A SECOND PART OF THE MIXTURE OF Scholastical Divinity, WITH PRACTICAL, IN SEVERAL TRACTATES: Wherein some of the most difficult Knots in Divinity are untied, many dark places of Scripture cleared, Sundry Heresies and Errors refuted. By Henry Jeanes, Minister of God's Word at Chedzoy in Somersetshire. Whereunto are annexed, Several Letters of the same Author, and Dr. Jeremy Taylor, concerning ORIGINAL SIN. Together with A REPLY UNTO Dr. Hammonds VINDICATION of his Grounds of Uniformity from 1 Cor. 14. 40. Oxford, Printed by H. Hall, Printer to the University, for Thomas Robinson. 1660. To the young Student in Divinity, SOme may be offended at the very Title of this, and my former Bock; for Scholastical Divinity hath, 〈◊〉 since the Reformation, been so generally declaimed against, as that most have been deterred from so much as booking into it. How much this excess hath prejudiced the Protestant Cause, I could easily, and at large demonstrate from our Controversal Writers: for of them, none have been so considerable, and formidable unto the Adversary, as those that have been well versed in the Schoolmen: Others, that are utter strangers unto them, though otherwise of great note and learning, being 〈◊〉 and anon in the dark and at a loss. But I would not be mistaken; when I plead for a sober, moderate, and 〈◊〉 use of Schoolmen, I make no Apology for their errors and fopperies; their vain and 〈◊〉 impious curiosities, no more than the Israelites approved of the Tyranny and 〈◊〉 of the Philistines, when they went down unto them, to sharpen at their forges every man his share, and his coulter, and his axe, and his mattock, 1 Sam. 13. 20 I cannot but confess, that he who studieth them must take a great deal of pains, to search for a little gold in a great heap of dross, to dig for a few Jewels in a vast dunghill: But these 〈◊〉 are so precious, as that they will abundantly 〈◊〉 thy greatest diligence; 〈◊〉 thy greatest diligence will be vain, and to little purpose, if thou rush 〈◊〉 the study of them unpreparedly, and if thou read them 〈◊〉. And 〈◊〉 for the study of them, I reckon, First, all 〈◊〉 that have not made a severe progress in Philosophical Learning; for without this they will be unintelligible, and serve rather to 〈◊〉 and amaze, then to give any light and direction: Secondly, Those that are not well 〈◊〉 in those points that are controverted 〈◊〉 Protestants and Papists, for without a competent insight into these, what 〈◊〉 can 〈◊〉 had against their Heterodoxies? as they must be come unto with 〈◊〉, so must they he read with abundance of caution: Prove all things, and hold 〈◊〉 that only which is good, 1 〈◊〉. 5. 21. Thou must pass a very 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉, and impartial examination of, and judgement upon the several Sects and Factions of them, Thomists and Scotists; Nominals, and Reals, and not resign up thy reason unto any one party of them: for this will 〈◊〉 the study of Schoolmen, a mere vassalage of thy understanding. 〈◊〉 not therefore every spirit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: But try the spirits, whether they be of God, 1 John 4. 1. For 〈◊〉 so pertinaciously and obstinately 〈◊〉 unto their respective Ringleaders, in all their 〈◊〉 and expr 〈◊〉 whatsoever; as the Dominicans to Thomas, the Franciscans to Scotus, the Nominals to Ocham; as that without such trial, they will more frequently misguid, then inform 〈◊〉. Unto this prudent liberty, thou must add, in the next place, a Christian humility, captivating thy reason unto the 〈◊〉 of faith, and submitting all subtleties unto the perfect and infallible rule of Scripture. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 findest the Schoolmen to swerve from this, presuming to be wise, 〈◊〉 that which is written, thou mayst without scruple 〈◊〉 them. These rules being observed, Schoolmen will not be found to be so 〈◊〉 and dangerous Authors, as they have been represented; nor Scholastical Divinity to have such a repugnancy with Practical, as hath been imagined. To manifest this, hath been 〈◊〉 end of these my undertake; and if my 〈◊〉 herein meet with success, and a 〈◊〉 reception, it may encourage me to attempt a 〈◊〉 of a higher nature, The purging of the Schoolmen from their dross, and the selecting out of them their rarities and choicest notions. I cannot expect to live so long, as to proceed far herein: But a beginning may invite some of both our Universities to pursue and carry on the design, who have better accommodations for such a work, than a Country 〈◊〉 can have: That God would stir up the hearts of some of them hereunto, is the hope, and will be the 〈◊〉 of him, that is Thine in the work of the Lord, HENRY JEANES. A TABLE of the Contents of the Treatises in this BOOK. A TREATISE concerning the indifferency of humane actions. Pag. Non-conformists' unjustly charged with denial of things indifferent. 1, 2. Some distinctions premised concerning the actions of man; they are either indeliberate, or deliberate. ib. 〈◊〉 again are to be considered two manner of ways. 1. In the general, actu signato. 2 2. In the singulars and individuals, actu exercito. ib. In a second place 'tis inquired what is meant by the indifferency of actions. 2, 3 For clearing the nature of 〈◊〉, two Queries propounded. 1. What medium indifferent things are betwixt things morally good and evil; whether medium 〈◊〉, or participationis? 3, 4, 5. 2. Whether all indifferent actions be equally indifferent; where a passage in Dr. Sanderson is at large 〈◊〉. 5, 6, 7, 8. Having 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things, three conclusions are laid down concerning the 〈◊〉 of the actions of man. Concl. 1. The indeliberate actions of man, etc. are indifferent, not only in the general, but in their individuals and singulars; because such actions, to speak 〈◊〉, are not moral and humane. 8, 9, 10, 11. Pag. Conclus. 2. There be divers deliberate actions, etc. which if they be considered in actu signato, in the general, secundum speciem, according to the sort or kind, are indifferent, neither morally good, nor evil. 11 This confirmed 1. By Scripture. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. 2. 〈◊〉 reason, where we have 1. The Arguments of the Protestants. 16 2. The Arguments of the Schoolmen. 16, 17, 18, 19 An Objection against the indifferency of some 〈◊〉 actions considered, in the 〈◊〉 propounded and answered. 19, 20. Against this Doctrine of indifferency there be two sailings, One in the defect. 20, 21. Another in the excess. 21, 22. 2. We may be 〈◊〉 unto thankfulness; because God hath indulged us Christians a greater 〈◊〉 of our liberty about things indifferent, than he ever 〈◊〉 unto the 〈◊〉 Synagogue. 22, 23. There be two ways of expressing our 〈◊〉 for the 〈◊〉 of this our liberty. 1. A slout 〈◊〉 of it. 23, 24. 2. A due and 〈◊〉 use of it. 24, 25. To inform us more fully and particularly what is to be done herein, such 〈◊〉 are 〈◊〉, as we are by the rule of Scripture, to put on the use and exercise of our Christian liberty in things indifferent. 25 It is to be restrained. 1. By prudence. 25, 26 2. By temperance and sobriety. 26, 27 3. By conscience, and that both condemning and doubting. 27, 28, 29 4. By religion, by the religion of a vow, and of an oath. 29, 30, 31 5. By authority. 31, 32, 33 6. By charity, and that 1. To ourselves. 33, 34 2. Unto others, in the case of scandal. 34, etc. usque ad 46. Conclus. 3. No deliberate actions of men, etc. if they be considered in actu exercito, in the singular, or particular, as clothed with circumstances, are indifferent; but all of them are morally either good or evil. Two limitations of this conclusion. 46, 47 The Conclusion being limited, is made apparent from the end and rule of deliberate actions. 1. From their end: and what ought to be the end of all deliberate actions of man, may be evidenced, 1. From their relation unto their original, the 〈◊〉 soul. 47, 48 2. From a consideration of them absolutely, as they are in themselves. 48, 49 For the further enforcement of this reason, some few Scriptures alleged and opened. 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54. Unto these two Arguments, a third is added, drawn from the relation betwixt moral goodness, and idleness. 54 An Objection of Vasquez propounded, and answered. 55, 56 The 〈◊〉 of our indifferent actions unto sin, affords, 1. Matter of Humiliation for the time past. 57, 58 2. Matter of Caution for the future. 58, 59, 60, 61 A Treatise concerning abstinence from all appearance of evil, on 1 Thess. 5. 22. THe Coherence and scope of the words. 67, 68, 69, 70. Several interpretations of the words examined. 1. Of those that take 〈◊〉, species, Logically for sort or kind. 68, 69 2. Of those who restrain the place to matters of Doctrine. 69, 70 The point deduced from the words, is, that we are to abstain not only from things intrinsically sinful; but from all shows and appearances of sin. 71 For limitation of this point, appearance of evil is either in positions or actions. 1. 'Tis questioned whether or no we are to abstain from all positions, which have an appearance of evil or falsehood. For resolution, divers distinctions premised. 71 These distinctions premised, it is inquired, 1. How far we are to abstain from assenting to the matter and substance of Doctrines that carry an appearance of evil unto ourselves. 71, 72, 73 2. How far we are to abstain from assenting to the matter and substance of Doctrines that carry an appearance of evil generally unto others. 73, 74, 75 3. How far we are to abstain from publishing of the matter and substance of Doctrines, that carry generally an appearance of evil unto others. 75, 76, 77 3. We are to abstain from that appearance of evil in Doctrines, which is in the expressions used in their proposal. 77, 78, 79, 80, 81 Practical appearance of evil in manners or matter of practice, is either real or imaginary. 82 1. No actions that have this real appearance of evil, are upon any pretext whatsoever to be adventured upon. 82, 83, 84, 85 2. Imaginary appearance of evil is ascribed thereunto from our own or others misconceits. 1. From our own, and here if a man be in his own conscience steadfastly, fully, and firmly persuaded, that such an action is evil and unlawful, which yet in truth is not so, but lawful, what ought he to do? Here the question concerning the obligation of an erroneous conscience, is at large stated. 85 etc. 〈◊〉; adque 93 2. An imaginary appearance of evil issues from the supposals of others; and that either wilful or weak ones. 92, 93 1. Wilful, proud, and wicked ones, and here, whether the censures and scandals of wilful, etc. and pharisaical spirits, are to be regarded, and how far, is at large resolved. 93, etc. 〈◊〉, ad 104 2. If this imaginary appearance of evil flow from the supposal of a weak one, it must be 〈◊〉, so it may be without sin, 103, 104 The action in which this appearance of evil is imagined to be, is either necessary, or indifferent. ibid. 1. If it be necessary, and commanded, it must not be omitted. 104, 105 Here, in a digression, is given the sum of what Thomas, and his Interpreters, say upon this question: An 〈◊〉 spiritualia sint propter scandalum dimittenda. 105, usque ad 109 2. If the action in which this appearance of evil, is, be but indifferent, why then it appeareth from what the Apostle Paul writeth unto the Romans, cap. 14. and unto the Corinthians, 1 Cor. 8. and cap. 10. That such an action is to be 〈◊〉, though the scandal arising thereby be only per accidens. 109, 110 Of this determination there are laid down divers exceptions, or limitations, that are sound and Orthodox; and others, that are 〈◊〉 rejected. 110, etc. usque ad 146 The point of abstinence from all appearance of evil, etc. being 〈◊〉 limited, is in the next 〈◊〉 confirmed. 1. By Precepts. 146, 147, 148 2. By Examples. 148, etc. usque ad 154 3. By Reasons which are drawn, 1. From God. 2. From Satan. 3. 〈◊〉 ourselves. 4. From our brethren. 1. From God. 1. From our relations unto him. 154, 155 2. From our danger in 〈◊〉 of him. 155 2. From Satan, from the consideration, 1. Of his cruelty and malice against us. ibid. 2. Of his temptations of us. ibid. 1. Of his temptations of us to sin. ibid. For in them they are, 1. The baits by which he allures us. 156 2. An argument by which he 〈◊〉 us. 156, 157 3. An encouragement whereby he is heartened to persist in tempting of us. 157, 158 2. Of his temptations of us to despair, or at least, discomfort for sin. 158 3. Abstinence from all appearance of evil, is needful, in regard of ourselves, for by them we may incur a double danger. 1. A danger of being infected with sin. 158, 159, 160 2. A danger of being punished for sin, etc. 161 4. Abstinence from all appearance of evil, is expedient, in regard of our brethren, to avoid scandal unto them. 1. As 'tis taken by Thomas and the Schoolmen. 161, 162 2. As 'tis used vulgarly and commonly. 162 An Objection against abstinence from things indifferent, that carry an appearance of evil, is examined. 162, 163, 164 A general application of the precedent Doctrine, touching abstinence from all appearance of evil. 164 Where, 1. Are propounded three inducements pressing hereunto: It will be a course, 1. Safe and secure. 164 2. Comfortable. ibid. 3. Honourable. 165 2. Two Cautions prescribed, directing how we are to abstain from the appearance of evil; we are to abstain neither only, nor chiefly therefrom. ibid. A more particular Application of the precedent Doctrine: Wherein, 1. All men are called upon for abstinence from the appearance, especially of some evils, of their Master, of their bosom evils. 166 2. Some men, above others, are especially called upon to decline the appearance of all evils, viz. all public men, especially Ministers. 166, 167 Of the last and general Judgement, on Rom. 2. 16. THe difference amongst Expositors about the coherence of the words, decided. 173, 174, 175 From the words, occasion taken to handle the common place of the last and general judgement, which is explained, confirmed, and applied. For explication of it, 〈◊〉 in the Text set forth by its causes, object, and adjunct. 1. By its causes, principal, and instrumental. 1. Principal, God shall judge, where inquired, in what sense the Father judgeth no man. 175, 176 2. Instrumental, by Ies Christ; where, whether he shall judge according to his manhood, controverted betwixt the Thomists and the 〈◊〉. 176, 177, 178 2. Next sollows the object of this judgement, and that is twosold; personal, and real. 1. Personal, the persons to be judged, men; where a conceit of Gorrans, that by the naming of men, evil angels are excluded, is examined 2. Real, the secrets of men, their secret, 1. state, 2. actions. 179 3. Lastly, We have an adjunct, the circumstance of time, when this judgement shall be, in the day; where 〈◊〉, in what sense day is taken. 179, 180 In the next place we have the confirmation, or proof of the prediction of a future judgement, from the testimony of the Gospel, according to my Gospel, where three things are inquired. 1. What is meant by Paul's Gospel. 180 2. How Paul termeth it his Gospel. 180, 181 3. In what sense God will judge, etc. according to the Gospel. 181, 182, 183 Unto the proof of the Text are added congivences out of the Schoolmen, for the last and general judgement. 183, etc. usque ad 191 The Point being confirmed, is next applied And 1. Here is a Use of Terror unto all the wicked. 191, 192, 193 2. Here is a Use of Consolation unto all true Believers. 193, 194 Particularly against their sins, 〈◊〉, and death. 1. Against their sins. 1. The guilt. 194, 195 2. The being and pollution of them. 195 2. Against their afflictions, of what nature soever. 195, 196 3. Against their death. 196, 197 3. We may hence be exhorted to an expectation of, and preparation for this day. 1. Expectation of it. 197, 198, 199, 200 2. Preparation for it. 200, 201 Out of those many duties in which this preparation stands, some few selected, unto which the Scripture propounds the day of Judgement as a motive: and they regard either God, ourselves, or others. Those which regard God, are 1. Faith in him. 201, 202, 203 2. Repentance of our sins against him. 203, etc. usque ad 212 3. Love of him. 212, 213, 214 4. Fear of him. 214, 215, 216 5. Prayer to him. 216, 217 A second sort of duties, unto which the day of Judgement excites, regard ourselves. 1. Watchfulness. 217, 218 2. Sobriety 218, 219 3. Diligence in our particular callings. 219, 220 4. A due and diligent use, and employment of our talents. 221, etc. usque ad 229 A third sort of duties, to which the day of Judgement is a provokement, regard others. And they may again be subdivided, they respect either all men, or bad men, or good men. 1. All men, and they are two. 1. Humility towards them. 229, 230 2. Charity in our censures of them. 230 231, 232, 233 2. Bad men, and they again are two. 1. Estrangement from them. 233, 234 2. Patience towards them. 234, usq, 〈◊〉 241 3. Good men, both ordinary Christians, and Ministers; and they are two, 1. The real expressions of a cordial love of them in general. 241, 242, 243 2. All actions of Christian communion with them in particular. 243, 244, 245, 246 The day of Judgement an inducement unto a due and requisite manner in the persormance of the forementioned duties, which stands in. 1. Fervency. 246 2. Frequency. ibid. 3. Sincerity. 246, 247, 248 4. Constancy and Perseverance, and that, 1. In faith, and the profession thereof. 248, 249, 250 2. In obedience. 251, 252 A brief and Scholastical Discourse touching the nature of Thanksgiving. Eph. 5. 20. Giving thanks always for all things, unto God, and the Father, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ. FIve Generals considerable in the words, 1. An act or duty, giving thanks. The disficulty and comprehensiveness of the duty. 257, 258 By way of Connotation, it takes in all duties that concern God or man. 258 Formally in itself, it hath five 〈◊〉, or degrees. 1. Observation. 258, 259, 260 2. Confession. 260, 261 3. Remembrance. 261 4. Valuation. 261, 262, 263 5. Retribution, not of justice, but of favourable acceptance. 263, 264, 265 2. The second General in the words, is the time when this duty is to be performed, always. How understood of the effects of thanksgiving, and how of thanksgiving itself. 266 1. Habitual. ibid. 2. Actual, in reference to that, it is to be taken, not in a Mathematical, but Moral Latitude; and so imports nothing but frequency and constancy. 266. 267. 268. 3. The third thing considerable, etc. is the matter for what, all things: And we are to give thanks for all things. 1. Collectively. 268 2. Distributively. 1. Pro generibus singulorum. 268 2. Pro singulis Generum. ibid. Two Questions propounded and resolved. 1. The first, Whether or no God's greatness, absolute goodness, his goodness in himself, with other absolute perfections of his, etc. be matter of thanksgiving, & c? 263 269 2. The second, Whether or no we are to be thankful for afflictions? 269, 270, 271, 272 3. The third General, is the object unto whom, God, and the Father. The words may be taken, either in regard of us, or of Christ. 1. In regard of us. 272 2. In regard of Christ; and so they contain a description of the Father, from two relations unto Christ, he is, 1. The God of Christ, as man, viz. by special Covenant, and confederation. 272 2. The Father of Christ. 1. As God, by eternal generation. 273 2. As man, not at all by adoption, but by collation of the grace of union. 273, 274 Having spoken of both titles, God, and Father considered absolutely; they are next treated of, as they relate unto our thanksgiving; and so they distinguish our thanks from Heathenish and Jewish Doxologies. 274 And here 'tis observed, that the addition of Father is not exclusive of the Son and holy Ghost: Notwithstanding then the appropriation of it unto God, as limited unto the Person of the Father, we may justly infer the dueness of it unto God indefinitely, and that unshared with any Creature, either in whole or in part. 274, 275, 276, 277 The last Particular, is the Mediator, in whose name our thanks are to be tendered, In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ. There is, 1. Necessity of a Mediator, whether we regard ourselves, or our thanks. 277 2. Congruity that Christ should be he. 277, 278 Of Original Righteousness, and its Contrary, Concupiscence. ALL that is said concerning Original righteousness, is reduced unto two heads. 1. An Sat? 2. Quid sit? 1. Inquiry is made concerning its an sit? Where proved against the Socinians, and Dr. Taylor, That Original righteousness was in Adam. 279, 280, 277 b 278 b 279 b 2. A double quid sit of original righteousness is inquired into. 1. Quid nominis? Why the righteousness of the first man is called original righteousness. 280b 281 2. Quid rei? What is meant by the thing itself: And for the clearing of this, seven particulars explicated: It's 1. Materiale, matter or foundation. 282, 283 2. Formale, or formality. 283 3. Subject in which seated. 283, 284 4. Causation, or production. 284 5. Effects. 285, 286 6. Difference from sanctifying grace. 286, 287 7. The relation unto the first man, Whether it were natural or supernatural to him? Which disficult and important question is at large handled against Papists, Arminians, Socinians, and Dr. Taylor. 288, usque ad 318 The malignant influence, or causality of Concupiscence. Jam. 1. 14, 15. But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin: and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death. LUst is not here taken for the act of lust, nor for contracted, acquired, habitual lust: But for original lust. 318 Concerning it, we have remarkable, 1. The propriety of its inherence, 〈◊〉 own lust. 319 2. The force of its influence, it tempteth, draweth, enticeth to sin, etc. ibid. Here we have of this influence, 1. The extent. 320 2. The branches. ibid. 3. The degrees. 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325 The words being analized, and expounded, are in the next place cleared 〈◊〉 two 〈◊〉 inferences of Papists. The first, That Concupiscence is not sin. 325, 326 The second, That there are venial sins. 326, 327 One observation pitched upon: That every man's lust or 〈◊〉, is the principal cause of his temptations unto sin. 327 The point deduced from the Text, is briefly explained, confirmed, and applied. 1. For Explication, two distinctions 〈◊〉, The first, Of an immediate, and medi eaten cause of temptation. 327 The second, Of an universal, and particular cause of temptation. 327, 328 2. The Confirmation hath two parts. 1. That our own lust is a cause. 328, 329 2. That 'tis a principal cause of temptation unto sin, because it tempts, 1. Internally. 2. Esfectively. 3. Perpetually. 329 3. The uses that are to be made of this Point, are Of Information. Of Reprehension. Of Exhortation. 1. Of Information, and they are three. 1. We may hence learn what a great difference there is betwixt the temptations of lapsed man unto sin, and the temptations of our first Parents unto the first sin. 329, 330 2. We may hence be instructed, what a wide 〈◊〉 there is betwixt our temptations unto sin, and the temptations of Christ. 330, 331 3. We may from the causality, or influence of lust, infer its obliquity against Papists, Socinians, and Dr. Taylor. 331, 332 From this, there may be refuted three other Points of Popery. 1. The absolute perfection of the good works of the regenerate. 332 2. Their Justification by them. ibid. 3. Their possibility of fulsilling the Law. 332, 333 From speculative, practical uses are proceeded to. 2. The next Use, is of reprehension of all such as excuse, or extenuate their sins, by discharging them upon the importunity & violence of outward temptations, etc. 333, 334 3. Lastly, Divers Exhortations may be inferred from the causality and influence of our Concupiscence. We may hence be 〈◊〉 unto, 1. Humiliation for it. 334, 335 2. Mortification of it. 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341 3. Watchfulness against it. 341, 342 4. Thankfulness for deliverance from it. 342, 343, 344 There be also some duties, regarding our brethren, 〈◊〉 which we may from this 〈◊〉 efficacy of 〈◊〉; be pressed. 1. We may hence be exhorted to be careful in our watch over them, diligent in our admonition of them, frequent in our prayers for them. 344, 345 2. We may hence be persuaded to sugar and sweeten our reproofs of brethren, with meekness and moderation. The created and lapsed condition of man. Eccles. 7. 29. Lo, this only have I found, that God hath made man upright, but they have sought out many inventions. THe Coherence of the words, wherein inquired in what sense Solomon saith, That he found not one woman amongst a thousand. 346 In the words, two Conclusions, unto which is premised a Preface, 〈◊〉, this only have I found: Wherein three things remarkable. 1. The weight and importance of these two Conclusions, employed in the Particle, Loe. 347 2. The means by which Solomon came to the knowledge of these two Points, diligent search, and study into the word and will of God; This have I found. 347, 348 3. We have a comparison of these Conclusions, with other points of Doctrine hinted in the Particle only: This only have I found; this, and nothing else. 348 Against which an Objection, and unto it three Answers. 348, 349, 350 Having 〈◊〉 over the praecognita, the Conclusions themselves are next proceeded to. Conclus. 1. Concerns Original righteousness, God made man upright. 350 Conclus. 2. Concerns Original Sin, peccatum originale originans, the fall of our first Parents; They have sought out many inventions. These words describe the fall of our first Parents, not as 'tis considered formally in itself; but Metonymically, by its motives or effects. 1. By its motives, if we understand them only of our first Parents. 350 Against this interpretation, two doubts propounded and resolved. 350, 351 2. By its effects, if we extend them unto their posterity also, they have all sought out many inventions. 1. For the committing 351, 352, usque ad 355 of sin. 2. For the defending 355 3. For the 〈◊〉 355, 356 4 For the concealing 356, 357 The words, as hitherto expounded, run of sin considered indefinitely. There be also, that restrain them unto one particular sin, men's erroneous inventions concerning their supreme end and happiness, and the ways and means leading thereunto. 357, 358 Divers other renderings of the words considered. 358, 359, 360. By this Table the Reader may correct the mistakes in the running Title. A TABLE of the Scriptures explicated in this Book. Genesis. Cap. ver. pag. 1. 2. 275. 12. 29. 281. 26. 27. 279. 280. 26. 28. 278. b. 26. 27. 280. b. 31. 280. 293. 313. 2. 19 20. 274. b. 3. 6. 329. 330. 351. 12. 13. 355. 17. 1. 58. 20. 6. 321. 322. 39 10. 12. 159. 341. Exodus. 20. 25. 275. Leviticus. 6. 13. 267. 19 17. 97. 28. 146. 147. 21. 11. 166. 25. 146. 147. Numbers. 6. 3. 146. 6. 166. Deuteronomy. 14. 1. 146. 147. 22. 12. 18. 27. 5. 275. Judges. 7. 2. 275. 20. 274. 1 Samuel. 15. 3. 353. 1 Kings. 10. 18. 239. 2 Kings. 16. 10. 11. 144. 17. 15. 146. 18. 4. 138. 139. 140. etc. Cap. ver. pag. 5. 141. 142. 23. 13. 139. 140. 141. 142. 1 Chronicles. 21. 7. 60. Ezra. 8. 22. 98. 9 13. 272. Esther. 4 14. 227. Job. 1 4. 5. 57 58. 29. 16. 232. 233. 31. 33. 356. Psalms. 4. 6. 358. 19 12. 58. 179. 32. 5. 206. 49. 14. 240. 50. 21. 207. 22. 208. 51. 5. 319. 334. 57 7. 266. 19 258. 63. 3. 259. 68 13. 196. 73. 2. 3. 17. 240. 89. 2. 267. 96. 11. 12. 13. 193. 194. 97. 11. 195. 98. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9 193. 194. 101. 3. 159. 340. 103. 2. 161. 106. 1. 2. 3. 264. 265. 43. 353. 118. 27. 267. 119. 113. 154. 143. 2. 202. Proverbs. 5. 8. 146. Cap. ver. pag. 16. 4. 278. b. 17. 7. 265. 27. 19 319. Ecclesiastes. 3. 16. 17. 238. 239. 240. 7. 29. 281. 282. 29. 280. 11. 9 210. Canticles. 1. 7. 148. 5. 2. 218. Isaiah. 1. 22. 23. 239. 3. 16. usq. ad 25. 60. 39 60. 61. 53. 1. 181. 57 10. 354. Jeremiah. 2. 13. 357. 23. 534. Lamentations. 3. 22. 271. 23. 267. Ezekiel. 43. 8. 114. 44. 20. 147. Hosea. 2. 16. 147. 10. 2. 307. Amos. 5. 7. 211. 6. 3. 12. 211. Habakkuk. 1. 16. 275. Zachariah. 14. 20. 21. 59 Malachi. Cap. ver. pag. 3. 17. 195. 4. 1. 191. 2. 215. 216. 3. 216. 240. Matthew. 4. 3. 5. 6. 8. 9 330. 331. 5. 28. 322. 29. 30. 33. 34. 39 40. 41. 136. 7. 6. 96. 97. 17. 18. 331. 306. 22. 23. 209. 9 29. 182. 10. 27. 232. 12. 8. 1. 50. 20. 40. 24. 31. 32. 35. 36. 49. 50. 51. 15. 12. 13. 14. 99 19 328. 16. 18. 40. 17. from 24. usque ad sinem, p. 149. 150. 151. 27. 98. 18. 7. 96. 120. 19 28. 196. 197. 20. 8. 179. 22. 12. 202. 24. 45. 46. 47. 220. 25. 1. usque ad 13. 247. 248. 6. 179. 5. 217. 218. 10. 11. 12. 200. 14. 18. 21. 26. 30. 222. 223 14. 227. 20. 21. 22. 23. 228. 32. 33. 233. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 241. Mark. 2. 28. 150. 7. 21. 22. 342. 12. 41. 42. 43. 44. 228. 13. 34. 35. 36. 37. 219. 220. Luke. 12. 1, 2, 3. 246. 247. Cap. ver. pag. 3. 232. 35. 201. 47. 201. 48. 228. 229. 16. 19 27. 19 23. 61. 17. 1. 2. 127. 27. 28. 29. 61. 19 12. 13. 226. 16. 17. 18. 19 246. 17. 19 222. 21. 1. 2. 3. 4. 228. 34. 35. 218. 35. 36. 217. John. 3. 18. 203. 5. 22. 176. 27. 177. 178. 6. 29. 40. 7. 24. 21. 14. 30. 330. 15. 15. 194. 16. 8. 9 10. 207. 17. 20. 181. 20. 17. 273. Acts. 3. 19 195. 196. 10. 42. 180. 15. 20. 29. 14. 151. 17. 30. 31. 203. 204. 205. 24. 25. 191. Romans. 1. 30. 352. 2. 5. 191. 206. 6. 12. 336. 337. 13. 336. 337. 14. 336. 337. 7. 8. 328. 335. 13. 335. 22. 311. 23. 311. 24. 334. 25. 343. 8. 7. 311. 19 196. 23. 197. 198. 26. 200. Cap. ver. pag. 13. 4. 32. 120. 5. 117. 118. 14. 1. 21. 24. 2. 18. 3. 23. 28. 29. 4. 29. 5. 28. 9 178. 10. 231. 244. 245. 11. 12. 231. 244. 245. 13. 35. 231. 244. 245. 14. 21. 27. 28. 36. 15. 39 41. 99 123. 127 278. 279 16. 40. 41. 17. 38. 20. 39 40. 123. 127. 21. 35. 22. 28. 36. 42. 23. 28. 15. 2. 132. 16. 16. 59 23. 87. 1. Cor. 1. 5. 230. 7. 230. 4. 3. 237. 4. 231. 232. 5. 190. 231. 232. 7. 344. 5. 10. 233. 6. 6. 98. 7. 98. 12. 11. 12. 13. 14. 26. 27. 102 7. 17. 227. 229. 8. per. tot. 95. 110. 1. 34. 8. 15. 16. 120. 9 120. 11. 39 12. 38. 13. 43. 44. 120. 121. 128. 133. 135. 136. 9 19 101. 20. 101. 21. 101. 22. 101. 24. 190. Cap. ver. pag. 27. 319. 339. 10. 20. usque ad 〈◊〉. 95. 110 36. 37 23. 14. 15. 34. 24. 34. 25. 15. 16. 21. 37. 27. 15. 16. 21. 28. 37. 38. 111. 112. 29. 37. 40. 30. 40. 31. 41. 52. 53. 32. 41. 96. 117. 120. 131. 132. 33. 42. 15. 58. 246. 16. 22. 212. 213. 2. Cor. 4. 10. 221. 11. 220. 221. 5. 10. 185. Galat. 2. 11. 144. 12. 144. 13. 144. 14. 144. 3. 10. 205. 4. 15. 33. 5. 1. 23. 5. 198. 13. 24. 25. 34. 17. 312. 332. 20. 304. 24. 338. 6. 1. 345. Ephes. 2. 3. 289. 292. 4. 13. 249. 24. 279. b. 28. 224. 30. 197. Philip. 3. 19 198. 199. Cap. ver. pag. 20. 198. 199. 4. 5. 219. 6. 219. Coloss. 2. 〈◊〉. 303. 3. 3. 195. 4. 195. 10. 277. 278. b. 17. 54. 25. 230. 1 Thess. 1. 9 199. 10. 199. 2. 9 151. 152. 3. 12. 241. 13. 241. 5. 2. 218. 6. 218. 2 Thess. 1. 10. 195 2. 1. 248. 249 2. 248. 249 2 Tim. 4. 8. 197 Titus. 1. 15. 58 2. 12. 199 13. 199 Hebrews. 2. 3. 193 3. 15. 344 4. 1. 148 5. 1. 278 9 28. 194. 197 10. 36, 37, 38, 39 250. 251 252 12. 1. 2. 337. 338. 15. 334 23. 230, 244 James. 1. 4. 234. Cap. ver. pag. 13. 347 17. 274 5. 1, 2, 3. 223, 224 7, 8, 9, 234. usque ad 241 8. 250. 9 245. 246 1 Peter. 1. 13. 200 13. 14. 15. 201. 17. 214 2. 5. 59 13. 14. 16. 31. 32 16. 24. 25. 163 4. 4. 5. 209. 210 7. 216. 218. 10. 229. 11. 54. 2 Peter. 1. 4. 328. 344 3. 3. 4. 209 11. 12. 199. 12. 201 12. 13. 14. 208. 14. 202 1 john. 2. 1. 2. 194 28. 202 3. 20. 203 4. 17. 212 Judas. 14. 15. 207. 213. 214. 23. 147. 148. Revelations. 1. 7. 206. 207. 177. 3. 12. 249. 6. 15. 16. 17. 191. 192 8. 3. 278 14. 7. 215. 20. 12. 247. 22. 17. 199. 200. Note, That Pages 277. 278. 279. 280. are, by a mistake of the Printer, twice figured, and therefore the latter Pages are in the Tables distinguished from the former, by the Letter b. Addenda & Corrigenda. EPistle, r. of the ablest Pens, p. 4. l. x 5. before actus homicidii r. lapis non est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Habes ibi medium negationis, sed cum 〈◊〉 ad 〈◊〉 extremum, p. 7. l. 33. r. it is, p. 15. l. 9 deal the first and, p. 10. Marg. l. 16. r. prosecutio, p. 〈◊〉. l. 27. r. 〈◊〉 scandals, p. 24. l. 21. r. given, p. 30. l. 14. for Calvinists r. 〈◊〉, p. 56. Marg. l. 26. r. 〈◊〉, p. 74. l. 2. 3. r. razed, p. 82. Marg. r. ex accidenti, p. 83. l. 22. r. as well as the performance, p. 85. l. 25. r. into consideration, p. 88 Marg. l. 37. r. sub ratione. p. 89. l. 8. r. princes, p. 94. l. 19 r. assertion, p. 102. 〈◊〉: two last lines, r. 〈◊〉, p. 〈◊〉. l. antepenult. deal all, p. 107. l. 7. r. but also, p. 112. l. 31. r. or else determined, p. 119. Marg. l. 5. r. 〈◊〉, vel partim justae, & partim injustae, p. 140. Marg. l. 〈◊〉, r. sapienter, p. 142. 〈◊〉. l. 4. r. morem, p. 148. Marg. l. 6. r. covered, p. 150. l. 23. r. a badge of the bondage, p. 157. l. 12. r. to, and l. 19 20. r. appearances, p. 165. l. 27. r. detestation, p. 167. l. 21. r. circumspection, p. 174. l. 22. 23. r. Archangel, p. 186. l. 24. r. there was, p. 187. l. 1. 〈◊〉. accrued, 〈◊〉 99 l. 6. r. so much despised, and a person they have so much contemned, p. 201. l. 35. r. and they are, 1. Faith, p. 202. l. 13. r. a David, p. 203. l. 5. r. for it, p. 204. l. 1. r. commands, and l. 20. r. so much improved, and l. 26. r. to repent by a more, p. 214. l. 〈◊〉, for a, r. as, p 226. l. 〈◊〉. r. Sermons, that we have heard the many good Books, etc. p. 231. l. 5. r. as sons, p. 233. l. 19 r. a tendency, p. 235. l. 20. deal second of, p. 237. l. 1. r. false, l. 27. r. employed, p. 244. l. 2. r. of petition, p. 247. 〈◊〉. 20. r. closest, p. 249. l. 28. r. fear of death, p. 251. Mar. l. 12, 13. r. fatigat &, p. 260. l. 12. r. such as is, p. 261. l. 31. r. ipso dono, p. 262. l. 1. r. fail we, p. 266. l. 32. 33. r. we are then always bound to give thanks actually, yet we are not bound to give thanks actually always, p. 268. l. 33. r. privative, p. 269. l. 7. r. 〈◊〉, p. 270. l. 8. r. formally, p. 〈◊〉. l. 21. r. on unto the, p. 276. l. 5. r. proprio, p. 280. l. 35. r. 〈◊〉, p. 281. l. 7. r. simultaneous, p. 292. l. 20. r. concreated therewith, p. 293. l. 1. r. summed up, p. 299. l. 7. r. necessarily, l. 32. r. it will, p. 300. l. 15. r. an p. 309. l. 6. r. excepted. p. 310. Marg: l. 4, 5. r. 〈◊〉, p. 311. l. 29. r. effect, l. 37. r. it fighteth, p. 314. l. 14. r. donum, p. 315. l. 21. r. and p. 319. l. 30. r. mens p. 320. l. 13. r. an aversion, p. 321. l. 12, 13. r. sub-divisions, p. 322. l. 20. r. by the bringing forth of sin, is meant the bringing of it forth, p. 327. l. 9 r. owe unto, l. 27. r. cause, l. 〈◊〉. r. as of, l. 31. r. and much, p. 328. l 5, 6, 7. deal as their 〈◊〉 varieth not only in several men, but in the same men, l. 29. r. the greatest. p. 331. l. 〈◊〉. r. lay down briesly, p. 334. l. 2. r. as the 〈◊〉, p. 337. l. 2. r. an obedience, l. 〈◊〉. r. souls, p. 339. l. 31. r. this haste, p. 344. l. 13. r. efficacy of lust, p. 355. l. 20. r. by translation. Slighter escapes are left unto the pardon and correction of the candid and intelligent Reader. A TREATISE Concerning the INDIFFERENCY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. 1 Corinth. 6. 10. All things are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient. All things are lawful for me, but I will not be brought under the power of any. 1 Cor. 10. 23. All things are lawful for me, but all things edify not: OXFORD, Printed by Hen: Hall, Printer to the UNIVERSITY, for Tho: Robinson, 1659. To the Right Worshipful Sir WILLIAM WYNDHAM, of Orchard Wyndham, in the County of Somerset, BARONET. SIR, THose that know the depth of my obligations to you, have long since expected my public acknowledgement thereof; and having now an opportunity to make it: My own Conscience would condemn me of a most disingenuous ingratitude, if I should any longer defer it. But not only my private, and personal engagements, but your own merit will justify this Dedication: for 'tis so well, and generally known, as that it may, with a great deal of justice, entitle you unto the exactest pieces of the able pens of the age, therefore much more unto the poor, and mean endeavours of Your Unworthy, though most grateful Servant HENRY JEANRS. A TREATISE Concerning the INDIFFERENCY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. I Have often wondered at some Prelatists, charging the poor non-conformists with denial of things indifferent; from which their Writings do sufficiently acquit them: Dr John Burgess (in his Rejoinder, Pag. 188, 189.) tells 〈◊〉, that Mr Bradshaw against all Learning, and sense, resolves, that there is nothing indifferent. But from this accusation, we have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his Vindication (in his fresh suit against 〈◊〉, pag. 161, 〈◊〉.) 〈◊〉 Hammond (in his grounds of Uniformity) accuseth Amesius himself for this opinion; but with how little truth, the Reader may, soon see; if he please to peruse these following places in him, Med. Theolog. lib. 2. cap. 3. sect. 13, 14, 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. lib. 3. cap. 18. Gregory de 〈◊〉 informs me, that one of the Articles of John Husse, (anathematised in the Council of Constance.) was, that 〈◊〉 sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. That which Papists of old charged upon him, these men impute to those, whom they have been pleased to nickname 〈◊〉. But for the untruth, and injustice of this crimination, we dare appeal to the more moderate, and Learned of their own party. The Reverend, and Learned Dr Sanderson disputeth against them, for making the restraint of the outward man in matters indifferent, an impeachment to Christian liberty; on Rome 14. 3. Pag. 24. 25. And this presupposeth that they held somethings to be in their nature indifferent. I shall therefore spend no more time, or paper, to wipe off an aspersion so manifestly untrue, and unjust: But yet however this hath occasioned me to resolve upon the brief stating of the truth touching things, or actions indifferent: and in order hereunto I shall 1. Premise some Distinctions concerning the actions of man; and 2. Explain what is meant by indifferency. 1. First, The actions of man are either indeliberate or deliberate. 1. Indeliberate, which proceed, either from the disposition of natural qualities (as hungering, thirsting, the easing and disburdening of nature) or else from the force of Imagination, (as rubbing of the beard, or hand, scratching of the head, lifting up of a straw from the ground, and such like things, when a man thinks not of them.) 2. Deliberate, which proceed from deliberate reason and are properly humane, and rational actions, all voluntary actions. These may be considered two manner of ways. 1. In the general, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 2. 〈◊〉 the singulars, and individuals, actu 〈◊〉. The former consideration is merely in regard of the object; The latter taketh in all circumstances whatsoever: The former is a consideration of actions, secundum speciem, according to their sort or 〈◊〉; The latter is a consideration of them in regard of their actual existence. In a second place we are to inquire, what is meant by the 〈◊〉 of actions: It apparently carrieth in its notlon, a negation of moral goodness, and illness: I say, signanter, of moral goodness, and illness; because the most indifferent actions are 〈◊〉, and may be naturally good. 〈◊〉 indifferent action than 〈◊〉 that, which is neither 〈◊〉 good, 〈◊〉 evil: The nature 〈◊〉 things 〈◊〉, (saith the great Hpoker in his 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉, Pag. 59) is neither to be commanded, nor forbidden, but left free, and arbitrary: With which I would desire Dr Hammond to reconcile what he hath in his Treatise of Will-worship; that the best of moral actions, the highest degrees of virtue, and of worship, the most superlative love of God are uncommanded: and he, I hope, will give me leave to add, that they are not forbidden, and hereupon I shall conclude, that (by Mr Hooker his definition) they are indifferent; which is as unsober a conceit almost, as can be uttered, and unworthy of any serious resutation. I shall here only make use of part of his expressions against Ames (in his grounds of Uniformity, Pag. 14.) He that thinks the highest degree of virtue is indifferent, doth certainly use other Dictionaries than we do. But to leave him, I shall for clearing the nature of indifferency propound, and satisfy two Queries. 1. What medium indifferent things are betwixt things morally good, and evil? whether medium abnegationis, or participationis? The Author of Altar Damascenum affirmeth it to be medium 〈◊〉 a middle between them by way of abnegation, Adiaphora non sunt media per participationem, ut 〈◊〉 inter album, & nigrum; sed per negationem utriúsque extremi, conformitatis & difformitatis ad rectam 〈◊〉, seu 〈◊〉, pag. 496. But for the disproof of this, I shall desire you to observe out of (a) Esse 〈◊〉 ad bonum, & malum contingit dupliciter, aut per modum abstractionis, secundum quod universale 〈◊〉 significat ut abstractum à differentiis, & concontrariis dividentibus ipsum, unde in 〈◊〉 communitate significatum significatur ut 〈◊〉 se habens 〈◊〉 differentiam. Sicut animal réque significatur ut rationale 〈◊〉 ut irrationale, & tamen 〈◊〉 omne 〈◊〉 animal esse 〈◊〉 vel 〈◊〉. Et 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 actus in 〈◊〉 quod est agere, 〈◊〉 quidem bonitatem in quantum est ens, sed 〈◊〉 se 〈◊〉 bonitatem, vel malitiam moralem. Et 〈◊〉 bonum ex 〈◊〉 indifferenter le habet ad bonum & malum ex cucumstantiâ & 〈◊〉, quamvis non inveniatur aliquod bonum in genere particulari, quod non sit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vestitum, & ad aliquem finem ordinatum, unde oportet, quod bonitatem, vel malitiam 〈◊〉. Et secundum hane considerationem quidam dixerunt omnes actus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse in eo quod sunt actus, & quidam 〈◊〉, quod non omnes, sed aliqui, accipientes magis in speciali nomina 〈◊〉, quae non 〈◊〉 aliquid, unde actus, ad malitiam vel 〈◊〉 determinetur, vel 〈◊〉 vel finem vel circumstantiam, 〈◊〉 comedere, coire, et hujusmodi. Alio modo contingit 〈◊〉 secundum, quod aliquod particulare significatum delicit a susceptibilitate 〈◊〉 perfectionis, sicut lapis à susceptibilitate visus, & 〈◊〉 modo aliqui actus, qui deficiunt a susceptibilitate bonitatis moralis dicuntur indifferenter. lib. 2. senten. 〈◊〉 40. quaest. 〈◊〉. Capreolus, that a thing may be said to be a medium, or middle betwixt that which is morally good, and morally evil; either by way of abstràction from them (as a general nature is abstracted from its differences, a subject from its accidents;) or else by way of repugnancy unto them, because it is uncapable of them, and thus a stone is of a middle nature betwixt that which seeth, and is blind, because it is uncapable of both sight, and blindness. Now it is this latter way, that a thing is said to be a medium by the abnegation of each extreme, as is evident by the instances usually brought for the exemplification hereof; For they are of such things as are uncapable of, and repugnant unto both extremes. And the most indifferent actions, that proceed from deliberate reason, are capable of becoming either good, or evil, by circumstances, and carry no 〈◊〉 thereunto: so much is confessed by Didoclave himself in the place above mentioned. Tertium quod constituit hujus medii formale est non repugnantia ad utrunque extremum. Actus 〈◊〉 in 'bove cornu-peta nullam habet conformitatem, aut dissormitatem ad rectam rationem, non tamen dicitur actus indifferens, quia ibi est repugnantia ad utrunque extremum, nam bos est animal irratimale. Adiaphora igitur sunt dubia, indistincta, & UTRÓQUE vergentia, sed non magis vergentia in unum quam alterum extremum. Others therefore conclude, that indifferent actions are a medium, or middle betwixt good, and bad, in a way of participation; and that either potential, or actual. 1. Potential, There is in them a non-repugnancy unto either of the extremes, unto moral goodness or badness, so that they may be either good, or bad by circumstances. 2. Actual, and this agreeth only to such indifferent acts, as become good by circumstances, for they being but imperfectly good, are in part good, and in part evil, and so partake actually of both extremes. By this you may see, though indifferent actions, which proceed from deliberate reason may in some sense be said to be a medium of participation betwixt that which is morally good, or evil; yet they are not said to be a middle of participation in such a strict sense, as lukewarmness is betwixt cold, and heat; for that always partaketh actually of both extremes (cold, and heat,) whereas indifferent actions do not always actually partake of the two extremes, (moral goodness or badness,) but only when they are good; for many of them may be, and too often are by circumstances totally and altogether evil, and in no respect good. Amesius qualifies the matter, and affirmeth that as it is not medium merae abnegationis, so it is medium alicujus participationis, a middle not of mere abnegation, but of some participation. Absolutely, and simply, in strictness of speech, it is neither medium negationis, nor participationis: 1. Not 〈◊〉; because it hath no repugnancy unto its extremes: 2. Not participationis; because it doth not always actually partake of both extremes; But yet, 〈◊〉 quid, after a sort, and in some respect, it may be reduced unto both medium abnegationis, and participationis: It resembleth medium 〈◊〉, because as such it is neither of the extremes; and it resembleth medium participationis, because sometimes it actually participates of both extremes: And thus you see how these different opinions may be reconciled; But yet (because denominatio fit à potiori) we shall rather reduce it unto medium participationis; because unto that it hath the greatest resemblance. A second question is; Whether all indifferent actions be equally indifferent? no more bending unto evil, then unto good? Didoclave holds the affirmative, Nec solum (saith he) requiritur negatio conformitatis, seu difformitatis ad legem ceu rectam rationem, sed etiam majoris propensionis in unam quam in aliam partem. And again afterwards: Adiaphora non sunt magis vergentia in unum quam alterum extremum. The incomparably Learned Dr Sanderson is of a contrary opinion, that some things are unequally indifferent, Indifferentia ad unum (as he is pleased to call them) I shall transcribe his words, and with all due reverence of his person briefly examine them. Dr Sanderson on Rome 3. 8. pag. 58. 59 Things unequally indifferent are such, as though they be neither universally good, not absolutely evil, yet even barely considered, sway more, or less rather the one way, than the other: And that either unto good, or unto evil. Of the former sort are such outward actions, as being in moral precepts 〈◊〉 commanded, are yet sometimes sinfully and ill done: as, giving an alms, hearing a 〈◊〉, repreoving an offender; and the like, which are in themselves good, and so to be accounted, rather than evil; though some unhappy Circumstance or other may make them ill. Of the latter sort are such outward actions, as being in moral precepts indefinitely prohibited, are yet in some cases lawful, and may be well done: as, swearing an oath, travelling on the Sabbath day, playing for money, and the like: which are in themselves rather evil, then good, because they are ever 〈◊〉, unless all circumstances concur to make them good. Now of these actions, though the former sort carry the face of good, the latter of evil; yet in very truth both sorts are indifferent. Understand me aright: I do not mean indifferent, indifferentiâ contradictionis, such as may be indifferently 〈◊〉 done, or not done; but indifferent only indifferentiâ contrarietatis, such as (suppose the doing) may be indifferently either good, or evil: because so they may be done, as to be good, and so they may be done also, as to be evil; but yet with this difference, that 〈◊〉 former, though indifferent, and in some cases evil, are yet of themselves notably and eminently inclined unto good rather then evil; and these latter proportionably unto evil, rather than good. For answer: The first sort of actions, such as being in moral precepts indefinitely commanded, are yet sometimes sinfully and ill done, (as, giving an alms, hearing a sermon, reproving an offender, and the like,) are not in the language of the Schoolmen, indifferent actions: This I shall make good by an argument out of Suarez (brought by him unto another purpose;) He disputing against some, that held all humane actions to be indifferent, proves the contrary; First in inward, then in outward actions; and his argument 〈◊〉 outward actions stands thus. If external acts be considered according to an objective goodness, or illness, this cannot be true, because there are many actions in their own nature objectively evil, and prohibited, and there are other also objectively good, and honest; because this goodness, and illness is not taken by extrinsic Denomination, from the inward act, but from its 〈◊〉 call agreement with, or repugnancy unto right reason. Those actions which have a material, and objective goodness, are not indifferent actions in the language of the Schools. But the actions, that the Doctor speaks of, have an objective, and material goodness, because they are commanded, and therefore they are not indifferent. But, saith the Doctor, they are indifferent at lest indifferentiâ Contrarietatis, such as (suppose the doing) may be indifferently either good or evil: because so they may be done, as to be good, and so they may be done also, as to be evil. For answer: By this account all outward ordinances of God, all external acts of worship, and indeed all outward good works whatsoever should be actions indifferent, because they may be done well, or ill: But to say that all these are indifferent would be very strange language: for although they may have evil cast upon them externally by the agent, yet this is no hindrance but that they may be in themselves objectively and materially good, as being matter of precept. But perhaps there may be some mystery in this clause, indefinitely commanded: They are commanded, but not to be performed always, but only loco, & tempore debitis; according to the known rule, Affirmativa praecepta obligant semper, non ad semper. For answer: This will nothing alter the case; for hereby it will follow, that the matter of all affirmative precepts should be indifferent; And whosoever shall say so takes indifferency in a different notion from the usual acception thereof by both Papists, and Protestants; who jointly make it to be a middle thing betwixt that moral goodness, and badness, which is called 〈◊〉 or material. As for the second sort of Actions, I readily confess that in some sense they may be said to be unequally indifferent, inclining and swaying more to evil, then to good. To clear which I shall distinguish of a twofold consideration of such actions: They may be considered merely in regard of their object, or else also in regard of the circumstances, which usually are annexed with them: In regard of their object they are equally indifferent; But yet in regard of Circumstances may be said to be more notably and eminently inclined unto evil then unto good; because the circumstances, which generally, and commonly are connexed with them, are evil. But as for the reason, which the Doctor bringeth to prove them to be unequally indifferent, rather evil, then good, is to me very unsatisfying. His words are, which are in themselves rather evil, then good, because they are over 〈◊〉, unless all circumstances concur to make them good. The ground of my exception against this reason is; because as much may be said of all outward good works, religious duties, and services whatsoever: They are all ever evil, unless all circumstances concur to make them good, according to that of Dionysius, Bonum fit ex causâ integrâ: malum ex quovis defectu. I shall conclude my answer unto this second 〈◊〉, with rehearsal of Dr Ames his proposal, and decision of it. An actiones indifferentes nihil inter se differant, sed aequè omnes à bono, & malo distent? Resp. In suâ intrinsecâ naturâ nihil omnino 〈◊〉; sed tamen 〈◊〉 sunt, quae ut plurimum habent circumstantias malas annexas, atque adeò dicuntur vergere in malum, aut in malum sonare, ut accusatoris aut carnificis munere fungi: quaedam etiam, quae ut plurimum habent circumstantias bonas annexas, atque adeò dicuntur 〈◊〉 in bonum, aut in bonum sonare, ut colere agros, diligentiam in studiis adhibere, etc. In their own intrinsical nature they differ nothing at all: but yet there are some which for the most part have evil circumstances annexed to them, and so bend more toward evil, and have an evil name: as to do the work of an accuser, the osfice of an hangman, etc. some there be also which for the most part have good circumstances, and so bend toward good, and have a good name, as to till the ground, to 〈◊〉 our study diligently etc. Having premised these things, I shall in the next place, proceed to lay down some conclusions concerning the indifferency of the actions of man: and they shall be three. 1. Conclusion. The Indeliberate actions of man which proceed from the disposition of natural qualities, or only from the Imagination, as to rub the beard, or hands, to scratch the head, to move the head, feet, or a staff (The mind being not intent upon them,) may be, and are indifferent, not only in the general, but in their individuals, and singulars: The reason which b 1. 2a qu. 18. art. 9 Aquinas giveth for this is very solid; Because such actions to speak properly are not moral, and humane, for they do not proceed from the soul as reasonable: Those actions, which are not moral, or of moral consideration, are uncapable of moral goodness or badness: for moral goodness, or badness implieth a moral being: But now those actions which proceed from the disposition of natural qualities, or from the force of the Imagination only are not moral, are not of moral consideration, they are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 moris: And the reason is because actions have their morality 〈◊〉 this, that they are some way or other immediately, or mediately derived from reason. Against this reason of Aquinas, (c) Durand propounds this following objection: that if the acts of the imagination be uncapable 〈◊〉 contra hoc 〈◊〉, quia ubi 〈◊〉 dominium rationis, vel voluntatis, ibi 〈◊〉 genus 〈◊〉, led 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vel 〈◊〉 invenitur non solum in actibus qui sequuntur rationem 〈◊〉, sed etiam qui praecedunt, in quantum à ratione praeveniri potuerunt, ut dictum suit, supra, dist. 24. q. 5. (〈◊〉 in sensualitate nullum posset esse 〈◊〉) ergo actus procedentes à solâ imaginatione pertinent ad genus moris, 〈◊〉 subsunt imperio rationis, in quantum ab ea pollunt 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 sic per 〈◊〉 sunt susceptivi bonitatis, & 〈◊〉 moralis, cujus 〈◊〉 assumebatur pro fundamento. Et ad hoc potest dici, quod aliqui actus procedentes ab imaginatione, et praevenientes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sunt tales, circa quos ratio debet esse pervigil, ne insurgant, et tales sunt 〈◊〉 appetitus sensitivi circa materiam 〈◊〉 etc. & 〈◊〉 talium actuum 〈◊〉 cunque deliberationem praeveniant, potest 〈◊〉 negligens ratio in reprimendo, & 〈◊〉 &c, 〈◊〉 de his procedit ratio, 〈◊〉 quod sunt aliquo modo in genere moris, rec sunt indifferentes. 〈◊〉 autem sunt, circa quos ratio nullo modo 〈◊〉 esse pervigil, nisi in casu ratione 〈◊〉 adjuncti, quia objecta talium 〈◊〉 se non sunt materia alicujus 〈◊〉 etc. ut 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, vel 〈◊〉 barbam: Et 〈◊〉 actus ut sic pervenientes, quos non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nisi in casu sunt purè extra 〈◊〉 moris, & indifferentes ad bonum, & malum, de quibus intelligenda 〈◊〉 praedicta opinio. of a moral being, and so not of a moral consideration, that then they are uncapable of sin: for every 〈◊〉 action is a moral action: But now they are not uncapable of sin: for it is most evident, that in sensualitate potest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that sin may be in the indeliberate acts of the sensitive appetite, and in the acts of the imagination; and the reason is, because the sensual powers or faculties are said to belong or appertain unto reason, though not essentialiter, yet participatiuè, as being under the conduct and guidance of right reason, obliged to hearken unto its voice, and to obey all its just Commands, and dictates. The answer here-unto in the same Author is, that the indeliberate acts of the sensitive powers, and faculties are of two sorts. 1. Some have for their matter, sin, and such are moral: for they are voluntary, though not directly, as being produced or commanded by the will, yet indirectly, as being that, which the will is able, and obliged to hinder: and therefore reason ought to be watchful to prevent the rising of them. But now there are some indeliberate acts of the sensitive faculties, which have not for their objects the matter of sin, such as are above instanced in, and of them we may say indefinitely, and in the general, that they are not moral; because they are not voluntary, either directly, or indirectly; Reason is not bound to keep any watch over them, nor is the will bound to restrain, and repress them; nisi in casu, rationo alicujus adiuncti, as Durand limits it. As when they are a hindrance to Duties, or against that decency which is required in the worship, and service of God; As for example if a man should be rubbing of his beard, scratching of his head, moving of his feet, or any other part of his body in an undecent way in the act of receiving the elements in the Lord's supper: That which I have said touching this Conclusion is for the substance of it in Ames de Conscientiâ. lib. 3. cap. 18. His words I shall transcribe. Actiones quaedam ita sunt hominis, ut non sint proprie humanae, illae scilicet, quae procedunt ab imaginatione nudâ, & non a ratione deliberatâ, ut fricare manus, aut barbam, scalpere caput, levare festucam, etc. dum aliud aliquid cogitamus. Hujusmodi actiones non sunt moraliter 〈◊〉 aut malae: quia non sunt in genere moris constitutae, dum omni consilio destituuntur. Quamvis enim istis etiam 〈◊〉 quis peccare, ut si tempore precum vagari sineret imaginationem suam, et huiusmodi nugis indulgere, ipsae tamen actiones per se 〈◊〉 malae sunt, 〈◊〉 bonae. Subijciuntur quidem istiusmodi motus imperio arbitrii humani; sed ita subijciuntur, 〈◊〉 possint exerceri nullo rationis actu 〈◊〉 nequè ulterius illas ratione praevenire tenemur, quam ut officis non obsint. Sicut in oculorum 〈◊〉 movendis moderandi potestatem habet ratio, et voluntas: sed non 〈◊〉 operae pretium observare quoties connivemus, si modo caveatur, ne praeter decorum, aut officium aliquid in 〈◊〉 admittatur. 1. There be some actions, which though they be actions of man, yet they are not humane actions, such are those which proceed from imagination only, and not from deliberate reason, as the rubbings of men's hands, to scratch the head or beard, to take up a straw, etc. while we are thinking of something else: these actions are not morally good or evil, they want that which is required to make them so, namely counsel and deliberation: for although a man may sin by those actions, as if in time of prayer he suffer his imagination to wander, and do give way to such toyings as those. Yet these actions considered in themselves are neither good nor evil. It is true these motions are subject to the Command of man's will, but yet they are so subject, that they may be exercised without any precedent act of reason; neither are we 〈◊〉 any farther by reason to prevent them, but only so 〈◊〉 that they hinder not the duties we are about. So 〈◊〉 moving of the eyelids, reason and the will have power to moderate them, but it is not worth the while to take notice how often we wink, if so be we take heed, that in such things nothing be done, which is undecent, or against our duty. A second Conclusion: There be divers deliberate actions, that proceed from deliberate reason, which if they be considered in actu signato, in the general, secundum speciem, according to their sort, or Kind, as abstracted from all singularizing circumstances. are indifferent, neither morally good, nor evil: This I shall confirm by scripture, and by reason. 1. By scripture: And here we have a most signal place. 1. Cor. 6. 12. All things are lawful unto me. Here all things are to be taken not absolutely, but limitedly, for all indifferent things: for as for things Commanded, they are not only lawful, but also necessary, and therefore must be done 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: And as for things prohibited, they are unlawful and sinful. The words than are an undeniable proof of the indifferency of some actions, and withal an explication of such indifferency: Indifferent actions are merely lawful, neither necessary, nor unlawful; They may lawfully be done, and lawfully be abstained from. In this text than 〈◊〉 have the extent of our Christian liberty 〈◊〉, and limited. 1. We have the extent of it unto all indifferent things asserted; And the Apostle contents not himself to affirm it once, but doubleth the affirmation: The reason of which may be, because he thought it an important point, or because he would put it out of all doubt, and controversy. 2. We have also a twofold limitation, or restraint put upon the use or exercising of our Christian liberty as touching things indifferent; But all things are not expedient; But I will not be brought under the power of any. Many think, that Paul speaks these words per mimesin, a figure called imitation; that he speaks not in his own person, but rehearseth the words of the Corinthians: so that here is, first Corinthiorum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the objection of the Corinthians, All things are lawful for me: secondly, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the reply of Paul, But all things are not expedient: But I will not be brought under the power of any. But whether the Apostle uttered his own words, or the Corinthians is not material: because, suppose they be the words of the Corinthians, he grants them with due limitations: The sentence of Paul, saith Aegidius Hunnius, consists of a concession and correction. 1. A Concession of the lawfulness of all indifferent things. All things are lawful for me. 2. A Correction or restriction of this large grant: wherein he showeth: that though all indifferent things be in their general nature lawful; yet they are in some cases to be abstained from, when they are inexpedient: when they enthrall us unto either persons, or things: But all things are not 〈◊〉: But I will not be brought under the power of any. A great difference there is amongst expositors about the coherence of these words: Some think, that the Apostle makes way for that Argument which he handles at large chap: 9 All things are lawful for me; therefore to receive a salary for preaching of the Gospel is lawful: But I will not make use of this my liberty: Because it will not be expedient unto the promoting of the Gospel amongst you, but an hindrance rather: And because I will retain my full liberty of reproving you, which I shall in great part lose, if I should receive my whole livelihood from you: As it fares with the false prophets among you, that are no better than Trencher chaplains, that dare not touch your sores, meddle with either your sins, or errors, for fear that hereupon you should shorten your benevolence: I will not be brought under the power of any. But the coherence is too 〈◊〉 fetched, and we may say the same of others, who would make these words to cohere with chap. 8. v. 9 Others with more probability derive the connexion of the words only from the present chapter: and they are again subdivided: some fetch it from the words foregoing: Others from the words following. 1. From the words foregoing. The Apostles discourse about going to law with Brethren before the unjust, and unbelievers: The Corinthians might be ready to object in behalf of this their practice, that it was a thing in its own nature indifferent, not prohibited by the word of God, and therefore lawful; for all things are lawful, that is all indifferent things. True, saith the Apostle, but. 1. all things are not expedient: And in particular for Christians to sue Christians before Paganish Tribunals is so far from being expedient, as that it is an impediment unto Christians own glorifying of God in his immediate worship and service, as also unto their quiet, peaceable, and comfortable communion with Brethren. 2. I will not be brought under the power of any, either persons, or things. And if you go in this manner to law with your Brethren you will put yourselves under the power of many both persons, and things. 1. Persons: Perhaps you will lie at the mercy of an unjust judge: a false witness may undo you; A corrupt lawyer betray you; your own witnesses will command your table, and purse, though for attesting the truth; And though your Advocates be never so faithful, you must give them your most diligent attendance; As the proverb is, you must not only pay, but pray them too. 2. Things: The many matters, the things of the world, which you sue for, will have you so far under their power, as that they will be a great hindrance to your free, and full service of God; for if they do not wholly withdraw you from it, they will wonderfully distract you in it; Because law suits will take up the greatest part of your time, and the best of your thoughts. (d) Quidem hanc 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 explicant: 〈◊〉 nullius 〈◊〉 potestate, i. e. Non patiar me propter res pecuniarias, ac temporales, velut 〈◊〉 sub earum potestate, vel abstrahi vel distrahi, quo minùs liberè, & absque impedimento serviam Deo, quod non potero, si tempus & cogitationes 〈◊〉 litibus. Esthius in loc. Add unto this, that for Christians, especially in those primitive times, to pursue their Brethren unto the judgment-seats of heathens, in matters capable of an amicable compromise by the mediation of Brethren, was a plain evidence, that they were under the power of the world, and the things thereof; for who but a muckworme, a vassal to his wealth, would do a thing so much unto the discredit of the Gospel, and reproach of Christianity; especially seeing they might with greater probability expect justice from the umpirage of saints, than the sentences of professed unbelievers? Others in the next place look for the cohaesion of these words forwards, upon the Apostles ensuing discourse, touching fornication: not only the Corinthians, but the Gentiles in general held simple fornication to be a thing indifferent. The old man in the Comedian, spoke the sense of the generality of them: Crede mihi non est slagitium adolescentulum scortari. And you will the less wonder at this, if you consider, that Durand, a Popish Schoolman, held it to be unlawful, not by the law of nature, but only by the positive law of God: Quod autem dicunt quidam, quod simplex fornicatio est peccatum mortale de se, exclusâ omni lege positiuâ, divinâ & humanâ, non benè intelligo, lib. 4. dist. 33. quaest. 2. And upon the Consideration of this opinion of the Gentiles touching the indifferency of fornication it was, (think interpreters,) that fornication is Acts. 15. by the first Council ranged amongst indifferent things, blood, and things strangled; The use of which was forbidden only for a time. Unto this erroneous supposition the Apostle answereth per limitationem, & per inficiationem: He limits the general rule touching things indifferent, and then he denieth the instance in question. And this his denial he illustrateth, and confirmeth from vers. 13. unto the end of the chapter. Unto this his denial he premiseth limitations of the general rule. All indifferent things are lawful: He puts a double restraint upon it. The first; But all things are not expedient, or profitable: Many indifferent things sometimes prove an impediment unto our Christian race, and then they are to be forborn. A second restraint is in these words: But I will not be brought under the power of any: My affection unto indifferent things shall be so temperate, as that it shall be in my power to forbear 〈◊〉 upon reasonable and important Considerations. There should be an indifferency in our desires towards things indifferent, so that they should not have the command of us; but we should be able to use, or not to use them, as the concurrence of particular circumstances guide us: To give yet further light unto these words, I shall briefly consider their coherence as they lie in 1 Cor. 10. 23. with little variation. The Apostle there states a case of Conscience touching the eating of Idolothytes, things offered unto Idols. First, he resolves, that to eat them publicly in the temple of Idols, at the idolatrous feasts of these Idols, was to have communion in the worship of these idols to have fellowship with Devils; to be partakers of the table of Devils: He that did thus eat them, did eat them considered formally, as 〈◊〉 and consecrated to idols; He did eat them in the honour of the idols, unto which they were offered; He did tacitly acknowledge their Deity, and 〈◊〉 approve of the Idolatrous worship and service of them; But now the Apostle alloweth a private use of things offered to idols, If they were not eaten under a religious notion, but considered only and materially as meat, matter of food, and as the good creatures of God. Two cases he instanceth in, wherein they might be thus eaten; First, they might buy them in the shambles, and eat them in their own houses, vers. 25. And secondly, they might eat them at the tables of their unbelieving neighbours, that invited them: This latter part of the Determination of the question he confirms, and limiteth, by putting in an exception in the case of scandal: And unto all this he prefixeth the extension of our Christian liberty, unto all indifferent things in the general, together with two restrictions, that we are to put upon it in the use and exercise: Even indifferent things are to be forborn, when they are not profitable, and conducing unto the ends, which a Ubi nota, Hactenus egit Paulus de idolothytis, qua talibus, sicque veruit ea comedere. Unde v. 14. Fugite, ait, ab idolorum cultu, 〈◊〉, ne sitis mensae, & calicis daemoniorum participes, ut explicat v. 20. 〈◊〉, comedendo 〈◊〉 bos idolis oblates, eo modo & iis 〈◊〉, quibus censeamini eos, quasi sacros, seu quasi idolothytum in honorem idoli velle comedere: hoc vero versu transit ad 〈◊〉 calum, 〈◊〉, quo idolothytum non 〈◊〉 qua 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 materialiter, qua cibus vel caro 〈◊〉, comeditur, & de hoc ait: 〈◊〉 mihilicent, sed non 〈◊〉 expediunt, quia, ut sequitur, non omnia aedificant. 〈◊〉 dicat, 〈◊〉 licet vesci 〈◊〉 per se, per accidens tamen non licet, si sequatur scandalum, pater ex v. 27. 28 33. Cornel. 〈◊〉 in loc. Christian should propound: when they are destructive and scandalous unto our Brethren: (*) Omniamihi 〈◊〉, omnia scilicet adiaphora, quale est comedere idolothyta, non quasi sacra, aut quasi idolothyta sed tanquam communes cibos. All things are lawful for me, but all things are not 〈◊〉: All things are lawful for me, but all things edify not. Unto these two places (1 Cor. 6. 12. 1 Cor. 10. 23.) I shall add one more (1 Cor. 8. 8.) But meat 〈◊〉 us not to God: for neither, if we eat are we the better: neither if we eat 〈◊〉, are we the 〈◊〉: Meat (that is) the use and eating of meat (〈◊〉 considered, and in the general) commendeth us not to God: for the kingdom of God is not meat and drink: for 〈◊〉 if we eat, are we the 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, have we the more, (that is) the more virtue in ourselves, the more grace and favour with God: Neither if we eat not, are we the worse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, have we the less, the less virtue in ourselves, the less acceptation with God: Eating then of any sort or kind of meat (considered, as abstracted from all singularizing circumstances) is a thing indifferent that hath neither virtue, nor vice in it, neither pleaseth nor displeaseth God: And what the Apostle speaketh of eating of meat, is appliable by way of analogy and proportion unto a world of things of the like nature, as shall be manifested by the reasons for the Conclusion, unto which in the next place I hasten. The Protestants generally thus argue: The nature of things indifferent (as the Learned Hooker determineth) is neither to be commanded nor forbidden, but left free and arbitrary: But now there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that are in the general neither commanded, nor forbidden (as to eat, drink, go a journey, walk into the field:) Therefore there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that are in the general, and for the kind indifferent. This argument the Papists dislike because they think, that there are matters of Counsel, which contain the highest degree of moral goodness, and perfection: And yet think they are uncommanded, and no man will say that they are forbidden. The Argument of the Schoolmen therefore generally runs thus: Actions, that are neither agreeable, nor disagreeable unto right reason are indifferent: But there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that in their general nature, and consideration carry, neither conformity, nor repugnancy unto right reason: And therefore there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that are indifferent. This argument is thus managed by (f) Ubi autem ratio non debet esse 〈◊〉 affirmando quam 〈◊〉, ibi voluntas non debet magiscon formari rationi affirmativae quam negativae: unde potest sic argui. Ille actus nec est bonus, nec est malus, circa quem ratio non potest esse magis 〈◊〉 in affirmando quam in negando, sed levare festucam, quantum est praecisè ex ratione, quam sortitur actus ex objecto, est hujusmodi, quia ratio neque affirmando quod levanda est, neque negando levandam esse magis 〈◊〉 est, ergo actus de se neque bonus est, neque malus. Major 〈◊〉, quia persecutio & fuga actus voluntatis quoad bonitatem vel malitiam correspondent affirmationi, & negationi rationis practicae quoad veritatem & falsitatem, & ideò ubi est ratio aeque indifferens quoad veritatem, & salsitatem in affirmando & negando, ibi 〈◊〉 actus indisterens quoad malitiam & bonitatem in prosequendo, & fugiendo. Minor probatur, quia 〈◊〉 rationis consistit in conformitate ad aliquam legem naturalem vel divinam vel ex his 〈◊〉, circa autem tales actus, ut levare festucam, vel buiusmodi, nulla lex aliquid determinat, nec divina, nec naturalis nec ex his derivata, ergo circa eos sic acceptos ratio non potest habere aliquam rectitudinem, vel obliquitatem magis in affirmando quam in negando, & haec suit minor. Sequitur ergo conclusio. lib. 2. dist. 40. q. 1. Durand: That act is neither good nor evil, but indifferent, Concerning which there is in the reason of man no more rectitude, or irrectitude and obliquity in the affirmation, then in the negation in its dictating either the practice, or in its dictating the forbearance thereof. For the pursuit and eschewall of the will are in regard of moral goodness, or badness correspondent unto the dictates of the practical understanding, and therefore where there is an indifferency in point of truth in the understandings dictates concerning the doing, or not doing of a thing, there is an indifferency in regard of moral goodness or badness in the wills embracing, or eschewing of that thing. If the understanding err not, whether it prescribe the performance, or forbearance of an action, than the will sinneth not, whether it perform or forbear it: But there are divers acts concerning which there is in the reason of man no more rectitude, or irrectitude and obliquity in the affirmation, then in the negation of them, in its dictating the practice, or in its dictating the forbearance of them: This he proveth because the rectitude of reason consists in conformity unto some natural law, or some divine law, or some law derived from these: But there are divers humane actions concerning which, there occurreth no such law, either forbidding, or commanding: and therefore there is no rectitude or obliquity in the reasons or understandings affirming or denying of them. It is indifferent, which way the understanding takes, whether it dictates the doing or not doing of them: and consequently it is indifferent, whether the will 〈◊〉, or nilleth them. Here by the way I cannot but take notice, how Durand unawares crosseth their doctrine of Evangelicall Counsels: for Suarez (the leg. lib. cap. 14.) will tell him, that Counsel is not properly a Law: By this doctrine of Durand then in matters of Counsel there should be no rectitude of reason, because no conformity unto any law: But this by the by. This argument is yet further improved by (g) Sunt 〈◊〉 complures actus, quos dum praecisè consideramus, ut versantur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, vel illud objectum; nec laudamus, nec vituperamus tanquam 〈◊〉 vel malos, sed censemus esse indifferentes. Loquimur enim in proposito debonitate, & 〈◊〉 morali propriè, ut 〈◊〉 bonitas non est qualis cunque congruentia cum ratione; & voluntate hominis, sed congruentia ejusmodi, ut habeat laudem secundùm aestimationem hominum; tanquam aliquid, nempe quod quadret in rationem hominis, etiam ut recta est, & ut is habet sibi à Deo propositam beatitudinem, ut ultimum sinem. Quemadmodum 〈◊〉 contra, malitia moralis, cui opponitur moralis bonitas, consistit in repugnantiâ quadam erga 〈◊〉 rectam hominis, quae secundum humanam aestimationem habeat vituperium, tanquam aliquid repugnans, & nocens homini, ut is habeat beatitudinem propositam sicut ultimum sinem omnium actionum. Sic itaque loquendo proprie de bonitate, vel malitiâ morali affirmamus quosdam esse actus, qui ex objecto 〈◊〉 nec 〈◊〉, nec mali sunt, sed indifferentes. Tom: 2. Com. Theol: qu. 13. punct: 2. 〈◊〉 de Valentia. The Moral goodness (saith he) which we speak of, is such a congruence unto reason, as carrieth praise with it according unto the usual estimate of men, and appertaineth unto man's everlasting happiness, his chief, and sovereign end; and answerably the moral illness or badness of an action stands in such a repugnancy unto right reason, as that according to the usual estimation of men, it is worthy of dispraise, and is an impediment unto his attaining his supreme end, the eternal bliss of his soul; But now there are several humane actions that considered in themselves have neither praise nor dispraise; neither prejudice, nor advantage the salvation of our souls; are neither helps, nor lets unto the obtaining of our highest end and happiness, and therefore there are actions morally indifferent. Unto what hath been said, I shall add two arguments more out of a late Philosopher. Irenaeus, A Carmelite or white Friar (h) Si omnis actus esset bonus aut malus ex suo objecto, seu suâ specie, liceret nobis judicare de quolibet 〈◊〉 opere, & tale ipsum 〈◊〉, quale habet objectum, sicuti actus ex objecto determinatos pronuntiamus bonos, aut malos 〈◊〉: sed non licet ita de singulis 〈◊〉, ex Matth: 7. cujus ratio est apud patres, & Interpretes quoth 〈◊〉 actus sint medii, scilicet de se indifferentes, ut sint boni, aut mali: ergo, etc. Multi actus sunt mali praecise ratione prohibitionis, V. G. portare arma de nocte: ergo two sunt ex specie suâ indifferentes. Ethic: cap: 3. Sect: 2. First, upon actions morally good, or bad, we may lawfully pass our Censures, that they are such; But we should pass rash judgement, if we should censure Divers actions of our brethren to be determinately virtuous, or determinately vicious, moraly good or bad: Let not him that eateth not judge him which eateth. Rom. 14. 2. There are therefore some actions, which for their kind are neither good, nor bad, but indifferent. Secondly, Many acts are evil, only by the prohibition of some positive law; As unto the Jews it was unlawful to eat Swine's flesh, to wear a garment of divers colours, as of woollen and linen together, Deut. 22. 11. These actions therefore, and many the like, were of themselves, and in their own nature, indifferent, and became unlawful only by the ceremonial law given unto the Jews, which law being abrogated, it is now a thing indifferent and lawful for Christians to eat swine's flesh, or not to eat it, to wear a garment of linsey-woolsey, or not. Unto these scriptures and reasons I shall add the testimony of Hierome, frequently quoted for this purpose. Bonum, inquit, est continentia, malum est luxuria. Inter utrumque indifferens ambulare, capitis, naribus purgamenta projicere, sputis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hoc nec bonum, nec malum est: siuè enim feceris, siuè non feceris, nec 〈◊〉 habebis, nec injustitiam. Aristotle, and Sextus Empyricus give in their verdict for the truth of this assertion, whose sayings the reader may peruse at large in Raynaudus moral. discipline. distinct. 4. quaest. 1. Art. 3. num. 39 pag. 550. There is but one Considerable 〈◊〉, which I shall briefly propound and answer. Whatsoever agreeth unto the species, the sort or kind of a thing, agreeth unto all individuals contained under it, And therefore if there be humane actions, that be indifferent, secundum speciem, according to their kind, the Individuals of such actions are indifferent too, which will be opposed in a third Conclusion: That which doth agree unto a thing 〈◊〉 se, the opposite thereof cannot agree unto it, either per se, or per Accidens: And therefore if some actions are per se of themselves indifferent, it is impossible for the Individuals of such: actions to be morally good, or evil. ay 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 secundum 〈◊〉 negatio 〈◊〉 per hoc quod est indifferens potest duplicitet ordinari ad copulam verbalem: uno 〈◊〉 nim modo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. & sic est sensus qd de ratione specificâ actus est, quod sit indifferens et si isto modo aliquis actus 〈◊〉 speciem esset indifferens, non solùm esset impossibile dare sub 〈◊〉 specie actum individualem indifferentem, immo impossibile esset sub tali specie dari actum, nisi 〈◊〉, quia ea quae sunt de ratione 〈◊〉 conveniunt omni individuo sub tali specie, sed si nullus est actus 〈◊〉 secundum speciem suam; sub quo tamen sensu argumentum procedit. 〈◊〉 modo 〈◊〉 negatio importata per hoc, quod est indifferens, praepuni copulae verbali sub hoc sensu, quod de ratione specifica actus non est, quod sit indifferenter, vel determinate bonus 〈◊〉 malus, sed tamen utrunque 〈◊〉 ipfis per aliud convenire, sicut homo ex suâ specie non habet quod sit determinate albus, vel determinate niger: et tamen per aliud ei utrunque istorum convenit. 〈◊〉 hoc 〈◊〉 sunt multi actus qui sunt indifferentes secundum suam speciem, nullus tamen secundum individuum, quia individuum multa includit quoad existentiam suam quae ad rationem speciei non pertinent. Lib. 2. dift. 40. q. 1. Unto this objection Durand answereth, by 〈◊〉 of a twofold sense of this expression. An act is indifferent secundum speciem, according to its kind. The sirst is, that indifferency is of the specific nature of such an act. And this sense, which is the sense of the objection, is false, for than it 〈◊〉 be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any individuals of such an act not to be indifferent: But now there is a second sense of the expression, that the specific nature of such an action doth not involve, or imply in its notion moral either goodness or illness, But is equally and indifferently abstracted from both: And this sense is true: It is not of the specific nature of many actions to be determinately good, or determinately evil; though they may be either by circumstances. As for the confirmation which is added; * Morisan 〈◊〉. Murc: Physic. The answer unto it is usually as followeth; A thing may be said to agree unto another per se, either positively, 〈◊〉 negatively. 1. 〈◊〉, when it is predicated in primo, or secundo modo 〈◊〉 per se, when it is either an essential predicate, or proper passion: And thus it agreeth unto man to be a sensitive creature, to be endued with the powers of understanding, willing, laughing, &c: And in this sense indifferency doth not agree per se, unto any humane voluntary actions, for than it would agree unto them always, and in all places, so that it would be utterly impossible for the individuals of such actions to be morally either good, or bad. 2. Negatively, When a thing of itself is not such, although by accident it may be such: And thus we may say of a man, that per se he is not white, he is not black, he is not tawny, he is not of an olive colour, or the like, because each of these colours considered separately, are accidental unto the nature of man, considered in the general, and in itself: And yet the individuals of the nature of man may some of them be white, some black, some tawny, some of an olive colour, or the like: Even so we may say of divers voluntary rational actions of man; that per se, (considered, as devested from all circumstances) they are indifferent, morally neither good, nor bad: because moral goodness and badness is accidental unto the nature of such actions considered in themselves, and yet the individuals of such actions are all of them either good, or evil, 〈◊〉 shall be cleared by the next conclusion, unto which before we proceed, let us make some application of this second conclusion. Against this doctrine of Indifferency there are two failings; one in the 〈◊〉, Another in the excess: There are, First, some, that fail in the defect, who know not the full extent of indifferency: and so either impose, as necessary, or condemn, as sinful, things that are in their own nature indifferent. Thus in the primitive Romish Church there were some new converts, who abstained from swine's flesh, and other meats prohibited by the ceremonial law, as unlawful, The use of which yet was indifferent and lawful under the Gospel: I know, and am persuaded (saith Paul,) by the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of itself. Rom. 14. 14. Thus also amongst the Corinthians there were some weak Christians, that branded for Communion, and fellowship with Idolaters all eating of things offered unto idols, Though bought in the market, or eaten at private meetings; In both which yet Paul pronounceth in general there was no unlawfulness, 1. Cor. 10. 25, 27. Amongst us there are divers persons, that are doubtless well affected in matters of Religion, and yet are too rigid in censuring as sins divers innocent and harmless recreations: This is an error in, and consequently a blemish unto the understanding: Paul calls it a weakness in the faith, Rom. 14. 1. that is an imperfection in point of knowledge, and that privative, or unblamable: For the faith and conscience of indifferent things is never indifferent, we are never to judge a thing indifferent, to be either sinful or necessary. Our Saviour's command, John 7. 24. Judge righteous judgement may be extended unto things and actions as well as persons: Therefore as we are not to call good, evil, or evil, good; so neither are we to call things indifferent, either evil, or necessary. This is injuriously to straiten the grand Charter of our Christian liberty, and presumptuously to make the narrow way to heaven narrower than ever God made it. Besides, it openeth a gap unto many mischiefs, it filleth the Church of God with needless, and endless disputes, it perplexeth the minds of many conscientious people with unnecessary and unprofitably scruples; it causeth many bitter and uncharitable censures, and occasioneth many dangers: In the believing Jews that lived in the Church of Rome, in Paul's time, there was but a little mistake touching things indifferent, meats and days; but how pernicious was the sequel hereof? Hereupon the strong despised the weak, and the weak judged the strong, Rom. 14. And this was a great disturbance unto the peace of the Church, and a great hindrance unto the comfortable communion of the Saints. 2. Against this doctrine of indifferency there are some, secondly, that fail in the excess, who make things necessary or sinful, to be but indifferent. There be some, that hold observation of the Lords day, preaching of the word, in distinction from mere reading of it to be no ordinances of God, but things merely indifferent; Erastians' affirm that Church Government, and Ecclesiastical censures are only matters of indifferency: The Heathens in the Apostles times generally ranked fornication amongst things indifferent: The like estimate some of the Corinthians had of eating things offered to Idols, in the midst of an Idols temple, at a religious feast of that Idol, which was a palpable communicating with Devils, and therefore a fact in its own nature unlawful: And some Travellers, that profess themselves Protestant's, have as large and loose Consciences, as these Corinthians had; for they have the same opinion of being present at an idolatrous mass, and bowing to popish Idols. Dr Peter Heylin (as himself informeth us) made no scruple of kissing a Crucifix, when it was desired of him, to discriminate him from a Hugenot: No less loose were the Principles of the Adiaphorists, and Flaccians in Charles the 5th his time, who pressed the Interim, which gave allowance to divers errors, and superstitions of the Church of Rome, as matters that were indifferent: Our Prelatists ever and anon in the controversy of Symbolical ceremonies allege their indifferency as a thing without dispute, which is never granted by us; however it may sometimes for disputation's sake be supposed. But what talk we of Ceremonies, whilst some of greatest note amongst them have so eagerly pleaded for such sports, and pastimes upon the Lord's day as indifferent, which a devout Papist would reckon a gross profanation thereof? Now this latter 〈◊〉 against the Doctrine of indifferent actions, in a way of excess, is as much against the Purity of the Church, as the former sailing, in a way of defect, was against the peace of the Church: It opens as wide a door to all licentiousness and profaneness to call good and evil indifferent, as it doth to call good evil, or evil good, and therefore a woe equally belongs unto it with this latter. Secondly, we may be exhorted unto thankfulness, Because God hath indulged us Christians a greater extent of our liberty about things indifferent, than he ever 〈◊〉 unto the Jewish Synagogue. Many things, in their own nature indifferent, were prohibited them by positive precepts, and so made unlawful unto them; This was a yoke (said Peter,) which they were unable to bear, Acts 15. 10. Blessed therefore be God, who hath freed us from this yoke by our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath abolished in his flesh the law of Commandments contained in Ordinances, Eph. 2. 15. So that now all (indifferent) things are lawful unto us; There 〈◊〉 nothing unclean of itself, Rom. 14. 14. all things indeed are pure, Rom. 14. 20. Unto the pure all things are pure, Tit. 1. 15. Every creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused, 1 Timoth. 4. 4. There be two ways, unto which I shall direct for expressing our thankfulness for the enlargement of this our liberty. 1. A stout asserting of it. 2. A due and 〈◊〉 use of it. 1. A stout asserting of it against Judaisme, Popery, or any other sect or party, that shall be so presumptuous towards God, and injurious towards us, as to abridge us thereof in any part. Stand fast therefore in the liberty, wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled 〈◊〉 with the yoke of bondage, Gal. 5. 1. The Apostle would have us not to be entangled again with the Jewish yoke of bondage; And there is the same reason, why in indifferent things we should decline any other yoke of bondage, which any man whatsoever should make, and attempt to put upon our necks: for liberty towards things indifferent is one branch of that liberty, wherewith Christ hath made us free: and therefore we should stand 〈◊〉 against all opposers. But now in this our asserting of our Christian liberty we should use a great deal of moderation towards weak dissenting brethren: 'Tis the Advice which the Apostle Paul gives in the like case, Rom. 14. 3. Let not him that eateth, despise him, that eateth not: The eating of meats prohibited by the Mosaical Law was after Christ's death indifferent; But yet there were among the Romans some weaklings in the faith, who thought the ceremonial law still in force, and consequently judged, the eating of all meats therein forbidden, to be sinful; Now the Apostle would not have those that were strong in the faith, that is, more knowing, better principled, and more fully instructed in the extent of their Christian liberty to despise, to disdain, and contemn those poor souls for their ignorance, and weakness in judgement; But to reach out the right hand of fellowship unto them, to receive them into an 〈◊〉 communion, 〈◊〉 deal gently, and tenderly with them, restoring them in the spirit of meekness, with all possible prudence, and caution: Him, that is weak in the faith, receive you, but not to doubtful disputations, Rom. 14. 1. The Apostle doth not prohibit altogether all disputations for the future touching the point in controversy: for he himself elsewhere very zealously disputes the matter, only he interdicts such disputes as were unseasonable for the present: because these Jewish converts were so extremely wedded unto the Law of Moses, as that to have pressed upon them in their first conversion an abolition thereof, was the ready way to have utterly prejudiced them against and alienated them from Christianity: He would have them first to be taught the first principles of the Oracles of God, the first Principles of the Doctrine of Christ, Heb. 5. 12. and chap. 6 vers. 1. And when they were well principled, and settled in the Christian faith, than they might proceed to a calm, and peaceable debate of this subject: for then their mind would be more capable of instruction, and the forementioned prejudice would be more easily removed: Indeed, after a while, there would be no place for such a prejudice: for when once there was a plenary promulgation of the Gospel, to observe them afterwards would be a virtual abrenunciation of the Christian Religion, a denial, that Christ is come in the flesh: When once the Apostles had gived the Jewish Synagogue and Ceremonies an honourable funeral, and respective burial, for any man afterwards to revive the observation of them, would be to rake in their dust, and sacrilegiously to violate their grave: Proindè nunc quisquis Christianorum, quamvis sit ex judaeis; similitèr ea celebrare voluerit, tanquam sopitos cineres eruens, non erit pius deductor vel baiulus corporis, sed impius sepulturae violator, August: Epist. 19 A second way of expressing our thankfulness for the extension of our Christian liberty in things indifferent is a due and discreet use of it, such an use of it as mayst, and with God's glory, and may 〈◊〉 no ways inconsistent with our own or others edification. Touching this use of our liberty Paul gives us a general caution, Gal. 5. 13. only use not liberty for an occasion unto the flesh; that is, to live according unto the flesh. Suitable unto which also is the advice of St Peter, 1 Pet. 2. 16. not using your liberty for a 〈◊〉 of maliciousness, But as the servants of God: In which advice there are two parts: On enegative: not using your liberty for a cloak of maliciousness: that is, for a colour or pretence unto any sin for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is (as Dr 〈◊〉 well observeth) taken here more largely for all manner of evil and naughtiness, according unto the adequate signification of the Greek and Latin Adjectives, from whence the substantive used in the text is derived. Another part of the advice is affirmative, using your liberty as the servants of God: that is in the use of this liberty admit of nothing, that may be prejudicial unto the service, unto the honour and glory of God: for this would be a most unthankful abuse, and not a true use of it. To inform us more fully, and particularly what we are to do in this weighty point, I shall briefly propound such restraints, as we are by the rule of Scripture to put on the use, and exercise of our Christian liberty in things indifferent, for without such restraints we can never use this our liberty aright, and as we ought: There be some loose people, that are impatient of all these restraints: If they judge a thing lawful in itself, they never consider, or consult farther, but without more a do adventure on it: But these men ever and anon abuse their liberty unto God's dishonour, their own danger, and the scandal of both brethren, and aliens: They use their liberty as an 〈◊〉 to the flesh, for a 〈◊〉 of maliciousness: He that gives himself the full swing in things indifferent, He that will do whatsoever is lawful, will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 into things unlawful, and ere he is aware indulge himself in the practice of them 〈◊〉 So Clemens, Alexandrinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 1. Qui faciunt quicquid 〈◊〉, huc cito 〈◊〉, ut faciant quod non 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 prevention of this licentiousness, I shall out of God's word recommend unto you 〈◊〉 restraints to be put upon this part of your 〈◊〉 liberty in the use and exercise of it, 〈◊〉. By Prudence. 2. By Temperance and 〈◊〉. 3. By Conscience. 4. By Religion. 5. By Authority. 6. By Charity, 1. By Prudence: which in indifferent things is, first, to compare them with those ends which every Christian should aim at. 2. To consider whether there concur not an obligation to some duty, or other. First then, It is the work of Christian prudence to compare indifferent actions with those ends, which every Christian should propound unto himself: the glorifying of God, the salvation of his own soul, and the edifying of Brethren: And to examine whether they be expedient, or inexpedient, profitable and conducing, or unprofitable and impedient unto these ends: And if upon due consideration it finds them inexpedient, an hindrance unto these ends, it then forthwith dictates a forbearance of them: Because whatsoever is 〈◊〉 impediment unto these ends is opposite unto them, and in that regard sinful: This restraint our Apostle layeth down in way of Doctrine for the instruction of all. All things are lawful for me, But all things are not expedient, 1 Cor. 6. 12. and Chapt 9 we have him putting it upon himself in his own practice: It was lawful for him to have received of the Corinthians a competent, and honourable maintenance, for his labour in the Word and Doctrine, as being a matter of due debt from them: But he did not exact it, but wrought with his hands for his livelihood, because he found it would have obstructed, and hindered the end of his preaching, which was the spreading of the Gospel, that the word of the Lord might have free course, and be glorified in the conversion of souls. A second act of Prudence about indifferent things is to consider, whether in that nick of time we are about an indifferent action there concur not an obligation unto some duty or other; And if there do, than prudence dictates, that pro hic & nunc, we should abstain from that indifferent action; because otherwise we should prefer it above a necessary and commanded duty, And though it be simply in itself lawful, it would become accidentally sinful, to wit, by comparison; Thus it would be sinful for a man to walk in the fields, if there lay upon him at the same time an obligation to hear such a sermon: Thus also it would be sinful for a man to follow recreations in themselves lawful, when the necessities of his family call upon him to follow his occupation, the works of his ordinary calling. A second Restraint (that we are to put upon the use of our liberty about things indifferent) is by temperance and sobriety, and this restraint also we have laid down by the Apostle in the place but now quoted. 1. Cor. 6. 12. All things are lawful for me, But I will not be brought under the power of any: Now what is it that brings a man under the power of meats, and drinks, apparel, recreations. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but an over-vehement affection unto them. This makes man a vassal unto those things, over which God hath given him a full Lordship, and dominion: Qui nimis 〈◊〉 aliquam amat (saith Aquinas) quodam modo servus istius efficitur, He that loves a thing overmuch, renders himself thereby the servant thereof: Know ye not that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are, to whom ye obey, Rom. 6. 16. He that immoderately affects those things, that are in themselves indifferent, cannot disobey, or resist the least temptation unto sin drawn from them, and therefore is no better than a slave unto them, nay an Idolater of them: You may see how Paul censures the false Prophets for such an excess, Rom. 16. 18. They that are such serve not our Lord 〈◊〉 Christ, but their own 〈◊〉, Their God is their belly Phil. 3. 19 We may say the like of those, that like the rich glutton, Luke. 16. 19 fare sumptuously or deliciously every day, and will have a splendid retinue, when the lowness of their state requires a meaner table and smaller attendance of those that are wedded unto such gaiety and bravery of apparel as is above their purses, or unsuitable unto their age, and rank, As also of those that are so mad upon their recreations, sports and pastimes, as that in the pursuit of them they forgo their meals, and sleep, they neglect the worship of God, and their particular callings, unto their great impoverishment, if not final and total beggary. A third limitation upon the exercise of our Christian liberty in things indifferent is to be by conscience: for though a man's conscience cannot legitimate sins, either of Commission, or Omission; yet it is of force sufficient to make that sinful, which is in itself indifferent, & lawful: for this we have the Apostles determination, and that touching both a condemning and doubting conscience. 1. A Condemning Conscience. Rom. 14. 14. I know and am persuaded by the Lord jesus, that their is nothing unclean of itself; But unto him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean. Unto the authority of Paul's Testimony I shall add two reasons. 1. Every man takes the voice of his conscience to be the voice of God; And therefore he that doth a thing in itself indifferent against the judgement of his Conscience, he disobeyeth and slighteth the voice of God, as for the manner of his action, and is a fighter against God. A second reason I shall give you in the words of Willet upon the place, Because the goodness or badness of an action is esteemed by the will and affection of the doer; Now when he thinketh a thing to be 〈◊〉, and yet doth it, It shows that such an one hath, deliberatam 〈◊〉 voluntatem, a 〈◊〉 mind and purpose to sin. The Apostle, secondly, gives us the same resolution touching a Doubting 〈◊〉, Rom. 14. 23. He that doubteth, is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith; for whatsoever is not of faith, is sin: that is; he that performeth an indifferent action, and yet doubteth of the lawfulness thereof, deserveth damnation, because he doth not act out of faith; for whatsoever we perform, though, it be (intrinsically, in itself) matter of indifferency; nay though it be matter of duty, yet if it proceed not from a belief of its lawfulness it becomes (accidentally and extrinsecally) sinful; It betrays a wicked and a wretched heart, that is not afraid of sin, but in a great readiness to commit it; who, almost would do any thing that he doubteth would anger and grieve a dear friend? God then is not so dear as he should be unto such men, as dare adventure upon the practice of that, which they are doubtful is displeasing unto him: Let us therefore hearken unto that exhortation, which the Apostle gave unto the Romans concerning things indifferent, Rom. 14. 5. Let every man be fully persuaded in his own 〈◊〉: And this exhortation he backs with a very good reason. ver. 22. Happy is he which condemneth not himself in that thing which he alloweth: that is, he that doth not condemn as sinful, that which he chooseth and embraceth in his practice; such a man is in that respect, and so far forth happy, as being free from those 〈◊〉, which torment those, who do what their consciences condemn. Thus you see, that not only condemnation, but doubtfulness of Conscience is a sufficient warrant to forbear things that are in themselves indifferent: But yet it is no ground for us to assume a liberty of condemning the same things in others, who are sufficiently satisfied touching their indifferency and lawfulness: Let not him that eateth not judge him that eateth. 〈◊〉 14. 3. Let not him that is weak in the faith, that out of ignorance censureth, 〈◊〉 suspecteth divers actions 〈◊〉 be sinful, 〈◊〉 he cannot prove to be so by any convincing argument; Let not such an one condemn for such actions the strong in the faith, those who are as godly and more knowing, than themselves: This exhortation the Apostle enforceth by divers reasons in the following words; for God hath received him; who art thou, that judgest another man's servant? To his own 〈◊〉 he standeth or 〈◊〉, yea, he shall be holden up; for God is able to make him stand, ver. 3. 4. The first argument is taken from the relation of the strong unto God, or God's acceptation of them; for God hath received him; to wit, into his favour, into an intimate union, and communion, into his family, as a servant, as a son, as a member of his only begotten son: To condemn him then is to throw a dishonour upon God himself. A second reason is, Because for the weak to condemn the indifferent actions of the strong for sin, of which they cannot prove them guilty, is a gross and presumptuous usurpation of God's prerogative, for which we have no Authority: who art thou that judgest another man's servant? Thou art but a fellow servant at the most: And God only is the master of the family, the Church: and therefore the unlawfulness of what is done in it is to be determined by God's precepts, and not by thy humour, or fancy, thy ungrounded surmises: If God hath permitted a thing, how darest thou interdict it? To his own master he standeth, or falleth. The words are to be understood in a law-sense, and their meaning is that God alone acquits or condemns the actions of his servants, and none else: They are to be tried by his word and will, and not by thy jealousies, and suspicions. Others expound the words thus: If a man eat and drink temperately with outward prayer and thanksgiving, who but God can discern, whether he eat or drink unto the glory of God, or no? It followeth he shall be holden up: that is, he shall be justified. This fact of his, his eating of meats forbidden by the levitical Law, shall be abetted and maintained: For God is able to make him stand: though thou load him with censures, God is able to acquit, and clear him. 4thly. Our Christian liberty towards things indifferent must admit of a restraint in the outward practice of it By Religion, by the Religion of a vow, of an oath, Deut. 23. vers. 21, 22, 23. When thou shalt vow a vow unto the Lord thy God, thou shalt not slack to pay it: for the Lord thy God will surely require it of thee, and it would be sin in thee. But if thou shalt forbear to vow, it shall be no sin in thee. That which is gone out of thy lips, thou shalt keep, and perform: even a freewill 〈◊〉, according as thou hast vowed unto the Lord thy God, which thou hast promised with thy mouth. It was indifferent for Ananias to have sold, or held his possession: But when once by solemn vow he had devoted it unto God, to keep back any part of the price in his own hand, was no less than sacrilege: Suppose Lusory lots be in themselves lawful, yet if a man swear, that he will never play more at Cards, or Tables, etc. By this Oath a man hath bound himself from such games for the future: and if he play at them, he shall incur the guilt of perjury: Numb. 30. v. 2. If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an Oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word, he shall do according unto all that proceedeth out of his mouth. Calvinist's about oath's concerning things indifferent have this case: Whether they be obligatory in trifles? As if a man should swear to lift up a straw, to rub his beard, to give an apple, to lend a pin unto a Child: This case k Casus posterior est, cum res aut ob sui levitatemindigna est viri prudentis deliberatione, nec cassà nuce interest 〈◊〉 an non feceris, ut levare festucam de 〈◊〉, fricare barbam etc. aut ob parvitatem 〈◊〉 non estmultum estimabilis; ut dare pomum puero, aciculam 〈◊〉 etc. Juramentum de re isto 〈◊〉 adiaphora omnino est illicitum. Arguit enim sancti nominis Dei aut nimiam irreverentiam, si (ut 〈◊〉 fit) ex quodam 〈◊〉 jurandi longo usu contracto 〈◊〉 fortè exciderit; aut apertum contemptum, siquis id 〈◊〉 prudensque admiserit, scilicet non est Deus advocandus testis, nisi ubi dignus vindice nodus inciderit: ubi causa exigit non justa modo sed & gravis. Et in hoc omnes consentiunt, caeterum de obligatione quid 〈◊〉? Video quidem plerosque casuistas pontificios in 〈◊〉 esse 〈◊〉 juramentum de re 〈◊〉 et parvi momenti esse 〈◊〉 naturâ nullum, & non 〈◊〉 quia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 levis non est idonea materia juramenti, & lex non curate de miminis. Sed miror potuisse eos, qui aliàs videri volunt esse tam Lyncei, inretam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: nisi quod putidae illi distinctioni 〈◊〉 mortalis & venialis, quo velut fermento totam Theologiae moralis massam faedè corruperunt, locum relictum cupiant. Sed obligare juramentum in re vel levissimi momenti constat; primò, quia in re gravi & levi eadem est veritatis & falsitatis ratio. Secundò, quià in assertorio juramento, qui 〈◊〉 dicit quam res est, etsi in re levissimâ, pejerat, ergo à simili & in promissorio, qui 〈◊〉 facit, quam juravit. Tertio, quià 〈◊〉, quantum in se esset, Deum 〈◊〉 rei testem faceret. 〈◊〉, quià omnis jurans tenetur facere totum quod promisit, 〈◊〉 potest, & licet: sed dare puero pomum, & 〈◊〉 est, & licitum, ergò tenetur praestare, non debuit ergò sie 〈◊〉: sed ubi iuratum est, debet impleri. De Jurament: Obligat: praelect: 3. Sect. 15. Dr Sanderson thus answereth. 1. He premiseth that such oath's are unlawful, Because in them Gods most Holy Name is taken in vain, The Great God of Heaven and Earth is appealed unto, and called upon to witness unto toys: But yet notwithstanding his resolution is, that such oath's bind; and for it he giveth four reasons. 1. Truth and falsehood have place in a light, as well as in a serious matter. 2. Because in an assertory Oath, He that saith otherwise then the thing is, though it be in a most trivial matter, is forsworn: therefore by the like reason, he is perjured in a promissory oath, that doth otherwise, than he hath sworn. 3. Because Otherwise, he that hath taken such an oath, should make God as much as in him lieth the witness of a falsehood. 4. Because every one that sweareth, is bound to do all that he hath sworn, so far forth as he is able, and so far forth as the thing is lawful to be done: But the matters here spoken of are possible and lawful, v. gr. it is possible and lawful to give a child an apple, etc. therefore such oath's are to be performed: Indeed such vain oath's should not be taken, but being once taken they ought to be fulfilled. A fifth restraint upon the exercise of our Christian liberty in things indifferent is by the just commands of authority, unto which we must be subject for conscience sake, Rom. 13. v. 5. The Apostle Peter having, 1 Pet. 2. 13. 14. exhorted us to submit ourselves unto every ordinance of man for the Lords sake; In vers. 16. (by the general consent of interpreters) he prevents an objection, that might be made against this submission, from our Christian liberty, As free, and not using your liberty for a Cloak of maliciousness, but as the servants of God: Upon which words it is well observed by Estius (out of Oecumenius and chrysostom) that, As 〈◊〉 is to be construed with 〈◊〉, submit yourselves: And not (as Bede would have it) with well doing. And from this connexion we may learn two things. First, That in submission unto every ordinance of man, we must not infringe our Christian liberty: We must not enslave ourselves to sin, Satan, and the World. Secondly, That submission unto every Ordinance of man, and our Christian freedom may very well stand together: We may submit ourselves as free: we may be obedient subjects, and yet free Christians: This may also be further gathered from what the Apostle hath in the following words touching the abuse, and use of our Christian liberty; Not using your liberty as a cloak for maliciousness, but as servants of God: Here we have. 1. A dehortation from the abuse of our Christian liberty, not using your liberty as a cloak of maliciousness: now to allege it as a plea for exemption of us from the yoke of temporal dominion, is to use it as a cloak of maliciousness; for not only scripture, but even nature itself condemneth disobedience unto, and rebellion against magistrates, as a very High point of maliciousness, that is naughtiness, and wickedness. 2. We have here a Direction unto a right use of our liberty, using it as the servants of God: Now the service of God is so far from being a bar, as that it is rather a spur unto this subjection; for First; it is for the Lords sake, that Peter would have us to submit ourselves unto every ordinance of man, vers. 13. Secondly, How can he cordially serve God, that contemns and disobeyes his deputy, and ministers? so the Apostle styles the magistrate, Rom. 13. 4, 6. And Thirdly, The servants of God are obliged to yield obedience unto all his commands, and one of them is to be subject unto the higher powers, Rom. 13. 1. They than that resist the higher powers do not use their liberty as the 〈◊〉 of God. But now, (that we may not run into another extreme, and with the flatterers of 〈◊〉, and Princes, extol the power of the magistrate beyond all bounds of moderation;) I shall desire you to take notice, that the power of the magistrate in things indifferent is not arbitrary, but is to be limited by the end of all 〈◊〉, the public good, Rom. 13. 4. He is the Minister of God unto thee for good. Unto this public good some indifferent things carry a tendency, and such the magistrate may command; unto it others may be prejudicial, and such he may forbid: But now he should abuse his power, and play the tyrant, If he should enjoin things unprofitable; As if he should command men to throw stones into the water, to pick straws, to scatter feathers into the air, or the like. By this you may see, that the legislative power of the temporal magistrate in things indifferent is not unlimited: But now as for Ecclesiastical superiors, They have no commission for to make any laws properly so called. To make this good Ames quotes Junius against Bellarmine, [cont. 3. lib. 4. cap. 16. n. 86, 87. and chap. 17. n. 9, 10, 12, 13.] where he showeth, that Christ is the only lawgiver, that appointeth things in his Church; and that he hath appointed all that are requisite, and that the Church maketh no laws (properly so called) to appoint any new things to be used, but only canons, orders, directions, ordering in seemly manner these things which Christ hath appointed: and that if she add any thing of her own, she doth decline: And the reason is, Because unto her is committed no authority of appointing new things, but a ministry to observe, and 〈◊〉 such things which Christ hath appointed. [This argument is prosecuted at large By Ames in his Reply unto Morton chap. 1. Sect. 16. and vindicated in his fresh suit against Ceremonies, pag. 64, 65, 66. usque ad 71. from the rejoinder of Dr John Burgess.] The sixth and last restraint, which I shall mention, that is to be put upon the outward exercise of our Christian liberty in things indifferent is by Charity: and that. 1. Unto ourselves. 2. Unto others. 1. Unto ourselves: He that truly loves himself, will deny himself the use of things indifferent, if he think it will hazard the health of his better part, his spiritual and immortal soul; He will 〈◊〉 those sports, and Pastimes he most delights in, if he find that they usually tempt him to Choler, or covetousness: He will not so much as step into a Tavern, Inn, or Alehouse, if he find himself prone unto excess: According unto the advice, that Solomon gives in the like case, Prov. 23. 2. Put a 〈◊〉 unto thy throat, if thou be a man given unto appetite: Our Saviour exhorts us to pluck out our right eye, and to cut off our right hand, when they offend us, Matth. 5. 29, 30. And Maldonate supposeth that he speaks literally of a true eye and hand indeed: neither (saith he) is there any absurdity in such a sense: because the plucking out of the right eye, and the cutting off the right hand is mentioned only in a way of hyperbolical exaggeration. In which there is understood such an exception, as is usual in the like cases, if it might be, if it were lawful: He parallels it with a hyperbole of the same nature in Gal. 4. 15. I bear you record, that if it had been 〈◊〉, yet would have plucked out your own eyes, and have given them unto me; If it had been possible: that is, as Estius 〈◊〉 it, si natura 〈◊〉, If nature would give way unto such a mutilation: Our Saviour therefore signifieth, that we must incur the greatest loss, rather than expose ourselves unto the danger of sin: And from this we may conclude that we must cast away our most beloved indifferences; when once they scandalise us, that is, when they prove occasions of, and incentives unto sin. 2. Charity towards others should put a restraint upon the use of our Christian liberty in things indifferent, and make us to forbear all indifferent things whatsoever, that may destroy the souls, weaken, or wound the 〈◊〉 of others, 1 Cor. 8. 12. Use not liberty for an occasion to the flesh, but by love serve one another, Gal. 5. 13. Where the Antithesis implied in the particle, but, plainly showeth, that we use our liberty for an occasion unto the flesh, if we do not by love serve one another, in the exercise thereof. Knowledge 〈◊〉 up, but charity edifieth. 1 Cor. 8. 1. that is, a firm and full knowledge of our liberty in things indifferent, ifit be separated from Charity, is apt to swell the mind with pride, and make men to despise, or set at naught weak, doubting, and scrupulous Brethren; But Charity edifieth, that is it is careful to build up others, as living stones in the spiritual house of God, the Church; It inclineth to promote their graces, and gracious practices, and to avoid whatsoever is of a destroying nature unto their souls, that is, every thing that may occasion their fall into sin: Now that indifferent things may sometimes be of an unedifying and destroying nature, the Apostlè affirmeth 1 Cor. 10. 23. All things are lawful for me, but all things edisie not, do not build up our brethren in truth, faith, and holiness, do not farther them in their Religion, charity, and justice: for that the Apostle speaks of the edification of others is plain by what followeth in the next verse, Let no man seek his own (that is, only) but every man another's wealth, that is, spiritual, the edification and salvation of another's soul. And therefore indifferent things are to be forborn in case of scandal, when they prove to be of a destructive nature unto the souls of men, when they weaken their graces, hinder their duties, and lead them into sin. This course the Apostle prescribes unto the Romans in the case of things legally unclean before the coming of Christ. Those that were strong in the faith among them, well instructed in the doctrine of Christian liberty, knew very well, that the legal uncleanness of meats and drinks, all Jewish festivals and fasts were removed by Christ's death, and that nothing was now of itself unclean, but all things indifferent and lawful: yet the Apostle would have them in the use of this point of Christian liberty not to scandalise those, that are weak in the faith, that is, such as (being newly won from Judaisme to Christianity) were as yet uninstructed about the cessation of ceremonials, Rom. 14. 13. Judge this rather, that no man put a stumbling block, or occasion, to fall in his brother's way; that is in the use of meats and drinks, that were before the Gospel Levitically unclean, and neglect of Jewish Festivals and fasts, the observation of which was for a while indifferent, until the interrement of the Ceremonial law: 〈◊〉 however the words run generally, yet if we look to the coherence backwards, the foregoing part of the chapter speaks only of such things, meats, drinks, and days: and if we look to the coherence forwards, it speaks only of such things, meats and drinks, vers. 15. Destroy not him with thy meat, for whom Christ died, ver. 17. for the kingdom of God is not meat and drink. v. 20. for meat destroys not the work of God: it is evil for that man who eateth with offence: It is 〈◊〉 not simply in itself, but accidentally by scandal. And therefore I shall conclude, that the place is in a special manner appliable against scandalising by abuse of liberty in things indifferent. Interpreters guess at three things, wherein the practice of the strong amongst the Romans might scandalise the weak. 1. It might unsettle them in, and distaste them against the Christian Religion: for they might hereupon think it to be contrary unto the Law of Moses, which they so highly reverenced, and so at last it might occasion their relapse unto Judaisme. 2. It might embolden them to sin against their consciences, by eating that which they thought to be unclean. And 3dly, it might grievously exassperate them, and provoke them to pour out many a bitter, uncharitable; and sinful censure upon the actions, and state of those that were strong in the faith. In vers. 21. The Apostle proceedeth to enlarge his doctrine touching this particular, beyond the controversy, that occasioned this his discourse: for (as Estius well noteth) He teacheth, that to avoid the scandal and offence of our Brethren we are to abstain, not only from things prohibited by the law, but also from things not prohibited, from flesh, wine, and any indifferent thing whatsoever: It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak. It is good, that is, it is morally good. 1. Good in regard of God, a thing very acceptable, and pleasing unto him. 2. Good in regard of our Brethren, profitable and conducing unto their edification. 3. Good in regard of ourselves, a duty that God requireth of us: And from this we may infer that the contrary hereof is (by the rule of contraries) morally evil: it is displeasing unto God, hurtful unto the soul of thy Brother, and sinful in thyself. In vers. 22. The Apostle prevents an objection of the strong: Hast thou faith, have it to thyself before God: He speaks not of a faith (saith chrysostom) that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of doctrines and tenets, to wit, such as are fundamental, and necessary unto salvation: but of a faith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, concerning the subject matter here handled, meats, and days, things indifferent, a belief touching their lawfulness: the strong amongst the Romans might be ready to object, that their knowledge and persuasion of their Christian liberty in the matter controverted amounted unto a Divine faith: for it was built upon a divine Revelation: Each of them might say as Paul did above vers. 14. I know, and am persuaded by the Lord Jesus, that nothing is unclean of itself. The Lord Jesus hath taught me this liberty now is it not fit, that my practice should be agreeable unto my belief; that I should exercise my knowledge, and act according unto my judgement: seeing it is so well grounded, why should I forbear the doing of that, which I know to be lawful? Unto this the Apostles answer is, that they should not make a vain ostentation, or unseasonable discovery of their faith: that is, knowledge, and persuasion, unto the offence of their Brother, the hazard of his soul: but rather in such a case conceal it, and content themselves with God's knowledge, and approbation of it, who seeth in secret, and will reward openly, Matth. 6. Hast thou faith, have it to thyself before God: This prudent and charitable management of Christian liberty, the Apostle exhorts the Corinthians unto, in their carriage towards their Brethren touching things offered unto Idols. 1 Cor. 8. 9 take heed lest, by any means this liberty of yours become a stumbling block to them that are weak. In Chapt. 10. he determineth, that it was lawful to eat things consecrated to the Idols, and he instanceth in two cases. 1. When they were sold in open markets. verse. 25. 2ly, When they were made use of at private feasts: But unto this his determination he subjoineth the exception of scandal, vers. 28. 29. If any man say unto you this is offered in sacrifice unto idols, eat not, for his sake that showed it, and for conscience sake; The earth is the Lords and the fullness thereof. Conscience; I say, 〈◊〉 thine own, but of the others: for why is my liberty judged of another man's conscience? This some understand of the unbelieving Idolater, others of a weak brother: And indeed this practice gives an wound unto both their consciences. 1. The Idolater triumphs, because he thinks it an honour unto his Idol, and so he is confirmed, and hardened in his Idolatry: And then, 2ly, As for the weak Brother, he supposeth, that the meat is so polluted by Consecration and sacrifice 〈◊〉 Idols, as that to eat thereof is a compliance with Idolatry; and therefore altogether sinful; and hereupon the eating of these meats by the strong may occasion in the weak two scandals. 1. The example of the strong may entice them unto imitation; and so they will sin against their consciences. 2ly, The practice of the strong may provoke them unto rash and uncharitable judgement: both scandals give a great blow unto the Conscience of the weak: But, that the Apostle speaks of the latter scandal, I am induced to think by the words following: Why is my liberty judged of another man's Conscience? that is, why do I needlessely, indiscreetly, and unseasonably expose my Christian liberty unto the rash censures of a weak Brother, who may be ready to traduce it, as a profane licentiousness? why shall I drive him upon a sin, which I may prevent by a prudent and charitable forbearance of the exercise of my liberty? Liberty is a thing, which men out of an excessive self love so much overvalue, as that they are very impatient of any restraint to be put upon it at all: But the Restraint, that Charity prompts us unto, is of all others most disregarded; because there is nothing almost, that is so much undervalved, as the precious souls of our poor Brethren, and therefore we make but little conscience how thick we throw scandals in their way: I shall therefore briefly propound such weighty, and pressing arguments, as the Apostle useth to persuade the Romans, and Corinthians to abstain from a scandalous use of their liberty in things otherwise indifferent, and lawful: and they are drawn, either, from the nature of things indifferent, or from the nature of scandal. 1. From the nature of things indifferent: and here, the first argument is Rom. 14. 17. the kingdom of God is not meat and drink: It doth not stand in indifferent things; for they are neither the way to the kingdom of Glory, nor our duty under the kingdom of grace: They are no part of God's worship, and service, no matter of Religion: the weal and safety of God's people is in no wise wrapped up in them; nay, many times a rigid pressing, and unseasonable practice of them is a great disturbance unto the peace, and a great hindrance unto the edification of the Church, the kingdom of Christ. A second Argument from the nature of things indifferent, is the great latitude of 〈◊〉: Though some of them be scandalous yet there will still remain an ample field of them besides, 1 Cor. 10. 28. If any man say unto you, this is offered in sacrifice unto idols, eat not for his sake, that showed it, etc. the earth is the Lords, and the fullness thereof: It is as much as if he had said; though ye abstain from things offered unto idols, yet there is no doubt of want, no fear of pinching your bellies: for you have the earth, and the fullness thereof for your supply: And from the scandal by meats, we may argue in like manner touching the scandal by recreation: If cards, dice, tables offend thy brother, there is plenty enough of other sports, bowling, chess, draughts, etc. A second sort of arguments, that the Apostle insists on, are taken from the nature of scandal: It is a sin against that tender love, which we owe unto our brethren: And when ye sin so against the brethren, 1 Cor. 8. 12. (And that 'tis no small, but a very heinous sin, the next words evince) And wound their weak conscience, The words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, where (as Beza well observeth,) the Antecedent is put for the consequent, beating, striking, or smiting for the effect thereof, wounding: As weapons or whips wound the body; so scandals the conscience. Unjustly to wound the body, the face, the eye of our Brother is a cruel and inhuman part; but to wound so tender a piece as his conscience, to wound a weak, a sickly, a diseased conscience is the very height of inhumanity. To wound the soul of a Brother with sorrow, is a breach of charity; If thy Brother be grieved with thy meat, now walkest thou not charitably, Rom. 14. 15. And hence we may reason in a way of comparison à minori ad majus, that to wound the soul of a Brother with sin, violates Christian love in a far higher measure; for the wound of the least sin is in its own nature mortal; and therefore scandal is not only of a wounding, but of a kill and destroying nature; it is a soul murder, Destroy not him with thy meat, Rom. 14. 15. Indeed the weak, that were scandalised, might by God's mercy, and Christ's merit, escape an actual destroying and damning: But the Apostles meaning is, that the strongs scandalising of them carried in its nature a tendency towards their destruction: for it drew them into sin, and sin without repentance will destroy the soul: This malignant and destructive efficacy of scandal the Apostle urgeth also unto the Corinthians Epistle 1. chapt. 8. v. 11. And through thy knowledge shall thy weak brother perish: that is; through thy scandalous abuse of thy knowledge of thy liberty in eating things offered unto idols, thou shalt do, what lieth in thee, to farther the perishing of thy weak Brother: This cruelty that is in scandal towards the souls of our Brethren, is aggravated from Christ's Redemption, God's Creation of their souls. 1. From Christ's Redemption of their souls: Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died, Rom. 14. 15. And through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish, for whom Christ died? But when ye sin so against the Brethren, and wound their weak conscience, ye sin against Christ: 1 Cor. 8. 11, 12. In the judgement of charity thou art to rank thy weak Brother in the number of those, for whom Christ died: Christ died for his salvation, and how darest thou oppose his work by doing that, which tends unto his damnation? Christ parted with his life to save him, and wilt not thou for that end abridge thyself of thy liberty in a few indifferent things. 2. From God's creation of their souls: for meat destroy not the work of God, Rom. 14. 20. that is the soul of thy brother: for that is styled Gods work in a way of 〈◊〉: because it was one of the choicest, chiefest, and most eminent works of the Creation, made as it were with the consultation of the whole Trinity, and had in it engraven the very Image of God himself: Therefore not only the defacing, but the very attempting to deface this would redound very much unto the dishonour of the worker God; And he will doubtless accordingly resent the despising of his workmanship: Some interpreters expound the place of the work of God's grace in the sanctification, or regeneration of the soul, wherein faith is begotten, and that faith in a peculiar manner is the work of God, we have Christ's own testimony, John 6. 29. Jesus answered, and said unto them, this is the work of God, that ye believe on him, whom he hath sent: But even so the words display the horrid malignancy of scandal: for they show that he who scandalizeth his brother, fighteth against God; that he goeth about to demolish that, which hath God alone for the builder. It was a part of Christ's character not to break a bruised reed, nor quench the smoking flax, Mat. 12. 20. How unsuitable unto this, is the disposition of those by whom offences come? For they do what lieth in them to quench the very beginnings of grace, and goodness. Indeed the work of God's grace is so all-powerfull, as that it will finally prevail against all resistance: If God have begun a good work, he will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ, Phil. 1. 6. And the gates of hell shall never be able to prevail against it, Matth. 16. 18. But yet the gates of hell will be ever hindering of it: and in especial by the spreadth of scandals: And this very opposition is a war against heaven, (in the language of the Scripture) a destroying of the work of God. There is one sequel more of active scandals of this nature, that our Apostle mentioneth, Rom. 14. and 1 Cor. 10. which deserveth also our consideration: and it is the blot of infamy, which they will contract unto our names, and the very Christian liberty, which we abuse: A scandal in this case, tending unto sin, is usually accompanied with a scandal tending unto disgrace, or defamation: And how careful we should be to decline scandal, even in this English sense of the word, the vehemency of the Apostles interrogations will sufficiently inform us, 1 Cor. 10. 29, 30. Conscience, I say, not thine own, but of the others: for why is my liberty judged 〈◊〉 man's conscience? for, if I by grace be a partaker, why am I evil spoken of, for that for which I give thanks? Unto these interrogations add we the Apostles precept also, Rom. 14. 16. Let not then your good be evil spoken of: that is, give none occasion for this great privilege of your Christian liberty to be traduced. Before I take my leave of this restraint of our liberty by Charity in the case of scandal, I shall examine the restraints, that some have put upon it, without any warrant from scripture: Those in which they most confide, are two. 1. They limit it unto the scandal of the weak, and, 2. Unto matters that are undetermined by Authority. 1. 〈◊〉 limit it unto the scandal of the weak: for the scandal of the malicious, and presumptuous persons, The scandal of pharisees (say they) may be neglected, Mat. 15. 12, 14. whether in our Ceremonies there was an active scandal, a scandal given will be largely disputed in the next treatise, for the present therefore we shall only prove that we are to avoid such an active scandal in the malicious, as well as the weak. For First, Such a scandal is of soul destroying nature: Destroy net him with thy meat, Rom. 14. 15. And who so wicked, and malicious upon the face of the earth, whose soul a true Christian charity will exclude from its care, mercy, and compassion. 〈◊〉, The Apostles motive reacheth unto the wicked and malicious: Destroy not him with thy meat, for whom Christ died, Rom. 14. 15. for they may be in the number of those, for whom Christ died, who for their present state and condition may be most wicked, and malicious; such as oppose themselves, such as are in the snare of the Devil, taken captive by him at his will. 3. The Apostles prohibition, 1 Cor. 10. 32. extendeth unto the malicious, as well as the weak, Give none offence neither to the 〈◊〉, nor to the Gentiles, nor to the Church of God: where Jew's and Gentiles are distinguished from the Church of God; and therefore by them are meant such as were unconverted, and as yet enemies unto the faith of Christ, and Church of God. And the things wherein the 〈◊〉 would have their offence to be avoided were matters of indifferency; Whether ye cat or drink, 〈◊〉. 31. But now, lest some should be ready to object unto Paul that which our Saviour said of the Scribes and Pharisees, Matth. 23. 4. that he did bind a heavy burden and grievous to be 〈◊〉, and lay it upon men's shoulders: but he himself would not move it with one of his fingers: the Apostle in the next verse showeth, how that his practice was conformable unto his precept, Even as I please all men (good and bad) in all things (that is, in all indifferent things) not seeking mine own profit, but the profit of many that they may be saved, 1 Cor. 10. 33. In a second place, the Fautors of our Ceremonies limit this restraint of our liberty in things indifferent by charity, in the case of scandal, only unto things undetermined by Authority. Where Authority hath determined our choice, we must (say they) hold to their determination, any scandal to the Contrary notwithstanding. It seems then in case the magistrate command it, we may wound the weak consciences of our Brother, Destroy with our indifferencies, the work of God, him for whom Christ died. It is good (saith Paul) neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor any thing whereby thy Brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made 〈◊〉, Rom. 14. 22. But our 〈◊〉 determine quite otherwise, if authority enjoin it, it is good (say they) to eat bread, drink wine, we are a surpliee, use the sign of the 〈◊〉 in Baptism, though thereby never so many Brethren stumble, or are offended, or made weak. The unreasonableness of this assertion Ames in his reply to Morton hath proved by many arguments, That are as yet unanswered, which I shall here transcribe. A scandal in the nature of it is spiritual murder: Now suppose a superior should command a thing in itself indifferent, whereupon murder were like to follow, as to run a horse, or a cart, in a certain way, at a certain time, when it may be unwitting to the commander, little children were playing in the way, would any man's conscience serve him to do it? Avoiding of scandal is a main duty of Charity: May Superiors at their pleasure appoint how far I shall show my Charity towards my brother's soul? Then surely an inferior earthly court may cross the determinations of the high court of heaven. The superiors have no power given them for destruction, but only for 〈◊〉: If therefore they command scandals, they go beyond their Commission: neither are we tied therein to do as they bid, but as they should bid. If determination by superiors were sufficient to take away the sin of a scandal. Then they do very ill that they do not (so farrè as is possible) determine all things indifferent, that so no danger may be left in giving of offence by the use of them. Then the Church of Rome is to be praised, in that she hath determined of so many indifferents: then Paul with the other Apostles might have spared a great deal of labour in admonishing the Churches how they should 〈◊〉 offences about some indifferent things: A far shorter way had been either to determine the matter fully: or else to have given order, that the Churches should among themselves determine it at home. But say that 〈◊〉 Archbishop of Corinth (for now I suppose such a one) had called his convocation, and with consent of his Clergy had 〈◊〉, that men might, and for 〈◊〉 of liberty should, at a certain time eat of such and such meats, which men formerly doubted of: would not yet the Apostle have given the same 〈◊〉 he did? Would not good Christians still have had care of their brother's consciences? Can the determination of a superior be a sufficient plea at the bar of God's judgement seat, for a man that by virtue or 〈◊〉 thereof alone, hath done any 〈◊〉, that his 〈◊〉 telleth him, will scandalise his brother. Lastly, I would 〈◊〉 know whether those superiors do not give a great scandal, which take upon them determinately to impose unnecessary rites, which they know many good men will be scandalised by? Thus far Ames. But this opinion of Ames, is I confess to be understood cum gravo salis, with many limitations, which I shall lay down fully in the Tractate that next followeth. If the Prelates would have seriously laid to heart that golden saying of Paul (1 Cor. 8. 13. If meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh, while the world 〈◊〉, lest I make my brother to offend) This would supersede all further dispute of this argument: for thence it is easy to evict, that it is unlawful for Church governor's to command the observation of things indifferent, when in all probability they will scandalise: how dare they make that the matter of a Church Canon, which Paul durst not adventure upon in his own personal practice? He thought it unlawful to do a thing otherwise indifferent, to eat flesh in the care 〈◊〉 scandal; and therefore doubtless he judged it unlawful in such a case to impose any such matter upon others: Greater was the importance of the flesh for borne by Paul unto his health, and the comfort of his life; then the profit of the controverted ceremonies can be unto the worship and service of God: And besides, the indifferency of eating flesh was a thing clear, and evident unto all, that were well instructed in the Doctrine of Christian liberty; whereas the indifferency of our ceremonies will at least be judged a very doubtful matter, and that by very indifferent men, who shall thoroughly ponder the Arguments of Didoclave, Parker, Ames and others against them, which to this day remain unanswered. The Prelates will not pretend unto such an ample authority in the Church of God, as Paul had: But though they be far inferior unto him in point of Authority, they are not yet so humble, as to imitate him in the condescension of his charity. Paul's peremptory resolve was to forbear a thing indifferent, when it scandalised. If 〈◊〉 makae my brother to offend, I will (saith he) eat no flesh, while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend, 1 Cor. 8. 13. But what a wide difference, nay contrariety was there betwixt this charitable resolution of Paul, and the rigid practice of the Prelates. For they were obstinately bend to press the Ceremonies, with all severity, without any care, or Conscience of the scandals ensuing: nay their endeavour was daily to add unto the heap of former ceremonies, though they knew that thereby the scandals would be increased: They spoke a language quite contrary to that of Paul: we will enjoin (say they) the surplice, cross, kneeling in the sacrament of the Lords supper, while the world standeth, as long as we have any power, and authority in the Church of God, Let who will be offended: This their rigour brings unto my mind a cruel command of (l) Cum Augustus coenaret apud Vedium Pollionem. Fregerat unus ex servis ejus crystallinum: rapi eum Vedius jussit, nec vulgari quidem periturum 〈◊〉 muraenis objici jubebatur, quas ingens piscina continebat. 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉 illum putaret luxuriae causa facere? saevitia erat: evasit è manibus puer, & confugit ad Caesaris pedes: nihil aliud petiturus, quam ut aliter 〈◊〉, nec esca fieret. Motus est novitate crudelitatis Caesar, & illum quidem mitti, crystallina autem omnia coram se frangi jussit, complerique 〈◊〉. Fuit Caesari sic castigandus amicus: bene usus est viribus suis. E convivio rapi homines imperas, & novi generis paenis lancinari? si calix tuus fractus est, viscera hominis distrahentur? tantum tibi placebis etc. Seneca de ira. Lib. 3. Vedius Pollio, that was countermanded by Augustus Caesar supping with him: A poor boy his slave had casually broken a Crystal glass, and for this Pollio most inhumanely condemned him to be thrown into a great pond of Lampreys, there to be devoured. The boy escaping from those appointed for his execution, prostrated himself at the feet of Caesar, who then supped with his master, and desired not pardon, but only commutation of so horrid and unnatural a death: Augustus was extremely transported with the strangeness and novelty of so inhuman a cruelty, and hereupon to prevent the like for the future he forthwith commanded all the Crystal glasses of Pollio, though his friend, to be broken, and the fishpond to be filled up: for the breaking of a sorry glass he thought it a disproportioned and too severe a punishment, to have a man's bowels plucked in pieces, and torn asunder. This spirit of Vedius Pollio breathed in many of our late Prelates; The Ceremonies in comparison of men's souls were but as paltry trifles, as glasses, and feathers: and yet, by the maintenance of them, they hazarded the souls of thousands (In as much as in them lay) they destroyed the work of God, they destroyed those for whom Christ died; they scandalise Papists, and separatists: people and Pastors: conformists, and non-conformists, as Mr Parker at large demonstrates: Dr John Burgess (as I have often heard) urged this story in a Sermon before King James to persuade him unto the abolition of the Ceremonies: And King James had doubtless expressed a Christian, and royal care of his people, if he had broken these glasses in pieces: if he had cashered these toys out of the Church, which had broken so many in their estates, wounded so many in their consciences, and endangered the salvation of so many souls: and hereby have prevented those unspeakable griefs, fears, and scandals, which they formerly occasioned. I proceed unto the third and last conclusion, which is, that 〈◊〉 actions of men, which proceeds from deliberate reason, if they be considered in actu exercito, in the singular or particular, as clothed with circumstances, are indifferent, but all of them are morally either good, or evil. For the better understanding of this Conclusion, I shall out of (m) Circumstantia una aut altera actionis alicujus humanae potest esse indifferens, ut si studiosus unus cum aliosermonem conferat, indifferens est, saepenumero, utrum vernaculo utatursermone, an Latino: sed sermo ipse, cum omnibus suis circumstantiis, vel bonus est, vel malus. Ratio eft, quia determinatio actionisnon pendet ab una circumstantia seorsim, sed ab omnibus conjunctim. Datur actio aliqua singularis, in qua nulla bonitatis ratio reperitur, quae inalia non possit 〈◊〉 atque adeo quod hoc tempore, hoc vel illud potius agimus quam aliud, in eo saepe nihil boni aut mali occurrit. Opportunitas, aut animi suggestio, sine ullo respectu bonitatis moralis, satis habet ponderis ad singularem istam determinationem. Quamvis igitur nulla singularis actio humana sit, quae neque est bona neque mala, fiunt tamen variae, quae singulariter & in comparatione ad alias, neque sunt necessariae, neque illicitae. Sicut enim statuarius certam rationem saepe non 〈◊〉, cur istam potius quam aliam statuam facit, si ta men aliquam faciat, necesse est, ut vel regulas artis sequendo bonam saciat, aut aberrando malam, sic est in multis action ibus hominum singularibus, quae quoad exercitium nullam habent rationem propriam, praeter inclinationem animi, sed cum exercentur vel bonae sunt, vel malae. De cas. cons. Lib. 3. cap. 18. Ames add two limitations of it. 1. Then; this conclusion is to be understood only of an adequate consideration of the circumstances of singular actions, for not only one, but more circumstances of a humane action in the individual may be indifferent: In a conference of scholars it is many times indifferent, whether they discourse in latin, or English, whether in the morning, or afternoon: But yet their whole conference considered adequately with all circumstances is either good, or evil; And the reason is because the determination of an action doth not depend upon one circumstance apart, but upon all jointly. A second limitation of the conclusion is that it is not to be extended unto every comparative consideration of humane actions and their circumstances: I know, that not only actions indifferent, but also those that are commanded become sometime to be sinful by comparison; when they are preferred to better actions. God dislikes those recreations, that otherwise he alloweth, when they justle out duties: nay he abhorreth sacrifice, when it is inconsistent with mercy: but notwithstanding this, when there is an equality, if not of actions themselves, yet of their moral motives as to hic, and nunc this present time and place, Then curiously to compare and balance such actions, were needless: for in such a case, the prelation of one before the other, would be a thing merely arbitrary; neither good nor bad: Reading, prayer, meditation are things commanded: but many times that I set apart such an hour for reading principally may be a thing indifferent: that I make choice of one Recreation before another, of bowling before Chess, draughts, etc. that I choose to walk in the forenoon, rather than in the afternoon, may be of no moral consideration, and so neither good, nor evil, but a matter of indifferency. Look as an Image carver may have no peculiar reason to make this Image, rather than that; yet if he make any Image at all; either he followeth the rules of his art, and then he makes a good Image; or he swarves from those rules, and then he makes a bad image, and doth not work like an Artist: So many times it may be to a Christian, a matter merely indifferent to perform this or that action, he may have no obligation to do either, or at least to do one rather than the other, but may be left unto his own mind, and pleasure: but yet he is as a Christian obliged to regard such circumstances in all his actions, and therefore whatsoever he doth, he doth it either well, or ill; for either he observeth these circumstances, and then his action is good, or he neglects them, and then it is bad. The conclusion being thus explained may be made apparent from the end, and rule of deliberate actions. 1. From their end, and what ought to be the end of all deliberate actions of man may be evidenced from their relation unto their Original, from a consideration of them absolutely as they are in themselves. 1. From their relation unto their Original, the rational soul, or the soul, as rational, they flow from man, as man, they proceed from his deliberate reason, and therefore, should have the same end, which man as rational should propound, the glorisying of his maker; If they have not this end, they are evil: and if they have this end, why then (if there be no failing otherwise) they are good. This argument is by (m) Quaerenda 〈◊〉 lunt firmiora praesidia, lententiae humanos actus indisserentes 〈◊〉. Unum duco ex operatione humana prout est germen naturae 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 enim ad suas operationes habet se veluti arbor ad fructus, ut optimè advertit Antonius l. 9 de vita sua, num. 8. & pulch è Guliel. Par lib. dev ircut. ca 12. initio: cum ca tamen 〈◊〉, ut scitè notavit Antonius l. 11. num. 1. quod atborum & quarumvis plantarumfruct us, alii percipiunt: 〈◊〉 homo fructus sui percipit, nec alii, sed sibi ipsi laborat. Cum lgitur operatio humana se habeat ad naturam rationalem, sicut fructus & germane ejus, necesse est, ut idem sit finis operationis ab humana natura prodeuntis, & ipsius naturae rationalis. Sic enim videmus, servata proportione, 〈◊〉 in omnibus aliis naturis. Et ratio est, quia cum natura sit actus quidam primus, actio verò sit actus ejus secundus, qui est ipsamet tendentia actus primi in objectum & finem suum; 〈◊〉 profecto vid etur, ut idemmet sit finis ultimus actionis & naturae actionem 〈◊〉: sicut trunci & germinum & totius arboris, ac fructuum, idem est sinis. Debet ergo humanae naturae & actionis humar 〈◊〉 esse idem finis. Atqui finis ultimus humanae naturae est Deus; Etgo finis quoque ultimus actionis nostrae debet esse Deus. Constat autem, actum indisserentem, si daretur, non habiturum pro fine Deum: nam sic non esset indifferens, led revera bonus. Ergo careret aliquo, quod habere deberet, nempe relatione illa ad sinem ultimum naturae humanae; ac proinde esset malus moraliter, non autem indifferens. Moral. 〈◊〉 didst 4. q. 1. 〈◊〉. 2. n. 37 Raynaudus thus urged: man is related unto his operations, as a tree unto its fruits and branches: and therefore there is the same end of the humane operations, and the humane nature, and the reason is, because that nature is the first act, and its operation the second act which is a tendency of the first act towards its object, and end; and therefore it seems necessary, that there should be the same uttermost end of the nature, and the operation; Even as there is the same end of the tree, it's stock, branches, and fruits: But now the uttermost end of the humane nature is God: and therefore God should be the uttermost end of every humane action; and consequently no humane action can be indifferent: for if it have not God for its end, it is sinful: because it wants that relation unto the uttermost end of the humane nature, which it ought to have: and if it have God for its end, than it is morally good, if it want not any other essential requisite. 2. From a consideration of them n Alterum sententiae 〈◊〉 firmamentum profero ex actu humano per seipsum considerato. Hoc est non quatenus 〈◊〉 germane naturae, & quatenus 〈◊〉 cum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Habere debet, sed solitariè, 〈◊〉 ac si non esset fructus illius naturae. Sic 〈◊〉 argumentor. Actio humana vel ultimo refertur ad Deum, sive 〈◊〉, sive 〈◊〉, & suapie natura, quatenus est 〈◊〉 conformis, & sic est bona: vel nullo modo in Deum tendit: & sic eo ipso deflectit 〈◊〉 eo fine, 〈◊〉 mala 〈◊〉. Nam eo ipso quod non fit ob finem increatum, nec in eum tendit saltem virtualiter, sicut faciunt omnes boni actus, sistit omnino in bono creato, est que ejus fruitio. Perversum autem est, frui utendis, ut latè tradit D. Augustinus 1. de Doct. Christ. a cap. 3. etc. 21. & 22. ostendens omnia bona creata debere tantum cadere sub usum nostrum, sub fruitionem autem non nisi Deum. Ergo Actus humani carentes bono fine, vel 〈◊〉, vel extrinseco, sunt 〈◊〉 ipso 〈◊〉, carentque aliquo quod 〈◊〉 deberent. Est enim in omni actione 〈◊〉, debitum ut sit fruitio 〈◊〉: id est, ut ultimò ad Deum 〈◊〉 aliquo modo. Nam si non haberet hoc 〈◊〉 debito, posset esse fruitio utendorum, nihilque idcirco haberet indebitum. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 actus humanus, qui dicitur fore prorsus 〈◊〉, esset 〈◊〉 puri boni creati, quod utendum 〈◊〉 non fruenduoo; merito convincitur non fuisse indifferens, sed oblitus coeno turpitudinis 〈◊〉, ob defectum volitionis ad finem 〈◊〉. n. 38. loc. praedict. absolutely as they are in themselves: Every humane rational action is referred unto some chief end or other, and that must be, either the creature, or the creator: If it be the creature, than the creature is most sinfully enjoyed, as man's supreme end, and highest happiness: whereas it should be only used, as a means: and hereby it is at least virtually, and interpretatively idolised, deified, and placed in the room of God: If it be the Creator than the action is good, unless it be in some other regard defective. And so you see that unto whatsoever end it be referred, either created, or uncreated, it cannot be indifferent. For the further enforcement of this reason, I shall allege, and open some few scriptures. The first is Matth. 12. 36. But I say unto you, that 〈◊〉 idle word that men shall 〈◊〉, they shall give account 〈◊〉 in the day of judgement. Three things here merit our consideration. 1. What is meant by an idle word. 2. What by giving account 〈◊〉: and 3dly, How this makes against the indifferency of humane actions, considered in their singulars, and actual existence. 1. What is meant by an idle 〈◊〉: that which hath no obliquity in it but this, that it wants a good and honest end: That it is unprofitable, and unfruitful, both unto speaker, and hearer: quod aut utilitate rectitudinis aut ratione justae necessitatis 〈◊〉, as 〈◊〉, Homily. 6. As for those, who think, that an idle word is extended unto every word, 〈◊〉 wicked, false, lying, blasphemous, the very context will disprove them: The occasion of our Saviour's discourse was that blasphemy 〈◊〉 the Pharisees, vers. 24. But 〈◊〉 the Pharisees heard it, they said, this fellow 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cast out Devils, but by Beelzebub, the prince of the Devils: Now our Saviour's 〈◊〉 is to discover the 〈◊〉; and danger of this blasphemous speech of theirs: And this he doth, as by several arguments, so particularly, in this verse, by arguing a minori ad majus, from the less to the greater: As if he should have said: If in the day of judgement ye shall give an account for every idle word, then much more for such a blasphemous vomit as this of yours, That I cast 〈◊〉 Devils by the assistance of 〈◊〉: That our Saviour's Argument here stands thus Maldonate tells us, all are of that opinion that he ever read. And for this coherence take these two Reasons. 1. Our Saviour proceeds in a way of aggravating the now mentioned Blasphemy: But if by every idle word you understand every grossly wicked, and blasphemous word, there will be little aggravation hereof: for to say that every wicked lying, blasphemous word, that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgement, falls very short of what was spoken already of this blasphemy vers. 31. 32. That it was a blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, and not to be forgiven, either in this world, or in the world to come. 2. Compare we these words with those immediately foregoing vers. 35. A good man out of the good treasure of the heart, bringeth forth good things: and an evil man out of the 〈◊〉 treasure, bringeth forth evil things: In the latter part of these words, by evil things are understood such evil words as were notoriously such, such as even the Pharisees acknowledged to be so; The Idle words then in vers. 36. are distinguished from them, as may very probably be gathered from the Antithesis insinuated in the particle [but] But I say unto you every idle word, that men shall 〈◊〉, they shall give account thereof in the day of Judgement: It is apparent, that our Saviour spoke of such words, whose sinfulness seemed strange, and new unto such loose commentators on the Law, as the Pharisees were: And it is very observable, that he ushereth in this his commination against every idle word with the very same form of speech, that he useth (chapt. 5. vers. 12, 28, 31, 34, 39, 44.) In his correction of their corrupt glosses upon the law of God. So then our Saviour speaks of that, which sounded as very harsh and rigid doctrine in the ears of the Pharisees: But I say unto you that every idle word, that men shall speak 〈◊〉 shall give an account thereof in the day of Judgement: Notwithstanding your slighting thoughts of your vain, and unprofitable discourse, I, who am the truth, and know fully the mind of God, as being always in his bosom, do assure you, that every idle word, which men shall speak, every word, which is not referred unto a good end, they shall give an account thereof in the day of Judgement. 2. Inquire we, what it is to give an account of every idle word in the day of Judgement. The phrase sometimes signifies only trial, and examination, Luk. 16. 2. Heb. 13. 17. But that here it importeth condemnation, and punishment, (n) Illa verba dixit ad incutiendum hominibus timorem, & ex aggerandam 〈◊〉 divini judicii: ergo sensus illorum verborum est ita 〈◊〉 reddituros 〈◊〉 otiosi verbi, ut si nullam aliam excusationem, vel rationabilem causam 〈◊〉, pro illo 〈◊〉 sunt alioquin verba Christi nullum 〈◊〉 pondus 〈◊〉 energiam haberent, neque aliquem metum inferent, cum tamen illo singulari exemplo voluerit Christus ostendere, quam sint 〈◊〉 puniendi homines: pro verbis pravioribus. De bonitate & malit, humanorum act: disp. 9 Sect. 3. Suarez proveth from the scope of the words which was to terrify the Pharisees for their blasphemy, and to deter others from the like, by displaying, and amplifying the severity of God's judgement against it: And unto this the threatening of punishment and condemnation for every idle word is more conducing, than a proposal of a bare trial and examination of every idle word, which is agreeable unto the best words and works of men: 〈◊〉 for them 〈◊〉 may give an account with joy, Heb. 13. 17. In the words then, there is plainly a Metalepsis, the Antecedent, to give an account in the day of Judgement is put for the consequent to be punished in hellfire, Every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give an account thereof in the day of Judgement: that is they without repentance shall be condemned, and everlastingly punished for it: And this acception of the phrase we find elsewhere, as 1 Pet. 4. 5. I pass on unto the third particular how this makes against the indifferency of humane actions considered in their singular and actual existence: I answer: because it concludes against the indifferency of any words of men; for those words, which in the general, and in their own nature are indifferent: yet as drawn into exercise, and putting on circumstances they are idle, if they have no goodness adjoined unto them, by reference unto their due, and requisite ends: And if they be idle they are sinful, and consequently 〈◊〉 indifferent: And what is said of idle words of men is appliable unto the idle thoughts, and works of men: for the thought of man is a more rational act then his speech, more an act of reason: And his rational works proceed from his thoughts, and are of far greater moment and importance than his words: and so in the upshot we may infer that if men's idle words are not indifferent, than neither men's idle thoughts, and works: And the justness of this inference, I shall confirm by two arguments. 1. Idle words are therefore sinful, because (being the birth and product of reason, and the free will of man) there is not in 〈◊〉 propounded an end suitable unto the reasonable nature of man: Now all the vain thoughts, and idle works of men are the issue of reason, and freedom of will: and therefore, (because they are not 〈◊〉 unto such an honest end, as becomes the dignity of such a rational creature, as man,) they are faulty and vicious. 2. Idle words are therefore morally evil: because in them, that precious treasure, time, is wasted, in which a man may be more lavish, then in the most prodigal mispence of money: But now out time is vainly consumed to no good end, and purpose, in our idle thoughts, and works: and therefore they are sinful, as well as our idle words: and consequently not indifferent. A second place is, 1 Cor. 10. 31. Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all unto the Glory of God: To eat, and to drink abstractively considered, are indifferent actions, and yet such actions are here commanded to be referred unto the glory of God: and therefore if they be not thus referred, they are sinful: And we may say the same of all other actions, that are in spccie, in their own nature indifferent. Capreolus (lib. 2. dist. 40. quaest 1. pag. 562.) noteth, that these words of the Apostle [Let all things be done unto the Glory of God] may be understood two manner of ways negatively or affirmatively. 1. Negatively, and then the sense is, do nothing against 〈◊〉 glory, nothing that may dishonour him: Things offered unto idols were in themselves the good creatures of God, and to eat them an action in itself indifferent, but to eat them in the Idols Temple was to countenance Idolatry, and so a high dishonouring of God, To eat them also with the scandal of a weak brother, was to prejudice, and obstruct the glorifying of God's name. 2dly, The words may be understood affirmatively, and so there is (as Capreolus observeth) a threefold reference unto the glory of God. 1. Habitual. 2. Actual. 3. Virtual. 1. An habitual reference there is unto the glory of God, wheresoever there is the habit, the grace, or virtue of the love of God, the principle of actually referring all things unto the glory of God. But now this is not sufficient: for the habit of love may (for a long time) lie idle, and un-active, and be consistent with very gross sins: as we see in David, Peter, and others. 2. An action is actually referred unto God's glory, when there is an actual cogitation of God, and his glory: And this, (though it ought frequently to be done) is not yet required in every action: well it may be our happiness in the next life; But it can not be our duty in this; because it would leave no room, or place for other duties: Thus for an Artist to be always thinking upon the rules of his Art, would be a disturbance unto his work: for a traveller to have perpetually in his thoughts, the end of his journey would retard his progress therein. In a third place therefore, the reference of all our actions unto God's glory, that is here exhorted to, is only virtual. And that an action may virtually be referred unto God's glory three things are required. 1. The above mentioned habitual reference unto God's glory must be presupposed, as also. 2dly, A foregoing actual reference of a man's self, and all that belongs unto him unto the glory of God, and the more frequent this is, the better, and 3ly, The Action itself. 1. Must not be referred unto any end opposite unto God's glory. 2. It must be referred unto some end subordinate unto God's glory, that carrieth a tendency unto it, and is naturally referrible thereunto. Now such an action is said to be virtually referred unto God's glory, because it is done in the virtue, and source of some preceding actual, and explicit proposal of God's glory as a supreme end: for the virtue, and force of the chief, and utmost end abideth in all inferior ends subordinated unto it; so that he, who propounds unto himself those inferior ends, may be said to propound implicitly, and mediately God's glory for his uttermost end. Thus those godly persons who have first actually made Gods honour and glory, the main aim of their desires, endeavours, and undertake, may be said afterwards to refer even their eating, and drinking, their recreations unto God's glory virtually, if they aim at no dishonest end, though their explicit and immediate intendment be only the refreshment of their bodies, by which they are the better fitted, and prepared for the glorisying of God in both their general, and particular callings. Thus every step in a man's journey, (so he go not out of the way) may be said to be virtually designed unto the end of his journey, and yet it is neither necessary, nor expedient, that in every step a man should have actual thoughts of the end of his journey. Unto this sentence of the Apostle here, Eslius makes Parallel two other places. The first, Col. 3. 17. Whatsoever ye do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, that is; for his glory and honour, for his name's sake. The second is, 1 Pet. 4. 11. If any man speak, let him speak as the Oracles of God: If any man minister, let him 〈◊〉 it as of the ability, which God giveth, that God in all things may be glorified through Jesus Christ; Not only in public ordinances, not only in acts of worship, not only in necessary duties, but even in indifferencies, in all the common actions of this life. But as for any further exposition of these two places in themselves, or application unto the matter in hand, I shall refer the reader unto what I but now spoke on the 1 Cor. 10. 