A view of some EXCEPTIONS Which have been made BY A ROMANIST TO The L D Viscount FALKLAND'S DISCOURSE Of the INFALLIBILITY of the CHURCH of ROME. Submitted to the Censure of all sober Christians. Together with The Discourse itself of Infallibility prefixed to it.  
The second Edition newly corrected.  
LONDON. Printed by J. G. for R. Royston at the Angel in Ivy-lane. M.DC.L.   

To the READER.  
THE Length and quality of this ensuing trouble will seem to have been given the Reader somewhat impertinently, if a brief account be not first rendered of the occasion thereof.  
The sad effects of the present differences, and divisions of this broken Kingdom, having made peace, and unity, and infallibility, such precious desirable things, that if there were but one wish offered to each man among us, it would certainly, with a full consent, be laid out on this one treasure, the setting up some Catholic Umpire, or Daies-man, some visible, infallible Definer of Controversies; the Pretenders to that Infallibility, having the luck to be alone in that pretention, have been looked on with some reverence, and (by those who knew nothing of their grounds, or arguments) acknowledged to speak, if not true, yet seasonably; and having so great an advantage upon their Auditors (their inclinations, and their wishes to find themselves overcome, going along with every argument that should be brought them) and so a fair probable entrance, by that inlet of their affections, to their minds, they began to redouble their industry, and their hopes, and instead of the many particulars of the Romish doctrine, which they were wont to offer proof for in the retail, now to set all their strength upon this one in gross, and by the compendiousness of that course to expect a more easy reception, then formerly they had met with; the very gains, and conveniences, that attend this doctrine of theirs, if it were true, being to flesh and blood (which all men have not the skill of putting off) mighty Topics of probability that it is so.  
To discover the danger of this sweet potion, or rather, to show how far it is from being what it it pretends, and so to exchange the specious for the sound, the made-dish for the substantial food (allowing the Universal Church the authority of an irrefragable testimony, and the present age of the Romish Church, as much of our belief, as it hath of conformity with the universal of all ages) but not a privilege of not being able to say false whatsoever it saith, and so to set us in the safer though longer way, thereby to whet our industry in the chase of truth, in stead of assuring ourselves that we cannot err (which is not a virtue, but an excellency, not a grace to be crowned, but a great part of the crown itself, reserved for another world, a felicity, but not a duty) this Discourse of the Lord Viscount Falkland's was long since designed; as also to remove the great scandals, and obstacles, which have obstructed all way of hope to that universal aim of all true Christians, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Catholic harmony which jamblicus talks of in the spheres above, but would found better in this vault (this arch to bear up those spheres) the Church below, the Universal peace of Christendom; for to this nothing is more unreconcileably contrary than pretensions to Infallibility in any part of it; all such making it unlawful either for themselves to mend, or others to be endured, shutting out all possibility either of compliance, or charity, or reformation in their own, or mercy to other men's errors. What was thus by his Lordship designed in all justice, was by an entire lover of peace and truth published in all charity, to resist and check a threatening tempest, which rising from out present evils, was apt (if it did not begin) to shake some. The Printing of this Tract presently provoked an Assertor of that Infallibility, to take upon him the answering of it, and to complain that an Answer which had been by the same hand given it formerly, was not permitted to attend it into public. This then being a second Care, was probably to have arrived to a higher degree of perfection, and indeed among the Favourers of that persuasion, was cried up for so satisfactory a piece, that it was delivered to a Member of the Church of England, as unanswerable. From him it came to those hands, which returned it to the Author with this ensuing rejoinder, withal intimating, that since in his, he seemed to wish the same freedom of the Press, which his Lordship had found, both the Answer and the Reply should be recommended thither, if he pleased.  
After he had detained the Reply some weeks, he was pleased to return it with a protestation, That he neither intended, nor would permit his to become public, pretending (that I may give you his own words) his Treatise to have been no finished work, but only a first draught, or inchoation, ventured abroad, to explore the judgements op one of two intelligent Adversaries, that so the Author by his second (he might have said third) thoughts, might be better able to understand, what was to be altered in it, what added or what taken a way, either as superfluous, or offensive, and till that act was done, and withal till an approbation and licence given by those, to whom it belonged, neither the work, nor any line of it, is to be acknowledged or vouched by the Author. And so both were returned with some few alterations and additions in his Answer, and marginal Notes on the Reply, and one sheet at the end of them, containing a new Scheme of probation, of the pretended Infallibility, and a preloquium to it, wherein the passage just now mentioned, is interminis recited.  
This the Replicant (to avoid all appearance of severity) was content to accept for sad earnest, and therefore freely expressed his willignesse to give the Author leave to provide a new Answer to his Lordships-Treatise, which he might be willing to own in public, which when he should do, promise was made to prepare a speedy Answer thereunto, and on those terms to be content to lay aside the former.  
That this should be done, was affirmed on one part, and on the other expected some months with patience, till at length the Answerers' pleasure was made known, that that resolution was put off, and that in stead of so mean a combat either with his Lordship, or this Replicant, he was pleased now to design a full discourse on that Subject, without taking notice of either, any farther, than he should think fit to take in his way any thing by them objected against his position, and that this should be printed beyond the Seas.  
When this will be performed I cannot tell. Only this is now discerned (somewhat contrary to expectation) that what hath been disclaimed by him, is extolled by others, and the weakness of the Replicant sufficiently despised; Wherein though he hath not much temptation to think himself injured, being ready to acknowledge the emptiness of these Papers (and more than so, to render a reason of it, viz: the fate which they were under, by a necessity of attending this Apologist 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which yielded them occasion of little variety, unless they would extravagate.) Yet could he not resist the Reasons which charged it on him as a duty, thus confidently to importune the Reader with the view of the whole matter, as far as it hath passed between them; setting down that Answer to, and this Vindication of his Lordship's Arguments by Chapters, and then (not do him the least injustice) adding in the end of all, the Answerers marginal Replies, and that concluding Sheet (that even now was mentioned) with a rejoinder to that also.  
By all this, endeavouring to lay grounds, for all men to judge, how little truth there is in that so Epidemical persuasion, that there is no middle, betwixt asserting an Infallible Judge, and the falling headlong into all the Schisms, and Heresies of this present age.  
My Conscience assuring me, that the grounds on which the established Church of England is founded, are of so rare an excellent mixture, that as none but intelligent truly Christian minds can sufficiently value the composition, so there is no other in Europe, so likely to preserve Peace and Unity, if what prudent Laws had so long ago designed, they now were able to uphold; For want of which and which only it is, that at present the whole Fabric lies polluted in confusion and in blood, and hopes not for any binding up of wounds, for restauration of any thing, that looks like Christian, till the faith of the reformed English have the happiness to be weighed prudently, and the military Sword being timely sheathed, the Power and Laws of Peace be returned into those hands, which are ordained by GOD the Defenders of it.  
H. H.   

Of the INFALLIBILITY of the CHURCH of ROME. A Discourse written by the Lord Viscount FALKLAND.  
Section 1 TO him that doubts whether the Church of Rome have any errors, they answer, that She hath none, for She never can have any. This being so much harder to believe than the first, had need be proved by some certain arguments, if they expect that the belief of this one should draw on whatsoever else they please to propose: Yet this is offered to be proved by no better ways than those by which we offer to prove she hath erred: Which are, arguments from Scripture, Reason, and Ancient Writers; all which, they say themselves, are fallible; for nothing is not so, but the Church; which if it be the only infallible determination, and that can never be believed upon its own authority, we can never infallibly know that the Church is infallible: for these other ways of proof (they say) may deceive both them and us; and so neither side is bound to believe them.  
Section 2 If they say, that an argument out of Scripture is sufficient ground of Divine faith, why are they so offended with the Protestants for believing every part of their Religion upon that ground, upon which they build all theirs at once? and if following the same Rule with equal desire of finding the truth by it, (having neither of those qualities, which Isidorus Pelusiota says, are the causes of all Heresies; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, pride and prejudication) why should God be more offended with the one than the other, though they chance to err?  
Section 3 They say the Church is therefore made infallible by God, that all men may have some certain Guide; yet though it be infallible, unless it both plainly appear to be so, (for it is not certain to whom it doth not appear certain) and unless it be manifest which is the Church, God hath not attained his end; and it were to set a Ladder to Heaven, and seem to have a great care of my going up, whereas unless there be care taken that I may know this Ladder is here to that purpose, it were as good for me it had never been set.  
Section 4 If they say we may know it, for that general and constant Tradition instructs us in it; I answer, that ignorant people cannot know this, and so it can be no Rule for them; and if learned people mistake in this, there can be no condemnation for them. For suppose to know, whether the Church of Rome may err, (as a way which will conclude against her, but not for her; for if She hath erred, certainly She may, but though She hath not erred hitherto, it follows not that She cannot err) I seek whether She have erred; and conceiving She hath contradicted herself, conclude necessarily, She hath erred, I suppose it not damnable though I err in my judgement: because I try the Church by one of those touchstones herself appoints me; which is, Conformity with the Antient. For to say I am to believe the present Church that it differs not from the former, though it seem to me to do so, is to send me to a Witness, and bid me not believe it.  
Section 5 Now to say the Church is provided for a Guide of faith, but must be known by such marks as the ignorant cannot seek it by, and the learned may chance not to find it by, though seeking it with all diligence, and without all prejudice, can no way satisfy me.  
Section 6 If they say, God will reveal the truth to whosoever seeks it in these ways sincerely; this saying both sides will (without means of being confuted) make use of; therefore it would be as good that neither did.  
Section 7 When they have proved the Church to be infallible; yet to my understanding they have proceeded nothing farther, unless we can be sure which is it; for it signifies only that God will always have a Church which shall not err; but not that such or such a Succession shall be always in the right; not that the Bishop of such a place, and the Clergy that adheres to him, shall always continue in the true faith. So that if they say the Greek Church is not the Church, because by its own confession it is not infallible; I answer, that it may be now the Church, and may hereafter err, and so not be now infallible; and yet the Church never err, because before their fall from truth, others may arise to maintain it, who then will be the Church; and so the Church may still be infallible; though not in respect of any set persons whom we may know at all times for our Guide.  
Section 8 Then if they prove the Church of Rome to be the true Church, and not the Greek, because their opinions are consonant either to Scripture or Antiquity, they run into a circle, proving their tenets to be true; first, because the Church holds them, and then theirs to be the true Church, because it holds the truth: which last, though it appear to me the only way, yet it takes away its being a Guide which we may follow without examination, without which, all they say besides is nothing.  
Section 9 Nay, suppose they had evinced, that some succession were infallible, and so had proved to a learned man that the Roman Church must be this, because none else pretends to it; yet this can be no sufficient ground to the ignorant, who cannot have any infallible foundation for their belief, that the Church of Greece pretends not to the same; and even to the Learned it is but an accidental argument, because if any other company had likewise claimed to be infallible, it had overthrown all so proved.  
Section 10 Nay, it is but an arbitrary Argument, and depends upon the pleasure of the adversary; for, if any society of Christians would pretend to it, the Church of Rome could make use of it no longer.  
Section 11 The chiefest reason why they disallow of the Scripture for Judge, is, because when differences arise about the interpretation, there is no way to end them; and that it will not stand with the goodness of God, to damn men for not following his will, if he had assigned no infallible way how to find it. I confess this to be wonderful true, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and let them excuse themselves that think otherwise. Yet this will be no argument against him, who believes that to all who follow their reason in the interpretation of the Scriptures, and search for Tradition, God will either give his grace for assistance to find the truth, or his pardon if they miss it: and then this supposed necessity of an infallible Guide, with this supposed damnation for want of it, fall together to the ground.  
Section 12 If they command us to believe infallibly the contrary to this, they are to prove it false by some infallible way, (for the conclusion must be of the same nature, and not conclude more than the premises set down,) now such a way, Scripture and Reason, or infused faith cannot be, (for they use to object the fallibility of them to those that build their Religion upon them) nor the Authority of the Church, for that is part of the question, and must be itself first proved, and that by none of the former ways, for the former reasons.  
Section 13 The Pope's infallibility can be no infallible ground of faith, being itself no necessary part of the faith; (& we can be no surer of any thing proved, than we are of that which proves it) and if he be fallible, no part is the more infallible for his sideing with them. So if the Church be divided, I have no way to know which is the true Church, but by searching which agrees with Scripture and Antiquity, and so judging accordingly. (But this is not to submit myself to her opinions as my guide, which they tell us is necessary.) Which course if they approve not of as a fit one for a Learned man, they are in a worse case for the ignorant, who can take no course at all, nor is the better at all, for this Guide, the Church; whilst two parts dispute which is it, and that by arguments he understands not.  
Section 14 If I granted the Pope, or a Counsel by him called, to be infallible, yet I conceive their Decrees can be no sufficient ground (by their own axioms) of Divine faith. For first (say the most) No Council is valid not approved by the Pope, (for thus they overthrew that held at Ariminum) & a Pope chosen by Simony is ipso facto no Pope. I can then have no certainer ground for the infallibility of those Decrees, and consequently for my belief of them, than I have that the choice of him was neither directly nor indirectly simoniacal; which to be certain of, is absolutely impossible.  
Section 15 Secondly, suppose him Pope, and to have confirmed the Decrees; yet that these are the Decrees of a Council, or that he hath confirmed them▪ I can have but an uncontradicted attestation of many men, (for if another Council should declare these to have been the Acts of a former Council, I should need again some certain way of knowing how this declaration is a Counsels) which is no ground (say they) of faith, I am sure not so good and general a one as that Tradition by which we prove that the Scripture is Scripture, which yet they will not allow any to be certain of but from them.  
Section 16 Thirdly, for the sense of their Decrees, I can have no better expounder to follow then Reason; which if, though I mistake, I shall not be damned for following, why shall I for mistaking the sense of Scripture? Or why am I a less fit interpreter of one, then of the other, where both seem equally clear? And where they seem so (I mean equally clear) and yet contradictory, shall I not as soon believe Scripture, which is, without doubt, of at least as great authority?  
Section 17 But I doubt whether Counsels be fit deciders of Questions; for such they cannot be, if they beget more, and men have cause to be in greater doubts afterwards (none of the former being diminished) than they were at first.  
Section 18 Now I conceive there arise so many out of this way, that the Learned cannot end all, nor the Ignorant know all. As (besides the forenamed considerations) Who is to call them, the Pope, or Kings: Who are to have voices in them; Bishops only, or Priests also: Whether the Pope or Council be Superior; and the last need the approbation of the first, debated among themselves: Whether any Countries not being called, or not being there (as the Abyssines, to great a part of Christianity, and not resolvedly condemned by them for Heretics, were absent at the Council of Trent) make it not general: Whether if it be one not every where received (as when the Bishops sent from some places have exceeded their Commission, as in the Council of Florence) it be yet of necessity to be subscribed to: Whether there were any surreption used or force, and Whether those disannul the Acts: Whether the most voices are to be held the Act of the Council, or those of all are required, (as Canus saith, All the Council cannot err, the most may; which never yet agreed) or Whether two parts will serve (as in the Tridentine Synod,) a considerable doubt, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Tom. 2. pa. 272.  because Nicephorus Callistus relateing the resolution of a Council at Rome against that of Ariminum makes them give three reasons. One, That the Bishop of Rome was not present. The second, That most did not agree to it. Thirdly, That others thither gathered were displeased at their resolutions: which proves, that in their opinions, if either most not present agree not to it, or, all present be not pleased with it, a Council hath no power to bind. All these doubts, I say, persuade me that whatsoever brings with it so many new questions, can be no fit ender of the old.  
Section 19 In those things in which, before a General Council have defined, it is lawful to hold either way, and damnable to do so after; I desire to know how it agreeth with the Charity of the Church, to define any thing, and so bestow upon the Devil one path more for us to walk in to him?  
Section 20 If the infallibility of a General Council be a point of faith, I desire to know why it is so? Scripture and Tradition seem to me not to say so: But if they did, so, I suppose, you will grant they do of this doctrine, [That the souls of the blessed shall see God before the day of judgement, and not be kept in secret Receptacles:] For, else the doctrine of prayer to Saints cannot stand: and yet for denying this, doth Bellarmine excuse Pope John 22. (of which belief they know he was not alone) because the Church (he means, I doubt not, a General Council) had not then condemned it. I desire to know, why should not he be condemned as well without one as many Heretics that are held so by their Church, yet condemned by no General Council? which if he makes to be the rule of Heresy, it had been happy to have lived before the Council of Nice, when no opinion had been damnable, but some against the Apostles Council at Jerusalem, because there had yet been no General Council:  
Section 21 At least, why shall not I be excused by the same reason, though I believe not a Council to be infallible, since I never heard that any Council hath decreed that they are so? Neither, if it have, can we be bound by that Decree, unless made certain some other way that itself is so.  
Section 22 If you say, we must believe it because of Tradition; I answer, sometimes you will have the not believing any thing, though not declared by a Council, to have power enough to damn; (that is, when it makes against us) at other times the Church hath not decreed, unless a Council have, and their error is pardonable, and they good Catholics.  
Section 23 Next, (as I have asked before) how shall an ignorant man know it? for he, in likelihood, can speak but with a few, from whom he cannot know that all of the Church of Rome's part do now, and in past Ages have believed it to be Tradition so certainly as to make it a ground of Faith, (unless he have some revelation that those deceive him not.) Neither indeed can those that should inform him of the opinions of former times be certainly informed themselves; for truly if (as they would persuade us) the relation of Papias could cozen so far all the Prime Doctors of the Christian Church into the belief of the doctrine of the Millenaries, so as that no one of those two first Ages opposed it, (which appears plain enough, because those that after rose up against this opinion, never quoted any for themselves before Dionys: Alexandrinus, who lived at least 250 years after Christ.) Nay, if those first men did not only believe it as probable, 
Dial. cum Tryph. pag. 307. lib. 5. cap. 33.  but Justin Martyr says he holds it, and so do all that are in all parts Orthodox Christians, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Irenaeus sets it down directly for a Tradition, and relates the very words that Christ used when he taught this; (which is plainer than any other Tradition is proved, or said to be (out of Antiquity) by them.) If (I say) these could be so deceived, why might not other of the Ancients as well be by others deceived in other points? And then, what certainty shall the Learned have, when after much labour they think they can make it appear that the Ancients thought any thing Tradition, that indeed it was so? And that either the folly, or the knavery of some Papias deceived them not? I confess it makes me think of some that Tully speaks of, who (arcem amittunt, dum propugnacula defendunt) lose the fort, whilst they defend the outworks; for, whilst they answer this way the arguments of Tradition for the opinion of the Chiliasts, they make unuseful to them the force of tradition to prove any thing else by. For which cause it was rather wisely than honestly done of them, who before Fevardentius set him forth, left out that part of Irenaeus which we allege (though we need it not much, for many of the Fathers take notice of this belief of his:) Yet he justifies himself for doing it by a worse blow to them than this itself, which is, saying, that if they leave out all Errors in the Books they publish, (that is, I suppose, all opinions contrary to the Church of Rome) bona pars Scriptorum Patrum Orthodoxorum evanesceret, a good part of the writings of the Orthodox Fathers must vanish away.  
Section 24 But the Tradition that can be found out of Ancients (since their witnessing may deceive us) hath much less strength when they argue only thus: Sure so many would not say this is true, and join in opinions, if there were no tradition for them. I would have you remember they can deliver their opinion possibly, but either before the controversy arise in the Church (upon some chance) or after. If before, it is confessed that they write not cautiously enough; and so they answer all they seem to say for Arius and Pelagius his faith, before themselves, and so consequently their controversy (though it may be not their opinion) arose. If after, than they answer often (if any thing be by them at that time spoken against them) that the heat of disputation brought it from them, and their resolutions to oppose Heretics enough; I desire it may be lawful for us to answer so too, either one of these former ways; or that it is (as often they say too) some Hyperbole, when you press us in any thing with the opinions of Fathers. At least, I am sure if they may deceive us with saying a thing is a Tradition, that is not, we may be sooner deceived if we will say and conclude it for a Tradition, when they speak it only as a Truth, and (for aught appears) their particular Opinion.  
Section 25 For besides, if when Salvian, comparing the Arians with evil Livers, (and that after they were condemned by a Council) extenuates, (by reason of their believing themselves in the right) with much instance the fault of the Arians, and says, How they shall be punished for it in the day of Judgement, none can know but the Judge. If (I say) they confess it to be his opinion, they must also confess the doctrine of their Church to be different from that of Salvian's times; because he was allowed a Member of that for all this saying; whereas he of the Church of Rome that should say so of us would be accounted Sesqui haereticus, a Heretic and a half: Or else they must say (which they can only say and not prove) that he was so earnest against ill men, that for the aggravation of their crime he lessened that of the Heretics, and said, what at another time he would not have said; which if they do, will it not overthrow wholly the authority of the Fathers? Since we can never infallibly know what they thought at all times, from what they were moved to say by some collateral consideration.  
Section 26 Next to this certain and undoubted damning of all out of the Church of Rome, which averseth me from it; comes their putting all to death, or at least pains, that are so, where they have power: which is an effect, though not a necessary one, of the first opinion; and that averseth me yet more; for I do not believe all to be damned whom they damn, but I conceive all to be killed whom they kill. I am sure if you look upon Constantine's Epistle, written to persuade concord upon the first disagreement between Alexander & Arrius, you will find that he thought (and if the Bishops of his time had at first thought otherwise, he would have been sure better informed) that neither side deserved either death or damnation, (and yet sure this question was as great as ever rose since:) For having spoken of the opinions as things so indifferent, that the Reader might almost think they had been fallen out at Spurn-point or Ketle-pins, he adds, 
Niceph. Tom. 1. pag. 555.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, For that which is necessary is one thing, that all agree and keep the same faith about divine providence. I am sure in the same Author, Moses, a man praised by him, refusing to be made Bishop by Lucius because he was an Arrian, and he answering, That he did ill to refuse it before he knew what his faith was; Answered, 
Tom. 2. p. 206.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The banishing of Bishops shows ENOUGH your faith. So that it is plain he thought punishing for opinions to be a mark which might serve him to know false opinions by.  
Section 27 I believe throughout Antiquity you will find no putting any to death, unless it be such as begin to kill first, (as the Circumcollians or such like) I am sure Christian Religions chief glory being that it increased by being persecuted, and having that advantage of the Mahometan (which came in by force) me thinks, especially since Synesius hath told us, and reason told men so before Synesius, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
De Regno.  Every thing is destroyed by the contrary to what settled and composed it. It should be to take ill care of Christianity, to seek to hold it up by Turkish means: at least, it must breed doubts, that if the Religion had always remained the same, it would not be defended by ways so contrary to those by which it was propagated.  
Section 28 I desire recrimination may not be used: for though it be true that Calvin hath done it, and the Church of England a little, (which is a little too much) for, Negare manifesta non audeo, & excusare immodica non possum, yet She, confessing She may err, is not so chargeable with any fault as those which pretend they cannot, (and so will be sure never to mend it:) and besides, I will be bound to defend no more than I have undertaken, which is, to give reasons why the Church of Rome is fallible.  
Section 29 I confess this opinion of damning so many, and this custom of burning so many, this breeding up those who know nothing else in any point of Religion, yet to be in readiness to cry, To the fire with him, and, To Hell with him, (as Polybius saith in a certain furious Faction of an Army of several Nations, and consequently languages, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, All of them understood only this word, Throw at him) this I say in my opinion was it chiefly which made so many so suddenly leave the Church of Rome, that indeed, to borrow the Authors phrase, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉— They needed not persuasion to do it, but only news that others had begun: For, as this alone, if believed, makes all the rest be so too; so one thing alone mis-liked, overthrows also all the rest.  
Section 30 If it were granted that, because it agrees not with the Goodness of God to let men want an infallible Guide, therefore there must be one; and that the Church of Rome were that one; yet if that teach any thing, to my understanding, contrary to God's Goodness, I am not to receive her doctrine, for the same cause for which they would have me receive it, (it being as good an argument: This Guide teaches things contrary to God's goodness, therefore is not appointed by God; as to say, It is agreeable to his goodness there should be a Guide, therefore there is one.) And sure it is lawful to examine particular doctrines, whether they agree with that principle which is their foundation; and to that (me thinks) to damn him that neither with negligence nor prejudication searcheth what is God's will, though he miss of it, is as contrary as the first can be supposed.  
Section 31 I would know whether he that never heard of the Church of Rome shall yet be damned for not believing her infallible. I have so good an opinion of them, as to assure myself they will answer, he shall not. I will then ask, whether he that hath searched what Religions they are, and finds hers to be one, and her infallibility to be part of it, if his reason will not assent to that, shall he be damned for being inquisitive after truth? (for he hath committed no other fault greater than the other) and Whether such an ignorance (I mean after impartial search) be not of all other the most invincible?  
Section 32 Nay, grant the Church to be infallible, yet, me thinks, he that denies it, and employs his reason to seek if it be true, should be in as good case as he that believes it, and searcheth not at all the truth of the proposition he receives: for I cannot see why he should be saved, because, by reason of his parent's belief, or the Religion of the Country, or some such accident, the truth was offered to his understanding, when had the contrary been offered he would have received that; and the other damned that believes falsehood, upon as good ground as the other doth truth; unless the Church be like a Conjurer's circle, that will keep a man from the Devil though he came into it by chance.  
Section 33 They grant that no man is an Heretic that believes not his Heresy obstinately; and if he be no Heretic, he may sure be saved. It is not then certain damnation for any man to deny the infallibility of the Roman Church: but for him only that denies it obstinately, and then I am safe; for I am sure I do not.  
Section 34 Neither can they say, I shall be damned for Schism, though not for Heresy, for he is as well no Schismatique, though in Schism, that is willing to join in communion with the true Church, when it appears to be so to him; as he is no Heretic though he hold Heretical opinions, that holds them not obstinately, that is (as I suppose) with a desire to be informed if he be in the wrong.  
Section 35 Why, if it be not necessary always to believe the truth, so one believe in general what the Church would have believed, (for so they excuse great men that have held contrary opinions to theirs now, before they were defined, or they knew them to be so) why (I say) shall not the same implicit assent to whatsoever God would have assented to (though I mistake what it is) be sufficient? When indeed to believe implicitly what God would have believed, is to believe implicitly likewise what the Church teacheth, if this doctrine be within the number of those which God commands to be believed.  
Section 36 I have therefore the less doubt of this opinion, that I shall have no harm for not believing the infallibility of the Church of Rome, because of my being so far from leaning to the contrary, and so suffering my will to have power over my understanding, that if God would leave it to me which Tenet should be true, I would rather choose that that should, than the contrary. For they may well believe me, that I take no pleasure in tumbling hard and unpleasant books, and making myself giddy with disputing of obscure questions & dazzled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Section 37 If I could believe, there should always be (whom I might always know) a society of men, 
Coesarius.  whose opinions must be certainly true, and who would 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Synesius.  labour to discuss & define all arising doubts so as I might be excusably at ease, and have no part left for me but that of obedience, which must needs be a less difficult, and so a more agreeable way then to endure endless volumes of commentaries, the harsh Greek of Evagrius, and the as hard Latin of Ireneus, and be pained by distinguishing between different senses and various lections, and he would deserve not the lowest place in Bedlam that would prefer these studies before so many, so much more pleasant, that would rather employ his understanding, then submit it; and if he could think God imposed upon him only the resisting temptations, would, by way of addition, require from himself the resolving of doubts. I say not that all these books are to be read by those who understand not the languages, for them, I conceive, their seeking into Scripture may suffice. But if I have, by God's grace, skill to look into them, I cannot better use it then in the search of his will, where they say it is to be found, that I might assent to them if there I find reason for it; or if I do not, they may have no excuse for not excusing me.  
Section 38 For whereas they say, it is pride makes us doubt of their infallibility; I answer, that their too much laziness and impatience of examining is the cause many of them do not doubt.  
Section 39 Next, what pride is it, never to assent before I find reason for it, (since they, when they follow that Church as infallible, pretend reason for it, and will not say they would, if they thought they found none) and if they say, we do find reason but will not confess it, than pride hinders not our assent, but our declaration of it; which if it do in any one, he is without question, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, condemned by himself, and it must be a very partial advocate that would strive to acquit him.  
Section 40 One much prevailing argument which they make, is this, that whosoever leave them, fall into dissension between themselves, whereas they in the mean while are always at unity. I answer, first, in this whereof the question is now, they all consent. Secondly, when there is fire for them that disagree, they need not brag of their uniformity who consent. Thirdly, they have many differences among them (as whether the Pope be infallible; Whether God predeterminate every action; Whether Election and Reprobation depend upon foresight;) Which seem to me as great as any between their adversaries; and in the latter the Jesuits have Ancienter and more general Traditions on their side; then the Church of Rome hath in any other question; and as much ground from reason for the defence of God's goodness, as they can think they have for the necessity of an infallible guide; yet these arguments must not make the Dominicans Heretics, and must us.  
Section 41 If they say, The Church hath not resolved it (which signifies only, that they are not agreed about it, which is that we object) I answer, It ought to have done, if conformity to the ancient Church be required; in which all that ever I could hear of before Saint Austin (who is very various I confess in it) delivered the contrary to the Dominicans, as not doubtful; and to say, it is lawful for them to disagree whensoever they do not agree, is ridiculous: for they cannot do both at once about the same point.  
Section 42 And if they say, they mean, by the Churches not having concluded it, that a Council hath not, I answer, that they condemn some without any, and why not these? Next, I say that the opinion of the Diffused Church is of more force than the conclusion of a Representative (which hath its authority from the other) and therefore if all extant for four hundred years teach any thing, it is more Heresy to deny that, than any Canon of a Council.  
Section 43 But may not howsoever any other company of People (that would maintain themselves to be infallible) say as much, that all other Sects differ from one another, and therefore should all agree with them? Would those not (think they) ascribe all other men's dissensions, and learned men's falling into divers Heresies to their not allowing their infallibility? to their not assenting to their Decrees? and not suffering them, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to sit as teachers of those things that come in question, and to have all others in that place of Disciples obedient to them? which is that which Nilus, a Greek Bishop, professeth, that because the Greeks would not allow the Romans, was the only cause of separation between them.  
Section 44 They use much to object, How could errors come into the Church without Opposition and mention both of that opposition in History? I answer, they might come in not at once, but by degrees; as in the growth of a child, and the motion of a clock, we see neither in the present, but know there was a present when we find it past. Next, so many Authors being lost, who can make it certain to me that from none of those, we should have had notice of this opposition, if they had come to us? Next, I say there are two sorts of errors, to hold a thing necessary that is unlawful and false, or that is but profitable and probable: Of the second sort that errors should come in, it appears not hard to me, and especially in those ages where want of Printing made books, and consequently learning not so common as now it is; where the few that did study busied themselves in School-speculations only, when the Authority of a man of chief note had a more general influence than now it hath, and so (as Thucydodes saith, the Plague did in his time, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the disease that first settled in the head easily passed through all the body) considering how apt all men are to desire that all men should think as they do, and consequently to lay a necessity upon thee reciving that opinion, if they conceived that a way to have it received: And then if it were believed generally profitable, (as for example, Confession) who would be apt to oppose their calling it necessary, for the same cause for which they called it so? Besides, if this error were delivered by some Father in the hot opposition of some Heretic, it may be none of his side would oppose it, lest they might take advantage by their dissension, and he that disputed for the Orthodox side, might lose by it much of his authority.  
Section 45 The word [necessary] itself is often used for very convenient; and then from necessary in that sense to absolutely necessary, is no difficult change, though it be a great one. The Father's use Heretics sometimes in a large sense, and sometimes in a stricter, and so differ in the reckoning them up; Some leaving out those that others put in (though they had seen the precedent Catalogue:) The doubtfulness of the sense of those words might bring in error. Names, as an Altar, Sacrifice, Mass, may have been used first in one sense, and the name retained, though the thing signified received change; which may have been the art of the Church of Rome, as it was once of an Emperor of Rome, Cui proprium fuit nuper reperta (I leave out S●●lera) priscis verbis obtegere, whose property it was to cover things newly found out with ancient terms. And the same Author tells us, that the same State was as it were cheated out of her liberty, because there did remain, Eadem Magistratuum vocabula, The same titles of Magistrates; and I believe that if the Protestants beyond the Seas would have thought Bishops as good a word as Superintendents, (and so in other such things) many, who understand nothing but names, would have miss the Scandal they have now taken.  
Section 46 These ways (I think) things may have come, without much opposition, from being thought profitable to be done, and probable to be believed, to be thought necessary to be both: and how many things little by little may have been received under old names, which would not have been so at once under new ones? (the first of these being no such small fault but that part of the Montanists heresy was thinking uncommanded fasting-days necessary to be observed, which without doubt might lawfully have been kept.)  
Section 47 But my main answer is, that if for an opinion to be in the Church without known precedent opposition, be a certain note of being received from the beginning, let them answer, how came in the opinion of the Chiliasts not contradicted till two hundred years after it came in.  
Section 48 To conclude, if they can prove that the Scripture may be a certainer teacher of truths to them then to us, so that they may conclude the infallibility of the Church out of it, and we nothing; If they can prove the Church's infallibility to be a sufficient Guide for him that doubts Which is the Church, and cannot examine that (for want of learning) by her chief mark, which is conformity with the Ancient; If they can prove that the consent of Father's long together (if they had it) is a stronger argument against us, then against the Dominicans; If they can prove that though the first of them affirm that such a thing is Tradition, and believed by all Christians (and this assertion till a great while after uncontradicted) yet they are not bound to receive it, and, upon less grounds, we are; if indeed any can prove by any infallible way the infallibility of the Church of Rome, and the necessity under pain of damnation for all men to believe it, (which were the more strange, because Justin Martyr, and Clemens Alexandrinus among the Ancients, and Erasmus and Ludovicus Vives among the Moderns, believe some Pagans to be saved) I will subscribe to it, And 

Sophoc.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   
Section 49 If any man shall vouchsafe to think either this, or the Author of it, of value enough to confute the one, and inform the other, I shall desire him to do it with proceeding to the business, and not standing upon any small slip of mine, (of which sort this may be full) and with that Civility which is fit to be used by men that are not so passionate as to have the definition of reasonable Creatures in vain; (remembering that truth, in likelihood, is where her Author God was, in the still voice, and not in the loud wind; And that Epiphanius excuseth himself if he have called any Heretics in his anger, Deceivers, or Wretches, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) and I request him also to bring me to the Truth, (if I be out of it) not only by his Arguments, but also by his Prayers: which ways, if he use, and I still continue on the part I am of, and yet do neither 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, neither am wilfully blind, nor deny impudently what I see, than I am confident that neither he will have reason to be offended with me in this world, nor God in the Next.  
FALKLAND.   

A view of the Exceptions, which have been made by a Romanist to the Lord Viscount Falkland's Discourse, Of the Infallibility of the Church of ROME.  

SEPTEMB. 11. 1645.  
THis day there came to my hands, A Treatise Apologetical, touching the Infallibility of the Church Catholic, in answer to another of the like argument lately published. And although I have no temptation to spend any more time upon it then a single reading hath cost me; nor to think it so dangerous a piece, that I should not venture it abroad with the weakest sons of my mother, without an appendent antidote, or defensative against the poison of it, especially being not obliged (in any other notion, then that of the respect I bear to the honour and memory of that noble Lord) to vindicate his discourse from the exceptions here offered; yet being not sure, that I can excuse the so excessive thrift of a few hours (which yet I could very gladly otherwise employ, then in drawing one end of a saw in a controversy of this nature) I shall give the Author of the exceptions or Apology, (in as few words as is possible) the reasons why I am not moved by them, much less persuaded that they are so extraordinarily lucky, as to give, as is pretended, full answer, to all that Master Chillingworth's large Book hath superstructed on this foundation. And this I shall do in such a manner, that it may appear, that I desire only to satisfy his reason, and not make him payment of his scoffs or triumphs, in that spirit of meekness, which is proper for the restoring of one overtaken in an error, (hoping in charity that he is such) of an infirm, not a malicious mistaker. And the first thing we have to view, is that which is entitled,   

A note upon the title of the adversary's. C. 1.  
We against whom this enquirer writes, or rather to whom he propounds his difficulties, with a pretending desire of procuring a satisfaction, are defenders of the Catholic Church's Infabillity; which Churches chief Pastor, or Metropolitan, though he be particular Bishop of Rome, as of some one place or other he must be, yet nevertheless from that one portion of it is not the whole and universal Church aptly to be styled the Church of Rome, as in the Enquirers title it is called, no more than the Church of England can be rightly termed the Church of Canterbury, or the Protestants of England the Canterburians, as the Scotch Puritans have called them, only because the chief Bishop and Primate of the whole Kingdom hath his seat at Canterbury. By the self same reason than cannot we justly be called Romanists, as it hath pleased some Protestants to entitle us. The reason of this assertion, is, That Rome and Canterbury are but small, and only material portions of either Church, and therefore no way sufficient to give a denomination to the whole. As then the Church of England is wrongfully called the Church of Canterbury, so, in like manner is the Church Catholic wrongfully styled the Church of Rome, or as such, controverted to be fallible, or infallible, forasmuch as this perfection of being infallible is not claimed by her as she is Church of Rome, but as she is the Catholic, and, according to the appointment of Christ, governed by S. Peter, and his successors. For this cause we have altered the title, and stated the question in terms more proper and formal, enquiring not Whether the Roman Church, but whether the Catholic be infallible, and this aught to be the title.  
But before we enter upon the examination of particular difficulties, the Reader may please to know, that this same Enquiry was written by the Author divers years ago, in his Catholic Mother's life time, and was by her mediation forthwith answered at large, and the answer sent unto the Enquirer fairly bound up; in whose hands, though it rested long, yet had it never any reply made unto it, though it was sometime threatened it should. At that very time Chillingworths' Book began to be in moulding, and it may be that same new labour diverted the Enquirer, and altered his design. Now at length in a time most unseasonable, by the frivolous officiousness of I know not whom, these old papers are forced to see the light, and to leave their answer behind them. After so mean and creeping a fashion do they appear now unto the world. But although no notice hath been taken of any answer made already, or of giving licence for any other to be made hereafter, or, if made to be published in print, and have the advantage to be dispersed abroad in many copies; yet are we not by this discouraged from composing one, for, though for want of the Printers help, it shall lie concealed, and in much restraint, yea and be in danger to perish, as the other did before it, yet may this small labour fall, at least, into some few hands, and remove out of their way such dangerous stumbling blocks as have been cast into it by this Enquirer, who, by his casting of doubts, about the method of resolving faith, hath thereby, amongst all those who are not much versed therein, endangered the stability and safety of the whole fabric, not of Catholic Religion only, but of Christian in General.  
As for the Papers themselves, and their particular contents, they, in a word, are Chillingworths' Book in little, and an Embryo of his large volume grown up after, made big and bolstered out with many new materials borrowed from Baron the Scotch Minister, and that impious author Volkelius, the veins of whose poisonous doctrines and discourses, are observed to run branching throughout all Chillingworths work. Wherefore this small collection containing the substance of the other larger book, the confutation of this Enquirers allegations, cannot but in substance contain a confutation of all Chillingworths delated errors and sophistications, wherewith so many souls have been perverted, or brought into great troubles and perplexities.   

