A VINDICATION OF Dr. Hammond's address, &c. From the Exceptions of Eutactus Philodemius, IN TWO PARTICULARS. Concerning 

The Power supposed in the Jew, over his own freedom.  
The No-power over a man's own life.    
TOGETHER WITH A brief REPLY TO Mr John GOODWINS {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, as far as concerns Dr. HAMMOND.  
LONDON, Printed for R. Royston, at the Angel in Ivy-lane. 1649.   

A VINDICATION OF Dr. Hammond's address, &c.  
§. 1. THe late Author of the original, and end of civil Power, under the name of Eutactus Philodemius, hath thought fit to question two things set down by Doctor Hammond in his address to the general, and counsel of War. 
page 5.  The first is this Affirmation, That the Jew under God's own Government might wholly give up himself, and his freedom to his Masters will (the power of life being only exempted) and by having his ear bored, might of a freeman, become a slave for ever.  
§. 2. The second is this Question, Whether ever any man was by God or Nature invested with power over his own Life, i. e. 
page 18.  to take away his own life, or to kill himself?  
§. 3. This Affirmation, and this Question, he willingly acknowledges, and is content that the Question shall be interpreted a downright Negation, That never any man was by God, or Nature invested with power over his own life, or power to kill himself. And having thus confessed the citation, as far as concerns him, it remains, that I proceed to justify, both parts of it. And to that end, I shall think myself sufficiently fortified by two advantages, which that author hath been pleased to allow me in this matter.  
§. 4. First, that it is not any opinion of Doctor Hammond, but the plain words of Scripture, which are under his name, thus opposed by this author in both places. The former is in terminis, Exodus 21. at the beginning, If the servant shall plainly say, I love my Master, &c. I will not go out free, Then his Master shall bring him to the Judges, &c. And his Master shall bore his ear thorough with an awl, and he shall serve him for ever. And again, Deut. 15.16. And it shall be, if he (i. e. the servant set free at the Sabbatick year) say unto thee, I will not go away from thee, &c. Then thou shalt take an awl, and thrust it thorough his ear unto the door, and he shall be thy servant for ever, and also to thy handmaid thou shalt do likewise.  
§. 5. That a plain place of Scripture should be thus mistaken for an Assertion of Doctor Hammond, I am not permitted to suspect, because that Author hath to his mention of the Doctors Name added the testimony of Gen. 21. which, though it be a mistake, I suppose, of the Printer, for Ex. 21. will yet be a competent testimony of that author's opinion, that Doctor Hammond had Moses on his side, and consequently, that both were to be involved by him in the same condemnation.  
§. 6. The same, I suppose, I may assume of the other Negation questioned by him, that 'tis in Doctor Hammond, but the repeating of the 6. Commandment [thou shalt not kill] according to the latitude, wherein all Jewish, and Christian Writers have interpreted it to the prohibition of self-murder, as hath been showed by him at large in another place. 
Pract. Cat. l. 2. sect. 5.   
§. 7. Having mentioned this first advantage against this Author, sufficient certainly to secure Doctor Hammond from his blame, and to make any apology for him unnecessary, and well-nigh scandalous (the Word of God being able to plead its own cause, without the assistance of any human Advocate) I have yet the benefit of a second kindness allowed me by this unknown adversary; which, though Scripture were not of Authority with him, would encourage the Doctor not to fear the falling under his displeasure. That is, the unreconcileableness of those two opinions (the one with the other) which he is pleased to confront to Doctor Hammond, viz. that it should be unlawful for a Jew to give up his freedom, (and that servitude should be, as he calls it, an unnatural servitude) and yet that it should be put in his power by God and Nature (for that is to affirm it lawful, and agreeable to Nature) to take away his own Life, or to kill himself. For it being by Job mentioned as an aphorism of common Nature, that a man will for his life give all he hath; and in the accounts and practices of all men, that of Liberty being part of that all; It will consequently be unreasonable, and impossible for him that hath once affirmed the parting with ones freedom to be an unnatural servitude, to deny the killing of himself to be an unnatural murder; And therefore, having so fair advantages before me, not only the Scripture in terminis on my side, but this Adversary, by so easy a consequence, become my Second also, I am (not unwillingly) persuaded to tender a brief reply to those reasons, which seem to have drawn this Author into this casual dispute, and to endeavour the preventing of those errors; to which, a Philodemius, or popular disputer may in such an Age of licentiousness betray others.  
§. 8. To the case of the Jewish Servant, giving up his freedom to his Master, (which was by the Doctor mentioned out of Moses) the author hath framed three Answers.  
§. 9 The first, That it cannot be affirmed upon good and pregnant grounds, that from nature the Jew had any such power, but that God only permitted it to be so; and the Jew, by this unnatural servitude to his master, was a fit type of that slavery that man should be in unto Sin, to obey it in the lusts thereof; for his servants we are whom we obey.  
§. 10. To this I Answer, That the affirmation of Moses in the Scripture, [That this was permitted by God to the Jews] is to me a good and pregnant ground that the Jew had this power under God's own Government, which is all that he affirms to be affirmed by Doctor Hammond in that place; and therefore, the putting in those other words [Of the Jews not having it from Nature] seems to be on purpose designed to take off from the clearness, and the pregnancy of the probation, and so only to darken, but not to invalidate the argument.  
§. 11. But than secondly, I add, that God's permitting any thing to any man, is a pregnant argument, that from Nature that man hath that power: If by Power we mean a moral power, or power of doing it without Sin; And if by God's permission we understand his Approbation, as of a lawful fact. For, thus it is certain, that God never so permits, as to approve (or not prohibit) any thing, which by the Law of Nature may not be done without sin. For the Law of Nature being the Law of God, as truly as any positive Law of his promulgating; and God in all his laws being constant to himself, so far as never to prohibit, and permit the same thing at the same time to the same men; It is most certain, that what God thus permits, Nature permits also, i. e. Leaves it lawful to be done, or possible without sin.  
§. 12. But if by Permission this Author means no more than dispensation, or grant of present Impunity, such as in the Jewish commonwealth was (for the hardness of their hearts) allowed in the business of divorce, or (for the multiplying of them) in polygamy, than it will sure rest upon him to prove, and not only, as he saith, to suppose, that God thus (and thus only) permitted it to be so: But this I shall suppose impossible to be proved, though it cannot lie upon me to demonstrate the Negative, nor shall I so much fear the probableness of his unproved groundless supposition, as to endeavour it. For indeed, what degree of likeness is there betwixt those divorces and polygamies, (which were such inordinate Liberties) and this other of divesting himself of Liberty? Only the same that is betwixt two Contraries.  
§. 13. I shall not need further to insist on this, both for the plain words of Scripture, and because it is the acknowledgement of this very Author, page 18. That this may lawfully be done for the obtaining of a greater good, which being compared with Rom. 3. ver. 8. makes up a demonstration, that a man hath this power, i. e. that he may lawfully do it. For 'tis not the intuition of the greatest moral good, much less of the greatest advantage to myself, or any other, that may make that lawful which in itself is unlawful, or which by nature man hath not power to do.  
§. 14. And therefore, when he adds, [That in this the Jew was a fit type of man's slavery to sin] as 'twill be easily granted, that he was (as type signifies Image or emblem) so sure it will not prove that this servitude of the Jew, was an unnatural servitude, any more than any other parts of the Judaical Law, (which either in the intention of the lawgiver, or by the wit of Man can be made an Image of any present state, or condition of men) can by that one Argument be proved to be unnatural. For, sure all types are not by that one evidence of their being types demonstrated to be sinful, especially when they are instituted, or permitted by God, and by that appear to be agreeable to his will, in Opposition to, or Variation from which all sin, or Obliquity consists: Or if this charge must fall singly on this Type, but not on all others (as sure the Passeover, which was a Type, was not yet unnatural, and so of the rest) then must this charge be proved by some other medium, then by this only, that it is a Type; and till that be produced, I must think this way of discourse (which first supposes this giving up of the Jews Liberty to be a Type, and then concludes it unnatural for being such) to be the proving of quidlibet ex quolibet, the same with his, which first supposes a live man to be a Picture, and then sends him a challenge for being such: Certainly such reasoning is too very loose, and light, to set any good Character on that cause that wants such supporters.  
§. 15. His second answer is yet a little more strange, and such as could not yet easily have been foreseen, or expected, That his having his ear bored was a punishment for his contempt of that Liberty, &c. 'tis sufficiently known that this boring of the ear was the ceremony of receiving a Servant among the Jews; and therefore, when David saith of Christ, But mine ear hast thou opened, 'tis acknowledged, that thereby was denoted his taking on him the form of a servant. This boring of the ear with an awl was no very painful thing, sure not so much as Circumcision; and yet 'twould be a little strange, that when a proselyte was received among the Jews with Circumcision, that should be deemed a punishment on him for his not continuing a Gentile, or that his Conversion to Judaism, of which this was the Ceremony, should be thereupon counted an unnatural sin: The answering such Arguments as these, would require a more cheerful, and pleasant humour, than the times, or occasion of these debates will well permit.  
§. 16. The last Answer looks a little more demurely, That his giving himself up to be a slave for ever, did refer to, and terminate in the year of Jubilee, &c. and that he did not make himself irrecoverably a slave, &c. [That this was to terminate in the year of Jubilee] is said without farther proof, then only of this untestified affirmation in a Parenthesis, that that was the year of his freedom from that servitude which the corruption of his own will had brought upon him, which is the proving a thing by a bare repeating of it in other words, and only throwing a little dirt upon it. For how doth it appear that it is a piece of Corruption (for a man that loves his Master, as the Text saith, and is better pleased with his service, then with his former liberty) thus to choose that which he likes best? Or how comes the casting off Liberty to be a corruption of the will, when casting off yokes, and servitude is made capable of so good a Character? Had the words of Saint Paul, speaking of servants, [If thou canst be free, use it rather] been brought to back this bare Assertion, there had been some tolerable excuse for such a begging of the question as this: But those words extend not to a command, that every man should be obliged to be free, that can, but only to a permission, that, if he will rather use it (i. e. prefer this Liberty) he most lawfully, and commendably may. But this author hath not thought fit to make this Interpretation, or account of that place necessary to be given him. As for the truth of his Affirmation, that this Bondman with his ear bored, was released at the year of Jubilee, 'tis that, which, as it doth not well consist with the words of Moses, [He shall serve him for ever] Exod. 21.6. and Deut. 15.17. so it is not proved by any other place, or made probable that [for ever] is not an absolute [for ever.] One place in Leviticus, there is Chap. 25.41. which saith, that the poor Brother that is sold to be a bond servant, shall be free at the year of Jubilee, and proportionably the servant (spoken of by me in Exodus and Deuteronomy) is to be set free from that servitude, to which he was sold (i. e. the forced and constrained, not purely voluntarily servitude) in the seventh, or sabbatick year, and so by the same reason in the Jubilee, which is the great Sabbatick (made up of seven times seven) in the place of Leviticus.  
