THE OCEANA OF James Harrington, AND HIS OTHER WORKS; Some whereof are now first published from his own MANUSCRIPTS.  
The whole Collected, Methodised, and Review'd, WITH An Exact Account of his LIFE Prefixed, By JOHN TOLAND.  
RESPUBLICA Res est Populi cum benè ac justè geritur, sive ab uno Rege, sive a paucis Optimatibus, sive ab universo Populo. Cum vero injustus est Rex (quem Tyrannum voco) aut injusti Optimates (quorum Consensus Factio est) aut injustus ipse Populus (cui nomen usitatum nullum reperio, nisi ut ipsum Tyrannum appellem) non jam vitiosa sed omnino nulla Respublica est, quoniam non RES est POPULI cum Tyrannus eam Factióve capessat; nec ipse Populus jam Populus est si sit injustus, quoniam non est Multitudo Juris consensu & Utilitatis communione sociata.  Fragmentum Ciceronis ex lib. 3. de Republica, apud Augustin. de Civ. Dei, l. 2. c. 21. 
LONDON, Printed, and are to be sold by the Booksellers of London and Westminster. M. DCC.   


MOSES.  
SOLON.  
CONFUCIUS.  
LYCURGUS.  
NUMA.  
L. JUNIUS BRUTUS.  
GULIELMUS. III.  
Commercio.  
Opificio.  
M. DCC.  
I. TOLANDUS. LIBERTATI. SACRAVIT.  
M. ●ander ●ucht. Scul:    

TO THE LORD MAYOR, aldermans, SHERIFFS, AND COMMON COUNCIL OF LONDON.  
IT is not better known to you, most worthy Magistrates, that Government is the preserving Cause of all Societys', than that every Society is in a languishing or flourishing condition, answerable to the particular Constitution of its Government: And if the Goodness of the Laws in any place be thus distinguishable by the Happiness of the People, so the Wisdom of the People is best discerned by the Laws they have made, or by which they have chosen to be governed. The truth of these Observations is no where more conspicuous than in the present State of that most Ancient and Famous Society you have the honour to rule, and which reciprocally enjoys the cheerful influence of your Administration. 'Tis solely to its Government that London owes being universally acknowleged the largest, fairest, richest, and most populous City in the World; all which glorious Attributes could have no Foundation in History or Nature, if it were not likewise the most free. 'Tis confessed indeed that it derives infinite Advantages above other places from its incomparable Situation, as being an inland City, seated in the middle of a Vale no less delicious than healthy, and on the Banks of a Noble River, in respect of which (if we regard how many score miles it is navigable, the clearness and depth of its Channel, or its smooth and even Course) the Seine is but a Brook, and the celebrated Tiber itself a Rivulet: Yet all this could never raise it to any considerable pitch without the inestimable Blessings of LIBERTY, which has chosen her peculiar Residence, and more eminently fixed her Throne in this place. LIBERTY is the true Spring of its prodigious Trade and Commerce with all the known parts of the Universe, and is the original Planter of its many fruitful Colonies in America, with its numberless Factories in Europe, Asia, and Africa: hence it is that every Sea is covered with our Ships, that the very Air is scarce exempted from our Inventions, and that all the Productions of Art or Nature are imported to this common Storehouse of Mankind; or rather as if the whole Variety of things wherewith the Earth is stocked had been principally designed for our profit or delight, and no more of 'em allowed to the rest of Men, than what they must necessarily use as our Purveyors or Laborers. As LIBERTY has elevated the native Citizens of London to so high a degree of Riches and Politeness, that for their stately Houses, fine Equipages, and sumtuous Tables, they exceed the Port of some Foren Princes; so is it naturally become every Man's Country, and the happy Refuge of those in all Nations, who prefer the secure enjoyment of Life and Property to the glittering pomp and slavery, as well as to the arbitrary lust and rapine of their several Tyrants. To the same Cause is owing the Splendour and Magnificence of the public Structures, as Palaces, Temples, Halls, Colleges, Hospitals, Schools, Courts of Judicature, and a great many others of all kinds, which, though singly excelled where the Wealth or State of any Town cannot reach further than one Building, yet, taking them all together, they are to be equalled no where besides. The delicate Country Seats, and the large Villages crowded on all hands around it, are manifest Indications how happily the Citizens live, and makes a Stranger apt to believe himself in the City before he approaches it by some miles. Nor is it to the felicity of the present times that London is only indebted: for in all Ages, and under all Changes, it ever showed a most passionate love of LIBERTY, which it has not more bravely preserved than wisely managed, infusing the same Genius into all quarters of the Land, which are influenced from hence as the several parts of the Animal Body are duly supplied with Blood and Nourishment from the Heart. Whenever therefore the execrable design was hatched to enslave the Inhabitants of this Country, the first Attemts were still made on the Government of the City, as there also the strongest and most successful Efforts were first used to restore Freedom: for we may remember (to name one instance for all) when the late King was fled, and every thing in confusion, that then the chief Nobility and Gentry resorted to Guildhall for protection, and to concert proper methods for settling the Nation hereafter on a Basis of Liberty never to be shaken. But what greater Demonstration can the World require concerning the Excellency of our National Government, or the particular Power and Freedom of this City, than the BANK of England, which, like the Temple of SATURN among the Romans, is esteemed so sacred a Repository, that even Foreigners think their Treasure more safely lodged there than with themselves at home; and this not only done by the Subjects of Absolute Princes, where there can be no room for any Public Credit, but likewise by the Inhabitants of those Commonwealths where alone such Banks were hitherto reputed secure. I am the more willing to make this Remark, because the Constitution of our Bank is both preferable to that of all others, and comes the nearest of any Government to HARRINGTON'S Model. In this respect a particular Commendation is due to the City which produced such Persons to whose Wisdom we owe so beneficial an Establishment: and therefore from my own small observation on Men or Things I fear not to prophecy, that, before the term of years be expired to which the Bank is now limited, the desires of all people will gladly concur to have it rendered perpetual. Neither is it one of the last things on which you ought to value yourselves, most worthy Citizens, that there is scarce a way of honouring the Deity known any where, but is either already allowed, or may be safely exercised among you; Toleration being only denied to immoral Practices, and the Opinions of Men being left as free to them as their Possessions, excepting only POPERY, and such other Rites and Notions as directly tend to disturb or dissolve Society. Besides the political Advantages of Union, Wealth, and numbers of People, which are the certain Consequents of this impartial Liberty, 'tis also highly congruous to the nature of true Religion; and if any thing on Earth can be imagined to engage the Interest of Heaven, it must be specially that which procures it the sincere and voluntary respect of Mankind. I might here display the Renown of the City for Military Glory, and recite those former valiant Achievements which our Historians carefully record; but I should never finish if I enlarged on those things which I only hint, or if I would mention the extraordinary Privileges which London now enjoys, and may likely possess hereafter, for which she well deserves the name of a New Rome in the West, and, like the old one, to become the Sovereign Mistress of the Universe.  
THE Government of the City is so wisely and completely contrived, that HARRINGTON made very few Alterations in it, though in all the other parts of our National Constitution he scarce left any thing as he found it. And without question it is a most excellent Model. The Lord Mayor, as to the Solemnity of his Election, the Magnificence of his State, or the Extent of his Authority, though inferior to a Roman Consul (to whom in many respects he may be fitly compared) yet he far outshines the figure made by an Athenian Archon, or the grandeur of any Magistrate presiding over the best Cities now in the World. During a vacancy of the Throne he is the chief Person in the Nation, and is at all times vested with a very extraordinary Trust, which is the reason that this Dignity is not often conferred on undeserving Persons; of which we need not go further for an Instance than the Right Honourable Sir RICHARD LEVET, who now so worthily fills that eminent Post, into which he was not more freely chosen by the Suffrages of his Fellowcitizens, than he continues to discharge the Functions of it with approved Moderation and Justice. But of the great Caution generally used in the choice of Magistrates, we may give a true judgement by the present Worshipful Sheriffs, Sir CHARLES DUNCOMB and Sir JEFFERY JEFFERIES, who are not the Creatures of petty Factions and Cabals, nor (as in the late Reigns) illegally obtruded on the City to serve a Turn for the Court, but unanimously elected for those good Qualitys which alone should be the proper Recommendations to Magistracy; that as having the greatest Stakes to lose they will be the more concern▪ d for securing the Property of others, so their willingness to serve their Country is known not to be inferior to their Zeal for King WILLIAM; and while they are, for the Credit of the City, generously equalling the Expenses of the Roman Praetors, such at the same time is their tender care of the Distressed, as if to be Overseers of the Poor were their sole and immediate Charge. As the Common Council is the Popular Representative, so the Court of Aldermen is the Aristocratical Senate of the City. To enter on the particular Merits of those Names who compose this Illustrious Assembly, as it must be owned by all to be a labour no less arduous than extremely nice and invidious, yet to pass it quite over in such a manner as not to give at least a Specimen of so much Worth, would argue a pusillanimity inconsistent with LIBERTY, and a disrespect to those I would be always understood to honour. In regard therefore that the eldest Alderman is the same at London with what the Prince of the Senate was at Rome, I shall only presume to mention the Honourable Sir ROBERT CLAYTON as well in that capacity, as by reason he universally passes for the perfect Pattern of a good Citizen. That this Character is not exaggerated will be evident to all those who consider him, either as raising a plentiful Fortune by his Industry and Merit, or as disposing his Estate with no less liberality and judgement than he got it with honesty and care: For as to his public and private Donations, and the provision he has made for his Relations or Friends, I will not say that he is unequalled by any, but that he deserves to be imitated by all. Yet these are small Commendations if compared to his st●ddy Conduct when he supplied the highest Stations of this Great City. The danger of defending the Liberty of the Subject in those calamitous times is not better remembered than the courage with which he acted, particularly in bringing in the Bill for excluding a Popish Successor from the Crown, his brave appearance on the behalf of your Charter, and the general applause with which he discharged his Trust in all other respects; nor ought the Gratitude of the People be forgot, who on this occasion first styled him the Father of the City, as CICERO for the like reason was the first of all Romans called the Father of his Country. That he still assists in the Government of London as eldest Alderman, and in that of the whole Nation as a Member of the High Court of Parliament, is not so great an honour as that he deserves it; while the Posterity of those Families he supports, and the memory of his other laudable Actions, will be the living and eternal Monuments of his Virtue, when time has consumed the most durable Brass or Marble.  
TO whom therefore should I inscribe a Book containing the Rules of good Polity, but to a Society so admirably constituted, and producing such Great and Excellent Men? That elsewhere there may be found who understand Government better, distribute Justice wiser, or love Liberty more, I could never persuade myself to imagine: nor can the Person wish for a nobler Address, or the Subject be made happy in a more suitable Patronage than THE SENATE AND PEOPLE OF LONDON; to whose uninterrupted increase of Wealth and Dignity, none can be a heartier Wellwisher, than the greatest admirer of their Constitution, and their most humble Servant,  
JOHN TOLAND.   

THE PREFACE.  
HOW allowable it is for any man to write the History of another, without intitling himself to his Opinions, or becoming answerable for his Actions, I have expressly treated in the Life of JOHN MILTON, and in the just defence of the same under the Title of AMYNTOR. The Reasons there alleged are Excuse and Authority enough for the Task I have since imposed on myself, which is, to transmit to Posterity the worthy Memory of JAMES HARRINGTON, a bright Ornament to useful Learning, a hearty Lover of his Native Country, and a generous Benefactor to the whole World; a Person who obscured the false Lustre of our Modern Politicians, and that equalled (if not exceeded) all the Ancient Legislators.  
BUT there are some People more formidable for their Noise than Number, and for their Number more considerable than their Power, who will not fail with open mouths to proclaim that this is a seditious Attemt against the very being of Monarchy, and that there's a pernicious design on foot of speedily introducing a Republican Form of Government into the Britannic Islands; in order to which the Person (continue they) whom we have for some time distinguished as a zealous promoter of this Cause, has now published the Life and Works of HARRINGTON, who was the greatest Commonwealthsman's in the World. This is the substance of what these roaring and hoarse Trumpeters of Detraction will sound; for what's likely to be said by men who talk all by rote, is as easy to guests as to answer, though 'tis commonly so silly as to deserve no Animadversion. Those who in the late Reigns were invidiously nicknamed Commonwealthsmen, are by this time sufficiently cleared of that Imputation by their Actions, a much better Apology than any Words: for they valiantly rescued our ancient Government from the devouring Jaws of Arbitrary Power, and did not only unanimously concur to fix the Imperial Crown of England on the most deserving Head in the Universe, but also settled the Monarchy for the future, not as if they intended to bring it soon to a period, but under such wise Regulations as are most likely to continue it for ever, consisting of such excellent Laws as indeed set bounds to the Will of the King, but that render him thereby the more safe, equally binding up his and the Subject's hands from unjustly seizing one another's prescribed Rights or Privileges.  
'TIS confessed, that in every Society there will be always found some Persons prepared to enterprise any thing (though never so flagitious) grown desperate by their Villainies, their Profuseness, their Ambition, or the more raging madness of Superstition; and this Evil is not within the compass of Art or Nature to remedy. But that a whole People, or any considerable number of them, should rebel against a King that well and wisely administers his Government, as it cannot be instanced out of any History, so it i● a thing in itself impossible. An infallible Expedient therefore to exclude a Commonwealth, is for the King to be the Man of his People, and, according to his present Majesty's glorious Example, to find out the Secret of so happily uniting too seemingly incompatible things, Principality and Liberty.  
'TIS strange that men should be cheated by mere Names! yet how frequently are they seen to admire under one denomination, what going under another they would undoubtedly detest; which Observation made TACITUS lay down for a Maxim, That the secret of setting up a new State consists in retaining the Image of the old. Now if a Commonwealth be a Government of Laws enacted for the common Good of all the People, not without their own Consent or Approbation; and that they are not wholly excluded, as in absolute Monarchy, which is a Government of Men who forcibly rule over others for their own private Interest: Then it is undeniably manifest that the English Government is already a Commonwealth, the most free and best constituted in all the world. This was frankly acknowleged by King JAMES the First, who styled himself the Great Servant of the Commonwealth, It is the Language of our best Lawyers, and allowed by our Author, who only makes it a less perfect and more inequal Form than that of his Oceana, wherein, he thinks, better provision is made against external Violence or internal Diseases. Nor does it at all import by what names either Persons, or Places, or Things are called, since the Commonwealthsman's finds he enjoys Liberty under the security of equal Laws, and that the rest of the Subjects are fully satisfied they live under a Government which is a Monarchy in effect as well as in name. There's not a man alive that exceeds my affection to a mixed Form of Government, by the Ancients counted the most perfect; yet I am not so blinded with admiring the good Constitution of our own, but that every day I can discern in it many things deficient, some things redundant, and others that require emendation or change. And of this the supreme Legislative Powers are so sensible, that we see nothing more frequent with them than the enacting, abrogating, explaining, and altering of Laws, with regard to the very Form of the Administration. Nevertheless I hope the King and both Houses of Parliament will not be counted Republicans; or, if they be, I am the readiest in the world to run the same good or bad Fortune with them in this as well as in all other respects.  
BUT, what HARRINGTON was obliged to say on the like occasion, I must now produce for myself. It was in the time of ALEXANDER, the greatest Prince and Commander of his Age, that ARISTOTLE (with scarce inferior Applause, and equal Fame) wrote that excellent piece of Prudence in his Closet which is called his Politics, going upon far other Principles than ALEXANDER's Government which it has long outlived. The like did LIVY without disturbance in the time of AUGUSTUS, Sir THOMAS MORE in that of HENRY the Eighth, and MACCHIAVEL when Italy was under Princes that afforded him not the ear. If these and many other celebrated Men wrote not only with honour and safety, but even of Commonwealths under Despotic or Tyrannical Princes, who can be so notoriously stupid as to wonder that in a free Government, and under a King that is both the restorer and supporter of the Liberty of Europe, I should do justice to an Author who far outdos all that went before him in his exquisite knowledge of the Politics?  
THIS Liberty of writing freely, fully, and impartially, is a part of those Rights which in the last Reigns were so barbarously invaded by such as had no inclination to hear of their own enormous violations of the Laws of God and Man; nor is it undeserving Observation, that such as raise the loudest Clamours against it now, are the known Enemy's of King WILLIAM's Title and Person, being sure that the Abdicated King JAMES can never be reinthroned so long as the Press is open for brave and free Spirits to display the Mischiefs of Tyranny in their true Colours, and to show the insinit Advantages of Liberty. But not to dismiss even such unreasonable People without perfect satisfaction, let 'em know that I don't recommend a Commonwealth, but writ the History of a Commonwealthsman's, fairly divulging the Principles and Pretences of that Party, and leaving every body to approve or dislike what he pleases, without imposing on his Judgement by the deluding Arts of Sophistry, Eloquence, or any other specious but unfair methods of persuasion. Men, to the best of their ability, aught to be ignorant of nothing; and while they talk so much for and against a Commonwealth, 'tis sit they should at least understand the Subject of their Discourse, which is not every body's case. Now as HARRINGTON'S Oceana is, in my Opinion, the most perfect Form of Popular Government that ever was: so this, with his other Writings, contain the History, Reasons, Nature, and Effects of all sorts of Government, with so much Learning and Perspicuity, that nothing can be more preferably read on such occasions.  
LET not those therefore, who make no opposition to the reprinting or reading of PLATO's Heathen Commonwealth, ridiculously declaim against the better and Christian Model of HARRINGTON; but peruse both of 'em with as little prejudice, passion, or concern, as they would a Book of Travels into the Indys for their improvement and diversion. Yet so contrary are the Tempers of many to this equitable disposition, that DIONYSIUS the Sicilian Tyrant, and such Beasts of Prey, are the worthy Examples they would recommend to the imitation of our Governors, though, if they could be able to persuade 'em, they would still miss of their foolish aim: for it is ever with all Books, as formerly with those of CREMUTIUS CORDUS, who was condemned by that Monster TIBERIUS for speaking honourably of the immortal Tyrannicides BRUTUS' and CASSIUS'. TACITUS records the last words of this Historian, and subjoins this judicious Remark: The Senate, says he, ordered his Books to be burnt by the Aediles; but some Copies were concealed, and afterwards published; whence we may take occasion to laugh at the sottishness of those who imagine that their present Power can also abolish the memory of succeeding time: for on the contrary, Authors acquire additional Reputation by their Punishment; nor have Foren Kings; and such others as have used the like severity, got any thing by it, except to themselves Disgrace, and Glory to the Writers. But the Works of HARRINGTON were neither suppressed at their first publication under the Usurper, nor ever since called in by lawful Authority, but as inestimable Treasures preserved by all that had the happiness to possess 'em entire; so that what was a precious rarity before, is now become a Public Good, with extraordinary advantages of Correctness, Paper, and Print. What I have performed in the History of his Life, I leave the Readers to judge for themselves; but in that and all my other studies, I constantly aimed as much at least at the benefit of Mankind, and especially of my fellow Citizens, as at my own particular Entertainment or Reputation.  
THE Politics, no less than Arms, are the proper study of a Gentleman, though he should confine himself to nothing, but carefully adorn his Mind and Body with all useful and becoming Accomplishments; and not imitat the servile drudgery of those mean Spirits, who, for the sake of some one Science, neglect the knowledge of all other matters, and in the end are many times neither masters of what they profess, nor versed enough in any thing else to speak of it agreably or pertinently: which renders 'em untractable in Conversation, as in Dispute they are opinionative and passionate, envious of their Fame who eclipse their littleness, and the sworn Enemy's of what they do not understand.  
BUT Heaven be duly praised, Learning gins to flourish again in its proper Soil among our Gentlemen, in imitation of the Roman Patricians, who did not love to walk in Leading strings, and to be guided blindfold, nor lazily to abandon the care of their proper Business to the management of Men having a distinct Profession and Interest: for the greatest part of their best Authors were Persons of Consular Dignity, the ablest Statesmen, and the most gallant Commanders. Wherefore the amplest satisfaction I can enjoy of this sort will be, to find those delighted with reading this Work, for whose service it was intended by the Author; and which with the study of other good Books, but especially a careful perusal of the Greece and Roman Historians, will make 'em in reality deserve the Title and Respect of Gentlemen, help 'em to make an advantageous Figure in their own time, and perpetuat their illustrious Names and solid Worth to be admired by future Generations.  
AS for myself, though no employment or condition of Life shall make me disrelish the lasting entertainment which Books afford; yet I have resolved not to write the Life of any modern Person again, except that only of one Man still alive, and whom in the ordinary course of nature I am like to survive a long while, he being already far advanced in his declining time, and I but this present day beginning the thirtieth year of my Age.  
Canon near Bansted, Novemb. 30. 1699.   

THE LIFE OF James Harrington.  
1. JAMES HARRINGTON (who was born in January 1611) was descended of an Ancient and Noble Family in Rutlandshire, being Great Grandson to Sir JAMES HARRINGTON; of whom it is observed by the 
* Wright's Antiquitys of the County of Rutland, p. 52.  Historian of that County, that there were sprung in his time eight Dukes, three Marquess', seventy Earls, twenty seven Viscounts, and thirty six Barons; of which number sixteen were Knights of the Garter: to confirm which Account, we shall annex a Copy of the Inscription on his Monument and that of his three Sons at Exton, with Notes on the same by an uncertain hand. As for our Author, he was the eldest Son of Sir SAPCOTES HARRINGTON, and JANE the Daughter of Sir WILLIAM SAMUEL of Vpton in Northamtonshire. His Father had Children besides him, WILLIAM a Merchant in London; ELIZABETH married to Sir RALPH ASHTON in Lancashire, Baronet; AND married to ARTHUR EVELYN Esq. And by a second Wife he had JOHN killed at Sea; EDWARD a Captain in the Army, yet living; FRANCES married to JOHN BAGSHAW of Culworth in Northamtonshire Esq and DOROTHY married to ALLAN BELLINGHAM of Levens in Westmoreland Esq. This Lady is still alive, and, when she understood my Design, was pleased to put me in possession of all the remaining Letters, and other Manuscript Papers of her Brother, with the Collections and Observations relating to him, made by his other Sister the Lady ASHTON, a Woman of very extraordinary Parts and Accomplishments. These, with the Account given of him by ANTHONY WOOD in the second Volume of his Athenae Oxonienses, and what I could learn from the Mouths of his surviving Acquaintance, are the Materials whereof I composed this ensuing History of his Life.  
2. IN his very Childhood he gave sure hopes of his future Abilitys, as well by his Inclination and Capacity to learn whatever was proposed to him, as by a kind of natural gravity; whence his Parents and Masters were wont to say, That he rather kept them in awe, than needed their correction: yet when grown a Man, none could easily surpass him for quickness of Wit, and a most facetious Temper. He was entered a Gentleman Commoner of Trinity College in Oxford in the year 1629, and became a Pupil to that great Master of Reason Dr. CHILLINGWORTH, who discovering the Errors, Impostures, and Tyranny of the Popish Church (whereof he was for some time a Member) attacked it with more proper and successful Arms than all before, or perhaps any since have done. After considerably improving his Knowledge in the University, he was more particularly fitting himself for his intended Travels, by learning several Foren Languages, when his Father died, leaving him under Age. Tho the Court of Wards was still in being, yet by the Soccage Tenure of his Estate he was at liberty to choose his own Guardian; and accordingly pitched upon his Grandmother the Lady SAMUEL, a Woman eminent for her Wisdom and Virtue. Of her and the rest of his Governors, he soon obtained a permission to satisfy his eager desire of seeing some other parts of the World, where he could make such Observations on Men and Manners, as might best fit him in due time to serve and adorn his Native Country.  
3. HIS first step was into Holland, than the principal School of Martial Discipline, and (what touched him more sensibly) a place wonderfully flourishing under the influence of their Liberty which they had so lately asserted, by breaking the Yoke of a severe Master, the Spanish Tyrant. And here, no doubt, it was that he begun to make Government the Subject of his Meditations: for he was often heard to say, that, before he left England, he knew no more of Monarchy, Anarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy, Oligarchy, or the like, than as hard words whereof he learned the signification in his Dictionary. For some months he listed himself in my Lord CRAVEN'S Regiment and Sir ROBERT STONE'S; during which time being much at the Hague, he had the opportunity of further accomplishing himself in two Courts, namely those of the Prince of Orange, and the Queen of Bohemia, the Daughter of our K. JAMES I. then a Fugitive in Holland, her Husband having been abandoned by his Father in Law, betrayed by the King of Spain, and stripped of all his Territories by the Emperor. This excellent Princess entertained him with extraordinary favour and civility on the account of his Uncle the Lord HARRINGTON, who had been her Governor; but particularly for the sake of his own Merit. The Prince Elector also courted him into his Service, engaged him to attend him in a Journey he made to the Court of Denmark, and, after his return from travelling, committed the chief management of all his Affairs in England to his care. Nor were the young Princesses less delighted with his Company, his Conversation being always extremely pleasant, as well as learned and polite; to which good qualities those unfortunat Ladies were far from being strangers, as appears by the Letters of the great Philosopher CARTESIUS, and by the other Writers of those times.  
4. THOUGH he found many Charms inviting his longer stay in this place, yet none were strong enough to keep him from pursuing his main design of travelling; and therefore he went next thro' Flanders into France, where having perfected himself in the Language, seen what deserved his curiosity, and made such Remarks on their Government as will best appear in his Works, he removed thence into Italy. It happened to be then (as it is now) the Year of Jubilee. He always used to admire the great dexterity wherewith the Popish Clergy could maintain their severe Government over so great a part of the World, and that Men otherwise reasonable enough should be enchanted out of their Senses, as well as cheated out of their Money, by these ridiculous Tricks of Religious Pageantry. Except the small respect he showed to the Miracles they daily told him were performed in their Churches, he did in all other things behave himself very prudently and inoffensively. But going on a Candlemass day with several other Protestants, to see the Pope perform the Ceremony of consecrating Wax Lights; and perceiving that none could obtain any of those Torches, except such as kissed the Pope's To (which he exposed to 'em for that purpose) though he had a great mind to one of the Lights, yet he would not accept it on so hard a condition. The rest of his Companions were not so scrupulous, and after their return complained of his squeamishness to the King; who telling him he might have done it only as a respect to a temporal Prince, he presently replied, that since he had the honour to kiss his Majesty's hand, he thought it beneath him to kiss any other Prince's foot. The King was pleased with his answer, and did afterwards admit him to be one of his Privy Chamber extraordinary, in which quality he attended him in his first Expedition against the Scots.  
5. HE preferred Venice to all other places in Italy, as he did its Government to all those of the whole World, it being in his Opinion immutable by any external or internal Causes, and to finish only with Mankind; of which Assertion you may find various proofs alleged in his Works. Here he furnished himself with a Collection of all the valuable Books in the Italian Language, especially treating of Politics, and contracted acquaintance with every one of whom he might receive any benefit by instruction or otherwise.  
6. AFTER having thus seen Italy, France, the Low Countries, Denmark, and some parts of Germany, he returned home into England, to the great joy of all his Friends and Acquaintance. But he was in a special manner the Darling of his Relations, of whom he acknowleged to receive reciprocal satisfaction. His Brothers and Sisters were now pretty well grown, which made it his next care so to provide for each of 'em as might render 'em independent of others, and easy to themselves. His Brother WILLIAM he bred to be a Merchant, in which calling he became a considerable Man; he was a good Architect, and was so much noticed for his ingenious Contrivances, that he was received a Fellow of the Royal Society. How his other Brothers were disposed, we mentioned in the beginuing of this Discourse. He took all the care of a Parent in the education of his Sisters, and would himself make large Discourses to 'em concerning the Reverence that was due to Almighty God; the benevolence they were obliged to show all mankind; how they ought to furnish their minds with knowledge by reading of useful Books, and to show the goodness of their disposition by a constant practice of Virtue: In a word, he taught 'em the true Rules of humanity and decency, always inculcating to 'em that good Manners did not so much consist in a fashionable carriage (which ought not to be neglected) as in becoming words and actions, an obliging address, and a modest behaviour. He treated his Mother in Law as if she were his own, and made no distinction between her Children and the rest of his Brothers and Sisters; which good Example had such effects on 'em all, that no Family has been more remarkable for their mutual friendship.  
7. HE was of a very liberal and compassionate nature, nor could he endure to see a Friend want any thing he might spare; and when the Relief that was necessary exceeded the bounds of his Estate, he persuaded his Sisters not only to contribute themselves, but likewise to go about to the rest of their Relations to complete what was wanting. And if at any time they alleged that this Bounty had been thrown away on ungrateful Persons, he would answer with a smile that he saw they were mercenary, and that they plainly sold their Gifts since they expected so great a return as Gratitude.  
8. HIS natural inclinations to study kept him from seeking after any public Employments. But in the year 1646, attending out of curiosity the Commissioners appointed by Parliament to bring King CHARLES the First from Newcastle nearer to London, he was by some of 'em named to wait on his Majesty, as a Person known to him before, and engaged to no Party or Faction. The King approved the Proposal, yet our Author would never presume to come into his presence except in public, till he was particularly commanded by the King; and that he, with THOMAS HERBERT (created a Baronet after the Restoration of the Monarchy) were made Grooms of the Bedchamber at Holmby, together with JAMES MAXWELL and PATRICK MAULE (afterwards Earl of Penmoore in Scotland) which too only remained of his old Servants in that Station.  
9 HE had the good luck to grow very acceptable to the King, who much conversed with him about Books and Foren Countries. In his Sister's Papers I find it expressed, that at the King's command he translated into English Dr. sanderson's Book concerning the Obligation of Oaths: but ANTHONY WOOD says it was the King's own doing, and that he showed it at different times to HARRINGTON, HERBERT, Dr. JUXON, Dr. HAMMOND, and Dr. SHELDON for their approbation. However that be, 'tis certain he served his Master with untainted fidelity, without doing any thing inconsistent with the Liberty of his Country; and that he made use of his Interest with his Friends in Parliament to have Matters accommodated for the satisfaction of all Parties. During the Treaty in the I'll of Wight, he frequently warned the Divines of his acquaintance to take heed how far they pressed the King to insist upon any thing which, however it concerned their Dignity, was no essential point of Religion; and that such matters driven too far would infallibly ruin all the endeavours used for a Peace, which Prophecy was proved too true by the Event. His Majesty loved his company, says ANTHONY WOOD, and, finding him to be an ingenious Man, chose rather to converse with him than with others of his Chamber: They had often discourses concerning Government; but when they happened to talk of a Commonwealth, the King seemed not to endure it. Here I know not which most to commend, the King for trusting a Man of Republican Principles, or HARRINGTON for owning his Principles while he served a King.  
10. AFTER the King was removed out of the I'll of Wight to Hurstcastle in Hampshire, HARRINGTON was forcibly turned out of service, because he vindicated some of his Majesty's Arguments against the Parliament Commissioners at Newport, and thought his Concessions not so unsatisfactory as did some others. As they were taking the King to Windsor, he begged admittance to the Boot of the Coach that he might bid his Master farewel; which being granted, and he preparing to kneel, the King took him by the hand, and pulled him in to him. He was for three or four days permitted to stay; but because he would not take an Oath against assisting or concealing the King's Escape, he was not only discharged from his Office, but also for some time detained in custody, till Major General IRETON obtained his Liberty. He afterwards found means to see the King at St. James', and accompanied him on the Scaffold, where, or a little before, he received a Token of his Majesty's Affection.  
11. AFTER the King's Death he was observed to keep much in his Library, and more retired than usually, which was by his Friends a long time attributed to Melancholy or Discontent. At length when they wearied him with their importunities to change this sort of Life, he thought fit to show 'em at the same time their mistake and a Copy of his Oceana, which he was privately writing all that while: telling 'em withal, that ever since he began to examine things seriously, he had principally addicted himself to the study of Civil Government, as being of the highest importance to the Peace and Felicity of mankind; and that he succeeded at least to his own satisfaction, being now convinced that no Government is of so accidental or arbitrary an Institution as people are wont to imagine, there being in Societys' natural causes producing their necessary effects, as well as in the Earth or the Air. Hence he frequently argued that the Troubles of his time were not to be wholly attributed to wilfulness or faction, neither to the misgovernment of the Prince, nor the stubborness of the People; but to a change in the Balance of Property, which ever since HENRY the Seventh's time was daily falling into the Scale of the Commons from that of the King and the Lords, as in his Book he evidently demonstrats and explains. Not that hereby he approved either the Breaches which the King had made on the Laws, or excused the Severity which some of the Subjects exercised on the King; but to show that as long as the Causes of these Disorders remained, so long would the like Effects unavoidably follow: while on the one hand a King would be always indeavoring to govern according to the example of his Predecessors when the best part of the National Property was in their own hands, and consequently the greatest command of Money and Men, as one of a thousand pounds a Year can entertain more Servants, or influence more Tenants, than another that has but one hundred, out of which he cannot allow one Valet; and on the other hand he said, the People would be sure to struggle for preserving the Property whereof they were in possession, never failing to obtain more Privileges, and to enlarge the Basis of their Liberty, as often as they met with any success (which they generally did) in quarrels of this kind. His chief aim therefore was to find out a method of preventing such Distempers, or to apply the best Remedys when they happened to break out. But as long as the Balance remained in this unequal state, he affirmed that no King whatsoever could keep himself easy, let him never so much endeavour to please his People; and that though a good King might manage Affairs tolerably well during his life, yet this did not prove the Government to be good, since under a less prudent Prince it would fall to pieces again, while the Orders of a well constituted State make wicked men virtuous, and fools to act wisely.  
12. THAT Empire follows the Balance of Property, whether lodged in one, in a few, or in many hands, he was the first that ever made out; and is a noble Discovery, whereof the Honour solely belongs to him, as much as those of the Circulation of the Blood, of Printing, of Guns, of the Compass, or of Optic Glasses, to their several Authors. 'Tis incredible to think what gross and numberless Errors were committed by all the Writers before him, even by the best of them, for want of understanding this plain Truth, which is the foundation of all Politics. He no sooner discoursed publicly of this new Doctrine, being a man of universal acquaintance, but it engaged all sorts of people to busy themselves about it as they were variously affected. Some, because they understood him, despised it, alleging it was plain to every man's capacity, as if his highest merit did not consist in making it so. Others, and those in number the fewest, disputed with him about it, merely to be better informed; with which he was well pleased, as reckoning a pertinent Objection of greater advantage to the discovery of Truth (which was his aim) than a complaisant applause or approbation. But a third sort, of which there never wants in all places a numerous company, did out of pure envy strive all they could to lessen or defame him; and one of 'em (since they could not find any precedent Writer out of whose Works they might make him a Plagiary) did endeavour, after a very singular manner, to rob him of the Glory of this Invention: for our Author having friendly lent him a part of his Papers, he published a small piece to the same purpose, entitled, A Letter from an Officer of the Army in Ireland, etc. Major WILDMAN was then reputed the Author by some, and HENRY NEVIL by others; which latter, by reason of this thing, and his great intimacy with HARRINGTON, was by his detractors reported to be the Author of his Works, or that at least he had a principal hand in the composing of them. Notwithstanding which provocations, so true was he to the Friendship he professed to NEVIL and WILDMAM, that he avoided all harsh Expressions or public Censures on this occasion, contenting himself with the Justice which the World was soon obliged to yield to him by reason of his other Writings, where no such clubbing of Brains could be reasonably suspected.  
13. BUT the publication of his Book met with greater difficulties from the opposition of the several Parties then set against one another, and all against him; but none more than some of those who pretended to be for a Commonwealth, which was the specious name under which they covered the rankest Tyranny of OLIVER CROMWELL, while HARRINGTON, like PAUL at Athens, endeavoured to make known to the People what they ignorantly adored. By showing that a Commonwealth was a Government of Laws, and not of the Sword, he could not but detect the violent administration of the Protector by his Bashaws, Intendants, or Major's General, which created him no small danger: while the Cavaliers on the other side taxed him with Ingratitude to the memory of the late King, and preferred the Monarchy even of a Usurper to the best ordered Commonwealth. To these he answered, that it was enough for him to forbear publishing his Sentiments during that King's life; but the Monarchy being now quite dissolved, and the Nation in a state of Anarchy, or (what was worse) groaning under a horrid Usurpation, he was not only at liberty, but even obliged as a good Citizen to offer a helping hand to his Countrymen, and to show 'em such a Model of Government as he thought most conducing to their Tranquillity, Wealth, and Power: That the Cavaliers ought of all People to be best pleased with him, since if his Model succeeded, they were sure to enjoy equal Privileges with others, and so be delivered from their present Oppression; for in a well constituted Commonwealth there can be no distinction of Parties, the passage to Preferment is open to Merit in all persons, and no honest man can be uneasy: but that if the Prince should happen to be restored, his Doctrine of the Balance would be a light to show him what and with whom he had to do, and so either to mend or avoid the Miscarriages of his Father; since all that is said of this doctrine may as well be accommodated to a Monarchy regulated by Laws, as to a Democracy or more popular form of a Commonwealth. He used to add on such occasions another reason of writing this Model, which was, That if it should ever be the fate of this Nation to be, like Italy of old, overrun by any barbarous People, or to have its Government and Records destroyed by the rage of some merciless Conqueror, they might not be then left to their own Invention in framing a new Government; for few People can be expected to succeed so happily as the Venetians have done in such a case.  
14. IN the mean time it was known to some of the Courtiers, that the Book was a printing; whereupon, after hunting it from one Press to another, they seized their Prey at last, and conveyed it to Whitehall. All the solicitations he could make were not able to retrieve his Papers, till he remembered that OLIVER'S favourite Daughter, the Lady CLAYPOLE, acted the part of a Princess very naturally, obliging all persons with her civility, and frequently interceding for the unhappy. To this Lady, though an absolute stranger to him, he thought fit to make his application; and being led into her Antichamber, he sent in his Name, with his humble request that she would admit him to her presence. While he attended, some of her Women coming into the room were followed by her little Daughter about three years old, who stayed behind them. He entertained the Child so divertingly, that she suffered him to take her up in his arms till her Mother came; whereupon he stepping towards her, and setting the Child down at her feet, said, Madam, 'tis well you are come at this nick of time, or I had certainly stolen this pretty little Lady: Stolen her, replied the Mother! pray, what to do with her? for she is yet too young to become your Mistress. Madam, said he, though her Charms assure her of a more considerable Conquest, yet I must confess it is not love but revenge that promted me to commit this theft. Lord, answered the Lady again, what injury have I done you that you should steal my Child? None at all, replied he, but that you might be induced to prevail with your Father to do me justice, by restoring my Child that he has stolen. But she urging it was impossible, because her Father had Children enough of his own; he told her at last it was the issue of his brain which was misrepresented to the Protector, and taken out of the Press by his order. She immediately promised to procure it for him, if it contained nothing prejudicial to her Father's Government; and he assured her it was only a kind of a Political Romance, so far from any Treason against her Father, that he hoped she would acquaint him that he designed to dedicat it to him, and promised that she herself should be presented with one of the first Copies. The Lady was so well pleased with his manner of Address, that he had his Book speedily restored to him; and he did accordingly inscribe it to OLIVER CROMWELL, who, after the perusal of it, said, the Gentleman had like to trapan him out of his Power, but that what he got by the Sword he would not quit for a little paper Shot: adding in his usual cant, that he approved the Government of a single Person as little as any of 'em, but that he was forced to take upon him the Office of a High Constable, to preserve the Peace among the several Parties in the Nation, since he saw that being left to themselves, they would never agree to any certain form of Government, and would only spend their whole Power in defeating the Designs, or destroying the Persons of one another.  
15. BUT nothing in the world could better discover CROMWEL'S Dissimulation than this Speech, since HARRINGTON had demonstrated in his Book, that no Commonwealth could be so easily or perfectly established as one by a sole Legislator, it being in his power (if he were a man of good Invention himself, or had a good Model proposed to him by others) to set up a Government in the whole piece at once, and in perfection; but an Assembly, being of better Judgement than Invention, generally make patching work in forming a Government, and are whole Ages about that which is seldom or never brought by 'em to any perfection: but is commonly ruined by the way, leaving the noblest Attemts under reproach, and the Authors of 'em exposed to the greatest dangers while they live, and to a certain infamy when dead. Wherefore the wisest Assemblies, in mending or making a Government, have pitched upon a sole Legislator, whose Model they could rightly approve, though not so well digest; as Musicians can play in consort, and judge of an Air that is laid before them, though to invent a part of Music they could never agree, nor succeed so happily as one Person. If CROMWELL therefore had meant as he spoke, no man had ever such an opportunity of reforming what was amiss in the old Government, or setting up one wholly new, either according to the Plan of Oceana, or any other. This would have made him indeed a Hero superior in lasting fame to SOLON, LYCURGUS, ZALEUCUS, and CHARONDAS; and render his Glory far more resplendent, his Security greater, and his renown more durable than all the Pomp of his ill acquired Greatness could afford: whereas on the contrary he lived in continual fears of those he had enslaved, died abhorred as a monstrous betrayer of those Liberties with which he was entrusted by his Country, and his Posterity not possessing a foot of what for their only sakes he was generally thought to usurp. But this last is a mistaken Notion, for some of the most notorious Tyrants lived and died without any hopes of Children; which is a good reason why no mortal aught to be trusted with too much Power on that score. LYCURGUS and ANDREW DORIA, who, when it was in their power to continue Princes, chose rather to be the founders of their Countries Liberty, will be celebrated for their Virtue thro' the course of all Ages, and their very Names convey the highest Ideas of Godlike Generosity; while JULIUS CAESAR, OLIVER CROMWELL, and such others as at any time enslaved their fellow Citizens, will be for ever remembered with detestation, and cited as the most execrable Examples of the vilest Treachery and Ingratitude. It is only a refined and excellent Genius, a noble Soul ambitious of solid Praise, a sincere lover of Virtue and the good of all Mankind, that is capable of executing so glorious an Undertaking as making a People free. 'Tis my fixed opinion, that if the Protector's mind had the least tincture of true greatness, he could not be proof against the incomparable Rewards proposed by HARRINGTON in the Corollary of his Oceana; as no Prince truly generous, whether with or without Heirs, is able to resist their Charms, provided he has an opportunity to advance the happiness of his People. 'Twas this Disposition that brought the Prince of ORANGE to head us when we lately contended for our Liberty; to this we owe those inestimable Laws we have obtained▪ since out of a grateful confidence we made him our King; and how great things, or after what manner, we may expect from him in time to come, is as hard to be truly conceived as worthily expressed.  
16. I SHALL, now give some account of the Book itself, entitled by the Author, The Commonwealth of Oceana, a name by which he designed England, as being the noblest Island of the Northern Ocean. But before I proceed further, I must explain some other words occurring in this Book, which is written after the manner of a Romance, in imitation of PLATO'S Atlantic Story, and is a method ordinarily followed by Lawgivers.  
Adoxus— King JOHN. Convallium— Hamton Court. Coraunus— HENRY VIII. Dicotome— RICHARD II. Emporium— London. Halcionia— The Thames. Halo— Whitehall. Hiera— Westminster. Leviathan— HOBBES. Marpesia— Scotland. Morpheus— JAMES I. Mount Celia— Windsor. Neustrians— Normans. Olphaus Megaletor— OLIVER CROMWELL. Panopaea— Ireland. Pantheon— Westminster Hall. Panurgus— HENRY VII. Parthenia— Queen ELIZABETH. Scandians— Danes. Teutons— Saxons. Turbo— WILLIAM the Conqueror. Verulamius— Lord Chancellor BACON.  
17. THE Book consists of Preliminaries divided into two parts, and a third Section called the Council of Legislators; then follows the Model of the Commonwealth, or the body of the Book; and lastly comes the Corollary or Conclusion. The Preliminary Discourses contain the Principles, Generation, and Effects of all Governments, whether Monarchical, Aristocratical, or Popular, and their several Corruptions, as Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Anarchy, with all the good or bad mixtures that naturally result from them. But the first part does in a more particular manner treat of ancient Prudence, or that genius of Government which most prevailed in the world till the time of JULIUS CAESAR. None can consult a more certain Oracle that would conceive the nature of Foren or Domestic Empire; the Balance of Land or Money; Arms or Contracts; Magistracy and Judicatures; Agrarian Laws; Elections by the Ballot; Rotation of Officers, with a great many such heads, especially the inconveniences and preeminences of each kind of Government, or the true comparison of 'em all together. These Subjects have been generally treated distinctly, and every one of them seems to require a Volume; yet I am of opinion that in this short Discourse there is a more full and clearer account of them, than can be easily found elsewhere: at least I must own to have received greater satisfaction here than in all my reading before, and the same thing has been frankly owned to me by others.  
18. THE second part of the Preliminarys treats of modern Prudence, or that genius of Government which has most obtained in the world since the expiration of the Roman Liberty, particularly the Gothic Constitution, beginning with the inundation of the barbarous Northern Nations over the Roman Empire. In this Discourse there is a very clear account of the English Government under the Romans, Saxons, Danes, and Normans, till the foundations of it were cunningly undermined by HENRY VII. terribly shaken by HENRY VIII. and utterly ruined under CHARLES I. Here he must read who in a little compass would completely understand the ancient Feuds and Tenors, the original and degrees of our Nobility, with the inferior Orders of the rest of the People: under the Saxons, what was meant by Ealdorman, or Earls; King's Thane; middle Thane or. Vavasors; their Shiremoots, Sheriffs, and Viscounts; their Halymoots, Weidenagemoots, and such others. Here likewise one may learn to understand the Baronage of the Normans, as the Barons by their Possessions, by Writ, or by Letters Patent; with many other particulars which give an insight into the ' springs and management of the Baron's Wars, so frequent and famous in our Annals. The rest of this Discourse is spent in showing the natural Causes of the dissolution of the Norman Monarchy under CHARLES the First, and the generation of the Commonwealth, or rather the Anarchy that succeeded.  
19 NEXT follows the Council of Legislators: for HARRINGTON being about to give the most perfect Model of Government, he made himself master of all the Ancient and Modern Politicians, that he might as well imitat whatever was excellent or practicable in them, as his care was to avoid all things which were impracticable or inconvenient. These were the justest measures that could possibly be taken by any body, whether he designed to be rightly informed, and sufficiently furnished with the best materials; o● whether he would have his Model meet with an easy reception: for since his own Sentiments (though never so true) were sure to be rejected as private Speculations or impracticable Chimaeras, this was the readiest way to make 'em pass currently, as both authorised by the wisest men in all Nations, and as what in all times and places had been practised with success. To this end therefore he introduces, under feigned names, nine Legislators, who perfectly understood the several Governments they were appointed to represent. The Province of the first was the Commonwealth of Israel; that of the second, Athens; of the third, Sparta; of the fourth, Carthage; of the fifth, the Achaeans, Aetolians, and Lycians; of the sixth, Rome; of the seventh, Venice; of the eighth, Switzerland; and of the ninth, Holland. Out of the Excellencies of all these, supplied with the Fruits of his own invention, he framed the Model of his Oceana; and indeed he shows himself in that work so throly versed in their several Histories and Constitutions, that to any man who would rightly understand them, I could not easily recommend a more proper Teacher: for here they are dissected and laid open to all Capacitys, their Perfections applauded, their Inconveniencies exposed, and parallels frequently made between 'em no less entertaining than useful. Nor are the Ancient and Modern Eastern or European Monarchys forgot, but exhibited with all their Advantages and Corruptions, without the least dissimulation or partiality.  
20. AS for the Model, I shall say nothing of it in particular, as well because I would not forestall the pleasure of the Reader, as by reason an Abridgement of it is once or twice made by himself, and inserted among his Works. The method he observes is to lay down his Orders or Laws in so many positive Propositions, to each of which he subjoins an explanatory Discourse; and if there be occasion, adds a Speech supposed to be delivered by the Lord ARCHON, or some of the Legislators. These Speeches are extraordinary fine, contain a world of good Learning and Observation, and are perpetual Commentaries on his Laws. In the Corollary, which is the conclusion of the whole Work, he shows how the last hand was put to his Commonwealth; which we must not imagine to treat only of the Form of the Senate and Assemblys of the People, or the manner of waging War and governing in Peace. It contains besides, the Discipline of a National Religion, and the security of a Liberty of Conscience; a Form of Government for Scotland, for Ireland, and the other Provinces of the Commonwealth; Governments for London and Westminster, proportionably to which the other Corporations of the Nation are to be modelled; Directions for the encouraging of Trade; Laws for regulating Academies; and most excellent Rules for the Education of our Youth, as well to the Wars or the Sea, to Manufactures or Husbandry, as to Law, Physic, or Divinity, and chief to the breeding and true figure of accomplished Gentlemen: There are admirable Orders for reforming the Stage; the number, choice, and business of the Officers of State and the Revenue, with all sorts of Officers; and an exact account both of their Salaries, and the ordinary yearly charge of the whole Commonwealth, which for two rarely consistent things, the grandeur of its State, and the frugal management of its Revenues, exceeds all the Governments that ever were. I ought not to omit telling here, that this Model gives a full answer to those who imagine that there can be no Distinctions or Degrees, neither Nobility nor Gentry in a Democracy, being led into this mistake, because they ignorantly think all Commonwealths to be constituted alike; when, if they were but never so little versed in History, they might know that no Order of men now in the world can come near the Figure that was made by the Noblemen and Gentlemen of the Roman State: nor in this respect does the Commonwealth of Oceana come any thing behind them; for, as HARRINGTON says very truly, an Army may as well consist of Soldiers without Officers, or of Officers without Soldiers, as a Commonwealth (especially such a one as is capable of Greatness) consist of a People without a Gentry, or of a Gentry without a People. So much may suffice for understanding the scope of this Book: I shall only add, that none ought to be offended with a few odd terms in it, such as the Prime Magnitude, the Pillar of Nilus, the Galaxy, and the Tropic of Magistrates, since the Author explains what he means by 'em, and that any other may call 'em by what more significative names he pleases; for the things themselves are absolutely necessary.  
21. NO sooner did this Treatise appear in public, but it was greedily bought up, and become the subject of all men's discourse. The first that made exceptions to it was Dr. HENRY FERNE, afterwards Bishop of Chester. The Lady ASHTON presented him with one of the Books, and desired his opinion of it, which he quickly sent in such a manner as showed he did not approve of the Doctrine, though he treated the Person and his Learning with due respect. To this Letter a reply was made, and some Queries sent along with it by HARRINGTON, to every one of which a distinct Answer was returned by the Doctor; which being again confuted by HARRINGTON, he published the whole in the year 1656, under the title of Pian Piano, or an Intercourse between H. FERNE Doctor in Divinity, and JAMES HARRINGTON Esq upon occasion of the Doctor's Censure of the Commonwealth of Oceana. 'Tis a Treatise of little importance, and contains nothing but what he has much better discoursed in his answers to other Antagonists, which is the reason that I give the Reader no more trouble about it.  
22. THE next that wrote against Oceana was MATTHEW WREN, eldest Son to the Bishop of Ely. His Book was entitled Considerations, and restrained only to the first part of the Preliminaries. To this our Author published an answer in the first Book of his Prerogative of Popular Government, where he enlarges, explains, and vindicats his Assertions. How inequal this Combat was, and after what manner he treated his Adversary, I leave the Reader to judge; only minding him that as WREN was one of the Virtuosos who met at Dr. WILKINS' (the Seminary of the now Royal Society) HARRINGTON jokingly said, That they had an excellent faculty of magnifying a Louse, and diminishing a Commonwealth. But the Subjects he handles on this occasion are very curious, and reduced to the twelve following Questions.  
(1.) WHETHER Prudence (or the Politics) be well distinguished into Ancient and Modern?  
(2.) WHETHER a Commonwealth be rightly defined to be a Government of Laws and not of men; and Monarchy to be a Government of some men or a few men, and not of Laws?  
(3.) WHETHER the Balance of Dominion in Land be the natural cause of Empire?  
(4.) WHETHER the Balance of Empire be well divided into National and Provincial? and whether these two, or any Nations that are of a distinct Balance, coming to depend on one and the same head, such a mixture creates a new Balance?  
(5.) WHETHER there be any common Right or Interest of Mankind distinct from the Interest of the parts taken severally? and how by the orders of a Commonwealth this may best be distinguished from private Interest?  
(6.) WHETHER the Senatusconsulta, or Decrees of the Roman Senate, had the power of Laws?  
(7.) WHETHER the Ten Commandments, proposed by God or MOSES, were voted and passed into Laws by the People of Israel?  
(8.) WHETHER a Commonwealth, coming up to the perfection of the Kind, comes not up to the perfection of Government, and has no flaw in it? that is, whether the best Commonwealth be not the best Government?  
(9) WHETHER Monarchy, coming up to the perfection of the Kind, comes not short of the perfection of Government, and has not some flaw in it? that is, whether the best Monarchy be not the worst Government? Under this head are also explained the Balance of France, the Original of a Landed Clergy, Arms, and their several kinds.  
(10.) WHETHER any Commonwealth, that was not first broken or divided by itself, was ever conquered by any Monarch? where he shows that none ever were, and that the greatest Monarchys have been broken by very small Commonwealths.  
(11.) WHETHER there be not an Agrarian, or some Law or Laws to supply the defects of it, in every Commonwealth? Whether the Agrarian, as it is stated in Oceana, be not equal and satisfactory to all Interests or Parties?  
(12.) WHETHER a Rotation, or Courses and Turns, be necessary to a welordered Commonwealth? In which is contained the Parembole or Courses of Israel before the Captivity, together with an Epitome of the Commonwealth of Athens, as also another of the Commonwealth of Venice.  
23. THE second Book of the Prerogative of Popular Government chief concerns Ordination in the Christian Church, and the Orders of the Commonwealth of Israel, against the opinions of Dr. HAMMOND, Dr. SEAMAN, and the Authors they follow. His Dispute with these learned Persons (the one of the Episcopal, and the other of the Presbyterian Communion) is comprehended in five Chapters.  
(1.) THE first, explaining the words Chirotonia and Chirothesia, paraphrastically relates the Story of the Perambulation made by the Apostles PAUL and BARNABAS thro' the Cities of Lycaonia, Pisidia, etc.  
(2.) THE second shows that those Cities, or most of 'em were at the time of this Perambulation under Popular Government; in which is also contained the whole Administration of a Roman Province.  
(3.) THE third shows the deduction of the Chirotonia, or holding up of hands, from Popular Government, and that the original of Ordination is from this custom: in which is also contained the Institution of the Sanhedrim or Senat of Israel by MOSES, and of that of Rome by ROMULUS.  
(4.) THE fourth shows the deduction of the Chirothesia, or the laying on of hands, from Monarchical or Aristocratical Government, and so the second way of Ordination proceeds from this custom: here is also declared how the Commonwealth of the Jews stood after the Captivity.  
(5.) THE fifth debates whether the Chirotonia used in the Cities mentioned was (as is pretended by Dr. HAMMOND, Dr. SEAMAN, and the Authors they follow) the same with the Chirothesia, or a far different thing. In which are contained the divers kinds of Church Government introduced and exercised in the age of the Apostles. By these heads we may perceive that a great deal of useful Learning is contained in this Book; and questionless he makes those Subjects more plain and intelligible than any Writer I ever yet consulted.  
24. AGAINST Oceana chief did RICHARD BAXTER writ his Holy Commonwealth, of which our Author made so slight that he vouchsafed no other answer to it but half a sheet of Cant and Ridicule. It does not appear that he railed at all the Ministers as a parcel of Fools and Knaves. But the rest of BAXTER'S complaint seems better grounded, as that HARRINGTON maintained neither he nor any Ministers understood at all what Polity was, but prated against they knew not what, etc. This made him publish his Holy Commonwealth in answer to HARRINGTON 's Heathenish Commonwealth; in which, adds he, I plead the Cause of Monarchy as better than Democracy or Aristocracy; an odd way of modelling a Commonwealth. And yet the Royalists were so far from thinking his Book for their service, that in the year 1683 it was by a Decree of the University of Oxford condemned to be publicly burnt, which Sentence was accordingly executed upon it, in company with some of the Books of HOBBES, MILTON, and others; whereas no censure passed on HARRINGTON's Oceana, or the rest of his Works. As for Divines meddling with Politics, he has in the former part of the Preliminaries to Oceana delivered his Opinion, That there is something first in the making of a Commonwealth, then in the governing of it, and last of all in the leading of its Arms, which (though there be great Divines, great Lawyers, great Men in all Professions) seems to be peculiar only to the genius of a Gentleman; for it is plain in the universal series of story, that if any man founded a Commonwealth, he was first a Gentleman; the truth of which Assertion he proves from MOSES downwards.  
25. BEING much importuned from all hands to publish an Abridgement of his Oceana, he consented at length; and so, in the year 1659., was printed his Art of Lawgiving (or of Legislation) in three Books. The first, which treats of the Foundations and Superstructures of all kinds of Government, is an abstract of his Preliminaries to the Oceana: and the third Book, showing a Model of Popular Government fitted to the present State or Balance of this Nation, is an exact Epitome of his Oceana, with short Discourses explaining the Propositions. By the way, the Pamphlet called the Rota is nothing else but these Propositions without the Discourses, and therefore to avoid a needless repetition not printed among his Works. The second Book between these two, is a full Account of the Commonwealth of Israel, with all the variations it underwent. Without this Book it is plainly impossible to understand that admirable Government concerning which no Author wrote common sense before HARRINGTON, who was persuaded to complete this Treatise by such as observed his judicious Remarks on the same Subject in his other Writings. To the Art of Lawgiving is annexed a small Dissertation, or a Word concerning a House of Peers, which to abridge were to transcribe.  
26. IN the same year, 1659., WREN comes out with another Book called Monarchy asserted, in vindication of his Considerations. If he could not press hard on our Author's Reasonings, he was resolved to overbear him with impertinence and calumny, treating him neither with the respect due to a Gentleman, nor the fair dealing becoming an ingenuous Adversary, but on the contrary with the utmost Chicanery and Insolence. The least thing to be admired is, that he would needs make the University a Party against him, and bring the heavy weight of the Church's displeasure on his shoulders: for as corrupt Ministers style themselves the Government, by which Artifice they oblige better men to suppress their Complaints, for fear of having their Loyalty suspected; so every ignorant Pedant that affronts a Gentleman, is presently a Learned University; or if he is but in Deacons Orders, he's forthwith transformed into the Catholic Church, and it becomes Sacrilege to touch him. But as great bodies no less than private Persons, grow wiser by Experience, and come to a clearer discernment of their true Interest: so I believe that neither the Church nor Universitys will be now so ready to espouse the Quarrels of those, who, under pretence of serving them, engage in Disputes they no ways understand, whereby all the discredit redounds to their Patrons, themselves being too mean to suffer any diminution of Honor. HARRINGTON was not likewise less blamable in being provoked to such a degree by this pitiful Libel, as made him forget his natural character of gravity and greatness of mind. Were not the best of men subject to their peculiar weaknesses, he had never written such a Farce as his Politicaster, or Comical Discourse in answer to Mr. WREN. It relates little or nothing to the Argument, which was not so much amiss, considering the ignorance of his Antagonist: but it is of so very small merit, that I would not insert it among his other Works, as a piece not capable to instruct or please any man now alive. I have not omitted his Answer to Dr. STUBBE concerning a select Senate, as being so little worth; but as being only a repetition of what he has much better and more amply treated in some of his other pieces. Now we must note that upon the first appearance of his Oceana this STUBBE was so great an admirer of him, that, in his Preface to the Good Old Cause, he says he would enlarge in his praise, did he not think himself too inconsiderable to add any thing to those Applauses which the understanding part of the World must bestow upon him, and which, though Eloquence should turn Panegyrist, he not only merits but transcends.  
27. OTHER Treatises of his, which are omitted for the same reason, are, 1. A Discourse upon this Saying: The Spirit of the Nation is not yet to be trusted with Liberty, lest it introduce Monarchy, or invade the Liberty of Conscience; which Proposition he disapproved. 2. A Discourse showing that the Spirit of Parliaments, with a Council in the intervals, is not to be trusted for a Settlement, lest it introduce Monarchy, and Persecution for Conscience. 3. A Parallel of the spirit of the People with the spirit of Mr. ROGERS, with an Appeal to the Reader whether the spirit of the People, or the spirit of men like Mr. ROGERS be the fit to be trusted with the Government. This ROGERS was an Anabaptist, a seditious Enthusiast, or fifthmonarchy man. 4. Pour enclover le canon, or the nailing of the Enemy's Artillery. 5. The stumbling block of Disobedience and Rebellion, cunningly imputed by PETER HEYLIN to CALVIN, removed in a Letter to the said P. H. who wrote a long Answer to it in the third part of his Letter combat. 'Tis obvious by the bare perusal of the Titles, that these are but Pamphlets solely calculated for that time; and it certainly argues a mighty want of Judgement in those Editors who make no distinction between the elaborat Works which an Author intended for universal benefit, and his more slight or temporary Compositions, which were written to serve a present turn, and become afterwards not only useless, but many times not intelligible. Of this nature are the Pieces I now mentioned: all their good things are much better treated in his other Books, and the personal Reflections are (as I said before) neither instructive nor diverting. On this occasion I must signify, that though the History I wrote of MILTON'S Life be prefixed to his Works, yet I had no hand in the Edition of those Volumes; or otherwise his Logic, his Grammar, and the like, had not increased the bulk or price of his other useful Pieces. Our Author translated into English Verse some of Virgil's Eclogues, and about six Books of his Aeneids; which, with his Epigrams, and other Poetical Conceits, are neither worthy of him nor the light.  
28. SOME other small Books he wrote which are more deserving, and therefore transmitted to Posterity with his greater Works; namely, 1. Valerius and Publicola, or, the true form of a Popular Commonwealth, a Dialog. 2. Political Aphorisms, in number 120. 3. Seven Models of a Commonwealth, Ancient and Modern; or brief Directions showing how a fit and perfect Model of Popular Government may be made, found, or understood. These are all the Commonwealths in the World for their kinds, though not for their number. 4. The Ways and means whereby an equal and lasting Commonwealth may be suddenly introduced, and perfectly founded, with the free consent and actual confirmation of the whole People of England. 5. There is added, The Petition of divers well affected Persons, drawn up by HARRINGTON, and containing the Abstract of his Oceana; but presented to the House of Commons by HENRY NEVIL the 6 th' of July 1659., to which a satisfactory answer was returned, but nothing done. 6. Besides all these, finding his Doctrine of Elections by Balloting not so well understood as could he desired, he published on one side of a large sheet of Paper, his use and manner of the Ballot, with a copper Cut in the middle representing such an Election in the great Assembly of the Commonwealth: but 'tis now inserted in its proper place in the body of Oceana. Most of these contain Abridgements of his Model, adapted to the various Circumstances and Occurrences of those times; but containing likewise some Materials peculiar to themselves, and for that reason thought fit to be printed a second time. He did not write the Grounds and Reasons of Monarchy exemplifyed in the Scotish Line (which Book is prefixed to his Works) but one JOHN HALL., born in the City of Durham, educated at Cambridg, and a Student of Grays Inn. Being commanded by the Council of State (of whom he had a yearly Pension) to attend OLIVER into Scotland, it occasioned him to publish that Piece. He wrote several other things in Prose and Verse, and died before he was full thirty, lamented as a Prodigy of his Age.  
29. HARRINGTON having thus exhausted all that could be written on this Subject, he likewise endeavoured to promote his Cause by public discourses at a nightly meeting of several curious Gentlemen in the New Palace Yard at Westminster. This Club was called the Rota, of which I shall give a short account from ANTHONY WOOD, who mortally hated all Republicans, and was as much prejudiced in favour of the Royalists, though, to his honour be it spoken, he never denied justice to either side. Their Discourses about Government, says he, and of ordering a Commonwealth, were the most ingenious and smart that ever were heard; for the Arguments in the Parliament house were but flat to those. This Gang had a balloting Box, and balloted how things should be carried by way of Essay; which not being used or known in England before on this account, the room was every evening very full. Besides our Author and H. NEVIL, who were the prime men of this Club, were CYRIAC SKINNER, Major WILDMAN, Major VENNER, CHARLES WOLSLEY afterwards knighted, ROGER COKE the Author of the Detection of the four last Reigns, WILLIAM POULTNEY afterwards made a Knight, JOHN AUBRY, MAXIMILIAN PETTY, and Dr. PETTY who was afterwards Sir WILLIAM, Sir JOHN HOSKYNS, and a great many others, some whereof are still living.— The Doctrine was very taking, and the more because, as to human foresight, there was no possibility of the King's return. The greatest of the Parlamentmen hated this Rotation and Balloting, as being against their Power. Eight or ten were for it, of which number H. NEVIL was one, who proposed it to the House, and made it out to the Members, that, except they embraced that sort of Government, they must be ruined. The Model of it was, that the third part of the Senate or House should rote out by Ballot every year (not capable of being elected again for three years to come) so that every ninth year the Senate would be wholly altered. No Magistrate was to continue above three years, and all to be chosen by the Ballot, than which nothing could be invented more fair and impartial, as 'twas then thought, though opposed by many for several reasons. This Club of Commonwealthsmen lasted till about the 21 saint of Feb. 1659., at which time the secluded Members being restored by General GEORGE MONK, all their Models vanished.  
30. WHEN the whole matter is duly considered, it's impossible a Commonwealth should have succeeded in England at that time, since CROMWELL, who alone had the Power, yet wanted the Will to set it up. They were comparatively but very few that entertained such a Design from the beginning of the Troubles; and, as it usually happens, a great part of these did afterwards desert their Principles, being seduced by the Honours and Preferments whereby they were retained in the Service of the reigning Powers. The body of the People were either exasperated on a religious account, only to obtain that Liberty which they afterwards mutually denied each other, or by the change of the Balance they grew weary of Monarchy, and did not know it. The Republicans indeed made an advantage of their Discontents to destroy the established Government, without acquainting 'em with their real Designs; and when this was effectually done, the People (who had not settled Form in their view, and thought all things safe by the Victory they had gained over the King and the Church) fell in with what was first offered by those in whom they confided, and would as well have accepted a better Government if they had been managed by men of honest and public Designs. But the Multitude can seel, though they cannot see. Instead of enjoying their desired Liberty, they soon sound themselves under a most heavy Yoke, which they naturally laboured to shake off; and yet in all the changes then made, two things were remarkable, that every one of 'em would be styled a Commonwealth, and yet none of 'em would mend or take warning by the Errors of those that preceded, but still continued to abuse the Nation, and unnaturally to engross the Government into a few hands. The People being all this while told they were under a Commonwealth, and not being able to see thro' the deceit, begun to think themselves mistaken in the choice they had made, since their sufferings under these pretended Commonwealths were infinitely greater than what induced 'em to dissolve the former Monarchy. In this condition the several Parties might (as HARRINGTON used to say) be fitly compared to a company of Puppydogs in a bag, where finding themselves uneasy for want of room, every one of 'em bites the tail or foot of the next, supposing that to be the cause of his misery. By this means whatever was said against a Commonwealth obtained ready belief, as, that it is the most seditious sort of Government, and that instead of one Tyrant there are a great many who enrich themselves by laying intolerable Taxes on others. All this and much more the People in England then experienced, and therefore detesting their new Commonwealth, they restored the old Monarchy. But to do all Governments the Justice due from an impartial Historian, they never had a Commonwealth, but were interchangeably under Anarchy, Tyranny, and Oligarchy, to which Commonwealths have ever been the greatest enemies, and have frequently lent their voluntary assistance to deliver other Nations from the like oppressions. Thus the People of England came to hate the name of a Commonwealth, without loving their Liberty the less.  
31. BUT to return whence we digressed: Our Author, not concerned in the excessive fears and hopes of those that favoured or opposed the Restoration of CHARLES the Second, continued to live in a peaceable manner at his one house, demeaning himself as became a person blindly engaged to no Party or Factions. But though his Life was retired, it was not solitary, being frequented with people of all sorts, some with a malicious design to fish something to his prejudice; and others to gain advantage to themselves by his learned Conversation, or to put him upon something towards the better settlement of the Kingdom. Among these there was an eminent Royalist who prevailed with him to draw up some Instructions for the King's service, whereby he might be enabled to govern with satisfaction to the People and safety to himself: which being performed and signed with his one hand, his Friend after showing it to several of the Courtiers, found they did not approve a Scheme that was not likely to further lemma ourself Designs. At last he put his Paper into the hands of a great Minister about the King; and how well our Author was rewarded for his good Intentions, we are now going to relate. About this time he was busy in reducing his Politics into short and easy Aphorisms, yet methodically digested in their natural order, and suited to the most vulgar capacities. Of this he made no secret, and freely communicated his Papers to all that visited him. While he was putting the last hand to this System, and as an innocent man apprehensive of no danger, he was by an Order from the King, on the 28 th' of December 1661., seized by Sir WILLIAM POULTNEY and others, and committed to the Tower of London for treasonable Designs and Practices. He had the written sheets of his Aphorisms then lying lose on the table before him, and understanding they intended to carry 'em to the Council, he begged the favour that he might stitch 'em together; which was granted, and so removed with some other Papers to Whitehall. I have that Manuscript now in my hands, and another Copy of the same which was given me by one of his acquaintance, from both which I have printed it among the rest of his Works. It is a complete System of Politics, and discovers the true Springs of the rise, temper, and dissolution of all sorts of Governments, in a very brief and perspicuous manner.  
32. HE had no time given him to take leave of any body, but was strait conveyed to the Tower, where none were allowed to come to his sight or speech. His Sisters were inconsolable, and the more so, the less they knew what was laid to their Brother's charge. One of them, who on another occasion had experienced the King's favour, threw herself now at his feet, and petitioned him to have compassion on her Brother, who thro' a great mistake was fallen under his Majesty's displeasure: for as she was sure that none of his Subjects exceeded his Loyalty, so his Majesty might see he was not the man they designed, since the Warrant was for Sir JAMES HARRINGTON, whereas her Brother was never honoured with such a Title by his Majesty's Ancestors, and he would not have accepted it from OLIVER. To this the King made answer, that though they might be mistaken in his Title, he doubted he might be found more guilty of the Crimes alleged against him, than he wished any Brother of hers to be. Then she pressed he might be examined before his Majesty, or be brought to a speedy trial. Shortly after my Lord LAUDERDALE, Sir GEORGE CARTERET, and Sir EDWARD WALKER were sent to the Tower to question him about a Plot which, they said, he had contrived against his Majesty's Person and Government. At this he was extraordinarily revived, not being able to divine before the cause of his Confinement, and knowing himself wholly innocent of this Charge. He found means to transmit a Copy of his Examination to his Sisters, giving 'em leave to publish it, which was never hitherto done, and is as follows.  33. THE Examination of JAMES HARRINGTON, taken in the Tower of London by the Earl of LAUDERDALE, Sir GEORGE CARTERET, and Sir EDWARD WALKER. LORD LAUDERDALE. 
Sir, I have heretofore accounted it an honour to be your Kinsman, but am now sorry to see you upon this occasion; very sorry I assure you.  HARRINGTON. 
My Lord, seeing this is an occasion. I am glad to see you upon this occasion. Which said, the Commissioners sat down; and Mr. HARRINGTON standing before my Lord, he began in this manner:  Lord. 
SIR, the King thinks it strange that you, who have so eminently appeared in Principles contrary to his Majesty's Government, and the Laws of this Nation, should ever since he came over live so quiet and unmolested, and yet should be so ungrateful. Were you disturbed? were you so much as affronted, that you should enter into such desperate practices?  Har. 
MY Lord, when I know why this is said, I shall know what to say.  Lord. 
WELL then, without any longer preamble, will you answer me ingenuously, and as you are a Gentleman, to what I have to propose?  Har. 
MY Lord, I value the asseveration (as I am a Gentleman) as high as any man, but think it an asseveration too low upon this occasion; wherefore, with your leave, I shall make use of some greater asseveration.  Lord. 
FOR that do as you see good: do you know Mr. WILDMAN?  Har. 
MY Lord, I have some acquaintance with him.  Lord. 
WHEN did you see him?  Har. 
MY Lord, he and I have not been in one house together these two years.  Lord. 
WILL you say so?  Har. 
YES, my Lord.  Lord. 
WHERE did you see him last?  Har. 
ABOUT a year ago I met him in a street that goes to Drury-lane.  Lord. 
DID you go into no house?  Har. 
NO, my Lord.  Sir G. Carteret. 
THAT's strange!  Lord. 
COM, this will do you no good: Had not you, in March last, meetings with him in Bowstreet in Coventgarden? where there were about twenty more of you; where you made a Speech about half an hour long, that they should lay by distinguishing Names, and betake themselves together into one Work, which was to dissolve this Parliament, and bring in a new one, or the old one again. Was not this meeting adjourned from thence to the Mill Bank? were not you there also?  Har. 
MY Lord, you may think, if these things be true, I have no refuge but to the mercy of God and of the King.  Lord. 
TRUE.  Har. 
WELL then, my Lord, solemnly and deliberately, with my eyes to Heaven, I renounce the mercy of God and the King, if any of this be true, or if ever I thought or heard of this till now that you tell it me.  Sir G. C. 
THIS is strange!  Lord. 
DO you know BAREBONES?  Har. 
YES, my Lord.  Lord. 
WHEN did you see him?  Har. 
I THINK that I have called at his house or shop thrice in my life.  Lord. 
HAD you never any meetings with him since the King came over?  Har. 
NO, my Lord.  Sir G. C. 
THIS is strange!  Lord. 
DO you know Mr. NEVIL?  Har. 
VERY well, my Lord.  Lord. 
WHEN did you see him?  Har. 
MY Lord, I seldom used to visit him; but when he was in Town, he used to see me at my house every evening, as duly almost as the day went over his head.  Lord. 
WERE you not with him at some public meeting?  Har. 
MY Lord, the publickest meeting I have been with him at, was at dinner at his own lodging, where I met Sir BERNARD GASCOIN, and I think Col. LEG.  Sir Edw. Walker. 
THEY were good safe company.  Lord. 
WHAT time was it?  Har. 
IN Venison time I am sure, for we had a good Venison pasty.  Lord. 
DO you know one PORTMAN?  Har. 
NO, my Lord, I never heard of his name before.  Sir G. C. 
THIS is strange!  Lord. 
COM, deal ingenuously, you had better confess the things.  Har. 
MY Lord, you do not look upon me (for I saw he did not firmly) I pray look upon me. Do you not know an innocent face from a guilty one? come, you do, my Lord, every one does: My Lord, you are great Men, you come from the King, you are the Messengers of Death.  Lord. 
IS that a small matter? (at which my Lord gave a shrug.)  Har. 
IF I be a Malefactor, I am no old Malefactor: why am not I pale? why do not I tremble? why does not my tongue falter? why have you not taken me tripping? My Lord, these are unavoidable symtoms of guilt. Do you find any such thing in me?  Lord. 
NO (which he spoke with a kind of amazement) and then added, I have said all that I think I have to say.  Har. 
MY Lord, but I have not.  Lord. 
COM then.  Har. 
THIS plainly is a practice, a wicked practice, a practice for innocent Blood; and as weak a one as it is wicked. Ah, my Lord, if you had taken half the pains to examine the Guilty that you have done to examine the Innocent, you had found it; it could not have escaped you. Now, my Lord, consider if this be a practice, what kind of persons you are that are thus far made instrumental in the hands of wicked men. Nay, whither will wickedness go? Is not the King's Authority (which should be sacred) made instrumental? My Lord, for your own sake, the King's sake, for the Lord's sake, let such Villanies be found out and punished. At this my Lord LAUDERDALE, as was thought somewhat out of countenance, risen up; and fumbling with his hand upon the Table, said:  Lord. 
WHY if it be as you say, they deserve punishment enough, but otherwise look it will come severely upon you.  Har. 
MY Lord, I accepted of that condition before.  Lord. 
COM, Mr. Vice-Chamberlain, it is late.  Har. 
MY Lord, now if I might I could answer the Preamble.  Lord. 
COM, say; and so he sat down again.  Har. 
MY Lord, in the Preamble you charge me with being eminent in Principles contrary to the King's Government, and the Laws of this Nation. Some, my Lord, have aggravated this, saying, that I being a private man have been so mad as to meddle with Politics: what had a private man to do with Government? My Lord, there is not any public Person, not any Magistrate, that has written in the Politics worth a button. All they that have been excellent in this way, have been private men, as private men, my Lord, as myself. There is PLATO, there is ARISTOTLE, there is LIVY, there is MACCHIAVEL. My Lord, I can sum up ARISTOTLE'S Politics in a very few words; he says there is the barbarous Monarchy (such a one where the People have no Votes in making the Laws) he says there is the Heroic Monarchy (such a one where the People have their Votes in making the Laws) and then he says there is Democracy; and affirms that a man cannot be said to have Liberty, but in a Democracy only.  
MY Lord LAUDERDALE, who thus far had been very attentive, at this showed some impatience.  Har. 
I SAY, ARISTOTLE says so; I have not said so much. And under what Prince was it? Was it not under ALEXANDER, the greatest Prince then in the World? I beseech you, my Lord, did ALEXANDER hang up ARISTOTLE, did he molest him? LIVY for a Commonwealth is one of the fullest Authors; did not he write under AUGUSTUS CAESAR? did CAESAR hang up LIVY, did he molest him? MACCHIAVEL what a Commonwealthsman's was he? but he wrote under the Medici when they were Princes in Florence; did they hang up MACCHIAVEL, or did they molest him? I have done no otherwise than as the greatest Politicians, the King will do no otherwise than as the greatest Princes. But, my Lord, these Authors had not that to say for themselves that I have; I did not write under a Prince, I wrote under a Usurper, OLIVER. He having started up into the Throne, his Officers (as pretending to be for a Commonwealth) kept a murmuring, at which he told them that he knew not what they meant, nor themselves; but let any of them show him what they meant by a Commonwealth (or that there was any such thing) they should see that he sought not himself: the Lord knew he sought not himself, but to make good the Cause. Upon this some sober men came to me and told me, if any man in England could show what a Commonwealth was, it was myself. Upon this persuasion I wrote; and after I had written, OLIVER never answered his Officers as he had done before, therefore I wrote not against the King's Government. And for the Law, if the Law could have punished me, OLIVER had done it; therefore my Writing was not obnoxious to the Law. After OLIVER the Parliament said they were a Commonwealth; I said they were not, and proved it: insomuch that the Parliament accounted me a Cavalier, and one that had no other design in my writing, than to bring in the King; and now the King first of any man makes me a Roundhead.  Lord. 
THESE things are out of doors; if you be no Plotter, the King does not reflect upon your Writings.  
AND so rising up, they went out: my Lord being at the head of the stairs, I said to him, My Lord, there is one thing more; you tax me with Ingratitude to the King, who had suffered me to live undisturbed: truly, my Lord, had I been taken right by the King, it had (by this Example already given) been no more than my due. But I know well enough I have been mistaken by the King; the King therefore taking me for no Friend, and yet using me not as an Enemy, is such a thing as I have mentioned to all I have conversed with, as a high Character of Ingenuity and Honour in the King's Nature.  Lord. 
I AM glad you have had a sense of it; and so went down.  Har. 
MY Lord, it is my duty to wait on you no farther.  
34. NOTWITHSTANDING the apparent Innocence of our Author, he was still detained a close Prisoner; and Chancellor HID, at a Conference of the Lords and Commons, charged him with being concerned in a Plot, whereof one and thirty persons were the chief managers after this manner: That they met in Bowstreet Coventgarden, in St. M●rtins le grand, at the Mill Bank, and in other places; and that they were of seven different Parties or Interests, as three for the Commonwealth, three for the Long Parliament, three for the City, three for the Purchasers, three for the Disbanded Army, three for the Independents, and three for the Fifthmonarchy men. That their first Consideration was how to agree on the choice of Parlamentmen against the ensuing Session; and that a special care ought to be had about Members for the City of London, as a precedent for the rest of the Kingdom to follow, whereupon they nominated the four Members after chosen, and now sitting in Parliament: but three of these, being then present, stood up, and cleared themselves of this Aspersion. Their next care was to frame a Petition to the Parliament for a preaching Ministry, and Liberty of Conscience. Then they were to divide and subdivide themselves into several Councils and Committees, for the better carrying on their business by themselves or their Agents and Accomplices all over the Kingdom. In these Meetings HARRINGTON was said to be often in the Chair; that they had taken an Oath of Secrecy, and concerted measures for levying Men and Mony.  
35. THE Chancellor added, that though he had certain Information of the times and places of their meetings, and particularly those of HARRINGTON and WILDMAN, they were nevertheless so fixed in their nefarious design, that none of those they had taken would confess any thing, not so much as that they had seen or spoken to one another at those times or places; which obstinacy, he thought, must needs proceed from a faithfulness to their Oath. But a Committee of Lords and Commons, after several sit, could make nothing of this imaginary Plot, and did not ever name our Author in all their Reports.  
36. HIS Sisters in the mean time being impatient to see him, and to know his Condition, after several fruitless Petitions, obtained an order of Council at last to be admitted into the Tower, where they found him barbarously treated by the Lieutenant, whom they softened into more humanity with a present of fifty pounds under the notion of Fees. By them he delivered a Petition to the King, importing that in the late times he was no public Person, nor acted to any man's detriment in his Life, Body, or Estate, but on the contrary had done his endeavours to help all persons in distress; that he had opposed the Usurper in such a manner as was judged even by the Royalists themselves to be very much to his disadvantage; and that it was not probable that he, who had lived so peaceably before, would attemt any Novelty after his Majesty's Restoration: wherefore he begged the favour of a public Trial, or a more easy confinement. But though he had been now a prisoner during the space of five months, neither he nor any on his behalf could receive an Answer to their Petitions; which made him somewhat impatient, not so much to enjoy his Liberty, as to vindicat himself from the base Aspersions of his Enemy's. He therefore continually urged his sister ASHTON to procure him a Trial, which she not being able to effect, he petitioned the Parliament, showing that he had lain a close Prisoner in the Tower for five months upon a bare suspicion of some disaffection to the Government, which in all his Examinations did not in the least appear; and that he hoped e'er that time so to have cleared his innocence by a public Trial, as to deserve his Liberty. But because he understood these matters were in some measure represented to their House, he would not presume, without first making his application to them, to sue for his freedom by other legal means. May it therefore please this honourable House, says he, to take tender consideration of the sufferings of an Englishman hitherto innocent; and that the long continuance of him in prison without trial may be hereafter the case of others, and a precedent for the like case: and that this honourable House would please to move his Majesty that your Petitioner may be proceeded against by a legal way of Trial, or that he may have his freedom; that so he may no longer languish in Prison to the ruin of his Health and Estate. These are not the words of a man conscious of Gild, or afraid of Power.  
37. HIS Sister could get no Member to deliver this Petition, or to give her any encouragement; some alleging that she was more likely to destroy than serve her Brother, and others that by unseasonable pressing she might precipitat his danger; whereas if he would be patiented under his sufferings, he might be safe in his restraint. Then he advised her to move for his habeas Corpus; which at first was flatly denied, but afterwards when it was granted and duly served, his Warder came one day to his Sisters at Westminster, and acquainted them that between one and two a clock that morning their Brother was put on board a Ship to be transported he knew not whither, without any time given him either to see his Friends, or to make provision of Money, Linen, or other necessaries. Nor could his Relations for a whole fortnight, either at the Tower or in the Secretaries Office, learn what was become of him, till they received a note from himself on board one of the King's Ships then lying under Hurst Castle, informing them that he believed he was bound for Plymouth. About a month after he sent 'em word by another letter that he was landed on a kind of Rock opposite to Plymouth, called St. Nicholas' Island, whence he afterwards had frequent opportunities of writing to 'em many pious and moral Admonitions, as well as Letters of business and entertainment.  
38. BUT his close restraint to this small spot of Earth, where there was no fresh Water, and scarce any room to move his Body, quickly changed the state of his Health; this occasioned him to petition he might be removed to Plymouth, which was granted, his Brother WILLIAM, and his Uncle ANTHONY SAMUEL, obliging themselves in a Bond of 5000 l. for his safe Imprisonment. Here he had not only the liberty of walking on the Ho, but was also used with extraordinary Respect by the Deputy Governor of the Fort Sir JOHN SKELTON, who frequently invited him to his Table, and much loved his Conversation. Among the other Acquaintance he made at Plymouth, one was Dr. DUNSTAN, who advised him to take a preparation of Guaiacum in Coffee, as a certain cure for the Scurvy, with which he was then troubled. He drank of this Liquor in great quantities, every morning and evening. But after using it for some time, his Sisters, to their no small amazement, received no more Answers to their Letters. At length Advice was brought 'em from his Landlady, that his Fancy was much disordered, and desiring some body might come to look after him. Immediately one of them addressed herself to the Earl of Bath, then chief Governor of Plymouth, and informed him of his Prisoner's sad condition. This noble Lord, who laid many Obligations on him before, and gave frequent orders for his good Usage, went hereupon to intercede for him with the King, representing the danger of his Life if he were not removed from that unwholesome place to London, where he might have the Advice of able Physicians: and the King was accordingly pleased to grant a Warrant for his Release, since nothing appeared against him supported by good Proof or probable Presumtions.  
39 THE next day the Lady ASHTON, with another of his Sisters, took their Journey towards Plymouth, where they found their poor Brother so transformed in Body and Mind, that they scarce could persuade themselves it was the same person. He was reduced to a Skeleton, not able to walk alone, slept very little, his imagination disturbed, often fainted when he took his drink, and yet so fond of it that he would by no means be advised to forbear it. Dr. PRUJEAN, and other eminent Physicians, greatly blamed Dr. DUNSTAN'S prescriptions, giving their Opinion under their hands that Guaiacum and the other drying things, which he administered to his Patient in Coffee, were enough of themselves to beget Melancholy or Frenzy, where there was no previous disposition to it. A rumour at Plymouth, that HARRINGTON had taken some drink which would make any man mad in a month; the surliness of his Doctor, and something blabbed by a Maid that was put against his will to attend him, made his Sister suspect he had soul play lest he should write any more Oceanas. 'Tis certain, that (though his Recovery was never perfect) he mended finely as soon as he was persuaded to abstain from this Liquor. In less than a month he was able to bear the Journey to London in a Coach, where he was no sooner arrived but Sir JOHN SKELTON, who was then in Town, paid him a visit. My Lady ASHTON complaining to him that she had not timely notice of her Brother's Distemper, he protested he would have sent her word of it, had not his Doctor assured him that he only counterfeited; and yet at the same time he made him take strong Doses of Hellebor, and God knows what besides.  
40. HE passed some time at Ashted in Surrey to drink the Epsomwaters, by which he found no benefit. At London he was put wholly under the care of Doctor PRUJEAN, who with all his Art could afford little help to the weakness of his Body, and none at all to the disorder of his Mind, to his dying day. He was allowed to discourse of most other things as rationally as any man, except his own Distemper, fancying strange things in the operation of his animal Spirits, which he thought to transpire from him in the shape of Birds, of Flies, of Bees, or the like. And those about him reported that he talked much of good and evil Spirits, which made them have frightful apprehensions. But he used, they said, sometimes to argue so strenuously that this was not depraved imagination, that his Doctor was often put to his shifts for an Answer. He would on such occasions compare himself to DEMOCRITUS, who for his admirable discoveries in Anatomy was reckoned distracted by his fellow Citizens, till HIPPOCRATES cured 'em of their mistake. I confess I did not know at first what to make of these things from the informations of his Acquaintance, till I met with a Letter of Dr. BURTHOGGE to his Sister, wherein are contained certain Queries proposed to him by HARRINGTON, with a state of his Case written by the Doctor, who was his intimat Friend, and a very good judge, whether considered as a Physician or a Philosopher, as appears by his late Treatise of the Soul of the World, etc. and as I have particular reason to affirm from his Letters to my Lady ASHTON, which are all now before me. Among other things the Doctor says, that he ever expressed the highest satisfaction in thinking of what he had at any time written, as the best Service he was capable to do his Country, and sincerely intended by him to the glory of God, which he thought in some measure to be the good of mankind: so far was he from being under any remorse of Conscience on that score, as his ill wishers maliciously reported. Now, though I was somewhat staggered concerning the nature of his Distemper by Dr. BURTHOGGE'S Letter, I grew perfectly amazed when I found among his Papers the beginning of a little Treatise written by himself, wherein (without raillery) he proves 'em to be all mad that thought him so with respect to what he discoursed of Nature, which he maintained to work mechanically or mathematically, as BELLINI, BORELLI, Dr. PITCAIRNS, and other eminent men have since evidently shown. It appears there that his pretended Visions of Angels and Devils were nothing else but good or bad animal Spirits, and that his Flies and Bees were only Similitudes whereby he used to express the various figures and forms of those Particles. I own that he might probably enough be much decayed in his understanding, by reason of his great and long weakness of body; but I shall never be convinced that he was delirious in that only instance which they allege: and to satisfy the Learned in this point (which, in my opinion, is a memorable Story that concerns 'em all) I shall subjoin his own discourse to this History.  
41. WERE he really out of order, it had been his misfortune, not his fault, and was the case of some of the best men that ever lived. An action that will better persuade the world he was not truly himself, was his marrying in this condition. The Lady was a very agreeable woman, whose Person and Conversation he always admired; she was the Daughter of Sir MARMADUKE DORREL of Buckinghamshire, famed for wit more than became her pretensions to good sense, had long lived among his Relations with the respect of a Friend and a Sister; but now would needs change the office of a voluntary Attendant for the name of a Wife. It soon appeared that this match was not so much disinterested as she would pretend, which occasioned some difference between 'em; but they were quickly reconciled, and she was always treated by him afterwards with the highest Generosity, though she did not use him so handsomely when they were both young and healthy, and might have made a more seasonable match than at this time. Towards his latter end he was subject to the Gout, and enjoyed little ease, but languishing and drooping a good while, he fell at last into a Palsy, and departed this Life at Westminster, the 11 th' of September, in the Year 1677 (leaving his Estate to his Brother's Children) and lies buried there in S. Margaret's Church, on the South side of the Altar, next to the Grave of Sir WALTER RALEIGH, with this Inscription over him: Hic jacet JACOBUS HARRINGTON Armiger (silius maximus natu SAPCOTIS HARRINGTON de Rand, in Com. Linc. Equitis aurati, & JANAE uxoris ejus, siliae GULIELMI SAMUEL de Vpton in Com. Northampton. Militis) qui obiit septimo die Septembris, aetatis suae sexagesimo sexto, anno Dom. 1677. Nec virtus, nec animi dotes (arrha licet ●terni in animam amoris Dei) corruption eximere queant corpus.  
42. THUS died JAMES HARRINGTON, whose Name is sure to live so long as Learning and Liberty bear any Reputation in England. But though he did not think so highly of himself, yet he was strongly persuaded that his Oceana was the Model of an equal Commonwealth, or a Government wherein no Party can be at variance with or gaining ground upon another, and never to be conquered by any foreign Power; whence he concluded it must needs be likewise immortal: for as the People, who are the materials, never die; so the Form, which is the Motion, must (without some opposition) be endless. The Immortality of a Commonwealth is such a new and curious Problem, that I could not assure myself of the Reader's pardon, without giving him some brief account of the Arguments for it, and they run much after this manner. The perfection of Government is such a Libration in the frame of it, that no Man or Men under it can have the interest, or (having the interest) can have the power to disturb it with Sedition. This will be granted at first sight, and HARRINGTON appeals to all Mankind, whether his Oceana (examined by this principle) be not such an equal Government, completely and entirely framed in all its necessary Orders or fundamental Laws, without any contradiction to itself, to Reason, or Truth. If this be so (as the contrary does not yet appear) than it has no internal cause of Dissolution, and consequently such a Government can never be ruined any way; for he further shows (what all History cannot contradict) that a Commonwealth, if not first broken or divided by Factions at home, was never conquered by the Arms of any Monarch from the beginning of the World to this day: but the Commonwealth of Oceana having no Factions within, and so not to be conquered from without, is therefore an equal, perfect, and immortal Government. For want of this equality in the frame he clearly demonstrats how the Commonwealths of Rome, Athens, and others, came to be destroyed by their contending and overtopping parties; whereas that of Venice can never change or finish. He proves that this Equality is yet more wanting in Monarchys; for in absolute Monarchy (as that of the Turk, for example) the Janizaries have frequent interest, and perpetual power to raise Sedition to the ruin of the Emperor, and, when they please, of the Empire: This cannot be said of the Arms of Oceana, and therefore an absolute Monarchy is no perfect Government. In what they improperly call a mixed Monarchy the Nobility are sometimes putting Chains on the King, at other times domineering over the People; the King is either oppressing the People without control, or contending with the Nobility as their Protectors; and the People are frequently in arms against both King and Nobility, till at last one of the three Estates becomes master of the other two, or till they so mutually weaken one another that either they fall a prey to some more potent Government, or naturally grow into a Commonwealth: therefore mixed Monarchy is not a perfect Government; and if no such Parties or Contentions can possibly exist in Oceana, then on the contrary is it a most equal, perfect, and immortal Commonwealth, Quod erat demonstrandum.  
43. IT will not be objected to the disparagement of this Model, that it was no better received by OLIVER CROMWELL; nor is it fair to judge of things at any time by their Success. If it should be said, that, after the expiration of his Tyranny, the People did not think fit to establish it; I shall only answer, that all the Attemts which have been used for introducing Arbitrary Power have proved as unfortunat, whereby it appears at least that the character which TACITUS gave the Romans of his time, may as well agree to the People of England: and it is, that They are able to bear neither absolute Liberty, nor absolute Slavery.  

CONCLUSION.  
I AM disposed to believe that my Lady ASHTON'S memory failed her, when she said that her Brother was at Rome during the Jubilee; for as Chronology seems to contradict it, so she might easily mistake the Jubilee for the Ceremony of consecrating Candles, or any other solemnity; his remarks being equally applicable to all those of the Popish Church. But as to the whole of this History, though it be managed with due moderation, and contains nothing but bare matters of fact, or such observations as they naturally suggest; yet I was sensible before I wrote it, that I could not escape the displeasure of three sorts of persons: such as have resolved to be angry at whatever I do; such as neither rightly understand what is written by me nor any body else; and those who, without any particular spite against an Author, yet to get a penny will pretend to answer any book that makes a considerable figure. Therefore I find myself obliged beforehand to disclaim all explanations made of my meaning, beyond what is warranted by the express words of my Book; having constantly endeavoured not only to write intelligibly, but so as that none can possibly misunderstand me. I renounce all the designs that may be imputed to me by such as are so far from being admitted into my secret, that they were never in my company; but I specially disown whatever is said by those who first presume to divine my thoughts, and then to vent their own rash conjectures as my undoubted opinions. I slight their artifice who, when unable to object against the point in question, labour to engage their Adversary in matters wholly besides the purpose; and when their Evasions have no better fortune than their Attacks, fall to railing against his Person, because they cannot confute his Arguments. I am as much above the malice of some, as they are below my resentments; and I would at any time choose to be rather the object of their Envy than of their Favour: but as I am far from thinking myself exempt from all the indiscretions of Youth, or the frailties of human Nature; so I am not conscious of entertaining higher thoughts of my own performances than are becoming, or meaner of other men's than they deserve. I know that to enterprise any thing out of the common road is to undergo undoubted envy or peril; and that he, who is not beforehand resolved to bear opposition, will never do any great or beneficial exploit: yet 'tis no small encouragement to me, that from the beginning of the world to this time not a single instance can be produced of one who either was or would be eminent, but he met with Enemy's to his person and fame. Notwithstanding this consideration be just, yet if I writ any thing hereafter (either as obliged by Duty, or to amuse idle time) I have determined it shall not concern personal disputes, or the narrow interests of jarring Factions, but something of universal benefit, and which all sides may indifferently read. Without such provocations as no man ought to endure, this is my fixed resolution; and I particularly desire that none may blame me for acting otherwise, who force me to do so themselves. I shall never be wanting to my own defence, when either the Cause or the Aggressor deserves it: for as to those Authors who conceal their names, if they writ matters of fact 'tis a sign they cannot make them good; and all men are agreed to reject their Testimony, except such as resolve to deny others common justice: but the ill opinion of these prejudiced persons can no more injure any man, than their good opinion will do him honour. Besides other reasons of mentioning my supposed designs, one is to disabuse several people who (as I am told) are made to believe that in the History of SOCRATES I draw a Parallel between that Philosopher and JESUS CHRIST. This is a most scandalous and unchristian calumny, as will more fully appear to the world whenever the Book itself is published: for that I have been some time about it, I freely avow; yet not in the manner those officious Informers report, but as becomes a disinterested Historian, and a friend to all mankind.    

The Inscription on the Monument of Sir JAMES HARRINGTON and his three Sons, at Exton in Rutlandshire.  
HERE lieth Sir James Harrington of Exton Kt. with 
a And Sister to Sir Philip Sidney Kt.  Lucy his Wife, Daughter to Sir William Sidney Kt. by whom he had 18 Children, whereof three Sons and 8 Daughters married as follows.  
THE eldest Son, Sir 
b Who was afterwards created Ld Harrington, and his Lady was Governess to the Queen of Bohemia. His Family is extinct as to Heirs Male: One of his Daughters was married to the Earl of Bedford, and was Groom of the Stole to Q. Ann. The other was married to a Scotch Lord whose name was Lord Bruce Earl of Elgin; his Grandson now Lord Alisbury.  John, married the Heiress of Robert Keylwoy Surveyor of the Court of Wards and Liveries. The 2 d Son, Sir 
c Who happened to be Precedent of Ireland; and from him descended my Lady Fretchavil's Father, my Lady Morison, and my Lord Falkland's Lady.  Henry, took to Wife one of the Coheirs of Francis Agar, one of his Majesty's Privy Council in Ireland. the 3 d Son, James. 
d Afterwards Baronet: To him were born Sir Edward Harrington, Sir Sapcotes Harrington, and Mr. John Harrington; who had Issue both Sons and Daughters.  Harrington Esq had to Wife one of the Coheirs of Robert Sapcotes Esq. The eldest Daughter, Elizabeth, was married to Sir Edward 
e Who was Father to the Lord Montague, the Earl of Manchester, and Lord Privy Seal; and Sir Sidney Montague, who was afterwards created Earl of Sandwich; and to the Earl of Rutlana's Lady, and Judge Montague.  Montague Kt. The 2 d, Frances, to Sir William 
f Who was afterwards created Lord Chichester and Earl of Dunsmore; and married one of his Daughters to the Earl of Southamton, by whom he had the present Lady Northumberland. And his other Daughter married herself to Col. Vill●rs, and is now Governess to the Lady Mary the Duke of York's eldest Daughter.  Lee Kt. The 3 d, Margaret, to Don 
g Which Dukedom afterwards fell to him; and by this Lady he had one sole Daughter and Heir, who is said to have married the Duke of Ferio, and by him to have had one Daughter, who is married to a King of Portugal.  Bonitto de Sisnores of Spain, of the Family of the Dukes of Frantasquo. The 4 th', Katherine, to Sir Edward 
h Of Lincolnshire, the King's Standard-bearer.  Dimmock Kt. The 5 th', Marry, to Sir Edward 
i An ancient noble Family in Kent.  Wing●ield Kt. The 6 th', Maball, to Sir Andrew 
k Now Lord Cambden, Owner of the place where this Monument is.  ●oell Kt. The 7 th', Surah, was married to the Lord Hastings, Heir to the Earl of Huntingdon. The 8 th', Theodosia, 
l One of whose Daughters married the Earl of Hume in Scotland, and had by him two Daughters; one married my Lord Morris, and the other my Lord Maitland now Duke of Lauderdale. The other Daughter of my Lady Dudley was Heir to the Honour of Dudley Castle; of whose Issue by the Mother's side is the present Lord Dudley.  to the Lord Dudley of Dudley Castle.  
THE same Sir James and Lucy were married fifty years: She died first, in the 72 d year of her Age; he shortly after yielded to Nature, being 80 years old, in the year of our Lord 1591., and of Queen Elizabeth's Reign 34. their Son James being made sole Executor to them both; who, that he might as well perform to his Parents their Rites, as leave a Testimony of his own Piety to Posterity, hath erected and dedicated this Monument to their eternal Memory.   

The Mechanics of Nature: OR An Imperfect Treatise written by JAMES HARRINGTON during his sickness, to prove against his Doctors that the Notions he had of his own Distemper were not, as they alleged, Hypocondriac Whimsys or Delirious Fancies.  

The PREFACE.  
HAVING been about nine months, some say in a Disease, I in a Cure, I have been the wonder of Physicians, and they mine; not but that we might have been reconciled, for Books (I grant) if they keep close to Nature must be good ones, but I deny that Nature is bound to Books. I am not studied Naturalist, having long since given over that Philosophy as inscrutable and incertain: for thus I thought with myself; Nature, to whom it is given to work as it were under her Veil or behind the Curtain, is the Art of God: now if there be Arts of Men who have wrought openly enough to the understanding (for example that of TITIAN) nevertheless whose excellency I shall never reach; How shall I thus, sticking in the Bark at the Arts of Men, be able to look thence to the Roots, or dive into the Abyss of things in the Art of God? And nevertheless, Si placidum caput undis extulerit, should Nature afford me a sight of her, I do not think so meanly of myself but that I would know her as soon as another, though more learned man. Laying therefore Arts wholly, and Books almost all aside, I shall truly deliver to the world how I felt and saw Nature; that is, how she came first into my senses, and by the senses into my understanding. Yet for the sake of my Readers, and also for my own, I must invert the order of my Discourse; For theirs, because, till I can speak to men that have had the same Sensations with myself, I must speak to such as have a like understanding with others: For my own, because, being like in this Discourse to be the Monkey that played at Chess with his Master, I have need of some Cushion on my head, that being in all I have spoken hitherto more laid at than my Reason. My Discourse then is to consist of two parts: the first, in which I appeal to his understanding who will use his Reason, is a Platform of Nature drawn out in certain Aphorisms; and the second, in which I shall appeal to his senses who in a Disease very common will make further trial, is a Narrative of my Case.   

A Platform or Scheme of Nature.  
1. NATURE is the Fiat, the Breath, and in the whole Sphere of her activity the very Word of God.  
2. SHE is a Spirit, that same Spirit of God which in the beginning moved upon the Waters, his plastic Virtue, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
3. SHE is the Providence of God in his Government of the things of this world, even that Providence of which it is said, that without it a Sparrow cannot fall to the ground, Mat. 10. 29.  
4. SHE is the Anima Mundi, or Soul of the World; 
Principio Coelum, ac Terras, camposque liquentes,  
Lucentemque globum Lunae, Titaniaque astra  
SPIRITUS intus alit, totamque effusa per artus  
Mens agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet.  
Indehominum pecudumque genus, vitaeque volantum,  
Et quae marmoreo fert monstra sub aequore pontus.  
Igneus est ollis vigour, & coelestis Origo  
Seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant,  
Terrenique hebetant artus, moribundaque membra.  
Hinc metuunt, cupiuntque, dolent, g●udentque, neque auras  
Dispiciunt clausae tenebris & carcere caeco. Virgil. Aen. l. 6.   
5. SHE is infallible: for the Law of an infallible Lawgiver must needs be infallible, and Nature is the Law as well as the Art of God.  
6. THOUGH Nature be not fallible, yet she is limited, and can do nothing above her matter; therefore no Miracles are to be expected from her.  
7. AS Defects, Redundancies, or such other rude qualities of matter, ought not to be attributed to the Artificer or his Art; so neither is Nature, or the Art of God, to be charged with Monsters or imperfections, the things so reputed being the regular Effects both of the Matter and the Art that forms it.  
8. NATURE is not only a Spirit, but is furnished, or rather furnishes herself with innumerable ministerial Spirits, by which she operats on her whole matter, as the Universe; or on the separate parts, as man's Body.  
9 THESE ministerial Spirits are certain Aethereal Particles invisibly mixed with elementary Matter; they work ordinarily unseen or unfelt, and may be called Animal Spirits.  
10. AS in sound bodies there must needs be GOOD SPIRITS managing the Oeconomy of Health; so in unsound Bodies, as in chronical Diseases, there must needs be EVIL SPIRITS managing the Oeconomy of Distempers.  
11. ANIMAL Spirits, whether in the Universe, or in man's Body, are good or evil Spirits, according to the Matter wherein and whereof they are generated.  
12. WHAT is a good Spirit to one Creature, is evil to another, as the food of some Beasts is poison to man; whence the gentleness of the Dove, and the fierceness of the Hawk.  
13. BETWEEN the Animal Spirits of the whole or Universe, and of the parts, as of man's Body, there is an intercourse or cooperation which preserves the common order of Nature unseen; and in some things often foretells or discovers it, which is what we call Prefages, Signs, and Prodigys.  
14. THE work of good Spirits, as Health for example, is felicitous, and as it were Angelical; and that of evil Spirits, as in Diseases, is noxious, and as it were diabolical, a sort of fascination or witchcraft.  
15. ALL Fermentation is caused by unlocking, unbinding, or letting lose of Spirits; as all Attenuation is occasioned by stirring, working, or provoking of Spirits; and all Transpiration by the emission or sending abroad of Spirits.  
16. NOTHING in Nature is annihilated or lost, and therefore whatever is transpired, is received and put to some use by the Spirits of the Universe.  
17. SCARCE any man but at some time or other has felt such a motion as Country people call the Life-blood; if in his Ey, perhaps there has flown out something like a dusky cloud, which is a transpiration or emission of Spirits; perhaps as it were a flash of Fire, which also was an emission of Spirits, but differenced according to the matter wherein and whereof they were wrought, as Choler, etc.  
18. ANIMAL Spirits are ordinarily emitted streaking themselves into various figures, answerable to little arms or hands, by which they work out the matter by Transpiration, no otherwise than they unlocked it, and wrought it up in the body by attenuation, that is, by manufacture: for these operations are perfectly mechanical, and downright handiwork as any in our shops or workhouses.  
19 IF we find Nature in her operations not only using hands, but likewise something analogous to any Art, Tool, Engine, or Instrument which we have or use, it cannot be said that Nature had these things of men, because we know that men must have these things of Nature.  
20. IN Attenuation and Transpiration, where the matter of the Disease is not only copious but inveterat, the Work will not as I may say be inarticulat, as in the trembling called the Life-blood; but articulate, and obviously so to the sense of the Patient by immediate strokes of the Humour upon his Organs, which sometimes may be strong enough (though not ordinarily) to reach another's.  
21. NATURE can work no otherwise than as God taught her, nor any man than as she taught him.  
22. WHEN I see a curious piece from the hands of an Apprentice, I cannot imagine that his Master was a bungler, or that he wrought not after the same manner as his Servant learned of him; which I apply to God and Nature.  
23. PHYSICIANS sometimes take the PRUDENCE of Nature for the FRENZY of the Patient.  
24. IF any man can show why these things are not thus, or that they may be otherwise, than I have done, and there is said in this part already more than enough; but if they can neither show that these things are not thus, nor know how they should be otherwise, then so far I stand my ground, and am now armed for my Narrative Cap a pè.  
'TIS a thousand pities that we have not this Narrative, to which no doubt he applied these Principles, and thence formed the state of his Distemper. But the Manuscript containing no more, we may however evidently conclude that the Writer of it was not so greatly disordered in his thoughts, which are for the most part very just, and all as close and coherent as any man's.    

ERRATA.  
Preface. Page 8. line 2. for too, read two.  
Life. P. 21. To the other words there explained add Hemisua the River Trent, and Alma the Palace of St. James.  
Works. P. 5. l. 32. r. opac. P. 35. l. 11. f. Assertors, r. Assertress. P. 48. l. 5. r. than to. P. 54. l. 11. r. Lycians. P. 106. l. 17. r. Tarentum. P. 107. l. 28. f. My Lords, other, r. My Lord's other. P. 110. l. 19 r. Brokage. P. 267. l. 37. f. poisoning, r. poising.   

THE Grounds and Reasons OF MONARCHY Considered: And Exemplifyed in the Scotish Line, out of their own best Authors and Records.   

THE PREFACE.  
THERE is nothing that has more confounded Knowledge among men, than the reciprocal violences of the Understanding and the Will; or, to speak plainly, the Passion of the one and Blindness of the other: Since some by chance or interest take up Principles which they force the Understanding by strained Arguments to maintain; others by the habit of some Opinion so bewitch the Will into confederacy, that they can never quit it, even after confutation. To remedy this Disorder, since I had resolved with myself to say something to this Point (which though it be but as a small Wire, yet the great weight of civil Felicity lies upon it) I knew no better Method than to take the Scales from the Eyes of the Understanding, and to show the Will how better to bring about her great Design of Good. And in the prosecution of this, I would not skirmish with every Argument, which had been a thing of immense slavery, and not for every Ey; but I chose rather to strike at the Foundations, that the Understanding might lose its Passion, and more freely consider upon what Quicksands they lay. And in this I needed not to be positive, because I undertake a Task in which most Men are commonly successful, that is, to support Error rather than to assert Truth. Hence I consider Kingship simply, not troubling myself to maintain any other Form, or to consider Oaths, Ends, Changes of Government, or the particular Necessity or Reasons of Safety: they being distinct Considerations and Subjects by themselves. Now if this negative Method satisfys not, I see no such great cause to be discouraged; for, I confess, I do not perceive it so easy a thing to discover an Error; and I had rather tell a Man he was out of the way, than by endeavouring to bring him to the end of his Journey, lead him further about. And it is my opinion, that as Scepticism is not only useless, but dangerous; if in setting our Thoughts in a posture of Defence, it makes us absolutely wavering and incredulous: yet had I rather be sceptical in my Opinion, than maintain it upon grounds taken upon trust, and not demonstrated.  
THE Second Part is merely an instance accommodated to the Arguments of the First, wherein I would not be understood to be a Writer of an Epitome (for I have other Employments for my Time and Thoughts, and those nobler too) but to set down a true Series by way of Example; and therefore I was only to note Accesses to Government, and Recesses from it, with the Effects proceeding from the Persons of Governors. And here as I needed not much trouble Chronology: So lest it might be a bare Sceleton, I sprinkled some Observations that came to hand, and seem to afford either Pleasure or Use. Thus much, lest I might be misunderstood, I thought necessary to premise.   

THE Grounds and Reasons OF MONARCHY.  
The First Part.  
I HAVE often thought it strange, that among all the Governments, either past or present, the Monarchical should so far in Extent and Number exceed the Popular, as that they could never yet come into comparison. I could never be persuaded but it was more happy for a People to be disposed of by a number of Persons jointly interested and concerned with them, than to be numbered as the Herd and Inheritance of One, to whose Lust and Madness they were absolutely subject; and that any Man of the weakest Reason and Generosity would not rather choose for his Habitation that spot of Earth where there was access to Honour by Virtue, and no Worth could be excluded, rather than that where all Advancement should proceed from the Will of one scarcely hearing and seeing with his own Organs, and gained for the most part by means lewd and indirect: and all this in the end to amount to nothing else but a more splendid and dangerous Slavery. To clear this Point, I considered how inscrutably Providence carries on the turns and stops of all Governments, so that most People rather found than made them. The Constitutions of Men, some not fit to be Masters of their Liberty, some not capable, some not willing; the Ambition of settled Tyrants, who breaking their own Bonds have brought in violent Alterations; and lastly, civil Discord, have either corrupted or altered better Settlements.  
BUT these are Observations rather than Arguments, and relate to Fact rather than Reason. That which astonished me most was to see those of this Heroic and Learned Age, not only not rising to Thoughts of Liberty, but instead thereof foolishly turning their Wits and Swords against themselves in the maintenance of them whose Slaves they are: and indeed they can be no weak Causes that produce so long and settled a Distemper; though some of those I mentioned, if not most of them, are the true ones.  
HE knows nothing that knows not how superstitiously the generality of Mankind is given to retain Traditions, and how pertinacious they are in the maintenance of their first Prejudices, insomuch that a Discovery or more refined Reason is as insupportable to them, as the Sun is to an Ey newly brought out of Darkness. Hence Opiniativeness (which is commonly proportioned to their Ignorance) and a generous Obstinacy sometimes to Death and Ruin. So that it is no wonder if we see many Gentlemen, whose Education enabled them only to use their Senses and first Thoughts, so dazzled with the Splendour of a Court, prepossessed with the Affection of a Prince, or bewitched with some subdolous Favour, that they choose rather any hazard than the Enchantment should be dissolved. Others, perhaps a degree above these, yet in respect of some Title stuck upon the Family (which has been as fortunate a Mystery of Kingcraft as any other) or in reverence to some glorious former Achievements (minding not that in all these cases the People are the only effective means, and the King only imaginary) think they should degenerate from Bravery in bringing on a Change. Others are witheld by Sloth and Timorousness, either not daring, or unwilling to be happy; some looking no further than their private Welfare, indifferent at the multiplication of public Evils; others (and these the worst of all) out of a pravity of Nature sacrificing to their Ambition and Avarice, and in order to that, following any Power, concurring with any Machinations, and supporting their Authors: while Princes themselves (trained up in these Arts, or receiving them by Tradition) know how to wind all their humours to their own advantage, now foisting the Divinity of their Titles into Pulpits, now amuzing the People with Pomp and Shows, now diverting their hot Spirits to some unprofitable foreign War (making way to their accursed ends of Revenge or Glory, with the effusion of that Blood which should be as dear to them as their own) now stroking the People with some feeble but enforced Law, for which notwithstanding they will be paid (and 'tis observed, the most notorious Tyrants have taken this Course) now giving up the eminentest of their Ministers (which they part with as indifferently as their Robes) to the Rage and Fury of the People; so that they are commanded and condemned by the same Mouth, and the credulous and ignorant, believing their King divinely set over them, sit still, and by degrees grow into Quiet and Admiration, especially if lulled asleep with some small continuance of Peace (be it never so injust, unsound, or dangerous) as if the Body Politic could not languish of an internal Disease, though its Complexion be fresh and cheerful.  
THOSE are the Reasons which (if I conceive aright) have stupefied the less knowing part of Mankind. Now, how the more searching part have soodly miscarried, will fall under consideration.  
FIRST then, we need not take the pains to demonstrat how easy a thing it is for men of Acuteness, not conversant in Civil Affairs, not only to miscarry in the Apprehension, but even in their Judgement of them: for they, instead of bringing the Series and Reason of things into Rule and Method, use on the contrary to measure them by their own presupposed Speculation; and by that means become incapable of weighing rightly the various Incidences and Circumstances of Business. For it is to be observed, that the Theorems of no Art or Profession are either more easily found, or of more difficult practice than those of Policy; so that it is no wonder if Men merely contemplative, fail so oft in the very laying of Grounds, as we shall anon▪ instance. Now how fruitful Daintys' Error and Absurdity are, we all know. But more especially the Contentions of contemplative Men are most numerous, various, and endless; for wrangling is with them an Art, and they are endued with that ungenerous Shame, never to acknowledge their Mistakes. Moreover, their Principles are most times ill-grounded, and it is to be feared that in their Superstructures they as often call in their Imaginations as their Judgement to frame Arguments. Besides, these men fight only with Pen, Ink and Paper, seldom arrive at a means to decide the Quarrel, by which he that gains the last word is supposed Conqueror; or the other leaves almost as inglorious a Conquest to the Victor, as if he had been overthrown.  
THAT which I would infer from all this, is, that the Generality of speculative Men, for the most part guiding their Understandings by those Notions which they find in Books, fall not seldom by this means into considerable Errors. For all Books, those I mean that are human, and fall directly under our Consideration, either lay down practical Things and Observations of Kingship, or some general and universal Notions, or else controversially assert Monarchy against some Opposers. Now in the two latter there are generally found two grand and insupportable Fallacies, the first whereof is, that they fraudulently converse in Generals, and (to borrow the School-terms) speak of that in the Abstract which they should do in the Concrete: As for example, where they should assert the particular Right of this or that Prince, they cunningly or ignorantly lay out most of their Discourse about Monarchy in general, and often weary and amaze the Dispute before they come to the true ground and stating of the Quarrel, whereby the Readers (diverted by such Prepossession, and entangled by general Notions of Authority, Power and Government) seldom descend into the consideration of Particulars, where the great Scruple and Difficulty for the most part lies. So that any King (be his Access to the Government never so fraudulent and unjustifiable) comes to be looked on as sacred, authoritative, and by degrees gins not to blush at the Attributes of Sacred Majesty, Grace, and Highness, or any other Terms that the servile Flattery and witty Barbarity of Courtiers can give to them: nay, some even of the wickedest of the Roman Emperors could be content to be saluted with Perennitys and Divinitys; whereas if Men would call their Reason into counsel, they might find that these blazing Stars were opace bodies, and did shine only by Reflection: These Men having no more Luster than either the Cabal of their own state and distance, or the wretched Imposition upon the People, casts on them. For did Men divest the Authority from the Person, they would then commonly find it inconsiderable, if not positively evil. And again, consider Authority in itself as a thing fixed, real, immutable, and (when justly administered) sacred, they might find, that granting a Prince to be the most regular, just Person in all the world, yet many Men as good joined with him, entrusted, and concurring to the same end, might do much more good; and that to deny this, were to be as irrational as to deny that one Person could do any good at all. But however, this I take to be certain and demonstrable out of their own Principles, that Kings being only to be considered in respect of the Trust and Power lodged in them, a number of Men by as just means (not to say better) invested with the same Trust and Power, are every jot as sacred, and of as much Divine Right as any Monarch is, the Power being essentially the same, united or divided, as if a Commission be to one or three. It will follow then, that Republics may be as just and authoritative as Kingships; and then their radical Argument of the Jure Divino of Kingship is wholly enervated, and the other rendered equally as Sovereign. And I am to note (but this is only transiently) the Poorness, or, to say better, the Blasphemy of that Argument which flourishes out Kings as the Types of Divinity, and vainly lavishes some Metaphysics, to prove that all things have a natural tendency to Oneness; nay, the itch of some merry Wits has carried them to run over most of the Divine Attributes (as some English Lawyers have talked of the legal, I must say fantastical Ubiquity and Omniscience of our Kings, though we see the contrary; and some Civilians have said as much about the Emperor before them) whereas they should consider, that the immense Simplicity of God flows out in its several Operations with ineffable variety, God being every where and the same, or, as the Platonists say, a Centre in every part of its Circle, a Spirit without Quantity, Distance, and Comprehension; whereas Man is a determinat narrow Being, who doing one thing, ceases to do another, and thinking of one thing is forced to quit his former thought. Now how sit he is to be a Shadow of this Archetype, let any judge, unless he could be refined from his Corporeity, and enlarged into a proportionable Immensity. Besides, I know not whether it be safe to think or no, That as God, who, for the most part, endues Men with Gifts suitable to the places to which he calls them, would in some measure pour out his Spirit proportionat to these Men, whereas most commonly we find them, notwithstanding their extraordinary advantages of Society, Education, and Business, as weak Men as any other: and good Princes being swayed by the Advice of Men, good and wise, and the bad seduced by Men of their own Inclinations, what are all Monarchys but in reality Optimacies? for a few only essentially govern under the name of one, who is utterly as unable as the meanest of those over whom he claims Superiority.  
THE second Fallacy is this, That Men, while they labour thus to support Monarchy, tell us not what kind of Monarchy it is, and consequently gain nothing, though we should grant them the former Proposition to be true. For what does it avail to tell me of the Title of such a Prince, if I know not by what Title he holds? Grant it were visible to me that such a Man was marked out by Providence to be my Governor, yet if I cannot tell what kind of one, whether absolute, mixed, limited, merely executive, or only first in order, how shall I know to direct my Obedience? If he be absolute, my very natural Liberty is taken away from me; nor do I know any Power that can make any Man such, the Scripture setting just limitations and restrictions to all Governors. If mixed and limited, I must know the due Temper and Bounds whereby he is to rule, or else he may usurp or be mistaken, and I oppressed or injured. If executive, the Power fundamentally resides not in him, but in the Great Council, or them entrusted by the People; then I adore only a Shadow. Now if any Prince of Europe can really clear up these Mists, and show the Lines of his Government drawn fairly, and his Charter whole and authentic, like that of Venice and ancient Rome, for my part, I'll be the first man shall swear him Allegiance, and the last that will preserve him. But you will find that they will tell you in general about their Office, and in particular of their Claims of Succession, Inheritance, and Ancestors; when look but three or four Stories back, and you will meet either some savage unnatural Intrusion, disguised under some forced Title or chimerical Cognation, or else some violent Alteration, or possibly some slender Oath or Articles, hardly extorted and imperfectly kept. Now if any man that will but run over these Rules, and apply them to any History whatever (as we shall exemplify in that of Scotland, upon which for the present we have pitched) and not find most Titles ambiguous, the Effects of former Monarchys (for where, in a Catalogue of forty Kings, can you almost show me three good ones, but things merely struggling to maintain their Titles and domestic Interest?) ruinous to the People, who for the most part consider them not otherwise than as to be rescued from violent Confusion, not as they conduce to the positive Happiness of a civil Life; I say, all this will be found to be true, or my small Conversation in Books is extremely false. And truly I conceive reading of History to be the most rational Course to set any Judgement right, because it instructs by Experience and Effects, and grounds the Judgement upon material Observations, and not blindly gropes after Notions and Causes, which to him are tantum non inscrutabile; but of that anon. A main Mistake under this Topic has been an erroneous comparison and application of matters Civil and Military; for Men observing that mixed Councils about Generals, Plurality, Equality of Commands, frequent and sudden Military Alterations, have brought no small Distempers and Dangers to several Governments and Attemts; therefore they presently conclude, that in Civils also it is the safest to continue a Command in one hand for preventing the like Disturbances. But here they are deceived; Civil matters consist in long debate, great consideration, patiented expectation, and wary foresight, which is better to be found in a number of choice experienced Heads, than in one single Person, whose Youth and Vigour of Spirit inables him rather to Action, and fills him with that noble Temerity which is commonly so happy in Martial Affairs; that must be guided always to improve Occasions, which are seldom to be found again, and, which mistaken, are to be scarcely amended. Besides, the Ferocity of daring Spirits can hardly be bounded while they stand level; so that it is no wonder if they extinguish all Emulations by putting the Power into the hands of one, whereas in a Commonwealth it is quite otherwise: and Factions (unless they be cruelly exorbitant) do but poise and balance one another; and many times, like the discord of Humours upon the natural Body, produce real good to the Government. That slender conceit, that Nature seems to dress out a Principality in most of her works, as among Birds, Bees, etc. is so slender indeed (in regard they are no more Chiefs than what they fancy them, but all their Prepotency is merely predatory or oppressive; and even Lions, Elephants, Crocodiles and Eagles, have small inconsiderable Enemy's, of which they stand in fear, and by which they are often ruined) that the Recital confutes it; and if it were so, yet unless they could prove their One Man to be as much more excellent than the rest as those are, and that solely too, I see not what it would advantage them, since to comply with the design of Nature in one, they would contradict it in others, where she is equally concerned. But these Philological and Rhetorical Arguments have not a little hindered the severer Disquisition of Reason, and prepossessed the more easy Minds with Notions so much harder to be laid aside, as they are more erroneous and pleasing.  
THESE are the fundamental Errors that have misled the Judgement; now those which have misguided the Conscience, have principally proceeded from the Misinterpretation of Scripture; and therefore seeming Sacred, have been less examined and doubted, as carrying the most Authority. Thus in the Old Testament, there being such frequent mention of Kings, which notwithstanding were given in Wrath, they superstitiously maintain not only the necessity, but even the impunity of Kings; whereas we know not their Powers and Limitations, and it is inconsequent to argue, That because Judea was so governed, we should follow the same Pattern, when we find neither Precept, Consequence, nor Necessity convincing us. And it is madness to think that while the Divine Spirit so freely and vehemently exclaims against the Iniquity of men, God would authorise it so far as to leave it in them only unpunishable who should exterminat and reform it. As for the Antiquity from ADAM, it is true, before his Fall his Dominion was large and wide, but it was over the Beasts that after his Fall learned to rebel against him; and oeconomically, not despotically, over his Wife and Children. But what is this to Civil Government? In the New Testament (for I the bries●ier pass over this head, in regard it has been so copiously treated upon by those under whose Profession it falls, and that it does not immediately conduce to my Design) the principal Argument has been the meekness of CHRIST and his compliance with Civil Powers, which certainly, if he had been disposed to have resisted, say they, he could as easily have overthrown, as with a few Cords whip the Buyers and Sellers out of the Temple. But he, that was the Wisdom of his Father, rather thought fit to build up his Kingdom (which is not earthly, nor known of earthly men) in Meekness and Obedience to Civil Powers, which are perpetually changed and hurried at the Will of the first Mover, otherwise he would never have concerned himself so much in giving Dues to CAESAR, and to God what is Gods; intimating the distinct Obedience owing by all men, as Christians, and Citizens. When, granting Monarchy the most and only lawful Government, yet every one knows, that knows any thing of the Roman Story, that AUGUSTUS had no more Title to that Government, than to any of those over whom he usurped, and that his Access to the Government was as fraudulent and violent as could be. Another Error is the mistaking of the word 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Rom. 13.  Powers, when it's clear the Scripture speaks of it in a Latitude, as extending it to all sorts of established Governments. Now men have falsely pretended, that those Powers were only meant of Kings; and what by an indiscrete collation of the places of the Old, and violent wrest of others of the New Testament, they perfected the other grand Mistake; which since it has been already cleared up, and as we said is but collateral with us for the present, we shall no further mention it.  
AS for the alleged Examples and Speeches of the Primitive Times, I see not much in them considerable: for though Insurrections against Princes cannot be produced, or rather much is said against them, yet we are to consider, that the Gospel of CHRIST (which was at that time not much defiled by the World) engages not to any Domination, but (wholly taken up with its own Extasys, spiritual Delights and Expectations) neglects all other Affairs as strange and dangerous. And moreover (though I know what has been said to the contrary) I cannot find, after well considering those Ages, any probable ground how, if they would have rebelled, they could have made any Head. They were indeed numerous, but then they had Legionaries among them; and who knows not what an ineffectual thing a People is (be it never so desirous) when overawed by the Soldiery? And they were a People (as Greatness to God and Man is different) not considerable for their worldly Power (for how few eminent Commanders were converted in the first Ages?) but out of his own mere choice, so that it was not strange if they could not do much. For God, as he chose the weakest means in planting the Gospel, even Fishermen; so, in the primitive Propagation he called the weaker Men, though Christianity afterwards grew ample and august, and Kings were proud to give their Names to it.  
AS for the Fathers (supposing them free of their many Adulterations, Interpolations, and all those Errors and Incertainties which the process of time and fraud of men has foisted into them) they are to be accepted only as Witnesses, not as Judges: that is to say, they may prove matter of Fact, but none of their words matter of Right; especially if we consider their Writings, either Homilies, Commentaries, or Controversys, which are ever directed to another end than this is, and they themselves (men secluded from Business) are so much more unable to judge and resolve civil Controversys, in regard the unhappiness of the latter times has produced many Controversys not known or thought of in their days, which not falling directly under their Profession, cannot receive any Light or Authority from them.  
HAVING thus considered Kingship, and how well it has appeared thro' the false Lights of the Understanding, we shall now consider, whether, taking it by itself, its Foundations be laid upon a Cylinder or upon a Cube: and this, I think, we are the likeliest to do, if we consider them in their Rights and Uses, or, to speak plainer, in their Legality and Policy; so that if we find that none of the ways of retaining their Crowns can be authentic except one, and that one makes against them, we shall see we have no just causes of blind Adoration or implicit Obligation to truckle under any of their Commands. And if again we discover that sort of Government itself is not so profitable to the end of civil Happiness, but rather diametrically opposite to it; we may suppose that men are either strangely obstinate, or else they might eradicat an Error which not only offers so many Prejudices to their Understanding, but that has such an evil Influence upon their external wellbeing.  
WE have then to consider, that for One man to rule over Many, there must necessarily be pretended some Right, though it be but colourable; for either he must be chosen by the People as their Arbitrator and supreme Judge, or else he must by force of Arms invade them, and bring them to Obedience, which he by force preserving for his Sons or Successors, makes way for a third Claim, which is Inheritance. A fourth some have invented, though were it real, it is but a difference of the last, and I therefore shall mention it under that Head. But to the Consideration.  
FIRST therefore Election, supposing the People, either finding themselves unable to wield their own Happiness, or for preventing of Disorder, make choice of one Man to be set over them, it here instantly follows, that the Authority is in the People, and flowing from them; for Choice argues a Power, and being elected a Subordination to it; in the end, I mean, though not in every act. Now there is none chosen but for some End, or for some Intentions reciprocal betwixt both Parties; for otherwise such a choice were but Dotage, and consequently invalid: Wherefore thus it will follow, that those who pretend to King it upon this Topic, must either show a formal Election (which I think many Kings are not able to do) or if he can show one, produce also the Conditions and Ends for which he was chosen. Now all parts being either implicit or explained, let him exhibit the Covenant, that it may be known whether he governs according to it or not; for if he transgresses, he forfeits, and the others are absolved from their promised Obedience. If the Agreement be unwritten or intentional, either Party is relatively tied; and than if he does any thing against the welfare of the People (that Sovereign Law and end of all Governments) the People may not only justly suppose the former Capitulation broken, but even endeavour, by what possible means they can, to restore themselves to their former Rights: for why should the making of a Compact prejudice any when it is once broken? And here comes in another Fallacy, with which the Assertors of Royalty have so flourished, that an Agreement between a People and one Man should descend to his Posterity; whereas it is to be considered, that the People choosing one man is commonly in consideration of his Person and personal Merit; which not being the same in his Son (as commonly Families in the Horizon are in the Meridian, the Founders being braver than any that follow after them) that very intent is frustrated and ceases; and the People providing for the Happiness of a few years, which are determinable with incertainty of the latter part of the Life of one man, run themselves and their Posterity into an eternal Inconvenience (for any thing they know) of bad Governors. And if the People would never so formally agree with him, that in regard of his Merits or felicity of Actions, his Son should be received in that place, yet would they not stand to it, that very Pact expiring with the life of either. For my Father may leave me notionally a Slave in a Tenure (a thing frequent with our Ancestors) or as Civilians term it, a Feodary, with which I am content, in respect of the Advantage it brings me, or because my own Estate is too little to be independent, and therefore I think it good prudence to be sheltered under the protection of the greater; but my natural Liberty, that is to say, to make my Life as justly happy and advantageous to me as I may, he can no more give away from me than my Understanding or Eyesight: for these are Privileges with which God and Nature have endued me, and these I cannot be denied but by him that will also deny me a Being. But to go on, Suppose a second Generation should accept the Son, and a third a Grandson, yet this confirms not a fourth; and the People very impoliticly strengthen and confirm the Power by continuance, and in a manner with their own hands lay the Foundation of Absoluteness; their Governors themselves growing in Interests, increasing in Alliances and Forces: so it is very improbable but that within a little they grow too big and formidable, and leave nothing of Liberty except the Name, and (if they be less cunning) not that. A pertinent Example of this, and so near us that I cannot pass it, we see in young ORANGE and the Low Countries at this day, who continuing his Progenitors for their signal Services, and him for theirs, are now punished for their generous and indiscrete rewarding of Virtue, that their Liberty was lately almost blown up before they well perceived it to be undermined, and they are now at charge to maintain their own Oppression. As for that formal Election and Stipulation, who sees not what a vain and ridiculous cheat it is, they coming with Swords in their hands to demand the Sceptre of a weak and stupid multitude that appears only to gaze upon the Ceremonies, and whose refusal were ineffectual? but it is a gracious piece of the Cabal of Tyranny to deceive the People with Shadows, Phantasms, and names of Liberty.  
AS for those that intrude by Force, they cannot certainly have the Forehead to infer any Right, they being but, as the Pirate said to ALEXANDER, public and more magnificent Robbers. Certainly these are the NIMRODS', the great Hunters, Gods Scourges, and the Burdens of the Earth; and whether they be Founders of Empires, or great Captains (as BOCCALIN distinguishes them) they ought rather to be remembered with horror and detestation, than have that undue Reverence with which they commonly meet.  
YET these are they that lay the Foundations of Succession, and from these do the Successors claim, and enjoy with he less reluctance, because the regret of the Violences, and hate of the first daily wears out; whether it be by the continuance of Peace that charms men into a love of ease, or that the continuance of Slavery enfeebles their Minds, that they rather choose to look at their present Enjoyment than real Happiness; so that it is not strange if the Person of their Oppressor becomes in time adorable, and he himself thinks that confirmed and justified to him in process of time, to which in the beginning he had no right. But if we consider the business a little higher, we might find that since neither the People (as we have proved before) have power to make themselves Vassals, and the Intruders themselves cannot pretend any just Title; their Domination is merely illegal, and apt to be shaken off with the first conveniency, it being every whit as equitable, that these men should be judged Enemy's of Mankind, and condemned to die the death of Parricids for usurping a Power, as NERO for abusing it. But I would fain ask the Regious Defenders, by what Law they can maintain Governments to be inherent in one, and to be transmitted to his Offspring? If they say by the Law of God, I would demand again how they can make this Law appear to me? If they say that the Scripture contains the Right and sacredness of Kings, I ask them again, How they know that God extends that Privilege and Authority to this King? If they say, that he is involved in the general Right, they do but run into a Circle; unless they can show me, that all his Approaches to the Government were regular, and such as God was pleased with, or else God had by some Sign and Wonder declared his approbation of him; for without these two, they must make God the Author of Evil, which is impious, and pretend his Commission for an unlawful Act; and by the same right, any other (as a Tyrant, for example) may pretend it to an Action never so unjust, it being no inusual thing to borrow the face of Divinity, even upon some foul Impostures, as (to forbear further Instances) NUMA'S Conference with AEGERIA, SCIPIO'S Retirement into the Capitol, and SERTORIUS' white Hart.  
Now if they pretend the Law of Nature, they must demonstrat to us, both that she endowed men with inequal Freedom, and that she shaped out such a Man to rule; whereas it appears on the contrary, that all Men naturally are equal: for though Nature with a noble Variety has made different the Features and Lineaments of Men, yet as to Freedom, till it be lost by some external means, she has made every one alike, and given them the same Desires. But suppose she had intended such a Family for Government, and had given them some illustrious Marks, as we read of some that had, whether by the imagination of their Mothers, or by Deceit; yet than would Nature fall into a double Irregularity, first in deserting her Method of making all free, and secondly in making her general Work merely subservient, and secondary to her particular; which how contrary it is to that beautiful Harmony of hers, I need not much insist. Now if they say, they are Fathers of the People, and for that reason they call themselves the Heads, inferring the People to be no more than a Trunk, it's only metaphorical, and proves nothing: for they must remember, that since Father has a relation upon which it depends, and upon whose removal it vanishes, they themselves cannot bring any such; for by physical procreation they will not offer it; and for metaphorical Dependence, it will come to nothing, we seeing People languish when their Princes are fullest, and, like Leeches, rather willing to burst than to fall of; and on the contrary, the People upon the removal of a Prince cheerful and relieved. Now if there were so strict a Union between these two, such a Contrariety and Antipathy could never appear; for certainly when any two Persons endeavour to gain ground one upon another, there is an Enmity, whatever is pretended. Besides, if these men would be Fathers, it were then their duty to do like Fathers, which is to provide for, defend and cherish; whereas on the contrary, it is they themselves that eat the bread out of the mouths of their Children, and thro' the groans of the Poor. And whereas Flattery has said, that what they draw up in Vapours they send down in Showers, yet are we sure that such rains are for the most part unfruitful, if not ominous and infectious. If they pretend the Law of Nations, it were well they would declare to us first what this Law is, and whether generally agreed on or no by Nations. If they say, yes, they must resolve whether explicitly or implicitly: if they say the former, let them produce them; if the latter, they must demonstrat, that all Nations are agreed in such and such Notions, and all men of these Nations, since every one must be of equal capacity: When on the contrary, though the Understandings of most men, whom we know or have conversed with, seem to agree in some general maxims, but unpolished, unnumbered, and unmethodized, yet we see many Nations differing from us in many things, which we think clearly, fundamentally, and naturally true; neither do Climates and Education only so diversify the Minds of men, but even their Understandings, and the different ways of thinking so distinguish even those of one Country, that though we may please ourselves in thinking that all men's thoughts follow the fantastical method of ours, yet we might find, if we were perfectly conversant with all men of the World, and well read in their Authors (as we are not with half of them, no, nor any one man with the twentieth part) that there are scarce four or five Axioms, excepting as they make a part of the Law of nature, would be universally received. Now (for I have been the longer by reason that this imaginary Law has been so held up by the Civilians, and made the subterfuge of so many considerable Disputes) if it be so weak as that we can scarce tell whether it has a being or no, for even that which we account the most sacred piece of it, the violation of public Messengers, the Tartar and Muscovite, unless restrained by fear, break it every day. What then are the Arguments deduced from it? or if there were such a Law, what would it avail such a particular man? for why should other Nations impose a Governor where they are not concerned? And if they pretend this Law as to the preservation and impunity of their Persons, the same Answer will serve again, with this addition, That they make an Offender incapable of punishment, which is but to give them a Commission to offend. Now if they run upon that distinction of suspending only, and not punishing (as if forsooth this kind of People must be preserved, though by the ruin of Mankind, to immediate Vengeance) than I say, That Suspension is really a Punishment; and if his Demerits can deserve that, I see not but that upon a proportionable Increase, they may deserve Dethronization or Death, as clearly as two and two make four, and four more make eight. If they allege positive or municipal Laws, and number Homages, they are not much the nearer, since that all such Laws are but Rivulets and Branches of them we before examined; and since we found that those speak so little in their favour, that which these do cannot signify much, especially since Princes, who are ever watchful to improve all occasions of this nature, can either by terror or artifice draw Assemblys, or the major part of them, to their own Lure; nay, even the worst of them have not forgot to be solicitous in this case. But it must be remarked, That whatever positive Laws are repugnant to those general ones, they are injurious, and aught to be repealed. And truly it is a sad Observation, that as Monarches grow, either out of the weakness of Government, and (as I may say) its Pupilage, as ROMULUS and THESEUS did at Rome and Athens, or else out of the disease or depravation of it, as CAESAR again invaded Rome: so have the People been never more fond of them, than when Manners were at the highest corruption, which ever gave access of strength to them; nor have they more distasted them, than when their Spirits and Discipline were the most brave and healthful: so fatally disagreeing are true Liberty, which is the very source of Virtue and Generosity, and the impotent Domination of a single Tyrant, who commonly reigns by no other means than the Discords of braver Citizens, who can neither endure Equality or Superiority among themselves, and rather admit a general Vassalage, than just Equality; or by the Vices of the base sort, which naturally reconcile them and Kings, and concern them both in a bad Example. But suppose Succession a thing sacred and inviolable, yet once break and interrupt it, it is little worth, either the Usurper being to be acknowleged regular, or the whole Series dashed out of order. Nay, we see Aspirers themselves either so blinded with their Pretences, or with Animosity, and so crying up their own Titles, that it is almost impossible for any private Judgement to do right in this case, themselves thwarting one another; and it cannot be in the power of Nature that both should be right. But who can instance one Monarch whose Crown is come to him by untainted Succession? and what History will not confirm the Example I shall anon bring? Certainly though Succession were a thing that had not so little reason or reality, yet I see not why men should with such a strange pertinacy defend it. Matters of Government ought to be managed by Prudence; but Succession puts them into the hands of Fortune, when a Child incapable or infirm, under the regiment of a Nurse, must (possibly) be Supreme Governor, and those whom either their Abilitys or Virtues fit for it, subordinat or laid aside. But what if the Person whom necessity has set at the stern be incapable, lunatic, weak, or vicious, is not this a good way to prevent Controversys? yet this plainly enervats all good Council, when a King should have need of Tutors, and that a multitude of People should be commanded by one who commands not himself; and, when we scarce obey even excellent Princes, to adore Shadows and weak ones.  
AS for BOXHORNIUS' distinction of Succession, wherein the next Heir must necessarily succeed by the original Right of the former, I would ask him, whether the Predecessor were a Possessor or Usufructuary? If the first, all our former Arguments fall on him; if the latter, it makes not for his Successor, the People being Owners: and besides, the distinction is one of his own coining, never pretended before; upon the first controversy it is invalid, although the first Founder had a Right, as we have proved the contrary.  
HAVING, with what brevity I could, brought to an end my first Intention, I shall now fall upon the second, which is the intrinsic value and expediency of this Government, and some little comparison with others; but herein we shall be short, and only so far as concerns this. And indeed it is a business so ticklish, that even Mr. HOBBS in his piece de Cive, though he assured himself that the rest of his Book (which is principally calculated for the assertion of Monarchy) is demonstrated, yet he doubts whether the Arguments which he brings to this business be so firm or not; and MALVEZZI contrarily remonstrats (in his Discourses upon TACITUS) that Optimacies are clearly better than Monarchys, as to all advantages. And indeed if we look on the Arguments for Monarchy, they are either Flourishes, or merely Notions; such are the reference and perfection of Unity, which, say they, must needs work better and more naturally, as one simple cause (besides that it stills and restrains all other claims) than many coordinat: whereas they never consider that though among many joint Causes there may be some jarring, yet like cross Wheels in an Engine, they tend to the regulation of the whole. What violent Mischiefs are brought in by the Contentions of Pretenders in Monarchys, the Ambiguitys of Titles, and lawless Ambition of Aspirers? whereas in a settled Republic all this is clear and unperplexed; and in case any particular man aspires, they know against whom to join, and punish as a common Enemy. As for that reason which alleges the advantage of Secrecy in business, it carries not much with it, in regard that under that even most pernicious designs may be carried on; and for wholesome Councils (bating some more nice Transactions) it matters not how much they be tossed among those who are so much entrusted and concerned in them, all bad designs being never in probability so feeble and ineffectual, as when there are many eyes to overlook them, and voices to decry them. As for that expedition in which they say Monarches are so happy, it may as well further a bad intention, as give effect to a just Council, it depending on the Judgement of a single man, to whose will and ends all must refer; whereas a select number of entrusted Persons may hasten every opportunity with a just slowness as well as they, though indeed (unless it be in some Military critical Minutes) I see not such an Excellency in the swiftness of heady Dispatch, precipitation in Counsils being so dangerous and ominous. As for what concerns private Suitors, they may as speedily and effectually (if not more) be answered in stayed Republics, as in the Court of a King, where Bribery and unworthy Favourites do not what is just, but what is desired.  
WITH these and many others as considerable (which partly willingly, and partly in this penury of Books, forgettingly I pass) do they intent to strengthen this fantastical and airy Building; but as sly Controverters many times leave out the principal Text or Argument, because should it be produced, it could not be so easily answered: so these men tell us all the Advantages of Monarchy, supposing them still well settled, and under virtuous men; but you shall never hear them talk of it in its corrupt state under lewd Kings and unsettled Laws; they never let fall a word of the dangers of Interreigns, the Minoritys and Vices of Princes, Misgovernments, evil Councils, Ambitions, Ambiguitys of Titles, and the Animositys and Calamities that follow them, the necessary Injustices and Oppressions by which Monarches (using the People's Wealth and Blood against themselves) hold them fast in their Seats, and, by some suspension of Divine Justice, die not violently.  
WHEREAS other Governments, established against all these Evils, being ever of Vigour and just Age, settled in their own Right, freed from pretences, served by experienced and engaged Councils, and (as nothing under the Moon is perfect) sometimes gaining and advantaged in their Controversys, which have not seldom (as we may see in Old Rome) brought forth good Laws and Augmentations of Freedom; whereas once declining from their Purity and Vigour, and (which is the effect of that) ravished by an Invader, they languish in a brutish Servitude, (Monarchy being truly a Disease of Government) and like Slaves, stupid with harshness and continuance of the lash, wax old under it, till they either arrive at that Period which God prescribes to all People and Governments, or else better Stars and Posterity awaken them out of that Lethargy, and restore them to their pristin Liberty, and its daughter Happiness.  
BUT this is but to converse in Notions, wand'ring, and ill abstracted from things; let us now descend to practical Observation, and clearly manifest out the whole Series of Time and Actions, what Circumstances and Events have either ushered or followed one Race of Kings, That if there were all the Justice in the World that the Government of a Nation should be entailed upon one Family, yet certainly we could not grant it to such a one whose criminal Lives and formidable Deaths have been Evidences of God's Wrath upon it for so many Generations.  
AND since no Country that I know yields such an illustrious Example of this as Scotland does, and it may be charity to bring into the way such as are misled, I have pitched upon the Scotish History, wherein as I have only consulted their own Authors, as my fittest Witnesses in this case; so have I (not as a just History, but as far as concerns this purpose) faithfully, and as much as the thing would permit, without glosses represented it: so that any calm Understanding may conclude that the Vengeance which now is levelled against that Nation, is but an attendent of this new introduced Person; and that he himself, though for the present he seems a Log among his Frogs, and suffers them to play about him, yet God will suffer him (if the English Army prevents not) to turn Stork and devour them, while their Cries shall not he heard, as those that (in spite of the warning of Providence, and the light of their own Reasons, for their own corrupt Interest and greedy Ambition) brought these Miseries upon themselves.   

An Instance of the preceding REASONS out of the SCOTISH HISTORY.  
The Second Part.  
AND now we come to our main business, which is the review of Story, wherein we may find such a direct and uninterrupted Series, such mutual Endearments between Prince and People, and so many of them crowned with happy Reigns and quiet Deaths (too successively scarce dying naturally) that we may conclude, they have not only the most reason, but a great deal of excellent Interest who espouse the Person and Quarrel of the hopeful Descendent of such a Family: nor shall we be so injurious to the Glory of a Nation, proud with a Catalogue of Names and Kings, as to expunge a great part of their number; though some, who have done it, affirm there can be no probability that they had any other being than what HECTOR BOYS, and the black book of Pasley (out of which BUCHANAN had most of his Materials) are pleased to bestow on them, there being no mention of the name of Scot in any Authentic Writer, till four hundred years after CHRIST. No, we shall no more envy these old Heroes to them, than their placing the Red Lion in the dexter Point of their Escutcheon. But though we might in justice reject them as fabulous and monkish, yet since they themselves acknowledge them, and they equally make against them, we shall run them over like genuine History. The first of this blessed Race was FERGUS; first General, and afterward got himself made King: but no sooner cast away on the Coast of Ireland, but a Contention arises about the validity of their Oath to him, and Uncles are appointed to succeed, which argues it Elective: so FERITHARIS Brother to FERGUS is King, but his Nephew forms a Conspiracy against him, forces him to resign and fly to the Isles, where he died. FERITHARIS dying soon after, was suspected to be poisoned. After him comes in MAIN (FERGUS' second Son) who with his Son DORNADILLA, reigned quietly fifty seven years. But REUTHER his Son not being of age, the People make his Uncle NOTHAT take the Government; but he misruling, REUTHER, by the help of one DOVAL, raised a Party against him, and beheads him, makes himself King with the indignation of the People that he was not elected: so that by the Kindred of NOTHAT he is fought, taken, and displaced; but afterwards makes a Party, and regains. His Son THEREUS was too young, so that his Brother RHEUTHA succeeded, but after seventeen years was glad to resign. Well, THEREUS reigns, but after six years declines to such Lewdness that they force him to fly, and govern by a Prorex. After his Death JOSINA his Brother, and his Son FINAN are Kings, and quietly die so.  
BUT then comes DURST, one who slays all the Nobility at a Banquet, and is by the People slain. After his Death the validity of the Oath to FERGUS is called in question, and the elective Power vindicated; but at length EVEN his Brother is admitted, who though he ruled valiantly and well, yet he had GILLUS a Bastard Son, Vafer & Regni cupidus. The next of the Line are Twins, DOCHAM and DORGAL, Sons of DURST: they while they disputed about priority of Age, are, by the artifice of GILLUS, slain in a Tumult; who makes a strong Party, and seizing of a Hold, says he was made Supervisor by his Father, and so becomes King, cuts off all the Race of DURST: but is after forced out of the Kingdom, and taken by EVEN the Second his Successor (who was chosen by the People) and by him put to death in Ireland. After EVEN comes EDER: after EDER his Son EVEN the Third, who for making a Law, that the Nobility should have the enjoyment of all new married Women before they were touched by their Husbands, was doomed to Prison during his Life, and there strangled. His Successor was his Kinsman METELLAN: after whom was elected CARATAC, whom his Brother CORBRET succeeded. But than came DARDAN (whom the Lords made to take on him the Government, by reason of the Nonage of CORBRET'S Son) who for his Lewdness was taken by the People, and beheaded.  
AFTER him CORBRET the Second, whose Son LUCTAC for his Lewdness was by the People put to death; then was elected MOGALD, who following his vicious Predecessors steps, found his Death like theirs violent.  
HIS Son CONAR, one of the Conspirators against him, succeeded, but misgoverning, was clapped in Prison, and there died.  
ETHODIUS his Sister's Son succeeded, who was slain in the night in his Chamber by his Piper.  
HIS Son being a Minor, SATRAEL his Brother was accepted, who seeking to place the Succession in his own Line, grew so hateful to the People, that, not daring to come abroad, he was strangled in the night by his own Servants, which made way for the youngest Brother  
DONALD, who outdid the others Vices by contrary Virtues, and had a happy Reign of one and twenty years.  
ETHODIUS the Second, Son of the first of that name, was next, a dull inactive Prince, Familiarium tumultu occisus.  
HIS Son ATHIRCO promised fair, but deceived their expectations with most horrid Lewdness, and at length vitiated the Daughters of NATHALOCK a Nobleman, and caused them to be whipped before his eyes; but seeing himself surrounded by Conspirators, eluded their Fury with his own Sword; his Brother and Children being forced to fly to the Picts. NATHALOCK, turning his Injury into Ambition, made himself King, and governed answerably; for he made most of the Nobility to be strangled, under pretence of calling them to Council, and was after slain by his own Servants.  
AFTER his Death ATHIRCO'S Children were called back, and FINDOC his Son, being of excellent hopes, accepted, who made good what his Youth promised: he beat in sundry battles DONALD the Islander; who seeing he could not prevail by force, sent two as Renegadoes to the King, who (being not accepted) conspire with his Brother, by whose means one of them slew him with a Spear when he was hunting.  
HIS Brother DONALD succeeds (the youngest of the three) who, about to revenge his Brother's Death, hears the Islander is entered Marray; whom he encountering with inequal Forces, is taken Prisoner with thirty of the Nobility, and whether of Grief, or his Wounds, dies in Prison.  
THE Islander that had before usurped the Name, now assumed the Power (the Nobleses, by reason of their kindred Prisoners, being overawed) This man wanting nothing of an exquisite Tyrant, was, aster twelve years' Butcheries, slain by CRATHLINTH Son of FINDOC, who under a disguise found Address and Opportunity. The brave Tyrannicid was universally accepted, and gave no cause of Repentance; his Reign is famous for a War begun between the Scots and Picts about a Dog (as that between the Trojans and Italians for a white Hart) and the defection of CARAUSIUS from DIOCLESIAN, which happened in his time.  
HIS Kinsman FINCORMAC succeeded, worthy of memory for little but the Piety of the Culdies (an Order of religious Men of that time overborne by others succeeding) He being dead, three Sons of his three Brothers contended for the Crown: ROMACH as the eldest, strengthened by his Alliance with the Picts, with their assistance seized on it, forcing others to fly; but proving cruel, the Nobility conspired and slew him.  
ANGUSIAN, another Pretender, succeeds, who being assailed by NECTHAM King of the Picts, who came to revenge ROMACH, routed his Army in a pitched Battle; but NECTHAM coming again, he was routed, and both he and NECTHAM slain.  
FETHELMAC, the third Pretender, came next, who beating the Picts, and wasting their Fields, HERGUST, when he saw there could be no advantage by the Sword, suborned two Picts to murder him, who drawing to conspiracy the Piper that lay in his Chamber (as the manner was then) he at the appointed time admitted them, and there slew him.  
THE next was EUGEN Son of FINCORMAC, who was slain in a Battle with the Picts, to the almost extirpation and banishment of the Scots; but at last the Picts, taking distaste at the Romans, entered into a secret League with the Scots, and agreed that FERGUS (whose Uncle the last King was) being then in banishment, and of a military breeding and inclination, should be chosen King. With him the Danes maintained a long War against the Romans, and pulled down the Picts wall: at last he and the King of Picts were in one day slain in a Battle against them. This Man's access to Government was strange, ignotus Rex ab ignoto populo accersitus, and may be thought temerarious; he having no Land for his People, and the Roman Name inimical; yet founded he a Monarchy, there having been Kings ever since; and we are to note, this is the first man that the sounder Writers will allow to be real and not fabulous. Him succeeded his Son EUGENIUS (whose Grandfather GRAHAM had all the power) a warlike Prince, whom some say slain, some dead of a disease. After him his Brother DONGARD, who after the spending of five superstitious years, left the Crown (as they call it) to his youngest Brother CONSTANTIN; who from a good private Man turned a lewd Prince, and was slain by a Nobleman, whose Daughter he had ravished. He was succeeded by CONGAL, CONSTANTIN'S Son, who came a tolerable good Prince to a lose People; and having spent some two and twenty years in slight excursions against the Saxons, left the rule to his Brother GORAN, who notwithstanding he made a good League against the Britan's, which much conduced to his and the People's settlement, yet in requital, after thirty four years, they made away with him; which brought in EUGENIUS, the Third of that name, the Son of CONGAL, who was strongly suspected to have a hand in his Death, insomuch that GORAN'S Widow was forced to fly into Ireland with her Children. This man in thirty three years' time did nothing but reign, and make short Incursions upon the Borders; he left the Rule to his Brother CONGAL, a monastical, superstitious, and inactive Prince, who reigned ten years. KINNATEL his Brother was designed for Successor; yet AIDAN the Son of GORAN laid his claim, but was content to suspend, in respect of the Age and Diseases of KINNATEL, which after fourteen Months took him out of the World, and cleared the controversy, and AIDAN by the consent of COLUMBA (a Priest that governed all in those days) came to be King; a Man that, after thirty four years turbulently spent, being beaten by the Saxons, and struck with the Death of COLUMBA, died of Grief.  
AFTER him was chosen KENNETH, who has left nothing behind him but his Name. Then came EUGENIUS the Fourth, the Son of AIDAN (so irregular is the Scots Succession, that we see it inverted by Usurpation or cross Elections in every two or three Generations) This man left an ambiguous Fame; for HECTOR BOETIUS says he was peaceable; the Manuscript, implacably severe: He reigned sixteen years, and left his Son FERCHARD Successor, who, endeavouring to heighten the Prerogative by the Dissensions of the Nobility, was on the contrary impeached by them, and called to an account, which he denying, was clapped in Prison, where he himself saved the Executioner a labour. So that his Brother DONALD succeeded, who being taken up with the Piety of those days, left nothing memorable, except that he in person interpreted Scots Sermons to the Saxons. He was followed by his Nephew FERCHARD, Son to the first of that Name, a Thing like a King in nothing but his Exorbitancies, who in hunting was wounded by a Wolf, which cast him into a Fever, wherein he not observing the imposed Temperance, brought on himself the lousy Disease; upon which discomforted, he was by the persuasion of COLMAN (a religious man) brought out in his Bed covered with Haircloth, where he made a public Acknowledgement to the People, and soon after died. MALDWIN, DONALD'S Son, followed, who after twenty years ignoble Reign was strangled by his Wife. EUGENIUS the Fifth succeeded, Son (they say) of King DONGARD, though Chronology seems to refute it. This man spent five years in slight Incursions, and was succeeded by EUGENIUS the Sixth, Son of FERCHARD. This man is famous for a little Learning, as the times went, and the Prodigy of raining Blood seven days, all Milkmeats turning into blood. AMBERKELLETH, Nephew to EUGENIUS the Fifth, who succeeded this rude Prince, while he was discharging the burden of Nature, was slain by an Arrow from an unknown hand. EUGENIUS the Seventh followed, who being attempted by Conspirators, had his new married Wife slain in bed beside him; for which he being accused, produced the Murderers before his Trial, and was acquitted, and so ended the rest of his 17 years in Peace, recommending to the People MORDAC, Son of AMBERKELLETH, who continuing a blank Reign, or it may be a happy one, in regard it was peaceable, left it to ETFYN Son of EUGENIUS the Seventh: the first part of his Reign was peaceable; but Age obliging him to put the Government into the hands of four of his Servants, it happened to him, as it does to other Princes, whose Fortunes decay commonly with their Strength, that it was very unhappy and turbulent: Which Miseries EUGENIUS the Eighth, Son of MORDAC, restrained. But he, it seems, having a Nature fit to appease Tumults than to enjoy Rest, at the first enjoyment of Peace broke into such Lewdness, that the Nobility at a meeting stabbed him, and made way for FERGUS▪ the Son of ETFYN, one like his Predecessor in manner, death, and continuance of Reign, which was three years; the only dissimilitude was, that the latters Wife brought his Death; for which others being impeached, she stepped in and confessed it; and to avoid punishment, punished herself with a knife. SOLUATH, Son of EUGENIUS the Eighth, followed him, who though his Gout made him of less Action, yet it made his Prudence more visible, and himself not illaudable: His Death brought in ACHAIUS the Son of ETFYN, whose Reign was ennobled with an Irish War, and many learned Men; besides the Assistance lent HUNGUS to fight against the Northumbrians, whom he beat in a famous Battle, which (if I may mention the matter) was presignifyed to HUNGUS in a Dream, St. Andrew appearing to him, and assuring him of it; and in the time of Battle a white Cross (that which the Heralds call a Saltier, and we see commonly in the Scots Banners) appeared in the Sky; and this I think to have been the occasion of that bearing, and an Order of Knights of St. Andrew, sometimes in reputation in Scotland, but extinguished, for aught I can perceive, before the time of JAMES the Sixth, though the Collar and Pendant of it are at this day worn about the Scots Arms. To this man CONGAL his Cousin succeeded, who left nothing behind him but five years to stretch out the account of time. DONGAL the Son of SOLUATH came next, who being of a Nature fierce and insupportable, there was an endeavour to set up ALPIN Son of ACHAIUS, which Design by ALPIN himself was frustated, which made the King willinger to assist ALPIN in his pretention to the Kingdom of Picts; in which Attemt he was drowned, and left to ALPIN that which he before had so nobly refused, who making use of the former, raised an Army, beat the Picts in many signal Victories; but at last was slain by them, leaving his name to the place of his Death, and the Kingdom to his Son KENNETH. This man seeing the People broken with the late War, and unwilling to fight, drew them on by this Subtlety; he invites the Nobility to dinner, and after plying them with Drink till midnight, leaves them sleeping on the floor (as the manner was) and then hanging Fishskins about the Walls of the Chamber, and making one speak thro' a Tube, and call them to war; they waking, and half asleep, supposed something of Divinity to be in it, and the next morning not only consented to War, but (so strange is deluded imagination) with unspeakable Courage fell upon the Enemy and put them to the rout; which being confirmed by other great Victories, utterly ruined the Pictish Name. This man may be added to the two FERGUSES, and truly may be said to be the Founder of the Scots Empire, not only in making that the middle of his Dominion, which was once the bounds, but in confirming his Acquisitions with good Laws, having the opportunity of a long Peace, which was sixteen years, his whole time of Government being twenty. This was he that placed that Stone, famous for that illusory Prophecy, Ni fallat fatum, etc. (which first was brought out of Spain into Ireland, and from thence into Argyle) at Scoon; where he put it in a Chair, in which all his Successors (till EDWARD the First brought it away) were crowned, and since that all the Kings of England, till the happiness of our Commonwealth made it useless. His Brother DONALD was his Successor, a man made up of extremities of Virtues and Vices; no man had more bravery in the Field, nor more Vice at home, which increasing with his yeras, the Nobility put him in prison, where either for fear or scorn he put an end to his days, leaving behind him his Brother CONSTANTIN, a Man wanting nothing of him but his Vices, who struggling with a potent Enemy (for the Picts had called in the Danes) and driving them much into despair (a Bravery that has not seldom reigned many excellent Captains) was taken by them, put into a little Cave, and there slain. He was succeeded by ETHUS his Brother, who had all his eldest Brother's Vices, and none of his second's Virtues; Nature, it seems, making two extremes and a middle in the three Brethren. This man voluptuous and cowardly, was forced to resign; or, as others say, died of Wounds received in a Duel from his Successor, who was GREGORY Son of DONGAL, who was not only an excellent Man, but an excellent Prince, that both recovered what the others had lost, and victoriously traversed the Northern Counties of England, and a great part of Ireland; of whose King a Minor, and in his power, he generously made no advantage, but settled his Country, and provided faithful and able Guardians for him. These things justly yield him the name of Great. DONALD Son of CONSTANTIN the Second, by his recommendation, succeeded in his Power and Virtues, notwithstanding some say he was removed by Poison. Next was CONSTANTIN the the Third, Son of ETHUS, an unstable person, who assisted the Danes, which none of his Predecessors would do; and after they had deserted him basely, yet yielded them Succours, consisting of the chief of the Scots Nobility, which with the whole Danish Army were routed by the Saxons. This struck him so, that he retired among the Culdies (which were as the Greece Caloyers, or Romish Monks at this day) and there buried himself alive. After him was MILCOM, Son of DONALD the Third, who though a good Prince, and well skilled in the Arts of Peace, was slain by a Conspiracy of those to whom his Virtue was burdensome. His Successor was INDULF (by what Title I find not) who fight with the Danes that with a Navy unexpectedly came into the Frith, was slain. DUF his Son succeeds, famous for an Accident, which if it be true, seems nearly distant from a Fable. He was suddenly afflicted by a sweeting Disease, by which he painfully languished, yet no body could find the cause, till at last a Girl, that had scattered some words, after torments, confessed that her Mother and some other women had made an Image of Wax, which, as it wasted, the King should waste, by sweeting much: the place being diligently searched, it was found accordingly; so the Image being broke, he instantly recovered. That which disturbed his five years' Reign was the turbulence of the Northern People, whom, when he had reduced and taken, with intent to make exemplary Punishment, DONALD the Commander of the Castle of Forres, where he than lay, interceded for some of them; but being repulsed, and exasperated by his Wife, after he had made all his Servants drunk, slew him in his Bed, and buried him under a little Bridg (lest the cutting of Turfs might discover a Grave) near Kilros' Abbey; though others say, he turned aside a River, and after he had buried him, suffered it to take its former Channel. CULEN the Son of INDULF, by the Election of Parliament, or Convention of the People, succeeded, good only in this one Action, of enquiring and punishing his Predecessor's Death; but after, by the neglect of Discipline, and the exquisiteness of his Vices, became a Monster, and so continued three years, till being weakened and exhausted in his Body, and vexed with perpetual Diseases, he was summoned by the Parliament, and in the way was slain by a Thane (so they then called Lieutenants of Counties) whose Daughter he had ravished.  
THAN came KENETH, Brother to DUF (though the forepart of his Reign was totally unlike his) who being invaded by the Danes, beat them in that famous Battle, which was won by the three HAYS, Husbandmen (from whom all the HAYS now give three Shields Gules) who with their Sythes reinforced the lost Battle; but in his latter time he lost this reputation, by poisoning MILCOLM Son of DUF, to preserve the Crown for a Son of his Name, though of less merit (for says BUCHANAN, They use to choose the fittest, not the nearest) which being done, he got ordained in a Parliament, that the Succession should be lineal, the Son should inherit, and be called Prince of Scots; and if he were a Minor, be governed by some wise Man (here comes the pretence of Succession, whereas before it was clearly Elective) and at fifteen he should choose his Guardian himself. But the Divine Vengeance, which seldom, even in this life, passes by Murder, overtook him; for he was ensnared by a Lady, whose Son he had caused to be executed, and slain by an Arrow out of an Ambush she had laid. CONSTANTIN the Son of CULEN, notwithstanding all the Artifice of KENNETH, by his reasoning against the Act, persuaded most of the Nobility to make him King, so that MILCOLM the Son of KENNETH and he made up two Factions, which tore the Kingdom; till at length MILCOLMS Bastard Brother (himself being in England assisting the Danes) fought him, routed his Army, and with the loss of his own Life took away his, they dying of mutual Wounds. GRIME, of whose Birth they do not certainly agree, was chosen by the Constantinians, who made a good Party; but at the Intercession of FORARD (an accounted Rabbi of the times) they at last agreed, GRIME being to enjoy the Kingdom for his Life, after which MILCOLUMB should succeed, his Father's Law standing in force. But he, after declining into Lewdness, Cruelty and Spoil (as Princes drunk with Greatness and Prosperity use to do) the People called back MILCOLUMB, who rather receiving Battle than giving it (for it was upon Ascension-day, his principal Holiday) routed his Forces, wounded himself, took him, pulled out his Eyes, which altogether made an end of his Life, all Factions and Humours being reconciled.  
MILCOLUMB, who with various Fortune fought many signal Battles with the Danes, that under their King SUENO had invaded Scotland, in his latter time grew to such Covetousness and Oppression, that all Authors agree he was murdered, though they disagree about the manner; some say by Confederacy with his Servants; some by his Kinsmen and Competitors; some by the Friends of a Maid whom he had ravished. DONALD his Grandchild succeeded, a good-natured and inactive Prince, who with a Stratagem of sleepy Drink destroyed a Danish Army that had invaded and distressed him; but at last being ensnared by his Kinsman MACBETH (who was pricked forward by Ambition, and a former Vision of three Women of a sour human shape, whereof one saluted him Thane of Angus, another Earl of Murray, the third King) he was beheaded.  
THE Severity and Cruelty of MACBETH was so known, that both the Sons of the murdered King were forced to retire, and yield to the times, while he courted the Nobility with Largesses. The first ten years he spent virtuously, but the remainder was so savage and tyrannical, that MACDUF Thane of Fife fled into England to MILCOLM Son of DONALD, who by his persuasions, and the assistance of the King of England, entered Scotland, where he found such great accessions to his Party, that MACBETH was forced to fly; his Death is hid in such a mist of Fables, that it is not certainly known.  
MILCOLUMB, the third of that name, now being quietly seated, was the first that brought in those gay inventions and distinctions of Honours, as Dukes, Marquesses (that now are become so airy, that some carry them from places to which they have as little relation as to any Island in America, and others from Cottages and Dovecotes) His first trouble was FORFAR, MACKBETH'S Son, who claimed the Crown, but was soon after cut of. Some War he had with that WILLIAM whom we call falsely the Conqueror, some with his own People, which by the intercession of the Bishops were ended. At length quarrelling with our WILLIAM the Second, he laid siege to Alnwick Castle, which being forced to extremity, a Knight came out with the Keys on a Spear, as if it were to present them to him, and and to yield the Castle; but he, not with due heed receiving them, was run through the Ey and slain. Some from hence derive the name of PIERCY (how truly I know not) His Son and Successor EDWARD following his Revenge too hotly, received some Wounds, of which within a few days he died.  
DONALD BANE (that is in Irish, White) who had fled into the Isles for fear of MACBETH, promised them to the King of Norway, if he would procure him to be King, which was done with ease, as the times than stood; but this Usurper being hated by the People, who generally loved the memory of MILCOLM, they se● DUNCAN, MILCOLM'S Bastard, against him, who forced him to retire to his Iles. DUNCAN a military Man showed himself unfit for Civil Government; so that DONALD, waiting all advantages, caused him to be beheaded, and restored himself: But his Reign was so turbulent, the Islanders and English invading on both sides, that they called in EDGAR Son of MILCOLM, then in England, who with small Assistances possessed himself▪ all Men deserting DONALD, who being taken and brought to the King, died in Prison. EDGAR secure by his good Qualitys, and strengthened by the English Alliance, spent nine years virtuously and peaceably; and gave the People leave to breathe and rest, after so much trouble and bloodshed. His Brother ALEXANDER, surnamed ACER, or the Fierce, succeeded; the beginning of whose Reign being disturbed by a Rebellion, he speedily met them at the Spey, which being a swift River, and the Enemy on the other side, he offered himself to ford it on Horseback: but ALEXANDER CAR taking the Employment from him, forded the River with such Courage, that the Enemy fled, and were quiet the rest of his Reign. Some say he had the name of ACER, because some Conspirators being by the fraud of the Chamberlain admitted into his Chamber, he casually waking, first slew the Chamberlain, and after him six of the Conspirators, not ceasing to pursue the rest, till he had slain most of them with his own hands: this with the building of some Abbeys, and seventeen years' Reign, is all we know of him.  
HIS Brother DAVID succeeded, one whose profuse Prodigality upon the Abbeys brought the Revenue of the Crown (so prevalent was the Superstition of those days) almost to nothing. He had many Battles with our STEPHEN about the Title of MAUD the Empress; and having lost his excellent Wife and hopeful Son in the flower of their days, he left the Kingdom to his Grandchilds, the eldest whereof was MILCOLUMB a simple King, baffled and led up and down into France by our HENRY the Second; which brought him to such contemt, that he was vexed by frequent Insurrections, especially them of Murray, whom he almost extirpated. The latter part of his Reign was spent in building Monasteries; he himself tied by a Vow of Chastity, would never marry, but left for his Successor his Brother WILLIAM, who expostulating for the Earldom of Northumberland, gave occasion for a War, in which he was surprised and taken, but afterwards released upon his doing Homage for the Kingdom of Scotland to King HENRY, of whom he acknowledged to hold it, and putting in caution the Castles of Roxboro (once strong, now nothing but Ruins) Barwic, Edinburg, Sterling, all which notwithstanding was after released by RICHARD Coeur de Lion, who was then upon an Expedition to the Holy War; from whence returning, both he and DAVID Earl of Huntingdon, Brother to the King of Scots, were taken Prisoners. The rest of his Reign (except the rebuilding of St. Johnston, which had been destroyed by Waters, whereby he lost his eldest Son, and some Treaties with our King JOHN) was little worth memory; only you will wonder that a Scotish King could reign forty nine years, and yet die in peace.  
ALEXANDER his Son succeeded, famous for little, except some Expeditions against our King JOHN, some Insurrections, and a Reign two years longer than his Father's. His Son was the third of that name, a Boy of eight years old, whose Minority was infested with the turbulent CUMMINS; who when he was of age, being called to account, not only refused to appear, but surprised him at Sterling, governing him at their pleasure. But soon after he was awaked by a furious Invasion of ACHO King of Norway (under the pretence of some Islands given him by MACBETH) whom he forced to accept a Peace, and spent the latter part amidst the Turbulencies of the Priests (drunk at that time with their Wealth and Ease) and at last having seen the continued Funerals of his Sons DAVID, ALEXANDER, his Wife, and his Daughter, he himself with a fall from Horse broke his neck, leaving of all his Race only a Grandchild by his Daughter, which died soon after.  
THIS Man's Family being extinguished, they were forced to run to another Line, which, that we may see how happy an expedient immediate Succession is for the Peace of the Kingdom, and what Miseries it prevents, I shall, as briefly and as pertinently as I can, set down.  
DAVID, Brother to K. WILLIAM, had three Daughters, MARGARET married to ALLAN Lord of Galloway, ISABEL married to ROBERT BRUCE Lord of Annandale and Cleveland, ADA married to HENRY HASTINGS Earl of Huntingdon. Now ALLAN begot on his Wife DORNADILLA, married to JOHN BALLIOL afterwards King of Scotland, and two other Daughters. BRUCE on his Wife got ROBERT BRUCE Earl of Carick, having married the Heretrix thereof. As for HUNTINGDON he desisted his claim. The question is, whether BALLIOL in right of the eldest Daughter, or BRUCE being come of the second (but a Man) should have the Crown, he being in the same degree, and of the more worthy Sex. The Controversy being tossed up and down, at last was referred to EDWARD, the First of that name, King of England. He thinking to fish in these troubled waters, stirs up eight other Competitors, the more to entangle the business, and with twenty four Counsellors, half English, half Scots, and abundance of Lawyers fit enough to perplex the matter, so handled the business, after cunning delays, that at length he secretly tampers with BRUCE (who was then conceived to have the better right of the business) that if he would acknowledge the Crown of him, he would adjudge it for him; but he generously answering, that he valued a Crown at a less rate, than for it to put his Country under a foreign Yoke: He made the same motion to BALLIOL, who accepted it; and so we have a King again, by what Right we all see; but it is good reason to think that Kings, come they by their Power never so unjustly, may justly keep it.  
BALLIOL having thus got a Crown, as unhappily kept it; for no sooner was he crowned, and had done homage to EDWARD, but the ABERNETHIES having slain MACDUF Earl of Fife, he not only pardoned them, but gave them a piece of Land in controversy: whereupon MACDUF'S Brother complains against him to EDWARD, who makes him rise from his Seat in Parliament, and go to the Bar: He hereupon enraged, denies EDWARD assistance against the French, and renounces his Homage. EDWARD immediately comes to Berwi●, takes and kills seven thousand, most of the Nobility of Fife and Lowthian, and afterwards gave them a great Defeat at Dunbar, whose Castle instantly surrendered. After this he marched to Montrose, where BALLIOL resigned himself and Crown, all the Nobility giving homage to EDWARD. BALLIOL is sent Prisoner to London, and from thence, after a years detention, into France. While EDWARD was possessed of all Scotland, one WILLIAM WALLACE arose, who being a private man, bestirred himself in the Calamity of his Country, and gave the English several notable foils. EDWARD coming again with an Army, beat him that was already overcome with Envy and Emulation as well as Power; upon which he laid by his Command, and never acted more, but only in slight Incursions. But the English being beaten at Roslin, EDWARD comes in again, taketh Sterling, and makes them all render Homage; but at length BRUCE seeing all his Promises nothing but smoke, enters into League with CUMMIN to get the Kingdom: but being betrayed by him to EDWARD, he stabbed CUMMIN at Drumfreis, and made himself King. This man, though he came with disadvantage, yet wanted neither Patience, Courage, nor Conduct; so that after he had miserably lurked in the Mountains, he came down, and gathering together some Force, gave our EDWARD the Second such a defeat near Sterling, as Scotland never gave the like to our Nation: and continued the War with various fortune with the Third, till at last Age and Leprosy brought him to his Grave. His Son DAVID, a Boy of eight years, inherited that which he with so much danger obtained, and wisdom kept. In his Minority he was governed by THOMAS RANDOLF Earl of Murray, whose severity in punishing was no less dreaded than his Valour had been honoured. But he soon after dying of poison; and EDWARD BALLIOL, Son of JOHN, coming with a Fleet, and strengthened with the assistance of the English, and some Robbers, the Governor the Earl of Mar was routed, so that BALLIOL makes himself King, and DAVID was glad to retire into France. Amidst these Parties (EDWARD the Third backing BALLIOL) was Scotland miserably torn, and the BRUCES in a manner extinguished, till ROBERT (after King) with them of Argile and his own Family and Friends, began to renew the claim, and bring it into a War again; which was carried on by ANDREW MURRAY the Governor, and afterwards by himself: So that DAVID, after nine years' banishment, durst return, where making frequent Incursions, he at length in the fourth year of his return marched into England, and in the Bishopric of Durham was routed, and fled to an obscure Bridg, showed to this day by the Inhabitants. There he was by JOHN COPLAND taken prisoner, where he continued nine years, and in the thirty ninth year of his Reign he died.  
ROBERT his Sister's Son, whom he had intended to put by, succeeds, and first brought the STUARTS (which at this day are a plague to the Nation) into play. This man after he was King, whether it were Age or Sloth, did little; but his Lieutenants and the English were perpetually in action. He left his Kingdom to JOHN his Bastard Son by the Lady MORE his Concubine, whom he married, either to legitimat the three Children (as the manner was then) he had by her, or else for old Acquaintance, his Wife and her Husband dying much about time. This JOHN would be crowned by the name of ROBERT (his own, they say, being unhappy for Kings) a wretched inactive Prince, lame, and only governed by his brother WALTER, who having DAVID the Prince upon complaint of some Exorbitancies delivered to his care, caused him to be starved; upon which the King intending to send his Son JAMES into France, the Boy was taken at Flamburg, and kept by our HENRY the Fourth: upon the hearing of which his Father swooned, and soon after died. His Reign was memorable for nothing but his breaking with GEORGE Earl of March (to whose Daughter, upon the payment of a great part of her Portion which he never would repay, he had promised his Son DAVID for a Husband) to take the Daughter of DOUGLAS who had a greater; which occasioned the Earl of March to make many inroads with our HENRY HOTSPUR; and a famous Duel of three hundred men apiece, whereof on the one side ten remained, and on the other one, which was the only way to appease the deadly Feuds of these two Families. The Interreign was governed by ROBERT, who enjoying the Power he had too much coveted, little minded the Liberty of his Nephew, only he sent some auxiliaries into France, who, they say, behaved themselves worthily; and his slothful Son MORDAC, who making his Sons so bold with Indulgence, that one of them killed a Falcon on his fist, which he denied to give him: he in revenge procured the Parliament to ransom the King, who had been eighteen years a Prisoner. This JAMES was the First of that name, and though he was an excellent Prince, yet had a troublesome Reign; first, in regard of a great Pension raised for his Ransom; next, for domestic Commotions; and lastly, for raising of Money; which, though the Revenue was exhausted, was called Covetousness. This having offended ROBERT GRAHAM, he conspired with the Earl of Athol, slew him in his Chamber, his Wife receiving two wounds, endeavouring to defend him.  
THIS JAMES left the Second, a Boy of six years, whose Infancy, by the misguidance of the Governor, made a miserable People, and betrayed the Earl DOUGLAS to death, and almost all that great Family to ruin; but being supplanted by another Earl DOUGLAS, the King in his just age suffered Minority under him, who upon displeasure rebelled, and was killed by the King's own hand. Afterwards having his middle years perpetually molested with civil Broils, yet going to assist the Duke of York against HENRY the Sixth, he was diverted by an English Gentleman that counterfeited himself a Nuncio (which I mention out of a Manuscript, because I do not remember it in our Stories) and broke up his Army. Soon after besieging Roxburg, he was slain by the bursting of a Cannon in the twenty ninth year of his Age.  
JAMES the Second left a Boy of seven Years, governed by his Mother, and afterwards by the BOYDS; thro' the persuasions of Astrologers and Witches, to whom he was strongly addicted, he declined to Cruelty; which so enraged the Nobility, that, headed by his Son, they conspired against him, routing his Forces near Sterling, where he flying to a Mill, and ask for a Confessor, a Priest came, who told him, that though he was no good Priest, yet he was a good Leech, and with that stabbed him to the heart. A Parliament approved his death, and ordered Indemnitys to all that had fought against him.  
JAMES the Fourth, a Boy of fifteen Years, is made King, governed by the Murderers of his Father; a prodigal, vainglorious Prince, slain at Floddon Field, or, as some suppose, at Kelsy by the HUMES, which (as the Manuscript alleges) seems more probable, in regard that the Iron Belt (to which he added a Ring every Year) which he wore in repentance for the death of his Father, was never found, and there were many, the day of Battle, habited like him. His Successor was his Son JAMES, the Fifth of that name, a Boy of not above two years of age; under whose Minority, what by the misgovernment of Tutors, and what by the Factions of the Nobility, Scotland was wasted almost into Famine and Solitude: however in his just Age he proved an industrious Prince, yet could not so satisfy the Nobility, but that he and they continued in a mutual hate, till that barbarous execution of young HAMILTON so filled him with Remorse, that he dreamed he came and cut of his two Arms, and threatened after to cut of his Head. And he displeased the People so much, that he could not make his Army fight with the English then in Scotland; whereupon he died of grief, having first heard the death of his two Sons, who died at the instant of his Dream, and leaving a Daughter of five days old, whom he never saw.  
THIS was that MARY under whose Minority (by the weakness of the Governor, and ambition of the Cardinal) the Kingdom felt all those Woes that are threatened to them whose King is a Child; till at length the prevalency of the English Arms (awaked for her cause) brought the great design of sending her into France to perfection: So at five Years old she was transported, and at fifteen married to the Dolphin FRANCIS, after King; while her Mother, a Daughter of the GUISE, in her Regency, exercised all Rage against the Professors of the pure Religion then in the dawn. FRANCIS after two Years left her a childless Widow, so that at eighteen she returned into Scotland to succeed her Mother (than newly dead) in her Exorbitancies.  
I HAD almost forgot to tell, that this young Couple in the transport of their nuptial Solemnitys took the Arms and Title of England; which indiscrete Ambition we may suppose first quickened the jealousy of ELIZABETH against her, which after kindled so great a flame.  
IN Scotland she showed what a strange influence lose Education has upon Youth, and the weaker Sex. All the French Effeminacies came over with her, and the Court lost that little Severity which was left. DAVID RIZIO, an Italian Fiddler, was the only Favourite, and it is too much feared, had those enjoyments which no Woman can give but she that gives away her Honour and Chastity.  
BUT a little after, HENRY Lord Darnly coming with MATTHEW Earl of Lenox, his Father, into Scotland, she cast an eye upon him, and married him. Whether it were to strengthen her pretention to England, he being come of HENRY the Seventh's Daughter, as we shall tell anon, or to colour her Adulteries, and hid the shame of an Impregnation (though some have whispered, that she never conceived, and that the Son was supposititious) or some Frenzy of Affection drew her that way; certain it is she soon declined her Affection to her Husband, and increased it to DAVID (he being her perpetual Companion at board, and managing all Affairs, while the King with a contemptible Train was sent away) insomuch that some of the Nobility that could not digest this, entered a Conspiracy, which the King headed, and slew him in her Chamber.  
THIS turned all her neglect of the King into rage, so that her chiefest business was to appease her Favourites Ghost with the slaughter of her Husband; poison was first attempted, but it being (it seems) too weak, or his Youth overcoming it, that expectation failed. But the Devil and BOTHWEL furnished her with another that succeeded; she so entices him, being so sick that they were forced to bring him in a Horslitter to Edinburg, where she cherished him extremely, till the credulous young man began to lay aside suspicion, and to hope better: So she puts him into a ruinous house near the Palace, from whence no news can be had, brings in her own bed, and lies in the house with him; and at length when the design was ripe, causes him one Sunday night, with his Servant, to be strangled, thrown out of the Window, and the house to be blown up with Gunpowder, her own rich Bed having been before secretly conveyed away. This and other performances made her favour upon BOTHWEL so hot, that she must marry him; the only obstacle was, he had a Wife already; but she was compelled to sue for a Divorce, which (so great Persons being concerned) it was a wonder it should be granting so long as ten days. Well, she marrys; but the more honest Nobility amazed at those Exorbitancies, assemble together, and with Arms in their hands begin to expostulat. The newmarryed Couple are forced to make back Southwards; where finding but slender assistance, and the Queen foolishly coming from Dunbar to Leith, was glad at last to delay a parley till her Dear was escaped; and then (clad in an old tattered coat) to yield herself a Prisoner.  
BEING brought to Edinburg, and used rather with hate of her former Enormitys, than pity of her present Fortune, she received a Message, that she must either resign the Crown to her Son JAMES (that was born in the time of her marriage with DARNLY) or else they would proceed to another Election, and was forced to obey. So the Child then in his Cradle was acknowleged JAMES the Sixth, better known afterwards by the Title of Great Britain.  
THE wretched Mother flying after into England, was entertained (though with a Guard) by Queen ELIZABETH; but after that being suborned by the Papists, and exasperated by the GUIZES, she entered into Plots and Machinations, so inconsistent with the Safety of England, that by an Act of Parliament she was condemned to death, which she received by a Hatchet at Fotheringay Castle.  
THE Infancy of her Son was attended with those domestic Evils that accompany the Minority of Kings. In his Youth he took to Wife the Daughter of Denmark (a Woman I hear little of, saving the Character SALLUST gives SEMPRONIA, that she could dance better than became a virtuous Woman) with whom he supposing the Earl GOWRY too much in League, caused him and his Brother to be slain at their own house whither he was invited; he giving out, that they had an intent to murder him; and that by miracle and the assistance of some men (whom he had instructed for that purpose, and taught their tale) he escaped. For this Deliverance (or to say better, Assassination) he blasphemed God with a solemn Thanksgiving once a Year all the remainder of his Life.  
WELL had it been for us, if our Forefathers had laid hold of that happy opportunity of ELIZABETH'S Death (in which the TEUTHORS took a period) to have performed that which, perhaps in due punishment, has cost us so much blood and sweat; and not have bowed under the sway of a Stranger, disdained by the most generous and wise at that time, and only supported by the Faction of some, and the Sloth of others; who brought but a slender Title, and (however the flattery of the times cried him up for a SOLOMON) weak Commendations for such an advancement.  
HIS Title stood thus, MARGARET, eldest Daughter to HENRY the Seventh, was married to JAMES the Fourth, whose Son JAMES the Fifth had MARY the Mother of JAMES the Sixth. MARGARET after her first Husband's death, marrys ARCHIBALD DOUGLAS Earl of Angus, who upon her begot MARGARET Wife of MATTHEW Earl of Lenox, and Mother of that HENRY DARNLY, whose tragical End we just now mentioned. Now upon this slender Title, and our internal Dissensions (for the Cecilians and Essexians, for several ends, made perpetual Applications) got JAMMY from a Revenue of 30000 l. to one of almost two Millions, though there were others that had as fair pretences (and what else can any of them make?) the Statute of 25 Edw. 3. expressly excluding Foreigners from the Crown: and so the Children of CHARLES BRANDON by MARY the second Daughter, Dowager of France, being next to come in. And the Lady ARABELLA being sprung from a third Husband (the Lord STUART) of the said MARGARET, and by a Male Line, carried surely so formidable a pretention (it should seem) that even that Iniquity which was personally inherent to her, made her days very unhappy, and for most part captive, and her death ('tis thought) somewhat too early; so cruel are the Persecutions of cowardly minds, even against the weakest and most unprotected Innocence.  
AND indeed his Right to the Crown was so unsatisfactory even to the most judicious of those days, that TOBY MATTHEWS having suit about some Privileges which he claimed to his Bishopric (which was then Durham) wherein the King opposed him; and having one day stated the Case before some of his Friends, who seemed to approve of it; yes, says he, I could wish he had but half so good a Title to the Crown. And 'tis known that some Speeches of Sir WALTER RAWLEY, too generous and English for the times, was that which brought him to Trial and Condemnation for a feigned Crime; and afterwards so facilitated that barbarous Design of GUNDAMAR, to cut of his Head for a Crime, for which he was condemned fourteen years before, and which by the Commissions he after received (according to the opinion of the then Lord Chancellor, and the greatest Lawyers) was in Law pardoned.  
THIS may appear besides our purpose; but we could not sever this consideration, unless we would draw him with a half face, and leave as much in umbrage as we expressed. That which most solemnised his Person was, first the consideration of his adhering to the Protestant Religion; whereas we are to consider that those slight Velitations he had with BELLARMIN and the Romanists, tended rather to make his own Authority more intrinsically intense and venerable, than to confute any thing they said: for he had before shaked them of as to foreign Jurisdiction; and for matter of Popery, it appeared in his latter time that he was no such enemy to it, both by his own compliances with the Spanish Ambassadors, the design of the Spanish Match (in which his Son was personally embarked) and the slow assistances sent to his Daughter, in whose safety and protection Protestantism was at that time so much concerned.  
FOR his Knowledge, he had some glance and nibblings, which the Severity of the excellent BUCHANAN forced into him in his younger time, and after conversation somewhat polished. But though I bear not so great a contemt to his other Works, as BEN JOHNSON did to his Poetry, yet if they among many others were going to the fire, they would not be one of the first I should rescue, as possibly expecting a more severe and refined Judgement in many others; and knowing that he that had so many able Wits at command, might easily give their Oracles thro' his Mouth. But suppose the things generous and fit to live (as I am not yet convinced) yet what commendation is this to a King, who should have other business than spinning and weaving fine Theories, and engaging in School Chiquaneries? which was well understood by HENRY the Fourth, who hearing some men celebrat him with these Attributes; yes (answered he, very tartly) He is a fine King, and writes little Books.  
'TIS true, he was a good Drol, and possibly after Greece Wine somewhat factious: But of his substantial and heroic Wisdom I have not heard any great Instances. He himself used to brag of his Kingcraft, which was not to render his People happy, and to prosecute the ends of a good King, but to screw up the Prerogative, divert Parliaments from the due disquisition and prosecution of their Freedoms, and to break them up at pleasure; and indeed his parting with the Cautionary Towns of the Low Countries, and that for so small a Sum, showed him a Person not so quicksighted, or unfit to be overreached.  
FOR his peaceable Reign, honourable and just Quarrels he wanted not; but sloth and cowardice witheld him: and indeed the ease and luxury of those times fomented and nourished those lurking and pestilent humours, which afterwards so dangerously broke out in his Son's Reign.  
WE shall not trouble his Ashes with the mention of his personal Faults; only, if we may compare God's Judgements with apparent Sins, we may find the latter end of his Life neither fortunate nor comfortable to him. His Wife distasted by him, and some say, languishing of a soul Disease; his eldest Son dying with too violent symtoms of Poison, and that, as is feared, by a hand too much allied; his second (against whom he ever had a secret antipathy) scarce returned from a mad and dangerous Voyage; his Daughter (all that was left of that Sex) banished, with her numerous Issue, out of her Husband's Dominion, and living in miserable Exile; and lastly, himself dying of a violent death by poison, in which his Son was more than suspected to have a hand, as may be inferred from BUCKINGHAM'S Plea, that he did it by the Command of the Prince, and CHARLES' dissolution of the Parliament that took in hand to examine it; and lastly, his indifferency at Buckingham's death (though he pretended all love to him alive) as glad to be rid of so dangerous and so considerable a Partner of his Gild. Yet the mitred Parasites of those times could say, that one went to Heaven in Noah's Ark, the other in Elisha's Chariot, he dying of a pretended Fever, she (as they said) of a Dropsy.  
CHARLES having now obtained his Brother's Inheritance, carried himself in managing of it like one that gained it as he did. The first of his Acts was that glorious attemt upon the I'll of Rhee. The next, that Noble and Christian betraying of Rochel, and consequently in a manner the whole Protestant Interest in France. The middle of the Reign was heightening of Prerogative and Prelacy, and conforming our Churches to the pattern of Rome; till at last just Indignation brought his Subjects of Scotland into England, and so forced him to call a Parliament: which though he shamelessly says in the first line of the Book, called his, was out of his own inclination to Parliaments, yet how well he liked them, may appear by his first tampering with his own Army in the North, to surprise and dissolve them; then with the Scots, who at that time were Court proof; then raising up the Irish Rebellion, which has wasted millions of Lives; and lastly, his open secession from Westminster, and hostility against the two Houses, which maintained a first and second sharp War, that had almost ruined the Nation, had not Providence in a manner immediately interposed and rescued us to Liberty, and made us such signal Instruments of his Vengeance, that all wicked Kings may tremble at the example.  
IN a word, never was Man so resolute and obstinate in a Tyranny; never People more strangely besotted with it. To paint the Image of DAVID with his face, and blasphemously to parallel him with CHRIST, would make one at first thought think him a Saint: But to compare his Protestations and Actions; his Actions of the Day, his Actions of the Night; his Protestant Religion, and his courting of the Pope; and obedience to his Wife; we may justly say, he was one of the most consummate in the Arts of Tyranny that ever was. And it could be no other than God's hand that arrested him in the height of his Designs and Greatness, and cut off him and his Family, making good his own Imprecations on his own Head.  
OUR Scene is again in Scotland, which has accepted his Son, whom for distinction sake we will be content to call CHARLES the Second. Certainly these People were strangely blind as to God's Judgement perpetually poured out upon a Family; or else wonderfully addicted to their own Interest, to admit the spray of such a stock; one that has so little to commend him, and so great improbability to further their Designs and Happiness; a Popish Education if not Religion too, however for the present he may seem to dissemble it; France, the Jesuits, and his Mother, good means of such an improvement; the dangerous Maxims of his Father, besides the Revenge he owes his Death, of which he will never totally acquit the Scots; his Hate to the whole Nation; his Sense of MONTROSE'S Death; his backwardness to come to them till all other means failed (both his forens begged Assistances, his Propositions to the Pope, and Commissions to MONTROSE) and last, his late running away to his old Friends in the North: so that any man may see his present compliance to be but histrionical and forced, and that as soon as he has led them into the Snare, and got power into his own hands, so as that he may appear once more barefaced, he will be a scourge upon them for their gross Hypocrisy, and leave them a sad Instance to all Nations, how dangerous it is to espouse such an Interest, against which God with so visible and severe a hand does fight, carried on by and for the support of a tyrannising Nobility and Clergy, and wherein the poor People are blindly led on by those affrighting (but false and ungrounded) pretensions of Perfidy and Perjury, and made instrumental with their own Estates and Blood towards enslaving and ruining themselves.   

THE Commonwealth OF OCEANA.  
To his HIGHNESS The Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland.  
— Quid rides? mutato nomine, de te  
Fabula narratur.— Horat.   

