THE THIRD STEP OF A Nonconformist, For Recovery of the Use of his Ministry. WITH Some Occasional Notice taken of the Judgement and Decree of the University of Oxford, passed in their Convocation, July 21. 1683.  
By one of the Followers of Peace, and Lovers of Impartiality.  
Probitas laudatur & alget.  Ju. 
LONDON, Printed for Tho. Parkhurst at the Bible and Three Crowns, the lower end of Cheapside. 1684.   

The Third Step.  
THE Year Eighty Two presenting some rise to the Nonconformist for new thoughts about their returning into the Vineyard, upon the Expiration of one Clause in the Subscription required by the Act for Uniformity, which was of deepest Resentment to many, and the greatest cause of their Ejection, it seemed reasonable to me to apply myself to the Bishop of the Diocese upon that Errand. It was not for any Preferment that I seek, (for I am not like to Conform so far) but it was for a Liberty only of Preaching without Molestation, as without Emolument, which is in effect for the licence only of exercising a piece of Self-denial, in coming out of a state of quiet and case, into a state of work, of care, of censure, that if it so please God, I might yet be some way serviceable to my Generation, and my Old Age not altogether unprofitable. Unto this end I Printed lately four or five Sheets, entituling them, Two Steps in order hereunto, appointing my Bookseller, as soon as they were done, to send them to the Bishop and Archbishop, with a Letter from me to both, the Contents whereof were, humbly to crave their pardon for my sending those Sheets, and their leave to wait on them after due time of readding, to know their pleasure, signifying my unwillingness to surprise them, but that they might consider beforehand, and if it were good for them, to deny or grant my request at first hearing, it would be good to do the same after deliberation.  
I stayed ten days or thereabout, and then went myself to both in person; I found no pride, and no offence, but all the civility, that becomes the gravity, candour, and dignity of such persons: but I found they had not read my Sheets, so as either to have understood what I sought, or considered whether it could be granted. Upon this I spared not to write again to both, for the informing them in short, and yet in full, what it was I desired, and I went again also to one of them, thinking to have spoke with him, but he sent me back word, I must come another time, he was then busy. Whether this Message by his Servant did signify his unwillingness to be pressed any further, or that I should indeed take a better opportunity when he had more leisure, I am in doubt: but for the prevention of the frustrating an endeavour of this kind (if it may be conscionably effected) I do upon this further pause judge it expedient, (if not necessary) to add a Third Step to my Two former, before I go to any Bishop more in this matter. For having by myself and friends made some trial of the Inclinations of more than these two of them, I am induced to a recollection upon the whole Design, and to set myself, if it be possible, to come yet to a closer point with them than I have already about the same.  
It is not (I know) for any Christian to judge of another's Conscience, which is know only to a man's own self and God; and much less is he to make his Judgement the standard or measure to another man's. Conscience in this case is nothing else but the inward Judgement of a man's Soul, whether such a thing be lawful for him to do in the sight of God, or agreeable to God's will, or not. Every considerate man knows here his own Latitude, and after many a day and years laying the thing to heart, I will, if I can, tell you Mine in this Case.  
The Rule I lay down in submitting to, or refusing any Imposition of men, is this. We must sit down and consider what we believe to be the meaning of the Lawgivers, and if we can submit to it in that sense or meaning which we believe theirs, we must do it: but if we believe their sense to be such as we cannot take it in that sense, we must forbear it, and suffer. See the Book entitled, A Peaceable Resolution of Conscience touching our present Impositions, and the Margin of the Sheriff's Case, where that Book is cited. The bottom is this; The Law is the Will of the Lawgiver, and it is the Lawgivers Meaning is his Will, which you will also find in them both.  
