically upon so small an occasion. I received a case from you, a very weighty one it is, and as weightily and solidly resolved, if the casuist may be his own Judge. So he goes on; I must confess I looked on this person as a Man of a most modest, humble, pious, ingenuous, calm temper, and I have the same opinion as to his worth and abilities as I had, but I do not like the spirit of this appendix, there is in the Apologist so much gentleness and care of offending, as hath seemed too much. On the contrary, here is in these papers such a deal of animosity, indignation, and that indeed which in women we call vixenish humour, but especially such an inveterate espousing of a party, with that disdain and contempt of every man, and thing, that appears against himself, or cause, that there is no do with him. Nevertheless I must needs say for my own part I am not yet converted to his opinion, but that I must think still that a Nonconformist who hath not taken the Oxford Oath, may live within five miles of a corporation and yet be a good Christian, or Minister of Christ.  
And what is the ground for such an imprudent expression as this was, and that he should continue the justification of it? The ground of all doth lie on this single point as himself has it, whether humane Laws bind the conscience? In the resolving which point he is come here to an acknowledgement that there is difficulty.  
He that finds none (says he) may well suspect that he does not fully understand it. And why is he so angry then, when he laid down his matter so inconsiderately in his first book; without any distinction or provision for any, that I should say only he was not so reflective as he ought, upon all the things at least, as he was to look to in so great an undertaking? Alas, that there should be so much vanity and elation of mind, in impotent man, that if you commend him never so much, for what is worthy in him, you must give him more than he deserves, or he will account what is due, but a disparagement to him.  
If you will praise a Man for his valour, and say he is as valiant as Hector, or Judas Maccabeus, it will not serve, unless you say also he exceeds Hercules, and make him wiser too withal, then Solomon, and all Kings. I could be contented, to have wanted his good word (says he) upon condition he had not said— What? why something that is innocently true, he names, but that which sticks, is, that I count him one more happy in his expression and other abilities then in his depth or reflectiveness on the things he offers.  
Whether I have herein judged amiss, or not, I will be content to come to some trial with him, and that I may treat with this Postscript in some method, it is convenient I should in the first place propose the determination of this case, or question, as I have tendered it together with his conception, understanding or apprehension of it. In the next place that I should take notice of his objections against it. It is convenient than that I and he take a review of the determination which he hath proposed in the place of it. And lastly that I answer to his exceptions, either here and there occasionally as they fall in upon me, or more fully and industriously, at the end.   

CAP. II.  
FOr the foremost, I wonder the less that this debater does show so much disdainful contempt of my determination, when he is possessed with so much prejudice, as gives him not leave to mind the very main distinctions I offer him in it. After he hath therefore in the ensuing, first three leaves fallen upon a passage of providence, which I have set down as proper and indeed peculiar to the matter of the Case, he enters the List with these words. This is sufficient to show what may be expected from this new undertaker, who will appear I don●t not as lame in his Reasonings as he doth in this, and prove as unfit to determine cases of Conscience, as to make observations of providence. I do not know what kind of gust one may have of the same thing which pleases another, but it does become any ingenuous mind to think, that all men are not cast into the same mould, and to take heed therefore, least by censuring of that which the most of others approve, he brings his own Judgement into question, and becomes the less regarded himself for it. And really if the spleen and extravagancy, of five sides and a half, and no less of about twenty leaves in all, to no purpose but abuse of his paper, do not show more what may be expected in this stolen undertaker, who hath come out now this fourth time to debate; then that observation of mine will discover in me, I am mistaken. For my part let the determination of the case be found as solid as that observation upon the matter of it is pertinent, and I shall have no cause to be moved by his censure. But what is that which hath moved him thus? why, he makes me (says he) such a pittisul Gamester that I am not reflective (here he quotes the Page wherein I have delivered that heinous word) upon more removes than one of those many I ought to see.— Yet I have done my endeavour to comprehend him and to fathom the bottom of his deep discourse. I must confess I have expressed myself in these words he quotes, I speak verily according to my thoughts, and I can't help that. But one would think by these words, we should have at least so much integrity now from this person, as to set down my determination at least in my own words, being so few, if not made better by his, that the Reader might judge whether he does indeed look to the bottom of what I have offered, and if after these words he yet does not, he may be ashamed, to express himself thus, and show such a spirit as this is.  
Well in my case, I distinguish then first, between the authority of the Magistrate, and of his Laws and Commands. To this purpose there is a distinction which Dr. Field has, parallel with it, to wit, between subjection and obedience, subjection is that which is due or proper to the Magistrate, or to the authority residing in his person: Obedience is that which is due to his commands, or to the authority of his Laws. By subjection we are to understand all that which stands in opposition to resistance, and so subjection in one verse in the Apostle, is equivalent with not resisting in the other; and the word in the Original does kindly serve this purpose. Now subjection being what is opposite to resistance, and what is due to the Authority which resides in the Magistrate's person, it is what is; and must be always due; so that we must never resist, but be subject, because this authority always resides there. But obedience which is proper to his Laws, or commands, is not due always, because there may be some Laws, or things, commanded, devoid of God's authority, and then if we obey them not, we do not sin. This is acknowledged, or very near it, in two cases, by this person; in a case of sin, and in a case of intolerable grievance, from whence others will follow.  
The other distinction is between the obligation of the conscience, and of the outward Man. Let this learned person now take of his eyes from the paper, and consider but a while before he reads on, what he thinks I mean by, and to what use I put this distinction, and he may take the best conjecture whether he be not short in his comprehension of it. The outward Man let us know then is obliged by the penalty, the sword, or wrath: and by Gods command not to resist, or to be subject in reference to his authority residing in the Magistrate himself. There are two things than you see go to the binding the outward Man, God's command of not resisting, or being subject to the Powers, and the Magistrates sword, and force. If we must never or by no means resist, than the Magistrate may make us do what he will, or else we must suffer. We cannot avoid suffering but by resisting or obeying, Resist we never may, obey we must then, if we will not suffer, unless the case be in the matter of sin, wherein we all agree in one, that we must always suffer. The Conscience is obliged only by God's will, which is the adequate Rule of Conscience. I will explain it farther. There is God's will, and Man's will, a divine and humane Obligation. When God will have a thing to be done as well as Man, I do account the Conscience is bound, because the Obligation is divine: but when Man will have it done, and God requires it not, but only his will is that whatsoever be imposed, the subject however must not rebel, I do account the Obligation to the thing to be humane altogether, and the outward Man bound only. Jus Regis vocatur (says Grotius I remember somewhere) non quia Rex ita agens juste ageret sed quia ita agenti nemini liceret vim ullam opponere. That is as much as to say there is a double right a Magistrate hath in his commands or actions; A moral right when he commands, or does, those things which he ought to do, or command: or a Political right, (called by Samuel the manner of the King) when though he commands or does those things he ought not (or what God does not allow, but he is accountable to him for them,) yet the subject may not resist him in those commands, or acts, and deliver himself from them by force. When the Magistrate uses the first of these Rights, I account the conscience is obliged: when the second the outward man only. The terms are used we know by grave Divines such as Bishop Downham (to name no other) in his tract of Christian Liberty: and it will be one benefit of these papers, if we can retain with good discretion, and sense, what is so useful, as rather than be without, we shall still use though with none. And by this distinction it does appear, how all that danger which hitherto this man hath fancied consequent to my determination, does fall away as the leaves from the trees in summer. For so long as we do all acknowledge the authority of the present Magistrate in his person with our subjection thereunto, that in no case it is lawful to resist, whereby the outward man comes to be bound, so that if he will, and when he will, he can force it to obey by his sword, there is not so much as any certain disobedience, and much less is there any danger to his Government, through Insurrection, or Rebellion, that follows from my opinion.  
If in Religious things, or moral, when the Magistrate commands any thing against a man's conscience, and the Subject does not obey, his authority nevertheless is preserved, though he cannot force them in that case to obedience if he would: how shall we think but in things which are secular, where be can force them to obey if he will, that there is any danger to his Government, for their obeying such and such a Law only because they dare not to resist (I mean for God's sake that they dare not) and not out of conscience else? I would have this worthy, and intelligent, but at this time over engaged person, who yet sees not all the removes which are to be seen in this business, for all his anger at me for my thinking so, to consider whether there be not many learned Men, Writers and others, who hold that the Laws of Men do not oblige the Conscience at all; and that they cannot, seeing Conscience is God's Throne, but the external man only▪ and does he think that all such must be so shallow that they are not able to avoid his extemporanous consequences, or that they see not the weakness of such a Gamester (seeing he calls himself so, for it was not I used that word) who hath not come yet so far here, as to consideration with himself? For I say, is there any Men of parts or learning thinks he, that fear God and are Christians, who hold it lawful to rebel, or to destroy all Society and Government. 〈◊〉 And if not, how comes it to pass he should not resolve with himself, that certainly if such consequences which he would fasten on me will be avoided and denied by those that hold that human Laws do never bind the Conscience, they may and must be denied by me with more facility, who have determined that human Laws do with a distinction bind it, but not indefinitely as he does.  
And what is that distinction then which after these two other not comprehended by the Debater, does determine the question in hand? That we are to be always subject as to the Authority of the Magistrate himself I have said and yet that we are not bound always to obey his commands, that is, we are not bound always in Conscience, when yet we are bound in the outward Man. This being said, the determining distinction concerning his Laws or Commands, which do bind, and which do not bind the Conscience is this. The commands of the Magistrate are either such as are agreeable to Gods will, or not agreeable to his will. Those that are, bind it: Those that are not, bind it not. The Reason is, because the authority the Magistrate hath to command, is derived from, and to be founded in Gods will. In the way, The Casuist (says this benign Debater) seems to have no low opinion of his own performance, but rather thinks we may chance to be beholding to him for a new Invention. Here says he, is that very mean indeed for aught I know which is wanting. A great discovery! and for ought I know may any body reply that which is not wanting but the very dangerous extreme into which the people are apt to run, as he is to follow those with whom I have had to deal. As for those with whom he hath been dealing I presume it will be found there is nothing of this determination in what they have said; if & I did not esteem it uncommon, I should (I must confess) have restrained it. Or if I did not think it considerable, I should have held my peace also. But after this scornfulness of his why did he not present us with that mean which follows in the words of the Case, that the Reader might judge, whether it be any discovery indeed, or none, or whether it deserves this Man's contempt or not? For as Cato said of Cicero when he played upon the Stoics opinions (which another hath noted) Cicero makes others laugh, but is himself ridicuculous: So say I, this person strives here to offer me and my determination to contempt, but the things I have said will bear themselves out, and he does but discover hereby his own desert. What is that mean then which follows? The words in the Case are these. That the Laws or Commands of the Magistrate (even in Political and indifferent things) does no less than bind the Conscience, when he is the executioner of God's will, but though the outward man (out of the Case of sin) may be bound if you will, the conscience cannot be obleiged, and aught to be still kept free, when he is the executioner only of his own. It may be the Debater will not yet be beholding to me for this, and he may choose, when perhaps others will, and take it never the less kindly for that. It fares with those that beat their heads about notions, as it doth with Miners; they are the condemned Men, and the Gold they dig becomes others: Never the less the Man that hath been digging & finds a Vein, may say, what he hath found is Gold as well as another, and without pride. He doth not commend himself, for his commending the Gold. I think verily that that which I I have here digged is the mean, the Golden mean we are to find in this case, and not an extreme wherein I follow any as he says: but the avoiding both extremes. The one is of those who hold that human Laws do not bind the Conscience at all: and the other such as hold as this Man did when he first unadvisedly set out, and therefore will continue of the mind still, that they bind indefinitely without discrimination, at least so far by all means, as Dr. Manton his good Neighbour, and every one such as he (whatsoever the breakers of other Laws may be) might be none of Christ's Ministers or good Christians on that account.  
Well! The will of God which determines the commands of Man to be obligatory or not, upon the Conscience, must be considered in the concerns of Religion: in things moral: and in things civil or Political. The rule or Law of God in things Religious, is the Scripture. The rule or Law of God in things moral is the Light of Nature, which also is the will of God, as the word is. The Rule and supreme Law which God hath appointed for things Political is the common good. If the Magistrate command any thing in Religion and it be not according to God's word, than Conscience cannot be bound to it as Religious, though the outward Man I think therein also is bound, if it be not against God's word. It the Magistrate command any thing of moral concern, if it be against the Law of nature, or common principles of Light in Man, that is the moral Law in the heart, the Conscience cannot be bound but must refuse it. If he command any thing which is civil or Political, and it be against the common good, then is it not agreeable to God's will, being not consonant to the rule he hath commanded for civils', and consequently the Conscience cannot be obleiged by it upon that account. In the mean while so long as it is not against conscience otherwise, that is so long as it is not sin, the outward man is bound, and if the Magistrate will constrain a person to it, rather than suffer he will obey.  
There are several books and Sermons of Ministers about Religion, which do bind the Readers and Hearers by virtue of Gods will: but the supreme Rule is God's Word, unto which consequently, if what they have said; or writ, be not consonant, the Conscience is not bound, and according as the Conscience of a Man is convinced, whether that which the Minister says be agreeable to the word or not, so is it bound, or not bound by it. The case is the same in Laws. The Magistrate doth give us such and such particular commands, or Laws. His authority he hath from God. The will of God as the supreme Law, or Rule, in Politicalls, is, that the common good be attended and advanced. They are Gods Ministers a sending continually upon this very thing. So far as his Laws, or commands then are agreeable to the common good, so far is his Authority good, and must oblige the Conscience being from God. And so long as a man is convinced in Conscience, that they are agreeable thereunto, he must be in Conscience obleiged: but if he be sincerely persuaded that such or such a thing commanded, be not for the public good, the case is but the same with what I said in Religion, when the Ministers exhortation disagrees with the word. The Magistrate is but God's Minister in Politicals, and his commands disagreeing, with the supreme Law, the common good, the Conscience cannot be obleiged in this Case. Nevertheless, so long as the outward Man is in the Magistrate's power, and the Subject may not resist, he can command obedience, out of the case of sin, when he pleases to exert his Sword.  
Before I pass off, I am made a little sensible how apt our question may be wrested into a dispute about Terms. It is hardly proper to say this or that Law binds the Conscience, for Conscience is the discerner of my duty, and it were more proper to say my conscience binds me to this Law, then that this Law binds it. It is scarce proper neither to say the Conscience is bound, seeing it is the person is bound. Conscience is placed in the understanding, and when a thing becomes a Man's duty, the will is obleiged rather than the understanding. It is not easy likewise to apprehend how the outward man is bound with distinction to the Conscience, considering that this obligation hath its rise, and virtue, from our duty of not resisting, unto which we are always bound in Conscience. The term Resisting likewise is liable to diversity of acceptation.  