The Introduction, or Order of the Work.  

Pliny's Description of Oceana.  OCEANA is saluted by the Panegyrist after this manner; O the most blessed and fortunate of all Countries, OCEANA▪ How deservedly has Nature with the bounties of Heaven and Earth endued thee? Thy ever-fruitful Womb not closed with Ice, nor dissolved by the raging Star; where CERES and BACCHUS are perpetual Twins. Thy Woods are not the harbour of devouring Beasts, nor thy continual Verdure the ambush of Serpents, but the food of innumerable Herds and Flocks presenting thee their Shepherdess with distended Dugs, or golden Fleeces. The wings of thy Night involve thee not in the horror of darkness, but have still some white feather; and thy Day is (that for which we esteem Life) the longest. But this Ecstasy of PLINY (as is observed by BERTIUS) seems to allude as well to Marpesia and Panopea, now Provinces of this Commonwealth, as to Oceana itself.  

The Nature of the People.  TO speak of the People in each of these Countries, this of Oceana, for so soft a one, is the most martial in the whole World. Let States that aim at Greatness (says VERULAMIUS) take heed how their Nobility and Gentlemen multiply too fast, for that makes the common Subject grow to be a Peasant and base Swain driven out of heart, and in effect but a Gentleman's labourer; just as you may see in Coppice Woods, if you leave the Staddels too thick, you shall never have clean Underwood, but Shrubs and Bushes: So in Countries, if the Gentlemen be too many, the Commons will be base; and you will bring it to that at last, that not the hundredth Poll will be sit for a Helmet, specially as to the Infantry, which is the nerve of an Army, and so there will be great Population and little Strength. This of which I speak has been no where better seen than by comparing of Oceana and France, whereof Oceana, though far less in Territory and Population, has been nevertheless an overmatch, in regard the middle People of Oceana make good Soldiers, which the Peasants in France do not In which words VERULAMIUS (as MACHIAVELLI has done before him) harps much upon a string which he has not perfectly tuned, and that is the balance of Dominion or Property: as it follows more plainly in his praise of the profound and admirable device of PANURGUS King of Oceana, in making Farms and Houses of Husbandry of a Standard; that is, maintained with such a proportion of Land to them, as may breed a Subject to live in convenient plenty, and no servile condition, and to keep the Blow in the hand of the owners, and not mere hirelings. And thus indeed (says he) you shall attain to VIRGIL'S Character 
* Terra potens armis atque ubere gleba.  which he gives of ancient Italy.  
BUT the Tillage bringing up a good Soldiery, brings up a good Commonwealth; which the Author in the praise of PANURGUS did not mind, nor PANURGUS in deserving that praise: for where the owner of the Blow comes to have the Sword too, he will use it in defence of his own; whence it has happened that the People of Oceana in proportion to their property have been always free. And the Genius of this Nation has ever had some resemblance with that of ancient Italy, which was wholly addicted to Commonwealths, and where Rome came to make the greatest account of her rustic Tribes, and to call her Consuls from the Blow; for in the way of Parliaments, which was the Government of this Realm, men of Country-lives have been still entrusted with the greatest Affairs, and the People have constantly had an aversion to the ways of the Court. Ambition loving to be gay, and to fawn, has been a Gallantry looked upon as having something in it of the Livery; and Husbandry, or the country way of Life, though of a grosser spinning, as the best stuf of a Commonwealth, according to ARISTOTLE, such a one being the most obstinate Assertors of her Liberty, and the least subject to Innovation or Turbulence. Wherefore till the Foundations (as will be hereafter showed) were removed, this People was observed to be the least subject to Shakes and Turbulence of any: Whereas Commonwealths, upon which the City Life has had the stronger influence, as Athens, have seldom or never been quiet; but at the best are found to have injured their own business by overdoing it. Whence the Urban Tribes of Rome, consisting of the Turba forensis, and Libertins that had received their Freedom by manumission, were of no reputation in comparison of the Rustics. It is true, that with Venice it may seem to be otherwise, in regard the Gentlemen (for so are all such called as have a right to that Government) are wholly addicted to the City Life: but then the Turba forensis, the Secretaries, Cittadini, with the rest of the Populace, are wholly excluded. Otherwise a Commonwealth, consisting but of one City, would doubtless be stormy, in regard that Ambition would be every man's trade: but where it consists of a Country, the Blow in the hands of the owner finds him a better calling, and produces the most innocent and steady Genius of a Commonwealth, such as is that of Oceana.  

The Nature of the Marpesians.  MARPESIA, being the Northern part of the same Island, is the dry Nurse of a populous and hardy Nation, but where the Staddels have been formerly too thick: whence their Courage answered not their hardiness, except in the Nobility, who governed that Country much after the manner of Poland; but that the King was not elective till the People received their Liberty, the yoke of the Nobility being broke by the Commonwealth of Oceana, which in grateful return is thereby provided with an inexhaustible Magazine of auxiliaries.  

The Nature of the Panopeans.  PANOPEA, the soft Mother of a slothful and pusillanimous People, is a neighbour Island, anciently subjected by the Arms of Oceana; since almost depopulated for shaking the Yoke, and at length replanted with a new Race. But (thro' what virtues of the Soil, or vice of the Air soever it be) they come still to degenerate. Wherefore seeing it is neither likely to yield men fit for Arms, nor necessary it should; it had been the Interest of Oceana so to have disposed of this Province, being both rich in the nature of the Soil, and full of commodious Ports for Trade, that it might have been ordered for the best in relation to her Purse: which in my opinion (if it had been thought upon in time) might have been best done by planting it with Jews, allowing them their own Rites and Laws; for that would have brought them suddenly from all parts of the World, and in sufficient numbers. And though the Jews be now altogether for Merchandise, yet in the Land of Canaan (except since their exile from whence they have not been Landlords) they were altogether for Agriculture; and there is no cause why a man should doubt, but having a fruitful Country, and excellent Ports too, they would be good at both. Panopea well peopled, would be worth a matter of four millions dry rents; that is, besides the advantage of the Agriculture and Trade, which, with a Nation of that Industry, comes at least to as much more. Wherefore Panopea being farmed out to the Jews and their Heirs for ever, for the pay of a provincial Army to protect them during the term of seven years, and for two Millions annual Revenue from that time forward, besides the Customs which would pay the provincial Army, would have been a bargain of such advantage both to them and this Commonwealth, as is not to be found otherwise by either. To receive the Jews after any other manner into a Commonwealth, were to maim it: for they of all Nations never incorporate, but taking up the room of a Limb, are of no use or office to the body, while they suck the nourishment which would sustain a natural and useful Member.  
IF Panopea had been so disposed of, that Knapsack, with the Marpesian Auxiliary, had been an inestimable Treasure; the Situation of these Countries being Lands (as appears by Venice how advantageous such a one is to the like Government) seems to have been designed by God for a Commonwealth. And yet that, thro' the streitness of the place and 
The Situation of the Commonwealth of Oceana.  defect of proper Arms, can be no more than a Commonwealth for Preservation: whereas this, reduced to the like Government, is a Commonwealth for increase, and upon the mightiest foundation that any has been laid from the beginning of the World to this day. 
Illam arctâ capiens Neptunus compede stringit:  
Hanc autem glaucis captus complectitur ulnis.   
THE Sea gives law to the growth of Venice, but the growth of Oceana gives law to the Sea.  
THESE Countries having been anciently distinct and hostil Kingdoms, came by MORPHEUS the Marpesian (who succeeded by hereditary right to the Crown of Oceana) not only to be joined under one head; but to be cast, as it were by a charm, into that profound sleep, which, broken at length by the Trumpet of Civil War, has produced those effects, that have given occasion to the ensuing Discourse, divided into four parts.   


1. The Preliminaries, showing the Principles of Government.  
2. The Council of Legislators, showing the Art of making a Commonwealth.  
3. The Model of the Commonwealth of Oceana, showing the effect of such an Art.  
4. The Corollary, showing some Consequences of such a Government.    

The Preliminaries, showing the Principles of Government.  
JANOTTI, the most excellent Describer of the Commonwealth of Venice, divides the whole Series of Government into two Times or Periods. The one ending with the Liberty of Rome, which was the Course of Empire, as I may call it, of Ancient Prudence, first discovered to mankind by GOD himself in the Fabric of the Commonwealth of Israel, and afterwards picked out of his Footsteps in Nature, and unanimously followed by the Greecs and Romans. The other beginning with the Arms of CAESAR, which, extinguishing Liberty, were the Transition of Ancient into Modern Prudence, introduced by those Inundations of Huns, Goths, Vandals, Lombard's, Saxons, which, breaking the Roman Empire, deformed the whole face of the World with those ill features of Government, which at this time are become far worse in these western parts, except Venice, which escaping the hands of the Barbarians, by virtue of its impregnable Situation, has had its eye fixed upon ancient Prudence, and is attained to a perfection even beyond the Copy.  

Definitions of Government.  RELATION being had to these two times, Government (to define it de jure, or according to ancient Prudence) is an Art whereby a Civil Society of Men is instituted and preserved upon the Foundation of common Right or Interest; or (to follow ARISTOTLE and LIVY) It is the Empire of Laws, and not of Men.  
AND Government (to define it de facto, or according to modern Prudence) is an Art whereby some man, or some few men, subject a City or a Nation, and rule it according to his or their private Interest: which, because the Laws in such cases are made according to the interest of a man, or of some few Families, may be said to be the Empire of Men, and not of Laws.  
THE former kind is that which MACHIAVELLI (whose Books are neglected) is the only Politician that has gone about to retrieve; and 
Pag. 180. Pag. 377.  that LEVIATHAN (who would have his Book imposed upon the Universitys) goes about to destroy. For, It is (says he) another Error of ARISTOTLE'S Politics, that in a well-ordered Commonwealth not Men should govern, but the Laws. What man that has his natural senses, though he can neither write nor read, does not find himself governed by them he fears, and believes can kill or hurt him when he obeys not? Or, who believes that the Law can hurt him, which is but Words and Paper, without the Hands and Swords of men? I confess, that 
* Magistratus est lex armata.  the Magistrate upon his Bench is that to the Law, which a Gunner upon his Platform is to his Cannon. Nevertheless, I should not dare to argue with a man of any Ingenuity after this manner. A whole Army, though they can neither write nor read, are not afraid of a Platform, which they know is but Earth or Stone; nor of a Cannon, which without a hand to give fire to it, is but cold Iron; therefore a whole Army is afraid of one man. But of this kind is the Ratiocination of LEVIATHAN (as I shall show in divers places that come in my way) throout his whole Politics, 
Pag. 111.  or worse; as where he says of ARISTOTLE and of CICERO, of the Greecs, and of the Romans, who lived under popular States, that they derived those Rights not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them into their Books, out of the practice of their own Commonwealths, as Grammarians describe the Rules of Language out of Poets. Which is as if a man should tell famous HERVY, that he transcribed his Circulation of the Blood not out of the Principles of Nature, but out of the Anatomy of this or that Body.  
TO go on therefore with this preliminary Discourse, I shall divide it (according to the two definitions of Government relating to JANOTTI'S two times) into two parts. The First treating of the Principles of Government in general, and according to the Ancients: The Second treating of the late Governments of Oceana in particular, and in that of modern Prudence.  

Division of Government.  GOVERNMENT, according to the Ancients, and their learned Disciple MACHIAVELLI, the only Politician of later Ages, is of three kinds; The Government of One Man, or of the Better sort, or of the whole People: which by their more learned names are called Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy. These they hold, thro' their proneness to degenerate, to be all evil. For whereas they that govern should govern according to Reason, if they govern according to Passion, they do that which they should not do. Wherefore as Reason and Passion are two things, so Government by Reason is one thing, and the corruption of Government by Passion is another thing, but not always another Government: as a Body that is alive is one thing, and a Body that is dead is another thing, but not always another Creature, though the Corruption of one comes at length to be the Generation of another. The Corruption then of Monarchy is called Tyranny; that of Aristocracy, Oligarchy; and that of Democracy, Anarchy. But Legislators having found these three Governments at the best to be naught, have invented another consisting of a mixture of them all, which only is good. This is the Doctrine of the Ancients.  
BUT LEVIATHAN is positive, that they are all deceived, and that there is no other Government in Nature than one of the three; as also that the Flesh of them cannot stink, the names of their Corruptions being but the names of men's Fancies, which will be understood when we are shown which of them was Senatus Populusque Romanus.  
TO go my own way, and yet to follow the Ancients, the Principles of Government are twofold; Internal, or the goods of the Mind; and External, or the goods of Fortune. The goods of the Mind are 
Goods of the Mind and of Fortune.  natural or acquired Virtues, as Wisdom, Prudence, and Courage, etc. The goods of Fortune are Riches. There be goods also of the Body, as Health, Beauty, Strength; but these are not to be brought into account, upon this score, because if a Man or an Army acquires Victory or Empire, it is more from their Discipline, Arms, and Courage, than from their natural Health, Beauty, or Strength, in regard that a People conquered may have more of natural Strength, Beauty and Health, and yet find little remedy. The Principles of Government then are in the goods of the Mind, or in the goods of Fortune. To the goods of the Mind answers Authority; to the goods of Fortune, Power or Empire. 
Empire and Authority.  Wherefore LEVIATHAN, though he be right where he says that Riches are Power, is mistaken where he says that Prudence, or the reputation of Prudence, is Power: for the Learning or Prudence of a Man is no more Power than the Learning or Prudence of a Book or Author, which is properly Authority. A learned Writer may have Authority though he has no Power; and a foolish Magistrate may have Power, though he has otherwise no Esteem or Authority. The difference of these two is observed by LIVY in EVANDER, of whom he says, 
* Regebat magis Autoritate quam Imperio.  that he governed rather by the Authority of others, than by his own Power.  

Empire.  TO begin with Riches, in regard that Men are hung upon these, not of choice as upon the other, but of necessity and by the teeth: for as much as he who wants Bread is his Servant that will seed him; if a Man thus seeds a whole People, they are under his Empire.  

Division of Empire.  EMPIRE is of two kinds, Domestic and National, or Foren and Provincial.  


Domestic Empire.  
Dominion.   DOMESTIC Empire is founded upon Dominion.  
DOMINION is Property real or personal, that is to say, in Lands, or in Money and Goods.  

Balance in Lands.  LANDS, or the parts and parcels of a Territory, are held by the Proprietor or Proprietors, Lord or Lords of it, in some proportion; and such (except it be in a City that has little or no Land, and whose Revenue is in Trade) as is the proportion or balance of Dominion or Property in Land, such is the nature of the Empire.  

Absolute Monarchy.  IF one Man be sole Landlord of a Territory, or overbalance the People, for example three parts in four, he is Grand Signior: for so the Turk is called from his Property; and his Empire is absolute Monarchy.  

mixed Monarchy.  IF the Few or a Nobility, or a Nobility with the Clergy be Landlords, or overbalance the People to the like proportion, it makes the Gothic balance (to be shown at large in the second part of this Discourse) and the Empire is mixed Monarchy, as that of Spain, Poland, and late of Oceana.  

Popular Government.  AND if the whole People be Landlords, or hold the Lands so divided among them, that no one Man, or number of Men, within the compass of the Few or Aristocracy, overbalance them, the Empire (without the interposition of Force) is a Commonwealth.  


Tyranny.  
Oligarchy.  
Anarchy.   IF Force be interposed in any of these three cases, it must either frame the Government to the Foundation, or the Foundation to the Government; or holding the Government not according to the balance, it is not natural, but violent: and therefore if it be at the devotion of a Prince, it is Tyranny; if at the devotion of the Few, Oligarchy; or if in the power of the People, Anarchy. Each of which Confusions, the balance standing otherwise, is but of short continuance, because against the nature of the balance, which, not destroyed, destroys that which opposes it.  
BUT there be certain other Confusions, which, being rooted in the balance, are of longer continuance, and of worse consequence; as first, where a Nobility holds half the Property, or about that proportion, and the People the other half; in which case, without altering the balance, there is no remedy but the one must eat out the other: as the People did the Nobility in Athens, and the Nobility the People in Rome. Secondly, when a Prince holds about half the Dominion, and the People the other half (which was the case of the Roman Emperors, planted partly upon their military Colonies, and partly upon the Senate and the People) the Government becomes a very shambles both of the Princes and the People. Somewhat of this nature are certain Governments at this day, which are said to subsist by confusion. In this case, to fix the balance, is to entail misery: but in the three former, not to fix it, is to lose the Government. Wherefore it being unlawful in Turkey, that any should possess Land but the Grand Signior, the balance is fixed by the Law, and that Empire firm. Nor, though the Kings often fell, was the Throne of Oceana known to shake, until the Statute of Alienations broke the Pillars, by giving way to the Nobility to sell their Estates. 
* Si terra recedat, jonium Aegaeo frangat mare.  While Lacedaemon held to the division of Land made by LYCURGUS, it was immovable, but, breaking that, could stand no longer. This kind of Law fixing the balance in Lands is called Agrarian, and was first introduced by God himself, who divided the Land of Canaan to his People by Lots, and is of such virtue, that wherever it has held, that Government has not altered, except by consent; as in that unparallelled example of the People of Israel, when being in liberty they would needs choose a King. But without an Agrarian, Government, whether Monarchical, Aristocratical, or Popular, has no long Lease.  
AS for Dominion personal or in Money, it may now and then stir up a MELIUS or a MANLIUS, which, if the Commonwealth be not provided with some kind of Dictatorian Power, may be dangerous, though it has been seldom or never successful: because to Property producing Empire, it is required that it should have some certain root or foothold, which, except in Land, it cannot have, being otherwise as it were upon the Wing.  

Balance in Mony.  NEVERTHELESS, in such Cities as subsist mostly by Trade, and have little or no Land, as Holland and Genoa, the balance of Treasure may be equal to that of Land in the cases mentioned.  
BUT LEVIATHAN, though he seems to scew at Antiquity, following his furious Master CARNEADES, has caught hold of the public Sword, to which he reduces all manner and matter of Government; as, where he affirms this opinion [that any Monarch receives his Power 
Pag. 89.  by Covenant, that is to say, upon conditions] to proceed from the not understanding this easy truth, That Covenants being but Words and Breath, have no power to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any Man, but what they have from the public Sword. But as he said of the Law, that without this Sword it is but Paper; so he might have thought of this Sword, that without a Hand it is but cold Iron. The Hand which holds this Sword is the Militia of a Nation; and the Militia of a Nation is either an Army in the field, or ready for the field upon occasion. But an Army is a Beast that has a great belly, and must be fed; wherefore this will come to what Pastures you have, and what Pastures you have will come to the balance of Property, without which the public Sword is but a name or mere spitfrog. Wherefore to set that which LEVIATHAN says of Arms and of Contracts a little straighter; 
Arms and Contracts.  he that can graze this Beast with the great belly, as the Turk does his Timariot, may well deride him that imagines he received his Power by Covenant, or is obliged to any such toy: it being in this case only that Covenants are but Words and Breath. But if the Property of the Nobility, stocked with their Tenants and Retainers, be the pasture of that Beast, the Ox knows his Master's Crib; and it is impossible for a King in such a Constitution to reign otherwise than by Covenant; or if he breaks it, it is words that come to blows.  

Pag. 90.  BUT says he, when an Assembly of Men is made Sovereign, than no Man imagines any such Covenant to have passed in the Institution. But what was that by PUBLICOLA of appeal to the People, or that whereby the People had their Tribune's? ●y, says he, no body is so dull as to say, that the People of Rome made a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Sovereignty on such or such conditions; which not performed, the Romans might depose the Roman People. In which there be several remarkable things; for he holds the Commonwealth of Rome to have consisted of one Assembly, whereas it consisted of the Senate and the People; That they were not upon Covenant, whereas every Law enacted by them was a Covenant between them; That the one Assembly was made Sovereign, whereas the People who only were Sovereign, were such from the beginning, as appears by the ancient stile of their Covenants or Laws, 
* Censuere patres, jussit populus.  The Senate has resolved, the People have decreed; That a Council being made Sovereign, cannot be made such upon conditions, whereas the Decemvirs being a Council that was made Sovereign, was made such upon conditions; That all Conditions or Covenants making a Sovereign, the Sovereign being made, are void; whence 
Pag. 89.  it must follow that, the Decemviri being made, were ever after the lawful Government of Rome, and that it was unlawful for the Commonwealth of Rome to depose the Decemvirs; as also that CICERO, if he wrote otherwise out of his Commonwealth, did not write out of Nature. But to come to others that see more of this balance.  

B. 5, 3. 3, 9  YOU have ARISTOTLE full of it in divers places, especially where he says, that immoderate Wealth, as where One Man or the Few have greater Possessions than the Equality or the Frame of the Commonwealth will bear, is an occasion of Sedition, which ends for the greater part in Monarchy; and that for this cause the Ostracism has been received in divers places, as in Argos and Athens. But that it were better to prevent the growth in the beginning, than, when it has got head, to seek the remedy of such an evil.  

D. B. 1. c. 55.  MACCHIAVEL has missed it very narrowly and more dangerously; for not fully perceiving that if a Commonwealth be galled by the Gentry, it is by their overbalance, he speaks of the Gentry as hostil to popular Governments, and of popular Governments as hostil to the Gentry; and makes us believe that the People in such are so enraged against them, that where they meet a Gentleman they kill him: which can never be proved by any one example, unless in civil War; seeing that even in Switzerland the Gentry are not only safe, but in honour. But the Balance, as I have laid it down, though unseen by MACCHIAVEL, is that which interprets him, and that which he confirms by his Judgement in many others as well as in this place, where he concludes, That he who will go about to make a Commonwealth where there be many Gentlemen, unless he first destroys them, undertakes an Impossibility. And that he who goes about to introduce Monarchy where the condition of the People is equal, shall never bring it to pass, unless he cull out such of them as are the most turbulent and ambitious, and make them Gentlemen or Noblemen, not in name but in effect; that is, by enriching them with Lands, Castles, and Treasures, that may gain them Power among the rest, and bring in the rest to dependence upon themselves, to the end that they maintaining their Ambition by the Prince, the Prince may maintain his Power by them.  
WHEREFORE as in this place I agree with MACCHIAVEL, that a Nobility or Gentry, overbalancing a popular Government, is the utter bane and destruction of it; so I shall show in another, that a Nobility or Gentry, in a popular Government not overbalancing it, is the very life and soul of it.  

The right of the Militia stated.  BY what has been said, it should seem that we may lay aside further disputes of the public Sword, or of the right of the Militia; which, be the Government what it will, or let it change how it can, is inseparable from the overbalance in Dominion: nor, if otherwise stated by the ●aw or Custom (as in the Commonwealth of Rome, 
* consuls sine lege Curiata rem militarem attingere non potuerunt.  where the People having the Sword, the Nobility came to have the overbalance) avails it to any other end than destruction. For as a Building swaying from the Foundation must fall, so it fares with the Law swaying from Reason, and the Militia from the balance of Dominion. And thus much for the balance of National or Domestic Empire, which is in Dominion.  

The Balance of foreign Empire.  THE balance of Foren or Provincial Empire is of a contrary nature. A man may as well say, that it is unlawful for him who has made a fair and honest purchase to have Tenants, as for a Government that has made a just progress, and enlargement of itself, to have Provinces. But how a Province may be justly acquired, appertains to another place. In this I am to show no more than how or upon what kind of balance it is to be held; in order whereto I shall first show upon what kind of balance it is not to be held. It has been said, that national or independent Empire, of what kind soever, is to be exercised by them that have the proper balance of Dominion in the Nation; wherefore provincial or dependent Empire is not to be exercised by them that have the balance of Dominion in the Province, because that would bring the Government from Provincial and Dependent, to National and Independent. Absolute Monarchy, as that of the Turks, neither plants its People at home nor abroad, otherwise than as Tenants for life or at will; wherefore its National and Provincial Government is all one. But in Governments that admit the Citizen or Subject to Dominion in Lands, the richest are they that share most of the Power at home; whereas the richest among the Provincials, though native Subjects, or Citizens that have been transplanted, are least admitted to the Government abroad: for men, like flowers or roots being transplanted, take after the soil wherein they grow. Wherefore the Commonwealth of Rome, by planting Colonies of its Citizens within the bounds of Italy, took the best way of propagating itself, and naturalising the Country; whereas if it had planted such Colonies without the bounds of Italy, it would have alienated the Citizens, and given a root to Liberty abroad that might have sprung up forens, or savage, and hostil to her: wherefore it never made any such dispersion of itself and its strength, till it was under the yoke of the Emperors, who disburdening themselves of the People, as having less apprehension of what they could do abroad than at home, took a contrary course.  
THE Mamalucs (which till any man show me the contrary, I shall presume to have been a Commonwealth consisting of an Army, whereof the common Soldier was the People, the Commission Officer the Senate, and the General the Prince) were Foreigners, and by Nation Circassians, that governed Egypt; wherefore these never durst plant themselves upon Dominion, which growing naturally up into the National Interest, must have dissolved the foreign yoke in that Province.  
THE like in some sort may be said of Venice, the Government whereof is usually mistaken: for Venice, though it does not take in the People, never excluded them. This Commonwealth, the Orders whereof are the most Democratical or Popular of all others, in regard of the exquisite Rotation of the Senate, at the first institution took in the whole People; they that now live under the Government without participation of it, are such as have since either voluntarily chosen so to do, or were subdued by Arms. Wherefore the Subject of Venice is governed by Provinces; and the balance of Dominion not standing, as has been said, with Provincial Government: As the Mamalucs durst not cast their Government upon this balance in their Provinces, lest the National Interest should have rooted out the Foren; so neither dare the Venetians take in their Subjects upon this balance, lest the foreign Interest should root out the National (which is that of the 3000 now governing) and by diffusing the Commonwealth throout her Territories, lose the advantage of her Situation, by which in great part it subsists. And such also is the Government of the Spaniard in the Indies, to which he deputes Natives of his own Country, not admitting the Creolios' to the Government of those Provinces, though descended from Spaniards.  
BUT if a Prince or a Commonwealth may hold a Territory that is forens in this, it may be asked, why he may not hold one that is native in the like manner? To which I answer, because he can hold a forens by a native Territory, but not a native by a forens▪ and as hitherto I have shown what is not the provincial Balance, so by this answer it may appear what it is, namely the Overbalance of a native Territory to a forens; for as one Country balances itself by the distribution of Property according to the proportion of the same, so one Country overbalances another by advantage of divers kinds. For example, the Commonwealth of Rome overbalanced her Provinces by the vigour of a more excellent Government opposed to a crazier, or by a more exquisite Militia opposed to one inferior in Courage or Discipline. The like was that of the Mamalucs, being a hardy People, to the Egyptians that were a soft one. And the balance of Situation is in this kind of wonderful effect; seeing the King of Denmark, being none of the most potent Princes, is able at the Sound to take Toll of the greatest: and as this King by the advantage of the Land can make the Sea tributary; so Venice, by the advantage of the Sea, in whose arms she is impregnable, can make the Land to feed her Gulf. For the Colonies in the Indies, they are yet Babes that cannot live without sucking the breasts of their Mother Cities, but such as I mistake if when they come of age they do not wean themselves: which causes me to wonder at Princes that delight to be exhausted in that way. And so much for the principles of Power, whether National or Provincial, Domestic or Foren; being such as are external, and founded in the goods of Fortune.  

Authority.  I COM to the principles of Authority, which are internal, and founded upon the goods of the Mind. These the Legislator that can unite in his Government with those of Fortune, comes nearest to the work of God, whose Government consists of Heaven and Earth: which was said by PLATO, though in different words, as, when Princes should be Philosophers, or Philosopher's Princes, the World would be 
Eccles. 10. 15. Tacit.  happy. And says SOLOMON, There is an evil which I have seen under the Sun, which proceeds from the Ruler (enimvero neque nobilem, neque ingenuum, nec libertinum quidem armis praeponere, regia utilitas est) 
Grot.  Folly is set in great dignity, and the Rich (either in Virtue and Wisdom, in the goods of the Mind, or those of Fortune upon that balance which gives them a sense of the National Interest) sit in low places. I have seen Servants upon horses, and Princes walking as Servants upon the earth. Sad complaints, that the principles of Power and of Authority, the goods of the Mind and of Fortune, do not meet and twine in the Wreath or Crown of Empire! Wherefore, if we have any thing of Piety or of Prudence, let us raise ourselves out of the mire of private Interest to the contemplation of Virtue, and put a hand to the removal of this evil from under the Sun; this evil against which no Government that is not secured, can be good; this evil from which the Government that is secure must be perfect. SOLOMON tells us, that the cause of it is from the Ruler, from those principles of power, which, balanced upon earthly trash, exclude the heavenly treasures of Virtue, and that influence of it upon Government, which is Authority. We have wandered the Earth to find out the balance of power: but to find out that of Authority, we must ascend, as I said, nearer Heaven, or to the Image of God, which is the Soul of Man.  
THE Soul of Man (whose life or motion is perpetual Contemplation or Thought) is the Mistress of two potent Rivals, the one Reason, the other Passion, that are in continual suit; and, according as she gives up her will to these or either of them, is the felicity or misery which Man partakes in this mortal life.  
FOR as whatever was Passion in the contemplation of a man, being brought forth by his will into action, is Vice and the bondage of Sin; so whatever was Reason in the contemplation of a man, being brought forth by his will into action, is virtue and the freedom of Soul.  
AGAIN, as those actions of a man that were Sin acquire to himself Repentance or Shame, and affect others with Scorn or Pity; so those actions of a man that are Virtue acquire to himself Honour, and upon others Authority.  
NOW Government is no other than the Soul of a Nation or City: wherefore that which was Reason in the debate of a Commonwealth being brought forth by the result, must be Virtue; and forasmuch as the Soul of a City or Nation is the Sovereign Power, her Virtue must be Law. But the Government whose Law is Virtue, and whose Virtue is Law, is the same whose Empire is Authority, and whose Authority is Empire.  
AGAIN, If the Liberty of a man consists in the Empire of his Reason, the absence whereof would betray him to the bondage of his Passions; then the Liberty of a Commonwealth consists in the Empire of her Laws, the absence whereof would betray her to the Lust of Tyrants. And these I conceive to be the Principles upon which ARISTOTLE and LIVY (injuriously accused by LEVIATHAN for not writing out of nature) have grounded their Assertion, That a Commonwealth is an Empire of Laws, and not of Men. But they must not ●arry it so. For, says he, the Liberty, whereof there is so frequent and 
Pag. 110.  honourable mention in the Histories and Philosophy of the ancient Greecs and Romans, and the Writings and Discourses of those that from them have received all their Learning in the Politics, is not the Liberty of particular Men, but the Liberty of the Commonwealth. He might as well have said, that the Estates of particular Men in a Commonwealth are not the Riches of particular Men, but the Riches of the Commonwealth; for equality of Estates causes equality of Power, and equality of Power is the Liberty not only of the Commonwealth, but of every Man. But sure a Man would never be thus irreverent with the greatest Authors, and positive against all Antiquity, without some certain demonstration of Truth: and, what is it? Why, there is written on the Turrets of the City of Lucca in great Characters at this day the word LIBERTAS; yet no Man can thence infer, that a particular Man has more Liberty or Immunity from the Service of the Commonwealth there, than in Constantinople. Whether a Commonwealth be Monarchical or Popular, the Freedom is the same. The Mountain has brought forth, and we have a little Equivocation! For to say, that a Luchese has no more Liberty or Immunity from the Laws of Luca, than a Turk has from those of Constantinople; and to say that a Lucchese has no more Liberty or Immunity by the Laws of Lucca, than a Turk has by those of Constantinople, are pretty different Speeches. The first may be said of all Governments alike; the second scarce of any two; much less of these, seeing it is known, that whereas the greatest Bassa is a Tenant, as well of his Head as of his Estate, at the Will of his Lord, the meanest Lucchese that has Land, is a Freeholder of both, and not to be controlled but by the Law, and that framed by every private Man to no other end (or they may thank themselves) than to protect the Liberty of every private Man, which by that means comes to be the Liberty of the Commonwealth.  
BUT seeing they that make the Laws in Commonwealths are but Men, the main Question seems to be, how a Commonwealth comes to be an Empire of Laws, and not of Men? or how the Debate or Result of a Commonwealth is so sure to be according to Reason; seeing they who debate, and they who resolve, be but Men? And as often 
●obs.  as Reason is against a Man, so often will a Man be against Reason.  
THIS is thought to be a shrewd saying, but will do no harm; for be it so that Reason is nothing but Interest, there be divers Interests, and so divers Reasons.  
AS first, there is private Reason, which is the Interest of a private Man.  
SECONDLY, There is Reason of State, which is the Interest (or Error, as was said by SOLOMON) of the Ruler or Rulers, that is to say, of the Prince, of the Nobility, or of the People.  
THIRDLY, There is that Reason, which is the Interest of Mankind, 
Hooker. B. 1.  or of the whole. Now if we see even in those natural Agents that want sense, that as in themselves they have a Law which directs them in the means whereby they tend to their own perfection, so likewise that another Law there is, which touches them as they are sociable parts united into one Body, a Law which binds them each to serve to others good, and all to prefer the good of the whole, before whatsoever their own particular; as when stones, or heavy things forsake their ordinary wont or centre, and fly upwards, as if they heard themselves commanded to let go the good they privately wish, and to relieve the present distress of Nature in common. There is a common Right, Law of Nature, or Interest of the whole; which is more excellent, and so acknowleged to be by the Agents 
Grot.  themselves, than the Right or Interest of the Parts only. Wherefore though it may be truly said that the Creatures are naturally carried forth to their proper utility or prosit, that ought not to be taken in too general a sense; seeing divers of them abstain from their own prosit, either in regard of those of the same kind, or at least of their young  
MANKIND than must either be less just than the Creature, or acknowledge also his common Interest to be common Right. And if Reason be nothing else but Interest, and the Interest o● Mankind be the right Interest, than the Reason of Mankind must be right Reason. Now compute well; for if the Interest of popular Government come the nearest to the Interest of Mankind, than the Reason of popular Government must come the nearest to right Reason.  
BUT it may be said, that the difficulty remains yet; for be the Interest of popular Government right Reason, a Man does not look upon Reason as it is right or wrong in itself, but as it makes for him or against him. Wherefore unless you can show such Orders of a Government, as, like those of God in Nature, shall be able to constrain this or that Creature to shake off that Inclination which is more peculiar to it, and take up that which regards the common Good or Interest; all this is to no more end, than to persuade every man in a popular Government not to carve himself of that which he desires most, but to be mannerly at the public Table, and give the best from himself to Decency and the common Interest. But that such Orders may be established, as may, nay must give the upper hand in all cases to common Right or Interest, notwithstanding the nearness of that which sticks to every man in private, and this in a way of equal certainty and facility, is known even to Girls, being no other than those that are of common practice with them in divers cases. For example, two of them have a Cake yet undivided, which was given between them: that each of them therefore may have that which is due, Divide, says one to the other, and I will choose; or let me divide, and you shall choose. If this be but once agreed upon, it is enough: for the dividend, dividing unequally, loses, in regard that the other takes the better half; wherefore she divides equally, and so both have right. O the depth of the Wisdom of God and yet by the mouths of Babes and Sucklings has he set forth his strength; that which great Philosophers are disputing upon in vain, is brought to light by two harmless Girls, even the whole Mystery of a Commonwealth, which lies only in dividing and choosing. Nor has God (if his Works in Nature be understood) left so much to Mankind to dispute upon, as who shall divide, and who choose, but distributed them for ever into two Orders, whereof the one has the natural right of dividing, and the other of choosing. For Example:  

The Orders of popular Government in Nature.  A COMMONWEALTH is but a civil Society of Men: let us take any number of Men (as twenty) and immediately make a Commonwealth. Twenty Men (if they be not all Idiots, perhaps if they be) can never come so together, but there will be such a difference in them, that about a third will be wiser, or at least less foolish than all the rest; these upon acquaintance, though it be but small, will be discovered, and (as Stags that have the largest heads) lead the herd: for while the six discoursing and arguing one with another, show the eminence of their parts, the fourteen discover things that they never thought on; or are cleared in divers Truths which had formerly perplexed them. Wherefore in matter of common concernment, difficulty, or danger, they hang upon their lips as Children upon their Fathers; and the influence thus acquired by the six, the eminence of whose parts is found to be a stay and comfort to the fourteen, is 
* Authoritas Patrum.  the Authority of the Fathers. Wherefore this can be no other than a natural Aristocracy diffused by God throout the whole Body of Mankind to this end and purpose; and therefore such as the People have not only a natural, but a positive Obligation to make use of as their Guides; as where the People of Israel are commanded to take wise men, 
Deut. 1. 13.  and understanding, and known among their Tribes, to be made Rulers over them. The six then approved of, as in the present case, are the Senate, not by hereditary Right, or in regard of the greatness of their Estates only (which would tend to such Power as might force or draw the People) but by election for their excellent Parts, which tends to the advancement of the influence of their Virtue or Authority that leads the People. Wherefore the Office of the Senate is not to be Commanders, but Counsellors of the People; and that which is proper to Counsellors is first to debate, and afterward to give advice in the business whereupon they have debated; whence the Decrees of the Senate are never Laws, nor so 
† Senatusconsulta.  called: and these being maturely framed, it is their duty 
‖ Ferre ad Populum.  to propose in the case to the People. Wherefore the Senate is no more than the debate of the Commonwealth. But to debate, is to discern or put a difference between things that, being alike, are not the same; or it is separating and weighing this reason against that, and that reason against this, which is dividing.  

The People.  THE Senate then having divided, who shall choose? Ask the Girls: for is she that divided must have chosen also, it had been little worse for the other in case she had not divided at all, but kept the whole Cake to herself, in regard that being to choose too, she divided accordingly. Wherefore if the Senate have any farther power thanto divide, the Commonwealth can never be equal. But in a Commonwealth consisting of a single Council, there is no other to choose than that which divided; whence it is, that such a Council sails not to scramble, that is, to be factious, there being no other dividing of the Cake in that case but among themselves.  
NOR is there any remedy but to have another Council to choose. The Wisdom of the Few may be the Light of Mankind; but the Interest of the Few is not the Profit of Mankind, nor of a Commonwealth. Wherefore seeing we have granted Interest to be Reason, they must not choose, lest it put out their Light. But as the Council dividing consists of the Wisdom of the Commonwealth, so the Assembly or Council choosing should consist of the Interest of the Commonwealth: as the Wisdom of the Commonwealth is in the Aristocracy, so the Interest of the Commonwealth is in the whole body of the People. And whereas this, in case the Commonwealth consist of a whole Nation, is too unwieldy a body to be assembled, this Council is to consist of such a Representative as may be equal, and so constituted, as can never contract any other Interest than that of the whole People; the manner whereof, being such as is best shown by Exemplification, I remit to the Model. But in the present case, the six dividing, and the fourteen choosing, must of necessity take in the whole interest of the twenty.  
DIVIDING and choosing in the language of a Commonwealth is debating and resolving; and whatsoever upon debate of the Senate is proposed to the People, and resolved by them, is enacted 
* Authoritate Patrum & jussu Populi.  by the authority of the Fathers, and by the power of the People, which concurring, make a Law.  

The Magistracy.  BUT the Law being made, says LEVIATHAN, is but Words and Paper without the Hands and Swords of Men; wherefore as those two Orders of a Commonwealth, namely the Senate and the People, are Legislative, so of necessity there must be a third to be executive of the Laws made, and this is the Magistracy; in which order, with the rest being wrought up by art, the Commonwealth consists of the Senate proposing, the People resolving, and the Magistracy executing: whereby partaking of the Aristocracy as in the Senate, of the Democracy as in the People, and of Monarchy as in the Magistracy, it is complete. Now there being no other Commonwealth but this in Art or Nature, it is no wonder if MACCHIAVEL has showed us that the Ancients held this only to be good; but it seems strange to me, that they should hold that there could be any other: for if there be such a thing as pure Monarchy, yet that there should be such a one as pure Aristocracy, or pure Democracy, is not in my understanding. But the Magistracy both in number and function is different in different Commonwealths. Nevertheless there is one condition of it that must be the same in every one, or it dissolves the Commonwealth where it is wanting. And this is no less than that as the hand of the Magistrate is the executive Power of the Law, so the head of the Magistrate is answerable to the People that his execution be according to the Law; by which LEVIATHAN may see that the hand or sword that executes the Law is in it, and not above it.  

The Orders of a Commonwealth in experience, as that  NOW whether I have rightly transcribed these Principles of a Commonwealth out of Nature, I shall appeal to God and to the World. To God in the Fabric of the Commonwealth of Israel: and to the World in the universal Series of ancient Prudence. But in regard the same Commonwealths will be opened at large in the Council of Legislators, I shall touch them for the present but slightly, beginning with that of Israel.  

Of Israel.  THE Commonwealth of Israel consisted of the Senate, the People, and the Magistracy.  
THE People by their first division, which was genealogical, were contained under their thirteen Tribes, Houses, or Families; whereof the firstborn in each was Prince of his Tribe, and had the leading of it: 
Numb. 1.  the Tribe of LEVI only being set apart to serve at the Altar, had no other Prince but the High Priest. In their second division they were divided locally by their Agrarian, or the distribution of the Land of 
Josh. ch. 13, to ch. 42.  Canaan to them by lot, the Tithe of all remaining to LEVI; whence according to their local division, the Tribes are reckoned but twelve.  

The People.  THE Assemblies of the People thus divided were methodically gathered by Trumpets to the Congregation; which was, it should seem, 
Numb. 10. 7.  of two sorts. For if it were called by one Trumpet only, the Princes of the Tribes and the Elders only assembled; but if it were called 
Numb. 10. 4.  with two, the whole People gathered themselves to the Congregation, 
Numb. 10. 3.  for so it is rendered by the English: but in the Greece it is called Ecclesia, 
Judg. 20. 2.  or the Church of God, and by the Talmudist, the great synagogue. The word Ecclesia was also anciently and properly used for the Civil Congregations or Assemblies of the People in Athens, Lacedaemon, and Ephesus, where it is so called in Scripture, though it be otherwise rendered 
Acts 19 23.  by the Translators, not much as I conceive to their commendation, seeing by that means they have lost us a good lesson, the Apostles borrowing that name for their spiritual Congregations, to the end that we might see they intended the Government of the Church to be Democratical or Popular, as is also plain in the rest of their Constitutions.  
THE Church or Congregation of the People of Israel assembled in a military manner, and had the result of the Commonwealth, or 
Judg. 20. 2.  the power of confirming all their Laws, though proposed even by God 
Exod. 19  himself; as where they make him King; and where they reject or depose him as Civil Magistrate, and elect Saul. It is manifest 
1 Sam. 8. 7.  that he gives no such example to a Legislator in a popular Government as to deny or evade the power of the People, which were a contradiction: but though he deservedly blames the ingratitude of the People in that action, he commands SAMUEL, being next under himself Supreme Magistrate, to hearken to their Voice (for where the suffrage of the People goes for nothing, it is no Commonwealth) and comforts him, saying, They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me that I should not reign over them. But to reject him that he should not reign over them, was as Civil Magistrate to depose him. The Power therefore which the People had to depose even God himself as he was Civil Magistrate, leaves little doubt but that they had power to have rejected any of those Laws confirmed by them throout the 
Deut. 29.  Scripture, which (to omit the several parcels) are generally contained under two heads, those that were made by Covenant with the People in the Land of Moab, and those which were made by Covenant with the People in Horeb: which two, I think, amount to the whole body of the Israelitish Laws. But if all and every one of the Laws of Israel being proposed by God, were not otherwise enacted than by Covenant with the People, then that only which was resolved by the People of Israel was their Law; and so the result of that Commonwealth was in the People. Nor had the People the result only in matter of Law, 
Josh. 7. 16. Judg. 20. 8, 9, 10. 1 Sam. 7. 6, 7, 8. 1 Chron. 13. 2. 2 Chron. 30. 4. Judg. 11. 11. 1 Sam. 10. 17. 1 Mac. 14. Exod. 9 3, 4, 5. Josh. 7. 1 Sam. 10.  but the Power in some cases of Judicature; as also the right of levying War; cognizance in matter of Religion; and the election of their Magistrates, as the Judge or Dictator, the King, the Prince: which functions were exercised by the Synagoga magna or Congregation of Israel, not always in one manner; for sometimes they were performed by the suffrage of the People, viuâ voce; sometimes by the Lot only; and at others by the Ballot, or by a mixture of the Lot with the Suffrage, as in the case of ELDAD and MEDAD, which I shall open with the Senat.  

The Senat.  THE Senate of Israel, called in the Old Testament the seventy Elders, and in the New the Sanhedrim (which word is usually translated the 
Numb. 11.  Council) was appointed by God, and consisted of Seventy Elders besides 
Deut. 1.  MOSES, which were at first elected by the People; but in what 
Numb. 11.  manner is rather intimated than shown. Nevertheless, because I cannot otherwise understand the passage concerning ELDAD and MEDAD, of whom it is said, that they were of them that were written, but went not up to the Tabernacle, then with the Talmudists, I conceive that ELDAD and MEDAD had the suffrage of the Tribes, and so were written as Competitors for Magistracy; but coming afterwards to the lot, failed of it, and therefore went not up to the Tabernacle, or place of Confirmation by God, or to the Sessionhouse of the Senate with the Seventy upon whom the lot fell to be Senators: for the Sessionhouse of the Sanhedrim was first in the Court of the Tabernacle, and afterwards in that of the Temple, where it came to be called the stone Chamber 
John.  or Pavement. If this were the Ballot of Israel, that of Venice is the same transposed: for in Venice the Competitor is chosen as it were by the lot, in regard that the Electors are so made, and the Magistrate is chosen by the Suffrage of the great Council or Assembly of the People. But the Sanhedrim of Israel being thus constituted, MOSES for his time, and after him his Successor, sat in the midst of it as Prince or Archon, and at his left hand the Orator or Father of the Senate; the rest of the bench coming round with either horn like a Crescent, had a Scribe attending upon the tip of it.  
THIS Senate, in regard the Legislator of Israel was infallible, and the Laws given by God such as were not fit to be altered by men, is much different in the exercise of their Power from all other Senates, except that of the Areopagits in Athens, which also was little more than a Supreme Judicatory; for it will hardly, as I conceive, be found that the Sanhedrim proposed to the People till the return of the Children of Israel out of Captivity under Esdras, at which time there was a new Law made, namely, for a kind of Excommunication, or rather Banishment, which had never been before in Israel. Nevertheless it is not to be thought that the Sanhedrim had not always that right, which from the time of Esdras it more frequently exercised, of proposing to the People, but that they forbore it in regard of the fullness and infallibility of the Law already made, whereby it was needless. Wherefore the function of this Council, which is very rare in a Senate, was executive, 
The Magistracy.  and consisted in the administration of the Law made; and whereas the Council itself is often understood in Scripture by the Priest 
Deut. 17. 9, 10, 11.  and the Levit, there is no more in that save only that the Priests and the Levits, who otherwise had no Power at all, being in the younger years of this Commonwealth, those that were best studied in the Laws were the most frequently elected into the Sanhedrim. For the Courts consisting of three and twenty Elders sitting in the Gates of every City, and the Triumvirats of Judges constituted almost in every Village, which were parts of the executive Magistracy subordinat to the Sanhedrim, I shall take them at better leisure, and in the larger Discourse; but these being that part of this Commonwealth which was instituted by MOSES upon the advice of JETHRO the Priest 
Exod. 18.  of Midian (as I conceive a Heathen) are to me a sufficient warrant even from God himself who confirmed them, to make farther use of human Prudence, wherever I find it bearing a Testimony to itself, whether in Heathen Commonwealths or others: And the rather, because so it is, that we who have the holy Scriptures, and in them the Original of a Commonwealth, made by the same hand that made the World, are either altogether blind or negligent of it; while the Heathens have all written theirs, as if they had had no other Copy: As, to be more brief in the present account of that which you shall have more at large hereafter;  

Of Athens.  ATHENS consisted of the Senate of the Bean proposing, of the Church or Assembly of the People resolving, and too often debating, which was the ruin of it; as also of the Senate of the Aropagits, the nine Archons, with divers other Magistrates executing.  

Of Lacedaemon  LACEDAEMON consisted of the Senate proposing; of the Church or Congregation of the People resolving only and never debating, which was the long life of it; and of the two Kings, the Court of the Ephors, with divers other Magistrates executing.  

Of Carthage.  CARTHAGE consisted of the Senate proposing and sometimes resolving too; of the People resolving and sometimes debating too, for which fault she was reprehended by ARISTOTLE; and she had her Suffetes, and her hundred Men, with other Magistrates executing.  

Of Rome.  ROME consisted of the Senate proposing, the Concio or People resolving, and too often debating, which caused her storms; as also of the Consuls, Censors, Aediles, Tribune's, Praetors, Questors, and other Magistrates executing.  

Of Venice.  VENICE consists of the Senate or Pregati proposing, and sometimes resolving too; of the great Council or Assembly of the People, in whom the result is constitutively; as also of the Doge, the Signory, the Censors, the Dieci, the Quazancies, and other Magistrates executing.  

Of Switzerland and Holland.  THE proceeding of the Commonwealths of Switzerland and Holland is of a like nature, though after a more obscure manner: for the Soverainties, whether Cantons, Provinces, or Cities, which are the People, send their Deputies commissioned and instructed by themselves (wherein they reserve the Result in their own power) to the Provincial or general Convention, or Senate, where the Deputies debate, but have no other power of Result than what was conferred upon them by the People, or is farther conferred by the same upon farther occasion. And for the executive part they have Magistrates or Judges in every Canton, Province or City, besides those which are more public, and relate to the League, as for adjusting Controversies between one Canton, Province or City, and another; or the like between such persons as are not of the same Canton, Province or City.  
BUT that we may observe a little farther how the Heathen Politicians have written, not only out of Nature, but as it were out of Scripture: As in the Commonwealth of Israel God is said to have been King; so the Commonwealth where the Law is King, is said by ARISTOTLE to be the Kingdom of God. And where by the Lusts or Passions of Men a Power is set above that of the Law deriving from Reason, which is the dictat of God, God in that sense is rejected or deposed that he should not reign over them, as he was in Israel. 
Pag. 170.  And yet LEVIATHAN will have it, that by reading of these Greece and Latin (he might as well in this sense have said Hebrew) Authors, young Men, and all others that are unprovided of the antidote of solid Reason, receiving a strong and delightful impression of the great Exploits of War, achieved by the Conductors of their Arms, receive withal a pleasing Idea of all they have done besides; and imagine their great prosperity not to have proceeded from the emulation of particular Men, but from the virtue of their popular form of Government, not considering the frequent Seditions and Civil Wars produced by the imperfection of their Polity. Where, first, the blame he lays to the Heathen Authors is in his sense laid to the Scripture; and whereas he holds them to be young Men, or Men of no antidote that are of like opinions, it should seem that MACCHIAVEL, the sole retriever of this ancient Prudence, is to his solid Reason a beardless Boy that has newly read LIVY. And how solid his Reason is, may appear, where he grants the great prosperity of ancient Commonwealths, which is to give up the Controversy. For such an effect must have some adequat cause; which to evade he insinuats that it was nothing else but the emulation of particular Men: as if so great an Emulation could have been generated without as great Virtue; so great Virtue without the best Education; the best Education without the best Laws; or the best Laws any otherwise than by the excellency of their Polity.  
BUT if some of these Commonwealths, as being less perfect in their Polity than others, have been more seditious, it is not more an argument of the infirmity of this or that Commonwealth in particular, than of the excellency of that kind of Polity in general; which if they, that have not altogether reached, have nevertheless had greater prosperity, what would befall them that should reach?  
IN answer to which Question let me invite LEVIATHAN, who of all other Governments gives the advantage to Monarchy for perfection, to a better disquisition of it by these three assertions.  
THE first, That the perfection of Government lies upon such a libration in the frame of it, that no Man or Men in or under it can have the interest; or having the interest, can have the power to disturb it with Sedition.  
THE second, That Monarchy, reaching the perfection of the kind, reaches not to the perfection of Government; but must have some dangerous flaw in it.  
THE third, That popular Government, reaching the perfection of the kind, reaches the perfection of Government, and has no flaw in it.  
THE first assertion requires no proof.  
FOR the proof of the second; Monarchy, as has been shown, is of two kinds, the one by Arms, the other by a Nobility, and there is no other kind in Art or Nature: for if there have been anciently some Governments called Kingdoms, as one of the Goths in Spain, and another of the Vandals in Africa, where the King ruled without a Nobility, and by a Council of the People only; it is expressly said by the Authors that mention them, that the Kings were but the Captains, and that the People not only gave them Laws, but deposed them as often as they pleased. Nor is it possible in reason that it should be otherwise in like cases; wherefore these were either no Monarchys, or had greater slaws in them than any other.  
BUT for a Monarchy by Arms, as that of the Ture (which of all models that ever were comes up to the perfection of the kind) it is not in the wit or power of Man to cure it of this dangerous flaw, That the Janizaries have frequent interest and perpetual power to raise Sedition, and to tear the Magistrate, even the Prince himself, in pieces. Therefore the Monarchy of Turkey is no perfect Government.  
AND for a Monarchy by a Nobility, as of late in Oceana (which of all other models before the declination of it came up to the perfection in that kind) it was not in the power or wit of Man to cure it of that dangerous flaw, That the Nobility had frequent interest and perpetual power by their Retainers and Tenants to raise Sedition; and (whereas the Janizaries occasion this kind of Calamity no sooner than they make an end of it) to levy a lasting War, to the vast effusion of Blood, and that even upon occasions wherein the People, but for their dependence upon their Lords, had no concernment, as in the feud of the Red and White. The like has been frequent in Spain, France, Germany, and other Monarchys of this kind; wherefore Monarchy by a Nobility is no perfect Government.  
FOR the proof of the third assertion; LEVIATHAN yields it to me, that there is no other Commonwealth but Monarchical or Popular: wherefore if no Monarchy be a perfect Government, then either there is no perfect Government, or it must be popular; for which kind of Constitution I have something more to say, than LEVIATHAN has said or ever will be able to say for Monarchy. As,  
FIRST, That it is the Government that was never conquered by any Monarch, from the beginning of the World to this day: for if the Commonwealths of Greece came under the yoke of the Kings of Macedon, they were first broken by themselves.  
SECONDLY, That it is the Government that has frequently led mighty Monarches in Triumph.  
THIRDLY, That it is the Government, which, if it has been seditious, it has not been so from any imperfection in the kind, but in the particular Constitution; which, wherever the like has happened, must have been inequal.  
FOURTHLY, That it is the Government, which, if it has been any thing near equal, was never seditious; or let him show me what Sedition has happened in Lacedaemon or Venice.  
FIFTHLY, That it is the Government, which, attaining to perfect equality, has such a libration in the frame of it, that no Man living can show which way any Man or Men, in or under it, can contract any such Interest or Power as should be able to disturb the Commonwealth with Sedition; wherefore an equal Commonwealth is that only which is without flaw, and contains in it the full perfection of Government. But to return.  
BY what has been shown in Reason and Experience it may appear, that though Commonwealths in general be Governments of the Senate proposing, the People resolving, and the Magistracy executing; yet some are not so good at these Orders as others, thro' some impediment or defect in the frame, balance, or capacity of them, according to which they are of divers kinds.  

Division of Commonwealths.  THE first division of them is into such as are single, as Israel, Athens, Lacedaemon, etc. and such as are by Leagues, as those of the Acheans, Etolians, Lyceans, Switz, and Hollanders.  
THE second (being MACCHIAVEL'S) is into such as are for preservation, as Lacedaemon and Venice, and such as are for increase, as Athens and Rome; in which I can see no more than that the former takes in no more Citizens than are necessary for defence, and the latter so many as are capable of increase.  
THE third division (unseen hitherto) is into equal and inequal, and this is the main point, especially as to domestic Peace and Tranquillity; for to make a Commonwealth inequal, is to divide it into parties, which sets them at perpetual variance, the one party endeavouring to preserve their Eminence and Inequality, and the other to attain to Equality: whence the People of Rome derived their perpetual strife with the Nobility or Senat. But in an equal Commonwealth there can be no more strife than there can be overbalance in equal weights; wherefore the Commonwealth of Venice, being that which of all others is the most equal in the Constitution, is that wherein there never happened any strife between the Senate and the People.  
AN equal Commonwealth is such a one as is equal both in the balance or foundation, and in the superstructure; that is to say, in her Agrarian Law, and in her Rotation.  

Equal Agrarian.  AN equal Agrarian is a perpetual Law establishing and preserving the balance of Dominion by such a distribution, that no one Man or number of Men, within the compass of the Few or Aristocracy, can come to overpower the whole People by their possessions in Lands.  
AS the Agrarian answers to the Foundation, so does Rotation to the Superstructures.  

Rotation.  EQUAL Rotation is equal vicissitude in Government, or succession to Magistracy conferred for such convenient terms, enjoying equal vacations, as take in the whole body by parts, succeeding others, thro' the free election or suffrage of the People.  

Prolongation of Magistracy.  THE contrary whereunto is prolongation of Magistracy, which, trashing the wheel of Rotation, destroys the life or natural motion of a Commonwealth.  

Ballot.  THE election or suffrage of the People is most free, where it is made or given in such a manner, that it can neither oblige 
* Qui beneficium accepit libertatem vendidit.  nor disoblige another; nor thro' fear of an Enemy, or bashfulness towards a Friend, impair a Man's liberty.  
WHEREFORE, says CICERO, 
† Grata populo est tabella quae frontes aperit hominum, mentes tegit, datque cam libertatem ut quod velint faciant.  the Tablet or Ballot of the People of Rome (who gave their Votes by throwing Tablets or little pieces of Wood secretly into Urns marked for the negative or affirmative) was a welcome Constitution to the People, as that which, not impairing the assurance of their brows, increased the freedom of their Judgement. I have not stood upon a more particular description of this Ballot, because that of Venice exemplifyed in the Model is of all others the most perfect.  

Definition of an equal Commonwealth.  AN equal Commonwealth (by that which has been said) is a Government established upon an equal Agrarian, arising into the Superstructures or three Orders, the Senate debating and proposing, the People resolving, and the Magistracy executing by an equal Rotation thro' the suffrage of the People given by the Ballot. For though Rotation may be without the Ballot, and the Ballot without Rotation, yet the Ballot not only as to the ensuing Model includes both, but is by far the most equal way; for which cause under the name of the Ballot I shall hereafter understand both that and Rotation too.  
NOW having reasoned the Principles of an equal Commonwealth, I should come to give an instance of such a one in experience, if I could find it; but if this work be of any value, it lies in that it is the first example of a Commonwealth that is perfectly equal. For Venice, though it comes the nearest, yet is a Commonwealth for preservation; and such a one, considering the paucity of Citizens taken in, and the number not taken in, is externally unequal: and though every Commonwealth that holds Provinces must in that regard be such, yet not to that degree. Nevertheless Venice internally, and for her capacity, is by far the most equal, though it has not in my judgement arrived at the full perfection of equality; both because her Laws supplying the defect of an Agrarian, are not so clear nor effectual at the Foundation, nor her Superstructures by the virtue of her Ballot or Rotation exactly librated; in regard that thro' the paucity of her Citizens, her greater Magistracies are continually wheeled thro' a few hands, as is confessed by JANOTTI where he says, that if a Gentleman comes once to be Savio di terra ferma, it seldom happens that he fails from thenceforward to be adorned with some one of the greater Magistracies, as Savi di mare, Savi di terra ferma, Savi Grandi, Counsellors, those of the Decemvirate or Dictatorian Council, the Aurogatori or Censors which require no vacation or interval. Wherefore if this in Venice, or that in Lacedaemon, where the Kings were hereditary, and the Senators (though elected by the People) for life, cause no inequality (which is hard to be conceived) in a Commonwealth for preservation, or such a one as consists of a few Citizens; yet is it manifest, that it would cause a very great one in a Commonwealth for increase, or consisting of the Many, which by engrossing the Magistracies in a few hands, would be obstructed in their Rotation.  
BUT there be who say (and think it a strong Objection) that let a Commonwealth be as equal as you can imagine, two or three Men when all is done will govern it; and there is that in it, which, notwithstanding the pretended sufficiency of a popular State, amounts to a plain confession of the imbecility of that Policy, and of the Prerogative of Monarchy: for as much as popular Governments in difficult cases have had recourse to Dictatorian Power, as in Rome.  
TO which I answer, That as Truth is a spark to which Objections are like bellows, so in this respect our Commonwealth shines; for the Eminence acquired by suffrage of the People in a Commonwealth, especially if it be popular and equal, can be ascended by no other steps than the universal acknowledgement of Virtue: and where men excel in Virtue, the Commonwealth is stupid and injust, if accordingly they do not excel in Authority. Wherefore this is both the advantage of Virtue, which has her due encouragement, and of the Commonwealth which has her due services. These are the Philosophers which PLATO would have to be Princes, the Princes which SOLOMON would have to be mounted, and their Steeds are those of Authority, not Empire; or, if they be buckled to the Chariot of Empire, as that of the Dictatorian Power, like the Chariot of the Sun, it is glorious for terms and vacations, or intervals. And as a Commonwealth is a Government of Laws and not of Men, so is this the Principality of Virtue, and not of Man; if that fail or set in one, it rises in another 
* Uno avulso, non deficit alter Aureus, & simili frondescit virga metallo.  who is created his immediate Successor. And this takes away that vanity from under the Sun, which is an Error proceeding more or less from all other Rulers under Heaven but an equal Commonwealth.  
THESE things considered, it will be convenient in this place to speak a word to such as go about to insinuat to the Nobility or Gentry a fear of the People, or to the People a fear of the Nobility or Gentry, as if their interests were destructive to each other; when indeed an Army may as well consist of Soldiers without Officers, or of Officers without Soldiers, as a Commonwealth (especially such a one as is capable of Greatness) of a People without a Gentry, or of a Gentry without a People. Wherefore this (though not always so intended, as may appear by MACCHIAVEL, who else would be guilty) is a pernicious error. There is something first in the making of a Commonwealth, then in the governing of it, and last of all in the leading of its Arms; which (though there be great Divines, great Lawyers, great men in all professions) seems to be peculiar only to the Genius of a Gentleman. For so it is in the universal series of Story, that if any man has founded a Commonwealth, he was first a Gentleman MOSES had his Education by the Daughter of PHARAOH; THESEUS and SOLON, of noble Birth, were held by the Athenians worthy to be Kings; LYCURGUS was of the Royal Blood; ROMULUS and NUMA Princes; BRUTUS' and PUBLICOLA Patricians; the GRACCHIS, that lost their lives for the People of Rome and the restitution of that Commonwealth, were the Sons of a Father adorned with two Triumphs, and of CORNELIA the Daughter of SCIPIO, who being demanded in marriage by King PTOLEMY, disdained to become the Queen of Egypt. And the most renowned OLPHAUS MEGALETOR, sole Legislator (as you will see anon) of the Commonwealth of Oceana, was derived from a noble Family: nor will it be any occasion of scruple in this case, that LEVIATHAN affirms the Politics to be no ancienter than his Book de Cive. Such also as have got any fame in the Civil Government of a Commonwealth, or by the leading of its Arms, have been Gentlemen; for so in all other respects were those plebeian Magistrates elected by the People of Rome, being of known Descents, and of equal Virtues, except only that they were excluded from the name by the Usurpation of the Patricians. Holland, thro' this defect at home, has borrowed Princes for Generals, and Gentlemen of divers Nations for Commanders: And the Swissers, if they have any defect in this kind, rather lend their People to the Colours of other Princes, than make that noble use of them at home, which should assert the Liberty of Mankind. For where there is not a Nobility to hearten the People, they are slothful, regardless of the World, and of the public interest of Liberty, as even those of Rome had been without their Gentry: wherefore let the People embrace the Gentry in peace, as the light of their eyes; and in war, as the trophy of their arms. And if CORNELIA disdained to be Queen of Egypt, if a Roman Consul looked down from his Tribunal upon the greatest King; let the Nobility love and cherish the People that afford them a Throne so much higher in a Commonwealth, in the acknowledgement of their Virtue, than the Crowns of Monarches.  

An inequal Commonwealth.  BUT if the equality of a Commonwealth consist in the equality first of the Agrarian, and next of the Rotation, than the inequality of a Commonwealth must consist in the absence or inequality of the Agrarian, or of the Rotation, or of both.  
ISRAEL and Lacedaemon, which Commonwealths (as the People of this, in JOSEPHUS, claims kindred of that) have great resemblance, were each of them equal in their Agrarian, and inequal in their Rotation; especially Israel, where the Sanhedrim or Senat, first elected by the People, as appears by the words of MOSES, took upon them 
Deut. 1.  ever after, without any precept of God, to substitute their Successors by Ordination; which having been there of civil use, as Excommunication, Community of Goods, and other Customs of the Esseans, who were many of them converted, came afterward to be introduced into the Christian Church. And the election of the Judge, Suffes or Dictator, was irregular, both for the occasion, the term, and the vacation of that Magistracy; as you find in the Book of Judges, where it is often repeated, That in those days there was no King in Israel, that is, no Judge: and in the first of SAMUEL, where ELY judged Israel forty years, and SAMUEL all his life. In Lacedaemon the election of the Senate being by suffrage of the People, though for life, was not altogether so inequal; yet the hereditary Right of Kings, were it not for the Agrarian, had ruined her.  
ATHENS and Rome were inequal as to their Agrarian, that of Athens being infirm, and this of Rome none at all; for if it were more anciently carried, it was never observed. Whence by the time of TIBERIUS GRACCHUS the Nobility had almost eaten the People quite out o their Lands, which they held in the occupation of Tenants and Servants: Whereupon, the remedy being too late, and too vehemently applied, that Commonwealth was ruined.  
THESE also were inequal in their Rotation, but in a contrary manner. Athens, in regard that the Senate (chosen at once by lot, not by suffrage, and changed every year, not in part, but in the whole) consisted not of the natural Aristocracy; nor sitting long enough to understand, or to be perfect in their office, had no sufficient Authority to restrain the People from that perpetual Turbulence in the end, which was their ruin, notwithstanding the efforts of NICIAS, who did all a man could do to help it. But as Athens by the headiness of the People, so Rome fell by the Ambition of the Nobility, thro' the want of an equal Rotation; which, if the People had got into the Senate, and timely into the Magistracies (whereof the former was always usurped by the Patricians, and the latter for the most part) they had both carried and held their Agrarian, and that had rendered that Commonwealth immovable.  
BUT let a Commonwealth be equal or inequal, it must consist, as has been shown by Reason and all Experience, of the three general Orders; that is to say, of the Senate debating and proposing, of the People resolving, and of the Magistracy executing. Wherefore I can never wonder enough at LEVIATHAN, who, without any reason or example, will have it, that a Commonwealth consists of a single Person, or of a single Assembly; nor can I sufficiently pity those thousand Gentlemen, whose Minds, which otherwise would have wavered, he has framed (as is affirmed by himself) into a conscientious obedience (for so he is pleased to call it) of such a Government.  
BUT to finish this part of the Discourse, which I intent for as complete an Epitome of ancient Prudence, and in that of the whole Art of Politics, as I am able to frame in so short a time;  
THE two first Orders, that is to say, the Senate and the People, are Legislative, whereunto answers that part of this Science which by Politicians is entitled 
* De Legibus.  of Laws; and the third Order is executive, to which answers that part of the same Science which is styled 
† De Judiciis.  of the Frame and Course of Courts or Judicatories. A word to each of these will be necessary.  

Of Laws.  AND first for Laws, they are either Ecclesiastical or Civil, such as concern Religion or Government.  
LAWS Ecclesiastical, or such as concern Religion, according to the universal course of ancient Prudence, are in the power of the Magistrate; but according to the common practice of modern Prudence, since the Papacy, torn out of his hands.  
BUT, as a Government pretending to Liberty, and yet suppressing Liberty of Conscience (which, because Religion not according to a man's Conscience can to him be none at all, is the main) must be a contradiction; so, a man that, pleading for the Liberty of private Conscience, refuses Liberty to the National Conscience, must be absurd.  
A COMMONWEALTH is nothing else but the National Conscience. And if the conviction of a man's private Conscience produces his private Religion, the conviction of the national Conscience must produce a national Religion. Whether this be well reasoned, as also whether these two may stand together, will best be shown by the examples of the ancient Commonwealths taken in their order.  
IN that of Israel the Government of the National Religion appertained not to the Priests and Levits, otherwise than as they happened to be of the Sanhedrim or Senat, to which they had no right at all but by election. It is in this capacity therefore that the People are commanded 
Deut. 17.  under pain of death to hearken to them, and to do according to the sentence of the Law which they should teach; but in Israel the Law Ecclesiastical and Civil was the same, therefore the Sanhedrim having the power of one, had the power of both. But as the National Religion appertained to the Jurisdiction of the Sanhedrim, so the Liberty of Conscience appertained, from the same date, and by the same right, to the 
Deut. 18. 10.  Prophets and their Disciples; as where it is said, I will raise up a Prophet — and whoever will not hearken to my words which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him. The words relate to prophetic Right, which was above all the Orders of this Commonwealth; whence ELIJAH not only refused to obey the King, but destroyed his 
2 Kings 1.  Messengers with fire. And whereas it was not lawful by the National Religion to sacrifice in any other place than the Temple, a Prophet was his own Temple, and might sacrifice where he would, as ELIJAH did in Mount Carmel. By this right JOHN the Baptist and our 
1 Kings 18. 19  Saviour, to whom it more particularly related, had their Disciples, and taught the People; whence is derived our present right of GATHERED CONGREGATIONS: Wherefore the Christian Religion grew up according to the Orders of the Commonwealth of Israel, and not against them. Nor was Liberty of Conscience infringed by this Government, till the civil Liberty of the same was lost, as under HEROD, PILOT, and TIBERIUS, a three-piled Tyranny.  
TO proceed, Athens preserved her Religion, by the testimony of PAUL, with great Superstition: If ALCIBIADES, that Atheistical fellow, had not showed them a pair of heels, they had shaved off his head for shaving their MERCURIES, and making their Gods look ridiculously upon them without beards. Nevertheless, if PAUL reasoned with them, they loved news, for which he was the more welcome; and if he converted DIONYSIUS the Areopagit, that is, one of the Senators, there followed neither any hurt to him, nor loss of honour to DIONYSIUS. And for Rome, if CICERO, in his most excellent Book de natura Deorum, overthrew the National Religion of that Commonwealth, he was never the farther from being Consul. But there is a meanness and poorness in modern Prudence, not only to the damage of Civil Government, but of Religion itself: for to make a man in matter of Religion, which admits not of sensible demonstration (jurare in verba Magistri) engage to believe no otherwise than is believed by my Lord Bishop, or Goodman Presbyter, is a Pedantism, that has made the Sword to be a Rod in the hands of Schoolmasters; by which means, whereas the Christian Religion is the farthest of any from countenancing War, there never was a War of Religion but since Christianity: For which we are beholden to the Pope; for the Pope not giving liberty of Conscience to Princes and Commonwealths, they cannot give that to their Subjects which they have not themselves: whence both Princes and Subjects either thro' his instigation, or their own disputes, have introduced that execrable custom, never known in the world before, of sighting for Religion, and denying the Magistrate to have any jurisdiction concerning it; whereas the Magistrates losing the power of Religion loses the Liberty of Conscience, which in that case has nothing to protect it. But if the People be otherwise taught, it concerns them to look about them, and to distinguish between the shrieking of the Lapwing, and the voice of the Turtle.  
TO come to Civil Laws, if they stand one way and the balance another, it is the case of a Government which of necessity must be new modelled; wherefore your Lawyers advising you upon the like occasions to fit your Government to their Laws, are no more to be regarded, than your Tailor if he should desire you to fit your body to his doublet. There is also danger in the plausible pretence of reforming the Law, except the Government be first good, in which case it is a good Tree, and (trouble not yourselves overmuch) brings not forth evil fruit; otherwise, if the Tree be evil, you can never reform the fruit: or if a Root that is naught bring forth fruit of this kind that seems to be good, take the more heed, for it is the ranker poison. It was nowise probable, if AUGUSTUS had not made excellent Laws, that the bowels of Rome could have come to be so miserably eaten out by the Tyranny of TIBERIUS and his Successors. The best Rule as to your Laws in general is, that they be few. Rome by the testimony of CICERO was best governed under those of the twelve Tables; and by that of TACITUS, Plurimae leges, corruptissima respublica. You will be told, That where the Laws be few, they leave much to Arbitrary Power; but where they be many, they leave more: The Laws in this case, according to JUSTINIAN and the best Lawyers, being as litigious as the Suitors. SOLON made few; LYCURGUS fewer Laws: and Commonwealths have the fewest at this day of all other Governments.  

Of Courts.  NOW to conclude this part with a word de Judiciis, or of the Constitution or Course of Courts; it is a Discourse not otherwise capable of being well managed but by particular examples, both the Constitution and Course of Courts being divers in different Governments, but best beyond compare in Venice, where they regard not so much the Arbitrary Power of their Courts, as the Constitution of them; whereby that Arbitrary Power being altogether unable to retard or do hurt to business, produces and must produce the quickest dispatch, and the most righteous dictates of Justice that are perhaps in human nature. The manner I shall not stand in this place to describe, because it is exemplifyed at large in the Judicature of the People of Oceana. And thus much of ancient Prudence, and the first branch of this preliminary Discourse.   

The Second Part of the Preliminaries.  
IN the second Part I shall endeavour to show the Rise, Progress, and Declination of modern Prudence.  
THE date of this kind of Policy is to be computed, as was shown, from those Inundations of Goths, Vandals, Huns, and Lombard's, that overwhelmed the Roman Empire. But as there is no appearance in the Bulk or Constitution of modern Prudence, that it should ever have been able to come up and grapple with the Ancient, so something of necessity must have interposed, whereby this came to be enervated, and that to receive strength and encouragement. And this was the execrable Reign of the Roman Emperors taking rise from (that foelix scelus) the Arms of CAESAR, in which storm the Ship of the Roman Commonwealth was forced to disburden itself of that precious Fraight, which never since could emerge or raise its head but in the Gulf of Venice.  

The Transition of Ancient into Modern Prudence.  IT is said in Scripture, Thy evil is of thyself, O Israel! To which answers that of the Moralists, 
* Nemo nocetur nisi ex se.  None is hurt but by himself, as also the whole matter of the Politics; at present this Example of the Romans, who, thro' a negligence committed in their Agrarian Laws, let in the sink of Luxury, and forfeited the inestimable Treasure of Liberty for themselves and their Posterity.  

The Agrarian Laws of the Romans.  THEIR Agrarian Laws were such, whereby their Lands ought to have been divided among the People, either without mention of a Colony, in which case they were not obliged to change their abode; or with mention and upon condition of a Colony, in which case they 
Sigonius de Ant. Ro.  were to change their abode; and leaving the City, to plant themselves upon the Lands so assigned. The Lands assigned, or that aught to have been assigned in either of these ways, were of three kinds: Such as were taken from the Enemy and distributed to the People; or such as were taken from the Enemy, and under colour of being reserved to the Public use, were thro' stealth possessed by the Nobility; or such as were bought with the Public Money to be distributed. Of the Laws offered in these cases, those which divided the Lands taken from the Enemy, or purchased with the Public Money, never occasioned any dispute; but such as drove at dispossessing the Nobility of their Usurpations, and dividing the common purchase of the Sword among the People, were never touched but they caused Earthquakes, nor could they ever be obtained by the People; or being obtained, be observed by the Nobility, who not only preserved their prey, but growing vastly rich upon it, bought the People by degrees quite out of those Shares that had been conferred upon them. This the GRACCHIS coming too late to perceive, found the Balance of the Commonwealth to be lost; but putting the People (when they had least force) by forcible means upon the recovery of it, did ill, seeing it neither could nor did tend to any more than to show them by worse effects, that what the Wisdom of their Leaders had discovered was true. For (quite contrary to what has happened in Oceana, where, the Balance falling to the People, they have overthrown the Nobility) that Nobility of Rome, under the conduct of SCYLLA, overthrew the People and the Commonwealth: seeing SCYLLA first introduced that new Balance, which was 
Military Colonies.  the Foundation of the succeeding Monarchy, in the plantation of Military Colonies, instituted by his distribution of the conquered Lands, not now of Enemy's, but of Citizens, to forty seven Legions of his Soldiers; so that how he came to be PERPETUAL DICTATOR, or other Magistrates to succeed him in like Power, is no Miracle.  

The Balance of the Roman Empire.  THESE Military Colonies (in which manner succeeding Emperors continued, as AUGUSTUS by the distribution of the Veterans, whereby he had overcome BRUTUS' and CASSIUS', to plant their Soldiery) consisted of such as I conceive were they that are called Milites beneficiarii; in regard that the Tenure of their Lands was by way of Benefices, that is for Life, and upon condition of Duty or Service in the War upon their own Charge. These Benefices ALEXANDER SEVERUS granted to the Heirs of the Incumbents, but upon the same conditions. And such was the Dominion by which the Roman Emperors gave their Balance. But to the Beneficiarys, as was no less than necessary for the safety of the Prince, a matter of eight thousand by the Example of AUGUSTUS were added, which departed not from his sides, but were his perpetual Guard, called Praetorian Bands; though these, according to the incurable flaw already observed in this kind of Government, became the most frequent Butchers of their Lords that are to be found in Story. Thus far the Roman Monarchy is much the same with that at this day in Turkey, consisting of a Camp, and a Horsequarter; a Camp in regard of the Spahies and Janizarys, the perpetual Guard of the Prince, except they also chance to be liquorish after his Blood; and a Horsequarter in regard of the distribution of his whole Land to Tenants for Life, upon condition of continual Service, or as often as they shall be commanded at their own charge by Timars, being a word which they say signifies Benefices, that it shall save me a labour of opening the Government.  
BUT the Fame of MAHOMET and his Prudence, is especially founded in this, That whereas the Roman Monarchy, except that of Israel, was the most imperfect, the Turkish is the most perfect that ever was. Which happened in that the Roman (as the Israelitish of the Sanhedrim and the Congregation) had a mixture of the Senate and the People; and the Turkish is pure. And that this was pure, and the other mixed, happened not thro' the Wisdom of the Legislators, but the different Genius of the Nations; the People of the Eastern Parts, except the israelites, which is to be attributed to their Agrarian, having been such as scarce ever knew any other Condition than that of Slavery; and these of the Western having ever had such a relish of Liberty, as thro' what despair soever could never be brought to stand still while the Yoke was putting on their Necks, but by being said with some hopes of reserving to themselves some part of their Freedom.  
WHEREFORE JULIUS CAESAR (saith 
* Comitia cum populo s●rtitus est.  SUETONIUS) 
Dion.  contented himself in naming half the Magistrates, to leave the rest to the suffrage of the People. And MAECENAS, though he would not have AUGUSTUS to give the People their Liberty, would not have him take it quite away 
† Neque id existima●e debes autorem me tibi esse, ut tyrannidem in S. P. Q. R. in servitutem redactum teneas: quod neque dicere meum, n●que facere tuum est. . Whence this Empire being neither Hawk nor Buzzard, made a flight accordingly; and the Prince being perpetually tossed (having the Avarice of the Soldiery on this hand to satisfy upon the People, and the Senate and the People on the other to be defended from the Soldiery) seldom died any other death than by one Horn of this Dilemma, as is noted more at large by MACCHIAVEL. But 
P. cap. 19  the Praetorian Bands, those bestial executioners of their Captain's Tyranny upon others, and of their own upon him, having continued from the time of AUGUSTUS, were by CONSTANTIN the Great (incensed against them for taking part with his Adversary MAXENTIUS) removed from their strong Garrison which they held in Rome, and distributed into divers Provinces. The Benefices of the Soldiers that were hitherto held for Life and upon Duty, were by this Prince made Hereditary: so that the whole Foundation whereupon this Empire was first built being now removed, shows plainly, that the Emperors must long before this have found out some other way of support; and this was by stipendiating the Goths, a People that, deriving their Roots from the Northern parts of Germany, or out of Sweden, had (thro' their Victories obtained against DOMITIAN) long since spread their Branches to so near a Neighbourhood with the Roman Territories, that they began to overshadow them. For the Emperors making use of them in their Arms (as the French do at this day of the Switz) gave them that under the notion of a Stipend, which they received as Tribute, coming (if there were any default in the payment) so often to distrein for it, that in the time of HONORIUS they sacked Rome, and possessed themselves of Italy. And such was the transition of ancient into modern Prudence; or that breach which being followed in every part of the Roman Empire with Inundations of Vandals, Huns, Lombard's, Franks, Saxons, overwhelmed ancient Languages, Learning, Prudence, Manners, Cities, changing the names of Rivers, 
Macchiavel.  Countries, Seas, Mountains, and Men; CAMILLUS, CAESAR and POMPEY, being come to EDMUND, RICHARD, and GEOFFREY.  

The Gothic Balance.  TO open the Groundwork or Balance of these new Politicians: Feudum, says CALVIN the Lawyer, is a Gothic word of divers significations; for it is taken either for War, or for a possession of conquered Lands, distributed by the Victor to such of his Captains and Soldiers as had merited in his Wars, upon condition to acknowledge him to be their perpetual Lord, and themselves to be his Subjects.  

Institution of Feudatory Principalitys.  OF these there were three Kind's or Orders: The first of Nobility, distinguished by the Titles of Dukes, Marquess', Earls; and these being gratified with the Cities, Castles, and Villages of the conquered Italians, their Feuds participated of Royal Dignity, and were called Regalia, by which they had right to coin Money, create Magistrates, take Toll, Customs, Confiscations, and the like.  
FEUDS of the second Order were such as, with the consent of the King, were bestowed by these Feudatory Princes upon men of inferior Quality, called their Barons, on condition that next to the King they should defend the Dignitys and Fortunes of their Lords in Arms.  
THE lowest Order of Feuds were such as being conferred by those of the second Order upon private men, whether Noble or not Noble, obliged them in the like Duty to their Superiors; these were called Vavasors. And this is the Gothic Balance, by which all the Kingdoms this day in Christendom were at first erected; for which cause, if I had time, I should open in this place the Empire of Germany, and the Kingdoms of France, Spain, and Poland: But so much as has been said being sufficient for the discovery of the Principles of modern Prudence in general, I shall divide the remainder of my Discourse, which is more particular, into three parts.  
THE first showing the Constitution of the late Monarchy of Oceana.  
THE second, the Dissolution of the same. And  
THE third, the Generation of the present Commonwealth.  
THE Constitution of the late Monarchy of Oceana is to be considered in relation to the different Nations by whom it has been successively subdued and governed. The first of these were the Romans, the second the Teutons, the third the Scandians, and the fourth the Neustrians.  
THE Government of the Romans, who held it as a Province, I shall omit, because I am to speak of their Provincial Government in another place; only it is to be remembered here, that if we have given over running up and down naked, and with dappled hides, learned to write and read, and to be instructed with good Arts, for all these we are beholden to the Romans, either immediately, or mediately by the Teutons: for that the Teutons had the Arts from no other hand, is plain enough by their Language, which has yet no word to signify either writing or reading, but what is derived from the Latin. Furthermore, by the help of these Arts so learned, we have been capable of that Religion which we have long since received; wherefore it seems to me, that we ought not to detract from the memory of the Romans, by whose means we are, as it were, of Beasts become Men, and by whose means we might yet of obscure and ignorant Men (if we thought not too well of ourselves) become a wise and a great People.  

For the proof of the ensuing Discourse out of Records and Antiquitys, see Selden's Titles of Honour, from pag. 593, to pag. 837.  THE Romans having governed Oceana provincially, the Teutons were the first that introduced the Form of the late Monarchy. To these succeeded the Scandians, of whom (because their Reign was short, as also because they made little alteration in the Government as to the Form) I shall take no notice. But the Teutons, going to work upon the Gothic Balance, divided the whole Nation into three sorts of Feuds, that of Ealdorman, that of King's Thane, and that of Middle Thane.  

The Teuton Monarchy.  WHEN the Kingdom was first divided into Precincts will be as hard to show, as when it began first to be governed; it being impossible that there should be any Government without some Division. The Division that was in use with the Teutons, was by Countys, and every County had either its Ealdorman, or High Reeve. The title of Ealdorman came in time to Eorl, or Earl, and that of High Reeve to High Sheriff.  

Earls.  EARL of the Shire or County denoted the King's Thane, or Tehant by Grand Serjeantry or Knight's Service, in chief or in capite; his Possessions were sometimes the whole Territory from whence he had his denomination, that is, the whole County, sometimes more than one County, and sometimes less, the remaining part being in the Crown. He had also sometimes a third, or some other customary part of the profits of certain Cities, Boroughs, or other places within his Earldom. For an example of the possessions of Earls in ancient times, ETHELRED had to him and his Heirs the whole Kingdom of Mercia, containing three or four Counties; and there were others that had little less.  

King's Thane.  KING'S Thane was also an honorary Title, to which he was qualified that had five Hides of Land held immediately of the King by service of personal attendance; insomuch that if a Churl or Countryman had thriven to this proportion, having a Church, a Kitchen, a Belhouse (that is, a Hall with a Bell in it to call his Family to dinner) a Boroughgate with a seat (that is, a Porch) of his own, and any distinct Office in the King's Court, than was he the King's Thane. But the proportion of a Hide Land, otherwise called Caruca, or a Blow Land, is difficult to be understood, because it was not certain; nevertheless it is generally conceived to be so much as may be managed with one Blow, and would yield the maintenance of the same, with the appurtenances in all kinds.  

Middle Thane.  THE Middle Thane was feudal, but not honorary; he was also called a Vavasor, and his Lands a Vavasory, which held of some Mesn Lord, and not immediately of the King.  
POSSESSIONS and their Tenors, being of this nature, show the Balance of the Teuton Monarchy; wherein the Riches of Earls were so vast, that to arise from the Balance of their Dominion to their Power, they were not only called Reguli or little Kings, but were such indeed; their Jurisdiction being of two sorts, either that which was exercised by them in the Court of their Counties, or in the High Court of the Kingdom.  

Shiremoot.  IN the Territory denominating an Earl, if it were all his own, the Courts held, and the Profits of that Jurisdiction were to his own use and benefit. But if he had but some part of his County, than his Jurisdiction and Courts (saving perhaps in those possessions that were his own) were held by him to the King's use and benefit; that is, he commonly supplied the Office which the Sheriffs regularly executed in Countys that had no Earls, and whence they came to be called Viscounts. 
Viscounts.  The Court of the County that had an Earl was held by the Earl and the Bishop of the Diocese, after the manner of the Sheriffs Turns to this day; by which means both the Ecclesiastical and Temporal Laws were given in charge together to the Country. The Causes of Vavasors or Vavasories appertained to the cognizance of this Court, where Wills were proved, Judgement and Execution given, Cases criminal and civil determined.  

Halymoot.  THE Kings Thanes had the like Jurisdiction in their Thane Lands, as Lords in their Manors, where they also kept Courts.  
BESIDES these in particular, both the Earls and Kings Thanes, together with the Bishops, Abbots, and Vavasors, or Middle Thanes, had in the High Court or Parliament of the Kingdom, a more public 
Weidenagemoots.  Jurisdiction, consisting First of deliberative Power for advising upon, and assenting to new Laws: Secondly, of giving council in matters of State: and Thirdly, of Judicature upon Suits and Complaints. I shall not omit to enlighten the obscurity of these times (in which there is little to be found of a methodical Constitution of this High Court) by the addition of an Argument, which I conceive to bear a strong testimony to itself, though taken out of a late Writing that conceals the Author. It is well known, says he, that in every quarter of the Realm a great many Boroughs do yet send Burgesses to the Parliament, which nevertheless be so anciently and so long since decayed and gone to nought, that they cannot be showed to have been of any Reputation since the Conquest, much less to have obtained any such Privilege by the grant of any succeeding King: wherefore these must have had this right by more ancient usage, and before the Conquest, they being enable now to show whence they derived it.  
THIS Argument (though there be more) I shall pitch upon as sufficient to prove; First, that the lower sort of the People had right to Session in Parliament during the time of the Teutons. Secondly, that they were qualified to the same by election in their Boroughs, and, if Knights of the Shire (as no doubt they are) be as ancient in the Countries. Thirdly, If it be a good Argument to say, that the Commons during the reign of the Teutons were elected into Parliament, because they are so now, and no man can show when this custom began; I see not which way it should be an ill one to say, that the Commons during the reign of the Teutons constituted also a distinct House, because they do so now; unless any man can show that they did ever sit in the same House with the Lords. Wherefore to conclude this part, I conceive for these, and other reasons to be mentioned hereafter, that the Parliament of the Teutons consisted of the King, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons of the Nation, notwithstanding 
25 Edw. 3. c. 1.  the stile of divers Acts of Parliament, which runs as that of Magna Charta in the King's name only, seeing the same was nevertheless enacted by the King, Peers, and Commons of the Land, as is testified in those words by a subsequent Act.  

Monarchy of the Neus●rians.  THE Monarchy of the Teutons had stood in this posture about two hundred and twenty years; when TURBO Duke of Neustria making his claim to the Crown of one of their Kings that died childless, followed it with successful Arms; and being possessed of the Kingdom, used it as conquered, distributing the Earldoms, Thane Lands, Bishoprics and Prelacies of the whole Realm among his Neustrians. From this time the Earl came to be called Comes, Consul, and Dux (though Consul and Dux grew afterward out of use) the King's Thanes came to be called Barons, and their Lands Baronies; the Middle Thane holding still of a mean Lord, retained the name of Vavasor.  

Their Earls.  THE Earl or Comes continued to have the third part of the Pleas of the County paid to him by the Sheriff or Vicecomes, now a distinct Officer in every County depending upon the King; saving that such Earls as had their Counties to their own use, were now Counts Palatin, and had under the King Regal Jurisdiction: insomuch that they constituted their own Sheriffs, granted Pardons, and issued Writs in their own names; nor did the Kings Writ of ordinary Justice run in their 
27 11. 8.  Dominions till a late Statute, whereby much of this privilege was taken away.  

Their Barons.  FOR Barons, they came from henceforth to be in different times of three kinds; Barons by their Estates and Tenors, Barons by Writ, and Barons created by Letters Patents. From TURBO the first to ADOXUS the seventh King from the Conquest, Barons had their denomination from their Possessions and Tenors. And these were either Spiritual or Temporal; for not only the Thane Lands, but the 
Barons by their Possessions.  possessions of Bishops, as also of some twenty six Abbats, and two Priors, were now erected into Baronies, whence the Lords Spiritual that had suffrage in the Teuton Parliament as Spiritual Lords, came to have it in the Neustrian Parliament as Barons, and were made subject (which they had not formerly been) to Knight's service in chief. Barony coming henceforth to signify all honorary possessions as well of Earls as Barons, and Baronage to denote all kinds of Lords as well Spiritual as Temporal having right to sit in Parliament, the Baronies in this sense were sometimes more, and sometimes fewer, but commonly about 200 or 250, containing in them a matter of sixty thousand feuda militum, or Knights Fees, whereof some twenty eight thousand were in the Clergy. It is ill luck that no man can tell what the Land of a Knight's Fee (reckoned in some Writs at 40 l. a year, and in others at 10) was certainly worth; for by such a help we might have exactly demonstrated the Balance of this Government. But says COOK, it contained 
Cook 11. Inst. pag. 596.  twelve Blow Lands, and that was thought to be the most certain account. But this again is extremely uncertain; for one Blow out of some Land that was fruitful, might work more than ten out of some other that was barren. Nevertheless, seeing it appears by BRACTON, 
Balance of the Neustrian Monarchy.  that of Earldoms and Baronies it was wont to be said, that the whole Kingdom was composed; as also, that these consisting of 60000 Knights Fees, furnished 60000 men for the King's service, being the whole Militia of this Monarchy, it cannot be imagined, that the Vavasories or Freeholds in the People amounted to any considerable proportion. Wherefore the Balance and Foundation of this Government was in the 60000 Knights Fees, and these being possessed by the 250 Lords, it was a Government of the Few, or of the Nobility; wherein the People might also assemble, but could have no more than a mere name. And the Clergy holding a third to the whole Nation, as is plain by the Parliament Roll; it is an absurdity (seeing the Clergy of France came first thro' their Riches to be a State of that Kingdom) to acknowledge the People to have been a State of this Realm, and not to allow it to the Clergy, who were so much more weighty in the Balance, which is 
4 Rich. 2. Num. 13.  that of all other whence a State or Order in a Government is denominated. Wherefore this Monarchy consisted of the King, and of the three (ordines Regni, or) Estates, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons: It consisted of these I say as to the balance, though during the Reign of some of these Kings, not as to the administration.  

Administration of the Neustrian Monarchy during the reign of the first Kings.  FOR the ambition of TURBO, and some of those that more immediately succeeded him, to be absolute Princes, strove against the nature of their Foundation, and, inasmuch as he had divided almost the whole Realm among his Neustrians, with some encouragement for a while. But the Neustrians while they were but foreign Plants, having no security against the Natives, but in growing up by their Prince's sides, were no sooner well rooted in their vast Dominions, than they came up according to the infallible consequence of the Balance domestic, and, contracting the National interest of the Baronage, grew as fierce in the vindication of the ancient Rights and Liberties of the same, as if they had been always Natives: Whence, the Kings being as obstinate on the one side for their absolute Power, as these on the other for their Immunitys, grew certain Wars which took their denomination from the Barons.  
THIS fire about the middle of the Reign of ADOXUS began to break out. And whereas the Predecessors of this King had divers times been forced to summon Councils resembling those of the Teutons, to 
Barons by Writ.  which the Lords only that were Barons by Dominion and Tenure had hitherto repaired, ADOXUS seeing the effects of such Dominion, began first not to call such as were Barons by Writ (for that was according to the practice of ancient times) but to call such by Writs as were otherwise no Barons; by which means striving to avoid the consequence of the Balance, in coming unwillingly to set the Government straight, he was the first that set it awry. For the Barons in his Reign, and his Successors, having vindicated their ancient Authority, restored the Parliament with all the Rights and Privileges of the same, saving that from thenceforth the Kings had found out a way whereby to help themselves against the mighty, by Creatures of their own, and such as had no other support but by their favour. By which means this Government, being indeed the Masterpiece of modern Prudence, has been cried up to the Skies, as the only invention whereby at once to maintain the Sovereignty of a Prince, and the Liberty of the People. Whereas indeed it has been no other than a wrestling match, wherein the Nobility, as they have been stronger, have thrown the King; or the King, if he has been stronger, has thrown the Nobility; or the King, where he has had a Nobility, and could bring them to his party, has thrown the People, as in France and Spain; or the People where they have had no Nobility, or could get them to be of their party, have thrown the King, as in Holland, and of later times in Oceana. But they came not 
49 11. 3.  to this strength but by such approaches and degrees, as remain to be further opened. For whereas the Barons by Writ (as the sixty four Abbats, and thirty six Priors that were so called) were but pro tempore, DICOTOME being the twelfth King from the Conquest, began to 
Barons by Letters Patents.  make Barons by Letters Patents, with the addition of honorary Pensions for the maintenance of their Dignitys to them and their Heirs; so that they were hands in the King's Purse, and had no shoulders for his Throne. Of these when the House of Peers came once to be full, as will be seen hereafter, there was nothing more emty. But for the present, the Throne having other supports, they did not hurt that so much as they did the King: For the old Barons taking DICOTOME'S Prodigality to such Creatures so ill, that they deposed him, got the trick of it, and never gave over setting up and pulling down their Kings according to their various interests, and that faction of the White 
Dissolution of the late Monarchy of Oceana.  and Red, into which they had been thenceforth divided, till PANURGUS the eighteenth King from the Conquest, was more by their Favour than his Right advanced to the Crown. This King thro' his natural subtlety reflecting at once upon the greatness of their Power, and the inconstancy of their favour, began to find another Flaw in this kind of Government, which is also noted by MACCHIAVEL, namely that a Throne supported by a Nobility, is not so hard to be ascended, as kept warm. Wherefore his secret Jealousy, lest the dissension of the Nobility, as it brought him in, might throw him out, made him travel in ways undiscovered by them, to ends as little foreseen by himself: while to establish his own safety, he by mixing Water with their Wine, first began to open those Sluices that have since overwhelmed not the King only, but the Throne. For whereas a Nobility strikes not at the Throne without which they cannot subsist, but at some King that they do not like; popular Power strikes thro' the King at the Throne, as that which is incompatible with it. Now that PANURGUS in abating the Power of the Nobility, was the cause whence it came to fall into the hands of the People, appears by those several Statutes that were made in his Reign, as that for Population, those against Retainers, and that for Alienations.  
BY the Statute of Population, all houses of Husbandry that were used with twenty Acres of Ground and upwards, were to be maintained, and kept up for ever with a competent proportion of Land laid to them, and in no wise, as appears by a subsequent Statute, to be severed. By which means the houses being kept up, did of necessity enforce Dwellers; and the proportion of Land to be tilled being kept up, did of necessity enforce the Dweller not to be a Beggar or Cottager, but a Man of some substance, that might keep Hinds and Servants, and set the Blow a going. This did mightily concern (says the Historian of that Prince) the might and manhood of the Kingdom, and in effect amortize a great part of the Lands to the hold and possession of the Yeomanry or middle People, who living not in a servile or indigent fashion, were much unlinked from dependence upon their Lords, and living in a free and plentiful manner, became a more excellent Infantry; but such a one upon which the Lords had so little Power, that from henceforth they may be computed to have been disarmed.  
AND as they lost their Infantry after this manner, so their Cavalry and Commanders were cut off by the Statute of Retainers: for whereas it was the custom of the Nobility to have younger Brothers of good houses, metalled fellows, and such as were knowing in the feats of Arms about them; they who were longer followed with so dangerous a train, escaped not such Punishments, as made them take up.  
HENCEFORTH the Country-lives, and great Tables of the Nobility, which no longer nourished veins that would bleed for them, were fruitless and loathsome till they changed the Air, and of Princes became Courtiers; where their Revenues, never to have been exhausted by Beef and Mutton, were found narrow, whence followed racking of Rents, and at length sale of Lands: the riddance thro' the Statute of Alienations being rendered far more quick and facile than formerly it had been thro' the new invention of Intails.  
TO this it happened, that CORAUNUS the Successor of that King dissolving the Abbeys, brought with the declining state of the Nobility so vast a prey to the Industry of the People, that the Balance of the Commonwealth was too apparently in the popular Party, to be unseen by the wise Council of Queen PARTHENIA, who converting her reign thro' the perpetual Lovetricks that past between her and her People into a kind of Romance, wholly neglected the Nobility. And by these degrees came the House of Commons to raise that head, which since has been so high and formidable to their Princes, that they have looked pale upon those Assemblies. Nor was there any thing now wanting to the destruction of the Throne, but that the People, not apt to see their own strength, should be put to feel it; when a Prince, as stiff in disputes as the nerve of Monarchy was grown slack, received that unhappy encouragement from his Clergy which became his utter ruin, while trusting more to their Logic than the rough Philosophy of his Parliament, it came to an irreparable breach; for the House of Peers, which alone had stood in this gap, now sinking down between the King and the Commons, showed that CRASSUS was dead, and the Isthmus broken. But a Monarchy devested of its Nobility, has no refuge under Heaven but an Army. Wherefore the dissolution of this Government caused the War, not the War the dissolution of this Government.  
OF the King's success with his Arms it is not necessary to give any further account, than that they proved as ineffectual as his Nobility; but without a Nobility or an Army (as has been showed) there can be no Monarchy. Wherefore what is there in nature that can arise out of these Ashes, but a popular Government, or a new Monarchy to be erected by the victorious Army?  
TO erect a Monarchy, be it never so new, unless like LEVIATHAN you can hang it, as the Country-fellow speaks, by Geometry (for what else is it to say, that every other Man must give up his will to the will of this one Man without any other foundation?) it must stand upon old Principles, that is, upon a Nobility or an Army planted on a due balance of Dominion. Aut viam inveniam aut faciam, was an Adage of CAESAR; and there is no standing for a Monarchy unless it finds this Balance, or makes it. If it finds it, the work's done to its hand: for, where there is inequality of Estates, there must be inequality of Power; and where there is inequality of Power, there can be no Commonwealth. To make it, the Sword must extirpate out of Dominion all other roots of Power, and plant an Army upon that ground. An Army may be planted Nationally or Provincially. To plant it Nationally, it must be in one of the four ways mentioned, that is, either Monarchically in part, as the Roman Benesiciarii; or Monarchically in the whole, as the Turkish Timariot; Aristocratically, that is, by Earls and Barons, as the Neustrians were planted by TURBO; or Democratically, that is, by equal lots, as the Israelitish Army in the Land of Canaan by JOSHUA. In every one of these ways there must not only be Confiscations, but Confiscations to such a proportion as may answer to the work intended.  
CONFISCATION of a People that never sought against you, but whose Arms you have born, and in which you have been victorious, and this upon premeditation, and in cold blood, I should have thought to be against any example in human Nature, but for those alleged by MACCHIAVEL of AGATHOCLES, and OLIVERETTO di Fermo: the former whereof being Captain General of the Syracusans, upon a day assembled the Senate and the People, as if he had something to communicate with them, when at a sign given he cut the Senators in pieces to a man, and all the richest of the People, by which means he came to be King. The proceedings of OLIVERETTO in making himself Prince of Fermo, were somewhat different in circumstances, but of the same nature. Nevertheless CATILINE, who had a spirit equal to anv of these in his intended mischief, could never bring the like to pass in Rome. The head of a small Commonwealth, such a one as was that of Syracuse or Fermo, is easily brought to the block; but that a populous Nation, such as Rome, had not such a one, was the grief of NERO. If SCYLLA or CAESAR attained to be Princes, it was by Civil War, and such Civil War as yielded rich spoils, there being a vast Nobility to be confiscated; which also was the case in Oceana, when it yielded earth by Earldoms and Baronies to the Neustrian, for the plantation of his new Potentats. Where a Conqueror finds the Riches of a Land in the hands of the Few, the Forseitures are easy, and amount to vast advantage; but where the People have equal shares, the Confiscation of many comes to little, and is not only dangerous, but fruitless.  
THE Romans in one of their defeats of the Volsci found among the Captives certain Tusculans, who, upon examination, confessed that the Arms they bore were by command of their State; whereupon information being given to the Senate by the General CAMILLUS, he was forthwith commanded to march against Tusculum; which doing accordingly, he found the Tusculan Fields full of Husbandmen, that stirred not otherwise from the Blow, than to furnish his Army with all kind of Accommodations and Victuals: drawing near to the City, he saw the Gates wide open, the Magistrates coming out in their Gowns to salute and bid him welcome: entering, the Shops were all at work, and open; the Streets sounded with the noise of Schoolboys at their Books; there was no face of War. Whereupon CAMILLUS causing the Senate to assemble, told them, That though the Art was understood, yet had they at length found out the true Arms whereby the Romans were most undoubtedly to be conquered, for which cause he would not anticipat the Senate, to which he desired them forthwith to send, which they did accordingly; and their Dictator with the rest of their Ambassadors being found by the Roman Senators as they went into the house standing sadly at the door, were sent for in as Friends, and not as Enemy's: Where the Dictator having said, If we have offended, the fault was not so great as is our Penitence and your Virtue; the Senate gave them peace forthwith, and soon after made the Tusculans Citizens of Rome.  
BUT putting the case, of which the World is not able to show an example, That the forfeiture of a populous Nation, not conquered, but Friends, and in cool blood, might be taken; your Army must be planted in one of the ways mentioned. To plant it in the way of absolute Monarchy, that is, upon feuds for life, such as the Timars, a Country as large and fruitful as that of Greece, would afford you but sixteen thousand Timariot, for that is the most the Turc (being the best husband that ever was of this kind) makes of it at this day: and if Oceana, which is less in fruitfulness by one half, and in extent by three parts, should have no greater a force, whoever breaks her in one battle, may be sure she shall never rise; for such (as was noted by MACCHIAVEL) is the nature of the Turkish Monarchy, if you break it in two battles, you have destroyed its whole Militia; and the rest being all slaves, you hold it without any further resistance. Wherefore the erection of an absolute Monarchy in Oceana, or in any other Country that is no larger, without making it a certain prey to the first Invader, is altogether impossible.  
TO plant by halves, as the Roman Emperors did their Beneficiarys, or military Colonies, it must be either for life; and this an Army of Oceaners in their own Country (especially having Estates of Inheritance) will never bear; because such an Army so planted is as well confiscated as the People; nor had the Mamalucs been contented with such usage in Egypt, but that they were Foreigners, and daring not to mix with the Natives, it was of absolute necessity to their being.  
OR planting them upon Inheritance, whether Aristocratically as the Neustrians, or Democratically as the israelites, they grow up by certain consequence into the national Interest: and this, if they be planted popularly, comes to a Commonwealth; if by way of Nobility, to a mixed Monarchy, which of all other will be found to be the only kind of Monarchy, whereof this Nation, or any other that is of no greater extent, has been or can be capable: for if the israelites (though their Democratical Balance, being fixed by their Agrarian, stood firm) be yet found to have elected Kings, it was because, their Territory lying open, they were perpetually invaded, and being perpetually invaded, turned themselves to any thing which thro' the want of experience they thought might be a remedy; whence their mistake in election of their Kings (under whom they gained nothing, but on the contrary lost all they had acquired by their Commonwealth, both Estates and Liberties) is not only apparent, but without parallel. And if there have been (as was shown) a Kingdom of the Goths in Spain, and of the Vandals in Asia, consisting of a single Person and a Parliament (taking a Parliament to be a Council of the People only, without a Nobility) it is expressly said of those Councils, that they deposed their Kings as often as they pleased: nor can there be any other consequence of such a Government, seeing where there is a Council of the People, they do never receive Laws, but give them; and a Council giving Laws to a single Person, he has no means in the World whereby to be any more than a subordinat Magistrate, but force: in which case he is not a single Person and a Parliament, but a single Person and an Army, which Army again must be planted as has been shown, or can be of no long continuance.  
IT is true, that the Provincial Balance being in nature quite contrary to the National, you are no way to plant a Provincial Army upon Dominion. But than you must have a native Territory in Strength, Situation, or Government, able to overbalance the forens, or you can never hold it. That an Army should in any other case be long supported by a mere Tax, is a mere fancy as void of all reason and experience, as if a Man should think to maintain such a one by robbing of Orchards: for a mere Tax is but pulling of Plumtrees, the roots whereof are in other men's grounds, who suffering perpetual Violence, come to hate the Author of it: And it is a Maxim, that no Prince that is hated by his People can be safe. Arms planted upon Dominion extirpate Enemy's, and make Friends; but maintained by a mere Tax, have Enemy's that have roots, and Friends that have none.  
TO conclude, Oceana, or any other Nation of no greater extent, must have a competent Nobility, or is altogether incapable of Monarchy: for where there is equality of Estates, there must be equality of Power; and where there is equality of Power, there can be no Monarchy.  

The generation of the Commonwealth.  TO come then to the generation of the Commonwealth; it has been shown how thro' the ways and means used by PANURGUS to abase the Nobility, and so to mend that flaw which we have asserted to be incurable in this kind of Constitution, he suffered the Balance to fall into the power of the People, and so broke the Government: but the Balance being in the People, the Commonwealth (though they do not see it) is already in the nature of 
* Cornua nota pri●● vitulo, quàm frontibus extant.  them. There wants nothing else but Time (which is slow and dangerous) or Art (which would be more quick and secure) for the bringing those native Arms (wherwithal they are found already) to resist they know not how every thing that opposes them, to such maturity as may fix them upon their own strength and bottom.  

What Prudence is.  BUT whereas this Art is Prudence; and that part of Prudence which regards the present Work, is nothing else but the skill of raising such Superstructures of Government, as are natural to the known Foundations: they never mind the Foundation, but thro' certain animosities (wherewith by striving one against another they are infected) or thro' freaks, by which, not regarding the course of things, nor how they conduce to their purpose, they are given to building in the Air, come to be divided and subdivided into endless Parties and Factions, both Civil and Ecclesiastical: which briefly to open, I shall first speak of the People in general, and then of their Divisions.  
A PEOPLE (says MACCHIAVEL) that is corrupt, is not capable of a Commonwealth. But in showing what a corrupt People is, he has either involved himself or me; nor can I otherwise come out of the Labyrinth, than by saying, that the Balance altering a People, as to the foregoing Government, must of necessity be corrupt: but Corruption in this sense signifys no more than that the Corruption of one Government (as in natural bodies) is the Generation of another. Wherefore if the Balance altars from Monarchy, the Corruption of the People in this case is that which makes them capable of a Commonwealth. But whereas I am not ignorant, that the Corruption which he means is in Manners, this also is from the Balance. For the Balance leading from Monarchical into Popular, abates the Luxury of the Nobility, and, enriching the People, brings the Government from a more private to a more public Interest; which coming nearer, as has been shown, to Justice and right Reason, the People upon a like alteration is so far from such a Corruption of Manners, as should render them incapable of a Commonwealth, that of necessity they must thereby contract such a Reformation of Manners as will bear no other kind of Government. On the other side, where the Balance changes from Popular to Oligarchical or Monarchical, the public Interest, with the Reason and Justice included in the same, becomes more private; Luxury is introduced in the room of Temperance, and Servitude in that of Freedom; which causes such a corruption of Manners both in the Nobility and People, as, by the Example of Rome in the time of the Triumvirs, is more at large discovered by the Author to have been altogether incapable of a Commonwealth.  
BUT the Balance of Oceana changing quite contrary to that of Rome, the Manners of the People were not thereby corrupted, but on the contrary adapted to a Commonwealth. For differences of Opinion in a People not rightly informed of their Balance, or a division into Parties (while there is not any common Ligament of Power sufficient to reconcile or hold them) is no sufficient proof of Corruption. Nevertheless, seeing this must needs be matter of scandal and danger, it will not be amiss, in showing what were the Parties, to show what were their Errors.  
THE Parties into which this Nation was divided, were Temporal, or Spiritual: and the Temporal Parties were especially two, the one Royalists, the other Republicans: each of which asserted their different Causes, either out of Prudence or Ignorance, out of Interest or Conscience.  
FOR Prudence, either that of the Ancients is inferior to the Modern (which we have hitherto been setting face to face, that any one 
The Royalist.  may judge) or that of the Royalist must be inferior to that of the Commonwealthsman's. And for Interest, taking the Commonwealths-man to have really intended the Public (for otherwise he is a Hypocrite and the worst of Men) that of the Royalist must of necessity have been more private. Wherefore the whole dispute will come upon matter of Conscience; and this, whether it be urged by the Right of Kings, the Obligation of former Laws, or of the Oath of Allegiance, is absolved by the Balance.  
FOR if the Right of Kings were as immediately derived from the Breath of God as the Life of Man, yet this excludes not Death and Dissolution. But, that the dissolution of the late Monarchy was as natural as the Death of a Man, has been already shown. Wherefore it remains with the Royalists to discover by what Reason or Experience it is possible for a Monarchy to stand upon a popular Balance; or, the Balance being popular, as well the Oath of Allegiance, as all other Monarchical Laws imply an impossibility, and are therefore void.  

The Commonwealthsman's.  TO the Commonwealthsman's I have no more to say, but that if he excludes any Party, he is not truly such; nor shall ever found a Commonwealth upon the natural Principle of the same, which is Justice. And the Royalist for having opposed a Commonwealth in Oceana (where the Laws were so ambiguous that they might be eternally disputed, and never reconciled) can neither be justly for that cause excluded from his full and equal share in the Government; nor prudently, for this reason, that a Commonwealth consisting of a Party will be in perpetual labour of her own destruction: Whence it was that the Romans having conquered the Alban, incorporated them with equal Right into the Commonwealth. And if the Royalists be flesh of your flesh, and nearer of Blood than were the Alban to the Romans, you being also both Christians, the arguments the stronger. Nevertheless there is no reason that a Commonwealth should any more favour a Party remaining in fixed opposition against it, than BRUTUS' did his own Sons. But if it six them upon that opposition, it is its own fault, not theirs; and this is done by excluding them. Men that have equal Possessions, and the same security for their Estates and their Liberties that you have, have the same cause with you to defend both: But if you will be trampling, they fight for Liberty, though for Monarchy; and you for Tyranny, though under the name of a Commonwealth: The nature of Orders in a Government rightly instituted being void of all jealousy, because, let the Parties which it embraces be what they will, its Orders are such as they neither would resist if they could, nor could if they would, as has been partly already shown; and will appear more at large by the following Model.  

Religious Par▪ 'tis.  THE Parties that are Spiritual are of more kinds than I need mention; some for a National Religion, and others for Liberty of Conscience, with such animosity on both sides, as if these two could not consist together, and of which I have already sufficiently spoken, to show, that indeed the one cannot well subsist without the other. But they of all the rest are the most dangerous, who, holding that the Saints must govern, go about to reduce the Commonwealth to a Party, as well for the Reasons already shown, as that their Pretences are against Scripture, where the Saints are commanded to submit to the Higher Powers, and to be subject to the Ordinance of Man. And that men, pretending under the notion of Saints or Religion to Civil Power, have hitherto never failed to dishonour that Profession, the World is full of Examples, whereof I shall confine myself at present only to a couple, the one of Old, the other of New Rome.  

Saints.  IN Old Rome the Patricians or Nobility pretending to be the godly Party, were questioned by the People for engrossing all the Magistracies of that Commonwealth, and had nothing to say why they did so, but 
* Quòd nemo plebeius auspicia haberet.  that Magistracy required a kind of Holiness which was not in the People: 
† Plebs ad id maximâ indignatione exarsit, quod auspicari, tanquam invisi▪ Diis immortalibus, negarentur posse. T. Liv. 4. 8.  at which the People were filled with such Indignation as had come to cutting of Throats, if the Nobility had not immediately laid by the Insolency of that Plea; which nevertheless when they had done, the People for a long time after continued to elect no other but Patrician Magistrates.  
THE Example of New Rome in the rise and practice of the Hierarchy (too well known to require any further illustration) is far more immodest.  
THIS has been the course of Nature: and when it has pleased, or shall please God to introduce any thing that is above the course of Nature, he will, as he has always done, confirm it by Miracle; for so in his Prophecy of the Reign of CHRIST upon Earth, he expressly promises: seeing that the Souls of them that were beheaded for JESUS, shall be seen to live and reign with him; which will be an object of Sense, the rather, because the rest of the Dead are not to live again till the Thousand Years be finished. And it is not lawful for men to persuade us that a thing already is, though there be no such object of our Sense, which God has told us shall not be till it be an object of our Sense.  
THE Saintship of a People as to Government, consists in the election of Magistrates fearing God, and hating Covetousness, and not in their confining themselves, or being confined to men of this or that Party or Profession. It consists in making the most prudent and religious choice they can; yet not in trusting to Men, but, next God, to their own Orders. Give us good Men, and they will make us good Laws, is the Maxim of a Demagog, and is (thro' the alteration which is commonly perceivable in men, when they have power to work their own Wills) exceeding fallible. But give us good Orders, and they will make us good Men, is the Maxim of a Legislator, and the most infallible in the Politics.  
BUT these Divisions (however there be some good Men that look sadly on them) are trivial things; first as to the Civil concern, because the Government, whereof this Nation is capable, being once seen, takes in all Interests. And, secondly, as to the Spiritual; because as the pretence of Religion has always been turbulent in broken Governments, so where the Government has been sound and steady, Religion has never showed itself with any other face than that of the natural Sweetness, and Tranquillity: nor is there any reason why it should; 
The Errors of the People are from their Governors.  wherefore the Errors of the People are occasioned by their Governors. If they be doubtful of the way, or wander from it, it is because their Guides misled them; and the Guides of the People are never so well qualified for leading by any Virtue of their own, as by that of the Government.  
THE Government of Oceana (as it stood at the time whereof we discourse, consisting of one single Council of the People, exclusively of the King and the Lords) was called a Parliament: Nevertheless the Parliaments of the Teutons and of the Neustrians consisted, as has been shown, of the King, Lords and Commons; wherefore this under an old Name was a new thing: A Parliament consisting of a single Assembly elected by the People, and invested with the whole Power of the Government, without any Covenants, Conditions, or Orders whatsoever. So new a thing, that neither ancient nor modern Prudence can show any avowed Example of the like. And there is scarce any thing that seems to me so strange as that (whereas there was nothing more familiar with these Counsillors, than to bring the Scripture to the House) there should not be a Man of them that so much as offered to bring the House to the Scripture, wherein, as has been shown, is contained that Original, whereof all the rest of the Commonwealths seem to be Copies. Certainly if LEVIATHAN (who is surer of nothing than that a popular Commonwealth consists but of one Council) transcribed his Doctrine out of this Assembly, for him to except against ARISTOTLE and CICERO for writing out of their own Commonwealths, was not so fair play; or if the Parliament transcribed out of him, it had been an honour better due to MOSES. But where one of them should have an Example but from the other, I cannot imagine, there being nothing of this kind that I can find in story, but the Oligarchy of Athens, the thirty Tyrants of the same, and the Roman Decemvirs.  

Lib. 8.  FOR the Oligarchy, THUCYDIDES tells us, that it was a Senate or Council of Four hundred, pretending to a Balancing Council of the People consisting of Five thousand, but not producing them; wherein you have the definition of an Oligarchy, which is a single Council both debating and resolving, dividing and choosing; and what that must come to, was shown by the Example of the Girls, and is apparent by the experience of all times: wherefore the Thirty set up by the Lacedæmonians (when they had conquered Athens) are called Tyrants by all Authors, LEVIATHAN only excepted, who will have them against all the World to have been an Aristocracy; but for what reason I cannot imagine, these also, as void of any Balance, having been void of that which is essential to every Commonwealth, whether Aristocratical or Popular; except he be pleased with them, because that, according to the Testimony of XENOPHON, they killed more men in eight months, than the Lacedæmonians had done in ten years; oppressing the People (to use Sir WALTER RALEIGHS words) with all base and intolerable Slavery.  
THE usurped Government of the Decemvirs in Rome was of the same kind. Wherefore in the fear of God let Christian Legislators (setting the Pattern given in the Mount on the one side, and these execrable Examples on the other) know the right hand from the left; and so much the rather, because those things which do not conduce to the good of the Governed, are fallacious, if they appear to be good for the Governors. God in chastising a People, is accustomed to burn his Rod. The Empire of these Oligarchys was not so violent as short, nor did they fall upon the People, but in their own immediate ruin. A Council without a Balance is not a Commonwealth, but an Oligarchy; and every Oligarchy, except it be put to the defence of its Wickedness or Power against some outward danger, is factious. Wherefore the Errors of the People being from their Governors (which Maxim in the Politics bearing a sufficient testimony to itself, is also proved by MACCHIAVEL) if the People of Oceana have been factious, the Cause is apparent: But what Remedy?  

The General.  IN answer to this Question, I come now to the Army; of which the most victorious Captain, and incomparable Patriot OLPHAUS MEGALETOR was now General: who being a much greater master of that Art, whereof I have made a rough draught in these Preliminaries, had such sad reflections upon the ways and proceedings of the Parliament, as cast him upon Books, and all other means of diversion, among which he happened on this place of MACCHIAVEL: Thrice happy is that People which chances to have a Man able to give them such a Government at once, as without alteration may secure them of their Liberties; seeing it is certain that Lacedaemon, in observing the Laws of LYCURGUS, continued about eight hundred years without any dangerous Tumult or Corruption. My Lord General (as it is said of THEMISTOCLES, that he could not sleep for the Glory obtained by MILTIADES at the Battle of Maratho) took so new and deep an Impression at these words of the much greater Glory of LYCURGUS, that, being on this side assaulted with the emulation of his illustrious Object, and on the other with the Misery of the Nation, which seemed (as it were ruined by his Victory) to cast itself at his feet, he was almost wholly deprived of his natural rest, till the debate he had within himself came to a firm resolution, that the greatest Advantages of a Commonwealth are, first, that the Legislator should be one Man: And, secondly, that the Government should be made altogether, or at once. For the first, It is certain, says 
Des. B. 1. c. 9  MACCHIAVEL, that a Commonwealth is seldom or never well turned or constituted, except it has been the Work of one Man; for which 
That a Legislator is to b● one.  cause a wise Legislator, and one whose mind is firmly set, not upon private but the public Interest, not upon his Posterity but upon his Country, may justly endeavour to get the sovereign Power into his own hands: nor shall any man that is Master of Reason blame such extraordinary means as in that case will be necessary, the end proving no other than the Constitution of a well-ordered Commonwealth. The reason of this is demonstrable: for the ordinary means not failing, the Commonwealth has no need of a Legislator; but the ordinary means failing, there is no recourse to be had but to such as are extraordinary. And, whereas a Book or a Building has not been known to attain to its perfection, if it has not had a sole Author or Architect; a Commonwealth, 
That a Commonwealth is to be made at once.  as to the Fabric of it, is of the like nature. And thus it may be made at once; in which there be great advantages: for a Commonwealth made at once, taketh Security at the same time it lends its Money; and trusts not itself to the Faith of Men, but lanches immediately forth into the Empire of Laws: and being set straight, brings the Manners of its Citizens to its rule; whence followed that uprightness which was in Lacedaemon. But Manners that are rooted in men, bow the tenderness of a Commonwealth coming up by twigs to their bent; whence followed the obliquity that was in Rome, and those perpetual Repairs by the Consul's Axes, and Tribune's Hammers, which could never finish that Commonwealth but in destruction.  
MY Lord General being clear in these Points, and of the necessity of some other course than would be thought upon by the Parliament, appointed a meeting of the Army, where he spoke his sense agreeable to these Preliminaries with such success to the Soldiery, that the Parliament was soon after deposed; and he himself (in the great Hall of the Pantheon or Palace of Justice, situated in Emporium the capital City) was created by the universal Suffrage of the Army, Lord ARCHON, or sole Legislator of Oceana: upon which Theatre you have, to conclude this piece, a Person introduced, whose fame shall never draw its Curtain.  
THE Lord ARCHON being created, fifty select Persons to assist him (by labouring in the Mines of ancient Prudence, and bringing its hidden Treasures to new light) were added, with the stile also of Legislators, and sat as a Council, whereof he was the sole Director and Precedent.   

The Council of Legislators.  
OF this piece, being the greater half of the whole work, I shall be able at this time to give no farther account, than very briefly to show at what it aims.  
MY Lord ARCHON in opening the Council of Legislators, made it appear how unsafe a thing it is to follow Fancy in the Fabric of a Commonwealth; and how necessary that the Archives of ancient Prudence should be ransacked before any Counsillor should presume to offer any other matter in order to the work in hand, or towards the consideration to be had by the Council upon a Model of Government. Wherefore he caused an Urn to be brought, and every one of the Counsillors to draw a Lot. By the Lots as they were drawn, The Commonwealth of ISRAEL fell to PHOSPHORUS DE AUGE. ATHENS NAVARCHUS DE PARALO. LACEDAEMON LACO DE SCYTALE. CARTHAGE MAGO DE SYRTIBUS. the ACHEANS, AETOLIANS, and LYCIANS ARATUS DE ISTHMO. the SWITZ ALPESTER DE FULMINE. HOLLAND, and theVNITED PROVINCES GLAUCUS DE ULNA. ROME DOLABELLA DE ENYO. VENICE LYNCEUS DE STELLA.  
THESE contained in them all those Excellencies whereof a Commonwealth is capable; so that to have added more, had been to no purpose. Upon time given to the Counsillors, by their own Studies and those of their Friends, to prepare themselves, they were opened in the Order, and by the Persons mentioned at the Council of Legislators; and afterwards by order of the same were repeated at the Council of the Prytans to the People: for in drawing of the Lots, there were about a dozen of them inscribed with the letter P. whereby the Counsillors that drew them became Prytans.  
THE Prytans were a Committee or Council sitting in the great Hall of Pantheon, to whom it was lawful for any man to offer any thing in order to the Fabric of the Commonwealth: for which cause, that they might not be oppressed by the throng, there was a Rail about the Table where they sat, and on each side of the same a Pulpit; that on the right hand for any man that would propose any thing, and that on the left for any other that would oppose him. And all Parties (being indemnifyed by Proclamation of the ARCHON) were invited to dispute their own Interests, or propose whatever they thought fit (in order to the future Government) to the Council of the Prytans, who (having a Guard of about two or three hundred men, lest the heat of dispute might break the peace) had the Right of Moderators, and were to report from time to time such Propositions or Occurrences as they thought fit, to the Council of Legislators sitting more privately in the Palace called Alma.  
THIS was that which made the People (who were neither safely to be admitted, nor conveniently to be excluded in the framing of the Commonwealth) verily believe when it came forth, that it was no other than that whereof they themselves had been the makers.  
MOREOVER, this Council sat divers months after the publishing, and during the promulgation of the Model to the People; by which means there is scarce any thing was said or written for or against the said Model, but you shall have it with the next impression of this work by way of Oration addressed to, and moderated by the Prytans.  
BY this means the Council of Legislators had their necessary Solitude and due aim in their greater work, as being acquainted from time to time with the pulse of the People, and yet without any manner of interruption or disturbance.  
WHEREFORE every Commonwealth in its place having been opened by due Method; that is, First, by the People; Secondly, by the Senate; And, Thirdly, by the Magistracy: The Council upon mature debate took such results or orders out of each, and out os every part of each of them, as upon opening the same they thought fit; which being put from time to time in writing by the Clear or Secretary, there remained no more in the conclusion, than putting the Orders so taken together, to view and examine them with a diligent ey, that it might be clearly discovered whether they did interfere, or could any wise come to interfere or jostle one with the other. For as such Orders jostling, or coming to jostle one another, are the certain dissolution of the Commonwealth; so taken upon the proof of like experience, and neither jostling, nor showing which way they can possibly come to jostle one another, they make a perfect, and (for aught that in human Prudence can be foreseen) an immortal Commonwealth.  
AND such was the Art whereby my Lord ARCHON (taking Council of the Commonwealth of Israel, as of MOSES; and of the rest of the Commonwealths, as of JETHRO) framed the Model of the Commonwealth of Oceana.   

THE MODEL OF THE Commonwealth of OCEANA.  
WHEREAS my Lord ARCHON being from MOSES and LYCURGUS the first Legislator that hitherto is found in History to have introduced or erected an entire Commonwealth at once, happened, like them also, to be more intent upon putting the same into execution or action, than into writing; by which means the Model came to be promulgated or published with more brevity and less illustration than is necessary for their understanding who have not been acquainted with the whole Procedings of the Council of Legislators, and of the Prytans, where it was asserted and cleared from all objections and doubts: To the end that I may supply what was wanting in the promulgated Epitome to a more full and perfect Narrative of the whole, I shall rather take the Commonwealth practically, and as it has now given an account of itself in some years' Revolutions (as DICEARCHUS is said to have done that of Lacedaemon, first transcribed 
Suidas.  by his hand some three or four hundred years after the Institution) yet not omitting to add for proof to every Order such Debates and Speeches of the Legislators in their Council, or at least such parts of them as may best discover the reason of the Government; nor such ways and means as were used in the institution or rise of the Building, not to be so well conceived, without some knowledge given of the Engines wherwithal the mighty Weight was moved. But thro' the entire omission of the Council of Legislators or Workmen that squared every stone to this Structure in the Quarrys of ancient Prudence, the proof of the first part of this Discourse will be lame, except I insert, as well for illustration, as to avoid frequent repetition, three remarkable Testimonies in this place.  

Exod. 18. 24.  THE first is taken out of the Commonwealth of Israel: So MOSES harkened to the voice of (JETHRO) his Father in law, and did all that he had said. And MOSES chose able men out of all Israel, and 
Numb. 1. 16.  made them heads over the People; Tribune's, as it is in the vulgar Latin; or Phylarches, that is, Princes of the Tribes, sitting upon twelve 
* Sellis Curulibus. Grot.  Thrones, 
Matth.  and judging the twelve Tribes of Israel: and next to these he chose Rulers of Thousands, Rulers of Hundreds, Rulers of Fiftys, and Rulers of Ten, which were the steps or rise of this Commonwealth from its foundation or root to its proper elevation or accomplishment in the Sanhedrim, and the Congregation, already opened in the Preliminaries.  
THE Second is taken out of Lacedaemon, as LYCURGUS (for the greater impression of his Institutions upon the minds of his Citizens) pretended to have received the Model of that Commonwealth from the Oracle of APOLLO at Delphos, the words whereof are thus recorded by PLUTARCH in the Life of that famous Legislator: When thou 
Crag. de Rep. Lac. lib. 1. c. 6.  shalt have divided the People into Tribes (which were six) and Obas (which were five in every Tribe) thou shalt constitute the Senate, consisting, with the two Kings, of thirty Counsillors, who, according as occasion requires, shall cause the Congregation to be assembled between the Bridge and the River Gnation, where the Senate shall propose to the People, and dismiss them without suffering them to debate. The Ob● were Lineages into which every Tribe was divided, and in each Tribe there was another Division containing all those of the same that were of military Age; which being called the Mora, was subdivided into Troops and Companies that were held in perpetual Discipline under the Command of a Magistrate called the Polemarch.  
THE Third is taken out of the Commonwealth of Rome, or those parts of it which are comprised in the first and second Books of LIVY, where the People, according to the institution by ROMULUS, are first divided into thirty Curias or Parishes, whereof he elected (by three out of each Curia) the Senate, which from his Reign to that of SERVIUS 
Halicar.  TULLUS proposed to the Parishes or Parochial Congregations; and these being called the Comitia Curiata, had the election of the 
* Quirites, Regem create; ita patribus visum est: Tullum Hostilium Regem Populus jussit, Patres authores facti.  Kings, the Confirmation of their 
† Ut ab Romulo traditum, suffragium viritim eadem vi, eodemque jure omnibus datum est.  Laws, and the last appeal in matters of Judicature, as appears in the case of HORATIUS that killed his Sister; till in the Reign of SERVIUS (for the other Kings kept not to the institution of ROMULUS) the People being grown somewhat, the Power of the Curiata was for the greater part translated to the Centuriata Comitia instituted by this King, which distributed the People according to the cense or valuation of their Estates into six Classes, every one containing about forty Centurys, divided into Youth and Elders; the Youth for field-service, the Elders for the defence of their Territory, all armed and under continual Discipline, in which they assembled both upon military and civil occasions. But when the Senate proposed to the People, the Horse only, whereof there were twelve Centurys consisting of the richest sort over and above those of the Foot enumerated, were called with the first Classis of the Foot to the suffrage; or if these accorded not, than the second Classis was called to them, but seldom or never any of the rest. Wherefore the People after the expulsion of the Kings, growing impatient of this inequality, rested not till they had reduced the suffrage as it had been in the Comitia Curiata to the whole People again: But in another way, that is to say, by the Comitia Tributa, which thereupon were instituted, being a Council where the People in exigencies made Laws without the Senate; which Laws were called Plebiscita. This Council is that in regard whereof CICERO and other great Wits so frequently inveigh against the People, and sometimes even LIVY, as at the first 
‖ Hunc annum insignem maximè Comitia Tributa efficiunt; res major victoriâ ●uscepti certaminis quam usu, plus enim dignitatis Comitiis ipsis detractum est, patribus ex Concilio submovendis, quam virium aut plebi additum aut demtum patribus.  institution of it. To say the truth, it was a kind of Anarchy, whereof the People could not be excusable, if there had not, thro' the Courses taken by the Senate, been otherwise a necessity that they must have seen the Commonwealth run into Oligarchy.  

Sigonius.  THE manner how the Comitia Curiata, Centuriata or Tributa were called, during the time of the Commonwealth, to the suffrage, was by lot: the Curia, Century, or Tribe, whereon the first lot fell, being styled Principium, or the Prerogative; and the other Curiae, Centurys, or Tribes, whereon the second, third, and fourth Lots, etc. fell, the Jure vocatae: From henceforth not the first Classis, as in the times of SERVIUS, but the Prerogative, whether Curia, Century, or Tribe, came first to the Suffrage, whose Vote was called Omen Praerogativum, and seldom failed to be leading to the rest of the Tribes. The Jure vocatae in the order of their Lots came next: the manner of giving suffrage was, by casting wooden Tablets, marked for the Affirmative or the Negative, into certain Urns standing upon a Scaffold, as they marched over it in files; which for the resemblance it bore, was called the Bridg. The Candidat or Competitor, who had most Suffrages in a Curia, Century, or Tribe, was said to have that Curia, Century, or Tribe; and he who had most of the Curiae, Centurys, or Tribes, carried the Magistracy.  
THESE three places being premised, as such upon which there will be frequent reflection, I come to the Narrative, divided into two parts, the first containing the Institution, the second the Constitution of the Commonwealth; in each whereof I shall distinguish the Orders, as those which contain the whole Model, from the rest of the Discourse, which tends only to the explanation or proof of them.  

Institution of the Commonwealth.  IN the institution or building of a Commonwealth, the first work (as that of Builders) can be no other than fitting and distributing the Materials.  

Divisions of the People.  THE Materials of a Commonwealth are the People; and the People of Oceana were distributed by casting them into certain Divisions, regarding their Quality, their Age, their Wealth, and the places of their residence or habitation, which was done by the ensuing Orders.  

1. Order. Into Freemen and Servants.  THE first ORDER distributes the People into Freemen or Citizens, and Servants, while such; for if they attain to Liberty, that is, to live of themselves, they are Freemen or Citizens.  
THIS Order needs no proof, in regard of the nature of Servitude, which is inconsistent with Freedom or participation of Government in a Commonwealth.  

2. Order. Into Youth and Elders.  THE second ORDER distributes Citizens into Youth and Elders (such as are from 18 years of age to 30, being accounted Youth; and such as are of 30 and upwards, Elders) and establishes that the Youth shall be the marching Arms, and the Elders the standing Garrisons of this Nation.  
A COMMONWEALTH whose Arms are in the hands of her Servants, had need be situated (as is elegantly said of Venice by 
* Lontana della fede degli huomini.  CONTARINI) out of the reach of their clutches; witness the danger run by that of Carthage in the Rebellion of SPENDIUS and MATHO. But though a City (if one Swallow makes a Summer) may thus chance to be safe, yet shall it never be great; for if Carthage or Venice acquired any Fame in their Arms, it is known to have happened thro' the mere virtue of their Captains, and not of their Orders: wherefore Israel, Lacedaemon, and Rome entailed their Arms upon the prime of their Citizens, divided (at least in Lacedaemon and Rome) into Youth and Elders; the Youth for the Field, and the Elders for defence of the Territory.  

3. Order. Into Horse and Foot.  THE third ORDER distributes the Citizens into Horse and Foot by the cense or valuation of their Estates; they who have above one hundred Pounds a year in Lands, Goods, or Monies, being obliged to be of the Horse; and they who have under that Sum, to be of the Foot. But if a man has prodigally wasted and spent his Patrimony, he is neither capable of Magistracy, Office, or Suffrage in the Commonwealth.  
CITIZENS are not only to defend the Commonwealth, but according to their abilities, as the Romans under SERVIUS TULLUS (regard had to their Estates) were some enrolled in the Horse Centurys, and others of the Foot, with Arms enjoined accordingly; nor could it be otherwise in the rest of the Commonwealths, though out of Historical Remains, that are so much darker, it be not so clearly provable. And the necessary Prerogative to be given by a Commonwealth to Estates, is in some measure in the nature of Industry, and the use of it to the Public. 
* Populus Romanus per Classes divisus erat, & pro Patrimonii facultate censebantur; ex iis, omnes quibus res erat, ad militiam ducebantur; diligenter enim pro victoria laborabant, qui ex libertate bona patriam desendebant: Illi autem quibus nullae opes erant, caput suum, quod solum possideb●nt, censebantur, & belli tempore in moenibus residebant; facile enim poterant existere proditores, quia egestas haud facile habetur sine damno. Hos igitur Marius, quibus non fuerat Resp. committenda, duxit ad bellum.  The Roman People, says JULIUS EXUPERANTIUS, were divided into Classes, and taxed according to the value of their Estates. All that were worth the Sums appointed were employed in the Wars; for they most eagerly contend for the Victory, who fight for Liberty in defence of their Country and Possessions. But the poorer sort were pol'd only for their Heads (which was all they had) and kept in Garrison at home in time of War: For these might betray the Arms for Bread, by reason of their Poverty; which is the reason that MARIUS, to whom the care of the Government ought not to have been committed, was the first that led 'em into the field; and his Success was accordingly. There is a mean in things; as exorbitant Riches overthrow the Balance of a Commonwealth, so extreme Poverty cannot hold it, nor is by any means to be trusted with it. The Clause in the Order concerning the Prodigal is Athenian, and a very laudable one; for he that could not live upon his Patrimony, if he comes to touch the public Money, makes a Commonwealth Bankrupt.  

4. Order. Into Parishes, Hundreds, and Tribes.  THE fourth ORDER distributes the People according to the places their Habitation, into Parishes, Hundreds, and Tribes.  
FOR except the People be methodically distributed, they cannot be methodically collected; but the being of a Commonwealth consists in the methodical Collection of the People: wherefore you have the Israelitish Divisions into Rulers of Thousands, of Hundreds, of Fiftys, and of Ten; and of the whole Commonwealth into Tribes: The Laconic into Obas, Moras, and Tribes; the Roman into Tribes, Centurys, and Classes: and something there must of necessity be in every Government of the like nature; as that in the late Monarchy, by Countys. But this being the only Institution in Oceana (except that of the Agrarian) which required any charge, or included any difficulty, engages me to a more particular Description of the manner how it was performed, as follows.  

The use and method of the Surveyors.  A THOUSAND Surveyors commissionated and instructed by the Lord ARCHON and the Council, being divided into two equal numbers, each under the inspection of two Surveyors General, were distributed into the Northern and Southern parts of the Territory, divided by the River Hemisua, the whole whereof contains about ten thousand Parishes, some ten of those being assigned to each Surveyor: For as to this matter there needed no great exactness, it tending only (by showing whither every one was to repair, and wherabout to begin) to the more orderly carrying on of the work; the nature of their Instructions otherwise regarding rather the number of the Inhabitants, than of the Parishes. The Surveyors therefore being every one furnished with a convenient proportion of Urns, Balls and balloting Boxes (in the use whereof they had been formerly exercised) and now arriving each at his respective Parishes, began with the People, by teaching them their first lesson, which was the Ballot; and though they found them in the beginning something froward as at toys, with which (while they were in expectation of greater matters from a Council of Legislators) they conceived themselves to be abused, they came within a little while to think them pretty sport, and at length such as might very soberly be used in good earnest: whereupon the Surveyors began the Institution included in  

5. Order▪ Institution of the Parishes, of the Ballot, and of the Deputies.  THE fifth ORDER, requiring, That upon the first Monday next ensuing the last of December, the bigger Bell in every Parish throout the Nation be rung at eight of the Clock in the morning, and continue ringing for the space of one hour; and that all the Elders of the Parish respectively repair to the Church, before the Bell has done ringing; where dividing themselves into two equal Numbers, or as near equal as may be, they shall take their places according to their Dignitys (if they be of divers qualities) and according to their Seniority (if they be of the same) the one half on the one side, and the other half on the other, in the body of the Church: which done, they shall make Oath to the Overseers of the Parish for the time being (instead of these the Surveyors were to officiat at the Institution or first Assembly) by holding up their hands, to make a fair Election according to the Laws of the Ballot, as they are hereafter explained, of such Persons, amounting to a fifth part of their whole number, to be their Deputies, and to exercise their Power in manner hereafter explained, as they shall think in their Consciences to be fittest for that trust, and will acquit themselves of it to the best advantage of the Commonwealth. And Oath being thus made, they shall proceed to Election, if the Elders of the Parish amount to one thousand by the Ballot of the Tribe (as it is in due place explained) and if the Elders of the Parish amount to fifty or upwards, but within the number of one thousand, by the Ballot of the hundred (as it is in due place explained). But if the Elders amount not to fifty, than they shall proceed to the Ballot of the Parish, as it is in this place and after this manner explained. The two Overseers for the time being shall seat themselves at the upper end of the middle Ally, with a Table before them, their faces being towards the Congregation: And the Constable for the time being shall set an Urn before the Table, into which he shall put so many Balls as there be Elders present, whereof there shall be one that is gilded, the rest being white; and when the Constable has shaken the Urn sufficiently to mix the Balls, the Overseers shall call the Elders to the Urn, who from each side of the Church shall come up the middle Ally in two files, every man passing by the Urn, and drawing out one Ball; which if it be Silver, he shall cast into a Bowl standing at the foot of the Urn, and return by the outward Ally on his side to his place. But he who draws the golden Ball is the Proposer, and shall be seated between the Overseers, where he shall begin in what order he pleases, and name such as (upon his Oath already taken) he conceives fittest to be chosen, one by one, to the Elders; and the Party named shall withdraw while the Congregation is balloting his name by the double Box or Boxes appointed and marked on the outward part, to show which side is Affirmative and which Negative, being carried by a Boy or Boys appointed by the Overseers, to every one of the Elders, who shall hold up a pellet made of linen Rags, between his Finger and his Thumb, and put it after such a manner into the Box, as though no man can see into which side he puts it, yet any man may see that he puts in but one pellet or suffrage. And the suffrage of the Congregation being thus given, shall be returned with the Box or Boxes to the Overseers, who opening the same, shall pour the affirmative Balls into a white Bowl standing upon the Table on the right hand, to be numbered by the first Overseer; and the Negative into a green Bowl standing on the left hand, to be numbered by the second Overseer: and the suffrages being numbered, he who has the major part in the Affirmative is one of the Deputies of the Parish: and when so many Deputies are chosen as amount to a full fifth part of the whole number of the Elders, the Ballot for that time shall cease. The Deputies being chosen are to be listed by the Overseers in order as they were chosen, except only that such as are Horse must be listed in the first place with the rest, proportionable to the number of the Congregation, after this manner: 
Anno Dom.  
The List of the first Mover.  A. A. Ord. Eq. 1 Dep. of the Parish of— in the Hundred of— and the Tribe of— which Parish at the present Election contains 20 Elders, whereof one is of the Horse or Equestrian Order. B. B. 2 Dep. C. C. 3 Dep. D. D. 4 Dep. E. E. 5 Dep.  
The first and second in the List are Overseers by consequence: the third is the Constable, and the fourth and fifth are Churchwardens; the Persons so chosen are Deputies of the Parish for the space of one year from their Election, and no longer; nor may they be elected two years together. This List being the Primum Mobile, or first Mover of the Commonwealth, is to be registered in a Book diligently kept and preserved by the Overseers, who are responsible in their places for these and other Duties to be hereafter mentioned, to the Censors of the Tribe: and the Congregation is to observe the present Order, as they will answer the contrary to the Phylarch, or Prerogative Troop of the Tribe; which, in case of failure in the whole or any part of it, have power to sine them or any of them at discretion, but under an Appeal to the Parliament.  
FOR proof of this Order; First, in Reason: It is with all Politicians past dispute, that paternal Power is in the right of Nature; and this is no other than the derivation of Power from Fathers of Families, as the natural root of a Commonwealth. And for Experience, if it be otherwise in that of Holland, I know no other example of the like kind. In Israel, the sovereign Power came clearly from the natural Root, the 
Jos. 24. 1.  Elders of the whole People; and Rome was born (Comitiis Curiatis) in her Parochial Congregations, out of which ROMULUS first raised her Senate, than all the rest of the Orders of that Commonwealth, which risen so high: For the depth of a Commonwealth is the just height of it.  

* Ipsa haeret Scopulis, & tantum vertice ad Auras Aethereas, quantum r●dice ad Tartara, tendit.  She raises up her Head unto the Skies,  
Near as her Root unto the Centre lies.  
AND if the Commonwealth of Rome was born of thirty Parishes, this of Oceana was born of ten thousand. But whereas mention in the birth of this is made of an Equestrian Order, it may startle such as know that the division of the People of Rome, at the Institution of that Commonwealth into Orders, was the occasion of its ruin. The distinction of the Patrician as a hereditary Order from the very Institution, engrossing all the Magistracies, was indeed the destruction of Rome; but to a Knight or one of the Equestrian Order, says HORACE, 
Si quadringentis sex septem millia desunt, Plebs eris.  By which it should seem that this Order was not otherwise hereditary than a man's Estate, nor did it give any claim to Magistracy; wherefore you shall never find that it disquieted the Commonwealth; nor does the name denote any more in Oceana, than the Duty of such a man's Estate to the Public.  
BUT the Surveyors both in this place and in others, forasmuch as they could not observe all the Circumstances of this Order, especially that of the time of Election, did for the first as well as they could; and, the Elections being made and registered, took each of them Copies of those Lists which were within their Allotments; which done, they produced  


4. Order.  
Of Ordination, a National Religion, and Liberty of Conscience.   THE sixth ORDER, directing, in case a Parson or Vicar of a Parish comes to be removed by Death or by the Censors, that the Congregation of the Parish assemble and depute one or two Elders by the Ballot, who upon the charge of the Parish shall repair to one of the Vniversitys of this Nationwith a Certificate signed by the Overseers, and addressed to the Vicechancellor: which Certificate giving notice of the Death or Removal of the Parson or Vicar, of the value of the Parsonage or Vicarage, and of the desire of the Congregation to receive a Probationer from that University; the Vicechancellor upon the receipt thereof shall call a Convocation, and having made choice of a fit Person, shall return him in due time to the Parish, where the Person so returned shall receive the full fruits of the Benefice or Vicarage, and do the duty of the Parson or Vicar, for the space of one year, as Probationer: and that being expired, the Congregation of the Elders shall put their Probationer to the Ballot: and if he attains not to two parts in three of the Suffrage affirmative, he shall take his leave of the Parish, and they shall send in like manner as before for another Probationer; but if their Probationer obtains two parts in three of the Suffrage affirmative, he is then Pastor of that Parish. And the Pastor of the Parish shall pray with the Congregation, preach the Word, and administer the Sacraments to the same, according to the Directory to be hereafter appointed by the Parliament. Nevertheless such as are of gathered Congregations, or from time to time shall join with any of them, are in no wise obliged to this way of electing their Teachers, or to give their Votes in this case, but wholly left to the liberty of their own Consciences, and to that way of Worship which they shall choose, being not Popish, Jewish, or Idolatrous. And to the end they may be the better protected by the State in the free exercise of the same, they are desired to make choice, in such manner as they best like, of certain Magistrates in every one of their Congregations, which we could wish might be four in each of them, to be Auditors in cases of differences or distaste, if any thro' variety of opinions, that may be grievous or injurious to them, should fall out. And such Auditors or Magistrates shall have power to examine the matter, and inform themselves, to the end that if they think it of sufficient weight, they may acquaint the Phylarch with it, or introduce it into the Council of Religion; where all such Causes as those Magistrates introduce, shall from time to time be heard and determined according to such Laws as are or shall hereafter be provided by the Parliament for the just defence of the Liberty of Conscience.  
THIS Order consists of three parts, the first restoring the power of Ordination to the People, which, that it originally belongs to them, is clear, though not in English yet in Scripture, where the Apostles ordained 
Acts 14. 23.  Elders by the holding up of hands in every Congregation, that is, by the suffrage of the People, which was also given in some of those Cities by the Ballot. And though it may be shown that the Apostles ordained some by the laying on of hands, it will not be shown that they did so in every Congregation.  
EXCOMMUNICATION, as not clearly provable out of the Scripture, being omitted, the second part of the Order implys and establishes a National Religion: for there be degrees of Knowledge in divine things; true Religion is not to be learned without searching the Scriptures; the Scriptures cannot be searched by us unless we have them to search; and if we have nothing else, or (which is all one) understand nothing else but a Translation, we may be (as in the place alleged we have been) beguiled or misled by the Translation, while we should be searching the true sense of the Scripture, which cannot be attained in a natural way (and a Commonwealth is not to presume upon that which is supernatural) but by the knowledge of the Original and of Antiquity, acquired by our own studies, or those of some others, for even Faith comes by hearing. Wherefore a Commonwealth not making provision of men from time to time, knowing in the original Languages wherein the Scriptures were written, and versed in those Antiquitys to which they so frequently relate, that the true sense of them depends in great part upon that Knowledge, can never be secure that she shall not lose the Scripture, and by consequence her Religion; which to preserve she must institute some method of this Knowledge, and some use of such as have acquired it, which amounts to a National Religion.  
THE Commonwealth having thus performed her duty towards God, as a rational Creature, by the best application of her Reason to Scripture, and for the preservation of Religion in the purity of the same, yet pretends not to Infallibility, but comes in the third part of the Order, establishing Liberty of Conscience according to the Instructions given to her Council of Religion, to raise up her hands to Heaven for further light; in which proceedingly she follows that (as was shown in the Preliminaries) of Israel, who though her National Religion was always a part of her Civil Law, gave to her Prophets the upper hand of all her Orders.  

Definition of a Parish.  BUT the Surveyors having now done with the Parishes, took their leaves; so a Parish is the first division of Land occasioned by the first Collection of the People of Oceana, whose Function proper to that place is comprised in the six preceding Orders.  

Institution of the Hundred.  THE next step in the progress of the Surveyors was to a meeting of the nearest of them, as their work lay, by twenties; where conferring their Lists, and computing the Deputies contained therein, as the number of them in Parishes, being nearest Neighbours, amounted to one hundred, or as even as might conveniently be brought with that account, they cast them and those Parishes into the Precinct which (be the Deputies ever since more or fewer) is still called the Hundred: and to every one of these Precincts they appointed a certain place, being the most convenient Town within the same, for the annual Rendezvouz; which done, each Surveyor returning to his Hundred, and summoning the Deputies contained in his Lists to the Rendezvouz, they appeared and received  

7. Order.  THE seventh ORDER, requiring, That upon the first Monday next ensuing the last of January, the Deputies of every Parish annually assemble in Arms at the Rendezvouz of the Hundred, and there elect out of their number one Justice of the Peace, one Juryman, one Captain, one Ensign of their Troop or Century, each of these out of the Horse; and one Juryman, one Crowner, one High Constable, out of the Foot; the Election to be made by the Ballot in this manner. The Jurymen for the time being are to be Overseers of the Ballot (instead of these, the Surveyors are to officiat at the first Assembly) and to look to the performance of the same according to what was directed in the Ballot of the Parishes, saving that the High Constable setting forth the Urn, shall have five several suits of Gold Balls, and one dozen of every suit; whereof the first shall be marked with the Letter A, the second with the letter B, the third with C, the fourth with D, and the fifth with E: and of each of these suits he shall cast one Ball into his Hat, or into a little Urn, and shaking the Balls together present them to the first Overseer, who shall draw one, and the suit which is so drawn by the Overseer shall be of use for that day, and no other: for example, if the Overseer drew an A, the High Constable shall put seven Gold Balls marked with the letter A into the Urn, with so many Silver one's as shall bring them even with the number of the Deputies, who being sworn, as before, at the Ballot of the Parish to make a fair Election, shall be called to the Urn; and every man coming in manner as was there showed, shall draw one Ball, which if it be Silver, he shall cast it into a Bowl standing at the foot of the Urn, and return to his place; but the first that draws a Gold Ball (showing it to the Overseers, who if it has not the letter of the present Ballot, have power to apprehend and punish him) is the first Elector, the second the second Elector, and so to the seventh; which Order they are to observe in their function. The Electors as they are drawn shall be placed upon the Bench by the Overseers, till the whole number be complete, and then be conducted, with the List of the Officers to be chosen, into a Place apart, where being private, the first Elector shall name a Person to the first Office in the List; and if the Person so named, being balloted by the rest of the Electors, attains not to the better half of the Suffrages in the Affirmative, the first Elector shall continue nominating others, till one of them so nominated by him attains to the plurality of the Suffrages in the Affirmative, and be written first Competitor to the first Office. This don, the second Elector shall observe in his turn the like order; and so the rest of the Electors, naming Competitors each to his respective Office in the List, till one Competitor be chosen to every Office: and when one Competitor is chosen to every Office, the first Elector shall begin again to name a second Competitor to the first Office, and the rest successively shall name to the rest of the Offices till two Competitors be chosen to every Office; the like shall be repeated till three Competitors be chosen to every Office. And when three Competitors are chosen to every Office, the List shall be returned to the Overseers, or such as the Overseers, in case they or either of them happened to be Electors, have substituted in his or their place or places: and the Overseers or Substitutes having caused the List to be read to the Congregation, shall put the Competitors, in order as they are written, to the Ballot of the Congregation: and the rest of the Procedings being carried on in the manner directed in the Fifth Order, that Competitor, of the three written to each Office, who has most of the Suffrages above half in the Affirmative, is the Officer. The List being after this manner completed, shall be entered into a Register, to be kept at the Rendezvouz of the Hundred, under inspection of the Magistrates of the same, after the manner following: 
Anno Domini  
The List of the Nebulosa.  A. A. Ord. Eq. Justice of the Peace of the Hundred of— in the Tribe of— which Hundred consists at this Election of 105 Deputies. B. B. Ord. Eq. First Juryman C. C. Ord. Eq. Captain of the Hundred D. D. Ord. Eq. Ensign E. E. Second Juryman F. F. High Constable G. G. Crowner  
THE List being entered, the High Constable shall take three Copies of the same, whereof he shall presently return one to the Lord High Sheriff of the Tribe, a second to the Lord Custos Rotulorum, and a third to the Censors; or these, thro' the want of such Magistrates at the first muster, may be returned to the Orator, to be appointed for that Tribe. To the observation of all and every part of this Order, the Officers and Deputies of the Hundred are all and every of them obliged, as they will answer it to the Phylarch, who has power in case of failure in the whole or any part, to fine all or any of them so failing at discretion, or according to such Laws as shall hereafter be provided in that case; but under an Appeal to the Parliament.  
THERE is little in this Order worthy of any further account, but that it answers to the Rulers of Hundreds in Israel, to the Mora or Military part of the Tribe in Lacedaemon, and to the Century in Rome. The Jurymen, being two in a Hundred, and so forty in a Tribe, give the Latitude allowed by the Law for exceptions. And whereas the Golden Balls at this Ballot begin to be marked with Letters, whereof one is to be drawn immediately before it gins; this is to the end that the Letter being unknown, Men may be frustrated of tricks or foul play, whereas otherwise a Man might bring a Golden Ball with him, and make as if he had drawn it out of the Urn. The Surveyors, when they had taken Copies of these Lists, had accomplished their work in the Hundreds.  

Definition of the Hundred.  SO a Hundred is the second Division of Land occasioned by the second Collection of the People, whose Civil and Military Functions proper to this place are comprised in the foregoing Order.  
HAVING stated the Hundreds, they met once again by Twentys, where there was nothing more easy than to cast every twenty Hundreds, as they lay most conveniently together, into one Tribe; so the whole Territory of Oceana, consisting of about ten thousand 
Institution of the Tribe.  Parishes, came to be cast into one thousand Hundreds, and into fifty Tribes. In every Tribe at the place appointed for the annual Rendezvouz of the same, were then, or soon after, begun those Buildings which are now called Pavilions; each of them standing with one 
Of the Pavilion.  open side upon fair Columns, like the porch of some ancient Temple, and looking into a Field, capable of the muster of some four thousand Men: Before each Pavilion stand three Pillars sustaining Urns for the Ballot, that on the right-hand equal in height to the brow of a Horsman, being called the Horse Urn; that on the lefthand, with Bridges on either side to bring it equal in height with the brow of a Footman, being called the Foot Urn; and the middle Urn with a Bridge on the side towards the Foot Urn, the other side, as left for the Horse, being without one: and here ended the whole work of the Surveyors, who returned to the Lord ARCHON with this 
Account of the Charge.   l. s. 
The whole Charge of the Institution.  IMPRIMIS, Urns, Balls, and Balloting Boxes for ten thousand Parishes, the same being wooden Ware, 20000 00 ITEM, Provisions of the like kind for a thousand Hundreds, 3000 00 ITEM, Urns and Balls of Metal, with Balloting Boxes for fifty Tribes,— 2000 00 ITEM, For erecting of fifty Pavilions,— 60000 00 ITEM, Wages for four Surveyors General at 1000 l. a man, 4000 00 ITEM, Wages for the rest of the Surveyors, being 1000, at 250 l. a man,— 250000 00 Sum Total, 339000 00  
THIS is no great matter of charge for the building of a Commonwealth, in regard that it has cost (which was pleaded by the Surveyors) as much to rig a few Ships. Nevertheless that proves not them to be honest, nor their account to be just; but they had their Money for once, though their reckoning be plainly guilty of a Crime, to cost him his Neck that commits it another time, it being impossible for a Commonwealth (without an exact provision that it be not abused in this kind) to subsist: for if no regard should be had of the Charge (though that may go deep) yet the Debauchery and Corruption, whereto, by negligence in Accounts, it infallibly exposes its Citizens, and thereby lessens the public Faith, which is the Nerve and Ligament of Government, aught to be prevented. But the Surveyors being dispatched, the Lord ARCHON was very curious in giving names to his Tribes, which having caused to be written in Scrols cast into an Urn, and presented to the Counsillors, each of them drew one, and was accordingly sent to the Tribe in his lot, as Orators of the same, a Magistracy not otherwise instituted, than for once and pro tempore, to the end that the Council upon so great an occasion might both congratulat with the Tribes, and assist at the first muster in some things of necessity to be differently carried from the established Administration, and future Course of the Commonwealth.  
THE Orators being arrived, every one as soon as might be, at the Rendezvouz of his Tribe, gave notice to the Hundreds, and summoned the Muster, which appeared for the most part upon good Horses, and already indifferently well armed; as to instance in one for all, the Tribe of Nubia, where HERMES DE CADUCEO, Lord Orator of the same, after a short salutation and a hearty welcome, applied himself to his business, which began with  

8. Order.  THE eighth ORDER, requiring, That the Lord High Sheriff as Commander in Chief, and the Lord Custos Rotulorum as Mustermaster of the Tribe (or the Orator for the first Muster) upon reception of the Lists of their Hundreds, returned to them by the High Constables of the same, presently cause them to be cast up, dividing the Horse from the Foot, and listing the Horse by their names in Troops, each Troop containing about a hundred in number, to be inscribed, first, second, or third Troop, etc. according to the Order agreed upon by the said Magistrates: Which done, they shall list the Foot in like manner, and inscribe the Companies in like order. These Lists upon the Eve of the Muster shall be delivered to certain Trumpeters and Drummers, whereof there shall be fifteen of each sort (as well for the present as other uses to be hereafter mentioned) stipendiated by the Tribe. And the Trumpeters and Drummers shall be in the Field before the Pavilion, upon the day of the Muster, so soon as it is light, where they shall stand every one with his List in his hand, at a due distance, placed according to the Order of the List; the Trumpeters with the Lists of the Horse on the right-hand, and the Drummers with the Lists of the Foot on the lefthand: where having sounded a while, each of them shall begin to call, and continue calling the names of the Deputies, as they come into the field, till both the Horse and Foot be gathered by that means into their due Order. The Horse and Foot being in order, the Lord Lieutenant of the Tribe shall cast so many Gold Balls marked with the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. as there be Troops of Horse in the Field, together with so many Silver Balls as there be Companies, marked in the same manner, into a little Urn, to which he shall call the Captains; and the Captains drawing the Gold Balls shall command the Horse, and those that draw the Silver the Foot, each in the order of his Lot. The like shall be done by the Conductor at the same time for the Ensigns at another Urn; and they that draw the Gold Balls shall be Cornets, the rest Ensigns.  
THIS Order may puzzle the Reader, but tends to a wonderful speed of the Muster, to which it would be a great matter to lose a day in ranging and martialling, whereas by virtue of this the Tribe is no sooner in the field than in Battalia, nor sooner in Battalia than called to the Urns or the Ballot by virtue of  

9 Order.  THE ninth ORDER, whereby the Censors (or the Orator for the first Muster) upon reception of the Lists of the Hundreds from the High Constables, according as is directed by the seventh Order, are to make their Notes for the Urns beforehand, with regard had to the Lists of the Magistrates, to be elected by the ensuing Orders; that is to say, by the first List called the prime Magnitude, six; and by the second called the Galaxy, nine. Wherefore the Censors are to put into the middle Urn for the Election of the first List twenty four Gold Balls, with twenty six Blanks or Silver Balls, in all sixty; and into the side Urns sixty Gold Balls divided into each according to the different number of the Horse and the Foot: that is to say, if the Horse and the Foot be equal, equally; and if the Horse and the Foot be inequal, inequally, by an Arithmetical Proportion. The like shall be done the second day of the Muster, for the second List, except that the Censors shall put into the middle Urn 36 Gold Balls with 24 Blanks, in all sixty; and sixty Gold Balls into the side Urns, divided respectively into the number of the Horse and the Foot: and the Gold Balls in the side Urns at either Ballot are by the addition of Blanks to be brought even with the number of the Ballotants at either Urn respectively. The Censors having prepared their Notes, as has been shown, and being come at the day appointed into the Field, shall present a little Urn to the Lord High Sheriff, who is to draw twice for the Letters to be used that day, the one at the side Urns, and the other at the middle. And the Censors having fitted the Urns accordingly, shall place themselves in certain movable Seats or Pulpits (to be kept for that use in the Pavilion) the first Censor before the Horse Urn, the second before the Foot Urn, the Lord Lieutenant doing the Office of Censor pro tempore at the middle Urn; where all and every one of them shall cause the Laws of the Ballot to be diligently observed, taking a special care that no Man be suffered to come above once to the Urn (whereof it more particularly concerns the Subcensors, that is to say, the Overseers of every Parish, to be careful; they being each in this regard responsible for their respective Parishes) or to draw above one Ball, which if it be Gold, he is to present to the Censor, who shall look upon the Letter; and if it be not that of the day, and of the respective Urn, apprehend the Party, who for this or any other like disorder, is obnoxious to the Phylarch.  
THIS Order being observed by the Censors, it is not possible for the People, if they can but draw the Balls, though they understand nothing at all of the Ballot, to be out. To philosophise further upon this Art, though there be nothing more rational, were not worth the while; because in writing it will be perplexed, and the first practice of it gives the demonstration: whence it came to pass, that the Orator, after some needless pains in the explanation of the two foregoing Orders, betaking himself to exemplify the same, found the work done to his hand; for the Tribe, as eager upon a business of this nature, had retained one of the Surveyors, out of whom (before the Orator arrived) they had got the whole Mystery by a stolen Muster, at which in order to the Ballot they had made certain Magistrates pro tempore. Wherefore he found not only the Pavilion (for this time a Tent) erected with three Posts supplying the place of Pillars to the Urns; but the Urns being prepared with a just number of Balls for the first Ballot, to become the Field, and the occasion very gallantly, with their Covers made in the manner of Helmets, open at either ear to give passage to the hands of the Ballotants, and flaunting with noble Plumes to direct the March of the People. Wherefore he proceeded to  

10. Order.  THE tenth ORDER, requiring of the Deputies of the Parishes, That upon every Monday next ensuing the last of February, they make their personal appearance, Horse and Foot in Arms accordingly, at the Rendezvouz of the Tribe; where being in Discipline, the Horse upon the right, and the Foot upon the left, before the Pavilion, and having made Oath by holding up their hands upon the tender of it by the Lord High Sheriff, to make Election without favour, and of such only as they shall judge fittest for the Commonwealth: The Conductor shall take three Balls, the one inscribed with these words [outward Files] another with these words [inward Files] and the third with these [middle Files] which Balls he shall cast into a little Urn, and present it to the Lord High Sheriff, who, drawing one, shall give the words of Command, as they are thereupon inscribed, and the Ballot shall begin accordingly. For example, if the Ball be inscribed middle Files, the Ballot shall begin by the middle; that is, the two Files that are middle to the Horse, shall draw out first to the Horse Urn, and the two Files that are middle to the Foot, shall draw out first to the Foot Urn, and be followed by all the rest of the Files as they are next to them in order. The like shall be done by the inward, or by the outward Files, in case they be first called. And the Files, as every Man has drawn his Ball, if it be Silver, shall begin at the Urn to countermarch to their places; but he that has drawn a Gold Ball at a side Urn, shall proceed to the middle Urn, where if the Ball he draws be Silver, he also shall countermarch: But if it be Gold, he shall take his place upon a form set cross the Pavilion, with his face toward the Lord High Sheriff, who shall be seated in the middle of the Pavilion, with certain Clercs by him, one of which shall write down the names of every Elector, that is, of every one that drew a Gold Ball at the middle Urn, and in the Order his Ball was drawn, till the Electors amount to six in number. And the first six Electors, Horse and Foot promiscuously, are the first Order of Electors; the second six (still accounting them as they are drawn) the second Order; the third six, the third Order; and the fourth six, the fourth Order of Electors: every Elector having place in his order, according to the order wherein he was drawn. But so soon as the first Order of Electors is complete, the Lord High Sheriff shall send them with a Copy of the following List, and a Clerc that understands the Ballot, immediately to a little Tent standing before the Pavilion in his eye, to which no other Person but themselves, during the Election, shall approach. The List shall be witten in this manner: 
Anno Domini  
The List of the Prime Magnitude or first days Election of Magistrates.  
Institution of the Prime Magnitude.  1. The Lord High Sheriff, Commander in Chief of the Tribe of Nubia, containing at this present Muster 700 Horse, and 1500 Foot, in all 2200 Deputies. 2. Lord Lieutenant 3. Lord Custos Rotulorum, Mustermaster General 4. The Conductor, being Quartermaster General 5. The first Censor 6. The second Censor  
AND the Electors of the first hand or order, being six, shall each of them name to his respective Magistracy in the left such as are not already elected in the Hundreds, till one Competitor be chosen to every Magistracy in the List by the Ballot of the Electors of the first Order; which done, the List with the Competitors thereunto annexed shall be returned to the Lord High Sheriff by the Clerc attending that Order, but the Electors shall keep their places: for they have already given their Suffrage, and may not enter into the Ballot of the Tribe. If there arises any Dispute in an Order of Electors, one of the Censors or Subcensors appointed by them in case they be Electors, shall enter into the Tent of that Order; and that Order shall stand to his Judgement in the decision of the Controversy. The like shall be done exactly by each other Order of Electors, being sent as they are drawn, each with another Copy of the same List, into a distinct Tent, till there be returned to the Lord High Sheriff four Competitors to every Magistracy in the List; that is to say, one Competitor elected to every Office in every one of the four Orders: which Competitors the Lord High Sheriff shall cause to be pronounced or read by a Crier to the Congregation; and the Congregation having heard the whole Lists repeated, the Names shall be put by the Lord High Sheriff to the Tribe, one by one, beginning with the first Competitor in the first Order, thence proceeding to the first Competitor in the second Order, and so to the first in the third and fourth Orders. And the Suffrages being taken in boxes by boys (as has been already shown) shall be poured into the Bowls standing before the Censors, who shall be seated at each end of the Table in the Pavilion, the one numbering the Affirmatives, and the other the Negatives; and he, of the four Competitors to the first Magistracy, that has most above half the Suffrages of the Tribe in the Affirmative, is the first Magistrate. The like is to be done successively by the rest of the Competitors in their order. But because soon after the Boxes are sent out for the first name, there be others sent out for the second, and so for the third, etc. by which means divers names are successively at one and the same time in ballotting; the Boy that carries a Box shall sing or repeat continually the name of the Competitor for whom that Box is carrying, with that also of the Magistracy to which he is proposed. A Magistrate of the Tribe happening to be an Elector, may substitute any one of his own Order to execute his other Function. The Magistrates of the Prime Magnitude being thus elected, shall receive the present Charge of the Tribe.  
IF it be objected against this Order, that the Magistrates to be elected by it, will be Men of more inferior rank than those of the Hundreds, in regard that those are chosen first; it may be remembered, that so were the Burgesses in the former Government, nevertheless the Knights of the Shire were Men of greater quality: And the Election at the Hundred is made by a Council of Electors, of whom less cannot be expected than the discretion of naming Persons fittest for those Capacitys, with an eye upon these to be elected at the Tribe. As for what may be objected in point of Difficulty, it is demonstrable by the foregoing Orders, that a Man might bring ten thousand Men (if there were occasion) with as much ease, and as suddenly to perform the Ballot, as he can make five thousand Men (drawing them out by double Files) to march a quarter of a mile. But because at this Ballot, to go up and down the Field, distributing the linen Pellets to every Man, with which he is to ballot or give suffrage, would lose a great deal of time, therefore a Man's Wife, his Daughters, or others, make him his provision of Pellets before the Ballot; and he comes into the field with a matter of a score of them in his pocket. And now I have as good as don with the sport. The next is  


11. Order.  
Functions of the Magistrates of the Prime Magnitude.   THE eleventh ORDER, explaining the Duties and Functions of the Magistrates contained in the List of the Prime Magnitude: And those of the Hundreds, beginning with the Lord High Sheriff, who, over and above his more ancient Offices, and those added by the former Order, is the first Magistrate of the Phylarch, or Prerogative Troop. The Lord Lieutenant, over and above his Duty mentioned, is Commander in Chief of the Musters of the Youth, and second Magistrate of the Phylarch. The Custos Rotulorum is to return the yearly Muster-rolls of the Tribe, as well that of the Youth as of the Elders, to the Rolls in Emporium, and is the third Magistrate of the Phylarch. The Censors by themselves, and their Subcensors, that is, the Overseers of the Parishes, are to see that the respective Laws of the Ballot be observed in all the popular Assemblies of the Tribe. They have power also to put such National Ministers, as in Preaching shall intermeddle with matters of Government, out of their Live; except the Party appeals to the Phylarch, or to the Council of Religion, where in that case the Censors shall prosecute. All and every one of these Magistrates, together with the Justices of Peace, and the Jurymen of the Hundreds, amounting in the whole number to threescore and six, are the Prerogative Troop or Phylarch of the Tribe.  
THE Function of the Phylarch or Prerogative Troop is fivefold.  

Functions of the Phylarch.  FIRST, They are the Council of the Tribe, and as such to govern the Musters of the same according to the foregoing Orders, having cognizance of what has passed in the Congregation or Elections made in the Parishes or the Hundreds, with power to punish any undue practices, or variation from their respective Rules and Orders, under an Appeal to the Parliament. A Marriage legitimatly is to be pronounced by the Parochial Congregation, the Muster of the Hundred, or the Phylarch. And if a Tribe have a desire (which they are to express at the Muster by their Captains, every Troop by his own) to petition the Parliament, the Phylarch, as the Council, shall frame the Petition in the Pavilion, and propose it by Clauses to the Ballot of the whole Tribe; and the Clauses that shall be affirmed by the Ballot of the Tribe, and signed by the hands of the six Magistrates of the Prime Magnitude, shall be received and esteemed by the Parliament as the Petition of the Tribe, and no other.  
SECONDLY, The Phylarch has power to call to their assistance what other Troops of the Tribe they please (be they Elders or Youth, whose Discipline will be hereafter directed) and with these to receive the Judges Itinerant in their Circuits, whom the Magistrates of the Phylarch shall assist upon the Bench, and the Juries elsewhere in their proper functions according to the more ancient Laws and Customs of this Nation.  
THIRDLY, The Phylarch shall hold the Court called the Quarter Sessions according to the ancient Custom, and therein shall also hear Causes in order to the protection of Liberty of Conscience, by such Rules as are or shall hereafter be appointed by the Parliament.  
FOURTHLY, All Commissions, issued into the Tribes by the Parliament, or by the Chancery, are to be directed to the Phylarch, or some of that Troop, and executed by the same respectively.  
FIFTHLY, In the case of Levys of Money the Parliament shall tax the Phylarches, the Phylarches shall tax the Hundreds, the Hundreds the Parishes, and the Parishes shall levy it upon themselves. The Parishes having levied the Tax Money, accordingly shall return it to the Officers of the Hundreds, the Hundreds to the Phylarches, and the Phylarches to the Exchequer. But if a man has ten Children living, he shall pay no Taxes; if he has five living, he shall pay but half Taxes; if he has been married three years, or be above twenty five years of Age, and has no Child or Children lawfully begotten, he shall pay double Taxes. And if there happen to grow any dispute upon these or such other Orders as shall or may hereto be added hereafter, the Phylarches shall judge the Tribes, and the Parliament shall judge the Phylarches. For the rest, if any man shall go about to introduce the right or power of Debate into any popular Council or Congregation of this Nation, the Phylarch or any Magistrate of the Hundred, or of the Tribe, shall cause him presently to be sent in custody to the Council of War.  

Institution of the Roll called the Pillar of Nilus.  THE part of the Order relating to the Rolls in Emporium being of singular use, is not unworthy to be somewhat better opened. In what manner the Lists of the Parishes, Hundreds, and Tribes are made, has been shown in their respective Orders, where after the Parties are elected, they give an account of the whole number of the Elders or Deputies in their respective Assemblies or Musters; the like for this part exactly is done by the Youth in their Discipline (to be hereafter shown) wherefore the Lists of the Parishes, Youth and Elders, being summed up, give the whole number of the People able to bear Arms; and the Lists of the Tribes, Youth and Elders, being summed up, give the whole number of the People bearing Arms. This account, being annually recorded by the Master of the Rolls, is called the Pillar of Nilus, because the People being the Riches of the Commonwealth, as they are found to rise or fall by the degrees of this Pillar, like that River, give an account of the public Harvest.  
THUS much for the Description of the first days work at the Muster, which happened, as has been shown, to be done as soon as said: for as in practice it is of small difficulty, so requires it not much time, seeing the great Council of Venice, consisting of a like number, gins at twelve of the Clock, and elects nine Magistrates in one Afternoon. But the Tribe being dismissed for this night, repaired to their Quarters, under the conduct of their new Magistrates. The next morning returning into the field very early, the Orator proceeded to  

12. Order. Institution of the Galaxy.  THE twelfth ORDER, directing the Muster of the Tribe in the second days Election, being that of the List called the Galaxy; in which the Censors shall prepare the Urns according to the Directions given in the ninth Order for the second Ballot; that is to say, with 36 Gold Balls in the middle Urn, making four Orders, and nine Electors in every Order, according to the number of the Magistrates in the List of the Galaxy, which is as follows:  
1. Knight to be chosen out of the Horse. 2. Knight  
3. Deputy to be chosen out of the Horse. 4. Deputy 5. Deputy  
6. Deputy to be chosen out of the Foot. 7. Deputy 8. Deputy 9 Deputy  
THE rest of the Ballot shall proceed exactly according to that of the first day. But forasmuch as the Commonwealth demands as well the fruits of a man's body as of his mind, he that has not been married shall not be capable of these Magistracies till he be married. If a Deputy, already chosen to be an Officer in the Parish, in the Hundred, or in the Tribe, be afterwards chosen of the Galaxy, it shall be lawful for him to delegat his Office in the Parish, in the Hundred, or in the Tribe, to any one of his own Order, being not already chosen into Office. The Knights and Deputies being chosen, shall be brought to the head of the Tribe by the Lord High Sheriff, who shall administer to them this Oath; Ye shall well and truly observe and keep the Orders and Customs of this Commonwealth which the People have chosen. And if any of them shall refuse the Oath, he shall be rejected, and that Competitor which had the most voices next shall be called in his place; who if he takes the Oath shall be entered in the List; but if he also refuses the Oath, he who had most voices next shall be called, and so till the number of nine out of those Competitors which had most voices be sworn Knights and Deputies of the Galaxy. [This Clause, in regard of the late Divisions, and to the end that no violence be offered to any man's Conscience, to be of force but for the first three years only.] The Knights of the Galaxy being elected and sworn, are to repair, by the Monday next ensuing the last of March, to the Pantheon or Palace of Justice, situated in the Metropolis of this Commonwealth (except the Parliament, by reason of a contagious Sickness, or some other occasion, has adjourned to another part of the Nation) where they are to take their places in the Senate, and continue in full Power and Commission as Senators for the full term of three years next ensuing the date of their Election. The Deputies of the Galaxy are to repair by the same day (except as before excepted) to the Halo situated in Emporium, where they are to be listed of the Prerogative Tribe, or equal Representative of the People; and to continue in full Power and Commission as their Deputies for the full term of three years next ensuing their Election. But forasmuch as the term of every Magistracy or Office in this Commonwealth requires an equal vacation, a Knight or Deputy of the Galaxy, having fulfilled his term of three years, shall not be reelected into the same Galaxy, or any other, till he has also fulfilled his three years' vacation.  
WHOEVER shall rightly consider the foregoing Orders, will be as little able to find how it is possible, that a worshipful Knight should declare himself in Ale and Beef worthy to serve his Country, as how my Lord High Sheriffs Honour, in case he were protected from the Law, could play the knave. But though the foregoing Orders, so far as they regard the Constitution of the Senate and the People, requiring no more as to an ordinary Election than is therein explained, that is but one third part of their Knights and Deputies, are perfect; yet must we in this place, and as to the Institution, of necessity erect a Scaffold. For the Commonwealth to the first creation of her Councils in full number, required thrice as many as are eligible by the foregoing Orders. Wherefore the Orator, whose aid in this place was most necessary, rightly informing the People of the reason, stayed them two days longer at the Muster, and took this course. One List containing two Knights and seven Deputies, he caused to be chosen upon the second day; which List being called the first Galaxy, qualified the Parties elected of it with power for the term of one year and no longer: another List containing two Knights and seven Deputies more, he caused to be chosen the third day, which List being called the second Galaxy, qualified the Parties elected of it with Power for the term of two years and no longer. And upon the fourth day he chose the third Galaxy, according as it is directed by the Order, impower'd for three years; which Lists successively falling (like the Signs or Constellations of one Hemisphere, which setting, cause those of the other to rise) cast the great Orbs of this Commonwealth into an annual, triennial, and perpetual Revolution.  
THE business of the Muster being thus happily finished, HERMES DE CADUCEO, Lord Orator of the Tribe of Nubia, being now put into her first Rapture, caused one of the Censors Pulpits to be planted in front of the Squadron, and ascending into the same, spoke after this manner.  

My Lords, the Magistrates and the People of the Tribe of Nubia.  
WE have this day solemnised the happy Nuptials of the two greatest Princes that are upon the Earth or in Nature, ARMS and COUNCILS: in the mutual Embraces whereof consists your whole COMMONWEALTH; whose Councils upon their perpetual Wheelings, Marches, and Countermarches, create her Arms; and whose Arms with the golden Vollies of the BALLOT at once create and salute her Councils. There be those (such is the World at present) that think it ridiculous to see a Nation exercising its Civil Functions in Military Discipline; while they, committing their Buff to their Servants, come themselves to hold Trenchards. For what avails it such as are unarmed, or (which is all one) whose Education acquaints them not with the proper use of their Swords, to be called Citizens? What were two or three thousand of you, though never so well affected to your Country, but naked, to one Troop of Mercenary Soldiers? If they should come upon the Field and say, Gentlemen, It is thought fit that such and such Men should be chosen by you; where were your Liberty? Or, Gentlemen, Parliaments are exceeding good, but you are to have a little patience, these times are not so fit for them; where were your Commonwealth? What causes the Monarchy of the Tur●s but Servants in Arms? What was it that begot the glorious Commonwealth of Rome, but the Sword in the hands of her Citizens? Wherefore my glad eyes salute the Serenity and Brightness of this day with a shower that shall not cloud it. Behold the Army of Israel become a Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth of Israel remaining an Army, with her Rulers of Ten and of Fiftys, her Rulers of Hundreds and Thousands, drawing near (as this day throout our happy Fields) to the Lot by her Tribes, increased above threefold, and led up by her Phylarches or Princes, to sit upon 
* Sellis Curulibus.  fifty Thrones, judging the fifty Tribes of Oceana! Or, Is it Athens, breaking from her Iron Sepulchre, where she has been so long trampled by Hosts of Janizarys? For certainly that is the voice of THESEUS, having gathered his scattered Athenians into one City. 
† 
— Haec juris sui  
Parere Domino Civitas uni negat:  
Rex ipse Populus annuas mandat vice●  
Honoris hui● illive—.   This freeborn Nation lives not upon the Dole or Bounty of one man, but distributing her annual Magistracies and Honours with her own hand, is herself King PEOPLE— (at which the Orator was a while interrupted with shouts, but at length proceeded)— Is it grave Lacedaemon in her armed Tribe divided by her Obae and her Mora, which appears to chide me that I teach the People to talk, or conceive such Language as is dressed like a Woman, to be a sit Usher of the Joys of Liberty into the hearts of men? Is it Rome in her victorious Arms (for so she held her Concio or Congregation) that congratulats with us, for finding out that which she could not hit on, and binding up her Comitia Curiata, Centuriata, and Tributa, in one inviolable League of Union? Or is it the Great Council of incomparable Venice, bowling forth by the self same Ballot her immortal Commonwealth? For, neither by Reason nor by Experience is it impossible that a Commonwealth should be immortal; seeing the People being the Materials, never die; and the Form, which is Motion, must, without opposition, be endless. The Bowl which is thrown from your hand, if there be no rub, no impediment, shall never cease: for which cause the glorious Luminaries that are the Bowls of God, were once thrown for ever; and next these, those of Venice. But certainly, my Lords, whatever these great Examples may have shown us, we are the first that have shown to the World a Commonwealth established in her rise upon fifty such Towers, and so garnizoned as are the Tribes of Oceana, containing a hundred thousand Elders upon the annual List, and yet but an Out-guard; besides her marching Arms to be equal in the Discipline, and in the number of her Youth.  
AND forasmuch as Sovereign Power is a necessary but a formidable Creature, not unlike the Powder which (as you are Soldiers) is at once your Safety and your Danger, being subject to take fire against you as well as for you; how well and securely is she by your Galaxies so collected as to be in full force and vigour, and yet so distributed that it is impossible you should be blown up by your own Magazine? Let them who will have it, that Power if it be confined cannot be Sovereign, tell us, whether our Rivers do not enjoy a more secure and fruitful Reign within their proper banks, than if it were lawful for them, in ravaging our Harvests, to spill themselves? Whether Souls, not confined to their peculiar bodies, do govern them any more than those of Witches in their Trances? Whether Power, not confined to the bounds of Reason and Virtue, has any other bounds than those of Vice and Passion? Or if Vice and Passion be boundless, and Reason and Virtue have certain Limits, on which of these Thrones holy men should anoint their Sovereign? But to blow away this dust, The Sovereign Power of a Commonwealth is no more bounded, that is to say straitened, than that of a Monarch; but is balanced. The Eagle mounts not to her proper pitch, if she be bounded; nor is free, if she be not balanced. And lest a Monarch should think he can reach further with his Sceptre, the Roman Eagle upon such a Balance spread her Wings from the Ocean to Euphrates. Receive the Sovereign Power; you have received it, hold it fast, embrace it for ever in your shining Arms. The virtue of the Loadstone is not impaired or limited, but receives strength and nourishment by being bound in Iron. And so giving your Lordships much Joy, I take my leave of this Tribe.   
THE Orator descending, had the period of his Speech made with a vast applause and exultation of the whole Tribe, attending him for that night to his quarter, as the Phylarch with some commanded Troops did the next day to the Frontiers of the Tribe, where leave was taken on both sides with more Tears than Grief.  

Definition of the Tribe.  SO, a Tribe is the third Division of Land occasioned by the third Collection of the People, whose Functions proper to that place are contained in the five foregoing Orders.  
THE Institution of the Commonwealth was such as needed those Props and Scaffolds which may have troubled the Reader; but I shall here take them away, and come to the Constitution which stands by itself, and yields a clearer prospect.  

Constitution of the Commonwealth.  THE motions, by what has been already shown, are Spherical; and Spherical Motions have their proper Centre: for which cause (ere I proceed further) it will be necessary, for the better understanding of the whole, that I discover the Centre whereupon the Motions of this Commonwealth are formed.  
THE Centre, or Basis of every Government, is no other than the Fundamental Laws of the same.  
FUNDAMENTAL Laws are such as state what it is that a Man may call his own, that is to say, Property; and what the Means be whereby a Man may enjoy his own, that is to say, Protection. The first is also called Dominion, and the second Empire or Sovereign Power, whereof this (as has been shown) is the natural product of the former; for such as is the Balance of Dominion in a Nation, such is the nature of its Empire.  
WHEREFORE the Fundamental Laws of Oceana, or the Centre of this Commonwealth, are the Agrarian and the Ballot: The Agrarian by the Balance of Dominion preserving Equality in the Root; and the Ballot by an equal Rotation conveying it into the Branch, or Exercise of Sovereign Power: As, to begin with the former, appears by  

13. Order.  THE thirteenth ORDER, constituting the Agrarian Laws of Oceana, Marpesia and Panopea, whereby it is ordained, First, for all such Lands as are lying and being within the proper Territories of Oceana, that every Man who is at present possessed, or shall hereafter be possessed of an Estate in Land exceeding the Revenue of two thousand Pounds a year, and having more than one Son, shall leave his Lands either equally divided among them, in case the Lands amount to above 2000 l. a year to each; or so near equally in case they come under, that the greater part or portion of the same remaining to the eldest, exceed not the value of two thousand pounds' Revenue. And no man, not in present possession of Lands above the value of two thousand Pounds by the year, shall receive, enjoy (except by lawful Inheritance) acquire, or purchase to himself Lands within the said Territories, amounting, with those already in his possession, above the said Revenue. And if a man has a Daughter, or Daughters, except she be an Heiress, or they be Heiresses, he shall not leave or give to any one of them in Marriage or otherwise, for her Portion, above the value of one thousand five hundred Pounds in Lands, Goods, and Monies. Nor shall any Friend, Kinsman, or Kinswoman, add to her or their Portion or Portions that are so provided for, to make any one of them greater. Nor shall any man demand, or have more in marriage with any Woman. Nevertheless an Heiress shall enjoy her lawful Inheritance, and a Widow, whatsoever the Bounty or Affection of her Husband shall bequeath to her, to be divided in the first Generation, wherein it is divisible according as has been shown.  
SECONDLY, For Lands lying and being within the Territories of Marpesia, the Agrarian shall hold in all parts as it is established in Oceana, except only in the Standard or Proportion of Estates in Land, which shall be set for Marpesia at five hundred Pounds. And,  
THIRDLY, For Panopea, the Agrarian shall hold in all parts, as in Oceana. And whosoever possessing above the proportion allowed by these Laws, shall be lawfully convicted of the same, shall forfeit the Overplus to the use of the State.  
AGRARIAN Laws of all others have ever been the greatest Bugbears, and so in the Institution were these, at which time it was ridiculous to see how strange a fear appeared in every body of that which, being good for all, could hurt no body. But instead of the proof of this Order, I shall out of those many Debates that happened ere it could be passed, insert two Speeches that were made at the Council of Legislators, the first by the Right Honourable PHYLAUTUS DE GARBO, a young Man, being Heir apparent to a very Noble Family, and one of the Counsillors, who expressed himself as follows.  

May it please your Highness, my Lord ARCHON of Oceana.  
IF I did not, to my capacity, know from how profound a Counsillor I descent, it would certainly be no hard task to make it as light as the day: First, That an Agrarian is altogether unnecessary. Secondly, That it is dangerous to a Commonwealth. Thirdly, That it is insufficient to keep out Monarchy. Fourthly, That it ruins Families. Fifthly, That it destroys Industry. And last of all, that though it were indeed of any good use, it will be a matter of such difficulty to introduce in this Nation, and so to settle that it may be lasting, as is altogether invincible.  
FIRST, That an Agrarian is unnecessary to a Commonwealth, what clearer Testimony can there be, than that the Commonwealths which are our Cotemporaries (Venice, to which your Highness gives the upper hand of all Antiquity, being one) have no such thing? And there can be no reason why they have it not, seeing it is in the Sovereign Power at any time to establish such an Order, but that they need it not; wherefore no wonder if ARISTOTLE, who pretends to be a good Commonwealthsman's, has long since derided PHALEAS, to whom it was attributed by the Greecs, for his invention.  
SECONDLY, That an Agrarian is dangerous to a Commonwealth is affirmed upon no slight Authority, seeing MACCHIAVEL is positive, that it was the Dissension which happened about the Agrarian that caused the Destruction of Rome; nor do I think that it did much better in Lacedaemon, as I shall show anon.  
THIRDLY, That it is insufficient to keep out Monarchy cannot without impiety be denied, the holy Scriptures bearing witness, that the Commonwealth of Israel, notwithstanding her Agrarian, submitted her neck to the arbitrary Yoke of her Princes.  
FOURTHLY, Therefore to come to my next Assertion, That it is destructive to Families; this also is so apparent, that it needs pity rather than proof. Why, alas, do you bind a Nobility (which no Generation shall deny to have been the first that freely sacrificed their Blood to the ancient Liberties of this People) on an unholy Altar? Why are the People taught, That their Liberty, which, except our noble Ancestors had been born, must have long since been buried, cannot now be born except we be buried? A Commonwealth should have the innocence of the Dove. Let us leave this purchase of her Birth to the Serpent, which eats itself out of the womb of its Mother.  
FIFTHLY, But it may be said, perhaps, that we are fallen from our first Love, become proud and idle. It is certain, my Lords, that the hand of God is not upon us for nothing. But take heed how you admit of such assaults and sallies upon men's Estates, as may slacken the Nerve of Labour, and give others also reason to believe that their Sweat is vain; or else, whatsoever be pretended, your Agrarian (which is my Fifth Assertion) must indeed destroy Industry. For, that so it did in Lacedaemon is most apparent, as also that it could do no otherwise, where every Man having his 40 Quarters of Barley, with Wine proportionable, supplied him out of his own Lot by his labourer or Helot; and being confined in that to the scantling above which he might not live, there was not any such thing as a Trade, or other Art, except that of War, in exercise. Wherefore a Spartan, if he were not in Arms, must sit and play with his fingers, whence ensued perpetual War, and, the Estate of the City being as little capable of increase as that of the Citizens, her inevitable Ruin. Now what better ends you can propose to yourselves in the like ways, I do not so well see as I perceive that there may be worse: For Lacedaemon yet was free from Civil War: But if you employ your Citizens no better than she did, I cannot promise you that you shall far so well, because they are still desirous of War that hope it may be profitable to them; and the strongest Security you can give of Peace, is to make it gainful. Otherwise Men will rather choose that whereby they may break your Laws, than that whereby your Laws may break them. Which I speak not so much in relation to the Nobility or such as would be holding, as to the People or them that would be getting; the passion in these being so much the stronger; as a Man's felicity is weaker in the fruition of things, than in their prosecution and increase.  
TRULY, my Lords, it is my fear, that by taking of more hands, and the best from Industry, you will further indamage it, than can be repaired by laying on a few, and the worst; while the Nobility must be forced to send their Sons to the Blow, and, as if this were not enough, to marry their Daughters also to Farmers.  
SIXTHLY, But I do not see (to come to the last point) how it is possible that this thing should be brought about, to your good I mean, though it may to the destruction of many. For that the Agrarian of Israel, or that of Lacedaemon might stand, is no such miracle; the Lands, without any consideration of the former Proprietor, being surveyed and cast into equal Lots, which could neither be bought, nor sold, nor multiplied: so that they knew wherabout to have a Man. But in this Nation no such Division can be introduced, the Lands being already in the hands of Proprietors, and such whose Estates lie very rarely together, but mixed one with another; being also of Tenors in nature so different, that as there is no experience that an Agrarian was ever introduced in such a case, so there is no appearance how, or reason why it should: but that which is against Reason and Experience is impossible.   
THE case of my Lord PHYLAUTUS was the most concerned in the whole Nation; for he had four younger Brothers, his Father being yet living to whom he was Heir of ten thousand Pounds a year. Wherefore being a Man both of good Parts and Esteem, his Words wrought both upon men's Reason and Passions, and had born a stroke at the head of the business, if my Lord ARCHON had not interposed the Buckler in this Oration.  