C. 1. Answer to C. 1.  
To the exceptions made against the title of the Lord Viscount falkland's discourse, I answer, by saying these few things,  
Section 1 First, that it is no news to hear of the Catholic Roman Church; it hath frequently been used and avowed by your own writers, and as I conceive, is by yourself acknowledged, when you say, the perfection of being infallible it not claimed by her (i. e. the Church Catholic) as she is the Church of Rome, but as she is the Catholic; which words by the rules of discourse must suppose you to think the Catholic Church to be capable of a double appellation, Roman and Catholic, though the perfection there spoken of, belong to it only under the second notion. And beside you say in another place, that the Roman Church is the Catholic; whence it will follow, that the Catholic is the Roman; And if this be not propriety of speech, his Lordship is not to be blamed for it, but you, whose dialect he is fain to use.  
Section 2 This then being presumed to be granted by your writers, and, as I conceive also by you, that the Roman Church is the Catholic Church, or that the Roman and Catholic are two names for the same Church, it will certainly follow, that he that affirms the Catholic Church to be infallible, must affirm the Roman Church to be so too, though not quatenus Roman. For any particular man being affirmed to be a Christian, whatsoever will be true to be said of this Christian, will be true to be said of this man (by the rule of quicquid praedicatur de praedicato, praedicatur de subjecto) if this Christian have a promise made, a privilege instated on him, this man hath so also, and if any that yielded the former, shall deny the latter, it will never be sufficient ground or authority for such denying, to affirm, that it was made to him as a Christian, and not as a man; for the whole man being a Christian, and not only some part of him, even that which belongs to him only for Christianity's sake, doth as truly belong to him, as that which his humanity gives him title to.  
Section 3 Or 2●y. If you have sprung a subtlety, and by help of that mean to disclaim the expression of other your friends, and therefore will not allow the Roman Church, to be in propriety of speech, the Catholic Church, and yet will agree with them in all but in the expression; truly you have revealed no great mystery to the world. And as long as you define (as you do) the Catholic Church, (as it is the subject of the pretended Infallibility) to be that which is governed by Saint Peter and his Successors, we that mean no more by the Roman Church then that which is so governed, shall assoon believe the Roman Church to be infallible, as the Catholic under your notion of it.  
Section 4 The short of it is, we shall never agree upon any thing till the equivocal terms be explicated, and one single sense of this, as of all other phrases, agreed on betwixt both parties. Tell us then plainly that by the Catholic Church you mean the Universal all the world over, without any kind of restriction, and not that only which is governed by the Pope of Rome, which is a great restriction of the word Catholic, (and must be not only affirmed but proved by you to be none) And then I shall thus far consent with you;  
Section 5 First, that the Universal Church is in fundamentals infallible (not from any thing inherent in itself, but by a prerogative acquired, i. e. by the promise of Christ, that his spirit shall lead them into all truth, and that he will be with them to the end of the world, and the like;) but then this Infallibility must signify no more, or be no farther extended, then that Christ doth and will so defend his Church, that there shall be for ever, till the end of the world, a Church Christian on the Earth, i. e. that the whole Church shall not at once make an universal defection, err from the foundation, or do any thing by which there shall cease to be a Church on earth.  
Section 6 But then 2dly. I say that this very Universal Church, though it be in the sense infallible in fundamentals, is not yet a rule, or Canon, or guide, or Judge infallible, even in fundamentals; visible it is, infallible it is, but 'tis not a visible judge, or rule infallible. And the reason of this assertion is this, that its Infallibility, explained as we have explained it, is all that can be certainly inferred from Christ's words, (and that belongs not at all to judicature) and so any other Infallibility that shall be pretended to belong to judicature, must be inferred from some other tenure, or else it will not be inferred.  
Section 7 If you cannot be thus liberal to us, and tell us that by Catholic in this question, you mean that Catholic without restriction; Tell us then Secondly, that you mean a representation of that Catholic, i. e. a Council General, Ecumenical, and then I shall acknowledge many privileges to belong to that; An humble, though not an absolute obedience, and in a word, that nothing is to be preferred before it, but the Word of God, or the Church truly Universal. Yet after all this, that it is not infallible or inerrable, I have the judgement of Panormitan, and shall add his reason also to back it; Because, saith he, 
* Licet concilium generale representet totam ecclesiam Universalem, tamen in veritate ibi non est vere Vniversalis ecclesia, sed representative, quia universalis ecclesia constituitur ex collectione fidelium, & ista est ea ecclesiae quae errare non potest. C. signific. ex●: de Electio.  the General Council is not truly, but only by representation, the Universal Church, and supposing such a Council to err, it would not yet follow, that the Universal Church or multitude of all Christians do err, because 'tis possible that some out of the Council do not err, yea, and in the Council too, though a major part overcome the better. In this I have the concurrence of Occam. dial. p. 3. tr. 1. l. 3. c. 5. Cardin. Cameracensis. c. 1. Waldensis Doctrine. fid. l. 2. artic. 3. c. 26. & quest. vesp. arg. 3. ad lit. O. Antoninus, to. 1. de sacram. l. 2. c. 19 Card. Cusanus in summarum par. 3. tit. 23. the council. general. c. 2. sect. 6. l. 2. Concord. Cathol. c. 4. Et Nic. de Clemangis, Collat. 2. p. 64, & 73. with this farther confirmation of it from the opinion of the 
† Antiquis patribus concilium celebraturis solenne suit jejuniis, orationibus, spiritûs assistentiam implorare, inutili sa●è diligentiâ si exploratum habebant se non posse falli aut deficere in his propter quae fuerant congregati.  Ancient Fathers, evidenced by their practice; In that (saith he) it was solemnly accustomed by them at the beginning of such a Council, by fasting and praying to implore the assistance of the spirit, which had been a piece of useless diligence, if they had been before assured, that they could not be deceived or fail in those things for which they were assembled. Which argument, if it do not infallibly induce the conclusion to those that pray for those things which they are sure of; yet is it an evidence, that they that use it are of the opinion which they infer by it, and will be of force to those, that from the mention of some of the Ancients praying for the dead, conclude them to be in a mutable state; as I conceive some of your friends are wont to do. To this assertion of ours I might also cite the Concordance of the Jesuits generally, who that they may fasten all Infallibility in the Pope alone, attribute nothing at all to a Council but this, that the error of a Council cannot be confirmed by the Pope, which is in effect no more, than that Counsels begin to be infallible, when the Pope confirms them, i. e. when the Council is at an end (which kind of Infallibility they will afford, I presume, to every Heretic, (and to me while I thus write) that my error cannot be confirmed by the Pope) unless they will be so bountiful to add also, that such a Council cannot err, if it follow the instructions of the Pope, which will also be acknowledged true of any the meanest Lutheran, or Calvinist, as well as of that Council.  
Section 8 If neither of these two be it you mean, then be ingenuous, and tell us, you either mean the Pope of Rome, as the Jesuits do, or else that you mean those parts of the Catholic that are governed by him, and then as we shall tell you, that it is the very thing which we learned from you to mean by the Roman Church, so you that affirm that to be the notion of the Catholic Church, must acknowledge to affirm the same thing to be Infallible, which we say you do affirm, when we propose the Question of the Roman Churches Infallibility; and in this there is no matter of deceit or difficulty, but that that Church under the government of the Pope, which we affirm to be fallible, even in the highest degree, fallible in fundamentals, you undertake and contest to be infallible. 'Tis true, this we call the Roman Church, conceiving it to be your Dialect, and if you say it is not, we will consent to you, and in obedience to your example, call it so no more; on condition you will be but as reasonable, and give it some other title; whether that of the Western Church, which were a good large Province, (and yet of that Saint Basil complains in no lower stile than this, 
Ep. 10.  That they neither know nor endure the unity of Faith) or any other title, besides that of the Catholic Church, which we are sure cannot properly be allowed it, unless it appear, First, that all Christians ought to be governed by the Bishop of Rome; and Secondly, that all they which are not so governed, are no longer members of the Catholic Church; and if you affirm both these, we profess to deny them, and then that must be the matter of debate; and till that be agreed, there will be no other question seasonable to be proposed in this matter, and when it is, there will be no other needful.  
Section 9 And for the parallel of the Canterburians, which you use to prove the unfitness of the question under these terms, it is but a thin fallacy (easily seen through) if it be thought to conclude any thing. To the clearing of which, be pleased to observe, that the Bishop of Canterbury may be considered in a threefold relation: First, to his particular Diocese of Canterbury, of which he is Bishop; Secondly, to the whole Province of Canterbury, of which he is Metropolitan; Thirdly, to the whole national Church of England, of which he is Primate; his two former relations are terminated in Canterbury, under the two significations of the word, but the third is terminated not in Canterbury, in any notion of that word, but in all England; and thence it follows, that the Church of Canterbury (whether as a Province, or a Diocese, which are the only two Notions we in England have of it) being not of the same latitude with the Church of England, it will be improper to call the Protestants of England Canterburians: But then on supposition that there were a third notion of it, whereby the Church of Canterbury, and the Church of England were of the same latitude, or to him that were confidently persuaded that they are so, it were no impropriety at all to call all English Protestants by that denomination; and if to prove it were improper, it should be affirmed that 'tis but an accident that he that is Primate of all England should be Bishop of the particular See of Canterbury, there would be no force in that proof; First, because that which is true per accidens, is nevertheless true, and denominations being ad placitum, are many times accidental; yet for all that denominations as much, as if they had been by nature or per se; and Secondly, because we are now upon a supposition (though it be but a supposition) that there is a national Church of Canterbury, as well as a Province and Diocese. And therefore I say on this supposition, if it had so happened, or been agreed on, that all that are under the Primate of Canterbury should be called the Church of Canterbury, as it hath been agreed on, that all that are under the Metropolitan of Canterbury, should be called the Province of Canterbury, we should never challenge any man of improper speaking, that should call us Canterburians. As for the Scotch Puritan you speak of, that calls us so by way of reproach; you cannot be ignorant of his meaning, or think it pertinent to the purpose, to which you apply it; It was used by him only in relation to the present doctrines of the then Bishop of Canterbury, (and only some men scoffed at under that title, as followers of his (as they erroneously conceived) particular, or personal doctrines) which is quite another notion of the word, then that which you have occasion to speak of.  
Section 10 From all this it will consequently appear to be as unreasonable for you, who acknowledge a notion of the Roman Church equipollent with Catholic, and affirm the whole Catholic Church to be governed by the Primate, or Pope of Rome, and urge the necessity of Christ's precept, that the Church which you pronounce infallible, must be so governed, (or else that it is no longer Catholic) to make any difference between the stile of Catholic, and of Roman Church, or of Catholics and Romanists; no man among us fetching the denomination of Roman, or Romanist (when he thus speaks) from the relative Diocese of Rome, as the Pope is a Bishop, or from the relative Province of Rome, as he is a Metropolitan, but from the relative Church of Rome; the whole number of those Christians who acknowledge the Pope their Primate or Partriarch, which you that affirm him to be Primate of all Christians by full right and succession from Saint Peter, must acknowledge him to be of the whole Catholic Church; In which acknowledgement because we agree not with you (but contend that his Patriarchate is limited as well as his Diocese or Province) as we cannot therefore speak throughout in your language, and call that the Catholic Church, which is but a part of the Catholic, or debate the Infallibility of the Catholic Church with them, that mean by that phrase only that are under the Roman Communion, or government of the Pope of Rome, whilst we mean Catholic without any restriction, (or if we should so speak, shall be guilty of leaving a main equivocation in the words of the question, which ought of all things to be avoided by distinguishing, before we go about to debate any thing, and after distinction made and agreed on, that by Catholic is to be meant only those which are in Obedience to the Pope, we will then debate it under that title also) so may we very reasonably use your dialect, when we agree in the meaning of it, as in the phrase [Roman Church] we do (meaning both of us, all those who are governed by the Pope) of which Church in that notion we now inquire, whether that be infallible or no? And so much for the phrase of the Question, or Title of that Treatise.  
Section 11 And then I shall add no more to the second part of the first Chapter, then by acknowledging the treatise of that excellent Lord to have been written many years since, and now not unseasonably published at a time when some arts were used (though, blessed be God, improsperously) to pervert unstable minds, and this pretended Infallibility a main auxiliary called in for that purpose; As for any answer long since framed to it, I am persuaded that that Lord thought it not such, as that his reputation should be concerned in providing an answer for it; And for the Publisher 'tis very possible that he might never hear of any such, (which I guess also by myself, who had long since a copy of the one, but till I read it here, never heard of the other,) or if he did, had reasons which he can justify to any ingenuous man, why he did not publish it also. Which being now said to you (and which you had before no ground of thinking to be otherwise) you will hardly give a civil account, why you should charge (and now not ask pardon for charging) on the Publisher a frivolous officiousness, by which that answer is forced to stay behind (though it were also sufficient to tell you, that when you set out all your Books at Rome or Douai, with our answers annexed to them, we will then publish this of yours at Oxford) or on the Edition, the stile of a m●ane an● creeping fashion of appearing to the world; which words being so contrary to truth, (which is punctually this, the Book was licenced by the Vicechancellor; Printed by the Printer to the University; the Author's name put in the Title page; and all this proclaimed on every wall and corner of the City, on purpose that every one that had kindness to the Roman Church might read it) if they signify any thing, have only this interpretation of which they are capable, that he that wrote them cared not how absolutely groundless his accusation was, but only was willing to accuse.  
Section 12 What you mean by the next words [that no notice hath been taken of giving licence for any other answer to be made hereafter, or if made to be published in print, and have the advantage to be dispersed abroad in many copies.] I profess I cannot tell, and yet was insolent enough to think, that I could have constituted a piece of plain English, of which I understood every word single, but now find, I had overvalued my own abilities, and should be more modest hereafter, but that by finding in the 
* The place to which these words reply, are upon this admonition mended by the Apologist in his revisal, by putting in after the word [Metropolitan] these words [is the Pope, who] and two lines after in stead of [it] [His Diocese] he might as reasonably have mended the other also.  sixth line of the Book the nominative Metropolitan without any verb after it, I am inclined to think that it is part of your stile to neglect those vulgar rules in which I had been instructed.  
Section 13 As for the sad news that you acquaint us with, [that this other answer of yours shall lie constrained, and in much restraint, yea and be in danger to perish] Though that be a heavy aggravation of the misery of these wicked times, yet sure this paper is not the only sufferer in that kind, and may both be thought to have deserved it aswell, and be as able to bear it with some patience, as many other good sons of the Church Catholic have been; and yet if it will but sue out its habeas Corpus, I doubt not but the law will be open for its plea, and in the mean I have designed this present paper to offer it bail, and obtain its enlargement through this City, so it will promise faithfully not to go farther, than its surety is ready to attend it. By this means, if it be accepted, it shall have leave to visit all its Catholic friends, and others to whom it desires to perform any civility, or from whom to receive any kindness.  
Section 14 In the mean, how his Lordship's treatise [hath cast dangerous stumbling blocks, which may endanger the stability and safety not only of Catholic Religion, but of Christian in general] I shall promise to consider with you when you proceed to any proof of it, and till then only advise you and all my fellow Christians to conclude no more against any creature, than you produce premises to justify; For by so doing you will appear not only injurious to him with whom you deal, (in rash causeless anger and censure) and secretly reproachful and contumelious to the Reader (by conceiving him so tame, so unworthy of the reasonable soul, which God hath given him, on purpose to distinguish betwixt reason and no reason, betwixt proof and libel, betwixt argument and confidence) but withal you will teach others an evil lesson against yourselves. If you please I shall give you an Example of each of these.  
Section 15 That which you add in the bottom of the Chapter concerning Master Chillingworth's Book, besides that it is utterly impertinent to the confuting of this, which is the present business (nay it is an argument on this side, both for the seasonableness of publishing it (as an Epitome useful and gainful to supersede the trouble of reading the larger Book) and for the leaving the former answer behind, if the Publisher had known there had been any; because, as you before intimated, the publishing of Master Chillingworth's Book than was conceived to have taken away all force and considerableness from that answer) is first, very unjust to Master Chillingworth, in saying without any proof, that he borrowed his new materials from Baron and Volkelius. Secondly, it is contumelious to the Reader's judgement, who is supposed to be so easy, as to conclude that to be an ill Book, which is affirmed to borrow materials from a Scotch Minister, and an impious Author; from which contumely I conceive he is able to vindicate himself, by telling you, First, that what is supposed to be borrowed from the Scotch Minister, is very authentic English Divinity, and indeed that Baron is content to profess himself to have borrowed (and that in this particular) from our Writers, especially (if my memory fail me not) from Bishop White, and the first edition of the Bishop of Canterbury's Book under his Chaplaine's name, from whom also Master Chillingworth might borrow, if he were in any want, and not from him, and yet I believe would not, if he were alive, be ashamed to have profited by so worthy a Scotchman as Baron was. Secondly, that Volkelius his being an impious Author, cannot extend to every part of his work, nor conclude, that that which is supposed to be borrowed from him, is therefore impious or poisonous (if it be, let it be produced and proved to be so by some other proof, then that of the impiety of the Author) but rather that Master Chillingworth had the skill of discerning, and took nothing but balsam, and antidote, where if he had been apt to mistake, he might have fallen on poison. Thirdly, this will teach others, if they be apt to learn, an evil lesson against yourselves; I mean not that of repaying evil with evil (God forbid that any injustice in others should so provoke us, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to be like them) but only this particular lesson, which hath cost us little pains to pierce or construe, that if this Tract of yours be a satisfactory answer to all Master Chillingworths' Book, than a satisfactory answer to this your Treatise, will be sufficient answer also to the three great Latin Volumes, which they say, you have written against Master Chillingworth. And this I shall be more glad to have obtained by your own rule of concluding, then patient to try by reading them over, whether it be truly so, or no; especially if those that have tasted them, pass a right judgement upon them.  
Section 16 Thus far I have given myself scope to take up almost every word you say in your first chapter, but am unwilling to think, that thereby I am engaged to do the like in all that follows. Truly upon reading on, I see the subtlety of composure, and the particulars incident are not of such weight, as that I can promise myself patience to examine it so strictly; I mean not patience, as it is opposed to anger or passion (for by God's help I shall not yield to any temptation, that shall bring me into that) but as it is opposed to weariness and lassitude; and I must be pardoned, if I think I could spend my time better to myself and the benefit of others, then in following the exceptions line by line, and giving them a large answer; for that any man may be patient to do so, or to read it when 'tis done; it is necessary, that the Text, which must bear that Comment, must have somewhat either of difficulty, or subtlety, or profit in it; either of which, whensoever I can find, I profess I shall be most ready to enlarge upon it, (and now acknowledge it an obligation from the Author, if he will point out to me, where I shall have failed) and in other particulars be more merciful to the reader, and myself.   

To the 1. §. Chap. 2.  
Section 1 True it is, and we grant it willingly, that every proof that is solid and good, must be, a notioribus, and that every sure conclusion must also be deduced from no other premises or principles, than such as be known, and, at least, be as certain as we desire the conclusion should be. Nevertheless we do absolutely deny, that this assertion of ours touching the Church's infallibility, is by us offered to be proved by ways no better than our Adversaries offer to prove that she hath erred, as this Inquirer pretends we do; for we affirm that our Church's infallibility is proved by reasons which are real and true, and that on the other side, the adversary offers to prove the contrary, only by such as be no more than seeming and pretended. Now true reason or authority is a way quite different from pretended, and much better than it, and therefore the Inquirers charge is false, or, at least, light and ineffectual. Must all controversies in Philosophy be undecidable, because both sides pretend reason; or no suits of Law be judged, because both sides pretend Law? Certainly, whatsoever both sides do pretend, yet there is but one side that hath it, as namely, but one side of Philosophers have true reason, and but one side of contendents have true Law, and so in like manner but one side of contending Christians have true reason for them, Scripture, or Tradition, howsoever both may pretend it, and therefore we do not go about to prove the Church is infallible by the self same ways that you go about to prove that she hath erred, but by ways that are quite different from them, and the same but in name only, and no farther; By which it follows, that, either you are deceived, or we, and it is not necessary that both. And so much for this great and principal difficulty which troubled the Inquirer so much as he writ to London for the solution of it, which thing, surely, was more than needed, for it might have been done at Great Tue without consulting London about it, or either of our two Universities.  
We do not maintain, as he falsely supposes, that Reason, Scripture, and Fathers be all fallible, universally speaking but, in some cases only, as, namely, reason is not fallible in such verities as be evident, but in other that be not so, it is. Again, Scripture is a most certain rule whensoever it is certainly expounded, otherwise it is not. Lastly, the Fathers be assured and undoubted witnesses of the Doctrines which were held in their time, though not undoubted definers of them. And, by this answer, all the three main props of this Author's discourse are overthrown, and fall unto the ground. 
* In this place the Apologist in his revisal put in these words [So that in fine all these three be infallible] I must a little wonder to what purpose. For if they belong to the words immediately precedent, they will then signify, that the three props of his Lordship's discourse are infallible. But if to the former part of the Section to signify Reason etc. to be infallible, they are then either to be understood, that they are infallible in all cases, and then that is point blank contrary to what he had said [that they were fallible in some] or else that they are infallible only in some; and than that he had said distinctly before, and needed not to have again a new repeated.    

C. 2. Answ. to the 2. Chap.  
Section 1 To the second Chapter, I need only to put you in mind, that when his Lordship saith [the ways of proof that the Church of Rome can never have any errors, are no better than those by which we offer to prove she hath erred, and nameth three heads of Arguments, from Scripture, Reason, and Ancient writers, and proveth you to affirm all these are infallible, because nothing is in your opinion infallible but the Church; and from thence concludes that we can never infallibly know that the Church is infallible, because all the means proposed to induce that knowledge, being of necessity somewhat else beside that only infallible, must needs be fallible] it will be very unsufficient in you to reply, that his Lordship hath not said true in the first particular, upon no other ground of proof, but only because you [affirm that the Church's infallibility is proved by Reasons which are really true, and that the contrary is by us offered to be proved only by such as be only seeming and pretended] for this very thing that you affirm, viz. that those your reasons are real and true, is a part of the very question in hand, and as much denied by us, as the infallibility of your Church, and therefore, by your own rule of proceeding à notioribus, cannot be proper means to conclude, that his Lordship erred, to him that will far more easily be brought to believe that your reasons are not real, then that his Lordship erred in this particular, and that will as readily confess he errs, as that those reasons are real.  
Section 2 It appeared strange to me that you should begin with such a petitio principii, until by reading on, I discerned that this one mean Sophism hath run through most Paragraphs of your following Treatise, which is a shrewd infirmity in a confutation, to take that for a principle granted, and so bestow no proof upon it, which is by you known to be denied by us, and yet to conceive that this will be able to satisfy our other importunities.  
Section 3 2dly. You must observe that his Lordship had said only this, [that your Church's infallibility is offered to be proved by no better ways, than those by which we offer to prove she hath erred] which is an undertaking of his Lordship, and not a bare assertion, and sure you cannot say he offers to prove it by reasons only seeming, for you as yet know not particularly, what those reasons are, any farther, then that they are from the same heads, by which you offer to prove the contrary.  
Section 4 And Thirdly, if the Arguments which he offers be only seeming on his side, yet if you mark it, they are so seeming to him, and as long as they seem to him to conclude that the Church hath erred, the very same arguments, or those that are no more seeming, cannot assure him, that she is infallible; for by your own confession every solid proof must be ex notioribus, i. e. not only by media which are more true, but which are more known to him, to whom this proof is offered; and, if you mark, that is it to which his Lordship's argument drives, that the reasons by which you prove the infallibility of your Church, are such as you confess yourselves to be fallible: Mark, not which you confess to be false, but fallible, your confessing them fallible is enough to his Lordship's turn, though they should have the luck to be true, because the infallibility of your Church, on which, as on a foundation and principle, you must build in many after difficulties, had need be infallibly asserted and known, or if it be but fallibly, will itself be fallible (no conclusion ascending higher, than the premises have ascended) and so, though it were true, yet not fit to commence a principle of all other truths.  
Section 5 Now that these reasons or premises of yours are fallible and by you acknowledged to be so, his Lordship was not content to affirm (and so is himself far enough from giving you example of begging the question) but proves it by this argument, because with you nothing is not fallible but the Church. This may be dissolved into an hypothetical syllogism, whereof you must deny one proposition, or else the conclusion is forfeited. If with you the Church be the only infallible, then with you any other reasons, by which you prove the infallibility of the Church, are not infallible, but with you the Church is the only infallible, therefore with you any other reasons by which you prove the infallibility of the Church are not infallible. Now if you look over your answer again, you shall find that your only exception cometh not home to any part of this syllogism, for you do not so much as say, that any thing is infallible but the Church; Or, if now you will see your want, and make additions to your answer, then say distinctly, is any other thing beside the Church infallible, or no? If it be, let it be named; if it be not, the conclusion is granted us. And till this addition be thus made (i. e. for this present answer of yours) 'tis, I conceive manifest, that you have said no syllable to the prime part of his Lordship's first Section.  
Section 6 As for your instances of Philosophy and Law suits, they can prove nothing against his Lordship, unless you can name some sect of Philosophy, that hath not only truth, but infallibility, and tell us which it is, and prove that by arguments which are confessed to be infallible; till you have done that, your instance is not pertinent, and if ever you shall do it, 'twill not be concluding against us, unless you produce the like arguments for the infallibility of your Church against us, which must be some other than are yet proposed.  
Section 7 As for Lawsuits, that they are determined to one side by the Judge, doth not prove that that Judge is infallible (which is the only matter of debate,) and if the contenders are bound to stand to his award, it is, because the Law and supreme Magistrate have commanded them to do so, and because this is evident and infallible, that they have done so, by the commission which the Judge hath from them. And when the like is produced for your Church, I hope all your Subjects will submit to it, but than it must be moreover proved that all Christians are such Subjects, or else we hope we shall not be involved under that obligation.  
Section 8 As for your long deduction from whence you conclude that either we are deceived, or you, and that it is not necessary that both should, we grant it, and profess our opinions, that though both you and we are fallible, yet only you are, or can be deceived in this particular, (which we conceive is clear, because only you pretend Infallibility, which we not pretending, but affirming that we are not so, cannot in this be deceived, unless we be infallible) but see not what it concludes against his Lordship, whose argument depends not on any such assertion, that both parties are deceived, but only that your pretended Infallibility is by you proved by no other arguments, than those which you confess are fallible.  
Section 9 What you add by way of triumph and scoff I must not answer, but by yielding you free leave thus to please yourself, and (if this recreation tend at all to your health) to advise you to do so still, and (whensoever it may be for your divertisement) to reckon up the names of London, Great Tue, and the two Universities.  
Section 10 After the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sang, you at length bethink yourself that his Lordship had affirmed, that Scripture, Reason and Fathers, are by you maintained to be all fallible; and to this you answer by a distinction of universally speaking, and in some cases only, and acknowledge that you affirm them all to be fallible only in some cases. Now first you ought to have given answer to his Lordship's proof for what he said, which was this, that you affirm that only the Church is infallible; from whence it is a conclusion, that therefore Reason, and Scripture, and Fathers, are by you affirmed to be fallible, whereas you letting the premises alone, apply answer to the conclusion, which is as much against Logic as to deny it. without denying the premises, or showing the falseness of them. But than Secondly, that which is fallible in some cases only, is by that acknowledged to be fallible, and by that is proved unsufficient to prove another thing to be infallible in all things, for if it be fallible in any, case, it may be fallible in this, that it pronounces that other to be infallible; and till there be some infallible argument produced that it is infallible in that particular pronouncing, its Infallibility in other things will avail nothing; or if it do, it may avail also for us to prove what we offer to prove from it, that your Church hath erred.  
Section 11 There is no possible avoiding of this, but by saying and proveing it infallible in inducing your conclusion, and false aswell as fallible in inducing ours, (for if it be true, though it be fallible, it will serve our turn, but it must be both, or will not serve yours, you being obliged to prove the Infallibility of your Church by something which is itself infallible, because it must be matter of faith with you, which nothing is, but what is infallibly induced, but it is sufficient for us to believe you and your Church fallible, though we should make it no matter of faith that you are so) which because you endeavour not to do in this place, it will be impertinent to examine the truth of what else you add (concerning the cases wherein you affirm Reason, and Scripture, and Fathers to be infallible) any farther than thus, that by your own explication of the distinction, and enumeration of cases, I shall conclude, that Reason doth not prove infallibly that your Church is infallible, because the Infallibility of your Church is not an evident verity; Scripture doth not prove it so, because it is not certainly expounded to that probation; Fathers do not prove it so, because it was not a doctrine held in their time, and affirmed by them to be so. Each of which negations of mine though they were as sufficient proof as what you have offered to the contrary, yet I shall undertake to make good against you, if you shall think fit to call me to it, by setting down your reasons to the contrary.  
Section 12 And so if on your supposition, his Lordship's three main props were fallen to the ground (which is another boast that had no more relation to the present matter, than ground in truth; and therefore I beseech you leave out such excesses hereafter) yet your supposition being not so much as endeavoured to be proved, the props stand as firmly as is desired.   

To the second §. Chap. 3.  
The Enquirer is here much mistaken, for we are not at all offended with Protestants for their alleging Scriptures, but for their doing of it after a way which is fallible and uncertain; in which case we say Scripture can be no foundation of faith. Wherefore though they allege Scripture and we also, yet doth it not follow thence that the Protestants disprove the infallibility by the self same media or means, by which we endeavour to prove the same. It is true, they attempt to do so, but that they do it, is denied. The Scripture when surely sensed or expounded, is a different medium from the same Scripture sensed unsurely or expounded falsely. Now he that takes an unsure way, which no reason or discretion commends unto him, and leaves the sure, which Reason does persuade him to be such, if that man chance to err, it is easy to understand why God should be more offended with him, then with others that do not so but hold a prudent and contrary course.  
The sum is, that holy Scripture, after such time as it comes to be known certainly for Canonical and shall be expounded according to the interpretation of the Church, foundeth an argument strong and invincible; but when otherwise, one that is probable only, or ad hominem; and this latter we say is your case, and out of this give a reason why your resolves are temerarious and presumptuous, and, in fine, such wherewith God may be displeased justly, forasmuch as no man ought to go about this work unadvisedly, or expose his salvation without all need, to chance and uncertainty, as if he meant to build upon the sand.   

C. 3. Ans. To the third Chap.  
Section 1 I answer, that through this whole Chapter the same fallacy returns again, of satisfying his Lordship's argument by a bare affirming (but not proving) a thing which is as much denied by his Lordship, viz. that your alleging of Scripture for the infallibility of your Church, is by an infallible and certain way, but our alleging of it for every part of our religion is by a fallible and uncertain.] (For though you in terms affirm only the latter of these, that which is against us, yet in charity to you I shall suppose you imply the former, or if you will say you do not, I shall then answer, that the granting of what you say, doth not vindicate your Infallibility, but only accuse us, not clear yourselves) or if that which you add by way of explication, may pass for a proof of it, viz. that Holy Scripture when it shall be expounded according to the interpretation of the Church, foundeth an argument strong and invincible, but when otherwise, only probable and ad hominem.] I answer, that this being applied to the matter in hand to you and us, must, if it signify any thing, have this importance, that the places of Scripture which you bring for the Infallibility of your Church, are expounded according to the interpretation of the Church, but the places which we bring for the several parts of our religion, are not so expounded. And then I answer, that by the Church you may (and I conceive aught too) mean the Universal Church truly so called, without your ordinary clog or restriction; and then all that we require of you is to make your affirmation good, and produce the places of Scripture which that Universal Church hath so expounded to the asserting the Infallibility of your Church, (which till you do produce 'tis petitio principii again) and then we shall show ourselves ingenuous, and (though we might reply something which add homines might be answer) yet shall we part with all other advantages of defending ourselves, and in plain ground yield you the cause, and contend no longer with you.  
Section 2 But if you mean by the interpretation of the Church the interpretation of the Church in the notion wherein we inquire, whether it be infallible, viz. that society of Christians which have been governed by the Pope; Though then we might deny, that you have any such interpretation of Scripture for your infallibility, and justify the denial, (for if you please we will undertake to show that some eminent persons in the Church of Rome, perhaps Popes themselves, never interpreted any Scripture to the asserting the Infallibility of your Church, and that many other differ among themselves, what is that Church which they affirm from Scripture to be infallible, and that will amount to the same also) yet we shall content ourselves with this other answer, that the interpretation of that Church, unless Saint Peter himself, or some other acknowledged to be inspired, join in it, is not Infallible, and for you to say it is, and not to prove it, is a petitio principii again; And for any other notion of the Church which shall be said so to interpret, when you shall fasten on it, we shall undertake to make good either that it doth not interpret the Scripture to the asserting the Infallibility of the Church, or else that the Church in that notion is not infallible.  
Section 3 As for the other part of your assertion which you principally insist upon in this Chapter, that our case is contrary to yours, i. e. that we found not our religion on Scripture expounded according to the interpretation of the Church, we utterly disclaim it, (and for you to affirm it without proof, is petitio principii again) and to put it to a fair issue, we make this offer, that what ever proposition we affirm without showing Scripture for it, and that expounded according to the interpretation of the ancient Church, we will presently forgo on your first instance; and if you would pay us the like offer, and your party make it good, I doubt not but as turbulent a Sea as the state of Christendom is at this time, the whole Church might quickly be at, peace, or at least the dissentient party not be considerable. I remember a passage in Saint Hilary, depredicating the Bishops of France as very happy men, quòd aliam non cognovissent confessionem●, etc. that they knew no other confession than that ancient and most simple which through all Churches from the Apostles age had been received. And I am a little confident that that which first made, and hath ever since fomented the breaches of that precious body, is the multiplying and imposing of new confessions and articles of belief from the suggestion of private or less public spirits, and that hath made the body like Aristotle's insectills, which for want of blood run out into a multitude of legs; every such new article so multiplied (above the number of those which Scripture in the truly Catholic interpretation of it, will authorise, not only as true, but necessary to be so acknowledged) being an effect of some want of blood, I mean charity in the Authors, (for though to teach any man any certain truth be an act of charity, yet to make an article, i. e. to require every man to believe whatever we conceive to be truth, is a great uncharitableness) and a cause or occasion of more; the adding to the necessary truths, ordinarily being a forerunner of the abatement of the inventory of the necessary performances, I mean of those which are indispensably required of us under Christ. These last few lines I confess to be a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which I hoped might not be unwelcome to you; If they be, I am sorry you were troubled with it, the seeing that there was nothing more in your Chapter, which wanted answer, gave me temptation and liberty for it.   

To the third Section Chap. 4.  
The third Section is all true, but concerns us nothing, because amongst ours there is care enough taken for showing which Church it is that is the true and infallible, and on the other side much negligence and partiality in the enquirers after it, in many of them, at least, though not in every one.   

C. 4. Answ: To the fourth Chap.  
Section 1 In your fourth Chapter, though you are just in acknowledging the perfect truth of his Lordship's third paragraph, yet must you not be believed on your bare word, that you are not concerned in it. For I conceive it clear that you are, because that argument from Reason (for such is that which is mentioned there, as in the second paragraph the argument from Scripture, and in the fourth the argument from Fathers or tradition) which you use to prove the Infallibility of your Church, viz. that it is therefore so made by God (or that it is reasonable to think that God therefore so made it) that all men may have some certain Guide] can never be able to conclude any thing, unless it be made known by God as certainly (or so offered by God to our knowledge, that 'tis our fault if we know it not) both that there is such an infallible Church, and which it is. Now that God hath so made known these two, it being impossible for reason to assure us any otherwise then by showing us some sure word of prophecy, I mean some revelation from God, with sufficient evidence that it is revelation, and this being not by you pretended to be showed, it avails little that you tell us, that among yours there is care enough taken to show which Church it is that is the true and infallible; for if by [showing] you mean demonstrating any way that it is so, this you know we deny, and saying it again without proof, is petitio principii; but if by showing you mean the pointing us out that for the true and infallible, of which you are a member, we have little obligation or encouragement to believe you say true, being a witness in your own cause; I am sure no evidence that (if you speak according to your judgement) you are Infallible in that showing or telling; For if we had, we must be supposed to have that evidence of your infallibility without (because before) your showing, and so to stand in little need of it.   

To the fourth Section Chap. 5.  
The answer is, that people illiterate may have evidence sufficient whereby to resolve and satisfy themselves without making any search into Histories, Fathers, or Scripture; and therefore this Enquirers supposition is false, and indeed it were a hard case, if no man might be able to understand what he was to believe, without looking into all these; and yet as hard as it is, doth this Enquirer impose it upon all, if not in express terms, yet by the consequence of his doctrine. As for ourselves alone, what need can we have for seeking out the true sense of Scripture, and a conformity of doctrine with the Ancient, more than other Christians have? Surely according to this method of his, all true religion, whether in our Church, or any other, would be impossible to be learned by the illiterate, and very hardly by any other men.  
But what evidence can the illiterate have, or rather from whence? Out of the present face, condition, and visible practice of religion in the Church, out of the ancient monuments yet remaining that give in their depositions, out of common fame and unsuspected testimonies, out of the manifest perfections and excellencies both of the Church and Religion; out of all which, as from so many clear signatures and characterismes of truth, ariseth an evidence of credibility that this Church and this Religion are the true, and whatsoever is once so creditable, cannot possibly be false, because for the verity of that, the veracity of God doth stand engaged, as Ric. Victorinus hath long since declared. For it is a clear case that all such things be true which God makes evidently credible and worthy of acceptance by the public acts of his own providence; for otherwise that providence should publicly entangle and deceive us by obliging us, or, at least, publicly and potently inducing and persuading us to believe that which were false; and so by following that way which God hath signed out for us, we should go astray; which thing can neither be done, nor yet permitted to be done, without imposture, as all the ancient Schoolmen do observe. By this means than are prudent public motives able to make a certainty, though not by their own virtue, yet at least by the virtue of the Supreme veracity which goes annexed with them.  
Moreover, this measure of evidence perceptible by the illiterate and weak, though it be not so ample as others have, or stand in need to have, yet is it sufficient to sway their understanding, and to call in the divine assistance for the supplying of whatsoever by reason of ignorance or incapacity, 
Prov. 3.32.  is wanting in them. Cum simplicibus est sermocinatio mea? saith the Wiseman. Therefore it is false and injurious to say, as this Enquirer seems to do; namely, That such men as these do assent to truth upon no better grounds than others do to falsehood.  
The Enquirer's inference against the Church is this. We think she hath erred, therefore she may: The Inference is good, but the Antecedent is infirm, and ought not to have been made, because he cannot have so great reason to judge she hath erred, as on the contrary that she hath not; in regard that it is far more likely he himself erred in making that judgement of the Church, then that the Church erred in making that judgement of the truth, or that she hath contradicted herself; it being far more probable, that a private man should be deceived, than a whole Church. Wherefore it is a great act of presumption and temerity in any single man, though never so intelligent, to judge the whole Church hath erred, rather than himself.  
The Enquirer saith, that he tries the Church by her conformity with the Ancients, as she herself appoints. But what then? Doubtless she is not that way to be convinced, forasmuch as every intelligent man will suppose that no particular man is able to examine that so well at she herself hath done before him, and therefore may be pleased to understand that this pretended nonconformity of hers ought to be discovered very clearly and perfectly before he adventure to condemn her; and this great discovery having yet not been made and manifested to the world, may justly be thought an act impossible, and be judged in such as make pretensions of it, a work rather of a strong apprehension, then of any solid judgement. If then our Enquirer in this case should be rejected, let him not complain of us, as if we sent him to a witness, and after bid him not believe it, but rather bid him not believe himself, and his own judgement more than the Churches; that is to say, more than he ought; nor suffer himself to be misled by the testimony of a witness to whom we did not send him, I mean himself, in harkening unto whom self-love too much inclines him, and made him over credulous, as to their great grief it hath made very man.  
Now for the better understanding this point of conformity with the Ancients, of which this Enquirer, and Chillingworth his confederate do talk so much, and seek to urge against us; the reader may please to know, that they themselves are bound to solve this knot, as well as we; for it will be both as necessary and as hard for them to find out the conformity of their doctrines with the Ancients, as it is for us to find out ours; and again, the conformity of this modern Scripture with the Ancient; and these present copies of the Greek and Hebrew with the Original, or Archetype of the same languages, as it is to find out a conformity of this Church and her Doctrines with the Ancients; and so these Authors have made a rod wherewith to whip themselves, as commonly wrangling people do.  
Secondly, That there be other notes of truth besides this conformity, and therefore the enquiry after it is not necessary for any man.  
Thirdly, That we may know this conformity by the truth a great deal easier, than the truth by conformity; because truth may be known by the present notes, and such as are before our eyes; but conformity must a great way off, and through a thick mist of many Ages, if it be sought after by examination of particulars.  
Fourthly, That the enquiry after conformity by examining the Ancient rites, and the innumerable dark passages and decisions of Antiquity cannot be a general method for the instruction of all, or of the greater part of Men; for it is a long business, and so cannot be ready at all times, but rather after divers years: it is also so difficult, that few have learning or ability to go through with it; for the passages of Antiquity be very intricate, and require a great light of understanding for their discovery. You see the Enquirer, Sect. 37. confesseth he was much vexed with the harsh Greek of Evagrius, and the hard Latin of Irenaeus, and with distinguishing between different senses, and various lections, etc.  
If this learned Gentleman found so much difficulty in the search; what must become of the greater part of Men, if there were no way but this? for in comparison of the rest, few have so much wit as he, or so much leisure; few understand Greek or Latin either, whether harsh or pleasant, few so painful. Must no man that is not acquainted with Evagrius or Irenaeus, come to the knowledge of the truth? nor any man be able to know the Creation of the World, and the Old law, without he can read in Hebrew, or learn the New law without reading the New Testament in Greek? These were very hard conditions, and certainly such at God never imposed upon us.  
Doubtless we are not obliged to find out the Original Copies of Scriptures and Fathers, of which sort, as I suppose, there be none extant, nor trouble our spirits with judging about various lections; we are not bound to impossibilities for our instruction and salvation, but have a ready way assigned us, which is the conspicuous body of the present Church, which body is like a City built upon a hill, and that hill is a rock not to be undermined.  
It will be therefore sufficient that we can any sure way come to the knowledge of the truth without taking care whether it be conform unto the Ancients or no; for sure we are, all truth is conform to that it should be, abstracting from the consideration either of Ancient or New, and this alone may be sufficient to content any Man.  
Yet if he would know conformity, I will show him a readier way than examination of places; let him but take the voluntary confession of the Magdeburgians in their several Centuries, and he need seek no further; for they acknowledge all that we desire, and this acknowledgement of theirs cannot but satisfy, for they make it neither out of ignorance of the truth, nor out of affection to us.   

C. 5. Answ. To the fifth Chapter.  
Section 1 Your fifth Chapter is a very long one, and by that length and the contents of it, puts me in mind of him that owing his Fellow Sixpence, being not able to pay him, offered him a hundred Counters one after another in a sudden motion of his hand, in hope that at length his eyes might dazzle, and take some one of them for coin, or if not, yet rather choose to lose his Sixpence, than to venture so many cheats by awaiting that payment. For I am persuaded that when I have but repeated to you his Lordship's Argument in the fourth Paragraph, you will spare me the pains of showing that you have not answered it, by confessing you have not said one word to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or rational importance of it.  
Section 2 The intent of the Paragraph is to prove that tradition or Authority of the Ancients is not a proper means to prove the Infallibility of the Church. The means of inferring the conclusion are, First, the division of men (to whom this Argument is supposed to be brought) into ignorant and learned. Secondly, the insisting on the proposition in relation to each of them, to the ignorant because they cannot know, to the learned because they cannot infallibly know that tradition doth prove this Infallibility.  
Section 3 First, To the ignorant, proving that tradition cannot prove the Infallibility to them, because the ignorant cannot know what is the voice of general and constant tradition; Which if it be true, is an infallible argument to induce the conclusion; (for that tradition cannot prove another thing till itself be proved, which it is not to him at least, who neither doth nor can know it) and that it is not true, you do not so much as pretend, but rather help to prove it more plainly, than his Lordship thought necessary to do. And this is all that you do return to the first part of the proof, save only by pretending that this knowledge or trial of tradition cannot be necessary to the ignorant; which as it is true, so is it nothing against his Lordship, who had no use of saying that it was necessary, but rather the contrary; and by saying it is impossible implies he cannot think it necessary; and therefore when you affirm of his Lordship, that by consequence of his Doctrine he imposes this impossible task upon the illiterate, and do not so much as pretend to mention that consequence, this is so clear a prevarication, that you cannot take it ill at any friends hands, to call upon you to confess and retract it; and of that nature is that other suggestion here, that his Lordship seems to say, that ignorant men do assent to truth on no better grounds than others do to falsehood,] there being no such syllable here affirmed, (and if afterwards there be, we shall there meet with it.)  
Section 4 The second part of the Argument is in relation to the learned, proving that tradition cannot to them infallibly prove the Infallibility of your Church, or be a rule by which to square your belief in this particular, so far at least, as to make it to them necessary to be believed, (as your friends do and must say it is) because it is possible they may mistake in it, and that mistake will not be damnable in them, if they fall into it with a good conscience, as possibly they may (i. e. if they use their best diligence to find the truth by tradition, and are not kept from it either by prejudice or passion) though it should fall out they do not find it.  
Section 5 This argument thus drawn out at length, his Lordship confirms by a clear and pertinent instance; suppose me in my inquest, whether the Church may err, to inquire whether it ever hath erred, and in that inquest suppose me to meet with some motives which really persuade me that the Church hath contradicted herself, (which if she hath done she hath certainly, erred, because both branches of a contradiction cannot be true but one of them must needs be false) in this case it follows, that I believe she hath erred; Wherein though it is possible that I may err (because the premises which I believed true may be false) yet because it is but an error in my judgement that did so think (and that being reconcileable in this case with sincerity, will not be damning to me) it will follow, that it will be pardonable in me, though never so learned, that Tradition doth not convince me of the truth of that, which I did really conceive it showed me to be false; it being as pardonable in the learned to believe that error which they conceive Tradition tells them, as it was impossible for the unlearned to know what is Tradition.  
Section 6 The whole weight of this part of the Argument lies in this, that what ever is necessary to be believed must be offered to be proved by a means wherein the learned at lest cannot err pardonably, and therefore the Infallibility of the Church offered to be proved by Tradition (that Tradition being a thing wherein the learned may err pardonably) is not proved by that means to be necessary to be believed. Or in a Syllogism thus; That wherein the learned may err pardonably, is not a means to prove the Infallibility of the Church to be necessary to be believed, but Tradition is a means wherein the learned may err pardonably, therefore Tradition is not a means to prove the Infallibility of the Church to be necessary to be believed.  
Section 7 This is the sum of what his Lordship saith in the other part of that paragraph; and to no part of this Syllogism, or of the materials there, out of which I have form it, do you return the least answer or denial, but rather confirm the Minor, First, by using Arguments to prove, that it is a difficulty and knot, common to Papists with Protestants, to find out the conformity of their doctrine with the Ancients; which difficulty being granted, will prove that in that matter the learned may err pardonably. Secondly, by asserting that there be other notes of truth besides this of conformity with the Ancients, and therefore that enquiry after that is not necessary to any man; which seems a disclaiming of that as of an unfit Argument. Thirdly, by saying that we know the conformity by the truth, much easier than the truth by conformity. From whence it will follow, that conformity is a very ill Argument, and the worse the Argument the more pardonable the error in it. And fourthly, by the professed unfitness of this Argument, at large dilated on by you, with this conclusion, that the conditions for the understanding of Tradition are so very hard, that certainly God never imposed them on us. On which grounds you offer us another means of proving it, (which shows that this was unsufficient in your opinion) viz. the conspicuous body of the present Church; which if it be not a very fallible means also (as in many respects I might prove it were particularly by this, that the compass of Christians that are of that Church of yours, is not by common computation a third part of the Christian world) is certainly very distant from Tradition; which that it is not a means infallible in this matter, is all that his Lordship now contends in that present Argument.  
Section 8 The only thing that is by you produced against this difficulty of using this means, (and so pardonableness of erring) is the last period of the Chapter, which commends the reading of the Magdeburgians as a readier way to know conformity, than examination of places.  
Section 9 To which I answer, that if they have voluntarily confessed that there is constant Tradition for the infallibility of the Roman Church, then have you fitly cited them; if they have not, or if upon my present instance you do not show that they have either directly, or by certain consequence, then have you wronged them in this your affirmation, and left yourself no means to prove your conclusion by that medium.  
Section 10 This is all I shall say to that long Chapter, and in that I have showed, that through it you much mistook the Argument proposed in the title of the Chapter, the confutation of the fourth paragraph, of which there being two parts, you spoke no word against either of them; and therefore if I should allow every word of that Chapter to be true, though you would be beholding to me, yet would it be no advantage to you against his Lordship's present reasoning, to which all you say is very extrinsecall and impertinent. But that I may not lay too great an obligation on you by so liberal a grant, I will mention to you some infirm parts in that your discourse.  
Section 11 I have touched on three already; and your evidences (that your Church and Religion is the true) which you mention for the illiterate, and are no one of them evidences, may be added to the number; which I need not prove, because you have not attempted to prove, but only assert the contrary. And so also your Divinity cited out of Ric: Victorinus, if applied to your purpose: [that whatsoever is once so creditable (as you have there made the Infallibility of your Church) can never be false] Which beside other falsities, must infer other things to be infallible, beside that only infallible; for 'tis sure that other things may by you be made so creditable, and as sure, that what ever else cannot be false (God's veracity standing engaged for it) is infallible also; and (not to mention your proofs of that Divinity) such is your assertion, that the Enquirer's inference against the Church is, [we think she hath erred, therefore she may err] for his inference is only this; if she hath erred, certainly she may; which I should say is another great injustice, by changing his Lordship's words, but that it is repaired and expiated with another act of more kindness to us, though of as little force of reason; that the inference is good, but the antecedent is infirm; whereas in truth the Inference had been nought, but the Antecedent either true, or only in the power of the Searcher of thoughts to disprove in him; so again, that the discovering the nonconformity of your Church with the Ancients, may justly be thought impossible; when if we had not actually done it, yet hereafter we might; and when in the present business we affirm (and you go not about to disprove) that your pretending to the Infallibility of your Church is inconformable to the Ancients, because they did not so pretend; and surely such is your affirmation, that to send one to a witness, and yet bid him not believe himself in what he conceives that witness tells him, is not as bad, as to send him in like manner, and bid him not believe the witness; there being no possibility of believing what the Witness saith, but by believing himself, affirming that that Witness said it: For if you say it be by believing of you (i. e. another Witness) that that Witness said it; I answer, that that will include a believing himself also, viz: himself affirming that you testified that the other Witness said it.  
Section 12 I shall trouble you with no more at once, lest you count me uncivil; one thing only more I shall let you know I take notice of, that in the compass of very few words you cast off much of the respect due to Antiquity, by saying, that it is sufficient, if we can by any sure way come to the knowledge of truth (mentioning at that time only the conspicuous body of the present Church for such) without taking care whether it be conform to the Ancients, or no, etc. By which as you acknowledge your preferring the conspicuous body of the present Church (for the finding out of truth) before Antiquity, which is the strangest speech I could have looked for from a defender of Tradition, so I confess I see the reason why a Section that undertook to prove that Antiquity was no infallible proof of your Church's Infallibility, had in a long Chapter of answer to it, never a word said in confutation of it; and so I very friendly take leave of it.   