§. 17. But this Author must mark, that this person thus set free, is not the Jew of whom Doctor Hammond spoke, but the other that hath made the voluntary surrender of his Liberty, he that, when the Sabbatick year comes (or consequently the year of Jubilee, which offers him the same release) resolves, that he will not go out free, refuses to make use of the advantage of a Jubilee, and so hath no more releases behind; and consequently by this act of his is in an irreversible estate, remains a servant for ever. And so this more specious answer appears to have as little of truth, or substance in it, as the two former.  
§. 18. To which, yet I might further add, That in case it were granted, that the next year of Jubilee gave this man release also, yet would not this avoid the concludency of this place for the lawfulness of giving up our Liberty (which is the only point in hand) because he that can do it for seven, or for fifty years, can surely do it: and although having done it, he shall have Liberty, after that number of years, to retract, if he please, yet is this no obligation that he shall retract, but only a privilege that he may, which privilege he may again as lawfully deny himself to make use of, as before he did of his first Liberty.  
§. 19 Mean while the conclusion, or close of this Authors reasoning is a little more extraordinary yet. For having from (the {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} of) the Jubilee, inferred that he did not make himself irrecoverably a slave, he proceeds. [And if so (i. e. sure, if he made not himself a slave irrecoverably) where is the warrant from God, or Nature, from passiing away his freedom, or Liberty at all? and if so, how without recall, and irreversibly?] Is it possible this Author could think these conclusions demonstrated so logically, as that he should set them down by way of question, which supposes them irrefragable at the first asking?  
§. 20. For the first of them, is not the contrary most demonstrable? that if he were a slave till the year of Jubilee, (as 'tis confessed he was, and withal that he was so by God's permission) then there is warrant from God for passing away his Liberty in some degree, and for some space, though not irrevocably. Doth not he serve at all, that serves not eternally? or is that no warrant at all, which is such for a limited time only? Then sure are we not at all permitted to be men, or warranted by God▪ or Nature, to live in this world, because we have our Jubilee too, our time of manumission from hence.  
§. 21. And for the second, what is that but a plain Circle, first to infer the [not at all] from the [not irrevocably] and then in same breath, the [not irrovocably] from the [not at all.] How reconcilable this is with the authors popular title of Philodemius I dispute not, but resolve, it is not the particular merit which bestowed on him that other more regular of Eutactus.  
§. 22. And for the dexterity that is expressed in the conclusion of the whole section, [That therefore, that absolute, and unreserved resignation of a man's native Liberty, &c. without any just condition, or adequate exchange, (which saith he, is hereby pleaded for by the Doctor) can have no rise, or origination from God, or reasonable nature] (imposing on the Doctor directly against his sense, those words of so irrational importance, [without any just condition, or adequate exchange] I shall suppose that this was an effect of the necessary wants of his cause, and a discreet prevision that his conclusion could not subsist without such supplies, which made him venture on such indirect means.  
§. 23. For Doctor Hammond is not such an enemy to mankind, as to plead for such irrational actings, or to become his advocate that makes imprudent, or unthrifty bargains, (though by the strength of his free will to evil, he may possibly do so sometimes, and be obliged by his own act, and justly suffer the inconveniences, and smarts of it) but resolveth, that both the Campanians in their dedition, and the Barbarians in their request to the Romans, that they might have leave to become their servants; and the Jew in Moses' supposition, that loved his Master, and preferred his service before his manumission, (I shall add myself also, who profess to prefer (in my choice for myself) subjection before absolute Liberty, nay, before sovereignty itself, and believe it a far more sober, and consequently rational speech in Saul, 1 Sam. 9.21. which expressed some aversation to Samuel's proposal about anointing him, then that other of Absalon's, O that I were a Judge, or King, &c.) did all part with their Liberty upon adequate exchanges, such, as they (which were the fittest judges what themselves thought) did conceive to be the full worth of the commodity they parted with: And such a rational power of parting with absolute Liberty for somewhat that I like better, (i. e. for subjection to Government, which is, 1. in itself, far removed from slavery; and 2. is the only way to secure men from the danger of it) is all that that address had occasion to assert, or plead for at that time.  
§. 24. One thing more there is, which I may be allowed to add, (having thus far replied to all his answers) that the conclusion which was in the address inferred from that practice of the Jews, was farther confirmed by the practice of diverse Heathens, who can neither be excused by the pretence of a permission, or special dispensation from God to do unnatural things (as he thinks may be affirmed of the Jew) nor yet were observed by the most rational Historians to have done any thing contrary to Reason or Nature, in changing absolute Liberty for somewhat which seemed better, and more advantageous to them, to wit, for security, and protestion, i. e. in changing a state of common hostility, (the unhappiest lot in nature) for that other (set down by the Apostle as the object of their Christian 
* {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}.  pursuit, and emulation, and 
* {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}.  contention) a quiet settled peace. The advantage of which change, he that is not inclined to acknowledge, must be of a temper of mind, or body so distant from that, which God hath given me, that I shall not wonder, that that which seems to me most demonstractively asserted, is to him so far from being acknowledged such. I shall add no more to the vindicating of the first proposition, till I meet with the temptation of better, or more dangerous arguments against it.  
§. 25. I proceed as briefly to the second, which is proposed in the address by way of question, Whether ever any man was by God, or Nature, invested with power of his own Life, i. e. with power to take away his own Life, to kill himself? The vindicating of which, I must acknowledge a task, to which I did not expect, that the Doctor should be called; having not, till now, been so fully convinced of the danger, and ill consequences of favouring the excesses of those men's wits, who have maintained paradoxes, or of the improvidence of those that have tempted others by the publishing of them.  
§. 26. For certainly about two years since, before the time, that the postthumous {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}: was set out, a man might in this Nation have adventured to have asked so calm a question [whether a man might Lawfully kill himself?] and not have feared a challenge in Print for this injury, or encroachment upon the liberty of our Nature. And I conceive those laws of our Land, which have looked on this self-slaughter, as an inhuman crime, and punished it after Death, with the denial of Christian burial, & a mark of reproach upon the grave, might, when time was, have been able to have come in to the assistance of so known a truth; had not the sacred rites of Christian burial been now so despised, and profaned, that the wanting them hath ceased to be esteemed a punishment among us; had not the custom of killing other men so harassed our Consciences, and obliterated all the remainders of written, and unwritten laws, that we need not be wondered at, if the swords, which have been so fleshed abroad, mistake their way sometimes, and return on the owner's breasts. And lastly, had not the deduction been so prone, and easy from the general, to the particulars, from the lawfulness of a Nations destroying itself, to a single persons going and doing likewise, from the justifying of civil intestine slaughters of the public, to that other more tolerable crime of a single violence.  
§. 26. As it is, I shall not endeavour to persuade myself (as the Pyrrhonian in Sextus Empiricus, would teach me to do) that I was in a dream, when I read D. Hammond cited, and confuted for thus affirming; I must rather provide for the encounter, and hasten to answer the arguments, which this Author hath offered against this branch of the sixt commandment (as he met with it in the doctor's hands) or else 'twill be possible this opinion may gather Proselytes also in this age, wherein nothing can be said so incredible, which some men do not make a shift to take up, and believe very contentedly.  
§. 27. His first argument is drawn from the doctor's Concession, that man hath power from God and Nature over his own body to cut, and lance it, and over his own freedom to pass it away, from whence, if he do any thing, he must undertake to conclude, that therefore he hath power over his life also; And to do that, he must make good these three things:  
§. 28. 1. That since the confutation of the former proposition, he hath now changed his mind, and agrees with Doctor Hammond, that a man hath from God or Nature power over his freedom to pass it away, (for otherwise, though it will be an advantage against Doctor Hammond, who confessed it, yet will it not be of use to himself who professeth the contrary) and again that he hath forgotten, what in his very last period he had affirmed [that God doth not intrust and allow any man to have power to destroy his own image, i. e. to take away man's life, but him, or them whom he makes Gods, i. e. Magistrates to whom he deputes his own place] for sure it cannot be thought, that every private man in the community of Nature, is such a Vicegerent of God, or Magistrate.  
§. 29. 2. That the argument, à minori ad majus affirmatiuè, is valid, against all logic, viz: That he that hath power over the body, or over freedom, is supposed to have power over Life also, and so that the Surgeon, that may scarify the flesh, or cut off an arm, may therefore as Lawfully slash the throat, and cut off the head also, and in like manner that the Master by being such, is become the Judge of his Servant, and hath among Christians that power of his Life, which he hath seldom been allowed among the worst of Heathens.  
§. 30. And 3. That God, which hath put something in our power, is thereby obliged to reserve nothing to himself; Or that by giving us the usus fructus, or benefits of Life, he hath giving us the absolute dominion, and propriety of it also.  
§. 31. But without either of these 3 more difficult undertakings, the author hath attempted an easier way, by supposing that neither cutting of flesh, nor Parting with freedom may be endured by God or Nature, unless they refer to such an end, whereby a far greater good is to be enjoyed, and obtained: that cutting or lancing (without this necessary circumstance of a greater good) is a step or degree toward self murder, &c. From whence the Conclusion, I suppose, must be, that by the same reason the Killing of one's self, may then also be conceived allowable by God, when it is referred by me to such an end, whereby a far greater good is to be enjoyed, and obtained, but never else.  