My Lords, the Legislators of Oceana.  
MY Lord PHYLAUTUS has made a thing which is easy to seem hard; if the Thanks were due to his Eloquence, it would be worthy of less praise, than that he owes it to his Merit, and the Love he has most deservedly purchased of all Men: nor is it rationally to be feared, that he who is so much beforehand in his private, should be in arrear in his public Capacity. Wherefore my Lord's tenderness throout his Speech arising from no other Principle than his Solicitude lest the Agrarian should be hurtful to his Country; it is no less than my duty to give the best satisfaction I am able to so good a Patriot, taking every one of his Doubts in the Order proposed. And,  
FIRST, Whereas my Lord, upon observation of the modern Commonwealths, is of opinion, that an Agrarian is not necessary: It must be confessed, that at the first sight of them there is some appearance favouring his Assertion, but upon Accidents of no precedent to us. For the Commonwealths of Switzerland and Holland, I mean of those Leagues, being situated in Countries not alluring the Inhabitants to Wantonness, but obliging them to universal Industry, have an implicit Agrarian in the nature of them: and being not obnoxious to a growing Nobility (which, as long as their former Monarchys had spread the wing over them, could either not at all be hatched, or was soon broken) are of no example to us, whose Experience in this point has been to the contrary. But what if even in these Governments there be indeed an explicit Agrarian? For when the Law commands an equal or near equal distribution of a Man's Estate in Land among his Children, as it is done in those Countries, a Nobility cannot grow; and so there needs no Agrarian, or rather there is one. And for the growth of the Nobility in Venice (if so it be, for MACCHIAVEL observes in that Republic, as a cause of it, a great mediocrity of Estates) it is not a point that she is to fear, but might study, seeing she consists of nothing else but Nobility; by which, whatever their Estates suck from the People, especially if it comes equally, is digested into the better Blood of that Commonwealth, which is all, or the greatest benefit they can have by accumulation. For how inequal soever you will have them to be in their Incoms, they have Officers of the Pomp, to bring them equal in expenses, or at least in the ostentation or show of them. And so unless the advantage of an Estate consists more in the measure than in the use of it, the Authority of Venice does but enforce our Agrarian; nor shall a Man evade or elude the Prudence of it, by the Authority of any other Commonwealth. For if a Commonwealth has been introduced at once, as those of Israel and Lacedaemon, you are certain to find her underlayed with this as the main Foundation; nor, if she is obliged more to Fortune than Prudence, has she raised her head without musing upon this matter, as appears by that of Athens, which thro' her defect in this point, says ARISTOTLE, introduced her Ostracism, as most of the Democracies 
Poli●. 1. 3. c. 9  of Grece. But, not to restrain a Fundamental of such latitude to any one kind of Government, do we not yet see, that if there be a sole Landlord of a vast Territory, he is the Turc? That if a few Landlords overbalance a populous Country, they have store of Servants? That if a People be in an equal balance, they can have no Lords? That no Government can otherwise be erected, than upon some one of these Foundations? That no one of these Foundations (each being else apt to change into some other) can give any security to the Government, unless it be fixed? That thro' the want of this fixation, potent Monarchys and Commonwealths have fallen upon the heads of the People, and accompanied their own sad Ruins with vast effusions of innocent Blood? Let the Fame, as was the merit of the ancient Nobility of this Nation, be equal to, or above what has been already said, or can be spoken; yet have we seen not only their Glory, but that of a Throne, the most indulgent to, and least invasive for so many Ages upon the Liberty of a People that the World has known, thro' the mere want of fixing her foot by a proportionable Agrarian upon her proper Foundation, to have fallen with such horror, as has been a Spectacle of Astonishment to the whole Earth. And were it well argued from one Calamity, that we ought not to prevent another? Nor is ARISTOTLE so good a Commonwealthsman's for deriding the invention of PHALEAS, as 
Polit. l. 5. c. 3.  in recollecting himself, where he says, That Democracies, when a less part of their Citizens overtop the rest in Wealth, degenerate into Oligarchys and Principalitys: and, which comes nearer to the present purpose, that the greater part of the Nobility of Tarantum coming accidentally to be ruined, the Government of the Few came by consequence to be changed into that of the Many.  
THESE things considered, I cannot see how an Agrarian, as to the fixation or security of a Government, can be less than necessary. And if a Cure be necessary, it excuses not the Patient, his Disease being otherwise desperate, that it is dangerous; which was the case of Rome, not so stated by MACCHIAVEL, where he says, That the strife about the Agrarian caused the Destruction of that Commonwealth. As if when a Senator was not rich (as CRASSUS held) except he could pay an Army, that Commonwealth could expect nothing but Ruin, whether in strife about the Agrarian, or without it. 
* Nuper divitiae avaritiam, & abundantes voluptates desiderium, per luxum atque libidinem, pereundi perdendique omnia invexere. Liv. in Praef.  Of late, says LIVY, Riches have introduced Avarice; and voluptuous Pleasures abounding, have thro' Lust and Luxury begot a desire of blasting and destroying all good Orders. If the greatest Security of a Commonwealth consists in being provided with the proper Antidote against this Poison, her greatest danger must be from the absence of an Agrarian, which is the whole truth of the Roman example. For the Laconic, I shall reserve the farther explication of it, as my Lord also did, to another place: and first see whether an Agrarian proportioned to a popular Government be sufficient to keep out Monarchy. My Lord is for the Negative, and fortified by the People of Israel electing a King. To which I say, That the Action of the People therein expressed is a full Answer to the Objection of that Example: For the Monarchy neither grew upon them, nor could, by reason of the Agrarian, possibly have invaded them, if they had not pulled it upon themselves by the election of a King. Which being an Accident, the like whereof is not to be found in any other People so planted, nor in this, till, as it is manifest, they were given up by God to infatuation (for says he to SAMUEL, They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected Me, that I should not reign over them) has something in it which is apparent, by what went before, to have been besides the course of Nature, and by what followed. For the King having no other Foundation than the Calamitys of the People, so often beaten by their Enemy's, that despairing of themselves, they were contented with any change; if he had Peace as in the days of SOLOMON, lest but a slippery Throne to his Successor, as appeared by REHOBOAM. And the Agrarian, notwithstanding the Monarchy thus introduced, so faithfully preserved the Root of that Commonwealth, that it shot forth oftener, and by intervals continued longer than any other Government, as may be computed from the Institution of the same by JOSHUA, 1465 years before CHRIST, to the total dissolution of it, which happened in the Reign of the Emperor ADRIAN, 135 years after the Incarnation. A People planted upon an equal Agrarian, and holding to it, if they part with their Liberty, must do it upon good will, and make but a bad title of their Bounty. As to instance yet further in that which is proposed by the present Order to this Nation, the Standard whereof is at 2000 l. a year: The whole Territory of Oceana being divided by this proportion, amounts to 5000 Lots. So the Lands of Oceana being thus distributed, and bound to this Distribution, can never fall to fewer than five thousand Proprietors. But five thousand Proprietors so seized will not agree to break the Agrarian, for that were to agree to rob one another; nor to bring in a King, because they must maintain him, and can have no benefit by him; nor to exclude the People, because they can have as little by that, and must spoil their Militia. So the Commonwealth continuing upon the balance proposed, though it should come into five thousand hands, can never alter; and that it should ever come into five thousand hands, is as improbable as any thing in the World that is not altogether impossible.  
MY Lords, other Considerations are more private: As that this Order destroys Families; which is as if one should lay the ruins of some ancient Castle to the Herbs which usually grow out of them; the destruction of those Families being that indeed which naturally produced this Order. For we do not now argue for that which we would have, but for that which we are already possessed of; as would appear, if a note were but taken of all such as have at this day above two thousand Pounds a year in Oceana. If my Lord should grant (and I will put it with the most) that they who are Proprietors in Land, exceeding this proportion, exceed not three hundred; with what brow can the Interest of so few be balanced with that of the whole Nation? or rather, what Interest have they to put in such a Balance? They would live as they have been accustomed to do; Who hinders them? They would enjoy their Estates; who touches them? They would dispose of what they have according to the Interest of their Families: It is that which we desire. A Man has one Son; let him be called: Would he enjoy his Father's Estate? It is his, his Son's, and his Son's Son's after him. A Man has five Sons; let them be called: Would they enjoy their Father's Estate? It is divided among them: for we have four Votes for one in the same Family, and therefore this must be the Interest of the Family, or the Family knows not its own Interest. If a Man shall dispute otherwise, he must draw his Arguments from Custom, and from Greatness, which was the Interest of the Monarchy, not of the Family: and we are now a Commonwealth. If the Monarchy could not bear with such Divisions because they tended to a Commonwealth; neither can a Commonwealth connive at such Accumulations, because they tend to a Monarchy. If the Monarchy might make bold with so many for the good of one, we may make bold with one for the good of so many; nay, for the good of all. My Lords, it comes into my mind, that which upon occasion of the variety of Parties enumerated in our late Civil Wars, was said by a Friend of mine coming home from his Travels, about the latter end of these Troubles; That he admired how it came to pass, that younger Brothers, especially being so many more in number than their Elder, did not unite as one man against a Tyranny, the like whereof has not been exercised in any other Nation. And truly, when I consider that our Countrymen are none of the worst natured, I must confess I marvel much how it comes to pass, that we should use our Children as we do our Puppies; take one, lay it in the lap, feed it with every good bit, and drown five: nay yet worse; forasmuch as the Puppies are once drowned, whereas the Children are left perpetually drowning. Really, my Lords, it is a flinty Custom! And all this for his cruel Ambition, that would raise himself a Pillar, a golden Pillar for his Monument, though he has Children, his own reviving Flesh, and a kind of Immortality. And this is that Interest of a Family, for which we are to think ill of a Government that will not endure it. But quiet yourselves: The Land thro' which the River Nilus wanders in one stream, is barren; but where it parts into seven, it multiplys its sertil shores by distributing, yet keeping and improving such a Propriety and Nutrition, as is a prudent Agrarian to a wellordered Commonwealth.  
NOR (to come to the fifth Assertion) is a political Body rendered any fit for Industry, by having one gouty and another withered Leg, than a natural. It tends not to the improvement of Merchandise that there be some who have no need of their Trading, and others that are not able to follow it. If Confinement discourages Industry, an Estate in Money is not confined; and lest Industry should want whereupon to work, Land is not engrossed or entailed upon any man, but remains at its devotion. I wonder whence the computation can arise, that this should discourage Industry. Two thousand Pounds a year a man may enjoy in Oceana, as much in Panopea, five hundred in Marpesia: There be other Plantations, and the Commonwealth will have more. Who knows how far the Arms of our Agrarian may extend themselves? and whether he that might have left a Pillar, may not leave a Temple of many Pillars to his more pious Memory? Where there is some measure in Riches, a man may be rich; but if you will have them to be infinite, there will be no end of starving himself, and wanting what he has: and what pains does such a one take to be poor! Furthermore, if a man shall think that there may be an Industry less greasy, or more noble, and so cast his thoughts upon the Commonwealth, he will have leisure for her, and she Riches and Honours for him; his Sweat shall smell like ALEXANDER'S. My Lord PHYLAUTUS is a young Man, who enjoying his ten thousand Pounds a year, may keep a noble House in the old way, and have homely Guests; and having but two, by the means proposed, may take the upper hand of his great Ancestors; with reverence to whom, I may say, there has not been one of them would have disputed his place with a Roman Consul. My Lord, do not break my heart; the Nobility shall go to no other Plows than those from which we call our Consuls. But, says he, it having been so with Lacedaemon, that neither the City nor the Citizens were capable of increase, a blow was given by that Agrarian, which ruined both. And what are we concerned with that Agrarian, or that blow, while our Citizens and our City (and that by our Agrarian) are both capable of increase? The Spartan, if he made a Conquest, had not Citizens to hold it; the Oceaner will have enough: the Spartan could have no Trade, the Oceaner may have all. The Agrarian in Laconia, that it might bind on Knapsacs', forbidding all other Arts but that of War, could not make an Army of above 30000 Citizens. The Agrarian in Oceana without interruption of Traffic, provides us in the fifth part of the Youth an annual source or fresh spring of 100000, besides our Provincial auxiliaries, out of which to draw marching Arms; and as many Elders, not feeble, but men most of them in the flower of their Age, and in Arms for the defence of our Territories. The Agrarian in Laconia banished Money, this multiplys it: That allowed a matter of twenty or thirty Acres to a man; this two or three thousand: There is no comparison between them. And yet I differ so much from my Lord, or his Opinion that the Agrarian was the ruin of Lacedaemon, that I hold it no less than demonstrable to have been her main support. For if, banishing all other diversions, it could not make an Army of above 30000; then letting in all other diversions, it must have broken that Army. Wherefore LYSANDER bringing in the golden spoils of Athens, irrecoverably ruined that Commonwealth; and is a warning to us, that in giving encouragement to Industry, we also remember, that Covetousness is the root of all Evil. And our Agrarian can never be the cause of those Seditions threatened by my Lord, but is the proper cure of them, as 
* Hinc usura vorax, rapidumque in tempore Foenus; Hinc concussa fides, & multis utile bellum.  LUCAN notes well in the State of Rome before the Civil Wars, which happened thro' the want of such an Antidote.  
Why then are we mistaken, as if we intended not equal advantages in our Commonwealth to either Sex, because we would not have women's Fortunes consist in that metal, which exposes them to Cutpurses? If a man cuts my Purse, I may have him by the heels, or by the neck for it; whereas a man may cut a woman's purse, and have her for his pains in fetters. How brutish, and much more than brutish, is that Commonwealth, which prefers the Earth before the Fruits of her Womb? If the People be her Treasure, the staff by which she is sustained and comforted, with what Justice can she suffer them, by whom she is most enriched, to be for that cause the most impoverished? And yet we see the Gifts of God, and the Bounties of Heaven in fruitful Families, thro' this wretched custom of marrying for Money, become their insupportable grief and poverty. Nor falls this so heavy upon the lower sort, being better able to shift for themselves, as upon the Nobility or Gentry. For what avails it in this case, from whence their Veins have derived their Blood; while they shall see the Tallow of a Chandler sooner converted into that Beauty which is required in a Bride? I appeal, whether my Lord PHYLAUTUS or myself be the Advocate of Nobility; against which in the case proposed by me, there would be nothing to hold the balance. And why is a Woman, if she may have but fifteen hundred pounds, undone? If she be unmarried, what Nobleman allows his Daughter in that case a greater Revenu, than so much Money may command? And if she marry, no Nobleman can give his Daughter a greater portion than she has. Who is hurt in this case? nay, who is not benefited? If the Agrarian gives us the sweat of our brows without diminution; if it prepares our Table, if it makes our Cup to overflow; and above all this, in providing for our Children, anoints our Heads with that Oil which takes away the greatest of worldly cares; what man, that is not besotted with a Covetousness as vain as endless, can imagine such a Constitution to be his Poverty? seeing where no woman can be considerable for her portion, no portion will be considerable with a woman; and so his Children will not only find better preferments without his Brocage, but more freedom of their own Affections. We are wonderful severe in Laws, that they shall not marry without our consent; as if it were care and tenderness over them: But is it not, lest we should not have the other thousand Pounds with this Son, or the other hundred Pounds a year more in Jointure for that Daughter? These, when we are crossed in them, are the Sins for which we water our couch with tears, but not of Penitence; seeing whereas it is a mischief beyond any that we can do to our Enemy's, we persist to make nothing of breaking the affection of our Children. But there is in this Agrarian a Homage to pure and spotless Love, the consequence whereof I will not give for all your Romances. An Alderman makes not his Daughter a Countess till he has given her 20000 l. nor a Romance a considerable Mistress till she be a Princess; these are Characters of bastard Love. But if our Agrarian excludes Ambition and Covetousness, we shall at length have the care of our own breed, in which we have been curious as to our Dogs and Horses. The Marriagebed will be truly legitimat, and the Race of the Commonwealth not spurious.  
BUT (impar magnanimis ausis, imparque dolori) I am hurled from all my hopes by my Lords last assertion of Impossibility, that the Root from whence we imagine these Fruits, should be planted or thrive in this Soil. And why? because of the mixture of Estates, and variety of Tenors. Nevertheless, there is yet extant in the Exchequer an old Survey of the whole Nation; wherefore such a thing is not impossible. Now if a new Survey were taken at the present rates, and the Law made, that no man should hold hereafter above so much Land as is valued therein at 2000 l. a year, it would amount to a good and sufficient Agrarian. It is true, that there would remain some difficulty in the different kind of Rents, and that it is a matter requiring not only more leisure than we have, but an Authority which may be better able to bow men to a more general Consent, than is to be wrought out of them by such as are in our capacity. Wherefore, as to the manner, it is necessary that we refer it to the Parliament; but as to the matter, they cannot otherwise fix their Government upon the right Balance.  
I SHALL conclude with a few words to some parts of the Order, which my Lord has omitted. As first to the Consequences of the Agrarian to be settled in Marpesia, which irreparably breaks the Aristocracy of that Nation; being of such a nature, as standing, it is not possible that you should govern. For while the People of that Country are little better than the cattle of the Nobility, you must not wonder if according as these can make their Markets with foreign Princes, you find those to be driven upon your Grounds. And if you be so tender, now you have it in your power, as not to hold a hand upon them that may prevent the slaughter which must otherwise ensue in like cases, the Blood will lie at your door. But in holding such a hand upon them, you may settle the Agrarian; and in settling the Agrarian, you give that People not only Liberty, but Lands; which makes your Protection necessary to their Security; and their Contribution due to your Protection, as to their own Safety.  
FOR the Agrarian of Panopea, it allowing such proportions of so good Land, men that conceive themselves straitened by this in Oceana, will begin there to let themselves forth, where every Citizen will in time have his Villa. And there is no question, but the improvement of that Country by this means must be far greater than it has been in the best of former times.  
I HAVE no more to say, but that in those ancient and heroic Ages (when men thought that to be necessary which was virtuous) the Nobility of Athens having the People so much engaged in their debt, that there remained no other question among these, than which of those should be King, no sooner heard SOLON speak than they quitted their Debts, and restored the Commonwealth; which ever after held a solemn and annual Feast called the Sisacthia, or Recision, in memory of that Action. Nor is this example the Phoenix; for at the institution by LYCURGUS, the Nobility having Estates (as ours here) in the Lands of Laconia, upon no other valuable consideration than the Commonwealth proposed by him, threw them up to be parcelled by his Agrarian. But now when no man is desired to throw up a farthing of his Money, or a shovel full of his Earth, and that all we can do is but to make a virtue of necessity; we are disputing whether we should have Peace or War: For Peace you cannot have without some Government, nor any Government without the proper Balance. Wherefore if you will not fix this which you have, the rest is Blood, for without Blood you can bring in no other.   
BY these Speeches made at the Institution of the Agrarian, you may perceive what were the Grounds of it. The next is  

14. Order.  THE fourteenth ORDER, constituting the Ballot of Venice, as it is fitted by several Alterations, and appointed to every Assembly, to be the constant and only way of giving suffrage in this Commonwealth, according to the following Scheme.  
P: 113.  
The Manner and Use of the Ballot.  
I SHALL endeavour by the preceding Figure to demonstrat the Manner of the VENETIAN BALLOT (a thing as difficult in discourse or writing, as facile in practice) according to the use of it in Oceana. The whole Figure represents the Senate, containing, as to the House or form of sitting, a square and a half; the Tribunal at the upper end being ascended by four steps. On the uppermost of these sit the Magistrates that constitute the Signory of the Commonwealth, that is to say, A the Strategus; B the Orator; C the three Commissioners of the Great Seal; D the three Commissioners of the Treasury, whereof one, E, exercises for the present the Office of a Censor at the middle Urn F.  
TO the two upper steps of the Tribunal answer G G. G G. the two long Benches next the Wall on each side of the House; the outwardmost of which are equal in height to the uppermost step, and the innermost equal in height to the next. Of these four Benches consists the first Seat; as the second Seat consists in like manner of those four Benches H H. H H. which being next the Floor, are equal in height to the two nethermost steps of the Throne. So the whole House is distributed into two Seats, each consisting of four Benches.  
THIS distribution causes not only the greater conveniency, as will be shown, to the Senators in the exercise of their Function at the Ballot, but a greater grace to the aspect of the Senat. In the middle of the outward benches stand I. I. the chairs of the Censors, those being their ordinary places, though upon occasion of the Ballot they descend, and sit where they are shown by K. K. at each of the outward Urns L. L. Those M. M. that sit with their Tables, and the Bowls N. N. before them, upon the half space or second step of the Tribunal from the floor, are the Clercs or Secretaries of the House. Upon the short Seats O. O. on the floor (which should have been represented by Woolsacks) sit P the two Tribune's of the Horse; Q the two Tribune's of the Foot; and R R. R R. the Judges: all which Magistrates are Assistants, but have no suffrage. This posture of the Senate considered, the Ballot is performed as follows.  
FIRST, whereas the gold Balls are of several suits, and accordingly marked with several Letters of the Alphabet, a Secretary presents a little Urn (wherein there is one Ball of every suit or mark) to the Strategus and the Orator; and look what Letter the Strategus draws, the same and no other is to be used for that time in the middle Urn F; the like for the Letter drawn by the Orator is to be observed for the side Urns L. L. that is to say, if the Strategus drew a Ball with an A, all the gold Balls in the middle Urn for that day are marked with the Letter A; and if the Orator drew a B, all the gold Balls in the side Urn for that day are marked with the Letter B: which don immediately before the Ballot, and so the Letter unknown to the Ballotants, they can use no fraud or juggling; otherwise a man might carry a gold Ball in his hand, and seem to have drawn it out of an Urn. He that draws a gold Ball at any Urn, delivers it to the Censor or Assessor of that Urn, who views the Character, and allows accordingly of his Lot.  
THE Strategus and the Orator having drawn for the Letters, the Urns are prepared accordingly by one of the Commissioners and the two Censors. The preparation of the Urns is after this manner. If the Senate be to elect, for example, the List called the Tropic of Magistrates, which is this;  

1. The Lord STRATEGUS;  
2. The Lord ORATOR;  
3. The third COMMISSIONER of the Great Seal;  
4. The third COMMISSIONER of the Treasury;  
5. The first CENSOR;  
6. The second CENSOR;   
This List or Schedule consists of six Magistracies, and to every Magistracy there are to be four Competitors, that is, in all four and twenty Competitors proposed to the House. They that are to propose the Competitors are called Electors, and no Elector can propose above one Competitor: wherefore for the proposing of four and twenty Competitors you must have four and twenty Electors; and whereas the Ballot consists of a Lot and of a Suffrage, the Lot is for no other use than for the designation of Electors; and he that draws a gold Ball at the middle Urn is an Elector. Now, as to have four and twenty Competitors proposed, you must have four and twenty Electors made; so to have four and twenty Electors made by lot, you must have four and twenty gold Balls in the middle Urn; and these (because otherwise it would be no Lot) mixed with a competent number of Blanks, or silver Balls. Wherefore to the four and twenty gold Balls cast six and twenty silver ones, and those (reckoning the Blanks with the Prizes) make fifty Balls in the middle Urn. This don (because no man can come to the middle Urn that has not first drawn a gold Ball at one of the side Urns) and to be sure that the Prizes or gold Balls in this Urn be all drawn, there must come to it fifty persons: therefore there must be in each of the side Urns five and twenty gold Balls, which in both come to fifty; and to the end that every Senator may have his Lot, the gold Balls in the side Urns are to be made up with Blanks equal to the number of the Ballotants at either Urn: for example, the House consisting of 300 Senators, there must be in each of the side Urns 125 Blanks and 25 Prizes, which come in both the side Urns to 300 Balls. This is the whole Mystery of preparing the Urns, which the Censors having skill to do accordingly, the rest of the Ballot, whether the parties balloting understand it or no, must of necessary consequence come right; and they can neither be out, nor shall into any confusion in the exercise of this Art.  
BUT the Ballot, as I said, is of two parts, Lot and Suffrage, or the Proposition and Result. The Lot determins who shall propose the Competitors; and the Result of the Senate, which of the Competitors shall be the Magistrates. The whole, to begin with the Lot, proceeds in this manner.  
THE first Secretary with an audible Voice reads first the List of the Magistrates to be chosen for the day; then the Oath for fair Election, at which the Senators hold up their hands; which done, another Secretary presents a little Urn to the Strategus, in which are four Balls, each of them having one of these four Inscriptions: FIRST SEAT AT THE UPPER END. FIRST SEAT AT THE LOWER END. SECOND SEAT AT THE UPPER END. SECOND SEAT AT THE LOWER END. and look which of them the Strategus draws, the Secretary pronouncing the Inscription with a loud Voice, the Seat so called comes accordingly to the Urns: this in the Figure is the SECOND SEAT AT THE UPPER END. The manner of their coming to the side Urns is in double Files, there being two holes in the cover of each side Urn, by which means two may draw at once. The Senators therefore SS. SS. are coming from the upper end of their Seats HH. HH. to the side Urns L. L. The Senators TT. T. are drawing. The Senator V has drawn a gold Ball at his side Urn, and is going to the middle Urn F, where the Senator W having done the like at the other side Urn, is already drawing. But the Senators X X. X X. having drawn Blanks at their side Urns, and thrown them into the Bowls Y. Y. standing at the feet of the Urns, are marching by the lower end into their Seats again; the Senator a having done the like at the middle Urn, is also throwing his blank into the Bowl b, and marching to his Seat again: for a man by a prize at a side Urn gains no more than right to come to the middle Urn, where if he draws a Blank, his Fortune at the side Urn comes to nothing at all; wherefore he also returns to his place. But the Senator c has had a Prize at the middle Urn, where the Commissioner having viewed his Ball, and found the mark to be right, he marches up the steps to the Seat of the Electors, which is the form d set cross the Tribunal, where he places himself according as he was drawn with the other Electors eee drawn before him. These are not to look back, but sit with their Faces towards the Signory or State, till their number amount to that of the Magistrate to be that day chosen, which for the present, as was shown, are six; wherefore six Electors being made, they are reckoned according as they were drawn: First, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, in their Order; and the first six that are chosen are the FIRST ORDER OF ELECTORS.  
THE first Order of Electors being made, are conducted by a Secretary, with a copy of the List to be chosen, out of the Senate, and into a Committee or Council-Chamber, being neither suffered by the way, nor in their room (till the Ballot be ended) to have conference with any but themselves; wherefore the Secretary, having given them their Oath that they shall make Election according to the Law and their Conscience, delivers them the List, and seats himself at the lower end of the Table with his Pen and Paper, while another Secretary keeps the Door.  
BY such time as the first Order of Electors are thus seated, the second Order of Electors is drawn, who with a second Copy of the same List are conducted into another Committee-chamber, by other Secretaries performing the same Office with the former.  
THE like exactly is done by the third and by the fourth Orders (or Hands, as the Venetians call them) of Electors; by which means you have the four and twenty Electors divided according to the four Copies of the same List, by six, into four Hands or Orders; and every one of these Orders names one Competitor to every Magistracy in the List; that is to say, the first Elector names to the first Magistracy, the second Elector to the second Magistracy, and so forth. But though the Electors, as has been shown, are chosen by mere lot, yet the Competitors by them named are not chosen by any Lot, but by the Suffrage of the whole Order: For example; The first Elector in the first Order proposes a Name to be Strategus, which Name is balloted by himself and the other five Electors; and if the Name so balloted attain not to above half the Suffrages, it is laid aside, and the first Elector names another to the same Magistracy; and so in case this also fails, another, till one he has named, whether it be himself, or some other, has attained to above half the Suffrages in the affirmative; and the name so attaining to above half the Suffrages in the Affirmative is written to the first Magistracy in the List by the Secretary; which being done, the second Elector of the first Order names to the second Magistracy till one of his nomination be chosen to the same. The like is done by the rest of the Electors of the first Order, till one Competitor be chosen, and written to every Magistracy in their List. Now the second, third, and fourth Orders of Electors doing exactly after the same manner, it comes to pass that one Competitor to every Magistracy being chosen in each Order, there be in all four Competitors chosen to every Magistracy.  
IF any Controversy arises in an Order of Electors, one of the Censors (these being at this game the Groomporters) is advertised by the Secretary, who brings him in, and the Electors disputing are bound to acquiesce in his Sentence. For which cause it is that the Censors do not ballot at the Urns; the Signory also abstains, lest it should deform the House: wherefore the Blanks in the side Urns are by so many the fewer. And so much for the Lot, which is of the greater Art but less Consequence, because it concerns Proposition only: But all (except the Tribune's and the Judges, which being but Assistants have no Suffrage) are to ballot at the Result, to which I now come.  
THE four Orders of Electors having perfected their Lists, the face of the House is changed: for the Urns are taken away, and every Senator and Magistrate is seated in his proper place, saving the Electors, who, having given their Suffrages already, may not stir out of their Chambers, till the House have given theirs, and the rest of the Ballot be performed; which follows in this manner.  
THE four Lists being presented by the Secretaries of each Council of Electors to the Signory, are first read, according to their Order, to the House with an audible Voice; and then the Competitors are put to the Ballot or Suffrage of the whole Senate in this manner: A. A. named to be Strategus in the first Order▪ wherupon eight Ballotins or Pages, such as are expressed by the Figures f. f. take eight of the Boxes represented, though rudely, by the Figures g. g. and go four on the one, and four on the other side of the House, that is, one to every Bench, singing A. A. named to be the Strategus in the first Order: and every Magistrate and Senator (beginning by the Strategus and the Orator first) holds up a little Pellet of Linen, as the Box passes, between his Finger and his Thumb, that men may see he has but one, and then puts it into the same. The Box consisting in the inner part of two Boxes, being painted on the outside white and green, to distinguish the Affirmative from the Nagative side, is so made, that when your Hand is in it, no man can see to which of the sides you put the Suffrage, nor hear to which it falls, because the Pellet being Linen, makes no noise. The Strategus and the Orator having begun, all the rest do the like.  
THE Ballotins having thus gathered the Suffrages, bring them before the Signory, in whose presence the outward Boxes being opened, they take out the inner Boxes, whereof the Affirmative is white, and the Negative green, and pour the white into the Bowl N on the right hand, which is white also, and the green into the Bowl N on the jest, which is also green. These Bowls or Basins (better represented at the lower end of the Figure by h. i.) being upon this occasion set before the Tables of the Secretaries at the upper end N. N. the white on the right hand, and the green on the jest, the Secretaries on each side number the Balls: by which if they find that the Affirmatives amount not to above one half, they writ not the Name that was balloted; but if they amount to above one half, they writ it, adding the number of above half the Suffrages to which it attained. The first name being written, or laid aside, the next that is put is B. B. named to be Strategus in the second Order; the third C. C. named to be Strategus in the third Order; the fourth D. D. named to be Strategus in the fourth Order: and he of these four Competitors that has most above half in the Affirmative, is the Magistrate; or if none of them attain to above half, the nomination for that Magistracy is to be repeated by such new Electors as shall be chosen at the next Ballot. And so, as is exemplifyed in the first Magistracy, proceeds the Ballot of the rest; first in the first, then in the second, and so in the third and fourth Orders.  
NOW whereas it may happen that A. A. (for example) being named Strategus in the first Order, may also be named to the same or some one or more other Magistracies in one or more of the other Orders; his name is first balloted where it is first written, that is, to the more worthy Magistracy, whereof if he misses, he is balloted as it comes in course for the next, and so for the rest, if he misses of that, as often as he is named.  
AND because to be named twice or oftener, whether to the same or some other Magistracy, is the stronger recommendation; the note must not fail to be given upon the name, at the proposition, in this manner; A. A. named to be Strategus in the first, and in the second Order: or A. A. named to be Strategus in the first and the third; in the first and the fourth, etc. But if he be named to the same Magistracy in the first, second, third, and fourth Orders, he can have no Competitor; wherefore attaining to above half the Suffrages, he is the Magistrate. Or thus: A. A. named to be Strategus in the first, to be Censor in the second, to be Orator in the third, and to be Commissioner of the Seal in the fourth Order, or the like in more or fewer Orders: In which cases if he misses of the first Magistracy, he is balloted to the second; if he misses of the second, to the third; and if he misses of the third, to the fourth  
THE Ballot not finished before Sunset, though the Election of the Magistrates already chosen be good, voids the Election of such Competitors as being chosen are not yet furnished with Magistracies, as if they had never been named (for this is no Juggling Box, but an Art that must see the Sun) and the Ballot for the remaining Magistracies is to be repeated the next day by new Orders of Electors, and such Competitors as by them shall be elected. And so in the like manner, if of all the names proposed to the same Magistracy, no one of them attains to above half the Suffrages in the Affirmative.  
THE Senatorian Ballot of Oceana being thus described, those of the Parish, of the Hundred, and of the Tribe, being so little different, that in this they are all contained, and by this may be easily understood, are yet fully described, and made plain enough before in the 5 th', 6 th', 7 th', 8 th', 9 th', and 10 th' Orders.  
THIS therefore is the general Order, whence those branches of the Ballot, some whereof you have already seen, are derived; which, with those that follow, were all read and debated in this place at the Institution. When my Lord EPIMONUS DE GARRULA, being one of the Counsillors, and having no farther patience (though the Rules were composed by the Agent of this Commonwealth, residing for that purpose at Venice) than to hear the direction for the Parishes, stood up and made way for himself in this manner.  

May it please your Highness, my Lord ARCHON.  
UNDER correction of Mr. PEREGRIN SPY, our very learned Agent and Intelligencer, I have seen the World a little, Venice, and (as Gentlemen are permitted to do) the Great Council balloting. And truly I must needs say, that it is for a dumb show the goodliest that I ever beheld with my eyes. You should have some would take it ill, as if the noble Venetians thought themselves too good to speak to strangers, but they observed them not so narrowly. The truth is, they have nothing to say to their Acquaintance; or Men that are in Council sure would have Tongues: For a Council, and not a word spoken in it, is a contradiction. But there is such a pother with their marching and countermarching, as, though never a one of them draw a Sword, you would think they were training; which till I found that they did it only to entertain strangers, I came from among them as wise as I went thither. But in the Parliament of Oceana you had no Balls, nor Dancing, but sober Conversation; a man might know and be known, show his parts, and improve 'em. And now if you take the advice of this same fellow, you will spoil all with his whimsies. Mr. Speaker,— Cry you mercy, my Lord ARCHON, I mean; Set the wisest man of your House in the Great Council of Venice, and you will not know him from a fool. Whereas nothing is more certain, than that flat and dull fellows in the judgement of all such as used to keep company with them before, upon election into our House, have immediately chitted like Barley in the fat, where it acquires a new Spirit, and slowed forth into Language, that I am as confident as I am here, if there were not such as delight to abuse us, is far better than TULLIES; Or, let any body but translate one of his Orations, and speak it in the House, and see if every body do not laugh at him. This is a great matter, Mr. Speaker; they do not cant it with your Booklearning, your Orbs, your Centres, your prime Magnitudes, and your Nebulones, things I profess that would make a sober man run stark mad to hear 'em; while we, who should be considering the Honour of our Country, and that it goes now or never upon our hand, whether it shall be ridiculous to all the World, are going to Nineholes, or trow Madam for our business, like your dumb Venetian, whom this same Sir POLITIC your Resident, that never saw him do any thing but make faces, would insinuat into you, at this distance, to have the only knack of State. Whereas if you should take the pains, as I have done, to look a little nearer, you would find these same wonderful things to be nothing else but mere natural Fopperies, or Capricios, as they call them in Italian, even of the meanest of that Nation. For, put the case you be travelling in Italy, ask your Contadino, that is, the next Country fellow you meet, some question, and presently he ballots you an answer with a nod, which is affirmative; or a shake with his head, which is the negative box; or a shrug with his shoulder, which is the Bossolo di non sinceri.— Good! You will admire SANDS for telling you, that Grotta di Cane is a Miracle: and I shall be laughed at for assuring you, that it is nothing else but such a damp (continued by the neighbourhood of certain Sulphur Mines▪) as thro' accidental heat does sometimes happen in our Coalpits. But Ingratitude must not discourage an honest man from doing good. There is not, I say, such a tonguetyed Generation under Heaven as your Italian; that you should not wonder if he makes signs. But our People must have something in their Diurnals, we must ever and anon be telling 'em our minds; or if we be at it when we raise Taxes, like those Gentlemen with the finger and the thumb, they will swear that we are Cutpurses.— Come, I know what I have heard 'em say, when some men had money that wrought hard enough for it; and do you conceive they will be better pleased when they shall be told, that upon like occasions you are at mumchance or stoolball? I do not speak for myself; for though I shall always acknowledge, that I got more by one years sitting in the House, than by my three years' Travels, it was not of that kind. But I hate that this same SPY, for pretending to have played at Billiards with the most Serene Commonwealth of Venice, should make such fools of us here, when I know that he must have had his intelligence from some Corncutter upon the Rialto; for a noble Venetian would be hanged if he should keep such a fellow company. And yet if I do not think he has made you all dote, never trust me, my Lord ARCHON is sometimes in such strange Raptures. Why, good my Lord, let me be heard as well as your Apple Squire; Venice has fresh blood in her Cheeks, I must confess, yet she is but an old Lady. Nor has he picked her Cabinet; these he sends you are none of her Receipts I can assure you, he bought them for a Julio at St. Marcs of a Mountebank. She has no other wash, upon my knowledge, for that same envied Complexion of hers but her Marshes, being a little better scented, saving your presence, than a Chamberpot. My Lords, I know what I say, but you will never have done with it, That neither the Great Turc, nor any of those little Turcs her Neighbours, have been able to spoil her! Why you may as well wonder that Weasels do not suck eggs in Swans nests. Do you think that it has lain in the devotion of her Beads; which you that have puked so much at Popery, are now at length resolved shall consecreate M. Parson, and be dropped by every one of his Congregation, while those same whimsical Intelligences your Surveyors (you will break my heart) give the turn to your primum mobile? and so I think they will; for you will find, that Money is the primum mobile, and they will turn you thus out of some three or four hundred thousand Pounds: a pretty Sum for Urns and Balls, for Boxes and Pills, which these same Quacksalvers are to administer to the Parishes; and for what Disease I marvel! Or how does it work? Out comes a Constable, an Overseer, and a Churchwarden! Mr. Speaker, I am amazed!   
NEVER was there Goose so stuck with Lard as my Lord EPIMONUS' Speech with Laughter; the ARCHON having much ado to recover himself, in such manner as might enable him to return these thanks.  

IN your whole lives, my Lords, were you never entertained with so much Ingenuity; my Lord EPIMONUS having at once mended all the faults of Travellers. For, first, whereas they are abominable liars, he has not told you (except some malicious body has misinformed him concerning poor SPY) one syllable of falsehood. And, secondly, whereas they never fail to give the upper hand in all their Discourses to foreign Nations, still justling their own into the kennel; he bears an Honour to his Country that will not dissolve in Cephalonia, nor be corrupted with Figs and Melons, which I can assure you is no ordinary obligation: And therefore hold it a matter of public concern, that we be no occasion of quenching my Lord's Affections; nor is there any such great matter between us, but in my opinion might be easily reconciled: for though that which my Lord gained by sitting in the House, I steadfastly believe, as he can affirm, was got fairly; yet dare I not, nor do I think, that upon consideration he will promise so much for other Gamesters, especially when they were at it so high, as he intimats not only to have been in use, but to be like enough to come about again. Wherefore, say I, let them throw with boxes; for unless we will be below the Politics of an ordinary, there is no such bar to cogging. It is known to his Lordship, that our Game is most at a throw, and that every cast of our Dice is in our Suffrages; nor will he deny, that partiality in a Suffrage is downright cogging. Now if the Venetian Boxes be the most sovereign of all Remedys against this same cogging, is it not a strange thing that they should be thrown first into the fire by a fair Gamester? Men are naturally subject to all kinds of Passions: Some you have that are not able to withstand the brow of an Enemy; and others that make nothing of this, are less proof against that of a Friend. So that if your Suffrage be barefaced, I dare say you shall not have one fair cast in twenty. But whatever a man's fortune be at the box, he neither knows whom to thank, nor whom to challenge. Wherefore (that my Lord may have a charitable opinion of the choice Affection which I confess to have, above all other Beauties, for that of incomparable Venice) there is in this way of Suffrage no less than a demonstration that it is the most pure: and the purity of the Suffrage in a popular Government is the Health, if not the Life of it; seeing the Soul is no otherwise breathed into the Sovereign Power, than by the Suffrage of the People. Wherefore no wonder if POSTELLUS be of opinion, that this use of the Ball is the very same with that of the Bean in Athens; or, that others, by the Text concerning ELDAD and MEDAD, derive it from the Commonwealth of Israel. There is another thing, though not so material to us, that my Lord will excuse me if I be not willing to yield, which is, that Venice subsists only by her Situation. It is true, that a man in time of War may be more secure from his Enemy's by being in a Citadel, but not from his Diseases: wherefore the first cause, if he lives long, is his good Constitution, without which his Citadel were to little purpose; and it is not otherwise with Venice.   
WITH this Speech of the ARCHON I conclude the proof of the Agrarian, and the Ballot, being the Fundamental Laws of this Commonwealth; and come now from the Centre to the Circumferences or Orbs, whereof some have been already shown: As how the Parishes annually pour themselves into the Hundreds, the Hundreds into the Tribes, and the Tribes into the Galaxies; the Annual Galaxy of every Tribe consisting of two Knights and seven Deputies, whereof the Knights constitute the Senate; the Deputies, the Prerogative Tribe, commonly called the People; and the Senate and People constitute the Sovereign Power, or Parliament of Oceana. Wherefore to show what the Parliament is, I must first open the Senate, and then the Prerogative Tribe.  

The Face of the Senate.  TO begin with the Senate, of which (as a Man is differently represented by a Picturedrawer, and by an Anatomist) I shall first discover the Face or Aspect, and then the Parts, with the use of them. Every Monday morning in the Summer at seven, and in the Winter at eight, the great Bell in the Clockhouse at the Pantheon gins, and continueth ringing for the space of one hour: in which time the Magistrates of the Senate, being attended according to their Quality, with a respective number of the Ballotins, Doorkeepers, and Messengers; and having the Ensigns of their Magistracies born before them, as the Sword before the Strategus, the Mace before the Orator, a Mace with the Seal before the Commissioners of the Chancery, the like with the Purse before the Commissioners of the Treasury; and a Silver Wand, like those in use with the Universitys, before each of the Censors, being Chancellors of the same. These with the Knights, in all three hundred, assemble in the House or Hall of the Senat.  
THE House or Hall of the Senate, being situated in the Pantheon or Palace of Justice, is a Room consisting of a Square and a half. In the middle of the lower end is the Door; at the upper end hangs a rich State overshadowing the greater part of a large Throne, or half pace of two Stages; the first ascended by two steps from the floor, and the second about the middle rising two steps higher. Upon this stand two Chairs, in that on the right hand sits the Strategus, in the other the Orator, adorned with Scarlet Robes, after the fashion that was used by the Dukes in the Aristocracy. At the right end of the upper Stage stand three Chairs, in which the three Commissioners of the Seal are placed; and at the other end sit the three Commissioners of the Treasury, every one in a Robe or Habit like that of the Earls. Of these Magistrates of this upper Stage consists the Signory. At either end of the lower Stage stands a little Table, to which the Secretaries of the Senate are set with their tusted Sleeves in the habit of civil Lawyers. To the four steps, whereby the two Stages of the Throne are ascended, answer four long Benches, which successively deriving from every one of the steps, continue their respective height, and extend themselves by the side Walls towards the lower end of the House, every Bench being divided by numeral Characters into the thirty seven parts or places. Upon the upper benches sit the Censors in the Robes of Barons; the first in the middle of the right hand bench, and the second directly opposite to him on the other side. Upon the rest of the Benches sit the Knights, who if they be called to the Urns, distributing themselves by the Figures, come in equal files, either by the first Seat, which consists of the two upper Benches on either side; or by the second Seat, consisting of the two lower Benches on either side: beginning also at the upper, or at the lower ends of the same, according to the Lot whereby they are called; for which end the Benches are open, and ascended at either end with easy stairs and large passages. The rest of the Ballot is conformable to that of the Tribe; the Censors of the House sitting at the side Urns, and the youngest Magistrate of the Signory at the middle: the Urns being placed before the Throne, and prepared according to the number of the Magistrates to be at that time chosen by the Rules already given to the Censors of the Tribes. But before the Benches of the Knights on either side stands one being shorter; and at the upper end of this sit the two Tribune's of the Horse. At the upper end of the other, the two Tribune's of the Foot in their Arms; the rest of the Benches being covered by the Judges of the Land in their Robes. But these Magistrates have no Suffrage, nor the Tribune's, though they derive their presence in the Senate from the Romans; nor the Judges, though they derive theirs from the ancient Senate of Oceana. Every Monday this Assembly sits of course; at other times, if there be occasion, any Magistrate of the House by giving order for the Bell, or by his Lictor or Ensignbearer, calls a Senat. And every Magistrate or Knight during his Session has the Title, Place, and Honour of a Duke, Earl, Baron, or Knight, respectively. And every one that has born the same Magistracy by his third Session, has his respective Place and Title during the term of his Life, which is all the Honour conferred by this Commonwealth, except upon the Master of the Ceremonies, the Master of the Horse, and the King of the Heralds, who are Knights by their places. And thus you have the face of the Senate, in which there is scarce any Feature that is not Roman or Venetian; nor do the Horns of the Crescent extend themselves much unlike those of the Sanhedrim, on either hand of the Prince, and of the Father of that Senat. But upon Beauty, in which every Man has his fancy, we will not otherwise philosophise than to remember that there is something more than decency in the Robe of a Judge, that would not be well spared from the Bench; and that the gravest Magistrate, to whom you can commit the Sword of Justice, will find a quickness in the Spurs of Honour, which if they be not laid to Virtue, will lay themselves to that which may rout a Commonwealth.  

Constitution of the Senat.  TO come from the Face of the Senate, to the Constitution and Use of the Parts: It is contained in the peculiar Orders. And the Orders which are peculiar to the Senate, are either of Election or Instruction.  
ELECTIONS in the Senate are of three sorts, Annual, Biennial, and Extraordinary.  
ANNUAL Elections are performed by the Schedule called the Tropic: And the Tropic consists of two parts; the one containing the Magistrates, and the other the Councils to be yearly elected. The Schedule or Tropic of the Magistrates is as follows in  

15. Order. Tropic of the Magistrates.  THE fifteenth ORDER, requiring, That upon every Monday next ensuing the last of March, the Knights of the Annual Galaxies taking their places in the Senate, be called the third Region of the same; and that the House having dismissed the first Region, and received the third, proceed to election of the Magistrates contained in the first part of the Tropic, by the ensuing Schedule:  
The Lord Strategus, Annual Magistrates. The Lord Orator, The first Censor, The second Censor,  
The third Commissioner of the Seal, Triennial Magistrates. The third Commissioner of the Treasury,  
THE Annual Magistrates (provided that no one Man bears above one of those Honours during the term of one Session) may be elected out of any Region. But the Triennial Magistrates may not be elected out of any other than the third Region only, lest the term of their Session expire before that of their Honour; and (it being unlawful for a Man to bear Magistracy any longer than he is thereto qualified by the Election of the People) cause a Fraction in the Rotation of this Commonwealth.  

Of the Strategus.  THE Strategus is first Precedent of the Senate, and General of the Army, if it be commanded to march; in which case there shall be a second Strategus elected to be first Precedent of the Senate, and General of the second Army: and if this also be commanded to march, a third Strategus shall be chosen; and so on, as long as the Commonwealth sends forth Arms.  

Of the Orator.  THE Lord Orator is the second and more peculiar Precedent of the Senate, to whom it appertains to keep the House to Orders.  

Of the Censors.  THE Censors, whereof the first by consequence of his Election is Chancellor of the University of Clio, and the second of that of Calliope, are Precedents of the Council for Religion and Magistrates, to whom it belongs to keep the House to the order of the Ballot. They are also Inquisitors into the ways and means of acquiring Magistracy; and have power to punish indirect proceedings in the same, by removing a Knight or Magistrate out of the House, under appeal to the Senat.  

Of the Commissioners of the Seal.  THE Commissioners of the Seal being three, whereof the third is annually chosen out of the third Region, are Judges in Chancery.  

Of the Commissioners of the Treasury.  THE Commissioners of the Treasury being three, whereof the third is annually chosen out of the third Region, are Judges in the Exchequer; and every Magistrate of this Schedule has right to propose to the Senat.  

Of the Signory.  BUT the Strategus with the six Commissioners, are the Signory of this Commonwealth, having right of Session and Suffrage in every Council of the Senate, and Power either jointly or severally to propose in all or any of them.  
I HAVE little in this Order to observe or prove, but that the Strategus is the same Honour both in name and thing that was born, among others, by PHILOPEMEN and ARATUS in the Commonwealth of the Acheans; the like having been in use also with the Aetolians. The Orator, called otherwise the Speaker, is with small alteration the same that had been of former use in this Nation. These two, if you will, may be compared to the Consuls in Rome, or the Suffetes in Carthage; for their Magistracy is scarce different.  
THE Censors derive their power of removing a Senator from those of Rome; the Government of the Ballot, from those of Venice; and that of Animadversion upon the Ambitus, or canvas for Magistracy, from both.  
THE Signory, with the whole Right and Use of that Magistracy, to be hereafter more fully explained, is almost purely Venetian.  
THE second part of the Tropic is directed by  

16. Order. Constitution of the Councils.  THE sixteenth ORDER, whereby the Constitution of the Councils, being four, that is to say, the Council of State, the Council of War, the Council of Religion, and the Council of Trade, is rendered conformable in 
Of the Council of State.  their Revolutions to that of the Senat. As, first, by the annual Election of five Knights out of the third Region of the Senate, into the Council of State, consisting of fifteen Knights, five in every Region. Secondly, 
Of the Council of War.  By the annual Election of three Knights out of the third Region of the Council of State, to be proposed by the Provosts, and elected by that Council, into the Council of War, consisting of nine Knights, three in every Region, not excluded by this Election from remaining Members also of the Council of State. The four Tribune's of the People have right of Session 
Of the Council of Religion.  and Suffrage in the Council of War. Thirdly, By the annual Election of four Knights out of the third Region of the Senate into the Council of Religion, consisting of twelve Knights, four in every Region: Of this Council 
Of the Council of Trade.  the Censors are Precedents. Fourthly, By the annual Election of four Knights out of the third Region of the Senate into the Council of Trade, 
Of the Provosts.  consisting of twelve Knights, four in every Region. And each Region, in every one of these Councils thus constituted, shall weekly and interchangeably elect one Provost, whose Magistracy shall continue for one Week; nor shall he be reelected into the same, till every Knight of that Region in the same 
Of the Council of the Provosts.  Council has once born the same Magistracy. And the Provosts being one in every Region, three in every Council, and twelve in all, besides their other Capacitys, shall assemble and be a Council, or rather an Academy apart, to certain ends and purposes to be hereafter further explained, with those of the rest of the Councils.  
THIS Order is of no other use than for the frame and turn of the Councils, and yet of no small one: for in Motion consists Life; and the Motion of a Commonwealth will never be current, unless it be circular. Men that, like my Lord EPIMONUS, not enduring the resemblance of this kind of Government to Orbs and Spheres, fall on physicing and purging it, do no more than is necessary; for if it be not in Rotation both as to Persons and Things, it will be very sick. The People of Rome, as to Persons, if they had not been taken up by the Wheel of Magistracy, had overturned the Chariot of the Senat. And those of Lacedaemon, as to Things, had not been so quiet when the Senate trashed their Business, by encroaching upon the Result, if by the Institution of the Ephors they had not brought it about again. So that if you allow not a Commonwealth her Rotation, in which consists her Equality, you reduce her to a Party, and then it is necessary that you be Physicians indeed, or rather Farriers; for you will have strong Patients, and such as must be haltered and cast, or yourselves may need Bonesetters. Wherefore the Councils of this Commonwealth, both in regard of their Elections, and, as will be shown, of their Affairs, are uniform with the Senate in their Revolutions; not as Whirlpits to swallow, but to by't, and with the Scrues of their Rotation to hold and turn a Business (like the Vice of a Smith) to the Hand of the Workman. Without Engines of which nature it is not possible for the Senate, much less for the People, to be perfect Artificers in a political Capacity. But I shall not hold you longer from  

17. Order. Constitution of the biennial Election or Orb of Ambassadors in ordinary.  THE seventeenth ORDER, directing biennial Elections, or the Constitution of the Orb of Ambassadors in ordinary, consisting of four Residences, the Revolution whereof is performed in eight years, and preserved thro' the Election of one Ambassador in two years by the Ballot of the Senate to repair to the Court of France, and reside there for the term of two years; and the term of two years being expired, to remove from thence to the Court of Spain, there to continue for the space of two years, and thence to remove to the State of Venice; and after two years' residence in that City, to conclude with his residence at Constantinople for a like term of time, and so to return. A Knight of the Senate, or a Deputy of the Prerogative, may not be elected Ambassador in Ordinary, because a Knight or Deputy so chosen, must either lose his Session, which would cause an unevenness in the motion of this Commonwealth, or accumulat Magistracy, which agrees not with the equality of the same. Nor may any Man be elected into this Capacity, that is above five and thirty years of Age, lest the Commonwealth lose the charge of his Education, by being deprived at his return of the Fruit of it, or else enjoy it not long thro' the defects of Nature.  
THIS Order is the Perspective of the Commonwealth, whereby she foresees Danger, or the Traffic; whereby she receives every two years the return of a Statesman enriched with eight years' experience, from the prime Marts of Negotiation in Europe And so much for the Elections in the Senate that are ordinary; such as are extraordinary follow in  

18. Order. Constitution of Election Extraordinary, or by the Scrutiny.  THE eighteenth ORDER, appointing all Elections upon emergent occasions, except that of the Dictator, to be made by the Scrutiny, or that kind of Election, whereby a Council comes to be a fifth Order of Electors. For Example, if there be occasion of an Ambassador Extraordinary, the Provosts of the Council of State, or any two of them shall propose to the same, till one Competitor be chosen by that Council: and the Council having chosen a Competitor, shall bring his name into the Senate, which in the usual way shall choose four more Competitors to the same Magistracy; and put them, with the Competitor of the Council, to the Ballot of the House, by which he of the five that is chosen is said to be elected by the Scrutiny of the Council of State. A Vice-Admiral, a Polemarch, or Field Officer, shall be elected after the same manner, by the Scrutiny of the Council of War. A Judge or Sergeant at Law, by the Scrutiny of the Commissioners of the Seal. A Baron, or considerable Officer of the Exchequer, by the Scrutiny of the Commissioners of the Treasury. Men in Magistracy, or out of it, are equally capable of Election by the Scrutiny; but a Magistrate or Officer elected by the Scrutiny to a military Employment, if he be neither a Knight of the Senate, nor a Deputy of the Prerogative, aught to have his Office confirmed by the Prerogative, because the Militia in a Commonwealth, where the People are Sovereign, is not lawful to be touched injussu Populi.  
THE Romans were so curious, that though their Consuls were elected in the 
* Centuriatis.  Centuriat Assemblys, they might not touch the Militia, except they were confirmed in the 
† Curiatis Comitiis.  Parochial Assemblies: for a Magistrate not receiving his Power from the People, takes it from them; and to take away their Power, is to take away their Liberty. As to the Election by the Scrutiny, it is easily perceived to be Venetian, there being no such way to take in the Knowledge, which in all reason must be best in every Council of such men as are most fit for their turns, and yet to keep them from the bias of particular Affection or Interest under that pretence: For the cause why the Great Council in Venice scarce ever elects any other than the Name that is brought in by the Scrutiny, is very probable to be, that they may .... This Election is the last of those appertaining to the Senat. The Councils being chosen by the Orders already shown, it remains that we come to those whereby they are instructed: and the Orders of Instruction to the Councils are two, the first for the Matter whereupon they are to proceed; and the second for the Manner of their proceeding. The Matter of the Councils is distributed to them by  


19 Order. Instructions for the Councils as to their Matter.  THE nineteenth ORDER, distributing to every Council such Businesses as are properly to belong to their Cognizance, whereof some they shall receive and determine; and others they shall receive, prepare, and introduce into the House: As, first,  

For the Council of State.  THE Council of State is to receive all Addresses, Intelligences, and Letters of Negotiation; to give audience to Ambassadors sent to, and to draw up Instructions for such as shall be sent by, this Commonwealth; to receive Propositions from, and hold Intelligence with the Provincial Councils; to consider upon all Laws to be enacted, amended, or repealed; and upon all Levys of Men or Money, War or Peace, Leagues or Associations to be made by this Commonwealth, so far forth as is conducible to the orderly preparation of the same to be introduced by them into the Senat. Provided 
For the Council of War.  that all such Affairs, as otherwise appertaining to the Council of State are, for the good of the Commonwealth, to be carried with greater secrecy, be managed by the Council of War, with Power to receive and send forth Agents, Spies, Emissarys, Intelligencers, Frigates; and to manage Affairs of that nature, if it be necessary, without communication to the Senate, till such time as it may be had without detriment to the Business. But they shall have no Power to engage the Commonwealth in a War, without the consent of the Senate and the People. It appertains also to this Council to take charge of the Fleet as Admiral; and of all Storehouses, Armories, Arsenals, and Magazines appertaining to this Commonwealth. They shall keep a diligent Record of the military Expeditions from time to time reported by him that was Strategus or General, or one of the Polemarches in that Action; or at least so far as the Experience of such Commanders may tend to the improvement of the military Discipline, which they shall digest and introduce into the Senate: and if the Senate shall thereupon frame any Article, they shall see that it be observed in the Musters or Education of the Youth. And whereas the Council of War is the Sentinel or Scout of this Commonwealth, if any Person or Persons shall go about to introduce Debate into any popular Assembly of the same, or otherwise to alter the present Government, or strike at the root of it, they shall apprehend, or cause to be apprehended, seized, imprisoned; and examine, arraign, acquit, or condemn, and cause to be executed any such Person or Persons, by their proper Power and Authority, and without appeal.  

For the Council of Religion.  THE Council of Religion, as the Arbiter of this Commonwealth in cases of Conscience more peculiarly appertaining to Religion, Christian Charity, and a pious Life, shall have the care of the National Religion, and the protection of the Liberty of Conscience, with the cognizance of all Causes relating to either of them. And first as to the National Religion; They shall cause all Places or Preferments of the best Revenue in either of the Vniversitys to be conferred upon no other than such of the most learned and pious Men, as have dedicated themselves to the study of Theology. They shall also take a special care that by such Augmentations as be or shall hereafter be appointed by the Senate, every Benefice in this Nation be improved at least to the value of one hundred pounds a year. And to the end that there be no interest at all, whereby the Divines or Teachers of the National Religion may be corrupted, or corrupt Religion, they shall be capable of no other kind of Employment or Preferment in this Commonwealth. And whereas a Directory for the Administration of the National Religion is to be prepared by this Council, they shall in this and other Debates of this nature proceed in manner following: A Question arising in matter of Religion shall be put and stated by the Council in writing; which Writing the Censors shall send by their Beadles (being Proctors chosen to attend them) each to the University whereof he is Chancellor; and the Vicechancellor of the same receiving the Writing, shall call a Convocation of all the Divines of that University, being above forty years of Age. And the Vniversitys upon a point so proposed, shall have no manner of Intelligence or Correspondence one with another, till their Debates be ended, and they have made return of their Answers to the Council of Religion by two or three of their own Members, that may clear their sense, if any doubt should arise, to the Council; which done, they shall return, and the Council having received such information, shall proceed according to their own Judgements, in the preparation of the whole matter for the Senate: That so the Interest of the Learned being removed, there may be a right application of Reason to Scripture, which is the Foundation of the National Religion.  
SECONDLY, This Council, as to the protection of the Liberty of Conscience, shall suffer no coercive Power in the matter of Religion to be exercised in this Nation: The Teachers of the National Religion being no other than such as voluntarily undertake that calling; and their Auditors or Hearers, no other than are also voluntary. Nor shall any gathered Congregation be molested or interrupted in their way of Worship (being neither Jewish nor Idolatrous) but vigilantly and vigorously protected and defended in the Enjoyment, Practice, and Profession of the same. And if there be Officers or Auditors appointed by any such Congregation for the introduction of Causes into the Council of Religion, all such Causes so introduced shall be received, heard, and determined by the same, with recourse had, if need be, to the Senat.  
THIRDLY, Every Petition addressed to the Senate, except that of a Tribe, shall be received, examined, and debated by this Council; and such only as they, upon such examination and debate had, shall think fit, may be introduced into the Senat.  

For the Council of Trade.  THE Council of Trade being the Vena Porta of this Nation, shall hereafter receive Instructions more at large. For the present, their Experience attaining to a right understanding of those Trades and Mysteries that feed the Veins of this Commonwealth, and a true distinction of them from those that suck or exhaust the same, they shall acquaint the Senate with the Conveniences and Inconveniences, to the end that Encouragement may be applied to the one, and Remedy to the other.  

For the Academy of the Provosts.  THE Academy of the Provosts, being the Affability of the Commonwealth, shall assemble every day towards the Evening in a fair Room, having certain withdrawing Rooms thereto belonging. And all sorts of Company that will repair thither for Conversation or Discourse, so it be upon matters of Government, News, or Intelligence, or to propose any thing to the Councils, shall be freely and affably received in the outer Chamber, and heard in the way of civil Conversation, which is to be managed without any other Aw or Ceremony than is thereto usually appertaining; to the end that every Man may be free, and that what is proposed by one, may be argued or discoursed by the rest, except the matter be of secrecy; in which case the Provosts, or some of them, shall take such as desire Audience into one of the withdrawing Rooms. And the Provosts are to give their minds, that this Academy be so governed, adorned, and preserved, as may be most attractive to Men of Parts and good Affections to the Commonwealth, for the excellency of the Conversation.  
FURTHERMORE, If any Man, not being able or willing to come in person, has any advice to give which he judges may be for the good of the Commonwealth, he may write his mind to the Academy of the Provosts, in a Letter signed or not signed; which Letter shall be left with the Doorkeeper of the Academy. Nor shall any Person delivering such a Letter be seized, molested, or detained, though it should prove to be a Libel. But the Letters so delivered shall be presented to the Provosts; and in case they be so many that they cannot well be perused by the Provosts themselves, they shall distribute them as they please to be read by the Gentlemen of the Academy, who finding any thing in them material, will find matter of Discourse: Or if they happen upon a business that requires privacy, return it with a Note upon it to a Provost. And the Provosts by the Secretaries attending shall cause such Notes out of Discourses or Letters to be taken as they please, to the end that they may propose, as occasion serves, what any two of them shall think sit out of their Notes so taken to their respective Councils: to the end that not only the Ear of the Commonwealth be open to all, but that Men of such Education being in her eye, she may upon emergent Elections or Occasions be always provided of her choice of sit Persons.  

●or the Attendance of the Councils.  EVERY Council being adorned with a State for the Signory, shall be attended by two Secretaries, two Doorkeepers, and two Messengers in ordinary, and have power to command more upon Emergencys, as occasion requires. And the Academy shall be attended with two Secretaries, two Messengers, and two Doorkeepers; this with the other Councils being provided with their farther Conveniences at the charge of the State.  

For the Dictator.  BUT whereas it is incident to Commonwealths, upon Emergencies requiring extraordinary speed or secrecy, either thro' their natural delays or unnatural haste, to incur equal danger, while holding to the slow pace of their Orders, they come not in time to defend themselves from some sudden blow; or breaking them for the greater speed, they but hast to their own destruction: If the Senate shall at any time make Election of nine Knights extraordinary, to be added to the Council of War, as a Juncta for the term of three Months, the Council of War, with the Juncta so added, is for the term of the same Dictator of Oceana, having power to levy Men and Money, to make War and Peace, as also to enact Laws, which shall be good for the space of one year (if they be not sooner repealed by the Senate and the People) and for no longer time, except they be confirmed by the Senate and the People. And the whole Administration of the Commonwealth for the term of the said three Months shall be in the Dictator; provided, that the Dictator shall have no Power to do any thing that tends not to his proper end and institution, but all to the preservation of the Commonwealth as it is established, and for the sudden restitution of the same to the natural Channel and common course of Government. And all Acts, Orders, Decrees, or Laws of the Council of War with the Juncta, being thus created, shall be signed,  
DICTATOR OCEANAE.   
THIS Order of Instructions to the Councils being (as in a matter of that nature is requisite) very large, I have used my best skill to abbreviat it in such manner as might show no more of it than is necessary to the understanding of the whole; though as to the parts, or further duties of the Councils, I have omitted many things of singular use in a Commonwealth. But it was discoursed at the Council by the ARCHON in this manner.  

My Lords, the Legislators;  
YOUR Councils, except the Dictator only, are proper and native Springs and Sources, you see, which (hanging a few sticks and straws, that, as less considerable, would otherwise be more troublesome, upon the banks of their peculiar Channels) derive the full stream of business into the Senate, so pure, and so far from the possibility of being troubled or stained (as will undeniably appear by the Course contained in the ensuing Order) with any kind of private Interest or Partiality, that it shall never be possible for any Assembly harkening to the advice or information of this or that worthy Member (either instructed upon his Pillow, or while he was making himself ready, or by the Petition or Ticket which he received at the door) to have half the Security in his Faith, or advantage by his Wisdom; such a Senate or Council being, thro' the incertainty of the Winds, like a wave of the Sea. Nor shall it otherwise mend the matter by flowing up into dry ditches, or referring businesses to be better examined by Committees, than to go further about with it to less purpose; if it does not ebb back again with the more mud in it. For in a case referred to an occasional Committee, of which any Member that is desirous may get himself named, and to which no body will come, but either for the sake of his Friend, or his own Interest; it fares little better as to the Information of the Senate, than if it had been referred to the Parties. Wherefore the Athenians being distributed into four Tribes, out of which by equal numbers they annually chose four hundred Men, called the Senate of the Bean (because the Ballot at their Election was performed by the use of Beans) divided them by Fiftys into eight parts. And every Fifty in their turn, for one eighth part of the year, was a Council apart called the Prytans. The Prytans in their distinct Council receiving all Comers, and giving ear to every Man that had any thing to propose concerning the Commonwealth, had power to debate and prepare all the businesses that were to be introduced into the Senat. The Achaeans had ten selected Magistrates called the Demiurgs, constituting a Council apart called the Synarchy, which with the Strategus prepared all the business that was introduced into their Senat. But both the Senate of the Athenians, and that of the Achaeans, would have wondered if a Man had told them, that they were to receive all Comers and Discourses, to the end that they might refer them afterwards to the Prytans or the Synarchy; much less to an occasional Committee, exposed to the catch that catch may of the Parties interested. And yet Venice in this, as in most of her Orders, excels them all by the Constitution of her Councils, that of the College, and the other of the Dieci, or Council of Ten. The course of the College is exactly described in the ensuing Order: And for that of the Dieci, it so little differs from what it has bestowed upon our Dictator, that I need not make any particular description of it. But to Dictatorian Power in general, and the use of it, because it must needs be of difficult digestion to such as, puking still at ancient Prudence, show themselves to be in the Nursery of Motherwit; it is no less than necessary to say something. And, First, in a Commonwealth that is not wrought up, or perfected, this Power will be of very frequent, if not continual use; wherefore it is said more than once, upon defects of the Government, in the Book of Judges, That in those days there was no King in Israel. Nor has the Translator, though for no King he should have said no Judge, abused you so much; seeing that the Dictator (and such was the Judge of Israel) or the Dictatorian Power being in a single Person, so little differs from Monarchy, which followed in that, that from the same cause there has been no other effect in any Commonwealth; as in Rome was manifest by SCYLLA and CESAR, who to make themselves Absolute or Sovereign, had no more to do than to prolong their Magistracy; for 
* Dictatoris imperium quasi Numen. Liv.  the Dictatorian Power was reputed Divine, and therefore irresistible. Nevertheless, so it is, that without this Power, which is so dangerous, and subject to introduce Monarchy, a Commonwealth cannot be safe from falling into the like dissolution; unless you have an Expedient in this case of your own, and bound up by your Providence from recoiling. Expedients in some cases you must not only have, but be beholden for them to such whom you must trust at a pinch, when you have not leisure to stand with them for Security; which will be a thousand times more dangerous. And there can never be a Commonwealth otherwise than by the Order in debate wrought up to that perfection; but this necessity must sometimes happen in regard of her natural slowness and openness, and the suddenness of Assaults that may be made upon her, as also the Secrecy which in some cases may be of absolute necessity to her Affairs. Whence MACCHIAVEL concludes it positively, That a Commonwealth unprovided of such a Refuge, must fall to ruin: for her course is either broken by the blow in one of those cases, or by herself, while it startles her out of her Orders. And indeed a Commonwealth is like a Greyhound, which having once coasted, will never after run fair, but grow slothful; and when it comes to make a common practice of taking nearer ways than its Orders, it is dissolved: for the being of a Commonwealth consists in its Orders. Wherefore at this lift you will be exposed to danger, if you have not provided beforehand for the safety of your Resort in the like cases: nor is it sufficient that your Resort be safe, unless it be as secret and quick; for if it be slow or open, your former Inconveniences are not remedied. Now for our imitation in this part, there is nothing in experience like that of the Council of Ten in Venice; the benefit whereof would be too long to be shown in the whole piece, and therefore I shall take but a pattern out of JANOTTI. In the War, says he, which the Venetians had with Florence in Casentin, the Florentines finding a necessity in their affairs far from any other inclination in themselves to ask their Peace, sent Ambassadors about it to Venice, where they were no sooner heard, than the bargain was struck up by the Council of Ten: and every body admiring (seeing this Commonwealth stood upon the higher ground) what should be the reason of such haste; the Council upon the return of the Ambassadors imparted Letters to the Senate, whereby it appeared, that the Turc had newly launched a formidable Fleet against their State; which had it been understood by the Florentines, it was well enough known they would have made no Peace. Wherefore the service of the Ten was highly applauded by the Senate, and celebrated by the Venetians. Whereby may appear, not only in part what use there is of Dictatorian Power in that Government, but that it is assumed at the discretion of that Council; whereas in this of Oceana it is not otherwise entrusted than when the Senate, in the Election of nine Knights extraordinary, gives at once the Commission, and takes security in a balance, added to the Council of War, though securer before by the Tribune's of the People than that of Venice, which yet never incurred Jealousy: For if the younger Nobility have been often girding at it, that happened not so much thro' the apprehension of danger in it to the Commonwealth, as thro' the awe of it upon themselves. Wherefore the Graver have doubtlessly shown their Prudence in the Law; whereby, the Magistracy of these Counsillors being to last till their Successors be created, the Council is established.   
THE Instructions of the Councils for their matter being shown, it remains that I show the Instructions for the manner of their proceeding, as they follow in  

20. Order. Instructions for the Councils as to their manner of proceeding.  THE twentieth ORDER, containing the Method of Debates to be observed by the Magistrates and the Councils successively, in order to a Decree of the Senat.  
THE Magistrates of the Signory, as Counsillors of this Commonwealth, shall take into their consideration all matters of State, or of Government; and, having right to propose in any Council, may any one or more of them propose what business he or they please in that Council to which it most properly belongs. And, that the Councils may be held to their duty, the said Magistrates are superintendents and inspectors of the same, with right to propose to the Senat.  
THE Censors have equal Power with these Magistrates, but in relation to the Council of Religion only.  
ANY two of the three Provosts in every Council may propose to, and are the more peculiar Proposers of, the same Council; to the end that there be not only an inspection and superintendency of business in general, but that every work be also committed to a peculiar hand.  
ANY one or more of the Magistrates, or any two of the Provosts respectively having proposed, the Council shall debate the business so proposed, to which they of the third Region that are willing shall speak first in their order; they of the second, next; and they of the first, last: and the opinions of those that proposed or spoke, as they shall be thought the most considerable by the Council, shall be taken by the Secretary of the same in writing, and each of them signed with the name of the Author.  
THE Opinions being thus prepared, any Magistrate of the Signory, the Censor, or any two of the Provosts of that Council, upon this occasion may assemble the Senat.  
THE Senate being assembled, the Opinions (for example, if they be four) shall be read in their Order, that is, according to the Order or Dignity of the Magistrates or Counsillors by which they were signed. And being read, if any of the Council introducing them will speak, they, as best acquainted with the business, shall have precedence; and after them the Senators shall speak according to their Regions, beginning by the third first, and so continuing till every man that will has spoken: and when the Opinions have been sufficiently debated, they shall be put all together to the Ballot after this manner.  
FOUR Secretaries carrying each of them one of the Opinions in one hand, with a white Box in the other, and ●ach following the other, according to the order of the Opinions, shall present his Box, naming the Author of his Opinion to every Senator; and one Secretary or Ballotin with a green Box shall follow the four white ones; and one Secretary or Ballotin with a red Box shall follow the green one: and every Senator shall put one Ball into some one of these six boxes. The Suffrage being gathered and opened before the Signory, if the red Box or Nonsincere had above half the Suffrages, the Opinions shall he all cast out, for the major part of the House is not clear in the business. If no one of the four Opinions had above half the Suffrages in the Affirmative, that which had fewest shall be cast out, and the other three shall be balloted again. If no one of the three had above half, that which had fewest shall be cast out, and the other two shall ballot again. If neither of the two had above half, that which had fewest shall be cast out, and the remaining Opinion shall be balloted again. And if the remaining Opinion has not above half, it shall also be cast out. But the first of the Opinions that arrives at most above half in the Affirmative, is the Decree of the Senat. The Opinions being all of them cast out by the Nonsincere, may be reviewed, if occasion permits, by the Council, and brought in again. If they be cast out by the Negative, the case being of advice only, the House approves not, and there is an end of it: the case being necessary, and admitting delay, the Council is to think again upon the business, and to bring in new Opinions; but the Case being necessary, and not admitting delay, the Senate immediately electing the Juncta, shall create the Dictator. 
* Et videat Dictator ne quid Respub. detrimenti capiat.  And let the Dictator, as the Roman saying is, take care that the Commonwealth receives no harm.  
THIS in case the Debate concludes not in a Decree. But if a Decree be past, it is either in matter of State or Government according to Law enacted already, and then it is good without going any further: or it is in matter of Law to be enacted, repealed, or amended; and then the Decree of the Senate, especially if it be for a War, or for a Levy of Men or Money, is invalid, without the result of the Commonwealth, which is in the Prerogative Tribe, or Representative of the People.  
THE Senate having prepared a Decree to be proposed to the People, shall appoint their Proposers; and no other may propose for the Senate to the People but the Magistrates of the House: that is to say, the three Commissioners of the Seal, or any two of them; the three of the Treasury, or any two of them; or the two Censors.  
THE Senate having appointed their Proposers, shall require of the Tribune's a muster of the People at a set time and place: and the Tribune's or any two of them having mustered the People accordingly, the Proposers shall propose the Sense or Decree of the Senate by clauses to the People. And that which is proposed by the Authority of the Senate, and resolved by the Command of the People, is the Law of Oceana.  
TO this Order, implicitly containing the sum very near of the whole Civil part of the Commonwealth, my Lord ARCHON spoke thus in Council.  

My Dear Lords;  
THERE is a Saying, That a man must cut his Coat according to his Cloth. When I consider what God has allowed or furnished to our present work, I am amazed. You would have a popular Government, he has weighed it to you in the present balance, as I may say, to a dram; you have no more to do, but to fix it. For the Superstructures of such a Government, they require a good Aristocracy: and you have, or have had a Nobility or Gentry the best studied, and the best Writers, at lest next that of Italy, in the whole World; nor have they been inferior, when so exercised, in the leading of Arms. But the People are the main body of a Commonwealth; show me from the Treasuries of the Snow (as it is in JOB) to the burning Zone, a People whose shoulders so universally and so exactly fit the Corslet. Nevertheless it were convenient to be well provided with auxiliaries. There is Marpesia thro' her fruitfulness inexhaustible of men, and men thro' her barrenness not only enured to hardship, but in your Arms. It may be said, that Venice, excepting only that she takes not in the People, is the most incomparable Situation of a Commonwealth. You are Venice taking in your People and your auxiliaries too. My Lords, the Children of Israel were makers of Brick, before they were bvilders of a Commonwealth: But our brick is made, our Mortar tempered, the Cedars of Lebanon are hewed and squared to our hands. Has this been the work of man? or is it in man to withstand this work? Shall he that contends with the Almighty, instruct him? He that reproves God, let him answer it. For our parts, every thing is so laid, that when we come to have use of it, it is the next at hand; and unless we can conceive that God and Nature do any thing in vain, there is no more for us to do but to dispatch. The Piece, which we have reached to us in the foregoing Orders, is the Aristocracy. Athens, as has been shown, was plainly lost thro' the want of a good Aristocracy. But the sufficiency of an Aristocracy goes demonstrably upon the hand of the Nobility or Gentry: for that the Politics can be mastered without study, or that the People can have leisure to study, is a vain imagination; and what kind of Aristocracy Divines and Lawyers would make, let their incurable running upon their own narrow bias, and their perpetual invectives against MACCHIAVEL (though in some places justly reprovable, yet the only Politician, and incomparable Patron of the People) serve for instruction. I will stand no more to the Judgement of Lawyers and Divines in this work, than to that of so many other Tradesmen; but if this Model chances to wander abroad, I recommend it to the Roman Speculativi (the most complete Gentlemen of this age) for their censure: or, with my Lord EPIMONUS his leave, send three or four hundred Copies to your Agent at Venice, to be presented to the Magistrates there; and when they have considered them, to be proposed to the debate of the Senate, the most competent Judges under Heaven, who, though they have great Affairs, will not refuse to return you the Oracle of their Ballot. The Counsillors of Princes I will not trust; they are but Journymen. The Wisdom of these later times in Princes Affairs (says VERULAMIUS) is rather fine deliveries and shift of dangers when they be near, than solid and grounded courses to keep them off. Their Counsillors do not derive their proceedings from any sound root of Government that may contain the demonstration, and assure the success of them, but are expedient-mongers, givers of themselves to help a lame dog over a stile; else how comes it to pass, that the fame of Cardinal RICHLIEU has been like Thunder, whereof we hear the noise, but can make no demonstration of the reason? But to return, if neither the People, nor Divines, and Lawyers, can be the Aristocracy of a Nation, there remains only the Nobility; in which stile, to avoid farther repetition, I shall understand the Gentry also, as the French do by the word Noblesse.  
NOW to treat of the Nobility in such sort as may be less obnoxious to mistake, it will be convenient, and answerable to the present occasion, that I divide my Discourse into four parts.  
THE First treating of Nobility, and the kinds of it.  
THE Second, of their capacity of the Senat.  
THE Third, of the divers kinds of Senates.  
THE Fourth, of the Senate, according to the foregoing Orders.  
NOBILITY may be defined divers ways; for it is either ancient Riches, or ancient Virtue, or a Title conferred by a Prince or a Commonwealth.  
NOBILITY of the first kind may be subdivided into two others, such as hold an overbalance in Dominion or Property to the whole People, or such as hold not an overbalance. In the former case, a Nobility (such was the Gothic, of which sufficient has been spoken) is incompatible with popular Government; for to popular Government it is essential that Power should be in the People, but the overbalance of a Nobility in Dominion draws the Power to themselves. Wherefore in this sense it is that MACCHIAVEL is to be understood, where he says, 
* Questi tali sono pernitiosi in ogni Republica, & in ogni Provincia.  That these are pernicious in a Commonwealth; and of France, Spain, and Italy, that they are Nations 
† Lequali tutte insieme sono la corruttela del mondo.  which for this cause are the corruption of the World: for otherwise Nobility may according to his definition (which is, That they are such as live upon their own Revenues in plenty, without engagement either to the tilling of their Lands, or other work for their livelihood) hold an underbalance to the People; in which case they are not only safe, but necessary to the natural mixture of a well-ordered Commonwealth. For how else can you have a Commonwealth that is not altogether mechanic? or what comparison is there of such Commonwealths as are, or come nearest to mechanic, for example, Athens, Switzerland, Holland, to Lacedaemon, Rome, and Venice, plumed with their Aristocracies? Your Mechanics, till they have first feathered their nests, like the Fowls of the Air, whose whole employment is to seek their food, are so busied in their private concernments, that they have neither leisure to study the public, nor are safely to be trusted with it, 
‖ Egestas haud sacile habetur sine damno.  because a Man is not faithfully embarked in this kind of ship, if he has no share in the freight. But if his share be such as gives him leisure by his private advantage to reflect upon that of the public, what other name is there for this sort of Men, being a leur aise, but (as MACCHIAVEL you see calls them) NOBILITY? especially when their Families come to be such as are noted for their Services done to the Commonwealth, and so take into their ancient Riches ancient Virtue, which is the second definition of Nobility, but such a one as is scarce possible in nature without the former. For as the Baggage, says VERULAMIUS, is to an Army, so are Riches to Virtue; they cannot be spared nor left behind, though they be impediments, such as not only hinder the march, but sometimes thro' the care of them lose or disturb the Victory. Of this latter sort is the Nobility of Oceana; the best of all others, because they, having no stamp whence to derive their price, can have it not otherwise than by their intrinsic value. The third definition of Nobility, is a Title, Honour, or distinction from the People, conferred or allowed by the Prince or the Commonwealth. And this may be two ways, either without any stamp or privilege, as in Oceana; or with such privileges as are inconsiderable, as in Athens after the battle of Plateae, whence the Nobility had no right, as such, but to religious Offices, or inspection of the public Games, to which they were also to be elected by the People: or with Privileges, and those considerable ones, as the Nobility in Athens before the battle of Plateae, and the Patricians in Rome, each of which had right, or claimed it, to the Senate and all the Magistracies; wherein for some time they only by their stamp were current.  
BUT to begin higher, and to speak more at large of Nobility in their several capacities of the Senat. The Phylarches or Princes of the Tribes of Israel were the most renowned, or, as the Latin, the 
Numb. 1. 16.  most noble of the Congregation, whereof by hereditary right they had the leading and judging. The Patriarches, or Princes of Families, 
Ver. 18.  according as they declared their Pedigrees, had the like right as to their Families; but neither in these nor the former, was there any hereditary right to the Sanhedrim: though there be little question but the wise men, and understanding, and known among their Tribes, which the People, 
Deut. 1. 13.  took or elected into those or other Magistracies, and whom MOSES made Rulers over them, must have been of these; seeing they could not choose but be the most known among the Tribes, and were likeliest by the advantages of Education to be the most wise and understanding.  
SOLON having found the Athenians neither locally nor genealogically, but by their different ways of Life, divided into four Tribes, that is, into the Soldiery, the Tradesmen, the Husbandmen, and the Goatherds, instituted a new distribution of them, according to the cense or valuation of their Estates, into four Classes: the first, second, and third, consisting of such as were Proprietors in Land, distinguished by the rate of their Freeholds, with that stamp upon them, which making them capable of adding Honour to their Riches, that is to say, of the Senate and all the Magistracies, excluded the fourth, being the Body of the People, and far greater in number than the former three, from all other right, as to those Capacitys, except the election of these, who by this means became a hereditary Aristocracy or Senatorian Order of Nobility. This was that course which came afterwards to be the destruction of Rome, and had now ruined Athens. The Nobility, according to the inevitable Nature of such a one, having laid the Plot how to divest the People of the Result, and so to draw the whole Power of the Commonwealth to themselves; which in all likelihood they had done, if the People, coming by mere chance to be victorious in the Battle of Plateae, and famous for defending Greece against the Persians, had not returned with such Courage as irresistibly broke the Classes, to which of old they had born a white Tooth, brought the Nobility to equal Terms, and the Senate with the Magistracies to be common to both; the Magistracies by Suffrage, and the Senate (which was the mischief of it, as I shall show anon in that Constitution) by Lot only.  
THE Lacedæmonians were in the manner, and for the same cause with the Venetians at this day, no other than a Nobility, even according to the definition given of Nobility by MACCHIAVEL; for they neither exercised any Trade, nor laboured their Lands or Lots, which was done by their Helots': wherefore some Nobility may be far from pernicious in a Commonwealth by MACCHIAVEL'S own Testimony, who is an admirer of this, though the Servants thereof were more in number than the Citizens. To these Servants I hold the answer of LYCURGUS, when he bade him who asked why he did not admit the People to the Government of his Commonwealth, to go home and admit his Servants to the Government of his Family, to relate: for neither were the Lacedæmonians Servants, nor farther capable of the Government, unless, whereas the Congregation had the Result, he should have given them the Debate also; every one of these that attained to sixty years of Age, and the major Vote of the Congregation, being equally capable of the Senat.  
THE Nobility of Rome, and their capacity of the Senate, I have already described by that of Athens before the battle of Plateae; saving only that the Athenian was never eligible into the Senate without the suffrage of the People, till the introduction of the Lot, but the Roman Nobility ever: for the Patricians were elected into the Senate by the Kings, by the Consuls, or the Censors; or if a Plebeian happened to be conscribed, he and his Posterity became Patricians. Nor, though the People had many disputes with the Nobility, did this ever come in controversy, which, if there had been nothing else, might in my judgement have been enough to overturn that Commonwealth.  
THE Venetian Nobility, but that they are richer, and not military, resemble at all other points the Lacedaemonian, as I have already shown. These MACCHIAVEL excepts from his rule, by saying, that their Estates are rather personal than real, or of any great revenue in Land; which comes to our account, and shows, that a Nobility or party of the Nobility, not overbalancing in Dominion, is not dangerous, but of necessary use in every Commonwealth, provided it be rightly ordered: for if it be so ordered as was that of Rome, though they do not overbalance in the beginning, as they did not there, it will not be long ere they do, as is clear both in reason and experience towards the latter end. That the Nobility only be capable of the Senate, is there only not dangerous, where there be no other Citizens, as in this Government and that of Lacedaemon.  
THE Nobility of Holland and Switzerland, though but few, have Privileges not only distinct from the People, but so great, that in some Soverainties they have a negative voice; an example which I am far from commending, being such as (if those Governments were not cantonized, divided, and subdivided into many petty Soveraintys that balance one another, and in which the Nobility, except they had a Prince at the head of them, can never join to make work) would be the most dangerous that ever was but the Gothic, of which it favours. For in ancient Commonwealths you shall never find a Nobility to have had a negative but by the Poll, which, the People being far more in number, came to nothing; whereas these have it, be they never so few, by their stamp or order.  
OURS of Oceana have nothing else but their education and their leisure for the public, furnished by their Ease and competent Riches; and their intrinsic value, which, according as it comes to hold weight in the judgement or suffrage of the People, is their only way to honour and preferment. Wherefore I would have your Lordships to look upon your Children as such, who if they come to shake off some part of their baggage, shall make the more quick and glorious march: for it was nothing else but the baggage sordidly plundered by the Nobility of Rome, that lost the victory of the whole World in the midst of her Triumph.  
HAVING followed the Nobility thus close, they bring us, according to their natural course and divers kinds, to the divers Constitutions of the Senat.  
THAT of Israel (as was showed by my Right Noble Lord PHOSPHORUS DE AUGE, in the opening of the Commonwealth) consisted of seventy Elders, elected at first by the People. But whereas they were for life, they ever after (though without any divine precept for it) substituted their Successors by Ordination, which Ceremony was most usually performed by imposition of hands; and by this means a Commonwealth of as popular institution as can be found, became, as it is accounted by JOSEPHUS, Aristocratical. From this Ordination derives that which was introduced by the Apostles into the Christian Church; for which cause I think it is, that the Presbyterians would have the Government of the Church to be Aristocratical: Tho the Apostles, to the end, as I conceive, that they might give no occasion to such a mistake, but show that they intended the Government of the Church to be popular, ordained Elders, as has been shown, by the holding up of hands (or free Suffrage of the People) in every Congregation, or Ecclesia: for that is the word in the Original, being borrowed from the civil Congregations of the People in Athens and Lacedaemon, which were so called; and the word for holding up of hands in the Text, is also the very same, which signified the Suffrage of the People in Athens, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; for the Suffrage of the Athenians was given per Chirotonian, says EMMIUS.  
THE Council of the Bean (as was shown by my Lord NAVARCHUS DE PARALO in his full Discourse) being the proposing Senate of Athens (for that of the Areopagits was a Judicatory) consisted of four, some say five hundred Senators, elected annually, all at once, and by a mere lot without suffrage. Wherefore though the Senate, to correct the temerity of the Lot, had power to cast out such as they should judge unworthy of that honour; this related to manners only, and was not sufficient to repair the Commonwealth, which by such means became impotent: and forasmuch as her Senate consisted not of the natural Aristocracy, which in a Commonwealth is the only spur and rain of the People, it was cast headlong by the rashness of her Demagogs' or Grandees into ruin; while her Senate, like the Roman Tribune's (
* Qui ferè semper regebantur à multitudine magis quam regebant.  who almost always, instead of governing, were rather governed by the multitude) proposed not to the Result only, but to the Debate also of the People, who were therefore called to the Pulpits, where some vomited, and others drank poison.  
THE Senate of Lacedaemon, most truly discovered by my Lord LACO DE SCYTALE, consisted but of 30 for life, whereof the two Kings having but single Votes, were hereditary, the rest elected by the free Suffrage of the People, but out of such as were sixty years of age. These had the whole debate of the Commonwealth in themselves, and proposed to the Result only of the People. And now the riddle which I have heretofore found troublesome to unfold, is out; that is to say, why Athens and Lacedaemon, consisting each of the Senate and the People, the one should be held a Democracy, and the other an Aristocracy, or laudable Oligarchy, as it is termed by ISOCRATES; for that word is not, wherever you meet it, to be branded, seeing it is used also by ARISTOTLE, PLUTARCH, and others, sometimes in a good sense. The main difference was, that the People in this had the Result only, and in that the Debate and Result too. But for my part, where the People have the election of the Senate, not bound to a distinct order, and the Result, which is the Sovereign Power, I hold them to have that share in the Government (the Senate being not for life) whereof, with the safety of the Commonwealth, they are capable in nature; and such a Government, for that cause, to be Democracy: though I do not deny, but in Lacedaemon, the paucity of the Senators considered, it might be called Oligarchy, in comparison of Athens; or, if we look on their continuance for life, though they had been more, Aristocracy.  
THE Senate of Rome (whose Fame has been heard to thunder in the Eloquence of my Lord DOLABELLA D' ENYO) consisting of 300, was, in regard of the number, less Oligarchical than that of Lacedaemon; but more in regard of the Patrician, who, having a hereditary Capacity of the same, were not elected to that Honour by the People; but, being conscribed by the Censors, enjoyed it for life. Wherefore these, if they had their wills, would have resolved as well as debated; which set the People at such variance with them, as dissolved the Commonwealth: whereas if the People had enjoyed the Result, that about the Agrarian, as well as all other strife, must of necessity have ceased.  
THE Senates of Switzerland and Holland (as I have learned of my Lords ALPESTER and GLAUCUS) being bound up (like the sheaf of Arrows which the latter gives) by Leagues, lie like those in their Quivers: But Arrows, when they come to be drawn, fly some this way, and some that; and I am contented that these concern us not.  
THAT of Venice (by the faithful Testimony of my most excellent Lord LYNCEUS DE STELLA) has obliged a World, sufficiently punished by its own blindness and ingratitude, to repent and be wiser: for whereas a Commonwealth in which there is no Senate, or where the Senate is corrupt, cannot stand; the Great Council of Venice, like the Statue of Nilus, leans upon an Urn or Waterpot, which pours forth the Senate in so pure and perpetual a stream, as being enable to stagnat, is for ever incapable of Corruption. The fuller Description of this Senate is contained in that of Oceana; and that of Oceana in the foregoing Orders. To every one of which, because something has been already said, I shall not speak in particular. But in general, your Senate, and the other Assembly, or the Prerogative, as I shall show in due place, are perpetual, not as Lakes or Puddles, but as the Rivers of Eden; and are beds made, as you have seen, to receive the whole People, by a due and faithful vicissitude, into their current. They are not, as in the late way, alternat. Alternat Life in Government is the alternat 
* Ut fratrem pollux alternâ morte redemit.  Death of it.  
THIS was the Gothic work, whereby the former Government (which was not only a ship, but a gust too) could never open her sails, but in danger to overset herself; neither could make any voyage, nor lie safe in her own harbour. The Wars of later ages, says VERULAMIUS, seem to be made in the dark, in respect of the glory and honour which reflected on men from the Wars in ancient times. Their shipping of this sort was for Voyages, ours dare not launch; nor lies it safe at home. Your Gothic Politicians seem to me rather to have invented some new Ammunition or Gunpowder, in their King and Parliament, than Government. For what is become of the Princes (a kind of People) in Germany? blown up. Where are the Estates, or the Power of the People in France? blown up. Where is that of the People in Arragon, and the rest of the Spanish Kingdoms? blown up. On the other side, where is the King of Spain's Power in Holland? blown up. Where is that of the Austrian Princes in Switzerland? blown up. This perpetual peevishness and jealousy, under the alternat Empire of the Prince, and of the People, is obnoxious to every Spark. Nor shall any man show a reason that will be holding in prudence, why the People of Oceana have blown up their King, but that their Kings did not first blow up them. The rest is discourse for Ladies. Wherefore your Parliaments are not henceforth to come out of the Bag of AEOLUS, but by your Galaxies, to be the perpetual food of the Fire of VESTA.  
YOUR Galaxies, which divide the House into so many Regions, are three; one of which constituting the third Region is annually chosen, but for the term of three years; which causes the House (having at once Blossoms, Fruit half ripe, and others dropping off in full maturity) to resemble an Orange-tree, such as is at the same time an Education or Spring, and a Harvest too: for the People have made a very ill choice in the Man, who is not easily capable of the perfect knowledge in one year of the Senatorian Orders; which Knowledge, allowing him for the first to have been a Novice, brings him the second year to practice, and time enough. For at this rate you must always have two hundred knowing Men in the Government. And thus the Vicissitude of your Senators is not perceivable in the steadiness and perpetuity of your Senate; which, like that of Venice, being always changing, is for ever the same. And though other Politicians have not so well imitated their Pattern, there is nothing more obvious in Nature, seeing a Man who wears the same Flesh but a short time, is nevertheless the same Man, and of the same genius; and whence is this but from the constancy of Nature, in holding a Man to her Orders? Wherefore keep also to your Orders. But this is a mean Request, your Orders will be worth little, if they do not hold you to them; wherefore embark. They are like a Ship, if you be once aboard, you do not carry them, but they you; and see how Venice stands to her tackling: you will no more forsake them, than you will leap into the Sea.  
BUT they are very many, and difficult. O, my Lords, what Seaman casts away his Card, because it has four and twenty Points of the Compass? and yet those are very near as many, and as difficult as the Orders in the whole circumference of your Commonwealth. Consider, how have we been tossed with every wind of Doctrine, lost by the glib Tongues of your Demagogs' and Grandees in our own Havens? A company of Fiddlers that have disturbed your rest for your Groat; two to one, three thousand pounds a year to another, has been nothing. And for what? Is there one of them that yet knows what a Commonwealth is? And are you yet afraid of such a Government in which these shall not dare to scrape, for fear of the Statute? THEMISTOCLES could not fiddle, but could make of a small City a great Commonwealth: these have fiddeled, and for your Money, till they have brought a great Commonwealth to a small City.  
IT grieves me, while I consider how, and from what causes imaginary Difficulties will be aggravated, that the foregoing Orders are not capable of any greater clearness in discourse or writing: But if a Man should make a Book, describing every trick or passage, it would far no otherwise with a game at Cards; and this is no more, if a Man plays upon the square. There is a great difference, says VERULAMIUS, between a cunning Man and a wise Man (between a Demagog and a Legislator) not only in point of honesty, but in point of ability: As there be that can pack the Cards, and yet cannot play well; so there be some that are good in Canvases and Factions, that are otherwise weak men. Allow me but these Orders, and let them come with their Cards in their sleeves, or pack if they can. Again, says he, it is one thing to understand Persons, and another to understand Matters; for many are perfect in men's humours, that are not greatly capable of the real part of Business: which is the constitution of one that has studied Men more than Books. But there is nothing more hartful in a State, than that cunning men should pass for wise. His words are an Oracle. As DIONYSIUS, when he could no longer exercise his Tyranny among men, turned Schoolmaster, that he might exercise it among Boys. Allow me but these Orders, and your Grandees so well skilled in the Baits and Palates of Men, shall turn Ratcatchers.  
AND whereas Councils (as is discreetly observed by the same Author in his time) are at this day, in most places, but familiar meetings (somewhat like the Academy of our Provosts) where matters are rather talked on than debated, and run too swift to order an Act of Council; give me my Orders, and see if I have not puzzled your Demagogs'.  
IT is not so much my desire to return upon haunts, as theirs that will not be satisfied; wherefore if, notwithstanding what was said of dividing and choosing in our preliminary Discourses, men will yet be returning to the Question, Why the Senate must be a Council apart (though even in Athens, where it was of no other Constitution than the popular Assembly, the distinction of it from the other was never held less than necessary) this may be added to the former Reasons, that if the Aristocracy be not for the Debate, it is for nothing; but if it be for debate, it must have convenience for it: And what convenience is there for debate in a crowd, where there is nothing but jostling, treading upon one another, and stirring of Blood, than which in this case there is nothing more dangerous? Truly, it was not ill said of my Lord EPIMONUS, That Venice plays her game, as it were, at Billiards or Nineholes; and so may your Lordships, unless your Ribs be so strong, that you think better of Football: for such sport is Debate in a popular Assembly, as, notwithstanding the distinction of the Senate, was the destruction of Athens.   
THIS Speech concluded the Debate which happened at the Institution of the Senat. The next Assembly is that of the People or Prerogative Tribe.  

The Face of the Prerogative Tribe.  THE face, or mein of the Prerogative Tribe for the Arms, the Horses, and the Discipline, but more especially for the select men, is that of a very noble Regiment, or rather of two; the one of Horse, divided into three Troops (besides that of the Provinces, which will be shown hereafter) with their Captains, Cornets, and two Tribune's of the Horse at the head of them; the other of Foot in three Companies (besides that of the Provinces) with their Captains, Ensigns, and two Tribune's of the Foot at the head of them. The first Troop is called the Phoenix; the second the Pelican; and the third the Swallow. The first Company the Cypress; the second the Myrtle; and the third the Spray. Of these again (not without a near resemblance of the Roman division of a Tribe) the Phoenix and the Cypress constitute the first Class; the Pelican and the Myrtle the second; and the Swallow with the Spray the third, renewed every Spring by  

21. Order. The Change or Election of the Triennial Officers of the Prerogative.  THE one and twentieth ORDER, directing, that upon every Monday next ensuing the last of March, the Deputies of the annual Galaxy arriving at the Pavilion in the Halo, and electing one Captain and one Cornet of the Swallow (triennial Officers) by and out of the Cavalry at the Horse Urn, according to the Rules contained in the Ballot of the Hundred; and one Captain with one Ensign of the Spray (triennial Officers) by and out of the Infantry at the Foot Urn, after the same way of ballotting; constitute and become the third Classes of the Prerogative Tribe.  
SEVEN Deputies are annually returned by every Tribe, whereof three are Horse, and four are Foot; and there be fifty Tribes: so the Swallow must consist of 150 Horse, the Spray of 200 Foot. And the rest of the Classes being two, each of them in number equal; the whole Prerogative (besides the Provinces, that is, the Knights and Deputies of Marpesia and Panopea) must consist of 1050 Deputies. And these Troops and Companies may as well be called Centurys as those of the Romans; for the Romans related not, in so naming theirs, to the number. And whereas they were distributed according to the valuation of their Estates, so are these; which by virtue of the last Order, are now accommodated with their triennial Officers. But there be others appertaining to this Tribe, whose Election, being of far greater importance, is annual, as follows in  

22. Order. The Change or Election of the Annual Magistrates of the Prerogative.  THE twenty second ORDER; whereby the first Class having elected their triennial Officers, and made Oath to the Old Tribune's, that they will neither introduce, cause, nor to their power suffer Debate to be introduced into any popular Assembly of this Government, but to their utmost be aiding and assisting to seize and deliver any Person or Persons in that way offending, and striking at the Root of this Commonwealth, to the Council of War; are to proceed with the other two Classes of the Prerogative Tribe to election of the new Tribune's, being four annual Magistrates, whereof two are to be elected out of the Cavalry at the Horse Urn, and two out of the Infantry at the Foot Urn, according to the common Ballot of the Tribes. And they may be promiscuously chosen out of any Classis, provided that the same Person shall not be capable of bearing the Tribunitian Honour twice in the term of one Galaxy. The Tribune's thus chosen shall receive the Tribe (in reference to the Power of mustering and disciplining the same) as Commanders in chief; and for the rest as Magistrates, whose proper Function is prescribed by the next Order. The Tribune's may give leave to any number of the Prerogative, not exceeding one hundred at a time, to be absent, so they be not Magistrates, nor Officers, and return within three months. If a Magistrate or Officer has a necessary occasion, he may also be absent for the space of one month; provided, that there be not above three Corners or Ensigns, two Captains, or one Tribun so absent at one time.  
TO this the ARCHON spoke at the Institution after this manner.  

My Lords;  
IT is affirmed by CICERO in his Oration for FLACCUS, that the Commonwealths of Greece were all shaken or ruined by the intemperance of their Comitia, or Assemblies of the People. The truth is, if good heed in this point be not taken, a Commonwealth will have bad legs. But all the world knows he should have excepted Lacedaemon, where the People, as has been shown by the Oracle, had no power at all of Debate, nor (till after LYSANDER, whose Avarice opened a gulf, that was not long ere it swallowed up his Country) came it ever to be exercised by them. Whence that Commonwealth stood longest and firmest of any other, but this, in our days, of Venice: which having underlayed herself with the like Institution, owes a great, if not the greatest part of her steddiness to the same principle; the great Council, which is with her the People, by the Authority of my Lord EPIMONUS, never speaking a word. Nor shall any Commonwealth, where the People in their political capacity is talkative, ever see half the days of one of these: But being carried away by vainglorious Men (that, as OVERBURY says, piss more than they drink) swim down the stream; as did Athens, the most prating of these Dames, when that same ranting fellow ALCIBIADES fell a demagoging for the Sicilian War. But whereas Debate by the authority and experience of Lacedaemon and Venice, is not to be committed to the People in a well-ordered Government, it may be said, That the Order specified is but a slight bar in a matter of like danger; for so much as an Oath, if there be no recourse upon the breach of it, is a weak ty for such hands as have the Sword in them: wherefore what should hinder the People of Oceana, if they happen not to regard an Oath, from assuming Debate, and making themselves as much an Anarchy as those of Athens? To which I answer, Take the common fort in a private capacity, and, except they be injured, you shall find them to have a bashfulness in the presence of the better sort, or wiser Men; acknowleging their Abilitys by attention, and accounting it no mean honour to receive respect from them: But if they be injured by them, they hate them, and the more for being wife or great, because that makes it the greater injury. Nor refrain they in this case from any kind of intemperance of Speech, if of Action. It is no otherwise with a People in their political capacity; you shall never find that they have assumed Debate for itself, but for something else. Wherefore in Lacedaemon where there was, and in Venice where there is nothing else for which they should assume it, they have never shown so much as an inclination to it. Nor was there any appearance of such a desire in the People of Rome (who from the time of ROMULUS had been very well contented with the power of Result either in the 
* Comitiis Curiatis.  Parochial Assemblies, as it was settled upon them by him; or in the meetings of the 
† Centuriatis.  Hundreds, as it was altered in their regard for the worse by SERVIUS TULLIUS) till news was brought some fifteen years after the exile of TARQUIN their late King (during which time the Senate had governed pretty well) that he was dead at the Court of ARISTODEMUS the Tyrant of Cumae. 
* Eo nuncio erecti patres, erecta plebs. Sed patribus nimis luxuriosa ea fuit laetitia; plebi, cui ad eam diem summâ ope inservitum erat, injuriae à primoribus fieri coepêre. Liv. l. 2.  Whereupon the Patricians, or Nobility, began to let out the hitherto dissembled Venom, which is inherent in the root of Oligarchy, and fell immediately upon injuring the People beyond all moderation. For whereas the People had served both gallantly and contentedly in Arms upon their own charges, and, though joint Purchasers by their Swords of the conquered Lands, had not participated in the same to above two Acres a man (the rest being secretly usurped by the Patricians) they thro' the meanness of their support, and the greatness of their expense, being generally indebted, no sooner returned home with Victory to lay down their Arms, than they were snatched up by their Creditors, the Nobility, to cram Goals. Whereupon, but with the greatest modesty that was ever known in the like case, they first fell upon debate, affirming, 
† Se foris pro libertate & imperio dimicantes, domi à civibus captos & oppressos esse: tutioremque in bello quam in pace, inter hostes quam inter cives, libertatem plebis esse.  that they were oppressed and captivated at home, while abroad they fought for Liberty and Empire; and that the Freedom of the common People was safer in time of War than Peace, among their Enemy's than their Fellow-citizens. It is true, that when they could not get the Senate, thro' fear, as was pretended by the Patricians, to assemble and take their grievances into consideration, they grew so much the warmer, that it was glad to meet; where APPIUS CLAUDIUS, a fierce Spirit, was of opinion, that recourse should be had to Consular power, whereby some of the brands of Sedition being taken off, the flame might be extinguished. SERVILIUS being of another temper, thought it better and safer to try if the People might be bowed than broken. But this debate was interrupted by tumultuous news of the near approach of the Volsci, a case in which the Senate had no recourse but to the People, who contrary to their former custom upon the like occasions would not stir a foot, but fell a laughing, and saying, 
‖ Patres militarent, patres arma caperent, ut penes eosdem pericula belli, penes quos praemia, essent.  Let them fight that have something to fight for. The Senate that had purses, and could not sing so well before the Thief, being in a great perplexity, found no possible way out of it, but to beseech SERVILIUS, one of a Genius well known to be popular, That he would accept of the Consulship, and make some such use of it as might be helpful to the Patrician Interest. SERVILIUS accepting of the Offer, and making use of his Interest with the People, persuaded them to hope well of the good intention of the Fathers, whom it would little beseem to be forced to those things which would lose their Grace, and that in view of the Enemy, if they came not freely; and withal published an Edict, that no Man should withhold a Citizen of Rome by imprisonment from giving his name (for that was the way, as I shall have opportunity hereafter to show more at large, whereby they drew out their Arms) nor to seize or sell any man's Goods or Children that was in the Camp. Whereupon the People with a mighty concourse immediately took Arms, marched forth, and (which to them was as easy as to be put into the humour, and that, as appears in this place, was not hard) totally defeated the Volsci first, than the Sabins (for the neighbour Nations, hoping to have had a good bargain of the Discord in Rome, were up in arms on all sides) and after the Sabins, the Aurunci. Whence returning victorious in three Battles, they expected no less than that the Senate would have made good their words: when APPIUS CLAUDIUS, the other Consul, of his innate Pride, and that he might frustrate the Faith of his Colleague, caused the Soldiers (who being set at liberty, had behaved themselves with such valour) to be restored at their return to their Creditors and their Goals. Great resort upon this was made by the People to SERVILIUS, showing him their Wounds, calling him to witness how they had behaved themselves, and minding him of his promise. Poor SERVILIUS was sorry, but so overawed with the headiness of his Colleague, and the obstinacy of the whole faction of the Nobility, that not daring to do any thing either way, he lost both Parties: the Father's conceiving that he was ambitious, and the People that he was false; while the Consul CLAUDIUS continuing to countenance such as daily seized and imprisoned some of the indebted People, had still new and dangerous Controversys with them, insomuch that the Commonwealth was torn with horrid Division, and the People (because they found it not so safe, or so effectual in public) minded nothing but laying their heads together in private Conventicles. For this AULUS VIRGINIUS, and TITUS VETUSIUS, the new Consuls, were reproved by the Senate as slothful, and upbraided with the Virtue of APPIUS CLAUDIUS. Whereupon the Consuls having desired the Senate, that they might know their pleasure, showed afterwards their readiness to obey it, by summoning the People according to command, and requiring names whereby to draw forth an Army for diversion, but no man would answer. Report hereof being made to the Senate, the younger sort of the Fathers grew so hot with the Consuls, that they desired them to abdicat the Magistracy, which they had not the courage to defend.  
THE Consuls, though they conceived themselves to be roughly handled, made this soft Answer: Father's Conscript, that you may please to take notice it was foretold some horrid Sedition is at hand, we shall only desire, that they whose valour in this place is so great, may stand by us to see how we behave ourselves, and then be as resolute in your Commands as you will: your Fatherhoods may know if we be wanting in the performance.  
AT this some of the hot young Noblemen returned with the Consuls to the Tribunal, before which the People were yet standing; and the Consuls having generally required names in vain, to put it to something, required the name of one that was in their eye particularly; on whom, when he moved not, they commanded a Lictor to lay hands: but the People thronging about the Party summoned, forbade the Lictor, who durst not touch him; at which the Hotspurs that came with the Consuls, enraged by the affront, descended from the Throne to the aid of the Lictor; from whom in so doing they turned the indignation of the People upon themselves with such heat, that the Consuls interposing, thought fit, by remitting the Assembly, to appease the Tumult; in which nevertheless there had been nothing but noise. Nor was there less in the Senate, being suddenly rallied upon this occasion, where they that received the repulse, with others whose heads were as addle as their own, fell upon the business as if it had been to be determined by clamour, till the Consuls, upbraiding the Senate that it differed not from the Marketplace, reduced the House to Orders. And the Father's having been consulted accordingly, there were three Opinions; PUBLIUS VIRGINIUS conceived, that the consideration to be had upon the matter in question, or aid of the indebted and imprisoned People, was not to be further extended than to such as had engaged upon the promise made by SERVILIUS: TITUS LARGIUS, that it was no time to think it enough, if men's Merits were acknowleged, while the whole People, sunk under the weight of their debts, could not emerge without some common aid; which to restrain, by putting some into a better condition than others, would rather more inflame the Discord than extinguish it. APPIUS CLAUDIUS (still upon the old haunt) would have it, that the People were rather wanton than fierce: It was not oppression that necessitated, but their power that invited them to these freaks; the Empire of the Consuls since the appeal to the People (whereby a Plebeian might ask his fellows if he were a Thief) being but a mere scarecrow. Go to, says he, let us create the Dictator, from whom there is no appeal, and then let me see more of this work, or him that shall forbid my Lictor. The advice of APPIUS was abhorred by many; and to introduce a general recision of Debts with LARGIUS, was to violate all Faith: That of VIRGINIUS, as the most moderate, would have passed best, but that there were private Interests, that constant bane of the Public, which withstood it. So they concluded with APPIUS, who also had been Dictator, if the Consuls and some of the graver sort had not thought it altogether unseasonable, at a time when the Volsci and the Sabins were up again, to venture so far upon alienation of the People: for which cause VALERIUS, being descended from the PUBLICOLAS, the most popular Family, as also in his own person of a mild nature, was rather trusted with so rigid a Magistracy. Whence it happened, that the People, though they knew well enough against whom the Dictator was created, seared nothing from VALERIUS; but upon a new promise made to the same effect with that of SERVILIUS, hoped better another time, and throwing away all disputes, gave their names roundly, went out, and, to be brief, came home again as victorious as in the former Action, the Dictator entering the City in Triumph. Nevertheless when he came to press the Senate to make good his promise, and do something for the ease of the People, they regarded him no more as to that point than they had done SERVILIUS. Whereupon the Dictator, in disdain to be made a stolen, abdicated his Magistracy, and went home. Here then was a victorious Army without a Captain, and a Senate pulling it by the beard in their Gowns. What is it (if you have read the Story, for there is not such another) that must follow? Can any man imagine, that such only should be the opportunity upon which this People could run away? Alas, poor men, the Aequi and the Volsci, and the Sabins were nothing, but the Father's invincible! There they sat some three hundred of them armed all in Robes, and thundering with their Tongues, without any hopes in the earth to reduce them to any tolerable conditions. Wherefore, not thinking it convenient to abide long so near them, away marches the Army, and encamps in the fields. This Retreat of the People is called the Secession of Mount Aventin, where they lodged very sad at their condition; but not letting fall so much as a word of murmur against the Fathers. The Senate by this time were great Lords, had the whole City to themselves; but certain Neighbours were upon the way that might come to speak with them, not ask leave of the Porter. Wherefore their minds became troubled, and an Orator was posted to the People to make as good conditions with them as he could; but, whatever the terms were, to bring them home, and with all speed. And here it was covenanted between the Senate and the People, that these should have Magistrates of their own Election, called the Tribune's; upon which they returned.  
TO hold you no longer, the Senate having done this upon necessity, made frequent attempts to retract it again; while the Tribune's on the other side, to defend what they had got, instituted their Tributa Comitia, or Council of the People; where they came in time, and, as Disputes increased, to make Laws without the Authority of the Senate, called Plebiscita. Now to conclude in the point at which I drive; such were the steps whereby the People of Rome came to assume Debate: nor is it in Art or Nature to debar a People of the like effect, where there is the like cause. For ROMULUS having in the Election of his Senate squared out a Nobility for the support of a Throne, by making that of the Patricians a distinct and hereditary Order, planted the Commonwealth upon two contrary Interests or Roots, which shooting forth in time produced two Commonwealths, the one Oligarchical in the Nobility, the other a mere Anarchy of the People, and ever after caused a perpetual feud and enmity between the Senate and the People, even to death.  
THERE is not a more noble or useful question in the Politics than that which is started by MACCHIAVEL, Whether means were to be found whereby the Enmity that was between the Senate and the People of Rome could have been removed. Nor is there any other in which we, or the present occasion, are so much concerned, particularly in relation to this Author; forasmuch as his Judgement in the determination of the question standing, our Commonwealth falls. And he that will erect a Commonwealth against the Judgement of MACCHIAVEL, is obliged to give such reasons for his enterprise as must not go a begging. Wherefore to repeat the Politician very honestly, but somewhat more briefly, he disputes thus.  

Macch. Disc. B. 1. c. 6.  THERE be two sorts of Commonwealths, the one for preservation, as Lacedaemon and Venice; the other for increase, as Rome.  
LACEDAEMON being governed by a King and a small Senate, could maintain itself a long time in that condition, because the Inhabitants, being few, having put a bar upon the reception of Strangers, and living in a strict observation of the Laws of LYCURGUS, which now had got reputation, and taken away all occasion of Tumults, might well continue long in Tranquillity. For the Laws of LYCURGUS introduced a greater equality in Estates, and a less equality in Honours, whence there was equal Poverty; and the Plebeians were less ambitious, because the Honours or Magistracies of the City could extend but to a few, and were not communicable to the People: nor did the Nobility by using them ill, ever give them a desire to participate of the same. This proceeded from the Kings, whose Principality being placed in the midst of the Nobility, had no greater means whereby to support itself, than to shield the People from all injury; whence the People not fearing Empire, desired it not: And so all occasion of enmity between the Senate and the People was taken away. But this Union happened especially from two causes; the one, that the Inhabitants of Lacedaemon being few, could be governed by the Few: the other, that, not receiving Strangers into their Commonwealth, they did not corrupt it, nor increase it to such a proportion as was not governable by the Few.  
VENICE has not divided with her Plebeians, but all are called Gentlemen that be in administration of the Government; for which Government she is more beholden to Chance than the Wisdom of her Lawmakers: For many retiring to those Lands, where that City is now built, from the inundations of Barbarians that overwhelmed the Roman Empire, when they were increased to such a number, that to live together it was necessary to have Laws; they ordained a form of Government, whereby assembling often in Council upon Affairs, and finding their number sufficient for Government, they put a bar upon all such as repairing afterwards to their City should become Inhabitants, excluding them from participation of Power. Whence they that were included in the Administration had right; and they that were excluded, coming afterwards, and being received upon no other conditions to be Inhabitants, had no wrong; and therefore had no occasion, nor (being never trusted with Arms) any means to be tumultuous. Wherefore this Commonwealth might very well maintain itself in Tranquillity.  
THESE things considered, it is plain that the Roman Legislators, to have introduced a quiet State, must have done one of these two things; either shut out Strangers, as the Lacedæmonians; or, as the Venetians, not allowed the People to bear Arms. But they did neither. By which means the People having power and increase, were in perpetual tumult. Nor is this to be helped in a Commonwealth for increase, seeing if Rome had cut off the occasion of her Tumults, she must have cut off the means of her Increase, and by consequence of her Greatness.  
Wherefore let a Legislator consider with himself, whether he would make his Commonwealth for preservation, in which case she may be free from Tumults; or for increase, in which case she must be infested with them.  
IF he makes her for preservation, she may be quiet at home; but will be in danger abroad. First, Because her Foundation must be narrow, and therefore weak, as that of Lacedaemon, which lay but upon 30000 Citizens; or that of Venice, which lies but upon 3000. Secondly, Such a Commonwealth must either be in Peace, or in War: If she be in Peace, the Few are soon effeminated and corrupted, and so obnoxious also to Faction. If in War, succeeding ill, she is an easy prey; or succeeding well, ruined by increase: a weight which her Foundation is not able to bear. For Lacedaemon, when she had made herself Mistress, upon the matter, of all Greece, thro' a slight accident, the Rebellion of Thebes, occasioned by the Conspiracy of PELOPIDAS discovering this infirmity of her nature, the rest of her conquered Cities immediately fell off, and in the turn as it were of a hand reduced her from the fullest tide to the lowest ebb of her fortune. And Venice having possessed herself of a great part of Italy by her purse, was no sooner in defence of it put to the trial of Arms, than she lost all in one Battle.  
WHENCE I conclude, That in the Ordination of a Commonwealth a Legislator is to think upon that which is most honourable; and laying aside Models for Preservation, to follow the example of Rome conniving at, and temporising with the enmity between the Senate and the People, as a necessary step to the Roman Greatness. For that any Man should find out a balance that may take in the Conveniences, and shut out the Inconveniences of both, I do not think it possible. These are the words of the Author, though the method be somewhat altered, to the end that I may the better turn them to my purpose.  
MY LORDS, I do not know how you harken to this sound; but to hear the greatest Artist in the modern World, giving sentence against our Commonwealth, is that with which I am nearly concerned. Wherefore, with all honour due to the Prince of Politicians, let us examine his reasoning with the same liberty which he has asserted to be the right of a free People. But we shall never come up to him, except by taking the business a little lower, we descend from effects to their causes. The causes of Commotion in a Commonwealth are either external or internal. External are from Enemy's, from Subjects, or from Servants. To dispute then what was the cause why Rome was infested by the Italian, or by the Servile Wars; why the Slaves took the Capitol; why the Lacedæmonians were near as frequently troubled with their Helots', as Rome with all those; or why Venice, whose Situation is not trusted to the faith of Men, has as good or better quarter with them whom she governs, than Rome had with the Latins; were to dispute upon external causes. The question put by MACCHIAVEL is of internal causes; Whether the enmity that was beeween the Senate and the People of Rome might have been removed. And to determine otherwise of this question than he does, I must lay down other Principles than he has done. To which end I affirm, that a Commonwealth internally considered, is either equal or inequal. A Commonwealth that is internally equal, has no internal cause of Commotion, and therefore can have no such effect but from without. A Commonwealth internally inequal has no internal cause of quiet, and therefore can have no such effect but by diversion.  
TO prove my Assertions, I shall at this time make use of no other than his examples. Lacedaemon was externally unquiet, because she was externally inequal, that is as to her Helots'; and she was internally at rest, because she was equal in herself, both in root and branch: In the root by her Agrarian, and in branch by the Senate, inasmuch as no Man was thereto qualified, but by election of the People. Which Institution of LYCURGUS is mentioned 
Arist. Polit. B. 2.  by ARISTOTLE, where he says, that rendering his Citizens emulous (not careless) of that honour, he assigned to the People the election of the Senat. Wherefore MACCHIAVEL in this, as in other places, having his eye upon the division of Patrician and Plebeian Families as they were in Rome, has quite mistaken the Orders of this Commonwealth, where there was no such thing. Nor did the quiet of it derive from the Power of the Kings, who were so far from shielding the People from the injury of the Nobility, of which there was none in his sense but the Senate, that one declared end of the Senate at the institution was to shield the People from the Kings, who from that time had but single Votes. Neither did it proceed from the straitness of the Senate, or their keeping the People excluded from the Government, that they were quiet, but from the equality of their administration, seeing the Senate (as is plain by the Oracle, their fundamental Law) had no more than the Debate, and the Result of the Commonwealth belonged to the People. Wherefore when THEOPOMPUS and POLYDORUS Kings of Lacedaemon, would have kept the People excluded from the Government, by adding to the ancient Law this Clause, If the determination of the People be faulty, it shall be lawful for the Senate to resume the Debate; the People immediately became unquiet, and resumed that Debate, which ended not till they had set up their Ephors, and caused that Magistracy to be confirmed by their Kings. 
* Nam cum primus instituisset Theopompus ut Ephori Lacedamone crearentur, ita futuri regiae potestati oppositi quemadmodum Romae Tribuni pl●bis consulati imperio sunt objecti; atque illi u●or dixi●●et, id egi●●● illum ut fil●is minorem potestatem re●inqueret: Relinquam, inquit, sed diuturniorem. Optimè quidem: Ea enim demum tuta est potentia, quae viribus suis modum imponit. Theopompus igitur legitimis regnum vinculis constringendo, quo longius à licentia ●etraxit, hot propius ad benevolentiam civium admovit. Val. Max. l. 4. c. 1. de externis, §. 8.  For when THEOPOMPUS first ordained that the Ephori or Overseers should be created at Lacedaemon, to be such a restraint upon the Kings there as the Tribune's were upon the Consuls at Rome, the Queen complained to him, that by this means he transmitted the Royal Authority greatly diminished to his Children: I leave indeed less, answered he, but more lasting. And this was excellently said; for that Power only is safe which is limited from doing hurt. THEOPOMPUS therefore, by confining the Kingly Power within the bounds of the Laws, did recommend it by so much to the People's Affection, as he removed it from being Arbitrary. By which it may appear, that a Commonwealth for preservation, if she comes to be inequal, is as obnoxious to enmity between the Senate and the People, as a Commonwealth for increase; and that the Tranquillity of Lacedaemon was derived from no other cause than her Equality.  
FOR Venice, to say that she is quiet because she disarms her Subjects, is to forget that Lacedaemon disarmed her Helots', and yet could not in their regard be quiet; wherefore if Venice be defended from external causes of Commotion, it is first thro' her Situation, in which respect her Subjects have no hope (and this indeed may be attributed to her fortune) and, secondly, thro' her exquisite Justice, whence they have no will to invade her. But this can be attributed to no other cause than her Prudence; which will appear to be greater, as we look nearer; for the effects that proceed from Fortune, if there be any such thing, are like their cause, inconstant. But there never happened to any other Commonwealth so undisturbed and constant a Tranquillity and Peace in herself, as is that of Venice; wherefore this must proceed from some other cause than Chance. And we see that as she is of all others the most quiet, so the most equal Commonwealth. Her Body consists of one Order, and her Senate is like a rolling stone, as was said, which never did, nor, while it continues upon that rotation, never shall gather the moss of a divided or ambitious interest; much less such a one as that which grasped the People of Rome in the talons of their own Eagles. And if MACCHIAVEL, averse from doing this Commonwealth right, had considered her Orders, as his Reader shall easily perceive he never did, he must have been so far from attributing the Prudence of them to Chance, that he would have touched up his admirable work to that perfection, which, as to the civil part, has no pattern in the universal World but this of Venice.  
ROME, secure by her potent and victorious Arms from all external causes of Commotion, was either beholden for her Peace at home to her Enemy's abroad, or could never rest her head. My LORDS, you that are Parents of a Commonwealth, and so freer Agents than such as are merely natural, have a care. For, as no man shall show me a Commonwealth born straight, that ever became crooked; so, no man shall show me a Commonwealth born crooked, that ever became straight. Rome was crooked in her birth, or rather prodigious. Her twins the Patricians and Plebeian Orders came, as was shown by the foregoing story, into the World, one body but two heads, or rather two bells: for, notwithstanding the Fable out of AESOP, whereby MENENIUS AGRIPPA the Orator that was sent from the Senate to the People at Mount Aventin, showed the Fathers to be the Belly, and the People to be the Arms and the Legs (which except that, how slothful soever it might seem, they were nourished, not these only, but the whole Body must languish and be dissolved) it is plain, that the Fathers were a distinct Belly; such a one as took the meat indeed out of the People's mouths, but abhorring the Agrarian, returned it not in the due and necessary nutrition of a Commonwealth. Nevertheless, as the People that live about the Cataracts of Nilus are said not to hear the noise, so neither the Roman Writers, nor MACCHIAVEL the most conversant with them, seem among so many of the Tribunitian storms, to hear their natural voice: for though they could not miss of it so far as to attribute them to the strife of the People for participation in Magistracy, or, in which MACCHIAVEL more particularly joins, to that about the Agrarian; this was to take the business short, and the remedy for the disease.  
A PEOPLE, when they are reduced to misery and despair, become their own Politicians, as certain Beasts when they are sick become their own Physicians, and are carried by a natural instinct to the desire of such Herbs as are their proper cure; but the People, for the greater part, are beneath the Beasts in the use of them. Thus the People of Rome, though in their misery they had recourse by instinct, as it were, to the two main Fundamentals of a Commonwealth, participation of Magistracy, and the Agrarian, did but taste and spit at them, not (which is necessary in Physic) drink down the potion, and in that their healths. For when they had obtained participation of Magistracy, it was but lamely, not to a full and equal Rotation in all Elections; nor did they greatly regard it in what they had got. And when they had attained to the Agrarian, they neglected it so far as to suffer the Law to grow obsolete: but if you do not take the due dose of your Medicines (as there be slight tastes which a man may have of Philosophy that incline to Atheism) it may chance to be poison, there being a like taste of the Politics that inclines to Confusion, as appears in the Institution of the Roman Tribune's, by which Magistracy and no more, the People were so far from attaining to Peace, that they in getting but so much, got but heads for an eternal feud; whereas if they had attained in perfection either to the Agrarian, they had introduced the equality and calm of Lacedaemon, or to Rotation, and they had introduced that of Venice: And so there could have been no more enmity between the Senate and the People of Rome, than there was between those Orders in Lacedaemon, or is now in Venice. Wherefore MACCHIAVEL seems to me, in attributing the Peace of Venice more to her luck than her prudence, of the whole stable to have saddled the wrong Horse; for though Rome 
* 
— Qui nimbos & non imitabile fulmen  
Aere, & cornipedum cursu simularat equorum.   in her military part could beat it better, beyond all comparison, upon the sounding hoof, Venice for the civil part has plainly had the wings of Pegasus.  
THE whole Question than will come upon this point, Whether the People of Rome could have obtained these Orders? And first, to say, that they could not have obtained them without altering the Commonwealth, is no Argument; seeing neither could they, without altering the Commonwealth, have obtained their Tribune's, which nevertheless were obtained. And if a man considers the posture that the People were in when they obtained their Tribune's, they might as well, and with as great ease (forasmuch as the reason why the Nobility yielded to the Tribune's was no other, than that there was no remedy) have obtained any thing else. And for experience, it was in the like case that the Lacedæmonians did set up their Ephors, and the Athenians after the battle of Plateae bowed the Senate (so hard a thing it is for a Commonwealth that was born crooked to become straight) as much the other way. Nor, if it be objected, that this must have ruined the Nobility (and in that deprived the Commonwealth of the Greatness which she acquired by them) is this opinion holding; but confuted by the sequel of the story, showing plainly, that the Nobility thro' the defect of such Orders, that is to say, of Rotation and the Agrarian, came to eat up the People: and battening themselves in Luxury, to be, as SALLUST speaks of them, 
† Inertissimi nobiles, in quibus, sicut in statue, praeter nomen nihil erat additamenti.  a most sluggish and lazy Nobility, in whom, besides the name, there was no more than in a statue; and to bring so mighty a Commonwealth, and of so huge a Glory, to so deplorable an end. Wherefore means might have been found to remove the enmity that was between the Senate and the People of Rome.  
MY LORDS, If I have argued well, I have given you the comfort and assurance, that notwithstanding the judgement of MACCHIAVEL, your Commonwealth is both safe and sound: but if I have not argued well, then take the comfort and assurance which he gives you while he is firm, That a Legislator is to lay aside all other examples, and follow that of Rome only, conniving and temporising with the enmity between the Senate and the People, as a necessary step to the Roman Greatness. Whence it follows, that your Commonwealth, at the worst, is that which he has given you his word is the best.  
I HAVE held your Lordship's long, but upon an account of no small importance, which I can now sum up in these few words: Where there is a liquorishness in a popular Assembly to debate, it proceeds not from the Constitution of the People, but of the Commonwealth. Now that your Commonwealth is of such a Constitution as is naturally free from this kind of intemperance, is that which to make good, I must divide the remainder of my Discourse into two Parts.  
THE First, showing the several Constitutions of the Assemblies of the People in other Commonwealths.  
THE Second, comparing our Assembly of the People with theirs: and showing how it excludes the Inconveniences, and embraces the Conveniences of them all.  
IN the beginning of the first Part I must take notice, that among the popular Errors of our days it is no small one, that men imagine the ancient Governments of this kind to have consisted for the most part of one City, that is, of one Town; whereas by what we have learned of my Lords that opened them, it appears that there was not any considerable one of such a Constitution but Carthage, till this in our days of Venice.  
FOR to begin with Israel, it consisted of the twelve Tribes, locally spread or quartered throout the whole Territory; and these being called together by Trumpets, constituted the Church or Assembly of the People. The vastness of this weight, as also the slowness thence inavoidable, became a great cause (as has been shown at large by my Lord PHOSPHORUS) of the breaking that Commonwealth; notwithstanding that the Temple, and those religious Ceremonies for which the People were at least annually obliged to repair thither, were no small Ligament of the Tribes, otherwise but slightly tacked together.  
ATHENS consisted of four Tribes, taking in the whole People both of the City and of the Territory; not so gathered by THESEUS into one Town, as to exclude the Country, but to the end that there might be some Capital of the Commonwealth: though true it be, that the Congregation consisting of the Inhabitants within the Walls, was sufficient to all intents and purposes, without those of the Country. These also being exceeding numerous, became burdensome to themselves, and dangerous to the Commonwealth; the more for their ill education, as is observed by XENOPHON and POLYBIUS, who compare them to Mariners that in a calm are perpetually disputing and swaggering one with another, and never lay their hands to the common tackling or safety, till they be all endangered by some storm. Which caused THUCYDIDES, when he saw this People thro' the purchase of their misery become so much wiser, as to reduce their Comitia or Assemblys to five thousand, to say in his eighth Book; And now, at least in my time, the Athenians seem to have ordered their State aright, consisting of a moderate temper both of the Few (by which he means the Senate of the Bean) and of the Many, or the five thousand. And he does not only give you his judgement, but the best proof of it; for this, says he, was the first thing that, after so many misfortunes past, made the City again to raise her head. The place I would desire your Lordships to note, as the first example that I find, or think is to be found, of a popular Assembly by way of Representative.  
LACEDAEMON consisted of thirty thousand Citizens dispersed throout Laconia, one of the greatest Provinces in all Greece, and divided, as by some Authors is probable, into six Tribes. Of the whole body of these, being gathered, consisted the great Church or Assembly, which had the Legislative Power; the little Church, gathered sometimes for matters of concern within the City, consisted of the Spartans' only. These happened, like that of Venice, to be good Constitutions of a Congregation, but from an ill cause the infirmity of a Commonwealth, which thro' her paucity was Oligarchical.  
WHEREFORE, go which way you will, it should seem, that without a Representative of the People, your Commonwealth consisting of a whole Nation, can never avoid falling either into Oligarchy or Confusion.  
THIS was seen by the Romans, whose rustic Tribes extending themselves from the River Arno to the Vulturnus, that is, from Fesels or Florence to C●pua, invented a way of Representative by Lots: the Tribe upon which the first fell, being the Prerogative; and some two or three more that had the rest, the Jure vocatae. These gave the Suffrage of the Commonwealth in 
* Binis Comitiis.  two meetings; the Prerogative at the first Assembly, and the Jure vocatae at a second.  
NOW to make the parallel, all the Inconveniences that you have observed in these Assemblies are shut out, and all the Conveniences taken into your Prerogative. For first it is that for which Athens, shaking off the blame of XENOPHON and POLYBIUS, came to deserve the praise of THUCYDIDES, a Representative. And, secondly, not as I suspect in that of Athens, and is past suspicion in this of Rome, by lot, but by suffrage, as was also the late House of Commons, by which means in your Prerogatives all the Tribes of Oceana are Jure vocatae; and if a man shall except against the paucity of the standing number, it is a wheel, which in the revolution of a few years turns every hand that is fit, or fits every hand that it turns to the public work. Moreover, I am deceived if upon due consideration it does not fetch your Tribes, with greater equality and ease to themselves and to the Government, from the Frontiers of Marpesia, than Rome ever brought any one of hers out of her Pom●ria, or the nearest parts of her adjoining Territories. To this you may add, That whereas a Commonwealth, which in regard of the People is not of facility in execution, were sure enough in this Nation to be cast off thro' impatience; your Musters and Galaxies are given to the People, as milk to Babes, whereby when they are brought up thro' four days election in a whole year (one at the Parish, one at the Hundred, and two at the Tribe) to their strongest meat, it is of no harder digestion, than to give their. Negative or Affirmative as they see cause. There be gallant men among us that laugh at such an Appeal or Umpire; but I refer it whether you be more inclining to pardon them or me, who I confess have been this day laughing at a sober man, but without meaning him any harm, and that is PETRUS CUNAEUS, where speaking of the nature of the People, he says, that taking them apart, they are very simple, but yet in their Assemblies they see and know something: and so runs away without troubling himself with what that something is. Whereas the People, taken apart, are but so many private Interests; but if you take them together, they are the public Interest. The public Interest of a Commonwealth, as has been shown, is nearest that of mankind, and that of mankind is right reason; but with Aristocracy (whose Reason or Interest, when they are all together, as appeared by the Patricians, is but that of a Party) it is quite contrary: for as, taken apart, they are far wiser than the People considered in that manner; so being put together, they are such fools, who by deposing the People, as did those of Rome, will saw off the branch whereupon they sit, or rather destroy the root of their own Greatness. Wherefore MACCHIAVEL following ARISTOTLE, and yet going before him, may well assert, 
* Che la multitudine è piu savia & piu constant i un Prencipe.  That the People are wiser and more constant in their Resolutions than a Prince; which is the Prerogative of popular Government for Wisdom. And hence it is that the Prerogative of your Commonwealth, as for Wisdom so for Power, is in the People: which (though I am not ignorant that the Roman Prerogative was so called à Praerogando, because their Suffrage was first asked) gives the denomination to your Prerogative Tribe.   
THE Elections, whether Annual or Triennial, being shown by the twenty second, that which comes in the next place to be considered is  

23. Order. The Constitution, Function, and manner of proceeding of the Prerogative.  THE twenty third ORDER, showing the Power, Function, and manner of proceeding of the Prerogative Tribe.  
THE Power or Function of the Prerogative is of two parts, the one of Result, in which it is the Legislative Power; the other of Judicature, in which regard it is the highest Court, and the last appeal in this Commonwealth.  
FOR the former part (the People by this Constitution being not obliged by any Law that is not of their own making or confirmation, by the result of the Prerogative, their equal Representative) it shall not be lawful for the Senate to require obedience from the People, nor for the People to give obedience to the Senate in or by any Law that has not been promulgated, or printed and published for the space of six weeks; and afterwards proposed by the Authority of the Senate to the Prerogative Tribe, and resolved by the major Vote of the same in the Affirmative. Nor shall the Senate have any power to levy War, Men, or Money, otherwise than by the consent of the People so given, or by a Law so enacted, except in cases of Exigence, in which it is agreed, that the Power both of the Senate and the People shall be in the Dictator, so qualified, and for such a term of time, as is according to that Constitution already prescribed. While a Law is in promulgation, the Censors shall animadvert upon the Senate, and the Tribune's upon the People, that there be no laying of heads together, no Conventicles or canvasing to carry on or oppose any thing; but that all may be done in a free and open way.  
FOR the latter part of the Power of the Prerogative, or that whereby they are the Supreme Judicatory of this Nation, and of the Provinces of the same, the cognizance of Crimes against the Majesty of the People, such as High Treason, as also of Peculat, that is, robbery of the Treasury, or defraudation of the Commonwealth, appertains to this Tribe. And if any Person or Persons, Provincials or Citizens, shall appeal to the People, it belongs to the Prerogative to judge and determine the case; provided that if the Appeal be from any Court of Justice in this Nation or the Provinces, the Appellant shall first deposit a hundred Pounds in the Court from which he appeals, to be forfeited to the same, if he be cast in his Suit by the People. But the Power of the Council of War being the expedition of this Commonwealth, and the martial Law of the Strategus in the Field, are those only from which there shall lie no Appeal to the People.  
THE proceeding of the Prerogative in case of a Proposition, is to be thus ordered. The Magistrates, proposing by Authority of the Senate, shall rehearse the whole matter, and expound it to the People: which done, they shall put the whole together to the Suffrage, with three Boxes, the Negative, the Affirmative, and the Nonsincere: and the Suffrage being returned to the Tribune's, and numbered in the presence of the Proposers, if the major Vote be in the Nonsincere, the Proposers shall desist, and the Senate shall resume the Debate. If the major Vote be in the Negative, the Proposers shall desist, and the Senate too. But if the major Vote be in the Affirmative, than the Tribe is clear, and the Proposers shall begin and put the whole matter, with the Negative and the Affirmative (leaving out the Nonsincere) by Clauses; and the Suffrages being taken and numbered by the Tribune's in the presence of the Proposers, shall be written and reported by the Tribune's to the Senat. And that which is proposed by the Authority of the Senate, and confirm'd by the Command of the People, is the Law of Oceana.  
THE proceeding of the Prerogative in a case of Judicature is to be thus ordered. The Tribune's being Auditors of all Causes appertaining to the cognizance of the People, shall have notice of the Suit or Trial, whether of Appeal or otherwise, that is to be commenced; and if any one of them shall accept of the same, it appertains to him to introduce it. A Cause being introduced, and the People mustered or assembled for the decision of the same, the Tribune's are Precedents of the Court, having power to keep it to Orders, and shall be seated upon a Scaffold erected in the middle of the Tribe. Upon the right hand shall stand a Seat, or large Pulpit assigned to the plaintiff, or the Accuser; and, upon the left, another for the Defendant, each if they please with his Council. And the Tribune's (being attended upon such occasions with so many Ballotins, Secretarys, Doorkeepers, and Messengers of the Senate as shall be requisite) one of them shall turn up a Glass of the nature of an Hourglass, but such a one as is to be of an hour and a halfs running; which being turned up, the Party or Council on the right hand may begin to speak to the People. If there be Papers to be read, or Witnesses to be examined, the Officer shall lay the Glass sideways till the Papers be read, and the Witnesses examined, and then turn it up again; and so long as the Glass is running, the Party on the right hand has liberty to speak, and no longer. The Party on the right hand having had his time, the like shall be done in every respect for the Party on the left. And the Cause being thus heard, the Tribune's shall put the question to the Tribe with a white, a black, and a red Box (or Nonsincere) whether Guilty▪ or not Guilty. And if the Suffrage being taken, the major Vote be in the Nonsincere, the Cause shall be reheard upon the next juridical day following, and put to the question in the same manner. If the major Vote comes the second time in the Nonsincere, the Cause shall be heard again upon the third day: but at the third hearing the question shall be put without the Nonsincere. Upon the first of the three days in which the major Vote comes in the white Box, the Party accused is absolved; and upon the first of them in which it comes in the black Box, the Party accused is condemned. The Party accused being condemned, the Tribune's (if the case be criminal) shall put with the white and the black Box these Questions, or such of them, as, regard had to the case, they shall conceive most proper.  

1. WHETHER he shall have a Writ of ease.  
2. WHETHER he shall be sinned so much, or so much.  
3. WHETHER he shall be confiscated.  
4. WHETHER he shall be rendered incapable of Magistracy.  
5. WHETHER he shall be banished.  
6. WHETHER he shall be put to death.   
THESE, or any three of these Questions, whether simple or such as shall be thought fitly mixed, being put by the Tribune's, that which has most above half the Voys in the black Box is the Sentence of the People, which the Troop of the third Classis is to see executed accordingly.  
BUT whereas by the Constitution of this Commonwealth it may appear that neither the Propositions of the Senate, nor the Judicature of the People, will be so frequent as to hold the Prerogative in continual employment; the Senate, a main part of whose Office it is to teach and instruct the People, shall duly (if they have no greater Affairs to divert them) cause an Oration to be made to the Prerogative by some Knight or Magistrate of the Senate, to be chosen out of the ablest men, and from time to time appointed by the Orator of the House, in the great Hall of the Pantheon, while the Parliament resides in the Town; or in some Grove or sweet place in the seld, while the Parliament for the heat of the year shall reside in the Country; upon every Tuesday, morning or afternoon.  
AND the Orator appointed for the time to this Office, shall first repeat the Orders of the Commonwealth with all possible brevity; and then making choice of one or some part of it, discourse thereof to the People. An Oration or Discourse of this nature, being afterward perused by the Council of State, may as they see cause be printed and published.  
THE ARCHON'S Comment upon the Order I find to have been of this sense.  

My Lords,  
TO crave pardon for a word or two in farther explanation of what was read, I shall briefly show how the Constitution of this Tribe or Assembly answers to their Function; and how their Function, which is of two parts, the former in the Result or Legislative Power, the latter in the supreme Judicature of the Commonwealth, answers to their Constitution. MACCHIAVEL has a Discourse, where he puts the question, Whether the guard of Liberty may with more security be committed to the Nobility, or to the People. Which doubt of his arises thro' the want of explaining his terms; for the guard of Liberty can signify nothing else but the Result of the Commonwealth: so that to say, that the guard of Liberty may be committed to the Nobility, is to say, that the Result may be committed to the Senate, in which case the People signify nothing. Now to show it was a mistake to affirm it to have been thus in Lacedaemon, sufficient has been spoken; and whereas he will have have it to be so in Venice also, 
* Quello appresso il quale e la somma autorita di tutta la città, e delle leggi & decreti, de i quali ●ende l'autoritâ cosi del Senato come ancora di tutti i Magistrati, e il Consiglio Grande.  They, says CONTARINI, in whom resides the Supreme Power of the whole Commonwealth, and of the Laws, and upon whose Orders depends the Authority as well of the Senate as of all the other Magistrates, is the GREAT COUNCIL. It is institutively in the Great Council, by the judgement of all that know that Commonwealth; though for the Reasons shown, it be sometimes exercised by the Senat. Nor need I run over the Commonwealths in this place for the proof of a thing so doubtless, and such as has been already made so apparent, as that the Result of each was in the popular part of it. The popular part of yours, or the Prerogative Tribe, consists of seven Deputies (whereof three are of the Horse) annually elected out of every Tribe of Oceana; which being fifty, amounts to one hundred and fifty Horse, and two hundred Foot. And the Prerogative consisting of three of these Lists, consists of four hundred and fifty Horse, and six hundred Foot, besides those of the Provinces to be hereafter mentioned; by which means the overbalance in the Suffrage remaining to the Foot by one hundred and fifty Votes, you have to the support of a true and natural Aristocracy, the deepest root of a Democracy that has been ever planted. Wherefore there is nothing in Art or Nature better qualified for the Result than this Assembly. It is noted out of CICERO by MACCHIAVEL, That the People, though they are not so prone to find out Truth of themselves, as to follow Custom, or run into Error; yet if they be shown Truth, they not only acknowledge and embrace it very suddenly, but are the most constant and faithful Guardians and Conservators of it. It is your Duty and Office, whereto you are also qualified by the Orders of this Commonwealth, to have the People as you have your Hauks and Greyhounds, in Leases and Slips, to range the Fields, and beat the Bushes for them; for they are of a nature that is never good at this sport, but when you spring or start their proper quarry. Think not that they will stand to ask you what it is, or less know it than your Hauks and Greyhounds do theirs; but presently make such a flight or course, that a Huntsman may as well undertake to run with his Dogs, or a Falconer to fly with his Hawk, as an Aristocracy at this game to compare with the People. The People of Rome were possessed of no less a prey than the Empire of the World, when the Nobility turned tails, and perched among Daws upon the Tower of Monarchy. For though they did not all of them intent the thing, they would none of them endure the Remedy, which was the Agrarian.  
BUT the Prerogative Tribe has not only the Result, but is the Supreme Judicature, and the ultimat Appeal in this Commonwealth. For the popular Government that makes account to be of any standing, must make sure in the first place of the 
† Ante omnes de provocatione adversus Magistratus ad Populum, sacrandcque cum bonis capite ejus, qui regni occupandi consilia iniisset.  Appeal to the People. As an Estate in trust becomes a man's own, if he be not answerable for it; so the Power of a Magistracy not accountable to the People, from whom it was received, becoming of private use, the Commonwealth loses her Liberty. Wherefore the Right of Supreme Judicature in the People (without which there can be no such thing as popular Government) is confirmed by the constant practice of all Commonwealths; as that of Israel in the cases of ACHAN, and of the Tribe of BENJAMIN, adjudged by the Congregation. The Dicasterion or Court called the Heliaia in Athens, which (the Comitia of that Commonwealth consisting of the whole People, and so being too numerous to be a Judicatory) was constituted sometimes of five hundred, at others of one thousand, or, according to the greatness of the cause, of fifteen hundred, elected by the Lot out of the whole Body of the People, had with the nine ARCHONS that were Precedents, the cognizance of such Causes as were of highest importance in that State. The five Ephors in Lacedaemon, which were popular Magistrates, might question their Kings, as appears by the cases of PAUSANIAS, and of AGIS, who being upon his Trial in this Court, was cried to by his Mother to appeal to the People, as PLUTARCH has it in his Life. The Tribune's of the People of Rome (like, in the nature of their Magistracy, and for some time in number, to the Ephors, as being, according to HALICARNASSEUS and PLUTARCH, instituted in imitation of them) h●d power 
† Diem dicere.  to summon any man, his Magistracy at least being expired (for from the Dictator there lay no Appeal) to answer for himself to the People. As in the case of CORIOLANUS, who was going about to force the People, by withholding Corn from them in a Famine, to relinquish the Magistracy of the Tribune's; in that of SPURIUS CASSIUS for affecting Tyranny; of MARCUS SERGIUS for running away at Veii; of CAIUS LUCRETIUS for spoiling his Province; of JUNIUS SILANUS for making War, without a command from the People, against the Cimbri; with divers others. And the Crimes of this nature were called Lazy Majestatis, or High Treason. Examples of such as were arraigned or tried for Peculat, or Defraudation of the Commonwealth, were MARCUS CURIUS, for intercepting the Money of the Samnites; SALINATOR, for the inequal division of Spoils to his Soldiers; MARCUS POSTHUMIUS, for cheating the Commonwealth by a feigned Shipwreck. Causes of these two kinds were of a more public nature; but the like Power upon Appeals was also exercised by the People in private matters, even during the time of the Kings; as in the case of HORATIUS. Nor is it otherwise with Venice, where the Doge LOREDANO was sentenced by the Great Council; and ANTONIO GRIMANI, afterwards Doge, questioned, for that he being Admiral had suffered the Ture to take Lepanto in view of his Fleet.  
NEVERTHELESS, there lay no Appeal from the Roman Dictator to the People; which if there had, might have cost the Commonwealth dear, when SPURIUS MELIUS affecting Empire, circumvented and debauched the Tribune's: whereupon ●ITUS QUINTIUS CINCINNATUS was created Dictator; who having chosen SERVILIUS AHALA to be his Lieutenant, or Magister Equitum, sent him to apprehend MELIUS, whom, while he disputed the Commands of the Dictator, and implored the aid of the People, AHALA cut off upon the place. By which example you may see in what cases the Dictator may prevent the Blow which is ready somtims to fall ere the People be ware of the Danger. Wherefore there lies no Appeal from the Dieci, or the Council of Ten, in Venice, to the Great Council, nor from our Council of War to the People. For the way of proceeding of this Tribe, or the Ballot, it is, as was once said for all, Venetian.  
THIS Discourse of Judicatories whereupon we are fallen, brings us rather naturally than of design from the two general Orders of every Commonwealth, that is to say, from the debating part or the Senate, and the resolving part or the People, to the third, which is the executive part or the Magistracy, whereupon I shall have no need to dwell: For the executive Magistrates of this Commonwealth are the Strategus in Arms; the Signory in their several Courts, as the Chancery, the Exchequer; as also the Councils in divers cases within their Instructions; the Censors as well in their proper Magistracy, as in the Council of Religion; the Tribune's in the Government of the Prerogative, and that Judicatory; and the Judges with their Courts: Of all which so much is already said or known as may suffice.  
THE Tuesday Lectures or Orations to the People will be of great benefit to the Senate, the Prerogative, and the whole Nation. To the Senate, because they will not only teach your Senator's Elocution, but keep the System of the Government in their memories. Elocution is of great use to your Senators; for if they do not understand Rhetoric (giving it at this time for granted, that the Art were not otherwise good) and come to treat with, or vindicat the cause of the Commonwealth against some other Nation that is good at it, the advantage will be subject to remain upon the merit of the Art, and not upon the merit of the Cause. Furthermore, the Genius or Soul of this Government being in the whole and in every part, they will never be of ability in determination upon any particular, unless at the same time they have an Idea of the whole. That this therefore must be, in that regard, of equal benefit to the Prerogative, is plain; though these have a greater concernment in it. For this Commonwealth is the Estate of the People: and a man, you know, though he be virtuous, yet if he does not understand his Estate, may run out or be cheated of it. Last of all, the Treasures of the Politics will by this means be so opened, rifled, and dispersed, that this Nation will as soon dote, like the Indians, upon glass Beads, as disturb your Government with Whimsys and Freaks of Motherwit; or suffer themselves to be stuttered out of their Liberties. There is not any reason why your Grandees, your wise men of this Age, that laugh out and openly at a Commonwealth as the most ridiculous thing, do not appear to be, as in this regard they are, mere Idiots, but that the People have not eyes.   
THERE remains no more relating to the Senate and the People than  

24. Order. Constitution of the provincial part of the Senate and the People.  THE twenty fourth ORDER, whereby it is lawful for the Province of Marpesia to have 30 Knights of their own election continually present in the Senate of Oceana, together with 60 Deputies of Horse, and 120 of Foot in the Prerogative Tribe, endued with equal Power (respect had to their quality and number) in the Debate and Result of this Commonwealth: provided that they observe the Course or Rotation of the same by the annual Return of 10 Knights, 20 Deputies of the Horse, and 40 of the Foot. The like in all respects is lawful for Panopea; and the Horse of both the Provinces amounting to one Troop, and the Foot to one Company, one Captain and one Cornet of the Horse shall be annually chosen by Marpesia, and one Captain and one Ensign of the Foot shall be annually chosen by Panopea.  
THE Orb of the Prerogative being thus complete, is not unnaturally compared to that of the Moon, either in consideration of the Light borrowed from the Senate, as from the Sun; or of the ebbs and floods of the People, which are marked by the Negative or Affirmative of this Tribe. And the Constitution of the Senate and the People being 
Constitution of the Parliament.  shown, you have that of the Parliament of Oceana, consisting of the Senate proposing, and of the People resolving; which amounts to an Act of Parliament. So the Parliament is the Heart, which, consisting of two Ventricles, the one greater and replenished with a grosser matter, the other less and full of a purer, sucks in, and spouts forth the vital Blood of Oceana by a perpetual Circulation. Wherefore the life of this Government is no more unnatural or obnoxious upon this score to dissolution, than that of a Man; nor to giddiness than the World: seeing the Earth, whether it be itself or the Heavens that are in rotation, is so far from being giddy, that it could not subsist without motion. But why should not this Government be much rather capable of duration and steddiness by motion? than which God has ordained no other to the universal Commonwealth of Mankind: seeing one Generation comes, and another goes, but the Earth remains firm for ever; that is, in her proper Situation or Place, whether she be moved or not moved upon her proper Centre. The Senate, the People, and the Magistracy, or the Parliament so constituted, as you have seen, is the Guardian of this Commonwealth, and the Husband of such a Wife as is elegantly described by SOLOMON. She is like the Merchant's Ship; she brings her 
Prov. 31.  Food from far. She considers a Field, and buys it: With the fruit of her hands she plants a Vineyard. She perceives that her Merchandise is good. She stretches forth her hands to the Poor. She is not afraid of the Snow for her Household; for all her Household are clothed with Scarlet. She makes herself Cover of Tapestry; her Clothing is Silk and Purple, Her Husband is known (by his Robes) in the Gates, when he sits among the Senators of the Land. The Gates, or inferior Courts, were branches as it were of the Sanhedrim or Senat of Israel. Nor is our Commonwealth a worse Housewife, or she has less regard to her Magistrates; as may appear by  

25. Order.  THE twenty fifth ORDER: That, whereas the public Revenue is thro' the late Civil Wars dilapidated, the Excise, being improved or improvable to the Revenue of one Million, be applied for the space of eleven years to come, to the reparation of the same, and for the present maintenance of the Magistrates, Knights, Deputies, and other Officers, who according to their several Dignitys and Functions, shall annually receive towards the Support of the same, as follows.  
THE Lord Strategus Marching, is, upon another account, to have Field Pay as General.  lib. per ann. THE Lord Strategus sitting— 2000 THE Lord Orator— 2000 THE three Commissioners of the Seal— 4500 THE three Commissioners of the Treasury— 4500 THE two Censors— 3000 THE 290 Knights, at 500 l. a man— 145000 THE 4 Ambassadors in Ordinary— 12000 THE Council of War for Intelligence— 3000 THE Master of the Ceremonies— 500 THE Master of the Horse— 500 HIS Substitute— 150 THE 12 Ballotins for their Winter Liveries— 240 FOR their Summer Liveries— 120 FOR their Boardwages— 480 FOR the keeping of three Coaches of State, 24 Coachhorses, with Coachmen and Postilions— 1500 FOR the Grooms, and keeping of 16 great Horses for the Master of the Horse, and for the Ballotins whom he is to govern and instruct in the Art of Riding— 480 THE 20 Secretaries of the Parliament— 2000 THE 20 Doorkeepers, who are to attend with Pole-axes; for their Coats— 200 FOR their Boardwages— 1000 THE 20 Messengers, which are Trumpeters, for their Coats— 200 FOR their Boardwages— 1000 FOR Ornament of the Musters of the Youth— 5000 Sum— 189370  
OUT of the personal Estates of every man, who at his Death bequeathes not above forty shillings to the Muster of that Hundred wherein it lies, shall be levied one per cent. till the solid Revenue of the Muster of the Hundred amounts to 50 l. per annum for the Prizes of the Youth.  
THE twelve Ballotins are to be divided into three Regions, according to the course of the Senate; the four of the first Region to be elected at the Tropic out of such Children as the Knights of the same shall offer, not being under eleven years of Age, nor above thirteen. And their Election shall be made by the Lot at an Urn set by the Sergeant of the House for that purpose in the Hall of the Pantheon. The Livery of the Commonwealth for the fashion or the colour may be changed at the Election of the Strategus according to his fancy. But every Knight during his Session shall be bound to give to his Footman, or some one of his Footmen, the Livery of the Commonwealth.  

THE Prerogative Tribe shall receive as follows.   lib. by the week. THE 2 Tribune's of the Horse— 14 THE 2 Tribune's of the Foot— 12 THE 3 Captains of Horse— 15 THE 3 Cornets— 9  THE 3 Captains of Foot— 12  THE 3 Ensigns— 7  THE 442 Horse, at 2 l. a man— 884  THE 592 Foot, at 1 l. 10 s. a man— 888  THE 6 Trumpeters— 7 10 s. THE 3 Drummers— 2 5 s. SUM by the Week— 1850 15 s. SUM by the Year 96239  THE Total of the Senate, the People, and the Magistracy, 287459 15 s.  
THE Dignity of the Commonwealth, and Aids of the several Magistracies and Offices thereto belonging, being provided for as aforesaid, the Overplus of the Excise, with the Product of the Sum rising, shall be carefully managed by the Senate and the People thro' the diligence of the Officers of the Exchequer, till it amounts to eight Millions, or to the purchase of about four hundred thousand Pounds solid Revenue. At which time, the term of eleven years being expired, the Excise, except it be otherwise ordered by the Senate and the People, shall be totally remitted and abolished for ever.  
AT this Institution the Taxes, as will better appear in the Corollary, were abated about one half, which made the Order when it came to be tasted, to be of good relish with the People in the very beginning; though the Advantages than were no ways comparable to the Consequences to be hereafter shown. Nevertheless, my Lord EPIMONUS, who with much ado had been held till now, found it midsummer Moon, and broke out of Bedlam in this manner.  

My Lord ARCHON,  
I HAVE a singing in my head like that of a Cartwheel, my Brains are upon a Rotation; and some are so merry, that a man cannot speak his griefs, but if your highshod Prerogative, and those same slouching Fellows your Tribune's, do not take my Lord Strategus', and my Lord Orator's heads, and jowl them together under the Canopy, then let me be ridiculous to all Posterity. For here is a Commonwealth, to which if a man should take that of the Prentices in their ancient Administration of Justice at Shrovetide, it were an Aristocracy. You have set the very Rabble with Troncheons in their hands, and the Gentry of this Nation like Cocks with Scarlet Gills, and the Golden Combs of their Salaries to boot, lest they should not be thrown at.  
NOT a Night can I sleep for some horrid Apparition or other; one while these Myrmidons are measuring Silks by their Quarter-staves; another, stuffing their greasy Pouches with my Lord High Treasurer's Jacobusses. For they are above a thousand in Arms to three hundred, which, their Gowns being pulled over their ears, are but in their Doublets and Hose. But what do I speak of a thousand? there be two thousand in every Tribe, that is, a hundred thousand in the whole Nation, not only in the posture of an Army, but in a civil Capacity sufficient to give us what Laws they please. Now every body knows, that the lower sort of People regard nothing but Money; and you say it is the Duty of a Legislator to presume all men to be wicked: wherefore they must fall upon the richer, as they are an Army; or, lest their minds should misgive them in such a villainy, you have given them encouragement that they have a nearer way, seeing it may be done every whit as well as by the overbalancing Power which they have in Elections. There is a Fair which is annually kept in the Centre of these Territories at Kiberton, a Town famous for Ale, and frequented by good Fellows; where there is a Solemnity of the Pipers and Fiddlers of this Nation (I know not whether Lacedaemon, where the Senate kept account of the stops of the Flutes and of the Fiddlestrings of that Commonwealth, had any such Custom) called the Bulrunning; and he that catches and holds the Bull, is the annual and supreme Magistrate of that Comitia or Congregation, called King Piper; without whose Licence it is not lawful for any of those Citizens to enjoy the liberty of his Calling; nor is he otherwise legitimatly qualified (or civitate donatus) to lead Apes or Bears in any Perambulation of the same. Mine Host of the Bear, in Kiberton, the Father of Ale, and Patron of good Football and Cudgelplayers, has any time since I can remember, been Grand Chancellor of this Order. Now, say I, seeing great things arise from small beginnings, what should hinder the People, prone to their own Advantage, and loving Money, from having Intelligence conveyed to them by this same King Piper and his Chancellor, with their Loyal Subjects the Minstrels and Bearwards, Masters of Ceremonies, to which there is great recourse in their respective Perambulations, and which they will commission and instruct, with Directions to all the Tribes, willing and commanding them, that as they wish their own good, they choose no other into the next primum Mobile, but of the ablest Cudgel and Footbalplayers? Which done as soon as said, your primum Mobile consisting of no other stuff, must of necessity be drawn forth into your Nebulones, and your Galimofries; and so the silken Purses of your Senate and Prerogative being made of Sow's ears, most of them Blacksmiths, they will strike while the Iron is hot, and beat your Estates into Hobnails; mine Host of the Bear being Strategus, and King Piper Lord Orator. Well, my Lords, it might have been otherwise expressed, but this is well enough a conscience. In your way, the Wit of man shall not prevent this or the like Inconvenience; but if this (for I have conferred with Artists) be a mathematical Demonstration, I could kneel to you, that e'er it be too late we might return to some kind of Sobriety.  
IF we emty our Purses with these Pomp's, Salaries, Coaches, Lacquys, and Pages, what can the People say less, than that we have dressed a Senate and a Prerogative for nothing, but to go to the Park with the Ladies?   
MY Lord ARCHON, whose meekness resembled that of MOSES, vouchsafed this Answer.  

My Lords;  
FOR all this, I can see my Lord EPIMONUS every night in the Park, and with Ladies; nor do I blame this in a young Man, or the Respect which is and aught to be given to a Sex that is one half of the Commonwealth of Mankind, and without which the other would be none: But our Magistrates, I doubt, may be somewhat of the oldest to perform this part with much acceptation; and, as the Italian Proverb says, 
* To love and not enjoy, is the way to break one's heart.  Servire & non gradire è cosa da far morire. Wherefore we will lay no certain Obligation upon them in this Point, but leave them, if it please you, to their own fate or discretion. But this (for I know my Lord EPIMONUS loves me, though I can never get his esteem) I will say, if he had a Mistress should use him so, he would find it a sad Life; or I appeal to your Lordships, how I can resent it from such a Friend, that he puts King Piper's Politics in the Balance with mine. King Piper, I deny not, may teach his Bears to dance, but they have the worst ear of all Creatures. Now how he should make them keep time in fifty several Tribes, and that two years together, for else it will be to no purpose, may be a small matter with my Lord to promise; but it seems to me of impossible performance. First, Thro' the nature of the Bean; and, Secondly, thro' that of the Ballot; or how what he has hitherto thought so hard, is now come to be easy: but he may think, that for expedition they will eat up these Balls like Apples. However, there is so much more in their way by the Constitution of this, than is to be found in that of any other Commonwealth, that I am reconciled; it now appearing plainly, that the Points of my Lord's Arrows are directed at no other White, than to show the excellency of our Government above others; which, as he proceeds further, is yet plainer; while he makes it appear, that there can be no other elected by the People but Smiths, 
Brontesque Steropesque & nudus membra Pyracmon:  OTHONIEL, AOD, GIDEON, JEPHTHA, SAMSON, as in Israel: MILTIADES, ARISTIDES, THEMISTOCLES, CIMON, PERICLES', as in Athens: PAPYRIUS, CINCINNATUS, CAMILLUS, FABIUS, SCIPIO, as in Rome: Smiths of the fortune of the Commonwealth; not such as forged Hobnails, but Thunderbolts. Popular Elections are of that kind, that all the rest of the World is not able, either in number or glory, to equal those of these three Commonwealths. These indeed were the ablest Cudgel and Football-players; bright Arms were their Cudgels, and the World was the Ball that lay at their feet. Wherefore we are not so to understand the Maxim of Legislators, which holds all men to be wicked, as if it related to Mankind or a Commonwealth, the Interests whereof are the only straight lines they have whereby to reform the crooked; but as it relates to every Man or Party, under what colour soever he or they pretend to be trusted apart, with or by the whole. Hence than it is derived, which is made good in all experience, that the Aristocracy is ravenous, and not the People. Your Highwaymen are not such as have Trades, or have been brought up to Industry; but such commonly whose Education has pretended to that of Gentlemen. My Lord is so honest, he does not know the Maxims that are of absolute necessity to the Arts of Wickedness; for it is most certain, if there be not more Purses than Thiefs, that the Thiefs themselves must be forced to turn honest, because they cannot thrive by their Trade: But now if the People should turn Thiefs, who sees not that there would be more Thiefs than Purses? Wherefore that a whole People should turn Robbers or Levellers, is as impossible in the end as in the means. But that I do not think your Artist which you mentioned, whether Astronomer or Arithmetician, can tell me how many Barlycorns would reach to the Sun; I could be content he were called to the account, with which I shall conclude this Point: when by the way I have chid my Lords the Legislators, who, as if they doubted my Tackling could not hold, would leave me to flag in a perpetual Calm, but for my Lord EPIMONUS, who breathes now and then into my Sails, and stirs the Waters. A Ship makes not her way so briskly, as when she is handsomely brushed by the Waves, and tumbles over those that seem to tumble against her; in which case I have perceived in the dark, that Light has been struck even out of the Sea, as in this place, where my Lord EPIMONUS feigning to give us a demonstration of one thing, has given it of another, and of a better. For the People of this Nation, if they amount in each Tribe to two thousand Elders, and two thousand Youths, upon the annual Roll, holding a fifth to the whole Tribe; then the whole of a Tribe, not accounting Women and Children, must amount to twenty thousand; and so the whole of all the Tribes, being fifty, to one Million. Now you have ten thousand Parishes, and reckoning these one with another, each at one thousand pounds a Year dry Rent, the Rent or Revenue of the Nation, as it is or might be let to Farm, amounts to ten Millions; and ten Millions in Revenue divided equally to one Million of men, comes but to ten pounds a year to each wherewith to maintain himself, his Wife and Children. But he that has a Cow upon the Common, and earns his Shilling by the day at his labour, has twice as much already as this would come to for his share; because if the Land were thus divided, there would be no body to set him on work. So my Lord EPIMONUS' Footman, who costs him thrice as much as one of these could thus get, would certainly lose by this bargain. What should we speak of those innumerable Trades whereupon men live, not only better than others upon good shares of Lands, but become also purchasers of greater Estates? Is not this the demonstration which my Lord meant, that the Revenue of Industry in a Nation, at least in this, is three or fourfold greater than that of the mere Rent? If the People then obstruct Industry, they obstruct their own livelihood; but if they make a War, they obstruct Industry. Take the Bread out of the People's mouths, as did the Roman Patricians, and you are sure enough of a War, in which case they may be Levellers; but our Agrarian causes their Industry to slow with Milk and honey. It will be owned, that this is true, if the People were given 
* O fortunati nimium, bona si sua nôrint, Agricolae!  to understand their own happiness; But where is it they do that? Let me reply with the like question, Where do they not? They do not know their happiness it should seem in France, Spain, and Italy: but reach them what it is, and try whose Sense is the truer. As to the late Wars in Germany, it has been affirmed to me there, that the Princes could never make the People to take Arms while they had Bread, and have therefore suffered Countries now and then to be wasted, that they might get Soldiers. This you will find to be the certain pulse and temper of the People; and if they have been already proved to be the most wise and constant Order of a Government, why should we think (when no man can produce one Example of the common Soldiery in an Army mutinying because they had not Captains pay) that the Prerogative should jowl the heads of the Senate together, because these have the better Salaries; when it must be as evident to the People in a Nation, as to the Soldiery in an Army, that it is no more possible their Emoluments of this kind should be afforded by any Commonwealth in the World to be made equal with those of the Senate, than that the common Soldiers should be equal with the Captains? It is enough for the common Soldier, that his Virtue may bring him to be a Captain, and more to the Prerogative, that each of them is nearer to be a Senator.  
IF my Lord thinks our Salaries too great, and that the Commonwealth is not Housewife enough; whether is it better Houswisery that she should keep her Family from the Snow, or suffer them to burn her House that they may warm themselves? for one of these must be. Do you think that she came off at a cheaper rate, when men had their Rewards by a thousand, two thousand pounds a Year in Land of Inheritance? If you say, that they will be more godly than they have been, it may be ill taken; and if you cannot promise that, it is time we find out some way of stinting at least, if not curing them of that same sacra Fames. On the other side, if a poor man (as such a one may save a City) gives his sweat to the Public, with what conscience can you suffer his Family in the mean time to starve? But he that lays his hand to this Blow, shall not lose by taking it off from his own: and a Commonwealth that will mend this, shall be penny wise. The Sanhedrim of Israel being the Supreme, and a constant Court of Judicature, could not choose but be exceeding gainful. The Senate of the Bean in Athens, because it was but annual, was moderately salariated; but that of the Areopagits being for Life, bountifully: and what advantages the Senators of Lacedaemon had, where there was little Money or use of it, were in Honours for life. The Patricians having no profit, took all. Venice being a Situation, where a man goes but to the door for his Employment, the Honour is great, and the Reward very little: but in Holland a Counsillor of State has fifteen hundred Flemish Pounds a Year, besides other Accommodations. The State's General have more. And that Commonwealth looks nearer her Penny than ours needs to do.  
FOR the Revenue of this Nation, besides that of her Industry, it amounts, as has been shown, to ten Millions; and the Salaries in the whole come not to three hundred thousand Pounds a Year. The Beauty they will add to the Commonwealth will be exceeding great, and the People will delight in this Beauty of their Commonwealth; the Encouragement they will give to the study of the Public being very profitable, the Accommodation they will afford to your Magistrates very honourable and easy. And the Sum, when it or twice as much was spent in Hunting and Housekeeping, was never any grievance to the People. I am ashamed to stand huckling upon this Point; it is sordid. Your Magistrates are rather to be provided with further Accommodations. For what if there should be Sickness? whither will you have them to remove? And this City in the soundest Times, for the heat of the Year, is no wholesome abode: have a care of their Healths to whom you commit your own. I would have the Senate and the People, except they see cause to the contrary, every first of June to remove into the Country Air for the space of three months. You are better fitted with Summer-houses for them, than if you had built them to that purpose. There is some twelve miles distant the Convallium upon the River Halci●nia, for the Tribune's and the Prerogative, a Palace capable of a thousand Men: and twenty miles distant you have Mount Cel●●, reverend as well for the Antiquity as State of a Castle completely capable of the Senate: the Proposers having Lodgings in the Convallium, and the Tribune's in Celia, it holds the Correspondency between the Senate and the People exactly. And it is a small matter for the Proposers, being attended with the Coaches and Officers of State, besides other Conveniences of their own, to go a matter of five or ten miles (those Seats are not much further distant) to meet the People upon any Heath or Field that shall be appointed: where, having dispatched their business, they may hunt their own Venison (for I would have the great walled Park upon the H●lcionia to belong to the Signory, and those about the Convallium 〈◊〉 the Tribune's) and so go to supper. Pray, my Lords, see that they do not pull down these Houses to sell the Lead of them; for when you have considered on't, they cannot be spared. The Founders of the School in Hiera provided that the Boys should have a Summer Seat. You should have as much care of these Magistrates. But there is such a selling, such a Jewish humour in our Republicans, that I cannot tell what to say to it; only this, any man that knows what belongs to a Commonwealth, or how diligent every Nation in that case has been to preserve her Ornaments, and shall see the waist lately made (the Woods adjoining to this City, which served for the delight and health of it, being cut down to be sold for three pence) will tell you, that they who did such things would never have made a Commonwealth. The like may be said of the Ruin or Damage done upon our Cathedrals, Ornaments in which this Nation excels all others. Nor shall this ever be excused upon the score of Religion; for though it be true, that God dwells not in Houses made with hands, yet you cannot hold your Assemblies but in such Houses, and these are of the best that have been made with hands. Nor is it well argued that they are pompous, and therefore profane, or less proper for Divine Service; seeing the Christians in the Primitive Church chose to meet with one accord in the Temple; so far were they from any inclination to pull it down.   
THE Orders of this Commonwealth, so far, or near so far as they concern the Elders, together with the several Speeches at the Institution, which may serve for the better understanding of them as so many Commentaries, being shown; I should now come from the Elders to the Youth, or from the Civil Constitution of this Government to the Military, but that I judge this the fittest place wherinto, by the way, to insert the Government of the City, though for the present but perfunctorily.  

The Government of Emporium.  THE Metropolis or Capital City of Oceana is commonly called Emporium, though it consists of two Cities distinct, as well in Name as in Government, whereof the other is called Hiera: For which cause I shall treat of each apart, beginning with Emporium.  

The City-Tribes and Wards.  EMPORIUM with the Libertys is under a twofold Division, the one regarding the National, and the other the urban or City Government. It is divided, in regard of the National Government, into three Tribes, and in respect of the urban into twenty six, which for distinction sake are called Wards, being contained under the three Tribes but inequally: Wherefore the first Tribe containing ten Wards is called Scazon, the second containing eight Metoche, and the third containing as many, Telicouta; the bearing of which names in mind concerns the better understanding of the Government.  

Wardmote.  EVERY Ward has her Wardmote, Court, or Inquest, consisting of all that are of the Clothing or Liveries of Companies residing within the same.  

The Liveries.  SUCH are of the Livery or Clothing as have attained to the dignity to wear Gowns and particolored Hoods or Tippets, according to the Rules and ancient Customs of their respective Companies.  

The Companies.  A COMPANY is a Brotherhood of Tradesmen professing the same Art, governed according to their Charter by a Master and Wardens. Of these there be about sixty, whereof twelve are of greater dignity than the rest, that is to say, the Mercers, Grocers, Drapers, Fishmongers, Goldsmiths, Skinners, Merchant-Taylors, Haberdashers, Salters, Ironmongers, Vintners, Clothworkers; which, with most of the rest, have common 
CommonHalls.  Halls, divers of them being of ancient and magnificent Structure, wherein they have frequent meetings at the Summons of their Masters or Wardens, for the managing and regulation of their respective Trades and Mysteries. These Companies, as I shall show, are the Roots of the whole Government of the City. For the Liveries that reside in the same Ward, meeting at the Wardmote Inquest (to which it belongs to take cognizance of all sorts of Nuisances, and violations of the Customs and Orders of the City, and to present them to the Court of Aldermen) have also power to make election of two sorts of Magistrates or Officers; the first of Elders or Aldermen of the Ward, the second of Deputies of the same, otherwise called Common Council men.  

Election of Aldermen, and of the Common Council men.  THE Wards in these Elections, because they do not elect all at once, but some one year, and some another, observe the distinction of the three Tribes; for example, the Scazon consisting of ten Wards, makes election the first Year of ten Alderman's▪ one in each Ward, and of one hundred and fifty Deputies, fifteen in each Ward▪ all which are Triennial Magistrates or Officers, that is to say, are to bear their dignity for the space of three Years.  
THE second Year, the Metoche, consisting of eight Wards, elects eight Aldermen, one in each Ward, and a hundred and twenty Deputies, fifteen in each Ward; being also Triennial Magistrates.  
THE third Year Telicouta, consisting of a like number of Wards, elects an equal number of like Magistrates for a like term. So that the whole number of the Aldermen, according to that of the Wards, amounts to twenty six; and the whole number of the Deputies, to three hundred and ninety.  

The Court of Aldermen.  THE Aldermen thus elected have divers Capacitys: for, first, they are Justices of the Peace for the term, and in consequence of their Election. Secondly, They are Precedents of the Wardmote, and Governors each of that Ward whereby he was elected. And last of all, these Magistrates being assembled together, constitute the Senate of the City, otherwise called the Court of Aldermen: but no man is capable of this Election that is not worth ten thousand Pounds. This Court upon every new Election, makes choice of nine Censors out of their own number.  

The Common Council.  THE Deputies in like manner being assembled together, constitute the Prerogative Tribe of the City, otherwise called the Common Council: by which means the Senate and the People of the City were comprehended, as it were, by the motion of the National Government, into the same Wheel of annual, triennial, and perpetual Revolution.  

The Common Hall.  BUT the Liveries, over and above the right of these Elections by their Divisions mentioned, being assembled all together at the Guild of the City, constitute another Assembly called the Common Hall.  

The Election of the Lord Mayor and Sheriffs.  THE Common Hall has the right of two other Elections; the one of the Lord Mayor, and the other of the two Sheriffs, being annual Magistrates. The Lord Mayor can be elected out of no other than one of the twelve Companies of the first Ranks; and the Common Hall agrees by the plurality of Suffrages upon two Names: which being presented to the Lord Mayor for the time being, and the Court of Aldermen, they elect one by their Scrutiny; for so they call it, though it differs from that of the Commonwealth. The Orator or Assistant to the Lord Mayor in holding of his Courts, is some able Lawyer elected by the Court of Aldermen, and called the Recorder of Emporium.  
THE Lord Mayor being thus elected, has two Capacitys; one regarding the Nation, and the other the City. In that which regards the City, he is Precedent of the Court of Aldermen, having power to assemble the same, or any other Council of the City, as the Common Council or Common Hall, at his will and pleasure: and in that which regards the Nation, he is Commander in Chief of the three Tribes wherinto the City is divided; one of which he is to bring up in Person at the National Muster to the Ballot, as his Vicecomites, or High Sheriffs, are to do by the other two, each at their distinct Pavilion, where the nine Aldermen, elected Censors, are to officiat by three in each Tribe, according to the Rules and Orders already given to the Censors of the rustic Tribes. And the Tribes of the City have no other than one common Phylarch, which is the Court of Aldermen and the Common Council; for which cause they elect not at their Muster the first List called the Prime Magnitude.  

Some Conveniences in this Alteration.  THE Conveniences of this Alteration of the City Government, besides the bent of it to a conformity with that of the Nation, were many, whereof I shall mention but a few: As first, whereas men under the former administration, when the burden of some of these Magistracies lay for life, were oftentimes chosen not for their fitness, but rather unfitness, or at least unwillingness to undergo such a weight, whereby they were put at great Rates to fine for their ease; a man might now take his share in Magistracy with that equity which is due to the Public, and without any inconvenience to his private Affairs. Secondly, Whereas the City (inasmuch as the Acts of the Aristocracy, or Court of Aldermen, in their former way of proceeding, were rather Impositions than Propositions) was frequently disquieted with the inevitable consequence of disorder in the power of Debate exercised by the popular Part, or Common Council; the right of Debate being henceforth established in the Court of Aldermen, and that of Result in the Common Council, killed the branches of Division in the Root. Which for the present may suffice to have been said of the City of Emporium.  

The Government of Hiera.  THAT of HIERA consists as to the National Government of two Tribes, the first called Agoraea, the second Propola: But as to the peculiar Policy, of twelve Manipuls', or Wards divided into three Cohorts, each Cohort containing four Wards; whereof the Wards of the first Cohort elect for the first Year four Burgesses, one in each Ward; the Wards of the second Cohort for the second year four Burgesses, one in each Ward; and the Wards of the third Cohort for the third Year four Burgesses, one in each Ward; all triennial Magistrates: by which the twelve Burgesses, making one Court for 
The Court.  the Government of this City, according to their Instructions by Act of Parliament, fall likewise into an Annual, Triennial, and perpetual Revolution.  

The High Steward.  THIS Court being thus constituted, makes election of divers Magistrates; As first of a High Steward, who is commonly some Person of Quality, and this Magistracy is elected in the Senate by the Scrutiny of this Court; with him they choose some able Lawyer to be his Deputy, and to hold the Court; and last of all they elect out of their own Number six Censors.  
THE High Steward is Commander in Chief of the two Tribes, whereof he in Person brings up the one at the National Muster to the Ballot, and his Deputy the other at a distinct Pavilion; the six Censors chosen by the Court, officiating by three in each Tribe at the Urns: and these Tribes have no other Phylarch but this Court.  
AS for the manner of Elections and Suffrage, both in Emporium and Hiera, it may be said once for all, that they are performed by the Ballot, and according to the respective Rules already given.  
THERE be other Cities and Corporations throout the Territory, whose Policy being much of this kind, would be tedious and not worth the labour to insert, nor dare I stay. Juvenum manus emicat arden's.  
I RETURN, according to the method of the Commonwealth, to the remaining part of her Orbs, which are Military and Provincial; the Military, except the Strategus, and the Polemarches or Field Officers, consisting of the Youth only, and the Provincial consisting of a mixture both of the Elders and of the Youth.  
TO begin with the Youth, or the military Orbs, they are Circles to which the Commonwealth must have a care to keep close. A Man is a Spirit raised by the Magic of Nature; if she does not stand safe, and so that she may set him to some good and useful work, he spits fire, and blows up Castles: for where there is life, there must be motion or work; and the work of idleness is mischief, but the work of industry is health. To set Men to this, the Commonwealth must begin betimes with them, or it will be too late: and the means whereby she sets them to it, is EDUCATION, the plastic art of Government. But it is as frequent as sad in experience (whether thro' negligence, or, which in the consequence is all one or worse, oversondness in the domestic performance of this Duty) that innumerable Children come to owe their utter Perdition to their own Parents; in each of which the Commonwealth loses a Citizen. Wherefore the Laws of a Government, how wholesome soever in themselves, are such as, if Men by a congruity in their Education be not bred to find a relish in them, they will be sure to loathe and detest. The Education therefore of a Man's own Children is not wholly to be committed or trusted to himself. You find in 
* Assueti more regio vivere— inter se conquerebantur— Regem homin●m esse à quo impetres ubi jus, ubi injuria opus sit; esse gratiae locum, esse benesicio; & irasci & ignoscere posse; inter amicum & inimicum discrimen nosse. Leges rem surdam, inexorabil●m esse; salubriorem, melioremque inopi quam potenti; nihil laxamenti nec veniae habere, si medum excesseris; periculosum esse in tot humanis erroribus sola innocentia vivere. Liv. l. 2.  LIVY the Children of BRUTUS having been bred under Monarchy, and used to a Court life, making faces at the Commonwealth of Rome: A King (say they) is a Man with whom you may prevail when you have need there should be Law, or when you have need there should be no Law; he has Favours in the right, and he frowns not in the wrong place; he knows his Friends from his Enemy's. But Laws are deaf inexorable things, such as make no difference between a Gentleman and an ordinary fellow; a Man can never be merry for them, for to trust altogether to his own innocence is a sad life. Unhappy wantoness! SCIPIO on the other side, when he was but a Boy (about two or three and twenty) being informed that certain Patricians or Roman Gentlemen, thro' a qualm upon the defeat which HANNIBAL had given them at Cannae, were laying their heads together and contriving their Flight with the transportation of their Goods out of Rome, drawn his Sword, and setting himself at the door of the Chamber where they were at Council, protested, That who did not immediately swear not to desert the Commonwealth, he would make his Soul to desert his Body. Let Men argue as they please for Monarchy, or against a Commonwealth, the world shall never see any Man so sottish or wicked as in cool blood to prefer the Education of the Sons of BRUTUS before that of SCIPIO; and of this mould, except a MELIUS or a MANLIUS, was the whole youth of that Commonwealth, though not ordinarily so well cast. Now the health of a Government, and the education of the Youth being of the same pulse, no wonder if it has been the constant practice of well ordered Commonwealths to commit the care and feeling of it to public Magistrates. A duty that was performed in such a manner by the Areopagits, as is elegantly praised by ISOCRATES. The Athenians, says he, writ not their Laws upon dead Walls, nor content themselves with having ordained Punishments for Crimes, but provide in such a way by the Education of their Youth, that there be no Crimes for Punishment. He speaks of those Laws which regarded Manners, not of those Orders which concerned the Administration of the Commonwealth, lest you should think he contradicts XENOPHON and POLYBIUS. The Children of Lacedaemon, at the seventh year of their age, were delivered to the Paedonomis, or Schoolmasters, not mercenary, but Magistrates of the Commonwealth, to which they were accountable for their charge: and by these at the age of fourteen they were presented to other Magistrates called the Beidiaei, having the inspection of the Games and Exercises, among which that of the Platanis●a was famous, a kind of Fight in Squadrons, but somewhat too sierce. When they came to be of military age, they were listed of the Mora, and so continued in readiness for public Service under the Discipline of the Polemarches. But the Roman Education and Discipline by the Centurys and Classes is that to which the Commonwealth of Oceana has had a more particular regard in her three Essays, being certain degrees by which the Youth commence as it were in Arms for Magistracy, as appears by  

26. Order.  THE twenty sixth ORDER, instituting, That if a Parent has but one Son, the Education of that one Son shall be wholly at the disposition of that Parent. But whereas there be Free Schools erected and endowed, or to be erected and endowed in every Tribe of this Nation, to a sufficient proportion for the Education of the Children of the same (which Schools, to the end there be no detriment or hindrance to the Scholars upon case of removing from one to another, are every of them to be governed by the strict inspection of the Censors of the Tribes, both upon the Schoolmasters manner of Life and Teaching, and the proficiency of the Children, after the rules and method of that in Hiera) if a Parent has more Sons than one, the Censors of the Tribes shall animadvert upon and punish him that sends not his Sons within the ninth year of their age to some one of the Schools of a Tribe, there to be kept and taught if he be able at his own charges; and if he be not able, gratis, till they arrive at the age of fifteen years. And a Parent may dispose of his Sons at the fifteenth year of their age according to his choice or ability, whether it be to Service in the way of Apprentices to some Trade or otherwise, or to further study, as by sending them to the Ins of Court, of Chancery, or to one of the Vniversitys of this Nation. But he that takes not upon him one of the Professions proper to some of those places, shall not continue longer in any of them than till he has attained to the age of eighteen years; and every Man having not at the age of eighteen years taken upon him, or addicted himself to the profession of the Law, Theology, or Physic, and being no Servant, shall be capable of the Essays of the Youth, and no other person whatsoever: except a Man, having taken upon him such a profession, happens to lay it by, ere he arrives at three or four and twenty years of age, and be admitted to this Capacity by the respective Phylarch, being satisfied that he kept not out so long with any design to evade the Service of the Commonwealth; but, that being no sooner at his own disposal, it was no sooner in his choice to come in. And if any Youth or other Person of this Nation have a desire to travel into foreign Countries upon occasion of business, delight, or further improvement of his Education; the same shall be lawful for him upon a Pass obtained from the Censors in Parliament, putting a convenient limit to the time, and recommending him to the Ambassadors by whom he shall be assisted, and to whom he shall yield Honour and Obedience in their respective Residences. Every Youth at his return from his Travel is to present the Censors with a Paper of his own writing, containing the Interest of State or Form of Government of the Countries, or some one of the Countries where he has been; and if it be good, the Censors shall cause it to be printed and published, prefixing a Line in commendation of the Author.  
EVERY Wednesday next ensuing the last of December, the whole Youth of every Parish, that is to say every Man (not excepted by the foregoing part of the Order) being from eighteen years of age to thirty, shall repair at the sound of the Bell to their respective Church, and being there assembled in presence of the Overseers, who are to govern the Ballot, and the Constable who is to officiat at the Urn, shall, after the manner of the Elders, elect every fifth Man of their whole number (provided that they choose not above one of two Brothers at one Election, nor above half if they be four or upward) to be a Stratiot or Deputy of the Youth; and the List of the Stratiots so elected being taken by the Overseers, shall be entered in the Parish Book, and diligently preserved as a Record, called the first Essay, They whose Estates by the Law are able, or whose Friends are willing to mount them, shall be of the Horse, the rest are of the Foot. And he who has been one year of this List, is not capable of being reelected till after another year's interval.  
EVERY Wednesday next ensuing the last of January, the Stratiots being mustered at the Rendezvouz of their respective Hundred, shall in the presence of the Jurymen, who are Overseers of that Ballot, and of the High Constable who is to officiat at the Urn, elect out of the Horse of their Troop or Company one Captain, and one Ensign or Cornet, to the command of the same. And the Jurymen having entered the List of the Hundred into a Record to be diligently kept at the Rendezvouz of the same; the first public Game of this Commonwealth shall begin and be performed in this manner. Whereas there is to be at every Rendezvouz of a Hundred one Cannon, Culverin, or Saker; the prize Arms being forged by sworn Armourers of this Commonwealth, and for their proof, besides their Beauty, viewed and tried at the Tower of Emporium, shall be exposed by the Justice of Peace appertaining to that Hundred (the said Justice with the Jurymen being Judges of the Game) and the Judges shall deliver to the Horsman that gains the Prize at the Career, one suit of Arms being of the value of twenty Pounds; to the Pikeman that gains the Prize at throwing the Bullet, one suit of Arms of the value of ten Pounds; to the Musketeer that gains the Prize at the Mark with his Musket, one suit of Arms of the value of ten Pounds; and to the Cannoneer that gains the Prize at the mark with the Cannon, Culverin, or Saker, a Chain of Silver being of the value of ten Pounds; provided, that no one man at the same Muster plays above one of the Prizes. Whosoever gains a Prize is bound to wear it (if it be his lot) upon Service; and no man shall sell or give away any Armour thus won, except he has lawfully attained to two or more of them at the Games.  
THE Games being ended, and the Muster dismissed, the Captain of the Troop or Company shall repair with a Copy of the List to the Lord Lieutenant of the Tribe, and the High Constable with a Duplicat of the same to the Custos Rotulorum, or Mustermaster General, to be also communicated to the Censors; in each of which the Jurymen giving a note upon every name of an only Son, shall certify that the List is without subterfuge or evasion: or, if it be not, an account of those upon whom the Evasion or Subterfuge lies, to the end that the Phylarch or the Censors may animadvert accordingly.  
AND every Wednesday next ensuing the last of February, the Lord Lieutenant, Custos Rotulorum, the Censors, and the Conductor, shall receive the whole Muster of the Youth of that Tribe at the Rendezvouz of the same, distributing the Horse and Foot with their Officers, according to the Directions given in the like case for the distribution of the Elders; and the whole Squadron being put by that means in Battalia, the second Game of this Commonwealth shall begin by the exercise of the Youth in all the parts of their military Discipline according to the Orders of Parliament, or direction of the Council of War in that case. And the hundred Pounds allowed by the Parliament for the Ornament of the Muster in every Tribe, shall be expended by the Phylarch upon such artificial Castles, Citadels, or the like Devices, as may make the best and most profitable sport for the Youth and their Spectators. Which being ended, the Censors having prepared the Urns by putting into the Horse Urn 220 Gold Balls, whereof ten are to be marked with the letter M, and other ten with the letter P; into the Foot Urn 700 Gold Balls, whereof 50 are to be marked with the letter M, and 50 with the letter P: and after they have made the Gold Balls in each Urn, by the addition of Silver Balls to the same, in number equal with the Horse and Foot of the Stratiots, the Lord Lieutenant shall call the Stratiots to the Urns, where they that draw the Silver Balls shall return to their places, and they that draw the Gold Balls shall fall off to the Pavilion, where, for the space of one hour, they may chop and change their Balls according as one can agree with another, whose Lot he likes better. But the hour being out, the Conductor separating them whose Gold Balls have no letter, from those whose Balls are marked, shall cause the Crier to call the Alphabet, as first A; whereupon all they whose Gold Balls are not marked, and whose surnames begin with the letter A, shall repair to a Clerc appertaining to the Custos Rotulorum, who shall first take the names of that letter; then those of B, and so on, till all the names be alphabetically enrolled. And the Youth of this List being six hundred Foot in a Tribe, that is, 30000 Foot in all the Tribes; and two hundred Horse in a Tribe, that is, 10000 Horse in all the Tribes, are the second Essay of the Stratiots, and the standing Army of this Commonwealth to be always ready upon command to march. They whose Balls are marked with M, amounting, by 20 Horse and 50 Foot in a Tribe, to 2500 Foot, and 500 Horse in all the Tribes; and they whose Balls are marked with P, in every point correspondent, are parts of the third Essay: they of M being strait to march for Marpesia, and they of P for Panopea, to the ends, and according to the further directions following in the Order for the provincial Orbs.  
IF the Polemarches or Field Officers be elected by the scrutiny of the Council of War, and the Strategus commanded by the Parliament or the Dictator to march, the Lords Lieutenants (who have power to muster and discipline the Youth so often as they receive Orders for the same from the Council of War) are to deliver the second Essay, or so many of them as shall be commanded, to the Conductors, who shall present them to the Lord Strategus at the time and place appointed by his Excellency to be the general Rendevou of Oceana, where the Council of War shall have the accommodation of Horses and Arms for his men in readiness: and the Lord Strategus having armed, mounted, and distributed them, whether according to the recommendation of their Prize Arms, or otherwise, shall lead them away to his Shipping, being also ready and provided with Victuals, Ammunition, Artillery, and all other necessaries; commanding them, and disposing of the whole Conduct of the War by his sole Power and Authority. And this is the third Essay of the Stratiots, which being shipped, or marched out of their Tribes, the Lord Lieutenants shall reelect the second Essay out of the remaining part of the first; and the Senate another Strategus.  
IF any Veteran or Veterans of this Nation, the term of whose Youth or Militia is expired, having a desire to be entertained in the further service of the Commonwealth, shall present him or themselves at the Rendevou of Oceana to the Strategus, it is in his power to take on such and so many of them as shall be agreed by the Polemarches, and to send back an equal number of the Stratiots.  
AND for the better managing of the proper Forces of this Nation, the Lord Strategus, by appointment of the Council of War, and out of such Levys as they shall have made in either or both of the Provinces to that end, shall receive auxiliaries by Sea or elsewhere at some certain place, not exceeding his proper Arms in number.  
AND whosoever shall refuse any one of his three Essays, except upon cause shown he be dispensed withal by the Phylarch; or, if the Phylarch be not assembled, by the Censors of his Tribe, shall be deemed a Helot or public Servant, shall pay a fifth part of his yearly Revenue, besides all other Taxes, to the Commonwealth for his Protection, and be incapable of bearing any Magistracy except such as is proper to the Law. Nevertheless if a man has but two Sons, the Lord Lieutenant shall not suffer above one of them to come to the Urn at one Election of the second Essay: and though he has above two Sons, there shall not come above half the Brothers at one Election: and if a man has but one Son, he shall not come to the Urn at all without the consent of his Parents, or his Guardians; nor shall it be any reproach to him, or impediment to his bearing of Magistracy.  
THIS Order, with relation to foreign Expeditions, will be proved and explained together with  

27. Order.  THE twenty seventh ORDER, providing, in case of Invasion apprehended, that the Lords High Sheriffs of the Tribes upon Commands received from the Parliament, or the Dictator, distribute the Bands of the Elders into divisions after the nature of the Essays of the Youth; and that the second Division or Essay of the Elders, being made and consisting of 30000 Foot, and 10000 Horse, be ready to march with the second Essay of the Youth, and be brought also by the Conductors to the Strategus.  
THE second Essay of the Elders and Youth being marched out of their Tribes, the Lords High Sheriffs and Lieutenants shall have the remaining part of the annual Bands both of Elders and Youth in readiness, which, if the Beacons be fired, shall march to the Rendevou to be in that case appointed by the Parliament, or the Dictator. And the Beacons being fired, the Curiata Comitia, or Parochial Congregations, shall elect a fourth both of Elders and Youth to be immediately upon the Guard of the Tribes, and dividing themselves as aforesaid, to march also in their Divisions according to Orders: which method in case of extremity shall proceed to the election of a third, or the levy of a second, or of the last man in the Nation, by the Power of the Lords High Sheriffs; to the end that the Commonwealth in her utmost pressure may show her trust that God in his Justice will remember Mercy, by humbling herself, and yet preserving her Courage, Discipline and Constancy, even to the last drop of her blood, and the utmost farthing.  
THE Services performed by the Youth, or by the Elders, in case of Invasion, and according to this Order, shall be at their proper cost and charges that are any ways able to endure it; but if there be such as are known in their Parishes to be so indigent that they cannot march out of their Tribes, nor undergo the burden in this case incumbent, than the Congregations of their Parishes shall furnish them with sufficient sums of Money to be repaid upon the Certificate of the same by the Parliament when the Action shall be over. And of that which is respectively enjoined by this Order, any Tribe, Parish, Magistrate, or Person that shall fail, is to answer for it at the Council of War, as a Deserter of his Country.  
THE ARCHON, being the greatest Captain of his own, if not of any age, added much to the Glory of this Commonwealth, by interweaving the Militia with more Art and Luster than any Legislator from or before the time of SERVIUS TULLIUS, who constituted the Roman Militia. But as the Bones or Skeleton of a man, though the greatest part of his Beauty be contained in their Proportion or Symmetry, yet shown without Flesh, are a spectacle that is rather horrid than entertaining; so without Discourses are the Orders of a Commonwealth: which, if she goes forth in that manner, may complain of her Friends that they stand mute, and staring upon her. Wherefore this Order was thus fleshed by the Lord ARCHON.  

