A TREATISE Concerning the INDIFFERENCY OF HUMAN ACTIONS.  1 Corinth. 6.10. 
All things are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient. All things are lawful for me, but I will not be brought under the power of any.  1 Cor. 10.23. 
All things are lawful for me, but all things edify not.  
OXFORD, Printed by Hen: Hall, Printer to the UNIVERSITY, for Tho: Robinson, 1669.   

To the Right Worshipful Sir WILLIAM WYNDHAM, of Orchard Wyndham, in the County of Somerset, BARONET.  
SIR,  
THose that know the depth of my obligations to you, have long since expected my public acknowledgement thereof; and having now an opportunity to make it: My own Conscience would condemn me of a most disingenuous ingratitude, if I should any longer defer it. But not only my private, and personal engagements, but your own merit will justify this Dedication: for 'tis so well, and generally known, as that it may, with a great deal of justice, entitle you unto the exactest pieces of the able pens of the age, therefore much more unto the poor, and mean endeavours of  
Your Unworthy, though most grateful Servant HENRY JEANES.   

A TREATISE Concerning the INDIFFERENCY OF HUMAN ACTIONS.  
I Have often wondered at some Prelatists, charging the poor non-conformists with denial of things indifferent; from which their Writings do sufficiently acquit them: Dr John Burgess (in his Rejoinder, Pag. 188, 189.) tells us, that Mr Bradshaw against all Learning, and sense, resolves, that there is nothing indifferent. But from this accusation, we have Dr Ames his Vindication (in his fresh suit against Ceremonies, pag. 161, 162.) Dr Hammond (in his grounds of Uniformity) accuseth Amesius himself for this opinion; but with how little truth, the Reader may soon see, if he please to peruse these following places in him, Med Theolog. lib. 2. cap. 3. sect. 13, 14, 15. De Conscientiâ etc. lib. 3. cap. 18. Gregory de Valentia informs me, that one of the Articles of John Husse, (anathematised in the Council of Constance) was, that nulla sunt opera indifferentia. That which Papists of old charged upon him, these men impute to those, whom they have been pleased to nickname Puritan's. But for the untruth, and injustice of this crimination, we dare appeal to the more moderate, and Learned of their own party. The Reverend, and Learned Dr Sanderson disputeth against them, for making the restraint of the outward man in matters indifferent, an impeachment to Christian liberty; on Rom: 14.3 Pag. 24.25. And this presupposeth that they held somethings to be in their nature indifferent. I shall therefore spend no more time, or paper, to wipe off an aspersion so manifestly untrue, and unjust: But yet however this hath occasioned me to resolve upon the brief stating of the truth touching things, or actions indifferent: and in order hereunto I shall 1. Premise some Distinctions concerning the actions of man; and 2. Explain what is meant by indifferency.  
1. First, The actions of man are either indeliberate or deliberate.  
1. Indeliberate, which proceed, either from the disposition of natural qualities (as hungering, thirsting, the easing and disburdening of nature) or else from the force of Imagination, (as rubbing of the beard, or hand, scratching of the head, lifting up of a straw from the ground, and such like things, when a man thinks not of them.)  
2. Deliberate, which proceed from deliberate reason and are properly humane, and rational actions, all voluntary actions.  
These may be considered two manner of ways. 1. In the general, actu signato. 2. In the singulars, and individuals, actu exercito.  
The former consideration is merely in regard of the object; The latter taketh in all circumstances whatsoever: The former is a consideration of actions, secundum speciem, according to their sort or kind; The latter is a consideration of them in regard of their actual existence.  
In a second place we are to inquire, what is meant by the indifferency of actions: It apparently carrieth in its notion, a negation of moral goodness, and illness: I say, sig nantèr, of moral goodness, and illness; because the most indifferent actions are transcendently, and may be naturally good. An indifferent action than is that, which is neither morally good, nor evil: The nature of things indifferent, (saith the great Hooker in his Ecclesiast. Policy, Pag. 59) is neither to be commanded, nor forbidden, but left free, and arbitrary: With which I would desire Dr Hammond to reconcile what he hath in his Treatise of Will-worship; that the best of moral actions, the highest degrees of virtue, and of worship, the most superlative love of God are uncommanded: and he, I hope, will give me leave to add, that they are not forbidden, and hereupon I shall conclude, that (by Mr Hooker his definition) they are indifferent; which is as unsober a conceit almost, as can be uttered, and unworthy of any serious refutation. I shall here only make use of part of his expressions against Ames (in his grounds of Uniformity, Pag. 14.) He that thinks the highest degree of virtue is indifferent, doth certainly use other Dictionaries than we do. But to leave him, I shall for clearing the nature of indifferency propound, and satisfy two Queries.  
1. What medium indifferent things are betwixt things morally good, and evil? whether medium abnegationis, or participationis? The Author of Altar Damascenum affirmeth it to be medium or a middle between them by way of abnegation, Adiaphora non sunt media per participationem, ut rubedo inter album, & nigrum; sed per negationem utriúsque extremi, conformitatis & difformitatis ad rectam rationem, seu legem, pag. 496.  
But for the disproof of this, I shall desire you to observe out of 
(a) Esse indifferens ad bonum, & malum contingit dupliciter, aut per modum abstractionis, secundum quod universale aliquid significat ut abstractum 〈◊〉 differentiis, & concontrariis dividentibus ipsum, unde in suâ communitate significatum significatur ut indifferenter se habens adutramque differentiam. Sicut animal réque significatur u● rationale neque ut irrationale, & tamen oporter omne particular animal esse rationale vel irrationale. Et similiter est hoc. Si enim significetur actus in eo quod est agere, haber quiden● bonitatem in quantum est ens, sed indifferenter se habet ad bonitatem, vel malitiam moralen● Et similiter bonum ex genere indifferenter le habet ad bonum & malum ex circumstantiâ 〈◊〉 fine, quamvis non inveniatur aliquod bonum in genere particulari, quod non sit aliquâ circumstantia vestitum, & ad aliquem finem ordinatum, unde oportet, quod bonitatem, vel malitia● contrabat. Et secundum hanc considerationem quidam dixerunt omnes actus indifferen● esse in eo quod sunt accus, & quidam dixerunt, quod non omnes, sed aliqui, accipientes mag● in speciali nomina actuum, quae non exprimunt aliquid, unde actus, ad malitiam vel bonitat● determinetur, vel materiam vel finem vel circumstantiam, sicut comedere, coire, et hujusmo●● Alio modo conting it hoc secúndum, quod aliquod particulare significatum desicit a suscep●bilitate alicujus perfectionis, sicut lapis à susceptibilitate visus, & hoc modo aliqui actus, qui d●● ficiunt a susceptibilitate bonitatis moralis dicuntur indifferenter. lib. 2. senten. dist. 40. quaest. 1.  Capreolus, that a thing may be said to be a medium, or middle betwixt that which is morally good, and morally evil; either by way of abstraction from them (as a general nature is abstracted from its differences, a subject from its accidents,) or else by way of repugnancy unto them, because it is uncapable of them; and thus a stone is of a middle nature betwixt that which seethe, and is blind; because it is uncapable of both sight, and blindness. Now it is this latter way, that a thing is said to be a medium by the abnegation of each extreme, as is evident by the instances usually brought for the exemplification hereof; For they are of such things as are uncapable of, and repugnant unto both extremes. And the most indifferent actions, that proceed from deliberate reason, are capable of becoming either good, or evil, by circumstances, and carry no repugnancy thereunto: so much is confessed by Didoclave himself in the place above mentioned. Tertium quod constituit hujus medii formale est non repugnantia ad utrunque extremum. Actus homicidii in 'bove cornu-peta nullam habet conformitatem, aut difformitatem adrectam rationem, non tamen dicitur actus indifferens, quia ibi est repugnantia ad utrunque extremum, nam bos est animal irrationale. Adiaphora igitur sunt dubia, indistincta, & UTRÓQUE vergentia, sed non magis vergentia in unum quam alterum extremum.  
Others therefore conclude, that indifferent actions are a medium, or middle betwixt good, and bad, in a way of participation; and that either potential, or actual.  
1. Potential, There is in them a non-repugnancy unto either of the extremes, unto moral goodness or badness, so that they may be either good, or bad by circumstances.  
2. Actual, and this agreeth only to such indifferent acts, as become good by circumstances; for they being but imperfectly good, are in part good, and in part evil, and so partake actually of both extremes. By this you may see, though indifferent actions, which proceed from deliberate reason may in some sense be said to be a medium of participation betwixt that which is morally good, or evil; yet they are not said to be a middle of participation in such a strict sense, as lukewarmness is betwixt cold, and heat; for that always partaketh actually of both extremes (cold, and heat,) whereas indifferent actions do not always actually partake of the two extremes, (moral goodness or badness,) but only when they are good; for many of them may be, and too often are by circumstances totally and altogether evil, and in no respect good. Amesius qualifies the matter, and affirmeth that as it is not medium merae abnegationis, so it is medium alicujus participationis, a middle not of mere abnegation, but of some participation. Absolutely, and simply, in strictness of speech, it is neither medium negationis, nor participationis: 1. Not negationis; because it hath no repugnancy unto its extremes: 2. Not participationis; because it doth not always actually partake of both extremes; But yet, secundum quid, after a sort, and in some respect, it may be reduced unto both medium abnegationis, and participationis: It resembleth medium abnegationis, because as such it is neither of the extremes; and it resembleth medium participationis, because sometimes it actually participates of both extremes: And thus you see how these different opinions may be reconciled; But yet (because denominatio fit à potiori) we shall rather reduce it unto medium participationis; because unto that it hath the greatest resemblance.  
A second question is; Whether all indifferent actions be equally indifferent? no more bending unto evil, then unto good? Didoclave holds the affirmative, Nec solum (saith he) requiritur negatio conformitatis, seu difformitatis ad legem ceu rectam rationem, sed etiam majoris propensionis in unam quam in aliam partem. And again afterwards: Adiaphora non sunt magis vergentia in unum quam alterum extremum. The incomparably Learned Dr Sanderson is of a contrary opinion, that some things are unequally indifferent, Indifferentia ad unum (as he is pleased to call them) I shall transcribe his words, and with all due reverence of his person briefly examine them.  
Dr Sanderson on Rom: 3.8 pag. 58.59.  
Things unequally indifferent are such, as though they be neither universally good, not absolutely evil, yet even barely considered, sway more, or less rather the one way, than the other: And that either unto good, or unto evil. Of the former sort are such outward actions, as being in moral precepts indefinitely commanded, are yet sometimes sinfully and ill done: as, giving an alms, hearing a sermon, repr●cving an offender; and the like, which are in themselves good, and so to be accounted, rather than evil; though some unhappy Circumstance or other may make them ill. Of the latter sort are such outward actions, as being in moral precepts indefinitely prohibited, are yet in some cases lawful, and may be well done: as, swearing an oath, travelling on the Sabbath day, playing for money, and the like: which are in themselves rather evil, then good, because they are ever evil, unless all circumstances concur to make them good. Now of these actions, though the former sort carry the face of good, the latter of evil; yet in very truth both sorts are indifferent. Understand me aright: I do not mean indifferent, indifferentiâ contradictionis, such as may be indifferently either done, or not done; but indifferent only indifferentiâ contrarietatis, such as (suppose the doing) may be indifferently either good, or evil: because so they may be done, as to be good, and so they may be done also, as to be evil; but yet with this difference, that those former, though indifferent, and in some cases evil, are yet of themselves notably and eminently inclined unto good rather then evil; and these latter proportionably unto evil, rather than good.  
For answer: The first sort of actions, such as being in moral precepts indefinitely commanded, are yet sometimes sinfully and ill done, (as, giving an alms, hearing a sermon, reproving an offender, and the like,) are not in the language of the Schoolmen, indifferent actions: This I shall make good by an argument out of Suarez (brought by him unto another purpose;) He disputing against some, that held all humane actions to be indifferent, proves the contrary; First in inward, then in outward actions: and his argument concerning outward actions stands thus. If external acts be considered according to an objective goodness, or illness, this cannot be true, because there are many actions in their own nature objectively evil, and prohibited, and there are other also objectively good, and honest; because this goodness, and illness is not taken by extrinsic Denomination, from the inward act, but from its intrinsical agreement with, or repugnancy unto right reason. Those actions which have a material, and objective goodness, are not indifferent actions in the language of the Schools. But the actions, that the Doctor speaks of, have an objective, and material goodness, because they are commanded, and therefore they are not indifferent. But, saith the Doctor, they are indifferent at lest indifferentiâ Contrarietatis, such as (suppose the doing) may be indifferently either good or evil: because so they may be done, as to be good, and so they may be done also, as to be evil.  
For answer: By this account all outward ordinances of God, all external acts of worship, and indeed all outward good works whatsoever should be actions indifferent, because they may be done well, or ill: But to say that all these are indifferent would be very strange language: for although they may have evil cast upon them externally by the agent, yet this is no hindrance but that they may be in themselves objectively and materially good, as being matter of precept.  
But perhaps there may be some mystery in this clause, indefinitely commanded: They are commanded, but not to be performed always, but only l●co, & tempere debitis; according to the known rule, Affirmativa praecepta obligant semper, non ad semper.  
For answer: This will nothing alter the case; for hereby it will follow, that the matter of all affirmative precepts should be indifferent; And whosoever shall say so takes indifferency in a different notion from the usual acception thereof by both Papists, and Protestants; who jointly make it to be a middle thing betwixt that moral goodness, and badness, which is called objective or material.  
As for the second sort of Actions, I readily confess that in some sense they may be said to be unequally indifferent, inclining and swaying more to evil, then to good. To clear which I shall distinguish of a twofold consideration of such actions: They may be considered merely in regard of their object, or else also in regard of the circumstances, which usually are annexed with them: In regard of their object they are equally indifferent; But yet in regard of Circumstances may be said to be more notably and eminently inclined unto evil then unto good; because the circumstances, which generally, and commonly are connexed with them, are evil.  
But as for the reason, which the Doctor bringeth to prove them to be unequally indifferent, rather evil, then good, is to me very unsatisfying. His words are, which are in themselves rather evil, then good, because they are ever evil, unless all circumstances concur to make them good.  
The ground of my exception against this reason is, because as much may be said of all outward good works, religious duties, and services whatsoever: They are all ever evil, unless all circumstances concur to make them good, according to that of Dionysius, Bonum fit ex causâ integrâ malum ex quovis defectu. I shall conclude my answer unto this second Qu●re, with rehearsal of Dr Ames his proposal, and decision of it. An actiones indifferentes nihil inter se differant, sed aequè omnes à bono, & malo distent?  
Resp. In suâ intrinsec â natur â nihil omnino differunt; sed tamen quaedam sunt, quae ut plurimum habent circumstantias malas annexas, atque adeò dicuntur vergere in malum, aut in malum sonare, ut accusatoris aut carnificis munere fungi: quaedam etiam, quae ut plurimum habent circumstantias bonas annexas, atque adeò dicuntur vergere in bonum, aut in bonum sonare, ut colere agros, diligentiam in studiis adhibere, etc.  
In their own intrinsical nature they differ nothing at all: but yet there are some which for the most part have evil circumstances annexed to them, and so bend more toward evil, and have an evil name: as to do the work of an accuser, the office of an hangman, etc. some there be also which for the most part have good circumstances, and so bend toward good, and have a good name, as to till the ground, to follow our study diligently etc.  
Having premised these things, I shall in the next place, proceed to lay down some conclusions concerning the indifferency of the actions of man: and they shall be three.  
1. Conclusion. The Indeliberate actions of man which proceed from the disposition of natural qualities, or only from the Imagination, as to rub the beard, or hands, to scratch the head, to move the head, feet, or a staff (The mind being not intent upon them,) may be, and are indifferent, not only in the general, but in their individuals, and singulars: The reason which 
(b) 1. 2 ae qu. 18. art. 9  Aquinas giveth for this is very solid; Because such actions to speak properly are not moral, and humane, for they do not proceed from the soul as reasonable: Those actions, which are not moral, or of moral consideration, are uncapable of moral goodness or badness: for moral goodness, or badness implieth a moral being: But now those actions which proceed from the disposition of natural qualities, or from the force of the Imagination only are not moral, are not of moral consideration, they are extra genus moris: And the reason is because actions have their morality from this, that they are some way or other immediately, or mediately derived from reason.  
Against this reason of Aquinas, 
(c) 
Sed contra hoe instatur, quia ubi invenitur dominium rationis, vel vosuntatis, ibi invenitur genus moris, led dominium rationis vel voluntatis invenitur non solum in actibus qui sequuntur rationem deliberantem, sed etiam qui praecedunt, in quantum à ratione praeveniri potuerunt, ut dictum suit, supra, dist. 24. q. 5. (alioquin in sensualitate nullum posset esse peccatum) ergo actus procedentes à solâ imaginatione pertinent ad genus moris, qui● subsunt imperio rationis, in quantum ab ea pos●unt praeveniri, et sic per consequens sunt susceptivi bonitatis, & malitiae moralis, cujus oppositum assumebatur pro fundamento.  
Et ad hoc potest dici, quod aliqui actus procedentes ab imaginatione, et praevenientes delib●rationem rationis sunt tales, circa quos ratio debet esse pervigil, ne insurgant, et tales sunt actus appetitus sensitivi circa materiam peccati etc. & respectu talium actuum quantumcunque deliberationem praeveniant, potest esse negligens ratio in reprimendo, & peccare &c, Et de his procedit ratio, scilicet quod sunt aliquo modo in genere moris, rec sunt indisterentes. Alii autem sunt, circa quos ratio nullo modo tenetur esse pervigil, nisi in casu ratione alicujus adjuncti, quia objecta talium secundum se non sunt materia alicujus peccati etc. ut levare festucam, vel fricare barbam: Et tales actus ut sic pervenientes, quos non tenetur praevenire ratio, nifi in casu sunt purè extra genus moris, & indifferentes ad bonum, & malum, de quibus intelligenda est przdicta opinie.   Durand propounds this following objection: that if the acts of the imagination be uncapable of a moral being, and so not of a moral consideration, that then they are uncapable of sin: for every sinful action is a moral action: But now they are not uncapable of sin: for it is most evident, that in sensualitate potest esse peccatum, that sin may be in the indeliberate acts of the sensitive appetite, and in the acts of the imagination; and the reason is, because the sensual powers or faculties are said to belong or appertain unto reason, though not essentialiter, yet participatiuè, as being under the conduct and guidance of right reason, obliged to hearken unto its voice, and to obey all its just Commands, and dictates.  
The answer here-unto in the same Author is, that the indeliberate acts of the sensitive powers, and faculties are of two sorts.  
1. Some have for their matter, sin, and such are moral: for they are voluntary, though not directly, as being produced or commanded by the will, yet indirectly, as being that, which the will is able, and obliged to hinder: and therefore reason ought to be watchful to prevent the rising of them.  
But now there are some indeliberate acts of the sensitive faculties, which have not for their objects the matter of sin, such as are above instanced in, and of them we may say indefinitely, and in the general, that they are not moral; because they are not voluntary, either directly, or indirectly; Reason is not bound to keep any watch over them, nor is the will bound to restrain, and repress them; nisi in casu, ratione alicujus adiuncti, as Durand limits it. As when they are a hindrance to Duties, or against that decency which is required in the worship, and service of God; As for example if a man should be rubbing of his beard, scratching of his head, moving of his feet, or any other part of his body in an undecent way in the act of receiving the elements in the Lord's supper: That which I have said touching this Conclusion is for the substance of it in Ames de Conscientià. lib. 3. cap. 18. His words I shall transcribe. Actiones quaedam ita sunt hominis, ut non sint proprie humanae, illae scilicet, quae procedunt ab imaginatione nudâ, & non a ratione deliberatâ, ut fricare manus, aut barbam, scalpere caput, levare festucam, etc. dum aliud aliquid cogitamus. Hujusmodi actiones non sunt moraliter bonae aut malae: quia non sunt in genere moris constitutae, dum omni consilio destituuntur. Quamvis enim istis etiam p●ssit quis peccare, ut si tempore precum vagari sineret imaginationem suam, et huiusmodi nugis indulgere, ipsae tamen actiones per se neque malae sunt, neque bonae. Subijciuntur quidem istiusmodi motus imperio arbitrii humani; sedita subijciuntur, ut possint exerceri nullo rationis actu praeeunte: nequè ulterius illas ratione praevenire tenemur, quam ut officiis non obsint.— Sicut in oculorum palpebris movendis moderandi potestatem habet ratio, et voluntas: sed non est operae pretium observare quoties connivemus, si modo caveatur, ne praeter decorum, aut officium aliquid in istis admittatur.  
1. There be some actions, which though they be actions of man, yet they are not humane actions, such are those which proceed from imagination only, and not from deliberate reason, as the rubbings of men's hands, to scratch the head or beard, to take up a straw, etc. while we are thinking of something else: these actions are not morally good or evil, they want that which is required to make them so, namely counsel and deliberation: for although a man may sin by those actions, as if in time of prayer he suffer his imagination to wander, and do give way to such toyings as those. Yet these actions considered in themselves are neither good nor evil. It is true these motions are subject to the Command of man's will, but yet they are so subject, that they may be exercised without any precedent act of reason; neither are we bound any farther by reason to prevent them, but only so far that they hinder not the duties we are about. So for moving of the eyelids, reason and the will have power to moderate them, but it is not worth the while to take notice how often we wink, if so be we take heed, that in such things nothing be done, which is undecent, or against our duty.  
A second Conclusion: There be divers deliberate actions, that proceed from deliberate reason, which if they be considered in actu signato, in the general, secundum speciem, according to their sort, or Kind, as abstracted from all singularizing circumstances. are indifferent, neither morally good, nor evil: This I shall confirm by scripture, and by reason.  
1. By scripture: And here we have a most signal place. 1. Cor. 6.12. All things are lawful unto me. Here all things are to be taken not absolutely, but limitedly, for all indifferent things: for as for things Commanded, they are not only lawful, but also necessary, and therefore must be done loco & tempore debitis: And as for things prohibited, they are unlawful and sinful. The words than are an undeniable proof of the indifferency of some actions, and withal an explication of such indifferency: Indifferent actions are merely lawful, neither necessary, nor unlawful; They may lawfully be done, and lawfully be abstained from. In this text than we have the extent of our Christian liberty asserted, and limited.  
1. We have the extent of it unto all indifferent things asserted; And the Apostle contents not himself to affirm it once, but doubleth the affirmation: The reason of which may be, because he thought it an important point, or because he would put it out of all doubt, and controversy.  
2. We have also a twofold limitation, or restraint put upon the use or exercising of our Christian liberty as touching things indifferent; But all things are not expedient; But I will not be brought under the power of any.  
Many think, that Paul speaks these words per mimesin, a figure called imitation; that he speaks not in his own person, but rehearseth the words of the Corinthians: so that here is, first Corinthiorum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the objection of the Corinthians, All things are lawful for me: secondly, Aposteli 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the reply of Paul, But all things are not expedient: But I will not be brought under the power of any. But whether the Apostle uttered his own words, or the Corinthians is not material: because, suppose they be the words of the Corinthians, he grants them with due limitations: The sentence of Paul, saith Aegidius Hunnius, consists of a concession, and correction.  
1. A Concession of the lawfulness of all indifferent things. All things are lawful for me.  
2. A Correction or restriction of this large grant: wherein he showeth: that though all indifferent things be in their general nature lawful; yet they are in some cases to be abstained from, when they are inexpedient: when they enthrall us unto either persons, or things: But all things are not expedient: But I will not be brought under the power of any.  
A great difference there is amongst expositors about the coherence of these words: Some think, that the Apostle makes way for that Argument which he handles at large chap: 9 All things are lawful for me; therefore to receive a salary for preaching of the Gospel is lawful: But I will not make use of this my liberty: Because it will not be expedient unto the promoting of the Gospel amongst you, but an hindrance rather: And because I will retain my full liberty of reproving you, which I shall in great part lose, if I should receive my whole livelihood from you: As it fares with the false prophets among you, that are no better than Trencher chaplains, that dare not touch your sores, meddle with either your sins, or errors, for fear that hereupon you should shorten your benevolence: I will not be brought under the power of any. But the coherence is too fare fetched, and we may say the same of others, who would make these words to cohere with chap. 8. v. 9  
Others with more probability derive the connexion of the words only from the present chapter: and they are again subdivided: some fetch it from the words foregoing: Others from the words following.  
1. From the words foregoing. The Apostles discourse about going to law with Brethren before the unjust, and unbelievers: The Corinthians might be ready to object in behalf of this their practice, that it was a thing in its own nature indifferent, not prohibited by the word of God, and therefore lawful; for all things are lawful, that is all indifferent things. True, saith the Apostle, but. 1. all things are not expedient: And in particular for Christians to sue Christians before Paganish Tribunals is so far from being expedient, as that it is an impediment unto Christians own glorifying of God in his immediate worship and service, as also unto their quiet, peaceable, and comfortable communion with Brethren.  
2. I will not be brought under the power of any, either persons, or things. And if you go in this manner to law with your Brethren you will put yourselves under the power of many both persons, and things.  
1. Persons: Perhaps you will lie at the mercy of an unjust judge: a false witness may undo you; A corrupt lawyer betray you; your own witnesses will command your table, and purse, though for attesting the truth; And though your Advocates be never so faithful, you must give them your most diligent attendance; As the proverb is, you must not only pay, but pray them too.  
2. Things: The many matters, the things of the world, which you sue for, will have you so fare under their power, as that they will be a great hindrance to your free, and full service of God; for if they do not wholly withdraw you from it, they will wonderfully distract you in it; Because law suits will take up the greatest part of your time, and the best of your thoughts. 
(d) Quidem hanc partem sic explicant: Sub nullius redigar potestate, i. e. Non patiar me propter res pecuniarias, ac temporales, vesut essem sub earum potestate, vel abstrahi vel distrahi, quo minus li. berè, & absque impedimento serviam Deo, quod non potero, si tempus & cogitationes impendam litibus. Esthius in loc.   
Add unto this, that for Christians, especially in those primitive times, to pursue their Brethren unto the judgment-seats of heathens, in matters capable of an amicable compromise by the mediation of Brethren, was a plain evidence, that they were under the power of the world, and the things thereof; for who but a muckworme, a vassal to his wealth, would do a thing so much unto the discredit of the Gospel, and reproach of Christianity; especially seeing they might with greater probability expect justice from the umpirage of saints, than the sentences of professed unbelievers?  
Others in the next place look for the cohaesion of these words forwards, upon the Apostles ensuing discourse, touching fornication: not only the Corinthians, but the Gentiles in general held simple fornication to be a thing indifferent. The old man in the Comedian, spoke the sense of the generality of them: Crede mihi non est slagitium adolescentulum scortari. And you will the less wonder at this, if you consider, that Durand, a Popish Schoolman, held it to be unlawful, not by the law of nature, but only by the positive law of God: Quod autem dicunt quidam, quod simplex fornicatio est peccatum mortale de se, exclusâ omni lege positiuâ, divinâ & humanâ, non benè intelligo, lib. 4. dist. 33. quaest. 2. And upon the Consideration of this opinion of the Gentiles touching the indifferency of fornication it was, (think interpreters,) that fornication is Acts. 15. by the first Council ranged amongst indifferent things, blood, and things strangled; The use of which was forbidden only for a time. Unto this erroneous supposition the Apostle answereth per limitationom, & per inficiationem: He limits the general rule touching things indifferent, and then he denieth the instance in question; And this his denial he illustrateth, and confirmeth from vers. 13. unto the end of the chapter. Unto this his denial he premifeth limitations of the general rule. All indifferent things are lawful: He puts a double restraint upon it. The first; But all things are not expedient, or profitable: Many indifferent things sometimes prove an impediment unto our Christian race, and then they are to be forborn. A second restraint is in these words: But I will not be brought under the power of any: My affection unto indifferent things shall be so temperate, as that it shall be in my power to forbear them upon reasonable and important Considerations. There should be an indifferency in our desires towards things indifferent, so that they should not have the command of us▪ but we should be able to use, or not to use them, as the concurrence of particular circumstances guide us.  
To give yet further light unto these words, I shall briefly consider their coherence as they lie in 1 Cor. 10.23. with little variation. The Apostle there states a case of Conscience touching the eating of Idolothytes, things offered unto Idols. First, he resolves, that to eat them publicly in the temple of Idols, at the idolatrous feasts of these Idols, was to have communion in the worship of these idols to have fellowship with Devils; to be partakers of the table of Devils: He that did thus eat them, did eat them considered formally, as sacrificed and consecrated to idols; He did eat them in the honour of the idols, unto which they were offered; He did tacitly acknowledge their Deity, and interpretatively approve of the Idolatrous worship and service of them; But now the Apostle alloweth a private use of things offered to idols, If they were not eaten under a religious notion, but considered only and materially as meat, matter of food, and as the good creatures of God. Two cases he instanceth in, wherein they might be thus eaten; First, they might buy them in the shambles, and eat them in their own houses, vers. 25. And secondly, they might eat them at the tables of their unbelieving neighbours, that invited them: This latter part of the Determination of the question he confirms, and limiteth, by putting in an exception in the case of scandal: And unto all this he prefixeth the extension of our Christian liberty, unto all indifferent things in the general, together with two restrictions, that we are to put upon it in the use and exercise: Even indifferent things are to be forborn, when they are not profitable, and conducing unto the ends, which a Christian should propound: when they are destructive and scandalous unto our Brethren: 
(*) 
Omniamihi licent, omnia scilicet adiaphora, quale est comedere idolothyta, non quasi sacra, aut quasi idolothy. ta, sed tanquam communes cibos.  
Ubi nota, Hactenus egit Paulus de idolothytis, qua talibus, ficque vetuit ea comedere. Unde v. 14. Fugite, ait, ab idolorum cultu, scilicet, ne sitis mensae, & calicis daemoniorum participes, ut explicat v. 20. puta, comedendo cibos idolis oblatos, eo modo & iis circumstantiis, quibus censeamini eos, quasi sacros, seu quasi idolothytum in honorem idoli velle comedere● hoc vero versu transit ad secundum casum, scilicet, quo idolothytum non formaliter qua idolothytum, sed materialiter, qua cibus vel caro est, comeditur, & de hoc ait: omn●a mihi licent, sed non omnia expediunt, quia, ut sequitur, non omnia aedificant. Quasi dicat, Materialiter licet vesci idolothyto per se, per accidens tamen non licet, si sequatur scandalum, pater ex v. 27. 28. 33. Cornel. Alapide in loc.   All things are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient: All things are lawful for me, but all things edify not.  
Unto these two places (1 Cor. 6.12. 1 Cor. 10.23.) I shall add one more (1 Cor. 8.8.) But meat Commends us not to God: for neither, if we eat are we the better: neither if we eat not, are we the worse: Meat (that is) the use and eating of meat (abstractly considered, and in the general) commendeth us not to God: for the kingdom of God is not meat and drink: for neither if we eat, are we the better, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, have we the more, (that is) the more virtue in ourselves, the more grace and favour with God: Neither if we eat not, are we the worse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, have we the less, the less virtue in ourselves, the less acceptation with God: Eating then of any sort or kind of meat (considered, as abstracted from all singularizing circumstances) is a thing indifferent that hath neither virtue, nor vice in it, neither pleaseth nor displeaseth God: And what the Apostle speaketh of eating of meat, is appliable by way of analogy and proportion unto a world of things of the like nature, as shall be manifested by the reasons for the Conclusion, unto which in the next place I hasten.  
The Protestants generally thus argue: The nature of things indifferent (as the Learned Hooker determineth) is neither to be commanded nor forbidden, but left free and arbitrary: But now there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that are in the general neither commanded, nor forbidden (as to eat, drink, go a journey, walk into the field:) Therefore there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that are in the general, and for the kind indifferent. This argument the Papists dislike because they think, that there are matters of Counsel, which contain the highest degree of moral goodness, and perfection: And yet think they are uncommanded, and no man will say that they are forbidden. The Argument of the Schoolmen therefore generally runs thus: Actions, that are neither agreeable, nor disagreeable unto right reason are indifferent: But there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that in their general nature, and consideration carry, neither conformity, nor repugnancy unto right reason: And therefore there are divers humane and voluntary actions, that are indifferent. This argument is thus managed by 
(h) Ubi autem ratio non debet esse magis recta affirmando quam n●gando, ibi voluntas non debetmagìscon formari rationi affirmativae quam negativae: unde potest sic argui. Ille actus nec est bonus, nec est malus, circa quem ratio non potest esse magis recta in affirmando quam in negando, sed levare festucam, quantum est praecisè ex ratione, quam fortitur actus ex objecto, est hujusmodi, quia ratio neque affirmando quod levanda est, neque negando levandam esse magis recta est, ergo actus de se neque bonus est, neque malus. Major pater, quia persecutio & fuga actus voluntatis quoad bonitatem vel malitiam correspondent affirmationi, & negationi rationis practicae quoad veritatem & falsitatem, & ideò ubi est ratio aeque indifferens quoad veritatem, & falsitatem in affirmando & negando, ibi est actus indifferens quoad malitiam & boniratem in prosequendo, & fugiendo. Minor probatur, quia rectitud● retionis confi●it in conformitate ad aliquam legem naturalem vel divinam vel ex his derivatam, ●irea autem tales actus, ut levare festucam; vel buiusmodi, nulla lex aliquid determinat, nec divina, nec naturalis, nec ex his derivata, ergo circa eos sic acceptos ratio non potest habere aliquam rectitudmem, vel obliquitatem magis in affirmando quam in negando, & haec suit minor. Sequitur ergo conclusio. lib. 2. dist. 40. q. 1.  Durand: That act is neither good nor evil, but indifferent, Concerning which there is in the reason of man no more rectitude, or irrectitude and obliquity in the affirmation, then in the negation in its dictating either the practice, or in its dictating the forbearance thereof. For the pursuit and eschewall of the will are in regard of moral goodness, or badness correspondent unto the dictates of the practical understanding, and therefore where there is an indifferency in point of truth in the understandings dictates concerning the doing, or not doing of a thing, there is an indifferency in regard of moral goodness or badness in the wills embracing, or eschewing of that thing. If the understanding err not, whether it prescribe the performance, or forbearance of an action, than the will sinneth not, whether it perform or forbear it: But there are divers acts concerning which there is in the reason of man no more rectitude, or irrectitude and obliquity in the affirmation, then in the negation of them, in its dictating the practice, or in its dictating the forbearance of them: This he proveth because the rectitude of reason consists in conformity unto some natural law, or some divine law, or some law derived from these: But there are divers humane actions concerning which, there occurreth no such law, either forbidding, or commanding: and therefore there is no rectitude or obliquity in the reasons or understandings affirming or denying of them. It is indifferent, which way the understanding takes, whether it dictates the doing or not doing of them: and consequently it is indifferent, whether the will willeth, or nilleth them. Here by the way I cannot but take notice, how Durand unawares crosseth their doctrine of Evangelicall Counsels: for Suarez (de leg. lib. cap. 14.) will tell him, that Counsel is not properly a Law: By this doctrine of Durand then in matters of Counsel there should be no rectitude of reason, because no conformity unto any law: But this by the by.  
This argument is yet further improved by 
(g) Sunt quidem complure● actus, quos dum praecisè consideramus, ut versantur circ● hoc, vel illud objectum; nec laudamus, nee vituperamus tanquam bonos vel malos, sed censemus esse indifferentes. Loquimur enim in proposito debonitate, & malitiâ morali propriè, ut scilicet bonitas non est qualis cunque congruentia cum ratione; & voluntate hominis, sed congruentia ejusmodi, ut habeat laudem secundùm aestimationem hominum; tanquam aliquid, nempe quod quadret in rationem hominis, etiam ut recta est, & ut is habet sibi à Deo propositam beatitudinem, ut ultimum finem. Quemadmodum etiam contra, malitia moralis, cui opponitur moralis bonitas, consistit in repugnantiâ quâdam erga rationem rectam hominis, quae secundum humanam aestimationem habeat vituperium, tanquam aliquid repugnans, & nocens homini, ut is hibeat beatitudinem propositam sicut ultimum sinem omnium actionum. Sic itaque loquendo proprie de bonitate, vel malitiâ morali affirmamus, quosdam esse actus, qui ex objecto suo nee boni, nec mali sunt, sed indifferentes. Tom: 2. Com. Theol▪ qu. 13. punct: 2.  Gregery de Valentia. The Moral goodness (saith he) which we speak of, is such a congruence unto reason, as carrieth praise with it according unto the usual estimate of men, and appertaineth unto man's everlasting happiness, his chief, and sovereign end; and answerably the moral illness or badness of an action stands in such a repugnancy unto right reason, as that according to the usual estimation of men, it is worthy of dispraise, and is an impediment unto his attaining his supreme end, the eternal bliss of his soul; But now there are several humane actions that considered in themselves have neither praise nor dispraise; neither prejudice, nor advantage the salvation of our souls; are neither helps, nor lets unto the obtaining of our highest end and happiness, and therefore there are actions morally indifferent.  
Unto what hath been said, I shall add two arguments more out of a late Philosopher. Irenaeus, A Carmelite or white Friar 
(h) 
Si omnis actus esset bo●as aut malus ex suo objecto, seu suâ specie, liceret nobis judicare de ●uolibet proxi●i opere, & tale ●psum asserere, ●uale habet ob●ectū, sicuti ●ctus ex ob●ecto determi●atospronunti●musbonos, aut ●alos determi●atè: sed non ●cet ita de sin●ulis Judicare, 〈◊〉 Matth: 7. ●ujus ratio ●st apud patres, & Interpretes quod plerique actus sint medii, scilicet de se indifferentes, ut sint ●oni, aut mali: ergo, etc.  
Multi actus sunt mali praecise ratione prohibitionis, V.G. portare arma de nocte: ergo i●●nt ex specie suâ indifferentes. Ethic: cap: 3. Sect: 2.    
First, upon actions morally good, or bad, we may lawfully pass our Censures, that they are such; But we should pass rash judgement, if we should censure Divers actions of our Brothers to be determinately virtuous, or determinately vicious, moraly good or bad: Let not him that eateth not judge him which eateth. Rom. 14.2. There are therefore some actions, which for their kind are neither good, nor bad, but indifferent.  
Secondly, Many acts are evil, only by the prohibition of some positive law; As unto the Jews it was unlawful to eat Swine's flesh, to wear a garment of divers colours, as of woollen and linen together, Deut. 22.11. These actions therefore, and many the like, were of themselves, and in their own nature, indifferent, and became unlawful only by the ceremonial law given unto the Jews, which law being abrogated, it is now a thing indifferent and lawful for Christians to eat swine's flesh, or not to eat it, to wear a garment of linsey-woolsey, or not.  
Unto these scriptures and reasons I shall add the testimony of Hierome, frequently quoted for this purpose. Bonum, inquit, est continentia, malum est luxuria. Inter utrumque indifferens ambulare, capitis, naribus purgamenta projicere, sputis rheumat a jacere. Hoc nec benumb, nec malum est: siuè enim feceris, siuè non feceris, nec justitiam habebis, nec injustitiam. Aristotle, and Sextus Empyricus give in their verdict for the truth of this assertion, whose say the reader may peruse at large in Raynaudus moral. discipline. distinct. 4. quaest. 1. Art. 3. num. 39 pag. 550.  
There is but one Considerable objection, which I shall briefly propound and answer. Whatsoever agreeth unto the species, the sort or kind of a thing, agreeth unto all individuals contained under it, And therefore if there be humane actions, that be indifferent, secundum speciem, according to their kind, the Individuals of such actions are indifferent too, which will be opposed in a third Conclusion: That which doth agree unto a thing per se, the opposite thereof cannot agree unto it, either per se, or per Accidens: And therefore if some actions are per se of themselves indifferent, it is impossible for the Individuals of such actions to be morally good, or evil. 
(i) Dicendum est quod actum ●sse indifferentem secundum speciem suam potest intellig● dupliciter, scilicet secundum quod negatio importata per hoc quod est indifferens, potest duplicitet ordinari ad copulam verbalem: uno enim modo potest post poni, & sic est sensus, qd de ratione specificâ actus est, quod sit indifferens et si isto modo aliquis actus secendum speciem esset indifferens. non solùm esset impossibile dare sub tali specie actum individualem indifferentem, immo impossibile esset sub tali specie dari actum, nisi indifferentem, quia ea quae sunt de ratione speciei conveniunt omni individuo sub tali specie, sed si nullus est actus indifferens secundum speciem suam; sub quo tamen sensu argumentum procedit. Alio modo potest negatio importata per hoc, quod est indifferens, praeponi copulae verbali sub hoc sensu, quod de ratione specificâ actus non est, quod fit indifferenter, vel determinate bonus vel malus, sed tamen utrunque potest ipsi per aliud convenire, sicut homo ex suâ specie non habet quod sit determinate albus, vel determinate niger: et tamen per aliud ei utrunque iftorum convenit. Et hoc modo sunt multiactus qui sunt indifferentes secundum suam speciem, nullus tamen secundum individuum, quia individuum multa includit quoad existentiam suam quae ad rationem speciei non pertinent. Lib. 2. dist. 40. q. 1.   
Unto this objection Durand answereth, by distinguishing of a twofold sense of this expression. An act is indifferent secundum speciem, according to its kind. The first is, that indifferency is of the specific nature of such an act. And this sense, which is the sense of the objection, is false, for than it would be impossible for any individuals of such an act not to be indifferent: But now there is a second sense of the expression, that the specific nature of such an action doth not involve, or imply in its notion moral either goodness or illness, But is equally and indifferently abstracted from both: And this sense is true: It is not of the specific nature of many actions to be determinately good, or determinately evil; though they may be either by circumstances. As for the confirmation which is added; 
* Morisan Ethic. Murc: Physic.  The answer unto it is usually as followeth; A thing may be said to agree unto another per se, either positively, or negatively.  
1. Positively, when it is predicated in primo, or secundo modo dicondi per se, when it is either an essential predicate, or proper passion: And thus it agreeth unto man to be a sensitive creature, to be endued with the powers of understanding, willing, laughing, &c: And in this sense indifferency doth not agree per se, unto any humane voluntary actions, for than it would agree unto them always, and in all places, so that it would be utterly impossible for the individuals of such actions to be morally either good, or bad.  
2. Negatively, When a thing of itself is not such, although by accident it may be such: And thus we may say of a man, that per se he is not white, he is not black, he is not tawny, he is not of an olive colour, or the like, because each of these colours considered separately, are accidental unto the nature of man, considered in the general, and in itself: And yet the individuals of the nature of man may some of them be white, some black, some tawny, some of an olive colour, or the like: Even so we may say of divers voluntary rational actions of man; that per se, (considered, as devested from all circumstances) they are indifferent, morally neither good, nor bad: because moral goodness and badness is accidental unto the nature of such actions considered in themselves, and yet the individuals of such actions are all of them either good, or evil, 'las shall be cleared by the next conclusion, unto which before we proceed, let us make some application of this second conclusion.  
Against this doctrine of Indifferency there are two failings; one in the defect, Another in the excess:  
There are, First, some, that fail in the defect, who know not the full extent of indifferency: and so either impose, as necessary, or condemn, as sinful, things that are in their own nature indifferent. Thus in the primitive Romish Church there were some new converts, who abstained from swine's flesh, and other meats prohibited by the ceremonial law, as unlawful, The use of which yet was indifferent and lawful under the Gospel: I know, and am persuaded (saith Paul,) by the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of itself. Rom. 14.14. Thus also amongst the Corinthians there were some weak Christians, that branded for Communion, and fellowship with Idolaters all eating of things offered unto idols, Though bought in the market, or eaten at private meetings; In both which yet Paul pronounceth in general there was no unlawfulness, 1. Cor. 10.25, 27. Amongst us there are divers persons, that are doubtless well affected in matters of Religion, and yet are too rigid in censuring as sins divers innocent and harmless recreations: This is an error in, and consequently a blemish unto the understanding: Paul calls it a weakness in the faith, Rom. 14.1. that is an imperfection in point of knowledge, and that privative, or : For the faith and conscience of indifferent things is never indifferent, we are never to judge a thing indifferent, to be either sinful or necessary. Our Saviour's command, John 7.24. Judge righteous judgement may be extended unto things and actions as well as persons: Therefore as we are not to call good, evil, or evil, good; so neither are we to call things indifferent, either evil, or necessary. This is injuriously to straiten the grand Charter of our Christian liberty, and presumptuously to make the narrow way to heaven narrower than ever God made it. Besides, it openeth a gap unto many mischiefs, it filleth the Church of God with needless, and endless disputes, it perplexeth the minds of many conscientious people with unnecessary and unprofitably scruples; it causeth many bitter and uncharitable censures, and occasioneth many dangers: In the believing Jews that lived in the Church of Rome, in Paul's time, there was but a little mistake touching things indifferent, meats and days; but how pernicious was the sequel hereof? Hereupon the strong despised the weak, and the weak judged the strong, Rom. 14. And this was a great disturbance unto the peace of the Church, and a great hindrance unto the comfortable communion of the Saints.  
2. Against this doctrine of indifferency there are some, secondly, that fail in the excess, who make things necessary or sinful, to be but indifferent. There be some, that hold observation of the Lords day, preaching of the word, in distinction from mere reading of it to be no ordinances of God, but things merely indifferent; Erastians' affirm, that Church Government, and Ecclesiastical censures are only matters of indifferency: The Heathens in the Apostles times generally ranked fornication amongst things indifferent: The like estimate some of the Corinthians had of eating things offered to Idols, in the midst of an Idols temple, at a religious feast of that Idol, which was a palpable communicating with Devils, and therefore a fact in its own nature unlawful: And some Travellers, that profess themselves Protestant's, have as large and lose Consciences, as these Corinthians had; for they have the same opinion of being present at an idolatrous mass, and bowing to popish Idols. Dr Peter Heylin (as himself informeth us) made no scruple of kissing a Crucifix, when it was desired of him, to discriminate him from a Hugenot: No less lose were the Principles of the Adiaphorists, and Flaccians in Charles the 5th his time, who pressed the Interim; which gave allowance to divers errors, and superstitions of the Church of Rome, as matters that were indifferent: Our Prelatists ever and anon in the controversy of Symbolical ceremonies allege their indifferency as a thing without dispute, which is never granted by us; however it may sometimes for disputation's sake be supposed. But what talk we of Ceremonies, whilst some of greatest note amongst them have so eagerly pleaded for such sports, and pastimes upon the Lord's day as indifferent, which a devout Papist would reckon a gross profanation thereof? Now this latter failing against the Doctrine of indifferent actions, in a way of excess, is as much against the Purity of the Church, as the former failing, in a way of defect, was against the peace of the Church: It opens as wide a door to all licentiousness and profaneness to call good and evil indifferent, as it doth to call good evil, or evil good, and therefore a woe equally belongs unto it with this latter.  
Secondly, we may be exhorted unto thankfulness, Because God hath indulged us Christians a greater extent of our liberty about things indifferent, than he ever vouchsafed unto the Jewish Synagogue. Many things, in their own nature indifferent, were prohibited them by positive precepts, and so made unlawful unto them; This was a yoke (said Peter,) which they were unable to bear, Acts 15.10. Blessed therefore be God, who hath freed us from this yoke by our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath abolished in his flesh the law of Commandments contained in Ordinances, Eph. 2.15. So that now all (indifferent) things are lawful unto us; There is nothing unclean of itself, Rom. 14.14. all things indeed are pure, Rom. 14.20. Unto the pure all things are pure, Tit. 1.15. Every creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused, 1 Timoth. 4.4.  
There be two ways, unto which I shall direct for expressing our thankfulness for the enlargement of this our liberty. 1. A stout asserting of it. 2. A due and discreet use of it.  
1. A stout asserting of it against Judaisme, Popery, or any other sect or party, that shall be so presumptuous towards God, and injurious towards us, as to abridge us thereof in any part. Stand fast therefore in the liberty, wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage, Gal. 5.1. The Apostle would have us not to be entangled again with the Jewish yoke of bondage; And there is the same reason, why in indifferent things we should decline any other yoke of bondage, which any man whatsoever should make, and attempt to put upon our necks: for liberty towards things indifferent is one branch of that liberty, wherewith Christ hath made us free: and therefore we should stand fast against all opposers. But now in this our asserting of our Christian liberty we should use a great deal of moderation towards weak dissenting brethren: 'Tis ●he A●●●ce which the Apostle Paul gives in the like case, Rom. 14.3. Let not him that eateth, despise him, that eateth not: The eating of meats prohibited by the Mosaical Law was after Christ's death indifferent; But yet there were among the Romans some weaklings in the faith, who thought the ceremonial law still in force, and consequently judged, the eating of all meats therein forbidden, to be sinful; Now the Apostle would not have those that were strong in the faith, that is, more knowing, better principled, and more fully instructed in the extent of their Christian liberty to despise, to disdain, and contemn those poor souls for their ignorance, and weakness in judgement; But to reach out the right hand of fellowship unto them, to receive them into an intimate communion, to deal gently, and tenderly with them, restoring them in the spirit of meekness, with all possible prudence, and caution: Him, that is weak in the faith, receive you, but not to doubtful disputations, Rom. 14.1. The Apostle doth not prohibit altogether all disputations for the future touching the point in controversy: for he himself elsewhere very zealously disputes the matter, only he interdicts such disputes as were unseasonable for the present: because these Jewish converts were so extremely wedded unto the Law of Moses, as that to have pressed upon them in their first conversion an abolition thereof, was the ready way to have utterly prejudiced them against and alienated them from Christianity: He would have them first to be taught the first principles of the Oracles of God, the first Principles of the Doctrine of Christ, Heb. 5.12. and chap. 6. vers. 1. And when they were well principled, and settled in the Christian faith, than they might proceed to a calm, and peaceable debate of this subject: for then their mind would be more capable of instruction, and the forementioned prejudice would be more easily removed: Indeed, after a while, there would be no place for such a prejudice: for when once there was a plenary promulgation of the Gospel, to observe them afterwards would be a virtual abrenunciation of the Christian Religion, a denial, that Christ is come in the flesh. When once the Apostles had gived the Jewish Synagogue and Ceremonies an honourable funeral, and respective burial, for any man afterwards to revive the observation of them, would be to rake in their dust, and sacrilegiously to violate their grave: Preindè nunc quisquis Christianorum, quamvis sit ex Judaeis, similitèr ea celebrare voluerit, tanquam sopitos cineres eruens, non erit pius deductor vel baiulus corporis, sed impius sepulturae violator, August: Epist. 19  
A second way of expressing our thankfulness for the extension of our Christian liberty in things indifferent is a due and discreet use of it, such an use of it as mayst, and with God's glory, and may be no ways inconsistent with our own or others edification. Touching this use of our liberty Paul gives us a general caution, Gal. 5.13. only use not liberty for an occasion unto the flesh; that is, to live according unto the flesh. Suitable unto which also is the advice of St Peter, 1 Pet. 2.16. not using your liberty for a cloak of maliciousness, But as the servants of God: In which advice there are two parts: On enegative: not using your liberty for a cloak of maliciousness: that is, for a colour or pretence unto any sin for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is (as Dr Sand●rson well observeth) taken here more largely for all manner of evil and naughtiness, according unto the adequate signification of the Greek and Latin Adjectives, from whence the substantive used in the text is derived. Another part of the advice is affirmative, using your liberty as the servants of God: that is in the use of this liberty admit of nothing, that may be prejudicial unto the service, unto the honour and glory of God: for this would be a most unthankful abuse, and not a true use of it.  
To inform us more fully, and particularly what we are to do in this weighty point, I shall briefly propound such restraints, as we are by the rule of Scripture to put on the use, and exercise of our Christian liberty in things indifferent, for without such restraints we can never use this our liberty aright, and as we ought: There be some lose people, that are impatient of all these restraints: If they judge a thing lawful in itself, they never consider, or consult farther, but without more ado adventure on it: But these men ever and anon abuse their liberty unto God's dishonour, their own danger, and the scandal of both brethren, and aliens: They use their liberty as an occasion to the flesh, for a cloak of maliciousness: He that gives himself the full swing in things indifferent, He that will do whatsoever is lawful, will soon slide into things unlawful, and ere he is ware indulge himself in the practice of them: So Clemens Alexandrinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 1. Qui faciunt quicquid licet, huc cito delabuntur, ut faciant quod non licet. For prevention of this licentiousness, I shall out of God's word recommend unto you six restraints to be put upon this part of your Christian liberty in the use and exercise of it, 1. By Prudence. 2. By Temperance and Sobriety. 3. By Conscience. 4. By Religion. 5. By Authority. 6. By Charity,  
1. By Prudence: which in indifferent things is, first, to compare them with those ends which every Christian should aim at. 2. To consider whether there concur not an obligation to some duty, or other.  
First then, It is the work of Christian prudence to compare indifferent actions with those ends, which every Christian should propound unto himself: the glorifying of God, the salvation of his own soul, and the edifying of Brethren: And to examine whether they be expedient, or inexpedient, profitable and conducing, or unprofitable and impedient unto these ends: And if upon due consideration it finds them inexpedient, an hindrance unto these ends, it then forthwith dictates a forbearance of them: Because whatsoever is an impediment unto these ends is opposite unto them, and in that regard sinful: This restraint our Apostle layeth down in way of Doctrine for the instruction of all. All things are lawful for me, But all things are not expedient, 1 Cor. 6.12. and Chapped 9 we have him putting it upon himself in his own practice: It was lawful for him to have received of the Corinthians a competent, and honourable maintenance, for his labour in the Word and Doctrine, as being a matter of due debt from them: But he did not exact it, but wrought with his hands for his livelihood, because he found it would have obstructed, and hindered the end of his preaching, which was the spreading of the Gospel, that the word of the Lord might have free course, and be glorified in the conversion of souls.  
A second act of Prudence about indifferent things is to consider, whether in that nick of time we are about an indifferent action there concur not an obligation unto some duty or other; And if there do, than prudence dictates, that pro hic & nunc, we should abstain from that indifferent action; because otherwise we should prefer it above a necessary and commanded duty; And though it be simply in itself lawful, it would become accidentally sinful, to wit, by comparison; Thus it would be sinful for a man to walk in the fields, if there lay upon him at the same time an obligation to hear such a sermon: Thus also it would be sinful for a man to follow recreations in themselves lawful, when the necessities of his family call upon him to follow his occupation, the works of his ordinary calling.  