It is convenient therefore for me, in my way to give the sense of my Terms (if it be not yet done enough) to prevent needless contention. By human Laws I understand the declaration of the will of the rightful Governor, what he would have his Subjects do, I will not also put in the end of Laws, in order to the common good, because that will presently spoil the question. For where the efficient is our rightful Ruler, and the Law serves indeed for that end, or hath its right final cause also, there is no question of its obligation. Yet if I leave out the end the question indeed may be whether such a declaration be a Law, rather than whether it binds. Nevertheless as I make a case of conscience of it (and count all our Acts of Parliament Laws) it is all one in effect to me, whether you say, such a Law binds not, or such an Act or Law is no Law, and binds not. Ex quo intelliges eos qui perniciosa et injusta populis jussa descripserius, cum contra feceriut quod polliciti pro fessique slat●, quoduis potius tulisse quam leges. Cicero de legious. By Conscience I understand a faculty in Man of descerning God's Judgement concerning himself and Actions. It is more proper to say a faculty is obleiged, than an habit, or an Act; and that faculty which man hath hereunto, is charged (whilst himself is) to judge whether such a thing commanded be his duty in relation to God, or not. By obligation I understand the constitution of a due; Obligare est jus constituere. By obligation of the Conscience I understand the constituting a thing to bedue from me so that if I do it not I must account or judge that God will condemn me for the neglect, or the making a thing my duty so that if I leave it undone I sin. The obligation of the outward man I account the constituting a thing to be due from me so as if I do it not, I may not resist, though I be punished; or I may be punished, and ought not to resi●t, though I could avoid both the thing, and punishment by resistance. The word, lacere, says Grotius (from one line of whom, a man shall have more Instruction sometimes then from another's book) is distinguished in id quod impune fi●, and in id quod v●tio caret. So must we say the word obligare, is distinguished into that which if we do not the thing makes us liable to punishment (in foro humano, or according to the law:) or that which if we do it not makes us liable to sin. That is, there is an obligation human only (which we have had before) that ties us to obedience upon the penalty of the law: or an obligation divine also, which ties us to the duty upon the pain of God's displeasure, & eternal condemnation. The one of these we call the obligation of the outward man, and the other of the Conscience. By resistance, lastly, I understand the repelling force with force. The word resistance, may be taken largely or strictly. Resistitur contra Imperium agendo aut vim vi reprim●ndo. I take it in the last and strict sense. Let me yet note one thing more, when we distinguish in the obligation of human laws, between the outward man and the Conscience, we do not distinguish the outward man from the will, when we distinguish it from the Conscience. The will is wrought upon under both obligations, through fear of man's law, and through fear of Gods. If you divide the outward man from the will, you cannot bind it, but Physically, by putting it in Bonds and Fetters. But the obleiging it by the will, is binding it with an human obligation; and that I account too, is not morally, but politicaly (as I have intimated,) to wit as human laws are, norma humani judicij, the man who breaketh a bad law, is according to that law to be adjudged to its penalty, and in sensu politico humano is an offendor of the law so that if he be punished by the judge, who judgeth by that law, he must submit, yet seeing the Law is no other than such, he is not made a sinner by that breach, or to be condemned by God. To sum up my opinion then without the terms, that those that will may assail me fairly in my sense I am persuaded as Gods will is not man's, so every command of man in indifferent things is not the command of God: but that when there is no declaration of the magistrates will, but it does make the thing he would have, to be due from us so, as he may punish us by his law for the not doing if he please, and we must bear it without defending ourselves by force, and consequently he may compel us to any thing not sinful by that means: yet does not every declaration of his will, make the thing he requires to be our duty, so, that we are necessarily guilty of sin, if it be not done; but contraily though many a man lives and dies in the breach of some laws and statutes of the realm (so long as they offer no contempt to the Ruler, nor scandal to their brethren, nor resist if they be brought to suffer) they may be good Christians for all that (to come to our first lock which our debater) and servants of Christ.  
And here I have no more that I know needful to be supplied, but only to do this: to produce what I have in my Case itself, that the main notion I offer here, and there may appear to be the same: and to vindicate that authority which alone sufficed me then, and shall now, for my confirmation. The words which I offer in my Case are these. Power (say I) is a right to rule or command. This right in the nature of the thing must arise from the grant or will of the supreme Lord, which is God; without whose will (or that grant or Charter which is an act of his will) no power can be derived to any. Now that grant or will of God which constitutes any to rule, or to be his Minister, being for the People's good, (He is the Minister of God for our good says the text) it must follow that whatsoever is not indeed for the people's good, the Magistrate is not to command, because it is God's will that he commands only for their good. And it he do command any matter that is otherwise, that command hath no authority as to the Conscience at all as being without the warrant of Gods will. I know I have set down this in a few lines, but it hath been the fruit of several thoughts and years. I thought good to confirm it with one testimony of Dr. Taylor, and I perceive this debater seems offended, and to accuse me of disingenuity for it, as if I had done him wrong. It is necessary therefore that I turn again to that Dr. and see; only I must say that I am glad (I must confess) that I have here such an authority as this Dr. so full for me, nevertheless Dr. Taylor is not (as far as I know in a tittle) the author to me; but a witness to the light I offer. In the third Book of his Cases, and the first chapter, he comes to treat of human laws, and what obligation they pass on the Conscience. In his first rule he tells us, the Conscience is obleiged directly and actively to obey the Laws of Man. Several learned Authors, together with Nine Arguments to the contrary, are proposed, which he having very hardly assailed, comes to his next Rule, that human Laws bind not when there is any intolerable, or grievous evil in the obedience. To make out this, be proceeds to a third Rule, that the Laws of our superior, that are not just and good, do not oblige the Conscience, and then showing what Laws are such he tells us, that a Law is unjust that contributes not to the public advantage. What can be more orderly and  to my purpose! Only yet to be more sure, it is fit, I cite also some few of his expressions. This is the limit of a Prince's power, so far as he relates to conscience, for beyond this the conscience is not bound. Again, If a Prince make a Law that is not for the public good, it hath no sanction but fear, and no tye upon the Conscience. Again, all such things as are against the good of the subjects, the Law itself declares it to be no Law, that is, to be more than the superior hath right, or leave to do. Again, Laws that are made to purposes beyond those measures, do no ways oblige the conscience. He is the Minister of God for good (saith St. Paul) otherwise he is not God's Minister, and hath to other purposes none of God's authority, and therefore cannot oblige the conscience to an active obedience in such, where his power is in incompetent to command.   

CAP. III.  
IT will be time now to come to see what he hath objected against this Determination. The proposition I am to maintain, and he to oppose, is this. That the laws of a common wealth, and particularly an act, or the acts of Parliament in this nation, that are nor for the common good, do not oblige the Conscience of the subject. Though we acknowledge in the mean time, our alleadgiance and subjection to his Majesty as the executioner of the laws, that our outward man is bound still, and spared through his clemency. It is true that there is a question fallen in, who shall be judge, whether that which is commanded in a law be for the common good? and I shall be ready to speak with the Debator about it, in its order: but in the mean while if it were not for that, what would this reverend man have had to say against the main determination.  
In the first place he tells us, that I am a notable instance of my Lord B●●●ns observation, that there is a little dry Light in the World. I remember Plutarch hath a tract of self praise, and among several things he hath against it, one thing he says for it, that there is some cases, and particularly in the case of a just defence, a man may speak of himself, or any thing of his own, as of another. Under Plutarch's Apology, I will say I do believe this, that in this particular I am indeed an instance that there is but little dry light in the World. For let this Debater set himself to read as many books as he can, yet I suppose he may find but few, if any that determine this case altogether as I do. I know the same Light hath shone in on Dr. Taylor in several passages, when yet it is mixed with such abundance of other matter, that if this Man may be judge he would be ready to cite him as of opinion against me in it. There is lumen siccum therefore, and lumen maceratum indeed. I remember the distinction well, my Lord Bacon hath it, in his advancement. And I will say yet, that the Light which this Debater pretends is macerated Light, Light steeped in a prejudiced mind and fetch● from the conceptions of others, and mostly perhaps from that Dr. whose clearest rays he want receive: When the determination which I have offered hath been beaten out from my own thoughts, and will be found that lumen siccum (notwithstanding his abuse) which is to be attended in this matter. I am become a fool in●glorying (says the Apostle) ye have compelled me.  
In the next place he produces two places of Scripture, that to the Romans, Wherefore you must needs be subject not only for wrath but also for Conscience sake, and that of Peter, Submit yourselves to every Ordinance of man for the Lords sake. I answer, these Texts speak of subjection and not of obedience; subjection to the Authority, residing in the persons of the Magistrate, and if you will in the Government itself: not obedience which is proper to their commands. I his appears from the first and second Verses. Be subject to the powers that be. He that resisteth the power, resisteth the Ordinance of God. The Powers no doubt are, but the Laws and Commands of men be not I hope the ordinance of God with this Man. Wherhfore you must needs be subject, It is the same word and spoken in respect to the resistance before, and in reference to their persons: it is not wherefore you must needs obey all their particular commands for Conscience sake, when for Conscience sake we must suffer, rather than obey some of them. So likewise in Peter, every ordinance of Man, is every human creature in the Original, that is, submit to every sort of Governor, or Government, whether to the King as supreme, or others under him. This is plain. Out of these Texts therefore may obedience arise, from the conscience of not resisting, but no direct obligation on the Conscience to obey actively can be deduced from hence. Again the Apostle tells us in these places, that the Magistrate is God's Minister for our good, a terror to evil doers, and encourager to well doing, with the like expressions. Upon this account he can be supposed to command only for the common good, and when a Law or Command of the supreme Magistrate is such, I deny not but it binds the Conscience no less than he. This is sufficient between us, that no Argument possible can be drawn from either of these places to serve his turn, seeing a Law must be supposed to be against the common good, and yet to bind the conscience according to him. Moreover, this I must say ag●in is most evident that obedience indefinite cannot be proved by these Texts, because some commands of the Magistrate may be evil, morally evil (as hath been intimated) and we must not obey them: or civility evil, and then though we do obey for the Swords sake, and because we must not resist, the Conscience is not bound in such a Case.  
It is therefore a peevish obstinacy in this person to persist in these following words. We are no considering when and in what cases a Law may cease to oblige and quite alter its Nature, but whether while it doth oblige and is in force it lays a tye on the Conscience or no? and to this we say yes. Laws while they are obligatory bind the Conscience. Because the Scripture faith so, and we say so indefinitely, because that is the Scriptures language also. First it's certainly false that all Laws of Men do indefinitely tie the Conscience, and therefore the Scripture doth not say so, nor can say so, which must be granted by him in the case of moral evil. Secondly this Debater is utterly lost that he would not learn of me to distinguish between the obligation of the outward man, and the Conscience; an obligation in foro extertori sive politico, & in foro interiori sive conscientiae. For it is false again that he says we are not considering when and in what cases a Law doth cease to oblige, for this is the very thing we are considering, in respect to the Conscience; and as for the obligation of the outward Man, he hath not yet thought of it. And I say as Dr. Taylor hath again and again, that such a Law, as is not for the common good, hath none of God's authority, and so ceases to be any Law as to the Conscience, when yet we being not to resist, (as is and must be often said) the outward man by the Sword may be brought to obey. Thirdly the speaking that Laws while they do oblige (or are of force) do tie the Conscience, in this Man, who hath not received yet the distinction of the obligation of the outward Man Politically, and the inward Man which is morally, is extremely senseless, and consequently false if he understood the sense. For Laws that are obligatory or do oblige the outward man, that is are Politically in force, may yet be morally null, as to the Conscience, that is, oblige it not, when being not for the common good I say they are without the authority of Gods will. Fourthly there is a manifest bar and contradiction in these words to his own determination after, if he durst been plain in it. For here he will be so obstinate to say still that human Laws bind indefinitely, nay and suborn the Scripture to false witnessing in affirming that they say so, when they say only be subject indefinitely (while he makes all Laws (that is Universally) and indefinitely equivalent here, lest he come off upon that word,) which we must not do, and yet in the end he is forced to come to confession and acknowledge (seeing Dr. Taylor will tell him so, from whom he will borrow that he has) that moral Divines and Lawyers (and I had hoped he were one of the first) do determine that human Laws bind not in the case of intolerable grievance. I have cited these words in the way something more acrimoniously than any other passage hitherto, not that I have cause to be angry at them, as I have at others, but to show occasionally how I might take up this Gentleman likewise in the rest of these raw Sheets, if I had a mind to exagitate that weakness which hitherto (till his eyes be opened farther by this controverting the point) is such as may have that epithet given to it at present which the Scriptures does in one place give unto darkness (though I acknowledge his sufficiency otherwise,) even weakness that may be felt.  
In the third place he want allow my little comment on Paul. The Scripture says the Magistrate is God's Minister to us for good. Very true, and the Apostle makes that an argument why we should be obedient to him because it is for our benefit. But this Casuist turns the words another way, and makes them an outlet to disobedience, by taking that to include an exception to the general precept of subjection, which is in truth nothing but a reason to enforce it. By this passage and such as this I take my conjecture of the happiness of this man's expression, which makes what he says very often to look considerable, when if it be reflected upon with more thoughts (but that this Man himself tells the Apologist somewhere that he is no melancholy Man) it signifies nothing. If there be any thing substantial in these words it must hold, if it he put into others; and then must this be denied that when the Apostle tells us the authority the Magistrate hath from God is for the people's good, we may not argue thence that he hath no authority from God for their hurt. But this arguing is good, and therefore this passage is but words. For indeed, is there any man that serves not Levi●than but God, will maintain that the Magistrate hath any authority committed to him of God but for the public benefit? Let this person take heed he turns not God into the Devil, and destroys all. If he dare not maintain that, than whatsoever is commanded against the public benefit hath no authority to bind the conscience; and it will be in vain for him to talk idly of the danger he apprehends from my determination which hath none in it, when if he look not better to himself he must be upon the justifying Tyranny, and bring ruin upon the World. Again suppose we build nothing on the very Text, this is a principle in the law of nature, as c●ea●ly written in man's heart as that he is a sociable creature to wit, that the end of Government and Laws, are for the good of the community, and consequently that there should be none, but for that end. From hence then, that the good of the community being the supreme Law as the general and ultimate end, of whatsoever is commanded, it must irrefragable follow, that whatsoever Law is made or is to be made, it must be over ruled by this supreme, and have its obligatory power originally from thence. We know in all Laws or any other things in the world, the inferior must give place to the greater or to the chief. God requires sacrifices and mercy, both are his Laws, it these interfare, mercy must be exercised and sacrifice binds not. It is no plainer in the earth that the elements give way from their own natures to serve the World, then that the greater or chief obligation must vacate the less. I might fill a side with instances, if any else could not do it. Whereas this matter than is written with a sunbeam on the heart of man, and the Apostle hath an intimation of it, it is but very sit and agreeable to reason, that we fetch a comment on the sex from that book he hath touched, that is the book of nature, or this natural Light which will convince every man, that the public good being the end of society, there can be no power from God but for that end. Again it is true the Apostle from hence argues for subjection, and he may say that he does not argue for any thing else. But what then? when Paul argues one thing from this truth, may not another argue from thence also something too? St. Paul argues well, the Magistrate is the Minister of God for our good, therefore we must be subject: And Dr. Taylor argues well, and therefore he hath none of his authority for other purposes; or that Law that conduceth not to the public good cannot bind the conscience, because it hath none of God's authority. Moreover, the Apostle argues for subjection, and that indefinite, but I say he argues not, nor may be construed to argue for obedience indefinite, and therefore howsoever these words tinkle, there is no doubt but we may and must make an outlet from these and the like Texts, that in some cases of the Magistrates commands, we may not think ourselves bound to obey in point of Conscience, though in regard of nonresistance and subjection, there is no disobedience does follow in the case. We say not that this passage of the Apostle doth include an exception to subjection for that is Universal and indefinite; but we can say it must include an exception to indefinite or Universal obedience, that is as to all the Magistrates commands, because there may be many of them wicked, unjust, or morally evil, unto which we are not bound, and consequently, say I, nor to such as are civilly so.  