§. 32. To which I shall make these clear replies, 1. That a thing directly forbidden by God, cannot be thought approvable by him, upon the referring of it to a moral (much less if it be but an advantageous or profitable) good end. Their damnation is just, that say, they may do evil that good may come: And that this is not a begging of the question; but that, indeed, self-homicide is evil, and forbidden by God, will be clear by remembering these three things, 1. That the command of not killing, is indefinite; and that he that kills himself, doth certainly kill, that he that sheds his own blood, sheds the blood of a Man: and 2. That the Image of God residing on him (which is the ground of this prohibition in Moses, Gen. 9.6.) is as truly so, when 'tis beheld in the reflection, as when in the direct line, in myself, as in any other man. 3. That the power of Life is Reserved a peculiar to God, and not communicated to the Creature, (save only to his vicegerent) which may thus appear. God as the Creator of the World, and sole donor of life must be acknowledged to have the dominion over it: This dominion consequently is communicated to none but to those to whom by God it is communicated; To the Magistrate this power is given by that Law of God, whereby he prescribes the putting certain Malefactors to Death; and whereby he constitutues the Magistrate his vicegerent on Earth, and so the executioner of that Law, an avenger for wrath, Rom. 13. And whosoever will challenge the like power, must show the like charter, and evidence; and if he cannot do that, that is sufficient to prove that he hath it not; As 'tis sufficient to convict any man of the injustice of any his claim to my estate, that he cannot show any deed whereby it was conveyed to him from me; And there need no other Affirmative proof against such an one, then that it was once in me, and it appears not how it parted from me to any other. And therefore, till some evidence be produced, (which I suppose will never be) that this power of life is made over from God to every private man, the demonstration is abundantly clear, that that power is not in any private man any more over himself than others. And it is observable to this very purpose, that though the Stoics, to teach their Disciples apathy, or courage against whatsoever events did talk of that sure remedy against all temporal pressures, the going out, or killing themselves, (looking on it favourably as a refuge, or sanctuary from all those things which might otherwise be fancied unsupportable) yet when they considered it this other way, (as every thing, they said, had two handles) i. e. in respect of God, who placed them here; it was generally resolved by them, viz. by Seneca, and the wisest of them (and the more foolish of that Sect, are seldom found to practise the contrary) that we must not on our own heads desert our station, but maintain that ground on which our general hath set us, and wait with courage and patience, till he think fit to command us off again. As for the other two, power over the flesh, and the freedom, the cutting of one, and parting with the other, they are no degrees toward the taking away life, but on the contrary are used on purpose for the preserving of it, in its being, or well being, the one by the rules of physic, the other of policy; and therefore is the power of those allowed us by God, and Nature, because they are thus instrumental to that end, and submitted to our discretion, because they may be so. Thus are some things referred to the steward's judgement, and put into his power, to dispose for the good of the Family, and yet others reserved peculiar, and sacred in the Masters own hands. Thus are my Writings put into my lawyer's hand, for him to use to the preserving of my Estate; yet is not my Estate put into his power to dispose of it at his pleasure for some greater end. And the argument would be very infirm, because that power which the Steward, or Lawyer hath entrusted to him, ought not to be used by him, but in order to some good end; that therefore, that which is not so entrusted to him, may be thus assumed also. Some rays there have always been communicated from Heaven to this Earth of ours; and yet some Flowers of of that celestial Crown, which have been reserved as sacred, and incommunicable. And so there will be no kind of weight or concludency in this present way of arguing, this balancing of flesh or liberty with Life, till it appear also from the same, or equal evidence, that those are reserved by God, as Life appears to be. This certainly without any more help, is a full satisfaction to this argument.  
§. 33. But than secondly, & ex abundanti, the Killing myself is no way ordinable to good, 1. 'Tis not ordinable to mine own present worldly advant●ge, as lancing, and subjection may be, that is clear; and that is a reason why God should not give us this Liberty, (though if we were not able to render reasons, the wisdom of the lawgiver were reason enough) and for future advantages to myself, the being with Christ, which is far better, 1. that cannot be taken notice of by bare Nature, till that be Christianized: and then 2. according to the Christians rules, we have all reason to resolve that 'twill not be purchased by any other way, but by that which God hath prescribed toward it, i. e. by lawful unprohibited courses. It being evident, that the Crown which is held in God's hand shall not be dispensed to any, but those which do {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, strive lawfully, and that patience of waiting till God calls, is one of the laws that are thus prescribed in our {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}.  
§. 34. As for advantages to others, the public-weal, or peace, 'tis not imaginable, how the killing myself can be directly, or otherwise then by accident, ordinable to that; whatsoever can be conceived of it, will be as sufficiently provided for by the Magistrates having power of life; and that he may have from God immediately, as well as he can be supposed to have it from any act of collation from me, if 'twere in my power.  
§. 35. Lastly, For any moral, or Christian virtue, or yet farther, the illustrating of the Glory of our creator, (which alone deserve the title of good ends) 'tis not the having an unlimited power, that immediately, or directly contributes to these, but the making use of the limited powers we have, the employing the lives which he hath given us, according to his will, and not the destroying them contrary to it, I shall not need to prosecute this. All that is in this place pretended by the Author to this purpose, is only this, that a man may freely consent, and willingly expose his life to death for a greater, or publicker good.  
§. 36. Where by consenting I shall suppose him to mean a consent of the will to that action which immediately follows, i. e. to the exposing his life to death, (and if by consent he should mean any thing else, as the consenting, that the other shall kill him, or the making it free and lawful to that other, to take away his Life, than hath he put two very distant things together, and so 'tis but the ordinary fallacy plurium interrogationum, and in that Notion of Consenting I shall anon show that man may not, i. e. hath not power so to Consent.) And to the proving of this, it is, that his remaining endeavours (as far as concerns Doctor Hommond) are directed. And accordingly he saith, He will be so bold as to state the Question as it ought, i. e. to remove it from the words and sense wherein Doctor Hammond proposed it (and in which it is that his whole discourse is grounded) to those other words of his own, most extremely distant in sound and sense; and in which I am as confident, that the truth is on his side, (if Consent signify no more than I take it to signify) as I am, that that truth doth not contradict those other truths, which by Doctor Hammond are superstructed on his foundation; or that the Proposition, as 'tis stated by the Doctor, is all that is necessary to be affirmed for the founding of the rest of his discourse.  
§. 37. For I desire to know, whether there be no difference betwixt killing myself, and exposing my life to death? If so, than it must be not only lawful so to kill myself (which is all the Author demands) but sometimes an act of duty, and necessity also: For so certainly (in the assisting my sovereign, or Country to hazard, and expose my life, when I am thereto lawfully called; and so again, to suffer martyrdom in the confession of Christ, or discharge of any Christian duty, is not only lawful for me to do, but I sin if I do it not. And yet I do not perceive that this author hath laid this obligation, or necessity on himself, or any man else in any case to kill (or lay violent hands upon) himself, and so I suppose he is still of the doctor's mind, (though he be willing to conceal it) that there is a difference between these.  
§. 38. And if there yet want any farther light to the clearing of this difference between this [having power of my own life so as to kill myself, and that [having power of my life, so as to expose it, or venture it in a good Cause] I shall (for the concluding of this Paper) propose the plain difference between them.  
§. 39 And that may be taken from the nature of the word [exposing] for that we know signifies no more, then to submit it to an hazard, and so to expose my life, is to hazard my life: In doing so, all that can be affirmed of me, is no more than this, that I am willing, or content (and by my actions express that willingness) to lose my life, if God please to permit it to be taken from me.  
§. 40. When my life is thus lost, three things must necessarily concur to it, 1. The Violence of the invader; 2. The Providence of God permitting him to invade; and 3. My not resisting, or my not using the means (which were naturally possible for me to use) to prevent, or avoid the violence of this invasion, as when Christ might have used Angels (and another slight, and a third compliance, and caution) but chooseth not to do so. Of these three the only efficient cause of the action (of killing) is the malicious violent invader; sure neither the providence of God in permitting, nor my own meekness, or obedience to Christ in following him, though it be to the very cross.  
§. 41. In this case, supposing that it be for a good End that I now expose my life; it is also supposed, that the pursuance of that end is either duty in me, a thing that I am absolutely bound to, as the Confession of Christ, &c. or else that 'tis excess of Charity, to which, though it be not under particular precept, yet the Intuition of some great, and glorious end doth so invite, and incline me, that 'tis heroical Virtue in me to do it, and that which (though God doth not so require it of me, as that I sin, if I do it not, yet) he hath promised to reward abundantly, whensoever 'tis done for his sake.  
§. 42. In the former of these cases, when the pursuance of that good end is strict duty, as in case I am commanded to confess Christ, or to assist my Prince in protecting my Country, There as my endeavour is required of me by that precept, so is my utmost endeavour, such as I must not remit, whatsoever the danger be; And if that danger prove to be the utmost danger, even of my l●fe itself, yet the command of Constancy, of not fearing, or fainting, and the character of perfect love given by Saint John, that it casts out fear, and the denunciations against the fearful, or cowardly, do all join to extend my obligation, to pursue this so necessary End without any receding, and if the cross itself lie in my way toward this end, to take it up, i. e. willingly to submit to God's Providence, which hath thought fit to call me to this trial, if it be even of resisting unto blood. And so still all that I do, is the constant, patient, cheerful submission to God's Will (in his providential disposing of my life, and in permitting the injurious to take it from me) and nothing else; an absolute choice of Obedience, but not of Death; a sacrificing to duty all desire of Life, but not otherwise undertaking to dispose of it.  
§. 43. Hence is it that my venturing of my Life doth not clear, or free the Invader, from any degree of sin, or guilt in thus taking it away from me. 'Twas but a sarcasm or Trope in Julian's soldiers, to say, they did not wrong the Christians by killing them, but only hasten them to their desired home: And the Fathers were able to answer the paralogism by the rule in ethics, distinguishing betwixt a mixed, and absolute will; and so concluding their slaughters to be Injuries, though they were willingly embraced, the Persecutors to be Persecutors still, though the other were Martyrs.  