A second Restraint (that we are to put upon the use of our liberty about things indifferent) is by temperance and sobriety, and this restraint also we have laid down by the Apostle in the place but now quoted. 1. Cor. 6.12. All things are lawful for me, But I will not be brought under the power of any: Now what is it that brings a man under the power of meats, and drinks, apparel, recreations? but an over-vehement affection unto them. This makes man a vassal unto those things, over which God hath given him a full Lordship, and dominion: Qui nimis rem aliquam amat (saith Aquinas) quodam modo servus istius efficitur, He that loves a thing overmuch, renders himself thereby the servant thereof: Know ye not that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are, to whom ye obey, Rom. 6.16. He that immoderately affects those things, that are in themselves indifferent, cannot disobey, or resist the least temptation unto sin drawn from them, and therefore is no better than a slave unto them, nay an Idolater of them: You may see how Paul censures the false Prophets for such an excess, Rom. 16.18. They that are such serve not our Lord Jesus Christ, but their own belly, Their God is their belly Phil. 3.19. We may say the like of those, that like the rich glutton, Luke. 16.19. far sumptuously or deliciously every day, and will have a splendid retinue, when the lowness of their state requires a meaner table and smaller attendance; of those that are wedded unto such gaiety and bravery of apparel as is above their purses, or unsuitable unto their age, and rank; As also of those that are so mad upon their recreations, sports and pastimes, as that in the pursuit of them they forgo their meals, and sleep, they neglect the worship of God, and their particular callings, unto their great impoverishment, if not final and total beggary.  
A third limitation upon the exercise of our Christian liberty in things indifferent is to be by conscience: for though a man's conscience cannot legitimate sins, either of Commission, or Omission; yet it is of force sufficient to make that sinful, which is in it self indifferent, & lawful: for this we have the Apostles determination, and that touching both a condemning and doubting conscience.  
1. A Condemning Conscience, Rom. 14.14. I know and am persuaded by the Lord jesus, that their is nothing unclean of itself; But unto him that esteemethany thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean. Unto the authority of Paul's Testimony I shall add two reasons.  
1. Every man takes the voice of his conscience to be the voice of God; And therefore he that doth a thing in itself indifferent against the judgement of his Conscience, he disobeyeth and slighteth the voice of God, as for the manner of his action, and is a fighter against God.  
A second reason I shall give you in the words of Willet upon the place, Because the goodness or badness of an action is esteemed by the will and affection of the doer; Now when he thinketh a thing to be evil, and yet doth it, It shows that such an one hath, deliberatam peccandi voluntatem, a deliberate mind and purpose to sin.  
The Apostle, secondly, gives us the same resolution touching a Doubting conscience, Rom. 14.23. He that doubteth, is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith; for whatsoever is not of faith, is sin: that is; he that performech an indifferent action, and yet doubteth of the lawfulness thereof, deserveth damnation, because he doth not act out of faith; for whatsoever we perform, though, it be (intrinsically, in itself) matter of indifferency; nay though it be matter of duty, yet if it proceed not from a belief of its lawfulness it becomes (accidentally and extrinsecally) sinful; It betrays a wicked and a wretched heart, that is not afraid of sin, but in a great readiness to commit it; who, almost would do any thing that he doubteth would anger and grieve a dear friend? God then is not so dear as he should be unto such men, as dare adventure upon the practice of that, which they are doubtful is displeasing unto him: Let us therefore hearken unto that exhortation, which the Apostle gave unto the Romans concerning things indifferent, Rom. 14.5. Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind: And this exhortation he backs with a very good reason. ver. 22. Happy is he which condemneth not himself in that thing which he alloweth: that is, he that doth not condemn as sinful, that which he chooseth and embraceth in his practice; such a man is in that respect, and so fare forth happy, as being free from those terrors, which torment those, who do what their consciences condemn.  
Thus you see, that not only condemnation, but doubtfulness of Conscience is a sufficient warrant to forbear things that are in themselves indifferent: But yet it is no ground for us to assume a liberty of condemning the same things in others, who are sufficiently satisfied touching their indifferency and lawfulness: Let not him that eateth not judge him that eateth. Rom. 14.3. Let not him that is weak in the faith, that out of ignorance censureth, or suspecteth divers actions to be sinful, which he cannot prove to be so by any convincing argument; Let not such an one condemn for such actions the strong in the faith, those who are as godly and more knowing, than themselves: This exhortation the Apostle enforceth by divers reasons in the following words; for God hath received him; who art thou, that judgest another man's servant? To his own master he standeth or falleth, yea, he shall be holden up; for God is able to make him stand, ver. 3.4.  
The first argument is taken from the relation of the strong unto God, or God's acceptation of them; for God hath received him; to wit, into his favour, into an intimate union, and communion, into his family, as a servant, as a son, as a member of his only begotten son: To condemn him then is to throw a dishonour upon God himself.  
A second reason is, Because for the weak to condemn the indifferent actions of the strong for sin, of which they cannot prove them guilty, is a gross and presumptuous usurpation of God's prerogative, for which we have no Authority: who art thou that judgest another man's servant? Thou art but a fellow servant at the most: And God only is the master of the family, the Church: and therefore the unlawfulness of what is done in it is to be determined by God's precepts, and not by thy humour, or fancy, thy ungrounded surmises: If God hath permitted a thing, how darest thou interdict it? To his own master h●standeth, or falleth. The words are to be understood in a law-sense, and their meaning is that God alone acquits or condemns the actions of his servants, and none else: They are to be tried by his word and will, and not by thy jealousies, and suspicions. Others expound the words thus: If a man eat and drink temperately with outward prayer and thanksgiving, who but God can discern, whether he eat or drink unto the glory of God, or no? It followeth he shall be holden up: that is, he shall be justified. This fact of his, his eating of meats forbidden by the levitical Law, shall be abetted and maintained: For God is able to make him stand: though thou load him with censures, God is able to acquit, and clear him.  
4thly. Our Christian liberty towards things indifferent must admit of a restraint in the out ward practise of it▪ By Religion, by the Religion of a vow, of an oath, Deut. 23. vers. 21, 22, 23. When thou shalt vow a vow unto the Lord thy God, thou shalt not slack to pay it: for the Lord thy God will surely require it of thee, and it would be sin in thee. But if thou shalt forbear to vow, it shall be no sin in thee. That which is gone out of thy lips, thou shalt keep, and perform: even a freewill offering, according as thou hast vowed unto the Lord thy God, which thou hast promised with thy mouth. It was indifferent for Ananias to have sold, or held his possession: But when once by solemn vow he had devoted it unto God, to keep back any part of the price in his own hand, was no less than sacrilege: Suppose Lusory lots be in themselves lawful, yet if a man swear, that he will never play more at Cards, or Tables, etc. By this Oath a man hath bound himself from such games for the future: and if he play at them, he shall incur the guilt of perjury: Numb. 30. v. 2. If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an Oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word, he shall do according unto all that proceedeth out of his mouth. Calvinist's about oath's concerning things indifferent have this case: Whether they be obligatory in trifles? As if a man should swear to lift up a straw, to rub his beard, to give an apple, to lend a pin unto a Child: This case 
(k) Casus posterior est, cum res aut ob sui levitatemindig●na est viri prudentis deliberatione, nec cassâ ●nuce interest ●fecerisne an non feceris, ut levare fe●●ucam de terrâ, fricare barbam etc. aut ob parvitatem mazeriae non estmultum estimabilis; ut dare pomum puero, aciculam commodare etc. Juramenzum de re illo sensu adiaphora omnino est illicitum. Arguit enim sancti nominis Dei aut nimiam irreverentiam, fi (ut ferè fit) ex quodam habitu jurandi longo usu contracto imprudenti fo●tè exciderit; aut apertum contemptum, siquis id sciens prudensque ad miserit, scilicet ●on est Deus advocand us testis, nisi ubi dignus vindice nodus inciderit: ubi causa exigit non justa modo sed & gravis. Et in hoc omnes consentiunt, caeterum de obligatione quid sta●uendum? Video quidem plerosque casuistas pontificios in eâ esse sententiâ juramentum de re exiguâ et parvi momenti esse suâ naturâ nullum, & none obligate; quia scilicet re● levis ●onest idonea materia juramenti, & lex non curate de miminis. Sed miror potuisse eos, qui ●liàs videri volunt esse tam Lyncei, in tetam apertâ caecu●ire: nisi quod putidae illi distinctioni peccati mortalis & venialis, quo velut fermento totam Theologiae moralis massam faedè corruperunt, locum relictum cupiant. Sed obligare juramentum in re vel levissimi momenti con●at; primò, quia in re gravi & levi eadem est veritatis & falsitatis ratio. Secundò, quià in assertorio juramento, qui alitèr dicit quam res est, etsi in re levissimâ, pejerat, ergo à simili & in promissorio, qui aliter, facit, quam jura vit. Tertio, quià ali●egrave; r, quantum in se esset, Deum fallae rei ●estem faceret. Quar●ò●quià omnis jurans tenetur facere totum quod promisit, quatenùs potest, & ●cet●sed dare puero pomum, & possibile est, & licitum, ergò tenetur praestare, non debuit ergò sic ●urari: sed ubi iuratum est, debet impleti. De Jurament: Obligat: praelect: 3. Sect. 15.  Dr Sanderson thus answereth. 1. He premiseth that such oath's are unlawful, Because in them Gods most Holy Name is taken in vain. The Great God of Heaven and Earth is appealed unto, and called upon to witness unto toys: But yet notwithstanding his resolution is, that such oath's bind; and for it he giveth four reasons.  
1. Truth and falsehood have place in a light, as well as in a serious matter.  
2. Because in an assertory Oath, He that saith otherwise then the thing is, though it be in a most trivial matter, is forsworn: therefore by the like reason, he is perjured in a promissory oath, that doth otherwise, than he hath sworn.  
3. Because Otherwise, he that hath taken such an oath, should make God as much as in him lieth the witness of a falsehood.  
4. Because every one that sweareth, is bound to do all that he hath sworn, so fare forth as he is able, and so fare forth as the thing is lawful to be done: But the matters here spoken of are possible and lawful, v. gr. it is possible and lawful to give a child an apple, etc. therefore such oath's are to be performed: Indeed such vain oath's should not be taken, but being once taken they ought to be fulfilled.  
A fift restraint upon the exercise of our Christian liberty in things indifferent is by the just commands of authority, unto which we must be subject for conscience sake, Rom. 13. v. 5. The Apostle Peter having, 1 Pet. 2.13. 14. exhorted us to submit ourselves unto every ordinance of man for the Lords sake; In vers. 16. (by the general consent of interpreters) he prevents an objection, that might be made against this submission, from our Christian liberty, As free, and not using your liberty for a Cloak of maliciousness, but as the servants of God: Upon which words it is well observed by Estius (out of Oecumenius and chrysostom) that, As free is to be construed with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, submit yourselves: And not (as Bede would have it) with well doing. And from this connexion we may learn two things.  
First, That in submission unto every ordinance of man, we must not infringe our Christian liberty: We must not enslave ourselves to sin, Satan, and the World.  
Secondly, That submission unto every Ordinance of man, and our Christian freedom may very well stand together: We may submit ourselves as free: we may be obedient subjects, and yet free Christians: This may also be further gathered from what the Apostle hath in the following words touching the abuse, and use of our Christian liberty; Not using your liberty as a cloak for maliciousness, but as servants of God: Here we have. 1. A dehortation from the abuse of our Christian liberty, not using your liberty as a cloak of maliciousness: now to allege it as a plea for exemption of us from the yoke of temporal dominion, is to use it as a cloak of maliciousness; for not only scripture, but even nature itself condemneth disobedience unto, and rebellion against magistrates, as a very High point of maliciousness, that is naughtiness, and wickedness.  
2. We have here a Direction unto a right use of our liberty, using it as the servants of God: Now the service of God is so fare from being a bar, as that it is rather a spur unto this subjection; for First; it is for the Lords sake, that Peter would have us to submit ourselves unto every ordinance of man, vers. 13. Secondly, How can be cordially serve God, that contemns and disobeyes his deputy, and ministers? so the Apostle styles the magistrate, Rom. 13.4, 6. And Thirdly, The servants of God are obliged to yield obedience unto all his commands, and one of them is to be subject unto the higher powers, Rom. 13.1. They than that resist the higher powers do not use their liberty as the servants of God.  
But now, (that we may not run into another extreme, and with the flatterers of states, and Princes, extol the power of the magistrate beyond all bounds of moderation;) I shall desire you to take notice, that the power of the magistrate in things indifferent is not arbitrary, but is to be limited by the end of all Magistracy, the public good, Rom. 13.4. He is the Minister of God unto thee for good. Unto this public good some indifferent things carry a tendency, and such the magistrate may command; unto it others may be prejudicial, and such he may forbid: But now he should abuse his power, and play the tyrant, If he should enjoin things unprofitable; As if he should command men to throw stones into the water, to pick straws, to scatter feathers into the air, or the like. By this you may see, that the legislative power of the temporal magistrate in things indifferent is not unlimited: But now as for Ecclesiastical superiors, They have no commission for to make any laws properly so called. To make this good Ames quotes Junius against Bellarmine, [cont. 3. lib. 4. cap. 16. n. 86, 87. and chap. 17. n. 9, 10, 12, 13.] where he showeth, that Christ is the only lawgiver, that appointeth things in his Church; and that he hath appointed all that are requisite, and that the Church maketh no laws (properly so called) to appoint any new things to be used, but only canons, orders, directions, ordering in seemly manner th●se things which Christ hath appointed: and that if she add any thing of her own, she doth decline: And the reason is, Because unto her is committed no authority of appointing new things, but a ministry to observe, and d●e such things which Christ hath appointed.  
[This argument is prosecuted at large By Ames in his Reply unto Morton chap. 1. Sect. 16. and vindicated in his fresh suit against Ceremonies, pag. 64, 65, 66. usque ad 71. from the rejoinder of Dr John Burgess.]  
The sixth and last restraint, which I shall mention, that is to be put upon the outward exercise of our Christian liberty in things indifferent is by Charity: and that. 1. Unto ourselves. 2. Unto others.  
1. Unto ourselves: He that truly loves himself, will deny himself the use of things indifferent, if he think it will hazard the health of his better part, his spiritual and immortal soul; He will forbear those sports, and Pastimes he most delights in, if he find that they usually tempt him to Choler, or covetousness: He will not so much as step into a Tavern, Inn, or Alehouse, if he find himself prone unto excess: According unto the advice, that Solomon gives in the like case, Prov. 23.2. Put a knife unto thy throat, if thou be a man given unto appetite: Our Saviour exhorts us to pluck out our right eye, and to cut off our right hand, when they offend us, Matth. 5.29, 30. And Maldonate supposeth that he speaks literally of a true eye and hand indeed: neither (saith he) is there any absurdity in such a sense: because the plucking out of the right eye, and the cutting off the right hand is mentioned only in a way of hyperbolical exaggeration. In which there is understood such an exception, as is usual in the like cases, if it might be, if it were lawful: He parallels it with a hyperbole of the same nature in Gal. 4.15. I bear you record, that if it had been possible, ye would have plucked out your own eyes, and have given them unto me; If it had been possible: that is, as Estius glosseth it, si natura permitteret, If nature would give way unto such a mutilation: Our Saviour therefore signifieth, that we must incur the greatest loss, rather than expose ourselves unto the danger of sin: And from this we may conclude that we must cast away our most beloved indifferences; when once they scandalise us, that is, when they prove occasions of, and incentives unto sin.  
2. Charity towards others should put a restraint upon the use of our Christian liberty in things indifferent, and make us to forbear all indifferent things whatsoever, that may destroy the souls, weaken, or wound the Consciences of others, 1 Cor. 8.12. Use not liberty for an occasion to the flesh, but by love serve one another, Gal. 5.13. Where the Antithesis implied in the particle, but, plainly showeth, that we use our liberty for an occasion unto the flesh, if we do not by love serve one another, in the exercise thereof. Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth. 1 Cor. 8.1. that is, a firm and full knowledge of our liberty in things indifferent, if it be separated from Charity, is apt to swell the mind with pride, and make men to despise, or set at naught weak, doubting, and scrupulous Brethren; But Charity edifieth, that is it is careful to build up others, as living stones in the spiritual house of God, the Church; It inclineth to promote their graces, and gracious practices, and to avoid whatsoever is of a destroying nature unto their souls, that is, every thing that may occasion their fall into sin: Now that indifferent things may sometimes be of an unedifying and destroying nature, the Apostle affirmeth 1 Cor. 10.23. All things are lawful for me, but all things edify not, do not build up our brethren in truth, faith, and holiness, do not farther them in their Religion, charity, and justice: for that the Apostle speaks of the edification of others is plain by what followeth in the next verse, Let no man seek his own (that is, only) but every man another's wealth, that is, spiritual, the edification and salvation of another's soul. And therefore indifferent things are to be forborn in case of scandal, when they prove to be of a destructive nature unto the souls of men, when they weaken their graces, hinder their duties, and lead them into sin. This course the Apostle prescribes unto the Romans in the case of things legally unclean before the coming of Christ. Those that were strong in the faith among them, well instructed in the doctrine of Christian liberty, knew very well, that the legal uncleanness of meats and drinks, all Jewish festivals and fasts were removed by Christ's death, and that nothing was now of itself unclean, but all things indifferent and lawful: yet the Apostle would have them in the use of this point of Christian liberty not to scandalise those, that are weak in the faith, that is, such as (being newly won from Judaisme to Christianity) were as yet uninstructed about the cessation of ceremonials, Rom. 14.13. Judge this rather, that no man put a stumbling block, or occasion, to fall in his brother's way; that is in the use of meats and drinks, that were before the Gospel Levitically unclean, and neglect of Jewish Festivals and fasts, the observation of which was for a while indifferent, until the interrement of the Ceremonial law: For however the words run generally, yet if we look to the coherence backwards, the foregoing part of the chapter speaks only of such things, meats, drinks, and days: and if we look to the coherence forwards, it speaks only of such things, meats and drinks, vers. 15. Destroy not him with thy meat, for whom Christ died, ver. 17. for the kingdom of God is not meat and drink. v. 20. for meat destroys not the work of God: it is evil for that man who eateth with offence: It is evil not simply in itself, but accidentally by scandal. And therefore I shall conclude, that the place is in a special manner appliable against scandalising by abuse of liberty in things indifferent.  
Interpreters guess at three things, wherein the practice of the strong amongst the Romans might scandalise the weak.  
1. It might unsettle them in, and distaste them against the Christian Religion: for they might hereupon think it to be contrary unto the Law of Moses, which they so highly reverenced, and so at last it might occasion their relapse unto Judaisme. 2. It might embolden them to sin against their consciences, by eating that which they thought to be unclean. And 3dly, it might grievously exassperate them, and provoke them to pour out many a bitter, uncharitable, and sinful censure upon the actions, and state of those that were strong in the faith.  
In vers. 21. The Apostle proceedeth to enlarge his doctrine touching this particular, beyond the controversy, that occasioned this his discourse: for (as Estius well noteth) He teacheth, that to avoid the scandal and offence of our Brethren we are to abstain, not only from things prohibited by the law, but also from things not prohibited, from flesh, wine, and any indifferent thing whatsoever: It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak. It is good, that is, it is morally good. 1. Good in regard of God, a thing very acceptable, and pleasing unto him. 2. Good in regard of our Brethren, profitable and conducing unto their edification. 3. Good in regard of ourselves, a duty that God requireth of us: And from this we may infer that the contrary hereof is (by the rule of contraries) morally evil: it is displeasing unto God, hurtful unto the soul of thy Brother, and sinful in thyself.  
In vers. 22. The Apostle prevents an objection of the strong: Hast thou faith, have it to thyself before God: He speaks not of a faith (saith chrysostom) that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of doctrines and tenets, to wit, such as are fundamental, and necessary unto salvation: but of a faith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, concerning the subject matter here handled, meats, and days, things indifferent, a belief touching their lawfulness: the strong amongst the Romans might be ready to object, that their knowledge and persuasion of their Christian liberty in the matter controverted amounted unto a Divine faith: for it was built upon a divine Revelation: Each of them might say as Paul did above vers. 14. I know, and am persuaded by the Lord Jesus, that nothing is unclean of itself. The Lord Jesus hath taught me this liberty now is it not fit, that my practice should be agreeable unto my belief; that I should exercise my knowledge, and act according unto my judgement: seeing it is so well grounded, why should I forbear the doing of that, which I know to be lawful? Unto this the Apostles answer is, that they should not make a vain ostentation, or unseasonable discovery of their faith: that is, knowledge, and persuasion, unto the offence of their Brother, the hazard of his soul: but rather in such a case conceal it, and content themselves with God's knowledge, and approbation of it, who seethe in secret, and will reward openly, Matth. 6. Hast thou faith, have it to thyself before God: This prudent and charitable management of Christian liberty, the Apostle exhorts the Corinthians unto, in their carriage towards their Brethren touching things offered unto Idols. 1 Cor. 8.9. take heed lest, by any means this liberty of yours become a stumbling block to them that are weak. In Chapt. 10. he determineth, that it was lawful to eat things consecrated to the Idols, and he instanceth in two cases. 1. When they were sold in open markets. verse. 25. 2ly, When they were made use of at private feasts: But unto this his determination he subjoineth the exception of scandal, vers. 28.29. If any man say unto you this is offered in sacrifice unto idols, eat not, for his sake that shown it, and for conscience sake; The earth is the Lords and the fullness thereof. Conscience; I say, not thine own, but of the others: for why is my liberty judged of another man's conscience? This some understand of the unbelieving Idolater, others of a weak brother: And indeed this practice gives an wound unto both their consciences. 1. The Idolater triumphs, because he thinks it an honour unto his Idol, and so he is confirmed, and hardened in his Idolatry: And then, 2ly, As for the weak Brother, he supposeth, that the meat is so polluted by Consecration and sacrifice unto Idols, as that to eat thereof is a compliance with Idolatry; and therefore altogether sinful; and hereupon the eating of these meats by the strong may occasion in the weak two scandals. 1. The example of the strong may entice them unto imitation; and so they will sinne against their consciences. 2ly, The practice of the strong may provoke them unto rash and uncharitable judgement: both scandals give a great blow unto the Conscience of the weak: But, that the Apostle speaks of the latter scandal, I am induced to think by the words following: Why is my liberty judged of another man's Conscience? that is, why do I needlessely, indiscreetly, and unseasonably expose my Christian liberty unto the rash censures of a weak Brother, who may be ready to traduce it, as a profane licentiousness? why shall I drive him upon a sin, which I may prevent by a prudent and charitable forbearance of the exercise of my liberty? Liberty is a thing, which men out of an excessive self love so much overvalue, as that they are very impatient of any restraint to be put upon it at all: But the Restraint, that Charity prompts us unto, is of all others most disregarded; because there is nothing almost, that is so much undervalved, as the precious souls of our poor Brethren, and therefore we make but little conscience how thick we throw scandals in their way: I shall therefore briefly propound such weighty, and pressing arguments, as the Apostle useth to persuade the Romans, and Corinthians to abstain from a scandalous use of their liberty in things otherwise indifferent, and lawful: and they are drawn, either, from the nature of things indifferent, or from the nature of scandal.  
1. From the nature of things indifferent: and here, the first argument is Rom. 14.17. the kingdom of God is not meat and drink: It doth not stand in indifferent things; for they are neither the way to the kingdom of Glory, nor our duty under the kingdom of grace: They are no part of God's worship, and service, no matter of Religion: the weal and safety of God's people is in no wise wrapped up in them; nay, many times a rigid pressing, and unseasonable practice of them is a great disturbance unto the peace, and a great hindrance unto the edification of the Church, the kingdom of Christ.  
A second Argument from the nature of things indifferent, is the great latitude of them: Though some of them be scandalous yet there will still remain an ample field of them besides, 1 Cor. 10.28. If any man say unto you, this is offered in sacrifice unto idols, eat not for his sake, that shown it, etc. the earth is the Lords, and the fullness thereof: It is as much as if he had said; though ye abstain from things offered unto idols, yet there is no doubt of want, no fear of pinching your bellies: for you have the earth, and the fullness thereof for your supply: And from the scandal by meats, we may argue in like manner touching the scandal by recreation: If cards, dice, tables offend thy brother, there is plenty enough of other sports, bowling, chess, draughts, etc.  
A second sort of arguments, that the Apostle insists on, are taken from the nature of scandal: It is a sin against that tender love, which we own unto our brethren: And when ye sin so against the brethren, 1 Cor. 8.12. (And that 'tis no small, but a very heinous sin, the next words evince) And wound their weak conscience, The words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, where (as Beza well observeth,) the Antecedent is put for the consequent, beating, striking, or smiting for the effect thereof, wounding: As weapons or whips wound the body; so scandals the conscience. Unjustly to wound the body, the face, the eye of our Brother is a cruel and inhuman part; but to wound so tender a piece as his conscience, to wound a weak, a sickly, a diseased conscience is the very height of inhumanity. To wound the soul of a Brother with sorrow, is a breach of charity; If thy Brother be grieved with thy meat, now walkest thou not charitably, Rom. 14.15. And hence we may reason in a way of comparison à minori ad majus, that to wound the soul of a Brother with sin, violates Christian love in a fare higher measure; for the wound of the least sin is in its own nature mortal; and therefore scandal is not only of a wounding, but of a kill and destroying nature; it is a soul murder, Destroy not him with thy meat, Rom. 14.15. Indeed the weak, that were scandalised, might by God's mercy, and Christ's merit, escape an actual destroying and damning: But the Apostles meaning is, that the strongs scandalising of them carried in its nature a tendency towards their destruction: for it drew them into sin, and sin without repentance will destroy the soul: This malignant and destructive efficacy of scandal the Apostle urgeth also unto the Corinthians Epistle 1. chapt. 8. v. 11. And through thy knowledge shall thy weak brother perish: that is; through thy scandalous abuse of thy knowledge of thy liberty in eating things offered unto idols, thou shalt do, what lieth in thee, to farther the perishing of thy weak Brother: This cruelty that is in scandal towards the souls of our Brethren, is aggravated from Christ's Redemption, God's Creation of their souls.  
1. From Christ's Redemption of their souls: Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died, Rom. 14.15. And through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish, for whom Christ died? But when ye sin so against the Brethren, and wound their weak conscience, ye sin against Christ: 1 Cor. 8.11, 12. In the judgement of charity thou art to rank thy weak Brother in the number of those, for whom Christ died: Christ died for his salvation, and how darest thou oppose his work by doing that, which tends unto his damnation? Christ parted with his life to save him, and wilt not thou for that end abridge thyself of thy liberty in a few indifferent things.  
2. From God's creation of their souls: for meat destroy not the work of God, Rom. 14.20. that is the soul of thy brother: for that is styled Gods work in a way of eminency: because it was one of the choicest, chiefest, and most eminent works of the Creation, made as it were with the consultation of the whole Trinity, and had in it engraven the very Image of God himself: Therefore not only the defacing, but the very attempting to deface this would redound very much unto the dishonour of the worker God; And he will doubtless accordingly resent the despising of his workmanship: Some interpreters expound the place of the work of God's grace in the sanctification, or regeneration of the soul, wherein faith is begotten, and that faith in a peculiar manner is the work of God, we have Christ's own testimony, John 6.29. Jesus answered, and said unto them, this is the work of God, that ye believe on him, whom he hath sent: But even so the words display the horrid malignancy of scandal: for they show that he who scandalizeth his brother, fighteth against God; that he goeth about to demolish that, which hath God alone for the builder. It was a part of Christ's character not to break a bruised reed, nor quench the smoking flax, Mat. 12.20. How unsuitable unto this, is the disposition of those by whom offences come? For they do what lieth in them to quench the very beginnings of grace, and goodness. Indeed the work of God's grace is so all-powerfull, as that it will finally prevail against all resistance: If God have begun a good work, he will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ, Phil. 1.6. And the gates of hell shall never be able to prevail against it, Matth. 16.18. But yet the gates of hell will be ever hindering of it: and in especial by the spreadth of scandals. And this very opposition is a war against heaven, (in the language of the Scripture) a destroying of the work of God. There is one sequel more of active scandals of this nature, that our Apostle mentioneth, Rom. 14. and 1 Cor. 10. which deserveth also our consideration: and it is the blot of infamy, which they will contract unto our names, and the very Christian liberty, which we abuse: A scandal in this case, tending unto sin, is usually accompanied with a scandal tending unto disgrace, or defamation: And how careful we should be to decline scandal, even in this English sense of the word, the vehemency of the Apostles interrogations will sufficiently inform us, 1 Cor. 10.29, 30. Conscience, I say, not thine own, but of the others: for why is my liberty judged of another man's conscience? for, if I by grace be a partaker, why am I evil spoken of, for that for which I give thanks? Unto these interrogations add we the Apostles precept also, Rom. 14.16. Let not then your good be evil spoken of: that is, give none occasion for this great privilege of your Christian liberty to be traduced.  
Before I take my leave of this restraint of our liberty by Charity in the case of scandal, I shall examine the restraints, that some have put upon it, without any warrant from scripture: Those in which they most confide, are two. 1. They limit it unto the scandal of the weak, and, 2. Unto matters that are undetermined by Authority.  
1. They limit it unto the scandal of the weak: for the scandal of the malicious, and presumptuous persons, The scandal of Pharises (say they) may be neglected, Mat. 15.12, 14. whether in our Ceremonies there was an active scandal, a scandal given will be largely disputed in the next treatise, for the present therefore we shall only prove that we are to avoid such an active scandal in the malicious, as well as the weak.  
For First, Such a scandal is of a soul destroying nature: Destroy not him with thy meat, Rom. 14.15. And who so wicked, and malicious upon the face of the earth, whose soul a true Christian charity will exclude from its care, mercy, and compassion.  
Secondly, The Apostles motive reacheth unto the wicked and malicious: Destroy not him with thy meat, for whom Christ died, Rom. 14.15. for they may be in the number of those, for whom Christ died, who for their present state and condition may be most wicked, and malicious; such as oppose themselves, such as are in the snare of the Devil, taken captive by him at his will.  
3. The Apostles prohibition, 1 Cor. 10.32. extendeth unto the malicious, as well as the weak, Give none offence neither to the Jews, nor to the Gentiles, nor to the Church of God: where Jew's and Gentiles are distinguished from the Church of God; and therefore by them are meant such as were unconverted, and as yet enemies unto the faith of Christ, and Church of God. And the things wherein the Apostle would have their offence to be avoided were matters of indifferency; Whether ye eat or drink, v. 31. But now, lest some should be ready to object unto Paul that which our Saviour said of the Scribes and Pharisees, Matth. 23.4. that he did bind a heavy burden and grievous to be borne, and lay it upon men's shoulders: but he himself would not move it with one of his fingers: the Apostle in the next verse showeth, how that his practice was conformable unto his precept, Even as I please all men (good and bad) in all things (that is, in all indifferent things) not seeking mine own profit, but the profit of many that they may be saved, 1 Cor. 10.33.  
In a second place, the Fautors of our Ceremonies limit this restraint of our liberty in things indifferent by charity, in the case of scandal, only unto things undetermined by Authority. Where Authority hath determined our choice, we must (say they) hold to their determination, any scandal to the Contrary notwithstanding. It seems then in case the magistrate command it, we may wound the weak consciences of our Brother, Destroy with our indifferencies, the work of God, him for whom Christ died. It is good (saith Paul) neither to eat flesh, nor to drink win●, nor any thing whereby thy Brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak, Rom. 14.22. But our Prelatists determine quite otherwise, if authority enjoin it, it is good (say they) to eat bread, drink wine, wear a surplice, use the sign of the cross in Baptism, though thereby never so many Brethren stumble, or are offended, or made weak.  
The unreasonableness of this assertion Ames in his reply to Morton hath proved by many arguments, That are as yet unanswered, which I shall here transcribe.  
A scandal in the nature of it is spiritual murder: Now suppose a superior should command a thing in itself indifferent, whereupon murder were like to follow; as to run a horse, or a cart, in a certain way, at a certain time, when it may be unwitting to the commander, little children were playing in the way, would any man's conscience serve him to do it?  
Avoiding of scandal is a main duty of Charity: May Superiors at their pleasure appoint how fare I shall show my Charity towards my brother's soul? Then surely an inferior earthly court may cross the determinations of the high court of heaven.  
The superiors have no power given them for destruction, but only for edification: If therefore they command scandals, they go beyond their Commission: neither are we tied therein to do as they bid, but as they should bid.  
If determination by superiors were sufficient to take away the sin of a scandal. Then they do very ill that they do not (so fare as is possible) determine all things indifferent, that so no danger may be left in giving of offence by the use of them. Then the Church of Rome is to be praised, in that she hath determined of so many indifferents: then Paul with the other Apostles might have spared a great deal of labour in admonishing the Churches how they should avoid offences about some indifferent things: A fare shorter way had been either to determine the matter fully: or else to have given order, that the Churches should among themselves determine it at home.  
But say that the Archbishop of Corinth (for now I suppose such a one) had called his convocation, and with consent of his Clergy had determined, that men might, and for testifying of liberty should, at a certain time eat of such and such meats, which men formerly doubted of: would not yet the Apostle have given the same direction he did? Would not good Christians still have had care of their brother's consciences? Can the determination of a superior be a sufficient plea at the bar of God's judgement seat, for a man that by virtue or force thereof alone, hath done any action, that his conscience telleth him, will scandalise his brother.  
Lastly, I would feign know whether those superiors do not give a great scandal, which take upon them determinately to impose unnecessary rites, which they know many good m●n will be scandalised by? Thus fare Ames. But this opinion of Ames, is I confess to be understood cum gravo salis, with many limitations, which I shall lay down fully in the Tractate that next followeth.  
If the Prelates would have seriously laid to heart that golden saying of Paul (1 Cor. 8.13. If meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh, while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend) This would supersede all further dispute of this argument: for thence it is easy to evict, that it is unlawful for Church governor's to command the observation of things indifferent, when in all probability they will scandalise: how dare they make that the matter of a Church Canon, which Paul durst not adventure upon in his own personal practice? He thought it unlawful to do a thing otherwise indifferent, to eat flesh in the case of scandal; and therefore doubtless he judged it unlawful in such a case to impose any such matter upon others: Greater was the importance of the flesh forborn by Paul unto his health, and the comfort of his life; then the profit of the controverted ceremonies can be unto the worship and service of God: And besides, the indifferency of eating flesh was a thing clear, and evident unto all, that were well instructed in the Doctrine of Christian liberty; whereas the indifferency of our ceremonies will at least be judged a very doubtful matter, and that by very indifferent men, who shall thoroughly ponder the Arguments of Didoclave, Parker, Ames and others against them, which to this day remain unanswered. The Prelates will not pretend unto such an ample authority in the Church of God, as Paul had: But though they be fare inferior unto him in point of Authority, they are not yet so humble, as to imitate him in the condescension of his charity. Paul's peremptory resolve was to forbear a thing indifferent, wh● it scandalised. If meat make my brother to offend, I will (saith he) eat no flesh, while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend, 1 Cor. 8.13.  
But what a wide difference, nay contrariety was there betwixt this charitable resolution of Paul, and the rigid practice of the Prelates. For they were obstinately bend to press the Ceremonies, with all severity, without any care, or Conscience of the scandals ensuing: nay their endeavour was daily to add unto the heap of former ceremonies, though they knew that thereby the scandals would be increased: They spoke a language quite contrary to that of Paul: we will enjoin (say they) the surplice, cross, kneeling in the sacrament of the Lords supper, while the world standeth, as long as we have any power, and authority in the Church of God, Let who will be offended: This their rigour brings unto my mind a cruel command of 
(h) Cum Augustus coenaret apud Vedium Pollionem. Fregerat unus ex se●vis ejus cry stallinum: rapi eum Vedius jussit, nec vulgari quidem periturum morte● muraenis objici jubebatur, quas ingens piscina cont●nebat. Q●●s non hoc illu●● putaret luxuriae causa facere? saevitia erat: evasit è manibus puer, & confugit ad Caesatis pedes: nihil aliud petiturus, quam ut aliter periret, nec esca fieret. Motus est novitate crudelitatis Caesar, & illum quidem mitti, crystallina autem omnia coram se frangi jussit, complerique piscinam. Fuit Caesari sic castigand us amicus: bene usus est viribus suis. E convivio rapi homines imperas, & novi generis paenis sancinari? si cali● tuus fractus est, viscera hominis distrahentur▪ tantum tibi placebis etc. Seneca de ira. Lib. 3.  Vedius Pollio, that was countermanded by Augustus Caesar supping with him: A poor boy his slave had casually broken a Crystal glass, and for this Pollio most inhumanely condemned him to be thrown into a great pond of Lampreys, there to be devoured. The boy escaping from those appointed for his execution, prostrated himself at the feet of Caesar, who then supped with his master, and desired not pardon, but only commutation of so horrid and unnatural a death: Augustus was extremely transported with the strangeness and novelty of so inhuman a cruelty, and hereupon to prevent the like for the future he forthwith commanded all the Crystal glasses of Pollio, though his friend, to be broken, and the fishpond to be filled up: for the breaking of a sorry glass he thought it a disproportioned and too severe a punishment, to have a man's bowels plucked in pieces, and torn asunder. This spirit of Vedius Pollio breathed in many of our late Prelates; The Ceremonies in comparison of men's souls were but as paltry trifles, as glasses, and feathers: and yet, by the maintenance of them, they hazarded the souls of thousands (In as much as in them lay) they destroyed the work of God, they destroyed those for whom Christ died; they scandalise Papists, and separatists: people and Pastors: conformists, and non-conformists, as Mr Parker at large demonstrates: Dr John Burgess (as I have often heard) urged this story in a Sermon before King James to persuade him unto the abolition of the Ceremonies: And King James had doubtless expressed a Christian, and royal care of his people, if he had broken these glasses in pieces: if he had cashered these toys out of the Church, which had broken so many in their estates, wounded so many in their consciences, and endangered the salvation of so many souls: and hereby have prevented those unspeakable griefs, fears, and scandals, which they formerly occasioned.  
I proceed unto the third and last conclusion, which is, that no deliberate actions of men, which proceeds from deliberate reason, if they be considered in actu exercito, in the singular or particular, as clothed with circumst ances, are indifferent, but all of them are morally either good, or evil.  
For the better understanding of this Conclusion, I shall out of 
(m) 
Circumstantia una aut altera actionis alicujus humanae potest esse indifferens, ut si studiosus unus cum aliosermonem conferat, indifferens est, saepenumero, utrum vernaculo utatursermone, an Latino: led sermo ipse, cum omnibus suis circumstantiis, vel bonus est, vel malus. Ratio est, quia determinatioactionisnon pendet ab una circumstantia seorsim, sed ab omnibus conjunctim.  
Datur actio aliqua singularis, in qua nulla bonitatis ratio reperitur, quae inalia non possi● inveniri: atque adeo quod hoc tempore, hoc vel illud potius agimus quam aliud, in eo saepe nihil boni aut mali occurrit. Opportunitas, aut animi suggestio, sine ullo respectu bonitatis moralis, satis h●bet ponderis ad singula●em istam determinationem.  
Quamvis igitur nulla singularis actio humana sit, quae neque est bona neque mala, fiunt tamen variae, quae singulariter & in comparatione ad alias, neque sunt necessariae, neque illicitae. Sicut enim statuarius certam rationem saepe non habet, cur istam potius quam aliam statuam facit, si●a nen aliquam faciat, necesse est, ut vel regulas artis sequendo bonam faciat, aut aberrando malam, sic est in multis actionibus hominum singularibus, quae quoad exercitium nullam habent rationem propriam, praeter inclinationem animi, sed cum exercentur vel bonae sunt, vel malae. De cas. cons. Lib. 3. cap. 18.   Ames add two limitations of it.  
1. Then; this conclusion is to be understood only of an adequate consideration of the circumstances of singular actions, for not only one, but more circumstances of a humane action in the individual may be indifferent: In a conference of scholars it is many times indifferent, whether they discourse in latin, or English, whether in the morning, or afternoon: But yet their whole conference considered adequately with all circumstances is either good, or evil; And the reason is because the determination of an action doth not depend upon one circumstance apart, but upon all jointly.  
A second limitation of the conclusion is that it is not to be extended unto every comparative consideration of humane actions and their circumstances: I know, that not only actions indifferent, but also those that are commanded become sometime to be sinful by comparison; when they are preferred to better actions. God dislikes those recreations, that otherwise he alloweth, when they justle out duties: nay he abhorreth sacrifice when it is inconsistent with mercy: but notwithstanding this, when there is an equality, if not of actions themselves, yet of their moral motives as to hic, and nunc this present time and place, Then curiously to compare and balance such actions, were needless: for in such a case, the prelation of one before the other, would be a thing merely arbitrary, neither good nor bad: Reading, prayer, meditation are things commanded: but many times that I set apart such an hour for reading principally may be a thing indifferent: that I make choice of one Recreation before another, of bowling before Chess, draughts, etc. that I choose to walk in the forenoon, rather than in the afternoon, may be of no moral consideration, and so neither good, nor evil, but a matter of indifferency. Look as an Image carver may have no peculiar reason to make this Image, rather than that; yet if he make any Image at all; either he followeth the rules of his art, and then he makes a good Image, or he swarves from those rules, and then he makes a bad image, and doth not work like an Artist: So many times it may be to a Christian, a martyr merely indifferent to perform this or that action, he may have no obligation to do either, or at least to do one rather than the other, but may be left unto his own mind, and pleasure: but yet he is as a Christian obliged to regard such circumstances in all his actions, and therefore whatsoever he doth, he doth it either well, or ill; for either he observeth these circumstances, and then his action is good, or he neglects them, and then it is bad.  
The conclusion being thus explained may be made apparent from the end, and rule of deliberate actions.  
1. From their end, and what ought to be the end of all deliberate actions of man may be evidenced from their relation unto their Original, from a consideration of them absolutely as they are in themselves.  
1. From their relation unto their Original, the rational soul, or the soul, as rational, they flow from man, as man, they proceed from his deliberate reason, and therefore, should have the same end, which man as rational should propound, the glorifying of his maker; If they have not this end, they are evil: and if they have this end, why then (if there be no failing otherwise) they are good. This argument is by 
(m) Quaerenda igitur sunt firmiora praesidia, sententiae hu● manos actusin● differentes inficiantis. Unum duco ex operatione humana prout est germen naturae rationalis. Hom● enim ad suas operationes habet se veluti a● bor ad fructus ut optimè ad● vertit Antoni● l. 9 de vita sua● num. 8. & pu● ch è Guliel. Pa● lib. dev irrut. c● 12. initio: cu● ea tamen diff●●rentia, ut scit● notavit Anto● us l. 11. num. quod arboru● & quarumvi● plantarumfru● us, alii percip● unt: ipse hou● fructus sui percipit, nec alii, sed sibi ipsi laborat. Cum igitur operatio humana se habeat ad 〈◊〉 turam rationalem, sicut fructus & germane ejus, necesse est, ut idem sit finis operationis ab hum●●na natura prodeuntis, & ipsius naturae rationalis. Sic enim videmus, servata proportione, ac● dear in omnibus aliis naturis. Et ratio est, quia cùm natura sit actus quidam primus, actio ve● sit actus ejus secundus, qui est ipsamet tendentia actus primi in objectum & finem suum; nec● sarium profecto videtur, ut idemmet sit finis ultimus actionis & naturae actionem principia tis: sicut trunci & germinum & totius a●boris, ac fructuum, idem est finis. Debet ergo hum●nae naturae & actionis huma●●● esse idem sinis. Atqui finis ultimus humanae naturae est De● E●go sinis quoque ultimus actionis nostrae debet esse Deus. Constat autem, actum indiffer● tem, si daretur, non habiturum pro fine Deum: nam sic non esset indifferens, led revera bon● Ergo careret aliquo, quod habere deberet, nempe relatione illa ad finem ultimum naturae hu●●●nae; ac proinde esset malus moraliter, non autem indiff●tens. Moral. discipline: didst 4 q 1 art. 2. n.  Raynaudus thus urged: man is related unto his operations, as a tree unto its fruits and branches: and therefore there is the same end of the humane operations, and the humane nature, and the reason is, because that nature is the first act, and its operation the second act which is a tendency of the first act towards its object, and end; and therefore it seems necessary, that there should be the same uttermost end of the nature, and the operation; Even as there is the same end of the tree, it's stock, branches, and fruits: But now the uttermost end of the humane nature is God: and therefore God should be the uttermost end of every humane action, and consequently no humane action can be indifferent: for if it have not God for its end, it is sinful: because it wants that relation unto the uttermost end of the humane nature, which it ought to have: and if it have God for its end, than it is morally good, if it want not any other essential requisite.  
2. From a consideration of them 
(n) Alterum sententiae nostrae firmamentum profero ex ●ctu humano ●er seipsum considerato. Hoc est non ●uatenus est ●ermen natu●ae, & quatenus ●undem cum a finem ul●mum habere ●bet, sed solitariè, perinde ac si non esset fructus illius naturae. Sic igitur argumentor. Actio ●mana vel ultimo refertur ad Deum, sive actu, sive virtualiter, & suapte natura, quatenus est ra●ni conformis, & sic est bona: vel nullo modo in Deum tend it: & sic eo ipso deflectit ab eo fine, ●que mala moraliter. Nam eo ipso quod non fit ob finem increatum, nec in eum tendit sal●m virtualiter, sicut faciunt omnes boni actus, sistit omnino in bono creato, est que ejus fruitio. ●rversum autem est, frui utendis, ut latè tradit D. Augustinus 1. de Doct. Christ. a cap. 3. etc. 21. 22. ostendens omnia bona creata debere tantum cadere sub usum nostrum, sub fruitionem ●em non nisi Deum. Ergo Actus humani carentes bono fine, vel intrinseco, vel extrinseco, sunt ●ipso depravati, carentque aliquo quod habere deberent. Est enim in omni actione creatâ, ●itum ut sit fruitio fruendorum: id est, ut ultimò ad Deum tendat aliquo modo. Nam si non ●eret hoc ex debito, posset esse fruitio utendorum, nihilque idcirco haberet indebitum. Quia ●ur actus humanus, qui dicitur fore prorsus indifferens, esset fruitio puri boni creati, quod u●dum fuisset non fruendum; merito convincitur non fuisse indifferens, sed oblitus coeno turpi●nis moralis, ob defectum volitionis ad finem debitam. n. 38. loc. praedict.  absolutely as they are in themselves: Every humane rational action is referred unto some chief end or other, and that must be, either the creature, or the creator: If it be the creature, than the creature is most sinfully enjoyed, as man's supreme end, and highest happiness: whereas it should be only used, as a means: and hereby it is at least virtually, and interpretatively idolised, deified, and placed in the room of God: If it be the Creator than the action is good, unless it be in some other regard defective. And so you see that unto whatsoever end it be referred, either created, or uncreated, it cannot be indifferent.  
For the further enforcement of this reason, I shall allege, and open some few scriptures.  
The first is Matth. 12.36. But I say unto you, that every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgement. Three things here merit our consideration. 1. What is meant by an idle word. 2. What by giving account thereof: and 3dly, How this makes against the indifferency of humane actions, considered in their singulars, and actual existence.  
1. What is meant by an idle word: that which hath no obliquity in it but this, that it wants a good and honest end: That it is unprofitable, and unfruitful, both unto speaker, and hearer: quod aut utilitate rectitudinis aut ratione justae necessitatis caret, as Gregory, Homily. 6. As for those, who think, that an idle word is extended unto every word, grossly wicked, false, lying, blasphemous, the very context will disprove them: The occasion of our Saviour's discourse was that blasphemy of the Pharisees, vers. 24. But when the Pharisees heard it, they said, this fellow doth not cast out Devils, but by Beelzebub, the prince of the Devils: Now our Saviour's drift is to discover the sinfulness; and danger of this blasphemous speech of theirs: And this he doth, as by several arguments, so particularly, in this verse, by arguing a minori ad majus, from the less to the greater: As if he should have said: If in the day of judgement ye shall give an account for every idle word, then much more for such a blasphemous vomit as this of yours, That I cast out Devils by the assistance of Beelzebub: That our Saviour's Argument here stands thus Maldonate tells us, all are of that opinion that he ever read. And for this coherence take these two Reasons.  
1. Our Saviour proceeds in a way of aggravating the now mentioned Blasphemy: But if by every idle word you understand every grossly wicked, and blasphemous word, there will be little aggravation hereof: for to say that every wicked lying, blasphemous word, that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgement, falls very short of what was spoken already of this blasphemy vers. 31.32. That it was a blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, and not to be forgiven, either in this world, or in the world to come.  
2. Compare we these words with those immediately foregoing vers. 35. A good man out of the good treasure of the heart, bringeth forth good things: and an evil man out of the evil treasure, bringeth forth evil things: In the latter part of these words, by evil things are understood such evil words as were notoriously such, such as even the Pharisees acknowledged to be so; The Idle words then in vers. 36. are distinguished from them, as may very probably be gathered from the Antithesis insinuated in the particle [but] But I say unto you every idle word, that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the day of Judgement: It is apparent, that our Saviour spoke of such words, whose sinfulness seemed strange, and new unto such lose commentators on the Law, as the Pharisees were: And it is very observable, that he ushereth in this his commination against every idle word with the very same form of speech, that he useth (chapt. 5. vers. 12, 28, 31, 34, 39, 44.) In his correction of their corrupt glosses upon the law of God. So then our Saviour speaks of that, which sounded as very harsh and rigid doctrine in the ears of the Pharisees: But I say unto you that every idle word, that men shall speak they shall give an account thereof in the day of Judgement: Notwithstanding your slighting thoughts of your vain, and unprofitable discourse, I, who am the truth, and know fully the mind of God, as being always in his bosom, do assure you, that every idle word, which men shall speak, every word, which is not referred unto a good end, they shall give an account thereof in the day of Judgement.  
2. Inquire we, what it is to give an account of every idle word in the day of Judgement. The phrase sometimes signifies only trial, and examination, Luk. 16.2 Heb. 13.17. But that here it importeth condemnation, and punishment, 
(n) Illa verba dixit ad incutiendum hominibus timorem, & ex aggerandam severitatem divini judiciitergo sen sus illorum verborum est ●●ta homines reddituros rationem otiosi verbi, ut si nullam aliam excusationem, vel rationabilem causam habeant, pro illo puniendi sunt alioquin verba Christi nullum fere pondus ●ut energiam haberent, neque aliquem metum inferent, cum tamen illo singulari exemplo vo●luerit Christus ostendere, quam sint g●aviter puniendi homines: pro verbis pravioribus. De boni●tate & malit, humanorum actidisp. 9 Sect. 3.  Suarez proveth from the scope of the words which was to terrify the Pharisees for their blasphemy, and to deter others from the like, by displaying, and amplifying the severity of God's judgement against it: And unto this the threatening of punishment and condemnation for every idle word is more conducing, than a proposal of a bare trial and examination of every idle word, which is agreeable unto the best words and works of men: because for them they may give an account with joy, Heb. 13.17. In the words then, there is plainly a Metalepsis, the Antecedent, to give an account in the day of Judgement is put for the consequent to be punished in hellfire, Every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give an account thereof in the day of Judgement: that is they without repentance shall be condemned, and everlastingly punished for it: And this acception of the phrase we find elsewhere, as 1 Pet. 4.5.  
I pass on unto the third particular how this makes against the indifferency of humane actions considered in their singular and actual existence: I answer: because it concludes against the indifferency of any words of men; for those words, which in the general, and in their own nature are indifferent: yet as drawn into exercise, and putting on circumstances they are idle, if they have no goodness adjoined unto them, by reference unto their due, and requisite ends: And if they be idle they are sinful, and consequently not indifferent: And what is said of idle words of men is appliable unto the idle thoughts, and works of men: for the thought of man is a more rational act then his speech, more an act of reason: And his rational works proceed from his thoughts, and are of fare greater moment and importance than his words: and so in the upshot we may infer that if men's idle words are not indifferent, than neither men's idle thoughts, and works: And the justness of this inference, I shall confirm by two arguments.  
1. Idle words are therefore sinful, because (being the birth and product of reason, and the free will of man) there is not in them propounded an end suitable unto the reasonable nature of man: Now all the vain thoughts, and idle works of men are the issue of reason, and freedom of will: and therefore, (because they are not referred unto such an honest end, as becomes the dignity of such a rational creature, as man,) they are faulty and vicious.  
2. Idle words are therefore morally evil: because in them, that precious treasure, time, is wasted, in which a man may be more lavish, then in the most prodigal mispence of money: But now our time is vainly consumed to no good end, and purpose, in our idle thoughts, and works: and therefore they are sinful, as well as our idle words: and consequently not indifferent.  
A second place is, 1 Cor. 10.31. Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all unto the Glory of God: To eat, and to drink abstractively considered, are indifferent actions, and yet such actions are here commanded to be referred unto the glory of God: and therefore if they be not thus referred, they are sinful: And we may say the same of all other actions, that are in specie, in their own nature indifferent. Capreolus (lib. 2. dist. 40. quaest 1. pag. 562.) noteth, that these words of the Apostle [Let all things be done unto the Glory of God] may be understood two manner of ways negatively or affirmatively.  
1. Negatively, and then the sense is, do nothing against God's glory, nothing that may dishonour him: Things offered unto idols were in themselves the good creatures of God, and to eat them an action in itself indifferent, but to eat them in the Idols Temple was to countenance Idolatry, and so a high dishonouring of God, To eat them also with the scandal of a weak brother, was to prejudice, and obstruct the glorifying of God's name.  
2dly, The words may be understood affirmatively, and so there is (as Capreolus observeth) a threefold reference unto the glory of God.  