My Lords;  
DIOGENES seeing a young Fellow drunk, told him that his Father was drunk when he begot him. For this in natural Generation I must confess I see no reason; but in the Political it is right. The Vices of the People are from their Governors; those of their Governors from their Laws or Orders; and those of their Laws or Orders from their Legislators. 
* Ut male posuimus initia, sic catera sequuntur. Cic.  Whatever was in the Womb imperfect, as to her proper work, comes very rarely, or never at all to perfection afterwards: and the formation of a Citizen in the Womb of the Commonwealth is his Education.  
EDUCATION by the first of the foregoing Orders is of six kinds: At the School, in the Mechanics, at the Universitys, at the Ins of Court or Chancery, in Travels, and in military Discipline: some of which I shall but touch, and some I shall handle more at large.  

Schools.  THAT which is proposed for the erecting and indowing of Schools throout the Tribes, capable of all the Children of the same, and able to give to the Poor the Education of theirs gratis, is only matter of direction in case of very great Charity, as easing the needy of the charge of their Children from the ninth to the fifteenth year of their age, during which time their work cannot be profitable; and restoring them when they may be of use, furnished with tools whereof there are advantages to be made in every work, seeing he that can read and use his Pen has some convenience by it in the meanest Vocation. And it cannot be conceived, but that which comes, though in small parcels, to the advantage of every man in his Vocation, must amount to the advantage of every Vocation, and so to that of the whole Commonwealth. Wherefore this is commended to the Charity of every wisehearted and welminded man, to be done in time, and as God shall stir him up or enable him; there being such provision already in the case, as may give us leave to proceed without obstruction.  

Mechanics in general.  PARENTS, under animadversion of the Censors, are to dispose of their Children at the fifteenth year of their age to something; but what, is lest, according to their abilities or inclination, at their own choice. This, with the multitude, must be to the Mechanics, that is to say, to Agriculture or Husbandry; to Manufactures, or to Merchandise.  

Husbandry.  AGRICULTURE is the Bread of the Nation; we are hung upon it by the teeth; it is a mighty Nursery of Strength, the best Army, and the most assured Knapsac; it is managed with the least turbulent or ambitious, and the most innocent hands of all other Arts. Wherefore I am of ARISTOTLE'S opinion, that a Commonwealth of Husbandmen, and such is ours, must be the best of all others. Certainly, my Lords, you have no measure of what ought to be, but what can be done for the encouragement of this Profession. I could wish I were Husband good enough to direct something to this end; but racking of Rents is a vile thing in the richer sort, an uncharitable one to the poorer, a perfect mark of Slavery, and nips your Commonwealth in the fairest Blossom. On the other side, if there should be too much ease given in this kind, it would occasion Sloth, and so destroy Industry, the principal nerve of a Commonwealth. But if aught might be done to hold the Balance even between these two, it would be a work in this Nation equal to that for which FABIUS was surnamed MAXIMUS by the Romans.  

Manufactures and Merchandise.  IN Manufactures and Merchandise the Hollander has gotten the start of us; but at the long run it will be found, that a People working upon a foreign Commodity does but farm the Manufacture, and that it is really entailed upon them only, where the growth of it is native: as also that it is one thing to have the carriage of other men's Goods, and another for a man to bring his own to the best market. Wherefore (Nature having provided encouragement for these Arts in this Nation above all others, where, the People growing, they of necessity must also increase) it cannot but establish them upon a far more sure and effectual Foundation than that of the Hollanders. But these Educations are in order to the first things, or necessities of Nature; as Husbandry to the Food, Manufacture to the Clothing, and Merchandise to the Purse of the Commonwealth.  
THERE be other things in Nature, which being second as to their Order, for their Dignity and Value are first, and such to which the other are but Accommodations; of this sort are specially these, Religion, Justice, Courage, and Wisdom.  

Vniversitys.  THE Education that answers to Religion in our Government is that of the Universitys. MOSES the Divine Legislator was not only skilful in all the Learning of the Egyptians, but took also into the Fabric of his Commonwealth the Learning of the Midianites in the advice of JETHRO: and his Foundation of a University laid in the Tabernacle, and finished in the Temple, became that Pinnacle from whence (according to many Jewish and Christian Authors) all the Learning in the world has taken wing; as the Philosophy of the Stoics from the Pharisees; that of the Epicureans from the Sadduces; and from the Learning of the Jews, so often quoted by our 
Acts 17. 18.  SAVIOUR, and fulfilled in Him, the Christian Religion. Athens was the most famous University in her days; and her Senators, that is to say, the Areopagits, were all Philosophers. Lacedaemon, to speak truth, though she could write and read, was not very bookish. But he that disputes hence against Universitys, disputes by the same Argument against Agriculture, Manufacture, and Merchandise; every one of these having been equally forbid by LYCURGUS, not for itself (for if he had not been learned in all the Learning of Crete, and well travelled in the knowledge of other Governments, he had never made his Commonwealth) but for the diversion which they must have given his Citizens from their Arms, who, being but sew, if they had minded any thing else, must have deserted the Commonwealth. For Rome, she had ingenium par imperio, was as learned as great, and held her College of Augurs in much reverence. Venice has taken her Religion upon trust. Holland cannot attend it to be very studious. Nor does Switzerland mind it much; yet are they all addicted to their Universitys. We cut down Trees to build Houses; but I would have some body show me, by what reason or experience the cutting down of a University should tend to the setting up of a Commonwealth. Of this I am sure, that the perfection of a Commonwealth is not to be attained without the knowledge of ancient Prudence; nor the knowledge of ancient Prudence without Learning; nor Learning without Schools of good Literature: and these are such as we call Universitys. Now though mere University learning of itself be that which (to speak the words of VERULAMIUS) crafty men contemn, and simple men only admire, yet is it such as wise men have use of; for Studies do not teach their own use, but that is a Wisdom without and above them, won by observation. Expert men may execute, and perhaps judge of Particulars one by one; but the general Counsils and the Plots, and the marshalling of Affairs, come best from those that are learned. Wherefore if you would have your Children to be Statesmen, let them drink by all means of these Fountains, where perhaps there were never any. But what though the Water a man drinks be not nourishment; it is the Vehicle without which he cannot be nourished. Nor is Religion less concerned in this point than Government; for take away your Universitys, and in a few years you lose it.  
THE Holy Scriptures are written in Hebrew and Greece: they that have neither of these Languages may think light of both; but find me a man that has one in perfection, the study of whose whole Life it has not been. Again, this is apparent to us in daily Conversation, that if four or five Persons that have lived together be talking, another speaking the same Language may come in, and yet understand very little of their Discourse, in that it relates to Circumstances, Persons, Things, Times and Places, which he knows not. It is no otherwise with a man, having no insight of the times in which they were written, and the Circumstances to which they relate, in the reading of ancient Books, whether they be divine or human. For example, when we fall upon the Discourse about Baptism and Regeneration that was between our SAVIOUR and NICODEMUS, where CHRIST reproaches him with his ignorance in this matter: Art thou a Doctor in Israel, and understandest not these things? What shall we think of it? or wherefore should a Doctor in Israel have understood these things more than another, but that both Baptism and Regeneration, as was showed at large by my Lord PHOSPHORUS, were Doctrines held in Israel? I instance in one place of a hundred, which he, that has not mastered the Circumstances to which they relate, cannot understand. Wherefore to the understanding of the Scripture, it is necessary to have ancient Languages, and the knowledge of ancient times, or the aid of them who have such knowledge: and to have such as may be always able and ready to give such aid (unless you would borrow it of another Nation, which would not only be base, but deceitful) it is necessary to a Commonwealth that she have Schools of good Literature, or Universitys of her own. We are commanded, as has been said more than once, to search the Scriptures; and which of 'em search the Scriptures, they that take this pains in ancient Languages and Learning, or they that will not, but trust to Translations only, and to words as they sound to present Circumstances? than which nothing is more fallible, or certain to lose the true sense of Scriptures, pretended to be above human Understanding, for no other cause than that they are below it. But in searching the Scriptures by the proper use of our Universitys, we have been heretofore blessed with greater Victories and Trophys against the purple Hosts and golden Standards of the Romish Hierarchy, than any Nation; and therefore, why we should relinquish this upon the presumption of some, that because there is a greater Light which they have, I do not know. There is a greater Light than the Sun, but it does not extinguish the Sun, nor does any Light of Gods giving extinguish that of Nature, but increase and sanctify it. Wherefore, neither the Honour born by the Israelitish, Roman, or any other Commonwealth that I have shown, to their Ecclesiastics, consisted in being governed by them, but in consulting them in matters of Religion; upon whose Responses or Oracles they did afterwards as they thought fit. Nor would I be here mistaken, as if, by affirming the Universitys to be, in order both to Religion and Government, of absolute necessity, I declared them or the Ministry in any wise fit to be trusted, so far as to exercise any power not derived from the Civil Magistrate in the administration of either. If the Jewish Religion were directed and established by MOSES, it was directed and established by the Civil Magistrate; or if MOSES exercised this Administration as a Prophet, the same Prophet did invest with the same Administration the Sanhedrim, and not the Priests; and so does our Commonwealth the Senate, and not the Clergy. They who had the supreme Administration or Government of the National Religion in Athens, were the first ARCHON, the Rex Sacrificus, or High Priest, and a Polemarch; which Magistrates were ordained or elected 
* Per 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  by the holding up of hands in the Church, Congregation, or Comitia of the People. The Religion of Lacedaemon was governed by the Kings, who were also High Priests, and officiated at the Sacrifice; these had power to substitute their Pythii, Ambassadors, or Nuncios, by which, not without concurrence of the Senate, they held intelligence with the Oracle of APOLLO at Delphos. And the Ecclesiastical part of the Commonwealth of Rome was governed by the Pontifex Maximus, the Rex Sacrificulus, and the Flamens, all ordained or elected by the People, the Pontifex by the 
† Tributis.  Tribes, the King by the 
‖ Centuriatis.  Centuries, and the Flamens by the 
‖ ‖ Curiatis Comitiis.  Parishes. I do not mind you of these things, as if, for the matter, there were any parallel to be drawn out of their Superstitions to our Religion; but to show that for the manner, ancient Prudence is as well a rule in divine as human things; nay, and such a one as the Apostles themselves, ordaining Elders by the holding up of hands in every Congregation, have exactly followed: for some of the Congregations where they thus ordained Elders were those of Antioch, Iconium, Lystra, Derbe, the Countries of Lycaonia, Pisidia, Pamphylia, Perga, with Attalia. Now that these Cities and Countries, when the Romans propagated their Empire into Asia, were found most of them Commonwealths, and that many of the rest were endued with like power, so that the People living under the protection of the Roman Emperors, continued to elect their own Magistrates, is so known a thing, that I wonder whence it is that men, quite contrary to the universal proof of these examples, will have Ecclesiastical Government to be necessarily distinct from Civil Power, when the Right of the Elders ordained by the holding up of hands in every Congregation to teach the People, was plainly derived from the same Civil Power by which they ordained the rest of their Magistrates. And it is not otherwise in our Commonwealth, where the Parochial Congregation elects or ordains its Pastor. To object the Commonwealth of Venice in this place, were to show us that it has been no otherwise but where the Civil Power has lost the liberty of her Conscience by embracing Popery; as also that to take away the Liberty of Conscience in this Administration from the Civil Power, were a proceeding which has no other precedent than such as is Popish. Wherefore your Religion is settled after the following manner: the Universitys are the Seminaries of that part which is national, by which means others with all safety may be permitted to follow the Liberty of their own Consciences, in regard that, however they behave themselves, the ignorance of the unlearned in this case cannot lose your Religion nor disturb your Government, which otherwise it would most certainly do; and the Universitys with their Emoluments, as also the Benefices of the whole Nation, are to be improved by such Augmentations as may make a very decent and comfortable subsistence for the Ministry, which is neither to be allowed Synods nor Assemblies, except upon the occasion shown in the Universitys, when they are consulted by the Council of State, and suffered to meddle with Affairs of Religion, nor to be capable of any other public Preferment whatsoever; by which means the Interest of the Learned can never come to corrupt your Religion, nor disturb your Government, which otherwise it would most certainly do. Venice, though she does not see, or cannot help the corruption of her Religion, is yet so circumspect to avoid disturbance of her Government in this kind, that her Council proceeds not to election of Magistrates, till it be proclaimed, Fora Papalini, by which words such as have consanguinity with red Hats, or relation to the Court of Rome, are warned to withdraw. If a Minister in Holland meddles with matter of State, the Magistrate sends him a pair of Shoes; whereupon, if he does not go, he is driven away from his charge. I wonder why Ministers, of all men, should be perpetually tampering with Government; first because they, as well as others, have it in express charge to submit themselves to the Ordinances of men; and secondly, because these Ordinances of men must go upon such political Principles, as they of all others, by any thing that can be found in their Writings or Actions, lest understand: whence you have the suffrage of all Nations to this sense, that an ounce of Wisdom is worth a pound of Clergy. Your greatest Clercs are not your wisest men: and when some foul Absurdity in State is committed, it is common with the French, and even the Italians, to call it Pas de Clerc, or, Governo da Prete. They may bear with men that will be preaching without study, while they will be governing without Prudence. My Lords, if you know not how to rule your Clergy, you will most certainly, like a man that cannot rule his Wife, have neither quiet at home, nor honour abroad. Their honest Vocation is to teach your Children at the Schools and the Universitys, and the People in the Parishes; and yours is concerned to see that they do not play the shrews: of which parts does consist the Education of your Commonwealth, so far as it regards Religion.  

The Ins of Court and Chancery.  TO JUSTICE, or that part of it which is commonly executive, answers the Education of the Ins of Court and Chancery. Upon which to philosophise requires a peculiar kind of Learning that I have not. But they who take upon them any Profession proper to the Educations mentioned, that is, Theology, Physic, or Law, are not at leisure for the Essays. Wherefore the Essays being Degrees whereby the Youth commence for all Magistracies, Offices, and Honours in the Parish, Hundred, Tribe, Senate or Prerogative; Divines, Physicians, and Lawyers, not taking these Degrees, exclude themselves from all such Magistracies, Offices, and Honours. And whereas Lawyers are likest to exact further reason for this, they (growing up from the most gainful Art at the Bar to those Magistracies upon the Bench, which are continually appropriated to themselves, and not only endowed with the greatest Revenues, but also held for life) have the least reason of all the rest to pretend to any other; especially in an equal Commonwealth, where Accumulation of Magistracy, or to take a Person engaged by his Profit to the Laws, as they stand, into the Power which is Legislative, and which should keep them to what they were, or aught to be, were a Soloecism in Prudence. It is true, that the Legislative Power may have need of Advice and Assistance from the executive Magistracy, or such as are learned inthe Law; for which cause the Judges are, as they have heretofore been, Assistants in the Senat. Nor, however it came about, can I see any reason why a Judge, being but an Assistant or Lawyer, should be Member of a Legislative Council.  
I DENY not, that the Roman Patricians were all Patrons, and that the whole People were Clients, some to one Family, and some to another, by which means they had their Causes pleaded and defended in some appearance gratis; for the Patron took no Money, though if he had a Daughter to marry, his Clients were to pay her Portion: nor was this so great a grievance. But if the Client accused his Patron, gave testimony or suffrage against him, it was a crime of such a nature, that any man might lawfully kill him as a Traitor; and this, as being the nerve of the Optimacy, was a great cause of ruin to that Commonwealth: for when the People would carry any thing that pleased not the Senate, the Senators were ill provided if they could not intercede, that is, oppose it by their Clients; with whom, to vote otherwise than they pleased, was the highest Crime. The observation of this Bond till the time of the GRACCHIS, that is to say, till it was too late, or to no purpose to break it, was the cause, why in all the former heats and disputes that had happened between the Senate and the People, it never came to blows, which indeed was good: but withal, the People could have no remedy, which was certainly evil. Wherefore I am of opinion, that a Senator ought not to be a Patron or Advocate, nor a Patron or Advocate to be a Senator: for if his Practice be gratis, it debauches the People; and if it be mercenary, it debauches himself: take it which way you will, when he should be making of Laws, he will be knitting of Nets.  
LYCURGUS, as I said, by being a Traveller became a Legislator, but in times when Prudence was another thing. Nevertheless we may not shut out this part of Education in a Commonwealth, which will be herself a Traveller; for those of this make have seen the World, especially because this is certain (though it be not regarded in our times, when things being left to take their chance, it sares with us accordingly) that no man can be a Politician, except he be first a Historian or a Traveller; for except he can see what must be, or what may be, he is no Politician. Now if he has no knowledge in Story, he cannot tell what has been; and if he has not been a Traveller, he cannot tell what is: but he that neither knows what has been, nor what is, can never tell what must be, or what may be. Furthermore, the Embassys in ordinary by our Constitution are the Prizes of young men, more especially such as have been Travellers. Wherefore they of these inclinations having leave of the Censors, owe them an account of their time, and cannot choose but lay it out with some ambition of Praise or Reward, where both are open: whence you will have eyes abroad, and better choice of public Ministers; your Gallants showing themselves not more to the Ladies at their Balls, than to your Commonwealth at her Academy, when they return from their Travels.  
BUT this Commonwealth being constituted more especially of two Elements, Arms and Councils, drives by a natural instinct at Courage and Wisdom; which he who has attained, is arrived at the perfection of human nature. It is true, that these Virtues must have some natural root in him that is capable of them; but this amounts not to so great a matter as some will have it. For if Poverty makes an industrious, a moderate Estate a temperate, and a lavish Fortune a wanton man, and this be the common course of things; Wisdom then is rather of necessity than inclination. And that an Army which was meditating upon flight, has been brought by despair to win the Field, is so far from being strange, that like causes will evermore produce like effects. Wherefore this Commonwealth drives her Citizens like Wedges; there is no way with them but thorough, nor end but that Glory whereof Man is capable by Art or Nature. That the Genius of the Roman Families commonly preserved itself throout the line (as to instance in some, the MANLIIS were still severe, the PUBLICOLAE lovers, and the APPII haters of the People) is attributed by MACCHIAVEL to their Education: nor, if Interest might add to the reason why the Genius of a Patrician was one thing, and that of a Plebeian another, is the like so apparent between different Nations, who, according to their different Educations, have yet as different manners. It was anciently noted, and long confirmed by the actions of the French, that in their first assaults their Courage was more than that of Men; and for the rest less than that of Women: which nevertheless, thro' the amendment of their Discipline, we see now to be otherwise. I will not say, but that some Man or Nation upon an equal improvement of this kind may be lighter than some other; but certainly, Education is the scale without which no Man or Nation can truly know his or her own weight or value. By our Histories we can tell when one Marpesian would have beaten ten Oceaners, and when one Oceaner would have beaten ten Marpesians. MARC ANTHONY was a Roman, but how did that appear in the embraces of CLEOPATRA? You must have some other Education for your Youth; or they, like that passage, will show better in Romance than true Story.  
THE Custom of the Commonwealth of Rome in distributing her Magistracies without respect of age, happened to do well in CORVINUS and SCIPIO; for which cause MACCHIAVEL (with whom that which was done by Rome, and that which is well done, is for the most part all one) commends this course. Yet how much it did worse at other times, is obvious in POMPEY and CAESAR; Examples by which BOCCALINI illustrats the Prudence of Venice in her contrary practice, affirming it to have been no small step to the ruin of the Roman Liberty, that these (having tasted in their Youth of the supreme Honours) had no greater in their age to hope for, but by perpetuating of the same in themselves; which came to Blood, and ended in Tyranny. The opinion of VERULAMIUS is safe: The Errors, says he, of young men are the ruin of business; whereas the Errors of old men amount but to this, that more might have been done, or sooner. But though their Wisdom be little, their Courage is great: Wherefore (to come to the main Education of this Commonwealth) the Militia of Oceana is the Province of Youth.  
THE distribution of this Province by the Essays is so fully described in the Order, that I need repeat nothing: the Order itself being but a Repetition or Copy of that Original, which in ancient Prudence is of all others the fairest; as that from whence the Commonwealth of Rome more particularly derived the Empire of the World. And there is much more reason in this age, when Governments are universally broken, or swerved from their Foundations, and the People groan under Tyranny, that the same causes (which could not be withstood when the World was full of popular Governments) should have the like effects.  
THE Causes in the Commonwealth of Rome, whereof the Empire of the World was not any miraculous, but a natural (nay I may safely say a necessary) consequence, are contained in that part of her Discipline which was domestic, and in that which she exercised in her Provinces or Conquest. Of the latter I shall have better occaon to speak when we come to our provincial Orbs; the former divided the whole People by Tribes, amounting, as LIVY and CICERO show, at their full growth to thirty five, and every Tribe by the Cense or Valuation of Estates into five Classes: for the sixth being Proletary, that is the Nursery, or such as thro' their poverty contributed nothing to the Commonwealth but Children, was not reckoned, nor used in Arms. And this is the first point of the Militia, in which modern Prudence is quite contrary to the ancient; for whereas we, excusing the rich, and arming the poor, become the Vassals of our Servants, they, by excusing the poor, and arming such as were rich enough to be Freemen, became Lords of the Earth. The Nobility and Gentry of this Nation, who understand so little what it is to be Lords of the Earth, that they have not been able to keep their own Lands, will think it a strange Education for their Children to be common Soldiers, and obliged to all the Duties of Arms: nevertheless it is not for 4 s. a week, but to be capable of being the best man in the Field or in the City; the latter part of which consideration makes the common Soldier herein a better man than the General of any monarchical Army. And whereas it may be thought, that this would drink deep of noble Blood, I dare boldly say, take the Roman Nobility in the heat of their fiercest Wars, and you shall not find such a shambles of them as has been made of ours by mere Luxury and Slothfulness; which, killing the Body, kill the Soul also; Animasque in vulnere ponunt. Whereas common Right is that which who stands in the vindication of, has used that Sword of Justice for which he receives the Purple of Magistracy. The Glory of a man on Earth can go no higher, and if he falls he rises again, and comes sooner to that reward which is so much higher as Heaven is above the Earth. To return to the Roman Example: Every Classis was divided, as has been more than once shown, into Centurys, and every Century was equally divided into Youth and Elders; the Youth for foreign Service, and the Elders for the guard of the Territory. In the first Classis were about eighteen Centuries of Horse, being those which by the Institution of SERVIUS were first called to the Suffrage in the 
* Centuriatis.  Centurial Assemblys. But the Delectus, or Levy of an Army, which is the present business, proceeded, according to POLYBIUS, in this manner.  
Upon a War decreed, the Consuls elected four and twenty military Tribune's or Colonels; whereof ten, being such as had merited their tenth Stipend, were younger Officers. The Tribune's being chosen, the Consuls appointed a day to the Tribes, when those in them of military age were to appear at the Capitol; the day being come, and the Youth assembled accordingly, the Consuls ascended their Tribunal, and the younger Tribune's were strait divided into four parts after this manner: four were assigned to the first Legion (a Legion at the most consisted of 6000 Foot, and 300 Horse) three to the second, four to the third, and three to the fourth. The younger Tribune's being thus distributed, two of the elder were assigned to the first Legion, three to the second, two to the third, and three to the fourth. And the Officers of each Legion thus assigned, having drawn the Tribes by Lots, and being seated according to their divisions at a convenient distance from each other, the Tribe of the first Lot was called: whereupon they that were of it knowing the business, and being prepared, presently bolted out four of their number, in the choice whereof such care was taken, that they offered none that was not a Citizen; no Citizen that was not of the Youth; no Youth that was not of some one of the five Classes; nor any one of the five Classes that was not expert at his Exercises. Moreover, they used such diligence in matching them for Age and Stature, that the Officers of the Legions, except they happened to be acquainted with the Youth so bolted, were forced to put themselves upon fortune, while they of the first Legion chose one; they of the second, the next; they of the third another; and the fourth Youth fell to the last Legion: and thus was the Election (the Legions and the Tribes varying according to their Lots) carried on till the Foot were complete. The like course with little alteration was taken by the Horse Officers till the Horse also were complete. This was called giving of Names, which the 
Judg. 20. 9  Children of Israel did also by Lot; and if any man refused to give his Name, he was sold for a Slave, or his Estate confiscated to the Commonwealth. When 
* Marcus Curius Consul cum subitum delectum edicere coactus esset, & juniorum nemo respondisset, conjectis in sortem omnibus, Polliae quae proxima exierat, primum nomen urna extractum citari jussit, neque eo respondente, bona adolescentis hastâ subjecit. Val.  MARCUS CURIUS the Consul was forced to make a sudden Levy, and none of the Youth would give in their Names, all the Tribes being put to the Lot, he commanded the first Name drawn out of the Urn of the Pollian Tribe (which happened to come first) to be called; but the Youth not answering, he ordered his Goods to be sold: which was conformable to the Law in Israel, according to which SAUL took a yoke of Oxen, and hewed them in pieces, 
1 Sam. 11. 7.  and sent them throout the Tribes, saying, Whosoever comes not forth to battle after SAUL and SAMUEL, so shall it be done to his Oxen. By which you may observe also, that they who had no cattle were not of the Militia in Israel. But the age of the Roman Youth by the Tullian Law determined at 30; and by the Law (though it should seem by MACCHIAVEL and others, that this was not well observed) a Man could not stand for Magistracy till he was Miles emeritus, or had fulfilled the full term of his Militia, which was complete in his tenth Stipend or Service: nor was he afterwards obliged under any penalty to give his name, except the Commonwealth were invaded, in which case the Elders were as well obliged as the Youth. 
† Quod per magnos tumultus sieri solitum erat, justitio indicto, delectus sine vacationibus habitus est. Liv.  The Consul might also levy Milites evocatos, or Soldiers, commanded Men out of such as had served their turn, and this at his discretion. The Legions being thus complete, were divided by two to each Consul; and in these no Man had right to serve but a Roman Citizen: now because two Legions made but a small Army, the Romans added to every one of their Arms an equal number of Foot, and a double number of Horse levied among their Latin or Italian Associates; so a Consular Army, with the Legions and auxiliaries, amounted to about thirty thousand: and whereas they commonly levied two such Arms together, these being joined made about sixty thousand.  
THE Steps whereby our Militia follows the greatest Captain, are the three Essays; the first, elected by a fifth man in the 
‖ Curiatis.  Parishes, and amounting in the whole to one hundred thousand, choose their Officers at the 
* Centuriatis.  Hundreds, where they fall also to their Games or Exercises, invited by handsome Prizes, such as for themselves and the honour of them will be coveted; such as will render the Hundred a place of Sports, and exercise of Arms all the year long; such as in the space of ten years will equip 30000 Men Horse and Foot, with such Arms for their Forge, Proof, and Beauty, as (notwithstanding the Argyraspides, or silver Shields of ALEXANDER'S Guards) were never worn by so many; such as will present marks of Virtue and Direction to your General or Strategus in the distribution of his Army, which doubles the value of them to the Proprietors, who are bound to wear them, and eases the Commonwealth of so much Charge, so many being armed already.  
BUT here will be the Objection now. How shall such a Revenue be compassed? Fifty pounds a year in every Hundred is a great deal, not so easily raised: Men will not part with their Money; nor would the sum as it is proposed by the Order of Pomp, rise in many years. These are difficulties that fit our Genius exactly: And yet a thousand pounds in each Hundred once levied, establishes the Revenue for ever. Now the Hundreds one with another are worth ten thousand pounds a year dry Rent, over and above personal Estates, which bring it to twice the value: So that a twentieth part of one year's Revenue of the Hundred does it. If you cannot afford this while you pay Taxes, though from henceforth they will be but small ones, do it when you pay none. If it be then too much for one year, do it in two: If it be two much for two years, do it in four. What Husbands have we hitherto been? What is become of greater Sums? My Lords, if you should thus cast your Bread upon the Waters, after many days you would find it: stand not huckling when you are offered Corn and your Money again in the mouth of the Sack.  
BUT to proceed: The first Essay being officered at the Hundreds, and mustered at the 
* Tributis.  Tribes (where they are entertained with other Sports, which will be very fine ones) proceeds to the Election of the second Essay, or standing Army of this Nation, consisting of thirty thousand Foot, and ten thousand Horse; and these, upon a War decreed, being delivered at the Rendezvous of Oceana to the Strategus, are the third Essay, which answers to the Roman Legions. But you may observe, that whereas the Consuls elected the military Tribune's, and raised commanded Men out of the Veterans at their own discretion; our Polemarches or Field Officers are elected by the Scrutiny of the Council of War: and our Veterans not otherwise taken on than as Volunteers, and with the consent of the Polemarches; which may serve for the removal of certain scruples which might otherwise be incident in this place, though without encouragement by the Roman way of proceeding, much less by that which is proposed. But whereas the Roman Legions in all amounted not in one Army to above 30000 Men, or little more, you have here forty thousand; and whereas they added auxiliaries, it is in this regard that Marpesia will be a greater Revenue to you, than if you had the Indys; for whereas heretofore she has yielded you nothing but her native Thistles, in ploughing out the rankness of her Aristocracy by your Agrarian, you will find her an inexhaustible Magazine of Men, and to her own advantage, who will make a far better account by the Arms, than by the Pins of Poland. Wherefore as a Consular Army consisted of about an equal number of auxiliaries added to their Legions by their Latin or Italian Associates, you may add to a Parliamentary Army an equal number of Marpesians or Panopeans, as that Colony shall hereafter be able to supply you: By which means the Commonwealth will be able to go forth to Battle with fourscore thousand Men. To make Wars with small Forces is no Husbandry, but a waist, a disease, a lingering and painful consumtion of Men and Money; the Romans making theirs thick, made them short, and had little regard to Money, as that which they who have Men enough, can command where it is fittest that it should be levied. All the ancient Monarchys by this means got on wing, and attained to vast Riches. Whereas your modern Princes being dear purchasers of small parcels, have but emty pockets. But it may be some will accuse the Order of rashness, in that it commits the sole Conduct of the War to the General; and the Custom of Venice by her Proveditori, or checks upon her Commanders in chief, may seem to be of greater Prudence: but in this part of our Government neither Venice nor any Nation that makes use of mercenary Forces is for our instruction. A mercenary Army, with a standing General, is like the fatal Sister that spins; but proper Forces, with an annual Magistrate, are like her that cuts the thread. Their Interests are quite contrary, and yet you have a better Proveditor than the Venetian, another Strategus sitting with an Army standing by him; whereupon that which is marching, if there were any probability it should, would find as little possibility that it could recoil, as a foreign Enemy to invade you. These things considered, a War will appear to be of a contrary nature to that of all other reckon, inasmuch as of this you must never look to have a good account if you be strict in imposing checks. Let a Council of Huntsmen assembled beforehand, tell you which way the Stag shall run, where you shall cast about at the fault, and how you shall ride to be in at the chase all the day: but these may as well do that, as a Council of War direct a General. The hours that have painted wings, and of different colours, are his Council: he must be like the Ey that makes not the Scene, but has it so soon as it changes. That in many Counsillors there is strength, is spoken of Civil Administrations: as to those that are military, there is nothing more certain, than that in many Counsillors there is weakness. Joint Commissions in military affairs, are like hunting your Hounds in their Couples. In the Attic War CLEOMENES and DEMARATUS, Kings of Lacedaemon, being thus coupled, tugged one against another; and while they should have joined against the Persian, were the cause of the common calamity: whereupon that Commonwealth took better Council, and made a Law, whereby from thenceforth there went at once but one of her Kings to Battle.  
THE Fidenatis being in rebellion, and having slain the Colony of the Romans, four Tribune's with Consular Power were created by the People of Rome, whereof one being left for the guard of the City, the other three were sent against the Fidenatis, who, thro' the division that happened among them, brought nothing home but Dishonour: whereupon the Romans created the Dictator, and LIVY gives his Judgement in these words: 
* Tres Tribuni, potestate Consulari, documento fuêre, quàm plurium imperium bello inutile esset; tendendo ad sua quisque consilia, cum alii aliud videretur, aperuerunt ad occasionem, locum hosti.  The three Tribune's with Consular Power were a lesson how useless in War is the joint Command of several Generals; for each following his own Counsils, while they all differed in their opinions, gave by this opportunity an advantage to the Enemy. When the Consuls QUINTIUS and AGRIPPA were sent against the AEQUI, AGRIPPA for this reason refused to go with his Colleague, saying, 
* Saluberrimum in administratione magnarum rerum, summam imperii apud unum esse.  That in the administration of great Actions it was most safe that the chief Command should be lodged in one Person. And if the Ruin of modern Arms were well considered, most of it would be found to have fallen upon this point: it being in this case far safer to trust to any one Man of common Prudence, than to any two or more together of the greatest Parts. The Consuls indeed being equal in Power, while one was present with the Senate, and the other in the Field with the Army, made a good Balance; and this with us is exactly followed by the Election of a new Strategus upon the march of the old one.  
THE seven and twentieth Order, whereby the Elders in case of Invasion are obliged to equal duty with the Youth, and each upon their own charge, is suitable to Reason (for every Man defends his own Estate) and to our Copy, as in the War with the Samnites and Tuscans. 
† Senatus justitium indici, delectum omnis generis hominum haberi jussit: nec ingenui modo, & juniores Sacramento adacti sunt, sed seniorum etiam cohortes factae.  The Senate ordered a Vacation to be proclaimed, and a Levy to be made of all sorts of Persons: And not only the Freemen and Youths were listed, but Cohorts of the old Men were likewise formed. This Nation of all others is the least obnoxious to Invasion. Oceana, says a French Politician, is a Beast that cannot be devoured but by herself; nevertheless, that Government is not perfect which is not provided at all points; and in this (ad Triarios res rediit) the Elders being such as in a martial State must be Veterans, the Commonwealth invaded gathers strength like ANTAEUS by her fall, while the whole number of the Elders consisting of five hundred thousand, and the Youth of as many, being brought up according to the Order, give twelve successive Battles, each Battle consisting of eighty thousand Men, half Elders and half Youth. And the Commonwealth whose Constitution can be no stranger to any of those Virtues which are to be acquired in human life, grows familiar with Death ere she dies. If the hand of God be upon her for her Transgressions, she shall mourn for her Sins, and lie in the dust for her Iniquitys, without losing her Manhood.  
Si fractus illabatur orbis,  
Impavidam ferient ruinae.   
THE remaining part, being the Constitution of the Provincial Orb, is partly Civil, or consisting of the Elders; and partly Military, or consisting of the Youth. The Civil part of the provincial Orb is directed by  


28. Order.  
Constitution of the Civil part of the Provincial Orb.   THE twenty eighth ORDER, whereby the Council of a Province being constituted of twelve Knights, divided by four into three Regions (for their term and revolution conformable to the Parliament) is perpetuated by the annual election at the Tropic of four Knights (being triennial Magistrates) out of the Region of the Senate whose term expires; and of one Knight out of the same Region to be Strategus or General of the Province, which Magistracy is annual. The Strategus or Magistrate thus chosen, shall be as well Precedent of the Provincial Council with power to propose to the same, as General of the Army. The Council for the rest shall elect weekly Provosts, having any two of them also right to propose after the manner of the Senatorian Councils of Oceana. And whereas all Provincial Councils are Members of the Council of State, they may and aught to keep diligent correspondence with the same, which is to be done after this manner: Any Opinion or Opinions legitimatly proposed and debated at a Provincial Council, being thereupon signed by the Strategus, or any two of the Provosts, may be transmitted to the Council of State in Oceana; and the Council of State proceeding upon the same in their natural course (whether by their own Power, if it be a matter within their Instructions, or by Authority of the Senate thereupon consulted, if it be a matter of State which is not in their Instructions; or by Authority of the Senate and Command of the People, if it be a matter of Law, as for the Levys of Men or Money upon common use and safety) shall return such Answers, Advice, or Orders, as in any of the ways mentioned shall be determined upon the case. The Provincial Councils of Marpesia and Panopea respectively shall take special care that the Agrarian Laws, as also all other Laws that be or shall from time to time be enacted by the Parliament of Oceana, for either of them, be duly put in execution: they shall manage and receive the Customs of either Nation for the Shipping of Oceana, being the common Guard: they shall have a care that moderate and sufficient pay upon the respective Province be duly raised for the support and maintenance of the Officers and Soldiers, or Army of the same, in the most effectual, constant and convenient way: they shall receive the Regalia, or public Revenues of those Nations, out of which every Counsillor shall have for his term, and to his proper use, the Sum of 500 l. per annum, and the Strategus 500 l. as Precedent, besides his Pay as General, which shall be 1000 Pounds; the remainder to go to the use of the Knights and Deputies of the respective Provinces, to be paid, if it will reach, according to the rates of Oceana; if not, by an equal distribution, respectively; or the overplus, if there be any, to be returned to the Treasury of Oceana. They shall manage the Lands (if there be any such held in either of the Provinces by the Commonwealth of Oceana, in Dominion) and return the Rents into the Exchequer. If the Commonwealth comes to be possessed of richer Provinces, the Pay of the General or Strategus, and of the Councils, may be respectively increased. The People for the rest shall elect their own Magistrates, and be governed by their own Laws, having Power also to appeal from their native or provincial Magistrates, if they please, to the People of Oceana. And whereas there may be such as receiving Injury, are not able to prosecute their Appeals at so great a distance, eight Sergeants at Law being sworn by the Commissioners of the Seal, shall be sent by four into each Province once in two years; who, dividing the same by Circuits, shall hear such Causes; and having gathered and introduced them, shall return to the several Appellants, gratis, the Determinations and Decrees of the People in their several cases.  
THE term of a Knight in a Provincial Orb, as to domestic Magistracies, shall be esteemed a Vacation, and no bar to present Election to any other Honour, his provincial Magistracy being expired.  
THE Quorum of a Provincial Council, as also of every other Council or Assembly in Oceana, shall in time of health consist of two parts in three of the whole number proper to that Council or Assembly; and in a time of sickness, of one part in three: But of the Senate there can be no Quorum without three of the Signory; nor of a Council without two of the Provosts.  
THE Civil part of the Provincial Orb being declared by the foregoing Order; the Military part of the same is constituted by  


29. Order.  
Constitution of the Military part of the Provincial Orb.   THE twenty ninth ORDER; whereby the Stratiots of the third Essay having drawn the Gold Balls marked with the Letter M, and being ten Horse and fifty Foot in a Tribe, that is to say, five hundred Horse, and two thousand five hundred Foot in all, the Tribes shall be delivered by the respective Conductors to the provincial Strategus or General, at such a time and place, or Rendezvous, as he shall appoint by Order and Certificate of his Election: and the Strategus having received the Horse and Foot mentioned, which are the third Classis of his provincial Guard or Army, shall forthwith lead them away, to Marpesia, where the Army consists of three Classes, each Classis containing three thousand men, whereof five hundred are Horse; and receiving the new Strategus with the third Classis, the old Strategus with the first Classis shall be dismissed by the Provincial Council. The same method with the Stratiots of the letter P, is to be observed for the provincial Orb of Panopea: and the Commonwealth coming to acquire new Provinces, the Senate and the People may erect new Orbs in like manner, consisting of greater or less numbers, according as is required by the respective occasion. If a Stratiot has once served his term in a Provincial Orb, and happens afterwards to draw the Letter of a Province at the Election of the second Essay, he may refuse his Lot; and if he refuses it, the Censor of that Urn shall cause the Files balloting at the same to make a halt; and if the Stratiot produces the Certificate of his Strategus or General, that he has served his time accordingly, the Censor throwing the Ball that he drew into the Urn again, and taking out a Blank, shall dismiss the Youth, and cause the Ballot to proceed.  
TO perfect the whole Structure of this Commonwealth, some Directions are given to the third Essay, or Army marching, in  

30. Order.  THE thirtieth ORDER. When thou goest to battle against thy Enemy's, and seest Horses and Chariots, and a People more than thou; 
Deut. 20. 1.  be not afraid of them, for the Lord thy God is he that goes with thee to fight for thee against thy Enemy's. And when thou dividest the Spoil, it shall be as a Statute and an Ordinance to thee, that as his 
1 Sam. 30. 24.  part is that goes down to the battle, so shall his part be that tarrys by the Stuff: that is, (as to the Commonwealth of Oceana) The Spoil taken of the Enemy (except Clothes, Arms, Horses, Ammunition and Victuals, to be divided to the Soldiery by the Strategus and the Polemarches upon the place according to their discretion) shall be delivered to four Commissaries of the Spoils elected and sworn by the Council of War; which Commissaries shall be allowed Shipping by the State, and Convoys according as occasion shall require by the Strategus; to the end that having a Bill of Lading signed by three or more of the Polemarches, they may ship and bring, or cause such Spoils to be brought to the Prize-Office in Oceana, where they shall be sold; and the Profit arising by such Spoils shall be divided into three parts, whereof one shall go to the Treasury, another shall be paid to the Soldiery of this Nation, and a third to the auxiliaries at their return from their Service, provided that the said auxiliaries be equal in number to the proper Forces of this Nation, otherwise their Share shall be so much less as they themselves are fewer in number: the rest of the two thirds to go to the Officers and Soldiers of the proper Forces. And the Spoils so divided to the proper Forces, shall be subdivided into three equal parts, whereof one shall go to the Officers, and two to the common Soldiers: The like for the auxiliaries. And the Share allotted to the Officers shall be divided into four equal parts, whereof one shall go to the Strategus, another to the Polemarches, a third to the Colonels, and a fourth to the Captains, Cornets, Ensigns, and under Officers, receiving their share of the Spoil as common Soldiers: The like for the auxiliaries. And this upon pain, in the case of failure, of what the People of Oceana (to whom the Cognizance of Peculat or Crimes of this nature is properly appertaining) shall adjudge or decree.  
UPON these three last Orders the ARCHON seemed to be haranguing at the head of his Army in this manner.  

My Dear Lords and Excellent Patriots;  
A GOVERNMENT of this make is a Commonwealth for Increase. Of those for Preservation, the Inconveniences and Frailties have been shown: Their Roots are narrow, such as do not run, have no Fibers, their tops weak and dangerously exposed to the weather; except you chance to find one, as Venice, planted in a Flowerpot; and if she grows, she grows top-heavy, and falls too. But you cannot plant an Oak in a Flowerpot; she must have Earth for her Root, and Heaven for her Branches. 
Imperium Oceano, famam quae terminet astris.   
ROME was said to be broken by her own weight, but poetically: For that weight by which she was pretended to be ruined, was supported in her Emperors by a far slighter Foundation. And in the common experience of good Architecture, there is nothing more known, than that Buildings stand the firmer and the longer for their own weight; nor ever swerve thro' any other internal cause, than that their Materials are corruptible: But the People never die; nor, as a political Body, are subject to any other Corruption than that which derives from their Government. Unless a Man will deny the Chain of Causes, in which he denys God, he must also acknowledge the Chain of Effects; wherefore there can be no effect in Nature, that is not from the first Cause, and those successive Links of the Chain, without which it could not have been. Now except a Man can show the contrary in a Commonwealth; if there be no cause of Corruption in the first make of it, there can never be any such Effect. Let no Man's Superstitition impose Profaneness upon this Assertion; for as Man is sinful, but yet the Universe is perfect, so may the Citizen be sinful, and yet the Commonwealth be perfect. And as Man, seeing the World is perfect, can never commit any such Sin as shall render it imperfect, or bring it to a natural dissolution; so the Citizen, where the Commonwealth is perfect, can never commit any such Crime as will render it imperfect, or bring it to a natural dissolution. To come to experience; Venice, notwithstanding we have found from flaws in it, is the only Commonwealth in the Make whereof no man can find a cause of dissolution; for which reason we behold her (though she consists of men that are not without sin) at this day with one thousand Years upon her back, yet for any internal cause, as young, as fresh, and free from decay, or any appearance of it, as she was born: but whatever in nature is not sensible of decay by the course of a thousand Years, is capable of the whole Age of Nature; by which Calculation, for any check that I am able to give myself, a Commonwealth, rightly ordered, may, for any internal causes, be as immortal or longlived as the World. But if this be true, those Commonwealths that are naturally fallen, must have derived their Ruin from the rise of them. Israel and Athens died not natural but violent deaths; in which manner the World itself is to die. We are speaking of those causes of Dissolution which are natural to Government; and they are but two, either Contradiction or Inequality: If a Commonwealth be a Contradiction, she must needs destroy herself; and if she be inequal, it tends to strife, and strife to ruin. By the former of these fell Lacedaemon, by the latter Rome. Lacedaemon being made altogether for War, and yet not for Increase, her natural Progress became her natural Dissolution, and the building of her own victorious Hand too heavy for her Foundation; so that she fell indeed by her own weight. But Rome perished thro' her native Inequality, which how it inveterated the Bosoms of the Senate and the People each against other, and even to death, has been shown at large.  
LOOK well to it, my Lords, for if there be a contradiction or inequality in your Commonwealth, it must fall; but if it has neither of these, it has no principle of Mortality. Do not think me impudent; if this be truth, I should commit a gross indiscretion in concealing it. Sure I am that MACCHIAVEL is for the immortality of a Commonwealth upon far weaker Principles. If a Commonwealth, 
Disc.. ●. 3. c. 22. b. 3. c. 29.  says he, were so happy as to be provided often with men, that, when she is swerving from her Principles, should reduce her to her Institution, she would be immortal. But a Commonwealth, as we have demonstrated, swerves not from her Principles, but by and thro' her Institution; if she brought no Bias into the world with her, her course for any internal Cause must be straight forward, as we see is that of Venice. She cannot turn to the right hand, nor to the left, but by some rub, which is not an internal but external cause; against such she can be no way fortified, but thro' her Situation, as is Venice; or thro' her Militia, as was Rome: by which Examples a Commonwealth may be secure of those also. Think me not vain, for I cannot conceal my opinion here; a Commonwealth that is rightly instituted can never swerve, nor one that is not rightly instituted be secured from swerving by reduction to her first Principles: Wherefore it is no less apparent in this place, that MACCHIAVEL understood not a Commonwealth as to the whole piece, than where having told you, That a Tribun, or any other Citizen 
Disc. B. 1. c. 18.  of Rome, might propose a Law to the People, and debate it with them; he adds, this Order was good, while the People were good; but when the People became evil, it became most pernicious. As if this Order (thro' which, with the like, the People most apparently became evil) could ever have been good; or that the People, or the Commonwealth could ever have become good, by being reduced to such Principles as were the Original of their Evil. The Disease of Rome was, as has been shown, from the native inequality of her Balance, and no otherwise from the Empire of the World, than as, this falling into one Scale, that of the Nobility (an evil in such a Fabric inevitable) kicked out the People. Wherefore a Man that could have made her to throw away the Empire of the World, might in that have reduced her to her Principles; and yet have been so far from rendering her immortal, that going no further, he should never have cured her. But your Commonwealth is founded upon an equal Agrarian; and if the Earth be given to the Sons of men, this Balance is the Balance of Justice, such a one as in having due regard to the different Industry of different men, yet faithfully judges the Poor. And 
Prov. 29. 14.  the King that faithfully judges the Poor, his Throne shall be established for ever; much more the Commonwealth, seeing that equality which is the necessary dissolution of Monarchy, is the Generation, the very Life and Soul of a Commonwealth. And now, if ever, I may be excusable, seeing my assertion, that the Throne of a Commonwealth may be established for ever, is consonant to the holy Scriptures.  
THE Balance of a Commonwealth that is equal, is of such a nature, that whatever falls into her Empire, must fall equally; and if the whole Earth falls into your Scales, it must fall equally; and so you may be a greater People, and yet not swerve from your Principles one hair. Nay, you will be so far from that, that you must bring the world in such a case to your Balance, even to the Balance of Justice. But harken, my Lords; are we on Earth? do we see the Sun? or are we visiting those shady places which are feigned by the Poets?  

Continuò auditae voces, vagitus & ingens.  These Gothic Empires that are yet in the world, were at the first, though they had legs of their own, but a heavy and unwieldy burden; but their Foundations being now broken, the Iron of them enters even into the Souls of the Oppressed; and hear the voice of their Comforters: My Father hath chastised you with Whips, but I will chastise you with Scorpions. Harken, I say; if thy Brother cries to thee in affliction, wilt thou not hear him? This is a Commonwealth of the Fabric, that has an open ear and a public concern; she is not made for herself only, but given as a Magistrate of God to Mankind, for the vindication of common Right, and the Law of Nature. Wherefore says CICERO of the like, that of the Romans, 
* Nos magis Patronatum orbis terrarum suscepimus, quam Imperium.  We have rather undertaken the Patronage, than the Empire of the World. If you, not regarding this Example, like some other Nations that are upon the point to smart for it, shall, having attained to your own Liberty, bear the Sword of your common Magistracy in vain, sit still, and fold your Arms, or, which is worse, let out the Blood of your People to Tyrants, to be shed in the defence of their Yokes like Water, and so not only turn the Grace of God into wantonness, but his Justice into Wormwood: I say if you do thus, you are not now making a Commonwealth, but heaping coals of fire upon your own heads. A Commonwealth of this make is a Minister of God upon Earth, to the end that the World may be governed with Righteousness. For which cause (that I may come at length to our present business) the Orders last rehearsed are buds of Empire, such as with the blessing of God may spread the Arms of your Commonwealth, like a holy Asylum, to the distressed World, and give the Earth her Sabbath of years, or rest from her Labours, under the shadow of your Wings. It is upon this point where the Writings of MACCHIAVEL, having for the rest excelled all other Authors, come as far to excel themselves.  
COMMONWEALTHS, says he, have had three ways of propagating 
Disc. B. 2. C. 4.  themselves, one after the manner of Monarchys, by imposing the Yoke, which was the way of Athens, and towards the latter times of Lacedaemon; another by equal Leagues, which is the way of Switzerland; (I shall add of Holland, though since his time) a third by inequal Leagues, which, to the shame of the World, was never practised, nay nor so much as seen or minded, by any other Commonwealth but that only of Rome. They will each of them, either for caution or imitation, be worthy to be well weighed, which is the proper work of this place. Athens and Lacedaemon have been the occasion of great scandal to the world, in two, or at least one of two regards: the first their Emulation, which involved Greece in perpetual Wars; the second their way of Propagation, which by imposing Yokes upon others, was plainly contradictory to their own Principles.  
FOR the first: Governments, be they of what kind soever, if they be planted too close, are like Trees, that impatient in their growth to have it hindered, eat out one another. It was not unknown to these in speculation, or, if you read the story of AGESILAUS, in action, that either of them with thirty thousand men might have mastered the East; and certainly, if the one had not stood in the others light, ALEXANDER had come too late to that end, which was the means (and would be if they were to live again) of ruin, at least to one of them: wherefore with any man that understands the nature of Government this is excusable. So it was between Oceana and Marpesia; so it is between France and Spain, though less excusable; and so it ever will be in the like cases. But to come to the second occasion of Scandal by them given, which was in the way of their propagation, it is not excusable: for they brought their Confederates under bondage; by which means Athens gave occasion of the Peloponnesian War, the wound of which she died stinking, when Lacedaemon, taking the fame Infection from her Carcase, soon followed.  
WHEREFORE, my Lords, let these be warnings to you, not to make that Liberty which God has given you a snare to others, in practising this kind of enlargement of yourselves.  
THE second way of Propagation or Enlargement used by Commonwealths, is that of Switzerland and Holland, equal Leagues: This, though it be not otherwise mischievous, is useless to the World, and dangerous to themselves: useless to the World; for as the former Governments were Storks, these are Blocks, have no sense of Honour, or concern in the Sufferings of others. But as the Aetolians, a State of the like Fabric, were reproached by PHILIP of Macedon, to prostitute themselves, by letting out their Arms to the Lusts of others, while they leave their own Liberty barren, and without legitimat issue; so I do not defame these People: the Swisser for Valour has no Superior, the Hollander for Industry no equal; but themselves in the mean time shall so much the less excuse their Governments, seeing that to the Switz it is well enough known that the Ensigns of his Commonwealth have no other Motto than in te converte manus: and that of the Hollander, though he sweats more Gold than the Spaniard digs, lets him languish in debt; for she herself lives upon charity. These are dangerous to themselves, precarious Governments, such as do not command, but beg their Bread from Province to Province, in Coats that being patched up of all colours are in effect of none. That their Cantons and Provinces are so many Arrows, is good; but they are so many Bows too, which is naught.  
LIKE to these was the Commonwealth of the ancient Tuscans, hung together like Bobbins, without a hand to wove with them; therefore easily overcome by the Romans, though at that time, for number, a far less considerable People. If your Liberty be not a Root that grows, it will be a Branch that withers; which consideration brings me to the Paragon, the Commonwealth of Rome.  
THE ways and means whereby the Romans acquired the Patronage, and in that the Empire of the World, were different, according to the different condition of their Commonwealth in her rise, and in her growth: in her rise she proceeded rather by Colonies; in her growth by inequal Leagues. Colonies without the bounds of Italy she planted none (such dispersion of the Roman Citizen as to plant him in foreign parts, till the contrary Interest of the Emperors brought in that Practice, was unlawful) nor did she ever demolish any City within that compass, or divest it of Liberty; but whereas the most of them were Commonwealths, stirred up by emulation of her great felicity to war against her, if she overcame any, she confiscated some part of their Lands that were the greatest Incendiaries, or causes of the Trouble, upon which she planted Colonies of her own People, preserving the rest of their Lands and Liberties for the Natives or Inhabitants. By this way of proceeding, that I may be as brief as possible, she did many and great things. For in confirming of Liberty, she propagated her Empire; in holding the Inhabitants from Rebellion, she put a curb upon the incursion of Enemy's; in exonerating herself o● the poorer sort, she multiplied her Citizens; in rewarding her Veterans, she rendered the rest less seditious; and in acquiring to herself the reverence of a common Parent, she from time to time became the Mother of newborn Cities.  
IN her farther growth the way of her Propagation went more upon Leagues, which for the first division were of two kinds, Social and Provincial.  
AGAIN, Social Leagues, or Leagues of Society, were of two kinds.  
THE first called Latinity or Latin, the second Italian Right.  
THE League between the Romans and the Latins, or Latin Right, approached nearest to Jus Quiritium, or the Right of a native Roman. The Man or the City that was honoured with this Right, was Civitate donatus cum suffragio, adopted a Citizen of Rome, with the right of giving Suffrage with the People in some cases, as those of Confirmation of Law, or Determination in Judicature, if both the Consuls were agreed, not otherwise; wherefore that coming to little, the greatest and most peculiar part of this Privilege was, that who had born Magistracy (at least that of Aedil or Quaestor) in any Latin City, was by consequence of the same, a Citizen of Rome at all points.  
ITALIAN Right was also a donation of the City, but without Suffrage: they who were in either of these Leagues, were governed by their own Laws and Magistrates, having all the Rights, as to Liberty, of Citizens of Rome, yielding and paying to the Commonwealth as head of the League, and having in the conduct of all Affairs appertaining to the common Cause, such aid of Men and Money as was particularly agreed to upon the merit of the Cause, and specified in their respective Leagues, whence such Leagues came to be called equal or inequal accordingly.  
PROVINCIAL Leagues were of different extension, according to the Merit and Capacity of a conquered People; but they were all of one kind: for every Province was governed by Roman Magistrates, as a Praetor or a Proconsul, according to the dignity of the Province, for the Civil Administration and Conduct of the Provincial Army; and a Quaestor for the gathering of the public Revenue, from which Magistrates a Province might appeal to Rome.  
FOR the better understanding of these Particulars, I shall exemplify in as many of them as is needful: and first in Macedon.  
THE Macedonians were thrice conquered by the Romans, first under the Conduct of TITUS QUINTUS FLAMINIUS'; secondly, under that of LUCIUS' AEMILIUS PAULUS; and, thirdly, under that of QUINTUS CAECILIUS METELLUS, thence called MACEDONICUS.  
FOR the first time PHILIP of Macedon, who (possessed of Acrocorinthus) boasted no less than was true, that he had Greece in fetters, being overcome by FLAMINIUS', had his Kingdom restored to him, upon condition that he should immediately set all the Cities which he held in Greece and in Asia at liberty; and that he should not make war out of Macedon, but by leave of the Senate of Rome; which PHILIP (having no other way to save any thing) agreed should be done accordingly.  
THE Grecians being at this time assembled at the Isthmian Games, where the Concourse was mighty great, a Crier, appointed to the office by FLAMINIUS', was heard among them proclaiming all Greece to be free; to which the People being amazed at so hopeless a thing, gave little credit, till they received such testimony of the truth as put it past all doubt: whereupon they fell immediately on running to the Proconsul with Flowers and Garlands, and such violent expressions of their Admiration and Joy, as, if FLAMINIUS', a young man, about thirty three, had not also been very strong, he must have died of no other death than their kindness, while every one striving to touch his hand, they bore him up and down the field with an unruly throng, full of such Ejaculations as these: How! Is there a People in the world, that at their own charge, at their own peril, will fight for the Liberty of another? Did they live at the next door to this fire? Or what kind of men are these, whose business it is to pass the Seas, that the World may be governed with Righteousness? The Cities of Greece and of Asia shake off their Iron Fetters at the voice of a Crier! Was it madness to imagine such a thing, and is it done? O Virtue! O Felicity! O Fame!  
IN this Example your Lordships have a donation of Liberty, or of Italian Right to a People, by restitution to what they had formerly enjoyed; and some particular Men, Families, or Cities, according to their merit of the Romans, if not upon this, yet upon the like occasions, were gratified with Latinity.  
BUT PHILIP'S share by this means did not please him, wherefore the League was broken by his Son PERSEUS; and the Macedonians thereupon for the second time conquered by AEMILIUS PAULUS, their King taken, and they some time after the Victory summoned to the Tribunal of the General; where remembering how little hope they ought to have of Pardon, they expected some dreadful Sentence: When AEMILIUS in the first place declared the Macedonians to be free, in the full possession of their Lands, Goods, and Laws, with Right to elect annual Magistrates, yielding and paying to the People of Rome one half of the Tribute which they were accustomed to pay to their own Kings. This don he went on, making so skilful a division of the Country in order to the methodizing of the People, and casting them into a form of popular Government, that the Macedonians, being first surprised with the Virtue of the Romans, began now to alter the scene of their Admiration, that a Stranger should do such things for them in their own Country, and with such facility, as they had never so much as once imagined to be possible. Nor was this all, for AEMILIUS, as if not dictating to conquered Enemy's, but to some well deserving Friends, gave them in the last place Laws so suitable, and contrived with such care and prudence, that long use and experience (the only Correctress of Works of this nature) could never find a fault in them.  
IN this Example you have a Donation of Liberty, or of Italian Right, to a People that had not tasted of it before, but were now taught how to use it.  
MYLORDS, The Royalists should compare what we are doing, and we what hitherto we have done for them, with this example. It is a shame that while we are boasting up ourselves above all others, we should yet be so far from imitating such examples as these, that we do not so much as understand that if Government be the Parent of Manners, where there are no Heroic Virtues, there is no Heroic Government.  
BUT the Macedonians rebelling, at the name of a false PHILIP, the third time against the Romans, were by them judged incapable of Liberty, and reduced by METELLUS to a Province.  
NOW whereas it remains, that I explain the nature of a Province, I shall rather choose that of Sicily, because having been the first which the Romans made, the descriptions of the rest relate to it.  
WE have so received the Sicilian Cities into Amity, says CICERO, that they enjoy their ancient Laws; and upon no other condition than of the same obedience to the People of Rome, which they formerly yielded to their own Princes or Superiors. So the Sicilians, whereas they had been parcelled out to divers Princes, and into divers States (the cause of ●perpetual Wars, whereby, hewing one another down, they became Sacrifices to the Ambition of their Neighbours, or of some Invader) were now received at the old rate into a new Protection which could hold them, and in which no Enemy durst touch them; no● was it possible, as the case then stood, for the Sicilians to receive, or for the Romans to give more.  
A ROMAN Province is defined by SIGONIUS, a Region having Provincial Right. Provincial Right in general was to be governed by a Roman Praetor, or Consul, in matters at least of State, and of the Militia: And by a Quaestor, whose Office it was to receive the Public Revenue. Provincial Right in particular was different, according to the different Leagues or Agreements between the Commonwealth, and the People reduced into a Province. Siculi hoc jure sunt, ut quod civis cum cive agate, domi certet suis legibus; quod Siculus cum Siculo non ejusdem Civitatis, ut de eo Praetor Judices, ex P. Rupilii Decreto, sortiatur. Quod privatus a Populo petit, aut populus a privato, Senatus ex aliqua Civitate, qui judicet, datur, cui alternae Civitates rejectae sunt. Quod civis Romanus a Sic●lo petit, Siculus Judex datur; quod Siculus a cive Romano, civis Romanus datur. Caeterarum rerum selecti Judices ex civium Romanorum conventu proponi solent. Inter aratores & decumanos lege frumentaria, quam Hieronicam appellant, judicia siunt. Because the rest would oblige me to a discourse too large for this place, it shall suffice that I have showed you how it was in Sicily.  
MY LORDS, Upon the Fabric of your Provincial Orb I shall not hold you; because it is sufficiently described in the Order, and I cannot believe that you think it inferior to the way of a Praetor and a Quaestor. But whereas the Provincial way of the Roman Commonwealth was that whereby it held the Empire of the World, and your Orbs are intended to be capable at least of the like use; there may arise many Controversys: As whether such a course be lawful; whether it be feasible; and, seeing that the Romans were ruined upon that point, whether it would not be to the destruction of the Commonwealth.  
FOR the first, If the Empire of a Commonwealth be an occasion to ask whether it be lawful for a Commonwealth to aspire to the Empire of the World, it is to ask whether it be lawful for it to do its duty, or to put the World into a better condition than it was before.  
AND to ask whether this be feasible, is to ask why the Oceaner, being under the like administration of Government, may not do as much with two hundred men as the Roman did with one hundred; for comparing their Commonwealths in their rise, the difference is yet greater. Now that Rome (seris Avaritia Luxuriaque) thro' the natural thirst of her constitution, came at length with the fullness of her Provinces to burst herself, this is no otherwise to be understood, than as when a man that from his own evil Constitution had contracted the Dropsy, dies with drinking: It being apparent that in case her Agrarian had held, she could never have been thus ruined; and I have already demonstrated that your Agrarian being once poised, can never break or swerve.  
WHEREFORE to draw towards some conclusion of this Discourse, let me inculcat the use, by selecting a few Considerations out of many. The regard had in this place to the Empire of the World appertains to a well-ordered Commonwealth, more especially for two reasons.  
1. THE facility of this great Enterprise, by a Government of the Model proposed.  
2. THE danger that you would run in the omission of such a Government.  
THE facility of this Enterprise, upon the grounds already laid, must needs be great, forasmuch as the Empire of the World has been, both in Reason and Experience, the necessary consequence of a Commonwealth of this nature only: for though it has been given to all kinds to drive at it, since that of Athens or Lacedaemon, if the one had not hung in the others light, might have gained it; yet could neither of them have held it: not Athens, thro' the manner of her propagation, which, being by downright Tyranny, could not preserve what she had; nor Lacedaemon, because she was overthrown by the weight of a less Conquest. The facility then of this great Enterprise being peculiar to popular Government, I shall consider it, first, In gaining; and secondly, In holding.  
FOR the former, Volenti non sit injuria; it is said of the People under EUMENES, that they would not have changed their subjection for Liberty; wherefore the Romans gave them no disturbance. If a People be contented with their Government, it is a certain sign that it is good, and much good do them with it. The Sword of your Magistracy is for a terror to them that do evil. EUMENES had the sear of God, or of the Romans before his eyes; concerning such he has given you no Commission.  
BUT till we can say here are the Romans, where is EUMENES? Do not think that the late appearances of God to you have been altogether for yourselves; he has surely seen the Affliction of your Brethren, and heard their cry by reason of their Taskmasters. For to believe otherwise, is not only to be mindless of his ways, but altogether deaf. If you have ears to hear, this is the way in which you will certainly be called upon: For if, while there is no stock of Liberty, no sanctuary of the afflicted, it be a common object to behold a People casting themselves out of the Pan of one Prince into the Fire of another; what can you think, but if the World should see the Roman Eagle again, she would renew her age, and her slight? Nor did ever she spread her Wings with better Omen, than will be read in your Ensigns; which if, called in by an oppressed People, they interpose between them and their Yoke, the People themselves must either do nothing in the mean time, or have no more pains to take for their wished Fruit than to gather it, if that be not likewise done for them. Wherefore this must needs be easy, and yet you have a greater facility than is in the arm of flesh; for if the Cause of Mankind be the Cause of God, the Lord of Hosts will be your Captain, and you shall be a Praise to the whole Earth.  
THE facility of Holding is in the way of your Propagation; if you take that of Athens and Lacedaemon, you shall rain Snares; but either catch, or hold nothing. Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord: If setting up for Liberty, you impose Yokes, he will infallibly destroy you. On the other side, to go about a work of this nature by a League without a Head, is to abdicat that Magistracy, wherewith he has not only endued you, but whereof he will require an account of you; for, cursed is he that does the Work of the Lord negligently. Wherefore you are to take the course of Rome: if you have subdued a Nation that is capable of Liberty, you shall make them a present of it, as did FLAMINIUS' to Greece, and AEMILIUS to Macedon, reserving to yourselves some part of that Revenue which was legally paid to the former Government, together with the right of being Head of the League, which includes such Levys of Men and Money as shall be necessary for the carrying on of the Public Work. For if a People have by your means attained to freedom, they owe both to the Cause and you, such Aid as may propagat the like Fruit to the rest of the World. But whereas every Nation is not capable of her Liberty to this degree, lest you be put to doing and undoing of things, as the Romans were in Macedon, you shall diligently observe what Nation is fit for her Liberty to this degree, and what not: Which is to be done by two Marks, the first if she be willing to help the Lord against the Mighty; for if she has no care of the Liberty of Mankind, she deserves not her own. But because in this you may be deceived by Pretences, which, continuing for a while specious, may afterwards vanish; the other is more certain, and that is if she be capable of an equal Agrarian; which that it was not observed by excellent AEMILIUS in his donation of Liberty, and introduction of a Popular State among the Macedonians, I am more than moved to believe for two reasons: the first, because at the same time the Agrarian was odious to the Roman Patricians; the second, that the PSEUDO-PHILIP could afterwards so easily recover Macedon, which could not have happened but by the Nobility, and their impatience, having great Estates, to be equalled with the People; for that the People should otherwise, at the mere sound of a Name, have thrown away their Liberty, is incredible. Wherefore be assured, that the Nation where you cannot establish an equal Agrarian, is incapable of its Liberty as to this kind of Donation. For example, except the Aristocracy in Marpesia be dissolved, neither can that People have their Liberty there, nor you govern at home; for they continuing still liable to be sold by their Lords to foreign Princes, there will never (especially in a Country of which there is no other profit to be made) be want of such Merchants and Drovers, while you must be the Market where they are to receive their second Payment.  
NOR can the Aristocracy there be dissolved but by your means, in relation whereto you are provided with your Provincial Orb; which being proportioned to the measure of the Nation that you have vindicated or conquered, will easily hold it: for there is not a People in the World more difficult to be held than the Marpesians, which though by themselves it be ascribed to their own nature, is truly to be attributed to that of their Country. Nevertheless you having nine thousand men upon the continual guard of it, that, threatened by any sudden insurrection, have places of retreat; and an Army of forty thousand men upon a days warning ready to march to their rescue; it is not to be rationally shown which way they can possibly slip out of your hands. And if a man shall think that upon a Province more remote, and divided by the Sea, you have not the like hold, he has not so well considered your Wings as your Talons, your shipping being of such a nature, as makes the descent of your Arms almost of equal facility in any Country: so that what you take you hold, both because your Militia, being already populous, will be of great growth in itself; and also thro' your Confederates, by whom in taking and holding you are still more enabled to do both.  
NOR shall you easilier hold, than the People under your Empire or Patronage may be held. My Lords, I would not go to the door to see whether it be close shut; this is no underhand dealing, nor a game at which he shall have any advantage against you who sees your Cards, but on the contrary the Advantage shall be your own: for with eighteen thousand men (which number I put, because it circulats your Orb by the annual change of six thousand) having established your matters in the order shown, you will be able to hold the greatest Province; and eighteen thousand men, allowing them greater pay than any Prince ever gave, will not stand the Province in one million Revenue; 
* This by the pay of a Parliamentary Army, is demonstrated in the Corollary.  in consideration whereof, they shall have their own Estates free to themselves, and be governed by their own Laws and Magistrates; which, if the Revenue of the Province be in dry Rent (as there may be some that are four times as big as Oceana) forty millions, will bring it with that of Industry, to speak with the least, to twice the value: So that the People there, who at this day are so oppressed that they have nothing at all whereon to live, shall for one Million paid to you, receive at least seventy nine to their proper use: in which place I appeal to any man, whether the Empire described can be other than the Patronage of the World.  
NOW if you add to the propagation of Civil Liberty (so natural to this Commonwealth that it cannot be omitted) the propagation of the Liberty of Conscience, this Empire, this Patronage of the World is the Kingdom of Christ: For as the Kingdom of God the Father was a Commonwealth, so shall be the Kingdom of God 
Psal. 110. 3.  the Son; The People shall be willing in the day of his Power.  
HAVING showed you in this and other places, some of those inestimable Benefits of this kind of Government, together with the natural and facile Emanation of them from their Fountain, I come (lest God, who has appeared to you, for he is the God of Nature, in the glorious Constellation of these subordinat Causes, whereof we have hitherto been taking the true Elevation, should shake off the dust of his Feet against you) to warn you of the Dangers which you, not taking the opportunity, will incur by omission.  
MACCHIAVEL speaking of the defect of Venice, thro' her want of proper Arms, cries out, 
† Questo tagliogli le gambe da montar in cielo.  This cut her Wings, and spoiled her mount to Heaven. If you lay your Commonwealth upon any other Foundation than the People, you frustrate yourself of proper Arms, and so lose the Empire of the World; nor is this all, but some other Nation will have it.  
COLUMBUS' offered Gold to one of your Kings, thro' whose happy incredulity another Prince has drunk the Poison, even to the consumption of his People; but I do not offer you a Nerve of War that is made of Pursestrings, such a one as has drawn the face of the Earth into Convulsions, but such as is natural to her Health and Beauty. Look you to it, where there is tumbling and tossing upon the bed of sickness, it must end in death or recovery. Tho the People of the World, in the dregs of the Gothic Empire, be yet tumbling and tossing upon the bed of sickness, they cannot die; nor is there any means of recovery for them but by ancient prudence, whence of necessity it must come to pass, that this Drug be better known. If France, Italy, and Spain, were not all sick, all corrupted together, there would be none of them so; for the sick would not be able to withstand the sound, nor the sound to preserve their health without curing of the sick. The first of these Nations (which, if you stay her leisure, will in my mind be France) that recovers the health of ancient Prudence, shall certainly govern the World; for what did Italy when she had it? And as you were in that, so shall you in the like case be reduced to a Province; I do not speak at random. Italy, in the Consulship of LUCIUS' AEMILIUS PAPUS, and CAIUS ATILIUS REGULUS, armed upon the Gallic Tumult that then happened of herself, and without the Aid of foreign auxiliaries, seventy thousand Horse, and seven hundred thousand Foot: But as Italy is the least of those three Countries in extent, so is France now the most populous.  
I, decus, I, nostrum, melioribus utere fatis.  
MY dear Lords, Oceana is as the Rose of Sharon, and the Lily of the Valley. As the Lily among Thorns, such is my Love among the Daughters. She is comely as the Tents of Kedar, and terrible as an Army with Banners. Her Neck is as the Tower of David, builded for an Armoury, whereon there hang a thousand Bucklers and Shields of mighty Men. Let me hear thy Voice in the morning, whom my Soul loves. The South has dropped, and the West is breathing upon thy Garden of Spices. Arise, Queen of the Earth, Arise, holy Spouse of Jesus; for lo the Winter is past, the Rain is over and gone; the Flowers appear on the Earth, the time for the singing of Birds is come, and the Voice of the Turtle is heard in our Land. Arise, I say, come forth, and do not tarry: Ah! wherefore should my eyes behold thee by the Rivers of Babylon, hanging thy Harps upon the Willows, thou fairest among Women?  
EXCELLENT PATRIOTS; If the People be Sovereign, here is that which establishes their Prerogative: If we be sincere, here is that which disburdens our Souls, and makes good all our Engagements: If we he charitable, here is that which embraces all Parties: If we would be settled, here is that which will stand, and last for ever.  
IF our Religion be any thing else but a vain boast, scratching and defacing human Nature or Reason, which, being the Image of God, makes it a kind of Murder; here is that Empire whence Justice 
Amos 5. 24.  shall run down like a River, and Judgement like a mighty Stream. Who is it then that calls us? or what is in our way? a Lion! is it not the Dragon that old Serpent? for what wretched shifts are these? Here is a great deal, might we not have some of this at one time, and some at another?  
MY LORDS, permit me to give you the Sum, or brief  

Epitome of the whole Commonwealth.  
THE Centre or Fundamental Laws are, first, the Agrarian, proportioned at two thousand Pounds a Year in Land, ●ying and being within the proper Territory of Oceana, and stating Property in Land at such a balance, that the Power can never swerve out of the hands of the Many.  
SECONDLY, The Ballot conveying this equal Sap from the Root, by an equal Election or Rotation, into the Branches of Magistracy or Sovereign Power.  
THE Orbs of this Commonwealth being Civil, Military or Provincial, are, as it were, cast upon this Mould or Centre by the Divisions of the People; First into Citizens and Servants: Secondly, into Youth and Elders: Thirdly, into such as have one hundred Pounds a year in Lands, Goods or Monies, who are of the Horse; and such as have under, who are of the Foot: Fourthly, they are divided by their usual residence, into Parishes, Hundreds, and Tribes.  
THE Civil Orbs consist of the Elders, and are thus created; every Monday next ensuing the last of December, the Elders in every Parish elect the fifth man to be a Deputy; which is but half a days work: every Monday next ensuing the last of January, the Deputies meet at their respective Hundred, and elect out of their number one Justice of the Peace, one Juryman, one Coroner, and one High Constable of the Foot; one days work.  
EVERY Monday next ensuing the last of February, the Hundreds meet at their respective Tribe, and there elect the Lords High Sheriff, Lieutenant, Custos Rotulorum, the Conductor, the two Censors out of the Horse, the Magistrates of the Tribe and of the Hundreds, with the Jurymen constituting the Phylarch, and who assist in their respective Offices at the Assizes, hold the Quarter Sessions, etc. The day following the Tribe elects the annual Galaxy, consisting of two Knights, and three Deputies out of the Horse, with four Deputies out of the Foot, thereby endued with Power, as Magistrates of the whole Nation, for the term of three years. An Officer chosen at the Hundred may not be elected a Magistrate of the Tribe; but a Magistrate or Officer either of the Hundred or of the Tribe, being elected into the Galaxy, may substitute any one of his own Order to his Magistracy or Office in the Hundred, or in the Tribe. This of the Muster is two days work. So the body of the People is annually, at the charge of three days work and a half, in their own Tribes, for the perpetuation of their Power, receiving over and above the Magistracies so divided among them.  
EVERY Monday next ensuing the last of March, the Knights, being a Hundred in all the Tribes, take their places in the Senate; the Knights, having taken their places in the Senate, make the third Region of the same; and the House proceeds to the Senatorian Elections. Senatorian Elections are annual, biennial, or emergent.  
THE annual are performed by the Tropic.  
THE Tropic is a Schedule consisting of two parts; the first by which the Senatorian Magistrates are elected; and the second, by which the Senatorian Councils are perpetuated.  
THE first part is of this Tenor.  
THE Lord Strategus, Annual Magistrates, and therefore such as may be elected out of any Region; the term of every Region having at the Tropic one year at the least unexpired. THE Lord Orator, THE first Censor, THE second Censor,  
THE third Commissioner of the Seal, Triennial Magistrates, and therefore such as can be chosen out of the third Region only, as that alone which has the term of three years unexpired. THE third Commissioner of the Treasury,  
THE Strategus and the Orator sitting, are Consuls, or Precedents of the Senat.  
THE Strategus marching is General of the Army, in which case a new Strategus is elected to sit in his room.  
THE Strategus sitting with the six Commissioners, being Counsillors of the Nation, are the Signory of the Commonwealth.  
THE Censors are Magistrates of the Ballot, Precedents of the Council for Religion, and Chancellors of the Vniversitys.  
THE second part of the Tropic perpetuats the Council of State, by the election of five Knights out of the first Region of the Senate, to be the first Region of that Council consisting of fifteen Knights, five in every Region.  
THE like is done by the election of four into the Council of Religion, and four into the Council of Trade, out of the same Region in the Senate; each of these Councils consisting of twelve Knights, four in every Region.  
BUT the Council of War consisting of nine Knights, three in every Region, is elected by and out of the Council of State, as the other Councils are elected by and out of the Senat. And if the Senate add a Juncta of nine Knights more, elected out of their own number, for the term of three months, the Council of War, by virtue of that addition, is Dictator of Oceana for the said term.  
THE Signory jointly or severally has right of Session and Suffrage in every Senatorian Council, and to propose either to the Senate, or any of them. And every Region in a Council electing one weekly Provost, any two of those Provosts have Power also to propose to their respective Council, as the proper and peculiar Proposers of the same: for which cause they hold an Academy, where any man either by word of mouth, or writing, may propose to the Proposers.  
NEXT to the Elections of the Tropic is the biennial Election of one Ambassador in ordinary, by the Ballot of the House, to the Residence of France; at which time the Resident of France removes to Spain, he of Spain to Venice, he of Venice to Constantinople, and he of Constantinople returns. So the Orb of the Residents is wheeled about in eight years, by the biennial Election of one Ambassador in Ordinary.  
THE last kind of Election is emergent. Emergent Elections are made by the Scrutiny. Election by Scrutiny is when a Competitor being made by a Council, and brought into the Senate, the Senate chooses four more Competitors to him; and putting all five to the Ballot, he who has most above half the Suffrages, is the Magistrate. The Polemarches or Field Officers are chosen by the Scrutiny of the Council of War; an Ambassador Extraordinary by the Scrutiny of the Council of State; the Judges and Sergeants at Law by the Scrutiny of the Seal; and the Barons and prime Officers of the Exchequer, by the Scrutiny of the Treasury.  
THE Opinion or Opinions that are legitimatly proposed to any Council must be debated by the same, and so many as are resolved upon the Debate are introduced into the Senate, where they are debated and resolved, or rejected by the whole House: that which is resolved by the Senate is a Decree, which is good in matters of State, but no Law, except it be proposed to, and resolved by the Prerogative.  
THE Deputies of the Galaxy being three Horse and four Foot in a Tribe, amount in all the Tribes to one hundred and fifty Horse, and two hundred Foot; which, having entered the Prerogative, and chosen their Captains, Cornet and Ensign (triennial Officers) make the third Classis, consisting of one Troop, and one Company; and so joining with the whole Prerogative, elect four annual Magistrates, called Tribune's, whereof two are of the Horse, and two of the Foot. These have the Command of the Prerogative Sessions, and Suffrage in the Council of War, and Sessions without Suffrage in the Senat.  
THE Senate having past a Decree which they would propose to the People, cause it to be printed and published, or promulgated for the space of six weeks; which being ordered, they choose their Proposers. The Proposers must be Magistrates, that is, the Commissioners of the Seal, those of the Treasury, or the Censors. These being chosen, desire the Muster of the Tribune's, and appoint the day. The People being assembled at the day appointed, and the Decree proposed, that which is proposed by authority of the Senate, and commanded by the People, is the Law of Oceana, or an Act of Parliament.  
SO the Parliament of Oceana consists of the Senate proposing, and the People resolving.  
THE People or Prerogative are also the Supreme Judicatory of this Nation, having Power of hearing and determining all Causes of Appeal from all Magistrates, or Courts Provincial, or Domestic; as also to question any Magistrate, the term of his Magistracy being expired, if the Case be introduced by the Tribune's, or any one of them.  
THE Military Orbs consist of the Youth, that is, such as are from eighteen to thirty years of Age; and are created in the following manner.  
EVERY Wednesday next ensuing the last of December, the Youth of every Parish assembling, elect the fifth of their number to be their Deputies; the Deputies of the Youth are called Stratiots, and this is the first Essay.  
EVERY Wednesday next ensuing the last of January, the Stratiots assembling at the Hundred, elect their Captain and their Ensign, and fall to their Games and Sports.  
EVERY Wednesday next ensuing the last of February, the Stratiots are received by the Lord Lieutenant their Commander in Chief, with the Conductors and the Censors; and, having been disciplined and entertained with other Games, are called to the Urns, where they elect the second Essay, consisting of two hundred Horse and six hundred Foot in a Tribe; that is, of ten thousand Horse, and thirty thousand Foot in all the Tribes, which is the Standing Army of this Nation, to march at any warning. They also elect at the same time a part of the third Essay, by the mixture of Balls marked with the letter M, and the letter P, for Marpesia and Panopea; they of either mark being ten Horse and fifty Foot in a Tribe, that is, five hundred Horse and two thousand five hundred Foot in all the Tribes, which are forthwith to march to their respective Provinces.  
BUT the third Essay of this Nation more properly so called, is when the Strategus with the Polemarches (the Senate and the People, or the Dictator having decreed a War) receive in return of his Warrants the second Essay from the hands of the Conductors at the Rendezvous of Oceana; which Army marching with all Accommodations provided by the Council of War, the Senate elects a new Strategus, and the Lords Lieutenants a new second Essay.  
A YOUTH, except he be an only Son, refusing any one of his three Essays, without sufficient cause shown to the Phylarch or the Censors, is incapable of Magistracy, and is fined a fifth part of his yearly Rent, or of his Estate, for Protection. In case of Invasion the Elders are obliged to like duty with the Youth, and upon their own charge.  
THE Provincial Orb consisting in part of the Elders, and in part of the Youth, is thus created.  
FOUR Knights out of the first Region falling, are elected in the Senate to be the first Region of the Provincial Orb of Marpesia; these being triennial Magistrates, take their places in the Provincial Council, consisting of twelve Knights, four in every Region, each Region choosing their weekly Provosts of the Council thus constituted. One Knight more chosen out of the same Region in the Senate, being an annual Magistrate, is Precedent, with Power to propose; and the Opinions proposed by the Precedent, or any two of the Provosts, are debated by the Council, and, if there be occasion of farther Power or Instruction than they yet have, transmitted to the Council of State, with which the Provincial is to hold Intelligence.  
THE Precedent of this Council is also Strategus, or General of the Provincial Army; wherefore the Conductors upon notice of his Election, and appointment of his Rendezvous, deliver to him the Stratiots of his Letter, which he takes with him into his Province: and the Provincial Army having received the new Strategus with the third Classis, the Council dismisses the old Strategus with the first Classis. The like is done for Panopea, or any other Province.  
BUT whereas the term of every other Magistracy or Election in this Commonwealth, whether annual or triennial, requires an equal Vacation, the term of a Provincial Counsillor or Magistrate requires no Vacation at all. The Quorum of a Provincial, as also that of every other Council and Assembly, requires two thirds in a time of health, and one third in a time of sickness.   
I THINK I have omitted nothing but the Props and Scaffolds, which are not of use but in building. And how much is here? Show me another Commonwealth in this compass? How many things? Show me another entire Government consisting but of thirty Orders. If you now go to Law with any body, there lie to some of our Courts two hundred Original Writs: If you stir your hand, there go more Nerves and Bones to that motion: If you play, you have more Cards in the pack; nay you could not sit with your ease in that Chair, if it consisted not of more parts. Will you not then allow to your Legislator, what you can afford your Upholdster; or to the Throne, what is necessary to a Chair?  
MY LORDS, If you will have fewer Orders in a Commonwealth, you will have more; for where she is not perfect at first, every day, every hour will produce a new Order, the end whereof is to have no Order at all, but to grind with the clack of some Demagog. Is he providing already for his golden Thum? Lift up your heads; Away with Ambition, that fulsome complexion of a Statesman, tempered, like SULLA'S, with blood and muck. And the Lord give to his Senator's Wisdom; and make our faces to shine, that we may be a Light to them that sit in darkness and the shadow of death, to guide their feet in the way of Peace.— In the name of God, what's the matter!—   
PHILADELPHUS the Secretary of the Council having performed his task in reading the several Orders as you have seen, upon the receipt of a Packet from his Correspondent BOCCALINI, Secretary of Parnassus, in reading one of the Letters, burst forth into such a violent passion of weeping and downright howling, that the Legislators being startled with the apprehension of some horrid news; one of them had no sooner snatched the Letter out of his hand, than the rest crying, Read, Read, he obeyed in this manner.  
THE 3d instant his Phoebean Majesty having taken the nature of Free States into his Royal consideration, and being steadily persuaded that the Laws in such Governments are incomparably better and more surely directed to the good of Mankind than in any other; that the Courage of such a 
Trajano Boccalini, Centuria 1. Raggual. 21.  People is the aptest tinder to noble fire; that the Genius of such a Soil is that wherein the roots of good Literature are least worm-eaten with Pedantism, and where their Fruits have ever come to the greatest maturity and highest relish; conceived such a loathing of their Ambition and Tyranny, who, usurping the liberty of their native Countries, become slaves to themselves, inasmuch as (be it never so contrary to their own Nature or Consciences) they have taken the earnest of Sin, and are engaged to persecute all Men that are good with the same or greater rigour than is ordained by Laws for the wicked: For 
* Nemo unquam imperium flagitio quaesitum bonis artibus exercuit.  none ever administered that Power by good, which he purchased by ill Arts: PHOEBUS, I say, having considered this, assembled all the Senators residing in the learned Court at the Theatre of MELPOMENE, where he caused CAESAR the Dictator to come upon the stage, and his Sister ACTIA, his Nephew AUGUSTUS, JULIA his Daughter, with the Children which she had by MARCUS AGRIPPA, LUCIUS' and CAIUS CAESAR'S, AGRIPPA POSTHUMUS, JULIA, and AGRIPPINA, with the numerous Progeny which she bore to her renowned Husband GERMANICUS, to enter. A miserable Scene in any, but most deplorable in the eyes of CAESAR, thus beholding what havoc his prodigious Ambition, not satisfied with his own bloody Ghost, had made upon his more innocent Remains, even to the total extinction of his Family. For it is (seeing where there is any humanity, there must be some compassion) not to be spoken without tears, that of the full branches deriving from OCTAVIA the elder Sister, and JULIA the Daughter of AUGUSTUS, there should not be one fruit or blossom that was not cut off or blasted by the Sword, Famine, or Poison. Now might the great Soul of CAESAR have been full; and yet that which poured in as much or more, was to behold that execrable race of the CLAUDII, having hunted and sucked his Blood with the thirst of Tigers, to be rewarded with the Roman Empire, and remain in full possession of that famous Patrimony: a Spectacle to pollute the Light of Heaven! Nevertheless as if CAESAR had not yet enough, his Phoebean Majesty caused to be introduced on the other side of the Theatre, the most illustrious and happy Prince ANDREA DORIA, with his dear Posterity, embraced by the soft and constant arms of the City of Genoa, into whose bosom, ever fruitful in her gratitude, he had dropped her fair LIBERTY like the dew of Heaven; which when the Roman Tyrant beheld, and how much more fresh that Laurel was worn with a firm root in the Hearts of the People, than that which he had torn off, he fell into such a horrid distortion of limbs and countenance, that the Senators who had thought themselves steel and flint at such an object, having hitherto stood in their reverend snowlike thawing Alps, now covered their faces with their large sleeves.  

MY Lords, said the ARCHON rising, witty PHILADELPHUS has given us a grave admonition in a dreadful Tragedy. Discite justitiam moniti, & non temnere Divos. Great and glorious Caesar, the highest character of flesh, yet could not rule but by that part of Man which is the beast: but a Commonwealth is a Monarchy; to her God is King, in as much as Reason, his dictat, is her Sovereign Power.   
WHICH said, he adjourned the Council. And the Model was soon after promulgated. Quod bonum, foelix, faustumque sit huic Reipublicae. Agite Quirites, censuere Patres, jubeat Populus: The Sea roared, and the Floods clapped their hands.  

LIBERTAS.  
The Proclamation of his Highness the Lord ARCHON of OCEANA upon Promulgation of the Model.  

See the course of the Decemvirs in the promulgation of the first ten of their twelve Tables in LIVY.  Whereas his Highness and the Council, in the framing of the Model promulgated, have not had any private interest, or ambition, but the fear of God, and the good of this People before their eyes; and it remains their desire that this great Work may be carried on accordingly: This present greeting is to inform the good People of this Land, that as the Council of Prytans sat during the framing of the Model, to receive from time to time such Propositions as should be offered by any wisehearted or public spirited man, towards the institution of a well ordered Commonwealth, so the said Council is to sit as formerly in the great Hall of the Pantheon during Promulgation (which is to continue for the space of three months) to receive, weigh, and, as there shall be occasion, transmit to the Council of Legislators, all such Objections as shall be made against the said Model, whether in the whole, or in any part. Wherefore, that nothing be done rashly, or without consent of the People, such, of what party soever, with whom there may remain any doubts o● difficulties, are desired with all convenient speed to address themselves to the said Prytans; where, if such objections, doubts, or difficulties receive solution to the satisfaction of the Auditory, they shall have public thanks: but if the said objections, doubts or difficulties, receive no solution to the satisfaction of the Auditory, than the Model promulgated shall be reviewed, and the party that was the occasion of the review, shall receive public thanks, together with the best Horse in his Highness' Stable, and be one of the Council of Legislators. And so God have you in his keeping.   
I SHOULD now write the same Council of the Prytans, but for two reasons; the one, that having had but a small time for that which is already done, I am overlabored; the other, that there may be new Objections. Wherefore if my Reader has any such as to the Model, I entreat him to address himself by way of Oration, as it were, to the Prytans, that when this rough draught comes to be a work, his Speech being faithfully inserted in this place, may give, or receive correction to amendment: For what is written will be weighed. But Conversation, in these days, is a game, at which they are best provided that have light Gold: It is like the sport of Women that make Flowers of straws, which must be stuck up, but may not be touched. Nor, which is worse, is this the fault of Conversation only: But to the Examiner, 
Arist. Rhet.  I say, If to invent method, and to teach an art, be all one, let him show that this Method is not truly invented, or this Art is faithfully taught.  
I CANNOT conclude a Circle (and such is this Commonwealth) without turning the end into the beginning. The time of Promulgation being expired, the Surveyors were sent down, who having in due season made report that their work was perfect, the Orators followed; under the administration of which Officers and Magistrates the Commonwealth was ratified and established by the whole body of the People, in their 
* Curiatis, Centuriatis, & Tributis Comitiis.  Parochial, Hundred, and County Assemblys. And the Orators being, by virtue of their Scrols or Lots, Members of their respective Tribes, were elected each the first Knight of the third List, or Galaxy: wherefore having at their return assisted the ARCHON in putting the Senate, and the People or Prerogative into motion, they abdicated the Magistracy both of Orators and Legislators.   

The COROLLARY.  
FOR the rest (says PLUTARCH, closing up the story of LYCURGUS) when he saw that his Government had taken root, and was in the very Plantation strong enough to stand by itself, he conceived such a delight within him, as GOD is described by PLATO to have done when he had finished the Creation of the World, and saw his own Orbs move below him: For in the Art of Man (being the imitation of Nature, which is the 
‖ Hobbs.  Art of GOD) there is nothing so like the first call of beautiful Order out of Chaos and Confusion, as the Architecture of a welordered Commonwealth. Wherefore LYCURGUS seeing in effect, that his Orders were good, fell into deep Contemplation how he might render them, so far as could be effected by human Providence, inalterable and immortal. To which end he assembled the People, and remonstrated to them, That for aught he could perceive, their Policy was already such, and so well established, as was sufficient to entail upon them and theirs all that Virtue and Felicity whereof human Life is capable: Nevertheless that there being another thing of greater concern than all the rest, whereof he was not yet provided to give them a perfect account, nor could, till he had consulted the Oracle of APOLLO, he desired that they would observe his Laws without any change or alteration whatsoever, till his return from Delphos; to which all the People cheerfully and unanimously engaged themselves by promise, desiring him that he would make as much hast as he could. But LYCURGUS before he went, began with the Kings and the Senators, and thence taking the whole People in order, made them all swear to that which they had promised, and then took his Journey. Being arrived at Delphos, he sacrificed to APOLLO, and afterwards enquired if the Policy which he had established, was good and sufficient for a virtuous and a happy Life? By the way, it has been a Maxim with Legislators not to give checks to the present Superstition, but to make the best use of it, as that which is always the most powerful with the People; otherwise though PLUTARCH being a Priest, was interested in the cause, there is nothing plainer than CICERO in his Book De Divinatione has made it, that there was never any such thing as an Oracle, except in the cunning of the Priests. But to be civil to the Author, The God answered to LYCURGUS, that his Policy was exquisite, and that his City, holding to the strict observation of his form of Government, should attain to the height of fame and glory. Which Oracle LYCURGUS causing to be written, failed not of transmitting to his Lacedaemon. This don, that his Citizens might be for ever inviolably bound by their Oath, that they would alter nothing till his return, he took so firm a resolution to die in the place, that from thenceforward receiving no manner of Food, he soon after performed it accordingly. Nor was he deceived in the consequence; for his City became the first in glory and excellency of Government in the whole World. And so much for LYCURGUS according to PLUTARCH.  
MY Lord ARCHON when he beheld not only the rapture of motion, but of joy and harmony, into which his Spheres (without any manner of obstruction or interfering, but as if it had been naturally) were cast, conceived not less of exultation in his Spirit; but saw no more necessity or reason why he should administer an Oath to the Senate and the People that they would observe his Institutions, than to a Man in perfect health and felicity of Constitution, that he would not kill himself. Nevertheless whereas Christianity, though it forbids violent hands, consists no less in selfdenial than any other Religion, he resolved that all unreasonable Desires should die upon the spot; to which end that no manner of food might be left to Ambition, he entered into the Senate with a unanimous Applause, and having spoken of his Government as LYCURGUS did when he assembled the People, he abdicated the Magistracy of ARCHON. The Senate, as struck with astonishment, continued silent; Men upon so sudden an Accident being altogether unprovided of what to say; till the ARCHON withdrawing, and being almost at the door, divers of the Knights flew from their Places, offering as it were to lay violent hands on him, while he escaping left the Senate with the tears in their Eyes of Children that had lost their Father; and to rid himself of all farther importunity, retired to a Country House of his, being remote, and very private, in so much that no man could tell for some time what was become of him. Thus the Lawmaker happened to be the first object and reflection of the Law made: For as Liberty of all things is the most welcome to a People, 
Never Ingratitude, but to● much Love, the constant fault of the People.  so is there nothing more abhorrent from their nature than Ingratitude. We, accusing the Roman People of this Crime against some of their greatest Benefactors, as CAMILLUS, heap mistake upon mistake; for being not so competent Judges of what belongs to Liberty as they were, we take upon us to be more competent Judges of Virtue. And whereas Virtue, for being a vulgar thing among them, was of no less rate than Jewels are with such as wear the most; we are selling this precious Stone, which we have ignorantly raked out of the Roman ruins, at such a rate as the Swissers did that which they took in the Baggage of CHARLES of Burgundy. For that CAMILLUS had stood more firm against the ruin of Rome than her Capitol, was acknowleged; but on the other side that he stood as firm for the Patricians against the Liberty of the People, was as plain: wherefore he never wanted those of the People that would die at his foot in the Field, nor that would withstand him to his beard in the City. An example in which they that think CAMILLUS had wrong, neither do themselves right, nor the People of Rome; who in this signify no less than that they had a scorn of Slavery beyond the sear of Ruin, which is the height of Magnanimity. The like might be shown by other examples objected against this, and other Popular Governments, as in the Banishment of ARISTIDES the Just from Athens, by the Ostracism, which, first, was no punishment, nor ever understood for so much as a disparagement; but tended only to the Security of the Commonwealth, thro' the removal of a Citizen (whose Riches or Power with a Party was suspected) out of harms way for the space of ten years, neither to the diminution of his Estate or Honor. And next, though the virtue of ARISTIDES might in itself be unquestioned, yet for him under the name of the Just to become Universal Umpire of the People in all cases, even to the neglect of the legal ways and orders of the Commonwealth, approached so much to the Prince, that the Athenians, doing ARISTIDES no wrong, did their Government no more than right in removing him; which therefore is not so probable to have come to pass, as PLUTARCH presumes, thro' the envy of THEMISTOCLES, seeing ARISTIDES was far more popular than THEMISTOCLES, who soon after took the same walk upon a worse occasion. Wherefore as MACCHIAVEL, for any thing since alleged, has irrefragably proved that Popular Governments are of all others the least ingrateful; so the obscurity, I say, into which my Lord ARCHON had now withdrawn himself, caused a universal sadness and cloud in the minds of Men upon the glory of his rising Commonwealth.  
MUCH had been ventilated in private discourse, and the People (for the Nation was yet divided into Parties that had not lost their animosities) being troubled, bend their eyes upon the Senate, when, after some time spent in devotion, and the solemn action of Thanksgiving, his Excellency NAVARCHUS DE PARALO in the Tribe of Dorean, Lord Strategus of Oceana (though in a new Commonwealth a very prudent Magistrate) proposed his part or opinion in such a manner to the Council of State, that passing the Ballot of the same with great unanimity and applause, it was introduced into the Senate, where it passed with greater. Wherefore the Decree being forthwith printed and published, Copies were returned by the Secretaries to the Phylarches (which is the manner of Promulgation) and the Commissioners of the Seal, that is to say, the Right Honourable PHOSPHORUS DE AUGE in the Tribe of Eudia, DOLABELLA D' ENYO in the Tribe of Turmae, and LYNCEUS DE STELLA in the Tribe of Nubia, being elected Proposers pro tempore, bespoke of the Tribune's a Muster of the People to be held that day six weeks, which was the time allowed for Promulgation at the Halo.  
THE Satisfaction which the People throout the Tribes received upon promulgation of the Decree, loaded the Carriers with weekly Letters between Friend and Friend, whether Magistrates or private Persons. But the day for Proposition being come, and the Prerogative upon the Place appointed in Discipline, SANGUINE DE RINGWOOD in the Tribe of Saltum, Captain of the Phoenix, marched by order of the Tribune's with his Troop to the Piazza of the Pantheon, where his Trumpets entering into the great Hall by their Blazon gave notice of his Arrival; at which the Sergeant of the House came down, and returning informed the Proposers, who descending were received at the foot of the Stairs by the Captain, and attended to the Coaches of State, with which CALCAR DE GILVO in the Tribe of Phalera Master of the Horse, and the Ballotins upon their great Horses, stood waiting at the Gate.  
THE Proposers being in their Coaches, the Train for the Pomp, the same that is used at the reception of Ambassadors, proceeded in this order: In the Front marched the Troop with the Cornet in the Van, and the Captain in the Rear: next the Troop came the twenty Messengers or Trumpets; the Ballotins upon the Curvet with their Usher in the Van, and the Master of the Horse in the Rear: Next the Ballotins, BRONCUS DE RAUCO in the Tribe of Bestia King of the Heralds, with his Fraternity in their Coats of Arms; and next to Sir BRONCHUS, BORISTHENES DE HOLIWATER in the Tribe of Ave, Master of the Ceremonies: The Mace and the Seal of the Chancery went immediately before the Coaches; and on either side, the Doorkeepers or Guard of the Senate, with their Pole-axes, accompanied with some three or four hundred Footmen belonging to the Knights or Senators; the Trumpeters, Ballotins, Guards, Postilions, Coachmen and Footmen, being very gallant in the Liveries of the Commonwealth; but all, except the Ballotins, without Hats, in lieu whereof they wore black velvet Calots, being pointed with a little peak at the forehead. After the Proposers came a long file of Coaches full of such Gentlemen as use to grace the Commonwealth upon the like occasions. In this posture they moved slowly thro' the streets (affording in the gravity of the Pomp, and the welcomness of the end, a most reverend and acceptable Prospect to the People all the way from the Pantheon, being about half a mile) and arrived at the Halo, where they found the Prerogative in a close body environed with Scaffolds that were covered with Spectators. The Tribune's received the Proposers, and conducted them into a Seat placed in the front of the Tribe, like a Pulpit, but that it was of some length, and well adorned by the Heralds with all manner of Birds and Beasts, except that they were ill painted, and never a one of his natural colour. The Tribune's were placed at a Table that stood below the long Seat, those of the Horse in the middle, and those of the Foot at either end, with each of them a Boul or Basin before him, that on the right hand being white, and the other green: In the middle of the Table stood a third which was red. And the Housekeeper of the Pavilion, who had already delivered a proportion of linen Balls or Pellets to every one of the Tribe, now presented Boxes to the Ballotins. But the Proposers as they entered the Gallery, or long Seat, having put off their Hats by way of Salutation, were answered by the People with a shout; whereupon the younger Commissioners seated themselves at either end; and the first standing in the middle, spoke after this manner.  

My Lords, the People of Oceana.  
WHILE I find in myself what a Felicity it is to salute you by this Name, and in every Face, anointed as it were with the Oil of Gladness, a full and sufficient testimony of the like sense, to go about to feast you with words, who are already filled with that Food of the mind, which being of pleasing and wholesome digestion, takes in the definition of true Joy, were a needless Enterterprize. I shall rather put you in mind of that thankfulness which is due, than puff you up with any thing that might seem vain. Is it from the arms of flesh that we derive these Blessings? Behold the Commonwealth of Rome falling upon her own victorious Sword. Or is it from our own Wisdom, whose Counsils had brought it even to that pass, that we began to repent ourselves of Victory? Far be it from us, my Lords, to sacrifice to our own Nets, which we ourselves have so narrowly escaped! Let us rather lay our mouths in the dust, and look up (as was taught the other day when we were better instructed in this Lesson) to the Hills with our Gratitude. Nevertheless seeing we read how God upon the neglect of his Prophets has been provoked to wrath, it must needs follow that he expects Honour should be given to them by whom he has chosen to work as his Instruments. For which cause, nothing doubting of my Warrant, I shall proceed to that which more particularly concerns the present occasion, the discovery of my Lord ARCHON'S Virtues and Merit, to be ever placed by this Nation in their true Meridian.   

My Lords;  
I AM not upon a Subject which persuades me to balk, but necessitats me to seek out the greatest Examples. To begin with ALEXANDER erecting Trophys common to his Sword and the Pestilence; To what good of Mankind did he infect the Air with his heaps of Carcases? The Sword of War, if it be any otherwise used than as the Sword of Magistracy, for the fear and punishment of those that do evil, is as guilty in the sight of God, as the Sword of a Murderer; nay more, for if the Blood of ABEL, of one innocent Man, cried in the ears of the Lord for Vengeance, what shall the Blood of an innocent Nation? Of this kind of Empire, the Throne of Ambition, and the Quarry of a mighty Hunter, it has been truly said, that it is but a great Robbery. But if ALEXANDER had restored the Liberty of Greece, and propagated it to mankind, he had done like my Lord ARCHON, and might have been truly called the Great. ALEXANDER cared not to steal a Victory that would be given: But my Lord ARCHON has torn away a Victory which had been stolen, while we were tamely yielding up Obedience to a 
* The Scotish Royal Line.  Nation reaping in our Fields, whose Fields he has subjected to our Empire, and nailed them with his victorious Sword to their native Caucasus.  
MACCHIAVEL gives a handsome caution, Let no man, says he, be circumvented with the Glory of CAESAR, from the false reflection of their Pens, who thro' the longer continuance of his Empire in the Name than in the Family, changed their Freedom for Flattery. But if a man would know truly what the Romans thought of CAESAR, let him observe what they said of CATILINE.  
AND yet by how much he who has perpetrated some heinous Crime, is more execrable than he who did but attemt it; by so much is CAESAR more execrable than CATILINE. On the contrary, let him that would know what ancient and heroic Times, what the Greecs and Romans would both have thought and said of my Lord ARCHON, observe what they thought and said of SOLON, LYCURGUS, BRUTUS, and PUBLICOLA. And yet by how much his Virtue, that is crowned with the perfection of his Work, is beyond theirs, who were either inferior in their aim, or in their performance; by so much is my Lord ARCHON to be preferred before SOLON, LYCURGUS, BRUTUS, and PUBLICOLA.  
NOR will we shun the most illustrious Example of SCIPIO: This Hero, though never so little less, yet was he not the founder of a Commonwealth; and for the rest, allowing his Virtue to have been of the most untainted Ray, in what did it outshine this of my Lord ARCHON? But if dazzling the Eyes of the Magistrates it overawed Liberty, Rome might be allowed some excuse that she did not like it, and I, if I admit not of this comparison: For where is my Lord ARCHON? Is there a Genius, how free soever, which in his presence would not find itself to be under power? He is shrunk into Clouds, he seeks Obscurity in a Nation that sees by his Light. He is impatient of his own Glory, lest it should stand between you and your Liberty.  
LIBERTY! What is even that, if we may not be grateful? And if we may, we have none: For who has any thing that he does not owe? My Lords, there be some hard conditions of Virtue: If this Debt were exacted, it were not due; whereas being conceled, we are all entered into Bonds. On the other side, if we make such a payment as will not stand with a free People, we do not enrich my Lord ARCHON, but rob him of his whole Estate, and ●his immense Glory.  
THESE Particulars had in due deliberation and mature debate, according to the Orders of this Commonwealth, It is proposed by Authority of the Senate, to you my Lords the People of Oceana.  
I. THAT the Dignity and Office of ARCHON, or Protector of the Commonwealth of Oceana, be, and is hereby conferred by the Senate and the People of Oceana, upon the most Illustrious Prince, and sole Legislator of this Commonwealth, OLPHAUS MEGALETOR, Pater Patriae, whom God preserve, for the term of his natural Life.  
II. THAT three hundred and fifty thousand pounds per annum yet remaining of the ancient Revenue, be estated upon the said Illustrious Prince, or Lord ARCHON, for the said term, and to the proper and peculiar use of his Highness.  
III. THAT the Lord ARCHON have the reception of all foreign Ambassadors, by and with the Council of State, according to the Orders of this Commonwealth.  
iv THAT the Lord ARCHON have a standing Army of twelve thousand men, defrayed upon a monthly Tax, during the term of three years, for the protection of this Commonwealth against dissenting Parties; to be governed, directed, and commanded by and with the advice of the Council of War, according to the Orders of this Commonwealth.  
V THAT this Commonwealth make no distinction of Persons or Parties, but every man being elected and sworn, according to the Orders of the same, be equally capable of Magistracy; or not elected, be equally capable of Liberty, and the enjoyment of his Estate free from all other than common Taxes.  
VI THAT a man putting a distinction upon himself, refusing the Oath upon Election, or declaring himself of a Party not conformable to the Civil Government, may within any time of the three years standing of the Army, transport himself and his Estate, without molestation or impediment, into any other Nation.  
VII. THAT in case there remains any distinction of Parties not conforming to the Civil Government of this Commonwealth, after the three years of the standing Army be expired, and the Commonwealth be thereby forced to prolong the term of the said Army, the pay from thenceforth of the said Army be levied upon the Estates of such Parties so remaining unconformable to the Civil Government.   
THE proposer having ended his Oration, the Trumpets sounded; and the Tribune's of the Horse being mounted to view the Ballot, caused the Tribe (which thronging up to the Speech, came almost round the Gallery) to retreat about twenty paces, when LYNCEUS DE STELLA receiving the Propositions, repaired with BRONCHUS DE RAUCO the Herald, to a little Scaffold erected in the middle of the Tribe, where he seated himself, the Herald standing bare upon his right hand. The Ballotins having their Boxes ready, stood before the Gallery, and at the command of the Tribune's marched, one to every Troop on Horseback, and one to every Company on Foot; each of them being followed by other Children that bore red Boxes: now this is putting the Question, whether the Question should be put. And the Suffrage being very suddenly returned to the Tribune's at the Table, and numbered in the view of the Proposers, the Votes were all in the Affirmative: whereupon the red or doubtful Boxes were laid aside, it appearing that the Tribe, whether for the Negative or Affirmative, was clear in the matter. Wherefore the Herald began from the Scaffold in the middle of the Tribe, to pronounce the first Proposition, and the Ballotins marching with the Negative and Affirmative only, BRONCHUS with his Voice like Thunder, continued to repeat the Proposition over and over again, so long as it was in Ballotting. The like was done for every Clause, till the Ballot was finished, and the Tribune's assembling, had signed the Points, that is to say, the number of every Suffrage, as it was taken by the Secretary upon the tale of the Tribune's, and in the sight of the Proposers; for this may not be omitted, it is the pulse of the People. Now whereas it appertains to the Tribune's to report the Suffrage of the People to the Senate, they cast the Lot for this Office with three silver Balls, and one gold one; and it fell upon the Right Worshipful ARGUS DE CROOKHORN in the Tribe of Pascua, first Tribun of the Foot. ARGUS being a good sufficient man in his own Country, was yet of the mind that he should make but a bad Spokesman; and therefore became something blank at his luck, till his Colleagues persuaded him that it was no such great matter, if he could but read, having his Paper before him. The Proposers taking Coach, received a Volley upon the Field, and returned in the same order, save that being accompanied with the Tribune's, they were also attended by the whole Prerogative to the Piazza of the Pantheon, where with another Volley they took their leaves. ARGUS, who had not thought upon his Wife and Children all the way, went very gravely up: and every one being seated, the Senate by their silence seemed to call for the Report; which ARGUS standing up, delivered in this wise.  

Right Honourable Lords and Fathers assembled in Parliament;  
SO it is, that it has fallen to my lot to report to your Excellencies the Votes of the People, taken upon the third instant, in the first year of this Commonwealth, at the Halo; the Right Honourable PHOSPHORUS DE AUGE in the Tribe of Eudia, DOLABELLA DE ENYO in the Tribe of Turmae, and LYNCEUS DE STELLA in the Tribe of Nubia, Lords Commissioners of the Great Seal of Oceana, and Proposers pro temporibus— together with my Brethren the Tribune's, and myself being present. Wherefore these are to certify to your Fatherhoods, that the said Votes of the People were as follows; that is to say: 

TO the first Proposition, Nemine contradicante—  
TO the second, Nemine contradictante—  
TO the third, the like.  
TO the fourth 211, above half.  
TO the fifth 201, above half.  
TO the sixth 150, above half, in the Affirmative.  
TO the seventh, Nomine again, and so forth—    
MY LORDS, It is a Language that is out of my Prayers, and if I be out at it, no harm—  
BUT as concerning my Lord ARCHON (as I was saying) these are to signify to you the true-heartedness and goodwill which is in the People, seeing by joining with you, as one man, they confess that all they have to give, is too little for his Highness. For truly, Fathers, if he who is able to do harm, and does none, may well be called honest; What shall we say to my Lord ARCHON'S Highness, who having had it in his power to have done us the greatest mischief that ever befell a poor Nation, so willing to trust such as they thought well of, has done us so much good, as we should never have known how to do ourselves? which was so sweetly delivered by my Lord Chancellor PHOSPORUS to the People, that I dare say there was never a one of them could forbear to do as I do— An't please your Fatherhoods, they be tears of Joy. Ay, my Lord ARCHON shall walk the streets (if it be for his ease I mean) with a Switches, while the People run after him, and pray for him: he shall not wet his foot; they will strew flowers in his way: he shall sit higher in their hearts, and in the Judgement of all good men, than the Kings that go up stairs to their Seats; and one of these had as good pull two or three of his fellows out of their great Chairs, as wrong him, or meddle with him; he has two or three hundred thousand men, that when you say the word, shall sell themselves to their shirts for him, and die at his foot. His Pillow is of Down, and his Grave shall be as soft, over which they that are alive shall wring their hands. And to come to your Fatherhoods, most truly so called, as being the loving Parents of the People, truly you do not know what a feeling they have of your Kindness, seeing you are so bound up, that if there comes any harm, they may thank themselves. And, alas! poor Souls, they see that they are given to be of so many minds, that though they always mean well, yet if there comes any good, they may thank them that teach them better. Wherefore there was never such a thing as this invented, they do verily believe that it is no other than the same which they always had in their very heads, if they could have but told how to bring it out. As now for a sample; My Lords the Proposers had no sooner said your minds, than they found it to be that which heart could wish. And your Fatherhoods may comfort yourselves, that there is not a People in the world more willing to learn what is for their own good, nor more apt to see it, when you have showed it them. Wherefore they do love you as they do their own selves; honour you as Fathers; resolve to give you as it were Obedience for ever: and so thanking you for your most good and excellent Laws, they do pray for you as the very Worthys of the Land, Right Honourable Lords and Fathers assembled in Parliament.   
ARGUS came off beyond his own expectation; for thinking right, and speaking as he thought, it was apparent by the House, and the thanks they gave him, that they esteemed him to be absolutely of the best sort of Orators; upon which having a mind that till then misgave him, he became very crounse, and much delighted with that which might go down the next week in print to his Wife and neighbours. LIVY makes the Roman Tribune's to speak in the same stile with the Consuls, which could not be, and therefore for aught in him to the contrary, VOLERO and CANULEIUS might have spoken in no better stile than ARGUS. However, they were not created the first year of the Commonwealth; and the Tribune's of Oceana are since become better Orators than were needful. But the Laws being enacted, had the Preamble annexed, and were delivered to BRONCHUS, who loved nothing in the Earth so much as to go staring and bellowing up and down the Town, like a Stag in a Forest, as he now did, with his fraternity in their Coats of Arms, and I know not how many Trumpets, proclaiming the Act of Parliament; when meeting my Lord ARCHON, who from a retreat that was without Affectation, as being for Devotion only, and to implore a Blessing by Prayer and Fasting upon his Labours, now newly arrived in Town, the Herald of the Tribe of Bestia set up his throat, and having chanted out his Lesson, past as haughtily by him, as if his own had been the better Office; which in this place was very well taken, though BRONCHUS for his high mind happened afterwards upon some disasters, too long to tell, that spoiled much of his Embroidery.  
MY Lord ARCHON'S Arrival being known, the Signory, accompanied by the Tribune's, repaired to him, with the news he had already heard by the Herald; to which my Lord Strategus added, That his Highness could not doubt upon the Demonstrations given, but the minds of Men were firm in the opinion, that he could be no seeker of himself in the way of earthly Pomp and Glory: and that the Gratitude of the Senate, and the People, could not therefore be understood to have any such reflection upon him. But so it was, that in regard of Dangers abroad, and Parties at home, they durst not trust themselves without a standing Army, nor a standing Army in any man's hands but those of his Highness.  
THE ARCHON made answer, that he ever expected this would be the sense of the Senate and the People; and this being their sense, he should have been sorry they had made choice of any other than himself for a standing General: First, Because it could not have been more to their own safety: And, Secondly, Because so long as they should have need of a standing Army, his work was not done: That he would not dispute against the Judgement of the Senate and the People, nor aught that to be. Nevertheless, he made little doubt but experience would show every Party their own Interest in this Government, and that better improved than they could expect from any other; that men's animosities should overbalance their Interest for any time, was impossible; that humour could never be lasting, nor, thro' the Constitution of the Government, of any effect at the first charge. For supposing the worst, and that the People had chosen no other into the Senate and the Prerogative than Royalists, a matter of fourteen hundred men must have taken their Oaths at their Election, with an intention to go quite contrary, not only to their Oaths so taken, but to their own Interest; for being estated in the Sovereign Power, they must have decreed it from themselves (such an example for which there was never any experience, nor can there be any reason) or holding it, it must have done in their hands as well every whit as in any other. Furthermore, they must have removed the Government from a Foundation that apparently would hold, to set it upon another which apparently would not hold; which things if they could not come to pass, the Senate and the People consisting wholly of Royalists, much less by a parcel of them elected. But if the fear of the Senate and of the People derived from a Party without, such a one as would not be elected, nor engage themselves to the Commonwealth by an Oath; this again must be so large, as would go quite contrary to their own Interest, they being as free and as fully estated in their Liberty as any other, or so narrow that they could do no hurt, while the People being in Arms, and at the beck of the Strategus, every Tribe would at any time make a better Army than such a Party; and there being no Parties at home, fears from abroad would vanish. But seeing it was otherwise determined by the Senate and the People, the best course was to take that which they held the safest, in which with his humble thanks for their great bounty, he was resolved to serve them with all Duty and Obedience.  
A VERY short time after the Royalists, now equal Citizens, made good the ARCHON'S Judgement, there being no other that found any thing near so great a sweet in the Government. For he who has not been acquainted with Affliction, says SENECA, knows but half the things of this world.  
MOREOVER they saw plainly, that to restore the ancient Government, they must cast up their Estates into the hands of three hundred men; wherefore in case the Senate and the Prerogative, consisting of thirteen hundred men, had been all Royalists, there must of necessity have been, and be for ever, one thousand against this or any such Vote. But the Senate being informed by the Signory, that the ARCHON had accepted of his Dignity and Office, caused a third Chair to be set for his Highness, between those of the Strategus and the Orator in the House, the like at every Council; to which he repaired, not of necessity, but at his pleasure, being the best, and, as ARGUS not vainly said, the greatest Prince in the World: for in the Pomp of his Court he was not inferior to any, and in the Field he was followed with a Force that was formidable to all. Nor was there a cause in the nature of this Constitution to put him to the charge of Guards, to spoil his stomach or his sleep: Insomuch, as being handsomely disputed by the Wits of the Academy, whether my Lord ARCHON, if he had been ambitious, could have made himself so great, it was carried clear in the Negative; not only for the Reasons drawn from the present balance, which was Popular; but putting the case the balance had been Monarchical. For there be some Nations, whereof this is one, that will bear a Prince in a Commonwealth far higher than it is possible for them to bear a Monarch. Spain looked upon the Prince of Orange as her most formidable Enemy; but if ever there be a Monarch in Holland, he will be the Spaniards best friend. For whereas a Prince in a Commonwealth derives his Greatness from the root of the People, a Monarch derives his from one of those balances which nip them in the root; by which means the Low Countries under a Monarch were poor and inconsiderable, but in bearing a Prince could grow to a miraculous height, and give the Glory of his Actions by far the upper hand of the greatest King in Christendom. There are Kings in Europe, to whom a King of Oceana would be but a petit Companion. But the Prince of this Commonwealth is the Terror and the Judge of them all.  
THAT which my Lord ARCHON now minded most, was the Agrarian, upon which Debate he incessantly thrust the Senate and the Council of State; to the end it might be planted upon some firm root, as the main point and basis of perpetuity to the Commonwealth.  
AND these are some of the most remarkable Passages that happened in the first year of this Government. About the latter end of the second, the Army was disbanded, but the Taxes continued at thirty thousand Pounds a month, for three years and a half. By which means a piece of Artillery was planted, and a portion of Land to the value of 50 l. a year purchased for the maintenance of the Games, and of the Prize arms for ever, in each Hundred.  
WITH the eleventh year of the Commonwealth, the term of the Excise, allotted for the maintenance of the Senate and the People, and for the raising of a public Revenue, expired. By which time the Exchequer, over and above the annual Salaries, amounting to three hundred thousand Pounds, accumulating every year out of one Million incom seven hundred thousand Pounds in Banco, brought it with a product of the Sum, rising to about eight Millions in the whole: whereby at several times they had purchased to the Senate and the People four hundred thousand Pounds per annum solid Revenue; which, besides the Lands held in Panopea, together with the Perquisits of either Province, was held sufficient for a public Revenue. Nevertheless, Taxes being now wholly taken off, the Excise of no great burden (and many specious advantages not vainly proposed in the heightening of the public Revenue) was very cheerfully established by the Senate and the People, for the term of ten years longer; and the same course being taken, the public Revenue was found in the one and twentieth of the Commonwealth, to be worth one Million in good Land. Whereupon the Excise was so abolished for the present, as withal resolved to be the best, the most fruitful and easy way of raising Taxes, according to future Exigencies. But the Revenue being now such as was able to be a yearly Purchaser, gave a jealousy that by this means the balance of the Commonwealth, consisting in private Fortunes, might be eaten out; whence this year is famous for that Law whereby the Senate and the People forbidding any further purchase of Lands to the Public within the Dominions of Oceana and the adjacent Provinces, put the Agrarian upon the Commonwealth herself. These Increases are things which Men, addicted to Monarchy, deride as impossible, whereby they unwarily urge a strong Argument against that which they would defend. For having their eyes fixed upon the Pomp and Expense, by which not only every Child of a King being a Prince, exhausts his Father's Coffers; but Favourites and servile Spirits, devoted to the flattery of those Princes, grow insolent and profuse, returning a fit Gratitude to their Masters, whom while they hold it honourable to deceive, they suck and keep eternally poor: It follows that they do not see how it should be possible for a Commonwealth to cloth herself in Purple, and thrive so strangely upon that which would make a Prince's hair grow thro' his hood, and not afford him bread. As if it were a Miracle that a careless and prodigal Man should bring ten thousand Pounds a year to nothing, or that an industrious and frugal Man brings a little to ten thousand Pounds a year. But the fruit of one man's industry and frugality can never be like that of a Commonwealth; First, because the greatness of the Increase follows the greatness of the Stock or Principal: And, Secondly, because a frugal Father is for the most part succeeded by a lavish Son; whereas a Commonwealth is her own Heir.  
THIS year a part was proposed by the Right Honourable AUREUS DE WOOLSACK in the Tribe of Pecus, first Commissioner of the Treasury, to the Council of State, which soon after past the Ballot of the Senate and the People: by which the Lands of the Public Revenue, amounting to one Million, were equally divided into five thousand Lots, entered by their names and parcels into a Lotbook preserved in the Exchequer. And if any Orphan, being a Maid, should cast her Estate into the Exchequer for fourteen hundred Pounds, the Treasury was bound by the Law to pay her quarterly two hundred Pounds a year, free from Taxes, for her Life, and to assign her a Lot for her Security: if she married, her Husband was neither to take out the Principal without her consent (acknowleged by herself to one of the Commissioners of the Treasury, who according as he found it to be free, or forced, was to allow or disallow of it) nor any other way engage it, than to her proper use. But if the Principal were taken out, the Treasury was not bound to repay any more of it than one thousand Pounds; nor might that be repaid at any time, save within the first year of her Marriage: the like was to be done by a half or quarter Lot respectively.  
THIS was found to be a great Charity to the weaker Sex, and as some say, who are more skilful in the like Affairs than myself, of good Profit to the Commonwealth.  
NOW began the native Spleen of Oceana to be much purged, and Men not to affect Sullenness and Pedantism. The Elders could remember that they had been Youth. Wit and Gallantry were so far from being thought Crimes in themselves, that care was taken to preserve their innocence. For which cause it was proposed to the Council for Religion by the Right Honourable CADISCUS DE CLERO, in the Tribe of Stamnum, first Censor, That such Women as living in Gallantry and View about the Town, were of evil fame, and could not show that they were maintained by their own Estates or Industry; or such as having Estates of their own, were yet wasteful in their way of life, and of ill example to others, should be obnoxious to the animadversion of the Council of Religion, or of the Censors: In which the proceeding should be after this manner. Notice should be first given of the scandal to the party offending, in private: if there were no amendment within the space of six months, she should be summoned and rebuked before the said Council or Censors; and, if after other six months it were found that neither this availed, she should be censured not to appear at any public Meetings, Games, or Recreations, upon penalty of being taken up by the Doorkeepers, or Guards of the Senate, and by them to be detained, till for every such Offence, five Pounds were duly paid for her enlargement.  
FURTHERMORE, if any common Strumpet should be found, or any scurrility or profaneness represented at either of the theatres, the Prelates for every such Offence should be fined twenty Pounds by the said Council, and the Poet, for every such offence on his part, should be whipped. This Law relates to another, which also was enacted the same year upon this occasion.  
THE Youth and Wits of the Academy having put the Business so home in the defence of Comedys, that the Provosts had nothing but the Consequences provided against by the foregoing Law to object, prevailed so far, that two of the Provosts of the Council of State joined in a Proposition, which after much ado came to a Law, whereby one hundred thousand pounds was allotted for the building of two theatres on each side of the Piazza of the Halo: and two annual Magistrates called Prelates, chosen out of the Knights, were added to the Tropic, the one called the Prelate of the Buskin, for inspection of the Tragic Scene called Melpomene; and the other the Prelate of the Sock, for the Comic called Thalia, which Magistrates had each five hundred pounds a year allowed out of the Profits of the theatres; the rest, except eight hundred a year to four Poets, payable into the Exchequer. A Poet Laureate created in one of these theatres, by the Strategus receives a Wreath of five hundred pounds in Gold, paid out of the said Profits. But no man is capable of this Creation, that had not two parts in three of the Suffrages at the Academy, assembled after six week's warning, and upon that occasion.  
THESE things among us are sure enough to be censured, but by such only as do not know the nature of a Commonwealth: for to tell men that they are free, and yet to curb the genius of a People in a lawful Recreation, to which they are naturally inclined, is to tell a tale of a Tub. I have heard the Protestant Ministers in France, by men that were wise, and of their own profession, much blamed in that they forbade Dancing, a Recreation to which the genius of that Air is so inclining, that they lost many who would not lose that: Nor do they less than blame the former determination of rashness, who now gently connive at that which they had so roughly forbidden. These Sports in Oceana are so governed, that they are pleasing for private diversion, and profitable to the Public: For the theatres soon defrayed their own charge, and now bring in a good Revenue. All this is so far from the detriment of Virtue, that it is to the improvement of it, seeing Women that heretofore made havoc of their Honours that they might have their Pleasures, are now incapable of their Pleasures, if they lose their Honours.  
ABOUT the one and fortieth year of the Commonwealth, the Censors, according to their annual Custom, reported the Pillar of Nilus, by which it was found that the People were increased very near one third. Whereupon the Council of War was appointed by the Senate to bring in a State of War, and the Treasurers the State of the Treasury. The State of War, or the Pay and Charge of an Army, was soon after exhibited by the Council in this Account.  

The Field Pay of a Parliamentary Army.   l. per ann. THE Lord Strategus, Marching — 10000 Pole marches. General of the Horse — 2000 Lieutenant General — 2000 General of the Artillery — 1000 Commissary General — 1000 Major General — 1000 Quartermaster General — 1000 Two Adjutants to the Major General — 1000 Forty Colonels — 40000. 100 Captains of Horse, at 500 l. a Man — 50000. 300 Captains of Foot, at 300 l. a Man — 90000. 100 Cornets, at 100 l. a Man — 10000 300 Ensigns at 50 l. a Man — 15000. 800 Quartermasters — 20000. Sergeants Trumpeters Drummers 10000 Horse, at 2 s. 6 d. per day each — 470000. 30000 Foot, at 1 s. per day each — 500000. Surgeons — 400. Sum — 1114400. 40000 auxiliaries, amounting to within a little as much — 1100000. THE Charge of mounting 20000 Horse — 300000. THE Train of Artillery, holding a 3 d to the whole — 900000. Summa totalis — 1414400.  
ARMS and Ammunition are not reckoned, as those which are furnished out of the Store or Arsenal of Emporium: Nor waftage, as that which goes upon the account of the Fleet, maintained by the Customs; which Customs, thro' the care of the Council for Trade, and growth of Traffic, were long since improved to about a Million Revenue. The House being thus informed of a State of War, the Commissioners brought in  

THE state of the Treasury this present year, being the one and fortieth of the Commonwealth.   l. RECEIVED from the one and twentieth of this Commonwealth, by 700000 l. a year in bank, with the Product of the Sum rising— 16000000.  

EXPENDED from the one and twentieth of this Commonwealth.   l. IMPRIMIS, For the Addition of Arms for 100000 Men, to the Arsenal, or Tower of Emporium— 1000000. FOR the storing of the same with Artillery — 300000. FOR the storing of the same with Ammunition — 200000. FOR beautifying the Cities, Parks, Gardens, Public Walks, and Places for Recreation of Emporium and Hiera, with Public Buildings, Aqueducts, Statues, and Fountains, etc.— — 1500000. EXTRAORDINARY Embassys — 150000. Sum — 3150000. REMAINING in the Treasury, the Salaries of the Exchequer being defalked— 12000000.  
BY comparison of which Accounts, if a War with an Army of 80000 Men were to be made by the Penny, yet was the Commonwealth able to maintain such a one above three years, without levying a Tax. But it is against all Experience, Sense and Reason, that such an Army should not be soon broken, or make a great progress; in either of which cases the Charge ceases; or rather, if a right course be taken in the latter, Profit comes in: for the Romans had no other considerable way but Victory whereby to fill their Treasury, which nevertheless was seldom emty. ALEXANDER did not consult his Purse upon his Design for Persia: It is observed by MACCHIAVEL, that LIVY arguing what the event in reason must have been had that King invaded Rome, and diligently measuring what on each side was necessary to such a War, never speaks a word of Mony. No man imagines that the Gauls, Goths, Vandals, Huns, Lombard's, Saxons, Normans, made their Inroads or Conquests by the strength of the Purse; and if it be thought enough, according to the dialect of our Age, to say in answer to these things, that those times are past and gone; what Money did the late GUSTAVUS, the most victorious of modern Princes, bring out of Sweden with him into Germany? An Army that goes upon a golden Leg, will be as lame as if it were a wooden one; but proper Forces have Nerves and Muscles in them, such for which, having four or five Millions, a Sum easy enough, with a Revenue like this of Oceana, to be had at any time in readiness, you need never, or very rarely charge the People with Taxes. What influence the Commonwealth by such Arms has had upon the World, I leave to Historians, whose custom it has been of old, to be as diligent Observers of foreign Actions, as careless of those domestic Revolutions which (less pleasant it may be, as not partaking so much of the Romance) are to Statesmen of far greater profit; and this Fault, if it be not mine, is so much more frequent with modern Writers, as has caused me to undertake this Work; on which to give my own Judgement, it is performed as much above the time I have been about it, as below the dignity of the matter.  
BUT I cannot departed out of this Country, till I have taken leave of my Lord ARCHON, a Prince of immense Felicity, who having built as high with his Counsils, as he digged deep with his Sword, had now seen fifty years measured with his own inerring Orbs.  

Plutarch in the Life of Timoleon.  TIMOLEON (such a hater of Tyrants, that not able to persuade his Brother TIMOPHANES to relinquish the Tyranny of Corinth, he slew him) was afterwards elected by the People (the Sicilians groaning to them from under the like burden) to be sent to their relief: Whereupon TELECLIDES the Man at that time of most Authority in the Commonwealth of Corinth, stood up, and giving an Exhortation to TIMOLEON, how he should behave himself in his Expedition, told him, that if he restored the Sicilians to Liberty, it would be acknowleged that he had destroyed a Tyrant; if otherwise, he must expect to hear that he had murdered a King. TIMOLEON taking his leave, with a very small Provision for so great a Design, pursued it with a Courage not inferior to, and a Felicity beyond any that had been known to that day in mortal Flesh, having in the space of eight years utterly rooted out of all Sicily those Weeds of Tyranny, thro' the detestation whereof men fled in such abundance from their Native Country, that whole Cities were left desolate; and brought it to such a pass, that others thro' the fame of his Virtues, and the excellency of the Soil, flocked as fast from all Quarters to it, as to the Garden of the World: While he, being presented by the People of Syracuse with his Townhouse, and his Country Retreat, the sweetest Places in either, lived with his Wife and Children a most quiet, happy, and holy Life; for he attributed no part of his Success to himself, but all to the Blessing and Providence of the Gods. As he passed his time in this manner, admired and honoured by Mankind, LAPHISTIUS an envious Demagog, going to summon him upon some pretence or other to answer for himself before the Assembly, the People fell into such a Mutiny, as could not be appeased but by TIMOLEON, who understanding the matter, reproved them, by repeating the pains and travel which he had gone thro', to no other end than that every Man might have the free use of the Laws. Wherefore when DAEMENETUS another Demagog, had brought the same Design about again, and blamed him impertinently to the People for things which he did when he was General, TIMOLEON answered nothing, but raising up his hands, gave the God's thanks for their return to his frequent Prayers, that he might but live to see the Syracusians so free, that they could question whom they pleased.  
NOT long after being old, thro' some natural imperfection, he fell blind; but the Syracusians by their perpetual visits held him, though he could not see, their greatest Object: if there arrived Strangers, they brought them to see this sight. Whatever came in debate at the Assembly, if it were of small consequence, they determined it themselves; but if of importance, they always sent for TIMOLEON; who being brought by his Servants in a Chair, and set in the middle of the Theatre, there ever followed a great shout, after which some time was allowed for the Benedictions of the People; and then the matter proposed, when TIMOLEON had spoken to it, was put to the Suffrage; which given, his Servants bore him back in his Chair, accompanied by the People clapping their hands, and making all expressions of Joy and Applause, till leaving him at his House, they returned to the dispatch of their Business. And this was the Life of TIMOLEON, till he died of Age, and dropped like a mature Fruit, while the Eyes of the People were as the Showers of Autumn.  
THE Life and Death of my Lord ARCHON (but that he had his Senses to the last, and that his Character, as not the Restorer, but the Founder of a Commonwealth, was greater) is so exactly the same, that (seeing by Men wholly ignorant of Antiquity, I am accused of writing Romance) I shall repeat nothing: but tell you that this year the whole Nation of Oceana, even to the Women and Children, were in mourning, where so great or sad a Funeral Pomp had never been seen or known. Sometime after the performance of the Exequys, a Colossus, mounted on a brazen Horse of excellent Fabric, was erected in the Piazza of the Pantheon, engraved with this Inscription on the Eastern side of the Pedestal: 
HIS 
 NAME 
 IS AS 
 Precious Ointment.   
And on the Western with the following: 
GRATA PATRIA  
Piae & Perpetuae Memoriae 
 D. D. 
 Olphaus Megaletor 
 Lord ARCHON, and sole LEGISLATOR 
 OF 
 OCEANA.  
Pater Patriae.  
Invincible in the Field.  
Inviolable in his Faith.  
Unfeigned in his Zeal.  
Immortal in his Fame.  
The Greatest of Captains.  
The Best of Princes.  
The Happiest of Legislators.  
The Most Sincere of Christians.  
Who setting the Kingdoms of Earth at Liberty,  
Took the Kingdom of the Heavens by Violence;  
Anno 

Aetat. suae 116.  
Hujus Reipub. 50.      

THE PREROGATIVE OF Popular Government.  
BEING A POLITICAL DISCOURSE In Two Books.  
The former Containing the first Preliminary of OCEANA, enlarged, interpreted, and vindicated from all such Mistakes or Slanders as have been alleged against it under the Notion of Objections.  
The Second Concerning Ordination, against Dr. H. HAMMOND, Dr. L. SEAMAN, and the Authors they follow.  
In which Two Books is contained the whole Commonwealth of the Hebrews, or of Israel, Senat, People, and Magistracy, both as it stood in the Institution by MOSES, and as it came to be formed after the Captivity.  
As also the different Policys introduced into the Church of CHRIST, during the time of the Apostles.  
Without Council Purposes are disappointed; but in the multitude of Counsillors they are established.  SOLOMON. 
La multitudine è piu Savia è piu costante ch'un Principe.  MACCHIAVEL.  

EPISTLE to the READER.  
WHOSOEVER sheds man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the Image of God made he Man. If this Rule holds as well in shedding the blood of a Turk as of a Christian, then that wherein Man is the Image of God is REASON. Of all Controversys, those of the Pen are the most honourable: for in those of Force, there is more of the Image of the Beast, but in those of the Pen there is more of the Image of God. In the Controversys of the Sword, there is but too often no other Reason than Force; but the Controversy of the Pen has never any Force but Reason. Of all Controversys of the Pen next those of Religion, those of Government are the most honourable, and the most useful; the true end of each, though in a different way, being that the Will of God may be done in Earth as it is in Heaven. Of all Controversys of Government, those in the vindication of Popular Government are the most noble, as being that Constitution alone, from whence all we have that is good is descended to us; and which, if it had not existed, Mankind at this day had been but a Herd of Beasts. The Prerogative of Popular Government must either be in an ill hand, or else it is a game against which there is not a Card in the will pack; for we have the Books of MOSES, those of the Greecs and of the Romans, not to omit MACCHIAVEL, all for it. What have the Asserters of Monarchy; what can they have against us? A Sword; but that rusts, or must have a Scabbard; and the Scabbard of this kind of Sword is a good frame of Government.  
A MAN may be possessed of a piece of Ground by force, but to make use or profit of it, he must build upon it, and till it by Reason; for whatever is not founded upon Reason, cannot be permanent. In Reason there are two parts, Invention and Judgement: As to the latter, In a multitude of Counsillors (say both SOLOMON and MACCHIAVEL) there is strength. Nay as for Judgement, there is not that Order in Art or Nature that can compare with a Popular Assembly. THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE IS THE VOICE OF GOD. Hence it is that in all well-ordered Policys the People have the ultimat result: but unless there be some other to invent, a Popular Assembly can be of no effect at all but Confusion. Invention is a solitary thing. All the Physicians in the world put together, invented not the Circulation of the Blood, nor can invent any such thing, though in their own Art; yet this was invented by one alone, and being invented, is unanimously voted and embraced by the generality of Physicians. The Blow and Wheels were at first, you must think, the invention of some rare Artists; but who or what shall ever be able to tear the use of them from the People? Hence, where Government is at a loss, a sole Legislator is of absolute necessity; nay where it is not at a loss, if well modelled, as in Venice, the Proposers, though frequently changeable, as in that case is necessary, are very few, as the Counsillors, the Savi, the Provosts. Wherever a Commonwealth is thus proposed to, the Balance or Popular Assembly will do her duty to admiration, but till then never. Yet so it has been with us of late years, that although in Royal Authority there was no more than the right of Proposing, and the King himself was to stand (legibus & consuetudinibus quas vulgas elegerit) to the result of the People, yet the popular Council has been put upon Invention, and they that have been the prevailing Party have used means to keep the Result to themselves, quite contrary to the nature of Popular Administration. Let one speak, and the rest judge. Of whatever any one man can say or do, Mankind is the natural and competent Judge, in which is contained the very reason of Parliaments; thro' the want of understanding this came in confusion. Man that is in Honour, and has no understanding, is like the Beasts that perish. Nor can we possibly return to Order, but by mending the Hedge where it was broken. A prudent, entire and sit Proposition made to a free Parliament, recovers all. To them who are of the greatest Eminency or Authority in a Commonwealth, belongs naturally that part of Reason which is Invention; and using this, they are to propose: but what did our Grandees ever invent or propose, that might show so much as that themselves knew what they would be at? and yet how confidently do they lay the fault upon the People, and their unfitness, forsooth, for Government: in which they are wondrous wise! For, this I will boldly say, Where there was an Aristocracy that performed their duty, there never was, nor ever can be a People unfit for Government; but on the contrary, where the Aristocracy have failed, the People being once under Orders, have held very often. But while they are not under Orders, if they fail it is not their fault, but the fault of the Aristocracy; for who else should model a Government but men of Experience? There is not in England, I speak it to their shame, one GRANDEE that has any perfect knowledge of the Orders of any one Commonwealth that ever was in the World. Away with this same grave complexion, this huff of Wisdom maintained by making faces. The People cannot do their duty consisting in Judgement, but by virtue of such Orders as may bring them together, and direct them; but the duty of the Aristocracy consisting in Invention, may be done by any one man, and in his study; and where is that one man among all the Grandees that studies? They are so far from knowing their own duty, that a man for proposing that in which none can find a flaw, has done enough to be ridiculous to them, who are themselves ridiculous to the whole World, in that they could never yet propose any thing that would hold.  
BUT if this amounts to a Demonstration, it amounts to a clear detection of your profound Grandees, and a full proof that they are Fanatical Persons, State Jesuits, such as have reduced the Politics to mental Reservation and implicit Faith in their nods or nightcaps.  
GOD, to propose his Commandments to the People of Israel, wrote them on two Tables; the Decemviri, to propose their Commandments to the People of Rome, wrote them on twelve Tables; the Athenians proposed in writing, signed with the name of the particular Inventor; after this pattern do the Venetians, as was said, the same at this day. But no Goosquill, no Scribbling: Your Grandees are above this.  
MOSES, who was the first Writer in this kind, shall be pardoned; but MACCHIAVEL, the first in later times that has revived his Principles, or trod in his steps, is deservedly pelted for it by Sermons. They are not for the Scripture, but the Cabala.  
I WILL tell you a story out of BOCCALINI: APOLLO having spied the Philosopher and great Master of Silence HARPOCRATES in the Court of Parnassus, used such importunity with him, that for once he was persuaded to speak; upon which such apparent discovery was made of the Hypocrite, and the gross ignorance he had so long harboured under a deceitful silence, that he was immediately banished the Court. Were there cause, I could be modest; but this Virtue, to the diminution of sound and wholesome Principles, would be none: wherefore let a Grandee write, and I will show you HARPOCRATES.  
THUS having sufficiently defied Sir GUY, I may with the less impeachment of reputation descend to TOM THUM. Not that I hold myself a fit Person to be exercised with Boys play, but that some, who should have more wit, have so little as to think this something. A good Rat-catcher is not so great a blessing to any City, as a good Jugglercatcher would be to this Nation. Now because I want an Office, I shall show my Parts to my Country, and how fit I am for the white Staff, or long Pole of so worshipful a Preferment.  Ridiculus ne sis, esto.  

THE FIRST BOOK, CONTAINING  
The first Preliminary of OCEANA, enlarged, interpreted, and vindicated from all such Mistakes or Slanders as have been alleged against it under the notion of Objections.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

A full Answer to all such OBJECTIONS as have hitherto been made against OCEANA.  
NEITHER the Author or Authors of the Considerations upon OCEANA, nor any other, have yet so much as once pretended one Contradiction or one Inequality to be in the whole Commonwealth. Now this is certain, That Frame of Government which is void of any contradiction, or any inequality, is void of all internal causes of Dissolution, and must, for so much as it embraces, have attained to full perfection. This by wholesale is a full Answer to the Considerations, with all other Objections hitherto; and will be (with any man that comprehends the nature of Government) to thousands of such Books, or Myriad of such tittel tattel. Nevertheless, because every man is not provided with a Sum, in the following Discourse I shall comply with them that must have things by Retail, or somewhat for their Farthing.   

The PREFACE.  
IT is commonly said, and not without encouragement by some who think they have Parnassus by the horns, that the University has lashed me: so it seems I have to do with the University, and lashing is lawful; with both which I am contented. In moorfield's, while the People are busy at their sports, they often and ridiculously lose their Buttons, their Ribbons, and their Purses; where if they light, as sometimes they do, upon the Masters of that Art, they fall a kicking them a while (which one may call a rude charge) and then to their work again. I know not whether I invite you to moorfield's, but (difficile est Satyram non scribere) all the favour I desire at your hands is but this, that you would not so condemn one man for kicking, as in the same Act to pardon another for cutting of Purses. A Gentleman that commits a fallacious Argument to writing, or goes about to satisfy others with such Reasons as he is not satisfied with himself, is no more a Gentleman but a Pickpocket; with this in my mind, I betake myself to my work, or rather to draw open the Curtain, and begin the Play.  
ONE that has written Considerations upon OCEANA, speaks the Prologue in this manner: I beseech you Gentlemen, are not we the Writers 
Epist.  of Politics somewhat a ridiculous sort of People? Is it not a fine piece of Folly for private men sitting in their Cabinets to rack their brains about Models of Government? Certainly our Labours make a very pleasant recreation for those great Personages, who, sitting at the Helm of Affairs, have by their large Experience not only acquired the perfect Art of Ruling, but have attained also to the comprehension of the Nature and Foundation of Government. In which egregious Compliment the Considerer has lost his considering Cap.  
IT was in the time of ALEXANDER, the greatest Prince and Commander of his age, that ARISTOTLE, with scarce inferior Applause and equal Fame, being a private man, wrote that excellent piece of Prudence in his Cabinet, which is called his Politics, going upon far other Principles than those of ALEXANDER'S Government, which it has long outlived. The like did TITUS LIVIUS in the time of AUGUSTUS, Sir THOMAS MOOR in the time of HENRY the Eighth, and MACCHIAVEL when Italy was under Princes that afforded him not the ear. These Works nevertheless are all of the most esteemed and applauded in this kind; nor have I found any man, whose like Endeavours have been persecuted since PLATO by DIONYSIUS. I study not without great Examples, nor out of my Calling; either Arms or this Art being the proper Trade of a Gentleman. A man may be entrusted with a Ship, and a good Pilot too, yet not understand how to make Sea-charts. To say that a man may not write of Government except he be a Magistrate, is as absurd as to say, that a man may not make a Sea-chart, unless he be a Pilot. It is known that CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS made a Chart in his Cabinet, that found out the Indys. The Magistrate that was good at his Steerage never took it ill of him that brought him a Chart, seeing whether he would use it or no, was at his own choice; and if Flatterers, being the worst sort of Crows, did not pick out the eyes of the living, the Ship of Government at this day throout Christendom had not struck so often as she has done. To treat of Affairs, 
Arte della Guer. proem.  says MACCHIAVEL, which as to the conduct of 'em appertain to others, may be thought a great boldness; but if I commit Errors in writing, these may be known without danger, whereas if they commit Errors in acting, such come not otherwise to be known, than in the ruin of the Commonwealth. For which cause I presume to open the Scene of my Discourse, which is to change according to the variety of these following Questions.  
1. WHETHER Prudence be well distinguished into Ancient and Modern?  
2. WHETHER a Commonwealth be rightly defined to be a Government of Laws, and not of Men; and Monarchy to be a Government of some Man, or a few Men, and not of Laws?  
3. WHETHER the Balance of Dominion in Land be the natural cause of Empire?  
4. WHETHER the Balance of Empire be well divided into National and Provincial? and whether these two, or any Nations that are of distinct Balance, coming to depend upon one and the same head, such a mixture creates a new Balance?  
5. WHETHER there be any common Right or Interest of Mankind distinct from the parts taken severally? and how by the Orders of a Commonwealth this may best be distinguished from private Interest?  
6. WHETHER the Senatusconsulta, or Decrees of the Roman Senate, had the power of Laws?  
7. WHETHER the ten Commandments proposed by GOD or MOSES were voted by the People of Israel?  
8. WHETHER a Commonwealth coming up to the perfection of the kind, comes not up to the perfection of Government, and has no flaw in it?  
9 WHETHER Monarchy, coming up to the perfection of the kind, comes not short of the perfection of Government, and has not some flaw in it? in which is also treated of the Balance of France, of the Original of a landed Clergy, of Arms, and their kinds.  
10. WHETHER a Commonwealth that was not first broken by itself, was ever conquered by any Monarch?  
11. WHETHER there be not an Agrarian, or some Law or Laws of that nature to supply the defect of it, in every Commonwealth? and whether the Agrarian, as it is stated in Oceana, be not equal and satisfactory to all Interests or Parties?  
12. WHETHER Courses or a Rotation be necessary to a well-ordered Commonwealth? In which is contained the Parembole or Courses of Israel before the Captivity; together with an Epitome of the whole Commonwealth of Athens, as also another of the Commonwealth of Venice.   

Ancient and Modern Prudence. Chap. 1  

CHAP. I.  
Whether Prudence be well distinguished into Ancient and Modern.  
THE Considerer (where by Ancient Prudence I understand the Policy of a Commonwealth, and by Modern Prudence that of King, Lords, and Commons, which introduced by the Goths and Vandals upon the ruin of the Roman Empire, has since reigned in these Western Countries, till by the predominating of some one of the three parts, it be now almost universally extinguished) thinks it enough for the confutation of this distinction, to show out of THUCYDIDES that of Monarchy to be a more ancient Policy than that of a Commonwealth. Upon which occasion, I must begin here to discover that which, the further I go, will be the more manifest; namely, that there is a difference between quoting Authors, and saying some part of them without book: this may be done by their words, but the former no otherwise than by keeping to their sense. Now the sense of THUCYDIDES, as he is translated by Mr. HOBBS in the place alleged, is thus: The manner, says he, 
Thu. B. 1. P. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9  of living in the most ancient times of Greece was Thieving; the stronger going abroad under the conduct of their most puissant Men, both to enrich themselves, and fetch home maintenance for the weak: for there was neither Traffic, property of Lands, nor constant Abode, till MINOS built a Navy, and expelling the Malefactors out of the Islands, planted Colonies of his own, by which means they who inhabited the Seacoasts, becoming more addicted to Riches, grew more constant to their dwellings: of whom some, grown now rich, compassed their Towns about with Walls. For out of a desire of Gain, the meaner sort underwent Servitude with the Mighty; and the Mighty (thus overbalancing at home) with their Wealth, brought the lesser Cities (abroad) into subjection. Thus PELOPS, though he was a stranger, obtained such Power in Peloponnesus, that the Country was called after his name. Thus ATREUS obtained the Kingdom of Mycenae; and thus Kingdoms with Honours limited came to be hereditary; and rising to Power, proceeded afterwards to the War against Troy. After the War with Troy, though with much ado, and in a long time Greece had constant rest (and Land without doubt came to Property) for shifting their seats no longer, at length they sent Colonies abroad; the Athenians into jonia with the Islands, the Peloponnesians into Italy, Sicily, and other parts. The Power of Greece thus improved, and the desire of Money withal, their Revenues (in what? not in Money, if yet there was no Usury; therefore except a man can show that there was Usury in Land) being enlarged, in most of the Cities there were erected Tyrannies. Let us lay this place to the former, when out of a desire of Gain the meaner sort underwent Servitude with the Mighty, it caused hereditary Kingdoms with Honours limited, as happened also with us since the time of the Goths and Vandals. But when the People came to Property in Land, and their Revenues were enlarged, such as assumed Power over Book I them, not according to the nature of their Property or Balance, were Tyrants: well, and what remedy? why, then it was, says the Considerer, that the Grecians out of an extreme aversion to that which was 
Consid. p. 4.  the cause of their present Sufferings, slipped into Popular Government, not that upon calm and mature Debates they found it best, but that they might put themselves at the greatest distance (which Spirit usually accompanies all Reformations) from that with which they were grown into dislike. Whereby he agrees exactly with his Author in making out the true Force and Nature of the Balance, working even without deliberation, and whether men will or no. For the Government that is natural and easy, being in no other direction than that of the respective Balance, is not of choice but of necessity. The Policy of King, Lords and Commons, was not so much from the Prudence of our Ancestors, as from their necessity. If three hundred men held at this day the like overbalance to the whole People, it was not in the power of Prudence to institute any other than the same kind of Government, thro' the same necessity. Thus the meaner sort with THUCYDIDES submitting to the Mighty, it came to Kingdoms with hereditary Honours: but the People coming to be wealthy, called their Kings, though they knew not why, Tyrants; nay, and using them accordingly, found out means, with as little deliberation it may be as a Bull takes to toss a Dog, or a Hern to split a Hawk (that is, rather, as at the long-run they will ever do in the like cases, by Instinct, than Prudence or Debate) to thro' down that, which by the mere information of sense they could no longer bear; and which being thrown down, they found themselves eased. But the question yet remains, and that is, forsooth, whether of these is to be called Ancient Prudence. To this end, never man made a more unlucky choice than the Considerer has done for himself of this Author, who in the very beginning of his Book, speaking of the Peloponnesian War, or that between the Commonwealths of Athens and Lacedaemon, says, that the Actions which preceded this, and those again that were more ancient, though the truth of them thro' length of time cannot by any means be clearly discovered; yet for any Argument that (looking into times far passed) he had yet lighted on to persuade him, he does not think they have been very great either for matter of War, or otherwise; that is, for matter of Peace or Government. And lest this should not be plain enough, he calls the Prudence of the 
Mr. Hobbs in the Magire.  three Periods, observed by Mr. HOBBS, viz. that from the beginning of the Grecian Memory to the Trojan War, that of the Trojan War itself, and that from thence to the present Commonwealths and Wars, 
Thu. B. 1. p. 3.  whereof he treats, The Imbecility of ancient Times. Whersore certainly this Prevaricator, to give him his own fees, has less discretion than a 
Consid. p. 34.  common Attorney, who will be sure to examine only those Witnesses that seem to make for the Cause in which he is entertained. Seeing that which he affirms to be Ancient Prudence is deposed by his own witness to have been the Imbecility of ancient Times, for which I could have so many more than I have leisure to examine, that (to take only of the most Authentic) as you have heard one Greece, I shall add no more than one Roman, and that is FLORUS in his Prologue, where (computing the Ages of the Romans, in the same manner THUCYDIDES did those of the Greecs) he affirms the time while they lived under their Kings, to have been their Infancy; that from the Consuls till they conquered Italy, their Youth; that from hence to their Emperors, their manly age; and the rest (with a Compliment or Salvo to TRAJAN his present Chap. 1 Lord) their Dotage.  
THESE things, though originally all Government among the Gree●s and the Romans was Regal, are no more than they who have not yet past their Novitiat in story, might have known. Yet says the Considerer, 
Consid. p. 2, 3.  It seems to be a defect of experience to think that the Greece and the Roman Actions are only considerable in Antiquity. But is it such a defect of Experience to think them only considerable, as not to think them chief considerable in Antiquity, or that the name of Ancient Prudence does not belong to that Prudence which was chiefest in Antiquity? True, says he, it is very frequent with such as have been conversant with Greece and Roman Authors, to be led by them into a belief that the rest of the World was a rude inconsiderable People, and, which is a term they very much delight in, altogether Barbarous. This should be some fine Gentleman that would have Universitys pulled down; for the Office of a University is no more than to preserve so much of Antiquity as may keep a Nation from stinking, or being barbarous; which Salt grew not in Monarchys, but in Commonwealths: or whence has the Christian World that Religion and those Laws which are now common, but from the Hebrews and Romans? or from whence have we Arts but from these or the Greecs? That we have a Doctor of Divinity, or a Master of Arts, we may thank Popular Government; or with what Languages, with what things are Scholars conversant that are otherwise descended? will they so plead their own Cause as to tell us it is possible there should be a Nation at this day in the world without Universitys, or Universitys without Hebrew, Greece and Latin, and not be Barbarous, that is to say, rude, unlearned, and inconsiderable? Yes, this humour even among the Greecs and Romans themselves was a servile addiction to narrow Principles, and a piece of very pedantical Pride. What, man! the Greecs' and the Romans that of all other would not serve, servile! their Principles, their Learning, with whose scraps we set up for Bachelors, Masters, and Doctors of fine things, narrow! their inimitable Eloquence a piece of very pedantical Pride! The World can never make sense of this any otherwise than that since Heads and Fellows of Colleges became the only Greecs and Romans, the Greecs and Romans are become servily addicted, of narrow Principles, very Pedants, and prouder of those things they do not understand, than the other were of those they did: For, say they, in this Question, the Examples of the Babylonians, Persians and Egyptians (not to omit the ancient and like modern Discoveries of the Queen of the Amazons, and of the King of China) cannot without gross partiality be neglected. This is pretty; they who say nothing at all to the Policy of these Governments, accuse me, who have fully opened it, of negligence. The Babylonian, Persian, and, for aught appears to the contrary, the Chinese Policy, is summed up, and far excelled by that at this this day of Turkey; and in opening this latter, I have opened them all, so far from neglect, that I every where give the Turc his due, whose Policy I assert to be the best of this kind, though not of the best kind. But they will bear me down, and but with one Argument, which I beseech you mark, that it is absolutely of the best kind; for say they, it is of a more absolute form (has more of the Man and less of the Law in it) than is to be met with in any Kingdom of Europe.  
Book I I AM amazed! This is that kind of Government which to hold Barbarous, was in the Greecs and Romans Pedantical Pride, but would be in us who have not the same Temptation of Interest, downright Folly. The Interest of a People is not their Guide but their Temptation! We that hold our Land divided among us, have not the same Temptation of Interest that had the servile Hebrews, Greecs, and Romans; but the same that had the free People of Babylon, Persia, and Egypt, where not the People but the Prince was sole Landlord! O the Arts in which these men are Masters! To follow the pedantical Pride of MOSES, LYCURGUS, SOLON, ROMULUS, were with us downright Folly; but to follow humble and learned MAHOMET or OTTOMAN, in whose only Model the Perfection of the Babylonian, Persian, Egyptian Policy is consummated, is Ancient Prudence! Exquisite Politicians! egregious Divines, for the leading of a People into Egypt or Babylon! These things considered, whether Ancient Prudence, as I have stated it, be downright Folly, or as they have stated it, be not downright Knavery, I appeal to any Court of Claims in the world, where the Judges, I mean, have not more in their Caps than in their Heads, and in their Sleeves than the Scarlet. And whereas Men love compendious works, if I gain my Cause, the Reader, for an answer to the Oxford Book, needs look no further than this Chapter. For if Riches and Freedom be the end of Government; and these Men propose nothing but Slavery, Beggary, and Turcism, what need more words?   

CHAP. II.  
Whether a Commonwealth be rightly defined to be a Government of Laws and not of Men, and a Monarchy to be the Government of some Man, or a few Men, and not of Laws?  
THAT part of the Preliminaries which the Prevaricator, as is usual with him, recites in this place falsely and fraudulently, is thus: Relation had to these two times (that of Ancient and that of Modern Prudence) the one, as is computed by JANOTTI, ending with the Liberty of Rome, the other beginning with the Arms of CESAR (which extinguishing Liberty, became the Translation of Ancient into Modern Prudence, introduced in the Ruin of the Roman Empire by the Goths and Vandals) GOVERNMENT (to define it de jure, or according to Ancient Prudence) is an Art whereby a civil Society of Men is instituted and preserved, upon the Foundation of Common Right or Interest; or (to follow ARISTOTLE and LIVY) it is an Empire of Laws, and not of Men.  
AND Government, to define it de facto, or according to Modern Prudence, is an Art whereby some Man, or some few Men, subject a City or a Nation, and rule it according to his or their private Interest; which, because Laws in such cases are made according to the Interest of a Man, or some few Families, may be said to be an Empire of Men, and not of Laws.  
HEREBY it is plain, whether in an Empire of Laws, and not of Men, as a Commonwealth; or in an Empire of Men, and not of Laws, as Monarchy: First, That Law must equally proceed from Will, that is either from the Will of the whole People, as in a Commonwealth; Chap. 2 from the Will of one Man, as in an Absolute, or from the Will of a few Men, as in a Regulated Monarchy.  
SECONDLY, That Will, whether of one, or more, or all, is not presumed to be, much less to act without a Mover.  
THIRDLY, That the Mover of the Will is Interest.  
FOURTHLY, That Interests also being of one, of more, or of all; those of one Man, or of a few Men, where Laws are made accordingly, being more private than comes duly up to the Law, the nature whereof lys not in Partiality but in Justice, may be called the Empire of Men, and not of Laws: And that of the whole People coming up to the public Interest (which is no other than common Right and Justice, excluding all Partiality or private Interest) may be called the Empire of Laws, and not of Men. By all which put together, whereas it is demonstrable that in this division of Government I do not stay at the Will, which must have some Motive or Mover, but go to the first and remotest Notion of Government, in the Foundation and Origination of it, in which lies the Credit of this Division, and the Definition of the several Members, that is to say, of Interest, whether private or public; the Prevaricator tells me, That this division of Government 
Consid. p. ●.  having (he knows not how) lost its Credit, the definitions of the several Members of it need not be considered further, than that they come not at all up to the first and remotest Notion of Government in the Foundation and Origination of it, in which lies all the difficulty; and being here neglected, there is little hope the subsequent Discourse can have in it the light of probable Satisfaction, much less the Force of infallible Demonstration.  
VERY good! Interest it should seem then is not the first and remotest Notion of Government, but that which he will outthrow; and at this cast, by saying, that the Declaration of the Will of the Sovereign 
Consid. p. 8.  Power is called Law: which if it outlives the Person whose Will it was, it is only because the Persons who succeed in Power are presumed to have the same Will, unless they manifest the contrary, and that is the Abrogation of the Law; so that still the Government is not in the Law, but in the Person whose Will gave a being to that Law. I might as well say, The Declaration to all men by these presents that a man owes Money is called a Bond; which if it outlives the Person that entered into that Bond, it is only because the Persons that succeed him in his Estate, are presumed to have the same Will, unless they manifest the contrary, and that is the abrogation or cancelling of the Bond; so that still the Debt is not in the Bond, but in his Will who gave a being to that Bond. If it be alleged against this example, that it is a private one, the case may be put between several Princes, States, or Governments, or between several States of the same Principality or Government, whether it be a Regulated Monarchy or a Commonwealth; for in the like Obligation of the States (as of the King, the Lords, and Commons) or Parties agreeing, Authoritate Patrum & jussu Populi, till the Parties that so agreed to the Obligation, shall agree to repeal or cancel it, lies all Law that is not merely in the Will of one Man, or of one State, or Party, as the Oligarchy. But not to dispute these things further in this place, let the Government be what it will, for the Prevaricator to fetch the Origination of Law no further than the Will (while he knows very well that I fetched it from Interest, the Antecedent of Will) and yet Book I to boast that he has outthrown me, I say he is neither an honest Man, nor a good Bowler. No matter, he will be a better Gunner; for where I said that the Magistrate upon the Bench is that to the Law, which a Gunner upon his Platform is to his Cannon, he goes about to take better aim, and says, If the proportion of things be accuratly considered, it will appear that the laden Cannon answers not to the Laws, but to the Power of the Person whose Will created those Laws: Which if some of them that the Power of the Person whose Will created them, intended should be of as good Stuff or Carriage as the rest, do nevertheless according to the nature of their Matter or of their Charge, come short or over, and others break or recoil; sure this Report of the Prevaricator is not according to the bore of my Gun, but according to the bore of such a Gunner. Yet again, if he be not so good a Gunner, he will be a better Anatomist: for whereas I affirm, that to say, ARISTOTLE and CICERO wrote not the Rights or Rules of their Politics from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them into their Books out of the practice of their own Commonwealths, is as if a man should say of famous HARVEY, that he transcribed his Circulation of the Blood, not out of the Principles of Nature, but out of the Anatomy of this or that Body: He answers, that the whole force of this Objection amounts but to this, that because HARVEY in his Circulation has followed the Principles of Nature, therefore ARISTOTLE and CICERO have done so in their Discourses of Government.  
PRETTY! It is said in Scripture, Thy Word is sweet as Honey: Amounts that but to this, Because Honey is sweet, therefore the Word of God is sweet? To say that my Lord Protector has not conquered many Nations, were as if one should say, that CESAR had not conquered many Nations: Amounts that but to this, that because CAESAR conquered many Nations, therefore my Lord Protector has conquered many Nations? What I produce as a Similitude, he calls an Objection; where I say, as, he says, because: what ingenuous man does not detest such a cheat! A Similitude is brought to show how a thing is or may be, not to prove that it is so; it is used for Illustration, not as an Argument: The Candle I held did not set up the Post, but show where the Post was set, and yet this blind Buzzard has run his head against it. Nor has he yet enough; if he be not the better Naturalist, he will be the better Divine, though he should make the worse Sermon. My Doctrine and Use upon that of SOLOMON, I have seen Servants upon Horses, and Princes walking as Servants upon the Ground, discovers the true means whereby the Principles of Power and Authority, the Goods of the Mind and of Fortune, may so meet and twine in the Wreath or Crown of Empire, that the Government standing upon Earth like a holy Altar, and breathing perpetual Incense to Heaven in Justice and Piety, may be something, as it were, between Heaven and Earth; while that only which is proposed by the best, and resolved by the most, becomes Law; and so the whole Government an Empire of Laws, and not of Men. This he says, is a goodly Sermon; it is honest, and sense. But let any man make sense or honesty 
Consid. p. 7.  of this Doctrine, which is his own; To say that Laws do or can govern, is to amuse ourselves with a Form of Speech, as when we say Time, or Age, or Death, does such a thing; to which indeed the Fancy of Poets, and Superstition of Women, may adapt a Person, and give a Power of Action: but wise Men know they are only Expressions of such Actions or Qualifications as belong to Things or Chap. 3 Persons.  
SPEAK out; Is it the Word of God, or the Knavery and Nonsense of such Preachers that ought to govern? Are we to hearken to that of the Talmud, There is more in the word of a Scribe, than in the words of the Law; or that which Christ thereupon says to the Pharisees, You have made the Word of God of no effect by your Traditions? 
Mat. 15. 6.  Say, is the Commonwealth to be governed in the Word of a Priest or a Pharisee, or by the Vote of the People, and the Interest of Mankind?   

CHAP. III.  
Whether the Balance of Dominion in Land be the natural Cause of Empire?  
THE Doctrine of the Balance is that, though he strains at it, which chokes the Prevaricator: for this of all others is that Principle which makes the Politics, not so before the invention of the same, to be undeniable throout, and (not to meddle with the Mathematics, an Art I understand as little as Mathematicians do this) the most demonstrable of any whatsoever.  
FOR this cause I shall rather take pleasure than pains to look back, or tread the same path with other, and perhaps plainer steps: as thus; If a man having one hundred pounds a year may keep one Servant, or have one man at his command, then having one hundred times so much, he may keep one hundred Servants; and this multiplied by a thousand, he may have one hundred thousand men at his command. Now that the single Person, or Nobility of any Country in Europe, that had but half so many men at command, would be King or Prince, is that which I think no man will doubt. But 
* Point de Argent, point de Suisse.  no Money, no Swissers, as the French speak: If the Money be flown, so are the Men also. Tho Riches in general have Wings, and be apt to bate; yet those in Land are the most hooded, and tied to the Perch, whereas those in Money have the least hold, and are the swiftest of flight. A Bank where the Money takes not wing, but to come home seized, or like a Coyduck, may well be great; but the Treasure of the Indys going out, and not upon returns, makes not Bank. Whence a Bank never paid an Army; or paying an Army, soon became not Bank. But where a Prince or a Nobility has an Estate in Land, the Revenue whereof will defray this Charge, there their Men are planted, have Toes that are Roots, and Arms that bring forth what Fruit you please.  
THUS a single Person is made, or a Nobility makes a King, not with difficulty, or any great prudence, but with ease, the rest coming home, as the Ox that not only knows his Master's Crib, but must starve or repair to it, Nor for the same reason is Government acquired with more ease than it is preserved; that is, if the Foundation of Property Book I be in Land: but if in Money, lightly come, lightly go. The reason why a single Person, or the Nobility that has one hundred thousand men, or half so many at command, will have the Government, is that the Estate in Land, whereby they are able to maintain so many, in any European Territory, must overbalance the rest that remains to the People, at least three parts in four, by which means they are no more able to dispute the Government with him or them, than your Servant is with you. Now for the same reason, if the People hold three parts in four of the Territory, it is plain there can neither be any single Person nor Nobility able to dispute the Government with them; in this case therefore, except Force be interposed, they govern themselves. So by this computation of the Balance of Property or Dominion in Land, you have according to the threefold Foundation of Property, the Root or Generation of the threefold kind of Government or Empire.  

Oceana, p. 39  IF one man be sole Landlord of a Territory, or overbalance the whole People, three parts in four, or thereabouts, he is Grand Signior; for so the Turc, not from his Empire, but his Property is called; and the Empire in this case is absolute Monarchy.  
IF the Few, or a Nobility, or a Nobility with a Clergy, be Landlords to such a proportion as overbalances the People in the like manner, they may make whom they please King; or if they be not pleased with their King, down with him, and set up whom they like better; a HENRY the Fourth, or the Seventh, a GUISE, a MONTFORT, a NEVIL, or a PORTER, should they find that best for their own ends and purposes: For as not the Balance of the King, but that of the Nobility in this case is the cause of the Government, so not the Estate or Riches of the Prince or Captain, but his Virtue or Ability, or fitness for the ends of the Nobility, acquires that Command or Office. This for Aristocracy, or mixed Monarchy. But if the whole People be Landlords, or hold the Land so divided among them, that no one man or number of men within the compass of the Few, or Aristocracy overbalance them, it is a Commonwealth. Such is the Branch in the Root, or the Balance of Property naturally producing Empire; which not confuted, no man shall be able to batter my Superstructures, and which confuted, I lay down my Arms. Till then, if the cause necessarily precede the effect, Property must have a being before Empire, or beginning with it, must be still first in order.  
PROPERTY comes to have a being before Empire or Government two ways, either by a natural or violent Revolution. Natural Revolution happens from within, or by Commerce, as when a Government erected upon one Balance, that for example of a Nobility or a Clergy, thro' the decay of their Estates comes to alter to another Balance; which alteration in the Root of Property, leaves all to confusion, or produces a new Branch or Government, according to the kind or nature of the Root. Violent Revolution happens from without, or by Arms, as when upon Conquest there follows Confiscation. Confiscation again is of three kinds, when the Captain taking all to himself, plants his Army by way of military Colonies, Benefices, or Timars, which was the Policy of MAHOMET; or when the Captain has some Sharers, or a Nobility that divides with him, which was the Policy introduced by the Goths and Vandals; or when the Captain divides the Inheritance by Lots, or otherwise, to the whole People; which Policy was instituted by GOD or MOSES in the Commonwealth Chap. 3 of Israel. This triple distribution, whether from natural or violent Revolution, returns as to the generation of Empire to the same thing that is to the nature of the Balance already stated and demonstrated. Now let us see what the Prevaricator will say, which first is this.  

Consid. p. 14.  THE Assertion, that Property producing Empire consists only in Land, appears too positive. A Pig of my own Sow; this is no more than I told him, only there is more employed in what I told him, than he will see; which therefore I shall now further explain. The balance in Money may be as good or better than that of Land in three cases. First, where there is no Property of Land yet introduced, as in Greece during the time of her ancient Imbecility; whence, as is noted by THUCYDIDES, the meaner sort thro' a desire of Gain underwent the Servitude of the Mighty. Secondly, in Cities of small Territory and great Trade, as Holland and Genoa, the Land not being able to feed the People, who must live upon Traffic, is overbalanced by the means of that Traffic, which is Mony. Thirdly, in a narrow Country, where the Lots are at a low scantling, as among the Israelits, if care be not had of Money in the regulation of the same, it will eat out the balance of Land. For which cause though an Israelit might both have Money, and put it to Usury (Thou shalt lend [upon usury] to many Nations) yet 
Deut. 15. 6. & 23. 19  might he not lend it upon usury to a Citizen or Brother: whence two things are manifest: First, that Usury in itself is not unlawful: And next, that Usury in Israel was not otherwise forbidden, than as it might come to overthrow the Balance or Foundation of the Government: for where a Lot as to the general amounted not perhaps to four Acres, a man that should have had a thousand Pounds in his Purse, would not have regarded such a Lot in comparison of his Money; and he that should have been half so much in debt, would have been quite eaten out. Usury is of such a nature, as, not forbidden in the like cases, must devour the Government. The Roman People, while their Territory was no bigger, and their Lots, which exceeded not two Acres a man, were yet scantier, were flayed alive with it; and if they had not helped themselves by their Tumults, and the Institution of their Tribune's, it had totally ruined both them and their Government. In a Commonwealth, whose Territory is very small, the Balance of the Government being laid upon the Land, as in Lacedaemon, it will not be sufficient to forbid Usury, but Money itself must be forbidden. Whence LYCURGUS allowed of none, or of such only as being of old, or otherwise useless Iron, was little better, or, if you will, little worse than none. The Prudence of which Law appeared in the neglect of it, as when LYSANDER, General for the Lacedæmonians in the Peloponnesian War, having taken Athens, and brought home the spoil of it, occasioned the Ruin of that Commonwealth in her Victory. The Land of Canaan compared with Spain or England, was at the most but a Yorkshire, and Laconia was less than Canaan. Now if we imagine Yorkshire divided, as was Canaan, into six hundred thousand Lots, or as was Laconia, into thirty thousand; a Yorkshire man having one thousand Pounds in his Purse, would, I believe, have a better Estate in Money than in Land; wherefore in this case, to make the Land hold the Balance, there is no way but either that of Israel by forbidding Usury, or that of Lacedaemon by forbidding Mony. Where a small Sum may come to Book I overbalance a man's Estate in Land, there I say Usury or Money for the preservation of the Balance in Land, must of necessity be forbidden, or the Government will rather rest upon the Balance of Money, than upon that of Land, as in Holland and Genoa. But in a Territory of such extent as Spain, or England, the Land being not to be overbalanced by Money, there needs no forbidding of Money or Usury. In Lacedaemon Merchandise was forbidden, in Israel and Rome it was not exercised; wherefore to these Usury must have been the more destructive: but in a Country where Merchandise is exercised, it is so far from being destructive, that it is necessary; else that which might be of profit to the Commonwealth would rust unprofitably in private purses, there being no man that will venture his Money but thro' hope of some Gain; which if it be so regulated that the Borrower may gain more by it than the Lender, as at four in the hundred, or thereabouts, Usury becomes a mighty Profit to the Public, and a Charity to private Men; in which sense we may not be persuaded by them that do not observe these different causes, that it is against Scripture. Had usury to a Brother been permitted in Israel, that Government had been overthrown: but that such a Territory as England or Spain cannot be overbalanced by Money, whether it be a scarce or a plentiful Commodity, whether it be accumulated by Parsimony, as in the purse of HENRY the 7 th', or presented by Fortune, as in the Revenue of the Indys, is sufficiently demonstrated, or shall be.  
FIRST, by an Argument ad hominem, one good enough for the 
Consid. p. 12.  Prevaricator, who argues thus; The Wisdom or the Riches of another man can never give him a Title to my Obedience, nor oblige Mr. HARRINGTON to give his Clothes or Money to the next man he meets, wiser or richer than himself.  
IF he had said stronger, he had spoiled all; for the parting with a man's Clothes or Money in that case, cannot be helped: now the richer, as to the case in debate, is the stronger, that is, the advantage of Strength remains to the Balance. But well; he presumes me to have Clothes and Money of my own, let him put the same case in the People, or the similitude does not hold. But if the People have Clothes and Money of their own, these must either rise (for the bulk) out of Property in Land, or at least out of the cultivation of the Land, or the Revenue of Industry; which if it be dependent, they must give such a part of their Clothes and Money to preserve that dependence out of which the rest arises to him or them on whom they depend, as he or they shall think fit, or parting with nothing to this end, must lose all; that is, if they be Tenants, they must pay their Rent, or turn out. So i● they have Clothes and Money dependently, the Balance of Land is in the Landlord or Landlords of the People: but if they have Clothes and Money independently, than the Balance of Land must of necessity be in the People themselves, in which case they neither would, if there were any such, nor can, because there be no such, give their Money or Clothes to such as are wiser, or richer, or stronger than themselves. So it is not a man's Clothes and Money or Riches, that oblige him to acknowledge the Title of his Obedience to him that is wiser or richer, but a man's no Clothes or Money, or his Poverty, with which, if the Prevaricator should come to want, he could not so finely prevaricat but he must serve some body, so he were rich, no matter if less wise than himself. Wherefore seeing the People cannot be said to have Clothes and Money of their own without the balance in Land, Chap. 3 and having the balance in Land, will never give their Clothes, or Money, or Obedience to a single Person, or a Nobility, though these should be the richer in Money; the Prevaricator by his own Argument has evinced that in such a Territory as England or Spain, Money can never come to overbalance Land.  
FOR a second Demonstration of this Truth, HENRY the Seventh, though he missed of the Indys, in which for my part I think him happy, was the richest in Money of English Princes. Nevertheless this accession of Revenue did not at all preponderat on the King's part, nor change the balance. But while making Farms of a Standard he increased the Yeomanry, and cutting off Retainers he abased the Nobility, began that Breach in the balance of Land, which proceeding has ruined the Nobility, and in them that Government.  
FOR a third, the Monarchy of Spain, since the Silver of Potosi sailed up the Guadalquivir, which in English is, since that King had the Indys, stands upon the same balance in the Lands of the Nobility on which it always stood.  

Consid. p. 16.  AND so the learned Conclusion of the Prevaricator (That it is not to be doubted but a Revenue sufficient to maintain a Force able [to cry aware horns] or beat down all opposition, does equally conduce to Empire, whether it arises from Rents, Lands, Profits of ready Money, Duties, Customs, etc.) asks you no more than where you saw her Premises. For unless they ascended his Monti, and his Banks, it is not to be imagined which way they went; and with these, because he is a professed Zealot for Monarchy, I would wish him by no means to be montebanking or meddling: for the purse of a Prince never yet made a Bank, nor, till spending and trading Money be all one, ever shall. The Genoese, which the King of Spain could never do with the Indys, can make you a Bank out of Letters of Exchange, and the Hollander with Herrings. Let him come no more here; where there is a Bank, ten to one there is a Commonwealth. A King is a Soldier, or a Lover, neither of which makes a good Merchant; and without Merchandise you will have a lean Bank. It is true, the Family of the MEDICI were both Merchants, and made a Bank into a Throne: but it was in Commonwealth of Merchants, in asmall Territory, by great purchases in Land, and rather in a mere confusion than under any settled Government; which Causes, if he can give them all such another meeting, may do as much for another man. Otherwise let it be agreed and resolved, that in a Territory of any extent, the balance of Empire consists in Land, and not in Money; always provided that in case a Prince has occasion to run away, as HENRY the Third of France did out of Poland, his Balance in ready Money is absolutely the most proper for the carrying on of so great and sudden an Enterprise.  
IT is an excellent way of disputing, when a man has alleged no experience, no example, no reason, to conclude with no doubt. Certainly upon such occasions it is not unlawful nor unreasonable to be merry. Reasons, says one Comedian, are not so common as Blackberrys. For all that, says another Comedian, no doubt but a Revenue in Taxes is as good as a Revenue in Feesimple; for this, in brief, is the sense of his former particular, or that part of it, which, the Monti and the Banks being already discharged, remains to be answered. Yet that the Rents and Profits of a man's Land in Feesimple or Property, come Book I in naturally and easily, by common consent or concernment, that is, by virtue of the Law founded upon the public Interest, and therefore voluntarily established by the whole People, is an apparent thing. So a man that will receive the Rents and Profits of other men's Land, must either take them by mere force, or bring the People to make a Law divesting themselves of so much of their Property; which upon the matter is all one, because a People possessed of the Balance, cannot be brought to make such a Law, further than they see necessary for their common defence, but by force, nor to keep it any longer than that Force continues. It is true, there is not only such a thing in nature as health, but sickness too: nor do I deny that there is such a thing as a Government against the Balance. But look about, seek, find where it stood, how it was named, how liked, or how long it lasted. Otherwise the comical Proposition comes to this, It is not to be doubted but that Violence may be permanent or durable, and the Blackberry, for it is because Nature is permanent or durable! What other construction can be made of these words? It is not to be doubted but a Revenue sufficient to maintain a Force able to beat down all opposition (that is, a Force able to raise such a Revenue) does equally (on which word grows the Blackberry) conduce to Empire; that is, as much as could any natural Balance of the same! He may slain mouths, as he has done some, but he shall never make a Politician. The Earth yields her natural increase without losing her heart; but if you come once to force her, look your Force continue, or she yields you nothing: and the balance of Empire consisting of Earth, is of the nature of her Element.  
DIVINES are given to speak much of things which the Considerer balks in this place that would check them, to the end he may fly out with them in others, whereto they do not belong, as where he 
Consid. p. 23.  says, that Government is founded either upon Paternity, and the natural Advantage the first Father had over all the rest of Mankind, who were his Sons; or else from the increase of Strength and Power in some Man or Men, to whose Will the rest submit, that by their submission they may avoid such mischief, as otherwise would be brought upon them. Which two Vagaries are to be fetched home to this place.  
FOR the former; If ADAM had lived till now, he could have seen no other than his own Children; and so that he must have been King by the right of Nature, was his peculiar Prerogative. But whether the eldest Son of his House, if the Prevaricator can find him at this time of day, has the same right, is somewhat disputable; because it was early when ABRAHAM and LOT dividing Territories, became several Kings: and not long after when the Sons of JACOB being all Patriarches, by the appointment of God, whose Right sure was not inferior to that of ADAM, though he had lived, came under Popular Government. Wherefore the advantage of the first Father is for grave men a pleasant fancy; nevertheless if he had lived till now, I hope they understand that the whole Earth would have been his Demeans, and so the Balance of his Property must have answered to his Empire, as did that also of ABRAHAM and LOT to theirs. Wherefore this way of Deduction comes directly home again to the Balance. Paterfamilias 
De jure belli, l. 1. c. 3.  Latifundia possidens, & neminem aliâ lege in suas terras recipiens quam ut ditioni suae, qui recipiuntur, se subjiciant, est Rex, says GROTIUS. Fathers of Families are of three sorts, either a sole Landlord, as ADAM, and then he is an absolute Monarch; or a few Landlords, as LOT and ABRAHAM, with the Patriarches of those days; who if Chap. 3 they joined not together, were so many Princes; or if they joined, made a mixed Monarchv; or, as GROTIUS believes, a kind of Commonwealth administered in the Land of Canaan by MELCHISEDEC, to whom as King and Priest ABRAHAM paid Tithes of all that he had. Such a Magistracy was that also of JETHRO, King and Priest in the Commonwealth of Midian. Fathers of Families for the third sort, as when the Multitude are Landlords (which happened in the division of the Land of Canaan) make a Commonwealth. And thus much, however it was out of the Prevaricator's head in the place now deduced, he, excepting no further against the Balance than that it might consist as well in Money as in Land, had confessed before.  
HIS second Vagary is in his deduction of Empire from increase of Strength, for which we must once more round about our ●oalsire. The strength whereby this effect can be expected, consists not in a pair of Fists, but in an Army; and an Army is a Beast with a great Belly, which subsists not without very large pastures: so if one man has sufficient pasture, he may feed such a Beast; if a few have the pasture, they must feed the Beast, and the Beast is theirs that feed it. But if the People be the Sheep of their own pastures, they are not only a flock of Sheep, but an Army of Lions, though by some accidents, as I confessed before, they be for a season confinable to their dens. So the advantage or increase of Strength depends also upon the Balance. There is nothing in the world to swear this Principle out of countetenance, but the fame of PHALARIS, GELON, DIONYSIUS, AGATHOCLES, NABIS, etc. with which much good do them that like it. It is proper to a Government upon the Balance to take root at home, and spread outwards; and to a Government against the Balance to seek a root abroad, and to spread inwards. The former is sure, but the latter never successful. AGATHOCLES for having conquered Africa, took not the better root in Syracuse. Parvi sunt arma foras, nisi sit consilium domi.  
To conclude this Chapter; the Prevaricator gives me this thanks for finding out the Balance of Dominion (being as ancient in Nature as herself, and yet as new in Art as my Writing) that I have given the world cause to complain of a great disappointment, who, while at my hand that Satisfaction in the Principles of Government was expected, which several great Wits had in vain studied, have in diversifying Riches in words only, as Property, Dominion, Agrarian, Balance, made up no more than a new Lexicon, expressing the same thing that was known before; seeing the opinion that Riches are Power is (as ancient as the first Book of THUCYDIDES, or the Politics of ARISTOTLE, and) not omitted by Mr. HOBBS, or any other Politician. Which is as if he had told Dr. HARVEY, that whereas the Blood is the Life was an Opinion as ancient as MOSES, and no Girl ever pricked her finger, but knew it must have a course; he had given the world cause to complain of great disappointment in not showing a Man to be made of Gingerbread, and his Veins to run Malmsy.   

Book I CHAP. IU.  
Whether the Balance of Empire be well divided into National and Provincial; And whether these two, or any Nations that are of distinct Balance, coming to depend upon one and the same Head, such a mixture creates a new Balance.  
THE Balance of Empire that is National, as it is stated in the former Chapter, stands in a regulated or mixed Monarchy upon the Property or native Interest of the Nobility; in a Commonwealth, upon the Property or native Interest of the People; so these are very natural. But the Balance of absolute Monarchy, partaking of Force as well as Nature, is a mixed thing, and not much different from the Balance of Provincial Empire, or the manner of holding a Province or conquered Country. In a Province, if the Native that is rich be admitted to Power, the Power grows up native, and overtops the forens: therefore you must either not plant your Citizens in your Provinces, where in time they will become native; or, so planting them, neither trust them with Power nor with Arms. Thus the provincial Balance comes to be contrary to the National. And as where Empire is native or national, the administration of it can be no otherwise than according to the national Balance; so where Empire is foreign or provincial, the administration of it can be no otherwise than contrary to the national Balance. That this may be admitted without opposition the Considerer is inclining to allow, always provided he be 
Consid. p. 16, 17.  satisfied in this demand, Whether distinct Balances under the same Head or Governor, as those of Castille and Arragon, the Power of the King (I presume he means by the Balance of a Nobility) being greater in the one, and that of the People in the other, may not so poise one the other, as to produce a new Balance. To which I answer, That no one Government whatsoever has any more than one of two Balances; that, except in the cases excepted, of Land which is national, or that of Arms which is provincial. Wherefore if the King of Spain by his War against the Commons altered the Balance of Arragon, it must have been one of two ways, either by strengthening the Balance of the Nobility, and governing the Arragonian People by them, in which case their Balance, though altered, remained yet National; or by holding both Nobility and People by a provincial Governor and an Army, in which case his Empire in that Kingdom is provincial. There is no third way; nor, putting the case that the Balance of Castille be national, and that of Arragon provincial, does this any more create in the Monarchy of Spain a third Balance of Empire, than did the multiplication of Associations and Provinces, divers for their Balances, in the Commonwealth of Rome. England and Scotland being united in one Prince, made, if it had been rightly used, an increase of Strength, but not a third Balance; nor do the Kingdoms in Spain. Whether a Sovereignty has many Territories and Provinces in subjection, or in League, it is all one as to this point; the stronger Union or League will give the stronger Balance: and the case of the present Soveraintys in Europe being no other, the more nice than wise Speculation of the Considerer, who has not been able to discern the Balance of a League from that of Empire, is a Mare's nest.   