§. 44. Which is a demonstrative proof, that 'tis the Invader, not Sufferer, whose act the killing is supposed to be, and so that I am not in this case of exposing my Life, supposed to give any Consent that he shall kill me, or consequently to divest myself of the power of my life, or indeed to have any such power over it. For whatsoever is absolutely in my power to dispose of, that I may lawfully consent to part with; That if I do part with it, ipso facto, and jure 
* Data ●o ipso quo dantur, siunt accipientis. jurist.  becomes his, to whom I part with it (and if there be any error in it, 'tis chargeable on the giver, who was thus profusely liberal above the proportion:) And consequently for him to take and use it, is in him no sin; As that part of my Estate which is in my power, may by me be past over to another by gift, and being so, is lawfully possessed, and enjoyed by the receiver.  
§. 45. And therefore, I say, if the lawfulness of the exposing my Life would conclude me to have a power over it, it must be as perfectly lawful for the Tyrant, into whose hands my Life (in the confessing of Christ) is by me exposed, to take that Life from me, as 'tis for the poor man into whose hands my goods are by me put (in obedience to Christ's command of mercifulness) to receive, and carry away those goods; which being an absurdity too gross to be defended by any, will, I suppose, incline this Author to discern the distance betwixt the questions, as the one is by him, and as the other was by Doctor Hammond proposed.  
§. 46. And in like manner also, when the End pursued by me, is (though not absolutely necessary, yet) better and more excellent; there the Precept of being faithful unto death, and the promise of reward made to him that lays down, or loses his life for Christ's sake, do as much oblige to constancy, at least, as much assure that such constancy shall be acceptable to God, (and that the more by how much greater the hazards, and terrors, and temptations are to the contrary) as when the particular matter of the action was under precept. And so that other accidental difference will make no variation in the main, nor make it at all probable, that exposing my life heroically was not warranted by God, when exposing it necessarily, was supposed to be so: it being as certain that God doth warrant me to do that which he commends, as what he strictly commands to me: And therefore what was said in the case of duty, doth as truly hold (and so needs not to be repeated again) in this case of [more excellent] also.  
§. 47. Having thus far proceeded, it will now be unnecessary for me to answer the Arguments which this Author adds in this matter, because the Question being by him changed from that, which was proposed by Doctor Hammond (and stated Negatively) to another, which no man can be more ready to affirm, and assert then that Doctor; It would be an impertinent niceness in him to refuse to have his Opinion confirmed by another man's reasons; I shall rather wish that all his proofs were demonstrative, and effectual to conclude, what Doctor Hammond affirms with him; and only briefly show, that they are ineffectual to prove what that Doctor denies, and that will soon be done by the most cursory mention of them.  
§. 48. For first, I grant with him that God permitted his own son to be put to death by the hands of violent, and unjust men, but see no consequence from thence, that Christ, as a Man might lawfully have taken away his own Life; as for the phrase of laying down the life for the sheep, that sure signifies not the killing himself, for the goodness of the shepherd consists not in that) the cutting his own throat, when the wolf invades the Flock; but the making use of his Life to the utmost, wherein it may be advantageous to the Sheep, and venturing, and hazarding it in their defence, or quarrel; yea, and contentedly suffering (not acting in) his own death, that he may be able to avert theirs. For this is the meaning of {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, to lay down the life, ({non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, to venture himself voluntarily into danger, {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, in the notion in which the Greek Glossaries explain the phrase, from {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, i. e. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} in Hesychius, and the Latin, Parabelanum animae suae esse, i. e. all one with {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}) to expose it, not to be so solicitous for the defence of it, as to forgo da●y, or charity, or care of the poor sheep entrusted to him, for the preserving of it.  
§. 49. A second Argument is by this Author touched on (though not formally urged by him) that the preserving whole societies from perishing is a good, and a public end, and that the impunity of offenders being the readiest way to the dissolution, and destruction of societies, Nature is supposed to dictate that one man should rather justly die, than whole societies unjustly perish. This Conclusion, and premises, the Doctor doth, as the Author foresaw, most willingly acknowledge, but withal discerns not, how it proves that a man hath power over his own life: It will be sufficient if God by any other means (as by instating it in the Prince &c.) do place that power of life in others. The utmost which this way of arguing can pretend to conclude, is, 1. That whatsoever any man hath in his own power, that 'tis reasonable for him to deliver up into the governor's hand, (thus to make it easy, or possible to discharge his trust, and by these advantages to contribute to the public quiet and weal.) Nay 2. that God that hath the power of life, and sees how useful 'tis to have that vested in governors, should consequently be supposed so to vest it (And that he doth so, is the clear acknowledgement of the address.)  
§. 50. But sure it cannot extend so far, as to make a man give (or have) that which he hath not, nor to restrain God from having the sole original power of that, which otherwise might be acknowledged to be vested in him.  
§. 51. As for the supposition, which the Author here adds on the back of this, [In case 10 men in the community of Nature chose one to rule over them, and one of them thus spontaneously subjected shall murder one of his fellow Subjects] (whereupon he demands whether the ruler so set up may not by his own consent by virtue of that power he received from him among the rest, put such a murderer to death) To this I answer, that the governor may in this case put the murderer to death, but this not by virtue of any power, or consent of the murderer, but by authority from God, who alone hath the power of life; In relation to which it is that the governor is styled {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, a Minister of God, in this very notion, as he is {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, an avenger for wrath or punisher of offenders.  
§. 52. That which is in the Subjects power the governor may have by the Subjects consent, and by virtue of the power which he received from him; And therefore it is that the power of violent resisting invaders, the right of repelling force by force, which God and Nature hath given the single man in community of Nature, is now, in case of submission to the governor, parted with, and deposited by him, so far as refers to the Governor, and though it be founded in self-defence, yet he that thus violently resists the powers, shall receive to himself damnation.  
§. 53. But still that which is not in the Subjects power, is not, nay cannot be vested by the subject in the governor, but flows from an higher principle (from him that really hath the power) and comes from the Subjects consent, only, as from the causa sine quâ non, or by way of resultance; That as God communicates not this power of life to any but the governor; so that man's Consent, that he should be his governor, doth remotely (and by way of condition, or qualifying of the subject to a capacity of receiving that power from God) concur to the vesting of that power in that person. Thus doth the temper of the air contribute to the qualifying the slime, or putrid matter to receive influences from the sun, and then those influences beget life in it, and endow it with that higher principle, which the temper of the air, that contributed all it could, (having not thus much in its power) could not be affirmed to contribute to it.  
§. 54. And so you see the doctor's way of stating this question doth as fully provide for the punishing of Malefactors, and preserving of communities, as the supposing the power of life to proceed originally from the People, would be able to do; As he that affirms the soul in every birth to be infused by God, makes as sure a provision for Generation, and consequently for the preservation of the human species, as they that suppose the Soul to be traduced from the Parents, as well as the Body.  
§. 55. His last Argument is from Rom. 5.7. For a good man one would dare to die, i. e. saith he, would with the presence of a resolved Spirit die; the word [daring] saith he, noting a presence of mind terrified with no dangers. To this Argument again, as far as by the Author it can be extended, i. e. to the acknowledgement, or concluding of the lawfulness of a valiant courageous suffering of death, either for a public good, or for some act of eminent private charity, I am fully of the author's mind.  
§. 56. But the word [dying] in that place, signifying no more than submission of the Will, contentedness, or willingness to suffer death, not by his own, but by some other man's hands, an {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, a taking those blows (though never so sharp and mortal) on his own shoulders, and breast, which were meant by the Enemy to another (to the merciful, or good man in that Text) there is no logic can conclude from hence, that a man hath any power over his own life, to take it away from himself by any act of force, (as {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} among the Attic Writers, is, saith Phrynicus, used {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, He that kills himself, takes upon him an Independent Authority over himself) or to give it into another man's hands, so that he may without any farther Authority (without any investiture of the power of the Sword from God) lawfully take it from him. 
Nam ne in animalibus quidem manendi amor ex animae voluntatibus verum ex naturae principiis venit, Nam saepe mortem cogentibus causis, quam natura reformidat, voluntas amplectitur, &c. de consol. Phil. l. 3. Pros. 11.  I shall conclude this with an observation of Boethius, that the love of life is not seated in the will of the Creature, but in the principles of Nature. That so our lives may not be ventured on the uncertainties & hazards of our own passions, or satieties, which may incl●ne the will to prefer death sometimes, but in the instincts of that more constant immutable Rule, which always prescribes the preserving of those treasures, by God and Nature entrusted to us.  
§. 57 Having made this short, and sudden return to this author's reasonings, Doctor Hammond will leave the matter most willingly, where this Author hath placed it, at the feet of all ingenuous, and unprejudiced Readers, and will endeavour (as unpassionately as any man) to approve himself a Servant of Reason, and embracer, or friend of Truth, wheresoever he meets with it; upon which score, he is content to acknowledge some Obligations to this Author, who hath occasioned this farther survey of his former affirmations, and given all other men some cause to be more confirmed in the persuasion and assurance of the truth of them. And thus much I conceive is sufficient to have said upon this occasion.  
§. 58. BUt it seems the Readers quiet is not to be obtained so easily; for while that which hath been thus said was under the Printers hand, Mr. John Goodwin's {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} came forth, and by the mention of Doctor Hammond's name twice in his Title page, gave reason to delay this Vindication so long, till it might appear whether 'twould be useful to add any thing to it (upon this new occasion) by way of postscript. And herein it hath proved a little unluckily, that this second Advocate of the same cause falling upon this passage in the address (the Subject of our present discourse) hath yet in his judgement upon it so varied from the former Author, that as he hath yielded the question hitherto debated, 
pag. 22.  and confessed that no man hath by nature the power over his own life; so he hath provided a new task for me, by denying the doctor's consequence from hence, [that than this power cannot be derived to Kings by Men, or from the People.] This I confess is somewhat strange that that should be imagined derivable by men, or from the people, which at the same time 'tis confessed no man hath. I have lately learned a 
* That cannot be brought But, that is not the Ben.  Scotch Proverb from Master Henderson, and find by search the meaning of it to be this plain English, that nothing is derivable from any place, which was never there: and Mr. Goodwin acknowledges the strength of that consequence to stand in the authority of this maxim, Nihil dat quod non habet, Nothing gives that to another which it hath not itself. And truly, I shall never desire a firmer basis for any conclusion of mine then such an acknowledged Principle as this. Should I find any part of my possessions in M. Goodwins hands, and he justify his Title to it, by pretending the donation, or sale from Philodemius to him, and I produce evidence that this was never in the possession of Philodemius, would there be any more required of me, to conclude consequently, that 'twas not derivable from Philodemius to him? would it not be a strange reply, to say, That this consequence depended on the Authority of a topic maxim? The word [Topicke] I suppose to be here prefixed by him upon a design of diminution, as topical is equivalent with probable, and opposed to demonstrative. But I hope this is not thus a topic maxim. Can any demonstration be more convincing, then that which is built upon a Principle, as acknowledged as any in the mathematics, and the contrary of which implies a contradiction [to have, and not to have?]  