1. Habitual.  
2. Actual.  
3. Virtual.   
1. An habitual reference there is unto the glory of God, wheresoever there is the habit, the grace, or virtue of the love of God, the principle of actually referring all things unto the glory of God. But now this is not sufficient: for the habit of love may (for a long time) lie idle, and un-active, and be consistent with very gross sins: as we see in David, Peter, and others.  
2. An action is actually referred unto God's glory, when there is an actual cogitation of God, and his glory: And this, (though it ought frequently to be done) is not yet required in every action: well it may be our happiness in the next life; But it can not be our duty in this; because it would leave no room, or place for other duties: Thus for an Artist to be always thinking upon the rules of his Art, would be a disturbance unto his work: for a traveller to have perpetually in his thoughts, the end of his journey would retard his progress therein.  
In a third place therefore, the reference of all our actions unto God's glory, that is here exhorted to, is only virtual. And that an action may virtually be referred unto God's glory three things are required. 1. The above mentioned habitual reference unto God's glory must be presupposed, as also. 2dly, A foregoing actual reference of a man's self, and all that belongs unto him unto the glory of God, and the more frequent this is, the better, and 3ly, The Action itself. 1. Must not be referred unto any end opposite unto God's glory. 2. It must be referred unto some end subordinate unto God's glory, that carrieth a tendency unto it, and is naturally referrible thereunto.  
Now such an action is said to be virtually referred unto God's glory, because it is done in the virtue, and force of some preceding actual, and explicit proposal of God's glory as a supreme end: for the virtue, and force of the chief, and utmost end abideth in all inferior ends subordinated unto it; so that he, who propounds unto himself those inferior ends, may be said to propound implicitly, and mediately God's glory for his uttermost end. Thus those godly persons who have first actually made Gods honour and glory, the main aim of their desires, endeavours, and undertake, may be said afterwards to refer even their eating, and drinking, their recreations unto God's glory virtually, if they aim at no dishonest end, though their explicit and immediate intendment be only the refreshment of their bodies, by which they are the better fitted, and prepared for the glorifying of God in both their general, and particular callings. Thus every step in a man's journey, (so he go not out of the way) may be said to be virtually designed unto the end of his journey, and yet it is neither necessary, nor expedient, that in every step a man should have actual thoughts of the end of his journey.  
Unto this sentence of the Apostle here, Estius makes Parallel two other places.  
The first, Col. 3.17. Whatsoever ye do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, that is; for his glory and honour, for his name's sake.  
The second is, 1 Pet. 4.11. If any man speak, let him speak as the Oracles of God: If any man minister, let him d●e it as of the ability, which God giveth, that God in all things may be glorified through Jesus Christ; Not only in public ordinances, not only in acts of worship, not only in necessary duties, but even in indifferencies, in all the common actions of this life.  
But as for any further exposition of these two places in themselves, or application unto the matter in hand, I shall refer the reader unto what I but now spoke on the 1 Cor. 10.31. which with due change will serve here.  
I shall therefore pass on unto a second argument taken from the rule of humane actions, right reason: Unto this rule all rational actions, proceeding from deliberate reason, are either agreeable, or disagreeable: If agreeable, than they are morally good; for right reason is a part of Scripture materially considered: If disagreeable, than they are vicious and sinful; For the will of man is bound to look to its rule, and conform all its actions thereunto: and therefore if in any thing it neglect, or thwart it, if it swarve therefrom in the least particulars, it thereby commits a sin.  
Unto these two arguments I shall add a third, drawn from the relation betwixt m●rall goodness and illness: They are privatively opposite; and inter privative opposita non datur medium in proprio subjecto susceptivo; betwixt things privatively opposite there is no middle, either of abnegation, or participation in capable subjects: Thus every sensitive creature either seethe, or is blind: but we cannot say of a stone, that it is blind, although it seethe not; because it is not capable of sight: Now moral goodness and illness are privatively opposed, (the formality of sin being nothing else, but a privation of that moral goodness, which is required unto every rational action;) Now every rational action, Every action, that proceeds from deliberate reason, and freedom of will, considered in its singulars, and as drawn into exercise is capable of moral goodness; because it is referrible unto a good end: and therefore it is either good, or evil, and so not indifferent.  
Against this there are divers objections: unto those of Scotus the reader may supply himself with answers out of what hath been said already: As for the arguments of Vasquez, there is but 
(o) Prima ratio est desumpta ex eo, quod Doctores prioris opinionis concedunt, esse nimirum actionem indifferentem ex seâ specie, & objecto, tametsi in individuo nulla maneat indifferens. Ratio vero est hujusmodi. Nulla est natura in specie, quae non habeat aliquod individuum in quo ratio ejus maneat, & non destruatur per contrariam: cum igitur sit actio humana indifferens secundum suam naturam & speciem, habere debet aliquod individuum ac proinde esse poterit aliqua actio individua, & singularis, quae maneat indifferens. In 12ae tom. disp. 52. cap. 4. pag. 378.  one of them merit's any examination, and yet that hath been also answered out of Durand. (b)  
In brief, it runs thus. As no Genus, no general nature can be without one species, so no species, no special without one singular. No specifical nature but hath at least one individual: and therefore, if there be some humane actions, that be in their species, in their specifical nature indifferent, there must needs be an individual of such an action, that must be indifferent: and consequently all humane actions considered in the individual are not morally good, or evil.  
This hath been sufficiently answered already; but now I shall, ex abundanti, add two things more.  
The first is out of 
(p) Hunc loquendi modum, fateor esse ca villo obnoxium; impugnaturque ab Argentina in 2. d. 40. qu. unica. art. 2. in 2. particuli: quia nulla potest esse species cujus non possit esse aliquid individuum. Ergo si dantur actus secundum speciem indifferentes, debent quoque dari indifferentes secundum individuum. Quod argumentum agendo de specie, & individuo in sensu quotidiano, & vulgari, rectè concludit, sed non contra eos, qui admittunt actus secundum speciem indifferentes, negant autem dari indifferentes in individuo. Name high Autores fatentur illos ipsos actus, quos admittunt, esse secundum speciem indifferentes, habere queque indifferentiam quoad gradum illorum specificum restrictum per individuationem. Tantum itaque negant, eos actus, si spectentur cum omnibus sibi debitis accidentibus, esse moraliter indifferentes. Et hoc appellant, actus non esse indifferentes secundum individuum: nempe quia individuum, secluso rigore illo Metaphysico, in quo tantùm importat restrictionem gradus specifici, involvit congeriem omnium horum accidentium, aut ut passim loquimur, conditionum individuantium, secundum quam congeriem actus humanus non est indifferens, quatenus vel inter illa accidentis est debitus finis extrinsecus, & sic actus est bonus. vel non est debitus finis, & sic est malus, Mor. disc. distin. 4. qu. 1. art. 2. Num. 31.  Raynaudus: An humane action that considered specifically is indifferent, in regard of object or matter may in its individuals and singulars be looked upon two manner of ways. 1. Inadequately only as touching matter, or object. 2. Adequately in regard of all circumstances.  
1. If an humane action be considered specifically indifferent as touching matter or object, than all the individuals or singulars of that action are indifferent too, not simply and absolutely, but secundum quid; that is only as touching their object, and matter: But notwithstanding this, if we consider them adequately in respect of all circumstances, they are either good, or evil: for either they are clothed with all circumstances required in a rational action, and then they are good: or else they want some, or one of these circumstances, and then they are evil and sinful, for malum fit ex quovis defectu.  
The second is out of a modern Thomist; 
(q) Respondeo, posse aliquid esse indifferens dupliciter. 1. Quod Indifferentia fit de ejus essentiâ. 2. Quod ipsi conveniat per accidens, & ab extrinseco. Si sit indifferens priori modo, necesse in inferioribus salvari istam in. differentiam, quia tota essentia superioris reperitur in inferiori, siquidem essentia consist it in indivisibili: si sit indifferens posterio●i modo, non est necesse salvari indifferentiam in inferiori: nam quae per accidens superiori conveniunt, sunt ab ipso separabil●●● ergo fine illis potest communicari inferiori. Si talia accidentia repugnent inferiori. V C. posse praedicari de multis numerò differentibus, convenit naturae humanae secundum speciem consideratae, sed per accidens, & ab extrinseco, scilicet per operationem mentis eam abstrahentibus à singularibus, & cum illis ipsam conferentis; talis autem operatio est merè contingens tali naturae. Ex opposito, esse animal rationale convenit eidem humanae naturae tanquam illius essentia. Ex quo fit, u●humana natura nequeat communicari inferioribus, quin ipsis tribuat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 animal rationale, sed non ipsis communicat posse de multis numero praedicari, alioqui quodlibet individuum esset species. Jam ut ad propositum veniam, Indifferentia actui secundum speciem concessa non est ipsi essentials, sed accidentalis per abstractionem ab individuis: imo non est indifferentia moralis positiva: quasi actus ille sit moralis, & indifferens: sed est moralis negativa, quatenus actus ille non est moralis, sed caret ordine ad rationem morum regulam, ideoque nec bonus est, nec malus moraliter. Unde patet non debere in ullo individuo salvari talem indifferentiam, nisi fortè in actibus indeliberatis, qui similiter non sint morales; fed ipsi absunt à nostrâ quaestione. Ethic. cap. 3. Sect. 2.  Irenaeus. A thing may be said to be indifferent two manner of ways. 1. When indifferency is essential unto it. 2. When indifferency agreeth unto it only by accident, and extrinsecally, from something that is extra-essentiall unto it: If indifferency were essential unto an humane action, considered specifically, than every singular, or individual thereof must be indifferent too; because the essentials of every thing superior in point of predication are imparted, and attributed unto every thing, that is under them in point of predication; as every individual of the humane nature is a sensitive creature, a living body, etc. But now indifferency is ascribed unto some humane actions (considered specifically) only by accident, and extrinsecally, from the operation of our understandings, abstracting, and divesting them from those circumstances good, or bad, wherewith in their individuals they are apparelled: and therefore agreeth not unto their individuals looked upon without such an abstraction.  
By what hath been said, 
Application.  you see that our most indifferent actions are liable unto sin; and therefore afford matter of humiliation for the time past, matter of Caution for the future.  
1. Matter of humiliation for the time past: In their singular, and actual existence they were morally either good or evil, sanctified or sinful; and good they could not be, unless there did concur all requisites: And (alas,) how seldom hath there occurred in them such a concurrence? sometimes they have risen from a wrong principle; other times they have been directed unto bad ends: most times they have been faulty in regard of either measure, or manner: It is very seldom, but there hath been wanting in them some circumstance, or other, that the word of God, or law of nature requireth: And the total want of one of the least of such circumstances will so vitiate indifferent actions, as that it will not only render them sinful, but make them sins, meritorious of all the flames, and torments in hell: and that which deserves so severe a punishment, calls for a very eminent sorrow and contrition: God hath set bounds unto the use of our liberty in things indifferent, (as unto the waves of the sea,) saying, thus fare shall ye go, and no farther: He hath commanded, that it should be restrained by prudence, Temperance, conscience, Religion, Authority, and charity; But we have transgressed these limits, and have exceeded all bounds of moderation: We have used this part of our Christian liberty very imprudently, and intemperately in regard of ourselves; irreligiously, and profanely in respect of God: against the dictates of our conscience, a deputy under him; against the obligations of our oaths, and vows unto him: disobediently against the lawful commands of our superiors: uncharitably with the scandal of many poor brethren. And thus have we most shamefully, and unthankfully abused this great privilege of Christianity, by using it as an occasion unto the flesh, as a cloak of maliciousness; and so have prostituted it unto the very service of Satan himself: When Job's Sons and Daughters had feasted together, Job offered burnt offerings according unto the number of them all: for he said, it may be that my sons have sinned, Job. 14.5. Their feasting was a thing indifferent, and very lawful in itself: but, because it was obnoxious unto sin, therefore Jobe sacrificed in the behalf of them all: It may be (saith he) that my sons have sinned: The possibility of sin in the indifferent things of others (especially such as are nearly related:) stirs up in the godly a fear, and a holy jealousy of them, and rouseth unto prayers for them: and therefore much more should the certain, and undoubted assurance of the adhesion of sin unto our own indifferent actions provoke us, with contrite hearts to deprecate the wrath of God against us: All the indifferencies of unregenerate men are sins: Unto them that are defiled and unbelieving nothing is pure, Tit. 1.15. the ploughing of the wicked is sin, Prov. 21.4. And however unto the pure all things are pure. Tit. 1.15. that is, all indifferent things in themselves are lawful, yet they may and do accidentally become sin, when they are not in all particulars rightly circumstanced: And then they present us with fresh occasion for the renewal of our repentance and faith in Christ Jesus: And how often this happeneth, is a matter, that the most wakeful and quicksighted conscience can hardly discern: so that the best of us may apply unto our indifferencies that of David, Psalm. 19.12. Who can understand his errors: cleanse thou me from secret faults.  
Secondly, The liableness of our indifferent actions unto sin should be a motive unto all possible caution and wariness for the future in them: There is no humane action so indifferent, but it is capable of sin, nay (if it be not in all particulars rightly circumstantiated,) it becomes actually sinful; and therefore our hearts should be very watchful against sin in the use of all indifferencies, in our meals, in our feast, and merry meetings, in our journey's, in our ordinary talk, and discourse, in our walks, in the actions of our ordinary vocations: Indeed the rule of God's word doth not at all either command, or forbidden the matter of such actions: but the manner of performing them cometh under the rule: They are all to be done to the glory of God, in the name of Christ: every good creature is to be sanctified by the word, and prayer: That Command, which God gave Abraham (to walk before him) is not to be straitened unto the ordinances of God, but to be extended unto all deliberate acts of a man's life, and conversation, Gen. 17.1. Zechariah (in his prophecy of the general call or conversion of Jews, and Gentiles) gives this for one character of such, as shall be converted, that they shall have a sacred and sanctified use of things common and indifferent: In that day shall there be upon the bells of their horses, holiness unto the Lord, yea, every pot in Jerusalem and Judah shall be holiness unto the Lord of Hosts, Zech. 14.20, 21. Not only acts of immediate worship, but all rational actions, whatsoever, should be offered up as spiritual sacrifices acceptable unto God by Jesus Christ, 1 Pet. 2.5. The Apostle exhorts the Romans to salute one another with an holy kiss, Rom. 16.16. this kiss was no religious rite in God's worship, but a ceremony of civility; and therefore in itself a thing indifferent: And yet the Apostle requires holiness for the qualification of it: All our civil actions ought to be such, as becometh saints; that is, so fare forth holy for manner, that they be free from sin, and unto the glory of God: Indeed this is a strictness impossible unto lapsed man: But though we cannot exactly and perfectly observe it, yet we may sincerely and cordially endeavour it: And this sincere and hearty endeavour is that, which God, for Christ's sake, will accept, reward, and crown; and therefore it concerns us very much to use our utmost diligence herein: and the rather, because we are (by fare) more prone and ready to slide into sin in things indifferent ere we are ware, then in such things, as are for their nature, and matter sinful; for in such things the danger is more apparent, and therefore the more feared, and watched against; Whereas, if once we know, and are persuaded, that actions are indifferent, and lawful, than we are apt to think that all is safe, and that we need not trouble ourselves with any farther considerations touching their expediency, and edification; and tha● there is no reason to perplex our hearts and conscience with an anxious care of referring them to God's glory, of walking before God in them, and of putting holiness unto the Lord upon them. Now when once such thoughts as these creep into men's heads, it cannot be imagined, unto what excesses, and failings it exposeth them: Add unto this: that look as the consideration of the lawfulness, and indifferency of actions occasioneth a surprisal many times with heinous sins: so also it proves (by accident) an obstacle unto repentance for such sins: When the Godly fall into gross, and acknowledged sins, either of omission, or commission; why, the checks of their own consciences, the public ministry, the reproaches of enemies, and the admonition of Christian friends will soon awaken them, and inform them of their guilt: But as for the sins, that adhere unto their indifferencies, how quickly are they hardened in them? For it is very seldom, that, either their consciences, or their ministers, or their Brethren take notice of them; or if they do, they are apt presently to hold forth the indifferency, and lawfulness of such actions in themselves, as a buckler to ward off all accusations of Conscience, all upbraid of enemies, all reprehensions, of either ministers, or private friends: Those, that are most lavish of their time, and purses, in gaming, will plead; that they follow none, but lawful sports: A Gentleman, that murders the greatest part of his time in hunting, hawking, and the like exercises, and redeems but an inconsiderable portion of it to do God, and his Country service, thinks, that he hath enough to stop the mouth of all reproof, to say, that the recreations, which he pursueth are things indifferent: such riotous persons, as waste their precious hours in joviallity, and good-fellowship, usually make this Apology for themselves: that it is not unlawful to drink with a friend in a Tavern or alehouse. To awaken from this licentiousness, and to quicken in us a careful watchfulness over our hearts in the use of things indifferent, I shall, for conclusion of this discourse, propound some examples of the severity of God's judgements against the sins of men's indifferencies: david's numbering of the people was a thing not evil in itself; but his curiosity, pride, and carnal confidence in an arm of flesh made it so; And God was displeased with this thing, therefore he smote Israel, 1 Chron. 21.7. with a pestilence, that devoured 70000. Doubtless most of those feminine ornaments (mentioned, Esay 3.) were in themselves lawful; but the haughtiness, and wantonness of the daughters of Zion abused them unto sin; And how severely this sinful abuse of them was threatened, you may read at large from verse the 16 usque ad 25: for Hezekiah to show unto the Babylonian Ambassadors the house of his precious things, the silver, and the gold and the spices, and the precious ointment, and all the house of his armour, and all that was found in his treasures, all that was remarkable in his house, and dominion was in itself, but a civil entertainment, and not unlawful: but because he did it out of vain ostentation, this turned it into sin, and this was one of the sins, which God chastised with the captivity of the whole nation, Esay 39 2 Chron. 32. 2 Kings 30. To be clothed in Purple, and fine linen, and to far sumptuously were things in themselves indifferent; but the excess of the rich glutton made it sinful unto him: and this sin, not being repent of, was unto him a forerunner of hell torments, Luke 16.19, 23. They were the sins of things indifferent that had a great hand in, and influence upon the drowning of the old world, and the burning of Sodom, Luke 17. vers. 27, 28, 29. In the days of Noah, they did eat, they drank, they married wives, they were given in marriage, until the day that Noah entered into the ark; and the flood came and destroyed them all. Likewise also as it was in the days of Lot, they did eat, they drank, they bought, they sold, they planted, they builded: But the same day that Lot went out of Sodom, it reigned fire and brimstone from Heaven, and destroyed them all.  
FINIS.   

A TREATISE Concerning ABSTINENCE From all appearance of EVIL, In Doctrine and in matters of practice, and that both unto ourselves and unto others. WHEREIN Divers Questions and Cases of Conscience belonging unto the difficult matter of scandal are briefly resolved.  
By HENRY JEANES Minister of God's word at Chedzoy in Somerset.  Bernard: ad Eugenium de Consideratione. Lib. 3. cap. 4. 
Sanè interest tuae perfectionis, & malas res, & malas pariter species devitare. In altero Conscientiae, in altero famae Consulis. Puta tibi non licere (etsi alias fortasse liceat) quicquid malè fuerit coloratum.  
OXFORD, Printed by Hen: Hall Printer to the UNIVERSITY for Tho: Robinson, 1660.   