In the fourth place we have this passage wherein appears the greatest weight. A Law is not merely the signification of the Magistrates judgement what is good, but the declaration of his will, that we do it, and God having given him his authority to command us, this declaration carries with it an obligatory virtue, to bind us to the execution of his will under the pain of sin. As for this, The declaration of the will of the Lawgiver does indeed immediately bind the outward Man against disobedience by resisting, or to whatsoever is contrary to subjection (that is it binds us Politically) but as for doing the thing out of conscience (that is to be bound morally) I like well that this learned Man hath delivered himself so judiciously as to put in that, which is the true & only ground of all the obligation that the Conscience can be capable of under the command of Man, and which does administer therefore the solution to what he offers. I answer then to that branch which he hath of Gods having given the Magistrate his authority, and we say that God hath given the Magistrate no authority to command any thing but for the common good, which is a truth for which I need not again quote Taylor or Hooker, as I remember well that I might, or twenty learned Schoolmen perhaps and others to this purpose, but that it were not worth my time and trouble to go to their books, Seeing there is indeed scarce any truth can shine more clearly from the Light of Nature and the end of policy. And the Law of nature must be acknowledged the foundation of all Laws, and the measure of their obligation. I do therefore advance here this argument which I think is a stone that cannot be removed, and it is the Sum of my determination. Whatsoever is not agreeable to the will of God, or carries not with it God's authority cannot bind the Conscience, because the Conscience hath an absolute and immediate dependence on the will of God, and his will is the adequate rule of Conscience. But for the Magistrate to command any thing that is against the common good, is disagreeable to Gods will: or such a law carries not with it God's authority. E●go whatsoever is commanded, or what law soever is not conducive to the common good, can not oblige the Conscience. So that it must not be under the pain of sin, but under the sense of wrath, and necessity that we must not resist, that we actively obey in such a case.  
In the last place he quotes Dr. Saunderson and I must confess I shall put the less trust hereafter on this man for any matters of controversy, or cases of weight for this presumption he seems to have upon one great name, when nothing else for aught appears, but Dr. Saunderson having resolved this case, hath given him the confidence to write in such an Imperious fashion as he hath done these sheets, upon a subject whereof he seems to have had so few thoughts before. As for that Dr. I have read his Lectures the obligatione conscientiae, and dejuramento, and the first body of his Sermons. I do believe him an excellent Casuist, and to speak freely wherein that excellence lies, a man of a clear head, but yet not for all that, of so searching a head, nor quite so learned as such a one as Rutherford, in his way; and by no means on the Earth, of so large a head, so great a wit, and incomparable sufficiency as Dr. Taylor. Well Dr. Saunderson in his ninth prelection puts this case, what if a Magistrate intends only his own profit or ambition in a law? does that bind? he answers yes. Because that though the Lawgiver may have an ill intention? the Law may tend to the common good. This is well resolved. In a case or two farther than he puts this other, what if a law be unprofitable to the public and something noxious? he answers it doth oblige, if the thing may be done without sin. This resolution is ill; for if the reason of the obligation in the former case was good, and the true right reason, then when there is not that reason, a law obliges not. If we must obey out of Conscience when a law does tend to the common good though the Lawgivers intention be bad, then though the Lawgivers intention be good, if the thing commanded tend not to the public advantage, the Conscience must not be obliged upon the same account. And thus Dr. Taylor resolves them both, it is in some transient passages, which I will not stand here to find out. But let us hear Dr. saunderson's reasons. The first is, Because every man ought to mind what belongs to his part and duty, and not trouble himself about other men's. But what reason is this? it does belong to every man to mind, yea and to consider and determine whether his Conscience be obliged by a law or no. His second is, Because our duty is to obey, not to command or ordain. And what reason is this? our duty is to obey if what is commanded be agreeable to God's will, else we cannot be obliged to it in Conscience though we do it. These two reasons indeed are twins, both Stillborn, and say nothing. The resolution is ill, and nothing is to be said for it. But what means he by these reasons? The subject is to obey the Law, not make the Law, and he troubles not himself to judge whether a thing be good in reference to the Magistrates act, but his own. If the law pass, he may obey it in the outward man whether it be civilly good or no, and not trouble himself. But if he come to the point, whether it bind his Conscience or no, he must consider, whether it hath the authority of God in it, and consequently, whether both it be Lawful, and conducive, to the public advantage. I may add (says the Debater himself,) though the Magistrate ought not to ordain any thing but what is for the people's good, yet when he doth otherwise, it will be more for their good to obey him, then refuse obedience. I answer if the Magistrate ought not to ordain any thing but what is for the people's good, then must the ordaining any thing not such, be against Gods will. But the Conscience cannot be obliged by any thing against God's will; or the Conscience is obleiged by nothing but by Gods will only. Ergo no Law or thing commanded us which is against the common good can oblige the Conscience; and so hath he cut his own throat here out of self conviction. Nevertheless as to what he says else, there is one remove yet this Debater sees not, and that is we distinguish between non obligation of Conscience, and disobedience; it may be that prudence, and such considerations as he urges, or others may prevail with a man in the outward action to o●ey, when yet he accounts himself free from any obligation on his Conscience.  
There is one thing after this. I feel upon my own mind. I find it not in these papers: but I cannot hardly be faithful if I omit it. It is this. Suppose a Father or a Master, bids me do a thing, I conceive it like to prejudice his affairs, and e●ve it undone: If this Father or Master be discreet, he will commend me for my care, and be so far from charging me with disobedience as that he will account I have done his will better than he declared it. Upon this I have been apt to determine that the commands of men, and Gods, do thus differ; The one binds unless I can give a reason which is more considerable for the forbearance then that which appears for obedience: the other binds both as the rule and reason itself for my action. I think again, suppose I tell this reason to this Father or Master, and they will not admit it, but require the thing to be done notwithstanding, the prejudice which shall accrue. If it be in heat I may do well yet to forbear, upon my belief that they will take it well; when their thoughts have cooled, and the Wisdom herein of many faithful servants have been proved. But if I be persuaded fully that they will be displeased presently, and not pleased after, it seems to me here I am bound to obedience in things not sinful, though they be commanded to my own and their hurt. I answer to this. In the first place it is sufficient that a Child, or a Servant is not indefinitely bound to do every thing they are bid, but that when they have such a reason as they judge their Parent or Master will be satisfied, and better pleased that they forbear the command, they may leave it undone. If their reason does not satisfy, they may be reckoned in the case of such as have no reason. In the second place when they have better reason to, forbear it then do it, I may hold that they are bound to doing only by virtue of the Authority residing in the Parent or Master's person, and that they may not 〈◊〉 hath been said about the Magistrate, will that otherwise they were free towards God in their Consciences, who accepts of no other but a reasonable provide. In the third place, I offer this, there is a diversity of Authority. The Government of Parents, and Masters is not the same with that of the Magistrates over the People. The Soverainnity in some Common wealths is in a single Person; in others it may be in the Nobles; in others in the Common body. That Government which i●●y a Monarchy is either Despotical or Royal. The Government of this Nation is a Royal Monarchy regulated by laws, These laws are 〈◊〉 by a Corporation of King, Lords, and ●●●m●nds, called the Parliament, wherein the three Estates are assembled to consult what is for the common good, now though we may suppose (without granting) that the subjects of a despotical Government who have no propriety of goods nor liberty of person (as children and servants are in the house) may be bound to do what the Lawgiver commands though it be to their common disadvantage, because he may command any thing for his will and pleasure only and not their goods: yet cannot we in our nation be so bound, because it is not to be supposed that the lawgiver does require any thing for his own will and pleasure, but for the common good altogether. To suppose otherwise is to suppose a change of the Government, from Royal to Despotical, which is a supposition to be abhorred The three Estates are assembled (says Sr. Tho. Smith de Rep. Ang.) to consult what is good, that is what is for the common good as before: and so long as this is their general end and intention, and the Law is the will of the Lawgiver, it appears that if any thing really be not for the common good, it hath none of their will and intention, and consequently does lay no obligation on the consciences of the people.   

CHAP. IU.  
I Proceed to that determination which he brings in opposition to mine, if I can find it, and know what to make of it when it is found. The case (says he about the beginning) depends on this single point, whether human Laws bind the Consciences. In resolving this, he acknowledgeth a difficulty. For if on the one side we say (saith he) the Conscience 〈◊〉 not concerned, I beseech you what is? nothing but our common discreton, to help ourselves out of the reach of the Princes Sword. So says Dr. Taylor. If Conscience be not obliged than nothing is concerned but prudence, and care that a man be safe from Rods and Axes. If on the other side we say that Conscience is obliged, then there may follow great perplexities when any thing is commanded, that proves an intolerable grievance. And this is also from Dr. Taylor, who does determine thereupon that in danger of death and intolerable grievance human Laws oblige not the Conscience to obedience. And what does this Debater determine? why truly when he comes to it at the end, The moral Divines and Lawyers (says he) do grant so. Well! These Divines and Lawyers are such as Dr. Taylor knows, but what says this evangellical Divine and no Lawyer himself? why he has said already that human Laws bind indefinitely, and he cannot find in his heart to go from it. Let me ask him then how comes it to pass, that he pretends to some better Medium then I have propounded in this Case? Those that say human Laws bind not the Conscience at all, and those that say they bind it indefinitely without distinction, are both in an extreme. I and Dr Taylor have a Medium: and what mean is that which this man will set up in opposition to us? Here I turn to the place in his sheets and I find his words come to these. I think good briefly to direct him in a better Medium then any that he hath propounded to find out the several degrees of sin against human Laws. Ridiculous! if this person would have offered us a better Medium to determine the Case in hand, we ought to have thanked him: but as for a Medium to this purpose. what is it to me? Is there any question or undertaking of mine about this in the least throughout the Case? If I had a mind to know the difference or degrees of sin against human Laws, I need not come to his I think good briefly, Dr. Taylor hath laid down at large Rules of distinction, or the measures by which we shall prudently conjecture, at the gravity or lessening of the sin of disobedience to human Laws. The truth is, if a man may guests at such a thing, this person as it is like upon the quotation, gets Dr. Taylor, where, in one place there being those Rules of distinction, and in another he finds, cautions for those that reduce into practise the rule he had laid down, that human Laws, not good, oblige not the Conscience, he apprehends these to be both good materials for the building something against me, but when he hath brought them here together into his books, there is no work for aught I see will come of them, and he may return them back where he had th●m. Here are a parcel of cautions, and notes of degrees of sin against laws, his cautions in the Dr. who giving liberty to the Conscience in some cases as not bound by human laws are very significant, that we may yet walk unblamably in such cases: but as for him who gives none, but makes the law of man to bind indefinitely, he hath nothing to do, but to require Universal obedience, upon the pain of sin, and can admit of no transgression under any caution what soever. His rules of distinction likewise, or of the degrees of sin against human laws, may have good use in the Dr. but how will they serve his purpose? the case (says he) depends on this single point, whether human laws ●ind the conscience. that is whether we sin, if we be not obedient to them? It follows then when this single point or question is resolved, that they do bind the conscience indefinitely, and that we do sin if we obey not, the point determined; and as for the discourse of the degrees of sin, it is another point, that never comes between us in controversy. In the mean while if this be the determination of the point which is single, what is become of the pretended difficulty? There is not the least difficulty in this case at all, if that be all the determination.  
Let us suppose the Negative extreme to what he holds, that the conscience were never concerned in human laws, and that to his words, I beseech you what then, it were replied though outward man, which politicly is bound, and may not resist, it were a question might require more consideration, whether every mans own security, and consequently the common discretion alone of all men, to keep themselves only from the danger they threaten, would not be a sufficient preservative of them: so far is this person wide who speaks so slightly, as if we should then care for the Princes commands not a straw, when we ourselves have known while we were boys, and made no conscience of the command of any, yet did we observe what we were bid more certainly through coercion, than the most of us God knows do now the divine precepts through the due conscience we own to them. And if so, there is the more reason for this Author to be considerate, how he bends thus to this other extreme, wherein he brings us into that open perplexity, which himself sees, but cannot find the way out, either with his distinction of sins, or ca●u●ons which will not suit his resolution of the question.  
Obedience is not to be denied (says he in the first of these cautions) but when a law is against the public good. This is the prime indeed of all the Drs. cautions, & what alone perhaps is enough to be regarded. For when the Dr. and I do both make this to be the determining distinction (though he hath not spoken indeed so dryly of it, through his large invention and multitude of matter as I do) between what does and what does not oblige the conscience, in the matter of human laws, if a man does but observe this caution, the main of his care is over in this business; he neither will, for the saving of his own damage, dare to neglect the public interest: nor will he omit obedience but when he can render a reason. The rest of his cautions I will not concern myself in, who have the same power to alter these, or frame others, to the over ruling truth I offer, as they had who at first did frame them; but as for this which I have named, the very proposing of it in the first place, when the Dr. brings it in after others, doth seem to carry in it some conviction on this person (when otherwise it no ways serves his purpose) that if a thing be not for the common good, it cannot in good earnest bind the conscience.  