By the way here I cannot but take notice of the Seventeenth Proposition, which is condemned in the late Decree of the University of Oxford, July 21. 1683. An Oath obligeth not in the sense of the Imposer, but the Takers, for which they quote and condemn the Sheriff's Case, when the Position or Rule, that all Impositions of our Superiors must be taken in the sense and meaning of those that Impose them, is the foundation of that whole Determinations. These express words are laid down in the beginning of it, and that they may be observed, there is this Note in the Margin: To this Rule there is a double extreme; The one is of those who think a man must take every Imposition in the strict literal Construction, and can submit to it no otherwise: The other is of such who suppose that if a man can frame any Interpretation of his own that is but reasonable, he may take the words in that sense, and be satisfied. The first of these is so rigid, that there is nothing to be Imposed, but we shall strain at it; and the last so lose, that nothing can be Imposed but we shall swallow it. Then is the true Medium offered there, which you have here recited before. If you ask now farther who this one and the other yet be, I will tell you. In the first Extreme are most of the Nonconformists: in the last are those of the Conformists, which we used to call Latitudinarians. The name risen up about the Uniformity Act, and this is the reason of it. A Latitudinarian is one that is, or was, against the Imposition of indifferent things that stumble people, as well as the Nonconformist, but he is for the Submission. And this I say is the reason because of his Latitude in the Interpretation. There was an excellent person, eminent in Learning, and of an incomparable Temper, now with God, the Reverend Dr. Whiscot, (the Father of this sort of men) who was several times discoursing with me, and maintaining the latter Opinion, being liberally ready to affirm, that a man might defend in Living with a Rational Construction of an Imposition by his Wit, as he might is Purse by his Sword; but I was always for holding him to the Meaning of the Lawgiver. I have been sorry methinks very much, that this superlative worthy man is not yet alive, that I might talk with him about this Decree at Oxford, that hath here given Judgement for me against him in the business, whom I would have had convinced really in Conscience, because that Opinion of his was not to be held, and I thought he did hurt others in holding it; and I do therefore hearty thank the University that they have picked up this Seventeenth Proposition into their Decree, and condemned it, being a Tenent of ill consequence, when Declarations and Oaths shall hereby be rendered but as so many Cobwebs, which may entangle a weak Judgement; but those that have Wit shall break through them, and the Magistrate shall have no holdfast on any. Nevertheless, I thank not the University for gathering this Proposition from the Sheriff's case, which professeth the clean contrary as they do. And if any such Tenent therefore could be deduced from any occasional passage thereof by consequence (or Logic,) so long as the Design and whole scope of it does bend de industria to the opposite thereunto, such a Decree as affixes to a Book that Proposition, against which it expressly declared, and then to burn the Book for it (if I may use the words of no less than a Bishop who had read both the Decree and Case) must be very iniquitous. I put it in these very words, because they are another's, and he spoke them not (I will suppose) in dishonour to the University, but the rather because he was told, it is some other Book they meant under the Title of the Sheriff's case, and not this which I speak of, and own, as proposing the same Doctrine which they do, and condemning the same Proposition.  
To return, if upon mature consideration, according to this Rule, I am persuaded that the meaning of the Parliament who imposed the Declaration which is to be subscribed by me, if I go on, was no more than I have tendered in the Explication of my former Sheets, then do I not need to be beholding to any Bishop, who can give myself the favour of subscribing, and so require his Certificate of course: But if indeed (do what I can) I find my mind still in some doubt, I must on necessity think father.  
It was some years before I could tell how to subscribe that Declaration at all (especially as it was clogged till Eighty two) with any Explication. When I came to think on an Explication, it was a good while longer before I could be satisfied how to do it, unless I might put my Explication to the words of the Declaration, and so set my hand to both together. I endeavoured therefore, and made trial, whether I might have leave to do so, but could not obtain it. I acknowledge the candid ingenuity, and courteous good will of the Diocesan, but he made higher inquisition. I bethought myself hereupon of a less Request, that if I might by the Bishop's consent be but permitted to write these words [According to a Paper given into the Bishop Isubscribe] in the Registers Book (as in the former Sheets,) it appeared to me in effect all one as to set my name to the words of the Declaration with my Explication, so long as such a Paper was given in to him. I have not been wanting therefore to try again with more than one Bishop, whether so little a favour as this might be obtained, and I have intimated my success, so that the Condescension that a man may reasonably expect (without a Parliament) from any Bishop, to trust to it, is like to come to this, to grant what the Law allows, if some of them will yet do that.  
Here are Two Steps than I have made, and the Third I am to get up. I cannot subscribe without an Explication, but I can subscribe with one. That was the First Step. If I subscribe with an Explication, it is necessary that I declare my Explication, but it is not necessary that my Explication and the words I subscribe be put together in one Paper, or in the Registers Book. If it be signified that I do it with an Explication, it is as well, and in effect the same thing. This was the Second Step. If I may not signify this in the Registers Book, I come now to consider if I publish it in Print, and so notify it both to Bishop, Register, and all the World, whether this really be not as well also, as if I were suffered to do so, and that for the substance, which will go to the heart of all my scruples. And if in the upshot this will serve, there is none can hinder me this Last Step, for I land methinks here upon my right (or upon Law) when my standing was but precarious before.  