§. 59 As for the reason of denying this consequence, which Master Goodwin renders, because [though no particular man hath by nature this power over his own Life, yet as a member of community he hath, not simply a power, but a necessity lying upon him by way of duty, &c. to consent with others, that his life shall be taken from him] 1. 'Tis not to me imaginable, that he should have a necessity of duty lying upon him▪ who hath not simply a power, meaning, as here he must, a power of doing it lawfully. And 2. For this power, or necessity of consenting only (as that differs fronthe power of giving) this will be of no kind of force, unless it also appear that the Magistrate derives the power of life (which is supposed to be in him) from this consent of theirs, or that it is this consent of theirs, and nothing else which gives him that power. But this is so far from being proved, that it is not so much as affirmed by Master Goodwin: And on the other side 'tis clear, that the bare consenting that a thing shall be taken out of my hands, is very distant from the taking upon me to give it; the latter pretends and supposeth a possession, or investiture in the giver, the former doth not in the Consenter; and so, though the latter would be of some use (if granted) to infer Mr. Goodwins conclusion, that the power is originally from the people, yet the former will be no way able to infer it.  
§. 60. The matter will be very visible by example in any Trust, or Stewardship. The Lord entrusts to his Steward the keeping of a sum of money, after that he assigns it over to some other man by Bill of Attorney, and legally vests his right in that other. In this case the Steward formerly entrusted consents, that that other shall take what is thus by the Lord assigned to him, and indeed a necessity lies upon him by way of duty so to do. In this case I shall ask M. G. from whom this money is derived to this other? from the Lord, or from the Steward? I hope he will acknowledge from the Lord: The same again, when the King delivers a Castle by way of Trust, to be kept by one of his Subjects, and after assigns it over to his son, and the Subject that kept it, consents that the son should have it, and so the son enters upon the possession; the case is clear, that 'tis not from the Subject that the son derives this possession (though 'tis as true that the Subject consents to deliver it up) but from the King only: and that Act of the Subject is no expression of any right in him, from him conveyable to the son, but only of his Trust, and subordination to the King. And this is generally the difference betwixt Investitures and Trusts: what is vested in me, I may give, or derive to another, what is entrusted only, I cannot: the Servant cannot dispose of his Master's goods, yet that his Master's disposal may stand good, he may, and aught to give his consent. This is so grossly true, that 'tis pity any longer to insist on it; and yet 'tis the very thing that the whole point in hand depends on, and was therefore, I conceive, so industriously involved, and obscured by Mr. Goodwin.  
§. 61. After this, Master Goodwin insensibly glides into another piece of artifice; The power of life, saith he, is eminently and virtually in the people collectively taken, though not formally. And again, A man, and a body of men, have power over their own lives Radically, and Virtually, though not formally. This period of Master Goodwin seems to be a new way of Answer, by applying distinction to the Antecedent, as the former was by denying the consequence. The Antecedent was [That no man hath by nature the power over his own life, &c.] from whence the address concludes that therefore [This power cannot be dirived from the people] To this Master Goodwin first returns his acknowledgement, That if the consequence be right, it is a clear case, that regal power is not originally in the people, but conferred on the Ruler immediately from God. This is an acknowledgement in him of the truth of the Antecedent, and a doubt only of the consequence, which accordingly he immediately proceeds to invalidate: And therefore 'tis a little strange (and an argument that his first attempt was not very successful to him) that he should now so soon return to deny the Antecedent▪ at least to distinguish of it, having before so absolutely granted it. But to pass over this, and allow him this liberty of recalling his bounty, let us examine the force of his distinction.  
§. 62. The force of this distinction doth not, I conceive, respect the Subject [the people] (as if that might be taken in two notions, either singly, or collectively) because presently, without that distinction, he speaks indifferently of [A man] and [A body of men] but it belongs to the Copula, or word [Is] and then it must be thus dissolved. The power of life may be said to be in a man two ways, 1. Formally, 2. Eminently and Virtually, and Radically. This distinction of Formaliter, and eminenter hath been applied by Philosophers to the Sun, and Heavenly Bodies: of which it being by them resolved, that they are simple and free from those mixtures to which our sublunary bodies are subject, and yet it being apparent, that they warm and heat other things, it is thereupon defined, that they have not heat, or other qualities in them Formally, (i. e. in that manner, or kind, that fire is hot, or we are hot) but Virtually, and eminently, i. e. that they have some other Virtue, or faculty in them, higher, or more eminent than that heat which is in inferior bodies: and that that doth enable them to warm other things, though they are themselves such pure creatures, as not to have those gross qualities in them. Whether this be rightly affirmed, or only nicely conjectured by Philosophers (for I suppose there is little known of those distant bodies beyond conjecture) I shall not now inquire, but only desire to be taught by Mr. Goodwin, how this can be made appliable to the matter in hand, i. e. to the power of life and death. This power, we know, is in God first, and if in any Eminently, and Radically, and Virtually, certainly in him: And in the supreme Magistrate formally, being actually inherent in him, though not Originally, nor in so eminent a degree as in God it is. But can it thus be said also to be eminently, etc in the People, i. e. that the People have in them some higher, and more eminent Virtue, or faculty than the power of every man over his own life; and that that supplies the place of that formal power, and that by it the People beget, or produce the power of life in the supreme Magistrate, as truly, as, if they had it formally, they could do? This is the meaning of the distinction in the ordinary, and only notion of it, and must be it, if it be rightly appliable; but Mr. Goodwin interprets his meaning of it, so far from this, so far from importing, or concluding the People to have such an higher power or faculty (to which [Eminently] and [Virtually] in opposition to [Formally] belongs) that 'tis indeed by him set down as much inferior to that power formally inherent. For thus he interprets it, A Man, and a body of Men, have power over their own lives Radically, and Virtually, in respect whereof, they may render themselves to a Magistrate, and to laws, which, if they violate, they must be in hazard of their lives, &c. By this I discern two things, 1. That by this eminent, virtual, radical power, Mr. Goodwin understands that (which is far enough from the meaning of those words, and) which Logicians call a remote, or indirect power, (as that is opposed to an immediate, or direct) or rather a power, to which this effect is merely accidental, as if the patient were said to have power to cure himself, meaning thereby that he hath power to submit himself to the physician, who is able to cure him. And for Mr. Goodwin to assume the liberty of speaking thus largely, was not, I suppose, his want of knowledge in propriety, but his willingness to receive advantage from this abuse of words: And then 2. If this be the only meaning of the four hard words, (Eminently, Virtually, Radically, and Formally) viz. that 'tis in the power of men (or the People in community of nature) to render themselves to a Magistrate, and to laws, to which rendering 'twill be consequent, that they shall hazard their lives upon violating those laws, then, I say, are Mr. Goodwin, and Doctor Hammond very well agreed; for this his explication of that distinction is very reconcilable with those words of the address. This giving up their (i. e. the people's) Liberties to one, or more, makes that man, or men, a Ruler over them, and being a Ruler, to him belongs (derived from God, not from them) the power of life which God's decree hath instated in the supreme Power, or Ruler, who is therefore in that relation of avenger for wrath or punishment, a Minister of God, Rom. 13. &c. For whence is it that their rendering themselves to a Magistrate, in Mr. Goodwins stile, brings upon them that hazard of lives, in case of violation of laws, unless it be that he that hath power of their lives, placeth that power in that Magistrate to whom they have rendered, or subjected themselves? That this is God, and not the People, I will not conclude to be Mr. Goodwins opinion, because 'tis his main design to prove the contrary, but that those words of his, and his distinction so explained will bear that sense, I mean, that they will be true, and acknowledged by him, that acknowledges the power of Life to be only in the supreme governor, derived from God, I conceive sufficiently manifest; & consequently, that though this power be said to be in the People remotely, improperly, and indirectly, and so in Mr. Goodwins notion of eminently, &c. yet 'tis not from the People, but from God only, that the governor hath it.  
§. 63. The reply will be as ready, and easy also to all force, or concludency of his next Argument, that which is taken from the people's power, to make, or consent to the making of capital laws. For 1. Mr. Goodwin cannot be ignorant that it hath been sometimes in the power of Kings to make laws, without the addition of any consent of the people: such were the Principum placitae among the Romans: and after it was thought fit by Princes to lay some restraint on themselves, both that they might be better advised, and more readily obeyed, then, though the people's consent hath been deemed necessary, yet doth this belong only to the regulating, and modifying the exercise of this power: the fundamental power itself of life, being in the supreme governor, before the making these laws; Now 'tis very easy to distinguish betwixt these two, the power, and the Regulating of the exercise of that power; the power in the gross, and the determination of that power to this, or that particular action. The interposition of man in the latter of these, doth no way prejudge the sole privilege of God, in the donation of the former of them: As the Grace of God is his peculiar, and proper gift; and yet man may give Directions, and Rules, how we are to act by that Principle, what use it will best become us to make of that precious talon entrusted to us. And therefore, for the great Noon-day-Truth which Mr. Goodwin induceth from these, and the like considerations, viz. [That men by nature have such a power over their lives, as voluntarily, &c. to expose them to the stroke of public justice, in case they shall offend, &c.] This being granted, is of no force against Doctor Hammond, but doth with him rather suppose a public Justice able to strike, i. e. a power of life already vested in the Magistrate, before this consent of the People, or abstractedly, without respect unto it. And so still it is not from this consent of the People, that this power is derived to the hand of public Justice, but from some other higher principle, viz. that of God, to whom {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} the avenging, or punishing of offenders, peculiarly belongs, and no other, but in subordination to, and substitution from him.  