31. which with due change will serve here. I shall therefore pass on unto a second argument taken from the rule of humane actions, right reason: Unto this rule all rational actions, proceeding from deliberate reason, are either agreeable, or disagreeable: If agreeable, than they are morally good; for right reason is a part of Scripture materially considered: If disagreeable, than they are vicious and sinful; For the will of man is bound to loòke to its rule, and conform all its actions thereunto: and therefore if in any thing it neglect, or thwart it, if it swarve therefrom in the least particulars, it thereby commits a sin. Unto these two arguments I shall add a third, drawn from the relation betwixt 〈◊〉 goodness and 〈◊〉: They are privatively opposite; and inter privative opposita non datur medium in proprio subjecto susceptivo; betwixt things privatively opposite there is no middle, either of abnegation, or participation in capable subjects: Thus every sensitive creature either seeth, or is blind: but we cannot say of a stone, that it is blind, although it seeth not; because it is not capable of sight: Now moral goodness and illness are privatively opposed, (the formality of sin being nothing else, but a privation of that moral goodness, which is required unto every rational action;) Now every rational action, Every action, that proceeds from deliberate reason, and freedom of will, considered in its singulars, and as drawn into exercise is capable of moral goodness; because it is referrible unto a good end: and therefore it is either good, or evil, and so not indifferent. Against this there are divers objections: unto those of Scotus the reader may supply himself with answers out of what hath been said already: As for the arguments of Vasquez, there is but (o) Prima ratio est 〈◊〉 ex eo, quod Doctores prioris opinionis concedunt, esse nimirum actionem indifferentem ex suâ specie, & objecto, tametsi in individuo nulla 〈◊〉 indifferens. Ratio vero est 〈◊〉. Nulla est natura in specie, quae non habeat aliquod individuum in quo ratio ejus maneat, & non destruatur per 〈◊〉: cum igitur sit actio humana indifferens secundum suam naturam & speciem, 〈◊〉 debet aliquod individuum, ac proinde esse 〈◊〉 aliqua actio individua, & singularis, quae maneat indifferens. In 12 〈◊〉 tom. disp. 52. cap. 4. pag. 378. one of them merit's any examination, and yet that hath been also answered out of Durand. (b) In brief, it runs thus. As no Genus, no general nature can be without one species, so no species, no special without one singular. No specifical nature but hath at least one individual: and therefore, if there be some humane actions, that be in their species, in their specifical nature indifferent, there must needs be an individual of such an action, that must be indifferent: and consequently all humane actions considered in the individual are not morally good, or evil. This hath been sufficiently answered already; but now I shall, ex abundanti, add two things more. The first is out of (p) Hunc loquendi modum, fateor esse cavillo obnoxium; impugnaturque ab Argentina in 2. d. 40. qu. unica. art. 2. in 2. particuli: quia nulla 〈◊〉 esse species cujus non possit esse aliquid individuum. Ergo si dantur actus secundum speciem 〈◊〉, debent quoque dari indisferentes secundum individuum. Quod argumentum agendo de specie, & individuo in sensu quotidiano, & vulgari, rectè concludit, sed non 〈◊〉 eos, qui admittunt actus secundum speciem indifferentes, negant autem dari indifferentes in individuo. Name 〈◊〉 Autores fatentur illos ipsos actus, quos admittunt, esse secundum speciem indifferentes, habere quc que indifferentiam quoad gradum illorum specificum restrictum per individuationem. Tantum itaque negant, eos actus, si spectentur cum omnibus sibi debit is accidentibus, esse moraliter indisferentes. Et 〈◊〉 appellant, actus non esse indifferentes secundum individuum: nempe quia individuum, secluso rigore illo Metaphysico, in quo tantùm importat restrictionem gradus specifiei, 〈◊〉 congeriem omnium horum accidentium, aut ut passim loquimur, conditionum individuantium, secundum quam congeriem actus humanus non est indifferens, quatenus vel inter illa 〈◊〉 est debitus finis extrinsecus, & sic actus est bonus, vel non est debitus finis, & sic est malus, Mor. disc. distin. 4. qu. 1. art. 2. Num. 31. Raynaudus: An humane action that considered specifically is indifferent, in regard of object or 〈◊〉 may in its individuals and singulars be looked upon two manner of ways. 1. Inadequately only as touching matter, or object. 2. Adequately in regard of all circumstances. 1. If an humane action be considered specifically indifferent as touching matter or object, than all the individuals or singulars of that action are indifferent too, not simply and absolutely, but secundum quid; that is only as touching their object, and matter: But notwithstanding this, if we consider them adequately in respect of all circumstances, they are either good, or evil: for either they are clothed with all circumstances required in a rational action, and then they are good: or else they want some, or one of these circumstances, and then they are evil and sinful, for malum fit ex 〈◊〉 defectu. The second is out of a modern Thomist; (q) 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 aliquid esse indifferens dupliciter. 1. Quod indifferentia sit de ejus 〈◊〉, 2. Quod ipsi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 accidens, & ab 〈◊〉. Si sit indifferens priori modo, necesse in inferioribus salvari istam indifferentiam, quia tota essentia superioris 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉, siquidem essentia consist it in indivisibili: si sit indifferens posterio i modo, non est necesse salvari indifferentiam in inferiori: nam quae per accidens superiori conveniunt, sunt ab ipso separabilia: ergo sine illis potest 〈◊〉 inferiori. Si 〈◊〉 accidentia 〈◊〉 inferiori. V, C. posse praedicari de multis numerd differentibus, convenit naturae humanae secundum speciem consideratae, sed per accidens, & ab 〈◊〉, scilicet per operationem mentis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 à singularibus, & cum illis ipsam conferentis; talis autem operatio est merè contingens tall naturae. Ex opposito, esse animal rationale convenit eidem humanae naturae tanquam illius essentia. Ex quo fit, 〈◊〉 humana natura nequeat communicari inferioribus, quin ipsis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rationale, sed non ipsis communicat posse de multis numero praedicari, alioqui quodlibet individuum esset species. Jam ut ad propositum veniam, Indifferentia actui secundum speciem concessa non est ipsi essentialis, sed accidentalis per abstractionem ab individuis: imo non est indifferentia moralis positiva: quasi actus ille sit moralis, & indifferens: sed est moralis negativa, quatenus actus ille non est moralis, sed caret ordine ad rationem morum regulam, ideoque 〈◊〉 bonus est, nec malus moraliter. Unde patet non debere in ullo individuo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 indifferentiam, nisi 〈◊〉 in actibus indeliberatis, qui similiter non sint moraless sed ipsi absunt à nostrâ quaestione. Ethic. cap. 3. Sect. 2. Irenaeus. A thing may be said to be indifferent two manner of 〈◊〉. 1. When indifferency is essential unto it. 2. When indifferency agreeth unto it only by accident, and extrinsecally, from something that is extra-essentiall unto it: If indifferency were essential unto an humane action, considered specifically, than every singular, or individual thereof must be indifferent too; because the essentials of every thing superior in point of predication are imparted, and attributed unto every thing, that is under them in point of predication; as every individual of the humane nature is a sensitive creature, a living body, etc. But now indifferency is ascribed unto some humane actions (considered specifically) only by accident, and extrinsecally, from the operation of our understandings, abstracting, and divesting them from those circumstances good, or bad, wherewith in their individuals they are apparelled: and therefore agreeth not unto their individuals looked upon without such an abstraction. By what hath been said, you see that our most indifferent actions Application. are liable unto sin; and therefore afford matter of humiliation for the time past, matter of Caution for the future. 1. Matter of humiliation for the time past: In their singular, and actual existence they were morally either good or evil, sanctified or sinful; and good they could not be, unless there did concur all requisites: And (alas,) how seldom hath there occurred in them such a concurrence? sometimes they have risen from a wrong principle; other times they have been directed unto bad ends; most times they have been faulty in regard of either measure, or manner: It is very seldom, but there hath been wanting in them some circumstance, or other, that the word of God, or law of nature requireth: And the total want of one of the least of such circumstances will so vitiate indifferent actions, as that it will not only render them sinful, but make them sins, meritorious of all the flames, and torments in hell: and that which deserves so severe a punishment, calls for a very eminent sorrow and contrition: God hath set bounds unto the use of our liberty in things indifferent, (as unto the waves of the sea,) saying, thus far shall ye go, and no farther: He hath commanded, that it should be restrained by prudence, 〈◊〉, conscience, Religion, Authority, and charity, But we have transgressed these limits, and have exceeded all bounds of moderation: We have used this part of our Christian liberty very imprudently, and intemperately in regard of ourselves; irreligiously, and profanely in respect of God: against the dictates of our conscience, a deputy under him; against the obligations of our oaths, and vows unto him: disobediently against the lawful commands of our superiors: uncharitably with the scandal of many poor brethren. And thus have we most shamefully, and unthankfully abused this great privilege of Christianity, by using it as an occasion unto the 〈◊〉, as a 〈◊〉 of maliciousness; and so have prostituted it unto the very service of Satan 〈◊〉: 〈◊〉 Job's Sons and Daughters had feasted together, Job offered burnt offerings according unto the number of them all: for he said, it may be that my sons have sinned, Job. 14. 5. Their feasting was a thing indifferent, and very lawful in itself: but, because it was obnoxious unto sin, therefore Jobe sacrificed in the behalf of them all: It may be (saith he) that my sons have sinned: The possibility of sin in the indifferent things of others (especially such as are nearly related:) stirs up in the godly a fear, and a holy jealousy of them, and rouseth unto prayers for them: and therefore much more should the 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 assurance of the adhesion of sin unto our own indifferent actions provoke us, with contrite hearts to deprecate the wrath of God against us: All the indifferencies of unregenerate men are sins: Unto them that are defiled and 〈◊〉 nothing is pure, Tit. 1. 15. the ploughing of the wicked is sin, Prov. 21. 4. And however unto the pure all things are pure. Tit. 1. 15. that is, all indifferent things in themselves are lawful, yet they may and do accidentally become sin, when they are not in all particulars rightly circumstanced: And then they present us with fresh occasion for the renewal of our repentance and faith in Christ Jesus: And how often this happeneth, is a matter, that the most wakeful and quicksighted conscience can hardly discern: so that the best of us may apply unto our indifferencies that of David, Psalm. 19 12. Who can understand his errors: cleanse thou me from secret faults. Secondly, The liableness of our indifferent actions unto sin should be a motive unto all possible caution and wariness for the future in them: There is no humane action so indifferent, but it is capable of sin, nay (if it be not in all particulars rightly circumstantiated,) it becomes actually 〈◊〉; and therefore our hearts should be very watchful against sin in the use of all indifferencies, in our meals, in our feast, and merry meetings, in our journey's, in our ordinary talk, and discourse, in our walks, in the actions of our ordinary vocations: Indeed the rule of God's word doth not at all either command, or forbid the matter of such actions: but the manner of performing them cometh under the rule: They are all to be done to the glory of God, in the name of Christ: every good creature is to be sanctified by the word, and prayer: That Command, which God gave Abraham (to walk before him) is not to be straitened unto the ordinances of God, but to be extended unto all deliberate acts of a man's life, and conversation, Gen. 17. 1. Zechariah (in his prophecy of the general call or conversion of Jews, and Gentiles) gives this for one character of such, as shall be converted, that they shall have a sacred and sanctified use of things common and indifferent: In that day shall there be upon the bells of their horses, holiness unto the Lord, yea, every pot in Jerusalem and Judah shall be 〈◊〉 unto the Lord of Hosts, Zech. 14. 20, 21. Not only acts of immediate worship, but all rational actions, whatsoever, should be offered up as spiritual sacrifices acceptable unto God by Jesus Christ, 1 Pet. 2. 5. The Apostle exhorts the Romans to salute one another with an holy kiss, Rom. 16. 16. this kiss was no religious rite in God's worship, but a ceremony of civility; and therefore in itself a thing indifferent: And yet the Apostle requires holiness for the qualification of it: All our civil actions ought to be such, as becometh saints; that is, so far forth holy for manner, that they be free from sin, and unto the glory of God: Indeed this is a strictness impossible unto lapsed man: But though we cannot exactly and perfectly observe it, yet we may sincerely and cordially endeavour it: And this sincere and hearty endeavour is that, which God, for Christ's sake, will accept, reward, and crown; and therefore it concerns us very much to use our utmost diligence herein: and the rather, because we are (by far) more prone and ready to slide-into sin in things indifferent ere we are aware, then in such things, as are for their nature, and matter sinful; for in such things the danger is more apparent, and therefore the more feared, and watched against; Whereas, if once we know, and are persuaded, that actions are indifferent, and lawful, than we are apt to think that all is safe, and that we need not trouble ourselves with any farther considerations touching their expediency, and edification; and that there is no reason to perplex our hearts and consciences with an anxious care of referring them to God's glory, of walking before God in them, and of putting holiness unto the Lord upon them. Now when once such thoughts as these creep into men's heads, it cannot be imagined, unto what excesses, and failings it exposeth them: Add unto this: that look as the consideration of the lawfulness, and indifferency of actions occasioneth a surprisal many times with heinous sins: so also it proves (by accident) an obstacle unto repentance for such sins: When the Godly fall into gross, and acknowledged sins, either of omission, or commission; why, the checks of their own consciences, the public ministry, the reproaches of enemies, and the admonition of Christian friends will soon awaken them, and inform them of their guilt: But as for the sins, that adhere unto their indifferencies, how quickly are they hardened in them? For it is very seldom, that, either their consciences, or their ministers, or their Brethren take notice of them; or if they do, they are apt presently to hold forth the indifferency, and lawfulness of such actions in themselves, as a buckler to ward off all accusations of Conscience, all upbraid of enemies, all reprehensions, of either ministers, or private friends: Those, that are most lavish of their time, and purses, in gaming, will plead; that they follow none, but lawful sports: A Gentleman, that murders the greatest part of his time in hunting, hawking, and the like exercises, and redeems but an inconsiderable portion of it to do God, and his Country service, thinks, that he hath enough to stop the mouth of all reproof, to say, that the recreations, which he pursueth are things indifferent: such riotous persons, as waste their precious hours in joviallity, and good-fellowship, usually make this Apology for themselves: that it is not unlawful to drink with a friend in a Tavern or alehouse. To awaken from this licentiousness, and to quicken in us a careful watchfulness over our hearts in the use of things indifferent, I shall, for conclusion of this discourse, propound some examples of the severity of God's judgements against the sins of men's indifferencies: david's numbering of the people was a thing not evil in itself; but his curiosity, pride, and carnal confidence in an arm of flesh made it so; And God was displeased with this thing, therefore he smote Israel, 1 Chron. 21. 7. with a pestilence, that devoured 70000. Doubtless most of those feminine ornaments (mentioned, Esay 3.) were in themselves lawful; but the haughtiness, and wantonness of the daughters of Zion abused them unto sin; And how severely this sinful abuse of them was threatened, you may read at large from verse the 16 usque ad 25: for Hezekiah to show unto the Babylonian Ambassadors the house of his precious things, the silver, and the gold and the spices, and the precious ointment, and all the house of his armour, and all that was found in his treasures, all that was remarkable in his house, and dominion was in itself, but a civil entertainment, and not unlawful: but because he did it out of vain ostentation, this turned it into sin, and this was one of the sins, which God chastised with the captivity of the whole nation, Esay 39 2 Chron. 32. 2 Kings 30. To be 〈◊〉 in Purple, and fine linen, and to far sumptuously were things in themselves indifferent; but the excess of the rich glutton made it sinful unto him: and this sin, not being repent of, was unto him a forerunner of hell torments, Luke 16. 19, 23. They were the sins of things indifferent that had a great hand in, and influence upon the drowning of the old world, and the burning of Sodom, Luke 17. vers. 27, 28, 29. In the days of Noah, they did eat, they drank, they married wives, they were given in marriage, until the day that Noah entered into the ark; and the 'slud came and destroyed them all. Likewise also as it was in the days of Lot, they did eat, they drank, they bought, they sold, they planted, they builded: But the same day that Lot went out of 〈◊〉, it reigned fire and brimstone from Heaven, and destroyed them all. FINIS. A TREATISE Concerning ABSTINENCE From all appearance of EVIL, In Doctrine and in matters of practice, and that both unto ourselves and unto others. WHEREIN Divers Questions and Cases of Conscience belonging unto the difficult matter of scandal are briefly resolved. By HENRY JEANES Minister of God's word at Chedzoy in Somerset. Bernard: ad Eugenium de Consideratione. Lib. 3. cap. 4. Sanè interest tuae perfectionis, & malas res, & malas pariter species devitare. In altero Conscientiae, in altero famae Consulis. Put a tibi non licere (et si alias fortasse liceat) quicquid malè fuerit coloratum. OXFORD, Printed by Hen: Hall Printer to the UNIVERSITY for Tho: Robinson, 1660. TO THOMAS MOOR of Hauck-Church in Dorsetshire. Esquires. ROBERT HUNT of Compton Paines-Ford in Somersetsh. Esquires. IT is unto your Mediation that I owe in great part that leisure, and liberty, which I had for the compiling of this Book, and this hath given you such an interest both in it, and in me, as that it would be a high piece of injustice, if no part of it should wear your Livery. This account that I have given, touching the reason of my prefixing your names unto this work, may induce such Readers, who shall reap any Benefit thereby, to Concur in their hearty prayers, for the pouring down of God's Blessings, Spiritual and Temporal, Upon your Persons and Families with the poor Author, who shall ever rest Your most truly devoted Servant HENRY JEANES. 1 Thes: 5. 22. Abstain from all appearance of evil. Our Apostle directs us, in the verse immediately preceding this Text, concerning Good; in this Text concerning Evil. Towards Good he exacts a prudent wariness; towards Evil a scrupulous fearfulness. Towards good, a prudent wariness, Prove all things, and then, hold fast that which is good. Nothing, how colourable soever, is to be received hand over head, before trial and examination by the balance of the Sanctuary: for, Vitia virtutes mentiuntur (saith Gregory) vice is masked under the skin of virtue; falsehood, disguised under the face of truth: so that one is often mistaken for the other. The grossest enormities have been glast and coloured over with the name, and face of virtues: the most poisonous heresies have often gained the esteem and applause of Orthodox Tenants, and therefore as we must steadfastly retain that which is truly true and good; so must we prudently discern, and carefully distinguish between that which is so indeed, and in truth and that which is so only in show, and colour; this we must reject, that keep, and hold fast: Prove all things, hold fast that which is good. But he requires now towards evil a far different carriage: there he looks for a scrupulous fearfulness. Though we must not hold fast any thing that hath but the appearance of good, yet we must abstain from but the appearance of evil. Abstain from all appearance of evil: or from every evil appearance the Words may be rendered indifferently, either way, both rendering being equally consonant to the truth, and Original. In the words our Apostle meets with a cavil, rise among the Libertines of our, and former times, who when their scandalous courses are charged upon them, baffle of all with this plea: that they are not intrinsically sinful. Could I (will the prosanest Libertine say) once see such and such things proved to be unlawful: why I would make no more words of the matter, but soon forbear them. ay, but have they the blush, the appearance of evil? that should be motive enough to shun them. Abstain from all etc. But are we sure this is the Apostles meaning? are not the words capable of another interpretation? First, some mislike our translation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, species, by appearance, and rather think it should be meant logically, for sort, or kind. That it may be so, Mat. Flac. Illyricus and Beza determine, That it is so the Syriack Interpreter, and after him Faber, and after them our own great and learned (r) See his Annotations. Doctor Hammond resolve. But I would fain know upon what ground they are thus singular against the Current both of Ancient and Modern Expositors. Setting aside this place the word occurs (as I think) in the whole new Testament but four times, In Luke 3. 22. and 9 29. John 5. 37. 2 Cor. 5. 7. And in none of these places is it, can it be taken in a Logical notion. If not elsewhere, why here? especially seeing such an acception is not enforced by the scope, coherence, any other circumstance of the Text, or any absurdity otherwise unavoidable. But some dream of a soul absurdity, that would ensue upon translating 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 species, appearance. If every appearance of evil should be abstained from, then should good things, the best things be eschewed, for they commonly appear to be evil unto sense, and carnal reason, that discern not the things of the spirit of God. How easily may an acute wit set false faces upon them and work a bad conceit of them into either weak or ill apprehensions. Unto this we may add that of Dr Hammond in his treatise of 〈◊〉. pag 9 10. Appearance of evil (saith he) is so uncertain and unconstant a thing, that to abstain from it, universim, cannot be the matter of any 〈◊〉 Command. This fear will quickly vanish and be discovered to be idle, and vain, when anon we shall explain that distinction of appearance of evil, into 〈◊〉, and imaginary: for the present therefore, leaving these men, proceed we, secondly, to others, who agree with us in interpreting 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in a vulgar, familiar, and common sense, for appearance: but then their exposition is not so general, as ours: for they restrain the place to matters of Doctrine, and will not allow it to be extended to matters of practice: and countenance, they think, the context gives their gloss: for the Apostle having at the 19 〈◊〉 exhorted not to quench the spirit, in verse 20. prescribes a means for cherishing the spirit, viz: a reverend demean our towards the word of God. If ye will not quench the spirit, despise not prophesying. And next, lest that some should except: are we thus reverently to receive promiscuously all prophesyings, and doctrines preached unto us, and not to beware of some, of false prophesyings and doctrines? the Apostle, (say they) more distinctly directs, how we should demean ourselves. First, towards all prophesyings in general: how, secondly, towards true: how, 3dly, towards false. First, all prophesyings, and doctrines whatsoever must be 〈◊〉 examined, Prove all things. Secondly, all true prophesyings, sound, and orthodox doctrines are to be embraced, with a firm, and unremovable assent, Hold fast that which is good. Lastly, as for false prophesyings and doctrines even their very appearance is to be shunned. Thus they &c. But first, I propose unto the consideration of the learned, whether or no an exact and accurate coherence be to be looked for in most of those precepts, delivered by the Apostle, from vers. 13: 〈◊〉 ad vers. 23. The loose and abrupt manner of heaping them together persuade (me thinks) that there is as little dependence of many of them upon either the foregoing, or following precepts, as is to be expected between Solomon's Proverbs, or Bede's Axioms. Hence is it that (s) Neque necesse est hanc partem 〈◊〉 (ut quidam faciunt) ut connexionem 〈◊〉 cum iis, quae proximè praecedunt: nam potius videtur Apostolus refricare memoriam 〈◊〉, quod praecipit 〈◊〉 superiori: ut honesti ambulent, ad 〈◊〉, qui 〈◊〉 sunt, etc. Estius. Estius holds it not necessary to interpret the place so, as that it should have connexion with those duties that immediately precede: rather (thinks he) the Apostle 〈◊〉 to rub up the memory of what he commanded in the former chapter, at verse the 12. That ye may walk honestly towards them that are without. Secondly, Suppose a coherence of the words with the former, must it needs be that which they obtrude? The words may sit under our interpretation, and yet the Analysis of the Context run smoothly, as thus: The Apostle having at verse 19 dehorted from quenching the spirit, next adviseth use of means tending to the preservation of its gracious and glorious residence in the soul: which means are either negative or positive: he assigns but one negative means, viz: a removal of a main bar and powerful obstacle unto the presence of the spirit, contempt of preaching, Despise not prophesying, vers. 20. of the positive means, two concern good, one evil: the two concerning good, are boni diligens examinatio, constans electio: Prove all things, hold fast that which is good. This respecting evil, est universalissima ejus rejectio, an abstinence not only from all kinds, but even from all appearance of evil. Lastly, suppose the primary scope and intention of the Apostle be limited unto matters of doctrine: yet because the main reason, for which they themselves conceive appearances of evil, even in matters of doctrine to be interdicted, is avoidance of scandal, the precept of which is juris naturalis, and not only doctrines but also actions are scandalous: justly therefore unto these, as well as those, 〈◊〉 the text appliable, and applied too, by all Schoolmen, or others that ever I met with purposely treating on the point of scandal. Should we then against the more generally received opinion of either former or later times, admit of their narrow and 〈◊〉 interpretation for the clear, and indubitate sense of the Apostle? Yet to make the words more instructive, their use more general, we might warrantably put an enlargement upon them, and extend them ad mores, 〈◊〉 well as ad dogmata: ad agenda, as well as ad credenda: to the decalogue, as well as creed; not only to doctrinal truths, but moral duties also. Use of a division here is none, but to bewray Logic: and therefore without more ado we will 〈◊〉 betake ourselves to Limitation, Consirmation, and Application of the plain point 〈◊〉 commended to us: we are to abstain not only from things intrinsically 〈◊〉, but from all shows and appearances of sin. For Limitation, appearance of evil is either in 〈◊〉 or actions. First then? 'tis questioned whether or no we are to abstain from all positions, which have an appearance of evil: of falsehood. For resolution we must distinguish, 1. Concerning appearance of evil in positions. 2. Concerning abstinence from such an appearance. Appearance of evil in Positions is twofold: 1. Either in regard of their 〈◊〉 and substance. 2. Or else in the terms, and expressions used in their proposal. That 〈◊〉 is in regard of their matter and substance, is, either to ourselves or others. Secondly, to distinguish concerning abstinence from the appearance 〈◊〉 evil, or falsehood in Positions: we may be said to abstain from doctrines false in appearance, two manner of ways: either 1. When we abstain from assenting to them. 2. Or when we abstain from publishing of them. We abstain from assenting to them either positively, or negatively. Positively, when by a positive, or real act of the understanding we descent from, we reject them. Now descent from them is twofold, 1 Either absolute and peremptory, 2. Or else but conditional, and cautionary. Negatively, when we do not descent from them, but only not assent unto them: when we suspend our assent. To apply these distinctions. Note first, that though the substance or matter of Doctrines appear to be false unto ourselves, our own judgements, yet are we not bound to abstain positively from assenting to them. to descent from them, to reject them; for this appearance may not be true and real, grounded upon the doctrines themselves, which perhaps may not send forth the least colour or shadow for suspicion, but only put and fastened upon them by means of the error, ignorance, and darkness of our understandings, that perhaps not with due care and circumspection, but rather with much precipitancy have given their censure of them: and therefore however at first blush they seem false, yet when once the light of our reason is cleared from mists, and clouds, they may upon due examination prove true: and to descent from, and reject a truth would be a soul error of, and blemish to our understanding. Obliged we are then, to abstain, not positively but negatively from assenting to them: that is, not to 〈◊〉 from them, but only not to assent unto them, to stay our assent, to demur a while, before we give in our judgement, lest we receive any thing with a doubtful, entangled, and perplexed Conscience. Of this Calvin gives us an hint in his exposition on this place, Speciem mali interpreter, cum nondum ita comperta est doctrinae falsitas, ut 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 queat, sed tamen aliqua haeret 〈◊〉 suspicio, & timetur, ne quid veneni 〈◊〉: ergò ab 〈◊〉 genere doctrinae, quod malum, etiamsi non sit, apparet, 〈◊〉 praecipit, non quod in totum rejici 〈◊〉, sed quia recipi, aut fidem obtinere non debet. Cur 〈◊〉 prius quod bonum est teneri jussit, nunc abstinere vult, 〈◊〉 simpliciter à malo, sed à mali specie? quia ubi dijudicatione in lucem product a fuerit veritas, tunc demum ei sidem haberi decet: ubi autem subest falsi metus, aut mens dubitatione 〈◊〉 implicita, 〈◊〉 refer, vel gradum suspendere 〈◊〉, nè quid dubiâ perplex áque censcientiâ amplectamur. By the appearance of evil I understand (saith he) when as the falsehood of a doctrine is not yet so throughly detected, that it may be deservedly rejected, but yet there sticks some bad suspicion of it, and 'tis feared, lest poison lurk under it: therefore he commands us to abstain from that kind of doctrine, which though it be not evil, yet appears so: not as though it ought altogether to be rejected, but because it ought not to be received, to be believed. For why doth he before command us to hold fast only that which is good, and here he wills us to abstain not barely from evil, but from its 〈◊〉? Because when after a through sifting a truth is cleared, 'tis fitting it should forthwith be believed: but when as the falsehood of it is feared, or the mind with doubting is entangled, we must for a while withdraw our assent, lest we 〈◊〉 any thing with a doubting, and 〈◊〉 conscience. But suppose I for mine own part am firmly persuaded of the truth of such, or such a Tenet, or at least unconvinced, unperswaded of its falsehood, and yet it appear generally unto others to be false unto the judgements of the godly learned, of most of the ancient 〈◊〉, unto either general or provincial Councils: in such a case, what course must I take, because it hath appearance of falsehood unto others understandings, must I therefore descent from it, or stop mine assent unto it? For answer, take these four following rules. First, we owe so reverend and humble an esteem of, and submission unto the Spirits of the Prophets, to the judgement of learned, sober, and pious Divines, unto the writings of the ancient godly Fathers, unto the Canons, and decrees of Ecumenical, and Provincial Councils, as that whatsoever Tenants the whole Church representative, to wit, a general Council, or the greatest and chiefest part of the Church most of the Fathers and Divines too, of later and present times, have rejected and condemned for false, and erroneous, we should abstain negatively from assenting to, that is, though not change, yet suspend our belief of them, and not fully pass over our full and absolute assent unto them, until by diligent inquisition, 〈◊〉 prayer, imploring the guidance of God's holy spirit, and use of all other good means, either their consonancy with, or dissonancy from the truth, be clearly discerned, fully confirmed, and manifested unto our Consciences. But Christian modesty stayeth not here, but goeth one step further, and in a second exacts of us a conditional, probable, and t Dr Jackson. cautionary dissent from all doctrines thus generally suspected, and censured: for upon general dislike of a doctrine, as upon a 〈◊〉 motive, we may ground a strong presumption, an high and probable conjecture of the falsehood of it: so that hereupon we may reject it, though not in an absolute and irrevocable way, yet with this limitation and caution: so the apparent verity therein of itself do not force us to embrace it. So sottish I am not, as to measure truth by multitude of voices: for errors I know that have grated upon the foundation, nay heresies, that have raised the foundation, have had their cloud of witnesses: yet I should so far honour a public testimony, as to suspect mine own, and others private bare opinions, not backed by plain scripture, with evident sense, or a 〈◊〉 demonstrative argument, rather than a general suffrage: for, nemo omnes, neminem omnes, 〈◊〉, * Pliny. improbable as for one to deceive all, so for all to deceive one, Rivet (u) 〈◊〉 dubitamus caeteris quidem paribus, majorem & pleniorem mensuram 〈◊〉 publicis Ecclesiae administris sive in una aliqua paticulari 〈◊〉 munus suum obeant, 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 aliquo legitimè & in Christinomine congregati de vero scriptutae sensu inter se 〈◊〉 quam sin gulis & privatis qui ne que 〈◊〉 donis instructi junt, neque tot oculis vident, neque privatâ & simplici meditatione aequare 〈◊〉 multorum collationem & disquisitionem. Isag. ad Scrip: Sac. 〈◊〉. 19 Pag: 272. makes no doubt, but caeteris paribus, that is, if parts, prayer, diligence of study after the truth, be equal, that then a greater and fuller measure of the gist of expounding the Scripture, and deciding controversies thereabouts, is comn unicated. to the public ministers of the Church, (whether they execute their function severally, and apart in some one particular Church, or else jointly confer and discourse among themselves concernîng the true and genuine sense of the Scriptures in some assemblies called lawfully, and in the name of Christ) than unto several private men, who are neither endowed with so many gifts, nor see with so many eyes, nor by their private and single meditation can equal the united consultations and inquiries after truth of many. And thus you see how far Christian modesty requireth us to abstain from assenting to doctrines upon the appearance of evil, or falsehood, which they carry unto those, who in interpeting scripture, and deciding controversies, have committed to them the public office of direction and instruction of others: but yet it taketh not 〈◊〉 us the judgement of private discretion; for Christian liberty alloweth us such a freedom of dissenting from, or assenting unto, what the Church, and her ministers say, as is to be specified in the next two following rules. In a third place therefore, although the Church, or the greatest and chiefest part of her, charge error and falsehood upon such a doctrine; yet this bare and single testimony, not seconded by any scripture or reason, is not to gain so far upon our belief, as that thereupon we should presently reject, and descent from the doctrine thus generally censured with an absolute and peremptory dissent. This were to give unto the Church's decisions as high and overruling a suffrage in our hearts, as is only due to divine revelations to receive them, not as they are indeed the word of men, but as if they were the word of God: to yield unto them an absolute divine faith, and credence. This were a mere Vassalage of our souls, understandings, faiths, unto the authority of an humane testimony: a thing utterly unworthy the generosity and freedom of Christian Spirits. If God hath indulged to any the exercise of such dominion over men's faiths, and consciences: alas! then to what purpose hath he placed that glorious lamp of reason in our bosoms? of what use are our intellectuals? What place is there left for Saint Paul's proving of all things? St John's trial of the Spirits? but the truth is, that God 1 Joh. 4. 1. is so far from enslaving our understandings, or captivating our belief unto the judgement of any mortal, as that he approves not only of a forbearance from a flat, and absolute 〈◊〉 from doubtful doctrines thus publicly, and generally disliked, but also of a full and peremptory assent unto doctrines manifestly true, though condemned in a general Council, as is apparent from the fourth and last rule, which is: If a doctrine be, as true in itself, so also clearly, and evidently by me 〈◊〉 to be so, and yet appear generally to be false unto others, of what degree, order, or condition soever; nevertheless it Commands absolute subscription, and assent of the mind without contradiction, without hesitancy, nay without so much as suspense of judgement. If the verity then of a doctrine be apparent, it must overrule the assent of the understanding against the testimony of the whole world. For the testimony of men, of the wisest, holiest men, considered either apart, or assembled in a council, admits, as always of examination, and trial by the balance of the Sanctuary, and rules of right reason, so likewise of contradiction and denial, when in it there is an express, and evident variation from either reason, or divine authority. In such a cause we may lawfully, and safely descent from it; always provided, that it be not in an insolent manner, but with a reverend, childlike, and respectful bashfulness. But to go on, if I am not to abstain from assenting to a doctrine manifestly true, because it appears generally to others to be false, must I not yet abstain from publishing, from spreading of it, either by writing or preaching? For answer, thou must consider the general nature and quality of the doctrine, thus wrongly either 〈◊〉, or suspected of falsehood, and also of what use, and importance it is in regard of the present times, and places, wherein thou livest, and if it prove to be a doctrine either fundamental, or at least of such weight and moment that from the publishing of it, will spring a greater good, more glory to God, and benefits to the Church than the trouble and disquiet it brings can be an evil, thou art then at no hand to conceal it, so shouldst thou be unfaithful both to God and his Church, and become accessary to the betraying, nay murder of the truth. Si de veritate scandalum sumatur (saith Gregory) melius est ut scandalum oriatur, quam ut veritas relinquatur. If scandal or offence be taken at a truth which the estate and exigence of those souls committed to a man's charge requireth him to publish, better suffer the whole world to be scandalised, than such a truth disadvantaged, either by denial, or but a cowardly smothering, and dissembling, thereof. Quemadmodum enim (saith Calvin) Charitati subjicienda est nostra Cal. lib. 3. Just. c. 12. Sect. 13. libertas, ita sub fidei puritate subsidere 〈◊〉 charitas ipsa debet: As our liberty is to be subjected to charity, 〈◊〉 also our Charity itself to faith's purity. But now if it be a doctrine, either not fundamental, but of a lower rank and quality, wherein both orthodox writers, and preachers may vary and abound in their own sense, without prejudice to the foundation: or if it be of so small use, that upon its divulgement, it is not probable there will arise so much honour to God, and edification of the Church, as may preponderate those mischiefs, that hurly-burly, those tumults, and contentions in the Church, which in all likelihood will ensue thereby, thou must then forbear to vent it, either from press, or pulpit; so shalt thou best consult for thine own private quiet, and public peace. And we must follow after things that make for peace. and edification: Rom. 14. 19 About such matters to be contentious, we have no custom, nor the Churches of God: and indeed about them to be contentious were the right prank of a Schismatic: for not only he is a Schismatic (saith (r) Non enim Schismaticus eò 〈◊〉, quoth fover perversum dogma, 〈◊〉 comingit aliquando, ut sententia schismatici 〈◊〉 verissima sit, tamen quia eam neque loco neque tempore debitis, 〈◊〉 necessitate 〈◊〉, Schismaticus est, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dei 〈◊〉 enim non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ecclesiae, ostendit se non adductum studio gloriae Christi, sed suae potius existimationis Ecclesia turbâsle. Cameron in 〈◊〉 quaedam N. T. loca. Tom. 2. in Mat. c. 18. v. 7. Cameron) who maintains a perverse Tenet: a man may hold a very true opinion, and yet play the Schismatic, and give scandal unto the people of God by delivering it in a rash, unpeaceable, and unseasonable manner, neither in fit place, nor due time, no necessity urging thereunto. for seeing in determining of his opinion the glory of God, and weal of the Church lie not at the stake, he plainly shows, that he hath troubled the Church, lead with desire of not Christ's glory, but his own Credit. I confess indeed, that a controverted, and suspected truth even of this low quality may be peaceably, and modesty professed, and debated too in private, but a public promulgation thereof is at any hand to be forborn, non sub intuitu mali, sed minoris 〈◊〉, not under the apprehension of any evil in the truth, but only as a lesser good, which will not consist with a greater, the tranquillity of the Church; or if you will, the public promulgation of such a truth is to be forborn, sub intuitu mali, etsi non simpliciter, tamen per accidens talis: under the apprehension of evil, not in the controverted truth, but in the promulgation thereof, which though it be not simply evil, yet becomes accidentally so, to wit, by comparison, in respect of a greater good than required, preservation of the general quiet; with which for the present it cannot stand, unto the care of which it is opposed, though not primo & per se, yet ex consequenti connexione virtutum, as Suarez upon another occasion phraseth it. But I digress. To go on to that appearance of evil in doctrines, which is in the expressions used in their proposal, a thing I could wish it were not to rife amongst many, who like no truth, unless delivered in heretical terms; men wonderfully taken with the language of Ashdod, the Romish dialect. But let it be our care to refrain all words, and phrases, which carry an appearance of either heresy or schism; for though they may, and are by us meant in an orthodox sense, yet carry they a shrewd show of evil, make others jealous, and suspicious of our soundness, and therefore (x) In rebus 〈◊〉 verba debent esse casta, & 〈◊〉. & quae rem ipsam 〈◊〉 exprimant, & haereticis non praestent occasionem calumniandi. 〈◊〉. Martinez; lib. 12. de locis cap. 9 ad 〈◊〉. Canus although he will by no means assent, absolutely to that usual saying; ex verbis inordinatè prolatis fit haeresis: yet he is content to approve of it, if it be moderated with this caution, secundum praesumptionem audientium, & judicum, qui per exteriora signa debent judicare de haeresi: if it be understood according to the supposal of hearers, and judges, who ought and indeed can judge of heresy only by outward signs. Between a minister and Popery let there be a great Chasma, a distance as wide as between heaven, and earth, nay heaven, and hell: yet if his phrase do but smell of Popery, if his words, though not his meaning, trench near upon it, men will presently exclaim that he hath a Pope in his belly, at least that he sounds for a Parley, and thinks upon conditions of peace with the Romish harlot. And besides as this suspicious complying in phrase, and language with the known errors of Popelings, or other novellers, and corrupt teachers grieves the settled and judicious, so farther it staggers weaklings, confirms and hardens aliens, and Apostates: rather opens than stops the mouths of gainsaying carpers, and sooner disadvantageth the truth, than converts an adversary. So far is it from effecting the usually pretended end, reconciliation; as that to use the similitude of our Saviour, Mat. ch. 9 v. 16. like the putting of a new piece of cloth unto an old garment, it maketh the rent worse, and wider. There goeth a manuscript from hand to hand, said to be penned by a learned (y) Dr Sanderson. Doctor of this Church, wherein (that amidst notwithstanding all the variety of opinions there may be yet preserved in the Church the unity both of faith, and charity) private men are advised in their own writings to observe formam, sanorum verborum, and to abstain not only from suspected opinions, but as much as may be also from phrases and speeches obnexious to misconstruction and exception. For first, it is not enough, much less a thing to be gloried in, for a man to be able by subtlety of wit, to find loopholes, how to 〈◊〉, and by colourable pretences, to make that, which through heat of passion, or violence of opposition hath fall'n from him unadvisedly, to seem howsoever défensible. But he should have a care to suffer nothing to pass from him, whereat an ingenious and dispassionate adversary (though dissenting from him in opinion,) might yet have cause to take distaste, or exception. And besides, it were a thing of dangerous consequence in the Church, if every man should be suffered to publish freely whatsoever might by some strain of wit be made capable of a good construction, if of itself it sounded ill, or suspiciously. For so many 〈◊〉, unhappy notions implicitly and virtually serving to the patronage and protection of Schism or heresy, might be cunningly conveyed into the minds of men, and impressions thereof insensibly wrought in their hearts, to the great damage and distraction of the Church. This last reason for the substance you may meet with in Aquinas 2. 2 daes. q. 11. a. 2. where (having told us out of Hierome, ex verbis inordinatè prolatis fit haeresis: that by unwary irregular expressions, by words disorderly spoken, the most dangerous heresies have often taken their first rise, and original) he afterwards gives us the reason hereof: Similiter enim per verba quae quis loquitur, suam fidem prositetur: est enim consessio actus fidei: & ideo si sit inordinata locutio circa ea quae sunt fid. i, sequi potest ex hoc corruptio fidei: Unde Leo Papa quâdam Epistolâ ad Proterium Episcopum Alexandrinum dicit, quod inimici crucis Christi, omnibus & verbis nostris insidiantur & syllabis, si ullam illis vel tenuem occasionem demus, quâ Nestoriano sensui nos congruere mentiantur. Likewise a man professeth his faith by words, which he speaketh; for confession is an outward act of faith, and therefore, if there be but an inordinate speech about matters of faith, the corruption of faith may hereupon ensue. Whence Leo the Pope, in a certain Epistle unto Proterius Bishop of Alexandria saith, that the enemies of Christ's Cross lie in wait for all our words, and syllables, if in them we give any the least occasion, upon which they may sane that we comply with Nestorianisme. Hence is it that Aquinas himself having proposed this question, whether or no this proposition be true, Christ is a creature in his answer thereunto tells us, first in general, cum haereticis nec nomina debemus habere communia, ne 〈◊〉 errori favere videamur, then more particularly, unto the question; that the Arrian heretics have said that Christ is a creature, and less than the Father, in regard not only of the humane nature, but also divine person, and therefore resolves, that lest we should seem to countenance their error, we must not say absolutely that Christ is a Creature, and less than his Father; but only with this limitation, according to the humane nature. Ariani autem heretici Christum dixerunt esse creaturam, & minorem Patre, non solùm ratione humanae naturae, sedetiam ratione 〈◊〉 personae, & ideò non est absolutè dicendum, quod Christus sit 〈◊〉, vel minor Patre, sed cum determinatione, scilicet secundum humanam naturam. Nay not only Aquinas, but generally all the Schoolmen, and Civilians too, are so precise in this particular, as that among the degrees of damnable propositions are ranked by them not only propositions down rightly heretical, or 〈◊〉, but also (z) Propositio 〈◊〉, quae etiam malè 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, aurium offensiva, 〈◊〉, quae praebet occasionem ruinae auditoribus, hoc est facilitatem cadendi in haeresin, ut sunt multae propositiones, quae licet cum modificatione adjuncta, sunt verae, per se tamen & absolutè sine modificatione prolatae videntur favere propositionibus haereticalibus. Ut si quis assereret simpliciter Patrem majorem Filio, & Deum in incarnatione factum creaturam, & similes, quae magis sunt exponendae, 〈◊〉 extendendae. Arnoldus Albertinus de agnoscendis assertionibus Catholicis & hereticis. quaest. 60. Propositio haeresin sapiens, aut malè circa ea, quae ad fidem pertinent, sonans, est illa quae in prima significatione, quam verba prima facie ostendunt, sensum 〈◊〉 haereticum, quamvis 〈◊〉 intellecta sensum aliquem habet verum. Alphonsus à Castro de justa haereticorum punitione: cap. 3. propositio sapiens haeresin, propositio male sonans, every proposition, that doth but smell, that hath but a smack of heresy, that sounds but ill or suspiciously; and such are all propositions, that in the first signification, which their words at first blush seem to import, have an heretical sense; all propositions, that of themselves, that is, uttered absolutely without any explanation, or qualification, seem to favour or countenance heretical propositions, although they be capable of a good construction, and with many cautions, limitations, and restrictions might pass for currant. And therefore was it, that the Council of Basil condemned this proposition, Christ sins daily, because taken properly 'tis false and against the faith, although perhaps it may be freed from error, if expounded in a unproper sense, thus; Christ sinneth daily, not in himself, but his members. (a) Explicatur optimè, modo suprâ tacto de propositione aequivocá, quae in proprio aliquo sensu, potest esse haeretica, & in also etiam propriè Catholica, nam illa absolutè, & sine distinctione, vel declaratione prolata merito dicitur male sonans, in quo distinctio alia 〈◊〉 potest. Nam quaedam propositio dicitur ab extrinseco malè sonans, alia ab intrinseco. Ab extrinseco vocatur, quando suspicio, vel malus sonus, non 〈◊〉 propositione nude sumpta, sed cum circumstantiis personae, loci, aut temporis oritur. Suarez. de triplici virture Theologica tract. de fide disp. 19 Sect. 7. Dicendum igitur est, quod propositio sapiens haeresin illa est, quae quamvis non appareat haeresis manifesta, quin potius aliquando poterit habere aliquem bonum sensum, tamen ex qulbusdam 〈◊〉, vel ex parte asserentis, vel ex temporum calamitate, saporem quendam 〈◊〉 haeresis, & suspicionis judicio prudentum & sapientum, id est, suspicionem quandam majorem vel minorem pro qualitate circumstantiarum. Bannes. Suarez saith, that if an equivocal proposition having two proper senses, one Cathelick, another heretical be delivered absolutely without any distinction, or declaration, in which sense 'tis meant, it is then deservedly said to be propositio malè sonans. The same author goeth on and tells us, that a proposition is said to be malè sonans, not only ab 〈◊〉, but also ab extrinseco when the suspicion or ill sound thereof ariseth not from the proposition taken nakedly, as it is in itself, but considered jointly with the circumstances either of the person delivering, or of the time and place, in which it is delivered. Omitting his instance, I will give you others more true, and savoury. The word Sacrament with the ancients sounded no other, than an holy significant rite; in those times then to have called matrimony, orders, etc. Sacraments, had been (it may be) without all manner of offence. But now, since the Church of Rome hath peremptorily determined, that therebe Seven Sacraments properly and strictly so called, seven outward and sensible signs, which by divine institution, have annexed unto them the promise of justifying grace. He that shall now term any thing a Sacrament, besides Baptism, and the Lords Supper, renders himself thereby justly suspected. In the writings of the Fathers, the words of satisfaction, and merit have been of large use. Satisfaction signified every bitter afflictive acknowledgement, or penitential mortification of our sins, whereby we prevent, and turn away God's hand, and punishments for them. Merit, denoted only obtaining, procurement, impetration, and according to this acception of the words, a man might safely have heretosore affirmed, that our prayers, alms, and other good works are satisfactory and meritorious. But now since some of the Romanists have wrested these sayings of the Fathers unto a worse sense, than they were uttered in: and hereupon taught that works are properly satisfactory, just compensations for our sins, wherein we make recompense unto God's wronged justice, and redeem ourselves at least from temporal punishments; that works are strictly and properly meritorious of eternal life, deserving and earning it ex condigno, in the way of condign wages; as if there were an equality or due proportion between it and them, without all regard unto God's gracious acceptance of them; he that shall now aver these propositions, may without breach of charity be justly thought to embrace them in that false, and erroneous sense, which our adversaries the Papists take them in. Hitherto concerning doctrinal appearance of evil, in Doctrines. Practical appearance of evil in manners or matters of practice next follows; (b) Dr Sclater in locum. and that may again be divided into 〈◊〉 or Imaginary. The distinction is the same with that of others. Aliquid 〈◊〉 speciem mali, vel per se ex conditione operis, vel per accidens ex aliorum 〈◊〉. The difference between these must be well weighed, else we may as foully be mistaken, as once the Pentickes were, who, as Florus tells us, fight in a night with the Romans, per errorem longius cadentes umbras suas quasi hostium corpora petebant: mistaking their own shadows projected long as at the going down of the Moon, laid at them as at the very bodies of their enemies: or as the Romans themselves, were, unto whom when Tiberius Gracchus touched his head with his hand to exhort the people, as by a sign, to stand upon their guard for their lives, it seemed as if he demanded a diadem. cum 〈◊〉 ad defensionem salutis suae manu caput tangens, praebuit speciem regni sibi, & diadema poscentis, Flor. lib. 3. cap. 14. To distinguish them then, a real appearance of evil flows per se ex natura operis, from the nature, and condition of the fact itself: when that of itself, and in its own nature, is a very probable sign of evil: and so it is, when it is ordinarily done for an evil end, when it is per se an occasion of Sin in ourselves, and of scandal unto others: it must be occasio data, non accepta. First, when naturally, and not only casually, it may prove, and ordinarily doth prove an occasion of an incentive to sin in ourselves. Secondly, when it becomes an occasion of scandal or offence, of scandal tending unto sin in the weak, of scandal tending unto sorrow and vexation in the strong and discreet: Such an appearance is there of adultery, in a man's lying in bed with another man's wife, though he hath no carnal knowledge of her. * Talis sc. materialis usus circumcisionis semper habet speciem mali, non ex accidentia tantum sed quasi per se supposito Eccesiae stau. Suarez. de legibus lib. 9 cap. 14. Such an appearance of Judaisme, (than which few greater evils) is there in the (c) circumcision of those Aethiopian Christians, that live under Prester John. Such was the appearance of evil in Christians fitting at meat in the Temples of Paganish Idols, in Naaman's bowing himself in the house of Rimmon, however Cajet an excuse him with a pretty distinction, inter genu 〈◊〉 imitativam, & genu flexionem obsequii. And such also is that appearance of evil in a good man's intimate fellowship with bad ones, in a true and formal compliancy with aliens in the signs of profession. As in a Protestants presence at the superstitious, and Idolatrous worship of Papists, or in any other complementing with them in the expression of that worship. Now no actions that have this real appearance of evil are upon any pretext whatsoever to be ventured upon, and for this I shall give two Reasons. First, because in them there is always a scandal given, an active scandal, as is plain from Aquinas his definition of scandal, 2. 2 daes. qu. 43. art. 1. Scandalum (saith he) understand it of an active seandall) est dictum vel factum minùs rectum praebens alteri occasionem ruinae. For a word or fact is (d) Dicitur autem minùs rectum, & non absolutè malum, aut non rectum, ad denot and umposse etiam scandali rationem esse in actu, qui non sit undequaque pravus, sed tantum habeat speciem mali; aut qui duntaxat ratione 〈◊〉 sc. ruinae alterius, malus sit, licet 〈◊〉 per se omnino sit bonus. Itaque quamvis per illam particulam, minus rectum significetur in praedicta 〈◊〉 actus, qui ex aliquo capite careat debità 〈◊〉, atque adeo simpliciter sit non rectus, seu pravus, tamen propter dictam rationem meritò hoc ipsum significatur illo modo dicendi, scil: minus rectum. Non enim id duntaxat minus rectum appellari solet, quod simpliciter rectum est, licet non adeò, comparatione alterius; sed etiam id; quod propter aliquem defectum est minus rectum, quam simpliciter debet, & quod ideo est absolutè, & simpliciter malum. Juxta illud D. Dionysil cap. 4 de divinis nominibus: Bonum consurgit ex integra causa, malum autem ex quocunque 〈◊〉. Greg: de Valentia Comment: Theol. Tom: 3. Quest. 18. Punct. 1. minus rectum some way or other irregular, not only when 'tis a sin in itself, but also when it hath a manifest show of sin; for the bare and naked show of sin may (praebere alteri occasionem ruinae) morally lead another to sin, may be the moral cause of another's sin, as well as sin itself; the actions, in which there is only an appearance of sin, may yet provoke another unto the practice of sin, as the performance of the sinful action itself: To see a Christian sitting at meat in an Idols Temple, at an Idols feast, may tempt a raw convert unto Idolatry, as well as to behold him knceling before an Idol. For this I could muster up the suffrages of all the schoolmen, a generation yet of divines, that are none of the precisest either in positions, or practise. But I will not trouble my Reader with the testimonies of above two of them. Opus malum (saith Suarez) vel 〈◊〉 speciem mali, quod de fe inductivum est ad pecc andum, vitandum est; nam illud est verè scandalum activum, ut patet ex desinitione ejus, moraliter enim inducit hominem ad malum. Quod 〈◊〉 non operteat esse verè malum, sed satis sit apparere, patet, 2 Thes. 5. 22. 1 Cor. 12. Ratio est, quia tenemur rectè operari, non selum coram Dco sed ctiam coram hominibus. Secundo, quia cum opus habet speciem mali, inducitur proximus ad malum opus, non selum suâ malitiâ, sed etiam ex vi mei operis, & ex quadam fragilitate. 〈◊〉, op. de triplici virtute tract. 2 disp 10. sect. 3. Quotiescunque datur occasio scandali (saith Vasquez) malo opere, aut habente speciem mali, semper imputatur scandalum tribuenti occasionem, sive scandalum 〈◊〉 ex malitiâ, sive infirmitate, aut ignorantià. Tunc enim qui 〈◊〉 occasionem scandali, peccat peccato scandali activi, quod nullâ ratione licet. Ratio vero est, quia nullâ justâ aut rationabili causâ excusari potest aliquis â peccato, qui coram alio peccat, vel exercet opus habens speciem mali: & ideo jure optimo dicitur tribuere occasionem peccandi, quia tale opus ex se occasio est peccandi. Vasquez opusculis Moralibus. tract. de scandalo. But now (to proceed unto a second reason) besides the evil of scandal in actions, that carry a real appearance of evil, there is also reductiuè the guilt of that evil of which they have an 〈◊〉; for that command, which forbids such a sin, forbids all the shows and occasions of it, all the preparatives unto it; as is usually observed by Commentators upon the Decalogue. Thus the prohibition of adultery takes in all the causes, and signs thereof: by this rule to sit at meat in the Idols Temple, at the Idols feast, was not only a sin of scandal, as being a provocation unto, and so a participation of the sin of Idolatry in weak and ignorant spectators; but also a sin of Idolatry by way of reduction, a sin against religion, a transgression against that worship, which God requireth. Suarez expresseth this, though somewhat obscurely, yet more fully: first he layeth down this conclusion; Quando aliquis indirectè inducit alium ad peccandum per actionem malam, vel habentem speciem mali, etiam incurrit specialem malitiam scandali: against this conclusion he propounds amongst others this objection; Sequitur eum etc. per actionem non malam, sed habentem speciem mali contrahere duas malitias. Vnam scandali contra charitatem: aliam illius speciei peccati, ad quam proximus inducitur. Consequens est contra divum Thomam hic, et sumitur ex Paulo primo ad Corinth. 8 & 12. Vbi manducantem scandalosè sacrificata Idolis, non reprehend reprehendit, ut Idolatram, sed ut scandalosum. Sequela autem patet, quia ille est 〈◊〉 talis malitiae, ergo incurrit illam. Unto this his answer is: that an action only evil in appearance may have a double obliquity in it, to wit, that of scandal, and that of which it is an appearance, unto which it induceth Concedo, inquit, ibi esse duas malitias. Est tamen advertendum, 〈◊〉 contra aliquam virtutem peccari. Vno modo per se primo, quia 〈◊〉 agitur contra objectum ejus, vel circumstantias illi ex se debitas, & hoc modo actio solum mala in apparentia, nullam virtutem 〈◊〉. Alio modo peccari potest tantum ex consequenti connexione virtutum. Nam ut dictum est 1. 2 quia actus virtutum sunt undique boni, quando hic, & nunc actus alicujus virtutis 〈◊〉 esse contrarius alteri virtuti, (quamvis in suo objecto, vel circumstantiis quasi intrinsecis 〈◊〉 habeat defectum) non potest prudenter sicri, atque adeo neque est actus virtutis simpliciter, & ideo participat malitiam contrariam utrique virtuti, sed alteram per se, alteram quasi per accidens, & consequenter. Sic etiam propria malitia scandali ferè semper fundatur in alia malitiâ, tamen ex consequenti, & per accidens, sempèr habet aliquo-modoillam conjunctam ex defectu circumstantiae debitae, saltem propter aliam virtutem, propter quam non 〈◊〉 prudenter cessandum 〈◊〉 ab opere hic, & nunc, habente speciem mali, quamvis ex se esset alias honestum. Suar: de triplici virtute Theolog. tract. de charitat: disp. 10. 〈◊〉. 2. 'Tis of this real appearance 〈◊〉 believe that the Apostle is here only to be understood. But yet to make this our discourse complete I shall also take in consideration that appearance of evil in an action which is but imaginary; and this is ascribed thereunto from our own, or others 〈◊〉 and censures thereupon. First, from our own. And here, if a man be in his own Conscience steadfastly, fully and firmly persuaded, that such an action is evil and unlawful, which yet in truth is not so, but lawful: what ought he to do? These times afford many instances by which we may exemplisy this case: There are many Sectaries that profess they think it unlawful to frequent the public Ordinances, to pay tithes unto the Minister, Contribution unto the Magistrate; and there be some, that think it unlawful to swear in any cause, though called thereunto by a Magistrate; and yet all these particulars are not only things lawful, but bounden duties. For 〈◊〉 we must premise two things. First, we must take into our consideration, the nature of the action, and the condition of the person that harbours this misperswasion of the action: the action in its nature may be either necessary, or indifferent and arbitrary: and the person misjudging it may be, in respect thereof, either sui juris, or determined therein by the lawful command of some superior power. Secondly, we must with Durand distinguish betwixt 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉, to bind, and to bind unto. Sciendum (saith he) lib. 2. dist. 39 qu. 5. quod aliud est ligari, aliud obligari, qui. n. obligatur debet, vel tenetur, id facere ad quod 〈◊〉, nec quantum est exparte suâ aliter absolvitur ab obligatione. Ligari autem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, qui 〈◊〉 dispositus est circa aliquod agibile, quod non potest licitè procedere, prout exigit natura illius agibilis, ad modum illius qui ligatur corporalitèr, nec potest procedere etiam in rectâ & planâ via. Conscience is said obligare to bind unto, when 'tis a bounden duty to do or not do what it dictates, when 'tis not only a sin to do any thing against it, but also not to do according to it: Conscience is said ligare merely to bind, when 'tis a sin as to act against it, so also to act according to it. Capreolus and others that follow him quarrel with this distinction that Durand puts between ligare and obligare: But Capreolus himself 〈◊〉 down a distinction of obligation, that will come unto all one: Obligatio (inquit) potest referri ad duo. Primo ad conformandum se tali conscientiae, & ad nullo modo discordandum illi, & ad non deponendum eam, secundò ad non discordandum ei, sednon ad conformandum, nec ad non deponendum. Primò strictissimè sumitur, & illo modo Conscientia crronea non obligat. Secundò sumitur largè, & illo modo intelligitur conclusio nostra, quod conscientia 〈◊〉 obligat, quia habens eam tenetur non discordare illi, ita quod illa stante faciat oppositum, quod illa dictat. Nec 〈◊〉 tonetur so conformare illi, nec tenetur eam conservare, immo potest, & tenetur eam deponere. Here his obligation largely so called differs nothing from Durand's ligation; The Controversy than is but a strife of words; and therefore not worthy the heeding. These things thus premised I shall lay down four Conclusions. First Conclusion. First, if the action in its nature be not necessary, but indifferent, and arbitrary, and the person misjudging it, be in respect thereof suijuris, not determined therein by the command of any superior power. Why then he is bound in Conscience during this his opinion, to abstain from the action. (For we suppose it 〈◊〉 rend; and a man may lawsully forbear action where there is no necessity of doing, à licitis po 〈◊〉 absque 〈◊〉 abstineri.) We suppose it, although indifferent, yet against 〈◊〉: and 〈◊〉 is done 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, with a settled reluctancy of a man's own judgement, and consciencè against it, cannot be of faith, and whatsoever is not of faith is sin (e) See Dr 〈◊〉 in lecum. Rom. 14. 23. That is 〈◊〉 action is done without a firm persuasion of the lawfulness thereof, let it be quoad rem, and essentially, in it self lawful, nay necessary, yet it becomes quoad hominem and accidentally evil, unto him it is sin. Now that action may lawfully, must necessarily be forborn, that can be omitted, but cannot be committed without sin. But now on the contrary (to come to a second Conclusion) if either Second 〈◊〉. the action be in its nature necessary, or the person entertaining this misprision thereof be justly enjoined persormance of it by some superior power, that can herein lawfully challenge obedience from him by a law, not 〈◊〉 p awl; and so the action too, though indifferent for its nature, be yet in its use, and unto him become 〈◊〉. Why then this misperswasion of its unlawfulness cannot bind to abstain from it; for so it should oblige unto either omission of a necessary duty, or else disobedience unto lawful authority, both great sins. And nulla est obligatio ad illicita. There is no obligation unto things unlawful can lie upon us. For, first, obligation is only to that which is a moral good; now nothing unlawful can be a moral good; and therefore an erroneous Conscience cannot oblige unto it. Secondly, no command of an inferior power can oblige, if it be contrary to the command of a superior power; But if an erroneous Conscience should bind unto things unlawful, it should oblige against the commandment of God, whose 〈◊〉 Conscience is, Indeed Conscience is the next rule of voluntary actions: But First, it is a well- informed censcience that ought to be this rule, the will is not bound to follow a blind guide: for then being of itself 〈◊〉 potentia, it must needs fall into the ditch. And secondly, conscience is but a subordinate rule unto the Law, and Word of God; and therefore its power to oblige is derived there from: it obligeth not therefore, but by virtue of some command of God's Law, or word; and God's Law cannot command things unlawful, for than it should clash with itself. (f) Diversimodè tamen ligat Conscientia 〈◊〉 & erronea, recta simpliciter ligat & 〈◊〉 see, erronea autem secundum quid & peraccidens. Dico autem rectam ligare simpliciter, quia ligat absolutè & in omnem eventum. Sienim aliquis conscientiam habet de vitando adulterio istam conscientiam 〈◊〉 peccato non potest deponere, quia in hoc ipso quòd eam deponeret errando graviter peccaret. Ea autem manente non potest 〈◊〉 in actu sine peccato. Unde absolute ligat & in omnem eventum: sed conscientia erronea non ligat 〈◊〉 secundum 〈◊〉, & sub conditione. Ille enim cui dictat conscientia, quod tenetur fornicari, non est obligatus ut fornicationem sine peccato dimittere non possit, nisi sub hac conditione, si talis conscientia duret. Haec autem conscientia removeri potest absque peccato, undè talis conscientia non obligat in omnem eventum. Potest enim aliquid contingere, scilicet Depositio conscientiae, quo contingente aliquis ulteriùs non ligatur. Quod autem sub conditione tantum est, secundum quid esse dicitur. Dico 〈◊〉 quod conscientia recta per se ligats erronea vero per accidens. Quod ex hoc patet, qui enim vult velamat unum propter alterum, illud quidem propter quod amat, reliquum per se amat, quod verò propter aliud, quasi per accidens, sicut qui vinum amat propter dulce, amat dulce per se, vinum autem per accidens. Ille autem qui conscientiam erroneam 〈◊〉 credens esse rectam, alias non etraret nisi inhaereret conscientiae etroneae propter rectitudinem, quam in ea credit esse, inhaeret quidem per se loquendo rectae conscientiae, sed erroneae quasi per accidens, in quantum 〈◊〉 conscientiam quam credit esse rectam, contingit, esse erroneam. 〈◊〉 exinde est quod per se loquendo ligatur à 〈◊〉 rectâ, per accidens vero ab erroneâ. 〈◊〉: Ex Aquinate Lib. 2. sent. Dist. 39 Quest. 1. Ar. 1. Nemo potest obligati ad malum sub rationem mali, sed benè ad malum, quod 〈◊〉 judicatur esse bonum, & quod proponitur sub ratione boni. Nec conscientia obligat contra legem Dei per se formaliter, sed solum per accidens, & materialiter, Becanus Sum: Theol: Scholast: T. 2. Tract. 1. chap. 4, Q. 7. Capreolus, Becanus, Raynaudus with many others resolve that however a right and well informed Conscience only binds unto a thing per se formaliter & in omnem eventum; yet an erroneous conscience, denominated such from an invincible and involuntary error, may oblige unto a thing materially, per accidens, sub conditione, and secundum quid. It obligeth per accidens as it is apprehended and believed to be right, and well informed; so that an erroneous Conscience is adhered unto, for the rectitude supposed to be in it. It obligeth sub conditione upon condition that such error of Conscience lasteth: for it may be removed without sin: and when it is removed the obligation ceaseth; & then, that which obligeth conditionally, obligeth only secundum quid, and not absolutely. Unto this I have three exceptions. First, they limit themselves to error invincible and involuntary, which is not imputable or blameworthy. This error may be conceived to be; either in matter of fact, or in matter of rule. Error in matter of fact, as when Jacob mistook Leah for Rachel; as when a poor subject, that cannot judge of the titles of primes, thinks a usurper to be his lawful Sovereign, or as when a man takes goods left unto him by his Parents to be truly his own, though perhaps a great part of them were gotten by sraud or oppression, without any knowledge of his: These and the like particulars are all impertinent unto our present purpose; and therefore I shall not stay upon the consideration of them. Error in matter of Law, right, or rule is again twofold, either in regard of law natural, or law positive. Now unto all that have actual use of reason, The error of the law of nature is vincible, and voluntary; because the law of nature is sufficiently promulgated unto them, it is written in their hearts, Rome 2. 15. And we may say the same of Christians, that enjoy the plenary promulgation of the Gospel, and are capable of understanding it: for the Gospel sufficiently reveals all divine positives; so that a rational man may know them, and is bound to know them; and Aquinas states it rightly. 1. 2 ae. q. 19 art 6. voluntas 〈◊〉 rationi erranti circaca, quae quis scire tenetur, 〈◊〉 est mala: If a man err concerning such things, as he may know, and is bound to know, such an error is (at lest indirectè) voluntary, and sinful, and cannot oblige. A Second exception: Conscience hath no power to oblige, but what it deriveth from God: and therefore what it obligeth unto; God also obligeth unto: and God is the moral cause, and consequently the Author of whatsoever he obligeth to: but he cannot be the moral cause, and author of that which is sin, and unlawful, either per se, or per accidens and therefore neither he, nor his deputy Conscience can oblige so much as per accidens unto that which is unlawful. A Third exception shall be the objection of Durand in the place above quoted: Sola vera notitia de re 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 magis confirmat: sed vera notitia de eo quod 〈◊〉 conscientia dictat, tollit 〈◊〉, ergo obligatio nulla suit. To be well informed, and to have a true knowledge of a thing cannot take away any obligation to it; But to be well informed, and to have a true knowledge concerning that, which an erroneous Conscience dictates, takes away all obligation to it; Therefore there was never any such thing as an obligation to it. The most considerable objection is that of 〈◊〉 [Sum: Theol. 2. part. p. 1. tom. 2. tract. 1. cap. 4.] Durandus còncedit illum p 〈◊〉, qui operatur contra hanc conscientiam: Ergo debet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, hanc conscientiam obligare. Nam ubi non est 〈◊〉, ibi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Durand grants, that he sinneth who acts against an erroneous Conscience: therefore he ought also to grant, that an erroneous conscience obligeth: for where there is no obligation there can be no sin. But the answer hereunto is very easy by distinguishing concerning obligation, which is twofold either as touching the 〈◊〉, or manner of actions. Though there be no obligation, as touching the matter of such actions, concerning which an erroneous Conscience dictates: yet there is a general obligation as 〈◊〉 the manner of all actions, that they be done without the Contempt of conscience: and therefore in every action where conscience is contemned, sin is committed: Quaevis voluntas (saith Aquinas, 2 dae. q. 19 art. 5.) à ratione sive 〈◊〉 sive errante discordans semper est mala. Which brings me unto my third conclusion. Although this Third Conclusion. erroneous conceit of the unlawfulness of this action, 〈◊〉 to be necessary either in its nature, or at least in its use, because lawfully commanded by authority, doth not obligare, that is, so bind, as that I must follow it; yet it doth ligare, so entangle and perplex, as that I cannot without sin oppose it, and for this I shall allege these following reasons. First, because whosoever goeth against his Conscience, (whether ill or well informed it matters not) goes against the will of God, although not for the thing he doth, yet for the manner of doing it, although not 〈◊〉, yet formally, and interpretatively: because whatsoever the Conscience 〈◊〉, a man takes for the will of God: each man's Conscience being 〈◊〉 Deputy God to inform, and direct him. Look as he who reviles, wounds, kills a private man, mistaking him for the King, is guilty of high treason against the King himself: so, he that ' thwarts the judgement of even an erroneous Conscience, fights against God, wars against Heaven: because what his conscience says, he thinks to be the voice of Heaven. Thus you see, that he, who acts against an erroneous Conscience in such an action, 〈◊〉 himself as disaffected towards God: for he knowingly adventureth upon that, which he thinketh will infinitely displease him. And in a second place: such an action is an argument of disaffection towards that rule of our moral actions, which God hath appointed: he that hath an erroneous Conscience, supposeth it to be right and well informed: and therefore, if he act against it, he slights that, which he takes to be the rule of his working: and therefore his action is, for the 〈◊〉 of it, lawless, and irregular. (g) Velle aliquid contrà Synt 〈◊〉 naturalem 〈◊〉, id est, contra primum aliquod principium 〈◊〉 à 〈◊〉 dictatum, omnino est malum & peccatum. Sed qui vult id, quod ratio judicat esse malum & fugiendum, sive id verè, five 〈◊〉 judicet, vult aliquid contra synteresin: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 peccat. Major est evidens, Adversatur namque id imprimis legi naturali, quae 〈◊〉 tissimum 〈◊〉 in principlis primis moralibus. Minor probatur. Nam principium illud primum, 〈◊〉, malum non est prosequendum, sed vitandum: inprimis vetat, ne quis, quantum in 〈◊〉 est malum consectetur. Ut enim praecepta naturalla affirmativa jubent inprimis 〈◊〉 homo, quantum in ipso est, bonum prosequatur; 〈◊〉 etiam praecepta negativa 〈◊〉 imprimis, nè 〈◊〉 quantum in ipso situm est, 〈◊〉 malum. Qui autem 〈◊〉 verè 〈◊〉 falsè judicat aliquid esse malum, & nihilominus illud prosequi 〈◊〉, is hoc ipso, quantum in se est, sectatur malum. Nam quod objectum ipsum per se sit revera bonum aut malum, hoc quidem non est in hominis voluntate situm, sed illud solùm, ut quod ipse malum judicat vel bonum, id vitare, aut pro equi velit. 〈◊〉 qui judicans aliquid esse malum sive verè, sive falsè. 〈◊〉 nihilominus vult, is quantum in ipso situm est, vult malum, & proindè 〈◊〉 violate legem illam naturalem 〈◊〉, quae id 〈◊〉 inprimis vetat. Greg. de 〈◊〉 tom. 2. disp. 2. q. 14 〈◊〉. 4. Thirdly, in such an action there is a depraved, affection towards sin: and that in Morals is the fountain of all illness: If a man's conscience be right, and well informed, and he act against it, every one will grant, that such an action proceeds from the love of that which is sin: and there is the same reason to say as much, of that action, which is against the dictate of an erring Conscience. Besides these reasons I shall allege Scriptures (to omit Rome 〈◊〉. 23. already spoken of) 〈◊〉 quotes also Rom. 14. 14. To him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean. The learned Dr Hammond allegeth for the same purpose the 1 Cor. 8. 7. For some with (h) 〈◊〉 Idoli 〈◊〉 Apostolus, non 〈◊〉 qua quis rectè de simulacris 〈◊〉: 〈◊〉 malè interpretatur & malè probat Cajecanus, eain re singularis: sed 〈◊〉 quo quis existimet Idolum esse aliquid, id est 〈◊〉 virtutis: ac proinde cibos 〈◊〉 ab idolo pati mutationem aliquam, sicque 〈◊〉 & co. 〈◊〉 posse edentes. Quod quidem judicium erroneum est: atque ex 〈◊〉 sequitur ut talem habens conscien: iam, si edat idolothytum, edat illud quasi idolothycum: id est quali immutatum aliquo more ' o per 〈◊〉 quod idolis sacrificatum sit ut eius opinione tam idolum quà idolothytum sit aliquid. Et conscientia ipsorum, cum sit infirma, polluitur. Illatiuè pars haec exponenda est: ut 〈◊〉 sit: atque ita animus 〈◊〉 erronea hujusmodi conscientia imbutus, cum 〈◊〉 infirmus, 〈◊〉 quod 〈◊〉: 〈◊〉, qua 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dei quam habe, tapplicet ad particulares conclusiones, ut suprâ dictum est, polluitur peccato: dum videlicet contra conscientiam quam idolothyto habent, existimantes edentes contaminari, de illo edunt. 〈◊〉 in locum. Conscience of the Idol, i e. 〈◊〉 resolved in mind that it is not lawful to eat or taste of any 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, part or portion of the Idol-feast, (whether 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, at the idol table, or having bought it at the shambles (as it seems was the fashion of those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to be sold there at second hand, chap. 10. 25.) 〈◊〉 it unlawful to eat any meat consecrated to that use, do yet eat that which is of this nature, and by so doing, their weak i. e. uninstructed Conscience, is polluted, i. e. they sin against their Conscience, do that which they are persuaded they may not do, which although it be never so innocent and harmless thing in itself (an Idol being simply nothing) yet to them which do it, when they think it unlawful (and all have not knowledge, saith he in the beginning of the verse, i. e. are not sufficiently instructed in their duty) it is pollution or sin. I shall proceed unto the fourth, and last conclusion. The only way then for a man to rescue himself out of these difficulties is to rectify his Conscience, to depose, and correct the error thereof, so he shall escape contempt of the judgement of his own Conscience on the one hand, and breach of either Gods or man's laws on the other. This Rayunaudus (from whom I know none do dissent) expresseth as followeth [Moral. disc. dist. 4. q. 3. art. 1. n. 247.] Unum igitur illud subsidium superest, ut judicium de malitiâ vincibilitèr errans, abjiciatur: Si enim neque adhaerere ei licet, ut primo loco monstravimus: neque illi obsistere, ut nunc diximus; non aliud superesse potest, quam ut homo errorem depellat, quod posse supponitur, 〈◊〉 de malitiâ sensum induat: alioqui quocunque se vertat, in culpâ erit. An imaginary appearance of evil issues, Secondly, from the supposals of, not only ourselves, but others that censure it, whose judgements are either misled by ignorance, and weakness, or else blinded through pride and prejudice: such was that in the moving of Hannah's lips, not afforded by her fact, but only fastened on it by old Eli his hasty censoriousness: no other appearance of evil was there in our Saviour's healing the diseased, his Disciples plucking and eating of the ears of corn on the Sabbath day; 'twas not grounded on their actions; but only 〈◊〉 by the Pharisees swelling uncharitableness. What other was that appearance of evil, with which the Gentiles charged the primitive Christians, lifting up of their hands in prayer, when they accused them for adoration of the Clouds? as appeareth by Tertullian, and by a Poet of their own, qui puras nubes & coeli numen adorant. (i) 〈◊〉 part. 2. pag 63. This imaginary appearance of evil proceeds, from either supposals of wilful, or weak ones: The censures and supposals of wilful, proud, and wicked ones, and the scandals thence arising, scandala Pharisaeorum, I determined (in my first Edition of this 〈◊〉) that we might slight: our warrant (said I) is our 〈◊〉 precedent. When his Disciples told him, that the Pharisees took offence at his speech, he made no reckoning thereof, but answered, let them alone, Matth. 12. 13, 14. and we, warranted by his example, may then be secure and regardless of many calumnies, and groundless exceptions against the government, discipline, and ceremonies of our Church: for 〈◊〉 hath been so much spoken and written concerning these subjects, as that the pretence of weakness is quite taken away from those that are capable of information. First, here my censure of the non-conformists to be wilful, proud, and Pharisaical was very rash, and uncharitable: all that I can say in excuse for myself is: that when I wrote this, I was a very young man, and conformity unto the Ceremonies established by Law was then generally embraced, without any of the least contradiction, for aught I knew; nay stoutly and zealously pleaded for by men, whom I admired for the general report that went of their sanctity, and 〈◊〉 v. g. Dr John 〈◊〉, Dr Sclater, Dr Sanderson and others: And then I had read but one side, being an utter stranger unto what the Inconformitants could say for themselves: and their adversaries represented their objections, and answer, to be so weaks: and ridiculous: as that 'tis no great wonder, that I was prejudiced against them: But, about the beginning of the long Parliament, being awakened with the general complaint of the Godly against the Ceremonies, I began to think a new of the controversy, and out of my former prejudice intended a full vindication of the discipline, and Ceremonies of the then Church of England: and in order hereunto I read all such books of the nonconformist's as I could procure: for I knew well by experience, that a controversy can never be well handled, unless all dissenting opinions thereabouts be weighed: but upon perusal of the non-conformists I soon found: that their adversaries most disingeniously misrepresented all that they said: that they refused to join issue with them in the state of the Question: that they came not up to an orderly grapple with their arguments: and that they seldom regularly replied unto the solutions, which were given unto their objections: and this quickly produced an alteration in my judgement, and I believe it will do so too in all, that will make such an impartial search into the matter; as I have done. But Secondly, to come unto the examination of that aspersion: that the scandals of the malicious, of Pharisaical, and wilful spirits are not to be regarded, so as to sorbear that, by which they are scandalised. Gregory de Valentia: though he lay down the affirmative in the general, yet afterwards he delivers it to be his opinion: that we are to do what lieth in us to prevent the scandals of even Pharisees, so it may be done without any great loss, or notable damage unto ourselves. Existimo etiam, si quis cum nullo suo, vel pene nullo detrimento posset impedire scandalum proximi Pharisaicum, aliquid faciendo vel omittendo, debere ipsum facere. Nam ut tradidimus suprà in quaest. de correctione fraternâ, etiam is qui ex malitiâ peccaturus alioqui est, est in aliquali necessitate spirituali, ac proinde ut (illic vidimus) debet ex charitate corrigi, vel aliter à peccati scandalo impediri, quando id sine detrimento proprio fieri potest. tom. 3. disp. 3. q. 18. punct. 4. For the better stating of this Question, I shall premise some distinctions of scandal: a scandal is either active or passive. An active scandal is in all such words, or deeds, as culpably occasion the fall of another into sin: and this is again by Gregory de Valentia [tom. 3. disp. 3. q. 18. punct. 1.] rightly subdivided into that which is per se, and into that which is per accidens. An active scandal per se is in such public acts, as either by the express intent of the agent, or from their nature, and in themselves, are inductive unto sin: and they are again twofold: First, all public sins, or sins committed before another: Secondly, all such public actions, as carry a real and manifest appearance of sin. An active scandal per accidens is in such things, as are not in themselves, and in their own nature occasions of sin unto another: and this is, either in an unseasonable performance of positive duties, commanded by affirmative precepts, which are not necessary hic & nunc: or else by an unseasonable use of our liberty in things 〈◊〉. A Passive scandal is the fall of another into sin: and this (by the author but now mentioned) is subdivided into given, and taken. Scandalum datum, a passive scandal given, is that which ariseth truly from the active scandal of another, as from its moral cause. Scandalum acceptum, a passive scandal that is only taken, is that which is only the fault of the party scandalised, and cannot be imputed to any other, as a moral cause: the words or deeds of another may be an occasion of it, but not a culpable occasion. I desire that these distinctions of scandal may be well heeded: for the want of Consideration of them hath occasioned a great deal of confusion in men's discourses about scandal. First, many exclude from active scandal all things that scandalise per accidens: and then, what will become of those scandals Paul speaks against? Rom. 14. 1 Cor. ch. 8. ch. 10. Secondly, most confound a passive scandal with scandalum acceptum, a scandal that is only taken, and make them to be of an equal extent: whereas a passive scandal may de distributed into both given, and taken: if it be culpably both given, and taken: than it is scandalum datum: if it be culpably taken, and not culpably given, than it is scandalum acceptum. Well, these distinctions being thus premised: I suppose it will be agreed upon by all sides: that the question is to be understood: First of active scandals, our scandalising of the wicked: or Secondly, (which comes all to one) of such passive scandals of them, as are given by us, as well as taken by them: Not, thirdly, of such passive scandals, as are only taken by them, not given by us: for from the guilt of these we may wash our hands, so that there is no obligation upon us to forbear those things, by which they are in this manner scandalised. My Conclusion shall be: that we are to eschew the active scandals, and consequently scandala passiva data, of the wicked, and malicious, those that are Pharisaical and wilful spirits: this is apparent: First from 〈◊〉 prohibition of scandal, 1 Cor. 10. 32. Give none offence neither to the Jews, nor to the Gentiles, etc. he spoke of unconverted Jews, and Gentiles, such as were enemies unto the Christian faith: and the Jews were of all men the most malicious enemies thereof. Secondly, from our Saviour's denunciation of a woe unto the world by means of scandal, Matth. 18. 7. 〈◊〉 unto the world because of offences; which undeniably is to be extended unto all sorts of men. Unto these two arguments we may add four other, taken from, First, the distribution; 〈◊〉, relation; Thirdly, effect; Fourthly, opposite of an active scandal. First, from the distribution of an active scandal, and perusal of the members thereof: An active scandal (as I showed but now) is distributed into scandalum per se, and per accidens: now there is no doubt, but that we are carefully to avoid such things as scandalise the wicked, and malicious per se, of themselves, and in their own nature, public sins, or such words, and deeds as have a real appearance of sin: all the question will be concerning such things as scandalise them only per accidens, our duties, and our indifferencies: and by these they are frequently scandalised, and that out of an erroneous opinion concerning their unlawfulness: in which regard the resolution will be pertinent unto the matter in hand. First then: duties, that are commanded by affirmative precepts, may be forborn, hic & nunc, sometimes, and in some places, to avoid the scandal of the wicked, and malicious. The usual instances are in reproof, admonition, punishment of sin, and the like: and this is warranted First, by the precept of our Saviour, Matth. 7. 6. Give not that which is holy unto the dogs: neither cast ye your pearls before swine: lest they trample them under their 〈◊〉, and turn again and 〈◊〉 you. Secondly, by the example of David, Psal. 39 1, 2. I will keep my tongue with a bridle, while the wicked is before me: I was dumb with silence, I held my peace even from good. Thirdly, by that rule in Divinity; affirmativa praecepta obligant semper, non ad semper; they always bind, but not to always: they do not oblige to do the things required at all times, but only, when they are expedient for the glory of God, and the good of others: To reprove, and admonish sinners is a duty commanded by God, Leu. 19 17. Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart: thou shalt in anywise rebuke thy neighbour, and not suffer sin upon him. But now this duty is not to be performed unseasonably, when 'tis likely to bring no glory to God, nor good unto others, but rather likely to scandalise them. Thus every private man is not bound to run into an alehouse, or tavern, there to reprehend a company of desperate drunkards, who would look upon his reprehension as an act of pragmaticalness, and insolency, and for it be ready to quoit him down the Stairs, or run him through with their swords: and as imprudent an act would it be, in Spain, to run into their Churches, and there to cry against the Idolatry of the Mass; and in the Streets of Constantinople to declaim against the impostures of Mahomet; for hereby we should scandalise them indiscreetly, and foolishly occasion them, as to blaspheme our religion, so to cut us in pieces. Unto the 〈◊〉 rule in Divinity I shall add another out of Logic; finis dat mediis amabilitatem: 'tis the 〈◊〉 only makes the means desirable: Now reproof, admonition, punishment, and the like duties are enjoined as means, in order to the reformation, and bettering of others: when therefore they are not likely to conduce unto this end, but rather to oppose and hinder it, prudence in such a case dictates an abstinence from them. But let us take two exemplifications of this out of Aquinas 2. 2 daes. 9 43. art. 7. The first is concerning the punishment of sin: 〈◊〉, quòd poenarum inflictio non est propter se expentenda: sed poenae infliguntur, ut medicinae quaedam ad cohibenda peccata, & ideò in tantum 〈◊〉 rationem justitiae, in quantum per eas peccata cohibentur. Si autem per inflictionem poenarum 〈◊〉 sit plura & 〈◊〉 peccata sequi, tunc poenarum inflictio non continebitur sub justitia. Et in hoc casu loquitur (k) August. in libro contra epistolam Parmenlani docet, quod ubi 〈◊〉 periculum timetur, a punitione peccatorum cessandum est. August quando 〈◊〉 ex excommunicatione aliquorum imminet periculum schismatis: 〈◊〉 enim excommunicationem ferre non pertinet ad veritatem justitiae. The second is concerning brotherly reproof: 〈◊〉 quod correptio fraterna ordinatur ad emendationem fratris: & ideò in tantum computanda est inter spiritualia bona, in quantum hoc consequi potest. Quod 〈◊〉 contingit si ex correptione 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 si propter scandalum correptio dimittatur, non dimittitur spirituale bonum. But to proceed next to the scandal of the wicked by our indifferencies: That we are to forbear things indifferent when they scandalise the wicked, and malicious. Parker [in his treatise of the Cross part. 2. pag. 57] proves by many instances: when the thing was indifferent, doth not our Saviour forego his liberty, to please the malicious? as when he paid tribute lest he should offend them? Matth. 17. 27. They were malicious at Corinth, and seekers of occasion against Paul, that were likely to be offended by his taking of wages there: yet the thing, being no necessary duty, he thinketh it his duty to forbear his power therein, 1 Cor. 9 The Heathens are malicious to take offence, when Christians go to Law for their own: yet, because going to law is not a duty necessary, it must be forborn, and Christians rather must lose their own, then give occasion of scandal to them, 1 Cor. 6. v. 6, 7. Unto these examples let me add another (quoted by the same author elsewhere) out of Ezra 8. 22. I was ashamed (saith Ezra) to require of the King a band of Soldiers and horsemen, to help us against the enemies in the way: because we had spoken unto the King, saying, the hand of our God is upon all them for good, that seek him, but his power and his wrath is against all them that forsake him Here for Ezra to have asked of the King of Persia, a Heathen, a band of soldiers, and horsemen for his safe conduct, was a thing lawful: and yet he forbore it, lest he should scandalise him by begetting in him a suspicion, that that was false, which he had told him concerning God's power, and justice. A second argument is drawn from the relation of an active scandal: it is the moral cause of a passive scandal; so that he who scandalizeth another, partaketh of, and is accessary unto the sin of the party scandalised, and we are not to partake of, or be accessary unto the sins of any, 1 Tim. 5. 22. We must have no fellowship with unfruitful works of darkness in any whomsoever, 〈◊〉. 5. 11. A third argument is fetched from the effect of an active scandal: 'tis of a soul destroying nature, & so a kind of spiritual murder: destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died, Rom. 14. 15. for 〈◊〉 destroy not the 〈◊〉 of God, verse. 20. and who should not tremble at the guilt of the murder of any soul whatsoever? for there is no soul so wicked, but may (for aught thou knowest) be one of those, for whom Christ shed his most divine, and precious blood. The last argument is taken from the Opposite of scandal, Charity, and its act beneficence: We are to love all, even our most malicious, and persecuting enemies, Matth. 5. 44. We are to do good unto all, though especially to the household of saith, Gal. 6. 10. We are to exercise patience, and meekness, towards even those that oppose themselves, 2 Tim. 2. 14, 15. And from this it will inevitably follow, that we are to scandalise none. Here we have usually objected the example of our Saviour, who slighted the scandal of the Pharisees, Matth. 15. 12, 13, 14. Then came his Disciples and said unto him: knowest thou that the Pharisees were offended after they heard this saying? but he answered and said etc. let them alone they be blind leaders of the blind etc. The objection concerns only the scandalising of them in things indifferent; and unto it I shall give an answer in the words of Parker part. 2. part. 57 If this be all the warrant we have, not to forbear in a thing indifferent for the malicious, then have we no warrant at all, because the scandal (there) not cared for, is when the Pharisees are 〈◊〉, at his abstaining from their washings, and his preaching of a true doctrine: both of which were necessary duties for him to do. And when he defendeth his healing on sabbaths, and his Disciples plucking ears, upon this reason they are duties of necessity and charity, he plainly insinuateth, there is no defence for deeds unnecessary, when the malicious are scandalised. In a second place I shall allege the Objection of the Schoolmen which by Gregory de Valentia is thus urged [Tom. 3. disp. 3. q. 18. punct. 4.] 〈◊〉 qui non ex ignorantiâ, aut infirmitate, sed ex malitiâ 〈◊〉, non laborat tali aliquâ necessitate spirituali, cui non possit ipse sine ope alterius proximi facile prospicere mutando pravam suam voluntatem. Ergo alter non tenetur tunc cum ali quo suo detrimento prospicere. Pharisees, the wicked, that are scandalised out of mere malice, and not out of ignorance, or weakness are not in any such spiritual necessity, or danger, but that they can easily provide for the safety, and indemnity of their souls, without the help or assistance of others, by changing their depraved will: and therefore others are not bound to 〈◊〉 any detriment for the prevention of their scandal. The answer unto this may easily be foreseen, for here is nothing but Jesuitical dictates, that are altogether proofelesse. First, Pharisees, the wicked, that are scandalised out of malice, are in a greater spiritual necessity, and danger, than those, that are scandalised out of ignorance, or weakness: for, they are in the snare of the devil, taken captive by him at his will. 2 Tim. 2. 16. And therefore, Secondly, they are more unable to help themselves, and prevent their own falling into sin; for their hearts are altogether destitute of any gracious habits: there is not in them the spirit, a renewed principle, to make head, or resistance against the flesh, the sinful corruption of their natures: there is need then of all help possible to keep them from falling: and all will be uneffectuall, unless God also put in his helping hand. Whereas he talks: that 'tis an easy matter for a wicked, and malicious man to provide against all danger, and need of his soul, by changing his perverse, and naughty will: this is a very gross Pelagian conceit: for it ascribes that, unto the power of man's corrupt will, which can be wrought only by the omnipotent grace of God. By this time (I hope) the Reader is sufficiently satisfied that the active scandals of the most wicked, and malicious are not to be contemned. But yet there remaineth a great difficulty in the point to be cleared; and that is, when an active-scandall is committed towards them, in our duties, and indifferencies? First, we actively scandalise them by our duties, when they are not rightly circumstanced, seasonably performed, in due time, and place: when they are not expedient unto those ends, for which God enjoined them: now when this is, cannot be determined by any general rule, but every one must be left to be guided by his spiritual prudence, and wisdom. [But for this hereafter I shall allot a peculiar digression by itself.] Secondly, we actively scandalise them by our indifferencies, when 'tis probable they will occasion their passive scandal, their falling into sin; But now this general rule is to be limited, and I shall give you three limitations of it. The first limitation: this rule is to be understood, when the use of our indifferencies is likely to prejudice, and obstruct the propagation of the Gospel, and the forbearance of them will in all probability conduce unto the advancement of the Credit of the Gospel, and not otherwise, ordinarily: upon this account, it would have been scandalous in Paul to have received maintenance from the Corinthians: but 'tis now unscandalous in Ministers, to accept, and challenge that maintenance, which is due unto them by the laws of the land; for a general forbearance thereof now would soon be followed with the utter ruin of the Gospel. A second limitation: the sorementioned rule is to be understood, when the forbearance of our indifferencies is likely to win upon the wicked, and malicious, so as to further their conversion, and not otherwise, when it only exposeth unto their contempt, scorn, and derision, 1 Cor. 9 19, 20, 21, 22. Though I be free from all men (saith Paul) 〈◊〉 have I made myself servant unto all, that I might gain the more. And unto the Jews I became as a few, that I might gain the Jews: to them that are under the law, as under the law, that I might gain them that are under the Law. To them that are without Law, as without Law (being not without Law to God, but under the Law to Christ) that I might gain them, that are without Law. To the weak became I as weak, that I might gain the weak: I am made all things to all men, that I might by all means save some. Here 'tis very remarkable, that Paul was made, in things indifferent, all things unto all men, only in order to their salvation, to gain their souls unto Christ; and why should we abridge ourselves in the use of our liberty, in things that are of great expediency and conveniency unto us, when such a restraint of our liberty, is not a probable means of reaching the said end? what reason can be given, why we should incommodate ourselves, by forbearing all such indifferencies, that wicked men are scandalised at, when such forbearance is unprofitable unto their spiritual good, and unlikely to bring them any jot the nearer unto God and Heaven? A third limitation: the forementioned rule hath not place, when by the sorbearance of our indifferencies, at which some wicked men are scandalised, there is incurred as great, if not a greater scandal, then that by their use: as when they are hereby confirmed, and hardened in their error, and sin; and others are hereby drawn into the like: prudenter advertendum est (saith Bernard) scandalum scandalo non emendari, qualis emendatio 〈◊〉, si ut aliis scandalum tollas, alios scandalizas. Thus you see how the rule is to be limited; and without such, or the like limitations, rigidly to press it, would make against both the liberty, and peace of conscience. First, against the liberty of Conscience: for it would in great part evacuate, and annul the grand charter of our Christian liberty in things indifferent, it would (as Peter saith in another case) put a yoke upon the neck of the disciples, which neither our Fathers were, nor we are able to bear, Acts 15. 10. All things are lawful for me (saith Paul) But I will not be brought under the power of any, 1 Cor. 6. 12. But now if we must forbear all our lawful conveniences, at which wicked men perhaps will be purposely scandalised, we should be brought under the power of them, we should be little better than their slaves; and what an unspeakable, and intolerable vassalage would that be? (l) Quoties scandalum passivum alterius futurum est, ex malitia nullus debet 〈◊〉 opus, quod nec est malum, nec 〈◊〉 speciem mali propter malitiam alterius, quando opus illud utile est temporaliter, vel spiritualiter operanti, quia non postulat ratio, ut 〈◊〉 alterius cum damno nostro succurramus, 〈◊〉 quilibet malitia sua possit nobis vocere, ut 〈◊〉 opus nobis 〈◊〉 autem alterias nobis vocere non debet Lucssius Turrianus. Secondly it would make against the peace of Conscience; for it would so perplex men's consciences with doubts, and uncertainties; as that they would hardly know when, and how to act in the use of things indifferent, for wicked men are very prone to be scandalised at the lawful conveniencies of the Godly: and there is no doubt, but many are so wicked, as that they would of set purpose nourish, and cherish such scandals in themselves, if they thought that the Godly would hereupon forbear such their conveniencies: there be some people of such malevolent spirits against Ministers, as that they are scandalised at the decent apparel of them, & their wives, at their competent fare, and moderate house-keeping: and, if they must make the humour, and opinion of such men the rule of their walking in all things indifferent, it will be a very difficult matter for them to know how herein to carry themselves. But this doctrine, that we are to 〈◊〉 all indifferencies, at which wicked men are scandalised, if it be unlimited would create perplexities, not only unto Ministers, but unto all sorts of men, especially such as have any thing due unto them from others: for grant this, and how often will a Landlord be at a loss to demand his rent? a Creditor his debts? and the magistrate his tribute or contribution? Add unto this, thirdly, that this doctrine, without limitation, will tend unto the overthrow of public peace, and 〈◊〉, and brings in nothing but anarchy and confusion: for public peace and order depends much upon the preservation of propriety: and upon what a ticklish point would propriety stand, if we must forbear to exact, or receive all such temporals, at which wicked men are scandalised, that can be forborn without sin? unto what wrongs, and injuries would this expose such, as are well affected? for there be some men so wicked and malicious, as that they would be scandalised at their temporals for the nonce to deprive them of them. I shall conclude this particular with the resolution of Aquinas 2. 2 daes. q. 43. art. 8. Propter eos, qui sic scandala concitant, non sunt temporalia dimittenda: quia hoc & noceret bono communi: daretur 〈◊〉 malis 〈◊〉 occasio, & noceret ipsis rapientibus, qui retinendo aliena, in peccato remanerent. Unde Greg. dicit in Moral. Quidam dum temporalia à nobis rapiunt, solummodo sunt tolerandi: quidam verò aequitate servata prohibendi: non 〈◊〉 cura, nè nostra subtrahantur, sed ne 〈◊〉 non sua, semet ipsos perdant. But what if this imaginary appearance of evil slow from the supposal of a weak one, yet an holy one. Why then it must be omitted, but with this caution, so it may be without sin, or as the ordinary gloss upon that 15 of Matth. v. 12, 13, 14. resolves it, Saluâ triplici veritate, vitae, Justitiae, Dectrinae, so the threesold verity of life, justice, and doctrine be preserved safe: Nam per hanc triplicem veritatem (saith Gregory de Valentia), intelligitur omnis rectitudo, & immunitas à 〈◊〉 in actionibus humanis. Veritas namque vitae continetur in actionibus rectis, quas quis in seipso exercet convenienter rectae rationi, & appetitui recto, atque 〈◊〉 verè veritate quadam practicâ: Veritas 〈◊〉 justitiae rectis actionibus quae 〈◊〉 erga 〈◊〉 similiter, convenienter rectae rationi, prout verè & absque 〈◊〉 oportet: veritas denique 〈◊〉 continetur 〈◊〉 verâ, & minimè 〈◊〉: By this triple verity is understood all the rectitude and freedom from sin, that is in humane actions, for the verity of life is contained in those regular actions, which any one 〈◊〉 in, and towards himself agreeably to right reason, and a well governed appetite, etc. The verity of justice consists in those regular actions, which are performed towards another, likewise suitably to right reason, as it behoveth, truly and without sin. And to conclude, the verity of doctrine consists in a true, regular, and unerring faith: if these three verities be kept inviolate, every thing must be abstained from, upon which follows scandalum pusillorum, a scandal springing from either the ignorance, or weakness of our brother: but, because this resolution may be thought both too general, and obscure (the Schoolmen themselves sumbling much about its explication,) we will therefore go to work more distinctly, and particularly. Consider whether or no the action, in which this appearance of evil is imagined to be, is necessary, or indifferent. If it be necessary, and commanded by God, it must not be omitted, though all the world be offended: For evil must not be done, that good may come thereof. Calvin, telling us, regard aught to be had of charity, limits 〈◊〉. l. 3. Inst. c. 19 Sect. 13. how far, usque ad arras, that is, so for our brother's sake we offend not 〈◊〉. I may add, so for our brother's sake we endanger not our own souls. To prevent scandal and sin in our 〈◊〉, Scandalum quod oritur ex rebus perse bonis, & necessariis non licet evitare: quia non est faciendum malum, ut eveniat bonum. Bonum enim est expetendum, 〈◊〉 bonum est, non expetitur autem quatenus bonum est, si malum simul 〈◊〉. Nam qui 〈◊〉 bonum, abhorret à malo: qui autem abhorret a malo, 〈◊〉 malum est, is nullo malo quod cunque sit, non potest allici. Jam vero nullae sunt res planè necessariae praeter eas quae sunt in se bonae, atque eiusmodi, ut nisi voluntàs illas expetat, à suo vero, & proprio obiecto abhorret: it a que ut maximè tumultuetur mundus, tamen omnia, etiam extrema quaeque 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ut fiet illibata Deigloria. Cameron, in electiora quaedam N. Test. 〈◊〉, Tom. 2. in 〈◊〉 18. 7. we may not run upon sin ourselves: for a well ordered charity, as Aquinas gives the reason 2. 2dae. q. 43. a. 7. beginneth ever at home, making a man chiefly desire and endeavour the salvation of his ownsoule, and consequently more solicitous to avoid sin in himself then to prevent it in other: I may not then omit or neglect necessary duties, because to some they seem but needless niceties; I must not fly true holiness, and the power of 〈◊〉, because unto the world it appears but brain sick peevishness, and an irrational preciseness: others error should not be seconded, and countenanced with mine impiety, and disobedience. Scandalum, nisi fallor, non bonae rei, sed 〈◊〉 exemplum est, aedificans ad delictum, Bonae res neminem scandalizant, nisi malam mentem. Si 〈◊〉 est modestia, verecundia, 〈◊〉 gloriae, soli Deo captans placere; agnoscant malum suum, qui de tali bono scandalizantur. Quod 〈◊〉 si & incontinentes dicant se à continentibus scandalizari, continentia revocanda est? Tertullian. Here it will not be an unprofitable, nor much impertinent digression, A Digression. to give you the sum of what Thomas and his Interprerers say upon this Question, An bona spiritualia sint propter scandalum dimittenda? Not to mention their rotten distinction between matters of counsel, and matters of precept, we will only out of them take notice, that there is a difference between 〈◊〉 of a precept, and a temporary, partial, or occasional 〈◊〉 of the matter commanded by a precept. No precept whatsoever, whether of the Law of Nature, or else but positive, is, for eschewing the scandal of any whether weak, or malicious, to be 〈◊〉 broken or transgressed. And a precept is transgressed whensoever what is enjoined in it is omitted at such a time, and in such a case, when all the particular circumstances, which we ought to regard, being considered, we are tied to all performance of it. But yet however upon emergency of scandal, that which is commanded by some precepts (p) Opera 〈◊〉 praecepti 〈◊〉, quod non pro semper obligat, debent aliquando deserri pro aliquo tempore, quando causarent pusillis scandalum, 〈◊〉 illi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 instructi, sed circumstantiae illius scandali sint mutatae, ita ut contingat praeceptum affirmativum etiam iuris quasi naturalis, aliquando hic & nunc non obligare 〈◊〉 concursum negativi praecepti de non ponendo 〈◊〉 pusillis. 〈◊〉 Wiggers. may pro hic & nunc, in some times, and at some places, be omitted, may for a while be forborn, until the scandal taken thereby can be removed by information, or instruction, or until the circumstances of the scandals be some way or other changed. Promulgation of a truth, and Christian reproof, are duties commanded by God, and yet are to be sometimes abstained from, for scandals taken by, not only the weak, but all malicious. Reprove not a scorner lest he hate thee, Prov. 9 8. Speak not in the ears of a fool, for he will despise the wisdom of thy words, Prov. 23. 9 〈◊〉 not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and turn again and rend you, Matth. 7. 6. To explain this farther, recourse must be had unto that old and golden rule. 〈◊〉 praecepta semper obligant 〈◊〉 ad semper. Affirmative precepts do always bind, but not to always: so 〈◊〉 we are not bound to perform always what they enjoin, but only loco & tempore debitis, when we have due time and place. Now as by the intercurrency of other circumstances, so especially by occurrence of the scandal of weak brethren there may not be opportunity, and seasonableness of doing what we are urged unto by some affirmative precepts; and so those precepts may pro his & nunc cease to be obligatory: For when the obligations of two precepts seem to meet together at the very same time, that which is of greater obligation tieth us, and so consequently we are for the present freed from the obligation of the other. Now the negative precept of eschewing the scandal of the weak is more obligatory than many affirmative precepts; and therefore (to use the words of Malderus,) contingit aliquando 〈◊〉 naturale affirmativum, hic & nunc non obligare, propter concursum negativi 〈◊〉 naturalis de vitando scandalo pusillorum: For example, vindicative justice binds a magistrate to execute wrath upon him that doth evil: Charity on the other side obligeth him to hinder, as much as he can, the scandal of the weak: now Charity is a virtue, of an higher note and nature, than vindicative justice: the precept belonging unto charity (hinder as much as you can the scandal of the weak) doth more strictly tie us, than that pertaining unto vindicative justice, (punish the guilty). And therefore, if it be probable, that a great and spreading scandal will be taken at the punishing of delinquents: a Magistrate may not transgress against justice, and yet defer the execution thereof. But so manifold and different are the degrees of obligation in affirmative precepts: such is the variety of circumstances appertaining unto the matters commanded by those precepts, and constancy of alterations about those circumstances, as that I do not see, how any unvariable rules, or constant directions can be given for Christian carriage in this case. For particulars then, every man is to be left unto the guidance of his spiritual prudence and wisdom, which is to direct him in a right apprehension, and discretion of circumstances: to define the opportunity, and seasonableness of practising what is commanded by affirmative precepts: and to compare them and the precept of eschewing the scandal of the weak together: and thereupon to determine, which is hic & nunc, most obligatory, or doth most strictly tie us to the obedience of it, as being of greater moment. Only in the general we may safely say thus much: that whereas we have said, that for shunning the scandal of the weak, we may forbear the practice of things commanded by affirmative precepts, Hic & nunc, in some places, and at some times, it must always be taken with this proviso, that there be not incurred a greater, and more perilous scandal, by forbearance, then would probably be occasioned by practice of the thing 〈◊〉; which is done, when either first, more are scandalised by the forbearance, than in all likelihood would be at the practice: or else, secondly, when the body in general, the Church and Common wealth, or the greatest, and 〈◊〉 part of either is scandalised at the sorbeareance, and only some few particular private persons stumble at the practice: or else, thirdly, when others take 〈◊〉 by this partial and temporary forbearance of what is commanded by affirmative precepts, to contemn the precepts 〈◊〉, as being by this our carriage induced to believe that we verily despise them, and do not so much, for a while forbear, as utterly disclaim the practice of what they command. Thus you see, that, according to the common opinion of the schoolmen, things commanded may in case of scandal for a while be omitted or forborn; but Vasquez and 〈◊〉 dissent from them in this particular: the explication and confirmation of their opinion I will propound, and then briefly pass my censure thereon. * Sum. Theol. 〈◊〉. 3. 〈◊〉. 27. q. 5. Becanus, to make way for his opinion premiseth, that there is a difference between natural precepts, for some saith he bind simply, and always whatsoever circumstances intervene, and their obligation never ceaseth, such like are those that forbid lying, perjury, hatred of God, Idolatry &c: for these facts are so intrinsically sinful, as that they cannot by any circumstances be made lawful: others now bind not simply, and absolutely, but with certain circumstances, and therefore they bind as long as those circumstances remain, they cease to bind when those circumstances are changed: Such is the precept forbidding to kill: for that 〈◊〉 with these circumstances, that we kill not by our private authority, except in case of necessary defence. Take away these circumstances, and it binds not, for it is lawful to kill upon the command of authority, or in our necessary defence: such also is the precept of eschewing scandal: for, however it be dictated by the law of nature, yet it obligeth not absolutè & quomodocunque: but with certain circumstances: and one circumstance necessarily requisite to make it bind us is, that there occur not any other precept, either natural, or positive. The reason is, because every one is bound to have a greater care of his own, than others salvation, and consequently, rather to avoid sin in himself, than to prevent it in his brethren. And therefore that precept which is given us for the prevention of sin in others, is but of a secondary obligation. Now the precept of eschewing scandal is imposed, only for the hindering of sin in others, and therefore doth not tie us, when there occurreth any other precept, which is given for the avoiding of sin in ourselves. But it may be objected, that the precept of shunning scandal is of the Law of nature, and therefore is more obligatory than those precepts that are but positive. Unto this 〈◊〉 answereth, that a natural precept is more obligatory, than that which is 〈◊〉, caeteris paribus, that is, if each precept, both that which is natural, and that which is positive, be primarily referred unto the furthering of our own salvation, unto the preventing of sin in ourselves: But now if on the other side the primary scope of the natural precept be to hinder sin in others, as it is in the precept of scandal; and the principal end of the positive precept be to shun sin in ourselves, than that precept which is positive doth more deeply bind us, than that which is natural. Again, secondly, it may be objected: that if the obligation of the natural precept of eschewing scandal ceaseth upon occurrence of but a positive precept; why, then it seems, this positive precept detracts or derogates from the natural precept of avoiding scandal: as being of greater force, and validity? In no wise, only it takes away a circumstance requisite to make the precept of avoiding scandal obligatory, quare cum dicimus (saith Vasquez) non esse omittendum praeceptum positivum 〈◊〉 vitandum scandalum proximi, non dicimus praeceptum naturale derogari 〈◊〉 positivo tanquam fortiori; sed dicimus occursu praecepti positivi 〈◊〉 quandam circumstantiam necessariam, ut 〈◊〉 praeceptum de vitando scandalo etiamsi naturale sit. But all this labour would have been saved, if the question had been rightly stated: for, whereas it is said, that one circumstance necessarily requisite to make the precept of eschewing scandal bind us, is, that there occur not any other precept either natural or positive: this is to be understood cum grano salis, with this limitation, in case such precepts bind (all circumstances considered to the performance of what they enjoin) 〈◊〉 & nunc, at such a particular time and place; for then omission of what they enjoin would be sinful, and we are not sinfully to omit any thing, for prevention of scandal in our brother: Unto the proof of which the reason of Vasquez and 〈◊〉 may be applied. But, the obligation of affirmative precepts is not universal ad 〈◊〉, but only loco & tempore debitis: and therefore what they enjoin may sometimes, in the case of scandal, be prudéntly omitted; but perhaps this which I say is all that Vasquez and 〈◊〉 aim at; and then they have no adversary that I know of; Every one will grant unto them, that one circumstance necessarily requisite to make the precept of 〈◊〉 scandal bind us, hic & nunc, in such a time and place, is, that there occur not any other precept binding us to what it enjoineth at that very instant time, and place: for it is evident unto all, that upon occurrencie of such obligations, though scandal ensue, it would not be on our parts a culpable scandal, an active scandal. But it may be thought that I have stayed too long upon this digression: to return therefore where we left. Secondly, if the action in which this appearance of evil is supposed to be, be but indifferent: why then, the best direction that we can have will be from what the Apostle Paul writes unto the Romans chap. 14. and unto the 〈◊〉, 1 Cor. 8. and chap. 10. of converts amongst the Romans there were some strong, and knowing ones, that were well principled, and so knew very well their deliverance from the yoke of the mosaical Law: and hereupon, without any scruple, did eat such meats as were prohibited thereby, perhaps Swine's flesh, or the like: Now at this their practice, several weak Christians, who were as yet ignorant and uninstructed touching the latitude of their Christian liberty, were in several regards scandalised, as I have shown in a foregoing treatise: But yet here the practice of the strong was a thing indifferent in itself vers. 14. 20. and the appearance of evil (to wit, a profane, and irreligious contempt of the Law of Moses) was only imaginary, arising from the ignorance, and error of the weak, who thought that Law of Moses to be still in source, and unabrogated; and the scandal consequent hereupon was only 〈◊〉 accidens, flowing not from the nature of the action in itself, but from the misapprehension of the weak: and yet the Apostle blames the strong for scandalising the weak: and therefore in this their action, though indifferent in itself, there was an active scandal, a scandal culpably given, as well as taken. The Apostle gives the same resolution unto the Corinthians concerning things offered unto Idols; to eat them at the Pagan religious feast, and in the temple of an Idol, carrieth a real appearance of communion with, and approbation of an Idolatrous worship of the Idol, and so is scandalous per se, of itself, and in its own nature, 1 〈◊〉. 8. 10. cap. 10. vers. 20, 21. But now to eat these same meats when sold, and bought in the shambles, or set before them in private meetings, the Apostle resolves to be a thing lawful, and indifferent, 1 Cor. 10. v. 25, 26, 27. And indeed it could not carry a real, but only an imaginary appearance of evil; for they were the good creatures of God, and so uncapable of any 〈◊〉 pollution, and they had no religious use, and so did not reflect any glance 〈◊〉 the least honour, credit or countenance to the Idol. The scandal then, accrueing by them, was only per accidens; and yet they were by the Apostles advise to be forborn, if such scandal were likely to ensue upon the use of them. But if any man say unto thee, this is offered in sacrifice unto Idols, eat not for his sake that showed it, and for conscience 〈◊〉, 1 Cor. 10. 28. Here we have a general rule, together with three limitations thereof. First, a general rule: if any man imagine evil, and sin to be in an indifferent action, and 〈◊〉 be scandalised, that action is to be abstained from; if any man say unto thee, this is offered in sacrifice unto Idols, 〈◊〉 not, for his sak that showed it. But now here are couched three exceptions. First, we are not bound to abstain from things indifferent, unless the scandal consequent be probable; if any man say unto you, this is offered in sacrifice unto Idols etc. if he say nothing, but 〈◊〉, there his opinion, and dislike in his own breast, we may be guiltless and blameless. And indeed, if we are to forbear all indifferent things, in which there is only a mere possibility of scandal, we should be at an utter loss, and uncertainty in our actings in things indifferent, and never know what to do, we are obliged then to abstain from things indifferent, only in the case of (q) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 circumstantiis ctus inordinatus unius non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ut 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 occasio 〈◊〉, non 〈◊〉 peccatum scandali, nec 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉, ut 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Bannes hic art 4. in fine. Name 〈◊〉 nonpotest quis censeri 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ruinae alterius. Gregor. de 〈◊〉 tem. 3. q. 18. punct. 2. scandal probable, and not in the case of scandal 〈◊〉 possible, and so much is observed by Calvin upon the 1 〈◊〉: 8. 13. Deinde 〈◊〉 jubet nos Paulus divinare 〈◊〉 offendiculo futurum sit quod facimus, nisi cum est praesens periculum. A second exception is; that we are not required to abstain from things indifferent, in which our weak brethren imagine that there is evil and sin, and thereupon are scandalised, unless they have some probable ground for their imagination: for though the eating of the Idolothytes at a private feast was not an action in itself scandalous, or nductive unto sin; as being free from both sin, and all real appearance of it, yet the Corinthians scandalised hereat had a probable ground why they conceived it to be unlawful and sinful, the late moral or religious 〈◊〉 n that the Idolothytes had unto an Idol: this is off red in sacrifice unto Idols; Mr Rutherford [in his treatise of scandal pag. 53, 54.] expresseth this limitation as followeth; we read not of scandals culpable in God's word, but there be some moral reasons in them; and 〈◊〉 applieth it unto the offence, that is taken, at tolling of bells, at a ministers gown, when he preacheth: there is no apparent moral reason why the tolling of a Bell, or a ministers gown should scandalise; for they are of mere civil use, and have no moral influence in the worship; for the same tolling of bells is, and may be used to convocate the people to a Baron Court to hear a declamation, to convocate soldiers. This exception, that I have laid down, is, I conceive, grounded, as upon what the Apostle saith; so also upon the reality, and truth of our Christian liberty in things indifferent, which otherwise would signify nothing; for if we are to abstain from all indifferent things, in which another without probable ground imagineth that there is sin; the servitude of Christians under the Gospel would be far greater, and more intolerable, then that of the 〈◊〉 under the mosaical administration. A third exception; which we may gather hence, is, in great part, coincident with the first, and 'tis; that the abstinence unto which we are obliged, in things indifferent, in the case of scandal, is not universal, and total, but limited ad hic & nunc, those times, and places in which there is danger, or likelihood of scandal: the Corinthians were, in their private feasts, to forbear eating Idolothytes, only in the presence of persons apt to be scandalised, and might elsewhere use 〈◊〉 liberty without regret of Conscience. Unto these exceptions insinuated here by the Apostle we may add divers others; of which, some may be collected from what we above said touching the scandal of the wicked in things indifferent mutatis mutandis, and by and by I shall add others; but first I shall examine some restrictions, which I gave in a former edition of this book. Former Edition. But now, if the action in which this appcarance of evil is supposed to be, be but indifferent, than these two following things must be 〈◊〉. First, whether, or no it be annexed with a necessary duty, or not? Secondly, whether or no it be undertermined, left to our own liberty and choice, or else by authority either Economical, Political, or Ecclesiastical? If it be annexed to a necessary duty, we must not omit this, to abstain from that: So to fly the shadow of sin, we should 〈◊〉 the body of sin, a sin really so, a sin of omission; for what is not good, if to omit a duty be not bad? Good must not be left undone, though evil per accidens come from it, much 〈◊〉, when only an appearance of evil is joined to it. We must not then shun the Lords table, because some weaker judgements have imagined in the act of kneeling, a show of Idolatry. So to avoid but an imaginary appearance of evil unto men, we shall 〈◊〉 indeed unto God to be evil. A Minister must not neglect the discharge of his duty, because some have supposed a show of superstition in some harmless ceremonies annexed to its performance. So, to avoid men's unjust censures, he should incur a just woe and curse from God: woe be to me (saith the Apostle) if I preach not the Gospel. Answer. This first limitation I borrowed from Dr 〈◊〉 upon the text: for the examination of it we must distinguish of humane Ceremonies; they are of two sorts, Circumstantial, or Doctrinal. First, circumstantial, such are the Circumstances of time or place, matters of order, decency, and the like. Now these are necessary in the general, and the particulars may be determined by the Magistrate, or Church-officers v. g. that the public assemblies be at such a convenient time of the day, in such a place, and that they be convocated by tolling of bells; that the Minister officiate in a grave habit, gown, cloak, or coat, etc. Now though some of these may be by some causelessly imagined to be evil; yet they are not therefore to be forborn, if they be by lawful command of the Magistrate, or Church, to be annexed with necessary duties; for necessary duties are not to be omitted for mere circumstances connexed with their performance. Thus we are not to forsake, or refrain our public assemblies, because some think there is some superstition in the places of them, our Churches, and the Convocation of them by bells, upon this ground, that both our Churches and bells have been abused by Papists. Dr Heylin [in a former edition of his Geography] relates this following story of Peter Du Moulin; that hearing how divers English Ministers scrupled to officiate in a Surplice, he said, that he would willingly preach at Paris in a fool's coat, if leave could not be gotten of the King, upon any other condition. If this great light of France ever dropped such words, he had in them doubtless a very good, devout, and zealous meaning; but yet (under correction) I cannot see how his resolution can be accorded with that rule of the Apostle; Let all things be done decently; for it cannot as yet sink into my foolish head, how that a fool's coat is a decent garment to preach in. But this on the buy. To proceed unto a second sort of Ceremonies, which we may call, for distinction sake, humane, Doctrinal, 〈◊〉; such as men institute, by their moral signification, to teach, v. g. the Cross, Surplice &c: if these might lawfully, by any humane authority whatsoever, be unavoidably annexed with necessary duties, we should then soon resolve, that we are not then to abstain from them; but the non-conformists ever held that no mortal wight whatsoever could lawfully urge, or press the unavoidable connexion of such Ceremonies with necessary duties; and indeed they have very good reason against the Command of such a connexion; because it would have been against religion, and against charity. First, against religion: they never granted them (as is still supposed) to be indifferent, but always arraigned them as guilty of superstition, and will-worship; and so, manifest 〈◊〉 against the second commandment, presumptuous additions unto the word, and ordinances of our Lord Jesus Christ, a setting of man's threshold by God's threshold, and their posts by God's posts, Ezek. 43. 8. and the justice of their accusation will be soon confessed by all learned, and unprejudiced men, that will with patience, and impartiality read the reenforcement of their arguments by Parker, Didoclave, and Aims against all answers and replies whatsoever. The Prelates connexing of humane symbolical ceremonies with duties and ordinances that are necessary, and commanded by the word of God, brings into my mind an artifice of Julian the Apostate: in the market places of Cities, he set up his own image, with the Essigies of the gods of the Heathen pictured round about, to the end, that whosoever should do civil reverence to the Emperor's Image, might also seem to worship the gods of the Gentiles: and by the contrary, they who would not bow to the Gods of the Gentiles, might seem also to refuse all due 〈◊〉 to the Emperor. Thus the Prelates, of their own heads, most presumptuously have set up in God's worship, and service, their own inventions, and have commanded them to be joined with the ordinances of Christ: so that hereby they drove many conscientious Ministers into a great strait, if, out of a loathness to lose the exercise of their Ministry, they conformed unto their Ceremonies, this they interpreted to be an approbation os them; and, if to avoid their Ceremonies, they did forbear to baptise, to administer the Lords supper etc. then they accused them for neglect, and contempt of God's Ordinances. Secondly, it was against charity for the Prelates, so rigidly, and peremptorily to press their paltry Ceremonies, as that unless men observed them they would not suffer them, by their good wills, to enjoy the precious Ordinances of Christ Jesus; and this can reasonably be denied by none, who think, that the souls of men may be damnified by the want of such ordinances: But to proceed unto a second restriction in the former edition. Former Edition. If we are not, secondly, nostri juris, but restrained; and determined by authority, we must 〈◊〉 disobey that to 〈◊〉 Brother; transgress duty, to express charity: So to please men, we should displease God. So we should do evil, that good might come thereof. When the Obligation of two precepts 〈◊〉 lieth upon us at the same time, and impossible for both to be at once obeyed, in such a case, because there is no clashing between God's 〈◊〉, neither doth God by them impose upon his creatures any necessity of sinning, therefore one of 〈◊〉 precepts must give place unto the other; to wit, that which 〈◊〉 a less duty, unto that which prescribes a more weighty and pressing one. Now the 〈◊〉 of Justice (as a learned Inconformitant, even Amesius himself, med: 〈◊〉. lib. 2. cap. 16. §. 62, 63, will tell us) are of stricter obligation 〈◊〉 those of charity. We are more bound to pay our debts then to distribute Alms. He that hath trespassed against another, is more strictly 〈◊〉 to sue for reconciliation, than the party who hath received the injury. Now to hinder the scandal of the weak, is a duty of Charity; to obey the lawful commands of authority, a duty of justice; and therefore of the greater obligation and 〈◊〉, unto it then the other must give place. I would have traveled farther in this argument, but that I am anticipated by the learned, and 〈◊〉 Professors of 〈◊〉 in their Duplies to the second answers of the Covenanting ministers, who from pag. 65. unto 75. have 〈◊〉 discussed this very question, whether the precept of obedience to Superiors, or the precept of eschewing scandal be more obligatory, and have there proved by many unanswerable arguments, that the former precept, that of obedience to Superiors is of the twain more Obligatory. Those than that desire larger satisfaction concerning this matter, I shall 〈◊〉 unto the perusal of them. How ever in the mean while 〈◊〉 it not be thought troublesome, if I insert, what I judge in them, if not most, yet very remarkable. 'Tis this, Debitum obedientiae, the debt of obedience, which we owe unto superiors, is (say they pa: 74) not only debitum morale, a debt or duty unto which we are tied by moral honesty, and God's Commandment: but also debitum legale, or debitum justitiae, (quoth viz: fundatur in proprio jure alterius) a a debt grounded upon the true and proper right which our Superiors have to exact this duty of us, so that they may accuse us of injury, and censure us, if we perform it not. There is a great difference betwixt these two sorts of debts, & the last is far more obligatory than the first; as for example: A man oweth 〈◊〉 to the poor by a moral debt, but to his Creditor he oweth them by legal debt, or debt of justice: and therefore he is more strictly obliged to pay his creditor, than to give alms. So by moral honesty, and Gods precepts also, a man oweth to his neighbour a pious car fullness to hinder sin in him, by admonition, instruction, good example, and by omission, even of things lawful, when he forseeth that his neighbour, in respect of his weakness will be scandalised by them. But his neighbour hath not such a right to exact these things of him, neither can he have action against him for not performing of them, as our lawful superiors have, for our due obedience. Thus they. Hence then may we shape an answer unto that same frequent clamour of some tumultuous spirits, that our 〈◊〉 for sooth, is wondrous offensive to many of our weak brethren. First, suppose it be so, better they without thy fault be offended, scandalised at thee, than that the Magistrate be with thy fault disobeyed by thee. It is no safe course to provide for the peace of thy brother's conscience, by wounding thine own with the sin of disobedience against authority, to which for conscience sake thou 〈◊〉 to yield subjection: we must not, to comply with men's humours, resist the ordinance of God, despise the voice of the Church, rather than a weak brother should be offended, scandalized: we may, and sometimes must part with our own right; but we ought not to rob the 〈◊〉 of hers, by 〈◊〉 her of her power, by denying her our obedience. Nay farther, I confess that rather than a weak brother should be scandalised, we may pro hic & nunc in some particular times and places, pretermit what superiors prescribe, provided they take no distaste thereat, and others by our example be not encouraged to contemn their persons, callings, commands: for so a greater and more pernicious scandal will be incurred, than was declined. But we are not upon occurrence of any scandal whatsoever, taken by whomsoever, either absolutely to deny, and utterly refuse obedience to the lawful injunctions of our public governor's, whether temporal, or ecclesiastical: or so much as contemptuously and scandalously for a while omit the practice of what they enjoin. And omission of what they require, is than contemptuous, when they 〈◊〉 urge the practice of it, then scandalous when it heartens others to a contempt of their authority. To grant any of these lawful, what were it, alas! but to licence confusion both in Church and 〈◊〉? Secondly, I demand whether or no the offence given to, or taken by a Magistrate, who is a brother, and withal a magistrate, be not greater than that which is given to, or taken by one, who is only a brother? An impartial Judge will soon determine, that the double relation of brother and magistrate, weigheth down the single and naked relation of a brother. Howsoever I am sure, that the whole exceeds the parts severally considered: the relation of mother exacts more at our hands than that of brother, and therefore, in warding a blow from my brother, I am to take care, that thereby the same stroke light not upon the head of my mother the Church. Whereupon, as Paul exhorts to give none offence, neither to Jew, nor Gentile, so he (r) Bishop 〈◊〉. adds in a further specialty nor to the Church of God, 1 Cor. 10. 37. The Jews and Gentiles were but parts, the Church of God the whole, they but brethren, she the mother. (s) Si 〈◊〉 sit vel pusillum quempiam scandalizare, & praestiterit alligata collo mola 〈◊〉 demergi quempiam in profundum, Taris quamscan dalizare unum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: 〈◊〉 est horrendum 〈◊〉 & quam atroci supplicio vindicandum scandalizare eos, quorum unius offensio magis 〈◊〉 quam aliorom multorum, etc. Forbesius 〈◊〉. pag 405. If then it were better to be thrown into the bottom of the sea, with a millstone about ones neck than to offend a little one, a poor and illiterate artisan, what expression shall we then find answerable to the heinousness of a scandal given to a pious Magistrate, to a religious Prince, to a Parliament, and Convocation, to a whole Church and Commonwealth? Examination. First, it cannot be denied, but that divers indifferent things may be hic & nunc of such weight, and moment, of such necessity, or at least expediency, and conveniency, as that the just commands of our lawful superiors may render them our duty, and omission of them would be sinful: of subjection unto such commands the Apostle speaks, Rom. 13. 5. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. Where by wrath is understood Metonymically punishment: we are therefore to obey the Commands of the Magistrate, not only for fear of punishment, but also for fear of sin: lest we wound the Conscience with transgression of the fifth Commandment. To assert the contrary, (that 'tis not a sinful disobedience to violate the Commands of Superiors concerning some things indifferent in their general nature,) tends apertly to the dissolving of all government, and stocks up the authority of Magistrates, and masters of families by the very roots. Secondly, 'tis as unquestionable, that all omissions of what is commanded by humane laws are not sins, unless they be out of contempt of authority: for First; otherwise (as (t) Aliae leges humanae, quia possunt esse vel justae vel injustae, idque ratione efficientis, materiae, formae, finis, & hujus aut illius subjecti, vel adjuncti; idcirco non ità simpli citèr aligant, ut earum quaelibet violatio culpam lethalem inducat. Si enim sic esset, tum quot sunt leges, tot essent laquei anima. rum, & qui sub legibus vivunt, pluribus multo peccatis essent obnoxii, quam qui in barbaris gentibus, vel absque legibus, vel cum paucissimis transigunt vitam. Ames. de Consc. cas. lib. 5. cap. 24. Num. 22. Ames rightly says) as many laws as there were, so many snares for souls there were, and they that live under laws, should be subject to many more sins, than they who live among barbarous people, either quite without laws, or with but a few. Secondly, there be divers laws, that be (u) Multae leges sunt purè 〈◊〉, ita ut ipsis plane satis fiat, si 〈◊〉 solvatur. Rat. 1. Quia legis 〈◊〉 est deterrere homines à communi & frequenti usu hujus áut illius rei, ad quem finem sufficit constitutio poenae. 2. In talibus etiam legibus est tacita conventio & pactum, de poena ferenda si contra fiat: Contra leges autem conventionales, aut sub conditione latas, venire quis potest absque peccato. 3. De talibus legibus, intelligentes homines nunquam faciunt scrupulum conscientiae, si absit contemptus, scandalum, & notabile damhum. Tales sunt leges de non 〈◊〉, de non piscando, de volucribus aut feris non capiendis, de non utendo hoc aut illo genere vestium, ciborum etc. num. 28. purely penal, and the intent of such laws is satisfied, when one patiently submits unto the punishment inflicted for the breach of them; such are several laws of our Land putting restraints upon some men in fouling, fishing, hunting, and the like: as also that statute, which prohibited the eating of flesh, at such times upon politic respects, for the breed, and increase of cattle, as also for the encouragement of fishing, Now no man can reasonably hold, that every breach of such laws is a sin, especially when 'tis not contemptuous, and scandalous: I put in that limitation, because contempt of authority, and scandal unto others will make a very small, and otherwise inconsiderable violation of a mere penal law, to be a very heinous sin. Thirdly, the omission of what is commanded by humane laws is in many cases (w) Obligatio legis non potest extendi ultra intentionem, & mentem 〈◊〉, eamque justam. Praesumend umautem est nullum hominem velle su. os subditos ad 〈◊〉 teatum & damnationem obligate, propter quemlibet suae voluntatis neglectum. Into si in aliquo casu magnum damnum, scandalum, aut 〈◊〉 modum ex observatione quarundam legum secuturum esset, praesumitur non intendisse legislatorem, ut in illo casu observaretur. agreeable unto the presumptive will of a just magistrate. It is to be presumed, that if he knew the cases, he would tolerate the omission, and therefore such a bare omission would not be a sin: Of this Ames speaks very well: the obligation, saith he, of a Law, must not be stretched beyond the just intention, and mind of the lawgiver, but it is to be presumed, that no man would oblige his Subjects to a mortal guilt, and utter damnation, for every neglect of his will and pleasure. Nay if in some case, the Law cannot possibly be observed, but some great damage, scandal, or inconvenience, must needs follow, it is to be presumed, that the Lawgiver never intended that the Law in such a case should be observed. We would reckon him a very cruel Magistrate that should be implacably angry at a sick man for eating flesh in a time of Lent, and can we think then, that there was any such thing as Christian pity and commiseration in the breasts of those men whom nothing could atone for the omission of the Cross, Surplice, & c? while they scandalised, that is destroyed, the immortal souls of many for whom Christ died. Suppose the greatest Monarch upon the face of the earth should command the meanest, and lowest of his slaves upon some important affair to ride post through such a City, without any of the least stay or diversion, and then it should happen, that a company of little children should be playing in the streets; can this slave think, that he is obliged to ride over them? Nay, unless we imagine his Master to be a most bloody Tyrant, we must needs think, that he will be highly displeased at so horrid a cruelty; and can any man than make any tolerable apology for the tyranny Ames. de Con. lib. 5. cap. 24. 〈◊〉. 22. of our late Prelates, who commanded all to drive on with a furious career in the course of conformity, without any the least stop, though hereby were hazarded a world of souls, purchased at no lower a rate than the divine blood of our blessed Saviour? It is the will and pleasure of the King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, that matters commanded by his affirmative precepts should be, for a while, forborn, in case of the likelihood of scandal consequent; but these men (in imitation of him that exalted himself above all that is called God 2 Thes. 2. 4.) could not be persuaded to dispense with a temporary forbearance of any ceremonies they enjoined: though they well foresaw, that the sequel of them was likely to be a very great, and spreading scandal. But now the non-conformists might spare all this discourse touching the obligation of humane laws in general: because they hold that humane, religious, Doctrinal Ceremonies the matter in question, cannot be lawfully determined by the authority of either Political, or Ecclesiastical superiors: and for this they have two, as I take it, very convincing arguments. First, because all such Ceremonies are Saucy additions unto the word, and ordinances of God, Deut. 4. 2. and cap. 12. 32. strange fire which the Lord commanded not, Leu. 10. 8. Secondly, because suppose they be indifferent (which was a thing never granted) yet they are unnecessary toys, and trifles: and therefore it is not lawful for our superiors to command them, when, from the practice of them, it is very probable, that scandal will arise. For First, every power is the Minister of God to thee for good, Rom. 13. 4 the power of the Magistrate is like that of the Minister, only for edification, and not destruction, 2 Cor. 10. 8. and cap. 13. 10. but now if he should have power to command humane symbolical Ceremonies (that may be well spared in God's worship and service) whenthere is likelihood of the consecution of Scandal: then he should have power to do mischief, to enjoin things hurtful, and destructive unto the souls of men. Secondly, our Saviour's commination against scandal, Matth. 18. 7. (Woe to that man by whom the offence cometh,) reacheth Magistrates, as well as private persons: and we may say the same of the Apostolical prohibitions of scandal both to the Romans, and the Corinthians, Rom. 14. 13, 15, 20, 21. 1 Cor. 8. 9 and chap. 10. 32. Unto these prohibitions add we Paul's resolution to avoid scandal arising from the use of things indifferent: if meat make my brother to offend (saith he) I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend, 1 Cor. 8. 13. For From this resolution the unlawfulness of the injunction of such ceremonies as ours will undeniably follow. To clear this I shall presuppose that, which cannot (with any colour of reason) be denied: to wit, that, that, which Paul held unlawful for himself to practise in his own person upon a general account belonging to all Christians, could not by him be lawfully imposed upon others by an Ecclesiastical Canon; but now Paul held it unlawful to eat flesh in case of scandal probably consequent, and this was upon a general reason belonging to all Christians: and therefore he thought it utterly unlawsull to impose any such matter upon others when scandal was likely to follow. From this thus premised, I shall hence thus argue Syllogistically, against our Prelate's imposition of our Ceremonies. If it were unlawful for Paul to impose upon the Corinthians such ceremonies as ours, than it was unlawful for our Prelates to impose such upon us. But it was unlawful for Paul to impose such Ceremonies as ours upon the Corinthians. Therefore it was unlawful for the Prelates to impose such Ceremonies upon us. The sequel of the major is evident: because the Prelates could not pretend unto so much authority in matters Ecclesiastical as Paul had: for in each of the Apostles there was a greater 〈◊〉 of jurisdiction then in any that succeeded them. As for the Minor that may be confirmed by this following Syllogism. If it were unlawful for Paul to impose upon the Corinthians the eating of flesh when scandal was likely to ensue, than it was unlawful for him to impose upon them the use of such Ceremonies as ours. But the former appeareth to be unlawful by the 1 Cor. 8. 13. Therefore the latter was unlawful also. There is nothing here can be questioned but the Major, and that is easily confirmed from a just comparison of flesh with such Ceremonies as ours. First, the eating of flesh was undoubtedly a thing more clearly indifferent, than the practice of such Ceremonies of ours. Secondly, flesh was necessary unto the maintenance of the life of man by disjunction: that is, flesh, or some other meat: but now such Ceremonies as ours are not necessary unto the worship and service of God by disjunction: for God may be worshipped without them, or any others in their stead: a surplice (saith Rutherford) is not necessary by way of disjunction, for neither is surplice necessary, nor any other white or red habit, that hath some mystical signification, like unto Surplice: So kneeling to the elements is neither necessary, nor any the like religious honouring of them by prostration before them, or kissing them. But against this accusation of our Ceremonies for scandal there are objected two Comparisons. First, of the duties of justice and Charity together: the duties of justice are more obligatory than the duties of charity, as being not only a moral, but a legal debt: Now to hinder the scandal of the weak is a duty of charity, only a moral debt, to obey the lawful command of authority in things indifferent a duty of justice, a legal debt; and therefore of the greater obligation, and moment: I shall the rather insist on this argument, because it is of late so much stood on by Dr Sanderson [in his last Sermons printed 1656. pag. 249.] where we are not (saith he) able to discharge both: debts of justice are to be paid (saith he) before bebts of charity. Now the duty of obedience is debitum justitiae, and a matter of right: my superior may challenge it at my hands as his due; and I do him wrong, if I withhold it from him. But the care of not giving offence is but debitum charitatis, and a matter of but courtesy. I am to perform it to my brother in love, when I see cause: but he cannot challenge it from me as his right, nor can justly say I do him wrong, if I neglect it. It is therefore no more lawful for me to disobey the lawful command of a superior, to prevent thereby the offence of one or a few brethren, than it is lawful for me to do one man wrong, to do another man a courtesy withal, or then it is lawful for me to rob the Exchequer to relieve an Hospital. (x) Quis est, qui dicat, ut habeamus quod demus pauperibus, faciamus furta divitibus? August. 〈◊〉. For answer: First, if this argument be applied unto our Ceremonies there will be in such application a mere begging of the question; for that our Ceremonies were things indifferent, the command of them lawful, the practice of them a duty of justice, a legal debt, is the main thing in controversy betwixt the conformists, Mendac. cap. 7. and non-conformists; and therefore all this should be proved, and not barely presupposed as it is. But Secondly, the fore mentioned rule is to be understood with this limitation, caeteris paribus, if the terms of the comparison be equal: and equal they are not, when the minims of justice are put into the balance with the weightiest duties of charity: and so 'tis in the present comparison, though we suppose our Ceremonies to be indifferent, and the practice of them a duty of justice: for of what importance is such practice in comparison of the not scandalising of our Brother? Who, that is not extremely transported with prejudice, will think, that the commands of the Prelates to wear the surplice, to sign children with the sign of the Cross in Baptism etc. carry any tolerable proportion with those precepts of the Apostle, destroy not him with thy meat, thy indifferencies, for whom Christ died; for such things destroy not the work of God? Rom. 14. 15, 20. What laws, of any earthly wight whatsoever, concerning ceremonies, can be more obligatory, than the Commands of God touching the externals of his worship and service? and yet it is his will, and pleasure, that these externals of his worship should be laid aside for the performance of outward works of mercy? I will have mercy and not sacrifice, Matth. 12. 7. Thus are we to leave our prayers, both public, and private, to forsake a Sermon, for to save the life 〈◊〉 our neighbours, to quench the firing of his house, to help his cattle out of the ditch: now, if the sacred Ordinances of God are to give way unto works of mercy unto the bodies of men, surely then much more is the trash of humane inventions to yield unto a work of mercy towards the souls of men: This answer which I now give was made by 〈◊〉 in his dispute of scandal unto the Duplies of the Doctors of Aberdeen pa. 50, 51, 52, 53. his discourse there is so satisfactory, as that I have thought fit to transcribe what he says; and I hope the reading of it will not be irksome unto the Reader. It is true these duties which we owe to others by way of justice, are more obligatory than those, which we owe only by way of charity, caeteris paribus: 〈◊〉 duties of the Law of nature, and moral Law, are compared together, then indeed the duties, which we owe both by the tye of justice and charity, are more obligatory than the duties that 〈◊〉 owe only by the tye of charity. As for example, My Father is in danger before mine eyes to be drowned, in one 〈◊〉 water, and before my 〈◊〉 also my neighbour or friend is in danger of the like kind: the two 〈◊〉 and bands of justice and charity, both by the fifth and sixth Commandments, are more obligatory, hic & nunc, and do more strictly oblige, that I run to succour and preserve the life of my Father, than the life of my neighbour: for the obligation to my neighbour, is only Charity, by the obligation of the sixth Commandment, which obligation ceaseth, hic & nunc, at this time, when my father's life is in hazard: and thus far the Doctor's argument goeth for strong, as Schoolmen, Casuists, and Divines teach. But it is not to a purpose for the Doctors: for all offices and duties generally, and universally, of what ever kind, which we owe by way of Justice, are not more obligatory, than duties which we owe only by way of charity: as when duties of a positive commandment of God, 〈◊〉 by our superiors, and duties which we owe by charity only, are compared together, than the Doctor's Major proposition is not clear of itself, as they dream, neither do Casuists, or Amesius, or Divines say with them; but truth, and all our Divines say against them. Let us suppose that the King, and Convocation, and Assembly of Priests and Prophets of Israel make a Canon according to God's word. That no manner of man presume to eat shewbread, save the Priests only. All men owe obedience to this, both because it is Gods express Law, and by the band of Justice the 〈◊〉 and assembly of the Ancients have forbidden it. But if our Doctor's argument st and strong, David at the point and hazard of famishing for hunger, sinned in eating shewbread, yet Christ acquitteth him of all sin, and saith Matth. 12. 5. he and his followers are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, blameless. Now David was under a duty by mercy, and love to his own life, and the lives of his followers, to eat show bread, and he was under the band of Justice, by the Law of the Ancients of Israel, and God's law, not to eat. Therefore in some cases when our superiors commandments are only positive Laws, they are not more obligatory, than duties of Charity, only commanded in the Law of nature. I clear it further thus, I see my neighbour in danger before my eyes of drowning, and my father commandeth me to go and labour, or sow his farm in that time, while I am to preserve the life of my neighbour, in present danger, to lose his life in a great water. By the Doctor's maxim, I am under the higher obligatory tie of Justice, to obey my father, who commandeth a thing both lawful and necessary, by virtue of the higher commandment, to wit the first of the second Table, than I am obliged by the sixth Commandment, and of charity only, to give present succour and help to my dying neighbour, so I must let my neighbour die in the waters, to give a duty of Justice to my father of far less necessity. I would not commit my Conscience to such Casuists, as are the Doctors of Aberdeen. But if the Doctors would see with some new light of reason; it is clear that not only, the tye of justice maketh the precept more obligatory, but also the 〈◊〉 of the thing commanded; yea, and if the positive Commandments of the Lord our God, who of Justice, and Kingly sovereignty hath right to ask obedience of us above all earthly Superiors, do yield and cede as less obligatory, than commandments of love only, that are commanded in the Law of nature. What do our Doctor's clatter and fable to us of a right of Justice, that mortal Rulers have to command in things indifferent, from which the destruction of souls doth arise? for these commandments of Rulers, (Kneel religiously before bread, the 〈◊〉 image of Christ crucified) (keep humane holy days) (Cross the air with your thumb above a baptised infants face) at best, are but positive Commandments, not warranted by God's word. But shall they be more obligatory by a supposed band of Justice that Prelates have over us to command such toys, than this divine Law of God, and Nature, Rom. 14. For indifferent days, meats, surpsice, 〈◊〉 not him for whom Christ died? All the Casuists and Schoolmen, Navarra, Sylvester, Sanchez, Raphael dela Torre, Meratius, Duvallius, Thomas, Scotus, Bonaventura, Suarez, Uasquez, Greg: de valentia, Albertus, Richardus, Biel, Corduba, Angelus, Adrianus, Alphonsus, Becanus, Yea, and all the host of our Divines cry with Scripture, that mercy and the precepts of love, and of the Law of nature are more obligatory, than sacrifice, burnt offerings, and Gods own positive Laws, yea, and that positive Laws lose their obligatory power, and cease to be laws, when the laws of nature and necessary duties of mercy, and love (as not to murder our brother) (not to scandalise) standeth in their way. I might weary the Reader here with citations, and be wilder myself also, but it is a point of Divinity denied by none at all. 3. What we owe of Justice to our Superiors, is indeed both a moral debt of obedience, and a debt of Justice and law, which Rulers may seek by their place, and exjure, as Aristotle saith, but this right is limited: Rulers have no right to seek absolute obedience, but only in the Lord, not against charity. And though the place of Rulers be authoritative, yet their commanding power, as touching the matter of what they enjoin is only 〈◊〉, and they cannot but in God's place exact, that which is God's due, and seeing God himself, if he should immediately in his own person Command, he would not urge a positive commandment, sarrè less the commandment of light and vain Ceremonies, against and beyond the precept of love, not to destroy a soul for whom Christ died. Ergò, Superiors under God, who borrow all their light from God, cannot have a higher right, than God hath. 4. The comparison of a man who oweth 〈◊〉 to a Creditor, and oweth monies to the poor, is close off the way, sor he is obliged to pay the Creditor first; but the case 〈◊〉 is far otherwise; the debt of practising indifferent seathers, and straws, such as 〈◊〉, crossing, wearing Surplice, is neither like the dept owen to the poor, nor to the Creditor; For nature's Law, and God's word, 1. Cor. 10. 18. 19 maketh the Non-practise, non-murthering obedience to God, when the practice of indifferent things is a soul stumbling to the weak, and the practising is but at ' its best obedience to a positive Law, and aught to stoop, and go off the way, and disappear, when nature's Law (murder not) doth come in ' its way. When the Doctors put Loyalty above Charity, they suppose obedience to Commandments commanding scandalising of soulès to be loyalty to Superiors; which is questioned, it being treason to the sovereign of Heaven, and Earth, to destroy his Image, it is taken as loyalty by our Doctors, but not proven to be loyalty, and so a vain question here, whether Loyalty be above Charity or not. This dispute of scandal is annexed unto his divine right of Church Government, which was published 1646. since that Dr. Sanderson 1656 (as I showed you but now) propounds the argument a new, with a great deal of triumph, but without any considerable reinforcement; and withal he takes no notice of Rutherford, his answer, from whence I gather that he never read it: and indeed it is a thing very incident unto the greatest Scholars of that party to censure, but never to read their adversaries. Thirdly, to say something unto Dr. Sanderson as well as unto the Duplyers, I must needs confess, that I am transported with a just admiration, that so great a scholar should so extenuate, as he doth, the guilt of an active scandal; for he makes the care of not giving offence to a brother to be a matter but of courtesy; he cannot, (saith he) justly say I do him wrong, if I neglect it: But first, the Apostle Paul speaks another language, in his account to make brethren to offend is to sin against them, to wound their weak consciences, and so to sin against Christ 1 Cor. 8. 12. Compared with ver. 11. 13. and Rom. 14. 15. 20. he resolves, that 'tis a destroying of a brother for whom Christ died, a destroying of the work of God in him: whereupon Divines generally determine, that 'tis soule-murther: Now, in wounding the weak conscience of our brother, in murdering his immortal soul, there is doubtless some wrong committed against him: not to destroy him for whom Christ died etc. is more than a matter of mere courtesy unto him. Secondly, suppose the care of not giving offence be, in respect of our brother, but debitum charitatis; yet in regard of God 'tis 〈◊〉 justitiae, a legal debt: he may, and doth challenge it as due, and we do him wrong if we disobey him. Our Saviour thundereth a woe against such disobedience; Woe to him through whom offences come, Luk. 17. 1. and in the second verse this woe is aggravated by comparison with a very grievous punishment, it were better for him that a Millstone were hanged about his neck, and he cast into the sea, then that he should offend one of these little ones. But to proceed'unto the second comparison on which I insisted out of Bishop Morton and Dr Sanderson: a Comparison betwixt a scandal given to a Magistrate, and a scandal given to one, who is only a brother: I demand whether or no the offence given to, or taken by a Magistrate, who is a brother, and withal a Magistrate be not greater, than that which is given to, or taken by one, who is only a brother? an impartial Judge will soon determine that the double relation of brother, and Magistrate weigheth down the single, and naked relation of a brother etc. ut suprà. For answer unto this, distinguish we of a twofold acception of scandal, Primary, and Secundary. First, Primary, and so 'tis an occasioning culpably the fall of another into sin. Secondly, Secundary, and so 'tis only the angering, vexing, displeasing of another. This distinction premised; the comparison may be understood; either of the scandal of a Magistrate in a secundary acception, with a scandal of one, who is only a brother in a secundary acception of the word too; or else of the scandal of a Magistrate in a secundary acception with the scandal of a brother in a primary acception; or 3. of the scandal of a Magistrate in a primary acception with the scandal of a brother in a primary acception also. First; if the Comparison be on both sides to be understood of scandal taken in a secondary sense, there is no doubt, but the scandal of the Magistrate is more dangerous, than that of one, who is only a brother: for the wrath of the supreme Magistrate is as the Messengers of death, Prov. 16. 