CHAP. V Chap. 5  
Whether there be any common Right or Interest of Mankind distinct from the parts taken severally; and how by the Orders of a Commonwealth it may best be distinguished from private Interest.  
IN the next place the Prevaricator does not go about to play the man, but the unlucky boy. Where I say that the Soul of Man is Mistress of two potent Rivals, Reason and Passion; he does not stand to weigh the truth of the thing, or the fitness of the comparison, either of which had been fair; but tumbles Dick upon Sis, the Logic upon the Rhetoric, the Sense upon the Figure, and scuds away in this manner: If I could be persuaded Mr. HARRINGTON was so far in earnest, as 
Consid. p. 19 20.  to expect any man should be convinced by the metaphorical use of two or three words, some farther consideration might be proposed. This is to use his Readers as the Fox does the Dogs, when having pissed upon his Tail, and flapt it in their Eyes, he gets away. Does not his Book deserve to be gilded and carried in statesmen's Pockets? Alas! mine are nothing? Quis leget haec? vel duo vel nemo: they break the Stationer. And yet let me comfort myself, Whose are better? the Prevaricator seems to set every whit as light by those of HOOKER and GROTIUS, at least where they favour me. The Opinions of GROTIUS, says he, cannot oblige us beyond the Reasons whereon they are founded; and what are those? he will dispute against that which he dares not repeat: that his Comment may take you by the Nose, he has left out the Text. The words of GROTIUS are of this sense: Tho it be truly said that the 
In Proleg. de jure B. ac P.  Creatures are naturally carried to their proper Utility, this ought not to be taken in too general a sense, seeing divers of them abstain from their own Profit, either in regard of those of the same kind, or at least of their Young. Which words, says the Prevaricator, carry a great restriction in them, and the way of producing Actions in Beasts is so different from the emanation of human Reason (mark the Impostor! the Author is speaking of natural Affection, and he wipes out that, and puts in human Reason) that the Inferences from (the natural Affection of) the one, to the (degree of Reason which is in the) other, must needs be very weak. Excellent! does it therefore follow that the eminent degree of Reason, wherewithal God has endued Man, must in him deface that natural Affection, and desertion in some cases of private for common good, which is apparent even in Beasts? What do reverend Divines mean to cry up this Infidel? Nay, is not he worse than an Insidel that provides not for his own Family? A Commonwealth is but a great Family; and a Family is a little Commonwealth. Even Beasts, in sparing out of their own mouths, and exposing themselves to danger for their young, provide for their Families; and in providing for their Families, provide for their whole Commonwealth; that is, forsake in some things their private good and safety, for the good of the public, or of the kind. In this case it is that even Stones or heavy things, says 
Book 1.  HOOKER, forsake their ordinary wont or centre, and fly upwards to relieve the distress of Nature in common. Wretch that he is, shall a Stone upon this occasion fly upwards, and will he have a Man to go Book I downwards! Yes, Mr. HOOKER'S Expression, says he, is altogether figurative; and it is easier to prove from thence that things wanting Sense make Discourses, and act by Election, than that there is such a thing as a common Interest of Mankind. This is like the rest, HOOKER speaks of the necessity that is in Nature, and this Gentleman translates that Sense into the word Election. So because a Stone is necessitated to comply with the common interest of Nature, without Discourse or Election; therefore it rather follows from hence, that things wanting Sense make Discourses, and act by Election, than that there is such a thing as a common Interest of Mankind. His old Trick. I do not say, that because it is so with the other Creatures, therefore it must be so with Man: but as we see it is with the Creatures in this part, so we find it to be with Man. And that so, and more than so, we find it to be with Man (who though he be evil, gives good things to his Children, will work hard, lay up, deny himself, venture his Life for his little Commonwealth) is thus further demonstrated. All civil Laws acknowledge that there is a common Interest of Mankind, and all civil Laws proceed from the Nature of Man; therefore it is in the Nature of Man to acknowledge that there is a common Interest of Mankind. Upon this acknowledgement of Mankind, a Man that steals is put to death, which certainly is none of his private Interest; nor is a man put to death for any other Man's private Interest: therefore there is a common Interest of Mankind distinct from the parts taken severally. But this, though acknowleged in part by all Governments, yet thro' their natural frailty is nothing so well provided for in some as in others: for if the Power be in one or a few Men, one or a few Men, we know, may be Thiefs, and the rather, because applying Money that is public, without a consideration that is public, to uses that are private, is thieving. But such Thiefs will not be hanged; in this case therefore the Government goes not upon public but private Interest. In the frame of such a Government as can go upon no other than the public Interest, consists that whole Philosophy of the Soul which concerns Policy: and this whole Philosophy of the Soul being throout the Commonwealth of Oceana demonstrated; for the Prevaricator to insinuat that I have omitted it, is to show what it is that he loves more than Truth. The main of this Philosophy consists in deposing Passion, and advancing Reason to the Throne of Empire. I expected news in this place, that this were to promise more for the Magistrate or the People than has been performed by the Stoics; but two Girls, meaning no body any harm, have provoked his Wrath, forsooth, to such extravagancy by the way, that though in all modesty it were forbid, as he confesses, by their cheeks, which discovering the Green-sickness, showed that they were past the rod, he has taken them up! Tantaene animis coelestibus irae! What he may have in School-Divinity for so rude a charge, I do not know; but he shall never be able to show any Maxim for this kind of Discipline or Philosophy of the Soul, either in Chivalry or the Politics. The offence of the Girls was no more, than that having a Cake (by the gift of an Uncle or Aunt, or by purchase, or such a one perhaps as was of their own making) in common, or between them, the one had most accuratly divided, and the other was about to choose; when 
Consid. p. 22, 23.  in comes this rude fellow: How now Gentlewomen, says he, What, dividing and choosing! Will no less serve your turn than the whole Mystery of a well-ordered Commonwealth? Who has taught you to cast away Passion, an't please you, like the Bran, and work up Reason as pure as the Flower of your Cake? Chap. 5 Are you acquainted with the Author of Oceana, that has seen foreign Countries, conversed with the Speculativi, learned of the most serene Lady VENETIA to work with Bobbins, makes you a Magistracy like a Pippin Py, and sells Butterprints with S. P. Q. R.? Have don, as you dread Ballads, fusty Pamphlets, or the Ostracism of Billingsgate. Have don, I say; will you vy that green in your Cheeks with the purple of the State? must your Mother, who was never there herself, seek you in the Oven? Come, when I live to see MACCHIAVEL in pufpaste, a Commonwealth come out of a Bakehouse, where Smocks were the Boulters, let me be a Mill-horse.— But now you must know comes the best Jest of all, and I need not say that it comes from Oxford; he tells them that their Cake is Dow (let it not be lost I beseech you) and so snatching it away, eats it, for all the world as Jackpudding eats the Custard. Did you ever see such a Bestia?  
BUT whereas either office, that of dividing or choosing, was communicable to either of the Girls, it is not indifferent in the distribution of a Commonwealth, because dividing is separating one thing, one reason, one interest, or consideration from another, which they that can so discern in private affairs are called discrete, but they that can do it in public are prudent; and the way of this kind of dividing in the language of a Commonweath is Debating. But they that are capable of this kind of dividing or debating are few among many, that when things are thus divided and debated, are able enough to choose, which in the language of a Commonwealth is to resolve. Hence it is that the Debate of the Few, because there be but few that can debate, is the wisest Debate; and the Result of the Many (because every man has an Interest what to choose, and that choice which suits with every man's Interest, excludes the distinct or private Interest or Passion of any man, and so comes up to the common and public Interest or Reason) is the wisest Result. To this end, God, who does nothing in vain, has so divided Mankind into the Few or the natural Aristocracy, and the Many or the natural Democracy, that there can hardly be upon any occasion a meeting of twenty men, wherein it will not be apparent, or in which you may not see all those Lines which are requisite to the face of a beautiful Commonwealth. For example, among any twenty men, occasionally met, there will be some few, perhaps six, excelling the fourteen in greatness of Parts. These six falling into discourse of business, or giving their judgement upon Persons or Things, though but by way of mere Conversation, will discover their Abilitys; whereupon they shall be listened to and regarded by the Fourteen; that is, the Six will acquire an Authority with, and imprint a Reverence upon the Fourteen: which Action and Passion in the Roman Commonwealth were called Authoritas Patrum, & Verecundia Plebis. Nevertheless if the Six endeavour to extend the Authority, which they find thus acquired, to Power, that is, to bring the Fourteen to terms or conditions of Obedience, or such as would be advantageous to the Few, but prejudicial to the Many; the Fourteen will soon find, that consenting, they hurt not only themselves by indamaging their own Interests, but hurt the Six also who by this means come to lose their Virtue, and so spoil their Debate, which, while such advantages are procurable to themselves, will go no further upon the common Good, but their private Benefit. Wherefore in this case they Book I will not consent, and not consenting, they preserve not only their own Liberty, but the integrity of the Six also, who perceiving that they cannot impair the common Interest, have no other interest left but to improve it. And neither any Conversation, nor any People, how dull soever and subject by fits to be deluded, but will soon see thus much, which is enough, because what is thus proposed by the Authority of the Six or of the Senate, and resolved by the Fourteen, or by the People, is enacted by the Whole, and becomes that Law, than which, though Mankind be not infallible, there can be nothing less fallible in Mankind. Art is the imitation of Nature; by observation of such Lines as these in the face of Nature, a Politician limns his Commonwealth. 
Consid. p. 26.  But says the Prevaricator, the Paralogism lies in this, that the twenty men are first supposed to be a Commonwealth, and then it is considered how they would dispose of the Government. What is this? Art is the imitation of Nature; therefore Art presumes Nature to be Art. A Picture is the representation of a Face; therefore the Picturedrawer presumed the Face to be a Picture; and in this same, there is lying, being, or squatting, a thing called a Paralogism. Did you ever hear such a Paraketism? for to speak a word without understanding the sense of it, is like a Parrot. And yet I wrong the Parrot in this comparison; for she, though she do not understand herself, is understood by others, whereas neither can this Prevaricator tell what he means, nor any man 
Consid. p. 27.  else. Or riddle me, riddle me what is this? The sense of want among men that are in equality of Power may beget a desire of exchange; as let me have your Horse, and you shall have my Cow, which is the fountain of private Contracts: but it is not to be with reason imagined, that this should be enough to make a man part with a natural Freedom, and put himself into the hands of a Power from which he can afterwards have no shield, though it should be used to his own destruction.  
MOST victorious Nonsense! for he that says nothing, cannot be answered. It should seem, if the twenty men were indeed a Commonmonwealth, or in equality of Power, for so he puts the case, they might truck Horses and Cows, but not by any means consider, or once let it enter into their heads, how by Art to make good their natural Freedom: That (unless they set up a Prince, as you shall see anon) were to part with their natural Freedom, and put themselves into the hands of a Power from which (there being no other Power but themselves) they can afterwards have no shield. To read it throughly for the understanding, as is intimated in his Epistle, will be more, I doubt, than his Book will obtain of any Reader. Yet is he, in his own conceit, as surefooted as any Mule, and knows the Road. But Mr. HARRINGTON has not lost his way without company; his Brother GROTIUS complains, that they who treat of Jus Gentium, do commonly mistake some part of the Roman Jus civil for it: and even so he laments (an't please you) that while men profess to consider the Principles of Government, they fall upon Notions which are the mere effects of Government. But as an Ape is the more ugly for being like a Man; so this Prevaricator, for making Faces like GROTIUS. I, who am complained of, deriving Government from the true Principle of the same, in the Balance or Foundation, set the Superstructures accordingly; and he who complains forsooth, never so much as proposes any thing like a Principle or Superstructure, but runs altogether upon mere Notions: 
Consid. p. 28.  As where he asks me, What Security will you give, that the Six in their Consultations shall not rather aim at their own advantage, than that of Chap. 5 the Fourteen, and so make use of the eminence of their Parts to circumvent the rest? In another place he can answer himself and say, that the Fourteen, or the People in this Constitution, have the Vote and the Sword too. How then should the Six circumvent them? What Security has a Prince, that his People will not pull him out of his Throne? why, a Nobility or an Army: And are not the People in a Commonwealth their own Army? Is this to mind Principles? On the other side, How, says he, shall we be satisfied that the Fourteen will not soon begin to ihink themselves wise enough to consult too, and making use of their excess in Power, pull the Six off their Cushions? As if there were any experience public or private, any sense or reason, that men having the whole Power in their own hands, would deprive themselves of Counsillors; or that ever a Commonwealth deposed the Senate, or can depose the Senate, and remain a Commonwealth. The People of Capua being enraged to the full height, resolved and assembled together (the Senate, if the People will, being always in their power) on purpose to cut the throats of the Senators, when PACUVIUS CALAVIUS exhorted them that ere they went upon the design, they would first make election among themselves of a new Senate, which, the throats of the old being cut, might for the safety of the Commonwealth immediately take their places; for, said he, 
* Sen●tum omnin● non ha●●re non vultis: Quip aut Rex, quod abominand●m; aut, quod ●num liberae civitatis Concilium est▪ Senatus habendus est. Liv.  You must either have a King, which is to be abhorred; or whatever becomes of this, you must have some other Senate: for the Senate is a Council of such a nature as without it no free City can subsist. By which Speech of PACUVIUS, the People, who thought themselves, as the Considerer has it, wise enough to consult, being convinced, sell to work for the Election of a succeeding Senate out of themselves (the Prevaricator should not tell me of Notions, but learn that in a Commonwealth there must be a Senate, is a Principle) while the People of Capua were intent upon choosing this new Senate, the Parties proposed seemed to them to be so ridiculously unfit for such an Office, that by this means coming to a nearer sight of themselves, they were secretly so filled with the shame of their Enterprise, that slinking away, they would never after be known so much as to have thought upon such a thing. Nor ever went any other People so far, not the Florentines themselves, though addicted to Innovation or changing of the Senate beyond all other examples. Sons of the University, Brothers of the College, Heads and Points; you love fine words. Whether tends to bring all things into servitude, my Hypothesis, or his 
† Aroche●.  Hypothytes? For says he, I am willing to gratify Mr. HARRINGTON with his partition of the twenty men into six and fourteen; but if I had been in a humour of contradiction, it had been as free for me to have said that some one of the twenty would have excelled all the rest in Judgement, Experience, Courage, and height of Genius, and then told him, that this had been a natural Monarchy, established by God himself over Mankind: As if the twenty would give their Clothes or Money to the next man they meet wiser or richer than themselves, which before he denied; Oportet mendacem esse memorem. God established Kings not otherwise than by election of the People; and the twenty will neither give their Clothes nor Money: How then? why in comes a Gallant with a file Book I of Musketeers; What, says he, are you dividing and choosing here? Go to, I will have no dividing, give me all. Down go the pots, and up go their heels: What is this? why a King! What more? by Divine Right! As he took the Cake from the Girls!   

CHAP. VI  
Whether the Senatusconsulta, or Decrees of the Roman Senate, had the Power of Laws.  
AMONG divers and weighty Reasons why I would have that Prince look well to his file of Musketeers, this is no small one, that he being upon no balance, will never be able to give Law without them. For to think that he succeeds to the Senate, or that the power of the Senate may serve his turn, is a presumption that will fail him. The Senate, as such, has no power at all, but mere Authority of proposing to the People, who are the makers of their own Laws; whence the Decrees of the Senate of Rome are never Laws, nor so called, but Senatusconsulta. It is true that a King coming in, the Senate, as there it did, may remain to his aid and advantage; and then they propose not as formerly to the People, but to him, who comes not in upon the right of the Senate, but upon that of the People: whence says JUSTINIAN; 
* Quod Principi placuit legis habet vigorem, quum lege Regia quae de ejus imperio lata est, Populus ei, & in eum omne imperium suum & potestatem concedat.  The Prince's Pleasure has the force of Law, since the People have by the Lex Regia concerning his Power, made over to him all their own Empire 
Consid. p. 30, 31.  and Authority. Thus the Senatusconsultum Macedonicum, with the rest that had place allowed by JUSTINIAN in compilement of the Roman Laws, were not Laws in that they were Senatusconsulta, or proposed by the Senate, but in that they were allowed by JUSTINIAN or the Prince, in whom was now the right of the People. Wherefore the Zealot for Monarchy has made a pas de clerc, or foul step in his procession, where he argues thus out of CUJACIUS: It was soon agreed that the distinct Decrees of the Senate and People should be extended to the nature of Laws; therefore the distinct Decrees of the Senate are Laws, whether it be so agreed by the People, or by the Prince, or no. For thus he has no sooner made his Prince, than he kicks him heels over head; seeing where the Decrees of the Senate are Laws without the King, that same is as much a King as the Prevaricator a Politician. A Law is that which was passed by the Power of the People, or of the King. But out of the Light; in this place he takes a Welsh Bait, and 
Consid. p. 32.  looking back, makes a muster of his Victories, like the bussing Gascon, who, to show what he had thrown out of the windows in his Debauchery, made a formal repetition of the whole Inventory of the House.   

CHAP. VII. Chap. 7  
Whether the Ten Commandments were proposed by GOD or MOSES, and voted by the People of Israel.  
ONE would think the Gascon had done well; Is he satisfied? No, he will now throw the House out of the windows. The principal 
Consid. p. 33, 35.  stones being already taken from the Foundation, he has a bag of certain Winds wherwithal to reverse the Superstructures. The first Wind he lets go is but a Puff, where he tells me, that I bring Switzerland and Holland into the enumeration of the Heathen Commonwealths: which if I had done, their Liberties in many parts and places being more ancient than the Christian Religion in those Countries (as is plain by TACITUS, where he speaks of CIVILIS, and of the Customs of the Germans) I had neither wronged them nor myself; but I do no such matter, for having enumerated the Heathen Commonwealths, I add that the Procedings of Holland and Switzerland, though after a more obscure 
Oceana, p. 51.  manner, are of the like nature. The next is a Storm, while reproaching me with Rudeness, he brings in Dr. FERN and the Clergy by head and shoulders, who till they undertake the quarrel of Monarchy, to the confusion of the Commonwealth of Israel, at least so far that there be no weight or obligation in such an Example, are posted. As if for a Christian Commonwealth to make so much use of Israel as the Roman did of Athens, whose Laws she transcribed, were against the Interest of the Clergy, which, it seems, is so hostil to popular Power, that to say the Laws of Nature, though they be the Fountains of all Civil Law, are not the Civil Law, till they be the Civil Law; or thus, that thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, though they be in natural Equity, yet were not the Laws of Israel or of England, till voted by the People of Israel, or the Parliament of England, is to assert 
Consid. p. 35, 40.  the People into the mighty Liberty of being free from the whole moral Law; and, inasmuch as to be the Adviser or Persuader of a thing, is less than to be the Author or Commander of it, to put an Indignity upon God himself. In which Fopperies the Prevaricator, boasting of Principles, but minding none, first confounds Authority and Command or Power; and next forgets that the dignity of the Legislator, or, which is all one, of the Senate succeeding to his Office, as the Sanhedrim to MOSES, is the greatest dignity in a Commonwealth: and yet that the Laws or Orders of a Commonwealth derive not otherwise, whether from the Legislator, as MOSES, LYCURGUS, SOLON, etc. or the Senate, as those of Israel, Lacedaemon, or Athens, than from their Authority received and confirmed by the Vote or Command of the People. It is true, that with Almighty God it is otherwise than with a mortal Legislator, but thro' another Nature which to him is peculiar, from whom as he is the cause of being, or the Creator of Mankind, Omnipotent Power is inseparable; yet so equal is the goodness of this Nature to the greatness thereof, that as he is the cause of wellbeing by way of Election, for example in his chosen People Israel, or of Redemption, as in the Christian Church, himself has preferred his Authority or Proposition before his Empire. What else is the Book I meaning of these words, or of this proceeding of his? Now therefore if ye will obey my Voice indeed, and keep my Covenant, ye shall be to me a 
Exod. 19 5.  Kingdom, or I will be your King; which Proposition being voted by the People in the Affirmative, God proceeds to propose to them the ten Commandments in so dreadful a manner, that the People being exceedingly 
Exod. 20. 19  affrighted, say to MOSES, Speak thou with us, and we will hear thee: that is, be thou henceforth our Legislator or Proposer, and we will resolve accordingly; but let not God speak with us, lest we die. From whenceforth God proposes to the People no otherwise than by MOSES, whom he instructs in this manner; These are the Judgements which thou shalt propose or set before them. Wherefore it is said of the 
Deut. 29. 1.  Book of Deuteronomy, containing the Covenant which the Lord commanded MOSES to make with the Children of Israel in the Land of Moab, besides the Covenant which he made with them in Horeb; This is 
Deut. 4. 44.  the Law which MOSES set before the Children of Israel. Neither did GOD in this case make use of his Omnipotent Power, nor CHRIST in the like, who also is King after the fame manner in his Church, and would have been in Israel, where when to this end he might have mustered up Legions of Angels, and been victorious with such Arms, or Argyraspides, as never Prince could show the like, he says no more 
Matth. 23. 37.  than, O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thee and thy Children, as a Hen gathers her Chickens under her wings, and ye would not? where it is plain that the Jews rejecting CHRIST, that he should not reign over them, the Law of the Gospel came not to be the Law of the Jews; and so if the ten Commandments came to be the Law of Israel, it was not only because God proposed them, seeing Christ also proposed his Law, which nevertheless came not to be the Law of the Jews, but because the People received the one, and rejected the other. It is not in the nature of Religion that it should be thought a profane saying, that if the Bible be in England, or in any other Government, the Law or Religion of the Land, it is not only because God has proposed it, but also because the People or Magistrate has received it, or resolved upon it; otherwise we must set lighter by a Nation or Government than by a private Person who can have no part nor portion in this Law, unless he vote it to himself in his own Conscience, without which he remains in the condition he was before, and as the Heathen, who are a Law to themselves. Thus whereas▪ in a Covenant there must be two Parties, the Old and New Testament being in sum the Old and New Covenant; these are that Authority and Proposition of GOD and CHRIST, to which they that refuse their Vote or Result may be under the Empire of a Clergy, but are none of his Commonwealth. Nor, seeing I am gone so far, does this at all imply Freewill, but, as is admirably observed by Mr. HOBBS, the freedom of that which naturally precedes Will, namely, Deliberation or Debate, in which, as the Scale by the weight of Reason or Passion comes to be turned one way or other, the Will is caused, and being caused, is necessitated. When God comes in thus upon the Soul of Man, he gives both the Will and the Deed; from which like Ossice of the Senate in a Commonwealth, that is, from the excellency of their Deliberation and Debate, which prudently and faithfully unsolded to the People, does also frequently cause and necessitat both the Will and the Deed. GOD himself has said of the Senate, that they are Gods: an expression, though divine, yet not unknown to the Heathens; Homo homini Deus, one man, for the excellency of his Aid, may be a God to Chap. 8 another. But let the Prevaricator look to it; for he that leads the blind out of his way, is his Devil.  
FOR the things I have of this kind, as also for what I have said upon the words Chirotonia and Ecclesia, the Prevaricator is delighted to make me beholden underhand to Mr. HOBBS, notwithstanding the open enmity which he says I profess to his Politics. As if JOSEPHUS upon that of SAMUEL, They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me 
1 Sam. 8. 7.  that I should not reign over them, had not said of the People (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) that they unchirotonized or unvoted God of the Kingdom. Now if they unchirotonized or unvoted God of the Kingdom, than they had chirotonized or voted him to the Kingdom; and so not only the Doctrine that God was King in Israel by Compact or Covenant, but the use of the word Chirotonia also in the sense I understand it, is more ancient than Mr. HOBBS. I might add that of CAPELLUS, 
* Deus Populi Judaici Rex crat veluti politicus, & civilis Legislator. In Diatriba de Voto Jephthae.  God was a Political King and Civil Legislator of the Jews. And for the use I have made of the word Ecclesia, as no man can read such as have written of the Grecian Commonwealths, and miss it, so I do not remember that Mr. HOBBS has spoken of it. To these things fuller satisfaction will be given in the second Book; which nevertheless I do not speak to the end I might wave Obligation to so excellent an Author in his way. It is true, I have opposed the Politics of Mr. HOBBS, to show him what he taught me, with as much disdain as he opposed those of the greatest Authors, in whose wholesome Fame and Doctrine the good of Mankind being concerned, my Conscience bears me witness that I have done my duty. Nevertheless in most other things I firmly believe that Mr. HOBBS is, and will in future Ages be accounted the best Writer, at this day, in the world. And for his Treatises of human Nature, and of Liberty and Necessity, they are the greatest of new Lights, and those which I have followed, and shall follow.   

CHAP. VIII.  
Whether a Commonwealth coming up to the perfection of the kind, comes not up to the perfection of Government, and has no flaw in it.  
WHAT a Commonwealth coming up to the perfection of the kind is, I have shown both by the definition of an equal Commonwealth, and the Exemplification of it in all the parts.  
THE Definition is contained in the first of my Preliminaries; which, because it is short, I shall repeat.  
An equal Commonwealth is a Government established upon an equal Agrarian, arising into the Superstructures or three Orders, the Senate debating and proposing, the People resolving, and the Magistracy executing, by an equal Rotation, or interchangeable Election, thro' the suffrage of the People given by the Ballot. The Exemplification is the whole Commonwealth Book I of Oceana. Each of which by him, who, if his Doctrine of pure and absolute Monarchy be observed, can be no Englishman, is called an Irish Bog; as in some sense it is, seeing the Prevaricator has set never 
Consid. p. 43.  a foot in it that will stand, nor has more to say, than that Where there is one ambitious poor man, or one vicious rich man, it is impossible there should be any such Government as can be secure from Sedition.  
WHICH, First, is rather to make all Governments ineffectual, or to make all Governments alike, than to object against any, seeing That there should not be one ambitious poor man, or one vicious rich man, is equally, if not more, improbable in a Monarchy than in a Commonwealth.  
SECONDLY, That one man alone, whether he be rich or poor, should without a Party be able to disturb a Commonwealth with Sedition, is an absurdity; nor is such a party, as may be able in some sort to disturb the Peace by robbing upon the Highway, or some such disorder, always able to disturb a Government with Sedition. Wherefore this feat goes not so much upon the ability of any one man, rich or poor, as the Power of the Party he is able to make; and this strength of the Party goes upon the nature of the Government, and the content or discontents thence deriving to the Few, or the Many. The Discontents, whether of the Few or the Many, derive from that which is, or by them is thought to be some bar to their Interest; and those Interests which are the causes of Sedition are three, the desire of Liberty, the desire of Power, and the desire of Riches; nor be there any more: for where the People thro' want of Bread, thro' Violence offered to their Women, or Oppression, rise up against their Governors, it relates to the desire of Liberty; those also under the name of Religion make not a fourth, but come to one of the three.  
NOW to speak in the first place of the Many, and anon of the Few; the People in an equal Commonwealth have none of these three Interests: Not the desire of Liberty, because the whole Frame of an equal Commonwealth is nothing else but such a method whereby the Liberty of the People is secured to them: Not of Power, because the Power which otherwise they could not exercise, is thus estated in them: Nor of Riches, because where the Rich are so bounded by an Agrarian that they cannot overbalance (and therefore neither oppress the People, nor exclude their Industry or Merit from attaining to the like Estate, Power, or Honour) the whole People have the whole Riches of the Nation already equally divided among them; for that the Riches of a Commonwealth should not go according to the difference of men's Industry, but be distributed by the Poll, were inequal. Wherefore the People in an equal Commonwealth having none of those Interests which are the causes of Sedition, can be subject to no such effect.  
TO affirm then with the Considerer, that the whole of this Libration is reduced to the want of Power to disturb the Commonwealth, must needs be a mistake, seeing in the Commonwealth proposed the People have the Power, but can have no such Interest; and the People having no such Interest, no Party can have any such Power, it being impossible that a Party should come to overbalance the People, having their Arms in their own hands. The whole matter being thus reduced to the want of Power to disturb the Government; this, according to his own Argument, will appear to be the Libration in which the Power, whereof the Governor is possessed, so vastly exceeds the Power remaining with those Chap. 8 who are to obey (which in case of contest must be so small a Party) that it would be desperately unreasonable for them to hope to maintain their Cause. If the true method then of attaining to perfection in Government be to make the Governor absolute, and the People in an equal Commonwealth be absolute, then there can be none in this Government, that upon probable terms can dispute the Power with the Governor, and so this State by his own Argument must be free from Sedition. Thus far upon occasion of the ambitious poor Man objected. I have spoken of the Many; and in speaking of the Many, implicitly of the Few: for as in an equal Commonwealth, for example in England during the Peerage or Aristocracy, the Many depended upon or were included in the Few; so in an equal Commonwealth the Few depend upon or are included in the Many, as the Senate of Venice depends upon, or is included in the Great Council, by which it is annually elected in the whole or in some part. So what was said in an equal Commonwealth of the Many or the poorer sort, is also said of the Few or of the Richer; who, thro' the virtue of the Agrarian, as in Oceana, or of other Orders supplying the defect of an Agrarian, as in Venice, not able to overbalance the People, can never have any Power to disturb the Commonwealth in case they had such an Interest, nor can have any such Interest in case they had such Power. For example in Oceana, putting the case that the Few were as powerful as it is possible they should be; that is, that the whole Land was fallen into five thousand hands: The five thousand, excluding the People, could get no more Riches by it, because they have the whole Land already; no more Liberty by it, because they were in perfect Liberty before; nor any more Power by it, because thro' the equality of the Balance, or of their Estates, they can be no more by themselves than an equal Commonwealth, and that they were already with the People: but would be much less, the Power or Commonwealth, in which there be five thousand Equals, being not greater, but much less than the Power or Commonwealth wherein the whole People are equal; because the Power or Effect of a greater People is proportionably greater than the Power or Effect of a lesser People, and the Few by this means would get no more than to be the lesser People. So the People being no bar to the Riches, Liberty, nor Power of the five thousand, and the desire of Liberty, Riches, and Power, being the only causes of Sedition; there could arise no Sedition in this Commonwealth by reason of the Nobility, who have no such Interest if they had the Power, nor have any such Power if they had the Interest, the People being equally possessed of the Government, of the Arms, and far superior in number. In sum, an equal Commonwealth consists but of one hereditary Order, the People, which is by election divided into two Orders, as the Senate and the Congregation in Lacedaemon, or the Senate and the Great Council in Venice; for the Gentlemen of Venice, as has been often said, are the People of Venice, the rest are Subjects. And an inequal Commonwealth consists of two Hereditary Orders, as the Patricians and Plebeians in Rome, whereof the former only had a hereditary Capacity of the Senate: whence it comes to pass that the Senate and the People in an equal Commonwealth having but one and the same Interest, never were nor can be at variance; and that the Senate and the People in an inequal Commonwealth having two distinct Interests, Book I never did nor can agree. So an equal Commonwealth cannot be seditious, and an inequal Commonwealth can be no other than seditious.  
IF a man be resolved, as the Considerer is, to huddle these things together, there is no making any thing of this kind of Policy; of which therefore it will be a folly to talk. For example, Lacedaemon is either to be considered as not taking in the Helots'; and then in herself she was an equal Commonwealth void of any Sedition, or cause of it, how much soever she were troubled with the Helots': So the Objection made by him, of her Troubles by the Helots', is impertinently urged, to show that she was a seditious Commonwealth: Or if he will needs have it, that she took in the Helots', it is undeniable that she took them in inequally, and so was inequal; whence the Troubles by the Helots' must needs be impertinently urged against an equal Commonwealth.  
AGAIN, when I allege Venice from PIERO GRADENIGO, that is, for the space of about four hundred years from the present date, at which time the Reformation, yet in force, began, as an Example of an equal Commonwealth; for him to instance in the times before, when though the Commonwealth, according to the intention, was as equal as now, yet being not bound by sufficient Orders to give herself Security of her native Liberty, her Dukes on the one side did what they pleased, and the enraged People on the other side banished, condemned to death, or murdered them; who sees not the Imposture? Indeed he blushes at it himself. Wherefore my Assertion being not yet knocked on the head, he promises to kill it better, first by the example of Lacedaemon leaving out the Helots', and next by that of Venice since the time of PIERO GRADENIGO.  

Consid. p. 60. Pausan. Lacon.  FOR the first you must know that once upon a time there was a quarrel between CLEOMENES and DEMARATUS Kings of Lacedaemon about Succession, which was determined by the Ephori, that is, by a Court of Justice, and not by the Sword; the like happened 
Plut. Alcib.  in LEOTYCHIDES the known Bastard of ALCIBIADES, or so confessed to be by his Mother to divers of her Maids. Now this is a Maxim in the Politics, Where the differences of Kings can go no further than a Court of Justice, there the Government is seditious. Most ridiculous! Is there a stronger Argument that such a Government is not seditious? No matter, give him room; Much more fatal was the contest between CLEONYMUS and his Brother AREUS the Son of ACROTATUS, by whose War ZARAX was ruined, and PYRRHUS came into the game, who besieged the Capital City: the Reign of AGIS and CLEOMENES was so full of turbulence, as would put a man out of breath to relate. Fair and softly: was not all this after LYSANDER, and the Spoils of Athens had broken the Agrarian, and so ruined Lacedaemon? I affirm there can be no Sedition in an equal Commonwealth; and he to oppose me, shows that there was Sedition in an inequal one; whether does this affirm his Assertion or mine?  
BUT for better luck in Venice. This City by Mr. HARRINGTON'S own confession is possessed of several Advantages. Yes, I say that the Commonwealth of Venice, thus seated, is like a man in a Citadel, who thereby may be the safer from his Enemy's, but ne'er a whit the safer from diseases. What conclusion would you expect he should infer from hence? Why among these therefore there is good cause to reckon her Immunity from Seditions: Does not our Logician repeat faithfully, and Chap. 8 dispute honestly? Again, Sir, she is like a Ship ready to be boarded by Pirates, has the Turc on this Frontier, the Pope on that, the King of Spain on another. As if this were an Argument every Government must not be void of Sedition, seeing there is none except they be Lands, whose Frontiers are not bounded by the Territories of other Princes. Well, but since the last Reglement (in English, Reformation) in the time of GRADENIGO, you have had three Seditions in Venice, that of MARINO BOCCONI, that of BAIAMONTE TIEPOLO, and that of MARINO FALERIO.  
BODIN has been long since beaten for this like Stockfish, and yet our Author will be serving it up for a Courtly dish. BOCCONI would have killed the Duke, but was hanged before he could do it. FELTON killed a Duke that had greater power here than the other in Venice, and was hanged afterwards, therefore England was a seditious Government; for this must either be undeniable for FELTON'S sake, or why must the other be so for BOCCONI'S? Again, FALERIO and his Complices would have destroyed the Great Council, but were hanged before they could do it. VAUX and his Accomplices would have blown up the Parliament but were hanged before they could do it; therefore England was in this relation a seditious Government, else why was Venice? There passes not a month but there die Rogues at Tyburn, is the Government therefore seditious? or is this one regard in which it is not? Where all that so invade the Government are by virtue of the same brought to that end, there the Commonwealth, or the Orders of it, are not the cause but the cure of Sedition; and so these are undeniable Arguments that Venice is not seditious, where, since the Reformation, there has not been a cut finger upon this score, save only thro' the conspiracy of BAIAMONTE, which indeed came to blows. Nor for this yet can Venice be called a seditious Commonwealth. You find no man accusing Rome of Sedition, in that she had a MANLIUS or a MELIUS that dangerously affected Monarchy, because to these her Orders, by which they suffered Death, as soon applied the Remedy. But Rome was a seditious Commonwealth, because the perpetual feud that was between the Senate and the People sprung out of her Orders, and was that to which there was no Remedy to apply. England was not a seditious Government because it had a VAUX or a FELTON, but because the Power anciently of the Nobility, and late of the People, was such by the Orders of the same as might at any time occasion Civil War. Put the case a Slave or some desperate fellow has killed the Great Turc, the Government for that cannot be said to be seditious, but in this, that thro' the very nature of the Policy, the Janizaries at any time may do as much, it is undeniably seditious. BAIAMONTE'S Conspiracy he will not say was of this nature. It was not a Disease in the Bones of the Commonwealth, but a thing that no sooner appeared, or broke out (though it be true, there happened a little scratching first) than it fell off like a Scab; such an accident may besal the best Constitution, and Venice never had the like but once: if he could say as much of a Monarchy, he gains no advantage; yet let him say it, and prove it, I give him all. I omit many Falsehoods and Absurditys in the proceeding of the Prevaricator, as where he intimats the Power of the Dukes to have been that whereby Venice gained I know not what, and yet to have Book I been that also by which FALERIO had like to have spoiled all: each of which, the Duke of Venice having no power at all, is known to be false. Why should I stay to put you in mind that having affirmed Venice to derive her Immunity from intestine Discord no otherwise than a Ship that is ready to be boarded by Pirates, he instances in such examples to the contrary, as took occasion by the hair of a soren scalp, while in those of BOCCONI and TIEPOLO the Commonwealth by her Wars with the Genoeses and Ferrara, was put to her plunges, and in that of FALERIO reduced to the last extremity? I shall only note, that if such sudden flashes as these may come under the name of Sedition, he has done a fine Office for Monarchy, seeing no Senate is so much exposed to like blows as any Prince.  
WELL; but for all this it is confessed that there may be such a thing as a seditious Commonwealth, in that the feud between the Senate and 
Consid. p. 48.  the People of Rome could not be cured; What Security, says he, will you give us, that the like may not happen in Oceana, or that the whole body of the People being entrusted with giving a Vote, and keeping a Sword, may not by way of Council or Arms, fall to such work as levelling the five thousand, or bringing the Agrarian from two to one thousand pounds a year, or less, as they fancy?  
TO which I answer by a like question, What security will he give me that the People of any Commonwealth shall not cast themselves into the Sea? A Prince may be mad, and do so, but the People are naturally incapable of such madness. If men will boast of their knowledge in Principles, and yet talk of nothing but effects, why may not a Man fly as well as a Bird? but if Causes may be regarded, let him once show how the Will, seeing it is not free, nor moved without some Object, should move the People in such a manner; or for what, they having all the Liberty and all the Power that can be had, should it strive? Well, that is soon done, for the Land may come into the hands of five thousand, and so the Booty may be great, and the resistance small. Good: The Romans being the wisest of all People, went no further towards the Remedy of their Grievances, than to strive for the introduction of an Agrarian, in which they fainted too, even to the destruction of that Government. Except these, none have been so wise; and if there be any such thing familiar with the nature of the People, why appeared it but once, and then vanished without effect? why did not the People for example under the late Monarchy (when the Dominion or Freehold of the Nation, by greater shares, was in a smaller Party, and they had not only Riches, but Liberty and Power too, to whet them on) ever so much as think of levelling three hundred Men? for the Nobility and Clergy, in whom was the Balance, were no more. If it be replied that the People were not armed; by whom did the Barons make War with the Kings? If they were not trusted with a Vote; what was that of the House of Commons? Let Dominion or Freehold stand upon what balance you will, inequal or equal, from the beginning of the world you shall never find a People turning Levellers. And as Reason is Experience in the root, so Experience is Reason in the branch, which might therefore be sufficient in the case. Nevertheless for clearer satisfaction in a point of such concernment, I shall endeavour to dig up and discover the root of this branch, or the reason of this Experience. That which in Beasts is Instinct, whereof they can give no account, is in itself that Wisdom of God whereby he provides for them; so it is with the People, they are not Chap. 8 Levellers, nor know they why, and yet it is, because to be Levellers were to destroy themselves. For, seeing I must repeat, to repeat briefly; There is no Territory of any Extent and Populousness where the Revenue of Industry is not twice as much as the dry Rent. This has been demonstrated in Oceana. The Revenue of Industry is in those that work, that is, the People: Wherefore the Revenue of the People, where their Industry is not obstructed, is twofold to that of the Nobility, holding the whole Territory in Freehold. But where their Industry is obstructed, their Revenue is nothing. Civil War being of all other the greatest Obstruction of Industry, the People in taking Arms must venture all they have, for that, which if they obtain they lose two for one; and if they obtain not, all for nothing. Wherefore a People never will, nor ever can; never did, nor ever shall take Arms for Levelling. But they are entrusted with a Vote; and therefore taking away the Lands of the five thousand, or diminishing the Agrarian by way of Council, they need not obstruct their Industry: but, preserving the Revenue of that, may bring themselves into the possession of the Land too. This will they, this can they less do, because being in Council they must propose something for the advantage of the Commonwealth, or of themselves, as their end in such an Action. But the Land coming to be in the possession of five thousand, falls not into a number that is within the compass of the Few, or such a one as can be Princes, either in regard of their Number, or of their Estates; but to such a one as cannot consent to abolish the Agrarian, because that were to consent to rob one another: nor can they have any Party among them, or against their common Interest, strong enough to force them, or to break it; which remaining, the five thousand neither are nor can be any more than a Popular State, and the Balance remains every whit as equal, as if the Land were in never so many more hands. Wherefore the Commonwealth being not to be bettered by this means, the People by Council can never go about to levelly, nor diminish the Agrarian for the good of the Commonwealth. Nor can they undertake it for the inrichment of themselves, because the Land of Oceana, as has been demonstrated, being levelled or divided equally among the Fathers of Families only, comes not to above ten pounds a year to each of them, whereas every Footman costs his Master twenty pounds a year; and there is not a Cottager having a Cow upon the Common, but with his own Labour, at one shilling a day, gets twenty pounds a year; which, the Land being levelled, were impossible, because there would be no body able to set a labourer on work, o● to keep a Servant: wherefore neither would, nor could the People by Council go about any such business. So there being no possible cause of Disagreement between the Few and the Many, the Senate and the People, there can be no such effect; whence this is the Government, which being perfectly equal, has such a Libration in the frame of it, that no man in or under it can contract such an Interest or Power, as should be able to disturb the Commonwealth with Sedition. Yet after all this, the Prevaricator will only tell 
Consid. p. 67.  Mr. HARRINGTON (for to deny the Conclusion is a fair way of disputing) that this Libration is of the same nature with a Perpetual Motion in the Mechanics. But let me tell him, that in the Politics there is nothing mechanic, or like it. This is but an Idiotism of some Mathematician Book I resembling his, who imagined the Stream of a River to be like that of his Spigot. 
Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at ille  
Labitur & labetur in omne volubilis aevum.  
The silly Swain upon a River stood,  
In hope the rolling bottom of the Flood  
Would once unwind itself, whose liquid Clew  
The silver Thread for ever shall renew.   
THE Mathematician must not take God to be such a one as he is. Is that of the Sun, of the Stars, of a River, a perpetual Motion? 
Galen. de usu partium, l. 4.  Even so one Generation goes and another comes. Nature, says GALEN, has a tendency to make her Creature immortal, if it were in the capacity of the matter on which she has to work; but the People never dies. This motion of theirs is from the hand of a perpetual Mover, even God himself, in whom we live, and move, and have our being; and to this Current the Politician adds nothing but the Banks, to which end, or none, the same God has also created human Prudence. Wherefore there is not any thing that raises itself against God or right Reason, if I say that it is in human Prudence so to apply these Banks, that they may stand as long as the River runs; or let this Considerer consider again, and tell me out of Scripture or Reason, why not. Mathematicians, it is true, pretended to be the Monopolists of Demonstration; but speak ingenuously, have they, as to the Politics, hitherto given any other Demonstration, than that there is a difference between Seeing, and making of Spectacles? Much more is that comparison of the Politics, going upon certain and demonstrable Principles, to Astrologers and Fortune-tellers, who have none at all, vain and injurious. For as in relation to what DAVID has said, and Experience confirmed, of the Age of Man, that it is threescore years and ten; I may say, that if a Man lies bedrid, or dies before threescore years and ten, of any natural Infirmity or Disease, it was not thro' any imperfection of Mankind, but of his particular Constitution: So in relation to the Principles and Definition of an equal Commonwealth yet unshaken, nay untouched by this Prevaricator, I may safely affirm, that a Commonwealth is a Government, which if it has been seditious, it has not been from any imperfection in the kind, but in the particular Constitution, which where the like has happened, must have been inequal. My Retreat to these Principles is called running into a Bog; as if such as have no Principles were not Bogs, Informis limus, Stygiaeque paludes.   

CHAP. IX. Chap. 9  
Whether Monarchy coming up to the perfection of the kind, comes not short of the perfection of Government, and has not some flaw in it. In which is also treated of the Balance of France; of the Original of a landed Clergy; of Arms, and their kinds.  
ON Monarchy I have said, that whereas it is of two kinds, the one by Arms, the other by a Nobility; for that by Arms, as (to take the most perfect model) in Turkey, it is not in Art or Nature to cure it of this dangerous flaw, that the Janizaries have frequent Interest, and perpetual Power to raise Sedition, or tear the Magistrate in pieces. For that by a Nobility, as (to take the most perfect Model) of late in Oceana, it was not in Art or Nature to cure it of that dangerous flaw, that the Nobility had frequent Interest and perpetual Power by their Retainers and Tenants to raise Sedition, and levy War: whence I conclude that Monarchy reaching the perfection of the kind, reaches not the perfection of Government, but must still have some dangerous flaw in it.  
THIS place (though I did not intent by it to make work for a Tinker) could not be of less concernment, than it proves to the Prevaricator, who, as if he were obliged to mend all, falls first to patching with a Monarchy by Arms, then with a Monarchy by a Nobility; at length despairing, throws away each, and betakes himself with egregious confidence, to make out of both a new Monarchy, which is neither. By observation of these three flourishes, the present Chapter may be brought into some method. The first blow of his Hammer, or that whereby he intends the flaw or hole in Monarchy by Arms shall henceforth be mended and tight, is this: That the Guards of the King's 
Consid. p. 46.  Person be not increased beyond the necessity of security; that they be not suffered to stagnat at Court, but be by a perpetual circulation drawn out upon service; and chief that they consist not of one entire Body united under the same Head, but be divided into distinct Parties and Commands; as we may see in France, where though (in proportion to the extent of their Dominions) the King's Guards be more numerous than those of the Roman or Turkish Emperors, yet being divided into distinct bodies of French, Scots and Swissers, under their several Colonels and Captains, they have never been the Authors of any the least Sedition. And in Turkey of late years they begin to learn the Art of poisoning the Janizaries by the Spahys, and so have frequently evaded the danger of their Mutinys. Which fine work at first view goes upon this false ground, that the Foundation of Monarchy by Arms is laid upon the Prince's Guards, or the Court Militia, whereas Monarchy by Arms consists in no other Balance than the Princes being sole Landlord, which, where imperfect, as it was in that of the Roman Emperors, the Empire is the most troubled, and where perfect, as in Turkey, the Empire is less seditious. For that which he says of France, it relates to Monarchy by a Nobility; and therefore is not to be confounded, according to his method, with this, but referred to the next branch.  
Book I AS to Monarchy by Arms, though it be true that the balance of Dominion in any of the three kinds may be said to be natural, in regard of the effect; yet seeing God has given the Earth to the Sons of Men, that of a sole Landlord, as Turkey, is not so natural in the cause or foundation, as the Timars, and therefore requires the application of some kind of force, as the Janizaries, who are not the root of the Government, that being planted in the Earth of the Timars, or military Farms and Colonies (for that the Janizaries are not the Foundation of this Empire, which was founded long before, is plain, in that this Order was not introduced till AMURATH the Second) but the Dragon that lies at that root, and without which the Fruit would fall into the mouths of the Timariot by way of Property (as when the Knights Fees granted first for life, became afterwards hereditary in Oceana) which would cause such a fall from Monarchy, that it would become, as we have seen, the rise of popular Power (the Lots, in case this should happen, of the Timariot, little differing from those divided by JOSHUA to the Children of Israel) wherefore when this happens in the Turkish Monarchy, it is at an end. And that this does not happen, though there be divers other concurrent Policys, I would have any man show me, how it could be but for the Janizaries. Otherwise it is plain that the Janizaries being a flying Army, on wing at all games, and upon all occasions, are not so much the Guard of the Prince, as of the Empire; which ruined, the Prey falls to the Timariot, as those that are in possession, except these be ruined too, who being all Horse, and far greater in number than the Janizaries that are Foot, would (in case the awe of the Prince, and the Policy of the Government which holds them divided, were broken) be invincible by the Janizaries, who nevertheless by these aids can easily contain them. Whence the Sedition of the Janizaries, like that of a Nobility, may be dangerous to the Prince, but never threatens the Throne; whereas the Sedition of the Timariot, like that of a People, would be more against the Throne than the Prince. These things considered, and in them the Nature, Constitution, or Disease of Monarchy by Arms, we may consult the more rationally with the Considerer upon the Applications or Remedys by him offered, which are three.  
FIRST, That the Guards of the King's Person be not increased beyond the necessity of Security. But of what Security, that of his Person, or of his Empire, or of both? for speaking of a Monarchy by Arms, in this latter sense only it is true; and if so, than this singular Maxim of State (Frustra fit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora) might have been spared (Cela s'en va sans le dire, comme les heures de nostre curè.)  
SECONDLY, That they be not suffered to stagnat at Court, but be by a perpetual circulation drawn out upon service; for if there be not perpetual service, it should seem, men might be apt to think that Government was instituted for Peace as well as War. I add no more than is employed in his words, which as to this of Turkey have chanced well; where not the Stagnation of the Janizaries only, but of the Court itself (which by the institution should always be in exercise of Arms) is the cause of that present decay, so perceivable in this Empire. But the Prince sitting still or stagnating, to what the Circulation of the Janizaries (whose Alienation from the Government, or Intelligence with the Timariot, must needs be of dangerous consequence) could tend, should have been thought on: otherwise to expose the Empire to Chap. 9 danger for the safety of the Prince, is no cure of the Government.  
BUT his chief Remedy remains: This Court Militia must not consist of one entire body united under the same head, but be divided under several Colonels, Captains, Parties, Brigades, and distributed to several Quarters. As if this were a cure, there were any Army that could be mutinous: but where he says, not united under the same Head, he intimats perhaps divers Generals, and divers Arms; now such are the Turkish Beglerbegs, and the Provinces under their Governments. That these therefore be kept divided, so that not any two of them can lay their heads together without having them cut off, nor any Son succeed the Father in Government, requires that there be always a sufficient force (distinct from the Interest of the Timariot and Beglerbegs) united, and still ready upon occasion of this service; and the Janizaries with the Spahies or Court-Horse being united, are no more than sufficient for this service. Wherefore if these also were so divided as thereby to be weakened, they could not be sufficient for this service; and their division, except such as might weaken them, would be of no security to the Prince. That the Provinces, under this awe, are less apt to rebel, than the Court-Guards to mutiny, is no wonder; but the Court-Guards being cured by the prescription of this Physician, of the possibility of Mutiny, which without weakening them is impossible, the Provinces, if Liberty, or Riches, or Power be desirable, would never endure the yoke of this Government. Wherefore it being inavoidable in the Turkish Empire, that either the Janizaries, or the Timariot may do what they list (in regard that whether of them be able to give Law to the other, must at the same time be able to give Law to the Prince; and to bring them to an equal Balance, were to make a Civil War, or at least to sow the Seed of it) the native Wound of Monarchy by Arms remains incurred and incurable. What more may be done for Monarchy, founded upon a Nobility, comes next to be tried. In this the Considerer gives his word, that there never rises any danger to the Crown, but when either a great part of the Sovereign Power is put into the hands of the Nobility, as in Germany and Poland 
Consid. p. 47.  (where it should seem by him, that the Electors and the Gentry do not put Power into the hands of the Emperor, or King, but the Emperor or King puts Power into the hands of the Electors or Gentry) or when some Person or Family is suffered to overtop the rest in Riches, Commands, and Dependence, as the Princes of the Blood and Lorraine, not long since, in France; and of old the MONTFORTS and NEVILS in England. The first of these he declares to be a vicious Government, and a Monarchy only in name: The second he undertakes shall easily admit of this Remedy; That the great ones be reduced (decimo sexto) to a lesser Volume, and levelled into an Equality with the rest of their Order.  
HIS Putpin is pretty: The Emperor puts Power into the hands of the Electors; and the King of Poland puts Power into the hands of the Gentlemen: Which Governments therefore (and all such like, as when the King of England did put Power into the hands of the Barons, at such a time as he was no longer able to keep it out of their fingers, by which means the ancient and late Government of King, Lords and Commons, was restored) are vicious Constitutions, and Monarchys only in name; such as he will not meddle with, and therefore let them go. Well; but where is the Patient then? if these be not Monarchys by Nobility, Book I what do we mean by that thing? or what Government is it that we are to cure? Why such a one, where some Person or Family is suffered to overtop the rest in Riches, Commands, and Dependence, as the Princes of the Blood and Lorraine, not long since, in France; and of old the MONTFORTS and the NEVILS in England. So then the same again (for these are no other) upon recollection, are those that admit of this easy cure. Let the great Ones be reduced to a lesser Volume, and levelled with the rest of their Order. But how? if they be the weaker Party, they are not the Great Ones; and if they be the stronger Party, how will he reduce them? Put the case a man has the Gout, his Physician does not bid him reduce his overtopping Toes to the Volume of the other Foot, nor to levelly them to equality with the rest of their Order, but prescribes his Remedys, and institutes the Method that should do this feat. What is the Method of our AESCULAPIUS? Point de Novelle; or where are we to find it? even where you please. The Princes of the Blood, and of Lorraine in France; the MONTFORTS and the NEVILS in England, overtoped not their Order by their own Riches or Power, but by that of the Party, which for their Fidelity, Courage, or Conduct, entrusted them with the managing of their Arms or Affairs. So the Prince that would have levelled them, must have levelled their Party; which in case the Controversy be upon the Right, or pretended Right of the Nobility in the Government, which commonly makes them hang together, may come to the 
Consid. p. 49.  whole Order: what then? Why then, says he, the Prince must preserve his Nobility weighty enough to keep the People under, and yet not tall enough in any particular Person to measure with himself: which, abating the figure, is the same again; and so I have nothing to answer but the figure. Now for this, the Prince himself is no otherwise tall, than by being set upon the shoulders of the Nobility; and so if they set another upon the same shoulders (as in HENRY the 4 th' or the 7 th', who had no Titles to the Crown, nor could otherwise have measured with the Prince) be he never so low, he comes to be tall enough in his particular person to measure with the Prince, and to be taller too, not only by those old examples, but others that are younger than ourselves, though such (the Nobility having not of late been weighty enough to keep the People under) as derive from another Principle, that of popular Balance. A Prince therefore preserving his Nobility weighty enough to keep the People under, must preserve in them the balance of that kind of Empire: and the balance containing the Riches, which are the Power, and so the Arms of the Nation; this being in the Nobility, the Nobility, when willing, must be able to dispose of the King, or of the Government. Nor under a less weight is a Nobility qualified to keep down the People, as by an Argument from the contrary. HENRY the 7 th' having found the strength of his Nobility, that set him in a Throne to which he had no right, and fearing that the Tide of their Favour turning, they might do as much for another, abated the dependence of their Tenants, and cut off their Train of Retainers; which diminution of their weight, releasing the People by degrees, has caused that Plain or Level into which we live to see the Mountain of that Monarchy now sunk and swallowed: wherefore the Balance of the Nobility being such as failing, that kind of Monarchy comes to ruin; and not failing, the Nobility, if they join, may give Law to the King, the inherent disease of a Monarchy by a Nobility remains also uncured, and incurable. Chap. 9  
THESE are points to which I had spoken before; but something 
The Balance of France.  concerning France and foreign Guards was mumbled by the Prevaricator in a wrong place, while he was speaking of Turkey, where there is no such thing. This, lest I be thought to have courted opposition for nothing, shall open a new Scene; while I take the occasion in this place to speak first of the Balance of the French Monarchy, and next of the Nature and Use of Foren Guards.  
THE whole Territory of France, except the Crown Lands, which on this account are not considerable, consists of three shares or parts, whereof the Church holds one, the Nobility another; and the Precedents, Advocats, other Officers of the Parliaments, Courts of Justice, the Citizens, Merchants, Tradesmen, the Treasures, Receivers of the Customs, Aids, Taxes, Impositions, Gabels, all which together make a vast body, hold a third: by how equal Portions I am sorry that I do not know, nor where to learn; but this is the Balance of the French Monarchy, to which the Peasant holding nothing, but living (though in one of the best Countries of the World) in the meanest and most miserable condition of a labourer, or Hind, is of no account at all.  
THE Parties that hold the Balance in a Territory are those of whom the Government does naturally consist, wherefore these are called Estates; so the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commons, are the three Estates of France. Tho the third, because the Peasant partaking not of the Balance can (in relation to Government) be of no account, is not called the Commons, but only the third Estate: whereas the Yeomanry and Gentry in England having weighed as well in the Balance as the Church and the Nobility, the three Estates of England (while the Monarchy was in vigour) were the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commons. The Consent of Nations evinces that the Function 
Grotius de Imp. Sum. Pot. circa sacra. C. 2. S. 4.  of the Clergy, or Priest, except where otherwise determined by Law, appertains to the Magistrate. By this right NOAH, ABRAHAM, JOB, with the rest of the Patriarches, instructed their Families, or sacrificed. There seems to have been a kind of Commonwealth in Canaan, while MELCHISEDEC was both King and Priest. Such also was MOSES till he consecrated AARON, and conferred the Priesthood upon the Levits, who are expressly said to succeed to the firstborn, that is to the Patriarches, who till then exercised that Function. Nor was it otherwise with the Gentiles, where they, who had the Sovereign Power, or were in eminent Magistracy, did also the Priestly Office (omnino apud veteres qui rerum potiebantur, iidem Auguria tenebant: ut enim sapere, sic divinare, regale ducebant, says CICERO; and VIRGIL, REX ANIUS, Rex idem hominum, PHOEBIQUE Sacerdos.) You find the Heros, that is Princes, in Poets, sacrificing. The Ethiopian, Egyptian, Lacedaemonian Kings did the like. In Athens constantly and in Rome, when they had no Kings, occasionally they elected a Rex sacrorum, or King Priest. So that a free People had thus far Power of electing their Priests, is not denied by any man. This came, it should seem, to be otherwise 
Original of a Landed Clergy.  established by the Law in Egypt, where the Priests (whose Lands JOSEPH when he bought those of the People did not buy) being 
Gen. 47. 22.  great Landlords, it may be to the Third of the whole Territory, were one of the three Estates of the Realm. And it is clear in Scripture that the People, till they sold their Lands, became not Servants to Book I PHARAOH. While AGESILAUS was in Egypt they deposed their 
Xenoph. in Orat. de Ages.  King, which implys the recovery of their Balance; but so, seeing they set up another, as withal shows the Balance of the Nobility to have been predominant. These Particulars seem to come near to the account of DIODORUS SICULUS, by whom the Balance of Egypt should 
L. 1.  have stood thus: The whole Revenue was divided into three Parts, whereof the Priest had the first, the King had the second, and the Nobility had the third. It seems to me that the Priests had theirs by their ancient Right and Title, untouched by JOSEPH; that the Kings had all the rest by the purchase of JOSEPH; and that in time, as is usual in like cases, a Nobility came thro' the bounty of succeeding Kings to share with them in one half. But however it came about, Egypt by this means is the first example of a Monarchy upon a Nobility, at least distributed into three Estates by means of a Landed Clergy, which by consequence came to be the greatest Counsillors of State, and, fitting Religion to their uses, to bring the People to be the most superstitious in the whole World.  
WERE it not for this Example, I should have said, that the Endowment of a Clergy or religious Order with Lands, and the erecting of them into an Estate of the Realm or Government, were no ancienter than the Goths and Vandals, who introducing a like Policy, which to this day takes place throout the Christian World, have been the cause;  
FIRST, Why the Clergy have been generally great Counsillors to Kings, while the People are led into Superstition.  
SECONDLY, By planting a religious Order in the Earth, why Religion has been brought to serve worldly ends.  
AND, Thirdly, by rendering the Mitre able to make War; why of latter Ages we have had such a thing as War for Religion, which till the Clergy came to be a third State or Landlords, was never known in the World: For that some Cities of Greece, taking Arms upon the 
Thucyd. l. 1.  Usurpation or Violation of some Temple, have called it the Holy War; such Disputes having been put upon matter of Fact, and not of Faith, in which every man was free, came not to this account. MOSES was learned in all the Learning of the Egyptians; but a Landed Clergy introduced he not in Israel: nor went the Apostles about to lay any such Foundation of a Church. Abating this one example of Egypt, till the Goths and Vandals, who brought in the third Estate, a Government, if it were inequal, consisted but of two Estates; as that of Rome, whether under the Kings or the Commonwealth, consisted of the Patricians and Plebeians, or of the Nobility and the People. And an equal Commonwealth consists but of one, which is the People: for example of this you have Lacedaemon and Venice, where the People being few, and having many Subjects or Servants, might also be called a Nobility, as in regard of their Subjects they are in Venice, and in regard of their Helots' or Servants, they might have been in Lacedaemon. That, I say, which, introducing two Estates, causes Division, or makes a Commonwealth inequal, is not that she has a Nobility, without which she is deprived of her most special Ornament, and weakened in her Conduct, but when the Nobility only is capable of Magistracy, or of the Senate; and where this is so ordered, she is inequal, as Rome. But where the Nobility is no otherwise capable of Magistracy, nor of the Senate, than by Election of the People, the Commonwealth consists but of one Order, and is equal, as Chap. 9 Lacedaemon or Venice.  
BUT for a Politician commend me to the Considerer, he will have Rome to have been an equal Commonwealth, and Venice to be an inequal one, which must be evinced by wiredrawing. For having elsewhere, as has been shown, admitted without opposition that the Balance of Empire is well divided into national and provincial, the humour now 
Consid. p. 16. 69. 70.  takes him to spin that wedg into such a thread, as by entangling of these two, may make them both easy to be broken. Hereto he betakes himself in this manner. As Mr. HARRINGTON has well observed (p. 40.) where there are two Parties in a Republic with equal Power (as in that of Rome, the People had one half, and the Nobility had the other half) Confusion and Misery are there entailed. For remedy whereof, or to avoid this, there can be no way but to make the Commonwealth very inequal.  
IN answer to this, there will need no more than to repeat the same things honestly. Mr. HARRINGTON speaks of the national Balance of Empire (p. 40.) to this sense: Where the Nobility holds half the Property, or about that proportion, and the People the other half (the shares of the Land may be equal; but in regard the Nobility have much among Few, and the People little among Many, the Few will not be contented to have Authority, which is all their proper share in a Commonwealth, but will be bringing the People under Power, which is not their proper share in a Commonwealth; wherefore this Commonwealth must needs be inequal. And except by altering the Balance, as the Athenians did by the Sisacthia, or recision of Debts; or as the Romans went about to do by an Agrarian, it be brought to such an equality, that the whole Power be in the People, and there remain no more than Authority to the Nobility) there is no remedy but the one (with perpetual feud) will eat out the other, as the People did the Nobility in Athens, and the Nobility the People in Rome. Where the Carcase is, there will be the Eagles also; where the Riches are, there will be the Power. So if a few be as rich as all the rest, a few will have as much Power as all the rest; in which case the Commonwealth is inequal, and there can be no end of staving and tailing, till it be brought to equality. Thus much for the national Balance; For the provincial, there Power does not follow Property, but the contrary: This the Prevaricator having acknowledged, let's slip, to the end he may take a gripe of Venice, which (because the three or four thousand of which originally consisted, and now consists that whole Government, having acquired Provinces, and increase of their City by later comers, do not admit these to participation of Power) he says is an inequal Commonwealth. He will be a Mill-horse, whether the Cake be dow or not; for this is to draw in a circle: and Rome, which by his former Arguments should have been equal, by this again must be inequal, seeing Rome as little admitted her Provinces into the body of the Commonwealth, as does Venice. This clash is but by way of Parenthesis; to return therefore to the business in present agitation.  
THE Estates, be they one, or two, or three, are such (as was said) by virtue of the Balance, upon which the Government must naturally depend. Wherefore constitutively the Government of France (and all other Monarchys of like Balance) was administered by an Book I Assembly of the three Estates; and thus continued till that Nation being vanquished by the English, CHARLES the 7 th' was put to such shifts as, for the recovery of himself in the greatest distress, he could make. To which recovery, while the Estates could not be legally called, he happening to attain without them, so ordered his affairs, that his Successors, by adding to his Inventions, came to rule without this Assembly; a way not suiting with the nature of their Balance, which therefore required some Assistance by force, and other concurring Policies of like nature, whereof the foreign Guards of that Monarchy are one; the great baits alluring the Nobility another; and the emergent Interest of the Church a third.  
TO begin with the last of these; the Church (except it be in a War for Religion, as when they joined with the Princes of Lorraine, and what Party of the French Nobility were made, or they could make against the King of Navarre) are not of themselves so hot at hand, or promt to Arms: but the King being (to use their word) no Heretic, thro' their great apprehension of the third Estate, as that which is most addicted to the Protestant Religion, may be confident they will never side with the People. So by this emergent Interest or Accident he has the Church sure enough.  
FOR the Nobility, which is exceeding gallant, this Change has the greatest baits; for whereas the Church being not spared, the third Estate is laden, and the Peasant overladen with Taxes, the Nobility is not only at better ease in this regard, but for the greater or more considerable part, receives advantage by it: the King having always, whether in Peace or War, a great Cavalry, than which there is no better in the world for the Exercise, Entertainment, and Profit of the Nobility; Governments of Cities, Castles, Provinces in abundance, which he rarely distributes to any other. The greater Nobility are Marechals, Generals; the less Officers in the Arms, specially of the Horse, the Emoluments whereof they receive also in time of Peace; and many of this Order being Pensioners, taste of the King's Liberality, without taking pains, or having any Employment at all. By which both that France is a Monarchy by a Nobility, and how she holds her Nobility, is apparent.  
NOW the Church and the Nobility standing thus engaged to the King, by which means he has two parts of the Balance to one, it is demonstrable that the Government must be quiet. Nor, seeing the Church for the reason shown is sure enough, comes the Government (since the Protestant Cities and Holds were demolished) to be otherwise disquieted than by the flying out of the Nobility, which, whenever it happens in any party considerable, either for the Number, or the Interest, causes the Crown to shake; for it seldom comes to pass upon this occasion, but the third Estate, or some part of it, taketh Arms immediately. In which place it is worthy to observed, that Wealth, according to the distribution of the Balance, has contrary motions. The third Estate in France having Riches, and those laden with Taxes, come to have something to lose, and something to save: which keeps them in continual fear or hope. The Nobility holding to the King, the third Estate has something▪ to lose, which withholds them from Arms thro' fear; but the Nobility flying out, the third Estate has something to save, which precipitats them into Arms thro' hope: whereas the Peasant having nothing to save or to lose, to hope or to fear, never stirs. The case standing thus, the sufficiency of the French Chap. 9 Politician (since the Masterpiece of Cardinal RICHLIEU, in demolishing those Walls of the Protestants, which had otherwise by this time been a Refuge for the third Estate, and perhaps overturned the Monarchy) lies altogether in finding for the Nobility work abroad, or balancing them in such sort at home, that if a Party flies out, there may be a stronger within to reduce it, or at least to be opposed to it. In this case, lest the native Interest of the Nobility, since the Assemblies of the three Estates were abolished, might cool the remaining Party, or make them slower in the redress of such Disorders or Discontents than were requisite, the King is wisely provided of Foren Guards; which being always in readiness, and not obnoxious to the native Interest, may upon like occasions be of more Expedition and Trust. Being come thus to foreign Arms, which is the point I more especially proposed to myself in the present Discourse, one Objection in relation to what has been already said, seems to interpose itself. Seeing France, while it is not governed by the Assembly of States, is yet of the same Balance it was when governed by the Assembly of States; it may be said that a Government of the same Balance may admit of divers Administrations.  
TO which I need make no other answer, than to put you in mind that while this Government was natural, or administered by the Assembly of States, it is celebrated by MACCHIAVEL to have been the best ordered of any Monarchy in the world; and that what it is, or has been of later times, you may believe your own eyes or ears.  

Of Arms, and their kind.  THERE be yet, before I can come to foreign Guards, some previous Considerations. All Government, as is employed by what has been already shown, is of these three kinds: A Government of Servants: A Government of Subjects; or, a Government of Citizens. The first is absolute Monarchy, as that of Turkey: The second Aristocratical Monarchy, as that of France: The third a Commonwealth, as those of Israel, of Rome, of Holland. Now (to follow MACCHIAVEL in part) of these, the Government of Servants is the harder to be conquered, and the easier to be held: The Government of Subjects is the easier to be conquered, and the harder to be held. To which I shall presume to add, that the Government of Citizens is both the hardest to be conquered, and the hardest to be held.  
MY Author's Reasons, why a Government of Servants is the hardest to be conquered, come to this, that they are under perpetual Discipline and Command, void of such Interests and Factions, as have Hands or Power to lay hold upon Advantages or Innovation; whence he that invades the Turk must trust to his own strength, and not rely upon Disorders in the Government, or Forces which he shall be sure enough to find united.  
HIS Reasons why this Government, being once broken, is easily held, are, that the Arms once past hope of rallying, there being no such thing as Families hanging together, or Nobility to stir up their Dependants to further Reluctancy for the present, or to preserve themselves by complacence with the Conquerors for future Discontents or Advantages, he that has won the Garland has no more to do but to extinguish the Royal Line, and wear it ever after in security. For the People having been always Slaves, are such whose condition he may better, in which case they are Gainers by their Conqueror, but can Book I never make worse, and therefore they lose nothing by him. Hence ALEXANDER having conquered the Persian Empire, he and his Captains after him could hold it without the least dispute, except it arose among themselves. Hence MAHOMET the Second having taken Constantinople, and put PALAEOLOGUS the Greece Emperor (whose Government was of like nature with the Persian) together with his whole Family, to the Sword, the Turk has held that Empire without reluctancy.  
ON the other side, the Reasons why a Government of Subjects is easilier conquered, are these: That it is supported by a Nobility so ancient, so powerful, and of such hold and influence upon the People, that the King without danger, if not ruin to himself or the Throne (an example whereof was given in HEN. 7 th' of England) can neither invade their Privileges, nor levelly their Estates; which remaining, they have power upon every discontent to call in an Enemy, as ROBERT Count of Artois did the English, and the Duke of Guise the Spaniard into France.  
THE Reasons why a Government of Subjects being so easily conquered, is nevertheless the harder to be held, are these: That the Nobility being soon out of countenance in such a case, and repenting themselves of such a bargain, have the same means in their hands whereby they brought in the Enemy, to drive him out, as those of France did both the English and the Spaniard.  
FOR the Government of Citizens, as it is of two kinds, an equal or an inequal Commonwealth, the Reasons why it is the hardest to be conquered, are also of two kinds; as first, the Reasons why a Government of Citizens, where the Commonwealth is equal, is hardest to be conquered, are, that the Invader of such a Society must not only trust to his own strength, inasmuch as the Commonwealth being equal, he must needs find them united, but in regard that such Citizens, being all Soldiers or trained up to their Arms, which they use not for the defence of Slavery, but of Liberty (a condition not in this world to be bettered) they have more specially upon this occasion the highest Soul of Courage, and (if their Territory be of any extent) the vastest Body of a well disciplined Militia that is possible in nature: wherefore an example of such a one overcome by the Arms of a Monarch, is not to be found in the World. And if some small City of this Frame has happened to be vanquished by a potent Commonwealth, this is her Prerogative, her Towers are her Funeral Pile, and she expires in her own flame, leaving nothing to the Conqueror but her Ashes, as Saguntum overwhelmed by Carthage, and Numantia by Rome.  
THE Reasons why a Government of Citizens, where the Commonwealth is inequal, is, next the former, the hardest to be conquered, are the same, with this difference, that though her Peace be not perfect within, her condition is not to be bettered by any thing without. Wherefore Rome in all her strife never called in an Enemy; and if an Enemy upon occasion of her strife, and hopes of advantage by it, came without calling, he presented her with her most Sovereign Cure, who had no leisure to destroy herself, till having no Enemy to find her work, she became her own. 
— Nondum tibi defuit hostis,  
In te verte manus—  Nor is there any example that a Government of this kind was ever Chap. 9 subdued by the Arms of a Monarch; though some indeed may be found that have called or suffered forens Princes or Force to come in, as Holland by Marriages of their Princes, and Genoa thro' her Factions, as those of the FIESCI and ADORNI. 
Guic. l. 11.   
TO conclude this part as to the Reasons why a Government of Citizens so acquired or possessed, as thro' Marriage, or Faction, is the hardest to be held, there needs no more than that men accustomed to their Arms and their Liberties will never endure the Yoke. Wherefore the Spaniard, though a mighty King, no sooner began in Holland, a small Commonwealth, to innovat or break her Orders, than she threw him off with such Courage and Disdain, as is admirable to the World. And somewhat of the like kind did Genoa by the help of her DORIA in the vindication of her Liberty from France.  

Proper and Improper Arms.  TO come by this farthest way about as I think the nearest way home: Arms are of two sorts, Proper or Improper; that is, Native or Foren.  
PROPER and Native Arms are, according to the triple nature of Government, of three kinds; Servants in Arms, as the Helots' in Lacedaemon, the Timariot and Janizarys in Turkey; Subjects in Arms, as the Horse in France, and the Seaguards or Forces in Venice; or Citizens in Arms, as those upon the Lexiarcha in Athens, of the Morae in Lacedaemon, and the Legions in Rome.  
IMPROPER or Foren Arms are of two sorts; auxiliaries, and Mercenarys  
auxiliaries are such as are supplied by virtue of some League, as were those of the Latins and Italians to the Romans; and those of the Cantons of Swiss (except Zuric) to the King of France: or they may be such as are occasionally lent freely, or let forth for Money by one State to another, the latter whereof differ not much from Mercenarys.  
MERCENARIES are Soldiers of Fortune that have no other Trade than their Arms, and let out themselves for Money; of such consisted the greatest part of the Carthaginian Strength, such is the Land Force of Venice, and, notwithstanding the ancient League of France with those Nations, such at this day are the Swiss and Scotish Guards (and sometimes a good part of the Foot) in France.  
MACCHIAVEL discourses upon these Particulars in his Art of War, to admiration: by whom I shall therefore steer.  
WHERE the Arms in bulk are proper, and consisting of Citizens, they have other Trades, and therefore are no Soldiers of Fortune; and yet because the Commonwealth has Arms for her Trade (in regard she is a Magistrate given for the good of Mankind, and bears not her Sword in vain) they are all educated as well in Military as Civil Discipline, taking their turns in service of either nature according to the occasion, and the Orders of the Commonwealth, as in Israel, Athens, Lacedaemon, and Rome, which had (if their Territories permitted, and sometimes, as I may say, whether their Territories permitted or no, as in Israel) the vastest, the highest tempered, and the best disciplined Militia, that is to be found in the whole compass of Story. Some Arms of Israel have consisted of three or four hundred thousand men: Rome upon the rumour of a Gallic Tumult, armed in Italy only, without 
Plin. L. Aemilio Papo, C. Atilio Regulo Coss.  foreign Aid, seventy thousand Horse and seven hundred thousand Foot; Book I things in our days (when the Turk can hardly arm half so many) not to be credited.  
HENCE that a Commonwealth, which had not first broken herself, or been broken by some other Commonwealth, should not be found to have been conquered by the Arms of any Monarch, is not miraculous, but a natural effect of an apparent Cause. In this place, or upon this Text, Divines whom I would desire not to be Enemy's of popular Power, but to give MACCHIAVEL his due, shall, if they please, hear him make a 
Arte della Guer. Proem.  goodly Sermon, in these words: If ancient Commonwealths and Governments used Diligence in any other Order to make their People lovers of Peace, faithful to their Country, and to have the fear of God before their eyes, they doubled it in this of their Militia: for of whom should your Country expect greater Faith, than of such as have offered themselves to die for her? Whom should she endeavour to make greater Lovers of Peace, than them who only can enslave her by force? In whom should there be greater Fear of God, than in such as carry their Lives in their hands? This, when Lawgivers and Captains rightly cinsidered, was the cause why Soldiers were esteemed, honoured, followed, and imitated above all men in the World; whereas since such Orders are broken, and Custom is altogether deviated from the course of ancient Prudence, men are come to detest the Iniquity of the Camp, and fly the Conversation of such as are in Arms, as the Pestilence. Where the Arms in bulk are proper, but consist of Subjects, they are the best next; and but the best next, as appears by all Examples ancient and modern. The Arms with which PYRRHUS Prince of Epyrus invaded the Romans, were of Subjects; yet that Prince, though he was not vanquished by the Romans, confessed their advantage, and gave them over. The Spaniard being a far more potent King than was PYRRHUS, has acknowleged as much to the Hollanders, though a far less Commonwealth than Rome: So have the Princes of Austria, and of Burgundy, to the Swissers. That the Arms of Subjects are nevertheless as much superior to the Arms of Servants, as inferior to the Arms of Citizens, is as plain; seeing as ALEXANDER, with thirty thousand Subjects, vanquished DARIUS, having innumerable Slaves; so thirty thousand Christians are at this day a match for any Army of Turks: and we see Venice, whose Force by Sea consists of Subjects, to have made him quit that Element near as fully to her Dominion or Empire, as did the Persian to Athens.  
TO Arms that are proper, but consist of Servants, all the preeminence that can be given is, that they are better than foreign Arms; a proof whereof we have in those of SELIMUS, whereby he conquered the Mamalucs; who being but a foreign Force that held Egypt in subjection, the Country was irrecoverably lost, and, for the reasons already shown, as easily kept.  
IMPROPER Arms, whether Auxiliary or Mercenary, where the Force of a Prince or of a Commonwealth consists, for the bulk or greater part, of no other, are the least effectual, and the most dangerous of all. For auxiliaries, or what effect has been found of them by Princes or Commonwealths, it was seen in France during the League by the Spaniard; and in Holland during the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH by the English; but especially in the Goths and Vandals, who having been auxiliaries or Mercenarys, relied upon by the later Emperors, came thereby to ruin the Roman Empire.  
MERCENARYS who make their Arms their Trade, must of Chap. 9 all others be the most pernicious; for what can we expect less of such whose Art is not otherwise so profitable, than that they should (as MACCHIAVEL shows) be breakers of their Faith, given up to Rapine, Enemy's of Peace and Government?  
TO instance in some Commonwealths, that of Carthage after her first War with the Romans, fell thro' the Rebellion of SPENDIUS and MATHO, Ringleaders of her Mercenaries, into another that was far more dangerous. Of such a Dilemma were the Arms of this State, that if HANNIBAL had conquered Rome, he must have been King of Carthage; and not conquering Rome, Carthage was ruined. The Commonwealth of Milan, trusting herself to F. SFORZA and his Mercenaries, became the Subject of her Servant, and he her Duke. Nor is Venice, whose Land-Forces are of the same kind, otherwise in safety as to these, than by her Situation. To give some instances of the same nature in Princes▪ The Father of F. SFORZA being Captain of a like mercenary Army, forced JOAN Queen of Naples, whom he left disarmed in the midst of her Enemy's, to lay herself at the feet of the King of Arragon; and BRACCIO by such another Treachery had plainly possessed himself of the Kingdom of Naples, had he not been broken at Aquila, where Death intercepted his design. From what has been said (first of Government, and then of Arms) if a Government of Servants be harder to be conquered, and easier to be held, then in this foreign Arms must needs be least necessary, and most dangerous.  
IF a Government of Subjects be easier to be conquered, and harder to be held, then in this foreign Arms may be more necessary, but must be less dangerous.  
BUT though a Government of Citizens be both hardest to be conquered, and hardest to be held, yet as it is again in this regard of two kinds, this cannot be said of each kind alike; wherefore I must distinguish.  
IN a Government of Citizens, if the Commonwealth be not for increase, but preservation only, as Lacedaemon, Carthage, Venice, foreign Arms are both necessary and dangerous; but in a Government of Citizens, where the Commonwealth is both for increase and preservation, as Rome, foreign Arms are neither necessary nor dangerous.  
TO repeat the parts of this Conclusion, which being brief is obscure, more fully and particularly.  
THE Empire of Turkey is of the harder kind to be conquered, wherefore the Turk needs not foreign Guards to defend him, but it is of the easier to be held; wherefore let him take heed of intrusting his Person with foreign Guards, who having a foreign Interest, may have a foreign Nation to assist them: and so the Person of the Prince being in their hands, they have no more to do than to extinguish the Royal Line; and the Empire being easily held, is their own thenceforth with security. Thus the Mamalucs which were at first foreign Guards, extinguishing the Royal Line of the Kings of Egypt, came to possess and hold that Realm without opposition. Who well considers this point, will never enough admire the Policy of the Turk in the creation (as it were) of his Janizaries, free from any national Interest that might make them dream of, or desire Liberty; and yet so void of all foreign Interest or Knowledge, that they know not what, or who were their Country or Parents. Hence though they have Interest to murder the Book I Turk, and sometimes do accordingly, they have no further Interest in the world but what depends upon the Government; and so the Empire is safe, though the Prince be in danger: whereas if they were foreign Guards, or had any native Interest, not only the Prince, but the Empire too would be in danger, the rest being Servants, and such whose condition might be bettered by a change, but could be no worse. Wherefore a Government of Servants must by no means admit of foreign Guards or Mamalucs.  
BUT the Empire of France, where the Nobility are not only subject to fly out, but to call in Strangers, may have use of foreign Guards, which not obnoxious to native Interest and Factions, as those of the Nobility, are the readiest and best help at this lift; yet not dangerous, though having the Prince in their power, because by him they are safe from the Nobility, who, were it not for the Prince, would be so far from bearing or brooking foreign Guards, that in case a foreigner came in upon their call, having the same means to help themselves whereby they brought him in, they would shake the Yoke, and the ends why they called him in, being satisfied or repent of, drive him out again, as they did the Spaniard and the English. But if this Government being invaded or conquered, be so hard to be kept, how much harder being surprised? Wherefore in a Government by Subjects, forens Arms may be more necessary, but must be less dangerous.  
IN a Commonwealth for preservation, as Lacedaemon, Carthage, Venice, foreign Arms are necessary: So Lacedaemon, though able to defend herself by her proper Forces against any one City, yet the Wars in Greece going much upon Leagues and Confederates, was forced also to make use of her Confederates, and sometimes of her Helots'.  
BUT as anciently to Carthage, so now to Venice, forens or mercenary Forces are essential, because for Land-service such a Constitution can have no other: Yet is this course extremely dangerous, as appeared by Lacedaemon, who (being ever in fear of her Helots') when she had acquired upon the matter the whole Empire of Greece, came, by the Rebellion of her Confederates, not only to lose all, but likewise to ruin. For Carthage, upon the Mutiny of SPENDIUS and MATHO, she escaped, as at other times upon like occasions, very narrowly. That such an Accident neither has befallen Venice, nor can befall her, is to be attributed to her Situation, by which, in this regard, she is secure: Nevertheless, her Progress or Increase, which by this means either cannot be great, or being great, must render her but the more infirm, is fully barred.  
TO a Commonwealth for increase, which always takes in the whole body of the People, foreign Arms (seeing she abounds above all other kinds of Policy, with such as are proper) must needs be the least necessary; and they are the most safe, because never admitting them, but for her mere convenience and frugality in expense of native Blood, she receives no such charge of them as can recoil, but must carry point blank, and as vigorously at her proper Interest, very near as her proper Arms. Thus did the Latin and Italian auxiliaries, of which, joined with the Roman Legions, consisted a Consular Army.  
BY thus much it seems that an inference from the success of Arms to the perfection of Government, and from the perfection of Government to the success of Arms, should be no fallacious way of disputing.  
BUT this being sweaty work with the Considerer, who loves his Chap. 9 ease, it is enough to argue thus: The Switz, Scotish, and French Guards, have never been the Authors of any Sedition, therefore the Seditiousness of a Nobility may be mended by foreign Guards: which is, as if one should say, such a Physician has never been the cause of the Gout; therefore the Gout may be cured by such a Physician. That foreign Arms may be well enough applied in the case of a seditious Nobility, and have some good effects, is not denied: but is France therefore cured of her Sedition, or remains she, notwithstanding her foreign Guards, the most seditious Example in the world? If thus she has not been, nor be, what has he read of the Princes of the Blood in former times, or heard of late from them? But if thus she has been, and be, is it not a fine way of Cure to give us an example of the Disease for the Remedy? Nor are her Guards so void of Sedition neither; but the Swisser, if he wants his pay, dares threaten Paris: the Scot, at least of late years, has not been so bold; but if a Prince flies out, the Ensigns of the French Guards will one way or other be Captains, while Soldier and Officer too follows his Affections or Interests, which way soever they frame. I should be glad to know when a Dragon fell from that Court, that did not bear down Stars with his Train. But the Prevaricator is set upon it: whereas of late years the Janizaries are known to have been far more imbrued in the Blood of their Princes than ever; he gives us his honest word, that of late years in Turkey they begin to learn the art of poising the Janizaries (who are the Foot of the Prince's Guard) by the Spahys (who are the Horse of the same) and so have frequently evaded the danger of their Mutinys. At which rate, seeing every Army consists of Horse and Foot, no Army could be mutinous. If these had not been mere slights, and so intended, he might have done well to have shown us one Mutiny of the Janizaries appeased by the Spahys. But all the parts of his Politics, as was said of those in Rhetoric, consist of Pronunciation.  
THUS the Wounds of Monarchy, notwithstanding the former, or this last Remedy of foreign Guards, are still bleeding or festering.  
BUT his Courage is undaunted (aut viam inveniet aut faciet) he will either mend a Government, or make one, by asserting without any example, but with egregious confidence, That the perfection of 
Consid. p. 48, 49.  Monarchy is free from those flaws which are charged upon it, and that it consists in governing by a Nobility, weighty enough to keep the People under, yet not tall enough in any particular Person to measure with the Prince; and by a moderate Army kept under the notion of Guards and Garrisons, which may be sufficient to strangle all Sedition in the Cradle: from which mixture, or counterpoise of a Nobility and an Army, arises the most excellent form of Monarchical Government.  
THERE's for your learning now, A Model which is a short Horse, and a Legislator that has soon curried him. To the parts of it, consisting of a Nobility, and in force, I have already spoken severally. I shall now speak to the whole together; that is, to the imagined mixture or counterpoise of a Nobility and an Army; and because there is nothing in Nature that has not had a natural effect by some example.  
THE scale of Arms, or of Iron, continued in the Line of WILLIAM the Conqueror; and the scale of Property, or Gold, continued in the Barons of England, and their Successors. But in this before the Baron's Wars consisted not the perfection of the Monarchy, Book I because it preponderated too much on the side of Arms; nor after the Baron's Wars, because the King, putting Power (which he could not keep out of their fingers) into the hands of the Nobility, it became a vicious Constitution, and a Monarchy only in name (so says the Considerer) therefore the Balance being then only even, when neither the King could overbalance or get the better of the Barons, nor the Barons overbalance or get the better of the King; the perfection of Monarchy consisted in the Baron's Wars! LYCURGUS' the Second!  
MARK; the King by all means must have a Nobility weighty enough to keep down the People; and then he must have an Army to hold Gold weight with his Nobility: as if the Nobility in that case would keep down the People, and not fetch them up (as did the Barons) into their Scale, that so together they might weigh down the Army; which sooner or later is the infallible consequence of this Fancy, or let it be shown where it was ever otherwise. To instance in France is quite contrary, where all the considerable Offices and Commands being in the Nobility, or the richer sort of that Nation, the Balance of Arms and of Property are not two, but one and the same. There is no way for Monarchy, but to have no Army, or no other than the Nobility, which makes the regulated Monarchy, as in France, Spain, etc. or to have an Army that may weigh down Nobility and People too; that is, destroy them both, which makes the absolute way of Monarchy, as in Turkey: the wit of man never found, nor shall find a third, there being no such thing in Nature.  
THIS Chapter is already with the longest, and yet I must give you a Corollary, pouce de roy, or a piece above measure; relating to a Question on which the greenest Politician that ever brought his Verjuice to the Press, has spurred me.  
WHERE he desires to know my opinion of the way of governing by Councils, which he confesses he has always thought admirable; he does not 
Consid. ●. 49, 50.  mean such as are coordinat with the Prince (which have been seen in the World) but such as those of Spain, purely of Advice and Dispatch, with power only to inform and persuade, but not limit the Princes Will. For almost all the Weaknesses which have been thought incident to Monarchy, are by this course prevented; and if there be any steadiness and maturity in the Senate of a Commonwealth, this takes it all in.  
TO give my Council without a Fee, and deal sincerely with a Prevaricator: Let the Prince (that is, such a one as his) hold himself contented with his Divan, or Cabinet. If this be that he means, we are agreed; but if he would have more, I can make no less of his words, than a hankering after such Councils as I have proposed, and that these are such as he always thought admirable, such as prevent almost all the Weaknesses incident to Monarchy, and take in the steadiness and maturity of a Commonwealth.  
HOW may we make this agree with that other place, where he says, that there is no frame of Laws, or Constitution of Government, which will not decay and come to ruin, unless repaired by the Prudence and 
Consid. p. 68  Dexterity of them that govern? Now that this may not be expected from a Monarch, as well as from a Senate or Assembly of Men, he has not yet met with any conviction, but rather finds it reasonable to think that where Debates are clearest, the result of them most secret, and the execution sudden (which are the advantages of Monarchy) there the disorders of a State will soon be discovered, and the necessary Remedys best applied. Chap. 9 In that former place he bethought himself, that the Debates of Rome were as clear as those of ANTIOCHUS', that her Results were as secret as those of PHILIP or PERSEUS, and of more sudden execution than either of theirs. He doubted it might be true, which is affirmed by good Authors, and commonly enough known, that for the clearness of Debate, and secrecy of Result, the world never saw any thing like the Senate of Venice; and that in all appearance they are for execution as quick with the Divan, as the Divan can be with them. Now when all this is done, to banish so generous Thoughts without showing us for what cause, and knock under the table, is sad news. But he shall sinned me, in any thing that is reasonable, most ready to serve him. To the Question then, how such Councils as I have proposed would do with a Prince; I answer, truly the best of them, I doubt, but untowardly. One, that is the popular Assembly, has no mean, but is either the wisest in Nature, or has no brains at all. * When affairs go upon no other than the public Interest, this having no other Interest to follow, nor eyes to see withal, is the wisest Council: but such ways are destructive to a Prince, and they will have no Nay. The Congregation of Israel, when REHOBOAM would not hearken to their advice, deposed him: and we know what popular Councils, so soon as they came to sufficient Power, did in England. If a Prince put a popular Council from this Ward, he does a great matter, and to little purpose; for they understand nothing else but themselves. Wherefore the Kings of France and of Spain have dissolved all such Assemblies. It is true, where a Prince is not strong enough to get Money out of them but by their consent, they are necessary; yet than they are not purely of Advice and Dispatch, but share in the Government, and he cannot be meddling with their Purses, but they will be meddling with his Laws. The Senate is of sitter use for a Prince, and yet, except he has the way of TIBERIUS, but a ticklish piece, as appears by MAXIMINUS, who was destroyed by PUPIENUS and BALBINUS, Captains set up against him by this Order. To go to the root: These things are not otherwise in Prudence or Choice than by direction of the Balance; where this is popular, no Remedy but the Prince must be advised by the People, which if the late King would have endured, the Monarchy might have subsisted somewhat longer: but while the Balance was Aristocratical, as during the great Estates of the Nobility and the Clergy, we find not the People to have been great or wise Counsillors. In sum, if a King governs by a popular Council, or a House of Commons, the Throne will not stand long: If he governs by a Senate, or a House of Lords, let him never fear the Throne, but have a care of himself: there is no third, as I have said often enough, but the Divan.   

Book I CHAP. X.  
Whether a Commonwealth that was not first broken by herself, was ever conquered by the Arms of any Monarch?  
I COM in this Chapter to resume the Discourse, where I broke off in the former, making good my assertion, That a Commonwealth is the Government, which from the beginning of the world to this day was never conquered by any Monarch; for if the Commonwealths of Greece came under the yoke of the Kings of Macedon, they were first broken by themselves.  
WHEN I speak of a Commonwealth, in relation to this point, I am no more to be argued against out of the little Cities in Asia, or those of Ragusa, and San Marino, which cannot be shown to have had the command of any considerable Army, than I argue against the Prevaricator, where he asserts Monarchy to consist of a mixture of Arms and of a Nobility, from the King of Yuetot, who had neither.  
THIS Assertion in the judgement of any rational man ought not to be encountered, but where there was a natural possibility of defence, in regard that a City which has no Army at all, as Geneva (which yet being invaded by the Duke of Savoy, found means to defend herself) or such a one as is not considerable, should be subdued by some potent Monarch (if we could find the example) concerns the Government no more, than if it had been overwhelmed by some Inundation, or swallowed up by some Earthquake. And yet all that is opposed by the Considerer, amounts not to thus much. The Testimony he brings out of PAUSANIAS comes far short; for it is 
Consid. p. 53. Paus. Messen.  recorded (says the Author speaking of the Lacedæmonians) that being corrupted by the Bounty of CROESUS, they were the first that contracted Amity with the Barbarians at the time when that King added the Territories inhabited by the Dorians upon the border of Caria, with other Commonwealths in Asia, to his Empire. So that CROESUS corrupted the Lacedæmonians with Gifts, PAUSANIAS is express; but whether he obtained the Asiatic Cities (likely in this case to have been easilier corrupted than the Lacedæmonians) by Arms or by Purchase, he is not express: and the presumption of the latter, as in other regards, so in this, is the stronger, that CROESUS by the testimony of SOLON, was more potent in Gold than in Iron. Now if it were so (and if otherwise, let the Considerer show) that these Commonwealths, inveigled by the Treasure of CROESUS, came first under the Lydian, and fell with that under the Persian Empire, when CROESUS was subdued by CYRUS; all I can learn by this example is no more than that CROESUS, for aught that is perceivable, might have bought those Commonwealths as COSIMO of MEDICIS did Florence; from whom it is affirmed by MACCHIAVEL, that there was not a considerable Man in the whole City that had not received some considerable Sum. So this example presumes; but in the next, which is of Sicily, there is not so much as a Presumption in favour of the Assertor: the State of Sicily, before that which the Romans call the first Carthaginian War, being clear in Story against his design. For that Africa for the generation of Monsters is not more famous than Sicily for that of Tyrants, Chap. 10 they who have passed their Novitiat in Story are not ignorant; nor how 
Fazello Hist. de Sicil▪ Polyb. l. 1.  when TIMOLEON had freed her of this Vermin, and with Liberty she had recovered some strength and virtue, she relapsed under AGATHOCLES and his horrid violation of Faith, while he was trusted with the Arms of her Citizens: how after him PYRRHUS was called in from Epirus; after PYRRHUS, HIERO usurped; all by the same Arts, getting first into trust or charge, and then recoiling upon them that would take no warning: by which it is apparent that the Commonwealths of Sicily, like those of Greece, were ruined by themselves, and their own Disorders; and no more subdued upon these changes by foreign Arms, than was Israel by the Canaanites, or Rome by the Gauls or Decemvirs.  
ISRAEL, having broken her Orders, was indeed sometimes oppressed by the Canaanites; Rome was sacked by the Gauls, and usurped by the Decemvirs. But as the man that having got a fall in a Duel, throws off his Adversary, recovers himself and his Sword, is not conquered, 
Decree of the States of Holland apud Grot. Hist. 4.  so neither the Commonwealth: wherefore neither Holland nor Genoa, though they have been under, being yet standing, can be said to be conquered by the Arms of Spain or France, but rather the contrary; seeing the Liberty of Holland (in many Cities more ancient than any Records or other Monuments there can witness, and in itself than that of Tacitus, whereby CIVILIS, born of Princely Blood, is affirmed to have vindicated the Batavian Freedom) is still the same; and Genoa, though happy in her DORIA, remains as she was before he was born. Nor did the Family of the MEDICIS banished out of Florence (where, by virtue of their prodigious Wealth, and the inevitable consequence of the Balance, their Ancestors had been Princes many years before CHARLES the Fifth was a Soldier) any more by the help of his Arms, those of the Pope (at that time of the same Family) and their Party at home, than get into their known saddle. To insist a little more at large upon the Stories of Genoa and Florence (because upon these the Prevaricator sets up his rest that Mr. HARRINGTON must needs be afflicted) Genoa was and is an Oligarchy consisting of twenty eight Families, making the Great Council, or Aggregation, as they call it, none but these being capable of the Senate or of Magistracy; and if ever it could be said of a Commonwealth, that she had broken herself, it might be said, at the time related to, of Genoa, where not only the Faction of the Guelphs and Gibelins, which had destroyed many Cities in Italy, then reigned; but the feud between the People included, and the Subject excluded, was as great as ever had been between the Nobility and the People in Rome. Besides the quarrel of the FIESCHI and the ADORNI, two Families, like CAESAR and POMPEY, which having many years together as it were engrossed the Magistracy of Duke, were nevertheless perpetually striving each with other, which should have it; and if one of these (as it did) brought in the King of France, there is nothing plainer than that this Commonwealth was subdued by her own Sedition, nor is there a man knowing any thing of her affairs, that makes any doubt of it. That of Florence indeed, if the Prevaricator could show it had been ever up, I should grant were down; but to relate the Story of this City, I must relate that of the House of MEDICIS. From COSIMO, a Citizen famous throout Europe both for his Wisdom and Book I his Riches, this Family for the space of sixty years exercised, under the pretext of some Magistracy, very great Power in Florence. To 
Comines. P. Jovius. Macchiavel.  COSIMO succeeded PETER, to PETER LAURENCE, a man in Prudence and Liberality resembling his Grandfather, save that he used more absolute Power in managing the Commonwealth; yet with gentleness, and not altogether to the suppression of Liberty. Nevertheless he obtained of the Signory (which did for the most part as he would have them) some small Guard for his Person; he was a man renowned thro' Italy, and looked upon by foreign Princes with much respect. To him succeeded his Son, another PETER, who thro' Youth and Rashness conceiving the Power exercised by his Predecessors to be no more than his due, took upon him the Government as absolute Lord of all; and standing most formidably upon his Guard, grew sottishly profuse of the public Money, and committed many Absurditys and Violences: By which means having incurred the hatred of the Citizens, he was banished by the Signory, with Cardinal JOHN and JULIAN his Brothers. This JOHN coming after to be Pope LEO the Tenth, required the revocation of his Brother's Banishment, and the restitution of the House of MEDICIS; to which finding the prevailing Party of the Florentines to be refractory, he stirred up the Arms of the Emperor CHARLES the Fifth against them, by whose joint aid the City, after a long siege, was reduced to her old Ward, and ALEXANDER of MEDICIS, Nephew to the Pope and Son in law to the Emperor, set in the known Saddle of his Ancestors. This is the▪ Action for which the Prevaricator will have a Commonwealth to have been conquered by the Arms of a Monarch, though whoever reads the Story may very safely affirm, First, That Florence never attained to any such Orders as could deserve the name of a Commonwealth; and next, That the Purse of COSIMO had done that long before, which is here attributed to the Arms of the Pope and the Emperor. Reason and Experience, as I said, are like the Roots and the Branches of Plants and Trees: As of Branches, Fruits, and Flowers, being open and obvious to the eye, the smell, the touch, and taste, every Girl can judge; so examples to vulgar capacities are the best Arguments. Let him that says a Commonwealth has been at any time conquered by a Monarch, to it again, and show us the example. But though Fruits and Flowers be easily known each from other, their Roots are latent, and not only so, but of such resemblance, that to distinguish of these a man must be a Gardener or a Herbalist. In this manner, the reason why a Commonwealth has not been overcome by a Monarch, has been shown in the distribution of Arms, those of a Prince consisting of Subjects or Servants, and those of a Commonwealth rightly ordered of Citizens, which difference relates plainly to the perfection or imperfection of the Government.  

Consid. p. 51.  BUT, says the Prevaricator, this seems intended for a trial of our Noses, whether they will serve us to discover the fallacy of an inference from the prosperous success of Arms to the perfection of Government. If the University, who should have some care of the Vinyard of Truth, shall lie pigging of wild Boars, to grunt in this manner and fear with their tusks, and I happen to ring some of them (as I have done this Marcassin for rooting) there is nothing in my faith why such trial of their Noses should be Sin; but for fallacious Inferences, such I leave to them whose Caps are squarer than their Play.  
FOR all that, Great and well policyed Empires, says he, have been Chap. 10 subverted by People so eloigned from the perfection of Government, that we scarce know of any thing to tie them together, but the desire of Booty. Where, or how came he to know this? What Reason or Experience does he allege for the proof of it? May we not say of this, it is for the trial of our Noses, whether they will serve us to discover that a Conclusion should have some Premises? He gives us leave to go look, and all the Premises that I can find are quite contrary.  

Judg. ch. 1, & 2.  THE Arms of Israel were always victorious, till the death of JOSHUA, whereupon the Orders of that Commonwealth being neglected, they came afterwards to be seldom prosperous. ISOCRATES in his Oration to the Areopagits, speaks thus of Athens: The Lacedæmonians, who when we were under Oligarchy, every day commanded us something; now while we are under popular Administration, are our Petitioners that we would not see them utterly ruined by the Thebans. Nor did Lacedaemon fall to ruin till her Agrarian, the Foundation of her Government, was first broken. The Arms of Rome (ever noted by Historians, and clearly evinced by MACCHIAVEL to have been the 
Arte della Guerra.  result of her Policy) during the popular Government were at such a pitch, as if Victory had known no other wings than those of her Eagles: nor seeing the Goths and Vandals are the Legislators, from whom we derive the Government of King, Lords, and Commons, were these when they overcame the Roman Empire, a People so cloigned from the perfection of Government, but their Policy was then far better than that of the Emperors, which having been at first founded upon a broken Senate, and a few military Colonies, was now come to a Cabinet, and a mercenary Army. The Judgement of all Ages and Writers upon the Policy of the Roman Emperors, is in this place worthy, and thro' the pains already taken by ERASMUS and SLEIDAN, easy to be inserted. O miserable and deplorable State, says ERASMUS, the Authority of the Senate, the Power of the Law, the 
In his Preface to Suetonius.  Liberty of the People being trod underfoot! to a Prince, that got up in this manner, the whole World was a Servant, while he himself was a Servant to such, as no honest man would have endured the like Servants in his House: the Senate dreaded the Emperor, the Emperor dreaded his execrable Militia: the Emperor gave Laws to Kings, and received them from his Mercenaries. To this is added by SLEIDAN, That the condition 
De quat. Imp.  of these Princes was so desperate, it was a wonderful thing Ambition itself could have the Courage to run such a hazard; seeing from CAIUS CAESAR slain in the Senate to CHARLES the Great, there had been above thirty of them murdered, and four that had laid violent hands upon themselves: For there was always something in them that offended the Soldiery, which whether they were good or bad, was equally subject to pick Quarrels, upon the least occasion raised Tumults, and dispatched even such of them as they had forced to accept of that Dignity, for example, AELIUS PERTINAX. But if this be true, that of the Goths and Vandals, when they subdued this Empire, must have been the better Government; for so ill as this never was there any, except that only of the Kings of Israel, which certainly was much worse. Those of the Britan's and the Gauls were but the dregs of this of Rome, when they were overcome by the Saxons and Franks, who brought in the Policy of the Goths and Vandals.  
Book I WHEN TAMERLAN overcame BAJAZET, the Turkish Policy had not attained to that extent of Territory which is plainly necessary to the nature of it, nor was the Order of the Janizaries yet instituted. The Hollander, who under a potent Prince was but a Fisherman, with the restitution of the popular Government, is become the better Soldier; nor has he been matched but by a rising Commonwealth, whose Policy you will say was yet worse, but then her Balance (being that especially which produces men) was far better. For Vastness, for Fruitfulness of Territory, for bodies of Men, for Number, for Courage, Nature never made a Country more potent than Germany: yet this Nation, anciently the Seminary of Nations, has of late years, merely thro' the defect of her Policy (which intending one Commonwealth, has made a hundred Monarchys in her Bowels, whose cross Interests twist her guts) been the Theatre of the saddest Tragedys under the Sun; nor is she curable, unless some Prince falling to work with the Hammer of War, be able totally to destroy the old, and forge her a Government entirely new. But if this comes to pass, neither shall it be said, that a well-policyed Empire was subverted, nor by a People so eloigned from perfection of Government, but theirs must be much better than the other. Let me be as ridiculous as you will, the World is (in faece Romuli) ripe for great Changes which must come. And look to it, whether it be Germany, Spain, France, Italy, or England. that comes first to fix herself upon a firm Foundation of Policy, she shall give Law to, and be obeyed by the rest. There was never so much fight as of late days to so little purpose; Arms, except they have a root in Policy, are altogether fruitless. In the War between the King and the Parliament, not the Nation only, but the Policy of it was divided; and which part of it was upon the better Foundation?  

Consid. p. 51.  BUT, says he, Ragusa and San Marino are commended for their upright and equal frame of Government, and yet have hardly extended their Dominion beyond the size of a handsome Manor.  
HAVE Ragusa or San Marino been conquered by the Arms of any Monarch? For this (I take it) is the question; though, if they had, these being Commonwealths unarmed, it were nothing to the purpose. The question of Increase is another point. Lacedaemon could not increase (because her frame was of another nature) without ruin; yet was she not conquered by any Monarch.  

Consid. p. 52.  COM, come, says he, for all this; It is not the perfection of Government, but the populousness of a Nation, the natural valour of the Inhabitants, the abundance of Horses, Arms, and other things necessary for equipping of an Army, assisted with a good military Discipline, that qualify a People for Conquest; and where these concur, Victory is entailed upon them. Very fine!  
AS if these could concur any otherwise than by virtue of the Policy. For example, there is no Nation under Heaven more populous 
Essay 29.  than France: Yet, says Sir FRANCIS BACON, If the Gentlemen be too many, the Commons will be base, and not the hundredth Poll fit for a Helmet, as may be seen by comparison of England with France, whereof the former, though far less in Territory and Populousness, has been nevertheless the overmatch; in regard the middle People in England make good Soldiers, which the Peasants in France do not. This therefore was from the Policy, by which the one has been the freest, and the other the most enslaved Subject in the World; and not from Populousness, in Chap. 10 which case France must have been the Overmatch.  
THE like is observable in the natural valour of the People, there being no greater courage of an Infantry, than that of the middle People in England, whereas the Peasant having none at all, is never used in Arms. Again, France has one of the best Cavalries in the World, which the English never had, yet it availed her not. Victory is more especially entailed upon Courage, and Courage upon Liberty, which grows not without a Root planted in the Policy or Foundation of the Government.  
ALEXANDER with a handful of Freemen overcame the greatest abundance of Horses, Arms, and other things necessary for the equipping of an Army, the hugest Arms, the most vast and populous Empire in the World; and when he had done, could not by all these subdue that handful of freer men (though he killed CLITUS with his own hand in the quarrel) to the servile Customs of that Empire. And that the best military Discipline derived from the Policy of the Romans, I intimated before, and have shown at large in other places.  
BUT the Prevaricator neither minds what is said, nor cares what he says; to affirm that a Commonwealth was never conquered by any Monarch, and that a Commonwealth has conquered many Monarches, or frequently led mighty Kings in triumph, is to run upon the foil, the second Proposition being with him no more than only the conversion of the first. As if that Rome was not conquered by 
Consid. p. 55.  the World, and that the World was conquered by Rome, were but a simple conversion. So the World having not conquered Venice, it must follow, that Venice has conquered the World. Do we take, or are we taken? Nor is he thus satisfied to burn his fingers, but he will blister his tongue.  
WHERE I said that the Commonwealth of Venice, consisting of all them that first fled from the main Land to those Lands where the City is now planted, at the Institution took in the whole People, he would make you believe I had said that the Senate of Venice, at the first Institution, took in the whole People: It is matter of fact, and that in 
Consid. p. 70. Oceana, p. 43.  which his Integrity will be apparent to every man's judgement. I pray see the places. And yet when he has put this trick upon me, he tells me, perhaps it is not true; and this only I grant him past peradventure is false, whether that I said it, or that the thing is possible. For how is it possible, that the Senate, which is no otherwise such than as it consists of the Aristocracy, or select part of the People, should take in the whole People? It is true, that good Authors, both ancient and modern, when they speak of the Senate of Rome, or of Venice historically, imply the People. MACCHIAVEL speaks of the Magistracy of PUBLILIUS PHILO, as prolonged by the Senate of Rome, without making any mention of the People, by whom nevertheless it was granted: the like is usual with other Authors. THUANUS seldom mentions the Commonwealth of Venice, but by the name of the Senate; which not understood by the learned Considerer, where CONTARINI speaks in the same manner of the Courses taken by the Commonwealth of Venice, for withholding the Subject in the City from Sedition, he takes him to be speaking of the means whereby the Senate (an't please you) keeps the People under: and so having put one trick upon me, and another upon Book I CONTARINI, these two are his Premises, whence he draws this Conclusion, That Venice is as much as any in the World an inequal Commonwealth. Now the Conclusion you know no body can deny.   

CHAP. XI.  
Whether there be not an Agrarian, or some Law or Laws of that nature, to supply the defect of it in every Commonwealth: and whether the Agrarian, as it is stated in Oceana, be not equal and satisfactory to all Interests.  
IN this Chapter the Prevaricator's Devices are the most well-favoured: for whereas the Agrarian of Oceana does no more than pin the basket, which is already filled, he gets up into the Tree where the Birds have long since eaten all the Cherrys, and with what Clouts he can rake up, makes a most ridiculous Scarecrow. This pains he needed not to have taken, if he had not slighted overmuch the Lexicon, of which he allows me to be the Author; yet will have it, that he understood the words before, some of which nevertheless his ill understanding requires should be further interpreted in this place, as Property, Balance, Agrarian, and Levelling.  
PROPERTY is that which is every man's own by the Law of the Land; and of this there is nothing stirred, but all entirely left as it was found by the Agrarian of Oceana.  
PROPERTY in Money (except, as has been shown, in Cities that have little or no Territory) comes not to the present account. But Property in Land, according to the distribution that happens to be of the same, causes the political Balance producing Empire of the like nature: that is, if the Property in Lands be so diffused thro' the whole People, that neither one Landlord, nor a few Landlords overbalance them, the Empire is popular. If the Property in Lands be so engrossed by the Few, that they overbalance the whole People, the Empire is Aristocratical, or mixed Monarchy; but if Property in Lands be in one Landlord, to such a proportion as overbalances the whole People, the Empire is absolute Monarchy. So the political Balance is threefold, Democratical, Aristocratical, and Monarchical.  
EACH of these Balances may be introduced either by the Legislator at the institution of the Government, or by civil Vicissitude, Alienation, or Alteration of Property under Government.  
EXAMPLES of the Balance introduced at the Institution, and by the Legislator, are first those in Israel and Lacedaemon, introduced by GOD or MOSES, and LYCURGUS, which were Democratical or Popular. Secondly, Those in England, France and Spain, introduced by the Goths, Vandals, Saxons, and Franks, which were Aristocratical, or such as produced the Government of King, Lords, and Commons. Thirdly, Those in the East and Turkey, introduced by NIMROD, and MAHOMET or OTTOMAN, which were purely Monarchical.  
EXAMPLES of the Balance introduced by civil Vicissitude, Alienation, or Alteration of Property under Government, are in Florence, where the MEDICI attaining to excessive wealth, the Balance altered Chap. 11 from Popular to Monarchical: In Greece, where the Argives being lovers 
Pausan. Corinth.  of Equality and Liberty, reduced the Power of their Kings to so small a matter, that there remained to the Children and Successors of CISUS little more than the Title, where the Balance altered from Monarchical to Popular. In Rome, about the time of CRASSUS, the Nobility having eaten the People out of their Lands, the Balance altered from Popular, first to Aristocratical, as in the Triumvirs, CESAR, POMPEY and CRASSUS; and then to Monarchical, as when CRASSUS being dead, and POMPEY conquered, the whole came to CESAR. In Tarentum, not long after the War with the Medes, 
Arist. Pol. L. 5. c. 3.  the Nobility being wasted, and overcome by japyges, the Balance, and with that the Commonwealth, changed from Aristocratical to Popular: The like of late has discovered itself in Oceana. When a Balance comes so thro' civil Vicissitude to be changed, that the change cannot be attributed to human Providence, it is more peculiarly to be ascribed to the hand of God; and so when there happens to be an irresistible change of the Balance, not the old Government which God has repealed, but the new Government which he dictates as present Legislator, is of Divine Right.  
THIS Volubility of the Balance being apparent, it belongs to Legislators to have eyes, and to occur with some prudential or legal Remedy or Prevention; and the Laws that are made in this case are called Agrarian. So An Agrarian is a Law fixing the Balance of a Government in such a manner that it cannot alter.  
THIS may be done divers ways, as by intailing the Lands upon certain Families, without power of Alienation in any case, as in Israel and Lacedaemon; or, except with leave of the Magistrate, as in Spain: But this, by making some Families too secure, as those in possession, and others too despairing, as those not in possession, may make the whole People less industrious.  
WHEREFORE the other way, which by the regulation of Purchases ordains only that a man's Land shall not exceed some certain proportion; for example, two thousand Pounds a year; or, exceeding such a proportion, shall divide in descending to the Children, so soon as being more than one, they shall be capable of such a division, or subdivision, till the greater share exceeds not two thousand pounds a year in Land, lying and being within the native Territory, is that which is received and established by the Commonwealth of Oceana.  
BY Levelling, they who use the word seem to understand, when a People rising invades the Lands and Estates of the richer sort, and divides them equally among themselves; as for example,— No No where in the World; this being that, both in the way and in the end, which I have already demonstrated to be impossible. Now the words of this Lexicon being thus interpreted, let us hearken what the Prevaricator will say, and out it comes in this manner.  

Consid. p. 73.  TO him that makes Property, and that in Lands, the Foundation of Empire, the establishing of an Agrarian is of absolute necessity, that by it the Power may be fixed in those hands to whom it was at first committed.  
WHAT need we then proceed any further, while he, having no where disproven the Balance in these words, gives up the whole Cause? For as to that which he says of Money, seeing neither the vast Treasure of HENRY the 7 th' altered the Balance of England, nor the Revenue of Book I the Indys altars that of Spain, this Retreat (except in the Cases excepted) is long since barricadoed. But he is on and off, and, any thing to the contrary notwithstanding, gives you this for certain.  
THE Examples of an Agrarian are so infrequent, that Mr. HARRINGTON is constrained to wave all but two Commonwealths; and can find in the whole extent of History only Israel and Lacedaemon to fasten upon.  
A MAN that has read my Writings, or is skilled in History, cannot choose but see how he slurs his Dice; nevertheless to make this a 
Pol. L. 2. C. 5.  little more apparent, It has seemed to some (says ARISTOTLE) the main point of Institution in Government, to order Riches right; whence otherwise derives all civil Discord. Upon this ground PHALEAS the Chalcedonian Legislator made it his first work to introduce equality of Goods; and PLATO in his Laws allows not increase to a possession beyond certain bounds. The Argives and the Messenians had each their Agrarian after the manner of Lacedaemon. If a man shall translate the words 
Plut. Lycurg.  (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, virtus & facultas civilis) Political Virtue or Faculty, where he finds them in ARISTOTLE'S Politics (as I make bold, and appeal to the Reader whether too bold to do) by the words Political Balance, understood as I have stated the thing, it will give such a light to the Author, as will go nearer than any thing alleged (as before by this Prevaricator) to deprive me of the honour 
Pol. L. 3. C. 9  of that invention. For example, where ARISTOTLE says, If one man, or such a number of men, as to the capacity of Government come within the compass of the Few, excel all the rest (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) in balance, or in such a manner, that the (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Political Facultys or Estates of all the rest be not able to hold weight with him or them, they will never condescend to share equally with the rest in power, whom they excel in Balance; nor is it to any purpose to give them Laws, who will be as the Gods, their own Laws, and will answer the People as the Lions are said by ANTISTHENES to have answered the Hares, when they had concluded, that every one ought to have an equal Portion. For this cause (he adds) Cities that live under Popular Power, have instituted the Ostracism for the preservation of Equality; by which, if a man increase in Riches, Retinue, or Popularity, above what is safe, they can remove him (without loss of Honour or Estate) for a time.  
IF the Considerer thinks that I have strained courtesy with ARISTOTLE (who indeed is not always of one mind) further than is warrantable, in relation to the Balance, be it as he pleases; I who must either have the more of Authority, or the less of Competition in the point, shall lose neither way. However, it is in this place enough that the Ostracism being of like nature, was that which supplied the defect, in the Grecian Cities, of an Agrarian. To proceed then to Rome, that the People there, by striving for an Agrarian, strove to save their Liberty, is apparent, in that thro' the want of such a Law, or the nonobservance of it, the Commonwealth came plainly to ruin. If a Venetian should keep a Table, or have his House furnished with Retainers, he would be obnoxious to the Council of Ten; and if the best of them appear with other State or Equipage than is allowed to the meanest, he is obnoxious to the Officers of the Pomp: which two Orders in a Commonwealth, where the Gentry have but small Estates in Land, are as much as needs be in lieu of an Agrarian. But the Germane Republics have no more to supply the place of this Law, than that Estates descending are divided among the Children; which sure no man but will say must needs be Chap. 11 both just and pious: and we ask you no more in Oceana, where grant this, and you grant the whole Agrarian. Thus had I set him all the Commonwealths in the World before; and so it is no fault of mine, that he will throw but at three of them: These are Israel, Lacedaemon, and Oceana.  

Consid. p. 77.  FIRST at Israel: Mr. HARRINGTON (says he) thinks not upon the Promise of GOD to ABRAHAM (whence the Israelites derived their Right to the Land of Canaan) but considers the division of the Lands as a Politic Constitution upon which the Government was founded, though in the whole History of the Bible there be not the least footstep of such a design.  
WHAT means the man! the Right of an Israelite to his Land derived from the Promise of GOD to ABRAHAM, therefore the Right of an Oceaner to his Land must derive from the Promise of GOD to ABRAHAM? Or, why else should I in speaking of Oceana (where Property is taken as it was found, and not stirred a hair) think on the Promise to ABRAHAM? Nor matters it for the manner of division, seeing that was made, and this was found made, each according to the Law of the Government. But in the whole Bible (says he) there is not the least footstep that the end of the Israelitish Agrarian was Political, or that it was intended to be the Foundation of the Government.  
THE Footsteps of God, by the Testimony of DAVID, may be seen in the deep Waters, much more, by the consent of the whole Bible, in Land, or in the foundation of Empire; unless we make the Footsteps of God to be one thing, and his ways another, which as to Government are these.  

Grot. ad Numb. 26. 53.  GOD by the Ballot of Israel (more fully described in the next Book) divided the Land (some respect had to the Princes and Patriarches for the rest) to every one his inheritance, according to the number of names, which were drawn out of one Urn first, and the Lots of Land (the measure with the goodness of the same considered) drawn afterwards out of the other Urn to those names. Wherefore God ordaining the Cause, and the Cause of necessity producing the Effect, God in ordaining this Balance intended Popular Government. But when the People admitting of no Nay, would have a King, God thereupon commanding SAMUEL to show them the manner of the King, SAMUEL declared to the People concerning the manner or policy of the King, saying, He will take your Fields and your Vineyards, and your Oliveyards, even 
1 Sam. 8.  the best of them, and give to his Servants (which kind of proceeding must needs create the Balance of a Nobility;) over and above this, he will take the tenth of your Seed, and of your Vineyards, and of your Sheep (by way of Tax, for the maintenance of his Arms) and thus your Daughters shall come to be his Cooks and Confectioners, and your Sons to run before his Chariot. There is not from the Balance to the Superstructures a more perfect description of a Monarchy by a Nobility. For the third Branch, the People of Egypt in time of the Famine, which was very sore, come to JOSEPH, saying, Buy us and our Land 
Gen. 47. 19, 20.  for Bread, and we and our Land will be Servants to PHARAOH. And JOSEPH bought all the Land of Egypt (except that of the Priests) for PHARAOH. So the Land became PHARAOH'S: who, lest the remembrance of their former Property by lively marks and continual remembrancers should stir them up (as the Vandals in Africa, stripped in 
Grot. ad Gen. 47.  like manner of their Property, and yet remaining in their ancient Book I Dwellings, were stirred up by their Women) to Sedition, removed the People thus sold, or drove them like cattle even from one end of the borders of Egypt to the other end thereof. In which you have the Balance of a sole Landlord or absolute Prince, with the miserable, and yet necessary consequence of an enslaved People. Now the Balance of Governments throout the Scriptures being of these kinds, and no other, the Balance of Oceana is exactly calculated to the most approved way, and the clearest Footsteps of God in the whole History of the Bible: and whereas the Jubilee was a Law instituted for preservation of the popular Balance from alteration, so is the Agrarian in Oceana.  
BUT says the Prevaricator, Hocus Pocus, or in the name of Wonder, how can this Agrarian be the Foundation of that Government which had subsisted more than forty five years without it? For they were so long after the giving of this Law for the division of the Land, before they had the Land to divide.  
WHICH is as if one should say upon that other Law of the like date, Judges and Officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates; Hocus Pocus, or in the name of Wonder, how should the Children of Israel make them Judges and Officers in their gates, before they had any gates to make them in? fine sport to be played by an Attorney for the Clergy with Scripture, where it is plain enough that the Laws of a Commonwealth were given by MOSES to an Army, to be put in execution when that Army should become a Commonwealth, as happened under JOSHUA.  
BUT no saying will serve his turn. If this Agrarian were meant as fundamental to the Government, the Provision (he will have it) was weak, and not proper for attaining the end proposed, there being nothing in the nature of the Agrarian to hinder, but that the whole Country might for the space of near fifty years, that is, the time between the two Jubiles, have come into the hands of one man, and so have destroyed Balance, Agrarian, Government and all.  
THIS they that boast of their Mathematics might have taken the pains (before they had been so confident) to have demonstrated possible; as how or by what means one Lot could come in fifty years to be multiplied six hundred thousand times, and that without Usury, which bar (the israelites being no Merchants) was thought sufficient to be given: or thus to call the Prudence of God by their impracticable Phansys in question, is abominable.  
I WOULD have Divines (as this Prevaricator persuades, and it should seem has persuaded some of them) to overthrow the Commonwealth of Israel; for otherwise I will give them my word they shall never be able to touch that of Oceana, which, except in the hereditary Succession and Dignity of the Princes of the Tribes, and the Patriarches, and that the Senate was for life, differs not from the former: for as to the divers working up of the Superstructures in divers Commonwealths, according to the diversity of occasions, it comes to no accountable difference; and much, I conceive, of this carving or finishing in Israel (which had it been extant, would perhaps have shown a greater resemblance) is lost. For the Senates, as to their numbers, that of the 300 in Oceana, considering the bulk of the People, exceeds not that of the Seventy in Israel; the Succession and Dignity of the Princes of the Tribes and of the Patriarches was ordained for the preservation of the Pedigrees, which (CHRIST being born) are not any more to be of like consequence; and that the Senators were for life, derived from a Chap. 11 former Custom of such a number of Elders exercising some Authority in Egypt (though not that of the Senate till it was instituted by God) from the descent of the Patriarches into that Land, who being at their descent seventy Persons, and governing their Families by the right of Paternity, as the People increased, and they came to die, had their Successors appointed in such a manner that the number of Seventy, in remembrance of those Patriarches, was diligently preserved. And forasmuch as the Patriarches governing their own Families (which at first were all) in their own right, were consequently for life, this also pleased in the substitution of others. These things rightly considered, I have not varied from the Authority of Israel in a tittle, there being neither any such necessary use of Pedigrees, nor uninterrupted Succession of Elders for life in Oceana; and unless a man will say, That we ought to have the like Effect where there is not the like Cause (which were absurd) the Authority of a Commonwealth holds not otherwise than from the Cause to the Effect.  
OCEANA, I say, cannot be wounded but by piercing the Authority of Israel, with which she is armed Cap a Pe. It is true, as the Prevaricator says in another place, that Law can oblige only those 
Consid. p. 36.  to whom it was given; and that the Laws of Israel were given, as to the Power or Obligation of them, only to the Children of Israel. But the Power, as has been shown, of a Commonwealth, and her Authority, are different things; her Power extends no further than her own People, but her Authority may govern others, as that of Athens did Rome, when the latter wrote her twelve Tables by the Copy of the former. In this manner, though a Man, or a Commonwealth, writing out of ancient Governments, have liberty to choose that which suits best with the occasion, out of any; yet (whether we consider the Wisdom and Justice of the Legislator supremely good, or the excellency of the Laws) the Prerogative of Authority, where the nature of the thing admits it, must needs belong to Israel. That this opinion should go sore with Divines, is strange; and yet, if there be any feeling of their pulse by this their Advocate or Attorney, it is as true.  

In his Epist.  FOR while he finds me writing out of Venice, he tells me, I have wisely put myself under her Protection or Authority, against whom he dares not make War, lest he should take part with the Turk.  

Consid. p. 39  BUT when he finds me writing out of Israel, he tells me, that he is not ware of any Prerogative of Authority belonging to the Israelitish more than any other Republic: which is to take part with the Devil.  
SO much for Israel. Now for Lacedaemon; but you will permit me to shake a Friend or two by the hand, as I go.  
THE first is ARISTOTLE, in these words: 

Pol. L. 5. c. 3.  INEQUALITY is the source of all Sedition, as when the Riches of one or the few come to cause such an Overbalance as draws the Commonwealth into Monarchy or Oligarchy; for prevention whereof the Ostracism has been of use in divers places, as at Argos and Athens. But it were better to provide in the beginning, that there be no such Disease in the Commonwealth, than to come afterwards to her Cure.   
Book I THE second is PLUTARCH, in these words: 

Plut. Lycur.  LYCURGUS judging that there ought to be no other inequality among Citizens of the same Commonwealth than what derives from their Virtues, divided the Land so equally among the Lacedæmonians, that on a day beholding the Harvest of their Lots lying by Cocks or Ricks in the field, he laughing said, that it seemed to him they were all Brothers.   
THE third should have been the Considerer, but he is at feud with us all. 

Consid. p. 78.  THE Design of LYCURGUS, he professes, was not so much to attain an Equality in the frame of his Government, as to drive into exile Riches, and the effects of them, Luxury and Debauchery.   
GENTLEMEN, What do you say? you have the Judgement of three great Philosophers, and may make your own choice; only except he that has but one hundred pounds a year, can have Wine and Women at as full command, and Retainers in as great plenty, as he that has ten thousand, I should think these advantages accrued from Inequality, and that LYCURGUS had skill enough in a Commonwealth to see as much. No, says the Prevaricator, it appears far otherwise, in that he admitted of no Money but old Iron, a Cartload of which was worth little. Well, but in Israel, where Silver and Gold was worth enough, my Gentleman would have it, that one man in the compass of fifty years might purchase the whole Land, though that Country was much larger than this: and yet where, if the People had used Money, they would have used Trade, and using both, such a thing, thro' the straitness of the Territory, might have happened, he will not conceive the like to have been possible. No, though he has an example of it in LYSANDER, who by the spoil of Athens ruin'd the Agrarian, first by the overbalance that a man's Money came to hold to his Lot; then by eating out the Lots themselves, and in those the Equality of the Commonwealth. But these things he interprets pleasantly, as if the Vow of voluntary Poverty (so he calls it) being broken, the Commonwealth, like a forsworn Wretch, had gone and hanged herself: a Fancy too rank, I doubt, of the Cloister, to be good at this work.  
BUT whereas PLUTARCH, upon the narrowness of these Lots (which had they been larger, must have made the Citizens fewer than thirty thousand, and so unable to defend the Commonwealth) and use of this same old and rusty Iron instead of Money, observes 
Plut. Lycur.  it came by this means to pass that there was neither a fine Orator, Fortune-teller, Bawd, nor Goldsmith to be found in Lacedaemon; our Considerer professes,  
THAT it is to him as strange as any thing in History, that LYCURGUS should find credit enough to settle a Government, which carried along with it so much want and hardship to particular men, that the total absence of Government could scarce have put them into a worse condition; the Laws that he made prohibiting the use of those things, which to enjoy with security, is that only to other men that makes the Yoke of Laws supportable.  
HERE he is no Monk again; I would ask him no more, than that Chap. 11 he would hold to something, be it to any thing. It is true, we, who have been used to our Plumpottage, are like enough to make faces (as did the King of Pontus) at the Lacedaemonian black broth: But who has opened his mouth against Plumpottage, gilded Coaches, Pages, Lacquys, fair Manor-houses, good Tables, rich Furniture, full Purses, Universitys, good Benefices, Scarlet Robes, square Caps, rich Jewels, or said any thing that would not multiply all this? Why, says he, you are so far right, that the Voice of LYCURGUS' Agrarian was, Every man shall be thus poor; and that of yours is, That no man shall be more than thus rich. This is an Argument (an't please you) by which he thinks he has proved, that there is no difference between the Agrarian that was in Lacedaemon, and that which is in Oceana: For, Sir, whatsoever is thus and thus, is like: But the Agrarian of Lacedaemon was thus, A man could have no Money, or none that deserved that name; and the Agrarian of Oceana is thus, A man's Money is not confined: Therefore the Agrarian of the one, and of the other, are like. Was it not a great grievance in Lacedaemon, think you, that they had no such Logic nor Logician? Be this as it will, It had been impossible, says he, for LYCURGUS to have settled his Government, had he not wisely obtained a Response from the Oracle at Delphos, magnifying and recommending it: After which all resistance would have been downright Impiety and Disobedience, which concerns Mr. HARRINGTON very little. The Bible than is not so good an Oracle as was that at Delphos. But this Reflection has a tang with it, that makes me think it relates to that where he says, I know not how, but Mr. HARRINGTON has 
Consid. p. 18.  taken up a very great unkindness for the Clergy. He will know nothing; neither that the Oracle of the Scripture is of all other the clearest for a Commonwealth, nor that the Clergy being generally against a Commonwealth, are in this below the Priests of Delphos, who were more for LYCURGUS than these are for MOSES. But hav'at the Agrarian of Oceana with the whole bail of Dice, and at five throws.  
THE first throw is, That it is unjust: For,  

Consid. p. 81.  IF it be truly asserted (in Oceana, Page the 39th) that Government is founded on Property, than Property consists in Nature before Government, and Government is to be fitted to Property, not Property to Government. How great a Sin than would it be against the first and purest notion of Justice, to bring in a Government not only different from but directly destructive to the settled Property of Oceana, where (in the 107th Page) there are confessed to be three hundred Persons, whose Estates in Land exceed the Standard of two thousand pounds a year. Let me not be choked with the Example of Lacedaemon, till Mr. HARRINGTON has shown us the Power of his Persuasion with the Nobility of Oceana, as LYCURGUS with them of Lacedaemon, to throw up their Lands to be parcelled by his Agrarian (as Page 111.) and when that is done, I shall cease to complain of the Injustice of it. Nor need any one of these three hundred be put to own a shame, for preferring his own Interest before that of a whole Nation; for though when Government is once fixed, it may be fit to submit private to public Utility, yet when the question is of choosing a Government, every particular man is left to his own native Right, which cannot be prescribed against by the Interest of all the rest of Mankind.  
Book I HOW many false Dice there are in this throw (because you see I have little to do) will be worth counting.  
WHEREAS I no where deny Property to derive her being from Law; he insinuats that I presume Property to be in Nature. There's One.  
WHEREAS in natural and domestic Vicissitude, I assert, That Empire is to follow the Legal State of Property; he imposes, as if I had asserted, that Empire must follow the natural state of Property. Two.  
WHEREAS in violent or foreign Vicissitude (as when the israelites possessed themselves of the Land of Canaan, the Goths and Vandals of Italy, the Franks of France, the Saxons of England) Property, in order to the Government to be introduced, is alterable; he insinuats as if I had said, that Empire must always follow the state of Property, not as it may be altered in that relation, but as it is found. Three.  
WHEREAS the Government of Oceana is exactly fitted to Property, as it was settled before; he insinuats it to be destructive to the settled Property. Four.  
WHEREAS I say, that to put it with the most, they that are Proprietors of Land in Oceana, exceeding two thousand pounds a year, do not exceed three hundred Persons; he says, that I have confessed they be three hundred. Five.  
WHEREAS I show that the Nobility of Lacedaemon, upon the persuasion of LYCURGUS, threw up their Estates to be parcelled by his Agrarian; but that in Oceana, it is not needful or required that any man should part with a Farthing, or throw up one shovelful of his Earth: he imposes, as if I went about to persuade the Nobility to throw up their Lands. Six.  
WHEREAS I have shown that no one of those within the three hundred can have any Interest against the Agrarian; he, without showing what such an Interest can be, insinuats that they have an Interest against it. Seven.  
WHEREAS the Government of Oceana goes altogether upon consent, and happens not only to fit private to public, but even public to private Utility, by which means it is void of all Objection; he insinuats, that it is against private Utility. Eight.  
WHERE he says, that in choosing a Government every man is left to his own native Right; he insinuats that the Agrarian (which does no more than fix Property, as she found it) is against native Right. Nine.  
WHEREAS God has given the Earth to the Sons of men, which native Right (as in case a man for hunger takes so much as will feed him, and no more, of any other man's meat or herd) prescribes against legal Property, and is the cause why the Law esteems not such an Action to be Theft; he insinuats that there is a native Right in legal Property, which cannot be prescribed against by the Interest of all the rest of Mankind. Ten.  
WHILE he pleaded the case of Monarchy, Levelling was concluded lawful; in the case of a Commonwealth, which asks no such favour, Levelling is concluded unlawful. Eleven.  
IN the Reformation or Levelly as to Monarchy, though Property subsisted before that Level, yet Property was to be fitted to the Government, and not the Government to Property▪ but in the case of a Commonwealth the Government is to be fitted to Property, and not Property Chap. 11 to the Government. Twelve.  
IN that, any man was bound to relinquish his native Right, else how could a Prince levelly his Nobility? In this, no man is bound to relinquish his native Right. Thirteen.  
IN that, this same native Right might be prescribed against by the Prince; in this, it cannot be prescribed against by the Interest of Mankind. Fourteen.  
IN that, no Nobleman but aught to own a shame if he preferred his Interest before that of the Prince; in this, no Nobleman ought to own a shame for preferring his own Interest before that of a whole Nation. Fifteen.  
WOULD you have any more? these fifteen majors and minors, or false Dice, are sooped up again, and put all into this Conclusion or Box, like themselves.  
THUS the Interest of the three hundred is not balanced with that of a whole Nation, but that of some few extravagant Spirits; who, by making Dams in the Current of other men's Estates, hope to derive some Water to their own parched Fortunes.  
CALUMNIARE fortiter, nihil adhaerebit. If a River has but one natural Bed or Channel, what Dam is made in it by this Agrarian? but if a River has had many natural Beds or Channels, to which she has forgot to reach her Breast, and whose Mouths are dried up or obstructed; these are Dams which the Agrarian does not make, but remove: and what parched Fortunes can hereby hope to be watered, but theirs only, whose Veins having drunk of the same Blood, have a right in Nature to drink of the same Milk? The Law of MOSES allowed the firstborn but a double portion: was his an extravagant Spirit?  
HIS second throw is, That the nature of the Agrarian is such as cannot be fixed, in regard that the People being entrusted with a Vote and a Sword, may alter it for the less, or come to downright Levelling. But as to this, in the 8 th' Chapter I have barred his Dice, that being the place in which I thought most proper to give a full Answer to this Objection.  
AT the third throw, he is extreme awkward. For whereas the Israelits (notwithstanding the Voyages of SOLOMON, and what is said of the Ships of Tharsis) during their Agrarian, or while they had Land, were a Commonwealth of Husbandmen, and not of Merchants, nor came to the exercise of this Trade, till they had no Land, or after their dispersion by the Emperor ADRIAN; he screws it in, after this manner— As the Jews who have no Lands, are every where great Traders; 
Consid. p. 85.  so the possession of Lands being limited by this Agrarian, men who are either covetous or ambitious (as if Estates were not got by Industry, but by Covetousness and Ambition) will employ themselves and their Estates in foreign Traffic, which being in a manner wholly engrossed by the Capital City of Oceana, that City, already too great, will immediately grow into an excess of Power and Riches, very dangerous to the Commonwealth; Amsterdam being come by such means to exercise of late a Tyranny in the disposal of some public Affairs, much to the prejudice both of the Liberty and Interest of the rest of the Union. An equal, if not greater Incommodity to Oceana, would b● created by the Agrarian, which making Emporium a City of Princes, would render the Country a Commonwealth of Book I Cottagers, able to dispute Precedence with the Beggar's Bush.  
NEWS, not from Tripoli, nor any other corner of the whole World but one. Bate me this, and show me in what other City increase of Houses or new Foundations was ever held a Nuisance. This sure is a Fancy that regards not the old Folks, or ancient Prudence.  
ONE of the Blessings that God promised to ABRAHAM, was, that his Seed should be multiplied as the Stars of Heaven: And the Commonwealth of Rome, by multiplying her Seed, came to bond her Territory with the Ocean, and her Fame with the Stars of Heaven. That such a Populousness is that without which there can be no great Commonwealth, both Reason and good Authors are clear; but whether it ought to begin in the Country, or in the City, is a scruple I have not known them make. That of Israel began in the Country, that of Rome in the City. Except there be obstruction or impediment by the Law, as in Turkey where the Country, and in England where the City is forbid to increase; wherever there is a populous Country, for example France, it makes a populous City, as Paris; and wherever there is a populous City, as Rome after the ruin of Alba, and Amsterdam after the ruin (as to Trade) of Antwerp, it makes a populous Territory, as was that of the Rustic Tribes, and is that of Holland.  
BUT the ways how a populous City comes to make a populous Country, and how a populous Country comes to make a populous City, are contrary; the one happening thro' sucking, as that of the City, and the other thro' weaning, as that of the Country.  
FOR proof of the former: the more mouths there be in a City, the more meat of necessity must be vented by the Country, and so there will be more Corn, more cattle, and better Markets; which breeding more Laborers, more Husbandmen, and richer Farmers, bring the Country so far from a Commonwealth of Cottagers, that where the Blessings of God, thro' the fruitfulness of late years with us, rendered the Husbandman unable to dispute Precedence with the Beggar's Bush, his Trade thus uninterrupted, in that his Markets are certain, goes on with increase of Children, of Servants, of Corn, and of cattle: for there is no reason why the Fields adjoining to Emporium, being but of a hard soil, should annually produce two Crops; but the Populousness of the City.  
THE Country then growing more populous, and better stocked with cattle, which also increases Manure for the Land, must proportionably increase in fruitfulness. Hence it is that (as the Romans also were good at such works) in Holland there is scarce a puddle undrained, nor a bank of Sand cast up by the Sea, that is not covered with Earth, and made fruitful by the People; these being so strangely, with the growth of Amsterdam, increased, as comes perhaps to two parts in three: nor, the Agrarian taking place in Oceana, would it be longer disputed, whether she might not destroy Fishes to plant Men. Thus a populous City makes a Country milch, or populous by sucking; and whereas some may say, that such a City may suck from foreign parts, it is true enough, and no where more apparent than in Amsterdam. But a City that has recourse to a foreign Dug, ere she had first sucked that of her proper Nurse or Territory dry, you shall hardly find; or finding (as in some Plantation not yet weaned) will hardly be able to make that Objection hold, seeing it will not lie so much against Chap. 11 the Populousness of the place, as the contrary.  
BUT a populous Country makes a populous City by weaning; for when the People increase so much, that the dug of Earth can do no more, the overplus must seek some other way of Livelihood: which is either Arms, such were those of the Goths and Vandals; or Merchandise and Manufacture, for which ends it being necessary that they lay their Heads and their Stock together, this makes populous Cities. Thus Holland being a small Territory, and sucked dry, has upon the matter weaned the whole People, and is thereby become as it were one City that sucks all the World.  
BUT by this means, says the Considerer, Emporium being already too great (while indeed Amsterdam, considering the narrowness of the Territory, or the smallness of Holland, is much more populous) would immediately grow into an excess of Power and Riches, very dangerous to Liberty, an example whereof was seen in the late Tyranny of that City: As if it were not sufficiently known that Amsterdam contributes, and has contributed more to the defence of the Commonwealth, or United Provinces, than all the rest of the League, and had in those late Actions which have been scandalised, resisted not the Interest of Liberty, but of a Lord. That the increase of Rome, which was always studied by her best Citizens, should make her Head too great for her Body, or her Power dangerous to the Tribes, was never so much as imagined; and though she were a City of Princes, her rustic Tribes were ever had in greatest Esteem and Honour; insomuch, that a Patrician would be of no other.  
BUT the Authority of ancient Commonwealths is needless; the Prevaricator by his own Argumentation or Might, lays himself neck and heels.  

Consid. p. 93.  FOR, says he, Were this Agrarian once settled, Emporium would be a City of Princes, and the Nobility so throly plumed, that they would be just as strong of wing, as wild Fowl in moulting time. There would be a City of Princes, and yet no Nobility. He is so fast that I have pity on him, if I knew but which way to let him lose. He means perhaps, that the Merchants growing rich, would be the Nobility; and the Nobility growing poor, would be Graziers.  
BUT so for aught I know it was always, or worse, that is, men attained to Riches and Honours by such or worse Arts, and in Poverty made not always so honest Retreats. To all which Infirmitys of the State, I am deceived if this Agrarian does not apply the proper Remedys. For such an Agrarian makes a Commonwealth for increase: the Trade of a Commonwealth for increase, is Arms; Arms are not born by Merchants, but by Noblemen and Gentlemen. The Nobility therefore having these Arms in their hands, by which Provinces are to be acquired, new Provinces yield new Estates; so whereas the Merchant has his returns in Silk or Canvas, the Soldier will have his return in Land. He that represents me as an Enemy to the Nobility, is the man he speaks of; for if ever the Commonwealth attains to five new Provinces (and such a Commonwealth will have Provinces enough) it is certain, that (besides Honours, Magistracies, and the Revenues annexed) there will be more Estates in the Nobility of Oceana, of fourteen thousand pounds Land a year, than ever were, or can otherwise be of four; and that without any the least danger to the Book I Commonwealth: for if Rome had but looked so far to it, as to have made good her Agrarian in Italy, though she had neglected the rest, the Wealth of her Nobility might have sucked her Provinces, but must have enriched the People; and so rather have watered her Roots, than starved and destroyed them, as it did. In this case therefore the Nobility of Oceana would not moulter like wild Fowl, but be strong of wing as the Eagle.  
ONE Argument more I have heard urged against the Populousness of the Capital City, which is, That the Rich in time of sickness forsaking the place, by which means the Markets come to fail, the Poor, lest they should starve, will run abroad, and infect the whole Country. But should a man tell them at Paris, or Grand Cairo (in the latter whereof the Plague is more frequent and furious than happens with us) that they are not to build Houses, nor increase so much, lest they should have the Plague; or that Children are not to be born so fast, lest they die, they would think it strange news. A Commonwealth is furnished with Laws, and Power to add such as she shall find needful. In case a City be in that manner visited, it is the duty of the Country, and of the Government, to provide for them by contribution.  

Consid. p. 37.  THE difficulty in making the Agrarian equal and steady thro' the rise or fall that may happen in Money, which is the fourth throw of the Prevaricator, is that which it might have been for his ease to have taken notice was long since sufficiently barred, where it is said, That if a new Survey at the present Rent was taken▪ an Agrarian ordaining that no man should thenceforth hold above so much Land as is there valued at the rate, however Money might alter, would be equal and steady enough.  

Consid. p. 89.  HIS last cast is, That the Agrarian would make War against universal and immemorial Custom; which being without doubt more prevalent than that of Reason, there is nothing of such difficulty as to persuade men at once, and crudely, that they and their Forefathers have been in an Error.  
WISE men, I see, may differ in Judgement or Council: for, says 
Essay 24.  Sir FRANCIS BACON, Surely every Medicine is an Innovation, and he that will not apply new Remedys must expect new Evils: for Time is the greatest Innovator; and if Time of course altars things to the worse, and Wisdom and Council may not alter them to the better, what must be the end?  
BUT the case of the Agrarian receives equal strength from each of these Counsillors or Opinions: from the latter, in that it goes upon grounds which Time has not innovated for the worse, but for the better; and so according to the former comes not to have been at once, and crudely persuaded, but introduced by Custom, now grown universal and immemorial. For who remembers the Gentry of this Nation to have worn the blue Coats of the Nobility, or the lower sort of▪ People to have lived upon the smoke of their Kitchens? On the contrary, Is it not now a universal Custom for men to rely upon their own Fortunes or Industry, and not to put their Trust in Princes, seeking in their Liberality or Dependence the means of living? The Prevaricator might as well jump into his great Grandfather's old Breeches, and persuade us that he is a la mode, or in the new cut, as that the ways of our Forefathers would agree with our Customs. Does not every man now see, that if the Kings in those days had settled the Estates of the Chap. 12 Nobility by a Law, restraining them from selling their Land, such a Law had been an Agrarian, and yet not warring against their ancient Customs, but preserving them? Wherefore neither does the Agrarian proposed, taking the Balance of Estates as she now finds them, make War against, but confirm the present Customs. The only Objection that can seem in this place to lie, is, that whereas it has been the Custom of Oceana that the bulk of the Estate should descend to the eldest Son, by the Agrarian he cannot, in case he has more Brothers, inherit above two thousand pounds a year in Land, or an equal share. But neither does this, whether you regard the Parents or the Children, make War with Custom. For putting the case the Father has twenty thousand pounds a year in Land, he goes not the less in his custom or way of Life for the Agrarian, because for this he has no less: and if he has more or fewer Sons to whom this Estate descends by equal or inequal portions, neither do they go less in their ways or customs of Life for the Agrarian, because they never had more. But, says ARISTOTLE 
Pol. L. 3. c. 9  (speaking of the Ostracism as it supplies the defect of an Agrarian) this course is as necessary to Kings as to Commonwealths. By this means the Monarchys of Turkey and of Spain preserve their Balance; thro' the neglect of this has that of the Nobility of Oceana been broken: and this is it which the Prevaricator, in advising that the Nobility be no further levelled than will serve to keep the People under, requires of his Prince. So, That an Agrarian is necessary to Government, be it what it will, is on all hands concluded.   

CHAP. XII.  
Whether Courses or a Rotation be necessary to a well-ordered Commonwealth. In which is contained the Courses or Parembole of Israel before the Captivity, together with the Epitome of Athens and Venice.  

Oceana, p. 54.  ONE bout more and we have done: This (as reason good) will be upon Wheels or Rotation: For,  
AS the Agrarian answers to the equality of the Foundation or Root, so does Rotation to the equality of the Superstructures or Branches of a Commonwealth.  
EQUAL Rotation is equal Vicissitude in, or Succession to Magistracy conferred for equal terms, injoining such equal Vacations, as case the Government to take in the Body of the People, by parts succeeding others, thro' the free Election or Suffrage of the whole.  
THE contrary whereto is prolongation of Magistracy, which, trashing the wheel of Rotation, destroys the Life or natural Motion of a Commonwealth.  
THE Prevaricator, whatever he has done for himself, has done this for me, that it will be out of doubt whether my Principles be capable of greater Obligation▪ or Confirmation, than by having Objections made against them. Nor have I been altogether ingrateful, or nice of my Labour, but gone far (much farther than I needed) about, that I might return with the more valuable Present to him that sent me on the Book I errand: I shall not bo short of like proceeding upon the present Subject, but rather over.  
ROTATION in a Commonwealth is of the Magistracy, of the Senate, of the People; of the Magistracy and the People; of the Magistracy and the Senate; or of the Magistracy, of the Senate, and of the People: which in all come to six kinds.  
FOR example of Rotation in the Magistracy, you have the Judge 
Grot.  of Israel, called in Hebrew Shophet. The like Magistracy after the King's ITHOBAL and BAAL came in use with the Tyrians; from these, with their Posterity the Carthaginians, who also called their supreme Magistrates, being in number two, and for their Term Annual, Shophetim, which the Latins by a softer Pronunciation render Suffetes.  
THE Shophet or Judge of Israel was a Magistrate, not, that I can find, obliged to any certain term, throout the Book of Judges; nevertheless, it is plain, that his Election was occasional, and but for a time, after the manner of a Dictator.  
TRUE it is, that ELI and SAMUEL ruled all their lives; but upon this such impatience in the People followed, thro' the corruption of their Sons, as was the main cause of the succeeding Monarchy.  
THE Magistrates in Athens (except the Areopagits, being a Judicatory) were all upon Rotation. The like for Lacedaemon and Rome, except the Kings in the former, who were indeed hereditary, but had no more Power than the Duke in Venice, where all the rest of the Magistrates (except the Procuratori, whose Magistracy is but mere Ornament) are also upon Rotation.  
FOR the Rotation of the Senate you have Athens, the Achaeans, Aetolians, Lycians, the Amphictionium; and the Senate of Lacedaemon reproved, 
Pol. l. 2. c. 7.  in that it was for life, by ARISTOTLE: Modern Examples of like kind are the Diet of Switzerland, but especially the Senate of Venice.  
FOR the Rotation of the People, you have first Israel, where the Congregation (which the Greecs call Ecclesia; the Latins, Comitia, or Concio) having a twofold capacity; first, that of an Army, in which they were the constant Guard of the Country; and, secondly, that of a Representative, in which they gave the Vote of the People, at the creation of their Laws, or election of their Magistrates, was Monthly. 
1 Chron. 27. 1.  Now the Children of Israel after their Number, to wit, the chief Fathers and Captains of thousands and hundreds, and their Officers that served the King in any matter of the Courses, which came in and went out month by month, throout all the months of the year, of every Course were twenty and four thousand.  

Grot. ad loc.  SUCH a multitude there was of military Age, that without inconvenience, four and twenty thousand were every month in Arms, whose term expiring, others succeeded, and so others; by which means the Rotation of the whole People came about in the space of one year. The Tribune's, or Commanders of the Tribes in Arms, or of the Prerogative for the month, are named in the following part of the Chapter, to the sixteenth Verse; where gins the enumeration of the Princes (though GAD and ASHUR, for what reason I know not, be omitted) of the Tribes, remaining in their Provinces, where they judged the People, and as they received Orders, were to bring or send such farther Enforcement or Recruits as occasion required to the Army: after these, some other Officers are mentioned. There is no question to be made but this Chap. 12 Rotation of the People, together with their Prerogative or Congregation, was preserved by the monthly Election of two thousand Deputies in each of the twelve Tribes, which in all came to four and twenty thousand; or let any man show how otherwise it was likely to be done, the nature of their Office being to give the Vote of the People, who therefore sure must have chosen them. By these the Vote of the People was given to their Laws, and at Elections of their Magistrates.  
TO their Laws, as where DAVID proposes the reduction of the Ark: And DAVID consulted with the Captains of thousands and hundreds, 
1 Chron. 13.  and with every Leader. And DAVID said to all the Congregation of Israel, If it seems good to you, and it be of the Lord God, let us send abroad to our Brethren every where (the Princes of Tribes in their Provinces) that are left in the Land of Israel, and with them also to the Priests and Levites, which are in the Cities and Suburbs, that they may gather themselves to us; and let us bring again the Ark of our God to us, for we enquired not at it in the days of SAUL. And all the Congregation (gave their Suffrage in the Affirmative) said that they would do so; for the thing was right in the eyes of the People. Nulla lex sibi soli conscientiam Justitiae 
Grot. è Tertul.  suae debet, sed eye a quibus obsequium expectat. Now that the same Congregation or Representative gave the Vote of the People also in the Election of Priests, Officers and Magistrates; Moreover DAVID and 
1 Chron. 25.  the Captains of the Host separated to the Service of the Sons of ASAPH, and of HEMAN, and of JEDUTHUN, who should prophecy with Harps, with Psalteries, and with Cymbals. But upon the occasion to which we are more especially beholden for the preservation and discovery of this admirable Order (DAVID having proposed the business in a long and 
1 Chron. 28. 2.  pious speech) the Congregation made SOLOMON the Son of DAVID King the second time, and anointed him to the Lord to be chief Governor, 
1 Chron. 29. 22.  and ZADOK to be Priest. For as to the first time that SOLOMON was made King, it happened, thro' the Sedition of ADONIJAH, to 
1 Kings 1.  have been done in haste and tumultuously by those only of Jerusalem; and the reason why ZADOK is here made Priest, is, that ABIATHAR was put out for being of the Conspiracy with ADONIJAH.  
I MAY expect (by such Objections as they afford me) it should be alleged, that to prove an Order in a Commonwealth, I instance in a Monarchy; as if there were any thing in this Order monarchical, or that could, if it had not been so received from the Commonwealth, have been introduced by the Kings, to whom in the judgement of any sober man (the Prevaricator only excepted, who has been huckling about some such Council for his Prince) no less could have followed upon the first frown of the People, than did in REHOBOAM, who having 
1 Kings 12.  used them roughly, was deposed by the Congregation, or the major part. It is true, that while Israel was an Army, the Congregation, as it needed not to assemble by way of Election or Representative, so I believe it did not; but that by all Israel assembled to this end, should be meant the whole People after they were planted upon their Lots, and not their Representative, which in a political sense is as properly so called, were absurd and impossible. Nor need I go upon presumption only, be the same never so strong, seeing it is said in Scripture of the Korathites, that they were keepers of the Gates of the Tabernacle, and their Fathers 
1 Chron. 9 29.  being over the Host of the Lord, were keepers of the Entry: That is, (according to the Interpretation of GROTIUS) the Korathites were Book I now keepers of the Gates, as it appears in the Book of Numbers, their 
Numb. 4.  Ancestors the Kohathites had been in the Camp, or while Israel was yet an Army. But our Translation is lame in the right foot, as to the true discovery of the ancient manner of this service, which according to the Septuagint and the vulgar Latin was thus, they were keepers of the Gates of the Tabernacle (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & familiae eorum per vices) and their Fathers by turns, or Rotation. So that Offices and Services by Courses, Turns, or Rotation, are plainly more ancient than Kings in the Commonwealth of Israel; though it be true that when the Courses or Rotation of the Congregation or Representative of the People were first introduced, is as hard to show, as it would be how, after the People were once planted upon their Lots, they could be otherwise assembled. If Writers argue well and lawfully from what the Sanhedrim was in the institution by JEHOSAPHAT, to what it had more anciently been; to argue from what the Congregation was in the institution by DAVID, to what it had more anciently been, is sufficiently warranted.  
THESE things rightly considered, there remains little doubt but we have the courses of Israel for the first example of Rotation in a popular Assembly. Now to come from the Hebrew to the Grecian Prudence, the same is approved by ARISTOTLE, which he exemplifys in the Commonwealth of THALES MILESIUS, where the People, 
Pol. l. 4. c. 14.  he says, assembled (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) by turns or Rotation. Nor is the Roman Prudence without some shadow of the like proceeding, where the Prerogative (pro tempore) with the jure vocatae, being made by Lot, gave frequently the Suffrage of the whole People. But the Gothic Prudence in the Policy of the third State, runs altogether upon the Collection of a Representative by the Suffrage of the People (though not so diligently regulated, by Terms and Vacations, as to a standing Assembly were necessary, by Turns, Rotation, Parembole or Courses) as in the election of the late House of Commons, and the constitutive Vicissitude of the Knights and Burgesses, is known by sufficient experience.  
WHEN the Rotation of a Commonwealth is both in the Magistracy and the People, I reckon it to be of a fourth kind, as in Israel, where both the Judge and the Congregation were so elected.  
THE fifth kind is when the Rotation of a Commonwealth is in the Magistracy and the Senate, as in those of Athens, of the Achaeans, of the Aetolians, of the Lycians, and of Venice; upon which Examples, rather for the influence each of them, at least Athens, may have upon the following Book, than any great necessity from the present occasion, I shall enlarge in this place.  
THE Commonwealth of Athens was thus administered.  

Epitome of the Athenian Commonwealth.  THE Senate of the Bean being the proposing Assembly (for that of the Areopagits, called also a Senate, was a Judicatory) consisted of four hundred Citizens chosen by Lot, which was performed with Beans. These were annually removed all at once: By which means Athens became frustrated of the natural and necessary use of an Aristocracy, while neither her Senators were chosen for their parts, nor remained long enough in this Function to acquire the right understanding of their proper Office. These thus elected, were subdivided by Lot into four equal parts, called Prytanys, each of which for one quarter of the year was in office. The Prytany, or Prytans in office, elected ten Precedents, Chap. 12 called Proedri, out of which Proedri or Presidents they weekly chose one Provost of the Council, who was called the Epistata. The Epistata and the Proedris were the more peculiar Proposers to the Prytans, and to the Prytans it belonged especially to prepare business 
Petit. de Leg▪ Att.  (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) for the Senat. They gave also audience to any that would propose any thing concerning the Commonwealth, which if, when reported by the Prytans, it were approved by the Senate, the party that proposed might promulgat the business; and Promulgation being made, the Congregation assembled, and determined of it. Sic data concio Laelio est, processit ille, & Graecus apud Graecos 
Cic. pro Flac▪  non de culpa sua dixit, sed de poena questus est; porrexerunt manus, Psephisma natum est.  
THE Prytans and their Magistrates had right to assemble the Senate, and propose to them; and what the Senate determined upon such a Proposition, if forthwith to be offered to the People, as in private cases, was called Proboulema; but if not to be proposed till the People had a years trial of it, as was the ordinary way in order to Laws to be enacted, it was called Psephisma; each of which words, with that difference, signifys a Decree. A Decree of the Senate in the latter sense had for one year the power of a Law, after which trial it belonged to the Thesmothetae (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to hang it in writing upon the Statues of the Heros, and assemble the Congregation. These Magistrates were of the 
Ulpi●n. ad Phil. 1.  number of the Archons, which in all were nine; the chief, more peculiarly so called, was ARCHON EPONYMUS, he by whose name the year was reckoned or denominated (his Magistracy being of a Civil 
Poll. l. 8. c. 8.  concernment) the next was the King (a Magistrate of a Spiritual concernment) the third the Polemarch (whose Magistracy was of a Military concernment) the other six were the Thesmothetae, who had several Functions common with the nine; others peculiar or proper to themselves, as (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to give the People (by Placarts) notice when the Judicatories were to assemble, that is, when the People were to assemble in that capacity, and to judge according to the Law made; or, when the Senate or the People were to assemble upon an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Crime that was not provided against by the Law, as that of ALCIBIADES (the Wits about that time in Athens being most of them Atheists) for laughing at CERES, discovering her Secrets, and shaving of the MERCURIES. If an Archon or Demagog was guilty of such a Crime, it belonged to the cognizance of the Senate, otherwise to that of the People, whom the Thesmothetae were also in like manner to warn, 
L. 8. c. 16.  when they were to come to the Suffrage.  
THESE six, like the Electors in Venice, presided at all Elections of Magistrates, whether made by the Lot as the Judges, or by Suffrage as the new Archons, the Strategus or General, and most of the rest. They also had the hearing and introducing of all Causes into the Judicatories.  
BUT the right of assembling the Ecclesia or Congregation belonged to the Prytans, by whom the Senate proposed to the People.  
THE Congregation consisted of all them that were upon the Roll of the Lexiarcha, that is to say, of the whole People having right to the City. The Prytans seated upon a Tribunal, were Precedents of this Assembly; the Assembly having sacrificed and made Oath of Fidelity to the Commonwealth, the Proedris or Precedents of the Prytans Book I proposed by Authority of the Senate to the People in this manner: July the 16th POLICLES being Archon, and the Tribe of Pandion in the Prytaneat, DEMOSTHENES PAEANEUS thought thus, or was of this opinion. The same Custom whereby the first Proposer subscribes his Opinion or Part with his Name, is at this day in Venice. Proposition being made, such of the People as would speak were called to the Pulpit; they that were fifty years of Age, or upwards, were to come first, and the younger afterwards; which custom of prating in this manner made excellent Orators or Demagogs', but a bad Commonwealth.  
FROM this, that the People had not only the Result of the Commonwealth, but the Debate also, Athens is called a Democracy; and this kind of Government is opposed to that of Lacedaemon, which, because the People there had not the power of Debate, but of Result only, was called an Aristocracy, sometimes an Oligarchy: thus the Greecs commonly are to be understood, to distinguish these two; while according to my Principles, if you like them, Debate in the People makes Anarchy; and where they have the Result and no more, the rest being managed by a good Aristocracy, it makes that which is properly and truly to be called Democracy, or Popular Government. Neither is this Opinion of mine new, but according to the Judgement of some of the Athenians themselves; for says ISOCRATES in his Oration to the Areopagits for Reformation of the Athenian Government, I know the main reason why the Lacedæmonians flourish to be, that their Commonwealth is popular. But to return. As many of the People as would, having showed their Eloquence, and with these the Demagogs', who were frequently bribed, concealed their Knavery; the Epistata, or Provost of the Proedris, put the Decree or Question to the Vote, and the People gave the Result of the Commonwealth by their Chirotonia, that is, by holding up their hands: the Result thus given, was the Law or Psephisma of the People.  

Dem. Phil. 1.  NOW for the Functions of the Congregation, they were divers; as first, Election of Magistrates (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉;) namely, the Archons, the Strategus or General, the Field Officers, the Admirals, with divers others, all, or the chief of them annual, and commonly upon Terms and Vacations; though it be true, as PLUTARCH has it, that PHOTION was Strategus four years together, having that Honour still put upon him by the Congregation, without his seeking. The next Office of this Assembly was to elect Judges into five Courts or Judicatories; for the People being in the Bulk too unwieldy a Body for the performance of this duty, they exercised the supreme Judicature by way of Representative, into which Election was made by Lottery, in such a manner that five hundred, one thousand, or 1500 of them (according to the importance of the occasion) being above thirty years of Age, and within the rest of the Qualifications in that case provided by the Law, became the Sovereign Judicatory, called the Heliaea. In all Elections, whether by Lot or Suffrage, the Thesmothetae were Precedents, and ordered the Congregation. Furthermore, if they would amend, altar, repeal, or make a Law, this also was done by a Representative, of which no man was capable that had not been of the Heliaea, for the rest elected out of the whole People: this amounting to one thousand, was called the Nomothetae or Legislators. No Law received by the People could be abrogated but Chap. 12 by the Nomothetae; by these any Athenian, having obtained leave of the Senate, might abrogat a Law, provided withal he put another in the place of it. These Laws the Proedris of the Prytans were to put to the Suffrage.  
FIRST, the old, whether it agreed with the Athenian People, or not? then the new; and whether of these happened to be chirotonized or voted by the Nomothetae, was ratified, according to that piece of the Athenian Law cited by DEMOSTHENES against TIMOCRATES, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. What has been said of the Commonwealth of Athens, in relation to the present purpose, amounts to thus much, That not only the Senate and the Magistracy in this Policy was upon Rotation, but even the People also, at least as to the Nomothetae, or their Legislative Power, and the Supreme Judicatory of the Heliaea, each of these being a Representative, constituted of one thousand, or fifteen hundred Citizens.  
BUT for what follows in the second Book, it is necessary that I observe in this place the proceeding of certain Divines, who endeavour to make use of this Commonwealth for ends of their own, as particularly Dr. SEAMAN; who in his Book called Four Propositions, argues after this manner.  
CHIROTONIA (as SUIDAS has it) signifys both Plebiscitum, a Law made by the People, and Psephisma. Now, says he, Psephisma is the ordinary word used in the Attic Laws, and in DEMOSTHENES for Senatusconsultum, a Law made by the Senate: whence he draws this Conclusion; As, when the People make a Law, they are said to Chirotonize; so may the Rulers, in like manner, in those Laws that are made by themselves alone.  
THESE ways with Divines are too bad. The words of SUIDAS are these (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Chirotonia is Election or Ratification by the Many: which expressly excludes the Few or the Senate from being otherwise contained by the word Chirotonia, than a part is by the whole. Nor has the Author the word Psephisma or Plebiscitum in the place. I would fain know what other word there is in Greece for Plebiscitum but Psephisma; and yet the Doctor puts it upon SUIDAS, that he distinguishes between these two, and taking that for granted where he finds Psephisma in DEMOSTHENES and the Attic Laws, will have it to signify no more than a Decree of the Senate. It is true that some Decrees of the Senate were so called, but those of the People had no other name; and whenever you find Psephisma in DEMOSTHENES or the Attic Laws, for a Law, there is nothing more certain than that it is to be understood of the People: for to say that a Law in a Popular Commonwealth can be made without the People, is a Contradiction.  

Poll. lib. 8. c. 9  THE second Passage is a What think you of these words of POLLUX, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Which the Doctor having englished in this manner, The Thesmothetae do privately prescribe when Judgement is to be given, and promulge public Accusations and Suffrages to the People, asks you whose Suffrages were these, if not the Rulers? By which strange Construction, where POLLUX Book I having first related in what part the function of the Thesmothetae was common with that of the nine Archons, comes (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to show you what was peculiar to themselves, namely, to give notice when the Heliaea or other Judicatories were to assemble; the Doctor renders it, they do privately prescribe: as if the Session of a Court of Justice, and such a one as contained a thousand Judges, being the Representative of the whole People, were to be privately prescribed. Then to this private prescribing of Justice, he adds, that they do publicly promulge (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Citations upon Crimes not within the written Law; as if private Prescription and public Promulgation could stand together. Next, whereas Promulgation in the very nature of the word signifys an Act before a Law made, he presumes the Law to be first made by the Rulers, and then promulgated by the Thesmothetae to the People, kim kam to the experience of all Commonwealths, the nature of Promulgation, and the sense of his Author, whose words, as I showed before, declare it to have been the proper or peculiar office of the Thesmothetae to give the People notice when they were to assemble for Judicature, or when for giving their Chirotonia or Suffrage, by Promulgation of the Cause (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) upon which they were to determine.  
FOR the fourth passage, the Doctor quoting a wrong place for these words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that the Nomothetae (being a Representative, as I showed, of the whole People, chosen by Lot, and in number one thousand) chirotonized, or gave the Legislative Suffrage; thence infers, that the Rulers chirotonized, voted or made Laws by themselves without the People: which is as if one should say, that the Prerogative Tribe in Rome, or the House of Commons in England, gave their Vote to such or such a Law, therefore it was made by the Rulers alone, and not by the People of Rome or of England.  
FOR the fourth Passage, STEPHANUS quotes DEMOSTHENES at large in these words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. This the Doctor interprets of an Officer; to which I shall say more, when he shows me where the Sentence is, or what went before: for as yet I do not know of an Officer in any Commonwealth, whose Election was indifferently made, either by the Senate or by the People; nor do I think the Doctor has looked further for this than STEPHENS, who has not interpreted it.  
THE fifth passage is, That a Decree of the Senate in Athens had the force of a Law for one year, without the People. So had the Edicts of the Praetors in Rome: but I would fain know, whence the Senate in Athens, or the Praetors in Rome, originally derived this Right (which was no more than that such Laws might be Probationers, and so better understood when they came to the vote) but from the Chirotonia, or Suffrage of the People.  
THE sixth passage stops the mouths of such as having nothing to say to the matter of my writing, pick quarrels with the manner or freedom of it, the Liberty I take in the defence of Truth; seeing the Doctor takes a greater liberty upon other terms, while he bids his Antagonist (one that defended the Cause now in my hand) go and consult his Authors, namely, STEPHENS and BUDAEUS again: for, says he, you wrong those learned Men, while you would have us believe that they were as ignorant of the Greece Story as yourself, or that things are to be found in them which are not. To which Confidence I have better leave to say, that the Doctor should do well to take no worse Council Chap. 12 than he gives.  
BUT what is become of my Prevaricator? I have quite lost him, else I should have entreated him to compare his Notes out of my Sermon, with these out of the Doctor's; or retract that same affectation, in saying, I know not how, but Mr. HARRINGTON has conceived a great unkindness for the Clergy. As if these their Stratagems, with which they make perpetual War against the unwary People, did not concern a man that has undertaken the cause of Popular Government.  
THE Policy of the Achaeans consisted of divers Commonwealths under one, which was thus administered. The Cities sent their Deputies twice every year of course, and oftener if they were summoned by their Strategus, or their Demiurges, to the place appointed. The Strategus was the Supreme Magistrate both Military and Civil, and the Demiurges being ten, were his Council, all Annual Magistrates elected by the People. This Council thus constituted, was called the Synarchy, and performed like Duties, in relation to the Senate, consisting of the Deputies sent by their peculiar Soverainties or Cities, as the Prytans to that in Athens. The Policies of the Aetolians and Lycians are so near the same again, that in one you have all. So both the Senates and the Magistracy of these Commonwealths were upon Rotation. To conclude with Venice.  

Epitome of the Commonwealth of Venice. The Great Council.  THE Commonwealth of Venice consists of four parts; the Great Council, the Senate, the College, and the Signory.  
THE Great Council is the aggregat Body of the whole People, or Citizens of Venice, which, for the paucity of their number, and the Antiquity of their Extraction, are called Gentlemen, or Noble Venetians. Every one of them at five and twenty years of age has right of Session and Suffrage in this Council; which right of Suffrage, because throout this Commonwealth, in all Debates and Elections, it is given by the Ballot, is called the right of Balloting, whereby this Council being the Sovereign Power, creates all the rest of the Orders, Councils, or Magistracies; and has constitutively the ultimat Result, both in cases of Judicature, and the Constitution of Laws.  

The Senat.  THE Senate, called also the Pregati, consists of sixty Senators properly so styled, whereof the Great Council elects six on a day, beginning so long before the month of October, that these being all chosen by that time, then receive their Magistracy: it consists also of sixty more, called the Junta, which are elected by the Scrutiny of the Old Senate, that is, by the Senate proposing, and the Great Council resolving; the rest of their Creation is after the same manner with the former. In the Sixty of the Senate, there cannot be above three of any one Kindred or Family, nor in the Junta so many, unless there be fewer in the former. These Magistracies are all annual, but without interval, so that it is at the pleasure of the Great Council, whether a Senator having finished his year, they will elect him again.  

The College.  THE College is a Council consisting more especially of three Orders of Magistrates, called in their Language Savi; as the Savi grandi, to whose cognizance or care belong the whole affairs of Sea and Land; the Savi di Terra ferma, to whose care and cognizance belong the affairs of the Land; and the Savi di Mare, to whose cognizance appertain Book I the affairs of the Sea, and of the Lands. These are elected by the Senate, not all at once; but for the Savi grandi, who are six, by three at a time, with the interposition of three months; and for the Savi di Terra ferma, and the Savi di Mare, who are each five, after the same manner, save only that the first Election consists of three, and the second of two. Each Order of the Savi elects weekly one Provost, each of which Provosts has Right in any affair belonging to the cognizance of his Order, to propose to the College. Audience of Ambassadors, and matters of foreign Negotiation, belong properly to this Council.  

The Signory.  THE Signory consists of the Duke and of his Counsillors. The Duke is a Magistrate created by the Great Council for life, to whom the Commonwealth acknowleges the Reverence due to a Prince, and all her Acts run in his name; though without the Counsillors he has no Power at all, while they can perform any Function of the Signory without him. The Counsillors, whose Magistracy is annual, are elected by the Scrutiny of the Senate, naming one out of each Tribe (for the City is locally divided into six Tribes) and the Great Council approving; so the Counsillors are six, whose Function in part is of the nature of Masters of Requests, having withal power to grant certain Privileges: but their greatest preeminence is, that all or any one of them may propose to any Council in the Commonwealth.  

Certain Rights of the Councils.  THE Signory has Session and Suffrage in the College, the College has Session and Suffrage in the Senate, and the Senate has Session and Suffrage in the Great Council. The Signory, or the Provosts of the Savi, have power to assemble the College, the College has power to assemble the Senate, and the Senate has power to assemble the Great Council; the Signiori, but more peculiarly the Provosts of the Savi, in their own Offices and Functions, have power to propose to the College, the College has power to propose to the Senate, and the Senate has power to propose to the Great Council. Whatever is thus proposed and resolved, either by the Senate (for sometimes, thro' the security of this Order, a Proposition goes no further) or by the Great Council, is ratified, or becomes the Law of the Commonwealth. Over and above these Orders, they have three Judicatories, two Civil and one Criminal, in each of which forty Gentlemen elected by the Great Council are Judges for the term of eight months; to these Judicatories belong the Avogadori and the Auditori, who are Magistrates, having power to hear Causes apart, and, as they judge fitting, to introduce them into the Courts.  
IF a man tells me, that I omit many things, he may perceive I writ an Epitome, in which no more should be comprehended, than that which understood may make a man understand the rest. But of these principal parts consists the whole body of admirable Venice.  
THE Consiglio d'ye Dieci, or Council of Ten, being that which partakes of Dictatorian Power, is not a limb of her but as it were a Sword in her hand. This Council (in which the Signory has also Session and Suffrage) consists more peculiarly of ten annual Magistrates, created by the Great Council, who afterwards elect three of their own number by Lot, which so elected are called Capi d'ye Dieci, their Magistracy being monthly: Again, out of the three Capi, one is taken by Lot, whose Magistracy is weekly: this is he, who over against the Tribunal in the Great Council sits like another Duke, and is called the Provost of the Dieci. It belongs to these three Magistrates to assemble Chap. 12 the Council of Ten, which they are obliged to do weekly of course, and oftener as they see occasion. The Council being assembled, any one of the Signory, or two of the Capi may propose to it: the power which they now exercise (and wherein for their assistance they create three Magistrates called the Grand Inquisitors) consists in the punishment of certain heinous Crimes, especially that of Treason; in relation whereto they are as it were Sentinels, standing upon the guard of the Commonwealth: But constitutively (with the addition of a Junta, consisting of other fifteen, together with some of the chief Magistráts having Right in cases of important speed or secrecy to this Council) they have the full and absolute Power of the whole Commonwealth as Dictator.  
THAT Venice either transcribed the whole and every part of her Constitution out of Athens and Lacedaemon, or happens to be framed as if she had so done, is most apparent. The Result of this Commonwealth is in the Great Council, and the Debate in the Senate: so was it in Lacedaemon. A Decree made by the Senate of Athens had the power of a Law for one year without the People, at the end whereof the People might revoke it: A Decree of the Senate of Venice stands good without the Great Council, unless these see reason to revoke it. The Pryians were a Council preparing business for the Senate; so is the Collegio in Venice: the Precedents of the Prytans were the ten Proedris; those of the Collegio are the three Provosts of the Savi. The Archons or Princes of Athens being nine, had a kind of Sovereign Inspection upon all the Orders of the Commonwealth; so has the Signory of Venice, consisting of nine besides the Duke. The Quarancies in Venice are Judicatories of the nature of the Heliaea in Athens; and as the Thesmothetae heard and introduced the causes into that Judicatory, so do the Avogadori and the Auditori into these. The Consiglio d'ye Dieci in Venice is not of the Body, but an Appendix of the Commonwealth; so was the Court of the Ephori in Lacedaemon: and as these had power to put a King, a Magistrate, or any Delinquent of what degree soever to death, so has the Consiglio d'ye Dieci. This again is wrought up with the Capi d'ye Dieci, and the weekly Provost, as were the Prytans with the Proedris, and the weekly Epistata; and the Ballot is lineally descended from the Bean: yet is Venice in the whole, and in every part, a far more exquisite Policy than either Athens or Lacedaemon.  
A POLITICAL is like a natural Body. Commonwealths resemble and differ, as Men resemble and differ; among whom you shall not see two Faces, or two Dispositions, that are alike. PETER and THOMAS in all their parts are equally Men, and yet PETER and THOMAS of all Men may be the most unlike; one may have his greater strength in his Arms, the other in his Legs; one his greater Beauty in his Soul, the other in his Body; one may be a fool, the other wise; one valiant, the other cowardly. These two, which at a distance you will not know one from the other, when you look nearer, or come to be better acquainted with, you will never mistake. Our Considerer (who in his Epistle would make you believe that Oceana is but a mere Transcription out of Venice) has Companions like himself; and how near they look into matters of this nature is plain, while one knows not JETHRO from MOSES, and the Book I other takes a state of Civil War to be the best model of a Civil Government.  
LET a Man look near, and he shall not find any one Orders in Oceana (the Ballot only excepted) that has not as much difference from, or resemblance to any one Orders in Rome or Venice, as any one Orders in Rome or Venice has from, or to any one Orders in Athens or Lacedaemon: Which different temper of the parts must of necessity in the whole yield a Result, a Soul or Genius, altogether new in the World, as embracing both the Arms of Rome, and the Counsils of Venice; and yet neither obnoxious to the Turbulence of the one, nor the narrowness of the other.  
BUT the sum of what has been said of Venice, as to the business in hand, comes to no more than that the Senate and the Magistracy of this Commonwealth are upon Rotation. No more: nay I am well if it comes to so much. For the Prevaricator catching me up, where I say, that for all this the greater Magistracies in Venice are continually 
Consid. p. 93.  wheeled thro' a few hands, tells me, that I have confessed it to be otherwise. I have indeed confessed, that though the Magistracies are all conferred for certain terms, yet those terms do not necessitat Vacations; that is, the term of a Magistracy being expired, the Party that bore it is capable upon a new Election of bearing it again without interval or vacation: which does not altogether frustrate the Rotation of the Commonwealth, though it renders the same very imperfect. This infirmity of Venice derives from a complication of Causes, none of which is incident to a Commonwealth consisting of the Many: wherefore there lies no obligation upon me to discover the reason in this place. But on the contrary, seeing, let me show things never so new, they are slighted as old, I have an obligation in this place, to try whether I may get esteem by concealing something. What is said, every body knew before; this is not said, who knows it?  

A Riddle.  RIDDLE me, Riddle me, what is this? The Magistracies in Venice (except such as are rather of Ornament than of Power) are all annual, or at most biennial. No man whose term is expired, can hold his Magistracy longer, but by a new Election. The Elections are most of them made in the Great Council, and all by the Ballot, which is the most equal and impartial way of Suffrage. And yet the greater Magistracies are perpetually wheeled thro' a few hands.  
IF I be worthy to give advice to a man that would study the Politics, let him understand Venice; he that understands Venice right, shall go nearest to judge (notwithstanding the difference that is in every Policy) right of any Government in the World. Now the assault of the Considerer deriving but from some Pique or Emulation which of us should be the abler Politician, if the Council of State had the curiosity to know either that, or who understands Venice, this Riddle would make the discovery; for he that cannot easily unfold this Riddle, does not understand her.  
THE sixth kind of Rotation is when a Commonwealth goes upon it in all her Orders, Senate, People, and Magistracy. Such a one taking in the Many, and being fixed upon the foot of a steady Agrarian, has attained to perfect Equality. But of this an example there is none, or you must accept of Oceana.  
THE Rotation of Oceana is of two parts, the one of the Electors Chap. 12 which is annual, and the other of the Elected which is triennial. 
Rotation of Oceana.   
SPEAKING of Electors in this sense, I mean as the great Council in Venice are Electors of all other Orders, Councils or Magistrates. But the Commonwealth of Oceana taking in the whole People, cannot, as does the Great Council of Venice (wherein they that have right are but a few) attain to this capacity at one step: for which cause she takes three steps; one at the Parishes, where every fifth Elder is annually elected by the whole People. There is no doubt but there was some such Order in Israel whereby the monthly Rotation of her Congregation or Prerogative, by election of two thousand in each Tribe, was preserved. The next step she takes is at the Hundred, whereby election of Officers and Magistrates, the Troops chosen at the Parishes, are very near formed. Her third step is at the Tribe, where the whole body of her Deputies are in exact Form, Discipline and Function, headed by proper Officers and Magistrates, these altogether consisting of one fifth part of the whole People. This Rotation being in itself annual, comes in regard of the body of the People to be quinquennial, or such as in the space of five years gives every man his turn in the power of Election.  
BUT though every man be so capable of being an Elector, that he must have his turn; yet every man is not so capable of being elected into those Magistracies that are Sovereign, or have the leading of the whole Commonwealth, that it can be safe to lay a necessity that every man must take his turn in these also: but it is enough that every man, who in the Judgement and Conscience of his Country is fit, may take his turn. Wherefore upon the Conscience of the Electors, so constituted as has been shown, it goes to determine who shall partake of Sovereign Magistracy, or be at the Assembly of a Tribe elected into the Senate or Prerogative; which Assemblies are so triennial, that one third part of each falling every year, and another being elected, the Parliament is thereby perpetuated.  
SUCH was the Constitution of those Councils which the Prevaricator has confessed he always thought admirable, but now the toy takes him to be quite of another mind; for, says he, That ancient Republics have 
Consid. p. 90.  thro' a malicious Jealousy (let them take it among them) made it unlawful even for Persons of the clearest merit to continue long in command, but have by perpetual vicissitude substituted new men in the Government, is manifest enough; but with what success they did this, will best appear by VETURIUS, VARRO, and MANCINUS. He is still admirable: One would wonder what he means; if it be that there were but three weak or unfortunat Generals in the whole course of Rome, how strange is it to urge this as an Argument against Rotation, which is as strong a one as can be urged for Rotation? If the Romans by this way of Election having experience of an able General, knew ever after where to have him; or lighting upon one they found not so fit for their purpose, could in the compass of one year be rid of him of course, without dishonour or reproach to him, taking thereby a warning to come no more there; was this a proceeding to favour malice? or such as one as, removing the cause of malice, left no root for such a branch or possibility of like effect? Certainly by this assertion the Prevaricator has jolted his presumptuous Head not only against the prudence of ancient Commonwealths, but of God himself in that of Book I Israel. VETURIUS, VARRO, and MANCINUS (though some of them cannot be at all points excused) by this mark upon them, may be thought hardlier of than is needful; for which cause there being that also in their Stories which is neither unpleasant nor unprofitable, I shall endeavour to make the Reader somewhat better acquainted with them. One of the greatest blows Rome ever received was by PONTIUS, Captain General of the Samnites, who having drawn 
Liv. l. 9  her Consuls, POSTHUMIUS and VETURIUS, by Stratagem into the Straits of Caudium, a Valley of narrow entrance, and shut up the mouth of it by possessing himself of the only Passage, the rest being environed with insuperable Rocks, the Samnit came to have both the Arms, and so upon the matter the whole strength (in those days) of Rome inevitably at his discretion. Hereupon, having leisure, and being desirous (in a matter of such moment) of good advice, he dispatched a Messenger to his Father HERENNIUS, the ablest Counsillor in Samnium, to know what might be his best course with the Romans now inavoidably at his mercy, who answered, that he should open the Pass, and let them return untouched. The young General amazed at this Council, desired farther direction; whereupon HERENNIUS for the second time made answer, that he should cut them off to a man. But the General, upon the strange disagreement of such opinions, having his Father's Age (for he was very old) in suspicion, took a third course, which neither (according to the first advice of wise HERENNIUS) making Friends, nor, according to the second, destroying Enemy's, became as he prophesied the utter Ruin of the Commonwealth of Samnium. For the Romans being dismissed safe, but ignominiously, the Senate upon their return fell into the greatest strait and consternation that had been known among them. On the one side, to live and not revenge such an affront was intolerable; on the other, to revenge it was against the Faith of the Consuls, whose necessity (the loss of two Arms lying upon it) had in truth forced them to accept of a dishonourable League with the Samnites. Now not the Arms, but the Senate itself was in Caudium, not a man of them could find the way out of this Vale environed with Rocks, but he only that could not find it out of the other; POSTHUMIUS, who having first showed, that neither War nor Peace could be so made, as to engage the Commonwealth (injussu Populi) without the Command of the People, declared that the Senate returning the Consuls, with such others as had consented to so wicked and dishonourable a Peace, naked, and bound to the Samnites, were free: nor ceased he till the Senate (thereto pressed by the necessity of the Commonwealth) resolving accordingly, He, VETURIUS, and some of the Tribune's were delivered to the Samnites; who, nevertheless, to hold the Romans to their League, dismissed them with safety. The Disputes on either side that arose hereupon, and, coming to Arms, ended with the destruction of Samnium, I omit. That which as to the present occasion is material, is the Reputation of the Consuls; and VETURIUS, though he were not the leading man, being for the rest as deep in the Action as POSTHUMIUS, the People were so far from thinking themselves deceived in this choice, that the Consuls were more honoured in Rome for having lost, than PONTIUS in Samnium for having won the day at Caudium.  
I DO not rob Graves, nor steal Windingsheets; my Controversys Chap. 12 are not but with the Living, with none of these that have not showed themselves best able for their own defence; nor yet with such, but in the prosecution of Truths opposed by them to the damage of Mankind: yet the Prevaricator accuses me of rude charges. What are his then in defence of Falsehood, and against such as cannot by't? or whether of these is the more noble?  
FOR VARRO, who being Consul of Rome, lost the Battle of Cannae to HANNIBAL, Captain General for the Carthaginians, though without Cowardice, yet by Rashness, he is not so excusable.  

Florus, l. ●. c. 18.  BUT for MANCINUS, brought (as was POSTHUMIUS by the Samnites) to dishonourable conditions by MEGAERA, Captain General of the Numantins, there be excuses: As first, the Numantins, for their number not exceeding four thousand fight men, were the gallantest of so many, on which the Sun ever shone.  
FOURTEEN years had their Commonwealth held tack with the Romans, in Courage, Conduct, and Virtue, having worsted POMPEY the Great, and made a League with him, when she might have made an end of him, ere ever MANCINUS (of whom CICERO gives a fair Character) came in play: So his Misfortunes, having great examples, cannot want some excuse. But suppose none of them deserved any excuse, what is it at which these examples drive? against a Commonwealth? Sure the Samnites, the Carthaginians, the Numantins were as well Commonwealths as the Romans; and so wherever the advantage goes, it must stay upon a Commonwealth: or if it be Rotation that he would be at (for we must guests) granting PONTIUS the Samnit, and MEGAERA the Numantin, to have been no more upon Rotation, than HANNIBAL the Carthaginian; yet is it plain that Rome upon her Rotation overcame not only PONTIUS, HANNIBAL and MEGAERA, but Samnium, Carthage, and Numantia. So much for Rome; but, says he, No less appears by the Rabble of Generals 
Consid. p. 91.  often made use of by the Athenians, while men of Valour and Conduct have lain by the walls:  
A RABBLE of Generals did I never hear of before; but not to meddle with his Rhetoric, whereas each of his Objections has at least some one Contradiction in it, this has two (one à priori, another à posteriori) one in the snout, another in the tail of it. For had there been formerly no Rotation in Athens, how should there have have been men of Valour and Conduct to lie by the Walls? And if Rotation thenceforth should have ceased, how could those men of Valour and Conduct have done otherwise than lie by the Walls? So this inavoidably confesses, that Rotation was the means whereby Athens came to be stored with Persons of Valour and Conduct, they to be capable of Employment, and the Commonwealth to employ the whole Virtue of her Citizens: And it being, in his own words, an Argument of much imperfection in a Government not to dare to employ the whole Virtue of the Citizens, this wholly routs a standing General; for the Government that dares employ but the Virtue of one, dares not employ the Virtue of all. Yet he jogs on.  

Consid. p. 91.  THOSE Orders must needs be against Nature, which, excluding Persons of the best Qualifications, give admission to others, who have nothing to commend them but their Art in canvasing for the suffrage of the People. He never takes notice that the Ballot bars Canvasing beyond all possibility Book I of any such thing; but we will let that go. Canvasing, it is confessed, was more frequent in Rome and Athens than is laudable, where nevertheless it is the stronger Argument for the integrity of popular Suffrage, which, being free from any aid of Art, produced in those Commonwealths more illustrious examples (if a man goes no further than PLUTARCH'S Lives) than are to be found in all the rest of Story.  

Consid. p. 91.  YET, says he, this Law has been as often broken as a Commonwealth has been brought into any exigence; for the hazard of trusting Affairs in weak hands then appearing, no scruple has been made to trample upon this Order, for giving the Power to some able man at that time rendered incapable by the Vacation this Law requires. The continuation of the Consulship of MARIUS is sufficient to be alleged for the proof of this, though, if occasion were, it might be backed by plenty of examples. His choice confutes his pretended variety, who jests with edged tools: this example above all will cut his fingers; for by this prolongation of Magistracy, or, to speak more properly, of Empire (for the Magistracy of the Consul was Civil, and conferred by the People Centuriatis Comitiis, but his Empire was Military, and conferred Curiatis) Rome began to drive those wheels of her Rotation heavily in MARIUS, which were quite taken off in CAESAR.  
I HAVE heretofore in vain persuaded them upon this occasion, to take notice of a Chapter in MACCHIAVEL, so worthy of regard, that I have now inserted it at length, as follows:  

Macch. Discor. B. 3. c. 24.  THE Procedings of the Roman Commonwealth being well considered, two things will be found to have been the causes of her dissolution. The Contention that happened thro' the endeavour of the People (always opposed or eluded by the Nobility) to introduce an Agrarian, and the damage that accrued from the prolongation of Empire; which Mischiefs, had they been foreseen in due time, the Government by application of fit Remedys might have been of longer life and better health. The Diseases which this Commonwealth, from contention about the Agrarian, contracted, were acute and tumultuous; but those being slower, and without tumult, which she got by promulgation of Empire, were Chronical, and went home with her giving a warning by her example, how dangerous it is to States that would enjoy their Liberty, to suffer Magistracy (how deservedly soever conferred) to remain long in the possession of the same man. Certainly if the rest of the Romans, whose Empire happened to be prolonged, had been as virtuous and provident as LUCIUS QUINTIUS, they had never run into this inconvenience. Of such wholesome example was the goodness of this man, that the Senate and the People, after one of their ordinary Disputes, being come to some accord, whereas the People had prolonged the Magistracy of their present Tribune's, in regard they were Persons more fitly opposed to the Ambition of the Nobility, than by a new Election they could readily have found; when hereupon the Senate (to show they needed not be worse at this game) would have prolonged the Consulat to QUINTIUS, he refused his consent, saying, that ill examples were to be corrected by good ones, and not encouraged by others like themselves; nor could they stir his Resolution, by which means they were necessitated to make new Consuls. Had this Wisdom and Virtue, I say, been duly regarded, or rightly understood, it might have saved Rome, which thro' this neglect came to ruin. The first whose Empire happened to be prolonged was PUBLILIUS PHILO, his Consulat expiring at the Camp before Palaepolis, while it seemed to the Senate that he had the Victory in his hand (actum cum Tribunis Plebis est, ad Populum Chap. 12 ferrent ut cum Philo Consulatu abiisset, Proconsul rem gereret) 
Liv. l. 8.  they sent him no Successor, but prolonged his Empire, by which means he came to be the first Proconsul. An Expedient (though introduced for the public good) that came in time to be the public bane: For by how much the Roman Arms marched further off, by so much the like course seeming to be the more necessary, became the more customary; whence ensued two pernicious consequences: The one, that there being fewer Generals, and Men of known Ability for Conduct, the Art with the reputation of the same came to be more engrossed, and obnoxious to Ambition: the other, that a General standing long, got such hold upon his Army, as could take them off from the Senate, and hang them on himself. Thus MARIUS and SCYLLA could be followed by the Soldiery to the detriment of the Commonwealth, and CESAR to her perdition. Whereas had Rome never prolonged Empire, she might perhaps not so soon have arrived at Greatness or Acquisition, but would have made less haste to destruction.  
ALL the Dilemma that MACCHIAVEL observes in these words is, that if a Commonwealth will not be so slow in her acquisition as is required by Rotation, she will be less sure than is requisite to her preservation. But the Prevaricator (not vouchsafing to show us upon what reasons or experience he grounds his Maxim) is positive, That 
Consid. p. 92.  the Dilemma into which a Commonwealth is in this case brought, is very dangerous; for either she must give herself a mortal blow by gaining the habit of infringing such Orders as are necessary for her preservation, or receive one from without.  
THIS same is another Parakeetism: these words are spoken by me, after MACCHIAVEL, in relation to Dictatorian Power, in which they are so far from concluding against Rotation, that this in case of a Dictator is more especially necessary (maxima libertatis custodia 
Mamercus apud Liv. l. 4.  est, ut magna imperia diuturna non sint, & temporis modus imponatur, quibus juris imponi non potest) which could not be more confirmed than by him, who in the example of MARIUS shows that the contrary course spoiled all.  
THE Romans, if they had sent a Successor to PUBLILIUS PHILO at Palaepolis, it may be might have let the Victory slip out of his hands, it may be not; however this had been no greater wound to the Commonwealth, than that her Acquisition would have been slower, which ought not to come in competition with the safety of a Government, and therefore amounts not to a Dilemma, this being a kind of Argument that should not be stubed of one horn, but have each of equal length and danger. Nor is it so certain that increase is slower for Rotation, seeing neither was this interrupted by that, nor that by this, as the greatest Actions of Rome, the Conquest of Carthage by SCIPIO AFRICANUS, of MACEDON by FLAMINIUS', and of ANTIOCHUS' by ASIATICUS, are irrefragable Testimonies.  
I WOULD be loath to spoil the Considerer's preferment; but he is not a safe Counsillor for a Prince, whose Providence not supplying the defect of Rotation, whether in civil or military affairs, with something of like nature, exposes himself if not his Empire as much to danger as a Commonwealth. Thus the Sons of ZERVIAH, JOAB 
2 Sam. 3. 39  Captain of the Host, and ABISHAI his Brother, were too strong for DAVID; thus the Kings of Israel and of Juda fell most of them Book I by their Captains or Favourites, as I have elsewhere observed more particularly. Thus BRUTUS' being standing Captain of the Guards, could cast out TARQUIN; thus SEJANUS had means to attemt against TIBERIUS; OTHO to be the Rival of GALBA, CASPERIUS AELIANUS of NERVA, CASSIUS of ANTONINUS, PERENNIS of COMMODUS, MAXIMINUS of ALEXANDER, PHILIPPUS of GORDIAN, AEMILIANUS of GALLUS; INGEBUS LOLLIANUS, AUREOLUS, of GALLIENUS; MAGNESIUS of CONSTANTIUS, MAXIMUS of GRATIAN, ARBOGASTES of VALENTINIAN, RUFFINUS of ARCADIUS, STILICO of HONORIUS. Go from the West into the East: upon the death of MARCIANUS, ASPARIS alone, having the command of the Arms, could prefer LEO to the Empire; PHOCAS deprive MAURITIUS of the same; HERACLIUS depose PHOCAS; LEO ISAURIUS do as much to THEODOSIUS ADRAMYTTENUS; NICEPHORUS to IRENE, LEO ARMENIUS to MICHAEL CUROPALATES, ROMANUS LAGAPENUS to CONSTANTIN, NICEPHORUS PHOCAS to ROMANUS PUER, JOHANNES ZISMISCES to NICEPHORUS PHOCAS, ISAAC COMNENUS to MICHAEL STRATIOTICUS, BOTONIATES to MICHAEL the Son of DUCAS, ALEXIUS COMNENUS to BOTONIATES: which work continued in such manner till the destruction of that Empire. Go from the East to the North: GUSTAVUS attained to the Kingdom of Sweden, by his Power and Command of an Army; and thus SECECHUS came near to supplant BOLESLAUS the Third of Poland. If WALLESTEIN had lived, what had become of his Master? In France the Race of PHARAMONT was extinguished by PIPPIN; and that of PIPPIN in like manner, each by the Major of the Palace, a standing Magistracy of exorbitant Trust. Go to the Indys: You shall find a King of Pegu to have been thrust out of the Realm of Tangu by his Captain General. Nay go where you will, though this be pretty well, you shall add more than one example. But as to the Prevaricator, if he was not given to make such mouths, as eat up nothing else but his own words, I needed not have brought any other Testimony to absolve a Commonwealth of Malice in this order than his own, where he 
Consid. p. 47, 48.  says, that when some Person overtops the rest in Commands, it is a Disease of Monarchy which easily admits of this cure, that he be reduced to a less Volume, and levelled to an equality with the rest of his Order. Now a Prince can not otherwise level a Nobleman, that excels the rest thro' Command, to equality with his Order, than by causing those of the same Order to take their turns in like command. Good Wits have ill 
Consid. p. 93.  Memorys. But, says he, I know not what advantage Mr. HARRINGTON may foresee from the Orders of this Rotation, for my part I can discover no other effect of it than this, that in a Commonwealth like that of Oceana, taking in the Many (for in Venice he confesses it to be otherwise) where every man will press forward towards Magistracy, this Law by taking off at the end of one year some Officers, and all at the end of three, will keep the Republic in a perpetual Minority: No man having time allowed him to gain that Experience, which may serve to lead the Commonwealth to the understanding of her true Interest either at home or abroad.  
WHAT I have confessed to be otherwise in Venice, I have shown Chap. 12 already at least so far as concerns the present occasion, the causes of that defect being incompatible with a Commonwealth consisting of the Many; otherwise why was not the like found in Athens or Rome? where though every man pressed forward towards Magistracy, yet the Magistrates were, for illustrious examples, more in weight and number than are to be found in all the rest of the world.  
IF where Elections were the most exposed to the Ambition of the Competitor, and the humours of the People, they yet failed not to excel all others that were not popular, what greater Vindication can there be of the natural integrity of popular Suffrage even at the worst? But this, where it is given by the Ballot, is at the best, and free from all that pressing for Magistracy in the Competitor, or Faction of the People that can any ways be laid to the former: or let the Considerer consider again, and tell me by what means either of these in such a State can be dangerous or troublesome; or if at worst the Orders for Election in Oceana must not perform that part, better than a Crowd and a Sheriff. Well; but putting the case the Elections which were not quarrelled much withal be rightly stated, yet this Law for Terms and Vacations, by taking off at the end of one year some Officers, and all at the end of three, will keep the Republic in perpetual Minority, no man having time allowed him to gain that Experience, which may serve to lead the Commonwealth to the understanding of her true Interest at home or abroad. Because every man will press forward for Magistracy, therefore there ought not to be Terms and Vacations, lest these should keep the Commonwealth in perpetual Minority. I would once see an Argument that might be reduced to Mode and Figure. The next Objection is, that these Orders take off at the end of one year some Officers, which is true, and that at the end of three years they take off all, which is false; for whereas the Leaders of the Commonwealth are all triennial, the Orders every year take off no more than such only as have finished their three years' term, which is not all, but a third part. Wherefore let him speak out; three years is too short a term for acquiring that knowledge which is necessary to the leading of a Commonwealth. To let the courses of Israel which were monthly, and the annual Magistracies of Athens and Rome go; if three years be too short a term for this purpose, what was three months? A Parliament in the late Government was rarely longer lived than three months, nor more frequent than once in a year; so that a man having been twelve years a Parlamentman in England, could not have born his Magistracy above three years, though he were not necessarily subject to any Vacation. Whereas a Parliament in Oceana may in twelve years have born his Magistracy six, notwithstanding the necessity of his Vacations. Now which of these two are most straitened in the time necessary to the gaining of due experience or knowledge for the leading of a Commonwealth? Nevertheless the Parliament of England was seldom or never without men of sufficient Skill and Ability; though the Orders there were more in number, less in method, not written, and of greater difficulty than they be in Oceana. There, if not the Parliament man, the Parliament itself was upon Terms and Vacations, which to a Council of such a nature is the most dangerous thing in the world, seeing Dissolution, whether to a Body natural or political, is Death. For if Parliaments happened to rise again and again, this was Book I not so much coming to themselves (seeing a Council of so different Genius has not been known) as a new Birth; and a Council that is every year new born indeed must keep a Commonwealth in perpetual Minority, or rather Infancy, always in danger of being overlaid by her Nurse, or strangled by her Guardian: whereas an Assembly continued by Succession, or due Rotation regulated by Terms, giving sufficient time for digestion, grows up, and is like a man, who though he changes his Flesh, neither changes his Body nor his Soul. Thus the Senate of Venice changing Flesh, though not so often as in a Commonwealth consisting of the Many were requisite, yet oftenest of any other in the world, is, both in Body and Soul, or Genius, the most unchangeable Council under Heaven. Flesh must be chánged, or it will stink of itself; there is a Term necessary to make a man able to lead the Commonwealth to her Interest, and there is a Term that may enable a man to lead the Commonwealth to his Interest. In this regard it is, that, according to MAMERCUS, the Vacations are (maxima libertatis custodia) the Keepers of the Liberties of Oceana.  
THE three Regions into which each of the leading Councils is divided, are three Forms, as I may say, in the School of State: for them of the third, though there be care in the choice, it is no such great matter what be their Skill; the Ballot which they practised in the Tribe being that in the performance whereof no man can be out: and this is all that is necessary to their Novitiat or first year, during which time they may be Auditors. By the second, they will have seen all the Scenes, or the whole Rotation of the Orders, so facile, and so intelligible, that at one reading a man understands them as a Book, but at once acting as a Play; and so methodical, that he will remember them better. Tell me then what it is that can hinder him for the second year from being a Speaker; or why for the third, should he not be a very able Leader.  
THE Senate and the Prerogative, or Representative of the People, being each of like constitution, drop annually four hundred, which in a matter of ten years amount to four thousand experienced Leaders, ready upon new Elections to resume their leading.  
ANOTHER thing which I would have considered is, whether our most eminent men found their Parts in Parliament, or brought them thither. For if they brought them, think you not the military Orders of the Youth, the Discipline of the Tribes, the eight years' Orb of the Ambassadors, the provincial Arms of Oceana, likely to breed men of as good Parts, as to such matters? Nor have Astronomers that familiarity with the Stars, which men without these Orbs will have with such as are in them. He is very dull, who cannot perceive that in a Government of this frame the Education must be universal, or diffused throout the whole Body. Another thing which is as certain as comfortable, is that the pretended depth and difficulty in matters of State is a mere cheat. From the beginning of the World to this day, you never found a Commonwealth where the Leaders having honesty enough, wanted skill enough to lead her to her true Interest at home or abroad: that which is necessary to this end, is not so much Skill as Honesty; and let the Leaders of Oceana be dishonest if they can. In the leading of a Commonwealth aright, this is certain, Wisdom and Honesty are all one: and though you shall find defects in their Virtue, those that have had the fewest, have ever been, and for ever shall be, the wisest.  
ROME was never ruined, till her Balance being broken, the Nobility Chap. 12 forsaking their ancient Virtue, abandoned themselves to their Lusts; and the Senators, who, as in the case of JUGURTHA, were all bribed, turned Knaves; at which Turn all their Skill in Government (and in this never men had been better skilled) could not keep the Commonwealth from overturning. CICERO, an honest man, laboured might and main; POMPONIUS▪ ATTICUS, another, despaired; CATO tore out his own Bowels; the Poigniards of BRUTUS' and CASSIUS' neither considered Prince nor Father: But the Commonwealth had sprung her Planks, and spilt her Ballast; the world could not save her.  