For his distinction or degrees of sin, the main design of opposing my determination thereby being frustrate, let us see to what use else he can put it. That may stand him perhaps in some stead for his own excuse, which will not stand his reader in any for his satisfaction. This Debater than we know in his late books, having designed to expose the Nonconformist to derision and contempt, as much as he could, for the withdrawing the people from Schism, and recalling them to Church (to speak honestly of his end) hath thought it fit in his first book to b●gin his charge of these men with the breach of the Oxford Act, the charge is very high upon this, that they are not good Christians, not Ministers of Christ. To this end persisting in the same mind, through his books even to this Postscript of his appendix, he gives us these notes for the discovering of the greatness of a sin against human Laws, the Issue whereof comes to this, that though there may be several Instances of persons besides living in the breach of other statutes the sin of the Nonconformist against this act, must come under thos● more heinous aggravations, that when such are excused, yet as for th●se, we may find he had reason to say what he did, not to use any other than his own words. And what is that then he will acknowledge ●e hath said? I never said that no man can be a good Christian that transgresseth an Act of Parliament: nor that every transgression of a statute is a deadly sin: Those are inventions of his own upon occasion of a single Instance which I gave of defiance to a Law wherein some men live, mark my words, from whence he draws as Uninersall proposition. And does ●e say so. Let me turn to his book and see how he can come of thus. The Nonconformist, speaking of his Minister, the matter is thu● Ushered in; How can he be a Minister of Christ (says the Conformist) who is disobedient to his Sovereign, whom Christ blas to obey? And then Instancing wherein, he urges this Oxford Act, and concludes, therefore he is not a good subject, and consequently no good Christian or Minister of Christ. Let any man judge here whether these words, How can he be a Minister of Christ who is disobedient to his Sovereign? be not equivalent with this proposition. No man that is disobedient to his Sovereign is a Minister of Christ. With what face then can he accuse me with drawing an Universal proposition from his words, when there is one express in the book, and from thence this conclusion is deduced? I never said, does he mean these are not his very words? away I nor do I say they are, but does not what he says amount plainly to this very sense? I prove it. Therefore (says he) he is not a good subject, and consequently not a good Christian. I argue with him from hence this person is a man of Reason and Logic. Here then is a conclusion, no conclusion can be good but from an Universal proposition. This Universal proposition must be this, that whosoever i● disobedient to his Sovereign, or transgresses an Act of Parliament is no good Christian. And the Universal proposition in his book is this, which howsoever we understand (to help him out) that he means, whosoever transgresses any act of Parliament in such a high and heinous manner as the Nonconformist does the Oxford act, yet still is a Universal proposition: either this person therefore must renounce the words in his book as illogically or falsely concluded, which yet he cannot do, neither but by acknowledging the universallty, and the denying the truth of the proposition: or else he must be ashamed here of this unjust accusation of me, who have done but right to him. But if this denial will not serve him, he is no● destitute of other shifts. There is no occasion (says he) for thi● question whether every transgression of a Statute be no less than a deadly sin, unless he is of opinion that all sins are equal. By these words he does seem manifestly here to make some escape upon that term deadly sin, and then he must distinguish between sin and deadly sin, which no Protestant will allow him to do, who say that all si● is mortal; & there was nothing else intended by a deadly sin, but a sin that deserves or makes one guilty of death. Indeed if this Person can tell me of any little sin, in opposition to a greater, which a man may knowingly and wilfully live in, without repentance unto death, and it shall not damn him, or do him hurt, than I shall like well of his coming off here, upon this term: but if he cannot, then will not this serve, he must seek another shift. And what is that in the next place, for he is brought here into a shuffling condition, that is plain? why we must distinguish between a wilful living only, in the transgression of a law, and the living in the defiance of it. The instance I have (says he) is of the defiance of a law in which some men live. This word defiance therefore he hath up three or four times, besides the cotation in the margin, and bidding us mark the word. But I pray why must the Waggoner that every day transgresses the law concerning his Wagon, or any other the like instance, be accounted with this man only to live in the transgression of that law. and the Nonconformist in his non observance of the Oxford act be adjudged to live in the defiance of it? Alas! who does not see here into what a pitiful shifting case he is driven? or who does not perceive what is worse, that is, the animosity, pevishness, or overbe●tness (to speak with candour) of the man● mind against the Nonconformist, which does hinder him the coming off here with that ingenuity as he should do, which is by confession of several of his imprudent speeches, and craving pardon for the intemperance he hath used. But in the last place, there are still degrees of sin, and the man that breaks other laws may not be so deeply guilty as he that lives in the breach of the act at Oxford. Let us see then what he can allege for this. The more needful a Magistrate judges a thing to be done or avoided or the more his will is set upon it, the greater or less is the sin of him who breaks such a Law. Now he argues from the Preface and the Penalty of the Oxford act, how much the will of the lawgiver is set upon the observation of that act, unto which I answer, besides that Dr. Taylor doth toll us that the greatness of the penalty doth sometimes show the smallness of a thing that is forbidden (as tha● which else would not be regarded) and not the haniousness of the transgression: it does appear that the will of the law givers in that act, was set upon the Nonconformist taking the oath there prepared, as that they would have enforced them to by so great and present a danger, and was the thing which seemed to them so apt to prevent, the evil supposed in the preface, when as for their living within five miles of a corporation otherwise, we cannot think the minds of the Majority to be at all engaged in it. Now this Debater should have endeavoured to give the Nonconformist satisfaction in reference to his taking the Oath, if he would have served the State according as the will of the law-givert were then set, but this was a task which he hath declined, although he was put upon it, and directed to their objections, in the defence of the proposition.  
There is something after this, which may be said, that though this distinction, or degrees of sins will stand him in no advantage for the opposing my determination, or justifying his censure of the Nonconformist to be no good Christian, yet may it be of use to him to alleviate the harshness of his judgement in the main, that human laws do oblige the Conscience so as without discrimination he that observes them not, does sin. Hence when he proposes the case of a lawgiver enjoining a thing to some particular good, for the public, and it appears that he is mistaken, this Debater does continue still (such an obedient Soul has he above others) that though he be not bound to be of the lawgivers judgement, yet does he take himself bound (he means bound in Conscience) to follow his will even while it were better for the public it were other wife or dained. There are casts we know sometimes wherein by the change of things and occasions (as in Seiges) that which was for the public good does suddenly turn to its hurt. In such instances we are not to obey a law says Aquinas, which Dr. Taylor hath noted: and there is no doubt to me in the Case, where the lawgiver is mistaken in a matter, the like reason ought to prevail. But if he be thus resolved, let us know how the degrees of sin will help him out at a need. Let me suppose a poor man who is render in his Conscience and fears God, coming to this reverend Person and telling him this case. His Grandfather got ashkettle money, and built him a small Cottage on such a waste ground, his Father lived in it, and bestowed more cost of it, and hath left it him, where he and his wife and children have lived comfortably upon his labour: but now it hath so happened, that being the other day at his Masters where he wrought, he heard one read a certain book called the Friendly Debate where he perceived, about the very beginning that the Author was of the mind that a man could not live in the breach of the Law of the Land, and be a good Christian: and he hath understood long by his Father that it is against the Law for any cottage to be erected withot four acres of ground belonging to it. Upon this he being afraid of his condition in regard of his open living in a known wilful transgression of a statute of the Realm, wherein he cannot think but that it is a very plain defiance of alaw as that book speaks, he is come to him to see what he can offer for the receiving his Conscience. If this author here deal roundly and plainly with the man, he must tell him that there is no remedy but he must pull down his house, and he and his wife and children be turned to beging, rather than by his living in a known sin without amendment he should be damned. It he deal otherwise, than he may tell him that though indeed every transgression of a human Law be sin, yet there are degrees of sin, and this sin of his is a less sin than that of the Nonconformist living in the breach of the Oxford Act and therefore he should be of good comfort and go home in peace. I pray now will this indeed serve a Conscientious man: It is nothing to him that another's sin is greater than his, he is to look to his own soul, and if he lives in the least sin with full knowledge and consent, and hardens his heart in it, he cannot see how he should be saved. So that unless you satisfy him, and that upon good ground, that every transgression of a Law is not sin, and then show him how his transgression is but such a one you are not able to stand him in any stead in his Case. I remember a text of our Lord which I have often thought upon, that by a man's words he shall be justified and by his words he shall be condemned. The ●harises were men very holy in their profession and did tie very heavy burdens upon others, but when they were to perform the same themselves they were it is like backward enough: our saviour Christ therefore meets with them, for these shows without reality, and words without performance. Verily I say unto you that for every Idle word a man shall speak he shall give on account for it at the day of judgement. The word Idle in the Original as without work says Causabone de verborum usu 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is contracted of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every Idle word is every word without deed; and must import thus much (whatsoever it does more) that when men make strict professions, and determine so rigidly in points of duty, and do not answer their own dictates and say, let them take heed lest by their words (lest ex ore tuo) as being Idle words they bring not themselves into a just condemnation. I will therefore advise this worthy person, and all men in resolving Cases of Conscience that they take heed of setting down any matter for the binding of others, then according to which in their own practice they dare be content to be judged by. The determining the obligation of human Laws Indefinitely on the Conscience is more than any mortal can bear. For my own part I will protest that whilst I allow the Conscience to be bound, by the Law of men when those Laws tend to the common good, yet do I not hereby cut myself of from the reserve of any liberty that may arise to me from a farther disquisition: although I count it but necessary both to give my reason why in sincerity I hold so, and to deliver my conception of that obligation.  
It is a saying of the Ancients, a man is not born for himself only, but for his Country which is not writ only in Cicero, but in the heart of all men, for this is a truth throughout the earth, and delivered by God all along his word, while he makes our own selves to be the rule of our carriage towards our Neighbours, that we mind not our own things only, but every one the things of others. Though we study and seek the tranquillity and peace of those with whom we live: and consequently in all Societies and Communities, we should regard the public concern, even above our particular advantage. These are general moral precepts which are writ I say in the heart of man, and to be proved in God's word. The Magistrate I account now is God's Minister, to consider of, and then design and appoint the particular things or instances wherein every one in their several places are serviceable in these duties and ends; and upon that designation of the particular things, the obligation flows from those general precepts of God, upon the Conscience, for their observation. I say there is the general Institution of God for Societies, and that men in society shall mind and endeavour in their place the public concern, and not their own only. The Magistrate is his commissi●ted Officer to design appoint or set apart, and so declare the instances or particular things which are conducive to this good of the community which they all are bound to intent upon the designation, appointment or declaration of these things, the obligation flows immediately from the general institution of God upon the Conscience for the observing of them, when there could flow none else from these particulars themselves. The particular laws or things themselves we know are not the precepts of God, and the Conscience is obliged only by God's will; but the general institution of society, and that we should seek and endeavour in our place the good of the Public as our own, and above our own, in such particulars as be conducive truly to that end, is of God; and the Magistrate (I say) according to his office designing these particulars, we come (not ratione consequentis, or absoluté, only because such things commanded, but ratione conseq●●ntiae, or ex hypothesi, because such things commanded do come under the divine institution) to have the Conscience bound to their performance. From hence it follows likewise that if these instances or particulars do not indeed come under the service of these general duties or end, such a law is to be looked upon as cut off from God's institution, and so can have no authority derived to it from God, for the obliging the Conscience of any, when yet the outward man (out of the case of sin) is still acknowledged to be bound. The particular commands of the Magistrate does (I say) bind the outward man: but the general institution or the moral duty in general of seeking the welfare of the Public, and not our own only, is that which binds the Conscience which otherwise were not bound.  
As for the fifth Commandment, which requires honour and obedience (such as is meet) to our superiors, I do not here distinguish it from, but include it in this general institution, for that command must be understood as a comprehensive thing, containing in it the whole commission, the superior hath from God, which granting him his power to command, doth also set the bounds and limitations to that power, that he command no other things, or no otherwise then as he hath appointed: and upon supposition that the superior acts only according to his commission, that is, according to his prescribed duty, or rule in civil things, this Commandment of God do●● lay an obligation on the subject to obey him out of Conscience. If you will say upon this that the Magistrate hath a derived authority from God, for this very act of determining the material object of our obedience, and therefore besides the obligation which flows from his institution when the matter is determined, the Conscience must be obliged from the Magistrates determination itself, by virtue of that derived authority from him, I have no need to gain say it, and whether you will make it a double obligation, or an obligation from a double causality, or a mixed obligation divine and human, it matters nothing to our dispute, so long as God's authority in the things commanded, or his allowance that they be commanded be first acknowledged, before we look upon the Conscience to be indeed concerned in them. This is certain, every authority that is derived must be limited, and that according to the will of him from whence it is derived. The authority God reserves in his own hands is that alone which is unlimimited and infinite. Now the limits God hath set the Magistrate as to the determining the particulars of his subjects duty (which is his power of making laws) comes to this, that he choose them only out of that general matter that is conducive to the end of government, the public good (that is to observe the rule of things political): If he shall therefore appoint any particular things for his own profit, pleasure, or humour, which come not under this general matter, (to wit, quae habet rationem publici commodi) as God hath prescribed, it is manifest that he acts not according to his commission, and so can have no power derived from thence, for those acts or laws, and consequently however such laws do bind us in his courts, they are of no validity in the court of Conscience. We will acknowledge in whatsoever he commands an authority divine for his Office and so if he will inflict the penalty we must not resist. But we can not acknowledge God's authority in this or that exercise of his office. that we should do the thing out of Conscience. In short, we are indeed bound upon the penalty of his law, (if you will) but we are not bound upon the pain of sin, to obey the Magistrate in every case.  
I must profess here in the words of truth, and soberness that so far as so mean a person as I am can discerns there is a great deal of darkness hath spread itself upon the face of the earth, and more especially over many learned men, who when they have forsaken that light which they have flowing immediately from God, on their hearts to to seek unto the Cisterns of others works and books, they have been not only misled themselves, but bereft us of many truths of the clearest evidence, and greatest concernment, such as this particularly concerning the obligation of human laws, how, when and how far the Conscience of man (which belongs directly only to the Regiment of God's its or can be bound by them. If we will therefore but go as near as we can to the fountain, and look into our own minds, into all which God shines according to a several measure with his light, though he influence but some with his saving grace, we may find, that as we are instructed in matters of Religion to seek unto supernatural revelation, and so to account that whatsoever is agreeable to the rule of God's word is obliging to the Conscience, and what is not cannot oblige us as worship: and as in matters of morality, what is and what is not agreeable to the law of nature, does or does not oblige us as virtue or vice: so in these matters which are of a cival or political concern only, we do find that the rule which God almighty hath written in the heart for us to judge by, and is the supreme law in such matters, (which in words also is famously acknowledged) is the common good: so that according as any thing commanded in human laws is agreeable or not, to that rule which is God's rule for these things, the Conscience is bound or not bound by the same. Nay as things are not only religiously or morally good and evil according as they agree and not agree with the word of God, and the moral law in the heart, but the more or less they agree with the rule, the more or less good or evil are they: so the more or less any thing commanded in a law doth agree with the supreme rule of God, or law, in these political things, by so much the greater or less is the sin of not observing them. So short indeed is this Person and others in their notes of the degrees of sin against human laws, that the formal difference itself of these aggravations or diminutions in respect to the conscience (whereof alone Divines should speak when this man's differences from the will of the law giver, belongs to the Lawyer) is not considered. And now when it hath pleased God Almighty by so inconsiderable a vessel, and in such a kind of careless and unregarded expression, (which others may mend) that the excellency of the truth may appear to be the more from him, to deliver to the world this law of his, to govern and resolve men in these cases, I do not know how few, or how many there be that will receive it. When Moses went up to God into the Mount, and brought down the law of the two Tables, it was a glorious matter? there is no man can go up to God now in that manner: but every one may go to him, (if we search after him who is not far from any of us as Paul speaks) as he dwells in that light which he hath put into our hearts, and from thence (as one who hath been conversing there rather then with the videturs of men) have I brought you down this law, or rule of his will in Politicalls, which though the generation of men no where, even amongst the most savage, is without, yet have they taken notice of it so little hitherto, that waxing vain in their own imaginations, they have not understood, when they have acknowledged, that this indeed is the supreme law to all others that are human, by which they must be tried, approved overruled, and according to which, and to which alone, can the Conscience of any be obliged in their obedience which they yield to these matters.   

CA V.  
THere remains the last thing I have to do, which is the survey of this Debaters exceptions, or other passages not yet considered, and to say something to them according as they are of moment. This general does contain the principle thing the Debater stands upon, and which requirers the larger field for my debate with him, I shall divide that one business, therefore into three succeeding Chapters, and leave a last for the rest.   