14. as the roaring of a Lion, Prov. 19 12. In indifferent things than it will be our safest course to anger a brother, rather than to displease the Magistrate. But this acception of scandal is impertinent unto our purpose, and so much is confessed by Dr Hammond in his treatise of scandal pag: 23. To be angry, grieved, troubled, at any action of another, is not (to be offended) in the scripture sense, nor consequently doth it follow, that I have done a miss in doing that which another man is angry at, unless my action be in itself evil. The scandal we speak of is culpable; but to displease a magistrate is not always a sin: the mistake of scandal for the angering of one is taken notice of by Calvin also upon 1 Cor. 8. 13. having affirmed, that some corrupted the doctrine of scandal with foolish glosses, and others with their impious calumnies, he showeth the original of both their mistakes touching the meaning of offence in the Apostle. Utrique errant in verbo offendendi. Nam offendere accipiunt, pro incurrere in odium, vel effensionem hominum, aut quod idem ferè est, 〈◊〉 quodipsis displiceat, vel minus arrideat. Atqui clarissimè patet ex contextu, nihil esse aliud quam mulo exemplo tanquam obice fratrem impedire à recto cursu, aut illi praebere causam lapsus. Non ergo hic disput at Paulus de retinendâ hominum gratiâ, sed de sublevandis infirmis, nè 〈◊〉, & prudentèr regendis, nè à rectâ viâ deflectant. Secondly, if the comparison proceed of the scandal of the Magistrate in a secondary sense with the scandal of a brother in a primary sense, doubtless the scandal of a brother is more to be declined: it is far better to anger, and displease a pious Magistrate, a religious Prince, a Parliament, a whole Church, & Commonwealth, then culpably to occasion the fall of the meanest, poorest, and most illiterate artisan into sin: and this will be denied by none who know, that 'tis more dangerous to displease God, than man. Thirdly, if the comparison be to be understood of the scandal of the Magistrate in a primary acception with a scandal of a brother in a primary acception too: then I should think, that the scandal of the Magistrate is the greater, and more to be eschewed, it is a greater sin culpably to occasion the fall of the Magistrate into sin, than the fall of a mere brother: because the falls of Magistrates are of a more pernicious example, giving greater countenance, and encouragement unto sin. But this will no ways advantage our Sticklers for Ceremonies: for the non-conformists deny, that their forbearance of Ceremonies did culpably occasion the fall of the Magistrate into sin: and the contrary they expect to have proved and not barely dictated. One thing let me observe on the buy, before I pass on: and 'tis: that, if those who make this comparison of the scandal of a Magistrate with the scandal of a brother, take scandal on both sides in the primary acception thereof: then they seem to intimate, that there may be a case wherein a man may be necessitated culpably to occasion the fall, either of a Magistrate, or of a brother into sin: Of a Magistrate if he forbear what he commands, of a brother if he practise it: But this is not casus dabilis, for God by his providence, can never necessitate a man unto sin: of this Rutherford speaks very solidly in his resutation of the Dupliers pag. 41, 42. You shall (saith he unto them) be 〈◊〉 to give a case, wherein we are necessitated by God's providence, and that by way of contradiction, whether we forbear, or forbear not to murder either the souls of some weak ones, or the souls of superiors, by our 〈◊〉 of the practice of things judged expedient by superiors: You make us to murder the souls of Superiors, by the non-forbearance, or you will have us to murder the souls of weak brethren, if we practise. This is a wronging of providence, and a Manichean tenant, that we can be under such a necessity of sinning. Yea, there must be two contrary revealed Wills in God, Commanding, by forbearing the Ceremonies, not to murder Superiors, and commanding by not forbearing, not to murder weak brethren: and so God commandeth both to forbear and also not to forbear. Mr Tombs [in his treatise of scandalising p. 266, 267, 268.] quarrels with Ames, for affirming, that there can be no such perplexity, that it should be necessary for a Godly man, whether he do this or that, or not do it, to scandalise some one: But Dr Ames is to be understood of a scandal in the primary sense, a culpable occasioning the fall of another into sin: and the objections of Mr Tombs proceed only concerning scandal in a secundary acception thereof, as will be apparent unto any one, that will be pleased to peruse them. There be two things more I shall take notice of in my forementioned discourse. First, I suppose all along that the Convocation was our Mother, and the Church of England: but surely she was a step mother unto divers of the Godly, using towards them far more rigour, then unto such whom profaneness rendered obnoxious unto their Courts: if any indifferent man look upon their Canons he must needs confess, that one of their chief designs was to crush, and persecute such religious persons, whom they nicknamed Puritans, to 〈◊〉 with their Ceremonies such among them for whom Christ died. But I wonder upon what account, I, or any man else, could think it to be the Church of England. If in any sense it can be called the Church of England, it was because it represented the Ministry of England, and that it did not; because the far major part of it were Cathedral men, Bishops, Deans, Arch-Deacons, and such as were chosen by the respective Chapters of each Cathedral: it might then be a representation of the Cathedral Ministers, but not of the ministry of England: and that I shall make good by two parallels. The first shall be, betwixt our Convocations, and the Council of Trent: many sober, and moderate Papists accused this to be a packed assembly, a representation, of, not the Catholic Church, but the Court of Rome; because the greatest part of it were of the Pope's faction, and depended wholly upon him: So the Major part of our Convocations were of the Bishop's faction, and minded chiefly the interests of Cathedrals: and therefore were not a representative of all the Ministers in England. I shall exemplify this by instancing in the Diocese of bath, and Wells, wherein I lived: In this there were members of the lower house of Convocation, one Deane, three Archdeacon's, and one chosen by the Chapter of Wells: and to balance these there were but two Clerks chosen by the Ministry of the whole Diocese: Now what impartial man, but will determine that these seven could be no due representation of the Ministers of the Diocese of bath and Wells, as long as five of them were members of the Cathedral, in whose election the Ministers of the Diocese had no hand at all. A second parallel shall be betwixt our convocation, and a civil assembly: wherein we will suppose, that the Prince chooseth three hundred, who are his Courtiers, or else such as have their dependence, either wholly, or in great part upon him: and the nation choose only a hundred: you may call this assembly a Parliament, or what you will; but surely no rational man can think it to be a representation of the nation: and as irrational were it to call the Convocation a representation of the Ministers, of England, seeing those chosen by the Ministers were an inconsiderable part of the Convocation. And unto this we may add; that there was seldom a due, and regular choice made of the Clerks of the Convocation: I was present at the last election, that was at Wells: and then Bishop 〈◊〉 told us, that it was an unquestionable privilege due unto his See for him to propound unto us the Clerks that we should choose, unto which he expected our conformity, tacitly menacing all that dissented. And when yet, by all this violence, he was unlikely to carry it for such as he had nominated; why then, he had another shift, that was (I believe) never heard of before: he enabled the Pluralists, of whom either all, or most were his favourites, to voice it in several capacities: to give as many double voices, as they had dignities, and benefices: his Son gave at that time eight single voices, two as he was Archdeacon of Bath, two as he was Prebend of Cudworth, two as he was Parson of Bucklan-Mary, two as he was Vicar of Kingsbury: Now, to say that such an election was regular, and lawful is as ridiculous, and senseless, as if a man should say, that in the Choice of Knights of the Shire for Parliament, men may give as many double voices, as they have Farms and Livings. A second thing I shall take notice of, in the now mentioned discourse, is my misinterpretation of the 1 Cor. 10. 32. Upon which I thus descanted: as Paul exhorts to give none offence 〈◊〉 to Jew nor Gentile, so he adds in a further 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the Church of God: The Jews and Gentiles were but parts, the Church of God the whole, they but brethren, she the mother. Here was a gross mistake, in thinking, that the Jews and Gentiles here spoken of were members of the Church: whereas, by the Apostles distinction of them from the Church of God, it is plain, that they were not as yet converted unto the Christian faith, but were as yet enemies thereunto, and consequently strangers unto the Church: And thus having finished my examination of the two limitations that I gave in a former edition of this treatise. I shall go on to that which followeth. But suppose the action in which this appearance of evil is imagined to be as indifferent in it self, so also not annexed unto a necessary duty, and we also left to the use of our liberty, what then? Two things are here especially to be considered: first, the quality of the action expected at; secondly, the difference of times, and places. To begin with the first, the action (at which thy brother is scandalised, by his groundless imagination, that 'tis evil, or carrieth a real appearance of evil) is either of none, or great importance to thee. If it be of none importance, but weightless, as affording thee either none, or but small benefit: offend not thy brother by an unseasonable exercise of thy liberty. Know that as authority, so charity should also restrain it: consider that by this undue use of thy liberty thou sinnest against thy brother, and by sinning against him thou sinnest against Christ 1 Cor. 8. 12. But now if it be of some weight, and moment, as yielding thee some great profit, why thou must a while forbear it, until thy brother may be better informed; and to inform him that the action is lawful which offends him, thou must take care too, otherwise thou wilt prejudice the truth, through thy regardless silence, and also continue his weakness, and foment in him a negative superstition. Let every one of us, (saith the Apostle, Rom. 15. 2.) please his neighbour for his good unto edification, And for a man to humour his neighbour in an erroneous and superstitious opinion, however it may please him, yet not for his good unto edification: Upon which ground I take it, that the Apostle Paul, as he refused maintenance at Corinth, to avoid appearance of a covetous intention, and mercenary affection in preaching: so also his just title, and unquestionable right thereunto he at large both professeth, and proveth. But now if thy brother refuse, and contemn information: Tunc desinit esse scandalum pusilli ex 〈◊〉, aut simplici ignorantiâ, et incipit esse scandalum Pharisaei ex purâ malitiâ, aut ignorantiâ affectatâ, & crassâ. The shelter of weakness is thereby taken from him, his judgement being now overshadowed no longer with a mere weakness arising out of simple ignorance, but with a proud, and wayward, if not envious and malicious perverseness, that is accompanied with a gross, wilful, & affected ignorance, He is no longer then to be accounted a weak one, but a proud and wilful one, and for his peevishness thou mayest choose, whether thou wilt forgo thy liberty. Calvin upon the 1 Cor. 8. 13. tells us os some foolish interpreters, that leave unto Christians almost no use at all of things indifferent, upon pretext to avoid the offence of superstitious persons inepti sunt, inquit, qui nullum prope usum rerum indifferentium 〈◊〉 faciunt Christianis, nè superstitiosos offendant, And he discovers the ground of their mistake to be; because they do not consider, that Paul here inveigheth against those, who unseasonably abuse their knowledge before such weak ones, whom they neglect to inform, or instruct concerning the matter, at which they are scandalised: therefore there will be no place for reprehension if such information preceded, In hoc hallucinantur inquit, quod non 〈◊〉 Paulum hic invehi adversus 〈◊〉, qui scientiâ suâ intempestiuè abutuntur coram infirmis, quos docere negligunt. Ergò 〈◊〉 amplius locus non erit, si praecedat doctrina. Mr Tombs [in his treatise of scandalising, pag. 233, 234.] quotes Peter Martyr, and Bucane for the same purpose, and this what they say is 〈◊〉, ordinarily, or for the most part true; for if we are to forbear all our conveniences, and matters of expediency, when men are scandalised at them, after we have given them, or offered to give them full information; our Christian liberty in things indifferent would in these our times come to be just nothing: nay our servitude would be greater, and more unsupportable, than that of the Jews under the levitical Ceremonies. However yet information doth not always alter the nature of scandal; for the scandal of the weak may sometimes last, Postquam reddita est ratio facti, after a reason of the fact, whereat they are scandalised, is rendered to them. For, by reason of their extreme ignorance, and slowness of understanding, they may be utterly incapable of information, and instruction; or else some opinion, or practise, whereunto they have been long accustomed, may cast such a mist before their weak judgements, as that they may not be able presently to apprehend the reason that is given of the action, at which they stumble. And we should so far pity the simplicity of such poor souls, as to abstain from that which scandalizeth them, if by such abstinence there accrue not to us any great loss, or inconvenience. This is observed by Cajetan upon Aquinas 2. 2 daes. q. 43. art. 7. Ubi dicitur, inquit, articulo 7 more. de scandalo pusillorum, si autem 〈◊〉 redditam rationem hujusmodi scandalum duret, jam videtur ex malitiâ esse; adverto, quod author non assertivo verbo utitur, sed opinativo, dicendo, jam videtur ex malitiâ esse; potest siquidem contingere, quod pusilli non sint capaces rationis redditae, vel propter pristinam consuetudinem, quae facit apparere dissonum, quod veritati consonat, vel propter rationem apud eos magis apparentem, vel aliquod hujusmodi: & tunc quia malitia non facit scandalum, sed ignorantia vel infirmitas, quamvis reddita sit ratio, cessandum est ab hujusmodi spiritualibus non necessariis. Cajetan. in 2. 2. 0. 43. etc. Whereas it is said in the 7th article, touching the scandal of the weak, if after a reason given, the scandal do still remain, it seemeth to be of malice; you must note the Author doth not use (verbo assertivo, sed opinativo) saying, it seemeth to be of malice. For it may fall out that the weak are not capable of the reason that is rendered, either by reason of his former Custom, which maketh that to appear discordant with the truth, or for some reason which in his eyes is more apparent, or by reason of some such like cause, and then it is not out of malice that he is offended, but out of ignorance and infirmity. After Cajetan, Petrus de Lorica doth roundly and fully express the matter. Verum est (saith he) quoth Cajetanus advertit, scandalum pusillorum perseverare posse adhuc, postquam reddita est ratio facti, vel quia rationem non capiunt ob mentis tarditatem, vel ob consuetudinem diu firmatam: in quo casu docet Cajetanus 〈◊〉 esse actionem, ex quâ scandalum accipiunt; vel differendam, donec ad saniorem mentem venerint. Quòd solùm verum, si actio omitti potest 〈◊〉 jacturâ nostrae utilitatis. Si enim magna utilitas temporalis vel spiritualis interveniat, contemni potest scandalum pusillorum, postquam sufficienter admoniti sint. In the next place I will recite a limitation of Gregory de Valentia, that comes under this head, and is very remarkable. Having laid down a rule, that for avoiding the scandal of our neighbour, which springeth, either from his ignorance, or weakness, it behooveth us by the obligation of Charity, to do, or omit, that which may be done, or left undone without sin: he afterwards puts this exception. Est autem animadvertendum hanc regulam intelligi debere de omni eo, quod sine peccato fieri, aut omitti possit, non quom: docunque, sed moralitèr, attentâ suavitate, quae est in jugo legum divinarum: idest, quod sine peccato fieri, aut omitti possit, sine maxima etiam aliqua, & penè intolerabili 〈◊〉, spectata quoque in hac conditione 〈◊〉 &c, And indeed (me thinks) he speaks reasonably. For improbable seems it, that the sweet moderation, which is in the yoke of divine laws, should consist with so great a rigour, as in all matters whatsoever, not simply unlawful, to exact, not only a brotherly, but also a servile compliancy with every supposed weak one, whose weakness may be but pretended by those, that are willing to speak favourably of them. For the humouring and contenting of every supposed weakling in all matters at which he takes offence, I conceive not myself bound to endanger my life, to hazard my estate, and fortunes, or to incur any other great, or notable inconvenience: for that would truly be durus sermo, an hard saying: who were able to bear it? But now against this may be objected the resolution of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 8. 13. if meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend: flesh is of great expediency for the nourishment of man's life, and yet Paul resolves upon a perpetual abstinence therefrom in case of scandal Consequent; and this example of Paul is obligatory unto all Christians. For answer, first, this flesh may be understood only of such as was sacrificed unto Idols; for words in scripture usually are to be restrained unto the subject matter spoken of, and the meat, and flesh, here spoken of in the Context, was such as had been offered unto an Idol. Secondly, Calvin resolveth that 'tis an Hyperbole: est, inquit, hyperbolica locutio, quia vix possibile est, ut quis à carnibus totâ vitâ abstineat, siremaneat in communi vitâ: significat tamen se 〈◊〉 usurum potius suâ libertate, quam ut fit insirmis offendiculo. Nunquam 〈◊〉 licitus est usus, nisi moderatus ad charitatis regulam. This Hyperbole of Paul's you may Parallel with that of our Saviour, 〈◊〉. 5. 39, 40, 41. whosoever shall smite thee on thy right 〈◊〉, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue 〈◊〉 at the Law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And 〈◊〉 shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain. Thirdly, Paul is to be understood, only upon supposition that the Gospel should not be fully promulgated, and brethren should remain uninstructed concerning the nature of Christian Liberty; for usually 'tis in this case only, that to eat flesh involves in the guilt of an active scandal, makes a brother to offend: hence the Apostle exhorts the strong amongst the Romans to abstain from meats forbidden by the Law of Moses, for prevention of the scandal of the weak: but amongst the Galathians; and Colossians he dislikes such an abstinence, and dehorts from it: & the reason, of this his 〈◊〉 carriage, was: because the weak amongst the Romans were not fully taught the doctrine of Christian liberty, & the Galathians & Colossians were Julian, mistaking the Apostles doctrine of scâdall, thought to make use of it for the starving of the Christias, and therefore, in Antiochia, and in the region round about, he dedicated all the sountaines to the Goddesses of the Gentiles, and caused all the victual, that was to be sold in market places, to be sprinkled with Ethnic, holy waters, thinking that some would be scandalised at the drinking of the water of such fountains, and at the eating of such victual, and that the Apostles doctrine obliged all to forbear any thing in the 〈◊〉 of scandal: nevertheless Christians, without scruple of conscience, drank of the water, that was in the Wells, and ate of the meat, which they bought in the market; being, since the full publication of the Gospel, fully persuaded, that to the clean all things are clean. Rutherford determines; that, since the plenary promulgation of the Gospel, we are not obliged to forbear the good Creatures of God, things good, fit, and useful for the life of man, or of physical use in the worship of God, though men be scandalised at such things, and the reason of their scandal be, because they have been abused unto Idolatry, and superstition: he instanceth in Churches, 〈◊〉 unto the saying of Mass, and unto the Idolatrous worship of Saints, and in bells that have been abused by Papists by being consecrated, baptised & used to chase away devils: & for this his determination you may gather out of him [p. 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, etc.] these two reasons. First, because abstinence from such things, (upon a religious account, for avoidance of scandal, because abused to Idolatry, and superstition,) would be, (after a 〈◊〉 publication of the Gospel) a Judaizing, an external Conformity with the Jew, a betraying of our Christian liberty, a confirming & hardening the Jews in their Apostasy: it would make, as Paul says, Jesus Christ of no effect, it would make us debtors to Circumcision, & to all the Ceremonies of Moses, Ga. 5. 3, 4. Secondly, the practice of such things, since we are 〈◊〉 possessed in that liberty, wherewith Christ hath made us free, is morally and Theologically necessary, for the asserting of our Christian liberty: to show, that every Creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused, 〈◊〉 Tim. 4. 4. That unto the pure all things are pure, 〈◊〉 1. 15. that we dare not call that unclean which God hath cleansed, Act. 10. 15. But there is one passage in this author concerning scandal, which I cannot in any ways approve of: it is pag. 58, 59 where he averreth, that things of mere civil use, that are necessary with a necessity of conveniency are to be forborn, if scandal follow, if they be not convenient in the highest degree. And that no man may think I misreport him, take his own words. There be some things of 〈◊〉 civil use, as Bells, gowns, Pulpits, preaching on Tuesday or Thursday. These be considered two 〈◊〉. 1. As necessary with 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 simply. 2. With 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 secundum 〈◊〉 gradum, as convenient in the highest degree of necessity, or that moral maximum quod sic. In the first degree, what scandalizeth, is to be rejected: in the last respect they oblige, and 〈◊〉 any be scandalised thereat, it is taken and not given. But sure this doctrine if embraced will put and hold men's Consciences upon a perpetual rack: For it will be a matter of great difficulty especially for some men always to determine what in their indifferencies is convenient in the highest degree. Secondly, we must put a difference between times, and places: for however they be but circumstances of actions, and therefore extrinsecall to them, so that they cannot cause any such essential variation in them, as to make those actions materially good, or sinful, which are of themselves in their own nature indifferent: yet notwithstanding the public and ordinary abuse of an action at such a time, or in such a place, may make it then and there, in that place and for that time appear to be evil; although the same action at another time, and in the same place; or in another place, at the same time, may not be obnoxious to any such censure. First then, time may alter this imaginary appearance of evil in an action. Reservation of the brazen serpent, as for other ends and purposes, so for commemoration of that miraculous deliverance of the Israelites thereby, from the stings of fiery Serpents, was for a while free from all suspicion, either of Idolatry or superstition: but when once it became the general, ordinary, nay daily occasion, and object of Idolatry that can be, when incense was offered to it: then if the public Magistrate had not demolished it, he might justly have been thought to favour that Idolatry wherewith it was polluted. And therefore commednable was Hezekiah his zeal in breaking it in pieces, 2 King 18.4. In the former Edition it was observed out of Morton that the same Hezekiah did not destroy the high places, which Solomon had built for Astoreth, the abomination of the Sidonians: and for Chemosh, the abomination of the Moabites; and for Milchom, the abomination of the Children of Ammon, and yet was never taxed for countenancing of Idolatry. For in his days the Idols there erected, were disregarded no man worshipping them, and therefore might safely be suffered to stand: but when afterwards they were generally and usually adored, than the good King Josiah justly demolished them: and indeed should he have permitted them then when the Idolatry wherewith they were defiled, was flagrant at the height, he might justly be suspected to be a favourer of that Idolatry. But unto this observation of morton's; Ames thus replieth. He propoundeth, as very observable, that Hezekiah did not abolish the Idols, which Solomon suffered to be set up, because they were neglected. But. 1. it may well be thought that those idols were destroyed by Hezekiah , and set up again before the time of Josiah , as many other superstitions were. 2. It cannot be doubted but they should have been destroyed, even though they were for the time neglected: because either Hezekiah had as good cause to destroy them as Josiah, or else he might have prevented that cause which Josiah had: and to prevent evil, we are as well bound, as to correct it. Unto this Reply of Ames, Dr. Burges rejoineth, whose Rejoinder and Aims his Triplication I shall rather transcribe them then Epitomise. Dr Burges his Rejoinder unto the first part of the Reply. Say you so? then belike it may be well thought that the holy Ghost knew not so well as you what was done, for the text saith, that Josiah destroyed those high places, which Solomon King of Israel had set up: and then describes by the very place, where, and by name those same Idols, which Solomon had set up for his outlandish wives, 1 King. 11.5,7. I hope you will repent this rashness, I am sure you should. Because the Defender did make this one ground of denying our consequence from Hezekiahs' zeal against the monuments of Idolatry, that he did not abolish the Idols which Solomon suffered to be set up in favour of his strange Wives: because they were (at that time) neglected Idols. It was replied, that it may be well thought, they were destroyed by Hezekiah, and set up again before the time of Josiah. This the Rejoinder calleth rashness to be repent of: because it is said (2. Reg. 23.13.) that Josiah destroyed those high places, which Solomon had set up. And was it such a rashness, to say that it may be thought so? the phrase is more mod●st than theirs, who peremptorily affirm those Idols to have been neglected, until after Hezekias' time: when the Scripture testifieth plainly, that Ahaz Hezekiahs' his father worshipped Molech (which was one of those Idols) by making his son to pass thorough teh fire: and was so madly given to superstition, that he sacrificed under every green tree. 2. Reg. 16. Nay less was said, than some learned have with great probability affirmed: z Existimamus etiam, ulvo Salomone, omnem illam daemonum officinam disruptam fui●le, dilaceratam, atque disperditam. Videnturque referendae illae statuae, & luci, & ●rae & reliqua Idolatriae monumenta (2. Reg. 23.13.) ad Manastem, & Ammonem (qui exc●taverant illa ●ncodem loco & ●upra eadem fundanenta) non ad Salomonem, ante annos 250. extinctum. Incredibile dictu est, tantum scandalum ab Asa, Josaphato, Joiada, cum late idolatriam disperderent, in oeulis ipsis positum, non vidisse, aut non ausoattingere, & ad annum 3405. Mirum profe●● si Idola illa post tercentoes 50. annos subsisterent, quae Salomon ipse poenitens, & caeteri reges boni su●tuliessent, Utique dicendum videtur, ab impiis regibus extructa fuisse ejusdem generis fana, & Idola, quae olim Salomon in lisdem locis extruxerat: ut illud quae aedificaverat Solomon, sit idem ac si dixisset, qualia aedisicaverar. Namely that those Idols with their appurtenances were first defaced by Solomon himself, after his repentance; and being restored after by Idolaters, were again defaced. Salianus (in his Annals add an. 3309.) saith thus: we think also that while Solomon lived, that whole shop of Devils was broken up and ruined. And withal the statues, the groves, and altars, as also the rest of Idolatrous monuments. 2. King. 23. 13. to have reference to Manasses, and Ammon (who had set them up in the same place, and upon the same foundation) and not to Solomon, who áyed 250 years Before. It is incredible to speak, that when Asa, Josaphat, and Jehoiada did far and near 〈◊〉 idolatery, they notwithstanding suffered a scandal so apparent. And to the year 3406. It were very strange if those idols after 350 years should yet remain, the which Solomon after his repentance, and other good Kings had abolished. So that it is probable that such like temples, and Idols were repaired, and built up again by other succeeding ungodly Kings, which Solomon in former time had made: that that which Solomon builded should be all one with such like as he had builded. Where he showeth by divers instances, both out of scripture, and out of common speech, how that word which, doth not always note the same singular substance; therein confuting all the ground that the Rej. had for censuring the Repl. of rashness to be repent of. This sentence is the more also to be favoured; because according to the other, which our Def. and Rej. maintain, it will be very hard to answer that objection against Solomon's repentance, which (a) Solomon de 〈◊〉 Idolatriae scelere, nunquam perfectè paenituit. Nam si fractus paenitentiae dignos faceret, satageret ante omnia, ut idola quae aedificaverat, tollerentur, & none in scandalum stultotum, quae ipse cum fuisset sapientissimus, erronea fecerat quasi sapientè ac rectè facta relinqueret. Rabanus on 2 Reg: 23. groundeth on that supposition: Solomon never truly repent of his Idolatry: for if he had manifested fruits worthy repentance, he would have taken order with those Idols, which he had set up by removing them, and (being so wise a man) never have left them to stand for stumbling blocks to fools, as if what he had erroneously devised, had been well and wisely done. Beside all this, it is not credible, that the same individual Temples stood by Jerusalem from Solomon's time to Josias; if it were but for this, that the Assyrians came even to the gates of Jerusalem, spoiling and breaking down all costly buildings, (Such as Solomon's Temples were) not sparing, but deriding the Gods of nations. 2. Reg. 8. Unto the second branch of the Reply Dr. Burges thus rejoineth Burges his Rejoinder, This proves not that they were, nor is it likely that God himself would have vouchsased such thorough praises to Hezekiah, as he doth, 1. Kings. 18. 5. If Hezekiah had been bound to destroy those neglected Idols, as well as others 〈◊〉 taken in the manner, and did not say, why he was bound to do that which he did not. Because either Hezekiah had as good cause to destroy them as Josiah; or else he might have prevented that cause which Josiah had; and to prevent evil, we are as well bound, as to correct it. If Hezekiah had as good cause to destroy those high places, which stood neglected, (and had done perhaps about three hundred years, even since the death of Solomon's wives, whose Chapels they were) as Josiah had, when Manasses, or Ammon had, after Hezekiah his time, revived that Idolatry; the holy Ghost would have taxed Hezekiah for not doing that, for doing whereof he commendeth Josiah; or at least, not have left his integrity crowned with like praises, as he doth, 2 Kings, 18. 5. nor was Hezekiah bound to 〈◊〉 the cause which Josiah had, unless he had suspected it. For though we are bound to prevent evil which we for see, so far as we well can, yet are we not bound to foresee all that may happen. Neither are the same means always requisite for prevention, which must be used for recovery. If you think otherwise, burn all your popish books, 〈◊〉 they fall into the hands of popelings, and do mischief; for you are bound to prevent evil, as well as to correct it. Ames his Triplication. It was added by the Repl. that those Idols should have been destroyed, (though they had been for the time neglected) because that evil for which Josiah destroyed them, aught as well to have 〈◊〉 prevented as corrected. To this the 〈◊〉 answereth, that this is not true, except Hezekiah had suspected that evil. And who will say, that there is no cause to suspect evil of an Idol, though it be for a time neglected? or can any man think, that if the Israelites had neglected them, no Sydonian, Moabite, or Ammonite gave occasion of any evil to be 〈◊〉 by those Idols? The Spanish and French Papists (to say nothing of English) when they in passing by the Cross in Cheapside, do 〈◊〉 unto it, give they not cause to suspect 〈◊〉 evil to 〈◊〉 unto it? The same means. (saith 〈◊〉 Rejoinder) are not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 requisite for prevention, which must be used for recovery. Yes truly, about Idols (if we judge out of the Scripture) the very same means. Burn then (saith the Rejoinder) all your Popish books, 〈◊〉 they fall into the hands of Popelings to abuse them. So will I certainly, if you can show me, that they must be burned, when Popelings have had them in their hands, and abused them, which here you grant concerning these Idols. Here is nothing of the Rejoinder left unexamined, but his quotation of the 2 Kings 18. 5. and how impertinent y that is alleged will appear by comparison of it with 1 King. 15. 5. David did that, which was right in the eyes of the Lord, and turned not aside from any thing, that he commanded him all the days of his life, save only in the matter of Uriah the Hittite. For 〈◊〉 this commendation of David we may as well conclude, that his numbering of the people, and his purpose and attempt to revenge himself of Nabal by destroying him and all his, were lawful; as we may infer from the praises of Hezekiah, that his omission in not demolishing solomon's outlandish Idols, must be unlawful: See Rutherford pag. 90. Secondly, we must distinguish of places. That which in some places carries a show of evil, elsewhere perhaps is not suspected thereof. According to places therefore, in indifferent matters we may vary our practice. It was the advice of Ambrose unto Austin, and Monica, respected by Austin, as if it had been the answer of an heavenly oracle; (b) Ad quamcunque Ecclesiá 〈◊〉, inquit, ejus monen servate, si pati scandalum non 〈◊〉, aut facere. Aug. Ep. 86. unto whatsoever Church ye shall come, observe the manner or custom thereof, if ye will neither give nor take scandal. Which advice if restrained unto things indifferent is very good: and besides we have Paul's precept, and precedent for it: his precept, 1 Cor. c. 10. v. 32. Give none offence, neither to 〈◊〉, nor Gentile, which could not be done, but by complying with them in indifferencies. His precedent also answereth his precept; To the Jews he became a Jew, to them that were under the Law, as under the Law; to them that were without the law, as without the Law; to the weak, as weak, 1 Cor. 9 20, 21, 22. Amongst the Jews he shaved his head, made a vow, Acts 18. 18. and (c) 〈◊〉 was then indifferent, but after the full promulgation of the Gospel it became to be not only mortua but mortifera, not only dead but deadly, as being an interpretative deny all of Christ's coming in the flesh. circumcised Timothy, Acts 16. 3. and yet amongst the Gentiles, where these actions bore an appearance of Judaisme, he withstood Peter for them even to his face, Gal. 2. 11. There be three other instances in the former edition, which because they are questionable I shall wholly wave, and pass on unto the examination of my vain triumph over the non-consormists, wherein, as the Proverb is, I reckoned without mine host. Former Edition. After these limitations of the duty of abstinence from all appearance of evil; I cannot but wonder at our irregulars misapplication of it. They hence eagerly cry down the laudable discipline, and lawful Ceremonies of our Church. What fearful outcries do they make concerning their appearance of Idolatry, superstition, will-worship and Popery? 〈◊〉 you see by the exceptions put to this precept, as much too by for our innocent, and 〈◊〉 Ceremonies, as Hercules' Hooker. shoe, for a child's foot. Indeed our Ceremonies, for example, the Surplice, Cross in Baptism, kneeling at the Lords Supper, may have a material semblance with those that in Popery have been abused to Idolatry, and superstition, and so consequently taken materially, in respect of their materials, may have an outward show of Popish Idolatry, or superstition; but consider them as imposed by our Church, and generally used by her members, so they are formally differenced from those which Papists have applied to Idolatrous ends and purposes. For our Church publicly professeth a quite contrary use or application, end, or intention of them. And external actions have their specification, and consequently distinction from their end, and intention, from it they take their species, or kind, and accordingly are distinguished. Now since all Popish, whether superstitious, or idolatrous abuses of our Ceremonies, are publicly disclaimed, and their right use explained; who can justly imagine any show of Popery in them? An Israelite was not to be smitten for an Egyptian, because for a while he once sojourned in Egypt, if afterward he had his constant abode in Canaan. The garment spotted with the flesh was no longer to be hated, than spotted: being once washed, it might again be used. Our Ceremonies were defiled in Egypt, in Popery, with superstitiom, and Idolatry; but our Church (God be praised) hath washed them from both in her public, and professed use of them. And therefore now they stand above either calumny or suspicion. Examination. First, our non-conformists will tell us, that there was betwixt our Ceremonies, and those of the Papists, even a formal conformity, 〈◊〉, and in part, though not total and adequate. For though our Prelates disavowed many, nay most of those superstitious and idolatrous ends, unto which the Papists applied our Ceremonies, yet they still processed one end and intention of the Papists in the use of them, to wit, mystical signification; and this to be a Popish and superstitious end, the non-conformists prove at large in their books. Secondly, a material conformity in Ceremonies, carrieth many times a real appearance of evil, and scandalizeth actively. It doth not appear that the Altar which Uriah erected, was formally the same with that Ahaz saw at Damascus, that it had the same use and intention, the worship of a false God. The text mentioneth only a material conformity unto it, and for this reason 'tis condemned, 2 King. 16. 10, 11. Peter's conformity with the Jews Gal. 2. was only material, not formal, for a Jewish end and purpose, and yet 'tis blamed by Paul as guilty of an active scandal, vers. 11, 12, 13, 14. Suppose a timorous Protestant in Spain or Italy go to Mass, and there bow before their breaden God, not out of any intent to honour the Idol, but only for preservation of his life; his presence and bowing will only be materially the same with that of Papists; but will any man think that this can acquit him from the sin of Idolatry? Indeed Aelian var. Histor. lib. 1. cap. 21. excuseth Ismenias a Thobane from adoring the King of Persia, because though he stooped down before him, yet it was not to worship him, but to take up a ring that he had for the nonce let fall at his feet: but no rational man will admit of this his apology, because this stooping in common use was the adoration of the King, and interpreted to be such by the King himself, and by the spectators. Some think that though a different end and intention from Pagans, jews, and Heretics in the use of their Ceremonies, cannot legitimate them and free them from scandal; yet that profession of such a different end and intention, is sufficient for such a purpose. But First, the primative Church was of a different opinion. (d) Aims dispute about humane Ceremonies pag. 127. The story of Origen is well known, how he delivered Palm to those that offered it to the image of Serapis, with this expression of his intention: come and receive the boughs, not of the image, but of Christ. Yet was he therefore censured as a worshipper of that Idol. Secondly, if this were true, than we might lawfully use circumcision and the passover, so we disclaim the Jewish end of them, to signify Christ to come; and profess that our intention, was by them only to signify, that Christ was already come in the flesh. Thirdly, a material conformity with Papists in their Ceremonies, hath nourished in them a hope of our coming up to them, but not inclined them in any degree unto us: for they have still protested that they would not step so much as one foot to mere with us: and if my memory fail me not, there is some such thing in Franciscus Sancta Clara. Indeed experience hath always showed, how uneffectuall a means such a compliance hath been for the conversion of Papists. Whom of them hath it ever won over unto the Protestant party, but Spalleto, and others of the like temper, who (as Mr Fuller speaks of some Italians that pretended unto true conversion) were neither good dough, nor good bread, but like Ephraim a Cake not turned? There was a greater material conformity with Popish Ceremonies in Cathedrals, then in other Churches; but how thin a harvest of converts can they produce? Nay 'tis observed by some, that near them, Popery thrived more than in other places. I heard a Knight of the royal party once affirm, in the presence of many persons of worth, that he thought there were more Papists in Wells then in all the County of Somerset besides: and yet of late years that Cathedral outstripped most in England for ceremoniousness. In the times immediately preceding the late troubles, not only the former Ceremonies of the Common-prayer book were urged with more violence than before, but divers others quite antiquated were revived. But though Popish Ceremonies were increased, we do not find that the number of Papists was hereby any thing diminished. I shall conclude this with that of Didoclave pag. 540, 541. Formalistae se retinere quosdam ritus Pontificiorum, ut eos lucrifacere possent, & reducere in rectam viam. Deus in dirigendis suis prudentissimus aliam praescripsit rationem, longè diversam, ut nempe ab omni gentium superstitione & idolatria essent, quantum sieri posset, remotissimi. Name species conformitatis, an't reservatae reliquiae superstitionis & idolatriae illaqueant pios, & confirmant idolatras in suâ superstitione & idolatria. Gloriarentur Judaei, ut suprà dixit Constantinus, si viderint religionem nostram non p sse subsistere absque illarum ritibus. Et Hieronymus alt, Judaicas Ceremonias in Ecclesiâ Christianâ retentas non essicere Judaeos Christianos, sid Christianos Judaeos'. Augustinus secundum regulam illam à legislatore prudentissimo datam populo suo sic consulit. Si quaeritis, unde vincantur Pagani, undè illuminentur, unde ad salutem 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 omnes solemnitates ipsorum. Deserite nugas 〈◊〉. Etsi non consentiant veritati nostrae, saltem pudeat 〈◊〉 suae. But I pass on to the second thing I proposed, the confirmation of the point; where my proofs shall be applied some to real, some to imaginary appearances of evil. First, See it backed by consonant places of Scripture. Solomon adviseth his young man to walk cautè, as well as 〈◊〉, not to come nigh the docre of the strange woman's house, Prov. 5. 8. This had not evilness real, but only the appearance of evil, as being in a corrupt mind an incentive to uncleanness, and in beholders an occasion of jealousies and suspicions. Now from Solomon's interdicting this appearance of evil in special, we may by way of Analogy and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a fitness of forbearing all in general. Unto this is anagogically applied the Nazarites precise abstinence from wine, Num. 6. 3, 4. The Nazarite, as you may see there, was to abstain from wine, from vin gar of wine, from any liquor of grapes, from the materials of wine, grapes, from moist grapes, from dried grapes, from all that is made of the vine tree, from not only the kernel, but even the husk of the grape. The Jews have added, they were not to come nigh a vineyard. With a semblable strictness are we to separate from sin, from all sin, not only from the kernel of sin, from a sin really so, but also from the husk, the appearance of sin. The Children of Israel were charged not to do like the Heathen that were round about them, 2 King. 17. 15. where they are interdicted not 〈◊〉 sameness with, but also likeness unto their fashions: they were forbidden the fashion of rounding their heads, and cutting their flesh, of marring the corners of their beards, of making any baldness upon their heads, or between their eyes, Leu. 19 28. and chap. 21. ver. 25. Deut. 14. 1. Not because so to do was simply in its own nature a sin, but for that it gave show of a sin, of inordinate sorrow for the departed; of which 'twas than an expression much in use amongst the heathen. Hugo Cardinalis upon the text allegeth Hosea 2. 16. Thou shalt call me Ishi, and shalt call me no more Baali. The Gentiles gave the title of Baal, so also of Baalim unto their great and common Idol-God, supposed to be the Sun, and to all the several images, and representations thereof. And therefore God prohibited application of that title unto himself, in worship and invocation: Thou shalt no more call me, o my Baal: for though there be no harm in the word (it signifying in Common use husband, as well as Ishi) yet by reason of the ordinary application thereof unto Idols, there would have been in invocation of God by that name, a gross and palpable appearance of Idolatry. (e) Dico 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 suisse prehibitam 〈◊〉 Ezek. 44. non quod in 〈◊〉 mala sit, sed nè viderentur similes Sacerdotibus Gentilium, in quorum vicinia habitabant, qui toto capite raso idolis sacrificabant. Ut ex Epist. Hieremiae, apparet. Quod ex se non esset malum pater, quia Ezechiel, qui Sacerdos erat, jubetur a Deo 〈◊〉. Ezech. 5. & 〈◊〉 Numb. 6. Nazaraeus completo tempore consecrationis suae, 〈◊〉 radi, Unde Paulo dicit Jocobus Actor. 21. sunt nobis 〈◊〉 quatuor habentes votum super se, his ergo assumptis sanctificato te cum illis, & radant capita sua. Sulum ergo propter viciniam Idolatrarum prohibebantur Sacerdotes Judaeorum radi quae 〈◊〉 causa erat, cur Optati, Hieronymi, & Ambrosii, tempote Christiani sacerdotes non raderentur, sed tonderentur. Nam ad huc 〈◊〉 tempore erant 〈◊〉 Isidis qui caput radebant. Ut Ambrose Epist. 36. & Hietonymus in c. 44. Ezechielis testantur. Bellar: de Monachis lib. 2. cap. 40. In 〈◊〉 44. 20. the Priests of the Jews were prohibited the shaving of their heads, not because it was a thing evil in itself, but only that they might not seem to be like unto the Priests of the bordering Gentiles, who were usually shaved, as appeareth by Baruch cap. 6. v. 31. But because it may be excepted, that most of these rigid, and severe prohibitions, were given unto the Jews under their pedagogy of ceremonies, and time of bondage, and therefore farther than in a moral admonition lay no restraint upon us Christians. See therefore all this seconded in the New Testament by (f) Locus hic, qui obscurus alioqui videtur, nihil 〈◊〉 difficultatis, metaphor â benè explicatâ, vult fideles, non tantùm cavere à vitiorum contactu, sed nè qua ad eos contagio pertingat: quicquid affine est ac vicinum fugiendum esse admonet, quemadmodum 〈◊〉 de 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 habetur, dicemus tollenda esse omnia libidinum irritamenta, id 〈◊〉 clarius 〈◊〉, si amplietur oratio, nempe ut oderimus non carnem modo, sed tunicam, quae ejus contactu infecta sit. Nam particulaxi ad ampliationem valet, ergo adeo non permittit iudulgentia fovere, uti omnes praeparationes, omniaque accessiora (ut vocant) potius resecari, 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉: in locum. St Judas ver. 23. Where in reference to that legal pollution, which came by touching the garment of one that was Levitically unclean, he exhorts Christians to hate the garment spotted by the flesh, that is, saith Gualther, quicquid ingenium carnis sapit, whatsoever hath but a smack or relish of the flesh, all preparations and accessaries of evil, any thing that is near of kin unto, or but bordering upon vice, thinks Calvin. Observe here the emphatical gradation of the Apostle, hate not only the flesh, but the garment spotted by the flesh, not only the garment overspread, quite covered, but the garment that was but here and there a little spotted by the flesh. Out of Christ's garment there issued virtue, which cured the woman that had the bloody flux; but contrariwise out of this garment, but spotted with the flesh, exit vis quaedam maligna, there goeth a poisonous kind of infection, which soon will stain a soul with the leprosy of sin. Unto this place of Judas I shall add another out of the Apostle Paul, Heb. 4. 1. Let us therefore fear, lest a promise being left us, of entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it. Hence 〈◊〉 collects, that we must not only fear, by misbelieving to come short; but to seem, or give any appearance of coming short. Pareus also hath the like note upon the place, verbo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, videatur, sollicitudine tanta hic opus esse innuit, ut non modo quae revera nos frustrent, sedetiam quae videatur frustratura provide caveamus. But because (as the old saying runs) praxis sanctorum est interpres praeceptorum, I shall entreat you next to take notice, how this precept hath been exemplified, The Church. (g) Those words Cant. 1. 7. as one that turneth 〈◊〉 side, may be rendered, as one that is recovered or 〈◊〉. This sense the Greek 〈◊〉 giveth, according to the usual signification of the Hebrew word: and this covering either is asigne of sorrow and shame: as 〈◊〉 used to cover their faces, Ezek. 24. 17. or of lightness and dishonesty, as Thamar was thought to be an 〈◊〉 because she had covered her face Gen. 38. 14. 15. So here the spouse desireth to know where Christ 〈◊〉, lest she should wander about and 〈◊〉 him with sorrow, and be by others reputed an 〈◊〉, for she would 〈◊〉 all appearance of evil. Ainsworth in locum. Cant. 1. 7. professeth against, even all show of communion with false Churches that pretend unto fellowship with Christ, Why should I be as one that turneth aside by the flocks of thy companions? But to come unto particular examples, and here in the times before Christ, is very remarkable the courageous and undaunted resolution of Eleazar, against but the appearance of an evil. 2 Mac. c. 6. v. 18. usque ad sinem: When he was besought to bring flesh of his own provision, such as was lawful for him to use, and but make as if he did 〈◊〉 of the flesh, taken from the sacrifice commanded by the King. v. 21. Why? even this evil appearance, this seeming, this making as if he did eat of the flesh taken from the sacrifice commanded by the King, so deeply disrelished him, as that he chose death before it. For it becometh not our age (saith he) in any wise to dissemble, whereby many young persons might think that 〈◊〉 being four score years old and ten, was now gone to a strange religion; & so they through mine hypocrisy, and desire to live a little time, and a moment longer, should be deceived by me, and I get a stain to my old age, and make it abominable. v. 24 25. But why mention I 〈◊〉? behold the example of one greater than Eleazar, the example of the rule and pattern of holiness unto the Church, Christ jesus God blessed for ever! whose example, in Morals and matters of ordinary obedience, amounts ever unto the authority of a command. How exemplary he was in this particular you may read Matth. c. 17. from v. 24, unto the end of the Chapter. There you have him performing an action, not for that omission of it would have been evil, but because in opinion of the Jews, it would have given show of evil. For if first, you understand the words, as most Interpreters do, of the tribute to be paid unto the secular Magistrate, then sinful it had not been in our Saviour to have refused payment of tribute unto Caesar. For how could the Son to the living God (who was King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, King of heaven, and earth, whose the earth and all the 〈◊〉 thereof was,) be justly tributary unto any mortal? The Kings of the earth take tribute, or custom, not of their own children, (however they expect obedience from them) but of strangers; because paying of tribute denoteth some degree, or kind of Servitude. The children than are free, vers. 25, 26. Therefore from all taxes and impositions, justly was to be exempted Christ, the Son of David; there was no reason he should pay tribute unto Caesar: nay more reason (he being of the blood royal) should receive tribute from the Jews, than Caesar, a foreigner, having no title to the Crown, but that which the sword gave him. Not payment, constant denial of payment, had not been (you see) morally evil in our Saviour; and yet because it would have borne appearance of an evil, of disloyalty, and disobedience, and so have drawn prejudices against, and scandal upon his unspotted person, holy and heavenly office, and doctrine: because seemingly it would have crossed a doctrine he afterwards delivered, Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's: therefore he stands not to plead his privilege, but voluntarily parted with his right, paid the tribute, and to pay it wrought a miracle: notwithstanding, Peter, lest we should offend them, go thou to the 〈◊〉, and cast an hook, and take up the fish that first cometh up, and when thou hast opened his mouth, thou shalt find a piece of money, that take, and give unto them for me and thee, vers. 27. Or if secondly, with the learned Cameron, you rather conceive to be here meant the half shekel, which by prescript of the Ceremonial Law, Exod. 30. was by the Jews to be paid for the use of the Sanctuary. Why yet so also sinful it had not been in our Saviour to have refused paying of it: for first, it was a Ceremony, and the Ceremonial Law Christ was above, Lord he was of the Sabbath, Matth. c. 12. ver. 8. Mar. c. 2. v. 28. where it is manifest (thinks Cameron) the Sabbath should 〈◊〉 signify the whole Ceremomall Law. Then secondly, this Ceremony, together with Sacrifices and all other Legal, typical Ceremonies, presupposed sin in the party, to whom they were commanded, and were a note, or badge contracted by sin; and therefore reach not unto Christ, a man without sin. Thirdly, as our Saviour well argues, even as Kings of the earth take not tribute of their own Children, so neither the King of Heaven of his Son, therefore seeing this half shekel is a tribute to be paid to the King of Heaven, for the Tabernacle of witness. 2 Chro. 24. 6. Christ was certainly free, and so might lawfully have refused to pay it: Yet because the jews would have taken offence, and umbrages at such his refusal, and charged it with appearance of a profane contempt of the Law of Moses, and the Sanctuary, therefore he voluntarily paid it, and so became a Jew to the Jews, as under the Law to them that were under the Law: Notwithstanding lest we should offend, etc. And if this be the sense of the place, what is said of this one Ceremony, may be applied unto all; for one of the reasons, and ends, why Christ observed the whole Ceremonial Law was, to prevent scandal, to abstain from all appearance of evil. In nature (saith Cameron) there is, appetitus quidem unionis, which causeth things to be moved, and to rest often, besides the proper condition of their particular nature, whence sometimes light things are moved downwards, heavy things upwards. Unto this appetite of union in nature, there is answerable in grace, the desire to promote God's glory, which often inclineth and carrieth the Godly beyond and besides the ordinary obligations, arising out of their particular and personal conditions and relations. And unto the measure of grace is proportionable the degree of the desire of God's glory, so that the holier any one is, the more vehemently he desireth the promotion thereof: and if it require any thing to be done of him, why he will do it, although otherwise by virtue of his particular, and personal condition, he be not bound thereunto. Therefore although Christ, secundum 〈◊〉 rationem personae suae, if we eye the special consideration, and dignity of his person, was not tied to keep the Ceremonial Law, yet he kept it, in as much as the Glory of God required him so to do. If you demand how the glory of God exacted this at Christ's hands, why Christ himself tells us, Nè simus illis scandalo, lest we should offend them; for if Christ had not observed the Ceremonial law, he had doubtless wonderfully estranged the Jews from him. In observing it then he did but as Kings often do in stooping to many things, unto which they are no ways obliged, for to win the hearts and affections of their humorous subjects. This example of our Saviour, was followed by the Apostles, and elders in the first general Council at Jerusalem, where they imposed upon the Gentiles abstinence from meat offered to Idols, from things strangled, and from blood, Acts 15. 29. Not for that these meats were in themselves unclean, and abominable, but because they appeared to be so to the froward and peevish Jews, who were kept off from Christ, because these meats, in which they supposed to be such abomination and uncleanness, were usually eaten by the Christians. But this was but a temporary injunction they gave to others. Let us view their own practice. Maintenance for preaching was due unto Paul, from both the Corinthians and Thessalonians, and yet he did forbear exacting it, 1 Cor. 9 1 Thes. 2. that so he might take away all colour for suspicion of any mercenary or greedy appetite after gain, to be in his preaching, and quice cut off all scandals thereby, which in that dawning of Christianity upon them, would have put a rub to the progress of the Gospel, and have made his ministry to be evil spoken off. And of St Paul, the Saints in succeeding ages were sollowers, as he of Christ. Those 〈◊〉, so often, and sharply censured by St Cyprian Epist. 15. 31. 52. lib. de lapsis. lib. de exhortatione Martyrum, Though they did not sacrifice, or directly deny Christ, were yet by the Church put to their penance, for seeming to deny him, because they either by themselves, or others, at least accepted from the Magistrate bills, or scrolls testimonial of their abnegation. Secundus (as Parker relates out of * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Secundus & ad scipsum 〈◊〉 à Curarore & ordine 〈◊〉 & Beneficiarium, qui peterent divinos codices exurendos, eisquerespondisse, Christianus sum & Episcopus, non traditor: Et cum ab co vellent aliqua ecvola sper ecvola intelligit res ejectas, nempe quarum nullus est usus, ab, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quodest 〈◊〉, seu 〈◊〉) 〈◊〉 quodeunque accipere, 〈◊〉 hoc eis dedisse, exemplo Eleazari 〈◊〉 qui nec fingere voluit suillam carnem se manducare, ne 〈◊〉 praeberet prevarication is ex emplum. Vid. Baronius) was commanded to deliver his bibles, he maketh answer, Christianus sum & non Traditor. Hereupon he is commanded to deliver aliqua Ecvola, that is certain stuff which was cast aside for that it had no use. Will be not deliver this to save his life? no not this. It was lawful, but it had a show of their sin whom the Church called Traditores for their delivering the holy books to be burnt by the officers of the Tyrant Dioclesian. (h) 〈◊〉 out of Suidas. Auxentius being commanded by Licinius to set a branch of a Vine-tree loaden with Clusters at the feet of Bacchus his image, presently shaped him this round, and resolute answer, God forbid, O Emperor, that I should do it, for I am a Christian. The matter was not great in itself, yet because it would have favoured 〈◊〉, or given manifest appearance of it, rather than do it, he chose banishment from the Court, and loss of the Emperor's service. As (i) Theodoret l. 3. 6. 15. 〈◊〉. l. 〈◊〉. 6. 〈◊〉. S. 〈◊〉. 6. c. 6. Valentinian, afterwards Emperor, went before Julian the Apostate into a Temple of the Goddess 〈◊〉, one of the Priests besprinkled Julian with a kind of purging, or holy water, a drop of which by chance fell upon Valentinian, at which he was so extremely incensed, as that he stroke the Priest, tore, and rend in pieces Aug. in 〈◊〉. Collat. die. 3 cap. 13. Damasc. that part of his garment on which it fell with a great disdain, and holy indignation, throwing it away from him, that so he might Hist. pag 578. avoid the least tincture of their superstitious, and idolatrous religion. But above all, very remarkable is the zeal of the k Th' od. l. 4. c. 15 〈◊〉. l. 11. c. 〈◊〉. boys of Samosatene, who because a tennis-ball, with which they played, had but touched the foot of the ass whereon Lucius road, their Heretical Bishop, they presently cried out that it was defiled, (although indeed it was not capable of any moral pollution) and therefore to purge or expiate it, threw it into the fire in the midst of the Market place. This may be thought, but a Childish prank, and therefore not imitable, however yet it aptly serves to demonstrate that their education, framed them unto a hatred of whatsoever had any remote reference, unto either evil actions, or persons. St Ambrose forbade Monica the bringing of wine and cakes to the Celebrities of the Martyrs, nè ulla occasio se ingurgitandi daretur ebriesis, & quia illa quasi parentalia superstitioni Gentilium essent simillima, as St Austin lib. 6. Confess. c. 2. lest occasion of excessive quaffing should be given to drunkards, and because those parentalia, funeral feasts, were very like to heathenist superstition, the offerings of the Pagans which were made at the Tombs of their parents, and to their ghosts. Bishop Morton assigns another reason, because this custom, had some resemblance of those superstitious, and idolatrous Colorydians, mentioned by Epiphanius, who offered cakes to the Virgin Mary, in imitation of that heathenish custom condemned by the prophet Jeremy chap. 7. ver. 18. of such as did offer cakes to the Moon, as unto the Queen of heaven. Now when Monica understood that Saint Ambrose had forbidden this, tam piè, atque obedientèr 〈◊〉 est, ut ipse mirarer, saith St Austin in that forecited place, quod tam facilè accusatrix potius consuetudinis 〈◊〉, quam disceptatrix illius prohibitionis effecta sit: she so piously, and obediently embraced this prohibition, as that I myself, saith Austin, wondered to see her so easily rather accuse her own custom, than dispute his command. When once the custom of thrice dipping or sprinkling in Baptism was used by Heretics, to signisy a trinity not of persons, but natures in the Godhead, than Saint 〈◊〉 thought fitting that it should be left off, not because it was evil, but for that it might seem to countenance their 〈◊〉 heresy: his words are these, De trina verò 〈◊〉 baptismatis nihil responderi verius potest, quam quod ipsi sensitis, quod in una side nihil officit sanctae Ecclesiae consuetudo diversa, etc. sed quia nunc hucusque ab haereticis infans in baptismate 〈◊〉 mergebatur, faciendum apud vos esse non censeo, ne dum mersiones numerant divinitatem dividant, dumque quod faciebant faciunt, se morem nostrum vicisse glorientur. lib. 1. Epist. 41. Gabriel Biel lectione 38: saith, that the Church of Rome thought it meet to use common leavened bread in the administration of the Eucharist, lest in using unleavened bread, they should be deemed to imitate Ebion the heretic. Nay Rellarmine in his recognition of his book de verbo 〈◊〉, admonisheth the Reader, that in the title of the third Chapter of the first book, Divi Pauli is put for Beati Pauli, for in making mention of the Saints, I never approved (saith he) the use of the word divus, or diva, and one of his reasons, is; because amongst the Heathens, 'twas usually ascribed to their false, or feigned Gods. To heap up other, either testimonies, or instances, were to prejudice, if not the authority of those before mentioned, yet your esteem of them, as if you were not by them sufficiently persuaded and convinced. My labour (I suppose) will be better spent in demonstrating unto you the expediency of that, which may seem rigour in this Doctrine, in discovering unto you what good reasons Saint Paul had to exact so great a measure, and so high a pitch of abstinence from sin. Those that I will specify shall be drawn from God, from Satan, from our selves, from our brethren, First, from God, we have these two, our relations unto him, our danger in offending of him. First, our Relations unto him, he is our Father, our Sovereign, Christ Jesus is our spiritual husband. Now a dutiful child declines not only disobedience, but whatsoever hath the colour of it; an obedient, and loyal subject startles at not only treason, but also whatsoever may occasion suspicion thereof: a faithful and chaste wife abhors not only adultery, but whatsoever may make her husband justly jealous, others but suspicious of her chastity. And shall not every child of God, every one that professeth subjection unto heaven, be fearful of the appearance of disobedience, and undutifulness to so indulgent a father as God, of the appearance of Treason and Rebellion against so Almighty a King as God? Doth it not befit the Spouse the Church, every member of Christ to dread all shows, and signs of disloyalty, and unfaithfulness to so loving a Spouse as Christ Jesus? Did Julius Caesar, but an earthly potentate, think it not enough that his wife was without a fault, unless withal she was without so much as the suspicion of a fault? And will not Christ (think you?) who is King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, expect as great unblameableness in his Spouse? (l) Plutarch. 〈◊〉 Lesbiai to dissuade Pompey from flying into Parthia, tells him, that his wife would be liable to a great deal of danger amongst those barbarous people; and though (said he) they proffer no villainy unto her, yet it is an undecent thing to think that the wife of Pompey might have been dishonoured: To dissuade us from the appearances and occasions of sin it should, (me thinks) be an effectual argument, that our souls, which are married unto Christ in righteousness, judgement, and holiness, will hereby be obnoxious unto danger of pollution. What though they be not actually defiled? Yet it is an undecent thing to think, that the Spouse a member of Christ might have been dishonoured, might have been foiled with a lust, ravished, varquished by Satan, defiled with sin. If from these appearances of evil, our relations to God cannot draw us, yet (me thinks) in the second place, our danger in offending of him, should drive us: for he is a consuming fire unto, as the Works, so also the workers of impiety: and how can we then but be afraid to venture on not only that we know doth, but what we fear others suspect may, deserve the wrath of so sin revenging a God? That we should abstain from all appearances of evil, may, secondly, be gathered from Satan, from the consideration, First, of his cruelty and malice against us, Secondly, of his temptations of us? First, from the consideration of his cruelty and malice against us, which the Scripture shadoweth out by terming him, the enemy by way of excellency, the envious man, the accuser, the tempter, the destroyer, the devourer, a murderer from the beginning: as also by comparing him unto a roaring Lion, unto a great red Dragon, and an old 〈◊〉. Now me thinks we should fear to come, not only under the power, but also into the sight of such an adversary: and yet by rushing upon the shows, the occasions of evil, what do we but hazard the surprisal of our souls by him? This will be more apparent from the consideration, 2. Of Satan's temptations of us: of his temptations of us to sin, of his temptations of us to despair, or at least discomfort, for sin: because in both sorts of temptations he goes about by these appearances of evil, to wreak his malice upon us. For first, in his temptations of us to sin, they are, first, the bait by which he allures: Secondly, an argument by which he persuades us thereunto. Thirdly, an encouragement, whereby he is heartened to persist in tempting of us. First then, the appearances of sin, are a bait whereby Satan allures us unto sin, which if we by't at, our consciences will soon be enlarged to swallow sin itself. Satan well knowing that God's Children would even 〈◊〉 at your gross, and more hideous sins, such as are, Idolatry, Adultery, Drunkenness, and the like, therefore chiefly plyeth them with enticements to the signs, shows, and occasions of them; for these will smooth the passage unto the sins themselves. Of this we have a remarkable instance in Alipius, who (as St Austin relates Confess. lib. 6. cap. 8) being drawn by his friend's importunity to accompany him unto the Roman Gladiatory Games, yet resolveth though he were present with his body, to be absent in his heart, and for that purpose to keep his eyes shut, that he might not defile them with so barbarous a sight: yet at last upon a great shout, that the people gave at the fall of one of the Combatants, his curiosity made him behold the occasion, and thereupon he presently became an applausive spectator of that bloody and inhuman spectacle. An Italian, as Holerius writes, by his often smelling to the herb Basile, had a scorpion engendered in his head: even so we by our often dallying, and tampering with things that carry a show of unlawfulness, may have Satan, as I may so speak, even form in us, for as St Hierome saith upon Ecclesiastes the ninth, Diabolus serpens est lubricus, cujus si capiti, id est, primae suggestioni non resistitur, totus 〈◊〉, dum non sentitur, illabitur, that is, the Devil is a slippery serpent, and if we do not keep out his head, that is, his first suggestions, it is not to be doubted but that he will stealingly slide into the most secret corners of the heart: and so we actuated by him, shall at last proceed from things only appearing 〈◊〉, unto the practice of most horrid and ghastly crimes. Secondly, the appearance of evil is an argument by which he persuades us unto what is in its own nature evil, for if a man have but slipped into such actions as the best minded judge to have a real appearance of evil, Satan forthwith will suggest unto him, that he hath by this quite cracked his credit amongst those that are accounted religious: by them (will he say) thou art as much suspected, and as deeply censured for thy seeming evil, as for thy being so: wert thou not better therefore, be as thou seemest, for they cannot think worse of thee then they do, thy shame, and disgrace, their jealousies, suspicious and censures cannot be greater for sin itself, than it is already for the show of it. Now this temptation of Satan, receives great advantage from our nature, for we naturally are addicted to society, and therefore if we find that upon the signs and shows of such and such sins in our practice, good men condemn us as guilty of the sins themselves, and therefore begin two reserve and estránge themselves from us, refusing any longer to reach out unto us the right hand of fellowship, why, then we will presently have fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, and couple in with loose, carnal and formal men, whose conversation will quickly infect us, so that it will not be long ere we run with them to the same excess of riot. And thus you see how Satan takes occasion from the appearance of sin, to draw us on unto sin itself, which me thinks should be sufficient to dissuade us from them. For is Satan so backward in tempting, or is his invention grown so barren, as that our lives and practice must put arguments into his mouth? is the purchase of hell and damnation so difficult, as that we must needs furnish the Devil with baits to allure us, with reasons to persuade us unto our everlasting perdition, this were folly and madness that would want a name. But in the third place, the signs and appearances of sin are not only a bait, by which he enticeth us, an argument by which he persuades unto sin, but withal an encouragement, by which he is heart'ned to go on in tempting of us, for they make him gather heart, and hope that we are coming on to sin itself; and this hope will breed diligence, make him a more importunate solliciter, make him to double and strengthen his assaults, to ply us even thick and threefold with temptations: A dog will not run from a man as long as he throws bread unto him, and can any man suppose the Devil will fly, so long as he gives place unto him, as long as he throws himself upon temptations, by practising such things as have a manifest show of evil? for though in themselves they be never so small, yet will they serve to usher in farther and greater matters: being than preparatives unto sin, they cannot be (as some have imagined) good senses against sin: seeming to be evil is not, cannot be a means to shield us from being so, no more than the opening the Gates of a City can be the way to raise the siege of it, or letting go the sluices of a river can be the course to stop its current. You have seen arguments from Satan's temptations of us to sin: take next one from his temptations of us to despair, or at least discomfort for sin, a temptation of so hideous a nature, as that, me thinks, our actions should not 〈◊〉 it the least advantage. His First labour is by the appearance of sin to make us offend God, but when he cannot proceed so far, his Second endeavour will be, to make us disquiet ourselves: when he cannot wound us by them, he will vex us for them; for he will wrest and misconstrue all that we have done unto the worst sense, he will swell motes into beams, molehills into mountains, appearances of evil into realities, and thunder unto us that there is not a pin to choose betwixt those and these; unto which our souls being distracted by the violent importunity of this temptation, will be over apt to give credence. And for a man to be thus tossed between Satan's powerful suggestions, and his own fears and suspicions cannot but even crush his spirits, and quite eclipse the peace and joy of his heart. Abstinence from all appearances of evil is, thirdly, needful in regard of ourselves, for by them we may incur a double danger, a danger of being infected with, a danger of being punished for sin. First, a danger of being infected with sin: what (m) Bern: tract. de grad. 〈◊〉. Bernard spoke of Eves beholding the forbidden fruit, is true concerning every appearance of evil: Et si culpa non est, culpae 〈◊〉 indicium est, & si culpa non est, culpae tamen occasio est, indicium commissae, & causa est committendae. Although it be not in itself a sin, yet it is a token, yet it is an occasion of sin, a token that sin hath been committed, a cause of committing it for the future. Now our natures are strongly bend to evil, when this (then) our natural inclination, is furthered by outward occasions, we may soon be led to the realities of sin, though the occasions of themselves are weak, they working but as objects, and the objective causality being of all most imperfect, yet Satan is strong, our lusts are strong, these occasions are suitable to our lusts: our souls therefore, by a little help from Satan will quickly catch infection from them. For this reason were the Israelites, in the time of the passover prohibited not only the eating, but the very having of leavened bread in their houses. For this reason too were the Nazarites forbidden to eat so much as the husks of the grapes, for if that had been permitted, they would perhaps have soon proceeded to the eating of the grapes, and thence to drinking of the wine itself: hence also grew that precise resolution of David, Psal. 101. 3. I will 〈◊〉 no wicked thing before mine 〈◊〉: well may the world, and Devil set wicked things before mine eyes, but for mine own part I will not invite temptations, I will set no wicked thing before mine eyes, as much as I can I will decline the objects, examples, and shows of wickedness: do but put fire unto flax, and it will presently be on flame: so present we unto our loose and corrupt natures the shows, (which (as you have seen) are also the occasions of evil) and how suddenly will they take fire? This Joseph knew, and therefore when his Mistress solicited him to that foul act of uncleanness, he hearkened not unto her to lie by her, or so much as to be with her, Gen. 39 10. but fled, and got himself out of her presence, ver. 12. doubting lest the very sight of her might kindle lust. Nay to the shame of many secure and venturous Christians, of this even Scipio an Heathen, and Soldier too, was apprehensive and fearesull, and therefore would not suffer certain captive Virgins, though of an exquisite beauty, to be brought so much as into his presence Nè quid (faith Florus) de virginitatis integritate delibâsse, saltem vel oculis vid rotur. That he might not seem to have sipped, or skimmed the honour of their chastity, so much as with beholding them. As Apelles then by drawing the picture of Campaspe fell in love with the pattern of his work Campaspe her self, so we from retaining, from affecting the show of sin, will soon proceed to a delight in sin itself. Some indeed are so strangely confident of their abhorrency from sin, as they doubt not infection from appearance of it: they can venture into the losest company, yet so bridle their appetite, as that they fear no excess; be present at an Idolatrous Mass, and yet be in no danger of being affected with it, unless it be with dislike of it. Surely these men are dropped from Heaven, never borne in sin, or conceived in iniquity: for they, whose original is from men, may possibly be drawn away by sinful objects, and shows: but these men (forsooth) are above gunshot, beyond the reach of temptation; Their professed hatred of sin brings me in mind of Pygmalion's averseness from women; he was a professed, almost a sworn enemy to woman kind, yet drawing but the picture of a woman, he fell in love with it, and he hug'd, and kissed it so long, till at last by the power of Venus (as the Poet fables it) it became a woman: Their case is like; they profess detestation of sin, and yet delight in some things, that have the appearance, the resemblance thereof: let them take heed they dote not so long upon these, as that at length by the power of Satan, and the strength of their own lusts, they be transformed into real sins. I will end this reason with that of chrysostom, in his fifteenth Homily unto the people of Antioch. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. It will be to 〈◊〉 the occasion, or ground of greatest security. if we do not only flee sins, but such indifferent things also, which are means whereby they do supplant us: for as he who goeth upon the edge of a steep, and craggy rock, though he falleth not, yet with fear trembleth, and so falls through his trembling, so he who leaveth not sin a loof, and a far off, but approacheth close to the brink of it, hath just cause to live in fear, seeing he hath just cause to fear to fall into it. Secondly, danger of being punished for sin, not by God, for he is an Omniscient Judge, and therefore cannot mistake the appearance of evil for evil itself: he is a just Judge, and therefore will not punish the appearance of evil, for evil itself: but by man, by the 〈◊〉 Magistrate with temporal punishments, by the governor's of the Church, with Ecclesiastical censures, and by all men generally with shame and obloquy. 〈◊〉 you know in the apparel of Ahab, was like to have been killed for Ahab. (n) Plutarch. 〈◊〉 having on the Cloak, and armour of Pyrrhus, was slain for Pyrrhus: even so many times some men, for the bare appearance of some crimes, are as hardly thought of, and as severely handled, as if they had committed the crimes themselves. (o) Florus l. 3. c. 14. Tiberius Gracchus was butchered by the Romans, because it seemed unto them, that by touching his head with his hand, he had demanded a Diadem, when he thereby as a sign only exhorted them to stand upon their defence. Because the Island of Crete seemed to have favoured Mithridates, for this seem sake, the people of Rome took revenge by the sword, Favisse Mithridati videbatur, hoc placuit armis vindicare. Indeed the Lord seeth not as man seeth, he looketh on the heart, and thereunto squareth his judgement, but man looketh on the outward appearance, 1 Sam. 16. 7. and according to it censureth, and so he may do, and yet often times judge righteous judgement. For if when there is wanting sufficient evidence of fact, Judges, and Juries should not sometimes proceed upon pregnant signs, and strong presumptions, howmany villainies would pass unpunished? And if Ecclesiastical Governors, should not take the same course too, how could they possibly stop the spreading mischiefs of scandal. This abstinence from appearance of evil, is lastly expedient in regard of our brethren, to avoid scandal unto them. First, as it is taken by Thomas, and the Schoolmen, for that which occasionally leads unto sin, which puts a stumbling block, or an occasion to fall in the way of others, Rom. 14. 13. for so do all evil shows, and that both in the way of the weak, and in the way of the wicked. First, in the way of the weak, for they are misguided, and drawn unto the practice of that evil, the appearance whereof they see in us, Secondly, in the way of the wicked, for first, hereby the obdurate are heartened, confirmed, and comforted: secondly, hereupon adversaries take occasion to speak reproachfully of that holy name, and profession which we bear, to blaspbeme the Cross, Truth, and Gospel of Christ. Secondly, as 'tis used vulgarly, and commonly for sorrow, grief, dislike, or displeasure at an action, for it matters not much whether our facts be evil, or bear show of evil, they equally would wound the hearts, and vex the righteous spirits of the Godly, and therefore are both violations of Saint Paul's precepts, Rom. 15. 2. Let every one of us please his neighbour for his good to edification. Valerius Publicola (saith Florus) nè specie arcis offenderet, eminentes aedes suas in planâ submisit: he leveled with the ground his high and losty building, lest he should offend the people with the appearance of a Citadel: and wilt not thou throw aside a vanity, an excrement, some idle if not monstrous fashion, rather than offend thy brother (for whom Christ died) with the appearance of an evil? A 〈◊〉 shame were it, that popularity should prevail more with a Roman, than Charity with thee, who art a Christian. But some will be ready to object, that this doctrine is prejudicial to our Christian liberty. For that reacheth to the use of all things that are of an indifferent nature, and such are these actions charged with the appearance of evil, and therefore if you straighten us in the use of them, you injuriously deprive us of that liberty which we have in Christ Jesus unto the use of all indifferent things. For answer, First, those actions, in which there is a real appearance of evil, are not indifferent in their nature, but evil, and sinful, forbidden, first, by the general prohibition of scandal, they are per se scandalous of themselves and in their own nature, and therefore 〈◊〉, for à per se ad de omni valet argumentum: prohibited, secondly, by those precepts which are against those evils of which they have a real appearance, because they are a step unto, and occasion of them, whereas 'tis usually said that they are evil only in appearance, this is not to be understood so as to exclude evil from them, but to restrain the evil of them unto this particular: that they have a real appearance of evil, the meaning is, they are evil in no regard but this, and this regard, for the reasons abovesaid, is sufficient to denominate them evil: they are always temptations unto evil, so that there is always committed in them an active scandal. This was the opinion of the vulgar translater, who translates, 1 〈◊〉. v. 22. ab omni specie 〈◊〉 abstinete vos, abstain from every evil appearance, this reading Cornelius à Lapide and other Popish Expositors think equivalent with 〈◊〉 translation abstain from all appearance of 〈◊〉, according to it then every appearance of evil is evil, if it be real and not merely imaginary. Unto this let me add that of Suarez already quoted, an action, saith he, only evil in appearance transgresseth some virtue, though not per se primo, yet 〈◊〉 consequenti connexione virtutum, by reason of the mutual connexion and commerce of one virtue with, and dependence upon another. But to come to, secondly, those indifferent actions in which there is only an imaginary appearance of evil, two things are here to be answered. First, however they be in thesi in their general nature indifferent, yet they do in casu and in hypothesi become to be accidentally evil, because done against Conscience, when they appear to be evil to ourselves; against charity, when they appear to be evil unto others: and then we are bound to abstain from them, though notlege communi, yet lege particulari, by reason of particular circumstances. Secondly, Although our Christian liberty extendeth to the use of all things indifferent, yet ought we in godly wisdom, and discretion to abridge ourselves of the outward exercise of this our liberty, whensoever 'tis very probable that it will become dangerous to ourselves, or scandalous to others. Ye have been called 〈◊〉 liberty, only use not liberty for an occasion to the flesh, but by love serve one another, Gal. 5. 13. As free, and not using your liberty for a cloak of maliciousness, the 1 Pet. 2. 16. Now we use or rather abuse our liberty for an occasion to the flesh, for a cloak to maliciousness, by practising such indifferencies, as have show of evil; for they, (as I have shown at large) are likely to prove, as occasions of sin unto ourselves, so also active scandals to misguide our brethren, and therefore, though they be not absolutely, and simply in their nature unlawful to be done, yet they are by accident unlawful for me to do, as long as they carry show of evil. All things (indeed) are pure (saith the Apostle) but it is evil for that man, who eateth with offence: It is good neither to 〈◊〉 flesh, nor drink wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak, Rom. 14. 20, 21. (p) Infirmitas nominat promptitudinem ad scandalum, offensio autem nominat indignationem, etc. scandalum autem importat ipsam impactionem ad ruinam, Aquin. 2. 2 daes. q. 44 art. 1. What remaineth then but that all be admonished in the Lord Jesus to take to heart a matter so deeply concerning them, both in conscience as a duty expressly enjoined by God, practised by Christ, his Apostles, and Saints; and in consequence, as befitting us as the Sons, subjects of God, as the spouse, members of 〈◊〉, as being needful to defeat Satan's malice, to cut off his temptations unto sin, and unto discomfort for sin, to avoid sin, etc. Application. in ourselves, scandals unto others, unto the weak, obstinate, and strong. If therefore there be in you any love of God, any care to walk worthy of those high relations you carry to him, any regard to the safety of your own souls, any fear of Satan, sin, or punishment, any compassion over the Consciences of your poor brethren, keep a loof from whatsoever neighbours, and borders upon sin, whatsoever hath the blush and show thereof: hate, as (q) Ambr. 1. 6. Hexaem. Ambrose exhorts, not only sin, but the coat of sin, the garment spotted by the flesh. Even an heathen will advise, you hereunto. (r) Quint. 1. 2. cap. 3. Carendum 〈◊〉 solum crimine turpitudinis, verum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Want we inducements, take we these three. It will be a course, First, Safe, and Secure: Secondly, Comfortable: Thirdly, Honourable. First, Safe, and Secure, by it sin and Satan shall be staved off, kept out at dagger's end, your own souls secured, kept out of gun shot either of infection or punishment, so that they shall not come nigh, scarce so much as the confines either of Sin, or Hell. Secondly, Comfortable: For what an unspeakable comfort will it be unto thy drooping soul in the hour of death, or in the time of spiritual desertion, when thy Conscience can truly suggest, that thou hast been so abhorrent from sin, as that thou hast shunned whatsoever hath been homogeneal thereunto, whatsoever hath looked but like unto it, it must needs stop Satan's mouth, and make thine own triumph in the calmness of a clear, and good conscience. Thirdly, Honourable, for 'twill gain thee esteem amongst both good, and badones, with those 'twill make thy name precious, 'twill muzzle the mouths of these, when they behold such uprightness in thy life, as that thou shunnest not only downright irreligiousness to God, injustice to men, but even their very picture and resemblance, this cannot but extort from them, though never so malicious, an ingenious acknowledgement, that thou art a true Israelite, a sincere Nathaniel, in whom there is sound no guile. Now though our main and first endeavour must be to keep a good Conscience, yet is not the jewel or precious ointment of a good name, to be in the mean while neglected; our care should be to preserve that likewise unspotted, St Paul, (Acts 24. 16.) professeth that he exercised himself to have always a conscience void of offence, as towards God: so towards 〈◊〉; and he adviseth us to provide things honest in the sight of all men, Rom. 12. 17. To walk honestly towards them that are without. 1 〈◊〉. 4. 12. To strive for a good report of them that are without, 1 Tim. 3. 7. I will but prescribe two cautions directing how we are to abstain from the appearance of evil, and then I shall have done with the general application of the words. We are to abstain neither only nor chiefly from the appearance of evil. First, not only, that were foul Hypocrisy of which yet there are even a generation guilty, who only combat with the shadow of sin, and in the mean while embrace the body of sin real sins: who abstain from the show of every evil work ' and yet remain reprobate to every good work, who professedestation of gain by gaiming, because they conceive it to be an appearance of theft, and yet make no conscience of fraud, deceit, and cozenage in their dealings, who stand at 〈◊〉 with all shows of uncleanness, and yet make no scruple of the grossest acts thereof. Secondly, not 〈◊〉, that were a great incongruity, for so care of the means should be greater than that of the end, because abstinence from the appearance of evil, is enjoined as a preservative against the evil itself. The evils themselves therefore should chiefly be avoided, the body of sin should be opposed more than the shadow, than the shows of sin. The flesh should be abhorred in a higher degree, than the garment spotted therewith. You have seen the point pressed generally as it concerns all men's abstinence from the appearance of all evils. I will only crave your pardon to call more particularly. First, upon all 〈◊〉 for abstinence from the appearance especially of some evils. Secondly, upon some men especially for abstinence from the appearance of all evils, and then I will put a period to my meditations upon these words. First, We must decline the shows of some evils above others, of our Master, our bosom evils. For from them is most danger to be feared, they having commonly most 〈◊〉 from our natures: and Satan besides knows but too well how our tide stands, he quickly acquaints himself with our predominant lusts, and most raging corruptions, and unto them especially fits and accords his temptations: as (s) 〈◊〉 Suetonius. Agrippina, when she poisoned her husband Claudius, mixed the poison in the meat which he most loved. Secondly, some men above others are especially to decline the appearance of all evils. All public men should do so, but especially we of the Ministry. The high Priests and Nazarites, under the Law were not to come nigh a dead body, Leu. 21. 11. Numb. 6. 6. And in imitation of them among the Romans, the Priest might not touch the dead, nay they might not see the dead: for if a Priest pronounced a Funeral Oration, 'twas not without a veil drawn betwixt him and the Corpse. Nay a Flaminian Priest might not hear the sound of pipes used at Funerals nor come into a place where there was a grave. Was there such ritual purity under the Law? such Ceremonial strictness in heathenish Priests? and shall there not be found an answerable degree of moral preciseness in the 〈◊〉 of the Gospel? shall they be willingly within sight, sent, and hearing of impiety, except to reprove it? (t) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal. 110. As a woman big with Child, for fear, and danger of miscarrying for beareth Physic, violent exercise, and many meats and drinks, which otherwise she might freely use: even so those who travel in birth with the Children of Christ, are put to deny and abridge themselves of many indifferencies. I will eat no flesh, saith St Paul while the world standeth, rather than make my brother to offend, 1 Cor, 8. 13. Reason's enforcing their abstinence after an especial manner from the appearance of evil are two: Because in them they 〈◊〉: First, greater looseness in bad ones: Secondly, more heaviness to good ones. First, Greater looseness in bad ones. 〈◊〉 it is how the lower, and more ignorant rank of men will be hereby strengthened in their downright sinful courses; Nay if a Minister do but wisely, and lawfully use his Christian liberty the rude vulgar will thereupon open themselves a gap unto all licentiousness. If he be but innocently pleasant, think they we may be mad. If he but sip, we may carouse. If he spend but some few hours, in his honest, and harmless recreations, the common gamester presently concludes his mispense of both time, and patrimony in gaming to be thence 〈◊〉. Secondly, more heaviness to good ones: it grieves the spirits of the righteous to see them in any, it wounds their souls, it makes their bloods, their heart's 〈◊〉 to behold them in a man of God. It becomes not my weakness to advise, only in mine own and others behalf, I unfeignedly wish, and pray, that this were seriously thought upon, and practised by us all, that all of us in a tender regard to the reputation, and honour of our high calling would walk with great surcumspection, make straight steps unto our feet, tread every step as nicely, as gingerly, as if we went among snares, walked upon ropes, or pinnacles. I will conclude with that of Bernard to 〈◊〉, lib. 3. the consideratione, cap. 4. which though written particularly unto him, may yet fittingly enough be applied to every Minister, nay every Christian. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 malas res, & malas paritèr species 〈◊〉, in altero conscientiae, in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. It becomes your holiness to decline as evil things, so also evil appearances, in that thou consult'st for thy Conscience, in this for thy fame, nay (indeed) if it be not presumption to add unto the Father, in this thou providest both for Conscience, and Fame: for 〈◊〉 first; for the purity, for the peace of thy Consci nce; for the purity of thy Conscience, to keep it void of offence both towards God, and towards men; for the 〈◊〉 of thy Conscience, to preserve it from the violence of Satan's temptations, from the vexations of thine own fears, and jealousies, Secondly, for fame, so to hedge it in from scandal, as that it shall be above the reach of suspicion. Therefore to go on in the words of the Father. Puta tibi non licere, etsi alias fortasse liccat, quicquid 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, coloratum, non sit in sama naevus malae 〈◊〉. Think not for the lawful, though perhaps otherwise lawful, whatsoever shall be evil coloured: In thy fame let there not be so much as a spot of evil appearance, so shalt thou follow things, that are of good report, Phil. 4. 8. and thereby quite take off all private prejudices, all open calumnies against either thy person, or profession. However thou shalt procure the testimony and approbation of God, and thine own Conscience, and be presented unblameable, clear from offensiveness before men, from saultinesse before God, at the appearing of the Lord Jesus Christ: To whom with the Father, and Holy Ghost, be ascribed by us, and the whole Church, the Kingdom, the Power, and Glory, from this time forth for evermore. AMEN. FINIS. THREE SERMONS (Enlarged into a TREATISE) Concerning The last and general Judgement, BEFORE The judges of Assize For the Country of Somerset: WHERE OF One Preached at Chard, Mar. 22. 1657. AND Two at Taunton, Aug. 15, 16. 1658. AT THE Request of WILLIAM HILLIARD Esq lately deceased, and then High Sheriff of that County. By Henry Jeanes, Minister of 〈◊〉 Word at CHEDZOY. OXFORD: Printed by H. Hall, Printer to the University, for Tho: Robinson. 1660. The Stationer to the Reader. THe Theme here handled is very usual and common: But our Author, as I am assured from very good hands, hath done his best for the removal of this prejudice; for first, his method is such, as, I am confident, will prevent all nauseating: and then, he hath inserted ever and anon out of the Schoolmen, such Notions, as thou shalt hardly meet with in any other Books upon this subject: Besides, many obscure and difficult places of Scripture are here fully explicated and cleared. This alone is enough to render this piece as acceptable, as any other Works of the Author. Romans 2. 16. In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my Gospel. THere is some difference amongst Expositors about the Coherence of these words: Beza fetcheth it from the 11th verse, making the 12, 13, 14, 15th verses to come in by way of Parenthesis; there is no respect of persons with God, in the day when God shall judge the 〈◊〉 of men by Jesus Christ according to my Gospel. Pareus amongst Protestants, and Estius amongst Papists draw it from the 12th and 13th verses, and they enclose verse the 14th and the 15th in a Parenthesis: for as many as have sinned without the Law, shall also perish without the law: and as many as have sinned in the Law, shall be judged by the law: for 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of the Law are just before God, but the doers of 〈◊〉 law shall be justified, in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ etc. But against both these ways the objection of 〈◊〉 against. Beza will serve: This verse cannot be well joined unto words so far off, without great divulsion of the sentence, and suspending of the sense: and therefore, with him, I shall look no further, for the 〈◊〉 of the words, than the foregoing verse, Which show the 〈◊〉 of the Law written in their hearts, their Conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one another in the day, when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my Gospel. What the Apostle here speaks of the Gentiles is appliable unto all men: the Consciences of all men shall bear witness, and their thoughts either accuse, or excuse them in the day, when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ etc. there will then be a special. 1. 〈◊〉. 2. Influence. 3. Evidence in the testimony of Conscience, more than there is in this life. First, A special Eminence; it's testimony will then be louder: that evil Conscience, which doth but now whisper, will then roar, and thunder: the peace of a good Conscience here, in this life, passeth all understanding: and that joy, which is the result of it, is unspeakable, and full of Glory: but compared with those ravishing sweets, and Comforts with which the Conscience shall be filled in the day of judgement, it bears not unto them half that proportion, which a Cluster of grapes, cut down at the brook 〈◊〉, had unto the whole vintage of Canaan, Numb. 13. Secondly, The influence of Conscience will then be greater, and 〈◊〉, more irresistible, and unobstructed then now; for now it may be silenced, or out-noised by our louder pleasures; but then, nothing will be able, either to stop or drown its voice; it will speak in as loud, and shrill an accent, as the voice of the Arkeangel, and the trump of God: as these shall awaken the dead out of their Coffins; so shall that raise in the memory of Reprobates those sins, which their impenitency had buried in a grave of forgetfulness, and put fresh life, and vigour into them, to torment, and terrify unto all eternity. Thirdly, In the day of judgement, there will be a clearer evidence in the testimony of Conscience, than now: for now it is many times undiscerned by any, but ourselves: for what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? 1 Cor. 2. 11. but then it will be made as legible, as if it were written with the glorious beams of the Sun upon a wall of the purest Crystal: in conformity hereunto 'tis, that some think, that there is an Elipsis in the words, which they thus supply: their Conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts in the mean while accusing or else excusing one another, as shall be manifested in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ. Estius quotes Stapulensis for another interpretation, to wit; that in the day is as much as against the day: and why may not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be translated here against the day, as well as verse the 5 th' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 against the day of wrath? and thus the coherence will be fluent, and 〈◊〉, and afford us this note: That Conscience will bind over against the grand assizes of Jesus, that day wherein God will Judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ etc. the tribunal of Conscience is a prognostic, and representation of Christ's throne: it's verdict a presage, and preoccupation of Christ's sentence, futuri judicii praejudicium, as Tertullian phraseth it: what are the terrors of a bad Conscience, but slashes of Hell fire? what are the triumphs, and Consolations of a good Conscience, but a glimpse, and dawning of Heaven-happinesse? But I dwell too long upon the Coherence. In the words themselves we have three things considerable. First, A prediction. 2ly, A Description. 3. A Confirmation of the last, and general Judgement. First, A prediction of it: shall Judg. Secondly, A description of it: and that. 1. By its causes. 1. Principal, God shall judge. 2. Instrumental: by Jesus Christ. Secondly, By its object, and that both personal, and real. 1. Personal: men. 2. Real: secrets of men. Thirdly: By an adjunct, the Circumstance of time when: in the day. Lastly, we have the Confirmation of this prediction from a testimony of undeniable authority, the testimony of the Gospel: according to my Gospel. From the words I shall take occasion to handle the Common place of the last, and general judgement, and it is a point that I shall briefly explain, confirm, and apply. 〈◊〉, In the explication of it, I shall confine myself to the opening of the text: the act of judgement is an aggregate action, containing many distinct, and particular acts: some formally, and others by way of concomitancy: a description of which you may see at large. Matth. 25. vers. 31, 32, etc. usque ad finem, 2 Thesal. 1 vers. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Judas 14. 15. Rev. 20. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. here in the text 'tis set forth by its causes, object, and adjunct. 1. By its causes, principal, and instrumental. 1. Principal, God shall Judge: God is taken in Scripture, either 〈◊〉, or personally. 1. Essentially: for the three persons in the Trinity: and so it may be taken here; because the act of judicature is an outward work, and therefore common unto them all. 2. Personally: for the first person, the Father: and the act of judging may, in a special manner, be ascribed unto the Father, by that manner of speaking, which the Schoolmen call appropriation: for hereby the Son, and holy Ghost are not excluded, but only the order of the Father's concurrency shown: to wit, that being the fountain of the Trinity, he judgeth of himself, by the Son, and Holy Ghost. But against this, that saying of our Saviour, may be objected John 5. 22. The Father Judgeth no man: but hath committed all judgement unto the Son. Unto this there are usually given two answers. 1. The Father Judgeth no man separately, without the Son, but hath communicated all Judgement unto the Son non largiendo, sed generando, saith Ambrose, not by temporary donati n, but by eternal generation: but, if any think, that to say, that Judgement is given, or committed unto the Son by eternal generation is too harsh a Catachresis. 2. In a second place therefore, 〈◊〉 answer may be returned, to wit: that the Father Judgeth no man in that manner, that he hath committed all Judgement unto the Son: to wit, as 〈◊〉, as God man, as subsisting in the 〈◊〉: he Judgeth no man in a visible, and external manner: for thus judgement is ascribed unto the Son, not per appropriationem, but per proprietatem. 2. Instrumental, by Jesus Christ, to wit, as man and Mediator; for, as God, he is a principal cause: but, the judiciary power conferred upon Christ's manhood: though, in comparison of other creatures, it be a power singularis 〈◊〉 of singular, and transcendent excellency, unto which no creature can have an equal power: yet, in respect of the judiciary power of his Godhead, 'tis but a secundary, subordinate, and ministerial power, which he hath by delegation, and Commission: so that, as man, he is but a deputy Judge; the Father hath committed all Judgement unto the Son, John 5. 22. that Christ shall Judge, in the humane nature, the Scripture is express: the Son of man shall come in his Glory etc. Matth. 25. 31. chap. 24. v. 30. He hath appointed a day in which he will Judge the world &c, by that man whom he hath ordained &c. Acts 17. 31. Every eye shall see him, and they also which 〈◊〉 him, Rev. 1. 7. Even Reprobates shall see him: but they cannot behold his Godhead; for the sight of that would make them happy, and banish all sadness in his manhood; than it is, that he shall be visible, and conspicuous unto them: but, though the Scripture be thus clear, that Christ shall judge in his manhood: yet whether he shall judge according to his manhood? is made a controversy betwixt the 〈◊〉 and the Scotists. Not so much for the state of the question itself, as for Aquinas his proofs of it; the validity of which Scotus, according unto his usual wont, questioneth and disputes against: the place of Scripture, that is chiefly quoted for the affirmative, is John 5. 27. And hath given him authority to execute judgement also, because he is the Son of man. Here Beza noteth, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because, is put for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as. 〈◊〉 says that the Authors of this interpretation, Heretics, render it infamous: and he quotes in the margin Calvine and Beza upon the place: but their great, and subtle Suarez [in tertiam partem Thom: quaest. 59 artic. 2.] citys Tertullian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cap. 22. for the very same thing: and he takes notice of it, as a thing very remarkable illud observatione dignum non legere quia sed qua: but now (as) is here to be taken not reduplicatiuè; for then authority to execute judgement would be essential to, and reciprocal with man: but specisicatiuè, so that it only determines the subject in which this derived authority is seated: unto this purpose speaks (u) Er juxta 〈◊〉 expositionem, illis verbis quia filius hominis est, non 〈◊〉 causa adaequata, ex qua oriatur potestas judicandi sic enim, ut argumentatur 〈◊〉: 〈◊〉 homines haberent illam 〈◊〉 sed 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 natura, quae necessaria fuit in Christo, ut esset capax hujus donationis, & potestatis. Si enim tantum fuisset Deus non 〈◊〉 hanc potestatem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: 〈◊〉 quia filius 〈◊〉 est, fuit capax ejus 〈◊〉. in 〈◊〉 pattem Thom. quaest. 59 at. 2. Suarez in the place but now quoted: according to this exposition (saith he) in those words (because he is the son of man) is not rendered the adequate cause, whence this power of Judging ariseth, but that nature is designed, which was necessary unto Christ, that he might be capable of the gift of this power; for, as God, he could not receive this power anew; but, because he was the Son of man, he was capable of it: but we may well stick unto our own translation, and render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because, for the humane nature hath not only a concomitancy with, but also a causality in respect of the act of execution of judgement. But then we must not abstract, and sever the humane nature from the grace of Head-ship, and the grace of personal union; but Consider them 〈◊〉 jointly. This Aquinas hints, when he saith [par. 3. quaest. 59 art. 2.] that the Father hath given authority unto the Son to execute Judgement, because he is the Son of man: 〈◊〉 propter conditionem naturae; not merely because of the condition of his nature; for then, as chrysostom objects, all men should have this authority: sed hoc pertinet ad gratiam capitis, quam Christus in humanâ naturâ accepit: but this appertaineth to the grace of head-ship, which he received in the humane nature: the words than may be thus glossed; he hath given him authority to execute judgement also, because he is the Son of man, because, as he is Mediator, King, and head of his Church, so also he is qualified for discharge of this his office, by being not only God, but man in one person, God-man: and it we take this way, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 translated also, will not be redundant, but emphatic: and Maldonate maketh the Emphasis to stand thus: the Father hath not alone the power of judging, but he hath transferred it also upon the Son, because he is the Son of man, and so fitted for the audible, and visible administration of judgement. Aquinas his reasons are by * Lib. 4. dist. 46 quaest. 1. Capreolus thus summed up: judgement agreeth unto Christ, according unto that nature, in regard of which, he hath, as Mediator, Redeemer, and head of his Church, a Lordship over men; but this Lordship agreeth unto him, not only according to his Godhead, but also according to his manhood: for to this 〈◊〉 Christ, both died, and rose, and revived, that he might be Lord both of the d ad, and living, Rom. 14. 9 and therefore he shall judge according to his manhood. Next follows the object of this judgement, and that is twosold, personal, and real. 1. Personal, the persons to be judged, men; although men be here expressed indefinitely: yet we may, by warrant of the Scriptures, add the universal sign, and say; God will judge the secrets of all men, of all sorts, ranks, and degrees of men; of all individuals of men: we shall all stand before the judgement seat of Christ, Rom. 14. 10. we must all appear before the judgement seat of Christ, 2 Cor. 5. 10. Gorran hath a Conceit, that, by the naming of men, the evil angels are excluded, he shall judge the 〈◊〉 of men, not devils, saith he; but, that the wicked angels shall come unto judgement also at the last day, the scripture is very plain, know ye not that we shall judge the Angels, 1 Cor. 6. 3. For if God spared not the Angels that sinned, but cast them down to 〈◊〉, and delivered them into chains of darkness to be reserved unto judgement. 2 Pet. 2. 4. And the Angels which kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation he hath reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgement of the great day, Judas 6. 2. Real, the secrets of men: their secret state, election, and reprobation; their most secrets actions, their chamber, their midnight, and closet sins, that have no witnesses, but such whose partnership, in guilt will render silent, Eccles. 12. 14: 1 Cor. 4. 5. the most hidden, and darkest muse of the mind: those purposes, desires, nay wouldings, and wish of the will, unto which no vent was given, either by language, or action: those passions of the heart, which have been smothered from outward notice with the greatest care, and cunning: nay those first motions, and inclinations unto sin, that were never consented unto, which arise so thick in the soul, as that 'tis impossible, for the most watchful Conscience, to take an exact survey of the most of them: and therefore, may be deservedly ranked, ámongst those errors, and secret faults of which David speaks, Psal. 19 12. Who can understand his errors? cleanse 〈◊〉 me from secret faults. Lastly, we have an adjunct, the circumstance of time, when this judgement shall be, in the day; which is so called (saith Gorran) propter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because then shall be a manifestation of all secret things: sometimes 'tis called midnight, Matth. 25. 6. propter improvisionem, because of the suddenness, and unexpectedness of it: it is called the even, Matth. 20. 8. propter sinem temporis, because then shall be the final period of time; and 'tis styled the morning (as he inferreth) from a mistranslation of the Latin Interpreter, Zeph. 3. 5. propter initium aeternitatis, because 'twill be the beginning, and as it were dawning of eternity: but these are but curious niceties, that have no footing in the text; for, doubtless the day is here taken for time indesinitely, as 'tis usually in many other places of Scripture Esa. 49. 8. 2 Cor. 6. 7. Luk. 19 42. Joh. 8. 56. So that there is no need to make any inquiry touching that opinion of some Millenaries; that the day of judgement shall last a thousand years; because 'tis the day of God, 2 Pet. 3. 12. and with him a thousand years is as one day, verse. 8. and as little cause have we to stay upon the examination of that in Aquinas [Suppl. ad tertiam partem quaest. 88 artis. 2.] where, because he thinks it impossible, that the discussion, and sentencing of all the thoughts, words, and works of men should be dispatched in the space of a day; therefore he concludes, that all things shall then be transacted, not by vocal locution, but mentally in the minds, and Consciences of men. In the next place we have the Confirmation, or proof of this prediction of a future judgement, from the testimony of the Gospel; according to my Gospel; that is according to that doctrine which I have taught you in preaching the Gospel: and this is a proof of unquestionable credit, not to be contradicted by any, either humane, or Angelical testimony: if any man, 〈◊〉 Angel from Heaven, preach any other Gospel unto you, then that you have received, 〈◊〉 him be accursed, Gal. 1. 8, 9 Here inquire we three things. 1. What is meant by Paul's Gospel? 2. How Paul termeth it his Gospel? 3. In what sense God will judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according unto the Gospel of Paul? First, What is meant by this Gospel of Paul? not any History of the birth, life, and sufferings of our Saviour written by Paul, as by Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John: but the doctrine of the Gospel, concerning Jesus Christ, delivered unto them by Paul, either in writing, or else by word of mouth. And hence we may note: that the last judgement is a branch of Evangelicall doctrine: it was one of the chief points, that the Apostles had in their Commission to publish: God commanded us (saith Peter) to preach unto the people, and to testify, that it is he, which was ordained of God to be the Judge, both of quick, and dead, Acts 10. 42. Rolloc. (w) Evangelium vocat praedicationem illam judicii futuri, non quòd ea sit propriè annunciatio gratiae, sed quod ei inserviat, eique necessary. ò permittenda sit, ut agnoscant bomines miseriam suam, qui est primus ad salutem 〈◊〉. loc: thinks, that it belongs unto the Gospel only by way of subserviency, and preparation: but I shall make no scruple to affirm, that it appertaineth properly unto the Gospel, for it is a consummate act of Christ's regal function, and that, not only in the perfect subduing of enemies, but also in the full rewarding of his faithful subjects, unto whom therefore it will be good, and acceptable tidings: neither is this impeached by its terror unto the wicked: for this is only by accident, and so the sweetest, and most comfortable points of the Gospel are unto them a savour of death unto death, 2 Cor. 2. 16, A second inquiry is why the Gospel is styled Paul's Gospel? according unto my Gospel, the same expression we find also, Rom. 16. 25. 2 Tim. 6. 8. For answer we must distinguish betwixt the authority: and the Ministry, or dispensation of the Gospel. The Gospel is Gods and Christ's in regard of authority: for it oweth all its divine worth, and authority unto them: and therefore is styled the Gospel of God, Rom. 1. 1. the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, 2 Thes. 1. 8. the Gospel, which was preached by me (saith Paul) is not after man; for I neither received it of man, neither was I taught it, but by the revelation of jesus Christ, Gal. 1. 1, 1 2. The Gospel than is termed Paul's, only in regard of Ministry and dispensation: because Paul was a Minister, a dispenser, a Steward (amongst 〈◊〉) of the mysteries it 〈◊〉. 1 Cor. 4. 1 a dispensation of the Gospel (saith he) is committed to me, 1 Cor. 9, 17. 〈◊〉 pray I (saith Christ) for these alone, but for them also, which believe on me through their word, Joh. 17. 20. where Christ termeth his own word, the word of his Disciples; because they were the Ministers, and dispensers thereof. And for the same reason, the Gospelis termed the report of the Prophets, and Apostles: who hath believed our report, Esa. 53. 1. Thus the Gospel you see is Gods, 〈◊〉, and Paul's: 'tis the Gospel of God, and Christ, tanquam Authoris: 'tis the Gospel of Paul, tanquam Praedicatoris. The third and last inquiry is how, and in what sense, God shall judge the secrets of men, according unto Paul's Gospel? according unto my Gospel. This clause [according to my Gospel,] may be referrred, either unto [Jesus Christ] or else unto [Judge]. If it (x) 〈◊〉 referti ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Provocat e in ad suum Evangellum non at doceat secundom quid Deus sit judicaturus, sed per quem nempe media torem: id quod non in lege, sed in Evangelio 〈◊〉. Pareus in loc be referred unto Jesus Christ; then the Apostle, in referring them for evidence unto his Gospel, doth not teach them, so much, according unto what rule God will judge: as by whom to wit, the Mediator: which is a point taught and revealed, not in the law, but in the Gospel. If we place this clause according unto my Gospel in order of sense and construction after judge: than it may import one of these two things concerning Gods future judgement of the world: either a conformity of it unto the Gospel: or else the revelation of it by the Gospel. 1. A Conformity of it unto the Gospel: and so it signifies, that the sentence, then to be denounced, is already set forth, and proclaimed in the Gospel, from which the Judge shall not then vary: he that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life, and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him, Joh. 3. 36. He that believeth and is baptised, shall be saved: but he that believeth not, shall be damned, Mark 16. 16. This is the voice of the Gospel: and according to the tenor of this Evangelicall decree, as I may say, shall God pronounce sentence at the last day: to wit a sentence of absolution and benediction upon believers, and of condemnation upon unbelievers. But now, though all that have not believed in Christ Jesus shall that day be condemned: yet those Pagans, unto whom Christ was never revealed, shall not be condemned for their not believing in Christ: but for transgression of the Law written in their heart: and the reason is, because the Obligation of any Law necessarily presupposeth promulgation thereof; and therefore those, unto whom Christ is not preached, cannot be bound to believe in him. How can they be condemned, for refusal of the Gospel, unto whom it was never offered? the rule then, by which God will judge such, will be, not the Gospel, but the Law of Nature. And therefore in a second place I rather believe that [according to the Gospel] signifies, the revelation of the judgement to come by the Gospel. (y) Dominus judicabit occulta hominum secundum Evangelium me 'em. Quomodo dicat Apostolus Deum Judicaturum lecundum Evangelium: cum prius dixerit, reddicurum unicuique secundum opera sua; Evangelium verò non est doctrina operum, sed fidei? Respons: In Explicatione ostendimus, particulam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non significare normam judicii, ut prius, sed certitudinem: q. d. judicabit de occultis hominum, prout docui vos in Evangelio. Quod si 〈◊〉 de normâ accipiatur, sententia non erit incommoda, nam infideles quidem Condemnabit Deus ex operibus secundum; legem: maledictus omnis qui non manserit in omnibus: sideles verò 〈◊〉. olvet secundum Evangelium: qui credit in silium Dei, habet vitam aeternam. Et tamen his & illis reddet secundum opers, prout vel ex side, vel ex insidelitate sluxerunt bona vel mala. Parcus dub. in loc. God shall judge the secrets of men, by Jesus Christ according unto my Gospel: that is, as verily and certainly, as I have foretold you of it in my Gospel: in which sense the particle according is taken by our Saviour; Matth. 9 29. according unto your faith be it unto you, that is, let it be unto you, as ye believe: Paul (lest any one should think this his discourse of judgement to come to be a fable or fiction) backs it with the authority of the Gospel: God shall judge etc. according unto my Gospel, that is, as I have taught you in my Gospel, in the preaching of which I was guided by a full, and infallible spirit. As for other scriptural proofs, besides the text, it is needless to urge them unto those, that have read the Bible, for, there is hardly any argument, wherein it is more plentiful: supposing therefore the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the point to be clear out of Scripture, I shall only point at some few Congruences, out of the Schoolmen, why it should be so. (z) 〈◊〉 ad iudicium generale quatuor congruentiae. Prima talis, quia 〈◊〉 est finalilèr separati omnes malos ab omnibus bonis. Non enim malus communicat cum bono; nisi vel ad hoc ut malus corrigatur, vel ut bonus per eam exerceatur, secundum illud Aug. super. Psal. nunc autem veniet finalls determinatio, ubi nec ultra boni exerceantur, nec mall corrigantur. Ergo 〈◊〉 est 〈◊〉 generalem sententiam: Ergo & generale judicium ut separatio illa generalis appareat iusta. Secunda Congruentia, quia in secretis iudiciis quae fiunt circa singulas personas, licet sit iustitia, non tamen omnibus manifesta: rationabile est ergo quod Deus habeat aliquod iudicium generale, in quo manifestetur sententia, vel iustitia, quam exercuit in iudiciis particularibus. Tertia Congruentia, sicut tes sunt à primo efficiente ita reducuntur in primum, ut in sinem: sed praetet speciales exitus rerum à Deo per illam operationem, de quâ dicit Salvator Jòh. 5. Pater mens usque modo operatur, & ego operor. Fuit unus exitus Unversalis in primâ terum creatione: ergo â simili praeter singulares reductiones congruit 〈◊〉 unam finalem reductionem in finem suum, & per Consequens ad hoc, unam finalem sententiam discretivam, quia mali non reducuntur. Quarta & est melior, quia praeter hoc, quod unusquisque ascribatur regno vel carceri tota multitudo praevisa ad regnum debet aliquando determinari ad possidendum 〈◊〉, & tota alia multitudo relinqui Carceri, ut sic sequestratio duarum familiarum, seu duarum civitatum, sicut tractat August. per totam de civi: Dei. licat ergo 〈◊〉 nunc iste, nunc ille, ascribatur regno, nunc iste nunc ille 〈◊〉: tamen 〈◊〉 est aliquod iudicium generale per quod tota multitudo praevisa ad regnum, mittatur in possessionem regni, & tota alia, relinquatur 〈◊〉. Scotus lib. 4. dist. 47. assigneth four Congruences why there should be a general judgement. The first Congruence is: because it is meet, that all the bad, and wicked ones should be finally, and everlastingly separated from all the good: for one purpose, whereto their outward Conjunction and Communion serveth, is for the exercise, and trial of the Godly. Now there shall come a time, wherein the godly shall be no longer exercised, tried, or vexed with the unrighteous Conversation of the ungodly: therefore there must be a final separation between them; and Consequently a general judgement, that so the general separation may appear to be just, wherein the wheat shall be no longer cumbered with the growth of tares amongst them. A second Congruence; because the justice of God's secret judgements of particular persons is not manifest unto all: therefore it is reasonable, that there should be a general judgement: wherein the justice of God's sentence in particular judgements shall be made manifest, and open to all the world. A third Congruence is; because as things are from God, as their first efficient, and author; so they are to be reduced, and as it were, brought back, or returned again, unto God, as their last end. But now, besides the special 〈◊〉, or outgoings of things from God by that operation, of which our Saviour speaketh; My Father worketh hitherto and I also work; there was one general 〈◊〉, or outgoing of all things from God, in the first Creation of things: therefore (by an argument drawn a simili,) besides the singular and several reductions of things unto God, it is Congruors that, of such as belong unto God, there should be one final reduction unto God, as unto their end: and by consequent there should be one final sentence distinguishing those, who belong unto God by election, from the wicked, who shall never be reduced unto, but for ever severed from God's glorious presence. The fourth and (saith Scotus) the best Congruence is, because it is meet, that, besides the private and several admittances of particular believers into possession of the Kingdom of Heaven, there should be a public, joint, and general admittance of all believers into inheritance of the Kingdom, which was prepared for them before the foundation of the world. And, besides the private, particular, and several condemnations of unbelievers unto the prison of Hell, there should be one public and general condemnation of all unbelievers unto perpetual abode in the said prison: that so there may be a sequestration, as it were, of two families, or Cities, the household of God and of faith, and the family, or brood of Satan. Unto these Congruences of Scotus, I shall add this one thing more; that, before the last judgement, God's judgement of man is not complete, and consummate; and this shall be cleared: First, from the two essential parts of man, soul and body, Secondly, from a twofold Consideration of the actions of men, as they are in themselves, and as they are in regard of their effects, and men's opinions of them. Thirdly, from a twofold Consideration of man himself as he is a particular private person and as he is a part of the universe. First, from the Consideration of the (a) Cum non sola anima, sod homo integer peccer, 〈◊〉 bene operetur, homo etiam integer judicari debet, & convenientem paenam aut praemium in animo & corpore debita proportione recipere. Suar. in 3 am partem Tho. 2. disp. 53 Sect. 1. p. 629. two essential parts of man, soul, and body, for, in the particular judgement, there is but one of these parts judged, the soul; therefore there is another judgement to be looked for, which shall be a total judgement, a judgement of the whole man, soul, and body: we must all appear before the judgement seat of Christ, that every one may receive the thing done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad. 2 Cor. 5. 10. the body and soul of the wicked have here in this life a joint and mutual Concurrence unto the work of sin; and therefore Congruent, that in the next life, they be associated in the punishment of sin, and be reciprocal tormentors one to another. The members of their bodies are here instruments, or weapons of unrighteousness; and therefore equitable, that hereafter they be subjects of misery, and unhappiness: Meet is it, that those eyes should then be full of anguish, which now are full of adultery; that that tongue should be then full of deadly torments, which now is full of deadly poison: so on the other side fit, that as the bodies of the Saints are instrumental unto their souls in Welldoing; so they should share with them in the reward of well-being, and have as much of their glory, and lustre derived unto them, as they are capable of. As here the members of their bodies are instruments of righteousness unto God; so it is Congruent, that they should then be receptacles of glory, and happiness from God. Secondly, from a twofold Consideration of men's actions: they may be considered, 〈◊〉, as they are in themselves; or (b) Sciendum, quod licet per mortem vita hominis temporalis terminetor secundum se, remanet tamen ex futuris, secundum quid dependens. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod adhuc vivit in memoriis hominum, in quibus quandoque contra veritatem remanei bonae famae vel malae etc. Alio modo quantum ad effectum Suorum operum sicut ex deceptlone 〈◊〉 & aliorum seductorum, postulat infidelitas usque ad finem mundi, & usque tune proficit sides ex praedicatione Apostolorum etc. Omnia autem baec sub 〈◊〉 existimationi judicii divini. Et ideo de his omnibus perfectum & manifestum judicium 〈◊〉 non potest, quamdiu hujus 〈◊〉 cursus durat. Et propter hoc oportet esse finale judicium in novissimo die, inquo perfectè id qd ad unumquemque hominem pertinet, quocunque modo, perfectè & manifestè judicetur, Aqu. 3 â par. 〈◊〉. qu. 59, Art. 5 Quia opera hominum alio modo manent post mottem eorum, vel in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, &. sama, vel in effectibus suis qui varii, & multiplices esse solent: Ergo licèt Deus judicet actiones unius cuiusque hominis in morte ejus, considerando illas secundum 〈◊〉, id est, secundum id, quod vera sunt, oportet nihilominus, ut de eyes faciat publicum & universale iudicium in quo conster tam de ipsis actionibus, quam de omnibus effectibus earum, & nocumentis, ac fructibus qui ad alios ex eis redundarunt tum re ipsâ, 〈◊〉 etiam secundum aliorum existimationem. Suarcz in 3 am partem Thom. Tom. 2. disp, 53. Sect. 1. secondly, in regard of their fruits and effects, unto which we may annex another consideration; in respect of the same, that goeth of them, of the judgement, opinion, and estimate, that men pass upon them. First, we may look upon men's actions as they are in themselves: and so God judgeth the actions of every man at his death, Heb. 9 27. Secondly we may Consider men's actions according to their effects, fruits, issue or event, good, or bad: and so, however they are Physically transient, and therefore can have no Physical operation after the death of their agents: yet their moral influence, (to wit by way of motive,) may reach unto many after ages: for unto that there is requisite only an objective existence in the minds, and memories of men. Thus good books edify, and Erroneous and heretical books pervert, and poison many thousands of years after the Authors are dead, and rotten: the Preaching of the Prophets, and Apostles will be fruitful, and effectual in the hearts and lives of men, as long as the sun, and moon endure. How many are there, even to this day, wonderfully affected with the Exampels, of Abraham's faith, Moses his meekness, Jobs patience, samuel's justice, and uprghtnesse, David's repentance, and the like? and so again, on the other side, the scandal of a lewd example may be propogated unto many generations: Jeroboam made Israel to sin a long time after his interrement as long as their was a face of a Church, or Commonwealth in Israel: how long doth a place groan under the effects of the ministry of precedent Pastors, that have been, either lazy, & negligent, or ignorant, or profane, or superstitious, or Erroneous? there must therefore be a time wherein Christ shall pass public, and universal judgement upon, not only men's actions considered in themselves; but also of all the fruits, and effects, which have from their actions redounded unto others; and that, both in their life, and after their death; that so the wicked may have a full measure of wrath, according unto the full measure of their sins, considered in themselves; and according to the full measure of their harmful, scandalous, and mischivous effects; and that the Godly may have a full and ample reward, as for their faith, and good works in themselves, so for the happy fruits of them; for the glory, that by them hath accured unto God, and for the benefit, and edification, that from them hath arisen unto the Church. (c) Quamvis etc. estentiale praemium, vel poena conferatur in fine vitae, etc. nihilominus tamen effectus postea subsecuti duabus ex causis conserre possunt ad iudicium. Primo ad accidentarium praemium, vel poenam, ut iniqui omnium actionum suarum structus intuentes magis consundantur: boni vero ècontrario de bonis 〈◊〉 gaudeant. Secundo & maximè quia essectus sleudunt malitiam, vel bonitatem operum, unde orti sunt, ut 〈◊〉 illis omnibus propositis & ponderatis evidentibus omnibus pateat aequitas divini iudicii, valdè congruum suit post consummaras et sinitas omnes actiones humanas hujus vitae, omnesque effectus earum, sleri universale iudicium in quo omnia 〈◊〉 perpendantur. Suarez [in tertiam partem. Tho. To: 2 dis. 53. 〈◊〉. 1.] assigneth two reasons, or causes, why the effects of actions, after the death of their agents, should conduce unto the universal judgement of them. First, they contribute, if not unto the essential, yet unto the accidental and accessary reward of the Godly, as also accidental and accessary punishment of the wicked. First, unto the accidental and accessary reward of the Godly; for, unto them, it cannot but afford matter of unspeakable joy, and triumph, to behold the blessed fruits of their exemplary faith, profession, obedience, patience, labours for the public etc. in that by them they have (perhaps) won many a soul unto God, Confirmed weaklings, Confounded adversaries, furthered any in the way of salvation, in the building up of their souls, in either knowledge, or holiness. Secondly, they confer unto the accidental and accessary punishment of the wicked; in that, they cannot but be amazed, and confounded, at the view of the many dismal effects of their accursed sins as in others; so particularly, in the wives of their bosoms, fruits of their loins, their dearest intimates: O! what a cutting consideration will it be unto them, at the day of judgement, that by their sins, as they have damned themselves, so also they have been the guilty occasion of sin, and consequently of damnation unto others, who have been seduced, and perverted by their Frrors, and heresies, or misguided, and misled by their evil counsel, corrupt discourse, and advice, and scandalised by their sinful example? A second reason (assigned by Suarez) is: because effects show the naughtiness, or goodness of the works, whence they spring, that therefore all those things, being both propounded, and examined the equity of God's judgement, may more evidently be manifested, it is very meet, that, after all the actions, and all the effects of the actions of all mankind in this life are once quite consummated, there should be a universal judgement, in which all things may be most exactly weighed. Before (i) Quanquam effectus 〈◊〉 accidentarii, qui nec praevisi sunt nec connexionem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cum actione 〈◊〉, non augeant etc. praemium vel paenam apud Deum: 〈◊〉 illi 〈◊〉 qui aliqua ratione sunt praevisi, vel quovis modo coniuncti cum actionibus hominis, ita ut in eyes tanquam in semine contenti suerint augent praemium ac paenam etc. lapraed. I leave this argument, I shall entreat you totake notice of Suarez his limitation of it: who understands it, not of such effects, as are merely accidental which cannot probably be foreseen, nor have any natural connexion with the actions themselves but of such effects, which are, or may be some way or other foreseen, and are in some regard conjoined with the actions: so that they are contained in them, as in a seed, or root. With this Consideration of men's actions, in regard of their effects, we may connex another, in regard of the fame that goeth of them, of the judgement, opinion, and estimate that men pass upon them: here men's actions are (e) Ad 〈◊〉 etiam consert illa ratio sumpta 〈◊〉 existimatione. Facile enim decipitur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vel maliciâ vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Quia ex iis, quae exterius apparent, 〈◊〉 unde fit, ut & bonorum sama saepe laedatur, & iniquorum malitia adeò occultetur, ut boni & insti existimentur. Oportuit ergo ut in divino iudicio, quod non est secundum carnem Joan. 8. nec secundum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, aut auditum 〈◊〉, Isa. 11. sed 〈◊〉 omnium 〈◊〉. 1. Reg. 16. 〈◊〉, inquam in hoc 〈◊〉 singulorum iniurias 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 quadam 〈◊〉, divinaque lance pensari, & iustis 〈◊〉 restitui, iniquotum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & versutiam detegi. Quare de illis dicitur Sapient. 5. Stabunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 magna 〈◊〉 etc. De iis 〈◊〉 Videntes turbabuntur timore horribili, & infra. Dicentes, high sont, quos 〈◊〉 aliquando in derisum, etc. Huc 〈◊〉 spectant 〈◊〉 illae, quibus Christus utitur in Evangelio, quibus explicat bonos & malos in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 permixtos ità, ut vix discerni possint, sicut virgines fatuae, & 〈◊〉: oportuit ergo 〈◊〉 discerni, & seperari, sicut 〈◊〉 à zizaniis, & granum à pallea, etc. Suarez in tertiam 〈◊〉 Thom. Tom. 2. disp. 53. sect. 1. p. 629. misjudged, misinterpreted, misconstrued; gross villainies are many times so coloured, and made so specious, as that they carry away a general applause: and the most laudable actions meet with most disgraceful, and reproachful aspersions. And as men's actions, so consequently men's persons are misjudged two. The rankest, and grossest Hypocrites pass many a times for glorious saints; and the best of Saints are reproached as the worst of men. Hannah was censured for a drunkard; David for a traitor, 〈◊〉 for the troubler of Israel; Paul a pestilent fellow and a mover of sedition amongst the Jews through out all the world: there must there fore be a second, and universal judgement, wherein all actions, and persons, that have been misjudged shall have righteous judgement pass upon them; so that men's now shining sins shall their be unmasked, and displayed in their proper colours; and on the Contrary, the procession of the power of Christianity, all pious aactions, which are now so discountenanced, and despised shall then receive a public, not only approbation, but reward, and that from God himself; and then for men's persons God will put a difference between the wheat, and the chaff; the Corn, and the tares; the empty formalist, that hath only a form, a powerles show of Godliness and the sincere Christian, that hath the power of Godliness, the vitals of religion, flaming in his heart, and life: then the Lord will (to allude unto the words of Moses in another case) Numb. 16. 5. show who are his, and who is holy, and will cause him to Come near unto him, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whom he hath chosen, will he cause to Come near unto him. Lastly, that God's judgement of man is not complete, before the last judgement, is to be manifested 〈◊〉 a (e) Dicendum quod quilibet homo, & est singularis quaedam 〈◊〉, & est pars totius generis 〈◊〉 unde & duplex ei judicium 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de eo fiet post mortem, quando recipiet 〈◊〉 ea quae in corpore gessit, quamvis non 〈◊〉, quià non quoad 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 tantum. Aliud iudicium debet esse de eo, secundum quod est pars totius humani generis; sicut aliquis 〈◊〉 dicitur secundum humanam iustitiam, 〈◊〉 quando iudicium 〈◊〉 de come nunitate cuius 〈◊〉 est par. Unde & tunc quando fiet universale iudicium totius humani genetis per universalem separationem bonorum à malis: etiam quilibet per coniequens iudicabitur, Aquin. suppl. quaest. 8 8. artic. 1. primo. 〈◊〉 Consideration of man; to wit, as he is a private, and particular person; and as he is a part of the Universe, that is whole mankind: this, by Suarez, (f) Accedit, quod ad 〈◊〉 hoius divinae iustitiae non solum necessarium fuit, considerare singulorum hominum peccata secundum se: sed etiam in ordine ad 〈◊〉, & in ordine ad gubernationem totius universi & ad 〈◊〉, & specialem providemiam, quam Deus 〈◊〉, & respectu totius universi, et respectu singulorum hominum, atque ideo voluit, non tantum quasi privatim iudicare singulos homines: sed etiam publicè totum 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 unius integri corporis 〈◊〉, cuius bona omnia, & mala, secundum omnes respectus, & habitudines suas in severum examen adducantur. 〈◊〉 fit, ut licet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ad ferendum iudicium singulorum, non sit necessaria haec generalis congregatio omnium: tamen ex parte ipsorum hominum sit quodammodo necessaria, tum al publicam 〈◊〉 divinae 〈◊〉, tum 〈◊〉, ut quaedam specialis retributio proveniens ex publicâ laude, & honore, vel confusione, locum 〈◊〉. Haec enim necessario resultat 〈◊〉 modo iudicii publici, et 〈◊〉, non autem ex privatis. Undè 〈◊〉 Paulus 1. add 〈◊〉. 4. Nolite aute tempus iudicare quoad usque veniat Dominus, qui illuminabit abscondita 〈◊〉, & tunc laus erit 〈◊〉 à Dco. Hinc intelligitur hunc modum iudicii esse valdè conformem distributivae 〈◊〉. Name (ut 〈◊〉 ait 1. ad Cor. 9) quamdiù in hâc vita vivimus, veluti in publico stadio versamur laborantes, ut bravium & coronam propositam consequamur; quando autem publicum praemium certantibus proponitur, ratio communis 〈◊〉 et 〈◊〉 distributivae postulat, ut in publico 〈◊〉 omnium congredientium debitus honor et praemium tribuatur singulis etc. Deus autem, qui 〈◊〉 ac suavitèr omnia disponit homines gubernare statuit, ac iudicare modo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nè accommodato, atque adeo ratione distributivae perfectissimè servata. 〈◊〉 Paulus 〈◊〉. 2. ad Corinth. 5. & add Rom. 14. Omnes nos manifestari oportet, ante tribunal Christi, ut unusquisque reserat propria corporis prout 〈◊〉 ob eandem rationem praemium beatorum 〈◊〉 in Sacra Scripeura Corona iustitiae, vitae, ac gloriae. 2. ad Tim. 4. Apocal. 2. Jacob. 1. Illa enim propriè dicitur corona, quae victoribus publicè, et cum celebritate donatur, in. loc. praedict. is thus cleared up; it is, not only necessary unto the manifestation of God's justice to Consider the sins of particular men secundum se, as they are in themselves: but also in reference unto others, in order unto the government of the whole world: in reference to that universal, and special providence, which God hath, both in respect of the whole Universe, and in respect of particular men: and therefore God will not only judge privately particular men, but he will also publicly judge the whole Universe, to wit of mankind, by way of one entire politic body: all whose good, and evil actions shall be brought unto a most severe trial: and that Considered according to all their respects, and references whatsoever. Hereupon it followeth: that, although on God's part this general gathering, or assembly of all be not necessary unto him to pass judgement on every particular person: yet in regard of men themselves 'tis after a sort necessary, both for the public manifestation of God's justice, as also that a certain special kind of retribution, proceeding, either from public praise, and honour, or else public shame, and confusion may have place: for this kind of retribution necessarily results from such a manner of public, and universal judgement, not from the private judgements of particular persons: judge nothing before the time until the Lord Come, who will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the Counsels of the heart: and then shall every man have praise of God; to wit public praise, and honour: and this also is imported by the resemblance of the reward of the Godly at the last day unto a prize, 1 Cor. 9 24. unto a Crown, a Crown of righteousness, a Crown of life, and a Crown of glory: for, however a prize, or a crown may be designed, or allotted privately; yet it is usually bestowed publicly, in some great assembly or concourse of people, seldom or never in a corner: and thus have you seen, that, before the last judgement, God's judgement is not consummate; for, it is but a judgement of the soul: it is but a judgement of men's actions, considered in themselves: it is but a judgement of men taken as private, and particular persons: therefore there is another judgement, which shall he complete, and perfect: a judgement both of bodies, and souls: a judgement, as of men's actions in themselves, so of their fruits, and effects, and of men's judgements, and opinions, that they pass upon them etc. a judgement of men, not 〈◊〉 as private particular persons, but as they are parts of the universe of mankind. 1. Here is a use of Terror unto all the wicked: for this day will be unto them, if they die in this Condition, a day of wrath, Rom. 2. 5. 〈◊〉. the fullness of God's vindicative wrath will then be poured upon 1 Use. them: the wrath of a mortal King is (saith Solomon) as the roaring Of Terror. of a Lion, Prov. 19 12. and as a messenger of death, Prov. 16. 14. it is the second and eternal death, of which the vengeance of the immortal King of Kings, and Lord of Lords is a forerunner: and, in Comparison of this, the most tormentful death of the body is but a flea-biting: for the hatred of an infinite God, cannot but make a creature infinitely miserable: behold (saith Malachi) the day cometh that shall burn as an Oven, and all the proud, yea, and all that do wickedly shall be stubble: and the day that cometh shall burn them up, saith the Lord of Hosts, that it shall leave them neither 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 branch, Mal. 4. 1. Suppose the place be chiefly meant of the destruction of Jerusalem, shortly upon the first coming of Christ; yet there is no doubt, but it may be applied unto the execution of Christ's wrath upon the ungodly in the very day of judgement: here, in this life they may be proud, (like the metals of iron, and brass) stubborn, and inflexible; but, in that day, they shall be like stubble before fire, before the fire of an Oven, where it burns more fiercely, and furiously then in the open air: the consuming fire of God's wrath shall then utterly, and irrecoverably destroy all their comforts, and happiness: the day that cometh shall burn 〈◊〉 up, it shall 〈◊〉 them neither root nor branch. The Doctrine of judgement to come made Felix, a corrupt judge to tremble upon the 〈◊〉 though the Pulpit was the bar, and the preacher but a poor prisoner, Paul in his bonds, Acts 24. 25. if the bare commination of this judgement be so terrifying: what will the sense, and experience of it do? In Rev. 6. 15, 16, 17. you shall find, that it will put the Kings of the earth, the great men and the rich men, and the chief Captains, and the mighty men into such a desperate affrightment, as that, they shall be so foolish, as to hide themselves in the dens, and the rocks of the mountains: as if it were possible for them to run from omniscience, and withal they shall bewray so impotent a passion, as to invocate the rocks and mountains to fall 〈◊〉 them: indeed to be crushed in pieces by them will be a more tolerable ruin, than the frown, and wrath of the Lamb that 〈◊〉 the Throne: it is strange there should be such Lion like terror in a Lamb; but, though he be a Lamb in regard of mildness unto his own, he will be the Lion of the Tribe of Judah unto his adversaries; and he will be unto them so dreadful a Lion, as that they shall be even forced to acknowledge the 〈◊〉 of his wrath, and the unresistablenesse of his power: they shall say the great day of his wrath is come, and who shall be able to stand: indeed the greatness of their terror will be such, as that it is undecipherable by the tongues of men, and Angels: but a guess we may give at it (though (alas!) very narrow and defective) by the terrors of some condemned Malefactors. Before the Assizes, how full are their minds of boding fears, and when it cometh, how are these their fears heightened? every circumstance, the grave, and severe aspect of the Judge, the aufulnesse of the Bench, and the Judgement seat, the Sheriff's Halberds, the great throng of spectators, and auditors, the rattling of their own irons will even distract and amaze them; the trumpets, that are musical unto others, sound unto them a doleful note; and are, as it were, a passing bell; but the dreadful sentence of death strikes them dead, and kills them before their execution: as you may see by their pale and bloodless cheeks, shaking hands, and trembling knees: but when once they are dragged from the prison to the place of execution, without hopes, either of pardon, or reprieve, than despair, the most terrible of all passions possesseth the place of fear, and sorrow, and the expressions of it are so doleful, as that they 〈◊〉 the pity of any humane breast: But now, what is any terrene Judge compared with the Son, that hath all judgement committed to him, all power given to him in Heaven and in earth? how poor and mean is the retinue of the most magnificent sheriff, in comparison of those millions of Angels, that shall wait on Christ? how inglorious is any bench, in respect of these Assessors, that shall sit with Christ in judgement, the myriads of Saints each of which shall shine forth as the Sun, Matth. 13. 43? how dreadless, and contemptible is any tribunal, in comparison of Christ's Throne? which Daniel 7. 16. is described to be like a fiery flame? what are your trumpets, in comparison of that shout, the voice of the Ark-Angell, and the trump of God? with which the Lord himself shall 〈◊〉: from Heaven, 1 Thes. 4. 16. which shall shake Heaven and earth? these, all these particulars together, with the thunder of that condemnatory sentence, and the sight of the horrid executioners there of, the Devil, and his Angels, will beget such an earthquake in their bosoms; that will be followed with such unspeakable yell, roar, and howl, as will express the greatest perturbation, that an humane soul is capable of. The day of judgement (you see) will be a black, and dismal day unto all the ungodly, a day of darkness, and not light, Amos 5. 18. The horror of it will receive no allay, or mitigation by the least degree, or drop of comfort. But, there are two particulars in the text, that will aggravate the sadness, and discomfort of the day unto unbelievers in the Church: and that far more than unto mere Pagans, though professed worshippers of Devils: to wit, consideration of. 1. The person by whom. 2. The rule by which they shall be judged. First, God will judge them by Jesus Christ: to accept of whom they have been daily wooed, and courted; and yet they have, with unspeakable contempt, refused him: whereas there be Pagans, that never so much as heard of the name of Christ, and therefore, it will be more tolerable for these in the day of judgement then for those. 2. God will judge them according to the Gospel, which they have so vilified, and despised: the Gospel cannot oblige those, unto whom it was never published; and consequently they cannot be judged by the rule of the Gospel, but now it hath been daily sounded in the ears of loose, and profane Christians: how shall they then escape (according to the Law of the Gospel) damnation at that day? if they continue with a scornful obstinacy to neglect, and reject that great Salvation, which is tendered them in the Gospel? and that, with the greatest and most condescending importunity, that can be imagined, Heb. 2. 3? Secondly, Here is a use of Consolation unto all true believers: 2 Use, Of Consolation. for the great day Judas 6. will be unto them a good day: as good as it will be great. The Psalmist, in a most Elegant Apostrophie, exhorts the inanimate, dumb, and senseless creatures to bear a part with them in their exultations and doxologies for the Lords coming to judgement: and, as it were, to congratulate the bliss, and glory, which they shall then enjoy: Let the Heavens rejoice, and let the earth be glad: let the sea roar and the fullness thereof. Let the field be joyful, and all that is therein, 〈◊〉 shall all the trees of the wood rejoice before the Lord, for he cometh, for he cometh to Judge the earth: he shall Judge the world with righteousness, and the people with his truth, Psal. 96. 11, 12, 13. Make a joysull noise unto the Lord, all the earth: make a loud 〈◊〉, and rejoice, and 〈◊〉 praise: Sing unto the Lord with the harp: with 〈◊〉 harp and the voice of a Psalm: with trumpets and sound of 〈◊〉: make a joy full noise before the Lord, the King. Let the sea roar and the fullness thereof: the world and they that dwell therein. Let the slouds clap their hands: let the hills be joyful together before the Lord, for he 〈◊〉 to Judge the earth: with righteousness shall he judge the world, and 〈◊〉 people with equity, Psal. 98, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 But to instance in some particulars, against which the expectation of the day of judgement may comfort the members of Christ: and they shall be their sins, their afflictions, and their death. First, It may comfort them against their sins: against. 1. The guilt. 2. The being and pollution of them. 1. Against the guilt of their sins: for God will Judge them by Jesus Christ, their Saviour, their Redeemer, their Head, their Husband, their elder Brother, who will spare them, as a man spareth his Son, that serveth him, Mal. 3. 17. Christ calleth his Disciples his Friends, joh. 15. 15. and therefore he cannot be unto them a rigid, and inexorable judge; for exuit personam judicis (saith the Orator) quisquis amici induit, he that assumes the person of a friend, puts off the person of a judge. He that shall then judge of their sins, is now an Advocate against their sins: and his Advocation is in the right of his satisfaction: he intercedes for the pardon of those sins, that he hath satisfied God's justice for unto the uttermost farthing: if any man sin? we have an Advocate with the Father jesus Christ the righteous, and he is the propitiation for our sins, 1 joh. 2. 1. 2. Christ will appear the second time without sin unto them that look for him, Heb. 9 28. And they are only such as believe in him: his appearing the second time will be the consummation of his discharge, from all the sins of believers imputed, to him at his first appearing: and if he, their surety, be discharged from them, impossible that they should be condemned for them: and therefore Peter promiseth unto them, that at that time their sins shall be blotted out, Acts 3. 19 that is at least declaratively: the pardon of all their sins shall then be proclaimed in the hearing of all the world: and they shall then also receive the full fruit of their pardon, a consummate deliverance from all the consequents of sin, in their bodies, as well as their souls. Secondly, against the being and pollution of their sins, for then Christ will appear without sin considered mystically, as well as personally: he will present his Church to himself glorious, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing, but it shall be holy and without blemish, Eph. 5. 27. Here is comfort, secondly, unto believers against all their afflictions, of what nature soever: rejoice, in as much as ye are made partakers of Christ's sufferings: that when his glory shall be revealed, ye may be be glad also with exceeding joy, 1 Pet. 4. 13. here the Saints life of glory is hid with Christ in God; hidden with great heaps of external misery: but when Christ who is their life shall appear, then shall 〈◊〉 also appear with him in glory, Colos. 3. 3, 4. God will then be glorified in his Saints, and admired in all them that believe, 2 Thes. 1. 10. Their glory shall be such, as that it shall strike their scornful slighters with stupor, and astonishment: and shall infinitely overbalance their greatest pressures, and lowest abasures: here is but the seeds time of glory. Light is but sown for the righteous, and gladness for the upright in heart, Psal. 97. 11. and commonly they have a wet seeds time too: they sow in tears Psal. 126. 5. but in this day, they shall reap a plentiful harvest of a most intense joy, in which there shall be no allay, by the mixture of the least grief, for God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, Rev. 21. 4. here their light is frequently interrupted, and eclipsed: a child of light may walk in darkness and see no light, Esai. 50. 10. not so much as a glimpse of comfort: but then they shall enjoy a clear, and a perpetual noon, that shall not be overcast, so much as with one cloud: Gods Jewels may now lie in the dirt, and upon the dunghill, but that will be the day when God will make up his 〈◊〉 Mal. 3. 17. and then they shall shine oriently with unimaginable lustre: those that are, as David, men after Gods own heart, may have their good names buried in a deeper and filthier grave than any in 〈◊〉 valley, Ezek. 37. (a throat of calumny deservedly entitled by the Psalmist an open sepulchre, Psal. 5. 9) but God will give their reputations, as well as their bodies, a resurrection: he will bring their innocency to light, and make their righteousness clearer than the 〈◊〉- day, Psal. 37. 6. Though God's people have lain amongst the Pots, Psal. 68 13. though they be so vile and miserable, as that, in this world, they are in no better a condition, then poor scullion boys, that stink with grease, and are blacked all over with smoke, and soot; yet in the resurrection they shall be as the wings of a dove covered with silver, and her feathers with yellow gold, that is, they shall glister, as the beautiful wings of a Dove; that are of a silver and golden colour: the day of judgement is termed by Peter, times of refreshing, tempor a refrigerii, times of cooling, and the hope of this may support against even a fiery trial, 1 〈◊〉. 4. 12. In ver. 21. of the same chapter it is entitled the day of restitution of all things: and this may digest the highest outward losses; for there is nothing, that injustice, and tyranny can bereave us of, but the glory of that day will make ample recompense for it, Matth. 19 29. In Rom. 8. 19 it is styled the manifestation of the Sons of God: here God's sons are under a cloud, the world treats them like the worst of slaves: but then their Sonship shall be manifested unto all, by Christ's public invitation of them unto a full possession of their glorious inheritance, the Kingdom prepared for them before the foundations of the world: here the silthy conversation of the wicked will be, unto the just, a perpetual corrosive, and vexation: but the day of Judgement will, for ever, deliver them from their company: so that afterwards they shall never hear so much as an idle word, never see so much as a sinful act, or a scandalous object: the Son of man shall send forth his Angels, and they shall gather out of his Kingdom all things that offend, and them which do iniquity, Matth. 13. 41. Thirdly, and lastly, the day of Judgement may cheer against even the terrors of death itself; and, in pursuit of this branch of the use, I shall only mind you of two appellations given unto the day of Judgement in Scripture. First, In Matth. 19 28. as some point the words, it is termed by our Saviour 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the regeneration; it will then be, as it were, a new birth day unto the bodies of the Saints; the earth will then prove a teeming mother, and bring them forth in a new, and glorious state. Secondly, The Apostle Paul calls it the day of redemption, Eph. 4. 30. to wit from death, and all its consequents, that debase the body, all the corruption, and dishonour of the grave: unto all them, that belong truly unto Christ we may apply those his words. Luke 21. 28. Look up and lift up your heads, for the day of your redemption draweth nigh. Thirdly, we may hence be exhorted unto an expectation of, and 〈◊〉 Uses of Exhottation 〈◊〉, an expectation of, and preparation for the day of Judgement. 1. Unto an expectation of it. preparation for this day. 1. Expectation of it: for this is that, which will infallibly seal up unto our souls all the ineffable comforts of this day: unto 〈◊〉 that look for Christ shall he appear the second time without sin unto salvation, Heb. 9 28. Here we have a double 〈◊〉 of Christ's second appearing; 〈◊〉 cujus, and 〈◊〉 cui. 1. Finis Cujus, the end for which he shall appear the second 〈◊〉: [unto salvation.] 2. Finis Cui, the end unto whom; unto them that look for him: The (g) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 word is a double Compound of two prepositions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and a verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: the word than implieth a desirous, and hopeful expectation of that, which is apprehended as good; so that, from the words, we may gather, that Christ will bring salvation unto all those, that look, and long for his second appearing, as a desirable thing: there is laid up a crown of righteousness, which the Lord the righteous Judge shall give unto them that love his appearing, 2 Tim. 4. 8. That love it with a love of desire: now if those prisoners, whom their own heinous misdeeds, and the law have marked out for condemnation, cannot desire the approach of the Assizes, and the coming of the judge; how is it possible, that the revelation of the Lord Jesus from Heaven with his mighty Angels in flaming fire should be desired by those, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God, and obey 〈◊〉 the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ, seeing then he will take vengeance on them, and they shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power, 2 Thes. 1. 7, 8, 9 the Apostle, (in his description of those, that wait for 〈◊〉 Adoption, to wit, the redemption of their bodies, 〈◊〉. 8. 23) gives two characters of them. 1. They have in general all sanctifying and saving graces; they have the first fruits of the spirit, and these are a pawn unto them of their future fullness of both grace, and glory. 2. In particular, they have the grace of repentance, or humiliation; they groan under the burden of sin within themselves: that is (as 〈◊〉 glosseth it) ex imo cord from the bottom of their hearts: ourselves also, which have the first fruits of the spirit, even we ourselves groan withim ourselves waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our bodies. By this description then, there are excluded from being waiters for the full manifestation, and effect of Adoption 1. In general, all unsanctified persons, that are destitute of even the first degree of regeneration: and so their souls are part of the suburbs of Hell, as being replenished with the initials thereof, reigning, and unmortified sins. 2. Particularly, all unrepentant, and unhumbled sinners, that do not groan to be disburdened of sin, as feeling it no load unto their spirits. In Gal. 5. 5. Paul professeth, in the name of all believers of the Jews, that their waiting for the hope of righteousness had two causes, the spirit, and faith: we through the spirit wait for the hope of righteousness by faith: and what he saith of believers of the Circumcision is appliable unto those of the uncircumcision also; therefore unspiritual, and carnal persons, that are not governed by the spirit, that do not walk in the spirit: and unbelievers, that are destitute of a justifying faith, that uniteth with Christ, and transformeth the heart, can never, whilst such, attain a due expectance of that day, wherein there will be a full revelation, and fruition of the hope of righteousness, that is eternal life, which now is only an object of hope: In Phil. 3. 20. you shall find, that those, who look from Heaven for the Lord Jesus Christ, as a Saviour, are such, whose conversation is already in Heaven; the thoughts of their minds, and the affections of their hearts are in Heaven; their aims, and desires are Heaven-ward; their actions savour of Heaven: whereas, on the contrary, they, that mind earthly things, vers. 19 who have their hearts, as it were, nailed, and glued unto the earth, would not have so much as a thought of Heaven, if they could be secure from Hell; but would be very well contented to have their perpetual abode on the face of the earth, and would be very loath to be disturbed by Christ's coming from Heaven: for their utter aversation from things heavenly sufficiently instructs them, that thence they have no reason to look for Christ to come, as a merciful Saviour: for what good, what salvation may they expect, from a place, they have so much contemned? The Thessalonians waiting for the Son of God from Heaven, 1 Thes. 1. 10 hath, for its antecedents a true Conversion from Idolatry, unto the worship and service of God, vers. 9 as also an inchoation of rescue from Hell: they turned to God from Idols, to serve the living, and true God, they were delivered from the wrath to come: and indeed it was an act altogether unperformable by them, as long as they were unconverted: as long as they were, either Idolaters, or Atheists, as long as they were children of wrath, in whose souls deliverance from wrath to come was not so much as begun; the Kingdom of sin, and Satan remaining in them still, as entire, powerful, and unbroken as ever. Compare 12, 13. of Titus 2. together, and you may easily collect, that those, who look for that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God, are such as deny ungodliness, and worldly lusts: such as live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world, St 〈◊〉 joineth looking for, and hastening unto the coming of the day of God with a most intense, zealous, and transcendent diligence in all holy conversation and Godliness, 2 〈◊〉. 3. 11, 12. in the Lord's prayer the petition, for the coming of God's Kingdom, is placed betwixt the two petitions Hollowed be thy name. Thy will be done in 〈◊〉 as it is in Heaven; and from this method we may observe, that none can pray cordially for the coming of God's Kingdom of Glory, when Christ shall deliver up the Kingdom to God, even the Father, that are careless of the glory of God's name, and regardless of obedience unto his will. I shall conclude this particular with Rev. 22. 17. where desire of, and prayer for the coming ofChrist to judgement, for a perfect vindication of all his from all the sequels ofsin, is appropriated unto: he Bride, unto the Church mystical, and unto every true, and genuine member thereof, every sincere believer, that is betrothed unto Christ in righteousness, in judgement, in loving-kindness, and in mercies, Host 2. 19 And the spirit and the Bride say, Come. In the words 〈◊〉 thinks there may be an Hendiadies: so that, the spirit, and the bride may be put for the spiritual Bride, the bride sanctified by the Spirit: or, if you rather think, that the Spirit is taken properly for the Holy Ghost; why then, saith he, the spirit saith come, in the same sense, that it maketh intercession for us, Rom. 8. 26. to wit, 〈◊〉; it enableth, and maketh the bride to say come; the Spirit and the Bride say come: that is, the Spirit in the Bride, or the Bride by the assistance, influence, and actuation of the Spirit, saith come: Come Lord Jesus, come quickly: those, that are espoused unto Christ, long for the Consummation of their Nuptials, and their marriage with the Lamb is this great and last day, Rev. 19 7. 9 Whereas now, on the Contrary, such as have gone a whoring after the creature, and have been wedded unto the mortal adversaries of Christ Jesus their lusts, and corruptions: their desire is to build Tabernacles on earth; and they stand in as great a terror of Christ's coming, as the disloyal Adulteress doth of the coming home of her abused Husband; for their guilty consciences cannot but assure them, that, without repentance, this day will not be their wedding day, but a day of eternal divorce: their outward, and visible be trothment unto Christ, by receiving of his Sacraments, and profession of his name, will then be proclaimed to be a mere nullity, and they shall be everlastingly separated from all communion with him: this day than will be unto them, as (Job saith) the morning is unto murderers, Thiefs, and Adulterers, as the shadow of death: they will be in the terrors of the shaof death, Job. 24. 