To the fifth Section, Chap. 6.  
Out of that which hitherto hath been said, it appears plainly how the conclusion which the Enquirer would infer in this fifth Section, is no way applicable to our manner of probation of the Church's Infallibility: for we do not, as he surmiseth, maintain that our Church the Guide of Faith, is to be known by such marks by which the ignorant cannot seek it, and the Learned may chance to miss, although with all diligence and without prejudice they inquire after it; for we affirm that our first principles of probation are certain and manifest, and out of them, we with certainty, though not with evidence, evict the Church. By which manner of proceeding it is clear, that our probations are Logical and conformable to the rules prescribed for the hunting out of truth by Aristotle in his Analytiques, and the Philosophers in general.  
Some peradventure will deny our Church's verity to be evidently credible: If any do it, the matter must be remitted to an equal trial between us. But, say you, who must be the Judge? I am no Socinian, nor inclining to that sort of misbelievers, yet nevertheless, I say, right reason must be he, and every man's own conscience; and of these Judges, I hope all men will allow, and it is reasonable sure they ought to do so, because reason is in all questions the last and the interior Judge, without whose assent and approbation, no exterior is sufficient and complete. For exterior Judges be as spectacles to the eyes; and as spectacles, be they never so good, cannot see without eyes, so cannot revelation, be it never so manifest, give the last sentence about any doctrine, nor be sufficient without reason.  
It may be further replied, that these principles of ours are also questioned. Admit they be, yet nevertheless may they be certain and evident, otherwise we should grant nothing to be certain; for there is no one thing so evident, which is not questioned by some or other.   

C. 6. Answer to the 6. Chap.  
Section 1 That which you say to the fifth Section, is in effect the denying the conclusion, when the premises are either not denied, or not confuted; for that which his Lordship saith in that Section, you acknowledge to be a conclusion, and is so indeed of all that went before; all directly tending to this, That the Church provided for the guide of faith, it offered by you to be known by such marks as the ignorant cannot seek it by, and the Learned, though never so honest in his search, may chance not to find it by. This then being the conclusion of all the discourse you profess to deny, upon no other proof but by affirming, that your principles of probation are certain and manifest, i. e. by saying the direct contrary to his conclusion, but not thinking needful to prove it; And so beside that other absurdity in Logic, there is petitio principii again.  
Section 2 In doing this you were, I conceive very much resisted by your own spirit; for the satisfying of which you are fain to say this strange thing, that your principles of probation are certain and manifest, and out of them you evict the Church with certainty, though not with evidence: where either you must affirm to think that [evident] and [manifest] are not all one, or else that the conclusion is not evident, when the premises are; either of which you shall have free liberty to take the choice of, and maintain in your reply. And when you have showed your skill in so doing, you then shall have leave to boast that your probations are Logical and conformable to the rules of Aristotle in his Analitiques, and the Philosophers in general; but till than 'twas to no more purpose to say that of yourself, than 'twill be to the edification of any that I have repeated it to you.  
Section 3 Having thus confimed the conclusion with that great popular argument (that prevails with so many) a bare confidence of affirming it, it is very remarkable what your next attempt is; why, in stead of that hard task which lay so heavy upon your shoulders, to get an easier, if 'twere possible; and therefore you foresee that some may peradventure deny your Church's verity to be evidently credible. Good Sir, what is this but to suborn a weaker adversary to challenge you, that you may be excused from fight with the stronger? we desire plain dealing, that you will prove your principles of probation to be certain and manifest (which is the thing you affirmed) and not to think to put us off with more obscure and less containing terms of your Church's verity being evidently credible. For first, your Church's verity (i. e. I conceive its being the true Church for I hope you speak not now of its Metaphysical verity, or its being truly a Church, for so it may be, and be very fallible, and very corrupt) is an equivocal phrase, and, in what ever sense, is not so much as your Church's infallibility; for it may be a true Church, and not be infallible, i. e. upon supposition, that what ever now it taught were actually true, 'twere yet possible it might err, even when it doth not; nay, if its verity should signify that it were a true Church (as perhaps you mean) exclusively to all others, i. e. that the Catholic Church were the Roman Church, and the Roman the Catholic; yet speaking of the present state of the Church, i. e. of the present Roman Church, though it were supposed to be the present Catholic Church, yet may that be fallible again, because those that are now in the truth, may fall into error, and others rise up, as they fall, to be defendors of the truth, and so the promise of God of keeping his Church from final or total falling, be made good still.  
Section 4 As for that other largest notion of the Catholic Church (under which we confess it to be infallible) that of the universal Church all the world over, without any restriction; I conceive it impossible, that by your Church (which is the Church with an eminent restriction) you should mean that; and upon that ground it was, that I affirmed, that the verity of your Church, in what ever sense, is not so much as its infallibility.  
Section 5 Then again your phrase of evidently credible, is not sure so much as certain and manifest; for though evidently credible sound strangely, (and if it have any sense in it, hath also some obscurity) yet I shall suppose you mean by it, that which is credible, or may be believed, and of which it is evident that it may, the words Grammatically can bear no other sense then this, that it is evident that they are credible; now certainly to be evident and certain, is much more than to be credible, though it be never so evident that it is credible. For suppose me actually to acknowledge that you have some probable arguments that your Church is the true Church; nay suppose it is so evident that you have such arguments, that every man that hath common understanding will be ready to acknowledge you have so, doth it thence follow, that I, or all others, do and must acknowledge that you have demonstrated it? this is to make no difference between the two sorts of Arguments in Logic, Topical and Demonstrative; or in a word, to conclude that to be infallible, which you durst not say was any more than credible; for as for the word [evidently] added to it, it cannot have such an influence on the word, credible, as to make that quite another, or higher sort of things than it was; Credible in the clearest or highest degree is but credible still, as the eminentest or excellentest man in the world is a man still; and therefore in brief, if we should help you to fewer adversaries than you have, and take off that suborned enemy of yours, whom you suppose to deny your Church's verity to be eminently credible, you would have gained by it but little peace from his Lordship, who would still require you to make good your pretention of infallibility, which will be a much harder theme to declaim for popularly, (I am sure Logically) than the credibility of the verity of your Church.  
Section 6 As for your way of answering that objection, because the objection is not needful for us to make, Any reply, or confutation of your answer will be as unnecessary. I shall only report to other men from your own pen, one notable decision of yours, that in a trial of huge importance, concerning the credibility of the verity of your Church (I must be fain to use your phrase) right reason and every man's own conscience must be the Judge; which being so great an act of compliance and favour both to those which assert reason, and to those that maintain the private spirit to be the Judge of Controversies, i. e. to two sorts of men, which have hitherto been believed opposite enough to your infallibility, it will be but gratitude to reward so great a bounty, with a favourable interpretation of a good meaning, and he should be very rude and uncivil, who would not grant upon such your demand, that you are no Socinian, nor inclining to that sort of misbelievers; for sure he that makes right reason the Judge of his very principles, must needs be so rational, and ingenuous, that he can never be an Heretic, though he say the very things that Heretics do.  
Section 7 As for your very excellent simile of the eyes and the spectacles, I shall not have a word to say to it, save only this, that although you have gotten the enclosure and monopoly of spectacles, (I mean of imposing of an exterior Judge upon us) yet other men may be allowed to have eyes, as well as you, i. e. to have reason and conscience to Judge of your Judge, and then the issue (according to your premises being granted to you) will be this, that they whose reason and conscience tells them, that 'tis not evidently credible, that your Church should be the true Church, exclusively to all others, shall not be obliged to believe it is so (for their own reason, say you, and Conscience is to be judge) that they whose reason, etc. tells them it is so credible, may believe it, if they please; nay, if they have no arguments as credible to the contrary, and upon impartial search can find none, it is very reasonable for them to believe what to their conscience is so credible; but if they have such arguments to the contrary, or if it be their fault that they have not, they are sure no farther bound to believe it (if they are not Subjects of your Church) than those dictates of their conscience do extend to oblige them, or (if they are Subjects, yet) no farther than the doctrine of obedience rightly stated (which will be too long a work for a parenthesis) hath influence on men's opinions; but then still, what ever their case be for believing the verity of your Church, they can no way from thence be obliged to believe your infallibility.  
Section 8 You confess there may farther reply be made to you, that these principles of yours are also questioned, but take no notice upon what grounds of reason or Scripture they are questioned, and so think you can deal with so unarmed an adversary, as you please, by telling him they may be certain and evident, though they be questioned; and perhaps I shall confess to you, that if they were only questioned, and no reason that were not by you easily answered, brought to justify such questioning, it were sufficient which you say, that questioning doth not disprove certainty; (and yet if every man's conscience be the Judge, as you acknowledge, then unless you can make it evident that that man's questioning is against conscience, you will have no way to keep it from being certain, and evident to him) but when there be arguments produced to back that questioning, which you have no way to answer, but by saying they may be certain and evident for all that; he that disputes with you, will be excused to think he hath more reason to say (and that you say must be judge) that it may be otherwise.   

To the 6. & 7. Sections, Chap. 7.  
No doubt there can be, but God will reveal his truth to all such as seek it with sincerity of heart; and though both sides, as the Enquirer objecteth, may make use of this for an exterior allegation, yet not as of interior help and preparation; and therefore this sincerity is not a disposition unprofitable, though it be a proof inefficacious, and thus much we grant willingly, neither do we challenge it as an argument of truth.  
We grant him also, that before such time as we can believe the Church, we are to acquire sufficient principles for informing us which is she; and also before we can believe upon her determinations, we must have principles of knowing she is infallible, and all this we make profession we do, de facto, know. Neither do we take this Church to be a Proteus, that is to say, sometimes of one shape, sometimes of another, but a conspicuous body constantly adorned with the robes of truth, and annexed to a Succession of Pastors legitimate from one age to another.   

C. 7. Ans. to Chap. 7.  
Section 1 Your answer to the sixth Section is by giving a distinction to tell us now both sides make use of the pretence of seeking truth sincerely] and concludes, that sincerity is not a disposition unprofitable, though it be a proof inefficacious; which because you are willing to grant, I will contain myself from springing any game or recreation for the Reader at this time (of which he that were playsomely disposed, would find abundant matter in the review of your distinction here applied) and give you present payment for your favour by acknowledging, that that which you grant, is all that is begged from you, viz. that God's promise of revealing of truth to those who seek it sincerely, is not at all an argument, that they that pretend to the benefit of that promise, must have real title to it; or consequently, that they that have no other arguments to prove their Church's Infallibility, but that they seek truth sincerely, and yet after that sincere search are of that opinion, are to be heeded in their pretensions. This justifies his Lordship's sixth paragraph, as fully as if you had subscribed it without your distinction.  
Section 2 His Lordship's seventh Paragraph consists of two things; First, a resuming of a part of his former argument, which had been only mentioned, but not enforced before, that [supposing the Church were proved to be infallible, yet were not that sufficient to give any man certain knowledge which were it:] Secondly, a solid proof of this affirmation, by plain reason, because the granting the Infallibility of the Church did only conclude, that God would always have a Church that should not err, but not that this was appropriated to any particular Church, to such a Succession, to the Bishop and Clergy of such a place, etc. Thirdly, by a lively instance of the Greek Church, which though it were now in the right, might hereafter err, and so the Greek Church be now fallible, and yet at the time that that erred, another Church might arise the Champion of truth, and so still the Church be infallible.  
Section 3 To these two parts of the Paragraph your dispatch is short, (and annexed to the nothing that was replied to the former Section) to the first, a liberal Grant of that which no man thanks you for, (that it is as necessary to know which that infallible Church is, as that the Church is so) but then saying and professing, that you do, de facto, know which is the Church, and that she is infallible; which (beside that it is your old beloved petitio principii, to say you know it, & offer no proof for it, but your profession and a Latin word, (when the very thing that his Lordship was just a proving, was, that you neither did nor could know it) comes not at all home to his Lordship's matter of showing, that the acknowledgement of the Infallibility of the Church doth not evict, which is she: For if 'twere acknowledged that you did know it, yet might it be by some other means, and not by proving or confessing the Church to be infallible.  
Section 4 As for his Lordship's proof and instance added to his proposition, 'twas so despicable a thing, that 'twas not worth taking notice of; but instead of any such thing, you give us a declaration of your own opinion, that the Infallible Church was not a Proteus, but a conspicuous body constantly adorned with truth, etc. which is again the meanest begging of that which was just then denied, and disproven; and must so stand, till you can annex reasons to your opinion, and answers to his Lordship's reasons.   

To the 8. Section. Chap. 8.  
We never go about to prove our Church to be the true, therefore, because it holdeth with the truth, or teacheth true doctrine, as this Enquirer seemeth to suppose we do; but rather chose, because it is the true Church of Christ, therefore we infer it teacheth true doctrine; but that it is the true Church, we prove first of all and originally by real revelations, called in the Scripture, Verba Signorum, that is, by signs, ostensions, or motives of credibility; 
Psal. 104.27.  which motives for a great and sufficient part of them, are the same by which we prove to Infidels the truth of Christianity itself. For these same motives, though when they are considered but in general, and as it were afar off, do persuade Christianity but in general, without designing out in particular this or that Individual Christianity; yet nevertheless the selfsame being understood distinctly, do design out a distinct and individual Christianity, and are applicable to none else; as for example, the same species which show me a man in general afar off, the selfsame afterwards, when he comes nearer, being distinctly perceived, do show me that man is this individual; as Plato for example, and no other: For real species do not represent unto us, Entia rationis, or, Individua vaga, but determinate Individuals, namely, as often as those species are distinctly and completely understood. As for the Circles into which both this Enquirer and Chillingworth would cast us, and make us dance within them whether we will or no, they are but Chymaericall conceptions of fiddling and trifling dispositions, which love to have toys wherewith to entertain themselves, and in this point of resolution, as we have declared it already, have no semblance of reality.   

C. 8. Ans. to the 8. Chap.  
Section 1 His Lordship supposing in charity that you had attempted to prove the Roman Church to be the true Church by its agreement with Scripture and Antiquity, which is in effect, by holding the truth; You plainly tell him he is mistaken in you. It seems you defy such mean ways of proving yours to be the Church, as accordance with Scripture or Truth, you must have it by some more noble way of demonstration; and if you would stand to this piece of gallantry, and never urge Scripture or Fathers to prove your opinions, but content yourself with your being the true Church, to prove all after it: As I confess I should not charge on you that Circle which his Lordship doth in this particular (supposing, as he thought favourably to you, that you had proved the truth of the Church by the truth (and consonancy to Scriptures and Fathers) of your doctrines) so I should have two quarrels more against you, in stead of that one composed. First, that you would disclaim Scriptures and fly to miracles, (for such are your real revelations, as you interpret them by the verba signorum, in the Psalm, the signs being there interpreted by the wonders that follow) that you would fly to God's extraordinary providence, when I presume you conceive his ordinary would have served your turn; for sure if at another time a man should have asked you, is not your accordance with the Scriptures and Fathers a prime proof that you are the true Church, I doubt not but you would be so well natured as to confess it; and why now should the Devil's infirmity, the fear of a Circle, make you so cowardly, as not to dare to own so popular an argument, especially when your fire comes down slowly, or your bath Col the voice from Heaven, (which is the only proper notion that I know of a real revelation) is not very audible to us that are afar off: nor if we were, to be put upon the rack; do we know, or can confess at this day, that we or any of our Fathers ever heard that 'twas so ever revealed, that the Roman Church is the true, or the infallible Church. And besides when you know, we Protestants are a little hard of belief, and dare not credit your own report, that you have such ostensions, and revelations, and signs, when you neither produce witness, nor tell us, when or what they were, but give us farther ground of jealousy, by an odd phrase let fall by you, that those real revelations of yours are motives (no more then) of credibility, when as true miracles acknowledged to be such, are grounds of Faith, and he is an Infidel that believes them not; and to be but a motive of credibility, is but a petty thing that every topical argument will take place of, probable being more than credible in the ordinary notion of the words.  
Section 2 The second quarrel that your words have brought upon you, is your telling us (without proof that it is so, but only by giving a similitude to show it may be so, and so, in your phrase, to be a motive of no more than credibility, which in him that concludes it is so, is petitio principii again) that the same motives you use to prove the truth of Christianity against Infidels, will prove yours to be the true Church; which being confidently said, we are so vile in your eyes, as not to be vouchsafed so much as the mention what they are, (unless by your former words we conclude you mean miracles) much less any evidence concerning them; And yet by the way, the miracles by which we prove the truth of Christianity to Infidels, must be those which we meet with in Scripture, and not those other in your Legends; and upon a strict survey and recollecting of all them (and so coming as near to them as can be) I must profess I cannot see your Churches being the true Church in those miracles, near so clearly and distinctly, as I can see the man afar off to be one of my acquaintance, when he comes near me, which you undertook I should, and made me try; and therefore I hope will recompense me for the loss of my labour, by giving me your reasons next time for your assertion, that I may try again whether your proofs are more lucky than your experiments.  
Section 3 But then I cannot see why you should be scurrilous upon both his Lordship and Master Chillingworth, for thinking you were in danger of the Circle, in which sure Baron had deprehended your Friend Turnbull, and in which you had been engaged infallibly, if you had but gone about to prove your Church the true Church by the truth (or consonancy to Scriptures and Fathers) of your opinions; which way of proving me thinks 'tis possible you may stand in need of, before you come to the end of your answer. In the mean, as the calling down Hercules upon the Stage, was wont to be a Character of a Tragic Poet, i. e. of a fabulous, wonderful undertaker, Cum fabulae exitum explicare non potuerit, so to fetch us in miracles and ostensions, to prove that divine truth that you confess must not be proved by the Scripture, will pass for a piece of Poetry, I fear, instead of a motive of credibility; and those that are cheerfully disposed, will be apt to tell you, that you were fain to conjure hard, and do, or pretend miracles, or else you had been enclosed in that Circle.   

To the 9 and 10. Sections, Chap. 9  
To these I answer in a word, that neither the Greek, nor any other Church can pretend the Primacy or Principal succession of Pastors, that is to say, from the Precedent of the Apostle Saint Peter; none, I say, besides Rome, can pretend this; and without this one, no●e can be authentical or sufficient to prove a Church, or a succession of Pastors Ecclesiastical; and so the Enquirers starting-hole in the Greek Church, into which he always makes his retreat, is prevented and shut up against him.  
By this also is the 10. Section answered, for whatsoever Churches claim unto succession shall be alleged, it can no way evacuate that of Rome, as hath before been showed.   

Ch. 9 Answ. to Chap. 9  
Section 1 Your answer to the 9 and 10. Sections, signifies a great deal, viz: that you were so put to it by the conviction of his Lordship's argument, that to disentangle yourself you have ventured to vent a piece of very severe divinity, which my charity to you makes me hope you will not justify; and if you will, yet your no argument produced, gives me nothing to answer, nor otherwise to reply, then by denying as mercifully and obligingly to the world, as you do cruelly affirm; viz: that without succession sufficient from Saint Peter, there is no succession sufficient to prove a Church, or a succession of Pastors Ecclesiastical] and this is so strange a news to our ears (who were confident that what ever you deem of the other two parts of three of the Christian world at this present, you had allowed liberty to Apostles to ordain Churches, as well as (and without succession from) Saint Peter; and indeed that that which in the second and eighth line of your Chapter, you call the Greek Church, might have been acknowledged to be a Church in the seventh) that had you not said it in the most evident terms (None beside Rome can pretend this, and without this one, none can be sufficient to prove a Church, etc.) & had there been any way imaginable but this, to answer his Lordship's argument, I should never have thought this had been your meaning; till I see you again own this severe doctrine, I shall not take pains to confute it; and when I see that, I must say, that his Lordship presumed you had not been so bloodily minded when he proposed to you the argument in those two Sections.  
Section 2 And yet after all this, I doubt not but with a little change, his Lordship's argument will still hold against you, even after you have ventured on such strange practices, to secure yourself from it, Thus; suppose you had evinced that the succession from S. Peter were infallible, and so proved the Roman Church to be so, because none else pretended to succeed S. Peter, yet this can be no sufficient ground of belief to the ignorant, who cannot have any infallible foundation of belief, that the Greek Church doth not pretend from S. Peter, whether by S. Mark at Alexandria, who might be ordained by S. Peter, whose right hand, they say, he was in the penning of the Gospel; or by Evodius at Antioch, where S. Peter was Bishop seven years (as your own Baronius) or by any other, or (to the ignorant it matters not) by no other known way; and even to the learned it is but an accidental argument, because if any other company had likewise claimed Succession from Saint Peter (as they of 
* Euscb. hist. l. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Antioch do) it had overthrown all that probation; nay it is but an arbitrary argument which the adversary can confute by but denying; for if any society of Christians so called, would pretend to be from Saint Peter some other way, then by succeeding him at Rome, or submitting to his government, your Church could make use of it no longer.  
Section 3 As for that which you add in a word of answer to the 10 Sect. that what ever Churches claim unto succession, shall be alleged it can no way evacuate that of Rome; if it be applied to his Lordship's argument, it is absolutely false, for if Rome's claim to Infallibility together, and to succession to Saint Peter, be to be proved by this, because none else pretends to it (which is the argument which his Lordship here confutes) then sure any other Churches claim, or pretending to it will evacuate that claim or title, that by that argument is pretended, and contrary to this there is yet nothing showed.   

To the 11. Section, Chap. 10.  
What mercy God will use in pardoning the errorurs of those men who do seek sincerely and yet miss, makes nothing at all against the ordinary provision and necessity of a guide, because those misses or mistake be cases extraordinary. Besides, I would know why any pardon should need for such innocent errors which be defects involuntary, and so can be no crimes; wherefore me thinks the discourse of our Enquirer in this Section is not coherent.   

C. 10. Answ: To the Chap. 10.  
Section 1 His Lordship's argument Sect. 11. is very strong against the collecting a necessity of an Infallible guide for the interpreting of Scripture from the topic of God's goodness, by proposing another way of reconciling God's providence with his goodness in this matter, (which if it may be done, concludes that other unnecessary) viz. by mentioning a doctrine of more Evangelicall oeconomy; in which errors may be reconcileable with mercy, when God doth give grace to the diligent seeker to find out truth, or by this dilemma, that without such an infallible guide, upon the use of Reason in the interpretation of Scripture, and search for tradition, God will either give grace to find what is so sought, or pardon if he miss; and so though it stand not with God's goodness to damn him for every error, to whom he hath assigned no infallible way to find out all truth, yet to him that is confident that God will not damn any man upon such terms, as the servant laid to his charge, when he told him he was an austere man, etc. to him that teaches not such legal bloody doctrine against God, this argument of the Romanists will not be pressing at all; this expedient of the Gospell-grace or Gospell-mercy being as fit for the turn of infirm souls, as an infallible guide would be; as indeed the state of imperfection wherein we are placed, is as fit for our turns, when the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Gospel is revealed, and proportioned to it, as Adam's Paradise of Supernatural all-sufficient strength, and innocence would be.  
Section 2 To all which all that you return is only this that all this is nothing against the ordinary provision and necessity of a guide; because those misses or mistake are cases extraordinary: To which I answer, First, that if it were supposed that against the ordinary provision of a guide the argument were not of force, yet sure it might against the necessity of it, and then that is all that is pretended to by his Lordship, and that which alone is destructive to you; and therefore 'tis strange you should couple them together as so social things, which are so distant and separable, for sure though Evangelicall grace and mercy do not exclude an ordinary provision of an infallible way, but leave it in medio, that God may if he will make that ordinary provision, yet notwithstanding this, it follows not that such a provision is required, or necessary; There is a wide distance betwixt [possible if God please] and [necessary to the vindicating of God's goodness] now against the latter only it is that his Lordship argues, and is not at all concerned in th'other, and therefore I shall not need to examine whether the first be true, it being so clear, that the second hangs so loose from it, and will alone serve our turns as well.  
Section 3 But then Secondly, I profess not at all to understand what you mean by that reason of your assertion, [because the misses or mistake be cases extraordinary] for first, how can it be denied in this imperfect infirm state of mortality, that now we are in, but that errors and mistake are very ordinary? That they are common there is no doubt, and as little that they are agreeable to that order or course that is now among men, and to you that say in the next words, that you know not why such defects should need any pardon (and to us that acknowledge that they that reform all other, and pray daily, demitte debita, shall through Christ have pardon of course for these) sure they cannot pass for extraordinary cases in either sense, for that would imply, that now under the Gospel it should be ordinary, or regular to punish involuntary errors (which you say can be no crimes) and extraordinary either for us to commit, or for God to pardon them.  
Section 4 But then Secondly, if it were true that these misses, etc. were cases extraordinary, yet can I not see how these words can be annexed to your former, as a proof of their being answer to his Lordship (because how extraordinary soever the misses may be, the pardon for misses may do as well for you, as an infallible guide) unless you mean somewhat else by ordinary cases, than what my capacity hath reached to, and till you please to instruct me better, I shall 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and by exercising my charity in not judging what I do not understand, invite yours to instruct me that I may.  
Section 5 As for the Coherence of his Lordship's discourse, you have little temptation to doubt of that, when you have said that he conceives that such errors or missing should need pardon, for to that, all that he saith is coherent; It seems you are not of his opinion for the truth of that; and whether is in the right I shall not now examine, or enlarge to any so accidental and extrinsecall discourse, but only tell you, that believing as you do, you ought to have said [not true] when you mistook, and said [not coherent.]   

To the 12. Section, Chap. 11.  
To this charge we answer, that our proofs of a sure guide, are themselves also sure; and what proofs those are, we before have signified, Chap. 8. & Sect. 8. and before Chap. 5. Sect. 4.   

Ch. 11. Answ. to the 11. Chap.  
Your next Chapter being but a reference to what you had before said (and that before examined by us) my answer shall be answerably only a reference also, without taking more pains, to put you in mind, how unfit your Verba signorum (which you there affirmed to be motives of credibility) are now to proceed or commence infallible proofs, for those are they which his Lordship's argument requires in his 12. Section.   

To the 13, 14, 15, 16, Sections, Chap. 12.  
The Infallibility of Popes or Counsels is no point of doctrine necessary to be known distinctly, before any resolution of faith can be made, because it is sufficient to learn out of Catechisms and the common practice of the Church, what is to be believed: Neither is there any more probable fear of missing which is the See Apostolic, and which the Churches living in communion with it, than there is of a Subjects being ignorant to what Kingdom he belongs; and, as for doctrine of belief, it is found out as readily, and as surely as the other, by those means of instruction which we have signified already. As for the Simony objected, Sect. 14. it is no impediment of his power, so he be received peaceably by the Church, and not 〈◊〉 in question for it. The like may be said of the decrees and definitions of Counsels, together with the sense or meaning of them. And by this the 15, and the 16 Sections are answered.   

C. 12. Answ. to the 12. Chap.  
Section 1 His Lordship, in quest. after your infallible ground of faith, took into consideration the Pope's Infallibility, Sect. 13. the Infallibility of a Council by him called, Sect. 14. and produced arguments, I conceive, convincing against each.  
Section 2 To these your only answer is, that neither of these Infallibilities are necessary to be known distinctly before any resolution of faith can be made, and you give your reasons for it, because, etc. which is in plain terms to grant and prove the thing which his Lordship desires, and proves; for if they were the ground of faith, they would be necessary to be known distinctly before any resolution of faith, the foundation being absolutely necessary to the superstruction in material edifices; and in intellectual, the distinct knowledge of a ground of faith being as necessary to a distinct resolution of faith, as the ground itself, which works not upon any man's understanding (the seat of this Faith) any further than it is known. This concession of yours being all that is demanded of you at this time, we shall not need insist on, nor debate farther, what influence the case of Simony may have upon the Pope's Infallibility; If he be infallible at all, He, or He and a Council, you say 'tis not necessary to ground faith, (which is the only use we have of it in this present enquiry) for it seems the Catechisms, or common practice of the Church, are sufficient to teach what is to be believed.  
Section 3 What? Is the Popes and Counsels Infallibility made unnecessary? and is a Catechism and common practice of the Church sufficient for the grounding of faith infallibly? Certainly we are grown very low, and are supposed men of very moderate desires, if it be thought we shall thus be content with the Infallibility of a Catechism: For whatsoever is sufficient for the grounding of faith infallibly (remember [infallibly] must come in, for otherwise 'tis not to his Lordship's discourse) must itself be acknowledged infallible. Which if you shall please to affirm of any of your Catechisms, as I shall first desire to be directed which Catechism it is, that of Trent, or what others, (that I may not mistake in the choice of my Guide) so I shall make bold to demand whence this Infallibility, or authority of this prime guide of faith is to be fetched? It will be sure from the authority of the Pope (or Council) of that time when 'twas compiled and confirmed, and then still we fall back to the infallibility of the Pope, or Council, which it seems in the last resolve is become necessary again to the grounding of Faith, and so again must be known before any resolution of Faith be built (even upon the Catechism) which was the thing you just now denied: As for the common practice of the Church, that that should be a ground of Faith, or sufficient for us to learn by it, what is to be believed (besides that this is a weaker ground than Catechisms, as much as errors are more likely to get into the practice of the many, then into the Books of the Learned, or Authentic Writings of the Church; and accordingly 'tis observable in the particular of images, that the common practice of men is much more gross, than the Writings of the Learned) 'tis impossible that that should ever be a guide, quâ cundum, which way we are to go, till it be some other way proved, that we ought to go that way.  
Section 4 For the improbability of missing the See Apostolic, and which be the Churches that live in communion with it, we have no obligation lying on us to deny it; his Lordship's words gave you no occasion to assert it; nor can we see what at this time you can get by it, when you acknowledge the Infallibility of Pope or Council unnecessary to be known before any resolution of faith can be made.  
Section 5 You add [and as for doctrine of belief, etc.] This I should conceive you had spoken of before in those words [what is to be believed] and then your memory was short to put it in again within five lines, as if it had been a new matter.  
Section 6 I told you 'twas not necessary, after you had confessed the cause to insist on the matter of Simony, which was an argument of his Lordships to defend it. Yet that you may not complain that any word of yours is neglected, or lost upon us, I have considered that also, and ask you whether it be not true what his Lordship saith, that a Pope chosen by Simony is ipso facto, no Pope, you (durst not, I conceive, because you) did not before deny it; and if now you will take more courage, let your mind be known, and we shall not doubt to bring as Classicke Authors as yourself against you. If it be true, then is your answer of no validity, because of no truth; for either that infallibility, or whatever other power, must be annexed to him as a man (which he may be indeed, though he be not Pope) or under some other relation, which infallibly belongs to him, (neither of which, I conceive, you will affirm, for then ten thousand to one, some other will communicate with him in that claim) or else he must be Pope, when he is, ipso facto, no Pope; or else that power must be annexed to him by some body, that may think him Pope when he is not, and then either God must run the error, or that power be given him from some other, for that God should know him to be no Pope, and yet give that power of Infallibility (for if you speak of any other power it is not pertinent) to him, as long as he is peaceably received, must, First, conclude that a no-pope may be infallible. And Secondly, that whosoever is so received by the Church, is so; which unless there be some promise of Gods to assure me that he hath promised it to the Churches blind reception, will, for aught I yet see, conclude again, that either the chair or the people's error gives him that prerogative.  
Section 7 To the 15, and 16, Sections, you reply no one word, but refer it to your former answer, whether, if I knew which part of your answer it were (for that immediately precedent I conceive 'tis not, for I hope the Simoniacal election hath nothing to do with the decrees of Counsels) I should attend it, but the scent being cold, I am at a loss, and so must be content to give over the game.  
Section 8 Yet seeing I am on this matter of the Pope's Infallibility (because you have wholly avoided that question, and by a kind of stratagem diverted it, and so not given me any occasion to defend his Lordship in that matter) I shall a little consider the reader, (to whom I am much obliged, if he shall have had patience to read thus far, i. e. to endure the penance of so much Nothing) and give him a few collections of my own, to this purpose of the Pope's infallibility; not that I conceive they will from me find any better entertainment than his Lordship's reasonings had done, but because they are for the most part the concessions of your own men, from whence I here transcribe them.  
Section 9 That the Pope is not only fallible, but even judicially subject to error, deviation, defection, and (in Ocham's phrase, haereticabilis) to heresy, apostasy, Atheism, and in his practice to sin of any the most hain us kind, and consequently to damnation irreversible. I shall assert no farther than these honourable Names will avow and authorise me. Among your own Writers, (I mean Pontificians) Lyra in Matth. 16. Waldensis, l. 2. doctrine. fidei antiq. Gerson. de exam. doct. consid. 1, 2, 3. Adrianus Sextus the Pope, in 4. sent. de confirm. qu. ult. Driedo de libert. Christ. l. 2. c. 2. Cardin. de Turrecrem. l. 2. c. 16. Almainus de author. Eccles. c. 8. ad 6. etc. 10. & de dom. civ. nat. & Eccl. concls. 3. Archidiaconus Bononiensis, in Grat. gloss. in dist. 19 contra Auxentium. Catharinus in Gal. 2. Yea and the Counsels of Constance and Basil, and the Fathers generally there assembled, which I hope took not up this doctrine from Luther's or calvin's dictates.  
Section 10 To this purpose is it that we read of Childebert King of France, that he sent Ruffinus his Legate to Rome, to inquire of Pelagius the Pope, whether he had violated the Faith, as 
(a) Ad a●n. 556. n. 25.  Baronius testifies; the same was suspected of him by the Bishop of Tuscia, and other Bishops of Italy, to whom he sent his Apology, saith the same 
(b) Ib. n. 30.  Baronius. So Gregory the first, being under the like suspicion, wrote his 
(c) Greg. l. 2. ●p. 4.  Apology to Theodolinda Queen of the Long●bards. So the Popes generally laboured to approve themselves to the Emperors, and purged themselves before them; Sixtus before Valentinian concerning the crime laid to his charge by Baessus Symmachus upon an accusation of forgery, saith an 
(d) Anonym: de aerat. eccles c. 7. ap. Gol●astum in monarch. 1.1. p. 29.  Author in Goldastus; all which are arguments that the Pope's infallibility was in those days unknown to the world, and the Popes themselves were not very perfect in it; if they had, they would have been more confident then to have made Apologies.  
Section 11 Farther yet, the Bishops of Germany met at Brixia, the Bishops of France at Mentz, condemned the Pope for a disciple of Berengarius. Or if the condemnations of such will not be of value against the Pope, you gave reason even now leave to be the Judge, and that, and common sense may be so in this matter, if you will but read the 
(e) Inter Episiclas Hyber. p. 49.  Epistle of Pope Zachary to Boniface, è Cathedra, a Papal and definitive rescript, wherein he condemns one Vergilius for an Heretic, for affirming that there were Antipodes; which whether it were an error in him, I leave you to judge, and profess myself to be of opinion, that though it were, 'twas yet more tolerably discreet and pious, then that of Gregory the seventh, that there is but one name under Heaven, that of the Pope, to whose Seat whosoever paid not obedience, became presently an Idolater and a Pagan; and if you will undertake to defend this, I will reward you by adventuring to justify the other. That speech of Gilbert, Bishop of Rheims, that after was Pope, shall with me be sufficient to expiate for either; Audaciter dicam, etc. I shall boldly say, 
In Epist. ad Scquiti Senonensem.  that the Bishop of Rome himself, if he have offended any Brother, and will not hear the admonitions of the Church, aught to pass for an Heathen and a Publican.  
Section 12 But all these are but trifles, if they be compared with other known passages of story, how Stephanus was reprehended by Cyprian, Liberius by Athanasius, Honorius almost by all Christians, of no less crimes than Heresy itself. Or because that is but one piece of carnality, and there be many others beside that, as probable, and considerable errors, and carnalities, I beseech you review either in your memory, or in Onufrius, and Platina, the lives and manners of the Popes, the incests, and sorceries, and cruelties of Alexander the 6. the Idolatrous sacrifices of Marcellinus, Calestin's using the help of Magicians and Devils to come to the Papacy, and then tell me your opinion, whether Popes may not err; and when you have replied, by way of distinction of manners from Doctrines, be then pleased to answer 
† De Papat●.  Nilus (by some more satisfactory way then by calling him prattling Greek) this question, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, how it falls out that the Pope can deny God in his works, but cannot by any means in his words; (what charm or amulet kept his tongue inerrable, when his whole body was subject to those darts of Satan) and when you have done that, I beseech you to fancy to yourself what kind of crimes you conceive those Popes would have committed, if they had been fallible.  
Section 13 I shall not enlarge this supernumerary trouble any farther, or expect your answer to every of these passages in Books; if I have wronged any by misciting, I shall be glad to hear of it; and if they make not all together one probable argument or proof of the fallibility of the Pope, I beseech you pardon me for this unneedfull importunity.   

To the 17, & 18, Sections, Chap. 11.  
I noted before, that the knowledge of all these particulars recited by the Enquirer, are no way necessary to the Believer, and therefore both this Author and Baron the Scotch Minister struggle in vain, when as with such care and vehemency they press them against us. I conclude then, that in the Church of God Counsels do not multiply doubts, but diminish them.   

C. 11. Answ. to Chap. 11.  
Section 1 To the 17, & 18, Sections, the answer is a reference again to a note dropped from you before, which truly I should not have been likely to apply to this business in hand, if you had not given me that seasonable admonition. Your note, I conceive, refers to your discourse in the precedent Chapter, how Catechisms, and the common practice of the Church teach all, what is to be believed. And (as then the Pope's infallibility, so now) that of Counsels is unnecessary to be known, and by that means all these particulars also; for if the infallibility of Counsels were necessary to be known (as it must be if they were deciders of questions) than all these particulars mentioned by his Lordship, would be necessary to be known also, because they are incident to every Council, and the knowledge of its infallibility (because of its decisions, and even being itself) depends on these.  
Section 2 And the fitness of Counsels to decide Controversies being the thing his Lordship had now in hand, and which Baron treats on, when he uses the like arguments, sure neither of them struggle in vain; but you rather (who 'twas thought in reason would have been no wiser than your fellows, and so would have asserted that fitness of Counsels) have become a very slippery Wrestler, gliding out of their hands, when their arguments began to lay hold on you; and after such an escape as this, I confess 'tis matter of wonder to me, how you could think fit to end with a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, triumph presupposing victory, and victory resistance, and none of these here are to be heard of, but only a conclusion, that what his Lordship had said and proved, he had said falsely (a petitio principii again) that Counsels do not diminish doubts, but multiply them. Which proposition and proof of his Lordships, having no need of defending any farther, I shall only interpose one caution, which I desire may be observed in his Lordship's discourse, that it being supposed, that Counsels are dot deciders of controversies, (meaning thereby infallible ones) they be yet of good authority and use in the Church, to help to decide them, and (notwithstanding all the doubts that his Lordship saith they do multiply) be only denied by us the privilege of infallibility, not that other of being very useful and venerable in a lower degree, and (such the Council may be) even next to the Word of God itself.   

To the 19 Section, Chap. 13.  
He maintains here a strange paradox, and one very improbable, namely, that to define any thing of new, is to bestow upon the Devil one path more for us to walk in towards him. If you ask why, he tells you, because, before the definition made, it was lawful to hold either side, but after, it is damnable. Belike then with this Author the manifestation of divine truths is the high way to damnation; but I suppose few men are of his mind. Certainly most are of opinion, that every such verity we learn, had rather been a new step towards Heaven, because knowledge of things divine do enable men for the attaining of salvation; and therefore the Apostles by their instructing our understandings in them, showed the world so many more paths to Heaven. It may be indeed that by accident minds blown up with self-conceit, may by their resisting such revealed truths, take an occasion to transgress, but that is their own faults, not the fault of them that teach, or of the verities that are declared, and therefore this cavil of the Enquirers against the definitions of Counsels was very frivolous. It should seems he had a great mind to be quarrelling with Counsels, that was content to take such a frivolous exception as this against them.   

C. 13. Answ. to Chap. 13.  
Section 1 Your great quarrel to his Lordships 19 Sect. comes now to be considered; wherein the paradox in, and improbability of his Lordship's conclusion will not be so great, if you observe but one thing, that the matter of definitions of Counsels, which he speaks of, is not divine truths, (as the following words suppose them, and upon that press them with absurdity) but, as I conceive, such things as have been defined by Counsels, being not before defined by Scripture, and so though affirmed to be truths, yet not as divine truths, at least of which it is not infallibly true, that they are so: of which nature I might instance at large in your Counsels of Lateran, Constance, and Trent; for to the ancient general Counsels I confess to bear such reverence, that I shall challenge any of you to exceed me.  
Section 2 Now to clear his Lordship from the guilt of a frivolous quarrel at this time, I must add, that in such decisions of Counsels, the worth of the matter, and inconvenience of leaving it undecided, are the main things worth considering; and so it is possible that the decision may be such, that it may tend, First, to some public end, whether the clearing of obscure Scripture, or the recovering of some venerable and useful practice, or doctrine of the Church. Secondly, to the settling and establishing of peace, by interposing such a judgement which may probably sway with both pretenders; And in these, and the like cases, the advantages being so intrinsecall to the decision, and withal so great, the inconvenience mentioned by his Lordship ought not to prevail to the disparaging of Counsels, because though it be an inconvenience, yet is it over-weighed with other conveniences, and therefore the argument I confess is not infinitely or unlimitedly true.  
Section 3 But then the case may be, that the matter of the definition is of no such great weight or use, that there is no such assurance acquirable from Scripture, that either side is true, (nay it may be audacious and untrue) and as little from any other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that either side will peaceably sit down and acquiesce in the decision, (but in matters of opinion probably prove opinionator) and so the decision will then rather widen the breach then compose it.  
Section 4 In this case, or when indeed in other respects the balance is even set, the good of defining counterpoised with the ill, then there is place for his Lordship's argument, and 'tis true that then upon that present supposition (that before decision 'twere lawful to hold either way, and damnable after) it were uncharitable to define; my reason is, because when charity doth not move to do a thing, i. e. when no advantage shall arise to mankind by it, but on the other side charity shall advise to abstain; some one, (though accidental) hurt, being foreseen to arise on the other side, there to do that thing is uncharitable.  
Section 5 Thus have we heard of an expression of Bishop Tunstall of Durham, who died in your communion, that if he had been Chaplain to Pope Innocent the Fourth, he would have begged on his knees, that he would not define Transubstantiation, as knowing it would tend to the breach of the peace of the Church; and thus in matters of controversy about Predestination, etc. you know the Pope hath in charity absteined to define, and the Apostles (or whosoever else were the composers of it) in their Creed defined but a few things; and generally those Churches that have avoided multiplying of articles, have by wise men been thought the most Christian, because the most charitable; and even in matters of rites and humane laws, the rule is, that they must not be multiplied unnecessarily; and the reason is, because they would consequently multiply snares on men's consciences, as unnecessarily, which is just his Lordship's reason in this place.  
Section 6 Which you will rather guess, because 'tis clear his Lordship speaks of those things in which before a Council hath determined, it is lawful to hold either way, perfectly lawful, (not excluding also that other circumstance that I have added, viz: when there is no real gain expectable by defining) And when the [those things] are by his Lordship so limited and restrained, I know not how (to make up your paradox) you could think fit to change the phrase from [those things, etc.] to [any thing] and after to [divine truths] and [things divine] and [verities] in general, when 'tis improbable that he did (I am sure very possible and probable that he did not) speak of any such, as are new steps toward Heaven, but such as only fill men's brains, puff up their phansyes (and oft make men to think themselves pious men for being of such opinions, and to neglect works of piety and charity, as not near so considerable) and so are to them even that believe them, accidentally paths to damnation, much more (if the doctrine of the decisions of Counsels be to be extended to whatsoever useless definitions) to those that do not believe them.  
Section 7 Having said thus much for defence of this supposed paradox of his Lordships, I must desire (once for all) these two things from the Reader, which Equity will require of him to grant me; First, that his Lordship's arguments be not extended infinitely, but only be supposed to undertake to conclude as far as is necessary to the present matter, and no farther, (an example of which this Chapter hath afforded you) Secondly, that his arguments being by him brought only to enervate the Infallibility of the Roman Church, be so cautiously taken, as that they be made use of only to that end, and not at all inclined, or wrested to the lessening the authority of the Church or Counsels universal; for this would be very unjust, and ill inferred, there being a wide difference betwixt authority and infallibility, as also betwixt universal and Roman, though (by reason of the manner of his Lordship's discourse, being, according to the design, wholly destructive of the one, and not assertive of the other) the Reader may perhaps be tempted to think otherwise; and therefore I thought it not impertinent thus to fortify him against this prejudice.   