TO 

THOMAS MOOR of Hauck-Church in .  
ROBERT HUNT of Compton Paines-Ford in Somersetsh.   Esquires.  
IT is unto your Mediation that I own in great part that leisure, and liberty, which I had for the compiling of this Book, and this hath given you such an interest both in it, and in me, as that it would be a high piece of injustice, if no part of it should wear your Livery. This account that I have given, touching the reason of my prefixing your names unto this work, may induce such Readers, who shall reap any Benefit thereby, to Concur in their hearty prayers, for the pouring down of God's Blessings, Spiritual and Temporal, Upon your Persons and Families with the poor Author, who shall ever rest  
Your most truly devoted Servant HENRY JEANES.   
1 Thes: 5.22. 
Abstain from all appearance of evil.  
OUr Apostle directs us, in the verse immediately preceding this Text, concerning Good; in this Text concerning Evil. Towards Good he exacts a prudent wariness; towards Evil a scrupulous fearfulness. Towards good, a prudent wariness, Prove all things, and then, hold fast that which is good. Nothing, how colourable soever, is to be received hand over head, before trial and examination by the balance of the Sanctuary: for, Vitia virtutes mentiuntur (saith Gregory) vice is masked under the skin of virtue; falsehood, disguised under the face of truth: so that one is often mistaken for the other. The grossest enormities have been glast and coloured over with the name, and face of virtues: the most poisonous heresies have often gained the esteem and applause of Orthodox Tenents● and therefore as we must steadfastly retain that which is truly true and good; so must we prudently discern, and carefully distinguish between that which is so indeed, and in truth, and that which is so only in show, and colour; this we must reject, that keep, and hold fast: Prove all things, hold fast that which is good. But he requires now towards evil a fare different carriage: there he looks for a scrupulous fearfulness. Though we must not hold fast any thing that hath but the appearance of good, yet we must abstain from but the appearance of evil.  
Abstain from all appearance of evil: or from every evil appearance: the Words may be rendered indifferently, either way, both renderings being equally consonant to the truth, and Original.  
In the words our Apostle meets with a cavil, rife among the Libertines of our, and former times, who when their scandalous courses are charged upon them, baffle of all with this plea: that they are not intrinsically sinful. Can I (will the profanest Libertine say) once see such and such things proved to be unlawful: why I would make no more words of the matter, but soon forbear them. I, but have they the blush, the appearance of evil? that should be motive enough to shun them.  Abstain from all etc. 
But are we sure this is the Apostles meaning? are not the words capable of another interpretation? First, some mislike our translation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, species, by appearance, and rather think it should be meant logically, for sort, or kind. That it may be so, Mat. Flac. Illyricus and Beza determine, That it is so the Syriack. Interpreter, and after him Faber, and after them our own great and learned 
(r) See his Annotations.  Doctor Hammond resolve. But I would feign know upon what ground they are thus singular against the Current both of Ancient and Modern Expositors. Setting aside this place the word occurs (as I think) in the whole new Testament but four times, In Luke 3.22. and 9.29. John 5.37. 2 Cor. 5.7. And in none of these places is it, can it be taken in a Logical notion. If not elsewhere, why here? especially seeing such an acception is not enforced by the scope, coherence, any other circumstance of the Text, or any absurdity otherwise unavoidable.  
But some dream of a foul absurdity, that would ensue upon translating 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 species, appearance. If every appearance of evil should be abstained from, then should good things, the best things be eschewed, for they commonly appear to be evil unto sense, and carnal reason, that discern not the things of the spirit of God. How easily may an acute wit set false faces upon them and work a bad conceit of them into either weak or ill appre ' hensions.  
Unto this we may add that of Dr Hammond in his treatise of scandal. pag 9.10. Appearance of evil (saith he) is so uncertain and unconstant a thing, that to abstain from it, universim, cannot be the matter of any possible Command. This fear will quickly vanish and be discovered to be idle, and vain, when anon we shall explain that distinction of appearance of evil, into real, and imaginary: for the present therefore, leaving these men, proceed we, secondly, to others, who agree with us in interpreting 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in a vulgar, familiar, and common sense, for appearance: but then their exposition is not so general, as ours: for they restrain the place to matters of Doctrine, and will not allow it to be extended to matters of practice: and countenance, they think, the context gives their gloss: for the Apostle having at the 19 verse exhorted not to quench the spirit, in verse 20. prescribes a means for cherishing the spirit, viz: a reverend demean our towards the word of God. If ye will not quench the spirit, despise not prophesying. And next, lest that some should except: are we thus reverently to receive promiscuously all prophesyings, and doctrines preached unto us, and not to beware of some, of false prophesyings and doctrines? the Apostle, (say they) more distinctly directs, how we should demean ourselves. First, towards all prophesyings in general: how, secondly, towards true: how, 3dly, towards false. First, all prophesyings, and doctrines whatsoever must be diligently examined, Prove all things. Secondly, all true prophesyings, sound, and orthodox doctrines are to be embraced, with a firm, and unremovable assent, Hold fast that which is good. Lastly, as for false prophesyings and doctrines even their very appearance is to be shunned. Thus they &c.  
But first, I propose unto the consideration of the learned, whether or no an exact and accurate coherence be to be looked for in most of those precepts, delivered by the Apostle, from vers. 13. usque ad vers. 23. The lose and abrupt manner of heaping them together persuade (me thinks) that there is as little dependence of many of them upon either the foregoing, or following precepts, as is to be expected between Solomon's Proverbs, or Bede's Axioms. Hence is it that 
(s) Neque necesse est hanc partem interpretari (ut quldam faciunt) ut connexionem habeat eum iis, quae proximè praecedunt: nam potius videtur Apostolus refricare memoriam ejus, quod praecipit cap● superiori: ut honesti ambulent, ad ecs, qui foris sunt, etc. Estius.  Estius holds it not necessary to interpret the place so, as that it should have connection with those duties that immediately precede: rather (thinks he) the Apostle seems to rubbe up the memory of what he commanded in the former chapter, at verse the 12. That ye may walk honestly towards them that are without.  
Secondly, Suppose a coherence of the words with the former, must it needs be that which they obtrude? The words may sit under our interpretation, and yet the Analysis of the Context run smoothly, as thus:  
The Apostle having at verse 19 dehorted from quenching the spirit, next adviseth use of means tending to the preservation of its gracious and glorious residence in the soul: which means are either negative or positive: he assigns but one negative means, viz: a removal of a main bar and powerful obstacle unto the presence of the spirit, contempt of preaching, Despise not prophesying, vers. 20. of the positive means, two concern good, one evil: the two concerning good, are boni diligens examinatio, constans electio: Prove all things, hold fast that which is good. This respecting evil, est universalissima ejus rejectio, an abstinence not only from all kinds, but even from all appearance of evil.  
Lastly, suppose the primary scope and intention of the Apostle be limited unto matters of doctrine: yet because the main reason, for which they themselves conceive appearances of evil, even in matters of doctrine to be interdicted, is avoidance of scandal, the precept of which is juris naturalis, and not only doctrines but also actions are scandalous: justly therefore unto these, as well as those, is the text appliable, and applied too, by all Schoolmen, or others that ever I met with purposely treating on the point of scandal. Should we then against the more generally received opinion of either former or later times, admit of their narrow and curtailed interpretation for the clear, and indubitate sense of the Apostle? Yet to make the words more instructive, their use more general, we might warrantably put an enlargement upon them, and extend them ad mores, as well as ad dogmata: ad agenda, as well as ad credenda: to the decalogue, as well as creed; not only to doctrinal truths, but moral duties also.  
Use of a division here is none, but to bewray Logic: and therefore without more ado we will roundly betake ourselves to Limitation, Confirmation, and Application of the plain point here commended to us: we are to abstain not only from things intrinsically sinful, but from all shows and appearances of sin.  
For Limitation, appearance of evil is either in positions or actions.  
First then? 'tis questioned whether or no we are to abstain from all positions, which have an appearance of evil: of falsehood.  
For resolution we must distinguish, 

1. Concerning appearance of evil in positions.  
2. Concerning abstinence from such an appearance.    
Appearance of evil in Positions is twofold: 

1. Either in regard of their matter and substance.  
2. Or else in the terms, and expressions used in their proposal. That which is in regard of their matter and substance, is, either to ourselves or others.    
Secondly, to distinguish concerning abstinence from the appearance of evil, or falsehood in Positions: we may be said to abstain from doctrines false in appearance, two manner of ways; either 

1. When we abstain from assenting to them.  
2. Or when we abstain from publishing of them.    
We abstain from assenting to them either positively, or negatively.  
Positively, when by a positive, or real act of the understanding we descent from, we reject them. Now descent from them is twofold, 

1 Either absolute and peremptory,  
2. Or else but conditional, and cautionary.    
Negatively, when we do not descent from them, but only not assent unto them: when we suspend our assent.  
To apply these distinctions.  
Note first, that though the substance or matter of Doctrines appear to be false unto ourselves, our own judgements, yet are we not bound to abstain positively from assenting to them, to descent from them, to reject them; for this appearance may not be true and real, grounded upon the doctrines themselves, which perhaps may not send forth the least colour or shadow for suspicion, but only put and fastened upon them by means of the error, ignorance, and darkness of our understandings, that perhaps not with due care and circumspection, but rather with much precipitancy have given their censure of them: and therefore however at first blush they seem false, yet when once the light of our reason is cleared from mists, and clouds, they may upon due examination prove true: and to descent from, and reject a truth would be a foul error of, and blemish to our understanding. Obliged we are then, to abstain, not positively but negatively from assenting to them: that is, not to descent from them, but only not to assent unto them, to stay our assent, to demur a while, before we give in our judgement, lest we receive any thing with a doubtful, entangled, and perplexed Conscience.  
Of this Calvin gives us an hint in his exposition on this place, Speciem mali interpreter, cùm nondum ita comperta est doctrinae falsitas, ut merito rejici queat, sed tamen aliqua haeret sinistra suspicio, & timetur, ne quid veneni lateat: ergò ab eo genere doctrinae, quod malum, etiamsi non sit, apparet, abstinere praecipit, non quod in totum rejici permittat, sed quia recipi, aut fidem obtinere non debet. Cur enim priùs quod bonum est teneri jussit, nunc abstinere vult, n●n simpliciter à malo, sed à mali specie? quia ubi dijudicatione in lucem producta fuerit veritas, tunc demum ei fidem haberi decet: ubi autem subest falsi metus, aut mens dubitatione est implicita, p●dem refer, vel gradum suspendere convenit, nè quid dubiâ perplex áque conscientiâ amplectamur. By the appearance of evil I understand (saith he) when as the falsehood of a doctrine is not yet so throughly detected, that it may be deservedly rejected, but yet there sticks some bad suspicion of it, and 'tis feared, lest poison lurk under it: therefore he commands us to abstain from that kind of doctrine, which though it be not evil, yet appears so: not as though it ought altogether to be rejected, but because it ought not to be received, to be believed. For why doth he before command us to hold fast only that which is good, and here he wills us to abstain not barely from evil, but from its appearance? Because when after a through sifting a truth is cleared, 'tis fitting it should forthwith be believed: but when as the falsehood of it is feared, or the mind with doubting is entangled, we must for a while withdraw our assent, lest we embrace any thing with a doubting, and perplexed conscience.  
But suppose I for mine own part am firmly persuaded of the truth of such, or such a Tenet, or at least unconvinced, unperswaded of its falsehood, and yet it appear generally unto others to be false unto the judgements of the godly learned, of most of the ancient Fathers, unto either general or provincial Councils: in such a case, what course must I take, because it hath appearance of falsehood unto others understandings, must I therefore descent from it, or stop mine assent unto it?  
For answer, take these four following rules.  
First, we own so reverend and humble an esteem of, and submission unto the Spirits of the Prophets, to the judgement of learned, sober, and pious Divines, unto the writings of the ancient godly Fathers, unto the Canons, and decrees of Ecumenical, and Provincial Councils, as that whatsoever Tenants the whole Church representative, to wit, a general Council, or the greatest and chiefest part of the Church most of the Fathers and Divines too, of later and present times, have rejected and condemned for false, and erroneous, we should abstain negatively from assenting to, that is, though not change, yet suspend our belief of them, and not fully pass over our full and absolute assent unto them, until by diligent inquisition, servant prayer, imploring the guidance of God's holy spirit, and use of all other good means, either their consonancy with, or dissonancy from the truth, be clearly discerned, fully confirmed, and manifested unto our Consciences.  
But Christian modesty stayeth not here, but goeth one step further, and in a second exacts of us a conditional, probable, and 
t Dr Jackson.  cautionary dissent from all doctrines thus generally suspected, and censured: for upon general dislike of a doctrine, as upon a prudential motive, we may ground a strong presumption, an high and probable conjecture of the falsehood of it: so that hereupon we may reject it, though not in an absolute and irrevocable way, yet with this limitation and caution: so the apparent verity therein of itself do not force us to embrace it. So sottish I am not, as to measure truth by multitude of voices: for errors I know that have grated upon the foundation, nay heresies, that have raised the foundation, have had their cloud of witnesses: yet I should so fare honour a public testimony, as to suspect mine own, and others private bare opinions, not backed by plain scripture, with evident sense, or a full demonstrative argument, rather than a general suffrage: for, nemo omnes, neminem omnes, fefellere, 
* Pliny.  improbable as for one to deceive all, so for all to deceive one, River 
(u) Ne dubitamus caeteris quidem paribus, majorem & pleniorem mensuram communicari publicis Ecclesiae administris five in una aliqua pa●ticulari Ecclesia munus suum obeant; five in coe●u aliquo legitimè & in Christinomine congregati de vero scriptutae sensu inter se confe. rant quam sin gulis & privatis qui neque tot donis instructi sunt, neque tot oculis vident, neque privatâ & simplici meditatione aequare possunt multorum collationem & disquisitionem. Isag. ad Scrip▪ Sac. cap. 19 Pag: 272.  makes no doubt, but caeteris paribus, that is, if parts, prayer, diligence of study after the truth, be equal, that then a greater and fuller measure of the gift of expounding the Scripture, and deciding controversies thereabouts, is communicated to the public ministers of the Church, (whether they execute their function severally, and apart in some one particular Church, or else jointly confer and discourse among themselves concerning the true and genuine sense of the Scriptures in some assemblies called lawfully, and in the name of Christ) than unto several private men, who are neither endowed with so many gifts, nor see with so many eyes, nor by their private and single meditation can equal the united consultations and inquiries after truth of many. And thus you see how fare Christian modesty requireth us to abstain from assenting to doctrines upon the appearance of evil, or falsehood, which they carry unto those, who in interpeting scripture, and deciding controversies, have committed to them the public office of direction and instruction of others: but yet it taketh not from us the judgement of private discretion; for Christian liberty alloweth us such a freedom of dissenting from, or assenting unto, what the Church, and her ministers say, as is to be specified in the next two following rules.  
In a third place therefore, although the Church, or the greatest and chiefest part of her, charge error and falsehood upon such a doctrine, yet this bare and single testimony, not seconded by any scripture or reason, is not to gain so fare upon our belief, as that thereupon we should presently reject, and descent from the doctrine thus generally censured with an absolute and peremptory dissent. This were to give unto the Church's decisions as high and overruling a suffrage in our hearts, as is only due to divine revelations to receive them, not as they are indeed the word of men, but as if they were the word of God: to yield unto them an absolute divine faith, and credence. This were a mere Vassalage of our souls, understandings, faiths, unto the authority of an humane testimony: a thing utterly unworthy the generosity and freedom of Christian Spirits. If God hath indulged to any the exercise of such dominion over men's faiths, and consciences: alas! then to what purpose hath he placed that glorious lamp of reason in our bosoms? of what use are our intellectuals? What place is there left for Saint Paul's proving of all things? St John's trial of the Spirits? but the truth is, 
1 Joh. 4.1.  that God is so fare from enslaving our understandings, or captivating our belief unto the judgement of any mortal, as that he approves not only of a forbearance from a flat, and absolute dissent from doubtful doctrines thus publicly, and generally disliked, but also of a full and peremptory assent unto doctrines manifestly true, though condemned in a general Council, as is apparent from the fourth and last rule, which is:  
If a doctrine be, as true in itself, so also clearly, and evidently by me apprehended to be so, and yet appear generally to be false unto others, of what degree, order, or condition soever; nevertheless it Commands absolute subscription, and assent of the mind without contradiction, without hesitancy, nay without so much as suspense of judgement. If the verity then of a doctrine be apparent, it must overrule the assent of the understanding against the testimony of the whole world. For the testimony of men, of the wisest, holiest men, considered either apart, or assembled in a council, admits, as always of examination, and trial by the balance of the Sanctuary, and rules of right reason, so likewise of contradiction and denial, when in it there is an express, and evident variation from either reason, or divine authority. In such a cause we may lawfully, and safely descent from it; always provided, that it be not in an insolent manner, but with a reverend, childlike, and respectful bashfulness.  
But to go on, if I am not to abstain from assenting to a doctrine manifestly true, because it appears generally to others to be false, must I not yet abstain from publishing, from spreading of it, either by writing or preaching?  
For answer, thou must consider the general nature and quality of the doctrine, thus wrongly either accused, or suspected of falsehood, and also of what use, and importance it is in regard of the present times, and places, wherein thou livest, and if it prove to be a doctrine either fundamental, or at least of such weight and moment that from the publishing of it, will spring a greater good, more glory to God, and benefits to the Church than the trouble and disquiet it brings can be an evil, thou art then at no hand to conceal it, so shouldst thou be unfaithful both to God and his Church, and become accessary to the betraying, nay murder of the truth. Si de veritate scandalum sumatur (saith Gregory) melius est ut scandalum oriatur, quam ut veritas relinquatur. If scandal or offence be taken at a truth which the estate and exigence of those souls committed to a man's charge requireth him to publish, better suffer the whole world to be scandalised, than such a truth disadvantaged, either by denial, or but a cowardly smothering, and dissembling, thereof. Quemadmodum enim (saith Calvin) Charitati subjicienda est nostra libertas, 
Cal. lib. 3. Just. c. 12. Sect. 13.  ita sub fidei puritate subsidere vicissim charitas ipsa debet: As our liberty is to be subjected to charity, so also our Charity itself to faith's purity.  
But now if it be a doctrine, either not fundamental, but of a lower rank and quality, wherein both orthodox writers, and preachers may vary and abound in their own sense, without prejudice to the foundation: or if it be of so small use, that upon its divulgement, it is not probable there will arise so much honour to God, and edification of the Church, as may preponderate those mischiefs, that hurly-burly, those tumults, and contentions in the Church, which in all likelihood will ensue thereby, thou must then forbear to vent it, either from press, or pulpit; so shalt thou best consult for thine own private quiet, and public peace. And we must follow after things that make for peace, and edification: Rom. 14.19. About such matters to be contentious, we have no custom, nor the Churches of God: and indeed about them to be contentious were the right prank of a Schismatic: for not only he is a Schismatic (saith 
(r) Non enim Schismaticus eò agnoscitur, quod fovet perversum dogma, i nó conting it aliquando, ut sententia schismatici hominis verissima sit, tamen quia eam neque loco neque tempore debitis, nulláque necessitate urget, Schismaticus est, & scandalum objecit Dei popu●o●cum enim non agatur salus Ecclesiae, ostendit se non adductum studio gloriae Christi, sed suae potiu; existimationis Ecclesiam turbâsse. Cameron in selectiora quaedam N. T. loca. Tom. 2. in Mat. c. 18. v. 7.  Cameron) who maintains a perverse Tenet: a man may hold a very true opinion, and yet play the Schismatic, and give scandal unto the people of God by delivering it in a rash, unpeaceable, and unseasonable manner, neither in fit place, nor due time, no necessity urging thereunto▪ for seeing in determining of his opinion the glory of God, and weal of the Church lie not at the stake, he plainly shows, that he hath troubled the Church, lead with desire of not Christ's glory, but his own Credit. I confess indeed, that a controverted, and suspected truth even of this low quality may be peaceably, and modesty professed, and debated too in private, but a public promulgation thereof is at any hand to be forborn, non sub intuitu mali, sed minoris b●ni, not under the apprehension of any evil in the truth, but only as a lesser good, which will not consist with a greater, the tranquillity of the Church; or if you will, the public promulgation of such a truth is to be forborn, sub intuitu mali, etsi non simpliciter, tamen per accidens talis: under the apprehension of evil, not in the controverted truth, but in the promulgation thereof, which though it be not simply evil, yet becomes accidentally so, to wit, by comparison, in respect of a greater good than required, preservation of the general quiet; with which for the present it cannot stand, unto the care of which it is opposed, though not primo & per se, yet ex consequenti connexione virtutum, as Suarez upon another occasion phraseth it. But I digress.  
To go on to that appearance of evil in doctrines, which is in the expressions used in their proposal, a thing I could wish it were not to rife amongst many, who like no truth, unless delivered in heretical terms; men wonderfully taken with the language of Ashdod, the Romish dialect. But let it be our care to refrain all words, and phrases, which carry an appearance of either heresy or schism; for though they may, and are by us meant in an orthodox sense, yet carry they a shrewd show of evil, make others jealous, and suspicious of our soundness, and therefore 
(x) In rebus fidei verba debent esse casta, & exacta. & quae rem ipsam propriè exprimant, & haereticis non praestent occasionem calumniandi. Pet. Martinez, lib. 12. de locis cap. 9 ad tertium.  Canus although he will by no means assent, absolutely to that usual saying; ex verbis inordinatè prelatis fit haeresis: yet he is content to approve of it, if it be moderated with this caution, secundum praesumptionem audientium, & judicum, qui per exteriora signa debent judicare de haeresi: if it be understood according to the supposal of hearers, and judges, who ought and indeed can judge of heresy only by outward signs. Between a minister and Popery let there be a great Chasma, a distance as wide as between heaven, and earth, nay heaven, and hell: yet if his phrase do but smell of Popery, if his words, though not his meaning, trench near upon it, men will presently exclaim that he hath a Pope in his belly, at least that he sounds for a Parley, and thinks upon conditions of peace with the Romish harlot. And besides as this suspicious complying in phrase, and language with the known errors of Popelings, or other novellers, and corrupt teachers grieves the settled and judicious, so farther it staggers weaklings, confirms and hardens aliens, and Apostates: rather opens than stops the mouths of gainsaying carpers, and sooner disadvantageth the truth, than converts an adversary. So fare is it from effecting the usually pretended end, reconciliation; as that to use the similitude of our Saviour, Mat. ch. 9 v. 16. like the putting of a new piece of cloth unto an old garment, it maketh the rent worse, and wider. There goeth a manuscript from hand to hand, said to be penned by a learned 
(y) Dr Sanderson.  Doctor of this Church, wherein (that amidst notwithstanding all the variety of opinions there may be yet preserved in the Church the unity both of faith, and charity) private men are advised in their own writings to observe formam, sanorum verborum, and to abstain not only from suspected opinions, but as much as may be also from phrases and speeches obnoxious to misconstruction and exception.  
For first, it is not enough, much less a thing to be gloried in, for a man to be able by subtlety of wit, to find loopholes, how to evade, and by colourable pretences, to make that, which through heat of passion, or violence of opposition hath fall'n from him unadvisedly, to seem bowsoever defensible. But he should have a care to suffer nothing to pass from him, whereat an ingenious and dispassionate adversary (though dissenting from him in opinion,) might yet have cause to take distaste, or exception.  
And besides, it were a thing of dangerous consequence in the Church, if every man should be suffered to publish freely whatsoever might by some strain of wit be made capable of a good construction, if of itself it sounded ill, or suspiciously. For so many erroneous, unhappy notions implicitly and virtually serving to the patronage and protection of Schism or heresy, might be cunningly conveyed into the minds of men, and impressions thereof insensibly wrought in their hearts, to the great damage and distraction of the Church.  
This last reason for the substance you may meet with in Aquinas 2. 2 daes. q. 11. a. 2. where (having told us out of Hierome, ex verbis inordinatè prolatis fit haeresis: that by unwary irregular expressions, by words disorderly spoken, the most dangerous heresies have often taken their first rise, and original) he afterwards gives us the reason hereof: Similiter enim per verba quae quis loquitur, suam fidem profitetur: est enim confessio actus fidei: & ideo si sit inordinata locutio circaea quae sunt fid●i, sequi potest ex hoc corrupti● fidei: Vnde Leo Papa quâdam Epistolâ ad Proterium Episcopum Alexandrinum dicit, quod inimici crucis Christi, omnibus & verbis nostris insidiantur & syllabis, si ullam illis vel tenuem occasionem demus, quâ Nestoriano sensui nos congruere mentiantur. Likewise a man professeth his faith by words, which he speaketh; for confession is an outward act of faith, and therefore, if there be but an inordinate speech about matters of faith, the corruption of faith may hereupon ensue.  
Whence Leo the Pope, in a certain Epistle unto Proterius Bishop of Alexandria saith, that the enemies of Christ's Cross lie in wait for all our words, and syllables, if in them we give any the least occasion, upon which they may feign that we comply with Nestorianisme. Hence is it that Aquinas himself having proposed this question, whether or no this proposition be true, Christ is a creature in his answer thereunto tells us, first in general, cum haereticis nec nomina debemus habere communia, ne corum errori favere videamur, then more particularly, unto the question; that the Arrian heretics have said that Christ is a creature, and less than the Father, in regard not only of the humane nature, but also divine person, and therefore resolves, that lest we should seem to countenance their error, we must not say absolutely that Christ is a Creature, and less than his Father; but only with this limitation, according to the humane nature.  
Ariani autem-heretici Christum dixerunt esse creaturam, & minorem Patre, non solùm ratione humanae naturae, sedetiam ratione divinae personae, & ideò non est absolutè dicendum, quod Christus sit Creatura, vel minor Patre, sed cum determinatione, scilicet secundum humanam naturam. Nay not only Aquinas, but generally all the Schoolmen, and Civilians too, are so precise in this particular, as that among the degrees of damnable propositions are ranked by them not only propositions down rightly heretical, or erroneous, but also 
(z) Propositio scandalosa, quae etiam malè sonans, seu piarum aurium offensiva, appellatur, quae praebet occasionem ruinae auditoribus, hoc est facilitatem cadendi in haeresin, ut funt multae propositiones, quae licet cum modificatione adjuncta, sunt verae, per se tamen & absolu●è sine modificatione prola●ae videntur favere propositionibus haereticalibus. Ut si quis assereret simpliciter Patrem majorem Filio, & Deum in incarnatione factum creaturam, & similes, quae magis sunt exponendae, quàm extendendae. Ar●oldus Albertinus de agnoscendis assertionibus Catholicis & hereticis. quaest. 60. Propositio haeesin sapiens, aut malè circa ea, quae ad fidem pertinent, sonans, est illa quae in prima significatio●e, quam verba prima facie ostendunt, sensum habet haereticum, quamvis piè intellecta sensum liquem habet verum. Alphonsus à Castro de justa haereticorum punitione: cap. 3.  propositio sapiens haeresin, propositio male sonans, every proposition, that doth but smell, that hath but a smack of heresy, that sounds but ill or suspiciously; and such are all propositions, that in the first signification, which their words at first blush seem to import, have an heretical sense; all propositions, that of themselves, that is, uttered absolutely without any explanation, or qualification, seem to favour or countenance heretical propositions, all though they be capable of a good construction, and with many cautions, limitations, and restrictions might pass for currant. And therefore was it, that the Council of Basil condemned this proposition, Christ sins daily, because taken properly 'tis false and against the faith, although perhaps it may be freed from error, if expounded in a unproper sense, thus; Christ sinneth daily, not in himself, but his members. 
(a) Explicatur optimè, modo suprâ tacto de propositione aequivocá, quae in proprio aliquo ensu, potest esse haeretica, & in alio etiam propriè Catholiea, nam illa absolutè, & sine distinctione, vel declaratione prolata merito dicitur male sonans, in quo distinctio alia adh●beri potest. Nam quaedam propositio diciturab extrinseco malè sonans, alia ab intrinseco. Ab extrinseco ●catur, quando suspicio, vel malus sonus, non ex propositione nude sumpta, sed cum circumantiis personae, loci, aut temporis oritur. Suarez de triplici virtute Theologica tract. de fide isp. 19 Sect. 7. Dicendum igitur est, quod propositio sap●ens haeresin illa est, quae quamvis non opareat haeresis manifesta, quin potius aliquando poterit habere aliquem bonum sensum, tamen 〈◊〉 quibusdam circumstantiis, vel ex parte afferentis, vel ex temporum calamitate, faporem quen●m habet haeresis, & suspicionis judicio prudentum & sapientum, id est, suspicionem quandam ●ajorem vel minorem pro qualitate circumstantiarum. Bannes.  Suarez saith, that if an equivocal proposition having two proper senses, one Catholic, another heretical be delivered absolutely without any distinction, or declaration, in which sense 'tis meant, it is then deservedly said to be propositio malè sonans. The same author goeth on and tells us, that a proposition is said to be malè sonans, not only ab intrinseco, but also ab extrinseco when the suspicion or ill sound thereof ariseth not from the proposition taken nakedly, as it is in itself, but considered jointly with the circumstances either of the person delivering, or of the time and place, in which it is delivered. Omitting his instance, I will give you others more true, and savoury. The word Sacrament with the ancients sounded no other, than an holy significant rite; in those times then to have called matrimony, orders, etc. Sacraments, had been (it may be) without all manner of offence. But now, since the Church of Rome hath peremptorily determined, that therebe Seven Sacraments properly and strictly so called, seven outward and sensible signs, which by divine institution, have annexed unto them the promise of justifying grace. He that shall now term any thing a Sacrament, besides Baptism, and the Lords Supper, renders himself thereby justly suspected.  
In the writings of the Fathers, the words of satisfaction, and merit have been of large use. Satisfaction signified every bitter afflictive acknowledgement, or penitential mortification of our sins, whereby we prevent, and turn away God's hand, and punishments for them. Merit, denoted only obtaining, procurement, impetration, and according to this acception of the words, a man might safely have heretofore affirmed, that our prayers, alms, and other good works are satisfactory and meritorious. But now since some of the Romanists have wrested these say of the Fathers unto a worse sense, than they were uttered in: and hereupon taught that works are properly satisfactory, just compensations for our sins, wherein we make recompense unto God's wronged justice, and redeem ourselves at least from temporal punishments; that works are strictly and properly meritorious of eternal life, deserving and earning it ex condigno, in the way of condign wages; as if there were an equality or due proportion between it and them, without all regard unto God's gracious acceptance of them; he that shall now aver these propositions, may without breach of charity be justly thought to embrace them in that false, and erroneous sense, which our adversaries the Papists take them in.  
Hitherto concerning doctrinal appearance of evil, in Doctrines. Practical appearance of evil in manners or matters of practice next follows; 
(b) Dr Sclater in locum.  and that may again be divided into Real or Imaginary. The distinction is the same with that of others. Aliquid habet speciem mali, vel p●r se ex conditione operis, vel per accidens ex aliorum interpretatione.  
The difference between these must be well weighed, else we may as foully be mistaken, as once the Pontickes were, who, as Florus tells us, fight in a night with the Romans, per errorem longius cadentes umbras suas quasi hostium corpora petebant: mistaking their own shadows projected long as at the going down of the Moon, laid at them as at the very bodies of their enemies: or as the Romans themselves, were, unto whom when Tiberius Gracchus touched his head with his hand to exhort the people, as by a sign, to stand upon their guard for their lives, it seemed as if he demanded a diadem. Cùm plebem ad defensionem salutis suae manu caput tangens, praebuit speciem regni sibi, & diadema poscentis, Flor. lib. 3. cap. 14. To distinguish them then, a real appearance of evil flows per seex natura operis, from the nature, and condition of the fact itself: when that of itself, and in its own nature, is a very probable sign of evil: and so it is, when it is ordinarily done for an evil end, when it is per se an occasion of Sin in ourselves, and of scandal unto others: it must be occasio data, non accepta.  
First, when naturally, and not only casually, it may prove, and ordinarily doth prove an occasion of an incentive to sin in ourselves.  
Secondly, when it becomes an occasion of scandal or offence, of scandal tending unto sin in the weak, of scandal tending unto sorrow and vexation in the strong and discreet:  
Such an appearance is there of adultery, in a man's lying in bed with another man's wife, though he hath no carnal knowledge of her.  

* Talis sc. materialis usus circumcisionis semper habet speciem mali, non ex accidentia tantum, sed quasi per se supposito Eccesiae stau. Suarez. de legibus lib. 9 cap. 14.  Such an appearance of Judaisme, (than which few greater evils) is there in the (c) circumcision of those Aethiopian Christians, that live under Prester John. Such was the appearance of evil in Christians sitting at meat in the Temples of Paganish Idols, in Naaman's bowing himself in the house of Rimmon, however Cajetan excuse him with a pretty distinction, inter genu flexionem imitativam, & genu flexionem obsequii. And such also is that appearance of evil in a good man's intimate fellowship with bad ones, in a true and formal compliancy with aliens in the signs of profession. As in a Protestants presence at the superstitious, and Idolatrous worship of Papists, or in any other complementing with them in the expression of that worship.  
Now no actions that have this real appearance of evil are upon any pretext whatsoever to be ventured upon, and for this I shall give two Reasons.  
First, because in them there is always a scandal given, an active scandal, as is plain from Aquinas his definition of scandal, 2. 2dae. qu. 43. art. 1. Scandalum (saith he) understand it of an active scandal) est dictum vel factum minùs rectum praebens alteri occasionem ruinae. For a word or fact is 
(d) Dicitur autem minùs rectum, & non absolutè malum, aut non rectum, ad denotandum, posse etiam scandali rationem esse in actu, qui non sit undequaque pravus, sed tantum habeat speciem mali; aut qui duntaxat ratione effectus sc. ruinae alterius, malus sit, licet alioqui per le omnino sit bonus. Itaque quamvis per illam particulam, minus rectum significetur in praedicta ●●finitione actus, qui ex aliquo capite careat debitâ rectitudine, atque ade● simpliciter sit non rectus, seu pravus, tamen propter dictam rationem meritò hoc ipsum significatur illo modo dicendi, scil: minus rectum. Non enim id duntaxat minus rectum appellati so let, quod simplicitet rectum est, licet non adeò, comparatione altetius; sed etiam id, quod propter aliquem defectum est minus rectum, quam simpliciter debet, & quod ideo est absolutè, & simpliciter malum. Juxta illud D. Dionysii cap. 4 de divinis nominibus: Bonum consurgit e● integra causa, malum autem ex quocunque defectu. Greg: de Valentia Comment: Theo● Tom: 3. Quest. 18. Punct. 1.  minus rectum some way or other irregular, not only when 'tis a sin in itself, but also when it hath a manifest show of sin; for the bare and naked show of sin may (praebere alteri occasionem ruinae) morally lead another to sin, may be the moral cause of another's sin, as well as sin itself; the actions, in which there is only an appearance of sin, may yet provoke another unto the practice of sin, as the performance of the sinful action itself: To see a Christian sitting at meat in an Idols Temple, at an Idols feast, may tempt a raw convert unto Idolatry, as well as to behold him kneeling before an Idol. For this I could muster up the suffrages of all the schoolmen, a generation yet of divines, that are none of the precisest either in positions, or practise. But I will not trouble my Reader with the testimonies of above two of them. Opus malum (saith Suarez) vel habens speciem mali, quod de se inductivum est ad pecc andum, vitandum est; naem illud est verè scandalum activum, ut patet ex definitione ejus, moraliter enim inducit hominem ad malum. Quod vero non operteat esse verè malum, sed satis sit apparere, patet, 2 Thes. 5.22. 1 Cor. 12. Ratio est, quia tenemur rectè operari, non solum coram Deo. sed etiam coram hominibus. Secundo, quia cum opus habet speciem mali, inducitur proximus ad malum opus, non solum suâ malitiâ, sed etiam ex vi mei operis, & ex quadam fragilitate. Suarez, op. de triplici virtute tract. 2 disp 10. sect. 3. Quotiescunque datur occasio scandali (saith Vasquez) malo opere, aut habente speciem mali, semper imputatur scandalum tribuenti occasionem, sive scandalum sequatur ex malitiâ, sive infirmitate, aut ignorantiâ. Tunc enim qui praebet occasionem scandali, peccat peccato scandali activi, quod nullâ ratione licet. Ratio vero est, quia nullâ justâ aut rationabili causâ excusari potest aliquis â peccato, qui coram alio peccat, vel exercet opus habens speciem mali: & ideo jure optimo dicitur tribuere occasionem peccandi, quia tale opus ex se occasio est peccandi. Vasquez opusculis Moralibus. tract. de scandalo.  
But now (to proceed unto a second reason) besides the evil of scandal in actions, that carry a real appearance of evil, there is also reductiuè the guilt of that evil of which they have an appearance; for that command, which forbids such a sin, forbids all the shows and occasions of it, all the preparatives unto it; as is usually observed by Commentators upon the Decalogue. Thus the prohibition of adultery takes in all the causes, and signs thereof: by this rule to sit at meat in the Idols Temple, at the Idols feast, was not only a sin of scandal, as being a provocation unto, and so a participation of the sin of Idolatry in weak and ignorant spectators; but also a sin of Idolatry by way of reduction, a sin against religion, a transgression against that worship, which God requireth. Suarez expresseth this, though somewhat obscurely, yet more fully: first he layeth down this conclusion; Quando aliquis indirectè inducit alium ad peccandum per actionem malam, vel habentem speciem mali, etiam incurrit specialem malitiam scandali: against this conclusion he propounds amongst others this objection; Sequitur eum etc. per actionem non malam, sed habentem speciem mali contrahere duas malitias. Vnam scandali contra charitatem: aliam illius speciei peccati, ad quam proximus inducitur. Consequens est contra divum Thomam hic, et sumitur ex Paulo primo ad Corinth. 8 & 12. Vbi manducantem scandalosè sacrificata Idolis, non reprehend reprehendit, ut Idolatram, sed ut scandalosum. Sequela autem patet, quia ille est causa talis malitiae, ergo incurrit illam. Unto this his answer is: that an action only evil in appearance may have a double obliquity in it, to wit, that of scandal, and that of which it is an appearance, unto which it induceth Concedo, inquit, ibi esse duas malitias. Est tamen advertendum, dupliciter contra aliquam virtutem peccari. Vno modo per se primo, quia directe agitur contra objectum ejus, vel circumstantias illi ex se debitas, & hoc modo actio solum mala in apparentia, nullam virtutem offendit. Alio modo peccari potest tantum ex consequenti connexione virtutum. Nam ut dictum est 1.2 quia actus virtutum sunt undique boni, quando hic, & nunc actus alicujus virtutis potest esse contrarius alteri virtuti, (quamvis in suo objecto, vel circumstantiis quasi intrinsecis non habeat defectum) non potest prudenter fieri, atque adeo neque est actus virtutis simpliciter, & ideo participat malitiam contrariam utrique virtuti, sed alteram per se, alteram quasi p●r accidens, & consequenter. Sic etiam propria malitia scandali ferè semper fundatur in alia malitiâ, tamen ex consequenti, & per accidens, semper habet aliquo-m●do illam conjunctam ex defectu circumstantiae debitae, saltem propter aliam virtutem, propter quam non laed ndam prudenter cessandum ess●t ab opere hic, & nunc, habente speciem mali, quamvis ex se esset alias honestum. Suar: de triplici virtute Theolog. tract. de charitat: disp. 10. Sect. 2. 'Tis of this real appearance I believe that the Apostle is here only to be understood. But yet to make this our discourse complete I shall also take in consideration that appearance of evil in an action which is but imaginary; and this is ascribed thereunto from our own, or others misconceits and censures thereupon.  
First, from our own. And here, if a man be in his own Conscience steadfastly, fully and firmly persuaded, that such an action is evil and unlawful, which yet in truth is not so, but lawful: what ought he to do?  
These times afford many instances by which we may exemplify this case: There are many Sectaries that profess they think it unlawful to frequent the public Ordinances, to pay tithes unto the Minister, Contribution unto the Magistrate; and there be some, that think it unlawful to swear in any cause, though called thereunto by a Magistrate; and yet all these particulars are not only things lawful, but bounden duties.  
For resolution we must premise two things.  
First, we must take into our consideration, the nature of the action, and the condition of the person that harbours this misperswasion of the action: the action in its nature may be either necessary, or indifferent and arbitrary: and the person misjudging it may be, in respect thereof, either sui juris, or determined therein by the lawful command of some superior power.  
Secondly, we must with Durand distinguish betwixt ligar●, and ●bligare, to bind, and to bind unto. Sciendum (saith he) lib. 2. dist. 39 qu. 5. quod aliud est ligari, aliud obligari, quinn. obligatur debet, vel tenetur, id facere ad quod obligatur, nec quantum est ex parte suâ aliter absolvitur ab obligatione. Ligari autem dicitur m●raliter, qui sic dispositus est circa aliquod agibile, quod non potest licitè procedere, prout exigit natura illius agibilis, ad modum illius qui ligatur corporalitèr, nec p●test procedere etiam in rectâ & planâ via. Conscience is said obligare to bind unto, when 'tis a bounden duty to do or not do what it dictates, when 'tis not only a sin to do any thing against it, but also not to do according to it: Conscience is said ligare merely to bind, when 'tis a sin as to act againstit, so also to act according to it.  
Capreolus and others that follow him quarrel with this distinction that Durand puts between ligare and obligare: But Capreclus himself layeth down a distinction of obligation, that will come unto all one: Obligatio (inquit) potest referri ad du●. Primo ad conformandum se tali conscientiae, & ad nullo modo discordandu● illi, & ad non deponendum eam, secundò ad non discordandum ●i, sed non ad confermandum, nec ad non dep●nendum. Primò strictissimè sumitur, & illo modo Conscientia erronea non obligat. Secundò sumitur largè, & illo modo intelligitur conclusio nostra, quod conscientia erronea obligat, quia habens eam tenetur non discordare illi, ita quod illa stante faciat oppositum, quod illa dictat. Nec tamen tenetur se conformare illi, nec tenetur eam conservare, immo potest, & tenetur eam dep●nere. Here his obligation largely so called differs nothing from Durand's ligation; The Controversy than is but a strife of words; and therefore not worthy the heeding.  
These things thus premised I shall lay down four Conclusions. 
First Conclusion.   
First, if the action in its nature be not necessary, but indifferent, and arbitrary, and the person misjudging it, be in respect thereof sui juris, not determined therein by the command of any superior power. Why then he is bound in Conscience during this his opinion, to abstain from the action. (For we suppose it indifferent; and a man may lawfully forbear action where there is no necessity of doing, à licitis po●est absque p●ccato abstineri.) We suppose it, although indifferent, yet against Conscience: and whatsoever is done repugn●nte consci●ntiâ, with a settled reluctancy of a man's own judgement, and conscience against it, cannot be of faith, and whatsoever is not of faith is sin 
(e) See Dr Sanderson in locum.  Rom. 14.23. That is whatsoever action is done without a firm persuasion of the lawfulness thereof, let it be quoadrem, and essentially, in it sell lawful, nay necessary, yet it becomes qu●ad hominem and accidentally evil, unto him it is sin. Now that action may lawfully, must necessarily be forborn, that can be omitted, but cannot be committed without sin.  
But now on the contrary (to come to a second Conclusion) if either the action be in its nature necessary, 
Second Conciusion.  or the person entertaining this misprision thereof be justly enjoined performance of it by some superior power, that can herein lawfully challenge obedience from him by a law, not me●rly penal; and so the action too, though indifferent for its nature, be yet in its use, and unto him become necessary. Why then this misperswasion of its unlawfulness cannot bind to abstain from it; for so it should oblige unto either omission of a necessary duty, or else disobedience unto lawful authority, both great sins. And n●lla est obligatio ad illicita. There is no obligation unto things unlawful can lie upon us.  
For, first, obligation is only to that which is a moral good; now nothing unlawful can be a moral good; and therefore an erroneous Conscience cannot oblige unto it.  
Secondly, no command of an inferior power can oblige, if it be contrary to the command of a superior power; But if an erroneous Conscience should bind unto things unlawful, it should oblige against the commandment of God, whose Viceroy Conscience is, Indeed Conscience is the next rule of voluntary actions: But  
First, it is a well- informed conscience that ought to be this rule, the will is not bound to follow a blind guide: for then being of itself coeca potentia, it must needs fall into the ditch.  
And secondly, conscience is but a subordinate rule unto the Law, and Word of God; and therefore its power to oblige is derived there from: it obligeth not therefore, but by virtue of some command of God's Law, or word; and God's Law cannot command things unlawful, for than it should clash with itself. 