17. Secondly, preparation for it: In the Parable, only the wise Virgins A second Exhortation unto preparation for the day of judgement. were ready for the coming of the Bridegroom: and hereupon they went with him into the marriage, and the 〈◊〉 (to wit of grace and mercy) was shut against the 〈◊〉 unprepared virgins, and could not be opened by their greatest importunity, Matth. 25. 10, 11, 12. the Apostle Peter connexeth this preparation for the coming of Christ in both his Epistles with expectance of it. 〈◊〉, in his first Epistle chap. 1. v. 13. Wherefore gird up the loins of your minds, be sober, and hope to the end, for the grace that is to be brought unto you at the revelation of Jesus Christ: where girding up the loins of the mind is a 〈◊〉 expression of that preparation, which is requisite in all those, that hope to the end, for the grace, that is to be brought unto them, at the revelation of jesus Christ, in allusion unto an ancient custom, of those Eastern Countries, where, not only women, but men, wearing long garments, were wont to tuck them up, when they addressed themselves unto a journey, unto work, unto battle, or unto service: our Saviour useth the very same similitude unto the same purpose; and joineth another of the like nature with it, Luk. 12. 35. Let your 〈◊〉 be girded about, and your lights burning, the whole verse is a borrowed speech from the guise of good Servants, that prepare for the coming of their Masters, by girding, and trussing up their garments, to wait and attend on them, and by lighting candles in a readiness for them. 2. In his second Epistle chap. 3. v. 12. he makes the like connexion: looking for, and hasting unto the Coming of the day of God: Indeed we cannot accelerare diem, but yet we may accelerare ad diem: though we cannot hasten it, yet we may hasten unto it: to wit, by fitting ourselves for it, by going forth, as it were, to meet the Lord with burning lamps: that is with saiths, that not only blaze before men, but also shine before God in their sruits, good works. This preparation is of a vast extent, and taketh in all duties, whether regarding the first, or second table: so much may be gathered from the, 1 Pet. 1. 13, 14, 15. Wherefore gird up the loins of your minds etc. as obedient Children, and not fashioning yourselves according to the former lusts, in your ignorance, but as he which hath called you, is holy, so be ye holy in all manner of conversation. Here we have a Concomitant of this preparing of ourselves, a general obedience, and Universal holiness: and hence also is it, that unpreparedness is described by disobedience, Luk. 12. 47. that Servant etc. which prepared not himself, neither did according to his Masters will etc. But now, out of those many duties, in which preparation for Out of those many duties in which this preparation stands, some, 〈◊〉 regarding either God, or ourselves or others. the day of judgement stands, I shall select some few: unto the performance of which the Scripture propounds the day of judgement as a motive: and they regard, either God, or ourselves, or others. 1. God and his Son Christ Jesus and saith in him. 2. Repentance of our sins against him. 3. Love. 4. Fear of him. 5. Prayer to him. First, faith in him and his Son Christ jesus: and unto the exercise Those which regard God are. of this faith there are two pressing arguments in the text. 1. Faith in him. 1. God shall Judge by 〈◊〉 Christ: now of all graces, faith is that, which primarily and principally ingratiates with Jesus Christ; for it unites us with him, and renders us his beloved spouse, and members: and therefore, though it cannot purchase or merit, yet it will infallibly procure his favour: so that, unto every believing soul, he will, when he sits upon his Throne of glory, (as 〈◊〉 unto 〈◊〉) at it were hold out his golden Sceptre. 2. God shall 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 Christ according to the Gospel, according to the Covenant of grace; and the condition thereof is faith: a believer then, hath the fidelity, the promises, the oath, the Sacraments of God engaged for his absolution; but now, on the contrary, unbelievers shall be judged according to a Covenant of works, and the severity of such a trial, even as David deprecates: Enter not into judgement with thy servant; for in thy sight shall no man living be justified, Psal. 14. 3. 2. That is, do not try me by thy law, for so wide is the perfection thereof, as that I fall infinitely short of it; and therefore can expect therefrom nothing but condemnation: sordet in conspectu judicis, quod 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 operantis: those performances, which most glitter in my own, and other men's eyes, will be found filthy, if the pure eyes of the judge measure them by the rigour of the Law. But to pass on unto other Scriptures, 2 Pet. 3. 14. 〈◊〉 beloved, seeing that you look for such things, be diligent, that you may be found of him in peace (to wit) with God: and this peace is an inseparable consequent of faith; being justified by faith, we have peace with God etc. Rom. 5. 1. 1 joh 2. 28. And now, little children abide in him, that when he shall appear, we may have 〈◊〉, and not be ashamed before him at his coming. Now it is by faith, that we have our abode in Christ: and therefore faith gives an undaunted boldness to stand in judgement before Christ: Whereas, on the contrary, those, that die in final unbelief, will hang down their heads, and be even confounded, as not being able to look the judge in the face with any confidence, whose tenders of life, and mercy they obstinately and contemptuously refused unto the very last gasp: The Guest, that is without a wedding garment, will in the day of judgement be speechless Matt. 22. 12. This wedding garment is the robes of Christ's righteousness: and what puts these on but saith? without faith then our guilt will strike us dumb joh. 3. 18. He that believeth not is condemned already, as by the Law, and Gospel, so by the verdict of his guilty, and accusing Conscience, when ever it awakens; now if our unbelief be so gross, as that our own Consciences cannot but condemn us for is, how can we expect, that our Omniscient judge should acquit us? if 〈◊〉 hearts condemn us, God is 〈◊〉 then our hearts, and knoweth all things, 1 joh. 3. 20. Secondly, we may hence be exhorted to repentance of our sins against 2. 〈◊〉 of our sins against him. him; The times of this ignorance God winked at, but now 〈◊〉 all men every where to repent, because he hath 〈◊〉 a day in the which he will judge the world in righteousness, by that man whom he hath ordained &c. Acts 17. 30, 31. This place hath some obscurity, and therefore I shall stay a while upon the opening of it; the particle, but; plainly showeth, that here is an Antithesis, or opposition betwixt two 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 and God's dispensation in them. 1. Here are times of Ignorance at which God winked; times before the general publication of the Gospel. 2. The present times of the Gospel, But he commands all men every where to repent; from this Antithesis or opposition it naturally followeth, that in the times before the general promulgation of the Gospel, times of ignorance, God did not Command all men every where to repent; he winked at them, he suffered the Gentiles to lie in their Idolatries without so much as any admonition. Against this, it may easily be foreseen, that it may be Objected; that all men, even before the times of the Gospel, had the law of nature written in their hearts, and that Commands repentance, by that then God, even before the times of the Gospel, commanded all men every where to repent. Unto this I find those following Answers. 1. Though all men, since the fall of Adam, were obliged by the natural law unto repentance; yet not by any positive command, and revelation superadded unto the law of nature [and this Answer I have in the Author of that learned Manuscript, unto which Mr john Goodwin pretends to give a reply in his Pagans 〈◊〉 and dowry] the generality of the Gentiles, before the resurrection of Christ, had no other preachers of Repentance, but the light of nature, and the book of the creature; but now God, by the Ministers of the Gospel, command, all men every where (that is where the Gospel is revealed) to repent. A 〈◊〉 Answer is; that the denial of the generality of the Command to repent, in the times of ignorance, before the Gospel, is to be understood only in a comparative sense; so that the import of the Antithesis is: God now commands all men every where to repent more clearly, fully, distinctly, and expressly, then in those times of ignorance before Christ: and this way Mounsieur (b) 〈◊〉 praeterita 〈◊〉 ignorantiae tem pora vocat 〈◊〉 ad praesenth: non quod Deus gentes nullo planèsuae vel irae, vel bonitatis documento, ad resipiscentia minvitasset, sed quod 〈◊〉, quam nunc, obscurius atque 〈◊〉 vocasset; quod scilicet ad gentes, quos nunc 〈◊〉 verbi praecones, nullos antehac misisset. 〈◊〉 Apol. par. 3. p. 384. 1. Dally, and others of that party take: The Command then, to repent, was given unto all men always, for the substance and matter of it: and is new only 〈◊〉 the manner of it. Unto which I may add for a third answer: that it is also new in regard of the enforcement of it by a new motive, the last, and general judgement of men, by Jesus Christ: which was not revealed, generally unto the Heathens, before the Gospel times: indeed the light of nature might dictate unto them the congruence, and probability of a second, and universal judgement: and this might be ground enough for the Poet's fictions, touching the three Judges of Hell-Minos, Aeacus, and Rhadamanthus: but though the light of nature, and reason be never so improved, yet as Scotus well observeth [lib. 4. dist. 47. quaest. 1. n. 5.] it can never make any demonstration of the certainty thereof: and he gives this reason: because it is a matter less known unto reason, than the resurrection, and this is a thing we can only prove by the revelation of Scripture. God then now commandeth all men in all nations, unto which the Gospel is published, to expect by a more pregnant, and 〈◊〉 motive, than ever the Gentiles in their times of ignorance heard of; to wit; because he hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in 〈◊〉, by that man, whom he hath ordained, etc. Unto these answers I shall add one of mine own, which I hope will be satisfactory: Repentance may be considered under a twofold notion: sub ratione officii, and sub ratione medii: as a duty, and as a means or way unto salvation. 1. Sub ratione officii, as a duty: and so the law of nature commanded it always, unto all, that had the actual use of reason: for what is Repentance, but a returning from sin unto God? Now this the law of nature enjoineth: for it obligeth to love God with all your soul, heart, might, and strength: and impossible, that this should be done by those, that do not turn from their sins, and return unto God. 2. Repentance may be considered sub 〈◊〉 medii, as a means, or way unto Salvation: and so the Gospel only declares, that all men, unto whom it is preached, should repent; for the Law is so rigorous, and inexorable, as that it admits not of Repentance in order to life, and salvation: Cursed is every 〈◊〉, that continueth not in all things, which are written in the 〈◊〉 of the Law to do them, Gal. 3. 10. Indeed the Law may press our obligation unto repentance, and discover its opposite to be a damnable sin: but it is only the Gospel, the Covenant of grace, that propounds it as an anteccdent condition of salvation, and promiseth the reward of eternal life, and happiness unto it. And thus I have done my best to explain this dark assertion: that God 〈◊〉 Commandeth all men every where to repent, which before he did not. But the Confirmation of it (〈◊〉 he hath appointed a day 〈◊〉 the which he will judge the world in righteousness by that man, whom he hath ordained &c.) is as obscure as the assertion itself: for this decree, or appointment of judging the world by Christ, was from all eternity; and therefore no Congruent proof, that God in, and since the fullness of time propounds it unto all men, every where, as of avail unto everlasting Salvation, For the clearing of this we must take a rule, that is usual in the interpretation of Scripture: Many things are said in scripture to be done, when they are only manifested to be done: And so here the appointment of the day in which God will judge the world is put for the manifestation 〈◊〉. The words than may be thus Paraphrased: God, by the preaching of the Gospel, hath revealed and manifested, that there shall be a day, in which he will judge the world in righteousness; by that man, whom he hath ordained etc. And that this is a competent argument, to provoke men unto Repentance, is evident from the manner of Gods procedure; in this day he will judge men according to their repentance, or unrepentance, he will acquit all true penitents, and Condemn all 〈◊〉 impenitents: 〈◊〉 ye therefore and be converted (saith Peter) that your sins may be blotted out, when the times of refreshing shall come, from the 〈◊〉 of the Lord, Acts 3. 19 without Repentance all our sins, our sins of baro, and naked omission, Matth. 25. 42. 43. Our idle words Matth. 12. 32. that have no obliquity in them, but 〈◊〉 (and what is said of idle words is appliable unto idle thoughts and works) shall all be fully charged upon our souls: those, who are not, by the 〈◊〉 of God, led unto repentance, after their 〈◊〉, and impenitent 〈◊〉, treasure up unto themselves wrath against the day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous judgement of God, Rom. 2. 5. they pile up plagues, Curses, and Torments: the day of judgement is termed the day 〈◊〉 wrath, in opposition unto 〈◊〉 time of this life, which alone is the 〈◊〉 of grace, and mercy: Behold 〈◊〉 is the accepted time, behold now is the day of salvation, 2 Cor. 6. 2. and therefore repent, now if ever, for in the day of wrath there will be no place, or time for, no acceptation of repentance, though sought with never so many, and bitter tears. Repentance implieth. 1. Examination, Confession of, and sorrow for past sins. 2. Caution and resolution against future sins. And unto all these the day of judgement persuades. First, Unto Examination, 〈◊〉 of, and sorrow for past sins: a voluntary selfe-inspection will avoid the severe scrutiny of that day: to Confess unto an earthly Judge is a speedy and an assured way unto Condemnation; but, with our Heavenly Judge, it secures our pardon; I acknowledged my sin unto thee, and mine iniquity have I not hid: I said, I will 〈◊〉 my transgressions unto the Lord, and thou forgavest the iniquity of my sin. Psal. 32. 5. qui 〈◊〉 vult peccata, detegat. is 〈◊〉 rule; the way to have our sins covered in this, and the next life, is to uncover them in this before God in an humble, and 〈◊〉 Confession; and without this God will discover them to the knowledge of all the world unto our Confusion in the day when he will judge the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 by Jesus Christ etc. if now we would accuse ourselves, it would then stop all the accusations of the Law, Satan, and our own Consciences; if we would now judge ourselves we should not then be judged, if we would now privately, in our own bosoms, arraign and Condemn ourselves for our sins, and lie prostrate at the feet of Christ for mercy, we may be certain, that we shall publicly be acquitted by proclamation in the great Assizes of the whole world, wh n Christ shall Come with Clouds, it is said that all kindreds of the earth shall wail because of him. Rev. 1. 7. Many think, that this is meant of the obstinate, and incorrigible enemies of Christ Jesus, and that the wailing here spoken of is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a wailing of hellish desperation, to prevent which no such way as Planctus 〈◊〉, the wailing of Evangelicall repentance and contrition: and is it not infinitely better to mourn, weep, sigh, and sob for sin here, then hereafter to roar, howl and yell for it unto all eternity? Behold the Lord cometh with ten thousands of his Saints to execute judgement upon all, and convince all that are ungodly among them, of all their ungodly deeds, which they have ungodly committed, and of all their hard speeches, which ungodly sinners have spoken against him, Judas 14. 15. The conviction here spoken of hath, for its end, the unrepealeable condemnation, and irremediles confusion of the parties convicted: The Lord will execute judgement upon all the ungodly whom he convinceth of ungodly deeds, and hard speeches against him: but yet now even the most ungodly may escape this conviction by a timely, internal, penitential conviction of conscience in this life, which, as an Echo, answereth the spirits convincing the world of sin, Joh. 16. 8, 9 Now those, whom the spirit convinceth of sin, it convinceth also of righteousness, vers. 10. this Conviction than hath a tendency towards the conversion and salvation of the soul: for it is inseparably followed with the judging, executing, and crucifying of our sins: that our spirits may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus: Gods threatening of the wicked, Psal. 50. 21. to reproove them, and to set their sins in order before their eyes, is by many applied unto the day of judgement: And (i) Modo ergo tu fac quisquis 〈◊〉, quod 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Deus, 〈◊〉 à 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by te videre non vis dissimulans à fact is tuis, & constitue te ante te ascend tribunal mentis tuae, esto tibi judex, torqueat te timor, erumpat à te confessio, & dic 〈◊〉 tuo, Quoniam 〈◊〉 meam ego cognosco, & delictum 〈◊〉 ante me est 〈◊〉. Quod erat post te, fiat ante te, ne tu ipse postea à Deo judice 〈◊〉 ante te, et non sit quo fugias à te. Austin upon the words adviseth us to do unto ourselves here, that which God threateneth to do unto us hereafter: to put our sins before us, that now we have forgotten, and cast behind our backs, to ascend the tribunal of our own Consciences, and there to act the part of judges against ourselves: to arraign, condemn ourselves, and by the exercise, of a filial fear, Godly sorrow, and penitent confession to do as it were execution upon ourselves: to say, as the Psalmist in the following Psalm v. 3. I acknowledge my transgression, and my sin is ever 〈◊〉 me: Conformably hereunto I find, that Mellerus, and other Interpreters think, that the next verse is an exhortation to repentance: Consider this ye that forget God, lest I 〈◊〉 you in 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 be none to 〈◊〉: Words of Knowledge (in Scripture) imply affection, and action: Consider this, to wit, that God will in the day of judgement reproove you, and set your sins in order before your eyes: Consider it affectionately, Consider it 〈◊〉: Consider it so as to endeavour to prevent it, and for that there is no such way, as to imitate the Process, that God here threateneth, to reproove ourselves, to set our sins in order before our own eyes, to tear our hearts in pieces, to rend our hearts by Evangelicall Contrition, and, if we do thus our Judge that otherwise would condemn us, will deliver us from every evil work. 2 Tim: 4. 18. from the condemning guilt of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and consequently from the wrath to come. 1 Thes. 1. 10. Wherefore (〈◊〉) 〈◊〉 you look for such things (as shall be in the coming of the day of God, the dissolution of the Heavens by fire, the melting of the Elements with fervent heat, the Creation of a new Heaven, and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness) be diligent, that you may be found of him without spot and 〈◊〉. 2 Pet. 3. 12, 13, 14. Now the unspottednesse, and blamelessness of sanctification stands in a total exemption from the sovereign dominion of sin, and this is utterly inconsistent with impenitency, for sin we daily contract new spots and stains, and they have a throne in those souls, where they are not washed and rinsed with penitent tears; though Christ's blood only cleanseth from the guilt of sin with the cleansing of Justification; yet, repentance cleanseth too from the spot, and pollution of sin with the cleansing of Mortification, and, if we are not here cleansed with this latter cleansing from the filthiness of sin, Christ will not in the day of his coming openly discharge from the guiltiness of sin. Secondly, We may, from the day of judgement, be exhorted unto Caution and resolution against all sin for the future; against acknowledged sins, and against suspected sins. First, against such sins as are acknowledged to be such: the very possibility of obnoxiousness unto Judges here on earth makes men afraid to displease them: how dare we then, day after day by our multiplied sins, to grieve, and incense the Judge of all mankind, out of whose mouth must proceed a sentence that will everlastingly either save, or condemn us? I have often heard of purses cut, even at the Assizes, in the place of justice; but sure no cutpurse can be so audacious, as to play such a prank, when he seeth the judge look upon him: Is it not then very strange, that we should make no scruple of committing sins of a very high, and heinous nature, when as yet we know, that all the sins we can commit are naked, and open unto the Omniscient Judge of quick, and dead? can we expect to be associated with Saints, and Angels in the Train of Christ, and in the mean while live like incarnate Devils? can we hope for the honour of Saints to be attendants unto the judge, and abhor holiness, that denominates us to be Saints? If we be like goats here, in this life unruly, and unclean: why should we think to have the honourable place of sheep, at the last day, upon the right hand of Christ? Christ will then reject, and banish from his presence, not only forward Professors, but even able and diligent Preachers, Prophets, nay such as have been renowned for miracles, if they be such as do not endeavour abstinence from sin; but are so addicted unto iniquity, as that they make it their trade, and business to commit it: Many will say unto me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name? and in thy name have cast out Devils? and in thy name done many wonderful works? And then I will 〈◊〉 unto them, I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 you, depart from me ye that work iniquity, Matth. 7. 22, 23. The Apostle Peter, prophesying 〈◊〉 such, as (in the last days) should scoff at all the predictions of God's word concerning the last judgement, saying 〈◊〉 is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his coming, layeth down this description of them: that they shall be men walking after their own lusts; knowing this that there shall come, in the last days, Scoffers walking after their own lusts, saying; where is the promise of his coming, 2 Pet. 3. 3, 4. Those that walk after their own lusts, that are acted, in the constant course, and way of their lives, by their 〈◊〉 lusts, are (in the interpretation of God) Mockers at the Doctrine of the day of judgement, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, such as shall make children's play of it: [for the simple verb, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth properly to play as a child, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] the same Apostle, having (in his first Epistle Ch: 4. v. 4.) spoken of the Gentiles running into an excess of riot, and of their wondering at, and complaining of the Convert Jew's dispersed among them, for not complying with them, presently. v. 5. he mentioneth the Account, that they shall pass at the last day: The Gentiles think it strange, that 〈◊〉 run 〈◊〉 with them to the same excess of riot, speaking evil of you, who shall give account to him that is ready to judge the quick and the dead. From these words, it appears plainly, that a due, and serious consideration of the account, that we must give unto him, that is ready to judge the quick, and the dead, is a strong bridle to restrain from the sins of the Gentiles here taxed, 〈◊〉. 3. 4. as also from all other sins whatsoever. Solomon makes use of it, to retrench the Exorbitancies of a youthful voluptuary, Eccl. 11. 9 here we have an Ironical Concession, and a dreadful 〈◊〉. 1. An Ironical 〈◊〉 Rejoice, O, young man, in thy youth, and let thy heart cheer 〈◊〉 in the days of thy youth, and walk in the ways of thy heart, and in the sight of 〈◊〉 eyes: as if he should have said; pursue thy 〈◊〉 pleasures without check, or stop; and abridge not thyself of any thing, that thy heart desireth or delighteth in; but to show, that this is but a Sarcasme, he presently brings in a dreadsull commination of judgement, as a cooling card to 〈◊〉 the the rage, and fury of his lusts: But know that for all these things God will bring thee to judgement. For all these things: that is, for all thy excesses, for all thy intemperate courses, for all thy Epicurism and Sensuality; God will bring thee unto Judgement: thou mayest perhaps be unwilling to come to a trial; but God will compel thee, and the Ministers of his justice will drag thee unto his Tribunal. This, in its own nature, is an apt and forcible dissuasive as unto all men from all sin, so especially unto those, that are in the Magistrary, or in any office apperteining to justice, from those sins; that are opposed unto the duties of their respective places: k Dr Heyling Geog. Asterion in Tenedos is memorable, for an old custom observed amongst them, which was, that at the back of the Judge there always stood a man with an axe advanced, as well to terrify the witness from giving false evidence to the Judge, as the Judge from pronouncing a false sentence upon the evidence: (whence the Proverb 〈◊〉 securis.) But this axe was but a 〈◊〉- crow, in comparison of a deep imprestion of the last judgement, one would think, that it should deter even a Judge, that is not very zealous for justice, from the perverting of judgement, and refusal to do justice; and make him return this, or the like answer unto all temptations unto unjustice, How shall I commit this great wickedness and sin against the Judge of all Judges? What then shall I do, when God 〈◊〉 up? and when he visiteth, what shall I answer him? job: 31. 14. And why should not this meditation have the like influence upon all organs of Justice, from the highest unto the lowest, from the Sheriff unto his Bailiffs? why should it not affright all Plaintiffs, from unjust contentious, and frivolous actions? all Accusers, and Informers from suggesting? all Witnesses from deposing any untruth? all Jurors from 〈◊〉, and partiality in their verdicts, and presentments? all Lawyers from colouring, and palliating bad causes, and persons? from betraying or delaying the causes of their poor Clients? Would all these but sadly Consider, that a day will come when all their actions, and proceedings at this time shall be revewed and reexamined; how 〈◊〉 might it make them against all failings, and practices, that turn judgement into 〈◊〉, into gall, and the fruit of 〈◊〉 into 〈◊〉? Amos. 5. 7, and. 6. 12. that is, that turn public Judicatories into places of bitter, baneful, and deadly injustice unto the oppressed: for of all these their Judge hath a more perfect cognizance, than their own Consciences. The Prophet Amos tells the great ones of Samaria, that they did put far away the evil day, and caused 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 to come near, Amos 6. 3. Although the evil day be there meant primarily of the 〈◊〉 of some particular judgement upon Israel: yet it may be extended unto the day of general judgement, which will be unto the wicked, in a way of eminency, the evil day, a day of sad, and 〈◊〉 tidings: Now if those, that have any employments in public dispensation, or distribution of Justice, put far away from them all thoughts of this day, they cause the seat of violence to come near: the 〈◊〉 of justice should be a sanctuary unto the distressed: but they, who dread not a day of accounts, turn it into a seat of unjust and Tyrannical violence: and they are very hot, and eager in the pursuit of their oppressive courses: they cause the seat of violence to come near. Secondly, The day of judgement should be a dissuasive from even suspected sins; from all things that have an appearance of evil: When Tunstall Bishop of Durham told Mr Gilpin that he should have a dispensation for nonresidence during his travel beyond the 〈◊〉; Mr Gilpin answered, that he feared 〈◊〉 he came to stand before Christ's Tribunal it would not serve his turn: and indeed, whosoever will seriously weigh the matter, must needs confess; that, in the general, we all have very good reason to stick, and scruple at those things, which we doubt will be disallowed by the supreme, and Sovereign Judge of all rational Creatures in this sublunary world: Me thinks then men should be afraid to adventure upon those recreations, fashions, or the like, concerning the lawfulness of which, they have not clear, full, and evident satisfaction. A third duty, regarding God unto which we may be exhorted 3. Love of him. from the day of judgement, is love of God and Christ Jesus: for the sincere and upright love of them will give admirable erection, and embolden against the terrors of that day, 1 Joh. 4. 17. Herein is our love made p rfect, that we may have boldness in the day of judgement, because as he is, so are we in this world: Whereas, on the Contrary, how can they have boldness in the day of judgement, whose hearts are here 〈◊〉 with enmity against Jesus Christ, by whom God will in that day judge the secrets of men? and God reckons all those, to be mortal enemies unto him, who are cordial friends unto any sin: against such what a thundering curse doth Paul denounce. 1 Cor. 16. 22. If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be Anathema Maranatha: there be many learned Expositors, that take the word to be an advice unto the third, and highest degree of Excommunication, that answered unto the Jewish Shammata, an accursing of a man, unto the coming of Christ, without hope of mercy, which cannot be done without a Prophetical spirit. But against this it may be objected: That the mere not loving of Christ is a sin of the heart, and therefore comes not under Ecclesiastical Cognizance, and censure. Unto this Objection I find two answers. The first, Of the learned and Reverend Doctor Hammond: that the not loving of Christ is the denying of him in time of trouble, and signifieth here him that was tainted with the Error of the Gnostics, and so would not confess Christ in time of persecution. A second Is, that the not loving of Christ is the sin against the holy Ghost, an opposition of Christ, and his Gospel, out of mere malice and desperate hatred. But to make either of these interpretations good we must fly unto a Meiosis (whereby less is spoken, and more employed) and what need we run unto a figure, as long as the words are capable of a fair interpretation in their proper sense: I shall therefore conclude (with Cornelius Alapide, Dickson and others) that the words contain only a simple denunciation of an eternal curse, and damnation to be inflicted at the coming of the Lord to judgement, upon all that love not the Lord Jesus: for Anathema is a Greek word, and signifieth cursing or banning; Maran-atha is a Syriack or Caldee word, importing that the Lord cometh: for Maran signifies Lord, or our Lord, and Atha cometh: the words than may be thus glossed; all impenitent haters of the Lord Jesus, all, in whom there shall be found a final want of the love of the Lord Jesus, shall be accursed by him when he cometh to judgement: Now Christ will then interpret all those to hate him, who, in their love of him, admit of any corrivalty: who love any thing, any creature, any lust, either above him, or but in an equality, and coordination with him: It is the general opinion of Expositors, that the Apostle alludes unto the Prophecy of Enoch, mentioned by 〈◊〉 vers. 14. 15. And Enoch also, the seaventh from Adam prophesied of these, saying, behold the Lord cometh with ten thousands of his Saints, to execute judgement upon all, and to convinee all that are ungodly among 〈◊〉, of all their ungodly deeds which they have ungodly committed, and of all their hard speeches, which ungodly sinners have spoken against him: And, if this conjecture be true, then from the collation of these two places, 1 Cor. 16. 22. Jud. 14. 15. we may gather this observation: That they love not the Lord Jesus Christ who are ungodly, irreligious, and profane (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, without worship) who neglect, and omit Gods both natural, and instituted worship; and such shall be Anathema; when the Lord cometh he will convince them, and execute judgement upon them: of these ungodly persons there are two Characters in the text. 1. Ungodly 〈◊〉 (that is sinful actions against the first Table) which 〈◊〉 have ungodly committed; and ungodly deeds are committed after an ungodly manner, when they proceed from souls, in which there is no renewed principle, no gracious habit, no seed of God, no divine nature to oppose, and resist them, or to incline unto repentance for them. A second part of their character is the hard speeches which they have spoken against Christ; and those, whose tongues run riot against his Ordinances, Ministers, Members, he accounts to utter hard speeches against himself; though their thoughts, and expressions of his person, nature, and offices be all orthodox. Fourthly, this point may provoke unto a fear of God, and of 4. Fear of him. Christ; not a distrustful, but an awful fear; that is opposed unto carnal presumption, and security, and not unto the assurance of faith. How do men dread those judges, whose severest doom reacheth only unto (that which they themselves cannot avoid) death of the body? and shall not we fear that Judge: whose bare sentence is so operative, and efficacious, as that it is able to destroy body and soul in Hell? If ye call on the Father (saith Peter) who without respect of persons judgeth according to every man's work, pass the time of your sojourning here in fear, 1 Pet. 1. 17. If ye call on the Father, that is, if ye make profession, that God is your Father, nay if by the spirit of Adoption ye be assured that he is your Father, yet fear him; for he that is your Father now will be your Judge hereafter, and he will be an impartial judge, he will judge without respect of persons; there will be no deceiving of this Judge by bare words, naked professions, and pretensions: he will judge according to every man's work: and besides we have but a short time unto this general Assizes, it is but a time of sojourning, and, for all these reasons, let us fear God: This fear, unto which the day of judgement should be a forcible incentive, is of so large a compass, as that virtually it takes in all duties whatsoever. For first, in the Old Testament, the Preacher explicates it by universal obedience, as its effect, Eccles. 12. 13, 14. Fear God, and keep his Commandments, for this is the whole duty of man, for God shall bring every work into judgement, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil: Here the last judgement is used, as an argument, for the keeping of God's Commandments, a well as for his fear; and for this it is very home, and pressing, for what can we expect, but that God should then be deaf, and inexorable unto our prayers and cries for mercy, if we now stop our ears, and hearts unto his calls, and exhortations of us unto obedience? the equitableness of such a course God himself demonstrates, Prov. 1. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28. Because I have called, and ye refused, I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded: But ye have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my reproof: I also will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your fear cometh; when your fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction cometh as a whirlwind; when distress, and anguish cometh upon you: 〈◊〉 shall they call upon me, but I will not answer; they shall seek me early, but they shall not find me. Secondly, in the New Testament, it hath subjoined unto it an effect, of as vast an extent, the glorisying of God; for unto that all other actions of religion, together with those of justice, and Charity are related, as means, Rev. 14. 7. The Angel that preached the everlasting Gospel etc. said with a loud voice, fear God, and give glory to him, for the hour of his judgement is come. And unto the glorisying of God the coming of the hour of his Judgement is a very apt and stirring motive, for we then look for glorisication by God: and unto such an expectation, what can be more suitable, than a cordial endeavour to promote the glorisying of God? what reason have we to hope then for the fruition of his glory, if we be now regardless of the advancement of his glory? If we do not here live unto God, Gal. 2. 〈◊〉. it will be but presumption to think that hereafter we shall live with God. I shall conclude this use with Mal. 4. 2. which together with the first verse may be applied unto the day of judgement: the particle [But] denoteth the opposition betwixt the terror of that day unto the wicked, and the comfort, and happiness of it unto those that fear God: But unto you that fear my name, shall the Sun of righteousness arise with healing in his wings, and ye shall go forth, and grow up, as Calves of the Stall. Unto you that fear my name; that fear (not only my justice and judgements, but) my name, (every thing by which I reveal myself, my pardoning mercy, Psal. 130. v. 4: my goodness, Host 3. 5: those that tremble at my word, Isa. 66, 2: unto all such) shall the Son of righteousness arise (here they may have a dark and a gloomy time, but then Christ as a Sun shall arise upon them, and scatter the darkness as of sin error, and ignorance, so also of misery and discomfort, he shall arise as a Son of righteousness their righteousness shall be as visible unto all the world, as the rising of the Sun is, he shall arise with healing in his wings (than shall there be a perfect cure of all spiritual diseases whatsoever) and ye shall go forth (to wit, in the resurrection, out of the 〈◊〉 of your graves) and grow up as Calves of the stall (your glorified bodies shall be endued with vigour, and agility; they shall leap and skip for joy like fatted Calves; and besides ye shall have a full both conquest and triumph over all your adversaries, v. 3.) And ye shall tread down the wicked: for they shall be as ashes under the soles of your feet, in the day that I shall do this, saith the Lord of Hosts. Lastly, we may hence be exhorted unto zealous, and frequent prayers 5. Prayer to him. unto God, Luk. 21. 36. The end of all things is at hand, therefore watch unto prayer, 1 Pet. 4. 7: not only pray, but be watchful in prayer; men dare not supplicate, in a sleepy posture, for their lives, that are forfeited unto the justice of the Law; for dull, and drowsy supplications bespeak a repulse rather than an answer: shall not we then rouse up ourselves, and stir up all our abilities, when we are suitors for the unmerited salvation of our souls in the day of the Lord Jesus? If petitions could prevail with Judges on earth, how would they be even overwhelmed with them? now God hath always an ear, and a heart open unto prayers rightly qualified; and impossible he should be ever cloyed with it; to be an Hearer of Prayer is one of his Titles, o thou that hearest prayer! saith David, Psal. 65. 2. And shall not this quicken us unto a diligent frequency, and most raised fervency in prayer for prevention of the Condemnatory sentence of the last day? He, that then shall be our Judge, is in the mean while to be God's great and sole master of requests; and God will be favourable unto every one, whom he intercedes for; and he will deny his intercession unto none, that Cordially, and sincerely crave it: but yet how seldom are our requests made known to God by him for favour? and how saint, and unzealous are those requests? He, that the last day shall sit upon a Tribunal of justice, now sitteth upon a Throne of grace and a mercy seat; and yet how desolate and unfrequented is this Throne of grace, this mercy Seat (how few, and cold are the petitioners that resort unto it? it is very strange; that we should be so backward and remiss in our prayers here in this life, seeing in the next, after death, & in the day of judgement, all prayers will be as as bootless, as the vain cries of condemned prisoners for mercy unto the Judge: though Christ be now an Advocate, that offers to plead for any Client who will sue unto him in a due manner; yet than his Commission for Advocate expires, and he is to enter upon the execution of the Commission of a Judge, and he is to give righteous judgement without the least partiality. Secondly, there be another sort of duties unto which the day of A second sort of duties unto which the day of judgement excites that regard ourselves. judgement excites, that concern ourselves, and they are four. 1 Watchfulness. 2. Sobriety. 3. Diligence and faithsulnesse in our particular callings. 4. A Diligent use, and faithful employment of all our Taleuts, etc. First watchfulness; and that, over all our duties, and actions, against the temptations of all our spiritual adversaries, Satan, the world, and our own deceitful hearts: unto this watchfulness our 1. watchfulness. Saviour and the Apostle press from the 〈◊〉 and uncertainty of the day of judgement; the certainty that it shall be; the uncertainty when it shall be, Matth. 24. 42, 43, 44. Mark, 13, 32. 33, 34, 35, 36, 37. Thes. 5, 2, 3, 6. Luk. 21. v. 35. 36. That day shall come, as a snare on all them, that dwell on the face of the whole 〈◊〉: Watch ye therefore, etc. that ye may be accounted worthy to escape all these things, that shall come to pass, and to stand before the Son of man. The worthiness that our Saviour speaks of is a worthiness of fitness, not desert, and may be expounded by that of the Apostle, Col. 1. 12. Made meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the Saints in light: unwatchsull souls are unprepared for judgement, and consequently unqualified for Heaven: When Epaminondas sound a 〈◊〉 sleeping he ran him through; The Lord hath appointed every one to be a spiritual watchman, What I say unto you, I say unto all, watch, Mark. 13. 37: and when the Captain of our Salvation shall be walking his great round in the day of judgement, if he find any securely sleeping, and snorting in sin, having their souls ungarded, and the Gates of their hearts lying wide open unto the enemy, what can such expect but the extremity of martial Law? indeed the wise Virgins may slumber and sleep, Matth. 25. 5: but it is only a slumber of insirmity; each of them may say as the Church, Cant. 5, 2. I sleep but my heart waketh; that is my regenerate part, the spirit striveth, and struggleth with the flesh to shake of all drowsiness; so that in regard of the constant bent of my heart I am always vigilant. A Second duty, regarding ourselves, unto which by the Consideration 2. Sobriety. of the day of Judgement we may be stirred up, is sobriety: The Apostles Paul and Peter join vigilancy, and sobriety together; because sobriety is a great help, and furtherance unto vigilancy; and they propound the day of judgement to enforce the practice of both, 1 Thes. 5. 2, 6. For yourselves know perfectly, the day of the Lord so cometh as a thief in the night: Therefore let us not sleep, as do others; but let us watch and be sober, 1 Pet. 4. 7. But the 〈◊〉 of all things is at hand: be ye therefore sober and watch, etc. (L) Nomen sobrietatis sumitur à 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 enim aliquis sobrius, quasi briam, i. e. mensuram servans, & ideo illam materiam specialiter sibi sobrietas ascribit, in qua maxime laudabile est mensuram servare. Hujusmodi autem est potus inebriare valens, quia 〈◊〉 usus mensuratus multum confert, & modicus excessus multum laedit, quia impedit usum rationis, magis etiam quam excessus cibi, etc. Et ideo specialiter sobrietas attenditur circa potum, non quemcunque, sed eum, qui sua fumositate natus est caput conturbare. sicut vinum, & omne quod in ebriare potest. Communiter autem sumendo nomen sobrietatis, potest in quâcunque materiâ dicls. 22 〈◊〉. quast. 149. artic. 1. cap. Aquinas points at two acceptions of the word sobriety: one more strict, and restrained; and thus taken it moderates the appetite in the use of drinks; the other more large, and general; and according unto this it puts due bounds, and limits unto our desires of, and endeavours after all things temporal; it keeps in all things, that measure, which is requisite: the opposites of sobriety, in each sense, are a virtual denial of the day of judgement: not only, they that are drunk with wine, and strong drink; but they that are intoxicated with covetousness, or any kind of Epicurism, carry themselves, as if they thought there were no day of general account: and hereupon our Saviour, dehorting from things, that expose unto the hazard of a sudden, and unexpected surprisal by that day, coupleth in his said exhortation the cares of this life, with 〈◊〉 and drunkenness; And take heed to yourselves, lest at any time your hearts be overcharged with surfeiting and drunkenness, and cares of this life, and so that day come upon you unawares: for as a snare shall it come on all them that dwell on the face of the whole earth, Luk. 21. 34, 35. First, gross drunkenness extinguisheth, for the present, all thoughts of a judgement to come; for a prisoner to reel drunk unto the bar, where he is to be tried for his life, would argue a belluine contempt of his life, and throw a strange and high scorn upon justice: though men habitually fear, and love God above all, and prise their precious souls more than millions of worlds; yet their act of drunkenness is a real, and interpretative slighting of the all-powerfull Judge, of men and Angels, and a disvaluing of the priceless soul. Secondly metaphorical drunkenness, drunkenness with prosperity, and riches, with delights, disports and recreations, &c: argueth an inadvertency, and inconsideration of the last judgement: they, that are in this sense drunk, and intemperate, show themselves to be careless of that, which merits the cheifty of their care, and extremely solicitous about that, which deserves the very height of contempt: whatsoever their professions be, yet, the truth is, such men make but little reckoning of their immortal souls; and the fear of the great Judge of all the earth is not before their eyes: see how the Apostle Paul backs his exhortation unto moderation with the near approach of the Lord to judgement, Phil: 4. 5. Let your moderation be known unto all men, the Lord is at hand: the moderation, that the Apostle calls for, extends unto all our actions, and passions; and, that it concerns us very much to labour for such moderation, he proveth; because the Lord is at hand, to call all to a most severe account, for all exorbitancies, all intemperateness, either of the inward mind, or outward behaviour: By the same reason he dehortes (in the following words, vers. 6.) from an opposite of moderation, inordinate, or immoderate care; The Lord is at hand, therefore be careful for nothing. This clause, the Lord is at hand, stands in the middle betwixt the exhortation and dehortation, and therefore may aptly be related as a motive unto both. A Third duty, regarding ourselves, is diligence and faithfulness in our particular callings: our Saviour himself, Mar. 13. 34, 35, 36, 3 Diligence in our particurar callings. 37: backs his 〈◊〉, of all Christians in general, and Ministers in particular, unto vigilancy in their respective Callings, with proposal of the uncertainty of the day of Doom. 1. He sheweth how he hath allotted every one their work, vers. 34. For the Son of man is as a man taking a farre journey, who left his house, and gave authority to his Servants, and to every man his work, and Commanded the Porter to watch. Hereupon he giveth a charge unto his Disciples, and Apostles to be watchful in their places: watch ye therefore, v. 35. And hereunto he urgeth them; because the time of both particular, and general judgement is uncertain, for ye know 〈◊〉 when the master of the house 〈◊〉, at even, or at midnight, or at the cock-crowing, or in the morning, ibid. Now this is a motive, that concerns, not only the than Disciples of Christ, but all Christians in general, and accordingly, our Saviour presseth the duty upon all, v. 37. And what I say unto you, I say unto all, watch; that is, in your callings; and be careful conscionably to discharge them: for, that the watchfulness here spoken of includeth this particular, if it be not restrained there unto is evident; because the first inference of our Saviour's Command of watchfulness, is drawn, from his appointing unto all the Servants of his family, and in particular the Porters of his house, that is, the Pastors of his Church, their several works, and employments, he gave to every man his work, and commanded the Porter to watch: Watch ye therefore, v. 34. 35. Unto this exhortation of our Saviour's let us add the gracious promise, that he makes, Matth: 24. 45, 46, 47: of a glorious reward unto Ministers, for diligence in their callings, and the like promise may be, in some sort, extended unto all others, that shall be found faithful in their stations. Here we have. 1: the duty of the ministerial function described, v. 45. Who then is a saithsull and wise servant, whom the Lord hath made ruler over his household, to give them meat in due season? Next we have the reward of it propounded and that, 1: in proper terms, vers. 46: blessed is that servant, whom his Lord when he cometh shall find so doing: next in metaphorical terms, in allusion unto the Custom of great men in preferring their diligent, and faithful Servants, vers. 47. Verily I say unto you, that he shall make him Ruler over all his goods. Here you see, that the faithful and laborious Minister, who gives his Lord's household their meat in due season, shall be happy at the last day: and from this we may, by the rule of Contraries, infer, that those Ministers shall then be most miserable, and accursed, without repentance, who are here idle, or active only in doing mischief, in sowing tares, and distributing poison, damnable Heresies destructive of the very foundation of faith: the belief of the terribleness of the last judgement had an influence upon Paul's diligence in the work of the ministry, 2 Cor. 4. 10, 11. We must all appear before the judgement seat of Christ; knowing therefore the terror of the Lord, we persuade men: here we have the work of the ministry expressed Synecdochally by its principal part, we persuade men, to wit, unto faith, repentance, obedience, &c, and then we have the inducement that stirred him up hereunto, 〈◊〉 therefore the terror of the Lord, to wit, in the day of judgement: Now, that Paul herein was acted by a servile and and legal spirit, I believe none will presume to assert. Those Ministers, have no practical knowledge of the terror of the day of judgement, that are remiss or unfaithful in their Callings, and do not resemble Paul, in his unwearied endeavours, to persuade men to fly from the wrath to come: but the terribleness of the last judgement should be, not only a spur unto Ministers to be diligent in their studies and Pulpits, but also an incentive unto activity in all others: it should make the Husbandman laborious at the Blow, the Artificer industrious in his shop, the Judge upright and impartial upon the tribunal, the Lawyer conscientious in his practice, and that both in his chamber and at the bar, and the Soldier valiant, and resolute in the field: knowing the terror of the Lord (should the husbandman and artificer say) we labour working with our hands that which is good, that we may have to give to him Job. 29. 14, 15, 16, 17. that needeth, Ephes. 4. 28: knowing the terror of the Lord (should the Judge say with Job) I put on righteousness, and it 〈◊〉 me, my judgement was as a robe and a 〈◊〉: I was eyes to the blind, and 〈◊〉 was I to the lame, I was a father to the poor: and the cause which I knew not I searched out: and I broke the jaws of the wicked, and 〈◊〉 the spoil out of his 〈◊〉, knowing the 〈◊〉 of the Lord (should the Lawyer say) my advice and plead shall be all guided by Conscience, and squared by law and justice, knowing the terror of the Lord (the Soldier should say) I will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and be content with my wages, Luk. 3. 14. I will be of good courage and play the man for my people, and for the cities of my God, and the Lord 〈◊〉 that which 〈◊〉 him good, 2 Sam. 10. 12. A fourth duty of this sort, under which the last mentioned may be 4. A due and dilignt use 〈◊〉 employment of our talents. comprehended, (as the particular under the general) is a diligent use and faithful employment of all the talents we have received from God: whether bona animi, corporis, or fortunae, whether they be goods and 〈◊〉, of the mind, or of the body, or of fortune (as they are usually called;) the least ability, or opportunity, that we have for the doing of any good; for they are all our maste'rs goods, Matth. 25. 14: our Lord's 〈◊〉, vers. 18: and we enjoy them, but as stewards, factors, or trusties; and so stand accountable how we have used them, and in the universal Audit God will punish, not only the misimployment, and abuse, but also the non-imployment of our talents: the world applauds the politic retiredness of those, that napkin 〈◊〉 talents, or hide them in the 〈◊〉; that bury their parts, and gifts in an obscure privacy, though they have, from both God, and man, many a 〈◊〉 call unto public employment; but the sharp check, and terrible censure of these men by Christ, at the last day, will discover them to be the arrantest fools that ever were upon the face of the earth: every slothful, and unprofitable servant shall then be pronounced to be a wicked servant, Matth. 25. 26: and he shall be condemned to be cast into utter 〈◊〉, vers. 30: that is, into Hell; which is so termed; because it is infinitely removed from the light, that is joy, comfort and happiness of Heaven: but he shall suffer, not only a privative punishment, a punishment of loss; but also a positive punishment, a punishment of sense: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth, ibid. but now cast we our eye one the other side, and see with what approbation and reward Christ will reward him, that duly useth and employeth his talents? vers. 21: his Lord said unto him well done thou good and faithful Servant, thou hast been faithful over a 〈◊〉 things, I will make thee ruler over many things: enter thou into the joy of thy Lord. Carnal men look upon him, as a busy, and forward fool; but Christ will proclaim him, in the hearing of all the world, to be a good and faithful Servant: and how should this cheer, and encourage against all the miscensures and reproaches of men? but his reward will be not only verbal, but real, and this is expressed, 1: in metaphorical, 2: in proper terms. 1. In metaphorical terms: thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over many things: or as it is in Luk. 19: because thou hast been faithful in a very little, have thou authority over ten Cities. vers. 17: and over five 〈◊〉, vers: 19: Our Saviour here alludes unto the custom of great Princes, that reward those, who 〈◊〉 their trust, and serve them faithfully in inferior places, by preferring them unto profitable, and honourable Commanderies. 2. In proper terms, enter thou into the joy of the Lord, that is, the joy which thy Lord enjoyeth, do thou share, and communicate in it. O! how could men be slothsull, and unprofitable, if they had but respect unto this recompense of 〈◊〉, fellowship with Christ in all his glory? The account that we must one day give for all our talents, is a very serious, and sad Theme; for it calls upon all for mourning, and reformation; because there is none, that can plead totally not guilty; as would soon appear, if men would but balance their receipts of Talents, and the employments of them; thou hast good, and great parts, both natural, and acquired; but of what good have they been productive? what is the service, that thou hast done with them? how few are there of thine intimates, that have learned any considerable thing from thee? Nay doth not thine own family remain uninstructed, and unchatechized, ignorant of the first principles of the Oracles of God? thou hast a strong memory; but it hath been only a storehouse for vanities, and not a treasure for good things, out of which thou bringest forth things new and 〈◊〉, Matth 13. 52. Thou hast a large portion of temporals; but alas how narrow, and short is the Catalogue of thy good works that thou canst produce? how backward hast thou always been to contribute toward any good cause? the wants, and necessities of thy poor brethren have loudly cried unto thee for relief and supply, when their modesty hath made them silent; but thou hast shut the bowels of thy compassion from them, 1 Joh. 3. 17. How sharply doth James reprehend the wicked rich, merely for their sordid sparing, and hording? Jam: 5. 23. 〈◊〉 to now ye rich men, &c: your riches are corrupted, and your garments motheaten: your gold and silver is cankered, and 〈◊〉 rust of 〈◊〉 shall be a witness against you, and shall eat your flesh as it 〈◊〉 fire: ye have heaped treasure together for the last days. Here we have a description of their sin, and a 〈◊〉 of the punishment of it. 1. A description of the sin of the Covetous rich; that they chose rather to have their goods corrupted & spoiled, than employed to good uses: their victuals might have refreshed the bowels of the hungry; but they rather suffered them to putrify and stink: the garments; that lay useless in their Wardrobes, might have clothed the backs of their naked brethren; but they rather let them be 〈◊〉: their gold, and silver might have been laid out for many a good use; but they had rather it should be cankered, and rust in their chests. 2. 〈◊〉 is a denunciation of the punishment of their sin, 〈◊〉 rust of their gold and silver (and we may say the same of the corruption and spoiling of their other goods for want of use) shall witness against them (by reflection of their Consciences it shall convince them of base avarice, but it shall be not only a witness, but an executioner) it shall eat your 〈◊〉 as it were fire (the memory and review of it shall gnaw their Conscience, and this corroding of their Conscience shall have an impression upon their bodies, it shall 〈◊〉 their 〈◊〉, not for consumption, but for 〈◊〉, and it shall be a sore and great torment like that of fire;) it shall eat your flesh as it were sire: (their design may be to amass up a great heap of treasure, to make provision against a rainy day; but instead of treasuring up wealth, they treasure up unto themselves wrath against the day of wrath, Rom. 2. 5: they only add to the heap of their vengeance) Ye have heaped treasure together for the last days. The poor now may think thence themselves unconcerned in all this discourse; but there may be some poor men, laborers, that get their living by their handy work, who yet may be obliged to give an alms unto those, that are poorer than themselves; and so much may be gathered from Eph. 4. 28. Let him that 〈◊〉, steal no more; but rather let him labour working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may have to give to him that needeth: but those that are poorest, may yet have other talents, wherewith they may be as useful in their place, as the rich, and yet in such use they extremely fail: they have wit, and judgement, and yet how shy are they of giving counsel, and advice unto their poor brethren? how backward in speaking for them, when they themselves are either ashamed out of modesty, or disabled by sickness to go to speak for themselves? they have health and strength; and yet they neglect to visit them, they refuse to watch with them, or to travel unto a Physician for them: nay there are some poor, who, though they are of very able bodies, are yet so extremely lazy, as that their own wants, and the cries of their wives, and children for bread, cannot awaken them unto any industry: but perhaps thou art, not only a beggar, but a Cripple also; why yet thou mayest have a richer and more precious talon, than many of vast wealth have, thou mayest have the spirit of grace, and supplication poured upon thee, and hast thou improved this as thou oughtedst to have done? must thou not needs confess, that thy prayers for thy sick, and poor brethren have been both unfrequent, and unfervent? but to proceed unto those, whom God hath entrusted with the talon of power, and authority: and here, I shall not myself accuse them, but desire them to examine their own Consciences, and they will soon inform them; whether they have exercised it so far as they might, for the suppressing of sin, for the encouragement of virtue, and religion, for the reforming of their Country? for helping the distressed? for crushing, or restraining potent oppressors? and delivering the oppressed from their violence? whether they can as clearly make such a protestation as Job did Concerning the administration of his Magistracy 〈◊〉. 29. 11, 12, 13. When the care heard me, than it 〈◊〉 me: and when the eye saw me it gave witness to me: because I delivered the poor that cried, and the fatherless, and him that had none to help him: the blessing of him that was ready to perish came upon me: and I caused the widow's heart to sing 〈◊〉 joy. From the talon of the Magistracy go we on to that of the Ministry; the Ministerial office, and the Ministerial gifts: and here who is there among us, but hath cause to bewail his unfaithfulness in part? and his supine negligence in discharging that trust, and duty, which the measure of his gifts, and the condition of his calling exact from him? for the perfecting of the Saints, for the work of the Ministry for the 〈◊〉 of the body of Christ, Eph. 4. 12. if our enemies should be silent, the unreformedness of our congregations will witness against us: for they are most of them, and that in great part by our default, like the sluggards field in Solomon, Prov. 24. 31. Which was all overgrown with thorns, and 〈◊〉 had covered the face thereof, and the stone wall thereof was broken down: so they are overspred with ignorance, error or profaneness, and the wall of discipline is broken down, or rather never erected. I might almost be infinite in the exemplification of this point, by instancing in all outward helps, all relations, interests, any thing whatsoever, that gives us any advantage of bringing any glory unto God, any benefit unto others, any true good unto ourselves; for, which of these things have any of us husbanded as we might; and in such a measure as our Lord and Master hath appointed? what a sorry and pitiful improvement have we made, of the many good sermons, that we have read; the good company that we have conversed with; the remarkable experiences, that we have met with? what unfaithful stewards have the most of men been of that large, and rich talon of time, which God hath trusted them with? omne tempus nobis 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 qualiter sit expensum; all the time, that God hath indulged us, must be accounted for, how it is spent: non peribit capillus de capite, 〈◊〉 momentum de tempore: as not a hair shall fall from our heads unnoticed by God: so neither shall there pass a minute, or moment of our lives unexamined by God: and then, how sad will the reckoning of those be, that have redeemed but an inconsiderable portion of their daiés for communion with God, and Christian fellowship? but have wasted the greatest part of them in eating, drinking, gaming and other pleasures, and recreations, if not in rioting and drunkenness, in chambering, and wantonness? thus you see, that all of us have been more or less faulty not in the abusing, yet in the not using of our talents: as for the future, let the command of our great Lord and Master, that hath received for himself the kingdom, prevail with us, Luke 19 12, 13. he saith occupy till I come, that is, negotiate, and traffic with your gifts, for my use, until I come, either by particular or general judgement: and that indeed will only be a time of reckoning, and no further place for trading: and therefore now, whilst we have time before us, let us up, and be doing: let us not receive our talents, our gifts, and graces in vain: and they are received in vain, when they are not used, for the glorifying of God's name, the promoting of Christ's Kingdom, the edifying of our brethren, the advancement of the public good, both of Church, and Commonwealth, 1 Cor. 12. 7. and 15. 10. 2 Cor. 6. 1. 1 Pet 4. 10. To quicken unto all possible diligence herein I shall propound three motives, and that out of the parable of the talents. 1. The Universality of the accomptants. 2. A specialty remarkable under this universality. And 3ly, The proportion, that shall be observed in the passing of their accounts. 1. The universality of the accomptants: those that have the fewest, and meanest talents must come to an audit for them: he that hath but one talon must reckon for that: to whom God giveth any thing of them he will require something: now God giveth to all men liberally, Jam. 1. 5. and therefore God expects from all men a grateful, and plentiful return: as God hath distributed to every one, so let him walk, 1 Cor. 7. 17. Now God hath distributed to every man some gift, and therefore he hath really called every man unto some work and employment: omne beneficium propter officium: you know what Mordecai said to Hester concerning her preferment, Esth. 4. 14. Who knoweth whether thou art come to the kingdom for such a time as this? and we may apply the saying (mutatis mutandis with due change) unto all ranks, and conditions of men: we may say to the Judge: who knoweth whether thou art come unto the tribunal for such a time as this? to rescue such a poor innocent from oppression, to deliver such a wronged party from injury? to curb such a mighty oppressor? to check such a litigious, and vexatious plaintiff? to repress, and moderate the overbold vociferations of such, and such lawyers, who otherwise would baffle an unconfident witness, and puzzle an ignorant Jury? nay we may go far lower, and apply it unto those, that move in inferior orbs: we may say unto a Constable, Tythingman, or Churchwarden, who knoweth whether thou art come to thy office for such a time as this? to suppress such a disorder? to convict such a grandee of swearing, drunkenness, uncleanness, profanation of the Sabbath etc. who thinks that his birth, alliance, riches, power, and reputation will shelter, and secure him from all pursuits of Justice? we may say unto a juror; who knoweth whether God hath called thee to serve for such a time, and cause as this? to prevent that partiality, and injustice, which is intended by some crafty, and false companions, who are for the nonce packed into the jury? 2. Under this Universality there is aspecialty, some whom God will reckon with in a more special manner then with the rest of mankind: and they (as you may see in the parable) are Christ's own Servants, Matth. 25. 14. the members of his Church visible, those that profess service to him: for their receipts are far greater than those of Pagans, and infidels: and therefore they shall undergo a more severe account. 3. Come we to the proportion, that God will observe in this account: he will proportion his reward, not unto the nature, or number of men's talents, but unto their diligence, and fidelity in the use and employment of them: well done thou good and faithful Servant, Matth. 25. 21: not well done thou wise, learned, rich, powerful, valiant servant. Now a man may be as faithful over few things as another over many: he that hath but few and mean talents, talents of silver, may be as faithful a steward of those, as he that hath more, and richer talents, talents of gold: in the parable he that had but two talents, had the same reward with him, that had five talents: and Interpreters give this reason; because there was no unequality in their labour: he that had two talents laboured as much in the employment of his two, as the other in the employment of his five; and therefore he, as well as the other, was to be ruler over many things, to enter into the joy of his Lord, Matth. 25. 20, 21, 22, 23. Inferior persons may, in their place, glorify God, and serve their Country, as faithfully, and diligenly, as the justice of peace upon the bench, the Judge upon the Tribunal, the Prince upon the Throne, and therefore may shine out all as gloriously in Heaven: a plain Country man, that hath but a little knowledge, and mean gifts, may do his utmost in the communicating of them, and then his happiness may not come short of that of the greatest Scholar: the Widow, that cast into the treasury but her two mites, was more accepted with, and shall more bountifully be rewarded by God, than those that threw in far larger sums, Luk 21. v 1. 2, 3, 4. Mark. 12. 41, 42, 43, 44: for though her talon was smaller, yet her fidelity was superior, and that, by the testimony of our Saviour himself: he, that praiseth God only upon a 〈◊〉 instrument, (his authority extending but to his family, and his example but unto his neighbourhood) may have as thankful a heart here, and as high a place in the celestial Choir hereafter; as the greatest Monarch, that praiseth God upon a ten thousand (m) Mr. SamuelWard of Ipswich in his Epistle dedicatory to his Peace offering. stringed instrument, upon the loud sounding Organs; having so many millions of pipes, as there be men, to whom his authority or example reacheth. But, though God will not proportion men's rewards unto their talents; yet he may be said to observe aproportion betwixt their talents, and accounts; because he expects that men's use, and employment of their talents should be answerable unto the nature, and number of them: unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required: and to whom men have committed much, of him they will 〈◊〉 the more, Luk. 12. 48: and is it not as equitable for God to do so too? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, crescunt rationes donorum, faith Gregory; as God hath distributed to every man, as the Lord hath called every 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 him walk, 1 Cor. 7. 17: where we may observe; that God's call, and man's duty in walking hold proportion with the gifts that God hath distributed; and therefore those, unto whom God hath distributed more, and greater gifts, for them he hath cut out more, and greater work: men than should make their gifts, and talents a rule unto themselves in working; for it will be a rule, unto which God will have an eye in judging: we should therefore conclude; that we have never done our full duty, as long as we have not done all that we can, as long as we have not laboured with all our 〈◊〉, with all our soul, might, and strength: as every man (saith Peter) * 1 Pet. 〈◊〉. 10. hath received the gift, even sominister the same one to 〈◊〉, as good Stewards of the manifold grace of God: here you see, that our layings out in ministering unto others must answer our Intrado; our harvest must be suitable unto our seed: where God hath sown bountifully, he will expect to reap bountifully: woe therefore be it unto you, if the accounts you bring in, be not in some reasonable fort proportionable unto your receipts: if thou hast a greater income, a more plentiful estate than others, more raised intellectuals than others; if thou enjoyest more spare time than others; if thou hast a vaster power, and authority than others if thou sittest under a better ministry, conversest with more able, and knowing company than others, and if withal thou dost not do thy master more service than others; thy stripes will be the more, and thy Condemnation the greater. A third sort of duties, unto which the day of judgement is a provokement The third sort of dutis unto which the day of judgement 〈◊〉 regards others 1: all men & they are 〈◊〉 1: 〈◊〉 the. regards others: and they may again be subdivided; they respect either all men, or bad men, or 〈◊〉. 1. All men: and they are two; humility towards them, charity in our censures of them. 1. Humility towards them: the day of judgement dissuades, 1: from all pride in temporals; because then there will be an utter abolition of them, 2. from all pride in spirituals; because 〈◊〉 then, there will not be a perfect consummation of them. 1. From all pride in 〈◊〉; because then there will be an an utter abolition of them; at least as to the use of putting a difference betwixt men in point of degrees, for before Christ's tribunal there will be no respect of persons, Colos. 3. 25. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is; there will be no respect of the face, or outward appearance, no regard had unto externals: God will then sentence all men according to their works; and he will put no distinction betwixt the free and the bond; the most redoubted Emperor, and his lowest vassal; betwixt a Croesus and an Irus; the rich glutton, and beggar Lazarus; betwixt the spruce and complemental Courtier, and the plain and blunt Peasant; betwixt the learned Critic, and the illiterate Swain; the gallant Lady, and the homely milk-maide, her that grindeth at the mill. It would be little better than madness for a stage-player, that personates a King, to be proud over his fellows who act inferior parts, when he knoweth, that the tiring house and the Conclusion of the play will end all this disparity: and is it not as ridiculous a folly, to pride it over others, in regard of those transitory things, in which the Charnel house, and the day of Judgement will take away all inequality? 2. Our spirituals are unapt fuel for pride; because their full consummation will not be until the day of judgement: for here, in this life, they will still be defective; and so present a continual argument for our tears, and humiliation: the Corinthians were enriched by Christ Jesus in every thing in all utterance, and all knowledge, so that they came behind in no gift: but yet, they waited for the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, 1 Cor. 1. 5, 7. (r) Dutch Annotations. as knowing, that then alone they should be made perfect in all that which was yet wanting to them: indeed, presently upon separation from the body, the spirits of just men are made perfect: Heb. 12. 23. intensively their graces than arrive unto their highest, and utmost degree: but this intensive perfection of their graces doth not extend its operation, and influence unto their bodies, until the coming of of our Lord Jesus. 2. Charity in our censures of them (especially if they be professors 2 Charity in our censures of them. with us of the same true religion) in our censures of their state, and of their actions: it will be one great torment of reprobates that day to review their miscensures of the Godly: how will it vex them to behold them their Judges, whom by their rash judgement they branded as scelestique hypocrites? how will they be confounded to hear all their black jealousies of them pronounced to be groundless, and injurious? nay the Godly themselves (though their glorified Condition be uncapable of shame and blushing) will have cause to retract their over censoriousness: God will then own many Sons, unto whom they would not vouchsafe the respect of brethren; they shall meet those, intermixed with the Angels in the glorious train of Christ, whom their uncharitable rigour always condemned unto the pit of Hell, as graceless; & shall hear their actions cleared from those crimes with which their bitter, and unjust censures charged them. There be two places, in the Apostle Paul, wherein the day of judgement is used as a reason to dehort from rash, and nncharitable judging. The first is, Rom. 14. 10, 11, 12, 13: Why dost thou judge thy brother? or why dost thou set at nought thy brother? we shall all stand before the judgement seat of Christ: for it is 〈◊〉, as I live saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall 〈◊〉 to God: 〈◊〉 us not therefore judge one another any more. The things, for which the Apostle would not have the weak to judge the strong, as irreligious, and profane, or the strong to despise the weak, (and despising is a kind of judging) as ignorant, and unnecessarily scrupulous in the use of their Christian liberty, were matters of an indifferent nature: and here (to pass ab Hypothesi ad Thesin) we may hence infer, that in indifferencies, wherein there is no outward and visible failings, we are not to judge or condemn one another, because Christ hath reserved the judicature of such matters unto himself, for he alone knows how they are in all particulars circumstanced, and therefore, for us here to be peremptory in censuring is a presumptuous usurpation, and invasion upon the royal prerogative of Christ. A second place is the 1 Cor. 4. 4, 5. He that judgeth me is the Lord, therefore judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come, who both will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts: and 〈◊〉 shall every man have praise of God. The Corinthians it seems had passed a very hasty, and headlong censure upon Paul in comparison of others, and that unto his injury, and disparagement; from them therefore he appealeth unto the unerring tribunal of Heaven: he that judgeth me is the Lord, he alone is my supreme, and infallible Judge, others may take upon them to judge me, and to call in question the uprightness, and the fidelity of my heart in the work of the Ministry: but, alas! they have no commission for such an act, and besides, they are utterly unqualified for it, for how little can they pierce into that privy closet of man's soul, the heart, and conscience? hereupon the Apostle dehortes them from the like rashness, and precipitancy for the future, therefore judge nothing, (to wit, that is hidden and unknown) before the time until the Lord come, wherein alone there will be a perfect discovery of all secrets: this the Apostle affirmeth: first, in the general he will bring to light the hidden things of darkness: some understand the passage only concerning evil actions, because darkness in scripture is usually taken in an evil sense: but (as Estius well observeth) it else where signifies only privacy, and 〈◊〉, and is appliable to both good and evil actions: for it, he citys two places, Matth. 10. 27: what I 〈◊〉 you in darkness that 〈◊〉 ye in light, Luk. 12. 3: whatsoever you have 〈◊〉 in darkness shall be heard in the light: that darkness is here taken in this latter sense he confirmteth from the context, which agreeth in cómon unto both sorts of actions: he will then bring to light both, he will then manifest the good, as well as the bad 〈◊〉 of the hearts: in these latter words he exemplifieth by a particular what he had said only in general in the former: and he instanceth in, what is inwardest, and secretest in man, the counsels of the heart: men's outward actions lie open unto our view; but the counsels of men's hearts, the purposes, intentions, ends, aims, and motives whence their actions spring are of themselves invisible, and no created understanding can have of them an immediate, and infallible intuition, and therefore, we must refer them unto the judgement of the last day: then indeed 〈◊〉 man (to wit, that hath done well) shall have praise, and his praise shall be proportioned unto the degree of his well doing: They, that will adventure to anticipate the divine retribution, will be very liable to mistakes, they may, ere they are aware, detract from the most praiseworthy, and crown those with praises that are of all others most undeserving: that which Paul here speaks to the Corinthians (and in them unto all private Christians) may be pressed, in a more special manner, upon public judicatories, they should judge nothing secret before the time, until the Lord come: indeed, that which Job professeth of himself, Job. 29. 16: the cause which I knew not I searched out, is the duty of every magistrate: a Judge should do his best for the bolting out of the most hidden truth, and to search into the bottom of the darkest cause; but, if when in this search he hath proceeded with his most diligent care, and greatest caution, he yet hath no convictive prooses, but only mere 〈◊〉 presumptions, and probabilities to guide him, which can beget only a conjectural knowledge, and that is full of uncertainty, here he may guess, but cannot properly judge: he, that in this case will peremptorily judge either way, may soon wrong the generation of the upright, & condemn as frequently the innocent as the guilty: the hidden things of darkness are to be put over unto the final, & infallible judgement of the great day, which will bring them all into the open light. Proceed we next unto those duties that regard wicked men; and they are two, 〈◊〉 from them, patience towards them. First, we may hence be exhorted unto an estrangement from all unnecessary, Secondly, the duties unto which the day of judgement persuades regarding wicked men are two. delightful, intimate fellowship with them, not that we may not at all converse with such; for then (as the Apostle saith, 1 Cor. 5. 10.) we must 〈◊〉 go out of the world: such a doctrine hath attendancy to the putting of the world into a mutiny, and the dissolving of all humane societies, our callings, relations: and necessities will many times enforce us to have commerce with the worst of men; but to enter into any league of familiarity, amity, and inwardness with persons notoriously; or professedly impious, and profane 1. Estrangement from them. is a thing disagreeable unto that final separation, which Christ shall make the last day, of the sheep from the goats, the godly from the ungodly, Matth. 25. 32, 33: shall they only be our intimates, and confidents here in this life from whom in the next life we are like to be everlasting separatists? shall they now alone have our hearts, and bosoms, unto whose curse, and condemnation we shall (without God give them repentance) give our vote, and suffrage? shall they have our most intimate, and friendliest conversation, that are as yet the professed enemies of Christ, and his Church? seeing, if they continue so still, we shall in the last day rejoice, and triumph in their eternal ruin, and damnation. Unless God work a change in their hearts, after death we shall never come into their company again; and after the day of judgement never so much as see them again, and therefore why shall they now engross, if not all, yet the greatest part of our intimate, and familiar society? betwixt us then there will be an impassable gulf, and that unto all eternity, and therefore why now is there such a nearness betwixt us? the ungodly shall not stand in the judgement, nor sinners in the Congregation of the righteous, Psal. 1. 5: the goats shall not so much as come nigh the sheep, and therefore now the righteous should not stand in the way of 〈◊〉, Psal. 1. 1: they should (as 〈◊〉 exhorts) not enter into the path of the wicked, nor go in the way of evil men, 〈◊〉 should avoid it, etc. turn from it, and pass away, Prov: 4. 14, 15. 〈◊〉, we may hence be exhorted to patience under their injuries, 2. Patience towards the. and at their 〈◊〉, Jam: 5. vers. 7. 8, 9 Be patient therefore, brethren, unto the coming of the Lord: behold the husbandman waiteth for the precious fruit of the earth, and hath long patience for it, until he receive the early and latter rain: be ye also patient, establish your hearts: for the coming of the Lord draweth nigh. Grudge not one against another, 〈◊〉, lest ye be condemned; behold the judged standeth 〈◊〉 the door. Here we have an 〈◊〉 unto patience, vers. 7. 8: and a 〈◊〉 from the effects of impatience, vers. 9 1. An 〈◊〉 to patience; and this is addressed unto the poor Christians oppressed, and persecuted by the wicked rich, and so much may be collected from comparison of vers. 7: with 〈◊〉. 6: unto which, the illative particle [therefore] carrieth us: ye have condemned and killed the just, and he doth not resist you, be patient therefore brethren; your unjust and unavoidable sufferings are, not only the matter, or object of, but a motive unto patience; ye are just, and innocent, and yet condemned, and killed, and you can make no resistance; therefore be patient, therefore you have need of the buckler of patience, and indeed without it the persecutions, that you are to suffer, will, not only ruin your states, and bodies; but even sink your souls: the word is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and (in the margin) it is rendered be long patient, or suffer with long patience; let patience have her perfect work, (Jam. 1. 4.) let it be parallel unto your sufferings, be as lasting, and as durable as they can be; and with them you must expect no truce here in this life, be patient therefore unto the coming of the Lord, that is, to judgement, until that time you will daily meet with matter for the exercise of your patience. In the words there may be both the extension, and the limitation, or restriction of our patience: be patient unto the coming of the Lord, and when he comes there will be no further need of your patience: indeed, the habit of patience will still remain, but there will be no objects wherewith to exercise it: the Apostle exhorts, as to patience itself, so also to the cause of it, establish your 〈◊〉 (be firm, and unshakeable in the faith:) and be rooted and grounded in love: (Eph. 3. 17.) & in all other practical graces: unsettledness in the faith, temporary graces, that have no firm, or deep rooting in the soul, will soon betray a man unto impatience, and unto its usual sequel Apostasy: some think, that the Apostle urgeth the fortification of our hearts with courage, and resolution, against the most bloody, and violent persecutions, that are one of the strongest temptations unto impatience: Christian fortitude will even steel, and (as it were) harden the soft spirits of women with an all-conquering patience, and enable them quietly, and composedly to encounter such dangers, as a stout Soldier would tremble to think of, whereas, on the other side, from the want of spiritual valour, you may expect nothing, but such impotent whining, and puling language, and behaviour, as expresseth a lower impatience, than a man shall meet with in poor children. Hitherto we have a 〈◊〉 of the patience exhorted to, 1: From its 〈◊〉 of the bloody persecutions of the ungodly rich, 〈◊〉. 6. 7. 2. By its 〈◊〉, and limitation unto the coming of the Lord, be patient until then, and afterwards there will be no further trial of your patience, 3. By its cause establish your hearts. In the next 〈◊〉 consider we the arguments, by which the Apostle enforceth this his exhortation unto patience, and they 〈◊〉 two, 1: A 〈◊〉 of it: 2. A promise of reward unto it. 1. A 〈◊〉 of it, behold the husbandman waiteth for the precious fruit of the earth, and hath long patience for it until he receive the early, and latter rain, 〈◊〉 ye also patient: With a comparison in point of quality, similitude, there is joined another in point of quantity, a comparison of unequals: so that the argument proceeds, à minori ad majus, from the less unto the greater: if husbandmen wait, with such long patience for the precious fruits of the earth, how much more should Christians wait, with all possible patience, for the far more precious objects of their faith and hope? But the second argument is more to our purpose, and that is the promise of reward unto this patience in the day of judgement: for the coming of the Lord draweth nigh, and he when he cometh will recompense your patience with such a glorious crown, as shall make a whole age of affliction, and misery spent in expectation of it to seem but a few days; as Jac. b's time of service seemed unto him for the love of Rachel, Gen. 29. 20. The very same motive is used in the next verse to 〈◊〉 from the effects of in patience: Grudge not one against 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉, lest ye be condemned, behold the Judge standeth before the 〈◊〉: the latter words are a 〈◊〉 expression of the neernes of a thing; so likewise ye, when you shall see all these things, know that it is near, even at the doors. Matth. 24. 33: the words, read in our translation, grudge not one against another, are in the original, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and in the margin it is thus varied, groan, or grieve not; to wit, either out of 〈◊〉, or envy. Unto both sorts of groans, I shall show how, the near approach of the Judge is suited, as a dissuasive. 1. Groan not against others out of a desire of revenge for injuries received from them; for behold the Judge standeth at the door: Vengeance is one of God's royal prerogatives, Rom. 12. 19 Deut. 32. 35: and the day of judgement is the time, which he hath set apart in a more special manner, for the complete inflicting of it; God will recompense, when he judgeth his people, Heb. 10. 30. It is a righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you; and to you, who are troubled rest with us, when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from Heaven with his mighty Angels in flaming fire, 2 Thes. 1. vers. 6. 7, 8: avenge not yourselves therefore, but rather give place unto wrath, Rom. 12. 19: and commit your cause unto him, whose insinitenesse will have a more tender resentment of your wrongs, than your own narrow hearts arecapable of. No injuries cut deeper in men's spirits, than those of tribunals; for what greater aggravation almost can there be of a man's wrongs, than to have them to be authorized by the abused Law, and cloaked with a pretence of Justice? and yet this is a mischief, that sometimes Judges, of the greatest, both ability, and integrity, may be unable to prevent; for unto the administration of Justice there be very many, that have a concurrence; and therefore it may be hindered by the default of the least, and lowest instrument: even as the motion of a clock will prove irregular, if the least wheel, or but pin be out of order: also witnesses may misguide both Jury, and Judge, nay suppose the witnesses give a true, and full testimony, and the Judge be (as the woman of Tekoah said of David, 2 Sam. 14. 20.) wise according to the wisdom of an Angel of God, and discharge his part exactly, in directing the evidence, in recapitulating, selecting, and collating the material points of that which hath been said; yet one crafty, and wilful knave in a tame Jury may pervert, or disturb Justice: but now, against the perjury of witnesses, the unjustice of Judges, Jurers, Counsellors, Attorneys, Clerks, there is not the poorest wretch, but may enter his appeal unto a Judge, that can neither deceive, nor be deceived, and this should make him in patience to 〈◊〉 his soul, and take up such an estimate of the unrighteous, both verdict, and sentence of men, as Paul had of humane unjust judgements in the general, private, as well as public; with me it is a very small thing that I should be judged of you, or of man's judgement, 1 Cor. 4. 3: in the Greek it is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of man's day, or a humane day; man's day (by a metonymy of the Adjunct) is put for man's judgement; and it is a phrase taken from ordinary Courts, in which set days are appointed for judgement: Hierome thinketh, that it is a form of speech proper unto the Cilicians, amongst whom Paul first learned his Greek, as being borne at Tarsus a City in Cilicia: others take it for a Hebraisme, for with the Hebrews (say they) the day of the Lord signifies the judgement of the Lord, and so man's day may, in like manner, signify man's judgement: the like also is in use amongst the Latins, with whom diem dicere, is in jus 〈◊〉: here is an opposition employed betwixt man's day, and the Lord's day. Paul knew that in the Lord's day he should be acquitted, and so long it was a matter of light moment with him to be condemned in man's day, if a man can say as Job; 〈◊〉 hold my witness is in Heaven, and my record is on high, why then he is beyond the reach of a slavish fear, or a distempered sorrow; that may arise from the falseness of testimonies, from a packed jury, a Corrupt Judge, an unfaithful Lawyer, God knoweth thine innocency, and he both can, and will clear it, if thy cause be just, and yet miscarry here, 〈◊〉 it unto the Lord, and he will (in his day) bring forth thy 〈◊〉 as the light, and thy judgement as the noonday, Ps. 37. v. 5. 6 〈◊〉 having shown how prone men are to abuse authority unto oppression, he comforteth, and encourageth those that are oppressed, with a consideration of God's future judgement, Eccles. 3 16, 17. And moreover I saw under the Sun the place of Judgement, that wickedness was 〈◊〉, and the place of 〈◊〉, that iniquity was there, I said in mine heart, God shall judge the righteous and the 〈◊〉: for there is a time there for every purpose and for every work. That worldly power, and authority is no branch of true happiness, but a mere vanity, the Preacher proves from its being subject to be abused unto wrong, and injustice; for let men have what opinion they will of it, yet, because it is liable to so great a mischief, the utmost it can render (if severed from the fear of God) is a glorious infelicity: Now the Preacher observeth, that this abuse of Magistracy was a thing very rife, and usual; and in all likelihood he speaks, not only of foreign nations, but of the Kingdom of Israel, the only Church of God at that time, wherein righteousness should, if in any place, reign, and flourish: not only of the former times under David, Saul, Samuel, and the Judges, but even of the very days wherein he himself lived: he was a very prudent prince, and his peace gave him leisure to look after the execution of his Laws; and withal, we may well presume, that his utmost vigilancy, and circumspection were not wanting; but notwithstanding all this injustice too too frequently crept into his very courts of Justice: Moreover I saw under the Sun the place of Judgement, that wickedness was there: and the place of righteousness, that iniquity 〈◊〉 there. The offence is aggravated from the circumstance of place, wherein it was committed; the place of righteousness, the place of Judgement: to violate justice any where is naught, but to do it in the Courts of Justice is extremely odious and abominable: for they, by their institution, should be Altars of refuge unto the wronged, and distressed: and therefore, when they prove unto them a rock, against which they split, and ship- 〈◊〉 all their hopes, and fortunes, the disappointment of their just expectation, cannot but add exceedingly to their injury, and vexation: as the Temple was consecrated wholly unto God's worship, so that no vessel, but what was holy, was to be brought therein: even so places of judgement are to be sacred unto justice, and nothing unjust should dare appear there: and if it do the frown of the Judge should soon scatter it. Solomon's great Throne (and it was a throne whereon he executed judgement, 1 King. 7. 7. was made of Ivory, and overlaid with the best gold, 1 Kings 10. 18. and this (n) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Solomon 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 justitiae ex 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 purissimo ab ducto, in altum 〈◊〉 gradibus 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 huic inde 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 magnificentià quid 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quam pretium quo Deus jus, & justitiam 〈◊〉 voluit, quam purgatissima, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 oportere judicia quae indè feuntur, & 〈◊〉, indignum 〈◊〉 ut 〈◊〉, aut plubeae sententiae ex tam augusto loco prodeant, 〈◊〉 un ut ex 〈◊〉 suggesto 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. 〈◊〉. (think some) was to signify, that from it nothing was to proceed, but what was white, 〈◊〉 Ivery, sound, and uncorrupt, 〈◊〉 precious as the best gold: the moral may be applied unto the tribunals of subordinate Judges; for, let them consist of whatsoever matter, yet their use, and end is not only innocent, white, like ivory, but also 〈◊〉, and glorious, like 〈◊〉 gold: and from a throne of ivory overlaid with the best gold, no dross should be heard, no lead, no sentence of ignorance, no iron, no sentence of violence: hereupon is it (as Mr Cartwright observeth) that the Prophet Esaiah thus describeth the corruption of public justice in Judah, Esai: 1. 22. thy silver is become dross, thy wine mixed with water (and how he explaineth this Allegory you may see in the next verse) thy princes are rebellious, and companions of thiefs: every one loveth gifts, and followeth after 〈◊〉: they judge not the fatherless, neither doth the cause of the widow come unto them. But the Preacher (having shown the disease of his times, public unjustice) in the next place points unto the remedy of the wronged against it vers. 17. and that sometimes is only a patient waiting for God's last judgement, that will review, correct, and redress all the miscarriages of humane judicatories: I said in my heart God will judge the righteous (to wit, by a sentence of absolution) and the wicked (to wit, by a judgement of condemnation) for there is a time there (that is, with God, in the judgement to come) for every purpose, and for every 〈◊〉: if men be overthrown in one court, and there lie an appeal unto another, where there sits a judge of known, and unquestionable uprightness and incorruption, they will hopefully, and cheerfully fly unto that other, though the prosecution of their appeal be very chargeable: The lowest vassal, that is upon the 〈◊〉 of the earth, hath liberty to appeal, from the highest court upon earth, unto one that is far higher, that which the Lord will hold in the day of judgement; the pursuit of thy appeal thither will cost thee nothing, but thy tears, & prayers; & there, God will judge over thy cause again, & do thee all the right, that thou canst desire, & assurance of this should (one would think) exclude, all excess of sorrow, faintness of courage, and despondency of spirit for the misiudging of the highest of men: If thou seest the oppression of the poor, and violent, perverting of judgement, and justice in a Province, 〈◊〉 not at the matter: for he that is higher than the 〈◊〉 regardeth, and there be higher than they, Eccl: 5. 8. 2. Groan not against the wicked, out of envy at their prosperity in this life; for, 〈◊〉 the judge standeth at the door, and when he cometh, men will diseerne, 〈◊〉 the righteous and the wicked, between him that 〈◊〉 God, and him that serveth him not, Mal. 3. 18. The Lord knoweth how to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgement to be punished, 2 Pet. 2. 9 and their punishment then shall be such, as shall throw them below all envy: it will then be plainly seen, that innocent Paul, at the bar, had no reason to look with an envious eye at his unjust judge, Felix, upon the tribunal: that Lazarus the beggar, in his rags, 〈◊〉 of sores, and wants, had no ground to repine at the pompous attire, and sumptuous fare of the rich glutton: that the poor Martyrs, in their deepest, and darkest dungeons, loaden with irons, and chains, upon the rack, in their greatest tortures, at the stake, amidst their flames were in a far happier condition, than their cruel persecutors in the height of all their power, pomp, and glory: the upright shall have dominion over them in the morning (to wit, in the resurrection) Psal. 49. 14. here the wicked flaunt it, domineer, and tyrannize it over the godly: but these, in the last day shall enjoy a full victory, and triumph over them: Ye that fear my name shall tread down the wicked (saith God, in the Prophet Malachi) for they shall be 〈◊〉 under the soles of your feet, in the day that I shall do this, saith the Lord of Hosts, Mal. 4. 3. Now they trample, upon the godly and make up the upper end of the world: but then, they shall be the vilest, and most contemptible of men: they shall be ashes under the soles of your feet to tread upon: the present selicity of the wicked was a great stumbling block even unto a David, until he went into the Sanctuary, than he understood their end, Psal. 73. 2. 3. 17. when he understood their end, their novissima, what happened unto them after death, and judgement, this calmed, and composed his spirit: for than he saw, that they were not to be envied in their highest glories. To go unto the last sort of duties: to wit, those which regard good men, both ordinary Christians, and Ministers, and they are two. 1. The real expressions of a cordial love of them in 〈◊〉. 2. All actions of Christian Communion with them in particular. First, the day of judgement should provoke unto real expressions A third sort of duties unto which the day of judgement perwades, regards good men: and are two. of a Cordial love of them in general: In the prayer of the Apostle for the Thessalonians (in the 1 Thes. 3. 12, 13.) you may observe: that growth in this love will be attended with such an unblameable holiness, as will stand before God at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ: the Lord make you to increase, and abound in love one towards another, and towards all men, even as we do towards 1. Real expressions of a cordioll love of them in general. you: to the end he may establish your hearts unblameable in holiness, before God, even our Father at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ with all his Saints. Now love, is not sincere, unless it be fruitful and expressive; and the very omissions of the expressions of charity will be, by Christ himself, put into the bill of endictment against reprobates in the day of Judgement, Matth. 25. 41, 42, 43, 44, 45. and therefore, much more, their injurious, and cruel acts of persecution, and oppression of them: men dare not affront, and wrong those, that are near in place, and favour unto a Judge, before whom they are to be tried for their lives: the general trial, at the last day, will concern men's eternal life, and happiness, and unto the judge Christ jesus none are so nearly related, as the Godly; for they are his servants, favourites, intimates, members, spouse, and 〈◊〉: and yet, there are none among the sons of men, that have so much contempt, so many, and so great injuries, and abuses heaped upon them, as they: nothing so much distasteth carnal men, as strictness in the service of Christ; nothing amongst them exposeth unto so much scorn, and obloquy, as to be a faithful Ambassador unto Christ: and is not this an evident argument of disesteem of, and disaffection unto his person, and office? the guilt hereof may sufficiently instruct such malignant enemies, that they are not to expect any good, or favour from him, when he shall sit upon the throne of his glory in judgement. John Damascene relates this following story of a certain great and powerful king, o Quidam Rex 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & gloriosus: & 〈◊〉 est procedente illo in curru deaurato cum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, obviasse illi duos viros, 〈◊〉 & sore did is indutos 〈◊〉, attenuatoes 〈◊〉, & pallidas facies habentes. Rex aute millico cognovit eos 〈◊〉, & exercitii sudoribus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ut ergo vidit illos, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 decurru, & in terram procidens, adoravit & surgens 〈◊〉 est eos, & 〈◊〉 osculatus. Magnates vero illius, ac proceres de hoc valdè 〈◊〉 sunt, 〈◊〉 cum fecisse indigna 〈◊〉 gloriâ, non tamen ausi illum in 〈◊〉 reprehendere, 〈◊〉 fratriejus suggesserunt, ut 〈◊〉 loqueretur, ne 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 tantam inferret contumeliam. Qui cum 〈◊〉 ista dicerer, & regis inutilem, (ut sibi videbatur) humiliationem 〈◊〉, ei 〈◊〉 responsum dedit, Quod tamen 〈◊〉 non intellexit. Consuetudo autem erat illi Regi, quando 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 contra aliquem 〈◊〉, praeconem ante januam illius cum tuba 〈◊〉 officio deputatâ mittere, cujus voce 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mortis reum illum existere. Vespere 〈◊〉 veniente, misit Rex buccinam 〈◊〉 tubicinare 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 domus 〈◊〉 sui. Ut ergo audivit ille tubam mortis, de suâ salute 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 nocte sua disposuit. Summo vero dilutulo nigtis, ac 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vestibus, cum uxore, & filiis pergit ad fores 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉, & lugens. Quem Rex ad se ingredi fecit, & videns eum ità lugentem, ait illi, O stulte, & insipiens, si 〈◊〉 sic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 germani 〈◊〉 tui ad versus quem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 deliquisse cognoscis: quomodo mihi reprehensionem intulisti, qui in humilitate 〈◊〉, & osculatus sum praecones Dei mei, sonorabiliùs tubâ mortem mihi significantes, & terribilem Domini occursum cui multa & magna 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? 〈◊〉 denique tuam arguens insipientiam, isto usus sum modo. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 qui te ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 reprehensionem stultitiam omnibus mod is aperte arguere curabo. Et ita 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 suum domum remisit. In Historia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 pag. 280. riding in a chariot overlaid with gold, and waited on by his Royal guard, he met with two Ministers well known unto him, who were very meanly habited and in a poor plight of body: He no sooner saw them but he forthwith leapt down from his chariot and in reverence of them prostrated himself upon the ground, and afterwards arising he embraced them, and affectionately kissed them. The nobles that attended him, deeply resented this his carriage as unbecoming the glory and majesty of a king. Hereupon they addressed themselves unto his brother, and he by their instigation tartly admonished him, that in this strange veneration of two such contemptible wretches he had forgotten his dignity, and dishonoured his Crown. The king for the present said little unto him, but the next evening he returned him a real and sharp answer. It was the custom of that Country (where the king's power was, it seems, 〈◊〉) for the king to denounce the sentence of death without farther process, by a trumpet sounded by an officer appointed for that purpose, so that all the neighbourhood looked upon him, before whose gate this trumpet was sounded, as a condemned man: when the night came, the king commanded this trumpeter to sound before the gates of his brother's house, who no sooner heard it, but he looked upon it as the messenger of his unavoidable death. And this despair made the Remainder of the night 〈◊〉 unto him, and all his family. As soon as it was day he went in 〈◊〉 apparel with his Wife and Children unto the Court-gates, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 expecting every minute the Executioner. The King hearing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 elently commanded him to be brought unto his presence; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in this mournful posture, thus he 〈◊〉 him: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 tremble at the trumpet of thy natural Brother, though thine 〈◊〉 be not privy unto any signal offence against him, what a 〈◊〉 part than was it in thee to reprehend me for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and reverential salutation of the trumpets of my great God, which 〈◊〉 me unto his tribunal, that is infinitely more 〈◊〉, than mine, seeing mine heart is conscious of great and in numerable transgressions against him. There was doubtless an imprudent excess in this action, which I may excuse; but shall not undertake to justify, much less shall I press to the practice of the same. God forbid, that any Protestant minister should accept so profound a respect from the people of his Congregation: But yet however the example may make those blush, (if their cheeks were capable of such a colour,) who have the ministers of Jesus Christ, by whom God will judge the secrets of men in such an horrible contempt, as that to use the expression of Job in another case; They disdain to set them with the dogs of their flocke, Job. 30. 3. Secondly, we may from the day of judgement be pressed unto all obliged acts of communion with them, let us consider 〈◊〉 another, to prevoke 2. All actions of Christian communion with them in particular. unto love, and to good works: not forsaking the assembling of ourselves together, as the manner of some is; but exhorting one another, and so much the more as ye 〈◊〉 the day approaching, Heb. 10. 24, 25: here the Apostle calls upon the Hebrews for both private, and public acts of Christian Communion; and he makes the near approach of the day of judgement a special incentive unto both. 1. It is an incentive unto private acts of Christian communion; let us consider one another to provoke unto love, and to good works; 〈◊〉 one another, and so much the more, as ye see the day approaching; for, when that day cometh, it will be to no purpose to exhort one another; and therefore as the 〈◊〉, chap. 3. vers. 13: Exhort 〈◊〉 another daily, whilst it is called to day: what the 〈◊〉 speaks of exhortation, I may say of private prayer for one another pray for one another, and so much the more as you see the day approaching; for, when that day cometh, prayers for one another will be in vain, the efficacy of the prayer or petition is proper unto the time of this life, now the effectual 〈◊〉 prayer of one righteous man 〈◊〉 much, and that for others, 〈◊〉 5. 16: but 〈◊〉 the prayers of millions will be of no avail. 2. Unto public acts of Christian communion; not forsaking the assembling of ourselves together, as the manner of 〈◊〉 is: and so much the more as you see the day approaching. At that day all the Saints will concur unto the making up of the general assembly and Church of the first borne, Heb. 12. 23: and therefore, why should any of them, that live here together, forsake the assembling of themselves together? then they shall for ever associate in the praises of God; and why then shall they not in the interim join in all other parts of God's worship? and walk hand in hand together, friendly, and fruitfully in all the ordinances of Christ? then shall there be a perpetual, and uninterrupted union, and communion betwixt them; and is it not a thousand pities, that there should be in the mean time betwixt them a separation? then they shall all stand together in one 〈◊〉 at the right hand of Christ; and why now should there be such distances, and divisions betwixt them? nothing shall then break off that happy fellowship, in which they shall everlastingly embrace one another; and what is there now then, that should make them to refuse to reach out to one another the right hand of fellowship? O beloved! the animosities, sidings, factions, schisms, and bandings, that are among st Protestant's (betwixt Lutherans, and Calvinists; Presbyterians and Independents; and betwixt both, and some moderate persons for Prelacy) are unmeet qualifications for that blessed unity, agreement, and harmony, which shall be betwixt all the Godly at the day of judgement, and from that unto all 〈◊〉: there is nothing almost more opposed unto this communion of Saints, than their condemning, and 〈◊〉 one another: and from both those the Apostle dehortes upon the account of the general judgement, Rom. 14. 10, 11, 12, 13. But why dost thou judge thy brother? or why dost thou set at nought thy brother? we shall all stand before the judgement seat of Christ: for it is written. As I live, saith the Lord, every knee shall 〈◊〉 to me, and every tongue shall confess to God. So then, every one of us shall give account of himself to God; let us not therefore 〈◊〉 one another, any more. Why do Christians judge one another, seeing they shall all be associated with Christ, as assessors in judgement? why do they set at nought one another, seeing they shall all stand upon the same level before the judgement seat of Christ? and at this general appearance; the weak must give an account, for judging of the strong, and the strong for their despising the weak; and both for their rending the Church of God, and disturbing the peace thereof: however their persons may be acquitted, yet their actions shall be condemned, and discovered to be nought. Contests between brethren are very unsuitable unto their work in the day of judgement; for than they shall all join in the worship of God: as I live saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to God, vers. 11: and unto this sacred conjunction how unfortable is it for them here to be snarling one at another, to be judging and despising one another? There is another opposite of Christian fellowship mentioned by James; and his dissuasive from it is, the nearness of the great Judges coming, grudge not one against another, brethren, behold the Judge standeth before the door, Jam. 5. 9: in the Greek it is, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, groan not one against another, brethren: it is very probable, that he speaks of the dissenting Christians of those times, that went under the names of the circumcision, and uncircumcision: in the two next foregoing verses he exhortes them to patience towards persecuting enemies, and in this he dissuades them from the effects, and fruits of impatience one towards another; to wit, contentious groans, groan not one against another (out of contention) for behold the Judge standeth at the door; and he disalloweth all such groans, and will put an utter period unto them: as he will wipe away all tears from the eyes of brethren, Rev. 21. 4: so he will suppress all their groans: we shall all be perfect friends at our journeys end; and therefore, why do we fall out by the way? God will reconcile all the brethren at the last day; and therefore it is folly for any of them to jangle in the mean while? they shall not then so much as harbour an ill thought one of another; and therefore why should they now think so uncharitably of, and speak, and write so bitterly one against another? that persecuters should condemn, and kill the just is no wonder, vers. 6: but that brethren should thus sigh, groan, and pray one against another, especially seeing the Judge standeth at the door, is very strange. Thus, having seen how the day of judgement is an inducement unto the matter of the forementioned duties; I shall only crave thy patience, Reader, to show, how it hath the same use, as touching the manner requisite in the performance of them; which standeth especially in four things; fervency, frequency, sincerity, and constancy. The two 〈◊〉 I shall join together: the day of judgement is an apt Day of judgement an inducement unto a due and requisite manner in the performance of the forementioned duties which stands first in fervency. motive unto fervency and frequency in the foregoing duties, 1 Cor. 15. 58. Be ye always 〈◊〉 in the work of the Lord; estote eminentes in opere 〈◊〉, as Beza reads it, be ye always eminent, or excelling in the work of the Lord; for as much as you know that your labour will not be in vain in the Lord: for, in the day of retribution, he will render unto every man according unto his 〈◊〉, according unto the degree, and measure, and according to the number of his works: the harvest of our glory will be proportioned unto our seed of grace, and good works: he which soweth spareingly, shall, reap spareingly, and he which soweth bountifully, shall reap bountifully, 2 Cor. 9 6: those that outshine their brethren here in holiness, shall hereafter outshine them in 〈◊〉: and this our Saviour 2. Frequency expresseth metaphorically, in conformity unto the guise of prudent Princes; who prefer their Servants proportionably unto the degree of their service: he that gained ten pounds, had authority 〈◊〉 him over ten Cities; and he that 〈◊〉 but five pounds, was placed but over five Cities, Luk. 19 16, 17, 18, 19 Thirdly, the day of judgement is an apt motive unto sincerity, because 3. In sincerity. then there will be a perfect, and full disclosure of all hypocrisy, and dissimulation; God will then judge the secrets of 〈◊〉; God will then bring every secret thing unto judgement, Eccles. 12. 14: he will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, the bidden things of 〈◊〉; he will make manifest the counsels of the hearts, 1 Cor. 4. 5: unto this some apply that of our Saviour, Luk. 12. 1, 2, 3. Beware ye of the leaven of the Pharisees, which is, hypocrisy; for there is nothing covered, that shall not be revealed, 〈◊〉 hid; that shall not be known: therefore whatsoever ye have spoken in darkness, shall be heard in the light, and that which ye have spoken in the ear in closerts, shall be proclaimed upon the house tops: the 2. and 3. verses are (by Cajetane and others) understood of the life to come, to wit, in the day of judgement. The design of Pharisaical hypocrites is to cloak, and conceal their vices, and sins with shows, and professions of religion: but this will be a vain, and fruitless design; for, in the day of judgement, the craftiest hypocrite shall be unmasqued; his most concealed, covered, and hidden actings shall be displayed, revealed, and made known; darkness shall be no shelter to him, and the greatest privacy cannot prevent detection: what he hath done in darkness shall be made visible to all the world: his most private whispers, and that in the closet, shall become audible to all the world, shall be as it were proclaimed upon the house tops: he respecteth the manner of the Jewish buildings, which were slat roofed, whence they might speak to multitudes in the streets: the books of men's consciences, that were here perhaps clasped, and tied, shall then be opened, Rev: 20. 12: and the contents of them shall be plainly legible by men, and Angeiss. Ottocar (P) M. Thomas Fuller. King of Bohemia, refused to do homage to Rodulphus the first Emperor, till at last chastised with war, he was content to do him homage privately in a tent, which tent was so contrived by the Emperor's servants, that by drawing one Cord it was all taken away, and so Ottacar presented on his knees doing his homage to the view of three armies in presence. Thus God at last shall uncase the closet dissembler to the sight of men, Angels, and 〈◊〉, having removed all veils and pretences of piety, no goat in a 〈◊〉 's skin shall steal on his right hand at the last day of judgement. 〈◊〉 relates a story of a counterfeit, who pretended that he was 〈◊〉 the Son of Herode he was saith he, so like unto Alexander, that they who had seen Alexander, and knew him well would have sworn he had been Alexander himself; but he could not deceive Augustus, who by the hardness of his hands and roughness of his skin soon found out the Imposture: it is no difficult matter for hypocrites to cheat men with Semblances of piety; but let them not be deceived for God will not (in their day of trial) be mocked; but will clearly evidence their hypocrisy unto all, by the hardness of their hearts, and brawniness of their consciences: the most discerning eye can hardly pierce into the hypocrisy of some Professors: they may be Virgins incorrupt, and sound in point of doctrine, and opinion, they may be Virgins true, and faithful unto Christ, by dedication in Baptism, as also by their voluntary Covenant, nay they may be 〈◊〉- like in respect of their external conversation, and untainted with the grosser pollutions of the world, they may have lamps of outward, and visible profession, and they may trim these their lamps, they may pretend to wait for the coming of the Bride groom, and be reputed to do so by even the wise Virgins themselves: but the coming of the Bridegroom will make an evident, and through discovery, that they were but foolish Virgins, that they had no oil in their vessels, no saving grace, no sound faith, no unfeigned repentance in their hearts, they had not received an unction from the 〈◊〉 one, 1 〈◊〉. 2. 20: and hereupon, they will be excluded the celestial Bride-chamber, and be disowned by the Bridegroom. Q Sed quinque fatuae acceptis lampadibus, non sumserunt oleum secum: hoc est, sumserunt oleum in lampadibus tantum, & non sumserunt oleum secum: hoc est, in 〈◊〉 suis ultra illud quod erat in lampadibus: prudentes autem ultra oleum in 〈◊〉, acciperunt in vasis suis. Istae enim cogitaverunt id, quod evenit, scilicet quod oleum lampadum non sufficeret. Illae autem 〈◊〉 sunt in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 tanquam sufficient. Et significatur per oleum testimonium bonitatis, seu charitatis. In hoc differunt operantes bona opera, quod aliqui habent testimonium suae bonitatis foris tantum in ipsis operibus bonis, intus enim non sentiunt se diligere Deum in toto cord, se poenitere peccatorum, quia sunt offensae Dei, se diligere proximum propter Deum. Alii autemoperantur sic bona, ut & ipsa opera 〈◊〉 testimonium foris reddant boni animi, & intus in conscientiâ propriâ iplespiritus sanctus testificetur spiritui eorum quòd 〈◊〉 Dei sunt. Sentiunt enim in cord toto se diligere Deum, poenitere propter Deum, diligere proximum & seipsum 〈◊〉 Deum, & breviter Deum 〈◊〉 sibi rationem amandi, sperandi, timendi, gaudendi, tristandi, & breviter operandi intus & extra, hoc est enim oleum in vasis propriis. Cajetane observeth that they had oil in their lamps, but not in their vessels: they could produce, as a testimony of their goodness, and sincerity, the blaze of outward good works: But, alas! this will never pass with God in the day of judgement, as long as there is wanting; in their hearts, and consciences the inward testimony of uprightness, and that is wanting in them, they have no oil in their vessels; for God is not the formalis Ratio, the ground, and principal inducement of their good works, and duties: they are not performed for his sake, from a love of him, in obedience to 4. In constancy and perseverance. his command, and out of respect unto his glory. Lastly, the day of judgement is a strong and powerful incentive unto Constancy, and perseverance, and that both in faith and obedience. 1. In faith and the profession thereof: Now we beseech you brethren, by the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, and by our gath ring together unto him, that ye be not soon shaken in mind, or judgement [or from your mind & judgement,] 2 Thes. 2. 1, 2. The Apostle speaks of a particular error concerning the day of judgement: but, we may enlarge what he saith unto instability of judgement in all matters of faith whatsoever, & shall gloss the words by these following Scriptures, Eph. 4. 14. Be not children tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine by the sleight of 〈◊〉, and cunning crastinesse whereby they lie in wait to 〈◊〉, Heb. 10. 23: Let us hold fast the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 faith without wavering, Heb. 13. 9 Be not carried about with divers and strange doctrines, for it is a good thing that the heart be established with grace. But you will demand why he adjures them hereunto, by the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, and by our gathering together unto him? The reason is, because, when the Lord Jesus Christ cometh, when we shall be gathered together unto him, we shall all then come in the unity of the faith, and knowledge of the Son of God unto a perfect man, Eph. 4. 13: then we shall all attain a firm immobility in the truth, and for this, not only a revolt or descent from, but even a doubting or unsettledness in any part of the doctrine of faith meritoriously unqualifieth: Christ promiseth when he cometh to make him that overcometh a pillar in the 〈◊〉 of his God, Rev. 3. 12: and for such a place in the Heavenly structure how unfit are those, that by every blast of false doctrine are transported from the truth of the Gospel? for every storm of persecution slip anchor and 〈◊〉 cable? he that denyeth any parcel of Evangelicall doctrine doth in part deny Christ, and how can such expect, but to be disowned by Christ, when he cometh to judgement? how esfectually this meditation wrought with à Persian Eunuch (one Usthazanes that had been Governor unto Sapores King of Persia in his minority) you may read in Sozomene, lib. 2. cap. 8: this man for fear denied the Christian faith, and worshipped the Sun, but was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by a strange providence: Simcon Archbishop of Seleucia and 〈◊〉 was for his constany in the faith dragged unto 〈◊〉 by the Court-gates where Usthazanes then sat, who, though he durst not make any profession of Christianity, yet he could 〈◊〉 but arise and express his reverence unto the aged Archbishop in a respective and an honourable salutation, but the zealous goodman frowned upon him, and turned away his face from him, as thinking him for his Apostasy, unworthy of his notice, and acquaintance: this forthwith stroke Usthazanes unto the heart, and 〈◊〉 from him store of tears, and groans: and thus he 〈◊〉 with himself, Simeon will not own me, and can I expect any other but that God should disclaim me when I appear before his tribunal? Simeon will not speak unto me, will not so much as 〈◊〉 upon me, and can I 〈◊〉 for so much as a good word or a good look from Christ, whom I have so shamefully betrayed, and denied? hereupon he threw off his rich, and courtly garments, and put on mourning apparel, and profissed himself a Christian, & so, of a Cowardly 〈◊〉, he became a resolute, and glorious Martyr. 2. The day of judgement is a congruent inducement unto Constancy in obedience: establish your hearts (saith James) for the coming of the Lord draweth nigh, Jam. 5. 8: not only establish your heads in 〈◊〉, but also establish your hearts in all moral virtues, graces, and duties; establish your heart's 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉, 1 Thes. 3. 13: for the coming of the Lord draweth nigh; and he when he cometh will give a crown of life unto all those, and only those, that are faithful unto death, Rev. 2. 10. I shall conclude with Heb. 10. 36, 37, 38, 39 For ye have need of patience, that after ye have done the will of God, ye 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the promise yet a little while, and he that shall come will come, and will not tarry: Now the just shall live by faith: but if any man draw back my soul shall have no pleasure in him. But we are not of them who draw back unto 〈◊〉; but of them that believe to the saveing of the soul. The patience here spoken of differs but little from constancy, and perseverance; and it regards in duties those difficulties, impediments, troubles, and molestations, that deter from them, and tempt unto a desertion of them: these are so many, and great; that patience is necessary unto every Christian to keep him from backsliding: and this patience must be an active, and diligent patience; ye must do the will of God; and without this patience there is no receiving of the promised reward; ye have need of patience that after ye have done the will of God, ye might receive the promise: for the promise runs conditionally, upon condition we patiently persevere: God will render to them, who by patient continuance in well doing, seek for glory, and honour, and immortality, eternal life, Rom. 2. 7. But now they may be ready to object, that the promise would not be fully accomplished until the day of judgement, and that was a great ways off, unto this Paul answers, that Christ's coming was near at hand, if (R) Cornelius Alapide. the distance were measured. 1. By God's eternity. 2. By Christ's vehement, and most intense desire to deliver, and reward all his people in the due, and appointed time: and this now he expresseth affirmatively, and 〈◊〉. 1. Affirmatively, and that, by a double Hebraisme. 1. By a double diminutive, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is a very little while: and the same thing is intimated by another gemination in the like imutation of the Hebrew, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (S) Adhucenim modicum aliquantulum; qui venturus est, veniet, & non tardabit. Occupatio est in his verbis. Nam dicere 〈◊〉: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ad 〈◊〉 nobis 〈◊〉 in longum dilata promissio. Quibus obviat Apost. adducto Prophetae 〈◊〉 quo doceat revera non longum esse tempus promissionis dilatae, sed brevae & modicum 〈◊〉 quidem verba Apost. sunt; Adhuc enim modicum, aliquantulum. Pro quibus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. Adhuc enim modicum quantum quantum. In hâc geminatione quaedam 〈◊〉 est 〈◊〉. Nam Hebraei, 〈◊〉 de quà sermo est, intendere volentes, gem. nant vocabulum, ut Psal. 86. Homo, & homo natus est in eâ, i. e. multi 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 post alios, in 〈◊〉 nati sunt, & Gen: 17. secundum LXX. multiplicabo te valde, valde, & 30. Crevit vir valde, valde. Pro quo Hieronymus priori loco, 〈◊〉 nimis: & posteriori, 〈◊〉 modum. Tale etiam est illud Salvatoris, Amen, Amen, dico vobis, i. e. certissi 〈◊〉 vobis 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 nunc Apostolus dicendo, modicum quantum quantum. Significare voluit tempus valde modicum: &, ut noster bene 〈◊〉, aliquantulum: ut Erasmus, temporis perpusillum: ut Anselmus legit & exponit, quantulum. Hieronymus autem dixit, Adhuc enim paululum modicúmque etc. 〈◊〉 verba posteriora, qui 〈◊〉 est veniet, & 〈◊〉, usque ad illud, Non autem, 〈◊〉 sunt ex Habacuc 〈◊〉, cap. 2. juxta versionem, LXX. sed ordine sententiarum mutato. Nec 〈◊〉 his, quod ad sensum attinet, discrepant Hebraea licet in verbis nonnulla sit diversitas, quam nos 〈◊〉. At primum pro 〈◊〉 quod hic secundum, LXX, legitur, qui venturus est, veniet, in Hebraeo est, veniens veniet: vel, veniendo veniet. Quâ phrasi constat Hebraeis significari, 〈◊〉 rei 〈◊〉, vel certitudinem, vel 〈◊〉, vel imperium, vel vehementiam, vel quid simile. Est enim phrasis cognata ei, de quâ paulò ante locuti sumus. Exempla passim obvia sunt, ut visitans visitavi vos. Exod. 〈◊〉. Expectans expectavi Dominum, Psal. 37. Gaudens gaudebo in Domino, Isa. 61. etc. Usus est & Lucianus Graecus in dial: 〈◊〉 Videns equidem vidi. Hoc 〈◊〉 loco apud 〈◊〉 certitudo significatur: ut sensus sit, Omnino, & procul dubio 〈◊〉. Sciendum est autem in Graeco legi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cui Apostolus articulum praefixit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Qua periphrasi Mesias designari solet. Ille nimirum qui venturus expectabatur, ut Matth. 11. Tu es qui venturus es? He that cometh will come, he will come as certainly as if he were come already, but, because flesh and blood, out of impatience, is apt to think, that the time is very long, he contents not himself with a vehement and earnest affirmation, that Christ will come shortly, and speedily, but goes yet further to put the matter out of all doubt by denial of the contrary, and will not (T) Quod sequitur, & non tardabit, hunc sensum habet: Non differet adventum suum ultra tempus constitutum. Tardat enim, non qui 〈◊〉 non veniet: fed qui procrastinat ultra condictum. 〈◊〉 dictum est à B. Petro secundo Epist. tertia. Non tardat Dominus promissionem suam, etc. 〈◊〉. 22. Decimas tuas, & primitias non tardabis 〈◊〉 id est, reddes eas suo tempore. Aliud igitur est, tardare, aliud moram faccre: Nam 〈◊〉 non tardet Christus, moram interim facit. Hoc enim praecedit apud eundem 〈◊〉 Simoram secerit, 〈◊〉 eum. Estius in loc. tarry, that is (as Diodati upon the place) beyond the time, which God hath prefixed, and beyond the tune as shall be necessary for the Church. But, though Christ's coming be near at hand in the above mentioned respects, yet in itself it is a long time off: and what shall poor and persecuted Christians do in the mean while? why the Apostle tells us (out of the Prophet Habakkuk) that until that time the just shall live by faith, faith in the promise of Christ's coming will sustain, and support the soul, and make to walk cheerfully and comfortably, But, one the contrary, the condition of the Apostate is very sad, and uncomfortable. For. 1: he incurreth the hatred of God. if any man draw back my soul shall have no pleasure in him, in the words there is a Litotes, so that more is understood, then is expressed: by the denial of God's complacency, is signified his hatred of, 〈◊〉: so that it is, as if he had said; I infinitely detest, and abhor all backsliders: a slavish fear of the wrath of man, is that which makes many Apostates; but such shall find in the day of judgement; that the hatred of their Judge will be more dreadful, than that of their most potent persecuters; who without repentance, will, as their fellow-prisoners, be arraigned with them at the same bar: men think, by their sinful compliances with the times, to procure the favour, and approbation of great men; but, alas 〈◊〉 this is but a sorry design, for withal they pull upon themselves the dislike of Jesus Christ: the foolish Virgins, whose lamps go out, shall be rejected by the Bridegroom, Matth. 25. v. 10, 11, 12: and what good will the countenance of Princes do a man, if he be rejected, and condemned by the Judge of all the earth. Thou mayest by thine unconstancy preserve thy state, and the life of thy body; but then thou runnest upon the assured ruin, and destruction of thy soul: we are not of them, who draw back unto perdition; all that draw back, draw back unto perdition: so that we may say of all Apostates, that are finally impenitent, what the Apostle speaks above, v. 26. 27: of the highest rank of them, such as sin against the holy Ghost, there remaineth no more sacrifice for their sins, but a 〈◊〉 fearful looking for of judgement, and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries. A BRIEF AND Scholastical Discourse, TOUCHING The NATURE of THANKSGIVING. BY HENRY JEANES, Minister of God's Word, at Chedzoy. Nullum officium referendâ gratiâ magis necessarium est. Cic. 1. de Offic. OXFORD, Printed by HEN: HALL. for THO: ROBINSON, 1660. Unto the Worshipful, The MAYOR, The ALDERMEN, WITH All other the well affected Inhabitants of the City of CHICHESTER, HENRY JEANES Dedicateth this ensuing discourse of Thanksgiving; AS A Public, and perpetual Testimonial of his Cordial gratitude, for their hospitable reception of him, and his, during the late Civil Wars of this Nation. To the READER. I Formerly published a Treatise touching the Excellency of Thanksgiving, & the favourable acceptation of that hath encouraged me to send after it This, Concerning the nature of Thanksgiving; The Subject was my first Theological Essay, which some twenty years since, or upwards, I revised, and contracted, and now I present it unto thee without any considerable either alteration, or addition: Many Authors I might perhaps then make use of, which now I have forgotten: But all that 〈◊〉 can remember I have either quoted in the discourse itself, or placed in the Margin: Thine in the Service of Christ, HENRY JEANES. Ephes: 5. 20. Giving thanks always for all things unto God, and the Father, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ. THe words without surther discourse, contain 5 Generals. 1. An act, or duty— Giving thanks. 2. Next the time when to be performed,— always. 3. The matter, for what— all things. 4. And 4ly, the object unto whom— God, and the Father. 5. Lastly, the Mean, or Mediator, through whose mediation, In the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ. I begin with the act, or duty itself— Giving thanks. A thing not so soon done, as said, but an harder task than most conceive, unto which must concur the whole man, the inward, the outward man, but the inward, first, and chiefly. The Summons David gave his soul, Psal. 103. we must ours, Praise the Lord, o my soul, and all that is within me bless his Holy Name. And indeed in these Eucharistical offerings with the fat, and inwards God is most delighted-He is the searcher of hearts,— Father of spirits, the thanks therefore of the heart, and spirit, he will especially eye, and reward. That sacrifice of thanks then, which is like that last of Caesar's without an heart, will prove but a sacrifice of fools, unacceptable to Heaven. Above all therefore have a care, that the instrument thine heart be as David's was, Psal. 57 7. prepared, and the strings the faculties thereof well-tuned, else the melody of thy Verbal thankfulness will be quite marred, even as the gracefullnesse of a sweetly sung song is lost by jarring upon a distuned instrument. But now, however this sacrifice must be first kindled at the Altar of the heart; yet it will not long stay there, but spread further, and break out into the Temple of the outward man. And first 'twill awaken our glory, Psal. 57 19 that is our tongue, so styled, because the chiefest instrument of glorifying God, wherein stands man's highest glory. And next it will quicken the hands to act, every member, some way or other, to express the thankfulness of our hearts, that so our thanks may absolutely be full, complete, and entire. Gratitude, as blood in the body, runn's through the whole practice of Christianity, and so hath general use in, and influence upon, all the duties we perform. Because as special Precepts oblige unto the severals of them, so also the freeness, and fullness of God's favours engage generally to all of them. And answerably the Schoolmen make ingratitude a general circumstance of sin, not as though it were of the Notion, and Definition of sin in general, but only because it adheres, and cleaves unto every sin, gradually aggravating the guilt, and demerit thereof. For in all sins we commit, there is, as a deviation from the special Laws against them, so also a virtual disregard of God's mercy, a powerful dissuasive from them: and therefore, although ingratitude be formally only when there is an express and actual contempt of Benefits; yet there is (saith (u) 21, 〈◊〉. q. 107. art. 2. ad 〈◊〉. Aquinas) a material kind of ingratitude in every sin. Thankfulness unto God then, by way of Connotation, takes in both tables, all duties that concern God, or man; and suitably unthankfulness too is by way of Concomitancy a bundle, or fardel of all other vices.— Ingratum si dicas, omnia dixeris. Nay thankfulness formally in itself is also of a wondrous wide extent, made up of many parcels, containing many integrals, all which (w) 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. q. 107. art. 2. Aquinas reduceth unto three. 1. To Recognize a 〈◊〉. 2. Duly to prise it etc. And 3ly, To requite it. We will add two more, and so reckon up in all five degrees of thankfulness, and so of thanksgiving. Observation, Confession, Remembrance, Valuation, Retribution,—— matters not so quickly run over, so soon dispatched, as we ordinarily dream, as will appear if we weigh them severally. 1. First then, we must punctually, or particularly and heedfully, or fixedly observe blessings; their receipt, enjoyment, use, continuance, increase; and this indeed is the foundation of all the rest: for unless favours be known, or taken notice of, they can never be acknowledged, remembered, duly valued, and then small likelihood any thing should be rendered for them: hopes then of our gratitude are even desperate, for notwithstanding the overflowings of mercies, the showers of blessings upon us (to phrase it with Ezekiel 24. v. 26.) how dull and heavy are we in the apprehension of them? Strange, that as Moses face shone to all except himself; so the lustre, and splendour of our growing happiness should even dazzle neighbouring-nations, and we ourselves scarce perceive so much as a glimpse thereof. Whom will it not possess with a degree of just amazement to consider, that we, though encompassed with God's favour, as with a shield, hedged about with blessings so many, so eminent, as that, unless we hoodwink ourselves, impossible they should escape our observation, can yet discern none of all this, though sharp-sighted enough in espial of miseries and losses? But to return. Our observation will be too short, if it reach no further than Blessings in themselves. Our thoughts therefore must not be fixed, and stay upon them, but be raised upward to a view of that bounty, which gave them; unto a sight of God in them: unto an apprehension, not only of his general providence, (for that makes the Sun to rise on the evil, as well as the good, and sendeth rain on the unjust, as well as just:) but of his special love, benevolence, the light of his Countenance shining through them on us in his Son Christ Jesus. This David prefers before a very great blessing in itself considered, and for it is chiefly thankful, Because thy loving kindness is 〈◊〉 than life, my lips shall praise thee, Psal. 63. 3. And indeed to observe God's kindness will give a sweet relish to the meanest favours, to but a cup of cold water, whereas want of such notice will embitter your oil, corn, wine, your richest variety and greatest plenty of outward things. Nay a thorough-sense, and feeling of God's special favour in the benefits we receive, will, as sweeten all of them, so elevate the nature of some of them, spiritualise, as it were, your temporal ones, and so make them, though in themselves 〈◊〉 of vanity, and vexation of spirit, suitable un to the nature, and desires of the soul. (x) Dr Edward 〈◊〉. For the object of the lower part of the soul is then proportionable to the higher part, unto the soul as reasonable, as spiritual; when linked with the object thereof, God. And therefore temporal blessings are then proportionable unto the soul as spiritual, when we behold God's name written upon them, as tokens of his love, when God comes along with them to the soul. For then, though they be still temporal in regard of their nature, and being; yet are they in a sense spiritual, as joined with God, the adequate spiritual good of the soul, as directed by a supernatural providence to work unto a spiritual end for the increase, exercise, and trial of our graces, for the bringing us to true happiness; such as spiritual, and supernatural union and communion with God. We have gone over the first step of our thanks— Observation, unto which the second, Confession, must be as it were the Echo, and reflection, resounding the same notes. What we have observed in blessings, we must confess too; as, That we have them, Whence and How. 1. That we have them. This to deny, or smother, or but sparingly to discourse of, what betrays it, but a loathness to acknowledge ourselves engaged to the Almighty? and yet in the acknowledgement of this we may be ample enough, and all the while but vent our pride, and stroke ourselves. Nebuchadnezar will acknowledge a great Babylon, but withal add that 'tis built by the might of his own power; and so we confess, (and perhaps beyond truth) the having of such or such benefits; but then we 〈◊〉 them to ourselves, as either the Authors, or deservers of them. This indeed (to speak properly) is not Confession, but boasting, and bragging of mercies. We must therefore, in the second place 2. Acknowledge that they come down from above, from the Father of lights there, and that 3ly, By way of 〈◊〉, freely— 〈◊〉 gratis (saith Bernard) 〈◊〉 merito, 〈◊〉 labour nostro, without our desert, without our endeavour: without our endeavour, always as the 〈◊〉 cause, sometimes as the means. We reap often, (as he in the parable) where we have not sown, and gather where we have not strawed. More freely yet; not only without, but against our deservings; for what are our 〈◊〉 except such as Augustine speaks of, merita mala? without our prayers, against our hopes, beyond our desires. But should I insist longer on this point, I should but anticipate what I am to deliver at large upon the fourth general. Dismissing it therefore, I pass on unto the third branch of our thankfulness, Remembrance of blessings, which is almost nothing else but a multiplied, and reiterated observation, and confession of them. And therefore all three, Observation, 〈◊〉, Remembrance, are wrapped up by Aquinas under one head, Recognition. That which is forgotten is not actually known for the present; nothing unknown works upon the will. A danger unknown moveth not; A Benefit unknown affecteth not. As the sacrifice of thanks then is kindled by observation, blazeth in Confession; so memory of benefits keepeth in the flame, fetcheth life into it, though almost extinguished even as the fainting light of a lamp is restored by a fresh supply of oil. That charge then that David gave his soul, Psalm. 103. 2. we must ours. Bless the Lord, o my soul, and forget not all his Benefits: that is, by an ordinary Hebraisme, forget not any of all his benefits. But now in divine dialect, words of knowledge do ever imply the affections: Our memory then of blessings must be not only Historical, and speculative, (for that by itself is dull, and lumpish, and will beget but a cold, and heartless thanksgiving) but also practic, and affectionate, accompanied with such effusion of the spirit's, dilating of the heart, such enlarged and enravished affections, such stupor, and admiration, raptures of joy, melting into kindness, as are in some measure proportioned, as unto the goodness, and quality of the blessings themselves, so also unto the love, and bounty of God relished in them; as 'twas said of her in the Comedy— Laeta 〈◊〉 non tam ipso dona, quam abs 〈◊〉 datum esse; id serio triumphant. Besides a diligent Recognising of benefits, which, as you have heard, is made up of Observation, Confession, Memory, there is required unto thanksgiving. A due valuation. 1. Of the worth, and greatness of God's gists in themselves. Thankful than we can never be, if we either prise them not at all, or underprize them: and yet herein how extremely fail me: Some there are amongst us, that are very loud in their complaints against the greatest outward mercies we can enjoy; They exclaim against the blessed work of reformation, as an unsufferable innovation; against the plenty of preaching as an intolerable burden: as the Israelites, Num. 11. 6. repined at their manna, saying there is nothing but this manna before our eyes, so these men at the bread of life, saying, there is nothing but preaching Sermons etc. As they, loathing manna, lusted after the Cucumbers, melons, leeks, onions, and garlic which they had in Egypt; so these people, even fursetting on the good word of God, hanker after those husks, I mean Superstitions, and Egyptian Ceremonies, with which they were formerly fed. There are others that, as 'twas said of Israel, Psal. 106. 24. despise, or as some read it, think scorn of this pleasant land, professing a liking rather to live in any barbarous, remote nook of the world, with cleanness of teeth, and scarcity of bread, then here, where God's mercies swarm about us. But some of us have more, though not grace, yet shame, then downrightly to complain of God's mercies: yet all the best of us do much lessen their worth. We aggravate our pettiest pressures beyond an Hyperbole; but then on the other side, how do we extenuate, and diminish the worth of our greatest blessings? (y) as the Cities Solamon gave Hiram pleased him not, and he said Dr Sanderson. to Solamon, What Cities are these thou hast given me? and he called them, the Land of Cabul, that is, as you may see by the margin, displeasing, or dirty, 1 Kings 9 12, 13. so Gods richest favours 〈◊〉 us not, but ever we have some quarrel or other at them, some flaws in them. How faulty we are in this particular, St Basil illustrates, by a similitude taken from the eye: look, as that seeth not objects, which are applied close unto it, and even lie on it; but taken away some pretty distance doth clearly discern them; so we have no sense or feeling of the worth of benefits we enjoy, until God by removal of them, teach us to set better price on them. But now our estimation is not to be bounded and terminated in the mercies of God considered in themselves, according to their own worth, and goodness, without reference to their ground, and Author; for so are we apt sometimes to over-rate them, as the Epicure his pleasure, the covetous man his muck, the 〈◊〉 his victory. Therefore we must in the second place rightly prise the love, and 〈◊〉 of God the giver: for as (z) 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. q. 106 ar. 5. ad 〈◊〉. Aquinas tells us: A Benefit taken morally as laudable, worthy of 〈◊〉, however materially it stands in 〈◊〉 in the thing given: yet formally and principally it consists in voluntate & affectu in the will and affection of the Donor. (a) 〈◊〉: Var. Hist. lib. 1. cap. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 accepted, largely requited a cup of water, which a poor man gave him. Why? because he had an eye, not to the value of the present, but to the good will of the giver: In like manner, would we but look on the meanest blessings we enjoy, as tokens of God's love, and goodness, how thankfully would we accept them, at how high a rate prise them, how be even ravished with the relishing of God's favour in them? I proceed on to the last Degree of our thanks— Retribution, not of Justice, but of favourable Acceptance, that is, not such as God may expect; but such as he in his Justice may, and in his mercy will accept. How canst thou recompense (saith (b) Ecclesiasticus 7. 28. Jesus the son of Sirach) thy Parents the things that they have done for thee? more justly may we demand. How shall we recompense our God the things he hath done for us? which infinitely surpass those of the most indulgent Father, the tenderest Mother: for these, though great, yet but finite. A man's tongue may reach them, at least his conceit may fathom them; but those are above all expression, nay all thoughts. 〈◊〉 then, such as God in rigour of Justice may exact, is below God's Majesty to receive, above men's ability to give; Even the light of nature dictates (as 〈◊〉, grants) that man cannot, paria reddere 〈◊〉. And yet there are certain expressions of a grateful mind, which God is pleased to interpret after a sort, as renderings and retributions made to his bounty. Else, what shall we think of David's 〈◊〉? Psalm. 116. 12. of Hezekiahs not rendering again according to the benefit done to him? 2 Chron. 32. 24. Now of those almost infinite duties, which though they be, to speak properly and strictly, nothing less, yet it pleaseth God for Christ his sake, to accept as a requital. I'll specify but these few following. 1. Proposal of God's honour, and Glory as our highest, and utmost aim in all our Actions, all our sufferings. A virtual Intention of this end is ever requisite: and that the Schoolmen tell us may very well be without an actual Advertency, and Consideration of it: even as in going a journey (saith Aquinas) it is not necessary that every step we tread, we should actually think, and ponder upon the end of our journey. 2ly, A placid, and well tempered contentedness upon a final warning to part with God's blessings, either one after an other, or all at a clap, when either God's Providence takes them from us, or else his cause require them of us. 3ly, Consecration, and dedication of our blessings unto God, employment of them for promoting of his glory, maintenance of his Cause, comfort of his children, whom he hath pleased to appoint receivers of his tribute. All the Benefits we enjoy are, as samuel's, obtained of God: and therefore fit we should make them, as lemuel's, dedicated unto God. If we have learning, we must write, preach, dispute for his cause; if riches, spend them for his cause. Be we never so mean, so poor, run, ride, and pray for his cause. Lastly, A Resignation of ourselves, lives, unto him, to be governed by him, sacrificed for him, sanctified unto him: sacrificed for him in Martyrdom: sanctified unto him in mortification. Unto the, former, a sacrificing of our lives, we may never be called: the latter, a sacrifice of the corruptions of our lives, must daily, hourly continually be offered. And in that consists the life of our thankfulness. By this time than you see that our thanks must not stay in words and compliments, but proceed on to a return of affections, and actions. It must be Actio gratiarum, a doing, a working of thanks. David having Psal. 106. 1. called for praise, and thanks unto God, makes a stop and begins to correct himself, vers. 2. as if he had called for an impossibility— Who can utter (saith he) the mighty acts of the Lord? who can show forth all his praise? He maketh the answer vers. 3. Blessed are they that keep Judgement, and he that doth righteousness at all times: as if he should have said: Indeed none can as they should render what praise, and thanks are due unto God, but he that comes nearest to it, is the keeper of judgement, and doer of righteousness. He answers not the question, as you may observe, directly, but only by 〈◊〉. He doth not expressly tell us, who can perform the duty, but who enjoys the reward, Blessed are etc. as if he should say. None indeed can perform this duty of thanksgiving as they ought, none can sufficiently declare the marvellous and merciful works of God: none can, shall I say, render, nay express what praise, and thanks the Lord deserves. However if the performance of this duty be real, and active, if we keep judgement, and do righteousness, this our performance of it, though weak, and imperfect, shall find acceptance with, and the reward of happiness from God. Blessed are they etc. We may then say of gratitude as James of saith- show it me by thy works, by thy works of piety, and devotion unto God, of charity and Justice unto men. If these be wanting, no matter for thy honouring of him in thy words: Thou really dishonourest him in thy works, and (c) Ward. that which an evil, and harsh-sounding Instrument is to a good voice, that is an unthankful life to a thankful mouth. Tacitus speaking of certain words of Tiberius, saith, they were Praeclara verba, sed non pro Tiberio, very excellent words, but not suiting with Tiberius. The like may we say of forms of thanksgiving uttered by ungodly men, they are very good and excellent in themselves, but very much unbefitting them. (d) 〈◊〉. For praise is not comely in the mouth of a sinner. (e) Prov. 17. 7. Prov. 17. 7. Excellent speech, or the lip of 〈◊〉 (saith Solomon) 〈◊〉 not a fool, a sinner. And the reason of it is that which Tacitus gave of his dislike of other words of Tiberius, nec enim ad hanc formam caetera sunt. His other actions are not of the same stamp, but of a far differing strain; sounding forth God's dispraise and dishonour in a louder accent, than his lips his praise. No matter then for thy forms of thanksgiving, if thou want the power: for thy singing a new song, if thou dost not lead a new life. Canticum novum & 〈◊〉 homo malè concordant, saith Austin. A new song sounds very ill-favouredly, looseth much of its grace and relish from the old man's mouth. And thus have I opened the nature of thanksgiving, about which if any think I have stood overlong, let them weigh how vast the duty is, how many and large its parts are, each of which had I not severally, though briefly, saluted, my discourse would have been lame and imperfect. Hasten we next to the second General— the Time, when the duty is to be performed— Always. Giving thanks always. This seems to be morally impossible. And therefore we must distinguish betwixt thanksgiving, and the effects of it. The effects and expressions of it may be perpetual, as lasting as our lives. A principal one, Obedience unto God, styled a real thanksgiving, the thanksgiving of the life may, must be so, Luk. 1. 75: nay sometimes signs of our thankfulness should outlive us: we should leave behind us some pawn of our thanks unto God, some permanent expression or other, that may even eternize them, transmit and convey them to succeeding ages. But for this perpetuity of the fruits and effects of thanksgiving the Apostle calls not here upon us. He is express for the duty of thanksgiving itself— Giving thanks always, etc. How can that, you will say, be done? Why thanksgiving, you must know, is either Habitual, or Actual. 1. Habitual 〈◊〉: the Habit of thankfulness, a thankful heart, and disposition must always be had, never laid aside, quoad 〈◊〉 & dispositionem animi; we must continually be thankful, our hearts should ever be kept in so sacred à tune and temper, as that they may always be apt, disposed, prepared for this work, so was David's. My heart is prepared, O God, my heart is prepared, I will sing and give praise, Psal. 57 7. 2. Actual thanksgiving: The act of thankfulness whether inward, or outward cannot be perpetual. We cannot, indeed we are not bound to be always actually thankful; for other duties are also required, and therefore must have their turn as well as thanksgiving. Recourse therefore must be had to that old golden Rule, Affirmativa 〈◊〉 obligant semper, non ad semper. Affirmative precepts do always bind, but not to always, so that we are not bound to perform always what they enjoin, but only loco & tempore 〈◊〉, where we have due time and place. We are then always bound to give thanks actually always; but then only when there is opportunity and seasonableness of doing it. The word Always, then is to be taken, not in a Mathematical, but a Moral latitude, and so it imports nothing but Frequency, and Constancy. And this acception of the word is usual in Scripture. The Disciples of Christ are said, Luk. 24. 53: to be continually in the Temple prayseing and blessing God, that is, frequently. 〈◊〉. th' thy master's Son shall 〈◊〉 bread always at my Table, 2 Sam. 9 10. 2 King. 25. 29. Giving thanks always then, with our Apostle, sounds no other than giving thanks frequently, and constantly. First, than we are to do it 〈◊〉, not for fits, and upon brunts only. God's hand is ever opened to bless us with an operative blessing; our mouth should therefore be if not ever yet often open to bless him with a declarative blessing. He daily loads us with benefits, saith David, Psal. 68 19 He 〈◊〉. was his mercy every morning, saith 〈◊〉. Lament, 3. 23: we may add, every hour, every minute, every moment. No day, morning, hour, minute, moment comes over our heads, but we have a fresh supply of them. We have them continued, increased, enlarged, old mercies renewed, new ones added. Is it not Justice then, that we desire and strive to send him back as often a fresh return of our praises: at least that we engross up as much of our time as we can for this business: that for it we think all our spare hours too sew? David herein was exemplary, with him no time amiss, no season unseasonable for this work. We have him at it as in the day. All the day, Psal. 71. 8: seven times a day, Psal. 119, 164: all the day long, Psal. 35. 28: so at night, in the deepest of night. At midnight will I rise, and give thanks unto 〈◊〉, Psal. 119. 62. 2: Our thanksgiving must be, not only frequent, but constant, durable: not as a flash, or blaze suddenly extinguished, but rather as the Vest all fire among the Romans ever kept in. This permanency of our thanks was figured (thinks Philo the 〈◊〉) by the fire upon the Altar; which, as you read, Levit. 6. 13: was ever to be burning, never to go out. Intimated (say some) by the binding of the sacrifice with cords unto the horns of the Altar, mentioned, Psal. 118. 27: for it is not only, lay the sacrifice, viz: of praise on the horns of the Altar, but bind it, bind it with cords: and what so fast and surely bound likely to hold. Now for this we can assign no better reason than the constancy of God s mercies, 'twas david's, Psal. 89. 2. I will sing of thy mercy, saith he, for ever. Why? for I have said mercy shall be built up for ever: built up, built up for ever; each term denotes a fixed and permanent state. His compassions fail not, Lam. 3. 22. Neither should our thanks therefore fail, but be as lasting as our lives; while I live, saith David, I will praise the Lord, I will sing praises unto my God while I have any being, Psal. 104. 33. His compassions are new every morning, Lam. 3. 23: and if so, than not fadeing: semblably therefore let our thanks be still new and fresh, never dying, nay not so much as languishing, decaying. You have seen one extent of thanksgiving in respect of Continuance, always. Another follows in regard of its matter, for all things. Howsoever thankfulness asks a sound Judgement to estimate duly of the value of blessings, yet not any Invention to find them out, to do that a barren and mean one will serve the turn. So we have a thankful heart we cannot be to seek of matter: for with it all things will supply us giving thanks: for all things, etc. And we may give thanks for all things, either collectively, or distributively. 1. Collectively, jointly for all things together, when we heap the whole matter of our thanksgiving into one lump, some such general form as: God be praised for all his mercies. This we may, must do; but at this we must not stop. We must go farther and give thanks for all things— Distributively, severally and apart: desire and endeavour we must to do it not only distributively, pro generibus singulorum, for all sorts, ranks, kinds of blessings; but also distributively, pro singulis generum, for all blessings of all sorts and kinds whatsoever. Labour we should to keep an exact bill and register of particular favours, and for them to allot particular and several thanksgivings. When we come to count our crosses, we reckon them distinctly, one by one, as how we have been afflicted this way; how that; how crossed in such an action, disappointed in such an enterprise, and shall we not be as punctual in our recognition of favours, and distinctly blazon out the specialties of them too? You see what a sea of matter even without bottom I have before me: All things. Should I curiously run over but the heads of blessings, blessings positive, blessings private; blessings temporal, blessings spiritual; blessings in 〈◊〉, blessings in reversion, and expectation, this discourse would be enlarged far beyond my intention. I will only then propound, and resolve two scruples, that hang by this point, and so dispatch it. The first of them is, Whether or no God's greatness, absolute goodness, his goddess in himself, with other absolute perfections of his, as Truth and power manifested in his works, be matter of thanksgiving, whether or no we must be thankful for them? For 〈◊〉, we must presuppose there is a difference betwixt praise and thanks (though we ordinarily use the words promiscuously.) We may you know praise Strangers that never did us good tune, nay enemies who have done us many bad; but we thank only benefactors. Any worth or excellency may be matter of our praise, only benefits of thanksgiving. God then absolutely 〈◊〉, without the relation of 〈◊〉 is invested with such attractive 〈◊〉, and ravishing beauties, as that he is, saith David, worthy to be praised, Psal. 18. 3. Secondly, we must observe that a thing may be said to be matter of our thanksgiving, either properly and directly, or else improperly, and by way of reduction: properly and directly only God's relative goodness, his goodness to us, the goodt hangs we receive from him can be matter of our thanksgiving: yet by way of reduction, and improperly God's absolute persections may be also, as they have respect to those good things we enjoy: either as the fountain from whence they flow, or as arguments illustrating 〈◊〉, confirming their communication, increase, Continuance to us. (c) 〈◊〉 tamen ad gratiarum actionem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 iaudum 〈◊〉, quae versatur 〈◊〉 illas 〈◊〉 quae in Deo ipso 〈◊〉, & in operibus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sed cum respect 〈◊〉 quodam ad illa, quae accepimus, quatenus nempe persectiones illae sunt 〈◊〉, vel 〈◊〉 qued accepimus 〈◊〉, vel 〈◊〉 nem ejus 〈◊〉. Apoc 4. 8, 9 Ames 〈◊〉: The 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 2. 〈◊〉. 9 §. 8. And this of the first. The second, whether or no we are to be thankful for afflictions? For resolution. 〈◊〉 are, we must note, either curses, or crosses. Curses are the sad effects of divine malediction, and vengeance, punishments properly so called, for satisfaction of God's justice, and manifestation os his wrath; and so but the prologue to the Tragedy of damnation, the very earnest, and pawn of Hell, therefore matter of trembling and humiliation, not of joy and thanksgiving. As for Crosses, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not 〈◊〉, which proceed from not God's 〈◊〉, but corrective wrath, or rather, tenderness, and compassion: As for them God's Children must, say some, indefinitely be thankful for them. Why? because they work for their good. Nothing doth, or can betide them, but God turns it to their benefit. Afflictions are Physic for the soul, as to cure it of present diseases, so to preserve it from future. Now (saith chrysostom upon the 147. Psalm,) We observe our Physician not only indulging, but restraining us of liberty in diet, exercise; not only anointing, but burning, cutting us; not only when he gives cordials, but when he administers the most bitter pills, and potions. And shall God have no thanks for our afflictions, whereby our corruptions are pruned, our diseases cured, our holiness and happiness increased, our souls weaned from the world, polished for the temple, prepared for Heaven? Thus many of the (f) See Doctor Sclater on 1 Thes. 5. 18. learned state the question 〈◊〉 as for mine own part I dare not be so general, but will distinguish betwixt crosses considered formerly in themselves, as oppressions, and distresses of nature, and according to their fruit, issue, and mitigation. If we consider them formally in themselves, as crosses, as evils of pain, tending either to the destruction, or trouble of nature, I see no reason, why we should be thankful for them. For first, the matter of petition, and thanksgiving is of the same latitude. Now we have no ground, no precept, no precedent to pray for afflictions, as they oppress, and disquiet nature; nay we have examples, and those unquestionable of declining them, withstanding them, praying against them and therefore as little warrant to give thanks for them. Secondly, whatsoever is matter of thanks, must be matter of joy too; for joy is not only a companion, but a cause of thanksgiving, both producing, and conserving. Now crosses, afflictions, simply considered as such, are not, cannot be matter of joy; for so considered they are of a destructive, malignant nature; therefore neither of thanksgiving; for crosses we must (I confess) be joyful, thankful, but not as they fall under the consideration of evils, as they oppress and burden nature, for them so considered impossible we should; Because evils as evils are undesirable, from them our natures and wills cannot but be abhorrent, and that cannot be matter of our joy, which is undesirable, and if not of our joy, then neither of our thanksgiving. The reason alleged in the beginning to the contrary, viz: that crosses and afflictions work together for the best to them that love God, is, methinks, of no force. For all this they do not naturally, but by accident, by means of God's wise, powerful disposing, and ordering of them: they are in their own nature wholly destructive: 'tis the grace, power, mercy and providence of God that makes them otherwise. He works good out of evil, light out of darkness, beauty out of ashes. Now as things in themselves good, cease not therefore to be the object of our prayers, and praises for that they are accidentally evil; so neither, do things in themselves evil become to be just matter of thanks, because they prove accidentally good. For the good that by accident flows from crosses, we ought, I confess, to be thankful; not so for the crosses themselves. Moreover. 1. This reason holds as well for sins, as afflictions; because they also are so ordered by God's overruling power, as that by accident they work the good of his chosen. 2. The miseries and calamities of the Church by accident also turn to the advancement of God's glory, to the bettering, humbling of his Church. But yet, I think, we would count him a monster, a prodigy, and curse, who should still rejoice, and give thanks simply for this, that Zion is afflicted, that the stones of Jerusalem lie still in the dust; that her members are wallowing and tumbling in their own blood. But we are 2ly, to give thanks, though not for crosses themselves, yet for their fruit, issue, and mitigation. 