To the 20, 21, 22, Sections, Chap. 14.  
It is true, we condemn some doctrines which general Counsels have not condemned, and we have great reason for it, because though Counsels be one rule of faith, yet not the only. Again, these we hold to be infallible, because they are the Compendium and quintessence of the Church, and the body representative thereof, as a King and the three States be of the whole Kingdom.  
The cause of Pope John the 22. is cleared sufficiently by Ciacconius in his life, by Caeffeteau in his learned answer to Plessye's iniquity, and by many others, and therefore needs not be argued any more. I grant it a point of faith that the souls of the just shall see God before the last judgement, and do deny that this doctrine was generally contradicted at any time. Nevertheless I do not know it to be of faith that all of them shall enjoy the same vision before that great day, and that none of them shall be detained in secret receptacles, as the Ancients hold, till they, together with their bodies, shall be completely purged in the great fire of the world's conflagration, as I have treated elsewhere.  
It was not needful that Counsels should define in terms their own immunity from error, because a Council both in substance and semblance is the Church, who needs not define her own infallibility, and therefore needs not, because that same is to be presupposed to all her definitions as a thing known without them, before hand; for otherwise she would not be believed in any of them at all, either touching herself, or any other matter. Nevertheless though this definition be not in terms, yet it is virtually done, and in actu exercito, as often as a Council defineth any thing, by the pronouncing of Anathema against such as do not submit, and counting them as Heretics; It is done again in the using continually this old form, Visum est Spiritui Sancto & nobis.  
For a conclusion I demand of these eager impugners both of Church and Counsels, what thing it it must regulate our belief, and keep us in discipline and unity; for if they let all men lose upon themselves, and make all men Judges in the Court of faith, as they, de facto, do, controversies will multiply apace, and no means left to reconcile them; and while all men have authority of deciding, no man hath it. Reason always did teach us, that confusion would be the effect of this new licence; yet could we never understand it, till that now costly experience, the mistress of the improvident, hath laid it open before our eyes. And now at length we smart for our leaving the venerable decrees and definitions of Church a●d Counsels, and do behold all brought to misery and ruin, both Church and State; yet such is our blindness, as we are not able to dis●erne the true causes of all these evils. The daily growing up of new and new devices in stead of the old faith, and the continual discords and dissensions thereupon ensuing, evict unanswerably the weakness and inaptitude of the rule of faith, and our young and presuming wits way see how far short they come of their forefather's wisdom, and how much more unhappy than those who were governed by Church and Counsels.   

C. 14. Answ. to Chap. 14.  
Section 1 The first part of this Chapter in the Apologist, is answer only to one of three or four proofs of his Lordship's argument, Section 20. viz. to that against the Counsels being a rule of heresy, [when some pass for Heretics that are not condemned by any Council] To this I confess it were satisfactory (if it were proved) to say that Counsels are a rule, but not the only rule. But then, First, there is no other rule specified. And Secondly, this argument of his Lordships is complicated with three others, being joined with which, it is of force to strengthen one of them (though of itself it were not sufficient to conclude) and then neither of those are taken notice of. Thirdly, 'tis meant but as a proof against this rule, not against any other. And yet Fourthly, his Lordship's method being to confute every one of them single, as they lie; all others being disproved, this must be concluded the only one, or none at all; and however, no more can here be required, then that here he disprove this from being the rule, not that he disprove all others in this period.  
Section 2 For your way of proof [that Counsels are infallible] First, that is not answer to the contrary proof; And Secondly, it is by a medium as much denied, as itself (the Infallibility of the Church whose quintessence it is) and so your old acquaintance, petitio principii again.  
Section 3 Your second part about John 22. puts us off to Ciaconius and Caeffeteau, whom in obedience to your direction I should advise with, but that I see from what you have learned from them, that either you have proved an ill Scholar (and 'twere insolence in me to hope to be better) or else that their resolutions are not pertinent to his Lordship's argument; for the three things that you add (I conceive from their Writings) are nothing at all to it.  
Section 4 First, not that which you grant, for his Lordship grants it. Secondly, not that which you deny, for his Lordship had not affirmed it (unless from these words [he was not alone] you conclude, that that which he contradicted, was generally contradicted; and than what his Lordship said, may be as truly said to be generally granted, for he is not you see alone in so saying.) Thirdly, Not that which you say you do not know, for his Lordship knows it as little, and indeed says never a word of it. Whereas the only thing wherein the force of that part of his Lordship's argument consisted, viz. Bellarmine's excusing Pope John (in his denying of that which you believe) from the no-Councell that had defined against him, hath no title said to it, but continues in great security, to make good the argument, [that you do amiss (and withal either you or Bellarmine are very partial) to condemn those that are condemned by no general Council.]  
Section 5 Your Answer indeed to the 21. Section, is nearer to the mark, but yet it hits it not; The argument is, that no Council ever decreed a Council to be Infallible, therefore as far as the argument is drawn for belief, from the infallibility of the Council, I am not bound to believe it infallible. To this you answer, 1. That for Counsels so to define, was not needful, because a Council is the Church, and the infallibility of that is a praecognitum in all her definitions, otherwise it would not be believed in any.  
Section 6 Here is excellent contrivance, 1. For Counsels to define that Counsels are infallible is not needful; which sure is needful, if nothing be to be believed, but what the Council defines to be so, and that must be granted, 1. if the Council be the rule of belief; and 2. if the Council be the Church (as you say it is) for that is the only rule infallible, if you be not deceived. 2. That the Council is the Church in substance.] I thought it had been in representation only, and that nothing is the Church in substance, but the Church in its full extent, of which you said before, the Church is only the quintessence, which sure is not the same in substance with that whose quintessence it is, but only the representation of it. 3. That the Infallibility of the Church is a praecognitum; if so, than it is a principle; and if so, than I am sure I must not look to see it proved, and then as long as we deny it, (as we do, you know) that is petitio principii again. 4. That unless the Church were presumed infallible before its determination, it could never be believed in any: this supposes men very hardhearted, that never will believe any thing, but what some presumed infallible tells them.  
Section 7 There is a belief (as well as a certainty) cui non subest dubium, of which a man doth not doubt, as well as cui non potest subesse falsum, in which there can be no falsity; and the Schools have told you of a certainty of adherence, where there is none of evidence; and let me tell you, this is the difference betwixt belief and knowledge, the latter only is inferred demonstratively, or by premises that cannot be otherwise, the former being content with probable arguments, so they be strongly probable, and such as have not any the like, or of as considerable weight to be balanced against them. And this sure is the reason that Faith is by God thought fit to be rewarded, as being an act of the Believers choice, (and knowledge not, because it is necessarily and irregably induced) and yet such, as that it will be all obstinacy and perverseness to resist, when it comes well provided with arguments extremely probable.  
Section 8 For, if you mark it, the most weighty actions of our lives, and those which we do most constantly, and most confidently, are founded no deeper than on probabilities. We eat and drink for the strengthening and refreshing of our bodies, and yet conceive not ourselves to have any certainty of evidence or demonstration, that every bit we eat, or drop we drink, may not choke, or poison us; yet having probabilities, on which to ground a belief, that they are wholesome, and no strong contrary probability, that our table shall become a snare, or death unto us, we doubt not to feed as securely, as if Euclid had been our surety by one of his Demonstrations.  
Section 9 So in every piece of land I buy, or estate I enjoy from my Ancestors, 'tis possible (and the contrary not demonstrable, or certain in that sense) that there may be some flaw which may undo me, and yet when I have searched my evidences, and have the opinion of wise men upon the matter, I sit down, and trade, and live securely, and all this but upon probabilities, without the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or full armour of infallibility or demonstration.  
Section 10 And so in all matters of fact, which we see or hear not with our own eyes or ears, but as with perspectives and otacoustickes, I mean where we are fain to trust the relations of others, be it that there was a Julius Caesar, or a Henry the eight, the ground of our belief is but a probability, viz. the topic ab authoritate, the argument taken from the authority of the relators; which though it be never so strengthened by the universal concurrence and non-dissenting of all witnesses, cannot yet ascend higher, then to be extremely probable, and yet sure is as firmly believed of us; and although it may possibly be otherwise (the contrary implying no repugnance, or contradiction in nature, and he that should be so mad to affirm it, being not confutable either by rational, or ocular demonstration) yet as little doubted of by any man in his right wits, and as little liable to any scruple, or matter of doubt, as what is most visible before our eyes.  
Section 11 This I have said perhaps ex abundanti (yet shall not repent of it because it is useful to be considered in order to other difficulties) to show you the falseness, and inconsequence of that argument, that unless the Church were presumed infallible before its determinations, it could never be believed in any. For hereby it hath appeared, that that may be believed, nay cannot sometimes without pertinacy and sin be not believed, (as in case the arguments, though but probable, be excessively so) which brings not with it demonstration, or any thing of equal power or force with it, and such is infallibility.  
Section 12 And from thence you will easily discern, how possible it may be for us Protestants to believe the universal Church in all things, wherein the testimony appears to be universal; nay to believe the Church of Rome in many things, wherein the arguments produced by her, do actually persuade with us, (such are her consonancy with antiquity, and the like) and yet to remain constant to our present undertake, that she is not infallible.  
Section 13 But it now appears that I might have spared this pains, in pressing these inconveniences on that first answer of yours. For it seems by what follows, that all that answer was needless; For now upon better consideration, 'tis true (with a distinction) that the Council doth virtually, and in actu exercito, define its own infallibility; and that you prove, First, because it pronounceth anathemas against those that submit not; Secondly, it doth it by saying [Visum est Spiritui Sancto, etc.]  
Section 14 Not to examine your phrase of actus exercitus, as 'tis here applied; To your arguments we answer, First, that our Counsels denounce anathemas too, yet you know do not pretend to infallibility.  
Section 15 That form, I conceive, signifies not, that all are damned that believe not what we believe, but that all they that shall disbelieve may be excommunicated, if they be refractory; and that again only in reference to those that are under dominion; but not that all others that are not under us, should by us be so handled; or that those that are not excommunicate, are in that other danger; or if these are, yet not for the sin of dis-believing an infallible doctrine, but for not believing our lawful superiors; which may be a damning sin, though they be not infallible, their being in the truth, when they make such constitutions, is sufficient for that. Secondly, the form of [Visum est Spiritui Sancto] is only a form transcribed from the Acts, arguing it their opinion (that use it) that this particular is the dictate of the Holy Ghost, not at all their belief, that the Holy Ghost was bound to assist irresistibly: which he must (as well as assist) to make the infallibility; for otherwise when he assists, we may possibly not make use of his assistance. In plain, 'tis an evidence that they think they are in the truth, not that they cannot be in the wrong.  
Section 16 To the 22. Section, though you answer not a word, yet you are as discreet as if you did, you do another thing in stead of it, you ask a question, and harangue upon it at large; the Question is pertinent enough (though not to this Section, yet) to the business in gross, and we answer it in a word, that the Word of God must regulate our belief, and reason, in the use of all the means that you will commend to us, and you have given us a pledge already, that you will not quarrel with us for this answer; as for discipline, and keeping in unity, we had, blessed be God, means very sufficient to that end, till the sword wrested them (as all other our lawful possessions) out of our hands; and I believe the Infallibility of the Church is not weapon-proofe, or able to keep Resisters in obedience, or Schismatics in unity.  
Section 17 As for your uncharitable judgement, that want of an Infallible Church (which must be but want of that insolence to undertake ourselves to be Infallible) is (that and no other) the 
* That passage in the Apologist to which this was returned, is by him in his last thoughts held better to be omitted, and accordingly I have left it out there.  cause of all our present miseries; and his Lordship's doctrine in this Book, (although never so remote) the cause of his death: This is but to let us see your change or variety, that you can use non causa pro causa, and not deal only in petitio principii; thus was Tenterden Steeple the cause of Goodwin Sands, and that is all I shall return to your State-observation; the cause of our present calamities, I conceive, came not out of the Church, but when it was infamous, it fled to it for a Sanctuary, to give it an honest Name, and a protection together; and I could tell you that the League in France was once pretty parallel to ours, and than 'twas the observation of a knowing man, that if a true story of the causes of that War should be written, the business would be traced into such or such a brothel house, that made as if it came out gravely from the Church; a competition or animosity, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or true cause, when religion was only the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or the pretended. Besides, let me tell you, that decisions and anathematizing have sometimes done as much hurt toward occasioning of breaches, as licence and acknowledgement of fallibility hath done; (and if you mark, the only colour of charge at this time against our Church, hath been the imposing too much) and truly whatever your opinion is, I conceive meekness hath the promise of this life, and I never knew that pretending to Infallibility is the only Symptom of that.   

To the 23, 24, & 25, Sections, Chap. 15.  
The argument of these three Sections, is, how an ignorant illiterate man cannot be able to trace out all traditions which be truly Apostolical: and this is sought to be persuaded and made good, by sundry intricate discourses, all which I willingly do pretermit, and only signify that they all fall wide of the mark; for, in a word, our answer to them is, that private men stand in no need at all of having any particular information of them, but, that it is sufficient for them if they do learn what is the common doctrine of the present Church, without looking any higher to the Primitive and elder times: because this doctrine now taught is credible and persuasive enough for satisfying of any wise man's understanding, and the settling of his judgement upon it: as for example, it is sufficient for any man desirous of knowing which is the River Thames, to see it at Gravesend or London, without any laborious ascending by it higher and higher, and tracing the shores thereof, till he come unto the springs; and more than this would not be needful for the distinguishing of it from Severne, or Trent, or any other River. For if this kind of assurance might not be sufficient, then certainly few or none could ever have come to know which water was the famous River Nilus, of which few have ever seen the springs, and which, as it is very likely, do lie concealed in Aethiopia, and wholly undiscovered even to this day.  
Against the possibility of searching out traditions Apostolical, and discerning them from others that be spurious and false, his principal instance, and that in which he most confides, is the doctrine of the Chiliasts or Millenaries; and the same example is vehemently pressed and repeated often by his Friend Chillingworth. The substance of all they say consists in this, namely, that their doctrine, although now generally received to be erroneous, was received in the first 200. years with one consent, as a tradition Apostolical. For making of this charge good, they both of them do jointly allege Saint Justin as their witness. But that we may judge most favourably of this their allegation, we needs must tell them they are mistaken grossly, for Saint Justin speaking there of three several sorts of Christians which were in his time, affirms, that of those three but one of them held the doctrine of the Chiliasts: 
Justin in Dial. cum Tryphone.  The first of these three sorts was, as he describeth, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Those, who as he conceived did in all points hold aright. The second class consisted of such other, who although they did not, like the former, in all things hold aright, yet nevertheless were, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: men of pure and pious judgement or belief, for so he expressly styleth them; the third and last sort were such as denied the resurrection, and were therefore censured by him to be Christians rather in name then in reality, and justly to be compared with the Sadduces amongst the Jews. Those of the first sort he telleth did hold the doctrine of the thousand years. The second sort, as he expressly witnesseth, although they were orthodox and good, yet did not hold that doctrine. Those of the third sort, as he saith, were Christians, but feignedly, and in name alone, and resembling the Sadduces, yet not for their denying the error of the thousand years, for what relation could that have unto the Sadduces? But, chose, for their denying the resurrection, as the Sadduces did, and all this appears clearly, within the compass of a few lines, in the Greek text of Saint Justine; Besides, if all at that time had been persuaded of the truth of the Millenaries fancy, what needed Saint Ireneus have laboured so much, as he did, and spent so many Chapters in the proving of it? This being so, it appears as plainly that the Enquirer and also his Partner Master Chillingworth, were both of them deceived in seeking to father upon Saint Justin, that all Orthodoxal Believers of his time received the doctrine of the Chiliasts, and that such as did not, were held as Sadduces, or Heretics; for, in the Text of Justin, there is no such matter, but rather the quite contrary to it, as may appear fully by the Text itself, and partly by the words before recited out of him; for, without all doubt, Saint Justines' many of pious and pure judgement or belief, and were no Chiliasts, must needs be Orthodox, and could not be Heretics, nor as the Sadduces amongst the Jews, unless we will say that with one breath, he called them by both contrary names. Again, if, as these men say, all the whole Church were Chiliasts during the first, second or third hundred years, how could or durst Dionysius of Alexandria have opposed them, either without forcing his own Conscience, or incurring the blame of Heresy? Now, it is certain he was not counted an Heretic; and again, very unlikely he would strain his Conscience, by opposing any doctrine, received as orthodoxal by the whole Church. Again, it is probable Saint Dionyse the Areopagite opposed that doctrine, therefore it cannot be certain, that during the first 200. years, it was not opposed: that Saint Dionyse did it, appears by the works now extant bearing his name; and, that these works be his, is very probable, first, because they are received for such by the major part, both of the Western and the Eastern Church; secondly, because they were cited for his a thousand years ago, and numbered amongst the rest of the Father's ancient and undoubted Monuments, by an intelligent Author, Philoponus, l. 2. de Operib. Create. c. 21. & l. 3. c. 9 & 13.  
The like may be said of the pretended tradition of the Quartodecimanes touching the celebration of Easter after the manner of the Jews, which was wholly rejected and forbidden in the first Nicene Council, and before that time opposed by many, and principally by Pope Victor, who, as Ciacconius conceives, did not cut Polycrates and his Associates from the body of the whole Church, but only threatened it, or, as Eusebius seems to say, did do it, but, yet at the instance of Saint Ireneus, and some others, if he had once past it, did not prosecute the censure against them, but let it fall; and, that it was so, is very probable, because there is no memory made how the sentence was received, whether with obedience, or otherwise; which particular, doubtless, would never have been omitted by Historians, no more than the sentence itself, or the intention of it was, if there had been any thing to register; and besides, because we find not by any record, but that all proceeded with those Asian Churches, as formerly it had done, without any note or alteration. And, by this, is solved all that Chillingworth with so much animosity, objecteth against the learned Cardinal Perone.  
Salvian lib. 5. de Gubern. Dei, where he speaks in excuse of some Arian Goths, speaks not at all in excuse of their Heresy, but supposing that sundry of them might have been innocently misled, conceiveth more hope of such men's salvation, then of such Catholics, who lived carelessly and lewdly. Now, what can this make against the tradition, or definition of the Church? Only this Inquirer must say something to his Mother, and be making difficulties where none is.   

Ch. 15. Answ. to the Chap. 15.  
Section 1 To the three next Paragraphs, 23, 24, 25. you profess it needless for you to give any answer, and do it so willingly, because, as you say, the discourses are intricate, i. e. such as you cannot easily accommodate answer to; but especially, because it is sufficient for private men to learn the common doctrine of the present Church, and therefore there will lie no obligation on me to reply any thing, save only this, that his Lordship's arguments do still prove sufficient to the end, to which he designed them, to show that Tradition is no infallible guide, which that you acknowledge, your diversion seems to intimate, and your many proofs, that 'tis not needful it should be.  
Section 2 But then it is in you a great injustice, not to take notice of his Lordship's design, to which his arguments are concluding, (but to impose another on him, to which he never thought himself engaged, nor could have foreseen your pleasure without the spirit of divination) and yet, to chide him for impertinence, and pretermit and despise all that he hath said upon this only ground of displeasure, because he hath not proved what you now think fit to set him for his task.  
Section 3 This only you must please to note, that the appointing the ignorant to learn their belief from the common doctrine of the Church (as before you did from the Catechisms) doth intimate your opinion, that your present Church is infallible, but is no show of proof that it is so (and so Petitio principii) nay if your words signify, as they sound [that your doctrine thus taught is credible and persuasive enough] I may conclude that your Church is not infallible; for whatever is taught by such an one, is more than credible and persuasible.  
Section 4 Your subtlety about the way of knowing the River Thames will as little come home to the business of Infallibility (though to Credibility it may) unless every Waterman on the River be as infallible as your Church, for of him it is that I learn it; and though his credit be great enough for a matter of this moment, and in it I would as willingly be ignorant or uncertain, as be at the trouble to seek out a better security: In matters of greater moment, I may be excused if I am not so credulous, if I choose not to believe them, whose interests are concerned, at least if I think every Catechism on the stall to be somewhat less than infallible.  
Section 5 Having now sufficiently disclaimed Tradition (at least shown your opinion of it, that you have little need of it to sustain your Church's infallibility) and so granted as much as his Lordship attempts to prove, yet for some former profession of kindness to it, you will now take its part a little (rather than his Lordship shall be permitted to say any thing true) and vindicate it from the argument about the Chiliasts. In which I must tell you, that what you here affirm of his Lordship and M. Chillingworth is not true of his Lordship (whether it be of M. Chillingworth is not tanti, as that not having the book by me, I should take the pains to examine it.)  
Section 6 As First, this, that he seeks to father on Saint Justin, that all orthodoxal beleivers of his time received the doctrine of the Chiliasts, whereas all that his Lordship saith, is but the repeating of Justin's own words (wherein he cannot be deceived in your opinion, for you before recite the same) and translating them (wherein he is not deceived, for he doth it ad literam) and in a word affirming, that Justin saith he holds it, and so do all that are in all parts orthodox Christians, which phrase [all that are (i. e. which he saith are) in all parts orthodox] that it differs from this other of yours [all orthodoxal beleivers] I shall appeal to no other judgement then that of your own conscience, who in the former page affirm, that Justin spoke of three sorts of men; First, Those that did as he conceived in all points hold aright: the second, which though they did not so in all things, yet were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of a pure and pious judgement, (and those which are such I shall suppose to be orthodoxal beleivers, though as it appears by your acknowledgement, they did not hold right in all things.) Or if your analysing of the place do not sufficiently convince you of this difference, (and the injury that consequently you have done his Lordship) I shall then, (having long ago seriously weighed that place) First, give you an account of it, such as I doubt not will satisfy you; and when I have done so, Secondly, confess the weakness of that place to conclude any thing against Catholic tradition; and yet Thirdly, make it clear, that you have wronged his Lordship in your report of his citation.  
Section 7 First, For the doctrine of the millennium, I profess to believe, that it appears not to be Justin's affirmation, that it was not opposed by his contemporaries, but rather the contrary, 
P. 306. C.  which I conclude from these words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. I have signified to you that many do not acknowledge this doctrine of the 1000 years, and those many, Christians that are of pure and pious opinion or judgement. And that you may be beholding to me, I shall also profess, that I am not of the opinion of those learned men that have conceived that period false written; and that either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 should be changed into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (which would be a strange and bold Criticism, of very ill example, if it were admitted against the consent of copies; and then Secondly, it would leave a very perplexed period of it) or that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 should be left out; For first this would be as dangerous a Criticism, and of as ill example, which would make Authors opinions mutable into the quite contradictory; and yet such, as is not without example among you, witness the disputation between the Regulars and Seculars in the controversy about the necessity of having an Ordinary here in England, upon occasion as I remember, of a Canon of a Council concerning Confirmation, one side contending that [non] should be in, the other that it should be left out, a controversy about a word, nay a syllable, but yet that of some concernment. Secondly, if either of these emendations should be admitted, the antecedents and consequents would not naturally and in good stile connect, but the sense of this period would be just all one with that that went before immediately.  
Section 8 A Second proof of what I said I shall fetch from this, that Trypho in that place (though Justin had told him that he denied not the Millennium, yet) suspected that Justin had equivocated with him on this ground, because other Christians were not of this opinion, and therefore begins with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, tell me whether you confess it sincerely, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. and Justin answers, that sure he would not say it if he had not thought it, and thereupon repeats, that he had confessed to him, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and promises he would set out a Book of this disputation, and profess it openly to others as well as him, and adds that he means not to follow men and their doctrines, but God; all which argues his acknowledgement that the opinion was not uncontradicted by men, nor generally consented to by Christians.  
Section 9 A last proof shall be, 
P. 307.  that those words which seem most to the contrary [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] will not come home to the proof of it, nor indeed of any more than this, that he was of that opinion, and some others in all things consenting with him; for it being supposed that he was of that opinion, it cannot be expected of him that he should affirm any that hold it not (though never so orthodox in other things) to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of right opinion all things: because every honest man supposing his own opinions to be right, (for else he will change them) must also suppose, that they that differ from him in one of those are not in that, (and so not in all things) of right opinions.  
Section 10 For the truth is, he speaks of three sorts of men (wherein I shall not differ much from you) the first, that denied the resurrection and the 1000 years, and those he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nominal Christians, Atheists, impious, haereticall leaders; the second, those that acknowledged the resurrection and denied the Millennium, and those are contained under 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Christians of pure and pious opinions; the third sort, those that held both, as himself, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
P. 306.  many others, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
P. 307.  if there were any that were orthodox in all things.  
Section 11 This being thus set down (if you please) by way of compliance with you in the first place, I shall make no scruple to add in the second, that by Justin it cannot be concluded, that the 1000 years was a matter of Catholic belief in his time, but only favoured by him, and many others, and consequently, though that were after condemned in the Church, would it not be from this testimony inferred, that a Catholic doctrine, (much less a tradition) were condemned.  
Section 12 And therefore (which was the third thing I promised you) you may observe, that his Lordship spoke very cautiously, and (as any man will now conceive) very critically, according to the importance of Justins' words, that Justin held it, and said, that all that were in all parts (that is in all particular points) Orthodox Christians did so too, but no more, which is much less than what you lay to his Lordship's charge, in the first place, that he fathers on Justin, that all Orthodoxal believers of his time received the doctrine of the Chiliasts; And infinitely less, then that which you lay to him in the second part of the charge, that he fathers again on Justin, that such as did not receive that, doctrine were held as Sadduces or Heretics; To which I answer in a word, that sure your memory of things is confused, and so apt to betray you to write things, which are apparently false, for so this particular is, his Lordship not saying one word to this purpose in this paragraph.  
Section 13 Which three things being thus cleared, I shall now proceed to view your dealing in that which his Lordship mentions from Irenaeus in this matter.  
Section 14 Of him indeed it is true, his Lordship saith, that he sets down the doctrine of the Chiliasts directly for a tradition, and relates the very words that Christ used, when he taught this. And to those words of his Lordship's, I shall make bold to add the words of Irenaeus on which they seem to be grounded: 
P. 497.  Presbyteri qui Johannem viderunt, meminerunt audisse se ab eo. & haec Papias Johannis auditor, Polycarpi contubernalis vetus homo, testata reliquit. The Presbyters that saw John, remember that they heard this of him: and Papias, Saint John's Auditor, that dwelled with Polycarpus, 
P. 498.  an ancient man, left these things testified. This surely sounds somewhat towards a testimony of Apostolic Tradition, and if it be capable of an answer reconcileable with your doctrine of Tradition, may yet certainly be acknowledged a difficulty worth your taking notice of. And yet you that were so large on that of Justin to little purpose, have not vouchsafed to take notice of this of Irenaeus, but on the other side affirm, that Irenaeus laboured very much, and spent many Chapters in proving of it. From whence, I confess you are willing to assume, that all at that time were not persuaded of the truth of the Millenaries fancies; but as that is a strange way of concluding, from his spending pains and Chapters to prove it, to infer that it was not generally believed in his age (when 'tis possible his so large a proving did make all men then of that opinion, and his proving it positively, and not against any adversary, though it doth not prove he had then no adversary, doth much less prove that he had) so is there not added by you any other, or indeed, any tittle of answer to what is brought by his Lordship out of Irenaeus.  
Section 15 His Lordship saith also in this Paragraph, that they that were after against the Millenaries never quoted any for themselves before Dionysius Alexandrinus, who lived 250 years after Christ: this indeed sounds somewhat toward concluding, that that was the doctrine of the first age not opposed by any prime Doctor, and might be worth your pains in answering too, but you endeavour not that neither, but would make it improbable, that if it were so general a doctrine, Dionysius should dare to oppose it. This is very ill arguing against a matter of fact, to ask how could or durst he? there is nothing done so many years since, but some probability may, by a witty man, be brought against it; I confess I acknowledge my opinion, that there were in that age men otherwise minded (as out of Justin it appeared) and his Lordship saith nothing to the contrary out of any other evidences, (no more than we made it clear he did out of Justin) all that he saith is, that Papias had gotten the Prime Doctors into the belief of it, and that no one of those two first ages opposed it, that is, wrote or interposed in any considerable manner against it.  
Section 16 And if I were apt to change my opinion in this matter, on easy terms, I should go near to do it upon the view of your proof of the contrary, so exceeding feeble and weak is it. For supposing all the eminent men for those ages had been for it upon the strength of some places of Scripture, and Papias his report from Saint John, it would not yet be very difficult for a learned man, Dionysius Alexandrinus (when no act of Council had interposed or bound up that doctrine) in the degree that he thought that those places of Scripture were misunderstood, and that Papias had abused them, in the same degree I say, to declare his opinion and the grounds of it, and never force or strain his own conscience, or incur the blame of heresy by so doing.  
Section 17 For what think you of another opinion that Irenaeus took up just upon the same terms, of Christ's being betwixt 40 and 50 years old, for which he vouched Scripture, 
Advers. haer. l. 2. c. 39  as he did for t'other, and the authority of omnes seniores (larger than Presbytery in tother) testantur qui in Asia apud Johannem discipulum Domini convenerunt; id ipsum tradidisse eis Johannem etc. All the Elders witness it, that were in Asia with John, that he delivered it to them; & qui alios Apostolos viderunt, haec eadem ab ipsis audierunt, & testantur de ejusmodi relatione, they that saw the other Apostles, heard the same of them, and bear witness of such a relation. This is as high an expression of Apostolical Tradition (if we will believe Irenaeus) as universally testified to be so, as any could be thought to be. And yet sure you would not think it a sin against Conscience, or obnoxious to the censure of Heresy for any man of meaner parts and authority than Dionysius Alexandrinus to have opposed this fancy, and professed his opinion to the contrary; you must know that there was not that perfect yoke of tyranny gone out upon all men's necks as now your infallible Church doth glory of, that no man must oppose any the meanest assertion or opinion of the Doctors of the Church, (though not at all defied) but presently he must be an Heretic; at least divinity was not turned into such an art, that it must receive no growth, or sensible change, but all go on in the same track, believe (nor understand) no more in Scripture, than the present Church understands, and so in effect have all their skill in tongues and fathers, and even their judicative faculty as so many unprofitable burdens upon them, that must not be made use of to the discovery of an error, to the helping of the world to more light, reforming any thing that is amiss in it.  
Section 18 This which is one of the greatest modern crimes in Christianity, was not so ancient as those purer days, wherein life was as censurable, as now false opinions, (I mean such as though supposed false, are yet perfectly extrinsecall to the anology of faith) wherein 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, impiety and piety, divided the Church into erroneous and true members, and teaching of opinions not before embraced (so it were not with pride, or judging of others) could be well enough endured. And so (according to the old rule of distingue tempora) do but consider how distant those times are from these amongst you on one side, and your opposite extreme (that run from you so far, till they meet you again at the Antipodes) on the other, and you will give Dionysius Alexandrinus leave to dare oppose that doctrine of the Chiliasts, though it had (more generally than it did) prevailed amongst them.  
Section 19 Another argument you have against the general reception of that doctrine, [that 'tis probable Saint Dionysius the Areopagite opposed it] I wonder one that asserts an infallible Church should deal so mightily in probabilities, just as if a profound Geometer should use but Topical arguments. Now to see how you prove this probability, 'Tis proved by the works now extant bearing his name.  
What works those are, and how improbable to be his, I could give you a large account by some hints which I remember Photius in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 helped me to, but I shall satisfy myself only with answering your argument out of Philoponus, briefly thus. That in the places by you cited, he mentions only an Epistle of Dionysius to Polycarpus, in which you know, or may know, there is no word of the Chiliasts, and then that will be a very alien testimony, and very unable to countenance the bulk of those books under Dionysius his name; which may all be spurious, (and in them the testimonies against the Chiliasts) though that letter should be canonical; and now see, I pray, what your probability is come to.  
Section 20 For your discourse about the Quartodecimani, I will not divine how it came in here, but am sure it hath no right to be taken notice of by me; his Lordship having not said one word of them, nor of any friend of theirs, whose interests lie common with them; and therefore shall I return no word to that part of your discourse, till you show how I am obliged to it.  
Section 21 What his Lordship saith out of Salvian you confess to be true, but see not what it makes against Tradition; If you be not modest in concealing your knowlekge in this matter, but really ignorant, I shall then tell you. His Lordship proves by this, that the Church that suffers Salvian to be a member of it while he refuses to pass sentence of condemnation upon Arrians (after they were condemned by a Council) either differs much from your Church (that will condemn any man for an Heretic, that shall profess not to condemn all Protestants) or else must suppose and admit the plea for Salvian, that he was so earnest against ill men, that for aggravating of their crime he lessens that of Heretics. And then if it may be accepted in one Father's behalf, that he could speak hyperbolically, or passionately, why may it not be admitted in another, that one of those, or some other collateral consideration might have influence on any speech that should be cited from them, and then the authority of fathers will cease to be infallible.  
Section 22 For this, by the way, you may please to observe of his Lordship's reasonings about tradition and authority of fathers, (which before I gave warning of) that they are not designed, or fitted to the taking away all authority from them, to make them vile or mean to any, but only to reduce them in ordinem to prove them not infallible: the Topicke à testimonio humano, is but a Topicke still, and though sometimes being heightened with circumstances (of which it is capable) it is a very convincing Topicke, yet is not for all this a demonstration; and so there is a difficulty which may exercise you in stead of scoffing of his Lordship in the close of the Chapter.   

To the 26 Section Chap. 16.  
The Enquirer seems to be troubled not a little, because we will not say with him, that men may be saved in a false religion, or because we do not think our religion false, or any other religion true besides our own; and in the same vein Chillingworth his Commentatour runs very fluently, and upon this ill sounding string is harping continually. Yet for all this harping, it will not be easily understood what offence against Charity it can be for us to judge, either that Christianity alone is the saving religion, or that our religion is the only true Christianity. For say we should be deceived in making this judgement, yet this same at the most can be but a want in ourselves of right understanding, and not any breach of charity towards others, or any matter of exclamation, as some frivolous men of late have made it. Wherefore, if we will state the question rightly, we are not to inquire whether we want charity in holding that none but Catholics and true Christians can be saved, or in our holding that we only are of that sort; or again, whether our adversaries for their accusing us, want not wit and charity together, or at least one of them; but the question between us ought to be, whether there be more saving religions than one? or whether ours be not that one? and this is the old controversy in Bellarmine and others, and may be disputed without any anger, or without disguising, or multiplying of controversies on set purpose, done by these novelists, as it seems, for making more business than needed, or causing more distaste and alienation than was before.  
The Enquirer is much displeased with us for damning, as he calls it, all that are not of the Church of Rome. But for pacifying of his angry spirit, I demand of any for him, what sin he thinks it in us to judge that all who die out of the Church of God, die in an evil state; or what other, to think that our Catholic Church, which he diminitively calls the Church of Rome, is the only Church of God. Let him satisfy me in this, and I will easily satisfy him in the other. In the mean time we are not nice to declare, That there is but one saving Religion. That there is but one true Christianity, and that one is the saving religion. That there is but one Catholic Church, and that this one Church is, by the institution of Christ, and according to the consent of antiquity, to be governed by the See Apostolic, and by the Successor of Saint Peter, as chief Pastor and Precedent of the rest. Now what hurt is there in all this, or what want of Christian charity? It is not uncharitable to say that some offenders shall be damned, and if any, then why not those who are truly and really Sestaries and men obstinate, for it is like that they deserve it as well as any. There wanted not one of this Enquirers confraternity, who fancied sometimes to himself, that all the damnation that was to fall upon the wicked, was an annihilation of them and extinction, and not a perpetuity of torments; which conceit is so charitable, that it exceeds the charity even of God himself, and controls his revelations made to the contrary in the Holy Scripture, and condemns them as guilty of too much rigour and severity, and therefore no marvel though we poor mortals cannot escape their censure.  
But now, lest any man should think our doctrine to be harsh and rigorous, he may please to be informed, that we do not hold every man for a Pagan and an Infidel who embraces Paganism, but only so many of them as be guilty of their error through affected, or culpable ignorance; which defect though it be a formal ignorance of the truth, yet it is a virtual knowledge of their error, and an interpretative rejection of the truth, and also a resistance to God and his divine veracity, manifested in his revelations; and therefore all these, whether Pagans os Heretics, be heinous offenders, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is to say, judged and condemned by their own consciences, of which doctrine it seems both this Enquirer, and after him his second Master Chillingworth, were ignorant, by their insinuating that no man is an Heretic, or selfe-condemned, but only such as adhere to a doctrine which he formally knows to be erroneous, that is to say, only such as do that which is impossible to be done; which conclusion is a covert affirmation that there be no Heretics at all, nor can be any; and so all is safe, whether sound or no.  
In like manner we do not hold to be an Heretic, or to be out of the Catholic Church every one who embraces an heresy, but such a number of them only as do it with an obstinate mind, and without preparation to be reform, or to hearken unto reason when it is told them. By which doctrine it appears, that we are not so strict as we may seem, nor yet so large as some would have us. For on the one side, we do not maintain that Heretics can be saved, or that heresy is not a deadly or damnable sin, as some Socinians and other Libertines would have us think; And on the other side, we dilate the spaces of the Church Catholic farther than every body conceives we do, and by that means comprehend within it many that in the eye of the world, seem aliens unto it; so that our charity is not irregular in judging Heretics to be in good state, but it is rather in concluding that very many are not Heretics really and interiorly, though outwardly they seem to be. And thus you see we do not cry all men down to hell, not yet any more than we are compelled to do by the doctrine delivered to us about that point in Holy Scripture.  
After this damning and firing men in the other world, of which the Enquirer hath wrongfully accused us, he proceedeth to blame us for sending Heretics to the fire in this, and therefore saith that he believes that throughout antiquity we shall not find the putting to death of any (for religion) but only of such as began to kill first.  
This provocation to antiquity, howsoever the matter be, can be of no force, unless antiquity did condemn that practice as unlawful, because antiquity did not all it might do, but left divers things for posterity to add as it should see expedient.  
Besides forasmuch as concerns punishment of impious men and innovatours both by death and other ways, if the Author had looked better into antiquity, he could not but have believed otherwise, as our Authors do show at large; for it is clear that amongst the Jews in was the practice to punish impious people very severely, and all such as with new doctrines sought to infect others, punishing according to the prescript of Moses' law, some with death, other some by other temporal punishments.  
The Canon law also and the Imperial decree the same, to all which the practice of the Church accords; and lastly, reason herself, and the common rules of equity and justice do permit, yea and prescribe the same: and these suffrages are so powerful and prevailing, as they suffice, not only for the justification of the Churches present practice, but also for the condemnation of high presumption and arrogance of all who should be so hardy as to impugn or question it.  
Nevertheless this same practice of infliction of temporal punishments upon offenders against religion, is not general without any limitation or restraint, as some may imagine it to be, as if forsooth none of a different religion from ours could be exempted from them; but chose it admits exception in many cases, as we are about to declare presently.  
Know therefore that wheresoever any Kingdom or Commonwealth is settled in a just and a peaceable possession of Catholic religion, without any notable commixture of contrary professions, as for example, in Italy or Spain, at this present. In this case it is no cruelty or rigour to inflict temporal punishments upon all such as shall adventure to disturb that settled peace by introducing thither any new doctrines upon pretence of whatsoever reformation; and that this may be done stands with so much reason as cannot be probably contradicted. Neither is this course of severity any defence unnecessary, forasmuch as vicious and overweening spirits are most efficaciously repressed and withheld from evil by fear of temporal punishments in this life, because their chief aim is at temporal contentments in the same, being moved more with the present, then with those other that are spiritual and to come, conscience and religion having little influence into what they do. In fine, they are governed more with sense than reason, with stripes then with Philosophy, insomuch, that neither the schools of Philosophers, nor the Temples of God, can work half so much with these worms of the earth, as temporal tribunals can. Now though the enemy be never so despicable, is he therefore to be neglected because the meanest Seducer may do mischief, as we find by the effects of the Tubmen; and again, because the grossest errors, if they tend to liberty, or be but new, may be persuaded to the multitude, as, by the successes of Mahomet, it is manifest; and the rather in this case of ours, because we experience daily, that our people having been once possessed, that the Religion of the See Apostolic, and of their own forefathers was superstition, they are easily persuaded, that the farther they depart from that Religion, the more pure and reformed they shall be, and so will be forward to run blindly on, till they pass all the bounds of Christianity, and reform all to nothing; for with such bewitched minds as these, every new nonsense will be more acceptable, and be received sooner, than any old sense, and this is the effects of those raylings against Rome which they have heard continually out of the Pulpits now for so many years together, without any intermission.  
But, although this course of severity be necessary for the preventing of disturbances by innovation, yet nevertheless it is not to be extended unto all that any where amongst us do teach, or profess erroneous doctrines, or Religions different from our own, but only against corruptors or invaders, that is to say, such as break in by fraud or violence, and disturb the quiet of the Church. For, after such time at the invasion is past, and the invaders gone, and that they are succeeded by another generation, which is not guilty of making any irruption, but, with whatsoever error they are tainted, it is contracted by the vice of education from their Parents and other such instructors, and withal do behave themselves peaceably, I say that against such as these the Church doth not proceed, nor execute the severity of the Laws in force against Heretics; of this sort be at this day, the descendants of first Protestants in this Kingdom, whose ancestors that were the invaders lived about King Edward and Queen Mary. Against these descendants the Church doth not press the Canon Law, though against the former sort it did, and had just cause given so to do. Conformable to this difference between Protestant and Protestant, do the Catholics in France and Polonia suffer the Protestants to live with them, without molestation, and to enjoy the liberties and Privileges of the Kingdom, as formerly they had done in Austria, Stiria and Carinthia, till such time at they became seditious, and conspired against those who gave them freedom.  
But now let it be noted and borne in memory, that notwithstanding this gentle proceedings of Catholics towards the Protestants after so many losses and injuries suffer'd from them, the same Protestants being themselves but juniors, and living by sufferance, fall hotly upon persecution of Catholics wheresoever they grow to be the stronger side, and that also in most Provinces, after a very violent, merciless, and desperate manner, slay, imprison, rob, banish, defame, in fine suffer Catholics in no place where they are predominant, and this against all right and common equity. Which manner of proceeding I must tell the Inquirer, is much worse and more unreasonable than Turkish, for the Turks though aliens, Barbarians and Conquerors, are sensible of the right the Christians of their conquered Provinces have for the free exercise of their Religion, and therefore do not go about to restrain them from it, but let them continue quietly in that right of theirs, and so they do even to this day, to the great shame of Protestants and Puritans here in these Kingdoms, may it be spoken without offence, being, as all men see plainly exceeded in justice and civility by the Turks. Wherefore no marvel that our Inquirer is forced to confess that Calvin is too blame in this point, and the Church of England a little, which is a little too much for, addeth he, Negare manifesta non audeo, & excusare immodica non possum. Sure this Inquirer came with very little indifferency to give his judgement here, when he saith, the Church of England is guilty but a little, I would know of him what is a great deal, if all that we have suffered from it be but a little. But it is well he would acknowledge thus much, for it is more than others have done, and more ingenuity appears in him, then in them, and perhaps he would have said more, if it might have been well taken, though in confessing this little he insinuates all. Doubtless, no manner of proceeding can be more unworthy then for a latter generation to forget from whose joins they came, and to become harsh and contumelious to their own forefather's children, and persecute them with all rigour, as if they were enemies and invaders, and aliens, only for their honourable continuing in that faith which their Ancestors did leave them and commended to them as chief inheritance in that faith, which hitherto they which assail it have never been able by any argument to prove it false; nor yet on the other side, to evict by any unanswerable demonstration that their own new faith was true. Wherefore since, if any have more right one then another for the exercise of their Religion in this Kingdom, it is we, and this right cannot be taken from us by any power under heaven, and again were your reasons never so good, yet you are not to school us, or to be our Tutors, or to compel us unto change. Therefore the severity that hath been used over us hath no warrant for it, no precedent or example, nothing wherewith to countenance it in the sight of the World, or to justify it in the sight of God, but is every way abominable and foul, such in fine as neither the Christians used to the Pagans their predecessors, nor Catholics to the descendants of the foremost and invading Protestants, nor any civil man would offer to another.  
If the Religion, saith the Inquirer, had always remained the same, it would not be defended by ways so contrary to those by which it was propagated. But now what ways are these? he means force and violence, and saying, To the fire with him, and To he●l with him, for these are the Inquirers own expressions. To these I add the slanderous and diabolical charges of Chillingworth, who knew much of the Inquirers mind, although in all things he did not follow his direction. You profess, saith Chillingworth, c. 2. §. 101. that it is lawful for you to use violence and power whensoever you can have it for the planting of your Doctrine, and extirpation of the contrary. Thus he, but because he citys no Author for this so heinous an accusation, we may justly suspect that you yourselves hold it lawful for you to slander and calumniate for the defence of your own bad cause, and the overthrowing of the contrary whensoever other means of doing it does fail you, as indeed it falls out continually. The same heavy charge he in foul terms reiterates, c. 5. §. 96. You, saith he, teach plainly you may propagate Religion whensoever you have power, by deposing of Kings, and invasion of Kingdoms, and think when you kill the adversaries of it you do God good service.  
For clearing of us against this malicious charge, I call into the Court Saint Thomas of Aquine and all his with him in 2.2. q. 10. art. 8. as witnesses sufficient to justify our cause, and show our innocency, even against the Devil himself that great calumniator of our Brethren, and to them I add Acosta in his book De procuranda Indorum salute, and Mariana in his history of Spain in sundry places, and might add many more sufficient to confute the Adversary, and make him hateful to every honest heart. Besides though in some cases we, as other professions also do, make use of penal Laws wherewith to keep off invaders, and yet not for any interior preservation or defence: In like sort we seek, by the help of the sword and force of Arms to keep the Turks out of Christendom, shall we all be blamed for doing so, or shall it be said therefore, that we defend the Christian Religion by Arms and violence, and by other means than it was propagated at the first? nothing less, we use reasons to persuade and plant our faith, we use the like to defend it against Infidels, Soci●ians, and all other Sects, how then is our Religion planted, propagated, or defended by violence? It is one thing to be fenced exteriorly and a far off with Statutes of temporal severity against invaders, which course is a thing expedient and avowed both by us and all, and it is another thing to defend it interiorly by the same means, that is to say, to justify the right truth of Religion by them, and this we disavow, neither do we practise it any where, as it is most manifest.  
The Inquirer was very provident when he desired that, in these accusations of violence, no recrimination should be used, for he must needs see there was more matter returnable, then either could be grateful, or they could justify, yet since he will needs talk of killing, and cast the blame upon our side, he must be content if we make some reflection upon the misdemeanours of the Adversary, as well as upon our own innocency. I desire therefore, the intelligent reader to consider, whether in this last age, the Catholics have put to death more Ministers or half so many, as the Protestants of England have done Priests, who it is well known they have slain and butchered with great barbarism and immanity.  
But setting aside these heavy crimes of blood deliberately shed, who is it have afflicted others more in their Estates and Fortunes, they, or we? and for proof of this, we will offer fair, let them restore all they have taken with a strong hand from us in livelyhoods, both spiritual and temporal in all the Provinces of Europe, and we will restore all we have taken from them, and in that go no farther than this Seventeenth age which is now passing, be it in this Kingdom, or in those about it. It is well known that in all those Provinces, where both Religions are professed and live intermingled, none be on the suffering hand but we, none persecutes but they; and it is we who are the Aborigines, as I may so term us, and thereby have at much right for all indemnity as our Ancestors could divolve upon us. 
Master Pym in the Parliament House.  We are not insensible of the wrong we suffer daily by having it printed and pronounced in public Assemblies, on purpose to countenance injuries, and to excite against us the ignorant multitude, that our religion it destructive of all others, and that amongst us it is a main principle or maxim, that all other are to be invaded and destroyed by us, and this it affirmed confidently, though against all probability and experience. It cannot indeed be denied but truth is destructive of falsehood by the own power, as light is of darkness, and one contrary of another, but for external coaction or violence, we leave that to the Accusers, and do not own it.  
By this it is not hard to make a judgement who have been the encroachers, and who have propogated and maintained themselves by violence, you, or we? And who are the destructive party and live by the spoils and oppression of others, let not those who possess other men's goods cry out of wrongs, or make any brags of just dealing, for neither of these can come well out of their mouths.  
This Enquirer confesseth both sides are in fault, but we in more, and for this assertion of his brings in some light sophistry, because forsooth Protestants hold that they may err, but we maintain we cannot, and so will be sure never to mend. That Protestants may err is granted him, and needs no other probation than experience, whereby we find thy have filled all this Kingdom with dissensions, and these dissensions with civil wars, so that by this that you have erred, we know you may. But so frequent possibility of erring doth not extenuate but aggravate your crime. For if you may err so foully, how dare you undertake to tutor others? how prescribe Laws? with what face Persecute? If your rule be so weak as it cannot contain you all in one body, but lets you disperse into multitude of Sects, and fall in pieces as now you do; why do you not forsake it and seek a better for it, or else have none at all; if you can find out a surer, why do you not learn wit by experience, but wallow on still in the same mire? If this Enquirer speak so ill for his Clients, we will not entertain him for our Advocate. The Protestants side sets down for a rule of religion every ones private judgement in the interpretation of Scripture, and so doth Master Chillingworth the disciple of Volkelius. We do all that, yet we do not please them; nay more, we must be punished by them for the result; what is this but to bid us do a thing, and then punish us for doing it? Is not this extreme perversity? certainly if the rule they give be a sufficient warrant for their receding from the faith of their Ancestors, and for their breaking off from the Church, and standing in defiance of her, then doubtless much more may it warrant us to continue on and to keep off from any new doctrines, either of the Protestants, or any other Innovatours whatsoever, and sure this is great reason and cannot be gainsayed.  
Besides if we were to yield, to whom were it to be done? There is a world of distracted Sectaries now in this Kingdom, all sprung from the same roll, or from the rule of faith which it common to you all, of which one sort imagines there is no Papacy, and these were the first ringleaders of all the rout; another, that there is no Episcopacy; a third, that there is no Clergy, but that Lay-Elders is all in all, and must rule the roast; a fourth, that there is no Church nor Church-government at all, but that the Church is like a School of Philosophers, where every man may believe and do what he pleases without being accountable to another, or any obligation of conformity; and peradventure the Inquirer was one of this number together with his confederate M. Chillingworth; a fifth sort that there is no Trinity; a sixth that there is no Sacrament, or at lest none necessary, or effectual. Is it not fit think you that these divided Christians should come and write Laws to others, or punish any man for nonconformity? nothing more improbable. It is a Comedy to see D. Featly a Protestant, and Page a Puritan make Cat●logues of Heretics, and when they have done, can find no way whereby to exempt themselves, nor give a reason why they themselves should not be of the number, as much Sectaries as any other of the Catalogue.  
The Inquirer charges us that because we pretend to be infallible we have less reason to prescribe to others; but on the contrary, me thinks we should have more, for, as he who is really infallible is fittest to guide and govern others, so he that thinks himself to be, is at least in his own judgement more fit than he that does not. He adds that this pretence of infallibility makes us sure never to mend, or as his Scholar Chillingworth speaketh, makes us incorrigible. True if it were a mere pretended one, but that is not yet proved, either by him, or any, although he say here in this 28. Section, he undertakes to give reasons why the Church of Rome is fallible. But, if, on the other side, it be a reality, and that the Inquirers reasons are but pretended, then surely will not this infallibility keep us from mending, but chose from erring or having any thing to mend, or, which is all one, from any errors to correct. And thus we see that our Religion is maintained by the self same arts that bred it, that is to say, not by force, or violence, but by reason, and revelation, and spiritual industries, contrary to the surmises of this Inquirer.   