Well! I do consider in the Sheriff's Case, to what Resolution (or Latitude) the Author of that Paper came about the Oxford Oath. Let us suppose a man convinced that the Interpretation offered in regard to the Oath, and in regard to this Declaration is probably the very meaning of the Lawgiver, but he is not persuaded beyond all doubt, and he would have something for his relief in regard to that doubt. For an alleviation to this man, there is this passage in that Case. If a man is persuaded in his Conscience, the meaning of the Lawgiver was no more than thus, he may submit, and make no stand; but if he believes their meaning was otherwise (or doubts that it was more than thus) he cannot swear or subscribe but with limitations, and he must declare those limitations, or forbear. But if he shall swear of subscribe (supposing him one that doubts) with making a declaration that he does it in this meaning supposing it the sense of the Lawgiver, and with these Explanatory Limitations to their meaning if in any thing indeed it be otherwise, if the Justices admit him to the Oath after this Declaration (for whether they admit the sense or not, it is no matter, because they have no power in it) we are persuaded (says that Paper) that his Conscience may receive satisfaction thereby, in his compliance with the Law in these Impositions.  
By the way again, from this place it is very likely the Oxford Convocation might gather the Proposition before cited out of this said Book; but if so, I must answer, Unless they are of the Opinion, that though a man refuse an Oath without admittance to take it with Limitation, and then does declare his Limitations, and so is admitted to it, he is yet obliged to perform it being taken, in the full sense of the Imposer, notwithstanding those Limitations, there is no difference between them and the Sheriff's Case in this matter. But if that indeed be their Opinion, let them speak it out, and make this the condemned Proposition. An Oath taken with a declared Limitation to the sense of the Imposer, does oblige no farther than he hath declared beforehand, that he will be bound when he took it. This Proposition I own in the behalf of the Sheriff's Case; if they condemn it, I crave from them some illumination. That an Oath in general must be taken in the sense of the Imposer, we agree, and that a man that takes it, and says nothing, is obliged to the full sense thereof so taken: But if a man declares his Limitations, I suppose that Instance alone of the Oath between Rahab and the Spies, does make the matter good on my side beyond disputation. But sure the University of Oxford can never differ with me in this, and consequently there is some mistake here about this Book. The Sheriff's case I speak of was first Printed 1680. and Reprinted 1681. in one Sheet, and then again Printed the third time with the Addition of the two Papers more making four Sheets and a half in all for the year 1682. and entitled, The Case of the Sheriffs, or third years Paper in regard to the Act for Corporations, being the Case also of the Dissenting Ministers in regard to the Act at Oxford. Whether this Paper (or Book) be the Sheriffs Case condemned and burnt by the Convocation, I must take liberty to question. I do acknowledge myself to be a Son of that University, and I ought not to think unmannerly of my Mother. I ought not to think so many not only of Persons, but Ranks of judicious persons could be so overly (nay so directly out) in any censure. And why should they condemn a Book that was never like to hurt any of them? Why should they really burn a Book that could never have been writ for the nonce by any one of themselves so much to serve them? Why should they Martyr an Innocent Book (let me say yet, seeing so many think it this) which hath certainly offered more toward Justifying the Conformist (I pray God it may not hinder any one man from a due sense of his sin, who either went against his Conscience, or knew not what he did when he Conformed), and helping the Dissenters to Conform, than all the Books that were writ on their own side (which generally have waved these Political Points, where lay our chief scruples) since the Act of Uniformity? I ought not above all, to think them of such a manner of spirit at University, as if they did hate us for coming in, and yet hate us for being Nonconformists.  
If any persist that this indeed is the Book which they meant and condemned, I must not then leave that matter yet without some farther discussion. The University have charged the Sheriff's Case for asserting that an Oath obliges not in the sense of the Imposer, but the Takers: The Sheriff's Case says expressly, An Oath must be taken in the sense of the Imposer, and builds upon it. There are two questions therefore to be made of this. One, In what sense must an Oath be taken? The other, In what sense does it oblige being taken? If these be not made two, the University will he guilty of Slander, and belying the Sheriff's Case, which is a thing not to be imagined: But these being distinguished, it appears strait that the University and Sheriffs Case agree thus far, (as was said even now) that an Oath must be taken in the sense of those that Impose it, and when it is so taken, it obliges accordingly. The difficulty arises only when the Imposers sense and Takers do differ, and there are two Cases herein to be proposed, for there are no General Rules ordinarily without their Exceptions. One is the Case of Mistake, when a man does honestly take an Oath in that sense which he believes in his Conscience to be the very sense of the Imposer, but he comes after his taking it to understand the sense to be such as he could not, and would not have taken it, if he had understood the same before: The question than is, Whether his Oath now obliges him to the performance in that sense which really is the Imposers, or that which he understood to be theirs when he took it, and else had not taken it. If the University does hold that an Oath binds in the sense of the Imposer universally even in this case of Mistake, and all others without discrimination, I desire the Judicious to ponder well of it, whether that be a mature Determination. The other Case is, when a man is not mistaken, but distinguishes the sense of an Oath beforehand, and declares the sense in which he takes it, excepting against that sense wherein he cannot take it: The question then still arises, Whether the University do hold the man is obliged to the Imposers sense, notwithstanding his Predeclaration; and if they do, I must leave it again to the better advised to consider, whether this be a mature, or rash Determination. If they determine the Point otherwise, how could they condemn the Proposition they have condemned, without explanation or exception? In short, unless it be another Book they mean, they have collected their Proposition out of the Sheriffs Case very untowardly, and they have as overly condemned it when they have so done.  