1. For their fruit and issue, that our souls are bettered, humbled by them, drained from their humours, sins, purged from their dross, winnowed from their chaffe. So we thank the Chy. rurgeon, not for that he cuts, burns, and lances us, but because by these he heals us: the Physician not for the bitterness of his pills and potions, but for the health they procure us. The 2 d: thing that in our crosses we must be thankful for, is their mitigation, that they are mitigated in themselves, or in reference to us: First that they are mitigated in themselves in regard either of their degree, or continuance. 1. Degree: that they are not extreme, unsupportable, but tempered with mercy, that though God hath thresht'd us with his slayle, beaten us with his staff or rod, yet he hath not broken us with his wheel, (g) Is. 28. 27, 28. Jeremiah in behalse of the Jewish Church acknowledgeth mercy, and therefore matter of praise amidst sore desolations. When their young and old lay slain in every corner of the street; yet saith Jerimy here is mercy. It is thy mercy Lord that we are not consumed (b) Lament. 3. 22. that a remnant of us are left, all are not gone, that some of us, though but an handful in comparison of the rest, are spared, not consumed. 2. Continuance, that as Job speaks of his comforts, they are swifter than a Weavers shuttle, that heaviness is our guest but for a night, and then joy cometh in the morning. But suppose our crosses in themselves extreme, most bitter, stinging, as lasting as our lives, yet to us, in reference to us: there may be moderation in them, & so cause of thankfulness for that they exceed not our comforts we have to sweeten and allay them, our stock of grace, abilities of faith, patience to undergo them, our deservings of them. Let our 〈◊〉 be what they will, we may still say with Ezra. 9 13: they are less than our iniquities 〈◊〉: were we in hell we might say so: the torments there would come short of our sins; were we there beaten with ne'er so many stripes, yet still it would be with fewer than we have deserved: for still in what place, case, state soever we be, it will be true, Deus praemiat ultra, punit citrà, God always rewards beyond, but he punisheth on this side of our deserts, beneath our iniquitics, as 'tis in the marginal note upon that forecited place of Ezra; He deals not with us after our sins, nor rewardeth us according to our Iniquities: for we in sinning have dealt with him as Traitors, and he in afflicting hath spared us as sons. And so much for this Question and the third General. From the object 〈◊〉 the matter for which, pass we on the object personal, the person unto whom we are to give thanks; unto God and the father. Here are not meant two persons, whereof one God, the other father, but the same essence or person is called both God and father: For usual is it with the holy Ghost, as to express one and the same thing by divers appellations, so to couple those several appellations by the copulative particle 〈◊〉 in which case the particle doth either redound, or signify nothing else but even: unto God and the father than is all one with God even the father, or else God who is the father: and the words may be taken in regard of us, or Christ. In respect of us (as Zanchy and 〈◊〉 à Lapide expounds them) they import a general and special mercy of the Almighty, God the general, father the special. For as God he blesseth us only as Creatures, hath created, doth preserve and govern us; as Father he blesseth 〈◊〉 as Sons, adopt's us in Christ Jesus to an Inheritance in the heavens, which is saith Peter, 1 Pet: 1. 4: incorruptible, undefiled, unfading. Now if you understand the words in reference unto Christ, the word God is taken not essentially, but personally for the first person in the Trinity, and the word Father is added by way of explanation. So that this clause, God and the Father, contains a description of the first person from two relations unto Christ. One of God, the other of Father. He is the God of Christ as man, the Father of Christ both as God and as man. First, the God of Christ as man. How a God? for a God in a sense we know he may be said to be, and is to all things whatsoever. To the Devils as they are his vassals: (i) Dr Edw: Reynolds. To the wicked of the world as they are his prisoners: To the faithful more especially as they are his subjects and followers: To Christ most especially. I ascend saith Christ, 〈◊〉. 20. 17. to my God and your God: not our God in common, but mine and yours by way of severance, to imply that he is otherwise 〈◊〉, and otherwise his, Ours by right of Dominion, as we are his creatures; His (understand me still in reference to his humane nature) not only by right of Creation, though so too; but also by special coven ant and confederation, by predestination of his manhood unto the grace of personal union, by Designation of him unto the glorious office of Mediator, by all the relations of intimateness that can be named. Secondly, the Father of Christ whether considered as God, or as man. The Father of him as God, by eternal generation, begetting him in the equality, nay numerical Identity of the same nature with himself. The Father of him as man, not only in the largest and most improper sense, as he is the Father of every creature, the Father of rain, and of the drops of 〈◊〉, in 〈◊〉. 38. 28. not at all by Adoption, for that is always (say Civilians) personae extrancae, and the manhood of Christ is taken into personal union with God the Son. So that Christ, even as man, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 personale God, and therefore uncapable of Adoption. Whereupon the Counsel of Frankford condemned Foelix, and Elipandus Archbishop of Toledo, for calling Christ in his humanity the Adoptive Son of God; not at all then by Adoption, but by collation of the grace of Union. For unto Christ's humane nature, by virtue of the Hypostatical union, the Primogeniture and Inheritance of all things is due, and as it were connatural. A congruence is there, that the man in whom all the fullness of the Godhead dwelleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, bodily, that is personally, should be the first borne among many brethren, the first borne of every creature, the heir of all things. Hitherto of both titles (God and Father) considered absolutely. A word of them as they relate to our Thanks giving, giving thanks unto God, and the Father. And so they distinguish our thanks, and praises from heathenish, and 〈◊〉 Doxologyes: The Heathen and Turk will give thanks unto God Almighty maker of Heaven and Earth; this to give thanks but as creatures. The Jew will give thanks unto the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, but the Christian alone to God the Father of Christ. This then the Christians Thanks giving. But here observe, that the addition of Father is not exclusive of the Son, and Holy-Ghost, but inclusive rather; for they have all the same essence, and therefore our blessings proceed from all three equally, undividedly, as from one entire, indivisible, and coessential agent according unto that known Maxim, Opera Trinitatis ad extrà sunt Indivisa. Our thanksgiving by consequent must be directed to each. Notwithstanding then the appropriation of it unto God, as limited unto the person of the Father, we may justly infer the dueness of it unto God indefinitely, and that unshared with any creature, either in whole or in part. Indeed we may give unto the Instrument, that which is the Instruments, provided withal that we give unto God that which is Gods. The sword of the Lord, and the sword of Gideon, Judges 7. 20. but the sword of the Lord had the upper hand; first the sword of the Lord, and then the Sword of Gideon. We may then give thanks unto second causes, as unto the conveighers, carrier's, and messengers of God's favours: But only unto God, as their Donor and sender: for he alone the principal Author of them, and in him his mercy the sole motive to confer them. First, He their principal Author, the Father of lights, james 1. 17. from whom not only every perfect, but every good gift cometh down. The Apostle alludes (think Interpreters) unto the sun in the firmament, that great fountain of light, whence the Moon and lesser stars borrow all their splendour. Now if God be the Alpha of our Blessings, if they come originally, and primarily from him, just then is it that he be the Omega of our thanks: that they be terminated in him, not directed unto secundary causes, either only unto them and not him, or chiefly unto them above him, or unto them equally and jointly with him, as far forth as unto him. Thanksgiving is an act of Religion, whereby in an immediate, direct, and especial manner we honour God, though not ad intrà by an inward increase of his honour, yet ad extrà by an outward manifestation thereof: And in acts of religion God could never away with corrivalty, and partnership, still he would have all or none at all: Hope not then that a party, and shared thankfulness should now content him, who was always so jealous of his glory. In the beginning he created the earth naked, void, and without form, Gen. 1. 2. lest we (thinks chrysostom) should ascribe that beauty, and glory wherewith afterwards it was apparelled vers. 12. unto its own nature, and not his omnipotency, that made it out of nothing. In the ceremonial law he commanded the Israelites not to lift up any tool of iron upon any altar of stone they should erect, but to build it all of unhewen and unpolished stones, Exod. 20 25. Deut. 27. 5. to intimate (saith Rabbi Isaac) that what ever blessings they obtained at the Altar, they should attribute them not to humane endeavours, but merely to the good will, and pleasure of that free spirit, which bloweth when, and where, and how he listeth. But farther: as we are not to detract, or defalk any thing from the entireness, absoluteness, and plenarinesse of God's praises, by rendering them unto others: So neither Secondly, by giving them to our selves, either wholly, or in part. We give the commendation of a wise speech and saying unto, not the tongue that utters, but mind that conceived it. For the fairness of a Character, not the pen, but the hand, that guides it, is praise worthy: so the glory of benefits belong not unto us, who possess them, but unto God that gave them: (The Illustrations are not mine, but Bernard's) for them no sacrifice to be offered to our own nets, either of nature, or endeavour: as some, I remember, descant upon that place of Habakkuk. The people that are with thee, saith God to Gideon, Judg. 7. 2. are too many for to give the Midianites into their hands, Why? lest Israel vaunt themselves against me, saying, mine own hand hath saved me. Should than Israel have said mine own hand hath saved me, they had vaunted themselves against God. 'tis Salvians note. Now 〈◊〉 we make default two manner of ways: by attribution of our blessings unto ourselves, either as the physical and real causes, the procurers; or moral causes, the deservers of them. First, as to the physical, and real causes, and procurers of them. We persuade ourselves that we have won them propria Marte, by our hand, or head, something in us; and therefore deserve to wear them. Aristotle tells us of some, who had their eyes so depressed, and darkened, that they imagined themselves to see in the air near unto them, as in a glass, their own proper, and bodily figures. We, I am sure, have the eyes of our understandings so blinded, and darkened, that we can see nothing in all the good we have, all the good we do, but our own abilities and endeavours. But if it be plain that nothing in us hath gotten our blessings, that God is the sole Author of them, than next we flatter ourselves with a presumptuous conceit that we are the moral causes, the deservers of them. That something from us, our desert, holiness, hath moved God to bestow them. Against this no so sovereign remedy, as meditation upon the second thing above proposed. As God the principal Author of blessings, so in him his mercy the sole motive to confer them. And therefore those abilities and perfections, which the Philosopher called Habits; St James styled gifts, James 1. St Paul 1 Cor. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, grace gifts, or gifts not of Justice, but of grace: as they are à Deo for the (k) Dr Sanderson. Author, so they are ex Dono for the manner; from God, and by way of most free and Liberal Donation; although in the procurement of benefits there be a concurrence of our abilities, our hand and head, power and wisdom; yet, if we dig to the root, we shall find these abilities to be the free gifts of God. For what hast thou that thou hast not received? 1 Corinth. 4. 7, Could we deserve, as we cannot, favours at the hand of the almighty, yet in the last resolution that desert would be of grace. For, whence but from God should come power to deserve? But what talk we of desert! can God be 〈◊〉 to any man? or hath any man given to him first, that it might be recompensed him again? Rom. 11. 35. As for our parts we are not only 〈◊〉, but male merentes, not only undeserving, but ill deserving, & so every way lesser than the least of God's mercies. Not therefore unto us Lord, not unto us, not to our abilities, endeavours, merit, but unto thee, and in thee to thy free grace and goodness, be the honour and glory of all our blessings. Well we have done with the party, to whom our thanks are to be directed, and in whom terminated. I will but touch upon the last particular, the Mediator, in whose name our thanks are to be tendered: In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ There is, first, neoessity of a 〈◊〉, or mean to prefer our thanks unto God: then congruity that Christ should be he. First, need we have of a Mediator, whether we regard ourselves, or our thanks. First, ourselves, who as Creatures are infinitely beneath God; as sinners at odds, and 〈◊〉 with God, enemies unto him, and therefore should not dare, in our own persons, approach the pure eyes, and dreadful presence of so consuming a fire, to present ourselves or our thanks unto him. Especially considering, In a second place. The blemishes of our thanks; Our thanks, alas, are seldom, faint dull heartless, liveless, like the sacrifice of Prometheus to Jupiter, nothing but skin and bones, outside and formality, and therefore, of themselves, unlikely to win acceptance. A Mediator therefore necessary to take away the guilt of sin, from our persons, by his merits, to hide the failings of our thanks by his intercession, and so to win our persons access, our thanks acceptation to God. This office not more needful for us, and our thanks, than Christ meet for it. In the name, through the Mediation of none so congruously as of Christ, can our thanks be given to God. For, first, Decursus gratiarum, the streams of God's bounty flow unto us, from God, by Christ; (l) Bishop Andrew's. from God, as the fountain: by Christ as the channel: and, therefore, Recursus gratiarum, the return of our thanks, should be unto God, by Christ: unto God as the object: by Christ, as the Mediator, or means in which presented. If for his sake, by his means, merito Passionis, beneficio Intercessionis, efficaciâ Operationis, for the merit of his passion, by the virtue of his intercession, through the efficacy of his Operation God showreth down his blessings on us, therefore in his name, through his mediation, should we pour out our Benedictions unto God. Secondly, Thanks cannot be given but Adjutorio Christi, by help and 〈◊〉 from Christ, by assistance of his spirit, working in us, both the will, and the deed: the will, the habit of thankfulness: the deed, the act of thanksgiving: and therefore should not be given but Nomine Christi, in the name of Christ. And there is a third reason too, on Christ's behalf, our Lord. He is ordained to be a Priest for men in things pertaining to God, Heb. 5. 1. to offer sacrifices for them, not only 〈◊〉, and expiatory, but also 〈◊〉 and gratulatory sacrifices of thanksgiving: And as he is a priest to offer them, so he hath a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and much 〈◊〉 to sweeten, and purify them from all sin adhering to them, and this seems to be laid down, Rev. 8. 3. for the place by some of good note (m) 〈◊〉 Edw: Reynolds. is expounded of Christ's Mediation and Intercession for his members at the right hand of his Father, his bearing the Iniquity of their holy things, as Aaron his Type was appointed to do (Exod. 28. 38.) his covering all the imperfections of their services, and procuring of them favour and acceptance. Secondly, he hath a golden altar whereupon to consecrate them, that is besprinkled with the blood of that great sacrifice, which hath more virtue, merit, and welpleasingnesse in it, than there can possibly be demerit, and malignity in all the corruptions and failings of our thanks. Meet therefore that we bring, as all our sacrifices, so the sacrifice of praise and thanks in particular unto this our high priest; so however of itself offensive in God's nostrils, yet, being 〈◊〉 with his Incense, 〈◊〉 by his altar, it shall ascend up in an holy smoke unto Heaven; and as the Apostle spoke of Alms, Phil. 4. 18. shall be an odour of a sweet smell, a sacrifice acceptable, and wellpleasing unto God. FINIS. OF Original Righteousness, And it's CONTRARY, CONCUPISCENCE, BY HENRY JEANES, Minister of God's Word at Chedzoy. Ecclesiastes 7. 29. Lo, this only have I found, that God hath made man upright: But they have sought out many inventions. James 1. 14, 15. But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin: and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death. OXFORD, Printed by Hen: Hall for Tho: Robinson, 1660. To his Honoured Friends, The RIGHT WORSHIPFUL Sir WILLIAM WYNDHAM Of Orchard Wyndham Baronet. THE WORSHIPFUL Esquires. FRANCIS LuTTRELL of Dunstar Castle. GEORGE TREVELYAN of Nettlecomb. CHARLES' STEYNINGS of Holnicote. Gentlemen, I Have joined you together in this Dedication, to publish your Conjunction in a very laudable, and Charitable action, The giving of a plentiful Exhibition for the maintenance of a poor youth, Student in the University of Oxon; A rare Example in these days in Gentlemen, of whom how few can the greatest importunity win to spare any thing from their superfluities for so good an use? But your Liberality was so forward, as that it needed no spur, nor Excitation, only it called for direction unto a meet object. That this should be published in Print, was a thing, I believe, you never desired, nor expected: But though you do not expect the praises of men, as being acted by a higher principle; yet you may lawfully accept them; provided, as Theseus dedicated unto Hercules the Temples that were built in his own honour, so you do not suffer these praises to be terminated in yourselves; but carry them further, and higher unto that God, who hath given you hearts and estates for such a work. There remains yet one thing to be done, and that is, that we all, you, and I, join in sincere and unfeigned prayers unto God for his blessing upon the studies of him, unto whom you have shown such Munificence; for though you water this plant, 'tis God alone can give the increase; Unto this God I commend you and yours, and rest Yours to be Commanded in the things of Christ HENRY JEANES. That Original Righteousness was in Adam Proved against Dr TAYLOR. ALl that I have to say concerning Original Righteousness shall be reduced unto two heads. 1. a sit. 2. Quid sit. First, Inquire we concerning its An sit; for the Socinians deny, that there was any such thing, as you may see by what Socinus himself saith, in his Prelections, Chap. 3. and with him Dr Jeremy Taylor fully accords, in divers places of his books; [Further explication of Original sin, pag. 461.] The matter of Original Righteousness is a thing framed in the School forges; but not at all spoken of in Scripture, etc. [An answer to a letter touching Original sin, pag. 5.] When the Luth●ran, and the Roman dispute, whether justice, and Original righteousness in Adam was natural, or by grace, it is de non ente. [Unum necessarium, pag. 380.] Innocency of Actual sin seems to be that which Divines call Original Righteousness, there being no other either taught or reasonable: who these Divines are, that he speaks of, I cannot guess, unless it be his reverend friends, the Socinians, and some 〈◊〉, that tread in their steps; for, excepting them, the generality of both Protestants, and Papists descent from this conceit of his, touching Original Righteousness; but the censure of Socinianism is that which Dr Taylor despiseth, and smileth at, as a trifling noise, a boy's trick, a woman's argument, &c: and therefore we shall oppugn his, and the Socinians opinion by arguments, and they shall be taken from Scripture, and Reason. First, From Scripture. The first place is, Gen. 1. 26, 27. God said, let us make man in our Image, after our likeness etc. and the principal part of this Image stood in Original Righteousness, as is apparent by Paul's exposition thereof, Ephes. 4. 24. Col. 3. 10. A second place is, Gen. 1. 31. And God saw every thing that he had made, and behold it was very good; man therefore was in his kind created very good: and the goodness proper unto a 〈◊〉 creature is a moral 〈◊〉, the righteousness which we here speak of: so that, 'tis impossible for man to be very good, unless his understanding be full of saving light, truth, and knowledge, and his will, affections, and whole man of holiness. Socinus [praelect. cap. 3.] hath here a very sorry shift: 〈◊〉, (〈◊〉,) ibi non de animi 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 de justitia sermonem esse, sed de aptitudine & 〈◊〉 ad id, quod Deus 〈◊〉 sibi 〈◊〉. I Answer (saith he) that by goodness is meant the fitness, and conveniency of every thing for that end, which God hath appointed: but, this is so far from infirming our argument, as that it rather makes unto the confirmation thereof: because, as I shall show anon, man cannot be fitted, and qualified for the end, unto which God hath designed him without a positive righteousness. A third place is Eccles. 7. 29. 〈◊〉 this only have I found, that God hath made man upright: the word translated upright, is jaschar: and that usually denoteth one, that is upright, not only with a negative uprightness, an uprightness of innocency, an exemption from sin; but also with a positive uprightness, an uprightness of virtue, purity, and holiness. Johannes Junius (in his refutation of Socinus his Prelections) observeth, that the 〈◊〉 render it here by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that signifieth straight, or right, [Matth. 3. 3. Mark. 1. 3. Luk. 3. 4, 5: Acts 8. 21, 13, 10. 2 Pet. 2. 15.] elsewhere by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, righteous, or just, [Prov. 17. 26. Numb. 23. 10.] by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good [Deut. 12. 28.] by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good, or fair; by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pure or clean [Job. 3 3. 3.] and doth not this amount to more, than a mere innocency, a bare absence of vice? he noteth as much also concerning the Latin word rectus; 〈◊〉 in line â non negat tantum, sed & ponit aliquid. [Cicer. 1. Offic.] 〈◊〉 autem officium, rectum opinor vocemus, quod graeci 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. [Idem 2. de finibus.] quae autem 〈◊〉 aut recta, aut 〈◊〉, facta dicimus, si placet, illi autem vocant 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, omnes numeros virtutis continent, valet ergo idem quodjustum, ut cum Virgil. 1. Aeneid. dicit, & mens sibi conscia recti. But to pass on unto the New Testament; and there (by the Apostle Paul) we have the particulars of that uprightness, and the image of God, in which the first man was created clearly expressed: to instance first in that, which was the leading grace unto all others, a true saving and sanctifying knowledge: and that, man was endued with such a knowledge, when he was created, may be easily concluded from, Col. 3. 10. And have put on the now man, which is renewed in knowledge, after the image of him, that created him: here, that knowledge, which is restored to man in his regeneration, hath for its exemplar the image of God stamped upon man in his creation; and therefore Beza (n) Est 〈◊〉 articuius, ut sit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quam ob causam sic malui interpretari, quam ad verbum. secundum 〈◊〉. renders, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in agnitionem 〈◊〉 imagini ejus, renewed in knowledge suitable, and agreeable unto the image of God; the knowledge therefore of the regenerate man represents, at least inpart, the image of God in the first man when created, & consequently knowledge was a branch of that image of God, in which the first man was created. Dr. Taylor speaks detractingly of the knowledge of Adam in his state of integrity [Unum necessarium, pag: 373.] neither can we guess (saith he) at what degree of knowledge Adam had before his fall: certainly, if he had so great a knowledge 'tis not likely he would so cheaply have sold himself, and all his hopes 〈◊〉 of a greedy appetite to get some knowledge. But we may go further than guesses, and that with good warrant from scripture; for. First, God created man in his image: and, wheresoever the image of God is, there is an assimilation unto God in understanding, wisdom, and knowledge, though with great inequality. Secondly, that this knowledge was, notitia 〈◊〉, an affectionate practical knowledge, that drew after it suitable affections, and actions, appeareth by these four arguments. First, because words of knowledge, in Scripture do imply answerable affections, and practices. Secondly, the word [Coll. 3. 10.] is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 'tis rendered, by latin Interpreters, rather agnitio, than cognitio; not a bare knowledge, but knowledge with an acknowledgement. Thirdly, it could not be inferior to that knowledge, which is a part of the new man; for it was the pattern, and sampler thereof: the new man is renewed in knowledge after the image of God. Fourthly, in the now quoted place [Coll. 3. 10.] knowledge is (by a synecdoche of the part for the whole) put for the whole new man; and the image of God in the first man is, (by a synecdoche of the whole for the part) put for his knowledge: now, for these Synecdoches, what better, and more probable reason can be assigned, thanthe connexion of knowledge with the principal parts of God's image, as in the new, so in the first man. Thirdly, the scripture ascribes divers things unto man, in his state of innocency, unto which a very great measure of 〈◊〉 was requisite: he was made head of all mankind, Lord of the universe; he gave names unto all the cattle, unto the souls of the air, and to every beast of the field, Gen. 2. 20: and doubtless, they were apt names, significant of their natures; because given by appointment, and approbation of God himself: God brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them, and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof, Gen. 2. 19: besides, God created man for his service; the Lord hath made all things for himself (saith the wise man) Prov. 16 4: to wit, to serve him, according to the capacity of their several natures: now man's nature was rational; and therefore his end was a reasonable service; and, to guide him in the way hereunto, he had the law of nature written in his heart: now all these particulars joined together required, even a fullness of knowledge. Politic Princes on earth will choose none but wise, and prudent persons for their deputies; and can we then imagine, that an omniscient God made choice of an ignorant, and unknowing Viceroy? God gave him dominion over the fishes of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth: and why should not his intellectuals hold proportion with his dominion, and be as vast, and extensive? it is altogether improbable, that God should give him so great, and large a sceptre, and not qualify him for the wielding of it: he was nomenclator unto the creation, and for such an office he was altogether unmeet, if he were ignorant of the essences, and qualities of creatures: doubtless, he knew the end, for which he was created; the duties, that were enjoined him; the light, and law of nature shone not more dimly in his breast, when he was in his integrity, than it doth in his lapsed posterity; and in the worst of them, the law is written in their hearts, Rom. 2. 15. We can do more than guess at the dictates of right reason, or else we should be at a loss touching all first principles, both speculative, and practical; and there is no question to be made, but that Adam, before his fall, knew all the dictates of right reason, and assented unto them, and therefore we are not, in such an utter uncertainty, touching the knowledge Adam had before his shall, as Dr. 〈◊〉 would bear us in hand. But let us weigh the Doctor's argument. Certainly if he had so great a knowledge, 'tis not likely he would so cheaply have sold himself, and all his hopes out of a greedy appetite to get some knowledge. The answer is very easy, and obvious: This greedy appetite to get that knowledge promised by the Serpent, was undeniably a great sin, and therefore to say it could be in him before his fall, were a very gross contradiction: for this were to affirm, that sin was in him in a state of innocency, when he was without sin; that he sinned, before he sinned: and, if it were not in him before his fall, I would know of the Dr. and all his admirers, how it can be an argument against the greatness of his knowledge before the fall? It is a common opinion amongst both (o) Bellarm: tom: 4 〈◊〉. great: & stat: 〈◊〉: lib. 3. cap. 5. versus finem. Papists, and Protestants, that this greedy appetite proceeded, not from error, or ignorance, but from incogitancy, inconsideration, or inadvertency. But I proceed on unto the last place. Ephes. 4. 24. And that ye put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness, and true holiness, here, (by the consent of most Interpreters) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, after God, is as much as, after or according to the image of God and, by this interpretation, it will follow, that the image of God consisted principally in righteousness and true holiness, and these are so comprehensive, as that they take in all graces, and virtues whatsoever: Junius [in his conference with Arminius] speaks of some, who understand that clause [after God] concerning the power, and virtue of God, working this righteousness, and true holiness: 〈◊〉 contendam (inquit) quod multi interpretantur [secundum Deum] ac si 〈◊〉 Apostolus virtute Dei agentis in nobis: But Dr. 〈◊〉 [in his animadversions upon the said conference] tells Junius: first, that this interpretation is opposite unto his own interpretation of the words, and then, he confesseth his ignorance os any, that are the authors of such an exposition: 〈◊〉 contenderes, 〈◊〉 ipsi contradiceres, ut qui ad Gen. 1. 26: hac ipsa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, de imagine Dei in homine interpreteris. Qui vero illi sint, qui contra instituunt mihi nondum 〈◊〉 est [pag. 39 cap. 1.] But, I shall further, unto this sense of the place, oppose an argument from the signification of the particle [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] which here, in all probability, rather denoteth the relation of righteousness, and true holiness unto its 〈◊〉, than unto its cause, physically procreant. By what hath been said, the reader may be informed, how remote from truth an other passage of Dr. Tailors is [in his Unum necessarium, p362.] What gifts and graces, or supernatural endowments God gave to Adam in his state of innocency, we know not, God hath no where told; and of things 〈◊〉 we commonly make wild conjectures. God, you see, hath told us, that he created man after his image, in knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness; that he made him very good, that he made him upright: now, whether the Dr. hath the forehead to affirm, that all this signifieth no gifts, graces, or supernatural endowments, which God gave to Adam in his state of innocency? and what proofs he will bring, for so strange an assertion, we will leave unto the issue? Unto the above mentioned scriptures there are usually added two reasons: the first, drawn from the end of the first man; the second, from the laws prescribed unto him; for without a positive righteousness it was impossible for him to reach this end; to obey these laws: but, of these two arguments, I shall hereafter speak more fully, and therefore, for the present, I shall pass on, from the Quod sit, unto the Quid sit of this original righteousness, and here, we have a double Quid sit of it, to be inquired into: Quid nominis, and Quid rei. To begin with Quid nominis; why the righteousness of the first man is called original righteousness. Four reasons may be given for it. First, because 'twas seated in the original, and parent of all mankind. Secondly, because 'twas the first righteousness of mankind that ever was in the world, it was before any other, either habitual, or actual. Thirdly, because Adam received it from his very original; and beginning; as soon as he was created, God created him in his image, after his likeness, Gen. 1. 26, 27. God's image was stamped upon him the very first moment of his creation, and his righteousness was the principal part of this image; God made man upright, Eccl. 7. 29: he made him, and made him upright at the same time, the essence of his soul was, in order of nature, before its uprightness, as being the subject thereof, and accordingly it was created before it in order of nature, but yet this is no hindrance, but that the creation of the essence of his soul, and the superinfusion of right. ousnesse thereinto, might be simultaneos, in regard of time; unto these scriptures, I shall only add a congruence out of the schoolmen. All the other creatures were created in a perfect state, with abilities for operations, suitable unto their respective ends, the herbs were created yielding seed, and the trees bearing fruit, Gen: 1. 12, 29: congruent therefore was it, that man the noblest of sublunary creatures, should be created in such a state too; but, if he had been created without original righteousness, he had been in a worse condition, than the meanest of the creatures; for, he would have been unfurnished for the ends of his creation, the glorification of, & communion with God, and destitute of the seeds of his glory, and happiness. Fourthly, it is called original righteousness in respect of Adam's posterity, because, if he had stood, it would have been coevall with the very beginnings of their beings, & so they would have received it together with their very natures: for, it was not given unto Adam only as a personal endowment, but as a gift unto the whole humane nature, he had it as the head, and representative of all mankind, and therefore his posterity were to receive it, (in regard of the habits, that were the foundation of it) when they had their humane nature derived from him: this the Schoolmen further confirm, from (the opposite of original righteousness) original sin: original sin is privatively opposed unto original righteousness, but because of the sin of Adam all his posterity are borne in original sin, therefore if he had never sinned all of them had been borne in original righteousness. But to pass on from its Quid nominis unto its Quid rei, what is meant by the thing itself; and for the clearing of this we shall explicate these seven following particulars. First, the materiale, secondly, the formale of it, which are (as it were) the essential parts of which is consisteth: Thirdly, the subject in which 'tis seated: Fourthly, the causation, or production: Fifthly, the effects of it: Sixthly, the difference of it from sanctifying grace, seventhly, the manner of its relation unto the first man; whether it were natural, or supernatural to him. First the materiale, the matter, or foundation of it; and that was all the moral perfections, all the graces, and virtues of the whole man; it was not one single habit, but an aggregate of all those habits, by which man was rendered right, and perfect, according to all his parts, and powers: Solomon saith, that God made man upright, Eccl. 7. 29: but upright he had not been, unless he had been sanctified wholly, in spirit, soul, and body: the least deformity, or defect had been inconsistent with his uprightness: the integrity, and universality of the righteousness of the first man is by Arnd (as Gerard insormeth us, 〈◊〉: Th. ol: l. 2. p. 179.) resembled unto the beauty of Absalon, 2 Sam. 14. 25. But in all Israel there was none to be so much praised as Absalon, for his beauty from the sole of his foot, even to the crown of his head, there was no blemish in him: so in all mankind there was never any so much to be praised (Christ Jesus alone excepted) as Adam in Paradise; for his beauty of holiness, from the sole of his feet, even to the crown of his head; from his lowest (to wit,) his sensual faculties, unto his highest, his intellectual faculties there was no blemish in him. The Schoolmen generally affirm, that there were, in the first man in his innocency, the habits of those virtues, whose acts did include an imperfection repugnant unto that state, and they instance in repentance, patience, mercy, etc. Suarez goeth further, and affirmeth; that some, though not the chief acts of repentance, and mercy, were consistent with the state of innocency. Licet verum sit, non 〈◊〉 has virtutes exercere in statu innocentiae potissimos actus suos, nihilominus semper aliquos actus exercere potuisset: Primo, actus 〈◊〉 conditionatos, ut in poenitentiâ esset hic actus, si 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in misericordiâ, si proximus indigeret illi 〈◊〉: Nam licet aliqui putent, 〈◊〉 actus esse potius intellectus, quam voluntatis, tamen esse possunt in actuali 〈◊〉 voluntatis de conditionato objecto. Imò illi conditionales non essent 〈◊〉 verè in homine, nisi fundarentur in actuali proposito voluntatis ejus. Secundo, posset exerceri actus complacentiae circa 〈◊〉 objectivam talium virtutum. Tertiò, specialitèr virtus poenitentiae, quamvis non posset 〈◊〉 malum commissum posset odio habere peccatum, quod offertur ut committendum, & habere voluntatem non 〈◊〉 Deo injuriam. Misericordia etiam 〈◊〉 semper, aut per se requirit dolorem in miserente, nam voluntas sublevandi 〈◊〉, si absque dolore haberi p sset, revera 〈◊〉 actus misericordiae. Hoc autem 〈◊〉, si status innocentiae duraret, posset unus 〈◊〉 cadere, & alter innocens habere voluntatem 〈◊〉 illi, 〈◊〉 displicentiâ de malo ejus, quae posset haberi sine tristitiâ, 〈◊〉 dolore. Et fortasse inter ipsos 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉 occasiones habendi 〈◊〉 actus. Nam licet in illis non esset propria miseria poenalis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aliqua indigentia naturalis, ut parvuli 〈◊〉 auxilio majorum ad educationem, & ad vitanda pericula, & ignorantes, 〈◊〉 insipientes indigerent doctrinâ. Ad 〈◊〉 ergò modum non 〈◊〉 ibi aliqua materia misericordiae, & sic 〈◊〉 de aliis similibus virtutibus facilè 〈◊〉. De hom: create: ac stat: 〈◊〉: lib. 3. cap. 11. Secondly, the Formale; the formality of this righteousness was (as Estius noteth in lib. 2. sent: didst: 25. sect. 5.) not so much the aggregation, and collection of those habits, that rendered man perfect, as the relation of 〈◊〉 resulting from them: original righteousness than was the rectitude of the whole man, and all his powers in reference unto one another, and (in regard of their acts it was) a relation of conformity of all in man unto the rule, the revealed will of God: but hear Estius himself largely and clearly explicating himself in this particular. 〈◊〉 et si non sit dubitandum, quin 〈◊〉 originalis 〈◊〉 bona vel omnia, vel 〈◊〉 in primo homine habuerit conjuncta, quod & futurum erat in posteris ex eo nascituris statu innocentiae durante; non tamen justitiae nomine 〈◊〉 propriè tale aliquod aggregatum, seu complexum significari, sed potius rectitudo quaedam quae in toto homine ex partium ac potentiarum ejus ordine atque optima dispositione consurgebat. Quare justitia originalis ad omnes 〈◊〉 habitus, seu dispositiones, ac perfectiones potentiarum, videtur 〈◊〉 habuisse tanquam relatio 〈◊〉 ad rationes fundandi; ut non sit 〈◊〉 is necesse, vel unum aliquem habitum, vel plures quaerere, qui propriè sint, 〈◊〉 constituant justitiam originalem, sed sufficiat intelligere quò d homo secundùm parts, & potentias suas ita fuerit ordinatus, ut absolutè rectus, ac justus 〈◊〉, ut pote nihil habens in se inordinatum, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vitiosum. Thirdly, what was the subject of original righteousness in which it was seated? Scotus placeth it only in the will: because upon that depends the rectitude of humane actions: Durand restrains it unto the 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 faculties of the soul: because they only are regulated, and made subject unto reason: But (p) Illud 〈◊〉 ex dictis colligi potest, quod 〈◊〉 solet de subjecto 〈◊〉 originalis, de quo quidem, vary docti 〈◊〉 putant. Sed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & per se 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, id est, relationem quandam, ut dixi, mus, consequitur subject 'em originalis 〈◊〉 esse 〈◊〉 seu potentias inter se coordinatas. 〈◊〉 enim sive in corporalibus, sive in spiritualibusintelligatur; existit in partibus eum inter se ordinem habentibus, à quo totum quod ex illis constat, rectum dicatur. Estius, in the place but now quoted, with better reason maketh the subject of it to be all the parts or powers of the soul; for rectitude (saith he) whether we understand it to be in corporals, or spirituals, existeth in the parts, having that order betwixt themselves, whence the whole that consists of them is denominated to be right, or straight: that was the subject of this original 〈◊〉, which was the subject of those habits, that were the foundation thereof: now those habits were placed in all the powers of the soul, some (as temperance, fortitude, and the like) were seated even in the sensitive appetites: for these lower, and sensitive powers are capable of habits in man; because in him rational, though not formally, yet by participation, as obedient unto reason. As for the body, this righteousness was not in it, as a subject, but only reached it as an instrument: its members were weapons of righteousness: To make the sensitive powers obedient unto the rational, habits were requisite to be in them for determination of them hereunto: 'tis true, habits were requisite to be in the sensitive powers, to make them obedient unto the rational; and, without inherence of such habits, they could not be determined hereunto; but now, there's no necessity for assigning any such habits in the body, to render that readily subordinate unto reason; because, 'tis sufficiently determined hereunto by those habits, that are in the faculties of the soul, directing, and commanding its actions. A fourth thing is the causation, or production of this original righteousness: seeing it is a relation it cannot be created, or produced per se, but ratione fundamenti, in its foundation, for neque datur motus neque mutatio ad relationem per se spectatam; relations are all produced by the same action, that their foundations are; and not by any new, proper, superadded, predicamental action: Thus, the likeness betwixt two white walls is produced by no other action, than the whitening of them; and thus God made the first man upright, or righteous only by the infusion of those habits, gifts, graces, virtues, that were the foundation of this uprightness, or righteousness; for man was denominated fundamentally upright, or righteous by them; though formally by the relation of righteousness. A fist thing is the effects of original righteousness: and these the Schoolmen generally make to be three. First, A subordination of the upper faculties of the soul, the understanding, and will unto God: In his understanding there was no privative, or unblamable ignorance, but a clear, and full knowledge of God, and his law: his will was clothed with grace, and holiness; it was created holy though mutable; so that, though there was in him a possibility of sin, yet not the least tendency, or inclination unto sin; as long as he stood, he adhered always unto God, and said, as the Psalmist, It is good for to draw near unto the Lord, Psal. 73. last. A second is a subjection of the inferior faculties of the soul unto the superior; of the fantasy unto the understanding, of the sensitive appetite unto the will: so that, in those inferior powers. there was no motion unsuitable unto, either the dignity, or duty of man: The Centurion, Matth. 8. 9 tells our Saviour of the forward obsequiousness of his soldiers and servants: for I am a man under authority, having soldiers under me: and I say to this man go, and he goeth, and to another come, and he cometh: and to my servant, do this, and he doth it. Such was the ready and cheerful obedience of Adam's lower faculties unto his superior: His 〈◊〉 were most likely to be unruly, and yet they all, went, and came; were let out, and chained up; intended, and heightened; slackened, or remitted; lengthened, or broken off according to the directions of his understanding, and commands of his will. A third effect of Original righteousness in Adam, was a regular subjection of his body unto his soul: in regard whereof, it was an helpful, and serviceable instrument thereunto, as in all, so especially in its gracious operations, those of piety towards God, and those of charity and justice towards man: all the members of his body were weapons, arms, or instruments of righteousness unto God, Rom. 6. 13. servants to righteousness unto 〈◊〉, verse. 19 His eyes were as windows to let in good, and profitable observations, from the creation of the world, concerning the invisible things of the Creator his eternal power and 〈◊〉, Rom. 1. 20. 21. His ears were as the gate of life, which, if he would, might have been shut, and locked against all evil, and open unto all good: his tongue was as the pen of a ready writer, Psal. 45. 1. ready to utter those things which a good heart had indicted: his hands on every occasion were apt to be lifted up to God in prayer, and devotion, and stretched out to man in actions of charity, and compassion: his 〈◊〉 were ready to be employed in any good errand, swift to run the ways of God's commandments. The sixth thing I propounded concerning Original righteousness, was, the difference of it from sanctifying grace: This is to be understood concerning the Materiale, or foundation of Original righteousness: Some distinguish it wholly, and altogether from the sanctifying grace of Adam: But such are by (q) Sum. The. 〈◊〉. Tom. 1. Tract. 5. de homine in 〈◊〉 Innocentiae Cap. 3. Qu. 2. Becanus thus refuted: Original righteousness rendered our first Parents righteous, and holy: But they, having no foreign righteousness to be justified by, could not be righteous and holy without sanctifying grace; Original righteousness therefore in them didinclude sanctifying grace: But, though it did include Habitual Holiness, or sanctifying grace, yet Becanus with others think, that it superadded something thereunto, and was not that alone: so that it was distinguished therefrom distinctione includentis ab incluso. It included sanctifying grace, and signified further such Habits in the inferior faculties, as made them obedient unto the superior, and repressed and prevented in them all Rebellion, and disorder, all irregular and disorderly Motions. Becanus loc: predict. for this produceth an Argument, which stands thus: Original righteousness had three effects, by the common 〈◊〉 of the Schoolmen, upon the souls of our first Parents. 1. Subjection of the superior part of the soul, the understanding, and will 〈◊〉 God. 2. Subjection of the inferior and sensitive part of the soul unto the higher, and rational part. 3. The Ready Subjection of the Body unto the Soul; But now grace alone, single, by itself had not these three effects, and therefore Original righteousness was not only grace: but implied something else: The Minor he goeth about thus to prove; 〈◊〉 sanctifying grace, in the state of innocency, was of the same nature, and kind with our grace: But our grace hath not these three effects, but only the 〈◊〉, and this he exemplifieth by Paul's complaint of a law in his Members warring against the law of his mind, Rom. 7. 23. that is; of Rebellion in his body, and sensitive faculties against the higher, and rational faculties of his soul: Paul's grace was 〈◊〉 to repress this rebellion; therefore we may conclude the same of Adam's too; and therefore (Besides sanctifying grace,) there were (to this purpose, and intent,) further requisite some gifts, or habits distinct from it. For Answer: These two last effects of Original righteousness may be produced two manner of ways, 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉. The grace of Paul, (and we may say the same of all regenerate Persons,) did produce these two 〈◊〉, but not in the same degree that Original righteousness did in Adam; for it was imperfect, defiled by the coexistence of sinful corruptions: and hereupon, it could beget in his material part, and powers only an imperfect obedience unto his immaterial and spiritua'l powers; But this obedience, though imperfect, is yet true and sincere. Grace wheresoever it is can lay commands, and impose laws upon the senses, and sensitive passions, as also upon all the members of the body: and can make these laws, and commands to be obeyed in some measure. Job could make a Covenant with his eyes. David could put a bridle into his lips: All the regenerate 〈◊〉 their Members instruments of righteousness unto God, servants to righteousness, unto 〈◊〉, Rom. 6. 13, 19 Therefore their inherent righteousness, and holiness hath some domination, and rule over their members; All rebellions and mutinies (such is its weakness and imperfection 〈◊〉 in this life,) it cannot possibly prevent; yet, when these flames break out, it doth what it can to allay, and compose them; it quencheth them with the waters of repentance, and so far prevaileth over them, as that it never suffers them to enjoy a total, and 〈◊〉 victory. Indeed the grace of Adam preserved in the soul a full, and undisturbed tranquillity, and gave reason, and the rational Appetite such a perfect regiment over the body, and the inferior faculties, as that there was not in them the least disobedience, or so much as reluctancy unto the dictates of the understanding, and motions of the will; and the Reason hereof was, because in the grace of Adam, there was all requisite perfection 〈◊〉 And, whereas Becanus objecteth, that grace in the state of innocency was of the same nature, and kind with that of ours: this is nothing unto the purpose: for, although it be the same in point of 〈◊〉, yet it falls far short of it in degree and measure: and therefore is unable for the perfect causation of that, for which, in the full, and persect grace of Adam, there was an ample sufficiency. The seaventh and last thing I proposed, concerning Original Righteousness, was a question concerning the manner of its 〈◊〉 unto the first man: whether it were natural or supernatural to him in his state of innocency? some may look upon it as an unnecessary nicety: but the Papists make it the foundation of many dangerous opinions: for grant that original righteousness was supernatural before the fall, they will hence inserre, that its contrary concupiscence was natural: and from this again, they will conclude, that in the regenerate 'tis not properly a sin, and consequently, that 'tis no bar unto the absolute persection of their good works, and their justification by them: and divers other the like unsound, and 〈◊〉 tenants: By a right stating then of this question these errors will be forestalled: and yet 'tis strange, what confusion, and mistakes there are in the stating of it, amongst both Protestants, and Papists: Amesius (I confess) hath, in a very short passage, given me herein greater satisfaction, than I could find in the larger discourses of others: His words are these Neque dicimus nos justitiam fuisse, vel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 naturae physicè, aut physico modo ex 〈◊〉 principiis 〈◊〉, sed conditionem esse moralem, naturae illi debitam, quae ad justè operandum fuit creata. But this may be looked upon, rather as a general, and an obscure hint, than a just determination of the question: and theresore I shall address myself unto a more full handling of it: and in order hereunto shall premise an Explication of these two terms in it, natural and supernatural. The first term to be explained is natural: and this hath many acceptions: a thing may be said to be natural to man five ways; in regard; first, of its 〈◊〉 of his nature: 〈◊〉, consecution, or emanation from it: or thirdly, 〈◊〉 unto it: or fourthly, connexion with it: or five, dueness unto it. First, a thing may be said to be natural unto man in regard of the constitution of his nature: to wit: that which is a principle, or essential part of his nature: his soul, and body, and all integral parts of one of his essential parts his body. Secondly, a thing may be said to be natural to man in regard of consecution, or emanation from his nature, that physically results, and flows from the principles of his nature: and thus the properties of his nature are said to be natural unto him, v. g. the faculties of the understanding, and will. Thirdly, a thing may be said to be natural to man in regard 〈◊〉 suitableness unto his nature: and thus every ornament, or 〈◊〉 suitable, and agreeable to his nature: every thing that heals, perfects, adorns, or advanceth his nature: all gracious and glorious endowments may be said to be natural: for natural, in this sense, is opposed unto, not supernatural, but that which is against nature, which is hurtful unto, or destructive of nature. Fourthly, a thing may be said to be natural to man in regard of 〈◊〉 with his nature: to wit: that which he hath derived unto him together with his nature, in the same instance of time, though not of nature: and thus original sin is said to be natural unto lapsed man, that is, connatural, connexed with his nature, from the very first receipt thereof: we were (saith Paul) by nature the children of wrath, Eph. 2. 7. that is, we were obnoxious unto wrath, as soon as we received our nature. Fiftly, a thing may be said to be natural to man in regard of dueness to his nature: without which his nature could not be created: and thus things due unto man, are said to be natural unto man: because they do (in some way) resemble natural properties in point of necessity: and are (in some sort) necessary unto man: This acception of the word is found in some of the most learned amongst the Papists, when they speak of other subjects: It is usually said, that habitual grace was connatural unto Christ's soul, as a property consequent unto the personal union, though it did not result theresrom by any physical dimanation, or real efficiency, but was immediately given thereunto by God's power and will: and this (r) 〈◊〉 cur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 haec 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & proprietas consequens unionem, sinon result at ab illa, sed 〈◊〉 est nova Dei actio libera ab actione incarnationis 〈◊〉, per quam haec gratia conferatur. Et 〈◊〉 nam operatio consequitur esse. Sed per unionem communicarur 〈◊〉 divinum 〈◊〉. Ergo, Ex illo resultat in humanitate d vina operatio: Ergo & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quae est talis 〈◊〉 principium. Respondetur etiam in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, aliqua esse 〈◊〉 connaturalia ab 〈◊〉 agente juxta naturae debitum collata, & non ab intrinseco principio actiuè manantia. Sic multi 〈◊〉 de quantitate respectu 〈◊〉 primae, de motu circulari respectu 〈◊〉, & de 〈◊〉: bus infusis angelorum. Sic ergo in praesenti dicimus vocari gratiam connaturalem proprietatem Christi Dei hominis, quia 〈◊〉 dignitate talis personae dcbita est, 〈◊〉 quodam proportionis connaturalis, ratione cuius praeternaturale ac prodigiosum 〈◊〉, unam actionem ab alterâ separari, & naturam humanam sine ornamentis gratiae verbo coniungere. Quomodo dici etiam potest, corporis 〈◊〉, optimamque dispositionem suisse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & connaturalem ratione unionis, ita ut miraculum 〈◊〉 career corporis immortalitate, & 〈◊〉, quamvis hae corporis proprietates non manant ab unione per physicam resultantiam, sed debeantur solum debito proportionis. 〈◊〉 justisieth from the present acception of the word natural: accidents (saith he) may be said to be connatural: not only, when they flow, and result actively from an intrinsic principle: but also, when by an extrinsic agent they are conferred juxta naturae debitum: so we say, that grace was called a connatural property of Christ God-man: because, from the worthiness of his person, it was due, debito quodam proportionis connaturalis, by a debt or dueness of connatural proportion, so that, it would have been a strange, preternatural, and prodigious thing, to have created the humane nature of Christ, and to have joined it unto the person of the word, and not to have replenished it with all the ornaments of divine grace. This dueness of a thing, unto the nature of man, is again twofold; either of condecency, or of obligation. First, A dueness of condecency; and according unto that a thing is only fit, congruent, convenient. Secondly, A dueness of obligation: and that again may be conceived to arise, either from the merit of man, or else from some acts of God preceding, or concomitant: for, though Gods will be most free, yet by one act he may necessitate, and oblige himself unto another, either following it, or connexed with it: Deus promittendo se feclt debitorem, is a proverb in Divinity: God by his promises freely obligeth himself: and we may say the same of other acts: this is fully declared (upon another occasion) by Mr Hord, whom I take yet to be our antagonist in this question: I grant (saith he) [in his treatise entitled God's love unto mankind] that God is simply and absolutely bound unto no man, he is agens liberrimum, a most free dispenser of his own favours, both what he will, and to whom he will; but yet he is conditionally: determinavit seipsum: he hath bound himself to give supernatural abilities to men by three things. First, Decernendo, the Almighty is eternally subject to his own decree, or else he would be mutable, and therefore what gifts soever he hath decreed to men, he is bound to give them by virtue of his decree. Secondly, Promittendo, we use to say promise is debt, it is justice to perform, what it was free to promise: if therefore God hath made a premise of any gift or grace to men, this promise binds him to performance. Thirdly, Legem ferendo; by giving men a law to keep, which, without supernatural power, they cannot keep any more than they can eat a rock: by such a law the Almighty Lawgiver binds himself to his creatures, to give them such power as may enable them to keep that law, or else he becomes the true, and proper cause of the transgression of it. From the first term, natural, pass we on to the second, supernatural: A thing may be said to be supernatural to the first man, either in regard of its original, or else in respect of the manner of its inhesion in, or agreement unto its nature. First, in regard of its original and efficient which is produced immediately by God, without the concurrence of any creature. Secondly, in regard of the manner of its inhesion in, and agreement unto the nature of man: and so, that is said to be supernatural, which resembled such supernaturals, as were unnecessary unto man's nature, without which his nature might well be created. Having thus explained the terms, the question may be divided into two parts, according unto the two parts of the predicate. First, whether or no original righteousness were natural unto the first man in his state of innocency? Secondly, whether it were supernatural? First, whether it were natural? and here I shall lay down First what is uncontroverted on both sides: Then secondly, what is controverted. First, what is uncontroverted on both sides: 'Tis granted by Protestants First, that original righteousness was not natural unto man constitutiuè, it was no principle constituting his nature. Secondly, that it was not natural unto man consecutiuè, in regard of emanation, or consecution from his nature. It was no property physically resulting from the principles of his nature. Now, for both these concessions there is usually alleged this one reason, because that, which is natural in either of these senses, is inseparable: things thus natural remained even in the Devils, and so also in lapsed man, his fall did not take away, either the principles or properties of his nature: but original righteousness remaineth not in lapsed man, and therefore it was not natural, as either a principle or property of nature; Bellarmine therefore [De gra: prim: hom. cap. 5.] doth but calumniate, when he makes this acception of natural to be that, of which the question is to be understood Quarto naturale vocatur, quod aut est pars naturae, aut fluit à 〈◊〉 naturae. Quâ significatione 〈◊〉, & animus facultates quoque, tum sentiendi, tum intelligendi, & operationes quae ab iisdem facultatibus exercentur, naturalia esse dicuntur. Atque haec est signisicatio, de quâ hoc loco propriè disputamus. And yet here, it cannot be denied, but that some Protestants have herein expressed themselves very unwarily, rectitudo quam primus homo in 〈◊〉 accepit, was, (saith Maccovius) Naturalis hec significato quo facultas sentiendi, videndi, cap. 44. loc: come: and there is a passage in Tilenus [Syntag: lib. 1. cap. 33. sect. 17] that sounds very harshly this way. Tam nature. lis primo parenti haec justitiae originalis qualitas fuit, quam ipsa natura, & forma substantialis, per creationem accepta: unto these I may join also our own Willet, for he makes natural in the question, to be that, which was either a part of man's nature, or did arise, or spring out of some natural beginning, as we say the soul in the body, and the understanding in the soul are natural. From the grants of Protestants proceed we unto those of Papists, here First, they grant, that original righteousness was natural to man in regard of connexion with his nature, it was concreated with: and this is confessed by Bellarmine, Primum naturale dicitur id omne, quod habetur â nativitate, quâ signisicatione dicimur filii irae, Ephes. 2: & hoc modo justitiam originalem fatemur dici posse naturalem. Sed haec significatio ad quaestionem praesentem non pertinet, 〈◊〉 quod naturale hoc modo acceptum non opponitur supernaturali, cum tam naturalia, quam supernaturalia dona possint haberi à nativitate, ut notum est. De gra: prim: hom: cap: 5. 〈◊〉, they grant, that it was natural unto man in regard of suitableness unto his nature, it was a perfection very agreeable unto a reasonable creature. Nay thirdly they go further, and seem (as I think) to affirm, that it was natural in respect of dueness unto nature, if we speak only of a dueness of condecency: thus much may be gathered from these following words of Bellarmine [De gra: prim: hom: cap 7.] Respondeo, aequum omnino fuisse, ut Deus homini ad finem tàm sublimem ordinato media necessaria non negârit: For he cannot deny, but that original righteousness was a necessary means unto man's chief end. Now all these three concessions of the Papists are by Greg: de valentia [tom. 2. disp. 6. 15. punct. 1.] thus briefly summed, Donum originalis justitiae naturale ab extrinseco dici potucrit, quatcnus & naturae hominis ab initio ingenitum erat, & ei congruebat, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, atque roborabat ad recte exequendas operationes omnes bonas natura humanae à bitas: Or (as he expresseth it in a second assertion) Ad exequendum sine disicultate, &c: 〈◊〉 naturale virtutum earum, quarum actiones lege naturae praecipiuntur, & praescribuntur. There is another grant that I shall premise, which (I believe) is agreed on, both by Papists, and Protestants, and that is; that original righteousness was not due unto man's nature in a way of merit, there was nothing in man's nature, that merited it. The Question than proceeds only concerning a 〈◊〉 of obligation arising from some acts of God, and may be thus propounded: whether or no original righteousness were not natural, that is, necessary unto the first man, in the state of innocency, necessary though not absolutely, yet, ex hypothesi, upon supposal of some acts of God? or whether God did not by some acts oblige, and necessitate himself unto the enduing of the first man with original righteousness? Where the assirmative, which is our conclusion shall be made good, by instancing in three decrees of God, by which he had bound himself to give the first man, in the state of innocency, original righteousness. First, his decree 〈◊〉 the goodness with which he intended to invest him. Secondly, his decree concerning the end unto which he designed him. Thirdly, his decree concerning the Laws unto which he intended to oblige him. First, his decree concerning the goodness with which he invested him: man, as the rest of the creatures, was created very good, Gen. c. 1. v. 31: and consequently, God decreed to create him very good; for he worketh all things after the counsel of his own will, Ephes. 1. 11. But now he could not be made good, much less very good, unless he had been created with original righteousness; for moral goodness is that, which is proper and agreeable unto a reasonable creature, and therefore, without this righteousness, man could not be morally good: presupposing therefore God's decree to make man very good, it was impossible to create him without original righteousness. Secondly, his decree concerning the end which he prescribed, and designed unto him: for the utmost end, unto which man was appointed, was the glory of God, Prov. 16. 4: and his own eternal happiness, consisting in the beatifical vision of God's essence, and the eternal fruition of his glory, even the light of reason dictated this only to be the supreme end of man and all other ends to be unsatisfactory, below the nature of his spiritual, and immortal soul: God's giving man a capacity of this end was a sufficient intimation that it was to be the chief end, which he was to aim at; hereupon also was it, that there was naturally in man a desire of this end and no other end could give satisfaction unto his infinite, and boundless desires; so that Bellarmine himself sticks not to affirm that it was natural unto man, Quoad appetitum, though not, Quoad consecutionem. Now God by thus designing man unto this end, and placing in him a natural appetite thereunto, engaged himself to furnish him with all necessary means, abilities, and qualifications for the compassing of it; for, qui destinat ad sinem, destinat ad media; and original righteousness was (undoubtedly) a qualification absolutely necessary for such a purpose; and, if he bade been created without it, he had been made, not only, a little lower than the Angels, but beneath the very beasts that perish; below the most contemptible worms, that crawl upon the face of the earth, for there is none of them destitute of such furniture, as is requisite, for the reaching of their respective ends. Thirdly, his decree concerning the Laws unto which he intended to oblige him: he intended to write the Law of nature in his heart assoon as he was created; and accordingly it was written; so that, from his creation, he was obliged unto several duties, but it was impossible for man to perform acceptably these duties without original righteousness, and therefore, God by his purpose to impose these duties upon man, determined himself to enable him for them, by making him habitually upright, and holy: for if he should have enjoined, impossible commandments where there was no ability for obedience, he had been a very unjust Lawgiver, like Pharaoh, that exacted brick, and would not allow straw: God's purpose to create such a creature as man, with the rational faculties of understanding, and will, employed a purpose, to oblige him to serve, obey, and glorify him as his Creator; and this again employed a purpose to enable, and qualify him for such service, and obedience: and was not original righteousness a necessary qualification: for this. Man no sooner knew, that he was a poor creature, dependant upon the Almighty maker of Heaven, and Earth; but he forthwith understood, that he was, by the Law of creation, without any positive superadded Law bound, to love this his Maker above all things with all his soul, heart, might, and strength; to love himself, and all other things in reference unto him, to 〈◊〉 all his voluntary, and rational actions unto his Glory, at least virtually: but now all these duties were unfeasible without the virtue, or grace of the love of God, and therefore, from God's purpose to to oblige man unto these duties, we may conclude, his purpose to 〈◊〉 into him the habit of love: and what we say of the acts, and habits of love may be applied unto the acts, and habits of other graces. (s) Si quis per debitam intelligat 〈◊〉 ex hypothesi 〈◊〉 & voluntatis divinae, de 〈◊〉 creatura, à qua 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 obedientiam persectam, negare non possunt adversarii, tali sensu, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primaevae naturae, qui gratiam universalem eamque sufficientem, debitam 〈◊〉 homini in statu lapsus constituto, ex hypothesi, non verentur 〈◊〉. Certè legem quandam naturalen: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inditam ab initio, fatentur nobiscum adversarii. Si data 〈◊〉 homini 〈◊〉 naturae, cur 〈◊〉 non dicendum erit, debitam fuisse homini creando 〈◊〉 qua ad legem unplendam 〈◊〉 erat? debita ergo fuit, per intentionem, & voluntatem divinam, quia voluntas sinis, necessariam, & quasi debitam facit voluntatem mediorum ad 〈◊〉. Rivet. in Genes. 〈◊〉. 7. pag. 34. 35. This Medium the Arminians generally make use of to prove, the 〈◊〉 of universal grace: Because God hath commanded all men to believe, and obey, therefore he hath bound himself to give every man power to believe, and obey: Their abuse of this argument it is not now pertinent to examine, only, I cannot but observe, the inconsistency of it with their opinion in the now controverted question: for Arminius, and his followers generally hold, that original righteousness was not natural, that is, due, and necessary unto man in his innocency: But for resutation of this their denial we need no other medium, but that now mentioned, which they bring for universal grace: for that with due change will sufficiently serve our turn: God commanded man in the state of innocency actual righteousness, therefore he had bound himself to furnish him with original righteousness, therefore original righteousness was necessary and due unto man in that state, and that is all we mean by the word natural. There be divers other arguments, usually alleged by Protestants, which I shall for the present wholly wave; only, I cannot but take notice of one, (that is urged by Macovius, and others) from the remainders of this original righteousness in man since the fall: these are now natural unto man; therefore original righteousness itself was natural to man before the fall; but this argument hath a tang of Pelagianisme: there be relics of God's image in man in his corrupt, and unregenerate condition; but none of original righteousness; for this was wholly lost, and extinct; supernaturalia erepta, naturalia corrupta: however then, there be left some shadows, and resemblances of it, yet not any true remnants of it: even Arminius himself in his conference with Junius confesseth, that there be not left in us so much as any principles, or seed of spiritual virtues. Dico agnition millam quae est 〈◊〉 pietatem, justitiam illam, & 〈◊〉, de quâ Apostolus non corruptas sed sublatas esse, null áque earundem in nobis post lapsum manere principia. Fateor principia & semina virtutum moralium, quae anologiam quandam & similitudinem habent ad istas spirituales virtutes in nobis manere post lapsum, quin & ipsas morales virtutes; licet per 〈◊〉 corruptas. Haec similitudo fallere potest non accuratè inter hasce & illas spirituales virtutes discriminantem. In hâc sententiâ mea, qua statuo illa bona esse ablata, habeo praeeuntem 〈◊〉 nostrum questione. 9: his verbis: Homo se & omnem posteritatem divinis illis 〈◊〉 orbavit: Quae autem sint illa divina 〈◊〉, explicatum est quaestione sexta praecedente, nempe, 〈◊〉 & sanctitas. But what congruence this hath with other principles of Arminius I leave to be determined by his disciples. Before I take my leave of this part of the question I shall desire the Reader to take notice that, besides Henricus de Gandavo, there have been many learned Papists of the opinion, that original righteousness was natural to man in his state of integrity: so much you may see at large in Estius: [in l. 2. sent: didst 26. sect. 6.] who reckons up distinctly seventeen of their arguments: indeed they take original righteousness (in a stricter sense than we) only for the subjection of the inferior faculties unto reason; but yet even herein, they are opposite unto the generality of Papists, as well, as we. But proceed we unto the second part of the question: whether or no original righteousness were 〈◊〉 unto man in his state of innocency? And here we readily grant, that it was supernatural to man, in regard of original or 〈◊〉, for God immediately produced it, and it did not, could not flow from any principle of nature: this concession is made by Dr. Twisse in his animadversions upon the conference of Arminius with 〈◊〉, pag. 36. 37, &c: and there justified by him at large against Junius, but though this be a very plain, and evident truth, yet Arminius doth very weakly confirm it, as appears by Dr. Twisse his examination of all his arguments. But there is one argument of (t) Videris mihi non recte imaginem Dei confistentem in justitia, & 〈◊〉 à supernaturali gratiâ excludere. Licet enim illud donum homini collatum sit in creatione, & simul cum ipsa natura, ita enim 〈◊〉 pono, tamen supernaturale est, & 〈◊〉 hominis naturam excedens: quod probo ab actu regenerationis, qui est gratiae supernaturalis. Quum enim regeneratione opus sit ad illam 〈◊〉 & sanctitatem recuperandam, quae 〈◊〉 est actio supernaturalis: 〈◊〉 est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 homini initio collatam fuisse 〈◊〉 supernaturali. Armin: his, which he urgeth, not only in the place cited, but also in his Examen of Perkins, pag. 587: that merits in a special manner to be remarked, not so much for the strength, and solidity of it, as for the facetiousness of Dr. Twisse his answer to it: Arminius his argument stands thus: that which is restored unto man by the supernatural action of regeneration, was at first supernatural, and bestowed upon man by a supernatural action; but holiness, and righteousness is restored unto man by a supernatural act, to wit, regeneration, therefore it was at first supernatural in itself, and bestowed upon man by a supernatural action. We shall pass over the greatest part of (v) Sin Perkinsius 〈◊〉 non modo hac ratione naturalem esse, sed & alla, nempè tanquam ex 〈◊〉 naturae profluentem, prorsus nihil obfuisset haec ratio 〈◊〉 à regeneratione sumpta. Neque enim sequitur, quia qualitas aliqua producitur actione supernaturali in statu naturae corruptae, 〈◊〉 fuisse etiam supernaturalem in statu naturae integrae. Etenim non paucis restituit Christus sanitatem corporis actione supernaturali, nec tamen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sanitatem corporis non fuisse Adamo naturalem; Actione supernaturali restituebat aurem 〈◊〉, quam Petrus praeciderat, 〈◊〉 tamen 〈◊〉 aurem illam sive dextram, sive sinistram, non fuisse Malcho naturalem. Dr. Twisse his answer, and only pitch upon what he saith unto the major, which he invalidates by two instances. Christ restored unto many health of body, by a supernatural action, it doth not therefore follow, that health of body was not natural unto Adam before his fall: it was by a supernatural action, that he restored unto Malchus that ear, which Peter with his sword had cut off, but it doth not therefore follow that this ear was at first supernatural unto Malchus. But leaving Arminius his argument, we confess that original righteousness was supernatural unto Adam, if you respect the principle of it, and thus it was supernatural unto Adam, not only per accidens, but also per se, it neither did, nor could flow from the principles of nature. That then, which alone is w Id tamen monemus nostros non negare absolutè, 〈◊〉 fuisse justitiam originalem; non solum, comparatè ad 〈◊〉 praesentis naturae, sed etiam ratione prioris status, quia etsi natutalis 〈◊〉 quomodo diximus, supernaturals etiam sult ratione objecti. Tendebat enim 〈◊〉 illa ad 〈◊〉 supernaturalem, quâ ratione si eam supernaturalem diceret Bellarm: non contenderemus. Sed id quod in controverliam vocatur, melius ex contrario 〈◊〉 potest; quia i'll come suis, hoc molitur, ut obtineat, 〈◊〉 in natura primum creata, fuisse vitlosum & inordinatum, quod per aliam rem, quae supra naturam data 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 in ordinem cogi, & quasi fraeno coerceri. Hic est praesertim controversiae 〈◊〉, quia alioquin in multis aliis, in verbis potius quam in rebus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & controversias multiplicat. Rivet. in Genes. exerc. 7. p. 35. We say that this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 essentially required to the 〈◊〉 of nature. So that there is no state of sole and pure nature, without addition of sin or grace, as the 〈◊〉 fond imagine, for that the nature or man is such, as must 〈◊〉 be lified above itself by grace, or 〈◊〉 below itself and be in a state of sin. Field of the Church pag. 137. We say that original righteousness is said to be a supernatural quality, because it groweth not out of nature, and because it raiseth nature above itself, but that it is natural, that is, required to the integrity of nature. Neither should it seem strange to any man, 〈◊〉 a quality not 〈◊〉 out of nature, should be required necessarily for the perfecting of nature's integrity, seeing the end and object of 〈◊〉 desires, knowledge, and action, is an 〈◊〉 thing and without the compass and bowds of nature, ibid. controverted, is, whither or no original righteousness was supernatural unto Adam in his state of innocency in respect of the manner of its inhesion in, and agreement unto the nature of man? whether the nature of man, could have been created without it? Here the Papists generally aver that man might have been created in his pure naturals without original righteousness, nay that the contrary of original righteousness, concupiscence would naturally have flown, and resulted from the codition, and very constitution, or composition of his nature, and such resultancy was prevented, and stayed by the supernatural gift, or grace of original righteousness: to illustrate this their opinion, they use divers 〈◊〉, they compare original righteousness unto a rich robe, or garment, which God threw upon man, to cover his natural nakedness; so that the state of man, after the fall of Adam, differeth no more from the state of Adam, in his pure naturals, than a man that is spoiled differeth from a naked man; they farther resemble it unto a garland, set on the head of a Virgin; as also unto Sampsons' locks; for look as a garland is not necessary required unto virginity, nor the strength that lay in Sampsons' locks unto humanity, so original righteousness (say they) was no necessary requisite unto the integrity of man's nature: a Virgin may be a Virgin, though no garland be put upon her head, and when the garand is taken away her virginity remains untouched, and unblemished; 〈◊〉 had been a man, though no supernatural strength had laid in his locks, and he remained a man still, when that strength was departed from him: thus (say they) man might have been created in his pure naturals, without the addition of original righteousness, because it was not required nececessarily sor the perfecting of his nature's integrity; and therefore, when this original righteousness was taken from him he was only reduced unto the condition of pure, and sole nature, and his naturals were no ways vitiated: original righteousness was (say they) as a sovereign antedote against concupiscence, which would have been a natural disease unto man; as a golden bridle to restrain, and keep in that fierceness, rebellion, and unruliness of the inferior faculties, which otherwise would naturally have been unavoidable; it was (say they) as a precious 〈◊〉, that made bright the nature of man, and kept it from that rust, which necessarily would have grown upon a nature, so framed, and compounded, as ours was: 〈◊〉 [in lib. 2. sent. 32. 〈◊〉. 1.] out of Anselm likneth original righteousness unto the 〈◊〉 of a ship, when the rudder of a ship is wanting, or broken, how can the Pilot guide it? will be in perpetual peril of being dashed, or split upon rocks, and quicksands: thus, if man had been created in his pure naturals without original righteousness, he had been as a ship without a rudder; so that he could never have steered the vessel of his soul unto its wished end, the haven of heaven; for it would have been, in continual danger of shipwreck, by the wind of every sensual passion, and desire: thus you see how dishonourably they speak of the nature of man, which yet was the masterpiece of the creation, and made (as it were) by the consultation of the whole Trinity; God said, let us make man in our image after our likeness, Gen. 1. 26. In opposition unto this doctrine of the Papists, I shall lay down 〈◊〉 conclusions; wherein I shall wholly lay aside the term supernatural, and speak only to the thing and matter: and indeed it were heartily to be wished, that the terms natural and supernatural had never been used in this controversy: for they have brought no light unto it, but occasioned only a strife of words. The first 〈◊〉 shall be: It was hypothetically impossible for man in the state of innocency to be created with the contradictory of Original righteousness, to wit, the negation and absence of it. The second conclusion: It was 〈◊〉 impossible for man to be created with the contrary of original righteousness, concupiscence and inclination 〈◊〉 sin. To begin with the first conclusion: It was hypothetically impossible for man in the state of innocency to be created with the contradictory of original righteousness, to wit, the negation, and absence of it: of more briefly: It was hypothetically impossible for man to be created without original righteousness; I say hypothetically, in respect of Gods ordinate power, presupposing those decrees of God mentioned in the first part of the question: First, his decree to make man very good: Secondly, his decree to prescribe him so high and glorious an end, as the glorifying, and enjoyment of himself, an infinite good: Thirdly, his decree to impose upon him several laws, obedience to which might bring him unto the said end. for, without original righteousness, it was impossible for any of these decrees to be put in execution: without it impossible, that he should be made 〈◊〉 good: for what goodness is correspondent unto a rational creature, but a moral goodness, righteousness and true holiness? without it impossible, that man should obtain the end prescribed unto him. that he should perform the duties enjoined him: and it was against the justice and goodness of God, and so a gross contradiction to appoint unto man an impossible end, to impose upon man impossible commandments: Gods chalking out such an end for man to seek, implieth, that he supplied him with means for assecution hereof: his injunction of laws argueth, that he gave power and ability to yield obedience unto them: but of this already more fully, and distinctly in the first part of the question. Unto what is there said, 〈◊〉 me add what Dr Feild [in his learned book of the Church pag. 251, 252, 253.] hath, in resutation of this fiction of the Papists, that man might have been created in his pure naturals, in a state of neutrality and 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 grace or sin; his argument may briefly be thus summed up. It was impossible for the nature of man, without grace, to perform its principal actions, about its principal objects, the sirst truth, and the chiefest good; without grace 'twas impossible for man to know God as he ought, to love him as he should, amore amicitiae, with a love of friendship, for himself, and his own sake, and without such a love all a man's actions would have been sins; for they could not have been done unto the glory of God; because 'tis such a love only, that referreth man's actions unto God's glory; and that state cannot, but be a sinful state, wherein all that a man doth is sin: briefly thus, without the grace of God 'tis impossible to love God; and without the love of God all our actions will be evil and sin, and therefore à primo ad ultimum without grace all our actions will be sin; and hereupon 'twill follow, that there can be no state of nature sinless without grace; and consequently that there can be no state of pure or mere nature. For the surther clearing of this I shall lay down two 〈◊〉 which cannot reasonably be denied. First, that God decreed, that man should act rationally, that he should perform rational actions. Secondly, that all his rational actions were under the law of nature; some for their substance, as to love, sear, praise and glorify God; and others for their 〈◊〉, and other the like 〈◊〉: whether a man did eat or drink, whatsoever he did, he was to do all unto the glory of God: to deny this were to uncreature man, take away his dependence upon, and relation unto God: and from this grant, (it undeniably follows that) all a man's rational, or voluntary actions were capable of moral goodness, or badness, and consequently, that, how ever some of them might be indifferent in their general, and abstract 〈◊〉, yet considered actu exercito, as singularized, and clothed with circumstances, they were all either morally good, or evil; for moral goodness and badness are privatively opposite, and 'tis an unquestioned rule in Logic, inter privatiuè opposita non datur medium in subjecto capaci; Between privative opposites there can be no middle, either of abnegatien, or participation in a capable subject; every subject capable of privative opposites must necessarily have one, or the other: thus a sensitive creature must be either seeing, or blind; the air must be either lightsome, or dark: now if there could be no indifferency, or neutrality in the rational actions of man, but that they must all necessarily be, either good, or bad; than it was impossible there could be any such state of indifferency, and neutrality in the rational faculties of man; they must also be morally either good, or bad, holy, or sinful; and therefore the possibility of man's existence in a state of pure naturals, without grace, or sin, hath no foundation in sound reason. The second conclusion: It was absolutely impossible for man to be created with the contrary of original righteousness, concupiscence, a proneness, or inclination of all the faculties of man unto sin. This conclusion is thus confirmed: if man had been created with this concupiscence, God had been the author of it; but 'twas impossible for God to be the author of it; the Apostle John saith, it is not from the Father, but is of the world, 1 John 2. 16: we may go farther and say, it could not be from the Father, and therefore it was 〈◊〉 for man to be created with it. The Minor is thus proved it was impossible for God to be the author of sin, but concupiscence is sin, and therefore God could not be the author of it. Unto this argument we find in Bellarmine two answers. First, that God would not have been the author of this concupiscence, though man had been created with it. Secondly, that this concupiscence is not sin, and therefore, though God had been the cause of it, yet it would not have therefore followed, that he had been the cause of sin. First, that God would not have been the author of concupiscence, though man had been created with it, but it would have been besides his purpose and intention: for it would (saith he) have flown naturally from the condition of the matter of man, and so it would have been natural unto man, not as a good, gift, or ornament, of nature, but as a defect, disease, or infirmity of nature: he endeavoureth to illustrate this by the similitude of a Smith: though a Smith frame a sword of Iron, and the sword grow rusty, yet the rust is not caused by the Smith, but proceedeth, as a sequel, from the nature, or quality of the Iron, that is the matter of the sword. But this answer is, first, dissonant from the truth: secondly, repugnant unto Bellarmine's own principles. First, dissonant from the truth, and that I shall clear by three arguments. The first argument: Causa causae est causa causati in 〈◊〉 subordinatis, the cause of a cause is the cause of its effects in things essentially subordinate, but God is the cause of the nature, and matter of a man, and (by the opinion of Bellarmine) concupiscence is essential to the nature, and matter of man 〈◊〉, and a 〈◊〉, for it would naturally, and necessarily (thinks he) have resulted from the nature, and matter of man, but that it was supernaturally prevented by the gift of original righteousness, and consequently God must needs be the cause, and author of it. A second argument is: because, this concupiscence is not only in the sensitive, and inferior, but also in the rational, and superior faculties, in the understanding and will: St. Paul Coll. 2. 15: speaks of a fleshly mind, vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind, so then there is flesh in the very mind of man: the carnal mind (or the minding of the flesh) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is enmity against God, Rom. 8. 7: remarkable is that saying of Augustine, voluntas sine charitate est tota vitiosa cupiditas, without love, the will is as it were wholly turned into lust, that is, wholly depraved and defiled with lust: he thinks then, that lust might be seated in the will, nay (x) Caeterum negandum non est, etiam in parte superiore simile vitium 〈◊〉. Nam ea quoque animi 〈◊〉 prona est ad concupiscendos 〈◊〉, inanem 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 vanitates, &, 〈◊〉 nolimus, interdum parit ejusmodi desidetia. 〈◊〉 B. 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉. ad 〈◊〉. cap. 5. cum 〈◊〉 carnem concupiscere adversus spiritum, 〈◊〉 enumerans opera 〈◊〉, non solum nominavit fornicationem, 〈◊〉 & alia id 〈◊〉 sed etiam 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉, &c: quod diligenter notavit S. Augustinus lib. 14. 〈◊〉 civ. cap. 2. 3. & 4: ubid. 〈◊〉 carnem interdum accipi pro toto homine, qualis est, 〈◊〉 Dei, post lapsum Adami, & 〈◊〉 dici carnalem, qui secundum seipsum, non lecundum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 quo in explicatione Psal. 79: dicit, omne 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ex cupiditate malè inflammante, vel ex 〈◊〉 malè humiliante. Itaque concupiscentiae vitium licet praecipuè in 〈◊〉, tamen etiam in ment sedem habet. de amiss. great. & stat. pecc. l. 5. cap. 15. 〈◊〉 himself though he think that concupiscence hath its chief residence in the flesh, (by which he means the body, and the sensual powers of man) yet he withal 〈◊〉, that there is something like unto it in the superior part of the soul; for even that is prone immoderately to desire honours, vain glory, and the like vanities; and therefore Paul Gal. 5: having said; that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lusteth against 〈◊〉 spirit; he nameth, not only fornication, drunkenness, and the like carnal sins; but also idolatry, heresies, envyings, &c: which were spiritual sins, sins of the upper region of the soul: thus you see, that a great part of concupiscence is placed in the supreme, the rational faculties of man; and extended unto spiritual, and immaterial objects: and hereupon it will follow, that (at least) this part of concupiscence cannot 〈◊〉 from the condition 〈◊〉 the matter. A third argument is, because this assertion (that the resultancy of this concupiscence from the nature, and matter of man would have been besides the intention of God) strikes against, either the omniscience, or omnipotency of God: for, either God foresaw this resultancy, or not? to say, that he did not foresee it, takes away the infiniteness of his knowledge; if he foresaw it, than I demand whether he could not? or would not prevent it? to say, that he could not prevent it, denieth the infiniteness of his power; if he could, but would not prevent or stay it, than it followeth, that this resultancy was not besides, but agreeable unto his purpose, and intention. Secondly, this answer is repugnant unto Bellarmine his own principles: I shall instance in two. First, it is apparent; that he maketh this concupiscence, to be chiefly, the natural, and necessary propension of the sensitive faculties, unto their proper, and natural object: and from this I thus argue. Natural, (y) Concupiscentia vocatur à Bellarm. cap. 5. 〈◊〉 carnis ad bonum corporale, & sensibile, in quod fertur per sensum & appetitum, propensio autem rei ad suum 〈◊〉 naturale, est 〈◊〉 naturae, non desectus, non morbus, nec ex materia pendens, sed ex illa causa, quae singulis facultatibus 〈◊〉 indidit propensiones. 2. Praeter intentionem Dei non factus est 〈◊〉 more animal vivens, cum omnibus illis propensionibus quae animalis naturae conveniunt. Ames. Bell. 〈◊〉. tom. 4. pag. 11. and necessary propensions of the natural faculties of any thing, unto their natural, and proper object, cannot be besides the intention of God, the creator; for such propensions must needs be positive qualities; and of every positive being, God is the cause, and author. But now concupiscence is (by Bellarmine's discourse) the natural, and necessary propension of the sensitive faculties of man unto their proper, and natural objects: And consequently, 'tis not besides the intention of the Creator, flowing as a natural defect, or disease, only from the condition of the mould, or matter of man. A second thing in Bellarmine, with which this his answer clasheth, is his confession; that concupiscence is contrary to the nature of man [de gratiâ primi hominis cap. 7.] From hence I thus argue. (z) Adversarius expressis verbis cogitur 〈◊〉 concupi. 〈◊〉 illam 〈◊〉 naturae contrariam. Ex quo sequitur, id quod est purae naturae contrarium, idem simul secundum puram naturam naturale esse non posse, nisi quis velit, lucem & tenebras simul in 〈◊〉 ponere, & aliquid esse, & non esse contra 〈◊〉 notiones asserere. Qui ergo concessit, cum natura pura concupiscentiam carnis & sensuum 〈◊〉, necessario 〈◊〉 debet, si sibi 〈◊〉 velit, concupiscentiam naturalem esse, seu ex puris naturae principiis emanantem, & contra concedere, 〈◊〉 illam naturae congruam, quae rebellionem tollendo, naturam perfecit, naturalem 〈◊〉, quod nos asserimus. Est ergo in verbis Bellarmini foeda contradictio, dum unam & eandem concupiscentiam, ratione unius & ejusdem naturae, naturalem simul & naturae contrariam dicit. Omne enim 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, vel quod 〈◊〉 ex naturae principiis, naturae non contrarium, sed consentaneum est; vicissim autem, quod contrarium, hoc naturale non est. Rivet. in Genes. Exerc. 7. pag. 35. Nothing, that is against the nature of man can 〈◊〉 naturally, and necessarily from the principles of his nature. But Bellarmine confesseth that this concupiscence is against the nature of man; And therefore he contradicts himself, when he affirmeth, that it results from the principles of man's nature, the condition of his matter. As for the similitude (of the Smith, and the Iron sword) that will be nothing unto the purpose: for First, no Smith whatsoever can make Iron, that is the matter of a sword, but God alone is the author of the matter of man, and consequently is the cause of all the natural sequels thereof. Secondly, a Smith, if he could, would frame such a sword as might not be subject or inclined unto rust, but it is not a thing in his power, for he cannot alter the nature of Iron, so that, if he will produce an Iron sword, it will be liable unto rust: The Papists seem to ascribe such an impotency unto God himself; for they suppose all along, that God cannot make man to be compounded of a reasonable soul, and sensible matter, but that, (besides the intention of God) the natural, and necessary result of such a composition will, (without supernatural prevention,) be a headlong inclination unto sensible objects, against the dictates of right reason: but the falsehood of this supposition I shall anon at large detect. A second answer of Bellarmin's (which we frequently sinned also in Dr. Taylor,) is, that this concupiscence is not a sin, but only a disease, languer, infirmity, or 〈◊〉 of nature, and therefore, though God had been the cause of it, it would not yet have followed, that God was the author of sin. Unto this I shall oppose the clear testimony of Paul, who (in 6, 7, 8. chapters of his Epistle unto the Roman's) calls it sin fourteen times, as Bishop Davenant, and Dr. Francis White (after Bishop of Ely) calculate the places. But unto all these places Bellarmine replieth, (in which reply he is seconded by Dr. Taylor) that concupiscence is called sin, by the Apostle, not properly and formally, but 〈◊〉, because it is the effect, and cause of sin, the effect of Adam's first sin, and the cause of our sin. But, that concupiscence is properly and formally a sin, I shall prove against both Bellarmine, (and his confident second Dr. Taylor) from its influence, subject, adjuncts, opposites. First, from its influence, mediate, and immediate. First, from its mediate influence: it is the cause of all actual sin whatsoever, whensoever we are tempted to any sin, we are enticed, and drawn away by our own lust, this is the mother that conceiveth and bringeth forth all sin, Jam. 1. 14, 15: and doubtless the daughter resembleth the mother, the cause and the effect have the same nature: that which as a habit or quality is the cause of sin, must needs be sin too; but concupiscence, or the original proneness of our natures unto sin is the root of all sin; and therefore (to use the Apostles expression) 'tis exceeding sinful, Rom. 7. 13: for, nil dat, quod non habet vel formalitèr vel eminenter: But, for confirmation of this argument, we have the testimony of him, who is the truth itself, Mat. 7. 17, 18. A corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit, a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit; now concupiscence, or an inclination unto sin, bringeth no fruit, but that which is morally evil, and corrupt; and therefore 'tis a tree morally evil, and corrupt: but this argument I shall insist on more fully hereafter in opening, Jam. 1. 14, 15. Secondly, from its immediate influence: it naturally, and directly produceth, as it's immediate effects, those first motions unto sin, which are without consent; and therefore, if we can prove these first motions unto sin to be sin, our adversaries will confess, that concupiscence is sin also: now, that they are sin, may be concluded from the Apostles description of sin, 1 〈◊〉 3. 4. Sin is the transgression of the law; for the first motions unto sin trespass against that, which our Saviour calls the first, and great commandment, thou shalt love the Lord with all thy soul, might, mind and strength; for if sin, God's greatest enemy, hath, any motions, or inclinations of the soul, any thoughts of the mind, God is not loved with all our soul, and mind; and the soul is faulty, when 'tis divided betwixt God, and sin: their heart is divided (saith the Prophet) now shall they be found faulty, Hosea 10. 2. This argument Dr. Abbot Bishop of Salisbary (brings in his defence of Mr. Perkins his reformed Catholic against Dr. Bishop, pag. 187. 188.) He erreth (saith he) in that be maketh Original 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 only in the integrity of the will, and the form of sin to stand only in the aversion of the will from God, by the 〈◊〉 of the same original justice, whereas original justice was in truth the integrity of all the parts of 〈◊〉, not subjecting the 〈◊〉 to the mind, and the mind to God, but 〈◊〉 whole man to God, the image whereof is set forth unto us in the commandment, (a) Mar. 〈◊〉. 30. Luk. 10. 27. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy mind, with all thy soul, with all thy thoughts and strength. The form of sin therefore, is not only in the aversion of the will, but in the aversion of any part, or power, or faculty of the soul: if in any of these there be a declining from the law of God, it is the sin of man. Now (b) Cum est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concupiscentiae carnalis quod vel continendo 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 tota anima diligitur Deus. August. de perfect. justit. Rat. 17. 〈◊〉 so long as there is any matter of concupiscence to be yet 〈◊〉 and restrained, God cannot be loved with all the soul (for how can 〈◊〉 have all the soul, so long as concupiscence hath any part?) therefore in the 〈◊〉 of any matter of concupiscence, there is sin; because it is sin, when either there is not love at all, or it is less than it should be, when it is not with all the soul. But further; as these first motions, and agitations of concupiscence are virtually, and implyedly contrary unto our Saviour's summary, of all the commandments, of the first table: so they are particularly and, expressly forbidden by the last commandment of the second table, the tenth commandment that God here dealeth with the first motions, and thoughts of the heart is the sense of Bishop Andrew's upon the commandments: and Dr. Taylor cannot say, that he was a Calvinist, or Presbyterian. But this his exposition hath for it very good 〈◊〉; because those motions unto sin, which are consented to, are forbidden in the several commandments, as appeareth by our Saviour's gloss upon the seventh commandment, Matth. 5. 28. Now, if they be forbidden in the several commandments, 'tis unlikely, that there should be allotted, for the prohibition of them, a distinct commandment, considering how short a breviary of man's duty the 〈◊〉 is: Indeed Ames rightly holdeth, that the first motions unto unjustice are here only expressly forbidden; but, from the forbidding of them, we may conclude, by way of proportion, the prohibition also of the first motions, which are against the duties of religion, and 〈◊〉 commanded in the first table. But, though the first motions of concupiscence had not been forbidden by any written law, yet 'tis sufficient to make them sin, that they are repugnant unto the light of right reason, for this is truly, properly, and univocally the law of God, the law of nature written in the hearts of all men, and, as for the repugnancy of the first motions of concupiscence unto right reason, it cannot be denied, if we instance in those, which are in the sensitive powers of man against the dominion of his mind: and so much may be gathered from what Aquinas acknowledgeth concerning concupiscence itself [part. 3. quaest. 15. art. 2.] Ad rationem fomitis, inquit, pertinet inclinatio sensualis appetitus, in id 〈◊〉 est contra rationem, and again afterwards [ad 1 m] ratio somitis consistit in resistentiâ sensualis appetitus ad rationem; and [add 2 m] foams peccati importat concupiscentiam delectabilium praeter ordinem rationis. This reason is urged by Augustine, to prove concupiscence to be, not only a punishment and cause of sin, but also sin itself: the concupiscence of the flesh, against which the good spirit striveth, is a sin (saith he) quia inest illi inobedientia contra dominatum mentis, by reason there's in it disobedience against the dominion of the mind. A second argument, to prove that concupiscence is a sin, and not a sinless infirmity, is taken from the subject of it: It is only found in sinful men, such as are descended from Adam in an ordinary way of natural generation: Hence now I thus reason. All sinless infirmities, so they were general unto our nature, and not personal, were found in the humanity of Christ, for he was made like unto us in all things, sin alone accepted. But concupiscence was not in the humanity of Christ, (as is confessed by the generality of Papists.) And therefore 'tis not a sinless, and natural, but a moral, and sinful infirmity. Unto the Major the Papists give an answer (I confess) which I have upon another occasion, replied unto in my treatise of the incarnation, pag. 103. 104. The Minor Dr. Taylor seems to deny [in his further explication of original sin, pag. 494.] his words I shall transcribe, and then give what reason I have for my suspicion: If concupiscence, which is in every man's nature, be a sin, it is certain Christ had no concupiscence or natural desires, for he had no sin. But if he had no concupiscence, or natural desires how he should be a man, or how capable of law, or how he should serve God with choice, where there could be no potentia ad oppositum, I think will be very hrd to 〈◊〉 understood: Christ felt all our infirmities, yet without sin: All our infirmities are the effects of the sin of Adam, and part of that which we call original sin, therefore all these our infirmities which Christ felt, as in him they were for ever without sin, so long as they are only natural, and unconsented to, must be in us without sin: for whatsoever is naturally in us is naturally in him; but a man is not a man without natural desires, therefore these were in him, in him without sin: and therefore so in us, without sin I mean, properly, really, and formally. Here, I expect to be cold, that the Dr hath explicated concupiscence by natural desires: But now I demand, whether, by natural desires, he understand the desires of the sensitive appetite after meat, drink, and and the like? if he doth, then, he speaks nothing to the purpose, but fights with his own shadow; for those whom he opposeth, 〈◊〉 and Calvinists hold such desires to be lawful, and indifferent, and never affirm, that they were in themselves sin, unless vitiated by circumstances: but, to prevent his shifting, and to sift out his meaning, I shall propound unto him this following Dilemma: either he speaks of concupiscence in that sense it is understood by Protestants and Papists in this controversy, or not. If not; then he playeth the egregious 〈◊〉, and runs away 〈◊〉 the question; and whither such a trifler be meet to reform the Divinity of Christendom, let any man judge. If he say, that he takes concupiscence in such a sense as Papists and Protestants understand it in the controversy, than I shall assume the boldness to tell him, that to say, that it was in Christ, is an assertion guilty of 〈◊〉 falsehood, and palpable blasphemy; for both sides take this concupiscence to be a proneness, or inclination unto sin, (as will be confessed by every one that knows any thing in the controversy:) and that a proneness, or inclination unto sin was in Christ's humanity is a proposition apparently, not only false, but also blasphemous against the purity, and persection of that holy one of God: this I shall evince by two arguments. First, an inclination unto sin could not be where there was not so much as a possibility of sinning. But, in Christ's humanity, there was not so much as a possibility of sinning. Therefore much less an inclination unto sin. This is one of the arguments reckoned up by Estius, (c) Christus potuit assumere naturam humanam in 〈◊〉 naturalibus; non potuit autem assumere concupiscentiam, rebellionem 〈◊〉 contra spiritum, pronitatem peccandi, difficultatem bonae voluntatis. Sic enim sequeretur eum peccare 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pronitas 〈◊〉 suppoint posse peccare, in lib. 2. sent. dist. 25. which those dissenters from the usual, and general opinion, of Papists, and Schoolmen, which he speaks of, do allege. A second argument, an inclination unto sin in any degree could not be in that wherein there was a total and utter aversen sse from sin in the highest degree, (for of contraries, if one be in the highest and most intense degree, it is not consistent in the same subject with its fellow contrary, so much as in a remiss degree:) But, in Christ's humanity, there was an utter and total averseness from sin in the highest degree, for there dwelled in him an all-fulness of grace, Col. 1. 19 Joh. 1. 14. And therefore there could not be in Christ's humanity an inclnatination unto sin in any the least degree, much less such an impetuous inclination unto sin, as Papists affirm concupiscence to be. A third principal argument is taken from the adjuncts of concupiscence, ab adjunctis occupatis: it is to be crucified, destroyed, and mortified, Gal. 5. 24. Rom. 6. 6. to be hated, as being hateful, not only unto good men, butunto God himself. But, nothing is to be thus dealt with, but sin, Concupiscence therefore is sin. The fourth principal argument is drawn from the opposites of concupiscence: First, the Law of God: Secondly, the grace of God in general: Thirdly, the love of God in particular. First, the Law of God: it warreth against the law of the mind, Rom. 7. 23: that is, (as Estius upon the place) adversus legem Dei, against the Law of God in which Paul 〈◊〉 after the inward man, vers. 22. Est enim (inquit) eadem lex Dei & lex mentis, sicut è diverso eadem est lex peccati & membrorum. Ex his verbis rectè colligitur concupiscentiam etiam quae in 〈◊〉 est, repugnare & contrariam esse legi Dei, quia ad instar legis ad ea quae legi divinae contraria sunt, impellit: the law of God, and the law of the mind are one, and the same thing: as one the other side the law of sin, and the law of the members: from these words than it may rightly be gathered, that even that concupiscence, which is in the regenerate, is repugnant, and contrary to the law of God, because, as a law, it impelleth unto those things, which are contrary unto the divine law. Unto this place let me add also Ro: 8. 7: the carnal mind, or the minding of the flesh, or the wisdom of the flesh, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is enmity against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be: the putting of the abstract for the concrete, enmity for enemy signifieth, that 'tis a very grand enemy unto God; and 'tis an enemy unto God only, because it is opposed unto his law, and revealed will: suppose, it be not a branch of concupiscence, or the flesh, but only an affect or fruit thereof, an actual sin (as Bellarmine determineth) yet; first no probable reason can be given, why 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the minding of the flesh should be so restrained as to exclude the first motions of the flesh, or concupiscence; and if they be enmity against God, then so also is 〈◊〉 original, the flesh or 〈◊〉 too. Secondly, whatsoever is meant by this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it proceedeth from the flesh, & it deriveth from the flesh, as it's being, so it's enmity against God, ti fighteth against God under the colours of the flesh, which (in this war against God) heads all actual sins whatsoever as their General: now from the enmity of the flesh (or concupiscence) unto God, we may infer its opposition unto the law of God, and the law of God is holy, just, and good. Rom. 7. 12: and therefore, that which is opposed unto it, must needs be naught, bad, and sinful. Unto this Gregory de Valentia [comment. theol: disp. 6. quaest. 12. punct. 1.] answereth, by distinguishing concerning a twofold repugnancy unto the law of God, one effective, and another formal concupiscence (saith he) is repugnant unto, the divine law effectively, as it inclineth unto sin, not 〈◊〉, as if that perfection of which it is a privation, were commanded in the law of God. But, this is refuted by the tenth commandment, wherein, the first motions unto sin are prohibited, and consequently concupiscence, the root of them: unto this I might add in the next place, that, this answer may be retorted in an argument, thus: that, which is repugnant unto God's law effectively, is also repugnant thereunto formally, that, which inclineth to disobey the law of God, is formally opposite thereunto (as I shall hereafter at large manifest:) But thus doth concupiscence (by even the confession of our adversaries,) and therefore 'tis opposed thereunto formally, as a deviation therefrom, and a transgression thereof. A second opposite of it is the grace of God in general: the flesh and the spirit (saith the Apostle) are contrary the one unto the 〈◊〉, Gal: 5. 17: where, by spirit, is understood the inherent and habitual grace, and by flesh, the concupiscence of a regenerate man, the corruption of his nature: the contrariety, of these two principles, is especially manifested by their actings one against another in the regenerate, for in them, and in them only, the flesh lusteth against the spirit,. and the spirit against the flesh, Gal. 5. 17: now nothing can be contrary to the spirit, and grace, but that which is properly, really, and formally a sin. Lastly, 'tis contrary unto the grace, or virtue of the love of God in particular. That, which inclineth the soul unto inordinate, and immoderate love of the creature, is contrary unto the love of God: (for where the creature is loved inordinately, God is not loved with all the soul, heart, mind, and strength.) But now, concupiscence inclineth, and disposeth the soul unto an (d) Inordinatio 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 virium 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mordinatio 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 potest dici 〈◊〉. Aquinas. 1 2ae. q. 8 2. a. 3. inordinate, and immoderate love of the creature, to wit, as it's sovereign end: (for what is it, but an habitual conversion of the soul from the enjoyment of an immutable God, unto the fruition of mutable goods? what is it, but an unbridled lust of committing fornication with the creature? which is done, when the creature is idolised, and placed in God's room, as it is, whensoever it is loved, either above God, or in an equality with him.) By this than it undeniably followeth, that concupiscence is contrary unto the grace, and virtue of the love of God; and abateth, and diminisheth of its strength, and vigour; and consequently is sin. That, which hath hitherto been said against the Popish opinion, concerning the possibility of man's creation with concupiscence, will serve à fortiori, for resutation of the Socinians, and Dr Taylor, who, outstripping the generality of the Papists, maintain; that concupiscence was actually in Adam before his fall by the creation, and as natural unto him, as the 〈◊〉 of hunger and thirst: concupiscence, you have heard, is sin; and therefore this is a downright blasphemy, making God to be the author of sin; and besides, it apertly contradicts what Moses speaketh of God's complacnecy in all the works of his creation, Gen 1. 31: and God saw every thing, that he had made, and behold it was very good, for, if man was created with concupiscence, he was made very defective, imperfect, and miserable; indeed the most miserable of all creatures, unable to reach his natural end; to discharge acceptably any part of that duty, which even the law of nature exacted of him; and to answer (in any measure) chose great, and high relations, which God had put upon him: he had a law in his members warring against the law of his mind; so that he might with a great deal of justice, pour out the pitiful complaint of Paul, Rom. 7. 24: oh wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? If Dr Taylor shall, in the behalf of himself, stoop so low, as to make any reply unto what I have said, I shall not decline him, and do assure him that he shall have very fair play from me, as 〈◊〉 words, and as hard arguments as I can possibly give him; only one thing I shall entreat of him, that he would dispute, and not declare against my opinion; and this request will not be thought unreasonable, if it be considered, that, in his controversial writings, his florid, and Rhetorical language doth disguise, and hide, the feebleness of his argumentation, with his ordinary readers. But to return unto Bellarmine: the most considerable argument that he hath, to prove that concupiscence was natural, and would have been in man, 〈◊〉 he had been created in his pure naturals, is taken from the composition of man's nature; for hence (he thinks) it 〈◊〉 loweth, that naturally there would have been a rebellion, and a repugnancy of the sensitive faculties against the rational: but let us hear his own words. Naturale est corpori animali sensu, & appetitu praedito concupiscere bonum sensibile: naturale est spiritui rationali, concupiscere bonum spirituale, quare si siat una natura ex spiritu rationali, & corpore animali conflata, naturale erit illi habere diveras, & inter se pugnantes propensiones. Quod igitur primi parentes nostri ante peccatum pugnâ ist â diversarum appetitionum carerent, domum erat supernaturale, non conditio naturalis. [de great: prim: hom: cap 6.] it is natural unto a sensible body endued with sense, and a sensitive appetite to covet a sensual good; and 'tis as natural unto a rational spirit to desire a spiritual good; therefore if one nature be compounded of a reasonable soul, a spirit, and a sensitive body, it will be natural unto it to have different, and repugnant propensions, the sensual appetite naturally would have rebelled against the rational. The usual answer to this objection is very solid, and rational, unto which I shall 〈◊〉 this one thing, that the sensitive faculties in man are rational, though not formally yet by participation, as being capable of the conduct, and government of reason. This being premised, the answer is, that, before the fall, all the motions of the sensitive faculties were subordinate, obedient, and agreeable unto reason. there might then be a diversity, but there could be no contrariety, or repugnancy betwixt the rational and sensitive appetites, for, all desires against reason are unnatural, against the very law of nature. Whereupon (c) Quia inquit in homine concupiscibilis naturaliter regitur ratione, in tantum concupiscere est homi ni naturale, in quantum est secundum rationis ordinem: concupiscentia autem quae transcendit 〈◊〉 rationis, inest homini 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Aquinas [12ae. q. 82 a. 3 ad 〈◊〉.] confesseth, that concupiscence is against the nature of man, so far as 'tis against the reason of man, such a concupiscence therefore cannot be the sequel of man's nature, as it came first out of God's hands. Suarez in his Metaphysics [disp. 44. sect. 1. n. 13.] hath a dictinction concerning the sensitive appetite, that will be a full and formal answer unto the present objection, Appetitus sensitivus hominis ex vi sui generis naturaliter inclinatur ad sensibilia, & delictabilia, tamen ex uj conjunctionis & emanationis ex animâ rationali habet inclinationem ad obediendum rationi, & 〈◊〉 appetendum ipsamet bona sensibilia, non tantum quatenus 〈◊〉 aut 〈◊〉 commoda, sed maximè quatonus simpliciter bona homini existimantur: to make application of this unto our present purpose; the sensitive appetite in man might be considered ex vi gen ris, or ex vi conjunctionis & emanationis ex animâ rationali; in regard of its kind; or in regard of its conjunction with, or emanation from the reasonable soul: we are here to speak of the sensitive appetite, in the first man, not as it is considered only in regard of its kind, or 〈◊〉 nature; for so it was common unto beasts, as well as man, and so inclined unto a most intense desire of things sensual; because as Scotus [lib. 2. sent. dist. 29. q. 1.) naturale est unicuique appetitui 〈◊〉 in suum appetibile, & si est appetitus non liber, naturale est 〈◊〉 sum ferri quantum potest: quia sicut talis appetitus secundum Damas. 24. ducitur & non est in potestate suaejus actus, quin 〈◊〉 quantum potest; as it is natural unto every appetite to be carried unto its object; so 'tis, unto that appetite, which is not free, to be carried as highly, and intensely as it is possible; so that, as its act, an lusting is not in its power, so neither is the intention thereof. But we are to consider it in regard of its conjunction with and 〈◊〉 from the reasonable soul; and 'twas rational, and free (as is noted before) though not formally, yet participative, as being under the guidance of reason; and so, in the first man before his fall, it was inclined only regularly, and orderly unto the desire of things sensual with subordination unto the dictates of right reason, and such motions of the will, as were suitable unto right reason: now this I shall not magisterially dictate, but make good by two reasons. The first reason I have 〈◊〉 of Ames (Bellarm. enerv. l. 4. pag. 8. Cum unio inquit naturae, ex spiritu rationali & corpore naturali, facta sit modo perfecto subordinationem infert unius propensionis ad alteram, quae pugnam omnem excludit. The union, betwixt the body, and the soul of man, was perfect; and therefore inferred a subordination of the propensions, and operations of the body unto the soul; and subordinatorum nulla est pugna, subordination excludes all opposition: this argument strikes chiefly against such as make the body to be the proper subject of the sensitive powers. But there be some (as you may see 〈◊〉 Metaphys. lib. 2. cap. 5. tit. 6. art. 1.] who in man make all sensitive powers to be seated in the soul; and unto them too this argument may be applied; the conjunction betwixt the sensitive, and rational faculties in the same soul? supposing them to be both there (which now it is not pertinent to dispute) was a most perfect, and orderly conjunction, made by God, the author of all good order, who abhorreth all ataxy, and confusion; and order still requireth a subjection of those things, or persons, that are inferior unto those, which are their superiors, the sensitive faculties therefore being the more ignoble, were, by God, who made man, subjected unto the rational; and they never had rebelled, if man by his fall had not perturbed this order: indeed we may now apply, unto the powers of lapsed man, that of Solomon, Eccles. 10. 7. I have 〈◊〉 servants upon horses, and Princes walking as servants upon the earth: those powers, which by the law of creation were servants, made to serve, and obey, have the throne, and supremacy in the soul; and those, unto which God gave the regency, are dethroned, and become servile; but it was impossible for any such disorder or confusion to be in the soul of man by creation; there could not then but be a most perfect. sweet, and blessed harmony betwixt all man's parts, and powers; without any the least clashing, or disagreement; for otherwise how could man be made, as Solomon saith he was, straight, or upright, Eccles. 7. 29. A second reason I have borrowed of Tilenus (f) Atqui cogitari debebant, formae specificae, cujusmodi est anima rationalis in homine, duplices esse operationes, 〈◊〉 tum proprias, ipsa habet, & exerit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quas non habet 〈◊〉 generalis, cujusmodi in 〈◊〉 mine est 〈◊〉 vegitans, & sentiens: tum etiam coarctat, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 modum revocat, & restring it operationes formae generalis, suaeque 〈◊〉 non modo congruentes, sed edam propias 〈◊〉. Sicut igitur anima vegetans, quae 〈◊〉, & bestiis & hominibus est communis, 〈◊〉 coarctatur in homine, ut ejus operatio non nisi humana sit, ac propterea homo non instar 〈◊〉 vel pecudiscreseat, 〈◊〉, gignat: sed humano 〈◊〉 agate. Ita & 〈◊〉, quae 〈◊〉 & hominibus est 〈◊〉, per rationalem, quae specifica est in homine, ita coarctatur & 〈◊〉, ut. ex natura humana, quamdiu illa incorrupta, non 〈◊〉 secundum rationem, qui 〈◊〉 humanus est modus, appetat & concupiscat. [syntag. pag. 1. cap. 33. s. 40.] the specifical form of man, his reasonable soul, doth so limit, determine, and restrain his general forms, vegetative, and sensitive, as that it makes their operations, not only agreeable, but proper unto man; it maketh the operations of the vegetative soul, which of themselves are common unto men with plants, and beasts so proper unto man, as that they are in man after a sort only humane; and therefore man groweth, and increaseth, not as a tree or beast, but after a humane way; even so also it maketh the operations of the sensitive soul, which are common unto men with beasts, proper and peculiar unto man; so that, whilst man's nature was uncorrupted, he naturally coveted sensual, and corporeal things, not after a brutish, but humane manner; that is conformably unto right reason: his nature then, as 'twas created by God, (for so you must still understand me) was without any repugnancy between his sensual; and rational appetites. As for the other objections of Bellarmine I shall wholly pass them over; because, some of them come not nigh the question as stated by me; others of them are trivial, and receive an easy solution, and unto all of them the Reader may find sufficient answers in Ames, Rivet, Gerard, Maccovius, and other writers upon popish controversies. It may now be expected, that I should make some application of this point, and in particular, that I should show how far we are to be humbled for Original sin, whose formale is the privation or want of original Righteousness; and I had prepared a great deal of matter upon this subject, but shall now wholly lay it aside; because I am happily prevented by the learned, and elaborate work of Mr. Anthony Burgess concerning original sin, whither I shall refer the Reader, and all that I shall do more, shall be to annex a brief exposition, and application of some few scriptures, that conduce to this purpose. Jam. 1. 14, 15. But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin: and sin when it is finished, bringeth 〈◊〉 death. IN the foregoing verse the Apostle James denyeth God to be the author of temptation unto sin, in verse (the 15.) he opposeth unto this denial an affirmation, that man himself is the cause thereof; and this Antithesis is denoted by the particle (but.) There is no doubt can be made, but that lust is here taken in an ill sense; but even so it hath a twofold acception, it signifieth either the habit, or the act. Habitual lust again is twofold, either original, or acquired and contracted. 1. Lust is not here taken for the act of lust; because actions are here ascribed unto it [to draw, entice, conceive, bring forth,] it draweth 〈◊〉 to sin, eonceiveth, bringeth forth sin; and, actionis non est actio, actions are better and more fitly ascribed to an habit, than to an act. 2. Lust is not here 〈◊〉 for contracted, and acquired habitual lust; because the lust here spoken of, is the cause of all temptations into sin whatsoever: Every man, whensoever he is tempted into sin, he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed, and men may be tempted, sometimes into some sins, not by any contracted and acquired habits of lust, as is plain, in the temptation of Noah into drunkenness; of Lot into both drunkenness, and incest; 〈◊〉 Peter into a cowardly denial of his Master, and Saviour. The lust then, which is the Theme that the Apostle James here treats of, is that, which is called original sin. Aquinas 1 a. 2ae. q. 82. a. 3. Well observeth that there be two things considerable in original sin, the formale, and the materiale of it. 1. The formale, and that is nothing else but the privation and want of original righteousness. 2. The materiale, is an inordinate conversion, or inclination of man's faculties, especially of his two appetites rational and sensual unto the creature, and so it is called lust, or concupiscence which saith Cornelius Jansenius [in his Augustinus, Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 7.] is, nihil aliud quam pondus habituale quo animus inclinatur ad sruendum, creaturis, 〈◊〉, ut Augustinus loquitur, rebus, 〈◊〉, it is as it were an habitual weight whereby the soul is inclined and carried downwards unto the fruition of the creatures as it's supreme end. Concerning this original lust we have here remarkable. 1. The propriety of its inherence, his own lust. 2. The force of its influence, it tempteth every man unto 〈◊〉, etc. 1. The propriety of its inherence [by his own lust,] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉:] indeed, original lust is one and the same specifically for sort or kind in all men; unto which some apply that of Solomon, Prov. 27. 19 As in water face answereth to face; so the heart of man to man; but yet every man hath his own particular, several, origiginall lust numerically different from that of others: even as the reasonable soul, though it be the same for kind in all men, yet every man hath his own soul, a soul individually distinct from that of others; (it is Laurentius his illustration upon the place.) Thus Paul appropriates unto himself the body of sin, which is the same with this lust. I keep under my body, 1 Cor. 9 27. This appropriation of original lust, or the corruption of man's nature unto our own selves will more affect, and humble us; than to 〈◊〉 upon a general, and abstract consideration thereof: and hence is it that David singleth out in his confession the iniquity, and sin of his own conception, Psal. 51. 5. Behold (saith he) I was 〈◊〉 in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me. He doth confess, not only that there was such a sin, but also that he himself was defiled therewith: besides this Epithet [own, or proper] may be added to prevent men, excusing of their sins by charging them upon the temptations of other men's lust, who have drawn or enticed them. This is a thing very usual, and therefore the Apostle adviseth to resolve, all temptations into sin into our own lust, the lust in our own bosoms: Satan and the world may tempt 〈◊〉 sin; but whensoever any man is tempted into sin, he is drawn away, and enticed of his own lust. 2. We have here the force of its influence [it tempteth, draweth, 〈◊〉 unto sin, conceiveth, bringeth forth sin, etc.] Here we have 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉, secondly, the branches, and thirdly, the degrees of this influence. 1. The extent of it in regard of its subject. Every man is tempted by his own lust: every man, except he that was God-man; who had God for his Father, and a Virgin for his mother; that holy thing which was borne of the blessed Virgin Mary, and was called the Son of God, Luk. 1. 35. 2. Here are the branches of this influence, it [draweth and enticeth unto sin:] these words may be understood either in regard of the parts in sin unto which it tempteth, or of the ways by which it tempteth. 1. Of the parts which are in sin unto which it tempteth: There are two parts as it were in every sin, and aversion from good, and a conversion unto evil: Now unto both these lust tempt's; it draweth from that which is good, and enticeth unto that which is evil; it draweth, ab incommutabili bono, and enticeth, ad commutabile bonum, it draweth from God, man's chief end, and enticeth to the sinful love and adulterous embraces of the creature, it inclineth the soul to forsake the fountain of living waters, to hew out unto itself Cisterns, broken 〈◊〉, that will 〈◊〉 no water, Jer. 2. 13. 2. The words may signify the several ways, or means by which every man's own lust tempteth him unto sin: it draweth by the importunity and impetuosity of its inclination unto unlawful objects; it enticeth, and allureth by 〈◊〉 plausibility of such objects; it draweth as a tyrant, and enticeth as a harlot. There are in the temptations of lust (as Bishop Andrew's observeth on the tenth Commandment) uncus, and esca, a hook, and a bait, it draweth as a hook, and enticeth as a bait: The Metaphor (g) Metaphorà 〈◊〉 à piscibus qui escâ ex hamo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 oblectantes 〈◊〉 capiuntur. Ad eundem modum inescantur homines illecebris quibusdam à concupiscentiâ suâ, quae 〈◊〉 in magna & multiplicia 〈◊〉 rapit dum oblatam sibi voluptatem, bonúmque solum 〈◊〉 persequuntur. Dia bolus piscator est, ho no piscis, mundus piscina, peccatum hamus, bona 〈◊〉 escae, & illecebrae illae sunt, quibus 〈◊〉 capitur. Tuk. in 〈◊〉. is taken from fishermen, who make use of both; they draw the fishes by the hook, and entice them by the bait. Concupiscence deals with us, as Joseph's Mistress with him, she enticed him to lie with her, she spoke to him day by day; and then she attempted to draw him to her, and she caught him by his garment, saying, lie with me, Gen. 39 v. 7, 10, 12. 3. We have the degrees of this influence of lust: and they may be reduced unto three heads; it had an influence upon, first, the production, secondly, the consummation, and thirdly, the punishment of sin. 1. Upon the production of sin; and that is, either inward, or outward: first inward, and that is twofold; first, the first motions unto sin, it draweth and 〈◊〉, secondly, consent unto such motions, lust when it hath conceived. 2. It hath an influence; secondly as upon the inward conception, so also upon the outward birth or production of sin, Lust bringeth forth sin. Next it hath an influence upon. 2. The Consummation of sin; Lust when it is finished. 3. And lastly upon the punishment of sin. Sin 〈◊〉 it is finished bringeth forth death. But, to lay aside the curiosity of division, we shall go over these gradations in the influence of lust, in order as they lie in the words, without taking notice of any subversions. First, it draweth and enticeth unto sin: by which may be meant the first motions, suggestions, agitations, and (as it were) titillations of lust before consented to. Secondly, lust when it conceiveth; Conception (say Physicians) is never but with some kind of consent of both parties; by the conception of lust therefore, is understood a consent unto its motions, either consensus in 〈◊〉, or consensus in actum, as Aquinas distinguisheth, 1 a. 2ae. q. 74. a. 7. 8: a consent of delight, or a consent of resolution. 1. A Consent of delight; when a man takes 〈◊〉 in the very thoughts, and apprehensions of the committing such a sin; and accordingly desireth conditionally to commit it, provided, that all obstacles were removed; thus many a rank lecher neighs after his neighbours wife, though he dare not outwardly attempt her chastity. Omnia si claudas intus adulter erit. His delights and desires, unto which he dares give no vent, will render him an adulterer in the sight of heaven. 2. A consent of 〈◊〉; an effectual purpose to commit sin, which yet may prove abortive, or miscarry, and be hindered from execution: the Children may come to the birth, and there may not be strength to bring forth, Esay. 37. 3. Psal. 21. 11. 3. A third degree in the influence of lust is, that it bringeth forth sin: that is, sin eminently, visibly, and manifestly such; the outward act of sin: thus sin is also taken, Gen. 20. vers. 6. I withheld thee, saith God to Abimelech, from sinning against 〈◊〉; to wit, by the gross and outward act of adultery; for there is no question, but that he sinned inwardly 〈◊〉 his desire, and purpose to 〈◊〉 Sarah: that here [by the bringing forth of sin] is meant the external perpetration of sin, either by word, or deed, I shall evince by two reasons. 1. Because in the inward conception of sin, by sinful delights, desires, and purposes, sin is brought forth in the eyes of God, Matth. 5. 28. I say unto you, (saith our Saulour,) that whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after 〈◊〉, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart. In conformity unto this it is, that the Schoolmen make the outward act of sin to add nothing per se, and properly unto the intensive badness of the inward, perfect, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 commit it: In good works God accepts the will for the deed 2 Cor. 8. 12. Heb. 11. 17: and therefore, (by the rule of contraries) he hates in evil works a full purpose to commit it, as much as he doth the outward commission of it: now the bringing forth of sin is here distinguished from the conception of it, & therefore (seeing in the very conception of sin, sin is brought forth before the eyes of God,) therefore by the bringing of sin is meant the bringing forth of it forth into external act, as it were before the eyes of men; and our most secret words and deeds may be said to be brought forth before men; because, the former are audible, though there be actually no auditors, and the latter visible though there be actually no spectators: even as a child may be 〈◊〉 to be brought forth, that hath no witness of its birth besides the mother. 2. Secondly, this sense would be most agreeable unto the Metaphor that is here used, for lust is here compared unto a teeming mother, now a mother conceiveth inwardly in her womb, and bringeth forth the fruit; of her womb out of her body into the world semblably, the conception of sin is inward by delights, desires, and purposes of the 〈◊〉, the birth of it is outward by words and deeds. The two last steps in the progress of sins influence, is the consummation of sin, and its production of death: sin when 'tis finished brings forth death: upon the exposition of which words, before I enter, I shall premise the several acceptions of each term. First, sin may be said to be finished either 〈◊〉 in itself, or else 〈◊〉 by extrinsecall denomination. 1. Intrinsically in itself: and that is, either in regard of the commission of it, when 'tis outwardly committed; or else in respect of impenitency for it, when 'tis continued in without repentance. 2. Extrinsecally, by extrinsecall denomination, from God's decree of permitting it, when one hath sinned so far, and so much, as God hath decreed to suffer him. 2. Death is taken, either for the inchoation of the spiritual death 〈◊〉 the soul, here in this life, or for the consummation of it, eternal damnation. 3. Sin finished may be said to bring forth death; either in regard of merit, and desert; or else in respect of issue, or event. The equivocation that is in the words being thus opened, proceed we next unto the interpretation of them; and 1. Inquire we how sin finished bringeth forth death; it cannot be understood of a meritorious production thereof; and my reason is, because this bringing forth of death is appropriated unto the finishing of sin, sin when 'tis finished, (and not before) bringeth forth death; but now before sin is finished, before 'tis brought forth, when it is but an embryo, when it is but conceived in the heart by consent unto it, and approbation of it, than it deserveth death, Hell, and damnadation (for this consent unto it is truly and properly sin, and the wages of every sin is death corporal and eternal) the bringing forth of sin then, is to be understood not in regard of the merit and desert but of the issue and event; it actually brings forth death, it actually throws into Hell. 2. By the finishing of sin cannot be understood barely the outward commission of it, for First, than the finishing of sin would be the same with the bringing of it forth; whereas (in all probability) they are distinguished as well, as the other degrees in sins influence. 2ly. Sin when 'tis 〈◊〉, assoon as 'tis finished brings forth death actually, in regard of the event; but as soon as sin is actually committed, it doth not bring forth death actually, in regard of the event; for God many times grants a long reprieve after the externallcommission of the foulest enormities. 3ly. If by the finishing of sin you understand 〈◊〉 for it; yet even so there will occur difficulties, to clear which, we must distinguish betwixt present impeniteny, and 〈◊〉 impenitency; and present impenitency is again twofold, actual, or habitual; which we may call the state of impenitency; and that is, when there is no renewed principle, no grace in the soul to dispose, and incline it unto repentance: these distinctions thus premised, I shall lay down four propositions, which will show the sense of this clause. The first proposition: Actual impenitency doth not always bring forth death actually; for it may be consistent with the seeds of spiritual life, gracious habits: and of this we have an example in David, who lay in his sin a long time impenitent, until awakened and roused by the ministry of Nathan. A second proposition: Neither doth present habitual impenitency, the present state of impenitency, always actually bring forth death; if ye take death for eternal death, hell and damnation: for unto those, that are, for the present, most impenitent, God may, in his due time, give repentance unto the acknowledgement of the truth, 2 Tim. 2. 25: and so rescue them out of the snare of the Devil. A third proposition: when sin is finish: d by a present habitual impenitency, by a state of impenitency, it doth actually bring forth death; that is, the inchoation of spiritual death, standing in a separation from God, and Christ, (who are the life of the soul,) and in an utter, and total privation of grace: a state of impenitency is a state of death: that soul which is habitually impenitent for sin, is totally dead in sin, for sin is there 〈◊〉, and reigns as a prince, or Lord; because there is no contrary principle of grace to oppose it, no spirit to 〈◊〉 against it, Name in quo peccatum consummatur spiritus sanctus non commoratur, (as Tuke upon the place) sin finished brings forth death, that is, spiritual death is the formal effect of habitual unrepentance for sin. The fourth proposition: when sin is finished by final impenitency, by perseverance in a state of impenitency, than it actually bring's forth death: to wit, hell and Damnation: those of grown years, that die without repentance drop into the eternal flames, and torments of hell. What I have hitherto said may be applied, not only to the whole course of sin, but also unto every actual sin: but Calvin restrains the words to the whole course of sin in a man's life, Perfectum peccatum (saith he) non intelligo unum aliquod opus perpetratum, sed cursum peccandi completum: with Calvin, Cartwright accords also (in his answer unto the Rhemists' annotations upon the place) James (saith he) by the consummation of sin, doth not mean every actual sin, but sin 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 up to such a height, as that 〈◊〉 calleth for an utter uncurable, and unresistable destruction from the just 〈◊〉 hand of God; as when a man doth not only walk in the counsel of the wicked. stand in the way of sinners, but even sit him down in the seat of the scornful, Psal. 1. 1: which are of such desperate hope, as Solomon will not have them once 〈◊〉, the only remedy of recovering them, if they were recoverable, Prov. 9 7, 8. If sin be here taken, as these worthies determine, only for the whole course of sin: than it is said to be finished, not only 〈◊〉 in itself, but also extrinsecally by extrinsecall denomination from God's decree of permitting it, and 'tis when men are come unto that fullness of sin, that extent, number, and measure of sin, which God hath purposed to suffer them to run into, when men arrive unto the utmost bounds, and limits, that God by his decree hath prefixed unto their sins, than sin being thus finished bringeth forth death, both temporal, and eternal. The words, thus analyzed, and expounded, we shall in the next place clear them from two false inferences of the Papists: first, that concupiscence is not sin: Secondly, that there are venial sins: we have here set 〈◊〉 (saith Bellarmine) [Tom. 4. de amiss. great. & statu pecc. lib. 1. cap. 9 lib. 5. cap. 7.] four things; lust, and three of its 〈◊〉, one involuntary, two other voluntary, one involuntary without all consent of the mind, and that is 〈◊〉, [lust draweth, and 〈◊〉 unto sin;] the two other are voluntary; one imperfectly, and the other perfectly; one imperfectly voluntary, and that is such a delectation wherein there is but an imperfect consent, [lust when it conceiveth, it bringeth forth sin,] the other perfectly voluntary, when there is a full, and perfect consent [sin when 'tis finished bringeth forth death.] These things thus presupposed: first he concludes, that 〈◊〉 is not sin; because the Apostle doth not call it sin, but only affirmeth that 'tis the cause of sin: lust 〈◊〉 it conceiveth, it bringeth forth sin. But this argument is very weak, for First, though it be not expressly here called sin, yet 'tis expressly called sin by the Apostle Paul, and that fourteen times, (as Commentators generally reckon) in three chapters of his Epistle to the Romans (viz: chap. 6. 7. and 8.) Secondly, though it be not here called sin expressly, yet 'tis imply'dly, for 'tis made the cause of sin: and such as the fruit is, such is the tree. Add unto this thirdly, that, if the place prove concupiscence not to be sin, it proves it not to be so in those that are unbaptised, unjustified, and unregenerate, as well, as in the baptised, justified, and regenerate, for it speaks universally, of all men, every man when he is tempted, &c: and therefore 'tis fallaciously done to bear his Readers in hand, as if he limited his conclusion, only to those, that are baptised, justified, and regenerate. In a second place, he endeavoureth from the words to prove, that there are venial sins: there are (saith he) two births of lust, one imperfect [lust when it conceiveth bringeth forth sin,] but 'tis a venial sin, for 'tis distinguished from the consummate birth, of lust, sin finished, unto which it is appropriated to bring forth death, to be mortal, to deserve hell and damnation: the argument may thus be reduced into form: every mortal sin bringeth forth death, deserveth hell, and damnation, but the sin, that lust engendereth or bringeth forth, when it hath conceived, doth not bring forth death, doth not deserve hell and damnation, therefore 'tis not a mortal, but a venial sin. The minor is confirmed, because 'tis appropriated to sin finished to bring forth death, and sin brought forth, is distinguished from sin-finished. The Answer shall be unto the Minor, and its confirmation: and it standeth in two particulars. First, to bring forth death in regard of issue or event is appropriate unto sin consummate or finished, but to bring forth death in point of merit agreeth unto the least sin, for every sin merits the curse of the law, Galat. 3. 10. Mat. 5. 19 Secondly, the sin, which lust, when it hath conceived, bringeth forth: and sin finished are not distinguished, as divers sorts, and kinds of sins, but only in regard (b) Non distinguit ut varia 〈◊〉, sed ut peccatum 〈◊〉 admissum, distingui 〈◊〉 à peccato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â 〈◊〉. Amefius Bell: enerv. 1. 4. p. 36. of several considerations: the very same sins, that lust bringeth forth, may be said to be finished, when they are unmortified, unsubdued: lust bringeth them forth as they are externally committed or accomplished, and they are 〈◊〉 to be finished, when they are 〈◊〉, and unsubdued, and so reign in the soul without repentance. The words afford many observations, But I shall pitch upon one, for which I made choice of them, and 'tis: that, every man's original lust or concupiscence, is the principal cause of temptation unto sin, and hereupon 'tis called original sin, because actual sins are unto it their rise, and original: est peccatum actuosum, seu agens, licet non sit actuale (saith Tuke, pag: 50:) indeed Satan, and the world tempt unto sin, but James here makes no mention of them, and what better reason can be assigned for this omission, than this, that they have not so great a stroke upon our temptations, as our own lust? This point being thus deduced from the Text, I shall briefly First, Explain: Secondly, Confirm: & Thirdly, Apply it. First, for explication: we must distinguish of an 〈◊〉, and a mediate cause of temptation: secondly of a universal and particular cause of temptation. First, of an immediate and mediate cause of temptation: original lust is not always the immediate cause of prevailing temptations unto sin, for we are many times tempted immediately by our contracted, and acquired lusts, but yet of such temptations our native concupiscence is the mediate and remote cause. Secondly, we must distinguish of a universal and particular case of temptation: original concupiscence is an universal, not a particular cause of our temptation unto sin: now the influence, or causality of universal second causes as if the heavens, and stars is determined, much diversified by divers particulars in the subjects upon whom it is, and thus the influence, of original lust upon men's temptations unto sin, is much differenced according to the variety, that is in the complexions, dispositions, conditions, and relations, &c: of men: it tempt's a choleric man unto wrath, and hatred, a man of a sanguine constitution unto good fellowship, riot, and luxury, a phlegmatic man unto idleness, a melancholy man unto envy, unto dark mischievous plots, a rich man unto pride, and covetousness, a poor man unto impatience, discontent, and murmuring, subjects unto disobedience, sedition, and rebellion, Princes unto Tyranny, and oppression: but this influence of concupiscence varieth not only in several men, but in the same men, as their 〈◊〉 varieth, not only in several men, but in the same men, as their conditions, and relations alter: when 〈◊〉 came to the sceptre of Syria, it quickly tempted him unto that belluine rage, towards the people of Israel, which, when he was a servant of Benhadad's, he thought he had abhorred, his 〈◊〉 heart misinformed him, that he was scarcely capable of so great a guilt, 2 King. 8. 12, 13: it made Caius Caesar Caligula, when he was a subject, to be a base and servile flatterer of Tiberius, and when he himself came to the empire, it rendered him intolerable, for all kind of Tyranny: hence also it is ordinary for men, whilst they are in a low condition, to declaim most bitterly against the arbitrary, and unjust government of magistrates, but, when they themselves get into places of authority, they prove so injurious, and oppressive unto all under them, as that one may justly think, that power is hardly capable of being abused unto greater wrong, and unjustice, than they have practised. The Consirmation shall have two parts: first, that our own lust is a cause, secondly, that 'tis a principal cause of temptation unto sin. First, that 'tis a cause of temptation unto sin, and that, these following scriptures evince, Matth. 15. 19 Out of the heart, that is, out of that bottomless evil treasure of the heart, Matth. 12. 35. Concupiscence, proceed, the smallest sins, evil thoughts, and greatest murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false-witness, blasphemies, Rom. 7. 8. sin, (that is original sin) taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence, to wit, actual concupiscence, those passions, or motions of sin, spoken of in verse the fifth: the commandment is only a cause per accidens (i) Rolloc. of them, not properly a cause, but only an occasion: an occasion, not given, but taken, 'tis the imbred corruption of our nature, original sin alone, that is, the causa per se of it, 2 Pet. 1. 4. All the corruption and naughtiness, that is in the world is throw lust: flesh in scripture is the same with lust, and what abominations the flesh produceth, you may see, Gal. 5. 19, 20, 21. Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are 〈◊〉, adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, Idolatry, witchcraft, haired, variance, 〈◊〉, wrath, strife, seditions, 〈◊〉, envyings, murders, 〈◊〉, revel, and such like. Secondly, that 'tis a principal cause of temptation unto sin: and that is evident by three reasons, because it tempts first, internally; secondly, effectively; thirdly, perpetually. First, it tempts internally; whereas Satan, and the world are but external tempters; this is domesticus hostis, a traitor and tempter in our own bosoms. Secondly, Satan and the world tempt only objectively, by their proposal of objects; but our concupiscence tempts effectively, and physically, by way of real efficiency; really inclining, and disposing unto sin: I mean (so far forth, as sin is capable of real efficiency) quoad materiale. Thirdly, concupiscence is the principal cause of temptation, because it tempts perpetually: resist the devil, and he will flee from you, Jam. 4. 7: but make never so great resistance against this lust, it will never flee from you; nor can ye ever flee or run from it: it is as restless an adversary as (Hannibal (k) Cum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (inquit 〈◊〉 Host res est, qui nec bonam, nec malam 〈◊〉 fortunam potest, seu vicit ferociter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: seu 〈◊〉 est, instaurat cum victoribus certamen. Livius lib. 27. said) Marcellus was; who would never be quiet, whether he was a conqueror, or whether he was conquered: men may retire themselves from most of the vanities, and temptations of the world; but 'tis impossible, whilst here in this mortal body, to withdraw ourselves from the temptations of our own lusts; of these Hermit's have complained in a wilderness, and Anchorites in their cells. The uses that may be made of this point, are of information, 〈◊〉, and exhortation. First, of information; and they are three. First, we may hence learn, what a great difference there is, betwixt the temptations of lapsed man unto sin, and the temptation of our first parents unto their first sin: every man, that hath sinned since their fall, is tempted by his own lust, whereas Adam, and Eve had only an outward tempter; & it was only by the abuse of their free will, that they consented unto his temptations: it is said of Eve Gen. 3. 6: when she saw, that tke tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat: here indeed she was tempted by her own lust; by those three sorts of lusts, that John speaks of, 1 Joh. 2. 16: First, the lust of the flesh (when the woman saw that the tree was good for food) secondly, the lust of the eyes (and that it was pleasant to the eyes) thirdly, the pride of life (and a tree to be desired to make one wise:) but this was not before her fall, but a degree, and part thereof. Dr. Tailor I know teacheth another doctrine [in his unum necessarium, pag. 374.] concupiscence (saith he) was actual before the fall; it was in Adam, and tempted him; [and in his further explication of original sin, pag. 462.] by rebellion, and prevailing of concupiscence it was, that Adam fell: but the answer unto this might easily be foreseen; to wit; that the rebellion, and prevailing of his concupiscence was a cause of a part of his fall, viz: of his outward eating the forbidden fruit, wherein his fall was completed; as also of his resolution to eat thereof: but yet notwithstanding it was not the cause of the first act of his fall, his first sin, for concupiscence (as I have proved) is sin, and by this, man should sin before he had sinned. Secondly, we may hence be instructed what a wide difference there is, betwixt our temptations unto sin, and the temptations of Christ: every one of us is tempted by his own lust, but lust is so filthy a thing, as that it was utterly repugnant unto the perfect, full, and unspotted purity, and holiness of the Lamb of God? the prince of this world cometh, and hath nothing in 〈◊〉 (saith Christ) Joh. 14. 38: nothing in me to side, and comply with his temptations: hence was it, that that sygnall temptation of him by Satan, Matth. 4: did not, could not make so much impression upon him, as the waves of the sea upon a rock: the devil tempted him unto all those branches of lust mentioned by John, [in the now quoted place, 1 Joh. 2. 16.] first unto the lust of the flesh, Matth. 4. 3: when the tempter came to him, he said, if thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread: secondly, unto the lust of the eyes, vers. 8. 9 Again the Devil taketh him up into an exceeding high mountain, and showeth him all the kingdoms of 〈◊〉 world, and the glory of them: and saith un-unto him, All these things will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me. Thirdly, unto the pride of life; to purchase unto himself renown by his miraculous preservation in his fall from the temple, vers. 5. 6: then the Devil taketh him up into the holy city, and setteth him on a pinnacle of the temple, and saith unto him, if thou be the Son of God, cast thyself down; for it is written, He shall give his Angels charge concerning thee, and in their hands they shall bear thee up, least at any time thou dash thy foot against a stone: none of these temptations could fasten on him; for, the Hypostatical union, the all-fulness of his grace, and the beatifical vision secured him from the danger of all temptations; and rendered the prevailing of them a thing utterly impossible. Thirdly, we may from the causality and influence of lust infer its obliquity: against Papists, Socinians, and Dr. Taylor: that 'tis not only a natural but a moral disease of the soul; not only vitium, but peccatum: that which as a quality, or habit tempts, draws, and entices unto sin, conceiveth and bringeth forth sin, must needs be sin; but lust doth all this; and therefore 'tis sin: to wit; properly, and formally: The Minor is affirmed in terminis by the Apostle in the text; and, for confirmation of the Major, I shall lay openly three things. First, the testimony of our Saviour Matth. 7. vers. 17. 18: a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit, a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit; but the fruit of lust is morally evil, it bringeth forth sin; therefore 'tis a tree morally corrupt. A second thing is that known Maxim in Logic: Nihil dat quod non habet vel formaliter vel eminenter; that which is the principal cause of the obliquity and deformity of sin, must needs have in itself that deformity or obliquity, 〈◊〉 formally, or 〈◊〉; it must either have the same deformity, or obliquity; or else some deformity, or obliquity, which is more eminent than that; but no deformity or obliquity can transcend that of sin; and concupiscence is the principal cause of sin, (whether efficient, or deficient it comes all to one) therefore concupiscence containeth the obliquity or deformity of sin formally; and consequently is formally a 〈◊〉. A Third particular, which I shall allege for confirmation of the Major is, the manner of lust's causality of, and influence upon sin: it tempts, draws, and enticeth unto sin; not outwardly, as an object; but inwardly, as a quality, or habit, it inc●lineth unto sin, as habits dispose unto their acts; now habits impart both their name, and nature unto their most accomplished, and complete acts, concupiscence therefore communicates unto its most consummate acts their nature, and name, and therefore hath (as they) both the name, and nature of sin: Ames thus urgeth this argument against Bellarmine, Concupiscentia dicitur parere peccatum, eo modo quo interna animi rectitudo (quae est justitia) parit justitiam, id est, completum actum, de quo nomen, & natura totius motus; & principii ejus usitate & proprie maxime praedicatur, [Bell. enerv. tom. 4. pag. 36.] From this there may be refuted three other points of popery: First, the absolute perfection of the good works of the regenerate: Secondly, their justification by them: And thirdly, their possibility of fulfilling the law. First, the absolute perfection of the good works of the regenerate, for concupiscence worketh in all the actions of man, and therefore (seeing 'tis a sin) it distilleth sinfulness into the best of them, and rendereth them peccaminosa, though not peccata, sinful, though not sins: the flesh lusteth against the spirit, so that ye cannot do the things that ye would, Gal. 5. 17: the good things that ye would so exactly or perfectly as ye desire. Secondly, we may hence conclude against justification by good works, at least in a meritorious way, for it so distaineth them, as that it disableth them to satisfy for the least sin against God, to merit the least good from God: and this may discover the necessity of a Christ for our justification, who was God as well as man, and in his manhood had such an all-fulness of grace, as was utterly exclusive of, and inconsistent with the least degrree of concupiscence: lust therefore did not, could not mingle with any of his actions, and sufferings, to impede the all-fulness of their satisfaction, and merit. Thirdly, we may hence infer the impossibility of fullfilling the law in a legal way, for though we may keep it evangellically, in such a measure, as God, for Christ's sake, will accept, yet concupiscence doth so immixe itself with all our actions, the very best of them, as that they must needs prove gradually defective, and come far short of that exactness and perfection which the law requireth: and so consequently every man is a sinner, a transgressor of the law. But to pass from speculative unto practical uses: The next use is of reprehension of all such as excuse, or extenuate their sins by discharging them upon the importunity, and violence of outward temptations, the text in hand teacheth us, that the principal cause, into which we are to resolve all the prevailing temptations unto sin, is our own lust: so that God may say to those that perish in their sins, as the Prophet unto Israel, Hosea 13. 9: thou hast destroyed thyself; it is thy own concupiscence hath undone thee, hath damned thee: oh Beloved! 'tis our own lust, that hath conceived, and brought forth all our sins 'tis this internal tempter in our hearts, that hath betrayed us unto all foreign, and external suggestions unto sin, by opening the gate of our consent unto them, and therefore it would be injustice to lay our sins at any others doors: external tempters are never total, but only partial causes of sin, they do never more than cooperate with that sinful lust within us: the goodly Babylonish garment, the two hundred shekels of silver, and the wedge of gold of fifty shekels, had never enticed Achan unto sacrilege if he had not been also tempted by his own lust, the lust of the eyes, covetousness: David had never by the beauty of Bathsheba been alured unto adultery with her, but that he was tempted by his own lust, the lust of the flesh: though Satan provoked him to number Israel, 1 Chron. 21. 1: yet he could never have drawn him thereunto, but that he was tempted by his own lust, the pride of life, ambition, and haughtiness: and hence was it, that he did not throw the blame upon Satan, but charged himself alone, 2 Sam. 24. 10. David's heart smote him, after that he had numbered the people: and David said unto the Lord I have sinned greatly in that I have done: when Scipio's invasion of Africa drew Hannibal out of Italy (it is said that) Hannibal broke out into this expression; it is not Scipio, but mine own country men Hanno, and his faction in the Senate of Carthage, that hath thwarted, and contradicted all my designs, and hindered my recruits, and supplies; 'tis he only that hath driven me out of Italy: So every regenerate man may say, when he is drawn, or driven from his communion, and fellowship with the Almighty; it is not so much Satan, the world, evil company, the badnesle of times, or places in which I live, outward provocations, and allurements, the infelicity of my condition, relations, and the like it is not so much these, the traitor in my heart; the flesh lusting against my better part, the spirit, hath tempted, and seduced me, hath drawn me from my God, and Saviour, and hath enticed me unto sin. Lastly, divers exhortations may be inferred from the causality and influence of our concupiscence: we may hence be exhorted unto; First, 〈◊〉 for it: Secondly, mortification of it: Thirdly, watchfulln sse against it: Fourthly, thankfulness for deliverance from it. First, unto humiliation for it. There will be a great deal of justice in our tears, for the fountain of all temptations, the mother of all sins: for that which tempteth, draweth, enticeth unto sin, which conceiveth, and bringeth forth all sorts of sins: David therefore (in his penitential Psalm, for murder, and adultery) had very good reason to spread before God this his birth sin, because 'twas a seminal sin, it contaived the seeds of his adultery, and murder, Psal: 51. 5: hence also 'tis no wonder, that Paul, having mentioned the malignant operation of this law in his members, forthwith subjoineth a most bitter complaint touching his infelicity and misery thereby, and most passionately wisheth for a 〈◊〉 deliverance therefrom: oh wretched man that I am (saith he) who shall deliver me from the body of this death? Rome 7. 24: concupiscence is the root of bitterness; Heb. 12. 15: the root of all the bitterness, that is in our evil deeds; and therefore every one, upon whom God hath poured a spirit of grace, will, or should be in bitterness for it, as one that is in bitterness for his first borne: every gracious heart grieves at the sad, doleful, and baneful effects of 〈◊〉, and shall we have no resentment of the badness of the cause: oh Beloved! did we but afford unto the accursed, or pernicious issue, or progeny of lust a due, and thorough contemplation, we would think, that we could never weep enough for that, which is productive of so much, and great mischief, though our head were waters, and our eyes a fountain of tears, Jer: 9 1: even the most wicked are troubled in their minds, when enormous sins break out into their lives, and thereby terrify their consciences, blot their reputations, prejudice their estates, or any other ways incommodate them; but this is but a worldly sorrow: the damned in hell howl, when sin being consummate bringeth forth death; but this is but a hellish sorrow: a true, heavenly, and godly sorrow riseth higher, and goeth further; it begins with the very inchoations of sin, the first suggestions unto sin, with concupiscence, that makes these suggestions; for this would be a likely means to retard, and in some measure 〈◊〉 any further progress of lust's influence; and so anticipate, or prevent the worldly, and hellish sorrow now spoken 〈◊〉 [when Elisha healed the waters of Jericho, he went forth unto the spring of the waters, and cast in salt there, 2 King. 2. 21. If we would heal the streams of actual sins, we should go unto the spring, original sin, and pour out our salt, our brinish tears upon it.] To further, and increase our humiliation, for this malignant influence of concupiscence, I shall propound only one, but that shall be a very stirring motive: and it is, that this influence is exceedingly heightened, and intended, viz: 〈◊〉 by the good, holy, and just law, and commandment of God: even as (by an antiperistasis) heat is many times intended by the opposition of the adjacent cold, Rom. 7. 8, 13: sin taking occasion by the 〈◊〉 wrought in me all manner of concupiscence; sin by the commandment became exceeding sinful: the prohibitions of the law 〈◊〉 accid ns provoke, exasperated, and enrage concupiscence; and render its workings more vigorous, outrageous, and violent, then otherwise they would be; for Nitimur in vetitum semper, cupimusque negàta. We long most after forbidden fruit; we are most addicted unto interdicted actions: 〈◊〉 waters, saith 〈◊〉 wise man, are sweet, Prov. 9 17: and hence is it, that those carnal and unregenerate men, who sit under a powerful ministry, usually run into a greater excess of riot, than such, whose lusts are not at all awakened by the home, and searching preaching of the law: oh! what an unfathomable pravity is there in this, that makes a most equitable dissuasive from sin, to be a powerful incentive unto it? that makes that a spur to excite unto sin, which in its natural tendency is a bridle to restrain therefrom? and so turns a most wholesome 〈◊〉, into a most pernicious poison? makes that to bring forth fruit unto death, which was ordained to life? Rom. 7. 