(f) Diversimodè amen ligat Conscientia recta & e●ronea, rect● simpliciter ligat & per se, erronea aute●● secundum quid & peraccidens. Dico autem rectam ligare fimpliciter, quia ligat absolutè & in omnem eventum. Sienim aliquis conscientiam habet de vitando adulterio istam conscientiam sine peccato non potest deponere, quia in hoc ipso quòd eam deponeret errando graviter peccaret. E● autem manente non potest praeteriri in a ctu sine peccato. Unde absolute ligat & in omnem eventu●: sed conscientia erronea non ligat nisi secundum q●id, & sub conditione. I●le enim cui dictat conscientia, quod tenetur fornicari, non est obligatus ut fornicationem sine peccato dimit●ere non possi●, nisi sub hac conditione, si talis conscientia duret. Haec autem conscientia removeri potest absque peccato, undè talis conscientia non obligat in omnem eventum. Potest enim aliquid contingere, scilicet Depositio conscientiae, quo contingente aliquis ulteriùs non ligatur. Quod autem sub conditione tantum est, secundum quid esse dicitur. Dico etiam quod conscientia recta per se ligat● erronea vero per accidens. Quod ex hoc pate●, qui enim vult vel amat unum propter alterum, illud quidem propter quod amat, reliquum per se amat, quod verò propter aliud, quasi per aceidens, sicut qui vinum amat propter dulce, amat dulce pierce, vinum autem per accidens. Ille autem qui conscientiam erroneam haber credens esse rectam, alias non erraret nisi inhaereret conscientiae erroneae propter rectitudinem, quam in ea credit esse, inhaeret quidem per se loquendo rectae conscientiae, sed erroneae quasi per accidens●in quantum hanc conscientiam quam credit esse rectam, contingit, esse erroneam. Et exinde est quod per se loquendo ligatur à conscientiâ rectâ, per accidens vero ab erroneâ. Capreol: Ex Aquinate Lib. 2. sent. Dist. 39 Quest. 1. Ar. 1.  
Nemo potest obligari ad malum sub rationem mali, sed benè ad malum, quod invincibiliter judicatur esse bonum, & quod proponitur sub ratione boni. Nec conscientia obligat contra legem Dei per se formaliter, sed solum per accidens, & materialiter. Becanus Sum: Theol: Scholast: T. 2. Tract. 1. chap. 4, Q. 7.   Capreolus, Becanus, Raynaudus with many others resolve that however a right and well informed Conscience only binds unto a thing per se formaliter & in omnem eventum; yet an erroneous conscience, denominated such from an invincible and involuntary error, may oblige unto a thing materially, per accidens, sub conditione, and secundum quid. It obligeth per accidens as it is apprehended and believed to be right, and well informed; so that an erroneous Conscience is adhered unto, for the rectitude supposed to be in it. It obligeth sub conditione upon condition that such error of Conscience lasteth: for it may be removed without sin: and when it is removed the obligation ceaseth; & then, that which obligeth conditionally, obligeth only sceundum quid, and not absolutely.  
Unto this I have three exceptions.  
First, they limit themselves to error invincible and involuntary, which is not imputable or blameworthy.  
This error may be conceived to be; either in matter of fact, or in matter of rule.  
Error in matter of fact, as when Jacob mistook Leah for Rachel; as when a poor subject, that cannot judge of the titles of primes, thinks a usurper to be his lawful Sovereign, or as when a man takes goods left unto him by his Parents to be truly his own, though perhaps a great part of them were gotten by fraud or oppression, without any knowledge of his: These and the like particulars are all impertinent unto our present purpose; and therefore I shall not stay upon the consideration of them.  
Error in matter of Law, right, or rule is again twofold, either in regard of law natural, or law positive. Now unto all that have actual use of reason, The error of the law of nature is vincible, and voluntary; because the law of nature is sufficiently promulgated unto them, it is written in their hearts, Rom: 2.15.  
And we may say the same of Christians, that enjoy the plenary promulgation of the Gospel, and are capable of understanding it: for the Gospel sufficiently reveals all divine positives; so that a rational man may know them, and is bound to know them; and Aquinas states it rightly. 1.2 dae. q. 19 art 6. voluntas concordans rationi erranti circaea, quae quis scire tenetur, semper est mala: If a man err concerning such things, as he may know, and is bound to know, such an error is (at lest indirectè) voluntary, and sinful, and cannot oblige.  
A Second exception: Conscience hath no power to oblige, but what it deriveth from God: and therefore what it obligeth unto, God also obligeth unto: and God is the m●rall eause, and consequently the Author of whatsoever he obligeth to: but he cannot be the moral cause, and author of that which is sin, and unlawful, either pierce, or per accidens and therefore neither he, nor his deputy Conscience can oblige so much as per accidens unto that which is unlawful.  
A Third exception shall be the objection of Durand in the place above quoted: Sola vera notitia de re obligationem non t●llit, ed magis confirmat: sed vera notitia de eo quod errenea conscientia dictat, tollit obligation●m, ergo obligatio nulla fuit. To be well informed, and to have a true knowledge of a thing cannot take away any obligation to it; But to be well informed, and to have a true knowledge concerning that, which an erroneous Conscience dictates, takes away all obligation to it; Therefore there was never any such thing as an obligation to it.  
The most considerable objection is that of Becanus [Sum: Theol. 2. part. p. 1. tom. 2. tract. 1. cap. 4.] Durandus concedit illum p●ccare, qui operatur contra hanc conscientiam: Ergo debet ●tiam concedere, hanc conscientiam obligare. Nam ubi non est ●bligatio, ibi nec peocatum. Durand grants, that he sinneth who acts against an erroneous Conscience: therefore he ought also to grant, that an erroneous conscience obligeth: for where there is no obligation there can be no sin.  
But the answer hereunto is very easy by distinguishing concerning obligation, which is twofold either as touching the matter, or manner of actions. Though there be no obligation, as touching the matter of such actions, concerning which an erroneous Conscience dictates: yet there is a general obligation as touching the manner of all actions, that they be done without the Contempt of conscience: and therefore in every action where conscience is contemned, sin is committed: Quaevis voluntas (saith Aquinas, 2 dae. q. 19 art. 5.) à ratione five rect á five errante discordans semper est mala.  
Which brings me unto my third conclusion. 
Third Conclusion.  Although this erroneous conceit of the unlawfulness of this action, supposed to be necessary either in its nature, or at least in its use, because lawfully commanded by authority, doth not obligare, that is, so bind, as that I must follow it, yet it doth ligare, so entangle and perplex, as that I cannot without sin oppose it, and for this I shall allege these following reasons.  
First, because whosoever goeth against his Conscience, (whether ill or well informed it matters not) goes against the will of God, although not for the thing he doth, yet for the manner of doing it, although not materially, yet formally, and interpretatively: because whatsoever the Conscience dictates, a man takes for the will of God: each man's Conscience being a Deputy God to inform, and direct him. Look as he who reviles, wounds, kills a private man, mistaking him for the King, is guilty of high treason against the King himself: so, he that ' thwarts the judgement of even an erroneous Conscience, fights against God, wars against Heaven: because what his conscience says, he thinks to be the voice of Heaven.  
Thus you see, that he, who acts against an erroneous Conscience in such an action, carrieth himself as disaffected towards God▪ for he knowingly adventureth upon that, which he thinketh will infinitely displease him.  
And in a second place: such an action is an argument of disaffection towards that rule of our moral actions, which God hath appointed: he that hath an erroneous Conscience, supposeth it to be right and well informed: and therefore, if he act against it, he slights that, which he takes to be the rule of his working: and therefore his action is, for the manner of it, lawless, and irregular. 
(g) Velle aliquid contrà Synteresin naturalem rationis●id est, contra primum aliquod principium m●r●le à synteresi dicta●um, omnino est malum & peccatum. Sed qui vult id, quod ratio judicat esse malum & fugiendum, five id verè, five fallò judicet, vult aliquid contra synteresin: Ergò omnino peccat. Major est evidens. Adversatur namque id imprimis legi naturali, quae potiffimum sucet in principiis primis meralibus. Minor probatur. Nam principium illud primum, scilicet, malum non est prosequendum, sed vitandum: inprimis vetat, ne quis, quantum in ipso est malum consectetur. Ut enim praeoepta naturalia affirmativa jubent inprimis ut homo, quantum in ipso est, bonum prosequatur; sic etiam praecepta negativa p●ohibent imprimis, nè homo quantum in ipso situm est, sectetur malum. Qui autem seu verè seu fal●è judicat ali● quid esse malum, & nihilominus illud prosequi vult, is hoc ipso, quantum in se est, sectatur malum. Nam quod objectum ipsum per se sit revera bonum aut malum, hoc quidem non est in bominis voluntate situm, sed illud solùm, ut quod ipse malum judicat vel bonum, id vitare, aut pro●equi velit. Quocirca qui judicans aliquid esse malum five ve●è, five falsè, illud nihilominus vult, is quantum in ipso situm est, vult malum, & proindè direc●è violat legem illam naturalem synteresis, quae id ipsum inprimis vetat. Greg. de Valentiâ tom. 2. disp. 2. q. 14 punct. 4.   
Thirdly, in such an action there is a depraved, affection towards sin: and that in Morals is the fountain of all illness: If a man's conscience be right, and well informed, and he act against it, every one will grant, that such an action proceeds from the love of that which is sin: and there is the same reason to say as much, of that action, which is against the dictate of an erring Conscience.  
Besides these reasons I shall allege Scriptures (to omit Rom: 14.23. already spoken of) B●canus quotes also Rom. 14.14. To him that esteems any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean. The learned Dr Hammond allegeth for the same purpose the 1 Cor. 8.7. For some with 

(h) Conscient●●m Idol● vo●cit Aposto●us non sc●en●iamqua quis rectè de sim●la●●s sentiat: ut malè interpretatur & malè probat Cajetanus; ea in re singularis: sed judicium quo quis existimet Idolum esse aliquid, id est a●icujus vittutis: ac proinde cibos immolatitios ab idolo pati mutationem aliquam, sicque afficere & co. inquinare posse edentes. Quod quidem judicium erroneum est: atque ex ●o sequitur ut talem habens conscientiam, fi edat idolothytum, ed at illud quasi●ido● lothy●um: id est quali immutatum aliquo more so per hoc quod idolis sacrificatum sit ut eius opinione tam idolum quà idolothytum sit aliquid.  
Et conscientia ipsorum, cum sit infirma, polluitur. Illatiuè pats haec exponenda est: ut sensus fit●atque ita animus eorum erronea hujusmodi conscientia imbutus, cum sit infirmus, eo quod scien●ta, qua fidem unius Dei quam habe, tapplicet ad particulates conclusiones, ut suprâ dictum est, polluitur peccato: dum videlicet contra conscientiam quam idolothyto habent, existimantes edentes contaminari, de illo edunt. Estius in locum.   Conscience of the Idol, i e. b●ing resolved in mind that it is not lawful to eat or taste of any 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, part or portion of the Idol-feast, (whether 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, at the idol table, or having bought it at the shambles (as it seems was the fashion of those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to be sold there at second hand, chap. 10.25.) accounting it unlawful to eat any meat consecrated to that use, do yet eat that which is of this nature, and by so doing, their weak i. e. uninstructed Conscience, is polluted, i.e. they sin against their Conscience, do that which they are persuaded they may not do, which although it be never so innocent and harmless thing in itself (an Idol being simply nothing) yet to them which do it, when they think it unlawful (and all have not knowledge, saith he in the beginning of the verse, i. e. are not sufficiently instructed in their duty) it is pollution or sin.  
I shall proceed unto the fourth, and last conclusion. The only way then for a man to rescue himself out of these difficulties is to rectify his Conscience, to depose, and correct the error thereof, so he shall escape contempt of the judgement of his own Conscience on the one hand, and breach of either Gods or man's laws on the other.  
This Rayunaudus (from whom I know none do dissent) expresseth as followeth [Moral. disc. didst 4. q. 3. art. 1. n. 247.] Vnum igitur illud subsidium superest, ut judicium de malitiâ vincibilitèr errans, abjiciatur: Si enim neque adhaerere ei licet, ut primo loco monstravimus: neque illi obsist●re, ut nunc diximus; non aliud superesse potest, quàm ut homo errorem depellat, quod posse supponitur, alinmque de malitiâ sensum induat: alioqut quocunque se vertat, in culpâ erit.  
An imaginary appearance of evil issues, Secondly, from the supposals of, not only ourselves, but others that censure it, whose judgements are either misled by ignorance, and weakness, or else blinded through pride and prejudice: such was that in the moving of Hannah's lips, not afforded by her fact, but only fastened on it by old Eli his hasty censoriousness: no other appearance of evil was there in our Saviour's healing the diseased, his Disciples plucking and eating of the ears of corn on the Sabbath day; 'twas not grounded on their actions; but only fancied by the Pharisees swelling uncharitableness. What other was that appearance of evil, with which the Gentiles charged the primitive Christians, lifting up of their hands in prayer, when they accused them for adoration of the Clouds? as appeareth by Tertullian, and by a Poet of their own, qui puras nubes & coeli numen adorant. 
(i) Parker par● 2. pag 63.   
This imaginary appearance of evil proceeds, from either supposals of wilful, or weak ones: The censures and supposals of wilful, proud, and wicked ones, and the scandals thence arising, scandala Pharisaeorum, I determined (in my first Edition of this book) that we might slight our warrant (said I) is our Saviour's precedent. Wh●n his Disciples told him, that the Pharisees took offence at his speech, he made no reckoning thereof, but answered, let them alone, Matth. 12.13, 14. and we, warranted by his example, may th●n be secure and regardless of many calumnies, and groundless exceptions against the government, discipline, and ceremonies of our Church: for th●re hath been so much spoken and written concerning these subjects, as that the pretence of weakness is quite taken away from those that are capable of information.  
First, here my censure of the non-conformists to be wilful, proud, and Pharisaical was very rash, and uncharitable: all that I can say in excuse for myself is: that when I wrote this, I was a very young man, and conformity unto the Ceremonies established by Law was then generally embraced, without any of the least contradiction, for aught I knew; nay stoutly and zealously pleaded for by men, whom I admired for the general report that went of their sanctity, and Learning u.g. Dr John Burg●sse, Dr Sclater, Dr Sanderson and others: And then I had read but one side, being an utter stranger unto what the Inconformitants could say for themselves: and their adversaries represented their objections, and answer, to be so weaks: and ridiculous: as that 'tis no great wonder, that I was prejudiced against them: But, about the beginning of the long Parliament, being awakened with the general complaint of the Godly against the Ceremonies, I began to think a new of the controversy, and out of my former prejudice intended a full vindication of the discipline, and Ceremonies of the then Church of England: and in order hereunto I read all such books of the nonconformist's as I could procure: for I knew well by experience, that a controversy can never be well handled, unless all dissenting opinions thereabouts be weighed: but upon perusal of the non-conformists I soon found: that their adversaries most disingeniously misrepresented all that they said: that they resused to join issue with them in the state of the Question: that they came not up to an orderly grapple with their arguments: and that they seldom regularly replied unto the solutions, which were given unto their objections: and this quickly produced an alteration in my judgement, and I believe it will do so too in all, that will make such an impartial search into the matter, as I have done.  
But Secondly, to come unto the examination of that aspersion: that the scandals of the malicious, of Pharisaical, and wilful spirits are not to be regarded, so as to forbear that, by which they are scandalised.  
Gregory de Valentia: though he lay down the affirmative in the general, yet afterwards he delivers it to be his opinion: that we are to do what lieth in us to prevent the scandals of even Pharisees, so it may be done without any great loss, or notable damage unto ourselves. Existimo etiam, si quis cum nullo suo, vel pene nullo detrimento posset impedire scandalum proximi Pharisaicum, aliquid faciendo vel omittendo, debere ipsum facere. Nam ut tradidimus suprà in quaest. de correctione fraternâ, etiam is qui ex malitiâ ●eccaturus alioqui est, est in aliquali necessitate spirituali, ac proinde ut (illic vidimus) debet ex charitate corrigi, vel aliter à peccati scanda●o impediri, quando●id sine detrimento proprio fieri potest. tom. 3. disp. 3. q. 18. punct. 4.  
For the better stating of this Question, I shall premise some distinctions of scandal: a scandal is either active or passive.  
An active scandal is in all such words, or deeds, as culpably occasion the fall of another into sin: and this is again by Gregory de Valentia [tom. 3. disp. 3. q. 18. punct. 1.] rightly subdivided into that which is per se, and into that which is per accidens.  
An active scandal pierce is in such public acts, as either by the express intent of the agent, or from their nature, and in themselves, are inductive unto sin: and they are again twofold:  
First, all public sins, or sins committed before another:  
Secondly, all such public actions, as carry a real and manifest appearance of sin.  
An active scandal per accidens is in such things, as are not in themselves, and in their own nature occasions of sin unto another: and this is, either in an unseasonable performance of positive duties, commanded by affirmative precepts, which are not necessary hic & nunc: or else by an unseasonable use of our liberty in things indifferent.  
A Passive scandal is the fall of another into sin: and this (by the author but now mentioned) is subdivided into given, and taken.  
Scandalum datum, a passive scandal given, is that which ariseth truly from the active scandal of another, as from its moral cause.  
Scandalum acceptum, a passive scandal that is only taken, is that which is only the fault of the party scandalised, and cannot be imputed to any other, as a moral cause: the words or deeds of another may be an occasion of it, but not a culpable occasion.  
I desire that these distinctions of scandal may be well heeded: for the want of Consideration of them hath occasioned a great deal of confusion in men's discourses about scandal.  
First, many exclude from active scandal all things that scandalise per accidens: and then, what will become of those scandals Paul speaks against? Rom. 14.1 Cor. ch. 8. ch. 10.  
Secondly, most confound a passive scandal with scandalum acceptum, a scandal that is only taken, and make them to be of an equal extent: whereas a passive scandal may de distributed into both given, and taken: if it be culpably both given, and taken: than it is scandalum datum: if it be culpably taken, and not culpably given, than it is scandalum acceptum.  
Well, these distinctions being thus premised: I suppose it will be agreed upon by all sides: that the question is to be understood. First of active scandals, our scandalising of the wicked: or Secondly, (which comes all to one) of such passive scandals of them, as are given by us, as well as taken by them: Not, thirdly, of such passive scandals, as are only taken by them, not given by us: for from the guilt of these we may wash our hands, so that there is no obligation upon us to forbear those things, by which they are in this manner scandalised.  
My Conclusion shall be: that we are to eschew the active scandals, and consequently scandala passiva data, of the wicked, and malicious, those that are Pharisaical and wilful spirits: this is apparent: First from Paul's prohibition of scandal, 1 Cor. 10.32. Give none offence neither to the Jews, nor to the Gentiles, etc. he spoke of unconverted Jews, and Gentiles, such as were enemies unto the Christian faith: and the Jews were of all men the most malicious enemies thereof.  
Secondly, from our Saviour's denunciation of a woe unto the world by means of scandal, Matth. 18.7. Woe unto the world because of offences; which undeniably is to be extended unto all sorts of men.  
Unto these two arguments we may add four other, taken from, First, the distribution; Secondly, relation; Thirdly, effect; Fourthly, opposite of an active scandal.  
First, from the distribution of an active scandal, and perusal of the members thereof: An active scandal (as I shown but now) is distributed into scandalum per se, and per accidens: now there is no doubt, but that we are carefully to avoid such things as scandalise the wicked, and malicious per se, of themselves, and in their own nature, public sins, or such words, and deeds as have a real appearance of sin: all the question will be concerning such things as scandalise them only per accidens, our duties, and our indifferencies: and by these they are frequently scandalised, and that out of an erroneous opinion concerning their unlawfulness: in which regard the resolution will be pertinent unto the matter in hand.  
First then: duties, that are commanded by affirmative precepts, may be forborn, hic & nunc, sometimes, and in some places, to avoid the scandal of the wicked, and malicious. The usual instances are in reproof, admonition, punishment of sin, and the like: and this is warranted  
First, by the precept of our Saviour, Matth. 7.6. Give not that which is holy unto the dogs: neither cast ye your pearls before swine: lest they trample them under their feet, and turn again and rend you.  
Secondly, by the example of David, Psal. 39.1, 2. I will keep my tongue with a bridle, while the wicked is before me: I was dumb with silence, I held my peace even from good.  
Thirdly, by that rule in Divinity; affirmativa praecepta obligant semper, non ad semper; they always bind, but not to always: they do not oblige to do the things required at all times, but only, when they are expedient for the glory of God, and the good of others: To reprove, and admonish sinners is a duty commanded by God, Leu. 19.17. Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart: thou shalt in anywise rebuke thy neighbour, and not suffer sin upon him. But now this duty is not to be performed unseasonably, when 'tis likely to bring no glory to God, nor good unto others, but rather likely to scandalise them. Thus every private man is not bound to run into an alehouse, or tavern, there to reprehend a company of desperate drunkards, who would look upon his reprehension as an act of pragmaticalness, and insolency, and for it be ready to quoit him down the Stairs, or run him through with their swords: and as imprudent an act would it be, in Spain, to run into their Churches, and there to cry against the Idolatry of the Mass; and in the Streets of C●nstantinople to declaim against the impostures of Mahomet; for hereby we should scandalise them indiscreetly, and foolishly occasion them, as to blaspheme our religion, so to cut us in pieces.  
Unto the forementioned rule in Divinity I shall add another out of Logic; finis dat mediis amabilitatem: 'tis the end only makes the means : Now reproof, admonition, punishment, and the like duties are enjoined as means, in order to the reformation, and bettering of others: when therefore they are not likely to conduce unto this end, but rather to oppose and hinder it, prudence in such a case dictates an abstinence from them. But let us take two exemplifications of this out of Aquinas 2. 2 daes. q. 43. art. 7. The first is concerning the punishment of sin: dicendum, quòd poenarum inflictio non est propter se expetenda: sed poenae infliguntur, ut medicinae quaedam ad cohibenda pecc. ta, & ideò in tantum habent rationem justitiae, in quantum per eas peccata cohibentur. Si autem per inflictionem poenarum manifestum sit plura & majera peccata sequi, tunc poenarum inflictio non continebitur sub justitia. Et in hoc casu loquitur 
(k) August. in lib●o contra epistolam Par, men●an● docet, quod ubi schismatis periculum timetut, a punitione peccatorum cessandum est.  August quando scilicet ex excommunicatione aliquorum imminet periculum schismatis: tunc enim excommunicationem ferre n●n pertinet ad veritatem justitiae.  
The second is concerning brotherly reproof: dicendum quod correptio fraterna ordinatur ad emendationem fratris: & ideò in tantum computanda est inter spiritualia bona, in quantum hoc consequi potest. Quod non contingit si ex correptione frater scandalizetur, & id●o si propter scandalum correptio dimittatur, n●n dimittitur spirituale bonum.  
But to proceed next to the scandal of the wicked by our indifferencies: That we are to forbear things indifferent when they scandalise the wicked, and malicious. Parker [in his treatise of the Cross part. 2. pag. 57] proves by many instances: when the thing was indifferent, doth not our Saviour forego his liberty, to please the malicious? as when he paid tribute lest he should offend them? Matth. 17.27. They were malicious at Corinth, and seek●rs of occasion against Paul, that were likely to be offended by his taking of wages there: yet the thing, being no necessary duty, he thinketh it his duty to forbear his power therein, 1 Cor. 9 The Heathens are malicious to take offence, when Christians go to Law for their own: yet, because going to law is not a duty necessary, it must be forborn, and Christians rather must lose their own, then give occasion of scandal to them, 1 Cor. 6. v. 6, 7. Unto these examples let me add another (quoted by the same author elsewhere) out of Ezra 8.22. I was ashamed (saith Ezra) to require of the King a band of Soldiers and horsemen, to help us against the enemies in the way: because we had spoken n unto the King, saying, the hand of our God is upon all them for good, that seek him, but his power and his wrath is against all them that forsake him Here for Ezra to have asked of the King of Persia, a Heathen, a band of soldiers, and horsemen for his safe conduct, was a thing lawful: and yet he forbore it, lest he should scandalise him by begetting in him a suspicion, that that was false, which he had told him concerning God's power, and justice.  
A second argument is drawn from the relation of an active scandal: it is the moral cause of a passive scandal; so that he who scandalizeth another, partaketh of, and is accessary unto the sin of the party scandalised, and we are not to partake of, or be accessary unto the sins of any, 1 Tim. 5.22. We must have no fellowship with unfruitful works of darkness in any whomsoever, Eph●s. 5.11.  
A third argument is fetched from the effect of an active scandal: 'tis of a soul destroying nature, & so a kind of spiritual murder: destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died, Rom. 14.15. for meat destroy not the works of God, verse. 20. and who should not tremble at the guilt of the murder of any soul whatsoever? for there is no soul so wicked, but may (for aught thou knowest) be one of those, for whom Christ shed his most divine, and precious blood.  
The last argument is taken from the Opposite of scandal, Charity, and its act beneficence: We are to love all, even our most malicious, and persecuting enemies, Matth. 5.44. We are to do good unto all, though especially to the household of faith, Gal. 6.10. We are to exercise patience, and meekness, towards even those that oppose themselves, 2 Tim. 2.14, 15. And from this it will inevitably follow, that we are to scandalise none.  
Here we have usually objected the example of our Saviour, who slighted the scandal of the Pharisees, Matth. 15.12, 13, 14. Then came his Disciples and said unto him: knowest thou that though Pharisees were offended after they heard this saying? but he answered and said etc. let them alone they be blind leaders of the blind etc.  
The objection concerns only the scandalising of them in things indifferent; and unto it I shall give an answer in the words of Parker part 2. part. 57 If this be all the warrant we have, not to forbear in a thing indifferent for the malicious, then have we no warrant at all, because the scandal (there) not cared for, is when the Pharisees are offended, at his abstaining from their washings, and his preaching of a true doctrine: both of which were necessary duties for him to do. And when he defendeth his healing on sabbaths, and his Disciples plucking ears, upon this reason they are duties of necessity and charity, he plainly insinuateth, there is no defence for deeds unnecessary, when the malicious are scandalised.  
In a second place I shall allege the Objection of the Schoolmen which by Gregory de Valentia is thus urged [Tom. 3. disp. 3. q. 18. punct. 4.] Nam qui non ex ignorantiâ, aut infirmitate, sed ex malitiâ scandalizatur, non laborat tali aliquâ necessitate spirituali, cui non possit ipse sine ope alterius proximi facile prospicere mutando pravam suam voluntatem. Ergo alter non tenetur tunc cum ali quo suo detrimento prospicere. Pharisees, the wicked, that are scandalised out of mere malice, and not out of ignorance, or weakness are not in any such spiritual necessity, or danger, but that they can easily provide for the safety, and indemnity of their souls, without the help or assistance of others, by changing their depraved will: and therefore others are not bound to incur any detriment for the prevention of their scandal.  
The answer unto this may easily be foreseen, for here is nothing but Jesuitical dictates, that are altogether proofelesse.  
First, Pharisees, the wicked, that are scandalised out of malice, are in a greater spiritual necessity, and danger, than those, that are scandalised out of ignorance, or weakness: for, they are in the snare of the d●vill, taken captive by him at his will. 2 Tim. 2.16.  
And therefore, Secondly, they are more unable to help themselves, and prevent their own falling into sin; for their hearts are altogether destitute of any gracious habits: there is not in them the spirit, a renewed principle, to make head, or resistance against the flesh, the sinful corruption of their natures: there is need then of all help possible to keep them from falling: and all will be uneffectuall, unless God also put in his helping hand.  
Whereas he talks: that 'tis an easy matter for a wicked, and malicious man to provide against all danger, and need of his soul, by changing his perverse, and naughty will: this is a very gross Pelagian conceit: for it ascribes that, unto the power of man's corrupt will, which can be wrought only by the omnipotent grace of God.  
By this time (I hope) the Reader is sufficiently satisfied that the active scandals of the most wicked, and malicious are not to be contemned.  
But yet there remaineth a great difficulty in the point to be cleared; and that is, when an active scandal is committed towards them, in our duties, and indifferencies?  
First, we actively scandalise them by our duties, when they are not rightly circumstanced, seasonably performed, in due time, and place: when they are not expedient unto those ends, for which God enjoined them: now when this is, cannot be determined by any general rule, but every one must be left to be guided by his spiritual prudence, and wisdom. [But for this hereafter I shall allot a peculiar digression by itself.]  
Secondly, we actively scandalise them by our indifferencies, when 'tis probable they will occasion their passive scandal, their falling into sin; But now this general rule is to be limited, and I shall give you three limitations of it.  
The first limitation: this rule is to be understood, when the use of our indifferencies is likely to prejudice, and obstruct the propagation of the Gospel, and the forbearance of them will in all probability conduce unto the advancement of the Credit of the Gospel, and not otherwise, ordinarily: upon this account, it would have been scandalous in Paul to have received maintenance from the Corinthians: but 'tis now unscandalous in Ministers, to accept, and challenge that maintenance, which is due unto them by the laws of the land; for a general forbearance thereof now would soon be followed with the utter ruin of the Gospel.  
A second limitation: the forementioned rule is to be understood, when the forbearance of our indifferencies is likely to win upon the wicked, and malicious, so as to further their conversion, and not otherwise, when it only exposeth unto their contempt, scorn, and derision, 1 Cor. 9.19, 20, 21, 22. Though I be free from all men (saith Paul) yet have I made myself servant unto all, that I might gain the more. And unto the Jews I became as a Jew, that Imight gain the Jews: to them that are under the law, as under the law, that I might gain them that are under the Law. To them that are without Law, as without Law (being not without Law to God, but under the Law to Christ) that I might gain● them, that are without Law. To the weak became I as weak, that I might gain the weak: I am made all things to all men, that I might by all means save some. Here 'tis very remarkable, that Paul was made, in things indifferent, all things unto all men, only in order to their salvation, to gain their souls unto Christ; and why should we abridge ourselves in the use of our liberty, in things that are of great expediency and conveniency unto us, when such a restraint of our liberty, is not a probable means of reaching the said end? what reason can be given, why we should incommodate ourselves, by forbearing all such indifferencies, that wicked men are scandalised at, when such forbearance is unprofitable unto their spiritual good, and unlikely to bring them any jot the nearer unto God and Heaven?  
A third limitation: the forementioned rule hath not place, when by the forbearance of our indifferencies, at which some wicked men are scandalised, there is incurred as great, if not a greater scandal, then that by their use: as when they are hereby confirmed, and hardened in their error, and sin; and others are hereby drawn into the like: prudenter advertendum est (saith Bernard) scandalum scandalo non emendari, qualis emendatio erit, si ut aliis scandalum tollas, alios scandalizas.  
Thus you see how the rule is to be limited; and without such, or the like limitations, rigidly to press it, would make against both the liberty, and peace of conscience.  
First, against the liberty of Conscience: for it would in great part evacuate, and annul the grand charter of our Christian liberty in things indifferent, it would (as Peter saith in another case) put a yoke upon the neck of the disciples, which neither our Fathers were, nor we are able to bear, Acts 15.10. All things are lawful for me (saith Paul) But I will not be brought under the power of any, 1 Cor. 6.12. But now if we must forbear all our lawful conveniences, at which wicked men perhaps will be purposely scandalised, we should be brought under the power of them, we should be little better than their slaves; and what an unspeakable, and intolerable vassalage would that be? 
(h) Quoties scandalum passivum alterius futurum est, ex malitia nullus debet omittere opus, quod nec est malum, nec h●qet speciem mali propter malitiam alterius, quando opus illud utile est temporaliter, vel spiritualiter operanti, quia non postulat ratio, ut malitiae alterius cum damno nostro succurramus, alias quilibet malitia sua possit nobis vocere, ut omitteremus opus nobis utile: malitia autem alterias nobis vocere non debet Lucssius Turrianus.   
Secondly it would make against the peace of Conscience; for it would so perplex men's consciences with doubts, and uncertainties; as that they would hardly know when, and how to act in the use of things indifferent, for wicked men are very prone to be scandalised at the lawful conveniencies of the Godly: and there is no doubt, but many are so wicked, as that they would of set purpose nourish, and cherish such scandals in themselves, if they thought that the Godly would hereupon forbear such their conveniencies: there be some people of such malevolent spirits against Ministers, as that they are scandalised at the decent apparel of them, & their wives, at their competent fare, and moderate house-keeping: and, if they must make the humour, and opinion of such men the rule of their walking in all things indifferent, it will be a very difficult matter for them to know how herein to carry themselves▪ But this doctrine, that we are to forbear all indifferencies, at which wicked men are scandalised, if it be unlimited would create perplexities, not only unto Ministers, but unto all sorts of men, especially such as have any thing due unto them from others: for grant this, and how often will a Landlord be at a loss to demand his rent? a Creditor his debts? and the magistrate his tribute or contribution?  
Add unto this, thirdly, that this doctrine, without limitation, will tend unto the overthrow of public peace, and order, and brings in nothing but anarchy and confusion: for public peace and order depends much upon the preservation of propriety: and upon what a ticklish point would propriety stand, if we must forbear to exact, or receive all such temporals, at which wicked men are scandalised, that can be forborn without sin? unto what wrongs, and injuries would this expose such, as are well affected? for there be some men so wicked and malicious, as that they would be scandalised at their temporals for the nonce to deprive them of them. I shall conclude this particular with the resolution of Aquinas 2. 2daes. q. 43. art. 8. Propter eos, qui sic scandala concitant, non sunt temporalia dimittenda: quia hoc & noceret bono communi: dar tur enim malis rapiendi occasio, & noceret ipsis rapientibus, qui retinendo aliena, in peccato remanerent. Vnde Greg. dicit in Moral. Quidam dum temporalia à nobis rapiunt, solummodo sunt tolerandi: quidam verò aequitate servata prohibendi: non solae cura, nè nostra subtrahantur, sedne rapientes non suae, semet ipsos perdant.  
But what if this imaginary appearance of evil flow from the supposal of a weak one, yet an holy one.  
Why then it must be omitted, but with this caution, so it may be without sin, or as the ordinary gloss upon that 15 of Matth. v. 12, 13, 14. resolves it, Saluâ triplici veritate, vitae, Justitiae, Doctrinae, so the threefold verity of life, justice, and doctrine be preserved safe: Nam per hanc triplicem veritatem (saith Gregory de Valentia), intelligitur omnis rectitudo, & immunitas à peccato in actionibus humanis. Veritas namquevitae continetur in actionibus rectis, quas quis in seipso exercet convenienter rectae rationi, & appetitui recto, atque ad●o verè veritate quadam practicâ: Veritas autem justitiae rectis actionibus quae exercentur erga alterum similiter, convenienter rectae rationi, prout verè & absque peccato oportet: veritas denique doctrinae continetur fide verâ, & minimè erroneâ: By this triple verity is understood all the rectitude and freedom from sin, that is in humane actions, for the verity of life is contained in those regular actions, which any one exerciseth in, and towards himself agreeably to right reason, and a well governed appetite, etc. The verity of justice consists in those regular actions, which are performed towards another, likewise suitably to right reason, as it behoveth, truly and without sin.  
And to conclude, the verity of doctrine consists in a true, regular, and unerring faith: if these three verities be kept inviolate, every thing must be abstained from, upon which follows scandalum pusillorum, a scandal springing from either the ignorance, or weakness of our brother: but, because this resolution may be thought both too general, and obscure (the Schoolmen themselves sumbling much about its explication,) we will therefore go to work more distinctly, and particularly.  
Consider whether or no the action, in which this appearance of evil is imagined to be, is necessary, or indifferent.  
If it be necessary, and commanded by God, it must not be omitted, though all the world be offended: For evil must not be done, that good may come thereof.  