C. 16. Answ: to Chap 16.  
Your doctrine of damning all that are out of the Church of Rome, you have enlarged much above the occasion that invited you to it, for all that his Lordship had said on that theme was only this, that your certain and undoubted damning of all out of the Church of Rome, averseth him from it. Which if it be true, you cannot blame him; (for sure they that hear the punishment of judging, Mat. 7. [being judged of the Lord] will have little love to that piece of sensuality, (or consequently to the religion that requires them to run upon this danger.) And that the charge is true of you, you do at first acknowledge, by labouring to prove that there is no uncharitableness in it. Secondly, that it is necessary for you to maintain, or that otherwise you must fall into some great absurdity, particularly this, that there is any Church but that which is governed by the See Apostolic; which is a rare petitio principii again, and saves us the pains of saying one word more in defence of the truth and justice of those true words of his Lordship.  
For indeed that enclosure of the Church Christianity, and Salvation, to those that are under the Roman submission, is the uncharitableness that you are charged of. The envy of which it seems (after all your confidence) you are willing to remove from you, and therefore add an handsome lenitive, to keep any from thinking that your doctrine is rigorous or harsh. And truly if you might be taken at your word, he were very unkind that would require more charity of you than you yield even to Pagan's themselves, whom you will not hold Pagans, unless they be guilty of their error through affected or culpable ignorance; and then sure you will be as good to us, (that would be a little above Pagans) and till you can prove us to be guilty of error, and that through affected or culpable ignorance, with an obstinate mind, without preparation to be reform, or hearken to reason when 'tis told us, (which till your arguments are more convincing, undoubtedly this discourse of yours will not evidence us to be) we are in full capacity of your charity, and therefore shall not follow you any further; (lest we provoke you again) in this point.  
Section 3 Especially since you are at last in so good humour, that you utterly disclaim this damning and firing men in another world. 
On occasion of this or the like speech of mine answer, the Apologist in his review thought fit to add these words at the end of his 16 Chapter: [Three propositions there are which we maintain; First, that none but true Christians can be saved. Secondly, none but true Catholics can be saved, for true Catholics and true Christians be all one. Thirdly, none be true Catholics but such as live under the obedience of the See of Peter, and many do so that through ignorance do not seem to do. The Gentiles find fault with the first proposition, divers Sectaries with the second, and now the Protestants with the third. All these have been pretended by some or other to be false, but how to be uncharitable is very hard to be understood.] To all which being only said not attempted to be proved, I shall only say that I am sorry to see him out of his good mood so soon, and desire he will not expect we shall be so tame as to think him charitable that saith none of any other See but Saint Peter's can be saved.  I beseech God to confirm you in this temper, and desire you may be taken at your word, and that witness may be called of this charity of yours, for sure there be others of your brethren that have not used to grant so much.  
Section 4 As for that of burning men here for religion, you seem unwilling to be tried by antiquity in this point, because, say you, Antiquity did not all it might, but left somewhat to posterity to add; yet sure this was a little unlucky that your additions to antiquity should be of this bloody complexion; Christ's addition to the Ancients was to love and bless and pray for enemies, not to retaliate injuries upon any terms, and your 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, your improvement of the ancient doctrine and practice, is of somewhat a distant making, your Sermon on the mount (Ebal it seems) to your disciples, is persecuting and massacring of friends, which never provoked you but by not being entirely of your opinion.  
Section 5 But it seems you mean to prove it too, that this bloody doctrine is no stranger to antiquity, and your first proof is from the Jews, whose practice it was to punish impious people, and such as with new doctrine sought to infect others; To which I answer, that those against whom those Jewish severities were in force, were Atheists, and Idolaters, and false Prophets, that would take men off from the acknowledgement of the one God to Gentilism, which is sure somewhat a distant state from that of Protestants at this day.  
Section 6 Your second proof is from the Canon, and your third from the Imperial law, of which seeing you give us no taste in either, and yet because some men may have appetite to see what grounds you had for such affirmation, I conceived it a probable course to know your mind by looking into Bellarmine your great Champion; from the view of whole Collections, l. 3. de laicis. c. 21. this will be the result.  
Section 7 That for the Canon law, the authorities are not fetched from the ancient Canons of any of the first or general Counsels, but only c. ad abolendam; cap. excommunicamus. ext. de haeret. & cap. super eo, de haeret. in 6. (all which is no more than if you had cited it from your Popes (who must not look to be so authentical in this case) and yet will hardly come home to the burning of your fellow Christians, only because they will not submit to the Pope of Rome, the only thing for which we were even now to be damned) and from the Council of Constance; which besides that it is of a short standing about 200 years ago is made infamous in this matter, by that vile resolution of the [no Faith to be kept with Heretics] the grossness of which position may make it reasonable to expect this bloody doctrine from them, but withal to deprive it of all authority with others.  
Section 8 As for the Imperial law, these places he produces; First, L. Manichaeos', cod. de haeret. and to this I answer, that that law makes not heresy capital, but at the utmost makes it capable of an action after death, such is the action of infamy, etc. and so they that have died Heretics, may for the warning of others be proceeded against, (as you know Traitors after death are infamous, i. e. their children deprived of their honour, though the Father died unpunished, because undiscerned) but that comes not home to our present purpose of burning or killing. Then L. Arriani, Cod. eodem. where indeed death was the punishment of the Manichees, who you know were a high rank of Heretics, making two principles (which is in effect two Gods) the good and the evil, God and the Devil. But for others, viz. Arians and Macedonians, though those were Heretics, condemned by the first general Counsels, and are expressly there named, there is yet no such punishment appointed them; and Lastly, L. quicunque cod. eodem. in which saith Bellarmine, jubentur occidi omnes qui prava docere tentant, all are commanded to be put to death who attempt to teach wicked things. But you must observe that that law being against the Eutychians, many penalties are there assigned to the several degrees of the guilt of that heresy; poena exilii, si Episcopos & Sacerdotes constituerint, scripta eorum nemo habeat sub poena deportationis perpetuae, nemo eos audiat sub poena 10 librarum auri, ultimo supplicio coerceantur qui illicita docere tentaverint. Banishment if they constituted Bishops or Priests, perpetual banishment upon having any of their books, 10 pounds or libres of gold to any that heard them, and capital punishment to those that attempt to teach unlawful things. Which last clause (that cited by Bellarmine, and by him extended to all false doctrine) belongs peculiarly to the Eutychians, for of them only before the discourse was; and beside the rule is, odiosa restringenda, laws of punishments, etc. must always be taken in the most restrained sense; and so the utmost that any of these extends to, is only in these two heresies of Manichaeisme and Eutychianisme, and that in case of teaching the contrary to law, and abusing the people, and that after fair warning and prohibition; and all this, if it were granted (as truly I know no obligation that lies on all Christians to think themselves regulated by the laws of the Emperors) would amount to very little against Protestants, who may well pass for as moderate Heretics, as Arians and Macedonians, who were not punished with death.  
Section 9 'tis true indeed, there is somewhat of this nature to be found against the Donatists (though Bellarmine mentions it not (L. Si quis rebaptizare C. ne sanctum baptisma iteretur; but this was not again for opinion, but only in taking upon them to rebaptize any, and peculiarly on the Circumcellions, which were a bloody kind of people, and their vileness of this nature, guilt enough to own that severity: whereas on the other side we find that Idacius and Ithacius were condemned by the Bishops of France for being authors of punishing some Pricillianists with the sword; and in the East a whole Synod was condemned for consenting to the burning of Begomyle; and so much for your authorities, or more whensoever you please to produce them. From whence will appear the wide distance of your practices in these and other Kingdoms from that, that the most Popish Canons or Imperial Constitutions were bloody enough to determine; there neither Arians, nor Macedonians, but that prodigy of Manichaisme, and the Eutychians teaching, and that (as I conceive by prava & illicita) things contrary not only to wholesome doctrine, but to the laws of the Empire; This I say, because if the crime were only their opinions, I cannot imagine why the Arians and Macedonians should far so much better than the Eutychians, nay why Apostates should only be fined, and Jew's only under some restraints (as from Polygamy) and payments, and not put to death, save only in case of keeping there Purim (which was for the great contumely done to Christ in that feast, the hanging Haman in effigy, and Christ next to him) and I say, only Eutychians put to death, unless there were somewhat else in it beside their doctrine. And then if you will make the comparison to go no farther, than ourselves, what shoals of poor persons (far enough from the docere illicita & prava, teaching illegal things, even from teaching at all) were in Queen Mary's days 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whole hecatombs at once offered up to your fury.  
Section 10 So remarkable are your proceedings herein, that I fear it was not a jest of him that said at Geneva, Servetus occidendus est, ne apud exteros Ecclesiae nostrae malè audiant; That Servetus was to be burnt that their Churches might not hear ill abroad, i. e. that the Papists might not be scandalised; which if it were the consideration that moved in that matter, then have you more blood lying at your door, than what you have spilt, even that which in care and caution, those whom you recriminate, shed by your example, and that you might not be scandalised at their mercy and lenity.  
Section 11 This were I confess an ill excuse to them that were so careful to transcribe that bloody lesson, (and which is worse, if you will have mine opinion, they have no better) but yet will be an argument that you are not overfit to accuse them for it. Erasmus among you, and Castellio among us were about the beginning of the reformation very bitter against such dealing: the former, you may see his notes upon Saint Jer. Ep. ad Laet. t. 1. p. 39 where he can hardly allow them the name of Christians that fight for religion (kill for religion) though against the Turk, as if war were wont to make Christians, cum ipsi Turcam in pectore geramus, when the very using of this violence is a prime piece of Turkism. The latter wrote a book on purpose against that practice; I wish the whole Christian world of both parties would suffer themselves to be represented by a couple of such meek and honest proxies; be you pleased to convert as many as you can to the doctrine of neither killing nor damning, and I will promise you to do the like, and that will be better employment for us then this debate.  
Section 12 And because examples are the most popular arguments, I will help you to one of this nature, and leave you to apply it; Nero went through Greece a contending in the Musica certamina with all that pretended to that skill, if he had the better of it he was crowned, if not, he took care that they that had the better of him were put to death. The issue of it was, that they that had skill did on purpose play as ill as they could; he conquered wherever he came, was crowned when he was there, and when he was gone, was counted a madman.  
Section 13 I shall only add, what upon more exact enquiry upon that hint of the Canon law I find, that the elder Canons or decrees of Gratian as they never mention the putting Heretics to death; so in many passages out of Saint Austin they do dissuade the Emperor from it, and only mention some other mulcts and restraints for them. The new Canons or the Decretals of your Popes are generally for delivering to the secular arm, but name not poenam mortis neither; but what that signifies the Christian world now knows well enough; only one piece of hypocrisy I heard of (and by request or proposal of Spalatensis. L. 6. c. 5. Sect. 171. do guess the truth of the report) in your proceedings in this matter; your Spiritual Courts when they so deliver up, are wont to interpose [ita tamen ut non admittant poenam mortis (or to that purpose) but so that they proceed not to death, when yet they knew well enough that that is the meaning of your delivering. Nay the Canons that require that the secular hand must proceed with all rigour against Heretics thus delivered to them, will soon excommunicate any that do not thus understand their meaning.  
Section 14 Besides these arguments ab authoritate, you have another drawn, as you say, from Reason, and the common rules of equity and justice, (but add not one word to prove what you say so very improbably, but only condemn all of high presumption and arrogance who should be so hardy as to impugn or question it) one would think you an enchanted Knight that when you have never a weapon in your hand, nor second near you, (but only the names of so many men, and arms to call for) it should yet pass for arrogance, presumption, and hardiness in any to combat with you.  
Section 15 That you did not fitly produce your testimonies to your purpose, 'tis plain enough by what follows, the limitations and restraints that this doctrine, you say, must be bounded with, whereas your citations were general without any restraint.  
Section 16 Your restraint or exception is, that where a Kingdom is in a peaceable possession of Catholic religion, there 'tis no cruelty to inflict these punishments on the Teachers of new doctrines. And for this you say there is reason, which cannot probably be contradicted, but are so very uncourteous and contemptuous to us, as not to think us worthy to partake of the least syllable of such reason, unless that must go for one, that wicked men aim at temporal contents, and are consequently withheld by temporal punishments, which shall be acknowledged a reason, when difference in opinion appears to be an impiety of so much design, & all whom you call Heretics, are by you proved to be worms of the earth, deep worldly designers also.  
For truly I confess, to all those things which are committed by any, who may justly be presumed to commit them against conscience, for some worldly interest, I should give my willing suffrage that some temporal bitterness should be opportioned; that so seeing their Error, and finding temporal pains in stead of temporal advantages to be their portion, they may be disciplined to better and more honest thoughts; nay if the doctrines tend to liberty, I mean either as Mahomet's did to all kind of voluptuous living, or that other liberty (that some of your friends and some others that call themselves reform, but in my opinion are very far from it, have been guilty of) the shaking off the yoke of civil obedience to the Magistrate set over them by God, it is then lawful to coerce such innovators, if the prudence of the State shall think fit. But difference in opinion (though it be in a Kingdom never so peaceably possessed of the Catholic Religion) if it tend not to any of these dangers, nor be convincible of those impieties and designs, will by no reason or consequence be involved in that number.  
Section 18 This you seem to be content with, when you add that this severity must not be extended to all that any where teach or profess erroneous doctrines; but upon better consideration of your following words, 'tis clear that your restraint or exception looks another way, viz. that against those that are not the first invaders, but another generation succeeding them, whose error is contracted by the vice of education, etc. the Church doth not execute the severity of the laws. In which words, though we of this, and all other Protestant Kingdoms at this day have so far our parts, as that, if it were never so much in your power, you ought upon these grounds not to hurt us, because we are the progeny, and not the first invaders; yet seeing all the restraint is for the execution only of the severity of the laws, and those laws are supposed by you to be in force against Heretics, and so against us, whom you call by that name; we have great reason to think, there is little kindness in this present restraint of yours.  
Section 19 For to the utmost of my understanding of your words, it remains still free to you after this concession, to be as severe to any, as your power will enable you. And if by us at any time any claim of favour should be put into your Consistory, your answer probably would be by this dilemma; either you are invaders, (and seeing beginnings are always weakest, all that are not able to resist or defend themselves, shall go for invaders) and then you have no title to mercy by this tenure; or else you are a numerous offspring and progeny of them (and so possibly able to resist) and then you shall have mercy; If we stand on these terms with you, and your order for restraint of severity hold no longer than our strength to resist you, than we shall scarce acknowledge the obligation, but think our enemies on the other extreme as kind as you; for both of you are good at being merciful, when you are on the weaker party, but both very tyrannical when you begin to be strong.  
Section 20 If you were so constant to your articles of restraint, as that all the prosperities of war, advantages of place, and auxiliaries, could not tempt you to a massacre of any, save only some one (single corrupter and invader) or two in an age, I might then have reason to think I might have mistaken your meaning, but certainly you have been as cruel on the cubs, as ever you were on the old foxes, and made as little scruple to put many thousands to death in one night (whom you could not think to be all leaders in factions, or invaders) (as the stories of France will testify, and the very words of the bull of urban the eighth, to encourage the King of France, to root out the quadrupedes in Galliâ stabulantes, etc. as any one John hus alone by himself at another time. And that you will have this latitude to let loose your restraint again, when time serves, it may seem probable by what you add of Austria, Stiria, and Carinthia, whose privileges it seems lasted no longer than you thought fit; For assoon as you thought it seasonable, they were presently pronounced seditious and conspirators, and so put to the sword; and for France and Poland, I wish the names of Massacres had never been heard in either of them, or at least that the Pictures of them with words of papal approbation, were not to be seen at Rome to testify what is the cause of your present kindness, (viz. the difficulty of the work) that the Protestants there at this time are not molested.  
Section 21 As for your recrimination against Protestants, seeing it is very universal (suffer Catholics in no place) and very sharp, (that they persecute Catholics wheresoever they are stronger, after a very violent, merciless, desperate manner, slay, imprison, rob, banish, defame, etc.) I must beseech you either to prove it against this your Country, or else to make it reparations, and remember when time serves, that when Protestants are thought to persecute you, then presently 'tis a proceeding much worse and more unreasonable than the Turkish.  
Section 22 As for the truth of your suggestion, certainly the number and strength of Protestants hath for many years surmounted that of Papists in this Kingdom; and yet I shall be confident you will be posed to produce the example of any one since Queen Mary's days that in this Kingdom was put to death merely for religion, without being guilty of something else, which by the known laws of the Realm is liable to the punishment of treason. And for the other penal laws in this Kingdom, which are not Capital, but pecuniary mulcts, etc. I shall say that 'tis somewhat hard, that we must be thought worthy of all those bitter invectives, which you yet farther add, because I conceive there was never any Kingdom, that owned any religion, but there was some difference made betwixt that, and all other, in respect of temporal privileges, and favours, and immunities, and any such difference reaches near as high, and goes as deep as pecuniary mulcts. And beside it is not irrational to say, that the inflicting such mulcts may very probably tend to the quiet, and so to the advantage rather, then to the oppression of such sufferers; it being not without example that the suspicions of the people, and jealousies that the established religion shall be discountenanced, (having no deeper ground than an imagination that the Prince may have inclined to give toleration to the other party, or but immunity from these punishments) hath brought such odium upon the present government, and sharpness on those thus thought to be favoured, that in comparison with these ill accidents, a few pecuniary mulcts might pass for a privilege, as the letting of blood is to be esteemed by those who are entering into a pleurisy for want of it.  
Section 23 If upon these considerations, such mulcts as these may not be conceived supportable, I must confess 'tis an hard lot to be placed in a throne betwixt two contrary pretenders, and as unhappy for any ingenuous man, to make any confession to you, who from his Lordship's acknowledgement, that the Church of England is a little too blame in this point, conclude, that in confessing this he insinuates all. This 'tis to deal with men who cannot imagine it possible, that a man's words and thoughts should be of the same latitude. Should I by the same Logic conclude, that you, by confessing that all invaders for Religion must be put to death, do intimate, that all kind of Protestants must be executed, I hope you would say you had wrong done you. And yet to tell you truth, the subtlety of your next distinction would give any man that observed it, great temptation so to conclude of you. For after your citation of S. Th. of Aquine, and the Schoolmen, you are pleased to communicate to us a notable Mystery, [that you do use reasons to persuade, and plant your faith, (and truly the telling us you cannot err, and upon that bottom building all your most irrational conclusions, is no special exercise of the reasonable faculty) and only fence it exteriorly, and afar off, with statutes of temporal severity against invaders, which, say you, is another thing from defending it interiorly by that means, i. e. from justifying the right and truth of religion by them.  
Section 24 I should never have been so uncivil as to have affixed such a sense to your distinction, had you not been your own interpreter. It is, as if you had said, you are not to be accused for planting religion by arms, because your swords do only force men to be of your minds, do not give them any reasons why they should. And truly I have not heard any man say, that your arms did fence religion interiorly, (being the unaptest thing in the world, to justify the right, and truth of religion; and therefore you need not disavow that so providently) the great Turk could send a letter to your Pope, and answer and confute his bull of inciting the Princes of Christendom to take up arms against him, for crucifying their god, and tell him, that as 'twas a great falsity to charge on him what was proper to the Jews, the crucifying of Christ, (the Turk being descended from the Trojans, and therefore desiring the Pope's aid against the Grecians, to avenge their murder of the Trojan Hector, a kind of god of theirs) so if the Pope were truly a worshipper of Christ, he would never invade any nation upon quarrel of religion; so far is this kind of fight (in the knowledge of all, even of Turks themselves) from justifying of the truth, that if is a very great argument of the falseness of any sect of Christian religion; a plain demonstration that they do not obey the Christ whom they worship.  
Section 25 The using the sword as an exterior means of propagating your religion, is all that is laid to your charge, and that it seems you are content to yield us. Though, within a page or two more, you have forgotten yourself again, and say, that for public coaction or violence you do not own it. I wish you did not.  
Section 26 And that you may for the time to come deal clearly, and never have mind to suck in your words, and own it again, I shall in passing mention to you a narration concerning an honest Philosopher in Valens his time; It was Themistius, who before his death turned from Aristotelian to Christian, but I conceive was not yet converted, when this story is related of him. Valens in Antioch, saith the 
(a) Hist. Trip. l. 8. ex Zozomen.  Historian, had vehemently persecuted the Christians that were not of his opinion, had not a book of Themistius the Philosopher recalled him, in which he persuaded him, that he ought not to be cruel to any 
(b) Propter discordiam Ecclosiasticorum dogmatum.  for a difference of Ecclesiastical opinions, seeing among the Pagan's themselves there were more than 300 sects differing all from one another; And perhaps this might be wore 
(c) Forte hoc deo gratum magis esset.  acceptable (at least more pardonable) before God, because God is not easily known, and is glorified in different manners, on purpose that every man may 
(d) Magis timeat, i. e. be more humble, as fear by Saint Paul is opposed to high-mindedness, and fear and trembling is by the Greek fathers rendered humility.  fear the more, the more he wants of the integrity and perfection of that knowledge of him, either how he is, or how qualified, or how great he is. By the reasons of Themistius, saith he, mitior factus est Imperator, the Emperor became more mild. It may not be unfit for your friends to consider the example, and do so too.  
Section 27 As for your challenge to us, that if we will restore all we have taken from Papists in Europe, you will restore what you have taken from us, it is a good safe boast; you know that it is not in any replyers power to strike the bargain. Yet, if all the pecuniary mulcts under the reign of the three last Princes in this Kingdom be price enough to ransom and fetch back the blood shed by you in Queen Mary's days, I doubt not but I shall be as forward as you to accept that challenge.  
Section 28 Mean while for the justification of our severest laws in this point, you cannot but confess that in most Kingdoms strong presumptions have been thought sufficient to make liable to punishment. In the Canon law the proving of nudus cum nudâ, that such a man and woman were taken naked together, is presumption enough to bring the punishment of adultery on any. And when our Queen had run so many dangers by Priests, and thereupon Capital laws were made, that no such should come into the Kingdom, or if they did they should be presumed traitorously disposed, and punished accordingly; and this Statute thus legally made, conveyed to the knowledge of all such, it hath been a very rational presumption against any that should be so found; Though as 'tis possible that nudus cum nudâ may be no adulterer, so such a Priest may have no traitorous purpose. And yet if you mark it, (unless since these times of troubles) very few of you have suffered among us by this Statute.  
Section 29 Sir, you had great leisure, when you could enlarge so to triumph over us for acknowledging our Church fallible, and profess to discharge his Lordship from being your Advocate, if he speak so ill for his Client. This you might have done long since, and unless your favour may be had upon some other terms then undertaking the Infallibility of mere creatures, we must all be content to be discarded by you.  
Section 30 Yet after all your turning away, and slighting, we shall never be so provoked, as to punish you for the result of what we prescribe you. If your best use of reason in the interpretation of Scripture (and not any prejudice, or passion, or fault of yours) have sincerely brought you to your opinions, and no light that is offered, hath been neglected, and yet all prove unsufficient to convince you, I shall never severely pronounce against you; and if you will say, and make good as much to me, our affections may meet, though not our brains, and both of us have charity enough to cover in each other, a multitude of errors.  
Section 31 Your catalogue of Sects in this Kingdom, I shall not go about to examine, but only tell you, that your infallibility hath been liable to such misadventures also, and had not the charm or skill of keeping all within its circle; if it had, there would then at this time have been no body to dispute against you.  
Section 32 In the close of your long Chapter, I wonder you should be so covetous or ambitious of lengthening it one page farther, by charging on his Lordship, that he charges you, that because you pretend to be infallible, you have less reason to prescribe to others; whereas his Lordship charges no such thing upon you, but only saith, that she that confesses she may err, is not so chargeable with any fault, as they that pretend they cannot; which is quite another matter.  
Section 33 To conclude, when the business is thus laid by you, that your infallibility is not yet proved to be only pretended, and yet you have no other ground of saying so, but because you say 'tis not, (though all his Lordship's arguments for so may Sections have driven all to that conclusion, and never an one of them is yet answered by you) it will be a most unreasonable thing (and a sound petitio principii again) to affirm without any one word of proof, that that infallibility is a reality, and so will not keep you from mending, whereas nothing can keep you from mending, if this do not; this contemning of arguments against you, and affirming magisterially without any.   

To the 29 Section, Chap. 17.  
This opinion, saith he, of damning so many, and this custom of burning so many, this breeding up of those who know nothing else in any point of religion, yet to be in readiness to cry, To the fire with him, To hell with him. All these be empty words, as we have showed before. As for our breeding up of men, I think we do it as well as any of our neighbours do; and by the way, must tell you that we do not take children from their parents only to breed them up in our religion; we do not offer that hard measure either to Turks or Jews, but hold it an act flatly against the law of nature, an impious violation of Parents right, which ought to be held sacred; and lastly, away of propagation of religions wholly violent and Unchristian, so far are we from propagating our religion by force; and if all others with whom we have to do, had been of that mind, it had been better with them; for God hath not blessed that way, forasmuch as by sad experience we have found, that none have proved greater scourges to their King and Country, than such as have had that sort of breeding given them, and contrary to their parents will, been violently seduced in their youth; and this is no secret, but known to all the three Kingdoms to their cost. But enough of this, for it is a distasteful business.   

C. 17. Answ. to C. 17.  
Section 1 To his Lordship's 29 paragraph you have no return, but that these are empty words as you have formerly showed (and I fear we have showed they are not, but should be very glad to be mistaken, and can truly say, that I wish vehemently that your judgement were right in this matter) But upon occasion of his Lordship's mention of [your breeding up those that know nothing else in religion, To cry to the fire, to hell with him] you are pleased to take occasion of some liberty, in showing what good breeding you bestow upon men in your Church, and so divert to a complaint against those that take children from their parents, etc. and are somewhat passionate and tragical on that subject; but this being nothing to his Lordship's words or argument, I desire to see that better answered by you, before I will enter any new combat about so extrinsecall an impertinency. And so enough of this also, for what ever 'tis, 'tis nothing to the matter of present handling.   

To the 30 Section Chap 18.  
If it were granted, saith the Enquirer, that because it agrees not with the goodness of God to let me want a guide infallible, and that the Church of Rome were that one; yet if that teach any thing contrary to God's goodness, I am not to receive her doctrine, for the same cause they would have me receive it, it being as good an argument. This guide teaches things contrary to God's goodness, therefore it is not appointed, by God; as to say, it is agreeable to God's goodness there should be a guide, therefore there is one. So he.  
The Enquirer seeks to delude us with a fallacy, by altering his terms; for in the first place, he speaks of a thing contrary to God's goodness, not absolutely, but according to his understanding. In the second place he speaks of it, not as it is in his understanding, but as it is simply in itself, which is a thing quite different from the former; for many things may be in his understanding thus or thus, or as he saith, contrary to God's goodness, which in themselves are not so, but rather, quite otherwise, for indeed it is no good consequence to argue on this sort. This in my understanding is contrary to God's goodness, therefore it is so, because your understanding is subject to error, and therefore some things may seem to it to be, which are not. Chillingworth who followeth this Author's footsteps, argues after the self same manner, and hath been answered elsewhere by himself. I grant then the consequence when as he saith, this guide teaches somewhat contrary to God's goodness, therefore it is not appointed for a guide. But I deny the Antecedent; and afterwards when he proves it, saying, it seems so to my understanding, therefore it is so, I deny the consequence, and admit the Antecedent.  
At least, saith he, if it seem so to my understanding, whether in the mean time it be so or not, I am not to receive it, because I am to be guided by my own reason and understanding. If it seem so to your understanding after such time as you have weighed all things as rightly as you can, I grant it; But if it seem so only before you have done that, than I deny it, for than it is not to be followed but forsaken, or reform if it be found erroneous, as in this case of yours it is. For in this case your understanding is to consult other understandings wiser than your own, if you can find any such; and according to that is to determine of the matter, and not to rely wholly upon your own single understanding. But if you do so, you will find your own single understanding was deceived, and that the guide of which we treat, teacheth nothing that is against the goodness of God. For it is to be supposed her understanding is brighter and more capacious than yours, and therefore is to be thought knows much better what doctrines be agreeable to the goodness of God, then yours can do what is against it; and therefore your own reason and understanding teaches you, that the Church's understanding is to be preferred, and that yours must submit; and again, that this is the rational way, and not the other: this the way of understanding, and that of error. And so much in answer to this fallacy, wherein I perceive, both he and Master Chillingworth confide very much.  
As for particular doctrines, it is true, as you say, you may examine whether they agree with the Principle, that is foundation, yet nevertheless cannot you from thence conclude any thing against the doctrines or Infallibility of the Church, but rather for it, and this for the reason before specified. Neither do we, therefore, send you to a witness, and bid you not believe it, but rather, to believe it as far as in right reason you are to believe it, and not farther, that is to say, you are to trust to your own particular discourses, as to particular discourses, and no farther, but to the resolves of the Church as to the dictamen of a higher understanding, by the light of which you are to judge and censure of the rest, and by doing thus, you are sure you do wisely and safely, and, in fine, so, as although you should chance to err, you might answer the business at the latter day, by saying, I did in this case what I ought to do, for I followed what my reason taught me, and more than this was not required at my hands. But if I follow my own judgement, and in confidence of that do adventure to condemn the Church, In that I offend against my reason and true judgement, and should not be able to make a good apology for myself, or any way make it good that I followed my reason, which faculty is the rule that God hath set me.  
For a conclusion of this dispute, I answer in brief, that putting the Inquirers argument as he ought to have put it, namely, thus as followeth. This guide, to my understanding; or, to my seeming, teaches things contrary to God's goodness, therefore it is not appointed by him for a guide, putting I say, the argument on this manner, it is nothing so good, or so concluding an argument, as this other is, videlicet; This guide teaches such and such doctrines, therefore they are not against the goodness of God, and therefore again, my understanding was deceived in holding them to be so; and therefore lastly notwithstanding all this, she may be an infallible guide and appointed by God for such: Note, that we infer hence she may be, but not that she is, as the Inquirer would impose upon us: for, we do not say that the Church is appointed a guide therefore, because it is agreeable with God's goodness to make her so, but because we for other reasons know he hath so made her: because we are not now to learn but that many things are agreeable to God's goodness to be done, which yet are not done, nor peradventure ever will be. Wherefore, when we are to judge what is, or will be, we are to consider, not what his goodness may admit, but what his will determines shall have a being, for of that lastly depends the existence of things, and not of the other.   

C. 18. Answ. to C. 18.  
Section 1 In your report of his Lordship's argument, Section 30. you leave out those words [therefore there is one] and so make nonsense of that period, which in his Lordship's setting of it is excellent reason. But I can believe that this was but a slip, As for your answer to the parallel cases, wherein, saith his Lordship, God's goodness is equally concerned; do you think you can ever satisfy any reasonable man in saying, [that the first thing he speaks of is only contrary to God's goodness in his Lordship's understanding, not absolutely; but of the second, he speaks, not as it is in his understanding, but as it is simply in itself] from whence you conclude, that he changes the terms] Certainly, Sir, in despite of your exception, argument is good, Thus;  
Section 2 If it be sufficient to conclude an infallible guide because it agrees not with God's goodness to let men want one, than any man that conceives that Church to teach any thing which he conceives against God's goodness, by the same reason is not to receive her doctrine; The case is clear, because nothing concludes to any man any farther, than it is conceived by him; and that is not a proof to me, which I do not conceive to be so; which makes his Lordship's arguing to be far from fallacious; For the matter of this paragraph is not whether it be really true, that it agrees not with God's goodness to let men want an infallible guide, but (supposing it to be so) whether it will follow the Church is infallible, or whether he whose understanding is convinced and persuaded of that truth, [that it is not agreeable to God's goodness to let us want such a guide] be enforced to confess it infallible.  
Section 3 This also his Lordship disputes not against (but will willingly acknowledge the consequence, supposing that the Antecedent were true) only by the same argument proves another thing, that he that conceives the Church to teach any doctrine contrary to God's goodness, or that, which is such to his understanding, or he that supposes the Church to teach so, must not believe that Church's doctrine. So that if you mark, the supposition is equal on both sides, not taken for true one side, and only pretended on t'other, but one taken to be true by you, (that, not to provide an Infallible guide is contrary to God's goodness) and tother taken to be true by his Lordship (that Gods damning those that err without either negligence or prejudication, is contrary to his goodness also) and if the Argument be of force on one side, it must be so also on t'other, and for you to say that what you suppose, is true, but what his Lordship supposes, is not so, is a terrible petitio principii again, and no ground of a confutation against his Lordship; The ridiculous arguments that you put in his Lordship's paper, without his privity, will be matter of reproach to you, (who if you understood (as I suppose you did) were willing to deprave his discourses) and not unto his Lordship.  
Section 4 As for your way of satisfying his Lordship's understanding, that what the Church teaches is not contrary to the goodness of God, [because the Church knows what is so, better than he] 'twill sure prevail little with any, that is a disputing whether the Church is infallible or no, (as you see his Lordship now is) for if she be fallible, she may mistake in that judgement, and that she doth not mistake, there will be no assurance from her saying it, as long as the controversy depends about her Infallibility, which to affirm not to depend, or to be no controversy, is petitio principii again.  
Section 5 As for your Conclusion of this dispute, wherein you set the comparison betwixt two Arguments, and say yours is much the better; I shall not need debate that with you, because they are not the two Arguments betwixt which his Lordship makes the comparison. The first I confess you have rightly set down, [This Guide to my understanding teaches things contrary to God's goodness, therefore it is not the Guide] and this will be as good an argument, as this other, ['Tis to my understanding contrary to the goodness of God, that the Roman Church should not be an infallible Guide, or that there should be no infallible Guide, where there is none but the Roman Church, therefore the Roman Church is so] In this comparison the consequences are equally true, and built upon the same ground, that that which is against God's goodness cannot be; and the Antecedents equally affirmed according to several understandings, and then whether the other Argument which you bring, be comparable to either, it matters not.  
Section 6 But when at last you give us a note, that the argument from God's goodness doth not conclude that your Church is infallible, but only that it may be so; I confess you make me repent of all this unprofitable attendance I have paid you, in following your argument thus far, when yourself have given me directions to a shorter cut of answering, viz: by granting that it may be infallible, that is, that nothing in nature resists, but that, if God's pleasure were so, it might be infallible, but say we, we have no evidence from God that it is his pleasure it should, and therefore we conclude it may be deceived, or may be fallible; betwixt which two, though there may be some difference, (as there is betwixt falli and fallibilem esse) yet unless some evidence can be brought against one, which cannot against the other, they will be both equally true, as far as respects our knowledge or debate of them.  
Section 7 And when you add, that 'tis from other reasons that you conclude she is infallible, and not from this of God's goodness, I answer, that 'tis clear that his Lordship was now disputing only against that reason taken from God's goodness, which it seems you confess was no reason; and for your other reasons, they are either confuted in other paragraphs of his Lordship's Treatise, or when you produce them, shall be.   