10. Secondly, unto mortification of it: sin when 'tis si nished brings forth death; and 'tis finished, when 'tis unmortified: now lust is a part of sin consummate (as Ames (l) 〈◊〉 peccatum non distinguit 〈◊〉 à peccato consummato & mortem generante, 〈◊〉 speciem a specie, sed tanquam partem à toto. Ames. Bell. enerv. tom. 4. pag. 15 marks in his answer unto Bellarmine;) and therefore, when our own lust is finally unmortified, it bringeth forth death, it casts into the fire of Hell: if we do not therefore mortify lust, it will kill, and damn us; without the mortification of original sin, the mortification of actual sin will be impossible; unless we mortify the body of sin, we can never mortify the deeds of the body, it will be a vain endeavour to dry up the streams, when the fountain is as full as ever. Stephen Gardiner, used (in the time of Queen Mary) to say, that 'twas in vain to strike at the branches, whilst the root of all heretics did remain; meaning the Lady Elizabeth, that was afterwards Queen: thus may we say; it will be to little purpose to lop the branches of the tree of corruption, unless we lay the axe unto the root of the tree, that root of bitterness, our own lust; which unless mortified will abundantly fructify, in sinful wishes, desires, delights, resolves, and outward works; it will always be conceiving, and bringing forth sin: the King of Meth in Ireland, sometimes asked one Turgehesie, how certain noisome birds, that came flying into the realm, and did much harm, might be destroyed; he answered him, nidos 〈◊〉 ubique destruendos, the way to be rid of them was to destroy their nests: the way to destroy actual lust is to mortify, and pull down original lust; that is, foams 〈◊〉, the nest and the womb of all actual sins whatsoever: unto this the Apostle: Paul exhorts, Rom. 6. 12. Let not sin reign in your mortal bodies, here [by sin] many learned interpreters (both Protestant, and popish) understand original sin; unto which all actual sin are but as Viceroys; and the mortification of this is nothing but the dethronization thereof; when original sin is mortified, then 'tis uncrowned, and dethroned; and 'tis unmortified, and reigns, when there is no spiritual resistance made against it, by a spiritual principle, upon spiritual, and scripture grounds; because 'tis displeasing unto God, and contrary unto his law; when there's no grace to impair, and weaken it, no spirit to lust against the flesh: The reign of original sin (which is nothing else but the unmortification thereof) is here vers. 13: described by its 〈◊〉 and opposite. First, by its correlate: and that is a twofold subjection. First, and obedience unto its laws, edicts, and commands, not obeying it in the lust thereof, that is, not yielding a full, and total consent unto its motions, suggestions, and desires. The second, is a 〈◊〉 to fight its battles, to take up arms in its defence, to employ all the parts of our body, and consequently, all the powers of our soul, by which these parts are acted, in its service: 〈◊〉 yield ye your members as instruments [or as it is in the greek arms or (m) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. weapons] of unrighteousness, [actual unrighteousness, unrighteous actions] unto sin, [that is, unto original sin.] Secondly, the reign or unmortification of original sin is here described by its opposite, subjection, and obedience unto the kingdom of God, and the righteousness thereof: but yield yourselves unto God, &c: and your members, [and conseqnently the faculties of your rolls] as instruments of righteousness unto God. Unto the mortification, that is, opposition of the reign of original sin, we have here two arguments: First, the shortness of the combat; (n) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Chrysostomus in locum. it will be only whilst you have these mortal bodies: Secondly the assurance and certainty of victory: First, sin shall not have 〈◊〉 over you, vers. 14: so you will do your devoyre, and make head and resistance against it; and this promise of victory, he confirms, from the state of regeneration; for ye are not under the law but under grace; ibid. ye are not under the law, as 'tis the strength of sin, 1 Cor. 15. 56: as it irritates, stir's up, and provokes unto sin, Rom. 7. 8: but ye are under grace, the grace of sanctification; it will enable, and assist you to resist, and overcome sin, and that original, as well as actual: unto this place let me add another of the same author in his Epistle unto the Hebrews, 〈◊〉, 12. 1, 2: let us lay aside the 〈◊〉 which doth so easily beset us: original sin cannot here in this life be laid aside, as touching the existence of it; but let us lay aside the dominion of it, let us shake of the rule of this sin, which (of itself) doth so easily beset us, beleaguer all our faculties; it tempts us without a tempter, its motions will arise without any outward provocation: Erasmus renders the clause; abjecto tenaciter inhaerente nobis peccato, sin, that cleaves so fast unto us: so fast, that it cannot be loosed from us, (à conceptione ad funus) though we be working on it, and weeding out of it from the beginning to the end of our life, so Bishop Lake, on Psal. 51. v. 5: notes upon the words: and (according to this translation) 〈◊〉 tells us of some, who think, that the Apostle alludes unto Ezekiel 24. 26: where some wicked men are compared to a pot, whose scum is therein, and whose scum is not 〈◊〉 out of it: the scum of concupiscence will never wholly be gone out of our natures here, but however we should always be rubbing, and scouring it away so much as we can: let us endeavour our utmost, to lay aside the sin which doth so easily beset us, that so we may with patience run the race, that is set before us; for if it be not in some measure laid aside, abated, and weakened, it will burden, hinder, and entangle us in our spiritual race: hence, in the Italian translation, the former words are thus read, the sin which doth so easily hinder us: the similitude (saith 〈◊〉) seems to be taken from such long, and large garments, as were wont to be laid of in such races, to be so much the more active: the laying aside, that is, the mortification of this sin is a very difficult task, and therefore in it we should look off from ourselves, upon our head, and Saviour Christ Jesus, and this will encourage us, for he is the author, and finisher of our faith, and faith will purify our hearts from original, and actual sin: he hath broken this head of the serpent for us, by his death and passion, in which he gave for it ample satisfaction 〈◊〉 the justice of God, and he hath also broken this head of the serpent in us by the remission and mortification of it: and this work, that he hath begun he will perfect, and accomplish in our glorification; in which he will present us to himself glorious, not having the least spot of lust, any the least proneness unto sin. This mortification of concupiscence is of such necessity, and importance; as that our Apostle, Gal. 5. 24. makes it the character of our christianity, our relation unto Christ; they that are Christ's [the true, and genuine members of Christ] have crucified the flesh, [that is, our original, and native lust] with the affections and lusts [the affections: that is, the sudden passions, and lusts, that is settled desires which it worketh,] those that do not endeavour to mortify, to crucify the flesh, the corruption of their natures, are not true, and real; but only nominal christians. The mortification of the flesh is here compared unto a crucifixion; not only, because in part it resembleth it; but also, because 'tis from the virtue, and merit of Christ's Cross, and by meditation thereon: for a 〈◊〉 thus reasoneth with himself; my inbred lust had a hand in the crucifying of my Saviour; shall I then suffer it to live, and reign in me? For it he hung upon a cross; and shall it then have a 〈◊〉 in my heart? shall I spare, and indulge that, which put him to so painful, and shameful a death? No I will (as it were) nail it unto a cross too, disable it for motion, so that it shall not have such liberty to revel it up and down in my heart, and life as formerly. The Apostle, not only recommendeth the subduing of the flesh unto others; but also exemplifieth it by his own practice, 1 Cor. 9 27. I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection; where [by body] protestant writers generally understand, that body whose deeds by the spirit are to be mortified, Rom. 8, 13: that which is called, Rome 6. 6: the body of sin, Rom. 7. 24: the body of death: and even Estius (o) Significat 〈◊〉 in hâc pugnâ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 corpus suum, utique ratione carnis, id est, 〈◊〉 concupiscentiae, de 〈◊〉 dicit, Gal. 5. Caro 〈◊〉 adversus spiritum: 〈◊〉 autem adversus carnem, Haec enim sibi invicem 〈◊〉 ideoque 〈◊〉 perpetua pugna debet este contra carnem, 〈◊〉 adeo contra corpus nostrum, quatenus per carnem adversatur 〈◊〉. a 〈◊〉 expositor, though he interpret it of the body, yet 'tis with regard unto the flesh in it, the carnal concupiscence; of which Paul speaks, Gal. 5. 17: the flesh lusteth against the spirit: the greek words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 &c: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, are very emphatical; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (as the Critics observe) is to strike about the face, or under the eyes, to give black, or blue wounds in the places there abouts; as Champions did unto their antagonists with their fists, or clubs; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is to bring under, as masters did their slaves, when they were unruly, wanton, or insolent, or, as wrestlers did their fellow combatants, when they overcame them. But you may now perhaps expect some directions for the mortification of concupiscence; I shall in this last, point at three: First, lust is mortified by sorrow for it, and hatred of it; it dies, when it dies in the affections, it is crucified, when 'tis bewailed, and loathed. Secondly, lust is mortified by the growth and 〈◊〉 of grace, for, intenso altero contrariorum 〈◊〉 reliquum; when one contrary is heightened, and intended, the other is thereby remitted, depressed, and abated; the strengthenning of grace then, will weaken the corruption of our nature: and therefore (which Paul, Ephes. 3. 14, 16. let us bow our knees unto the father of our Lord Jesus Christ, that he would grant us according to the riches of his glory to be strengthened with might in the inner man by his spirit, giving efficacy unto a diligent use of God's ordinances; for this will decay and impair the old man. A third way to mortify concupiscence is, to stop its influence; for this must needs enfeeble it, and (as it were) dishearten and discourage it; now this is done, when its motions, and desires are resisted, its conceptions are strangled in the womb, its births (like brats of Babylon) Psal. 137. 9: dashed in pieces against the 〈◊〉, i: e: destroyeyd by a timely repentance, and never suffered to arrive unto any growth, or maturity. For this hindrance of lust's operation, I shall prescribed two means one inward, another outward. First inward, and that will be to exert, and act all our 〈◊〉, as much as possibly we can, for contrary actions, as well as contrary qualities, will weaken, and wound each other: the way then, to quench the lustings of the flesh against the spirit, will be, to foment the lustings of the spirit against the flesh, to entertain, and cherish all holy motions, thoughts, and desires. Secondly outward, and that is, abstinence from the occasions, that are likely to excite, and stir up concupiscence, that bring (as it were) 〈◊〉 unto the fire, and throw oil upon the flame thereof, for what were this? but to make provision for the flesh to fulfil the lusts thereof? Rom. 13. 14: we should therefore take up David's resolution, Psal 101. 3. I will set no wicked thing before mine eyes; if we set wicked things before our eyes, they will soon steal into our hearts, and there kindle a fire, that may never end, but in the flames of hell, Prov. 23. v. 2, 31: put a knife to thy throat, if thou be a man given to appetite. Look not thou upon the wine when it is red, when it giveth its colour in the cup, when it moveth its self aright. Forbear gaming, if thy experience inform thee, that it tempts thee unto either rash anger, or covetousness, if thou findest, that thou art prone unto wantonness, do not so much as look upon an amorous romance; harken unto the advice of Solomon, Prov. 5. 8: remove thy way far from the strange woman, and come not 〈◊〉 the door of her house, imitate the prudence of Joseph, who, not only refused the embraces of his mistress, but fled from her very sight, and presence. Gen. 39 verse. 10, 12: he was more afraid of the temptation of his own lust, then of all the charms in her beauty, and the importunity of her solicitations. Thirdly, we may from the influence of lust be exhorted unto watchfulness against it, and that in all the faculties of our souls, and members of our bodies: we should trust none of them without Job's covenant, Job. 31. 1: or David's bridle, Ps. 39 1: Peter exhorts unto vigilancy, because our adversary the Devil as a roaring Lion walketh about seeking whom 〈◊〉 may 〈◊〉: 1 Pet. 5. 8: But if it were not for the compliance, and correspondence of our own lust, this roaring lion could do us no more hurt, than the Lions did Daniel in the den: 'tis this that opens the door of our souls unto him, and so betrayeth us unto his temptations: nay this would be an importunate, and restless tempter, though Satan, and the world should surcease their temptations; for it can conceive sin without a father, bring it forth without a midwife, and breed it up without a nurse: concupiscence is a dangerous adversary, not only, when as a King it commands all in the soul, but also, when it is deposed from its rule, and is in a subdued, nay in a crucified condition, and therefore the most sanctified should keep on still their watch against it, and be jealous of all its motions, though they seem to be never so weak and remiss: Mr. Knowles in his Turkish history relates a very strange story concerning a wounded soldier, which I shall insert, and apply unto our present purpose. After Amurath, the third King of the Turks, had overcome Lazarus, the 〈◊〉 of Servia, he (with some of his chief captains) taking view of the dead bodies, a Christian 〈◊〉 sore wounded, and all 〈◊〉, seeing him, in staggering manner arose out of an 〈◊〉 of stain men, and making towards him, for want of strength fell oftentimes by the way, at length drawing nigh unto him (when they that guarded the King's person would have stayed him) he was by Amurath himself commanded to come near, 〈◊〉 sing, that he would have craved his life of him: thus this half dead Christian, pressing near unto him, as if he would for honour's sake have kissed his feet, suddenly stabbed him in the bottom of his belly with a short dagger, which he had under his soldier's 〈◊〉, of which wound, that great King and conqueror presently died: unto this soldier every regenerate man may compare his own lust, though it be in a wounded, nay dying, and mortified state, ready (as it were) to expire, and give up the Ghost, yet, if we suffer it to arise from the dead, if we do not hinder its motions though they seem to be faint, and feeble, if we do not continue a constant watch, and guard against it, but suffer its approaches, and give way unto a conference, and parley with it, it will soon smite us (as it were) under the fist rib, give such a fatal blow, and stab unto the conscience, as would soon make a total, and final dispatch, an utter riddance of all the remainders of spiritual life in us, but that we are under the hands of a Physician, unto whom belong the issues of death, who hath a plaster of divine, and infinite virtue, and value, his own heart blood, the blood of God-man; and a sovereign balsam of infinite power, and efficacy, his spirit which can cure the deepest, and most dangerous wounds of the soul, that otherwise would be deadly. Fourthly, from the influence of lust we may be exhorted unto thankfulness for deliverance from it; and this exhortation may be addressed unto both the unregenerate, and regenerate. First, unto the unregenerate, who are delivered from it only in a way of restraint; when they see malefactors imprisoned, stocked, whipped, dragged to shameful executions, let them consider, that, if God did not withhold their concupiscence from its natural energy, it would have brought them into the like case, made them as public spectacles of shame, as any; if it were not for the bridle of God's 〈◊〉 grace upon them, original sin would work in them all manner of concupiscence, Rom. 7. 8: out of the concupiscence, that is in their hearts, would proceed (as waters stream from a fountain) not only evil thoughts, but the most scandaloussinnes, Adulteries, fornications, murders, 〈◊〉, covetousness, wickedness, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, blasphemy, pride, foolishness, Mar. 7. 21, 22: their lives would soon be replete with those odious, and abominable works of the flesh, which Paul mentioneth, Gal. 5. 19, 20, 21: adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, Idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunknnesse, revel, and such like. But, in a second place the regenerate have the greatest reason to be thankful for their deliverance from concupiscence: because 'tis in a way of remission from its condemning power, in a way of mortisication from its reigning power: and hence is it that the Apostle, Paul after along discourse touching the tyranny of it, concludes all with a doxology for his freedom from it, I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord, Rom. 7. 25: in the next words he layeth down the ground of this his thanksgiving: First, deliverance from the dominion of the 〈◊〉, by a contrary principle inclining unto contrary, and better actions, with the 〈◊〉 I myself serve the law of God: Secondly, deliverance from the 〈◊〉 of it, for the sake of his relation unto Christ, there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, chap. 8. 1: concupiscence is in them damnable, but yet it shall not actually condemn them, and every Believer, every member of Christ hath the same inducements to bless God, that Paul here speaketh of. First, he hath ground to praise him for the remission of concupiscence: if the fault, that is in his concupiscence were not remitted, it would rise up in judgement against him, and the desert of it is sufficient for the condemnation of millions of worlds, and that single by itself, abstracted from all it's black train, its works, and fruits. Secondly, he hath ground to praise God for the mortification of his concupiscence, as would soon be confessed, if he would but compare himself, with himself, and others. First, with himself: if he would compare his present with his past state: Oh! reflect upon the temptations, conceptions, and births of lust in the days of thy unregenerancy, which thou now blushest to own, consider how thy own lust made thy heart, as it were, another hell, full of such black wishes, desires, delights, and purposes, as thou now tremblest to think of, and then how canst thou but acknowledge thy deep obligation for that happy change, which God hath made in thy soul? that is, now become a temple of the holy Ghost, replenished with all those gracious, and glorious fruits of the spirit, reckoned up by Paul, Gal. 5. 22. 23. Secondly, compare thyself with others, with the worst of men, and 〈◊〉 of sinners, and then weigh, that, if the power of 〈◊〉 to tempt, to draw from God, and entice unto sin were not in some measure in thee broken, and abated, it might have rendered thee, as criminal, and scelestique, as any of them, as those that are the greatest monsters of irreligion, and unjustice in the world: Oh! seriously, and sadly propound unto thyself Paul's query, 1 Cor. 4. 7: who 〈◊〉 thee to differ from another? Alas! it was not, it could not be nature, for thy nature is originally as corrupt and depraved as that of others: it is grace then, that hath made the distinction, and therefore say with Paul, and say it with a grateful heart, by the grace of God I am what I am, 1 Cor. 15. 10: by the grace of God, a participation of the divine nature, it is, that I have escaped the corruption, that is in the world through lust, 2 Pet. 1. 4. There be also some duties regarding our 〈◊〉, unto which we may, from this malignant efficacy of sin, be pressed; at which I shall only lightly touch, and so conclude. First, we may hence be exhorted, to be careful in our watch 〈◊〉 them, diligent in our admonition of 〈◊〉, frequent and 〈◊〉 in our prayers for them: exhort one another daily (saith the Apostle) 〈◊〉 'tis called to day, 〈◊〉 any of you be hard ned thorough the deceitfulness of sin, Heb. 3. 15: not only actual, but original sin is very deceitful, Rom. 7. 11: seducing the understanding with the mere shows of truth, the will with the bare appearances of good, it is so deceitful (p) Familiar scriptures est, ut peccatum, seu concupiscentia dicatur homines seducere, decipere, 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉, ut Rom. 7. 〈◊〉. 12 〈◊〉. 1. Idautem 〈◊〉 per quandam 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 homo tentatione 〈◊〉, velut suasione sollicitatus & inductus est, 〈◊〉 consentit, quasi ab ipso 〈◊〉 persuasus; fit autem 〈◊〉 modo, 〈◊〉, dum cor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, paulatim 〈◊〉 adversus praecepta 〈◊〉. Estius in locum. that it soon tempts, not only into sin, but into obduration in sin: whilst by it s temptations it softens, and even melts the heart in the delights of sin, it hardens it towards the commands of God: now from this we may infer our obligation, unto an assiduous diligence, in admonishing of one another, in order, unto the discovery, and prevention of all its deceits, wiles, and policies: exhort one another daily, whilst 'tis called to day, we may extend, what the Apostle saith, further unto all other acts of Christian communion: watch over one another, warn, and advise one another, pray for one another daily, whilst 'tis called to day; whilst ye have time, and oppoertunity, lest any of you be hardened, through the deceitfulness of this sin; which without the preventing grace of God is able to harden any of us, the very best of us: unto this place, let me add another of the same Apostle in the same Epistle (at least by way of allusion unto the words) Heb. 12. 15: Looking diligently, lest any man fail of the grace of God, lest any root of bitterness springing up trouble you, and thereby many be defiled: there is a root of bitterness in every one of our hearts: this radical sin, and this root is of itself very apt to spring up, and to bring forth a venomous, and mischievous fruit; to trouble the peace, and quiet of the Church; and to diffuse a spreading, and infectious scandal to defile many: now from this we may learn, that there is a necessity, that we should be overseers, and superintendents one towards another; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, looking diligently, that is, one towards another, and with all exciting, stirring up, and quickening one another's graces; for 'tis from the languor and decay of God's grace, that the corruption of our natures grows fruitful: when we fail of the grace of God, than the root of bitterness springeth up, and fructifieth, but of all those, that come under our care, and inspection, we are to have a more especial regard unto our own families; and in them unto our little children; for their age, and innocency doth not exempt them from the temptations, and operations of their own lust: they are 〈◊〉 from the womb, the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth, Gen. 8. 21: man is borne like a wild Ass' colt, Job. 11. 12: foolishness is bound in the heart of a child, Prov. 22. 15: this root of bitterness begins to operate in little children, as soon as they come unto actual use of reason, and therefore we should be very 〈◊〉 (to do what we can) to repress its workings, by early instructions, and seasonable corrections. Secondly, we may hence be persuaded to sugar, and sweeten our 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 with meekness & moderation, Gal. 6. 1: if a man be overtaken in a fault, 〈◊〉 which are spiritual, restore such a 〈◊〉, in the spirit of 〈◊〉, considering thyself, 〈◊〉 thou also be tempted: here spiritual is taken in opposition, not unto the unregenerate, as 'tis used, 1 Cor. 2. 15: but unto weak Christians, babes in Christ, and so 'tis understood chap. 3. vers. 1: by spiritual persons than are understood, those that are strong in the faith, of full age, who by reason of use have their senses 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 both good and evil, Heb. 5. 14: now the Apostle, to induce these spiritual persons unto 〈◊〉, and gentleness in their reproofs, propounds unto them the consideration of their own frailty, and obnoxiousness unto surprisal by sin; considering thyself lest thou also be 〈◊〉; as if he should have said; suppose thou art spiritual, an eminent Christian, one extraordinarily gifted, with the gifts of both edification, and sanctification; yet if thou wilt duly consider the depravation of thy nature, thou must needs be sensible that it is no impossible thing for thee, to be tempted, drawn, and enticed by thy own lust, into the very same faults, with which thy weaker brethren are overtaken; and for which they are now under the lash of thy censures, thy lust may conceive, and bring forth the same sins; meditation upon this, would take of much from the rigour, severity, and unclemency, that usually is in our reprehensions; which makes them to be mistaken, for rail; and deemed to proceed from an hostile, and not fraternal affection; it would incline us to reprehend our falling, and failing brethren, with such tenderness, as a Chirurgeon handles his patients; and so much, may be imported by the word here translated, restore, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, signifieth to set a bone, that is broken, or out of joint; and this is, or should be done with a tender hand, and 〈◊〉 heart. Ecclesiastes, 7. 29. Lo, this only have I found, that God hath made man upright, but they have sought out many inventions. IN the verse foregoing, Solomon complains of the general depravation of mankind: one man among a thousand have I found, but a woman among all those have I not found: in the words there is an 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sive 〈◊〉; so that the words [one] and [none] are here taken for few, and fewer, as 'tis observed in the Dutch Annotations: if ye take the words properly, the last clause is to be limited unto his outlandish wives, and concubines, that seduced him unto Idolatry; who are said to be a thousand, 1 Kin, 11. 3: seven hundred wives three hundred concubines: amongst all these, there was not so much as one prudent, and good woman; now lest any, should hereupon throw the blame of this upon God, for giving man so depraved a nature, he cleareth God, by laying down two conclusions. The First, concerning the state of man by creation, God made man upright. The second, concerning the state of man by his apostasy, and defection from God; but they have sought out many inventions. Unto these two Conclusions he premiseth a preface; Lo this only have I found; wherein we have three things remarkable: First, the importance of these two conclusions; employed in the note of attention [lo!] Secondly, the means, by which he came to the knowledge of them, diligent search, and study into the word, and will of God, [this have I found.] Thirdly, a comparison of them with other points, he found them [only.] First, here's the weight and importance of these two conclusions, employed in the note of attention [lo:] and the weight, and concernment of them may be gathered. First, from the influence of them upon practice; being well studied, they will make us thankful unto God; humble in, and watchful over ourselves; charitable unto others, in admonishing of them, and praying for them. Secondly, from the proneness that is in men to justify themselves, and accuse God for the corruption of their natures: let no man (saith James) say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God, James 1. 13: this prohibition implieth, that men are apt to say, that they are tempted by God. Secondly, we have the means by which Solomon came to the knowledge of these two points; diligent search, and study into the word, and will of God: this have I found; to wit, by enquiring after divine revelations, the light of nature, and reason can never discover, that Adam was made upright. as the representative of all mankind; and that, his fall from this uprightness was imputable, and derivable to all mankind: indeed the Lord of Plessie Marlie in his work entitled the trueness of Christian religion, chap 26, proveth, by natural reasons; that man's nature is corrupted, that man is fall'n from his first original, and for it also chap. 27: he allegeth the testimonies of divers ancient Philosophers: indeed, by the woeful effects, they had a confused knowledge of the 〈◊〉, that there was a great confusion, and disorder in the soul of man; but first, however they knew it to be vitium, a blemish, or infirmity of nature; yet doubtless the generality of them was ignorant that it was peccatum, a fault, or sin. Secondly, reason, though never so much improved, could never attain unto so much as a glimmering of its 〈◊〉, the cause whence it came: it fared with them, as with Rebecca, Gen. 25. 22: two children struggled together within her womb, and 〈◊〉 said, if it be so, why am I thus? so they, by daily experience, find contrary appetices struggling within them; but they cannot guess at the cause of this unnatural war; and therefore they say, as she, if it be so, why are we thus? and unto this demand 'tis impossible to have any satisfying answer, unless they do, as she did in the close of the verse, she went to inquire of the Lord. This than may discover the true reason, why Papists, Socinians, and Arminians, have been at such a loss, touching original righteousness, and original sin: they have not taken such a course, as Rebecca here; they have not gone to inquire of the Lord, they have consulted reason only, and not scripture, they have followed Aristotle, not Paul, for their guide. Thirdly, we have a comparison of these conclusions, with other points of doctrine; shinted in the particle [only:] this only have I found; this, and nothing else. But sounds not this very strangely? was Solomon such a truant, such a sorry proficient in the study of divinity, as to know only two heads thereof, original righteousness, and original sin? sure than he was not gifted, or qualified for the office of Ecclesiastes, the Preacher, for he had been unable to declare all the counsel of God. For Answer unto this First, this particle [only] is to be taken, not simply, but secundum quid, (q) Solummodo hoc inveni: Hic notatur concupiscentiae 〈◊〉 litas, quae quidem non 〈◊〉 à Deo, sed à 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 solummodo hoc inveni, quod fecit Deus hominem 〈◊〉. Bonavent. in relation unto that depravation of mankind, spoken of in the foregoing verse: this only have I found; to wit, as touching the cause of it; first, negatively; that God is not the cause of it; for he made man upright: secondly, affirmatively; that man himself is the cause of it; But they have sought out many inventions. If it be objected, that the Devil was also a cause of the corruption of man's nature, and therefore the Preachers resolution of it into man alone is defective; he might have found, that Satan propounded unto our first parents many inventions, as well, as that they sought out many inventions. For answer; Satan was the cause of our first parents fall, or sin, only per modum suadentis, not per modum 〈◊〉 determinantis, he was only a counselling, and persuading cause, and that's only an imperfect cause, only a moral cause, he was not of sufficient efficacy to make them sin, for, nothing can be the sufficient cause of sin unto man, besides his own will, as Aquinas (r) Nil 〈◊〉 potest este homini 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quod est spiritualis 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 propria voluntas, & ideo dicta, vel fact a alterius hominis 〈◊〉 else solum causa imperfect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ad ruinam. rightly 2 a. 2ae. q: 43. Ar. 1. ad 3 m; nothing can compel, or determine him thereunto: so then, notwithstanding Satan's temptations, the Preacher saith truly touching the causation of that pollution, which is in our nature; that 'tis only to be attributed to the fall of our first parents, because they of their own accord have freely sought out many inventions. There's a second 〈◊〉 of the word translated [only] that makes it to amount to no more than chiefly; and indeed, some Logicians say, that exclusive particles sometimes exclude not, à 〈◊〉 à 〈◊〉, but only à summitate 〈◊〉, and, if the particle may be thus interpreted, than Solomon by the addition thereof signifies; that the principal thing, that is to be remarked, touching the sinfulness of men is; that God was not the cause of it, by his creation of man's nature; but that our first parents were authors thereof, by their fall from that rectitude, in which God created them, God hath made man upright, but they have sought out many inventions: now the pre-eminence of this above all other doctrines, touching the sinfulness of man, is very evident unto those, that look upon sin, as the scripture describes it; for 'tis the foundation of all true sincere sorrow for sin, and mortification of it: the knowledge of an effect is ever confused, until we understand its cause; so our sight of sin is never distinct, and accurate, until we come to a view of the original of all sin; and when this fountain of sin is found out, original sin, both imputed, and inherent, it will be then a far more easy work, than formerly, to discover the streams of actual sins. There's a third interpretation of the particle yet behind, which renders it, seorsim, (s) The original word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 most directly signisicth 〈◊〉, apart. so that it sccmeth to me, that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be that 〈◊〉 in the consideration of man the works of God, and the 〈◊〉 of man be found the works of God to be right all and that it was man himself who had made himself and his works to a perverse and 〈◊〉. apart, or severally; and, by this exposition, Solomon professeth, that he hath separated, in his consideration, God's work, from man's work; God's work in the creating of man's nature upright; and man's work in the defiling of his nature by his fall; wherein he sought out many inventions: and 〈◊〉 separation, 〈◊〉. of God's act, and man's act, being 〈◊〉 made, may sufficiently instruct concerning the cause of 〈◊〉 irrectitude in men, and women, of which he complains in the verse preceding, that 'tis not God, but man himself. Having thus briefly run over the praecognita, proceed we next unto the conclusions themselves. The first conclusion, concerns original righteousness, the second concerns original sin. The first conclusion concerns original righteousness; God made man upright; not only with an uprightness of innocency, but also with an uprightness of sanctity: but of this before at large. The second conclusion concerns original sin; peccatum originale originans; the fall of our first parents; they have sought out many inventions: these words describe the fall of our first parents, not as 'tis considered formally, in itself; but metonymically, by its motives, or effects: by its motives, if we understand them only of our first parents; by its effects, if we extend them unto their posterity also. First, by its motives, if we understand them of our first parents only; they sought out many 〈◊〉: that is, plurima 〈◊〉, many reasonings, as Junius, and Tremelius render the word, they found out many reasons, arguments, or motives to eat of the forbidden fruit; and what they did, in this their first sin, is reckoned to be done by us their offspring, because we were represented by them, and contained in them; even as Levi is said to pay tithes in Abraham, because, he was in the loins of his Father Abraham, when Melchisedech 〈◊〉 him, Heb. 7. 9, 10. Against this interpretation there are two doubts. (t) Quod autem quaesivisse dicuntur ratiocinia, quae tamen illis non 〈◊〉 à serpent antiquo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sunt: eo docere voluit, illas frauds 〈◊〉 avide 〈◊〉 arreptas fuisse. Quod vero dicit plurima 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, cum tamen 〈◊〉 testetur duplici tantum ratione pellectos fuisse, nempe quod corpori simul & animae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 verito fructu comedere, sciendum est in his multas rationes comprehendi. Nam quod aperiendi illis essent oculi, & ipsi Deo assimulandi, multiplicem rationem continet: fore ut Deo felicitate per omnia similes sorent; non minus quam ille sapientes, potentes, 〈◊〉, omnique virtute consummati: Ad corpus quod attinet sibi in animum 〈◊〉 fructum illum esu jucundum, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Cartwright in locum. The first, these reasons or motives were first propounded by Satan, and therefore not sought out by them; they were his temptations, and not so properly their own inventions. Answer; They are said to be sought out by them, as their inventions; because they so greedily, and speedily embraced them; their acceptation of them answered Satan's temptations, as an echo; and there is such resemblance betwixt a voice, and an echo; as that standers by sometimes can hardly discern betwixt them. A second doubt is, concerning the multitude of these inventions, or reasons; they have found out many inventions: now Moses, in his history, mentioneth but a few motives, or arguments, that induced them to this fact, Gen. 3. 6: and when the woman saw, that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise; she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat: improbable therefore that the Preacher speaks of these reasons, or motives. Answer. These motives were very comprehensive; though they were formally, and expressly few, yet they were implyedly many: that one design to be wise, to have their eyes opened, knowing good & evil, virtually comprehended many other plots, dependent upon it: or concomitant with it: they hoped, that their knowledge, and wisdom would be backed, or accompanied with an equal power, and so able to effect whatsoever they desired: they projected then, not only to be as knowing; but also as powerful, and in every thing as happy, and glorious as Gods. But some may think, that this exposition is somewhat strained, and far fetched; and therefore I shall propound a second, which extends the clause, not only unto them, but to all their posterity also, that descend from them in an ordinary way of generation: and so the fall of our first parents is here set forth by its mediate effects, the inventions of them, and their progeny: touching their actual sins, which issue from original corruption inherent in both, as streams from a fountain, and branches from a tree; they have all sought out many inventions. First, for the committing of sin. Secondly, for the defending of sin. Thirdly, for the extenuating of sin. Fourthly, for the concealing of sin. First, for the committing of sin: & so the clause may be verified either of the same, or of several men, & both again of the same, or several sins. First, of the same sins; and that in regard, either of the motives for, means unto, or manners of committing them: First, they have found out many inventions; that is, many motives and reasons to incite themselves unto the same sins: thus an Harlot, is alured unto her libidinous course of life, by pleasure, and by profit, by a desire to maintain herself in idleness, and gaiety of apparel, by a vain, and proud delight that she takes in the court, & adorations of her beauty: thus in an unworthy, and sinful compliance with the vices of the times, there may be a concurrence of many impulses, servile fear, covetousness, vainglory, and ambition; but now, though men may by variety of arguments tempt themselves unto the same sins; yet there's no solidity in any of these arguments; they are but inventions, have no more reality in them, than poetical fictions. Secondly, they have found out many inventions; that is, many means and ways for the practising of the same 〈◊〉: how many are the wiles by which an adultress deviseth to defile her husband's bed? who can reckon up all those unlawful practices, tricks, deceits, cheats, and fetches, by which misers scrape, and hoard up wealth in an inordinate way? and it is not as impossible to trace all the bypaths, and crooked ways, by which the ambitious ascend their undeserved honours, and preferments. Thirdly, they have 〈◊〉 out many inventions; that is, many ways and manners of acting the same sins. Tiberius' instituted (saith 〈◊〉) a new office forsooth, à 〈◊〉, for the devising of new, and various pleasures; he had also (as the same Author) monstrosi concubitus repertores, such as invented monstrous kinds of libidinous filthiness; indeed not only he, but divers others of the Romans (as their Historians and Satirists inform us) used such unnatural ways of lust, and uncleanness, as modesty prohibits the recital of them; and the devisers of them may be those inventors of evil things, of which the Apostle speaks, Rom. 1. 30: But to speak of our own times; the drammatique poetry of our age hath been very inventive; and 〈◊〉 was never able to keep pace with the various, and acquaint frauds of cheaters; with the several modes, and methodes of drinking unmeasurable healths; with those horrid oaths, and blasphemies, that some men (shall I say rather incarnate Devils) daily coin, and boast of such coinage, as a rare invention; with those monstrous, and ridiculous fashions in apparel, and otherwise, by which the gallants of both sexes express their pride, and vanity. Secondly, this clause may be understood of several sins they have found out: many inventions; that is, they have invented many forts, and kinds of sins; First, many sins against the first table; much profaneness, and neglect of duties; many 〈◊〉, and heretical inventions against the truth of God; many superstitious, and idolatrous inventions against the worship of God. Secondly, many sins against the second table; many vile, unjust, and uncharitable practices in the way of converse with, and carriage towards men. If this be the sense of the clause, there be three things observable in it: First, the nature and original of men's sins, they are their [inventions;] Secondly, their numerousness [many] Thirdly, their voluntariness [sought out.] First, their nature and original: they proceeded from their own invention, and therefore called their inventions: the ground of all sin is, that men lay aside the unerring rule of God's word, and will, and invent rules of their own to walk by: our first parents had never fall'n, but that they first suspected, and then disrelished the supposed rigour of God's precept; and hereupon chalked out unto themselves a way unto happiness, that in truth, and reality lead down unto the chambers of Death: what made Saul run upon a worse sin, than that of witchcraft, rebellion against his maker.? a sin that rooted out him, and all his posterity? but that he undervallued God's command, and followed his own judgement, his own invention? God commanded him to smite 〈◊〉, and utterly to destroy all that they had, and to spare them not; but to 〈◊〉, both man, and woman, infant, and suckling, ox, and sheep, Camel, and Ass, 1 Sam. 15. 3: but he devised (as he thought) a more prudent, and politic course; he reserved their King for triumph or ransom; and the best of their cattle, for spoil, and plunder; though he pretended it was for sacrifice, in Psal. 106. verse 43: that which the Psalmist calls, the counsel of the Israelites, in the former part of the verse; he terms their iniquity in the latter part: they provoked him with their 〈◊〉, and were brought low for their iniquity: now, from this collation, the inference is 〈◊〉; that men's own counsel is their iniquity: men sin, when they are guided by their own counsels, and inventions; the best way then, for prevention of sin, is not to be directed by our own counsels, and inventions, but to keep exactly unto the perfect rule of righteousness, the law, and testimony of God: I hate vain thoughts, but thy law do I love (saith the Psalmist, Psal: 119. 113.) the cause of his hatred of vain thoughts, was his love of the law of God: so, on the contrary, distaste at the laws of God is the principle of all vain thoughts, and sinful inventions: because men do not love God's law, therefore they love vain thoughts, they seek out many inventions. This note, as it may be averred of all sin in general; so in a more special manner of will worship, and 〈◊〉; for what is it other, than humane invention, the offering of strange fire to the Lord, which he commanded not? Levit. 10. 1: the setting of our posts by God's posts, our thresheld by his threshold? Ezek. 43. 8: what was the cause of the Israelites Idolatry against the second commandment, the same thing with superstition, but their desertions of God's ceremonial Law, (that was to be the adequate rule of instituted worship,) and their seeking, and following of many inventions? and with what severity did God both threaten, and punish this Idolatry of the Israelites, you may read at large in the old Testament. Secondly, we have the numerousness of man's sins; many inventions: the 〈◊〉 inventions, which the deceitful hearts of men have sought out, are so various, and numerous: as that they are unsearchable by any, but the Lord himself, who 〈◊〉 the heart, and trieth the 〈◊〉, Jer. 17. 9, 10: Unto this, at least by way of allusion, we may apply that of the Prophet Isay, 57 10: thou art 〈◊〉 in the 〈◊〉 of thy way: the way to hell is so great, and broad, the paths in it so many, the sinful inventions which wicked men seek, and pursue are so infinite as that 'tis no wonder, that they are quite tired out in their journey: they are in this respect as a swift Dromedary traversing her ways, Jer. 2. 23: (v) The late annotations. that is; several ways running, when she is proud, or hot with lust, to and fro after several males, one while after one of them, and another while after another. Thirdly, we have the voluntariness of man's sins, they are of their own seeking; they are their own inventions: they not only greedily embraced, what 〈◊〉 counsels were propounded by others; but of themselves, of their own accord sought out many inventions; they sinned not only by others temptatinos, but by their own inventions, Hosea. 4. 8. Eccles. 8. 11. Secondly, men have found out many inventions, as for the committing, so for the defending of sin: how many inventions have the Papists sought out for the supporting of Papal monarchy, and usurpations? for the patronage of their idolatries, in their invocation of Saints, worshipping of images, 〈◊〉 of mass, and for the defence of all other execrable tenets, and practices in their religion? But, what talk we of Papists? some among us, who profess a great distance from Antichrists, have (to the reproach of our nation) made shameless apologies for libertinism, profanation of the Sabbath, polygamy, sacrilege, disobedience unto magistrates, neglect, and contempt of all God's ordinances. Thirdly, they have found out many inventions, for the extenuating, excusing, palliating of sin; of which see Dyke at large in the deceitfulness of the heart: I shall instance only, in the excuse of sin, translation of it upon another cause, because herein our first parents were precedential unto all their posterity: Adam transferred the blame of his fall unto the Woman, nay he fathered it implyedly upon God himself, Gen. 3. vers. 12: the man said, the woman, whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat: tis, as if he should have said, if thou hadst suffered me to have been alone, I had still been innocent; it is this companion, whom thou hast given me, that hath enticed, and undone me: and Eve for her part, translates all the fault upon the Serpent, vers. 13: and the woman said, the serpent beguiled me, and I did eat, this example, of our first parents, is imitated but, too too well by their sinful progeny: there are that in their hairs, though not in their words, impute their sins unto God's decrees, and providences, and others (which comes all to one) blame, the malignant influence of their stars, the good creatures of God; they were borne (they will say) under an unlucky planet; others complain of Satan, and the world: the Devil is a wily serpent, the world a cunning strumpet; and how is it possible for such imprudent, and ignorant creatures as we, either to discover or evade their artifices, and stratagems? the Devil (say some) owed me a spite; others discharge their sins upon the infortunity of their condition, and relations: it was poverty (saith the 〈◊〉) that made me steal; it is the greatness of my charge, and family (saith the worldling) that makes me often pass by family duties, that makes me seem a covetous niggard; it was provocation (saith the swearer) that made me take God's name in vain; it was ill language (saith the manslayer) made me strike; it was bad company (saith the intemperate person) hath seduced me unto this excess of riot: I should never thus have frequented taverns, and alehouses (saith another drunkard) but that my calling engageth me there to meet, and confer with chapmen: I had plied my vocation, and kept my house (saith a third) but that the the tempest of my wife's tongue ever and anon drove me out of doors; I had never been disloyal, and unchaste (saith the adultress) but that my husband was unkind, and jealous. Lastly, men have found out many inventions for the concealing of their sins: very observable unto this purpose is that place in Job. 31. 33: If I covered my transgressions, as Adam: by hiding mine iniquity in my 〈◊〉: here the word [Adam] may be taken, either as the proper name of the first man; or as the common name of all men: first, as the proper name of the first man; he did what he could to hide his sin, Gen. 3. 8: and as the common name of all men; and so 'tis as much as, after the manner of men, as 'tis varied in the margin; and so, we may note from the words; that 'tis the guise and manner of men to cover their transgressions, to hide their iniquity in their bosom: in this regard, what Solomon saith of the way of an adulterous woman, Prov. 30. 20: is incident unto other sinners; they eate, and wipe their mouths, and say we have done no 〈◊〉: the way of most sinners (save those impudent ones, that declare their sins as Sodom) may be compared (for secrecy, and concealment) to the way of a man with a maid, to the way of an Eagle in the air, the way of a serpent upon the rock, the way of the ship in the midst of the sea, which leave no tract, or foot-step behind them: David was a man after God's own heart, and yet, what sad inventions did he seek out to hide the shame of his adultery with Bathsheba? first, he made Uriah drunk, that in that distemper he might go home to lie with his wife; and so father that bastard, which he had begotten on her; and when this would not do, gave directions unto 〈◊〉, for the contrivance of his death, which could not be effected, but by the fall also of divers other innocent subjects of David's, 2 Sam. 11. The words, as hitherto expounded, run of sin considered indefinitely; there be also that restrain them unto one particular sin, men's erroneous inventions concerning their supreme 〈◊〉, and happiness, and the ways, and means leading thereunto: indeed this may be called a 〈◊〉 sin; because 'tis 〈◊〉 with every sin; in every sin, there is an aversion from the right end God, and a conversion unto some wrong end in ourselves, or the creatures: several men propound unto themselves several chief ends; some pleasure, some profit, some honour, some knowledge, and learning; nay, the very same men do so succestively: in the morning of their day's men usually aim at sensual pleasures; and in their riper years their aims are as vain, dirt, air and smoke, riches, and honours, &c: children's ends are toys, and trifles; and, when the days of childish vanity are passed over, men dream to be happy in the embraces of some rich, beautiful, and loving wife; but they are soon cloyed with the sweets of marriage, which are quickly imbittered, and over balanced by its greater cares, & troubles; & then men comomnly promise to themselves a great deal of comfort, and happiness in their little children, and they when they grow up to maturity, prove many times the greatest crosses of their lives; and so bring down their grey hairs with sorrow to the grave: now, the reason of this variety, and vagrancy, that is in wicked men's desires about their chief ends, is the unsatisfactoriness, which is in all sinite, and inseriour ends; unto which men divert from God, who alone is an infinite; and therefore all satisfying good: in the ways of sin, and lust, in the fruition of the creatures there's nothing but vanity, and vexation of spirit; no rest for the sole of the soul's foot, Gen. 8. 9: and therefore no wonder, that men, in a natural condition, make their end to be, one while to satisfy this lust, and another while to satisfy that; one while to enjoy this creature, another while to enjoy that: when men for sake the fountain of living waters; they then hew, and dig out unto themselves (many cisterns) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that will hold no water, Jer. 2. 13: when they neglect the unum necessarium, the one thing that's needful, they are soon (with Martha) careful, and troubled about many things, Luk. 10. 41. Carnal men's desires of happiness are consused, and unsettled; for, they are the many (of whom the Psalmist speaks, Psal. 4. 6.) that say, who will show us any good? they do not pitch upon the true, and only good; yet they desire, in a general way, to be happy; but they know not where this happiness lieth; and therefore is it, that (in the prosecution of it) they post, and run from creature to creature, from lust to lust, from sin to sin; they seek out many inventions, and do not fix (as David) upon the lifting up of the light of God's countenance upon them: and thus have I given you the sense of the words, according unto our translation; I shall briefly acquaint you with other renderings of them, and so conclude my meditations upon them. First, the Septuagint render the word we translate inventions, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Junius renders it ratiocinia, reasonings, or dispute; Luther, arts: Some translate it deliberations; others (of which Diodati is one) expound it so largely as to take in all thoughts, imaginations, and counsels, that are vain, false, sinful, and exalt themselves against the knowledge of God; Symmachus turns the whole clause thus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, operati sunt curiositatem 〈◊〉 variam negotiationem; they were become polypragmatists, they toiled, and busied themselves with many curious, and 〈◊〉 affairs, that were utterly unrelated unto their chief end, the glory of God, and salvation of their souls; Bernard renders it thus, ipse autem se implicuit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he enwrapped himself in many griefs, troubles, difficulties, perplexities, and miseries, (w) Titil 〈◊〉 vult quaestionum nomine contineri omnem 〈◊〉, perplexitatem, miseriam, in quis homines post primum parentem, qui naturam ipsam involvit, se quoque ipsi involvunt. Adam's fall was, as it were, a Pandora's box, out of which flew all the evils, and calamities, with which the world is replenished; in the vulgar latin 'tis ipse 〈◊〉 infinitis miscuit quaestion bus, he hath mingled himself, or (as the Divines of Douai express it) he hath entangled himself with infinite or numberless questions; 〈◊〉 Alapide (x) Quaestiones significant cupiditates, quibus scatet homo, per 〈◊〉: quaestiones enim notant cupiditatum originem, & fontem, 〈◊〉 quod prodeant ex 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & sciendi, puta ex 〈◊〉 sentiendi, & experiendi, quid in qualibet re sit bonum, 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 ad primam quaestionem serpenus, quam movit Evae, dicens; cur praecepit Deus vobis, ut non comederetis de ligno 〈◊〉 boni & mali? Gen 〈◊〉 ad quam quaestionem in curlositatem gustandi pomi exarsit Eva, illúdque 〈◊〉, ac eodem maritum nósque omnes perdidit, arque suam curiositatem & concupiscentiam in posteros omnes 〈◊〉. thinks, that questions here signify lusts and sins in general, by a metalepsis; because all lusts, and sins have in some sort their original from questions; the first sin of our first parents had its rise from the question of the serpent, Gen. 3. 1: He said unto the woman, yea, hath God said ye shall not eat of every tree of the Garden? and 〈◊〉 by listening unto this question ruined herself, her husband, and all her posterity; and in ensuing sins the sinner hath ever some questions: First, interpretatively he questions, and disputes the authority of God's commands; and next, commonly, he hath some question concerning some creature, or other, to find out what is good, and evil in it; and thirdly, some question concerning the sin committed, a curious itch to experience what sweetness and delight there is therein. But the generality of Popish interpreters understand the clause more particularly of the ignorance, 〈◊〉, and contentiousness of lapsed man, First, of his ignorance: for questions presuppose ignorance, and doubts; to say that man hath mingled himself with infinite questions, is as much as to say, man is ignorant, full of queries, in search of which he languisheth away his days: this the endless disputes of Philosophers, de summo 〈◊〉, concerning man's chief good, and end, do plainly witness; for these imply that man is naturally 〈◊〉 of it, and at some loss about it. Secondly, of his 〈◊〉; he hath mingled himself with infinite questions; to wit, curious, nice, and unpresitable questions, that have no tendency to edification; such as the Apostle speaks of, 1 Tim. 1. 4: & 6. 4: of this curiosity the schoolmen are a sad example; many of whose questions are, like spider's webs, curiously spun but 〈◊〉 to catch flies, than souls. Thirdly, of his contentiousness, he hath mingled himself with infinite questions; that is, brawls, disputes, and quarrels; and that both with himself, and others. First, with himself; how frequent, and warm are the contests in his own bosom, betwixt his rational, and sensual powers? ever and anon his sensitive appetite disputes the most rational dictates of his understanding, and the most regular commands of his will. Secondly, with others; with strangers, and nearest neighbours, with foes, and most intimate, and dearest friends, with his most faithful servants, with the wife of his bosom, the children of his bowels. Pineda observeth; that there is an Auxesis in the word [mingled;] so that it signifies man is ingulfed in, and (as it were) swallowed up of questions: they are (as it were) incorporated into him, and he (as it were) compounded, and made up of them; he is wholly, and altogether a questionist. But the Reader may perhaps think, that I stay too long upon these several versions, seeing the word [Chishbonoth] hath but one signification in the whole scripture: it signifies inventions (as 'tis rendered by our Translatours) and nothing else. FINIS. Certain Letters OF HENRY JEANES Minister of God's word AT CHEDZOY. AND Dr JEREMY TAYLOR Concerning A passage of his, in his further Explication of Original sin. OXFORD, Printed by HEN: HALL. for THO: ROBINSON, 1660. Dr Taylor in his further explication of the doctrine of original sin, pag. 496. THat every man is inclined to evil, some more, some less, but all in some instances; is very true: and it is an effect, or condition of nature, but no sin properly; 1: because that which is unavoidable is not a sin; 2: because it is accidental to nature, not intrinsecall, and essential; 3: It is superinduced to nature, and is after it, etc. To the unprejudiced Reader. I shall only give thee a brief narrative of the occasion of the ensuing letters: one Mr T. C. of Bridgwater being at my house, broke out into extraordinary, (that I say not excessive, and Hyperbolical) praises of Dr jeremy Taylor; I expressed my concurrence with him in great part; nay I came nothing behind him in the just commendations of his admirable wit, great parts, quick and elegant pen, his abilities in Critical learning, and his profound skill in antiquity: but notwithstanding all this I professed my dissent from some of his opinions which I judged to be erroneous; and I instanced in his doctrine of original sin; now his further explication of this lay then causually in the window (as I take it) which hereupon I took up, and turned unto the passage now under debate, and showed unto Mr T. C. that therein was gross nonsense, and blasphemy; he for his own part, with a great deal of modesty, forthwith declined all further dispute of the business, but withal he told me, that he would, If I so pleased, give Dr Tailor notice of what I said; whereunto I agreed, and in a short time he brought me from the Dr a fair, and civil invitation to send him my exceptions, and with it a promise of a candid reception of them; whereupon I drew them up in a letter unto Mr T. C. the Copy whereof followeth. Letters of the Author And Dr JEREMY TAYLOR To Mr T. C. Sir, I have here, according unto your desire sent you my 〈◊〉 against that rassage in Dr Taylor, concerning which you 〈◊〉 at my house; It is in his further explication of the Doctrine of original sin, pag: 496: and it is the second argument, which he brings to prove; that inclination to evil is no sin properly; because it is accidental to nature, not intrinsecall and essential. The argument put into sorme may be reduced into two syllogisms. The first. Sin properly is not accidental to the nature of man. An inclination to evil is accidental to the nature of man: therefore An inclination to evil is no sin 〈◊〉. A second Syllogism is. Sin properly so called is intrinsecall, and essential to the nature of man. An inclination to evil is not intrinsecall, and essential to the nature of man: therefore, An inclination to evil is not sin properly so called. Unto the first of those syllogisms; I answer that the major is false; and that according to Porphyry his so celebrated desinition of an accident. Accidens est quod adest, & abest sine 〈◊〉 interitu: that is, as the best Commentators upon Porphyry expound the words. An accident is that, which may be affirmed, or denied of its subject, without any repugnancy, or contradiction to the essence, and desinition thereof; now to deny sin of man, gives no overthrow to his essence and definition, for a man that is no sinner may be animal 〈◊〉; sin therefore is accidental to the nature of man. The major of the second syllogism is 〈◊〉 less false, than that of the first, as for the term, intrinsecall, I shall not stay upon it; because the 〈◊〉 useth it as equivalent to essential, as is apparent by the 〈◊〉, he puts between 〈◊〉 and accidental; but shall wholly insist upon the word 〈◊〉: To say, as the Dr doth by consequence, that sin is essential to the nature of man, is an assertion, guilty of nonsense, Blusphemy, and libertinism. 1. Nonsense. A thing may be said to be essential unto an other, either a priori, and then it is 〈◊〉 of it, in primo modo dicendi pierce; or else 〈◊〉 posteriori, and then it is predicated of it, in secundo modo dicendi per se. And to say that fin is either of these ways essential to the nature of man, is such pitiful, and prodigious nonsense, as that I cannot think it 〈◊〉 of any serious refutation. In a second place I charge it with Blasphemy: it blasphemes three actions, three acts of God. 1. The creation of man. 2. The incarnation of Christ 3. The full 〈◊〉 of the Saints at the resurrection. 1. The creation of man: God was the Author of whatsoever was essential unto man; And if sin be essential unto the nature of man, than God was the Author of sin. 2. The 〈◊〉 of Christ: in which God made Christ like unto man in essentials; If sin then be 〈◊〉 unto the nature of man, God made Christ sinful; a blasphemy that I tremble to mention. 3. This opinion blasphemes God's full glorification of the Saints in the resurrection; for it affirms by just consequence, that they shall be raised with sin; because doubtless they shall be raised with whatsoever is essential to the nature of man. In the third, and last place this Tenet is chargeable with 〈◊〉: 'Tis a licentious doctrine, and opens a gap to the greatest 〈◊〉; for it takes away all conscience of sin, all repentance of it for the time past, all caution against it for the future: If sin be essential to the nature of man, what reason hath he to be humbled for it? to ask God pardon for it? to make any scruple of the committing of it? And thus having briesly performed my promise, and satisfied your request, I shall rest Your affectionate friend, and humble servant HENRY JEANES. Before the receipt of this, Mr T. C. gave an account unto Dr Taylor of what he remembered in our discourse, and received from him an answer, which he concealed from me until the delivery of my paper, and then he produced it. This answer together with my reply thereunto I shall next offer unto thy Consideration. To his respected Friend Mr. T. C. these, etc. Mr. C. I thank you for your letter, and friendly information os Mr Jeanes his exception; but is he had been as careful to understand as he was forward to object, and mistake, he had cased you, and me of this little trouble. He objects that I say, that inclination to sin is no sin, because it is accidental, not intrinsecall, and essential: and he gives reasons why such a reason is absurd. To all which I return this sost answer, that he says true, but nothing to the purpose. For the thing that I was to prove then, was the precedent word: [that every man is inclined to evil, some more, some less:] that is, that this inclination to evil is not regular and 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 not natural, sor as sor the other clause] it is an effect or condition of nature, but no sin properly] that was the less principal part of the proposition, and to it only the first reason 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, viz: [that which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not a sin.) But if he had considered the 〈◊〉 I was then 〈◊〉, he 〈◊〉 needs have seen that I was explicating that clause of the Church Article [and is inclined to evil] which I was to say, was an inclination not natural, not 〈◊〉, not 〈◊〉; but accidental: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this thing I pursue, and to this all the other 〈◊〉 relate to the end of that section, and none of 〈◊〉, the first only excepted, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 part of the proposition, which is I had lest out, and the reasons 〈◊〉 to it, the sense had been as complete, and my argument not the worse, and my 〈◊〉 no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And 〈◊〉 be 〈◊〉 the 4 last reasons, that is, all 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 to that 〈◊〉 of the variety of our inclination to 〈◊〉, he will not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 reason, but all the 〈◊〉. Besides this if Mr Jeanes had so much 〈◊〉 as he pretends to have Logic, he would have perceived that sore me to 〈◊〉, what he says I 〈◊〉, had been the perfect destruction of all my 〈◊〉, and all my 〈◊〉, sor if I had said, that nothing could be a sin, but what is 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 I had 〈◊〉 that not only some sin, but all sin had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Now my Thesis being, that no sin, properly such, is natural; it cannot be imagined that I should mean what 〈◊〉 dreams of: it had not been to my purpose, either there or in 〈◊〉 question. But all the following reasons do so explicate, and sully manifest the meaning of the second; that I wonder hon Mr Jeanes is he be that person which he would be thought, could mistake, it, unless he be also that person he would not be thought: I could say many more things, but this being the truth of the business, and the real 〈◊〉 of my discourse, I need add no more; but one thing I cannot but add to Mr Jeanes, that is, since he instances in our B. Saviour, he must needs allow that 〈◊〉, taking it for those 〈◊〉, which are purely natural, and concreated with us, cannot possibly be a sin: Because as Mr Jeanes rightly observes, whatsoever is natural to man, was in Christ, because he 〈◊〉 all our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, but he had, not our 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 our 〈◊〉 nature hath no sin: for Christ was in all things 〈◊〉 to us, sin only excepted, but he took 〈◊〉 him our nature, and nothing of that was excepted; 〈◊〉 our nature of itself is not properly 〈◊〉: nothing os our constitution is 〈◊〉. Sir, I have given you a saire and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. I pray let Mr Jeanes have 〈◊〉 much conveyed to him, as 〈◊〉 that part to which he 〈◊〉: and if he writes 〈◊〉 thing against me, let him take notice os this my answer, or else all the World shall take notice of his impertinent, and uningenious dealing: I pray let not this letter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of your hand, because I have no copy os it, if Mr Jeanes should be troublesome: But if he be, it will be 〈◊〉 to acquaint his neighbourhood with my 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 what he says shall go no 〈◊〉. Sir, I hope you will 〈◊〉 this trouble I put you to in reading a long letter to my readiness to do you service, and as a return os those great kindnesses by which you have obliged. London July 4th. 1657. Sir, Your very affectionate friend to love and serve you 〈◊〉: TAYLOR. Postscript. I hope I have spoken clearly enough in the explicating, and untying this knot in the bulrush; but if it be not extremely plain, for your own satisfaction make but the second part of the proposition to be a Parenthesis; thus, beginning at (and it is an effect, &c: unto 2.) and then the thing is extremely plain, (or there the design was only to say and prove that although man be (more or less, as it happens) inclined to sin, yet his nature is never the more criminal for that: for it is besides his nature, it is accidental to it, not but that it is natural to be inclined to such objects; but that this should be sinful is but in some cases, and it is accidental, and it is because those objects were forbidden after our nature was given to us. Man is naturally inclined to some things, which are not naturally, but accidentally sinful. To his Loving friend Mr T. C. these etc. Sir, I have received Dr Taylor his letter sent unto you, bearing date July 4th. What design you had in concealing of it so long from me I cannot guess. But if you had delivered it before I had sent you my objections, you would have eased me, and Dr Taylor of some trouble: for I should then have let alone these objections, and have only proved, that I did him no wrong, in charging him with the conclusions, against which these objections were directed; to wit, that no sin is accidental; that all sin is essential, and intrinsical. Two things he layeth to my charge, want of care to understand him, and disingenuity. 1. Want of care to understand him. [If he had been (he saith) as careful to understand as he was forward to object, and mistake, he had eased you, and me of this little trouble.] But if the Dr had been a man of that ingenuity, which you fame him for, he would have confessed his carelessness in expressing of himself, and not have charged me with want of care to understand, that to be his meaning which I could not understand to be his meaning without offering violence to his words: he propounds two propositions (without any thing, but a copulative conjunction interposed between them) And unto the last of these propositions he subjoineth 6 reasons. Now what rule of Logic obliged me to carry the 5 last of these reasons backwards, and to place them between the above mentioned propositions, I readily confess myself to be utterly ignorant, and shall be very ready to sit down at the Doctor's feet, and to learn any such rule of him. If the Dr must have such liberty allowed him to make such unexampled transpositions, he is a very formidable adversary, not to be coped with by mortal wights, who cannot guess, how he will in an after game sever these reasons, that he hath first joined together. Logic informeth me that secondly signifies a relation of order betwixt itself and firstly. But now if two reasons be related unto not one, but several conclusions, I would fain know why one should be the first, and the other the second reason. Besides here is a first reason, that hath no second reason following it, relating unto the same conclusion. There goeth a story of an Alderman in Oxford, that upon the reading of some records touching something controverted betwixt the Town, and University, he broke out into this expression; unless we can prove King Henry the 8th to be before King Henry the seventh the University will have the better of us: But if we can make it good, that King Henry the 8th was before King Henry the 7th, than there is no doubt, but that we shall in this 〈◊〉 have a full Conquest over the Scholars. I take this to be a fable: 〈◊〉 however give me leave to make application of it unto my present purpose. All the wrong, that the Dr can pretend, that I have done him, is because I did not place secondly before firstly, and if he can make it good, that I ought to have placed secondly before firstly, than I must needs confess I have done him a great deal of Injury, and shall be ready to ask his pardon; and unless such proof can be made, he must lay the blame upon the Confusion, and disorder of his own discourse: But to go on. The Dr tells us, that this clause [it is an effect, or condition of nature, but no sin properly, is the less principal part of the proposition:] both clauses then, according unto him, make but one proposition; and this is a great failing against that Logic, which the learned have 〈◊〉 used; for by that, 〈◊〉 two clauses are not parts of one proposition, 〈◊〉 several, entire, distinct propositions. But perhaps he may say, that they make one compounded proposition. Unto this I shall reply, 1. That a compounded 〈◊〉 consists ever of simple propositions. Now the last of these 〈◊〉 (to say nothing of the first) is a compounded proposition itself, for it is an 〈◊〉 proposition; and therefore, though these two clauses may make an 〈◊〉 of several propositions, yet they can never concur to the Composition of one. 2. If both clauses make one 〈◊〉 proposition, than it is a 〈◊〉 proposition; because they are knit together by a copulative conjunction; Now a copulative proposition is not true, unless all parts be true; and 〈◊〉 it is not proved to be true, unless all parts be proved to be true: Now the Doctor for the proof of this pretended copulative proposition jumbleth together 6 reasons without any note of distinction to direct the 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 which part of the proposition (as he calls 〈◊〉) he should apply the 〈◊〉 all reasons: and whether this proof of a copulative 〈◊〉 be not illog call, I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any man, that knows any thing in Logic. He informs you, that the first reason is to be 〈◊〉 unto the latter part of the proposition (as he calls it) and the 5 other reasons unto the first part of the proposition. But what precept of 〈◊〉, or Grammar I have transgressed in 〈◊〉 making such a distribution, or application of his reasons, he doth not 〈◊〉 you. But the Doctor directs you unto two ways sor the 〈◊〉 out of his meaning. The First to leave out the second clause, and the reason relating unto it. Is I had (〈◊〉 he) 〈◊〉 out the latter part of the proposition, and the reasons 〈◊〉 to it, my sense had been as complete, and my argument not the 〈◊〉, and my discourse no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But the second clause being lest in, perturbeth, and confoundeth the sense, and occasioneth the mistake: and who (I pray) is to be blamed, the Dr for putting it into the 〈◊〉, or I for still keeping it in the Analysis of his words? 〈◊〉 would be a strange, and unheard of way of analysing, that a Reader should lop off two lines at a time of an author: But it should seem we are to make such 〈◊〉 to make your great Dr speak sense, only I would know by what warrant, and obligation. A second way, which will make it extremely plain (as he tells you in the 〈◊〉) is to make the second part of the proposition (as he terms it) and the reason relating unto it to be a 〈◊〉. But, 1. that this was not brought in by way of Parenthesis, who is in the fault? Again, 2. The Dr hath told us, that it is the second part of the same proposition with the foregoing clause, and if so, than it cannot be inserted as a 〈◊〉 betwixt it, and the following proposition. And besides, 3. If he bring in the words only by way of Parenthesis, I would 〈◊〉 know what is to be done with 2ly, in this case he must new figure, and number his reasons. That which he figureth to be the second reason, must be the first, and his six reasons will prove to be but five. The second thing that he chargeth me with is disingenuity. Besides this (saith he) if Mr Jeanes had so much ingenuity, as he pretends to have 〈◊〉, he would have perceived, etc. 1. As what he speaks of my pretending unto Logic, I think unworthy of any answer, and shall leave it unto the Reader to judge of the wit, and ingenuity thereof. 2. It is no disingenuous part in me to charge the Dr with a conclusion, that I prove his words to be guilty of: For as for his meaning, I cannot guess at it, but by his words, but I believe the unpartial Reader, will judge it a very high point of 〈◊〉 in the Dr, not to acknowledge the incommodious structure of his words. But let us hear wherein my disingenuity consists. Is Mr Jeanes (saith he) had so much 〈◊〉 as he pretends to have Logic, he would have perceived that for me to mean, what he says I mean, had been the persect destruction of all my discourse, and all my intention. If this be all; The Dr hath no reason to charge me with want of ingenuity in this particular; for I do very weil perceive, that for him to mean, what I say, his words hold forth (for as for any secret, and reserved meaning, I have nothing to do with) had been the perfect destruction of all his 〈◊〉, etc. But I believe the 〈◊〉 meaning is, that it is an ingenuous part in me to 〈◊〉 it possible; or probable for him to assert any thing, that is the perfect destruction of all his discourse, and all his intention. Now this I utterly deny. I have no such apprehension of the Doctor's 〈◊〉; but take him to be a man as likely to 〈◊〉 himself, as other mortals. There is one thing more, that the Dr adds concerning our blessed Saviour, that concupiscence taking it for those desires, which are purely natural, and concreated is no sin, because it was in Christ. Unto which I answer that this is nothing unto the purpose; for the concupiscence in controversy is 〈◊〉, and never created, or concreated by God. It is an inclination unto evil; and therefore irregular, and disorderly: it is that which the Apostle termeth, the sin, that dwelleth in him, Rom. 7. 17: which 〈◊〉 him do that evil, which he would not, vers: 19: which he hated, vers: 15. The law of his members warring against the law of his mind, vers: 23: the body of this death, from which he desired to be delivered, vers: 24: And (methinks) he should be afraid to ascribe this concupiscence unto Jesus Christ, who was the Lamb of God without blemish, and without spot, 1 Pet. 1. 19: holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners, Heb. 7. 26: And thus I have according unto the Doctor's desire, taken notice of his answer, and shall not be so hasly as to write any thing against him, but that I shall stay a convenient time to hear the uttermost, that he can say; and when our Paper shall be made public unto all the World, I do not doubt but there will be more that will accuse him of incogitancy, than me of impertinency. Many ingenious and learned men, and some, that otherwise admire the Dr, have made the same construction of his words, that I have, and thought that, he here forgot himself. I am informed that the Dr in a letter unto you, tells you, that he desires not to be 〈◊〉 with my 〈◊〉 Logic, I hope he reviles not Logic as trifling, for 〈◊〉 I know in what herd of writers to rank him, and should decline him as an 〈◊〉 adversary, who is an enemy to the very art of reason. But it is not Logic itself I believe, but my Logic, that he thus bespatters: and if it be so, I shall return nothing unto this his censure, but leave you, and others his admirers to judge of the humility, and 〈◊〉 thereof. I have heard that the Dr hath printed a very good Grammar, if he will also publish a Logic, for the better information of such triflers as myself, I do assure you, that I will very diligently peruse it, and if it be more solid, weighty, and 〈◊〉, than those which I have hitherto read, give him many thanks for it. As for his last letter, I have not yet had the leisure fully to peruse it, but by that 〈◊〉 view which I have taken of it, I find it to be as empty of reason, (though fuller of passion) as the former: you have given it out that it is unanswerable; but I shall desire you to have a little patience, and if I do not give it a satisfying answer, I shall submit unto what penance you will enjoin me. In great hast I rest. Your affectionate 〈◊〉, and servant, HENRY JEANES. Chedzoy August 31. 1657. Mr C. thought, that the Doctor's letter would supersede all 〈◊〉 sputation; but perceiving that I was unsatisfied, and that I intended a replication, he conveyed my objections unto the Doctor, which begat a very angry letter from him; unto which he would not vouchsafe so much as a superscription; but I saw the Contents concerned me, and therefore unto thee I shall present it, together with my answer thereunto, submitting both unto thy censure, and so shall rest Devoted to thy spiritual service HENRY JEANES Sir, I understand by my very good friend Mr T. C that you are very much troubled at a passage in my [further explication of original sin] pag: 496: The words are these [that every man is inclined to 〈◊〉 some more, some less, but all in some instances, is very true, and it is an effect, or condition of nature; but no sin properly.] The 〈◊〉 you conceive is because, one of the 〈◊〉 I bring to prove it is, because it is accidental to nature, not intrinsecall and essential.] 〈◊〉 this you 〈◊〉 that I 〈◊〉 that all sin is intrinsecall and essential to nature: which indeed is I had said, I had been as very a fool as you conceive me, and worse; 〈◊〉 besides the reasons you are pleased to object, which I am no way by this 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉, I had destroyed my main intention, nay, that which I was proving in that 〈◊〉 place; for my work there was to prove that no sin is, or can be natural. Now 〈◊〉 although I 〈◊〉 you could easily have understood what I did and must mean there; yet because you are pleased not to do it; I will point in out to you. To 〈◊〉 to evil is an effect or condition of nature; but no sin properly, 〈◊〉: of 〈◊〉; for that is the subject of the Question: whether inclination to evil be an 〈◊〉 os nature, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 principle of evil; a sin natural and necessary. Now that it is not this; I doc suppose that reason, which you so misconstrued competent: 〈◊〉: It is not a natural or necessary sin, not a sin of our nature, because it is 〈◊〉 to nature, not intrins. call, not essential; If it be in our nature, it must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it 〈◊〉 be at first, it must be in all persons, that have our 〈◊〉. And this is my meaning; and that you may not be troubled at the word essential; I 〈◊〉 it not in the 〈◊〉 physical, but in the moral sense; that which is not after our nature, but together with it in real being: and I explicate it, by intrinsical; I oppose it to accidental; (in this 〈◊〉) 〈◊〉 to [superinduced] in the next, Sir I did give an account to Mr C. in a letter to him, which I know was sufficient, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; for cujus est loqui, ejus est 〈◊〉; I told you perfectly what is my meaning, it is very plain by the whole 〈◊〉 of that, that it must be my meaning; it is also 〈◊〉 enough and very easy in the expression, and therefore I now appeal to your 〈◊〉, whether you ought to have made such tragedios with that which common 〈◊〉 would have made plain to you, unless you had received a prejudice. And now 〈◊〉, to your two 〈◊〉, be pleased to the subject of the two majors, to add but this qualification; [natural] and try if those horrid consequents will follow which you assixed to your own 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But I shall for this once consider the particulars. 1. You charge it with nonsense; but with your favour you prove it most pitifully, your 〈◊〉 is, that to say [essential] is predicated of (sin) in either os the two ways, dicendi per se, is such pitiful and prodigious nonsense, that you 〈◊〉 it not worthy of any serious resutation: so that this is your argument [to say that sin is essential is prodigious and pitiful nonsense; g. it is prodigious and pitiful nonsense] surely a good argument; or thus, that which is such nonsense that you think ' not worthy of resutation, is certainly nonsense: but to say that sin is essential is such nonsense that you think not worthy of resute: therefore it is 〈◊〉. I do not say your argument is 〈◊〉, but I am sure it is no argument, 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 affirmative be a sufficient proof in your Logic. But to the thing that 〈◊〉 is essential, is 〈◊〉 false to say, but to say so, is not 〈◊〉. And whereas you will suppose me to say so, you are uncharitable, and something unreasonable in it: for I was to prove that inclination to sin, was not a sin of our nature (as was pretended,) because what was 〈◊〉, is 〈◊〉 and essential, as docibility to man; which because to be 〈◊〉 to sin is not, g. it is not a sin, viz: of nature. In the next place you charge this with blasphemy. If I had 〈◊〉 or meant what you pretend; you had reason. But then pray consider how your charge will return really upon yourself. For is it be blasphemy to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be the Author of sin; than what I derived from 〈◊〉 is no sin, for that 〈◊〉 sin should descend upon me, I demand, who was the Author of that? If you please you may take time to consider it; but in the interim, if you be pleased to read a little 〈◊〉 of mine called Deus justificatus, you shall find my Question not to be answered by you, if you have any regard to the authority, or to the reason of Mr Calvin, Dr Twisse, and some other Bigots of your party. Your second charge of Blespemy, is that my reason does by implication involve Christ in the guilt of sin; because whatsoever is essential he had. But then if you remember, that I say not, that sin is essential; and that I bring the reverse of this very argument against your party and 〈◊〉 in some of my late discourses, you have reason to 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 out of your own bosom, not to tell me, that I 〈◊〉. For if inclination to sin be a sin naturally, and derived from our Parents, I demand whether or no had not Christ all natural 〈◊〉? If he had not, he was not a 〈◊〉 man. If he had then all natural desire: are not natural sins, for if you say they be you are the blasphemer by the consequence of your affirmative; not I: But God forbid that either of us should. Your 〈◊〉 reason also is as pretty. For first; I demand whether a possibility to sin be not of the nature of man (for that is all I mean by essential.) If it be not; how came Adam to sin his first sine? if it be; I ask: whether shall the 〈◊〉 in the resurrection be raised up with it or no? If yea, than you 〈◊〉 God's full glorification of the Saints in the resurrection, for 〈◊〉 is certainly a part of their full glorification; If nay, than it is no blasphemy to say that in the resurrect on the Saints shall be raised up will out something that is essential to them, or of their nature. But Sir, what 〈◊〉 you of mortality? is that 〈◊〉, or os the nature of man? I suppose you will not 〈◊〉 it. But yet I also believe you will confess that though we are 〈◊〉 a corruptible 〈◊〉, yet we shall be 〈◊〉 an incorruptible; and the 〈◊〉 shall put on immortality. Once more, is it natural to be natural? that will not be denied; but then remember that although to be natural is essential, that is, of the essence of the body, yet the natural body shall 〈◊〉 without its 〈◊〉, it is sown a naurall body, it is raised a spiritual. So that you see if I had said this which you charge upon me, which is so contrary to my thoughts, and so against my purpose, yet your arguments could not have overthrowns it. It is good advice, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. If you had been pleased to have learned my meaning, before you had published your dislike, I should have 〈◊〉 myself obliged to you in a great acknowledgement: now you have said very much evil of me, though I deserved it not. For suppose I had not prosperously enough expressed my meaning; yet you who are a man of wit and parts could easily have 〈◊〉 my purpose and my design, you could not but know and consider too, that my great 〈◊〉 was to say, that sin could not be natural; that it is so sar from being 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not so much as subjected in our common nature, but in our persons only. 〈◊〉 beside 〈◊〉 Sir, I am a little to complain of you, that when you had two 〈◊〉 at your choice to explicate each other, (intrinsical and 〈◊〉) you would take the 〈◊〉 and the worst seize, not the easiest and most ready: for you cannot but know that (〈◊〉) is not always to be taken in the 〈◊〉 sense os Philosophy 〈◊〉 that which is 〈◊〉 os a nature; but largely and for all sorts of proprieties, and the universal accidents of 〈◊〉; as it is essential to man to laugh, to be capable 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to be mortal, to 〈◊〉 a body of contrary qualities, and consequently by nature corruptible; and in a moral 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 metaphysical significations, and not to be content with 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from an 〈◊〉 to quarrel, but not from that ingenuity which will be your and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Although I have not much to do with it, yet because you are so 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉, and so great an admirer of that, which everyone of your 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 desinition of an accident: I care not if I tell you, that the 〈◊〉 on is imperfect and 〈◊〉 it is not convertible with the 〈◊〉. For even 〈◊〉 things 〈◊〉 be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, sine interitu subjecti. I instance: to be 〈◊〉, is essential 〈◊〉 a ledy, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 have succession of duration; but yet in the resurrection, when bodies shall be spiritual and eternal, those other which are now Essential predicates shall be taken away, and yet the subject remain, and be improved to higher and more noble predicates. This I have here set down, not that I at all value the problem whether it be so or no; but that you may not think me a Socinian particularly in this Article, or that I think the bodies in the resurrection shall be specifically distinct from what they are: I believe them the same bodies, but ennobled in their very beings: For to a specifical and substantial change, is required that there be an introduction of new forms; but yet the improving of Essential predicates, is no specification of subjects, but melioration of the first: But the consequent is, that abesse, & adesse, &c is not an excellent definition of an accident. And yet further, it follows, That if sin were as essential to a man, as mortality is, or to be quantitative, yet there is no more need that a man should rise with sin, then with mortality: But Aristotle's, Philosophy, and Porphyries Commentary, are but all measures in Theology; and you should do well to scour bright the armour in which you trust, which unless it be prudently conducted, it will 〈◊〉 a man a Sophister, rather than a Theologue; but you are wiser. I have only this one thing to add, That the common discourses of Original sin, make sin to be natural, necessary and unavoidable; and then may not I use your own words? This Tenet is chargeable with Libertinism: It is a licentious Doctrine, and opens a gap to the greatest profaneness: For it takes away all conscience of sin, all repentance of it for the time past. If sin be natural, necessary, and unavoidable, as it is to us, if we derive it from Adam, etc. What reason hath he to be humbled for it, and to ask God pardon for it? So that you have done well against your own Opinion; and if I had not used the argument before, I should have had reason to thank you for it: Now as it is, you are further to consider it, not I Sir, Though I have reason to give you the priority to every thing else, yet in civility I have far outdone you: You were offended at a passage, which you might easily, but would not understand: You have urged arguments against me, which return upon your own head: The Proposition you charge me withal, I own not in any of your senses, nor (as you set it down) in any at all; and yet your Arguments do not substantially or rationally confute it, if I had said so: Besides all this, you have used your pleasure upon me, you have reviled me, slighted me, scorned me, untempted, unprovoked: you never seat to me civilly to give you satisfaction in your objections but t●k'd it in my absence, and to my prejudice; yet I have sent you an answer, I hope satisfactory, and together with it a long Letter, which in the midst of my many affairs, and straitened condition, is more than I can again afford: And after all this, I assure you that I will pray for you, and speak such good things of you, as I can ●●●de, or hear to be in you, and profess myself, and really be, Sir, Your affectionate Friend and Servant in our blessed Lord and Saviour jesus. Jer 〈…〉 Taylor. August 15. 1657. Postscript. Sir, I received yours late last night, and I have returned you this, early this 〈◊〉. that I might in 〈◊〉 thing be respective of you; but I desire not to be troubled with 〈◊〉 thing that is not very 〈◊〉, for I have business of much greater concernment; 〈◊〉 there can I draw the saw of contention with any man about things less 〈◊〉. I 〈◊〉 no 〈◊〉, I need none, I desire none; 〈◊〉 expect that you will employ 〈◊〉 good parts in any thing rather, then in being 〈◊〉 in alieno libro: Your 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (if you 〈◊〉) serve God, then by 〈◊〉 with, or without reason. To the Reverend and Learned, Dr. 〈◊〉 Tailor. SIR. WHat you mean, by my being very much troubled at a passage in your further Explication of Original Sin, I know not; Indeed I expressed unto Mr. T. C. my dislike of it, and charged it with nonsense and Blasphemy: And this charge I have proved; and now shall briefly vindicate the proof of it, from your Reply in this my rejoinder. You tell me, that your work in that very place, is to prove, That no sin is, or can be natural: Now I cannot find any thing sounding that way within forty lines of these words; and that it was my duty to look further for the Coherence of them, I confess, I knew not. Another great mistake also, it seems I have committed; in that I have not so high thoughts of you, as to think it impossible, or very unlikely, that you should be so uncautelous as to drop any contradiction unto your main intention: And this is an error that I can hardly shake off as yet; but I do assure you, that I shall endeavour to have as reverend an opinion of you as I possibly can; only, I shall never exempt you from a 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉: never think that you sit upon a Chair made of Irish Timber, that cannot endure a venomous Spider to hang his web thereon. I shall, for that which followeth, insert the words of your Letter verbatim, that the Reader may the better compare them and my answer together. Dr. Taylor. Now although I know you could easily have understood what I did, and must 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; yet, because you are pleased not to do it, I shall point it to you. 〈◊〉. I wonder why you should think it so easy a matter to understand your meaning, seeing you, who are the Author, 〈◊〉 from yourself in 〈◊〉 what it is; for in your Letter unto Mr. C. you apportioned this second Reason soley unto the 〈◊〉 Clause; That every man is inclined to evil, some more, some less, but all, 〈◊〉 some 〈◊〉 stances is very true: And here in your Letter to me, you apply it unto the second Clause: It is an effect or condition of nature, but no sin 〈◊〉. Suppose I were at a loss, yet you have no reason to blame me, until you agree with your 〈◊〉: I have no Spectacles to look into your meaning, but your words, and that they 〈◊〉 related only unto one Proposition, as a reason thereof; and yet related to two Propositions, as a proof of each, was a thing that I could never 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 cannot yet understand; and herein, I am afraid, you are as unable to teach me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 can be, as I am uncapable of learning; but if you can teach any such thing unto me, you shall find me, though perhaps not an apt, yet a willing and thankful Scholar: But to deal plainly with you, I am very confident that your words in themselves hold forth neither of those senses that you propound; and if by 〈◊〉 of argument you can prove either of them from your words, you shall have my most 〈◊〉 and subm ssive 〈◊〉 of my mistake, and shall have full leave to prescribe me as public and shameful a satisfaction, as you can think on; unto which, I do 〈◊〉 to conform my 〈◊〉. But let us hear how you point out your meaning to me. Dr. Taylor. Yet because you are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to understand what I did, and must mean 〈◊〉, I will point it out to you: To be 〈◊〉 to evil, is an effect or 〈◊〉 of nature, but no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, viz. of nature; 〈◊〉 that is the subject of the 〈◊〉, whether 〈◊〉 unto evil be an effect of nature, or an 〈◊〉 principle of evil; a 〈◊〉 natural and 〈◊〉? Now that it is not this, I do suppose that reason, which you so 〈◊〉, competent, 〈◊〉. it is not a natural, or necessary 〈◊〉, not a sin of our nature, because it is 〈◊〉 to nature, not 〈◊〉, not essential. Jeanes. To rescue your second reason from that which I charge it with, you are 〈◊〉 to make an additional supply unto the Proposition; unto which, you 〈◊〉 your second reason is competent. To be 〈◊〉 to evil, etc. is no sin properly, no natural and necessary sin, no inherent Principle of evil. Now unto this addition I shall apply your words that you have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 in the like case; whether it may be allowed you by 〈◊〉 cense, less than 〈◊〉, let 〈◊〉 judge: Surely, Sir, if the most of your Writings be thus 〈◊〉, they will be 〈◊〉 unto me without a Commentary, and if you must be indulged the liberty of making such 〈◊〉, all the 〈◊〉 in Christendom are no match to dispute with you. But to insist a little upon the 〈◊〉 of this Interpolation. 1. You seem to make equivalent these two 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 principle of evil, 〈◊〉 to evil, is a sin 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉: But I am utterly unsatisfied touching this their 〈◊〉, and shall desire you to clear it up unto me. Nay further, I very much question the truth of the first Proposition; this 〈◊〉 to evil, is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 principle of evil; and shall entreat you to inform me, whether you deny it to be a 〈◊〉 of evil, or an 〈◊〉 principle, and think it only adherent, 〈◊〉, or the 〈◊〉: but I believe you will tell me of some 〈◊〉 in your words, that I ought to understand, and supply something to make out your 〈◊〉: What it is, I will not adventure to guests at, but leave it to you to express it yourself. Secondly, The conclusion that is confirmed by your second Reason, is the same with that which is proved by your first Reason; and that was, that inclination to evil was no sin, without the additional Epithets of natural and 〈◊〉 It is no sin, say you, properly; because, that which is 〈◊〉, is no sin: and indeed, the unavoidableness of our 〈◊〉 to evil, may be a probable argument that it is no sin, and require an answer; but no competent reason at all to prove it not to be natural and necessary: But seeing you say, it must be your meaning that these 〈◊〉 should be interposed, we will for once 〈◊〉 it, for Disputation sake, and see whether we can understand by any means what you would have. 1. You say, your meaning in your conclusion is, that 〈◊〉 to evil is no sin, 〈◊〉. of nature, which I shall consider 〈◊〉, when I shall come to examine that 〈◊〉 of yours, That sin is not so much as 〈◊〉 in our common nature. 2. Let us inquire what you mean by 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉. 1. What you mean by natural: There be divers significations of the word natural, which are impertinent to our present Discourse, and therefore I shall omit them. I suppose that you take natural, either for that, which is so termed, in regard of 〈◊〉 with our nature; or else in respect of Physical, and necessary 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 nature. If you take it for that, which is so termed, in regard of 〈◊〉 with our nature, which is 〈◊〉 with our nature, derived unto us in the Nativity and Concept on of our nature, than your second Reason is Tautological, a most pitiful and 〈◊〉 begging of the question; for you tell us afterward, that by essential, you mean that which is not after our nature, but together with it in real being; and then, there will be no more difference betwixt essential and natural, in this acception of it, than there is betwixt 〈◊〉 and gladius, and so your Argument explained will stand thus. 〈◊〉 to evil is not connexed with our nature; because it is not connexed with our nature: it is not coeval with our nature, derived unto us in the Conception and Nativity of our nature; because it is after our nature, and not together with it in real being. 2. If you take natural, in regard of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from our 〈◊〉; then your Argument is impertinent, and concerns not those whom you oppose; for they deny, as well as you, that 〈◊〉 unto evil is natural in such a 〈◊〉: Let two speak for all. First, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in his 〈◊〉, where his determination of the sixteenth Question, is, 〈◊〉 ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ex 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The second is Dr. Baro in his Metaphysics, pag. 256. Theologi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But perhaps you may pitch upon some other acception of natural; if you 〈◊〉, I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 you not to chide me, but to certify my mistake by 〈◊〉 of your meaning; for I have done my 〈◊〉 to bolt it out, and must needs 〈◊〉, that I cannot 〈◊〉 at any other signification of natural, which you can here in 〈◊〉 place with any 〈◊〉 pretend unto: But if you can 〈◊〉 me with any other, when I know it, I shall be ready to examine it. But to proceed unto the next 〈◊〉 necessary: When you said, that an inclination to evil was not properly a sin, your meaning was (you say) that it was not a necessary sin. But then I desire to know how your first Reason will be suited unto this conclusion, for your first Reason stands thus, because that which is 〈◊〉, is not sin; and I would entreat you also to inform us, what is the difference here 〈◊〉 necessary and unavoidable; for if there be no difference, I shall 〈◊〉 suspect your arguments sick of that infirmity, called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But perhaps we must here make the 〈◊〉 supply, and understand you thus, because that which is unavoidable is not a necessary sin; if so, your Argument reduced unto form, will run thus. Nothing that is unavoidable can be a necessary sin: But an inclination to evil is unavoidable: Therefore it is not a necessary sin. Unto your 〈◊〉 I say, that though unavoidableness, in one sense, may carry a 〈◊〉 unto sin, yet not to necessary; it may prove a thing not to be a sin, but it makes 〈◊〉 against its being necessary; for that which is 〈◊〉, may be, and is necessary; it is probable therefore, that necessary was never in your 〈◊〉 thoughts, but put in, to secure your second Reason from 〈◊〉 Objections against it. However, yet I shall here propound and apply a 〈◊〉 of necessary, usual among your Antagonists: * Dr. 〈◊〉: Reynolds 3 Treatises, pag: 209. A thing, say they, may be said to be necessary, in regard of either 〈◊〉 and created, or 〈◊〉 and contracted 〈◊〉. If you speak of that, which is necessary with that necessity, which is primitive and created, then indeed I grant your conclusion true, and your second reason competent unto it: Inclination unto evil is not a necessary sin, in regard of a Primitive and Created necessity. But now this were utterly besides the main of your intention, for here you would sight with nothing but your own shadow, because your adversaries do not avouch such a necessity in our inclination to evil, but defy and abhor it more than yourself; and you cannot 〈◊〉 any such thing unto them, unless you 〈◊〉 calumniate them. If you speak of that which is necessary, with a consequent and contracted necessity; then your conclusion is false, and your second reason no confirmation thereof; if it be put into form, it will make up two Syllogisms. The first Syllogism. Nothing that is accidental, can be a sin necessary, with a consequent and contracted necessity. But our inclination to evil is accidental. Therefore it is not a necessary sin in respect of a consequent and contracted necessity. The second Syllogism. Every thing that is necessary in respect of a consequent and contracted necessity, is intrinsecal and essential. But 〈◊〉 to evil is not intrinsecal and essential. Therefore it is not necessary, in regard of a consequent and contracted necessity. The major in both Syllogisms is evidently false, as will appear, when you attempt the proof of them: and I am very 〈◊〉, you never will own them, if you can any other way shift off my objections. In the next place, we have a strange Paradox of yours, which I understand not, I shall propound it, and briefly consider it. Dr. Taylor. Is it 〈◊〉 in our nature, it must be naturally inseparable, it must be at first, it must be is all 〈◊〉 that have our nature. Jeanes. I shall not 〈◊〉 charge this Proposition with falsehood, until I know how you 〈◊〉 it, and yet I will tell you what reason I have to suspect it to be very false; divers accidents are in our nature, properly and strictly inherent in our nature, which yet are naturally separable from our nature, which were not at 〈◊〉, which are not now in all persons that have our nature: I might instance in several acquired habits, and 〈◊〉 acts of the rational soul, which are neither adequate unto, nor coeval with, nor naturally inseparable from it. But I look for some strange Ellipsis; a Rhetorical Scheme it seems you are much delighted with; but if you use it 〈◊〉 often, it will prove rather a Weed, than a Flower in your Rhetoric; you expect, it seems, I should pay such reverence unto your Writings, as great Critics do unto the Ancients, in whose words, when they cannot make sense, they suppose some Chasma to 〈◊〉 up, with which they torture 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; but I have something else to do, then to trouble myself with Divinations at your meaning: when you vouchsafe to acquaint us what it is, I shall then examine it. But having seen how ill you have sped in new shaping your conclusion, let us 〈◊〉 next whether your success be better in the qualification of your second reason 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Dr. Taylor. And this is my meaning, and that you may not be troubled at the word Essential; I mean it not in the strict Physical, but 〈◊〉 the moral sense, that which is not after our nature, but together with it in real being, and explicate it by 〈◊〉; and I oppose it to accidental in this reason, and to 〈◊〉 in the next. Jeanes. But first, pray who could tell that you thus meant it, until you now tell me: Is this a usual and received sense of the word? and if it be, direct me unto those moral Philosophers and Divines, that thus take it; if it be not, my ignorance of it is 〈◊〉 negationis, not 〈◊〉 dispositionis, not privative and unblamable: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 se positum slat pro 〈◊〉 Analogato; and therefore I appeal unto your own ingenuity, whether I have injured you, by supposing that you took Essential in the accustomed accept on thereof. 2. I shall beseech you to set down the difference that you make betwixt natural in your conclusion, and essential in your second reason for it; and when you have done this, I am very confident to make it appear, that your Argument is either a mere tautology, or an utter impertinency; but of this before. Next you refer me unto your former Letter unto Mr. C. Dr. Taylor. Sir, I did give an account unto Mr. C. in a Letter to him, which I know was sufficient, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Jeanes. The vanity of this brag you will soon acknowledge, when you shall compare that Letter with this unto me; for in this you apply the second reason unto the latter as a congruent proof; it it is an effect, or condition of nature, but no sin 〈◊〉: And this you point out to be your meaning, and say, That I could easily have understood it: But in your Letter to Mr. C. you aver, that this second reason is appliable only unto the first clause; That every man is 〈◊〉 to evil, some more, some less, etc. and not at all unto the second; nay, that it is not appliable unto it, without a mistake of not only the second, but the four other reasons also; and of this too, you say that it must be your meaning, and that 'tis clear enough, and easy in the 〈◊〉; and you wonder that Mr Jeanes, if he be the man, that he would be thought could mistake it: Here you propound inconsistent and contrary meanings, and it seems you intent to tie me unto such hard meat, as that I must find out each to be your 〈◊〉; but this is a task, that my understanding cannot perform, and therefore I 〈◊〉 beg assistance from the 〈◊〉 and learning of yours: and until you afford this, I shall offer unto your consideration this common rule in 〈◊〉, That contrary 〈◊〉 cannot be both true, 〈◊〉 one of them must needs be false: But these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, this second 〈◊〉 is referred unto the second clause, as a competent proof, and this second reason is not referred unto the second clause, are contrary propositions; the opposition betwixt singular propositions, being, as 〈◊〉 well showeth, the prop: cap. 11. num. 18. most aptly reducible unto contrariety; an i yet both these propositions are yours, the first in this letter, the latter in your former letter, and therefore one of them must needs be false; you are not then so much 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, extra 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, out of Gun-shot, but that my poor 〈◊〉 Logic is able to reach you: if you should deny the matter of Fact, that both these propositions are yours, your letters will convince you of untruth, and I shall need no more then to transcribe your own words: The first Proposition you have in these words of this Letter, To be inclined to evil, is an effect, or condition of nature, but no sin properly, viz. of nature, etc. a sin natural and necessary; now that it is not this, I do suppose that reason, which you so misconstrued, is competent, etc. The second, in several passages of your former Letter; as for the other clause, it is an effect, or condition of nature, but no sin properly, that was the less principal part of the Proposition, and to it only the first reason was apportioned; and again afterward, none of the other reasons, the first only excepted, relate to the latter part of the Proposition: But let us hear your reason for the sufficiency of your Letter unto Mr. C. Dr. Taylor. For cujus est loqui, ejus est interpretari. Jeanes. I shall willingly grant you all fair liberty of interpreting yourself, so you do it logically and rationally; but that which you expect, is rather a licentiousness, than a true liberty of interpretation. First, You would have a licence of 〈◊〉, to carry your words where you please; you would have the second reason placed betwixt the two Propositions, and before the first Reason; thus in your Letter to Mr. C. 〈◊〉, You usurp the licence of interposition, to put in what you please; as when in this Letter you add the Epithets of natural and necessary to sin. And thirdly, You take up a strange licence in exposition of your Terms; for if you cannot justify what you say, if such a term in your words be taken in the common and usual sense: Then you impose upon me an unusual, that I say not a new and unheard of signification thereof. Thus you deal with the word Essential. And lastly, You assume a licence of contradiction, to contradict yourself, to say and unsay; one while to make this your meaning, and another time to make that which is contrary your meaning; and you think that I am obliged to take these contrary meanings to be both your meanings. Surely Sir, if you can get a Patent for these four Licenses, you will, for matter of Disputation, be shot-free and invulnerable; your Opponents may 〈◊〉 their caps at you, but not an Argument of theirs can touch you. Dr. Taylor. I told you perfectly what is my meaning, it is very 〈◊〉 by the whole design of that, that it must be my meaning, it is also clear enough, and very plain, and very 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the expression; and therefore I now appeal to your 〈◊〉, whether you ought to have made such Tragedies with that, which common sense would have made plain unto you, unless you had received a prejudice. Jeanes. As for this triumphant appeal which you make in the close here to my ingenuity, I need say nothing, but refer unto the premises; only I cannot but 〈◊〉 one Advertisement unto your Disciples, that you sometimes triumph when you have not conquered. Dr. Taylor. And now Sir, to your two Syllogisins, be pleased to the subject of the two Majors, add but this qualification [natural] and try if 〈◊〉 horrid 〈◊〉 will follow, which you affixed to your own 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Jeanes. I have already considered with how little sobriety you have added this Qualification of natural, and, I believe, the impartial Reader will conclude with me, that you have foisted it in upon second thoughts, only to avoid those horrid 〈◊〉, unto which your words in themselves are liable. Dr. Taylor. But I shall for this once consider the particulars. 1. You charge it with 〈◊〉 seize; but with your 〈◊〉 you prove it most pitisully: Your reason is, that to say [〈◊〉] is predicated of [sin] in either of the two ways dicendi per se, is such 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 nonsense, that you think it not worthy of any serious 〈◊〉: So that this is your Argument, To say that sin is Essential, is prodigious and pitiful nonsense, therefore it is prodigious and pitiful nonsense. Surely a good 〈◊〉; or thus, that which is such nonsense that you think not worthy of refutation, is certainly nonsense: But to say that sin is Essential, is such nonsense, that you think not worthy of refutation, therefore it is nonsense. I do not say your Argument is nonsense, but I am sure it is no Argument, unless a bold 〈◊〉 be a 〈◊〉 proof in your Logic. But to the 〈◊〉, That sin is Essential, is indeed 〈◊〉 to say, but to say so is not nonsense. And whereas you will suppose me to say so, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 uncharitable, and something unreasonable in it; for I was to prove, That inclination to sin was not a sin of our nature (as was pretended) because what was natural is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 essential, as 〈◊〉 to a man: which because to be 〈◊〉 to sin is not, 〈◊〉 it is not a sin, viz, of nature. Jeanes. First, Here is a gross and 〈◊〉 falsification of my 〈◊〉, and that without any advantage to your cause: Your reason is, say you, That to say Essential is predicated of sin in either of the two ways, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 see, is such pitiful and prodigious nonsense, that 〈◊〉 think it not worthy of any serious refutation: Whether these words be justifiable, or no, I need not inquire; for there are no such words in my Paper, neither can you, with all your wit and learning, infer any such matter therefrom. Secondly, To make 〈◊〉 for your followers, you 〈◊〉- 〈◊〉 my Argument; and first, clap it into a single Enthymeme, and then into one 〈◊〉, both of your own 〈◊〉; in both which you leave out two mediums, that are in my Argument, which reduced unto form, will make up two 〈◊〉: To convince you of 〈◊〉 unfair, injurious, and 〈◊〉- ingenuous dealing, I shall insert my words at large. To say (as the Doctor doth by consequence) that sin is essential to the nature of man, is an assertion guilty of nonsense; a thing may be said to be essential to another, à priori, and then it is predicated of it in primo modo dicendi per se; 〈◊〉 else à 〈◊〉, and then it is predicated of it in secundo modo dicendi per se. And to say that sin is either of these ways essential to 〈◊〉 nature of man, is 〈◊〉 pitisul and prodigious nonsense, as that I cannot think 〈◊〉 worthy of 〈◊〉 serious resutation. The learned Reader will soon perceive how 〈◊〉 alliance your Enthymeme and Syllog 〈◊〉 have with my Argument; and to him I appeal, to judge of 〈◊〉 unworthy and unscholarly injury that you have herein done me; but yet, for the 〈◊〉 stopping of your mouth, I shall Analyze this my Argument. My conclusion 〈◊〉, that to say (as you do by consequence) that sin is essential unto the nature of man, is an assertion guilty of nonsense; this I prove from a distribution of essential; whatsoever is essential is such, either à priori, or à 〈◊〉. But to say that sin is essential, either à priori, or à posteriori, is nonsense. Therefore to say that sin is essential to man, is nonsense. 〈◊〉 Syllogism is grounded upon a known and received Maxim [Negatis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 subjectis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de aliquo subjecto 〈◊〉 ipsum 〈◊〉 universale, 〈◊〉 cunctis membris 〈◊〉, negatur ipsum divisum] The major I presumed none would deny, and as for the minor, that I proved from a description of both ways of being essential. That which is essential to a thing, à priori, is predicated of it in primo modo dicendi per se; that which is essential to a thing, à posteriori, is predicated of it in secundo modo dicendi per se. Now to say that sin is predicated of man, in either primo, or 〈◊〉 modo dicendi 〈◊〉 se, is nonsense: Therefore to say that sin is essential to man, either à priori, or à posteriori, is nonsense. The major I thought undeniable, and as for the minor, here indeed I stopped too in the proof thereof, as thinking all further proof of it needless; because I took it, and still do take it to be, propositio per se nota, which needs no proof, but a bare explication of its terms; propositio per se nota dicitur; quae non est nota per 〈◊〉, as Lychetus; quae suis tantum terminis cognoscibilis, as Collegium 〈◊〉 gather out of Aristotle; quae tales terminos habet, 〈◊〉 two 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notitiam totius propositionis fine addito; omnis propositio 〈◊〉 est per se 〈◊〉, ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉 aliquod medium, sed solum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 contentus est, so Scheibl r. Now, for the terms of the minor 〈◊〉: I presumed, that all explication of them was needless unto a Scholar of so great a repute as Dr. Taylor: And therefore, without more ado, I inferred, that to say that sin is 〈◊〉 of these ways essential, either à priori, or à posteriori, is such 〈◊〉 and prodigious nonsense, as that I could not think it worthy of any serious refutation. And now Sir, I shall entreat you to review my Argument, being thus truly Analyzed, and I shall appeal unto 〈◊〉 conscience, when you are next upon your knees before God, whether you have not deeply wronged me, to represent my Argument thus defectively (that I say not 〈◊〉) on purpose, I am afraid, to 〈◊〉 it and me ridiculous. Suppose any 〈◊〉 should be so absurd, as to say, That a Stone is animal; and I to refute 〈◊〉 should thus argue, Omne animal est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, who is endued with reason, as well as sense; or Brutum, which is endued with sense, but not with reason; but to say that a stone is either homo, or brutum, is such 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as that I cannot think it 〈◊〉 of any serious refutation. Now he that shall say 〈◊〉 is no Argument, but only a bold affirmative, will go a degree beyond 〈◊〉; for 〈◊〉 plain, that here are couched and employed two 〈◊〉. First, a distribution of animal in hominem & brutum: Next, a description of each member of the 〈◊〉, and my Argument is exactly paralleled unto 〈◊〉. But Sir, though I thought, that, before you, I might have spared my labour to prove that 〈◊〉 nonsense, to say that sin is essential unto man, either à priori, or à posteriori; that it's predicated of man, either in primo, or secundo modo dicendi per se; yet, because you 〈◊〉 to blame mine omission of such proof, I shall now give you herein, I hope, sufficient 〈◊〉. First, To say that that which is 〈◊〉, is positive, is nonsense: Put to say that 〈◊〉 is essential unto man, either à priori, or à 〈◊〉, is to say, that 〈◊〉 which is privative is positive (for the essentials of man are positive, and the sormality of sin is a privation.) Therefore to say that sin is 〈◊〉 unto man, either à 〈◊〉, or à posteriori, 〈◊〉 nonsense. Secondly, To say that that which is predicated of man 〈◊〉 ac 〈◊〉, is 〈◊〉 of man in primo, or secundo modo dicendi per se, is 〈◊〉 (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 per se & per accidens, are opposite ways of predication.) But to say that sin is predicated of man in primo, or secundo modo 〈◊〉 per se, is to say, That that which is predicated of man per accidens, is predicated of man per se (sor that sin is predicated of man, per 〈◊〉, will be questioned by none, who know what primus modus dicendi per accidens is) Therefore to say that sin is predicated of man in primo, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 per se, is nonsense. Thirdly, To say that that which is predicated contingently of man, is predicated 〈◊〉 of him, is nonsense. But to say that sin is predicated of man in primo, or secundo modo 〈◊〉 per se, is to say, That that which is predicated of man 〈◊〉, is predicated of 〈◊〉 necessarily, (for sin is predicated of man contingently, because man and sin cohere 〈◊〉; man might not have been a sinner, and when he shall not be a sinner, he will still be a man; and then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, per se est gradus necessitatis. Therefore to say that sin is predicated of man in 〈◊〉, or secundo modo dicendi per 〈◊〉, is nonsense. If these arguments satisfy you not, you may command more of me when you please, as also any further enlargement of these. Yea but you say, that sin is essential is 〈◊〉 to say, but to say so is not nonsense. To this I answer, that however it may be 〈◊〉 in Grammar, yet 'tis nonsense in Logic; because 'tis a 〈◊〉; for in 〈◊〉 every contradiction not only express, but that also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and employed is nonsense, a 〈◊〉, as we usually speak: thus 'tis nonsense to say that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; that a spirit is corporeal; that a body is 〈◊〉, without quantity or extension; that an 〈◊〉 subsists; or that a substance properly inhereth. Now my three arguments above irrefragably prove that, to say that sin is 〈◊〉 to man is a contradiction; for 'tis in effect as much as to say, that that which is privative is positive; that that which is predicated of man per accidens, is predicated of him per se; that that which is predicated of man 〈◊〉, is predicated of man necessarily; and these are gross and palpable contradictions; and therefore not only false, but most pitiful and 〈◊〉 nonsense. You accuse me of uncharitableness, and unreasonableness, in supposing that you say that sin is essential unto man; but from this accusation I have 〈◊〉 vindicated myself by beating you from all your miserable shifts; And unto what I have said herein, I shall refer both yourself and the Reader. Dr Taylor. In the next place you charge me this with blasphemy: if I 〈◊〉 said or meant what you 〈◊〉, you had reason; but then I pray consider how your charge will 〈◊〉 really 〈◊〉 yourself; for if it be 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 God to be the Author of sin, 〈◊〉 what I derived from Adam is no sin; for that Adam's sin should 〈◊〉 upon me, I demand who was the Author of that? If you please you may take time to consider it; but in the interim if you be pleased to 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 discourse of 〈◊〉; called Deus justificatus, you shall find my question not to be answered by you; if you 〈◊〉 any regard to the authority or to the reason of Mr Calvin, Dr Twisse, and some other of the 〈◊〉 of your party. Jeanes. 1. Here you tempt me to a digression; and you may with as good reason call upon me to answer all the reproaches that Bellarmine in this particular, 〈◊〉 upon the Protestant Churches, and some of the most eminent members thereof, as propound this question unto me. 2. However yet I briefly answer to it, that Adam was the author of the descent of his sin upon me, not God; for to be the Author of sin is to be a desicient, culpable cause thereof; and it is impossible that God should be defective in a culpable manner; and that our doctrine of original sin maketh him to be such, you may boldly affirm, but can never prove. 3. Bishop 〈◊〉 in the doctrine of 〈◊〉 sin is one of our party; and he speaks that which will abundantly 〈◊〉 your demands, in his animadversions upon Hord pag. 323. 224. It was not (says he) God's absolute decree of 〈◊〉, but Adam's voluntary act of rebellion, which brought sin, and the guilt of sin upon himself, and all his posterity, God having justly 〈◊〉 that Adam's children should participate with him 〈◊〉 his state of 〈◊〉, did as justly 〈◊〉 that they should also participate in the state of sin. If this Author deny the propagation of 〈◊〉 from Adam, he must acknowledge 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉, etc. His whole discourse concerning original sin and the propagating 〈◊〉 unto all mankind is 〈◊〉, in that he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that the divine 〈◊〉 must needs be 〈◊〉 or causative of all the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; whereas if the events be actions sinful, God's decrees are 〈◊〉, and ordinative, not 〈◊〉 of causing, much, esse necessitating such evil 〈◊〉, as hath been often told him. 4. I have seen your little 〈◊〉 called 〈◊〉 justisicatus; and must say of it as Florus did of the Ligurians: lib. 2. cap. 3. Major 〈◊〉 labour 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vincere; The Rhetoric of it is so rank, as that it will be a very hard matter to find out the Logic and reason that is in it. If you please to put your arguments into form, you then may command me to consider them; but otherwise, I shall be very loath to adventure upon any thing of yours; for I find by this present debate about two or three lines, that I shall not without great difficulty search out what is your meaning. 5. I wonder why you say, that by this discourse I shall find your question not to be answered by me; why (pray Sir) could I answer it before you propounded it? but your meaning is, I suppose, that I shall find, that your question cannot be answered by me: but the event will 〈◊〉 that. 6. That which you mean in Mr Calvin, and Dr Twisse, are I 〈◊〉 those places which you quote, pag. 32: of that your 〈◊〉; and then unto the place in Calvin you have an answer in Dr Twisse (〈◊〉: gra: lib. 2. dig: 2. cap. 3. pag. 42.) where he clears it from the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉: And then for the place in Dr Twisse you may gather an answer from that he saith unto Mr Hord, (〈◊〉. 149. 150.) who makes the like objections against him from another place. 7. You are the unmeerest man in the world to 〈◊〉 me with the 〈◊〉 of my party; sor the rigid Zelots of your party, in your doctrine of original sin, are such whom you may be ashamed to name. Indeed in 〈◊〉 point there are very few of your party, save the Pelagians of old, and now the worthy 〈◊〉 of the Racovian den, and their followers; unto whom the best and the most learned of Protestants will hardly vouchsafe the name of Christians. The Archbishop of Armagh 〈◊〉 them, in a sermon of 〈◊〉 (that I heard) a company of 〈◊〉 Turks; and indeed Turks, and 〈◊〉 can hardly be greater enemies unto the divine person, and nature of Christ, unto his offices, and unto his great and glorious work of redemption, and satisfaction, than these wretched miscreants are. Dr Taylor. Your second charge of blaspemy is, that my reason does by implication involve Christ in the guilt of sin; because whatsoever is essential he had; but 〈◊〉, If you remember that I say not, that sin is 〈◊〉; and that I bring the reverse of this very argument against your party and opinion in some of my late discourses, you have reason to shake the fire out of your own 〈◊〉, not to tell me, that I burn; for is inclination to 〈◊〉 be a 〈◊〉 naturally and derived from our Parents; I 〈◊〉 whether or no 〈◊〉 not Christ all natural desires? if he had not, he was not a 〈◊〉 man; If he had 〈◊〉 all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are not natural 〈◊〉; sore is you say they be, you are the 〈◊〉 by the consequence of your 〈◊〉, not I; but God forbid that 〈◊〉 of us should. 〈◊〉. First, here is no 〈◊〉 of my argument; for none of my party or opinion hold, that inclination unto 〈◊〉 is essential unto man: Flaccius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that 〈◊〉 sin was the 〈◊〉, or substance of the soul; but I never heard that 〈◊〉 sollowers were considerable; he hath (I am sure) both Papists and Protestants; 〈◊〉, and Lutherans for 〈◊〉 opponents: but, perhaps you confound natural with 〈◊〉, and make them all one; if you do, your reason will be 〈◊〉, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 2. I believe, you here play with the 〈◊〉 of the word natural, a thing (though it may be tolerated in a Sophister,) altogether unworthy of a 〈◊〉. Inclination to 〈◊〉 may be said to be natural, either 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉. That inclination to 〈◊〉 is natural 〈◊〉 (that it flows, and 〈◊〉 Physically, and necessarily from our nature,) I slatly deny: and if you can direct me unto any place in your books, where you prove it to be natural in this sense, I shall take it into 〈◊〉. Indeed to say, that it is in this sense natural, is to throw a reproach upon God the Author of nature. But it is natural 〈◊〉; together with our nature derived unto us from our first Parents; and yet not in Christ, who had not his nature from Adam in an ordinary way of Generation, but was miraculously conceived by the holy Ghost, and 〈◊〉 in the womb of the 〈◊〉 Mary. This inclination unto evil is a 〈◊〉 blemish of 〈◊〉 nature; because it is a cause of sin, & qualis causa 〈◊〉 est effectus. A good tree, saith our Saviour, cannot bring forth evil fruit, Matth. 7. 18. This inclination to evil bringeth forth much 〈◊〉 fruit, and therefore it cannot be good; and consequently it is bad, and sinful; and therefore could not be in Christ; (who even as man) was the most holy one of God. Indeed if Christ had wanted any propriety of man's nature, he had not then been a perfect man, but, that inclination to evil is a propriety of our nature, sc: proprium 4 to modo you are never able to make good. But, Sir, in good earnest, do you think that Christ was inclined unto evil? if you do not, your 〈◊〉 of Christ is impertinent; if you do, I shall conclude your opinion to be blasphemous; and unto it shall oppose this following argument. He in whom dwelled an all-fulness of the Godhead bodily; he in whom dwelled an all-fulness of habitual grace; he who enjoyed the 〈◊〉 vision, was not, could not be inclined unto evil. But, in Christ dwelled an all- 〈◊〉 of the Godhead 〈◊〉; in him also dwelled an all- 〈◊〉 of habitual, and sanctifying grace; he enjoyed the 〈◊〉 vision Therefore he was not, could not be inclined unto evil. The Minor will not be denied by any Orthodox Divine, and we may say the same of the Major, for, he that shall think that the grace of personal union, the 〈◊〉 of habitual grace, and the beatifical vision are not sufficient to exclude from Christ all inclination untoevil will render both 〈◊〉 learning & religion too suspected. But, to put the matter out of doubt, take this following argument for confirmation of the Major: there could not be the least inclination unto evil in that person, in whom there was an utter averseness from evil in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; (for of contraries, that which is in a 〈◊〉 degree is not consistent with the other in the highest and most intense degree) but, in that person, in whom there was an 〈◊〉 of the Godhead, on all-fulness of habitual grace, and the beatifical vision, there was an utter averseness from evil, and that in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; and therefore impossible that there should be in him an inclination to evil in the least degree. The Papists extenuate the malignancy of concupiscence as much as may be, affirming that in the regenerate it is no sin, and that it had been 〈◊〉 Adam if he had been created in his pure naturals; yet, they think not so well of it, as to ascribe it unto Christ. Indeed 〈◊〉 is accused for speaking somewhat suspiciously this way; but he is contradicted by the generality of the Schoolmen; * 〈◊〉 in 3 am 〈◊〉 Thom: disp. 34. 〈◊〉. 2. 〈◊〉. Valentia. Tom. 4. dist. 1 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 3. who hold that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, concupiscence was neither 〈◊〉 primo, nor 〈◊〉 in Christ. 1. Not in actu primo, and for this they allege three reasons. 1. The absolute perfection of his virtues, and all-fulness of grace. 2. The perpetual vigilancy, and advertency of 〈◊〉 reason. 3. The government of his humane nature, and actions, by his divine and infinite person. 2. Not in actu secundo, because in him, the very first motions unto sin would have been voluntary, and consequently sinful. Unto this purpose 〈◊〉, (〈◊〉: 〈◊〉: Scholast: Tom: 5. cap. 12. 〈◊〉: 5. pag: 200.) observeth; that the first motions of concupiscence may be said to be voluntary two manner of ways. 1. Antecedently; when one willingly admits them when he may avoid them. 2. Consequently; when one yields consent unto them after they are crept in, in the former way or manner they had been voluntary in Christ; because Christ could have avoided them, by reason of the government of the person of the word; if he had not therefore avoided them, but willingly admitted them, they had in him been blameworthy. Dr Taylor. 〈◊〉 third reason also is as pretty; for, first; I demand whether a possibility to sin be not of the nature of man; (for that is all I mean by essential) if it be not; how came Adam to sin his first sin? if it be, I ask whether shall the Saints in the resurrection be raised up with it or no? If yea; than you blaspheme God's full glorification of the Saints in the resurrection; for impeccability is certainly a part of their full glorisication. If nay; than it is no blasphemy to say that in the resurrection the Saints shall be raised up without something that is essential to them, or to their nature. Jeanes. That possibility to sin is essential unto every rational creature I grant; and hereupon 〈◊〉, that 'tis not separated from the Saints in 〈◊〉 full 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 shall I 〈◊〉 your charge of blasphemy herein, having the 〈◊〉 of Schoolmen, (both Thomists, and Scotists) and reason too on my side. Indeed, the Saints of Heaven do constantly, and interruptedly shun, and decline sin; yet, 'tis an 〈◊〉 possible unto their nature, considered in itself; 〈◊〉 they are 〈◊〉 therefrom by their glorified state and 〈◊〉: for though sin, and a fullness of glory 〈◊〉 inconsistent; yet ' 〈◊〉 no 〈◊〉, or repugnancy, that their natures abstractly considered, secluding the consideration of their glory, should be sinful. Yea, but you say, 〈◊〉 is certainly a part of the full glorification of the Saints; and what is impeccability but an impossibility of sinning; if God then make the Saints impeccable, he 〈◊〉 away from them all 〈◊〉 of sinning. For answer. 1. There is a twosold impeccability. 1. By nature. 2. By the grace and 〈◊〉 of God. 〈◊〉 by nature takes away all possibility of sinning; but it is received generally as a rule among the Schoolmen, that a creature cannot be made 〈◊〉 per 〈◊〉, (that is) such a one, as cannot by nature sin. And, if you please, you may view the proofs thereof in 〈◊〉 lib: 2. Dist: 22. quaest. 1. 〈◊〉 by the gift and grace of God doth not eradicate the remote power of sinning; but only keeps it from being actuated; and 'tis this impeccability only, that is part of the Saints glorification. 2. A thing may be said to be impossible, sensu diviso, or sensu 〈◊〉. In sensu diviso 'tis not impossible, but possible, for the Saints in Heaven to sin; for that (considered in themselves without the custodient grace of God always underpropping them) they are liable unto sin, the lamentable fall of the Angels of darkness is an evident proof. But now, 〈◊〉 composito, 'tis indeed impossible for glorified Saints to sin; that is; 'tis impossible for them to sin considered under this reduplication, as fully glorified; because fullness of glory and sin cannot stand together. This answer is in Scotus (lib. 4. dist: 49. quaest: 6.) whose words I shall insert for the sake of some Readers who may not have him in their 〈◊〉:) 〈◊〉; patet, quod beatus est impeccabilis in sensu compositionis, hoc est, non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 beatus, & peccare: sed in sensu divisionis, quod manens beatus 〈◊〉 habeat potentiam & possibilitatem ad peccandum potest 〈◊〉 duplicitèr: vel per aliquid sibi 〈◊〉, quod excludit potentian talem; vel per causam 〈◊〉, quoth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 propinquam ab illo, &c: 〈◊〉 est causa intrinseca in 〈◊〉 Michaelis 〈◊〉 beati, per quam 〈◊〉 potentia ad peccandum pro alias, in sensu divisionis, non est autem causa intrinseca 〈◊〉 istam 〈◊〉 omnino reduci ad actam: sed per causam 〈◊〉 est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 illa propinqua ad peccandum, 〈◊〉 per 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 semper 〈◊〉 actum fruendi, & it a 〈◊〉 possit 〈◊〉 suam remolam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 ad actum: siquidem 〈◊〉 causa secunda praeventa à causâ superiori agente ad 〈◊〉 oppositum potest 〈◊〉 propinqua exire in aliud oppositum. Concedo ergo, quod infert, quod 〈◊〉 beatus, & sit peccabilis in sensu divisionis loquendo de 〈◊〉 remotâ. Dr. Taylor. But Sir, 〈◊〉 think you of Mortality? is that essential, or of the nature of man? I suppose you will not deny it. But yet I also believe you will 〈◊〉, that 〈◊〉 we are sown a corruptible body, yet we shall be raised an incorruptible, and the mortal shall 〈◊〉 on immortality. jeanes. For answer, I shall propound a distinction of mortality, that is very obvious and ordinary. A thing may be said to be mortal, either respectu 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 propinquae. 1. In respect of a remote power of dying, which hath in it the remote cause of dissolution, an elementary matter. 2. In regard of a near power of dying, arising from the actual conflict, and 〈◊〉 influence of the Elements, and their contrary qualities. The latter Mortality is separable, but than it is not essential. As for the former Mortality, which alone is essential, I think very few doubt, but that 'tis also inseparable from the nature of a man, body: for, the 〈◊〉 and incorruption of the bodies of the Saints in the resurrection, will not be by taking away out of their bodies the remote causes of corruption, the Elements, and their contrary qualities. (for, than their bodies would not be mixed; and so not for substance the same that they were) but by an hindrance or prevention of the corruptive influence of the Elements, and their contrary qualities. That I am not singular in this, I shall manifest, by transcribing the Testimonies of some few Schoolmen, who though they differ one from another in assigning the cause and reason of the impassibility and 〈◊〉 of glorified Bodies; yet they all agree with Durand in this, That glorified Bodies are not impassable, per privationem 〈◊〉 passivae, sed per aliquod 〈◊〉 impedimentum actualis 〈◊〉 nè fiat. The first shall be of Scotus, (lib 4. dist. 49. quaest. 13.) Dico ergo quod causa impassibilitatis est voluntas divina non 〈◊〉 causae secundae corruptivae, & per hoc, est illud impassibile, 〈◊〉 potentia remota, sed propinqua, non à causâ 〈◊〉, sed 〈◊〉 impediente, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est de 〈◊〉 supra, etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de 〈◊〉 in camino, qui non 〈◊〉 ad 〈◊〉 trium puerorum, non 〈◊〉 per aliquam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pueris, 〈◊〉 ex carentiâ potentiae 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 ex contrario 〈◊〉 impediente, sed quia Deus ex voluntate suâ non 〈◊〉 ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The second is of Durand (lib. 4. dist. 44. quaest. 4.) Restat ergò quod 〈◊〉 gloriosa non 〈◊〉 impassibilia simplicitèr, & absolutè per privationem principii 〈◊〉, cum natura corporum gloriosorum, sit 〈◊〉 eadem quae prius, sed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aliquid praestans impedimentum actualis passionis nè fiat. Quid autem sit illud, utrum sit aliqua forma 〈◊〉, an solum virtus divina 〈◊〉, duplex 〈◊〉 opinio: 〈◊〉 enim quidam quod talis impassibilitas 〈◊〉 per aliquam forman inexistentem, etc. Alius modus est, quod impassibilitas corporum gloriosorum non crit per aliquam 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉, sed solum per virtutem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 beatis ad 〈◊〉 & prohibentem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 extriaseci inserentis passionem. This latter way Darand takes himself, and endeavoreth to confirm it by three Reasons. The third shall be of Suarez, (in tertiam part: Thom: 〈◊〉: 48. p. 531.) nam licet in corpore glorioso maneat eadem 〈◊〉, idemque temperamentum ex 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, inde solum sit, corpus illud in nudâ naturá suá consideratum, esse corruptibile, & in beatitudine 〈◊〉 quasi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, seu naturalem radicem 〈◊〉: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 intrinsecam esse 〈◊〉 & impassibile: quia 〈◊〉 est aliâ quadam persectione quae ex se potest impedire, nè illa maturalis 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 reducalur. Dr. Taylor. Once more, Is it natural to be a natural? that will not be denied: But then remember, that although to be natural is essential, that is, of the essence of the body, yet the natural shall arise without its naturality; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual. Jeanes. 1. That that which is natural, is natural, will not be denied, as you say; but 'tis propositio identica 〈◊〉, a most 〈◊〉 Tautology: and unto what purpose you propound a question concerning it, I know not. 2. Of things natural unto man, some are natural powers, some are natural acts: Natural (〈◊〉) powers may be and are essential unto the body; and so they are inseparable too; our Bodies, when they shall be raised, shall not want so much as one such natural power: But natural acts are accidental, and in the resurrection there may be no place for the exercise of, at least, some of them, viz: Generation, Nutrition, and the like; as touching such things, we shall be like the angels in Heaven, as it were spiritual. 3. In the Apostle, 1 Cor. 15. 44. it is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a natural body, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, an animal or souly body, that is, actuated and animated by the soul after a natural way and manner, by the intervention of bodily helps, such as eating, drinking, sleeping, and the like. And in all congruence of opposition hereunto, a glorious body is said to be a spiritual, in regard of an immediate supportance by the spirit, without any corporeal means, and without any use of the generative and 〈◊〉 faculties. Dr. Taylor. So that you see, is I had said this which you charge upon me, which is contrary to my thoughts, and so against my purpose, yet your Arguments could not have 〈◊〉 it. Jeanes. Whether you do not here boast, and triumph without a victory, I am very well contented to refer it unto the learned Reader. Since my penning of my exceptions, sent unto Mr. C. I have read the Metaphysics of Dr. Robert Baro, that learned Scot; and in them I find the like of these three last Arguments of mine, urged against the error of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; that Original Sin is of the substance of man, and essential to him after the 〈◊〉, a 〈◊〉 subalternate unto that which I charge you with; 〈◊〉 words are as followeth, Prima opinio demnanda & à postris 〈◊〉 & a 〈◊〉 de 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est absurdissima haeresis 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 peccatum originale 〈◊〉 de 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 esse quid 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, contra quam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 disputans; varias assert rationes: 〈◊〉 ha' 〈◊〉, Primò, si 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pars 〈◊〉 humanae, 〈◊〉 Deus 〈◊〉 author 〈◊〉, quip qui 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 si 〈◊〉 neget 〈◊〉 substantiam 〈◊〉 à 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse à 〈◊〉, qui est author peccati; necessarium 〈◊〉 est, 〈◊〉 habeat aliquam causam; at 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 absurdum, ergò & 〈◊〉: 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 Christus non assumpsit naturam 〈◊〉 integram, 〈◊〉 peccato non 〈◊〉, quorum 〈◊〉 est absurdum: 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 diem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 resurget, & aeternam vitam possidebit, saltem quoad 〈◊〉: Peccatum verò tum 〈◊〉 erit in glorificatis, ergò peccatum non est quid 〈◊〉, sed quid separabile est ab 〈◊〉 natura, pag. 248, 249. These reasons differ so little from mine, as that you may think perhaps that I have 〈◊〉 mine from either Bellarmine or 〈◊〉, which yet I assure you I did not: The reason why now I recite these Reasons, is to show, that my arguments are not such 〈◊〉 and pitiful things, but that very Learned Men have made use of the like, to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proposition subordinate unto that which I go about to refute. Dr. Taylor. It is good advice 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, if you had 〈◊〉 pleased to have learned my meaning before you had published your 〈◊〉, I should have esteemed myself 〈◊〉 to you in a great acknowledgement. Jeanes. Your advice out of Aristophanes, I like very well; I am not conscious unto myself that I have towards you transgressed against it: for before I uttered a syllable of dislike, I used my best endeavour to find out what was your meaning, and to that purpose, made use of that little Logic and Reason which I had; and as for that meaning which I affix unto your words, let the Reader determine, whether I have violated any rule of Logic or Reason, in imputing it unto you: What I took to be your sense, together with my Objections against it, I sent unto Mr. C. to be transmitted speedily unto you, exposing all unto the utmost severity of your 〈◊〉; and wherein I have here trespassed against charity or justice, I would fain know. Besides, my dislike I expressed only in a private place, before very few, in private discourse, and I have not hitherto published it, from either Press or Pulpit. Dr. Taylor. Now you have said very much evil of me, though I deserve it not. 〈◊〉. This I deny, and slatly challenge you to prove what you aver. Dr. Taylor. For suppose I had not prosperously enough expressed my meaning, yet you, who are a man of wit and parts, could easily have discerned my purpose and my design: You could not but know, and consider too, that my great design was to say, That sin could not be natural, that it is so sar from being essential, that it is not so much as subjected in our common natures, but in our persons only. jeanes. 1. Whether what you say of my wit and parts, be not a 〈◊〉, I shall not trouble myself to inquire, but leave it unto your conscience: However, I suppose, you think yourself far superior unto my poor self in wit and parts, and I also readily acknowledge as much: Now I wonder why you should think that I should so easily find out what is your meaning, seeing you (whose abilities so far transcend mine) be so unprosperous, not only in the expression, but in the after interpretation of your meaning, as that you descent in a latter Letter, from yourself in a former Letter: How can you reasonably expect that I, who am not (as one of your Proselytes lately said) worthy to be named the same day with you, (I shall not deny the truth of the 〈◊〉, nor envy you the honour thereof) should (as the Proverb is) see further into a Millstone than you, who are so Eagle and quick sighted. Secondly, Whereas you say, That sia is not so much as subjected in our common nature, but in our persons only; I doubt that I understand you not, for to me it seems very evident, that sin, (so far as a privation can be inherent) is truly inherent in our natures; for it hath all the Requisites of inherence, that Aristotle layeth down (Categor: cap. 2.) 1. It is in our nature. 2. 〈◊〉 as a part of our nature. 3. Neither can it exist severed and apart from our natures: Sin is seated in all individuals of our nature, whilst living here upon earth, Christ his humanity alone excepted; and therefore why may not we say, that 'tis subjected in our common nature? Seeing those accidents are seated secundarily, and mediately in second substances, which are primarily and 〈◊〉 placed in their respective first substances; 〈◊〉 secundae substant accidentibus gratiâ primarum. Yea, but you will (perhaps) say, it is subjected in our persons only, therefore not in our nature: But this is a very sorry Objection: For who knows not the distinction of subjectum, in subjectum quo, & quod; our persons only are subjectum quod of sin, our natures notwithstanding may be subjectum quo of it; and we may say the same of other accidents. I find you (pag. 494.) quoting that usual Axiom, actiones 〈◊〉 suppositorum; but, if you had considered the limitations that are usually given thereof, you would have spared the urging of it: actio est suppositi (saith Scotus) ultimate denominati ab actione, sed non ut solius denominati ab ipsa: But you may have some deep meaning, which I fathom not; fair leave may you take to explain yourself. Dr. Taylor. But besides this, Sir, I am a little to complain of you, that when you had two words at your choice to explicate each other (intrinsical, and essential) you would take the hardest and the worst sense, not the 〈◊〉 and most ready. jeanes. I have here given you, not only no cause, but not so much as any shadow or colour for complaint. 1. I gave a reason why I insisted on the word essential only, and passed by the term intrinsecal; because you use intrinsecal as equivalent unto essential, as is apparent, by your opposing it unto accidental: And have you said, can you say any thing to the contrary. 2. I would fain know why you should say that essential is a harder word than intrinsical; there is, I am sure, that equivocation in the word intrinsecal, which is not in the word essential; for, that which is accidental, may be intrinsecal; there being intrinsical, as well as extrinsical accidents; interaum & externum (say Philosophers) sumuntur, vel ratione essentiae, vel ratione loci, & subjecti. Dr. Taylor. For you cannot but know, that essential is not always to be taken in the strictest sense of Philosophy, for that which is constitutive of a nature; but largely, and for all sorts of properties, and the universal accidents of nature. jeanes. The distinction of essential, into that which is such constitutiuè, as constituting the essence, or that which is such, 〈◊〉, as necessarily resulting from the essence, I very well know: and I grant the proprieties which are such, quarto modo, which agree omni, 〈◊〉, semper, are in this latter sense said to be essential; but that essential is ever taken, as you say, for all sorts of proprieties, those which are such, 〈◊〉, secundo, or tertio modo, is notoriously false, for then essential would be taken for that which is most accidental; but let us examine your instances. Dr. Taylor. As it is essential to a man to laugh, to be capable of learning, to be mortal, to have a body of contrary qualities, and consequently by nature corruptible. jeanes. If you should affirm in the public Schools of either of the Universities, that to laugh is essential to man, you would not only be laughed, but 〈◊〉, and houted at: the gross and palpable absurdity of this your Assertion, I thus prove. Nothing that is accidental to man, can be said to be essential to him. But to laugh is accidental to man. Therefore it is not essential. The Major is apparent from the opposition, that you yourself make 〈◊〉 essential, and accidental. The 〈◊〉 is thus confirmed. That which is predicated of man contingently, is accidental to man. But to laugh is predicated of man contingently. Therefore it is accidental to man. The Major is plain, because contingency of predication is one of the chief things which distinguisheth 〈◊〉 praedicabile, from all other predicables, and it is a 〈◊〉 character thereof. And for the 〈◊〉, that is no less evident: indeed risibile is essential unto man, and predicated of him in 〈◊〉 modo dicendi per se; but ridere to laugh is accidental; because it is predicated of man contingently; for a man and actual laughter cohere contingently: the lowest degree of necessity in assirmative and essential predications, is the omni; and de omni 〈◊〉, requireth universitatem 〈◊〉 as well as subjecti; that is, propositio 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 debet esse semper vera; now all men do not always laugh, and therefore laughter is predicated of man contingently, and consequently accidental to him. You see, Sir, I am bold to trouble you, ever and anon, with my 〈◊〉 Logic, and you can expect no other, as long as you thus trespass against what is most trivial and obvious in Logic, the very A. B. C. thereof. 2. As for the second instance, you bring capacity of learning: that is taken for potentia prima, or secunda. 1. If it be taken for potentia prima, than it immediately flows from the soul, and is essential to man, consecutiuè, as à proprium 4 to modo of man, and so 'tis inseparable from him; but, if taken for potentia secunda, so it ariseth from the disposition of the temper and organs of the body, and is not essential, but accidental, and separable from man. As for the third, to be mortal, I have already spoken of that sufficiently. As for the 4th instance; to have a body of contrary qualities is essential consecutiuè. and à posteriori unto an essential predicate of man; viz: a mixed body; and so is essential unto man, and predicated of him in secundo modo dicendi per se, as a mixed body is predicated of him primo modo dicendi per se. For, as Scheibler [the prop: cap: 4. n: 41.] showeth, ad praedicationes per se secundi modi pertinent non solum praedicationes illae, in quibus proprium praedicatur de subjecto suo primo, veluti corpus est quantum, sed etiam ille praedicationes in quibus proprium praedicatur de speciebus sui primi 〈◊〉, veluti homo est 〈◊〉: but this hath no alliance with laughing, for it agreeth always unto all men. Dr. Taylor. And in a moral discourse to call for Metaphysical significations, and not to be content with moral and general, may proceed from an itch to quarrel, but not from that ingenuity, which will be your and my best ornament. jeanes. It hath hitherto been a received 〈◊〉 amongst all Logicians; that in mixed questions, the terms of which belong unto several disciplines, we must for the explication of each term, have recourse unto the discipline, unto which it 〈◊〉; and you can say nothing to disprove this rule: whether inclination to 〈◊〉 be essential to man? is a mixed question; for inclination to evil or 〈◊〉, is a 〈◊〉 term, and essential, is a 〈◊〉 term, and therefore, in taking it in a Metaphysical sense, I have done nothing, but what Logic, and reason have prescribed me; and therefore I shall not fear your passionate, and irrational 〈◊〉 of me for it. To clear this yet further by instancing in mixed 〈◊〉 of the like nature; an formale 〈◊〉 in genere sit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all creaturae? an formale 〈◊〉 originalis sit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 originalis 〈◊〉? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ad malum 〈◊〉 ex principiis naturae integrae? an Sacramentum sit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? an 〈◊〉 sint 〈◊〉 Physicae gratiae? Now if here you should be pleased to say, that in these questions to call for Metaphysical significations, of privatio, 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 respectivum, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, may proceed from an itch to quarrel, but not from that ingenuity, which 〈◊〉 be our best ornament, you will bewray but little judgement, and less 〈◊〉. 2. If that, which you call essential in a moral, and large 〈◊〉, do not either constitute the essence, or necessarily flow therefrom, it will in the upshot prove to be but accidental; and how then comes it that you oppose it unto accidental? But you will, perhaps,, tell me, that I must take accidental in a moral, and large sense, as well as essential; But, Sir, what is there in your words to guide me unto this sense of accidental? I took accidental for the concrete of accidens 〈◊〉, and so I believe have most Scholars that have read you; and why it should not be thus understood I think you can allege no reason, but that, you know not otherwise to make any tolerable sense of your words: your discourse is polemical, and if therein you use Philosophical terms, and I call for a Philosophical signification of the terms, with what forehead can you accuse me for being 〈◊〉 some, and disingenuous? if when you cannot defend what you say, according unto the proper, and usual signification of the words you use, you must have liberty to 〈◊〉 unto large and 〈◊〉 senses of them, you may say even what you please; for no man will be able to understand what you say, unless he hath a peculiar key unto your writings, But let us inquire what can be here meant by accidental in a moral and large sense: essential, you say, in a moral sense, is that which is not after our nature, but together with it; and, in conformity hereunto, accidental in a moral sense must be that which is after our nature, and not together with it, and then I shall desire you to awake, and consider, whether your second reason be not coincident with your third; for your second reason, as you expound it, stands thus; 〈◊〉 to evil is after our nature, and not together with it in real being: And your third 〈◊〉 is this, inclination to evil is superinduced unto nature, and is after it, etc. Dr Taylor. Although I have not much to do with it, yet because you are so great a Logician, and so great an admirer of that which every one of your Pupils knows, I mean Porphyrics 〈◊〉 of an accident, I care not if I tell you that the definition is imperfect and false. Jeanes. 1. You have ever and 〈◊〉 an uncivil fling at my poor Logic; But, Sir, let me be so bold as to tell you, that as my Logic is the object of your contempt, so that my Pupils cannot find in that 〈◊〉, which you manifest in these your papers, matter for either their envy or emulation. 2. Why, pray Sir, do you say, that I am so great an admirer of Porphyrics definition of an accident? indeed I say, that 'tis a celebrated definition of an accident; but thereby I signify only that 'tis frequently and much used, commonly known, and in every man's mouth; and this acception of the word is usual in Cicero, as these instances following evidence: Celebratur omnium sermone 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: hoc delatum est tum ad vos pontifices, post omnium sermone celebratum, quemadmodum iste 〈◊〉 fecit: quod it a esse constanti fama atque omnium sermone celebratum est: quid porro in graeco sermone tum tritum atque celebratum est quam, etc. 3. Though you care not to tell me, that Porphyries definition of an accident is false, and imperfect; yet you should have been careful to have brought stronger objections against it, than those you have urged, for they contain such gross, and absurd untruths, as that every one that understands them, will think you a very incompetent judge of the definitions of Porphyry and Aristotle. Indeed how far you are to seek in the nature of accidents, appears by your talking of accidents constitutive of a substance, in your discourse of the Real-presence, &c: (Sect: 11. num: 12: pag: 209.) but let us hear your objections. Dr Taylor. It is not convertible with the defiaitum; for even, essential things may be taken away sine interit u subjecti. Jeanes. For an answer unto this, I shall refer you to yourself, in your book, but now mentioned of the Real-presence of Christ in the holy Sacrament. (Sect. 11. num. 30. p. 244. & 245.) God can do what he pleaseth, and he can reverse the laws of his whole creation, because he can change or annihilate every creature, or alter the manners and essences; but the question now is, what laws God hath already established, and whether or no essentials can be changed, the things remaining the same? that is, whether they can be the same, when they are not the same? he that says God can give to a body all the essential properties of a spirit, says true, and confesses God's Omnipotency; but he says also that God can change a body, from being a body to become a spirit; but if he saves, that remaining a body it can receive, the essentials of a spirit, he does not confess God's 〈◊〉, but makes the Article dissicult to be believed, by making it not to work wisely and possibly: God can do allthings, but are they undone, when they are done? that is, are the things changed in their essentials and yet remain the same? then how are they changed, and then what hath God done to them? But to come unto your instances. Dr. Taylor. I instance to be quant tative is essential to a body, and to have succession of duration; but yet in the resurrection when bodies shall be spiritual, and eternal, those other which are now essential predicates shall be taken away, & yet the subject remain, & be improved to higher, and more noble predicates. Jeanes. 1. As for the 1. of these instances it is without doubt, that to be quantitative is essential unto a body à posteriori, and consecutive as a probrium thereof 4 to modo. but. 1. That quantity is separable from a body was never affirmed by any besides the Patrons of either transubstantiation or consubstantiation. 2. If a body were without quantity, it would be without extension, and so would exist in an undivisible point without distinction of parts, and so it would be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a bodiless body, which is a flat contradiction. But for refutation of this, I shall refer you to your own self in your discourse of the Real-presence, etc. (Sect. 11. 13 pag. 211.) But I demand, when we 〈◊〉 of a body what we mean by it? for in all discourses and intercourses of 〈◊〉 by words, we must agree concerning each others meaning: when we speak of a body, of a substance, of an accident, what does mankind agree to mean by these words? all the 〈◊〉 and all the wise men in the world, when they speak os a body, and separate it from a spirit, they mean, that a spirit is that which hath no material divisible parts Physically that which hath nothing of that which makes a body that is extension & 〈◊〉 by sins and superficies. And, (Pag. 212.) when we speak os a body all the world means that, which hath a finite quantity. Pag. 219. 220: that which I now insist upon is, that in a body there cannot be indistinction of parts, but each must possess his own portion, or place, and if it does not, a body cannot be a body. Sect. 11. num. 18. Again, (Pag 221. num. 20: ejusd: Sect:) If Christ's body be in the Sacrament according to the manner of a substance not of a body; I demand according to the nature of what substance whether of a material or an immaterial? if according to the nature of a material substance, than it is commensurate by the dimensions of quantity, which he is now endeavouring to avoid. If according to the nature of an immaterial substance, 〈◊〉 it is not a body, but a spirit, or else the body may have the being of a spirit, whilst it remains a body, that is, be a body, and not a body at the same time. Here every material substance, by your opinion is commensurate by the division of quantity, and therefore no material substance can be without the dimensions of of quantity; afterwards in (pag. 241. &. 242. num: 29. ejusd: Sect:) you bring in a shift of Bellarmine's unto which you return a very good answer, both which I shall transcribe. 〈◊〉 says that to be coextended to a place is separable from a magnitude or body, because it is a thing that is extrinsical and consequent to the intrinsical extension of parts, and being later than it, is by divine power separable: but this is as very a sophism as all the rest; for if whatever in nature is later than the substance, be 〈◊〉 from it, than fire may be without heat, or water without moisture; a man can be without time, for that also is in nature after his essence, and he may be without a faculty of will, or understanding, or of affections, or of growing to his state, or being nourished, and then he will be a strange man, who will neither have the power of will, or understanding, of desiring, or avoiding, of nourishment or growth, or any thing, that can distinguish him from a beast, or a tree, or a stone; for these are all later than the essence, for they are all essential 〈◊〉 from it, thus also quantity can be separated from a substantial body if every thing that is later than the form can be separated from it. When you wrote this, you thought it a gross absurdity to aver that quantity could be separated from a substantial body; when you have answered yourself, I shall then take up the Cudgels, and reply unto your answer in the mean while, I shall consider your argument by which you endeavour to prove quantity separable from a body. It stands thus; in the resurrection bodies shall be spiritual; therefore to be quantitative, which is now an essential predicate, shall be then taken away. For answer. 1. If the bodies of the Saints shall be raised without quantity, then without extension, without integral parts, without heads, eyes, arms, legs, feet, and this would be a very pretty, and proper resurrection; it would indeed be an invisible resurrection; this is a very strange, and false assertion, contrary as to the constant tenet of both ancient, and modern Divinity, so also unto express scripture; In my flesh, says Job, shall I see God, whom I shall see for myself, and my eyes shall behold, and not another, Job. 19 26, 27: the bodies of the Saints shall in the resurrection be conformed unto Christ's glorious body in his: Philip. 