§. 64. And what if the King, as M. Goodwin next allegeth, have no power to take away the life of his Subjects without cause, or for every cause, but only such as by Law are punishable with death; what if he cannot command them to be their own Executioners? Doth it follow from hence, that therefore, he hath the power of life from the People, not from God? Doth the power of God so consist in doing causeless, or irrational things, that nothing which is exercised moderately, or ordinately, can be imagined to come from him? I shall suppose that God himself hath perfect dominion over the world; and yet that he observes rules of all-justice, and goodness in the exercise, and dispensing of that power, and hath not power of doing any thing contrary to those rules of eternal Justice; which he hath prescribed to himself; which to do by all wise men hath been counted an act of imbecility, not of power. And consequently, how natural is it that he should thus determine, and limit his deputies also? give them power of life over their Subjects, and yet command them to exercise that power with that just temperament, which either natural, or civil, or municipal laws shall dictate, and prescribe them? And therefore Master Godwin's arguing is very loose, and unconcluding; [That if the power which the King hath over the lives of the people, were immediately from God, than he might lawfully execute the same, and take away the lives of men, without any mediating direction, or warranty from any Law.] For sure the same God that gives the Magistrate the power of life, doth command him also not to throw away that precious trust causelessly, makes him his Minister for wrath to them that do evil, and contrary wise a rewarder to them that do well, and though he subject him not to any earthly superior, but reserve him to his own severe tribunal, yet he subjects him to reason, and rules of Justice, and (when he hath undertaken to govern by that Standard) to the positive municipal laws of that particular kingdom also, and hath been as particular in prescribing laws to the Prince, to avoid Oppression, or acts of Height, as to Subjects to abstain from resistance.  
§. 65. As for that proof which Mr. Goodwin produceth to enforce his arguing, viz. [That the execution of no commission immediately issued by God, aught to be suspended upon, or determined, or regulated by any commission, or constitution of men.] It is as far from truth, as it could well have been contrived to be: As will appear if it be considered; that the word [Commission] 1. signifies not an absolute, or positive Command, but only a power, or investiture of Authority; or if a Command, yet that 2. only an Affirmative precept, the nature of which is, that it binds not ad semper, and so consequently, may be suspended at some time, by the free will of him that hath the Commission, much more if any weighty reason interpose to determine his will. 3. That this Commission is only general, and indefinite, without application to particular cases, referring that application to the conjuncture and concurrence of circumstances, (which ordinarily are human, and political;) and consequently to the discretion of Rulers judging by those circumstances: The intervenience of which circumstances makes the particular exercise of that Commission convenient, and seasonable in one place, and at one time; and consequently, where they do not intervene, there the exercise of it may be at that time, and place suspended as unseasonable. As when the shedder of blood is by God commanded to be put to death, and yet some men accidentally, and invountarily fall under that Title, it must be in the power of the Magistrate, to suspend the execution of that sentence, or else the Innocent must lose the benefit of the city of refuge, and run the same fortune with the most murderous designer.  
§. 66. After this manner 'tis clear, that Christ had a Commission from heaven to work Miracles, to cure Diseases; yet 'tis particularly affirmed of the infidelity of his countrymen, that that suspended the exercise of his power for some time; He could not do many mighty works there because of their unbelief, yet, I hope, this will no way be thought to argue, that Christ's commission issued from his countrymen, or from the belief of men, (though that were necessary, to the exercise of it) or that Christ did ill in suspendi●g the exercise of his Commission. In like manner the people of Israel had from God not only a commission, but command to put the nations to death, Deut. 20.10. And yet on those of them that were left, 1 Kings. 9.20. Solomon suspended the act of that commission, and only levied a tribute of bond-service ver. 21. Once more; I shall suppose a general to receive power of martial Law from the sovereign in any kingdom, this power he is not willing to exercise, but by a cognizance of each malefactor's cause before a council of war. Here 'tis plain that that council of war suspends that exercise of the general's power upon a particular man; but sure it will no way follow from thence, that that Commission, which was supposed to issue to the general from the sovereign, doth now issue not from the sovereign, but that council of war; and then no more will the possibility of suspending the exercise of the King's Commission by Law, &c. conclude that Commission to issue from the People, and not from God. And therefore in the case which Mr. Goodwin hath been confident to refer to Doctor Hammond to Arbitrate [Whether the King hath any Regular or just power over the lives of men, other than that which is proportioned, &c. by the laws of the State] I suppose the Doctor may agree with Mr. Goodwin, and yet never be enforced, or concluded by that concession, to question the original of the power from God, the difference being discernible between the Power itself, and every particular exercise of that power; and the suspension of the latter, far from including the evacuation, or cancelling of the former.  
§. 67. The same answer will clear Mr. Goodwins succeeding Plea, pag. 26. That if the power of Kings over the lives of men, were by immediate derivation from God, then must this power be uniform, &c. in all kingdoms whatsoever.] This consequence is far from all appearance of truth; Because the power may be from God, and yet that God that gives the power, may leave it in the particular exercises of it, to be determined either by the arbitration, and free will, and prudence of the governor, where there are no laws, or by the Regulation of laws, where there are such; The Dimensum, or proportion of power over the lives of the Subjects, which a governor claims, consists not in indivisibili, in any certain, or definite point, but is that which may enable him to discharge his office of Ruler, i. e. to protect his people, and restrain their inordinacies. And as far as Reason, and (which are supposed to be a branch of that) paticular laws, (subordinate to God's Word) see it fit to extend the exercise of that power, so far may that Ruler regularly extend it; And whatsoever proportion it be, that he is entrusted with by God, 'tis not reasonable that he should irrationally extend the exercise of it. And this regulation of indefinite power by such prudent limits as these (i. e. by the universal law of Reason and Justice, or by the particular conclusions, which the wisdom of lawgivers hath thought fit to deduce from thence) cannot justly be quarrelled, as a retrenchment of power, any more, than the infinite goodness of God which permits him not to be able to do any thing which is contrary to that attribute, is a manicling, or restraining his Omnipotence, but is only a cultivating and dressing of it, a paring off the excesses, and exorbitances of it, and leaving it a form channel, instead of a vast or unbridled Ocean.  
§. 68 And thus I suppose the nature of Angels or men, which have bounds of Virtue and Conscience, and laws prescribed them, within which they are to move, and not to range unlimited in the desert of their own uncertain proposals, cannot thereby be said to have lost the liberty of their species, or to have received no powers from God in their creation, though some regulations (it must be acknowledged) they are under, and consequently, determinations and suspensions for the exercise of their powers. And what inconvenience the affirming of this will bring upon the Doctor, what hazard of blaspheming of God, &c. I must profess myself so tame, as not to foresee, or imagine, howsoever M. Goodwins {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} hath helped him to fancy such invisible Mormos, and Anakim's in our passage.  
§. 69. Next, it is but affirmed, and not at all made probable by Mr. Goodwin, that the Affirming the King's power over the lives of the people to be by immediate derivation from God, is to smite them with blindness, &c. and not to discover to them the Dan and Bersheba (I suppose he means by this trope, the due bounds and limits) of such their power] I am sorry Mr. Goodwin should think it fit that such popular harangues should be admitted to supply the place of reason, and shall briefly reply, That they that affirm the power of the Sword to be from God derived to magistrates, do at the same time define, and affirm, that those Magistrates are to remain rational creatures, and to continue under the sovereignty of Reason, and all the branches of that, as far as their particulars are concerned in it, i. e. to be ruled by the universal laws of Justice and Equity, by the civil Sanctions which tend to the preserving of Societies, and consequently by the particular local, or municipal laws of any Country, which are supposed to have a peculiar propriety toward the preserving, and regulating of that People.  
§. 70. 'Twill now be to little purpose to prove that these two affirmations are reconcilable, the one deriving the power of life to the Ruler from God, the other acknowledging the regulation of this power by these bounds; For there is no kind of repugnance, or contradiction, nothing but accord and amity between them: The very Hand of God that confers this power, gives this very direction, and Law for the exercise of it, that they that rule other men should themselves be guided by Reason in all their actions: And what that Reason is in each particular emergent, they are not always, or only, the judicials of Moses, which are fit to direct us, but the wisdom sometimes of Particular Laws, and lawmakers. And so there is small danger either of ensnaring Kings, or disturbing States, (as he seems willing to fear) by this doctrine; which though it define the original of this power to be from Heaven, can yet allow the regulation of this power for the Exercise of it to be of an inferior, human, political Orgination.  
§. 71. One Argument more Mr. Goodwin is pleased to take in to disprove the immediate derivation of this power of life from God. Because, saith he, that derivation which is immediate from God, can by no ways be assisted, furthered, or promoted by any creature, or second means, but this derivation of that power of life is at least furthered by the act of the people in electing, &c. Ergo, I shall not examine the force of his ensuing probations, which have frailties enough in them, but shall be content to suppose the most he can wish, or imagine, viz. That the people do elect, or choose their King; In this case, saith the Doctor, The people give not the power of their lives to that King, but by giving up their Liberties, &c. to him, nominate him to that office of supreme power, which, wheresover it is, God superinvests with the power of life. This is the Doctors stating of the question in his address, and thereby the separation is evident between the Act of the People in Electing the person of the Ruler, and the Act of God in conferring this power of life. All that can be said of the former of these is that that act of the people is the means of determining the general decree of God (that Rulers shall (as his Deputies) have the power of life) to this particular person, not that it is an assistant, or social cause in conveying this power to the Ruler, much less that it shall undertake to wrest this power out of God's hands, and assume it into their own; but, I say, as a causa sine quâ non, or a previous preparation of the subject, by their choice qualifying the person to be thus invested, and impower'd by God. And so, though the people in this case are supposed to do somewhat, i. e. to Elect, and that election to determine this power of Gods to this person, yet is this power derived solely from God, as the address hath sufficiently explained, and not from any act of the People: And therefore the word [Furthering] in Mr. Goodwins Argument, may be taken (as an equivocal word) in a double sense, either to denote actual assistance, or contribution of force, or efficacy, toward the production of the effect, viz. of the power of life in the Ruler: And in that sense it is not true, that the Act of the People in Electing, doth further this power, it being the sole act of God's decree to give that power, and nothing else. Or else the word [Furthering] may be taken to signify no more than preparing, or qualifying the Subject to a capacity of receiving this power from God, (as John Baptist prepared men's hearts for the receiving of Christ, when he came, but had nothing to do in the mission of him, which was the sole work of God) and thus indeed, the Election of the People may further the derivation of this power from God to such a particular Ruler; And there is nothing more ordinary than for God's works to be thus furthered by second causes, or means, even his work of Grace, which he owns most peculiarly. The resemblance made use of in the address, is very commodious to clear this whole matter. In the Generation of a child, the parents are acknowledged to contribute much, to be not only furtherers, but even efficients in the production, Yet is it commonly agreed, that God creates, infuses, and inspires the Soul immediately. I need not examine, or attest the truth of the ordinary opinion, that the soul comes from heaven, not from the Parents; because I now use it as a resemblance only, and that it may be allowed to be, though it should not be true, and thus far at least it will be argumentative, that the electing of the person of the Ruler by the people, doth no more conclude that the power of life is not superinfused and derived to the Ruler (so chosen) from heaven, than the parents begetting of the child is an argument, that the soul is not superinfused from God. Our Phoenomena may be all very happily solved by this way of setting it; and M. G. exceptions superseded, and the conclusion cleared, which was the only one, which the address desired to infer by this consideration, viz. That whatsoever were supposed of the people's electing their Ruler, yet the supreme power neither is nor can be in the community of the people by force, merely of their original, or natural Liberty, upon this firm ground (not yet shaken by M. G. or Philodemius) that the power of life, which is part of the supreme Power, is not part of the natural Liberty, nor consequently either inherent in the Community of men, nor by them communicable to any Representative. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}▪ The only thing, which this rejoinder (as the former discourse) was designed to demonstrate most irrefragably.  