To the 31. Sect. Chap. 19  
This Section is spent in the enquiring whether a man shall be damned for making a diligent and impartial enquiry after the true religion, of which he finds the infallibility of the Church to be a part, supposing that his reason, when all is done, will not assent. This is his Quaere, and the same may be made concerning any other verity, or point of doctrine; as namely, of the holy Scripture, whether or no it be the word of God; and what shall become of that man whose reason, after an impartial search made, will not assent; or again, about the truth of Christian Religion, unto which, after such a search made, his reason will not condescend.  
I answer first, that it is a mockery to ask whether or no any Man shall be damned for making a good enquiry without success; and in effect it is the same as to inquire whether a Man shall be damned for doing a deed that's commendable and good. For this Question supposes that either the Enquirer, or we were very simple Creatures, and did not understand ourselves, or else that the Gentleman-demander was not in earnest, but propounded it only for his recreation, though at a time ill chosen and unseasonable, and also in a matter about which there ought to be no jesting.  
I answer secondly, that in a place where instruction and information may be had, the case he puts is morally impossible to happen out; for we deny that where the search is diligent, impartial, and without prejudice, and where again information sufficient is to be had, that there the reason shall not be able to assent, and that wheresoever it cannot, that same happens, either through weakness, or inability of judgement and capacity, or else by reason of some disordinate passion of the will, by which the understanding is misled and darkened, as in those, who are refractory, it for the most part falls out. Which passion and prejudices arise, sometimes from custom and education, sometimes from vicious inclinations, sometimes from a crookedness and perversity of nature, which doth refuse instruction. Wherefore as it is no sufficient excuse for an Infidel to say, I have searched diligently whether or no Christ be the true Messias, or whether the Scripture be the word of God or no, and after all endeavours used, my reason will not assent; so in like manner it is as little sufficient to allege, that after enquiry made about the true Church and her Infallibility, your reason would not assent, for in these cases, we cannot grant any ignorance invincible; or free that error which possesses them from guilt. Now what shall become of others who want instruction sufficient, and have no crookedness or backwardness in their will, and die in ignorance, is another point, and different from this of ours, and is to be resolved in the Question about the efficacy of Implicit faith, to which I refer my Reader.   

Chap. 19 Answ. to Ch. 19  
Section 1 In this Paragraph his Lordship asks a Question, Whether, supposing [that he that never heard of the Church of Rome, shall not be damned for not believing it infallible] it can be thought, that he that hath made diligent search, and used honestly all means afforded him, and yet doth not believe the Church infallible, shall be damned for that not-believing (this is the Question, and to weigh it down on one side [that that latter shall not be damning when t'other is not] this reason is put in that in this matter all that that Man hath done in the second case more than in the former, is only the having diligently enquired, which is presumed to be no damning sin.  
Section 2 In stead of the Question thus put, you set another somewhat distant, but I will suppose tending to the same effect, whether a Man shall be damned for making a good enquiry without success; which you say is a mockery, and so, as I conceive, ridiculous to affirm it; and so, Sir, after all your descanting on his Lordship for ask this question, it is apparent by our explication of it, that upon the denying of that which you say, 'tis ridiculous not to deny, it inevitably follows, that that Man shall not be damned for denying the infallibility of your Church.  
Section 3 And though you take pains to persuade that this case is morally impossible, yet you must give us leave from your stating of the case, wherein you say it is so, (viz: when information sufficient is to be had) to conclude your proof a petitio principii again; for when we deny your Church to be infallible, and moreover affirm, that if it be, it cannot be infallibly known to be so, how can you think that we shall ever yield (without any offer of proof) that there is sufficient instruction to be had for any man in this point? besides, for you to say that every Mans not acknowledging this, proceeds either from Weakness or Passion, what is that but uncharitableness first, and then shortness of discourse, (when the case was on supposition that there was no fault of which his search was guilty) and Petitio principii again?   

To the 32. Section, Chap. 20.  
Whosoever admits of truth upon no better grounds than others do admit of falsehood, doth not receive it rightly, solidly, and as he ought, but after a way defective and infirm. Again, whosoever searches and is loath to find, and would not see it when he might, this Man refuseth truth as badly and weakly as the other doth receive it; and as the truth will not benefit the one, so the enquiry will not advantage or excuse the other. As for such as are bred up in a true Religion, and which, without particular examination, they accept, it were rash judgement to say all these received truths upon no better grounds, than others did falsehood; for first, according to this account, the greatest portion of Christian men on all sides would be in a hard condition: amongst whom the simple and illiterate, who are not able to read Evagrius either in Greek or Latin, nor yet the Bible either in Hebrew or Greek, or otherwise to make any strict search into antiquity, for their making discoveries which faith was the Ancient and Apostolic. But though they be unable to do this, yet do they not therefore take up their Religion at random and by chance, or consult passion about it, and not reason, but chose, do find their reason satisfied each one according to their several models, or measure of capacity, by the present view of the majesty and divine perfections of the Catholic Church and faith therein professed, together with the assurances from public fame and creditable relations. By means of which the divine providence and veracity shows them infallibly what ways they are to take, and what doctrines to receive as revealed from above. And thus, regularly speaking amongst orthodox Believers, where Religion may appear like itself, every Man of capacity, though illiterate, may see sufficient to resolve him, which satisfaction from any false Religion he could not receive; for though to a heedless eye, and before a diligent exquiry made, some grand falsehoods may seem more probable than truths, and that as Aristotle teacheth, multa falsa sunt probabiliora veris, many falsehoods are more probable than truths; yet, not to a diligent Enquirer after the search is made, and especially, in businesses of great concernment, because God and nature have laid these kind of truths more open to our view, and set marks upon them by which they might be known and discerned from falsehood. Wherefore, in the law of nature, it was more credible, even to the illiterate, that there was a God, then that there was none; and now Judaisme is not so probable as Christianity is, though sometimes it hath been, nor Mahumetism at any time so persuasible as Christian Religion, or Heresy so credible and satisfactory as orthodoxal Christianity, or the Greek schism as the Greek unity; wherefore though the Parent's belief, and the Religion prevalent in the Country have great influence into the minds of Man, and are great and powerful Persuaders, yea oftentimes Seducers also, and those very dangerous; yet nevertheless in those places where truth is taught, they do not hinder Men from the right apprehension of it, and from making true judgements about it, but rather like a prosperous gale of wind to Vessels under sail, cause them to move towards the Port desired more swiftly than otherwise they would. And thus much may suffice for taking off the slander and scandal which this Enquirer, and after him Chillingworth, with great acerbity, have almost in the very same terms, laboured to cast upon right believing Christians, therewith to disparage their faith, as if forsooth, they believed truths invalidly and upon no better reasons than others believe falsehood. Thus have both these conspired against the truth, for both indeed are but one Author in effect, one the Text, and the other the Commentary; wherefore the Publisher of this small work hath showed us all the well head to which Chillingworth went to draw, which Well before was unknown to the most part of Men, and so might have still remained, had it not been for this Publishers unseasonable diligence.   

Chap. 20. Answ. to Ch. 20.  
Section 1 Your mistake is very remarkable in this Paragraph, and your pains very prodigally misspent in disproving of that which is by his Lordship mentioned only on supposition of somewhat else affirmed by you, and by that means demonstrated to be infirm.  
Section 2 His Lordship's present reasoning is, that supposing your infallibility true, yet he that denies it, and withal uses his best reason to seek if it be true, will sure be in as safe a condition, as he that believes it, and searches not. And this he proves, because the one believes that supposed falsehood on as good grounds, as the other doth that supposed truth. Which is so fully concluded from those premises, (and so needs no farther proof) that indeed these premises are able to conclude more; viz: that in that case that Man believes that supposed falsehood on better grounds (viz: upon impartial search) than the other believes that supposed truth; and than 'twere unreasonable to think, that God that rewards men's actions, and not their fates, their choices, and not their stars, should condemn the one, more ingenuous and guiltless, and reward the other meaner and more criminal part of the parallel.  
Section 3 All this you in a manner confirm, by saying, that he that thus admits of truth, admits it not solidly, rightly, and as he ought, but after a defective and infirm way. Which being borrowed from you out of this Chapter, the rest will appear to belong very nothing to his Lordship's argument, and therefore I choose not to insist on any reply to it. For of those which do find their reason satisfied in your infallibillity, of which you speak a while, his Lordship speaks not; and for the truths that God and nature have laid so open to our view, of which you speak again, sure this of infallibillity is none.  
Section 4 As for your displeasure expressed again (without any new occasion) against the unseasonable Publisher (which if you and some others of your Friends were mere Students and Votaries, to pray for, and study the peace of Jerusalem, and not too active Infusers and Enterprizers in these troubled waters, might indeed be acknowledged less seasonable) it is the very thing you said before, and then was sufficiently proved to be unseasonable.   

To the 33, & 34. Sections, Chap. 21.  
That the Enquirer did not deny with obstinacy the infallibility of the Church of Christ, or any other Article, we are willing to believe, yet nevertheless how safe he was we know not. For a man may be obstinate and yet not think so, though he may peradventure have just reason to suspect it. It is not likely that Arius for example, or any other Arch-heretic did think themselves to be obstinate, although it is not to be doubted but they were, for in the heart of Man there be many dark corners in which obstinacy may lurk and be unseen; many passions that do corrupt the intention, which without great diligence are not espied, especially in Men that are Lovers of the world, or be possessed with prejudices before hand. For which the wise Man wisely said, Verebar omnia opera mea, I disinherited all my works. And so hath every Man reason to do in this universal corruption of nature and manners. The 34 Sect. hath no difficulty in it which may require an Answer.   

Chap. 21. Answ. to Chap. 21.  
Section 1 Your Answer to the 33 Sect. is very strange; you first grant very freely, that you believe that his Lordship did not deny with obstinacy the infallibility of your Church; and yet in your next words you interpose against him, that a man may be obstinate, and yet not think so; and on that, ground your Answer to that Section. But sure, Sir, whosoever else maybe obstinate, or what grounds soever he may have to suspect he is, yet this cannot by you be said of him at the same time when you acknowledge he is not obstinate.  
Section 2 I beseech you compare your Answer with that Paragraph of his Lordships again, and tell me whether this would not be very strange dealing. Suppose a Friend should make this Syllogism for you; an honest Catholic ought not to be denied the liberty of this Town, but this Gentleman is an honest Catholic, ergo: and to the major I should answer by silence, (i. e. consent) and to the minor, [that you are an honest Catholic I am willing to believe:] Nevertheless whether you ought to have the liberty of this Town, I know not, for you may be a dishonest Catholic, and yet not think so.  
Section 3 I pray how would you like this way of discourse? would you not first tell me that I did in effect deny the conclusion, i. e. make scruple how you should be dealt with, after I had acknowledged both that all honest Catholics ought to be used as you desire, and that you are an honest Catholic? And Secondly, that I did suck in my concession of your being an honest Catholic, assoon as I had made it; for if that Reply belong to me, than is it doubted, whether I am such or no. Be pleased to compare the cases, and this is directly your answer.  
Section 4 What you mean by the no-difficulty in the 34 Sect. (which you confess, and which therefore requires no Answer) I do not perfectly know, but shall suppose you mean, that there is nothing of doubt or question in it, and then I am sure I have nothing to reply, but that by the same reason the 33 Section must be granted also, for the medium is the same to infer both those conclusions.   

To the 35, & 36, Sections, Chap. 22.  
To believe, saith he, implicitly what God would have believed, is also to believe implicitly what the Church teacheth, if this doctrine be one of those which God commands, to be believed. My Answer to this is negative, and my reason of denial is, because one implicit faith doth not contain another, but it is an explicit assent and no other that contains within it an implicit. To the point than I answer, that if that same general belief, which he falsely calls Implicit, be sincere and cordial, we then grant that it may, as he saith, implicitly contain the other. But what will he deduce from thence? what? that all who pretend to believe on that manner do it sincerely? It is improbable, for if it were sincere, it would in knowing Men, not stay within the narrow compass of an implicit assent, but quickly dilate itself, and become explicit. Indeed this great profession of believing in a preparation of mind all which God would have believed, and goes no farther, seems in most Men to be but feigned and delusory, and so no great trust can be reposed in it.   

Chap. 22. Answ. to Chap. 22.  
Section 1 The force of the argument, Sect. 35. you deny upon a show of some subtlety, because, say you, one implicit faith doth not contain another. This you affirm, but afford us not the least offer of proof for the affirmation. I must therefore beseech you to look over your principle again. Suppose me to believe by an implicit faith, that you are an honest Man, may not that belief contain in it an implicit belief to every proposition by you asserted? Nay, what need this circumlocution? is not his Lordship's argument most clear being put into a Syllogism?  
Section 2 If God commands the Church to be believed, than he that implicitly believes all the commands of God, implicitly believes that the Church is to be believed: but God commands the Church to be believed, ergo. See now which Proposition you will deny, the major is evident, the minor I presume you will not deny, whosoever else doth, and then I beseech you be good to the conclusion.  
Section 3 But that it seems you will grant too, but suspect that that general belief is not sincere and cordial; But that I am sure is not for us to dispute of, or discern, and I am as sure 'tis nothing to the case where 'tis supposed to be sincere, and if it be not, no Man ever thinks it can be relied on.   

To the 37, 38, & 39 Sections, Chap. 23.  
Admitting the foremost of these Sections as probable. To the 38, I answer, that as some are made obstinate by pride, so again othersome laziness detains in ignorance. But what of that? I grant you that it is not pride in you or any Man never to assent, till you find good reason for it, but rather wisdom. Nevertheless it may be pride which blinds a Man and hinders him from the seeing a just reason of assenting, yea even then when it is not only perceptible, but also easy to be perceived; for the eye of the proud sees not the truth, but overlooks it. The 39 Paragraph containeth in it no business considerable in the matter of controversy between us.   

Chap. 23. Answ. to Chap. 23.  
Section 1 The 38 Sect. you admit as probable, and now methinks I understand your Dialect somewhat better than before I did; Doth not [admitting as probable] signify [not understanding?] Truly it had been more ingenuously done to have used that other phrase; for the truth is, it might have been done at this time without any disparagement to your understanding; for in the beginning of this Section there was at the first Edition clearly an error in the print. It should be thus as 'tis now mended; To the Greek that concludes the former Section should be adjoined in the same period, If I could, etc. and no new Section be there made; and as the sense, by that mistake of the Printer, lies broken in the first Impression, it is nonsense.  
Section 2 Now this being said, It is a little odd that there should be but one piece of nonsense in the Book, and that should have the luck to be in your favour, and by you be confestly admitted as probable. But this was but a misfortune. Your Answer to the 38 is not so excusable, being not one syllable to the matter in hand, [that sluggishness may as probably bring a Papist to grant your infallibility, as pride a Protestant to deny it] In stead of denying or answering of which, you only reply, that pride may possibly blind a man. Sure this paragraph you might have admitted also, (as well as the other two that encompass it) much better than to have said nothing to the purpose.  
Section 3 The 39 I would not discourage you from granting (it had been much for my ease if you had granted the whole treatise) otherwise I could show you, that it contains an argument perfectly concludent against your cause, in satisfying one main objection of yours against us.   

To the 40 Section Chap. 24.  
We Catholics do not disagree in points of faith, neither where there is fire to keep us in awe, nor where there is none, and therefore this exception against our unity is frivolous. It is the clearness and perfection of our rule that draws us all to unity, and not any of the four Elements. If we follow this rule we are at peace, and we do well know how to follow it: contrariwise, follow your rule as well as you can, and yet you are at variance; wherefore you assign a rule, which though it in itself be not uncertain, yet which is as bad, you are uncertain of it. Now as in Logic a maxim, or axiom, if unknown, or uncertain, is no good principle of argumentation; so in matter of belief, a rule not certainly discernible and understood, is no good rule of faith, though never so perfect in itself: and this is just your case.  
The differences amongst those of our Church are not differences in matters of faith or religion, as it is evident; but on the other side it is manifest and confessed, that yours are. Our differences are in Philosophy only, or in some Scholastic and undefined point, and such in particular is, that now some years agitated between the Dominicans, and sundry of their party on the one side, and the Jesuits, and Sorbon Doctors, and many more, on the other. For these contend not as we do, with the Calvinists, namely, whether we have free will or no: all of them agreeing in that verity of faith, but they contend about a question only Philosophical, which hath some relation to it, namely whether with this freedom of will acknowledged by both sides, Physical predeterminations or praemotions can consist: which question is no question of faith. Now admitting as many think, that these predeterminations could not stand with the doctrine of free will, yet the said doctrine of faith is not hurt thereby: for the opposition between them and free will, is either discovered by the Dominicans, or not. If not, then is it dormant, and so, though never so ill, it cannot do hurt to faith, or work it any prejudice. If it be discovered, than it can work nothing, forasmuch as thereupon it will be relinquished and abandoned presently: because the doctrine of free will is received by an assent of faith, and the other but by a philosophical or opinative; the former being the stronger, must needs command and expel the latter, assoon as they begin to fall at variance. Wherefore it would in that case be a good consequence with them, viz. Man hath free will, therefore there is no predetermination and not contrariwise, (as it is with the Calvinists) there is predetermination, therefore no free will. Therefore in the holding of predeterminations there is a vast difference between a Calvinist and a Dominican, even as much as between an obedient Catholic, and a perverse and obstinate Heretic, and that is difference enough. And since you would needs know, this is the reason why these arguments make you Heretics, and not the Dominicans. That the Church ought to have resolved the point in difference, between those two orders, is more than the inquirer can prove, for neither of their doctrines do hinder conformity with the ancients in any one thing, wherein conformity was requisite; for men are not bound to conform with the ancients in the reasons of their belief, but in their belief only. The 42. Section we grant as making nothing against our doctrine. And thus Chillingworth is also answered who insists upon this same point, and also in the same fashion with this Inquirer, so that all things considered, both these make but one Author and require but one answer to what they have objected. And by this the 41, and 42. Sections be also answered.   

C. 24. Answer to C. 24.  
Section 1 His Lordship saith that the consent is little thankworthy, because that may be an effect of fear, when there is fire for them that disagree. To this you answer, that you disagree not in matters of faith, neither where there is fire to awe, nor where there is none.  
Section 2 Sir, is not that a strange answer in you, that know there is fire to awe disagrees in all matters of faith, and consequently no matter of faith, where there is no fire to awe? By this it appears that that exception of his Lordships against your unity in matters of faith is far from frivolous, and to get quit of it, you are fain to make a distribution, of which only one species belongs to the Genus, which being put into form betrays itself presently: It must be thus, of matters of faith, some are required of us sub poenâ ignis, some are not. Can you stand to it, that this shall hold? are there any things de fide, which a Man may safely disbelieve? if not, all the rest you say in that Section is nothing to the purpose. But than you add, that all the differences are in matters not of faith, to which the answer will be very obvious (if I troubled you with no other) that ours are so too, and then you have little matter of triumph over us in that excellence.  
Section 3 But if you please, I shall be a little more large with you in this point, and first I beseech you to consider, that it is you that bring this Argument against us, taken from Dissensions amongst us, and not we against you (though we might with as good reason) and therefore that it lies on you to prove it a concluding Argument, and to us 'tis abundantly sufficient, if we be but able to retort it, for than 'twill be an Argument ad homines, though in itself it be no Argument.  
Section 4 This being premised, I pray observe, in the second place, the no force of this Argument against us, unless it may also appear that our departing from you, is the cause of these Dissensions. For if they be but only consequent to it accidentally, this ought not in all reason to be laid to our charge, any farther than thus, that this accidental consequent, is a probable argument of one of these two things, either that you have better rules for the restraining of such Dissensions than we, or else that you are more careful in executing the rules you have; and if either of these be said by you, I shall then tell you: 1. That it seems this Argument concludes but probably, though the proposition were granted, and I believe I could urge as probably on the other side, and conclude the excellency of our Reformation from that old saying of Clemens (by way of Answer to your Objection, both of Jews and Heathens against Christianity, taken from the Dissensions of Christians in the Primitive Church) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The cause of them is, because all things, that are excellent, are subject to the envy of Men, and Devils, and from thence to the sowing of seeds of Dissensions amongst them; agreeably to that of our Saviour, that as soon as the wheat was in the ground, the envious sowed his tares.  
Section 5 But than secondly, for the preventing of such Dissensions, I shall add, that though we have not pretence of infallibility, and threats of fire to restrain Men from them, yet we have other rules more agreeable to ancient Church practice, than either of these; and though the weapon of our warfare are not carnal in your sense of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to the taking away of life, yet are they if they were executed, mighty to bring down or shut out Heresies. For, if you know it not, I can tell you, that Excommunication (that sovereign receipt of Christ and his Apostles, the most perfect design of charity, to save and recover that which is lost, to shame Men to reformation) and upon contempt of that, that secular rougher hand interposing, the Writ de Excommunicato capiendo, and the Statute of Abjuration are very strong restraints; and if they have not been so diligently executed as they ought to be, though I hope you will pardon this fault, yet he that will not, must charge it only on the Persons of our Magistrates, and not on our Religion, or the state of our Reformation. And then let me add that even these laws, and this execution of them, or the like, whether among you or us can extend no farther then to outward restraints, and that only of those that will be so terrified, or to punishment of them that will not; but not to preventing of Heresies in the inward rise or growth, or sometimes in the breaking out, whensoever ambition of being Leader of a Sect, etc. are more prevailing than fear of punishments, which cases must be looked for in every Church.  
Section 6 To which purpose you may please to reflect upon yourselves, and tell me, whether there were not good store of Heretics before the times of the Reformation, If not, I am sure Irenaeus, & Epiphanius, and Saint Augustine, and Philastrius have abused us in their Catalogues; and I beseech you, but to remember the ridiculous Heresies of Galatia (which Saint Jerome mentions on occasion of Gal. 3.1. in respect of which he conceives the Apostle calls them such fools, and thinks they were bewitched) particularly those of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that would have Cheese mixed with the Bread in the Sacrament, which with two others of the like stamp, there mentioned, came from Ancyra the Metropolis of Galatia. And yet I believe you would not think the Argument of much force, if it should (from your example against us) be made use of by us either against those Apostolical Churches, or against the Roman Church ever since, that so many Heresies are gone out of it; and yet that would be as reasonable in us, as in you it is to charge all the Heresies which have been in the World since Luther, upon the Reformation.  
Section 7 For, let me ask you, is the fault that you object to us in this matter, that Heretics are gone out from us? That which we have said will satisfy you that that is no argument, that we are not a true Church, for if it be, it will be of force against the Catholic Orthodox Church in all Ages. Or is it, that they that thus descent from us are suffered to continue among us? if that be it, than first there are also Dissenters among you, continuing with you. Secondly, our Laws and Canons are for the casting them out, if their dissentings be Heretical, and that is all that you can pretend of these, and if we have been more indulgent than you would have us, that is but an error of tenderness first, and then that only the fault of Persons.  
Section 8 Having said thus much (which I conceive full ground of satisfaction to what you have or can say in this matter) I might now add, that if you look no farther than the Church of England even in these (which I suppose you will count the) worst times of it, you cannot find any greater or more dangerous Heresies avowed by any considerable Party than are owned by some of the Jesuits among you.  
Section 9 I shall first mention that popular doctrine (you know what I mean) of Bellarmine, resumed and confirmed not long before his death, with his most advised care in his Recognitions. Secondly, the doctrine and practice of resisting and deposing lawful Magistrates under colour of religion (that I set it no higher, even to killing of Kings.) Thirdly, the opposing the Order of Bishops, as expressly contrary to the sole-power enstated by Christ on S. Peter. And also Fourthly, the affirming it lawful that evil may be done, so it be in order to a public good; and that I trouble you with no more (and yet give you reason to think that it is in my power) I beseech you to believe that I have read Watson's Quodlibets, (and I could without much difficulty make a parallel betwixt these whom you so much charge, and those whom you defend, your hatedst Enemies, and your dearest Friends, that Book being so richly able to furnish me with hints) & that I have surveyed the Writings betwixt the Seculars and the Regulars (with the late controversy among you about the Bishop of Calcedons being appointed Ordinary in this Kingdom, produced) and in them the difference about the necessity of Confirmation, and the [non] (even now mentioned) in the Canon of the Council, as also the Symbolum Jesuiticum, etc. and if we have any greater divisions among us yet, than these, I beseech you to let me know it from you (for I believe 'twill be no easy discovery) and I shall promise to do and pray my utmost, that they may be avoided.  
Section 10 This being thus set betwixt us, I shall not need to descend to a particular survey of the truth of what you say, that these differences among you are in matters not the fide; though in that there would be a large field to amplify in also.  
Section 11 To his Lordship's argument, [That the Church ought to have resolved these questions if they desired conformity with the ancient Church] you answer, that neither of these Doctrines hinder Conformity with the Ancients in any thing wherein Conformity is required; and confirm that by an implicit Assertion, which you will never be able to prove, viz: that the Fathers did not deliver doctrines (as well as reasons) directly contrary to the Dominicans; Whereas 'tis clear they did, viz: to that, that physical predeterminations can consist with freedom of will. Which even now you thought good (not to deny but) to excuse by a dilemma, that if this opposition were not discovered to the Dominicans, it would do no hurt, if it were, it would be relinquished. It seems by this, that if they are discovered, and not relinquished, the danger would then be great, and so that if they knew this conformity, this conformity would be requisite also, and so is requisite in itself, though by the excuse of blameless ignorance it be capable of mercy.  
Section 12 To the 42 Sect. you answer by granting again, and thus you say also Master Ch. is answered, and truly so any Man will be content to be answered; I would all his Lordship's Treatise had been so answered, it had been more ease to yourself, and advantage to somebody else.   

To the 43 Sect. Chap. 25.  
We do not formally infer, that because our rule breeds unity, therefore all dissenting Parties ought to yield to that; but that dissenting Parties have no rule on which it is fit, or safe to rely; and again, that in place of it, we ought to seek out one which causes unity, because no rule can be good without that quality. Nevertheless it follows also, ours is the true rule, because, de facto, none but ours either doth it, or is apt to do it, and one such rule there must be, we are sure. Ours then is not therefore to be accepted, because it breeds unity, but because it alone doth breed it. As for Nilus, he is a prattling Greek, and besides that in his several sayings he overthrows himself, and confirms our Doctrines; in this point no heed is to be taken to what he saith.   

Chap. 25. Answ. to Chap. 25.  
Section 1 In this Chapter you disclaim an Assertion by affirming it; disclaim it in these words, [That you do not infer, because your rule breeds Unity, therefore all dissenting Parties ought to yield to it] and affirm it in these [That dissenting Parties have no rule, that they ought to seek out one that causes unity, that yours is the true rule, and none but yours:] your meaning is, it seems, that you do infer it, but you do it not formally; and sure it matters little for formality, when the thing is so granted by you.  
Section 2 For that you put in the word [only] it matters little; because any other company that should deny that infallibility, and usurp it themselves, would soon get the monopoly of it also, especially from any that differed from them in any particular. As for Nilus, 'tis far cheaper and easier to call him prattling Greek, than to confute his saying, which yet, if you please to mark his words in this place, is no more than you say in the very undertaking to answer this Treatise, that your Church must by all be looked on as infallible.   

To the 44, 45, 46, 47, Sections, Chap. 26.  
In these four Sections the Enquirer busily endeavours to persuade that errors might secretly creep into the Church by degrees, as a Child waxes bigger, and as the index of a Clock moves about. Be it so as the Enquirer saith, yet nevertheless, might all such creeping errors, if there were any, be espied, at least, when they had once got in, if not while they were stealing thither. Thus the growth of a Child is seen plainly, though not the growing, and the hand, or shadow of a Dial is seen at what hour it is, though the slow pace thither was not perceptible; and Men may give a judgement whether it go false or true. Why then could not errors be espied as easily after they were once stolen in, though by never so small degrees, they made their approaches thither? Thus were the errors of Arius, Pelagius, Wicliffe, Socinus, and others, presently discovered, notwithstanding all their Authors counterfeiting and sly manner of divulging them; even as tares, which were sown while Men slept: as soon as grown up were seen and noted. What then should hinder all other pretended errors of the Church from being seen and registered, although crept in never so insensibly?  
What matter is it that sundry Books are lost? Are they more lost for those errors, then for others? or were these more invisible than all the rest? It is strange with what improbable conjectures this Enquirer deludes himself.  
He tells us afterwards of another sly way of breaking in, that is to say, under old names and titles, altering the signification, but not the words. But I would know how the errors of the Church could by this art be concealed, more than the errors of Calvin, who sought with old appellations to palliate his new Doctrines.  
But, in conclusion, his principal device is, that if no precedent opposition were a note of the being taught from the beginning, that then the doctrine of the Chiliasts would pass for right and Apostolical, because, as he affirmeth, it was not contradicted till two hundred years after the coming in. But my answer is, it is more than any Man can prove, that it was contradicted no sooner: nay, it is more than probable, that it was contradicted in the time of S. Justin, as we have showed before, and also highly probable, that it was opposed and rejected in the time of Dionysius the Arcopagite, as also hath been noted before.  
Besides, it is no way necessary that every casual or innocent opinion should be forthwith contradicted, or noted as an error against faith; and of this sort was the error of the Chiliasts during the time it was held but as an opinion, without censuring or condemning others, to which height, assoon as it arrived, it was cried down presently and rejected.  
The 48 Sect. contains but a recapitulation of what was before propounded, and therefore requires no new answer to it.  
The last Sect. contains nothing that deserves not commendation, or is unworthy of the Author, but is rather to be extolled and imitated by all that make Inquiries after truth, and his resolves there be such, that if they be truly and sincerily put in execution by any, no man can have reason to be offended with him in this world, nor is it likely that God will be displeased with him in the next. But whether the Enquirer was not very unhappy in his searches after truth, or no, I leave it by the searcher of all hearts to be determined.   

C. 26. Answ. to C. 26.  
Section 1 To your answer to the undiscernablenesse of errors, that though they are not seen at the time, they may be seen after. I reply, that I confess it possible they may be seen after, and that some are so, very soon after, but yet sure not all presently after, at least not publicly and vulgarly seen; As they are seen, so they may be made known to the world, some a long time after others; and this is sufficient to show, that the Authors of the errors may possibly not be seen & discovered at all, though the error in process of time chance to be so, which will be most evidently true, if it be farther considered (what his Lordship affirmed) that errors came in by degrees, and not at once.  
Section 2 To your question what it matters that sundry books are lost? I answer, that thus much it matters, that from thence it follows infallibly, that 'tis possible there might be opposition against any doctrine, though in the writings we have, there be none mentioned, and as you disprove not that, so his Lordship desires not to have more acknowledged.  
Section 3 Your next answer by retortion against Calvin will be of no force, unless Calvin undertook to be infallible.  
Section 4 For the matter about the Chiliasts as you refer to your answer before, so do I to my reply, only from your favour or indulgence to that opinion, during the time that it was held but as an opinion, without censuring or condemning others; but then withdrawing that favour when it arrived to that height; I am very glad and joyful to join issue with you, and charitably to suppose (though I affirm it not) that till you took upon you to condemn and censure others, any opinion you held, merely as an opinion, might do you no irreparable hurt; but now that you proceed to that insolent unmerciful height, what mercy can you expect from your own principles, by which yet we that censure not, condemn not, are confident to hope for some kindness from you, though not from other men.  
Section 5 To the 48 Sect. I shall take your example likewise, and to the last commend your ingenuity for commending that, that deserved it so much; and only demand with what conscience you could think him very unhappy in those searches, which you confess to be so happy in proposing; for sure if unhappiness signify the ill success of his searches, there can be (according to your Principles) no fear that they should by God be permitted to be unhappy; or if it signify any fault in them, you cannot without uncharitableness, and judging of hearts pronounce him guilty of it.   

The Conclusion.  
The general result of all that which hath been debated hitherto betwixt the Enquirer and me, is, in effect, no other but that, First, the Catholic Church's infallibility is a sovereign preservative against error; and against all dissension or dis-union in believing, unto all those who do acknowledge it, and yield submission thereunto. Secondly, that each new verity defined by that Church is to them a new path to heaven, though on the other side, to all such other as refuse to be directed by her, it may prove just as the Enquirer is pleased to express himself, a new path to walk in towards the Devil, or one step more unto damnation. And in this he was in the right, and spoke truer than he was aware. Now it is well known that all we Catholics are guided by that same infallibility; and again, that on the contrary all Anti-Catholiques do resist it, and what will follow out of this, is no hard matter to collect. Moreover, this same infallibility, a quality so unpleasing to the Enquirer, cannot, as he surmises, make us sure, if we be in error, never to mend, for we all do offer freely that if either he, or any of his side be sure to disprove sound and clearly the infallibility, we will be as sure to mend and forthwith to relinquish it; by which expected act of theirs we shall be reduced unto such good terms, in which all Anti-Catholiques continually are, that is to say, to believe at random, reel wildly up and down unconstantly, and fall at variance amongst ourselves, as they do; and then I hope the Enquirer will be contented with us.  
But the want on their behalf of such an efficacious proof as this, hath been the true reason why we have not hitherto thought of any alteration, or coming towards them. Certainly it is much better to be persuaded though falsely, of an infallibility, then to be sure to have none, as you now are, but to be wrangling perpetually, falling out and fight amongst yourselves; whereas, before you were, when as our Religion prevailed, this inconvenience happened not. So that, in fine, all the goodly fruits you have reaped from your impugning Church and Counsels, and in bringing in instead thereof a new invention of your own, is but the making of yourselves and your Country miserable, which daily, by dear experience we find. And so much for the Enquirer's unadvised impugnation of the infallibility of the Catholic Church.   

Chap. 27. Answ. to the Conclusion.  
Section 1 In your Conclusion which recapitulates the sum of these debates betwixt his Lordship and you, your first result is acknowledged perfectly, upon supposition that your Church were infallible; but than whether it be or no, that is the question still, and its being taken by you for a Principle, when 'tis so far from being supposed one, is the clear ground of the Irreconcileablenesse betwixt You and Us. For, upon supposition that we were your Proselytes in all manner of doubts besides, yet your requiring us to believe you not only in the right, but infallible, equally obligeth us to believe all that your Church can possibly ever affirm, as what you do already, and then we must have a strong faith indeed to be able to bear such a burden. Whereas if you could but be brought to think it possible, you might be deceived, we could then find place in you for Scripture and reason to make impression: but till then, you have that terrible prejudice against them, whensoever they are produced against you (and whensoever they are urged for you, they are to little purpose, only to confirm you in the belief of that which you are already infallibly persuaded to be infallible) that they are but temptations and shafts of Satan, which, the stronger they come, and the more irresistibly, the more is your faith obliged to resist them all; and to that this one fortification is sufficient, that you know that whosoever doubts of your infallibility, is not fit to be heeded in any thing else; Reason must cease to be Reason, Scripture to be Scripture, when it appears on that Argument.  
Section 2 And that sure is the reason that this Treatise of his Lordships, which consists not of more Paragraphs, than convincing Reasons, against your Infallibility, is so easily rejected, or forgotten by you, that now you cannot acknowledge ever to have heard any such on that Theme. And then I shall not attempt to hope to have so much, either Logic or Rhetoric, as to make that impression on you.  
Section 3 Only let me desire you to consider the ground of your last period but one, that certainly it is better to be persuaded, though falsely, of an Infallibility, then to be sure to have none.  
Section 4 Where first you must, if you speak intelligibly, intimate that your error is better (not only than another error, but) than truth, for the Infallibility you suppose to be an error, when you so speak, but the no-infallibility you do not suppose to be no-truth.  
Section 5 But than Secondly, I am so far from this opinion of yours, that I conceive it hard to imagine any error, that could do so much harm, as this of the pretended Infallibility, supposing it as now you do, to be an error; for that which brings a certain possibility (if no more) of all errors after it, and leaves no one falsity out of the Creed; that 'tis possible for all temptations to persuade your Church, is certainly a complicated error, and may well be called Legion, for nothing else can be so numerous as this; I'm sure not the believing you fallible, though you were not so; For, that would be but one error, and no other necessarily consequent to it, it being very possible for him that hath that opinion of you▪ to think every thing else that you think, to think you actually in the truth, although it be possible you may be in the wrong. Not to mention the great injury that that Infallibility, if it did belong to you, would in one respect be apt to do you, I mean to deprive your Church of all reward for any truths you preach, there being no matter of reward where there is no possibility of doing otherwise, nor capacity of a crown, where, for want of a p●ssibility of being overcome, there is also an impossibility of obtaining victory.  
Section 6 Thus have I given you an impartial account how much, or rather how little, your Papers have wrought upon my understanding; and truly as the end of my writing any thing was, that I might satisfy your judgement, so the main end of my enlarging to so many particulars, and, (as you may see by the expressions of my then-present-intentions at the end of the first Chapter) to a length which I had resolved against, by examining almost every period in your seven sheets, was to satisfy your desire, signified in putting your Papers into so many hands, that, to tell you tru●, after I had read them over, and declined the having any thing to do with them once, then within few days after found another way to come to my hands again; so that it had not been civility toward you to have put you to any more trouble, or farther to have tempted you to think yourself victorious. To fortify you the better against that temptation, I have been perhaps more plain and punctual sometimes then would otherwise have been necessary; and if when you have read it over, you find any such plainness to have been without cause, upon your signification of your se●ce of any such my offence, I will promise to ask your pardon; mean while I shall not trouble you with any farther thoughts of continuing this Controversy, (peace and unity and amity of pens and hearts being much a more lovely thing) but desire that if any thing in your Paper (as far as it presses his Lordship) be in your opinion unsatisfied, it may in few words, without such a large trouble as this, be mentioned by you▪ and then friendly debated betwixt us at any time of meeting; of which whensoever by the means that this came to my hands, you shall signify to me your pleasure, I shall not fail to serve you, being indeed resolved never to be thus injurious to my Reader again in civility to any man.  
From my Study Sept. 23. 1645.    