Consid. p. 3●. p. 94.  FOR the close, the Prevaricator, who had judged before, that there was much reason to expect some of the Clergy (against all of whom Mr. HARRINGTON has declared War) would undertake the Quarrel, tells me in the last line, that there be to whom he has recommended the Disquisition of the Jewish Commonwealth.  
IT is a miserable thing to be condemned to the perpetual Budget; once turn an honest man to me. In the mean time, that it may be further seen, how much I am delighted in fair play, since some Divines, it may be, are already at work with me, and I have not so fully explained myself upon that Point, which with them is of the greatest concernment, that they can yet say, they have peeped into my hand, or seen my game; as I have won this trick, gentlemans, or speak, so I play them out the last Card in the next Book for Up.    

An Advertisement to the Reader, or a Direction contained in certain Queries, how the Commonwealth of Oceana may be examined or answered by divers sorts of men, without spoiling their high Dance, or cutting off any part of their Elegance, or freeness of Expression.  

To the Scholar that has passed his Novitiat in Story.  
I. WHETHER the Balance of Property in Land coming thró Civil Vicissitude by slow and undiscerned degrees, to alter as it did, and to stand as it does in Oceana, any other Government could have been introduced, otherwise than by the interposition of foreign Arms, that could have subsisted naturally without Violence or Reluctancy, or steadily without frequent Changes, Alterations, and Plunges, except that only of the Commonwealth proposed?  
II. WHETHER the Balance in Land so standing, as has been shown, the Commonwealth proposed, being once established, were without the immediate hand of God, as by Pestilence, Famine, or Inundation, to be altered or broken; and which way?   

To the Godly Man.  
I. WHETHER Human Prudence be not a Creature of God, and to what end God made this Creature?  
II. WHETHER the Commonwealth of Israel in her main Orders, that is to say, the Senate, the People, and the Magistracy, was not erected by the same Rules of human Prudence with other Commonwealths?  
III. WHETHER JETHRO were not a Heathen?  
iv WHETHER God did not approve of the Advice of JETHRO, in the Fabric of the Commonwealth of Israel?  
V WHETHER the natural Body of a Godly Man can any otherwise be said to support and nourish itself in the Air, or between Heaven and Earth, than by a figurative Speech? or whether it be any more possible for the Political Body of a People so to do, than for the natural Body of a Godly Man?   

To the Grandee, or Learned Commonwealthsman's.  
I. WHETHER a noble Housekeeper has a Horsekeeper, that is as well to live as himself; and whether the Housekeeper, should he lose his Estate, would not be a Horsekeeper rather than want Bread?  
II. WHETHER Riches and Poverty, more or less, do not introduce Command or Obedience, more or less, as well in a public as in a private Estate?  
III. WHETHER the Introduction of Command or Obedience, more or less, either in a public or private Estate, does not form or change the Genius of a Man, or of a People accordingly? Or what is the reason why the Peasant in France is base, and the lower People in England of a high Courage?  
iv WHETHER the Genius of the People of Oceana has been of late years, or be devoted or addicted to the Nobility and the Clergy as in former times?  
V WHETHER the Genius of the People of Oceana, not being addicted to the Nobility and Clergy as formerly, can be said to be for Monarchy, or against it?  
VI WHETHER the People be not frequently mistaken in Names, while as to Things they mean otherwise; or whether the People of Oceana desiring Monarchy in Name, do not in Truth desire a Government of Laws, and not of Men?  
VII. WHETHER for these Reasons, not to know how to hold the Balance or Foundation of a Government steady, nor yet to reform, or vary the Orders of the same (as the Foundation comes to vary) be not to deliver a Nation to certain Ruin and Destruction?   

To the Rational Man.  
I. WHETHER there be any thing in this Fabric or Model that is contradictory to itself, to Reason, or to Truth?  
II. WHETHER a Commonwealth that is framed entire or complete in all her necessary Orders, without any manner of contradiction to herself, to Reason, or to Truth, can yet be false or insufficient?    

THE SECOND BOOK; OR, A Political Discourse CONCERNING ORDINATION: Against Dr. H. HAMMOND, Dr. L. SEAMAN, And the Authors they follow.  
Optat Aprum aut fulvum descendere monte Leonem.  E. W.  

Advertisement to the READER.  
BOOKS, especially whose Authors have got themselves Names, are Leaders; wherefore in case any of these err in Leading, it is not only lawful, but matter of Conscience to a man that perceives it, as far as he is able, to warn others. This were Apology enough for my writing against Dr. HAMMOND and Dr. SEAMAN; and yet I have happened to be brought under a farther Obligation to this enterprise, their Books having been sent me by way of Objection against what I have formerly said of Ordination, and am daily more and more confirmed I shall make good. However, there can be no great hurt in this Essay, Truth being, like Venison, not only the best Quarry, but the best Game.   

Order of the Discourse.  
TO manage the present Controversy with the more Clearness, I have divided my Discourse into five Parts or Chapters.  
THE First, explaining the words Chirotonia and Chirothesia, paraphrasticaly relates the Story of the Perambulation made by the Apostles PAUL and BARNABAS thro' the Cities of Lycaonia, Pisydia, etc. by way of Introduction.  
THE Second shows those Cities, or most of them, at the time of this Perambulation, to have been under popular Government. In which is contained the whole Administration of a Roman Province.  
THE Third shows the Deduction of the Chirotonia from Popular Government, and of the Original Right of Ordination from the Chirotonia. In which is contained the Institution of the Sanhedrim or Senat of Israel by MOSES, and of that at Rome by ROMULUS.  
THE Fourth shows the Deduction of the Chirothesia from Monarchical or Aristocratical Government, and the second way of Ordination from the Chirothesia. In which is contained the Commonwealth of the Jews as it stood after the Captivity.  
THE Fifth debates whether the Chirotonia, used in the Cities mentioned, was (as is pretended by Dr. HAMMOND, Dr. SEAMAN, and the Authors they follow) the same with the Chirothesia, or a far different thing. In which are contained the divers kinds of Church-Government introduced and exercised in the age of the Apostles.  
I AM entering into a Discourse to run much, for the Words, upon a Language not vulgar, which therefore I shall use no otherwise than by way of Parenthesis, not obstructing the Sense; and for the Things, upon Customs that are forens, which therefore I shall interpret as well as I can. Now so to make my way into the parts of this discourse, that (whereas they who have heretofore managed it in English, might in regard of their Readers have near as well written it in Greece) I may not be above the vulgar capacity, I shall open both the Names whereof, and the Things whereupon we are about to dispute, by way of Introduction.   

A Chap. 1 Political Discourse CONCERNING ORDINATION.  

The INTRODUCTION, OR First Chapter.  
THE Names or Words whereof we are about to dispute are Greece, the one Chirotonia, the other Chirothesia. The first signification of the word Chirotonia, in SUIDAS, imports a certain lewd action of the hand, which seems also by the Greece that renders it by the same word, to have been intimated in Isa. 5. 9 In the second signification with SUIDAS, it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Election (that is not say of Magistrates) or Ratification (that is to say of Laws) by the Many: which amounts both by his Testimony, and that generally of ancient Authors, to this, that the most usual and natural signification of the word Chirotonia is Popular Suffrage, whether given, as when they speak of Athens, by the holding up of hands; or as when they speak (as does SUIDAS in the place mentioned) of Rome, and other Commonwealths (whose Suffrage was not given with this Ceremony) without holding up of hands.  
CHIROTHESIA (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) is a word that in the strict signification imports laying on of hands, and no more: but the Jews using to confer their Ordination most commonly by laying on of hands, and yet sometimes by word of mouth, or by letter, the word both as it relates to the custom of the Jewish Commonwealth, and Ordination thence transplanted into the Church of CHRIST, signifys Ordination conferred by one man, or a few men, that is to say, by some distinct Order from the People, whether with imposition of hands, or without it.  
THESE words thus interpreted, I shall throout my discourse (which else must have run altogether upon the Greece) presume, as already I have done, to take for good English, and so proceed to the things whereof we are to dispute; first, by opening the Scene of this Perambulation, which will be done best by the help of ERASMUS, a man as for his Learning not inferior to any, so for his freedom not addicted to Interests or Parties. For the remainder then of this Introduction, I shall begin with the nineteenth Verse of the eleventh, and continue my discourse to the end of the fourteenth Chapter of the Acts; interweaving the Text where it is darker with the Paraphrase of that excellent Author, for light, and his Paraphrase with the Text, where it is clearer, for brevity, in manner following.  
Book TWO THEY whom the heat of Persecution from the Death of STEPHEN 
Acts 11. 19  had dispersed, travelled thro' the Cities and Villages as far as Phenice, and the adjacent Island of Cyprus; as also thro' Antiochia, which lies between Phenice and Cilicia, preaching the Gospel received from the Apostles, which nevertheless they dared not to communicate but to such only as were of the Jewish Nation, not out of Envy, but a kind of Superstition, they believing that to do otherwise were to give the children's Bread to Dogs, which Christ had forbid.  
BUT some of them that believed, being of Cyprus and Cyrene, when they came to Antioch, had the boldness to speak of CHRIST to the Greecs, preaching the Lord JESUS, in which they made such progress thro' the Blessing of God upon them and their Labours, that a great number of these also believing the Gospel, were turned to the Lord. The tidings of these things coming to the ears of the Church which was at Jerusalem, a man of Apostolical Sincerity, BARNABAS the Levite, a Cyprian born, was sent by the Apostles to take a view of what was done upon the places; and if he found it to be according to the will of God, to approve of it, by authority of the Apostles. So great caution in receiving the Gentiles to the Gospel was not, that the thing was not greatly desired by the Apostles; but lest it should afterwards be repealed or made void by the Jews, as don rashly, or that the Gentiles should rely less upon what was done, as conceiving it needed ratification by the Law. Wherefore BARNABAS so soon as he came to Antioch, and found the Greecs by Faith, and without profession of the Law, to have received the same Grace of God with the Jews, was very much joyed that the number of Believers increased, and exhorted them to remain constant in their Enterprise of adhering to the Lord. For he was a good man, and full of the Holy Spirit, and of Faith. Wherefore thro' his ministry it came to pass, that a multitude of other Believers were added to the former. Now Antioch being not far from Cilicia, the Neighbourhood of the place invited him to seek PAUL, the fittest helper in this work, as chosen by CHRIST to preach his Name to the Gentiles and Kings of the Earth. For when PAUL fled from Jerusalem, the Disciples had conducted him to Caesarea of Phenice, whence he went to Tarsus; whom therefore when BARNABAS had found there, he brought to Antioch, hoping in a City both famous and populous (but with a confused mixture of Jews and Greecs) to receive the better fruit thro' the aid of an Apostle more peculiarly designed to this work. These two being conversant a whole year in the Church of Antioch, which by the confluence both of Jews and Greecs became very numerous, so many were added by their preaching, that whereas hitherto, not exposing the name of CHRIST to envy, they had been called Disciples, they now began first at Antioch from the name of their Founder to be called Christians. In these times certain Prophets came from the City of Jerusalem to Antioch, whereof one named AGABUS standing up in the Congregation, signified by inspiration, that there should be a great Dearth thro' the whole world; which came to pass under CLAUDIUS CESAR, the Successor of CALIGULA. At this time they at Jerusalem, partly because they were poor at their conversion to the Gospel, partly because they had deposited their Goods in common, and partly because they had been spoiled by the Priests for their profession of CHRIST, ordained that by the contribution of such as had wherwithal, especially among the believing Gentiles, Money should be sent to the relief of the Christians dwelling in Judea; but so that this Contribution was not to be forced but free, and according to every man's ability. This Money thus gathered was sent by PAUL and BARNABAS to the Elders at Jerusalem, to be distributed at their discretion to such as were in need. Chap. 1 While PAUL and BARNABAS were thus employed, King HEROD, the same that beheaded JOHN, and returned CHRIST clothed, thro' derision, in white, to PILOT, being grieved to see this kind of People increase, and the Name of JESUS King of the Jews to grow famous in divers Nations, became concerned to root out such a Faction, and so spreading; wherefore he stretched forth his hand to vex certain of the Church, killed JAMES the Brother of JOHN with the Sword; and because he saw it pleased the Jews, proceeded further to take PETER also, who being imprisoned, was afterward miraculously delivered. But PAUL and BARNABAS having performed the Trust committed to them by the Brethren, and delivered the Contribution for relief of the Poor to the Apostles, returned from Jerusalem to Antioch, taking with them JOHN, whose Surname was MARC.  
NOW the Church of Antioch flourished in such manner, that she had some filled with the gift of Prophecy, and others with that of Teaching; among whom was BARNABAS and SIMEON, alias NIGER, together with LUCIAS a Cirenian, and MANAEN who had been brought up with HEROD the Tetrarch, whom he left to come to CHRIST: but the chief of them was SAUL, endowed with all the Gifts and Graces Apostolical. While all these were intent upon the Ministry of the Church, employing their several Gifts to the Glory of God, and in his most acceptable Service, the Salvation of Souls, with fasting and prayer, the Holy Ghost being stirred up by their Zeal, signified his Will by the Prophets, saying, Separate me BARNABAS and PAUL for the Work whereto I have called them, namely, to be Doctors of the Gentiles, that by them I may propagat the Gospel. The command of the Spirit was obeyed, and BARNABAS with PAUL, to the end that every one might see who were chosen, were separated from the rest; and when the Congregation had unanimously implored the favour of God by prayer and fasting, the most eminent in Authority among them laid their hands upon the Persons so separated, and sent them wherever the Spirit of God should direct them. By this impulse therefore BARNABAS and PAUL went to Seleucia, being a Promontory of Antiochia, and thence sailed into the Island of Cyprus, where they landed at Salamis, a famous City upon the Eastern part of the Island; they preached not human Inventions, but the Word of God, nor that by stealth, but in the Synagogs' of the Jews, whereof thro' the Neighbourhood of Syria there was store. This Honour by the Commandment of CHRIST was always deferred to the Jews▪ that the Gospel should be first offered to them, lest they being a querulous and repining Nation, should complain that they were despised. Thus travelled these Apostles thro' the whole Island till they came to Paphos, a City consecrated to VENUS upon the Western Coast of Cyprus. Here they found a certain Magician called BARJESUS, that is, the Son of JESUS a Jew, both by Nation and Religion, under which colour he falsely pretended to the gift of Prophecy. This man followed the Court of SERGIUS PAULUS, Proconsul or Governor of the Island for the Romans, otherwise a prudent man; but this sort of Vermin insinuats itself into the best to choose, that so their Corruption may do the greater and more compendious mischief to mankind. The Proconsul nevertheless having understood the Gospel to be planting throout Cyprus, not only forbore to stop the ears of others, but by sending for BARNABAS and PAUL seemed desirous to open his own. Wherefore BARJESUS indeavoring to resist the growth of the Word, as an Enemy to CHRIST, and resisting the Truth with Falsehood, a strife arose between the true Prophets and a false one (for such is the Interpretation Book TWO of the Syriac word ELYMAS) whom PAUL at length confuted of spiritual blindness, by taking away the eyes of his body, miraculously struck in the presence of the Proconsul, who at the same time receiving the light of the Gospel, embraced the Christian Faith. This being done at Paphos, PAUL embarked there with his Associates for the lesser Asia, and came to Perga, being a City of Pamphylia; here JOHN, whose Surname was MARC, left them, and returned to Jerusalem, while they, when they had visited Pamphylia, travelled to Antiochia, a City of Pisidia, where having entered a synagogue, they sat after the usual manner with the rest, attentive to the Law and the Prophets; whereof when the Parts appointed were read, and no man stood up, the Rulers of the synagogue perceiving that the Strangers by their habit were Jews, and such as by their aspect promised more than ordinary, sent to them, desiring that if they had any word of exhortation for the People, they would speak. Whereupon PAUL standing up, preached to them CHRIST; whence came the Word of the Lord to be divulged throout that Region, though the Jews out of envy to the Gentiles, stirring up the devoutest Matrons (an Art not unknown in these times) and by them the chief of the City, raised such Sedition in it, and Tumult against the Apostles, that PAUL and BARNABAS being cast out, shook off the dust from their feet against them, and went thence to Iconium a City of Lycaonia. 
Chap. 14.  When they were come to Iconium, entering with the Jews after the custom into the synagogue, they preached, as they had at Antioch, the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and with such efficacy, that multitudes both of the Jews and Greecs believed. Here again the Envy of the Jews became the Author of Sedition, by which means the City was divided into two Parts or Factions, whereof one stood for the unbelieving Jews, and the other for the Apostles. At length when such of the Gentiles as were joined with the Jews, and the Rulers of the City, made an assault upon the Apostles, to offer violence and stone them; they being ware of it, fled to Lystra (a City of Lycaonia, which is a part of Pamphylia) and Derbe. At Lystra there was a man lame of his feet from the Womb, who having listened to PAUL with great Attention and Zeal, was miraculously cured by the Apostle; when the People seeing what PAUL had done, cried out, The Gods were descended in the likeness of men: a persuasion that might gain the more easily upon the minds of the Lycaonians for the Fable of JUPITER and MERCURY, said to have descended in human shape, and been entertained by LYCAON, from whom the Lycaonians received their name. Wherefore they called BARNABAS, for the gravity of his aspect, JUPITER; PAUL for his Eloquence, MERCURY: and the Priest of JUPITER, who dwelled in the Suburbs, brought Bulls and Garlands to the Gates of the House where the Apostles were, to have offered Sacrifice with the People, which the Apostles abhorring, vigorously dissuaded. In the mean time certain Jews by Nation that were unbelievers, coming from Antioch of Pisidia, and Iconium, drew the People to the other extreme, who from sacrificing to the Apostles fell on stoning them; a work which was brought so near to an end, that PAUL being drawn by them out of the City, was left for dead, though he soon after recovered, and went thence with BARNABAS to Derbe: when they had propagated the Gospel there also, they returned to Lystra, Iconium, and Antiochia, confirming the Disciples whom they had converted. Now because the propagation of the Gospel required that the Apostles should be moving thro' divers Nations, they chirotonizing them Elders in every Congregation or Church, that is, ordaining them Elders by the Votes of the People in every City, left them to perform the Duties of the absent Apostles, and when they had fasted and prayed, commended them to the Lord. These Chap. 2 things being brought to a conclusion, or finished at Antioch in Pisidia, when they had perambulated this Country, they also visited Pamphylia, sowing the Gospel where it was not yet sow●, and confirming those who already believed, till they came to Perga: where having ordered their affairs, they proceeded to Attalia, being a maritime City of Pamphylia; and from thence they sailed back to Antioch of Syria, whence first they set out, with Commission from the Elders, to preach the Gospel to the Gentiles, and where by the Chirothesia, or Imposition of hands, Prayer and Fasting, they had been recommended to the Grace of God, and designed to the Work now finished.  
IN this Narrative you have mention both of the Chirotonia and of the Chirothesia, or Imposition of hands, but of the former as of Ordination; for by that such were made Presbyters or Church-Officers as were not so before: of the latter not, I think, as of Ordination, at least in the sense we now take it; but as of designation of Persons to an occasional and temporary employment, that had been ordained before, for so sure had PAUL at least. However, that which is offered by this Narrative to present consideration, is no more than the bare Story.   

CHAP. II.  
That the Cities, or most of them named in the Perambulation of the Apostles PAUL and BARNABAS, were at that time under popular Government. In which is contained the administration of a Roman Province.  
THE Romans of all Nations under Heaven were endowed, as with the highest Virtues, so with the greatest human Glory; which proceeded from this especially, that they were in love with such as were in love with their Liberty. To begin with their dawn, the Privernates (a free People inhabiting the City and Parts adjoining, which at this day is called Piperno, some fifty miles from Rome, and five from Sesse) being the second time conquered by the Romans, it was consulted in the Senate what course should be taken with them; where while some, according to the different temper of men, showed themselves hotter, and others cooler, one of the Privernates more mindful 
Liv. l. 8. c. 21.  of the condition wherein he was born, than of that wherein he was fallen, happened to render all more doubtful: for being asked by a Senator of the severer judgement, what Punishment h● thought the Privernates might deserve, Such (says he) as they deserve who believe themselves worthy of Liberty. At the courage of which answer, the Consul (perceiving in them that had been vehement enough before against the Privernates but the greater animosity, to the end that by a gentler Interrogatory he might draw some softer answer from him) replied, And what if we inflict no punishment at all, but pardon you; what Peace may we expect of you? Why if you give us a good one (said the other) a steady and perpetual Peace, but if an ill one, not long. At which a certain Senator falling openly upon ruffling and threatening the Privernat, as if those words of his tended to some practice or intention to stir up the Cities in Peace to Sedition, the better part of the Father's being quite of another mind, declared, That they had heard the voice of a Man, and of a Freeman. For why, said they, Book TWO should it be thought that any Man or People will remain longer under such a Burden as they are not able to bear, than till they can throw it down? There a Peace is faithful, where it is voluntary; if you will have Slaves, you are not to trust them, but their Fetters. To this opinion the Consul especially inclining, inclined others, while he openly professed, That they who had no thought but upon their Liberty, could not but be thought worthy to be Romans: whereupon the Decree passed by Authority of the Fathers, which was afterwards proposed to the Congregation, and ratified by the Command of the People, whereby the Privernates were made Citizens of Rome. Such was the Genius of the Roman Commonwealth; where by the way you may also observe the manner of her Debate and Result (Authoritate Patrum & Jussu Populi) by the Advice of the Senate, and the Chirotonia of the People.  
BUT that which in this place is more particularly offered to consideration, is her usual way of proceeding in case of Conquest with other Nations: for though bearing a haughty brow towards such as, not contented to enjoy their Liberty at home, would be her Rivals abroad, she dealt far otherwise, as with Carthage; this case excepted, and the pilling and polling of her Provinces, which happened thro' the Avarice and Luxury of her Nobility, when the Balance of popular Power being broken, her Empire began towards the latter end to languish and decline; the way which she to●k with the Privernates was that which she usually observed with others throout the course of her Victories, and was after the Change of Government made good at least in some part by the Roman Emperors, under whom were now those Cities mentioned in the present Perambulation of the Apostles PAUL and BARNABAS. STRABO for his credit among human Authors is equal to any; he lived about the time of this Perambulation, and being a Greece, is less likely to be partial: Of that therefore which I have affirmed to have been the course of the Romans in their Victories, I shall make choice of this Author for a witness; first where he epitomizes the Story of 
Strab. 1. 9  Athens after this manner: When the Carians by Sea, and the Boeotians by Land wasted Attica, CECROPS the Prince, to bring the People under shelter, planted them in twelve Cities, Cecropia, Tetrapolis, Epacrea, Decelea, Eleusis, Aphydna, Thoricus, Brauron, ●ytherus, Sphettus, Cephissia, Phalerus; which THESEUS is said to have contracted into one called Athens. The Government of this City had many changes; at first it was Monarchical, then Popular: This again was usurped by the Tyrants PISISTRATUS and his Sons, whence recovered, it fell afterwards into the hands of the Few, as when the four hundred once, and again the thirty Tyrants were imposed by the Lacedæmonians, in the War of Peloponnesus: which Yoke the Athenians (by means of their faithful Army) shaking off, restored their popular Government, and held it till the Romans attained to the Dominion of Greece. Now though it be true that they were not a little disturbed by the Kings of Macedon, to whom they were forced to yield some kind of obedience; they nevertheless preserved the form of their Commonwealth so entire, that there be who affirm it never to have been better administered, than at such time as Macedon was governed by CASSANDER: for this Prince, though in other things more inclining towards the Tyrant, having taken Athens by surrender, used not the People ill, but made DEMETRIUS PHALEREUS the Disciple of THEOPHRASTUS the Philosopher, chief Magistrate among them; a man so far from ruining their popular State (as in the Commentaries he wrote upon this kind of Government is attested) that he repaired it. Nevertheless, whether suspected Chap. 2 or envied for his Greatness without support by the Macedonians, after the death of CASSANDER he fled into Egypt, while his Enemy's breaking down his Statues (as some say) made homely Vessels of them. But the Romans having received the Athenians under their popular form, left them their Laus and Libertys untouched, till in the war with MITHRIDATES they were forced to receive such Tyrants as that King was pleased to give them; whereof ARISTION the greatest, when the Romans had retaken the City from him, being found trampling upon the People, was put to death by SCYLLA, and the City pardoned, which to this day (he wrote about the Reign of TIBERIUS) not only enjoys her Liberties, but is high in honour with the Romans. This is the Testimony of STRABO agreeing with that of CICERO, where disputing of Divine Providence, he says, that to affirm the World to be governed by Chance, or without God, is as if one should say that Athens were not governed by the Areopagits. Nor did the Romans by the deposition of the same Author (or indeed of any other) behave themselves worse in Asia (the scene of our present Discourse, where the same PAUL, of whom we are speaking, being born at Tarsus, a City o● Cilicia, that had acquired like or greater Privilege by the same bounty, was also a Citizen of Rome) than in Greece. Asia is understood in three significations: First, for the third part of the World answering to Europe and Africa. Secondly, for that part of Asia which is now called Anatolia. Thirdly, for that part of it which ATTALUS King of Pergamum, dying without Heirs, bequeathed and left to the People of Rome: this contained Mysia, Phrygia, Aeolis, jonia, Caria, Doris, Lydia, Lycaonia, Pisidia, and by consequence the Cities whereof we are speaking. To all these Countries the Romans gave their Liberty, till in favour of ARISTONICUS, the Bastard of EUMENES, many of them taking Arms, they were recovered, brought into subjection, and framed into a Province.  
WHEN a Consul had conquered a Country, and the Romans intended to form it into a Province, it was the custom of the Senate to send (decem Legatos) ten of their Members, who with the Consul had power to introduce and establish their provincial way of Government. In this manner Asia was formed by MARCUS aquilius Consul; afterwards so excellently reformed by SCAEVOLA, that the Senate in their Edicts used to propose his example to succeeding Magistrates, and the Inhabitants to celebrat a Feast to his Name. Nevertheless MITHRIDATES King of Pontus (all the Romans in this Province being massacred in one day) came to possess himself of it, till it was recovered at several times by SCYLLA, MURENA, LUCULLUS and POMPEY. The Romans in framing a Country into a Province, were not accustomed to deal with all the Inhabitants of the same in a like manner, but differently according to their different merit. Thus divers Cities in this were left free by SCYLLA, as those of the Ilienses, the Chians, Rhodians, Lycians, and Magnesians, with the Cyzicens, though the last of these afterwards for their practices against the Romans forfeited their Liberty to TIBERIUS, in whose Reign they were for this reason deprived of the same.  
TAKING Asia in the first sense, that is, for one third part of the World, the next Province of the Romans in this Country was Cilicia, containing Pamphylia, Isauria, and Cilicia more peculiarly so called. Here CICERO was sometimes Proconsul, in honour to whom part of Book TWO Phrygia, with Pisidia and Lycaonia, were taken from the former, and added to this Jurisdiction, by which means the Cities whereof we are speaking came to be of this Province. Adjoining hereto was the Commonwealth of the Lycians, which the Romans left free: into this also the City of Attalia by some is computed, but Iconium both by STRABO 
●●ist.  and CICERO; the latter whereof being Proconsul, in his Journey from Laodicea, was received by the Magistrates and Deputies of this City. Lys●ra and Derbe, being Cities of Lycaonia, must also have been of the same Province. Next to the Province of Cilicia was that of Syria, containing Comagene, Seleucis, Phoenicia, Coelosyria, and Judea or Palestin. In Seleucis were the four famous Cities, Seleucia, Antiochia, Apamea (the last entire in her Liberty) and Laodicea. Comagene and Judea were under Kings, and not framed into Provinces, till in the time of the Emperors.  
THE fourth Province of the Romans in Asia was that of Bythinia with Pontus: these were all acquired or confirmed by the Victories of POMPEY the Great. STRABO, who was a Cappadocian born at Amasia, relates a story worthy to ●e remembered in this place. From the time, says he, that the Romans, having conquered ANTIOCHUS', became Moderators of Asia, they contracted Leagues of Amity with divers Nations; where there were Kings, the honour of address was deferred to them, with whom the Treaties that concerned their Countries were concluded. But as concerning the Cappadocians, they treated with the whole Nation, for which cause the Royal Line of this Realm coming afterwards to fail, the Romans gave the People their freedom or leave to live under their own Laws: and when the People hereupon sending Ambassadors to Rome, renounced their Liberty, being that to them which they said was intolerable, and demanded a King; the Romans amazed there should be men that could so far despair, permitted them to choose, of their Nation, whom they pleased; so ARIOBARZANES was chosen, whose Line again in the third Generation coming to fail, ARCHELAUS was made King by ANTONY (where you may observe, in passing, that the Romans imposed not Monarchical Government, but for that matter used to leave a People as they found them) Thus at the same time they left PONTUS under King MITHRIDATES, who not containing himself within his bounds, but extending them afterwards as far as Colchis and Armenia the Less, was reduced to his terms by POMPEY; who divesting him of those Countries which he had usurped, distributed some part of them to such Princes as had assisted the Romans in that War, and divided the rest into twelve Commonwealths, of which, added to Bythinia, he made one Province. When the Roman Emperors became Monarches, they also upon like occasions made other distributions, constituting Kings, Princes, and Cities, some more, some less, some wholly free, and others in subjection to themselves. Thus came a good, if not the greater part of the Cities in the Lesser Asia, and the other adjoining Provinces, to be some more, some less free; but the most of them to remain Commonwealths, or to be erected into popular Governments, as appears yet clearer by the intercourse of PLINY, while he was Praetor or Governor of Bythinia, with his Master the Emperor TRAJAN; a piece of which I have inserted in the Letters following.  
PINY to TRAJAN. Chap. 2  
SIR;  

Plin. Epist. l. 10.  IT is provided by POMPEY'S Laws for the Bithynians, that no man under thirty years of Age be capable of Magistracy, or of the Senate: by the same it is also established, that they who have born Magistracy may be Senators. Now because by a latter Edict of AUGUSTUS, the lesser Magistracies may be born by such as are above one and twenty; there remains with me these doubts, whether he that being under thirty, has born Magistracy, may be elected by the Censors into the Senate; and if he may, whether of those also that have not born Magistracy, a man being above one and twenty, seeing at that age he may bear Magistracy, may not by the same interpretation be elected into the Senate, though he has not born it: which is here practised and pretended to be necessary, because it is somewhat better, they say, that the Senate be filled with the Children of good Families, than with the lower sort. My opinion being asked upon these points by the new Censors, I thought such as being under thirty have born Magistracy, both of POMPEY'S Laws, and the Edict of AUGUSTUS, to be capable of the Senate; seeing the Edict allows a man under thirty to bear Magistracy, and the Law, a man that has born Magistracy, to be a Senator. But as to those that have not born Magistracy, though at the age in which they may bear it, I demur till I may understand your Majesties pleasure, to whom I have sent the Heads both of the Law and of the Edict.  
TRAJAN to PLINY.  
YOU and I, dearest PLINY, are of one mind. POMPEY'S Laws are so far qualified by the Edict of AUGUSTUS, that they who are not under one and twenty may bear Magistracy, and they who have born Magistracy may be Senators in their respective Cities: but for such as have not born Magistracy, though they might have born it, I conceive them not eligible into the Senate till they be thirty years of age.  
PLINY to TRAJAN.  
SIR;  
POWER is granted to the Bithynian Cities by POMPEY'S Law, to adopt to themselves what Citizens they please, so they be not Foreigners, but of the same Province; by the same Law it is shown in what cases the Censors may remove a man from the Senate: Among which nevertheless it is not provided what is to be done in case a foreign Citizen be a Senator. Wherefore certain of the Censors have thought fit to consult me, whether they ought to remove a man that is of a foreign City for that cause out of the Senat. Now because the Law, though it forbids the adoption of a foreigner, commands not that a foreigner for that cause should be removed out of the Senate, and I am informed there be foreign Citizens almost in every Senate; so that many, not only Men, but Cities might suffer Concussion by the Book TWO restitution of the Law in that part, which thro' a kind of consent seems to be now grown obsolete; I conceive it necessary to have your Majesties Resolution in the case, to which end I have sent a Breviat of the Law annexed.  
TRAJAN to PLINY.  
WITH good cause, dearest PLINY, have you doubted what answer to return to the Censors, enquiring whether they ought to elect a man into the Senate that is of another City, though of the same Province; seeing on the one side the Authority of the Law, and of Custom on the other to the contrary, might well disorder you. To innovat nothing for the time past, I think well of this expedient: they who are already elected Senators, though not according to the Law, of what City soever they be, may remain for the present; but for the future POMPEY'S Laws should return to their full virtue, which if we should cause to look back, might create trouble.  
THIS might serve, but there will be no hurt in being a little fuller in the discovery of Provincial Government.  
THE Provinces so framed, as has been shown, were subdivided into certain Circuits called Dioceses; that of Asia had six, Alabandae, Sardes (anciently the Senate of CROESUS) Smyrna, Ephesus, Adramytis, Pergamum. That of Cilicia had also six, the Pamphylian, Isaurian, and Cilician, the Metropolis whereof was Tarsus, a free City; to these were taken out of the Province of Asia, Cibyra, Sinnadae, Apamea: what were the Dioceses of the other two SIGONIUS, whom I follow, does not show. At these in the Winter (for the Summer was spent commonly with the Army) the People of the Province assembled at set times, as at our Assizes, where the Roman Governors did them Justice.  
THE Governors or Magistrates, to whose care a Province was committed, were of two kinds: the first and chief was Consul or Praetor, which appellations differed not in Power, but in Dignity, that of Consul being more honourable, who had twelve Lictors, whereas the Praetor had but six; if the annual Magistracy of either of these came to be prorogued, he was called Proconsul or Propretor.  
THE second kind of Magistrate in a Province was the Quaestor, Receiver or Treasurer, who being also annual, was attended by Lictors of his own; if he died within his year, the Consul, Proconsul, or Praetor might appoint one for that time in his place, who was called Proquestor. The Power of the Consul, Proconsul, or Praetor, was of two kinds, the one Civil, the other Military; the former called Magistracy, the latter Empire.  
THE Pomp of these assuming and exercising their Magistracy was reverend; the Consul or Proconsul had Legates, sometimes more, but never under three, appointed him by the Senate: these were in the nature of Counsillors to assist him in all Affairs of his Province; he had Tribune's, Colonels, or Field Officers, for the military part of his Administration; he had also Secretarys, Sergeants, Heralds or Criers, Lictors or Insignbearers, Interpreters, Messengers, Divines, Chamberlains, Physicians; and besides these his Companions, which for the most part were of the younger sort of Gentlemen or Gallants that accompanied Chap. 2 him for his Ornament, and their own Education. Into this the some what like Train of the Quaestor (who by the Law was in place of a Son to the Proconsul, and to whom the Proconsul was to give the regard of a Father) being cast, it made the Praetorian Cohort or Guard always about the Person of the Proconsul, who in this Equipage having done his Devotions at the Capitol, departed the City, Paludatus, that is in his Royal Mantle of Gold and Purple, followed for some part of the way with the whole Train of his Friends, wishing him much joy and good speed.  
IN his Province he executed his twofold Office, the one of Captain General, the other of the supreme Magistrate. In the former relation he had an Army either received from his Predecessor, or new levied in the City; this consisted in the one half of the Legions (as I have elsewhere shown) and in the other of Associates: for the greatness of the same, it was proportioned to the Province, or the occasion; to an ordinary Province in times of Peace, I believe an Army amounted not to above one Legion with as many auxiliaries, that is, to a matter of twelve thousand Foot, and twelve hundred Horse. The Magistracy or Jurisdiction of the Proconsul, or Praetor, was executed at the Metropolitan City of each Dioecis, which upon this occasion was to furnish the Praetorian Cohort with Lodging, Salt, Wood, Hay, and Stable-room at the charge of the Country. These, though CICERO would hardly receive any of them, were, towards the latter time of the Commonwealth, extended by the Provincial Magistrates to so great a burden to the People, that it caused divers Laws to be passed in Rome (de repetundis) for restitution to be made to the Provinces, by such as had injured them. Upon such Laws was the prosecution of VERRES by CICERO. When and where this kind of Court was to be held, the Consul, Proconsul, ●or Praetor, by Proclamation gave timely notice. Being assembled at the time, and the City appointed, in the Townhal stood a Tribunal; upon this the Sella Curulis, or Chair of State, in which sat the Consul, Proconsul, or Praetor, with his Praetorian Cohort or Band about him, furnished with all manner of Pomp, and Officers requisite to the Ornament or Administration of so high a Magistracy. The Jurisdiction of this Court was according to the Laws made for the administation of the Province; but because they could not foresee all things (as appeared by the Questions which PLINY put upon the Laws of POMPEY, to TRAJAN) it came to pass, that much was permitted to the Edicts of the Provincial Praetors, as was also in use at Rome with the Praetors of the City: and if any man had judged otherwise in his Province, than he ought to have done in the City, made an Edict contrary to the Law of his Province, or judged any thing otherwise than according to his own Edict, he was held guilty of, and questionable for a heinous Crime. But what the Law of this or that Province (which differed in each) was, would be hard particularly to say; only in general it was for the main very much resembling that of Sicily, called Rupilia.  
LEGE Rupilia, or by the Law of RUPILIUS, a Cause between one Citizen and another being of the same City, was to be tried at home by their own Laws. A Cause between one Provincial and another being of divers Cities, was to be tried by Judges whom the Praetor should appoint by lot. What a private man claimed of a People, or a People of a private man, Book TWO was to be referred to the Senate of some third City. Upon what a Roman claimed of a Provincial, a Provincial was to be appointed Judg. Upon what a Provincial claimed of a Roman, a Roman was to be appointed Judg. For decision of other Controversys, select Judges from among the Romans (not out of the Praetorian Cohort, but out of such Romans, or other Citizens free of Rome, as were present in the same Court) were to be given. In criminal Causes, as Violence, Peculat, or Treason, the Law, and the manner of proceeding was the same in the Provinces, as in Rome.  
FOR the Tributs, Customs, Taxes, levies of Men, Money, Shipping, ordinary or extraordinary, for the common defence of the Roman Republic, and her Provinces, the Consuls, Proconsul's, or Praetors, proceeding according to such Decrees of the Senate as were in that case standing or renewed upon emergent occasions; in gathering these lay the Magistracy or office of the Quaestor: if the Proconsul were indisposed, or had more business than he could well turn his hand to, Courts of this nature might be held by one or more of his Legates. With matter of Religion they meddled not; every Nation being so far left to the liberty of Conscience, that no violence for this cause was offered to any man: by which means both Jews and Christians, at least till the time of the persecuting Emperors, had the free exercise of their Religion throout the Roman Provinces. This the Jews liked well for themselves, nor were they troubled at the Heathens; but to the Christians they always grudged the like privilege. Thus when they could not otherwise induce PILOT to put Christ to death, they accused Christ of affecting Monarchy, and so affrighted PILOT, being a mean conditioned fellow, while they threatened to let TIBERIUS know he was not Cesar's Friend, that he complied with their ends. But when at Corinth where GALLIO (a man of another temper) was Proconsul of Achaia, they would have been at this sport again, and with a great deal of Tumult had brought PAUL before the Tribunal, GALLIO took it not well, that they should think he had nothing else to do than to judge of Words, and Names, and Questions of their Law; for he cared no more for the Disputes between the Christians and the Jews, than for those between the Epicureans and the Stoics Wherefore his Lictors drove them from the Tribunal, and the officious Corinthians, to show their love to the Proconsul, fell on knocking them out of the way of other business.  
NOW though the Commonwealth of the Achaeans, being at this time a Roman Province under the Proconsul GALLIO, enjoyed no longer her common Senate, Strategus, and Demiurges, according to the model shown in the former Book; yet remained each particular City under her ancient form of Popular Government, so that in these, especially at Corinth, many of the Greecs being of the same judgement, the Jews could not dispute with the Christians without Tumult. Of this kind was that which happened at Ephesus, where Christianity growing so 
Act. 19  fast, that the Silversmiths of DIANA'S Temple began to fear they should lose their Trade; the Jews liking better of Heathenism than Christianity, set ALEXANDER, one of their pack, against PAUL.  
THIS place (in times when men will understand no otherwise of human story than makes for their ends) is fallen happily unto my hand; seeing that which I have said of a Roman Province, will be thus no less than proved out of Scripture. For the Chancellor of Ephesus perceiving the Ecclesia (so it is in the Original) or Assembly (as in our Translation) uncalled by the Senate, or the Magistracy to Chap. 2 be tumultuously gathered in the Theatre (their usual place, as in Syracuse and other Cities, of meeting) betakes himself to appease the People with divers arguments: among which he has these. First, as to matter of Religion, You have brought hither, says he, these men which are neither robbers of Temples (Churches our Bible has it, before there was any Church to be robbed) nor yet blasphemers of the Goddess: In which words (seeing that they offering no scandal, but only propagating that which was according to their own judgement, were not obnoxious to Punishment) he shows that every man had liberty of Conscience. Secondly, as to Law: If DEMETRIUS and the Craftsmen which are with him have a matter against any man, the Law, says he, is open. Thirdly, as to the matter of Government, which appears to be of two parts, the one Provincial, the other Domestic: For the former, says he, there are (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Proconsul's (he speaks in the plural number with relation to the Legates, by whom the Proconsul sometimes held his Courts; otherwise this Magistrate was but one in a Province, as at this time for Asia PUBLIUS SUILIUS) and to the latter, says he, if you desire any thing concerning other matters, that is, such as appertain to the Government of the City (in which the care of the Temple was included) it shall be determined in a lawful Ecclesia, or Assembly of the People. By which you may see that notwithstanding the Provincial Government, Ephesus, though she was no free City, (for with a free City the Proconsul had nothing of this kind to do) had (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) the Government of herself (as those other Cities mentioned in PLINY'S Epistles) by the Senate, and the People; for wherever one of these is named, as the Senate by PLINY, or the People by LUKE, the other is understood. When the Chancellor had thus spoken, he dismissed the Ecclesia. It is LUKE'S own word, and so often as I have now repeated it, so often has he used it upon the same occasion. Wherefore I might henceforth expect two things of Divines; first, that it might be acknowleged that I have good Authors, LUKE and the Chancellor of Ephesus, for the word Ecclesia in this sense; and secondly, that they would not persuade us, the word Ecclesia has lost this signification, lest they condemn this place of Scripture to be no more understood. The manner of Provincial Government being thus proved, not only out of profane Authors, but out of Scripture itself; and the Cities that were least free having had such power over themselves, and their Territories; why, if the Romans took no more of them for this protection, than was paid to their former Lords, did they not rather undertake the patronage of the World than the Empire; seeing Venice, and Dantzic, while the one was tributary to the Turk, the other to the King of Poland, were nevertheless so free Estates, that of a King, or a Commonwealth that should have put the rest of the world into the like condition, no less in our day could have been said? And yet that the Romans, when the nature of the Eastern Monarchys shall be rightly considered, took far less of these Cities than their old Masters, will admit of little doubt. CICERO surely would not lie; he, when Proconsul of Cilicia, wrote in this manner concerning his Circuit, to his friend SERVILIUS: Two days I stayed at Laodicea, at Apamea five, at Sinnadae three, at Pilomelis five, at Iconium ten; than which Jurisdiction or Government there is nothing more just or equal. Why then had not those Cities their Senates and their Book TWO Ecclesiae, or Congregations of the People, as well as that of Ephesus, and those whereof PLINY gives an account to TRAJAN?  
CORINTH was in Achaia; Perga of Pamphylia, Antioch of Pisidia, Iconium, Lystra, Derbe of Lycaonia, were in Cilicia; and with these, as some reckon, Attalia. Ephesus and the other Antioch were in Syria. Achaia, Cilicia, and Syria, were Roman Provinces at the time of this Perambulation of the Apostles: The Cities under Provincial Administration, whether free or not free, were under Popular Government; whence it follows, that Corinth, Ephesus, Antioch of Syria, Antioch of Pisidia, Perga, Iconium, Lystra, Derbe, Attalia, being at this time under Provincial Administration, were at the same time under Popular Government. There has been no hurt in going about, for the proof of this; though indeed to show that these Cities (had quandam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) were under Popular Government, we needed to have gone no further than the Text, as where the Chancellor of Ephesus, to get rid of a tumultuous Ecclesia or Assembly of the People, promises them a lawful one. In Iconium, Lystra, Derbe, and the rest, you hear not of any King (as where HEROD stretched out his hand to please the Jews, and vex the Church) but of the People, of their Rulers, of their Assemblies, and of their Tumults. The People at Lystra are now agreed to give the Apostles divine Honours: and anon, both at Iconium and Lystra, to stone them. Now to determine of divine Honour, or of Life and Death, are acts of Sovereign Power. It is true, these nevertheless may happen to be usurped by a mere Tumult; but that cannot be said of these Congregations, which consisted as well of the Magistrates and Rulers, as of the People, and where the Magistrates show that they had no distinct Power whereby to restrain the People, nor other means to prevail against them, than by making of Parties: Which Passages, as they prove these Commonwealths on the one side to have been ill constituted, evince on the other, that these Cities were under Popular Government.   

CHAP. III.  
The Deduction of the Chirotonia from Popular Government, and of the Original Right of Ordination from the Chirotonia. In which is contained the Institution of the Sanhedrim or Senat of Israel by MOSES, and of that of Rome by ROMULUS.  
DIVINES generally in their way of disputing have a bias that runs more upon Words than upon Things; so that in this place it will be necessary to give the Interpretation of some other Words, whereof they pretend to take a strong hold in their Controversys. The chief of these has been spoken to already: Chirotonia being a word that properly signifys the Suffrage of the People, wherever it is properly used, implys Power; wherefore though the Senate decrees by Suffrage as well as the People, yet there being no more in a Decree of the Senate than Authority, the Senate is never said to Chirotonize, or very seldom and improperly, this word being peculiar to the People. And thus much is employed in what went before.  
THE next Word in Controversy is Psephisma, which signifys a Decree Chap. 3 or Law; and this always implying Power, always implys the Suffrage of the People, that is, where it is spoken of popular Government: for though a Psephisma or Decree of the Athenian Senate was a Law for a year before it came to the Suffrage or Chirotonia of the People, yet the Law or Constitution of SOLON, whereby the Senate had this Power, originally derived from the Chirotonia of the People.  
THE third Word (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) signifys to constitute or ordain; this in the political sense of the same implys not Power, but Authority: for a man that writes or proposes a Decree or Form of Government, may be said (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to propose or constitute it, whether it be confirmed by the Chirotonia of the People or not; nay with HALICARNASSAEUS the Word signifys no more than barely to call or assemble the Senate, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
NOW if these Words be sometimes otherwise taken, what Words be there in any Language that are not often used improperly? But that understood politically, they must of necessity be understood as I have shown, or will so entangle and disorder Government, that no man shall either make head or foot of it, is that which I make little question to evince in the surest way, that is, by opening the nature of the Things whence they derive, and whereof they are spoken by the best Authors.  
AND because the Words (though the Things they signify were much more ancient) derive all from Athens, I shall begin by this Constitution to show the proper use of them. Chirotonia in Athens, as has been shown out of SUIDAS (who speaking of Rome refers to this) was Election of Magistrates, or enacting Laws by the Suffrage of the People; which, because they gave by holding up their hands, came thence to be called Chirotonia, which signifys holding up of hands. The Legislative Assembly, or Representative of the People, called the Nomothetae, upon occasion of repealing an old Law, and enacting a new one, gave the Chirotonia of the People: And yet says the Athenian 
Demost. contra Timocr.  Law (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Let the Proedris give or make the Chirotonia to either Law. The Proedris, as was shown in the former Book, were the ten Precedents of the Prytans; which Prytans upon this occasion were Precedents of the Nomothetae. Again, whereas it was the undoubted Right and Practice of the People to elect their Magistrates by their Chirotonia (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) it is nevertheless 
Phil. 1.  shown by POLLUX to have been the peculiar Office of the Thesmothetae (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to chirotonize the Magistrates. For as the Proedris were Precedents of the People in their Legislative Capacity, so were the Thesmothetae, upon occasion of Elections: thus the Chirotonia 
L. 8. c. 8.  of the Proedris or of the Thesmothetae, signifys nothing else but the Chirotonia of the People, by which they enacted all their Laws, and elected all their Civil or Ecclesiastical Magistrates or Priests, as the Rex Sacrificus, and the Orgeones, except some by the Lot; which Ordination, as is observed by ARISTOTLE, is equally popular. This, whether ignorantly or wilfully unregarded, has been, as will be seen hereafter, the cause of great absurdity; for who sees not that to put the Chirotonia, or Sovereign Power of Athens upon the Proedris or the Thesmothetae, is to make such a thing of that Government as can no wise be understood?  
Book TWO WHAT the People had passed by their Chirotonia, was called Psephisma, an Act or Law. And because in the Nomothetae there were always two Laws put together to the Vote, that is to say, the old one, and that which was offered in the room of it, they that were for the old Law were said (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to pronounce in the Negative; and they that were for the new (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to pronounce for the Affirmative.  
THESE Laws, these Propositions, or this frame of Government, having been proposed first by SOLON, and then ratified or established by the Chirotonia of the Athenian People; ARISTOTLE says of him (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) that he instituted or constituted the popular Government; which Constitution implys not any Power in SOLON, who absolutely refused to be a King, and therefore the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to him implys no more than Authority. I have showed you the Words in controversy, and the Things together in the Mint; now whether they that as to Athens introduced them both, understood either, I leave my Reader by comparing them to judge.  
IT is true that the Things expressed by these Words have been in some Commonwealths more, in others less ancient than the Greece Language; but this hinders not the Greecs to apply the Words to the like Constitutions or Things, wherever they find them, as, by following HALICARNASSAEUS, I shall exemplify in Rome.  

Lib. 2.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ROMULUS, when he had distributed the People into Tribes and Parishes, proceeded to ordain the Senate: in this manner the Tribes were three, and the Parishes thirty; out of every Tribe he elected three Senators, and out of every Parish three more, all by the Suffrage of the People. These therefore came to ninety nine chosen by the Chirotonia; to which he added one more, not chosen by the Chirotonia, but by himself only: Which Election we may therefore say was made by the Chirothesia; for as in this Chapter I am showing that the Chirotonia is Election by the Many, so in the next I shall show that the Chirothesia is Election by One, or by the Few. But to keep to the matter in hand; the Magistrate thus chosen by ROMULUS was (praefectus urbi) the Protector of the Commonwealth, or he who, when the King was out of the Nation or the City, as upon occasion of war, had the exercise of Royal Power at home. In like manner with the Civil Magistracy were the Priests created (though some of them not so anciently) for the Pontifex Maximus, the Rex Sacrificus, and the Flamens, were all ordained by the Suffrage of the People (Pontifex Tributis, Rex Centuriatis, Flamines Curiatis) the latter of which, being no more than Parish Priests, had no other Ordination than by their Parishes. All the Laws, and all the Magistrates in Rome, even the Kings themselves, were according to the Orders of this Commonwealth to be created by the Chirotonia of the People; which nevertheless is by APPIAN sometimes called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Chirotonia of the Tribune's, whether these Magistrates were Precedents of the Assemblies of the People, or elected by them. Sic Romani Historici non raro loquuntur, Consulem 
Calv. Inst. l. 4. cap. 3. ●. 15.  qui comitia habuerit creasse novos Magistratus, non aliam ob causam nisi quia suffragia receperit, & Populum moderatus est in eligendo.  
WHAT past the Chirotonia of the People, by the Greecs is called 
Dion. Hal. l. 8.  Psephisma: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ When the Congregation of the People was to be dismissed, MARCUS standing up, said, Your Psephisma, Chap. 3 that is your Act, is exceeding good, etc.  
THIS Policy, for the greater part, is that which ROMULUS (as was shown) is said (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to have instituted or ordained, though it be plain that he ordained it not otherwise than by the Chirotonia of the People.  
THUS you have another example of the three words in controversy (Chirotonia, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Psephisma) still applied in the same sense, and to the same things. Have I not also discovered already the original Right of Ordination, whether in civil or religious Orders? This will be scandalous. How! derive Ordination as it is in the Church of CHRIST, or as it was in the Church of the Jews, from the Religion, or rather Superstition of the Heathens! I meddle not with their Religion, nor yet with their Superstition, but with their Ordination which was neither, but a part of their Policy. And why is not Ordination in the Church or Commonwealth of CHRIST, as well a political thing as it was in the Churches or Commonwealths of the Jews, or of the Heathens? Why is not Election of Officers in the Church as well a political thing, as Election of Officers in the State? and why may not this be as lawfully performed by the Chirotonia in the one, as in the other?  

Philo de Inst. Princ.  THAT MOSES introduced the Chirotonia, is expressly said by PHILO; though he opposes it to the Ballot, in which I believe he is mistaken, as not seeing that the Ballot including the Suffrage of the People, by that means came as properly under the denomination of the Chirotonia, as the Suffrage of the Roman People, which though it were given by the Tablet, is so called by Greece Authors. All Ordination of Magistrates, as of the Senators or Elders of the Sanhedrim, of the Judges or Elders of inferior Courts, of the Judge or Suffes of Israel, of the King, of the Priests, of the Levits, whether with the Ballot or viva voce, was performed by the Chirotonia or Suffrage of the People. In this (especially if you admit the Authority of the Jewish Lawyers, and Divines called the Talmudists) the Scripture will be clear, but their Names are hard; wherefore not to make my Discourse more rough than I need, I shall here set them together. The Authors or Writings I use, by way of Paraphrase upon the Scripture, are the Gemara Babylonia, Midbar Rabath, Sepher Siphri, Sepher Tanchuma, Solomon Jarchius, Chiskuny, Abarbanel, Ajin Israel, Pesiktha Zotertha. These and many more being for the Election of the Sanhedrim by the Ballot, I might have spoken them more briefly; for the truth is, in all that is Talmudical I am assisted by SELDEN, GROTIUS, and their Quotations out of the Rabbis, having in this Learning so little Skill, that if I miscalled none of them, I showed you a good part of my acquaintance with them.  
NOR am I wedded to GROTIUS or SELDEN, whom sometimes I follow, and sometimes I leave, making use of their Learning, but of my own Reason. As to the things in this present Controversy, they were no other in Athens and Rome than they had been in the Commonwealth of Israel.  

Numb. 11. v. 16, 24.  WHEN MOSES came to institute the Senate, he asked council of God. And the Lord said, Gather to me seventy men of the Elders of Israel; and MOSES went out and told the People the words of the Lord: that is, proposed the Dictat of the supreme Legislator to the Chirotonia of the Congregation. What else can we make of these words of MOSES Book TWO to the People? Take ye wise men, and understanding, and known among 
Deut. 1. v. 13, 14, 15.  your Tribes (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) and I will constitute them Rulers over you. Now how the People could otherwise take or choose these Rulers or Magistrates thus proposed, than by their Chirotonia, let Divines— show; or notwithstanding the constitution of MOSES, both the Senate of Israel, and the inferior Courts, were decreed by the Chirotonia of the People. For the People upon this Proposition resolved in the Affirmative, or answered and said, The thing which thou hast spoken is good for us to do. This than was the Psephisma or Decree of the People of Israel, whereupon says MOSES (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) I constituted or ordained them Governors. In which example you have the three words, or the three things again; nor as to the things, is it, or ever was it, otherwise in any Commonwealth. Whence it is admirable in our Divines, who will have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, constituted, to be the word of Power; that they do not see by this means they must make two Powers in the same Government; the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Constitution of the Legislator, and the Chirotonia or Suffrage of the People: or else say that the Commonwealth of Israel was instituted by the Power of the Legislator, and the Authority of the People, than which there is nothing more absurd. But the People stayed not upon their first Psephisma, or Result, that the thing was good for them to do, but did accordingly. The manner of their proceeding at different times was somewhat different; for it was sometimes viva voce, sometimes by the Lot, without the Suffrage, and sometimes by the Ballot, which consisted not of the Lot only, but of the Suffrage. Each of these are equally popular (for neither of them gives an advantage to any Person or Party) but not equally prudent ways of proceeding; the Lot committing too much to Fortune, except in some kinds of businesses, as first in the division of Lands, whence the Suffrage was properly excluded: for the Divisions being made by three Deputies out of each Tribe, if there happened to fall some advantage or disadvantage to any man by the Lot, it was equal or impartial; whereas if it had fallen by the Suffrage, it must have been inequal, or partial. Such was the cause why the Lot in the Division of the Land of Canaan was used without the Suffrage. In case of a Crime committed by an unknown Author, but among many of whom some one or more must have been guilty, as in the cases of ACHAN and JONATHAN, the Lot was also used without the Suffrage, somewhat after the manner of Decimation in an Army, when many that are guilty throw the Dice, and he on whom the Lot falls is punished; yet with considerable difference, for whereas Decimation is not used but for punishment, where the Persons are as well known as the Gild; this use of the Lot in Israel was for the discovery of the unknown Author of some known Crime, that some one of many being put to the question (who if either by his own confession, or other proof he were found guilty, was punished accordingly, otherwise not) Men might have less encouragement that their Crimes would be the more hidden, or less punishable for company, or the shadow of it.  
WHEN the People were set upon the introduction of a new Magistracy, and cared not at all who should be the man, as in the Election of SAUL, at which time the Phitistins lay hard upon them, and they looked upon the Ease they hoped from a King, without coveting the trouble which he was like to have; it seems to me there was a third use of the Lot without the Suffrage.  
BUT that the common use of the Lot in Israel employed also the Chap. 3 Suffrage, and was of the nature of the Ballot at this day in Venice, is little to be doubted; or you may satisfy yourself, when you have considered the manner how the Senate or Sanhedrim was first elected (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) or constituted by MOSES.  
UPON the Psephisma, or decree of the Legislator and the People, The thing which thou hast spoken is good for us to do, they proceeded to election of Competitors in this manner. Each of the twelve Tribes (to be hereafter as well locally, as they were yet but genealogically divided) were to make the Election, not excluding the Thirteenth, nor yet nominally taking it in; for LEVI, though genealogically as distinct a Tribe as any of them, yet was not designed locally so to be, but to have the right of promiscuous Inhabiting, Cohabiting, or Marriage with all or any of the rest, and with right of Suffrage accordingly; for this cause the Tribes being Thirteen, are reckoned but Twelve. So each of the twelve Tribes elected among themselves by their Suffrages, six wise men, and understanding, and known among them; who being elected, were written; and being written, were delivered each in a several Scrol to MOSES. MOSES having received all the Scrols, had seventy two Competitors, which caused a Fraction; for the Senate, as is plain by the Text (gather me seventy men, that they may stand with thee) was to consist but of Seventy with MOSES, that is, in all, of seventy one. So MOSES having two Competitors more than he needed, caused two Urns to be brought, into one of which he cast the seventy two Competitors, or Names written in the Scrols; and into the other seventy two Scrols, of which two were blanks, and seventy were inscribed with the word Presbyter. This being done, the whole Congregation prayed, and when they had prayed, gave forth their Lots.  
THE Lots were given forth after this manner. First a Lot was drawn out of the Urn of the Magistracies, than another out of the Urn of the Competitors. The Competitor to whose name a Blank was drawn, departed: but he to whose name a Prize was drawn, or given forth, became a Magistrate.  
THEY who had thus gained Magistracy were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by this Psephisma decreed to be together of the number of the seventy Elders. But whereas in the Urn of Magistracies there were two Blanks, two that had been written Competitors must of necessity have failed of Magistracy. So ELDAD and MEDAD being of them that were 
Numb. 11. 26▪  written Competitors by the Tribes, yet went not up to the Tabernacle; that is, attained not to be (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) numbered among the seventy, who were to sit in the Court of the Tabernacle; as afterwards they did in the Pavement, or stone-Chamber, in the Court of the Temple.  
IN this place I shall mind you but once more of the three Words in controversy. MOSES the Legislator (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) constituted, the People chirotonized; and that which they had chirotònized, was Psephisma, their Decree.  
THERE be in these times that are coifed with such Opinions, that to show Scripture to be Reason, is to make it lose weight with them; and to talk of the Talmudists, is to profane it: Of these I shall only desire to know how they understand that place of ELDAD and MEDAD; for if they can not otherwise make sense of it than as Book TWO I have done, it is a sufficient proof (letting the Talmudists go) of all that I have said. What therefore has the Hierarchy, and the Presbytery for their opinion that the Sanhedrim was instituted by the Chirothesia, or Imposition of Hands?  
THERE is in the Old Testament no mention of laying on of Hands by way of Ordination, or Election, but only by MOSES in the designation of JOSHUA for his Successor: and in this MOSES did first as ROMULUS afterwards in the Election of the Perfect or Protector of Rome, but upon a far greater exigence; for the Commonwealth of Rome, when ROMULUS did the like, was seated or planted, but the Commonwealth of Israel, when MOSES did this, was neither seated nor planted, nor indeed a Commonwealth, but an Army designed to be a Commonwealth. Now between the Government that is necessary to an Army, and that which is necessary to a Commonwealth, there is a vast difference. The Government even of the Arms of Rome, when she was a Commonwealth, was nevertheless Monarchical: in this regard MOSES himself exercised a kind of Dictatorian Power for his life; and the Commonwealth being not yet planted, nor having any Balance whereupon to weigh herself, must either have been left at his death to the care of some Man whom he knew best able to lay her Foundation, or to extreme hazard. Wherefore this Ordination, which was but accidental, regarding the present military condition of the People, MOSES most prudently distinguishes from the other; in that he showed them how they should manage their Commonwealth, in this he bequeathes them the Man whom he thinks the most likely to bring them to be a Commonwealth: of which judgement and undertaking of MOSES, JOSHUA the next illustrious Example, most worthily acquitted himself.  
THERE is in these Elections another remarkable passage, but such a one as, being so far from political that it is supernatural, does not properly appertain to this discourse, and so I shall but point at it. When the Elders, thus chosen, were set round about the Tabernacle, 
Numb. 11. 24, 25.  the Lord came down in a cloud, and took of the spirit of MOSES, and gave it unto the seventy Elders; and it came to pass, that when the Spirit rested upon them, they prophesied and did not cease. So JOSHUA 
Deut. 34. 9 ● Tim. 1. 6.  was full of the spirit of Wisdom, for MOSES had laid his hands upon him. And PAUL minds TIMOTHY, Stir up the gift of God which is in thee by the laying on of my hands. But the Talmudists themselves do not pretend that their Ordination was further accompanied with supernatural endowments than the first Institution; and if Divines were as ingenuous, no less might be acknowleged of theirs. MOSES was a Prophet, the like to whom has not been in Israel; and has there been an Apostle like PAUL in the Christian Church? Every body cannot do Miracles, we see they can't. Take heed how you deny Sense, for then bread may be flesh. If we be not to make choice of a political Institution without a miraculous test or recommendation; either Ordination was at first accompanied with supernatural Gifts, and from thenceforth, as I conceive, neither. Divines methinks as such should not be so much concerned in the Ordination of the Sanhedrim, or of JOSHUA, who were Magistrates, as the People or the Magistrate: yet if these should hence infer that their Election, Ordination, or Designation of persons conferred supernatural Gifts, Divines would hardly allow of it; and why are the People, or the Magistrate obliged to allow more to that of a Clergy? To return. Chap. 3  
SUCH as I have shown was the Ordination of the Senate, or great Sanhedrim, that of the lesser Sanhedrim, or inferior Courts, was of like nature, for it follows; I took the chief of your Tribes, wise men and 
Deut. 1. 15.  known (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) and made them Heads over you, Captains of thousands, and Captains of hundreds, etc. which were other Magistrates than, according to our custom, we should readily expect to be intimated by such words, for they were the Judges of the inferior Courts, those that sat in the gates of each City, and others that appertained to the Villages, as in the next Verse: And I charged your Judges at that 
Ver. 10.  time, saying, Hear the Causes, and judge righteously.  
THE next Magistrate whose Election comes to be considered is the Dictator, or Judge of Israel. Where it is said of this People, that the Lord raised them up Judges, which delivered them out of the hands of 
Judg. 2. 16. De Rep. Heb.  those that spoiled them, it is to be understood, says SIGONIUS, that God put it into the mind of the People to elect such Magistrates, or Captains over them. For example, when the Children of Ammon made war against Israel, God raised up JEPHTHA, whose Election was after this manner: The Elders went to fetch JEPHTHA out of the Land of 
Judges 11.  Tob, and when they had brought him to Mizpeh (which in those days was the place, where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Congregation of Israel usually assembled) the People made him Head and Captain over them. Now that the Election of the King was as much in the Chirotonia of the People, as that of the Judge, is past all controversy, seeing the Law speaking of the People says thus: One from among thy Brethren shalt 
Deut. 17. 15.  thou set King over thee; and accordingly when the Government was changed to Monarchy, it was not SAMUEL, but the People that would have it so; thus SAUL was chosen King by the Lot. Where the contradiction of GROTIUS is remarkable, who in this place to show that the Lot is of Popular Institution, quotes ARISTOTLE; and yet 
Arist. Pol. B. 6. c. 2.  when he comes to speak of the Lots that were cast at the Election of MATHIAS, says it was that it might appear not whom the Multitude, 
De Imp. S. P. c. 10.  but whom God had ordained; as if the Magistrate lawfully elected by the People, were not elected by God, or that the Lot which thus falls into the lap were not at the disposing of the Lord. But if the League by which the People received DAVID into the Throne, or the Votes by which first the People of Jerusalem, and afterwards the Congregation of Israel (as was shown in the former Book) made SOLOMON King, were of the Lord; then Election by the People was of the Lord, and the Magistrate that was elected by the Chirotonia of the People, was elected by the Chirotonia of God: for as the Congregation of Israel is called in Scripture (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) the Ecclesia or Congregation 
Judges 20.  of God; so the Chirotonia of this Congregation is called by JOSEPHUS (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) the Chirotonia of God, who as I noted 
Jos. l. 4.  before out of CAPELLUS, was in this Commonwealth Political King, or Civil Legislator (Sans comparaison) as SOLON in Athens, and ROMULUS in Rome; that is to propose to the People (Haec est lex quam MOSES proposuit) and whatever was proposed by God, or the lawful Magistrate under him, and chirotonized or voted by the People, was Law in Israel, and no other. Nay, and the People had not only power to reject any Law that was thus proposed, but to repeal any Law that was thus enacted: for if God intending Popular Government should have ordained it otherwise, he must have contradicted Book TWO himself; wherefore he plainly acknowleges to them this power, where 
Josephus, l. 6. c. 5.  (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) they rejected him (whom they had formerly chirotonized or chosen King) that he should not reign over them; and elected SAUL. This if God had withstood by his Power, he must have introduced that kind of Monarchy which he had declared against; wherefore he chose rather to abandon this sottish and ingrateful People to the most inextricable yoke of deserved slavery, telling them, when he had warned them and they would not hear him, that they should cry to him and he would not hear them, one tittle of whose words passed not unfulfilled.  
BY this time I have shown that all the Civil Magistrates in Israel were chosen by the Chirotonia of the People, or, to follow JOSEPHUS, by the Chirotonia of God, which is all one; for the Chirotonia of the Precedent of the Congregation, as I have instanced in that of the Proedris, of the Thesmothetae, of the Consuls, of the Tribune's, and the Chirotonia of the Congregation is the same thing; and of the Congregation of Israel God, except only at the voting of a King, was Precedent.  
TO come then from the Civil Magistrates to the Priests and Levits, these were chosen in two ways, either by the Lot, or by the Chirotonia.  
THE office and dignity of the High Priest being the greatest in Israel, and by the institution to be hereditary, caused great disputes in the Election: to this MOSES by the command of God had designed AARON his Brother; which Designation, the Command of God being at first either not so obvious as that relation, or the ambition of others so blind that they could not or would not see it, caused great combustion. First, thro' the conspiracy of KORAH, DATHAN, and ABIRAM; and next by the murmuring of the Princes of the Tribes, all emulous of this Honor. KORAH being not only a great 
Numb. 16. Josephus l. 4.  man, but of the Tribe of Levi, could not see why he was not as worthy of the Priesthood, consideration had of his Tribe, as AARON; and if any other Tribe might pretend to it, DATHAN and ABIRAM being descended from REUBEN were not only of the elder House, but troubled to see a younger preferred before them. Wherefore these having gained to their party three hundred of the most powerful men of the Congregation, accused MOSES of affecting Tyranny, and doing those things which threatened the Liberty of the Commonwealth; as under pretence of Divination to blind the eyes of the People, preferring his Brother to the Priesthood without the Suffrage of the Congregation: of which charge MOSES acquitting himself in the Congregation, tells the People that AARON was chosen both by God, and (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) by their Suffrages, which (KORAH being upon this occasion miraculously destroyed) were thereupon once more given by the People. Nevertheless the Princes of the Tribes continuing still discontented, and full of murmur, God decided the Controversy by a second miracle, the budding of AARON 's Rod: (and so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) being thrice confirmed by the Chirotonia of God, he was confirmed in that honour. Now that the Chirotonia of God in this place of JOSEPHUS signifys the Chirotonia of the 
1 Chron. ●9. 22.  People, is plain by that in Scripture, where they made SOLOMON King, and ZADOCK to be Priest. After the Captivity, as in other things, so in this power the Sanhedrim came, as I conceive, Chap. 3 to overreach the People: JOSHUA the Son of JOSEDECH being thus elected High Priest by the Sanhedrim, and this Honour thenceforth 
Grot, ad Hag. 1. 1. Joseph. de Bel, Jud. l. 4. Maimon. Hal. Cele Hamikdasch; cap. 4, & 5. 2 Chron. 24. 5. & 25. 8. & 26. 13.  (as appears by MAIMONIDES) being at the disposing of this Court. Nor could any inferior Priest serve at the Altar, except he had acquired that right by the Lot, as is not only delivered by the same Author, and by JOSEPHUS, but in Scripture. Now the Lot, as was shown, giving no Prerogative either to any person or party, is as popular an Institution as the Chirotonia. So in election of Priests, the Orders of Israel differed not from human Prudence, nor those of other Commonwealths, the Priest of JUPITER having been elected after the same manner in the Commonwealth of Syracuse; the Augustales, and the Vestals in that of Rome: and if the right of bearing holy Magistracy, being in Israel confined to one Tribe or Order, may seem to make any difference, it was for some time no otherwise in Athens, nor in Rome, where the Patricians or Nobility assumed these Offices, or the greatest of them to themselves, till the People in those Cities disputed that Custom, as introduced without their consent, which the People of Israel could not fairly do, because it was introduced by their consent.  
TO come to the Levits in their original Ordination, God commanded MOSES saying, Thou shalt bring the Levits before the Tabernacle 
Numb. 8. 9, 10.  of the Congregation, and thou shalt gather the whole assembly of the Children of Israel, and they shall put their hands upon the Levits. This in the sound of the words may seem to imply the Chirothesia, or Imposition of Hands, but take heed of that; Divines will not allow the Chirothesia to be an Act of the People: but in this proceeding the whole people acted in the Ordination of the Levits, wherefore the Levits also were ordained by the Chirotonia, Consent, Vote, or Suffrage of the whole People employed in this action. But for the Ordination of Priests and Levits, whatever it was, it is not to the present purpose; Divines deriving not theirs from Priests and Levits, but from Dukes, Generals and Magistrates, from that of JOSHUA and of the Sanhedrim, always provided, that this were of the same nature with the former, that is, by the Chirothesia, or Imposition of Hands, and not by the Chirotonia of the People. However the Ordination of the 
Exod. 29▪  Magistracy was certainly Political; and so in this deduction they themselves confess that their Ordination also is a Political Constitution: yet whereas MOSES is commanded by God to bring AARON and his 
Numb. 8.  Sons to the door of the Tabernacle of the Congregation, and having washed them there, to adorn them with the Priestly Robes, with the Mitre, and to anoint them; whereas he is commanded (the Children of Israel having first laid their Hands upon the Levits) to cleanse them, and offer them for an Offering; Divines of the Hierarchy and the Presbytery (though it be otherwise with WALLAEUS and such as acknowledge Popular Government) give the Congregation, or Consent of the People for nothing, and put the whole Ordination of the Priests and Levits upon the washing and cleansing, or other Ceremonies of Consecration: as if to put the Ordination of SAUL upon the Ceremony of anointing by SAMUEL, though performed by the immediate Command of God, were not absolutely contradictory to Scripture, and to the known Law of Israel, which speaking of the People, expressly says, One from among thy Brethren shalt thou set King over thee; Book TWO upon which place says PHILO, Most wise MOSES never intended that 
Philo de inst. principiis.  the Royal Dignity should be acquired by lot, but chose rather that the Kings should be elected by the Chirotonia, or Suffrage of the whole People. The Congregations of the People assembled upon this as upon other public affairs, and required a sign or confirmation from God: forasmuch as by his will Man is to the rest of Nature, what the Face is to the Body. Whereto agrees that of the Heathens, Os homini sublime dedit, Coelumque tueri jussit, and their Divinations upon the like occasions by entrails, none of which were ever understood as destructive of the liberty of the People, or of the freedom of their Chirotonia.  
WHERE SOLOMON is made King, and ZADOCK Priest by the People, though the Ceremony of anointing was doubtless performed, and perhaps by the Prophet NATHAN, it is wholly omitted in the place as not worth the speaking of. The opinion that the Ordination of the Priests and Levits lay in the Ceremonies of their Consecration, is every whit as sober and agreeable to reason, as if a man should hold the Kings of England to have been made by the Unction of the Bishops. Israel from the institution of MOSES to the Monarchy, was a Democracy, or Popular Government; in Popular Government the Consent of the People is the Power of the People, and both the Priests and Levits were ordained by the Consent of the People of Israel.  
TO bring these things to the Cities in the perambulation of the Apostles, which by the former Chapter I have proved to have been 
Ditm. c. 10.  Popular Governments; it is acknowleged by GROTIUS to the Cities of Asia, not only that they used the Chirotonia, but in the strictest sense of the word, that is, to give their Suffrage by the holding up of Hands. And that they had the liberty of their Religion, the choice of their Magistrates, both Civil and Ecclesiastical in their Ecclesi●, or Congregations, has been also undeniably evidenced; whence it must needs follow that there were Cities in Asia (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) chirotonizing or ordaining them Elders, that is, Magistrates and Priests in every Congregation (with Reverence be it spoken) long before CHRIST was in the flesh, or the Apostles any of them were born. Wherefore to sum up what in this Chapter I conceive to be sufficiently proved, I may boldly conclude, That the Chirotonia derives from popular Constitution, and that there was a way of Ordination by the Chirotonia.   

CHAP. IU.  
The deduction of the Chirothesia from Monarchical or Aristocratical Government, and of the second way of Ordination from the Chirothesia. In which is contained the Commonwealth of the Jews as it stood after the Captivity.  
WHAT pleases the Prince, says JUSTINIAN, has the force of a Law, seeing the People in his Creation have devolved their whole Power upon his Person; which is with the most. But when Popular Government is changed into Monarchical, either the whole Power of the People, or a great part of it must of necessity accrue to the King. Hence says SAMUEL, he will appoint him Captains over Thousands, Chap. 4 and Captains over Fiftys: in which words perhaps is intimated the Judges of the inferior Courts, or Jethronian Prefectures; so that hereby 
1 Sam. 8. 12.  SAMUEL tells the People they shall no more have the Election of their Rulers, but the King will have it; who, it may be, changed the nature of some of these Magistracies, or added others: for when DAVID came to reign over all Israel, JOAB was over the Host (his 
2 Sam. 8. 15.  Strategus or General) JEHOSHAPHAT was Recorder, ZADOC and ABIMELEC were the Priests, SERAIAH was the Scribe, and BENAIAH was over the Pelethits, and the Cherethits; that is, was Captain of his Regiments of Guard, called perhaps by these names, as those of ROMULUS were called Celeres. But it should seem that few or none of these Officers were elected by the Chirotonia, that is by the People, but by the Prince, which kind of Election, as will be shown anon, may be called Chirothesia. For the deduction of this kind of Ordination, or Election, we shall do well to hearken first to Dr. HAMMOND; who in his Query, or Discourse concerning Ordination 
§. 10.  by the Imposition of Hands, puts it thus. To lift up the Hands was a Ceremony in Prayer, and accordingly to lay hands on any (differing 
Exod. 17. 11.  not otherwise from lifting up, than by the determining that Action to a peculiar Object, the Person that was prayed for) was generally among the Jews a Ceremony of benediction used first by the Father to the Children, in bestowing the Blessing upon them (and with that the succession to some part of his Estate or Inheritance) as appears in JACOB'S blessing the Children of JOSEPH: he stretched out his right hand, and laid it upon EPHRAIM'S 
Gen. 48. 14.  head, and his left hand on MANASSES, and so he blessed, etc. From thence it was accommodated among them to the communicating of any part of Power to others as assistants, or to the deriving of any successive Office from one to another. Thus when MOSES had from Heaven received, and long used his Commission to be under God the Ruler of the People, the seventy Elders were by God's appointment assumed to assist him: 
Numb. 11. 17.  it being certain from the Jewish Writings, though the sacred Scripture has no occasion to mention it, that the succession of the seventy Elders under the name of Sanhedrim or Council was continued thro' all Ages by their creating others in the place of those that died, by this Ceremony of Imposition of Hands. To this purpose are the clear words of MAIMONIDES: 
Tit. Sanhed. c. 4.  MOSES our Master created the seventy Elders by Imposition of hands, and the Divine Majesty rested on them; and those Elders imposed Hands on others, and others on others, etc. So a little before the departure of MOSES out of this life, when a Successor was to be provided for him, God commands him to take JOSHUA, and lay his hands upon 
Numb. 27. 18, 23.  him. And MOSES laid his hands upon him, and gave him a Charge as the Lord commanded by the hand of MOSES: that is, derived to him by this Ceremony the Authority which himself had, and constituted him his Successor in that Government. And so it is repeated, JOSHUA 
Deut. 34. 9  was full of the spirit of Wisdom, for MOSES had laid his Hands upon him.  
THIS is the Doctor's deduction of the Chirothesia, or Ordination by the laying on of Hands, from the Commonwealth of Israel: and, says he, from the three uses of this Ceremony there, that is, first in praying for another; secondly, in paternal benediction; thirdly, in creating Successors in power, either in whole, or in part, derive three sorts of things in the New Testament, to which this Ceremony of laying on of Hands is Book TWO accommodated. That of Prayer simply taken was of two sorts, either for the cure of Diseases, or pardoning of Sins. For Diseases: They shall 
Mar. 16. 18.  lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover. For Sins they were done away also by this Ceremony in the absolution of Penitents, to which belongs 
1 Tim. 5. 22.  that Exhortation of PAUL to TIMOTHY, Lay hands suddenly on no man, that is, not without due examination and proof of his Penitence, lest thou be partaker of other men's Sins. From the second, that of Paternal 
Mar. 10. 16.  Benediction, was borrowed, first that of blessing Infants with the Ceremony of Imposition of Hands, as it differed from Baptism. And secondly, that of confirming those of fuller age, that had been formerly baptised. Lastly, to the creating Successors in any Power, or communicating any part of Power to others, as to Assistants, is answerable that Imposition of Hands in Ordination so often mentioned in the New Testament, sometimes in 
Acts 6. 6.  the lower degree, as in the ordaining of Deacons, elsewhere in the highest degree, setting Governors over particular Churches, as generally when by that laying on of Hands it is said, they received the Holy Ghost; whereas the Holy Ghost contains all the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 required to the pastoral 
Luke 24. 49.  Function, and so signifys Power from on high: the Authority and Function itself, so it be given by Imposition of Hands, makes the parallel exact between this of Christian Ordination, and that observed in the creating Successors in the Jewish Sanhedrim. So far the Doctor.  

Deut. 1.  NOW say I, if the Scripture be silent as to the Ordination of the Elders in Israel, what means that place; Take ye wise men, and understanding, and known among your Tribes, and I will make them Rulers over 
Numb. 11.  you? Once in their lives let them give us the sense of it, or of that other, where ELDAD and MEDAD are of those that were written, and yet went not up to the Tabernacle: Otherwise that we hear no more of these, is from the silence of Divines, and not of the Scripture. But if the Scripture be not silent in this point, is there not a great deal of fancy in going on to cure the Sick, to pardon Sins, to bless Infants, confirm the Baptised, ordain Ministers, nay, give the Holy Ghost, and all the Graces belonging to the pastoral Function, from a place that has no such thing in it? for if the Sanhedrim according to Scripture were not ordained by the Chirothesia, there is no such thing to be derived by the Chirothesia from the Sanhedrim. The first Chirotonia indeed of the Sanhedrim was accompanied with miraculous endowments; wherefore if they will derive these Gifts and Graces from the Sanhedrim, why are they sworn Enemies to the Chirotonia? Again, the Sanhedrim was a Civil Court or Senate; wherefore then by this Title should not these Gifts and Graces be rather pretended to by the Civil Magistrate, than by Divines? what becomes of the Priest AARON and his Lots? is he left to the Civil Magistrate, while Divines derive themselves from General JOSHUA and his Chirothesia? But if the Sanhedrim and inferior Judicatories were otherwise ordained originally; then no Magistrate in Israel was originally ordained by the Chirothesia, but only JOSHUA. It is admirable that Divines should look upon God, as if in the institution of a Commonwealth he had no regard at all to human Prudence, but was altogether fixed upon their vain advantages. Who made human Prudence? or to what end was it made? Any man that understands the Politics, and considers that God was now proceedingly according to this Art (as in his constitution of the Senate, and of the People or Congregation, is most obvious) must needs see that this Power he indulged to MOSES of making his own choice of one man, could not possibly be intended as a permanent Constitution; Chap. 4 for whereas he intended Popular Government, nothing is plainer than that a People not electing their own Magistrates can have no Popular Government. How absurd is it to conceive that God having already made an express Law, that the People if at any time they came under Monarchy, should yet have the election of their King, would now make a Law that the People being under a Commonwealth, should no longer have the election of their Magistrates? For who sees not that to introduce the Chirothesia as a standing Ordinance, had been to bar the People of this power? Israel at this time, though designed for a Commonwealth, had no Land, no foundation to balance herself upon, but was an Army in a Wilderness, encompassed about with Enemy's. To permit to the People in this case, the choice of all their Civil Magistrates was nevertheless safe enough, nay best of all: for at the election of wise men, and understanding, and known among their Tribes, so far as was needful to civil administration, their skill must needs have been at any time sufficient; but the Commonwealth was yet in absolute necessity of a Protector, and of Dictatorian Power. Now to know who was fittest in this case to succeed MOSES, required the Wisdom of God, or of MOSES; and therefore was not yet safe to be ventured upon a People so new in their Government. For these reasons, I say, MOSES used the Chirothesia for once, and no more; or let them show me among all the Dictator's, Judges, or Kings, that succeeded JOSHUA, any one that was chosen by the Chirothesia, and be all Dictator's. It is now above three thousand years since the institution of the Sanhedrim, from which time the ambitious Elders first, than the Talmudists, and of latter ages Divines have been perpetually striving for, or possessing themselves of this same Oligarchical Invention of the Chirothesia pretended to be derived from MOSES; though there be neither any such Precept of God or Christ in the Old or New Testament, nor any unanimous result upon the point, either by the Talmudists or Divines themselves. And for the clear words quoted by the Doctor out of MAIMONIDES, they are such to which I shall in due time show MAIMONIDES to be elsewhere of a clear contrary opinion. But in this Controversy, without some clearer deduction of the Chirothesia, we shall make no happy progress; in this therefore I shall follow SELDEN the ablest Talmudist of our age, or of any.  
THE Commonwealth of Lacedaemon (if I could stand to show it) has strange resemblances to that of Israel, not only in the Agrarian, which is nothing to the present purpose, but in the Senate, which to prevent catching another time, I do not say was a Judicatory only, but not only a Senate, but a Judicatory also. For LYCURGUS of all other Legislators was in this the likest to God, or to MOSES, that his work was so exquisitely perfected at once, and his Laws so comprehensive, that if the Senate had had no other function than to make or propose new Laws, there being little or nothing of that wanting, they would have had little or nothing to do. Now it being thus, and much more than thus in Israel, the Sanhedrim was not only the Senate, but the supreme Judicatory. And because one Court in a Territory of any Extent is not where sufficient to this end; therefore the Sanhedrim had divers branches distended not only to the Cities of Judea, but even to the Villages; these were called the Lesser Sanhedrim, or the Jethronian Prefectures.  
Book TWO THE Great Sanhedrim consisting, as has been shown, of 70 Elders, 
Selden de Syn.  sat first in the Tabernacle, and afterwards in the Court of the Temple.  
THE Jethronian Prefectures consisted some of three and twenty Elders, and others but of three. Of the former kind there were two in the gates of the Temple, and one sitting in the gates of every City; of the latter there was one almost in every Village.  
THE power of the Jethronian Court, consisting of twenty three Elders, was in matter of Judicature equal with that of the great Sanhedrim, 
Vid. Grot. ad Deut. 17. 8.  only in cases of difficulty they observed this Precept. If there arise a matter too hard for thee in judgement between Blood and Blood, between Plea and Plea, between Stroke and Stroke, being matter of Controversy within thy gates; then shalt thou arise, and get thee up into the place which the Lord thy God shall choose (in the future, for the Commonwealth was yet but designed, not planted) and thou shalt come to the Priests and the Levits, and to the Judge that shall be in those days, and inquire, and they shall show thee the sentence of Judgement: That is, thou shalt consult the Sanhedrim, or if there be no Sanhedrim, the Suffes or Judge of Israel. The reason why the Sanhedrim in this Text is mentioned under the name of the Priests and Levits is, that these about the beginning of this Commonwealth having (as were also the Egyptian Priests at the same time) been the learnedst Men, whether for Lawyers, or Physicians, there were scarce any other chosen into the Sanhedrim, though towards the latter end it happened to be far otherwise. For whereas sacrificing was feasting, the Priests enjoying a fat Idleness, became in latter times so heavy, that as to the Election of the Sanhedrim not only the Levits of inferior rank were upon the matter wholly laid by, but the Highpriest himself sometimes omitted, the rest of the Tribes far excelling this in Learning.  
THE power of the Triumvirats, or three Judges in the Villages, extended no farther than to inflict stripes to a certain number, and pecuniary mulcts to a certain sum. These possibly had the same recourse upon occasion of difficulty to the Judges in the Gates, as the Judges in the Gates had to the Sanhedrim: but their power is not so much to the present purpose, which regards only their manner of Election. This having been institutively exercised, as has been shown by the Chirotonia, or Ballot of the People, came sooner or later (I find no man that can resolve upon the certain time) to the Chirothesia. For though when a Judge in the Gates was dead, that Court elected his Successor out of their Disciples (each Court in the Gates had 99 Disciples that were their constant Auditors) or out of the Triumvirats; and when an Elder of the Sanhedrim died, the Sanhedrim elected his Successor out of the Courts in the Gates, more particularly those in the Gates of the Temple by Suffrages; yet no man was capable of being elected into any of these Courts that was not a Presbyter, nor was any man a 
Mikotzi Misna Gemara.  Presbyter that had not received the Chirothesia: nor could any man confer the Chirothesia that had not first received it, or been so ordained a Presbyter himself: nor though he were so ordained, could he confer the like Ordination, but in the presence of two others, whether ordained or not ordained: and no Ordination could be conferred but either this way, or 
Abr. Zacuth. Maimonides.  by some one of the Judicatories. The manner how this Ordination was conferred, if the party were present, was either by laying on of Hands, or by saying a Verse or Charm; or if he were absent, by a Letter, or Patent.  
AN Elder thus ordained was called Rabbi, might have Disciples, Chap. 4 teach, practice, or expound the Law, declare what was thereby free 
Rab. Jonah. Rab. Nathan.  or forbidden (which with them was called binding and losing) ordain others with the assistance mentioned, or be capable of Election into some one, or any Court of Justice, according to the nature of his Ordination, the Conditions mentioned at the conferring of the same, or the gift that was in him by the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery; which in some extended no farther than to show how Meat should be killed and dressed, how Uncleanness should be purified, what were Vices of the body, what might be eaten or drunk, and what not; in others it extended to some one or more, or all the Faculties expressed: but I am inclining to believe that a plenary Ordination used not to be conferred but by the Great Sanhedrim, or at least some one of the Jethronian Courts.  
THEY used also to confer this Ordination some time occasionally, and for a season in this manner. Receive the gift of judiciary Ordination, 
Maimon. Tit. San. cap. 4.  or the right of binding and losing, till such time as you return to us in the City. Where the Christian Jews still following their former Customs in higher matters, as the observation of the Sabbath, and of Circumcision, even to such a degree, that PAUL not to displease them took TIMOTHY and circumcised him, seem to me to have followed this custom, who when the Prophets at Antioch had informed them that PAUL and BARNABAS were to be separated to an extraordinary work, laid their hands upon them, and sent them away: for otherwise 
Acts 13. 3.  as to Ordination PAUL and BARNABAS had that before; at least PAUL by ANANIAS, and for any such Precept in the Christian Religion 
Acts 9 17.  there was none.  
JOSEPHUS, PHILO, and other Authors that tell us the Commonwealth of Israel was an Aristocracy, look no farther than the introduction of the Chirothesia by the Presbyterian Party, which must have taken date some time after the Captivity, or the restitution of the Commonwealth by EZRA, there being not one syllable for it in Scripture, but enough to the contrary, seeing God introduced the Chirotonia. By which it is demonstrable that a Presbyterian Party may bring a Popular Government to Oligarchy, and deface even the work of God himself, so that it shall not be known to after ages; as also that Ecclesiastical Writers (for such are the Talmudists) may pretend that for many hundred years together, as Divines also have done, to be in Scripture, which neither is, nor ever was there. But have I yet said enough to show that Ordination, especially as in this Example, not of a Clergy, but of a Magistracy, whether by the Chirotonia, or Chirothesia, is a Political Institution? or must I rack my brains for Arguments to prove that an Order or a Law having such influence upon the Commonwealth, that being introduced or repealed, it quite altars the whole frame of the Government, must needs be of a political nature, and therefore not appertain to Divines, or to a Clergy, but to the Magistrate, unless their Traditions may be of force to alter the Government as they please? All is one, they can abate nothing of it, let what will come of the Government, the Chirothesia they must and will have. Then let them have Monarchy too, or Tyranny; for one of these, according as the balance happens to stand with or against their Chirothesia, is the certain consequence; either Tyranny as in Israel, or Monarchy as in the Papacy, and, from that or the like Principle, in all Book TWO Gothic Empires: which Examples, to begin with Israel, well deserve the pains to be somewhat more diligently unfolded.  
ALL Elections in Israel, save those of the Priests who were eligible by the Lot, being thus usurped by the Presbyterian Party, and the People by that means devested of their Chirotonia; some three hundred years before CHRIST, HILLEL Senior High Priest, and Archon, or Prince of the Sanhedrim, found means to draw this Power of Ordination, in show somewhat otherwise, but in effect to himself, and his 
Maimon. Tit. San. cap. 4.  Chirothesia: for by his influence upon the Sanhedrim it was brought to pass, that whereas formerly any man ordained might, in the manner shown, have ordained his Disciples; it was now agreed that no man should be ordained without the Licence of the Prince, and that this Power should not be in the Prince, but in the presence of the Father of the Sanhedrim, or Speaker of the House. Thus the Aristocracy of Israel becoming first Oligarchical, took (according to the nature of all such Governments) long steps towards Monarchy, which succeeding in the Asmonean Family, commonly called the Maccabees, was for their great merit, in vindicating the Jews from the Tyranny of ANTIOCHUS', confirmed to them by the universal consent and Chirotonia of the People. Nevertheless to him that understands the Orders of a Commonwealth, or has read the Athenian, Lacedaemonian, or Roman Story, it will be plain enough that but for their Aristocracy they needed not to have been so much beholden to, or to have stood so much in need of one Family. It is true, both the merit of these Princes, and the manner of their free Election by the People, seem to forbid the name of Tyranny to this Institution: but so it is, that let there be never so much Merit in the Man, or Inclination of the People to the Prince, or the Government that is not founded upon the due balance, the Prince in that case must either govern in the nature of a Commonwealth, as did those of this Family, reforming the policy after the Lacedaemonian Model; or turn Tyrant, as from their time, who lived in the Age of the Grecian Monarchy, did all their Successors, till under the Romans this Nation became a Province: From which time such Endeavours and Insurrections they used for the recovery of their ancient Policy, that under the Emperor ADRIAN (who perceived at what their Ordination, being not of Priests, but of Magistrates, and of a Senate pretending to Sovereign Judicature and Authority, seemed to aim) there came, says the Talmud, against the Israelites an Edict out of the Kingdom of the Wicked (meaning the Roman Empire) whereby whosoever should ordain, or be ordained, was to be put to death, and the School or City in which such an Act should be done, to be destroyed: whereupon Rabbi JEHUDA BEN BABA (lest Ordination should fail in Israel) went forth, and standing between two great Mountains, and two great Cities, and between two Sabbathdays journies from Osa and Sephara, ordained five Presbyters. For this Feat the Rabbi is remembered by the Talmudists under the name of Ordinator; but the same, as it follows, being discovered by the Roman Guards, they shot his Body thro' with so many Darts, as made it like a Sieve: Yet stayed not the business here, but so obstinate continued the Jews in the Superstition to which this kind of Ordination was now grown, that whereas by the same it was unlawful for them to ordain in a foreign Land, and at home they could not be brought to abstain, the Emperor banished them all out of their own Country; whence happened their total Dispersion. That of a Chap. 4 thing which at the first was a mere delusion, such Religion should come in time, and with education to be made that not only they who had received advantage could suffer Martyrdom, but they that had lost by it, would be utterly lost for it, were admirable in the case of this People, if it were not common in the case of most in the World at this day: Custom may bring that to be received as an Ordinance of God, for which there is no colour in Scripture. For to consult MAIMONIDES a little better upon this point: Whereas, says he, they grant, in case it 
Halac. San. C. 4. S. 11.  should happen that in all the Holy Land there remained but one Presbyter, that Presbyter, assisted by two other Israelites, might ordain the seventy, or great Sanhedrim, and the Sanhedrim so constituted might constitute and ordain the lesser Courts, I am of opinion that were there no Presbyter in the Land, yet if all the Wise Men of Israel should agree to constitute or ordain Judges, they might do it lawfully enoug. But if so, then how comes it to pass that our Ancestors have been so solicitous, lest Judicature should fail in Israel? Surely for no other cause than that from the time of the Captivity the Israelites were so dispersed that they could not upon like occasions be brought together. Now I appeal whether the clear Words of MAIMONIDES, where he says, that our Master MOSES ordained the Sanhedrim by the Chirothesia, be not more clearly and strongly contradicted in this place, than affirmed in the other, since acknowleging that if the People could assemble, they might ordain the Sanhedrim, he gives it for granted, that when they did assemble, they had power to ordain it; and that MOSES did assemble them upon this occasion, is plain in Scripture. Again, if the power of Ordination falls ultimately to the People, there is not a stronger argument in Nature that it is thence primarily derived. To conclude, the Chirothesia of the Presbyterian Party in Israel is thus confessed by the Author no otherwise necessary, than thro' the defect of the Chirotonia of the People: which Ingenuity of the Talmudist, for any thing that has yet past, might be worthy the imitation of Divines.  
IN tracking the Jews from the restitution of their Commonwealth after the Captivity to their dispersion, it seems that the later Monarchy in Israel was occasioned by the Oligarchy, the Oligarchy by the Aristocracy, and the Aristocracy by the Chirothesia; but that this Monarchy, though erected by magnanimous and popular Princes, could be no less than Tyranny derived from another Principle, that is, the insufficiency of the balance: For though from the time of the Captivity, the Jubilee was no more in use, yet the Virgin MARY as an Heiress, is affirmed by some to have been married to JOSEPH by virtue of this Law: Every Daughter that possesses an Inheritance in any Tribe of the Children of Israel, 
Numb. 27. 8.  shall be Wife to one of the Family of the Tribe of her Fathers, etc. By which the Popular Agrarian may be more than suspected to have been of greater vigour than would admit of a well-balanced Monarchy.  
THE second Presbytery, which is now attained to a well balanced Empire in the Papacy, has infinitely excelled the pattern, the Lands of Italy being most of them in the Church. This, if I had leisure, might be tracked by the very same steps: At first it consisted of the seventy Parish Priests, or Presbyters of Rome; now seventy Cardinals creating to themselves a High Priest, or Prince of their Sanhedrim, the Pope, but for the Superstition whereto he has brought Religion, Book TWO and continues by his Chirothesia to hold it, a great and a Reverend Monarch, established upon a solid Foundation, and governing by an exquisite Policy, not only well balanced at home, but deeply rooted in the greatest Monarchys of Christendom, where the Clergy by virtue of their Lands are one of the three States.  
THE Maxims of Rome are profound; for there is no making use of Princes without being necessary to them, nor have they any regard to that Religion which does not regard Empire. All Monarchys of the Gothic Model, that is to say, where the Clergy by virtue of their Lands are a third estate, subsist by the Pope, whose Religion creating a reverence in the People, and bearing an awe upon the Prince, preserves the Clergy, that else being unarmed, become a certain Prey to the King or the People; and where this happens (as in HENRY the Eighth) down goes the Throne; for so much as the Clergy loses, falls out of the Monarchical into the Popular Scale. Where a Clergy is a third Estate, Popular Government wants Earth, and can never grow: but where they die at the root, a Prince may sit a while, but is not safe; nor is it in nature (except he has a Nobility or Gentry able without a Clergy to give balance to the People) that he should subsist long or peaceably: For wherever a Government is sounded on an Army, as in the Kings of Israel or Emperors of Rome, there the saddest Tragedys under Heaven are either on the Stage, or in the Tiring-house. These things considered, the Chirothesia being originally nothing else but a way of Policy excluding the People, where it attains not to a balance that is sufficient for this purpose, brings forth Oligarchy or Tyranny, as among the Jews: And where it attains to a balance sufficient to this end, produceth Monarchy, as in the Papacy, and in all Gothic Kingdoms.  
THE Priests of Egypt, where (as it is described by SICULUS) their Revenue came to the third part of the Realm, would no question have been exactly well fitted with the Chirothesia pretended to by modern Divines. Suppose the Apostles had planted the Christian Religion in those Parts, and the Priests had been all converted, I do not think that Divines will say, that having altered their Religion they needed to have deserted their being a third Estate, their overbalance to the People, their Lands, their Preeminence in the Government, or any part of their Policy for that: and I am as far from saying so as themselves.  
ON the other side, as PAUL was a Citizen of Rome, let us suppose him to have been a Citizen of Athens, and about (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to constitute the Christian Religion in this Commonwealth, where any Citizen might speak to the People: Imagine than he should have said thus: Men of Athens, that which you ignorantly seek I bring to you, the true Religion; but to receive this, you must not alter your former Belief only, but your ancient Customs. Your Political Assemblies have been hitherto called Ecclesiae; this word must lose the ancient sense, and be no more understood but of Spiritual Consistories; and so where as it has been of a Popular, it must henceforth be of an Aristocratical, or Presbyterian signification. For your Chirotonia, that also must follow the same rule; insomuch as on whomsoever one or more of the Aristocracy or Presbytery shall lay their hands, the same is understood by virtue of that Action to be chirotonized. How well would this have sounded in Egypt, and how ill in Athens? Certainly the Policy of the Church of CHRIST admits of more Prudence Chap. 5 and Temperament in these things: Tho the Apostles being Jews themselves, satisfied the converted Jews that were used to Aristocracy, by retaining somewhat of their Constitutions, as the Chirothesia; yet when PAUL and BARNABAS come to constitute in Popular Commonwealths, they are (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Chirotonizing them Elders in every Congregation.   

CHAP. V.  
Whether the Chirotonia mentioned in the fourteenth of the Acts be indeed, as is pretended by Dr. HAMMOND, Dr. SEAMAN, and the Authors they follow, the same with the Chirothesia, or a far different thing. In which are contained the divers kinds of Church-Government introduced and exercised in the age of the Apostles.  
EITHER I have impertinently intruded upon the Politics, or cannot be said so much to meddle in Church matters, as Churchmen may be said to have meddled in State matters: For if the Chirotonia be Election by the many, and the Chirothesia be Election by one, or by the Few, the whole difference between Popular and Monarchical Government falls upon these two words; and so the question will be, Whether the Scriptures were intended more for the advantage of a Prince, of a Hierarchy or Presbytery, than of the People. But that God in the Old Testament instituted the Chirotonia, not only in the Commonwealth, as by the Election of the Sanhedrim, but in the Monarchy, as in the Election of the Kings, is plain: So if there remains any advantage in Scripture to Kings, to the Hierarchy or Presbytery, it must be in the New Testament. Israel was God's chosen People, and God was Israel's chosen King: That God was pleased to bow the Heavens, and come down to them, was his choice, not theirs; but in that upon his Proposition, and those of his Servant MOSES, they resolved to obey his Voice, and keep his Covenant, they chose him their King. In like manner, the Church is CHRIST'S chosen People, and CHRIST is the Church's chosen King. That CHRIST taking flesh was pleased to bow the Heavens, and come down in a more familiar capacity of proposing himself to Mankind, was his own choice, not theirs: but in that the Church upon his Proposition, or those of his Apostles sent by him, as he was sent by the Father, resolved to obey his Voice, and keep his Covenant, she has chosen him her King. Whatever in Nature or in Grace, in Church or in State, is chosen by Man according to the Will of God, is chosen by God, of whom is both the Will and the Deed. Which things considered, I wonder at Dr. HAMMOND, who says, Sure the Jewish and Heathen Cities, to whom the Gospel by 
§. 36.  CHRIST'S Command was to be preached, were not to choose their Guides or Teachers. CHRIST was not chosen by them to whom he preached; for says he, ye have not chosen me. He came from Heaven, sent by his Father on that Errand; and happy they whom he was thus pleased to choose, to call, Book TWO and preach to. And when his Apostles, after his example, go and preach to all Nations, and actually gather Disciples, they chose their Auditors, and not their Auditors them. To make short work, I shall answer by explaining his Words as they fall.  
A ROMAN choosing whether he would speak to the Senate or the People, chose his Auditors, and not they him: Nevertheless if it were the Consul, they chose him, and not he them. It is one thing to be a Speaker to a People, that have the liberty, when that's done, to do as they think fit; and another thing to be a Guide, whom the People have consented, or obliged themselves to follow: which distinction not regarded, makes the rest of his Argumentation recoil upon himself; while he proceeds thus: And they that give up their Names to the Obedience of the Gospel (chose the Preachers, as I should think, of that Gospel their Guides) one branch of this Obedience obliges them (by their own consent it seems, because before they gave up their Names) to observe those that (being thus placed over them by their consent) are placed over them by God: such not only are their Civil Magistrates (who succeed to their places by, and govern according to the Laws which the People have chosen) but also their Pastors, whom the Holy Ghost either mediately (according to the Rules of Church Discipline in Scripture) or immediately (upon some such miraculous Call, as the People shall judge to be no imposture) has set over them. From which words the Doctor, not considering those Qualifications I have shown all along to be naturally inherent in them, concludes that a Bishop is made by the Holy Ghost, and not by the People.  
IF he would stand to this yet it were something; for if the Holy Ghost makes a Bishop, than I should think that the Holy Ghost ordained a Bishop, and so that the Election and Ordination of a Bishop were all one. But this hereafter will appear to be a more dangerous Concession than perhaps you may yet apprehend. Wherefore when all is done, you will not find Divines, at least Dr. HAMMOND, to grant that the Holy Ghost can ordain: he may elect indeed, and that is all; but there is no Ordination without the Chirothesia of the Bishops, or of the Presbytery. Take the Doctor's word for it.  

§ 107. Acts 20. 28.  WHEN St. PAUL says of the Bishops of Asia, that the Holy Ghost had set them Overseers, I suppose that it is to be understood of their Election or Nomination to those Dignitys: for so CLEMENT speaks of St. JOHN, who constituted Bishops of those that were signified by the Spirit; where the Spirit's Signification notes the Election or Nomination of the Persons, but the constituting them was the Ordination of St. JOHN.  
GOD may propose, as the Electors do to the great Council of Venice; but the Power of the Council, that is, to resolve or ordain, is in the Bishop, says Dr. HAMMOND, and in the Presbytery, says Dr. SEAMAN. Indeed that Election and Ordination be distinct things, is to Divines of so great importance, that losing this hold, they lose all: For, as I said before, whatever is chosen by Man according to the Will of God, that is, according to Divine Law, whether natural or positive, the same, whether in State or Church, is chosen by God, or by the Holy Ghost, of whom is both the Will and the Deed. To evade this, and keep all in their own hands, or Chirothesia, Divines have invented this distinction, that Election is one thing, and Ordination another: God may elect, but they must constitute; that is, God may propose, but they must resolve. And yet GROTIUS, who in these things is a great Champion for the Clergy, has little Chap. 5 more to say upon this Point than this. Whether we consider ancient or 
De Imp. sum. Pot. c. 10. §. 31.  modern Times, we shall find the manner of Election very different, not only in different Ages and Countries, but in different years of the same age, and places of the same Country; so uncertain it is to determine of that which the Scripture has left uncertain. And while men dispute not of Right, but of Convenience, it is wonderful to see what probable Arguments are brought on all sides. Give me CYPRIAN and his times, there is no danger in popular Election. Give me the Nicene Fathers, and let the Bishops take it willingly. Give me THEODOSIUS, VALENTINIAN, and CHARLES the Great, than Royal Election there is nothing safer. Upon the heels of these Words treads Dr. HAMMOND in this manner: 
§. 104▪  That Election and Ordination are several things, is sufficiently known to every man that measures the nature of Words either by usage or Dictionaries; only for the convincing of such as think not themselves obliged to the observation of so vulgar Laws, I shall propose these evidences. In the Story of the Creation of the Deacons of Jerusalem, there are two 
Acts 6.  things distinctly set down, one proposed to the multitude of Disciples to be done by them, another reserved to the Apostles; that which was proposed to the Multitude was to elect, etc. Election of the Persons was by the Apostles permitted to them, but still the (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) constituting is reserved to the Apostles. Then comes Dr. SEAMAN: Be it granted, as it 
Of Ordinat. p. 13.  is by Protestants generally, that PAUL and BARNABAS made Elders with the consent of the People, their Consent is one thing, and their Power another.  
WHERE in the first place I for my particular, who have had the Books of Dr. HAMMOND and Dr. SEAMAN sent to me by way of Objection, need not go a step further. All that I have inserted in my Oceana concerning Ordination, is in these three Votes acknowledged and confirmed: For the Probationer to be there sent by a University to a Cure that is vacant, may by a Doctor, or the Doctors of the same University already ordained, receive Imposition of Hands, if that be thought fit to be added, and then the Election of the same Probationer by the People does no hurt, nay, says GROTIUS, is of 
De Imp. c. 10▪  the right of Nature; for it is naturally permitted to every Congregation to procure those things which are necessary to their conservation, of which number is the Application of Function. So Merchants have the right of electing of a Master of their Ship; Travellers of a Guide in their way, and a free People of their King. The Merchant, it seems, does not make the Master of his Ship, the Traveller his Guide, nor the free People their King, but elect them. As if VAN TRUMP had been Admiral, a Robber upon the Highway had been a Scout, or the Guide of an Army, or SAUL a King before they were elected. The point is very nice, which instead of proving, he illustrats in the beginning of the same Chapter by these three similitudes.  
THE first is this, The Power of the Husband is from God, the Application of this Power to a certain Person is from consent, by which nevertheless the right is not given; for if this were by consent, the Matrimony might be dissolved by consent, which cannot be. As if an apparent retraction of Matrimonial Consent, as when a Wife consents to another than her own Husband, or commits Adultery, did not deliver a man from the bond of Marriage by the Judgements of CHRIST. There is an imperfection or cruelty in those Laws, which make Marriage to Book TWO last longer than a man in humanity may be judged to be a Husband, or a Woman a Wife: To think that Religion destroys Humanity, or to think that there is any defending of that by Religion which will not hold in Justice, or natural Equity, is a vast error.  
THE second Similitude is this: Imperial Power is not in the Princes that are Electors of the Empire; wherefore it is not given by them, but applied by them to a certain Person.  

1 Pet. 2. 13.  THIS is answered by PETER, where he commands Obedience to every Ordinance of Man (or, as some nearer the Original, every Power created by men) whether it be to the Roman Emperor as Supreme, or to the Proconsul's of Asia and Phrygia, as sent by him; for this is the sense of the Greece, and thus it is interpreted by GROTIUS. Now if the than Roman Emperor were a Creature of Man, why not the now Roman Emperor?  
THE last Similitude runs thus: The Power of Life and Death is not in the Multitude before they be a Commonwealth; for no private Man has the right of Revenge; yet it is applied by them to some Man, or Political Body of Men. But if a man invades the Life of another, that other, whether under Laws or not under Laws, has the right to defend his own Life, even by taking away that (if there be no other probable Remedy) of the Invader. So that men are so far from having been vo●d of the power of Life and Death before they came under Laws, that Laws can never be so made as wholly to deprive them of it after they come under them: wherefore the power of Life and Death is derived by the Magistrate from, and conferred upon him by the consent or Chirotonia of the People, whereof he is but a mere Creature; that is to say, an Ordinance of Man.  
THUS these Candles being so far from lighting the House, that they die in the Socket, GROTIUS has been no less bountiful than to grant us that the People have as much right (where there is no human Creature or Law to the contrary) to elect their Churchmen, as Merchants have to elect their Seamen, Travellers their Guides, or a free People their King; which is enough a conscience. Nor is Dr. HAMMOND straighter handed: Election, says he, was permitted by the Apostles to the Multitude, and therefore the same may be allowed, always provided the (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) constituting be reserved to the Pastors, or ordained Doctors and Preachers. And Dr. SEAMAN, upon condition the People will not say that it was done by their power, but think it fair that it was done by their consent, is also very well contented. So all stands straight with what I have heretofore proposed. Let no man then say, whatever follows, that I drive at any Ends or Interests, these being already fully obtained and granted; nevertheless for truth sake I cannot leave this Discourse imperfect. If a Politician should say that the Election and the Ordination of a Roman Consul or Pontifex were not of like nature; that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Contract of the Senate of Rome with the People in the 
Livy.  Election of NUMA (ut cum populus regem jussisset, id sic ratum esset, si patres autores fierent) included or implied the Sovereign power to be in the Fathers; that the Consent of this People was one thing, and their Power another: if, I say, he should affirm these or the like in Athens, Lacedaemon, or any other Commonwealth that is or has been under the Sun, there would be nothing under the Sun more ridiculous than that Politician. But should men pretending to Government of any kind be not obliged to some consideration of these Rules in Nature Chap. 5 and universal Experience; yet I wonder how the word (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to constitute, with which they make such a flourish, did not lead them, otherwise than they follow; this, as it was said of SOLON by ARISTOTLE, being that which I have already shown to be used both in the Greece of the Scripture, for the constitution of the Sanhedrim by MOSES, and in other Authors for that of the Senate by ROMULUS, each of which was then elected by the People: whence it may appear plainly that this is no word, as they pretend, to exclude popular Suffrage, but rather to imply it. And indeed that it is of no such nature as necessarily to include Power, could not have been overseen in the New Testament, but voluntarily where (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) they are 
Acts 17. 15.  signified by it that conducted PAUL. But they have Miracles: such indeed as have neither words nor reason for them, had need of Miracles. And where are these same Miracles? why the Apostles by the Chirothesia or laying on of hands conferred the Holy Ghost. So they did not only when they used that Ceremony in reference to Ordination, but when they used it not in that relation, as to those that were newly baptised in Samaria, Men and Women: now it is not probable, that 
Acts 8.  these, who should seem to have been numerous, were all ordained, at least the Women; and so the Miracle is to be attributed to the Hands of the Apostles, and not to Ordination in general. JOSHUA was full of the Spirit (not because he had been ordained by the Chirothesia, for so had many of them that crucified CHRIST and persecuted the Apostles, but) because MOSES had laid his hands upon him.  
WOULD Divines be contented that we should argue thus; The Chirotonia or Suffrage of the People of Israel at the first institution was followed with miraculous Endowments, therefore whoever is elected by the People shall have the like? Or what have they to show why the Argument is more holding as to their Chirothesia, seeing for above one thousand years all the Hierarchy and Presbytery laid together have done no more Miracles than a Parish Clerc?  
A CONTINUED Miracle, as that the Sea ebbs and flows, the Sun always runs his admirable course, is Nature. Intermitted Nature, as that the waters of the Red Sea were mountains, that the Sun stood still in the Dial of AHAZ, is a Miracle. To continue the latter kind of Miracle were to destroy the former, that is, to dissolve Nature. Wherefore this is a certain rule, that no continued external Act can be in the latter sense miraculous. Now Government, whether in Church or State, is equally a continued external Act. An internal continued Act may indeed be natural, or supernatural, as Faith.  
A NATURAL Man, being even in his own natural apprehension fearfully and wonderfully made, is by the continued Miracle of Nature convinced that the World had a Creator, and so comes to believe in that which is supernatural; whence it is that all Nations have had some Religion: and a Spiritual Man being convinced by the purity of CHRIST'S Doctrine, and the Miracles whereby it was first planted, is brought to the Christian Faith. However CHRIST may require such continued Faith or Spiritual exercise of his Church as is supernatural, he requires not any such continued Act or bodily exercise of his Church as is supernatural. But the Government of the Church is a continued Act, or bodily exercise. It should be heeded that to delude the sense is not to do Miracles, but to use Imposture. Now to persuade Book TWO us, That Monarchical, Aristocratical, Popular, or mixed Government have not always been in Nature, or that there has ever been any other in the Church, were to delude sense. Wherefore give me leave (in which I am confident I shall use no manner of Irreverence to the Scripture, but on the contrary make the right use of it) to discourse upon Church-Government according to the rules of Prudence.  
THE Gospel was intended by Christ to be preached to all Nations, which (Princes and States being above all things exceeding tenacious of their Power) is to me a certain Argument that the Policy of the Church must be so provided for, as not to give any of them just cause of Jealousy, there being nothing more likely to obstruct the growth of Religion: and truly the nearer I look to the Scripture, the more I am confirmed in this opinion.  

First way of Ordination in the Church Christ. Acts 1.  CHRIST being taken up into Heaven, the first Ordination that we find was that of the Apostle MATHIAS after this manner.  
THE Aristocracy of the Church, that is the Apostles, assembled the whole Congregation of Disciples or Believers at Jerusalem, being in number one hundred and twenty, where PETER (it having as it should seem been so agreed by the Apostles) was Proposer; who standing up in the midst of the Disciples, acquainted them, that whereas JUDAS was gone to his place, the occasion of their present meeting was to elect another Apostle in his room: whereupon proceeding to the Suffrage, they appointed two Competitors, JOSEPH and MATHIAS, whose names being written each in a several Scrol, were put into one Urn, and at the same time two other Lots, whereof one was a blank, and the other inscribed with the word Apostle, were put into another Urn; which done, they prayed and said, Thou Lord which knowest the hearts of all men, show whether of these two thou hast chosen. The Prayer being ended, they gave forth their Lots, and the Lot fell upon MATHIAS (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) and by this Psephisma (the very popular word, and not only so, but being applied to the Ballot, is the very literal and original signification) he was added to the eleven Apostles. So you have the first way of Ordination in the Church, after Christ was taken up into Heaven, performed by the Election or Chirotonia of the whole Church.  
NOW except any man can show that MATHIAS ever received the imposition of hands, these several things are already demonstrated. First, that the Chirotonia is not only the more ancient way of Ordination in the Commonwealth of Israel, but in the Church of CHRIST. Secondly, that the Chirothesia or imposition of Hands is no way necessary to Ordination in the Christian Church. Thirdly, that the Discipline of the Christian Church was primitively Popular; for to say that in regard of the Apostles it was Aristocratical, is to forget that there is no such thing, without a mixture of Aristocracy, that is without the Senate, as a Popular Government in Nature. Fourthly, that Ordination in the Commonwealth of Oceana being exactly after this pattern, is exactly according to the Discipline of the Church of CHRIST. And fifthly, that Ordination and Election in this example are not two, but one and the same thing.  
THE last of these Propositions having been affirmed by Mr. HOBBS, 
§. 115.  Dr. HAMMOND tells him plainly, that his assertion is far from all truth: Let us therefore consider the Doctor's Reasons, which are these; Seeing the Congregtion, says he, is affirmed by the Gentleman to have ordained, and it is plain by the words of St. LUKE that God elected, Election Chap. 5 and Ordination by this Example must be distinct things: which in another place going about to fortify with this Argument, That it was done by Lottery, and SOLOMON says, The Lot is at the disposing of the Lord, he utterly overthrows without and beyond help; for in this SOLOMON not denying, but rather affirming that he was chosen King by the People, plainly shows that Election by the People is Election by God. Where it is affirmed, that God raised up Judges in Israel, it is not denied that the People elected them. The Doctor is at it in MAIMONIDES more than once, that the Divine Majesty rested upon such as were ordained by Imposition of Hands. But whereas it is affirmed by MAIMONIDES more often, that when the People (Ecclesia Dei) or Congregation of Israel assembled, than the Divine Majesty, or the Holy Ghost rested upon them; of this he never takes any notice. The People, whether in Israel, Athens, Lacedaemon, or Rome, never assembled for enacting of Laws, or Election of Magistrates, without Sacrifice and imploring the assistance of God, to whom when their work was performed, they always attributed the whole Result or Election: and would the Doctor have Christians to allow him but a Piece? For whereas God electing there had in the sense both of Jews and Heathens, his choice of all, God electing here had in the sense of Divines, but his choice of two, which were next this or none, but that indeed where he has not the whole he has none at all. Is that then far from all truth, which the Gentleman, or that which the Divine has said, either in this part, or where he adds, that the hundred 
Dr. H. of Imposition.  and twenty in the Text are never mentioned but once, and then it is in a Parenthesis? I will but transcribe the place. 
§. 115.   

Acts 1. 15.  AND in those days PETER stood up in the midst of the Disciples, and said (the number of the Names together were about an hundred and twenty) &c. Are the Disciples in the Parenthesis, or out of it? Are they but once mentioned, and that is in a Parenthesis? Or are they but once numbered, and that is in a Parenthesis? If a Gentleman should do thus, what would they say? Or, what were ill enough to be said? But to mend the Text, and bring the Disciples into the Parenthesis, they have more ways than one; whereas the Heathen People, while the Priests were willing, mixed these Duties with Devotions, Divines will not suffer a Christian People upon like occasions to pray: for where it is said, They prayed, it went before, they appointed two, and it follows, They gave out their Lots; which antecedent and consequent, if the People prayed, must be equally understood of them, and so they could be no Parenthesis. Therefore pray they must not, or Divines are lost. But how will they silence them? To show you this art I must transcribe the Heads of the Chapter.  
THE Apostles being returned from Mount Olivet to Jerusalem, went up into an upper room, where abode both PETER and JAMES, 
Verse 13.  and JOHN, and ANDREW, JAMES the Son of ALPHEUS, and SIMON zealots, and JUDAS the Brother of JAMES.  
AND in those days PETER stood up in the midst of the Disciples, and said (the number of Names together were about one hundred and twenty)  
MEN and Brethren,  
OF these men which accompanied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us,  
Book TWO MU one be ordained to be a Witness with us of his Resurrection.  
AND they appointed two, JOSEPH and MATHIAS.  
AND they prayed, and said, Thou Lord which knowest the hearts of all men, show whether of these two thou hast chosen.  
AND they gave forth their Lots, and the Lot fell upon MATHIAS, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
THEY whom PETER acquainted that one must be ordained, one would verily believe were the hundred and twenty Disciples, in the midst of whom he stood up, and made the Proposition; and so much the rather, because this was no more than the Apostles knew before, and (in all right understanding of Government and Sense) were already agreed upon, it being the Office of the Aristocracy or Senate in a Commonwealth (and such exactly were the Apostles in the Church) upon all new Orders or Elections to be made; first, to debate and determine by themselves, and then to propose to the Chirotonia or ultimat result of the People. But Divines say absolutely no, which word to make good, They appointed two, and they prayed, and they gave forth their Lots, being sentences that stand plainly together, or hunt in couples, must leap sheer over nine Verses, PETER'S whole Oration (which by this means is no more than a Parenthesis neither) and over the hundred and twenty Disciples, without touching a hair of their heads, to light plum upon the thirteenth Verse, and the eleven Apostles! Never man used his Grammar so since he threw it at a Pear tree! Yet 
Grotius.  that CHRYSOSTOM (who understood Greece) allows of no such construction, is confessed by the learnedst of this opinion; and whereas they fly to the Latin Fathers, that retreat is wholly cut off by DAVID BLUNDEL in his very learned Treatise of the right of the People in Church-Government.  
BUT what do we stand upon words? Are these such whereof the things to which they relate may be Interpreters? Or to what things can they relate but the Institution of the Sanhedrim by MOSES? That at the Institution of the Sanhedrim the Competitors were elected by the Suffrage of the People, and from thence that the Ballot of Israel consisted not only of a Lot but of a Suffrage too, has been already demonstrated out of Scripture; and that the Election of MATHIAS was by the Ballot of Israel is no less apparent in itself, than fully confessed upon the place by GROTIUS.  

Demonstration that God never ordained any Policy Ecclesiastical or Civil, but upon the Principles of Human Prudence. Josh. 9 11.  THEY that under colour of Religion in matter of Government, slight Prudence, are mistaken, or do not mean honestly. Neither GOD nor CHRIST ever instituted any Policy whatsoever upon any other Principles than those of Human Prudence. The Ambassadors sent from the Gibeonits' to JOSHUA deliver their Message in this manner; The Elders and all the Inhabitants of our Country spoke to us, saying, Go meet them, and say to them, We are your Servants; therefore now make ye a League with us. They that had power to send Ambassadors, and to make a League with a foreign Nation, had sovereign Power; this sovereign Power was in the Elders, or Senate, and in the People of Gibeon: wherefore God constituting his Commonwealth for the main Orders (that is to say, the Senate and the People) upon the same Principles on which the Gibeonits' had long before built theirs, laid his Foundations upon no other than human Prudence. So for the inferior Courts they were transcribed by MOSES out of the Commonwealth of Midian, upon advice of JETHRO his Father in Law. According to such patterns was Chap. 5 Israel framed, and by that of Israel this first Policy of the Church of CHRIST so exactly, as (sans comparaison) any man shall show the Commonwealth of Oceana to have been transcribed out of Rome or Venice. Let them that would have the Government be somewhat between Earth and Heaven, consider this place.  
NOR is Ecclesiastical Policy only subject to Human Prudence, but to the same vicissitudes also whereto Human Prudence is subject, both in her own nature, and as she is obnoxious to the State wherein she is planted, and that inavoidably; as I come now to demonstrat by the Alterations which happened even in the Age of the Apostles themselves: for this at the Election of MATHIAS being altered, the next form of Ecclesiastical Policy introduced in their times, is resembled by GROTIUS to that of Athens, of which, for the better clearing of what follows, it is necessary that I first say something by way of Introduction.  
THE Thesmothetae, being in number six, were Magistrates of the highest dignity, power, and rank in Athens. These, says ARISTOTLE, 
Arist. 2. lib. 2▪ c. 10.  were elected by the Chirotonia or Suffrage of the People; and says, POLLUX being elected underwent the Inquisition of the Senate, where they were to answer to these Interrogatories, Whether they worshipped the God of their Countries? Whether they had been dutiful to their Parents? born Arms for the Commonwealth? paid Duties or Taxes? In which Particulars the Senate being satisfied, They were sworn and 
Pol. lib. 8. c. 9  crowned with Myrtle: which comes to this, that the (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) or Constitution being reserved to the Senate, the Thesmothetae were elected by the Chirotonia of the People. Now though the Government of Athens throout the Cities of Asia (being most of them of the like Model) was most known, I will not say that the Apostles wrote their Orders out of Athens, but seeing all Political Institutions must needs be according to Human Prudence, and there is nothing to be written out of this but what will fall even with some other Government that is or has been, I may say, as GROTIUS has said before me, that the frame of Church Government in the ensuing Example was after the manner of Athens.  

Second way of Ordination in the Church of Christ.  WHEN the number of the Disciples, or Believers, was multiplied, there arose a murmuring among such of the Jews as having been bred in Alexandria or other parts, were for their Language (which was Greece) partly strangers, against the Hebrews or converted Jews, that spoke their own Language, as if these indeed used them like strangers, their Widows being neglected, or not dealt so liberally withal, as those of the Hebrews in the Contributions due for their constant maintenance.  
HEREUPON the twelve Apostles, after the manner of the Senate, having without all question debated the business among themselves, as appears by the speech upon which they were agreed, assembled the People, which is still Senatorian, or called the multitude of the Disciples to them, and said, It is not reason that we should leave preaching, or the Word of God, to be taken up with this, though charitable, nay, seeing we have introduced Community of goods, most just and necessary employment of providing Food and Clothing for every one of our Fellowship or Community (the Christians in these times, much after the manner of the Lacedaemonian Convives, used to eat in public and together) to do this as it ought to be done, were to become Book TWO Caterers, and be taken up in serving Tables. Wherefore, Brethren, (take the wise men and understanding, and known among you) look out seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost, and of Wisdom (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) whom we may appoint over this business.  
THIS Saying, that is, this Proposition of the Senate or Apostles, pleased the whole Multitude (like that of MOSES, the thing which thou hast said is good for us to do) So they chose STEPHEN, PHILIP, PROCHORUS, NICANOR, TIMON, PARMENAS', and NICHOLAS, whom being elected, they set before the Apostles, who when they had prayed, laid their hands upon them.  
WHAT fuller demonstration can be given of any thing, than that in this example Ordination and Election are one and the same, and that this was conferred by the Chirotonia of the People? If there be any possible way of making this clearer, it must be by opposition: wherefore let us see what Divines have to say to the contrary.  
GROTIUS gives all we ask from this place, which he gives for nothing, because it concerns not the Election of Pastors, but of Deacons. As if STEPHEN and PHILIP had not only been Preachers of the Gospel, but done Miracles. What Dr. SEAMAN denys or grants in relation to the same, I have endeavoured to understand, but it will not do. Dr. HAMMOND is so plain, that his Objections may be of use. He, to prove that the Ordination of these Deacons was not in the Chirotonia of their Disciples, but in the Chirothesia of the Apostles, has these Arguments.  
THERE be two things distinctly set down, Election permitted to the People, and the (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) constituting reserved to the Apostles.  
TO which I answer, That there were two things set down by the Athenian Law, Election of the Thesmothetae by the People, and the (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) constituting of them by the Senate; yet that the Ordination was in the Power, and that the Power was in the People of Athens: he that makes a doubt, is not resolved whether the most popular Commonwealth that ever was were a Démocracy.  
BUT, says he, this looking out of men, or choosing, was permitted to the Multitude by the Apostles with these three bounds: First, to take seven, neither more nor fewer: Secondly, those men generally known and well reputed of: And thirdly, full of the Spirit, and of Discretion or parts ●it for Government. To which I answer, That the Election of the Thesmothetae was permitted by the Law to the People of Athens with these three bounds; First to take six, neither more nor fewer: Secondly, those generally known and reputed of: Thirdly, in such estimation for their honesty and ability for Government, as in their consciences (to which also they made Oath) they should judge fittest for the Commonwealth. Yet is all this so far from any proof that Athens was no Democracy, or that the Sovereign Power, whether in enacting of Laws, or election of Magistrates by the Lot or the Suffrage (Institutions equally popular) was not in the People, that it amounts to the strongest argument that the People were Sovereign, and the Commonwealth was Democratical. Can Truth desire greater advantage than redounds from such opposition? We have another example of the same Model, in which, because it has been paraphrased upon already in the Introduction, I shall be 
Acts 13.  briefer here. In the Church of Antioch, where the Disciples were now become so numerous, that they began to be called Christians, Chap. 5 there were among them Prophets: so being assembled on occasion, as I conceive, of giving an extraordinary Commission after the manner of the people of Athens when they elected Ambassadors, or (that I may avoid strife upon a point so indifferent) to choose two new Apostles, The Holy Ghost said, Separate me BARNABAS and SAUL for the Work whereto I have appointed them: that is (for so it is rendered by all Interpreters) the Holy Ghost spoke those words by the mouths of the Prophets. Now the Prophets being well known for such, this Suffrage of theirs was no sooner given, than (as one that can allow Prophets to be leading men may easily think) followed by all the rest of the Congregation: So the whole multitude having fasted and prayed, the most eminent among them, or the Senatorian Order in that Church, laid their hands upon PAUL and BARNABAS, who being thus sent forth by the Holy Ghost, departed to Seleucia.  
TO evade this apparent Election, or Chirotonia of the whole Congregation, whereby these Apostles or Ambassadors to the Churches of the Gentiles were ordained, Divines have nothing to say, but that they were elected by the Holy Ghost: As if the Chirotonia of the People were more exclusive to election by the Holy Ghost, than the Chirothesia of the Aristocracy, for which in the mean time they contend. But if neither of these were indeed exclusive of the Holy Ghost, how is it possible in this frame (where tho of natural necessity an Aristocracy must have been included, yet the Aristocracy is not in the Text so much as distinguished from the People, or once named) that the Power, and so the Ordination should not have been in the People? The Council of the Apostles, of the Elders, and of the whole Church at Jerusalem, and other Councils, not of Apostles, nor of the whole Church, in other times or places, used this form in their Acts; It seems good to the Holy 
Acts 15. 22.  Ghost, and to us: But does this, whether a true or a pretended stile, exclude that Act from being an Act of that whole Council? Or how comes it to pass that because PAUL and BARNABAS were separated by the Holy Ghost, they were not ordained by the Chirotonia of the whole Christian People at Antioch?  
THE Chirothesia can be no otherwise understood in nature, nor ever was in the Commonwealth of the Jews, than Election by the few: And so even under the mere Chirothesia, Ordination and Election were not two, but one and the same thing. If MOSES ordained JOSHUA his Successor by the Chirothesia, he elected JOSHUA his Successor by the Chirothesia; and for what reason must it be otherwise with the Chirotonia? That a Pharisee could do more with one hand▪ or a pair of hands, than a Christian Church or Congregation can do with all their hands, is a Doctrine very much for the honour of the true Religion, and a sovereign Maxim of Ecclesiastical Policy.  

Third way of Ordination in the Church of Christ.  THE third Constitution of Church-Government in Scripture (whether consisting of Bishops or Presbyters, between which at this time a man shall hardly find a difference) runs wholly upon the Aristocracy, without mention of the People, and is therefore compared by GROTIUS to the Sanhedrim of Israel, as that came to be in these 
Grot. ad 1 Tim. 4. 14.  days; from whence Divines also generally and truly confess that it was taken up: to which I shall need to add no more, than that it is an Order for which there is no Precept, either in the Old Testament of God, or in the New Testament of Christ. This therefore thus taken up by the Book TWO Apostles from the Jews, is a clear demonstration that the Government of the Church, in what purity soever of the Times, nay though under the inspection of the Apostles themselves, has been obnoxious to that of the State wherein it was planted. The Sanhedrim, from the institution of the Chirothesia, for a constant Order, consisted of no other Senators than such only as had been ordained by the Imposition of Hands; which came now to be conferred by the Prince, in the presence, or with the assistance of the Sanhedrim. The same Order was 
Grot. ad Mat. 19 13.  observed by the Jewish Synagogues, of which each had her Archon; nor would the Jews converted to the Christian Faith, relinquish the Law of MOSES, whereto this way of Ordination, among other things, though erroneously, was vulgarly attributed: whence in the Church, where it consisted of converted Jews, Ordination was conferred by the Archon, or first in order of the Presbytery, with the assistance of the rest. Hence PAUL, in one place, exhorts TIMOTHY thus: 
1 Tim. 4. 14.  Neglect not the Gift that is in thee, which was given thee by Prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery. And in another thus: 
2 Tim. 1. 6.  Wherefore I put thee in remembrance, that thou stir up the Gift of God which is in thee by the putting on of my hands.  
I GRANT Divines, that Ordination by this time was wholly in the Presbytery; what say they then to the distinction of Ordination and Election? Are these still two distinct things, or may we hence, at least, compute them to be one and the same? If they say Yes, why then might they not have been so before? If they say No, who in this place, but the Presbytery, elected? Why, says Dr. HAMMOND, 
§. 106.  it is plain that the Spirit of Prophecy elected. But to give account of no more than is already performed, were the spirit of History rather than of Prophecy, to which it appertains to tell things before they be done; as did the Prophets now living in this Church, that TIMOTHY should come to be ordained: So the place is interpreted by GROTIUS; and how it should be otherwise understood I cannot see. But putting the case some Act preceded, as SAUL and DAVID were elected Kings by Prophecy; yet did ever man say that for this SAUL or DAVID were any whit the less elected Kings by the People? To the contrary in every well-ordered Commonwealth (a Jove principium) the disposing of the Lot, and of the Suffrage too, has universally been attributed to God.  
THE Piety of Divines in persuading the People that God elects 
§. 134.  for them, and therefore they need not trouble themselves to vote, is as if they should persuade them that God provides their daily Bread, and therefore they need not trouble themselves to work. To conclude this point with Dr. HAMMOND'S own words upon the same occasion; this distinction of Ordination and Election is in Divines the procreative 
§. 111.  Mistake, or Ignorance producing all the rest.  
THE reason why PAUL ordained now after this manner among the Jews, is to me an irrefragable argument that he ordained not after this manner among the Gentiles: for whereas the first Ordination in the Christian Church, namely that of MATHIAS, was performed by the Chirotonia, which by degrees came now in complacence with the Jews to the Chirothesia; it seems he was contented not to alter the worst of political Institutions or Customs, where he found them confirmed by long and universal Practice: and if so, why should any man think that he would go about to alter, or weed out the best, where they had taken like root? That this Administration of the Jews was Chap. 5 of the very worst, is clear in the nature of the Politics, there being no example of a pure Aristocracy or of a Senate, such as was now the Sanhedrim, without a popular balance, that ever governed with Justice, or was of any continuance. Nor was the Chirothesia, by which means this work came to effect in Israel, introduced by the prudence of God, but by the corrupt arts of Men. Now that the Governments at the same time of the Gentiles, all balanced by the Chirotonia of the People, were in their nature more excellent, and indeed more accommodated to ancient Prudence, as it was introduced by God himself in the Commonwealth of Israel, has been already sufficiently proved: nevertheless, to refresh your memory with one example more.  
CRETE having been (as is affirmed by the Consent of Authors) the most ancient, and the most excellent Commonwealth in human Story, was founded by RHADAMANTHUS and MINOS, an Age before the Trojan War: These were held to have learned their Arts by familiar Discourse with JUPITER, and from point to point to have framed their Model according to his direction. Nor, though all acknowledge MINOS to have been a King, did he found his Government upon any other than a popular Balance, or a fundamental regard to the Liberty of the People: For the whole Commonwealth was made up of these three 
Epitome of the Commonwealth of Crete.  parts, the College, the Senate, and the People. The College consisted of the annual Magistrates called the Cosmi: these had the whole extentive Power, some in leading forth the Arms, and others in judging the People; which Functions were accordingly assigned by the Orders to each in particular. That which was common to them all, was to propose such things as they had debated or prepared in their College or Council, to the Senat. The Senate being elective for life, was the Council, to which appertained the Debate of whatever was to be proposed to the Congregation. The Congregation, or Assembly of the People of Crete, had not the right of Debate; but in enacting of Laws, and election of Magistrates, had the ultimat Result of the Commonwealth. Such was the Copy after which LYCURGUS wrote himself so famous a Legislator. And thus stood this Frame to the six hundred and eighth year of Rome; when this People, having been too favourable to Pirates then infesting those Seas, turned the Arms of the Romans upon themselves; and by these, under the conduct of QUINCTUS METELLUS, thence called CRETICUS, Crete was made a Province: though the chief Cities being first freed, it should seem (by CICERO'S second Oration against Antony) that the whole Island was at length restored to her ancient Liberty. However by the manner observed by the Romans, as was shown, in Provincial Government, the Cities under their Magistrates (who while the Commonwealth was a Province perhaps might have exercised the Office of the Cosmi) were not yet deprived of their Popular Assemblies, at least in their distinct Cities, electing all Magistrates for their (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) peculiar or domestic Government. Such was the State of Crete, when PAUL having appealed from the Jews to CAESAR; and being thereupon conducted by Sea towards Rome, touched in his way upon this Island, where he left TITUS to constitute Elders in every City. The word (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) constitute, our Divines will have to signify ordain by Imposition of Hands, and Imposition of Hands to signify an act of Power, excluding the People. But why PAUL, who among the Jews had complied with their Customs, should enjoin; or how TITUS, had it been so Book TWO enjoined, should accomplish this where the Power was Popular, they have not shown nor considered. To introduce Religion or Government there be but two ways, either by persuasion, or by force. To persuade the people of Crete, in whom was the Power, to this new way of Ordination, TITUS must have spoken to this effect: Men of Crete, MINOS being a King, could not choose but have a natural inclination to popular Power; wherefore his pretence that JUPITER told him, Power was to be in the People, may be suspected to have been imagined merely for his own ends: or this is a certain sign that JUPITER is no true, but a feigned God; seeing the true God will have it that the People should have no Power at all, but that such, upon whom his Ambassadors shall confer power, be without all dispute obeyed. How! are you starting at this! are you solicitous for your Commonwealth! It is true, that upon carnal principles or human prudence, without Power in the People there can be no Commonwealth: but Israel was a Commonwealth without power in the People; where MOSES made all the Laws by the power invested in him by God, and created all the Magistrates, not by popular suffrage, but by his Chirothesia. Wherefore, Men of Crete, know ye, that on whomsoever I lay my hands, the same is in all spiritual Affairs, or matters of Church-Government, to be obeyed by you, after the same manner that you have hitherto obeyed such Magistrates or Priests as have been ordained by your own Election, or Chirotonia. Of what other nature the Arguments of TITUS to the pretended purpose could have been, I am not able to imagine; nor how this should have done less than provoke the People to a dangerous jealousy of such a Doctrine. But Divines, to set all straight, think it enough to repeat the words of PAUL to TITUS in Greece: 
Tit. 1. 5. De Corond.  For this cause left I thee in Crete (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) that thou shouldst ordain Elders in every City. It is true that DEMOSTHENES speaks somewhat like words concerning the Expedition of PHILIP of Macedon in Peloponnesus (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) when he had ordained Tyrants in every City: but then PHILIP had an Army; what Army did PAUL leave with TITUS? Or if he ordained his Elders neither of these two ways, I see no other than that only by the known and legal Chirotonia or Suffrage of the People. But if this be clear, the Clergy come from Crete, not upon the Wings of TITUS, but of ICARUS, whose ambitious Wax is dissolved by the Sun.  
SO much, I conceive, is now discovered concerning Church-Government, as may show that it was not of one, but of three kinds, each obnoxious to the nature of the Civil Government under which it was planted; in as much as the Chirotonia, or Ballot of Israel, being first introduced pure, and without any mixture, as at the Ordination of MATHIAS, came afterwards to receive some mixture of the Chirothesia, as in the Ordination of STEPHEN; and last of all by excluding the People, to degenerate wholly into the Chirothesia of the Presbytery, as in the Ordination of TIMOTHY: all this by the testimony of Scripture, and in the purest times, even the age of the Apostles. Whence my Undertaking, to show that as CHRIST intended his Doctrine should be preached to all Nations, so he intended his Discipline should be such as might suit with any Government (as indeed, if the choice of any of these three be lawful, it does exactly) is, I hope, performed. For where the Government is Popular, it is the same with the first; where it is Aristocratical or Monarchical, it agrees with the last; and where it is mixed, it is between both, and responsible to the second. Of these three in the farther exercise of their natural and Chap. 5 intended compliance with Human Prudence, it may be convenient to give some fuller Exemplification.  
THAT any other Ordination than that of the first kind for the original Authority or Practice of it, whether in the Commonwealth of Israel or in the Church of Christ, and indeed for the Prerogative of the same in nature, should have been introduced by the Apostles, where it might, much less where the nature of the civil Policy would admit of no other, is neither probable by Scripture nor Reason; whence it is that in the Cities of Lycaonia and Pisidia, the Government of these being then Popular, we do not find any mention at all of the Chirothesia, the Apostles in these places (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) chirotonizing Elders in every Congregation.  
TO evade this place, our Adversaries turn tail to the things, and make their whole flight at the words. In taking one of them into the Disputation, I shall take in all, for they run all upon the same Quotations, or with little addition.  

§. 3.  THAT the word Chirotonizing, says Dr. HAMMOND, in this place signifys no more than ordaining by the Imposition of Hands, is not so generally acknowleged by late Writers, but that it may be useful to give some few Testimonies out of those Writers which were nearest the times of the Scripture. Thus PHILO JUDAEUS of JOSEPH (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) he was ordained Governor of all Egypt under the King. So again of MOSES (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) he was constituted their Ruler. So of AARON'S Sons (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) God constituted them Priests. ALEXANDER Son of ANTIOCHUS' EPIPHANES writes to JONATHAN (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) 
Joseph. An. L. 13. c. 5.  We (in the regal stile) constitute thee High Priest. LUCIAN says of HEPHESTION (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) that ALEXANDER made him a God when he was dead. APPIAN (which is added out of GROTIUS, whence most of the rest is taken) to signify Election of Magistrates made by the Roman Emperors, uses no other word; and later Writers speak of some that were chirotonized Emperors by their Fathers. For the use of the word among Christian Writers, take one place in the Author of the Constitutions 
L. 7. c. 45.  for many; CLEMENT after the death of LINUS (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) was ordained Bishop of Rome by PETER. But what need any more? CHRIST'S Disciples are said (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) designed 
Act. 10. 41.  or foreconstituted by God the witnesses of his Resurrection: by all which that of PAUL and BARNABAS (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) is but constituting or creating Elders in every Church. Wherefore they that have looked so far back to the Original, as to think it necessary to render the word to create by Suffrages, are sure guilty of a very impertinent nicety. I promise you had this been against one of our Doctors, it might have been a rude Charge; but it is only against ERASMUS, BEZA, DIODATI, and such as took upon them to translate the Switz, French, Italian, Belgic, and (till the Episcopal correction) the English Bibles. And what apparent cause is there of such confidence? What necessity is there even in the places alleged why the word Chirotonia should be understood in the sense imposed? The People of Egypt, till having sold their Lands they came to lose their Popular balance, were not Servants to PHARAOH; wherefore when JOSEPH was made Governor over all Egypt they were free: Book TWO now that a King should make a Governor of a free People without their consent, or some advice as we say of his Parliament, is altogether improbable, the rather because a Protector, in the absence or minority of the King, has been no otherwise made in England, nor pretends the present Protector to any other title than the like Chirotonia. But that MOSES is said by the same Author (who affirmed that he introduced the Chirotonia in Israel) to have been chirotonized Ruler of the People, can in my judgement be no otherwise than originally and literally taken, seeing God himself was not otherwise made King in Israel than by the Suffrage of the People. That the like must be understood of the Sons of AARON has been already shown. The Doctor is the first has told me, that the plural number for the Royal Style is so ancient as EPIPHANES: Sure I am it was not derived from his Macedonian Predecessors, for in the Letters to the Athenians and the Thebans 
De Cor.  recited by DEMOSTHENES, PHILIP of Macedon writes in the singular number. But the Letter of EPIPHANES to JONATHAN must it seems import that he at single hand (though the words carry double) had chirotonized a High Priest of the Jews: Who can help it? Some Princes have not only given out that their Priests have been chirotonized when they were not, but that themselves have been chirotonized when there was no such matter. When a Prince says that he was chirotonized or elected by the People, to talk of Rhetoric is to have none. Divines in this case commonly understand it to be proper, or literally meant; for to impose a new sense is to spoil the word; and spoil the word, spoil the Prince. LUCIAN is a Drol, and intends a Jest, but not so good a one, as that he of all others should come nearest to help up with a Hierarchy. For the Chirotonia, or Election of the Roman Magistrates by the Suffrage of the People or of the Army, every man knows that it is literal: SUIDAS himself interpreting the word by this very example; where he affirms it to signify Election or Ratification by the Many. The Quotation out of the Constitutions, with those of Bishop BILSON, and others out of the Greece Fathers, and out of Councils, do not only imply the word Chirotonia, but the thing, while they all relate to that kind of Ordination, which being in those Churches yet administered as at the Ordination of STEPHEN, was not conferred without the consent of the People. But it is above all, that labouring to prove the Chirotonia and the Chirothesia to be the same thing, they should rely most upon the place where the Apostles are said (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to have been forechirotonized by God; as if it were clear in this, that God ordained the Apostles by the laying on of Hands, for so it must be understood, or it makes no more for them than for us. Or if they mean it only to show that the word Chirotonia or Suffrage is used for some Ordination that cannot be taken in our sense; so the word Chirothesia (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) or laying on of Hands, where ANANIAS being neither Bishop nor Presbyter, but only a Disciple, that is, a Christian, lays his hands upon PAUL, is used for some Ordination that cannot be taken in their sense; or a man not ordained may ordain as well as they: for to say that the Call was extraordinary, where the like is, or is pretended, will avail little. But there is no need that we should go so near the wind; wherefore to give them all these places in their own sense, even till we come to the Cities in question. What word in any Language is not sometimes, nay frequently, used in some other than the proper sense? With what elegance, if this be forbidden, can any Chap. 5 man write or speak? Is a word like a Woman that being taken with a Metaphor, it can never be restored to the Original Virtue? If Chirotonia has, as Divines pretend, lost all other but their signification, how shall we understand it in Isaiah, or where PAUL speaks it of the Brother (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) chirotonized, or chosen by 
2 Cor. 8. 19▪  the Churches? Certainly in this one place at least it is of our sense, and in the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it is but once yet in all the New Testament of any other; so that if we gain the place in controversy, we have it twice of our sense in Scripture for once not in theirs, but in any other: and in human Authors, they will not so much as pretend to have it once for them of a hundred times for us; which is pretty well for the vindication of the property of one word, and somewhat more perhaps than can be done for another. But in the sense of words that are sometimes properly and sometimes improperly taken, may we admit of the things whereof they are spoken for Interpreters? Or if Lillys and Roses have been almost as often said of Lady's Cheeks, must we understand them not otherwise when we are speaking of Gardens?  
YES, says Dr. HAMMOND, and therefore to say of the Apostles PAUL and BARNABAS, that they created Elders by their own Suffrages, is no more than to say that they jointly did create, and indeed being but two, there could be no place for Suffrages; and to affirm they did it by the Suffrages of others, is not agreeable to the pretended use of the word; for where it is used of choosing by Suffrages, as when the People are said to chirotonize, it is certain that their own, and not others Suffrages are meant by it.  

His own words to Mr. Hobbs▪ §. 118.  IT were hardly possible to have contrived a greater number of Affirmations in so small a compass, nor to have gone farther in them from all truth. Phrases, as words, are to be understood according to the Rule and Law of Speech, which is Use: and thus that the Apostles created Elders by their own Suffrage, is not said; that they did it by the Suffrage of others, is necessarily employed; as also that the People are understood to chirotonize as well when it is said of the Precedents of their Assemblies, as of themselves.  
Diruit, aedificat, mutat quadrata rotundis.  
WHEN a man is said to build a House, or marry a Daughter, he is not understood to be the Mason, or the Bridegroom: but the Apostles built Churches in these Cities; therefore the People were not the Masons. The Apostles married CHRIST to these Nations; therefore the People gave not their Consent or Suffrage: what a Construction were this in ordinary discourse or writing, and yet in the Language, as I may say, of a Commonwealth the Phrase is more usual. How often does DEMOSTHENES speak of his Laws (see my Psephisma, 
De Coron.  peruse my Law) and those of other private men? after which Copy the Parté, or Laws in the Commonwealth of Venice, are called by the names of the Proposers, as were those of Rome, Rupilia, Cornelia, Trebonia; in which manner we have poinding's Law, and some Statutes bearing no other Style than Enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, which nevertheless are known to have been all enacted by the Parliament. Thus the Laws of MOSES, RHADAMANTHUS, Book TWO MINOS, LYCURGUS, SOLON, ROMULUS, King EDWARD, were (leges & consuetudines quas vulgus elegerit) such as the People had confirmed or chosen by their Chirotonia. But they may say, granting you this use of speech in relation to Laws, what have you of this kind for Elections? The Exception is nice, but to leave none.  
THE High Sheriffs in England proposing to their Counties the Names of such as stand, are said to elect Parlament-men. They that thus propose Competitors to the Great Council in Venice are called Electors, and said to elect the Magistrates. The Proedris, certain Magistrates to whom it belonged to put the Question in the Representative of the People of Athens, consisting of one thousand, were said 
Demost. count. Timocrat.  (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) to give or make the Suffrage. The Thesmothetae, who were Precedents at the creation of Magistrates, were said (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) 
Pol. l. 8. c. 8.  to chirotonize the Generals. JOSEPHUS renders those words of God to SAMUEL, Harken to the Voice of the People (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) 
Ant. l. 6. c. 4.  I command thee to chirotonize them a King; which Authors vindicating LUKE for his understanding both of the Grecian Customs, and property of Speech, at each of which he was expert, come up to the full and genuine interpretation of the place in controversy, where PAUL and BARNABAS (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) chirotonizing them Elders in every Congregation, can be no otherwise understood than that they here, as MOSES at the institution of the Sanhedrim, SAMUEL at the Election of the King, the Proedris at the passing of Laws, the Thesmothetae at the creation of Magistrates, the Electors in the great Council of Venice, and the High Sheriffs in the Counties of England, were no more than Precedents of that Chirotonia, which was given or made by the Suffrage of the People.  
WHEREFORE the Greece is thus rendered by these several Translations of the Bible.  
That of Zurich, 
WHEN they had created them Elders by Suffrages in every Congregation.   
That of Beza, 
WHEN they had created them Elders by Suffrages in every Congregation.   
The French, 
WHEN by the advice of the Assemblys they had established Elders.   
The Italian, 
WHEN by the advice of the Congregation they had constituted them Elders.   
That of Diodati, 
WHEN they had ordained them in every Church by the common votes of the Elders.   
That appointed by the Synod of Dort, 
WHEN in each Church, by the holding up of Hands, they had elected Presbyters.   
That used in England from the time of the Reformation till the Episcopal correction of the same, 
WHEN they had ordained them Elders by Election in every Congregation.   
INDEED the circumstance of the Place forbids any other construction Chap. 5 of the words; for if the Suffrage or Chirotonia (which were scarce sense) related to the Apostles only, what needed they have done that in every Congregation or Church, which they might have done in any Chamber or Closet? The circumstance of the Action forbids any other construction; for the People were assembled upon occasion of Election or Creation of Officers, which thing does not use to be done in Assemblys gathered for Divine Service: besides, these Congregations were not always of one mind, but sometimes for sacrificing to the Apostles, sometimes for stoning them, which are acts of Power; wherefore they were Political Assemblys. Now these consisting also of a People, that had in their Cities (quandam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) the government of themselves, hence arises the strongest circumstance of all, forbidding any interpretation of the Text that might exclude them from election of their own Magistrates, Priests, or Ecclesiastical Elders, such as had been the Asiarches, though Heathen Prelates, yet remembered by the Scripture as affectionate Friends to PAUL; or such as were those, though 
Acts 19 31▪  to a better end, now ordained by the Apostles. Wherefore GROTIUS, notwithstanding all the art he uses in other places to avoid this sense, giving his note upon the Text, yields, Tho chirotonizing may be said of any Election made by one, or by the few; yet to the Election in this place it is probable that the consent of the People was given, no less being implied in the beginning of the Chapter, where the Multitude believed, where they were stirred up, where they were evil affected, and where part held with the Jews, and part with the Apostles: Which shows that the People were active in the business. But, says Dr. SEAMAM, There is difference between the Consent of the People, and the Power of the People: which is not to understand the case in controversy, nor to take notice that the People whereof we are speaking were under Popular Government; for wherever the People are under Popular Government, between that which is done by their consent, and that which is done (jussu populi) by their power, there is no difference. How should the People give their consent, but by their Suffrage? or what difference, where they have Power, can there be between the Suffrage, and the Power of the People?  
Dr. HAMMOND upon this point is far more acquaint: where the Scripture says, that the Multitude were evil effected, and where part held with the Jews, and part with the Apostles, he thinks it even like enough: But where it is said that a great Multitude of the Jews, and also of the Greecs believed, he seems to have no opinion of it: for, says he, It is evident that Believers were at first but few in every Town or City; 
§. 134.  they were not whole Corporations at once converted, nor consequently could they act in a common capacity: but as CLEMENS ROMANUS says, they that were by the Apostles constituted Bishops and Deacons in several Cities and Regions, were constituted over those that should after believe, there were oft so few at the present. And then, as fast as any did come into the Faith, they readily submitted themselves to those by and under whom they did come in, and were not at all troubled (honest men) with the consolation or deliberation about the way of electing their Teachers and Guides.  
COM away, to leave the Scripture a while, and follow CLEMENS; be it so for discourse sake, that in those days there was not where any such thing as a great Multitude believing, much less whole States or Book TWO Commonwealths at once converted, whereby they might still act in a common capacity, but only some private or gathered Congregations or Churches; and that in such it was the Apostles PAUL and BARNABAS chirotonized: yet these, as they were found, or as afterwards they came to be made, must of necessity have been Corporations; for what can a number of Men coming into a Society regulated by certain Laws, Constitutions, or Form, be but a Corporation? Some Ecclesiastical Policy or Discipline they must have had; and that probably, seeing the greatest Legislators, even MOSES himself, have written after Copies, according to some Pattern: what was this Pattern, and whence came it?  

§. 125.  WHY, says he, not from their Heathen Customs, but from the Metropolis; for it must be remembered, that whersoever the Gospel was preached, it came originally from Jerusalem; and then, as AGRIPPA in PHILO 
§. 135.  says of that City, it was the Metropolis, not only of Judea, but many other Regions, because of the Colonies thence sent into Egypt, Phenice, and both the Syria's; nay, to Pamphylia, Cilicia, and a great part of Asia, as far as Bythinia and Pontus. So in reason the Churches in Lystra, Iconium, and Antioch, where PAUL and BARNABAS ordained Elders, were to follow the pattern at Jerusalem; and there, we know, it was not by the Suffrage of the People, that an Elder was assumed into the Sanhedrim, but the Prince or Head of the Sanhedrim received him in by Imposition of Hands. It will be much more reasonable to deduce the circumstances of ordaining Elders from the Customs familiar to them that preached the Faith to them, than from the former usages of them to whom it was preached, who were not to dispute, but to believe, and receive the Institutions as well as Doctrines which were brought them.  
THESE, methinks, are strange Arguments: The Gospel came to us from Rome, is Rome therefore the Metropolis of England? It is true AGRIPPA being a Jew, and writing to CALIGULA in the behalf 
Philo de legatione ad Caium.  of the Jews, not of the Christians, tells him, That Jerusalem is the Metropolis of the Jews, and of all their Colonies; so is London of the English, and of all their Colonies: but does it follow from hence that either Jerusalem or London is the Metropolis of Christendom? But the Jews had many Colonies in Asia; and therefore the Churches of Lystra, Iconium, and Antioch were to follow the pattern at Jerusalem. The Jews indeed had Synagogs' in Iconium and Lystra, as the French have Churches in England; but is this a good argument, The French have Churches in England, therefore the English are to follow the Orders of the French Church? The Jews withstood the Gospel at Iconium; for, 
Acts 14. 4.  says the Text, the Multitude of the City was divided, and part held with the Jews, and part with the Apostles: therefore the believing Iconians must have acknowleged Jerusalem to be their Metropolis, and were to follow the pattern of that City: And what was that? Why there we know it was not by the Suffrages of the People that an Elder was assumed into the Sanhedrim, but the Prince or Head of the Sanhedrim received him in by Imposition of Hands. The Government of the Iconians was Popular, that of the Jews was Aristocratical; therefore the Iconians receiving the Christian Faith, were bound to change their Democracy into Aristocracy. The Apostles, to comply with an Oligarchy, had altered that Ordination, which originally (as at the Election of MATHIAS) was popular, to Aristocracy; therefore being now to plant the Gospel in a free State, they might not alter it from Aristocracy to Democracy: To please the Jews they might change for the worse; therefore to please the Iconians they might not charge for the better, Chap. 5 but must tell the People plainly, That they were not to dispute, but to believe, and receive the Institutions as well as Doctrines that were brought them from the Metropolis. How would this sound to a People that understood themselves?  
Sic volo, sic jubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas.  
THE right temper of a Metropolitan, to whom Popular Power is a Heathen Custom, and with whom nothing will agree but Princeing of it in the Senate: But with the Apostles it was otherwise, who making no words of the Chirothesia where it was needless, were glad of this occasion to chirotonize, or elect them Elders in every Congregation by Popular Suffrage. But this, they will say, is not to come off from the haunt, but to run still upon the People in a common or public capacity. Tho the Scripture speaks of great Multitudes believing, believe it there is no such thing: CLEMENS says they were very few, their Assemblies private, and very scanty things. As private as they were, by the judgement of Divines they were, it seems, to receive from their Pattern (if that were the Sanhedrim) a Form that was public enough; and why might not they have received this from that public Form whereto they were accustomed, rather than from a foreign Policy, and one contrary to their Customs? why should they suffer such Power in new and private, as they would not endure in their old and public Magistrates? Or, if they received the Scriptures, why should they choose that Ordination which would fit them worst, rather than that which would fit them best? that of TIMOTHY rather than that of MATHIAS? Or, let their Assemblies have been never so private or scanty, yet if the Apostles chirotonized them Elders in every Congregation, is it not demonstrable that they did receive that of MATHIAS, and not that of TIMOTHY?  
THUS much for the Propagation of the pure, or first kind of Ecclesiastical Policy to the Cities of Lycaonia. The mixed or second kind into which (the Christian Presbytery delighting to follow the steps of the Jewish) the former might soon degenerate, continued in the primitive Church, to speak with the least (for WALLEUS brings it down to CHARLES the Great) three hundred years after CHRIST: which Assertion in Mr. HOBBS, proved out of AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, Dr. HAMMOND has either willingly overseen, or includes in this Answer, it is most visibly void of all appearance of Truth. 
§. 138.  Wherefore to the Quotation mentioned I shall add the words of PLATINA: DAMASUS the second, by Nation a Bavarian, surnamed BAGNIARIUS, or as some will POPO, possessed himself of the Papacy by force, and without consent of the Clergy and of the People. Now what can be clearer than that by this place the Clergy and the People had hitherto a right to elect the Pope? The Doctor comes near the word of defiance to Mr. HOBBS, in a matter of fact so apparent to any judgement, that I need not add what goes before in the Life of CLEMENT the second; where the Emperor engages the People of Rome not to meddle with the Election of the Pope without his express Command: nor what follows after in LEO the Ninth, where the whole power of Election was now conferred by the Emperor upon the Clergy. Again, VICTOR the Second, says the same Author, obtained the Papacy rather by favour of the Emperor, than by free Suffrages of the Clergy and the People of Rome, who apprehended the power of the Emperor, whose displeasure they had sometime incurred by creating Popes. So then the People, it is clear, had hitherto Book TWO created the Popes. The power of Election thus in the whole Clergy came afterwards, as at this day, to be restrained to the Cardinals only; and so to devolve into the third kind of Ordination exactly correspondent to the Sanhedrim, and their Chirothesia, as it was exercised among the converted Jews, when TIMOTHY was ordained by the laying on of the Hands of the Presbytery.  
NOW this is that with which, of all others, Divines are so enamoured, that they will not endure it should be said there is any other: It is also propitious above all the rest to Monarchy, as that which according to the inherent nature or impotence of Oligarchy, must have a Prince at home or abroad to rest upon, or become the inevitable Prey of the People. Herein lies the Arcanum or Secret of that Antipathy which is between a Clergy and a Popular Government, and of that Sympathy which is between the Mitre and the Crown. A Prince receiving a Clergy with the Monopoly of their Chirothesia, has no more to do than to make a Metropolitan, by whom he governs them, and by them the People, especially if he indows them with good Revenues; for so they become an Estate of his Realm, and a more steady Pillar of his Throne than his Nobility themselves, who as their dependence is not so strong, are of a more stirring nature. This is the Gothic Model, from whence we had our Pattern, and in which No Bishop, no King.  
THUS for the dignity of Ecclesiastical Policys, whether in Scripture or Human Prudence, Popular Government you see is naturally inclined to the very best, and the spiritual Aristocracy to the very worst. It is also remarkable that the Political Balance extends itself to the decision of the question about Ordination: For as a People never offered to dispute with a well-balanced Clergy, so a Clergy dismounted never gained any thing by disputing with the People. As to the question of Empire or Government (I propheti disarmati Rovivano) the Apostles became all things to all.  

His own words to Mr. Hobs. §. 122.  THUS beyond all measure improsperous are this Divine'svndertaking against Mr. HOBBS, and thevndertaking of Divines upon this Subject.  

Advertisement to the Reader, or Direction to the Answerer.  
THE Answer of this Book must lie in proving that the Apostles at the several times and places mentioned, introduced but one way of Ordination, and that the same to which Divines now pretend: or if the Apostles divided, that is to say, introduced divers ways of Ordination, than the People or Magistrate may choose.  
I HAVE taken the more leisure and pains to state, I think, all the Cases of Controversy that can arise out of the Commonwealth of Oceana, as you have seen in these two Books, to the end I may be no more obliged to write, and yet not omit writing on any occasion that shall be offered; for if my Principles be overthrown (which when I see, I shall most ingenuously confess with thanks to the Author) such an acknowledgement will lie in a little room; and this failing, I am deceived if I shall not now be able to show any Writer against me that his Answer is none, within the compass of three or four sheets.  
THIS also will be the fittest way for Boys-play, with which I am sure enough to be entertained by the quibbling University men; I mean a certain busy Gang of 'em, who having publicly vaunted that they would bring 40 examples against the Balance, and since laid their Caps together about it, have not produced one. These vaunts of theirs offering prejudice to truth and good Principles, were the cause why they were indeed pressed to show some of their skill; not that they were thought fit Judges of these things, but first that they had declared themselves so, and next that they may know they are not.    

An Answer to three Objections against Popular Government, that were given me after these two Books were printed.  

Object. 1.  MONARCHICAL Government is more natural, because we see even in Commonwealths that they have recourse to this, as Lacedaemon in her Kings; Rome both in her Consuls and Dictator's; and Venice in her Dukes.  

Answer▪  GOVERNMENT, whether Popular or Monarchical, is equally artificial; wherefore to know which is more natural, we must consider what piece of Art comes nearest to Nature: as for example, whether a Ship or a House be the more natural; and than it will be easy to resolve that a Ship is the more natural at Sea, and a House at Land. In like manner where one man or a few men are the Landlords, a Monarchy must doubtless be the more natural; and where the whole People are the Landlords, a Commonwealth: for how can we understand that it should be natural to a People, that can live of themselves, to give away the means of their livelihood to one or a few men that they may serve or obey? Each Government is equally artificial in effect, or in itself; and equally natural in the cause, or the matter upon which it is founded.  
A COMMONWEALTH consists of the Senate proposing, the People resolving, and the Magistracy executing; so the Power of the Magistrates (whether Kings as in Lacedaemon, Consuls as in Rome, or Dukes as in Venice) is but barely executive: but to a Monarch belongs both the Result, and Execution too; wherefore that there have been Dukes, Consuls, or Kings in Commonwealths (which were quite of another nature) is no Argument that Monarchical Government is for this cause the more natural.  
AND if a man shall instance in a mixed Government, as King and Parliament; to say, that the King in this was more natural than the Parliament, must be a strange Affirmation.  
TO argue from the Roman Dictator (an Imperfection which ruin'd that Commonwealth, and was not to be found in any other) that all Commonwealths have had the like recourse in exigences to the like remedy, is quite contrary to the universal Testimony of Prudence or Story.  
A MAN who considers that the Commonwealth of Venice has stood one thousand years (which never any Monarchy did) and yet shall affirm that Monarchical Government is more natural than Popular, must affirm that a thing which is less natural may be more durable and permanent than a thing that is more natural.  
WHETHER is a Government of Laws less natural than a Government of Men? or is it more natural to a Prince to govern by Laws or by Will? Compare the Violences and bloody Rapes perpetually made upon the Crown, or Royal Dignity in the Monarchys of the Hebrews and the Romans, with the State of the Government under either Commonwealth, and tell me which was less violent, or whether that which is more violent must therefore be more natural.  

Object. 2.  THE Government of Heaven is a Monarchy, so is the Government of Hell.  

Answer.  IN this, says MACCHIAVEL, Princes lose themselves and their Empire, that they neither know how to be perfectly good, nor entirely wicked. He might as well have said, that a Prince is always subject to Error and Misgovernment, because he is a Man, and not a God, nor a Devil. A Shepherd to his Flock, a Ploughman to his Team, is a better Nature; and so not only an absolute Prince, but as it were a God. The Government of a better or of a superior Nature, is to a worse or inferior as the Government of God. The Creator is another and a better Nature than the Creature; the Government in Heaven is of the Creator over his Creatures, that have their whole dependence upon him, and subsistence in him. Where the Prince or the Few have the whole Lands, there is somewhat of dependence resembling this; so the Government there must of necessity be Monarchical or Aristocratical: But where the People have no such dependence, the causes of that Government which is in Heaven are not in Earth; for neither is the Prince a distinct or better Nature than the People, nor have they their subsistence by him, and therefore there can be no such effect. If a Man were good as God, there is no question but he would be not only a Prince but a God; would govern by Love, and be not only obeyed but worshipped: or if he were ill as the Devil, and had as much power to do mischief, he would be dreaded as much, and so govern by Fear. To which latter, the Nature of man has so much nearer approaches, that though we never saw upon Earth a Monarchy like that of Heaven, yet it is certain the perfection of the Turkish Policy lies in this, that it comes nearest to that of Hell.  

Object. 3.  GOD instituted a Monarchy, namely in MELCHIZEDEC, before he instituted a Commonwealth.  

Answer.  IF MELCHIZEDEC was a King, so was ABRAHAM too; though one that paid him Tithes, or was his Subject: for ABRAHAM made War, or had the power of the Sword, as the rest of the Fathers of Families he fought against. So if CANAAN was a Monarchy in those days, it was such a one as Germany is in these; where the Princes also have as much the right of the Sword as the Emperor, which comes rather (as has been shown already) to a Commonwealth. But whether it were a Monarchy or a Commonwealth, we may see by the present state of Germany that it was of no very good Example; nor was MELCHIZEDEC otherwise made a King by God than the Emperor, that is, as an Ordinance of Man.    

THE ART OF LAWGIVING: In Three BOOKS.  
The First, showing the Foundations and Superstructures of all kinds of Government.  
The Second, showing the Frames of the Commonwealths of Israel, and of the Jews.  
The Third, showing a Model fitted to the present State, or Balance of this Nation.   

The Order of the Work.  

The First Book.  
THE Preface, considering the Principles, or Nature of Family Governments.  
CHAP. I. Considering the Principles, or Balance of National Governments; with the different kinds of the same.  
CHAP. II. Showing the variation of the English Balance.  
CHAP. III. Of the fixation of the Balance, or of Agrarian Laws.  
CHAP. IU. Showing the Superstructures of Governments.  
THE Conclusion, observing that the Principles of Human Prudence being good without proof out of Scripture, are nevertheless such as are provable out of Scripture.   

The Second Book.  
THE Preface, showing that there were Commonwealths before that of Israel.  
CHAP. I. Showing that Israel was a Commonwealth.  
CHAP. II. Showing what Commonwealth Israel was.  
CHAP. III. Showing the Anarchy, or state of the israelites under their Judges.  
CHAP iv Showing the state of the israelites under their Kings to the Captivity.  
CHAP. V Showing the state of the Jews in Captivity, and after their return from Captivity; or the frame of the Jewish Commonwealth: and in that the Original of Ordination.  
CHAP. VI Showing how Ordination was brought into the Christian Church, and the divers ways of the same at divers times in use with the Apostles.  
THE Conclusion, Showing that neither God, nor Christ, or the Apostles ever instituted any Government Ecclesiastical or Civil, upon any other Principles than those only of Human Prudence.   

The Third Book.  
THE Preface, Containing a Model of Popular Government, proposed notionally.  
CHAP. I. Containing the Civil part of the Model, proposed practicably.  
CHAP. II. Containing the Religious part of the Model, proposed practicably.  
CHAP. III. Containing the Military part of the Model, proposed practicably.  
CHAP. IU. Containing the Provincial part of the Model, proposed practicably.  
THE Conclusion, Showing how the Model may be proved or examined; and giving a brief Answer to Mr. WREN's last Book, entitled, Monarchy asserted, etc.    

THE FIRST BOOK, SHOWING THE FOUNDATIONS AND SUPERSTRUCTURES Of all kinds of GOVERNMENT.  
If this Age fails me, the next will do me Justice.  

The PREFACE, Considering the Principles or Nature of Family Government.  
DIVINES, and the like studious Assertors of Monarchy, have not laid their Principles so fairly, while they have concealed one part from the right of Paternity, or from the Government of Families, which may be of two kinds; whereas they have taken notice but of one: For Family Government may be as necessarily Popular in some cases, as Monarchical in others.  

Monarchical Family.  TO show now the nature of the Monarchical Family. Put the case a man has one thousand Pounds a year, or thereabouts; he marrys a Wife, has Children and Servants depending upon him (at his good will) in the distribution of his Estate for their livelihood. Suppose then that this Estate comes to be spent or lost, where is the Monarchy of this Family? But if the Master was not otherwise Monarchical than by virtue of his Estate, than the foundation or balance of his Empire consisted in the thousand pounds a year.  

Popular Family.  THAT from these principles there may also be a Popular Family, is apparent: For suppose six or ten, having each three hundred pounds a year, or so, shall agree to dwell together as one Family; can any one of these pretend to be Lord and Master of the same, or to dispose of the Estates of all the rest? Or do they not agree together upon such Orders, to which they consent equally to submit? But if so, then certainly must the Government of this Book I Family be a Government of Laws or Orders, and not the Government of one, or of some three or four of these men.  

Government of Laws, and Government of Men.  YET the one Man in the Monarchical Family giving Laws, and the Many in the Popular Family doing no more, it may in this sense be indifferently said, That all Laws are made by Men. But it is plain that where the Law is made by one Man, there it may be unmade by one man; so that the Man is not governed by the Law, but the Law by the Man; which amounts to the Government of the Man, and not of the Law: Whereas the Law being not to be made but by the Many, no man is governed by another man, but by that only which is the common interest; by which means this amounts to a Government of Laws, and not of Men.  

The facility that is in true Politics.  THAT the Politics may not be thought an unnecessary or difficult Art, if these Principles be less than obvious and undeniable, even to any Woman that knows what belongs to housekeeping, I confess I have no more to say. But in case what has been said be to all sorts and capacities evident, it is most humbly submitted to Princes and Parliaments, whether, without violence or removing of Property, they can make a Popular Family of the Monarchical, or a Monarchical Family of the Popular? Or, whether that be practicable or possible in a Nation, upon the like balance or foundation in Property, which is not in a Family? A Family being but a smaller Society or Nation, and a Nation but a greater Society or Family.  

The difference between a Sovereign Lord, and a Magistrate, though supreme.  THAT which is usually answered to this point, is▪ That the six or ten, thus agreeing to make one Family, must have some Steward; and to make such a Steward in a Nation, is to make a King. But this is to imagine that the Steward of a Family is not answerable to the Masters of it, or to them upon whose Estates (and not upon his own) he defrays the whole Charge: For otherwise this Stewardship cannot amount to Dominion, but must come only to the true nature of Magistracy, and indeed of annual Magistracy in a Commonwealth; seeing that such Accounts in the years end, at farthest, use to be calculated, and that the Steward, Body and Estate, is answerable for the same to the Proprietors or Masters; who also have the undoubted right of constituting such another Steward or Stewards as to them shall seem good, or of prolonging the Office of the same.  

Where the art of Lawgiving is necessary.  NOW, where a Nation is cast, by the unseen ways of Providence, into a disorder of Government, the duty of such particularly as are elected by the People, is not so much to regard what has been, as to provide for the supreme Law, or for the safety of the People, which consists in the true Art of Lawgiving.  

The art of Lawgiving is of two kinds.  THE Art of Lawgiving is of two kinds; the one (as I may say) false, the other true. The first consists in the reduction of the Balance to Arbitrary Superstructures; which requires violence, as being contrary to Nature: The other in erecting necessary Superstructures, that is, such as are conformable to the Balance or Foundation; which, being purely natural, requires that all interposition of Force be removed.    

CHAP. I. Chap. 1  
Considering the Principles or Balance of National Governments; with the different kinds of the same.  


Psal. 115. 16. The Original of Property.  
Gen. 3. 19   THE Heaven, says DAVID, even the Heavens are the Lords; but the Earth has he given to the Children of Men: Yet, says God to the Father of these Children, In the sweat of thy Face shalt thou eat thy Bread. Dii laborantibus sua munera vendunt. This Donation of the Earth to Man comes to a kind of selling it for INDUSTRY, a Treasure which seems to purchase of God himself. From the different kinds and successes of this Industry, whether in Arms, or in other Exercises of the Mind or Body, derives the natural equity of Dominion or Property; and from the legal establishment or distribution of this Property (be it more or less approaching towards the natural equity of the same) proceeds all Government.  

The balance of Empire consists in Property.  THE distribution of Property, so far as it regards the nature or procreation of Government, lies in the overbalance of the same: Just as a man, who has two thousand pounds a year, may have a Retinue, and consequently a Strength, that is three times greater than his who enjoys but five hundred pounds a year. Not to speak at this time of Money, which in small Territories may be of a like effect; but to insist upon the main, which is Property in Land, the overbalance of this, as it was at first constituted, or comes insensibly to be changed in a Nation, may be especially of three kinds; that is, in One, in the Few, or in the Many.  

The generation of Absolute Monarchy.  THE overbalance of Land, three to one or thereabouts, in one Man against the whole People, creates Absolute Monarchy; as when JOSEPH had purchased all the Lands of the Egyptians for PHARAOH. The Constitution of a People in this and such cases, is capable of entire servitude. Buy us and our Land for Bread, and we and 
Gen. 47. 19  our Land will be Servants to PHARAOH.  


The generation of Regulated Monarchy.  
1 Sam. 8.   THE overbalance of Land to the same proportion, in the Few against the whole People, creates Aristocracy, or Regulated Monarchy, as of late in England: And hereupon says SAMUEL to the People of Israel, when they would have a King, He will take your Fields, even the best of them, and give them to his Servants. The constitution of a People in this and the like cases, is 
* Nec totam libertatem nec totam servitutem pati possunt. Tacit.  neither capable of entire Liberty, nor of entire Servitude.  

The generation of Popular Government.  THE overbalance of Land to the same proportion in the People, or where neither one nor the few overbalance the whole People, creates Popular Government; as in the division of the Land of Canaan to the whole People of Israel by lot. The constitution of a People in this and the like cases, is capable of entire Freedom, nay, not capable of any other settlement; it being certain, that if a Monarch, or single Person in such a State, thro' the corruption or improvidence of their Counsils, might carry it; yet by the irresistible force of Nature, or the reason alleged by MOSES (I am not able to bear all this People alone, 
Numb. 11. 14.  Book I because it is too heavy for me) he could not keep it; but out of the deep Waters would cry to them, whose feet he had stuck in the mire.  

Of the Militia, and of the Negative Voice.  WHEREVER the balance of a Government lies, there naturally is the Militia of the same; and against him or them wherein the Militia is naturally lodged, there can be no negative Vote.  
IF a Prince holds the overbalance, as in Turkey, in him is the Militia, as the Janizaries and Timariot. If a Nobility has the overbalance, the Militia is in them, as among us was seen in the Baron's Wars, and those of York and Lancaster; and in France is seen, when any considerable part of that Nobility rebelling, they are not to be reduced, but by the major part of their Order adhering to the King.  
IF the People has the overbalance, which they had in Israel, the 
Judg. 20.  Militia is in them; as in the four hundred thousand first decreing, and then waging War against Benjamin: Where it may be enquired, what Power there was on earth having a Negative Voice to this Assembly? This always holds where there is Settlement, or where a Government is natural. Where there is no Settlement, or where the Government is unnatural, it proceeds from one of these two causes; either an imperfection in the Balance, or else such a corruption in the Lawgivers, whereby a Government is instituted contrary to the Balance.  

Imperfect Government.  IMPERFECTIONS of the Balance, that is, where it is not good or down weight, cause imperfect Governments; as those of the Roman and of the Florentin People, and those of the Hebrew Kings and Roman Emperors, being each exceeding bloody, or at least turbulent.  

Tyranny, Oligarchy, Anarchy.  GOVERNMENT against the balance in One, is Tyranny, as that of the Athenian PISISTRATUS: in the Few it is Oligarchy, as that of the Roman DECEMVIRS; in the Many Anarchy, as that under the Neapolitan MAZINELLO.  

The Divine right of Government.  WHEREVER, thro' Causes unforeseen by Human Providence, the Balance comes to be entirely changed, it is the more immediately to be attributed to Divine Providence: And since God cannot will the necessary cause, but he must also will the necessary effect or consequence, what Government soever is in the necessary direction of the Balance, the same is of Divine Right. Wherefore, though of the israelites God says, 
●os. 8. 4.  They have set up Kings, but not by me; they have made Princes, and I knew it not; yet, to the small Countries adjoining to the Assyrian Empire, 
●●r. 27. 6, 17.  he says, Now have I given all these Lands into the hand of the King of Babylon my Servant— Serve the King of Babylon, and live.   

CHAP. II.  
Showing the variation of the English Balance.  
THE Land in possession of the Nobility and Clergy of England, till HENRY 7 th', cannot be esteemed to have overbalanced those held by the People less than four to one. Whereas in our days, the Clergy being destroyed, the Lands in possession of the People overbalance those held by the Nobility, at least, nine in ten. In showing how this change came about, some would have it that I assume to myself more than my share; though they do not find me delivering that which must rely upon Authority, and not vouching my Authors. But HENRY the Seventh being conscious of infirmity in his Title, yet finding with what strength and vigour he was brought in by the Nobility, Chap. 2 conceived jealousies of the like Power in case of a decay or change of Affections. Nondum orbis adoraverat Romam. The Lords yet led Country lives, their Houses were open to Retainers, Men experienced in Military Affairs, and capable of commanding; their Hospitality was the delight of their Tenants, who by their Tenors or Dependence were obliged to follow their Lords in Arms. So that, this being the Militia of the Nation, a few Noblemen discontented could at any time levy a great Army; the effect whereof, both in the Baron's Wars, and those of York and Lancaster, had been well known to divers Kings. This state of Affairs was that which enabled HENRY the Seventh to make his advantage of troublesome times, and the frequent unruliness of Retainers; while, under the pretence of curbing Riots, he obtained the passing of such Laws as did cut off these Retainers, whereby the Nobility wholly lost their Officers. Then, whereas the dependence of the People upon their Lords was of a strict ty or nature, he found means to loosen this also by Laws, which he obtained upon as fair a pretence, even that of Population. Thus Farms were so brought to a 
Verulam. H. 7.  standard, that the Houses being kept up, each of them did of necessity enforce a Dweller; and the proportion of Land laid to each House, did of necessity enforce that Dweller not to be a Beggar or Cottager, but a man able to keep Servants, and set the Blow on going. By which means a great part of the Lands of this Nation came in effect to be amortized to the hold of the Yeomanry, or middle People, whereof consisted the main body of the Militia, hereby incredibly advanced; and which henceforth, like cleaner underwood less choked by their staddles, began to grow exceedingly. But the Nobility, who by the former Laws had lost their Offices, by this lost their Soldiery. Yet remained to them their Estates, till the same Prince introducing the Statutes for Alienations, these also became lose; and the Lords less taken (for the reasons shown) with their Country lives, where their Trains were clipped, by degrees became more resident at Court, where greater pomp and expense by the Statutes of Alienations began to plume them of their Estates. The Court was yet at Bridewell, nor reached London any farther than Temple-Bar. The latter growth of this City, and in that, the declining of the Balance to Popularity, derives from the decay of the Nobility and of the Clergy. In the Reign of the succeeding King were Abbeys (than which nothing more dwarves a People) demolished. I did not, I do not attribute the effects of these things thus far to my own particular observation; but always did, and do attribute a sense thereof to the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH, and the Wisdom of her Council. There is yet living Testimony, that the ruin of the English Monarchy, thro' the causes mentioned, was frequently attributed to HENRY the Seventh by Sir HENRY WOTTON; which Tradition is not unlike to have descended to him from the Queen's Council. But there is a difference between having the sense of a thing, and making a right use of that sense. Let a man read PLUTARCH in the Lives of AGIS, and of the GRACCHIS, there can be no plainer demonstration of the Lacedaemonian or Roman Balance; yet read his Discourse of Government in his Morals, and he has forgot it: he makes no use, no mention at all of any such thing. Who could have been plainer upon this point than Sir WALTER RALEIGH, where, to prove that the Kings of Egypt were not elective but hereditary, he alleges that if the Book I Kings of Egypt had been elective, the Children of PHARAOH must have 
Hist. of the World, part 1. p. 200.  been more mighty than the King, as Landlords of all Egypt, and the King himself their Tenant? Yet when he comes to speak of Government, he has no regard to, no remembrance of any such Principle. In Mr. SELDEN'S Titles of Honour, he has demonstrated the English Balance of the Peerage, without making any application of it, or indeed perceiving it there, or in times when the defect of the same came to give so full a sense of it. The like might be made apparent in ARISTOTLE, in MACCHIAVEL, in my Lord VERULAM, in all, in any Politician: there is not one of them in whom may not be found as right a sense of this Principle as in this present Narrative; or in whom may be found a righter use of it than was made by any of the Parties thus far concerned in this story, or by Queen ELIZABETH 
M. D. l. 1. b. 10.  and her Council. If a Prince, says a great Author, to reform a Government were obliged to depose himself, he might, in neglecting of it, be capable of some excuse; but reformation of Government being that with which a Principality may stand, he deserves no excuse at all. It is not indeed observed by this Author that where by reason of the declination of the Balance to Popularity, the State requires Reformation in the Superstructures, there the Prince cannot rightly reform, unless from Sovereign Power he descends to a Principality in a Commonwealth: nevertheless upon the like occasions this fails not to be found so in Nature and Experience. The growth of the People of England, since the ruins mentioned of the Nobility and the Clergy, came in the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH to more than stood with the interest, or indeed the nature or possibility of a well founded or durable Monarchy; as was prudently perceived, but withal temporised by her Council, who (if the truth of her Government be rightly weighed) seem rather to have put her upon the exercise of Principality in a Commonwealth, than of Sovereign Power in a Monarchy. Certain it is, that she courted not her Nobility, nor gave her mind (as do Monarches seated upon the like foundation) to balance her great Men, or reflect upon their Power now inconsiderable; but ruled wholly, with an art she had to high perfection, by humouring and blessing her People. For this mere shadow of a Commonwealth is she yet famous, and shall ever be so; though had she introduced the full perfection of the Orders requisite to Popular Government, her fame had been greater. First, She had established such a Principality to her Successors, as they might have retained. Secondly, This Principality (the Commonwealth, 
The great Council of Venice has the Sovereign Power, and the Duke the Sovereign Dignity.  as Rome of ROMULUS, being born of such a Parent) might have retained the Royal Dignity and Revenue to the full, both improved and discharged of all Envy. Thirdly, It had saved all the Blood and Confusion, which thro' this neglect in her and her Successors, has since ensued. Fourthly, It had bequeathed to the People a Light not so naturally by them to be discovered, which is a great pity. For 
M. D. l. 1. c. 9  even as the Many, thro' the difference of opinions that must needs abound among them, are not apt to introduce a Government, as not understanding the good of it: so the Many, having by trial or experience once attained to this understanding, agree not to quit such a Government. And lastly, It had placed this Nation in that perfect felicity, which, so far as concerns mere Prudence, is in the power of human nature to enjoy. To this Queen succeeded King JAMES, who likewise regardless of this point (into which nevertheless he saw so far as not seldom to prophecy sad things to his Successors) neither his new Peerage, which Chap. 3 in abundance he created, nor the old availed him any thing against that dread wherein, more freely than prudently, he discovered himself to stand of Parliaments, as now mere Popular Councils, and running to popularity of Government like a Bowl down a hill; not so much, I may say, of Malice prepensed, as by natural instinct, whereof the Petition of Right, well considered, is a sufficient Testimony. All persuasion of Court Eloquence, all patience for such, as but looked that way, was now lost. There remained nothing to the destruction of a Monarchy, retaining but the name, more than a Prince who by contending should make the People to feel those advantages which they could not see. And this happened in the next King, who, too secure in that undoubted right whereby he was advanced to a Throne which had no foundation, dared to put this to an unseasonable trial; on whom therefore fell the Tower in Silo. Nor may we think that they upon whom this Tower fell, were Sinners above all men; but that we, unless we repent, and look better to the true foundations, must likewise perish. We have had latter Princes, latter Parliaments. In what have they excelled, or where are they? The Balance not considered, no effectual work can be made as to settlement; and considered, as it now stands in England, requires to settlement no less than the Superstructures natural to Popular Government: and the Superstructures natural to Popular Government require no less than the highest skill or art that is in Political Architecture. The sum of which Particulars amounts to this, That the safety of the People of England is now plainly cast upon skill or sufficiency in Political Architecture: it is not enough therefore, that there are honest men addicted to all the good ends of a Commonwealth, unless there be skill also in the formation of those proper means whereby such Ends may be attained. Which is a sad, but a true account; this being in all experience, and in the judgement of all Politicians, that whereof the Many are incapable. And though the meanest Citizen, not informing the Commonwealth of what he knows, or conceives to concern its safety, commits a heinous Crime against God and his Country; yet such is the temper of later times, that a man, having offered any light in this particular, has scaped well enough, if he be despised and not ruined.  
BUT to proceed: if the Balance, or state of Property in a Nation, be the efficient cause of Government, and, the Balance being not fixed, the Government (as by the present Narrative is evinced) must remain inconstant or floating; then the process in the formation of a Government must be first by a fixation of the Balance, and next by erecting such Superstructures as to the nature thereof are necessary.   

CHAP. III.  
Of Fixation of the Balance, or of Agrarian Laws.  
FIXATION of the Balance of Property is not to be provided for but by Laws; and the Laws, whereby such a Provision is made, are commonly called Agrarian Laws. Now as Governments, thro' the divers Balance of Property, are of divers or contrary natures, Book I that is Monarchical or Popular; so are such Laws. Monarchy requires of the standard of Property, that it be vast or great; and of Agrarian Laws, that they hinder recess or diminution, at least in so much as is thereby entailed upon Honour: But Popular Government requires, that the standard be moderate; and that its Agrarian prevent accumulation. In a Territory not exceeding England in Revenue, if the 
It is at present in more hands; but without fixation may come into fewer.  Balance be in more hands than three hundred, it is declining from Monarchy; and if it be in fewer than five thousand hands, it is swerving from a Commonwealth: which as to this point may suffice at present.   

CHAP. IU.  
Showing the Superstructures of Governments.  