§. 72. And having proceeded thus far to make return to M. Goodwins offers of reason, I shall not endeavour to make payment to his scoffs, pag. 28. or vindicate Doctor Hammond from his charge of overweeningness, &c. Though 'tis not at all intelligible to me, how those words in the address (For it is possible that I may put you in mind of an evident truth, which perhaps you have not taken notice of] should be chargeable with this {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, or interpretable to any farther sense, then only this, That this truth so evident in Doctor Hammond's opinion, was not by him ●onceived to be sufficiently taken notice of, or laid to heart by them, to whom he then made his address. And if that Doctor were therein mistaken, or if he be justly charged in his next page (together with the rest of his persuasion, under the title of the whole Legion of the royal Faction) as the firstborn of that evil Generation of Flatterers, for producing plain Arguments of Reason, and Scripture to avert, that which appeared to him a heavy sin, and Judgement, from a Nation; I must then betake myself to my Prayers, that God will forgive me my more discernible sins, (when innocencies, and good offices to mankind are become so culpable) and get out of his company as soon as I can, who can so readily shift the discourse from reasoning to defaming, and supply with reproaches what was wanting in Arguments.  
§. 73. I am now come to an end of this debate concerning the Power of life, but cannot be so prudent, or thrifty of my pains, as to dissemble the other exceptions, which (in this book) Master Goodwin hath made to some other parts of the address; I shall give you as brief an account of them as is possible.  
§. 74. The first, is his dislike of that critic annotation, as he styles it, of the royal Doctor, taking notice that the supreme Power, or Ruler is styled by the Apostle, Rom. 13. the Minister of God, and not of the people] How this comes to be styled a critic annotation, (which supposes it a grammatical one, 
Vi. Moschopul. Gram. Gr.  (as {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, are the parts divisive of {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}) where there is no use made of Grammar to deduce it, nor indeed of any thing but of the plain words, as they lie in the Text) I have not the skill, or sagacity to divine. All that Doctor Hammond affirms is this, that the supreme power, Rom. 13. is styled by the Apostle, the Minister of God, and not of the people. And is not this manifest to any that looks on Rom. 13.4. where he is twice styled {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, the Minister of God, and is neither there, nor anywhere else styled the Minister of the People.  
§. 75. But, saith M. Goodwin, This no way infringes the credit of his conclusion, that Kings are the Servants and Ministers of the People. The Apostles were the Ministers of God, and yet they preach themselves also the servants of Men, 2 Cor. 4.5. and Ministers of the Saints, Rom. 15.25. &c. To this I answer, that the phrase {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, Minister of God, signifies a Minister of God's Ordination, and Institution, and though it may signify somewhat else, yet this is the only notion wherein Doctor Hammond takes it in his address, according to Rom. 13. of which he speaks, where the powers are said to be ordained by God, and to be his Ordinance. Now he that is thus a Minister of God, cannot be so also of the People, because these two Ordinations being incompatible, he that holds by one, must needs disclaim holding by the other. Another notion there may be of the phrase, as it signifies performing of service to God; and so indeed the same Apostle that serves God, may be a servant of Men also, and to that, all M. Goodwins probations are directed, and though S. Paul's {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, his carrying of alms, and contributions to the poor Saints, be no very proper instance to this purpose; yet thus 'tis acknowledged, that S. Paul may be a servant of Men, and perform offices of Humility to them, (though by the way this Servant of theirs behaves himself sometimes very like a Master, and comes with a Rod when he sees it convenient.)  
§. 76. But this is nothing to the purpose to infer the King to be {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, a Minister of the People in the former notion, i. e. a Minister of the people's Institution; and therefore all that M. Goodwin adds of the Reasons why the Ruler, Rom. 13. is not called the Minister of the people, is very extrinsical to that purpose. The utmost that he can enforce from that place is, that the King attends on the public good. But sure that will avail as little to prove that he is not a minister of God's instituting, or one that hath the power from him, as the shepherds waiting over the Flock, is a proof that he is ordained, or instituted by his Sheep.  
§. 77. The next undertaking of M. Goodwin against Doctor Hammond, is to prove that the civil Magistrate is by S. Peter called {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}; which he renders the Ordinance, or creature of Man because they receive their very being from the people as Kings, and as Magistrates. Doctor Hammond hath, I conceive, sufficiently vindicated that Text of S. Peter from this interpretation, and 'twere easy to show, that the phrase {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} must by all analogy be rendered human creature; not Ordinance, or creature of Man; by human creature, meaning any part of mankind; by creature of man, a thing of man's creating. The phrase to express the latter of these would be, {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, taking Creature for production, or work, and Man for the artificer, or workman of it; what is said in the address, is sufficient to direct any sober man to a right understanding of that place. And M. Goodwins exceptions are very far from persuading the contrary. As 1. [That the King is there called supreme, not in respect of the community of the people, as, saith he, the Doctor supposeth, but as compared with subordinate Rulers.] But this is of no force against the Doctor in that place, where all that he infers from their title of supreme, is, that they are the very persons that are enstiled the Ordinance of God, Ro. 13. & that is the signal character which he mentions in that Text, without taking notice of any other aspect of the word supreme, or drawing any nice conclusion from it.  
§. 78. His second exception is against the concludence of a Negative Argument. Which I acknowledge an exception so far as to keep that Argument from being demonstrative, in case all the force of it were fetched from the Negative; But that Argument from the Negative (or from the governors not being said to be sent by the people) is but praelusory and preparative to another more forcible branch of the Argument, viz. that (on the contrary) Supremacy is affixed to the King, and Subjection for the Lord's sake, commanded to be paid him, (as mission from him is affirmed of all other Magistrates) And both those put together, the Kîngs being Supreme, (i. e. inferior to none but God) and subjection being affirmed to be due to him for the Lord's sake, (i. e. because of the relation which he stands in to God, by whom he is said to be ordained Rom. 13.) may well enough pass for a character of some remark upon the King, and keep the pretended rendering of {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, from being the necessary importance of that text, or the Supreme power from being concluded to be originally in the people.  
§. 79. As for the groaning of the creation, or creature] Rom. 8. which Doctor Hammond renders [the hope of the heathen world] 'tis not all M. Goodwins {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} that will render it an improbable interpretation. That the Heathen world (though without hope, i. e. in a desperate condition in respect of salvation, as long as they remained in their idolatries) were yet so capable of receiving benefit of Christ's coming into the world, that Christ is called Desiderium omnium Gentium, the desire of all Nations, in Haggai, and {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, the expectation of the Gentiles, in the Septuagints rendering of Jacob's prophecy; that they seeing their own impure condition, desired the means of restoring their lost treasure, and consequently are said to desire Christ, without explicit foreknowing any thing of him, (because that which they desired was no otherwise compassable, but by him) is no nicety of the doctor's invention, but largely insisted on by S. Augustine in his books De Civ: Dei; and this one Consideration is Reply sufficient to all the inconveniences which M. Goodwin hath sprung in this interpretation.  
§. 80. As for the other difficulties which to him seem to press and resist the interpreting of the following words to this sense, they are not so solemnly mentioned by M. Goodwin as to own my impertinence, if I should enlarge on them; though I can assure him, that D. Hammond hath long since considered the whole Context, and is ready to give an account of the agreeableness of it to his present notion, whensoever it shall be seasonable. Only in favour to the Reader, he doth not unnecessarily obtrude it on him at this time, meaning to expect a fairer opportunity for that, and other the like dissertations.  
§. 81. But M. Goodwin upon the granting of this notion of {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, for the heathen world, hath fall'n upon a special {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, that however, It signifies the world under the consideration of being the creature or creation of God. And then he wonders why {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} should not signify the Magistrate to be the creation of man, and how by this interpretation that conclusion of the Kings being the creature of the people, is avoided. To this I answer punctually, that M. Goodwin being the affirmer of this doctrine, [That the King is the creature of the people] and his proof of it being those words of Saint Peter, where obedience is commanded to be paid {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, as 'tis by him rendered, to every creation, or ordinance, or creature of man, It is certainly sufficient for D. Hammond (to disprove this conclusion so inferred from that place of Saint Peter) if he shall be able to mention another probable interpretation of those words, from whence that Conclusion will not be inferred; especially if by other places of Scripture he make it manifest, that that interpretation is most agreeable to the analogy of that and other Scriptures. Now this hath D. Hammond done, by showing that {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} is a phrase which needs not signify any more than every man, or human creature, not only Christian, but Gentile, or Heathen also. Which if it be the entire notation of the phrase (as at this time M. Goodwin is content to grant) then sure is there no ground for him from thence to conclude, that the King is {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} in that other so distant sense, an ordinance or creature of the people. As long as M. G. conclusion depends upon that one only notion of the phrase, so long, unless that be acknowledged the genuine sense of it, (as certainly 'tis not, when another so distant from that, is supposed possible to be it) there is no stability to be expected to that conclusion, whose premises are thus forfeited by his own concession.  