To pass on; It is proposed farther in that Sheriff's Case, that a man should moreover write down his sense or limitations, and give in his Writing (or that Case itself, supposing it speaks his full mind for him) to the Justices, together with his declaring those Limitations, which if he does in abundantiorem cautelam, he is like to be still the better satisfied: Yet if he does not, so long as in words, or writing, a man does but declare as openly as he swears (that it may be as much known,) that he takes the Oath but in such or such a lawful sense (Sèe the Quotation in the Margin of the Case), this is the main there intended.  
There are two ways then for myself here to take, to establish me in my Resolution. One is, if I can convince my Soul beyond doubt that the meaning of the Lawgiver was no more than I propose in my Explanations: And the other is, if any doubt yet remains, to heal it with the prepared Remedy.  
For the two first Clauses of the Subscription, they are all one (it is plain) with the two first Clauses in the Oath, and it is really something easier, in my mind, to subscribe to the same things in a Declaration, than to swear to them in an Oath. The Contents of both Clauses comes but to this, That it is unlawful to take Arms against the King, or against his Authority, when both are certainly to be held inviolable. To take Arms in the first Clause must be construed Raising War or Forces, because it is meant so on necessity in the second Clause. Nothing less can be understood by it against the Commissionated. The Commissionated are such as have the King's Authority. The Authority of the King in this Realm is Royal, not Lordly, that is, a Right to Govern according to Law. These persons consequently who have not, or pursue not their Commissions according to Law, are not Commissionated, that is, have not, or exercise not his Authority. When this little Interpretation only is made, there are no Objections to be invented, but they may hereby receive a Solution. See the Margin of the first Sheet of that Case. And that this is the true sense of the Lawgiver, let the Second and Third Sheets of the same be consulted.  
I am not indeed ignorant of the many and hard Cases which are, and may be raised here by way of Objection, and which do require therefore that I should speak a little fuller, though I am else unwilling, and this alone is as much as can be well born. The Learned and Acute Bishop of Winton, who like another Caleb in Divinity, does write after Fourscore as if he were but Forty, (whether his Pen be for Fight or Government, for polemics or Politics) in his late Book against Mr. Baxter sticks not to assert, that the Legislative Power in this Realm does lie solely in the King, and yet doth make no doubt to tell us for all that, with others, that the Government is not Despotical but Political, that is, as I call it, Regal; which is thus explained by Bracton, Non est Rex, ubi Voluntas imperat, non Lex. As the Apostle therefore speaks of his own Authority which was Spiritual, that he had none for Destruction, but for Edification, and that he could say nothing against the Truth, but for the Truth: So may we say of the Power of the King, which is Temporal, it is a Power according to Law, and for the Law, not against the Law. The King, and the King's Officers can do nothing against the Law, but for it.  
Put the Case then that a Prince should go about to Destroy his whole People, which is a Case put by Grotius from Barclay, as inconsistent with Ruling them, and the Bishop forementioned answers, this is not to be supposed of any man but a Madman. But suppose it replied, what if a Price were a Madman, or so mad, or savage as the Spaniard, who, when they had Conquered Mexico, Hispaniola, and those places, butchered so many thousands of them, worrying them like Beasts with Dogs? What if a Prince were of the Spirit of the Duke of Alva, of Charles the Fifth, of the Irish, unto whom a hundred thousand Heretics were but a Breakfast, and he could then Dine presently with another hundred thousand of the same? Suppose a Prince that would alienate his Kingdom, as King John, That would bring in the Turks upon them, or sell them for Slaves to a Foreign Tyrant? What if a Prince would raise an Army out of one of his Dominions that were Papists, and bring it into another of them that are Protestants, and swear that unless they will turn their Religion (that is, yield to be damned), he will burn them all, or exterminate them, according to the Lateran Council; yea, though the said Religion were by Law Established? These are Cases may be supposed; Not that I imagine any such in good earnest ever like to be. God forbidden! I am not a man of that complexion: but to the end I may make the most of the Objection (for I had as good else even quite say nothing), I do anatomize the Scruples of my Brethren, laying them naked before all men of equal Judgement, who may consider whether they are with, or without Reason, and searching the wound to the quick; I am willing so to apply the Remedy, as at once to procure both the Adversaries Compassion, and our own Satisfaction.  