CAP. VI  
THe great and principal exception he hath, and which will deserve the pains, is upon a question which comes in as necessary to be asked upon my determination, and it is this. It being supposed, and to be granted, that the will of God is that alone which does oblige the Conscience, and that according as a thing commanded in human Laws does conduce to the public good or not, so is it agreeable or not to his will: the question is who shall be judge, whether a thing commanded by a Law be for the common good or no, and consequently agreeable to Gods will and obligatory to the Conscience. I answer every Man must be Judge on necessity himself in reference to his own action. I prove this. Every Man must judge of his own actions whether they be agreeable to the will of God or no. But to judge whether a thing commanded by a Law be agreeable to God's will, is to judge whether it be conducive to the common good or not. Therefore every Man is judge himself, whether a thing commanded be for the public good or no, in reference to his own action. Again, to judge whether we are bound in Conscience to any thing commanded in a Law, is to judge whether it have God's authority or not. But a Law or any thing commanded by a Law hath God's authority or not, according as it is conducive to the common good. Therefore a Man must judge, whether that which is commanded him in a Law be for the common good or not, to judge whether he be bound or not bound to it in Conscience. I must needs say there are some have had occasion to be more ready to resolve this question, than otherwise they have desired. We have had late impositions, and thought many times in what sense they might be taken. We have come quickly to see, if they be taken, it must not be in any sense of our own, we can frame, which were most lose; but it must be in the imposers meaning. This meaning is not certain, but some have believed thus and some otherwise. In the upshot than this is that I have been brought, in my last thoughts, to conclude, that if a Man after the best means he can use for the understanding the Imposers meaning, can take what is imposed in that sense which he verily believes in his own heart to be their meaning, he shall do well and aught to take it; if he cannot, he must for bear and choose to suffer. Being thus prepared in order to the determining a man's own act, about the taking an imposition, when the question lies upon the meaning of the Lawgiver, and the subject I count being changed only into his general end in this, I had no cause to stick here, where there is but one and the same answer to be given to all such questions. To wit, that notwithstanding there may be several good cautions of thinking reverendly of our superiors judgements, and not leaning too much on our own, with the like words used in the way, we must come to this result at last, that according as every man for his own part (after the best enquiry or exercise of his reason he can make) does believe in his very Conscience whether the thing commanded in a Law be for the public good or no, I mean it in reference to his own doing it, that is most plainly according as he believes in his own soul that the doing the thing which is commanded (by his example or otherwise) is conducive to the public good or not, so must he account it agreeable or not to God's will, and his Conscience accordingly be bound, or loosed in regard to the performance.  
I will convince the Debater from his own mouth and from the thing itself.  
From his own mouth we have a Case hath fallen very luckily before mentioned. What if Magistrate mistake in a Law, and the matter be not conducive to that end for the public he ordained it? He answers he is not bound to be of the Magistrates opinion, but may judge it better the Law were otherwise, yet thinks he is bound to obey it. But if this man and so another may be, and is, of a contrary opinion to the Magistrate, that the thing commanded is not for the public benefit, as he acknowledges in that Case of his own putting, then hath he acknowledged in effect all that for which he cavils so much at me upon my answer to this question.  
For the thing itself, In the first place no mortal man on Earth, can have power to make me, or him, or any understand, to think, or believe otherwise then we do. If I do think then, that such a thing commanded be not for the common good, so I shall think, and must think do what the Magistrate can, or myself either. And it 〈◊〉 do believe so then do I judge or believe that i● is not according to Gods will, and consequently that I am not bound in Conscience 〈◊〉. If you say I should not think so, it is unlawful to judge so, you contradict this man, who says, he is not bound absolutely to be of the Lawgivers opinion, that all such things are for the public good as he decrees; which is as truly, as stoutly said against himself, for the matter will not bear it to be otherwise. In the second place, Conscience is a faculty which God hath put into Man, to judge of his own actions, in reference to his approving or condemning him for them. Whatsoever actions then are accountable unto God at the great day, are to be judged at present by Conscience. We are accountable now no doubt to God for our civil actions, as well as others; and when in matters that are civil, those things have or have not his approbation, as they do, or do not conduce to the common good, it follows that every man must judge of the things commanded him, whether they be or they be not to the common good, that he may be accountable unto God, according to what he is bound or not bound in Conscience by them. In the third place our Protestant Divines in their cont oversy which the Papist Do judice, do allow to every man a judgement of private discretion which is the same with this judgement of Conscience, that what means soever we use for our information, we must be the last judges ourselves of the things we do, whether they are agreeable to Gods will or not, and according to our own belief must resolve upon the practice or forbearance of them. It seems to me now a thing unreasonable and injurious unto mankind, if we shall take away from the subject this judgement of private discretion in things that are political which we cannot but allow them in all other their moral and religious actions. If there be an infallible judge in Civils we may expect one in religions matters. But if there be no Pope nor Counsels but may err in their Canons, there are no Lawgivers but may err in their Laws, and there is no cause why any should indeed be more shy of granting the subject this judgement of discretion in reference to what the Prince hath Enacted, any more than what the Church hath declared, but only that they could not so well tell the rule to judge of things Civil as they could to judge of Doctrines and moral Precepts. As God therefore hath given us the Scriptures for a rule of religion, that when any thing is required of us to believe or practise as necessary to God's worship or our salvation, we may and are to try it, by this rule, and can be obliged thereby no farther than we do judge it agreeable to this rule: and as in morals he hath given the law of nature for our rule: so hath the Almighty given to man his rule also in things political (which he hath written in his fleshly tables, as sure as there is any law of nature, and that is God's will, as the scripture is) whereby the Laws of every Commonwealth are to be tried and judged, the Lawgiver being accountable to God according as he acts by it, and the People obliged in Conscience, so far to obey his will as he commands agreeably to it: and this Rule or Law as I have before said, is the common good. Things are religiously good or evil as they agree or agree not with the Scriptures. Things are moraly good or evil as they agree or agree not with the Law of nature. Things politically good or evil as they agree or agree not to the public advantage. If I am commanded any thing about my religion I will go to the Scripture, if that commands me otherwise I cannot obey it. I will go to the moral Law in matters of virtue and vice. In political things, or things required by human Laws, I must go to this rule I have proposed: I must judge of them as good or evil in their kind by that. If my doing the thing will not answer the rule, I am not bound in Conscience to active obedience. In the last place if this be not granted, when you allow the subjects to be reasonable agents in things religious, or moral, that may bring what is superior command's of that nature to the rest of God's will, you turn them into bruits in things civil while they may bring what they are commanded to no test, in relation to their own actions. If you deny me my judgement of private discretion, you will not let me act as a man. Indeed this person will have the liberty to judge otherwise then the Magistrate does, and yet be bound in Conscience to obey, which is to be beneath a bruit, for the best act spontaneously, and follow the dictates of their sense, if they be not hindered. But this man will have his judgement one way, that the thing is not good, and his will and actions another way, and that not upon constraint from without, but upon the principle of Conscience, which is a contradiction against all good sense. But as for others and this man too otherwhere (who makes it a placing ourselves in the throne to determine otherwise concerning the public welfaer, than the proper judge of it doth, so consistent is he with himself, and such need hath he to be angry if one advise him to be more reflective● on what he writes 〈◊〉 that will not let us have a judgement different from the Lawgiver, and so to act only upon theirs, they make men to become Horse as the and the Mule, upon whom the rider gets up, and they must go on, the why, and the whither as the driver pleases. But if this be the Issue which this man's opinion will lead us to, and this son of Circe should expect by the conjuration of these few leaves to transform us presently out of our humanity, that we should be content to be governed hence forward without, the exercise of our own reason, or assent that is, not to act out of election, but to be moved in civil obedience only as we are driven, we shall have little cause to be very forward to hearken to him. He may lay down his Pen and take a Whip in his hand and go Whistle.  
But let us hear his exceptions to this answer. Who shall be judge whether a Law be for the public good or no. His answer is ready at his Tongue's end, for he needs not go deep for it. The Magistrate must judge, what is for the public good for the making the Law, and we must judge as to our obedience to it. Then which it is hard to write any thing more inconsiderate and dangerous. I do acknowledge this to be my judgement, and for which I have offered here some reasons, and it is not his saying this answer is inconsiderate and dangerous aught to prejudice it, if it be well advised, and there be no danger indeed in it. For neither doth this man know the previous thought on other occasions upon which this hath been set down: nor hath he yet understood the state of my opinion right, that he should charge it with any of those consequences, as are but the Lions, and the Bears, the Chariots and the Armies, that fly in the Clouds of his own Imagination. But let us hear the reason of this wonderful decision which he hath as ready as he had his answer. Because saith he every man is made by God the judge of his own actions, I cannot for my life see how that follows from this, though I have put his reasoning into the plainest form that ever I could. It is pity but this man's life should be saved, and therefore I will tell him my reasoning Those Laws, I was showing, which be not for the common good are not agreeable to God's will, or have not his Authority, and so bind not the Conscience. The question upon this was as it is set down, and the answer and the reason with the addition of the words following. Because God hath made every man judge of his own actions, and consequently of all circumstances, whether they are agreeable or not to his will for his forbearing or doing of them. If God then hath made every man judge of those things which he is to do in all the circumstances, whether they be agreeable or not to his will, then must he judge whether those things that he is commanded to do in human Laws be for the common good or no, because those Laws only are agreeable to his will (I had laid down before) which are for the common good, and those that are not are devoid of his Authority and bind not the Conscience. This I deny not to be my very substance, and as the reasoning is manifest, and will appear so (I doubt not) to the indifferent, so must it not be thought to be inculcated too often, either there, or here, seeing no man can stand safe in dispute, but he that knows what is, and when he is upon his foundation. For the man's disdainful expressions I have (I account) my satisfaction, and he his sufficient reproof, that he hath no more cause for them. It is not sense to say the Magistrate must judge what is for the public good in reference to his act of making the Law, and we in reference to ours of obedience to it; for he doth not only judge but enjoin, when he makes a Law; which leaves us no liberty but to judge whether his will and Gods do not clash together. And why is not this sense, what reason is this that 〈◊〉 is not sense? if he could have said the Magistrate does enjoin, and not judge at all before he enjoins it, than he might have pretended to say thus. But if the Magistrate must not enjoin any thing before he hath considered, and judges it to be for the common good, and if he doth enjoin any thing that is not for the common good he hath no Authority from God for it, then does it appear necessary, that we do consider likewise, and judge whether it be for the common good, and have his Authority, or else we cannot be bound in Conscience to it. And thus you see very good sense, evidence and fullness in this answer to the question and that the Magistrates will, declaration of his will, or enjoining a thing, does not take away our liberty and duty, to consider when he hath enjoined it, whether we be yet in Conscience in obliged, or in prudence only, and the outward man to obedience. The mistake of this person is that he thinks we may not judge of a Law, but only whether it be against Conscience, when we must no doubt judge also whether it be obliging to Conscience, or otherwise how shall we make Conscience of it? We are not to judge only whether it clasps with Gods will, but whether it agrees with it. If the Magistrates will be not against God's will, yet if it hath not his will and authority with it, it is not obligatory to the Conscience. The Magistrates will binds not asunder from Gods, In morals the case is not thus, whatsoever is not according to Gods will is against it: But in civil and indifferent things a thing may not be against his will, that is against any moral precept (as our obedience I speak of to some human Laws) and yet have none of his Authority for it. Thus prudence, the preservation of myself, and the Magistrates honour, may prevail with me to do a thing which I think otherwise I have no obligation to do in my Conscience.  
I will yet add. I distinguish my obediénce, and my obedience out of Conscience, or my obedience out of other general rersons, and my obedience out of Conscience, to this particular command. I do not resolve my obedience, into a judgement of private discretion whether a Law be for the common good or no, for I can apprehend easily that when God hath required the Magistrate to make no Law but according to this rule, no unjust, or unprofitable Law, he hath not yet commanded that I should never obey such a Law. I may obey out of a general implicit apprehension of duty; or a singular love to my superiors person, for fear of his displeasure: to avoid the danger of the Law: or out of several prudential considerations, regarding the Magistrate, myself, or others: when yet If I come to the point, whether I am bound in Conscience to do the particular thing commanded, that is whether there lies a divine obligation on me as well as that from the Law to do it I am on necessity then to examine it, by the rule which God hath set me, and that being no other but the common good in politicalls, I must resolve my obedience out of Conscience into this judgement, when I resolve my prudential obedience otherwise. It may suffice me therein, so long as the thing is not sinful, that I am obliged by man. It may be but very rare if. I question my Ruler's commandment, which is like to be only perhaps in some grievous pressure. If the Law be bad, my obedience yet and my example may do good, nor does the Magistrates abuse of his office I hope take away my liberty to endure it if I please. The true ends moreover happily of obedience, may be obtained, when the end of Ruling is neglected. Nay the common good may be promoted possibly, by my yielding to a Law when the Law itself does cross it. And farther my disobedience may do more hurt to the common good than the obeying that hurtful command would do. So fare am I from discouraging any from obedience to human Laws (as a thing generally good and prudential) when I would keep the Conscience free, and not have it burdened with sin for every want of their performance. I see indeed by this and other learned persons, what an imagination they have got, that if I resolve the question whether I am in Conscience obliged to obey such a Law, by my private judging of the thing commanded whether it be agreeable or not to the common good I do usurp the place of the Ruler and make myself only my own Lawgiver, as they are apt to speak. But this is a mistake, for besides that when I judge of the thing commanded by its Rule, this judgement of mine is not the maker of my duty but the discerner of it, and so I do not become any Lawgiver to myself in the business: I distinguish the obligation of a human Law, and the obligation of Conscience (formaliter. & simpliciter) by that Law. If I resolved the whole obligation of human Laws into this Ru●e, and my judgement of the Law by it, so that I held it must never be obeyed on other reasons, or that if I were punished for not obeying, I was not bound to submit, than did I offer injury indeed to my Ru●er and usurped his Government. But if I resolve only the obligation of my Conscience by that Law into this rule, and my judgement of it accordingly, I usurp no power of the Magistrates, which I leave him still over the exterior man, but I keep God only as I ought in his own feat of the Conscience. And verily if the Conscience of man be concerned in every human law, I would fain know, how any of our great Clerks can say that human laws bind not in the case of intolerable griveance. If God does command me to do the thing, it is not any griveance of mind can excuse me, but if it be man indeed commands it only and not God, the griveance will be reason enough for me to call it in question, and to avoid it if I may; but the reason of my nonobedience, must not have this foundation, that it is my grievance, or that I cannot endure it, but that consideratis considerandis, I am not obliged to it in Conscience.   

CAP. VII.  
THus far his exceptions are but words, let us pass now to his reasons against my answer.  