3. 21: and that was a visible and palpable body, it might be seen and felt, it had flesh and bones, and hands, feet and sides, Luk. 24. 39, 40: John. 20. 27: see Aquin: sup: ad 3 am part. sum: &c: quaest. 80. Art. 1. Tertullian upon these words of the Apostles [this corruptible shall put on incorruption] hath this gloss, quantitativam & eandem numero essentiam digito demonstrat, magis enim expressè loqui non poterat, 〈◊〉 cutem suam manibus 〈◊〉. 2. As for the spirituality of our bodies in the resurrection, that shall not be destructive of their quantity; for they shall be spiritual, not in regard of substance; but in respect of either immediate supportance by the spirit, or else resemblance unto a spirit. 1. In respect of immediate supportance by the spirit without the help of bodily means, meats, drinks, sleep, medicaments, &c: he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his 〈◊〉 that dwelleth in you, Rom. 8. 11: or else 2. (As others conjecture) in regard of resemblance unto a spirit as touching some particulars in the resurrection; they neither marry, nor are given in marriage; but are as the Angels of God in Heaven, Matth. 22. 30. But that spirituality of the body in ` Paul's sense of the word is no impeachment unto the quantity of it is evident enough from what you say in your treatise of the Real-presence, &c: for therein you rightly aver, that Christ's body is now a spiritual body, and yet maintain against the Papists that 'tis endued with quantity, and hath partem extra partem, one part without the other answering to the parts of his place. Your second instance is, to have succession of duration, this is essential to a body think you; yet in the resurrection, when our bodies shall be eternal, it shall be taken away. But here Sir, my poor Pupils, because you are so great a Metaphysitian, care not much if they tell you, That succession in duration is so far from being essential to a body, as that it doth not at all agree thereunto; and they have learned it out of Scheibler, Metap. lib. 1. cap. 16. n. 48. 53. 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, cap. 19 n. 9, 10, 11, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35. And 〈◊〉, disp: 50. Sect. 5. and 7. Metaphysitians no 〈◊〉 inferior unto your great self. Out of them they thus argue, whatsoever hath a successive duration, hath also a successive essence or being; but now no body hath a successive essence or being, therefore no body hath a successive duration. The Major is evident, because as Suarez and Scheibler well prove, the duration of a thing is not distinguished from the actual existence thereof, really, but only ratione ratiocinata. And then for the Minor, it may be thus confirmed, Whatsoever hath a successive essence or being, hath the parts of its essence in fluxu, so that 'tis partly past, partly present, and in part to come; but no such thing can be affirmed of any body, and therefore no body hath a successive essence or being. Or thus, No permanent being hath a successive being or essence; but every body is a permanent being, therefore no body hath a successive being or essence. The Minor, that alone asks proof, may be thus confirmed: Whatsoever hath all the parts of its essence or being together (so that in no moment of time there is wanting unto it any thing requisite unto its essential integrity) that is a permanent being; but every body hath all the parts of its essence or being together (so 〈◊〉 in no moment of time there is wanting unto it any thing requisite unto its essential integrity.) Therefore every body is a permanent being. If you should say, That God only hath permanency of being, according to that of the Psalmist, Psal. 102. 26, 27. The Heavens shall perish, but thou shalt endure; yea all of them shall wax old, like a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed, but thou art the same. Unto this they will answer, That you do but triste with the equivocation of the word permanency, it is (they will say) opposed unto either mutability or succession; if it be opposed unto mutability and defectibility of being, than God alone hath permanency of being; but if it be opposed unto succession of being, than every created being, besides motion, hath permanency of being; and this Scheibler hath taught them, Met: lib. 1. cap. 19 n. 35. Nullae rei (inquit) convenit fluxus vel successio partium essentialium praeterquam motui (〈◊〉 loquendo) unde non est tempus successivum, nisi tempus quo durat ipse motus: nempe sicut essentia motus consistit in successione partium: ita etiam duratio motûs consistit in successione partium, & proinde utrumque est ens successivum, si tamen a parte rei loquamur, tum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 eas est successivum, nempe motus, duratio enim motus à parte rei cadem est cum essentià ipsà. If you should say with Bonaventure, and others, That succession of duration distinguisheth the creature from the Creator, and therefore every creature hath succession of duration: They will again (out of the forementioned Authors) distinguish of a twofold succession, privative and positive. 1. A privative or negative succession, and that is, either betwixt not being, and being, or betwixt being, and not being; thus when a man is begotten, his being succeeds his not being, and when he dies, his not being succeeds his being; and this privative succession doth distinguish the creature from the Creator, and therefore doth or may agree to every creature: for even the Angels had a beginning, and so there was a succession of their being unto their not being; and they might have an end, by God's omnipotency, if he had not decreed otherwise: nay, God could 〈◊〉 them merely by the withdrawing of his preservative influence, and so there might have been a succession of their not being unto their being: this succession is opposed unto an intrinsical necessity of existence, or unto an immutable permanency, seu stabilitati permanentiae, as Suarez phraseth it, Disp: 50 Sect. 5. n. 26. and not unto 〈◊〉 of being as such: This succession, if we speak of the power and capacity of it, is essential to our bodies, and withal, 'tis inseparable from them; for even after the resurrection, God could (if he had not determined the contrary) reduce them unto their first nothing. A positive succession hath for both its extremes a positive being, and this is again (they will say) either discrete, or continuous. 1. Discrete between beings totally perfect; as the knowledge of one Plant succeeds the knowledge of another Plant: But this succession doth not constitute a successive being There is another succession, which they call continuous, and that is not betwixt total beings, but betwixt parts of the same being; when they do not exist together, but one after another, in 〈◊〉 (as they say) and this succession is proper and peculiar unto motion, though not unto every motion. Thus far my Pupils. Dr. Taylor. This I have here set down, not that I at all value the problem whether it be so or no, but that you may not think me a Socinian particularly in this Article, or that I think the bodies in the resurrection shall be specifically distinct from what they are here; I believe them the same bodies, but ennobled in their very beings, for to a specifical and substantial change, is required, that there be introduction of new forms. 〈◊〉. 1. You will not be throughly and sufficiently distinguished from the Socinians in this Article, if you think the bodies in the resurrection shall be numerically distinct from what they are here; and therefore I shall entreat you to tell us in your next, how far you accord with or descent from them in this particular. 2. You here say, that to be quantitative, shall be taken away from our bodies in the resurrection; and the sequel of this is, that bodies in the resurrection shall be specifically distinct from what they are here; for a quantitative substance, and a substance without quantity, are specifically distinct; because the one is material, a body, and the other immaterial, a spirit, and not a body at all, unless nomine tenns. Dr. Taylor. But yet the improving of essential predicates, is no specification of subjects, but a 〈◊〉 of the first. Jeanes. The ordinary Reader may perhaps think, that there is some great mystery wrapped up under these hard words; but the plain meaning of them, is (as I suppose) that the improving of essential predicates, doth not make a specifical change of subjects, but only advance a subject unto a better being. Essential predicates may be said to be improved three manner of ways. 1. By abolition of them. 2. By 〈◊〉 of them. 3. By addition unto them. The two latter are impertinent to this business in hand; for suppose (though not grant) that the essential predicates of substances might be improved by 〈◊〉 of them, or by addition unto them; yet what will this make to the separability of essentials from a subject: The improving of essential predicates, that belongs unto our present purpose, is by abolition of them, and by substituting new and more noble essentials in their room; and that essentials may be abolished, and new essentials substituted in their rooms (the things remaining the same) is a thing you may magisterially and imperiously dictate, but can never Scholastically prove. But (perhaps) you will say, that you take essential in a Moral and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: But Sir, you must remember, that you are not to take essential here, in such a latitude, as to include accidental and contingent predicates; for if you should, Porphyry's definition of Accidens will remain unshaken by what you say: Would not this be a ridiculous Argument? accidental and contingent predicates may be taken away, sine subjecti interitu, therefore adesse & abesse sine subjecti 〈◊〉, is no excellent definition of an accident; and yet this will be your very argument, if by essential predicates you mean any thing besides the four first predicables, unto which all essential predicates are reducible. Dr. Taylor. But the consequent is, that abesse & adesse sine subjecti interitu, is not an excellent definition of an accident. Jeanes. The arguments from which you infer this consequent, are overthrown, and therefore this consequent falleth to the ground of itself, without you support it by some fresh arguments. Dr. Taylor. And 〈◊〉 further, it follows; That if 〈◊〉 were 〈◊〉 essential to a man, as mortality is, or to be 〈◊〉, yet there is no more need that man should rise with sin, then with mortality. jeanes. And, pray Sir, why do not you add, and with quantity? Do you begin to startle at this Proposition? that men shall rise without quantity: But as 〈◊〉 the separability of both mortality and quantity from bodies in the resurrection, I have spoken already so fully, as that I may spare to say any thing anew of it. Dr. Taylor. But Aristotle's Philosophy, and Porphyry's Commentary, are but ill measures in 〈◊〉, and you should do well to scour bright that armour in which you trust, which 〈◊〉 it be prudently conducted, will make a man a Sophister rather than a 〈◊〉: but 〈◊〉 are wiser. jeanes. Aristotle and Porphiry are no contemptible Authors in Philosophy; but who ever thought them 〈◊〉 in Philosophy, or their Books measures in Theology? Philosophy is a very useful Handmaid unto Divinity, and none will decry it, but such whose sayings and writings cannot endure the test thereof; nothing that is true in Philosophy, can be false in Divinity; for verum vero non opponitur, one truth doth not, cannot clash with another: As for my Philosophy, I hope God will preserve me from trusting in it, or in any other arm of flesh: If you can detect any error therein, I shall be ready to retract it, and be very thankful to you for your pains; as for the dirt you have hitherto thrown thereon, it will not stick, but recoileth on your own face. Dr Taylor. I have only this one thing to add, That the common Discourses of Original Sin, makes sin to be natural, necessary, and unavoidable, and then may I not use your own words, this Tenet is chargeable with Libeatinism, it is a liceatious Doctrine, and opens a gap to the greatest profaneness, for it takes away all conscience of sin, all 〈◊〉 of it for the time past; if sin be natural, necessary, and unavoidable, as it is to us, if we derive it from Adam, etc. what reason hath he to be humbled for it, and to ask God pardon for it? so that you have done well against your own opinion; and if I had not used the argument before, I should have had reason to thank you for it: now as it is, you are further to consider of it, not I Jeanes. If you understand by natural, that which naturally results from nature, and by necessary and unavoidable, that which is denominated such from a primitive and created necessity, that which you say is a foul slander against the common discourses of Protestants against Original sin: But if you mean by natural that which is connexed with, and cocval unto our nature, and by necessary and unavoidable, that which is such in regard of a consequent and contracted necessity, it will be nothing to the purpose: for you (and you may take in to boot your good friends of Racovia) are never able to prove, that the assertion of such a naturality and necessity of Original sin, is any bar to humiliation or repentance for it, unto Prayer for the pardon of it. Dr Taylor. Sir, Though I have reason to give you the priority in every thing else, yet in civility I have far outdone you. jeanes. First, You have written a Letter to me without a Superscription, and I have returned one unto you with a Superscription; and this I take, to be of the two, the greater civility. If I may believe the echo of the neighbourhood, you have written several Letters unto Mr. T. C. concerning me, that cannot pretend to any great civility, for they are said to be stuffed with insulting reproaches: unto which I shall return nothing, but my Prayers for the increase of your charity and humility. Dr. Taylor. You were offended at a passage, which you might easily, but would not understand; you have urged arguments against me, which return upon your own head: The Proposition you charge me withal, I own not in any of your 〈◊〉, nor (as you set it down) in any at all, and yet your arguments do not substantially, or rationally confute it, if I had said so. jeanes. Here you sum up your Conquests, but whether you do not reckon without your Host, let the Reader judge. Dr. Taylor. 〈◊〉 all this, you have used your pleasure upon me; you have reviled me, slighted me, scorned me, untempted, unprovoked; you never sent to me civilly to give you satisfaction in your Objections, but talked it my absence, and to my prejudice. jeanes. Unto all this, a general negative is a sufficient answer, until I know the Particulars that your Delator hath informed you with; but perhaps, you may think that for such an obscure person as myself, to dare to except against what you write, is to revile, slight, and scorn you; if you be so impatient of contradiction, I shall leave it unto your own bosom to judge from what spirit it proceeds: When you published your Book, you exposed it to every man's censure that would read it; and will you accuse every man of uncivility that passeth his censure upon any passage in it, in a private discourse with friends? But Sir, upon Mr. C. his entreaty, I sent him in writing the reasons that I had for my censure, and these reasons were by my consent to be conveyed to you, and therefore I sent unto you mediately by another to give satisfaction to my objections: If you shall say that 'twas uncivil for me not to make my address immediately unto yourself, it is a charge will easily be wiped off; I was, as I thought, an utter stranger unto you, and Mr. C. professed a greet acquaintance with, and interest in you, and assured me that my Exceptions should be received with all possible candour, and promised his diligence and 〈◊〉 in conveying of them unto 〈◊〉 my objections therefore were sent civilly unto you, though sent by him; but however you are thus 〈◊〉, the Reader, I hope, will have a more charitable opinion of my procedure herein, and think, that you have no reason to make such 〈◊〉 Outcries against me for abusive uncivilities towards you. Dr. Taylor. Yet I have sent you an answer, I hope, satisfactory, and together with it a long Letter, which in the midst of my many affairs and straitened condition, is more than I can again afford. Jeanes. Unto your long Letter I have returned a longer answer; and whether yours or mine be satisfactory, I am contented to refer it unto the indifferent Reader: 〈◊〉 your condition be straitened, I wish it were more plentiful: But my affairs are, I 〈◊〉, neither for number nor importance inferior unto yours; and from them I have borrowed so much time, as to answer you, and shall be ready to do so again to perform unto you the like office. Dr Taylor. And after all this, I assure you that I will pray for you, and speak such good things of you, as I can find, or hear to be in you; and profess myself, and really be, Sir, Your affectionate friend and servant, in our blessed Lord and Saviour Jesus. Jer: Taylor. jeanes. For this your promise I give you hearty thanks, and shall endeavour to make you as grateful a return as I can, in the like Christian offices of love, and so shall rest, In Christ Jesus your humble servant, Henry Jeanes. POSTSCRIPT. Dr Taylor. Sir, I received yours late last night; and I have returned you this early in the morning, that I might in every thing be respective of you. Jeanes. This I easily believe, and am confident, that upon review of your Letter you will acknowledge, that according to the proverb, you have made more haste then good speed. Dr. Taylor. But I desire not to be troubled with any thing that is not very material, for I have business of much greater concernment; neither can I draw the saw of contention with any man about things less pertinent. I expect no answer, I need none, I desire none, but expect that you will employ your good parts in any thing, rather 〈◊〉 in being ingeniosus in alieno libro. Your talents can better (if you please) serve God, then by cavilling with or without reason. jeanes. Whether or no the controversy between us be not material, but less pertinent; whether your Letter be so satisfactory, as that it needs no answer? as also, whether I cavil without reason (to cavil with reason, is a Catachresis as harsh as ratione 〈◊〉, and as hardly justifiable, but by a licentiâ pocticâ) are things in which I refuse you for my Judge, and appeal unto the learned and unprejudiced Reader. Secondly, That you neither expect nor desire an answer from me may be very probable, but that I was obliged to return you one, I have 3 Reasons that convince me. First, By my silence, the truth which you have wronged would suffer. Secondly, your Papers have been with a great deal of diligence published, and if I should not give them an answer, I should be accessary to the Funeral of my own good name. And Thirdly, A friend of yours, when he gave me this your Letter, told me, That I could not answer it, and that you were, as he thought, infallible: now I thought it my duty to undeceive him, who having your person in too great an admiration, greedily swalloweth whatsoever falls from your pen, though never so 〈◊〉 and erroneous. UNIFORMITY IN Humane Doctrinal Ceremonies Ungrounded on 1 Cor. 14. 40. OR, A REPLY UNTO D r. HAMMONDS VINDICATION OF HIS Grounds of Uniformity from the 1 Cor. 14. 40. BY HENRY JEANES, Minister of God's Word at CHEDZOY. OXFORD, Printed by A. Lichfield Printer to the University, for Tho. Robinson, 1660. Uniformity in Humane Doctrinal Ceremonies ungrounded on 1 Cor. 14. 40. Dr. HAMMOND. 1 Cor. 14. 40. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Decently, and according to appointment. 1. SInce the publishing that Answer to Mr. J. concerning the degrees of ardency in Christ's Prayer, I am advertised of another passage in that volume, in which I am concerned, relating to some words of mine in the view of the Directory, pag. 19 on the head of Uniformity in God's Service, and particularly respecting my rendering of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 14 40. Let all things be done 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 2. These indeed I thus rendered [decently and according to order or appointment] and affirmed the importance of that place to be, that all be done in the Church according to Custom and appointment, rendering this reason of the former, because it was employed in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, decently (custom being the only rule of decency, etc.) and of the latter, because the words do literally import this, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. according to order or appointment. 3. To the former of these he makes his first exception, thus, [he dares not affirm that this is the immediate sense of the place, but only that it is employed; it cannot be denied, but that decency doth imply such customs, the omission of which doth necessarily infer indecency; but that the omission of such ceremonies as ours, doth infer indecency, the Doctor and all his party can never make good: What undecency can the Doctor prove to be in the administration of Baptism without the Cross; as also in public Prayers and Preaching without a Surplice? But of this see farther in 〈◊〉 in the places but new quoted: The Doctor may perhaps look upon him as an inconsiderable adversary. But we shall think his Arguments considerable, until the Doctor, or some other of his party give a satisfactory answer unto them. In the mean while let us examine the proof that 〈◊〉 Doctor brings for this sense: and it is because custom is the only rule of decency. This Proposition, though very strange, is 〈◊〉; and therefore we might as well reject it, as the Doctor dictates it. But I shall add a consutation of it, from these follow:ing arguments. 1. If custom be the only rule of decency, than nothing else can be a rule thereof besides custom; but this is false; for the light and law of Nature, is also a rule thereof, and that 〈◊〉. 2. Nothing can be undecent, that is agreeable unto the only rule of 〈◊〉 but divers things are undecent, which yet can plead custom; and this is so evident, as that I will not so much undervalue the Doctor's judgement, as to endeavour any 〈◊〉 thereof It is 〈◊〉 that the only rule of decency should be undecent; but yet 〈◊〉 is very possible that many customs should be 〈◊〉, and therefore I shall conclude, that custom is not the 〈◊〉 rule of 〈◊〉. 3. Lastly, unto custom, as you may see in both Aristotle and Aquinas, the frequent usage of a thing is required. But new there may be decency or handsomeness in the 〈◊〉 usage of a thing; and of this decency custom is not the rule, and therefore it is not the only rule of decency. 4. The 〈◊〉 thing here charged on me, is 〈◊〉, that I 〈◊〉 not say what I said not, and this attended with a concession (in a limited sense) of the truth of what I did say; the 〈◊〉 is the 〈◊〉 unsufficiency of that, in that limited sense, to prove what he 〈◊〉 I would have from it, viz. that the omission of our ceremonies 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 indecency: And the proof of this charge 〈◊〉, 1. by way of question, founded in two 〈◊〉, the Cross in Baptism, and the 〈◊〉 in public Prayer, and 〈◊〉: 2. By reference to Ames, and resolving to think his arguments considerable, till a satisfactory answer be given them. And his third charge, is my using an unsufficient proof to prove my interpretation, viz. this, [because custom is the only rule of decency] which he confutes by three arguments. These three charges I shall now very 〈◊〉 examine, and, if I mistake not, clearly evacuate. The first by assuring him, 1. that I did dare to say, and indeed said (as I then thought perspicuously) the full of what I meant; but that it was no way incumbent on me, to say either what I did not mean, or what Mr. J. or any other should be justly able to charge of want of truth in the least degree. And 2. if what I said cannot, as he confesses, be denied, to have truth in it in one sense, I demand why must it be a not daring (which is wont to signify timidity or cowardice) 〈◊〉 I 〈◊〉 it not in another sense, wherein 〈◊〉 doth not consent to it. Jeanes. The not daring of a thing proceeds from, not only timidity, but also from conscience and shame: When we say of men in controversal writings, that they dare not affirm such and such errors, we do not reproach them with cowardice, unless he be a coward that is afraid, or ashamed to deliver an untruth. That according unto custom is the immediate sense of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is a very gross & evident falsehood; & when I said that you dared not to 〈◊〉 it, my meaning plainly was, that your conscience or shame kept you from such an affirmation, and what wrong I have herein done you I am yet to 〈◊〉. If you demand why I say that, you dare not say what you said not? I answer, I have two reasons for it: 1. In entrance into this dispute, I did, as is usall in Controversies, premise what I took for uncontroverted on both sides. 1. for your part, I thought you would not deny, but that the immediate sense of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was not according unto custom; and then, I propounded for my own part what I granted. 2. Though in Charity I judge, that you dare not say, that according unto custom is the immediate sense of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, yet I must needs tell you, that by your opinion it is incumbent upon you to say as much, and that I thus prove: You 〈◊〉 that according to 〈◊〉 is the importance of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, the adequate and full importance of it, for that you should so 〈◊〉, as to say, that you meant, it is only the partial, and inadequate importance of it, I will not so much as imagine: But now, if it be not the express, and immediate sense of the word, but only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as drawn therefrom, as a sequel or 〈◊〉; by way of deduction or consequence, it may only be a part or piece of the importance thereof: to prove then, that 'tis the full and adequate importance of the word, you must make good, that it is the immediate sense of it. Dr. Hammond. sect. 6. To make short, and prevent all 〈◊〉 of his, or any man's farther mistaking my words, I shall 〈◊〉 to tell him the full of my meaning in that 〈◊〉, that (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 decently) implies (according to custom) viz. that in such things as these, of which then I spoke, gestures, habits, and the like circumstances of God's 〈◊〉 service, wherein the 〈◊〉 prescribes care of decency, 'tis necessary to observe the custom, of the place wherein we live. Jeanes. 1. The customs of some places in gestures, habits, and the like circumstances of God's worship are very undecent, and it is not necessary to observe such customs: But you will perhaps 〈◊〉 that you except undecent customs, and then you are to be understood only of decent customs; for every custom is decent or undecent: because decency and undecency are privatively opposed, and inter 〈◊〉 opposita non datur 〈◊〉 in subjecto 〈◊〉, between privative opposites there is no middle either of 〈◊〉 or participation 〈◊〉 a capable subject: The 〈◊〉 and upshot then of your meaning is, that, decently implies, according unto decent customs; and then 1. The full of your meaning is but a 〈◊〉 speech, that proves nothing in the Controversy, unless you also prove the Ceremonies controverted, to 〈◊〉 so decent, as that the 〈◊〉 of them will be undecent in the service of God. 2. I would 〈◊〉 know, how you will suit unto it the proof of it: Custom is the only rule of decency, for there too, by custom you understand that which is decent, so that your argument runs thus: decent custom is the only rule of decency; therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 decently, implieth decent customs. And this argument most of your learned Readers will (to borrow your words concerning a saying of mine) despise under the appearance of a 〈◊〉. 2. If the full of your meaning in that passage, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 decently, implies according to custom, be, that in such things as these, of which then you spoke, gestures, habits and the 〈◊〉 circumstances of Gods public service, etc. it is necessary to observe the customs of the place wherein we live, why then I must be bold to tell you, that the full of your: meaning is very short of the meaning of the Apostle; for these words of the Apostle, let all things be done decently 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, prohibits all undecency not only that undecency against the custom of the place wherein we live, but also that undecency which is against the dictates of the Law of Nature. By this the Reader may see, how defective your exposition is: the Apostle saith, let all things be done decently, and your gloss is, let some things in God's worship be done according unto some customs, to 〈◊〉, such as are decent. 3. I suppose that by gestures, habits, and the like circumstances in the service of God, you mean such of them as are Symbolical ceremonies; for otherwise your full meaning is nothing unto the purpose, because it will be no ground for that uniformity you plead for. Now that the Apostles words, let all things be done decently implieth, that in humane Symbolical ceremonies it is necessary that we observe the customs of the place wherein we live, is a thing which I utterly deny, and shall be constant in such denial, until you drive me from it by some convincing argument; and that I do not do this out of stomach, will appear by the reason that I shall allege: The words of the Apostle, let all things be done decently, 〈◊〉 not disobeyed, unless there be some undecency committed in the worship and service of God; for decency and undecency are privatively opposite, and therefore there is decency in those actions where there is no undecency; but now by the omission of Symbolical ceremonies of humane institution, such as the Cross in Baptism, Surplice in Prayer and Preaching, which can plead custom of the present place we live in, there is committed no undecency in the worship and service of God, viz. in Baptism, in Preaching and Praying, as will be apparent unto any man that will attempt to prove syllogistically the contrary; therefore the Apostles precept is not disobeyed by the omission of such Symbolical ceremonies, and consequently the Apostles precept doth not in any way imply such Ceremonies. Dr. Hammond. sect. 6. This I then thought sufficiently explicated by exemplifying in men's wearing long hair, which the Apostle proved indecent by its being against 〈◊〉, i. e. saith 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a custom of some continuance in that place (which yet in women there, and men in other places, where that custom prevailed not, had nothing indecent in it.) Jeanes. 1. This conceit that you have out of 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 de 〈◊〉 disputes against; but his argument satisfyeth me not, and therefore I shall wave all that he says, and confine myself unto the very words of the Apostle for disproof of your sense of them, and my reason is taken from the joining of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; for suppose that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Nature, may sometimes signify custom, yet that ' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nature itself should signify custom, is very improper. 2. women's wearing of long hair is no religious 〈◊〉 ceremony, but used out of God's worship and service, as well as in, and therefore a most impertinent exemplification of that which you plead for, 〈◊〉 in religious mystical Ceremonies, that are proper and peculiar unto the special and solemn worship of God. I readily grant, that in some places, custom hath made the long hair of women one badge of distinction between them and men; but being by custom made such a badge, nature itself dictates the observation of it; and if a man wear such long hair as women, he sins against the law of nature. if not immediately and 〈◊〉, yet mediately ex interventu 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. As 〈◊〉 is your second exemplification, if Chrysostom's and others exposition may have place; for they refer [we have no such custom] unto the words immediately foregoing (and why we should go 〈◊〉 for a coherence, I can see no reason) if any man seem to be contentious: So that the meaning of the Apostle is, we have no custom to be contentious: Now to be contentious, is a sin against the Moral Law, the Law of Nature, and therefore belongs not 〈◊〉 to your discourse of Ceremonies. Dr. Hammond. sect 7. But this exemplification of my meaning he thought 〈◊〉 to conceal from the Reader, and supply that vacuity only with an etc. yet reciting at length, to a word, what was immediately before, and after it. His design in so doing, I judge not, but shall endeavour to undeceive the Reader for the future, by farther enlarging on it. Jeanes. 1. women's wearing of long hair is no Symbolical ceremony, and therefore what you said of it was an 〈◊〉, and no exemplification of your 〈◊〉, and therefore I had no reason to take notice of it. But 2. suppose it were an exemplification, yet unless it were also for 〈◊〉 of your 〈◊〉; that 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 only rule of 〈◊〉, I was no wise obliged to 〈◊〉 what you said herein; for I 〈◊〉 told the Reader, I would transcribe what was 〈◊〉 in your words; now what I 〈◊〉 out was not argumentative; 〈◊〉 from it, neither you, nor any man else can ever infer your now mentioned conclusion. Dr. Hammond sect. 8. All people, I think, in the world, have some outward significations, and expressions of Reverence; but all have not the same, but according to Topical customs, some different, some contrary to others: We of this and all our 〈◊〉 nations express reverence by uncovering the 〈◊〉, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the contrary. Again, among Christians, 'tis customary for men so to express their reverence, but for women, saith the Apostle, it is not, but the contrary; and so it is still among us. Nay it was once among some Heathens (that worshipped Mercury) an act of the highest reverence, even of adoration, to throw stones at their God; among others, to cut themselves with Lances, when they were a praying to him. And it can be no news to Mr. 〈◊〉. that these customs were not observed by other Countries; the Jews that 〈◊〉 stones at Christ, and the 〈◊〉 that cut himself with them, were neither of them 〈◊〉 to worship him. Jeanes. 1, Unless you can prove, that there cannot be outward significations and expressions of reverence in God's service, without humane Symbolical ceremonies, all this your enlargement about the expressions of reverence will be to no purpose. We require reverence in all parts of God's worship as well as you; but then we hold, that God's worship may be performed reverently, and in a seemly manner, without mystical ceremonies of humane invention. 2. Kneeling in Prayer is an expression of the highest degree of Reverence, Adoration; and it hath a higher rule than Custom, viz. Scripture and the light of Nature: No Custom can render this Kneeling undecent; unless you will say those words of the Psalmist, Psal. 95. 6, do not oblige Christians: O come, let us worship and bow down, let us kneel before the Lord our maker. 3. There be some customary expressions of reverence, that are undeniably unjustifiable, and you cannot say that they are employed in the Apostles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thus 〈◊〉 expression of reverence, 'tis a 〈◊〉 with Papists not to touch the bread with their hands, but to have it put into their 〈◊〉; and upon the like pretence of reverence, it is customary amongst them, for Lay men to abstain from the Cup altogether. Lastly, why you bring in the Heathens throwing of stones at Mercury in a way of worship, I cannot divine; for I cannot imagine, that you 〈◊〉 it to be a decent way of worship, and if it be undecent, than 〈◊〉 serveth nothing unto the exemplification of your meaning. Dr. Hammond. sect. 9 This therefore was no dark, but visible foundation of what I said; In assigning any rite or ceremony for the service of God, 〈◊〉, saith the 〈◊〉, was to 〈◊〉 observed, the only rule to judge of that, is, say I, to consider the Customs of that particular place, of which we consult. Where bowing the knee, or 〈◊〉 on the ground is customarily used as a token of reverence, where putting off, or keeping off the hat, there the choice of Ceremonies must be made with 〈◊〉 to those particular 〈◊〉: Here 'tis evident, that I mean not the frequent usage of that ceremony, in opposition to a first usage of it, as Mr. 〈◊〉. is willing to mistake me, and found one of his arguments upon that mistake, but the standing custom of the place, by which, as by an argument or evidence, such a ceremony is demonstrated to be a reverential respect, and so (for the service of God, to whom all reverence is due) decent in that place, though in nature or in the estimation of all other men, it be not so. Jeanes. 1. If the Apostle had said, as you say, he saith, there ought to be no farther controversy about the lawfulness of humane ceremonies; but that clause in assigning any rite or ceremony for the service of God, etc.] is an Apocryphal addition of yours, without any colour from the Text itself, or from the coherence; and therefore all you build upon it is but fancy and fiction: That the Apostles decency cannot be observed without assigning such Rites and Ceremonies as you dispute for, you may dictate and boldly affirm, but can never with all your learning 〈◊〉 prove; and unless you can make proof hereof, you and your party have just reason to be ashamed of urging this place for ceremonies, with such an unshaken confidence as you do. 2. Whereas you tell us, 'tis evident that you mean not the frequent usage of that ceremony in opposition to the first usage of it: This evidence of your meaning you have not so much as attempted to prove; and if you shall for the future make such an attempt, it would, I am afraid, prove 〈◊〉. The custom of a thing (unless you can fasten upon it a sense or meaning never yet heard of) is opposed unto the first usage of that thing; for custom implieth the frequent usage of a thing, and to say that the frequent usage of a thing is the first usage of it, is an evident repugnancy and an apparent contradiction, contradictio in adjecto 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉, as they say. I am therefore much to seek for the sense and reason of that Antithesis you make in these words, I mean, not the frequent usage of that ceremony in opposition to a first usage of it, but the standing custom of the place, etc. for 'tis impossible that the standing custom of the place in a ceremony, should be the first usage of that ceremony; where the mistake is let the Reader judge. 3. In that which followeth, there is nothing of argument, unless you can prove every ceremony, which can plead the standing custom of a place, to be a fitting and decent expression of that reverential respect, which is due unto God. Bishop Morton in his Book of the Institution of the Sacrament of the blessed 〈◊〉 and Blood of Christ, p. 80, 81. showeth that the opinion of reverence, hath been the 〈◊〉 and nurse of 〈◊〉 superstitions; and after such demonstration he quotes a saying of 〈◊〉 upon Joh. 13. 8. Let us therefore learn 〈◊〉 honour and reverence Christ as he would, and not as we think sit. Dr. Hammond. sect. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14. 10. Certainly this is so evident in itself, and so undeniably the importance of my words, that there can be no need farther to enlarge on it, much less to examine the weight, or meaning of his concession, 〈◊〉 it cannot be 〈◊〉 but that 〈◊〉 doth imply such customs, the omission of which 〈◊〉 infers indecency] 11. This saying of his some Readers may look on with Reverence, as not readily comprehending the importance of it, others may 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 it under the appearance of a tautology. But upon pondering, it will appear that the Author had a 〈◊〉 in it; which be designed should bring in some advantage to his cause, and without which he was not likely to advance far, 〈◊〉 succeed in it. 12. Some customs we know there are, which are so highly decent, as that the omission of then necessarily infers indecency: But what are they? why such as the law of (at least 〈◊〉) nature prescribes, covering of nakedness, and the like; of which 'tis evident among all that have not learned of Carneades industriously to raze out all natural measures of honest and dishonest, that the omission of them 〈◊〉 indecency, yea and necessarily infers it, this sort of decency being natural to all men that ever were, or shall be in the world, born and educated in what vation, or enured to what custom seever, and this the very first hour after our first Parents fall, before any custom had been contracted which might recommend it to them. 13 And as of these his rule is true, that the omission of these necessarily infers undecency, so it is in a manner proper to these, and belongs not to any other sort of things, whose decency flows but from some positive command though it be of God, or custom, or command of men. To such things whose decency flows from any 〈◊〉 either of God or man, this rule cannot be fully applied; for that command might have been not given, or there might be a space before it was given, or a people to whom it was not given, and then in any of those cases the omission would not be indecent, to whom the law was not given; and so it doth not necessarily and absolutely, but only dependently on the 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; so in like manner the 〈◊〉 holds not in those things, whose 〈◊〉 is introduced only by custom, for that Mr. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 frequency of actions, it must again be granted, 〈◊〉 there was a time when that which now is 〈◊〉, was new, and so not custom; and again, there are, or may be Nations, with whom that custom (whatsoever can be instanced in) hath not 〈◊〉, which prejudges still the 〈◊〉 spoken of, that such omission should infer indecency. And so we see the sum of Mr. J. his liberal concession, viz. that decency 〈◊〉 natural decency, or such customs, which are naturally decent, and so the omission of them naturally indecent; and if the Doctor or his party do not prove, or make 〈◊〉, that the administration of Baptism without the Cross is against the law of nature, that the Preaching without the Surplice bears 〈◊〉 to the 〈◊〉 of nakedness, he is utterly refuted by Mr. J. in his interpretation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or notion of decency. Jeanes. 1. That I had no design in putting in the word necessarily, is evident by my leaving it out in the next words; but that the omission of such ceremonies as ours doth inserre 〈◊〉, the Doctor and all his party can never make good. You shall have my good leave instead of necessarily to place truly, or convincingly. Voeiferations I have heard many against the undecency of God's worship and service amongst 〈◊〉, and when I have called for proof, 〈◊〉 have been told, amongst other things, that they Baptised without the 〈◊〉, that they put up prayers unto God 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉; but that 〈◊〉 is undecently 〈◊〉, where such toys as these are omitted, you may stoutly affirm, but can never prove, by so much as one convictive 〈◊〉: the word necessarily may 〈◊〉 very well be inserted, in opposition to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the ignorant, and prooflesse dictates of some learned men. Ignorant men may 〈◊〉, and learned men may 〈◊〉, that the omission of our ceremonies 〈◊〉 infer indecency, but this surmise and dictate can never be made good by argument. 2. In Logic, a necessary inference is opposed unto that 〈◊〉 is follacious, as also that which is but probable and contingent; and therefore I wonder why you should quarrel at the word necessarily? for do you think in earnest, that decency implies such customs, the omission of which doth sophistically, or at the best, only probably inserre undecency, you cannot, I know, harbour so 〈◊〉 and irrational a thought, and therefore you must say as I do, that decency here implieth only such customs, the omission of which, necessarily infer undecency. 3. When you say that my rule is in a manner proper to those customs, which the Law, of at least, lapsed Nature prescribes, that limitation in a manner is a backdoor, out of which how far you may run, I know not, and therefore until you somewhere make a stand, I shall not run after you. 4. Whereas you fasten upon me this assertion, that decency here implieth only such customs which are naturally decent, viz. prescribed immediately by the Law of Nature, and so 〈◊〉 omission of them naturally indecent, you have for this no colour, but that which you take from the word necessarily, and how weak a ground this is for such an imputation, you must needs 〈◊〉, when you remember what I now told you, that accessarily here is opposed unto fall: ciously and probably. Dr. 〈◊〉 himself in the dispute about humane ceremonies, pag. 58. confesseth, that comeliness, in the very place of the Apostle, containeth all natural and civil handsomeness; and in his Reply to Mortons' general Defence, etc. cap. 3. sect. 28. he acknowledgeth the women's veils, 1 Cor. 11. to be an instance of this decency; for by the example of it, he concludes that other Churches may be directed so far, just as the Apostles rule stretcheth, 1 Cor 14. 40. Let all things be done 〈◊〉: when Bishop Morton desired to know whether this matter were not a thing indifferent? his answer is, it is indifferent in the general nature of it; yet at that time, and in that place, they sinned that did otherwise, 〈◊〉 before Paul, or any of their overseers gave them charge about it. By this his answer it is apparent, that he did not think it dictated by Nature unto the Corinthians, before any custom had recommended it unto them. As for my own part you shall have here my frank concession, that decency here implieth even that decency which is introduced by civil custom, provided, 1. That it be, consuetudo rationabilis; for no other custom can have the force and 〈◊〉 of a law, and if you, or any other can bring Suarez 〈◊〉 legib. any arguments, that it was consuetudo rationabilis which introduced our ceremonies, they shall have, God willing, an answer. 2. That the omission of it renders God's worship undecent: the equity of this limitation appeareth from this reason, because the Apostles command of decency is not violated but by undecency: This is at large set down in Ames his dispute about humane ceremonies, pag. 77, 78. Lastly, your, and my learned friend Mr Barlow, resolveth and proveth, Exercit. Metaph. p. 29. every moral evil, every evil of sin, to be against the law of Nature, if not proximè and immediatè, yet mediatè ex interventu legis positivae, now the undecency here prohibited by the Apostle is a moral evil, a sin, malum culpae, therefore 'tis at lest mediately against the Law of Nature. Your great and learned 〈◊〉, pag. 95. of his Ecclesiastical Polity saith, that this rule of the 〈◊〉 is an edict of Nature, a Canon of that Law which is written in all men's hearts; the Church had for ever, no less than now, stood bound 〈◊〉 observe it, whether the Apostle had mentioned it or no. And hereupon I shall infer, that if you or your party do not prove or make good, that the administration of Baptism without the Cross, that Preaching, Praying, without the Surplice, is against the Law of nature, in some sense at least, mediately, he is utterly 〈◊〉 by Mr. Hooker his interpretation of ' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or notion of decency; and I do not desire to live so long, as to see such a proof as this made. Dr. Hammond. sect. 15. This is indeed his meaning, which (though somewhat darkened in that his expression) will appear but consequent to the two things which he hath premised in this matter from Amesius his notion of decency. p. 64. in marg. 1. that 〈◊〉 requires not that any sacred things be instituted the 〈◊〉, but only that those things which are instituted by God, be used in that 〈◊〉 which is agreeable to the dignity of them. 2. That as order, so decency belongs to civil offices, as well as sacred things, in which indecorum est vitium oppositum debito illi modo, qui 〈◊〉 ad corum justum finem, & usum consequendum, 〈◊〉 is a vice opposed to that due manner which is 〈◊〉 to the obtaining the just end, and use of those things. Now if in the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉, the mode he speaks of, as agreeable to the dignity of those things which are 〈◊〉, be it self-supposed by him to be 〈◊〉 by men, then must he acknowledge humane 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 ceremonies, which being so contrary to his design, I must 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him; but rather, 〈◊〉 as the sacred things 〈◊〉 instituted by 〈◊〉, so the mode which is consentaneous to their dignity is instituted 〈◊〉 God also, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is decent in sacris, which is not so instituted. And so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 on the second 〈◊〉, that of civil 〈◊〉. For that indecency, which is a vice or sin, must be 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 Law of Gods, and so also that which is 〈◊〉 to the 〈◊〉 manner which is 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 so is necessary either necessitate medii, or praecepti also to obtaining a just end, this sure is more than the omission of an indifferent 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 may, or may not be continued without any offence against nature, even the omission of strict universal duty, either natural decency, or somewhat that bears proportion with it. Jeanes. Both Aims and my poor self 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 God hath by the Canon of the Apostle, and by the light of Nature, appointed and commanded, that 〈◊〉 in his worship and service, the neglect 〈◊〉 would be undecent; but that he holds that there is need of a special divine institution to render a thing decent, is disclaimed by Aims in several places of his writings: Medul. Theol. lib. 2. c. 14. sect. 24, 25, 26. Hujusmodi igitur 〈◊〉, quae 〈◊〉 naturâ sunt civiles, aut communes. nen sunt particulariter in 〈◊〉 praeceptae, partim, quia in 〈◊〉 hominum sensum incurrunt; & 〈◊〉, quia infra dignitatem & 〈◊〉 legis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, ut talia 〈◊〉 in illa praescribantur, hâc 〈◊〉 ratione 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fuissent singulari lege cavenda: Exempli gratiâ, ne in ecclesiastico, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 sinu sese colocaret, in alterius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, out ne 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in sacris actionibus. Habendae 〈◊〉 sunt 〈◊〉 ex 〈◊〉 Dei 〈◊〉. 1. Quta in genere 〈◊〉, sub lege ordinis, decori, & 〈◊〉. 2 Quia pleraeque 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sequuntur ex 〈◊〉 quae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sunt 〈◊〉 constituta. 〈◊〉 enim 〈◊〉 constituit, 〈◊〉 fideles omnis generis convenirent, ad 〈◊〉 nomen & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 etiam 〈◊〉, ut 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 locum habeant, in quo possint convenire, & 〈◊〉 etiam assignatam, qua 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 etiam minister à Des sit constitutus ad alios 〈◊〉 instituendos, fimul etiam constituitur, ut 〈◊〉 & fitum corporis illum habeat, qui tali 〈◊〉 congruit. 25. Illa igitur quae pertinent ad ordinem & decorum, non ita relinquuntur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; ut 〈◊〉, quod 〈◊〉 libet, sub illo nomine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 partim determinantur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 natura ipsarum rerum, & partim circumstantiis illis, quae ex occasione seize 〈◊〉. 26. Variae enim 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 circumstantiae tales sunt, ut nulla institutione publica accedente, debeant tamen à singulis observari, neque 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hominibus prohiberi sine 〈◊〉. 24. Such like circumstances therefore, which of their own nature are civil or common, are not particularly commanded in the Scriptures, partly because they come into men's common sense, and partly because it would not stand with the dignity and majesty of the Law of God, that such things should be severally prescribed in it. For by this 〈◊〉 many ridiculous 〈◊〉 should have been provided for by a special Law; as for example, that in the Church assenibly one should not place himself in another's 〈◊〉, spit in another's face, or should not make months in holy actions: Yet they are to be accounted as commanded from God: 1. Because they are 〈◊〉 in general under the Law of 〈◊〉, Decency, and 〈◊〉. 2. Because most of them do necessarily follow from those things which are 〈◊〉 appointed by God. For when God appointed that the faithful of all sorts should meet together to celebrate his name, and worship, he did consequently 〈◊〉 that they should have a sit and conventent place, wherein they may meet together, and an hour also assigned at which they may be 〈◊〉 together: when also there is a Minister appointed by God to teach others publicly, it is withal appointed that he have a seat which is meet for such an action. 25. Those things therefore which pertain to order and decency, are not so 〈◊〉 to men's wills, that they may under the name of that, 〈◊〉 what they please upon the 〈◊〉: but they are partly determined by the general precepts of God, partly by the nature of the things themselves, and partly by those circumstances which do offer themselves upon occasion. 26. For divers circumstances of order and decency are such, as though there be no public institution of them, yet they 〈◊〉 to be observed of every one, neither can men forbid them without sin. Unto this add another place in his 〈◊〉 soit against Ceremonies, disput. pag. 29. We never said, or thought, that all particular rites pertaining to order and decency are punctually determined in the Scripture. We never dreamt, that all such 〈◊〉 being beside the particular determination of the Scripture, are against it, we speak of double, or treble rites as the Rejoinder 〈◊〉 them, 〈◊〉 no mere order and decency doth 〈◊〉 require, but only the mere will of man 〈◊〉. That which is instituted by God in his worship, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 well to be a part of God's worship; but that decency 〈◊〉 no part of God's worship, Ames in his disput. pag. 176. proves by a Reason quoted out of 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉, Def of Mr. 〈◊〉. pag 844 Order and comeliness (saith the Popish Bishop) is some part of 〈◊〉 worship. But (saith Dr. Abbot) who taught him this deep point of Philosophy, that an accident is a part of the subject, that the beauty or comeliness of the body is a part of the body, order and 〈◊〉 properly and immediately respect men, and therefore can be no parts of the worship of God. To be instituted by God, if we speak 〈◊〉 & properly, is to be enjoined by a divine positive Law superadded unto the law of 〈◊〉; and in conformity hereunto it is that our Author Ames divides God's worship, Med. lib. 2. cap. 5. into natural and instituted: Now if this be your meaning, when you impute unto Ames and me, that our opinion is, that nothing is decent in 〈◊〉, which is not instituted by God, as the charge is false in itself, so it proveth not that which you bring it for, viz. that in our sense decency in the Apostle, is only that decency which the law of nature prescribes; but 〈◊〉 the clean contrary, because that which is instituted by a positive law superadded to the law of nature, is not prescribed 〈◊〉 and immediatè by the law of nature. You are by this time, I hope, conscious of the great injury you have done unto poor Dr. Ames, in 〈◊〉 unto him so irrational an opinion, and hereupon I shall be bold to give you this advertisement, that however you may despise him as a mean Author, unworthy of your perusal, yet, if you undertake to 〈◊〉 and refute him, you must read him, or else you will be very liable unto the breach of the ninth Commandment, Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour. But you will perhaps say in defence of yourself, that if it were not the opinion of Ames, it is the sequel of his words; and for this you have two reasons. The 1. because the mode or manner agreeable unto the dignity of sacred things is instituted by God, as the sacred things are instituted by God: But this proposition, if it be particular, 〈◊〉 nothing, and if it be universal, is false, as you might have seen in the next reason of Ames, but that you cannot see wood for trees, as the Proverb is; There is a mode or manner in the use of sacred things agreeable unto their dignity, that is not adequate, proper, and peculiar to them, but common unto civil matters of a grave nature together with them; and this is a matter inculcated by Dr. Ames in many places, which if you had weighed, you would never have troubled the Reader with this objection, Medul. Theol. lib. cap. 14. th': 23. 〈◊〉 igitur hujusmodi circumstantiae vocari soleant à nonnullis ritus & ceremoniae religiosae, 〈◊〉 ecclesiasticae, nihil tamen habent in sua natura, quod proprium est religionis, atque adeo in iis non propriè consistit cultus 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 ex corum neglectu, & contemptu violatur aliquo modo 〈◊〉 cultus religiosi; quia communis illa ratio ordinis & decori quae aequè convenit religiosis actibus, 〈◊〉 que civilibus, à religioso cultu non potest separart, quin oliquo modo 〈◊〉 ipsius dignitas & majestas. Although these circumstances of time, place, and other like, are wont by some to be called rites, or religious Ecclesiastical ceremonies, yet in their nature they have nothing that is proper to Religion, and therefore religious worship 〈◊〉 not properly consist in them, however by neglect and contempt of such circumstances, the sanctity of such religious worship is in some sort violated, because the common respect of order and decency, which do equally agree to religious and civil actions cannot be severed from religious worship, without diminishing of the sanctity and dignity of it. Thus also largely in his Manuduction to the dispute about humane Ceremonies, pag. 55, 56. If men and 〈◊〉 come purposely in their best apparel to Church, if they compose themselves to a grave posture, give the upper place to the chiefest persons, and take such to themselves as they may hear the 〈◊〉 in, and yet have no exception taken against them for it, if all the places and seats be made cleanly, and fit for a meeting, to be held in a 〈◊〉 fashion, all these are Ceremonies according to the Rejoinder his definition, yet no man but out of contention will affirm, they are merely religious or ecclesiastical: For all these in the same manner, and to the same immediate end, the same persons would do, if the meeting were to hear the Magistrate propound unto them a grave civil business, concerning the Commonwealth affairs. And surely that which remaining the same may be civil, is not merely and properly ecclesiastical, but common to both uses, and rather merely civil, than merely ecclesiastical; because civility is supposed and included in ecclesiastical affairs, but ecclesiastical proceedings are not supposed and included in civil. Dr. Jackson in his original of unbelief, pag. 337. doth well observe, that decent behaviour doth change the subject only, not alter its own nature and form, whilst it is used in matters sacred, nor is the habit of civil compliment, or good manners, such an unhallowed weed, as must be laid aside when we come into the Sanctuary. And indeed there is no more reason to shut civility out of the Church or sacred business, than to shut Religion out of the Town house, or civil affairs. Dr. Hammond. sect. 15. And so likewise on the second head that of civil offices, for that indecency which is a vice or sin must be contrary to some law of God, etc. Jeanes. Indecency in things civil, however it may be a vice in Ethics against civility and good manners, yet it is not always a sin in divinity contrary to some law of Gods but undecency in things sacred in the worship and service of God, if it be voluntary and avoidable, is against the command of the Apostle, which is a rule of the law of nature, saith Hooker; and this I believe you will not deny in cold blood: and indeed you have no reason to deny it; for it will not hereupon follow that the Apostle enjoineth only that decency which is immediately prescribed by the Law of Nature, and my reason is, because as the Apostle, so the light of Nature enjoineth as that decency the neglect whereof would be undecent by the light of nature; so also that, the omission whereof would be uncomely by 〈◊〉 custom, and therefore as undecency by the light of nature is against the light and Law of Nature immediately, so also undecency by civil custom is against the law of nature mediately. The long hair of women is one note by which custom hath distinguished them 〈◊〉 men; and therefore 'tis undecent for men to wear such long hair as women, and this supposed, mens wearing of such long hair is a mediate 〈◊〉 of the Law of nature; whereupon the Apostle propounds this smart interrogation unto the Corinthians, 1 Cor. 11. 14 Doth not even nature itself teach you, that 〈◊〉 a man have long hair, 'tis a shame to him? We may say the same of the long garments of women: doth not even nature teach you 〈◊〉 if a man wear such garments it is a shame unto him, and very undecent, and yet the undecency thereof ariseth immediately from civil custom, and not 〈◊〉 any immediate Law of Nature. Dr. Hammond. For that indecency, which is a vice, or sin must be contrary to some Law of Gods, and so also that which is opposed to the due manner which is 〈◊〉, and so is 〈◊〉 either incessitate 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 also, to obtain in a just end, this sure is more than the 〈◊〉 of an indifferent custom, which may, or may not be continued without any offence against nature, even the omission of strict universal duty, either natural decency, or somewhat that bears proportion with it. Jeanes. That decency in God's worship and service, the neglect of which would be undecent, is necessary both 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and praecepti. 1. Medii is required as a means unto the acceptable celebration of God's worship, but than it is not a means proper and peculiar thereunto, for it hath the same immediate end both in civil and religious matters, and therefore is common unto both. 2 That it is necessary necessitate praecepti you cannot question, unless you will deny the title and obligation unto the Apostles injunction, for that it binds as an edict of nature we have the testimony of your own Hooker: if this twofold necessity of decency be chargeable with any absurdities, you are as deeply concerned to answer them as myself: indeed that decency. from the omission whereof we cannot infer indecency is necessary, neither necessitate praecepti, nor medii. But with such a decency we have nothing to do; for it comes not within the compass of the Apostolical command, and such is the decency of your ceremonies altogether unnecessary; neither commanded by any Law of God, nor necessary as a means for the better service of God. But perhaps you may attempt to prove, that God is better served with your Ceremonies, than without them; when I shall have such proof from you, I shall return it an answer. In the mean while let us consider the absurdity with which you charge the assertion of the, but now mentioned, double necessity of decency in God's worship: If that be necessary, necessitate praecepti, or medii, then undecency, say you, which is opposed thereunto, is more than the omission of an indifferent custom, which may, or may not be continued without any offence against nature. For answer, the undecency here prohibeted by the Apostle, is either by the light of nature, or by civil custom. The former is more than the omission of an indifferent custom, and is an immediate transgression against nature. As for the latter, we must distinguish of a twofold consideration of such customs, they may be considered either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the general, as abstracted from all singularizing circumstances, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉, as clothed with such and such circumstances, and so they are not indifferent but necessary necessitate both praecepti and medii. I might exemplify this by instancing in the long hair, proper apparel, viz. long garments of women, and the like. There is a passage in Ames, already 〈◊〉, that will be here very apposite; Bishop Morton had demanded of him whether the women's veils, 1 Cor. 11. were not a thing indifferent, and his answer is, it is indifferent in the general nature of it, yet at that time, and in that place, they finned that did otherwise, even before Paul, or any of their Overseers gave them charge about it. Dr. Hammond. sect. 16. Now this being thus far explained, it is time to close with Mr: J. and mind him, what he cannot but know, that the decency which I said, employed custom, is certainly another thing from natural decency, and hath place only in those things, the omitting of which doth not necessarily infer indecency. That omission which necessarily infers indecency, infers it in all that ever did it, or shall omit it: We know in Logic that no proposition is necessary, which is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, true in the whole species of all, and every one, and I leave it to his judgement, whether he think the Dr. and his party (i. e. Prelatists, I suppose) do conceive, that Adam, (whether in, or out of Paradise) Noah in, or out of the Ark, etc. were obliged to pray in Surplices under pain of indecency? And so (in his other instance) that John Baptist, that Christ, or (because the Text saith that he baptised not, but his Disciples) that those Disciples, even before the death of Christ, might not baptise any without the sign of the Cross, but under the same penalty? Jeanes. Natural decency is a branch, nay the principal branch of that decency commanded by the Apostle, and therefore I could not think it excluded by you; but withal, I must conclude your interpretation of the Apostle, to be very 〈◊〉 and defective, when you said the clear importance of the Apostles words was, Let all things be done according to custom; I was so foolish to suppose that you meant this clear importance of the Apostles words, was also the full importance of them, neither can you assign any reason, why I should think otherwise. But that, I see, which so much stumbleth you, is the word necessarily, concerning which I hope you are satisfied by what I have already said, and therefore I shall only add this one thing, that necessarily hath two acceptions. 1. In regard of an absolute necessity. 2. In respect of an Hypothetical necessity arising from some extrinsical circumstance or condition. Now, I 〈◊〉 not restrain it unto either of these senses, but take it abstractively in such a latitude, as that 'tis appliable unto either of the significations according unto the nature of the things spoken of: the omission of natural 〈◊〉 infers undecency necessarily, in regard of an absolute necessity; the omission of civil undecency, infers undecency necessarily only ex Hypothesi: and that inference of indecency which is only necessary ex Hypothesi, is more than an inference thereof, which is fallacious, or at the most but probable; and if we speak of this necessity, it is very false which you say, that that omission which thus necessarily infers undecency, infers it in all that ever did, or shall omit it. But you say that, we know in Logic, that no 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉, which is not de omni true in the whole species of all and every one. Unto which I answer, that he who hath any tolerable knowledge in 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 that what you say is to be limited only unto that necessity which is scientifical and demonstrative; for to say nothing of such propositions as are necessary only hypothetically, there are divers propositions absolutely in themselves 〈◊〉, setting aside all outward circumstances and conditions, which are not 〈◊〉 de omni. 1. I shall instance in divers particular propositions, as, Quaedam 〈◊〉 est 〈◊〉: 〈◊〉 corpus est mixtum. 2. In several negative propositions, as, nullus spiritus est corpus: nullus lapis est 〈◊〉. Now these are necessary propositions, because of an immutable truth, and they are not the omni: For, 1. A particular proposition is not the omni, but de aliquo: And then 2. a negative proposition is not the omni; for the omni is opposed unto that which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de nullo. Dr. Hammond. sect. 17. Nay, 'tis already past question, that Mr. J. in his first argument against my dictate (as he calls it) saith, that the light and law of nature is also a rule of 〈◊〉, and so not only custom: And if so, then custom is a rule of decency also, and not only the law and light of nature, and where 〈◊〉, and not the light of nature is the rule, there the omission of that doth not necessarily infer indecency. And of such decency alone it is evident that I spoke, on the head of Uniformity (and could not speak sense, if I spoke, either of any other, or of the general notion of decency, which is compatible to any other) and 〈◊〉 thence it follows demonstratively that of that decency of which I spoke (though not of that, of which it is certain I spoke not) still custom is the only rule of decency. This therefore I hope may serve in answer to his first charge, that of my timidity, that I dared not say what I said not; together with a view of his concession of the truth of what I did say, and the wary limitation of that concession. Jeanes. 1. I called your assertion, viz. Custom is the only rule of decency, a dictate, and shall call it so still, until you can prove it, and when you bring any solid proof of it, abstracted from your 〈◊〉, for limitations I cannot call them, I shall be contented to be your vassal. 2 You seem to 〈◊〉, that in the things you speak of, custom, and not the light of nature is the role, but this is very false; for custom is mensura passiva, as well as activa: When it is a rule of decency, it is first measured and regulated by the light of nature, and without such regulation it is no rule of decency in any matter whatsoever; for custom hath not the force of a law 〈◊〉 sit rationabilis, that is agreeable unto the dictate of right reason and the law of Nature; the law of Nature than is still the principal rule of decency, speak of what decency you will or can, and custom is but a rule subordinate thereunto, and to be examined thereby. 3. If you speak of such decency alone, the omission whereof doth not necessarily infer undecency, in respect either of an absolute, or 〈◊〉 necessity, you do not speak of that decency which the Apostle commandeth; for that the Apostle should command such a decency, in the omission of which, men only boldly affirm, or merely opine there is 〈◊〉, and cannot make good such an affirmation or opinion, by any other than sophistical, or at the best, but probable arguments, me thinks should not sink into the head of any rational man. Yea, but you say, that you could not speak sense, if you spoke either of any other, or of the general notion of decency which is compatible to any other. Suppose I grant this, what then? this argument is of little prevalency with me, who am in this particular your Antagonist; for though I acknowledge and admire your great parts and learning, yet I think it not only possible, but probable for you, or any other, though never so great a scholar, to speak nonsense in opposition of the truth. 2. It is evident and certain that the Apostle spoke of the general notion of decency, which is compatible unto natural decency, and from thence it follows demonstratively, that if it be so certain, that you speak not of this decency, it is as certain that your gloss of the Apostles ' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 and maimed; for it leaves out what is chiefly meant by it, but of this before. Dr. Hammond. sect. 18. Secondly, then to his second charge, the unsufficiency of that limited truth (which is the utmost he will yield my 〈◊〉) to prove what I would have from it] It will soon appear of how little force it is, when 〈◊〉. my meaning was quite another thing from what he affixed to my words, or yielded me in his limited concession, as hath already been largely manifested; and 2. my conclusion is regularly consequent to that which 〈◊〉 alone my meaning. This latter the addition of a few words will clear also. Jeanes. For answer unto this I shall refer unto what hath been said already. Dr. Hammond. sect. 19 My conclusion designed in that Section was the justifying of Uniformity of Ceremonies in the service of God, and one of the grounds to support that, the decency of those ceremonies, wherein all should join, and that decency ruled, and judged of by the custom of the place in which such and such a ceremony was an usual indication, and expression of that reverence, which being due from all inferiors to their superiors is much more due from all Christians to God. Jeanes. 1. 〈◊〉 ceremonies have two acceptions. 1. They are taken largely for all circumstances of order, decency; as also for all mere indicant signs of reverence, and these for distinction sake may be called circumstantial ceremonies: but these are not the ceremonies in question; for the Non-conformists acknowledge these law full, and so also Uniformity in them; but yet of these ceremonies, custom is neither the only or principal rule, as shall be manifested when I come unto the examination of your Answer unto my Objections against this your dictate. In 〈◊〉 second place, humane ceremonies are taken strictly, only for such as are 〈◊〉, symbolical, and sacramental, and unto such neither 〈◊〉 nor reverence 〈◊〉 us. Not, first, the Apostles decency; because in the omission of them there is no undecency. Not, secondly, that reverence which is due unto God in his worship, 〈◊〉 in the omission of them there is no irreverence committed; you may think my notion of reverence to be too narrow; but 'tis the utmost I can grant you; and indeed 'tis all that Scripture and Reason call for: reverence and irreverence are 〈◊〉 opposed, and between privative opposites, in a capable subject, there is no medium, either of abnegation or participation, and therefore when there is no irreverence in the external worship of God, that worship is reverently administered: now that 〈◊〉 is unreverently administered when the Cross is omitted, or that 〈◊〉 Prayers and Preaching are unreverent, when the Surplice is left off, may perhaps be very affectionately averred by you and others, but I do not hope to live so long as to receive from you, or any man living, for it, so much as the shadow of an argument. In the first place than you see that reverence bindeth not to humane, religious, mystical ceremonies. 〈◊〉, in a second place, it bindeth to lay them quite aside, because God's Ordinances are treated very irreverently, when men's inventions are joined with them, when men set their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thresholds, and their posts by his posts, Ezek. 43. 8. that is, when humane inventions are added unto God's precepts. Yea, but you may perhaps say our Ceremonies are joined with God's Ordinances only as adjuncts, or annexaries, not as parts of God's worship. But unto this I reply in the words of Aims unto Morton, all external ceremonies, whose proper use is the honouring of God, are external worship, as all divinity showeth. Reply unto gen. Def. pag 19 Thirdly, the pretence of reverence in God's worship, hath 〈◊〉 been an inlet unto many superstitious practices; this Ames showeth in his Reply unto 〈◊〉 particular Defence, &c pag. 69. Out of such 〈◊〉 as this, saith he, all superstition hath crept into the Sacrament. For expression of reverence, some would not touch the bread with their hands, or the cup either, but have both bread and wine put into their mouths. 〈◊〉 more agreeably to 〈◊〉 fashion (urged by the 〈◊〉) where meat is taken with silver forks, 〈◊〉 of hands, devised a silver 〈◊〉 to suck up the wine through. Some would not have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. men 〈◊〉 of the wine 〈◊〉 all: And many for mere reverence (as they say) will neither touch wine nor 〈◊〉, abstaining altogether from the 〈◊〉. All these usages might have been, and may be 〈◊〉, and yet custom cannot legitimate them and make them decent. I shall conclude all that I have to say unto 〈◊〉 two last Sections with a remarkable passage in Parker his Treatise of the 〈◊〉, part. 1. pag. 112. The second office of the Cross is to procure reverence to 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse communis ablutio: Which is the office of the Salt, the Taper, and the rest of Popish signs, which how cut we 〈◊〉, but with this Axe that beheadeth the 〈◊〉 as well. Non 〈◊〉, etc. We must not think but that the Baptism of Christ, and of the Apostles was performed with reverence enough, when these 〈◊〉 were wanting; neither must we take upon us to be wiser than they. To procure right reverence to the Sacrament, is to lay open the institution by the Preaching of the Word, and then to deliver it in that simplicity in wh ch we have received it. To add signs over and above is 〈◊〉 to honour it, but to 〈◊〉 it. Indeed the 〈◊〉 had been more honourably 〈◊〉, if 〈◊〉 had been sent home again as it came into the land and hand of the 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 thought they could not honour it sufficiently, unless they set a budget by it of certain new devised signs to wait upon it, which did defile it. David 〈◊〉 this budget, and did well: Howbeit, 〈◊〉 Cart he thinketh cannot well be spared, for which the Lord made a breach in Israel, until he drove him to confess that he was not sought in due order, as long as one Ceremony of the Philistines did remain. The Lord show mercy to our Church, otherwise he will show, that our 〈◊〉 of the Popish budget, in banishing the salt, the oil, the 〈◊〉, with the rest, will not be judged sufficient, unless we cease also with a 〈◊〉 of theirs to cart Baptism, which should be born up to reverence no other way than by the shoulders of the Levites, I mean the labours of those Preachers which now (〈◊〉) lie in the dust, because they will not defile their hands by touching of this Philistim 〈◊〉 for to uphold it. Dr. Hammond. sect. 20, 21. In these it is certain, custom is the rule and the only rule of 〈◊〉: Neither nature nor God's Law obliges all mankind to this, or that expression 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 nations have their several manners of doing 〈◊〉; only nature tells us, that the most reverend manner of treating is best becoming God, and that it cannot be decent, to treat 〈◊〉 in that manner as we would not do 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 beside, and God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 about the offering of polluted bread 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉, and of sacrificing the lame and the sick, Mal. 1. 8. is a confirmation of that; Offer it now, saith God, unto thy 〈◊〉, will he be pleased with thee? 21. Apply this to a particular case, to a Nation, where 'tis customary to address to Kings kneeling, and 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 will 〈◊〉 exactly (but not where that is not custom) Among such I may say, Did ever any man that had his limbs and health offer a 〈◊〉 to his Prince in the gesture of sitting, or lying along upon a table? and if he did not, than I 〈◊〉, I suppose, regularly conclude from custom, the only rule of 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 matters, that according to Gods arguing it cannot be decently done in his service, 〈◊〉 is the tendering our petitions or requests to that infinite Majesty. And so 〈◊〉 in other things. Jeanes. Your 〈◊〉 of the indications and expressions of that reverence of which custom is the only rule, by instancing in kneeling in prayer, when we tender our petitions or requests to the infinite majesty of God, is very impertinent; for it is very evident, that 〈◊〉 is not the only 〈◊〉 of it, because it is sufficiently warranted both by Scripture and the light of Nature. Unto all this I shall add a distinction of reverence; it may be taken sometimes largely, and so it comprehends 〈◊〉: sometimes strictly, & so it is distinguished 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; for reverence, is due unto the Ordinances of God, 〈◊〉, and worship only unto God: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be a 〈◊〉 and subordinate rule of the signs of reverence, taken strictly, whereupon by custom, uncovering of the 〈◊〉 is a general or common gesture of reverence, to be used with discretion in all 〈◊〉 exercises; but now as for the indications and expressions of adoration, I do think the Scripture a 〈◊〉 rule of them, where, I do not exclude the law and light of nature, for materially considered, it is a part of Scripture. Dr. Hammond. sect. 22. This I did not apply to the Cross in Baptism; and the Ministers using of the 〈◊〉, as being not 〈◊〉 to that place. Another 〈◊〉 was set 〈◊〉 for those, and proceeded to sect. 18. the Cross expressly named, and the 〈◊〉 employed under the title of other Ceremonies, of which it may there be seen, what my 〈◊〉 was, not what is here deemed incambent on me to prove, that the 〈◊〉 of them infers 〈◊〉, but that standing on 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whereon they are known to stand, Conscience duly instructed, cannot think it 〈◊〉, or tending to 〈◊〉 to cast them 〈◊〉 out of this Church, or the whole Liturgy for their sakes. Jeanes. What you said, was appliable unto the Cross in Baptism, and the Ministers using of the Surplice for your conclusion was, the more than lawfulness of prescription of ceremonies in a Church, and of Uniformity therein; and here sect. 19 you acknowledge that your cnclusion, designed in that Section, was the justifying of Uniformity of Ceremonies in the service of God: now I had reason to think that you speak of humane, religious, mystical ceremonies, because such only were opposed by the Non-conformists, and such the Cross and Surplice were, 〈◊〉, though not exclusively. 2. If your design be to justify doctrinal ceremonies from the Apostles command of decency, then 'tis incumbent on you to prove that the omission of such ceremonies doth 〈◊〉 undecency; for if it doth not infer undecency, than therein there is no transgression of the Apostles precept, and if the Apostles precept be not transgressed by the omission of them, the Assembly had no cause, upon that account, to repent of their casting such ceremonies out of the Church of God. Dr. Hammond. sect. 23, 24. And yet if Mr. J. shall now desire to know what the grounds of these two Ecclesiastical rites are, which alone he is pleased to name, on persuasion, I suppose, that they were as fit, if not fitter than any others for the disproving my position, of (custom being the only rule of decency) I shall now render him a brief account of them, such as may in some degree confirm the truth of it. 24. And 〈◊〉 for the Cross in Baptism. 1. 'Tis known to all, that our Christian course is a spiritual Warfare under Christ our great General: Now it is, and always hath been customary over the world, that in a militia there should be some Banner, or Ensign, to which every one should resort, and fight under it. This hath custom made decent among all; and supposing that custom, the omission of it in an Army is indecent, yet not so, as things dishonest, or breaches of the Law of Nature are indecent. Jeanes. 1. As our Christian course is a spiritual warfare, so unto this the Ordinances of Christ Jesus are a more suitable Banner or Ensign, than any humane invention whatsoever: But you think that the Banner requisite in our spiritual warfare must be of humane invention, not divine institution; for otherwise you speak nothing to the purpose; and if the omission of such a Banner or Ensign be undecent, you may arraign Christ and his Apostles as guilty of undency. 2. The sign of the Cross hath been a long time used by Antichrist, as an Ensign or Banner, and is it undecent to lay aside the Ensign or Banner of an enemy? 3. How little weight there is in the customary use of a Banner for the decency of the sign of the Cross in Baptism, will be apparent by these following considerations. 1. It is a custom in Armies for different companies or troops to have Banners or Ensigns; but it was never the custom of any Armies for every several soldier to carry a Banner or Ensign: from the custom of a Banner or Ensign then, how you can conclude for the signing of every singular Christian with the sign of the Cross passeth my imagination. 2. The customary use of a Banner is in the whole war, and not only at the first enrolment of Soldiers, and therefore if it prove any thing for the Sign of the Cross, it will conclude for the frequent and constant use of it all the time of our warfare; and this I hope you will not plead for. 3. A permanent Cross hath more proportion unto the Banners and Ensigns of Armies than the transient and aërial Cross; and yet there be some of your party, who allow of the transient Cross in Baptism, that dislike permanent Crosses in God's worship; because they think there is more danger of superstition in them: Now these men, in all probability, lay no great stress upon this your resemblance of the sign of the Cross to a Banner or Ensign, and my reason for this my conjecture (for I urge it only as a conjecture) is, because they reject all permanent Crosses in God's service, which do more resemble a Banner or Ensign than a transient Cross. 4. I have done my best to sound the depth and strength of your argument, and if I be not deceived, thus it stands: The omission of a Banner or Ensign, in our spiritual warfare, that was used by the Primitive Christians, is undecent; but the sign of the Cross in Baptism was thus used by the Primitive Christians, therefore omission of it is undecent. By Primitive Christians, I suppose you do not mean the Apostles, or such Apostolical persons as were guided by an infallible spirit, and then I deny your Major, and for this my denial I shall give you two reasons. 1. In Christ our great General, the Captain of our salvation, were hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, and therefore he knew better what was decent in his worship, than all Primitive Christians, han all the Fathers and Councils that ever were in the world; and therefore seeing there is such a deep silence of the Cross in his word, I shall never think it so highly decent as you 〈◊〉, so decent, that the omission of it is undecent. 2. It is, and always hath been 〈◊〉 over the world, at least in civil and wel-governed Nations, that in a Militia all should be done by Commission derived from the General. Manlius put his own Son to death for fight with an enemy, though he had the Conquest, because it was 〈◊〉 order, and L. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 had, for the same reason, executed Q. Fabius' 〈◊〉, though he had 〈◊〉 a great Victory over the Samnites, but that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the people of Rome 〈◊〉 him. But now our 〈◊〉 can produce no Commission from our great General, to use any Banner or Ensign in his worship, but such as he hath already 〈◊〉, his Word, Sacraments, Discipline, and 〈◊〉 I shall condemn 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of any such Banner or Ensign, as a transgression against his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of this, I found this your objection both propounded and answered by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Scharp. 〈◊〉. theol. 〈◊〉. 2 pag 39, 40. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 militare, quo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 distinguantur: At Christiani omnes sunt 〈◊〉, Eph 6 11. ergo & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 debent, & per consequens signum 〈◊〉. Resp. 〈◊〉 illud conseq 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 alia 〈◊〉, nempe internum signum fidei, externam 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 verbi & 〈◊〉, etc. What he speaks of external 〈◊〉 and participation of the Word and Sacraments, will satisfy what you say. I cannot here pass by a passage in 〈◊〉 against Duraeus, pag 191, 192 in the Edition of his Works in Fol. Daraeus having cited many Fathers for the Ceremonies added unto Baptism, Whitaker thus replieth unto him: 〈◊〉 vero non interest quid Clemens, quid Leo, quid Damasus, quid quisquam alius Pontifex ad Baptismi Sacramentum 〈◊〉. Christus ecclesiae 〈◊〉 de 〈◊〉 ceremoniarum nugis mandavit, 〈◊〉 in illis 〈◊〉, quos in scriptura legimus, baptismis, ulla harum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 reperitur. 〈◊〉 vero putemus 〈◊〉 ecclesiam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quibus in Baptismo ceremoniis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quam Christum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? Before I proceed further, I shall take notice of the limitation that you have in the close of sect: 24. of your assertion of undecency in the omission of a Banner in an Army: It is not so 〈◊〉, say you, as things dishonest, or breaches of the Law of Nature; Now if you apply this unto the omission of a Banner in our spiritual Militia, I thus object against it: The public worship of God is a chief part of our spiritual warfa e, and the command of decency in that is, saith your Hocker, an edict or Law of Nature, and whatsoever is therein undecent transgresseth against this Law: If the omission then there in of a Banner or Ensign of humane invention (for of such only you speak) be undecent, 'tis so undecent as things dishonest, or breaches of the Law of Nature are undecent. Dr. Hammond. sect. 25, 26, 27, 28. And the Cross on which 〈◊〉 was crucified, the Emblem also of that 〈◊〉 that every Christian enters into, a constant, courageous patience for all afflictions, was by the Primitive Christians thus used, as their Symbol or Ensign, and every man that is enrolled in the Christian Militia, is by him that inrolles him, signed with it; and this practice being thus founded, and revived in the Church, Saint Augustine's words are worth remembering, and cannot be denied to have truth in them: Signum crucis nifi adhibeatur, sive 〈◊〉 credentium, sive ipsi 〈◊〉 quâ regenera 〈◊〉 etc. nihil ritè perficitur: Unless the sign of the Gross be used either to the foreheads of the believers (who are baptised) or to the water itself by which we are regenerate, it is not duly performed. i e. with such ceremonies as by custom of the Church, the rule of decency, belong to it; and, crucis signo in front 〈◊〉 tanquam in post 〈◊〉 es, omnesque Christiani signantur (de Catechiz. rud. cap. 20. rom. 4. p. 915.) thou must be signed now in the forehead with the sign of the 〈◊〉, as the Israelites on their door-posts, and so must all Christians. In the forehead particularly c Tom. 10. p. 289. B. in front figat, ubi sedes 〈◊〉, because the seat of shame is there, which we render, in token that the baptised shall not be ashamed. 26. The usage of this ceremony of signing with the Cross, was, we 〈◊〉 know, frequent in the Church (while the gifts of healing continued) in (d) See Aug. de Civit Dei. l. 2. c. 8. curing 〈◊〉, and casting out Devils, to that Athanasius frequently affirms of it, (e) De Incarnate. Tom. 1. pag. 84. So pag. 101. D. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And pag. 102. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And contr. Arian. Or. 1. pag. 285. A. ` O 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And Praesente signo crucis 〈◊〉 it Paganitas. Aug. T. 4. 229. B. And 832. B. Daemonia nominatâ cruce Christi 〈◊〉, si 〈◊〉 fiat, fugantur. Dii Paganorum 〈◊〉 crucis responsa dare non possunt. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; by the sign of the Cross all Magic, and Witchcraft is brought to nought, all the Idol Temples laid waste and empty. 27. And then Baptism being the 〈◊〉 of Devils (the ancient Catechists we know were called Exorcists) the rescuing of a person from the power of Satan into God's Sonship and Family, what can be more proper, or agreeable, or exactly symbolical, than the use of this in Baptism, according to that of 〈◊〉. de Resurr Carn. Caro sig. nature, ut anima muniatur, the flesh or body is signed, that the soul may be defended or fortified? 28. And if instead of the (f) Ad omnem progressum 〈◊〉 crucis signaculo. Tertul. de Cor. Mil. c. 3. frequent use of it among the ancients, even (g) Vide Narrat. Hippolyti Apostolorum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, apud Pallad. Hist. 〈◊〉. pag. 1049. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. before the cumbersome weight of Ceremonies came in, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, saith the Author of the Quest. and Resp. ascribed to Justin 〈◊〉, Qu. 〈◊〉. pag. 364. in time of prayer we sign those that are any way ill affected) we in our Church retain it only in our solemn entrance into Christ's ' camp, in token that we mean 〈◊〉 to fight under his banner, and in confidence that he that thus signed to Constantine victory from Heaven (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in this overcome) will thus give grace, and seal 〈◊〉 us victory over our 〈◊〉 enemies: what question can there ever be of the perfect decency of this usage among us? Jeanes. Here you heap up many Testimonies of the Fathers for the Sign of the 〈◊〉, unto which it is no difficult 〈◊〉 to add more, but you 〈◊〉 very well have spared all this labour; for first, it is not unknown unto you, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hold, that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 the Cross, are no ways justifiable; hear what Bishop 〈◊〉 quotes out of the 〈◊〉, and Mr. High, pag. 〈◊〉, 238. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 put 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Sign of 〈◊〉 Cross, and wrote of it very superstitiously. Some telling us that it was a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, attributed a power thereunto of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; What shall we 〈◊〉? 〈◊〉 that the 〈◊〉 hath been as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Fathers, as by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 that the 〈◊〉 have 〈◊〉 it with divine worship, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ever the Fathers did 〈◊〉 it. Bishop 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to give an Answer hereunto, but Dr 〈◊〉 hath so replied unto him, as that he hath sat down, and neither he, or his Second, have in this rejoined any thing unto Amesius. Unto this of the Abridgement, and Mr. High, let me add what Mr. 〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉, will tell thy hath observed in the Father's speeches concerning the Cross, Treat. part. 1. pag. 90. Chew a little upon these speech s, it may be they taste how unsavoury the Fathers are, in the matter of the Cross: o August. de 〈◊〉. 181. With the sign of the Cross it is that the Body of our Lord is 〈◊〉, and the 〈◊〉 of Baptism sanctified. With p Idem Cont. 〈◊〉. lib. 6 c. 8. the Sign of the Cross is the wave of Baptism consecrated. q 〈◊〉. in Mat. 16, 〈◊〉. 55. By the Sign of the Cross is the Lords Body consecrated. The Font of Baptism sanctified, and all things whatsoever are made holy, they are made holy with the sign of the Lords 〈◊〉. r Cypr. lib. de 〈◊〉. we glory in the Cross of the Lord, whose 〈◊〉 worketh throughout all Sacraments: without which sign nothing else is holy, nor any other consecration that cometh to 〈◊〉. s Aug. de Sanct. Serm. 19 With the sign of the Cross is the Fonte of Regeneration made holy; and to speak fully, all Sacraments are perfected by his virtue. t Aug. in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 18. Unless the sign of the Cross be applied to the 〈◊〉 of the Believers, or to the water whereby they are 〈◊〉, or to the sacrifice whereby they are fed, none of these are rightly performed. u Aug. de utilitat. 〈◊〉. The water of salvation is not the water of salvation, unless being consecrated in Christ's name, it be signed with his Crosse. Again w 〈◊〉. de 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. cap. 3, The water is good for no use of future health, without the Preaching of the Lords Crosse. But when it is consecrated with the 〈◊〉 of the saving Cross, than it is 〈◊〉 to the use of a spiritual washing, and of a saving Cup. As therefore Moses threw the wood 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉, and made them sweet, so the Priest sends the Preaching of the Lords Cross into this 〈◊〉, and the water thereof is made sweet unto grace. By this you may see that 〈◊〉 allegations out of the Fathers are in vain, unless you had added a proof of their infallibility, or that they are to be a rule of our faith in matters of this nature. 2. One Papist is found (saith Parker, part 1. pag. 〈◊〉) who 〈◊〉, the Fathers meant 〈◊〉 of the outward sign, but of the thing 〈◊〉, which is Christ's death: It is well, that we 〈◊〉 this 〈◊〉 from him, that the Fathers cannot be justified, in case they mean the outward sign, which they mean undoubtedly, or else our opposites do us great wrong, who object the Fathers against us in the Outward ceremony of the Cross, etc. 3. Those that are but tolerably versed in the Fathers, cannot but confess, that they ascribe very strange things unto the sign of the Cross; as that it is a necessary requisite of Baptism, that it was an 〈◊〉 against the Devil, and an instrument of Miracles, a fence or fortification of the soul against all spiritual adversaries; but these 〈◊〉, however you may excuse them, yet they are so gross, as that they are utterly 〈◊〉 of any just Apology to be made for them; and this without more ado might 〈◊〉 for answer unto sect. 25, 26, 27, 28. But I shall farther give you some general exceptions against those testimonies of the Fathers you allege, and next, say something unto them taken severally and apart. My general exceptions shall be six. The first, the not using of the Cross by Christ and his Apostles, is a greater prejudice against it, than all the 〈◊〉 can be given unto it by the Fathers of after ages; 〈◊〉 what are Augustine, 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉, etc. whom you 〈◊〉, in comparison of our blessed Saviour: unto them the Spirit was given but in measure, unto him without measure, Joh. 3. 34. And, it was a 〈◊〉 of wisdom and understanding, a spirit of counsel and knowledge, Isa. 11. 12. and so was able to make 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 provision for any religious Ceremonies in his Church that he thought requisite: Why should 〈◊〉 we 〈◊〉 ourselves with those few that he hath ordained? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no mortal men can produce a patent from him for the 〈◊〉 of any other: and why should we think the omission of the Cross in Baptism undecent? seeing it was omitted by Christ himself and his Apostles; for that it was 〈◊〉 by them, is confessed by a learned Conformist, Dr. Fulk, in answer unto the 〈◊〉, pag 252. Neither was the sign of the Cross, saith he, in any estimation with the Apostles, or the faithful in their time. 〈◊〉 indeed, 〈◊〉 signing with the Cross to be an old Tradition, which yet is no more certain to have been used by the Apostles, than other like Ceremonies which he there 〈◊〉, as the 〈◊〉 of Milk and Honey by them that were baptised, and the abstinence from washing for a week after baptism, 〈◊〉 for birth days, and such other, 〈◊〉 since abolished, which they should not have been, if they had been ordained by the Apostles as necessary for Christian Religion. As a man runneth to the Fountain, saith Cyprian, when the channels are defiled, so must we repair to the practice of the 〈◊〉 Church, which is the Fountain of all piety: non est attendendum (saith he) quid aliquis ante nos 〈◊〉 putaverit, sed quid, qui ante omnes est, Christus fecerit, & faciendum praeceperit. Agreeable hereunto is that which Mr. Parker part. 1. pag. 100 quotes out of Sadeel against the Monks of Bordeaux. When the Monks of Bordeaux affirm the signs which are added to Baptism, are an ornament to it, we thus reply: Are they wiser than Christ Jesus, who hath ordained his Sacrament in so great purity and simplicity, and who knoweth better than all the men in the world, what ornament was fittest for it? If it be but the covenant of a man, when it is confirmed, no man abrogateth it, or addeth any thing to it: What arrogancy is it then to add to the institution of Christ? A second exception of the Non-conformists against the Testimonies of the Fathers for the sign of the Cross, is, that they do not contribute so much honour thereunto, as the suspected infamous birth and original of it doth discredit: In all probabilities, say they, that Devilish Heretic, Valentinus, was the first Author and Father of it, the first that advanced it unto any religious use; and this they prove out of 〈◊〉. Parker part. 1. pag. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that it 〈◊〉 by the Text of 〈◊〉, that 〈◊〉 did use the figure of the 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 express one of his 〈◊〉 by; and as 〈◊〉 was the Father of it, so 〈◊〉, say they, was the Nurse of it. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉, as I told you, was a Conformitant 〈◊〉, and no enemy unto the sign of the Cross, so he professeth of himself in his confutation of the 〈◊〉 pag. 87. As 〈◊〉 the sign of the Cross, so it be 〈◊〉 superstition, we can abide well 〈◊〉. And yet this man pag. 252. tells us, that Valentinus the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that made any great account of it; and 〈◊〉 for it too 〈◊〉, as well as the Non-conformists. A third exception against the pretended antiquity of the Cross, and the Testimonies of the Fathers in that behalf, is, that divers Ceremonies 〈◊〉 with the Cross are not urged, but abolished, and yet they were 〈◊〉 prostituted 〈◊〉 such superstitions and 〈◊〉 abuses as the Cross hath been: And therefore why should the Cross be such a 〈◊〉, as to be 〈◊〉? This exception you may see thus managed by 〈◊〉, part. 1. pag. 39 If our Opposites must needs drink of this Cistern of 〈◊〉, than lot the q Beat. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. Oil itself of Baptism, be 〈◊〉: Yea, r 〈◊〉. ex 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Baptising by Laymen; for these be as ancient as the Cross, and sprang about the same time with it. Sure with far better reason may 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 3. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. they take out of their graves, the ceremony s 〈◊〉 lib. 3 Epis. 8. of Kissing the Infant Baptised; the ceremony of the t 〈◊〉. de pudicit. Ring given in Baptism, for an obsignation of Faith and Profession; the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 u Tertul. lib. de coron. 〈◊〉. Milk and Honey into 〈◊〉 mouth; And lastly 〈◊〉 Ceremony of the w Idem de Bapt. & Beat. 〈◊〉. in lib. de coron. 〈◊〉. White Garment, wherewith the 〈◊〉 was wont to be clothed. These being equal to the Cross, both for Antiquity, and for profitableness of signification, and 〈◊〉 it in other respects, as that they were never so much abused as the Cross hath been, nor now import so much peril as the Cross bring eth with it, may give wise men cause to wonder, why 〈◊〉 should 〈◊〉 buried in a tomb sealed up, while the Cross not only 〈◊〉, but also 〈◊〉. A fourth exception against the ancient use of the Cross by the Fathers, is that it is overbalanced by the Papists abuse of it unto 〈◊〉: The Brazen Serpent was ordained by God, and yet when it was abused unto Idolatry, 〈◊〉 did well to break it in pieces, 2 King. 18. 4. And therefore the Cross being a humane invention altogether unnecessary in God's worship, is for the 〈◊〉 abuse of it rightly abolished. The force of this consequence may be gathered from what two English Bishops say. 1. From what Bishop 〈◊〉 hath from a translation of a passage out of the Canon Law, Def: of Mr. Perkins part. 1. pag. 168. 〈◊〉 our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 done some things, which at that time might be without 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 be 〈◊〉 to error, and superstition, we are 〈◊〉 (saith the Law) by 〈◊〉 breaking the Brazen Serpent, that the Posterity may abolish the same 〈◊〉 any delay, and with great authority. The very same 〈◊〉 are 〈◊〉 in the like manner by Dr. John 〈◊〉 in his 〈◊〉 with 〈◊〉, page 510. As also by 〈◊〉 in his Ecclesiastical 〈◊〉, pag. 347. 2. From what Jewel 〈◊〉 for the abolition of 〈◊〉, because of their Adoration, 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 14. pag 383. The best remedy in this behalf, and most 〈◊〉 with God's Word, is utterly to abolish the cause of the ill. So the godly King 〈◊〉 took down, and 〈◊〉 in pe ces the Brazen Serpent; notwithstanding 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 commandment had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; notwithstanding it were an 〈◊〉 figure of Christ hanging upon the Cross; notwithstanding it had 〈◊〉 so many years; notwithstanding God by it had wrought so many 〈◊〉. So the 〈◊〉 Bishop 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in sunder the Image of Christ painted in a cloth; and said, It was against God's commandment 〈◊〉 thing 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 for the Church, and people of God; notwithstanding it were the 〈◊〉 of Christ. So the godly Emperor 〈◊〉 made his 〈◊〉 over all his Dominions in this sort; Signum Servatoris 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 reperietur, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: We 〈◊〉 command, that the 〈◊〉 of our Saviour be taken down, in what place soever it shall be found: notwithstanding it were the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 our Saviour. So it is decreed in the late Council of 〈◊〉 that, when Images happen to be 〈◊〉 by the people, they be either notably 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 abolished. Unto these two I shall add the testimony of 〈◊〉, De Civitate Dei 〈◊〉 10. 〈◊〉. 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Serpentem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idolum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, cum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Suppose then, though not grant, that the Ancients lawfully and laudably used the sign of the 〈◊〉, as a 〈◊〉 sign of Christ's death, and a monitory sign of their duty, yet seeing it hath been made by the Papists such an 〈◊〉 Idol, there is very good reason for the utter 〈◊〉 it out of God's worship. A fifth exception is, that our Cross is not the Father's Cross, who never annexed any word unto it, and therefore ours is the more Sacramental; for this see Aims in his Reply to 〈◊〉 particular Def page 27, As also Mr. Parker part. 1. pag. 114. My sixth exception I shall give you in the words of Mr. Parker, part. 1. page 133. What though the custom of the Fathers, who used the Cross for a sign of Christ, were on all sides good, the times do differ. They lived in an age when it was despised; we in a time when it is adored. 〈◊〉 in a time when it professed the Faith; we in a time when it is common to Papists. They in a time when it was used over all the Church for the sign of Christianity; we in an age, when out of our own Church it is no where used but for a 〈◊〉 of Antichristianity. In regard whereof we may well appeal to the old Canons, Regulae Patrum 〈◊〉 sunt (〈◊〉 Gregory) prout res 〈◊〉 videbatur, 〈◊〉, loci personarum, reique 〈◊〉 habitâ 〈◊〉. And Leo, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sunt, quae nulla possunt ratione convelli, 〈◊〉 multa sunt, quae pro 〈◊〉 temporum, ac confideratione 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But I shall proceed to the examination of your testimonies apart. Dr. Hammond. Saint Augustine's words are worth remembering, and cannot be denied to have 〈◊〉 in them b In 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. Signum crucis 〈◊〉 adhibeatur, sive frontibus credentium, sive ipsi aquae qua 〈◊〉, etc. nihil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 the sign of the Cross be used either to the foreheads of the 〈◊〉 (who are 〈◊〉) or to the water itself by which we are regenerate, it is not duly performed, i. e. with such ceremonies as by custom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Church, the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉, belong to it. Jeanes. Saint Augustins' words at large are as followeth, Quod signum nisi 〈◊〉, five 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 ipsi aquae qua 〈◊〉, sive 〈◊〉 quo Chrismate unguntur, sive sacrificio 〈◊〉 aluntur, 〈◊〉 eorum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Saint 〈◊〉 here you see approves of the Chrism, and os the crossing of the Oil therein, and sets it check by 〈◊〉 with the water in 〈◊〉 and the Sacrament of the Lords Supper; now your 〈◊〉 do hope that you do not concur with him herein; and if you do not, why do you urge us with the authority of his Testimony? 2. If you apply Saint Augustine's words to our times, and aver, that they cannot be denied to have 〈◊〉 in them, 〈◊〉 your opinion is, that unless the 〈◊〉 of the Cross be used to the water in Baptism, and to the Elements in the Lord's Supper, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are not duly performed with such ceremonies, as by custom of the Church, the rule of decency, belong unto them; and than what Apology can you make for the Church of 〈◊〉, that never since the Resormation used any of these Cross. 3. Suppose 〈◊〉 in Augustine's time had been administered without Crossing of either the forehead of the Baptised, or the water wherewith they were baptised, it had then indeed been performed not with such 〈◊〉 as by the Custom of the then Church belonged 〈◊〉 it: and so Fulk, in his 〈◊〉 of the Rhemists, expoundeth Augustine's 〈◊〉, page 693, but this 〈◊〉 nothing against us; for we hold that such Baptism hath been 〈◊〉, that is, duly, lawfully, and laudably administered, because it would have been agreeable unto Christ's institution, which alone, and not the custom of the Church, is the rule of its administration, 4. These words of Augustine are at best, but propositio malè sonans; for they 〈◊〉 a palpable appearance of evil, because they plainly seem to assert the necessity of the Sign of the Cross unto Baptism and the Lords Supper. Bellarmine bringeth them to prove, that nothing can be consecrated without the sign of the Cross, de Sacra 〈◊〉. lib. 2. c. 13 as also to justify their Cross, 〈◊〉 they use in the 〈◊〉, de Missa, lib. 3. c. 13. And there's a Popish Ballad mentioned by the Abridgement, and transcribed in Parker, wherein I believe this is one of the places in Augustine, related unto, part. 1 p. 92. Without the Cross Saint Augustinesaith, (Read him and 〈◊〉 may see) 1. No man is steadfast in the Faith, Nor Christened well may 〈◊〉. No Sacrifice, no holy Oil, No washing in the Font, 2. Nor any thing can thee 〈◊〉, If thou the Cross do want. Children by it have Christendom, The water's blest also: 3. The Holy Ghost appears to some, 〈◊〉 gifts of Grace bestow, When that this Cross is made 〈◊〉, Of them 〈◊〉 hallowed be: 4. Where it is not, there wanteth might, For aught that I can see. But the very Canons of the Convocation doc disclaim all necessity of the sign of the Cross in Baptism, The Church of England, since the abolishing of Popery, hath ever held and taught, and teacheth still, that the sign of the Cross used in Baptism is no part of the substance of that Sacrament; for when the Minister, dipping the Infant in water, or laying water upon the face of it (as the manner also is) hath pronounced these words (I baptise thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost) the Infant is fully baptised; so as the sign of the Cross being afterwards used, doth neither add any thing to the virtue, or 〈◊〉 of Baptism; nor being omitted, doth detract any thing from the effect and substance of it. Dr. Hammond. And, Crucis signo in front hodie tanquam in post signandus es, omnesque Christiani signantur (de Catechiz. rud. c. 20. tom. 4. pag. 915.) thou must be signed now in the forehead with the sign of the Cross, as the Israelites on their door posts, and so must all Christians. Jeanes. Whereas you say above, that Augustine's words cannot be denied to have truth in them, you mean these last quoted, as well as the former; and if this be so, than it will be an easy matter for you to clear up by argument this undeniable truth that is in them. God commanded the Israelites to strike the lintel and the two side posts of the door with the blood of the Passeover; therefore all Christians are obliged to be signed in the forehead with the sign of the Cross, sounds with me as a very wild and loose inference; and therefore I shall entreat you to confirm it, or else relinquish this place of Augustine, as containing nothing of an argument in it. Bellarmine allegeth this place of Augustine to prove that the blood of the Lamb sprinkled upon the posts of the doors was a figure of the sign of the Cross: Tom. 2. 〈◊〉 Eccles: triumph: lib. 2. c. 29. And unto him Chamier thus answereth; Tom. 2. pag 8: 8, 879. Nego crucem significatam in 〈◊〉 Testamento; nisi per accidens: hoc est, quatenus Christus significatus est crucifigendus. Sed crucem directe ac per se significatam ullis figuris, nego. Nec ignoro tamen produci posse in contrarium testimonia quaedam ex Patribus. Sed ego quicquid Patribus in buccam venit, non censco amplect endum, ut verbum Dei. Potest, inquiebat Augustinus in Psalmum trigesimum sextum, nihil aliquid videri, alteri aliud: sed neque ego, quod dixero, praescribo alteri ad meliorem intellectum, nec ille mihi. Idem de reliquis dicendum. Itaque liceat in earum sententias inquirere. Certe illud de sanguine agni 〈◊〉 super utroque post, 〈◊〉 est à Cruse. 〈◊〉 solum tenuissimum vestigium; positio in post, nonnihil alludit ad positionem in front; quae in corpore supremum locum 〈◊〉, sicut in ostio 〈◊〉. Sed sanguis, quanto aptiùs sanguinem Christi significaret? ut apud Gregorium homilia vigesima secunda in Evangelia. Quid sit sanguis 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 audiendo, sed bibendo didicistis. Quisanguis super 〈◊〉 postem ponitur, quando non solum ore corporis; sed etiam ore cordis hauritur. Gretserus excipit; posse 〈◊〉 idemque plura significare. Ita sane, inquam; sed primo variis rationibus. Itaque eadem ratione qua significat sanguinem, non potest 〈◊〉 crucem; At unius loci unica est ratio. Quare si hoc uno loco significat sanguinem Christi, non significat 〈◊〉. Deinde unum 〈◊〉 potest varia 〈◊〉, at non quelibet: sed ea tantum, ad quae habet analogiam. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sanguinis agni ad crucem? nam agno significari Christum nemo inficias eat. 〈◊〉 ergo sanguis ex 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, significabit crucem non eductam ex Christo? sanguis, inquam, essusus, crucem compactam? Dr. Hammond. In the forehead particularly c Tom. 10. p. 289. B. in front sigat ubi sedes pudoris) because the seat of shame is there, which we render, in token that the baptised shall not be ashamed. Jeanes. This weighs little or nothing, unless withal you can prove, that the Apostles command of decency enjoineth, that the seat of shame in the baptised should be marked with the sign of the Cross, in token that he should not be ashamed. Doubtless Saint Paul's practice was suitable unto his precept, and you do not, you cannot pretend, that ever he was signed in the 〈◊〉 with the sign of the Cross, either by himself or any other: he 〈◊〉 his example for imitation, and gives this for a reason, that his pattern was that of our blessed Saviour, 1 Cor. 11. 1. Be ye even followers of me, as I also am of Christ We shall not then think that so requisite unto Baptism which he never used; so so long as we follow so great a 〈◊〉, we shall not be much 〈◊〉, though we swarve from the advice of Augustine, that hath no warrant from the Word of God. Paul makes large professions, that he was not ashamed of the Gospel, which held forth a crucified Christ, Rom. 1. 16. Phil. 1. 20. 〈◊〉 Tim 1. 12. But no man can say that he ever expressed this his profession by the sign of the Cross; and therefore we shall make no other account of the Sign of the Cross, than as of a supernumerary in God's service; and those Believers that want it, may have confidence when Christ shall appear, and not be ashamed before him at his coming, 1 Joh. 2. 28. But perhaps you think we must stoop unto the bare words of Augustine, though not seconded with any reason; and this is more than Augustine himself would have expected from us: for after this manner the holy Scriptures alone are to be entertained, as Bishop Jewel proveth against Harding, Def. Apol. Chur. Englpart. 1. p. 55. out of several places of Sr. August. Therefore St. Aug. saith, Alios Scriptores ita lego, ut quanta libet sanctitate doctrinâque praepolleant, non ideo verum putem, quod ipsi ita senserint, sed quod id mihi, vel per alios Authores Canonicos, vel probabili ratione persuadere potuerint. Other Writers or Fathers (besides the holy Scriptures) I read in this sort, that be their learning and holiness never so great, I will not think it true, because they have thought so, but because they are 〈◊〉 to persuade me so, either by other Canonical Writers, or else by some likely reason. Likewise again he saith, Hoc genus literarum non cum credendi necessitate sed cum judicandi libertate, legendum est: This kind of Writings (of the holy Doctors and Fathers) must be read, not with necessity to believe each thing, but with liberty to judge each thing. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Augustine disputing against the Arians, 〈◊〉, as I have said before, both Councils and Fathers, and appealeth only to the Scriptures: Nec ego 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 tibi, nec tu mihi Ariminensem debes objicere: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, res cum re, causa cum 〈◊〉, ratio cum ratione concerter. Neither will I allege the Council of Nice against you, nor shall you allege the Council of Ariminum against me. By the authority of the Scriptures let us weigh matter with matter, cause with cause, reason with reason. I shall conclude all that I have to say unto the foregoing Testimonies of 〈◊〉 (and you may apply it also unto those which 〈◊〉) 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of Whitaker, Tom. 1. pag. 293. unto a place 〈◊〉 out of the 118 〈◊〉. of Aug, ad Januar. Respondeo, Magnum esse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 Dei, & 〈◊〉 quidem: Sed 〈◊〉 debemus, hominem fuisse, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Et licet hoc loco quidem videatur favere Traditionibus, tamen in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, scripturae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 defendit, ut postea melius patebit. Sensit enim apertissimè, nullum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse, quod non scripturis nitatur. 〈◊〉 de 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉 loquitur, aut sibi 〈◊〉 non consentit. Dr. Hammond. sect. 26. Secondly, the usage of this Ceremony of signing with the Cross, 〈◊〉, we also know, frequent in the Church (while the gifts of healing continued) in d See Aug. de civ. Dei, lib. 22. cap. 8. curing diseases, and casting out Devils, so that Athanafius frequently 〈◊〉, (e) De Incarnate. Tom. 1. pag. 84. So pag. 101. D. T 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And pag. 102. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And contr. Arian. Or. 1. pag. 285. A. ` O 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And, Praesente signo crucis 〈◊〉 Pagavitas. Aug. T. 4. 229. B. And, 832. B. Daemonia 〈◊〉 cruse Christi terrentur, si impensius fiat, fugantur. Dii Paganorum metu crucis responsa dare non possunt. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; by the fign of the 〈◊〉 all Magic and 〈◊〉 is brought 〈◊〉 naught, all the Idol Temples laid waste and empty. Jeanes. Bishop Morton in his particular Defence of the Ceremony of the Cross, pag. 231, 232. tells us, That our Church doth not ascribe unto it any 〈◊〉 power of driving out devils, or of curing diseases, etc. And what he saith of our Church he speaks by just consequence of the Primitive Church; For our Church (〈◊〉 he, ibid.) professeth, that she useth it only as primitively it was used; that is, only as a token whereby there is protestation made of a future constancy in the profession of Christianity: If it were used only thus, than it was not used for the miraculous cure of diseases, and chase away of Devils; and this will be denied by none, that knows the force of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only; but you have a higher opinion of the efficacy of the sign of the Cross, than ever 〈◊〉 Morton had, or the 〈◊〉 of England, as he thought; and therefore I shall address myself to give 〈◊〉 answer unto your miracles of the Crosse. 1. I shall in general say unto them three things. 1. If 〈◊〉 were any such Miracles, as are pretended, they were wrought only at the sign of the Cross, and not by the 〈◊〉 of the Cross (as you bring in 〈◊〉 affirming) so much as by a Moral instrument they were done for the sike only of the 〈◊〉 and prayers of those that used the sign of the Cross, and were consequent unto the sign of the 〈◊〉, only 〈◊〉 accidens; and for this that I say, Bishop Morton allegeth a saying out of Pe kins: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (〈◊〉 he) that miracles were done of God at the sign of the Cross, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto it a manifest, or at least a secret 〈◊〉 of the name of 〈◊〉 crucified: so that the virtue was not to be imputed unto the sign of the Cross, but unto the 〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉, and invocation of Christ. 2. Many Miracles were 〈◊〉 by the Brazen Serpent; 〈◊〉 it came to pass, that if a Serpent had bitten any man, when he beheld the Serpent of Brosse, he lived, Numb. 21. 9 Yet Ilezechias broke it in pieces, 2 King. 18. 4. and the reason is assigned why he did so; for unto those days the children of Israel did 〈◊〉 incense to it. This fact of Hezechias is praise worthy; and therefore it was no evil act to throw aside the sign of the Cross: for suppose, though not grant, 〈◊〉 Miracles were wrought by it, yet the Papists have burnt incense unto it: for 〈◊〉 Dr. Rainolds in his Conference with Hart, page 509, 510. It is written in 〈◊〉 Masse-book, that in solemn Masses, the 〈◊〉 having made obeisance to 〈◊〉 Cross, doth incense it thrice: The Jews gave u Exod. 30. 8. the honour of God to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in that they 〈◊〉 incense to it. And therefore 〈◊〉 did 〈◊〉 it brazen stuff; as if you should call your Rood 〈◊〉 stuff; your Agnus 〈◊〉 Dei's 〈◊〉 stuff, your Crucisixes and Crosses 〈◊〉 of Copper, Copper-stuff, because you impart the honour of God to them, by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hope in them. And if x 〈◊〉. 5 5. the 〈◊〉 man be called an Idolater, 〈◊〉 he maketh 〈◊〉 his God, not as though he thought the 〈◊〉 be God, but because he 〈◊〉 to live and prosper by it, y Jer. 17 〈◊〉. which 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 he should 〈◊〉 in God only: then worship you the sign of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Idol, 〈◊〉 you trust to be saved by it, as in your z 〈◊〉. Roman: 〈◊〉. qua to. 〈◊〉 Church 〈◊〉 you 〈◊〉 notoriously, and a Thom. 〈◊〉. Sum. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 3. 〈◊〉. 25. 〈◊〉. 4. Andrad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Explicat. 〈◊〉 9 so yourselves 〈◊〉, you worship it as God; wherefore it b 2 Kings 18 3. 5. 〈◊〉 be praised by God for breaking in pieces the 〈◊〉 of brass, because the children of 〈◊〉 did burn 〈◊〉 to it, we who have re moved the sign of the Cross, because you put the hope of 〈◊〉 in it, 〈◊〉 content 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be dispraised by men. But if you say 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 we be against the 〈◊〉 Fathers in Religion, because we pluck down that 〈◊〉 they did set up, 〈◊〉 heed 〈◊〉 your speech 〈◊〉 not touch the Holy 〈◊〉, who saith that 〈◊〉 c ver. 6. did keep God's commandments which he 〈◊〉 Moses; and yet with 〈◊〉 saith, that d ver. 4. he broke in 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of brass which Moses had made. 3. A third answer shall be that which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concerning 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which the 〈◊〉 allege were done by the use of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the sign of the 〈◊〉: In all which, and the 〈◊〉 Miracles (〈◊〉 he, page 〈◊〉) not to overthrow 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; we yet 〈◊〉 answer, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 success that 〈◊〉 means had, prove no more the lawfulness os them, than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of living men amongst the Gentiles unto their Idols, accompanied with some desired issue out of their troubles wherein they were, prove the lawfulness of that horrible and most detestable worship of their God. 4. That the former use of the sign of the Cross in Miracles, obligeth not to a use of it (now all miraculous use thereof is by the general 〈◊〉 of Protestants ceased) may be 〈◊〉, in a way of Analogy and proportion from what the above mentioned Bishop 〈◊〉 speaks, pag. 58. of 〈◊〉 and Oil: We confess that spittle was used by our Saviour Christ, in healing of the cumb; and cyle by the Apostles, in curing of many other diseases; yet both 〈◊〉: but to imitate the work of a Miracle without the miraculous power, is but an opish 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for to hold such a miraculous ceremony, after the virtue be gone, is but to preserve a carcase, because it had been once possessed of a soul. From this general Answer proceed we to some particulars of the Crosses efficacy. 1. You say that the usage of this Ceremony of signing with the Cross, was we also know, frequent in the Church (while the gifts of healing continued) in curing diseases. But now for this 〈◊〉 you only quote in the Margin Aug. de Civ. Dei, lib. 22. cap. 8. And in that place there is but one instance of any cure wrought upon the usage of the sign of the Cross, and that in Innocentia, a Carthaginian Matron, and the story hereof I shall give unto the Reader, as it lieth in the Book and Chapter quoted. In eadem Carthagine, Innocentia religiosissima faemina de primariis ipsius civitatis, in 〈◊〉 cancrum habebat, rem, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dicunt, nullis medicamentis 〈◊〉. Aut ergo praescidi solet, & à corpore separari membrum ubi nascitur, aut, ut aliquanto homo quietius vivat fomentis est pestis 〈◊〉 frequentibus. Nam ut inde mortem quantumlibet tardius 〈◊〉 confidamus, secundum Hippocratis, ut fertur, sententiam, omnis est omittenda curatio. 〈◊〉 illa à perito medico, & suae domui familiarissimo acceperat, & ad 〈◊〉 Deum se orando converterat. Admonetur in somnis appropinquante pascha, ut in parte faeminarum 〈◊〉 ad baptisterium, 〈◊〉 illi 〈◊〉 primitus occurrisset, signaret ei locum signo crucis Christi, fecit, & confestim sanitas secuta est. In the same Town one Innocentia a most religious woman, and one of the principal in the City, had a Canker on her breast, a kind of sore which the Physicians told her is utterly uncurable: wherefore they use either to cut the infected part away, or for the prolonging of the life a little while in some ease, the malady is to be assuaged and mitigated with frequent plasters; for the opinion of Hypocrates will induce us to believe, that death will thence ensue, though somewhat slowly: 〈◊〉 he, as they say, doth advise to omit all attempt of curing it; this a 〈◊〉 Physician her familiar friend told her; so that now she sought help of none but the Lord, who told her in a dream, that 〈◊〉 next, which then drew near, she should mark on the 〈◊〉 side by the Font, what woman she was, that, being then 〈◊〉, should first meet her, and that she should 〈◊〉 her to sign her sore with the sign of the Cross of Christ: She did it, and was cured. But the Miracles related in this Chapter are of a 〈◊〉 credit, it 〈◊〉 unto Ludovicus Viues to be a matter without doubt, that many things in this Chapter were added, etc. by those, who with their filthy hands have defiled all the Writings of great and famous Authors: In hoc capite non dubium, quin multa sint addita, 〈◊〉 declarandi gratia, ab iis, qui omnia magnorum autorum scripta spurcis suis 〈◊〉 contaminabant, etc. Of this annotation of Ludovieus Vives Rivet speaks thus, Critic. sacr. pag. 453. Lud. Viv ad cap. 8. lib. 22. In 〈◊〉 miracula multa narrantur, quae omnia non 〈◊〉 exactam judicii 〈◊〉, quam in aliis August, operibus lectores sagaces observant, annotat, in hoc capite non dubium, 〈◊〉 multa sint addita, velut declarandi gratia, ab iis, qui omnia magnorum autorum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 suis manibus 〈◊〉: Huic 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉 censores Belgici in indice 〈◊〉: neque Hispani inquisitores in suo: quod ideo notandum lectori, ne semper quae ex genuine is autorum libris asseruntur, genuina esse putet, quod per Monachorum corruptelas non licet. 〈◊〉 igitur 〈◊〉 opus est sagacitate, & judicii libra. Chamier in reference to another passage in the Notes of Lud: Viu. passeth this censure upon other miracles, alleged by Papists from that place of Augustine to justify their Invocation of Saints, de Vigesim: Octau. lib. de Civit. Dei: Possum ex Vive dicere, 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 jusisse sciolorum lasciviam, aut potius 〈◊〉 audaciam: the Divines of Rheims in their Annotations on 〈◊〉 14. 12. charge Protestants, that they discredit, as other Miracles, so in particular, those testified by St. Augustine in this place; and unto this charge neither Fulk nor Cartwright entered any dissent, and therefore it is probable that they acknowledged it: whereas Fisher in his Answer to the Questions propounded by King James, goes about to justify the Oblations made to Saints by some of the Miracles here recorded, said to be done at their Tombs and Shrines, Dr. Francis White seems to think that a doubt of the truth of some of these Miracles is defensible, because, saith he, these things were extraordinary; and the credit of divers of them dependeth upon fame (which is many times uncertain) b Tertul. Apol. 〈◊〉. 7. cur malum sama? Quia velox, an quia plurimum mendax? quae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quidem cum veri aliquid adfert sine mendacii vitio est 〈◊〉, adjiciens, 〈◊〉 de veritate. and Saint Augustine himself saith, they are not commended unto us by such weighty authority, as that without all doubt they must needs be credited c Aug. de civet. Dei lib. 22. cap. 8. non tanta ea commendat authoritas, ut sine difficultate vel dubitatione credantur. they cannot be sufficient 〈◊〉 or foundations of Catholic Doctrine or Practice. 2. You say that by the sign of the Cross all Magic and Witchcrast is brought to nought. 1. Surely, Sir, if ever the sign of the Cross had such an influence, it is questionable, whether there was ever any word or promise of the Lord for it, and without such word or promise, to use the sign of the Cross for such a purpose, was virtual and interpretative Witchcraft. Besides 2. if it were so efficacious against Magic and Witchcraft in the Primitive times, yet, that since it hath been abused unto Magic and Witchcraft, is confessed by 〈◊〉 Abbot, a man of great 〈◊〉 and learning, part. 1. pag. 169. But 〈◊〉 the Harpy of Rome hath had the handling of it, and made it a matter of Magical Enchantment, and through the current of 〈◊〉 profanations, it hath 〈◊〉 into the hands of Conjurers, Charmers, Witches, to be 〈◊〉 with their 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 practices, we have had a religious care to clear the first Church in the using of it; but no further to use it ourselves than it may be washed from the soil and filth of these abominations. 3. By what you say in the Margin out of Athanasius and Augustine, you 〈◊〉 a great efficacy of the sign of the Cross in the routing and chase away of Devils: unto this I answer: 1. That the whole Armour of God, the complete harness of the Spirit, deters not Satan from assailing the best and most perfect of Christians: Christ's unspotted innocency, and his absolute all-sulnesse of Grace, was temptation proof, and yet the Devil adventured upon the 〈◊〉 of him, and therefore it is very strange that he should be so perilously, and terribly afraid of so weak a shield as the sign of the Cross in the forehead: No, no, saith Fulk, in answer to the Rhemists, pag, 69. 4. the Devil is too crafty and strong to yield to so weak a weapon, but when he is disposed to play with men, that they may more easily be seduced by him. 2. It is but a sorry Sophism, to conclude the Devil's terror at the sign of the Cross, from his running away upon 〈◊〉 see thereof; for this might be done out of design to get ground upon men, to return upon them with the more advantage: It might be like the flight of an Enemy to draw into an Ambuscado, 〈◊〉 the superstition of the Cross, that hath since so 〈◊〉. It is to be feared therefore, that that which the Pharisees blasphemously spoke of Christ, may truly be objected unto the sign of the Cross, that it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out Devils by Beelzebub the Prince of the Devils. Hear what 〈◊〉 says of the Devils fear 〈◊〉 the sign of the Cross, Tom. 1. pag 〈◊〉. Hoc omnium interim memoriis infixum esse debet, Daemonem esse callidum, versutum, versipellem, fallacem, mendacem, 〈◊〉. Fingit igitur se timere signum crucis, ut 〈◊〉 nos externo magis signo confidere, quam Christo ipsi crucifixo 3. Some excuse the Fathers, as if they held, that the sign of the Cross drived away Devils ex opere operantis, only by the saith and prayers of those that used it; but others think, that they held it to be done ex opere operato, by the Ordinance of God; and they give this reason, because they held it to be done by aliens and unbelievers, by Pagans and Jews, who had not the Christian Faith. Nazianzen relates, how that Julian the Apostate being about some feats of Necromancy, the Devils that he had conjured ran all away, when he by chance had made the sign of the Cross, without any purpose or thought of a Miracle; for he marvelled at the matter, as that which was more than he expected: And 〈◊〉 reports that a Jew, as yet 〈◊〉 unto the Faith of Christ, being benighted, and taking up his lodging in a Temple of 〈◊〉, routed a great multitude, or Troup of Devils that were there assembled, by signing his 〈◊〉 with the sign of the Cross: Unto these examples Bellarmine, Eccles. Triumph. lib. 2. 〈◊〉. 30. adds the testimony of Augustine: Quare S. Augustinus lib. 83. 〈◊〉, qu. 79. dicit indictum 〈◊〉 Deo 〈◊〉 ut cedant cruci, 〈◊〉 sceptro 〈◊〉 Regis, 〈◊〉 populi militibus cedunt, cum ab illis profertur signum Imperatoris: Nec mirum est. inquit. quod 〈◊〉 signa valent, cum à bonis Christianis adhibentur, quando etiam cum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 extraneis, qui omnino suum nemen ad istam militiam non dederunt, 〈◊〉 honorem tamen 〈◊〉 Imperatoris valent. Cum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his signis hujusmodi potestates, Deus ipse prohibet 〈◊〉 modis, cum id justum 〈◊〉 utile iudicat; nam nullo modo ulli spiritus audent haec signa contemnere: 〈◊〉 hec, 〈◊〉 illa 〈◊〉. By this you may see, how far the Father's 〈◊〉 in their opinion touching the efficacy of the Cross, and I am so charitable as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 you do not come up unto them herein, and if you do not, you have no reason to press me with their sayings. 3. You say out of Athanafius, that by the sign of the Cross, all the Idol Temples were laid waste and empty: I could wish that you had exemplified this by some instances, that we might have considered of what weight they had been: The Papists of the Seminary of Rheims have referred us unto a famous story in Theodoret, which saith Fulk, pag 694. is a Miracle wrought by Marcellus Bishop of 〈◊〉 in setting the Temple of Jupiter a fire, with sprinkling of water, after he had signed it with the 〈◊〉, and prayed, when it would not burn with fire: This is a pretty story, if true, and will serve aptly for your purpose: But, Sir, we shall hope for so much charity from you, that you will 〈◊〉 brand for Infidels, all, that have not faith strong enough to swallow these Miracles of the Crosse. Theodoret might have this at the second hand, and he himself might be deceived, though he were unwilling to deceive, and in all ages devout and well meaning persons have been over-credulous in entertaining 〈◊〉 it and feigned Miracles. As for the places quoted out of Augustine, I cannot find them in Frobenius his Edition of Augustine, and I have no other, and therefore I think you follow some other Edition; but the thing is not material; for I hope, that what I have said already will be a satisfactory answer unto them. Dr. Hammond. sect. 27. And then Baptism being the exorcising of Devils (the ancient Catechists we know were called Exorcists) the rescuing of a person from the power of 〈◊〉 into God's Sonship and family, what can 〈◊〉 more proper, or agreeable, or exactly symbolical, than the use of this in 〈◊〉, according to that of Tertullian, de Resurr. Carn. Caro signatur, ut anima muniatur, the flesh or body is signed, that the soul may be descended or 〈◊〉. Jeanes. Your ordinary Readers will think you Conjure, when they hear you term Baptism an exorcising of Devils; for they never heard of any Exorcisne in Baptism, save of the Papists, which our Divines brand for Magical; and whether this expression might not have been forborn to avoid all appearance of evil, in compliance with Papists in their use of 〈◊〉, I shall 〈◊〉 determine, but leave it unto your own prudence to think of. Whereas you say, that the ancient 〈◊〉 were called Exorcists, the reason of this may probably be, because the Catechumeni were exorcised before Baptism, Aquin. Sum. part. 3. quaest. 71. artic. 2. But I shall not contend about this with you, for fear I should be thought as very a fool as the Philosopher, who read a Lecture of War before Hannihal. There is a passage in Augustine that seems to 〈◊〉 somewhat what you 〈◊〉. Tom 7 pag. 〈◊〉. Ab hac igitur 〈◊〉 tenebrarum, quarum est Diabolus princeps, id est, à 〈◊〉 Diaboli, & angelorum ejus quisquis erui, cum baptizantur, negaverit parvulos, ipsorum ecclefiae sacramentorum veritate convincitur, etc. In veritate itaque non in salsitate potestas diabolica exorcizatur in parvulis, eique renunciant, quia 〈◊〉 sua non possunt, per 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 gestantium, ut eruti à potestate 〈◊〉 in regnum sui Domini transferantur. Unto this testimony I believe it is easy for you to add many more. But yet notwithstanding all this, it is very well known, by all that know the difference 〈◊〉 the Predicaments, that the Sacrament of Baptism cannot be said to be the Exorcising of Devils, the rescuing of a person from the power of Satan, the delivery of him from the 〈◊〉, otherwise than in an improper, tropical, and metonymical praedication, viz. as it is a sign and seal, and if you will, a moral instrument of the conditional promise thereof. But what advantage reap you unto your cause by this? why unto this Exorcising of Devils, the rescuing a person from the power of Satan into God's family, the use of the Cross in Baptism is exactly symbolical? Your argument (if there be any argument in your words) as I conceive, stands thus: That which is so exactly symbolical unto any thing signed, sealed, conveyed, and exhibited in Baptism, is so decent, as that the omission thereof would be undecent: but the use of the Cross in Baptism is exactly symbolical unto that which is signed, sealed, and conveyed, or exhibited in Baptism, viz. the Exorcising of Devils, the rescuing a person from the power of 〈◊〉 into God's Sonship and Family, therefore the use of it is so decent, as that the omission thereof would be undecent; you cannot but expect that the Major will be denled, and 'tis very strange that you leave it destitute of all proof; for you cannot be ignorant if you have read the Non-conformists, whom you oppose, that their great quarrel against our Ceremonies, was their symbolicalnesse and mystical signification; their arguments against which you may read at large in the Abridgement, page 41, 42, etc. usque 〈◊〉 49. Ames his Reply to Mortons' General Def. page 33, 34, etc. usque ad 58. As also in his Triplication to Dr. Burges Disp. about humane Ceremon. page 209, 210. usque ad 336. Parker. Treat. of the Cross, part 1. page 97, 98, etc. usque ad 112. Didoclave, page 522, 523, etc. usque ad 536. But, Sir, you may think to blow off all the Arguments with a silent scorn and contempt, and this indeed many do with those arguments which they cannot answer; but if you will not vouchsafe to read these Authors, if you please to accept of my service, I will abridge the substance of their arguments, and attend your answer unto them. Then, for the Minor, I have four things to say unto it. 1. Baptism itself is more proper, agreeable, or exactly Symbolical, unto the rescuing of a person from the power of Satan into God's Sonship and Family, than the sign of the Cross; and therefore the sign of the Cross in Baptism is a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, like the dim and smoky light of a candle in the presence of the clear and glorious light of the Sun at noonday. 2. The Popish Exorcism and 〈◊〉 are as, if not more, proper, agreeable, and exactly symbolical, unto the Exorcising of Devils as the use of the Cross in Baptism, and they have not been so much abused as it, and may as 〈◊〉 be purged from all Superstition and Idolatry, and therefore you may as well conclude concerning them as the Cross, that they are so decent as that the omission of them would be undecent. 3. I much question whether or no two cross motions of a finger or a thumb 〈◊〉 so proper, agreeable, and exactly symbolical, unto so high, dreadful and profound a mystery, as the delivery of us from the power of Satan and darkness, and the translation of us into the kingdom of the dear Son of God, as you affirm; and I shall hardly believe you, unless you bring other proofs, besides the Hyperboles of the Fathers. As for that which in confirmation of the Minor, you quote out of Tertullian: 1. It is urged by some, not only for the signification, but also for the operation and efficacy of the Cross, and whether you will go so far I cannot tell. 2. Unto it Mr. Whitaker, when urged by Papists for Traditions, gives this answer, Tom. 1. pag. 390. At anima fide contra Satanam munienda est, non cruse. Veteres quidem se 〈◊〉 signo adversus Daemonas munitos esse putârunt, sed hoc ex haeresi 〈◊〉 fluxit. And 〈◊〉 him Mr. Fuller in his History of the University of Cambridge pag. 125, gives this 〈◊〉 character; He was one so exactly qualified, that the Professors Chair may seem made for him, and he for it, they mutually so fitted each other. 3. I would 〈◊〉 to know, how you like the companion of the Cross in Tertullian, the holy oil? caro ungitur, saith he, in the words immediately foregoing, ut anima 〈◊〉: but perhaps you are for the reviving of that, as well as for the using of the Cross; and some 〈◊〉 not to say, that 'tis as ancient as the Crosse. One thing more I cannot but remember you of, before I leave this Section, and it is a distinction of mystical signification by the learned and reverend 〈◊〉, the word mystical signification hath two acceptions, saith he, General Def. pag. 52. The one Sacramental, by signification of grace 〈◊〉 by God; the other is only Moral, by signification of man's duty and obedience towards God. The ceremonies which we defend (saith he) are only mystical Moral, not Sacramental; and for his disclaiming these, he gives this reason, page 53, 54. A sacramental sign (being, as sacramental, so likewise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a seal of God's promises, as the Apostle Rom. 4. 〈◊〉 Circumcision) is always founded upon the express Covenant of God, therefore none but the Author of the Covenant may institute or appoint any such sign. For whosoever shall undertake to add a seal unto the Will and Covenant of any Testator amongst men, is farthwith held Falsarius, and thereby made obnoxious to the Law, and liable to the grievous judgements of man: How much more 〈◊〉 an Act were it for any to offix any sign, properly Sacramental, unto the Testament of our Lord Jesus? which whosoever shall attempt to do, becometh guilty of sacrilegious depravation of the blessed Mysteries of Salvation. Now you make the sign of the Cross to be that which Morton calls a Sacramental sign; for he describes a Sacramental sign to be that which signifieth Grace conferred by God: & is not the rescuing of a person from the power of Satan into God's Sonship and Family (as for your other expression: Baptism is the Exorcising of Devils, I am not much delighted with the repetition of it) a grace conferred by God? and unto this you say the sign of the Cross is exactly Symbolical, and therefore a Sacramental sign. Dr. Hammond. sect. 28. And if instead of the f Ad omnem progressum frontem crucis signaculo 〈◊〉. Tertul. 〈◊〉 Cor. Mil. c. 3. frequent use of it among the Ancients, even g Vide Narrat. 〈◊〉 Apostolorum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, apud Pallad. Hist. Laus. pag. 1049. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. before the cumbersome weight of Ceremonies came in (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, saith the Author of the Quest. and Resp. ascribed to Justin Martyr, Qu. 〈◊〉 pag. 364. in time of Prayer we sign those that have any need of it, those that are any way ill affected) we in this our Church retain it only in our solemn entrance into Christ's Camp, in token that we mean valiantly to 〈◊〉 under his Banner, and in confidence that 〈◊〉 that thus signed to Constantine Victory from heaven (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in this overcome) will thus give grace, and seal to us victory over our 〈◊〉 enemies. What question can there ever be of the perfect decency of this usage among us? Jeanes. Here the argument to prove the perfect decency of the usage of the sign of the Cross in Baptism, is the frequent religious use of it amongst the ancients; I say the religious use, because we oppose not the civil use of it in Coins and Banners. But 1. You know, it is generally denied by the Non-consormists, that the 〈◊〉 use of the Cross amongst the Ancients was lawful and justifiable, and until this be cleared, your argument will bec little better than 〈◊〉 principii. 2. Bellarmine useth the like argument, de Missa lib. 2. cap. 15. for their cross in the Mass, having quoted divers Fathers for the antiquity of the sign of the Cross, who teach that it is to be used in every business: he propounds hereupon an interrogation, very like unto that of yours: Quod 〈◊〉 in omni negotio signum crucis adhibendum, cur non in actione tremendi sacrificii? But this perhaps startles you not. 3. I demand whether the use of the Cross amongst the Ancients was decent or undecent? If it was decent, then why was it abrogated? If it was undecent, then how can you infer therefrom, the perfect decency of the use of the Cross in Baptism? But though I do not deny the frequent use of the Cross among the Ancients, yet I have something to observe concerning the witnesses which you allege therefore. The first is Tertullian de Cor. Milit. cap. 3. But this Book was written by him when a Montanist, this is confessed on all hands, but I shall content myself with the naming only of two Witnesses. The first is a moderate Conformist, Doctor Whitaker, Tom. 1. pag. 392. Respondeo, Tertullianum fuisse Montanistam, quando hunc librum scripsit. Facit enim 〈◊〉 novarum prophetiarum, quarum Montanum inventorem fuisse, dubium non est. Fuit vero Montanus 〈◊〉 Traditionum author, quae postea extirpari non poterant. Dixit, se habere illum paracletum, quem promisit Christus; & fretus 〈◊〉 paracleti authoritate, multa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Ecclesiam invexit. Impius 〈◊〉 Montanus Tertullianum ipsum fefellit, cujus viri jacturam casumque merito lugere possumus. Illo enim tempore nullus doctior, nullus sanctior, nullus 〈◊〉 fidei Christianae defension vehementior fuit Tertulliano. Sed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Montani omnem Tertulliano fidem detraxit. Sic enim Hilarius ait, in Comment. in Matth. Canon. 5. Quanquam & Tertullianus (inquit) hac de re aptissima volumina scripserit, consequens error 〈◊〉 detraxit scriptis probahilibus authoritatem. Hieronymus verò, in lib. 〈◊〉 Helvidium 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 Ecclesiae hominem non fuisse. Et in Catal. de 〈◊〉 idem ait, eum 〈◊〉 contra Ecclesiam scripsisse; & reverâ scripsit. Quae cum ita sint, quam absurdum est, Montanicas Traditiones Tertulliani 〈◊〉 nobis obtruderc. The other is a zealous and rigid pleader for humane religious Ceremonies, Mr. Hooker in his 〈◊〉 Polity, pag. 65. when Tertullian disputed against the Christian soldiers wearing a Crown or Garland on their heads, when they receive their 〈◊〉; He was a Montanist, and an enemy unto the Church, for condemning that prophetical spirit, which Montanus and his followers did boast they had received, as if in them Christ had performed his last promise; as if to than he had sent the Spirit, that should be their perfecter and final instructor in the mysteries of Christian truth. Which exulceratian of mind made them apt to take all occasions of contradiction. Wherefore in honour of that action, and to gall their minds, who did not so much commend it, he wrote his book De Corona Militis, not dissembling the stomach wherewith he wrote it. 2. The Cross which Tertullian speaks of, would be a weight cumbersome enough without any other Ceremony, and this cannot be denied by such indifferent persons as will read his words at large; for thus they are, Ad omnem progressum, atque promotum, ad omnem additum, & exitum, ad vestitum, ad calceatum, ad 〈◊〉, ad mensas, ad lumina, ad cubicula, ad sedilia, quandocunque nos conversatio 〈◊〉, frontem 〈◊〉 signaculo terimus. Here you see, that the Crossing in Tertullia's time was at every step, at every coming to and going out, at the appareling themselves, at washing, at eating, at lighting candles, and at sitting etc. 3. The frequent use of the Cross, mentioned by Tertullian at every step, and in every action that we do, was not, could not be decent, because it could not but be a great hindrance, disturbance, and distraction unto the more necessary, and important actions of men's lives, especially seeing you will say, it was to be accompanied with inward action of the soul suitable thereunto: now how can that, which is not decent in itself, derive that, which it hath not, unto another: this perpetual Crossing, was so far from being decent, as that it was ridiculous; and should we now see a man after this manner crossing of himself, we would think either that he was out of his wits, or else that he was transported with such delusions of Satan, as the Quakers are now, or the Montanists were in Tertullia's time. A second witness is Palladius de Historia 〈◊〉. This Author I suspected to be fabulous by the two tales related out of him by Bellarmine, de Reliq. & Imaginib. Sanctorum, cap. 29. and I cannot but wonder that you should allege him, considering the character that Hierome and Epiphanius give of him; but not having the Book in my own Study, I sent unto a friend in Oxford, to make some search after the place, and in a short time this answer was returned unto me. What authority is to be given to that quotation out of 〈◊〉 concerning Quest. Hippolytus, whom he would have to be Apostolorum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? None at all, or very little: For Answ. 1. Palladius, he lived in the end of the forth Century, anno 389, says (a) In Chronolog. Authorum praefixa Hist. vet. Patrum Paris. 1583. Laurentius de la Bar, Bellarmine (descript. Eccles. pag 156. in Palladio, puts him ad annum 390) saith he was coetaneous with Hierom and 〈◊〉, and a man of no great repute. 〈◊〉 (saith (b) De Scriptor. Eccles in Palladio pag. 156. 〈◊〉) 〈◊〉 Origenista 〈◊〉 (〈◊〉 (c) Preaemio adversus Pelagianos ad 〈◊〉 utem. Hierome) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, eandem 〈◊〉 instaurare 〈◊〉 est, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nunc quoque 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And 〈◊〉 the same time 〈◊〉, (d) Epist. 60. 〈◊〉 Hieron. Palladium, qui quondom nobis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 misericordiâ Dei indiget, cave, quia nunc Originis baeresim praedidicat, etc. And though he seemed afterwards to have 〈◊〉 his Heresies, yet (if we may believe (e) In Apparatu 〈◊〉. pag. 60. Possevine) Mutavit 〈◊〉 non animum. 2. This Historia Lausiaca, was called so, not by Palladius himself, 〈◊〉 pag. 〈◊〉. who inseribes it thus (f) Vide Palladium 〈◊〉 editum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 pag. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: Paliadii 〈◊〉 Historia vitas 〈◊〉 Patrum 〈◊〉. But because he dedicated that History, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Lauso Praeposito, to an eminenr man then in authority; so it was that from this Lausus it was called 〈◊〉. 3. This 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 here cited, occurs in the (g) In Hist. Vet. Patrum per Laurentium de la Bar, cap. 〈◊〉. pag. 88 who puts these words in the Margin, Crucis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Latin Edition of Palladius by 〈◊〉 Hervetus, thus, Quae cum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & see 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 crucis 〈◊〉, egressa est, etc. He speaks of a 〈◊〉 Virgin, a Christian, damned by the Judge to the Stews, out of which place she escaped (a 〈◊〉 young man giving her the clothes) in man's apparel, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (that is, 〈◊〉 on man's apparel) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. MS. in 〈◊〉. Bodlianâ. and signing herself all over with the Mystery of the Cross, she escaped safe, So the story is, in the 〈◊〉 Edition by 〈◊〉 pag. 154. what other Greek copy the Doctor made use of, I know not; Palladius graecè per 〈◊〉. Meurs. Lug. 〈◊〉. 1616. 〈◊〉. he citys pag 〈◊〉. whereas in Meursius his Edition there are but 212. pages in all. 3. He tells us where he had this Fable, or History (〈◊〉 Palladius does not affirm it to be true) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (i. e.) in alio libello, qui inscribebatur (〈◊〉 ipsis 〈◊〉 cogniti, seu 〈◊〉 coaetanei) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inveni: And then he tells this story of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 4. So that the Sum is: He found a Pamphlet (for so the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies) which was inscribed to Hippolytus, who was known to the Apostles, but that it was not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a false and spurious inscription, he tells us not, only he found a Pamphlet so inscribed. 2. It is very likely he had no great opinion of that Pamphlet, for than he would have told us so, to give reputation to the story. For in the very next (h) Palladius ex Edit. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, pag. 152. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. story before this, which is concerning a Virgin called Juliana, he tells us, he had it out of a most ancient book of Hymns, writ by origen's own hand, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; whereas he hath nothing of this, but that he saw a Pamphlet so inscribed. 3. And this is more probable, because I find not any Ecclesiastical Historian (or other Author) mention any such Hippolytus, who was Apostolorum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 4. 〈◊〉 is there any foundation in Antiquity, in the testimony of any good Author, that any such Crossing was used in the Apostles time, though I know in 〈◊〉 time, and afterwards, it grew much in fashion, especially in the fourth Century in the time of (i) August in Evang. Joh. Tract. 118. 〈◊〉 (k) Chrysost. demonstrat 〈◊〉 Christus 〈◊〉 Deus. Augustine, and this Palladius, who was Bishop of Helenopolis, and this is confessed by (l) In his 〈◊〉 with Hart, page 504. Edit. 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 against Hart (where you have much about Crossing) who denies (and justly too) that any such use of the Cross was used in the Apostles times, nor do I find any affirm it, but they of Rome, who (against all reason and antiquity) would 〈◊〉 all their ridiculous and superstitious Ceremonies to be Apostolical: It is observable further, that the Latin Translation by Gentianus, differs very much from the Greek put out by Joh. 〈◊〉 (as he (m) 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 in Praefat. Lectori 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 himself tells us) and both of them very much seven in this present story we now speak of) from an ancient Greek Manuscript copy of 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 Library. So that 'tis evident the book hath been much 〈◊〉; so that he had need of a spirit of Prophecy, who would 〈◊〉 tell us which is genuine, which spurious. For instance, in Meursius his Edition Lugd. Batav. 16 16. pag. 152. The London, Anno 1598. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the 93 Narration or Chapter is thus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And then the narration begins thus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. And then the next Narration (Narratio 94. pag. 154. hath this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Now in the Manuscript ancient Copy in Bodlyes' Library those two Chapters are but one, and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one, thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And then the Narration begins thus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. 〈◊〉 enough, and therefore negligence or knavery enough in the Transcribers. Besides this University friend, I consulted another in the Country, who had, I knew, a well furnished study, and from him I received this following Answer. Sir, Palladius his Historia Lausiaca I find in the seventh Tom. of 〈◊〉 Sanct. Patrum, put forth by Margarinus de la Bigne at Paris, Anno 1589. of which Author 〈◊〉 himself in his Book de Scriptoribus 〈◊〉 ad 〈◊〉 390. confesseth (after he had first 〈◊〉 this History, as not a little profitable to the Reader of it) that this Palladius is reproved by Saint Hierome, in an Epistle of his to 〈◊〉, for an Origenist, and so accounted also by 〈◊〉 in an Epistle of his to John of Jerusalem, which Epistle is to be seen (as he 〈◊〉) in the second Tom. of Hieroms Works. This History of 〈◊〉 hath the name 〈◊〉, from one Lausus, to whom it is dedicated both by Palladius and 〈◊〉, a Bishop of 〈◊〉; both which Epistles dedicated to 〈◊〉, are prefixed to this History. The History hath more Miracles in it than are in the New Testament, and as strange ones as are in any Legend, and it seemeth the 〈◊〉, (as he faith at the 56. Sect. of this History) could have reported stranger, but that they did 〈◊〉 miraculi modum; not that they were false though, but because men wanted faith to believe them. In the first Sect one Dorotheus, cum prius signaculo crucis se munivisset, draweth, and drinketh the water of a Well, wherein there were Asps: Abbot Copres, sect. 49. went 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of a great 〈◊〉, and stayed there half an hour, and had no hurt, but as he 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 he was in nomine Christi signatus. One 〈◊〉 Be, at the entreary of some Husbandmen of that Country, commanded a Sea horse (〈◊〉) who wasted that Country to be packing, and not to spoil the Country any more. And so forthwith this Sea horse, as if he had been driven away by an Angel, anished, omnino 〈◊〉. Sect. 17. An Hyaena brings her whelp unto Abbot Macarius and layeth it down at the Abbot's feet, this whelp was blind, the Abbot 〈◊〉 upon the eyes of this blind whelp, prayeth, and the whelp recovereth its sight; the Hyaena taketh up the whelp, and deparreth: But then the next day the same Hyaena bringeth a great sheep. skin unto the Abbot, ostereth it unto him (belike as a token of her thankfulness for the cure) the Abbot refuseth the present, rattleth the Hyaena for killing the sheep, adviseth her to kill no more sheep, the Hyaena, capite suo annuit, ut quae sancto Macario assentiretur, Saith my Author: up on the report of St. Paphnutius in another Place, the Devil in the habit of a Presbyter offereth the Sacrament to one, but the good P esbyter discovereth the Devil, and defies him, and his Sacrament. In another place one 〈◊〉 many years, and had no other sustenance, but the Sacrament once every Sabbath day. By this time the Reader is, I hope, sufficiently satisfied, that your Author Palladius is a Legendary writer, the Gentlemen who have made this search for me, desire for the present, to have their names concealed, but however they will be responsible for what they have written, when ever you shall be pleased to call them to an account. A third witness is the Author of the Quest. and Resp. ascribed to Justin Martyr, but this Author is unknown, and the book a forgery, unworthy of Justin Martyr, and as short of his former writings as Lead is of Gold, this you know a great deal better than myself, but others may see as much demonstrated by Rivet. Critic. sacr. lib. a. cap. 5. Out of Possevinus, Sylburgius and 〈◊〉. But you have perhaps another argument, hinted towards the conclusion of this section, and it is the apparition of the sign of the Cross unto Constantine, of which you speak in those words; he that thus signed to Constantine victory from Heaven (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in this overcome etc. But it is much questioned, whether or no that which you call the sign of the Cross, was that which appeared unto Constontine. Bishop Abbot in his answer unto Dr. Bishop his Epistle unto King James pag. 167. saith, that the sign of the Cross, unto which Constantine was so much affectioned (and that which he was so affectionate unto, was that which appeared unto him) was indeed i Euseb. de vit. Const. lib. 1 c. 25. the sign of the name of our Saviour, consisting of the two Greek letters χ and ρ, and in the form of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which are the two first letters of the name of Christ, and did import the same whole name, by the fight whereof in the sky Conflantine was advertised, that k Ib. c. 22. by Christ he must conquer and 〈◊〉. To which name of Christ, represented to Constantine, his most excellent majesty giveth the same honour that Constantine did, reposing therein the whole trust of his Victory, and safety, both spiritual and corporal, and knowing that no l Acts 4. 7. other name is given under heaven, by which we must be saved, but only the name of Jesus Christ. This opinion 〈◊〉 embraced by many; but Dr. John Rainolds of all others, I believe, speaks most fully of it in his conference with Hart, pag. 507, 508. The sign that appeared to Constantine in the Element was a sign of the name of Christ, not his Cross: howsoever the Coiners and m Marshal's treatise of the Cross art. 2. Harpesfeildes Cope-dialog. 4. Crosse-maintainers of your Church do falsely paint it out. For as n De vit. Constant. lib. 1. cap. 15, Eusebius writeth, (unto whom Constantine did report the thing, and showed him that ensign, which he had caused to be made in the likeness thereof) it was the form of a (1) Spear standing straight upright, with a (2) Crown on the top of it, and as it were (3) a horn, which (4) did cross the midst of the Spear aslope. So that it represented two of the Greek letters, χ and ρ: which being the two first letters of the name of Christ, the name of Christ was signified by that sign to Constantine. Thus be describeth it who saw it. which words translated amiss by Interpreters (erat litero ρ inserta in 〈◊〉 literae χ) have occasioned some to make the sign otherwise then Eusebius describeth it. Unto this Hart thus replieth, but out of doubt he calleth it the sign or the monument of the Cross also. And unto this Dr. Rainolds thus rejoineth. But 5 cap. 25. himself showeth, that he calleth it so, because it resembled o 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. the sign of a Cross For neither was it like the Cross fully, which had p The figure of the letter T. Tertull. advers. Martion. lib. 3. Hieron: lib. 3. Comment. in Ezec. c. 9 another figure: and where he describeth it, he saith in plain terms that it was 6 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. a sign of the name of Christ. Neither were these words that you rehearsed written by it, In this sign overcome, as your q Harpsfeild in his Cope-Dialog. 4. c. 3. Doctor saith: (〈◊〉 because he read it coined in the Cruseado so, or in the Portigue) but r 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Euseb. de vit. Constant. l. c. 22. by this overcome: as if God showing him the name of Christ. should have said unto him that s Acts 4. 12. there is no other name given under Heaven whereby we must be saved. In the which meaning it seemeth that Constantine did understand it also: because t Euseb. de vit. Const. lib. c. 25. he used afterward to carry in his Helmet, not the sign of the Cross, but those two letters by which the name of Christ was represented to him. But suppose it was the very sign of the Cross, which you imagine appeared unto Constantine, yet this will make nothing for the perfect 〈◊〉 of the usage of the sign of the Cross in Baptism amongst us: and my reason is, because apparitions in the air, though they be not illusions of Satan, the Prince of the air, but true & real miracles, do not oblige us unto 〈◊〉 of the like in God's ordinances: strong and powerful motives they are unto the worship of Christ, but were never designed to be a rule of it, and he that useth it to such a purpose perverts it from its right end. Dr. Hammond. And then for the Surplice: It is no news, I hope, for several sorts of men to have solemn Garments, for solemn actions which they do not use at other times. The Judges upon the Bench, or the Lords at their coming to Parliament, are a sufficient evidence of this, who wear not those Robes in common occasions, which there they do, as betokening their quality. and the employments they are about. And than what is thus customary in civil matters (viz. to difference persons and employments, yea and days, by distinction of garments) and is allowed to be decent therein, this by analogy undeniable, is as fitly and decently from thence derived to solemn sacred actions also, such are the public offices of the Priest: and the commands of our Superiors being added to this decency of the matter, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it is, I am sure, more than undecent for inferiors to be obstinate, and deny obedience to them. In the choice of the garment, there bathe been also, as near as may be, a resemblance observed of those garments, which in Scripture are mentioned for the like solemnities, long, shining, i. e. white robes or garments. And if the constant usage of other Churches besides this of ours, Eastern as well as Western, for so many Centuries together, be considered, it will be competently able to 〈◊〉 establish an Ecclesiastical custom also, which, in things of this nature, external ornaments and formalities, is a more 〈◊〉 onal ground, and rule or measure of decency, than any Mr. J. (or Amesius to boot) will readily he able to produce for the rejecting of them, or breaking and casting away those bands which tied no harder a 〈◊〉 than this upon their shoulders. Jeanes. The Surplice was used not only as a note of distinction, but also for its mystical signification, to betoken sanctity of life, and until this latter use of them be proved lawful, your four arguments will be but a begging of the Question, as you will soon perceive, when you attempt the reducing of them into form. This may suffice for answer unto all your arguments; but I shall also give unto each of them a several answer. The first argument is taken from the Analogy betwixt civil and sacred persons and actions: Civil persons wear solemn garments for solemn actions, which they do not use at other times; therefore it is decent for Ministers to wear solemn garments in their solemn sacred actions, which they do not use in common occasions, as whilst they are walking in the streets, or the like. To answer this, I need not trouble my 〈◊〉, but only refer the Reader unto what Ames answereth unto the like objection of Bishop morton's in his Reply to his particular Def. &c pag. 4. To which I answer. 