Suppose than it be demanded whether a Kingdom or whole Nation have a right by the law of Nature to defend themselves in these Cases, though Particular Persons have not? I must answer, that such Cases as these are so odious in the naming, as we are not to conceive they came once into the mind of the Lawgiver (that is, the King and the Two Houses, as one Corporation) who imposed this Declaration: and consequently that they are not to be put, for the stumbling such as are to subscribe it: but if they be supposed and put, that it was the mind of the Imposers they should be excepted, or excluded by such an Interpretation of the Commissionated, as is already given.  
For, for instance but in one Case more that is easy and obvious: Suppose a Prince of our Land should send persons for the Levying Money on the Subject without a Parliament, or Parliament-Tax: I doubt not but the Constables, Justices, or Sheriffs, might keep the Peace in the name of the King against these men: and that yet we may maintain it unlawful to take Arms against those that are Commissionated by him, because such as these (I have said) are not Commissionated, or such Commissions have no Authority, and are no Commissions. The Constitution of our Kingdom is such, as the King can Commission no such thing. And when I have said so in regard to this one Case which is the lower, the same Answer may be given to those Cases, which are higher, I account beyond disputation.  
The Learned Arnisaeus writes a Book (I remember) on this Subject, Non licere subditis ulla ex causa contra legitimum Principem arma sumere. He holds the Position indefinitely in the affirmative, yet makes no scruple upon supposition of any such a Case, to put in his Limitations: And why may we not conceive that when a Parliament imposed upon us such a Declaration as this, they did intent we should subscribe it not otherwise but in such a Determination as the Learned who have most Loyally written for Monarchy, and against Rebellion, do maintain such a Position; that is, prout prudens definierit? The Commissionated (I say) are such as have the King's Authority. The King's Authority is Political, and he can give no other, but what he hath himself, to any. If his Authority then be for the Law, and he has none against it; and if it be against the King only, and those Commissionated by him, that is, against his Person, and his Authority only, that we declare it unlawful to take Arms, I see not any thing left in the Objection (let what Case soever be put) but that this Declaration in the Two first Clauses of it may be subscribed.  
For the last Clause, [And I will Conform to the Lyturgy of the Church of England as it is now by Law Established] let us compare it with the last Clause of the Oath, [And I will not at any time endeavour any Alteration of Government in Church or State] and surely methinks a man's heart will begin to beat much rather at his approach to the taking the latter, than subscribing the former. But there is one thing instead of all to satisfy. This Subscription is not imposed only on Ministers; but on such as Teach School, and Tutors at University; and it cannot be conceived the meaning of the Lawgiver, that such persons in subscribing this Declaration, should be engaged to read Common-Prayer, but to hear it, or go to Church, or Chapel: Now, while I am a Minister without any Place which requires my reading Common-Prayer, I am to be understood to engage no farther in my Conforming to the Lyturgy, that such who are bound to subscribe, and are no Ministers (For if I took a Living, I must subscribe this Declaration again, which I should not scruple to do in my former Sheets Explication, but in my state, that have no place to officiate in, and seek none, I suppose that in the mind of the Lawgiver I am not yet bound so far): and as for going to Church, it is what I am wont to do, without Subscription.  
Neither is there any word in this Subscription that confines the Subscriber so to go to Church, as that he may never go to other Meetings upon any occasion. It were excessively rigorous to stretch the words so far, and there is not one of a hundred that would rationally gather that this was the Parliaments meaning by this Subscription. If it were, I declare my Exception.  
I must moreover signify, that in Subscribing, I will Conform to the Lyturgy, I do not oblige myself to every thing whatsoever that is enjoined in that Book, as I do in general to go to Divine Service in the Parish Congregation. More particularly, in the Preface before the Prayers it is required of all Ministers, that they say daily the Morning and Evening Prayer either privately or openly, not being let by sickness, or some urgent Cause, and I do not apprehend that by Conforming to the Lyturgy, it was the Lawgivers meaning I should be engaged to this, who do not, and will not engage myself to that which I shall never perform, for I shall use my own Prayers at home. Indeed I think that what Minister soever does make the Declaration of assent and consent to all and every thing contained in, and prescribed by that Book, he must be according to the Lawgivers meaning engaged hereunto, for he does consent to all in regard to the Use: And I shall not lightly therefore ever (I think) make that Declaration, in those words and no other.  