(m) Galvin. l. 3. Inst. c. 19 Sect. 13.  Calvin, telling us, regard aught to be had of charity, limits how fare, usque ad arras, that is, so for our brother's sake we offend not God: I may add, so for our brother's sake we endanger not our own souls. 
(n) Scandalum quod oritur ex rebus perse bonis, & necessariis non licet evitare: quia non est faciendum malum, ut evenia● bonum. Bonum enim est expetendum, q●atenus bonum est, non expetitur autem quatenus bonum est, si malum simul expetitur. Nam qui expet●t bonum, abhorret à malo●qui autem abhorret a malo, qua malum est, is nullo malo quodcunque sit, non potest allici. Jam vero nullae sunt res planè necessariae praeter eas quae sunt in se bonae, atque eiusmodi, ut nisi voluntas illas expetat, à suo vero, & proprio obiecto abhorret▪ it a que ut maximè tumultuetur mundus, tamen omnia, etiam extrema quaeque subeunda sunt, ut fiet illibata Dei gloria. Cameron, in electiora quaedam N. Test. loca▪ Tom. 2. in Math 18.7.  To prevent scandal and sin in our brethren, we may not run upon sin ourselves: for a well ordered charity, as Aquinas gives the reason 2. 2dae. q. 43. a. 7. beginneth ever at home, making a man chiefly desire and endeavour the salvation of his ownsoule, and consequently more solicitous to avoid sin in himself then to prevent it in other: I may not then omit or neglect necessary duties, because to some they seem but needless niceties; I must not fly true holiness, and the power of Godliness, because unto the world it appears but brain sick peevishness, and an irrational preciseness: others error should not be seconded, and countenanced with mine impiety, and disobedience.  
Scandalum, nisi fallor, non bonae rei, sed malae exemplum est, aedificans ad delictum, Bonae res neminem scandalizant, nisi malam mentem. Si bonum est modestia, verecundia, fastidium gloriae, soli Deo captans placere; agnoscant malum suum, qui de tali bono scandalizantur. Quod enim si & incontinentes dicant se à continentibus scandalizari, continentia revocanda est? Tertullian.  
Here it will not be an unprofitable, 
A Digression.  nor much impertinent digression, to give you the sum of what Thomas and his Interprerers say upon this Question, An bona spiritualia sint propter scandalum dimittenda?  
Not to mention their rotten distinction between matters of counsel, and matters of precept, we will only out of them take notice, that there is a difference between transgression of a precept, and a temporary, partial, or occasional forbearance of the matter commanded by a precept.  
No pre●ept whatsoever, whether of the Law of Nature, or else but positive, is, for eschewing the scandal of any whether weak, or malicious, to be truly broken or transgressed. And a precept is transgressed whensoever what is enjoined in it is omitted at such a time, and in such a case, when all the particular circumstances, which we ought to regard, being considered, we are tied to all performance of it.  
But yet however upon emergency of scandal, that which is commanded by some precepts 
(p) Opera divi●● praecepti affirmativi, quod non pro semper obligat, debent aliquando deferri pro aliquo tempore, quando causarent pusillis scandalum, donee illi sint melius instructi, sed circumstantiae illius scandali sint mutatae, ita ut conting at praeceptum affirmativum etiam iuris quasi naturalis, aliquando hic & nunc non obligare propter concursum negativi praecepti de non ponendo offendiculo pusillis. Joan●●es Wiggers.  may pro hic & nunc, in some times, and at some places, be omitted, may for a while be forborn, until the scandal taken thereby can be removed by information, or instruction, or until the circumstances of the scandals be some way or other changed. Promulgation of a truth, and Christian reproof, are duties commanded by God, and yet are to be sometimes abstained from, for scandals taken by, not only the weak, but all malicious. Reprove not a scorner lest he hate thee, Prov. 9.8. Speak not in the cares of a fool, for he will despise the wisdom of thy words, Prov. 23.9. Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and turn again and rend you, Matth. 7.6.  
To explain this farther, recourse must be had unto that old and golden rule. Affirmativa praecepta semper obligant n●n ad semper. Affirmative precepts do always bind, but not to always: so that we are not bound to perform always what they enjoin, but only loco & tempore debitis, when we have due time and place. Now as by the intercurrency of other circumstances, so especially by occurrence of the scandal of weak brethren there may not be opportunity, and seasonableness of doing what we are urged unto by some affirmative precepts; and so those precepts may pro his & nunc cease to be obligatory: For when the obligations of two precepts seem to meet together at the very same time, that which is of greater obligation toeth us, and so consequently we are for the present freed from the obligation of the other. Now the negative precept of eschewing the scandal of the weak is more obligatory than many affirmative precepts; and therefore (to use the words of Malderus,) contingit aliquando praeceptum naturale affirmativum, hic & nunc non obligare, propter concursum negativi praecepti naturalis de vitando scandalo pusillorum: For example, vindicative justice binds a magistrate to execute wrath upon him that doth evil: Charity on the other side obligeth him to hinder, as much as he can, the scandal of the weak: now Charity is a virtue, of an higher note and nature, than vindicative justice: the precept belonging unto charity (hinder as much as you can the scandal of the weak) doth more strictly tie us, than that pertaining unto vindicative justice, (punish the guilty). And therefore, if it be probable, that a great and spreading scandal will be taken at the punishing of delinquents: a Magistrate may not transgress against justice, and yet defer the execution thereof.  
But so manifold and different are the degrees of obligation in affirmative precepts: such is the variety of circumstances appertaining unto the matters commanded by those precepts, and constancy of alterations about those circumstances, as that I do not see, how any unvariable rules, or constant directions can be given for Christian carriage in this case. For particulars then, every man is to be left unto the guidance of his spiritual prudence and wisdom, which is to direct him in a right apprehension, and discretion of circumstances: to define the opportunity, and seasonableness of practising what is commanded by affirmative precepts: and to compare them and the precept of eschewing the scandal of the weak together: and thereupon to determine, which is hic & nunc, most obligatory, or doth most strictly tie us to the obedience of it, as being of greater moment. Only in the general we may safely say thus much: that whereas we have said, that for shunning the scandal of the weak, we may forbear the practice of things commanded by affirmative precepts, Hic & nunc, in some places, and at some times, it must always be taken with this proviso, that there be not incurred a greater, and more perilous scandal, by forbearance, then would probably be occasioned by practice of the thing commanded; which is done, when either first, more are scandalised by the forbearance, than in all likelihood would be at the practice: or else, secondly, when the body in general, the Church and Common wealth, or the greatest, and chiefest part of either is scandalised at the forbeareance, and only some few particular private persons stumble at the practice: or else, thirdly, when others take occasion by this partial and temporary forbearance of what is commanded by affirmative precepts, to contemn the precepts themselves, as being by this our carriage induced to believe that we verily despise them, and do not so much, for a while forbear, as utterly disclaim the practice of what they command.  
Thus you see, that, according to the common opinion of the schoolmen, things commanded may in case of scandal for a while be omitted or forborn; but Vasquez and Becanus descent from them in this particular: the explication and confirmation of their opinion I will propound, and then briefly pass my censure thereon. 
* Sum. Theol. Scholar 3. par ca 27. q. 5.  Becanus, to make way for his opinion premiseth, that there is a difference between natural precepts, for some saith he bind simply, and always whatsoever circumstances intervene, and their obligation never ceaseth, such like are those that forbidden lying, perjury, hatred of God, Idolatry &c: for these facts are so intrinsically sinful, as that they cannot by any circumstances be made lawful: others now bind not simply, and absolutely, but with certain circumstances, and therefore they bind as long as those circumstances remain, they cease to bind when those circumstances are changed: Such is the precept for bidding to kill: for that binds with these circumstances, that we kill not by our private authority, except in case of necessary defence. Take away these circumstances, and it binds not, for it is lawful to kill upon the command of authority, or in our necessary defence: such also is the precept of eschewing scandal: for, however it be dictated by the law of nature, yet it obligeth not absolutè & quomodocunque: but with certain circumstances: and one circumstance necessarily requisite to make it bind us is, that there occur not any other precept, either natural, or positive. The reason is, because every one is bound to have a greater care of his own, than others salvation, and consequently, rather to avoid sin in himself, than to prevent it in his brethren. And therefore that precept which is given us for the prevention of sin in others, is but of a secondary obligation. Now the precept of eschewing scandal is imposed, only for the hindering of sin in others, and therefore doth not tie us, when there occurreth any other precept, which is given for the avoiding of sin in ourselves. But it may be objected, that the precept of shunning scandal is of the Law of nature, and therefore is more obligatory than those precepts that are but positive. Unto this Becanus answereth, that a natural precept is more obligatory, than that which is positive, caeteris paribus, that is, if each precept, both that which is natural, and that which is positive, be primarily referred unto the furthering of our own salvation, unto the preventing of sin in ourselves: But now if on the other side the primary scope of the natural precept be to hinder sin in others, as it is in the precept of scandal; and the principal end of the positive precept be to shun sin in ourselves, than that precept which is positive doth more deeply bind us, than that which is natural.  
Again, secondly, it may be objected: that if the obligation of the natural precept of eschewing scandal ceaseth upon occurrence of but a positive precept; why, then it seems, this positive precept detracts or derogates from the natural precept of avoiding scandal: as being of greater force, and validity? In no wise, only it takes away a circumstance requisite to make the precept of avoiding scandal obligatory, quare cum dicimus (saith Vasquez) non esse omittendum praeceptum positivum propter vitandum scandalum proximi, non dicimus praeceptum naturale derogari pracepto positivo tanquam fortiori; sed dicimus occursu praecepti positivi cessare quandam circumstantiam necessariam, ut ●blig●t praeceptum de vitando scandalo etiamsi naturale sit.  
But all this labour would have been saved, if the question had been rightly stated: for, whereas it is said, that one circumstance necessarily requisite to make the precept of eschewing scandal bind us, is, that there occur not any other precept either natural or positive: this is to be understood cum grano salis, with this limitation, in case such precepts bind (all circumstances considered to the performance of what they enjoin) hic & nunc, at such a particular time and place; for then omission of what they enjoin would be sinful, and we are not sinfully to omit any thing, for prevention of scandal in our brother: Unto the proof of which the reason of Vasquez and B●canus may be applied.  
But, the obligation of affirmative precepts is not universal ad semp●r, but only l●co & tempore debitis: and therefore what they enjoin may sometimes, in the case of scandal, be prudently omitted; but perhaps this which I say is all that Vasquez and Becanus aim at; and then they have no adversary that I know of; Every one will grant unto them, that one circumstance necessarily requisite to make the precept of eschewing scandal bind us, hic & nunc, in such a time and place, is, that there occur not any other precept binding us to what it enjoineth at that very instant time, and place: for it is evident unto all, that upon occurrencie of such obligations, though scandal ensue, it would not be on our parts a culpable scandal, an active scandal. But it may be thought that I have stayed too long upon this digression: to return therefore where we left.  
Secondly, if the action in which this appearance of evil is supposed to be, be but indifferent: why then, the best direction that we can have will be from what the Apostle Paul writes unto the Romans chap. 14. and unto the Corinthians, 1 Cor. 8. and chap. 10. of converts amongst the Romans there were some strong, and knowing ones, that were well principled, and so knew very well their deliverance from the yoke of the mosaical Law: and hereupon, without any scruple, did eat such meats as were prohibited thereby, perhaps Swine's flesh, or the like: Now at this their practice, several weak Christians, who were as yet ignorant and uninstructed touching the latitude of their Christian liberty, were in several regards scandalised, as I have shown in a foregoing treatise: But yet here the practice of the strong was a thing indifferent in itself vers. 14.20. and the appearance of evil (to wit, a profane, and irreligious contempt of the Law of Moses) was only imaginary, arising from the ignorance, and error of the weak, who thought that Law of Moses to be still in force, and unabrogated; and the scandal consequent hereupon was only p●r accidens, flowing not from the nature of the action in itself, but from the misapprehension of the weak: and yet the Apostle blames the strong for scandalising the weak: and therefore in this their action, though indifferent in itself, there was an active scandal, a scandal culpably given, as well as taken. The Apostle gives the same resolution unto the Corinthians concerning things offered unto Idols; to eat them at the Pagan religious feast, and in the temple of an Idol, carrieth a real appearance of communion with, and approbation of an Idolatrous worship of the Idol, and so is scandalous per se, of itself, and in its own nature, 1 Cor. 8.10 cap. 10. vers. 20,21. But now to eat these same meats when sold, and bought in the shambles, or set before them in private meetings, the Apostle resolves to be a thing lawful, and indifferent, 1 Cor. 10. v. 25, 26, 27. And indeed it could not carry a real, but only an imaginary appearance of evil; for they were the good creatures of God, and so uncapable of any moral pollution, and they had no religious use, and so did not reflect any glance of the least honour, credit, or countenance to the Idol. The scandal then, accrueing by them, was only per accidens; and yet they were by the Apostles advise to be forborn, if such scandal were likely to ensue upon the use of them. But if any wan say unto thee, this is offered in sacrifice unto Idols, eat not for his sake that shown it, and for conscience sake, 1 Cor. 10.28. Here we have a general rule, together with three limitations thereof.  
First, a general rule: if any man imagine evil, and sin to be in an indifferent action, and hereupon be scandalised, that action is to be abstained from; if any man say unto thee, this is offered in sacrifice unto Idols, eat not, for his sake that shown it.  
But now here are couched three exceptions.  
First, we are not bound to abstain from things indifferent, unless the scandal consequent be probable; if any man say unto you, this is offered in sacrifice unto Idols etc. if he say nothing, but smother his opinion, and dislike in his own breast, we may be guiltless and blameless. And indeed, if we are to forbear all indifferent things, in which there is only a mere possibility of scandal, we should be at an utter loss, and uncertainty in our actings in things indifferent, and never know what to do, we are obliged then to abstain from things indifferent, only in the case of 
(q) Quando attentis etiam omnibus ci●cumstantiis actus inordinatus unius non est ta lis, ut pr●babiliter putar● possitasteri futurus occasio ruinae, non eri● peccatum scandali, nec distinctum, nee non distinctum, ut sentit etiam Bannes hic art 4. in fine. Name tune nonpotest quis censeri causa moralis ruinae alterius. Gregor. de Valentiâ. tom. 3. q. 18. punct. 2.  scandal probable, and not in the case of scandal merely possible, and so much is observed by Calvin upon the 1 Cor. 8.13. Deinde non jubet nos Paulus divinare nunquid offendiculo futurum sit quod facimus, nisi cum est praesens periculum.  
A second exception is; that we are not required to abstain from things indifferent, in which our weak brethren imagine that there is evil and sin, and thereupon are scandalised, unless they have some probable ground for their imagination: for though the eating of the Idolothytes at a private feast was not an action in itself scandalous, or inductive unto sin; as being free from both sin, and all real appearance of it, yet the Corinthians scandalised hereat had a probable ground why they conceived it to be unlawful and sinful, the late moral or religious relation that the Idolothytes had unto an Idol: this is offered in sacrifice unto Idols; Mr Rutherford [in his treatise of scandal pag. 53, 54.] expresseth this limitation as followeth; we read not of scandals culpable in God's word, but there be some moral reasons in them; and he applyeth it unto the offence, that is taken, at tolling of bells, at a ministers gown, when he preacheth: there is no apparent moral reason why the tolling of a Bell, or a ministers gown should scandalise; for they are of mere civil use, and have no moral influence in the worship; for the same tolling of bells is, and may be used to convocate the people to a Baron Court to hear a declamation, to convocate soldiers. This exception, that I have laid down, is, I conceive, grounded, as upon what the Apostle saith; so also upon the reality, and truth of our Christian liberty in things indifferent, which otherwise would signify nothing; for if we are to abstain from all indifferent things, in which another without probable ground imagineth that there is sin; the servitude of Christians under the Gospel would be fare greater, and more intolerable, then that of the jews under the mosaical administration.  
A third exception; which we may gather hence, is, in great part, coincident with the first, and 'tis; that the abstinence unto which we are obliged, in things indifferent, in the case of scandal, is not universal, and total, but limited ad hic & nunc, those times, and places in which there is danger, or likelihood of scandal: the Corinthians were, in their private feasts, to forbear eating Idolothytes, only in the presence of persons apt to be scandalised, and might elsewhere use their liberty without regret of Conscience.  
Unto these exceptions insinuated here by the Apostle we may add divers others, of which, some may be collected from what we above said touching the scandal of the wicked in things indifferent mutatis mutandis, and by and by I shall add others; but first I shall examine some restrictions, which I gave in a former edition of this book.  

Former Edition.  
But now, if the action in which this appearance of evil is supposed to be, be but indifferent, than these two following things must be pondered. First, whether, or no it be annexed with a necessary duty, or not? Secondly, whether or no it be undetermined, left to our own liberty and choice, or else by authority either Economical, Political, or Ecclesiastical?  
If it be annexed to a necessary duty, we must not omit this, to abstain from that: So to fly the shadow of sin, we should embrace the body of sin, a sin really so, a sin of omission; for what is not good, if to omit a duty be not bad? Good must not be left undone, though evil per accidens come from it, much less, when only an appearance of evil is joined to it. We must not then shun the Lords table, because some weaker judgements have imagined in the act of kneeling, a show of Idolatry. So to avoid but an imaginary appearance of evil unto men, we shall appear indeed unto God to be evil. A Minister must not neglect the discharge of his duty, because some have supposed a show of superstition in some harmless Cerem nies annexed to its performance. So, to avoid m●ns unjust censures, he should incur a just woe and curse from God: woe be to me (saith the Apostle) if I pr●ach not the Gospel.   

Answer.  
This first limitation I borrowed from Dr Sclat●r upon the text: for the examination of it we must distinguish of humane Ceremonies; they are of two sorts, Circumstantial, or Doctrinal.  
First, circumstantial, such are the Circumstances of time or place, matters of order, decency, and the like. Now these are necessary in the general, and the particulars may be determined by the Magistrate, or Church-officers v. g. that the public assemblies be at such a convenient time of the day, in such a place, and that they be convocated by tolling of bells; that the Minister officiate in a grave habit, gown, cloak, or coat, etc. Now though some of these may be by some causelessly imagined to be evil; yet they are not therefore to be forborn, if they be by lawful command of the Magistrate, or Church, to be annexed with necessary duties; for necessary duties are not to be omitted for mere circumstances connexed with their performance.  
Thus we are not to forsake, or refrain our public assemblies, because some think there is some superstition in the places of them, our Churches, and the Convocation of them by bells, upon this ground, that both our Churches and bells have been abused by Papists. Dr Heylin [in a former edition of his Geography] relates this following story of Peter Du Moulin; that hearing how divers English Ministers scrupled to officiate in a Surplice, he said, that he would willingly preach at Paris in a fool's coat, if leave could not be gotten of the King, upon any other condition. If this great light of France ever dropped such words, he had in them doubtless a very good, devout, and zealous meaning; but yet (under correction) I cannot see how his resolution can be accorded with that rule of the Apostle; Let all things be done decently; for it cannot as yet sink into my foolish head, how that a fool's coat is a decent garment to preach in. But this on the buy.  
To proceed unto a second sort of Ceremonies, which we may call, for distinction sake, humane, Doctrinal, Ceremonies; such as men institute, by their moral signification, to teach, u.g. the Cross, Surplice &c: if these might lawfully, by any humane authority whatsoever, be unavoidably annexed with necessary duties, we should then soon resolve, that we are not then to abstain from them; but the non-conformists ever held that no mortal wight whatsoever could lawfully urge, or press the unavoidable connexion of such Ceremonies with necessary duties: and indeed they have very good reason against the Command of such a connexion; because it would have been against religion, and against charity.  
First, against religion: they never granted them (as is still supposed) to be indifferent, but always arraigned them as guilty of superstition, and will-worship; and so, manifest transgressions against the second commandment, presumptuous additions unto the word, and ordinances of our Lord Jesus Christ, a setting of man's threshold by God's threshold, and their posts by God's posts, Ezek. 43.8. and the justice of their accusation will be soon confessed by all learned, and unprejudiced men, that will with patience, and impartiality read the reenforcement of their arguments by Parker, Didoclave, and Aims against all answers and replies whatsoever. The Prelates connexing of humane symbolical ceremonies with duties and ordinances that are necessary, and commanded by the word of God, brings into my mind an artifice of Julian the Apostate: in the market places of Cities, he set up his own image, with the Effigies of the gods of the Heathen pictured round about, to the end, that whosoever should do civil reverence to the Emperor's Image, might also seem to worship the gods of the Gentiles: and by the contrary, they who would not bow to the Gods of the Gentiles, might seem also to refuse all due reverence to the Emperor.— Thus the Prelates, of their own heads, most presumptuously have set up in God's worship, and service, their own inventions, and have commanded them to be joined with the ordinances of Christ: so that hereby they drove many conscientious Ministers into a great strait, if, out of a loathness to lose the exercise of their Ministry, they conformed unto their Ceremonies, this they interpreted to be an approbation of them; and, if to avoid their Ceremonies, they did forbear to baptise, to administer the Lords supper etc. then they accused them for neglect, and contempt of God's Ordinances.  
Secondly, it was against charity for the Prelates, so rigidly, and peremptorily to press their paltry Ceremonies, as that unless men observed them they would not suffer them, by their good wills, to enjoy the precious Ordinances of Christ Jesus; and this can reasonably be denied by none, who think, that the souls of men may be damnified by the want of such ordinances: But to proceed unto a second restriction in the former edition.   

Former Edition.  
If we are not, secondly, nostri juris, but restrained; and determined by authority, we must not disobey that, to satisfiea Brother; transgress duty, to express charity: So to please men, we should displease God. So we should do evil, that good might come thereof. When the Obligation of two precepts seemingly lieth upon us at the same time, and impossible for both to be at once obeyed, in such a case, because there is no clashing between God's precepts, neither doth God by them impose upon his creatures any necessity of sinning, therefore one of these precepts must give place unto the other; to wit, that which enjoineth a less duty, unto that which prescribes a more weighty and pressing one. Now the duties of Justice (as a learned Inconformitant, even Amesius himself, med: Theol. lib. 2. cap. 16. §. 62, 63, will tell us) are of stricter obligation than those of charity. We are more bound to pay our debts then to distribute Alms. He that hath trespassed against another, is more strictly tied to sue for reconciliation, than the party who hath received the injury. Now to hinder the scandal of the weak, is a duty of Charity; to obey the lawful commands of authority, a duty of justice; and therefore of the greater obligation and moment, unto it then the other must give place. I would have traveled farther in this argument, but that I am anticipated by the learned, and reverend Professors of Aberdene in their Duplies to the second answers of the Covenanting ministers, who from pag. 65. unto 75. have purposely discussed this very question, whether the precept of obedience to Superiors, or the precept of eschewing scandal be more obligatory, and have there proved by many unanswerable arguments, that the former precept, that of obedience to Superiors is of the twain more Obligatory. Those than that desire larger satisfaction concerning this matter, I shall refer unto the perusal of them. How ever in the mean while let it not be thought troublesome, if I insert, what I judge in them, if not most, yet very remarkable. 'Tis this, Debitum obedientiae, the debt of obedience, which we own unto superiors, is (say they pa: 74) not only debitum morale, a debt or duty unto which we are tied by moral honesty, and God's Commandment: but also debitum legale, or debitum justitiae, (quoth viz: fundatur in proprio jure alterius) a a debt grounded upon the true and proper right which our Superiors have to exact this duty of us, so that they may accuse us of injury, and censure us, if we perform it not. There is a great difference betwixt these two sorts of debts, & the last is far more obligatory than the first; as for example: A man oweth mon●y to the poor by a moral debt, but to his Creditor he oweth them by legal debt, or debt of justice: and therefore he is more strictly obliged to pay his creditor, than to give alms. So by moral honesty, and Gods precepts also, a man oweth to his neighbour a pious carefulness to hinder sin in him, by admonition, instruction, good example, and by omission, even of things lawful, when he forseeth that his neighbour, in respect of his weakness will be scandalised by them. But his neighbour hath not such a right to exact these things of him, neither can he have action against him for not performing of them, as our lawful superiors have, for our due obedience. Thus they.  
Hence then may we shape an answer unto that same frequent clamour of some tumultuous spirits, that our conformity forsooth, is wondrous offensive to many of our weak brethren.  
First, suppose it be so, better they without thy fault be offended, scandalised at thee, than that the Magistrate be with thy fault disobeyed by thee. It is no safe course to provide for the peace of thy brother's conscience, by wounding thine own with the sin of disobedience against authority, to which for conscience sake thou art to yield subjection: we must not, to comply with men's humours, resist the ordinance of God, despise the voice of the Church, rather than a weak brother should be offended, scandalized: we may, and sometimes must part with our own right; but we ought not to rob the Church of hers, by bereaving her of her power, by denying her our obedience. Nay farther, I confess that rather than a weak brother should be scandalised, we may pro hic & nunc in some particular times and places, pretermit what superiors prescribe, provided they take no distaste thereat, and others by our example be not encouraged to contemn their persons, callings, commands: for so a greater and more pernicious scandal will be incurred, than was declined. But we are not upon occurrence of any scandal whatsoever, taken by whomsoever, either absolutely to deny, and utterly r●fuse obedience to the lawful injunctions of our public governor's, whether temporal, or ecclesiastical: or so much as contemptuously and scandalously for a while omit the practice of what they enjoin. And omission of what they require, is than contemptuous, when they peremptorily urge the practice of it, then scandalous when it heartens others to a contempt of their authority. To grant any of these lawful, what were it, alas! but to licence confusion both in Church and Commonwealth?  
Secondly, I demand whether or no the offence given to, or taken by a Magistrate, who is a brother, and withal a magistrate, be not greater than that which is given to, or taken by one, who is only a brother? An impartial Judge will soon determine, that the double relation of brother and magistrate, weigheth down the single and naked relation of a brother. Howsoever I am sure, that the whole exceeds the parts severally considered: the relation of mother exacts more at our hands than that of brother, and therefore, in warding a blow from my brother, I am to take care, that thereby the same stroke light not upon the head of my mother the Church. Whereupon, as Paul exhorts to give none offence, neither to Jew, nor Gentile, so he 
(r) Bishop Morton. : adds in a further specialty nor to the Church of God, 1 Cor. 10.37. The Jews and Gentiles were but parts, the Church of God the whole, they but brethren, she the mother. 
(s) Si ne●as sit vel pusillum quempiam scádalizare, & praestiterit alligata collo mola afinaria demergi quempiam in profundum, ma●is quamscan dalizare unum ex pu●●llis Christianis: quam est horrendum fl●gitium & quam atroci supplicio vindi. candum scandalizare ●os▪ quorum unius offensio magis pe●iculoia quá aliorum multorum, etc. Forbefius I●enic. pag 405.  If then it were better to be thrown into the bottom of the sea, with a millstone about ones neck than to offend a little one, a poor and illiterate artisan, what expression shall we then find answerable to the heinousness of a scandal given to a pious Magistrate, to a religious Prince, to a Parliament, and Convocation, to a whole Church and Commonwealth?   