His first reason is, It is no easy thing to judge what is best for the People's good, Kings themselves find it necessary to have their Councets to advise about it. To judge what is best for the People's good is indeed a high matter. To judge only whether a thing be for the common good or not, is another matter. The judgement of every one is free, and any body may judge of any thing as he is able, and as he will. The Cock may pass his judgement on the Pearl he scraped up. That which comes to carry any stress upon judging, is the consideration of the effect that depends upon that judgement. The judging of a thing which a Man himself hath to do, hath this effect depending on it, the doing his duty, every one is to judge of all those things and circumstances which belong to his own acts, whether or no they be agreeable to God's will, that he may do as he ought; and the rule of this will in politicals, I have declared. There is the act now of the Magistrate, and the act of the Subject. There is a great difference of the concern or moment that lies on a judgement of the same thing when the act of the one depends upon it, and when there depends upon it the act only of the other. The act of the Magistrate is to make the law, and see it executed; the act of the People is to obey it. By this first reason of his against my answer, do I see good reason for it, and the sufficiency of it. The Magistrate judges whether a thing be for the common good, or according to our supreme rule in reference to his passing it into a law, and then to cause it to be executed. The People and every particular person does judge, whether the thing commanded be for the common good, in reference only to the obligation of their Consciences to obedience. Upon the judgement of the Magistrate, there does depend an effect of universal concernment, that is the obligation of a whole Nation to live according to the Law he makes, upon the judgdement of each particular when the law is made, there depends no concern but a man's own, and that respecting his inward man only. Now its certain that the Magistrate in regard of such an effect as depends upon his judgement, hath need indeed of the greatest wisdom, and the ablest Council, and he cannot be too cautions in his proceeding, seeing if he be mistaken, and the Consciences of the Subjects be not obliged by such a law, yet are their persons liable to be compelled and they must not resist, which may prove a vast inconvenience, and to be avoided only by a right information at first about the matter. But as for a private person who judges not what is best for the people's good (as he speaks right in regard to the Magistrate) but only judges of the thing commanded whether it be agreeable or not to the will of God, or the rule of his (which he hath given to the world about Politicals, if they forget not to mind it, to wit) that it be in ●eneral for their good, the effect which (I have said) does attend such a judgement, is of that nature only as requires no greater understanding or discretion, than every man hath for himself to act by in all the rest of his life and conversation. He judges here according to his Rule in these things, as he doth in other of his actions according to the word whether he be bound or not bound in Conscience to them. And God requires of him to judge and act but according to his talon in all business whatsoever. He will acknowledge the outward man to be bound, and in a matter of his soul which concerns no body but him, or the inward obligation of his Conscience, you must leave him to God and his own Judgement.  
His next reason is, That when Men know what is conducing to their good, they are not apt to do it without a Law. And what does this prove or contradict? It proves it good therefore that the people have a Lawgiver or Governor, and that he should be wiser and better than they, as Plato may urge it: But does it follow they may not therefore judge, whether the thing commanded be for their good; Surely this will be a good reason why the people should judge of it. For if the good they conceive in it, is the reason they admit to have any Law, and the argument to press them to obey it, then must they judge of that good, and whether it be conducive to that good or not. In the mean while the difference of the reason and ends, (which is distinguished, in the Magistrates judging of a thing to be for the common good or not, and the people's does sufficiently declare the weakness and vanity of such speeches, as this Man hath several of. He that makes every Man judge of what is for the people's good, takes away the principal power of the Magistrate. And why so? as if it were an act of power, and that usurped for any but the Prince to have a judgement of discretion over his civil actions. Again, if the people be able to judge of that there is no need of any Law or Lawgiver. As if when men knew their duty they needed no Magistrate to make them do it, and that while himself too is telling us the need of Laws, because men a●e not like to prefer the public good though they comprehend it, before that of their own particular persons. I cannot I perceive, be throughly intent to answer what is insignificant, but the substance in the main of these two reasons comes to this, that every man is not able to bring the thing commanded by the Magistrate to the rule, so as to judge whether it be for the common good or not, and therefore they must act only upon the judgement of the Lawgiver, and consequently be no reasonable agents, in their Political obedience. For satisfaction therefore to this, Let us conceive the Magistrate commanding something moral or Religious, there are no Protestants but do hold that every man for himself must bring here what is commanded to the rule of the moral Law and Scripture, and according as himself believes it consonant or not to the rule he judges it, so is he bound to obey it or not to to obey it. Now let any man who hath but the heart to think and speak with integrity, consider whether a rude and illiterate man that never could read a word in the Bible, be more able to judge whether a thing commanded by the Magistrate be agreeable or not to the word of God; or whether it be conducive or not to the common good? suppose the Waggoner as unlearned as any man, I will ask whether such a man be not more able to judge of the Law concerning Wagons, that is whether it be good for the high ways and consequently whether he had best or not observe the act, then to judge whether the Doctrine and Discipline of the Church of England, or whether whatsoever is contained in the whole Book of Common Prayer with the Rites and Ceremonies, be agreeable or not to the Scriptures of the old and New Testament? I suppose there is no man will have the hardiesse to oppose such a manifest conviction. And if in regard to his practice, this man and every other that uses the Common-prayer must judge as well as he can of the lawfulness of it, or else he cannot act in faith: and so likewise of all those doctrines or practices he yields unto them, then will there I hope be no stumbling block left here upon this account, I do advance therefore and rest upon this one argument, if the incapacity, unfitness, or little ability that some men have to judge of what is required by the Magistrate, whether it be agreeable or no to the common good, be a reason sufficient for the denying to the subject such a judgement: then must the lesser ability of such to judge whether that which is required be agreeable to the word of God, be a reason sufficient to discharge them from judging of it by the word. But the consequent is false, and therefore the antecedent. By the way, observe, if any man distinguish between judging of a Law whether it be for a common good: and judging of the thing commanded by a law, or rather of a man's own doing the thing commanded, whether it be for the public good or not, I am to be understood of the last, when I say the Magistrate judges of the thing in reference to his passing it into a law and we judge of it so passed in reference to our obedience or obligation by it.  
His third reason is the same with the first. The people are so far from being able to judge, that the wisest Princes find it difficult, only we have more words for the enlargement; which consist partly in a grave kind of discourse from a passage of a Bishop Bramhall, of the several things and circumstances that the Lawgiver is to weigh in his making of a law, which the people cannot consider and attend unto: and then in an idle descant upon this, that it is not fit therefore that laws should be suspended till the subjects be agreed they are for their good, with the like words, as if there were any indeed ever dreamed that a Lawgiver, who is with us the Parliament, could not make a law until they had consulted the people first, whether they all of them judged the matter such, that if it were passed into a law, they should be bound in Conscience to the performance, and before they had an affirmative answer from them (who must be made loath too to be satisfied about it) they could pass no act or statute of the Realm. This is the sense in which this man let his pen run here, and then concludes. The Prince is in an ill case who hath such subjects, and he is not in very good, whose Divines begin to instill such doctrine into them If there be any thing in those more words and the same reason that seems of moment, it is already answered I count by distinguishing the part of the Lawgiver, the subject, whose judgement of a thing commanded in a law already passed, for the satisfiying himself whether he be obliged in Conscience to the doing, can by no means prejudice the act of the Lawgiver in the passing the law as is manifest, nor does it throw it down being passed. For this is a mistake in this person very palpable, as if a human law could not be of force unless a man's Conscience be obliged by it. I observed this in him before where he said, Laws while they do oblige tie the Conscience, and that the cause of his error was the want of present knowledge to distinguish between Political and moral obligation. The obligation which is on the Conscience is moral and can be no other, and passes on it I have said from God's institution of our general duty: but the obligation which is Political belongs to the outward man and may stand good when the moral ceases, and for as much as this obligation of the outward man itself does so arise from the commandment of God for subjection, and that we should not resist, it may appear to the impartial that will consider aright of what is said, that the question or single point between this man and I concerning the obligation of human Laws, in reference only to the conscience, is really and in good earnest very little or not at all material to the Magistrate, or the civil Government, which way soever it is determined. And when there are so many learned men of divers sorts who exercise their liberty in maintaining the opinion of either extreme without control or prejudice to the world, it's a thing hardly becoming either a temperate mind, or modest Learning, or that I should have most expected from this Author a free Theology, to express himself in this manner, as if a man could not endeavour the finding out a middle way that is so needful in such a controversy but he must be adjudged one that is broaching of something against the State, and deserved correction.  
His fourth reason is, Grant the subjects such a power (that is, a power only of judging of their own civil acts) and in a little time no law shall be observed. He proceeds, Taxes will not be paid. He goes on. There will be Insurrections and Rebellion. Upon this, he brings in certain narrations, of the Subsidy of Head money in Richard the Seconds time and what followed; of the aid granted to Henry the Seventh in his third year and the Northern Rebellion; then of a subsidy in his thirteenth year when the Cornish-men took up arms, then of the case of Henry the eight about Aliens, and of one John Lincoln a Broker that was hanged. See more in a certain dialogue between a Couceellor of state, and a Justice, he has in his study; for this it is for the man to light on a new book, he must by all means be teling us of what he was reading last. And thus had we at the beginning of these Papers from the tenth argument of Bellarmine against Image worship, the relation of the Iconomachi and what befell them in the time of Leo Isaurus; in the time of Constantinus Copronomus; in the time of the horrible cold and freezing of the Pontic Sea, the drought after, and the death of the Emperor, The man hath a strange fruitful application. This brings to my remembrance an advice once I received from an ingenious and prudent Woman, who seeing me over engaged in dispute sometimes with an Anabaptist, who was a man of much talk and being not willing I should be so much concerned: you must not says she, argue with these men in the way you do; you lay down the subject, and speak upon that, and then think to hold them to it, and are moved when they speak from the point, and so are confounded; but you should (says she) give them leave to speak so long until you can lay hold on something that they say, and whatsoever it is, you must speak of that; and by this means while you take them up still upon their last words, whether it be to the point or not, you will never want matter no more than they do, and by the use of their own weapon may deal with them. I must profess if this man who hath so apt an expression, do come to get this knack of it, as he appears to have in these continuations and apendix, he may continue his continuations while he lives, and I know no body able to dispute with him, unless I could light on the fellow that would preach with any body, but it should be (he said) in a Negative way, And Peter went to Antioch. He went not to be drunk, here he speaks of drunkenness, gluttony, and all manner of excess. He went not to lie with women, there he speaks of fornication, and uncleanness and all other deadly sin. But he went to preach, there he speaks of the Scriptures from Genesis to the Revelation, of the Fathers the Schoolmen, the Counsels, and all the books that ever he read to this day.  
For the reason itself without its appurtenance, I have I account prevented it in the state of my opinion. The state alone of what I have said, will wipe off any such mistaken consequence, which he would injuriously bring upon it. It is one question whether we are to observe a law: & another whether we are bound in Conscience to observe it. The question between us in the bottom of the point is not concerning outward observation: but the inward obligation of Consciences. And the truth is as I was saying at the close of the other reason, that this business does not really concern the Magistrate, or the Commonwealth directly at all (though indirectly and ex consequenti any thing may concern any body) for what is it to the Magistrate or the community, so long as he can enforce the thing to be done if he will, whether a man does do it out of Conscience, or out of discretion only: out of fear of God, or fear of the law, or his sword. The Magistrate cannot take any cognizance out of what principle a man acts; the judgement is not within his jurisdiction, and if a man doth not act out of Conscience, he cannot make him. It is sufficient, so long as a man acknowledges his authority from God, that he must therefore be subject and must not resist, and consequently if in good earnest he stand upon it, and will have obedience from him, let it be in any thing but sin, there is no help for him that is, he may not help himself by resistance) but he must yield to it, whether he will or no. This is that which secures government, and Governors. Let every man be held bound in Conscience but thus far, and as for the rest, it is a matter concerns each one's own soul only and his private peace, and it will become those that are prudent to be very tender what they determine in the business.  
It is true this reverend Person thought I believe he had spoken well in his saying, that it is hard to write any thing more inconsiderate and dangerous then that I have: but if a man should write any word against subjection to Magistracy, or his own present Magistrate, or that it were lawful to resist if the Magistrate should impose any law against the common good (when yet it is not sin, I account many times not to obey it, and escape if we can without resistance), this let me tell him were dangerous (I cannot say more dangerous because the other is not dangerous,) that the man may receive some shame and conviction for his own being so inconsiderate in his censure of what he understood no better. This Debater shall not have I will warrant him, a breath or Title of this nature from me. Nay if a law be good I mean politically good (and a law is politically good where it is for the common good,) I am ready to believe and hold it is obliging, obliging to the Conscience, not only that we must obey rather than resist (which we must do if the thing be politically evil, unless we count suffering to be better) but if we could escape with man, we must yet do it, I count lest we offend God, if a law be not politically good, I say we must not resist for all that, and upon that account rather than suffer we are liable to obedience. And what is there now, or what reason is there that any should desire more. Let us here our man of Proverbs. A man must not resist (says our Casuist) that is express, and rather than resist he must suffer, but this is to steal a goose, and stick a feather; I thank him first for this, that he hath not left out this passage wholly in this place, lest his Reader else might have thought me indeed some dangerous person, whereas these words have acquitted me; and I answer, that this Goose he speaks of my stealing, is the thing ought to be stolen or removed, and that which he makes so light of, is to be brought in the Room of it, to wit, this man is of opinion that human laws even all laws indefinitely bind the Conscience, so that a man must sin if he break any of them, This is his Goose, that is, his foolish opinion, an opinion intolerable: and instead of this, that which I would bring in is, that though we conceive there be some laws, which if a man sometimes observes not, he is not to charge himself with sin, yet if he be compelled by the lawful Magistrate, rather than resist he must suffer, and rather than suffer obey. But why must he (says he) when he is already persuaded that he need not unless he be forced? this is strange! where is this Debaters' reason! I say he must, though he should not sin else by neglect, because he is forced, and cannot help it, but for avoiding of suffering, he does it. But wrath or suffering is not to be feared when the multitude is agreed not to be injured. I answer here is the want of the distinction which this author would not take from me, between the authority which is in the Magistrate's Person, and that of his commands. The one is from God immediately, the other mediately by virtue of the things commanded being for the common good, and so particulars of that general moral duty which is required of God. Some may use other words to express this distinction by the Magistrate's authority itself, and the exercise of it in his commands or laws: but this must be known that distinguish we must here to the same sense I intent, and be very careful too of the distinction or we shall be lost. If the multitude be agreed not to do a thing that is ill, it is well I take it, and as they ought, it was manifestly Jonathans' case. But if they agree together not to suffer, if the Magistrate will enforce the thing, let there be but the least Officer will act in it, than they resist, and sin against God, and it is not justify able upon any terms, suppose a whole army and but two men in it will stand by the Prince, he may. I must affirm to speak strictly on the point of Conscience, by these two men alone, punish a whole army for any thing they refuse to do, and they must bear it, and cannot help themselves, but with sin which they must not do. For he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and receiveth to himself damnation. We know the case under Maximinian, when a whole legion of Christians were commanded to sacrifice, and they chose rather to suffer decimation twice over, being executed man by man, rather than defend themselves while their lives were at stake, and the sword was in their hands. Such a Conscience ought we to have of our subjection (and so much does the concern of government and the whole World lie upon it,) when of obedience as to some particular commands we need to have none. In short there lies no obligation upon Conscience sometimes to obey, but there does always not to resist, and that both serves the Magistrate turn, and suffices when he pleases to have a civil thing done.   

CAP. VIII.  
I will not yet leave his last reason, seeing he lays so much stress on it, and his strength of all comes to this. I do not take here his very words, but matter which he may express as he will otherwise. The People must not be allowed to judge of their own actions, which are commanded by the Magistrate about civil things, because they will be swayed by their own interests, and judge those Laws against the public good which are not for their private profit: by which means unless they be taught and hold that all Laws indefinitely do bind their Consciences, they will notwithstanding the Magistrate's power, absolve themselves from what they please, no Laws will be observed, and all Government come to the ground, Unto this as his substance, besides my answer I have already given, I shall crave leave to offer a few considerations.  