In fine, if the sense of this Clause comes to no more in my state than going to Church, and of the other two to no more than I have delivered, then may I very safely yield to this subscription, and if I am to do what I can, both in regard to the fifth Commandment, and in regard to the uniting and strengthening the Protestant interest, and in regard to the use of my Ministry (I charge my brethren by the way to lay these three things with me well to heart, for really I stick greatly for want of their company) or at least the freer use of it, to preach in public, then is it not only lawful, but what it seems I am bound to do. Nevertheless because I am not certain, or at least not so certainly persuaded of the mind of the Lawgiver, as to be in regard to all particulars beyond doubt, and because I shall be apt to be raising scruples after, I must for the preventing my trouble, and securing my peace, fly to that refuge in regard to this Declaration, which is set open in regard to the Oath in the Sheriff's Case: And I do therefore make this present & public declaration (I crave pardon for the necessary repetition) that in this meaning, which I have all along delivered, supposing it the meaning of the Lawgiver, and with these explanatory limitations to the meaning, if in any thing indeed it be otherwise, I do subscribe the Declaration required to be subscribed in the Act for Uniformity, whensoever I set my hand to the Bishop's Registers book; whom I desire by these presents with all other any way concerned, to take cognizance of it. And also when I give my assent to the 39 Articles (if I give it) I do assent with my First sheets foreprized explication.  
I know there is no body of a deliberate understanding, but he does and must make some Interpretation of the Articles (to speak also a little of these) in which he conceives them true, or else he cannot assent to them according to his Conscience, let it be as large as it will, if he hath any at all: But I must profess this is not satisfactory to mine without a declaration also of the sense of such of them (which you may see in my former sheets) as I do scruple. I will as honestly give my reason, and it is, because if I assent to the Articles and say nothing, my Conscience tells me I must Interpretatively be thought to assent to them in the sense of the Imposers, that is (as I have been used to think) of the Majority of the Convocation that framed and decreed them, and I do verily believe their sense to be such in some of them, as I do certainly in my Judgement descent from it. I might instance in the 18th and the 11th Article, but I refer to my Two first Steps.  
It may be said, it is true it was the Convocation decreed the Articles, but it is the King that ratifies them, and when the ratification is from his authority alone, it is he, is the sole Imposer. I answer, this is a notion but newly risen up in my mind, and if it prove right after due canvasing, then must we look into the Declaration of the King (whether James or Charles, or both) which is set before the Articles, to find out what that sense is which is there ratified, and we have these words. We will that no man put his own comment to be the meaning of the Article, but shall take it in the literal and grammatical sense.  
I must ask here in the first place, what was the intent of the King when he says he will have no man put his own comment on the Article? Can any man indeed subscribe the Article and not make his own Interpretation? This were not to subscribe with Truth or Judgement; on only he must not make his sense to be the meaning, that is, his private sense to go for the sole public Interpretation. There is a latitude manifestly understood and allowed by the King in this literal and grammatical sense, because it is supposed by him that all the Clergy though of different Judgements do subscribe them, and every one pleads them in favour of his own opinion. I must ask them next, whether this literal and grammatical sense be to be understood with reference to the mind of the Convocation that decreed these Articles, or without any regard to it? All words (we know) are nothing but the signification of the mind, that mind must be some bodies, and an Article having no mind, but they that passed them, I should judge that the literal and grammatical sense of an Article is the meaning or mind of those that decreed it, Interpreted or Understood by a Literal and Grammatical construction of the words wherein they have expressed that mind or meaning: But if the Literal and Grammatical sense which is authorized by the King's Declaration, be understood without any such reference, so that a man may frame for himself any sense he can, so long as he makes it hold true in a Literal, Grammatical sense, then must I confess here a great freedom, ease, and kind of deliverance appearing to me for my Assenting to some of the Articles which have most stumbled me, because in the sense of those that decreed them I could not do it (I will name particularly the 18th and 36th Article): Nevertheless, in regard that there is, or may be, some other of these Articles as hard to be subscribed in the Literal and Grammatical sense, as those two to me foreintimated in the sense of the Convocation, I do find myself still constrained to keep to my foregoing Declaration. That is, if I take the liberty (I say) of an Explication, and Declare the same, the Bishop and all the World do see how I assent to them, which is, in a Doctrinal Interpretation, and with which I am then methinks well satisfied: But if I make no Explication, or if I use no words about it, I must be construed to assent to them in the Authentic Interpretation; and whether that be the strict Literal and Grammatical sense, authenticated by the King, or the sense in which they were at first decreed or passed, it will come all to one, I have no way without the course I take, to escape prevarication. This is my Conscience, and I go by it.  