The Superstructures of Absolute Monarchy.  THAT the Policy or Superstructures of all absolute Monarches, more particularly of the Eastern Empires, are not only contained, but meliorated in the Turkish Government, requires no farther proof than to compare them: but because such a work would not lie in a small compass, it shall suffice for this time to say, that such Superstructures of Government as are natural to an absolute Prince, or the sole Landlord of a large Territory, require for the first story of the Building, that, what Demeans he shall think fit to reserve being set apart, the rest be divided into Horse quarters or Military Farms, for life or at will, and not otherwise: And that every 
Timariot.  Tenant for every hundred pounds a year so held, be, by condition of his Tenure, obliged to attend his Sovereign Lord in Person, in Arms, and at his proper cost and charges, with one Horse, so often, and so long as he shall be commanded upon service. These among the Turks are called Timariot.  

Beglerbegs.  THE second Story requires, that these Horse quarters, or Military Farms, be divided by convenient Precincts or Proportions into distinct Provinces; and that each Province have one Governor or Commander in chief of the same, at the will and pleasure of his Grand Signior, or for three years and no longer. Such among the Turks (unless by additional honours they be called Bashaws or Viziers) are the Beglerbegs.  

Janizaries and Spahys.  FOR the third Story, there must of necessity be a Mercenary Army consisting both of Horse and Foot, for the Guard of the Prince's Person, and for the Guard of his Empire; by keeping the Governors of Provinces so divided, that they be not suffered to lay their arms or heads together, or to hold correspondence or intelligence with one another. Which Mercenary Army ought not to be constituted of such as have already contracted some other interest; but to consist of Men so educated from their very childhood, as not to know that they have any other Parent, or native Country, than the Prince and his Empire. Such among the Turks are the Foot called Janizarys, and the Horse called Spahys.  

The Divan and the Grand Signior.  THE Prince accommodated with a Privy Council, consisting of such as have been Governors of Provinces, is the Topstone: This Council among the Turks is called the Divan, and this Prince the Grand Signior.  
THE Superstructures proper to a regulated Monarchy, or to the Chap. 4 Government of a Prince (three or four hundred of whose Nobility, 
The Superstructures of Regulated Monarchy.  or of whose Nobility and Clergy hold three parts in four of the Territory) must either be by his personal influence upon the Balance, or by virtue of Orders.  
IF a Prince, by easing his Nobility of Taxes, and feeding them with such as are extorted from the People, can so accommodat their Ambition and Avarice with great Offices and Commands, that a Party rebelling, he can overbalance and reduce them by a greater part of their own Order, he may have greater Power and less Security, as at present in France.  
THE safer way of this Government is by Orders; and the Orders proper to it specially consist of a Hereditary Senate of the Nobility, admitting also of the Clergy, and of a Representative of the People made up of the Lords menial Servants, or such as by Tenure and for Livelihood have immediate dependence upon them, as formerly in England.  

No such thing as pure Aristocracy, or pure Democracy.  AN Aristocracy, or State of Nobility, to exclude the People must govern by a King; or to exclude a King, must govern by the People: Nor is there, without a Senate or mixture of Aristocracy, any Popular Government. Whence, though for discourse sake Politicians speak of pure Aristocracy, and pure Democracy, there is no such thing as either of these in Nature, Art, or Example.  

The Superstructures of Popular Government.  WHERE the People are not overbalanced by one Man, or by the Few, they are not capable of any other Superstructures of Government, or of any other just and quiet settlement whatsoever, than of such only as consists of a Senate as their Counsillors, of themselves or their Representatives as Sovereign Lords, and of a Magistracy answerable to the People, as distributers and executioners of the Laws made by the People. And thus much is of absolute necessity to any or every Government, that is or can be properly called a Commonwealth, whether it be well or ill ordered.  


Definition of a well ordered Commonwealth.  
Distinction of Magistracy.   BUT the necessary definition of a Commonwealth, any thing well ordered, is, That it is a Government consisting of the Senate proposing, the People resolving, and the Magistracy executing.  
MAGISTRACY is a stile proper to the executive part: yet because in a Discourse of this kind it is hardly avoidable, but that such as are of the proposing or resolving Assemblies, will be sometimes comprised under this name or stile, it shall be enough for excuse to say, that Magistracy may be esteemed of two kinds; the one proper or Executive, the other improper or Legislative.  

Senates, and their kinds.  A SENATE may consist of a Hereditary Order, elective for life by itself, or by some Magistrate or Magistrates of the same; as the Senate of Rome consisted of the Patrician Order thereinto eligible, first by the Consuls, and then by the Censors. A Senate may consist of Senators elected by the People for life, as that of Lacedaemon: It may consist of Senators eligible by the People for terms, without any vacation or interval, as the Senate of Venice; or with intervals, as the Senate of Athens, which also for another difference was elected by lot.  

Popular Assemblys, and their kinds.  A POPULAR Assembly may consist of the whole People, as the great Council of Venice (for the Venetians, though called, in respect of their Subjects, Nobility, are all that free People which is comprised in that Commonwealth) or of a Representative, as in Israel. Again, a Representative Book I of the People may be for life, as in the particular Cities or Soverainties of Holland, improperly called Senates; or it may be upon Rotation, that is to say, by changes or courses, as that of Israel, and the present Representative in England; it may also be by lot, as the Roman Tribes called the Prerogative, and the Jurevocatae.  

Supreme Magistrates, and their kinds.  TO speak of Magistrates in a Commonwealth, and all their kinds, were to begin an endless discourse; the present I shall therefore confine to such only as may be called Supreme Magistrates. The Supreme Magistracy of a Commonwealth may be in one or more; and it may be for life, or for terms and vacations. In one elective by the People for life; as in the Duke of Venice, whose Function is Civil and not Military. In two Hereditarily; as in the two Kings of Lacedaemon, whose Function was rather Military than Civil. In nine annually elective by the People; as in the nine Princes or Archons of Athens. In two annually elected by the People; as the Roman Consuls, whose Power was both Military and Civil. In a word, it may be in one or more, for life, or for terms and vacations, as shall best suit with the occasion.  

Other differences in Commonwealths.  SOME Commonwealths consist of distinct Soveraintys, as Switzerland and Holland; others are collected into one and the same Sovereignty, as most of the rest. Again, some Commonwealths have been upon Rotation or Courses in the Representative only, as Israel: Others in the Magistracy only, as Rome. Some in the Senate and in the Magistracy, as Athens and Venice: Others in some part of the Magistracy, and in others not; as Lacedaemon in the Ephori, and not in the Kings; and Venice not in the Duke, nor in the Procuratori, but in all the rest. Holland, except in the Election of States Provincial (which is emergent) admits not of any rotation or courses. There may be a Commonwealth admitting of Rotation throout, as in the Senate, in the Representative, and in the Magistracy; as that proposed in Oceana.  

Rotation, or Courses.  ROTATION, if it be perfect, is equal election by, and succession of the whole People to the Magistracy by terms and vacations.  

Popular Election.  EQUAL Election may be by Lot, as that of the Senate of Athens; by Suffrage, as that of Lacedaemon; or by Ballot, as that of Venice, which of all others is the most equal.  

The Ballot.  THE Ballot, as it is used in Venice, consists of a Lot; whence proceeds the right of proposing, and of an unseen way of suffrage, or of resolving.  

The different Genius of Commonwealths.  FROM the wonderful variety of parts, and the difference of mixture (hitherto scarce touched by any) result those admirable differences that are in the Constitution and Genius of Popular Governments; some being for defence, some for increase; some more equal, others inequal; some turbulent and seditious, others, like soft streams, in a perpetual tranquillity.  

T●● 〈◊〉 ●f Sedition in a Common-wealth.  THAT which causes innat Sedition in a Commonwealth, is Inequality; as in Rome, where the Senate oppressed the People. But if a Commonwealth be perfectly equal, it is void of Sedition, and has attained to perfection, as being void of all internal causes of dissolution.  

Definition of an equal Commonwealth.  AN equal Commonwealth is a Government founded upon a balance which is perfectly Popular, being well fixed by a suitable Agrarian; and which from the balance, thro' the free suffrage of the People given by the Ballot, amounts in the Superstructures to a Senate debating Chap. 4 and proposing, a Representative of the People resolving, and a Magistracy executing: each of these three Orders being upon Courses or Rotation; that is, elected for certain terms, injoining like Intervals.  

The difference between Laws and Orders.  SUCH Constitutions in a Government as regard the Frame or Model of it, are called Orders; and such things as are enacted by the Legislative Orders, are called Laws.  
TO undertake the binding of a Prince from invading Liberty, and yet not to introduce the whole Orders necessary to Popular Government, is to undertake a flat contradiction, or a plain impossibility.  

Hazard thro' the want of Principles.  A PEOPLE or Assembly not understanding true Principles, give lest credit to the best Orders, and so come to cast themselves upon particular persons: for where Orders are not credited, there Men must be trusted; and where Men are trusted, they find themselves so well in their power, that they are either for bringing in a Commonwealth by degrees, or more probably not at all. The desire of bringing in a Commonwealth by degrees, arises from want of considering that the whole of a Commonwealth, as to charge or trouble, is less than the half. He who has a Journey to go, does not choose to have but half a Bridle, or but one Boot or Stirrup, though these be fewer things, and come but to half the charge; because this would but necessitat him to procure more things, and perhaps more chargeable or dangerous.  
Optimus ille animi vindex, laedentia pectus  
Vincula qui rupit, dedoluitque semel.   

The Conclusion:  
Observing that the Principles of Human Prudence being good without proof of Scripture, are nevertheless such as are provable out of Scripture.  
WHO imagines that the Romans governed by proof out of Scripture? Yet says PETER, Submit yourselves to (Human Prudence, 
1 Pet. 2. 13.  or) every Ordinance of Man; which relates more particularly to the Government of the Romans. The most frequent comparison of a Commonwealth is to a Ship; but who imagines that a Ship ought not to be built according to the Art of the Shipwright, or governed according to the Compass, unless these be proved out of Scripture? Nevertheless, as hitherto I have proved the principles of Human Prudence in the several parts out of Holy Scripture; so I undertake to vindicat them in the whole, as to the entire frame of Popular Government, in the ensuing Book, by the same Authority and undeniable Evidence.   

Book TWO THE SECOND BOOK, Containing the COMMONWEALTHS OF THE HEBREWS: Namely, ELOHIM, or the Commonwealth of Israel; AND CABALA, or the Commonwealth of the Jews.  

The PREFACE, Showing that there were Commonwealths before that of Israel.  
HUMAN Prudence is originally a Creature of God, and, with respect to its existence, as ancient as human Nature; nor is it so much younger in any of those Effects or Ends for which it was ordained by God, that we should think Israel to have been the first Commonwealth, or the first Popular Government that ever was, or that was planted at least in Canaan: for the like Governments, in the Countries thereabout, there were both before and at the same time. It was in Canaan, that MELCHISEDEC, King and Priest of Salem, had reigned during the time of ABRAHAM, who paid him Tithes of all that 
Tithes originally belonging to Kings. 1 Sam. 8. 15, 17.  he had. Now Tithes before Israel and the institution of the Levits, belonged not to any sort of Clergy, but to the Prince or State. Whence SAMUEL in the description of a King, tells the People that he will take the tenth of their Goods. Thus ABRAHAM in paying Tithes to MELCHISEDEC, acknowledged him for his Prince. Yet had ABRAHAM 
The Commonwealth of Salem.  the right of the Sword, and made War with Kings, as those of Sodom, at his own discretion; whence Canaan may seem to have been a Commonwealth in those days, much after the manner of Germany in ours. The Chap. 1 five Lords (perhaps five Tribune's) of the Philistines must needs have been 
The Commonwealth of the Philistines.  some Aristocracy at least of Princes joining in one Body or Commonwealth. So Venice in her first Age was under Lords or Tribune's. It is little to be doubted, but the Government of JETHRO, King and Priest of Midian, 
The Commonwealth of Midian.  was of a like nature with that of MELCHISEDEC, or of the Lacedaemonian Kings, who were also Priests; or that the Council he gave to MOSES (being for the institution of such Judicatcries as are not proper in a Monarchy) was any other than according to the Orders of his own Commonwealth. And lest these Governments should seem less popular, the Ambassadors of the Gibeonits' coming to JOSHUA, say thus; Our Elders 

The Commonwealth of the Gibeonits'.  
Joshua 9 11.   (or our Senate) and all the Inhabitants of our Country (or the popular Assembly of the same) spoke to us saying, Go meet them, and say to them, We are your Servants: therefore now make a League with us. To make a League with a foreign Nation evinces Sovereign Power; and that this League was made by the Senate and the People, evinces Gibeon to have been a Popular Government. Such a thing then as Popular Government most undeniably there was before Israel. Now whether Israel were a Popular Government or no, I shall refer to trial by the ensuing Chapter.    

CHAP. I.  
Showing that Israel was a Commonwealth.  


Exod. 1. 5. The rise of the Israelitish Government.  
Of the Princes of the Tribes, and Princes of Families.   IT is said of the Israelits that went first into Egypt, All the Souls that Sect. 1 came out of the loins of Jacob were seventy Souls. These becoming so many Fathers of Families, and governing their own Families by Paternal Right, it follows that at first they so governed the whole People; yet not with any sovereign Power (as may be easily thought in a Country that had a Prince of its own) but by way only of direction and advice. The People being thus accustomed to this way, as any of these seventy came to die, supplied his place with another of their Election; at least for the probability of this opinion, we find mention of MOSES, NADAB, ABIHU, and seventy of the Elders, 
Exod. 24. 9  before the institution of the Israelitish Senat or Sanhedrim. To these and to the People MOSES proposed his Laws. So I am sure in the 
* Haec est lex quam Moses proposuit, Deut. 4. 44. and whereas betwixt a Precept and a Command there is a large difference; in places more than I can stand to number, where the Latin has it, praecepit Moses, the English has it, Moses commanded.  Latin it is expressly said, where by our English Translation it is thus rendered, This is the Law (and by the Law here is meant no less than the whole Book of Deuteronomy) which MOSES set before the Children of Israel, whose Assemblies were not always without faction. For KORAH, DATHAN, and ABIRAM, with two hundred Princes of the Assembly, famous in the Congregation, Men of Renown, bandied themselves against MOSES, and his intended Election of his Brother AARON to the hereditary Priesthood, reproaching him (says JOSEPHUS) 
Antiq. l. 4. c. 2.  that he went about to dispose of this Honour without the Suffrage of the Congregation, thereby affecting Tyranny, and a sly Book TWO usurpation of the Liberty of the People: which sense also is employed by their upbraiding him in Scripture; Is it a small thing that thou hast 
Numb. 16. 13.  brought us up out of the Land that flows with Milk and Honey, to kill us in the Wilderness? except thou makest thyself altogether a Prince over us. But whereas the Scripture in all this presumes these Incendiaries to have 
That Moses was not King.  belied MOSES, some will have all they thus laid to his charge, to be no more, but less than truth; in as much as they will needs have MOSES not only to have been a King, but to have been a King exercising Arbitrary Power, and such Arbitrary Power as, being without any bounds, fully amounts to Tyranny.  
Sect. 2 
That Moses proposed his Laws to the People and their Suffrage.  THE word King is not a sufficient definition of the Magistrate so styled: Between a Lacedaemonian King and a Persian King, or between either of these and a King of England, there was a vast difference. Both the Kings in Lacedaemon were but as one Duke in Venice. The Venetians therefore, if it had so pleased them, might as well have called their Duke a King. Certainly it is, that he is not so much in the Commonwealth, as are a few of his Counsillors; and yet all Acts of the Government run in his name, as if there were no Commonwealth.  

Deut. 34. 4. In what sense Moses may be called a King.  IT is said (according to our Translation) MOSES commanded us a Law, etc. according to the Original, MOSES (proposed, or) gave us a Law, which is an Inheritance to the Congregation of JACOB. The Duke of Venice has a right to propose or give Law in the Congregation or great Council of Venice; where he, who sees him sitting, would believe he were a King. And if MOSES were King in Jesurun 
Ver. 5.  (or Israel) it was when the Heads of the People and the Tribes of Israel were gathered together. PAUL, epitomizing the story of the 
Acts 13.  People of Israel in his Sermon to the Antiochian Jews, shows how God chose their Fathers, exalted the People, destroyed (for their sakes) seven Nations in the Land of Canaan, and divided their Land to them by Lots: but speaks not a word of any King given to them, till expressly after their Judges. But if MOSES were a King, yet that he did not propose, but command by his power the Laws which he gave to Israel, does not follow. For DAVID was a King, who nevertheless did not otherwise make any Law than by Proposition to the People, and their 
● Chron. 13.  free Suffrage upon it. DAVID consulted with the Captains of thousands, and hundreds, and with every Leader (of which Military Discipline of the Congregation of Israel more in due place will be shown) and DAVID said to all the Congregation, If it seems good to you, and that it be of the Lord our God (though he was a King, and a man after God's own heart, he makes the People Judges what was of God) let us send abroad to our Brethren every where that are left in all the Land of Israel, and with them also to the Priests and Levits that are in their Cities and Suburbs, that they (to the end this thing may be performed with the greatest solemnity) may gather themselves to us, and let us bring the Ark of God to us: for we enquired not at it in the days of SAUL. 
1 Sam. 4.  In the days of ELI the Ark was taken by the Philistines, who being smitten till there was a deadly destruction throout all the City, and their Divines attributing the cause thereof to the detention of the Ark, after seven months sent it to Bethshemesh; whence it was brought to Kirjath-jearim, and there lodged in the house of AMINADAB, before SAUL was King, where it remained till such time as DAVID proposed (in the manner shown) to the People the reduction of the same. Upon this Proposition, the People giving Suffrage are unanimous Chap. 1 in their result; All the Congregation said, that they would do so (not 
1 Chron. 13. 4.  that they could do no otherwise by a King, for they did not the like by REHOBOAM, but that) the thing was right in the eyes of all the People. Moreover, DAVID and the Captains of the Host separated to 
Chap. 25.  the Service some of the Sons of ASAPH, and of HEMAN, and of JEDUTHUN, who should prophecy with Harps, with Psalteries and with Cymbals; that is, proposed these Laws for Church Discipline, or Offices of the Priests and Levits, to the same Representative of the People: of which more in other places. Thus much in this, to show, that if MOSES were a King, it does not follow that he proposed not his Laws to a Congregation of the People having the power of Result. To say that the Laws proposed by MOSES were the Dictat of GOD, is not to evade, but to confirm the necessity of proposing them to the People, seeing the Laws or Dictates of GOD or of CHRIST, can not otherwise be effectually received or embraced by a People, or by a private man, than by the free suffrage of the Soul or Conscience; and not by Force or Rewards, which may as well establish the Laws of the Devil.  


That there lay no appeal from the 70 Elders to Moses.  
Numb. 11. 16.   BUT for another way, such a one as it is, of crowning MOSES, Sect. 3 some are positive that there lay an appeal from the seventy Elders to Him. Now the Command of God to MOSES for the institution of the Seventy, is this: Gather to me seventy men of the Elders of Israel— that they may stand with thee. Upon which words let me ask, whether had MOSES thenceforth a distinct or a joint political Capacity? If the Seventy stood with MOSES, or it were a joint Capacity, than MOSES was no King in their sense; and if it were distinct, then lay there to MOSES no appeal, even by his own Law: for thus in the case of Appeals it is by him directed. If there arises a Controversy too 
Deut. 6.  hard for thee in Judgement— thou shalt come to the Priests and Levits (that is, to the seventy Elders)— According to the sentence of the Law which they— shall tell thee, thou shalt do— And the man that will do presumtuously, and will not hearken— even that man shall die. In which words all colour of appeal from the seventy Elders is excluded.  
BUT whether MOSES were a King or no King, either his Sect. 4 Power was more than that of King DAVID; or without proposition to, and result of the People it is plain that he could pass no Law. Now the Senate, Sanhedrim, or seventy Elders, came in the place of MOSES, or stood with him; therefore their Power could be no more than was that of MOSES. So that if the Power of MOSES were never more in the point of Lawgiving, than to propose to the People; then the power of the Sanhedrim could be no more in the point of Lawgiving, than to propose to the People. Nor will it be found in Scripture that the Sanhedrim ever made any Law without the People, yet it is found in Scripture that the People made a Law without the Sanhedrim, or levied War without them, which is all one: for where there is a power to levy War, there will be the power of making Law. And the occasion upon which this is found, is the War levied against BENJAMIN by the Congregation consisting of four hundred 
Judg. 20.  thousand. Again, If the Sanhedrim inherited the whole power of MOSES, and yet had no larger power in Lawmaking than to propose to the People, than had MOSES never any larger power in Law-making than to propose to the People. Now where there is no King, Book TWO or no King in a distinct capacity from the Senate; and where the Senate has no farther power in Lawmaking than to propose to the free suffrage of the People; the Government there is a Commonwealth. Thus having shown that Israel was a Commonwealth, I come next to show what Commonwealth Israel was.   

CHAP. II.  
Showing what Commonwealth Israel was.  
Sect. 1 
Division of the Children of Israel; first Genealogical.  ALICE Political Methods that are collective of the People, must necessarily begin with a distribution or division of the People.  
FOR the division of the People of Israel, it was first Genealogical, and then local. Now these are the Names (of the Ancestors of the 
Exod. 1.  Tribes, or) of the Children of Israel which came into Egypt, every man and his Household came with JACOB: REUBEN, SIMEON, LEVI, and JUDAH, ISSACHAR, ZEBULUN, and BENJAMIN, DAN, and NAPHTALI, GAD, and ASHER. These being eleven in number, were the Sons of JACOB, who had also one more, 
Gen. 41. 50, 51, 52.  namely JOSEPH. And to JOSEPH were born two Sons before the years of Famine came, which ASENAH the Daughter of POTIPHERAH Priest of on., bore to him. And JOSEPH called the name of the firstborn MANASSEH— and the name of the second called he EPHRAIM. Which two (though but Grandchilds) were adopted by JACOB for 
Gen. 48. 16.  his Sons, in these words: Let my name be named on them, and the name of my Fathers ABRAHAM and ISAAC; and let them grow into a multitude in the midst of the Earth. From which addition to the former came the Tribes of Israel, genealogically reckoned, to be in number thirteen. In the genealogical distribution of the Tribes there were also observed certain Ranks, Qualitys, or Degrees, as appears by the Poll 
Num. 1.  made of Israel in the Wilderness of Sinai, and in the Tabernacle of the Congregation by MOSES. These Degrees were of two sorts: first, Phylarches, or Princes of Tribes; and secondly, Patriarches, or Princes of Families: all hereditary Honours, and pertaining to the Firstborn of the Tribe or of the Family respectively. That this Poll be more perfectly understood, will be useful; for which cause I shall be somewhat more particular. First, for the Phylarches, or Princes of the Tribes; and then for the Patriarches, or Princes of Families. To begin with the Princes of the Tribes.  
Sect. 2 
Num. 1. 17, 18. Of the Princes of bribe's; or the Muster Roll in Sinai.  MOSES and AARON— assembled the Congregation (or political Convention of the People) together on the first day of the second month, after their Families, by the house of their Fathers, according to the number of the names, from twenty years old and upward, by the poll. Where every Phylarch or Prince of a Tribe, with the number of men at the age mentioned and upward, throout his Tribe, are listed much after this manner.  
1. OF the Tribe of REUBEN, ELIZUR, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, forty six thousand five hundred.  
2. OF the Tribe of SIMEON, SHELAMIEL, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, fifty nine thousand three hundred.  
3. OF the Tribe of JUDAH, NASHON, Prince. The men of military Chap. 2 age in his Tribe, threescore and fourteen thousand six hundred.  
4. OF the Tribe of ISSACHAR, NETHANIEL, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, fifty four thousand four hundred.  
5. OF the Tribe of ZEBULUN, ELIAB, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, fifty seven thousand four hundred.  
6. OF the Tribe of EPHRAIM, ELISHAMA, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, forty thousand five hundred.  
7. OF the Tribe of MANASSEH, GEMALIEL, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, thirty two thousand two hundred.  
8. OF the Tribe of BENJAMIN, ABIDAN, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, thirty five thousand four hundred.  
9 OF the Tribe of DAN, AHIEZER, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, threescore and two thousand seven hundred.  
10. OF the Tribe of ASHER, PAGIEL, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, forty one thousand five hundred.  
11. OF the Tribe of GAD, ELIASAPH, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, forty five thousand six hundred and fifty.  
12. OF the Tribe of NAPHTALI, AHIRA, Prince. The men of military age in his Tribe, fifty three thousand four hundred.  
THE total sum of which Musterroll in the twelve Tribes, amounts to Princes twelve; and men of military age six hundred three thousand five hundred and fifty, besides the Levits.  


The Levits Call, Order, or Tribe.  
Num. 3. 12, 13.   ALL the firstborn, says God, are mine. In which words is employed Sect. 3 that the Priesthood, or right of preaching, instructing, or administering divine things, belonged, as it were, of natural right, to Fathers of Families, or the Firstborn; till the Lord took the Levits from among the Children of Israel, instead of the Firstborn. These being thus taken, were set apart, and so listed by themselves (to omit their several Families, Functions, and Orders in the service of the Tabernacle, and afterwards of the Temple, which would require a Volume) much after this manner.  
OF the Tribe of LEVI, AARON High Priest. The number of all the Males of this Tribe, from a month old and upwards, twenty 
v. 39  and two thousand. The manner how God took the Levits, is thus expressed. Thou shalt bring the Levits before the Tabernacle of the Congregation, 
Num. 8. 9, 10, 11, 12.  and thou shalt gather the whole Assembly together— and the Children of Israel (after the manner that the Levits lay their hands upon the Bullocks, or Sacrifice) shall put their hands upon the Levits, in token that they are sacrificed or separated by the free suffrage of the People to the Lord. For lest the suffrage of the People be thought hereby to have been excluded, so DAVID and the Captains of the Host or Army 
1 Chr. 25.  (which Army was the Representative of the People) separated to the service some of the Sons of ASAPH, of HEMAN, and of JEDUTHUN— who should prophecy with Harps. But of the Congregations of the People more in due place.  


The Military Orders.  
Grot. ad Num. 10.   THE hereditary Right more specially belonging to the Phylarches, Sect. 4 or Princes of the Tribes, consisted (as that of the Kings of Lacedaemon, of Athens, and of Rome) in the leading of the Arms of the Commonwealth; which was distributed to them in this manner. The twelve Tribes were divided into four Brigades, every Brigade consisting of three Tribes. The leading of the first Brigade pertained to Book TWO JUDAH, who in his Standard bore a Lion. The leading of the second Brigade belonged to REUBEN, who in his Standard bore a Man. The leading of the third Brigade belonged to EPHRAIM, who in his Standard bore an Ox. The leading of the fourth Brigade belonged to DAN, who in his Standard bore an Eagle. These four by the text 
Num. 10. 14, 18, 22, 25.  are termed Standards of the Camp, which were as the Roman Eagles. Furthermore, as the subdivisions of the Roman Legions had their proper Insigns, so had the Tribes here, which had not the leading of a Brigade of the Camp. The Insigns of these Tribes were called Staves; as the Staff of the Children of ISSACHAR, the Staff of the Tribe of ZEBULUN, which followed the Standard of JUDAH: The Staff of the Tribe of SIMEON, the Staff of the Tribe of GAD, which followed the Standard of REUBEN: The Staff of the Tribe of MANASSEH, the Staff of the Tribe of BENJAMIN, which followed the Standard of EPHRAIM: The Staff of the Tribe of ASHER, the Staff of the Tribe of NAPHTALI, which followed the Standard of DAN. All which Insigns or Staves in our English Translation are rendered Hosts, or Arms.  

Num. 3.  IN the midst of these four Squadrons or Brigades stood the Tabernacle, with the Levits divided, and distributed by their distinct Families to the several uses and carriages of the same, and lodged upon the four quarters.  
WHEN the Ark set forward, or the Camp removed, these words were with solemnity pronounced by the General, or by the High Priest; 
Num. 10. 35.  Rise up Lord, and let thy Enemy's be scattered, and let them that hate thee fly before thee.  
OF the Martial Discipline in which the Youth in Israel were educated to these ends, there was certainly more than is remaining in story. But that their Popular Assemblies were all held in Military Order and Discipline, and that the deserters of the Militia were anathematised, confiscated, or put to the sword, will in due time be made sufficiently apparent. For the present, you have the Israelitish Musterroll, being of a like nature with that in Athens called Lexiarcha, and that in Rome called Census. Nor has any Commonwealth been well ordered in its Militia, which has not been diligent in the institution and preservation of the like Military Rolls or Registers. Hitherto of the Phylarches, or Princes of the Tribes; the next rank or quality in this Government was that of the Patriarches or Princes of Families.  
Sect. 5 THE word Family in many places of Scripture, is not to be taken 

The Patriarches, chief of the Fathers, or Princes of Families; with a Catalogue of the same.  
Num. 26.   for a single Household; but as we take the word in Heraldry, that is, for a Lineage or Kindred. The Patriarches in Israel, taken in this sense, were such as, till of late years in Scotland, were they that could lead the whole Name or Kindred, and be followed by them. The Families in Israel of this kind, that were greatest about the plantation of the Commonwealth, were of REUBEN, the Henochits, the Phalluits, the Hesronits', and the Charmits.  
OF SIMEON, the Namuelits, the Jamnits, the Jachenits, the Zarits, and the Shaulits.  
OF GAD, the Zephronits', the Haggits, the Shunits, the Oznits, the Erits, the Arodits, and the Arelits.  
OF JUDAH, the Shelanits, the Pharzits, the Zarhits, the Hesronits', and the Hamulits.  
OF ISSACHAR, the Tholaits, the Punits, the Shuhits, and the Shimranits.  
OF ZABULUN, the Sardits, the Elonits', and the Jahleelits. Chap. 1  
OF MANASSEH, the Machirits, the Galeadits, the Jeezrits, the Helekits, the Asrielits, the Sechemits, the Shemidaits, and the Hepherits.  
OF EPHRAIM, the Shuthalaits, the Bachtits, the Tahanits, and the Eranits.  
OF BENJAMIN, the Belaits, the Ashbelits, the Ahiramits, the Shuphamits, the Huphamits, the Ardits, the Heredits, and the Naamits.  
OF DAN, the Suhamits.  
OF ASHER, the Jimnits, the Jessuits, the Britt's, the Heberits, and the Melchielits.  
OF NAPHTALI, the Jazrielits, the Gunits, the Jeserits, and the Shillemits.  
OF LEVI, the Gersonits', the Caharits, and the Merarits. The heads of these were such as are called Patriarches, Princes, heads of Families, or chief of the Fathers.  
FAMILIES, though far less subject than in other Governments to decay or increase, might at divers times be different in Israel; as after BENJAMIN was destroyed, or after DAVID had raised his own and many other: But thus were the Families at this time sixty; the Tribes being, as was shown before, thirteen.  
IN the first institution of the Tribes of Rome, that is, Ramnenses, Titienses, and the Luceri, they were also generalogical, but long it held not so; genealogical divisions in a Commonwealth being for the most part of greater danger than use: but whether Genealogys be observed or not, the local way of division is of absolute necessity.  

Of the Lot or Ballot of Israel.  TO insert the Geography of the Israelitish Tribes, would be as Sect. 6 burdensome both to the Reader and myself, as needless to either. But the manner how the Tribes became local, was thro' the distribution of the Land of Canaan by Lot, and intailing the Lands so distributed upon the Proprietors and their Heirs for ever, without power of alienation, in any such manner as to deprive their Posterity. The Lot or Ballot in Israel was specially of three uses; one for election of Magistrates, another for the discovery of some secret Malefactor, and a third for the division of Lands. To which three heads I hope to reduce the whole History of their Government: and this work once performed, it will be easy to represent the Commonwealth in its Political method.  
TO begin with the election of Magistrates, it was performed sometimes by the Lot, without Suffrage; and sometimes by the Ballot, that is, by a mixture of Lot and Suffrage. For the clearer discovery of the Order in Elections, I must invert the Order of the Magistrates elected, and begin with the King; then proceed to the Judge, and come last of all to the Sanhedrim, and the inferior Courts.  
THE Instruments used upon these occasions, were first Lots, some Blanks and some Prizes; then Urns (that is, Pots) into which these Lots were cast, and out of which they were afterwards drawn, or given forth; by what Officers, or with what farther Solemnity, does not appear.  


Manner of electing the King.  
1 Sam. 8. 7, 22. 1 Sam. 10. 17.   WHEN the People would needs have a King, SAMUEL being Sect. 7 their Judge, did that, though against his will, which nevertheless was no more than his duty: that is, first, harkened to the voice of the People; or obeyed their Vote. Secondly, Called the People together to the Lord to Mizpeh. The political Assembly, or Congregation of the People Book TWO of Israel was called Ecclesia Dei, the Congregation of the Lord, as it 
Judg. 20. Deut. 23.  ought to have been expressed in the Trial of BENJAMIN, and is in some places by our Translation; as where an Eunuch (or one unfit for marriage with a Daughter of Israel, which capacity was necessary to the being enrolled of a Tribe) a Bastard (as dishonourable) an Ammonite or Moabite (as descended of perfidious Nations) shall not enter into the Congregation of the Lord: that is, shall not have right of suffrage with the People of Israel. So SAMUEL, by calling 
For the Assembly of the Congregation at Mizpeh, see Judg. 10. 17. & 11. 11. & 20. 1. & 21. 1. 1 Sam. 7. 6, 16.  the Congregation of the Lord, or the People together to the Lord in Mizpeh (the place, before the taking of Jerusalem, where they always held their Parliaments or political Assemblys) did the office of the like Magistrates in Commonwealths. The People being thus assembled (for to be brief, I must proceed with conjectures, which at first sight will seem bolder than really they are) SAMUEL causing the Urns to be set forth, pronounced the solemn form of words in use upon the like 
1 Sam. 10. 19  occasion, which were these: Present yourselves before the Lord by your 
The Military Order of Political Congregations in Israel, see Chap. 3.  Tribes, and by your thousands. The political Assemblies of the Children of Israel were held, or gathered (as we say) with Drums beating, and Colors flying; and if it were an extraordinary Congregation, that is, a Congregation consisting of the whole People, as this, and that for the trial of BENJAMIN, the Princes of the Tribes with their Staves, and the Standards of the Camp (in the order shown) led up the People to the Urns, or Ballot. Wherefore upon these words of SAMUEL, the Princes marched in their known discipline to the Urns. The Urns were two: in the one were twelve Lots inscribed with the names of the twelve Tribes; in the other were also twelve other Lots, whereof eleven were Blanks, and the twelfth inscribed with some word. What the Israelitish word was, does not appear; the Roman word upon the like occasion was Prerogative: wherefore seeing that which is lost must have been of a like nature, we may, for discourse sake, presume it to have been the same in Israel 
V 20. The Prerogative Tribe.  as in Rome. And when SAMUEL had caused all the Tribes of Israel to come near, the Tribe of BENJAMIN was taken: That is, the name of this Tribe being drawn out of the one Urn, to it was drawn the word Prerogative out of the other Urn; which being done, the Urns were changed, or at least the Lots. And whereas in the enumeration of the Patriarches, I showed by a cate-log of their Names, that the whole Tribe of BENJAMIN consisted of seven Families; seven names by that account should have been cast into the one Urn, and as many Lots into the other; one of them being inscribed with the word Prerogative, and the other six being Blanks. But both the names, and the number of Families at this Ballot, are most likely to have been quite otherwise than in the 
Judg. 20. 2.  Catalogue; because since that time the Tribe of BENJAMIN had in the far greater part been destroyed, and pieced up again out of a Remnant: so for the number of the Families, or the names of them, I can say nothing. But the Urns being thus prepared, came BENJAMIN, as now the Prerogative Tribe, to the Urns by Families. And when SAMUEL had caused the Tribe of BENJAMIN to come near by their Families, the Family of MATRI (which is a new one) was taken: that is, lighting, in the manner shown, upon the Prize, became the Prerogative Family. This don, the Lots were again changed, and so many others as there were Households in the Family of MATRI (for 
J●●●. 7. 14, 16, 17, 18.  so you will find it in the trial of ACHAN) were cast into the Urns. Thus the Household of KISH coming to be the Prerogative Household, Chap. 1 and so many Lots as there were men of that Household, being cast into the Urns, whereof the Prize was inscribed King; came the Household of KISH, man by man, and SAUL the Son of KISH was taken.  

That miraculous designation of Magistats in a Commonwealth, was never understood to exclude the free Suffrage of the People in their Election.  WE find it recorded by LIVY, of TARQVINIUS PRISCUS, Sect. 8 and of SERVIUS TULLIUS, that before either of them was King, the one had his hat taken off, and carried up by an Eagle; the other had a flame resting upon his forehead, by which it was firmly believed, that each of them was designed of the Gods to be King: yet was this never so understood by themselves, or any other, as to exclude the right of popular Suffrage in their Election, by which PRISCUS reigned; or to create an opinion that any man ought to be King of Rome, whom the People had not first commanded to reign over them, to whose Election therefore SERVIUS, though in possession of the Throne, thought it his best way to refer himself. Far be it from me to compare Prodigys among Heathens, to Miracles in the Church: But each People had of each a like opinion. Both Israel and the Heathens began their popular Assemblies with Sacrifice. In order to the election of SOLOMON, the Representative of Israel 
1 Chron. 29. 21, 22.  sacrificed Sacrifices to the Lord— even a thousand Bullocks, a thousand Rams, and a thousand Lambs, with their Drink-offerings, and Sacrifices in abundance, for all Israel. And when they had thus done, what Magistrates soever the Israelits, or the Heathens elected, they always understood to be elected by God. The Lot is cast into the lap, but the 
Prov. 10. 33.  whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. And indeed, whereas in this manner they made SOLOMON King, and ZADOC to be Priest, if we will hold otherwise, we must think that neither the King nor the Priest was elected by God. A man that is elected to some great Office, by a King rightly qualified, must have little Religion, or hold himself to be raised up by God. Why then should it be otherwise, when a Magistrate is elected by a People rightly qualified? Or what consequence is there in saying, that SAUL was anointed by SAMUEL before he was elected by the People, or that God raised them up Judges; therefore neither SAUL nor the Judges were elected by the People? That God elected the Kings in Israel, is certain; and that the People no less for that did also elect the Kings, is as certain. One from among thy Brethren shalt thou (that is, thou the People of Israel) 
Deut. 17. 15.  set King over thee. That God raised up Judges in Israel, is certain; and that the People no less for that, did also elect the Judges, is as certain. When the Children of Ammon made War against Israel, Israel assembled themselves together, and encamped in Mizpeh, whence the 
Judg. 10. 17.  Elders of Gilead went to fetch JEPHTA out of the Land of Tob.— Then 
Judg. 11. 5, 11.  JEPHTA went with the Elders of Gilead, and the People made him Head and Captain over them: and JEPHTA uttered all his words before the Lord in Mizpeh. But that SOLOMON was elected by the Lot, I do not affirm; it being most probable, that it was by Suffrage only, DAVID proposing, and the People resolving. Nor whether JEPHTA was elected by Suffrage, or by the Ballot, is it material; however that the ordinary Magistrates were elected by the Ballot, I little doubt.  

Election of Senators, and Judges of inferior Courts.  THE ordinary Magistrates of this Commonwealth (as shall hereafter Sect. 9 be more fully opened) were the Sanhedrim, or the seventy Elders; and the inferior Courts or Judges, in the Gates of the Cities. Book TWO For the Institution and Election of these, MOSES proposed to the 
Deut. 1. 13.  People, or the Congregation of the Lord, in this manner. Take you wise men, and understanding, and known among your Tribes (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) and I will make (or constitute) them Rulers over you. Where, by the way, lest MOSES in these words be thought to assume power, SOLON, says ARISTOTLE (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) made, or constituted the Popular Government of Athens. In which he implys, not that SOLON was a King, or had Sovereign Power, but that he was a Lawgiver, and had authority to propose to the People. Nor is there more in the words of MOSES; upon whose Proposition, say Jewish Writers, each of the twelve Tribes, by free Suffrages, elected six Competitors, and wrote their Names in scrols, which they delivered to MOSES. MOSES having thus presented to him by the twelve Tribes seventy and two Competitors for seventy Magistracies, had by consequence two more Competitors than were capable of the Preferment to which they were elected by the People: Wherefore MOSES took two Urns, into the one he cast the seventy two Names presented by the People; into the other, seventy two Lots, whereof two were blanks, the rest inscribed with the word Elder. This don, he called the Competitors to the Urn, where the seventy, to whose Names came forth the Prizes, went up to the Tabernacle, the Session-house 
See Numb. 11. 26.  being there provided: and the two that drew the Blanks, namely ELDAD and MEDAD, though of them that were elected and written by the Tribes, went not up to the Tabernacle, but remained in the Camp, as not having attained to Magistracy. Thus, if this place in Scripture can admit of no other Interpretation, so much as I have cited out of the Talmud (though otherwise, for the most part, but a fabulous and indigested heap) must needs be good and valid. In this manner, one or more Senators happening to die, it was easy for each Tribe, choosing one or more Competitors accordingly out of themselves, to decide at the Urn which Competitor so chosen, should be the Magistrate, without partiality, or cause of feud; which, if a man considers this Constitution, was not perhaps so readily to be done otherwise. The like, no doubt, was done for the inferior Courts, except that such Elections (the Commonwealth being once settled) were more particular, and performed by that Tribe only in whose Gates that Court was sitting.  
Sect. 10 

The story of the Sanhedrim, and of the inferior Courts, as to their first institu ion.  
Exod. 18. 24, 25.   THE first institution of these Courts came to pass in the manner following. Before the People were under orders, the whole Judicature lay upon the shoulders of MOSES, who being overburdened, was advised by JETHRO. And MOSES harkened to the voice of his Father-in-law— and chose (after the manner shown) able men out of all Israel, and made them Heads over the People, Rulers of thousands, Rulers of hundreds, Rulers of fifties, and Rulers of ten. The number of which Rulers, compared with the number of the People, as in the muster roll at Sinai, must in all have amounted to about six thousand. These thus instituted, while Israel was an Army, came to be the same when the Army was a Commonwealth: whereof it is said, 
〈◊〉 16. 18.  Judges and Officers shalt thou make thee in all thy Gates which the Lord thy God gives thee, throout thy Tribes; and they shall judge the People with just Judgement. Each of these Courts, by the practice of the Jewish Commonwealth, consisted of twenty three Elders. But JETHRO, in his advice to MOSES, adds concerning these Judicatories, this Caution; Let them judge the People at all seasons: and it shall be, that Chap. 2 every great matter they shall bring to thee, but every small matter they shall 
Exod. 18. 22.  judge: So shall it be easier for thyself, and they shall bear the burden with thee. Which nevertheless followed not according to JETHROES promise, the Appeals being such to MOSES that he goes with this complaint to God: I am not able to bear all this People alone, because it is too heavy for me. 
Numb. 11. 14, 16.  Whereupon the Lord said to MOSES, Gather to me seventy men, of the Elders of Israel, whom thou knowest to be Elders of the People, and Officers over them; and bring them to the Tabernacle of the Congregation, that they may stand with thee— (but Crowns will have no rivals) and they shall bear the burden of the People with thee, that thou bear it not alone. But a Monarch is one that must be alone. And MOSES went out, and told 
Ver. 24.  the People the words of the Lord (which a Monarch needed not to have done) and gathered the seventy men of the Elders of the People; the manner whereof is already shown. JETHRO, being a Heathen, informs MOSES of the Orders of his own Commonwealth, which also was Heathenish. Yet in Scripture is both JETHRO joined with MOSES, and the Commonwealth of Midian with the Commonwealth of Israel. How then comes it to be irreverend, or atheistical, as some say, in Politicians (and while political Discourses cannot otherwise be managed) to compare, though but by way of illustration, other Legislators, or Politicians, as LYCURGUS, SOLON, with MOSES; or other Commonwealths, as Rome, and Venice, with that of Israel? But the Authors of such Objections had better have minded, that the burden whereof MOSES here complained, could in no manner be that of ordinary Judicature, of which he was eased before by the advice of JETHRO; and therefore must have been that of Appeals only: so either the Sanhedrim bore no burden at all with MOSES, or they bore that of Appeals with him. And if so, how say they that there lay an Appeal from the seventy Elders to MOSES?  


Lot, Ordel, or Inquisition by Lot.  
Deut. 13. 12, etc.   BUT I said the Lot was of use also toward the discovery of concealed Sect. 11 Malefactors. Of this we have an Example in the detection of ACHAN. The words of the Law, whereby the Fact of ACHAN was criminal, are these: If thou shalt hear say in one of thy Cities, which the Lord thy God has given thee to dwell therein, saying, Certain men, the Children of Belial, are gone out from among you, and have withdrawn the Inhabitants of their City, saying, Let us go and serve other Gods, which you have not known: then shalt thou inquire, and make search, and ask diligently; and behold, if it be truth, and the thing certain, that such Abomination is wrought among you, thou shalt surely smite the Inhabitants of that City with the edge of the Sword, destroying it utterly, and all that is therein, and the cattle thereof with the edge of the Sword. And thou shalt gather all the spoil of it into the midst of the street thereof, and shalt burn with fire the City, and all the spoil thereof, every whit, for the Lord thy God: and it shall be a heap for ever, it shall not be built again, and there shall cleave nought of the accursed thing to thy hand. Among the Cities that were given by God to Israel, was Jericho. Now though against this City, before it was taken, JOSHUA had solemnly 
Josh. 6. 17.  and publicly denounced the Anathema, or Curses contained in the foregoing Law; and after the taking of it, had, in all appearance, executed upon it the whole of the Anathema so pronounced: yet thro' subsequent losses before the City of Ai, being sore afflicted, he entered into suspicion, that there might have been some failure in the performance Book TWO of the Law. Whereupon he rend his Clothes, and fell to the 
Josh. 7. 6.  Earth upon his face before the Ark of the Lord, till the eventide, he and the Elders (or Sanhedrim of Israel) and put dust on their heads. The Sanhedrim, in difficult cases of the Law, enquired of God by Vrim; and the Sanhedrim, or the People, in cases of high concernment to the State, as in the War against BENJAMIN, enquired of the Ark. When God was enquired of by Vrim, he gave his Oracle by the shining of certain Stones or Jewels in the Breastplate of the High Priest. When he was enquired of by the Ark, he gave his Oracle vocally from the Mercy seat, which was placed upon the Ark of the Covenant. Whence he who sat between the Cherubims thus answered JOSHUA: 
Josh. 7. 10.  Get thee up; wherefore liest thou thus upon thy face? Israel has sinned— they have even taken of the accursed thing. JOSHUA thus informed of the Crime, but not so particularly of the Malefactor as to know 
Josh. 7. 17.  where to charge it, calls the whole People to the Urns; in one of which it may be thought that there were eleven white Stones, or Lots, with one black one; and in the other the twelve Names of the Tribes. So Israel coming first by Tribes to the Urns, the Tribe of JUDAH was taken; that is, this Tribe lighting upon the black Lot, was denoted for the Guilty Tribe: Which consisting (as appeared by the Catalogue) of five Families, whereof the Zarhits were one, came next by Families to the Urn; wherein there might be four white Lots, and one black one, by which the Zarhits were taken. In like manner came the Family of the Zarhits by Households, and the Household of ZABDI was taken: Last of all came the Household of ZABDI man by man, and ACHAN was taken. This kind of Inquisition was performed with such Religion and Solemnity, that a man thus taken, if he had any guilt, could have no face to conceal it; or, if there were any Witnesses of his Crime, they could not any longer dissemble it: and whether he were convicted by testimony, or by his own confession (as now ACHAN) he was put to death. The like proceeding, in part, 
1 Sam. 14.  is employed to have been in the case of JONATHAN; though in this, by agreement thereupon between SAUL and the People, it should seem as if but two Lots were put into the Urn, whereof SAUL and JONATHAN, on the one part, drew the black: Or the Prince of the Tribe of JUDAH drawing for the whole People, on the other part, drew the white one; and that the same being put into the Urn again, to decide it between SAUL and JONATHAN, JONATHAN drew the black: whereupon, he being questioned, confessed the fact; and, but that the People rescued him from SAUL, had been put to death.  
Sect. 12 
Distribution of Lands, and Agrarian Laws in Israel.  TO conclude with the use of the Lot, in the division of the Land of Canaan. This (as implying the Foundation or Balance of the Government) ought to have been the first in order, but happens here to come last; because these Orders were instituted in the Wilderness, and so before the People had any Lands to divide. Nevertheless, this also was proposed by MOSES, and resolved by the People: By lot was their 
Josh. 14. 2.  Inheritance, as the Lord commanded MOSES; and now comes (as it was, or should have been put in execution by JOSHUA) to be considered.  
IT may be true, that the Roman People were the wisest that have been; and it is true, that they only of a People, did labour to introduce Agrarian Laws, though without effect: Otherwise, Levelling was never introduced, but by the wisdom and providence of some great Man, as a MOSES, a JOSHUA, or a LYCURGUS; or by some accident, or Chap. 2 accidents, bringing a Nobility to ruin, as the Laws of HENRY VII. and the ways of HENRY VIII. in England.  

Num. 1. 46. Num. 26. 51.  BETWEEN the Muster Roll in Sinai, whereby the men of military age, as was shown, amounted to six hundred and three thousand five hundred and fifty, in the twelve Tribes, and the Law for the division of the Land of Canaan, there happened a Plague, by which the number of the People, upon a new Poll, came but to six hundred and one thousand seven hundred and thirty. Upon this Poll was the Law made, which runs thus: To these the Land shall be divided for an Inheritance, 
V 53, 54, 55, 56.  according to the number of names. To many thou shalt give the more Inheritance, and to fewer thou shalt give the less inheritance: To every one shall his Inheritance be given, according to those that were numbered of him. Notwithstanding, the Land shall be divided by lot: according to the names of the Tribes of their Fathers, they shall inherit; according to the lot shall the possession thereof be divided to many and few. This Law, in another place, is repeated thus: You shall divide the 
Num. 33. 54.  Land by lot, for an inheritance among your Families; and to many ye shall give the more Inheritance, and to the fewer ye shall give the less Inheritance: Every man's inheritance shall be in the place where his Lot falls, according to the Tribes of your Fathers ye shall inherit.  
IN the making of these Lots consideration was as well had of the goodness of the Land, as of the measure. Now supposing this Law to have been in the whole and methodically executed, the Canaanites must first have been totally rooted out of the Land of Canaan; which Land, in that case (as some affirm) would have afforded to this Commonwealth a Root or Balance, consisting of three millions of Acres. 
Hecateus apud Joseph. count. Ap.  These, reckoning the whole People in the twelve Tribes, at six hundred and two thousand (which is more than upon the later Poll they came to) would have afforded to every man four Acres; to every one of the Patriarches (upon the poll of the foregoing Catalogue, where they are sixty) four thousand Acres; to every one of the Princes of the Tribes, fourteen thousand Acres; to the Levitical Cities (being forty eight, each with its Suburbs, of four thousand Cubits diameter) one hundred thousand Acres; and yet for extraordinary Donations, as to JOSHUA and CALEB (of which kind there were but few) some eighty thousand Acres might remain. Now it is true, four Acres to a man may seem but a small Lot; yet the Roman People, under Romulus, and long after, had but two. And it may very well be, that one Acre in Canaan was worth two in Italy, especially about Rome; and four in England, though of the best sort: and if so it were that four Acres in Palestin were worth sixteen of our best, such a Lot, at our account, might be worth about thirty or forty pounds a year; which, for a popular share, holding that rate thro' the whole body of a People, was a large proportion. By this estimat, or what possibly could be allowed to the Princes of the Tribes and of the Families, their share came not to a sixth of the whole: so the rest remaining to the People, the Balance of this Government must have been purely popular. It is true, that in the whole this Law of MOSES for the division of the Land was never executed: but that in the parts some such course was taken, is plain; for example, in the division to seven Tribes, where JOSHUA proposes to the People in this manner: Give out from among 
Josh. 18. 4.  you three men for each Tribe— and they shall go thro' the Land and describe Book TWO it. The People having resolved accordingly, these went, and passed thro' the Land, and described it by Cities into seven parts in a Book, and came again to JOSHUA to the Host at Shiloh. And JOSHUA cast Lots for them in Shiloh, before the Lord: and there JOSHUA divided the Land to the Children of Israel according to their divisions. It were absurd to think that this Lot determined of proportions; for so a mean man might have come to be richer than the Prince of his Tribe: but the proportions allotted to Tribes being stated, though at first but by guess, and entered into the Lot Book of the Surveyors (who, says JOSEPHUS, were most expert in Geometry) the Princes came first to the Urns, whereof the one contained the names of the Tribes that were to draw, the other the names of those parcels of Land that were to be drawn first to a whole Tribe. Thus the name of a Tribe, for example BENJAMIN, being drawn out of one Urn, to that name a parcel was drawn out of the other Urn; for example, the Country lying between Jericho and Bethaven. This being done, and the Prince of the Tribe having chosen in what one place he would take his stated and agreed proportion, whether of fourteen thousand Acres, or the like, the rest of the Country was subdivided in the Lot Book, according to the number of Families in the Tribe of this Prince; and the Parcels subdivided being cast into the one Urn, the names of the Patriarches into the other, the same Tribe came again by Families. Thus every Patriarch making choice in what one part of this Lot he would take his agreed proportion, whether of four thousand Acres, or the like; the remainder was again subdivided in the Lot Book, according to the number of names in his Family: if they were more than the parcel would furnish at four Acres a man, than was that defect amended by addition out of the next parcel; and if they were fewer, than the overplus was cast into the next parcel. By such means the People came, or might have come in the whole, and in every part, to the Lot of their Inheritance; while every Tribe that was thus planted, became local, 
Num. 36. 3.  without removal. Neither shall the Inheritance remove from one Tribe to another Tribe; but every one of the Tribes of the Children of Israel shall keep himself to his own Inheritance.  
Sect. 13 

The Portion of Levi.  
Josh. 21. 4, 5, 6. Num. 18. 20. Deut. 10. 9 Deut. 18. 1.   THE Tribes thus planted, or to have been planted, were twelve. The thirteenth, or that of LEVI, came in the like manner to the Lot, for their forty eight Cities with their Suburbs, and received them accordingly; as the Lot came forth for the Families of the Kohathits, and the rest. These Israel gave to the Levits out of their Inheritance: That is, these were such as the twelve Tribes, before the division, set apart for the Levits, with the Tithes, and the Offerings; which, though this Tribe had no other Lands, made their portion by far the best. The Tribes being henceforth reckoned by their locality, and these forty eight Cities being scattered throout the twelve Tribes, that of LEVI was no more computed as a distinct Tribe, but lost as it were the name, yet with advantage: for to their promiscuous abode they had the right of promiscuous marriage; no more in this point 
Ezek. 44. 22.  being enjoined any of them, than to take Maidens of the Seed of Israel, or at least the Widows of Priests. And as in the Tribes where they dwelled they had promiscuous Marriage, so had they right of promiscuous Election; that is, of electing, and being elected, into all the Magistracies and Offices of the Commonwealth: which they so frequently enjoyed, that the Sanhedrim is sometimes understood by their names. If there arises a matter too hard for thee in judgement, thou shalt Chap. 2 come to the Priests the Levits. Between the Law, and the Religion of 
Deut. 17. 8.  this Government, there was no difference; whence all Ecclesiastical persons were also Political persons, of which the Levits were an entire Tribe, set more peculiarly apart to God (the King of this Commonwealth) from all other cares, except that only of his Government. Thus MOSES did that with the safety of Liberty in Israel, which LYCURGUS could not do in Lacedaemon, but by condemning the Helots' to perpetual Slavery: For whereas without these to be tilers of the Ground, the Citizens of Lacedaemon could not be at leisure for the Commonwealth; the Children of Israel might employ themselves in their domestic Affairs, as they required, with safety: while the Levits bore the burden of the Government; or, in case either their private Affairs permitted, or their Ambition promted, were equally capable of Magistracy.  


Cities of Refuge.  
Num. 35.   OF the Levitical Cities, three beyond, and three on this side Jordan, Sect. 14 were Cities of Refuge. If a man was slain, the next of kindred, by the Laws of Israel, was the Avenger of Blood; and to the Avenger of Blood it was lawful to slay him that slew his Kinsman, wherever he could find him, except only in a City of Refuge. For this cause, if a man had slain another, he fled immediately to one of these Sanctuaries; whence nevertheless, the Judges in the Gates, within whose proper verge the Crime was committed, caused the Malefactor to be brought before them by a Guard, and judged between the Slayer and the Avenger of Blood. If that which we call Murder, or Manslaughter, was proved against him by two Witnesses, he was put to death: but if it was found, as we say, Chancemedly, he was remanded with a Guard to the City of Refuge; whence if, before the Death of the High Priest, he was found wand'ring, it was lawful, not only for the Avenger of Blood, but for any man else to slay him. The High Priest being dead, he returned, not home only, but to his Inheritance also, with liberty and safety. If a Priest had slain a man, his Refuge was the Sanctuary: whence nevertheless he was taken by the Sanhedrim; and, if upon trial he was found guilty of wilful Murder, put to death. If a man comes presumtuously upon his Neighbour to slay 
Exod. 21. 14.  him with guile, thou shalt take him from my Altar, that he may die.  

The Jubilee.  INHERITANCES, being thus introduced by the Lot, were immovably Sect. 15 entailed on the Proprietors and their Heirs for ever, by the institution of the Jubilee, or the return of Lands, however sold or engaged, once in fifty years to the ancient Proprietor, or his lawful Heir. Yet remained there two ways whereby Lots might be accumulated; the one by casual Inheritance, the other by marriage with an Heiress: as in the case 
Num. 36.  of ZELOPHEDAD, or of his Daughters.  
NOW to bring the whole result of these historical parts, thus proved, Sect. 16 to the true Political Method or Form, the Commonwealth instituted by MOSES was according to this Model.  

The Model of the Commonwealth of Israel.  THE whole People of Israel (thro' a popular distribution of the Land of Canaan among themselves by lot, and the fixation of such a popular Balance by their Agrarian Law, or Jubilee, intailing the inheritance of each Proprietor upon his Heirs for ever) was locally divided into twelve Tribes.  
Book TWO EVERY Tribe had a double capacity, the one Military, the other Civil.  
A TRIBE, in its Military capacity, consisted of one Staff or Standard of the Camp, under the leading of its distinct and hereditary Prince, as Commander in chief; and of its Princes of Families or chief Fathers, as Captains of thousands and Captains of hundreds.  
A TRIBE, in its Political capacity, was next and immediately under the government of certain Judicatories, sitting in the Gates of its Cities; each of which consisted of twenty three Elders, elected for life, by free suffrage.  
THE Sovereign Power, and common Ligament of the twelve Tribes, was the Sanhedrim of Israel, and the Ecclesia Dei, or Congregation of the Lord.  
THE Sanhedrim was a Senate, consisting of seventy Elders for life, so instituted by the free Election of six Competitors, in and by each Tribe; every Elder, or Senator of the Sanhedrim being taken out of this number of Competitors by the Lot.  
THE Congregation of the Lord was a Representative of the People of Israel, consisting of twenty four thousand, for the term of one month; and perpetuated by the monthly Election of two thousand Deputies of the People in each Tribe.  
THE Sanhedrim, upon a Law made, was a standing Judicatory of Appeal from the Courts in the Gates, throout the Tribes; and upon a Law to be made, whatever was proposed by the Sanhedrim, and resolved in the affirmative by the Congregation of the Lord, was an Act of the Parliament of Israel.  

Deut. 4. 5, 6.  OF this Frame says MOSES to the People (as well he might) Behold, I have taught you Statutes and Judgements, even as the Lord my God commanded me, that ye should do so in the Land whither you go to possess it. Keep therefore, and do them; for this is your Wisdom, and your Understanding in the sight of the Nations, which shall hear all these Statutes, and say, Surely this great Nation is a wise and understanding People. In another place, upon the People's observing this form, he pronounces all the choicest Blessings; and in case of violation of the same, a long enumeration of most dreadful Curses, among which he 
Deut. ●8. 36.  has this: The Lord shall bring thee, and thy King which thou shalt set over th●e, to a Nation which neither thou nor thy Fathers have known; and there shalt thou serve other Gods, Wood and Stone. In which words, first he charges the King upon the People as a Creature of their own, and next opposes his Form pointblank to Monarchy; as is farther apparent in the whole Antithesis running throout that Chapter. To the neglect of these Orders may be applied those words of DAVID: I have said that ye are Gods— but ye shall die like Men, and fall like one of the Princes. But this Government can with no countenance of Reason, or testimony of Story, give any man ground to argue from the Frame thus instituted by MOSES, that a Commonwealth rightly ordered and established, may by any internal cause arising from such Orders, be broken or dissolved; it being most apparent, that this was never established in any such part as could possibly be holding. MOSES died in the Wilderness: and though JOSHUA, bringing the People into the promised Land, did what he could, during his Life, towards the establishment of the Form designed by MOSES; yet the hands of the Peopl, e specially after the death of JOSHUA, grew slack, and they Chap. 3 rooted not out the Canaanites, which they were so often commanded to do; and without which it was impossible their Commonwealth should take any root. Nevertheless, settled as it could be, it was in some parts longer lived than any other Government has yet been; as having continued in some sort from MOSES, to the dispersion of the Jews in the Reign of the Emperor ADRIAN; being about one thousand seven hundred years. But that it was never established according to the necessity of the Form, or the true intent of MOSES, is that which must be made farther apparent throout the sequel of the present Book; and first, in the state of the israelites under their Judges.   

CHAP. III.  
Showing the Anarchy, or State of the israelites under their Judges.  


A full Description of the Representative of the People of Israel.  
1 Chr. 27.   THE Frame of that which I take to have been the ordinary Congregation Sect. 1 or Representative of the People of Israel, is not perfectly shown in Scripture, till the time of DAVID; when, though it has nothing in it of a Monarchical Institution, it is found entirely remaining, and perfectly described in these words: Now the Children of Israel after their number, to wit, the chief Fathers, and Captains of thousands and hundreds, and their Officers that served the King in any matter of the Courses, which came in, and went out month by month, throout all the months in the year; of every Course were twenty and four thousand men. The Polls of the People, as they have been hitherto shown, were taken before their plantation in Canaan, where before they had Kings, they had grown (according to the account of PAUL) four hundred and 
Acts 13. 20.  fifty years; during which time, that they were exceedingly increased, appears by the Poll of Military age taken by DAVID, and amounting 
2 Sam. 24. 9  to one Million three hundred thousand: yet could this Assembly of the Children of Israel after their number, in one year, by monthly rotation, take in the whole body of them. How these, being a Representative of the People, and thus changeable, could be otherwise collected than by the monthly election of two thousand in each Tribe, is not imaginable. And that both a Representative of the People they were, and thus changeable, is by the clear words of Scripture, and the nature of the business upon which occasion they are described, undeniably evinced: for DAVID proposing, and the People resolving, they make SOLOMON King, and ZADOC Priest. This Assembly 
1 Chr. 29. 22.  (besides the Military Discipline thereof, in which it differed little from the Customs of such other Commonwealths as have been great and martial) had not only a Civil, but a Military Office or Function, as the standing Guard or Army of this Country; which, though small, and lying in the very Teeth of its Enemy's, could thus, by taking in every man but for one month in a whole year, so equally distribute a Burden, to have been otherwise intolerable to all, that it might be born by a few, and scarce felt by any. This Epitome of that Body (already described under the leading of the several Princes of the Tribes, with their Staves, and Standards of the Camp) seems to have been commanded by Lieutenants of the Princes, or Tribune's of the respective Tribes: Book TWO For, over the first course, for the first month, was JASHOBEAM the 
Ver. 2, 3.  Son of ZABDIEL (of the Children of PEREZ, or of the Family of the Pharzits, in the Catalogue of JUDAH) and of his course were four and twenty thousand.  
IN this case the Princes did not lead in person, but resided in their Tribes for the Government of the same; whence, upon extraordinary occasions, they sent extraordinary Recruits: or in case of solemn War, or some weighty affair, as the trial of a Tribe or the like, led up in person, with their Staves and Standards; an Ordinance, whether we regard the military or civil use of it, never enough to be admired.  
Sect. 2 

That this Representative was used in the time of the Judges.  
Judg. 2. 6. Judg. 3. 3.   IT is true, while, the whole People being an Army, MOSES could propose to them in body, or under their Staves and Standards of the Camp; as he needed not, so he used not any Representative. But when JOSHUA had let the People go, and the Children of Israel went every man to his Inheritance, to possess the Land; how was it possible they should possess any thing (while the five Lords of the Philistines, and all the Canaanites, and the Sidonians, and the Hivits, remained yet among them unconquered) without the wing of some such Guard or Army as this, under which to shelter themselves? How was it equal, or possible, that a few of the People upon the guard of the whole, should be without relief, or sustain all the burden? Or how could every man be said to go to his Inheritance to possess it, unless they performed this or the like duty, by turns or courses? These things considered, there is little doubt but this Congregation was, according to the Institution of MOSES, put in practice by JOSHUA.  
Sect. 3 
The dissolution of the Mosaical Commonwealth.  THUS stood both the Sanhedrim, and the Congregation, with the inferior Courts, and all the Superstructures of the Mosaical Commonwealth, during the life of JOSHUA, and the Elders of the Sanhedrim that outlived him; but without any sufficient root for the 
Judg. 2. 7, 11.  possible support of it (the Canaanites not being destroyed) or with such roots only as were full of worms. Wherefore, though the People served the Lord all the days of JOSHUA, and all the days of the Elders that outlived JOSHUA; yet after the death of these, they did evil in the sight of the Lord. And an Angel (a Messenger or Prophet) of the 
Judg. 2. 1, 2.  Lord came up from Gilgal to Bochim, and said, I made you go up out of the Land of Egypt, and have brought you into the Land which I swore to 
Deut. 7. 2. ch. 12. 2.  your Fathers; and I said, I will never break my Covenant with you. And ye shall make no League with the Inhabitants of this Land, ye shall throw down their Altars: but ye have not obeyed my Voice: Why have you done 
Josh. 23. 3. Exod. 23. 33. ch. 34. 12. Antiq. l. 5. c. 2.  this? Wherefore I also said, I will not drive them out from before you: but they shall be as Thorns in your sides, and their Gods shall be a snare to you. Upon the several Contents of which places, says JOSEPHUS, The israelites (after the death of JOSHUA, and the Elders that outlived him) neglecting their Arms, betook themselves to Tillage; and effeminated with Peace, gave their minds rather to what was easy and pleasing, than what was secure or honourable: forgetful of the Laws of God, and of their Discipline. Whereupon God being moved to anger, admonished them by a Prophet, that in sparing the Canaanites, they had disobeyed him; and that in case they persisted, for his Mercys neglected they should taste of his Justice. But they, though terrified with the Oracle, were altogether averse to the War; both because they were bribed by the Canaanites, and thro' luxury were become unapt for labour: the form of their Commonwealth being now depraved, and the Aristocratical part thereof invalid; while neither the Senate was elected, nor the solemn Magistrates created as formerly. In which words, Chap. 3 the not electing of the Senate as formerly, being laid as a Crime by JOSEPHUS to the People; he is first clear enough, for his part, that the Senate was formerly elected by the People, and aught to have been so still: And secondly, that henceforth the election of the Senate, or Sanhedrim, was neglected by the People. So this Commonwealth, which, thro' the not rooting out of the Canaanites, had never any Foundation, came now to fail also in her Superstructures: for proof whereof, the Testimony of Scripture is no less pregnant in divers places. As where JUDAH said to SIMEON his Brother, Come up with me into my Lot, 
Judg. 1. 3, 27, 29, etc.  that we may fight against the Canaanites, and I likewise will go with thee into thy Lot: So SIMEON went with him. In which words you have a League made by two Tribes, and a War managed by them, while other Tribes, that is, EPHRAIM, MANASSEH, with the rest, sat still: whereas, if there had been now any common ligament, as while the Sanhedrim was in being, such leaguing, and such warring by particular Tribes at their own discretion, could not have been. Again, whereas to judge a Tribe pertained to the Sanhedrim; in the Judgement given against BENJAMIN, by the Congregation of four hundred thousand, 
Judg. 20.  there is no mention of the Sanhedrim at all.  


No King, some Senate; no Senate, some King.  
Calav. ap. Liv. Acts 13.   NOW Government is of such a nature, that where there is no Sect. 4 Senate, there must be some King, or somewhat like a King, and such was the Judge of Israel; yet is not their reckoning valid, who from hence compute the Monarchy of the Hebrews. First, because PAUL distinguishes between the Kings and the Judges. Secondly, because GIDEON, when he was a Judge, in refusing to be King, does the like. 
Judg. 7. 23.  Thirdly, because the Judges in Israel (as Dictator's in other Commonwealths) were not of constant Election, but upon Emergencys only. Fourthly, because complaint being made to the men of JUDAH of 
Judg. 15. 13.  their Judge SAMSON, they delivered him to the Philistines bound; no less than did the Romans their Consuls to the Samnites. And lastly, because SAMUEL, distinguishing to perfection between Dictatorian and Royal Power, or between the Magistracy of the Judge and of the King, shows plainly (in that he harkened to the Voice of the People) that the one being without any balance at all, was at the discretion of the People; and that the other (not to be founded but upon Property in himself, to which end he must take the best of their Fields, and give them to his Servants) could not otherwise subsist than by having the People at the discretion of the King. This difference (being no small one) excepted, the office of the King and of the Judge was much the same; each consisting in judging the People, and going forth with their Arms.  

Besognia vezzaro speguere.  BUT whatever be the difference between these Magistracies, the Sect. 5 State of the Israelitish Commonwealth under the Judges was both void of natural Superstructures, and of the necessary Foundation; so the israelites, when they were weak, served the Philistines, as is employed in the speech of the men of JUDAH to their Judge: Knowest thou not that the 
Judg. 15. 11.  Philistines are Rulers over us?— And it came to pass when Israel was strong, that they put the Canaanites to tribute, and did not utterly drive them out. Which, as it was contrary to the Command of God, so was it pointblank against all Prudence; for thus neither made they to themselves Friends, nor did they ruin their Enemy's: which proceeding, as it fared with this Commonwealth, and was observed by HERENNIUS in that 
Livy.  Book TWO of the Samnites, is the certain perdition of a People.  
Sect. 6 

The Anarchy of Israel.  
Judg. 17. 6. 18. 1. 19 1. 21. 25.   OF the disorder of this People upon the dissolution of the Mosaical Commonwealth, it is often said that there was no King in Israel: every man did that which was right in his own eyes. That is, at the times related to by these expressions, there was neither Sanhedrim, nor Judge in Israel: so every man, or at least every Tribe governed itself as it pleased. Which, nevertheless, is not so generally to be understood, 
Judg. 20.  but that the Tribes (without either Judge or Sanhedrim) marching up with their Standards and Staves of the Camp, not only assembled the Congregation in the usual place at Mizpeh, but there condemned BENJAMIN for the rape of the Levits' Concubine; and, marching thence to put their Decree in execution, reduced that obstinate Tribe, or rather destroyed it by a Civil War.  
Sect. 7 

The rise of the Hebrew Monarchy.  
1 Sam. 4. 3.   WHEN in this, and divers other ways, they had pampered their Enemy's, and exhausted themselves, they grew (as well they might) out of love with their Policy; especially when after impious expostulation (Wherefore has the Lord smitten us this day before the Philistines?) they had, as it were, staked their God (let us fetch the Ark— that it 
1 Sam. 7. 3.  may save us) and the Ark being taken by the Enemy, they fell to Idolatry. To this it happened, that though upon Repentance success was better, God having miraculously discomfited the Philistines before them; yet SAMUEL their Judge was old, and had made his two Sons (being takers of Bribes, and perverters of Justice) Judges over Israel. Whereupon, there was no gainsaying, but a King they must and would have.   

CHAP. IU.  
Showing the State of the israelites under their Kings, to the Captivity.  
Sect. 1 
The Method of this part.  FOR Method in this part, I shall first observe the Balance or Foundation, than the Superstructures of the Hebrew Monarchys; and last of all, the Story of the Hebrew Kings.  
Sect. 2 

The Balance of this Monarchy.  
1 Sam. 8. 11, 14.   THE Balance necessary to Kingly Government, even where it is regulated or not absolute, is thus described by SAMUEL. This will be the manner of the King that shall reign over you: He will take your Fields, your Vineyards, and your Oliveyards, even the best of them, and give them to his Servants. That is, there being no provision of this kind for a King, and it being of natural necessity that a King must have such an Aristocracy or Nobility as may be able to support the Monarchy (which otherwise, to a People having equal shares in property, is altogether incompatible) it follows, that he must take your Fields, and give them to his Servants, or Creatures.  
THIS notwithstanding could not SAUL do, in whose time the Monarchy attained not to any balance, but was soon torn from him 
2 Sam. 8. 1. 1 Chron. 11.  like the lap of a Garment. The Prince who gave that balance to this Monarchy, which it had, was DAVID: for besides his other Conquests, by which he brought the Moabits, the Syrians of Damascus, the Ammonits', the Amalekits, the Edomits, to his Obedience, and extended his Border to the river Euphrates; he smote the Philistines, and subdued them, and took Gath and her Towns, out of the hand of the Philistines. Now this Country which DAVID thus took, was part of Chap. 4 the Land given to the People by God, and which was by the Law of MOSES to have been divided by Lot to them. Wherefore if this division followed not, but DAVID having taken this Country, did hold it in his particular Dominion or Property; then though he took not from the People any thing whereof they were in actual possession, yet, as to their legal Right, took he from them (as SAMUEL had forewarned) their Fields, their Vineyards, and their Oliveyards, even the best of them, and gave them to his Servants, or to a Nobility, which by this means he introduced.  

2 Sam. 23. 1 Chron. 11.  THE first Order of the Nobility thus instituted, were, as they are termed by our Translators, DAVID'S Worthys: to these may be added, the great Officers of his Realm and Court, with such as sprang out of both. But however, these things by advantage of foreign Conquest might be ordered by DAVID, or continued for the time of his next Successor; certain it is, that the balance of Monarchy in so small a Country must be altogether insufficient to itself, or destructive to the People.  


A Parallel of the Monarchichal Balances in Israel and in Lacedaemon.  
Plutarch in Agis and Cleomenes.   THE Commonwealth of Lacedaemon, being founded by LYCURGUS Sect. 3 upon the like Lots with these designed by MOSES, came, after the spoil of Athens, to be destroyed by Purchasers, and brought into one hundred hands; whereupon, the People being rooted out, there remained no more to the two Kings, who were wont to go out with great Arms, than one hundred Lords: nor any way, if they were invaded, to defend themselves, but by Mercenarys, or making War upon the Penny; which, at the farthest it would go (not computing the difference in Discipline) reached not, in one third, those Forces which the popular Balance could at any time have afforded without Mony. This some of those Kings perceiving, were of all others the most earnest to return to the popular Balance. What Disorders in a Country no bigger than was theirs, or this of the Israelits, must, in case the like course be not taken, of necessity follow, may be at large perused in the story of Lacedaemon; and shall be fully shown, when I come to the story of the present Kings.  

The Superstructures of the Hebrew Monarchy.  FOR the Superstructures of DAVID'S Government, it has been Sect. 4 shown at large what the Congregation of Israel was; and that without the Congregation of Israel, and their Result, there was not any Law made by DAVID. The like in the whole, or for the most part, was observed till REHOBOAM, who, refusing to redress the Grievances of the People, was deposed by one part of this Congregation or Parliament, and set up by another; to the confusion both of Parliament and People. And DAVID (as after him JEHOSHAPHAT) did restore the Sanhedrim; I will not affirm, by popular Election, after the ancient manner. He might do it perhaps, as he made JOAB over the Host, JEHOSHAPHAT Recorder, and SERAIAH Scribe. 
1 Sam. 8. 15.  Certain it is, the Jewish Writers hold unanimously, that the seventy Elders were in DAVID'S time, and by a good token; for they say, to him only of all the Kings it was lawful, or permitted, to enter into the Sanhedrim: which I the rather credit, for the words of DAVID, where he says, I will praise the Lord with my whole Heart in the Council, 
Psal. 111. 1.  and in the Congregation of the Upright; which words relate to the Senate, and the Congregation of Israel. The final cause of the popular Congregation, in a Commonwealth, is to give such a balance by their Book TWO Result, as may, and must keep the Senate from that Faction and Corruption, whereof it is not otherwise curable, or to set it upright. Yet our Translation gives the words cited, in this manner: I will praise the Lord with my whole Heart in the Assembly of the Upright, and in the 
Psal. 82. 1.  Congregation. There are other Allusions in the English Psalms, of the like nature, shaded in like manner: As, God is present in the Congregation of God (that is, in the Representative of the People of Israel) he judges among the Gods, that is, among the seventy Elders, or in the Sanhedrim. What the Orders of the Israelitish Monarchy in the time of DAVID were, though our Translators throout the Bible have done what they could against Popular Government, is clear enough in many such places.  
Sect. 5 
The Story of the Hebrew Kings.  TO conclude this Chapter with the story of the Hebrew Kings: Till REHOBOAM, and the division (thro' the cause mentioned) of the Congregation in his time, the Monarchy of the Hebrews was one, but came thenceforth to be torn into two: that of Judah, consisting of two Tribes, Judah and Benjamin; and that of Israel, consisting of the other ten. From which time this People, thus divided, had little or no rest from the flame of that Civil War, which, once kindled between the two Realms or Factions, could never be extinguished but in the destruction of both. Nor was Civil War of so new a date among them; SAUL, whose whole Reign was impotent and perverse, being conquered by DAVID; and DAVID invaded by his Son ABSALON so strongly, that he fled before him. SOLOMON, the next Successor, happened to have a quiet Reign, by settling himself upon his Throne in the death of ADONIJAH his elder Brother, and in the deposing of the High Priest ABIATHAR; yet made he the yoke of the People grievous. After him, we have the War between JEROBOAM and REHOBOAM. Then, the Conspiracy of BAASHA against NADAB King of Israel, which ends in the destruction of JEROBOAM'S House, and the Usurpation of his Throne by BAASHA, which BAASHA happens to leave to his Son ASA. Against ASA rises ZIMRI, Captain of the Chariots; kills him with all his kindred, reigns seven days; at the end whereof he burns himself for fear of OMRI, who upon this occasion is made Captain by one part of the People, as is also TIBNI by another. The next Prize is played between OMRI and TIBNI, and their Factions; in which TIBNI is slain. Upon this success, OMRI outdoing all his Predecessors in Tyranny, leaves his Throne and Virtues to his Son AHAB. Against AHAB drives JEHU furiously, destroys him and his Family, gives the flesh of his Queen JEZEBEL to the Dogs, and receives a Present from those of Samaria, even seventy Heads of his Master's Sons in Baskets. To ASA and JEHOSHAPHAT, Kings of Judah, belongs much Reverence. But upon this Throne sat ATHALIAH; who, to reign, murdered all her grandchildren except one, which was JOASH. JOASH being hid by the High Priest, at whose command ATHALIAH was some time after slain, ends his Reign in being murdered by his Servants. To him succeeds his Son AMAZIA, slain also by his Servants. About the same time ZACHARIAH King of Israel was smitten by SHALLUM, who reigned in his stead: SHALLUM by MANAHIM, who reigned in his stead: PEKAHA the Son of MANAHIM by PEKAH one of his Captains, who reigned in his stead: PEKAH by HOSHEA. HOSHEA having reigned nine years, is carried by Chap. 4 SALMANAZZER King of Assyria with the ten Tribes into Captivity. Now might it be expected that the Kingdom of Judah should enjoy Peace: a good King they had, which was HEZEKIAH; but to him succeeded his Son MANASSEH, a shedder of innocent Blood. To MANASSEH succeeded his Son AMMON, slain by his Servants. JOSIAH the next, being a good Prince, is succeeded by JEHOAHAZ, who being carried into Egypt, there dies a Prisoner, while JEHOIAKIM his Brother becomes PHARAOH'S Tributary. The last of these Princes was ZEDEKIAH, in whose Reign was Judah led away captive by NABUCHADNEZZAR. Thus came the whole Enumeration of those dreadful Curses denounced by 
Deut. 28.  MOSES in this case, to be fulfilled in this People; of whom it is also said, I gave them a King in my anger, and took him away in my wrath. 
Hos. 13. 11.   
TO conclude this Story with the Resemblances or Differences that are between Monarchical and Popular Government: What Parallel can there be beyond the Stories whereby each of them are so largely described in Scripture? True it is, that AHIMELEC usurped the Magistracy of Judge in Israel, or made himself King by the men of Sichem; that the men of Ephraim fought against JEPTHA, and that there was a Civil War caused by Benjamin: yet, in a Popular Government, the very womb (as they will have it) of tumult, though never so well founded that it could be steady, or take any sufficient root, can I find no more of this kind.  

A Parallel of the Tribunitian Storms with those in the Hebrew Monarchys.  BUT the Tribune's of the People in Rome, or the Romans under Sect. 6 the Magistracy of their Tribune's, throout the whole Administration of that Government, were never quiet; but at perpetual strife and enmity with the Senat. It is very true; but first, this happened not from a Cause natural to a Popular Government, but from a Cause unnatural to Popular Government; yea, so unnatural to Popular Government, that the like has not been found in any other Commonwealth. Secondly, the Cause is undeniably discovered to have consisted in a Faction introduced by the Kings, and fostered by the Nobility, excluding the Suffrage of the main body of the People thro' an Optimacy, or certain rank or number admitted not by the People or their Election, but by the value of their Estates, to the Legislative Power, as the Commons of that Nation. So the State of this People was as if they had two Houses of Lords, and no House of Commons. Thirdly, this danger must have been in any other Nation, at least in ours, much harder to be incurred, than Authors hitherto have made it to be seen in this. And last of all, this Enmity, or these Factions, were without Blood, which in Monarchys they are not, as you saw well in those mentioned; and this Nation in the Baron's Wars, and in those of York and Lancaster, besides others, has felt. Or, if at length they came indeed to Blood, this was not till the Foundations were destroyed, that is, till the Balance of Popular Government in Rome was totally ruined; which is equally in cases of the like nature inavoidable, be the Government of what kind soever, as of late years we have been sufficiently informed by our own sad Experience.   

Book TWO CHAP. V  
Showing the State of the Jews in the Captivity, and after their return out of it; with the Frame of the Jewish Commonwealth.  
Sect. 1 
The State of the israelites in Captivity.  WE left the Children of Israel upon a sad march, even into Captivity. What Orders had been anciently observed by them during the time they were in Egypt (one of which, as has been already shown, was their seventy Elders) the same, so far as would be permitted by the Princes whose Servants they were, continued in practice with them during the time of their Captivity, out of which the ten 
Jer. 25. 12. 2 Chr. 36. 22. Ezra 1.  Tribes never more returned. The two Tribes, when seventy years were accomplished from the time that they were carried away by NABUCHADNEZZAR, and in the first year of CYRUS King of Persia, returned the best part of them, not only with the King's leave and liking, but with restitution of the Plate and Vessels belonging to the Temple.  
Sect. 2 

The Balance of the Commonwealth restored by Zorobabel.  
Ezra 2. Ezra 8.   THE first Colony (as I may say) of the two Tribes, or those that returned under the Conduct of ZOROBABEL Prince of Judah, amounted to forty two thousand three hundred and threescore, among which there were about one hundred Patriarches or Princes of Families. To these, in the reign of ARTAXERXES, came sixteen or twenty Princes more with their Families; among whom the Prophets HAGGAI, ZACHARIAS, and MALACHI were eminent. Some of 
Ezra 2. 59  them could not show their Father's House and their Seed, whether they were of Israel. But these were few; for it is said of them in general, That they went every one to his own City, or to the Inheritance of his Fathers: In which you may note the restitution of the Balance of the Mosaical Commonwealth; though to what this might come without fixation, the Jubilee being not after the Captivity in use, I cannot say. However, for the present, plain it is that the ancient Superstructures did also ensue: as in order to the putting away of the strange Wives, which the People in Captivity had taken, is apparent.  
Sect. 3 
The Superstructures of this Commonwealth in the time of Ezra and Nehemia.  THEIR whole progress hitherto is according to the Law of MOSES; they return every man to his Inheritance by direction of his Pedigree, or according to the House of his Fathers; they are led by Princes of their Families, and are about to put away strange Wives: for what reason then should a man believe that what follows should not be according to the Orders of the same Lawgiver? Now that which follows, in order to the putting away of these foreign Wives, is, 
Ezra 10. 8, 9  Proclamation was made throout Judah and Jerusalem to all the Children of the Captivity, that they should gather themselves to Jerusalem; and that whosoever would not come within three days, according to the council of the Princes and Elders, all his Substance should be forfeited, and himself separated from the Congregation of those that had been carried away. This plainly, by the penalty annexed, is a Law for Banishment; of which kind there was none made by MOSES; and a Law made by the Princes and the Elders. What doubt then can remain, but these Elders were the Sanhedrim, or seventy Elders? But whereas neither the Sanhedrim, nor any other Senate of itself has been found to make Laws, what others can these Princes be that are joined with the Elders, than those spoken of before; that is, the Princes of Families, or the chief Chap▪ 5 Fathers in the Congregation of them that had been carried away? So the Princes and the Elders in this place may be understood of the Sanhedrim and the People: for thus DAVID proposes to the Congregation of the People of Israel, or the chief Fathers, and must be understood 
1 Chr. 27. 1.  of them; because there is no such thing throout the Scripture to be found, as a Law made by the Sanhedrim without the People: and if so, then that the Sanhedrim with the People had power to make a Law, is by this place of Scripture undeniably evinced. But besides the chief Fathers, which here are called Rulers of the Congregation, 
Ezra 10. 14▪  and in the time of DAVID were called Captains of thousands and Captains of hundreds, mention is also made of the Elders of every City, and the Judges thereof; in which words you have the Judges in the Gates throout the Tribes of Israel, as they were instituted by MOSES. All which particulars being rightly summed up, come to this total; T●at the Commonwealth restored by EZRA, was the very same that 〈…〉 was instituted by MOSES.  

A Transition to the Cabalistical or Jewish Commonwealth▪  SUCH was the Government restored by ZOROBABEL, EZRA, Sect. 4 and NEHEMIA. Now whether the Jewish or Cabalistical Commonwealth, fathered by the Presbyterian Jews of latter ages upon MOSES or EZRA, be the same, shall be shown by reducing the invention of these Men to three heads: as first, their Cabala; secondly, their Ordination; and last of all, their great synagogue.  

The Cabala▪  THE Cabala, called also by the Jews the Oral Law, consists of Sect. 5 certain Traditions by them pretended at the institution of the Sanhedrim to have been verbally delivered to the seventy Elders by MOSES for the Government of the Commonwealth. These were never written till after the dispersion of the Jews by the Emperor ADRIAN; when, to save them from being lost, they were digested into those Volumes called the Talmud: which they hold to be, and indeed are as to matter of Fact, the authentic Records of their Government. Of the Traditions thus recorded says one of the Rabbins or Jewish Doctors: Think not 
Rabbi Corbulensis.  that the written Law (or the Law of MOSES) is fundamental, but that the Oral or Traditional Law is fundamental, it being upon this that God entered into a League with the Israelits, as it is written: After the tenor of 
Exod. 34. 27. In codice juris Chagiga.  these words, I have made a Covenant with thee, and with Israel. A man (says another) who returns from the study of the Talmud to the study of the Bible, can have no quiet conscience, neither was there any peace to him that 
Zach. 8. 10.  went out or came in. The like whereof is the Talmudical way of applying Scripture throout. And it was the common Blessing the Pharises gave their Children: My Son, harken to the words of a Scribe or Doctor, rather than to the Law of MOSES. To whom says CHRIST hereupon, You have made the Commandment of God of no 
Mat. 15. 6.  effect by your tradition.  

Ordination by Imposition of Hands.  NOW as true as the Talmud, or as this word of a Scribe, or that Sect. 6 MOSES delivered the Oral Law to the seventy Elders and to JOSHUA, so true it is that MOSES ordained both the seventy Elders and JOSHUA by the imposition of Hands; and that this Ordination by the imposition of Hands, together with the Oral Law, came successively, and hand in hand from the seventy Elders, and from JOSHUA downright to these Doctors. This indeed is so generally affirmed by their Talmudists, that there is no denying of it; but, that as to the seventy Elders it is quite contrary to Scripture, has already been Book TWO made sufficiently apparent; for JOSHUA is acknowleged to have been ordained by MOSES with imposition of hands. But this Argument (besides that the Act of MOSES was accompanied with a miracle, and that it is absurd to think that a thing plainly miraculous should or can be received as an Order in a Commonwealth) will go no farther than that JOSHUA, upon this authority, might have elected his Successor by imposition of hands. Let them show us then that he did so, or indeed that he left any Successor at all: for certainly if JOSHUA left no Successor so ordained, or no Successor at all (which is the truth of the case) then descended there upon them no such Ordination from JOSHUA; and so by consequence none from MOSES. Whence it follows, that the Authority and Vogue of Ordination by the imposition of hands among the Jews proceeds not from the Law of MOSES, but from the Oral Law; which how bad an Authority soever i●●e to us of right, is of fact, or of what the exercise of Ordina 〈…〉 s among the Jews, a good and sufficient testimony. Now thereby the condition of this Ordination (though in some times of the Commonwealth it was less restrained) was such, that no man not having received the same from the great Sanhedrim, or some one of the inferior Courts by laying on of hands, by word of mouth, or by writing, could be a Presbyter, or capable of any Judicature or Magistracy in the Commonwealth, or to give Council in the Law, or any part of the Law, or to be of the Assembly of the great synagogue.  
Sect. 7 
The great synagogue.  WHAT the Assembly of the Princes and Fathers was in the time of EZRA, has been shown, and is left to the judgement of others. But this is that which the Talmudists and their Ancestors the Cabalistical Jews (among which the Pharises were of the highest rank) unanimously affirm to have consisted of the seventy Elders, and of a Juncta of fifty Presbyters not elected by the People; but by the laying on of hands by the Sanhedrim, or by some other Judicatory. This, they say, was the institution of their great synagogue, where I leave them: but that, according to the sense wherein they cite their Authoritys, the like with them was a constant practice, appears not only by their own Testimony and Records, but is plain in Scripture; as where CHRIST speaks of the Jews to his Apostles in this manner, They 
Grot. ad Mat. 10. 17.  will scourge you in their Synagogs': that is, the Jews, having as yet no Law made whereby they can invade the liberty of Conscience, or bring you for the practice thereof to punishment, will call their great synagogue, wherein the Priests and the Pharises, or the Sanhedrim, have at least seven to five the overbalancing Vote over the rest. Which also are their Creatures, and by these will easily carry, or make such Laws whereby they may inflict upon you corporal Punishment: which Interpretation of Christ's words, was fulfilled even to a tittle, or rather with over measure. For upon this occasion the High Priest, and as 
Acts 4. 6.  many as were of the kindred of the High Priest, were gathered together at Jerusalem. That this same Juncta, to be in this case added to the Sanhedrim, was to consist but of fifty, those fifty not elected by the People, but chosen by the Elders of the Sanhedrim; and not out of the body of the People, but out of such only as had received Ordination by the Sanhedrim, or by some other Court, or indeed were actually Judges in some other Court, was not enough, unless they might consist also of 
Acts 5. 21.  as many as were of the kindred of the High Priest. Which Rights and Privileges being all observed, The High Priest came, and they that were Chap. 5 with him, and called the Sanhedrim, and all the Presbytery of the Children of Israel: that is, so many of them, as being assembled in the great synagogue, represented all the Presbytery of the Children of Israel, or all the Children of Israel themselves. In this Assembly you have the full description of the great synagogue: and when (in this synagogue) they had beaten the Apostles PETER and JOHN, they commanded them that 
Act. 5. 40.  they should not speak in the Name of JESUS, and let them go. Upon these proceedings there are Considerations of good importance; as first, That the Cabalistical Doctors themselves did never so much as imagine that MOSES had endued the Sanhedrim alone, or separately considered from the People, with any Legislative Power; nevertheless, that the Sanhedrim came into the place, and succeeded to the whole Power of MOSES, they unanimously held: whence, even upon their Principles, it must follow that in MOSES, distinctly and separately taken from the People, there could be no Power of making any Law. The second thing remarkable in this proceeding, is, That the most corrupt Commonwealth, and in her most corrupt Age, had not yet the face, without some blind, of pretending to Legislative Power in a single Council. The last I shall observe, is, That no possible security is to be given to liberty of Conscience, but in the security of Civil Liberty, and in that only not by Laws which are otherwise as perishing as flowers or fruits, but in the roots or fundamental orders of the Government. What even in these times must have followed, as to the liberty of Conscience, had there been an equal Representative of the People, is apparent, in that the Captain and the Officers, employed by this synagogue to apprehend 
Acts 5. 26.  the Apostles, brought them without violence; for they feared the People, lest they should have been stoned. It is true, there is nothing with us more customary, even in the solemnest places, and upon the solemnest occasions, than to upbraid the People with giddiness from the Hosanna and the Crucifige of the Jews. What may be charged upon a multitude not under orders, the fouler Crime it be, is the fairer Argument for such Orders, as where they have been once established, the People have not been guilty of such Crimes; at least, it should seem, that in this case there is great scarcity of Witnesses against them, seeing the Death of SOCRATES is more laid to one People, than that of all the Martyrs to Kings: yet were the false Witnesses by whom SOCRATES suffered (and by the like whereto a man in the best Government may chance to suffer) no sooner discovered, than they were destroyed by the People, who also erected a Statue to SOCRATES. And the People who, at the Arraignment of CHRIST, cried, Crucify him, 
Mark 15. 11.  crucify him, were such as the chief Priests moved or promted, and such also as feared the multitude. Now that the People which could be 
Mat. 21.  promted by the chief Priests, or the People which could fear the People, could be no other than this pretended Representative of the People, but indeed a Juncta of Cousins and Retainers, is that which, for aught I know, may be possible; and the rather, for what happened before upon the Law called among the Jews, The Law of the Zealot, which was instituted by MOSES in these words: If thy Brother, the 
Deut. 13. 6.  Son of thy Mother— entice thee, saying, Let us go and serve other Gods— thy hand shall be first upon him to put him to death— and afterwards the hand of all the People. By this Law it is plain that, as to the true intent thereof, it relates to no other case than that only of Idolatry. The Book TWO execution of the same, according to the Talmud, might be performed by any number of the People, being not under ten, either apprehending the Party in the Fact, or upon the Testimony of such Witnesses as had so apprehended him: yet will it not be found to have been executed by the People, but upon instigation of the Priest, as where (they interpreting the Law as they list) STEPHEN is stoned. Now if the Priests could have made the People do as much against CHRIST, what needed they have gone to PILOT for help? and if they could not, why should we think that the Multitude which cried out, Crucify him, crucify him, should be any other than the great synagogue?  
HOWEVER, that it was an Oligarchy, consisting of a Senate and a Presbytery, which not only scourged the Apostles, but caused CHRIST to be crucified, is certain. And so much for the great synagogue.  
Sect. 8 
The Model of the Jewish Commonwealth.  THESE parts being historically laid down and proved, it follows that the Cabalistical or Jewish Commonwealth was much after this Model.  
BE the capacity of bearing Magistracy, or giving Council upon the Law, or any part of the Law of this Commonwealth, in no other than such only as are Presbyters.  
BE Presbyters of two sorts: the one general, the other particular.  
BE Presbyters general ordained by the laying on of hands of the Prince of the Sanhedrim with the rest of the Elders, or Presbytery of the same, and by no other Court without a Licence from the Prince of the Sanhedrim; and be those ordained in this manner eligible by the major vote of the seventy Elders into the Sanhedrim, or into any other Court by the major vote of the Elders or Presbytery of that Court.  
BE Presbyters particular ordained by any Court of Justice; and be these capable of giving Council in the Law, or in some particular part of the Law, according to the gift that is in them by the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery.  
BE all Presbyters capable of nomination to the great synagogue.  
BE the Sanhedrim in Law made the supreme Magistracy or Judicatory; and with a Juncta of fifty Presbyters of their Nomination, the great synagogue.  
BE the great synagogue the Legislative Power in this Commonwealth.  
SUCH was the Government, where the word of a Scribe or Doctor was avowedly held to be of more validity than the Scripture; and where the usual appellation of the People, by the Doctors and Pharises, was (populus terrae) the Rascally Rabble.  
Regis ad exemplum totus componitur orbis.  
Sect. 9 
Ordination in the lesser synagogue.  THERE were other Synagogs' for other uses, as those wherein the Law was read every Sabbathday; each of which also had her Ruler and her Presbytery, with power to ordain others to this Capacity.   

CHAP. VI Chap. 6  
Showing how Ordination was brought into the Christian Church, and the divers ways of the same that were at divers times in use with the Apostles.  


The form introduced by Christ into his Church.  
Matth. 19 28.   WE do not find that CHRIST (who gave little countenance to Sect. 1 the Jewish Traditions) ordained his Apostles or Disciples by the imposition of hands: his Apostles were twelve, whom he compares to the twelve Princes of the Tribes of Israel; and his Disciples were seventy, in which number it is received by Divines, that he alluded to the seventy Elders or Sanhedrim of Israel. So thus far the Government of the Church, instituted by CHRIST, was according to the form instituted by MOSES. But CHRIST in this form was King and Priest, not after the institution of MOSES, who separated the Levits to the Priesthood; but as before MOSES, when the Royal and Priestly 
Vid. Grotium, & videat Grotius, in Epist. ad Hebraeos.  Function were not separated, and after the order or manner of MELCHISEDEC, who came not to the Priesthood by proving his Pedigree, as the High Priest in Israel by Father, or as the King Priest in Athens by Mother, but without Father and Mother. Or be what has been said of MELCHISEDEC approved or rejected, such for the rest, as has been shown, was the form introduced by CHRIST into his Church.  


The first way of Ordination.  
Acts 1.   CHRIST being taken up into Heaven, his Disciples or Followers Sect. 2 in Jerusalem increased to about one hundred and twenty names; and the Apostles decreased by one, or by JUDAS, who was gone to his place. PETER, whether upon the Council or Determination of the eleven Apostles (as is most probable) beforehand or otherwise, stood up and spoke both to the Apostles and Disciples assembled upon this occasion, That one out of the present Assembly might be ordained an Apostle: and they (that is, the Congregation, or why was this proposed to them?) appointed two by Suffrage; for how otherwise can an Assembly appoint? These were BARSABAS and MATHIAS, which Names, being written in scrols, were cast into one Urn; two Lots, whereof one was a blank, and the other inscribed with the word Apostle, being at the same time cast into another Urn. Which don, they prayed that God would show which of the Competitors by them so made, he had chosen: when they had thus prayed, they gave forth their Lots, that is, a scrol out of the one Urn, and then a name to that scrol out of the other Urn; and the Lot fell upon MATHIAS, or MATHIAS was taken; whereupon MATHIAS was numbered, or rather decreed with the eleven Apostles. For 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Psephisma, being a word which properly derives from such Stones or Pebbles as popular Assemblies of old were wont to ballot with or give suffrage by, not only signifys a Decree, but especially such a Decree as is made by a popular Assembly. Now if this was Ordination in the Christian Church, and of Apostolical Right, then may there be a way of Ordination in the Christian Church, and of Apostolical Right, exactly conformable to the Ballot, or way used by MOSES in the institution of the seventy Elders or Sanhedrim of Israel.  
Book TWO AFTER the conversion of some thousands more, most, if not all, Sect. 3 of which were Jews, a People though converted, yet so tenacious of their 

The second way of Ordination.  
Acts 4. 4.   Laws and Customs, that even Circumcision (hitherto not forbidden by the Apostles) was continued among them; the twelve Apostles called the multitude of Disciples to them. So MOSES, when he had any thing 
Acts 6.  to propose, assembled the People of Israel. And when the twelve had thus called the Disciples, they said, Look ye out among you seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost and Wisdom, whom we may appoint over this business. So MOSES said to the Congregation of Israel, Take ye wise men, and understanding, and known among your Tribes, and I will make them Rulers over you. And the saying of the Apostles pleased the whole multitude. So the People of Israel were wont to answer to MOSES, The thing which thou sayest is good for us to do. This saying of the Apostles being thought good by the whole multitude, the whole multitude elected seven men whom they set before the Apostles: and when they had prayed, they laid their hands on them. To say in this place (as they do) that the Act of the People was but a Presentation, and that the Apostles had power to admit or refuse the Persons so presented, is as if one should say, That the act of electing Parliament men by the People of England, was but a Presentation, and that the King had power to admit or refuse the Persons so presented. And seeing the Deacons henceforth had charge of the Word, to say, that by this choice the Deacons received not the charge of the Word, but the care to serve Tables, is as if one should say, That Parliament men by their Election received only the care to levy Money or Provision for the King's Table; but if upon such Election they debated also concerning Laws, that Power they received from the King only.  
BUT if this was a way of Ordination in the Christian Church, and of Apostolical Right, then there may be a way of Ordination in the Christian Church, and of Apostolical Right, consisting in part of the Orders of the Israelitish Commonwealth, and in part of the Orders of the Jewish Commonwealth.  
Sect. 4 

The third way of Ordination.  
1 Tim. 4. 14.   LASTLY, PAUL writing to TIMOTHY concerning his Ordination, has in one place this expression, Neglect not the Gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery. So the Presbytery of a Jewish synagogue laid their hands on 
2 Tim. 1. 6.  the Party ordained. And in another place he has this expression: Stir up the Gift of God which is in thee by the laying on of my hands. So the Ruler of a Jewish synagogue did lay his hands also on the Party ordained. Moreover, the Apostle in these words, The Gift that is in thee by laying on of hands, though in relation to Gifts beyond comparison more excellent, uses the Phrase known upon the like occasion to have been common with the Jews. Wherefore if this were a way of Ordination in the Christian Church, and of Apostolical Right, then may there be a way of Ordination in the Christian Church exactly conformable to the Jewish Commonwealth, and yet be of Apostolical Right. Nor is it so strange that the Apostles in matters of this nature should comply with the Jews, of which so many were converted, seeing it is certain that not only the Apostles, but all such as in these times were converted, did observe the Jewish Sabbath; nay, and that PAUL himself took TIMOTHY and circumcised him, because of the Jews; that is, to comply with them, or to give them no offence. Nor do our Divines any where pretend imposition of hands to be derived from CHRIST, but unanimously confess, that it was taken up by the Apostles from the Jewish Sanhedrim.  

The Providence of God in the different way of Apostolical Ordination.  NOW in these several ways of Ordination, there is a most remarkable Sect. 5 Providence of God. For whereas States and Princes in receiving of Religion are not at any point so jealous as of an encroachment upon their Power; the first way of Apostolical Ordination destroys Monarchical Power: the last wholly excludes the Power of the People: and the second has a mixture which may be received by a Commonwealth, or by a Monarchy. But where it is received by a Commonwealth, the imposition of hands comes to little; and where it is received by a Monarchy, the Election of the People comes to nothing, as may be farther considered in the original and progress of the Congee d' Elire.  
THE ways of Ordination or of Church Government lying thus in Scripture, the not receiving of the Christian Religion is not that whereof any State or Prince thro' the whole world can be any ways excusable.   

The Conclusion:  
Showing, that neither GOD, nor CHRIST, or the APOSTLES, ever instituted any Government Ecclesiastical or Civil upon any other Principles than those only of Human Prudence.  

uses of this Book.  TO sum up this second Book in the Uses that may be made of it: Sect. 1 Certain it is of the Greece and Roman Stories, that he who has not some good Idea or Notion of the Government to which they relate, cannot rightly understand them. If the like holds as to the Scripture Story, some light may be contributed to it by this Book. Again, if some gifted Men happening to read it, should chance to be of the same judgement, it is an Argument for acquired Learning, in that for the means of acquired Learning, and in the means of acquired Learning for Universitys. For how little soever this performance be, had it not been the fashion with the English Gentry, in the breeding of their Sons, to give them a smack of the University, I should not have done so much.  

The present use of this Book.  BUT letting these pass. If there were Commonwealths, or Governments Sect. 2 exercising Sovereign Power by the Senate and the People, before that of Israel, as namely, Gibeon: If the inferior Orders and Courts in Israel, as those instituted by MOSES after the advice of JETHRO a Heathen, were transcribed out of another Government though Heathen, as namely, that of Midian: If the order of the Church introduced by CHRIST in his twelve Apostles and his seventy Disciples, were after the pattern of Israel, namely, in the twelve Princes of the Tribes, and the seventy Elders: If there were three distinct ways of Ordination introduced by the Apostles; one exactly according to the Ballot of Israel, as namely, in the Ordination of MATHIAS; another exactly according to the way of the Jewish Sanhedrim or synagogue, as namely, that of TIMOTHY; and a third, composed of these two, as namely, that of the Deacons: Then is it a clear and undeniable result of the whole, That neither GOD, nor CHRIST, Book TWO or the APOSTLES, ever instituted any Government Ecclesiastical or Civil upon any other Principles than those only of Human Prudence.  
Sect. 3 
The Consequence of this Use.  AN Observation of such consequence, as, where it has been rightly considered, there the truth of Religion and of Government once planted, have taken root and flourished; and where it has not been rightly heeded, there has Religion or the pretence of it been the hook and the line, and the State the prey of Impostors and false Prophets, as was shown in the hypocritical Pharises, for ever stigmatised by the word of Truth.  
AND for Might, let her be never so much exalted in herself, let her Sword be never so dreadfully brandished; the Government not founded upon Reason, a Creature of God, and the Creature of God whose undoubted right in this part is by himself undeniably avowed and asserted, is a Weapon framed against God; and no Weapon framed against God shall prosper.  
Sect. 4 
A transition to the next Book.  THE Principles of Human Prudence, and in them the Art of Lawgiving, being shown in the first Book, and vindicated throout the whole course of Scripture by this second, I come in the third to show a Model of Government, framed according to the Art thus shown, and the Principles thus vindicated.   

THE THIRD BOOK: CONTAINING A MODEL OF Popular Government, Practically proposed according to Reason, confirmed by the Scripture, and agreeable to the present Balance or State of Property in England.  

The PREFACE, Containing a Model of Popular Government, proposed Notionally.  
THERE is between the Discourses of such as are commonly called Natural Philosophers, and those of Anatomists, a large difference; the former are facile, the latter difficult. Philosophers, discoursing of Elements for example, that the Body of Man consists of Fire, Air, Earth and Water, are easily both understood and credited, seeing by common Experience we find the Body of Man returns to the Earth from whence it was taken. A like Entertainment may befall Elements of Government, as in the first of these Books they are stated. But the fearful and wonderful making, the admirable structure and great variety of the parts of man's Body, in which the Discourses of Anatomists are altogether conversant, are understood by so few, that I may say they are not understood by any. Certain it is, that the delivery of a Model of Government (which either must be of no effect, or embrace all those Muscles, Nerves, Arteries and Bones, which are necessary to any Function of a well ordered Commonwealth) is no less than political Anatomy. If you come short of this, your Discourse is altogether ineffectual; if you come home, you are not understood: you may, perhaps, be called a learned Author; but you are obscure, and your Doctrine is impracticable. Had I only suffered in this, and not the People, I should long since have left them to their humour; but seeing it is they that suffer by it, and not myself, I will be yet Book III more a fool, or they shall be yet wiser. Now comes into my head what I saw long since upon an Italian Stage, while the Spectators wanted Hoops for their sides. A Country fellow came with an Apple in his hand; to which, in a strange variety of faces, his Teeth were undoubtedly threatened, when entered a young Anatomist brimful of his last Lesson, who, stopping in good time the hand of this same Country fellow, would by no means suffer him to go on with so great an Enterprise, till he had first named and described to him all the Bones, Nerves, and Muscles which are naturally necessary to that motion: at which, the good man being with admiration plainly chopfallen, comes me in a third, who, snatching away the Apple, devoured it in the presence of them both. If the People, in this case whereof I am speaking, were naturally so well furnished, I had here learned enough to have kept silence: but their eating, in the political way, of absolute necessity requires the aid of some political Anatomist; without which, they may have Appe●i●s, but will be chopfallen. Examples whereof they have had but too many; one I think may be insisted upon without envy.  
THIS is that which was called The Agreement of the People, consisting in sum of these Propositions:  

The Anarchy of the Levellers  THAT there be a Representative of the Nation consisting of four hundred Persons, or not above.  
WHICH Proposition puts the Bar on the quite contrary side; this being the first example of a Commonwealth, wherein it was conceived, that five hundred thousand men, or more, might be represented by four hundred. The Representation of the People in one man, causes Monarchy; and in a few, causes Oligarchy: the Many cannot be otherwise represented in a State of Liberty, than by so many, and so qualified, as may within the compass of that number and nature embrace the interest of the whole People. Government should be established upon a Rock, not set upon a Precipice: a Representative consisting but of four hundred, though in the nature thereof it be popular, is not in itself a Weapon that is fixed, but has something of the broken Bow, as still apt to start aside to Monarchy. But the paucity of the number is tempered with the shortness of the term, it being farther provided,  
THAT this Representative be biennial, and sit not above eight Months. But seeing a supreme Council in a Commonwealth is neither assembled nor dissolved, but by stated Orders directing upwards an irresistible strength from the root, and as one tooth or one nail is driven out by another; how is it provided that this Biennial Council shall not be a perpetual Council? Whereas nothing is more dangerous in a Commonwealth than entire Removes of Councils, how is it provided that these shall be men sufficiently experienced for the management of Affairs? And last of all, whereas dissolution to Sovereign Power is death, to whom are these after their eight months to bequeath the Commonwealth? In this case it is provided,  
THAT there be a Council of State elected by each new Representative, within twenty days after their first meeting, to continue till ten days after the meeting of the next Representative. In which the faults observed in the former Order, are so much worse, as this Council consists of fewer. Thus far this Commonwealth is Oligarchy: but it is provided,  
THAT these Representatives have Sovereign Power, save that in some things the People may resist them by Arms. Which first is a flat contradiction, and next is downright Anarchy. Where the Sovereign Power is not as entire and absolute as in Monarchy itself, there can be no Government at all. It is not the limitation of Sovereign Power that is the cause of a Commonwealth, but such a libration or poise of Orders, that there can be in the same no number of men having the interest, that can have the power; nor any number of men having the power, that can have the interest, to invade or disturb the Government. As the Orders of Commonwealths are more approaching to, or remote from this Maxim (of which this of the Levellers has nothing) so are they more quiet or turbulent. In the Religious part only, proposing a National Religion and Liberty of Conscience, though without troubling themselves much with the means, they are right in the end.  
AND for the Military part, they provide,  
THAT no man (even in case of Invasion) be compellable to go out of the Country where he lives, if he procures another to serve in his room. Which plainly intails upon this Commonwealth a fit Guard for such a Liberty, even a Mercenary Army; for what one does of this kind, may and will (where there is no bar) be done by all: so every Citizen by money procuring his man, procures his Master. Now if this be work of that kind which the People in like cases (as those also of Rome, when they instituted their Tribune's) do usually make, then have I good reason not only to think, but to speak it audibly, That to soothe up the People with an opinion of their own sufficiency in these things, is not to befriend them, but to feed up all hopes of Liberty to the slaughter. Yet the Leveller, a late 
* A later Pamphlet called XXV Queries, using the Balance of Property, which is fair enough, refers it to Sir Thomas Smith's 15th chap. (de Repub. populi ingenio accommodanda) where the Author speaks not one word of Property; which is very foul.  Pamphlet, having gathered out of Oceana the Principles by him otherwise well insinuated, attributes it to the Agitators, or that Assembly which framed this wooden Agreement of the People: That then some of that Council asserted these Principles, and the reason of them.  
BUT Raillery apart, we are not to think it has been for nothing that the wisest Nations have in the formation of Government as much relied upon the invention of some one man, as upon themselves: for whereas it cannot be too often inculcated, that Reason consists of two parts, the one Invention, the other Judgement; a People or an Assembly are not more eminent in point of Judgement, than they are void of Invention. Nor is there in this any thing at all against the sufficiency of a People in the management of a proper Form, being once introduced, though they should never come to a perfect understanding of it. For were the natural bodies of the People such as they might commonly understand, they would be (as I may say) wooden bodies, or such as they could not use; whereas their bodies being now such as they understand not, are yet such as in the use and preservation whereof they are perfect.  
THERE are in Models of Government things of so easy practice, and yet of such difficult understanding, that we must not think them even in Venice, who use their Commonwealth with the greatest prudence and facility, to be all, or any considerable number of them, such as perfectly understand the true Reason or Anatomy of that Government: nor is this a presumptuous Assertion, since none of those Venetians, who have hitherto written of their own form, have brought the truth of it to any perfect light. The like perhaps (and yet with due acknowledgement to LIVY) might be said of the Romans. The Lacedæmonians had not the right understanding of their Model, till about the time of ARISTOTLE it was first written Book III by DICEARCHUS one of his Scholars. How egregiously our Ancestors (till those foundations were broken which at length have brought us round) did administer the English Government, is sufficiently known. Yet by one of the wisest of our Writers (even my Lord VERULAM) is HENRY the Seventh paralleled with the Legislators of ancient and heroic times, for the institution of those very Laws which have now brought the Monarchy to utter ruin. The Commonwealths upon which MACCHIAVEL in his Discourses is incomparable, are not by him, any one of them, sufficiently explained or understood. Much less is it to be expected from a People, that they should overcome the like difficulties, by reason whereof the wisest Nations (finding themselves under the necessity of a change, or of a new Government) induced by such offers as promised fair, or against which they could find no exceptions, have usually acted as men do by new Clothes; that is, put them on, that, if they be not exactly fit at first, they may either fit themselves to the body in wearing, or thereby more plainly show wherein they can be mended even by such, as would otherwise prove but bad workmen. Nor has any such offer been thought to have more Presumption, much less Treason in it, than if one conscious of his skill in Architecture, should offer himself to the Prince or State to build a more convenient Parliament house. England is now in such a condition, that he who may be truly said to give her Law, shall never govern her; and he who will govern her, shall never give her Law. Yet some will have it, that to assert Popular Power, is to sow the seed of Civil War, and object against a Commonwealth, as not to be introduced but by Arms; which by the undeniable testimony of later Experience, is of all other Objections the most extravagant: for if the good old Cause, against the desire even of the Army, and of all men well affected to their Country, could be trod under foot without blood; what more certain demonstration can there be, that (let the deliberations upon, or changes of Government, be of what kind soever which shall please a Parliament) there is no appearance that they can occasion any Civil War? Streams that are stopped may urge their Banks; but the course of England, into a Commonwealth, is both certain and natural. The ways of Nature require Peace: The ways of Peace require Obedience to the Laws: Laws in England cannot be made but by Parliaments: Parliaments in England are come to be mere popular Assemblys: The Laws made by popular Assemblies (though for a time they may be awed, or deceived, in the end) must be popular Laws: and the sum of popular Laws must amount to a Commonwealth. The whole doubt or hazard of this Consequence remains upon one question, Whether a single Council consisting but of four hundred, endued both with Debate and Result; the Keys of whose Doors are in the hands of ambitious men; in the crowd and confusion of whose Election the People are as careless as tumultuous, and easy, thro' the want of good Orders, to be deluded; while the Clergy (declared and inveterat Enemy's of popular Power) are laying about, and sweeting in the throng, as if it were in the Vinyard; upon whose Benches Lawyers (being feathered and armed, like sharp and sudden Arrows, with a private interest pointblank against the Public) may and frequently do swarm, can indeed be called a popular Council. This, I confess, may set the whole state of Liberty upon the cast of a Die; yet questionless it is more than odds on the behalf of a Commonwealth, when a Government labours in frequent or long struggles, not thro' any certain bias of Genius or Nature that can be in such a Council, but thro' the impotence of such Conclusions as may go awry, and the external force or state of Property now fully introduced: whence such a Council may wander, but never find any rest or settlement, except only in that natural and proper Form of Government which is to be erected upon a mere Popular Foundation. All other ways of proceeding must be void, as inevitably guilty of contradiction in the Superstructures to the Foundation; which have amounted, and may amount to the discouragement of honest men, but with no other success than to imbroil or retard Business: England being not capable of any other permanent Form than that only of a Commonwealth; though her supreme Council be so constituted, that it may be Monarchically inclined. This contradiction in the Frame is the frequent occasion of contradictory Expostulations and Questions. How, say they, should we have a Commonwealth? Which way is it possible that it should come in? And how, say I, can we fail of a Commonwealth? What possibility is there we should miss of it?  
IF a man replies, he answers thus: No Army ever set up a Commonwealth. To the contrary, I instance the Army of Israel under MOSES; that of Athens about the time of ALCIBIADES; that of Rome upon the expulsion of the TARQUINS; those of Switzerland and Holland. But, say they, other Arms have not set up Commonwealths. True indeed, divers other Arms have not set up Commonwealths; yet is not that any Argument why our Arms should not. For in all Arms that have not set up Commonwealths, either the Officers have had no Fortunes or Estates at all, but immediately dependent upon the mere Will of the Prince, as the Turkish Arms, and all those of the Eastern Countries; or the Officers have been a Nobility commanding their own Tenants. Certain it is, That either of these Arms can set up nothing but Monarchy. But our Officers hold not Estates of Noblemen able upon their own Lands to levy Regiments, in which case they would take home their People to blow, or make Hay; nor are they yet so put to it for their Livelihood, as to depend wholly upon a Prince, in which case they would fall on robbing the People: but have good honest Popular Estates to them and their Heirs for never. Now an Army, where the Estates of the Officers were of this kind, in no reason can, in no experience ever did set up Monarchy. Ay but, say they, for all that, their Pay to them is more considerable than their Estates. But so much more must they be for a Commonwealth, because the Parliament must pay: and they have found by experience, that the Pay of a Parliament is far better than that of a Prince. But the four hundred being Monarchically inclined, or running upon the Interest of those irreconcilable Enemy's of Popular Power, Divines and Lawyers, will rather pay an Army for commanding, or for supporting of a Prince, than for obeying. Which may be true, as was acknowleged before, in the way; but in the end, or at the long run, for the reasons mentioned, must be of no effect.  
THESE Arguments are from the Cause; now for an Argument to Sense, and from the Effect: If our Arms would raise Money of themselves, or, which is all one, would make a King, why have they not made a King in so many Years? Why did they not make one yesterday? Why do they not to day? Nay, why have they ever been, why do they still continue to be of all others in this point the most averse and refractory?  
BUT if the case be so with us, that Nature runs wholly to a Commonwealth, and we have no such Force as can withstand Nature, why may we not as well have golden Dreams of what this Commonwealth may be, as of the Indys, of Flanders, or of the Sound? The Frame of a Commonwealth may be dreamt on, or proposed two ways; the one in Theory, or notionally, in which it is of easy understanding, but of difficult practice: The other practicably, in which it is of difficult understanding, but of facile use. Book III One of these ways is a Shooinghorn, and the other the shoe; for which cause I shall propose both, as first notionally, thus:  

The Model proposed notionally.  1. THAT the native Territory of the Commonwealth be divided, so equally as with any convenience it may, into fifty Tribes or Precincts.  
2. THAT the People in each Tribe be distinguished, first by their Age, and next by the valuation of their Estates: All such as are above eighteen, and under thirty, being accounted Youth; and all such as are thirty or upwards, being accounted Elders. All such as have under one hundred pounds a year in Lands, Goods, or Money, being accounted of the Foot; and all such as have so much or upwards, being accounted of the Horse.  
3. THAT each Tribe elect annually out of the Horse of their number two Elders to be Knights; three Elders out of the same, and four Elders more out of the Foot of their number, to be Deputies or Burgesses. That the term of each Knight and Burgess, or Deputy so elected, be triennial; and that whoever has served his triennial Term in any one of these Capacitys, may not be reelected into any one of the same, till a triennial Vacation be expired.  
4. THAT in the first year of the Commonwealth there be a Senate so constituted, of three hundred Knights, that the term of one hundred may expire annually; and that the hundred Knights, annually elected by two in each Tribe, take in the Senate the places of them whose Term comes to be thus annually expired.  
5. THAT in the first year of the Commonwealth there be a Representative of the People, consisting of one thousand and fifty Deputies; four hundred and fifty of them being Horse, and the rest Foot. That this Representative be so constituted, that the term of two hundred of the Foot, and of one hundred and fifty of the Horse, expire annually; and that the two hundred Foot, and one hundred and fifty Horse elected annually, by four of the Foot, and three of the Horse in each Tribe, take the places in this Representative of them whose terms comes thus annually to be expired.  
6. THAT the Senate have the whole Authority of Debate; that the Representative have the whole power of Result, in such a manner, that whatever (having been debated by the Senate) shall by their Authority be promulgated, that is, printed and published, for the space of six weeks; and afterwards (being proposed by them to the Representative) shall be resolved by the People of the same in the Affirmative, be the Law of the Land.  
THUS much may suffice to give implicitly a notional account of the whole frame. But a Model of Government is nothing as to use, unless it be also delivered practicably; and the giving of a Model practicably, is so much the more difficult, that men, not versed in this●way, say of it (as they would of the Anatomy of their own bodies) that it is impracticable. Here lies the whole difficulty: such things as, trying them never so often, they cannot make hang together, they will yet have to be practicable; and if you would bring them from this kind of shifts, or of tying and untying all sorts of knots, to the natural nerves and ligaments of Government, then with them it is impracticable. But to render that which is practicable, facile; or to do my last endeavour of this kind, of which if I miss this once more, I must hereafter despair: I shall do two things; first, omit the Ballot, and then make some alteration in my former method.  
THEY who have interwoven the Ballot with the description of a Chap. 1 Commonwealth, have thereby rendered the same by far the more complete in itself; but in the understanding of their Readers, as much defective: wherefore presuming the use of the Ballot throout the Orders of this Model, I shall refer it to practice; in which it will be a matter of as much facility, as it would have been of difficulty in writing. And for the method I have chosen, it is the most natural and intelligible, being no more than to propose the whole practicably: first, in the Civil; secondly, in the Religious; then in the Military; and last of all in the Provincial part of the Model.    

CHAP. I.  
Containing the Civil part of the Model, proposed practicably.  
SEEING it has been sufficiently proved, that Empire follows the nature of Property; that the particular kind of Empire or Government depends upon the special distribution (except in small Countries) of Land; and that where the Balance in Property has not been fixed, the nature of the Government (be it what you will) has been floating: it is very reasonable that, in the proposition of a Commonwealth, we begin with a fixation of the Balance in Property; and this being not otherwise to be done than by some such Laws as have been commonly called Agrarian, it is proposed,  
THAT every one holding above two thousand pounds a year in Land, lying within the proper Territory of the Commonwealth, leave the said 
Agrarian Laws.  Land equally divided among his Sons; or else so near equally, that there remain to the eldest of them not above two thousand pounds a year in Land so lying. That this Proposition be so understood, as not to concern any Parent having no more than one Son, but the next Heir only that shall have more Sons; in such sort, as nothing be hereby taken from any man, or from his Posterity, but that fatherly Affection be at all points extended as formerly, except only that it be with more Piety, and less Partiality. And that the same Proposition, in such Families where there are no Sons, concern the Daughter or Daughters in the like manner.  
THAT no Daughter, being neither Heir nor Coheir, have above fifteen hundred pounds in Portion, or for her preferment in Marriage. That any Daughter, being an Orphan, and having seven hundred pounds or upwards in Portion, may charge the State with it. That the State being so charged, be bound to manage the Portion of such an Orphan for the best, either by due payment of the Interest of the same; or, if it be desired, by way of Annuity for Life, at the rate of one hundred pounds a year, for every seven hundred pounds so received. The manner whereof being elsewhere shown, is not needful to be repeated.  
THAT these Propositions prevent the growing of a Monarchical Nobility, is their peculiar end: Wherefore that this should hold the weight of an Objection in a popular Balance, already introduced thro' the failure of a Monarchical Nobility, or thro' a level made not by the People but by the Kings or themselves, were preposterous. Yet upon this score (for I see no other) is there such Animosity against the like Laws, that wise men have judged it an Indiscretion, in such as are affected to Popular Government, not to temporize in this point; at Book III least, till a Commonwealth were first introduced. To which Judgement I am by no means inclining: First, Because the whole stream of this kind of Government is so clear and pellucid, as to abhor having any thing in the bottom which may not appear at the very top. Secondly, Because an Agrarian, not brought in with the introduction of a Commonwealth, was never yet known to be brought in after the introduction of a Commonwealth. And thirdly, Because the change of Balances in States, thro' the want of fixation, has been so sudden, that between the Reign of HENRY the Seventh, and that of Queen ELIZABETH, being under fifty years, the English Balance of Monarchical became Popular; and that of Rome, between the Lives of SCIPIO and of TIBERIUS GRACCHUS, being also under fifty years, of Popular became Monarchical. Nevertheless, if there remains any cure of Animosity that may be safe, it must be prudent: And such a cure (if we be not so abandoned to mere fancy, as to sacrifice all Prudence to it) there may be in the addition of this Clause;  

Additional Clause to the Agrarian.  THAT no Agrarian Law hereby given to this Commonwealth, or to be hereafter given to the same, or to any Province of the same, be understood to be otherwise binding, than to the Generation to come, or to the Children to be born seven years after the enacting of the Law.  
UPON the addition of this Clause, it may be safely said of these Agrarian Laws, that they concern not any man living: and for Posterity, it is well known, that to enact a Law, is no more in their regard, than to commend a thing to their choice; seeing they, if so pleased, can no more be devested of the Power to repeal any Law enacted by their Ancestors, than we are of repealing such Laws as have been enacted by ours.  
TO this it may be objected, That Agrarian Laws, being once enacted, must have brought Estates to the standard of the same, before Posterity can come into a capacity to judge of them. But this is the only means whereby Posterity can come to a true capacity to judge of them: First, because they will have had experience of the Laws whereof they are to judge: And secondly, because they will be void of all such imaginary Interests as might corrupt their Judgement, and do now certainly corrupt ours.  

The first Parallel.  THE Balance of the Commonwealth of Israel, thro' the distribution of Lands at the introduction of the same, became Popular; and 
Deut. 25. 28.  becoming Popular, was fixed by the Law for the Jubilee. That which was sold, shall remain in the hands of them that bought it till the year of Jubilee; and in the Jubilee it shall go out, and he shall return to his possession. The ways in Israel, and in the Commonwealth proposed, where the Popular Balance is not made but found, are divers; but the Agrarian Laws in each, as to the end, which is the preservation of the Balance, are of a like effect.  
TO rise thus from true Foundations to proper Superstructures, the first step from the Balance thus fixed into the Orders of a Commonwealth, is not otherwise to be taken than by certain Distributions or Divisions of the People, whereof some are to be personal, and some local.  

Freemen and Servants.  THE first personal division of a People, is into Freemen and Servants. Freemen are such as have wherwithal to live of themselves; and Servants, such as have not. This division therefore is not constitutive, but naturally inherent in the Balance; nor, seeing all Government is in the direction of the Balance, is it possible for the Superstructures of any to make more Freemen than are such by the nature Chap. 1 of the Balance, or by their being able to live of themselves.  


The second Parallel.  
Levit. 25. 29.   ALL that could in this matter be done, even by MOSES himself, is contained in this Proviso: If thy Brother that dwells by thee be grown poor, and be sold to thee, thou shalt not compel him to serve as a bondservant: but as a hired servant, and a sojourner he shall be with thee, and shall serve thee to the year of Jubilee. And then shall he departed from thee, both he and his Children with him, and shall return to his own Family, and to the Possession of his Fathers shall he return.  
THE nature of Riches considered, this division into Freemen and Servants is not properly constitutive, but as it were natural. To come to such Divisions as are both personal and constitutive, it is proposed,  

Horse and Foot.  THAT all Citizens, that is, Freemen, or such as are not Servants, be distributed into Horse and Foot. That such of them as have one hundred pounds a year in Lands, Goods or Money, or above that proportion, be of the Horse; and all such as have under that proportion, be of the Foot.  

Elders and Youth.  THAT all Elders or Freemen, being thirty years of Age or upwards, be capable of Civil Administration: and that the Youth, or such Freemen as are between eighteen years of Age and thirty, be not capable of Civil Administration, but of Military only; in such a manner as shall follow in the Military part of this Model.  
NOW, besides personal divisions, it is necessary in order to the framing of a Commonwealth, that there be some such as are local. For these therefore it is proposed,  

Precinct of the Parish.  THAT the whole native, or proper Territory of the Commonwealth, be cast, with as much exactness as can be convenient, into known and fixed Precincts or Parishes.  

Parochial Congregations and Deputies.  THAT the Elders, resident in each Parish, annually assemble in the same; as for example, upon Monday next ensuing the last of December. That they then and there elect out of their own number every fifth man, or one man out of every five, to be for the term of the year ensuing, a Deputy of that Parish; and that the first and second so elected be Overseers, or Precedents, for regulating of all Parochial Congregations, whether of the Elders or of the Youth, during the term for which they were elected.  

Precinct of the Hundred.  THAT so many Parishes lying nearest together, whose Deputies shall amount to one hundred or thereabout, be cast into one Precinct called the Hundred. And that in each Precinct called the Hundred, there be a Town, Village, or place appointed to be the Capital of the same.  

Assembly or Muster of the Hundred.  THAT the Parochial Deputies elected throout the Hundred, assemble annually; for example, upon Monday next ensuing the last of January, at the Capital of their Hundred. That they then and there elect out of the Horse of their number one Justice of the Peace, one Juryman, one Captain, one Insign: and out of the Foot of their number, one other Juryman, one High Constable, etc.  
THOUGH our Justices of the Peace have not been annual; yet that they may so be is apparent, because the high Sheriffs, whose Office is of greater difficulty, have always been annual: seeing therefore they may be annual, that so they ought in this Administration to be, will appear, where they come to be constitutive of such Courts as, should they consist of a standing Magistracy, would be against the nature of a Commonwealth. But the Precincts hitherto being thus stated, it is proposed,  
Book III THAT every twenty Hundreds, lying nearest and most conveniently together, be cast into one Tribe. That the whole Territory being after this 
Precinct of the Tribe.  manner cast into Tribes, some Town, Village, or place be appointed to every Tribe for the Capital of the same. And that these three Precincts, that is, the Parish, the Hundred, and the Tribe (whether the Deputies, thenceforth annually chosen in the Parishes or Hundreds, come to increase or diminish) remain firm and inalterable for ever, save only by Act of Parliament.  
THESE Divisions, or the like, both personal and local, are that in a well ordered Commonwealth, which Stairs are in a good house; not that Stairs in themselves are desirable, but that without them there is no getting into the Chambers. The whole matter of Cost and Pains, necessary to the introduction of a like Model, lies only in the first Architecture, or building of these Stairs; that is, in stating of these three Precincts: which done, they lead you naturally and necessarily into all the Rooms of this Fabric. For the just number of Tribes into which a Territory thus cast may fall; it is not very easy to be guest: yet, because for the carrying on of discourse it is requisite to pitch upon some certainty, I shall presume that the number of the Tribes, thus stated, amounts to fifty; and that the number of the Parochial Deputies annually elected in each Tribe, amounts to two thousand. Be the Deputies more or fewer by the alterations which may happen in progress of time, it disorders nothing. Now to ascend by these Stairs into the upper Rooms of this Building, it is proposed,  

Assembly or Muster of the Tribe.  THAT the Deputies elected in the several Parishes, together with their Magistrates and other Officers both Civil and Military, elected in their several Hundreds, assemble or muster annually; for example, upon Monday next ensuing the last of February at the Capital of their Tribe.  
HOW the Troops and Companies of the Deputies, with their Military Officers or Commanders thus assembled, may, without expense of time, be strait distributed into one uniform and orderly Body, has been elsewhere 
* In Oceana.  shown, and is not needful to be repeated. For their work, which at this meeting will require two days, it is proposed,  

Magistrates of the Tribe.  THAT the whole Body thus assembled, upon the first day of the Assembly, elect out of the Horse of their number one High Sheriff, one Lieutenant of the Tribe, one Custos Rotulorum, one Conductor, and two Censors. That the High Sheriff be Commander in chief, the Lieutenant Commander in the second place, and the Conductor in the third, of this Band or Squadron. That the Custos Rotulorum be Mustermaster, and keep the Rolls. That the Censors be Governors of the Ballot. And that the term of these Magistracies be annual.  
THESE being thus elected, it is proposed,  
THAT the Magistrates of the Tribe, that is to say, the High Sheriff, 
The Prerogative Troop.  Lieutenant, Custos Rotulorum, the Censors, and the Conductor, together with the Magistrates and Officers of the Hundreds, that is to say, the twenty Justices of the Peace, the forty Jurymen, the twenty High Constables, be one Troop, or one Troop and one Company apart, called the Prerogative Troop or Company. That this Troop bring in and assist the Justices of Assize, hold the Quarter Sessions in their several Capacitys, and perform their other Functions as formerly.  
BY this means the Commonwealth at its introduction may embrace the Law as it stands, that is, unreformed; which is the greatest advantage of such Reformations: for to reform Laws before the introduction of the Government, which is to show to what the Laws in Reformation Chap. 1 are to be brought or fitted, is impossible. But these Magistrates of the Hundreds and Tribes being such whereby the Parliament is to govern the Nation, this is a regard in which they ought to be further capable of such Orders and Instructions as shall thereto be requisite: For which cause it is proposed,  

The Phylarch  THAT the Magistrates of the Tribe, that is to say, the High Sheriff, Lieutenant, Custos Rotulorum, the Censors, and the Conductor, together with the twenty Justices elected at the Hundreds, be a Court for the Government of the Tribe called the Phylarch; and that this Court proceed in all matters of Government, as shall from time to time be directed by Act of Parliament.  
BY these Courts the Commonwealth will be furnished with true Channels, whereby at leisure to turn the Law into that which is sufficiently known to have been its primitive Course, and to a perfect Reformation by degrees, without violence. For as the corruption of our Law proceeds from an Art enabled to improve its private Interest; or from the Law upon the Bench, and the Jury at the Bar: So the Reformation of our Law must come from disabling it as an Art to improve its private Interest; or to a Jury upon the Bench, and the Law at the Bar, as in Venice.  


The third Parallel.  
Deut. 16. 18.   JUDGES and Officers shalt thou make thee in all thy Gates which the Lord thy God gives thee throout thy Tribes, and they shall judge the People with just Judgement. These Courts, whose Sessionhouse was in the Gates of every City, were shown each of them to have consisted of 
Book 2.  twenty three Elders, which were as a Jury upon the Bench, giving sentence by plurality of Votes, and under a kind of appeal to the seventy Elders or Senat of Israel, as was also shown in the second Book.  
THIS, or the like, by all example and beyond any controversy, has been, and is the natural way of Judicature in Commonwealths. The Phylarches, with a Court or two of Appeals eligible out of the Senate and the People, are at any time with ease and very small alteration to be cast upon a triennial Rotation: which, in all things besides proceeding after the manner of the Venetian Quarancies, will be in this case perfect Orders.  
TO return: The first Day's Election at the Tribe being as has been shown, it is proposed,  
THAT the Squadron of the Tribe, on the second day of their Assembly, elect two Knights and three Burgesses out of the Horse of their number, 
Knights and Burgesses.  and four other Burgesses out of the Foot of their number. That each Knight upon Election forthwith make Oath of Allegiance to the Commonwealth; or refusing this Oath, that the next Competitor in Election to the same Magistracy, making the said Oath, be the Magistrate: the like for the Burgesses. That the Knights, thus sworn, have Session in the Senate for the term of three years; and that the Burgesses thus sworn be of the Prerogative Tribe, or Representative of the People for the like term.  
NOW whereas this Proposition is sufficient for the perpetuation of the Senate and the Assembly of the People, being once instituted, but not sufficient for the full and perfect Institution of them, it necessitats the addition in this place, not of a permanent Order, but of an Expedient for the first years Election only; which may be this:  
Book III THAT for the full and perfect Institution of the Assemblys mentioned, 
Expedient for the first years Election.  the Squadron of the Tribe in the first year of the Commonwealth elect two Knights for the term of one year, two other Knights for the term of two years, and lastly, two Knights more for the term of three years: the like for the Burgesses of the Horse first, and then for those of the Foot.  
BY this Expedient the Senate in fifty Tribes is constituted of three hundred Knights or Senators, whereof one hundred, by the expiration of their terms, come annually to fall; and another hundred at the same time to enter. The like for the Prerogative Tribe or Assembly of the People, which, consisting in the whole of one thousand and fifty, suffers the like alteration in one third part, or in the yearly exchange of one hundred and fifty Burgesses: By which means the Motion or Rotation of these Assemblys is Annual, Triennial, and Perpetual. For the full dispatch of the foregoing Elections there remains but one Proposition more, which is this:  

Proviso.  THAT a Magistrate or Officer elected at the Hundred be thereby excluded from being elected a Magistrate of the Tribe, or of the first days Election: that no former Election whatsoever exclude a man from the second days Election at the Tribe, or to be chosen a Knight or Burgess. That a man being chosen a Knight or Burgess, who before was chosen a Magistrate or Officer of the Hundred or Tribe, delegat his former Office, or Magistracy in the Hundred or the Tribe, to any other Deputy being no Magistrate nor Officer, and being of the same Hundred and of the same Order, that is, of the Horse or Foot respectively. That the whole and every part of the foregoing Orders for Election in the Parishes, the Hundreds, and the Tribes, be holding and inviolable upon such Penalties in case of failure, as shall hereafter be provided by Act of Parliament against any Parish, Hundred, Tribe, Deputy or Person so offending.  
WITHOUT some such Provision as is contained in the former part of this Proposition, men would be inconveniently excluded from preferment, or the Tribe obliged to return to the Ballot; and so to spend more time for trifles than is required by their real business.  


The fourth Parallel.  
2 Chron. 27.   THE Representative of Israel collected monthly by the two thousand out of each Tribe (if we consider what Method must have been used in such Elections) intimats, first, that there were Subdivisions to that end in each Tribe, perhaps of the nature of our Hundreds and Parishes: Secondly, that there were qualifications in those Elections as to the Patriarches or chief Fathers, and as to the People with their Captains of thousands, and Captains of hundreds; which is enough thus far to approve and recommend the foregoing Propositions.  
THE Senate, and the Congregation or Representative of the People, are in every Commonwealth the main Orders. The Stairs or Degrees of ascent to these being now mounted, it remains that I lead you into the Rooms of State, or the Assemblys themselves: which shall be performed, first, by showing their Frame, and next by showing their Uses or Functions. To bring you first into the Senate, it is proposed,  

Frame of the Senat.  THAT the Knights of the Annual Election in the Tribes take their places on Monday next ensuing the last of March in the Senat. That the like number of Knights, whose Session determins at the same time, recede. That every Knight or Senator be paid out of the public Revenue quarterly, one hundred twenty five Pounds during his term of Session, and be obliged to sit in purple Robes.  
THAT annually, upon the reception of the new Knights, the Senate Chap. 1 proceed to the Election of new Magistrates and Counsillors. That for Magistrates they elect one General, one Speaker, and two Censors, each for the 
Senatorian Magistrates.  term of one year; these promiscuously: and that they elect one Commissioner of the Great Seal, and one Commissioner of the Treasury, each for the term of three years, and out of the new Knights only.  
THIS Proposition supposes the Commissioners of the Seal and those of the Treasury to consist each of three, wheeled by the annual Election of one into each Order, upon a triennial Rotation. For farther explanation of the Senatorian Magistracies, it is proposed,  

The General sitting, and the Speaker.  THAT the General and Speaker, as CONSULS of the Commonwealth, and Precedents of the Senate, be, during the term of their Magistracy, paid quarterly five hundred Pounds: That the Insigns of these Magistracies be a Sword born before the General, and a Mace before the Speaker: That they be obliged to wear Ducal Robes; and that what is said of the General in this Proposition, be understood only of the General sitting, and not of the General marching.  

The General marching.  THAT the General sitting, in case he be commanded to march, receive Field Pay; and that a new General be forthwith elected by the Senate to succeed him in the House, with all the Rights, Insigns, and Emoluments of the General sitting: And this so often as one or more Generals are marching.  
THAT the three Commissioners of the Great Seal, and the three Commissioners 
Commissioners of the Seal and of the Treasury.  of the Treasury, using their Insigns and Habit, and performing their other Functions as formerly, be paid quarterly to each of them three hundred seventy five Pounds.  

The Censors.  THAT the Censors be each of them Chancellor of one University by virtue of their Election: that they govern the Ballot; that they be Precedents of the Council for Religion; that each have a silver Wand for the Insign of his Magistracy; that each be paid quarterly three hundred seventy five Pounds, and be obliged to wear scarlet Robes.  

The Signory.  THAT the General sitting, the Speaker, and the six Commissioners abovesaid, be the Signory of this Commonwealth.  
THIS for the Senatorian Magistrates. For Senatorian Councils it is proposed,  

Council of State.  THAT there be a Council of State consisting of fifteen Knights, five out of each Order or Election; and that the same be perpetuated by the annual Election of five out of the new Knights, or last elected into the Senat.  

Councils of Religion, of Trade.  THAT there be a Council for Religion consisting of twelve Knights, four out of each Order, and perpetuated by the annual Election of four out of the Knights last elected into the Senat. That there be a Council for Trade, consisting of a like number, elected and perpetuated in the same manner.  

Council of War.  THAT there be a Council of War, not elected by the Senate, but elected by the Council of State out of themselves. That this Council of War consist of nine Knights, three out of each Order, and be perpetuated by the annual Election of three out of the last Knights elected into the Council of State.  

The Dictator.  THAT in case the Senate adds nine Knights more out of their own number to the Council of War, the said Council be understood by this addition to be DICTATOR of the Commonwealth for the term of three months, and no longer, except by farther Order of the Senate the said Dictatorian Power be prolonged for a like term.  

The Proposers general.  THAT the Signory have Session and Suffrage, with right also jointly or severally to propose, both in the Senate and in all Senatorian Councils.  
THAT each of the three Orders, or Divisions of Knights in each 
Provosts, or particular Proposers.  Senatorian Council, elect one Provost for the term of one week; and that any two Provosts of the same Council so elected may propose to their respective Council, and not otherwise.  

Academy.  THAT some fair Room or Rooms well furnished and attended, be allowed at the States charge for a free and open Academy to all comers at some convenient hour or hours towards the Evening. That this Academy be governed according to the Rules of good Breeding, or civil Conversation, by some or all of the Proposers; and that in the same it be lawful for any man by word of mouth or by writing, in jest or in earnest, to propose to the Proposers.  
FROM the frame or structure of these Councils, I should pass to their Functions; but that besides annual Elections, there will be some biennial, and others emergent: in which regard it is proposed, first, for biennial Elections,  

Ambassadors in ordinary.  THAT for Ambassadors in ordinary, there be four Residences; as France, Spain, Venice, and Constantinople: that every Resident, upon the Election of a new Ambassador in ordinary, remove to the next Residence in the Order nominated, till having served in them all, he returns home. That upon Monday next ensuing the last of November, there be every second year elected by the Senate some fit Person, being under thirty five years of Age, and not of the Senate or popular Assembly: that the Party so elected, repair upon Monday next ensuing the last of March following, as Ambassador in ordinary to the Court of France, and there reside for the term of two years, to be computed from the first of April next ensuing his Election. That every Ambassador in ordinary be allowed three thousand pounds a year during the term of his Residences; and that if a Resident comes to die, there be an extraordinary Election into his Residence for his term, and for the remainder of his Removes and Progress.  

Emergent Elections.  THAT all emergent Elections be made by Scrutiny, that is, by a Council, or by Commissioners proposing, and by the Senate resolving in the manner following: That all Field-Officers be proposed by the Council of War; that all Ambassadors extraordinary be proposed by the Council of State; that all Judges and Sergeants at Law be proposed by the Commissioners of the great Seal; that all Barons and Officers of Trust in the Exchequer, be proposed by the Commissioners of the Treasury: and that such as are thus proposed, and approved by the Senate, be held lawfully elected.  
THESE Elections being thus dispatched, I come to the Functions of the Senate, and first, to those of the Senatorian Councils: for which it is proposed,  

Function of the Senatorian Councils.  THAT the cognizance of all matters of State to be considered, or Law to be enacted, whether it be Provincial or National, Domestic or Foren, pertain to the Council of State. That such Affairs of either kind, as they shall judge to require more Secrecy, be remitted by this Council, and belong to the Council of War, being for that end a select part of the same. That the cognizance and protection both of the National Religion, and of the Liberty of Conscience equally established in this Nation, after the manner to be shown in the Religious part of this Model, pertain to the Council for Religion. That all matters of Traffic, and the regulation of the same belong to the Council of Trade. That in the exercise of these several Functions, which naturally are Senatorian or Authoritative only, no Council assume any other Power than such only as shall be settled upon the same by Chap. 1 Act of Parliament.  

Function of the Senat.  THAT what shall be proposed to the Senate by any one or more of the Signory or Proposers general; or whatever was proposed by any two of the Provosts or particular Proposers to their respective Council, and upon debate at that Council shall come to be proposed by the same to the Senate, be necessarily debatable and debated by the Senat. That in all cases wherein Power is committed to the Senate by a Law made, or by Act of Parliament, the Result of the Senate be ultimat: that in all cases of Law to be made, or not already provided for by an Act of Parliament, as War and Peace, levy of Men or Money, or the like, the Result of the Senate be not ultimat. That whatsoever is resolved by the Senate, upon a case wherein their Result is not ultimat, be proposed by the Senate to the Prerogative Tribe or Representative of the People; except only in cases of such speed or secrecy, wherein the Senate shall judge the necessary slowness or openness in this way of proceeding to be of detriment or danger to the Commonwealth.  

Function of the Dictator.  THAT if upon the motion or proposition of a Council or Proposer General, the Senate adds nine Knights promiscuously chosen out of their own number, to the Council of War; the same Council, as thereby made Dictator, have power of Life and Death, as also to enact Laws in all such cases of speed or secrecy, for and during the term of three months and no longer, except upon a new Order from the Senat. And that all Laws enacted by the Dictator be good and valid for the term of one year, and no longer; except the same be proposed by the Senate, and resolved by the People.  
THIS Dictatorian Council (as may already appear) consists fundamentally of the Signory, with nine Knights elected by the Council of State, additionally of nine Knights more emergently chosen by the Senate, and of the four Tribune's of course; as will appear when I come to speak of that Magistracy. Now if Dictatorian Power be indeed formidable, yet this in the first place is remarkable, that the Council here offered for a Dictator is of a much safer Constitution, than what among us hitherto has been offered for a Commonwealth; namely, a Parliament and a Council in the interim. For here is no interim, but all the Councils of the Commonwealth not only remaining, but remaining in the exercise of all their Functions, without the abatement of any; speed and secrecy belonging not to any of them, but to that only of the Dictator. And if this Dictatorian Council has more in it of a Commonwealth than has hitherto among us been either practised or offered, by what Argument can it be pretended that a Commonwealth is so imperfect thro' the necessity of such an Order, that it must needs borrow of Monarchy; seeing every Monarchy that has any Senate, Assembly, or Council in it, thereby most apparently borrows more of a Commonwealth, than there is to be found of Monarchy in this Council?  

The fifth Parallel.  TO dimiss this whole Senate with one Parallel: The institution of the seventy Elders in Israel (as was shown in the second Book) for their number related to an Accident, and a Custom thereupon anciently introduced. The Accident was that the Sons of JACOB who went into Egypt were so many; these, first governing their Families by natural right, came, as those Families increased, to be for their number retained and continued in the nature of a Senatorian Council, while the People were yet in Egyptian Bondage. So we, having had no like Custom, have as to the number no like Inducement. Again, the Book III Territory of Canaan amounted not to a fourth of our Country; and in Government we are to fit ourselves to our own proportions. Nor can a Senate, consisting of few Senators, be capable of so many distributions as a Senate consisting of more. Yet we find in the restitution 
2 Chr. 19 11.  of the Sanhedrim by JEHOSHAPHAT, that there was AMARIAH chief in all matters of the Lord, that is, in judgement upon the Laws, which, having been proposed by God, were more peculiarly his matters; and ZEBADIAH chief in all the King's matters, that is, in political debates concerning Government, or War and Peace. Lastly, 
Judg. 11. 5, 11.  When the Children of Ammon made War against Israel, the People of Israel made JEPHTHA not only Captain, but Head over them. So the Judge of Israel, being no standing Magistrate, but elected upon emergencies, supplies the Parallel as to Dictatorian Power in a Commonwealth.  
DEBATE is the natural Parent of Result; whence the Senate throout the Latin Authors is called Fathers, and in Greece Authors the compellation of a popular Assembly is Men; as Men of Athens, Men 
Act. 7. 2. & 22. 1. Luke throout is perfectly well skilled in the Customs of Commonwealths.  of Corinth, Men of Lacedaemon: nor is this Custom Heathen only, seeing these Compellations are used to the Senate and the People of the Jews, not only by STEPHEN, but also by PAUL, where they begin their speeches in this manner: Men, Brethren, and Fathers. To come then from the Fathers to the People, the Popular Assembly, or Prerogative Tribe; it is proposed,  

Fabric of the Prerogative Tribe.  THAT the Burgesses of the annual Election returned by the Tribes, enter into the Prerogative Tribe upon Monday next ensuing the last of March; and that the like number of Burgesses, whose term is expired, recede at the same time. That the Burgesses thus entered elect to themselves out of their own number, two of the Horse; one to be Captain, and the other to be Cornet of the same: and two of the Foot; one to be Captain, the other to be Insign of the same, each for the term of three years. That these Officers being thus elected, the whole Tribe or Assembly proceed to the Election of four annual Magistrates; two out of the Foot, to be Tribune's of the Foot: and two out of the Horse, to be Tribune's of the Horse. That the Tribune's be Commanders of this Tribe in chief, so far as it is a Military Body; and Precedents of the same, as it is a civil Assembly. And lastly, that this whole Tribe be paid weekly as follows. To each of the Tribune's of Horse, seven pounds. To each of the Tribune's of Foot, six pounds. To each of the Captains of Horse, five pounds. To each of the Captains of Foot, four pounds. To each of the Cornets, three pounds. To each of the Insigns, two pounds seven shillings. To every Horseman two pounds, and to every one of the Foot one pound ten shillings.  
FOR the Salaries of the Senate and the People together, they amount not to three hundred thousand pounds a year; which is cheaper by near two parts in three, than the chief Magistracy ever did or can otherwise cost: for if you give nothing (omnia dat qui justa negat) men will be their own Carvers. But to proceed, it is proposed,  
THAT inferior Officers, as Captains, Cornets, Insigns, be only for 
Offices of the Officers.  the Military Discipline of the Tribe. That the Tribune's have Session in the Senate without suffrage; that they have Session of course in the Dictatorian Council, so often as it is created by the Senate, and with suffrage. That they be Precedents of the Court in all cases to be judged by the People.  
THAT Peculat or Defraudation of the Public, and all cases tending Chap. 1 to the subversion of the Government, be triable by this Representative; and that there be an Appeal to the same in all Causes, and from all Magistrates, 
Appeal to the People.  Courts, and Councils, whether National or Provincial.  


The sixth Parallel.  
Judg. 20. Halicar.   THIS Judicatory may seem large: but thus the Congregation of Israel, consisting of four hundred thousand, judged the Tribe of Benjamin. Thus all the Roman Tribes judged CORIOLANUS. And thus Duke LOREDANO was tried by the great Council of Venice, consisting 
Janot●●.  yet of about two thousand.  
THIS is as much as I have to say severally of the Senate and the People; but their main Functions being joint, as they make one Parliament, it is farther proposed,  

The main Function of the Senat.  THAT the right of Debate, as also of proposing to the People, be wholly and only in the Senate; without any power at all of Result, not derived from the People.  

The main Function of the Prerogative Tribe.  THAT the power of Result be wholly and only in the People, without any right at all of Debate.  
THAT the Senate having debated and agreed upon a Law to be proposed, cause promulgation of the same to be made for the space of six weeks 
Promulgation.  before proposition; that is, cause the Law to be printed and published so long before it is to be proposed.  

Manner of Proposition.  THAT promulgation being made, the Signory demand of the Tribune's, being present in the Senate, an Assembly of the People. That the Tribune's, upon such a demand of the Signory or of the Senate, be obliged to assemble the Prerogative Tribe in Arms by sound of Trumpet, with Drums beating, and Colors flying, in any Town, Field, or Market place being not above six miles distant, upon the day and at the hour appointed; except the meeting, thro' any inconvenience of the weather or the like, be prorogued by the joint consent of the Signory and the Tribune's. That the Prerogative Tribe being assembled accordingly, the Senate propose to them by two or more of the Senatorian Magistrates, thereto appointed at the first promulgation of the Law. That the Proposers for the Senate open to the People the Occasion, Motives, and Reasons of the Law to be proposed; and the same being done, put it by distinct Clauses to the Ballot of the People. That if any material Clause or Clauses be rejected by the People, they be reviewed by the Senate, altered, and proposed (if they think fit) to the third time, but no oftener.  

Act of Parliament.  THAT what is thus proposed by the Senate, and resolved by the People, be the Law of the Land, and no other, except as in the case reserved to the Dictatorian Council.  

The seventh Parallel.  THE Congregation of Israel being monthly, and the Representative proposed being annual and triennial, they are each upon Courses or Rotation: the Congregation of Israel consisting of twenty four thousand, in which the whole number of the Princes of the Tribes and of the Princes of the Families amounted not, I might say, to one hundred, but will say to one thousand; it follows, that the lower sort in the Congregation of Israel held proportion to the better sort, above twenty to one. Whereas in the Representative proposed, the lower sort hold proportion to the better sort but six to four; and that popular Congregation where the lower sort hold but six to four, is by far the most Aristocratical that is or ever was in any well ordered Commonwealth, except Venice: but if you will have that Gentry to be all of one sort, or if you allow them to be of a better and of a meaner sort, Venice is not excepted. The Sanhedrim made no Law without Book III the People; nor may the Senate in this Model: but the Sanhedrim with 
Ezra 10. 8.  the Congregation, might make Laws; so may the Senate, in our Model, with the Representative of the People. Lastly, as the Congregation in Israel was held either by the Princes in person, with their Staves and Standards of the Camp, or by the four and twenty thousand in Military Discipline; so the Representative proposed is in the nature of a Regiment.  
EXCEPTING Venice, where there is a shadow, and but a shadow of Law made by the Senate (for the Sovereign Power is undeniably in the great Council) and Athens, where a Law made by the Senate was current as a Probationer for one year before it was proposed to the People; there neither is nor has been any such thing in a Commonwealth as a Law made by the Senat. That the Senate should have power to make Laws, reduces the Government to a single Council; and Government by a single Council, if the Council be of the Many, is Anarchy, as in the Assembly of the Roman People by Tribes, which always shook, and at length ruin'd that Commonwealth: Or, if the Council be of the Few, it is Oligarchy, as that of Athens consisting of the four hundred, who nevertheless pretended to propose to 
Thucyd. lib. 8.  five thousand, though they did not. Of which says THUCYDIDES, This was indeed the form pretended in words by the four hundred; but the most of them, thro' private ambition, fell upon that by which an Oligarchy made out of a Democracy is chief overthrown: for at once they claimed every one not to be equal, but to be far the chief. Anarchy, or a single Council consisting of the Many, is ever tumultuous, and does ill even while it means well. But Oligarchy, seldom meaning well, is a Faction wherein every one striving to make himself, or some other from whom he hopes for advantage, spoils all. There is in a Commonwealth no other cure of these, than that the Anarchy may have a Council of some few, well chosen, and elected by themselves, to advise them; which Council so instituted, is the Senate: Or that the Oligarchy have a popular Representative to balance it; which both curing Tumult in the rash and heady People, and all those Corruptions which cause Factiousness in the sly and subtle Few, amount to the proper Superstructures of a well ordered Commonwealth. As, to return to the example of the Oligarchy in Athens, where the four hundred (whose Reign, being very short, had been as seditious) were deposed; and the Sovereignty was decreed to a popular Council of five thousand, with a Senate of four hundred annually elective upon Courses, or by 
Lib. 8.  Rotation. Of this says THUCYDIDES, Now first (at least in my time) the Athenians seem to have ordered their State aright, it consisting of a moderate temper both of the Few and the Many. And this was the first thing that, after so many misfortunes, made the City again to raise her Head. But we in England are not apt to believe, that to decree the Sovereignty to thousands, were the way to make a City or a Nation recover of its Wounds, or to raise its Head. We have an aversion to such thoughts, and are sick of them. An Assembly of the People Sovereign! Nay, and an Assembly of the People consisting in the major vote of the lower sort! Why, sure it must be a dull, an unskilful thing. But so is the Touchstone in a Goldsmith's Shop, a dull thing, and altogether unskiled in the Trade; yet without this, would even the Master be deceived. And certain it is, that a well ordered Assembly of he People is as true an Index of what in Government is good or great, as tany Touchstone is of Gold.  
A COUNCIL (especially if of a lose Election) having not Chap. 1 only the Debate, but the Result also, is capable of being influenced from without, and of being swayed by Interest within. There may be a formed, a prejudiced Party, that will hasten or outbaul you from the Debate to the Question, and then precipitat you upon the Result: Whereas if it had no power of Result, there could remain to the same no more than Debate only, without any Bias, or cause of diverting such Debate from Maturity; in which Maturity of unbiass'd Debate lies the final cause of the Senate, and the whole Light that can be given to a People. But when this is done, if your resolving Assembly be not such as can imbibe or contract no other Interest than that only of the whole People, all again is lost: for the Result of all Assemblys goes principally upon that which they conceive to be their own Interest. But how an Assembly upon Rotation, consisting of one thousand, where the Vote is six to four in the lower sort, should be capable of any other Interest than that only of the whole People by which they are orderly elected, has never yet been, nor, I believe, ever will be shown. In a like distribution therefore of Debate and Result, consists the highest Mystery of Popular Government; and indeed the supreme Law, wherein is contained not only the Liberty, but the Safety of the People.  
FOR the remainder of the Civil part of this Model, which is now but small, it is farther proposed,  

Rule for Vacations.  THAT every Magistracy, Office, or Election throout this whole Commonwealth, whether annual or triennial, be understood of consequeuce to enjoin an interval or vacation equal to the term of the same. That the Magistracy of a Knight and of a Burgess, be, in this relation, understood as one and the same; and that this Order regard only such Elections as are National or Domestic, and not such as are Provincial or Foren.  

Exception from the Rule.  THAT, for an exception from this Rule, where there is but one Elder of the Horse in one and the same Parish, that Elder be eligible in the same without interval; and where there be above four Elders of the Horse in one and the same Parish, there be not above half, nor under two of them eligible at the same Election.  
OTHERWISE the People, beyond all manner of doubt, would elect so many of the better sort at the very first, that there would not be of the Foot or of the meaner sort enough to supply the due number of the Popular Assembly or Prerogative Tribe: and the better sort being excluded subsequent Elections by their intervals, there would not be wherwithal to furnish the Senate, the Horse of the Prerogative Tribe, and the rest of the Magistracies; each of which Obstructions is prevented by this Exception. Where, by the way, if in all experience such has been the constant temper of the People, and can indeed be reasonably no other, it is apparent what cause there can be of doubt who in a Commonwealth of this nature must have the leading. Yet is no man excluded from any Preferment; only Industry, which ought naturally to be the first step, is first enjoined by this Policy, but rewarded amply: seeing he who has made himself worth one hundred Pounds a year, has made himself capable of all Preferments and Honours in this Government. Where a man from the lowest state may not rise to the due pitch of his unquestionable Merit, the Commonwealth is not equal: yet neither can the People, under the Limitations proposed, make choice (as some object) of any other than Book III the better sort; nor have they at any time been so inclining to do, where they have not been under such Limitations. Be it spoken, not to the disparagement of any man, but on the contrary to their praise whose Merit has made them great, the People of England have not gone so low in the election of a House of Commons, as some Prince has done in the election of a House of Lords. To weigh Election by a Prince with Election by a People, set the Nobility of Athens and Rome by the Nobility of the old Monarchy, and a House of Commons freely chosen by the Nobility of the new. There remains but the Quorum, for which it is proposed,  

The Quorum.  THAT, throout all the Assemblies and Councils of this Commonwealth, the Quorum consist of one half in the time of Health, and of one third part in a time of Sickness, being so declared by the Senat.  
HOW the City Government, without any diminution of their Privileges, and with an improvement of their Policy, may be made to fall in with these Orders, has 
* In Oceana.  elsewhere been shown in part, and may be considered farther at leisure. Otherwise the whole Commonwealth, so far as it is merely Civil, is in this part accomplished. Now as of necessity there must be a natural Man, or a Man endued with a natural Body, before there can be a spiritual Man, or a Man capable of Divine Contemplation; so a Government must have a Civil, before it can have a Religious part: And if a man furnished only with natural parts can never be so stupid as not to make some Reflections upon Religion, much less a Commonwealth; which necessitats the Religious part of this Model.   

CHAP. II.  
Containing the Religious Part of this Model, proposed practicably.  
THERE is nothing more certain or demonstrable to common Sense, than that the far greater part of Mankind, in matters of Religion, give themselves up to the public Leading. Now a National Religion rightly established, or not coercive, is not any public driving, but only the public leading. If the Public in this case may not lead such as desire to be led by the Public, and yet a Party may lead such as desire to be led by a Party; where would be the Liberty of Conscience as to the State? Which certainly in a well ordered Commonwealth, being the public Reason, must be the public Conscience. Nay, where would be the Liberty of Conscience in respect of any Party which should so proceed as to show, that without taking their Liberty of Conscience from others, they cannot have it themselves? If the Public, refusing Liberty of Conscience to a Party, would be the cause of Tumult, how much more a Party refusing it to the Public? And how, in case of such a Tumult, should a Party defend their Liberty of Conscience, or indeed their Throats from the whole or a far greater Party, without keeping down or tyrannising over the whole or a far greater Party by force of Arms? These things being rightly considered, it is no wonder that Men, living like men, have not been yet found without a Government, or that any Government has not been yet found without a National Religion; that is, some orderly and known way of public Chap. 2 leading in divine things, or in the Worship of God.  
A NATIONAL Religion being thus proved necessary, it remains that I prove what is necessary to the same; that is, as it concerns the State, or in relation to the Duty of the Magistrate.  
CERTAIN it is, that Religion has not seen corruption but by one of these three causes; some Interest therewith incorporated, some ignorance of the truth of it, or by some complication of both. Nor was ever Religion left wholly to the management of a Clergy that escaped these Causes, or their most pernicious Effects; as may be perceived in Rome, which has brought Ignorance to be the Mother of Devotion, and indeed Interest to be the Father of Religion. Now the Clergy not failing in this case to be dangerous, what recourse but to the Magistrate for safety? specially seeing these Causes, that is, Interest and Ignorance (the one proceeding from evil Laws, the other from the want of good Education) are not in the right or power of a Clergy, but only of the Civil Magistracy. Or if so it be that Magistrates are obliged in duty to be nursing Fathers and nursing Mothers to the Church; 
Isa. 49. 23.  how shall a State in the sight of God be excusable, that takes no heed or care lest Religion suffer by Causes, the prevention or remedy whereof is in them only? To these therefore it is proposed,  

Universitys.  THAT the Vniversitys being prudently reformed, be preserved in their Rights and Endowments, for and towards the education and provision of an able Ministry.  

Joh. 5. 39  WE are commanded by CHRIST to search the Scriptures: The Scriptures are not now to be searched but by skill in Tongues: The immediate gift of Tongues is ceased: How then should skill in Tongues be acquired but mediately, or by the means of Education? How should a State expect such an Education (particularly for a matter of ten thousand men) that provides not for it? And what provision can a State make for this Education, but by such Schools so endowed and regulated, as with us are the Universitys? These therefore are a necessary step towards the prevention of such Ignorance or Interest, as thro' the infirmities or bias of Translators, Interpreters, and Preachers, both have and may frequently come to be incorporated with Religion; as also to the improvement or acquisition of such Light as is by the command of CHRIST to be attained or exercised in searching the Scriptures.  

The eighth Parallel. 1 Chron. 25. 8. Mal. 2. 12.  THE excellent Learning of the Levits in all kinds, not ordinarily infused, but acquired (there having been among them as well the Teacher as the Scholar) leaves little doubt but their forty eight Cities were as so many Universitys. These with their Suburbs or Endowments contained in the whole (each of their Circuits in Land reckoned at four thousand Cubits deep) about a hundred thousand Acres; that is, if their measure was according to the common Cubit: if according to the holy Cubit (as with Levits was most likely) twice so much; which, at the lowest account, I conceive to be far above the Revenues of both our Universitys.  
THESE being ordered as has been said, it is proposed,  

Augmentation of Live.  THAT the legal and ancient provision for the National Ministry be so augmented, that the meanest sort of Live or Benefices, without defalcation from the greater, be each improved to the Revenue of one hundred pounds at least.  
Book III THIS, in regard the way is by Tithes, comes up so close to the 
The ninth Parallel.  Orders of Israel, as, in our day, may show that a Commonwealth may come too near that pattern to be liked. We find not indeed that the Apostles either took or demanded Tithes; in which case the Priests, who were legally possessed of them, might have had suspicion that they, under colour of Religion, had aimed at the violation of Property. But putting the case that generally the Priests had been converted to the Christian Faith, whether the Apostles would for that reason have enjoined them to relinquish their Tithes? Or what is there in the Christian Religion to favour any such surmise? To me there seems abundantly enough to the contrary. For if the Apostles stuck not to comply with the Jews in a Ceremony which was of mere human invention, and to introduce this, as they did Ordination by imposition of hands, into the Christian Church; that they would, upon a like inducement, have refused a standing Law undoubtedly Mosaical, is in my opinion most improbable. So that, I conceive, the Law for Tithes now in being, may or may not be continued, at the pleasure of the Lawgivers, for any thing in this case to the contrary. Confident I am, that the introducing of this Model in the whole, which is thought impracticable, were not to willing minds so difficult a work as the abolition of Tithes.  
BUT Benefices, whether by way of Tithes or otherwise, being thus ordered; it is proposed,  

Ordination.  THAT a Benefice becoming void in any Parish, the Elders of the same may assemble and give notice to the Vicechancellor of either University by a Certificate, specifying the true value of that Benefice: that the Vicechancellor, upon the receipt of this Certificate, be obliged to call a Congregation of his University: that the Congregation of the University to this end assembled, having regard to the value of the Benefice, make choice of a Person fit for the Ministerial Function, and return him to the Parish so requiring: that the Probationer thus returned to a Parish by either of the Vniversitys, exercise the Office, and receive the Benefits as Minister of the Parish for the term of one year: that the term of one year being expired, the Elders of the Parish assemble and put the Election of the Probationer to the Ballot: that if the Probationer has three parts in four of the Balls or Votes in the Affirmative, he be thereby ordained and elected Minister of that Parish; not afterwards to be degraded or removed, but by the Censors of the Tribe, the Phylarch of the same, or the Council of Religion in such cases as shall be to them reserved by Act of Parliament: That in case the Probationer comes to fail of three parts in four at the Ballot, he depart from that Parish; and if he returns to the University, it be without diminution of the former Offices or Preferments which he there enjoyed, or any prejudice to his future Preferment: and that it be lawful in this case for any Parish to send so often to either University, and it be the duty of either Vicechancellor upon such Certificats to make return of different Probationers, till such time as the Elders of that Parish have fitted themselves with a Minister of their own choice and liking.  
IN case it was thought fit that a Probationer thus elected should, before he departs, receive imposition of hands from the Doctors of the University, I cannot see what the most scrupulous in the matter of Ordination could find wanting. But let this be so, or otherwise, it is indifferent. The Universitys by proposing to the Congregation in every Parish, do the Senatorian Office; and the People, thus fitting themselves by their Suffrage or Ballot, reserve that Office Chap. 2 which is truly popular, that is the Result, to themselves.  

The tenth Parallel.  MOSES (for so far back the Divines reach at Ordination) in the institution of the Senate of Israel, wherein he can never be proved to have used imposition of hands, performing the Senatorian Office, caused the People to take wise men, and understanding, and known among 
Deut. 1. Numb. 11.  their Tribes, whereof the Lot fell upon all but ELDAD and MEDAD. And the Apostles doing the Senatorian Office, in like manner without imposition of hands, caused the whole Congregation to take two, 
Acts 1. 26.  whereof the lot of Apostleship fell upon MATHIAS. So that this way of Ordination being that which was instituted by MOSES, and the chief or first of those which were used by the Apostles, is both Mosaical and Apostolical. Nor has a well ordered Commonwealth 
See Book 2. chap. 8.  any choice left of those other ways of Ordination, used by the Apostles in complaisance to worse sort of Government; but is naturally necessitated to this, that is, to the very best.  
ORDINATION being thus provided for, it is proposed,  

National Religion; and provision against scandalous Ministers.  THAT the National Religion be exercised according to a Directory in that case to be made, and published by Act of Parliament. That the National Ministry be permitted to have no other public Preferment or Office in this Commonwealth. That a National Minister being convict of Ignorance or Scandal, be movable out of his Benefice by the Censors of the Tribe, under an appeal to the Phylarch, or to the Council for Religion.  

Liberty of Conscience.  THAT no Religion, being contrary to or destructive of Christianity, nor the public exercise of any Religion, being grounded upon or incorporated into a foreign Interest, be protected by or tolerated in this State. That all other Religions, with the public exercise of the same, be both tolerated and protected by the Council of Religion: and that all Professors of any such Religion, be equally capable of all Elections, Magistracies, Preferments, and Offices in this Commonwealth, according to the Orders of the same.  
UPON the whole of these Propositions, touching Church Discipline, we may make these Observations. Thus neither would the Party that is for gifted Men, and Enemy's to Learning, thro' ignorance (which else in all probability they must) lose Religion; nor the Clergy be able to corrupt it by Interest. But Decency and Order, with liberty of Conscience, would still flourish together; while the Minister has a Preferment he sought, the Parish a Minister they chose, the Nation a Religion according to the public Conscience, and every man his Christian Liberty. He therefore that endeavours to confute this Chapter, must either show how these things may be omitted, or more effectually provided for; or tithe Mint and Cumin, and neglect the weightier things of Lawgiving.  
A COMMONWEALTH having, in the establishment of Religion, made resignation of herself to God, aught in the next place to have regard to the natural means of her defence; which introduces the Military part of this Model.   

Book III CHAP. III.  
Containing the Military part of this Model, proposed practicably.  
THE Military Part, on which at present I shall discourse little, consists in the Discipline of the Youth, that is, of such as are between eighteen and thirty years of Age: and for the Discipline of the Youth it is proposed,  

Discipline of the Youth.  THAT annually upon Wednesday next ensuing the last of December, the Youth of each Parish (under the inspection of the two Overseers of the same) assemble and elect the fifth man of their number, or one in five of them, to be for the term of that year Deputies of the Youth of that Parish.  

Their Troops, and Sports.  THAT annually on Wednesday next ensuing the last of January, the said Deputies of the respective Parishes meet at the Capital of the Hundred (where there are Games and Prizes allotted for them, as has been showed 
* In Oceana.  elsewhere) and there elect to themselves out of their own number, one Captain, and one Insign. And that of these Games, and of this Election, the Magistrates and Officers of the Hundred be Presidents, and Judges for the impartial distribution of the Prizes.  

Their Squadrons, and Exercises.  THAT annually upon Wednesday next ensuing the last of February, the Youth thro' the whole Tribe thus elected, be received at the Capital of the same, by the Lieutenant as Commander in chief, by the Conductor, and by the Censors; that under the inspection of these Magistrates, the said Youth be entertained with more splendid Games, disciplined in a more military manner, and be divided by lot into sundry parts, or Essays, according to the Rules 
* In Oceana.  elsewhere given.  

The second Essay, or the standing Army.  THAT the whole Youth of the Tribe, thus assembled, be the first Essay. That out of the first Essay, there be cast by lot two hundred Horse, and six hundred Foot: that they whom their friends will, or themselves can mount, be accounted Horse, the rest Foot. That these Forces (amounting in the fifty Tribes to ten thousand Horse, and thirty thousand Foot) be always ready to march at a week's warning: and that this be the second Essay, or the standing Army of the Commonwealth.  

Provincial Guards.  THAT for the holding of each Province, the Commonwealth in the first year assign an Army of the Youth, consisting of seven thousand five hundred Foot, and one thousand five hundred Horse. That for the perpetuation of these Provincial Arms or Guards, there be annually, at the time and places mentioned, cast out of the first Essay of the Youth in each Tribe ten Horse, and fifty Foot: that is, in all the Tribes five hundred Horse, and two thousand five hundred Foot for Scotland; the like for Ireland; and the like of both orders for the Sea Guards: being each obliged to serve for the term of three years upon the States pay.  
THE standing Army of the Commonwealth consisting thus of forty thousand, not Soldiers of fortune neither in body nor in pay, but Citizens at their Vocations or Trades, and yet upon command in continual readiness; and the Provincial Arms each consisting of nine thousand in pay in body, and possessed of the Avenues and places of strength in the Province, it is not imaginable how a Province should be so soon able to stir, as the Commonwealth must be to pour forty thousand men upon it, besides the Sea Guards. Nor comes this Militia thus constituted, except upon Marches, to any charge at all; the Chap. 3 standing Army having no pay, and the Provinces, whereof the Sea thus guarded will be none of the poorest, maintaining their own Guards. Such is the military way of a Commonwealth, and the 
The eleventh Parallel.  Constitution of its Arms, whether levied by Suffrage, as in Rome; or by Lot, as in Israel.  
WE will go up by Lot against Gibeah. 
Judg. 20. 9   
STANDING Forces being thus established; for such as are upon emergent occasions to go forth, or march, it is proposed,  

The third Essay, or Army marching.  THAT the Senate and the People, or the Dictator having decreed or declared War, and the Field Officers being appointed by the Council of War; the General by Warrant issued to the Lieutenants of the Tribes, demand the second Essay, or such part of it as is decreed; whether by way of levy or recruit. That by the same Warrant he appoint his time and Rendezvouz: that the several Conductors of the Tribes deliver him the Forces demanded, at the time and place appointed. That a General thus marching out with the standing Army, a new Army be elected out of the first Essay as formerly, and a new General be elected by the Senate; that so always there be a General sitting, and a standing Army, what Generals or Arms soever be marching. And that in case of Invasion the Bands of the Elders be obliged to like duty with those of the Youth.  

Poena 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or the Guardian of Education and Liberty.  THAT an only Son be discharged of these Duties without prejudice. That of two Brothers there be but one admitted to foreign Service at one time. That of more Brothers, not above half. That whoever otherwise refuses his Lot, except upon cause shown he be dispensed with by the Phylarch, or upon penitence be by them pardoned and restored, by such refusal be uncapable of electing, or being elected in this Commonwealth; as also that he pay to the State a fifth of his Revenue for protection, besides Taxes. That Divines, Physicians, and Lawyers, as also Trades not at leisure for the Essays, be so far exempted from this Rule, that they be still capable of all Preferments in their respective Professions, with Indemnity, and without Military Education or Service.  
A COMMONWEALTH whose Militia consists of Mercenarys, to be safe, must be situated as Venice, but can in no wife be great. The Industry of Holland is the main Revenue of that State; whence not being able to spare hands to her Arms, she is cast upon Strangers and mercenary Forces, thro' which we in our time have seen Amsterdam necessitated to let in the Sea upon her, and to become (as it were) Venice. To a Popular Government that could not do the like, Mercenary Arms have never failed to be fatal; whence the last Proposition is that which in every well ordered Commonwealth has been looked to as the main guard of Liberty.  

The twelfth Parallel.  IN this Israel was formidable beyond all other Commonwealths with a kind of Fulmination. SAUL when he heard the Cruelty of NAHASH the Ammonit, at the Leaguer of Jabesh-Gilead, took a 
1 S●m. 11. 7.  yoke of Oxen and hewed them in pieces, and sent them throout the Coasts of Israel, by the hands of Messengers, saying, Whosoever comes not out after SAUL, and after SAMUEL, so shall it be done to his Oxen. Which amounted not only to a confiscation of Goods (the Riches of the israelites lying most in their cattle) but to a kind of Anathema, as more plainly appears, where it is said, Curse ye Meroz, 
Judg. 5. 23.  curse ye bitterly the Inhabitants thereof, because they came not forth to help the Lord against the Mighty. Nay this (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) desertion of the Book III Military Orders and Services in Israel, was sometimes punished with total extermination, as after the Victory against Benjamin, where the Congregation or Political Assembly of that People, making inquisition 
Judg. 21.  what one of the Tribes of Israel came not up to the Lord in Mizpeh (the place where before the taking of Jerusalem they held, as I may say, their Parliaments) and finding that there came none to the Camp from Jabesh-Gilead, sent thither twelve thousand men of the valiantest, saying, Go and smite the Inhabitants of Jabesh-Gilead with the edge of the Sword, with the Women and the Children: which was done accordingly.  
BUT by this time men will shrink at this as a dreadful Order, and begin to compute that a Commonwealth, let her Prerogatives for the rest be what they will, must at this rate be but a dear purchase: whereas indeed, if this way costs something, there is no other that does not hazard all; forasmuch as discarding this Order, play your game as you can, you are sometime or other a Prey to your Enemy's, or to your Mercenaries. This certainly is that root in (the Penetralia) the bowels of a Commonwealth, whence never any Court Arts, or Politeness, could attain to the gallantry or splendour of the Education in Popular Governments. For let any man (remembering what it was to be a GIDEON, a MILTIADES, a TIMOLEON, a SCIPIO, or a Magistrate in a Commonwealth) consider if there should be no way with us to Magistracy, but by having served three years at Sea, and three years at Land, how the whole face and genius of Education, both in the better and in the lower sort, would of necessity be changed in this Nation, and what kind of Magistrates such experience in those Services must create to the Commonwealth. Consider, whether the threatened Punishments of this Order, though thro' unacquaintance they may at first sight have some brow, would not, as they have done in other Commonwealths of like structure, even with low spirits, expire in scorn and contemt, or thro' the mere contemplation of the reward of Honour, nay of the Honour itself, in which point where right has not been done, men, under Governments of this nature, have been much more apt to heats; as where the men of Ephraim fought against JEPTHA, for an affront in this kind which they conceived him 
Judg. 12.  to have put upon them. Wherefore passedst thou over to fight against the Children of Ammon, and didst not call us to go with thee? We will burn thy house upon thee with fire. Nor is this way so expensive of the Purse, or of Blood. Not of the public Purse, because it detests Mercenarys; nor of the private Purse, because the ways of Education thus directed, are all assisted with the States pay: so that a man in this road might educat three Children cheaper, and to the most solid ends, than he could any one to trifles in those which among us hitherto have been usual. And as to Blood, there is nothing more certain, than that Idleness, and its inseparable companion Luxury, are exceedingly more wasteful as of the Purse, so of Health, nay and of Life itself, than is War; which nevertheless this Order is such as does rather prevent than necessitat, in regard that to be potent in Arms is the way of Peace. But whereas in a Martial Commonwealth there may be men having exceeded the thirtieth year of their Age, who like those of Ephraim would yet take it ill to be excluded the Lists of Honour, and it must also be to the detriment of the Commonwealth that they should; for these, whom we may call Volunteers, it is proposed,  
THAT upon Warrants issued forth by the General for Recruits or Chap. 4 Levys, there be an Assembly of the Phylarch in each Tribe; that such Volunteers, or men being above thirty years of Age, as are desirous of farther 
Volunteers.  employment in Arms, appear before the Phylarch so assembled. That any number of these, not exceeding one moiety of the Recruits or Levys of that Tribe, may be taken on by the Phylarch, so many of the Youth being at the discretion of this Council disbanded, as are taken on of the Volunteers. That the Levys thus made, be conducted by the Conductor of the respective Tribe to the Rendezvouz appointed. And that the Service of these be without other term or vacation, than at the discretion of the Senate and the People, or such Instructions to the General, as shall by them in that case be provided.  
THUS much for the Military or Defensive part of this Model. For Offences in general it is written, Woe unto the world because of Offences; 
Mat. 18. 7.  for it must needs be that Offences come, but woe to that man by whom the Offence comes. Among Offences are offensive Wars: now it being out of question, that for the righteous execution of this Woe upon him or them by whom the Offence comes, a War may be just and necessary, as also that Victory in a just and necessary War may entitle one Prince or one People to the Dominion or Empire of another Prince or People; it is also out of question, that a Commonwealth, unless in this case she be provided both to acquire, and to hold what she acquires, is not perfect: which Consideration brings me to the Provincial part of this Model.   

CHAP. IU.  
Containing the Provincial Part of this Model, proposed practicably.  
THE word Province is with Roman Authors of divers significations. By these it is taken sometimes for Magistracy; as that of the Consul, which is called His Province: sometime for any Religion or Country, in which a Roman Captain or General was commanded to make War; but specially for such a Country as was acquired and held by Arms, or by Provincial Right. The word is of the like different use in Scripture; as where it is said, That AHASUERUS 
Esth. 1. 1.  reigned over a hundred and seven Provinces; by which are understood as well the divisions of the native, as those of the acquired Territories. But where TANAIS the Governor writes to 
Ezra 5. 8.  the King of Assyria concerning the Province of Judea, it is understood a Country acquired and held by Arms; which comes to the usual signification of the word with the Romans, it being in this sense that the Governor FELIX asked PAUL of what Province he was, 
Acts 23. 34.  and came to understand that he was of Cilicia, than a Province of the Roman Empire: and this signification is that in which I take the word throout this Chapter.  
THE mighty load of Empire which happened to the Commonwealth of Rome thro' the Acquisition of many and vast Provinces, is that whereto the Songs of Poets, and the opinions of more serious Writers attribute the weight which they say overswayed her. But this Judgement, though in itself right, is not in the manner they take it to be swallowed without chewing. For how probable it is that the Book III succeeding Monarchy was able to support a weight in this kind, which the Commonwealth could not bear, may at this distance be discerned, in that the Provinces were infinitely more turbulent in the Reign of the Emperors, than in that of the Commonwealth, as having a far stronger Interest, thro' ambition of attaining to the whole, to tear the Empire in pieces: which they did, while divers Provinces made divers Emperors, which before could not hope to make divers Commonwealths, nor to acquire safety by retreat to a petty Government. But in this, the acquisition of Provinces devoured the Commonwealth of Rome, that, she not being sufficiently fortified by Agrarian Laws, 
Plutarch in Gra●ch.  the Nobility, thro' the spoil of Provinces, came to eat the People out of their popular Balance or Lands in Italy by Purchases; and the Lands that had been in the hands of the Many, coming thus into the hands of the Few, of natural and necessary consequence there follows Monarchy.  
NOW that England, a Monarchy, has been seized of Provinces (one of them, while France was such, being as great as any one of the Roman) is a known thing; and that the Militia proposed by the present Model, contains all the causes of Greatness that were in that of Rome, is to such as are not altogether strangers to the former, no less than obvious. Now of like Causes not to presume like Effects, were unreasonable. The safety therefore of the foregoing Agrarian, as hitherto proposed, or that Lands be divided in their descent, must in this case be none at all, unless there be some stop also given in their Accumulation by way of purchase; lest otherwise the spoil of some mighty Province be still sufficient to eat out the People by purchase.  
TO submit therefore in this place (for aught I perceive) to inevitable necessity, it is proposed,  

Additional Propositions to the Agrarian.  THAT (great Commonwealths having been overthrown by the spoil of Provinces) an Estate of two thousand pounds a year in Land, be incapable of any Accumulation by way of purchase.  
DONATIONS and Inheritances will be fewer than to be dangerous; and as some fall, others will be dividing in their descent. But to resume the Discourse upon the Agrarian Laws, which, because they were not till in this Proposition complete, remains imperfect. That to Agrarian Laws some Standard is necessary, appears plainly enough. This Standard in a well founded Monarchy, must bar recess; and in a well founded Commonwealth must bar increase. For certain it is, that otherwise each of the Policys does naturally breed that Viper which eats out the Bowels of the Mother: as Monarchy, by Pomp and Luxury, reduces her Nobility thro' debt to poverty, and at length to a level with the People, upon which no Throne ever stood or can stand: such was the case of this Nation under her latter Princes. And a Commonwealth by her natural ways of frugality, of fattening and cockering up of the People, is apt to bring Estates to such excess in some hands, as eating out the rest, bows the Neck of a free State or City to the yoke, and exposes her to the goad of a Lord and Master; which was the case of Rome under her perpetual Dictator's. But why yet must this Standard of Land in the present case, be neither more nor less than just two thousand pounds a year? Truly, where some Standard was necessary to be named, I might as well ask why not this as well as any other? yet am I not without such Reasons why I have pitched upon this rather than any other, as I may submit to the judgement of the Reader in Chap. 4 the following computation or comparison of the divers Effects or Consequences of so many different Standards, as by the rules of proportion may give sufficient account of the rest.  
LET the dry Rent of England (that is, at the rate a man may have for his Land without sweeting) be computed at ten Millions: This presumed, if you set the Standard at ten thousand pounds a year, the whole Territory can come into no fewer than one thousand hands. If you set it at five thousand pounds a year, it can come into no fewer than two thousand hands; and if you set it at two thousand pounds a year, it can come into no fewer than five thousand hands. It will be said, In which way you please, it will never come into so few hands as are capable of having it; which is certain: yet because the Effects in their approaches would be such as may be measured by their Extremes, I shall pitch upon these as the readiest way to guide my Computation. The Balance in a thousand hands might affect the Government with a hankering after Monarchy; in two thousand hands it might usurp it, as did the Roman Nobility, and thereby occasion a feud between the Senate and the People. These not only in the extremes, but with much of a like nature in the approaches.  
BUT letting these pass, as also the numbers or compass necessary to the Rotation of such a Commonwealth (none of which inconveniences are incident to the Standard of two thousand pounds a year, as that whereby Lands can come into no fewer than five thousand Proprietors) we will suppose these Standards to be each of them, as to the safety of the Government, indifferently practicable.  
YET it is recorded by Experience, and wise Authors, that the true cause whence England has been an overmatch in Arms for France, lay in the communication or distribution of Property to the lower sort; and for the same cause let it be considered, if the Commonwealth upon the Standard of two thousand pounds a year (c●eteris paribus) must not necessarily be an overmatch in the potency of its Militia for the other two. Such are the advantages, such is the glory of the like moderation to the public. Money (says the Lord VERULAM) is like muck, not good except it be spread. Much rather in Popular Government is this holding as to Land, the latter having upon the State a far stronger influence, at least in larger Territories, than Money: for in such, Money, while scarce, cannot overbalance Land; and were Silver and Gold as plentiful as Brass or Iron, they would be no more, nor would Land be less worth. And for private men, were it not that it is easier to fill the belly of a Glutton than his eyes, not only Virtue, but the Beatitude of Riches, would be apparently consistent in a mean. But what need I play the Divine or the Philosopher upon a Doctrine, which is not to diminish any man's Estate, not to bring any man from the Customs to which he has been inur'd, nor from any emergent expectation he may have; but regards only the Generation to come, or the Children to be born seven years after the passing such a Law? Whence it must needs follow, that putting the case this Agrarian be introduced, it is to our Age as if there were none; and if there be no Agrarian, it is to our Age as if there was one. The difference is no more, than that in the one way the Commonwealth is at all points secured, and in the other it is left to its fortune even in the main. Of Book III such sovereign effect are the like Laws, that I would go yet farther, and propose,  

Agrarian for Scotland and Ireland.  THAT in Scotland the Standard be set at five hundred pounds a year; in Ireland at two thousand pounds a year in Land; the rest for each as for England.  
NARROWNESS of an Agrarian for Scotland, being a Martial Country, would make the larger provision of a good Auxiliary Militia; and largeness of an Agrarian for Ireland, being less Martial, would cast a Sop into the Jaws of the Avarice of those who should think it too much confined in England. And lest the Provincials in this case should think themselves worse dealt with than the Citizens themselves, the sum of the Agrarian Laws being cast up together, any man in the three Nations may hold four thousand five hundred pounds a year in Land; and any small Parcel of Land, or mere Residence in England, makes a Provincial a Citizen. Should the Commonwealth increase in Provinces, the Estates at this rate both of the Citizens and Provincials, would be more and greater than ever were those of the ancient Nobility of these Nations; and without any the least hazard to Liberty. For he, who considering the whole Roman Story, or that only of the GRACCHIS in PLUTARCH, shall rightly judge, must confess, that had Rome preserved a good Agrarian but in Italy, the Riches of its Provinces could not have torn up the Roots of its Liberty, but on the contrary must have watered them. It may be said, What need then of putting an Agrarian upon the Provinces? I answer: For two Reasons: first is Indulgence to the Provincials; and the second, Advantage to the Commonwealth. For the first, it is with small foresight apparent enough, that the Avarice of the Citizen being bounded at home, and having no limits in the Provinces, would in a few years eat up the Provincials, and bring their whole Countries (as the Roman Patricians did Italy) to sound in their Fetters, or to be tilled by their Slaves or Underlings. And so, for the second, the Commonwealth would by such means lose an Auxiliary Militia, to be otherwise in Scotland only more worth than the Indys. These things therefore thus ordered, it is proposed,  

Provincial Councils.  THAT upon the expiration of Magistracy in the Senate, or at the annual Recess of one third part of the same, there be elected by the Senate out of the part receding, into each Provincial Council four Knights for the term of three years; thereby to render each Provincial Council (presuming it in the beginning to have been constituted of twelve Knights, divided after the manner of the Senate by three several Lists or Elections) of annual, triennial, and perpetual Revolution or Rotation.  

Provincial Governors or Generals.  THAT out of the same third part of the Senate annually receding, there be to each Province one Knight elected for the term of one year. That the Knight so elected be the Provincial General or Governor. That a Provincial Governor or General receive annually in April at his Rendevou appointed, the Youth or Recruits elected in the precedent Month to that end by the Tribes, and by their Conductors delivered accordingly. That he repair with the said Youth or Recruits to his Province, and there dismiss that part of the Provincial Guard or Army whose triennial term is expired. That each Provincial Governor have the conduct of Affairs of War and of State in his respective Province, with advice of the Provincial Council; and that he be Precedent of the same.  
THAT each Provincial Council elect three weekly Proposers, or Provosts, Chap. 4 after the manner, and to the ends already shown in the constitution of Senatorian Councils; and that the Provost of the signior List, during his 
Provincial Provosts.  term, be Precedent of the Council in absence of the General.  

Subordination and Function of Provincial Councils.  THAT each Provincial Council proceed according to Instructions received from the Council of State, and keep intelligence with the same by any two of their Provosts, for the Government of the Province, as to matters of War or State. That upon Levys of native or proper Arms by the Senate, and the People, a Provincial Council (having to that end received Orders) make Levys of Provincial auxiliaries accordingly. That Auxiliary Arms upon no occasion whatsoever exceed the proper or native Arms in number. That for the rest, the Provincial Council maintain the Provincials, defraying their peculiar Guards and Council, by such a known proportion of Tributs, as on them shall be set by the Senate and the People, in their proper Rights, Laws, Liberties and Immunitys, so far as upon the Merits of the cause wherupon they were subdued, it seemed good to the Senate and the People to confirm them, And that it be lawful for the Provincials to appeal from their Provincial Magistrates, Councils, or Generals, to the People of England.  
IN modelling a Commonwealth, the concernment of Provincial Government comes in the last place; for which cause I conceive any long Discourse upon these Orders to be at present unnecessary: But certain things there are in the way which I am unwilling to let slip without pointing at them.  