In the first place, this is certainly a shallow apprehension, which must suffer a conviction from the constant experience of the world. For how is the world governed? there is not one of a hundred that observes the Laws out of Conscience; if they did, then must they for aught I know be careful to g●t the Statutes and read them as their bibles, which one of a thousand never do. But men understand, it they do such or such things, they are liable to be sued, or to be bound to the Sessions or the like, and to avoid the danger of the Law, they observe it. Now it is a foolish thing to say the Laws will not be observed, or the world will not be governed, unless by another means then that by which it is governed, and the Law are observed. Our Nations and Heathen Nations, and those Nations which never had the fear of God to believe a judgement to come, have been kept under the observation of the Laws of their Country by these means.  
In the second place, this is not only against universal experience, but it confronts the very institution of God, the appointment of the Magistracy, God hath made the Magistrate his Minister, and put the sword into his hand, for the ordering and governing Societies, and Common wealths, and if this indeed will not serve that purpose, than you render his institution insufficient, and make his Minister to bear the sword in vain. The Law (says the Apostle) is not made for the righteous, but the disobedient and unrighteous. If all were righteous and would of themselves make Conscience of doing what they should do, there would be no need of Magistrate or Law: but when the Law and Magistrate is appointed for this end: to bring the refractory to order, and those that make no Conscience of what they do to be ruled, how fond must the imagination be which conceits, unless men do first believe themselves bound in Conscience to obey, they will not observe the Laws?  
In the third place, if it be for some persons particular interest to break the Laws, it will be the concern of others that they be forced to keep them if they be indeed for the common good: & so shall they join with the Magistrate in his causing the execution of them. This indeed is that which upholds all Laws that are good. The public interest being greater than the private does uphold them. Whereas if a Law be not really for the public good, this is one certain reason at the bottom of its invalidity, and decay, because it hath not root enough, upon the public utility, to maintain itself against particular enchroachments. If a Nonconformist come within five miles of a Corporation there is no body hurt by it, and no body like to be concerned at it, were this a thing truly conducing to the public good, then must the public be disadvantaged in their breach of that Law; and if the public, then must some more eminently, and those should be as much concerned, that they obey as themselves to avoid the observation. By the way, when the advantage for the public does not countervail and exceed the private loss or damage that particular persons shall suffer by a Law, such a Law I take to be unjust, or at least Politically evil, and binds not the Conscience. However that which I here affirm is, that whether men make a Conscience of a Law or not, if the Law be good: the public advantage will prevail (when the Magistrate is minded) or cause it to be observed.  
In the fourth place, it is a thing very unpolitick to offer to the world any principle upon which it should be governed, which is other then that which does govern it. If the world be governed by the Magistrate's sword, and the Conscience only that we must not rebel, and is governed as well as ever it is like to be governed: it is but an unhinging the world to pretend they must receive this principle, that human laws bind the Conscience; or else there will be no need to obey, seeing the People may join and choose not to be forced as he speaks. It is a saying, if a Horse knew his strength, what might he not do? he would not let man ride him and use him as he does. If the world knew their strength, that the Magistrate indeed could not punish them whatsoever they did, unless they joined with him one against another, when there is just cause for it, they might shake off every yoke: but as the whole body of the People cannot be made to know this, so as at once to agree upon it, any more than the Horse can, though every particular man does know it: so were it an utterly ruinous thing to speak of it if they could. It is true if the people did agree together (which agreement is their strength, and they cannot know one another's present minds all) that they would not be forced, they might choose: but then when they made no Conscience to resist, how should this man think upon his principle, that they would make such Conscience to obey.  
In the first place, it does seem to me a pernicious thing to the souls of pious and tender Christians, to lay any such load upon the Conscience which is more than it can bear. I say there is no temptation hardly more dangerous to the undoing of a soul, then to press it upon such things as goes beyond it, and over sets it. If a man does believe he is bound to make Conscience of every command of his superior and Law of the Realm or else he doth sin, it is enough to make him cast off all the Laws, and when his duty is made so grievous to him, that it seems impossible for him but to live in sin, to be ready for resistance next, and then all Magistracy is gone. The way to have some Laws obeyed out of Conscience, is to take off its obligation from others; and if a Magistrate indeed might choose whether his Subjects Consciences should be bound by all his Laws or not, there is good reason for him to be content that the matter should be as it is. They are bound in Conscience not to resist, and he knows not his own strength if he desire any more: although when a Law is for the common good, then is there Gods command also which takes place. There is one thing I cannot but add, which might make another consideration, what if a despotical Prince was so wicked, as resolving to be damned himself to seek the damnation of all his people, and should thereupon make so many Laws, and about such trivial things on purpose, that none of his Subjects might regard to keep them, but live and die in the wilful breach of them: I pray let this Debater tell me really whether according to his opinion it does not lie in the power of such a Devil as this is, to carry a whole Nation to Hell with him.  
In the sixth place, let us suppose the Consciences of men were bound indefinitely to all Laws, does this Author think really that the belief of this would make the world to observe them, and so maintain Government more than the Magistrates sword? I doubt me he is here more wide: we see too well that when the worldly or carnal interest of men is concerned, what little regard Conscience has. It were happy indeed for the Earth if the fear of God Almighty did but prevail more with the Generality than the fear of a suit at Law, or a Penalty of twenty shillings. If interest will prevail with a man, to judge a thing commanded him to be against the common good, when it is for it, the same interest of his it is like with such a man would prevail still upon him not to observe the Law, though he were bound in Conscience to it.  
In the seventh place, than those few honest persons that would observe a Law if they thought themselves bound in Conscience to it, not withstanding their private interest be against it, will likewise make the like Conscience in their judging of a Law, so as not to be biased by their particular concernment to think otherwise of it, then does comport with the public advantage. And this in effect will come to the same issue.  
In the last place. I will offer you one precedent to pin the basket. It pleased God in the late times that this case became Dr. saunderson's own case. The Act of Uniformity bound the Minister to read Common Prayer. This Law the Dr. acknowledges to be of force, for all the Times; but if he observes the Law he must lose his living. Upon this he considers of the Act, and when he looks on the immediate particular end of it, he can find nothing but that their remains obliged to it. He than looks on the general and ultimate end, and that he conceives right to be the public good, which is intended or is to be supposed to be intended in all laws. Upon this end he comes to the consideration whether all circumstances being weighed, it be conducive for the common good for him to observe this Law or not: and being in the result fully persuaded in his own mind that the benefit to the public could not ways countervail his particular loss and suffering he concludes it lawful by the neglect of that Law to retain his living. There is a sober person having read my Case shown me a Manuscript of the Doctors (but would not let me write any thing out of it) for the confirmation of my judgement. I cannot relate either the whole matter or words of it, but these two things I affirm for truth in it. That be comes off upon the consideration of the general end of the Law, the public benefit: and judges himself whether his observing that Law were conducive to that end in reference to the determining his own practice. And here I have (I account) my full weight for myself, and think I had best to fetch the poor man before also, who finding no sufficient relief from this Author about his Cottage, may meet with it from this instance to his satisfaction, and it will come to this, whit● seems a little more than I have yet quite sai●● that not only when a Law is politically ●●vil, but when it is good in regard of its general observation, yet if a man be persuaded fully in his Conscience upon such du●● considerations and cautions as he ought to take, that his particular keeping of it under the present circumstances he lies, is not so much for the common good really as his not keeping of it is (which I will take to be plainly this poor man's case instanced, who if he holds not his house must with his Family presently fall on the Parish), he is not to charge his soul with sin for his wholesome breach of it. After this I will yet subjoin a little more in reference also to some others. When the Apostle gives us this precept, obey those that have the rule ouér you, though there be no words added by way of exception, it is to be supposed the things they command are for our edification, this being a condition necessarily employed to all rightful obedience, that the Ruler hath authority in what he enjoins. But the Minister hath authority only for men's edification, and hath none in things against their spiritual good, according to our authority (says the Apostle) for edification, not destruction. The Case is the same with the Magistrate. His commands that have authority must be to our civil good. It is a mistake therefore (how ingenious and ordinary soever it may seem in some that say, the people have liberty to judge indeed, whether a thing commanded be lawful, but not at all whether it be convenient. That by all means they count it to be denied, as if the allowing any such thing would presently (as this author fancies too) subvert all Government. I hese Persons I perceive therefore distinguish not between judging what is sit for the general, or universality, which judgement indeed is proper to the supreme Magistrate: and judging what is fit for a man's self only to do. All things are lawful for our (says the apostle) But all things are not expedient. I will not be brought under the power of any. a Christian judges for himself of both these; of the lawfulness and of the expedience of his own actions. If this be not granted then must he be brought under the power of indifferent things, which he ought not to be: and then does he submit himself unto the Ordinance of man or the human Creature as his servant and not as free and as the Servant of God. Again these persons have not yet considered what I have been telling still in these papers, that this liberty is assumed of us in reference only to the Conscience or to our obligation in for interiori; and that while the outward man i● still acknowledged to be bound, there is n● danger at all to Government in the matter On the contrary side there is this intolerable snare, or evil consequence does follow on the denial hereof, that every time any human Law (the matter whereof is not for bidden of God) is not observed, the subject must sin, and consequently if he live and dies knowingly and wilfully, in his neglect he must be damned, I will yet propose therefore one or two instances. There is a Statute in Henry the eights time (if I mistake not) which remains unrepealed, that no man shall brew with Hopps. I do ask hereupon whether there be any Brewer in this Nation knowing of this, that can be saved? I do not find my Debator can answer me this question; and I do not doubt but there are many Brewers that are honest men and good Christians, as well as I believe he is. If you will say that this Law now is antiquated through disuse; I will ask then what think you of those Brewers that disused it at first? was they all damned necessarily who wilfully brought it into disuse? the Case is a frequent Case as to all the like Laws, and you must come at length to this, that those who observed not this Law at first did judge it was not good for the Nation, or not fit to be kept: and upon that judgement are to be justified. It follows then both that a Law against the common good binds not the Conscience: and that every man for himself may judge whether it be so or no in reference to his own acting. Another instance shall be this, suppose a Father or a Master lays some strict charge on his Son or Servant to lay out a Thousand pounds on a Commodity which is more perhaps (but for his Credit) than he is worth by half. This Son or Servant in going to do it, bears of the growing or coming in of this Commodity by great quantities in some parts of the Kingdom, and upon his own discretion alone and good consideration of what may fall our, forbears, his Father or Master perhaps now at present is grievously chased: but within few days the price of the Commodity falls half, and then he sees that if he had been obeyed he had been undone. From hence do there appear not only the necessity, but benefit, of allowing a judgement of discretion unto Persons of capacity, under the commands of their Superiors; and that I say not merely to judge whether the thing commanded be lawful or unlawful in reference unto God whereof there is no question: but whether it be convenient or inconvenient to that end or outward good which by that command is designed. It appears also from both these instances, that the commands of men do not by virtue of the fifth Commandment itself bind the Conscience immediately and absolutely, but mediately and ex hypothesi, to wit upon supposition those commands are good, human laws Dr. Taylor will have it bind the Conscience directly and properly. I do not love to dispute about terms, but if any think he intends immediately, he is out, for they do bind only by the intervention of God's will, he argues, the authority of the Magistrate is God's authority. I answer the authority which is in the person of the Magistrate as God's Minister is God's authority, and binds directly and immediately to subjection: but the commands of the Magistrate have not God's authority, unless the things commanded be agreeable to his will, and then it is by the intervention of his will, I say, that the Conscience is bound to obedience. A third thing appears that the Conscience of man is not bound by virtue of God's authority unto every command of our Superiors though the thing commanded be in a matter sometimes which of itself or its own Nature, is indifferent because the consideration then of the external commodity, or discommodity only, could not justify the breaker of any of them. If as soon as a Father or Master had forbidden any thing, the Commandment of God took place immediately, and he thereby is to be reckoned to forbid it too, this Son or Servant might not break such a command though he did gain a thousand pounds, or though either that Master or Father should be undone by it There be several examples might be feched from Histories of great Commanders and Ambassadors that to a chieve some great exploits have been forced to leave the instructions of their Princes, for which though at their return they have begged their pardon (out of form) as being obnoxious to the Law, yet have they had that Conscience of their own fact towards them and toward God, as not only to be free from sin, in that disobedience, but to expect some signal reward for the service of such transgressions.   

CAP. VLT.  
THus much for his grand exception, I must now look out for others, or any passage else that requires Animadversion.  
At the first there comes to my view in General, the cavilling way which he uses toward me, as if when a Man wanted a good answer, he should show an ill Spirit, which I would not believe in this Author. I perceive he pretends often that the Apologist doth wrong him and so accuses him of falsifyings and impertinences, which are his frequent words: But in the mean while I wonder he should not see how notoriously he is guilty of both these fine things himself. It would be no great matter (says he) if the Casuist imitated not these men only in their phrase, and not in their weak reasonings, and then produces an observation I have of providence in transitu, as if I argued something from thence, which if he could tell what, he would confute no doubt, and he well might, wherefore it is manifest I lay that passage down and make no reasoning at all upon it, neither do I imitate any body's phrase, nor tie myself to any part, And if this than be not falsifying neither shall his four or five sides after about Image worship, be any impertinency: nor his six or seven pages in another place about the Taxes and Insurrections there has been in this Nation: no though he should tell you the whole Life and Death of Wat Tyler, and Jack Straw, with a more perfect Narration yet of that Dr. Standish, unto whom John Lincoln the Broker came when he was to preach at the Spittle on a Monday in Easter week. This should also be no impertinency, but a forceable confutation of whatsoever is said by the Apologist or me. He may next tell us any other story as well out of the Chronicles. Of Jack Cad●, and his Cousin Mortimer. Of Lambert Simuel and the Lady Margaret his Aunt. How might he have mauled us with the Relation of Perkin Warb●ck, and Thomas Plamm●ck, and Robert Ket with his Oak of Reformation, and then killed us quite dead with an arrow our of Robin Hoods bow? In the Reign of Richard the first there was the noble Earl Robin Hood, and one little John, and an hundred stout Fellows more, rob the Passengers upon the High way. And what indeed is it that we may well think of such a Roving faculty we see in this Author's last books, but that the Man's pen hath got a leoseness, and that is the reason he hath so be spattered the poor Apologist, whose ill luck and my good one it was, that he came between him and me. This is the reason that makes him come abroad so often, in a Debate, a continuation of that debate, a continuation of that continuation, an appendix to that continuations continuation, and a Postscript to that appendix to that continuation, of the continuation of the Friendly Debate. Nec dum fini●us Orestes. I must needs say here, I have been tempted to use some expressions that perhaps might be grateful to many who are willing to have a person (as they are apt to speak) met with in his kind, but I remember there is a self-denial to be used in our writings as in our conversations, and there is an office of Love and honour we own to worthy persons; and when I may use such expressions as these I think from the example of Elijah, I must use no bitterness from the command of the Apostle, nor any word from an offended mind from the example of our Saviour and Lord.  