To return to the Subscription, it may be questioned, in the end whether it be lawful to Subscribe a Declaration or Swear an Oath with an Explication, if it be such as includes any restriction or limitation to the sense of the Imposer. For Answer therefore to this,  
I do premise that if any man Subscribe or Swear to an Imposition, without making any Declaration about it, he must frame no Interpretation in his mind but that which he believes to be the very meaning of the Lawgiver, or else he prevaricates, or equivocates (his mind and words being not equal), which is to sin against Truth: But if he does declare himself before he Swears or Subscribes, I take that to be nothing but fair dealing, and another matter. Only I must yet make a difference between a man's declaring himself upon Conviction that the sense of the Imposer is ill, and such as he cannot Subscribe but by virtue of that Declaration: And his declaring upon doubt only, that is, being persuaded as to the main, that the sense of the Imposer is no other but what is good, or what he can Subscribe, and yet there remains some doubt retarding him. In the one case I think there is more reason for a man to put the question, which yet I shall speak to by and by: When in the other I think the declaring a man's self is a Salve so proper to the Malady, and so innocent, as I should be sorry if any question at all be made of the Lawfulness of it. For the Truth is, I do account the determination of this Case in regard to the frequency of it, so needful, that if there were nothing else in the Sheriff's Case besides that, it were fit to be Printed for its sake. This being premised, I answer directly.  
I. If there be any evil in this, it must be either in regard to the Fifth Commandment, or the Ninth. Either because it is against our duty of Obedience to the Higher Powers, or against our Duty of Sincerity or Truth. Here is no sin against Truth and Sincerity, for therefore do I make my Explication, that I may not forsake Truth, but keep my Sincerity in what I do: And here is no sin of Disobedience, because the Law of God supersedes that of Man; and when I do what I can in regard to the one, I must do no more (and I think declare it) by virtue of the other.  
2. If a Position be capable (note I say capable, not if uncapable) of a good sense, and a bad, and the bad sense were the sense of the Imposer, and yet I subscribe it in the good sense with professing my Exceptions against the bad, and that be as well known, as that I have subscribed, I do not sin thereby against Truth, because I subscribe not indeed in this case to the Position of the Imposer, but to another which I can subscribe. You may say, Here is a Cheat then put upon the Law. I answer, no Cheat, which signifies something dishonest, but an honest Avoidance of it, or lawful shift (without equivocation, mental reservation, or Jesuitical Trick), which all that do not submit to it, do use in some other way as they can, without sin. Indeed, if he that is to take my Subscription, or my Oath, will, after I have made my Declaration, refuse me upon that account saying, This is not the Oath Imposed, and I cannot accept it), he may prevent my passing, but if he does not, (and will let me go off with another, which serves as well, or better), I see no evil in it by him or me, supposing still no detriment to the Public in the business. If you ask then how shall a Certificate be given me that I have subscribed, I must confess, unless I may write According to a Paper delivered in to the Bishop I subscribe, and so it be certified likewise, According to a Paper delivered in he hath subscribed, I see not how a Certificate should be other in this case.  
But 3. I thank God this is not the case here in good earnest, for the Explication which I do give of this Subscription, and in which (as respecting me): it may be clearly subscribed, is the very, sense itself (I suppose) of the Low-giver, insomuch as I think therefore I should myself scruple no farther, and that another in my stead would not, and need not: Only being conscious of some former wound on my mind, I am forced to provide against my own infirmity. And the truth is, it is in this case alone I dare insist so much on what I do, referring the other case before to the Judgement of the more assured, and to my own farther consideration: When if an Imposition (I say) be indeed such as that the sense thereof is really doubtful, or I indeed doubt of the Lawgivers meaning therein (especially if in my belief I en cline more to think the good sense theirs rather than the evil) I cannot apprehend any means more honest, or so proper, as such a Declaration of ones self mentioned for the keeping a good Conscience (or rather for satisfying the same) in what a man does. And now if the Bishop then herein, and all good men will, or do, bear with me, I do them no hurt, and they relieve me. Bear ye one another's burdens (says the Apostle), and so fulfil the Law of Christ.  
It remains only, that I go to some Bishop after I have Printed my Paper, and give it him. If when he hath read it, he thinks my Explanations (or sense) agreeable to the meaning of the Lawgiver, he can have nothing to say against me: if he think otherwise, let him choose whether he will admit me. I am not to be solicitous about his thoughts, so long as I have discharged myself. He cannot refuse me in Law, and I in my Conscience have my satisfaction. Let him but read my Papers, or let me (or his Chaplain) signify the Contents to him, and all is brought to this Period.  
Before my going off, that I may understand myself, and be understood, there are Two things I am to make my Application for, to the Bishop, or Bishops; For a Certificate; For a Licence.  