An Appendix, or Answer to what was returned by the Apologist.  
TO this Reply of mine what was by the Apologist returned in the Margin of my Paper, shall be now distinctly set down, as the Preface promised, with a direction (by some Letter of the Alphabet) to that part of any Chapter of the discourse, to which each of his Annotations were applied, and affixed. And for Answer to them I shall not need enlarging.  In the Introduction, at the letter [A] this Annotation was set in the Margin. [I know of neither Scoffs nor Triumphs.] 
Answ. That there are such, the Reader will give credit to his own eyes, if he review the latter part of your first Chapter, as also the close of the 8 and of the 15 Chapter; And that you ought to know them, i. e. acknowledge and reform them, as being contrary, the former to that Charity, the latter to that Meekness, which our Saviour left in charge with those that would be called by his name, I hope you will discern, and confess with me.  C. 2. B. the Annotation is [I do not treat here what is done by some, but what in propriety of speech ought to have been done.] 
To this I answer, first, That it being true (as this Reply confesses) that some Romanists used that stile of Catholic Roman Church, (though this Apologist did not) This is fully sufficient to justify his Lordship's title, because he was not bound to foresee that this Apologist would reform the stile of others; And secondly, though it be not propriety of speech, yet was that no argument neither, because his Lordship that holds that Church fallible in greater matters, might conceive it possible for them to be so in matter of propriety of speech, nay was confident that so they were, being not able to disbelieve his eyes and ears, that of this they were guilty, as improper as it is. But than thirdly, the matter is yet more clear against the Apologist, for though his Lordship's title did not presage, yet I which had read that Answer, could see that he himself said that the Church Catholic was the Roman, and the Roman the Catholic, and that is the thing which I affirmed from his own words in that place to which that Annotation is prefixed. And therefore for him to say, that in propriety of speech this ought not to be done] as it is an accusation of himself, who was guilty of that impropriety, so is it not a confutation of me, who only said he was so.  Ib. C. [We speak here according to the rules of formal predication, not for reprehension of the Enquirer, but for rectifying the manner of speaking, and stating the Question rightly.] 
Answ. 'Tis not imaginable how this note could advantage the Writers cause. In the very place to which this note is affixed, I am a proving by rules of formal predication, that, by what is said by the Romanists, and particularly by yourself, it is apparent, that you affirm the Roman Church to be Infallible, though not quatenus Roman. this conclusion you deny not to follow from those rules, but say [you speak according to those rules.] And truly I have as yet no necessity to deny that you do so, nor shall I, until having affirmed the Roman Church to be the Catholic, you proceed to deny the Roman to be Infallible, though the Catholic be. This you do not yet distinctly deny, (though the whole controversy about the title of his Lordship's book shows that you are not very willing to stand to the affirmative.) When you do so, I shall make bold to put you in mind of those rules, and in the mean only to take notice of your own confession, that what you said was not for reprehension of the Enquirer: which I must affirm to be a retrataction of your former writing, which pretended to prove that in truth it was not so, as in the Enquirer's title it is called. This was then surely a reprehension of the Enquirer, and if now you say you meant not to reprehend him, this is to say you did not mean to do what you did, which being a ●●ile of humility I shall never reproach or find fault with in you; ●ut yet tell you, that what you call in the next words of your Annotation, your [rectifying the manner of speaking, and stating the Question aright] is in my Answer proved to be contra●y to your own manner of speaking; and a clear misstating To which proofs as here you reply nothing, (nor is it imaginable how you should, the matter being so evident, viz: that they that affirm the Roman Church, to be the Catholic, and the Catholic to be infallible, must needs affirm the Roman to be infall●bl●) so do you in effect confess that you had nothing to reply to the remainder of that whole Chapter, which as it is the longest in the Book, so by vindicating the fitness of his Lordship's title, and stating of the Question against your exceptions, doth l●y very useful grounds for the voiding your pretensions to infallibility: For if it be cleared by my first Chapter (as I conceive it is, and your Annotations do not deny it to be) that the Question is of the infallibility of the Roman Church, than we that deny the Roman to be the Catholic must never be charged of denying the Catholic to be infallible, nor be liable to the arguments that are brought against us upon that head, (which without question are the b●st you have) though we deny it never so confidently of the Roman.  Id. D. Surely the meaning is very obvious.] 
Answ. If it be, I am sure the words do not clearly express it, for how should the editor of his Lordship's tract (to whom the former part of that period belongs, in these words [though no notice hath been taken of any answer given already]) take notice of giving licence for any other answer? Give notice he might, but that in my judgement is not to take; and take notice you might, but that I conceive would not cohere with the antecedents, and any third way of rendering, I confess I imagine not; and therefore still if the meaning be obvious, it must be met with somewhere else, then in the sound, and contexture of the words, but this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 shall not be imputed to you, it was only an officiousness in me then, to show you it was such.  Id. E. These are bitter scoffs, and no way grounded upon my words. 
Answ. That the phrase [sad news] was grounded on your words there recited by me, I must still affirm, for they are most evidently a form of complaining, and that is all I meant by [sad news:] yet if to you it seem to be a scoff, or bitter, and both those in the plural, (more scoffs than one in that single expression) though my conscience doth not accuse me of any such intention, yet I will fall at your judgement, and beseech you to pardon me for it, and to make you reparations, promise to endeavour to offend no more against you, or any other Adversary by any kind of bitterness; and for once be you pleased to imitate my resolution, and remember, that when another man spoke it [sad news] was a bitter scoff, and then perhaps your reprehension of me may work a double cure, and heal you also of some excesses.  
Chap. 2. Answ. to Ch. 2. A. I do not beg the Question, but deny what the Enquirer assumed as true and granted, namely that our proofs of the Church are no other nor better than those by which you impugn it: which assumpt of his we deny, and whether justly or no, must depend upon the trial and the examination of his proofs to follow after; and therefore this denial of mine is no petitio principii, but a right and Logical denial, which either the Enquirer or you were bound to disprove, and not to tell us as you do that we are bound to prove against the Enquirer, who here chargeth us, and sustaineth the Person of the Opponent, or one that argues against our Infallibility.  
I am the Defendant, and no Defendant can beg the Question, my discourse is Apologetical as the Title tells you.  
Answ. I did not venture to tell you that you were guilty of a petitio principii, until I had, as I conceived, made an ocular demonstration to you that it was such, which you may please to review in the place; or to save you that trouble, I shall tell you the sum of it; you deny a proposition, which in that place 'tis clear that his Lordship proves, and having not answered one word to his proofs (which is in effect to deny the conclusion) you then give a proof or reason of your denial [for we affirm that our Church's infallibility is proved by reasons which are real and true, etc.] this reason of yours being as much denied by his Lordship, as your main conclusion against which he disputes, aught in any reason to have been backed with some firm proof, and of that kind you give none but your own affirmation; and because you do not, this I there call a petitio principii, agreeably both to Aristotle's notion of that Sophism, and to the notation of the phrase. For principium, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, being acknowledged to signify the question, for that or any part of it to be brought in to prove any thing that in that disputation is denied, is either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to beg the question, or take it for granted, and in effect, to prove a thing by itself, (which is the most irrational proceeding that can be.) If you are not yet convinced of this, I shall yet farther give you a proof of it from those ancient Authors, which can best judge of this matter, the Interpreters of Aristotle; Take one for all, 
† 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. fol. 28.  Magentius, in his definition of this Sophism. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A begging of the question is, when any thing is proved by itself, which ought to be proved by something else. Or again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, when that which is proposed to be proved, is used as a medium, to prove itself. Or again, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, when we use a medium which seems to differ from the question (or the thing to be proved) but is all one with it. As if to prove that pleasure is good, I should assume, that pleasure is to be chosen, whereas, saith he, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that which is good, and that which is to be chosen are all one: and therefore unless that be farther proved, that pleasure is to be chosen, there is nothing done toward the proving it to be good. That this is your very manner of proceeding, I need not farther prove, having done it so newly by laying your whole process before you; I shall only add the note of that Scholiast, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The not demonstrating of what we undertake, is the genus of this begging the Question; or Begging the Question is a special species of not demonstrating; and unless you will discern first, and then labour to repair this infirmity in your discourses, all your mentions of the Philosopher in his Analytickes, will not persuade us that you are likely to demonstrate.  
Thus much I had briefly said to you before, but now have been forced to lay down more largely; and let me tell you, that when I had not only affirmed, but proved you guilty of this Sophism, you ought either by denying my premises, or by some other way to have answered my proof.  
And in stead of so doing, To say only [you are not guilty] is a denying my conclusion, and petitio principii again. And from this you cannot be cleared by what you add [that you deny what the Enquirer assumed as true and granted;] For First, I say you were to have answered or denied my premises, and you only assay to prove your own conclusion; Secondly, your way or medium of proving that, is not concluding neither; For the thing assumed (by his Lordship) being this, [That the means brought to prove your Infallibility were fallible means, and so granted by you] his Lordship did not assume this as granted or true in itself immediately or without proof, but proceeded to prove it to be true and granted by you, and that by this medium, because with you nothing was conceived infallible, but the Church: That conclusion then (being not set down as a premise or principle of probation, but as a conclusion proved by that medium) you again profess to deny, (remember I say you deny the conclusion) and then sure we want no trial to discover the justness of so doing; and whereas you say his proofs follow after, I answer, that some other proofs follow after, but one sufficient proof is brought in that place; and the denying the conclusion without answering of that one proof, is it which brought all this charge and inconvenience upon you, and therefore you now see I do not require of you (as you say I do) to prove against the Enquirer, but only to answer his proofs; But if in stead of doing so, you will take upon you to prove the conclusion which the Enquirer hath disproved, and do that only by a bare saying somewhat which you know he denies, this is a petitio principii still. And your second Argument that it is not, taken from your being Defender, or Answerer, or Apologist, will no more quit you from that charge; for though an Answerer as long as he doth no more but either deny the major or minor, or answer to either of them by distinguishing, limiting, &c. cannot be guilty of that fault, yet if he deny none but the conclusion, he doth in effect, and interpretatiuè beg the Question, and if instead of denying of, or answering to the premises, he go about to prove the Question in hand, or any part of it, he doth by so doing, take the place of an Opponent upon him. Now because 'tis possible for an Answerer to do one of these, though he ought to do neither, it follows, that by either of those ways the Answerer may beg the Question, and both those are your case at this time, as hath, I conceive, already been manifested, and therefore I must be excused, if I still conceive my conclusion is regular, the Apologist is guilty of that Sophism.  C. 5. Answ. to C. 5. A. An Answerer is not bound to prove but to defend; This Arguer and the Replyer, which is yourself, are bound to prove. 
Answ. He that keeps himself strictly to the Respondents task, i. e. either to deny, or limit, or distinguish of either of the premises in the Objection, is not, I confess, bound to prove, because he is not supposed to affirm any thing, his repelling the Enemy's weapons, or avoiding of them, is enough to defend himself. And if this were your case, I should be unjust to require any proofs from you. But you must be a very great Despiser of my Papers, if you did not take notice in that place, that I was forced to be plain with you, and tell you that you had not answered (either by denying or distinguishing, etc.) any one word to his Lordship in your whole fifth Chapter, but fell into other discourses of your own, which course as it is not the part of an Answerer strictly taken, so if it be permitted him at all, it must oblige him to give proof for all such assertions as he shall bring in thus casually, or else never to expect, or require to be heeded by his Adversary.  
And of such assertions as these, (which were casual and extrinsecall to your discourse, and by me conceived false) it was, that I required proof from you, and you are still my Debtor for it.  Chap. 6. Answ. to the 6. Chap. A. If we affirm our principles be certain, contrary to the Enquirers surmise, you, if you can, are to prove they are not, or else leave off contending. 
Answ. Certainly this is very strange usage, when that which you call the Enquirers surmise, is a conclusion induced by the Enquirer by many strong proofs. This you know is there evidenced by me, and if I had been mistaken, you should have said so.  
This being supposed, I must tell you, that it is far from being sufficient for you, to affirm your principles to be certain; for when the Enquirer hath proposed many Arguments to prove they are not certain, and among the rest this convincing one, [That your Church (which is your infallible) is offered to be proved by such marks as the ignorant cannot seek it by, and the learned, though never so honest, may chance not to find it by] for you still to affirm they are certain, and to add no more, is but to deny the conclusion; and against such an one 'tis to little purpose for me to bring farther proofs, when those that are already brought are so dealt with; and truly unless you please to give over this course of denying conclusions, and not considering premises, I will soon obey your advice, and resolve to leave off contending.  Ibid. B. Our Authors have proved all that we in defending do affirm, and if the Enquirer had impugned their proofs, we then would have tried to defend; wherefore that which we affirm and declare, doth not rest upon a bare affirmation, although I prove them not in this place, as being here a mere Defendant, and not an Arguer. 
Answ. This annotation being upon the same occasion, and in substance the same with the former, is already answered. Only I shall add, that if you affirm aught which your Authors in other Books bring proof for, this will not excuse you from a necessity of answering his Lordship's arguments against that conclusion of your Authors; or if it do, you must not pass for a Defendant. His part it is to ward the Adversaries blows, and if he make a thrust himself, he than turns Offendent or Arguer, and when he doth so, he must take care his weapon have some edge (I mean, his affirmations some proofs annexed) or else they will wound no body. As for the Enquirer, i. e. his Lordship, it was not his present task to descend to an enumeration and impugning of all your Authors arguments (though yet those which he could think of as your chief, he hath insisted on; and were he alive, he would from your dealing here have little encouragement to seek out for others) his intention was to frame arguments against your conclusion, and if you had denied or answered them, you needed not to have troubled yourself to affirm any thing; or if out of design, or ex abundanti, you will, you must be content to be called upon to prove it; For call yourself what you please, you must be an Arguer when you so affirm.  Ibid. C. Yes sure by consequence it is. 
Answ. I am forced to ask your pardon, if I know not certainly to what part of my discourse this Annotation belongs, whether to the end of one period, or the beginning of the other. Yet it falls out luckily, that which soever it is, it is again the denying the conclusion (which you are very subject to) for the end of the former period is the mention of a conclusion deduced from grounds immediately before specified. And the beginning of the second period is a negation of mine, with proof immediately following it, and before I come to the proof, [For though, etc.] you presently interpose your [Yes sure by consequence it is] but will not consider me so much, as after my example to give the least proof for what you say, or take notice of that proof of mine.  C. 7. Answ. to C. 7. A. I make no distinction here, but suppose it made and also manifest. 
Answ. I only said you had given a distinction (not made it) and that supposed it made also; and I then contained myself from taking any exceptions to it; only I told you the applying of it to that place would have afforded some game if I had been so sportingly disposed. And to that I pray consider how pertinent your Annotation hath proved. I will not be provoked to add more.  Ibid. B. Your part was to have confuted what I say, and not so often, and to no purpose repeat this Petitio Principii. 
Answ. If it be a sufficient confutation of any Sophister to find out, and tell him of his sophism (which ipso facto is worth nothing when 'tis discovered, as the title of Aristotle's Book of Elenches supposes, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being defined by Varinus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a discovery of that which was hid; and 'tis manifest by comparing 1 Cor. 14.24. with v. 25. & Eph. 5.13.) then have I obeyed you in confuting what you say, though I take not your advice for the way of it. And indeed if it should be in any Duellers power to prescribe to his Adversary (when he is in his danger) that he shall not wound him this way, but some other, or if it were regular for you to forbid me to tell you of a Petitio principii, (when you are clearly guilty of it, and when to evidence that against you, is not only the shortest, but most logical, most expedite and most clear way of redargution) your Adversary might be weary of playing out the prize, though he were sure to conquer in it. I showed you that an Answerer might so carry the matter; as to be guilty of Petitio principii, and 'twas but passion in you to check or tell me, 'twas to no purpose, that I said you were so.  C. 8. Answ. to C. 8. A. We have done it, and do it continually when occasion requires. 
Answ. I beseech you read over those lines of mine to which your Annotation is affixed, and speak your conscience, whether you think 'twas fitly noted, If you can be so partial to your own creature, I will not contend with you, but only tell you, that as I conceive it impertinent, so I see apparently, that 'tis contrary to that other speech of yours, which within three lines I there recited from you. For if you do it continually (i. e. prove the Roman Church to be the true by its agreement with Scripture, etc.) as here your Annotation saith you do, how could you say his Lordship was mistaken in supposing you did so? I wish you had first read out to the end of the period, and then I suppose you would have fitted your Annotation to it the better.  Ibid. B. I do not disclaim Scripture, though I do not hold it to be the first or foremost proof either of the Church or of Christian Religion, and would know how you yourself would convert an Infidel or Atheist by Scripture, beginning with that proof. 
Answ. You must again remember (what my last Answer mentions) that in that place when his Lordship had supposed you to prove the Roman Church to be the true Church by its agreement with Scriptures and antiquity, which is in effect by holding the truth, you plainly tell him he is mistaken in you. On this ground I must conclude (and think it proved by that confession) that you do disclaim Scripture, as far as I said you did, i. e. not to all purposes, but to that of which the discourse was, viz: to prove your Church to be the true Church. And 'tis not enough to say that you do not hold it to be the first or foremost proof, etc. For if it be used by you as any proof at all, that will also be a very probable means, (besides that it makes it evident, that his Lordship was not mistaken in supposing it so) to bring you into the circle which you were so careful to avoid. You see I am clear from your Animadversion, and so have no occasion to enter into that new controversy, whether the Scripture be the foremost proof either of the Church, or of the Christian Religion, (though sure it may be one without being the other, it may be the foremost proof of evidencing which is the true Church to them that are supposed Believers (and none else will be fit for that enquiry) yet not be the first means to prove Christian Religion to Unbelievers:) And yet I shall not be over-coy, nor make much scruple to tell you my opinion of this also, that I would not begin with an Infidel, with that proof to either purpose, as supposing he did believe it, or that it would of its own accord attract his belief infallibly; but for Christianity itself, I should first labour to win somewhat upon his affections by converse, and by showing him the excellency of the Christian precepts, (and the power of them in my life) bring him to think my discourse worth heeding, then when I had gotten that advantage, I would relate the rem gestam of Christianity, where all the acts, and miracles, and passages of Christ's life would come in; then, if he doubted of the truth of it, tell him the authority, by which it comes down to us in a continued, undistributed, undenied tradition; from those that were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, oculate Witnesses of Christ, and the whole matter; and to as good an advantage as I could, compound the several motives of Faith together, which if you please you may view at leisure in Grotius de verit. Chr. Rel. and when by these means I had converted him, I should then by Scripture and antiquity, (which would now be of some authority with him) and not by miracles, attempt to manifest to him which were the true Church. To which end it may be worth your remembering, that your Apostle of the Indies Xaverius▪ thought fit for their use to compile a double Gospel, one of Christ, another of S. Peter, by the authority of one of them to teach them Christianity, of the other, the supremacy and infallibility of S. Peter's chair. But I shall not give myself liberty to enlarge on this.  Ib. C. I deliver the method, and how it may be, I also affirm or declare that it is, I was not in this place to prove, but to defend against the Enquirers arguments, and no other, and therefore those two quarrels needed not. 
Answ. The design of most of your Notes is to save yourself from the necessity of proving any thing that you affirm, whereas it might be but an act of a little supererogating charity if you would sometimes prove your assertions, even when by strict law you were not bound to it. But, Sir, I will not require your alms, but only your justice, and though that will not oblige you to prove, when you only defend, i. e. when you only deny the premises of his Lordship's arguments, etc. or when you are strictly an Answerer; yet when instead of that, you confront any affirmation of yours to his Lordship's conclusion (as here you do, and in all places when we charge petitio principii upon you) I must then be pardoned to put you in mind of your duty (which is that of Arguers then, and not of Respondents) either to prove what you so say, or not to think you have convinced any man. They that cannot answer one argument produced against them, may yet think fit to make use of some argument for them, hoping that may prove as convincing on their sides, as that against them: and so by divertisement put off the heat of the impression; and this you have been proved to be often guilty of, and 'twill satisfy no man to say, that you neither are, nor (because Defendant) can be guilty of so doing.  Ibid. D. Sure he hath not, for Turnbull hath vindicated himself. 
Answ. If every reply were a Vindication, than you may have affirmed truth, and then these few marginal notes of yours (such as they are) would be your Vindication also; and then I suppose you will give your free consent that they be printed. But the task would be too long to disprove what you have now said, (for it would require the examination of all those writings betwixt the two Combatants, and when that were done, you would think perhaps, that Turnbull were vindicated, and I that he were not) I shall only tell you that you had been so concluded in a circle infallibly, if you had asserted that method, which his Lordship there disproves; which is enough to vindicate his Lordship against those that do assert that method, (as sure some Romanists do) and against them he there argues and not against you, or any in that place which renounce that method.  Ibid. E. If our Church be the true Church, it must be proved firstly, as Christianity is first proved; that is to say, by motives of credibility, and supernatural ostensions, or acts not of natural and ordinary, but supernatural and extraordinary providence; and he that will not prove Christianity by this way, will not prove it at all. After this done, Scriptures and Fathers do come, but not before, and this way is not new, but the way of the Ancients. 
Answ. I have here no necessity of re-examining of the means of proving Christianity to an Infidel, it will suffice to remember that those means which are necessary to that, may be unnecessary to prove, which is the true Church, because now to him that is converted (as he that will judge betwixt true and heretical is supposed to be) other means may suffiently supply the place; such are Scripture and Antiquity, which to an Heathen are of no authority, but to a Christian, or suppositâ fide, are, and being so (as I conceive you will not think fit to deny) may well be made the umpire betwixt us, who are, I hope, allowed to be Christians still by the consent of parties, or if we are not, our pretensions to miracles will hardly gain any credit with them that have that prejudice against us.  
Mean while I must remember you that motives of credibility, as you call them, are but weak premises to induce a conclusion of such weight, as the choice of religion is. I will tell you what I should have said instead of it. Motives of excessive probability, of the same, or greater force than those, on which I ground and build the most considerable actions of my life, and which (as 
* Answ. to C. 14.  formerly I told you) if I will disbelieve, I have as good reason to mistrust the wholesomeness of every dish of meat I taste on, (which 'tis physically possible may poison me, but yet none but Hypocondriackes think it will, or fancy it so strongly, as to abst●ine) the security of any title of estate I purchase or possess, the truth of any matter of fact in the most acknowledged history or tradition among men, that I daily talk of.  
All which though they produce not (nor are apta nata to do so) a science or infallible certainty, cui non potest subesse falsum, yet do they (or are very sufficient to do so) a Faith, or fiducial assent, cui non subest dubium; of which I doubt no more, then of the demonstrated problem before me, a certainty of adherence, of which the believer is as fully possessed, and from it receives as strong motives to do any thing proportionable to that belief, as if the certitude of evidence were allowed him. And this I conceive is a degree prettily advanced above motives of credibility, for such is every the lowest probability▪ nay almost possibility, and non-repugnance, whatsoever is possible to be, being (in itself, and in case the opposite balance be not otherwise weighed down) credible, i. e. possible to be believed also. But this by the way, and ex abundanti.  C. 9 Answ. to C. 9 A. Why cannot the simple know this (viz. that the Greek Church doth not pretend from Saint Peter) as surely as they know the whole Christian Church pretends from Christ, and from no other? 
Answ. Sir, you are a little too hasty in your annotation, for if you had but read on to the next lines, you had received the answer to your question, so far as my discourse is concerned in it, viz. a specifying of divers ways, by which 'tis possible the Greek Church might (and one, whereby one part of it doth) pretend succession to S. Peter. And then that which so manifestly may be, and is, will not I hope be so easy for ignorant men to know surely that it is not, or so surely as that the Christian Church pretends from Christ, and from no other. Which yet if it have any difficulty in it not intelligible to some ignorant men, I take no pleasure in frighting any with an apprehension that God will ever damn those ignorants for not being sure of what is so difficult, so their lives be believing and Christian, and agreeable to what they do know of Christ.  C. 10. Answ. to C. 10. A. No sure, not against the ordinary necessity. 
Answ. The thing I say in that place is, that his Lordship's argument might be (I shall add, is) of force against the necessity of a guide, (meaning thereby an infallible one, for such only is to our purpose) and that that will serve his Lordship's turn, and destroy you, I there farther prove by a full explication of the whole matter. And therefore you must give me favour to leave out your epithet of [Ordinary] which you would have me interpose, when my discourse in order to its end, hath no need of it. And if you tell me you put it in in your answer to his Lordship, and that therefore I have not vindicated his Lordship from that answer, unless I take it in also; I must then confess to you, that▪ I did not so understand your words, [all this is nothing against the ordinary provision and necessity of a guide] that the word [ordinary] was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be repeated to the word [necessity] but only that it belonged to [provision] And now that I know your pleasure, I shall more clearly return my answer, that his Lordship supposes some men (and I confess myself to be one of them) to believe, that to all who follow their reason in the interpretation of Scripture, and search for tradition (i. e. the constant interpretation of the Catholic Church concerning any difficulty) God will either give his grace of assistance to find the truth, or his pardon if they miss it. To which purpose you may please to compare Justin. Mart. quest. ●. ad Orthod. and, to omit many more, Facundus Hermian. in def. 3. capit. ad Just. l. 11. p. 491. & p. 496. & l. 12. pag. 513.  
Now to them that so believe, the argument which you fetch from God's providence to conclude an infallible guide, will not, saith his Lordship, be sufficient to prove it; because he still will be able to say, that where imperfection is accepted, means of perfection are not necessary; if God will pardon weaknesses, he need not give such a measure of strength, as excludes all weaknesses; if sincerity, though with some mixture of sin, will serve turn here in viâ, we need not expect from God that integrity of faculties, which either was bestowed in paradise, or will be in heaven, to give us an unsinning innocence. And if you will still interpose, that this is nothing against the ordinary necessity, because these are cases extraordinary. I answer, that this is a great mistake; For under the Gospel or Evangelicall State (under which all men have been since the promise of Christ upon Adam's fall) there is no ordinary necessity of never missing or mistaking; our natural state being an estate of weakness, is advanced by Christ into such a condition, not wherein all weakness is excluded, but wherein sincerity with mixtures of slips and errors shall be accepted, and this as infallibly as innocence had been rewarded under the first covenant made with Adam in the first state. To the first Covenant, which is stricti juris, such pardon for slips might be extraordinary; but to this second (whereof 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or gentleness, is as much apart, as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or strict justice, was before) this pardon for invincible infirmities is as ordinary, as obligation to punishment for every slip had been before, this being a prime ingredient in that Covenant, and not extraordinarii, but ordinarii juris, that under it such slips shall not be remembered. In like manner as in this Kingdom Chancery, though it be opposed to Common Law (in one sense, as that signifies strict law) yet it is a part of our common law, as that signifies the Municipal law, or total body of laws by which this Kingdom is ruled; Equity (though perhaps it came in later, and to repair defects or excesses in the strict law) being now as much every Subjects right, and Writs out of that Court as legally required and granted, and the whole process in Chancery, as clearly sec. jura & consuetudines Angliae, and so as much Ordinary, or secundum Ordinem, as any thing that passes in the Common Pleas. And so much for your nice interposition of the word [Ordinary] to your pretended necessity of a guide; where yet I might farther tell you, that infallibility is not essential to, or inseparable from a guide; and therefore though the Guide were granted to be ordinarily necessary to the finding out of truth, yet this would not come home to infallibility. The antecedent I could make good at large, if it were now seasonable.  Ibid. B. They (i. e. misses and mistake) are called extraordinary, because happening accidentally besides the provision of the law, and not because they happen seldom. 
Answ. That misses and mistake, infirmities and ignorances', do happen besides the provision of the second, or the Evangelicall Covenant, is a mistake, as was intimated then (within few lines after those, whereon your annotation was fastened) and now at large proved in my last answer to your former annotation, and I shall not need repeat it, but only tell you there is a law of Faith (aswell as of works) and that in that law there is provision for errors, aswell as sins, and that I hope belongs to all Christians, for we are not under the Law, but under grace.  Ib. C. And why so? 
Answ. I had before given you the reason, viz: because your discourse hath tended to infer the one, and not the other.  C. 14. Answ. to C. 14. A. No man can bind another under pain of Anathema to believe as he defines, unless his definition be certain. 
Answ. There was here very little occasion for this note. For the business of anathemas, I had sufficiently restrained; First, by limiting them only to excommunications, as an act of Ecclesiastical discipline upon the refractory; and therefore Secondly, not for matter of simple believing or disbeleiving; but Thirdly, for matter of disobedience to our lawful Superiors, and that disobedience again not in refusing to submit our understandings, but our wills, and our consequent actions: and Fourthly, all this with stubbornness and perverseness, after the using of all milder courses. And with these and the like limitations there will be no more difficulty to say an Ecclesiastical Magistrate may excommunicate a disobedient refractory perverse Gain-sayer, without undertaking to be infallible, then to say a civil Magistrate may punish a Malefactor without being inerrable. And therefore when you talk of binding to believe under pain of Anathema; there is some mistake in that, or if there were not, yet Truth (if it were on grounds of Scripture believed to be so) would be as sufficient a foundation of so doing, as the infallibility of the Judge. For not only every truth is in itself as certain, as that which is infallible, (every matter of fact that is so, is as certainly true, as any demonstration in Euclid, and he that speaks it, speaks as certainly true, as if he did demonstrate, yet is not in other things infallible for all that) but he that believes it with a full assent, hath as little doubt of that truth, as if it were before his eyes; yet doth it not fide cui non potest subesse falsum, on any supposition of its infallibility; by which means (though he pretends not to infallibility, yet) having no degree of doubt, he hath that, on which he will confidently build any action, and even lay down his life for such truths, if they be of weight: which if it be not ground enough to proceed on to an Ecclesiastical censure against the stubborn and perverse you are very mercifully disposed, and I will not provoke you out of it, but rather give you my suffrage, that no man be thus censured for matter of opinion but upon that light which is clearly deducible from the Scripture, or universal tradition; and then I shall confess my sense, that to anathematise men for any matter of doctrine, of any lower alloy, is though not formally, yet interpretatiuè a kind of pretending to infallibility, usurping as much, as if men were infallible, which they that have the spirit but by measure, should have so much humility in themselves, and charity toward others, as not to be guilty of.  Ibid: B. The sword preserves not inward unity, nor satisfies the mind. 
Answ. I had no occasion to say it did. I was speaking (as your answer called me to it) of discipline, and unity, or such unity as discipline produced, which is outward unity, as opposed to division and Shisme; and yet let me tell you, it were not impossible to extend my speech to inward unity, and satisfying of the mind. For suppose a particular Church to have sufficient means to work in the hearts of her sons this inward unity, viz. by setting up the authority of Scripture, as it is interpreted by the Fathers, and receiving with due respect, and obedience all Apostolical Traditions; These, if duly revered by all Sons and Subjects, would be able to keep all of one mind in all matters of Faith (and for lower points some kind of liberty being allowed, would preserve Charity as well) and then while that Church were in this happy temper, you may farther suppose the sword of violence to come in, and disturb all, wresting out of her hands the use and exercise of those means, and beating down the authority, and taking away the reputation of them. And then in the case thus set, you will surely grant that the rightful sword, if it might be so prosperous as to vanquish the disturber, and restore what was thus violently taken away, may prove no improbable means of preserving even inward unity in this sense; and if you mark it, we spoke it not in any other. And yet once more, if we had, we might have been justified perhaps in our saying. For Heresy being a piece of carnality in the Apostles judgement, 'tis possible that the outward smart, that comes from the exercise of the power of the sword, i. e. from temporal punishments, may cure that disease, and persuade them, who instead of pleasure from their heresy, reap nothing but pain, and sorrow, to make better provision for their own flesh and blood, and think of hearing that reason, to which other honest men's ears are open, and then that may produce inward unity also, and these men's minds may be sufficiently satisfied with that truth coming thus to them tempore congruo, at a fit season of working, which at another time had been rejected. You see how little reason you had for that annotation.  C. 15. Answ. to C. 15. A. Chillingworth saith it in terms, and him also I desired to answer. 
Answ. Can you think this fair dealing? His Lordship, I made appear from his words, said it not. And you cannot say he did. But I'll: say you did say it. What is that to his Lordship, or to me who undertake only to vindicate his Lordship, and had not that rich harvest of leisure to think fit to be retained any more in other men's causes on such joyless terms as these? in which rather then I would adventure to be engaged, I should be content to be thought to have no degree of kindness to him, especially hearing that you had three great volumes prepared against Master Chill: But then I pray what is the meaning of [him also I desired to answer?] Can you think fit to impose a thing on his Lordship, which was said only by Master Chillingworth, and when you were disproved, think you had still confuted Master Chillingworth also, when you had only falsified, not confuted his Lordship? Sure, Sir, this is not fair.  Ib. B. I know very well this was objected by both of them, and this I desired to answer, whether it were in their books or no. 
Answ. Here is more of the same strain. But I did conceive by your title, that you had confuted his Lordship's tract that was published, not any unwritten discourses, which we have no way of knowing, whether they past or no, I am sure were not undertaken by me to be vindicated. I never resolved to justify all that you could say either of them said, and I might be forced to be uncivil with you, if I should enter any such debate with you.  Ib. C. Neither Arius, Nestorius, nor others could peep out for saying any thing against the doctrine received. How then could this Dionysius have escaped, if he had adventured any thing against all the Orthodox? 
Answ. You are very much given, in stead of answering Reasons, to deny Conclusions, and if that were backed with Reason, 'twere yet very improper for a Respondent, which you told us was your office at this time. But than secondly, in this matter you know, that neither I, nor his Lordship have said that all the Orthodox were for the Millennium. And yet thirdly, if they had, yet the denying the Millennium being a more tolerable opinion than those other of Arius, and Nestorius, Dionysius' opposition of the Chiliasts might pass more unresisted, than Arius, or Nestorius could do.  Ib. D. Photius tells us there were Answers given, though he recites them not, and Schottus in his Notes hath resolved them. 
Answ. I will not take the pains to see or examine whether Photius say there were Answers. If he recites them not, I shall not be much moved with such blank Papers. The truth is, this hath been the way to satisfy the hardest Arguments that ever were brought, and confuting whole Books at once, by having it given out, that they are confuted, or that Answers are made to them, when what those answers are, is not so much as intimated; this is a very cheap way of confutations; As for Schottus' Solutions, if he have any, they prevail little with us, I am sure they will not conclude that Photius foresaw, or would have counted them of any moment to alter his opinion, which was the only thing I there had occasion to take notice of.  Ib. E. Though Philoponus cite but one Epistle, yet elsewhere he numbers him among the famous Doctors. Basil, Gregory, etc. thereby insinuating he had left works as they had, and not one single Epistle to Polycarpus. This is but a conjecture, but such both we and all must use in matters of fact, and when we are to walk through dark passages of Antiquity. 
Answ. Sir, you cited three places out of Philoponus, to prove that Dionysius Arcopagita wrote those works now extant bearing his name: This testimony I told you would be nothing to your purpose, unless it testified (if not all those Books, yet) of some one wherein he wrote against the Chiliasts. But this I showed you was not done, because those places mention nothing of his, but an Epistle of Polycarpus, and in that I advertized you there was nothing against the Chiliasts. This it seems you cannot deny, but being willing to say something, say that elsewhere Philoponus numbers him amongst the famous Doctors, etc. I have not now leisure to read over all Philoponus, for that [elsewhere] (though I have reason to think that you that before cited the Chapters in Philoponus so punctually, would have had the same charity to me again, if it had suited with your interests) considering how little can be concluded from what you now cite out of him. Dionys. was numbered among the famous Doctors, Basil, Gregory, etc. doth it follow thence, that all the works now extant under his name were his▪ or particularly that wherein he opposes the Chiliasts? Nay, would not a man rather conclude from that pretended testimony of Philoponus that the Author under the name of Dionysius Ar●op. was some Writer about S. Basils' or S. Gregory's time, with whom he is there consorted, and that is somewhat later than Dionysius in the Scripture. Nay, if Philoponus really meant him, would he not rather have given him the title of an Apostolical Person, than of a famous Doctor, such as S. Basil, etc. As for the insinuation which you mention from this of Philoponus, if it did conclude as you would have it, that he left Works as they did, and not only one single Epistle, yet sure 'twill not so much as once insinuate that they were the Works, that we have under his name, much less that peculiarly, which opposes the Chiliasts, lest of all, that 'twas the Apostolical Dionysius that really wrote all these. But you confess these but a conjecture, and therefore sure 'twill be a very weak prop to hold up infallibility, especially when the conjecture if it should be supposed true, would tell us that which we had not before been told from you, that the Chiliasts doctrine was taught, (and so capable of being confuted) so early as the Apostles times, for with them this Dionysius lived.  
You conclude that such conjectures as this, you and all must use in matters of fact, etc. To which I answer that 'tis possible you may be forced to it, on supposition that you think yourself obliged to vindicate your Church's Infallibility, for 'tis very possible, there may be no better, than such conjectures to sustain it. But believe me, Sir, I will never maintain cause, as long as God keeps me in my right wits, which hath no better conjectures, than these to sustain it. And for matters of fact so long ago, they are of all things in the World the unfittest to be believed upon such conjectures. Because nothing but an authentic express witness can be ground of faith for such. There is no matter of fact done yesterday, but may if we will go by conjectures (I am sure as good and as probable as yours here) be related 10000 ways, for whatsoever may be, some bold Affirmer may conjecture was, and the more ancient, and more dark the passage was, the more liberty there will be for such Conjecturers, because the less possibility to confute any of them.  Ib. F. Salvian doth not refuse to condemn the Arian heresy, but some of the Gothick Arians for it, as men not guilty of the malice of it. 
Answ. If you look again you will find that both his Lordship, and I say that Salvian refused to condemn the Arian Heretics (not heresy) and this it seems, you confess with the restraint of [Gothick Arians] and this will serve our turns perfectly, and so we shall not quarrel about that, but hope from your own confession, that he that is not willing to condemn all Protestants, may escape as well as Salvian even in your censure.  C. 16. Answ. to C. 16. A. The Council of Constance doth not teach this [viz: that no Faith is to be kept with Heretics] neither our Doctors hold it, as Molanus, Becanus, Tannerus, Layman, Coeffecteau, Coquaeus, and others do show us. 
Answ. To teach is an equivocal word, and may signify to define by way of position or doctrine in universum; In this sense I said it not, nor do now mean it of that Synod, that they made any such determination, that it should be unlawful to keep faith with Heretics, or lawful for any man in any case not to keep it. But then to teach may signify also, to teach by example, & to lay grounds of doctrine for the justifying of such example. And thus the Council of Constance did teach it; The Emperor had given safe conduct to John Hus▪ etc. and the Synod declared that that safe conduct should be no prejudice to any Ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and that non obstante any such concession, any competent Ecclesiastical Judge might inquire, and proceed against any such Persons, and punish them as much as justice should persuade, if they would not retract their errors. And this cost those poor men their lives, whose presumption on the Emperor's safe conduct, made them venture themselves in that snare, never suspecting, that such a distinction as that could have proved so fatal to them. That you may not hereafter say I charge you unjustly, I shall set you down the very words in the Council in Binius Sess. 19  
Praesens sancta Synodus ex quovis salvo conductu per Imperatorem, Reges, & alios saeculi principes haereticis vel de haeresi diffamatis, putantes eosdem sic à suis erroribus revocare, quocunque vinculo se astrinxerint, concesso, nullum fidei Catholicae vel jurisdictioni Ecclesiasticae praejudicium generari vel impedimentum praestari posse seu deb●re declarat, quo minus dicto salvo conductu non obstante liceat judici competenti & Ecclesiastico de ejusmodi personarum erroribus inquirere, & aliâs contra eos debitè procedere, eosdemque punire, quantum justitia suadebit, si suos errores revocare pertinaciter recusaverint, etiamsi de salvo conductu confisi ad locum venerint judicii, alias non venturi: nec sic promittentem, cum fecerit quod in ipso est, ex hoc in aliquo remansisse obligatum. I shall not trouble you with the English, but only ask what this differs from teaching that Faith is not to be kept (i. e. not necessarily, but in some case may be broken) with Heretics? They that shall after safe conduct given, proceed to judgement (be it Ecclesiastical) against any man, and condemning him for heresy, deliver him up to that secular hand to punish him with death, who had given him the safe conduct, and tell him, that he, having done what in him lies, remains not obliged by his promise, but may and must put him to death, who came to that judicature, only on confidence of that his promise and safe conduct, have sure proceeded upon other notions of justice than those with which my education hath embued me, and I must profess to appeal from their judgements, as in my Reply to that citation of them, I was bold to do; and whatever your friends Molanus, etc. have thought fit to say for the saving the reputation of that Council, the matter is too gross to be palliated, and I shall not trouble myself or you to examine their excuses.  Ibid. B. Heresy is punished not for the accidental grievousness of it, but for the essential. 
Answ. This is again a denying the conclusion, (and not so much as endeavouring to prove the contrary) for this was the thing in this place clearly proved by the citation of those Laws, that all Heretics, viz: Arians and Macedonians by name) were not to be so punished, when only Eutychians were, the former of these acknowledged by you as much Heretics in respect of the essential grievousness of their doctrine, as the latter▪ From whence it follows, that either there was great partiality, or else the difference arose from the accidentals. And truly, Sir, your saying in general that it is not so, will little persuade any, when here is such evidence in the particular, that it is.  Ib. C. The title of defence is the Argument. 
Answ. There is not in that place any one word of this Title of defence, or of any other argument; And that was all I affirmed. If you please to survey the place, that will judge it betwixt us.  Ib. D. This is a hard censure, and hardly to be proved. 
Answ. I confess 'tis hard in some sense, i. e. to them that suffer under you for being Heretics (as you call those that depart from your deformations) and for being invaders (which all may at pleasure be called that are not able to resist) As for the censure it is but that for which the grounds are gathered from your own words. Which till you disprove, 'tis but your bare saying that 'tis an hard censure; or when it is proved, it matters little what difficulty there was in doing it.  Ibid. E. These were not settled violences, but tumultuous, and outrages not for religion, but for other quarrels occasioned by religions. 
Answ. The passage to which this annotation was affixed, was about the pictures of Papal approbation of Massacres, to be seen at Rome. Which if they were, as you now say, tumultuous and outrages, than it seems there is papal approbation for such; and then either that or you are fallible. But since you see it necessary to add another limitation, that the Massacres so approved were not for religion, I would fain persuade myself that you disclaim massacres for religion (the lawfulness of which you were so long defending.) And if you be now in that good mood of mercy, I shall not go about to confute or provoke you out of it, but rather pray that God confirm you and all your friends in it for a longer space, than your charitable not damning us did last in the former part of the Chapter.  Ibid. F. Those of Queen Mary's days had spoiled and stripped the Catholics of all they had, and therefore no marvel they did seek to punish them severely, and to suppress them as men would do wild Boars broken into a park or garden. 
Answ. He that should compare this annotation with the text would wonder how it came in, so without all temptation or occasion. I was there a challenging him to name one, that since Queen Mary's days was in this kingdom put to death for religion. And to the mention of Queen Mary, the annotation is affixed. But I shall excuse the impertinence; that very hint might well put him in mind of that sea of blood in Queen Mary's days. Which if it were by way of punishment for spoiling and stripping Catholics, and nor for religion; I beseech you produce one such bill of indictment brought in against the sufferers. Our stories have told us otherwise, If you have any authentic records in your Archives, I pray make us partakers of the truth; In the mean, I fear a Protestant son of a Romanist father, may when opportunity serves, pass for such a wild boar and a spoiler.  Ib. G. My sense is that religion may not be planted by arms, but being once planted and in quiet possession it may. And this I suppose no learned man will deny. 
Answ. I may believe you that this is now your sense, but that it is the sense of those words of yours, which I was then confuting, I shall be confident to deny, not only because the words bear no such sense, but because you did there yourself interpret them thus, that the thing which you disclaimed the designing by arms, was only the justifying the right and truth of religion by them. Which I then conceived to signify, that your swords do only force men to be of your minds, do not give them reasons why they should. Yet if after all this, you tell me in earnest, that this was not your meaning, I shall cry you mercy for the mistake, but not now enter into a dispute with you of that new question now proposed by you, [Whether religion (that must signify your doctrines as they are distinguished from, or opposed to ours, or else 'twill not be pertinent to our purpose) being planted and in quiet possession, may] because I cannot imagine what verb that syllable [may] is the mood of. [Plant] it cannot be, for that which is in possession, is already planted: But what it should be, I must not divine for you. Only at an adventure I shall make a plain state. If your doctrines were in quiet possession here, and you should know of any man that taught the contrary to them, must your sword be drawn against him, or no? I beseech you answer out of the sense of your brethren, that we may know what to expect from you. For my own part, I shall make no scruple to tell you, that though the defender of the Faith have the power of the sword given him by God to that end, to govern in godliness and quiet, and may therefore draw it effectually against any that raise sedition to bring in some other religion against that which is by law established, or that vent doctrines that are in themselves seditious, yet ought he not, only in case of any single doctrine or difference in religion (where none of the civil interests are concerned, no violent assault made, or feared from the dissenters) to unsheathe his slaughtering sword against any such dissenter, provided always that that doctrine be not blasphemous. (And they that consenting to this truth, will yet tyrannize over men's souls in ordine ad temporalia, as you and some others have done over men's bodies and estates in ordine ad spiritualia, shall never be excused by me) and of this opinion I conceive there might be vouched as learned, and as primitive-tempered Christians as any that are more zealously, and so more bloodily minded.  Ibid. H. Aspersions be easily cast, but should not be admitted, when there are strong presumptions to the contrary, without evident proof; The Catholics were known good Patriots under our former Kings, and under this our most gracious Prince we have good testimony, greater then which cannot be given. 
Answ. The case is not here of aspersions, but of matters of fact, or attempts of Priests, whereby Queen Elizabeth was known to have been in danger. On which provocation the laws forbidding all such to come into the Kingdom, made it such a legal presumption, that if they did, they should incur that suspicion, and sentence of the law. And so every man knowing what measure to expect from the laws, were farther to be presumed either traitorous or mad, if on those terms he would adventure on such a forbidden journey. As for evident proof, which you require, it belongs little to this matter, because the very being in the Kingdom was a demonstration of contemning the law, and an evidence that they were the men that were under that legal presumption; which is far more than a prooflesse aspersion, with evidence to the contrary. As for the fidelity of your Patriots under our foremost Kings, when they were of their opinions, I shall not question it; neither in like manner your behaviour to our present Sovereign, but only tell you, that the Queen Elizabeth laws might be just for all that; (which was all we had now in hand) and for the execution of them in latter times, I before gave you an account.  Ibid. I. We do profess our best reason hath brought us to our religion, not our passion, and we have as much reason to be believed as any others can. 
Answ. 'Tis possible you may not; for if men's actions give in any testimony against their words, there will not be so much reason to believe such, as when there is a concordance of them; But if upon serious shrift you are able to profess this sincerity, I shall be so charitable to believe you and allow you any hope of mercy for your errors, which you can wish; but yet tell you, that by making this profession in the plural number, you do somewhat prejudge it; no man being so privy to the hearts of his fellow professors, as to be a fit voucher for them, every man must stand or fall to his own Master.  Ibid. K. I was to answer and not to prove, and therefore might in right deny what the Enquirer falsely supposes without proof. It is the respondents right to affirm the very point in question, or to deny it, without caring whether it be granted or no, so he himself be ready to defend it; and so he that can exact this as his own, shall not need to beg any thing, and if he do, he cannot beg more than what he hath, and what he affirms or denies already. For example, I deny against Copernicus that the earth moves, or I affirm that it is quiet, and I stand to maintain my saying. Certainly this is no begging, but yet to say that it is so, may be a begging, or if I should say it stood still, because it doth not move, were a frivolous speech, but yet for all that no begging of the question. 
Answ. This vindication of your beloved petitio principii, (that stands you in such stead, and returns so frequently upon you) I have already examined, and discovered the mistake of it; and must now tell you again, that when the question is by the opponent proved by any medium, it must never be lawful for the respondent to deny it again any farther than by denying the proof on which it was inferred; for this would be the denying the conclusion, and petitio principii again. The respondent in this case cannot exact the question as his own, nor any otherwise defend it, then by repelling the weapons brought against him. As for your great simile of denying the motion of the earth, and your standing to maintain your saying; if you do this by any other means then by denying or answering the proofs produced against you, this is not the respondents part, but will, when you have done what you can, appear to be that vulgar Sophism. It being certain that when a thing is questioned betwixt two, the affirming without proof is begging it, and it being not the respondents part to prove (or if he do, he becomes opponent) it follows necessarily, that the respondent that in time of disputation affirms, must either cease to be respondent, or else beg the question.  C. 18. Answ. to C. 18. A. We are to consider here not what is conceived but what is to be conceived. Now what is to be conceived I have showed, namely that the Church understands better than he doth, for right reason will tell him this. 
Answ. This is the very thing which is disproved in that place, and then the bare repeating it over again, will be but a mean kind of vindication. Be pleased to look over the place again, and if you will still think that there was any place for this annotation, I shall be sorry I have been thus troublesome to you.  Ibid. B. I have showed the reason why. 
Answ. When an argument is framed on a double supposition; without disputing the truth of either, 'tis not to be allowed the respondent to answer, by denying the truth of either of the things supposed, for they are supposed in that dispute, but not disputed of. As for example, if the question were, [Whether supposing Adam were not fall'n, and Christ were come, the coming of Christ could be for the sin of Adam.] do you think 'twould be tolerable for the respondent to avoid some argument brought against him, by saying that it was absolutely false to say that Adam was not fall'n, whereas 'twas true that Christ was come? This would certainly be so gross and impossible to be justified, that I should suspect any man's fidelity, that should tell me, he had rendered a satisfying reason why this should be. And this is your case at this time.  Ibid. C. Whether she be infallible or no, she is like to be wiser than any private man. And this point cannot be in controversy with a wise man, and therefore here is no petitio principii. 
Answ. This is a rare way of replying, when a discourse hath been proved guilty of a petitio principii, to say 'tis impossible it should, and when a thing is denied, to say it cannot be in controversy.  
But, Sir, I shall yield you the Church may be wiser than any private man, yet not conceive it to follow (unless she be also infallible) that when a private man and the Church differ, she must always be in the right. He that is much wiser than another, may yet in some particular be mistaken, when that other is in the right, yea and may be advised and reform in such a particular, by one that is not so wise as he. This you may apply to the matter in hand, not so far as to prefer the authority of any one man before the Church in general, but only so, as not to pronounce it infallible. I might tell you farther, that a member of the Church of England assenting fully to the doctrine of that Church, and so discharging the duty of a private man in preferring the judgement of the Church (whereof he is a member) before his own judgement, may yet doubt of some things affirmed by the Church of Rome, and not make the comparison between a private man's judgement, and the judgement of the Church, but only betwixt one particular Church and another. But after all this, I might have spared any, or all these Answers, and do now only desire you to look back upon the place, and you will soon see what no ground is to be found there of your Annotation.  Ibid. D. If you have no evidence (that 'tis God's pleasure that your Church should be infallible) nor can have, you say true, but this latter is denied. 
Answ. 'Tis easy to deny conclusions still. But if you will either answer the arguments, which have proved there is none, or produce any such evidence that it is infallible, you shall be victorious indeed.  Ib. E. This argument which the Inquirer impugns, is an argument of his own making, and none of ours, yet for all that, the argument is not like a Ballad as good backward as forward, as M. Chillingworth, putting it a little differently from the Inquirer, would have it. 
Answ. If you had pleased to disclaim and not defend this argument at the first, you might have saved us some pains, and if you will yet promise me that no man shall out of M. Knots Book make use of this argument any more, I will be very well content that argument shall be no longer insisted on, yet must tell you my opinion from my own express knowledge, that they which read that Book before 'twas confuted by M. Chillingworth did verily believe that that argument to prove an infallible judge, taken from the topic of God's goodness, was M. Knots masterpiece, and the founation on which the main weight of his structure was supported.  C. 19 Answ. to C. 19 A. In a Respondent there can be no such thing as Petitio principii. 
Answ. We have showed you that a Respondent may so ill behave himself that there may. As for example, when a man hath used Arguments to prove that you have been guilty of begging the Question, For you to despise and not take notice of the arguments, and to say only that there can be no such thing, is the very thing called Petitio principii.  Ib. B. But we again deny it is [Petitio principii] and the contrary aught to be proved. 
Answ. It is clearly proved in the place, and not to consider the proofs, but to deny the conclusion is another guilt of that sophism.  C. 20. Answ. to C. 20. A. If the Enquirers meaning be as you put it, it makes nothing at all against us, nor needs any Answer. But Chillingworth goes farther, and says that many of the simpler sort amongst us believe Truth upon no better grounds, than others believe Falsehood, and yet our simpler sort believe Truths, upon all the motives that yours do, and somewhat more. 
Answ. That that is his Lordship's meaning is plain, viz: That he that denies your infallibility, and yet uses his best reason to seek if it be true, will be in as safe a condition, as he that believes it, and searches not. And if this be nothing against you, I shall hope this quarrel is nearer an end then ever I had thought to see it. And then sure many of us shall be capable of that charity, which you bestow upon your own, for I am confident what we do, we do upon search, and use of our best reason; and yet that we deny your infallibility, you are sufficiently assured.  C. 21. Answ. to C. 21. A. He might be secretly obstinate, and yet both he and we conceive the contrary. 
Answ. 'Tis true he might. But yet sure you that believe he was not obstinate, cannot believe that the punishment of obstinacy should belong to him, but must either think God unjust, or else believe him safe in the same degree that you think him not obstinate. And this is all I required from you.  C. 22. Answ. to C. 22. A. Every implicit assent must be resolved lastly into an explicit, or else there will be an infinite regression, for every implicit presupposes something in which it is involved or implicit. 
Answ. I beseech you observe the nature of this Annotation of yours. You say in your Apology, that one implicit Faith doth not contain another. I proved that false by this instance, that supposing I believed by an implicit Faith, that you were an honest man, this might contain in it an implicit belief of every Proposition by you asserted, and farther by putting his Lordship's affirmation by you denied into a down right Syllogism: you after your wont answer no proofs, but prove against the conclusion. And truly your proof is a strange one, every implicit assent must be resolved lastly into an explicit: Ergo, One implicit faith doth not contain another. As if you should say, Every subordinate cause must be resolved lastly into a first cause; Ergò, One subordinate cause doth not contain another, the Genealogy of Abraham must at last be reduced to God, therefore Abraham's Grandfather was not Father to Abraham's Father: what sound of reason is there in this arguing? The antecedent is the only thing which you go about to prove, and the consequence that which we deny, and therefore I shall need say no more to this Annotation.  C. 24. Answ. to C. 24. A. We mean the fire of this world, and that fire we are sure is not in all Countries appointed to burn such as do dissent from us. 
Answ. What? not to burn such as descent in matters of faith? Is there any matter of faith which is not required sub poenâ ignis? (I mean also with you, the fire of this world) If there be, speak out. But you have by your next Annotation in effect confessed there is not, and so by that confuted this, for so you add.  Ib. B. I make no such distinction. 
Answ. i e. No such distinction, that of matters of faith some are required sub periculo ignis, some not; which is in effect that in respect of that penalty all matters of faith are of the same nature. Which is absolutely contrary to that former, unless in that your meaning were, that fire was not in all Countries appointed to burn Dissenters from you, i. e. not in those Countries, where you had not the power. And that will be but a slender obligation from you, if it be acknowledged.  Ib. C. If you could make that appear we were satisfied. 
Answ. It is made appear as much, as your like Assertion of yourselves, i. e. by our affirming it. But if you will have patience to read on in that place, you shall see the point stated, and as much of it proved, as we have need to assert in this matter.  Ib. D. In some places we do (make use of the Argument from Mutual Dissensions) but in this it is brought against us. 
Answ. This is clearly false, for in the 40. Sect. his Lordship there mentions it as an Argument of yours, and in that place becomes Respondent, gives an Answer to that Argument, and that is the ground of the present debate.  Ib. E. Our Criterion or rule of Faith keeps off dissensions when it is followed, yours does not. Lutherans and Calvinists follow the same rule, and yet descent and condemn one another, ours do not so, but remit the differences to be decided to one and the same judge both exterior, and interior. 
Answ. I was a proving by the ancient Catalogues of Heretics, that there were good store of Heretics in the world before the Reformation, (from which it follows that either your infallible Judge was not then in fashion, or else that it is not such a sovereign means or antidote against Heretics) you seem to distinguish that your rule keeps off dissensions, not always, but when it is followed; and prove that farther, because you remit the differences to be decided to one and the same Judge. I might answer, that our rule, the word of God doth so too, at least in matters of faith, and that any such dissension, at least uncharitable censuring of Dissenters, is absolutely against that rule. But I conceive that is not the thing that commends a rule as a means to prevent dissensions, that they that follow it descent not, (for the rule if it be but one rule, what ever it is, will do that) but that it is able & apt to keep men obedient, and to restrain them from excesses & not following of it. Now this is an excellence that these many Catalogues of Heresies proved, that you had no right to pretend to, and if we have not so neither, we are but Partners in this piece of humane infelicity, to which, as long as we carry flesh about us, it will be incident, for there must be Heresies among you. As for your instance of the Lutherans and Calvinists dissensions, and condemning one the other, I must tell you that this little concerns the Church of England, which always disclaimed the being called by the names, or owning the dissensions of Lutheran and Calvinist, and professeth only the maintaining of the Primitive Catholic faith, and to have no father on earth, to impute their faith to. I might add more even for those Lutherans and Calvinists, that if they did really follow (I say not only profess, but follow) the same rule, they would certainly agree also.  Ibid. F. I do not excuse all (the Jesuits from the doctrine of resisting Magistrates under colour of Religion, killing Kings, opposing the Order of Bishops etc.) nor ought you to have accused all; For neither all the Jesuits, nor near all be of that mind, but of the quite contrary. Bellarmine, Valentia, Petavius, and other Jesuits have written for the Order of Bishops against Salmasius and others, but none at all have written against it. Neither was the controversy between the Saeculars about that point, as it is most evident. 
Answ. I have already obeyed your commands; and indeed had no necessity to accuse all of that Order in all places. It was sufficient to prove the point in hand, (dissensions among yourselves) that any considerable number were of those opinions, which are the worst that are to be found among our Sectaries, And it seems you cannot in your own heart excuse all, as kind as you are to them. If others in a matter of such moment are of a contrary mind, this is an argument not against, but for the truth of what is laid to you, dissensions after all your infallible judgements. For the Jesuits opinion of Bishops I appeal no farther than the disputations in the Council of Trent, and the general pretensions of that Order to an Independency, and absoluteness from any but their own superior, and the Pope, and this, though it allow Bishops over other men, yet is sufficiently contrary to the Apostolic institution, and practice of having all the Churches and Presbyters in them, subjected to them. You add, that the controversy of the Saeculars (I suppose you mean and Regulars) was not about that point, i. e. of Episcopacy, I did not say it was, any farther than thus, as the necessity of Confirmation is all one with the necessity of Episcopacy, (which truly to me seems to be very near it▪ and I am sure the business was whether the Catholics in England should have an Ordinary here resident or no, and that Ordinary was a Bishop; so that though it was not of Episcopacy, in universum, yet it came to a debate, whether the having Bishops was necessary, or no) On which soever it is, it is enough to prove dissensions.  C. 26. Answ. to C. 26. A. At least they might have been discerned, as well as other errors were, and the Authors of them also. 
Answ. This note being reduced to intelligible sense, will I conceive be, that the now Romish errors might have been discerned, etc. To which I answer, that though they might, yet First, 'tis possible that they might not; Secondly, very possible that being favoured, if not brought in by those in authority among them, they would not be branded or recorded for errors, and then all that we their posterity can see, may be only, that the tares are sown, but not punctually at what point of the night, or who the man was that sowed them.  Ibid. B. No more for these then for other errors. 
Answ. His Lordship had occasion only to speak of these, but will say the like of all others whose original is not discernible.  Ibid. C. In all ages errors were censured and condemned. 
Answ. All kind of errors were not thought to be of such weight, as that such heavy censures and condemnations which you lay on us, should be fastened on them. And therefore in case ours be not errors, or but in materia non gravi, in disputable parts, (as if you please to descend to particulars, we will undertake to prove them) those severe censures of yours, being more contrary to charity, may prove more dangerous to you, than we shall otherwise affirm your opinions to be.  Ibid. D. I judge one of these two by the event, and the other by the semblance of his making a search in manner as he ought. 
Answ. This is a dark speech which I do not clearly understand: if the meaning be, that you judge the ill success of his Lordship's searches by the event, and the fault of them by the semblance, etc. I must then tell you, that the first is a very ill grounded judgement, for no event hath proved the illness of that success, (unless like those in the Gospel, you count them the greatest Sinners on whom the Tower of Siloah fell; or like him of late, that being willing to pass his opinion on a learned man's choice of a side in the differences in the Low Countries, said only this, Illud notum est, parts quas secutus non est praevaluisse; si quis infelicitati hoc tribuat, ego prudentiam non probo minus felicem; and Busbequius tells us somewhat like of the Turks judgements of good and bad erterprises) but rather on your own principles I have already proved, that they must be good in the success, which were so happy in proposing.  
But than what you mean by the semblance of his making a search in manner as he ought, by which you judge the fault in his searches; I must confess I do not at all understand, and therefore must be fain to confess myself overcome and mastered, though not by the reason, yet by the obscurity of your writing; and if that be a victory, I wish you much good of it.  To the Conclusion. A. I here contend no more, but that our Church may be infallible, notwithstanding any thing the Enquirer hath objected. That she is so, hath in due place been proved by others. 
Answ. If you had performed the former, I mean satisfied all his Lordship's arguments, I should not require at this time the latter from you, i. e. proving your Church to be Infallible. I must then only ask you in earnest, whether you do believe that no one of his Lordship's arguments against your Infallibility (for any one will serve our turn) remains unanswered by your Apology; and than whether all that I have said to vindicate his Lordship, be effectually answered in your marginal Notes, and whether you can justify all them against his last Reply. If you are of this opinion in each, I am to crave your pardon for this so gainlesse trouble, but refer the matter to God and impartial men to judge between us.  Ibid. B. If you would do it, we then would think it more than possible. 
Answ. The meaning of this annotation if it be sense, must be this, that if we Protestants could or would find place in you for Scripture and Reason to make impression, you Papists would then think it more than possible you might be deceived. Which if it be the meaning, I must then only reply by prayer, that God would so soften your hearts, that they might be capable of that impression. But if the words be indeed no sense, but yet mistaken for some other words, which would be sense, than the likeliest thing that I can imagine, is, that you would have said somewhat to this purpose. [If you Protestants could by Scripture or Reason disprove our Doctrines, we then would think it more than possible for us to be deceived] Which though it were no huge Concession, yet I should be glad to have it from you, for then in effect your grounding of Faith on your Infallibility would be laid aside, and then there would be no more truth in any individual Doctrine of your Church, than Scripture or Reason would infer, abstracted from the Authority of your Church, which is all that at this time we demand from you.  
And in that we are a little importunate (seeing we have you now in a seeming good humour:) First, because there is so much danger in insisting on that privilege of Infallibility, even in any particular, wherein men are in the right, because he that really doth stand, yet may (and therefore aught to take heed lest he) fall, but most eminently, when a man chances to be in the wrong. He that mistakes first in a piece of Divinity, and after in a persuasion that he cannot mistake, sealeth up that error, obstructs all entrance, all approach, all possibility of Reformation, is fortified impregnable against all assaults either of reason, or even the spirit of truth; and by that one error hath a kind of propriety in all other that can by the same hand be represented to him. Secondly, because we cannot but observe the prudence of your fellow-Champions, Master Knot etc. now of late, who have chosen to vary the method from insisting on the several points of difference betwixt us, and them (proving themselves to be the only true Church from the particular truths professed by them, and by no others) to this other more commodious way of putting off all together by wholesale, of concluding the truth of all their assertions from the unerrablenesse of the Asserter, manifesting that they are in the right, because 'tis impossible they should be in the wrong, using all skill to persuade this one point, and then confident on good grounds, that no other can be resisted. These two things put together, will advertise you, how seasonable an admonition it is to you, that you will bestow a little pains on your Brethren, to persuade them they are mortal or fallible; and then again Reason and Scripture may find reception, and be agreed on the umpire betwixt us and we shall promise sincerely, that whatever that shall, sententiâ latâ, award to you, we will most gladly yield, and never break with you, till you break from that umpirage.  Ibid. C. The words are applicable against our belief of Christianity, as well as against our belief of our Church's doctrine. 
Answ. The words are applied by me only against your infallibility, and if that be as infallible as Christianity itself, I beseech you either show as plain testimonies from the consent of all Ages, that the Church of Rome is infallible, as there are for the Canon of the Scripture, or as plain places out of the Scripture for it, as we can for the several parts of Christianity, and then I will give you leave so to apply the words; In the mean, you may spare your labour of applying my words, or else prove demonstratively that they are so applicable.  Ibid. D. A possibility perhaps of more errors, but a probability of fewer, for if she were fallible, yet she would not be fallible, as a private man; so that with these fewer errors we should have quiet and unity, you with more errors should have disturbances and dissensions. 
Answ. In this place, whereto your Annotation was affixed, the discourse was upon a supposition, that your Infallibility were an error, (which I in that case affirmed, would be the most dangerous, because most prolifical complicated error imaginable) and will you say that upon that supposition, there would be a probability of fewer errors? Will the thinking I cannot fall make me stand the longer? is there no advantage to be made of care, and caution, and fear? or is there a disadvantage in them? This is brave fiduciary doctrine, I must think infallibly I shall be saved, and that I cannot fall away, and the thinking that, will make it more probable that I shall be saved, and shall not fall. I confess I had thought that humility were a readier way both to truth and Heaven, then either of these presumptions. What you mean by adding (by way of proof of that saying) that if your Church were fallible, she would not be fallible as a private man, I confess I cannot guess. If she would not, I conceive, this would be but little advantage on her side, for her fallibility would be a greater snare and scandal, and more apt to draw into error those that conceived her infallible, than any private man's fallibility would do. For that which you add of quiet and unity, if it were supposed to be joined with fewer errors, I grant it would be an advantage, but at a time, when that infallibility was supposed to be one error, and that proved most apt to produce a multitude; surely this ought not to have been supposed, any more, than that we should have more errors still, though 'twere not at the same time supposed that we have.  Ibid. E. It was never put into more hands than two, but what those hands might do, I know not; and to those on purpose to make trial what exceptions might be made against it, that so upon a review, I might know better what to alter in it, what to add, and what to take away. 
Answ. I conceive one man hath two hands, and therefore 'tis possible you may mean, it was never communicated to above one man. If you do, 'tis certainly false; But if you mean two men by two hands, you acknowledged what I said, for I said no more. As for your affirmation that 't was put into those hands only for trial, etc. This cannot be said of one of them, for to him it was delivered by one of your friends, as an unanswerable piece, but yet if it were, as you pretend, that you might know better what to alter in it; I am then glad I have given you occasion to do so, but must tell you, that now you have altered it, and delivered it from some infirmities, which appeared to be in it, there be yet enough behind, to be reform by any body else, and when that is done, there will remain somewhat else perhaps, but I am sure no answer to my Lord of Falkland.  Ibid. F. Sir, your noble courtesy is gratefully acknowledged, and I desire with all due respects and services to correspond. 
Answ. This I conceive to be a civility, and I shall never go about to confute that, or answer it, but by the return of the like, and my prayers also, that the Lord give you a right judgement in all things.   