Whether Men or Money be the Nerve of War.  SOME will have Men, some will have Money to be the Nerve of War; each of which Positions, in proper cases, may be a Maxim: For if France, where the main Body of the People is embased; or Venice, which stands upon a Mercenary Militia, want Money, they can make no War. But it has heretofore been otherwise with Commonwealths. Roman Historians (as is observed by MACCHIAVEL) in their Military Preparations or Expeditions, make no mention of Money, unless what was gained by the War, and brought home into the Treasury; as the Spoil of Macedon by AEMILIUS PAULUS, being such, as the People for some years after were discharged of their Tribute. Not that their Wars were made altogether without Money; for if so, why should the People at any time before have paid Tribute? Or why, upon this occasion were they excused? but that the Money in which their Wars stood them, was not considerable in comparison of that which is requisite where Money may be counted the Nerve of War; that is, where Men are not to be had without it. But Rome, by virtue of its Orders, could have raised vaster numbers of Citizens and Associates than perhaps it ever did, though during the Consulat of PAPPUS and REGULUS, she levied in Italy only seventy thousand Horse, and seven hundred thousand Foot. Should we conceive the Nerve of this Motion to have been Money, we must reckon the Indys to have been exhausted before they were found; or so much Brass to have been in Italy, as would have made Stones to be as good Mony. A well ordered Commonwealth does these things not by Money, but by such Orders as make of its Citizens the Nerve of its Wars. The Youth of the Commonwealth proposed are esteemed in all at five hundred thousand. Of these there is an annual Band, consisting of one hundred thousand. Of this one hundred thousand there is a standing Army consisting of thirty thousand Foot and ten thousand Horse, besides such as being above Book III thirty years of age, shall offer themselves as Volunteers; of which the number is in no wife likely to be few. To the standing Army the Provinces, or that only of Scotland, being both Populous and Martial, can afford at any time an equal number of auxiliaries.  
THESE Orders, thus summed up together, render this Commonwealth ordinarily able to wage War with fourscore thousand men; a Force which, it is known, not any Prince in Christendom is able to match in Virtue, Number, or Discipline. For these the Commonwealth in her Sea Guard has always at hand sufficient Waftage, or at least such a sufficient Convoy as may make any Vessels at hand a sufficient Transportation: all this, I say, by virtue of Orders. Not but that the March, the Equipage, the Waftage of so great an Army must cost Money; but that it will come to no account in comparison of a lingering War made by a matter of thirty thousand Mercenaries, the very consumtion of a State: whereas fourscore thousand men so disciplined and so furnished, as has been shown, being once transported, must suddenly come to be no Charge, or make the War defray itself.  
BUT 'tis objected, that to reckon upon such a Militia were to suppose a large Country capable of being a Commonwealth; whereas we hold them learned, who say that no Commonwealth has consisted of more 
Whether a Commonwealth has consisted of more than one City or Town.  than some one City or Town. But in what Language or in what Geography, are the twelve Tribes of Israel; the (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) Peopledoms or Prytanies of Athens, which THESEUS gathered into one body; the Tribes and Lineages in Lacedaemon instituted by LYCURGUS; the five and thirty Roman Tribes planted between the Rivers Vulturnus and Arno, or between the Cities now called Capua and Florence; the 13 Cantons of the Swissers; the seven United Provinces of the Low Countries, understood to have been or to be but one City or Town? Whether were not the People of Israel under their Commonwealth six hundred thousand? What reason can be given why the Government that could take in six hundred thousand, might not as well take in twice that number? How much short came the Country, planted by the Roman Tribes, of 150 Miles square? Or how much over is England? And what reason can be given why a Government, taking in 150 Miles square, might not as well take in twice that Compass? Whether was our House of Commons under Monarchy not collected from the utmost Bounds of the English Territory? And whether had the Laws by them enacted not their free course to the utmost limits of the same? And why should that be impossible or impracticable to a Representative of the People in a Commonwealth, which was so facile and practicable to a Representative of the People under Monarchy?  
IT is a wonder how the Commonwealth of Rome, which held as it were the whole World by Provinces, should be imagined by any man to have consisted but of one Town or City.  
BUT to return: It is alleged by others, and as to Provincial Government very truly, that a Commonwealth may be a Tyranny: Nor do I think that Athens, in this point, came short of any Prince: Rome, on the other side, was (according to the merits of the cause) as frequent in giving Liberty as in taking it away. The Provinces of Venice and of Switzerland, would not change their condition with the Subjects of the best Prince. However the possibility in a Commonwealth of tyrannising over Provinces, is not to be cured; for be the Commonwealth or the Prince a State or a Man after God's own heart, there is no way of holding a Province but by Arms.  

The thirteenth Parallel. 2 Sam. 8. 5, 6.  WHEN the Syrians of Damascus came to succour HADADEZER King of Zobah, DAVID slew of the Syrians two and twenty thousand Men: then DAVID put Garrisons in Syria of Damascus, and the Syrians became Servants to DAVID, and brought Gifts; and the Lord preserved DAVID whithersoever he went.  
WITH this Parallel I draw the Curtain, and close (be it Comedy to such as are for Tragedy) this Model; appealing to the present, or the next Age, whether throout I have not had God himself for my Vouchees. In the mean time, there is nothing hereby proposed which 
See the Corollary of Oceana.  may not stand with a supreme Magistrate.   

The Conclusion:  
Showing how the Model proposed may be proved or examined; and giving a brief Answer to Mr. WREN'S last Book, entitled, Monarchy asserted against Mr. HARRINGTON'S Oceana.  

That a Commonwealth not rightly ordered, is less seditious than the best of Monarchys.  FOR a Nation to be still upon the cast of a Die, to be ever in Sect. 1 trepidation as to the main chance of Government, is a dreadful state of things. Such indeed with us has been the Constitution of our late Governments, of which therefore not any can be called a Commonwealth. Yet has the like state of things (in favour of Monarches, and thro' the industry of the Clergy) been for many Ages, that whereof Commonwealths unheard are still accused and condemned. For proof in this case, the Tribunitian Storms of the Roman People are thought abundantly sufficient. But these having been without Blood, if with our Affairs they hold any parallel, are not to be compared with the Baron's Wars, those of York and Lancaster, or the like; but with the Contests or Strive of our Parliaments with their Kings, while such Disputes came not to Arms. Or if the Roman Fields from the time of the GRACCHIS grew bloody, we have known a matter of a dozen years in which ours might have compared with them. The Seditions under the Commonwealth of Rome to those under the Empire, hold such a proportion, as the Seditions under the Commonwealth of Israel to 
See Book 2. chap. 4.  those under their Kings. I am contented at this time, for discourse sake, that the Seditions of Venice should pass as they are computed by Mr. WREN: Let those also which have happened in the Commonwealths of the Swissers, and of the United Provinces, by the skill of some Man who may be thought more impartial than myself, be rightly enumerated and added. This being done, let the Seditious that have happened in the Monarchys of England, France, and Spain, be as impartially summed up; and I may venture to promise you, That you shall not find the sum of the Seditions which have happened in those three Commonwealths, to balance the foot of the account with those Seditions which have happened in any one of those Monarchys: nor are we without sufficient inducement to believe, that the whole account in this particular of those Commonwealths which have been in the World, can come any whit nearer to that of the Monarchys. But this being so, be it also supposed, though not granted, that a Commonwealth is a seditious Government, yet must it be the least seditious Government. The Republic of Corinth never 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Lib. 4.  suffered but that one Sedition which is described by Xenophon; and this too from an external cause.  
Sect. 2 BUT I am the more confirmed by the Assaults of Mr. WREN, 
That Mr. Wren's Opposition of P●pular P●●de●●e amounts to a Consummation of it.  to have no less than demonstrated in the proposed Model, that a Commonwealth rightly ordered is altogether incapable of Sedition, and so consequently of Dissolution, that is, from any internal cause. To render his Confutation entire, and the truth of this Assertion the more conspicuous, I shall first insert those Rules or Maxims whereby a Model of a Commonwealth may be exactly proved or examined, and then show how they totally enervat and overturn those Arguments elaborated by Mr. WREN towards the examination and confutation of the Model proposed.  

How a Model of Popular Government may be tried or examined.  THE Maxims or Rules whereby a well ordered Model of Popular Government may be most exactly proved or examined, are specially two:  
1. IT must be wholly void of any Contradiction or Inequality.  
2. IT must be such in which no number of Men, having the Interest, can have the Power or Strength; and no number of Men, having the Power or Strength, can have the Interest to invade or disturb the Government.  
IT is not in the power of Nature that there should be an effect, where there is not the cause of that effect; and in a Frame of Government that is exactly according to the foregoing Maxims, there can be no cause of Sedition or Dissolution. A Model of Government therefore that will hold examination by these Maxims, must (without ostentation, or with Mr. WREN'S patience) be perfect.  
NOW let us observe how he bestirs himself to examine and confute this Model. As to contradiction, he does not so much as pretend that there is any Guile in it; yet will not allow it to have any truth: 
W. p. 78.  For, says he, as in a Fiction the several Members may be so contrived, as not to give one another the lie, but be all contained within the limits of Verisimilitude, and yet the whole remain without the least syllable of Truth; so in a Model of Government. To which I answer, that there being a truth of Nature, and a truth of Fact, this way of Mr. WREN'S disputing is mere equivocation. For the Model is not proposed to show the truth of Fact, or that there has been any such exactly in practice; but to show the truth of Nature, or that such a Model is practicable: wherefore he needed not to have alleged that it has not the truth of Fact, which we all know; but was to show where it fails of such a truth in Nature as can any way render it impracticable. But instead of this, he is gone to the Moon; and will read us a Lecture in Politics by the Planets, or the various Hypotheses of Celestial Motions, 
Ibid.  which may be excogitated including no absurdity in themselves, and yet perhaps not any one of them prove to be the true method of Nature. But may a man therefore argue in this manner? It is very hard to know certainly which are the Highways of the Planets, therefore there can be no certain knowledge which are the Highways to London. Let us even say, Because the Rotation of the World may as well go upon the Heavens as upon the Earth, therefore a man may as well go upon his Head as upon his Heels; and a Commonwealth as well stand upon a Milkwoman's Pattens, as upon the strongest Interest, or the Interest of the strongest.  

W. p. 179.  So much for Contradiction. Now for Inequality, says Mr. WREN, Tho it should be allowed Mr. HARRINGTON, that his Commonwealth has none in it, yet would it fail of attaining the perfection of Government, seeing there is an inequality in the Nature of man, which is not rectified by the Model of his Commonwealth. As if the equality of a Government was pretended to be such, as should make a crooked man strait, a wicked man good, or a passionate man a Philosopher; and it were not perfect, in being sufficient to prevent any influence that Wickedness or Passion in a man or men, may have upon the Government. But for farther discovery of these Inequalitys in the Nature of man, that are not rectified by the Model, Mr. WREN sends us to his eight and ninth Chapters, where he produces them in such order, as I shall observe in repeating him. Whensoever, says he, under Popular Government 
Pag▪ 84.  the number of those whose Offences have rendered them liable to the severity of Laws, is considerable enough to qualify them for attemt, Popular Government has no more security than any other, of being free from Sedition. It is very true: but Mr. WREN was obliged to show how in an equal Commonwealth, or under the Model proposed, it was possible that the number of such men should come to be considerable enough to qualify them for such an attemt. But in this kind he is no otherwise provided than to tell us, That of this Original and Extraction, as to the main, was CATILIN'S attemt upon the Roman Commonwealth. So undertaking against Oceana, or the most equal Commonwealth, he is come to arguing against Rome, or the most inequal Commonwealth; and at such a time too, when being no longer capable of Liberty, but ready for bonds, there were other parties besides CATILIN'S, and others besides such as were obnoxious to the Laws, that lay in wait for her: as POMPEY and his Party, or at least CESAR and his, who at length carried it; so that this feat was not so much performed by men otherwise liable to severity of Laws, as by men puffed up by ambition. But let these have been of which sort he will, it remains with him to show, how there should be of either kind enough in Oceana for a like attemt. It is known that long before this happened in Rome, the whole of that Commonwealth was in the hands of three men, CESAR, POMPEY, and CRASSUS: wherefore he should have first shown, which way the whole of the Commonwealth of Oceana might come into the hands of three, or of a few men. But leaving this untouched, he runs making a dust, and a doubt where the sovereign Power of Oceana can be; which even in Rome, as inequal as it was, is acknowleged to have been in the Assemblies of the People; and in Athens, THUCYDIDES expressly says, That the Sovereignty 
Lib. 5.  was in the five thousand. Who ever doubted but where the ultimat Result is, there also must be the Sovereignty? and the ultimat Result of Oceana is in the Prerogative Tribe, or Representative of the People. Then says he, This Representative thinking it their interest, may 
Pag. 84.  dissolve the Government, and perpetuat themselves, and may come to think it their interest. For the desire of Power being natural to man, a far greater share of Power remains with every particular man, when the Sovereign Power is divided among so many, than when the same Power is divided among two hundred thousand. But I showed that this Representative has the whole Sovereign Power in themselves, not divided with any other, or with the five hundred thousand; which I suppose he means by the two hundred thousand he mentions. Now this Representative cannot be understood to have the Sovereign Power by overbalance of strength, because they are but one thousand to five hundred thousand; so it is plain that they have it by consent, or by orders only: wherefore these Orders they have not the power, or strength, nor the interest to break; because breaking their Orders (by which only, and not by strength, the Power is in themselves) they come to divide the Power that was in themselves, with the five hundred thousand, as they, who, in defect of the Orders, have the far greater strength, and 
W. p. 85.  no legal bar. Yet says he, That a Representative is not incapable of making such an attempt as this, will (it is not improbable) easily find belief with those who are acquainted with the Actions of these last eighteen years. Which is as much as to say, That because a Representative, by and with the People, may have both the interest, and the power or strength to free themselves of a broken Monarchy; therefore a Representative may, without and against the People, have both the interest, and the power or strength to break the Orders of the most equal Commonwealth. But if the Representative of Oceana has not the power or strength to break their Orders, and perpetuat themselves; much less the Senat. True it is, if we look upon some other Commonwealths, a Senate might have the interest to do it; but not where the Senate has been upon Rotation. To add then to Mr. WREN'S faculty of opposition greater strength than is in it; if the Senate of Oceana would do any thing of this kind, their readiest way were by creating of the Dictator. The Dictator being created, has sovereign Power in carrying on the Orders of the Commonwealth: but those do not perpetuat their Power; this therefore cannot be done but by Force or Arms. The Arms of the Commonwealth are both numerous, and in a posture or readiness; but they consist of its Citizens: and for the Dictator to bring the Citizen to break the Commonwealth, were for a General to command his Army to cut their own throats. It is true, the Roman Decemvirs put in for prolongation; but, though in the most inequal Commonwealth, they could not make it stand one year, because of the Citizens in Arms: And for Mercenarys there are none in Oceana; is this news? there were none in Israel, there were none in Athens, there were none in Lacedaemon, there were none in Rome, while those Commonwealths flourished. But were there Mercenarys, as he might perhaps reckon Servants, they are unarmed, undisciplined; they cannot rise thro' the vast bodies of Citizens in Arms both Elders and Youth; or if they would rise, they could be nothing in their hands. The Roman Slaves, and the Lacedaemonian Helots', being far of another and more dangerous nature, never risen against their Lords but to their own destruction. All this while I say nothing of the security which is in the frame of this Dictator, beyond any example or interest of prolongation to be found either in the Roman Dictator or the Venetian Council of ten, each whereof having had the like power, did never discover any such inclination. It is true, that in the time of SCYLLA, the Roman Dictator began to be perpetual; but this is not to be attributed so much to the imperfection of the Order, as to the change of the Balance. But if the Dictator of Oceana cannot have the interest, or, having the interest, cannot have the power or strength to perpetuat that Magistracy; much less can the Senat.  
THE sum of what has been said, may be thus cast up, as to the whole Constitution. If Things or Persons that have neither the right nor the might, may prevail against Things and Persons who have both the right and the might; then may one Order of this Commonwealth break the whole System: but the Might, thro' the foundation or popular balance of Property, being in the whole People, and the whole Superstructures of this Commonwealth being nothing else but an equal distribution of common Right to the whole People, who are possessed of the Might; they who have the Might, have not the interest to break, but to preserve the Orders; which therefore no other can have the power or strength to break, or some other breaking, must but lose that which they pretend to gain, to wit, the Right, which in this case must still fall to the Might, devolving upon the People. That Mr. WREN will needs fancy the Tribes or Cities in Oceana, as those in 
W. p. 87.  the united Provinces, or the Cantons of Switzerland, to be distinct Soveraintys, concerns not me, seeing the form of Oceana is far otherwise; nor indeed him, seeing neither do the Cities in Holland, nor the Cantons in Switzerland go about to dissolve their Commonwealths or Leagues. The Champion having thus failed at the head, is contented to play low. Tho there be care taken, says he, that at the Assembly of the Hundred 
W. p. 181.  and the Tribe, such and such Magistrates should be elected out of the Horse, there is no necessary provision there should be any Horse there, out of which to elect. And where can they be then, if not in some Parish? He might better have said, that at the Parish there was no care taken, that the People should not elect too many of the Horse, which being indeed the defect of the former, is in this Edition rectified. His last 
See Proposition 44. W. p. 183.  exception is against the place where I say, that They who take upon them the profession of Theology, Physic or Law, are not at leisure for the Essays, whereby the Youth commence for all Magistracies and Honours, in the Commonwealth. To which reason he offers not so much as any Answer: nor pretends any other Argument against it, than that this excludes Divines, Lawyers, and Physicians, from those Honours to which their Parish Clerks, their Scriveners, and their Apothecaries, nay Farriers and Cobblers may attain. And what can I help that, if it ought nevertheless so to be, for a reason which he cannot answer? Nay, if so it be in common practice where the reason is nothing near so strong, seeing a Parish Clerk, a Scrivener, an Apothecary, nay a Cobbler or a Farrier, is not uncapable of being of the Common Council, nor yet of being an Alderman or Lord Mayor of London; which nevertheless that a Divine, a Lawyer, or a Physician should be, were absurd to think. Divines have a Blow from which they ought not to look back: they have above a tenth of the Territory, with which they ought to be contented; and more than all, Civil Interest contracted by a Clergy, corrupts Religion. For Lawyers, their Practice and Magistracies are not only the most gainful, but for life; and in a Commonwealth, neither is accumulation of Magistracy just or equal, nor the confounding of Executive and Legislative Magistracy safe. Will Mr. WREN believe one of our own Lawyers, and one of the learnedst of them upon this point? It is the Lord VERULAM: They, says he, 
Verulam de Aug. Scien. lib. 8. cap. 3.  who have written (de legibus) of Lawmaking, have handled this Argument as Philosophers, or as Lawyers. Philosophers speak higher than will fall into the capacity of practice (to which may be referred PLATO'S Commonwealth, Sir THOMAS MORE'S Utopia, with his own Atlantis) and Lawyers being obnoxious, and addicted each to the Laws of their particular Country, have no freedom nor sincerity of Judgement, but plead as it were in bonds. Certainly the cognizance of these things is most properly pertaining to political Persons, who best know what stands with human Society, what with the safety of the People, what with natural Equity, with ancient Prudence, and with the different Constitution of Commonwealths. These therefore, by the Principles and Precepts of natural Equity and good Policy, may and aught to determine of Laws. For Physicians, who (as such) have in the management of State Affairs no prejudice, if you open them the door, they will not at all, or very rarely, come in: whereby it appears, First, that such a bar may in some cases be no violation of Liberty; and, secondly, that the Divines, who for better causes might be as well satisfied, and for more unanswerable Reasons ought to forbear, yet are impatient, and give a full testimony that their meaning is not good.  
THUS is the Commonwealth by Mr. WREN opposed, by him asserted. There remains no more to the full confutation of his Book, than to show how the Monarchy by him asserted is by him destroyed. This is to be done by the examination of his ninth Chapter, which is the next of those to which he referred us.  
Sect. 3 THE opposition made by Mr. WREN to a Commonwealth, 
That Mr. Wren's Assertion of Monarchy amounts to the Subversion of it.  and his pretended asserting of Monarchy, run altogether upon Mr. HOBS' Principles, and in his very words; but for want of understanding, much enervated: so that Mr. WREN'S whole ●eat of Arms comes but to have given me a weaker Adversary for a stronger. In Sovereignty, says he, the diffused strength of the Multitude is united 
W. p. 97.  in one person; which in a Monarchy is a natural person; in a State, an artificial one procreated by the majority of Votes. This then is the grand 
W. p. 99  security of all Soverains, whether single Persons or Assemblys, that the united Forces of their Subjects, with which they are invested, is sufficient to suppress the beginnings of Seditions. Who reads Mr. HOBBS, if this be news? But what provision is made by either of these Authors, that the Forces of the Subject must needs be united? Is Union in Forces, or in Government, an Effect whereof there is no Cause? Or to what cause are we to attribute this certain Union and grand Security? Why let 
W. p. 103.  there be such a Nobility as may be a Monarch's Guard against the People. And lest a Monarch stand in need of another Guard against this Nobility, let none of these excel the res● of his Order in power or dignity. Which Effects or Ends, thu● commanded▪ ●ouchsafe not to acquaint us with 
Ibid.  their ways: Y●s, let the Nobility h●●e no right to assemble themselves for electing a Successor to the Monarchy, or for making of War or Peace, or for nominating the great Ministers of State, or for performing any other Act which by the nature of it is inseparable from the Sovereign Power. But why then must such a Nobility be a guard against the People, and not rather a guard for the People, seeing both their Interests and Sufferings at this rate are the same, and include those very causes for which, in the Baron's War, the Nobility became Incendiaries and Leaders of the People of England against their Kings, and so those whereby their Captain came to excel the rest of his order in power or dignity? But for this 
W. p. 105.  the Prince is to be provided, by having always in pay a sufficient Militia; and some places of strength where a few may be secure against a number. For places of Strength, Citadels, or Castles, there were in the time of the Baron's Wars, more than some; yet were they, as to this purpose, none. But a Militia is one thing, and a sufficient Militia is another; where the Government consists of a Nobility and of a People, what sufficient part of the Property or Revenue of the Territory can there remain to the Prince, whereby to have always in pay such a Militia, as may be sufficient to keep the Nobility and the People from joining, or to suppress them being joined? If these be small Arms, the like may befall them, which befell those of the Kings in the Wars of the Barons. And if they be great Arms, the Prince has not wherwithal to support or content them; nay if he had, Mr. WREN tells us plainly, 
W. p. 106.  That Princes who keep great Arms, as Guards to their Persons or Empires, teach us that this is to walk upon Precipices; there being no possibility of preventing such an Army (specially if they lie still without employment) from acquiring an interest distinct from that of the Prince. Wherefore (to follow Mr. WREN, and no other Leader, in his own words against himself) this Militia being great, cannot be so instituted, as to have no interest besides the pay it receives from the Monarch; nor so as to have no hopes of being safe in their own strength, if they should withdraw themselves from the Service and Obedience due to him: and being not great, against the whole Order or Orders of the Nobility and the People they cannot be sufficient. What then remains but to say, that Mr. WREN having declared the perfection of Monarchical Government 
W. p. 107.  to consist in a mixture of Monarchy by a Nobility, and a Monarchy by Arms, has as to his Model entirely subverted Monarchy? In this way of disputing, I have rather followed my Leader than Reason; the true Answer being that which was given in the Preface, namely, that an Army to be effectual in England, must be such where the Officers have popular Estates, or where they have such Estates as had the ancient Nobility: in the latter case, they make a King; in the former, a Commonwealth. But Mr. WREN will have his own way; and therefore, to conclude, let me but desire him to lay his hand upon his heart, and then tell me, whether the condition of the Nobility (to whose favour in my exclusion he pretends a meritorious Title) sharing eminently and according to their rank with the People in the Commonwealth by me proposed; or the condition of the Nobility under the insolence and burden of a mercenary Army, sharing equally with the People in Oppression and Slavery, or reviving the old Barons Wars for new Liberty, in the Monarchy by him proposed; be the more desirable. And to speak a word for my Adversary, we will submit it wholly to the present Nobility, whether Mr. WREN or I be so extravagant in these things, that they have, or can have any other than the like choice. Yet enters not Mr. WREN 
Ibid.  into despair of living to enjoy his share (which ought to be a good one) of the Felicitys which will belong to the Subjects of such a Government. He looks upon Persons, but Things are invincible.  
THE rest of his Book (to which The Prerogative of Popular Government is still a complete Answer) consists altogether of gross evasion or invective, or of drawing out of story against Popular Prudence such imaginary Swords as do but stand bend. To rectify or straighten these, I may hereafter present him (if any man shall think it worth the while) with a fuller Answer.   

A WORD Concerning a House of PEERS.  
NO man knowing what is necessary to the Foundation or Being of a Popular Government, can hope or expect the introduction of any such Form, where Monarchy is not impracticable. They (where Monarchy is impracticable) who come first to discover it, and be convinced of it, if Reason be not altogether deposed, are inevitable Leaders. Hence it is that our Commonwealthsmen are already renowned throout this Nation for their invincible Reasons, even by the confession of their Opponents, or such as proceed nevertheless in other ways. But where Seed is so well sown and rooted, intervening Possession and Interests are like such Wether as holding back the Spring, yet improves the Harvest: Commonwealthsmen indeed may have a cold time on't, but upon the Commonwealth it must bestow Fermentation. Had our incomparable Assertors of public Liberty appeared before a universal eviction of the necessity which enforces their Cause, it must have been thro' such a reluctancy, as would have made them glad to do things by halves, which is the only Rock to a rising Commonwealth of Scandal, or of Danger; the whole being such against which there is nothing to be alleged, and the half what may be easily confuted. These things considered, what appearance is there but that it must redound to the greater advantage of our Commonwealthsmen, that we are under the force of a present Humour which abhors the very name of a Commonwealth? Seeing by this means one of two things must of necessity happen, and come shortly to public view or discovery: either that Monarchy is practicable, or that it is not practicable; I mean, in our state of Affairs, or in this present distribution of the Balance. If Monarchy be found practicable, Commonwealthsmen are satisfied in their Consciences, and so ready in fair ways to return, and submit not only for Wrath, but for Conscience sake. But (let Divines cry Atheism, and Lawyer's Treason) if it be once discovered to common Understanding that Monarchy is impracticable, then in comes the Commonwealth, not by halves, but with all its Tackling, full sail, displaying its Streamers, and flourishing with Top and Top-gallant.  
THE ways whereby it is at hand to be discovered whether Monarchy be practicable or impracticable, are particularly two; the one quicker, the other slower: The quicker way will be by the Workmen, the slower by the Work.  
IF the Workmen, being willing, be yet overcome by the mere obstinacy of their Matter, it amounts to a plain confession, that Monarchy is impracticable. And if they give away the Liberties of the People, they are overcome by the obstinacy of the Matter; for that is not their Work: nor any other Work than such as must be useless, not so much in regard of itself (though that may be true enough) as by the want of any other Security than what the Prince had before, that is, an Army. And such an Army, which for security is as good as none at all, nay the very contrary, as has been shown already: nor to 
Art of Law-giving, p. 433.  be altered with better success than theirs, who became Princes in Grecian and Sicilian States.  
BUT if the Workmen give not away the Liberties of the People, then must they so limit their Prince, that he can in no manner invade those Liberties; and this by any other means than the full and perfect introduction of a well ordered Commonwealth, they will find to be utterly impossible: So either way they are overcome by the mere obstinacy of their Matter.  
IF thro' some secret Dictat (as when the Senate of Rome was Conviva Caesaris) or a haste to make riddance, this be not perceived by the Workmen, it will be but the more perceivable by the Work when it comes to wearing or in practice; and the Flaws or Grievances being found insupportable, the next Parliament, thro' the mere want of any other remedy, must introduce a Commonwealth.  
GOOD, and egregiously Prophetical! But what say you for all this, if we have a House of Peers, and that even for the Lord's sake, there being no other way to secure Liberty of Conscience? Why I say, if we have a House of Peers, it must be a House of old Peers, or a House of new Peers, or a House of the one and the other. Moreover I say, Let it be which way you will, such a House may at some time, or for some reason, be personally affected to Liberty of Conscience; but is a Constitution in itself naturally averse, and contrary to Liberty of Conscience, and therefore can be no security to the same, whether the Lords be Spiritual, or Temporal, or partiperpale.  
LORDS Spiritual are inspired with a third Estate, or share of a Realm, which gives no toleration to any Religion, but that only asserting this point, which is Monarchy. Setting this Oracle, and some like Reasons of State aside, we may think that every Sovereignty (as such) has Liberty of Conscience: This a King having, cannot give; and a People having, will not lose. For Liberty of Conscience is in truth a kind of State, wherein a man is his own Prince: but a House of Peers sets up another Prince; it cannot stand without a King. If the Balance be in the Lords, as before HENRY the Seventh, yet must they have a King to unite them, and by whom to administer their Government; and if the Balance be not in the Lords, they stand or fall with the King, as the House of Peers in the Long Parliament: and the King falling, their Government devolves to the People. Again, a House of Peers having the overbalance, signifys something; in which case it has not been known to be for Liberty of Conscience: and not having the overbalance, signifys nothing; in which case it cannot secure the Liberty of Conscience. Thus a House of Peers, whether something or nothing, is no way for the Liberty of Conscience, but every way for a King: and a King is a defender of the Faith. The Faith whereof a King is defender, must be that which is, or he shall call his own Faith; and this Faith it concerns his Crown and Dignity, that he defend against all other Faiths. True it is, that a King for a step to a Throne, may use what is readiest at hand: Otherwise where there is Liberty of Conscience, to assert Civil Liberty by Scripture can be no Atheism; which lames a Prince of one Arm. But where Liberty of Conscience is not at all, or not perfect, Divines, who (for the greater part) are no fair Huntsmen, but love dearly to be poaching or clubbing with the secular Arm (though if we, who desire no such Advantages, might prosecute them for abusing Scripture, as they have done this thousand years, to all the ends, intents, and purposes of Monarchy, they would think it a hard case) Divines, I say, not only brand the Assertors of Civil Liberty with Atheism, but are some of them studious in Contrivances, and acquaint in Plots to give a check or remove to this or that eminent Patriot, by the like pretences or charges; which succeeding accordingly by the power of a Parliament, they may at length come to have a Parliament in their power. Where there is no Liberty of Conscience, there can be no Civil Liberty; and where there is no Civil Liberty, there can be no security to Liberty of Conscience: but a House of Peers is not only a necessary, but a declared check upon Civil Liberty; therefore it can be no security to Liberty of Conscience. And so much for this particular.  
NOW to make upon the other parts proposed, and in a mere civil sense, some farther conjecture.  
WHEN a House of Peers sets up a House of Commons, as in the Baron's Wars, they will govern the Commons well enough for their own purpose, and not seldom the King too.  
BUT we are to speak of a thing without any example, a House of Peers set up by a House of Commons; nor, in the want of example, are we thought worthy by our Adversaries to be furnished with Reason: so the guidance of our Discourse upon this point is committed to Mother Wit, a notable Gossip, but not so good a Politician.  
NEVERTHELESS, if this House consists of old Peerage only, we have direction enough to know how that will be; for either the single Person, or the Commons will be predominant in the Government: if the Commons be so, than it will be with the Peers, as it was before their last Seclusion; that is, while they do as the Commons would have them, they may sit; otherwise they are sent home. And if the single Person be predominant, it can be no otherwise than by an Army; in which case the old Peers being not in Arms, nor having any help that way, are as much under the Yoke as the Commons. By which it may be apparent, that it is the great interest of the present Peerage, that there be a well ordered Commonwealth; otherwise the Commons being in bondage, the Lords, whom that least becomes, are but equal with them: and being free, the Lords are not the head, but at the foot of them; whereas in an equal Commonwealth, that the Nobility be not at the head, or have not the leading, is quite contrary to all Reason and Experience.  
IF the House consists of new Peers only, it must consist of the chief Officers in the Army; which immediately divides the Government into two distinct Governments: the one in the House of Commons, whose Foundation is the Body of the People; the other in the House of Peers, whose Foundation is the Army. This Army if it remains firm to the Peers, they not only command the Commons, but make and unmake Kings as they please; or as ambitious Parties and Persons among themselves are diligent or fortunate: But if the Army (as is most and more than most likely) comes off to the Commons, the Peers are nothing, and the Commons introduce a Commonwealth.  
IF the House consists of new Peers and old, the old Peers while they like it, are Ciphers to new Figures; and when they like it not, may go home again: Nor whether they stay or go, is this case so different from the former, as to be any greater obstruction to a Commonwealth.  
TO hate the very name of a Commonwealth, or not to see that England can be no other, is as if men were not in earnest. It is asked of the Commons what the Protector shall be, and he can be nothing but what they will. It is asked of the Commons what the other House shall be, and it can be nothing but what the Commons will. The Commons are asked whose the Army, whose the Militia, whose the Negative Vote is; nor can these be otherwise determined than as they please. The Commons are asked whether they will make such a War, whether they will pay such a Debt, whether they will advance such a Sum; all which are entirely at their discretion: therefore actually and positively England is a Commonwealth. Nay, and that there remain not the least doubt, whether it be safe for any man to say thus much, the present Government has either no legal denomination at all, or is legally denominated the Commonwealth: the question of the future state of it comes not one whit upon the matter, which is already granted, but upon the form only. A Commonwealth for the matter makes itself; and where they will not bestow upon it the Form necessary, fails not of coming to ruin, or, at least, to disgrace the Workmen: Or, to speak more properly and piously, a Commonwealth is not made by Men, but by God; and they who resist his holy Will, are Weapons that cannot prosper.  
Feb. 20. 1659.   

Six Political TRACTS Written on Several Occasions.  
VIZ.  
I. Valerius and Publicola. A Dialog.  
II. A System of Politics, delineated in short and easy Aphorisms, now first published from the Author's own Manuscript.  
III. Political Aphorisms.  
iv Seven Models of a Commonwealth, Ancient and Modern, etc.  
V The Ways and Means of introducing a Commonwealth by the Consent of the People.  
VI The humble Petition of divers well affected Persons: with the Parlament's Answer thereto.   

Valerius and Publicola: Or, the True FORM OF A POPULAR COMMONWEALTH Extracted Ex puris Naturalibus.  
Quos perdere vult JUPITER, hos dementat prius.   

To the READER.  
THE way of Dialog being not faithfully managed, is of all others the most fraudulent; but being faithfully managed, is the clearest and most effectual for conveying a man's sense into the understanding of his Reader. There is nothing in this World, next the favour of God, I so much desire as to be familiarly understood; which because great men have thought below them, has proved hitherto but the ruin of themselves, and the detriment of the Public: for which reason, having tried all other means, I now add this. My work, if I be not given over to utter blindness, is the same with, or nearest, that of the Nation; and the Work of the Nation being not understood, is in extreme danger of utter ruin.   
Valerius. 
DEAREST PUBLICOLA, how have I longed to meet you, and in the favourable silence of this long Walk!  Publicola. 
What has my noble Friend VALERIUS to command his faithful Servant?  Val. 
Why really, notwithstanding the tumult of these extravagant Changes, your last Discourse had so much of my attention then, and has had such a digestion with me since, that I feel it running in my Veins.  Pub. 
Do you find in that any temptation to the buckling on of High-shoons?  Val. 
My thoughts, PUBLICOLA, are quite of another strain; sometimes I fancy I see England grasping at Empire, like Rome itself.  Pub. 
Why then VALERIUS, my Discourses are not such as they say; there runs nothing of them in your Veins, that has embased your noble Blood.  Val. 
The Heraldry of them is of as high a pitch as the Policy; but I would have them be a little lower in some things.  Pub. 
What are those?  Val. 
The Vulgar complain of you, that you are too learned.  Pub. 
I thought it was not you, VALERIUS.  Val. 
For all that, I could be contented to see you raise your Structure by your own strength, and without the help of other Authors.  Pub. 
That I dare say you may, when you please.  Val. 
I must see it then, before I lose the covert of these reverend Elms.  Pub. 
You take care that the Building should be well situated; and for the Foundation, I may presume by what has already past between you and me, that we are long since agreed.  Val. 
That the threefold Balance, or Distribution of Property is the cause of the triple way of Government, I fully consent with you; as also, that the Balance now in England is in the People plainly, and exclusively both of a King and Lords.  Pub. 
You are not of them that grant this, and then ask which way a Commonwealth should be introduced in England.  Val. 
Why truly yes; seeing not only the People are so wholly unacquainted with the means, but their Leaders so averse to it.  Pub. 
Think you that a Plant grows the worse for not understanding the manner of its Vegetation?  Val. 
A Plant is not a free Agent; but among Men who are free Agents, the Introduction of Government seems to be Arbitrary.  Pub. 
What, where there is no more than Hobson's choice, this or none?  Val. 
It is true, that if they can have nothing else, they must at length have a Commonwealth; but though they can have nothing else to be holding, yet they will be trying other things.  Pub. 
There is all the mischief.  Val. 
And enough to ruin the Nation.  Pub. 
To hurt it very sore, but not to ruin it; nor yet to evade a Commonwealth, except they expose us to foreign Invasion.  Val. 
I am glad of your Confidence.  Pub. 
You may let it pass for Confidence, if you please; but if there be no other way except that only of Invasion, whereby the present Balance can receive a change sudden enough to admit of any other Form, the reason why we must have a Commonwealth is coercive.  Val. 
And putting the case it be the Will of God to defend us from foreign Invasion, how long will it be ere they see at home the coerciveness of this Reason, or, which is all one, that all Power is in and from the People?  Pub. 
Good VALERIUS, how long is it since this was both seen and declared in Parliament?  Val. 
Perhaps as they meant, it might be admitted as a Principle even in Monarchy.  Pub. 
This with your pardon you will revoke, seeing you well remember that this their Declaration of Power in the People, has been exclusive of King and Lords, and that in express terms.  Val. 
But in this they related not at all to the Distribution of Property.  Pub. 
Why then, there is not such a difference between the growing of a Plant and of a Commonwealth, as you thought; seeing a Commonwealth knowing as little, does no less.  Val. 
This of all others is to me a Consideration fullest of comfort.  Pub. 
It will in time proceed accordingly, thro' a mere necessity of nature, or by feeling; but your desire, I suppose, is to know how it should be rationally introduced, or by seeing, and that with more ease and greater speed.  Val. 
If it might please God, I would live to have my share of it, though I fear I never shall.  Pub. 
You carve for yourself ill: for by hope a man enjoys even that which he never comes to attain; and by fear he is deprived even of that which he comes not to lose.  Val. 
I must confess that our Army has it now in their power to introduce a Commonwealth.  Pub. 
And there is no other action in their power that can excuse them.  Val. 
Putting the case they would hearken to you, what course would you advise?  Pub. 
The same that I have advised over and over.  Val. 
As how?  Pub. 
As how! is that yet a Question? Let them divide the Territory into fifty equal parts.  Val. 
They will never make a new division.  Pub. 
Why then they shall never have an equal Commonwealth.  Val. 
What ill luck is this, that the first step should be so difficult?  Pub. 
You speak as if never any Territory had been divided, whereas there is none that has not; and Surveyors will tell you, it is a work to be perfectly performed in two months, and with ease.  Val. 
Putting the case this were done, what is next?  Pub. 
The next is, that the Commonwealth were complete.  Val. 
Say you so? this indeed makes amends: but how?  Pub. 
With no more addition, than that the People in every distinct division elect annually two Knights and seven Deputies.  Val. 
I dare say the People would never stick at this.  Pub. 
Not sticking at this, they of their own power have instituted the two great Assemblies, of which every Commonwealth consists.  Val. 
But in advising these things, you must advise men so that they may understand them.  Pub. 
VALERIUS, could I as easily have advised men how to understand, as what to do, there had been a Commonwealth ere this.  Val. 
Come, I will have you try something of this kind, and begin upon some known Principle, as this, All Power is in the People.  Pub. 
Content. But the diffusive Body of the People (at least in a Territory of this extent) can never exercise any Power at all.  Val. 
That is certain.  Pub. 
Hence is the necessity of some form of Government.  Val. 
That is, the People of themselves being in a natural incapacity of exercising Power, must be brought into some artificial or political capacity of exercising the same.  Pub. 
Right. Now this may be done three ways; as first, by a single Person—  Val. 
How!  Pub. 
Nay, I am not likely to trouble you much upon this point: but as you were intimating just now, there are Royalists who derive the original Right of Monarchy from the consent of the People.  Val. 
There are so.  Pub. 
And these hold the King to be nothing else, but the Representer of the People and their Power.  Val. 
As the Turc.  Pub. 
Yes, as the Turc.  Val. 
The People's Power at that rate comes to the People's Slavery.  Pub. 
You say right; and so it may at other rates too.  Val. 
As how?  Pub. 
Why as I was about to say, The Power of the People may be politically brought into exercise three ways: by a single Person; by an Assembly consisting of a few; or by an Assembly consisting of many.  Val. 
Or by a mixture.  Pub. 
Nay, I pray let that alone yet a while: for which way soever you go, it must come at length to some mixture, seeing the single Person you named but now, without his Divan or Council to debate and propose to him, would make but bad work even for himself. But as the Government comes to be pitched fundamentally upon one of these three, so it differs not only in name, but in nature.  Val. 
I apprehend you, as Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy.  Pub. 
Nay, you are out with your Learning, when you have forbidden it me. But in Countries where there is not a Nobility sufficiently balanced or enriched, there can be none of your Aristocracy; and yet there may (as long as it will last) be a Government in a few.  Val. 
What call you that?  Pub. 
Nay, what say you?  Val. 
Come, it is Oligarchy: when all is done, some words of Art we must use.  Pub. 
I thought you would come to it; and yet seeing I have promised, I will be sparing. But with your pardon, you have disordered my Discourse, or by this time I had showed, that if the Power of the People be committed to a single Person, the common Interest is submitted to that of a Family; and if it be committed to a few, it is submitted to the Interest of a few Families.  Val. 
Which, so many times as they are more than one, is so many times worse than Monarchy.  Pub. 
I am not sorry that you are of that mind. For there is no such thing as a Commonwealth, or, as you say, Democracy in nature, if it be not pitched upon a numerous Assembly of the People.  Val. 
What call you numerous?  Pub. 
Why, an Assembly such for number as can neither go upon the interest of one single Person or Family, nor the interest of a few Persons or Families.  Val. 
How will you constitute such an Assembly?  Pub. 
Commonwealths for the Constitution of their Popular Assemblies, have had two ways. The first by inrolling all their Citizens, and stating the Quorum in such sort, that all to and above the stated number repairing at the time and place appointed, are impower'd to give the Vote of the whole Commonwealth.  Val. 
The Athenian Quorum was six thousand; which towards the latter end of that Commonwealth came to five.  Pub. 
So, so, you may quote Authors: But you may remember also, that Athens was a small Commonwealth.  Val. 
How many would you advise for England?  Pub. 
Put the case I should say, ten thousand?  Val. 
They will laugh at you.  Pub. 
What can I help that? or how many would you advise?  Val. 
I would not go above five thousand.  Pub. 
Mark you then: they only that are nearest would come; and so the City of London would give Law to the whole Nation.  Val. 
Why really that same now is clear; but would there be less danger of it, in case you stated your Quorum at ten, at twenty, or though it were at a hundred or two hundred thousand?  Pub. 
No: For which cause, as to England, it is a plain case, that this is no way for the institution of a popular Assembly.  Val. 
Which way then?  Pub. 
For England there is no way but by Representative, to be made to rise equally and methodically by stated Elections of the People throout the whole Nation.  Val. 
Needs this to be so numerous as the other?  Pub. 
No.  Val. 
Why?  Pub. 
Because it is not obnoxious to a Party, to any certain Rank, or such as are soon upon the spur, or that make least account of their Pains or of their Mony.  Val. 
Will you be so curious?  Pub. 
Do you think this a Curiosity? How else will you avoid improvement in the Interest of the better sort, to the detriment of those of meaner rank; or in the Interest of the Few, to the detriment of that of the Many?  Val. 
But even this way there is danger of that foul Beast the Oligarchy.  Pub. 
Look about you. The Parliament declares all Power to be in the People; is that in the better sort only?  Val. 
Stay; the King was to observe Leges & Constitutiones quas vulgus elegerit: That Vulgus is to be understood of the Parliament; and the Parliament consisted wholly of the better sort.  Pub. 
It is true; but then that Commonwealth acted in all things accordingly.  Val. 
It was, you will say, no Democracy.  Pub. 
And will you say it was?  Val. 
No truly: yet this derived in part from the free Election of the People.  Pub. 
How free? seeing the People, then under Lords, dared not to elect otherwise than as pleased those Lords.  Val. 
Something of that is true; but I am persuaded that the People, not under Lords, will yet be most addicted to the better sort.  Pub. 
That is certain.  Val. 
How then will you prevent the like in your Institution?  Pub. 
You shall see presently. The diffusive Body of the People, in which the Power is, and is declared to be, consists in the far greater part of the lower sort: wherefore their Representative, to rise naturally, and to be exactly comprehensive of the common Interest, must consist also in the far greater part of the lower sort.  Val. 
Of what number will you have this Representative?  Pub. 
Suppose a thousand, or thereabout.  Val. 
What proportion will you have the meaner sort in it to hold to the better?  Pub. 
Suppose about six to four.  Val. 
How will you order it, that it shall be so constituted?  Pub. 
Why thus: Let the People in every Precinct or Shire at Election choose four under one hundred pounds a year in Lands, Goods, or Money, together with three at or above that proportion.  Val. 
I see not but this Representative must be exact.  Pub. 
It is yet none at all; that is, unless you presume Changes: for one thousand, without change governing the whole People, amounts neither to a Representative nor to a Commonwealth, but comes still to your hard name.  Val. 
How do you order your Changes?  Pub. 
By annual election of one third part for three years.  Val. 
So that every year one third part of your Assembly fallsout of it, and a new third part at the same time enters into the same.  Pub. 
Even so.  Val. 
This causes the Representative to be perpetually extant.  Pub. 
It does so: But to respite that a little, I should be glad, before I stir farther, to know which way the Vote of a Representative thus constituted, can go one hairs breadth beside the common and public Interest of the whole diffusive Body of the People.  Val. 
No way in the Earth that I can imagine, except thro' ignorance.  Pub. 
No Human Ordinance is infallible; and what is done thro' mere ignorance or mistake at one time, will be found and amended at another.  Val. 
A thousand men, and six to four of the lower sort perpetually extant! this must be a grievous Charge to the most of them; it will be hard to bring them, and impossible to hold them together.  Pub. 
Upon such as are elected and come not, considerable Fines must be levied; and such as come and stay together must have good Salarys.  Val. 
Salaries to so many! what will that come to?  Pub. 
Not, with the rest of the Commonwealth, to three hundred thousand pounds a year.  Val. 
Why? the Kings have rarely had above six.  Pub. 
And did England ever grudge them any part of that proportion?  Val. 
I must confess the Quarrel grew when they would not be contented with so little.  Pub. 
Now if England never did, nor needed grudge a King six hundred thousand pounds a year, to be spent among Courtiers, why should we imagine she should grudge a Commonwealth three hundred thousand pounds a year, to be spent among Magistrates?  Val. 
But Parlamentmen have taken nothing.  Pub. 
Have the People given nothing?  Val. 
That was for the maintenance of Arms.  Pub. 
And whether had you rather maintain Arms or Magistrates?  Val. 
But putting the case that this Assembly needed not to be perpetually extant, this Charge in the whole or in the far greater part might be abated.  Pub. 
I cannot tell: for how often think you fit that this Assembly should convene?  Val. 
Parliaments at most met not above once a year.  Pub. 
If they had been perpetually extant, there would have been no King.  Val. 
No truly, except in name only.  Pub. 
Therefore the Popular Assembly in a Commonwealth ought not to be perpetually extant.  Val. 
To the end, you will say, that there may be some King.  Pub. 
Mock not: or what other guard of Liberty is there in any Commonwealth, but the Popular Assembly?  Val. 
Come, let them assemble twice a year upon their ordinary Guard.  Pub. 
And what if there be an extraordinary occasion?  Val. 
Then, as often as there is any such occasion.  Pub. 
How much will this abate of their necessary Charge, or of the Salaries? And how much better were it for a Representative to lead the Life of Statesmen than of Carriers?  Val. 
Commonwealths, whose Assemblies have been of the former kind, have called them not otherwise than at stated times, or upon extraordinary occasions.  Pub. 
But then their Assemblies were not equal Representatives, but consisted of such as being next at hand were still ready upon any occasion.  Val. 
That makes indeed a considerable difference: But were this Representative always extant, I cannot see but it would have nothing to do.  Pub. 
And in case it be not always extant, you imagine that it may have something to do.  Val. 
Yes.  Pub. 
Then whether goes it better with the Commonwealth when the Representative has something to do, or when it has nothing to do?  Val. 
This is very acquaint.  Pub. 
No truly, VALERIUS, it is plain, that the Guard of Liberty perpetually extant, in doing nothing must do much; and not perpetually extant, in doing much may do nothing.  Val. 
I am afraid that having nothing to do, they will make work.  Pub. 
Such I warrant you as the Parliament and the Army made the other day.  Val. 
Nay, I am not so wide. A civil Council and a standing Army must needs have Interests much more distinct than two civil Assemblies; and where there is not a like cause, I know well enough there cannot be the like effect.  Pub. 
I shall desire no more, than that you will hold to this; and then tell me what Disputes there used to be between the Senate of Venice and the great Council, which is perpetually extant, and consists of about two thousand.  Val. 
Nay, certain it is, that between those two there never was any dispute at all.  Pub. 
Then tell me for what cause such a thing should any more happen between the Assemblys proposed; or, according to your own rule, from like causes expect like effects.  Val. 
You put me to it.  Pub. 
Nay, it is you that put me to it; for you will be presuming that this Assembly can have nothing to do, before we come to consider what are their proper Businesses and Functions.  Val. 
I beg your pardon, and what are those?  Pub. 
Why surely no small matters; for in every Commonwealth truly Popular, it is inseparable from the Assembly of the People that first they wholly and only have the right of Result in all matters of Lawgiving, of making Peace and War, and in levying Men and Money: Secondly, That the ultimat Result in Judicature lie to them: and thirdly, That they have right to call to account, and to punish their Magistrates for all matters of Maladministration of Government.  Val. 
I assure you this must amount to a great deal of business.  Pub. 
Certain it is, that in some Commonwealths the Popular Assembly by this means has been perpetually employed.  Val. 
And so I think it might be in England.  Pub. 
It might; but I do not think it would. However, if it be in the undoubted right of the Popular Assembly to proceed against their Magistrates for Maladministration, would you leave it upon the hand of those Magistrates, whether this Representative should assemble or no?  Val. 
Come, you have said enough, it were not prudent: but as to the matter of Appeals, it is certain that in Israel the ultimat Resort was to the Sanhedrim or 70 Elders.  Pub. 
I know it very well: nevertheless you shall find that the Congregation judged Benjamin; and if you mark the Appeal to the 70 Elders, you shall find that it was not an Appeal of the Party for Relief, but of the Judges in inferior Courts for further light and direction in difficult cases of the Law.  Val. 
Let me but know in what manner this Assembly is to perform these Functions, and I have done.  Pub. 
Why as to matter of Lawgiving, I told you that they wholly and only have the right and power of Result.  Val. 
But to Result, there must necessarily go precedent Debate; seeing a Man, much less an Assembly, resolves not upon any thing without some Considerations, Motives, or Reasons thereto conducing, which ought to be first orderly and maturely debated: and how will you bring a thousand men, especially being six to four of the lower sort, to debate any thing with order and maturity?  Pub. 
You say that the Popular Assembly in Athens consisted at the least of five thousand.  Val. 
And I said true.  Pub. 
Yet this Assembly debated: Why may not a thousand men debate as well as five thousand?  Val. 
As well! Nay PUBLICOLA, if they debate no better in your Commonwealth than they did in that, you may know what will become of it. And to tell you true, I do not think that a thousand men can debate any whit more orderly and maturely than five thousand.  Pub. 
And so think I too.  Val. 
How then?  Pub. 
How then? Why this is the reason of the Senate in every Commonwealth.  Val. 
So there must be a Senate, which amounts to thus much; without a Senate there can be no Commonwealth, and with a Senate there will always be Practices upon the Liberty of the People.  Pub. 
How prove you that?  Val. 
Why by the Senate of Lacedaemon in the beginning, and by the Senate of Rome throout.  Pub. 
But find you the like by the Senates of Athens and Venice?  Val. 
No.  Pub. 
Consider then that these were by Election of the People, and upon frequent Removes, and that the former were defective in one or in both these circumstances.  Val. 
You intent your Senate upon Removes then?  Pub. 
Right.  Val. 
And Elective by the People?  Pub. 
Yes.  Val. 
How? by the Popular Assembly, or by the body of the People in their Precincts?  Pub. 
By the body of the People in their Precincts, at the same time when they elect their other Deputies, and with the same circumstances, except that these be all elected out of such as have a hundred pounds a year real or personal.  Val. 
What hurt, if they were elected by the Popular Assembly?  Pub. 
They would not derive so immediately, nor rise so equally from the People, as when chosen in the Precincts; because this way every Shire comes necessarily to have a share in the Senate: besides, wise men and understanding are better known in their Tribes than they can be in an Assembly out of their Tribes, especially while they are new comers; nor will the Popular Assembly afford so good a choice as the whole People. There are other Reasons.  Val. 
Enough, enough. Of what number do you constitute this Senate?  Pub. 
Of three hundred.  Val. 
Why should not one hundred be full enough for a debating Council, especially seeing Debate is the more orderly where the Counsillors are fewer?  Pub. 
You are to bear it in mind, that this Senate is upon annual change in one third part.  Val. 
That is, every year one hundred having served three years, go out, and a new hundred comes in.  Pub. 
Right: for which cause, to have one hundred well practised indebate, your Senate must consist of three hundred.  Val. 
May not those that go out come presently in again by a new Election?  Pub. 
Not at all; for that were yet another way of continuing the Government in a few.  Val. 
Do you mean that no man shall serve in this Capacity, or in that of the Popular Assembly, but once in his life?  Pub. 
I mean that a man, having served his term in one of these, may after a like vacation or interval be elected again to serve in either of them, and not before.  Val. 
At what age do you make a man capable of these Elections?  Pub. 
Not till thirty.  Val. 
He stays a great while ere he comes to preferment, and is soon out again: at which rate a man should have much ado to attain to sufficient knowledge for the leading of the Commonwealth.  Pub. 
This was never objected against Parliaments.  Val. 
It is true: but then the Election of Parlamentmen was not obliged to any Interval, and divers have been of every Parliament that was summoned during their Lives.  Pub. 
Parliaments when they were the most frequent, assembled not above once a year, very rarely so often; and how long, pray, did they usually sit?  Val. 
Some two or three months.  Pub. 
I allow you the most you ask: at which rate a man that had sat in twenty Parliaments, could not have sat above four years complete.  Val. 
And in your Parliament, at one Election he sits three.  Pub. 
Mark you that?  Val. 
Yes, and more: Whereas a Parlamentman without interval could in twenty years have sat but four complete, in your Assemblies a man observing his intervals, may in twenty years serve ten years complete.  Pub. 
You allow that, I hope, to be some advantage towards acquiring knowledge in conduct; and yet anciently your Parlamentmen were in this point thought able enough.  Val. 
Now would I desire no more than to be as fully satisfied, that these Senators must be honest enough.  Pub. 
Which way can they be dishonest?  Val. 
Indeed I am not yet acquainted with their ways: but if nothing can be proposed to the popular Assembly, except by these only, they should, I think, propose nothing but what is for their own advantage.  Pub. 
They are the Senate; and in that they have all the advantages that a well ordered Commonwealth can give to a Senat.  Val. 
But they will be still hankering after more.  Pub. 
As what?  Val. 
Why Riches or Power.  Pub. 
All Magistrates are accountable to the Popular Assembly; and so, without acquisition of Power, I cannot imagine which way they should turn themselves to the acquisition of Riches.  Val. 
They will drive then at Power; they will be coordinat.  Pub. 
In the World there has never yet been any Senate that durst so much as pretend to Power.  Val. 
No? Had not the Senate of Israel, and that of Lacedaemon Power?  Pub. 
Executive Power they had, in as much as they were Judicatories; but Legislative or Sovereign Power (which is that whereof we speak) they had none at all.  Val. 
Other Senates have had other power, as in the managing of foreign Affairs, and the like.  Pub. 
Which still comes not to the point in hand, because in these and the like matters, as the creation of divers Magistrates, the Senate uses to be made Plenipotentiary by the Popular Assembly, that is, by Law.  Val. 
I hear them talk of making a coordinat Senate first, and without the People, and then of assembling a Parliament in the old way to govern with that Senat.  Pub. 
Things, VALERIUS, are soon said; but if any Parliament whatever, so it be elected by the People (and, perhaps, if otherwise) do not make it one of their first works to pull down a coordinat Senat, I ask no credit to my Politics.  Val. 
This is to prophecy.  Pub. 
Then, to reason the case: I say, That the Senate assuming Power, the popular Assembly falls immediately to debate; and the popular Assembly debating, the Senate is ipso facto deposed, there being no other necessary use or function of the Senate but Debate only.  Val. 
You said but now, That the Popular Assembly could not debate.  Pub. 
Not orderly and maturely: but upon such an occasion as this, they will do as they can; nor is it avoidable.  Val. 
Nay, if there be some occasion in which you allow that the popular Assembly must and aught to debate, there will hardly be any in which they will be persuaded that they may not. So this will come to the pulling down of the Senate as often as the People please.  Pub. 
Which is so much the rather to be feared, because you shall never find that popular Assembly which did ever actually depose their Senat.  Val. 
Our Army has pulled down a good many Parliaments.  Pub. 
What is that to the purpose? Is our Army a popular Assembly? Y●t let them pull down a Parliament as often as they please, they must set up another; and in this indeed there may be some resemblance: for let a popular Assembly pull down the Senate as often as they please, they must set up another.  Val. 
Or a single Person.  Pub. 
Right: for that holds both ways too, and (as to our case) will stand neither.  Val. 
The People of Athens debated, yet for all that their Senate was not deposed.  Pub. 
Not formally; but it remained little better than a Warren, wherein great Men did, as it were, start hares, to be hunted in the tumult of the popular Assembly.  Val. 
Verily, PUBLICOLA, this Model of yours is a most entire thing.  Pub. 
This with the necessary consequences, as the division of the Senate into Senatorian Councils, the adorning and actuating of this and the other Assembly with fit Magistrates, whereof I have sufficiently discoursed in other places, amounts to an entire thing.  Val. 
And you offer it freely.  Pub. 
I do.  Val. 
Would it not grieve you to see them crop a little of it, and spoil it?  Pub. 
They had better take it to some purpose.  Val. 
Nay, what they take will be to some purpose, I warrant you. Come, there is a Party, a select, a refined Party, a Nation in a Nation, that must and will govern.  Pub. 
That is it which I desire to see.  Val. 
You are of a rare temper; happy in unhappiness.  Pub. 
O I love frequent Changes.  Val. 
Is that any of your Virtues?  Pub. 
Yes, where we are certain never to go right, while there remains a way to go wrong.  Val. 
They are confident men. They cannot be persuaded but they can govern the World.  Pub. 
Till they have tried. Such as can govern the World, are such as can be governed by Reason. Now there is no Party refined, select, or what you will in England, amounting to one twentieth part of the whole People.  Val. 
One twentieth part of the People, for aught I know, may amount to a hundred thousand; there is no Party any thing near this account, I dare say.  Pub. 
A twentieth part of the People can never govern the other nineteen, but by a perpetual Army.  Val. 
They do not like that the worse.  Pub. 
The People having been governed by a King without an Army, and being governed by a Commonwealth with an Army, will detest the Government of a Commonwealth, and desire that of a King.  Val. 
Yes, such is the spirit of the Nation.  Pub. 
Such is the spirit in this case of any Nation.  Val. 
And yet they make it a particular quarrel.  Pub. 
They make every thing particular: if you speak of Israel, Athens, Rome, Venice, or the like, they hear you with volubility of countenance; and will not have it that God ever minded the matter of Government, till he brought them in play. Nay, though they have come heels over head for this very thing, I know not how often, yet they are resolved to take no warning.  Val. 
PUBLICOLA, you will be shent.  Pub. 
I am to perform my duty. To flatter is not my duty.  Val. 
But between you and me, Do you not think that the spirit of the Nation, or the main body of the People of this Land, desires the restitution of their ancient Government?  Pub. 
I make little doubt of it.  Val. 
How then in case of a Commonwealth are they to be trusted?  Pub. 
In case of a Commonwealth, it is not the People that are trusted, but the Orders of the Commonwealth.  Val. 
The Commonwealth must consist of the People.  Pub. 
The People under the Monarchy, when that invaded them, invaded it.  Val. 
True, and in such a manner as has caused the ruin of it.  Pub. 
What was the spirit of the People then?  Val. 
But it is now another thing.  Pub. 
Nay, the very same: for than it invaded a Government that invaded their Liberty, and now it would invade a Government that invades their Liberty.  Val. 
But how should this be mended?  Pub. 
Do you not see that this should not be mended, but encouraged?  Val. 
How should it be encouraged then?  Pub. 
By giving them a Form that must preserve their Liberty.  Val. 
I little doubt but there is in your Form a full security to the People of their Liberty; but do you think that there is in it any full security that the People shall not cast off this Form?  Pub. 
If it secures their Liberty, why should they?  Val. 
My question is not, why they should, but whether they can.  Pub. 
They cannot, without going against their own interest.  Val. 
But they can go against their own interest.  Pub. 
Nay, remember yourself, whether the Form shown be not such, as you have already granted can in no wise go beside the interest of the whole People.  Val. 
They that are now in power, have no trust at all in Forms.  Pub. 
Do they sail in Ships, not upon Planks? Do they ride Horses, not Hogs? Do they travel in Coaches, not upon Hurdles? Do they live in Houses, not in Ditches? Do they eat Bread, not Stones?  Val. 
Enough, enough.  Pub. 
But in so doing, they acknowledge such a Form to be security for such a use or action. And must the form of a Commonwealth be the only form in which they can allow no security for the proper use and action?  Val. 
They observe none of this.  Pub. 
Do they observe that there is any security in Men?  Val. 
That, especially in our times, were somewhat a hard matter.  Pub. 
And how many Securitys are there?  Val. 
I know no more, than one personal, or in Men; another real, or in Things.  Pub. 
Choose you whether you would have.  Val. 
Well, be the necessary action or use of your Form what it will, I would see it more plainly and particularly demonstrated how the spirit of the Nation, or the whole People, being freely eligible into your Assemblies, must presently lose that inclination which now plainly they have to set up Monarchy, or to persecute for Conscience.  Pub. 
You will allow no weight in the Argument, that a People in Liberty, unless the Orders of their Commonwealth were first fundamentally ruined, that is, broken in the balance or foundation, did never do either of these.  Val. 
What weight soever I allow to this Argument, it is no ways to my present purpose.  Pub. 
You will put me then beside experience, and to show by what reason it is that a Peartree must bear Pears, or why men gather not Grapes on Thorns, or Figs on Thistles.  Val. 
Poor PUBLICOLA, be the task as hard as it will, I am for this time resolved to hold you to it.  Pub. 
What is it then that any Government can be sufficiently founded or balanced upon, but such an Interest as is sufficiently able to bear it?  Val. 
Good Sir, a Government ought to be founded upon Justice, I take it.  Pub. 
Right: and is not that Government which is founded upon an Interest not sufficiently able to bear it, founded upon Injustice?  Val. 
I suspect whither this will go. A Government founded upon the overbalance of Property, is legitimatly founded, and so upon Justice; but a Government founded upon the underbalance of Property, must of necessity be founded upon Force, or a standing Army. Is not this that which you mean by Interest sufficient or not sufficient to sustain a Government?  Pub. 
You have it right.  Val. 
O Atheist! this damns the Government of the Saints.  Pub. 
Look you now, how irreligious a thing it may be made, to speak but with common honesty. Do you think that such as are plainly Oligarchists, or shall exercise by a force, and without election by the People, such a Power as is both naturally and declaredly in the People, and in them only, can establish their Throne upon Justice?  Val. 
No.  Pub. 
Do you think that such as are truly Saints, can establish their Throne upon Injustice?  Val. 
No.  Pub. 
Why then you have granted, that such as are plainly Oligarchists cannot be truly Saints. Again, do you still think, as you once intimated, that a Government now introduced in England, exactly according to the Principles of Prudence and Justice, would rule the Earth?  Val. 
Yes.  Pub. 
Do you think, that such as are truly Saints, if they introduce a Government, aught to introduce it exactly according to the Principles of Prudence and Justice?  Val. 
Yes,  Pub. 
Why then, let such as are truly Saints but see what it is to rule the Earth, and take the Rule of the Earth.  Val. 
They will not approve of this way.  Pub. 
How! not the Saints approve of Prudence and Justice! Who is the Atheist now, VALERIUS?  Val. 
Good PUBLICOLA, let us keep to the point in hand. You say, That the security of Liberty lies not in the People, but in the form of their Government; so I am yet to expect when you will show, what there is in your form, why it must be impossible for the People under it to restore Monarchy, or to persecute for Conscience.  Pub. 
See you not, that to do either of these under such a form, must be pointblank against their Interest?  Val. 
But so either of these is now, and yet in this posture you will confess that they would do both.  Pub. 
Mark how I am used. I speak of a Form supported by an Interest sufficiently able to bear it, and of an Interest contained under a Form sufficiently able to secure it; and you instance in a Posture which is no form at all, but such a confusion among, and force upon the People, as creates an Interest in them to rid themselves which way they can of such a misery.  Val. 
I did acknowledge and must confess, that your popular Assembly is such as cannot err, except thro' ignorance; but thro' this, you yourself have acknowleged, and must confess, that it may err.  Pub. 
I retract nothing.  Val. 
Now first, or never, they will restore Monarchy thro' ignorance.  Pub. 
But they cannot do this first, therefore they can never do it.  Val. 
Why cannot the popular Assembly do this first?  Pub. 
Because it must first be proposed by a Senate, that can neither do any such thing thro' ignorance nor thro' knowledge.  Val. 
Nay, then have at you; I will set this same Senate and Representative of yours to work in such a manner, that you shall confess they may set up Monarchy.  Pub. 
Do your worst.  Val. 
Your Senate being assembled (I will not have them make long Speeches;  Pub. 
Nor I)  Val. 
Rises me up one of the Senators, and says, Mr. Speaker, this Nation has been long in labour, but now thro' the mercy of God, the Child is not only come to the Birth, but there is also strength to bring forth: In the number of Counsillors there is strength; the number of this House is good (far better than has usually been of late) and their Election has been very free and fair. Here is also, I know not how (but the Inventions of men are overruled by the Providence of God) an extraordinary and exceeding great confluence of honest men, who are not so well here; and if you determine any thing that is good for your Country, will go home and pray for you. Now, Sir (to be brief) since our Government consisted of King, Lords, and Commons, the ancient, the only, the most happy Government that this Nation, nay, that the World ever knew, it is but too well known, that we have had no Government at all: wherefore my opinion is, that we propose, as they call it, to these honest men (who you need not doubt will receive it with glad hearts) the restitution of Right, and of the Government in this Nation by King, Lords, and Commons'.  
As sure as you live, PUBLICOLA, thus much being said, your whole Senate will immediately agree to propose it to the Representative: and thus much being proposed to the Representative, those People will throw up their Caps for joy, and immediately return to their Houses.  Pub. 
But VALERIUS, thus much has been said in Parliament when the House was fuller; when they who were for this Restitution were backed by a single Person in actual possession of the Throne; when over and above the zeal of the Presbyterians, there were Parties that knew no other means of selfpreservation; as without, Divines belaboring the Oak of every Pulpit; and within, Laywers, Officers, and Pensioners: yet was it so far from being carried, that the single Person has been forced to dissolve Parliaments, and that thro' apparent danger of being overrun by the Principles of a Commonwealth not in being. But if this were so when a Commonwealth could scarce be hoped, what will it be when the Commonwealth shall be in such a condition as cannot be withstood? for the Senate can never come to propose any thing to the People without first agreeing upon debating what it is they will propose; nor is it possible that such Debate should be brought to any end, but by reasons thereto conducing: now it must not only be impossible to find reasons for the restitution of Monarchy, but the reasons why Monarchy ought not to be restored must be obvious; not only in regard that it is quite contrary to the interest of the Nation, and of these Assemblies, but to the interest ten to one of every particular man in either of these Assemblies: nor are or have the reasons been less obvious, or less ventilated in Parliament, why Monarchy as to this Nation is impossible in itself.  Val. 
Will you say the like for Liberty of Conscience?  Pub. 
Yes; because without Liberty of Conscience, Civil Liberty cannot be perfect; and without Civil Liberty, Liberty of Conscience cannot be perfect.  Val. 
These things are true, but they never will see them, never, PUBLICOLA: you yourself say, That the People cannot see, but they can feel.  Pub. 
I meant that of the diffusive Body of the People, not of the People under good Orders; in which case they are the sharpest sighted of any kind of Government whatsoever: and therefore it is not modest that you, or I, or any particular Man or Party, blinded with selfconceit, should pretend to see with such a Constitution; or show me that Ey under the Sun, that sees like that of Venice. But putting the case it were otherwise as to seeing, these things are plainly palpable or obvious to feeling.  Val. 
I have indeed observed, that in Commonwealths there are very few that see or understand them, and yet their affection to that way of Government is exceeding vigorous.  Pub. 
Whence can this otherwise be than from feeling? But one thing, VALERIUS, I take at your hands extreme heavily.  Val. 
What is that, PUBLICOLA?  Pub. 
That you with one little Speech of a single Senator, should run so regardlessly over these two Assemblies, without taking any notice at all of the necessary Course of them.  Val. 
What Course, PUBLICOLA?  Pub. 
Why you might easily have thought that among three hundred Senators there might have been at least one hundred as good Speakers as yours.  Val. 
Have I said any thing to the contrary?  Pub. 
And do you or I what we can, ten to one of them will be longer wound than you have allowed.  Val. 
For that matter let them please themselves.  Pub. 
Ay, but than you should not have made an end of your Debate in a minute.  Val. 
What is all this?  Pub. 
Why I say, They would have been debating on that point at least a fortnight.  Val. 
Well, and when that had been done, would never have agreed.  Pub. 
No.  Val. 
Did not you say that before?  Pub. 
Well, but I am now upon another point; that was to the matter in debate, this is to the manner of proceeding: imagine the matter had been such upon which they could have agreed.  Val. 
What then?  Pub. 
Then such an agreement had been a Decree of the Senat.  Val. 
Is a Decree of the Senate binding?  Pub. 
If it be upon a Law made, it is binding; if upon a Law to be made, it is to be proposed to the People. Now every Proposition to the People is to be promulgated, that is, printed and published to the whole Nation six weeks before the time that the Representative is to assemble and give the Vote of the Commonwealth, or that test without which no such Proposition can be any Law.  Val. 
By this means it must follow, that the whole People both by Discourse and Letters, debate six weeks together upon the matter.  Pub. 
You are right.  Val. 
How is it then that you say, The Representative of the People must not debate? You allow to these less privilege than to the whole People.  Pub. 
No less, nor in this point any more.  Val. 
Yet does this amount to Debate in those that are of the Representative.  Pub. 
You say well, but not to any Debate at all in the Representative.  Val. 
Why this Representative is nothing else but an Instrument or Method, whereby to receive the Result of the whole Nation with order and expedition, and without any manner of tumult or confusion.  Pub. 
And is that any thing the worse?  Val. 
No; but I am glad you have told it me: for that those of the Representative would one way or other have Debate, I knew certainly.  Pub. 
In sum, are you satisfied, that the Spirit of the Nation, or the People, however they may now under no Form at all, and in detestation of such as having governed them by force, will let them see no way out of confusion, desire their old Government, as having never yet known any other; yet under such a Form as is proposed, can never go about to introduce▪ Monarchy, without obvious discovery, that as to their Interest it is quite contrary, and as to itself impossible?  Val. 
The satisfaction is pretty good.  Pub. 
Pretty good! give me but half so good, that the Spirit of the Army, not formerly obedient to Parliaments, and now dreading or despising them, must apprehend the restitution of Monarchy to be quite contrary to their interest.  Val. 
You surprise me: for if the Army will have no Parliament, and a King restored can now in England without an Army have no Government, they may imagine this their only way to Greatness and Continuance.  Pub. 
Had not the Oligarchy then, if they meant well, better to have used sober expressions, and minded what those true and real Interests are which in the foundation and preservation of every kind of Government are paramount, than to have overcast them with the mist of new affected Phrases, and fallen on conjuring up Spirits?  Val. 
You have conjured up a Spirit that will keep me waking.  Pub. 
Set him on pulling down the Law and the Ministry; when that is done, let him blow up Windsor Castle, Hampton Court, and throw Whitehall into the Thames.  Val. 
It is the only way, for then there can be no King.  Pub. 
You may be sure of that, seeing the Count of Holland's Domain, and his Houses are yet not only standing, but diligently preserved by the Hollanders.  Val. 
PUBLICOLA, have you any more to tell me?  Pub. 
VALERIUS, have you any more to ask me?  Val. 
Not, except why you have not given the Parliament to understand thus much.  Pub. 
I have printed it over and over.  Val. 
They take no great notice of Books; you should have laid it, as they say, in their dish by some direct Address, as a Petition, or so.  Pub. 
I did petition the Committee for Government.  Val. 
What answer did they make you?  Pub. 
None at all.  Val. 
I would have gone further, and have presented it to the House.  Pub. 
Towards this also I went as far as I could.  Val. 
How far was that?  Pub. 
Why, I think my Petition may have been worn out in the pockets of some two or three Members.  Val. 
Have you a Copy of it about you?  Pub. 
Let me see— here are many Papers; this same is it.  

To the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England, etc.  
The Humble Petition, etc.  
Shows,  
THAT what neither is, nor ever was in Nature, can never be in Nature.  
THAT without a King and Lords, no Government either is, or ever was in Nature (but in mere force) other than by a Senate endued with Authority to debate and propose; and by a numerous Assembly of the People wholly and only invested with the right of Result in all matters of Law-giving, of making Peace and War, and of levying Men and Mony.  
WHEREFORE your Petitioner (to disburden his Conscience in a matter of such concern to his Country) most humbly and earnestly prays and beseeches this Parliament to take into speedy and serious consideration the irrefragable truth of the Premises, and what thereupon must assuredly follow, that is, either the institution of a Commonwealth in the whole People of England (without exception, or with exception for a time, of so few as may be) by way of a Senate, and a numerous Assembly of the People, to the ends, and for the respective Functions aforesaid; or the inevitable ruin of this Nation, which God of his mercy avert.  
And your Petitioner shall pray, etc.   Val. 
I would it had been delivered.  Pub. 
Look you, if this had been presented to the House, I intended tohave added this other Paper, and to have printed them together.  

The Petitioner to the Reader.  
Reader,  
I SAY not that the Form contained in the Petition (if we had it, and no more) would be perfect; but that without thus much (which rightly introduced, introduces the rest) there neither is, was, nor can be any such thing as a Commonwealth, or Government without a King and Lords, in Nature.  
WHERE there is a coordinat Senat, there must be a King, or it falls instantly by the People; as the King failing, the House of Peers fell by the Commons.  
WHERE there is a Senate not elective by the People, there is a perpetual Feud between the Senate and the People, as in Rome.  
TO introduce either of these Causes, is certainly and inevitably to introduce one of these Effects; and if so, then who are Cavaliers, I leave you to judge hereafter.  
BUT to add farther reason to experience. All Civil Power among us (not only by declaration of Parliament, but by the nature of Property) is in and from the People.  
WHERE the Power is in the People, there the Senate can legitimatly be no more to the Popular Assembly, than my Council at Law is to me, that is (auxilium, non imperium) a necessary Aid, not a Competitor or Rival in Power.  
WHERE the Aids of the People become their Rivals or Competitors in Power, there their Shepherds become Wolves, their Peace Discord, and their Government Ruin. But to impose a select or coordinat Senate upon the People, is to give them Rivals and Competitors in Power.  
SOME perhaps (such is the temper of the times) will say, That so much human Confidence as is expressed, especially in the Petition, is Atheistical. But how were it Atheistical, if I should as confidently foretell, that a Boy must expire in Nonage, or become a Man? I prophecy no otherwise; and this kind of Prophecy is also of God, by those Rules of his Providence, which in the known Government of the World are infallible. In the right observation and application of these consists all human Wisdom; and we read that a poor man delivered a City by his Wisdom, 
Eccles. 9 14.  yet was this poor man forgotten. But if the Premises of this Petition fail, or one part of the Conclusion comes not to pass accordingly, let me hit the other mark of this ambitious Address, and remain a Fool upon Record in Parliament to all Posterity.   Val. 
Thou Boy! and yet I hope well of thy Reputation.  Pub. 
Would it were but as good now, as it will be when I can make no use of it.  Val. 
The Major of the Petition is in some other of your Writings; and I remember some Objections which have been made against it: As, that à non esse nec fuisse, non datur argumentum ad non posse.  Pub. 
Say that in English.  Val. 
What if I cannot? are not you bound to answer a thing, though it cannot be said in English?  Pub. 
No truly.  Val. 
Well, I will say it in English then. Tho there neither be any House of Gold, nor ever were any House of Gold, yet there may be a House of Gold.  Pub. 
Right: but then, à non esse nec fuisse in natura, datur argumentum ad non posse in natura.  Val. 
I hope you can say this in English too.  Pub. 
That I can, now you have taught me. If there were no such thing as Gold in nature, there never could be any House of Gold.  Val. 
Softly. The frame of a Government is as much in Art, and as little in Nature, as the frame of a House.  Pub. 
Both softly and surely. The Materials of a Government are as much in Nature, and as little in Art, as the Materials of a House. Now as far as Art is necessarily disposed by the nature of its Foundation or Materials, so far it is in Art as in Nature.  Val. 
What call you the Foundation, or the Materials of Government?  Pub. 
That which I have long since proved, and you granted, The Balance, the distribution of Property, and the Power thence naturally deriving; which as it is in one, in a few or in all, does necessarily dispose of the form or frame of the Government accordingly.  Val. 
Be the Foundation or Materials of a House what they will, the Frame or Superstructures may be diversely wrought up or shapen; and so may those of a Commonwealth.  Pub. 
True: but let a House be never so diversely wrought up or shapen, it must consist of a Roof and Walls.  Val. 
That's certain.  Pub. 
And so must a Commonwealth of a Senate and of a Popular Assembly, which is the sum of the Minor in the Petition.  Val. 
The Mathematicians say, They will not be quarrelsome; but in their Sphere there are things altogether new in the World, as the present posture of the Heavens is, and as was the Star in Cassiopoeia.  Pub. 
VALERIUS, if the Major of the Petition extends as far as is warranted by SOLOMON, I mean, that there is nothing new under the Sun, what new things there may be, or have been above the Sun, will make little to the present purpose.  Val. 
It is true; but if you have no more to say, they will take this but for shifting.  Pub. 
Where there is Sea, as between Sicily and Naples, there was anciently Land; and where there is Land, as in Holland, there was anciently Sea.  Val. 
What then?  Pub. 
Why then the present posture of the Earth is other than it has been, yet is the Earth no new thing, but consists of Land and Sea, as it did always; so whatever the present posture of the Heavens be, they consist of Star and Firmament, as they did always.  Val. 
What will you say then to the Star in Cassiopoeia?  Pub. 
Why I say, if it consisted of the same matter with other Stars, it was no new thing in nature, but a new thing in Cassiopoeia; as were there a Commonwealth in England, it would be no new thing in Nature, but a new thing in England.  Val. 
The Star you will say in Cassiopoeia, to have been a new thing in nature, must have been no Star, because a Star is not a new thing in nature.  Pub. 
Very good.  Val. 
You run upon the matter, but the newness in the Star was in th● manner of the generation.  Pub. 
At Putzuoli near Naples, I have seen a Mountain that risen up from under water in one night, and poured a good part of the Lake anciently called Lucrin into the Sea.  Val. 
What will you infer from hence?  Pub. 
Why that the new and extraordinary generation of a Star, or of a Mountain, no more causes a Star, or a Mountain to be a new thing in nature, than the new and extraordinary generation of a Commonwealth causes a Commonwealth to be a new thing in nature. ARISTOTLE reports, that the Nobility of Tarantum being cut off in a Battle, that Commonwealth became popular. And if the Powder Plot in England had destroyed the King and the Nobility, it is possible that Popular Government might have risen up in England, as the Mountain did at Putzuoli. Yet for all these, would there not have been any new thing in nature.  Val. 
Some new thing (thro' the blending of unseen causes) there may seem to be in shuffling; but Nature will have her course, there is no other than the old game.  Pub. 
VALERIUS, let it rain or be fair weather, the Sun to the dissolution of Nature shall ever rise; but it is now set, and I apprehend the mist.  Val. 
Dear PUBLICOLA, your Health is my own; I bid you goodnight.  Pub. 
Good-night to you, VALERIUS.  Val. 
One word more, PUBLICOLA: Pray make me a present of those same Papers, and with your leave and licence, I will make use of my Memory to commit the rest of this Discourse to writing, and print it.  Pub. 
They are at your disposing.  Val. 
I will not do it as has been done, but with your name to it.  Pub. 
Whether way you like best, most noble VALERIUS.  
Octob. 22. 1659.   

Chap. 1 A System of Politics Delineated in short and easy APHORISMS.  
Published from the Author's own Manuscript.  

CHAP. I.  
Of GOVERNMENT.  
1. A PEOPLE is either under a state of Civil Government, or in a state of Civil War; or neither under a state of Civil Government, nor in a state of Civil War.  
2. CIVIL Government is an Art whereby a People rule themselves, or are ruled by others.  
3. THE Art of Civil Government in general is twofold, National, or Provincial.  
4. NATIONAL Government is that by which a Nation is governed independently, or within itself.  
5. PROVINCIAL Government is that by which a Province is governed dependently, or by some foreign Prince or State.  
6. A PEOPLE is neither governed by themselves, nor by others, but by reason of some external Principle thereto forcing them.  
7. FORCE is of two kinds, Natural and Unnatural.  
8. NATURAL Force consists in the vigour of Principles, and their natural necessary Operations.  
9 UNNATURAL Force is an external or adventitious opposition to the vigour of Principles, and their necessary working, which, from a violation of Nature, is called Violence.  
10. NATIONAL Government is an effect of natural Force, or Vigour.  
11. PROVINCIAL Government is an effect of unnatural Force, or Violence.  
12. THE natural Force which works or produces National Government (of which only I shall speak hereafter) consists in Riches.  
13. THE Man that cannot live upon his own, must be a Servant; but he that can live upon his own, may be a Freeman.  
14. WHERE a People cannot live upon their own, the Government is either Monarchy, or Aristocracy: where a People can live upon their own, the Government may be Democracy. Chap. TWO  
15. A MAN that could live upon his own, may yet, to spare his own, and live upon another, be a Servant: but a People that can live upon their own, cannot spare their own, and live upon another; but (except they be no Servants, that is, except they come to a Democracy) they must waste their own by maintaining their Masters, or by having others to live upon them.  
16. WHERE a People that can live upon their own, imagine that they can be governed by others, and not lived upon by such Governors, it is not the Genius of the People, it is the Mistake of the People.  
17. WHERE a People that can live upon their own, will not be governed by others lest they be lived upon by others, it is not the Mistake of the People, it is the Genius of the People.  
18. OF Government there are three Principles; Matter, Privation, and Form.   

CHAP. II.  
Of the Matter of Government.  
1. THAT which is the Matter of Government, is what we call an Estate, be it in Lands, Goods, or Mony.  
2. IF the Estate be more in Money than in Land, the port or garb of the Owner goes more upon his Monies than his Lands; which with private Men is ordinary, but with Nations (except such only as live more upon their Trade than upon their Territory) is not to be found: for which cause overbalance of Riches in Money or Goods, as to the sequel of these Aphorisms, is altogether omitted.  
3. IF the Estate be more in Land than in Goods or Money, the garb and port of the Owner (whether a Man or a Nation) goes more if not altogether upon his Land.  
4. IF a Man has some Estate, he may have some Servants or a Family, and consequently some Government, or something to govern: if he has no Estate, he can have no Government.  
5. WHERE the eldest of many Brothers has all, or so much that the rest for their livelihood stand in need of him, that Brother is as it were Prince in that Family.  
6. WHERE of many Brothers the eldest has but an equal share, or not so inequal as to make the rest to stand in need of him for their livelihood, that Family is as it were a Commonwealth.  
7. DISTRIBUTION of shares in Land, as to the three grand Interests, the King, the Nobility, and the People, must be equal or inequal.  
8. EQUAL distribution of Land, as if one man or a few men have one half of the Territory, and the People have the other half, causes privation of Government, and a state of Civil War: for the Lord or Lords on the one side being able to assert their pretention or right to rule, and the People on the other their pretention or right to Liberty, that Nation can never come under any form of Government till that Question be decided; and, Property being not by any Law to be violated or moved, any such Question cannot be decided but by the Sword only.  
Chap. III 9 INEQUAL distribution of shares in Land, as to the three grand Interests, or the whole Land in any one of these, is that which causes one of these three to be the predominant Interest.  
10. ALL Government is Interest, and the predominant Interest gives the Matter or Foundation of the Government.  
11. IF one man has the whole, or two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, the Interest of one man is the predominant Interest, and causes absolute Monarchy.  
12. IF a few men have the whole, or two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, the Interest of the few or of the Nobility is the predominant Interest; and, were there any such thing in nature, would cause a pure Aristocracy.  
13. IT being so that pure Aristocracy, or the Nobility having the whole, or two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, without a Moderator or Prince to balance them, is a state of War, in which every one, as he grows eminent or potent, aspires to Monarchy; and that not any Nobility can have Peace, or can reign without having such a Moderator or Prince, as on the one side they may balance or hold in from being absolute, and on the ot●●r side may balance or hold them and their Factions from flying out into Arms: it follows, that if a few men have the whole, or two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, the Interest of the Nobility being the predominant Interest, must of necessity produce regulated Monarchy.  
14. IF the Many, or the People, have the whole, or two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, the Interest of the Many or of the People is the predominant Interest, and causes Democracy.  
15. A PEOPLE neither under absolute or under regulated Monarchy, nor yet under Democracy, are under a privation of Government.   

CHAP. III.  
Of the Privation of Government.  
1. WHERE a People are not in a state of Civil Government, but in a state of Civil War; or where a People are neither under a state of Civil Government, nor under a state of Civil War, there the People are under Privation of Government.  
2. WHERE one Man, not having the whole, or two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, yet assumes to himself the whole Power; there the People are under Privation of Government, and this Privation is called Tyranny.  
3. WHERE a few Men, not having the whole, or about two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, yet assume to themselves the whole Power; there the People are under Privation of Government, and this Privation is called Oligarchy.  
4. WHERE the Many, or the People, not having the whole, or two parts in three of the whole Land or Territory, yet assume to themselves the whole Power; there the People are under Privation of Government, and this Privation is called Anarchy.  
5. WHERE the Tyranny, the Oligarchy, or the Anarchy, not having in the Land or Territory such a full share as may amount to the truth of Government, have nevertheless such a share in it as may Chap. IV maintain an Army; there the People are under privation of Government, and this Privation is a state of Civil War.  
6. WHERE the Tyranny, the Oligarchy, or the Anarchy, have not any such share in the Land or Territory as may maintain an Army, there the People are in privation of Government; which Privation is neither a state of Civil Government, nor a state of Civil War.  
7. WHERE the People are neither in a state of Civil Government, nor in a state of Civil War, there the Tyranny, the Oligarchy, or the Anarchy, cannot stand by any force of Nature, because it is void of any natural Foundation; nor by any force of Arms, because it is not able to maintain an Army; and so must fall away of itself thro' the want of a Foundation, or be blown up by some tumult: and in this kind of Privation the Matter or Foundation of a good orderly Government is ready and in being, and there wants nothing to the perfection of the same, but proper Superstructures or Form.   

CHAP. IU.  
Of the Form of Government.  
1. THAT which gives the being, the action, and the denomination to a Creature or Thing, is the Form of that Creature or Thing.  
2. THERE is in Form something that is not Elementary but Divine.  
3. THE contemplation of Form is astonishing to Man, and has a kind of trouble or impulse accompanying it, that exalts his Soul to God.  
4. AS the Form of a Man is the Image of God, so the Form of a Government is the Image of Man.  
5. MAN is both a sensual and a philosophical Creature.  
6. SENSUALITY in a Man is when he is led only as are the Beasts, that is, no otherwise than by Appetit.  
7. PHILOSOPHY is the knowledge of Divine and Human Things.  
8. TO preserve and defend himself against Violence, is natural to Man as he is a sensual Creature.  
9 TO have an impulse, or to be raised upon contemplation of natural things to the Adoration or Worship of God, is natural to Man as he is a Philosophical Creature.  
10. FORMATION of Government is the creation of a Political Creature after the Image of a Philosophical Creature; or it is an infusion of the Soul or Facultys of a Man into the body of a Multitude.  
11. THE more the Soul or Facultys of a Man (in the manner of their being infused into the body of a Multitude) are refined or made incapable of Passion, the more perfect is the Form of Government.  
12. NOT the refined Spirit of a Man, or of some Men, is a good Form of Government; but a good Form of Government is the refined Spirit of a Nation.  
Chap. IV 13. THE Spirit of a Nation (whether refined or not refined) can neither be wholly Saint nor Atheist: Not Saint, because the far greater part of the People is never able in matters of Religion to be their own Leaders; nor Atheists, because Religion is every whit as indelible a Character in man's Nature as Reason.  
14. LANGUAGE is not a more natural intercourse between the Soul of one man and another, than Religion is between God and the Soul of a man.  
15. AS not this Language, nor that Language, but some Language; so not this Religion, nor that Religion, yet some Religion is natural to every Nation.  
16. THE Soul of Government, as the true and perfect Image of the Soul of Man, is every whit as necessarily religious as rational.  
17. THE Body of a Government, as consisting of the sensual part of Man, is every whit as preservative and defensive of itself as sensual Creatures are of themselves.  
18. THE Body of a Man, not actuated or led by the Soul, is a dead thing out of pain and misery; but the Body of a People, not actuated or led by the Soul of Government, is a living thing in pain and misery.  
19 THE Body of a People, not led by the reason of the Government, is not a People, but a Herd; not led by the Religion of the Government, is at an inquiet and an uncomfortable loss in itself; not disciplined by the conduct of the Government, is not an Army for defence of itself, but a Rout; not directed by the Laws of the Government, has not any rule of right; and without recourse to the Justice or Judicatories of the Government, has no remedy of wrongs.  
20. IN contemplation of, and in conformity to the Soul of man, as also for supply of those his Necessitys which are not otherwise supplied, or to be supplied by Nature, Form of Government consists necessarily of these five parts: The Civil, which is the Reason of the People; the Religious, which is the Comfort of the People; the Military, which is the Captain of the People; the Laws, which are the Rights of the People; and the Judicatories, which are the Avengers of their Wrongs.  
21. THE parts of Form in Government are as the Offices in a House; and the Orders of a Form of Government are as the Orders of a House or Family.  
22. GOOD Orders make evil men good, and bad Orders make good men evil.  
23. OLIGARCHISTS (to the end they may keep all others out of the Government) pretending themselves to be Saints, do also pretend that they in whom Lust reigns, are not fit for Reign or for Government. But Libido dominandi, the Lust of Government, is the greatest Lust, which also reigns most in those that have least right, as in Oligarchists: for many a King and many a People have and had unquestionable Right, but an Oligarchist never; whence from their own argument, the Lust of Government reigning most in Oligarchists, it undeniably follows that Oligarchists of all men are least fit for Government.  
24. AS in Houses not differing in the kinds of their Offices, the Orders of the Families differ much; so the difference of Form in different Governments consists not in the kinds or number of the Parts, which in every one is alike, but in the different ways of ordering Chap. V hose parts. And as the different Orders of a House arise for the most part from the quantity and quality of the Estate by which it is defrayed or maintained, according as it is in one or more of the Family as Proprietors, so is it also in a Government.  
25. THE Orders of the Form, which are the manners of the mind of the Government, follow the temperament of the Body, or the distribution of the Lands or Territories, and the Interests thence arising.  
26. THE Interest of Arbitrary Monarchy is the absoluteness of the Monarch; the Interest of Regulated Monarchy is the greatness of the Nobility; the Interest of Democracy is the felicity of the People: for in Democracy the Government is for the use of the People, and in Monarchy the People are for the use of the Government, that is, of one Lord or more.  
27. THE use of a Horse without his Provender, or of the People without some regard had to the necessities of Human Nature, can be none at all: nor are those necessities of Nature in any Form whatsoever to be otherwise provided for than by those five parts already mentioned; for which cause every Government consists of five parts▪ the Civil, the Religious, the Military, the Laws, and the Judicatories.   

CHAP. V.  
Of Form in the Civil part.  
1. THOSE Naturalists that have best written of Generation, do observe that all things proceed from an Eglantine, and that there is in every Eglantine a Punctum saliens, or a part first moved, as the purple Speck observed in those of Hens; from the working whereof the other Organs or fit Members are delineated, distinguished, and wrought into one Organical Body.  
2. A NATION without Government, or fallen into privation of Form, is like an Eglantine unhatched; and the Punctum saliens, or first mover from the corruption of the Former to the generation of the succeeding Form, is either a sole Legislator or a Council.  
3. A SOLE Legislator, proceeding according to Art or Knowledge, produces Government in the whole piece at once and in perfection. But a Council (proceeding not according to Art, or what in a new case is necessary or fit for them, but according to that which they call the Genius of the People still hankering after the things they have been used to, or their old Customs, how plain soever it be made in reason that they can no longer fit them) make patching work, and are Ages about that which is very seldom or never brought by them to any perfection; but commonly comes by the way to ruin, leaving the noblest Attemts under reproach, and the Authors of them exposed to the greatest miseries while they live, if not their Memories when they are dead and gone to the greatest infamy.  
4. IF the Punctum saliens, or first mover in generation of the Form be a sole Legislator, his proceeding is not only according to Nature, but according to Art also, and gins with the Delineation of distinct Orders or Members.  
Chap. V 5. DELINEATION of distinct Organs or Members (as to the Form of Government) is a division of the Territory into fit Precincts once stated for all, and a formation of them to their proper Offices and Functions, according to the nature or truth of the Form to be introduced.  
6. PRECINCTS in absolute Monarchy are commonly called Provinces; and as to the delineation or stating of them, they may be equal or inequal. Precincts in regulated Monarchy, where the Lords or Nobility as to their Titles or Estates ought not to be equal, but to differ as one Star differs from another in Glory, are commonly called Countys, and aught to be inequal. Precincts in Democracy, where without equality in the Electors there will hardly be any equality in the Elected; or where without equality in the Precincts, it is almost, if not altogether impossible there should be equality in the Commonwealth, are properly called Tribes, and aught by all means to be equal.  
7. EQUALITY or Parity has been represented an odious thing, and made to imply the levelling of men's Estates; but if a Nobility, how inequal soever in their Estates or Titles, yet to come to the truth of Aristocracy, must as to their Votes or participation in the Government be pares regni, that is to say Peers, or in parity among themselves: as well likewise the People, to attain to the truth of Democracy, may be Peers, or in parity among themselves, and yet not as to their Estates be obliged to levelling.  
8. INDUSTRY of all things is the most accumulative, and Accumulation of all things hates levelling: The Revenue therefore of the People being the Revenue of Industry, though some Nobility (as that of Israel, or that of Lacedaemon) may be found to have been Levellers, yet not any People in the World.  
9 PRECINCTS being stated, are in the next place to be formed to their proper Offices and Functions, according to the truth of the Form to be introduced; which in general is to form them as it were into distinct Governments, and to endow them with distinct Governors.  
10. GOVERNMENTS or Governors are either Supreme or Subordinat. For absolute Monarchy to admit in its Precincts any Government or Governors that are not subordinat but supreme, were a plain contradiction. But that regulated Monarchy, and that Democracy may do it, is seen in the Princes of Germany, and in the Cantons of Switzerland: Nevertheless these being Governments that have derived this not from the Wisdom of any Legislator, but from accident, and an ill disposition of the matter, whereby they are not only incapable of Greatness, but even of any perfect state of Health, they come not under the consideration of Art, from which they derive not; but of Chance, to which we leave them. And, to speak according to Art, we pronounce that, as well in Democracy and in regulated as in absolute Monarchy, Governors and Governments in the several divisions ought not to be Soveraintys, but subordinat to one common Sovereign.  
11. SUBORDINAT Governors are at will, or for life, or upon Rotation or Changes.  
12. IN absolute Monarchy the Governors of Provinces must either be at will, or upon Rotation, or else the Monarch cannot be absolute. In regulated Monarchy the Governors of the Counties may be for life or hereditary, as in Counts or Lords; or for some certain term and upon rotation, as in Viscounts or Sheriffs. In Democracy Chap. V the People are Servants to their Governors for life, and so cannot be free; or the Governors of the Tribes must be upon rotation and for some certain term, excluding the Party that have born the Magistracy for that term from being elected into the like again, till an equal Interval or Vacation be expired.  
13. THE term in which a man may administer Government to the good of it, and not attemt upon it to the harm of it, is the fittest term of bearing Magistracy; and three years in a Magistracy described by the Law under which a man has lived, and which he has known by the carriage or practice of it in others, is a term in which he cannot attemt upon his Government for the hurt of it, but may administer it for the good of it, though such a Magistracy or Government should consist of divers Functions.  
14. GOVERNORS in subordinat Precincts have commonly three Functions; the one Civil, the other Judicial, and the third Military.  
15. IN absolute Monarchy the Government of a Province consists of one Beglerbeg, or Governor for three years, with his Council or Divan for Civil matters, and his Guard of Janizarys and Spahys, that is, of Horse and Foot, with power to levy and command the Timariot or Military Farmers.  
16. IN regulated Monarchy the Government of a County consists of one Count or Lord for Life, or of one Viscount or Sheriff for some limited term, with power in certain Civil and Judicial matters, and to levy and command the Posse Comitatus.  
17. IN Democracy the Government of a Tribe consists of one Council or Court, in one third part elected annually by the People of that Tribe for the Civil, for the Judicial, and for the Military Government of the same; as also to preside at the Election of Deputies in that Tribe towards the annual supply in one third part of the common and sovereign Assemblies of the whole Commonwealth, that is to say, of the Senate and of the Popular Assembly; in which two these Tribes, thus delineated and distinguished into proper Organs or fit Members to be actuated by those sovereign Assemblies, are wrought up again by connexion into one entire and organical Body.  
18. A PARLIAMENT of Physicians would never have found out the Circulation of the Blood, nor could a Parliament of Poets have written VIRGIL'S Aeneis; of this kind therefore in the formation of Government is the proceeding of a sole Legislator. But if the People without a Legislator set upon such work by a certain Instinct that is in them, they never go further than to choose a Council; not considering that the formation of Government is as well a work of Invention as of Judgement; and that a Council, though in matters laid before them they may excel in Judgement, yet Invention is as contrary to the nature of a Council as it is to Musicians in consort, who can play and judge of any Air that is laid before them, though to invent a part of Music they can never well agree.  
19 IN Councils there are three ways of Result, and every way of Result makes a different Form. A Council with the Result in the Prince makes absolute Monarchy. A Council with the Result in the Nobility, or where without the Nobility there can be no Result, makes Aristocracy, or regulated Monarchy. A Council with the Result Chap. V in the People makes Democracy. There is a fourth kind of Result or Council which amounts not to any Form, but to Privation of Government; that is, a Council not consisting of a Nobility, and yet with the Result in itself, which is rank Oligarchy: so the People, seldom or never going any further than to elect a Council without any Result but itself, instead of Democracy introduce Oligarchy.  
20. THE ultimat Result in every Form is the Sovereign Power. If the ultimat Result be wholly and only in the Monarch, that Monarchy is absolute. If the ultimat Result be not wholly and only in the Monarch, that Monarchy is regulated. If the Result be wholly and only in the People, the People are in Liberty, or the Form of the Government is Democracy.  
21. IT may happen that a Monarchy founded upon Aristocracy, and so as to the Foundation regulated, may yet come by certain Expedients or Intrusions (as at this day in France and in Spain) as to the Administration of it to appear or to be called absolute; of which I shall treat more at large when I come to speak of Reason of State, or of Administration.  
22. THE ultimat Result in the whole body of the People, if the Commonwealth be of any considerable extent, is altogether impracticable; and if the ultimat Result be but in a part of the People, the rest are not in Liberty, nor is the Government Democracy.  
23. AS a whole Army cannot charge at one and the same time, yet is so ordered that every one in his turn comes up to give the Charge of the whole Army; so though the whole People cannot give the Result at one and the same time, yet may they be so ordered that every one in his turn may come up to give the Result of the whole People.  
24. A POPULAR Assembly, rightly ordered, brings up every one in his turn to give the Result of the whole People.  
25. IF the popular Assembly consists of one thousand or more, annually changeable in one third part by new Elections made in the Tribes by the People, it is rightly ordered; that is to say, so constituted that such an Assembly can have no other Interest whereupon to give the Result, than that only which is the Interest of the whole People.  
26. BUT in vain is Result where there is not Matter to resolve upon; and where maturity of Debate has not preceded, there is not yet Matter to resolve upon.  
27. DEBATE to be mature cannot be managed by a Multitude; and Result to be popular cannot be given by a Few.  
28. IF a Council capable of Debate has also the Result, it is Oligarchy. If an Assembly capable of the Result has Debate also, it is Anarchy. Debate in a Council not capable of Result, and Result in an Assembly not capable of Debate, is Democracy.  
29. IT is not more natural to a People in their own affairs to be their own choosers, than upon that occasion to be provided of their Learned Council; in so much that the saying of PACUVIUS, That either a People is governed by a King or counsiled by a Senate, is universally approved.  
30. WHERE the Senate has no distinct Interest, there the People are counsillable, and venture not upon Debate: where the Senate has any distinct Interest, there the People are not counsillable, but fall into Debate among themselves, and so into Confusion.  
31. OF Senates there are three kinds: First, A Senate eligible out of Chap. VI the Nobility only, as that of Rome, which will not be contented to be merely the Council of the People, but will be contending that they are Lords of the People, never quitting their pretensions till they have ruined the Commonwealth. Secondly, A Senate elected for life, as that of Sparta, which will be a species of Nobility, and will have a kind of Spartan King, and a Senate upon rotation; which being rightly constituted is quiet, and never pretends more than to be the learned Council of the People.  
32. THIRDLY, Three hundred Senators, for example, changeable in one third part of them annually by new Elections in the Tribes, and constituted a Senate to debate upon all Civil matters, to promulgat to the whole Nation what they have debated, this Promulgation to be made some such convenient time before the Matters by them debated are to be proposed, that they may be commonly known and well understood, and then to propose the same to the Result of the Popular Assembly, which only is to be the Test of every public Act, is a Senate rightly ordered.  
FORM of Government (as to the Civil part) being thus completed, is summed up in the three following Aphorisms.  
33. ABSOLUTE Monarchy (for the Civil part of the Form) consists of distinct Provinces under distinct Governors, equally subordinat to a Grand Signior or sole Lord, with his Council or Divan debating and proposing, and the Result wholly and only in himself.  
34. REGULATED Monarchy (for the Civil part of the Form) consists of distinct Principalitys or Countys under distinct Lords or Governors, which if rightly constituted are equally subordinat to the King and his Peerage, or to the King and his Estates assembled in Parliament, without whose Consent the King can do nothing.  
35. DEMOCRACY (for the Civil part of the Form) if rightly constituted, consists of distinct Tribes under the Government of distinct Magistrates, Courts, or Councils, regularly changeable in one third part upon annual Elections, and subordinat to a Senate consisting of not above three hundred Senators, and to a popular Assembly consisting of not under a thousand Deputies; each of these also regularly changeable in one third part upon annual Elections in the Tribes, the Senate having the Debate, and the Popular Assembly the Result of the whole Commonwealth.   

CHAP. VI  
Of Form in the Religious part.  
1. FORM for the Religious part either admits of Liberty of Conscience in the whole or in part; or does not admit of Liberty of Conscience at all.  
2. LIBERTY of Conscience entire, or in the whole, is where a man according to the dictates of his own Conscience may have the Chap. VI free exercise of his Religion, without impediment to his Preferment or Employment in the State.  
3. LIBERTY of Conscience in part is, where a man according to the dictates of his Conscience may have the free exercise of his Religion; but if it be not the National Religion, he is thereby incapable of Preferment or Employment in the State.  
4. WHERE the Form admits not of the free exercise of any other Religion except that only which is National, there is no Liberty of Conscience.  
5. MEN who have the means to assert Liberty of Conscience, have the means to assert Civil Liberty; and will do it if they are oppressed in their Consciences.  
6. MEN participating in Property, or in Employment Civil or Military, have the means to assert Liberty of Conscience.  
7. ABSOLUTE Monarchy, being sole Proprietor, may admit of Liberty of Conscience to such as are not capable of Civil or Military Employment, and yet not admit of the means to assert Civil Liberty; as the Greece Christians under the Turk, who, though they enjoy Liberty of Conscience, cannot assert Civil Liberty, because they have neither Property nor any Civil or Military Employments.  
8. REGULATED Monarchy, being not sole Proprietor, may not admit naturally of Liberty of Conscience, lest it admits of the means to assert Civil Liberty, as was lately seen in England by pulling down the Bishops, who, for the most part, are one half of the Foundation of regulated Monarchy.  
9 DEMOCRACY being nothing but entire Liberty; and Liberty of Conscience without Civil Liberty, or Civil Liberty without Liberty of Conscience being but Liberty by halves, must admit of Liberty of Conscience both as to the perfection of its present being, and as to its future security: As to the perfection of its present being, for the Reasons already shown, or that she do not enjoy Liberty by halves; and for future security, because this excludes absolute Monarchy, which cannot stand with Liberty of Conscience in the whole, and regulated Monarchy, which cannot stand safely with it in any part.  
10. IF it be said that in France there is Liberty of Conscience in part, it is also plain that while the Hierarchy is standing this Liberty is falling, and that if ever it comes to pull down the Hierarchy it pulls down that Monarchy also: wherefore the Monarchy or Hierarchy will be beforehand with it, if they see their true Interest.  
11. THE ultimat Result in Monarchy being that of one Man, or of a few Men, the National Religion in Monarchy may happen not to be the Religion of the major part of the People; but the Result in Democracy being in the major part of the People, it cannot happen but that the National Religion must be that of the major part of the People.  
12. THE major part of the People, being in matters of Religion enable to be their own Leaders, will in such cases therefore have a public leading; or, being debarred of their Will in that particular, are debarred of their Liberty of Conscience.  
13. WHERE the major part of the People is debarred of their Liberty by the minor, there is neither Liberty of Conscience nor Democracy, but Spiritual or Civil Oligarchy.  
14. WHERE the Major part is not debarred of their Liberty of Chap. VI Conscience by the Minor, there is a National Religion.  
15. NATIONAL Religion is either coercive, or not coercive.  
16. RELIGION is not naturally subservient to any corrupt or worldly Interest, for which cause to bring it into subjection to Interest it must be coercive.  
17. WHERE Religion is coercive, or in subjection to Interest, there it is not, or will not long continue to be the true Religion.  
18. WHERE Religion is not coercive, nor under subjection to any Interest, there it either is (or has no obstruction why it may not come to be) the true Religion.  
19 ABSOLUTE Monarchy pretends to Infallibility in matters of Religion, employs not any that is not of its own Faith, and punishes its Apostats by death without mercy.  
20. REGULATED Monarchy comes not much short of the same pretence; but consisting of Proprietors, and such as if they descent have oftentimes the means to defend themselves, it does not therefore always attain to the exercise of the like power.  
21. DEMOCRACY pretends not to Infallibility, but is in matters of Religion no more than a Seeker, not taking away from its People their Liberty of Conscience, but educating them, or so many of them as shall like of it, in such a manner or knowledge in Divine things as may render them best able to make use of their Liberty of Conscience, which it performs by the National Religion.  
22. NATIONAL Religion, to be such, must have a National Ministry or Clergy.  
23. THE Clergy is either a landed or a stipendiated Clergy.  
24. A LANDED Clergy, attaining to one third of the Territory, is Aristocracy; and therefore equally incompatible with absolute Monarchy, and with Democracy: but to regulated Monarchy for the most part is such a Supporter, as in that case it may be truly enough said, that NO BISHOP, NO KING.  
25. THE Sovereignty of the Prince in absolute Monarchy, and of the People in Democracy, admitting not of any Counterpoise, in each of these the Clergy ought not to be landed; the labourer nevertheless being worthy of his hire, they ought to be stipendiated.  
26. A CLERGY well landed is to regulated Monarchy a very great Glory; and a Clergy not well stipendiated is to absolute Monarchy or to Democracy as great an Infamy.  
27. A CLERGY, whether landed or stipendiated, is either Hierarchical or Popular.  
28. A HIERARCHICAL Clergy is a Monarchical Ordination; a Popular Clergy receives Ordination from Election by the People.  
FORM of Government (as to the Religious part) being thus completed, is summed up in the three following Aphorisms.  
29. ABSOLUTE Monarchy (for the Religious part of the Form) consists of a Hierarchical Clergy, and of an Alcoran (or some Book received in the nature of Scripture) interpretable by the Prince only and his Clergy, willingly permitting to them that are not capable of Employments a Liberty of Conscience.  
Ch. VII 30. REGULATED Monarchy (for the Religious part of the Form) consists of an Aristocratical Hierarchy, of the Liturgy, and of the Holy Scriptures (or some such Book received for a Rule of Faith) interpretable only by the Clergy, not admitting Liberty of Conscience, except thro' mere necessity.  
31. DEMOCRACY (for the Religious part of the Form) consists of a Popular Clergy, of the Scriptures (or some other Book acknowleged divine) with a Directory for the National Religion, and a Council for the equal maintenance both of the National Religion, and of the Liberty of Conscience.   

CHAP. VII.  
Of Form in the Military part.  
1. A MAN may perish by the Sword; yet no man draws the Sword to perish, but to live by it.  
2. SO many ways as there are of living by the Sword, so many ways there are of a Militia.  
3. IF a Prince be Lord of the whole, or of two parts in three of the whole Territory, and divides it into Military Farms at will and without rent, upon condition of Service at their own charge in Arms whenever he commands them, it is the Sword of an absolute Monarchy.  
4. IF the Nobility, being Lords of the whole, or of two parts in three of the whole Territory, let their Lands by good pennyworths to Tenants at will, or by their Leases bound at their Commands by whom they live to serve in Arms upon pay, it is the Sword of a regulated Monarchy.  
5. IN Countries that have no Infantry, or Militia of free Commoners, as in France and Poland, the Nobility themselves are a vast Body of Horse, and the Sword of that Monarchy.  
6. IF a People, where there neither is Lord nor Lords of the whole, nor of two parts in three of the whole Territory, for the common defence of their Liberty and of their Livelihood, take their turns upon the Guard or in Arms, it is the Sword of Democracy.  
7. THERE is a fourth kind of Militia, or of men living more immediately by the Sword, which are Soldiers of Fortune, or a mercenary Army.  
8. ABSOLUTE Monarchy must be very well provided with Court Guards, or a mercenary Army; otherwise it's Military Farmers having no bar from becoming Proprietors, the Monarchy itself has no bar from changing into Democracy.  
FORM of Government (as to the Military part) being thus completed, is summed up in the three following Aphorisms.  
9 IN a regulated Monarchy where there is an Infantry, there needs not any Mercenary Army; and there the People live tolerably well.  
10. IN a regulated Monarchy where there is no Infantry, but the Nobility themselves are a vast Body of Horse, there must also be a mercenary Infantry, and there the People are Peasants or Slaves. Ch. VIII  
11. THERE is no such thing in nature as any Monarchy (whether absolute or regulated) subsisting merely by a mercenary Army, and without an Infantry or Cavalry planted upon the Lands of the Monarch, or of his whole Nobility.   

CHAP. VIII.  
Of Form in the Legal part.  
1. IF Justice be not the Interest of a Government, the Interest of that Government will be its Justice.  
2. LET Equity or Justice be what it will, yet if a man be to judge or resolve in his own case, he resolves upon his own Interest.  
3. EVERY Government, being not obnoxious to any Superior, resolves in her own case.  
4. THE ultimat Result in every Government is the Law in that Government.  
5. IN absolute Monarchy, the ultimat Result is in the Monarch.  
6. IN Aristocracy, or regulated Monarchy, the ultimat Result is in the Lords or Peers, or not without them.  
7. IN Democracy the ultimat Result is in the People.  
8. LAW in absolute Monarchy holds such a disproportion to natural Equity, as the Interest of one Man to the Interest of all Mankind.  
9 LAW in Aristocracy holds such a disproportion to natural Equity, as the Interest of a few Men to the Interest of all Mankind.  
10. LAW in Democracy holds such a disproportion to natural Equity, as the Interest of a Nation to the Interest of all Mankind.  
11. ONE Government has much nearer approaches to natural Equity than another; but in case natural Equity and Selfpreservation come in competition, so natural is Selfpreservation to every Creature, that in that case no one Government has any more regard to natural Equity than another.  
12. A Man may devote himself to death or destruction to save a Nation, but no Nation will devote itself to death or destruction to save Mankind.  
13. MACCHIAVEL is decried for saying, that no consideration is to be had of what is just or injust, of what is merciful or cruel, of what is honourable or ignominious, in case it be to save a State, or to preserve Liberty; which as to the manner of expression is crudely spoken. But to imagine that a Nation will devote itself to death or destruction any more upon Faith given or an Engagement thereto tending, than if there had been no such Engagement made or Faith given, were nor piety but folly.  
14. WHERSOEVER the power of making Law is, there only is the power of interpreting the Law so made.  
15. GOD who has given his Law to the Soul of that man who shall voluntarily receive it, is the only Interpreter of his Law to that Soul; such at least is the judgement of Democracy. With absolute Monarchy, and with Aristocracy, it is an innat Maxim, That the People are to be deceived in two things, their RELIGION and their LAW; Chap. IX or that the Church orthemselves are Interpreters of all Scripture, as the Priests were anciently of the Sibyls Books.  
FORM of Government (as to the Legal part) being thus completed, is summed up in the three following Aphorisms.  
16. ABSOLUTE Monarchy (for the Legal part of the Form) consists of such Laws as it pretends God has delivered or given the King and Priest's power to interpret; or it consists of such Laws as the Monarch shall choose or has chosen.  
17. ARISTOCRACY (for the Legal part of the Form) consists of such Laws as the Nobility shall choose or have chosen; or of such as the People shall choose or have chosen, provided they be agreed to by their Lords, or by the King and their Lords.  
18. DEMOCRACY (for the Legal part of the Form) consists of such Laws as the People, with the advice of their Council, or of the Senate, shall choose or have chosen.   

CHAP. IX.  
Of Form in the Judicial part.  
1. MULTIPLICITY of Laws, being a multiplicity of Snares for the People, causes Corruption of Government.  
2. PAUCITY of Laws requires arbitrary Power in Courts, or Judicatories.  
3. ARBITRARY Power (in reference to Laws) is of three kinds. (1) In making, altering, abrogating, or interpreting of Laws, which belong to the Sovereign Power. (2) In applying Laws to Cases which are never any one like another. (3) In reconciling the Laws among themselves.  
4. THERE is no difficulty at all in judging of any case whatsoever according to natural Equity.  
5. ARBITRARY Power makes any man a competent Judge for his Knowledge; but leaving him to his own Interest, which oftentimes is contrary to Justice, makes him also an incompetent Judge, in regard that he may be partial.  
6. PARTIALITY is the cause why Laws pretend to abhor Arbitrary Power; nevertheless, seeing that not one case is altogether like another, there must in every Judicatory be some arbitrary Power.  
7. PAUCITY of Laws causes arbitrary Power in applying them; and Multiplicity of Laws causes arbitrary Power in reconciling and applying them too.  
8. ARBITRARY Power where it can do no wrong, does the greatest right; because no Law can ever be so framed, but that without arbitrary Power it may do wrong.  
9 ARBITRARY Power, going upon the Interest of One or of a Few, makes not a just Judicatory.  
10. ARBITRARY Power, going upon the Interest of the whole People, makes a just Judicatory.  
11. ALL Judicatories and Laws, which have been made by Arbitrary Power, allow of the Interpretation of Arbitrary Power, and acknowledge an appeal from themselves to it.  
12. THAT Law which leaves the least arbitrary Power to the Chap. IX Judge or Judicatory, is the most perfect Law.  
13. LAWS that are the fewest, plainest, and briefest, leave the least arbitrary Power to the Judge or Judicatory; and being a Light to the People, make the most incorrupt Government.  
14. LAWS that are perplexed, intricat, tedious, and voluminous, leave the greatest arbitrary Power to the Judge or Judicatory; and raining snares on the People, make the most corrupt Government.  
15. SEEING no Law can be so perfect as not to leave arbitrary Power to the Judicatory, that is the best Constitution of a Judicatory where arbitrary Power can do the least hurt, and the worst Constitution of a Judicatory is where arbitrary Power can do the most ill.  
16. ARBITRARY Power in one Judge does the most, in a few Judges does less, and in a multitude of Judges does the least hurt.  
17. THE ultimat Appeal from all inferior Judicatories is to some sovereign Judge or Judicatory.  
18. THE ultimat Result in every Government (as in absolute Monarchy, the Monarch; in Aristocracy, or Aristocratical Monarchy, the Peers; in Democracy, the Popular Assembly) is a sovereign Judge or Judicatory that is arbitrary.  
19 ARBITRARY Power in Judicatories is not such as makes no use of the Law, but such by which there is a right use to be made of the Laws.  
20. THAT Judicatory where the Judge or Judges are not obnoxious to Partiality or private Interest, cannot make a wrong use of Power.  
21. THAT Judicatory that cannot make a wrong use of Power, must make a right use of Law.  
22. EVERY Judicatory consist● of a Judge or some Judges without a Jury, or of a Jury on the Bench without any other Judge or Judges, or of a Judge or Judges on the Bench with a Jury at the Bar.  
FORM of Government (as to the Judicial part) being thus completed, is summed up in the three following Aphorisms.  
23. ABSOLUTE Monarchy (for the Judicial part of the Form) admits not of any Jury, but is of some such kind as a Cadee or Judge in a City, or as we say in a Hundred, with an Appeal to a Cadaliskar or a Judge in a Province, from whom also there lies an Appeal to the M●phti, who is at the devotion of the Grand Signior or of the Monarch.  
24. ARISTOCRACY or Aristocratical Monarchy (for the Judicial part of the Form) may admit of a Jury, so it be at the Bar only, and consists of some such kind as Delegates or ordinary Judges, with an Appeal to a House of Peers; or some such Court, as the Parliament at Paris, which was at the institution in the Reign of HUGH CAPET, a Parliament of sovereign Princes.  
25. DEMOCRACY (for the Judicial part of the Form) is of some such kind as a Jury on the Bench in every Tribe, consisting of thirty persons or more annually eligible in one third part by the People of that Tribe, with an Appeal from thence to a Judicatory residing in the Capital City of the like Constitution, annually eligible in one third part out of the Senate or the popular Assembly, or out of both; from which also there lies an Appeal to the People, that is to the Popular Assembly.   

Chap. X CHAP. X.  
Of the Administration of Government, or REASON OF STATE.  
1. AS the Matter of a Ship or of a House is one thing, the Form of a Ship or of a House is another thing, and the Administration or Reason of a Ship or of the House is a third thing; so the Matter of a Government or of a State is one thing, the Form of a Government or of a State is another, and the Administration of a Government (which is what's properly and truly called Reason of State) is a third thing.  
2. THERE are those who can play, and yet cannot pack the Cards; and there are who can pack the Cards, and yet cannot play.  
3. ADMINISTRATION of Government, or Reason of State, to such as propose to themselves to play upon the square, is one thing; and to such as propose to themselves to pack the Cards, is another.  
4. REASON of State is that in a Kingdom or a Commonwealth, which in a Family is called THE MAIN CHANCE.  
5. THE Master of a Family that either keeps himself up to his ancient bounds, or increases his Stock, looks very well to the main Chance, at least if his play be upon the square, that is, upon his own Abilitys, or good Fortune, or the Laws; but if it were not upon the square, yet an Estate however gotten, is not for that a less Estate in itself, nor less descending by the Law to his Successors.  
6. IF a People thro' their own Industry, or the prodigality of their Lords, come to acquire Liberty; if a few by their Industry, or thro' the folly or slothfulness of the People, come to eat them out, and make themselves Lords; if one Lord by his Power or his Virtue, or thro' their Necessity, their Wisdom, or their Folly, can overtop the rest of these Lords, and make himself King, all this was fair play and upon the square.  
7. REASON of State, if we speak of it as fair play, is forens or domestic.  
8. REASON of State, which is forens, consists in balancing forens Princes and States in such a manner, as you may gain upon them, or at least that they may not gain upon you.  
9 REASON of State, which is domestic, is the Administration of a Government (being not usurped) according to the Foundation and Superstructures of the same if they be good, or so as not being good that they may be mended, or so as being good or bad they may be altered; or, the Government being usurped, the Reason of State than is the way and means whereby such a Usurpation may be made good or maintained.  
10. REASON of State, in a Democracy which is rightly founded and rightly ordered, is a thing of great facility, whether in a forens or in a domestic relation. In a forens, because one good Democracy, weighing two or three of the greatest Princes, will easily give the Balance abroad at its pleasure; in a domestic, because it consists not of any more than giving such a stop in accumulation that the State comes not Chap. X to be Monarchical: which one Reason of State being made good, all the rest goes well; and which one Reason of State being neglected, all the rest comes in time to infallible ruin.  
11. REASON of State in a Democracy, which is not right in its Foundations, may flourish abroad, and be one: but at home will languish or be two Reasons of State, that is, the Reason of the State or Orders of the Nobility, which is to lord it over the People; and the Reason of the popular State or Order, which is to bring the Commonwealth to equality: which two Reasons of State, being irreconcilable, will exercise themselves against one another, first by Disputes, then by Plots, till it comes at last to open Violence, and so to the utter ruin of the Commonwealth, as it happened in Rome.  
12. REASON of State in an absolute Monarchy (whether Foren or Domestic) is but threefold; as first, to keep its Military Farmers or Timariot to the first Institution; next to cut him that grows any thing above his due Stature, or lifts up his head above the rest, by so much the shorter; and last of all to keep its Arms in exercise.  
13. IN Aristocratical Monarchy Reason of State (as to the whole) is but one thing, that is, to preserve the Counterpoise of the King and the two or the three, or the four Estates: For in some Countries, as in Poland, there are but two Estates, the Clergy and the Nobility; in others, as in Sweden, there are four, the Nobility, the Gentry, the Clergy, and the Commons; in most others there are but three, the Lords Spiritual, the Lords Temporal, and the Commons.  
14. IN Aristocratical Monarchy Reason of State (as to the parts) is a multifarious thing, every State having its peculiar Reason of State, and the King also his Reason of State: with the King it is to balance the Nobility, that he may hold them under; Reason of State with the Nobility is to balance the King, lest he should grow absolute; Reason of State both with the King and the Nobility is to keep down the People; and Reason of State with the People is to drive at their Liberty.  
15. IN Forms that are pure, or in Governments that have no more than an absolute Prince or one State, as absolute Monarchy and equal or pure Democracy, there is but one Reason of State, and that is to preserve the Form entire. In Forms that are mixed (as in an inequal Commonwealth where there are two Estates, and in Aristocratical Monarchy where there is a King and two if not three Estates) there are so many Reasons of State to break the Form, that there has not been any inequal Commonwealth which either the People have not brought to Democracy, or the Nobility to Monarchy. And scarce was there any Aristocratical Monarchy, where (to omit the Wars of the Nobility with their King, or among themselves) the People have not driven out the King, or where the King has not brought the People into Slavery. Aristocratical Monarchy is the true Theatre of Expedientmongers and Stateemperics, or the deep Waters wherein that Leviathan the Minister of State takes his pastime.  
16. THE Complaint that the Wisdom of all these latter times in Princes Affairs consists rather in fine deliveries and shift of Dangers or Mischiefs when they are near, than in solid and grounded courses to keep them off, is a Complaint in the Streets of Aristocratical Monarchy; and not to be remedied, because the Nobility being not broken, Chap. X the King is in danger, and the Nobility being broken, the Monarchy is ruined.  
17. AN Absurdity in the form of the Government (as that in a Monarchy there may be two Monarches) shoots out into a mischief in the Administration, or some wickedness in the Reason of State, as in ROMULUS' killing of REMUS, and the monstrous Associations of the Roman Emperors.  
18. USURPATION of Government is a Surfeit that converts the best Arts into the worst: Nemo unquam imperium flagitio acquisitum bonis artibus exercuit.  
19 AS in the privation of Virtue, and in Beggary, men are Sharks or Robbers, and the reason of their way of living is quite contrary to those of Thrift; so in the privation of Government, as in Anarchy, Oligarchy, or Tyranny, that which is Reason of State with them is directly opposite to that which is truly so: whence are all those black Maxims set down by some Politicians, particularly MACCHIAVEL in his Prince, and which are condemned to the fire even by them who, if they lived otherwise, might blow their fingers.  
20. WHERE the Government from a true Foundation rises up into proper Superstructures or Form, the Reason of State is right and straight; but give our Politician peace when you please, if your House stands awry, your Props do not stand upright.  
21. TAKE a Juggler, and commend his Tricks never so much, yet if in so doing you show his Tricks you spoil him; which has been and is to be confessed of MACCHIAVEL.  
22. CORRUPTION in Government is to be read and considered in MACCHIAVEL, as Diseases in a man's Body are to be read and considered in HIPPOCRATES.  
23. NEITHER HIPPOCRATES nor MACCHIAVEL introduced Diseases into man's Body, nor Corruption into Government, which were before their times; and seeing they do but discover them, it must be confessed that so much as they have done tends not to the increase but the cure of them, which is the truth of these two Authors.    

POLITICAL APHORISMS.  
Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit. Terent.  
1. THE Errors and Sufferings of the People are from their Governors.  
2. WHEN the Foundation of a Government comes to be changed, and the Governors change not the Superstructures accordingly, the People become miserable.  
3. THE Monarchy of England was not a Government by Arms, but a Government by Laws, though imperfect or ineffectual Laws.  
4. THE later Governments in England since the death of the King, have been Governments by Arms.  
5. THE People cannot see, but they can feel.  
6. THE People having felt the difference between a Government by Laws and a Government by Arms, will always desire the Government by Laws, and abhor that of Arms.  
7. WHERE the Spirit of the People is impatient of a Government by Arms, and desirous of a Government by Laws, there the spirit of the People is not unfit to be trusted with their Liberty.  
8. THE spirit of the People of England, not trusted with their Liberty, drives at the restitution of Monarchy by Blood and Violence.  
9 THE Spirit of the People of England, trusted with their Liberty, if the Form be sufficient, can never set up a King; and if the Form be insufficient (as a Parliament with a Council in the intervals▪ or two Assemblys coordinat) will set up a King without Blood or Violence.  
10. TO light upon a good Man, may be in Chance; but to be sure of an Assembly of good Men, is not in Prudence.  
11. WHERE the Security is no more than personal, there may be a good Monarch, but can be no good Commonwealth.  
12. THE necessary Action or Use of each thing is from the nature of the Form.  
13. WHERE the Security is in the Persons, the Government makes good men evil; where the Security is in the Form, the Government makes evil men good.  
14. ASSEMBLIES legitimatly elected by the People, are that only Party which can govern without an Army.  
15. NOT the Party which cannot govern without an Army, but the Party which can govern without an Army, is the refined Party, as to this intent and purpose truly refined; that is, by Popular Election, according to the Precept of MOSES, and the Rule of Scripture: Take ye wise men, and understanding, and known among your Tribes, and I will make them Rulers over you.  
16. THE People are deceived by Names, but not by Things.  
17. WHERE there is a well ordered Commonwealth, the People are generally satisfied.  
18. WHERE the People are generally dissatisfied, there is no Commonwealth.  
19 THE Parties in England declaring for a Commonwealth, hold every one of them something that is inconsistent with a Commonwealth.  
20. TO hold that the Government may be managed by a few, or by a Party, is inconsistent with a Commonwealth; except in a Situation like that of Venice.  
21. TO hold that there can be any National Religion or Ministry without public Endowment and Inspection of the Magistracy, or any Government without a National Religion or Ministry, is inconsistent with a Commonwealth.  
22. TO hold that there may be Liberty, and not Liberty of Conscience, is inconsistent with a Commonwealth that has the Liberty of her own Conscience, or that is not Popish.  
23. WHERE Civil Liberty is entire, it includes Liberty of Conscience.  
24. WHERE Liberty of Conscience is entire, it includes Civil Liberty.  
25. EITHER Liberty of Conscience can have no security at all, or under Popular Government it must have the greatest security.  
26. TO hold that a Government may be introduced by a little at once, is to wave Prudence, and commit things to Chance.  
27. TO hold that the Wisdom of God in the formation of a House or of a Government, goes not universally upon natural Principles, is inconsistent with Scripture.  
28. TO hold that the Wisdom of Man in the formation of a House, or of a Government, may go upon supernatural Principles, is inconsistent with a Commonwealth, and as if one should say, God ordained the Temple, therefore it was not built by Masons; he ordained the Snuffers, therefore they were not made by a Smith.  
29. TO hold that Hirelings (as they are termed by some) or an endowed Ministry, aught to be removed out of the Church, is inconsistent with a Commonwealth.  
30. NATURE is of GOD.  
31. SOME part in every Religion is natural.  
32. A UNIVERSAL Effect demonstrats a universal Cause.  
33. A UNIVERSAL Cause is not so much natural, as it is Nature itself.  
34. EVERY man, either to his terror or consolation, has some sense of Religion.  
35. MAN may rather be defined a religious than a rational Creature; in regard that in other Creatures there may be something of Reason, but there is nothing of Religion.  
36. GOVERNMENT is of human Prudence, and human Prudence is adequat to man's Nature.  
37. THE Prudence or Government that is regardless of Religion, is not adequat nor satisfactory to man's Nature.  
38. WHERE the Government is not adequat or satisfactory to man's Nature, it can never be quiet or perfect.  
39 THE major part of Mankind gives itself up in the matter of Religion to the public leading.  
40. THAT there may be a public leading, there must be a National Religion.  
41. WHERE the minor part takes away the National Religion, there the major part is deprived of Liberty of Conscience by the minor.  
42. WHERE the major part is deprived of Liberty of Conscience by the minor, there they will deprive the minor of that Liberty of Conscience which they might otherwise enjoy.  
43. IN Israel there was an endowed Clergy or Priesthood, and a National Religion under inspection of the Magistrate: whence the Christians in Apostolic Times, defraying their own Ministry, could have Liberty of Conscience; whereas if the Christians by going about to take away Tithes, and abolish the National Religion, had endeavoured to violate the Consciences of the unconverted Jews, these being far greater in number, must needs have taken away the Liberty of Conscience from the Christians.  
44. PAUL in Athens could freely and undisturbedly convert DIONYSIUS and others; therefore in Athens there was Liberty of Conscience: but if PAUL and his Converts had gone about to drive Hirelings, or an endowed Priesthood or Clergy out of that Church, who sees not that the Athenians would have driven PAUL and his Converts out of Athens?  
45. THAT there may be Liberty of Conscience, there must be a National Religion.  
46. THAT there may be a National Religion, there must be an endowed Clergy.  
47. COMMONWEALTHS have had three ways of Union. As the Athenians, by bringing their Confederates to subjection▪ As the United Provinces by an equal League: or as the Romans by an inequal League. The first way is tyrannical. In the second, one Commonwealth under the League is no more than another, and each one as to herself has a Negative: which kind of Union is not only obstructive, but tends (as we have seen both in Holland and Switzerland) towards Division. In the third way, the Commonwealth uniting other Commonwealths, retains to herself the leading of the whole League, leaving to each of the rest her own Laws, and her own Liberty.  
48. TILL a Commonwealth be first framed, how such a Commonwealth should make an effectual Union with another Nation, is not possible to be seen.  
49. THE new, unpractised, and heretofore unheard Union (as it is vulgarly spoken) with Scotland, by uniting Deputies of divers Nations, not in a Council apart, or by way of State's General, as in the United Provinces, but in the standing Councils of some one Commonwealth in the League, is destructve to Liberty both in England and in Scotland.  
50. IF the Commonwealth of England receives Deputies from Scotland in a greater number than that of her own, she receives Law from a foreign Interest, and so loses her own Liberty.  
51. IF Scotland be received in an equal number, it obstructs the freedom of both, or occasions War or Dissension.  
52. IF Scotland be received in an inferior number, she receives Law from England, and so loses her Liberty. The like is understood of Ireland.  
53. WHEREAS a well ordered Commonwealth should give the Balance to her Confederates, and not receive it from them; the Councils, in which divers others are thus united, though in a far inferior number of Deputies, yet if these ●y in wait, or lay their heads together, may be overruled, obstructed, or overbalanced by foreign Interests.  
54. WHERE Countries are divers in their Laws, and yet are to receive Laws one from the other, neither the Commonwealth giving Law, knows what to give, nor the Commonwealth receiving Law, understands what she receives: in which case the Union returns to Force or Confusion.  
55. THE best way of holding a Nation different or not different in Laws, is the Roman, that is, by way of Province.  
56. A PROVINCE, especially if she has strong holds, may by defraying of a small Guard, be kept to a just League, and for the rest enjoy her own Laws, her own Government, and her perfect Liberty. Other ways of Union will be found more chargeable, and less effectual, on both sides; for if England has no Army in Scotland, Scotland will receive no Law from England; and if England has an Army there, her hold consists not in the Union, but in the Force. The like is to be understood of Ireland.  
57 IF a Country be very small, and not able to subsist of itself, as Wales, it may be safely united and held: but the advantage that Wales has in participation of all Magistracies and Offices, is not that which England is able to afford to such a Country as Scotland, without subjecting her neck to the yoke.  
58. THE order of a Commonwealth requires, that it consists, first, of a Civil; secondly, of a Religious; thirdly, of a Military; and fourthly, of a Provincial part. The manner of uniting Provinces or different Nations, pertains to the last part; and in the formation of a Commonwealth, to begin with that first, which is naturally last, is to invert the Order, and by consequence the Commonwealth itself, which indeed is nothing but Order.  
59 WHERE there can be any other Government, there can be no Commonwealth.  
60. WHERE there can be a Commonwealth, what tumults soever there happen, and which soever prevail, there can be no other Government; that is to say, without foreign Invasion, which throout I must be understood to except.  
61. IF Sir GEORGE BOOTH had prevailed, he must either have introduced a Commonwealth, or have restored the King.  
62. IF the King were restored, he must either govern by an Army, or by Parliaments.  
63. A KING governing now in England by an Army, would for the same Causes find the same Effects with the late Protector.  
64. A KING governing now in England by Parliaments, would find the Nobility of no effect at all.  
65. A PARLIAMENT, where the Nobility is of no effect at all, is a mere Popular Council.  
66. A MERE Popular Council will never receive Law from a King.  
67. A MERE Popular Council giving Law to a King, becomes thereby a Democracy, or equal Commonwealth; or the difference is no greater than in the imperfection of the Form.  
68 A COMMONWEALTH or Democracy to be perfect in the Form, must consist especially of such an Assembly, the Result whereof can go upon no Interest whatsoever, but that only which is the common interest of the whole People.  
69. AN Assembly consisting of a few, may go upon the Interest of one man, as a King; or upon the Interest of one Party, as that of Divines, Lawyers, and the like; or the Interest of themselves, and the perpetuation of their Government.  
70. THE Popular Assembly in a Commonwealth may consist of too few, but can never consist of too many.  
71. IN every Commonwealth there has been a Popular Assembly▪ This in Israel at least consisted of twenty four thousand, upon a monthly Rotation. In Athens, Lacedaemon, Rome, it consisted of the whole Citizens, that is, of all such as had a right in the Commonwealth, whether they inhabited in City or Country. In Venice it consists of about two thousand. In the Province of Holland only, which contains eighteen or nineteen Soverainties, the Popular or resolving Assemblies consist at least of five hundred Persons: these in the whole Union, may amount to five or six thousand; in Switzerland I believe they come to a greater number. And the most of these Assemblies have been perpetually extant.  
72. IF the Popular Assembly consists of so few, and so eminent Persons as are capable of any orderly Debate, it is good for nothing but to destroy the Commonwealth.  
73. IF the Popular Assembly consists of so many, and for the greater part of so mean Persons as are not capable of Debate, there must be a Senate to help this defect.  
74. THE Reason of the Senate is, that a Popular Assembly rightly constituted, is not capable of any prudent debate.  
75. THE Reason of the Popular Assembly is, that a Senate rightly constituted for Debate, must consist of so few and eminent Persons, that if they have the Result too, they will not resolve according to the Interest of the People, but according to the Interest of themselves.  
76. A POPULAR Assembly without a Senate cannot be wise.  
77. A SENATE without a Popular Assembly will not be honest.  
78. THE Senate and the Popular Assembly being once rightly constituted, the rest of the Commonwealth will constitute itself.  
79. THE Venetians having slain divers of their Dukes for their Tyranny, and being assembled by such numbers in their great Council as were naturally incapable of Debate, pitched upon thirty Gentlemen who were called Pregati, in that they were prayed to go apart, and, debating upon the Exigence of the Commonwealth, to propose as they thought good to the great Council: and from thence first arose the Senate of Venice (to this day called the Pregati) and the Great Council, that is, the Senate and the Popular Assembly of Venice. And from these two arose all those admirable Orders of that Commonwealth.  
80. THAT a People of themselves should have such an understanding as when they of Venice did institute their Pregati or Senat, is rare.  
81. THAT a Senate or Council of Governors having supreme Power, should institute a popular Assembly, and propose to it, though in all reason it be the far more facile and practicable, is that which is rarer.  
82. THE diffusive body of the People is not in a natural capacity of judging; for which cause the whole judgement and power of the diffusive Body of the People must be entirely and absolutely in their collective bodies, Assemblies or Representatives, or there can be no Commonwealth.  
83. TO declare that the Assemblies or Representatives of the People have power in some things, and in others not, is to make the diffusive Body, which is in a natural incapacity of judging, to be in a political capacity of judging.  
84. TO bring a natural incapacity of judging to a political capacity of judging, is to introduce Government. To bring a natural incapacity of judging to such a collective or political capacity of judging, as yet necessarily must retain the Interest of the diffusive Body, is to introduce the best kind of Government. But to lay any appeal whatsoever from a political capacity of judging, to a natural incapacity of judging, is to frustrate all Government, and to introduce Anarchy. Nor is Anarchy, whether imposed or obtruded by the Legislator first, or by the People, or their Demagogs' or Incendiaries afterwards, of any other kind whatsoever than of this only.  
85. TO make Principles or Fundamentals, belongs not to Men, to Nations, nor to human Laws. To build upon such Principles or Fundamentals as are apparently laid by GOD in the inevitable necessity or Law of Nature, is that which truly appertains to Men, to Nations, and to human Laws. To make any other Fundamentals, and then build upon them, is to build Castles in the Air.  
86. WHATEVER is violent, is not secure nor durable; whatever is secure or durable, is natural.  
87. GOVERNMENT in the whole People, though the major part were disaffected, must be secure and durable, because it waves Force, to found itself upon Nature.  
88 GOVERNMENT in a Party, though all of these were well affected, must be insecure and transitory, because it waves Nature, to found itself upon Force.  
89. COMMONWEALTHS, of all other Governments, are more especially for the preservation, not for the destruction, of Mankind.  
90. COMMONWEALTHS, that have been given to cut off their diseased Limbs (as Florence) have brought themselves to impotence and ruin. Commonwealths that have been given to healing their diseased Limbs (as Venice) have been healthful and flourishing.  
91. ATHENS under the Oligarchy of four hundred, was infinitely more afflicted and torn with Distraction, Blood and Animosity of Parties, than is England; yet by introduction of a Senate of four hundred, and a Popular Assembly of five thousand, did thereupon, so suddenly as if it had been a Charm, recover Might and Glory. See the eighth Book of THUCYDIDES; A Story in these Times most necessary to be considered.  
92. TO leave ourselves and Posterity to a farther purchase in Blood or Sweat of that which we may presently possess, enjoy, and hereafter bequeath to Posterity in Peace and Glory, is inhuman and impious.  
93. AS certainly and suddenly as a good state of health dispels the peevishness and peril of Sickness, does a good state of Government the animosity and danger of Parties.  
94. THE Frame of a Commonwealth having first been proposed and considered, Expedients (in case such should be found necessary for the safe, effectual, and perfect introduction of the same) may with some aim be applied or fitted; as to a House, when the Model is resolved upon, we fit Scaffolds in building. But first to resolve upon Expedients, and then to fit to them the Frame of a Commonwealth, is as if one should set up Props, and then build a House to lean upon them.  
95. AS the chief Expedients in the building of a House are Axes and Hammers; so the chief Expedient in the building of a Government, is a standing Army.  
96. AS the House which, being built, will not stand without the perpetual noise or use of Axes and Hammers, is imperfect; so is the Government which, being formed, cannot support itself without the perpetual use of a standing Army.  
97. WHILE the Civil and Religious parts of a Commonwealth are in forming, there is a necessity that she should be supported by an Army; but when the Military and Provincial parts are rightly formed, she can have no farther use of any other Army. Wherefore at this point, and not till then, her Arms are by the practice of Commonwealths, upon slighter occasions, to have half pay for life, and to be disbanded.  
98. WHERE there is a standing Army, and not a formed Government, there the Army of necessity will have Dictatorian Power.  
99 WHERE an Army subsists upon the Pay or Riches of a single Person, or of a Nobility, that Army is always monarchical. Where an Army subsists not by the Riches of a single Person, nor of a Nobility, that Army is always popular.  
100 THE English Arms are popular Arms.  
101. WHERE Arms are popular, and exercise Dictatorian Power in deposing single Persons, and monarchical Assemblies, there can be no greater, nor needs any other Expedient for the introduction of a Commonwealth. Nevertheless to this may be added some such moderate Qualifications as may prune the Commonwealth, not lop off her Branches. Whom these will not satisfy, it is not a Commonwealth, but a Party, that can.  
102. IF the late King had freely permitted to the People the exercise of the Power inevitably devolved upon them by the change of the Balance, he had not been destroyed. If either of the late single Persons had brought the People into an orderly exercise of the Power devolved upon them, he had been great. What Party soever shall hinder the People from the exercise of the Power devolved upon them, shall be certainly ruined: who or what Party soever shall introduce the People into the due and orderly exercise of the Power devolved upon them, shall be forthwith secure and famous for ever.  
103. A MAN uses, nourishes, and cherishes his Body, without understanding it; but he that made the Body understood it.  
104. THE reason why the Nations that have Commonwealths, use them so well, and cherish them so much, and yet that so few Nations have Commonwealths, is, That in using a Commonwealth, it is not necessary it should be understood; but in making a Commonwealth, that it be understood, is of absolute necessity. Caput Reipublicae est nosse Rempub. CICERO.  
105. AS the natural Body of a Christian or Saint can be no other, for the frame, than such as has been the natural Body of an Israelit or of a Heathen; so the political Bodsy, or Civil Governments of Christians or Saints can be no other, for the frame, than such as have been the political bodies or Civil Governments of the Israelits, or of the Heathens.  
106. IT shall be as soon found when and where the Soul of a Man was in the Body of a Beast, as when or where the Soul or Freedom natural to Democracy, was in any other Form than that only of a Senate, and an Assembly of the People.  
107. IN those things wherein, and so far as Art is directed or limited by the nature of her Materials, it is in Art as in Nature.  
108. THAT Democracy, or equal Government by the People, consist of an Assembly of the People, and a Senate, is that whereby Art is altogether directed, limited, and necessitated by the nature of her Materials.  
109. AS the Soul of Man can never be in the Body of a Beast, unless GOD make a new Creation; so neither the Soul or Freedom natural to Democracy in any other Form whatsoever, than that only of a Senate, and a Popular Assembly.  
110. THE right Constitution, Coherence, and proper Symmetry of a Form of Government goes for the greater part upon Invention.  
111. REASON is of two parts; Invention, and Judgement.  
112. JUDGEMENT is most perfect in an Assembly.  
113. INVENTION is most perfect in one Man.  
114. IN one Man, Judgement wants the strength which is in a multitude of Counsillors.  
115. IN a multitude of Counsillors, Invention is none at all.  
116. THRO the defect of Invention, the wisest Assemblies in the formation or reformation of Government, have pitched upon a sole Legislator.  
117. IT is not below the Dignity of the greatest Assembly, but according to the practice of the best Commonwealths, to admit of any man that is able to propose to them, for the good of his Country.  
118. TO the making of a well ordered Commonwealth, there goes little more of pains or charge, or work without doors, than the Establishment of an equal or apt Division of the Territory, and the proposing of such Election to the Divisions so made, as from an equal Foundation may raise equal Superstructures; the rest being but paperwork, is as soon done, as said or voted.  
119. WHERE such Elections are proposed, as being made by the People, must needs produce a well ordered Senate and Popular Assembly, and the People (who, as we have already found by experience, stick not at the like work) elect accordingly; there not the Proposers of any power in themselves, but the whole People by their peculiar and natural right and power, do institute and ordain their whole Commonwealth.  
120. THE highest earthly Felicity that a People can ask, or GOD can give, is an equal and well ordered Commonwealth. Such a one among the Israelits, was the Reign of GOD; and such a one (for the same reason) may be among Christians the Reign of CHRIST, though not every one in the Christian Commonwealth should be any more a Christian indeed, than every one in the Israelitish Commonwealth was an Israelit indeed.   

Seven Models of a Commonwealth: OR BRIEF DIRECTIONS Showing how a fit and perfect MODEL OF Popular Government May be made, found, or understood.  
THERE is nothing more apparent, than that this Nation is greatly disquieted and perplexed thro' a complication of two Causes: The one, that the present state thereof is not capable of any other Form than that only of a Popular Government; the other, that they are too few who understand what is the Form or Model naturally necessary to a Popular Government, or what is required in that Form or Prudence for the sitting of it to the use of this Nation. For these Infirmitys I shall offer some Remedy by a brief Discourse or Direction consisting of two Parts.  
THE first showing those Forms or Models of Popular Government, or of Commonwealths, which have been hitherto extant, whether fit or unfit for the present state of this Nation: The second, showing a Model or Form of Popular Government fitted to the present state of this Nation. In the first part I shall propose seven Models roughly and generally: In the second, one, but more particularly and exactly.  

THE FIRST PART.  
IN every Frame of Government, either the Form must be fitted to the Property as it stands, and this only is practicable in this Nation; or the Property must be altered and fitted to the Frame, which without force has been sometimes, but very seldom, practicable in any other Nation. Nevertheless, for the better knowledge of the one way, it will be best to propose in both ways.  

THE FIRST MODEL OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT PROPOSED.  
The Commonwealth of Israel.  
THAT the Nobility, the Gentry, and the People, be persuaded to give up their whole Lands to the Commonwealth.  
THAT if the whole People shall so give up their Lands, they be divided into twelve equal Precincts, called Tribes.  
THAT the man of greatest quality in every Tribe have about ten thousand pounds a year given to him and his Heirs, with the hereditary Dignity of Prince of his Tribe.  
THAT some ten other men of the next quality under the Prince in every Tribe, have about two thousand pounds a year in the same given to each of them and their Heirs, with the hereditary Dignity of Patriarches, or Chief of the Fathers.  
THAT the remaining part of the Lands, except forty eight Cities and their Suburbs, be distributed to the whole People equally by Lots.  
THAT it be not lawful for any Prince, Patriarch, or other, to sell or alienat his Land, or any part thereof, in such manner, but that upon every fiftieth year, being for this cause a year of Jubilee, all Lands within that compass sold or alienated return to the ancient Possessors or lawful Heirs.  
THAT there be one other Tribe added to the twelve; that this Tribe so added be not local, nor suffered to have any Lands at all, except the forty eight Cities above reserved, with their Suburbs, that is, with a quantity of Land to each of them, being in depth two thousand Cubits round. That these be settled upon them and their Heirs for ever, besides the annual Tithe of the whole Territory, and a piece of Money every year upon every Head under the notion of an Offering, in regard that other Offerings are now unlawful; and that this Tribe consist of Clergy, having one hereditary Archbishop, or High Priest, for the Head and Prince of their Tribe.  
THAT there be no other Law than that of the Word of God only; and that the Clergy being best skilled in this Law, be eligible into all Courts of Justice, all Magistracies and Offices whatsoever.  
THAT the Prince of a Tribe, together with one or more Courts, consisting of twenty three Judges elected by the People of that Tribe for life, be the Government of the same.  
THAT the People of the twelve local Divisions take by the Ballot wise men and understanding among their Tribes, and of these constitute a Senate for the whole Commonwealth consisting of seventy Elders for life.  
THAT every local Tribe monthly elect two thousand of their own number; and that these Elections amounting in all to four and twenty thousand, assemble at the Metropolis or Capital City, and be the monthly Representative of the People.  
THAT the Senate be a standing Judicatory of Appeal from all other Courts, with power to show the Sentence of the Laws of God.  
THAT besides the Law of God, whatever shall be proposed by the seventy Elders, and resolved by the monthly Representative of the People, be the Law of the Land.   

A SECOND MODEL OF A COMMONWEALTH PROPOSED.  
THAT there be a King without Guards.  
THAT the Word or Command of this King be the Law.  
THAT this King stirring out of his Palace, it may be lawful for any man to slay him.  
IN this Model there wants but Security, that while the People are dispersed the King can gather no Army, to demonstrat, That either the People must be free, or the King a Prisoner.   

A THIRD MODEL OF A COMMONWEALTH PROPOSED.  
The Commonwealth of Sparta.  
THAT the Nobility, the Gentry, and the People, having upon persuasion given up their Lands to the Public, the whole Territory be divided into one hundred thousand equal Lots, and two more, being each of ten thousand Acres.  
THAT the inferior Lots be distributed to the People.  
THAT every man possessing a Lot, be a Citizen.  
THAT the rest, except only the Children of Citizens, be Servants to, and tilers of the ground for the Citizens.  
THAT there be no professed Students.  
THAT no Citizen exercise any Trade, but that of Arms only; and that the use of Money, except it be made of Iron, be wholly banished.  
THAT there be two Kings hereditary: That each of them possess one of those Lots of ten thousand Acres.  
THAT they be Precedents of the Senate, with single Votes; and that in War they have the leading of the Arms.  
THAT there be a Senate consisting, besides the Kings, of twenty eight Senators, elected for life by the People.  
THAT whatever be proposed by this Senate to the whole People, or any ten thousand of them, and shall be resolved by the same, be the Law.  
THAT there be a Court consisting of five annual Magistrates elected by the People; and that this Court have power to bring a King, a Senator, or other, that shall openly or secretly violate the Laws, or invade the Government, to Justice.   

A FOURTH MODEL OF A COMMONWEALTH PROPOSED.  
The Commonwealth of Athens.  
THAT there be a Representative of the People, consisting of five thousand.  
THAT these annually elect by lot a Senate consisting of four hundred, and a Signory by suffrage consisting of nine annual Princes.  
THAT each fourth part of the Senate, for one fourth part of their annual term, be a Council of State.  
THAT the Council of State may assemble the Senate, and propose to the same: That the Senate may assemble the People, and propose to them. And that what is proposed by the Senate, and resolved by the People, be the Law.  
THAT the executive Power of the Laws made, be more especially committed and distributed in various Functions, and divers Administrations, to the nine Princes.   

A FIFTH MODEL OF A COMMONWEALTH, PROPOSED.  
The Commonwealth of Rome.  
THAT the whole Nation be divided into three distinct Orders: the one Senatorian, or Nobility; the other Equestrian, or Gentry; and the third Plebeian, or Popular.  
THAT the Equestrian Order be the Cavalry of the Commonwealth, and the Plebeian the Foot.  
THAT there be a Senate consisting of the Senatorian Order, and of three hundred Senators for life.  
THAT there be two Magistrates elected by the People, for five years' term, called Censors.  
THAT the Censors have power upon cause shown to remove a Senator out of the Senate; and to elect a Nobleman, or sometimes a Plebeian, thereby made Noble, into the Senat.  
THAT there be two annual Magistrates elected by the People, called Consuls.  
THAT the Consuls be Precedents of the Senate, and have the leading of the Arms.  
THAT the Senate (as they shall see occasion) may nominat one person to be Dictator for some short term.  
THAT the Dictator for his term have Sovereign Power.  
THAT there be a Division of the whole People, of what Orders soever, into six Classes, according to the valuation of their Estates. For example: That the first Classis consist of all such as have two thousand pounds a year, or upwards; the second of all such as have one thousand pounds a year, or upwards, under two; the third, of all such as have six hundred pounds a year, or upwards, under one thousand; the fourth, of all such as have three hundred pounds a year, or upwards, under six hundred; the fifth, of all such as have under the former proportion; the sixth, of all such as pay no Taxes, or have no Land, and that these be not used in Arms.  
THAT the Senate propose all Laws to be enacted, to an Assembly of the People.  
THAT all Magistrates be elected by the same.  
THAT this Assembly of the People consist of the five Classes, in such manner, that if the Votes of the first and second Classes be near equal, the third Classis be called; and if these agree not, the fourth be called; and so for the rest.  
THAT what is thus proposed by the Senate, and resolved by the People, be the Law.  
IN this Frame the Senate, by the optimacy of the first and second Classes (which seldom or never disagree) carries all, to the exclusion of the main Body of the People: whence arises continual feud or enmity between the Senate and the People; who consulting apart, introduce Popular Debate, set up some other way of Assembly, as by Tribes, or by Parishes, with more equality of Votes; elect Magistrates of their own, make Decrees binding the Senate or Nobility, endeavour to curb their Power by weakening their Balance, or diminishing their Estates: All these tumultuously, and to the alteration of the Government, with so frequent Changes under so divers shapes, as make a very Proteus of the Commonwealth, till having been all her life-time afflicted with Anarchy, she ends her days in Tyranny.   

A SIXTH MODEL OF A COMMONWEALTH PROPOSED.  
The Commonwealth of Venice.  
THAT the Sovereign Power be estated upon four thousand select men, to them and their Heirs for ever.  
THAT there be a great Council consisting of these four thousand; and that their Sons at five and twenty years of age have right to the same.  
THAT the great Council elect one Duke for life: That the Duke have a Royal Palace assigned, with a Guard, at the States charge, and a Revenue of fifteen hundred pounds a year; and that he bear the Sovereign Dignity of the Commonwealth.  
THAT this Duke have six Counsillors annually chosen by the great Council. That he have no power to sign any Writing, though in his own Name, nor to do any of his political Functions without his Counsillors. That his Counsillors have power to sign any Writing in the Duke's name, or to do any of his political Functions without him; and that the Duke with these six Counsillors be the Signory of the Commonwealth.  
THAT the Signory of this Commonwealth have session and suffrage in all the Councils of the same, with right also to propose to each or any of them, either jointly or severally.  
THAT one hundred and twenty elected annually by the great Council, together with other Councils and Magistrates, to whom of course the like Honour is appertaining, be the Senat.  
THAT sixteen other Magistrates proposed by the Senate, and confirmed by the great Council for the term of six months, be a Council apart, with three weekly Provosts or Proposers, called the College.  
THAT the Signory may assemble the College, and propose to them; that the College may assemble the Senate, and propose to them; and that the Senate may assemble the great Council, and propose to them. And that whatever is resolved by the Senate, and not contradicted, nor questioned by the great Council, be the Law.  
THAT there be a Council of Ten elected annually by the great Council; and that this Council of Ten, with the Signory, and some of the College, having right of Session and Suffrage in the same, may upon occasion exercise Dictatorian Power in this Commonwealth.  
THAT the rest of the People under the Empire of this Commonwealth, be disarmed, and governed by Lieutenants of Provinces. That the Commonwealth have a standing Army of strangers or others, in Discipline and Pay. And that the City wherein she shall reside, be founded in the Sea, after such a manner, that it can no more be approached by a Fleet, than by an Army without a Fleet. Otherwise, this Commonwealth is exposed both to the Provinces, and to a mercenary Army.   

A SEVENTH MODEL OF A COMMONWEALTH PROPOSED.  
The Commonwealth of Holland.  
THAT the People in every City, and in every Province or County within these three Nations, elect to every City, Province, or County of the same, a matter of twenty, thirty, or forty Magistrates for life. That these Magistrates being so elected, be the Senate of that respective City, Province or County.  
THAT the Senates, thus elected, thenceforth have and enjoy the Sovereign Power within their respective Jurisdiction, for ever. That every Senate annually elect two or four Burgomasters or Consuls, to be Precedents of the same. That they also elect seven Magistrates, or present fourteen persons to the Governor of the Province; and that he elect seven. That the seven so elected be Judges, or have the Executive Power of the Laws for their term, and within their respective Jurisdiction.  
THAT in case of Affairs of more public and general concern, as War or Peace, levy of Men or Money, and the like, the Governor of the Province give information of the things to be considered, to the Nobility, and to the Senates of that Province; therewith appointing a time and place for the Assembly of the States Provincial. That each of the Senates, having debated the matter proposed, delegat one Consul, with some other Senators well informed and instructed with their Will and Pleasure, to the Assembly of the States Provincial. That the Nobility of the same Province delegat some of their Order likewise to the Provincial States. That the Delegates both of the Nobility and of the Senates, give the Vote of their Principals according to instruction; and that neither the Nobility, nor any Senate or Sovereignty be otherwise bound, than by their own Vote.  
THAT the Provincial Estates elect one Magistrate for life, or during pleasure, to be Provincial Governor: That they elect one or more other Magistrates for life, or during pleasure, to be States General.  
THAT the State's General being elected, and well instructed by their Provinces, have the direction of the whole League: That each give not his own Vote, but the Vote of his Province; and that no Province be otherwise bound, than by her own Vote.  
IF these Models (in which I claim to be the first that has laid the whole, and the highest Mysteries of the ancient Commonwealths, to the lowest capacity of vulgar Debate) be not all in the mouths of great men, and in Pamphlets, for Chimaeras or Utopias, it is great chance: Yet contain they no less than the whole Revolution of Popular Prudence. Nor is it more certain, that no one of them would fit the present state of this Nation, than that he or they, whose Contemplation and Understanding is not well versed in the most, or in the best of these, shall never fit a Model of Popular Government to the present state of this Nation, or of any other. In which assurance, I come to fulfil my promise in the Second Part, or to propose such a Model as is fitted to the present state of this Nation.    

THE SECOND PART, Proposing a MODEL of A COMMONWEALTH Fitted to the Present State of this Nation.  
BUT so it is ever, that the Humours or Interests of predominant Parties hold themselves to be National: and that which fits them, can never fit a Nation; nor that which fits a Nation, ever fit them. This in the introduction of Government, is always the main difficulty. But where Parties are no better founded, or fitted for Usurpation, than now in England, they are rather to be slighted than considered, as those, the stoutest whereof have but given this Example to the rest, that they who in this state of Affairs shall obstruct an equal and well ordered Government, shall but ruin themselves. For which cause it is proposed:  
1. THAT all Citizens, that is, Freemen, or such as are not Servants, be distributed into Horse and Foot. That such of them as have one hundred pounds a year in Lands, Goods, or Money, or above this proportion, be of the Horse; and all such as have under this proportion, be of the Foot.  
2. THAT all Elders, or Freemen, being thirty years of age or upwards, be capable of civil Administration; and that the Youth, or such Freemen as are between eighteen years of age and thirty, be not capable of civil Administration, but of military only, in such manner as shall follow in the military part of this Model.  
3. THAT the whole native, or proper Territory of the Commonwealth be cast with as much exactness as can be convenient, into known and fixed Precincts, or Parishes.  
4. THAT the Elders resident in each Parish annually assemble in the same, for example upon Monday next ensuing the last of December: That they then and there elect out of their own number every fifth man, or one man of every five, to be for the term of the year ensuing a Deputy of that Parish; and that the first and second so elected be Overseers, or Precedents for the regulating of all Parochial Congregations, whether of the Elders, or of the Youth, during the term for which they were elected.  
5. THAT so many Parishes lying nearest together, whose Deputies shall amount to one hundred or thereabouts, be cast into one Precinct called the Hundred; and that in each Precinct called the Hundred, there be a Town, Village, or place appointed to be the Capital of the same.  
6. THAT the Parochial Deputies elected throout the Hundred assemble annually, for example upon Monday next ensuing the last of January, at the Capital of their Hundred. That they then and there elect out of the Horse of their number one Justice of the Peace, one Juryman, one Captain, one Insign; and out of the Foot of their number one other Juryman, one High Constable, etc.  
7. THAT every twenty Hundreds lying nearest, and most conveniently together, be cast into one Tribe; that the whole Territory being after this manner cast into Tribes, some Town or place be appointed to every Tribe for the Capital of the same; and that these three Precincts (that is, the Parish, the Hundred, and the Tribe) whether the Deputies thenceforth annually chosen in the Parishes or Hundreds, come to increase or diminish, remain firm and inalterable for ever, save only by Act of Parliament. The Tribes are presumed throout these Propositions to amount to fifty.  
8. THAT the Deputies elected in the several Parishes, together with their Magistrates and other Officers both Civil and Military elected in the several Hundreds, assemble or muster annually, for example upon Monday next ensuing the last of February, at the Capital of their Tribe, for the space of two days.  
9 THAT this whole Body thus assembled, upon the first day of their Assembly elect out of the Horse of their number, one high Sheriff, one Lieutenant of the Tribe, one Custos Rotulorum, one Conductor, and two Censors. That the High Sheriff be Commander in chief, the Lieutenant Commander in the second place, and the Conductor in the third place, of this Band or Squadron: That the Custos Rotulorum be Mustermaster, and keep the Rolls; that the Censors be Governors of the Ballot: and that the term of these Magistracies be annual.  
10. THAT the Magistrates of the Tribe (that is to say, the High Sheriff, Lieutenant, Custos Rotulorum, the Censors, and the Conductor, together with the Magistrates and Officers of the Hundreds, that is to say, the twenty Justices of the Peace, the forty Jurymen, the twenty High Constables) be one Troop, or one Troop and one Company apart, called the Prerogative Troop or Company. That this Troop bring in and assist the Justices of Assize, hold the Quarter Session in their several Capacitys, and perform their other Functions as formerly.  
11. THAT the Magistrates of the Tribe (that is to say, the High Sheriff, Lieutenant, Custos Rotulorum, the Censors, and the Conductor, together with the twenty Justices elected at the Hundreds) be a Court for the Government of the Tribe called the Phylarch; and that this Court proceed in all matter of Government as shall from time to time be directed by Act of Parliament.  
12. THAT the Squadron of the Tribe on the second day of their assembly, elect two Knights, and three Burgesses out of the Horse of their number, and four other Burgesses out of the Foot of their number: that each Knight upon election forthwith make Oath of Allegiance to the Commonwealth, or refusing such Oath, the next Competitor in Election to the same Magistracy, making the said Oath, be the Magistrate. The like for the Burgesses. That the Knights thus sworn, have Session in the Senate for the term of three years; and that the Burgesses thus sworn, be of the Prerogative Tribe or Representative of the People for the like term.  
13. THAT for the full and perfect institution of the Assemblys mentioned, the Squadron of the Tribe in the first year of the Commonwealth, elect two Knights for the term of one year, two other Knights for the term of two years, and lastly two Knights more for the term of three years; the like for the Burgesses of the Horse first, and then for those of the Foot. And that this Proposition be of no farther use than for the first years Election only.  
14. THAT a Magistrate or Officer elected at the Hundred be thereby barred from being elected a Magistrate of the Tribe, or of the first day's Election; but that no former Election whatsoever bar a man of the second day's Election at the Tribe, or to be chosen a Knight or Burgess. That a man being chosen a Knight or Burgess, who before was chosen a Magistrate or Officer of the Hundred, or Tribe, may delegat his former Office or Magistracy in the Hundred, or in the Tribe, to any other Deputy, being no Magistrate nor Officer, and being of the same Hundred, and of the same Order, that is, of the Horse or Foot respectively.  
15. THAT the Knights of the annual Election take their places on Monday next ensuing the last of March in the Senate; that the like number of Knights whose Session determins at the same time, recede. That every Knight or Senator be paid out of the public Revenue quarterly, one hundred twenty five pounds during his term of Session, and be obliged to sit in purple Robes.  
16. THAT annually on reception of the new Knights, the Senate proceed to election of new Magistrates and Counsillors. That for Magistrates they elect one General, one Speaker, and two Censors, each for the term of one year, these promiscuously; and that they elect one Commissioner of the great Seal, and one Commissioner of the Treasury, each for the term of three years, and out of the new Knights only.  
17. THAT the General and the Speaker, as Consuls of the Commonwealth, and Precedents of the Senate, be during the term of their Magistracy paid quarterly out of the public Revenue five hundred pounds; that the Insigns of these Magistracies be a Sword born before the General, and a Mace before the Speaker; that they be obliged to wear Ducal Robes. And that what is said of the General in this Proposition, be understood only of the General sitting, and not of the General marching.  
18. THAT the General sitting, in case he be commanded to march, receive Fieldpay; and that a new General be forthwith elected by the Senate to succeed him in the House, with all the Rights, Insigns and Emoluments of the General sitting; and this so often as one or more Generals are marching.  
19 THAT the three Commissioners of the Great Seal, and the three Commissioners of the Treasury, using their Insigns and Habit, and performing their other functions as formerly, have paid quarterly to each of them three hundred seventyfive pounds.  
20. THAT the Censors govern the Ballot; that they be Precedents of the Council for Religion; that each have a silver Wand for the Insign of his Magistracy; that each be paid quarterly three hundred seventy five pounds, and be obliged to wear scarlet Robes.  
21. THAT the General sitting, the Speaker, and the six Commissioners abovesaid, be the Signory of this Commonwealth.  
22. THAT there be a Council of State consisting of fifteen Knights, five out of each Order, List, or Election; and that the same be perpetuated by the annual election of five out of the new Knights, or those last elected into the Senat.  
23. THAT there be a Council for Religion consisting of twelve Knights, four out of each Order, and perpetuated by the annual election of four out of the Knights last elected into the Senat. That there be a Council for Trade, consisting of a like number, elected and perpetuated in the same manner.  
24. THAT there be a Council of War not elected by the Senate, but elected by the Council of State out of themselves. That this Council of War consist of nine Knights, three out of each Order, and be perpetuated by the annual election of three out of the last Knights elected into the Council of State.  
25. THAT in case the Senate add nine Knights more elected promiscuously, or not promiscuously, out of their own number, to the Council of War, the said Council of War be understood by such addition to be Dictator of the Commonwealth for the term of three months and no longer, except by farther Order of the Senate the said Dictatorian Power be prolonged for a like term.  
26. THAT the Signory have session and suffrage, with right also jointly or severally to propose both in the Senate, and in all Senatorian Councils.  
27. THAT each of the three Orders or Divisions of Knights, in each Senatorian Council, elect one Provost for the term of one Week; and that any two Provosts of the same Council so elected, may propose to the same Council for their term, and not otherwise.  
28. THAT some fair Room, or Rooms well furnished and attended, be allowed at the States charge, for a free and open Academy to all comers, at some convenient hour or hours towards the Evening: That this Academy be governed according to the rules of good Breeding, or civil Conversation, by some one or more of the Provosts; and that in this Academy it be lawful for any man, by word of mouth, or by writing, in jest or in earnest, to propose to the Proposers.  
29. THAT for Ambassadors in Ordinary, there be four Residences, as France, Spain, Venice, and Constantinople; and that every Resident upon election of a new Ambassador in Ordinary, remove to the next Residence in order hereby mentioned, till having served orderly in all the said Residences, he returns home. That upon Monday next ensuing the last of November, there be every second year elected by the Senate some fit person, being above twenty five and under thirty five years of age, and not of the Senate, nor of the Popular Assembly. That the Party so elected repair on Monday next ensuing the last of March following, as an Ambassador in Ordinary to the Court of France, and there reside for the term of two years to be computed from the first of April next ensuing his election. That every Ambassador in Ordinary be allowed three thousand pounds a year during the term of his Residences. And that if a Resident comes to die, there be an extraordinary Election into his Residence for his term, and for the remainder of his removes and progress.  
30. THAT all emergent Elections be made by scrutiny, that is by a Council, or by Commissioners proposing, and by the Senate resolving in the manner following: That all Field Officers be proposed by the Council of War: That all Ambassadors Extraordinary be proposed by the Council of State: That all Judges and Sergeants at Law be proposed by the Commissioners of the Great Seal: That all Barons and Officers of trust in the Exchequer be proposed by the Commissioners of the Treasury; and that such of these as are thus proposed to, and approved by the Senate, be held lawfully elected.  
31. THAT the cognizance of all foreign Negotiation, and of all matter of State to be considered, or Law to be enacted, whether Provincial or National, Domestic or Foren, pertain to the Council of State. That all such Affairs of like kind as the Council of State shall judge fit to be carried with more than ordinary secrecy, be committed by them, and pertain to the cognizance and trust of the Council of War, to this end consisting of a select Part, or Committee of the Council of State. That the Cognizance and Protection both of the National Religion, and of the Liberty of Conscience, equally established in this Nation, after the manner provided in the religious part of this Model, pertain to the Council for Religion. That all matter of Traffic, and regulation of the same pertain to the Council for Trade. That in the exercise of these several Functions, each being naturally Senatorian or Authoritative only, no Council assume any other Power than such only as shall be particularly or expressly estated upon the same by Act of Parliament.  
32. THAT what shall be proposed to the Senate by any one or more of the Signory, or of the Proposers General; or whatever was proposed by any two of the Provosts, or particular Proposers to their respective Council, and upon debate at that Council shall come to be proposed by the same to the Senate, be necessarily debatable, and debated by the Senat.  
33. THAT in all cases wherein Power is derived to the Senate by Law made, or by Act of Parliament, the result of the Senate be ultimat: That in all cases of Law to be made, or not already provided for by Act of Parliament, as some particular Peace or War, levy of Men or Money, or the like, the Result of the Senate be not ultimat, but preparatory only, and be proposed by the Senate to the Prerogative Tribe, or Assembly of the People, except only in cases of such speed or secrecy, wherein the Senate shall judge the necessary slowness or openness of like proceeding to be of detriment or danger to the Commonwealth.  
34. THAT if upon the motion or proposition of a Council, or Proposer General, the Senate add nine Knights, promiscuously or not promiscuously chosen out of their own number, to the Council of War, the said Council of War be thereby made Dictator, and have power of Life and Death, as also to enact Laws in all cases of speed or secrecy, for and during the term of three months and no longer, except upon new Order from the Senate: And that all Laws enacted by the Dictator, be good and valid for the term of one year, and no longer, except the same be proposed by the Senate, and resolved by the People.  
35. THAT the Burgesses of the annual Election returned by the Tribes, enter into the Prerogative Tribe on Monday next ensuing the last of March; and that the like number of Burgesses whose term is expired, recede at the same time. That the Burgesses thus entered, elect to themselves out of their own number two of the Horse, one to be Captain, and the other to be Cornet of the same; and two of the Foot, one to be Captain, the other to be Insign of the same, each for the term of three years. That these Officers being thus elected, the whole Tribe or Assembly proceed to the election of four annual Magistrates, two out of the Foot to be Tribune's of the Foot, and two out of the Horse to be Tribune's of the Horse. That the Tribune's be Commanders in chief of this Tribe so far as it is a Military Body, and Precedents of the same as it is a Civil Assembly. And lastly, that this whole Tribe be paid weekly as follows: to each of the Tribune's of the Horse seven pounds, to each of the Tribune's of the Foot six pounds; to each of the Captains of Horse five pounds, to each of the Captains of Foot four pounds; to each of the Cornets three pounds, to each of the Insigns two pounds seven shillings; to every Horseman one pound ten shillings, and to every one of the Foot one pound.  
36. THAT inferior Officers, as Captains, Cornets, Insigns, be only for the Military Discipline of the Tribe. That the Tribune's have Session in the Senate without Suffrage: That of course they have Session and Suffrage in the Dictatorian Council, so often as it is created by the Senat. That in all cases to be adjudged by the People they be Precedents of the Court or Judicatory.  
37. THAT Peculat or Defraudation of the Public, and all Cases or Crimes tending to the subversion of the Government, be triable by the Prerogative Tribe or the Assembly of the People; and that to the same there lie an Appeal in all Causes, and from all Courts, Magistrates, or Councils, National or Provincial.  
38. THAT the right of Debate, as also of proposing to the People, be wholly and only in the Senate, without any power at all of Result not derived from the People, and estated upon the Senate by act of Parliament.  
39 THAT the power of Result be wholly and only in the People, without any right at all of Debate.  
40. THAT the Senate having debated and agreed upon a Law to be proposed, cause promulgation of the said Law to be made for the space of six weeks before Proposition; that is, cause the Law to be written fair, and hung up for the time aforesaid in some of the most eminent places of the City, and of the Suburbs.  
41. THAT promulgation being made, the Signory demand of the Tribune's sitting in the Senate, an Assembly of the People. That the Tribune's upon such demand of the Signory, or of the Senate, be obliged to assemble the Prerogative Tribe in Arms by sound of Trumpet, with Drums beating, and Colors flying, in any Town, Field, or Marketplace, being not above six miles distant, upon the day, and at the hour appointed, except the meeting, thro' inconvenience of the Wether, or the like, be prorogued by consent of the Signory and of the Tribune's. That the Prerogative Tribe being assembled accordingly, the Senate propose to them by two or more of the Senatorian Magistrates thereto appointed, at the first promulgation of the Law. That the Proposers for the Senate open to the People the occasion, motives, and reasons of the Senate for the Law to be proposed; and that the same being done, they put the Law or Proposition by distinct clauses to the Ballot of the People. That if any material Clause or Clauses of the Proposition, or Law so proposed, be rejected by the People, the Clause or Clauses so rejected may be reviewed, altered, and proposed again to the third time, if the Senate think fit, but no oftener.  
42. THAT what is thus proposed by the Senate, and resolved by the People, be the Law of the Land, and no other, except what is already received as such, or reserved to the Dictatorian Council.  
43. THAT every Magistracy, Office, or Election throout this whole Commonwealth, whether annual or triennial, be understood of course or consequence to enjoin an interval or vacation equal to the term of the same. That the Magistracy or Office of a Knight, and of a Burgess, be in this relation understood as one and the same; and that this Order regard only such Elections as are National or Domestic, and not such as are forens, or contained in the Provincial part of this Model.  
44. THAT for an Exception from this Rule, where there is but one Elder of the Horse in one and the same Parish, that Elder be eligible in the same without interval; and where there be above four Elders of the Horse in one and the same Parish, there be not above half, nor under two of them eligible at the same Election.  
45. THAT throout all the Assemblies and Councils of this Commonwealth, the Quorum consist of one half in the time of health, and of one third part in a time of sickness, being so declared by the Senat.  
THE use of the Ballot, being as full of prolixity and abstruseness in writing, as of dispatch and facility in practice, is presumed throout all Elections and Results in this Model, and for the rest referred rather to practise than writing. There remain the Religious, Military and Provincial parts of this Frame: But the Civil part being approved, they follow, or being not approved, may be spared.  

CONCLUSION; or, the use of these PROPOSITIONS.  
THESE Propositions are so laid out to debate or examination, that a man having the mind to weigh, discourse upon, or object against this Model, may do it in the parts with the greatest convenience.  
ANY examination of, or objection against the whole, or any part in print or in writing, the Author holds himself bound to acknowledge or answer: But as to mere discourse upon matters of this compass, it is usually narrow; besides that in writing a man must put himself upon better aim than he can be obliged to take in discourse.  
ANY one objection lying in writing against any one Orders in this part of the Model, after such manner as to show that the Part or Order so invaded aught to be expunged, altered, or amended, unless it may be expunged, altered, or amended accordingly, destroys the whole.  
AND any one or more Objections so lying against any one or more of these Orders or Propositions, that thereby they may be expunged, altered or amended, must in the whole or in part make a better Model.  
IN this case therefore, or in case no Objection lies, the use of these Propositions will be such, as thereby any Man or any Assembly of men, considering or debating upon them in order, may find or make a true Model of a well ordered Commonwealth.  
AND that an Assembly can never make or frame a Model of any Government otherwise than in some such manner, is provable first by a demonstration from the effect; and secondly by a demonstration from the cause.  
THE demonstration from the Effect is, that an Assembly no otherwise frames a Law or Order, than by having it first penned by some one man, and then judging upon it; and the Model of a Commonwealth must consist of many Laws or Orders.  
THE demonstration from the Cause is, that whereas Reason consists of two parts, the one Invention, and the other Judgement, a Man may be as far beyond any Assembly for Invention, as any Assembly can be beyond a Man for Judgement; or which is more, that the formation of a Model of Government requires a strong faculty of Invention, and that an Assembly is naturally void of all manner of Invention.  
Nou. 13. 1658.     

THE Ways and Means Whereby an Equal and Lasting COMMONWEALTH May be suddenly introduced, and perfectly founded, with the free Consent and actual Confirmation of the Whole People of England.  
Scire tuum nihil est, nisi te scire hoc sciat alter. Pers.  
A WORD fitly spoken is like Apples of Gold in Pictures of Silver.  
THE Desire of the People of England now runs strongly to have a Free Parliament.  
LET there be a free Parliament.  
TO the end that the People may be most equally represented, or that the Parliament may be Freest,  
LET there be a new Division of England and Wales, with as much equality as may stand with convenience, into fifty Shires.  
LET every Shire elect annually two Knights to be of one House, and seven Deputies to be of another House of Parliament, for the term of three years. For the first year only, let the Deputies in each Division be elected triple, that is, seven for the term of one year, seven for the term of two years, and seven for the term of three years. The like for the Knights, save only that the present Parliament remain; that is, let two Knights in each Division be elected the first year only for the term of one year, two other Knights at the same time for the term of two years; and let the present Parliament be the triennial part of the Knight's House for the first Election.  
THE House of Knights and the House of Deputies being assembled, let the House of Knight's debate and propose.  
LET what is proposed by the House of Knights, be promulgated for the space of six weeks.  
PROMULGATION being thus made, let the House of Deputies meet, and give their Result upon the Proposition.  
LET what was thus proposed by the Senate or House of Knights, and resolved by the People or House of Deputies, be the Law.  
IN this Constitution these Councils must of necessity contain the Wisdom, and the Interest of the Nation.  
IN this method, Debate must of necessity be mature.  
IF it be according to the Wisdom and the Interest of the Nation upon mature debate that there be a King, let there be a King.  
IF it be according to the Wisdom and the Interest of the Nation upon mature debate, that there be a Commonwealth; two Assemblies in this Order are actually a Commonwealth, and so far a well ordered Commonwealth, that they are capacitated and inclined to reach to themselves whatever furniture shall be further necessary in more particular Orders, which also is at hand.  
TILL this or the like be done, the Line of the late King and the People must be fellowsufferers; in which case the impatience of the People must be for the restitution of that Line at all adventures.  
BUT this or the like being once done, immediately the Line of the late King and the People become Rivals, in which case they will never restore Monarchy.  
WILL never, may some say? But if the Senate and the Popular Assembly be both Royalists, they both will and can restore Monarchy.  
THOUGH both Royalists, they neither will nor can: for let them, that look no further than home or self, say what they will, to affirm that a Senate, and a Popular Assembly thus constituted can procreate Monarchy, is to affirm that a Horse and a Mare can generat a Cat; that Wheat being rightly sown may come up Pease; or that a River in its natural channel may run upwards.  
IN the present case of England, Commonwealthsmen may fail thro' want of Art, but Royalists must fail thro' want of Matter; the former may miss thro' impotence, the latter must thro' impossibility. Or where the State is purely popular, that is, not overbalanced by a Lord or Lords; let there be one Example, or one Reason given that there is, was, or ever can be Monarchy▪ There will be this when all fails, for the aftergame, though the work should fall, as is like enough, into the hands of Royalists.  
CERTAIN it is, that where any private Citizen or Freeman might not (some way or other) propose, there never was a well ordered Commonwealth.  
UPON this encouragement I offered this Paper to good hands, but it was (according to custom) thrown after me.  
SO it went in the Protector's time, in every Revolution since. La fortuna accieca gli animi de gli huomini; but that is Atheism, that's MACCHIAVEL.  
WELL, but now says the Protectorian Family, O that we had set up the equal Commonwealth! So say broken Parliaments and Statesmen; so say the sadly mistaken Sectaries; so say the cashiered Officers; so says he that would have no nay, but Oligarchy was a good word; and so will more say after these, except they learn to say after another, Aut reges non exigendi fuerunt, aut plebi re, non verbo, danda libertas; either the Kings ought not to have been driven out, or the People to have their Liberty not in word, but in deed: but that is Heathenism, that's CICERO; well this is Christian, if there will b● no such saying, I would there might be no swearing.  
Feb. 6. 1659.   

THE HUMBLE PETITION OF DIVERS Well affected Persons, Delivered the 6 th' day of July, 1659. With the PARLAMENT'S Answer thereto.  
TO THE SUPREME AUTHORITY, THE Parliament of the Commonwealth of England; The Humble Petition of divers well affected Persons,  
SHOWS,  
THAT your Petitioners have for many years observed the breathe and long of this Nation after Rest and Settlement, and that upon mistaken grounds they have been ready even to sacrifice and yield up part of their own undoubted right, to follow after an appearance of it.  
AND your Petitioners do daily see the bad effects of long continued Distractions, in the ruins and decays of Trade forens and domestic; and in the advantages that are taken to make Confederacies to involve the Nation in Blood and Confusion, under pretence of procuring a Settlement.  
THAT it has been the practice of all Nations, on the subversion of any form of Government, to provide immediately a new Constitution suitable to their condition; with certain Successions and Descents, that so both their Lawgivers and Magistrates might use their several Trusts, according to the established Constitution; and the People's minds be settled secure, and free from attemts of introducing several forms of Government, according to the variety of their Fancies, or corrupt Interests.  
THAT God has preserved this Nation wonderfully without example many years, since the dissolution of the old form of Government by King, Lords and Commons; there having been no fundamental Constitutions of any kind duly settled, nor any certain Succession provided for the Legislative Power; but even at this instant, if by any sudden sickness, design, or force, any considerable numbers of your Persons should be rendered incapable of meeting in Parliament, the Commonwealth were without form of successive Legislature or Magistracy, and left to the mercy of the strongest Faction. Yet we have reason to remember in these years of unsettlement, the inexpressible sufferings of this Nation in their Strength, Wealth, Honour, Liberty, and all things conducing to their wellbeing; and we have like reason now sadly to apprehend the impending ruin. And we cannot discern a possibility of your Honours unanimous and expeditious proceedings towards our Countries preservation, and relief from its heavy pressures, while your minds are not settled in any known Constitution of Government or fundamental Orders; according to which, all Laws should be made: but divers or contrary Interests may be prosecuted on different apprehensions of the Justice and Prudence of different forms of Government, though all with good intentions.  
YOUR Petitioners therefore conceiving no remedy so effectual against the present Dangers, as the settlement of the People's minds, and putting them into actual security of their Properties and Libertys, by a due establishment of the Constitution under which they may evidently apprehend their certain enjoyment of them; and thereupon, a return of their Trade and free Commerce, without those continual fears that make such frequent stops in Trade, to the ruin of thousands.  
AND your Petitioners also observing, that the Interest of the late King's Son is cried up, and promoted daily, upon pretence, that there will be nothing but Confusion and Tyranny, till he come to govern; and that such as declare for a Commonwealth, are for Anarchy and Confusion, and can never agree among themselves, what they would have.  
UPON serious thoughts of the Premises, your Petitioners do presume with all humility, and submission to your Wisdom, to offer to your Honours their Principles and Proposals concerning the Government of this Nation: Whereupon, they humbly conceive, a just and prudent Government ought to be established, viz.  
1. THAT the Constitution of the Civil Government of England by King, Lords, and Commons, being dissolved, whatever new Constitution of Government can be made or settled according to any rule of Righteousness, it can be no other than a wise Order or Method, into which the free People's Deputies shall be formed for the making of their Laws, and taking care for their common safety and welfare in the execution of them: For, the exercise of all just Authority over a free People, ought (under God) to arise from their own Consent.  
2. THAT the Government of a free People ought to be so settled, that the Governors and Governed may have the same Interest in preserv●ng the Government, and each others Properties and Libertys respectively; that being the only sure foundation of a Commonwealth's Unity, Peace, Strength, and Prosperity.  
3. THAT there cannot be a Union of the Interests of a whole Nation in the Government, where those who shall sometimes govern, be not also sometimes in the condition of the Governed; otherwise the Governors will not be in a capacity to feel the weight of the Government, nor the Governed to enjoy the advantages of it: And then it will be the interest of the major part to destroy the Government, as much as it will be the interest of the minor part to preserve it.  
4. THAT there is no security that the Supreme Authority shall not fall into Factions, and be led by their private Interest to keep themselves always in power, and direct the Government to their private advantages, if that Supreme Authority be settled in any single Assembly whasoever, that shall have the entire power of propounding, debating and resolving Laws.  
5. THAT the Sovereign Authority in every Government, of what kind soever, aught to be certain in its perpetual Successions, Revolutions, or Descents; and without possibility (by the judgement of human Prudence) of a death or failure of its being, because the whole form of the Government is dissolved if that should happen, and the People in the utmost imminent danger of an absolute Tyranny, or a War among themselves, or Rapine and Confusion. And therefore where the Government is Popular, the Assemblies in whom reside the Supreme Authority, ought never to die or dissolve, though the Persons be annually changing: neither ought they to trust the Sovereign care of the strength and safety of the People out of their own hands, by allowing a Vacation to themselves, lest those that should be trusted be in love with such great Authority, and aspire to be their Masters, or else fear an Account, and seek the dissolution of the Commonwealth to avoid it.  
6. THAT it ought to be declared as a Fundamental Order in the Constitution of this Commonwealth, that the Parliament being the Supreme Legislative Power, is intended only for the exercise of all those Acts of Authority that are proper and peculiar to the Legislative Power; and to provide for a Magistracy, to whom should appertain the whole Executive Power of the Laws: and no Case either Civil or Criminal to be judged in Parliament, saving that the last Appeals in all Cases, where Appeals shall be thought fit to be admitted, be only to the Popular Assembly; and also that to them be referred the Judgement of all Magistrates in Cases of Maladministrations in their Offices.  
AND in prosecution of these Principles,  
YOUR Petitioners humbly propose for the settlement of this Commonwealth, that it be ordained,  
1. THAT the Parliament or the supreme Authority of England, be chosen by the free People, to represent them with as much equality as may be.  
2. THAT a Parliament of England shall consist of two Assemblies, the lesser of about three hundred, in whom shall reside the entire power of consulting, debating, and propounding Laws: the other, to consist of a far greater number, in whom shall rest the sole power of resolving all Laws so propounded.  
3. THAT the free People of England, in their respective divisions at certain days and places appointed, shall for ever annually choose one third part to each Assembly, to enter into their Authority, at certain days appointed: the same days, the Authority of a third of each of the said Assemblies to cease, only in the laying the first Foundation in this Commonwealth's Constitution: the whole number of both the Assemblies to be chosen by the People respectively, viz. one third of each Assembly to be chosen for one year, one third for two years, and one third for three years.  
4. THAT such as shall be chosen, having served their appointed time in either of the said Assemblies of Parliament, shall not be capable to serve in the same Assembly during some convenient interval or vacation.  
5. THAT the Legislative Power do wholly refer the execution of the Laws to the Magistracy, according to the sixth Principle herein mentioned.  
6. THAT in respect to Religion and Christian Liberty, it be ordained that the Christian Religion by the appointment of all succeeding Parliaments, be taught, and promulgated to the Nation, and public Preachers thereof maintained: and that all that shall profess the said Religion, though of different Persuasions in parts of the Doctrine, or Discipline thereof, be equally protected in the peaceable profession, and public exercise of the same; and be equally capable of all Elections, Magistracies, Preferments in the Commonwealth, according to the order of the same. Provided always, that the public exercise of no Religion contrary to Christianity be tolerated; nor the public exercise of any Religion, tho professedly Christian, grounded upon, or incorporated into the Interest of any Foren State or Prince.  
THESE your Petitioners humbly conceive to be the Essentials of the form of a free Commonwealth, which if they were made fit for practice by your Honours appointing the numbers, times, places, and all other necessary circumstances, and settled as the fundamental Orders of the Commonwealth, would naturally dispose those that should hereafter be chosen into the Parliaments, from the love of their own interest to seek the common good, being obliged by the Constitutions here humbly offered to partake with the whole body of the People, of the good or evil that shall happen to the Commonwealth, having no probable temtations or means left to compass any private or factious ends in matters Religious or Civil. And your Petitioners cannot imagine a greater security for the Cause and Interest contended for with such effusion of Blood, than by disposing the free People into this kind of order, whereby the same Cause would become their common Interest. Yet if your Honours should think it necessary or convenient for securing the minds of such as are doubtful and jealous that the People may betray their own Liberties, there may be inserted into the fundamental Orders of the Commonwealth, these following Expedients, viz.  
1. THAT for securing the Government of this Commonwealth, and of the Religious and Civil freedom of the good People thereof, it may be for ever esteemed and judged Treason against the Commonwealth, for any Member of either Assembly of Parliament, or any other person whatsoever, to move or propose in either of the said Assemblies, the restitution of Kingly Government, or the introduction of any single Person to be chief Magistrate of England, or the alteration of that part of the fundamental Order herein contained that concerns the equal freedom and protection of Religious persons of different Persuasions.  
2. THAT about the number of twelve persons of the most undoubted Fidelity and Integrity, may be authorised and impower'd, for some certain number of years next ensuing, to seize, apprehend, and in safe custody to detain any person or persons whatsoever, till he or they be in due form of Law delivered, as is hereafter specified, that shall move or propose in either of the said Assemblies of Parliament the restitution of Kingly Government, or the introduction of any single Person to be chief Magistrate of this Commonwealth, or the alteration of that part of the fundamental Order herein contained, that concerns the equal freedom and protection of religious persons of different persuasions; but for no other matter or cause whatsoever. And when it shall happen that any person or persons shall be arrested or seized for any of the causes aforesaid, in manner aforesaid, than a Commission of Oyer and Terminer may issue forth in due form of Law to the said twelve, or any six of them, to proceed in due form of Law, within one month after the apprehension of any such person or persons, to the arrainment and public trial of every such person or persons; and upon the legal conviction of him or them by the testimony of two sufficient Witnesses of any of the Treasons herein declared, to condemn to the pains of death, and to cause the same Judgement to be duly executed: and the Keeper or Keepers of the Great Seal of England that shall be for the time being, may be authorised and required from time to time during the term of years, to issue out Commissions to the said twelve or any six of them, authorising them to proceed as aforesaid.  
AND if your Honours shall further judge it convenient, the fundamental Orders of the Government may be consented to or subscribed by the People themselves, if their express Pact shall be esteemed any additional security; other Nations, upon the like occasions of expulsion of their Kings, having taken the People's Oaths against their returning: And the same may be proclaimed as often as our Ancestors provided for the proclaiming of Magna Charta, and any further security also added, if any can be found among men, that has a foundation in Justice.  
NOW your Petitioners having, with humble submission to your grave Wisdoms, thus declared their apprehensions of the present condition of this distracted Nation, and the only effectual means under God to prevent the impending Mischiefs; They do must humbly pray,  
THAT such speedy considerations may be had of the Premises as the Condition of this Nation requires; and that such a method may be settled for the debating and consulting about the Government, that your wise Results may be seasonable for the healing all the breaches of the Commonwealth, and establishing the sure foundations of Freedom, Justice, Peace, and Unity.  
And your Petitioners shall always pray, etc.   

Wednesday July the 6 th', 1659.  
THE House being informed that divers Gentlemen were at the door with a Petition, they were called in, and one of the Petitioners in behalf of himself and the rest said, We humbly present you a Petition, to which we might have had many thousand hands, but the Matter rather deserves your serious Consideration than any public Attestation; and therefore we do humbly present it to this Honourable House. Which, after the Petitioners were withdrawn, was read, and was entitled, The humble Petition of divers wellaffected Persons.  
Resolved,  
THAT the Petitioners have the Thanks of the House.  
THE Petitioners were again called in, and Mr. Speaker gave them this Answer.  

Gentlemen,  
THE House has read over your Petition, and find it without any private end, and only for the public Interest; and I am commanded to let you know that it lies much upon them to make such a Settlement as may be most for the good of Posterity: and they are about that work, and intent to go forward with it with as much expedition as may be. And for your parts they have commanded me to give you Thanks: and in their names I do give you the Thanks of this House accordingly.  
Tho. St. Nicholas Clerc of the Parliament.   
FINIS.   

Advertisement.  
DIscourses concerning Government, by ALGERNON SIDNEY, Son to ROBERT Earl of Leicester, and Ambassador from the Commonwealth of England to CHARLES GUSTAVUS King of Sweden. Published from an Original Manuscript of the Author. Price 15 s.  
A Complete Collection of the Historical, Political, and Miscellaneous Works of JOHN MILTON, both English and Latin. With some Papers never before published. In 3 Vol. To which is prefixed, The Life of the Author, containing, besides the History of his Works, several extraordinary Characters of Men, and Books, Sects, Parties, and Opinions. Price 35 s.  
Both printed by J. DERBY, and sold by the Booksellers.