For the Certificate, That is to be granted of course upon my subscribing the Declaration required in the Uniformity Act. In order to subscribe it, I made in my former Sheets Two Steps. The First was, I desired liberty to explain the Declaration, and then to set my hand to it in the same Paper with my Explication. This being not granted, and the way of Subscribing (as I am informed) being by the Registers inserting that Declaration in his Book, and the Ministers putting their Names only to it, my Second Step or Request hath been that I may do so with the liberty of writing these words, According to a Paper delivered in to the Bishop, I subscribe. What hurt it could be to any Bishop, for me to subscribe thus, that is, with these words in his Registers Book, Jam ignorant, either from the Law, or from the Canons: But because I am apprehensive how apt the Bishops themselves are to suspect it as dangerous, or though safe, not to allow it, because singular, I am put upon a procedure to a Third Step in these second present Sheets, which is, the capacitating myself against the need of more Condescension than the Law allows, if no other can be had; and this hath not been altogether unprepared before in my thoughts. It is no sin for a Bishop to read my Sheets, if I present them to him, no breach of the Law, or of the Cannons. If he do read them, or hath read them, and I know that, I am free then to seek to be admitted. If he will not read my Paper, or hear the Contents, then will not I neither subscribe; If he will, or hath, and would not after admit me upon that account, I shall acquiesce in his pleasure; but so long as I offer to subscribe as other do, he cannot refuse me an Admission, nor a Certificate, because the Act of Parliament does require it.  
For a Licence then to Preach, the matter I confess is not altogether the same. Here is a May, there was a Must. In the Bishops granting Licences, they go ordinarily upon the Canons, and the 36th Canon requires Three Points or Articles to be subscribed, with an Ego libenter & ex animo subscribos: Upon those terms I seek not a Licence, (I cannot, I never shall believe) but upon the Act for Uniformity, where we may find these words. And be it further Enacted, That no Person shall be allowed to Preach, etc. unless he be Licenced by the Archbishop, or Bishop, and shall in the presence of the same Archbishop, or Bishop, read the 39 Articles of Religion, with a Declaration of his unfeigned Assent to the same. By which words it appear that though the Canons require Two Points more than Assenting to the 39 Articles, a Bishop (at least the Archbishop) may justify himself by this Act, if he require but that one, that is, if he give me a Licence only upon my Reading in his presence, and declaring my Assent to the 39 Articles of Religion. And why am I to Read the Articles in his presence, but that it is to be supposed the mind of the Lawgiver, that he may examine me thereupon, if he will, whether I understand them, or how? And if so, I must on necessity explain myself, and consequently it is so far from being against Law to accept of my Assent with an Explication, that it seems rather the intent of the Lawgiver that it should not be taken without.  
Note moreover, To come for a Licence upon a man's being Beneficed in a Diocese is one thing, and to seek a Licence for Occasional Sermons is another. The Canon does impose its Subscription upon all that have any Living, Lecture, or Preferment in the Church, but for a liberty to Preach merely on occasion, without any Public Emolument, I think no more needs be required than what is made necessary by the Act of Uniformity.  
Let the Canons be consulted, the Bishops will find this true, that if the shall give a Licence for Preaching to any that have Benefice, Living or Lecture in their Diocese, without requiring of him the Canonical Subscription, they are obnoxious to a penalty; but what is it? why such a Bishop shall be suspended for a year from doing so any more, That is in effect all, and how rarely was that penalty itself ever executed upon any? But if he give a Licence only for Occasional Preaching, where a man hath no Dignity, Living, or Lecture in the Diocese, let the Order of the Canons be inspected, they will find no penalty inflictable for that. And if there be no penalty to be found in such a case, quod impunè fieri potest, I must urge, it lieet; and the Licet then appearing, there can be no question remain but upon the Libet only.  
And now whether the Bishop or Bishops will deal with me, as he may, according only to the Act, or will stand with me upon the Canons, which he may choose, the Lord knows. I have reason to doubt. If my Request be grated, it is well; I will say of it as Lot said of Zoar, It is a little one, and my Ministry shall live; let them but read my Papers, and admit me▪ I ask no more. But if they will not grant it, I have done; for when I have gone so far as I can, I will not be got to make a Step farther to what I cannot for any thing, or any body (through God's grace) in the world.  
I must confess moreover, that I am myself exceeding timorous, and backward to the doing any thing in order to Ministerial Conformity, although I am for coming to Church as a Parishioner, even more forwards than other; for it hath still been my practice, and I have been engaged in my Opinion and Books against Separation. My fears about doing this are secret and dark, and whether it be Superstition only; or aliquid 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, some Impress from God, it is for aught I see unevitable; so that I am not sure if the Bishops at last would let me, whether that will. I do not use here any Colour (God is my witness), but I speak with a feeling care as I would of my Life: & I must therefore conclude thus. As on the part of the Bishops, If they will; So on my part also, if it be right, if it be meet, if I be clear in my Soul if I can do it.  
JOHN HUMPHREY.  
FINIS.