HEre it seems was once an end of those annotations, and it had been for the reader's ease and mine, that you had continued in that mind. But upon better thoughts, either that which had been here noted, was thought not quite sufficient, or else, ex abundanti, this superfoetation is bestowed on us. The closing sheet which I mentioned in the Preface, and promised to annex also. Which here in justice to the Apologist, I shall give you, though I conceive I had been as kind to him, if I had forgotten it.   

Section 1 THis small treatise Apologetical is no finished work, but only a first draught or inchoation, and was ventured abroad to explore the judgements or censures of one or two intelligent Adversaries, that so the Author by his second thoughts might be the better able to understand what was to be altered in it, what added, and what taken away, either as superfluous or offensive, and till that act was done, and withal an approbation and licence given by those to whom it belonged, neither the work, nor any line of it is to be acknowledged, or vouched by the Author.  
Section 2 The drift is not to prove the Church which we call Catholic, and the Enquirer calls Roman, to be infallible, but to defend it against the Enquirers arguments; for he Sect. 28. undertakes to give reasons why the Church of Rome is fallible. So that our drift is to make it good that this same Church may still be infallible, notwithstanding any thing that he hath said unto the contrary.  
Section 3 The pillars that support all his discourse be 1. Sect. videl. that with us both Reason, Scripture, and Antiquity, be fallible; his proof of this assertion is a supposed maxim of ours, namely, that nothing is infallible but the Church. The assertion is first denied, and afterward the proof, and against these denials no reply can be made, because we know best our own inward acts and judgements, and no man is able to tell us what we think, but we must tell them.  
Section 4 These three pillars of fallibility being broken and relinquished as desperate, you are pleased to come with new ones in their places.  
Section 5 Reason, say you, cannot prove the infallibility of your Church, because it is not an evident verity; Scripture cannot; because not certainly expounded to that probation; Fathers do not, because it was not a doctrine held in their time.  
Section 6 It seems then, that the cause why none of these three can prove our Church's infallibility, is not any want of infallibility in them, as the Enquirer contended it was, but some other different; such, namely, as you here assign; and so the Enquirers argument is at an end, even at the very beginning of it, and my task is done, yet, in my respects, to you, I will go on farther.  
Section 7 To your first, I answer, that though reason cannot itself alone prove our Church's infallibility, yet, as you acutely note, Sest. 3. reason can assure us, by showing us some words of prophecy, or revelation from God, with sufficient evidence that it is a revelation, and thus reason can prove a verity be it never so inevident. After this manner it is that we say reason proves our Church, against which proof the inevidence of it, as we see, can be no impediment.  
Section 8 To your second, I answer, by denying that scripture hath not been so certainly expounded to that purpose, for we say it hath been showed by our authors at large, as for example, by Bellarmine, Valentia, Petavius, Veron and others.  
Section 9 To your 3. I answer, first, that 1. Irenaeus, 2. Augustinus, 3. Lactantius, 
1. L. 5. c. 20. l. 3. c. 4.2. L. 2. advers. Crescon. c. 33. item ep. 118. item l. de unitate Eccles. c. 22.3. l. 4. c. 30.4. L. 12.  and 4 Facundus Hermanensis do absolutely teach the Church to be infallible. Secondly, I deny that the Fathers teach not the Roman Church to be the true Church and contrary to your tenet, I affirm that they hold that Church to be the true Christian Church, as the forenamed authors have declared out of them, as also Card. Perone and Co●ffeteau have excellently showed. Also I myself have endeavoured it elsewhere out of the several Testimonies of Antiquity not to be in this place repeated.  
Section 10 The business touching the motives of Faith which I, with Irenaeus, called Ostensions, their place, use and efficacity needs only explanation, and aught to be admitted by every Christian, and therefore, begging your patience, I will tarry longer upon it.  
Section 11 We do not go about to prove our Church to be the true, therefore because she holdeth with the truth, but because we conceive we have good solid reasons to persuade us that she hath the truth. These reasons have been often rendered by our Authors, to whom if the Inquirer had replied, we also had endeavoured to defend them. Concordance with the Scriptures and fathers we do marshal amongst them, not in the first place indeed in order of Doctrine but yet in the first in order of dignity. Neither do we aim to prove our Church by the gallantry of Demonstration, or any other way than Christianity, sooner or later, is to be persuaded unto Infidels; for we are now dealing, not about a parcel, but the whole frame of Christianity, from the top to the foundation, and the laying of the first stone; which first stone we hold to be those acts of God which Psal. 104.27. are called verba signotum, and fitly may be termed signa realia, that is to say, sings and ostensions, which be the acts of God's omnipotence and sovereign Government, and, by a moral certainty and rational way are showed for humane institution and instruction. This sort of signs is, by order of nature, to have the precedence before all artificial signs, or vocal expressions of the divine will, and therefore as Raymund Sebund observeth, liber factorum is to be perused before liber dictorum; By these signs, as, by the apparentiae, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in Astronomy, we are to get the first notions of these celestial revolutions, or resolutions of faith; and though these be sure, yet are they not demonstrative, because no way intrinsecall, neither to the revelations which they assure, nor to the objects revealed, which are assured by the revelations, as being no causes, nor effects of either, nor signs inherent of those objects.  
Section 12 Seeing then, the true Catholic Religion is but the true Christianity, they both of them are to be learned by the same Apparences, or Ostensions, more or less expressly understood. Now, while we draw nearer unto these signs, and learn them more and more expressly, amongst other things we may discover as good characterismes and signatures of revealed truth, the Concordance of our Faith with holy Writ and venerable Antiquity, which two signs, without the preceding could have little force to persuade belief. For, say I were to convert an Indian, I would not seek to do it by telling him first of all of these two Concordances mentioned, which 'tis like would move him but a little, for, though I could show him the Bible was ancient and Godly, and the Father's wise, yet this would not be enough to persuade him, and therefore I should hold it fit, First to represent unto him, some other motives, as namely, Prophetical predictions authorized by event, miracles and miraculous operations and effects, creditably recorded from age to age, both in the Evangelists and other sequent Histories, of whose faith a man rationally cannot doubt, at least in the sum of them, or the chief bulk. I speak not here of fabulous Narrations, or suspected Histories, 
Et est plenissima haec ostensio unam & eandem vivificatricem fidem, etc. Irenaeus l. 3. c. 3.  but Authors of credit and esteem; Secondly, the excellency of our Faith itself, and manner of propagation of it. Thirdly, the perfection of life and heroic actions of such as do profess it, and all this after a manner not interrupted, but continued from age to age, and conveyed down to us by the prime Ecclesiastical succession, not of persons only, but of Pastors in the chief seat, and other inferior, prized so highly by Irenaeus, and held a most sure note of truth, and a way to confound all that do gainsay it. Lastly, a consonance with Reason, Scripture, and Antiquity. These and such like be our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, these our Ostensions; these be the received notices and signatures of revealed truth; by these God invites us and induces us to believe; and by these, engages his own veracity to warrant the act of our assent, it being repugnant to the high perfection of his truth, to lay upon man a rational obligation, and then desert him, and to permit that the public acts of his providence should be a snare, not a direction, not an introduction to truth, but a seduction from it. Though therefore these motives make our faith but credible in an eminent and a high degree, yet the veracity of God is at hand to supply, seal and confirm all, and with the authority thereof, to make the assurance absolute. This method of resolving and reducing faith, 
Iren. l. 3. c. 4. Augustin, ad Honoratum Manichaeum.  was signified by Irenaeus, when as he said, Post tot Ostensiones factas non oportet adhuc quaerere apud alios veritatem quam facile est ab Ecclesia sumere. This way designed by Saint Augustin, this is conformable to the Analytique principles delivered by Aristotle in his Organon; this the beaten path of all Divines, and no new invention or exotique stuff.  
This method we are ready to maintain as strong and solid, not permitting the believer to sit down with a slender Socinian certainty liable to deceit, not enclosing him in any maze, circle, or semicircle, not enforcing him into endless and wearisome regresses, neither producing evidence, nor destroying liberty, but by these motives fortified with the divine veracity, leading him assuredly to the Church, and by the Church to the entire and determinate Canon of holy Scripture; and so at length by both these joined together, to the full discovery and distinct knowledge of the doctrines of our faith, after the manner following.  
Section 13 These motives or ostensions being once considered, we are forthwith to observe to what body of Christian professors they belong, and in what line of succession of Ecclesiastical Magistrates they descend unto us, and in the passages of antiquity, diligently to note which ship it is which in the Christian fleet was counted the Praetorian, or Admiral, with which all the rest were to join company, and by the separation from which, we are to judge which vessels be fugitive, or pyratical, and which not; which assembly of Christians legitimate and approved, and by this association to be distinguished from the broken and dispersed troops of Anti-Catholiques, and by the same the army of the living God in the Church militant, discerned from the straggling companies of divided and disagreeing Sectaries, how numerous soever they may seem, when summed up all into one inconsistent body, or confused rout. This way and method we hold, which if it do not satisfy any, let them set us down a better, and not leave us without any; but let them take heed, that while with the Enquirer, we receive and admit the fallibility of the Church of Rome, or of any other determinate Church, and of one denomination we fall not, with Master Chillingworth, to the fallibility of the Christian faith, and so presently to Infidelity. It is easy to impugn the Organon of faith, or Doctrinal principles, but not easy to compose it, easy to pull down, but not to build. The Enquirers judgement uttered to me, was, that Baron, when he writ against us, was lusty and strong, but when he spoke any thing for himself, he was weak and languishing; and I believe this is the Enquirers own case, and that he was able to say more against an infallibility then for it. In the one he hath showed his strength, in the other not.  
Section 14 Now a word or two about laws, and I have done. In which point I observe it as an uncontroverted doctrine, that unjust laws, properply speaking, are not laws; first because Lex is the dictamen rectae rationis practicae in eo qui potestatem habet; but an unjust law, is neither dictamen rectae rationis practicae, nor potestatem habentis, for no man is prescribed to do wrong by reason, nor hath God the chief Legislatour given power to make them. Durandus concurres in terminis in Opusculo de legibus, saying, Injusta leges magis sunt violentiae quam leges, nam secundum quod dicit Augustinus, l. de libero arbitrio, Lex esse non videtur quae justa non fuerit. Et tales non obligant quantum ad Deum. So Durandus. To him Suarius subscribeth, l. 3. de legib. c. 19 n. 11. Lex injusta non est lex, praesertim quando ex parte materiae est injusta, quia rem iniquam praecipit; tum enim ad acceptandum eam non obligat, verum etiam, neque si sit acceptata, And presently after, giving a reason hereof, he addeth, Quia excedit potestatem legislatoris.  
Secondly, so much veneration is due to laws, though never so unjust, that they are nevertheless in conscience to be obeyed, unless they should be publicly and knownely found contrary to a greater authority then that was by which they were enacted; that is to say, to the law of God, or Nature, Therefore they are not to be judged or censured by any private man.  
Thirdly, being discovered to be unjust, they derogate nothing at all from the authority of the rest, no more than the unjust laws of some Emperors did from the body of the law Imperiall. For though all of them were made by the same Authors, yet not by the same authority; because for the making of one sort, there was good authority derived from God; but, for the making of the other, there was none at all, but such as could not make it.  
Fourthly, in case of such laws, no man is to take arms, or make resistance, but chose, to suffer with humble patience, remitting the righting of his cause only to God, per quem Reges regnant & legum conditores justa decernunt. And thus, Sir, I rest your humble servant.  
Section 15 The holy Scripture hath a threefold influence into faith. 1. Dispositive, as one of the motives, or inducements. 2. Negative, as a property, sine qua non. 3. Positive, as a foundation or principle. The 1. as an ancient and godly book. The 2. as a rule, without concordance to which faith could not be acknowledged; for every doctrine must be consonant to its rule, whether that rule be true, or false, certain, or uncertain. The 3. as a settled principle, and a book known to be Canonical.   

TO all this I shall answer as briefly as I can.  
First, to the 1 Sect. That for the matter of fact which concerns this treatise, I have already averred those truths, that will not permit any reasonable man to believe that this was so indeed, [a first draught, etc.] for it was confessed by him, Chap. 1. to be a second draught. Secondly, it was not sent out only to explore, etc. for it was, 
* In Conclus.  saith he, delivered but to two adversaries, and to one of them (as I said before) it was delivered as unanswerable. Thirdly, if there were any such design of exploring and mending, etc. I must conceive that that work is now done; for when it was sent home to me again with these notes, many places which I had charged, were altered or taken away, and for additions, sure such were the marginal notes, and this appendage. Fourthly, For the licence I can say nothing, (but that I conceive it might as easily be gotten, as to what you have already made public, if you had a mind to it) nor indeed force you to acknowledge or vouch any line of this book, but only tell you, that those words in your first Chapter of complaint, [That there was no notice given of licence for it be published, and have the advantage to be dispersed abroad in many copies] and that [for want of the Printers help it shall lie concealed, and in much restraint, yea and be in danger to perish] seemed to me to signify your willingness then to make it public; and if you have since retracted that design, I hope so weak an answer, as some of your friends boast this to be, did not discourage you. I shall rather think it was modesty, or else design, that you chose rather to have disclaimed, then commended your own, and thought it would appear more glorious for you to have it extorted from you, or (if it should prove less splendid) yet more tolerable, to have been ravished from you then prostituted.  
To the second Sect. I answer, that you had said that before in annot. to the concls. A. And the answer there belongs to this Sect. and if you had made good what you say was your drift, you should be pronounced conqueror.  
To the third Sect. You have taken a good course to defend infallibility, by setting up for it yourself, and affirming that no reply can be made to you in that matter, because it depends only upon your judgement, which none can know but whom you tell it; But, good Sir, your Authors do tell us, that there is nothing infallible but the Church, and when they have done so, we may know your outward acts, for such are your writings, though your inward we pretend not to pry into.  
To Sect. 4. I answer, that one argument of his Lordships, taken from your affirmed fallibility of Reason, Scripture, and Antiquity, is most prodigiously by you called three pillars. And how Sampson-like you have broken them down, the Reader must judge; if you are so confident, I have here expressed myself your servant, by helping you to a public trial.  
To Sect. 5. I acknowledge that from your own confession I make those three arguments, that neither Reason, Scripture, nor Antiquity, can infallibly prove your Church to be infallible. And  
To the Sect. 6. I say that the want of infallibility in those three mentioned Sect. 6. and by you confessed, is sufficient to prove his Lordship's conclusion that they cannot infallibly prove your infallibility, and this is the same that was meant by his Lordship, though more explicated by me, and brought home against you by way of retortion, and Argument ad hominem, upon your own confession. And so your 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was sung much too early, and you must to your task again, if you will make an end of it.  
To Sect. 7. I answer, that if you had showed the revelation, on which reason infers your infallibility, your section had stood good, but the total want of that is your main impediment.  
To Sect. 8. Be you also pleased to produce your consent of Antiquity certainly expounding Scripture to infer your infallibility; and that shall be yielded you also, but I conceive those writers of yours have not done it, and whensoever you please, I shall be ready to examine their testimonies with you.  
To Sect. 9 I answer. That we have allowed a sense, wherein the Church universal may be styled infallible, and that to save myself the pains of examining your testimonies (though some without examining I know to be ill cited) I shall grant it in that sense to be so; But then to your second proposition, (be it either [I deny that they teach not] or [I affirm that it holds] it matters little) that the Roman Church is the true Church, I answ. That if there be emphasis in the particle [the] in the predicate, so that it signify the [Catholic] Church in the former proposition, 'tis then absolutely false, that the Fathers say any such thing. And you are prudent to cite none to that ridiculous purpose. But if you mean, that the Roman Church is a true Church, (so you do not mean that all it saith is true) as we grant that, so we challenge you to prove, that ever the ancient Church thought any such particular Church of one denomination to be infallible, When you please to produce your testimonies, you shall receive answer to them.  
To Sect. 10. Concerning the motives of Faith, You might have spared that pains, it being not at all concluded by you here or before, that that infallibility is built on the same grounds with Christanity.  
To Sect. 11. If you had never such solid reasons to persuade you; that your Church had the truth (as I should not need to deny, were it not for your denying the cup to the Laity against Scripture, and your keeping the Scripture in an unknown tongue, and some other such defects in faciendis, but rather charge you that you have more than the truth, viz. many errors mixed with the truth) this would prove but a very weak probation, that your Church is [the true Church] in the exclusive notion, i. e. that no other is the Church, but that: for having the truth, doth not signify a Monopoly, or enclosure of it, or that no body else can have it; And if by [the true Church] you mean no more, but a true part, you know we do not question it, nor affirm that your errors though many, have turned you in non Ecclesiam, into a no Church. As for your Concordance with the Fathers which you say you have, I answer, that in those things wherein you and we consent, we shall not be unwilling to grant it to you (but yet must remember you, that you would not allow that to be a proof of your being infallible) but in those other which we call errors in you, we challenge you to produce an universal Concordance. You go on; that you prove your Church by no other way than Christianity is persuaded unto Infidels. I hope your meaning is, that you prove your Church to be a true Church, and that shall be granted you without your proof: but that it is the only true one, or the infallible one, I hope you have not miracles for that, (if you have, you have trifled away a great deal of time in not telling us of them) nor revelation from Heaven, nor universal tradition to assure you, (what you affirm so confidently) that the Infallibility of your Church is the whole frame of Christianity. And therefore what you learnedly add about the verba signorum, or signa realia, signs and ostensions, etc. by which you go about to prove Christianity, I must profess to edify me but little in point of the infallibility of your Church, because that is so distant a thing from it.  
To Sect. 12. Your affirmation, that the true Catholic Religion is the true Christianity, (if that be the only thing you aim at) shall be willingly granted you, all the question will be, whether all your doctrines, that of denying the cup to the Laity etc. be that Catholic Religion. And sure to him that questions that, all the characterismes, etc. all your Prophetical predidictions will give but little satisfaction, and no more will the excellency of Faith, perfection of heroic actions of professors, nor the conveyance from age to age, by the Prime Ecclesiastical succession of Pastors in the Sea of Rome, because that of the sub unicâ specie, etc. which we quarrel at in you, might as well be pretended to have testimonies out of the present Articles of our Church, as out of these. If there be any of these evidences, or moreover of Reason, Scripture, Antiquity, on your side for such controverted particulars, I beseech you let them be produced, or else you may be Christians, but yet corrupt in these particulars, your being a true Church will not pronounce you infallible, your Church of Rome Primitive may have the truth, and your Modern Rome be filled with errors. And therefore you may spare the pains of proving (what we have no occasion at this time to deny) that God engages his veracity to make good those things, for which he gives us such rational means of proof to induce our assent, For what ever else is, your infallibility, or your other errors, for which we charge you, are none of these things. And if you mark it, that which (according to your discourse) gives us such assurance of the truth of Christianity, is the ostensions, miracles, public acts of God's providence, not the Infallibility naturally inherent either in your Church, or in any particular society of men, nor the promise of God that any such society shall be infallible, and visible to all that it is that infallible. As for that which you covertly cast into the heap of the motives of Faith, [that 'twas continued from age to age in the succession of Pastors in the chief seat] that is no more a ground of the truth of Christanity, than its succession in all other seats, as I conceive you have yourself let fall also. The truth is the Preaching the Gospel over all the world, and the reception in so great a part of it, is an argument of the truth of Christianity (among many others) because it is the fulfilling of a Prophecy of their sounds going out into all Lands, But this is far from concluding the peculiar privilege of infallibility of those, who are under the Roman subjection. By which 'tis clear, that what you cite out of Irenaeus, and Saint Aug. comes home no better to your point of infallibility, than Aristotle's Analytick principles, which in the same place (and elsewhere) you cite also. And therefore if all you say in that long Section were yielded, (concerning the motives to Christianity, and your way by bringing to the Church, etc.) yet would you be as far to seek as ever, concerning your pretended infallibility.  
To your 13. Sect. which is nearer indeed to your purpose, I answer, that being by your means brought to Christianity, there is no need that I should find out any particular body of professors (or Church of one denomination) to which those motives to Christianity should so belong, as to belong to no othey but that; This sure I may better say without proof, than you have affirmed the contrary, For do you think it reasonable, that Christianity being planted all the world over, each man that is converted to it, must find out the Roman Bishop, and those that are in subjection to him, or not be accounted a Christian? If he be borne at Jerusalem, or converted there, will it not serve his turn to communicate with that Church, which hath given him Baptism? Was there any thing in his Creed could send him thither, till the holy Catholic Roman Church was (by mockery I conceive) put in thither? As for the line of succession of Ecclesiastical Magistrates, you must know, that is to be found in other Christian Churches, as well as in Rome, and the Scriptures and Apostolical verities descend down to us in them also. And what if in some passages of Antiquity the Sea of Rome should be found to be the Praetorian or Admiral, in your stile, i. e. the prime or principal Sea, would this prove her infallible, the Praetorian may spring a leak, as well as any other, and in case it should, I do not conceive, that all other Ships of that fleet, were bound to do so too, or else be counted fugitive, because they are unwilling to run that unhappy fate of sin, or error with her. Sure if the Praetorian should casually, or wilfully split upon a Rock, you would not censure all others for pyratical, that did not so too. The reasons are visible, why that Sea of Rome had the Primacy at some time (and at other times other Seas put in their plea for it, and if they obtained not, yet was that an argument that it was never judged a matter of Faith, because the Pretenders were not condemned for Heretics, even when it went not with them) viz: from the Imperial Seat being placed in that City, with which the Ecclesiastical 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, might proportionably go along, just as your Praetorian is that ship, where the Admiral resides, or which peculiarly belongs to him. But what is that to infallibility? That honour which comes by sympathy with the Civil State, is not like to be such a charm, or amulet, so to elevate above humane condition, that it must presently set up for perfection. Let your Church have all its due and customary respects, but do not so link inerrablenesse with Principality, unless you can bring some ground from Scripture, for the union, and because in all your Apology, Annotations, and Appendage you do not so much as name any such, I shall conceive you are too wise to claim by [Tu es Petrus] or any other so unconcluding an argument. Believe me, your prescription for some kind of Principality from the possession of it continued to that Sea so many years, is a better plea than any other, and against that I am not now a disputing, but only add that greatness saecular is no mark of infallibility. As for your rule of judging by the Association with Rome, which Assembly of Christians is legitimate, which not, that that is an infallible way of judging is not at all proved by your magnificent simile. For first, the fleet may be broken asunder by some tempest, and so without any fault of any ship, be divided from the Praetorian. 2. The Praetorian may quarrel with all, or any of the rest, and by threats or bullets drive them from her, and then if the cause be not just, if it be for example upon no other crime, but that the other ships judge it necessary to cast out some vessels or trumpery which they are resolved to be either useless, or perhaps dangerous to the vessel and all the Passengers, or again because the rest of the ships are resolved to obey the commission that sent out the whole Fleet, when the Praetorian was resolved to disobey it, in this and the like cases, 'tis clear, that the Praetorian is the only Schismatic; Or if it be just, yet the ships though confessed guilty of that other crime, or crimes, which made that severity of the Praetorian just, will yet not be guilty of a new crime of separation: the reason is clear, because she is forced to that, driven away, and now ever since lies under it unwillingly, 'tis her infelicity, not her crime; her punishment, not her fault. Or if there be a fault in that, viz: That she doth not humbly confess the fault, and desire to be reconciled, yet sure it will not be infinitely true, that that is a fault, when either she was guilty before of no fault, but a pretended one, for which that punishment was inflicted (to which purpose the Chancellor of Paris will advise you) or when the condition of her being received again is such, as cannot with any honesty be entertained, be it the undertaking any Treasonable act against the King, whose Admiral he is, which denominates that Praetorian, and who is supreme Master of the whole fl●et, or be it, but swearing any thing to be true which is false, or subscribing to the belief, or practice of what we believe neither true nor practicable. And that this is the state of our Church in its separation from yours, I shall undertake to make good, whensoever you will yield the point of Infallibility, or exchange it for the question of Schism. You see I am not much edified by your way, and because you are not so importunate, that I should, but are modestly content that if I am not satisfied with it, I should set you down a better, I shall humbly crave leave to do it in very few words. The far better way, more Christian, because more humble and more charitable, (and beyond all, probably the most peaceful too) Is, to make the Scripture, as 'tis interpreted by the ancient Fathers, the ground of our belief for all the substantial, i. e. plain parts of Faith; to define as few of this nature, as the Primitive Christians may be discerned to have done, to command and require obedience, and assent to these from all our Inferiors under our authority, and to proceed to Ecclesiastical admonitions, in case of error, to censures, in case of contumacy, but to blood, never purely for Religion, nor too often for Religion in ordine ad temporalia; To tolerate with meekness, those that are contrary minded, in all things that are not either of the number of these few, very few necessariò credenda, or that have not a necessary connexion and immediate influence on practice, and good life; This as it is far from either pretending to infallibility, or letting loose the reins to licentiousness, so is it the happiest, most lasting, durable temper of a Church, most agreeable to all those ends that Christ hath made most estimable to us in his Gospel, and so will be far from that fear of yours, of betraying us to a deserting of the Christian faith▪ or falling to Infidelity; universal peace and charity and humility, being above all things most contrary to that. And so you see, 'tis not so unpracticable a difficulty to compose an Organon of Faith so far, as to preserve it among Christians; And for the planting it among Infidels, that is not hujus considerationis, nor do I much believe I shall have much reason to differ from any learned Romanist on that Subject, on condition he would agree with me in this. As for your judgement upon his Lordship, that he was able to say more against an infallibility then for it, and that in the one he hath showed his strength, in the other not, I easily believe, and must think myself bound to confess, because I have seen a Book of his against Infallibility, but never any for it. If this must be thought a fault in him, I must be content to lie under your severest censure for the same crime also, and sic habes confitentes reos, patiently expecting what you will pronounce against us.  
Sect. 14. You are resolved it seems to have a word or two about Laws, upon what temptation, or provocation from the precedent discourses, at least from the main business in hand, I cannot readily satisfy my Reader. The most I can guess is, that in our meeting we fell into some discourse and difference about the nature of unjust Laws, whether they might be said to be Laws, or no. And perchance your charity led you now out of your road to inform me in this matter; if 'twere only so, I must acknowledge it an obligation, and shall thank you for that, though I chance to descent from you.  
And that matter I perceive will be soon stated: Thus: That Laws, if (considered in respect of the matter of them) they be found to command me to do aught, which by any superior law, 'tis unlawful for me to do, they are then unjust Laws, be the Legislatour never so lawfully my Magistrate; and in this case 'tis true, that God hath not given him power to make them; meaning thereby such a power, that he may make them without being unjust; but yet another power he hath given him, to wit, such an one, as that, if he exercise it thus against God the Doners will, yet it shall not be lawful for any man, or society of men on earth, to call him to account, and punish him, to resist violently, or reduce him in ordinem; Only God that hath given him potestatem in genere (which is libera ad utrosque actus, power to make good or evil laws, but withal restrained by a command from the law of nature, and God, and limited by that law only to the lawful exercise of it, or making the good laws) is to receive an account of the Talon given him to trade with as his Steward, and to inquire whet●er he hath used it well or no. Thus much, unless I am mistaken, your discourse gives me reason to think granted by you. And from thence I must conclude, that any such abuse of power in the Lawgiver, though it be in him aberration from the rule in respect of God, yet still is an act that hath some effect on the man which is borne, or lives under that law, though not to oblige him to do what is commanded him, yet to oblige him to nonresistance, and suffering patiently, if the Lawgiver be so wicked to tyrannize over him. Which obligation to passive, though not active Obedience, is the result of a Law, if not properly so called in your notion of it, yet very lawfully and intelligibly so called, as I have interpreted it; And for the propriety or impropriety of the word, I shall not much contend with you, so the substance be agreed on; and yet 'twere easy enough to repay you with the quotations of Schoolmen and Casuists, which make no scruple to use the word in my sense, and to answer the places you have produced, and show that 'twas only in that sense which we yield that they did deny it. But enough of this.  
For your 15 Section. What it signifies, or whether it would, I cannot I confess divine; 'twas I conceive in you an excessive act of liberality, that you thought might be for my turn; and, though I know not how at this time I shall reap profit by it, yet I cannot but accept your good intentions. And so being extremely weary of a very thankless task, I bid you heartily farewell.    
FINIS.