1. That if all this be granted, yet it maketh not for the Surplice; which is not a Civil 〈◊〉 an Ecclesiastical, Religious habit; there is great difference betwixt a grave, civil habit, and a mystical garment. 2. The consequence doth not follow; because in the exercising of the Ministerial duty, nothing is requisite which the Lord himself doth not impose upon his Ministers. A Minister than hath another person, than when he walkoth in the street. 3. There is a great disparity betwixt Judges and Ministers, in regard of their Functions; for Judges Functions are civil, and therefore subject unto man's Institutions: but Ministers in their Functions are only to observe what he, whose service they are to perform hath appointed. This answer fits your argument, as if it had been purposely made for it, and by this the 〈◊〉 may see, that it was baffled long ago, and 〈◊〉 you should not have propounded it anew without some reinforcement. But your second argument will strike the matter dead; The Command of our Superiors added unto the decency of the matter. But this mends the matter nothing at all; for our Superiors, as well as others, are prohibited to make any additionals unto the Worship instituted by the supreme Lawgiver, who had infinite Wisdom, and so could sufficiently provide whatsoever was fitting in his own Worship and Service: All additions unto the Ceremonial Law under the Old Testament 〈◊〉 unlawful, Deur. 12. 32. And why then should it be lawful to add unto the Ceremonial Law in the New Testament? Christ was faithful in the House of God, as Moses, Heb. 3. 2. and therefore his provision for 〈◊〉 was as perfect and exact, though not as numerous. Your third Argument, The resemblance of the Surplice unto those Garments which in Scripture are mentioned for the like solemnities, long, shining, white Robes or Garments, I suppose you mean some of the holy Garments of Aaron, that were appointed for glory and for beauty, Levit. 16. 4. and then this reason may involve the Surplice in the guilt of Judaisme, rather than prove its decency. Hath God, think you, abrogated those mystical Garments that were of his own 〈◊〉, to make way for such as shall be of men's invention: If we must needs have mystical apparel, what can be more sitting than that which God himself ordained? The Word and Sacraments do sufficiently mind a Minister of his duty, and the light of them is so full and clear, like that of the Sun, as that it needs not the candle of a Surplice. This instruction of the Church by humane Ceremonies, is to teach her with a Fescue, to hide the light of the Gospel under a bushel, and it is a 〈◊〉 and shadowing of its brightness. Some have concluded the Surplice to be decent, because the Angels appeared in shining garments, Luk. 24. 4. in raiment white as snow, Mat. 28. 3. because the glorious Saints in heaven are 〈◊〉 with white robes, Revel. 7. 9 and the Lamb's Wife shall be arrayed with fine linen, clean, white, Revel. 19 8. But these inferences are, as they say, 〈◊〉 ad angulum, and you are wiser than to own them, and yet the strength of your argument is little, if at all, superior to them. Your fourth argument is, the constant usage of other Churches, besides this of ours, Eastern as well as Western, for many Centuries together. But first, the not using the Surplice by Christ and his Apostles, and some Centures immediately following their times, is a saser prosident to imitate, than the usage of it in succeeding Centuries, which were not so pure and incorrupt as the Primitive time. 2. Those which are utterly unskilled in the Ancients, may collect from the confession of your great and learned Hooker, Ecclesiastical Polity, rag. 245. That the true and Primitive antiquity of the Surplice, is a matter very doubtful, notwithstanding, saith he, I am not bend to stand stiffly upon these probabilities, that in Hieromes and Chrysostom's times any such 〈◊〉, as a white garment, was made several unto this purpose, to wit, for Ministers to execute their Ministry in, and it is without doubt that in the next age, the cumbersome weight of Ceremonies, as you call it, burdened the Church; for Augustine who lived in the times of Hierome complained hereof, Epist. 119. ad Januar. Quamvis enim neque hoc inveniti possit, quomodo contra fidem sint, 〈◊〉 tamen religionem, quam paucissimis & manifestissimis celebrationum Sacramentis misericordia Dei esse liberam voluit, servilibus oneribus premunt, ut tolerabilior sit conditio Judaeorum, qui etiam si tempus libertatis non agnoverint, legalibus tamen sarcinis, non humanis praesumptionibus subjieiuntur. Sed ecclesia Dei inter multam paleam multaque, zizanta constituta multa tolerat. In the next place you aver, that Ecclesiastical custom in things of this nature, is a more rational ground and rule of decency 〈◊〉 any Mr. J. or Amesius to boot, will readily be able to produce, for the rejecting of them, etc. But until Amesius his argument against things of this nature, humane mystical ceremonies, be answered, this comparison with impartial Readers will pass for nothing but vapouring. In the end of the Section, you give a hint of the tolerablenesse of the Ceremonies, they were bands which tied no harder 〈◊〉 than this, upon your shoulders. But first, God hath broken the yoke of his own Ceremonies, and our Prelates cannot show us any commission for their pretended authority to make a new yoke of their own, and with it to gall the necks and consciences of Christ's Members and Ministers. Paul, though he thought all indifferent things to be lawful, yet he professeth that he would not be brought under the power of any, 1 Cor. 6. 12. Now we were brought under the power of the Cross and Surplice; for as Aquinas 〈◊〉, qui utitur eo, quod non expedit, sive licitum sive illicitum, redigitur 〈◊〉 sub rei illius potestate, and we were enthralled unto the use of them, when they were not expedient, when they did not edify, but destroy and scandalise. 2. If we may judge of the late Bishop's zeal by their punishments, they showed more zeal against the neglect of their Ceremonies, than against the omission of the weightiest matter of both the Law and Gospel; the most scandalous and ignorant Ministers found more favour at their Tribunals, than such of the Nonconformists as were renowned for parts and learning, and exemplary for personal piety and diligence in their Ministerial function. 3. Their rigour in imposing these bands was unexcusable and unsupportable; for it was upon no less penalties than silencing and deprivation, and these were upon the most peaceable and conscientious Dissenters: and when these arguments satisfied them not (and they were the best arguments their Consistories yielded) the poor men were judged obstinate and contumacious, and then the Secular power was called upon for their 〈◊〉 imprisonment, they must not breathe in English 〈◊〉, unless in the close, and perhaps infected one, of a 〈◊〉 prison; and there they must 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉, except they conform against their consciences: But I hope the Prelares sufferings have awakened them unto a sight of, and sorrow for this their over 〈◊〉, if not, I shall pray unto God to open 〈◊〉 ears, that they may hear the voice of his rod. Dr. Hammond. sect. 30. In this case I believe (though not in the garments themselves) there is place for that decency, the omission of which necessarily infers indecency, and for such order the breaking of which must soon end in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (which Mr. J. saith St. Paul opposes to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) viz. down right confusion. Jeanes. Here we have a great deal of confidence in your conclusion, but upon a diligent and most impartial search, I cannot find any premises of a proportionable strength to 〈◊〉 it up; indeed you are like to meet with some partial Readers, who will think your proofs irrefragable, because you have 〈◊〉 out so many quotations out of the Fathers, whereas all the while there is nothing in all this your discourse that looks like an Argument: If you think my censure injurious, you may right yourself, by reducing your Arguments unto form, and then, 〈◊〉 they be found convincing, the shame will be mine, and until this be done, I shall 〈◊〉 myself with that which Aines speaks concerning the pretence of 〈◊〉, In his reply to Mortons' particular def. etc. pag. 3. As for the rule of decency, which is here made the ground-of all this affirmation; it were to be wished that the 〈◊〉 would have brought 〈◊〉 into a 〈◊〉, that we might have seen the force of it; for now I 〈◊〉 devise what Logic will conclude different Ministerial Garments, from decency; 〈◊〉 decency was, and is without them, in a multitude of Christian Churches and Ministers; but as some blundering Logicians, make their rule de omni & de nullo, serve to prove everything so this Defendant would make us believe that his rule of decency will 〈◊〉 any thing that it pleaseth 〈◊〉 spiritual Lords to impose upon us. Dr. Hammond. sect. 31, 32, 33. Having said thus much ex abundanti above what was incumbent on me, I shall 〈◊〉 myself, 〈◊〉 I 〈◊〉 not spare any 〈◊〉 pains, in survey of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which Mr. J. is, resolved to think considerable, and to speak very 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉, as proving that 〈◊〉 text 1 Cor. 14. 40. rightly 〈◊〉, doth not only not authorise any humane institution of ceremonies, but on the contrary plainly condemns them, and this, saith he, was so well managed by him, that he hath quite beaten out of the field Bishop Morton and his second, Dr. J. Burges, 32. Here is triumph indeed. And I suppose the Reader already discerns, what are the grounds of it, viz. that Amesius acknowledges nothing decent, but that, the omission of which necessarily infers indecency, i. e. as hath been showed, nothing but natural decency, the 〈◊〉 of which is a vice contrary to that, by consequence, that there is no such thing, as an indifferent gesture or garment, which either 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 custom, or obedience to our lawful Superiors may render decent; that whatsoever some 〈◊〉 law of nature commands not the doing of that, if it be but wearing such a garment, which the Canons of any Church 〈◊〉, nay, by parity of reason a Cloak or a but 〈◊〉 Doublet, is absolutely unlawful by 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 Cor. 14. 40. 33. This being the bottom of those arguments of Amesius, I may safely tell Mr. J. that they could no otherwise beat either Bishop Morton or Dr. J. 〈◊〉 out of the field, 〈◊〉 that they thought them utterly 〈◊〉 their making replies 〈◊〉; He that thinks 〈◊〉 is nothing 〈◊〉, nothing lawful, the omission of which is not sin, doth 〈◊〉 use other Dictionaries than we do, discerns no difference 〈◊〉 lawful and necessary 〈◊〉, as the 〈◊〉 of Fa all production of all things, will not allow a cause to be sufficient to produce any effect, which it doth not produce, and so produce, that it cannot 〈◊〉 produce it, which is to tell me that I sit, and walk at the very i'm, when I stand still, it being certain that I am equally able to do both those, when yet I really do the third 〈◊〉, so he will not allow any thing morally possible, which is not morally necessary which is certainly the eiving new laws to 〈◊〉 (making the word lawful or possible which was wont to be interpreted that which may or may not be done, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only that which must be done, and may not be on 〈◊〉) and not new reasons to 〈◊〉 old paradoxes. Jeanes. In these three Sections I shall stay upon nothing but your charge of 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 who almost that hath heard of your great parts, learning 〈◊〉 ingenuity (〈◊〉 who is there such a stranger in our Israel unto whose ears the same thereof hath not arrived) but will upon this conclude us both guilty? whereas we are both free & innocent, and most untruly aspersed by you, 〈◊〉 which I expect & challenge satisfaction. Sir, herein I desire no favour at your hands, 〈◊〉 shall 〈◊〉 you to put any of our words upon the 〈◊〉, and if by all your 〈◊〉 you can 〈◊〉 any such inference from them, I shall confess my 〈◊〉 worthy of all that disgrace which your pen can pour upon me To 〈◊〉 myself from this your 〈◊〉 I have joined herewith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concerning the 〈◊〉 actions of man; And as for Ames, his own writings will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 him in his 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. lib. 2. cap. 3. thes. 13 he expressly affirmeth that many acts, in the 〈◊〉 are in their own nature indifference, and in his Cases of Conscience he hath a whole chapter de 〈◊〉 and there 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 is, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ac nuda natura antequam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aut 〈◊〉. Tales sunt 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 are etc. lib 3. cap. 18 There he divers actions which in their common and bare nature, before they be as it were 〈◊〉 with circumstances, do in lude in themselves no goodness or badness; as to eat, to 〈◊〉, to take a journey, to walk etc. Dr. I Burges impureth unto Bradshaw this opinion, which you father upon Ames, and Ames his defence of Mr. 〈◊〉 will serve for his own apology. Dr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mr. Bradshaw 〈◊〉 good reason to reverse his opinion f things indifferent, for 〈◊〉 all learning and 〈◊〉, be resolves that there is nothing indifferent, and unto this Aims thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. cap. 2 〈◊〉 8. 9 If this were so as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, reason would persw 〈◊〉 some 〈◊〉, but 〈◊〉 only the Rejoinder his telling again without any show or proof The 〈◊〉 raiseth up a report, without 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 he received it, which 〈◊〉 it be some other way confirmed, then by an 〈◊〉 bore telling and that in a humour of 〈◊〉 his person, it must he accounted a meet 〈◊〉. I for my 〈◊〉, can find 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 words in Mr. 〈◊〉 shaw his 〈◊〉, neither any thing from whence such a raw 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be reasonably collected. He concludeth 〈◊〉 cap. 3 that there is no 〈◊〉 indifferent 〈◊〉 i. e. every way, a well in 〈◊〉 of nature. as of morality. He 〈◊〉 also cap. 7 there is nothing actually indifferent, which is not potentially good or evil, and cap. 8 there is no action of man's will so indifferent, but the doing 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 be evil. There is no action that a man can 〈◊〉, by the power of his will, 〈◊〉 is merely and absolutely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 individuo consideratum ex 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ratione procedentem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse, vel ma 〈◊〉 necesse est. indifferent. These passages come the nearest to 〈◊〉 which is here fathered upon the treatise: 〈◊〉 all which this 〈◊〉 appeareth not: there is nothing indifferent. Nay the ha shest of these 〈◊〉 may be found not only in little Pamphlets made by 〈◊〉 Boys, against learning and sense, but in great volumes, written by those that go for very learned, and sensible in 〈◊〉 matters as this is. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aquinas, in the great book called his 〈◊〉, prima 〈◊〉. q 〈◊〉 or. 9 hath this 〈◊〉: it must needs be that every individual act of man (〈◊〉 from deliberate reason) is either good or bad. And all 〈◊〉 almost all) 〈◊〉 which have written upon that place, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and defend the same. who yet wore men, that in questions of such a nature, did not usually write against all learning and sense. Dr. Hammond. sect. 34. This argument of Amesius against things indifferent, that learned Bishop was well 〈◊〉 with, by his familiar conferences with Mr. 〈◊〉, a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 against Ceremenies, and whom the Bishop thought fitter to 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 instances, of 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉, than by more serious attempts of 〈◊〉. i e. in plain 〈◊〉 to despise and smile at, than to dread; and if Mr. J. have really read Mr. Hooker, 〈◊〉 he somewhere entitles our Patron of Ceremonies, 〈◊〉 may in him remember a discourse of Laws, which will supersede all necessity or 〈◊〉 of my farther enlarging on it. Jeanes. Here we have a gross mistake, and a bitter jeer. 1. A gross mistake, to 〈◊〉 no worse, for Ames hath no where any Argument against things indifferent; it is a Conclusion which he never dream of, and therefore you most injuriously fasten it upon him, and hereof, I hope, you will repent, and give some public testimonial thereof. Next we have a bitter jeer at Non conformists, 〈◊〉 if their opinion concerning humane, religious Ceremonies, were so silly and ridiculous, that Bishop 〈◊〉 despised it, and smiled at it, and could 〈◊〉 it easily, by 〈◊〉 instances by unbuttoning and buttoning his Cassock: There may be truth in this your relation concerning Mr Hind and Glapthorne, but your false accusation of Ames will render your bare word questionable, if it be not backed with farther proofs; but suppose your relation true, yet all that you can gather hence is, that they were weak Respondents, and knew not the state of the Question; and unto that you seem as great a stranger as they, for you dare not say that Bishop 〈◊〉 button and unbuttoning his Cassock, was a religious Ceremony, and if it were not, was it not a proper medium to prove the lawfulness of humane religious Ceremonies? The Non conformists laid down four qualifications in the Ceremonies which they oppose: 1. Humane Institution. 2. Ordained signification. 3. Mystical signification. 4. Appropriation unto God's solemn Worship and Service. 1. Humane Institution, they are humane inventions, now Kneeling, Bowing. Prostrating, lifting up of the eyes and of the hands, shouting and dancing for joy, they absolutely deny to be humane inventions, as you may see in Ames his dispute about Ceremonies, pag. 495. 2. A second thing is ordained signification, though they have an aptness to signify, yet they do not actually signify, 〈◊〉 special institution of man: those signs then that signify without institution by 〈◊〉 or by civil custom 〈◊〉 shut out of this controversy. 1. By nature, natural Ceremonies as they are called, such as to look up to Heaven, to 〈◊〉 up our heads, to 〈◊〉 our knees in 〈◊〉; for these Nature itself, saith Ames, doth teach all nations to observe without any institution though 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 some government of counsel, nor without such 〈◊〉, as Nature itself is subject unto. 〈◊〉 unto disp. about humane Ceremon. pag. 27. 2. By civil custom, and of this nature was 〈◊〉 woman's 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 Cor. 11. By received use and ancient custom, it showed the subjection of a woman unto the husband, and so was an indicant sign thereof without any new institution of man. 3. They are of mystical signification, they signify either some grace or duty, they teach some spiritual and religious thing by their instituted signification, and therefore are termed by some, 〈◊〉 Ceremonies. 4. They are appropriated unto the acts of Religion in God's service, and so are religious in state, and have, as Parker phraseth it, a kind of immobility in God's worship, and hereupon they are 〈◊〉 rel gious Ceremenies, and by this all circumstances, or if you will call them circumstantial Ceremonies, all Ceremonies of mere order and decency are excluded out of the controversy, because they are common to things civil as well as sacred, and 〈◊〉 as well out of God's worship, as in it. Whereas Doctor Morton objecteth, that a 〈◊〉, Communion cup, the Church and place of God's service itself, may be appropriated and assigned only unto God's Worship: Ames for answer distinguisheth betwixt appropriation of this or that individual, and of the kind; Individuals (saith he) may be extrinsecally and accidentally appropriated, the kind remaining 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 common and indifferent, and the individuals that are thus 〈◊〉 appropriated, are of the same use out of God's service that they are in it; this, saith Ames, is occasion of admiration unto Dr. Burges the 〈◊〉, but he might have considered, that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a Cloth, is to cover; of a Cup, to drink out of; of Meeting places to meet in; and then where is the strangeness of this 〈◊〉? Is there not the same immediate use of a man's eyes, in reading one book, as another, of a man's ears, in hearing one voice, as another, however the subject seen, or heard, may differ in nature or kind? This is a true state of the Question, made, not by me, but by Parker, Ames, Didoclave, and other learned Non- 〈◊〉 long ago: And now I hope you are sensible that Bishop Morton his button and unbuttoning his Cassock, came not within many leagues of it; there is no doubt, but that either you have, or may 〈◊〉 procure a 〈◊〉 of the like 〈◊〉 and fashion, as that of the Bishops; and why should not this feat be as seasible 〈◊〉 you as unto him? P ay, Sir, try the 〈◊〉 of your skill, and let all the Bishops in the Land 〈◊〉 your 〈◊〉; nay, take in what help you can 〈◊〉 Mr. Hooker his discourse of Laws that you refer me unto, and if from the buttoning and unbuttoning of your Cassock, you can with all your united forces, prove the lawfulness of humane religious Ceremonies, symbolical signs; that is, those which teach some things spiritual by their 〈◊〉 instituted signification, and are appropriated unto God's worship, I will then confess that there is as miraculous a virtue in your Cassock, as you 〈◊〉 unto the sign of the Cross in the Primitive times, and shall be ready publicly to 〈◊〉 whatsoever I have written, or spoken against these Ceremonies; but until such proof be made, it will be no act of imprudence in you to 〈◊〉 for the future, such unsavoury girds; for however they bewray a passionate, high, and 〈◊〉 contempt of your poor 〈◊〉, yet upon examination they will be sound to be sapless and irrational, to have in them nothing of truth, and as little of charity and humility. Dr. Hammond. sect. 35. Mean while, to the reproach of my great stupidity, I willingly acknowledge, that it cannot enter into my understanding, what sense that text is capable of, which with the 〈◊〉 (〈◊〉) 〈◊〉 can be taught plainly to condemn 〈◊〉 of Ceremonies in the Church, i. e. by what 〈◊〉 or supplies, or advantages of art this Enthymeme shall be rendered 〈◊〉. The Apostle commands that all things be 〈◊〉 decently, and in order: ergo, he condemnt all institution of Ceremonies for God's worship. He that can maintain this consequence not only to be true but (as Mr 〈◊〉 it) plain and evident, will be a formidable adversary indeed, much better deserving that 〈◊〉, than one whom he knows not, and therefore honours with it. Jeanes. Nothing hath more betrayed men to shameful overthrows than contempt of Adversaries: what opened the King of Sweden so speedy a way unto his Victories, as the Emperor's 〈◊〉 of him? And I am confident that your despising of Ames, will add nothing unto your conquests; it appears by your mistake of him, that as yet, you never read him, and yet you have undertaken to censure and 〈◊〉 him, and in order 〈◊〉 have adventured upon 〈◊〉 conjectures or 〈◊〉 that have proved groundless and to have no 〈◊〉 in his Writings; and now as for his Argument from the 1 Cor. 14. you 〈◊〉 and deride it, before you know what it is, and thus you 〈◊〉 over an enemy that you never yet looked in the face; but for your conviction, and the Readers satisfaction, I have prevailed with the 〈◊〉 for the Printing of the passages quoted in Ames, and unto them shall only prefix this Preface; Let not him that girdeth on his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 himself, as he that 〈◊〉 it off, 1 King. 20. 11. Concerning an Argument against our Ceremonies, 1 Cor. 14. which is acknowledged to be the only place in all the New Testament, that can be alleged for their imposing. In Ames his Repl. to Mortons' general Def. etc. pag. 9, 10, 11, 12. This Scripture, 1 Cor. 14. 26. 40. being rightly understood, doth not only not justify such Ceremenies as ours, but plainly condemneth them. For the manifesting of which assertion, because it may seem strange to those 〈◊〉 that are accustomed to other sounds, I will here distinctly ser down an Argument drawn 〈◊〉 of these words, against such Ceremonies as ours are. All that is left unto the Church's liberty in 〈◊〉 pertaining unto God's Worship, is to order them in 〈◊〉 manner. This is manifestly collected out of that place in question. So the Defendant seemeth to grant, so P. Martyr understandeth it, as is to be seen in his 〈◊〉 upon 1 Sam. 14. which judgement of his is cited and approved by Dr 〈◊〉 de Pont, pag. 841. & 844. confirmed also by Junius against Bellarmine. 〈◊〉. 3. l. 4. c 16 n 86 87. &c, 17. n. 9, 10, 12, 13. where 〈◊〉 that Christ is the 〈◊〉 Law giver, that appointeth things 〈◊〉 his Church; and that he hath appointed all that are requisite; and that the Church maketh no Laws (properly so called) to appoint any new things to be used, but only Canons, Orders, Directions, ordering in seemly manner those things which Christ hath appointed; and that if she addeth any thing of her own, she doth decline. The reason is because unto her is committed no authority of appointing new things, but a 〈◊〉 to observe and do such things which Christ 〈◊〉 appointed. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jun. de 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. lib. 1. cap. 2. n. 26, 27. 31. This is also confirmed by sound reason, both in respect of the wisdom required, 〈◊〉 in all Lawmakers, and perfectly found in Christ, and also in regard of the nature of such Institutions. For the former reason teacheth (as 〈◊〉 showeth Rhet: 1. 3.) that all, which possibly may, should be appointed in the law by the giver of it, and nothing left unto the ministerial judges, but that which must needs be lest, as matters of fact, etc. Now in the worship of God, all but particular circumstances of order, may easily be appointed (as in very deed they were) by our Lawgiver Christ. As for the nature of such institutions, that doth also require so much: for 〈◊〉 is above civility therein, if it be not a circumstance of order, it is worship, and therefore invented by man, unlawful will worship. For whatsoever 〈◊〉 used. or acted by him that 〈◊〉 God, in that act, it must needs be either grounded on 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 considerations, and therefore civility: or an act and means of worship, and therefore worship: or the ordering and manner of disposing those acts and means, and therefore lawful, if lawfully and 〈◊〉 applied: or else at the least, idle and vain, and therefore to be avoided, according to that of Basil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A 〈◊〉 cannot be given. By all this it may appear, that the authority of the Church is not to appoint what she will, no not of things in their own nature indifferent, and say they be in order, or for order: But only to 〈◊〉 those things which God hath appointed. Thus far the proposition, or first part of my Syllogism: the assumption followeth. But to appoint and use the Ceremonies as we do, is not to order in comely manner any thing pertaining to God's worship. The reason is, because order requireth not the institution or usage of any new thing, but only the right placing and disposing of things which are formerly instituted. This 〈◊〉 1. By the 〈◊〉, which is given of the word itself, which both in Greek and Latin is 〈◊〉 from the ranking of Soldiers in certain bounds and limits of time and place. Dicebant enim 〈◊〉 tribuni, 〈◊〉 tibi licet, hic 〈◊〉, eô progrediêre, hac revertere, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inde ordo, Scalig and 2. By the definitions which are given thereof by Philosophers and Divines Tull. Off. lib 1. Eadem vis videtur ordinis & collocationis. 〈◊〉 definiunt compositionem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is & a commodatis locis. Locum autem actionis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse temporis. Aug. the civet. lib. 15. cap. 13. Order is the disposition which fit places to things equal and unequal, id est, when things are 〈◊〉 ranked, some to go before, and some to follow, as P. Martyr expoundeth it, loc. come. cl. 4. cap. 5. 3. The same also is confirmed by our Divines, who usually giving instances of order, do insist in time, place, and suchlike circumstances, making a difference betwixt 〈◊〉 ceremonies and order, many times condemning the one, and allowing the other: as the Divines of France and the Low Countries in their observations on the Harmony of Confession Sect. 17. Beza Ep. 8. Jun. in Bell. Append. tract de 〈◊〉 imaginum. c 7. n. 12, 13, 14. 4. By the Context of the Chap. viz. 1 Cor. 14. it plainly appeareth, that order is opposed unto that confusion spoken of vers. 33. and therefore in porteth thing but that peaceable proceeding, whereby they should speak one by one, 〈◊〉 & the rest attend, etc. v. 30, 31. So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it, showing order to consist in sorting of Persons, some to this, and some to that, according to their office, and in determining of time and place, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 459. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and p. 520. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Lastly neither Luk. 1. 8. neither in any place of Scripture doth the word order import any more than hath been said. As for 〈◊〉 that is nothing but the 〈◊〉 of order. For as P. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in 1 Cor. 11 it is such a 〈◊〉 of actions as whereby they may more 〈◊〉 attain their end. Otherwhere it may contain that natural, or 〈◊〉 handsomeness, which is spoken of chap. 11. 13. as it doth chap. 12. 23 and so includeth all that wh ch is 〈◊〉 on civility, as a fair cloth and Cup for the Communion, a fair and 〈◊〉 vessel for 〈◊〉; but not the appointing of new mystical 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ceremonies were here commanded to all Churches, which the 〈◊〉 I 〈◊〉 will not say: and then the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 shouldhave worth 〈◊〉 God uncomelily. Thus we have both proposition and assumption of our argument, against the ceremonies, 〈◊〉 out of this place, which the Defendant choose as the only 〈◊〉 that could be brought for them. Now I hope we may add the conclusion. Therefore to appoint and use the ceremonies as we do, is not left to the liberty of the Church, i. e. it is unlawful. Concerning an argument against our Ceremonies, out of 1 Cor. 14. 〈◊〉 is acknowledged to be the only place in all 〈◊〉 new Testament that can be alleged for their imposing. Aims in his dispute about humane Ceremonies pag. 57 usque pag. 81. 1. The Replyer, seeing that all thecause (on the 〈◊〉) dependeth on this 〈◊〉 of Scripture, and finding nothing by any 〈◊〉 could be drawn from it for our 〈◊〉, thought 〈◊〉 to try if there may not, 〈◊〉 the same 〈◊〉 be 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 argument against them. This the 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a new 〈◊〉, and losing the way, as if all the Def. his 〈◊〉 and all the 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 which he maketh after the 〈◊〉. when he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to fly, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 away, were new Hares and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. I know 〈◊〉 what 〈◊〉 he hath, to use a 〈◊〉, and a weight, one for the 〈◊〉. with 〈◊〉, and another for the 〈◊〉. 2. The argument 〈◊〉 thus put together by the Rej pag. 77 All that is left unto the 〈◊〉 liberty, in things 〈◊〉 to God's worship, is to order them in 〈◊〉 manner: But to appoint and use the 〈◊〉, as we do, is not to 〈◊〉 in comely manner any things pertaining to God's worship: Therefore, to appoint and use the Ceremonies, as we do, is not left to the 〈◊〉 of the Church, i e it is unlawful The 〈◊〉 answereth first to the 〈◊〉, and then to the assumption, but so as he 〈◊〉 both together, in many words: Yet I will follow his order. 3. First of all the denyeth the proposition to be 〈◊〉 in the 〈◊〉 his meaning. But I can see no reason of his 〈◊〉. 1 He 〈◊〉, that the order, and ordering is taken sometimes largely, for all discipline, or policy; 〈◊〉 strictly, for 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉, and actions handsomely, one before, and another 〈◊〉, and so is opposed only to 〈◊〉, as in this place, 1 Cor. 14. 40. Now this is far from overthrowing the proposition, in the Repl. his meaning: for the 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 order in the strict 〈◊〉, which maketh also for his purpose: And this the Rej. granteth to be the 〈◊〉 of the Apostle in this place, 1 Cor. 14 40. Which place the same 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 57 confesseth to be the only place (in the New Test.) by which power is given to the Church to constitute Ceremonies: from both which 〈◊〉 together, it necessarily 〈◊〉, that all which is 〈◊〉 to the Church's power under the title of order is ordaining in the strict sense, i. e. ranking of Persons and Actions 〈◊〉. as the Rejoind. expoundeth it. Yet immediately after he accuse 〈◊〉 the Repl. for saying order to be the right 〈◊〉 and disposing of things, 〈◊〉 for time, place, &c, not 〈◊〉 why he 〈◊〉 k him, or wherein 〈◊〉 from his own expectation. Only he saith that &c osten by the 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 to time and place, is a blind. Which is not so, for by etc. is meant all 〈◊〉 of like nature with time and place, as Number, Measure, vicissitude etc. How many Psalms shall be sung, or Chapters read what and how much Scripture shall be at this or that 〈◊〉 expounded, how one part of worship shall succeed 〈◊〉 etc. without a blind. 4 In the next place, the rejoined. findeth a wrong meaning in the Repl. his use of the phrase (in comely manner) because afterward, in the end of he Assumption, he saith that, Comeliness is the Seemliness of order. For (saith the Rej.) beside that Comeliness of order, there is other 〈◊〉. Now this the Repher p 〈◊〉 immediately after the words quoted, otherwhere Comeliness 〈◊〉 ay contain all natural and civil hand 〈◊〉 etc. Neither will I contend about this, but it implieth so much in this very place; 〈◊〉 that the rejoined. hath not given any reason, why the Proposition or first part of the argument should not be admitted. Yet after that he hath 〈◊〉 it upon Mr. Jac b, and made the Repl his disciple, he cometh to examine the proofs of 〈◊〉, though he himself (as is now showed) hath given sufficient assent unto all contained 〈◊〉. The First proof is, that it is manisestly collected out of the place in question, 1 Cor 14 and the 〈◊〉. seemeth to grant as much. To which the rejoined. answer th'. 1. That in that place three distinct things are propounded, Edification, Decency, Order: And these three cannot be one. But Edification being the end, Decency and Order the means, they may well be contained in one: decent order tending to Edification, or (which is as much to our purpose) in two; 〈◊〉 and Order for Edification. A holy Sacrament decently, and orderly 〈◊〉 istred, for Edification, is not four distinct things, but one. His Second is, that these words are the 〈◊〉 of the whole Tract: beginning at 〈◊〉 Eleventh Chapt. wherein are handled some things only concerning decency, some 〈◊〉 properly pertaining to Edification. and some which 〈◊〉 more 〈◊〉 to Order, Ergo more is commanded in 〈◊〉 words, 〈◊〉 the comely placing of one thing after another. Let this be granted, yet 〈◊〉 solloweth 〈◊〉 that more is left unto the Church's 〈◊〉 than order and 〈◊〉 unto 〈◊〉; sor all things that are 〈◊〉, are not 〈◊〉 unto the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But hat speaking in unknown tongues, which the rejoined. doth refer to 〈◊〉, is distinct from order and decency is by good Divines accounted 〈◊〉 offend against the order, and decency, spoken of chap. 〈◊〉. and 40. So Dr. 〈◊〉, de Script. q. 2. c. 18. disputeth against the use of an unknown tongue in God's service, out of the very place: pugnat hoc vero cum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quam 〈◊〉, 1 Cor. 14. 40. i e. this mightily 〈◊〉; that good order which 〈◊〉 so much stands for. His 3. is, the Descend. 〈◊〉 no way seem to 〈◊〉 the proposition; because the Repl. undertaketh by argument 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this place out of the 〈◊〉. his hands, 〈◊〉 this nothing at all argueth, that the 〈◊〉. and the Repl. do not agree 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉, thought ey 〈◊〉 about the place, as it is 〈◊〉 in the assumption. The Papists grant us this Proposition: No Ph 〈◊〉 is used 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in these words, This is my body, but a 〈◊〉 one: Yet 〈◊〉 they deny the assumption; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are not a 〈◊〉 phrase, we undertake by 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 this place 〈◊〉 of their hands. So the Des 〈◊〉 no more, than order and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Edification, to be 〈◊〉 unto the Church's 〈◊〉, for the 〈◊〉 of our Ceremonies, doth seem at 〈◊〉 to grant, that all which is 〈◊〉 to the 〈◊〉 liberty is order and 〈◊〉 unto Edification, though he 〈◊〉 these to contain no more then mere circumstances, which is the assumption: Of Edification there is not mention made in the proposition, because 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 an end, is out of question, and always included. 6. Peter Martyr is cited out of D. Whitaker De Pontis. pag. 841. 844. As agreeing with that which the Repl. would have, Here the 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 himself much for the sake (as he saith) of those that are unlatined. He telleth us P. M. doth distinguish, though not divide, comeliness from order, which we do also, for take the Repl. his words in the most 〈◊〉 sense you can, yet comeliness of order, doth distinguish comeliness from order, no less than comeliness of a man doth distinguish it from a man. 2. He addeth, that P. Mart. doth there instance in the Ceremony of thrice dipping, and in the observation or institution of Feasts. But let the Reader know, 〈◊〉 those words. Ceremony, Observation, Institution of Feasts, which the Rej. hath set down in a 〈◊〉 letter, to be noted as P. M his words, are not to be found in the place of P. M. but are added by the Rej. for advantage. P. M. expoundeth the meaning he had in all his 〈◊〉, by what place, what time, what manner. If therefore the Repl. did not look upon that place, but took it on trust, from the trusty hand of D. 〈◊〉 (as the Rej objected to him) yet it proveth good and 〈◊〉. So that the Rej 〈◊〉 himself much, when upon 〈◊〉 uncertain, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he compareth the Repl. to a hungry creature (or dog) that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with a bare bone D Morton once (at the least) alleged some 〈◊〉 on trust; and therefore, being challenged for them, he 〈◊〉, that 〈◊〉 had them from Mr. Stock Yet the Popish 〈◊〉 (〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) did not 〈◊〉 him to a dog, but only said, 〈◊〉 he sent to 〈◊〉 and stones for satisfaction about them. Which I do not allege to the 〈◊〉 of either D. M or M St. but only to show by comparison how the 〈◊〉. doth sometime ove 〈◊〉 in his terms. 3 For D 〈◊〉, he telleth us, that he only saith, that 〈◊〉. Laws belong only to order, or ordering, but not as it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 come linosse. As if any of us did so. The Repl his words; ordering in comely manner, do not (I hope) refer all to order, considered apart from all comeliness. This is the full sum of all that the Rejoind. had to except against the first allegation. And yet here upon this nothing, it pleaseth him to accuse, not only the Repl. but these men, of haughty and magistral 〈◊〉, gulling, and deceiving, great and 〈◊〉 sin, and the poor. Repl. at the least, for a man 〈◊〉 of common 〈◊〉. It seemeth he was very angry at something. Let the understanding Reader 〈◊〉, at what? 6. For more manifestation of the Repl. his 〈◊〉 of common 〈◊〉, the Rej. referreth us to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out of 〈◊〉 against Bell. Cont. 3. l. 4. c. 16. n. 86, 87. and cap. 17. n. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. Omitting therefore unnecessary repetition, let us 〈◊〉 the reasons of extraordinary 〈◊〉. 1 Junius cap 16 n. 86, 87. saith only 〈◊〉, that those humane Laws are only 〈◊〉 in the Church, which tend to this, that all things may be done decently, and in order, 1 Cor. 14. 40. 2. That 〈◊〉 are improperly called Laws in the Church, being more properly Constitutions, or Canons. Now out of the 〈◊〉 saying, the Repl. concluded, that Junius did judge the Apostle 〈◊〉 no more to the Church's liberty, than to order God's Ordinances in decent manner: And out of 〈◊〉 second he 〈◊〉 the same conclusion; because any constitution, above ordering in decent manner that which before was 〈◊〉, is properly a Law. What extraordinary 〈◊〉 is here? 2. Junius c. 17. 〈◊〉. 9 saith only, that to make new Laws in divine things, is to decline, i. e. in points of Faith, or 〈◊〉 rules of 〈◊〉. But junius 〈◊〉 no 〈◊〉 at all, either of Faith or Sanctimony, or Necessity, nor Bell. himself in that place. Neither is the question there handled of points of Faith, or things absolutely necessary to Sanctimony. All double, treble Ceremonies reductively Sacramental, and Worship, are by the Rej. his own dictates double sacred; and 〈◊〉 is it which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by divine. 3. 〈◊〉. saith that the addition forbidden 〈◊〉. 4. is of 〈◊〉 contrary to the Law of God: Whereunto 〈◊〉, n. 10. answereth, that any Laws at all, added to God's Laws, are contrary to the Law of God, 〈◊〉 of proper Laws, without any backing of God's Law, binding the 〈◊〉, as he showeth, cap. 16. n. 86. 8. Here 1. the Rejoind. 〈◊〉 out those words of 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 contrary 〈◊〉 beside the word; which if he had 〈◊〉, than the Readers 〈◊〉 might have recalled, how this place cited before for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that phrase, was 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 by the Rejoind. pag 42. 2. It is to be marked that the Def. and Rej. their answer unto Deut 4. is the same with 〈◊〉. pag. 134. 3. That exposition of Laws 〈◊〉 backing, is of the 〈◊〉. his own 〈◊〉. No such thing is sound in the places 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 to defend any such thing. Of binding the conscience, enough hath been said in the head of difference 〈◊〉 our Ceremonies and Popish. 4. 〈◊〉 n. 12 answering to 〈◊〉 his saying, that God (in the N. T) gave only the common Laws of Faith and Sacram. leaving the specials to the Church, etc. 〈◊〉 Gods Laws to be perfect 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉, and those of the Church to be but Canons and disposings of conveniency, for better observing of divine Laws. Where note 1. an example of an etc. for a blind, or blinding, which the rejoined. formerly told of, for in that etc. is 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: 〈◊〉 non possunt diversissimi 〈◊〉 convenire in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & ritibus. i e. for this cause, special laws of ritual things, are lest to the Church's liberty, because of variety, which falleth out now by occasion of 〈◊〉 and places, which is the very thing, that the rejoined. pawned his credit, Bell. never said, pag. 15, 16. Note also, Secondly, that Junius doth not in this place mention Canons, 〈◊〉 the rejoined. pleaseth to alter his words in reciting 〈◊〉 them; But cautions and dispositions. Now a caution about the 〈◊〉 of any thing, is not an institution of a new thing. 3. 〈◊〉. is sound to say as much as he was alleged 〈◊〉, and to the contrary we have from the 〈◊〉. a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 5. Junius n. 13. saith only that Christ is the only Law giver, that is, to give laws, that in themselves and by the very authority of the law maker, do bind the conscience. As if 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 of Bell. did only say the very same thing with him, that he goeth about to 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 Bellarmine, in that very place saith: Christ is the 〈◊〉 law giver, who by his own authority can judge and make laws. Now out of all these allegations, the rejoined. maketh his 〈◊〉. 1. Where he these words, all that is requisite as spoken of Rites and 〈◊〉? Answer, the sense of these words, as spoken 〈◊〉 all Ceremonies above mere order and decency, is cap. 16. 28. 2. Where 〈◊〉 you in 〈◊〉 that the Church may constitute no new thing? Ans. cap. 17. n. 9 this in things divine is to turn aside: for the rejoined. his interpretation of those words, that they mean points of saith, and necessary rules of Sanctimony, is 〈◊〉 by conference of Bellarmine's words there opposed, who in that place 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 and Judicial laws, and speaketh not at all of saith and necessary Sanctimony? 3. Where are these words, Ordering in seemly manner. Ans. cap. 16. n. 86. those only humane laws are necessary in the Church, which make that all things be done decently and in order, 1 Cor. 14. 40. 4. If the Church may appoint no new things, but only see to decency and order, then saith the rejoined. what Patent hath she to make particular 〈◊〉 for time and place? unless they be no new things. I ans. 1. Time and place considered as mere occasional circumstances, are no 〈◊〉 new things in God's service, then concreated time and place, were 〈◊〉 things in creation, distinct from the created world. And Calvin 〈◊〉. l. 4. cap. 10. Sect. 22. severely 〈◊〉 these, that call such times of 〈◊〉 new laws: Quis nisi 〈◊〉, sic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ab iis legem dicat, quos constant duntaxat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quae sunt a domino satis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? if 〈◊〉 that scandals be avoided, be no new thing, than neither is procuring that disorder, and undecency, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, place, etc. be avoided, any 〈◊〉 thing. As for a Patent to appoint double, 〈◊〉, sacred 〈◊〉, it is a 〈◊〉 thing for them to 〈◊〉 it, that cannot show it 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 Seal. I do 〈◊〉 think that any 〈◊〉 King would have his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it themselves to that power, which is fetched out of a patent, invisible and only avouched by 〈◊〉. 7. A 〈◊〉 was given of the foresaid proposition, out of 〈◊〉. de 〈◊〉. Imp. l. 1. c 2. n. 26, 27. 31. 〈◊〉. that the Church hath only 〈◊〉 ministry, to observe such things as Christ hath appointed, not authority of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things. Here the Rej 1. observeth, that those words (new things) have no footsteps in Junius; As if new things could be appointed lawfully without authority of appointing; and leaveth only ministerial performance of things appointed, he denieth appointing of new things. 2 He cryeth thus, if the Church have a ministry to appoint and do such things as Christ hath commanded, then must she needs have a commission legative, to appoint and use tites, serving to order and decency. Add to this only, and then it is not only that, but all that which we require. 3. He cryeth out of 〈◊〉 perversion, either: by gross negligence, or mistaking And why so I pray? because forsooth all that 〈◊〉 saith is good to prove, that no Ecclesiastical all person hath any power by his calling over temporal Princes. But this is nothing against their delegated dependant power, by commission: But First, these are very strange distinctions: they have not any power by their calling, but some by commission. They have not any power over temporal Princes (though they be members of the Church) but over the Church they have. 2. The rejoined. maketh Junius only to deny that, which Bellarmine never affirmed, viz. absolute independent power of Ecclesiastical 〈◊〉 persons as supreme Lords. Nay Bellarmine answereth to Calvin in the very same manner that the rejoined. 〈◊〉: The Pope is not the chief law giver but the Vicar of Christ, and by Christ's authority maketh laws. 3. He addeth, that Junius 〈◊〉. de trad. distinguisheth betwixt decency, and the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 alone. As if this were the main question, or any part of the Proposition, or denied by the Repl. at all. The rejoined. having little to say that was to purpose, catcheth hold of one word in the end of the Assumption used by the Repl. seem 〈◊〉 of order (which yet is immediately there differenced from other decency, as well commanded as 〈◊〉) and that he maketh the main matter of the proposition: whereas the meaning is, that nothing is left unto liberty in God's worship, above decency and order, for which 〈◊〉 testimonies are brought, and not for the other. 8. For more full support of the foresaid proposition, a reason is added, from the fullness of a perfect law, which leaveth no more unto ministerial judges, than needs must. For answer, the rejoined. 1. Observeth that some cases are of necessity variable, and so left. So the occasions of different rites, and Ceremonies are so various, that if our Lord had fixed any one certain fashion, he should have made rather snares than laws for his Church As if he had appointed 〈◊〉 at the table in a communion: or kneeling in prayer. This-is strange stuff. 1. So much is granted, as is 〈◊〉. viz. that God hath left nothing (about his worship) undetermined in his 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 uncommanded, and unforbidden particulary save only that which he could not 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 forbid: Now let any man think, and judge, whether it had not been possible for God in his word, either to have commanded, or forbidden the signing of those that are baptised with the sign of the Cross as well, as baptising of them with water? 〈◊〉. How can that too too bold and inconsiderate assertion be excused: if our Lord had fised (or Commanded) any one certain fashion of Ceremonies, he had made rather snares than laws for his Church. If it had pleased God to command, or forbid the sign of the Cross in particular, what snare had it been? When God appointed all the Ceremonies of the Old Testament, he did not I hope make snares for his Church, though he did lay a burden upon it, 3. Whereas the rejoined. maketh sitting at a table, in the Lord's Supper, and kneeling at Prayer, to be such things as the Lord could not command, but as snares, because sometime a Table may be wanting, or something to sit on, or ability to sit; and so of Kneeling: this is as poor a 〈◊〉 to catch any man of understanding in, as one shall lightly see made. For 1. many affirmative Commandments of God there are, which in 〈◊〉 cases cannot be fulfilled, and 〈◊〉 to bind, as praying unto, and praising of God with our voice; which is no snare to him that cannot speak. The appointing of Wine for the Supper, is no snare, though some Countries have it not, and some men cannot well drink it. See 〈◊〉 Ep. 2. 〈◊〉 and Symb. 〈◊〉. lib. 1. 〈◊〉. 9 2 I would know, whether it had been a snare if God 〈◊〉 appointed sitting at the Table with exception of such extraordinary cases? if 〈◊〉, then much more when men appoint kneeling, surplicing, and crossing; if no, 〈◊〉 our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proceed. Kneeling in public prayer might have been appointed without snaring, as 〈◊〉 before the Lord thrice in the year, was appointed to every Male in Israel, 〈◊〉. 16. 16. For (without doubt) many men in Israel, were, by accident more unable to travel up to jerusalem, than any Christian that hath knees, is to kneel. After this observation, of which the 〈◊〉 saith it may he as we will, he answereth, that our Lord hath left nothing absolute to the will of his Officers; but hath left even 〈◊〉 Rites, under general rules, which will tie them as perfectly, as if every one had been named and with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 1. But this is 〈◊〉 to the purpose; because so the in perfect est Law that is in any Nation upon 〈◊〉 earth, if it be worthy the name of Law, leaveth nothing so absolute to the will of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as that it should be without the general rules of Justice, common good, etc. 〈◊〉 not without the rules of order and decency. 2. Concerning the 〈◊〉 of perfection, betwixt 〈◊〉 and particular rules, though enough 〈◊〉 been said before, upon like occasion, yet this I will add. If he meaneth, that a general rule, if it be perfectly understood and applied, doth as perfectly tie as 〈◊〉. I grant it to be a truth. And so was the Old Testament as perfect a rule of 〈◊〉 Faith as the New, 〈◊〉 shalt love thy Neighbour, as 〈◊〉 as the six of the second Table. But if he mean, that a general rule is as sit and full for the 〈◊〉 of us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as 〈◊〉 are, than I think no man conscious of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, will believe him. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I believe, 〈◊〉 he himself is so fully 〈◊〉 in crossing the baptised, by any rule which he hath out of God's word for that, as he is for 〈◊〉 by the rule of 〈◊〉 The 〈◊〉 having (as he thought) 〈◊〉 grounded the general, that a 〈◊〉 Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 needs must unto 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, goeth on to assume, that in the worship of God, all, but particular 〈◊〉 of order, might easily be (〈◊〉 indeed 〈◊〉 were) 〈◊〉 by Christ, and therefore need not be 〈◊〉 to the Church's wisdom. Upon this it pleaseth the Rej. to say little to the purpose, in many words. 1. He saith, that circumstances of order were not harder to determine than those of decency. Now it is plain enough that the 〈◊〉. here, naming order, did also understand decency, though he named order only. 2. He asketh, what School of Divinity hath taught the Repl. to say, that our Lord forbore the determining of such circumstances, because all else was easy? I answer, no rule of Divinity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 teach the Repl. to say so, nor yet the Rejoinder to impute unto him, what he never said. But if he meaneth (as it seemeth 〈◊〉 doth) because it was not so easy to determine circumstances of time and place, as real worship. I then answer, that this (as I think) the Replyer learned out of that Divinity School, out of which the Def and Rejoinder learned. That which they cite out of Calvin, pag. 15, 16 Janius is cited to the contrary out of Cont. 3. l. 4. cap. 17. n. 12. (which place the Rejoinder looked upon by occasion of the Replyer his former citation of it) But he in that very place, distinguisheth betwixt Laws, properly so called, and 〈◊〉, leaving only cautions to the Church's liberty, which is the very same that the Repl. meaneth. The plain truth is, that supposing Gods will to be, we should worship him in any place, and at any time fitting, it was necessary, that the particular choice of fitting time & place, should be left 〈◊〉 to any particular time, or place, exclusively. Calvin also is cited, as more comely, expressing the cause to be, that 〈◊〉 would not, than that he could not 〈◊〉 such matters. Now though Calvin, being so excellent in his expressions may easily be granted to have expressed the same meaning in more comely manner than the Repl. Yet here was no cause of noting disparity: For the Repl in saying, all things but particular order and decency may be easily appointed, did not say what Christ could do, but what might be easily for us appointed, or with our case, or with the ease which we do conceive of in Law giving, or of an ordinary Lawgiver, having such authority as Christ had. And who doth not see, that it is not so easy, to appoint every 〈◊〉 place, and time, wherein God shall be worshipped, throughout all the world, as with that worship he shall be served? For that particular description, a thousand books, so great as our own Bible, would not have sufficed. The world (as john saith) would 〈◊〉 be capable of the volumes that must have been written. The Rej. himself, pag 89. telleth us of cumber, and much ado, that would have been, in naming every 〈◊〉, and is not this as much as less easy? yet it pleased him to seek matter of 〈◊〉 about this 〈◊〉, and that (which 〈◊〉 not) 〈◊〉 after he had, without reason, accused the Repl. of picking quarrels. 〈◊〉. 88 10. A second reason of the Repl. his proposition, was, that whatsoever in worship is above order and decency, is worship: Because whatsoever is acted by him that worshippeth, in that act, beside 〈◊〉 civility, must either 〈◊〉 an act or means of worship, or an orderly decent disposing of those acts, or else at the least idle, and so unlawful. The 〈◊〉 answereth 1. that a significant Ceremony for Edification is lawful; yet cometh not under any of those heads. But he himself 〈◊〉 a significant Ceremony instituted of God, to be essential worship, and instituted of man to be worship, though nor in itself: of which distinction enough 〈◊〉 been said in the head of Worship: Yet this by the way: A significant ceremony for 〈◊〉 is the same in itself, by whomsoever it be instituted, because institution is extrinsical to the thing instituted, and altars it not in itself, internally. If therefore it be essential lawful worship, in it 〈◊〉, when it is instituted by God, it is also 〈◊〉 (though not lawful) worship, in itself, when it is instituted by man. Beside that Ceremony whose proper sole end is 〈◊〉 toward God, is properly done to the honour of God, and so properly divine worship 2. 〈◊〉 answer is, that comeliness grounded on civil humane considerations, is not mere 〈◊〉 in sacred actions and use, but sacred by application. Which is very true, if civil application be meant by 〈◊〉 civil; but than it is nothing to the purpose. For sacred by application is seemly clothing 〈◊〉 on for to go to Church in, and yet is in itself 〈◊〉 civil. The Question is not of application, but of internal 〈◊〉. Sacred things 〈◊〉 to civil business, do not therefore become civil; for who will say, that prayer, at the beginning of a 〈◊〉, is a civil act, though it were used in the upper and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and applied to that civil meeting, as it ought to be? And why 〈◊〉 shall 〈◊〉 application of civil decency unto sacred business, make it alter the nature or name of it? 3. His answer is that all means of worship are not worship. But he knew well enough, that this was meant of proper 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉. His fourth is, that ordering and manner of disposing is ill divided from comeliness. Neither did the Repl. intent so to divide, but rather to 〈◊〉 them, understanding by that manner of 〈◊〉, comeliness. But if the 〈◊〉 not catched up some show of confounding comeliness with order, which was not intended by the Repl. he had been in this argument wholly at a 〈◊〉. His 〈◊〉 and last answer is, that by 〈◊〉 leave somethings in 〈◊〉, may, and sometimes must be tolerated. But he should have 〈◊〉 bred, that the question here is not of tolerating, but of appointing and 〈◊〉. Now if it be lawful, to 〈◊〉 and use empty and 〈◊〉 Ceremony; in God's worship, let those worshippers judge, that 〈◊〉 at the majesty of God, and are afraid in any manner to appear empty, and unprofitably before 〈◊〉. Nay (to 〈◊〉 by our 〈◊〉) let the Papists themselves judge. 〈◊〉. de Pontif. l. 4. c. 〈◊〉. ad 4. 〈◊〉 those Ceremonies to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 are unprofitable altogether, and vain precepts, 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 Ceremonies, only by humane spirit invented. And the 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. l. 2. c. 32. empty and good for nothing, more than needs, and not a jot 〈◊〉 to any 〈◊〉. and who not? 11. Thus 〈◊〉 concerning the 〈◊〉 of our argument: the assun 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is this: To appoint and 〈◊〉 the Ceremonies as we do, is not to order in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 any thing pertaining to God's worship. The reason is, because order 〈◊〉 not the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of any 〈◊〉, but only the right placing and 〈◊〉 of things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The rejoined. answers 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 time, place and measure: which is a 〈◊〉 in the 〈◊〉 before 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉. 2 His second is, that ordering in 〈◊〉 manner, or 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 the institution of such 〈◊〉, as shall be 〈◊〉 to the 〈◊〉, and variety of divine actions. Where the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not so formal, that a man may spy in it the difference it 〈◊〉 from other things: the rejoinder in his 〈◊〉. pag. 36. 〈◊〉 it to 〈◊〉 Rochets, etc. 〈◊〉 as they are distinct from Surplices: the Bishops went 〈◊〉 the hearse in their 〈◊〉, the Clerks in their Surplices. So that it 〈◊〉 to mean some 〈◊〉 of State, and dignity: of which kind neither 〈◊〉, not surplice is any. Howsoever the ordering of one thing, doth not require another new thing, but only disposing of that one. For if it did, than that new thing (because that also must be ordered) would require another new thing, and that also for order sake another, so that no one thing could be ordered without an infinite 〈◊〉 of new things. As 〈◊〉 the dignity of divine actions, that is best suited with man's reverend and humble simplicity, not with outward shows of dignity, 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉. The woman's 〈◊〉 vail was more suitable to the dignity of God's worship, then if she had adorned herself with Gold, and 〈◊〉 us 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 plain Cloak was more suitable, than the 〈◊〉 Cope in all Rome. If 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 outward shows of dignity, than Rome, which is a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, may be to all Churches a mirable example of religious order; for the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 Sess. 22. professeth their Mass Ceremonies to be invented, that the 〈◊〉 of such a Sacrifice might be set out. 12. To show further that order requireth not such Ceremonies as ours, the notation of the word was brought in, signifying no such thing. Now the rejoined. granteth, that originally the word doth nor contain within the compass of it, 〈◊〉 kind of Ceremonies, though by usage it may. Which is very true, but helpeth not, Except the Def. or rejoined, whose princi all argument is taken from this place, and only retorted by us, can prove, that in this place the word order is extended beyond his original signification. He will not therefore stand with us, about the signification of the word in this place: let order saith he, in this place signify no more than placing. But he maketh his retreat to the word Comeliness; ask if comeliness be nothing? I answer yes, it is something; but the 〈◊〉. did not insist on that word, because he took the 〈◊〉 of the Def. his argument from this place, principally to lie upon order. But seeing the rejoinder hath given up Order, I will add a word or two concerning Comeliness. I take this for granted, that seeing the rejoinder 〈◊〉 order here to be taken in strict signification, as opposed only to 〈◊〉, pag. 78. he will also consent with us, that decency, in 〈◊〉 same 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉, is to be taken in strict signification, as opposed only to the vice 〈◊〉 undecency. Now hence it followeth that decency requireth nothing, but that which is necessary to the avoiding of undecency. I ask therefore if 〈◊〉 in God's worship cannot be avoided, without double, 〈◊〉, sacred, significant Ceremonies, of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? If not, than the Apostles did much 〈◊〉 themselves, in their public worshipping of 〈◊〉, before men had 〈◊〉 such Ceremonies; for that is no answer which the rejoined, after 〈◊〉; all Churches are not bound to this or that particular way of comeliness. All Churches are bound to avoid undecency, 〈◊〉 to do 〈◊〉 which decency 〈◊〉, or bindeth them unto. If yea, then 〈◊〉 doth not require such kind of Ceremonies. Neither 〈◊〉 it indeed, any more 〈◊〉 order. So Mr. 〈◊〉, lat. to. 2. p. 888. 〈◊〉 is when the service of God is 〈◊〉 with 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of time, place, person, and gesture: and hereof the Apostle speaketh 1 〈◊〉. 14. 40. The plain simple 〈◊〉, without 〈◊〉 affectation, is, that decency is (in this place) nothing but good civil 〈◊〉, agreeable not only to worship, but 〈◊〉 to any grave assembly. Decency (saith 〈◊〉 upon the place) is opposed to vanity, sports, riot: it stands not in hoods, 〈◊〉, or vizards of fond Ceremonies. etc. I dare appeal to D. B. his conscience, if Baptism be not as decently administered without the 〈◊〉, as with it,? and public prayers made 〈◊〉 decently without a Surplice, as with it? Let conscience here speak, and the Rejoind harkening unto it, will (without all doubt) confess, that decency in this 〈◊〉 doth no more require either Cross or Surplice, than 〈◊〉, and that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 them together doth no more require those Ceremonies, than a hundred other, which in England (though not at Rome) are denied unto them. To this purpose Mr. Attersall, in his second book of the 〈◊〉, chap 5. saith well: if they refer all this trash and trumpery (of humane Ceremonies in Baptism) to order and comeliness, as Hosius doth, do they not thereby 〈◊〉 phemously accuse the 〈◊〉 of John, and of the Apostles of uncomeliness and disorder? whereas the 〈◊〉 and dignity of the Sacraments is to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the word of God, by the institution of Christ, by the 〈◊〉 of the Gospel, and by the practice of the Apostles: Nothing is more comely, decent, and orderly, then that which Christ commandeth and 〈◊〉: nothing is more uncomely and unseemly then that which man inventeth in the 〈◊〉 of God, and in the celebration of the Sacraments; thereby inverting and perverting the holy Ordinances of God. 12. The received definitions of order, are brought in to the same purpose, by the Replier. And the Re joinder 〈◊〉 so much as they import, viz. that order in strict signification doth not imply such Ceremonies as ours. He must therefore either prove, that in this place, 1 Cor. 14. 40. that 〈◊〉 is not taken strictly, which he himself formerly granted, or give up the place, which is (by his own confession) the only place of all the New Testament, for 〈◊〉 of such Ceremonies, or 〈◊〉 to decency, upon which he cannot any more fasten then upon order, as 〈◊〉 been showed. Nothing material is added in the rest of the rejoined. his answer unto this argument (where our divines are observed, to distinguish order and decency, from mystical Ceremonies, 〈◊〉 context of the Chapter, 1 Cor.. 14. is declared to respect 〈◊〉 mystical Ceremonies, the 〈◊〉 of Scripture is showed to consent) nothing (I say, and the Reader may see) is added; but only the same things are repeated about order, and decency which are now sufficiently discussed. So the rejoinder hath nothing to say to the contrary, but that we 〈◊〉 safely conclude, Ergo. to appoint and 〈◊〉 the Ceremonies as we do, is not 〈◊〉 to the liberty of the Church, i. e. it is unlawful. If there were nothing else against them, in all the Scripture, than this place, 〈◊〉 which the Defend. and rejoined. can find none in all the New Testament for them, any indifferent man would say they are not allowed. Those that are devoted to the Ceremonies may shuffle up and down, first to 〈◊〉, and when they are beaten thence, to Decency, and from decency, when they can defend that no longer, to Edification, as the 〈◊〉. doth: But all will not help. Let them pitch or insist upon one of these grounds, without starting, I will pawn my Head, their 〈◊〉 will come home to them again, as finding no fast ground either in Order, Decency, or Edification, for double significant Ceremonies (such as ours) to 〈◊〉 at. The Defend. could frame no consequence out of any of these words, the rejoined, saith there is one, but he cannot show it. To the contrary consequence, nothing is answered of any moment, And is not this a miserable cause, which hath no place in all the N. 〈◊〉 which the best Advocates can allege for it, but only that, out of which it is utterly confounded? To the Defend. and Rejoinders maintaining such a cause, this 〈◊〉 may be given that they would willingly, so far as they can, favour things which the times favour, and therefore strive to make something of that which maketh nothing for them. In the former 〈◊〉, when Order, Decency, and Edification, should have been handled as rules, according to the title of the digression, the rejoinder suddenly breaketh off, referring them to a sitter place. Now here in this place, he was constrained to touch upon them, but so softly, and sparingly, that it 〈◊〉 he found this no fitter place than the former, for those reserved Considerations. When shall we come to the 〈◊〉 place? By this I hope the Reader is satisfied, that there is more in Ames his Argument than you imagined, and thinks that 〈◊〉 had no reason to slight it before you had seen it. I will readily acknowledge that you are far his superior 〈◊〉 your incomparable skill in Critical learning and Antiquity, and all the world would account me a fool to 〈◊〉 or think otherwise; but I hope it is no 〈◊〉 to say, that he was not much your inferior for Logic, Philosophy, and Scholastical Divinity; in which latter, he was more versed than most of our Protestant Writers: Comparisons I know are odious, but I Apologise for a dead man, and therefore I hope I shall be held 〈◊〉: Indeed his memory 〈◊〉 to be 〈◊〉 with me; for though I descent from him 〈◊〉 some things, yet I must needs 〈◊〉, that in my first study of Divinity, I most profited by him: I have often found in a few words of his that satisfaction, which I in vain searched for in more voluminous discourses. I know that he hath been contemned by many, but it hath been by Learned men that never read him, or by ignorant Readers that never understood him; and indeed unto those that have not made some tolerable progress in Philosophy, he will be in many places unintelligible; for he studied 〈◊〉, and for that purpose, frequently made choice of scholastical expressions: He lived and died an exile for his dislike, and opposition of our Ceremonies; and the 〈◊〉 were not contented to have hunted him from his Native soil, but pursued him beyond the Seas; for they engaged King James to command the than English Ambassador at the Hague to solicit against his employment in the netherlands Universities, and he prevailed with the State's General to exclude him from Leyden, where otherwise he had been received as a Professor; but making the like attempt at 〈◊〉, the motion was rejected as unchristian and uncharitable, with some tart reflections upon the Bishop's malice. This I have received from a very good hand, one of his Scholars, that heard it from his own mouth: But I return from this digression. Upon the review of this Section I find, what you say of Ames his Argument for condemning of the Ceremonies from 1 Cor. 14. may with better reason be applied unto Bishop Mortons' medium for justifying of them, and with your leave, Mutatis mutandis, I shall apply it thereunto: To the reproach of my great stupidity, I willingly: acknowledge, that it cannot enter into my 〈◊〉 what sense his buttoning and 〈◊〉 of his 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 of which with the best possible managery 〈◊〉 be taught plainly to justify humane institution of religious mystical Ceremonies in the Church appropriated unto God's worship, i. e. by what Prosyllogismes or supplies, or advantages of art, this Enthymeme shall be rendered concludent. Bishop Morton 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 his Cassock, therefore it is lawful for Church governor's to invent and devise Symbolical Ceremonies, that is, those which teach things spiritual by their mystical signification, and appropriate them unto God's worship. He that can maintain this consequence to be not only true, but plain and evident, will be a formidable adversary indeed, as formidable an adversary as ever put pen to paper; and if you cannot maintain this Consequence, the terror of your name will with me in greatpart vanish, as touching argumentation: When the Spaniards came first into America, the inhabitants 〈◊〉 them to be immortal, but when they had once taken some of them, they put their heads under water, and there kept them until they had drowned them, and this soon altered their opinion: knowing your vast abilities, I looked upon you as a very formidable adversary, and expected from you very terrible arguments; but your arguments for the Ceremonies I have taken, and I think 〈◊〉 them with satisfying answers, and therefore you are not in this controversy so formidable an adversary as at first I thought you; but I 〈◊〉 this to the badness of your cause, and not to any defect in your abilities. Dr. Hammond. sect. 36. His third and last impression now remains, wherein he undertakes to prove by three arguments, that custom is not the only rule of decency; and his first argument is, because the light and law of nature is also a rule of decency. To this I answer, that 〈◊〉 those things, whereof alone he knows I there 〈◊〉 in the Sect: concerning uniformity, i. e. in things indifferent, gestures, and other Ceremonies in God's service, the law of nature is no rule at all: and I suppose he cannot think, I am sure he pretends not to prove, or so much as affirm it is, and therefore though not 〈◊〉 in all 〈◊〉 of things, of which I speak not, nor can by any rules of discourse be supposed to have 〈◊〉, yet as to the matters then before me, wherein Ecclesiastic conformity consisted, custom, and only custom was the rule of 〈◊〉. Jeanes. 1. I had no reason to imagine that your words were to be restrained unto things indifferent, gestures and other Ceremonies in God's service, for you undertook to give us the importance of the Apostles words: Let all things be done decently, and the Apostles words reach unto even natural decency, now of that the light of nature is a rule. 2. There be, as Bellarmine rightly lib. 2. the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. cap. 20. some Ceremonies, which receive their institution as it were from nature itself, which may be called natural Ceremonies, as to look up 〈◊〉 Heaven, to 〈◊〉 up our hands, to bow our knees, and knock our breasts when we pray unto God: Quaedam 〈◊〉 sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 natura 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quae naturales 〈◊〉 possunt, qual. est respicere in 〈◊〉, tollere manus, flectere genua, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, cum Deum 〈◊〉: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 natura ipsa docet, unde ettam communes sunt Gentilibus & 〈◊〉 sectis. 3. Those Ceremonies which we oppose, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, such as the Cross and Surplice, are not things indifferent, because they are imposed and used as parts of God's worship, and no worship of God is 〈◊〉. 4. Suppose that I concurred with you in holding the questioned Ceremony: to be lawful, yet I should deny Custom to be the only rule of their Decency, and that because the light and Law of Nature, right Reason is a rule thereof too. My argument I shall thus reinforce; If Custom be in the Ceremonies of God's service, the only rule of 〈◊〉, than nothing else can be a rule thereof besides Custom; but this is false; for the light and law of Nature is also a rule thereof: therefore in the Ceremonies of God's service Custom is not the only rule of Decency. The 〈◊〉 of the Major is evident from what Logicians say concerning, first, the exposition, secondly, conversion, and thirdly, consecution of exclusive propositions. 1. Concerning the exposition of them, Propositio 〈◊〉 subjecti 〈◊〉 exponitur per duas exponentes, quarum prima est affirmata, & appellatur praejacens, estque nihil 〈◊〉 quam propositio exclusiva, 〈◊〉 signo exclusivo: & secunda est negativa de subjecto exclusiuè in 〈◊〉, vel 〈◊〉. This exclusive proposition then in the Ceremonies of God's service, Custom is the only rule of Decency, must be expounded by these two. 1. By an Affirmative: in the Ceremonies of God's service, Custom is a rule of Decency: And then 2. Negative: whatsoever is not Custom, that is not in the Ceremonies of God: service a rule of Decency. 2. Concerning the conversion of them, Propositio exclusiva subjecti affirmativa convertitur in universalem affirmativam de transpositis terminis. The Doctor's proposition then, Custom in the Ceremonies of God's service, is the only rule of Decency, is converted into this Universal Affirmative, every rule of Decency is Custom. Well, upon this premised concerning the 〈◊〉 and conversion of exclusive propositions, Logicians lay down concerning the consecution of them this rule: Ab exclusiva ad exponentes propositiones itemque ad universalem conversam bona est consequentia: By this rule than it will follow, that if Custom in the Ceremonies of God's service be the only rule of Decency, that then in them nothing but Custom is the rule of Decency, and that every rule of Decency is Custom. The Major then is fortified beyond all exception. The Minor I shall confirm by instancing in the light or law of Nature, right reason, this to join issue with you, would be in the controverted Ceremonies of God's service, if they were lawful, a rule of Decency. For first, what is the end of a rule but to regulate and direct? now the light and law of Nature regulates all gestures and Ceremonies in God's worship, as touching their Decency. 2. It is in these particulars not only a rule, but a principal rule of Decency, by which all Customs are to be tried, examined, and regulated. For the confirmation of this I shall add three reasons. 1. Gestures, Ceremonies agreeable 〈◊〉 Custom may be found to be dissonant unto the light and law of Nature, and to be rejected as undecent. 2. Custom is not the rule of decency unless it have the force of a Law, and that it cannot have, say the Schoolmen, rightly, unless it be rationabilis, and such it cannot be, unless it be agreeable unto right reason, which is all I mean by the light and law of nature; though the light of nature do not dictate the necessity of it, yet it must give allowance and approbation of it; without its warrant it is not to be received as Decent. A 3. Argument shall be ad hominem: by nature you say, out of 〈◊〉, is meant 1 Cor. 11. 14. Custom of some continuance in that place, and what more probable reason can be assigned for terming of a Custom Nature, than its conformity unto its allowance and approbation by the Law of Nature? It being thus proved, that even in the Vestures, Gestures, and Ceremonies of God's service, upon supposition of their lawfulness, the law and light of nature is a principal rule, it will follow that we may with far better reason say of it, than of custom, that 'tis, in the matters spoken of, the only rule of Decency: For 1. We may truly say of the law and light of Nature, that it is in Ceremonies the only rule of Decency, though Custom be a rule thereof also; because the exclusive particle only doth not exclude things subordinate: Now Custom is a rule of Decency subordinate unto the light of Nature, and therefore is not excluded; when I say, the light and law of nature is the only rule of Decency. 2. We cannot say of Custom, with any truth at all, that it is the only rule of Decency in the matters before you, wherein Ecclesiastical conformity 〈◊〉, because the only things excepted from being excluded by the particle only, are things subordinate, and things necessarily 〈◊〉; but now the light and law of Nature as it is not subordinate unto custom, so neither is it necessarily concomitant therewith; for divers customs in Ceremonies may be, and have been irrational against the light and law of Nature: The law and light of Nature than is excluded from being a rule of Decency, by saying Custom is the only rule of Decency. Add hereunto, that the particle 〈◊〉, only, doth not always exclude à totâ 〈◊〉, but sometimes only à summitate speciei, as may be seen in Scheibl. topic. c. 2. n. 29. Now Custom is a less principal rule, that must undergo trial and examination by the light and law of Nature, as a superior rule. Dr. Hammond. sect. 37, 38. His second argument is wholly deceitful, and must be discovered to be so, by reducing it to rules of art. 'Tis by him variously form in two several 〈◊〉. The 〈◊〉 is this. Nothing can be undecent which is agreeable to the only rule of Decency. But divers things are undecent, which yet can plead 〈◊〉. The conclusion now must be, Therefore Custom is not the only rule of Decency. 38. But this is no regular Syllogism, 'tis in no mood or figure, not readily reducible to any; and therefore 'twas his only way to presume it evident, and never to endeavour 〈◊〉 proof thereof. Jeanes. I never said that it was an exact and regular Syllogism. But first, here is matter for a Categorical Syllogism, and it is easily reducible 1. Unto a Hypothetical Syllogism. 2. Ad Syllogismum ducentem ad impossibile. 1. Here is matter for a Categoric all Syllogism: The only rule of Decency hath not any thing undecent agreeable unto it: Custom hath many undecent things agreeable unto it: Therefore Custom is not the only rule of Decency. 2. 'Tis easily reducible, 1. Unto a hypothetical Syllogism. 2. Ad Syllogismum ducentem ad impossibile. 1. It may be reduced unto an hypothetical Syllogism thus: If Custom be the only rule of Decency, than nothing can be undecent, that is agreeable unto Custom: But divers things are undecent which are agreeable unto Custom; Therefore Custom is not the only rule of Decency. The sequel of the Major is evident, because nothing can be undecent that is agreeable to the only rule of Decency. And the Minor cannot be denied: In the Syllogism then there is only a Crypsis, the Major is concealed, and the proof thereof placed in its room, and Cryptical Syllogisms are in all discourses justifiable, when they may be reduced: If you call upon me to reduce the hypothetical Syllogism, unto which it is reduced, unto a Categorical, you will herein be unreasonable; for those hypothetical Syllogisms that have four terms in the Major, are hardly capable of reduction unto a Categorical Syllogism; So Scheibler hath instructed me, de Propos. etc. cap. 12. n. 24. 2. It is reduced unto that Syllogism which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which doth ducere ad impossibile, as it is taken largely for that argumentation which doth reduce an adversary unto an 〈◊〉 upon his own principles; for from this your principle, that Custom is the only rule of Decency, this Syllogism will inevitably follow, Nothing that is agreeable to the only rule of decency can be undecent. All things customary are agreeable to the only rule of decency: Therefore nothing customary can be undecent. But now this conclusion is apparently false, therefore one of the premises is also false; for ex vero nil nifi verum sequitur: It is not the Major, for the only rule of decency makes and denominates every thing conformable unto it to be decent, therefore it is the Minor, which is, that all things customary are agreeable unto the only rule of decency; and if this proposition be false, than your position is false too, that custom is the only rule of decency, because all things customary are agreeable unto custom. Dr. Hammond. sect. 39, 40. But he hath thought fit to vary this Syllogism, and give it in other terms, and then one might hope it would be exactly form. 'Tis thus, It is impossible that the only rule of decency should be undecent. But yet it is very possible that many customs should be indecent. Therefore he shall conclude, that custom 〈◊〉 not the only rule of decency. 40. But this is no Syllogism neither, being far removed from the measure that Logicians exact, and such as by which I will prove any thing 〈◊〉, that is the most distant from it. For example, it is granted truth, that Law is the only rule of justice, yet this I shall disprove by a Syllogism exactly form by Mr. J. his model. Thus, It is impossible, that the only rule of justice should be unjust. But yet it is very possible that many Laws should be unjust. Therefore I shall conclude that Law is not the only rule of Justice, Jeanes. This is a modal Syllogism, framed exactly according to the rules of Logic touching modal Syllogisms; as for that Syllogism which you parallel unto it, it hath no alliance with it; for both the premises of mine are true, and the Minor of yours is grossly and palpably false; for unjust laws are not, in propriety of speech, laws, but are so termed only equivocally, as a painted, a dead man, is said to be a man: turpe praeceptum non est lex, sed 〈◊〉, for obligation is essential unto a law; now every law obligeth in the name of God, by authority derived from him, and the glorious name of God cannot oblige unto any thing that is unjust: the Fathers, Schoolmen and ancient Philosophers are all so unanimous in 〈◊〉 of this, and have for this their assertion such pregnant and convincing reasons, as that I cannot but wonder, that a man of your learning should be of an other opinion; but in your next we shall hear what arguments you have for your distent: In the mean while, I shall desire the Reader to take notice of the witnesses, and reasons produced, amongst many others, by Suarez, and Gregory de Valentia, for what I affirm, 1. Suarez de legib. lib 1. cap. 9 De ratione, & essentia legis, est, inquit, ut praecipiat justa: Assertio est non solum certa secundum fidem, sed 〈◊〉 clara secundum naturalem rationem. Et ita 〈◊〉 tradunt non solum Theologi, & Patres inserius allegandi, sedetiam passim Philosophi etc. Verum 〈◊〉 haec ipsa conditio dupliciter explicari potest, scilicet vel negative, ut scilicet quod 〈◊〉, nec injustum, nec turpe sit; vel positive, ut sit justum & 〈◊〉. Conditio ergo haec praecipue intelligitur 〈◊〉 modo, & sic est evidens, alia vero ratione invenitur in legibus divinis, & aliter in humanis. In divinis 〈◊〉 ratio est rectitudo per essentiam divinae voluntatis. Est enim Deus summe bonus, & ideo non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aliquid pravum praecitere. etc. De legibus autem humanis, hoc fundatur in alio principio. Name legislator humanus non habet voluntatem 〈◊〉, sicut Deus, & ideo quantum est ex se, & quoad 〈◊〉, potest interdum iniqua praecipere, ut constat: non 〈◊〉 habet potestatem ad obligandum per iniquas leges, & ideo licet iniqua praecipiat, tale praeceptum non est lex, quia vim, cut valorem ad obligandum non habet. etc. Et ita est clara ratio assertionis, tum quia illa potestas, 〈◊〉 obligandi, est a Deo, quae tem a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt: Ergo est data in bonum, & in 〈◊〉, non in malum, 〈◊〉 in destructionem: Tum etiam quia nullus inserior potest obligare contra 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 superioris; sed lex praecipiens pravum actum est contra legem Dei prohibentis illum: Ergo non potest obligare, quia impossibile est, homines simul obligari ad agendum, & non agendum aliquid: si autem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est prohibitum lege divina, non totest lex inferioris tollere illam superioris obligationem: Ergo nee potest inducere 〈◊〉: Ergo ejus lex tali opere non potest esse valida. Et de hac justitia legis lequebatur August. lib. 1. de libero arbit. cap. 5. cum dixit, mihi lex esse non videtur, quae justa non fuerit. Et de eadem intelligi potest, quod dicit lib. de vera relig. cap. 31. 〈◊〉 segum temporalium, si vir bonus est & sapiens, legem consulit aeternam, ut secundum ejus incommutabiles regulas, quid sit pro tempore vitandum, jubendumque discernat. Vnde sicut lex aeterna solum just a praecipit, quia est ipsa justitia per essentiam, 〈◊〉 a vero lex humana esse debet paerticipatio ejus, & ideo non potest valide praecipere, nisi 〈◊〉, & honesta, 〈◊〉 illud Prov. 8. Per me Reges regnant, & legum conditores justa decernunt. Atque hinc ulterius concluditur, hanc conditionem, etiam positive intellectam esse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 legis; 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 modo singulis applicanda sit, etc. Ex hac assertione sic declarata duo inferre possumus. Vnum est ad illam maxim 〈◊〉 primam conditionem positam ab Isidoro, 〈◊〉, ut lex 〈◊〉 honesta, quod ex ipsa vocis proprietate satis patet. etc. 〈◊〉 infertur ex 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 non habentem hanc justitiam, seu honestatem, non esse legem, neque obligare, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nec servari posse etc. Unto this of Suarez I shall 〈◊〉 what Gregory de Valentia hath to the same purpose, tom. 2. disp. 7. quaest. 1. punct. 1. Nomen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 significat rectam aliquam regulam praescribentem communitati alicui perfectae modum necessarium ad bonum ejusdem communitatis etc. Atque 〈◊〉 modo 〈◊〉 D. Thomas 〈◊〉, cum infra quaest. 96. art. 4, inquit leges 〈◊〉 magis esse violentias, quam leges. Item quaest. 90. art. 2 & 3. Vbi definite, 〈◊〉 ad 〈◊〉 common ordinari, & ab eo, qui curam gerit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 etiam D. Augustinus lib. 1. de libero arbitrio cap. 5. 〈◊〉 accepit, cum dixit, legem non videri, quae justa non sit. In quam sententiam lib. 19 the 〈◊〉 Dei, cap. 21. inquit etiam, non esse jura dicenda, vel 〈◊〉, iniqua 〈◊〉 constituta. Atque etiam legem esse regulam aliquam rectam censuit Clemens Alexandrinus, lib. 1. Stromatum, cum dixit: legem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & regulam 〈◊〉. & injustorum. 〈◊〉 Plato in Dialogo 〈◊〉 de legibus, & in Epineme, ubi asseruit, finem legis esse Deum & 〈◊〉 ejus. Item Philosophus lib. 5. Ethitor. cap. 1. inquiens, legalia justa esse factiva & conservativa faelicitatis, 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 Cicero lib. 2. de legitus: Constat, inquit, profecto ad salutem civium 〈◊〉; incolumitatem, 〈◊〉 quietam. & beatam, conditas esse leges. Et post, cum dixisset eos, qui 〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉 populis jara descripsissent, quidvis aliud potius tulisse, quam leges, concludit, perspicuum esse in ipso nomine leges interpretando, inesse vim, atque sententiam justi, & juris colendi. By this you may see, that in your Syllogism there are four terms, for laws in the Minor are taken improperly and equivocally, in the conclusion properly and univocally; But custom in my Syllogism, both in Minor and Conclusion, is taken properly and univocally, for custom is predicated univocally of the most undecent customs. For farther justification of my Syllogism I shall reduce it in like manner that Logicians reduce Syllogisms made in Baroco and Bocardo, to wit, with that reduction which is ad impossibile or per deductionem ad absurdum: I suppose, that you will grant my premises, for the minor you confess in terminis in the next Section; And the Major cannot be denied with any colour of reason; for the rule of 〈◊〉 is, in some sort, an 〈◊〉 cause of decency, and it is impossible for the exemplary cause of decency to be undecent. Well then, I suppose, that you grant the premises, and only deny, that the inference of the conclusion from these premises is legitimate; if you grant the premises to be true, than you grant the Propositions, that are contradictory unto them, to be false, and hereupon it will follow, that if I take the contradictory of my Conclusion, and can thence, 〈◊〉 with one of my premises conclude, that one of the premises which I suppose, you grant, is false, hereby I shall convince you, that the principal conclusion, which is contradictory unto this, was true: The contradictory of my conclusion is, custom is the only rule of decency (I take contradictory largely, as some opposite propositions are said by Logicians, to be contradictory de lege) Now this I take and subjoin unto my Major, and here hence I infer the contradictory of my Minor, 〈◊〉 which will make up this following Syllogism. It is impossible for the only rule of Decency to be 〈◊〉. But Custom is the only rule of Decency. Therefore it is impossible that any custom should be undecent. But the conclusion is false, and, I suppose, that you grant the 〈◊〉 thereof. Now if the conclusion be false, one of the premises must needs be false; for, ex vero nil 〈◊〉 verum sequitur. Now 'tis not the Major, for I suppose, and that with very good reason, that it is granted by you, therefore 〈◊〉 the Minor: now the Minor is contradictory unto the conclusion which you deny, and therefore the conclusion, which you denied, is true, viz. that Custom is not the only rule of decency: for of contradictory propositions both cannot be true, Contradictio semper dividit verum 〈◊〉 falso. Thus you see my 〈◊〉 is demonstrated to be true, 〈◊〉 ducente ad 〈◊〉 vel 〈◊〉. But for the fuller 〈◊〉 of it, I shall propound and answer two objections, that I foresee may be made against it, by such as are not well 〈◊〉 in Modal Syllogisms. The first is, that the duo modi impossibile and possibile are repeated but once a piece in my Syllogism, and in a good Syllogism every term is to be put twice. The answer unto this in brief is, that in a Modal Syllogism, the modus is none of the terms, but only a Syncategorematis call word, so Vallius Introduct. Log. par. 3. cap. 12. In terminis, inquit, non 〈◊〉 modus sicut; enim in conversione propositionum modus non numeratur inter praedicata vel subjecta, sed est quid additum illis, sic in Syllogismis modalibus, modus non numeratur inter terminos, unde etiam saepe in Syllogismo modali non potest inferri conclusio cum modo, sed sine illo. The very same thing is taken notice of by 〈◊〉. concerning such Modal Syllogisms as consist of Modal compounded propositions, 〈◊〉 enim inquit, quod modalis particula non habeat vel rationem 〈◊〉, vel rationem praedicati; sed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 se ex parte copulae: inde clarum est, quod in istis modalibus Syllogismis, particula modalis 〈◊〉 poni potest, nempe in singulis 〈◊〉 Syllogismorum partibus, veluti: Necesse est hominem esse animal. Necesse est Petrum esse hominem. Ergo necesse est Petrum esse animal. Hîc aio, particulam necesse, nec habere rationem praedicati, nec subjecti, sed esse ex parte copulae, quia in propositione, assumptione, & conclusione reperitur. At nullus terminus in Syllogismo ter poni potest. A second objection is, that in the 〈◊〉 Syllogisms mentioned by Aristotle, this mixture or combination of impossibile and possibile is not at all mentioned. For answer, Aristotle instanceth in Modal Syllogisms, wherein there is a mixture of necesse and contingens, and Logicians generally hold that impossibile is reduced unto necessarium and possibile unto contingens. Let two speak for all. 〈◊〉. The but now quoted Vallius in lib. 1. prior pag. 38. Impossibile (inquit Philoponus) comprehenditur sub necessario, quia quod est necessarium, est impossibile ut non sit, 〈◊〉 quia homo est necessario animal, impossibile est ut non sit animal: & 〈◊〉 ratione quod est impossibile, est necessarium ut non sit. Similiter possibile comprehenditur sub contingenti, quod enim contingit esse, 〈◊〉 fieri potest, 〈◊〉 est possibile, & quoth 〈◊〉 non esse, contingit non esse: adeoque id, quod proprie vocatur possibile, concurrit cum contingenti. He quotes also for it, if my memory fail not, Burana affirming as much ex Alexandro. The second Author is a late one read by every Freshman, 〈◊〉 institut. Log. lib. 2 c 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 modi 〈◊〉 annumerantur propositionibus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; & propositiones modi possibile, iis quae sunt modi contingit. Dr. 〈◊〉. sect. 41. To discover this deceit then, the Syllogism, which is now no Syllogism, must be somewhat better form, according to the rules of Logic, and reduced, as 〈◊〉 as it can, into a true Syllogism. Thus, Whatsoever is itself undecent, cannot be the only rule of Decency. But custom is itself undecent. Therefore Custom cannot be the only rule of 〈◊〉. Here before it can be defined, whether this be a regular Syllogism, or no? It must be demanded, quanta est minor, is the assumption universal or particular? If it be particular, then either the conclusion must be particular also, or else 'tis a false Syllogism. And if the 〈◊〉 be particular, than it infers no more, than that some undecent custom cannot be the only rule of decency, which is 〈◊〉 granted by me, who do not at all affirm it of undecent 〈◊〉. But if the Minor be universal, then 'tis a false proposition; for certainly all customes are not indecent. The short is, Nature may be the rule of one sort of decency, and Custom 〈◊〉 only rule of another; 〈◊〉 if the custom be in itself indecent, then of such indecent custom it is not pretended, that it is either only, or at all the rule of decency. And so still my proposition may stand good, which as it belonged not to natural decency, so much less to what is by nature, or in itself undecent, never imagining it reasonable, that what gestures were against those Laws of Nature, or Scripture, or any other Law of decency, or rather of natural 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 by pretence of any custom whatever, be 〈◊〉 into God's 〈◊〉: 'Tis sufficient that some customs, may be decent, or in themselves not indecent, and that all decency in the service of God, is to be regulated and 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with them: For I said not, that all customs were the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 that some were, and that there was no other rule, but custom. This, I hope, hath discovered the invalidity of his second Argument. Jeanes. My Syllogism is, as I have demonstrated, a true Syllogism; you might then very well have spared the pains you have taken to reduce it, as near as you could, to a true Syllogism; for there was no need of it: You deserve then no 〈◊〉 for your labour, but I have reason to expect reparation from you for 〈◊〉 of my Syllogism: This Section therefore I might wholly pass over, but yet I shall stay a while upon the examination of a second restriction that you put upon your dictate: you have already told us, that it is not to be understood of all decency. Now you give us to understand, that 'tis not meant of all custom, but only of some such as are not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; when you say custom is the only rule of decency, your meaning is some customs are the only rule of some kind of decency in the Ceremonies of God's worship. But whether this liberty which you assume in thus limiting your position be justifiable, is very questionable; for after this rate, what 〈◊〉 absurdities 〈◊〉 any man maintain? If I should say, that solum brutum est animal: that a spirit only is substance: that number only is quantity: that Baptism is the only Sacrament of the New Testament: would not every one cry out against these propositions as untrue, as well they might? and do you think they would pass for 〈◊〉? though I should come with an after game, and go about to limit them, in such a manner as you have done, by your assertion, and say, my 〈◊〉 was, that solum brutum est animal irrationale: that a spirit only is an 〈◊〉 substance: that number only is 〈◊〉 quantity: that 〈◊〉 is the only Sacrament of the New Testament of initiation; and yet these restrictions are altogether as fair and allowable as yours. 2. I did not think your proposition capable of having an universal sign affixed unto it; and my reason was, because as Aquinas p. 1. q. 31. art. 3. observeth out of the Summularii, dictio 〈◊〉 immobilitat terminum cut adjungitur, ut non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sub eo descensus pro 〈◊〉 suppositorum, non enim sequitur, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is animal rationale mortale: Ergo solus Socrates. But yet notwithstanding this, I thought your proposition might be 〈◊〉 de 〈◊〉, as they say; and so, though it were not formally, it would be 〈◊〉 universal. But now I shall 〈◊〉 aside this conjecture, because you inform us, that your indefinite proposition, was intended by you for a particular proposition, only I shall propound some objections against your making it a particular proposition. 1. When you 〈◊〉 Custom is the only rule of Decency, you speak of Custom either formally or materially; if you speak of Custom formally and 〈◊〉 as Custom, why then every Custom is a rule of Decency, because à quatenus 〈◊〉 de omni valet consequentia, that which doth agree to a thing as such, doth agree to every singular contained under it: but if you speak of Custom only 〈◊〉, and your meaning be, that Custom sub tali formali under such a consideration or qualification, is the only rule of Decency, why then this formale, this consideration or qualification of Custom, may, with far better reason, be said to be the importance of the Apostles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, then according unto Custom, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 will be but the materiale in the rule of Decency. 2. Until you express how those some 〈◊〉 may be qualified, that you make to be the only rule of Decency, your interpretation of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Let all things be done decently, will be very obscure, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, if not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ignotum, and your proof that you bring for your Exposition will be as dark and doubtsome: Thus both will run, Let all things be done according to some customs, because some customs are the only rule in some things of some decency, whether that which you call the clear importance of the place, do 〈◊〉 leave the Reader in an uncertainty, be you yourself judge. 3. The quantity of indefinite propositions may be gathered from their 〈◊〉; in a necessary matter they are universal, in a contingent, particular: Now I demand whether to be the rule of decency be predicated of custom necessarily or contingently? if necessarily, than custom cannot but be the rule of decency, and then all custom is a rule of decency: A necessary proposition that is affirmative, direct, natural, where superius praedicatur de 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 de in 〈◊〉, is also the omni: if it be predicated of it contingently, than custom may be, and may not be a rule of decency, and then I desire you to evidence unto us how 〈◊〉 being thus a rule of decency, viz. contingently, will be a solid proof, that the clear importance of the Apostles words, Let all things be done decently, is, let all things be done according unto custom? and your best and 〈◊〉 way to clear this unto us, will be by reducing your argument into a Syllogism. 4. If to be a rule of decency be predicated contingently of 〈◊〉, than custom is only a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉, and therefore it needs regulation by a higher rule; and if there be in the Ceremonies of God's 〈◊〉 a higher rule than custom, it will hereupon inevitably follow, that custom is not in them the only rule of decency. 5. You implyedly give us the Character of those Customs which you affirm to be the only rule of decency, when you say, that of such undecent customs it is not pretended, that 'tis either only, or at all the rule of decency: Now all customs, in the Ceremonies of God's service, are either decent or undecent: the Custom that is undecent is not at all a rule of decency, and therefore your position is to be understood of that Custom which is decent: for betwixt decent and undecent customs in the Ceremonies of God's service there is no medium, as I have showed already: the upshot of your meaning then is, that some Customs, viz. such as are decent, are the only rule of decency, etc. What sobriety is in this limitation will appear, if we will consider that herein we have a twofold decency: one in the rule, decent customs; another in the thing, regulated decency: The former is different from, and antecedent unto the latter: now of the former decency, in the rule, in custom itself, I demand, What is the rule of that decency, whether custom itself, or some other thing? I presume you will not say Custom itself; for than it would be an underived, unsubordinate, and independent rule, a role of itself: and if you should say that some other thing besides custom is the rule of the decency which is in custom, thou by conformity unto this, we must judge of the decency of Customs in the Ceremonies of God's worship, whether they be decent or undecent? and from this it is obvious to infer, that in Ceremonies there is a rule of decency antecedent unto Custom, by which Custom itself is to be regulated and measured; and therefore Custom is not the only rule of Decency. Your limitation then is so far from being any support unto your position, as that it giveth unto it a plain overthrow. Dr. Hammond. sect. 42. His last argument [because there is decency in the first usage of some things] falls upon that mistake of my words which I discoursed of, and cleared at the beginning; for I never said that a thing must be customary, before it is decent in any kind: 〈◊〉 knowing unquestionably that there is a natural decency) but that the decency of any Ceremony in God's service, wherein God and Nature have prescribed nothing particularly, must be regulated according to those measures, which the customs of any place do allow to be reverential among them; or, in yet plainer words, the civil customs of any nation, by which this or that sort of gesture is rendered a token of reverence, are the only rule, by which the decency of indifferent gestures, etc. is to be judged of, in order to God's service. And so much for the last argument also, and consequently for the first part of his exception, that against my interpretation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 decently. Jeanes. You talk indeed, Section the ninth, of such a mistake of your words, but prove it not. Now to prevent all mistakes. I shall come up unto your limitation: Custom is not the only rule of all decency in the Ceremonies of God's service, wherein God and Nature have prescribed nothing particularly: Verbi gratid, in the Surplice and Cross: For your Principles I suppose will lead you to assert the decency of the first usage of the Cross in Baptism, and of the Surplice in Preaching and Praying; and indeed if the first usage of these Ceremonies was undecent, it was sinful: and besides, this decency was not a natural decency, dictated by the Law of Nature, as you yourself will confess; but now if there were a decency in the first usage of these Ceremonies, Custom was not, could not be rule thereof, because, as I declared out of Aristotle and Aquinas, the frequent usage of a thing is required unto Custom. For conclusion of this first part of mine exception, I shall entreat the Reader to take notice of the definition of Custom, usually quoted out of 〈◊〉: Consuetudo est jus quoddam moribus institutum quod pro lege suscipitur cum lex deficit. By this definition, Custom hath not the force of a Law, but where the Law is defective, and the Word, the Law of God is not defective in appointing religious mystical Ceremonies, for 'tis so sufficiently profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, and for instruction in righteousness, as that the man of God may thereby be perfected, throughly furnished unto all good works, 2 Tim. 3. 16, 17. I shall therefore conclude that Custom doth not, cannot oblige unto any religious, mystical Ceremonies, besides those which God hath instituted in his Word. Dr. Hammond. sect. 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48. But there is yet a second charge behind against my rendering 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to appointment] which he hath managed in these words. 44. As for the other part of the words, Let all things be done in order; Aims in the place forementioned showeth, that order requireth not such Ceremonies as ours, and he giveth this reason, because order requireth not the institution of any new thing, but only the right placing, and disposing of things, which are formerly instituted: and this he makes good from the notation of the word, from the definitions of order, which are given by Philosophers and Divines, etc. from the context of the Chapter, and from the usage of the word elsewhere. But the Doctor, that the words, may give some countenance unto our Ceremonies, adventureth upon a new interpretation of them. The words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (saith he) literally import, according unto appointment, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sometimes signifies to appoint, as Matth. 28. 16. Acts 22. 10. and 28. 23. And we may hereupon argue à conjugatis, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be sometimes rendered appointment. But because it may sometimes be rendered appointment, will it therefore follow that it must be so rendered in this place? We may say as well as the Doctor, that the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 literally import according unto order, as order is taken 〈◊〉 for the right placing, and ordering of things one before, another after, and this we have confessed even by Doctor John Burgess in his Rejoinder unto Ames, pag. 78. a book published by the special command of the late King. Moreover this sense is favoured by the coherence; for v. 31, we have a particular instance of order in this acception of the word, ye may all 〈◊〉 one by one etc. and not all or many speak at once. 2. We have the opposite of order taken in this sense. 1. v. 33. confusion. Let all things be done in order, then, is as much, as, let all things be done without consusion. And I hope confusion may be avoided in the worship of God without such Ceremonies as ours. But we will for once suppose, though not grant, that the clear importance of the words, is that all be done in the Church according to custom and appointment. Yet the D. 〈◊〉 a hard task to perform, before he can come nigh his conclusion, that the words of Paul, are a proof of the more than lawfulness of prescription of such Ceremonies as ours, in a Church. For he must prove that 〈◊〉 and order here, are taken in such a latitude, as that they include not only the customs and appointments of the Apostolical Churches, but also of all the Churches of God in succeeding ages: and the performance of this he will find not to be so easy, as he may imagine. I am sensible that I have by this discourse provoked a very learned and formidable adversary, but it is only love of the truth that engaged me in so unequal an encounter, and therefore I hope the D. will pardon and excuse my boldness. If he can by dint of argument prove the truth to be on his side, I shall not be sorry or ashamed to be overcome by him. 45. To this, my answer will be very brief, 1. By giving the reason of my rendering, 2. By evidencing, that if the vulgar were acknowledged the righter rendering, yet my conclusion would very regularly follow thence, and that therefore I have no need to contend with any gainsayer, about my rendering. 46. For the first it is manifest to any that knows but the elements of Greek, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 literaly and properly signifies (according to ordination or appointment) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies [according to] not (in) and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [an ordinance or constitution] millions of times in authors, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 [〈◊〉, or in order] lying more 〈◊〉 with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 reason can be rendered, why if that had been the designed meaning, that word should not have been used there. 47. That it may so signify M. J. acknowledges, and so I have obtained all I seek in my first proposal, which was not that it must necessarily thus signify, but that this being the literal regular rendering of it, I had sufficient reason to tender it thus. 48. I proceed then to the second thing, that if what be pretends to be possible also, were indeed the only possible, or (by way of supposition, but not 〈◊〉) if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did really inport no more than [in order] as that is opposed to disorder or confusion, yet I say, it will soon appear, that that Apostles commanding such order or orderliness, and forbidling all confusion in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, must by consequence he interpreted to command the instituting and observing uniformity of Ceremonies in a Church. Jeanes. 1. Our last translators of the Bible surely knew something more than the Elements of Greek, or else King James was ill advised to make such a choice of them, and yet they thought fit to translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in order. 2. Few mortals perhaps, besides yourself, have read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 millions of times in Authors; but to know the meaning of that word, there is no need of such great reading, one that knows but the Elements of Greek may by the help of a Greek Concordance and Stephanus his Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, make it manifest, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth literally & properly order in opposition to confusion. But 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 you say signifieth according to, not in. But, Stephonus in the book, but now mentioned, will furnish the Reader with store of instances, wherein, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies [in] and a school boy may be able to do as much, for the Latin word, Secundum, out of Cicero and Suetonius. But suppose that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were translated here, according, yet this will no ways disadvantage our sense, for, according, applied to actions. signifieth, usually, the manner of such actions; so that both it, and the 〈◊〉 unto which it is joined, may be paraphrased, by an adverb, and so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be as much as, orderly. Add unto all this, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies many times, with, and so it is translated in the Dutch Bible; and let all things be done with order is equivalent unto, let all things be done in order. Dr. Hammond sect. 47. That it may so signify Mr. I acknowledges, and so, I have obtained all I seek in my first proposal, which was not, that it must necessarily thus signify, but that this being the literal regular rendering of it, I had sufficient reason to render it thus. Jeanes. Indeed I acknowledged that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may sometimes be rendered appointment; but I added, that it doth not therefore follow that it must be so rendered in this place, & unless you can prove that it must be so rendered in this very place, I am to seek, what sufficient reason you had to render it thus: for if a word hath several acceptions, that is to be embraced that hath most countenance from the context, now I gave you for the vulgar sense a reason from the Coherence, unto which you say nothing, and you say as little from the coherence for the justification of your own reading, and therefore I am not to be blamed for adhering unto the vulgar reading, especially seeing 'tis favoured by the general consent of both Translators, and Commentators, though, as you observe in the foregoing section, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lie more consonant in sound with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for I do not think that the Apostle was bound always to observe Paronomasies. Dr. Hammond. sect. 48, 49. I proceed then to the second thing, that if what he pretends to be possible also, were indeed the only possible, or (by way of supposition, but not concession) if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did really import no more than in Order, as that is opposed to disorder or confusion, yet, I say, it will soon appear, that the Apostles commanding such order, or orderliness, and forbidding all confusion in Ecclesiastical 〈◊〉, must by consequence 〈◊〉 interpreted to command the instituting and observing 〈◊〉 of Ceremonies in a Church. This I thus deduce. First there is no possibility of worshipping God externally and publicly, without use of some Ceremonies, 〈◊〉 of time, place, and gesture, etc. 2. There is no possibility of order in a multitude, without uniformity in the same circumstances. 3. There is as little possibility of uniformity among many, without either agreement one with another, or direction of some superior to them all, what shall by all be uniformly performed. 4. The agreement one with another, if it 〈◊〉 only voluntary, and such, as by which 〈◊〉 are obliged, no way secures the end; but if it be such an agreement, that every single person is obliged to observe, than still is that a law of that body, as of a council, etc. and as truly so, as the constitution of a single Prelate can be thought to be. And so the conclusion regularly follows, that to the preserving but of order, or orderliness in a 〈◊〉, it is necessary, there be appointment, what shall by all be 〈◊〉 performed; confusion anavoidably coming in, where no certain rules are prescribed 〈◊〉 uniformity. What can be denied in this process I foresee not. Here it shall suffice to note, that time, place, and such like circumstances, are so manifestly necessary in their kind, that the 〈◊〉 may be deduced from them, by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, without any institution; but no man can deduce our 〈◊〉 from those kinds named. Man's will is the only reason, of them, as Gods will is the only reason of Ceremonies truly divine by institution. No man can conclude thus: we must every where have some garment, and therefore in England a Surplice. We must always in Baptism, have some admonition to profess the faith, and 〈◊〉 in England, a Crosse. We must use reverend gestures in receiving the holy `` 〈◊〉; and therefore in England we must kneel in the act of receiving. But we may conclude thus; we must have a fit place to meet in, and this place is generally fittest for our Congregation, therefore we must have this. We must have a convenient time to meet in, and this hour is generally most convenient for our Congregation: therefore this. The Monks may as well conclude: we must have some garments; therefore we must in one order have black; in another white; in a third, black over white, or white over black; in a fourth, grey; a fifth, 〈◊〉 coloured; in some, all woollen; in some, all linen; &c. ad insinitum, as well (I say) every 〈◊〉, as the rejoinder can conclude from a garment, to a 〈◊〉; from 〈◊〉, to the sign of the Cross, or from reverence in a table-gesture; 〈◊〉 kneeling. Jeanes. Though you cannot see what can be denied in this process, yet he that 〈◊〉 may read what is constantly denied by the Non-conformists, if he ever read their books: they deny over and over, over and over etc. Your two first conclusions if applied unto the Ceremonies in question: Indeed they grant, that circumstances of time, place, order and decency, and the like, are necessary genere in their kind, but these, I will tell you, are not the Ceremonies in controversy; the Ceremonies which they oppose are not circumstantial, but doctrinal, of moral signification, and the mere divises of men, such as the surplice, 〈◊〉, etc. And you may affirm, but can never prove, that there is no possibility of worshipping God externally, and publicly without such ceremonies, for it is 〈◊〉, that such Ceremonies are not necessary in their kind. In hoc vertitur cardo 〈◊〉, therefore if you can prove this, we shall yield you the cause, and lie 〈◊〉 at your feet to be trampled upon and triumphed 〈◊〉: and until this proof be made, you can never regularly infer, that to the preserving but of order or orderlyness in a Church, it is necessary there be appointment, what 〈◊〉 religious Ceremonies shall by all be uniformly performed. If you shall say that by Ceremonies you understand only circumstances 〈◊〉 time, place, decency, order, and the like, I shall confess myself to be mistaken, but must withal for my own discharge 〈◊〉, that you alone ere guilty of this my mistake, for who could reasonablely imagine that in a controversy with the opposers of Ceremonies, you should exclude from the Ceremonies mentioned by you, all such Ceremonies as they oppose. Your 〈◊〉 conclusion calls for confirmation, and until you shall bethink yourself of some reason to confirm it, I shall offer against it these following instances, unto which it is no difficult matter to add many more; suppose the 〈◊〉 of Churches in a City meet at nine of the clock for God's 〈◊〉, and in the Country Parishes adjoining, where many people live at a great distance from their Churches, they meet at ten or half an hour after nine, nay in the same Church at one and the same time, whilst the word of God is read or preached, those that sit in seats may have their heads uncovered, and those that stand in allies may keep on their hats the whole Sermon 〈◊〉, because the crowd or throng may render it in convenient to keep them off. Now in both these instances there is not uniformity in the same circumstances, and yet there may be order observed, and confusion may very well, notwithstanding, be avoided in all the parts of God's worship and service. But to give an instance ad hominem out of Parker, some of our Churches in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Organs, some not; some discant and broken singing, some 〈◊〉; here was no uniformity, but you will not, I believe, 〈◊〉, that there was confusion. This point of uniformity in rites and Ceremonies, the Reader may find at large debated in the now mentioned Mr. Parker 〈◊〉. of the Cross part 2. pag. 91. usque ad 〈◊〉. These two conclusions being thus 〈◊〉, I need not stay upon the following, which will be useless and 〈◊〉, without the two former be presupposed as true. Dr. Hammond. sect. 50. 51, 52, 53, 54. What can be denied in this process, I foresee not, yet when 'tis granted, one reserve Mr. J. hath still left him. For saith he, 〈◊〉 it were granted that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies appointment or ordination, yet still it will be incumbent on the Dr. to prove that this extends not only to the customs and appointments of the Apostolic Churches, but also to the Churches of the succeeding ages. And my answer to this will conclude this whole debate. 51. First then I acknowledge, that it is not here necessarily ordained by the 〈◊〉, that all the Churches of succeeding ages should institute Ceremonies in worship, for, provided those Ceremonies were once instituted, all that this text enforces, is uniform obedience to them. 52. But than Secondly, When for many circumstances of God's worship, there is no order particularly 〈◊〉 by Christ and his Apostles, as in what gesture public supplication shall be addressed, in what, lauds and hymns, and confession of the faith, etc. And yet the rule is given by them, that all shall be done according to appointment, and more over in other places, that obedience be paid to those superiors, which watch over our 〈◊〉; and when those rules are not given only to the persons that then lived in the Church of Corinth, etc. But to all that should ever live in that, and in all other Churches, it can not then be deemed, either that there were no superiors designed to succeed Christ, and his Apostles in the ordering of his Church, or that they should not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, set in order the things that were wanting, such as the 〈◊〉 had left undisposed of, or that inseriors should not be bound to obey them 〈◊〉, when they thus gave order to them. 53. When we are commanded to obey our parents, civil as well as natural, by a Law given by God to Moses, or by Christ to his Disciples, can it be strange, that we that lived not in either of those ages should thereby be obliged, when God in his providence hath given Fathers of both kinds (as well as them) regularly presiding over us, and making use of that 〈◊〉 that is presumed in all parents, viz. to give Commands, and expect obedience from their children? Certainly it cannot: and as little can it be doubted, either whether our ecclesiastical parents have power to institute in things omitted, & thereby remitted to their care by the Apostles, or whether we their obedient children, that are commanded to act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to appointment, should from time to time be disobliged, and free to disobey them in 〈◊〉 they appoint us. 54 'Tis granted him, if he please, that what Christ, and his Apostles have already prescribed, should not be repealed by 〈◊〉, that thus succeed them; should they 〈◊〉 assume that power, they would not in so doing act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whether regularly, or according to appointment; but for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in which they have made no rules, but left order to Titus, etc. (i e. by parity of reason, to the Bishop in every Island) to make them, here what power is left them, may certainly with perfect safety be exercised by them, and that necessarily infers our obligation to yield obedience to their exercises of them. Jeanes. Here you explicate your meaning by first a concession. 2. By instances, and then you produce pretended arguments for the proof of the proposition which I say is incumbent on you to confirm. 1. You lay down a concession, I acknowledge, that it is not here necessarily ordained by the Apostle, that all the Churches of God in succeeding ages should institute Ceremonies in worship &c, 1. I cannot imagine to what purpose you lay down the grant, for notwithstanding it, you still hold, that uniform obedience is to be yielded by the members of each respective Church unto such Ceremonies in God's worship as have been, are, or shall be appointed or commanded by any Churches in the ages succeeding the Apostles, and so still it will be incumbent upon you to prove, that custom and order are here taken in such a latitude, as that they include the customs and appointments of all the Churches of God in succeeding ages. 2. There is a difference betwixt institution and commandment or appointment of Ceremonies, for though every institution be a commandmentor appointment, yet every commandment or appointment is not an institution, and hence a Church in a place may command and appoint the uniform observance of Ceremonies instituted unto its hand by the Church in a former age. This pray supposed, I demand, whether you hold it here necessarily ordained by the Apostle, that all the Church of God in succeeding Ages, should 〈◊〉 institute Ceremonies in God, worship, or else appoint and command such as have been already instituted? If you think them all free, and disobliged from both institution and appointment of Ceremonies in worship, why then all 〈◊〉 might lawfully have abstained from such both 〈◊〉 and commandment, and if such abstinence were lawful, I may, I believe, presume that it will be a very hard matter to prove such an abstinence to be inexpedient and against edification. If you should say, that some, though not all, the Churches of God are obliged either to institute Ceremonies in God's worship, or to appoint 〈◊〉 command such as are already instituted, by precedent Churches succeeding the Apostles time, why then we shall justly expect that you should specify or nominate such 〈◊〉, and give some reason for the appropriation of such an obligation unto such Churches, rather than unto others. 3. In your view of the Directory, page 19 you affirm that in the command of St. Paul, there is a proof of the more than lawfulness of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, prescription of Ceremonies in a Church, and of 〈◊〉 therein: Now I thought that you were to be understood of all Churches, and then by more than lawfulness, I suppose, you had meant necessity: You say that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the prescription of Ceremonies in a Church is more than lawful, and hereupon I imagined that you affirmed it to be necessary; but it seems I was mistaken in your meaning: I shall therefore wait for a further explication of it, and therein I shall desire to know what you understand by the more than lawfulness of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or prescription of Ceremonies in a Church? As also to be informed, whether you extend what you say of the prescription of Ceremonies in a Church unto all Churches? and if not, what reason you have for the restriction of it unto some Churches? and what these Churches are? In the beginning of the 52 Sect. you perplex the state of the Question, by instancing in the circumstances of God's worship, which are by the Non-conformists expressly excluded from the Question, for they limit it only unto humane religious Ceremonies. Now betwixt these and the circumstances of God's worship, there is a great, and very wide difference. 1. Circumstances of time, place, order, and decency, etc. are necessary, and appointed in general; but humane religious Ceremonies are not 〈◊〉 in general, as will soon appear when you go about to prove such a necessity of them. It is impossible for God's worship to be performed without some circumstances, but it is very possible for God's worship to be celebrated without any humane religious Ceremonies. 2. Circumstances of God's worship, viz. a sitting time and place, a decent Pew and Pulpit, a fair and handsome cloth for the Communion Table, are not Worship; but humane religious Ceremonies are in their nature Worship, as being instituted to lift up God's honour immediately in their use and end. 3. Things of 〈◊〉 order require no ordering: Time and place require not other time and place to circumstance them aright; but now humane sacred Ceremonies are capable of time and place, and of being ordered. 4. Circumstances of time, place, order, and decency are common to religious, with civil actions; but religious Ceremonies are appropriated unto God's worship and service. But to come unto your own instances. Your first instance is in the gesture, in which public prayer is to be 〈◊〉. But this instance is very impertinent: for 1. This is in the general necessary, so that it is utterly impossible for Prayer to be put up, but in some gesture or other; but the Ceremonies which Non-conformists oppose, are mere humane inventions, and so unnecessary in the general. 2. We have, for the particular gesture in Prayer, sufficient warrant and direction from the light of Nature and Scripture, without any humane institution: But we have no direction in Scripture for particular humane Ceremonies: This is very well set down in Ames disp. about Ceremon. pag. 139. pag. 151. No 〈◊〉 thing can with any colour be averred of Surplice, Cross and the like. I do not quote Ames, as if I thought you any thing valued what he said, but that the Reader might know the true state of the question, and that in the laying of it down you have not so much as consulted your adversaries. But now to prevent as much as may be the multiplying of needless Controversies betwixt us, I shall acknowledge that a Church may 〈◊〉 the usage of any reverend, lowly, submissive gesture in public supplications, when there is conveniency for the usage thereof. But yet it will not hereupon follow, that all things are to be done in the gestures of public Prayer according unto the Church's appointment; for suppose the Church should prohibit in public Prayers the gestures of kneeling, lifting up the eyes and the hands to heaven, I should conclude such an appointment of any Church whatsoever to be unlawful, because contrary unto the express direction of Scripture. Your second instance is impertinent too, for the gestures of laud's, Hymns and Confessions of the Faith, etc. is a matter of mere decency, and how 〈◊〉 matters of mere decency are from the Ceremonies in question, I have declared a little before, I shall therefore now only add these three things. 1. That a rational man may by mere light of Nature, without any institution, easily gather, what gesture is fitting, decent and agreeable unto these actions. 2. That notwithstanding this, the Governors or Officers of a Church may appoint in these actions any decent gesture or posture of the body, provided that by special institution they do not put upon it any mystical signification, and thereby make it a Worship. 3. That from this grant it can never be inferred, that in those gestures which are to be 〈◊〉 in laud's, Hymns, Confessions of the Faith, all things are to be 〈◊〉 according to the appointment of Church Governors: and my reason is, because it is possible, that Church Governors may be so irrational, as to appoint here undecent gestures, as that the people should lie along on their faces in singing of Psalms of Praise, and in Confession of the Faith. Now an undecent gesture would be finfull, because against the Apostles prescription, Let all things be done decently. In the last place proceed we unto those arguments, if I may so call them, which you have for confirmation of the proposition, which I say is incumbent on you to prove: If you have for this any arguments in this your discourse, they are, as I conceive, these three. 1. Because obedience must be paid to those Superiors, which watch over our souls, 2. Because the Apostle left order to Thus 〈◊〉 set in order the things that were wanting. 3. Because we are commanded to obey our Ecclesiastical as well as natural and civil parents: Now let the Reader apply unto each of these arguments the proposition that is to be proved, therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the 1 Cor. 14. 40. is taken in such a latitude, as that it includes the appointments of all the Churches of God in succeeding ages, and the consequence will be of an imperceptible validity. The Reader may farther, if he please, make another experiment touching these arguments, he may try what they will conduce unto the principal conclusion, that the words of 〈◊〉 are a proof of the more than lawfulness of prescription of such Ceremonies as ours in a Church; if by the help of them he can come nigh this conclusion of the Doctors, I will 〈◊〉 that I have been grossly mistaken. And this might 〈◊〉 for answer unto these three arguments; but yet I shall for the further satisfaction of the Reader say something unto each of them apart. The first is, because obedience must be paid to those Superiors which watch over our souls; the place is Heb. 13. 17. but this place will prove nothing for the humane institution of religions Ceremonies, because our Guides may rule over us without institution of such Ceremonies, and consequently we may pay obedience to them without practice of such Ceremonies: The place is urged by Bellarmine for the Pope's Coactive power to make Laws binding the conscience, and in Whitakers Answer thereunto, Tom. 2. page. 722. you may take notice of this passage; Non constituit 〈◊〉 Jententia regnum Episcopis extra, aut supra Evangelium: non debent Episcopi suas traditiones aut leges, aut contra, aut extra, aut praeter Evangelium obtrudere. Obediendum ergo est, sed cum cautione, si praeeant illi in Domino, & nil suum tradunt: nam si hoc fecerit omittendi sunt, juxta illud, ctiamsi nes, aut Angelus e Coelo, evangelizet vobis praeter id quod vobis evangelizavimus, anathemae esto. Gal. 1. 8. Let the Reader consider whether our Ceremonies were not 〈◊〉, praeter Evangelium, besides the Gospel: A second argument which you prosecute, Sect. 53, 54. is because Paul left order to Titus, to set in order the things that were wanting; such as the Apostle had left undisposed of, in which they have made no rules, and the same power you think is left, by parity of reason, to the Bishops in every Island: For answer, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the things that were wanting were wanting in Crete, left undone, as it is in the Margin of our English Bible, and not in the 〈◊〉 or rules which Paul gave to Titus: for that Titus was to keep unto the instructions that he had received from Paul, you might have seen, if you had had the patience to have read unto the end of the verse; 〈◊〉 there the 〈◊〉 points to him the rule he should walk by, he was to 〈◊〉 in order the things that were wanting in Crete, not of his own head, but according to the appointment of 〈◊〉; as I had appointed thee. I might farther allege, that Bishops (by whom you mean our Prelates) have not the same power delegated unto them, which Paul committed unto Titus: But I shall for the p 〈◊〉 wave this, because it may occasion a long digression, and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is abundantly satisfactory, and from it we may conclude; that suppose Bishops had power left them to set in order things that are 〈◊〉, yet we may not thence collect, that they have power for institution of new doctrinal Ceremonies, besides those instituted by Christ and his Apostles, because however there may be many things wanting in their Churches, which may need reformation, yet there is nothing wanting in the Scriptures, which needs to be supplied by humane additions. Your third Argument is drawn from the power of our Ecclesiastical parents and the obedience we owe unto them. It cannot be doubted, say you, either whether our Ecclesiastical parents have power to institute in things omitted, and thereby remitted to their care by the Apostles, or whether we their obedient Children, that are commanded to act 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to appointment, should from time to time, be 〈◊〉 and free to disobey them in whatsoever they appoint us? Here we have no argument, but only a begging of the thing in question: It is not denied but that Ecclesiastical parents have power to appoint and dispose of such Circumstances of time, place, order, decency etc. 〈◊〉 in their kind are necessary, but in particular determination do vary: But that they have any power to institute new 〈◊〉 Ceremonies, of mystical signification, is a thing which you cannot but know to be constantly denied by your Antagonists, and therefore why you should 〈◊〉 the contrary evident, and never attempt the proof of it, I cannot sufficiently wonder. But perhaps you have an argument couched in these words, it cannot be doubted etc. whether our Ecclestastical parents have power to institute in things 〈◊〉, and thereby remitted to their 〈◊〉 by the Apostles. But pray, Sir, do you in earnest think, that if things be omitted by the Apostles, they are by them hereby remitted unto the care of Ecclesiastical parents in succeeding ages? Every one will confess that it sounds like a very strange proposition: however, you cannot expect that I should swallow it, until you bring 〈◊〉 confirmation of it. By this the Reader is, I hope, satisfied, that though your reading of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according unto appointment, were to take place, yet you have brought nothing to prove that, which you were justly called upon for proof of, viz. that appointment, was to be taken here in this place of the Apostle in such a latitude, as to comprehend humane, as well as divine appointment. But though you fail in your proofs, your adversaries the non-conformists are before hand with you, for they have proved that men's institution of religious Ceremonies omitted by Christ and his Apostles is a most plain detraction and palpable derogation, from 1. The all-sufficiency of the Scripture. 2. Perfection of God's ordinances. 3. Fidelity of Christ in his prophetical office. And lastly from the all-fulnes of his Kingly office. I foresee that it will be alleged, that all these arguments are long ago answered, and unto this I shall at present only give this short Reply, that they have been vindicated from all answers, as by others, so especially by Ames, and that this vindication of them remains unto this day unanswered. However, I shall stay a while upon two places in Deuteronomy, which the Non- 〈◊〉 usually urge against our Ceremonies, and examine an answer which the conformists gives thereunto, because this examination will conduce very much unto the learning of the truth in the controversy of Ceremonies: the places are Deut. 4. 2. Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shall you diminish aught from it, that ye may keep the Commandments of the Lord 〈◊〉 God which I command you. And cap. 12. 32. What thing soever I command you, observe to do it: Thou shalt not add thereto, nor diminish from it. Unto these two places, the conformists answer by distinguishing of the parts, and the Ceremonies of God's worship; it is unlawful, say they, to add unto the parts of God's worship instituted by God, but 'tis lawful to add unto 〈◊〉 Ceremonies of worship that are instituted by God. Unto this answer I thus reply. 1. Moses sealed up with this prohibition not only the moral, but also the Ceremonial Law; it was unlawful then, to add 〈◊〉 the Ceremonial Law of Moses; and why should it not be as unlawful now, to add unto the Ceremonial Law of 〈◊〉? vis hujus consequentiae, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 ex 〈◊〉, quod non minus nunc quam tunc rationem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 certis septis: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cancellis circumscribi opus sit, ne in rebus 〈◊〉 lasciviat, aut in 〈◊〉 delabatur. 2. The Scripture is a rule of even Ceremonies in God's worship, for it gives prescriptions and directions in the new Testament concerning the Sacraments of Baptism and the Lords Supper; now if it doth not prescribe all Ceremonies requisite and convenient, then 'tis only a partial and imperfect rule of Ceremonies in God's worship; but we, for our part, think so honourably of Scripture, as that we cannot but hold it to be a perfect 〈◊〉 and total rule of Ceremonial as well as moral worship, it is able to perfect the man of God, & throughly to furnish him unto all good works, and so unto all Ceremonies, that are good works. A third reply is, that the members of this distinction are not opposite, 〈◊〉 the members of every good distinction should be, for Ceremonies of worship though they be not parts of that worship of which they are Ceremonies, yet they are parts of worship in general, for 1. Worship is divided into moral and Ceremonial, so that Ceremonial worship is a subjective part of worship, a sort and kind of worship. 2. Mosaical Ceremonies under the Law were, and the Sacraments under the Gospel are parts of worship: the distinction then betwixt the parts, and religious Ceremonies of 〈◊〉, is an artless and false distinction. To make this yet more evident, I shall propound some arguments, by which the Non-conformists prove our Ceremonies to be external worship, for than it will follow, that they are parts of God's worship. 1. Those external Ceremonies whose proper use is the honouring of God, are external worship: But our Ceremonies are such, and therefore they are external worship. 2. All external Ceremonies in their nature, formally elicited from religion, are external worship: But our Ceremonies are such, and therefore they are external worship. This argument I find thus varied in a nameless author that hath collected twelve arguments against our Ceremonies. All mere and immediate actions of religion are parts of divine worship. But all religious Ceremonies, such as ours, are mere and immediate actions of religion. Therefore they are parts of divine worship. And these arguments might serve to evidence, that our Ceremonies, the surplice. Cross etc. Are imposed and used as parts of God's worship, though for want of a due and right author or efficient, they are false and unacceptable 〈◊〉: But to return unto the Doctor, from whom I may seem to have digressed. Dr. Hammond. This is all the observance M. J. seems to expect of me at this time, unless his intimation to all admirers of M. Hooker, that they should vindicate their great patron, of Ceremonies, may pass for an admonition to me, who acknowledge myself a thankful adoter of God's graces in that godly learned man, and so exact a few lines more above the regular account. 56. This will detain me no longer, then whilst I mind the Reader, that in a discourse of the benefits which we receive from Christ in the Sacrament, & otherwise, M. Hooker undertakes to set down how Christ in his humane nature is communicated to us, and so present with 〈◊〉; To this end three things he shows at large. 1. That as nothing created can be unlimited, or receive any such accident from any as may really make it infinite, so neither the soul nor body of Christ, nor Christ as man, nor according to his humane nature, can possibly be every where present, no nor the substance of the body of Christ, which netther hath or can have any presence but only local. 2. That this cannot be rendered possible, either by the grace of union with the Diely, nor by any other possible means, as he at large excellently deduceth it, pag. 300, 301, 302, 3. That it may peradventure be well enough granted in some sense, and after a sort, that Christ is every where present, as man, viz. 1. In respect of the conjunction of the humane nature with the Deity, which conjunction is extended as far as the Deity, the actual position being restrained, and tied to a certain place, and 2. By cooperation with the Deity, and that in all things. 57 Now on this third head, (without reflecting on the two former, which assure us of the author's meaning in it) two passages M. J. takes hold of, which if he know any thing in either Philosophy, or scholastical divinity, are both 〈◊〉 of a gross mistake, and cannot be sufficiently wondered at by him, that they should fall from so a learned a pen. 58. But I suppose there is no great skill in either of those learned faculties required, to distinguish betwixt that which truly and properly is, and that which may in some sense, and after a sort, and in two respects only (〈◊〉 of which belong to the propriety of being) be well enough granted, and that with a (peradventure) also to have influence on all these. 59 And what severity is this, to require of every learned man, that hath most largely refuted an adversary, to be so averse from all thoughts of peace, and reconciliation with him, that he may not allow him to speak truth, or but perhaps to speak truth in a sort, and in some sense, and in two only respects? All which are still more than intimations, that he thinks him to be absolutely, and in simplicity and propriety of speaking, in a gross error, impossible even to the power of God to have truth in it. 60. If any should chance to say of an eloquent man, that you might hear an Angel speak in him, and I should reply, that it might per adventure be well enough granted in a sort, or in some sense, that when he spoke you might hear an Angel, assuring you at large of my opinion, that no 〈◊〉 man can truly be an Angel, nay that it was impossible for God himself to bring to pass, that at the same time he should be an Angel, and not an Angel, a man, and not a man, or which is all one, a bare man, and yet an Angel, or (in fewer words) when Christ saith he is a door, and a vine, if I should say that in a sort, and in some sense, and that in two respects, each of these had truth in them, would M. J. think fit to leave 〈◊〉 subject, and let loose for three leaves together, and pawn all his philosophy, and 〈◊〉 (not considering what the consequence also may be to his practical) divinity, to 〈◊〉 and wonder at, and 〈◊〉 to give over wondering, and withal solemnly to refute this or that improper figurative 〈◊〉, so perfectly acknowledged by the Speakers to be such? 61. If he have that great 〈◊〉, and any prevalent temptation thus to lay it out, I shall only assure him, that I have not so much of either, as to attend these 〈◊〉 motions, nor any other lover or admirer of Mr. Hooker, that I know of, and theresore bescech him contentedly to rest in this general return to his charge of that 〈◊〉 man, without expecting any more explicit, or particular survey of it: And so much for Mr. Hooker also. Jeanes. I believe that most ordinary Readers will think me guilty of this disingenuous carriage towards Mr. Hooker, which the Doctor 〈◊〉 me of; but if they would have but the patience to read me in the passage related unto, they would soon acquit me, and find the Doctor guilty of a great deal of injury towards me. Indeed Mr. Hooker says, that it may well enough be granted in some sense, and after a sort, that Christ is every where present as man, viz. in two respects; but whether this were liable to exception, I meddle not, 'tis the 〈◊〉 of the respects which he mentioneth, that I question, and the words that I challenge, the Reader may find page 141. of my 〈◊〉. of the 〈◊〉 of Christ thus summed up. Then for the great Hooker, whereas he saith, That the conjunction of the Manhood with Deity, is extended as far as Deity, that the Body of Christ is joined unto Deity, wheresoever Deity is, that his Bodily substance hath every where a presence of true conjunction with Deity This also is easily refuted, etc. Now this he affirmeth absolutely and simply without any limitation, and not in a sort, or in some sense, and in two respects; and this any man that hath his eyes in his head may see, that will compare Mr. Hooker and me together; and if any learned and impartial Reader will but make this comparison, I shall be very well contented that he shall judge betwixt us, who of us hath most trespassed against practical Divinity, I in my charge of Mr. Hooker, or the learned Doctor in his gross and undeniable falsification of my said charge? But I shall in charity hope, that this falsification was but a mistake, proceeding from his hasty and 〈◊〉 zeal towards the memory of Mr. Hooker: Whereas he is pleased to talk his pleasure of my pawning all my Philosophy and fcholastical Divinity, I shall only humbly assume the boldness to intimate thus much unto the Reader, that though I have no great store of either, yet I hope I have enough to attend (that I may borrow the Doctor's phrase) the motions of him, and all other admirers of Mr. Hooker in the Defence of the matter questioned: but if he shall decline all future further debate of it, I shall with a great deal of probability conclude, that what Mr. Hooker saith is uncapable of any tolerable vindication: for if he were defensible, Dr. 〈◊〉 is so able as that he could, and withal so zealous a lover and admirer of him, as that he would continue the justification of him: Now from the undefensiblenesse of Mr. Hooker in this one point, I shall only take occasion to admonish his followers, that seeing he hath erred in so weighty a point, therefore he might err in matters of a far inferior nature, especially seeing the times were such, as that they transported with prejudice many men, that were unquestionably otherwise very learned and godly. Dr. Hammond. sect. 62. I have thus without any other obligation, than what my desire to undeceive the Author and his Readers 〈◊〉 upon me, paid him now this my second observance: And may be allowed to think it time, that he who hath been so liberal of his uses of publickrefutation of others words, should find some vacancy for one use of more private (if not 〈◊〉, yet) examination of his own actions: And then I shall offer to his consideration, how much more agreeable to the Laws of brotherly kindness or 〈◊〉 it hath been, to have proposed his exceptions in such a manner, or friendly address, as might have brought him home the same satisfaction, and saved others the 〈◊〉 of these useless, because personal debates: When he hath sincerely observed in himself the motive of his other distant choice, I have obtained the end of my charity in mentioning it to him, and have no more to return to him at this time. Jeanes. We poor ignorant men, that use the trite, but not illogical Method of Doctrine and Use in Preaching, 〈◊〉 usually first confirm our Doctrine, before we infer any Uses therefrom. Now Sir, if you will be pleased first to prove, that it is much more agreeable to the Laws of Brotherly kindness or candour, to propose a man's exceptions against a printed Book in a way of private Letter (for that I conceive is the manner of friendly address that you speak of) than in a public way from the Press, especially when the said exceptions are propounded, not for any personal satisfaction, but for the undeceiving of others, unto which end the private way is no apportionare mean; I shall then proceed unto the use of, not only examination, but also reprehension of this mine action; but in the mean while I shall 〈◊〉 upon my justification, and maintain that I am guiltless of any unbrotherly, uncandid, and disrespective carriage towards you in the proposal of my objections, which was in as civil and friendly a manner, I am confident, as ever you received any from any Antagonist whatsoever. The most considerable Escapes of the Printer in the Letters, etc. And in the Reply to Dr. Hammond. First in the Letters. PAg. 2. l. 13. r. in all. p. 7. l. 6. r. papers. p. 8. l. 20. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 18. l. 30. r. essential to the nature of man. l. 34. r. subjectivis. p. 29. l. 13. r. much less. p. 23. l. ult. r. or of their nature. l. 42. r. continuet. p. 34. l. 12. deal 〈◊〉 a. l. 14. r. natural body shall. l. 30. r. a spiritual body. p. 36. l. 6. r. scum. p. 37. l. 19 consecutiuè. p. 42. l. penult. r. yet you think p. 47. l. 10. r. in my absence. l. 34 r. indifferent and rational Reader. Secondly in the Reply unto Dr. Hammonds Vindication, etc. p. 5. l. 41. r prohibit, p. 6 l 33 r. improbable, p. 8 l. 42. r. 〈◊〉. p. 9 l. 〈◊〉. r. à place. p. 15. l. 26. r. it is. p. 22. l. penult. r. then all. p. 25. Marg. two last lines r. initiantur. p. 26. l. 17. r. alas. p. 28. l. 41. r. temberari. p. 39 l. 22. r. had been. P. 38. l 2. r. from his. p. 39 l 4. r. demones. p. 41. l. 13. r. aditum. p. 42. l. 36. r. ' 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 47. l. ult. r. arguments. p. 50. l. 12. r. variae. p. 54. l. 48. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. p. 55. l. 16. r. those. p, 56. l. 〈◊〉. r. as distinct. p. 59 l 37. r. such kind of. p. 61. l. 21, 23. r. try. l. 35. r. six Commandments p. 62. l 27, r. as with what. p. 71. l. 32. r. 〈◊〉. p. 72. l. 24. r. legis. p. 78. l. 15. r. uniformly. ibid. from l. 18. usque ad l. 36. there is made a part of Dr Hammonds Vindication, which is a quoration out of Ames his Disp. about Hum. Ceremon. p. 481, 482, and should be placed in the Marg. against l. 39] l. 41. r. they will. p. 80. l. ult. r. Churches. p. 83. l. 28. r. fecerint. Some Advertisements to the Reader. I shall in a word acquaint thee with the relation & pertinency of these two foregoing Debates unto the rest of the Book. The Letters have an apt connexion with the Tract of Original Righteousness. And the Reply unto Dr. Hammond may be referred unto the Treatile concerning the 〈◊〉 of humane actions; and indeed it was the Doctor's unjust charge of me, and Ames, with the denial of things Indifferent, that occasioned that Treatise, These two pieces have laid a long time by me (as can be attested by divers Gentlemen, and Ministers, unto whom they have long since been communicated) But I was persuaded by the Bookseller to defer the publication of them, until a Second Part of the Mixture of Scholastical and Practical Divinity was ready: And that had been long since 〈◊〉, if Sickness, with other private crosses, together with the public troubles and distractions of the times, had not hundred: He hath also prevailed with me, to reserve for a 〈◊〉 Part, all my future Replies, unto all such as have, or shall write against me. Only I shall in part alter this resolution touching the Nameless Author of the Defence of 〈◊〉 Hammonds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, not that I think it meritorious of any serious consideration; for 'tis fraught, all along, with such reviling, boasting, and insulting language, as is every way unsuitable unto the gravity of a Divine, the ingenuity of a Scholar, the charity, meekness, and humility of a Christian: nay the morality of a man. An ingenuous and good natured Pagan, would highly scorn to treat an Adversary with such incivilities, as he doth me. But because some, who are of the same persuasion with the Author in other particulars, have triumphed, and insulted in this his doughty work, as unanswerable; I shall therefore, as soon as that which is now under my hands (viz. An Exposition upon the 7th. of the Romans) is finished, address myself unto the examination thereof. I am so charitable as to think, that Dr. Hammond hath so much of Christianity, so much of a Minister, of a Scholar, of a Gentleman in him, as not to accept, or approve of this Thrasovical and Vainglorious Second. And if the Doctor disowne him, I might pass him by with silence, and a just neglect. But if the Doctor shall judge, that 'tis but justice, to chastise with 〈◊〉, calumnies, and reproaches, so contemptible a person, as myself, for daring to diffent from him, and to represent the reasons of my said dissent, though in a calm and modest way: I shall then appeal unto all the world how unagreeable this is unto that humility and moderation, for which the Doctor is generally famed. To irritate the Doctor against me, this Libeler tells him, that I have publicly bragged, that I have made him a Dunce. But I profess, that this is a gross, and most unworthy untruth; and he can bring no witnesses for it, but Knights of the Post. With the like falsehood, disingenuity, and malice, he pretends, page 96. etc. that I contumeliously undervalue the Doctor's Critical Learning, and make him to be but a petty Grammaticaster, etc. And hereupon he spends near five pages, in an Apology for 〈◊〉 in general, and the Doctor in particular. And what I pray is the ground of this terrible accusation? Why (〈◊〉) I said, I am very loath to enter into a contest with so great a Critic, about the meaning of a word. Hereupon he infers, that I make the Doctor to be but a 〈◊〉 Grammarian; that I account a Critic but a 〈◊〉, and a Grammarian, but an empty Poedagogue: But that for these odious inferences there is no colour, or shadow in 〈◊〉 words, will be quickly discerned by every Freshman. But such loose sequels as 〈◊〉, are very rife, and thick in his Book. And of this, I do not doubt, but I shall shortly, make so perfect a discovery, as shall give full satisfaction, touching the vast abilities of this our Mr. Thraso, unto all impartial Readers, save such whose understandings reach no further than Romances and Plays. His numerous Quotations out of the Schoolmen, have induced some to admire him for his deep insight into Scholastical Divinity. But 〈◊〉 such his Admirers consider, 〈◊〉 he be likely to be such a 〈◊〉. School-man, as they suppose him, who talks of the Author of Collegium Complutense, as of a single person, pag. 30. and questions whether 〈◊〉 quote Aquinas only to refute him, as the latter School men 〈◊〉 the former, pag. 341. whereas Capreolus was the professed Champion of Aquinas: And his Book on the Sentences consisteth chiefly of collections out of 〈◊〉; and hereupon he is termed, Thomistarum princeps. Notwithstanding then this Gentleman makes such frequent Musters of the Names of the Schoolmen, as if he were Nomenclator to them, it is unto me very probable, that this is his first considerable voyage that he ever made into them; and that now too he hath traveled in them but by the Index. Three great advantages this our Libeler 〈◊〉 against me: First, his Billingsgate Rhetoric, by which, 'tis 〈◊〉 improbable, he hoped to tempt me into such an outrageous fury, as his zeal for Doctor Hammond hath transported him with. But unto this I shall return nothing, but my pity and prayers, that God would pardon, and heal this his distemper. The second is, the concealment of his Name, for by this he hazards no 〈◊〉; his pretence for it is, that I might not run into personal 〈◊〉. How liable he is to personal 〈◊〉, I know not: But let him be never so obnoxious, he may be secure, and need not fear any such usage from me: For 'tis that which I shall studiously decline in all contests whatsoever, though my Antagovist should be a Papist, a Turk, a Pelagian, or a Socinian; for I know that personal invectives will betray the best cause unto jealousies and suspicions. And besides, a man cannot throw 〈◊〉 and dung in another's man's face, but some of it will slick to his own fingers. A third artifice that he hath, is the swelling of his Book into so large a volume, as that may either wholly prevent, or much delay all Replication. My Refutation was printed about three years since in 40. pages, and his Defence is now come forth in 644. pages. Unto this tediousness I shall apply what Bishop Hall speaks of his Popish Opponent; Should I follow him in this proportion, He might expect an Answer in Tostatus hides, whose first words should be, Quis legit haec? Or if my patience would delay my Reply to the just paces of his Answer, this Volume of his would perhaps be vanished into Grocer's 〈◊〉, for waste paper, in 〈◊〉 piperisve 〈◊〉, and would no more need 〈◊〉, than now it deserveth one. Against this his voluminousnesse I shall make use of this expedient; I shall consult some learned and judicious friends, and desire them faithfully and impartially to select such passages as they think material, and them only I shall examine. But I shall detain thee, Reader, no longer. All that I have to desire further of thee, is thy patience, that thou wilt suspend a while thy censure, until thou canst hear what I can say for myself. An Explication of a passage in the Treatise of Things 〈◊〉, etc. WHereas in the Treatise concerning the Indifferency of humane actions, pag. 54. as also in my Reply to Dr. 〈◊〉 Vindication, etc. page 5. I laid down this for a Rule out of some Schoolmen, viz. That 〈◊〉 things privatively opposite there's no medium, no middle, either of abnegation, or of participation, in capable subjects; I find some to make a 〈◊〉 concerning the latter, the middle of participation; for such a medium (say they) is the dawning and twilight betwixt light and darkness; to have one eye betwixt sight and blindness; such a medium is a disposition unto a disease, betwixt health and that disease. But this doubt would soon vanish, if men would heed the limitations that are usually given of it. The first is, that there is not such a medium of participation betwixt privative opposites, as there is in 〈◊〉, in contrary qualities; for here, each of the extremes is positive and 〈◊〉, verè ens, whereas in 〈◊〉 opposites, 〈◊〉 of them is more non ens than ens. A second you have in Scheibler in his Topics, c. 20. n. 72. having quoted a saying out of Plutarch, that non datur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, he referreth, for limitation, unto what he had said concerning the intention and remission of privation, n. 43, 44, 45. There he layeth down this Canon, privatio 〈◊〉 suscipit magis & minus. Privations have no degrees, are not intended nor remitted. But this he tells us is to be understood of not partial privations, such as those now instanced in: for such are privations only secundum 〈◊〉; but of total privations, such as blindness, dumbness, deafness, death. These are uncapable of degrees, and so likewise there can be no mixture, or cohesion of them. The same for substance we have in Aquinas, 1. 2ae q. 18. a. 8. add 〈◊〉. Duplex est privatio, quaedam quae consistit in privatum esse: & haec nihil 〈◊〉, sed totum aufert: ut caecitas totaliter aufert 〈◊〉, & tenebrae lucem, & mors vitam; & inter hanc privationem, & habitum oppositum non potest esse aliquod medium circa proprium susceptibile, Est autem alia 〈◊〉, quae 〈◊〉 in privari, sicut aegritudo est privatio sanitatis, non quod tota sanitas sit sublata, sed quod est quasi quaedam via ad totalem 〈◊〉 sanitatis, quae 〈◊〉 mortem. Et ideo talis privatio, cum a 〈◊〉 relinquat, non semper est immediata cum opposite habitu. The sum and sense of this is, that privations and their habits are immediately opposite, if we speak of privations in facto esse, not in fieri. Now that Aquinas here speaks of medium participationis, is the Comment of Gregory de Valentia, Tom. 2 dis. 2. q. 13. punct 5. This advertisement I thought fit to insert, for the prevention of unnecessary cavils: But yet I must confess, that medium participationis was put into the rule ex abundanti, and contributes nothing to the matter in hand: So that the Reader, if he please may leave it out; for the stress of the proof lies only upon this, viz. that betwixt things privatively opposite, there's no medium of abnegation in capable subjects. And this is affirmed so unanimously by all, as that I know not so much as one Dissentient. FINIS. A Catalogue of Books Printed for, and Sold by THO: ROBINSON. CHronicon Historiam Catholicam complectens ab exordio Mundi ad Nativitatem D. N. Jesus Christi, & exinde ad annum à Christo nato LXXI. Authore Ed. Simson, S. T. D. in Folio. An Answer to Mr. Hoard's Book, entitled God's Love to Mankind, by W. Twisse, D. D. in Fol. Books written by Dr. Prideaux. XXII Lectiones, Tredecim Orationes, & Sex Conciones. in Fol. Fasciculus Controversiarum Theol. 4o. Theologiae Scholasticae Syntagma Mnemonicum, & Conciliorum Synopsis. 4o. Manuductio ad Theol. Polemicam. 8o. An Easy and Compendious Introduction for reading all sorts of History; contrived in a more facile way than heretofore hath been published. 4o. Books written by Dr. Owen. The Doctrine of the Saints Perseverance examined & confirmed. in 〈◊〉. Socinianism examined, in the confutation of Biddle's, and the Racovian Catechism. 4o. A Review of the Annotations of H. Grotius, in reference to the Doctrine of the Deity, and Satisfaction of Christ, in Answer to Dr. Hammond. 4o. Of the Mortification of Sin in Pelievers, with a resolution of sundry cases of 〈◊〉 thereunto belonging. 8o. Of Temptation, the nature and power of it, the danger of entering into it, and the means preventing the danger; with a Resolution of sundry Cases thereunto belonging. 8o. providential Alterations in their subserviency to Christ's Exaltation, opened in a Sermon on Ezech, 17. ver. 24. 4o. 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Doctor Hammonds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or a greater Ardency in Christ's love of God at one time than another, proved to be Irreconcilable with his Fullness of Habitual Grace, the perpetual Happiness, and the Impeccability of his soul. 40. Saintship no ground of Sovereignty, or a Treatise tending to prove, that the Saints, barely considered as such, ought not to govern. By Edw. Bagshaw, M. A. Stud. of Ch. Ch. 80. Three Decades of Sermons preached to the University at St. Mary's Church in Oxon: By Henry Wilkinson, D. D. Principal of Magdalen Hall, Oxon. 4ᵒ.