§. 82. As for the Doctors Answer to the supposed Objection, (where by the parallel command of honouring all, ver. 17. he infers the limitation of the subject, All to whom honour belongeth there, (i. e. superiors, not inferiors) and so here, every human creature, (i. e. every such, that is in place of magistracy) certainly M. G. hath failed much in his attempt to invalidate it, by affirming that that Apostle, in his command to honour all, supposeth a debt of honour due from every man to every man, according to that of the Rom. 12.10. In honour preferring one another. For to this I answer, that the meaning of 1 Pet. 2.17. cannot sure so properly be fetched from Rom. 12.10. as it may from the circumstances of the Text and verses on each side of it in the place of S. Peter. In the former verses, 13. and 14. the words clearly refer to the doctrine of obedience to superiors, and so ver. 15. the mention of God's will [that by well-doing we should put to silence the ignorance of foolish men] (i. e. that by obeying of our superiors we should take off the scandal that lay on Christianity, as if it made men ill Subjects, ver. 16.) doth plenarily belong also to the same matter. So again, honouring the King in the end of the 17. ver. and servants obeying their Masters, ver. 18. are very forward to concur with this notion; And the precept of loving the brotherhood, i. e. their fellow-Christians, and of fearing God▪ (from which fear the honour divolves upon his vicegerent) will no way prejudice this notion of the honour there spoken of, that it belongs only to the debt of inferiors to superiors; and so that the [All] are only those all that are thus capable of it.  
§. 83. As for the honouring of widows (by Master Goodwin mentioned from Saint Paul to Timothy) that sure is not appliable to this matter, since the honour there, is the relieving, or feeding of them, giving them that honour of supply, which is acknowledged to be another notion of the Word, not that which in the fift commandment, and those other places, is the principal importance of it.  
§. 84. As little reason hath Mr. Goodwin to conclude that the precept of being Subject one to another, 1. Pet. 5.5. should not be a precept of obedience to Superiors, when the words immediately precedent are, Likewise ye younger submit yourselves to the Elders, and those Elders, ver. 2. the {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} & {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, the Pastors and Bishops of the Church. 'Tis possible indeed, that the [one another] may be, Others beside Superiors, but sure 'tis not so probably so, when that which immediately precedes, is Submission to Elders, to which the subjection here added, is not a phrase of diminution, but of addition rather, and when God's resisting the proud, that immediately follows, is, saith Saint Augustine, (as in the Poet, debellare superbos) the direct contrary to Subjectis parcere, the giving pardon, or grace to the obedient Subjects. And thus I conceive the parallel words of Saint Paul, Eph. ●. 21. Submitting yourselves one to another] are most probably to be interpreted, to those among you who are in any relation of superiority, for so it▪ follows immediately, ver. 22. Wives submit yourselves to your own husbands, &c. Whereas, when he rerurnes to the husba●ds duty toward the wife, it is not submission but love only, v. 25. Other places I might easily mention, where the word ({non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}) may very well signify no more than others. So the {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, confess your faults one to another, Jam. 5.16. cannot farther be extended then to a direction to the sick to make confession of his sins, whether to others simply, or to those others whom he hath injured, but obligeth not them that are in health to tonfesse their sins reciprocally or back again to the sick, and so in the next words [and prey {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, for one another] that is, that the brethren in health should pray for them that are sick, and not reciprocally that the sick should pray for them in health, the end of the prayer there mentioned being {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, that ye may be healed; which end, and close doth, I conceive, confine the discourse to the sick first to confess, and to the healthy, after to pray for the sick and no more. And so {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, 1 Pet. 4.9. notes hospitality to the strangers that wanted, and not mutual, reciprocal entertainments one of the other: For though it is possible that it might note the inhabitants civility to the traveller first, and then that travellers repayment of the like, when he comes to be a sixt inhabitant, yet the word {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, strangers, being ordinarily taken as a species of men in want (as besides some places of Scripture, I remember in Just: Mar: second Apolog: speaking of the offertory, he saith that by that means the Praefect became the guardian of strangers, &c. and of all that were in want) I conceive {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} is no more than kind to that sort of poor strangers, and that without any expectation of being entertained by them again, for that the alms-giver should expect that return from the poor, or stranger, is both unreasonable and unchristian also. So Luke. 12.1. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} cannot be taken reciprocally, that they which trod on others were also trod upon by them, but that one trod upon another agreeable to our present sense: so Act. 7. ●6. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}; not that the person injured was injurious also, but only that one injured the other. And yet more plainly, Rom. 2.15. their thoughts excusing or accusing, {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, where it cannot be imagined that the thoughts mutually or reciprocally accuse or excuse, the accusation belonging to the conscience, which accuseth the erroneous will, but not in like manner to the will, that that should accuse the Conscience. These places are added ex abundanti; That of Ephes. 5. will be able alone to serve the turn, if these others should not be thought to be demonstrative. I have thus briefly replied to these other exceptions of Mr. Goodwin as far as concerns that Place in Saint Peter, and I suppose have vindicated it from being the foundation of Mr. Goodwins beloved dogma (which I shall desire him to show to be the affirmation of any one ancient Father or Commentator on that place, or of any one place of Scripture b●sides, which might help to countenance it) that Kings are the creatures of the people.  
§. 85. There are yet some old reckonings which Mr. Goodwin is willing to make even with the Doctor, and I must b●g a very Little patience from the reader to observe what account he hath given of them.  
§. 86. He begins with fair words of D. H. and acknowledgements, that having frequently heard of him, he never heard any thing but well and worthy of a man, his judgement in the grand state-question of the times only excepted. That the discharge of his Conscience in obedience to the fift commandment should be thus made an exception against the Doctor, he hath sure learned {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} neither to think strange, nor take ill at M. G. hands, remembering that some of the Christians which were anciently in the world, in the absence of other visible crimes, were thought worthy of all reproaches for their common profession, or being Christians. One thing only I shall suppose, I have the Doctors leave to assure M. G. that it was no special desire to engage M. G. which caused the particular mentions, and refutations of some passages in his books, but only the opinion which he had, that they might probably prove matter of seduction to the reader (and that seduction of a dangerous consequence) if such necessary antidotes were not provided to avert, or prevent the danger. D. H. I suppose, is not overfond of such disputes, or debates as these, and is never more in constraint, than when he lies under such engagements.  
§. 87. Some passages in M. G. butcher's blessing were a first great temptation to him, which, though resisted by the love of quiet, prepared him to receive more violent impressions from some remarkable sections in the anticavalierism, And at last the fire kindled, and his pen gave testimony of it.  
§. 88 The particulars he then took notice of in M. G. were 1. His dexterities in evacuating the force of Tertullian's testimonies concerning the patience, and nonresistance of the Primitive Christians, and these are at large refuted in the tract of Resisting &c. pag. 10. to pag. 20. Secondly, his strange affirmation of God's hiding from the first Christians this liberty of resisting superiors, as part of his counsel to bring Antichrist into the world, and his manifesting it to us now, as a means of casting Antichrist out. The latter of these two, D. H. conceived as strange, and as dangerous a Doctrine, as he ever met with, and therefore examined it to the bottom, Resist. pag. 21. to 28. These two main matters of difference D. H. acknowledges to have managed against M.G. but conceive without any thing of asperity, or excess in any kind, which should look like a particular desire of engaging M. G. And M. G. hath thought fit for many years to let these reckonings sleep without ever giving the least reply to either of them. And now that [of God's hiding of truths from the Ancient Christians, and the helping Antichrist to his throne] hath not the fortune to be taken notice of at all. And for the other of Tertullian, though that be now mentioned, yet is it a little strange that no other return should be made to all the doctor's answers, save only the transcribing of two or three pages from M. Rutterford, and M. Pryn, as from a pair of Royalists, in their two tracts of Lex Rex, and Soveragine power of Parliaments, which sure he could not believe will be of any Authority with the Doctor, though he is so pleasant as to mention the friendliness of their judgements, and the Doctors in case of the late King: Beside this transcription, there is but one passage in those dissertations of the Doctors, to which he thinks fit to make reply, and that is a grammatical {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman}, taken notice of {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} by the Doctor, viz. M. G. attributing to Montanist, that he called himself the holy Ghost. This D. H. did conceive to be hastily written by M. G. and not agreeably to the rules of the grammar, unless as in Smectymnus, Areopagi, are set for the Areopagites, so è contra, Montanist were set by M. G. for Montanus. In this casual incidental charge M. G. thinks himself very nearly concerned, more it seems, than in giving account either of his Censure of Tertullian's testimony of the Christians patience, or of God's hiding of Truths, and assisting Antichrist. For to justify the grammaticalness of these words, [Montanist who called himself the holy Ghost] a great deal of pains is taken, and three whole pages spent on that affair. 'tis not possible I should think fit to exercise my Reader by continuing such a Debate as this any longer, but shall think it abundantly sufficient to assure M. G. that the English remains still unjustified, upon this ground, that the word Montanist is no possessive, and if he still have inclinations to dispute it, I shall propose him this parallel: M. Goodwin is a Christian, who died for the sons of the world, and ask him, Whether it be grammatical sense to have said this. As for the deep recriminatior against D. H. for using the word [Resolve] for concluding, or being satisfied within himself, &c. if this be any matter of ease on refreshment to M. G. 'twere pity he should be denied the liberty to make use of it.  
§. 89. There now remains but one particular, the Doctors accusing M. G. of flattery in the eulogies bestowed upon that action of the Army, (collected in the address, p. 6.) Whether they were thus guilty, I shall no farther dispute, but leave it to the Reader to determine, having no other design in this whole Reply, then that M. G. may resume the consideration of his actions, and of his arguments, and remember that the matters of these debates, are of such an importance toward the public peace, that men of our profession owe an account to God for them. And for other passages of this Author, wherein the London-Ministers are concerned; I leave them to answer for themselves, and so conclude this Paper.  
THE END.