The next thing which presents itself to my notice is a passage which hath a malignant aspect on my opinion, or on what I have said, yet shall be found but a friend to it. I am sensible now and then of a learing hint from this engaged man, I choose to be a little free with him, seeing he hath chalked out that way to me, but do reflect again on that word as having too aptly or truly expressed the thing, whether I had best let it stand. By a learing passage I understand any such as reflects any thing upon me, which seems to him to render me obnoxious, besides the being slighted above what is just. Nevertheless when I perceive he speaks out of ignorance, that is out of the want of a fuller understanding in this particular matter, of what he reproves, I am sustained with my own opinion and the integrity of it. Although too, while he conceits his knowledge so superior, it is all one for me, to taste his Spirit. When I say ignorance, to wit hitherto, in reference to this point, I understand not this person to be an ignorant person. No I hold him to be a learned Man of very much ability, and the least of his sufficiency I take to be for dispute. I compare not myself with him. I know the shortness of my household stuff yet this have I, that when a particular point gets into my head, it costs me more thoughts usually then others will bestow upon it, and consequently ought not in every thing I say, be so readily contemned. In the most points that ever I studied I could arrive ordinarily but to this, that there is reason on both sides. That to be dogmatical is not safe. I do sometimes speak for a thing out of courage, to bear it up against the stream, rather than out of pride. I have scarce ever come up to so much confidence in any point as I have in this in good earnest, and if I show it too much though i● be out of the simplicity of my heart, I could help it if I would, but that I think the world requires it, and the matter will bear it, for I am myself a piece of dust. The passage is this, The Casuists principle if pursued will prove the very same with that in the perverse meaning of it so much cried up, when all our mischiefs began, salus populi suprema lex▪ for the right understanding of which maxim I refer you to the last Lecture of Dr. Saunderson. It is very much that this person should see at first glimpse upon what foundation all that I say does stand and that this foundation is made good by Dr. Saunderson, and yet that he should go to put such a slur as this on it, without any good consideration or honesty.  
As for the maxim which in the words is fercht from Cicero de legibus, out of what o●d Roman Law soever he had it, in the truth it is no less ancient than Magistracy or Government itself, and shall stand so ●long as there is any in the World. There be some have abused the holy Gospel and turned it into wantonness, but the abuse of the Gospel is no cause sufficient to throw off the Gospel. No more is the abuse of this maxim sufficient reason to hinder any the patronage of it. You may as well lay aside the Gospel in Religion, as this truth out of Politics, without which neither any society or Commonwealth, or the World itself could stand. I do hugely like the design of this Dr. in that Lecture which is the vindication of that Maxim, that every one may safely embrace it, and I assent to all so far as I remember he hath said of it; but yet I must needs say, I think not the Lecture most sufficient of his Lectures, who appears rather as himself accounts, something out of his proper study, when he is drawn upon it.  
That which he says is no less truth than obvious, that under the word populus we must comprehend the supreme Magistrate as well as the Subject. It is trite, that Plebs and Populus in Political Writers are distinguished, and this may be most convincing that in Cicero's time (whose words these are) the Roman people was a Commonwealth, so that the supreme Magistracy itself lay in the body of the people, so far it is from any Justice or Right, that any should make use of this maxim to suppress the chief Magistrate by it. The good of the people in their public capacity is the good of the Commonwealth. A Commonwealth consists in the order of superiority and inferiority. The Commonwealth's good than is the good of Magistrates and Subjects, the common interest of one is also the Interest of the other. There being no consequence deducible therefore from this maxim for the people to rise up against the King any more than against themselves, or their own welfare, There is one question I think wanting in that Lecture of the Dr. whereof neither he (as the truth is) nor this man have yet cast any right account, It is this, How comes it to pass that when this maxim doth warrant the subject in not obeying some Laws which are made by the Magistrate, it will by no means warrant any subject to rise against or resist the Magistrate if he will execute them upon him? The answer to this will be like the invention of making the Egg stand an end, that is so apparent and easy, that you will wonder it should not be seen already by every body. When the common good then or the good of the community, is said to be the supreme Law, it must be understood most undoubtedly in reference to those laws which are made for the community. Ex illis haec suprema lex esto. If there be any one of such consequently does clash with this, which is the chief or superior to them all, that is, if there be any law made which is not indeed for the common good, then is the subject manifestly discharged by virtue of this maxim from any obligation to it, in the point of equity or conscience. But it is as manifest likewise, that we are not to understand this maxim in reference to God's Laws. To wit, The common good is the supreme Law to all other Laws of the State, to ●ll human Laws, which are made to that end, the public good of civil society: but it is not supreme to God's Laws, or to any Law of God religious or moral which are made to another end, to wit the glorifying of God, not in order to our civil happiness, but our everlasting salvation. When God says Thou shalt have no other Gods but me, a Roman or a Greek might not say not it is son the good of our Country that many Gods be worshipped, and the common good must take place of other Laws. For besides that it is false to think it for the good of any state, to have more than one God; The Law of the common good is to take place over the Common wealth's Law, or is the supreme Law, I say to all human Laws, but not to God's Laws, which comes not under any subordination to such good but do concern the salvation of men's souls. Now it is the Law or command of God that Magistracy be set up, that we be in subjection to the powers that are, that is the present Magistrate that we have, and that we resist not. This is no less his Commandment then that we have no other Gods but him. If there be any then will argue we are not obleiged in Conscience to obey a Law which is not for the common good upon the account of this maxim: Therefore we are not obleiged in Conscience to subjection to the Magistrate if he rule not for the common good upon account of the same, he is greatly mistaken. Because this maxim as we are to know, was Originally intended so is to be understood on necessity, in reference to the Laws of men, or the Common wealth's Laws only, and not in reference to the Commandments of God. Again, when a human Law passes for the good of the community, the common good being the supreme rule and measure of all, every one judges and aught to judge (upon the pinch of the question) whether the thing commanded be for the common good, that is, whether it be agreeable to the supreme Law, and according as he judges and believes it to be or no, so is he obliged in Conscience or not to it. But when a Magistrate rules not as he ought, and so we are free as to his inordinate commands, there is no man may judge whether he himself, or the Government itself be for the good or no. You will say why? Because the powers that be are of God, and his Ordinance, and whether the Ordinance of God be for our good or no, there is no mortal may question or is to judge. God hath himself declared this that he is the Minister of God for our good even Nero was, and no man may once offer to determine contrary to Gods declared word, or tell the Almighty he says not truth. Consequently when a Law sometimes doth pass that is not for the common good, and a man judging of it according to truth is not obliged in Conscience to obedience, yet the Magistrate himself being for our good (God having determined so and man's judgement being confined by his) even by this maxim itself that the common good is the supreme Law, he must be still bound to subjection. And what now is become of this man's reproach which he hath laid to my charge with so much falsehood, and little judgement? as if Dr. Saunderson and he were for this maxim in the right sense, and I was for it in the perverse meaning, when it is plain that indeed neither he nor Dr. Saunderson (how worthy soever in their pacts otherwise) understood this maxim● in the full import of it, seeing else he would have determined the main case no otherwise then I do.  
And this brings me to another passage of this Debater, which I was willing to reserve ●ill now, both for the agreement of it here, ●nd for making a discovery of some of this authors strong reasonings, who counts mine ●o weak. It is resolved by the Casuist, that if the Magistrate command any thing for the People's hurt, there lies no obligation upon the Conscience to obey, and they are made judges of what ●s for their hurt. If then he require them not ●o resist and they find this is for their hurt, they are not bound in Conscience not to resist. Is not this very goodly? Does not the Gentleman show us here indeed what a fathom it is that he has, as he speaks somewhere? why this can be no less sure than Bonaventures Son, or Bradwardines' brother! What if the Magistrate should require us not to resist? If it were the Magistrate only required this, there were no doubt but we might resist if he hurt or wrong us, as well as not obey his Laws if they be for our hurt. But it is God's Commandment that we resist not, and if he shall do us wrong or hurt we must bear it upon that account. It is but suffering according to his well and that is the reason why the Magistrate and Government itself safe, when the Conscience is yet at liberty 〈◊〉 avoid, if we can, any unjust, unreasonab●● noxious, or unprofitable Law for the people You will say are we not bound to obey h●● Laws, as well as not to resist his authority I answer, there is this difference, we ha●● not command from God that says you m●● obey this or that particular Law of the Commonwealth, or that you must indefinite● obey them all seeing some may be unjust some wicked, some vain; But there is a La● or command from God to be subject to the powers that are: whatsoever they are, and 〈◊〉 whatsoever they are, that is rightful power (for else the devil may come in) and th● we must net resist. I say moreover that to be ruled by the common good in civil affairs designed by his Minister, I take to be a Law of God of the same Nature as to be subject to the Magistrate, and to fear himself.  
After this, there is one passage more I will not pass because it looks lightly and is a concession against himself, but does not satisfy if the word may unto offend) without a farther remove upon it. It is this. It is supposed when a case of intolerable inconvenience happens that it being not the intention of a Prince to make his Subjects miserable, he would not have made that Law if he could have foreseen such a mischief, and upon that account it ceases to be a Law, and loses its obligation. I remember well that some indeed speak thus, and when any take a Latitude in applying it to an individual case it will come to this, that supposing the Lawgiver to consider the circumstances that this or that particular man is in, it is presumed that he would consent to the breach of his Law by that person, and upon this presumption there may be many perhaps that absolve themselves from several pieces of obedience. That which may be said for this is, that if the Lawgiver is to be supposed not to intent to make his subjects miserable by a Law; he is to be supposed not to intent to make any one miserable for he cannot simply do the one any more than the other. Eadem est ratio unius cujusque & Universorum. If such a Law makes this or that particular man miserable if he keep it, he will judge it to be the Lawgivers intention, that he be dispensed with, that those should observe it who are made happy, or at least not so distressed as he by it. There is something I suppose of solidity in this, if we can find out for it a right bottom. There is no particular person can say if the Lawgiver had foreseen this or the particular man's inconvenience he would not have made the Law, because Laws in the nature are confinements and streightnin● to particular persons for the good of the community. But this he must say, th● notwithstanding the will of the Lawgiver is indeed, that the generality should keep the Law being for their good, yet it is to be understood with exception, to such a ca●● or cases, as his is. If he can give a reason now for this that will hold, it is well. The saying he made not his Law to make an● simply miserable is true, but in Relation to the public he passed it though some should be distressed by it: He cannot say therefore that he made not this Law to make him miserable, but this he may say, that he made not this Law to make him or any man miserable, but for the advantage of the community, seeing for the benefit of the public 〈◊〉 any one may be made to suffer damage, whereas to make a Law that any might suffer it without advantage to the public is unjust. There is necessity then to come here to my foundation and that is this. That the general end of every Law and Lawgiver is (or aught to be and so is supposed to be) the public advantage. When any case then general or particular is such that it is not for the public benefit that a Law be observed, or that it is more for the public good that it be not observed rather then observed, the Lawgivers intention is to be supposed from the general end, that it should not be obligatory to the Subject. His intention is to oblige us to such a thing for the public good. But if such a thing in such a case be not for the public good the obligation ceases being forsaken of his intention.  
There is much may be said here, beside what we insist on before from the will of God.  
At the close he presents us with the testimonies of two or three learned men for obedience to all lawful commands of our superiors. He might have taken the harmony of confessions, or most Divines common places, and added as many more as he pleased of greater authority. He might find expressions too as strict as any from some of our Nonconformist Divines. But that which is to be answered to all is this, that we are to apprehend such passages to be still spoken upon supposition that the Laws or commands of the superiors be good and wholesome Laws.  
They may put in the word lawful only, but under it this must also be employed. The honest and learned Mr. Perkins therefore when he speaks of our duty to the Magistrate, does judiciously use such terms. We are bound to observe the good and wholesome Laws of the Nation wherein we live.  
When he and others speaks thus it is plain that in the bottom of their minds they apprehend, that if the Laws and commands of men be not good and wholesome Laws or commands, they are not accordingly bound to them, that is not in Conscience bound, though the outward man be at the Magistrate's service. And this I take it is that Light which does even almost Universally flow into the Souls of men, at the first consideration of these matters, and as it is of Nature, it is from God. But who shall judge whether a Law be a good or wholesome Law or no? This I know may be again asked. It is a good and wholesome Law I account when the thing commanded be for the common good. And I reply who shall judge whether that which be commanded be lawful or not? It will be a thing most foolish to say, that he who hath passed the Law as good already must be judge, for than it might be no question. You will say that every man must indeed be judge of that. I say then that if every man must judge whether the thing commanded him in a Law be according to God's word or not, which is a matter of so much more difficulty and concernment to his Soul, and where of the most of men are so much more indeed uncapable to judge with soundness, and yet every one must judge for himself according to his ability in reference to his own practice, why should any scruple to have the same said in the question whether it be for the common good, being what is easier done and a less matter? The sum of the whole sheets will come to this. The most both of Religious and Learned men are at a loss (through their dispute and jangling I suppose when the matter else perhaps were more plain) in their conceptions about the obligation of human Laws. Two extremes we hear. The one that they bind not the Conscience at all; the other, that they bind indefinitely, that is, all bind under pain of sin. A middle path I have effered in resolving the case. We see where it is the opposer does pinch. They will not allow the subject to be a reasonable agent in Politicals, when they cannot deny him to be so in Morals and things Religious. If they will allow us a judgement of discretion in Civils, They must be ignorant, or consider not, that the common good is the supreme Law. That the supreme must overrule the subservient. So long as any know not this, they are in darkness and bondage: But the Scintillations of this truth and Doctrine that I here have brought, are the feeds of Light and Liberty to the World. In which liberty the considering Christian will stand fast, and the tender will rejoice in consolation.   
THE END.   

Reader,  
BEfore I sent these Sheets to the Press, at first I shown them a Learned Dr. a person of note, as of ability, and I received his thoughts of them in the words which you find in the beginning. Being returned from the Printer, I had opportunity to show them to another of the like eminency, and I received presently a full Sheet from him upon the subject, I will make bold to set down thus much of it which follows.  
The Office (to wit, of the Magistrate) and exercise or administration being distinguished, you truly say that he that is not bound in a particular case to obey, yet may be a Subject still (which is the relation of one bound to ordinary obedience) and Rebellion which is the casting off this subjection, i● forbidden notwithstanding a particular Law may be disobeyed.  
A Law made against God or the safety of the Commonwealth is no Law in sensu uni voco but it is in sensu ae●●●v●●o vel analogico, and does not properly bind the Subject.  
All men in their wits (that are masters of such discourse) are agreed that judicium est vel publicum vel provatum. Publicum est vel ; Magistratus, per gladium exe quendum: Vel ecclesiastum, Pastorum, per verbum & claroes exequendum: Et privatum discretionis est omnium. No Man ever obeyed without it, for authoritas imperantis agnita, is the objectum formale obedientiae and answereth the question Quare obedis?  
The Magistrate being by Office entrusted with the bonum pubeicum the Subject is not called to try every one of his Laws whether they are suited to the bonum publicum or not, much less to be critical and busy out of his place.  
But being not bound to be blind or or careless in a notorious case or such of which he hath full and lawful cognizance, he may and must discern what command is against the common good.  
R. B.