Examination.  
First, it cannot be denied, but that divers indifferent things may be hic & nunc of such weight, and moment, of such necessity, or at least expediency, and conveniency, as that the just commands of our lawful superiors may render them our duty, and omission of them would be sinful: of subjection unto such commands the Apostle speaks, Rom. 13.5 Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. Where by wrath is understood Metonymically punishment: we are therefore to obey the Commands of the Magistrate, not only for fear of punishment, but also for fear of sin: lest we wound the Conscience with transgression of the fifth Commandment. To assert the contrary, (that 'tis not a sinful disobedience to violate the Commands of Superiors concerning some things indifferent in their general nature,) tends apertly to the dissolving of all government, and stocks up the authority of Magistrates, and masters of families by the very roots.  
Secondly, 'tis as unquestionable, that all omissions of what is commanded by humane laws are not sins, unless they be out of contempt of authority: for  
First; otherwise (as 
(t) Aliae leges humanae, quia possunt esse vel justae vel injustae, idque ratione efficientis, materiae, formae, finis, & hujus aut illius subjecti, vel adjuncti; idcirco non ità simpli citèr aligant, ut earum quaelibet violatio culpam lethalem inducat. Si enim sic esset, tum quot sunt leges, tot essent laquei animarum, & qui sub legibus vivunt, pluribus multo peccatis essent obnoxii, quam qui in barbaris gentibus, vel absque legibus, vel cum paucissimis transigunt vitam. Ames. de Consc. call. lib. 5. cap. 24. Num. 22.  Ames rightly says) as many laws as there were, so many snares for souls there were, and they that live under laws, should be subject to many more sins, than they who live among barbarous people, either quite without laws, or with but a few.  
Secondly, there be divers laws, that be 
(u) Multae leges sunt pu●è poe●●les, i●a ut ipsis plane satisfiat, 〈◊〉 poena solvatur. Rat. 1. Quia legis finis est deterrere homines à communi & frequen●i usu hujus aut illius rei, ad quem finem sufficit constitutio poenae. 2. In talibus etiam legibus est ●acita conventio & pactum, d● poena ferenda si contra fiat: Contra leges autem conventionales, aut sub conditione latas, venire quis potest absque peccato. 3. De talibus legibus, intelligentes homines nunquam faciunt scrupulum conscientiae, si absit contemptus, scandalum, & notabile damnum. Tales sunt leges de non ven●ndo, de non piscando, de volucribus aut feris non capiendis, de non utendo hoc aut i●lo genere vestium, ciborum etc. num. 28.  purely penal, and the intent of such laws is satisfied, when one patiently submits unto the punishment inflicted for the breach of them; such are several laws of our Land putting restraints upon some men in fouling, fishing, hunting, and the like: as also that statute, which prohibited the eating of flesh, at such times upon politic respects, for the breed, and increase of cattle, as also for the encouragement of fishing, Now no man can reasonably hold, that every breach of such laws is a sin, especially when 'tis not contemptuous, and scandalous: I put in that limitation, because contempt of authority, and scandal unto others will make a very small, and otherwise inconsiderable violation of a mere penal law, to be a very heinous sin.  
Thirdly, the omission of what is commanded by humane laws is in many cases 
(w) Obligatio legis non potest extendi ultra intentionem, & mentemlegislatoris, eamque Justam. Praesumendumautem est nullum hominem velle su. os subditos ad ●ethalem reatum & damnat●onem obligare, propter quemlibet suae voluntatis neglectum. Imo si in aliquo casu magnum damnum, scandalum, aut incommodum ex observatione quarundam legum secuturum esset, praesumitur non intendisse legislatorem, ut in illo casu observaretur. Ames. de Con. lib. 5. cap. 24. n. 22.  agreeable unto the presumptive will of a just magistrate. It is to be presumed, that if he knew the cases, he would tolerate the omission, and therefore such a bare omission would not be a sin: Of this Ames speaks very well: the obligation, saith he, of a Law, must not be stretched beyond the just intention, and mind of the lawgiver, but it is to be presumed, that no man would oblige his Subjects to a mortal guilt, and utter damnation, for every neglect of his will and pleasure. Nay if in some case, the Law cannot possibly be observed, but some great damage, scandal, or inconvenience, must needs follow, it is to be presumed, that the Lawgiver never intended that the Law in such a case should be observed. We would reckon him a very cruel Magistrate that should be implacably angry at a sick man for eating flesh in a time of Lent, and can we think then, that there was any such thing as Christian pity and commiseration in the breasts of those men whom nothing could atone for the omission of the Cross, Surplice, & c? while they scandalised, that is destroyed, the immortal souls of many for whom Christ died. Suppose the greatest Monarch upon the face of the earth should command the meanest, and lowest of his slaves upon some important affair to ride post through such a City, without any of the least stay or diversion, and then it should happen, that a company of little children should be playing in the streets, can this slave think, that he is obliged to ride over them? Nay, unless we imagine his Master to be a most bloody Tyrant, we must needs think, that he will be highly displeased at so horrid a cruelty; and can any man than make any tolerable apology for the tyranny of our late Prelates, who commanded all to drive on with a furious career in the course of conformity, without any the least stop, though hereby were hazarded a world of souls, purchased at no lower a rate than the divine blood of our blessed Saviour?  
It is the will and pleasure of the King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, that matters commanded by his affirmative precepts should be, for a while, forborn, in case of the likelihood of scandal consequent; but these men (in imitation of him that exalted himself above all that is called God 2 Thes. 2.4.) could not be persuaded to dispense with a temporary forbearance of any ceremonies they enjoined: though they well foresaw, that the sequel of them was likely to be a very great, and spreading scandal.  
But now the non-conformists might spare all this discourse touching the obligation of humane laws in general: because they hold that humane, religious, Doctrinal Ceremonies the matter in question, cannot be lawfully determined by the authority of either Political, or Ecclesiastical superiors: and for this they have two, as I take it, very convincing arguments.  
First, because all such Ceremonies are Saucy additions unto the word, and ordinances of God, Deut. 4.2. and cap. 12.32. strange fire which the Lord commanded not, Leu. 10.8.  
Secondly, because suppose they be indifferent (which was a thing never granted) yet they are unnecessary toys, and trifles: and therefore it is not lawful for our superiors to command them, when, from the practice of them, it is very probable, that scandal will arise. For  
First, every power is the Minister of God to thee for good, Rom. 13.4 the power of the Magistrate is like that of the Minister, only for edification, and not destruction, 2 Cor. 10.8. and cap. 13.10. but now if he should have power to command humane symbolical Ceremonies (that may be well spared in God's worship and service) when there is likelihood of the consecution of Scandal: then he should have power to do mischief, to enjoin things hurtful, and destructive unto the souls of men.  
Secondly, our Saviour's commination against scandal, Matth. 18.7. (Woe to that man by whom the offence cometh,) reacheth Magistrates, as well as private persons: and we may say the same of the Apostolical prohibitions of scandal both to the Romans, and the Corinthians, Rom. 14.13, 15, 20, 21. 1 Cor. 8.9. and chap. 10.32.  
Unto these prohibitions add we Paul's resolution to avoid scandal arising from the use of things indifferent: if meat make my brother to offend (saith he) I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my broth●r to offend, 1 Cor. 8.13. For  
From this resolution the unlawfulness of the injunction of such ceremonies as ours will undeniably follow.  
To clear this I shall presuppose that, which cannot (with any colour of reason) be denied: to wit, that, that, which Paul held unlawful for himself to practise in his own person upon a general account belonging to all Christians, could not by him be lawfully imposed upon others by an Ecclesiastical Canon; but now Paul held it unlawful to eat flesh in case of scandal probably consequent, and this was upon a general reason belonging to all Christians: and therefore he thought it utterly unlawful to impose any such matter upon others when scandal was likely to follow.  
From this thus premised, I shall hence thus argue Syllogistically, against our Prelate's imposition of our Ceremonies.  
If it were unlawful for Paul to impose upon the Corinthians such ceremonies as ours, than it was unlawful for our Prelates to impose such upon us.  
But it was unlawful for Paul to impose such Ceremonies as ours upon the Corinthians.  
Therefore it was unlawful for the Prelates to impose such Ceremonies upon us.  
The sequel of the major is evident: because the Prelates could not pretend unto so much authority in matters Ecclesiastical as Paul had: for in each of the Apostles there was a greater fullness of jurisdiction then in any that succeeded them.  
As for the Minor that may be confirmed by this following Syllogism.  
If it were unlawful for Paul to impose upon the Corinthians the eating of flesh when scandal was likely to ensue, than it was unlawful for him to impose upon them the use of such Ceremonies as ours.  
But the former appeareth to be unlawful by the 1 Cor. 8.13.  
Therefore the latter was unlawful also.  
There is nothing here can be questioned but the Major, and that is easily confirmed from a just comparison of flesh with such Ceremonies as ours.  
First, the eating of flesh was undoubtedly a thing more clearly indifferent, than the practice of such Ceremonies of ours.  
Secondly, flesh was necessary unto the maintenance of the life of man by disjunction: that is, flesh, or some other meat: but now such Ceremonies as ours are not necessary unto the worship and service of God by disjunction: for God may be worshipped without them, or any others in their stead: a surplice (saith Rutherford is not necessary by way of disjunction, for neither is surplice necessary, nor any other white or red habit, that hath some mystical signification, like unto Surplice: So kneeling to the elements is neither necessary, nor any the like religious honouring of them by prostration before them, or kissing them.  
But against this accusation of our Ceremonies for scandal there are objected two Comparisons.  
First, of the duties of justice and Charity together: the duties of justice are more obligatory than the duties of charity, as being not only a moral, but a legal debt: Now to hinder the scandal of the weak is a duty of charity, only a moral debt, to obey the lawful command of authority in things indifferent a duty of justice, a legal debt; and therefore of the greater obligation, and moment: I shall the rather insist on this argument, because it is of late so much stood on by Dr Sanderson [in his last Sermons printed 1656. pag. 249.] where we are not (saith he) able to discharge both: debts of justice are to be paid (saith he) before bebts of charity. Now the duty of obedience is debitum justitiae, and a matter of right: my superior may challenge it at my hands as his due; and I do him wrong, if I withhold it from him. But the care of not giving offence is but debitum charitatis, and a matter of but courtesy. I am to perform it to my brother in love, when I see cause: but he cannot challenge it from me as his right, nor can justly say I do him wrong, if I neglect it. It is therefore no more lawful for me to disobey the lawful command of a superior, to prevent thereby the offence of one or a few brethren, than it is lawful for me to do one man wrong, to do another man a courtesy withal, or then it is lawful for me to rob the Exchequer to relieve an Hospital. 
(x) Quis est, qui dicat, ut habeamus quod demus pauperibus, faciamu● furta divitibus? August. ●ont. Mendac. cap. 7.   
For answer: First, if this argument be applied unto our Ceremonies there will be in such application a mere begging of the question; for that our Ceremonies were things indifferent, the command of them lawful, the practice of them a duty of justice, a legal debt, is the main thing in controversy betwixt the conformists, and non-conformists; and therefore all this should be proved, and not barely presupposed as it is. But  
Secondly, the fore mentioned rule is to be understood with this limitation, caeteris paribus, if the terms of the comparison be equal: and equal they are not, when the minims of justice are put into the balance with the weightiest duties of charity: and so 'tis in the present comparison, though we suppose our Ceremonies to be indifferent, and the practice of them a duty of justice: for of what importance is such practice in comparison of the not scandalising of our Brother? Who, that is not extremely transported with prejudice, will think, that the commands of the Prelates to wear the surplice, to sign children with the sign of the Cross in Baptism etc. carry any tolerable proportion with those precepts of the Apostle, destroy not him with thy meat, thy indifferencies, for whom Christ died; for such things destroy not the work of God? Rom. 14.15, 20. What laws, of any earthly wight whatsoever, concerning ceremonies, can be more obligatory, than the Commands of God touching the externals of his worship and service? and yet it is his will, and pleasure, that these externals of his worship should be laid aside for the performance of outward works of mercy? I will have mercy and n●t sacrifice, Matth. 12.7. Thus are we to leave our prayers, both public, and private, to forsake a Sermon, for to save the life of our neighbours, to quench the firing of his house, to help his cattle out of the ditch: now, if the sacred Ordinances of God are to give way unto works of mercy unto the bodies of men, surely then much more is the trash of humane inventions to yield unto a work of mercy towards the souls of men: This answer which I now give was made by Ruth●rford in his dispute of scandal unto the Duplies of the Doctors of Aberdeen pa. 50, 51, 52, 53. his discourse there is so satisfactory, as that I have thought fit to transcribe what he says; and I hope the reading of it will not be irksome unto the Reader.  
It is true these duties which we own to others by way of justice, are more obligatory than those, which we own only by way of charity, caeteris paribus: Wh●n duties of the Law of nature, and moral Law, are compuned together, then indeed the duties, which we own both by the tye of justice and charity, are more obligatory than the duties that we own only by the tye of charity. As for example, My Father is in danger before mine eyes to be drowned, in one d●ep water, and before my eyes also my neighbour or friend is in danger of the like kind: the two ties and bands of justice and charity, both by the fifth and sixth Commandments, are more obligatory, hic & nunc, and do more strictly oblige, that I run to secure and preserve the life of my Father, than the life of my neighbour: f●r the obligation to my neighbour, is only Charity, by the obligation of the sixth Commandment, which obligation ceaseth, hic & nunc, at this time, when my father's life is in hazard: and thus fare the Doctor's argument goeth for strong, as Schoolmen, Casuists, and Divines teach. But it is not to a purpose for the Doctors: for all offices and duties generally, and universally, of what ever kind, which we own by may of Justice, are not more obligatory, than duties which we own only by way of charity: as when duties of a positive commandment of God, enjoined by our superiors, and duties which we own by charity only, are compared to either, th●n the Doctor's Major proposition is not clear of itself, as they dream, neither do Casuists, or Amesius, or Divines say with them; but truth, and all our Divines say against them. Let us suppose that the King, and Convocation, and Assembly of Priests and Prophets of Israel make a Canon according to God's word. That no manner of man presume to eat shewbread, save the Priests only. All men own obedience to this, both because it is Gods express Law, and by the band of Justice the Elders and assembly of the Ancients have forbidden it. But if our Doctor's argument stand strong, David at the point and hazard of famishing for hunger, sinned in eating shewbread, yet Christ acquitteth him of all sin, and saith Matth. 12.5. he and his followers are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, blameless. Now David was under a duty by mercy, and love to his own life, and the lives of his followers, to eat show bread, and he was under the band of Justice, by the Law of the Ancients of Israel, and God's law, not to eat. Therefore in some cases when our superiors commandments are only positive Laws, they are not more obligatory, than duties of Charity, only commanded in the Law of nature. I clear it further thus, I see my ●●ighbour in danger before my eyes of drowning, and my father commandeth me to go and labour, or sow his farm in that time, while I am to preserve the life of my neighbour, in present danger, to lose his life in a great water. By the Doctor's maxim, I am under the higher obligatory tie of Justice, to obey my father, who commandeth a thing both lawful and necessary, by virtue of the higher commandment, to wit the first of the second Table, than I am obliged by the sixth Commandment, and of charity only, to give present succour and help to my dying neighbour, so I must let my neighbour die in the waters, to give a duty of Justice to my father of fare less necessity. I would not commit my Conscience to such Casuists, as are the Doctors of Aberdeen. But if the Doctors would see with some new light of reason; it is clear that not only, the tye of justice maketh the precept more obligatory, but also the weightin●sse of the thing commanded; yea, and if the positive Commandments of the Lord our God, who of Justice, and Kingly sovereignty hath right to ask obedience of us above all earthly Superiors, do yield and cede as less obligatory, than commandments of love only, that are commanded in the Law of nature. What do our Doctor's clatter and fable to us of a right of Justice, that mortal Rulers have to command in things indifferent, from which the destruction of souls doth arise? for these commandments of Rulers, (Kneel religiously before bread, the Vicegerent image of Christ crucified) (keep humane holy days) (Cross the air with your thumb above a baptised infants face) at best, are but positive Commandments, not warranted by God's word. But shall they be more obligatory by a supposed band of Justice that Prelates have over us to command such toys, than this divine Law of God, and Nature, Rom. 14. For indifferent days, meats, surplice, destroy not him for whom Christ died? All the Casuists and Schoolmen, Navarra, Sylvester, Sanchez, Raphael dela Torre, Meratius, Duvallius, Thomas, Scotus, Bona●entura, Suarez, Vasquez, Greg: de valentia, Albertus, Richardus, Biel, Corduba, Angelus, Adrianus, Alphonsus, Becanus, Yea, and all the h●st of our Divines cry with Scripture, that mercy and the precepts of love, and of the Law of nature are more obligatory, than sacrifice,  offerings, and Gods own positive Laws, yea, and that positive Laws lose their obligatory power, and cease to be laws, when the laws of nature and necessary duties of mercy, and love (as not to murder our brother) (not to scandalise) standeth in th●ir way. I might weary the Reader here with citations, and be wilder myself also, but it is a point of Divinity denied by none at all. 3. What we own of Justice to our Superiors, is indeed both a moral debt of obedience, and a debt of Justice and law, which Rulers may seek by their place, and ex jure, as Aristotle saith, but this right is limited: Rulers have no right to seek absolute obedience, but only in the Lord, not against charity. And though the place of Rulers be authoritative, yet their commanding power, as touching the matter of what they enjoin is only Ministerial, and they cannot but in God's place exact, that which is God's due, and seeing God himself, if he should immediately in his own person Command, he would not urge a positive commandment, fare less the commandment of light and vain Ceremonies, against and beyond the precept of love, not to destroy a soul for whom Christ died. Ergò, Superiors under God, who borrow all their light from God, cannot have a higher right, than God hath. 4. The comparison of a man who oweth moneys to a Creditor, and oweth monies to the poor, is close off the way, for he is obliged to pay the Creditor first, but the case h●re is fare otherwise; the debt of practising indifferent feathers, and straws, such as kneeling, crossing, wearing Surplice, is neither like the dept owen to the poor, nor to the Creditor; For nature's Law, and God's word, 1. Cor. 10.18.19. maketh the Non-practise, non-murthering obedience to God, when the practice of indifferent things is a soul stumbling to the weak, and the practising is but at ' its best obedience to a positive Law, and aught to stoop, and go off the way, and disappear, when nature's Law (murder not) doth come in ' its way. When the Doctors put Loyalty above Charity, they suppose obedience to Commandments commanding scandalising of soulès to be loyalty to Superiors; which is questioned, it being treason to the sovereign of Heaven, and Earth, to destroy his Image, it is taken as loyalty by our Doctors, but not proven to be loyalty, and so a vain question here, whether Loyalty be above Charity or not.  
This dispute of scandal is annexed unto his divine right of Church Government, which was published 1646. since that Dr. Sanderson 1656 (as I shown you but now) propounds the argument a new, with a great deal of triumph, but without any considerable reinforcement; and withal he takes no notice of Rutherford, his answer, from whence I gather that he never read it: and indeed it is a thing very incident unto the greatest Scholars of that party to censure, but never to read their adversaries.  
Thirdly, to say something unto Dr. Sanderson as well as unto the Duplyers, I must needs confess, that I am transported with a just admiration, that so great a scholar should so extenuate, as he doth, the guilt of an active scandal; for he makes the care of not giving offence to a brother to be a matter but of courtesy; he cannot, (saith he) justly say I do him wrong, if I neglect it: But first, the Apostle Paul speaks another language, in his account to make brethren to offend is to sin against them, to wound their weak consciences, and so to sin against Christ. 1 Cor. 8.12. Compared with ver. 11.13. and Rom. 14.15.20. he resolves, that 'tis a destroying of a brother for whom Christ died, a destroying of the work of God in him: whereupon Divines generally determine, that 'tis soule-murther: Now, in wounding the weak conscience of our brother, in murdering his immortal soul, there is doubtless some wrong committed against him: not to destroy him for whom Christ died etc. is more than a matter of mere courtesy unto him.  
Secondly, suppose the care of not giving offence be, in respect of our brother, but debitum charitatis; yet in regard of God 'tis debitum justitiae, a legal debt: he may, and doth challenge it as due, and we do him wrong if we disobey him. Our Saviour thundereth a woe against such disobedience; Woe to him through whom offences come, Luk. 17.1. and in the second verse this woe is aggravated by comparison with a very grievous punishment, it were better for him that a Millstone were hanged about his neck, and he cast into the sea, then that he should offend one of these little ones.  
But to proceed unto the second comparison on which I insisted out of Bishop Morton and Dr Sanderson: a Comparison betwixt a scandal given to a Magistrate, and a scandal given to one, who is only a brother: I demand whether or no the offence given to, or taken by a Magistrate, who is a brother, and withal a Magistrate be not greater, than that which is given to, or taken by one, who is only a brother? an impartial Judge will soon determine that the double relation of brother, and Magistrate weigheth down the single, and naked relation of a brother etc. ut suprà.  
For answer unto this, distinguish we of a two 〈◊〉 acception of scandal. Primary, and Secundary.  
First, Primary, and so 'tis an occasioning culpably the fall of another into sin.  
Secondly, Secundary, and so 'tis only the angering, vexing, displeasing of another.  
This distinction premised; the comparison may be understood; either of the scandal of a Magistrate in a secundary acception, with a scandal of one, who is only a brother in a secundary acception of the word too; or else of the scandal of a Magistrate in a secundary acception with the scandal of a brother in a primary acception; or 3. of the scandal of a Magistrate in a primary acception with the scandal of a brother in a primary acception also.  
First; if the Comparison be on both sides to be understood of scandal taken in a secondary sense, there is no doubt, but the scandal of the Magistrate is more dangerous, than that of one, who is only a brother: for the wrath of the supreme Magistrate is as the Messengers of death, Prov. 16.14. as the roaring of a Lion, Prov. 19.12. In indifferent things than it will be our safest course to anger a brother, rather than to displease the Magistrate. But this acception of scandal is impertinent unto our purpose, and so much is confessed by Dr Hammond in his treatise of scandal pag: 23. To be angry, grieved, troubled, at any action of another, is not (to be offended) in the scripture sense, nor consequently doth it follow, that I have done a miss in doing that which another man is angry at, unless my action be in itself evil. The scandal we speak of is culpable; but to displease a magistrate is not always a sin: the mistake of scandal for the angering of one is taken notice of by Calvin also upon 1 Cor. 8.13. having affirmed, that some corrupted the doctrine of scandal with foolish glosses, and others with their impious calumnies, he showeth the original of both their mistakes touching the meaning of offence in the Apostle. Vtrique errant in verbo offendendi. Nam offendere accipiunt, pro incurrere in odium, vel offensionem hominum, aut quod idem ferè est, facere quod ipsis displiceat, vel minus arrideat. Atqui clarissimè patet ex contextu, nihil esse aliud quam malo exemplo tanquam obice fratrem impedire à recto cursu, aut illi praebere causam lapsus. Non ergo hic disputat Paulus de retinendâ hominum gratiâ, sed de sublevandis infirmis, nè concidant, & prudentèr rege●●●●, nè à rect â viâ deflectant.  
Secondly, if the comparison proceed of the scandal of the Magistrate in a secondary sense with the scandal of a brother in a primary sense, doubtless the scandal of a brother is more to be declined: it is fare better to anger, and displease a pious Magistrate, a religious Prince, a Parliament, a whole Church, & Commonwealth, then culpably to occasion the fall of the meanest, poorest, and most illiterate artisan into sin: and this will be denied by none who know, that 'tis more dangerous to displease God, than man.  
Thirdly, if the comparison be to be understood of the scandal of the Magistrate in a primary acception with a scandal of a brother in a primary acception too: then I should think, that the scandal of the Magistrate is the greater, and more to be eschewed, it is a greater sin culpably to occasion the fall of the Magistrate into sin, than the fall of a mere brother: because the falls of Magistrates are of a more pernicious example, giving greater countenance, and encouragement unto sin.  
But this will no ways advantage our Sticklers for Ceremonies: for the non-conformists deny, that their forbearance of Ceremonies did culpably occasion the fall of the Magistrate into sin: and the contrary they expect to have proved and not barely dictated.  
One thing let me observe on the buy, before I pass on: and 'tis: that, if those who make this comparison of the scandal of a Magistrate with the scandal of a brother, take scandal on both sides in the primary acception thereof: then they seem to intimate, that there may be a case wherein a man may be necessitated culpably to occasion the fall, either of a Magistrate, or of a brother into sin: Of a Magistrate if he forbear what he commands, of a brother if he practise it: But this is not casus dabilis, for God by his providence, can never necessitate a man unto sin: of this Rutherford speaks very solidly in his refutation of the Dupliers pag. 41, 42. You shall (saith he unto them) be forced to give a case, wherein we are necessitated by God's providence, and that by way of contradiction, whether we forbear, or forbear not to murder either the souls of some weak ones, or the souls of superiors, by our forbearance of the practice of things judged expedient by superiors: You make us to murder the souls of Superiors, by the non-forbearance, or you will have us to murder the souls of weak brethren, if we practise. This is a wronging of providence, and a Manichean tenant, that we can be under such a necessity of sinning. Yea, there must be two contrary revealed Wills in God, Commanding, by forbearing the Ceremonies, not to murder Superiors, and commanding by not forbearing, not to murder weak brethren: and so God commandeth both to forbear and also not to forbear. Mr Tombs [in his treatise of scandalising p. 266, 267, 268.] quarrels with Ames, for affirming, that there can be no such perplexity, that it should be necessary for a Godly man, whether he do this or that, or not do it, to scandalise some one: But Dr Ames is to be understood of a scandal in the primary sense, a culpable occasioning the fall of another into sin: and the objections of Mr Tombs proceed only concerning scandal in a secundary acception thereof, as will be apparent unto any one, that will be pleased to peruse them.  
There be two things more I shall take notice of in my forementioned discourse.  
First, I suppose all along that the Convocation was our Mother, and the Church of England: but surely she was a step mother unto divers of the Godly, using towards them fare more rigour, then unto such whom profaneness rendered obnoxious unto their Courts: if any indifferent man look upon their Canons he must needs confess, that one of their chief designs was to crush, and persecute such religious persons, whom they nicknamed Puritans, to destroy with their Ceremonies such among them for whom Christ died. But I wonder upon what account, I, or any man else, could think it to be the Church of England. If in any sense it can be called the Church of England, it was because it represented the Ministry of England, and that it did not; because the fare major part of it were Cathedral men, Bishops, Deans. Arch-Deacons, and such as were chosen by the respective Chapters of each Cathedral: it might then be a representation of the Cathedral Ministers, but not of the ministry of England: and that I shall make good by two parallels.  
The first shall be, betwixt our Convocations, and the Council of Trent: many sober, and moderate Papists accused this to be a packed assembly, a representation, of, not the Catholic Church, but the Court of Rome; because the greatest part of it were of the Pope's faction, and depended wholly upon him: So the Major part of our Convocations were of the Bishop's faction, and minded chief the interests of Cathedrals: and therefore were not a representative of all the Ministers in England. I shall exemplify this by instancing in the Diocese of , and Wells, wherein I lived: In this there were members of the lower house of Convocation, one Deane, three Archdeacon's, and one chosen by the Chapter of Wells: and to balance these there were but two Clerks chosen by the Ministry of the whole Diocese: Now what impartial man, but will determine that these seven could be no due representation of the Ministers of the Diocese of  and Wells, as long as five of them were members of the Cathedral, in whose election the Ministers of the Diocese had no hand at all.  
A second parallel shall be betwixt our convocation, and a civil assembly: wherein we will suppose, that the Prince chooseth three hundred, who are his Courtiers, or else such as have their dependence, either wholly, or in great part upon him: and the nation choose only a hundred: you may call this assembly a Parliament, or what you will; but surely no rational man can think it to be a representation of the nation: and as irrational were it to call the Convocation a representation of the Ministers, of England, seeing those chosen by the Ministers were an inconsiderable part of the Convocation.  
And unto this we may add; that there was seldom a due, and regular choice made of the Clerks of the Convocation: I was present at the last election, that was at Wells: and then Bishop P●irce told us, that it was an unquestionable privilege due unto his See for him to propound unto us the Clerks that we should choose, unto which he expected our conformity, tacitly menacing all that dissented.  
And when yet, by all this violence, he was unlikely to carry it for such as he had nominated; why then, he had another shift, that was (I believe) never heard of before: he enabled the Pluralists, of whom either all, or most were his favourites, to voice it in several capacities: to give as many double voices, as they had dignities, and benefices: his Son gave at that time eight single voices, two as he was Archdeacon of Bath, two as he was Prebend of Cudworth, two as he was Parson of Bucklan-Mary, two as he was Vicar of Kingsbury: Now, to say that such an election was regular, and lawful is as ridiculous, and senseless, as if a man should say, that in the Choice of Knights of the Shire for Parliament; men may give as many double voices, as they have Farms and Live.  
A second thing I shall take notice of, in the now mentioned discourse, is my misinterpretation of the 1 Cor. 10.32. Upon which I thus descanted: as Paul exhorts to give none offence neither to Jew nor Gentile, so he adds in a further specialty nor to the Church of God: The Jews and Gentiles were but parts, the Church of God the whole, they but brethren, she the mother. Here was a gross mistake, in thinking, that the Jews and Gentiles here spoken of were members of the Church: whereas, by the Apostles distinction of them from the Church of God, it is plain, that they were not as yet converted unto the Christian faith, but were as yet enemies thereunto, and consequently strangers unto the Church: And thus having finished my examination of the two limitations that I gave in a former edition of this treatise. I shall go on to that which followeth.  
But suppose the action in which this appearance of evil is imagined to be as indifferent in it self, so also not annexed unto a necessary duty, and we also left to the use of our liberty, what then?  
Twothings are here especially to be considered: first, the quality of the action excepted at; secondly, the difference of times, and places.  
To begin with the first, the action (at which thy brother is scandalised, by his groundless imagination, that 'tis evil, or carrieth a real appearance of evil) is either of none, or great importance to thee.  
If it be of none importance, but weightless, as affording thee either none, or but small benefit: offend not thy brother by an unseasonable exercise of thy liberty. Know that as authority, so charity should also restrain it: consider that by this undue use of thy liberty thou sinnest against thy brother, and by sinning against him thou sinnest against Christ. 1 Cor. 8.12.  
But now if it be of some weight, and moment, as yielding thee some great profit, why thou must a while forbear it, until thy brother may be better informed, and to inform him that the action is lawful which offends him, thou must take care too, otherwise thou wilt prejudice the truth, through thy regardless silence, and also continue his weakness, and foment in him a negative superstition. Let every one of us, (saith the Apostle, Rom. 15.2.) please his neighbour for his good unto edification, And for a man to humour his neighbour in an erroneous and superstitious opinion, however it may please him, yet not for his good unto edification: Upon which ground I take it, that the Apostle Paul, as he refused maintenance at Corinth, to avoid appearance of a covetous intention, and mercenary affection in preaching; so also his just title, and unquestionable right thereunto he at large both professeth, and proveth.  
But now if thy brother refuse, and contemn information: Tunc desinit esse scandalum pusilli ex insirmitate, aut simplici ignorantiâ, et incipit esse scandalum Pharisaei ex purâ malitiâ, aut ignorantiâ affectatâ, & crassâ. The shelter of weakness is thereby taken from him, his judgement being now overshadowed not longer with a mere weakness arising out of simple ignorance, but with a proud, and wayward, if not envious and malicious perverseness, that is accompanied with a gross, wilful, & affected ignorance, He is no longer then to be accounted a weak one, but a proud and wilful one, and for his peevishness thou mayest choose, whether thou wilt forgo thy liberty. Calvin upon the 1 Cor. 8.13. tells us of some foolish interpreters, that leave unto Christians almost no use at all of things indifferent, upon pretext to avoid the offence of superstitious persons inepti sunt, inquit, qui nullum prope usum rerum indifferentium reliquum faciont Christianis, nè superstitiosos offendant, And he discovers the ground of their mistake to be; because they do not consider, that Paul here inveigheth against those, who unseasonably abuse their knowledge before such weak ones, whom they neglect to inform, or instruct concerning the matter, at which they are scandalised: therefore there will be no place for reprehension if such information preceded, In hoc hallucinantur inquit, quod non considerant Paulum hic invehi adversus eos, qui scientiâ suâ intempestiuè abutuntur coram infirmis, quos docere negligunt. Ergò reprehensioni amplius locus non erit, si praecedat doctrina. Mr Tombs [in his treatise of scandalising, pag. 233, 234.] quotes Peter Martyr, and Bucane for the same purpose, and this what they say is generally, ordinarily, or for the most part true; for if we are to forbear all our conveniences, and matters of expediency, when men are scandalised at them, after we have given them, or offered to give them full information; our Christian liberty in things indifferent would in these our times come to be just nothing: nay our servitude would be greater, and more unsupportable, than that of the Jews under the levitical Ceremonies.  
However yet information doth not always alter the nature of scandal; for the scandal of the weak may sometimes last, Postquam reddita est ratio facti, after a reason of the fact, whereat they are scandalised, is rendered to them. For, by reason of their extreme ignorance, and slowness of understanding, they may be utterly incapable of information, and instruction; or else some opinion, or practise, whereunto they have been long accustomed, may cast such a mist before their weak judgements, as that they may not be able presently to apprehend the reason that is given of the action, at which they stumble. And we should so fare pity the simplicity of such poor souls, as to abstain from that which scandalizeth them, if by such abstinence there accrue not to us any great loss, or inconvenience.  
This is observed by Cajetan upon Aquinas 2. 2 daes. q. 43. art. 7. Vbi dicitur, inquit, articulo 7 more. de scandalo pusillorum, si autem post redditam rationem hujusmodi scandalum duret, jam videtur ex malitiâ esse; adverto, quod author non assertivo verbo utitur, sed opinativo, dicendo, jam videtur ex malitiâ esse; potest siquidem contingere, quod pusilli non sint capaces rationis redditae, vel propter pristinam consuetudinem, quae facit apparere dissonum, quod veritati consonat, vel propter rationem apud eos magis apparentem, vel aliquod hujusmodi: & tunc quia malitia non facit scandalum, sed ignorantia vel infirmitas, quamvis reddita sit ratio, cessandum est ab hujusmodi spiritualibus non necessariis. Cajetan. in 2.2.0.43 etc. Whereas it is said in the 7th article, touching the scandal of the weak, if after a reason given, the scandal do still remain, it seemeth to be of malice; you must note the Author doth not use (verbo assertivo, sed opinativo) saying, it seemeth to be of malice. For it may fall out that the weak are not capable of the reason that is rendered, either by reasen of his former Custom, which maketh that to appear discordant with the truth, or for some reason which in his eyes is more apparent, or by reason of some such like cause, and then it is not out of malice that he is offended, but out of ignorance and infirmity.  
After Cajetan, Petrus de Lorica doth roundly and fully express the matter. Verum est (saith he) quoth Cajetanus advertit, scandalum pusillorum perseverare posse adhuc, postquam reddita est ratio facti, vel quia rationem non capiunt ob mentis tarditatem, vel ob consuetudinem diu firmatam: in quo casu docet Cajetanus omittendam esse actionem, ex quâ scandalum accipiunt; vel differendam, donec ad saniorem mentem venerint. Quòd solùm verum, si actio omitti potest sine jacturâ nostrae utilitatis. Si enim magna utilitas temporalis vel spiritualis interveniat, contemni potest scandalum pusillorum, postquam sufficienter admoniti sint. In the next place I will recite a limitation of Gregory de Valentia, that comes under this head, and is very remarkable.  
Having laid down a rule, that for avoiding the scandal of our neighbour, which springeth, either from his ignorance, or weakness, it behooveth us by the obligation of Charity, to do, or omit, that which may be done, or left undone without sin: he afterwards puts this exception. Est autem animadvertendum hanc regulam intelligi debere de omni eo, quod sine peccato fieri, aut omitti possit, non quom docunque, sed moralitèr, attentâ suavitate, quae est in jugo legum divinarum: id est, quod sine peccato fieri, aut omitti possit, sine maxima etiam aliqua, & penè intolerabili difficultate, spectata quoque in hac conditione personae &c, And indeed (me thinks) he speaks reasonably. For improbable seems it, that the sweet moderation, which is in the yoke of divine laws, should consist with so great a rigour, as in all matters whatsoever, not simply unlawful, to exact, not only a brotherly, but also a servile compliancy with every supposed weak one, whose weakness may be but pretended by those, that are willing to speak favourably of them. For the humouring and contenting of every supposed weakling in all matters at which he takes offence, I conceive not myself bound to endanger my life, to hazard my estate, and fortunes, or to incur any other great, or notable inconvenience: for that would truly be durus sermo, an hard saying: who were able to bear it?  
But now against this may be objected the resolution of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 8.13. if meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend: flesh is of great expediency for the nourishment of man's life, and yet Paul resolves upon a perpetual abstinence therefrom in case of scandal Consequent; and this example of Paul is obligatory unto all Christians.  
For answer, first, this flesh may be understood only of such as was sacrificed unto Idols; for words in scripture usually are to be restrained unto the subject matter spoken of, and the meat, and flesh, here spoken of in the Context, was such as had been offered unto an Idol.  
Secondly, Calvin resolveth that 'tis an Hyperbole: est, inquit, hyperbolica locutio, quia vix possibile est, ut quis à carnibus totâ vitâ abstineat, si remaneat in communi vitâ significat tamen se nunquam usurum potius suâ libertate, quam ut fit infirmis offendiculo. Nunquam enim licitus est usus, nisi moderatus ad charitatis regulam. This Hyperbole of Paul's you may Parallel with that of our Saviour, Matth. 5.39, 40, 41. whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the Law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, give with him twain.  
Thirdly, Paul is to be understood, only upon supposition that the Gospel should not be fully promulgated, and brethren should remain uninstructed concerning the nature of Christian Liberty; for usually 'tis in this case only, that to eat flesh involves in the guilt of an active scandal, makes a brother to offend: hence the Apostle exhorts the strong amongst the Romans to abstain from meats forbidden by the Law of Moses, for prevention of the scandal of the weak: but amongst the Galathians, and Colossians he dislikes such an abstinence, and dehorts from it: & the reason, of this his different carriage, was: because the weak amongst the Romans were not fully taught the doctrine of Christian liberty, & the Galathians & Colossians were Julian, mistaking the Apostles doctrine of scádall, thought to make use of it for the starving of the Christi●s, and therefore, in Antiochia, and in the region round about, he dedicated all the fountains to the Goddesses of the Gentiles, and caused all the victual, that was to be sold in market places, to be sprinkled with Ethnic, holy waters, thinking that some would be scandalised at the drinking of the water of such fountains, and at the eating of such victual, and that the Apostles doctrine obliged all to forbear any thing in the case of scandal: nevertheless Christians, without scruple of conscience, drank of the water, that was in the Wells, and eaten of the meat, which they bought in the market; being, since the full publication of the Gospel, fully persuaded, that to the clean all things are clean. Rutherford determines; that, since the plenary promulgation of the Gospel, we are not obliged to forbear the good Creatures of God, things good, fit, and useful for the life of man, or of physical use in the worship of God, though men be scandalised at such things, and the reason of their scandal be, because they have been abused unto Idolatry, and superstition: he instanceth in Churches, abused unto the saying of Mass, and unto the Idolatrous worship of Saints, and in bells that have been abused by Papists by being consecrated, baptised & used to chase away devils: & for this his determination you may gather out of him [p. 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, etc.] these two reasons.  
First, because abstinence from such things, (upon a religious account, for avoidance of scandal, because abused to Idolatry, and superstition,) would be, (after a full publication of the Gospel) a Judaizing, an external Conformity with the Jew, a betraying of our Christian liberty, a confirming & hardening the Jews in their Apostasy: it would make, as Paul says, Jesus Christ of no effect, it would make us debtors to Circumcision, & to all the Ceremonies of Moses, Ga. 5.3, 4.  
Secondly, the practice of such things, since we are fully possessed in that liberty, wherewith Christ hath made us free, is morally and Theologically necessary, for the asserting of our Christian liberty: to show, that every Creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused, 1 Tim. 4.4. That unto the pure all things are pure, Titus 1.15. that we dare not call that unclean which God hath cleansed, Act. 10.15.  
But there is one passage in this author concerning scandal, which I cannot in any ways approve of: it is pag. 58, 59 where he averreth, that things of mere civil use, that are necessary with a necessity of conveniency are to be forborn, if scandal follow, if they be not convenient in the highest degree. And that no man may think I misreport him, take his own words. There be some things of mere civil use, as Bells, gowns, Pulpits, preaching on Tuesday or Thursday. These be considered two ways. 1. As necessary with necessity of conveniency simply. 2. With necessity of conveniency secundum praevalentem gradum, as convenient in the highest degree of necessity, or that moral maximum quod sic. In the first degree, what scandalizeth, is to be rejected: in the last respect they oblige, and if any be scandalised thereat, it is taken and not given.  
But sure this doctrine if embraced will put and hold men's Consciences upon a perpetual rack: For it will be a matter of great difficulty especially for some men always to determine what in their indifferencies is convenient in the highest degree.  
Secondly, we must put a difference between times, and places: for however they be but circumstances of actions, and therefore extrinsecall to them, so that they cannot cause any such essential variation in them, as to make those actions materially good, or sinful, which are of themselves in their own nature indifferent: yet notwithstanding the public and ordinary abuse of an action at such a time, or in such a place, may make it then and there, in that place and for that time appear to be evil; although the same action at another time, and in the same place; or in another place, at the same time, may not be obnoxious to any such censure.  
First then, time may alter this imaginary appearance of evil in an action. Reservation of the brazen serpent, as for other ends and purposes, so for commemoration of that miraculous deliverance of the Israelites thereby, from the stings of fiery Serpents, was for a while free from all suspicion, either of Idolatry or superstition: but when once it became the general, ordinary, nay daily occasion, and object of Idolatry, of the grossest, and most palpable kind of Idolatry that can be, when incense was offered to it: then if the public Magistrate had not demolished it, he might justly have been thought to favour that Idolatry wherewith it was polluted. And therefore commendable was Hezekiah his zeal in breaking it in pieces, 2 King. 18.4.  
In the former Edition it was observed out of Morton that the same Hezekiah did not destroy the high places, which Solomon had built for Astoreth, the abomination of the Sidonians: and for Chemosh, the abomination of the Moabites; and for Milchom, the abomination of the Children of Ammon, and yet was never taxed for countenancing of Idolatry. For in his days the Idols there erected, were disregarded no man worshipping them, and therefore might safely be suffered to stand: but when afterwards they were generally and usually adored, than the good King Josiah justly demolished them: and indeed should he have permitted them then when the Idolatry wherewith they were defiled, was flagrant at the height, he might justly be suspected to be a favourer of that Idolatry.  
But unto this observation of morton's, Ames thus replieth. He propoundeth, as very observable, that Hezekiah did not abolish the Idols, which Solomon suffered to be set up, because they were neglected. But. 1. it may well be thought that those idols were destroyed by Hezekiah, and set up again before the time of Josiah, as many other superstitions were. 2. It cannot be doubted but they should have been destroyed, even though they were for the time neglected: because either Hezekiah had as good cause to destroy them as Josiah; or else he might have prevented that cause which Josiah had: and to prevent evil, we are as well bound, as to correct it.  
Unto this Reply of Ames, Dr Burges rejoineth, whose Rejoinder and Aims his Triplication I shall rather transcribe than Epitomise.  
Dr Burges his Rejoinder unto the first part of the Reply.  
Say you so? then belike it may be well thought that the holy Ghost knew not so well as you what was done, for the text saith, that Josiah destroyed those high places, which Solomon King of Israel had set up: and then describes by the very place, where, and by name those same Idols, which Solomon had set up for his outlandish wives, 1 King. 11.5, 7. I hope you will repent this rashness, I am sure you should.   

Ames His Triplication.  
Because the Defender did make this one ground of denying our consequence from Hezekiahs' zeal against the monuments of Idolatry, that he did not abolish the Idols which Solomon suffered to be set up in favour of his strange Wives: because they were (at that time) neglected Idols. It was replied, that it may be well thought, they were destroyed by Hezekiah, and set up again before the time of Josiah. This the Rejoinder calleth rashness to be repent of: because it is said (2. Reg. 23.13.) that Josiah destroyed those high places, which Solomon had set up. And was it such a rashness, to say that it may be thought so? the phrase is more modest than theirs, who peremptorily affirm those Idols to have been neglected, until after Hezekias' time: when the Scripture testifieth plainly, that Ahaz Hezekias his father worshipped Molech (which was one of those Idols) by making his son to pass thorough the fire: and was so madly given to superstition, that he sacrificed under every green tree. 2. Reg. 16. Nay less was said, than some learned have with great probability affirmed: 
(z) Existimamus etiam, vivo Salomone, omnem illam daemonum officinam disruptam fuisse, dilaceratam, atque disperditam. Videnturque referendae illae statuae, & luci, & ●rae & reliqua Idolatriae monumenta (2. Reg. 23.13.) ad Manassem, & Ammonem (qui excitaverant illa in eodem loco & su● pra eadem fundanenta) non ad Salomonem, ante annos 250. extinctum. Incredibile dictu est, tantum scandalum ab Asa, Josaphato, Joiada, cum late idolatriam disperderent, in oeulis ipsis positum, non vidisse, aut non auso● attingere, & ad annum 3406. Mirum profectò si Idola illa post tercentoes 50. annos subsisterent, quae Salomon ipse poenitens, & caeteri reges boni sustuliffent. Utique dicendum videtur, ab impiis regibus extructa fuisse ejusdem generis fana, & Idola, quae olim Salomon in iisdem locis extruxerat: ut illud quae aedificaverat Solomon, sit idem ac si dixisser, qualia aedificaverat.  Namely, that those Idols with their appurtenances were first defaced by Solomon himself, after his repentance; and being restored after by Idolaters, were again defaced. Salianus (in his Annals add an. 3309.) saith thus: we thinks also that while Solomon lived, that while shop of Devils was broken up and ruined. And withal the statues, the groves, and altars, as also the rest of Idolatrous monuments. 2. King. 23.13. to have reference to Manasses, and Ammon (who had set them up in the same place, and upon the same foundation) and not to Solomon, who died 250 years Before. It is incredible to speak, that when Asa, Josaphat, and Jehoiada did fare and near destroy idolatery, they notwithstanding suffered a scandal so apparent. And to the year 3406. It were very strange if those idols after 350 years should yet remain, the which Solomon after his repentance, and other good Kings had abolished. So that it is probable that such like temples, and Idols were repaired, and built up again by other succeeding ungodly Kings, which Solomon in former time had made: that that which Solomon builded should be all one with such like as he had builded.  
Where he showeth by divers instances, both out of scripture, and out of common speech, how that word which, doth not always note the same singular substance; therein confuting all the ground that the Rej. had for censuring the Repl. of rashness to be repent of. This sentence is the more also to be favoured; because according to the other, which our Def. and Rej. maintain, it will be very hard to answer that objection against Solomon's repentance, which 
(a) Solomon de admiffo Idolatriae scelere, nunquam per. fectè paenituit. Nam si fractus paenitentiae dignos faceret, satageret ante omnia, ut idola quae aedificave●at, ●ollerentur, & none in scan●alum stultotum, quae ipse ●um fuisset sa●ientissimus, ●tronea fecerat ●uasi sapientè ●c rectè facta ●elinqueret.  Rabanus on 2 Reg. 23. groundeth on that supposition: Solomon never truly repent of his Idolatry: for if he had manifested fruits worthy repentance, he would have taken order with those Idols, which he had set up by removing them, and (being so wise a man) never have left them to stand for stumbling blocks to fools, as if what he had erroneously devised, had been well and wisely done. Beside all this, it is not credible, that the same individual Temples stood by Jerusalem from Solomon's time to Josias; if it were but for this, that the Assyrians came even to the gates of Jerusalem, spoiling and breaking down all costly buildings, (Such as Solomon's Temples were) not sparing, but deriding the Gods of nations. 2. Reg. 8.  
Unto the second branch of the Reply Dr. Burges thus rejoineth   

Burges his Rejoinder,  
This proves not that they were, nor is it likely that God himself would have vouchsafed such thorough praises to Hezekiah, as he doth, 1. Kings. 18.5. If Hezekiah had been bound to destroy those neglected Idols, as well as others then taken in the manner, and did not say, why he was bound to do that which he did not.  
Because either Hezekiah had as good cause to destroy them as Josiah; or else he might have prevented that cause which Josiah had; and to prevent evil, we are as well bound, as to correct it.  
If Hezekiah had as good cause to destroy those high places, which stood neglected, (and had done perhaps about three hundred years, even since the death of Solomon's wives, whose Chapels they were) as Josiah had, when Manasses, or Ammon had, after Hezekiah his time, revived that Idolatry; the holy Ghost would have taxed Hezekiah for not doing that, for doing whereof he commendeth Josiah; or at least, not have left his integrity crowned with like praises, as he doth, 2 Kings, 18.5. nor was Hezekiah bound to prevent the cause which Josiah had, unless he had suspected it. For though we are bound to prevent evil which we foresee, so fare as we well can, yet are we not bound to foresee all that may happen. Neither are the same means always requisite for prevention, which must be used for recovery. If you think otherwise, burn all your popish books, lest they fall into the hands of popelings, and do mischief; for you are bound to prevent evil, as well as to correct it.   

Ames his Triplication.  
It was added by the Repl. that those Idols should have been destroyed, (though they had been for the time neglected) because that evil for which Josiah destroyed them, aught as well to have been prevented as corrected. To this the rejoinder answereth, that this is not true, except Hezekiah had suspected that evil. And who will say, that there is no cause to suspect evil of an Idol, though it be for a time neglected? or can any man think, that if the Israelites had neglected them, no Sydonian, Moabite, or Ammonite gave occasion of any evil to be suspected by those Idols? The Spanish and French Papists (to say nothing of English) when they in passing by the Cross in Cheapside, do reverence unto it, give they not cause to suspect some evil to cleave unto it? The same means (saith the Rejoinder) are not always requisite for prevention, which must be used for recovery. Yes truly, about Idols (if we judge out of the Scripture) the very same means. Burn then (saith the Rejoinder) all your Popish books, lest they fall into the hands of Popelings to abuse them. So will I certainly, if you can show me, that they must be burned, when Popelings have had them in their hands, and abused them, which here you grant concerning these Idols.  
Here is nothing of the Rejoinder left unexamined, but his quotation of the 2 Kings 18.5. and how impertinently that is alleged will appear by comparison of it with 1 King. 15.5. David did that, which was right in the eyes of the Lord, and turned not aside from any thing, that be commanded him all the days of his life, save only in the matter of Vriah the Hittite. For from this commendation of David we may as well conclude, that his numbering of the people, and his purpose and attempt to revenge himself of Nabal by destroying him and all his, were lawful; as we may infer from the praises of Hezekiah, that his omission in not demolishing solomon's outlandish Idols, must be unlawful: See Rutherford pag. 90.  
Secondly, we must distinguish of places. That which in some places carries a show of evil, elsewhere perhaps is not suspected thereof. According to places therefore, in indifferent matters we may vary our practice. It was the advice of Ambrose unto Austin, and Monica, respected by Austin, as if it had been the answer of an heavenly oracle; 
(b) Ad quamcunque Ecclesiam veneritis, inquit, ejus monen servate, si pati scandalum non vultis, aut facere. Aug. Ep. 86.  unto whatsoever Church ye shall come, observe the manner or custom thereof, if ye will neither give nor take scandal. Which advice if restrained unto things indifferent is very good: and besides we have Paul's precept, and precedent for it: his precept, 1 Cor. c. 10. v. 32. Give none offence, neither to Jew, nor Gentile, which could not be done, but by complying with them in indifferencies. His precedent also answereth his precept; To the Jews he became a Jew, to them that were under the Law, as under the Law; to them that were without the law, as without the Law; to the weak, as weak, 1 Cor. 9.20, 21, 22. Amongst the Jews he shaved his head, made a vow, Acts 18.18. and 
(c) Circumcision was then indifferent, but after the full promulgation of the Gospel it became to be not only mortua but mortifera not only dead but deadly, as being an interpretative deny all of Christ's coming in the flesh  circumcised Timothy,., Acts 16.3. and yet amongst the Gentiles, where these actions bore an appearance of Judaisme, he withstood Peter for them even to his face, Gal. 2.11. There be three other instances in the former edition, which because they are questionable I shall wholly wave, and pass on unto the examination of my vain triumph over the non-conformists, wherein, as the Proverb is, I reckoned without mine host.   

Former Edition.  
After these limitations of the duty of abstinence from all appearance of evil; I cannot but wonder at our irregulars misapplication of it. They hence eagerly cry down the laudable discipline, and lawful Ceremonies of our Church. What fearful outcries do they make concerning their appearance of Idolatry, superstition, will-worship and Popery? Terms you see by the exceptions put to this precept, 
Hooker.  as much too big for our innocent, and harmless Ceremonies, as Hercules' shoe, for a child's foot. Indeed our Ceremonies, for example, the Surplice, Cross in Baptism, kneeling at the Lords Supper, may have a material semblance with those that in Popery have been abused to Idolatry, and superstition, and so consequently taken materially, in respect of their materials, may have an outward show of Popish Idol. try, or superstition; but consider them as imposed by our Church, and generally used by her members, so they are formally differ need from those which Papists have applied to Idolatrous ends and purposes. For our Church publicly professeth a quite contrary use or application, end, or intention of them. And external actions have their specification, and consequently distinction from their end, and intention, from it they take their species, or kind, and accordingly are distinguished. Now since all Popish, whether superstitious, or idolatrous abuses of our Ceremonies, are publicly disclaimed, and their right use explained; who can justly imagine any show of Popery in them? An Israelite was not to be smitten for an Egyptian, because for a while he once sojourned in Egypt, if afterward he had his constant abode in Canaan. The garment spotted with the flesh was no longer to be hated, than spotted: being once washed, it might again be used. Our Ceremonies were defiled in Egypt, in Popery, with superstition, and Idolatry; but our Church (God be praised) hath washed them from both in her public, and professed use of them. And therefore now they stand above either calumny or suspicion.   

Examination.  
First, our non-conformists will tell us, that there was betwixt our Ceremonies, and those of the Papists, even a formal conformity, inadequate, and in part, though not total and adequate. For though our Prelates disavowed many, nay most of those superstitious and idolatrous ends, unto which the Papists applied our Ceremonies, yet they still professed one end and intention of the Papists in the use of them, to wit, mystical signification; and this to be a Popish and superstitious end, the non-conformists prove at large in their books.  
Secondly, a material conformity in Ceremonies, carrieth many times a real appearance of evil, and scandalizeth actively. It doth not appear that the Altar which Vriah erected, was formally the same with that Ahaz saw at Damascus, that it had the same use and intention, the worship of a false God. The text mentioneth only a material conformity unto it, and for this reason 'tis condemned, 2 King. 16.10, 11. Peter's conformity with the Jews Gal. 2. was only material, not formal, for a Jewish end and purpose, and yet 'tis blamed by Paul as guilty of an active scandal, vers. 11, 12, 13, 14. Suppose a timorous Protestant in Spain or Italy go to Mass, and there bow before their breaden God, not out of any intent to honour the Idol, but only for preservation of his life; his presence and bowing will only be materially the same with that of Papists; but will any man think that this can acquit him from the sin of Idolatry? Indeed Aelian var. Histor. lib. 1: cap. 21. excuseth Ismenias a Th●bane from adoring the King of Persia, because though he stooped down before him, yet it was not to worship him, but to take up a ring that he had for the nonce let fall at his feet: but no rational man will admit of this his apology, because this stooping in common use was the adoration of the King, and interpreted to be such by the King himself, and by the spectators.  
Some think that though a different end and intention from Pagans, jews, and Heretics in the use of their Ceremonies, cannot legitimate them and free them from scandal; yet that profession of such a different end and intention, is sufficient for such a purpose. But  
First, the primative Church was of a different opinion. 
(d) Aims dispute about humane Ceremonies pag. 127.  The story of Origen is well known, how he delivered Palm to those that offered it to the image of Serapis, with this expression of his intention: come and receive the boughs, not of the image, but of Christ. Yet was he therefore censured as a worshipper of that Idol.  
Secondly, if this were true, than we might lawfully use circumcision and the , so we disclaim the Jewish end of them, to signify Christ to come; and profess that our intention, was by them only to signify, that Christ was already come in the flesh.  
Thirdly, a material conformity with Papists in their Ceremonies, hath nourished in them a hope of our coming up to them, but not inclined them in any degree unto us: for they have still protested that they would not step so much as one foot to meet with us: and if my memory fail me not, there is some such thing in Franciscus Sancta Clara.  
Indeed experience hath always showed, how uneffectuall a means such a compliance hath been for the conversion of Papists. Whom of them hath it ever won over unto the Protestant party, but Spalleto, and others of the like temper, who (as Mr Fuller speaks of some Italians that pretended unto true conversion) were neither good dough, nor good bread, but like Ephraim a Cake not turned?  
There was a greater material conformity with Popish Ceremonies in Cathedrals, then in other Churches; but how thin a harvest of converts can they produce? Nay 'tis observed by some, that near them, Popery thrived more than in other places. I heard a Knight of the royal party once affirm, in the presence of many persons of worth, that he thought there were more Papists in Wells then in all the County of Somerset besides: and yet of late years that Cathedral outstripped most in England for ceremoniousness. In the times immediately preceding the late troubles, not only the former Ceremonies of the Common-prayer book were urged with more violence than before, but divers others quite antiquated were revived. But though Popish Ceremonies were increased, we do not find that the number of Papists was hereby any thing diminished. I shall conclude this with that of Didoclave pag. 540, 541. Formalistae se retinere quosdam ritus Pontificiorum, ut eos lucrifacere possent, & reducere in rectam viam. Deus in dirigendis suis prudentissimus aliam praescripsit rationem, longè diversam, ut nempe ab omni gentium superstitione & idolatria essent, quantum fieri posset, remotissimi. Name species conformitatis, aut reservatae reliquiae superstitionis & idolatriae illaqueant pios, & confirmant idolatras in suâ superstitione & idelatria. Gloriarentur Judaei, ut suprà dixit Constantinus, si viderint religionem nostram non p●sse subsistere absque illarum ritibus. Et Hieronymus ait, Judaicas Ceremonias in Ecclesiâ Christianâ retentas non efficere Judaeos Christianos, said Christianos Judaeos. Augustinus secundum regulam illam à legislatore prudentissimo datam populo su● sic consulit. Si quaeritis, unde vincantur Pagani, undè illuminentur, unde ad salutem vocentur. Deserite omnes solemnitates ipsorum. Deserite nugas eorum. Etsi non consentiant veritati nostrae, saltem pudeat paucitatis suae.  
But I pass on to the second thing I proposed, the confirmation of the point, where my proofs shall be applied some to real, some to imaginary appearances of evil.  
First, See it backed by consonant places of Scripture. Solomon adviseth his young man to walk cautè, as well as castè, not to come nigh the door of the strange woman's house, Prov. 5.8. This had not evilness real, but only the appearance of evil, as being in a corrupt mind an incentive to uncleanness, and in beholders an occasion of jealousies and suspicions. Now from Solomon's interdicting this appearance of evil in special, we may be way of Analogy and proportion infarre a fitness of forbearing all in general. Unto this is anagogically applied the Nazarites precise abstinence from wine, Num. 6.3, 4. The Nazarite, as you may see there, was to abstain from wine, from vinegar of wine, from any liquor of grapes, from the materials of wine, grapes, from moist grapes, from dried grapes, from all that is made of the vine tree, from not only the kernel, but even the husk of the grape. The Jews have added, they were not to come nigh a vineyard. With a semblable strictness are we to separate from sin, from all sin, not only from the kernel of sin, from a sin really so, but also from the husk, the appearance of sin.  
The Children of Israel were charged not to do like the Heathen that were round about them, 2 King. 17.15. where they are interdicted not only sameness with, but also likeness unto their fashions: they were forbidden the fashion of rounding their heads, and cutting their flesh, of marring the corners of their beards, of making any baldness upon their heads, or between their eyes, Leu. 19.28. and chap. 21. ver. 25. Deut. 14.1. Not because so to do was simply in ' its own nature a sin, but for that it gave show of a sin, of inordinate sorrow for the departed; of which 'twas than an expression much in use amongst the heathen. Hugo Cardinalis upon the text allegeth Hosea 2.16. Thou shalt call me Ishi, and shalt call me no more Baali.  
The Gentiles gave the title of Baal, so also of Baalim unto their great and common Idol-God, supposed to be the Sun, and to all the several images, and representations thereof. And therefore God prohibited application of that title unto himself, in worship and invocation: Thou shalt no more call me, o my Baal● for though there be no harm in the word (it signifying in Common use husband, as well as Ishi) yet by reason of the ordinary application thereof unto Idols, there would have been in invocation of God by that name, a gross and palpable appearance of Idolatry. 
(e) Dico Sacerdotibus Judaeorum fuisse prohibitam rasuram Ezek. 44. non quod in se mala sit, sed nè viderentur similes Sacerdotibus Gentilium, in quorum vicinia habitabant, qui toto capite raso idolis sacrificabant. Ut ex Epist. Hieremiaes apparet. Quod ex se non es●et malum patet, quia Ezechiel, qui Sacerdos erat, jubetur a Deo radi. Ezech. 5. & praeterca Numb. 6. Nazaraeus completo tempore consecrationis suae, jubetur radi. Unde Paulo dicit Jacobus Actor. 21. sunt nobis viri quatuor habentes votum super se, his ergo assumptis sanctificato te cum illis, & radant capita sua. Solum ergo propter viciniam Idolatrarum prohibeba●tur Sacerdotes Judaeorum radi quae fortè causa erat, cur Optati, Hieronymi, & Ambrosii, tempore Christ●an● facerdotes non raderentur, sed ●onderentur. Nam ad huc ip●orum tempore erant Sacerdotes Isidis qui caput radebant. Ut Ambrose Epist. 36. & Hieronymus in c. 44. Ezechielis testantur. Bellar: de Monachis lib. 2. cap. 40.  In Ezekiel 44.20. the Priests of the Jews were prohibited the shaving of their heads, not because it was a thing evil in itself, but only that they might not seem to be like unto the Priests of the bordering Gentiles, who were usually shaved, as appeareth by Baruch cap. 6. v. 31. But because it may be excepted, that most of these rigid, and severe prohibitions, were given unto the Jews under their pedagogy of ceremonies, and time of bondage, and therefore farther than in a moral admonition lay no restraint upon us Christians. See therefore all this seconded in the New Testament by 
(f) Locus hic, qui obscurus alioqui videtur, nihil habebit difficultatis, metaphorâ berè explicatâ; vult fideles, non tantùm cavere à vitiorum contactu, sed nè qua ad eos contagio pertingat: quicquid affine est ac vicinum fugiendum esse admonet, quemadmodum si de pudicitia sermo habetur, dicemus tollenda esse omnia libidinum irritamenta, id etiamnum clarius fiet, si amplietur oratio, nempe ut oderimus non carnem modo, sed tunicam, quae ejus contactu infecta fit. Name particula●● ad ampliationem valet, ergo adeo non permittit indulgentia fovere, uti omnes praeparationes, omnia que accessiora (utvocant) potius resecari jubeat, Calvin: in locum.  St Judas ver. 23. Where in reference to that legal pollution, which came by touching the garment of one that was Levitically unclean, he exhorts Christians to hate the garment spotted by the flesh, that is, saith Gualther, quicquid ingenium carni● sapit, whatsoever hath but a smack or relish of the flesh, all preparations and acc ssaries of evil, any thing that is necre of kin unto, or but bordering upon vice, thinks Calvin.  
Observe here the emphatical gradation of the Apostle, hate not only the flesh, but the garment spotted by the flesh, not only the garment overspread, quite covered, but the garment that was but here and there a little spotted by the flesh. Out of Christ's garment there issued virtue, which cured the woman that had the bloody flux; but contrary wise out of this garment, but spotted with the flesh, exit vis quaedam maligna, there goeth a poisonous kind of infection, which soon will stain a soul with the leprosy of sin.  
Unto this place of Judas I shall add another out of the Apostle Paul, Heb. 4.1. Let us therefore fear, lest a promise being left us, of entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it. Hence Dickson collects, that we must not only fear, by misbelieving to come short; but to seem, or give any appearance of coming short. Pareus also hath the like note upon the place, verbo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, videatur, sollicitudine tanta hic opus esse innuit, ut non modo quae revera nos frustrent, sedetiam quae videatur frustratura provide caveamus.  
But because (as the old saying runs) praxis sanctorum est interpres praeceptorum, I shall entreat you next to take notice, how this precept hath been exemplified, The Church. 
(g) Those words Cant. 1.7. as one that turneth aside, may be rendered, as one that is recovered or veiled. This sense the Greek version giveth, according to the usual signification of the Hebrew word: and this covering either is asigne of sorrow and shame● as mourners used to cover their faces, Ezek. 24.17. or of lightness and dishonesty, as Thamar was thought to be an harlot because she had covered her face Gen. 38.14, 15. So here the spouse desireth to know where Christ feedeth, lest she should wander about and seek him with sorrow, and be by others reputed an harlot, for she would eschew all appearance of evil. Ainsworth in locum.  Cant. 1.7. professeth against, even all show of communion with false Churches that pretend unto fellowship with Christ, Why should I be as one that turneth aside by the flocks of thy companions?  
But to come unto particular examples, and here in the times before Christ, is very remarkable the courageous and undaunted resolution of Eleazar, against but the appearance of an evil. 2 Mac. c. 6. v. 18. usque ad finem: When he was besought to bring flesh of his own provision, such as was lawful for him to use, and but make as if he did eat of the flesh, taken from the sacrifice commanded by the King. v. 21. Why? even this evil appearance, this seeming, this making as if he did eat of the flesh taken from the sacrifice commanded by the King, so deeply disrelished him, as that he chose death before it. For it becometh not our age (saith he) in any wise to dissemble, whereby many young persons might think that Eleazar being fourscore years old and ten, was now gone to a strange religion, & so they through mine hypocrisy, and desire to live a little time, and a moment longer, should be deceived by me, and I get a stain to my old age, and make it abominable. v. 24 25. But why mention I Eleazar? behold the example of one greater than Eleazar, the example of the rule and pattern of holiness unto the Church, Christ jesus God blessed for ever! whose example, in Morals and matters of ordinary obedience, amounts ever unto the authority of a command. How exemplary he was in this particular you may read Matth. c. 17. from v. 24, unto the end of the Chapter. There you have him performing an action, not for that omission of it would have been evil, but because in opinion of the Jews, it would have given show of evil. For if first, you understand the words, as most Interpreters do, of the tribute to be paid unto the secular Magistrate, then sinful it had not been in our Saviour to have refused payment of tribute unto Caesar. For how could the Son to the living God (who was King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, King of heaven, and earth, whose the earth and all the fullness thereof was,) be justly tributary unto any mortal? The Kings of the earth take tribute, or custom, not of their own children, (however they expect obedience from them) but of strangers; because paying of tribute denoteth some degree, or kind of Servitude. The children than are free, vers. 25, 26. Therefore from all taxes and impositions, justly was to be exempted Christ, the Son of David; there was no reason he should pay tribute unto Caesar: nay more reason (he being of the blood royal) should receive tribute from the Jews, than Caesar, a foreigner, having no title to the Crown, but that which the sword gave him. Not payment, constant denial of payment, had not been (you see) morally evil in our Saviour; and yet because it would have borne appearance of an evil, of disloyalty, and disobedience, and so have drawn prejudices against, and scandal upon his unspotted person, holy and heavenly office, and doctrine: because seemingly it would have crossed a doctrine he afterwards delivered, Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's: therefore he stands not to plead his privilege, but voluntarily parted with his right, paid the tribute, and to pay it wrought a miracle: notwithstanding, Peter, lest we should offend them, go thou to the sea, and cast an hook, and take up the fish that first cometh up, and when thou hast opened his mouth, thou shalt find a piece of money, that take, and give unto them for me and thee, vers. 27.  
Or if secondly, with the learned Cameron, you rather conceive to be here meant the half shekel, which by prescript of the Ceremonial Law, Exod. 30. was by the Jews to be paid for the use of the Sanctuary. Why yet so also sinful it had not been in our Saviour to have refused paying of it: for first, it was a Ceremony, and the Ceremonial Law Christ was above, Lord he was of the Sabbath, Matth. c. 12. ver. 8. Mar. c. 2. v. 28. where it is manifest (thinks Cameron) the Sabbath should synecdochically signify the whole Ceremonial Law. Then secondly, this Ceremony, together with Sacrifices and all other Legal, typical Ceremonies, presupposed sin in the party, to whom they were commanded, and were a note, or badge contracted by sin; and therefore reach not unto Christ, a man without sin. Thirdly, as our Saviour well argues, even as Kings of the earth take not tribute of their own Children, so neither the King of Heaven of his Son, therefore seeing this half shekel is a tribute to be paid to the King of Heaven, for the Tabernacle of witness. 2 Chro 24.6. Christ was certainly free, and so might lawfully have refused to pay it: Yet because the jews would have taken offence, and umbrages at such his refusal, and charged it with appearance of a profane contempt of the Law of Moses, and the Sanctuary, therefore he voluntarily paid it, and so became a Jew to the Jews, as under the Law to them that were under the Law. Notwithstanding lest we should offend, etc. And if this be the sense of the place, what is said of this one Ceremony, may be applied unto all; for one of the reasons, and ends, why Christ observed the whole Ceremonial Law was, to prevent scandal, to abstain from all appearance of evil. In nature (saith Cameron) there is, appetitus quidem unionit, which causeth things to be moved, and to rest often, besides the proper condition of their particular nature, whence sometimes light things are moved downwards, heavy things upwards. Unto this appetite of union in nature, there is answerable in grace, the desire to promote God's glory, which often inclineth and carrieth the Godly beyond and besides the ordinary obligations, arising out of their particular and personal condition; and relations And unto the measure of grace is proportionable the degree of the desire of God's glory, so that the holier any one is, the more vehemently he desireth the promotion thereof: and if it require any thing to be done of him, why he will do it, although otherwise by virtue of his particular, and personal condition, he be not bound thereunto. Therefore although Christ, secundum specialem rationem personae suae, if we eye the special consideration, and dignity of his person, was not tied to keep the Ceremonial Law, yet he kept it, in as much as the Glory of God required him so to do. If you demand how the glory of God exacted this at Christ's hands, why Christ himself tells us, Nè simus illis scandalo, lest we should offend them; for if Christ had not observed the Ceremonial law, he had doubtless wonderfully estranged the Jews from him.  
In observing it then he did but as Kings often do in stooping to many things, unto which they are no ways obliged, for to win the hearts and affections of their humorous subjects. This example of our Saviour, was followed by the Apostles, and elders in the first gen●rall Council at Jerusalem, where they imposed upon the Gentiles abstinence from meat offered to Idols, from things strangled, and from blood, Acts 15.29. Not for that these meats were in themselves unclean, and abominable, but because they appeared to be so to the froward and peevish Jews, who were kept off from Christ, because these meats, in which they supposed to be such abomination and uncleanness, were usually eaten by the Christians. But this was but a temporary injunction they gave to others. Let us view their own practice. Maintenance for preaching was due unto Paul, from both the Corinthians and Thessalonians, and yet he did forbear exacting it, 1 Cor. 9 1 Thes. 2. that so he might take away all colour for suspicion of any mercenary or greedy appetite after gain, to be in his preaching, and quite cut off all scandals thereby, which in that dawning of Christianity upon them, would have put a rub to the progress of the Gospel, and have made his ministry to be evil spoken off. And of St Paul, the Saints in succeeding ages were followers, as he of Christ. Those Lib●llatici, so often, and sharply censured by St Cyprian Epist. 15.31.52. lib. de lapsis. lib. de exhortatione Martyrum, 
* Scriptit etia● Secundus & ad scipsum mis●os à Curar●re & ordine Centutionem & Beneficiarium, qui peterent divinos codices exurendos, eisque respondis●e, Christianus sum & Episcopus, non traditor: Et cum ab eo vellent aliqua ecvola (per ecvola intelligit res ejectas, nempe quatum nullus est usus, ab, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quod est ejectio, seu expulsio) a●t quodcunque accipere, neque hoc eis dedisse, exemplo Eleaza●i Macchabaei, qui nec fingere voluit suillam car●nem se manducare, ne a●is praeberet praevaricationis exemplum. Vid. Aug. in Brevic. Collat. die. 3. cap. 13. Damasc. Hist. pag 578.  Though they did not sacrifice, or directly deny Christ, were yet by the Church put to their penance, for seeming to deny him, because they either by themselves, or others, at least accepted from the Magistrate bills, or scrolls testimonial of their abnegation. Secundus (as Parker relates out of Baronius) was commanded to deliver his bibles, he maketh answer, Christianus sum & non Traditor. Hereupon he is commanded to deliver aliqua Ecvola, that is certain stuff which was cast aside for that it had no use. Will he not deliver this to save his life? no not this. It was lawful, but it had a show of their sin whom the Church called Traditores for their delivering the holy books to be burnt by the officers of the Tyrant Dioclesian. 
(h) Baronius out of Soidas.  Auxentius being commanded by Licinius to set a branch of a Vine-tree loaden with Clusters at the feet of Bacchus his image, presently shaped him this round, and resolute answer, God forbidden, O Emperor, that I should do it, for I am a Christian. The matter was not great in itself, yet because it would have favoured Idolatry, or given manifest appearance of it, rather than do it, he chose banishment from the Court, and loss of the Emperor's service. As 
(i) Theodoret. l. 3. c. 15. Nicep. l. 11. c. 1. S. Zo. l. 6. c. 6.  Valentinia●, afterwards Emperor, went before Julian the Apostate into a Temple of the Goddess Fortune, one of the Priests besprinkled Julian with a kind of purging, or holy water, a drop of which by chance fell upon Valentinian, at which he was so extremely incensed, as that he stroke the Priest, tore, and rend in pieces that part of his garment on which it fell with a great disdain, and holy indignation; throwing it away from him, that so he might avoid the least tincture of their superstitious, and idolatrous religion. But above all, very remarkable is the zeal of the 
(k) Th●od. l. 4. c. 15 Niceph. l. 11. c. 21.  boys of Samosatene, who because a tennis-ball, with which they played, had but touched the foot of the ass whereon Lucius road, their Heretical Bishop, they presently cried out that it was defiled, (although indeed it was not capable of any moral pollution) and therefore to purge or expiate it, threw it into the fire in the midst of the Market place. This may be thought, but a Childish prank, and therefore not imitable, however yet it aptly serves to demonstrate that their education, framed them unto a hatred of whatsoever had any remote reference, unto either evil actions, or persons. St Ambrose forbade Monica the bringing of wine and cakes to the Celebrities of the Martyrs, nè ulla occasio se ingurgitandi daretur ebri●sis, & quia illa quasi parentalia superstitioni Gentilium essent simillima, as St Austin lib. 6. Confess. c. 2. lest occasion of excessive quaffing should be given to drunkards, and because those parentalia, funeral feasts, were very like to heathenist superstition, the offerings of the Pagans which were made at the Tombs of their parents, and to their ghosts. Bishop Morton assigns another reason, because this custom, had some resemblance of those superstitious, and idolatrous Colorydians, mentioned by Epiphanius, who offered cakes to the Virgin Mary, in imitation of that heathenish custom condemned by the prophet Jeremy chap. 7. ver. 18. of such as did offer cakes to the Moon, as unto the Queen of heaven. Now when Monica understood that Saint Ambrose had forbidden this, tam piè, atque obedientèr amplexa est, ut ipse mirarer, saith St Austin in that forecited place, quòd tam facilè accusatrix p●tius consuetudinis suae, quam disceptatrix illius prohibiti●nis effecta sit: she so piously, and obediently embraced this prohibition, as that I myself, saith Austin, wondered to see her so easily rather accuse her own custom, than dispute his command. When once the custom of thrice dipping or sprinkling in Baptism was used by Heretics, to signify a trinity not of persons, but natures in the Godhead, than Saint Gregory thought fitting that it should be left off, not because it was evil, but for that it might seem to counterance their damnable heresy: his words are these, De trina verò mersione baptismatis nihil responderi verius potest, quam quod ipsi sensitis, quod in una fide nihil officit sanctae Ecclesiae consuetudo diversa, etc. sed quia nunc hucusque ab haereticis infans in baptismate tertiò mergebatur, faciendum apud vos esse non censeo, ne dum mersiones numerant divinitatem dividant, dumque quod faciebant faciunt, se morem nostrum vicisse glorientur, lib. 1. Epist. 41. Gabriel Biel lectione 38. saith, that the Church of Rome thought it meet to use common leavened bread in the administration of the Eucharist, lest in using unleavened bread, they should be deemed to imitate Ebion the heretic. Nay Bellarmine in his recognition of his book de verbo D●i, admonisheth the Reader, that in the title of the third Chapter of the first book, Divi Pauli is put for Beati Pauli, for in making mention of the Saints, I never approved (saith he) the use of the word divus, or diva, and one of his reasons, is; because amongst the Heathens, 'twas usually ascribed to their false, or feigned Gods.  
To heap up other, either testimonies, or instances, were to prejudice, if not the authority of those before mentioned, yet your esteem of them, as if you were not by them sufficiently persuaded and convinced. My labour (I suppose) will be better spent in demonstrating unto you the expediency of that, which may seem rigour in this Doctrine, in discovering unto you what good reasons Saint Paul had to exact so great a measure, and so high a pitch of abstinence from sin. Those that I will specify shall be drawn from God, from Satan, from our selves, from our brethren, First, from God, we have these two, our relations unto him, our danger in offending of him.  
First, our Relations unto him, he is our Father, our Sovereign, Christ Jesus is our spiritual husband. Now a dutiful child declines not only disobedience, but whatsoever hath the colour of it; and obedient, and loyal subject startles at not only treason, but also whatsoever may occasion suspicion thereof: a faithful and chaste wife abhors not only adultery, but whatsoever may make her husband justly jealous, others but suspicious of her chastity. And shall not every child of God, every one that professeth subjection unto heaven, be fearful of the appearance of disobedience, and undutifulness to so indulgent a father as God, of the appearance of Treason and Rebellion against so Almighty a King as God? Doth it not befit the Spouse the Church, every member of Christ to dread all shows, and signs of disloyalty, and unfaithfulness to so loving a Spouse as Christ Jesus? Did Julius Caesar, but an earthly potentate, think it not enough that his wife was without a fault, unless withal she was without so much as the suspicion of a fault? And will not Christ (think you?) who is King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, expect as great unblameableness in his Spouse? 
(l) Plutarch.  Theophan●s Lesbiai to dissuade Pompey from flying into Parthia, tells him, that his wife would be liable to a great deal of danger amongst those barbarous people; and though (said he) they proffer no villainy unto her, yet it is an undecent thing to think that the wife of Pompey might have been dishonoured: To dissuade us from the appearances and occasions of sin it should, (me thinks) be an effectual argument, that our souls, which are married unto Christ in righteousness, judgement, and holiness, will hereby be obnoxious unto danger of pollution. What though they be not actually defiled? yet it is an undecent thing to think, that the Spouse a member of Christ might have been dishonoured, might have been foiled with a lust, ravished, vanquished by Satan, defiled with sin.  
If from these appearances of evil, our relations to God cannot draw us, yet (me thinks) in the second place, our danger in offending of him, should drive us: for he is a consuming fire unto, as the Works, so also the workers of impiety: and how can we then but be afraid to venture on not only that we know doth, but what we fear others suspect may, deserve the wrath of so sin revenging a God?  
That we should abstain from all appearances of evil, may, secondly, be gathered from Satan, from the consideration, First, of his cruelty and malice against us, Secondly, of his temptations of us.  
First, from the consideration of his cruelty and malice against us, which the Scripture shadoweth out by terming him, the enemy by way of excellency, the envious man, the accuser, the tempter, the destroyer, the devourer, a murderer from the beginning: as also by comparing him unto a roaring Lion, unto a great red Dragon, and an old Serpent.  
Now me thinks we should fear to come, not only under the power, but also into the sight of such an adversary: and yet by rushing upon the shows, the occasions of evil, what do we but hazard the surprisal of our souls by him?  
This will be more apparent from the consideration,  
2. Of Satan's temptations of us: of his temptations of us to sin, of his temptations of us to despair, or at least discomfort, for sin: because in both sorts of temptations he goes about by these appearances of evil, to wreak his malice upon us.  
For first, in his temptations of us to sin, they are, first, the bait by which he allures: Secondly, an argument by which he persuades us thereunto. Thirdly, an encouragement, whereby he is heartened to persist in tempting of us.  
First then, the appearances of sin, are a bait whereby Satan allures us unto sin, which if we by't at, our consciences will soon be enlarged to swallow sin itself. Satan well knowing that God's Children would even startle at your gross, and more hideous sins, such as are, Idolatry, Adultery, Drunkenness, and the like, therefore chief plyeth them with enticements to the signs, shows, and occasions of them; for these will smooth the passage unto the sins themselves. Of this we have a remarkable instance in Alipius, who (as St Austin relates Confess. lib. 6. cap. 8) being drawn by his friend's importunity to accompany him unto the Roman Gladiatory Games, yet resolveth though he were present with his body, to be absent in his heart, and for that purpose to keep his eyes shut, that he might not defile them with so barbarous a sight: yet at last upon a great shout, that the people gave at the fall of one of the Combatants, his curiosity made him behold the occasion, and thereupon he presently became an applausive spectator of that bloody and inhuman spectacle. An Italian, as Holerius writes, by his often smelling to the herb Basile, had a scorpion engendered in his head: even so we by our often dallying, and tampering with things that carry a show of unlawfulness, may have Satan, as I may so speak, even form in us, for as St Hierome saith upon Ecclesiastes the ninth, Diabolus serpens est lubricus, cujus si capiti, id est, primae suggestioni non resistitur, totus interna cordis, dum non sentitur, illabitur, that is, the Devil is a slippery serpent, and if we do not keep out his head, that is, his first suggestions, it is not to be doubted but that he will stealingly slide into the most secret corners of the heart: and so we actuated by him, shall at last proceed from things only appearing finfull, unto the practice of most horrid and ghastly crimes.  
Secondly, the appearance of evil is an argument by which he persuades us unto what is in its own nature evil, for if a man have but slipped into such actions as the best minded judge to have a real appearance of evil, Satan forthwith will suggest unto him, that he hath by this quite cracked his credit amongst those that are accounted religious: by them (will he say) thou art as much suspected, and as deeply censured for thy seeming evil, as for thy being so: wert thou not better therefore, be as thou seemest, for they cannot think worse of thee then they do, thy shame, and disgrace, their jealousies, suspicious, and censures cannot be greater for sin itself, than it is already for the show of it. Now this temptation of Satan, receives great advantage from our nature, for we naturally are addicted to society, and therefore if we find that upon the signs and shows of such and such sins in our practice, good men condemn us as guilty of the sins themselves, and therefore begin two reserve and estrange themselves from us, refusing any longer to reach out unto us the right hand of fellowship, why, then we will presently have fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, and couple in with lose, carnal and formal men, whose conversation will quickly infect us, so that it will not be long  we run with them to the same excess of riot.  
And thus you see how Satan takes occasion from the appearance of sin, to draw us on unto sin itself, which me thinks should be sufficient to dissuade us from them. For is Satan so backward in tempting, or is his invention grown so barren, as that our lives and practice must put arguments into his mouth? is the purchase of hell and damnation so difficult, as that we must needs furnish the Devil with baits to allure us, with reasons to persuade us unto our everlasting perdition, this were folly and madness that would want a name.  
But in the third place, the signs and appearances of sin are not only a bait, by which he enticeth us, an argument by which he persuades unto sin, but withal an encouragement, by which he is heart'ned to go on in tempting of us, for they make him gather heart, and hope that we are coming on to sin itself; and this hope will breed diligence, make him a more importunate solliciter, make him to double and strengthen his assaults, to ply us even thick and threefold with temptations: A dog will not run from a man as long as he throws bread unto him, and can any man suppose the Devil will fly, so long as he gives place unto him, as long as he throws himself upon temptations, by practising such things as have a manifest show of evil? for though in themselves they be never so small, yet will they serve to usher in farther and greater matters: being than preparatives unto sin, they cannot be (as some have imagined) good fences against sin: seeming to be evil is not, cannot be a means to shield us from being so, no more than the opening the Gates of a City can be the way to raise the siege of it, or letting go the sluices of a river can be the course to stop its current.  
You have seen arguments from Satan's temptations of us to sin● take next one from his temptations of us to despair, or at least discomfort for sin, a temptation of so hideous a nature, as that, me thinks, our actions should not lend it the least advantage. His First labour is by the appearance of sin to make us offend God, but when he cannot proceed so fare, his Second endeavour will be, to make us disquiet ourselves: when he cannot wound us by them, he will vex us for them; for he will wrest and misconstrue all that we have done unto the worst sense, he will swell motes into beams, molehills into mountains, appearances of evil into realities, and thunder unto us that there is not a pin to choose betwixt those and these; unto which our souls being distracted by the violent importunity of this temptation, will be over apt to give credence. And for a man to be thus tossed between Satan's powerful suggestions, and his own fears and suspicions cannot but even crush his spirits, and quite eclipse the peace and joy of his heart.  
Abstinence from all appearances of evil is, thirdly, needful in regard of ourselves, for by them we may incur a double danger, a danger of being infected with, a danger of being punished for sin.  
First, a danger of being infected with sin: what 
(m) Bern: tract. de grad. humilititatis.  Bernard spoke of Eves beholding the forbidden fruit, is true concerning every appearance of evil: Et si culpa non est, culpae tamen indicium est, & si culpa non est, culpae tamen occasio est, indicium commissae, & causa est committenda. Although it be not in itself a sin, yet it is a token, yet it is an occasion of sin, a token that fin hath been committed, a cause of committing it for the future. Now our natures are strongly bend to evil, when this (then) our natural inclination, is furthered by outward occasions, we may soon be led to the realities of sin, though the occasions of themselves are weak, they working but as objects, and the objective causality being of all most imperfect, ye● Satan is strong, our lusts are strong, these occasions are suitable to our lusts: our souls therefore, by a little help from Satan will quickly catch infection from them. For this reason were the Israelites, in the time of the  prohibited not only the eating, but the very having of leavened bread in their houses. For this reason too were the Nazarites forbidden to eat so much as the husks of the grapes, for if that had been permitted, they would perhaps have soon proceeded to the eating of the grapes and thence to drinking of the wine itself: hence also grew that precise resolution of David, Psal. 101.3. I will set no wicked thing before mine eyes: well may the world, and Devil set wicked things before mine eyes, but for mine own part I will not invite temptations, I will set no wicked thing before mine eyes, as much as I can I will decline the objects, examples, and shows of wickedness: do but put fire unto flax, and it will presently be on flame: so present we unto our lose and corrupt natures the shows, (which (as you have seen) are also the occasions of evil) and how suddenly will they take fire? This Joseph knew, and therefore when his Mistress solicited him to that foul act of uncleanness, he hearkened not unto her to lie by her, or so much as to be with her, Gen. 39.10. but fled, and got himself out of her presence, ver. 12. doubting lest the very sight of her might kindle lust. Nay to the shame of many secure and venturous Christians, of this even Scipio an Heathen, and Soldier too, was apprehensive and fearful, and therefore would not suffer certain captive Virgins, though of an exquisite beauty, to be brought so much as into his presence Nè quid (saith Florus) de virginitatis integritate delibásse, saltem vel oculis videretur. That he might not seem to have sipped, or skimmed the honour of their chastity, so much as with beholding them. As Apelles then by drawing the picture of Campaspe fell in love with the pattern of his work Campaspe herself, so we from retaining, from affecting the show of sin, will soon proceed to a delight in sin itself.  
Some indeed are so strangely confident of their abhorrency from sin, as they doubt not infection from appearance of it: they can venture into the losest company, yet so bridle their appetite, as that they fear no excess; be present at an Idolatrous Mass, and yet be in no danger of being affected with it, unless it be with dislike of it.  
Surely these men are dropped from Heaven, never borne in sin, or conceived in iniquity: for they, whose original is from men, may possibly be drawn away by sinful objects, and shows: but these men (forsooth) are above gunshot, beyond the reach of temptation; Their professed hatred of sin brings me in mind of Pygmalion's averseness from women; he was a professed, almost a sworn enemy to woman kind, yet drawing but the picture of a woman, he fell in love with it, and he hug'd, and kissed it so long, till at last by the power of Venus (as the Poet fables it) it became a woman: Their case is like; they profess detestation of sin, and yet delight in some things, that have the appearance, the resemblance thereof: let them take heed they dote not so long upon these, as that at length by the power of Satan, and the strength of their own lusts, they be transformed into real sins. I will end this reason with that of chrysostom, in his fifteenth Homily unto the people of Antioch.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
It will be to us the occasion, or ground of greatest security, if we do not only flee sins, but such indifferent things also, which are means whereby they do supplant us: for as he who goeth upon the edge of a steep, and craggy rock, though he falleth not, yet with fear trembleth, and so falls through his trembling, so he who leaveth not sin a loof, and a fare off, but approacheth close to the brink of it, hath just cause to live in fear, seeing he hath just cause to fear to fall into it.  
Secondly, danger of being punished for sin, not by God, for he is an Omniscient Judge, and therefore cannot mistake the appearance of evil for evil itself: he is a just Judge, and therefore will not punish the appearance of evil, for evil itself: but by man, by the Secular Magistrate with temporal punishments, by the governor's of the Church, with Ecclesiastical censures, and by all men generally with shame and obloquy. J●hosaphat you know in the apparel of Ahab, was like to have been killed for Ahab. 
(n) Plutarch  M●gacles. having on the Cloak, and armour of Pyrrhus, was flame for Pyrrhus: even so many times some men, for the bare appearance of some crimes, are as hardly thought of, and as severely handled, as if they had committed the crimes themselves. 
(o) Florus l. 3. c. 14.  Tiberius Gracchus was butchered by the Romans, because it seemed unto them, that by touching his head with his hand, he had demanded a Diadem, when he thereby as a sign only exhorted them to stand upon their defence. Because the Island of Crete seemed to have favoured Mithridates, for this seem sake, the people of Rome took revenge by the sword, Favisse Mithridati videbatur, hoc placuit armis vindicare. Indeed the Lord seethe not as man seethe, he looketh on the heart, and thereunto squareth his judgement, but man looketh on the outward appearance, 1 Sam. 16.7. and according to it censureth, and so he may do, and yet often times judge righteous judgement. For if when there is wanting sufficient evidence of fact, Judges, and Juries should not sometimes proceed upon pregnant signs, and strong presumptions, how many villainies would pass unpunished? And if Ecclesiastical Governors, should not take the same course too, how could they possibly stop the spreading mischiefs of scandal.  
This abstinence from appearance of evil, is lastly expedient in regard of our brethren, to avoid scandal unto them.  
First, as it is taken by Thomas, and the Schoolmen, for that which occasionally leads unto sin, which puts a stumbling block, or an occasion to fall in the way of others, Rom. 14.13. for so do all evil shows, and that both in the way of the weak, and in the way of the wicked.  
First, in the way of the weak, for they are misguided, and drawn unto the practice of that evil, the appearance whereof they see in us,  
Secondly, in the way of the wicked, for first, hereby the obdurate are heartened, confirmed, and comforted: secondly, hereupon adversaries take occasion to speak reproachfully of that holy name, and profession which we bear, to blaspbeme the Cross, Truth, and Gospel of Christ.  
Secondly, as 'tis used vulgarly, and commonly for sorrow, grief, dislike, or displeasure at an action, for it matters not much whether our facts be evil, or bear show of evil, they equally would wound the hearts, and vex the righteous spirits of the Godly, and therefore are both violations of Saint Paul's precepts, Rom. 15.2. Let every one of us please his neighbour for his good to edification. Valerius Publicola (saith Florus) nè specie arcis offenderet, eminentes aedes suas in planâ submisit: he leveled with the ground his high and lofty building, lest he should offend the people with the appearance of a Citadel: and wilt not thou throw aside a vanity, an excrement, some idle if not monstrous fashion, rather than offend thy brother (for whom Christ died) with the appearance of an evil? A foul shame were it, that popularity should prevail more with a Roman, than Charity with thee, who art a Christian.  
But some will be ready to object, that this doctrine is prejudicial to our Christian liberty. For that reacheth to the use of all things that are of an indifferent nature, and such are these actions charged with the appearance of evil, and therefore if you straighten us in the use of them, you injuriously deprive us of that liberty which we have in Christ Jesus unto the use of all indifferent things. For answer,  
First, those actions, in which there is a real appearance of evil, are not indifferent in their nature, but evil, and sinful, forbidden, first, by the general prohibition of scandal, they are per se scandalous of themselves and in their own nature, and therefore always, for à per se ad de omni valet argumentum: prohibited, secondly, by those precepts which are against those evils of which they have a real appearance, because they are a step unto, and occasion of them, whereas 'tis usually said that they are evil only in appearance, this is not to be understood so as to exclude evil from them, but to restrain the evil of them unto this particular: that they have a real appearance of evil, the meaning is, they are evil in no regard but this, and this regard, for the reasons abovesaid, is sufficient to denominate them evil: they are always temptations unto evil, so that there is always committed in them an active scandal. This was the opinion of the vulgar translater, who translates, 1 Thes. v. 22. ab omni specie malaâ abstinete vos, abstain from every evil appearance, this reading Cornelius à Lapide and other Popish Expositors think equivalent with our translation abstain from all appearance of evil, according to it then every appearance of evil is evil, if it be real and not merely imaginary. Unto this let me add that of Suarez already quoted, an action, saith he, only evil in appearance transgresseth some virtue, though not per se primo, yet ex consequenti connexione virtutum, by reason of the mutual connexion and commerce of one virtue with, and dependence upon another.  
But to come to, secondly, those indifferent actions in which there is only an imaginary appearance of evil, two things are here to be answered.  
First, however they be in thesi in their general nature indifferent, yet they do in casu and in hypothesi become to be accidentally evil, because done against Conscience, when they appear to be evil to ourselves; against charity, when they appear to be evil unto others: and then we are bound to abstain from them, though not lege communi, yet lege particulari, by reason of particular circumstances.  
Secondly, Although our Christian liberty extendeth to the use of all things indifferent, yet ought we in godly wisdom, and discretion to abridge ourselves of the outward exercise of this our liberty, whensoever 'tis very probable that it will become dangerous to ourselves, or scandalous to others. Ye have been called unto liberty, only use not liberty for an occasion to the flesh, but by love serve one another, Gal. 5.13. As free, and not using your liberty for a cloak of maliciousness, the 1 Pet. 2.16. Now we use or rather abuse our liberty for an occasion to the flesh, for a cloak to maliciousness, by practising such indifferencies, as have show of evil; for they, (as I have shown at large) are likely to prove, as occasions of sin unto ourselves, so also active scandals to misguide our brethren, and therefore, though they be not absolutely, and simply in their nature unlawful to be done, yet they are by accident unlawful for me to do, as long as they carry show of evil. All things (indeed) are pure (saith the Apostle) but it is evil for that man, who eateth with offence: It is good neither to eat flesh, nor drink wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak, Rom. 14.20, 21. 
(p) Infirmitas nominat prom●p●itudinem ad scandalum, of●fensio autem nominat indignationem, etc. scandalum autem importat ipsam impactionem ad ruinam, Aquin. 2. 2 daes. q. 44 art. 1.   
What remaineth then but that all be admonished in the Lord Jesus to take to heart a matter so deeply concerning them, both in conscience as a duty expressly enjoined by God, practised by Christ, his Apostles, and Saints; and in consequence, as befitting us as the Sons, subjects of God, as the spouse, members of Christ, as being needful to defeat Satan's malice, to cut off his temptations unto sin, and unto discomfort for sin, to avoid sin, etc. in ourselves, 
Application.  scandals unto others, unto the weak, obstinate, and strong. If therefore there be in you any love of God, any care to walk worthy of those high relations you carry to him, any regard to the safety of your own souls, any fear of Satan, sin, or punishment, any compassion over the Consciences of your poor brethren, keep a loof from whatsoever neighbours, and borders upon sin, whatsoever hath the blush and show thereof: hate, as 
(q) Ambr. l. 6. Hexaem.  Ambrose exhorts, not only sin, but the coat of sin, the garment spotted by the flesh. Even an heathen will advise, you hereunto. 
(r) Quint. l. 2. cap. 3.  Carendum non solum crimine turpitudinis, verum etiam suspicion.  
Want we inducements, take we these three. It will be a course, First, Safe, and Secure: Secondly, Comfortable: Thirdly, Honourable.  
First, Safe, and Secure, by it sin and Satan shall be staved off, kept out at dagger's end, your own souls secured, kept out of gun shot either of infection or punishment, so that they shall not come nigh, scarce so much as the confines either of Sin, or Hell.  
Secondly, Comfortable: For what an unspeakable comfort will it be unto thy drooping soul in the hour of death, or in the time of spiritual desertion, when thy Conscience can truly suggest, that thou hast been so abhorrent from sin, as that thou hast shunned whatsoever hath been homogeneal thereunto, whatsoever hath looked but like unto it, it must needs stop Satan's mouth, and make thine own triumph in the calmness of a clear, and good conscience.  
Thirdly, Honourable, for 'twill gain thee esteem amongst both good, and bad ones, with those 'twill make thy name precious, 'twill muzzle the mouths of these, when they behold such uprightness in thy life, as that thou shunnest not only downright irreligiousness to God, injustice to men, but even their very picture and resemblance, this cannot but extort from them, though never so malicious, an ingenious acknowledgement, that thou art a true Israelite, a sincere Nathaniel, in whom there is found no guile. Now though our main and first endeavour must be to keep a good Conscience, yet is not the jewel or precious ointment of a good name, to be in the mean while neglected; our care should be to preserve that likewise unspotted, St Paul, (Acts 24.16.) professeth that he exercised himself to have always a conscience void of offence, as towards God: so towards men; and he adviseth us to provide things honest in the sight of all men, Rom. 12.17. To walk honestly towards them that are without. 1 Thess. 4.12. To strive for a good report of them that are without, 1 Tim. 3.7.  
I will but prescribe two cautions directing how we are to abstain from the appearance of evil, and then I shall have done with the general application of the words. We are to abstain neither only nor chief from the appearance of evil.  
First, not only, that were foul Hypocrisy of which yet there are even a generation guilty, who only combat with the shadow of sin, and in the mean while embrace the body of sin, real sins: who abstain from the show of every evil work, and yet remain reprobate to every good work, who profess detestation of gain by gaiming, because they conceive it to be an appearance of theft, and yet make no conscience of fraud, deceit, and cozenage in their deal, who stand at defiance with all shows of uncleanness, and yet make no scruple of the grossest acts thereof.  
Secondly, not chief, that were a great incongruity, for so care of the means should be greater than that of the end, because abstinence from the appearance of evil, is enjoined as a preservative against the evil itself. The evils themselves therefore should chiefly be avoided, the body of sin should be opposed more than the shadow, than the shows of sin. The flesh should be abhorred in a higher degree, than the garment spotted therewith.  
You have seen the point pressed generally as it concerns all men's abstinence from the appearance of all evils. I will only crave your pardon to call more particularly.  
First, upon all men for abstinence from the appearance especially of some evils.  
Secondly, upon some men especially for abstinence from the appearance of all evils, and then I will put a period to my meditations upon these words.  
First, We must decline the shows of some evils above others, of our Master, our bosom evils. For from them is most danger to be feared, they having commonly most strength from our natures: and Satan besides knows but too well how our tide stands, he quickly acquaints himself with our predominant lusts, and most raging corruptions, and unto them especially fits and accords his temptations: as 
(s) Tacitus, Suetonius.  Agrippina, when she poisoned her husband Claudius, mixed the poison in the meat which he most loved.  
Secondly, some men above others are especially to decline the appearance of all evils. All public men should do so, but especially we of the Ministry. The high Priests and Nazarites, under the Law were not to come nigh a dead body, Leu. 21.11. Numb. 6.6. And in imitation of them among the Romans, the Priest might not touch the dead, nay they might not see the dead: for if a Priest pronounced a Funeral Oration, 'twas not without a veil drawn betwixt him and the Corpse. Nay a Flaminian Priest might not hear the sound of pipes used at Funerals nor come into a place where there was a grave. Was there such ritual purity under the Law? such Ceremonial strictness in heathenish Priests? and shall there not be found an answerable degree of moral preciseness in the ministers of the Gospel? shall they be willingly within sight, sent, and hearing of impiety, except to reprove it? 
(t) Dr Ed. Reyn● Psal. 110.  As a woman big with Child, for fear, and danger of miscarrying forbeareth Physic, violent exercise, and many meats and drinks, which otherwise she might freely use: even so those who travel in birth with the Children of Christ, are put to deny and abridge themselves of many indifferencies. I will eat no flesh, saith St Paul while the world standeth, rather than make my brother to offend, 1 Cor. 8.13.  
Reason's enforcing their abstinence after an especial manner from the appearance of evil are two: Because in them they occasion: First, greater looseness in bad ones: Secondly, more heaviness to good ones.  
First, Greater looseness in bad ones. Strange it is how the lower, and more ignorant rank of men will be hereby strengthened in their downright sinful courses; Nay if a Minister do but wisely, and lawfully use his Christian liberty the rude vulgar will thereupon open themselves a gap unto all licentiousness. If he be but innocently pleasant, think they we may be mad. If he but sip, we may carouse. If he spend but some few hours, in his honest, and harmless recreations, the common gamester presently concludes his mispense of both time, and patrimony in gaming to be thence justifiable.  
Secondly, more heaviness to good ones: it grieves the spirits of the righteous to see them in any, it wounds their souls, it makes their bloods, their hearts rise to behold them in a man of God. It becomes not my weakness to advise, only in mine own and others behalf, I unfeignedly wish, and pray, that this were seriously thought upon, and practised by us all, that all of us in a tender regard to the reputation, and honour of our high calling would walk with great surcumspection, make straight steps unto our feet, tread every step as nicely, as gingerly, as if we went among snares, walked upon ropes, or pinnacles.  
I will conclude with that of Bernard to Eugenius, lib. 3. the consideratione, cap. 4. which though written particularly unto him, may yet fittingly enough be applied to every Minister, nay every Christian. Interest tuae perfectionis malas res, & malas paritèr species d●vitare, in altero conscientiae, in altero famae consulis. It becomes your holiness to decline as evil things, so also evil appearances, in that thou consult'st for thy Conscience, in this for thy fame▪ nay (indeed) if it be not presumption to add unto the Father, in this thou providest both for Conscience, and Fame: for Conscience first; for the purity, for the peace of thy Conscience; for the purity of thy Conscience, to keep it void of offence both towards God, and towards men, for the peace of thy Conscience, to preserve it from the violence of Satan's temptations, from the vexations of thine own fears, and jealousies. Secondly, for fame, so to hedge it in from scandal, as that it shall be above the reach of suspicion. Therefore to go on in the words of the Father. Puta tibi non licere, ●●tsi alias fortasse liceat, quicquid malè fuerit, coloratum, non sit in fama naevus malae specisi. Think not for the lawful, though perhaps otherwise lawful, whatsoever shall be evil coloured: In thy fame let there not be so much as a spot of evil appearance, so shalt thou follow things, that are of good report, Phil. 4.8. and thereby quite take off all private prejudices, all open calumnies against either thy person, or profession. However thou shalt procure the testimony and approbation of God, and thine own Conscience, and be presented unblameable, clear from offensiveness before men, from faultiness before God, at the appearing of the Lord Jesus Christ: To whom with the Father, and Holy Ghost, be ascribed by us, and the whole Church, the Kingdom, the Power, and Glory, from this time forth for evermore. AMEN.  
FINIS.